Turbulent Transition in Iraq: 

Can It Succeed?

by Judith S. Yaphe

Strategic Forum

As the Interim Government of Iraq

begins to assert authority, diverse

communities within the country are

struggling to protect their equities. Critical

issues include Kurdish desires for federalism

and a veto on the constitution; Shi’a resistance to separatism and minority veto rights;

religious demands that Islam be recognized

as the exclusive source of legislation; and

increasing combativeness of Arab Sunnis,

facing marginalization after the fall of a

regime they long dominated.

Iraqis will grow increasingly fractious as

they jockey for political space. However, the

risk of civil war between Arabs and Kurds or

between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims is low.

While fissures are deep, all parties appear to

understand that division is not an option and

more can be gained through participation and

negotiation. Two developments could raise the

risk of domestic strife: if Sunni and Shi’a

extremists succeed in undermining the new

government, and if the Kurds, who waver in

their commitment to join the government, push

for greater autonomy and control of Kirkuk.

Iraqi government efforts to deal with the

United States as a partner rather than a client

will bolster its credibility in the eyes of many

Iraqis. These efforts will not, however, lessen

terrorist or insurgent attacks.

Iraqis will remain suspicious that the

new government will not be fully sovereign.

Success will depend on American officials

resisting the temptation to promote Iraqi

foreign and domestic policies that support

U.S. regional goals but could endanger the

prospects for survival of the new government.

One year after liberation, most Iraqis are

impatient with the military occupation of their

country. Although grateful for the removal of

Saddam Hussein’s cruel and repressive regime,

many assumed the United States and its coalition members would soon go home and leave

them to sort out their political, economic, and

military fate. The war, after all, had been

fought to liberate Iraqis from political tyranny,

not to defeat the Iraqi people. Both U.S. and

Iraqi expectations were high that the transition

from oppression to democracy would be

smooth and quick and that Iraqi political elites

would move swiftly to ensure democratic rule. 

Despite the formation of the Interim

Government of Iraq on June 1, 2004, many

Iraqis and their neighbors remain skeptical

that the United States will give up its control or

not try to retain control through appointed

puppets. Success as measured by quick victory

and regime change has been accomplished;

success as measured by rapid reconstruction of

the Iraqi polity and economy has not been

achieved and may be in peril. 

Three Dramas

During this turbulent transitional period,

success will hinge upon the outcome of three

distinct “dramas.”

Civil War. The first drama is the specter of

civil war, which has not happened. Anti-American violence has increased, as have insurgent

efforts to spark civil war between ethnic and

sectarian elements. Even so, Iraq is not in a

state of civil war, nor has there been any serious outbreak of sectarian or ethnic warfare—

yet. Sunni are not fighting Shi’a, and Arabs are

not at war with Kurds. Nor are Iraqi Shi’a

wedded to an Iranian-style cleric-dominated

regime. The confrontations that have

occurred—in Baghdad, Kufah, Fallujah, and

Najaf, for example—reflect carefully planned

and coordinated attacks on U.S. forces and

civilians working on reconstruction. 

What is important is the absence of discourse on several topics. Little is heard about

the rounds of negotiations between extremist

Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and representatives of the ayatollahs of Najaf, including Grand

Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and his son, yet it is

clearly in the interest of the Shi’a clerical hierarchy to resolve this crisis. Little is heard, as

well, about negotiations in Fallujah, yet the

emergence of a respected Republican Guard

general and tribal leaders may have opened the

way to broader conflict resolution in that

volatile municipality. And no cleric has yet

issued a decree (fatwa) sanctioning rebellion

against the foreign occupier. Despite the murders of Iraqis cooperating with the Coalition

Provisional Authority (including a president

and two ministers on the Iraqi Governing

Council, clerics in the Sunni and Shi’a communities, and officials of both Kurdish factions

in northern Iraq), civil war—meaning between

Iraqi Arabs and Kurds, or between Sunni and

Shi’a—has not erupted and is not likely to. 

Civil war, if it happens, is more likely to

occur between religious extremists (Sunni and

Shi’a) and everyone else than between Sunni

and Shi’a or Arab and Kurd. Iraq is an amalgam of Shi’a Arab (approximately 60 percent),

Sunni Arab (20 percent), and Kurd (Sunni and

Shi’a, approximately 20 percent), but it cannot

be simply defined and divided mathematically.

Generally, Sunni and Shi’a Arabs share an

assumption of Iraqi nationalism and an intention to maintain the political and territorial

No. 208

June 2004

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points

No. 208, June 2004
integrity of the country as defined by the 1920

San Remo treaty and the 1932 treaty of independence. Iraqi Kurds have committed themselves for the moment to being part of Iraq, but

their reluctance to accept permanent status in

Iraq is certainly linked directly to future constitutional and perhaps territorial concessions.

Transitional Governance.The second

drama concerns the fate of transitional governance. Squabbling over the nature of the

interim government that assumed power on

June 1, how it was chosen, and who would

serve in the various cabinet posts exacerbated

relations between the Coalition Provisional

Authority (CPA) and Iraqis. Both sides had

unrealistic expectations of what was possible.

From outward appearances, the Governing

Council (GC) preempted United Nations

(UN)–U.S. efforts to select the new interim

government, which it intended to announce on

June 1, by choosing a new president (a prominent shaykh of the million-member Shammar

tribal federation from northern Iraq), two

deputy presidents (a Kurd and a Shi’a Arab),

and a prime minister (the head of the Iraq

National Accord party, Iyad Allawi, who is a

secular Shi’a and former Ba’thist who had

lived in exile for the past 25 years) a week

earlier. The new cabinet contains a mix of

former GC members and newly appointed

technocrats, divided among the country’s

diverse groups and including six women. A

commission to prepare the country for national

elections was also named, and a nationwide

assembly is being planned for July to advise the

interim government and plan for Iraq’s political future. The elections, when held, will not

ensure perfect democratic governance or a proAmerican government. They should, however,

reflect the consensus of the Iraqi people. 

Municipal elections have occurred in

many areas, and it is probably at this level that

the greatest progress in democratic rule has

occurred. Democracy represents two values:

majority rule and protection of the rights of

minorities. It took Britain nearly 900 years and

a civil war to evolve into a truly representative

government; it has taken the United States

more than 225 years and a civil war to achieve

its current state of democracy. How can the

Iraqis be expected to achieve this in 1 year?

Political Institution Building. Longerterm political institution building in Iraq is the

third drama. The interim government that took

over from the Governing Council lacks legitimacy, and the nature of political institutions

and a permanent constitution have yet to take

shape. These issues will not be resolved soon,

nor should anyone expect them to be. Political

institutions and constitutions do not automatically confer legitimacy, establish the rule of law,

create checks and balances in government, and

guarantee equal rights and protections for all.

Parliaments are buildings, and constitutions are

written on paper. It takes time and trust to create

a free people and an open society. 

In 1920, the British created institutions of

government (parliament) for Iraq, imported a

foreign Arab and installed him by a plebiscite

of hand-picked natural leaders known to favor

pro-British rule, and selected a rainbow coalition drawn from all the communities of Iraq.

This government lacked the power and authority to rule Iraq. Not only did the British rule

indirectly and closely through political commissioners and officers chosen in Whitehall,

but they also wrote the constitution and the

treaties the Iraqis had to sign to gain independence. Even after the League of Nations recognized an independent Iraq in 1932, the British

retained control over security and military

decisionmaking until the 1958 revolution.

Under the British, Iraqis gained, at best, only

second-hand experience in democratic institutions and practices. The United States is in

danger of repeating the errors of the British if it

does not pass real, transparent decisionmaking

power to the Iraqis. 

Where Are We Now? 

Despite the unanimous passage on June 8

of the UN resolution recognizing the new interim government and approving the timeline

for elections, foreign observers and many Iraqis

probably continue to doubt that the transition of

political authority from the U.S.-dominated CPA

to Iraqis will occur without the simultaneous

transition to democracy or Iraqi control of

security policy.1 They suspect that the United

States passed power to a group of self-promoting

Iraqis who are unelected and do not represent

the wishes of the people, that Washington will

retain control of the real centers of decisionmaking, and that the exercise will be an opaque one

at best. Only time will tell if they are right.

Others argue that Iraq cannot be ruled democratically or that it is better off being divided

into three weak states to ensure protection for

ethnic and religious groups and remove their

ability to threaten any one but themselves in the

future. They are certainly wrong.

The new government, led by President

Ghazi al-Yawar, Prime Minister Iyad Allawi,

and Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, seeks a

transparent and unambiguous transfer of

authority that gives them power over political,

economic, financial, and security policy without actual responsibility for security, which

they prefer remain in U.S. hands. A small but

increasingly vociferous number of Iraqis demand removal of all vestiges of U.S. presence,

from civilian advisers aiding the transition to

military forces assigned to provide security and

fight the insurgents and terrorists.

Who is right? How does an occupierliberator know when enough is enough? How

do you measure success or acknowledge failure? Any attempt to answer these questions

requires an assessment of what the new government needs to do to survive as a stable and

effective element of the country’s new politics

and what can be achieved by it, by other Iraqi

leaders, and by the United States. 

Past as Prologue? 

The U.S. Government has been accused of

many deficiencies in planning for a postSaddam Iraq. Accusations range from having

no plan to having the wrong plan—planning

for humanitarian, refugee, and health crises

that did not happen—to having hidden agendas to retain control of Iraqi wealth. While

these accusations carry the hallmarks of conspiracy theories, one issue stands out. Washington did not adequately consider the impact of

many of the measures it imposed on Iraq since

the fall of Saddam Hussein.

The first American administrator for humanitarian aid and reconstruction, Jay Garner,

had served in Iraq in 1991 following the abortive

Kurdish rebellion in the north. He and his staff

assumed they would face similar crises in 2003:

internally displaced people, refugee flows, and a

desperate need for housing, food, water, and

health care. He also assumed he would take over

ministries and civil servants in place and, with

only a few American advisers and contractors,

would be able to get government up and running quickly. He had no detailed plans for

widespread de-Ba’thification—removal of

2 Strategic Forum No. 208, June 2004

Judith S. Yaphe is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense

University. Please address questions or comments to her attention at ndu-inss-research@ndu.edu.
anyone who was a party member down to the

third level of responsibility in the party hierarchy—of the civil service or public sector workers

or for the mass demobilization of the Iraqi

military forces. Plans in early 2003 for the Iraqi

armed forces were based on downsizing,

depoliticizing, and professionalizing. Garner

understood that a large number of suddenly

unemployed Iraqis from the military or the

bureaucracy could not be dumped on an economy already suffering dislocation and high

unemployment. Garner had not included

looting, sabotage, and a disappeared civil

bureaucracy among his most pressing postconflict concerns.

Unintended Impact of De-Ba’thification. One month after replacing Garner in

April 2003, new CPA administrator Paul Bremer implemented several significant policies.

He first ordered removal of all Ba’th Party

members from public posts. In September,

controversial former Iraqi exile Ahmad Chalabi, then serving as president of the Governing

Council for the month, ordered a much

broader de-Ba’thification: he wanted to extend

the purge to the fourth level of the party and

deny local and regional commanders and CPA

officials the right to grant exemptions to the

de-Ba’thification edict. 

The second Bremer decree closed the

Ministry of Defense and demobilized—

fired—all the members of the military and

security forces, including the regular army

and the Republican Guard, and security and

intelligence units, including the Special Republican Guard, the Saddam fedayeen, and

the special militias that served as regime

bodyguards and secret police. 

The impact of these actions cannot be

easily measured. As many as 50,000 party

members lost their jobs in civil service, education (kindergarten through university), public

health, and the media. Probably only a small

percentage were earnest loyalists prepared to

implement regime edicts and party ideology.

The far greater number of Ba’th party members,

perhaps 80 to 90 percent, had joined out of fear,

pressure, and promises of better jobs, higher

salaries, and personal security. Party membership was required for teachers and any government bureaucrat, professional, or technical

specialist aspiring to a better job and higher

status. Approximately 450,000 military and

security personnel were relieved of their positions without salaries or other compensation.2

Both measures sent a clear signal—in

particular to Sunni Arabs who out of fear and

loyalty had been Saddam’s pillar of strength.

The Arab Sunni tribes of the so-called triangle

or center—an area bounded by Mosul, Fallujah, Tikrit, and Baqubah and including Baghdad—provided most of the recruits and personnel for the officer corps of the army,

Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard,

and other security and intelligence units. They

filled the upper ranks of the Ba’th Party and

the elite group of advisers around Saddam. 

Bremer’s edicts targeted these Sunni Arab

elites in particular, creating the image of a

beleaguered and disenfranchised community

that had lost its place in Iraqi society, politics,

economics, and governance. The oppressors

would now become the oppressed. In this

light, the willingness of disgruntled military

officers to join with Saddam loyalists, former

Ba’thists, and Sunni religious extremists

becomes more explicable.

Transitional Administrative Law as

Roadmap. In the leadup to the June 30

turnover of power, Bremer took several measures to ensure that the interim government

would steer a moderate course. He appointed

advisers to ministries with multiyear terms that

go far beyond the life of the CPA and the interim government, and he oversaw the composition of a draft provisional basic law. Draconian measures to improve security and to end

the insurgencies that flared in spring 2004 were

implemented. Bremer and the U.S. military

commanders also pursued a more cautious

strategy to resolve confrontations with some

insurgent elements. In both Fallujah and

Najaf, the CPA dealt with unelected and influential Iraqi power brokers—especially clerics

loyal to the relatively moderate Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who heads one of the largest

endowments in the Shi’a world and is based in

the shrine city of Najaf. 

The clearest indicator of the U.S. vision for

the new Iraq has been set forth in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), also referred to

as the Basic Law or interim constitution. The

document, written by Iraqis according to Bremer, resonates with protections for individual

rights and civil liberties as contained in Western

constitutions. It describes the Iraqi government

as republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic. Key sections deal with federal versus state’s

rights, Islam as a component rather than the

sole source of legislation, and the structure and

nature of governance. 

Some Iraqi constituencies have objected to

parts of the law. Shi’a leaders oppose allowing

a majority of voters in three governates the

power to veto a new constitution or legislation

passed by the majority. Kurds are dissatisfied

with the geographic basis of federalism and

mistrust the willingness of any Arab-dominated

government to share revenues or political

offices fairly with them. Kurds, Christians, and

secular Arabs object to recognizing Iraq as Arab

or Muslim. Islamists prefer an avowedly

Islamic government with shariah (religious

law) as the foundation of all law. While little

mention is made in Iraq about complying with

all UN resolutions, at some point this, too, will

probably become a symbol of unfairness and

oppression intended to keep Iraq weak.

What Do Iraqis Want? 

While Iraqi unhappiness with the occupation in general and the Transitional Administrative Law in particular is easy to chronicle, the

harder task is to discern what exactly Iraqis

want. The answer varies among the country’s

different sectarian and ethnic communities.

Iraqi communities have cooperated in the past,

intermarried, and lived together for hundreds of

years. Many families, tribes, and clans—including that of Saddam Hussein and the Shammar

of President al-Yawar—have Sunni and Shi’a

members. Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs, Kurds,

Turkmen, and Christians live intermingled in

many cities and towns, including Baghdad,

Tikrit, Mosul, and Kirkuk. The Arab communities include secular and religious elements that

are both tribal and urban. Iraqi Kurdish and

Christian communities, however, are avowedly

secular and worry about domination by a new

Islamist and Arab political constellation. 

What Are Shi’a Aspirations? The Shi’a are

not one monolithic community sharing a

common vision of the political future. They are

multiple communities with multiple goals and

conflicting visions of a new Iraq. The majority,

including Grand Ayatollah Sistani, tend to reject

No. 208, June 2004 Strategic Forum 3

the far greater number of

Ba’th party members,

perhaps 80 to 90 percent,

had joined out of fear,

pressure, and promises 

of better jobs
4 Strategic Forum No. 208, June 2004

the Iranian model of the Islamic republic and

Ayatollah Khomeini’s concept of vilayat-i faqih

(rule by clerics). An outspoken minority, however, are pressing for Islamic rule.

Most of the Iraqi Shi’a community did not

convert to Shi’a Islam until the late 18th century. These tribes over the centuries had acquired the characteristics of a persecuted minority—alienation from the larger society, an

intense feeling of cohesion, and a pervasive

sense of oppression and injustice—that

Shi’ism accentuated. Iraqi Shi’a were excluded

from participation in the Sunni Ottoman

Empire that ruled the Iraqi provinces for four

centuries; they fared no better under British,

monarchist, and Arab nationalist rule. They, in

turn, rejected Sunni schools, academies, and

governance. Nevertheless, a number served in

government under the monarchy and after the

1958 revolution, including as prime ministers

and cabinet members. They joined the Communist and Ba’thist parties and served as

loyalists to Saddam Hussein, seeing these

secular movements as offering a more level

playing field than the parties that had dominated the state since independence, and favored

Arab Sunni nationalist causes. 

However, the Shi’a, for the most part, saw

themselves as Arab, Iraqi, and Shi’a. The Shi’a

tribes of the south remained loyal to Baghdad

in the Iran-Iraq war, a loyalty acknowledged

and rewarded by Saddam in the 1980s. Shi’a

conscripts, the majority of the Iraqi army,

returning from Kuwait in February 1991 saw

opportunity in the absence of government

forces and, with perceived encouragement from

the United States, staged a revolt. The revolt

was uncoordinated, Iran failed to back it sufficiently, and guerrillas and mullahs carrying

portraits of Khomeini frightened many in

southern Iraq. The rebellion failed. 

Many of the more urbanized Shi’a are not

religious or, if so, still favor secular political

rule. On the other hand, traditional Shi’a tend

to be more village- and tribal-centered and

more pious and observant. Majorities from

both camps follow Grand Ayatollah Sistani as

their guide (marja al-taqlid), and many may

favor some sort of Islamic governance, with

Islam being more than just one among many

sources of state law. There seems to be little

support for an Islamic republic styled along the

Iranian model. Sistani’s political vision for Iraq

is not altogether clear. While he opposes rule by

clerics, as in Islamic Iran, it is not obvious that

an Iraq fashioned along the lines of secular

Turkey would satisfy him. Nor is he likely to be

happy with Islam as a source (as opposed to

the sole source) of law. Sistani, like Khomeini,

may be appalled at the official separation of

Islam and state in Turkey, even with the current Islamist government in Ankara. 

Iraq, however, has several Shi’a extremist

factions that would like to emulate Iran. They

share a vision of a republic governed by Islam

as the sole source of all law and have little

tolerance for Western values or practices, including the emancipation of women. The most

prominent is the Supreme Council for the

Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), established

by Iran in the early 1980s as an umbrella

group to unite anti-regime Iraqis in exile in

Iran. Its leader, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr alHakim, was assassinated in August 2003, after

returning from more than 20 years in exile in

Iran; his brother, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, served

on the Governing Council and heads the Badr

Brigade, the SCIRI militia. 

The first modern Shi’a extremist faction in

Iraq was the Dawa (Call) Party, founded in

Najaf in the 1960s by Ayatollah Muhammad

Baqr Sadr, who was martyred by Saddam’s

regime in 1980. He was a companion of

Khomeini during the latter’s 15-year exile in

Iraq and wrote a political treatise advocating a

role for clerics in governance (similar to

Khomeini’s principle of vilayat-i faqih, or rule

by religious jurisprudent). Dawa members were

involved in anti-U.S. and anti-Western terrorism

with the Lebanese Hizballah terrorist infrastructure in Kuwait and Lebanon during the 1980s.

They have never been comfortable in their

alliance with SCIRI, and indicators suggest the

Key Provisions of the Transitional Administrative Law

■ Islam is the official religion of the country as well as a source (but not the only source) of legislation.

■ Iraq is a country of many nationalities, and the Arab people in Iraq are an inseparable part of the Arab nation.

■ Arabic and Kurdish are recognized as official languages, and Iraqis can educate their children in their own language in state and private schools.

■ An Iraqi citizen is anyone who carries Iraqi nationality.

■ All Iraqis have full equality without regard to gender, sect, opinion, belief, nationality, religion, or origin. All are equal before the law and have the right to a

fair, speedy, and public trial. 

■ The Iraqi transitional government will include a national assembly, a presidency council, a council of ministers including a prime minister, and a judiciary.

There is separation of powers—legislative, executive, and judicial. The assembly will elect the head of state—a president—and two deputy presidents from

its ranks to serve as the presidency council; this council will name a prime minister. One-quarter of the assembly’s 275 representatives shall be women, and

all communities shall be fairly represented. 

■ Federalism is defined as a system of separation of powers based on geographic and historical realities and not race, ethnicity, nationality, or religious sect

(confession). Formulation of national security policy as well as foreign, diplomatic, economic, trade, and debt policies belong to the federal government.

Managing the natural resources and distributing revenues also fall under federal authority. The government will also observe checks and balances, with an

independent judiciary.

■ The armed forces and the intelligence services come under civilian control, and all military personnel are banned from political office and activity. 

■ The transitional government must honor Iraq’s international obligations under international treaties. This includes the Non-Proliferation Treaty and all United

Nations resolutions banning weapons of mass destruction.

■ Resolution of disputed territories, including Kirkuk, is deferred until a census has been conducted and people who were compelled by force to leave their

homes and region are compensated or returned home.

■ The draft permanent constitution will be presented to the Iraqi people for approval by October 15, 2005. It will be approved if the majority approves it and if

two-thirds of the voters in three or more governates do not reject it.
two may have split. They also have representatives in the new government. 

Finally, a Hizballah party is forming in

southern Iraq. Little is known about its activities

or backing, but it is apparently building grassroots organizations—constructing schools,

housing, clinics, mosques, and societies to

provide martyrs’ benefits to families affected by

the war and occupation in much the same

manner as the Lebanese Hizballah. Like the

Lebanese version, it almost certainly has ties to

radical Iranian clerics and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The Al-Sadr Phenomenon. The most

dangerous movement thus far is that of Muqtada al-Sadr, a junior cleric in his 30s who

seems to appeal primarily to disgruntled young

unemployed males with a taste for sacrifice and

violence. His Mahdi militia and rhetoric portray the struggle against U.S. forces as a holy

war (jihad) against the infidel; he wraps himself in a white shroud to show he is ready for

death. He is implicated in the murder of Ayatollah Abd al-Majid al-Kho’i in Najaf in April

2003. Kho’i, a moderate, pro-American leader

of a wealthy foundation, had returned to Iraq

and was trying to reconcile factions in Najaf

when he was brutally murdered. 

Sadr follows an Iraqi exile in Iran as his

marja (source of emulation or guide)—Ayatollah Ha’iri, who resides in Qom. Sadr does not

appear to find much favor with Iranian clerical

leaders; more likely, they find him a dangerous

source of instability and civil strife where they

would prefer quiet manipulation and a more

subtle exercise of their assumed influence.3 The

merchants and elders of Najaf and Karbala have

pressured Sistani and the senior clerics of the

hawza, the leadership council of senior clerics,

to end Sadr’s reign of terror, which has been

marked by crime and brought a thriving pilgrimage business to a halt. 

Finally, there are the senior clerics, most of

whom are not Iraqi. They are not always central

to the lives of Iraqi Shi’a. The exceptions are in

times of great stress, as in revolt and under

occupation.4 Many senior and mid-level Shi’a

clerics in Iraq are Iranian in origin. Sistani,

who came to Iraq from Iran more than 50 years

ago, is portrayed as anti-American, but is more

accurately described as pro-Iraqi. He opposes

non-Iraqis writing a constitution for Iraq and

demands direct elections for the new government and parliament. He probably also was

unhappy with some members of the Governing

Council whom he saw as unrepresentative,

unpopular, and unelectable. He has given tacit

approval to the new interim government. Some

observers believe his insistence on elections

simply reflects his belief that the majority Shi’a

population would naturally choose Shi’a candidates and thereby create a Shi’a-dominated

state. This view is open to question. 

What Do the Sunnis Want? Sunni Arabs

were given control of Iraq by the Turks and the

British and ruled a secular state under

monarch and autocrat for eight decades. Religious extremism was not a significant force

under the monarchy or Saddam, who saw

Islamic extremism of any form as one of the

most serious threats to his regime. He supported the Sunni extremist Syrian Muslim

Brotherhood only because of their common

antipathy to Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, but

he suppressed all religious activism inside Iraq

that he could not control. 

Despite Saddam’s best efforts, Islamic

activism has been growing among Iraqi Sunnis. In part, the growth parallels similar developments in other Arab countries, where personal piety and a retreat to the safeguards of

religion have been gaining strength. Saddam

suspected, correctly, that Wahhabi influences

(the name given to any Sunni extremism)

from Saudi Arabia were infiltrating Iraq.5 Saudi

Wahhabi clerics and the Saudi-sponsored

Muslim Brotherhood have long been active in

northern Iraq and among the Sunni tribes of

central and western Iraq to woo them back to a

strict and observant Islam. They are building

mosques in areas of northern and central Iraq.

Sunni clerics in Iraq, however, lack the power

and influence exercised by Shi’a clerics.

Whereas the latter have been relatively more

independent of the state in terms of wealth and

status, Sunni clerics were state employees and

hence controllable by the government.

Nonetheless, Sunni Arab and Shi’a activists have been uniting to protest the U.S.

presence in Iraq. This may seem an unusual

phenomenon, but it is not a new one. In the

1920 revolt, Sunni and Shi’a clerics prayed and

preached in each others’ mosques, denounced

the British occupation, and organized joint

anti-British demonstrations. Ultimately, however, it was a Shi’a cleric who issued a fatwa

authorizing rebellion against the British that

led the Shi’a tribes of southern Iraq to revolt.

Since the fall of Saddam’s regime, Sunni and

Shi’a religious extremists have held meetings

similar to those of 1920, which raises the

question: Is this a replay of events exactly 84

years ago this April, when Sunni and Shi’a

prayed together, and the arrest of angry Shi’a

led to an anti-British decree and a rebellion?

Probably not, but there is evidence that Sunni

and Shi’a extremist factions are cooperating in

operations against the foreign presence (American and international) as well as against

moderate clerics in both communities. 

It is easy to see what the Sunni elements

are against: all foreign intervention and any

progress in reconstruction that would promote

stability and success for the interim Iraqi governments. It is harder to see what they are for.

Aside from vaguely worded slogans of an Iraq

free of foreign occupation, there seems to be no

coherent or consistent vision for the new Iraq. If

Fallujah is an example of the post-Saddam

Sunni extremist vision, then the desired endstate is a rigid Islamist-style rule similar to a

Taliban-style diktat. No leaders have emerged

other than local clerics and the urban legend

that is Zarqawi.6 All politics is local in Iraq, and

the Sunnis in general seem determined to

preserve their local power and status while

carving out a role in the new national political

infrastructure. Few call for restoration of

Saddam and his regime, which probably had as

many opponents as proponents in Fallujah and

the other predominantly Sunni Arab tribal areas

of north and central Iraq.

What Will the Kurds Accept? Iraqi Kurds

identify themselves ethnically rather than in

religious terms. Most are Sunni, and Sufi

mysticism is popular, while a small number

are Shi’a and even Jewish. Few belong to the

Ansar al-Islam, which is linked to al Qaeda, or

to other extremist or Iranian-sponsored factions. Kurdish efforts to exploit the recent

unrest in central and southern Iraq have been

limited to political debate. Mainstream Kurdish

factions, headed by Masud Barzani and Jalal

Talabani, prefer a secular Iraq. They oppose

inserting Islam into any constitution and fret

that Shi’a efforts to restrict the veto power in

the TAL may succeed.7 Attempts to take advantage of the turmoil in the south and in Baghdad by occupying lands claimed by the Arab

and Turkman communities in Kirkuk, however,

could result in Arabs regrouping to battle them

after the United States is gone from Iraq. 

The Kurds have been winners in Iraqi

reconstruction so far. The TAL accords them a

virtual veto over national legislation in the

future, including a new constitution. Their

regional government authority, established 

No. 208, June 2004 Strategic Forum 5
in the 1990s, is recognized as the official

government of the territories under its control—Dohuk, Arbil, Sulaymaniya, Kirkuk,

Diyala, and Ninevah regions as of March 19,

2003—but boundaries of the 18 provinces

remain unchanged. The Kurdish regional

authority will have control over local police and

internal security forces and the power to tax. 

The Kurds worry about their future as a

minority in a state that has no experience of

protecting minority rights. The TAL denies the

Kurds the expanded territory—the city and

oilfields of Kirkuk and the city of Mosul—that

they demand. They are trying to create a new

Kurdistani national identification that nonKurdish elements living in the north—the

Turkmen and Assyrians, for example—could

embrace. This, too, is unpopular among populations who reject kurdification just as the

Kurds rejected arabization by Saddam. Kurdish

spokesmen demanded a Kurd be appointed

president or prime minister of the new interim

government, but they had to be satisfied with the

appointment of several Kurds—some outspoken

supporters of Kurdish separatism—as deputy

president, foreign minister, minister of state, and

minister for human rights.

The ultimate test for the Kurds could

come within the next year. If Kurdish leaders

see weakness in Baghdad, they could decide to

move to consolidate control over Kirkuk and

other territories. This would probably trigger

fighting between Arab and Kurdish militias,

both of which are well armed and uncontrolled

by any federal security apparatus. It would

create a refugee crisis—approximately 200,000

to 300,000 Arabs remain on property in the

Kirkuk region contested by Kurds and Turkmen. The picture in the predominantly Kurdish

region is further complicated by the rivalry

between the leaders of the two main Kurdish

factions. Despite having a regional governing

authority, the factions have not merged their

territories, organizations, or militias. Disarming the Kurdish militias—the guerrilla units

called the pesh merga—will be a difficult task,

even as some Kurds call for the disarming of

Iraqi warlords and armed bands. The lesson

the Kurds say they have learned from the recent

negotiations between the CPA, former Ba’thists,

tribal leaders, and clerics in Fallujah and Najaf

is that “the squeaky wheel gets oiled”—that to

get attention and realize political objectives, it

is necessary to pressure the Americans, the CPA,

and the military presence.

Near-Term Quandaries

In the year since Saddam Hussein and his

brutal regime were removed from power, the

United States won a war with surprising ease

only to be confronted with a growing and

violent opposition to its continuing military

presence and political role. The situation in

Iraq on the eve of the turnover of power on

June 30, 2004—violence, political uncertainty,

and economic instability—is troubling to most

observers. But who can argue that removing

Saddam was wrong? His removal freed Iraqis

from long years of repression and removed a

major security threat in the region. 

Iraqis face an uncertain summer. Electrical

power has not yet been completely restored,

unemployment and underemployment rates are

high, schools and hospitals lack the tools needed

to provide adequate education and health care,

and crime is rife in the cities and countryside.

The new Iraqi political elites are jockeying for

power, uncertain how to adopt the long-denied

political behaviors and practices. The military

operations in Fallujah and Najaf and the revelations about the abuse of detainees at the Abu

Gharayb prison have contributed to the rising

anti-American sentiment in Iraq and the region. 

The United States has not wavered in its

determination to transfer sovereignty to the

Iraqi state by June 30, and yet the practical

implications of this transfer remain to be seen.

How much power and authority will the new

governmental entity exercise? On what terms

will the United States maintain its military

presence in Iraq? 

Under the most optimistic scenario, the

turnover of power could prove substantial.

Assuring that outcome was one factor prompting the old Iraqi Governing Council to select its

successor by choosing new leaders, establishing

a new cabinet, and dissolving itself on June 1.

The new government understands that it urgently needs validation of its legitimacy from

the United Nations as well as from Iraqis who

still have not had the opportunity to choose

their government, who resent the influence of

exiles and other self-appointed power brokers,

and who deeply mistrust U.S. intentions to turn

over real authority. 

In search of recognition and acceptance,

the new government insisted on participating

with the United States in formulating the terms

of the turnover resolution and in obtaining the

right to veto American military operations. They

won on the former but not the latter. The issue is

not one of throwing the Americans out. Rather,

it is the need to establish international legitimacy and internal credibility by acquiring full

sovereignty over financial, diplomatic, and

security interests. Iraqi leaders are painfully

aware of their vulnerability; if they cannot

improve standards of living, ensure internal

security and public safety, and provide jobs,

there may be little interest in elections next year.

U.S. acquiescence with this strategy could help

shore up the fledgling interim government.

Nonetheless, more pessimistic scenarios

are certainly possible. The United States could

withhold some decisionmaking prerogatives

from the interim government. It could insist

that advisers appointed to the ministries by

Bremer remain in place and that the TAL be

adopted as the permanent constitution for Iraq.

It has refused to allow the Iraqi government to

have veto power over military operations and

could insist on intrusive measures against

insurgents, terrorists, or criminals, regardless of

Iraqi advice. It could demand that the new

government sign a status of forces agreement

that would give legal, extraterritorial protection

to U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq. The

United States also could insist that the new

government adopt foreign policies, such as

recognizing Israel and supporting the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and gearing economic

policies toward total privatization (denationalizing the oil industry). These measures, however desirable they may be from the U.S. standpoint, would be resented by the interim

government and by most Iraqis, with Kurds

and other minorities being the lone dissenters.

The new government would lose whatever

credibility and popular support it had mustered, and the United States would face increasing security risks with little or no local help.

Outside Influences

In thinking through the next steps in the

ongoing transition, U.S. policymakers should

not lose sight of two outside players. The first,

in the short term, is the United Nations. The

second, in the longer term, is Iran. 

Is the United Nations part of the problem

or the solution? The international community

and Iraq’s neighbors have long argued for

giving the UN authority over Iraqi political

and economic reconstruction and foreign

military forces in the country. Iraqis, however,

are far less enthusiastic; they blame the UN for

6 Strategic Forum No. 208, June 2004
implementing U.S.-imposed sanctions after the

Kuwait war and resent having to comply with

UN resolutions that limit Iraqi military capabilities and insist on reparations payments.

Why, they will ask, should Iraq be held accountable for Saddam’s actions, why should

we pay off debts he incurred, and why should

we be denied the right to acquire whatever

weapons we need to defend ourselves when our

neighbors have dangerous weapons systems,

including weapons of mass destruction, that

could be used against us? 

The United Nations itself has only limited

resources to give to Iraq, which suggests that

the United States avoid presuming too much

about the UN capacity or room for maneuver.

Giving the organization a greater political role

in Iraq will not end attacks by insurgents or

terrorists, and it will not resolve domestic resistance to outside influence. It could, however, be

critical to obtaining international assistance as

well as support from Sistani and Iraqis seeking

a more moderate road to self-rule. 

As for Iran, the question remains as to

whether it is a spoiler or a supporter of the

transition. Iran looks at Iraq in a somewhat

condescending manner. The feelings are part

religious (Iranians are better Muslims) and

part nationalist (Persians are better than

Arabs). Tehran believes it is the preeminent

power in the region, and Supreme Leader Ali

Khamenei views himself as leader of the world

Shi’a Muslim community. More importantly, by

the 1990s, Iran was host to nearly one million

Iraqi refugees, some of whom were Kurds, most

of whom were Arab Shi’a Muslims fleeing the

wars or forced into exile by Saddam’s ethnic

cleansing operations. 

Iran has a vested interest in Iraqi stability—or instability—and will watch closely for

signs of unrest, rebellion, or success, fearing

potential spillover should civil war erupt or

ethnic violence spread. Iran has always had

diplomats, scholars, clerics, pilgrims, intelligence agents, and networks of informants active

in Iraq. Iranians long dominated the religious

schools and courts of the shrine cities, in particular Najaf and Karbala, and many clerical

families own property and burial plots near the

mosques. Iran, however, seems unable to capitalize on its influence. One of its closest allies,

SCIRI leader Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr alHakim, was murdered last August, and its long

support—safe haven, training, arms, and

political support—to his organization and other

Iraqi exiles has not paid off. Nor does Iran

appear to have influence over Muqtada al-Sadr.

Its efforts to negotiate with Sadr and the Sistani

elements in Najaf in April reportedly failed. 

In large measure, Iran has created its lack

of influence. Most Iraqis would say the Iranian

revolutionary style of government is not a

model worthy of emulation. Hardcore Iraqi

Islamists—Shi’a and Sunni—seem insistent

on an Islamic state under strict Islamic law,

but Iran is not their preferred model. Iraqis are

more likely to be influenced by their perception

of how much power they will have after June

30, progress on holding direct elections, and

the U.S. and UN roles in determining the shape

and authority of an interim government. They

may not view the Iranian experiment in theocratic democracy as a failure, but the majority

will outright reject the idea of clerical-dominated politics or the need for a religious

supreme leader. Their objection to unelected

leaders running a country has already been

applied to the councils appointed by the United

States. Iran, then, may have little impact on

the shape of Iraqi politics and policies, but it

will have sufficient influence to play the spoiler

in stirring up ethnic and sectarian unease. 

A Way Ahead

Ultimately, the success of the Iraq transition will depend on the U.S. willingness and

ability to empower the new Iraqi authority, to

maintain an effective security presence while

new governmental institutions stabilize and

acquire the ability to protect themselves and the

nation, and to support an international effort to

rebuild Iraq economically and psychically. 

Iraqis and their neighbors will view

future U.S. intentions in light of how it behaves now. Washington cannot appoint advisers for multiyear terms; that is for the Iraqis to

do. The United States cannot write legislation

or a constitution for the Iraqis, although it can

encourage secular government, the rule of law,

and opportunities for all Iraqis—men,

women, Arabs, Kurds, Sunnis, Shi’a, Turkmen,

and Christian. It should not favor one party or

politician at the expense of others but should

encourage the reemergence of the middle

class, professionals, technocrats, civil servants,

and military officers in a new Iraq. And finally,

the United States cannot cut and run. Giving

up on the transition only will compound U.S.

problems—and Iraqi miseries—over the

longer term.

So can the United States achieve success in

Iraq? It is impossible at this stage to predict any

definitive outcome, good or bad, with confidence, although actions by the new government

led by Yawar and Allawi and responses by the

United States so far are encouraging. Chances

for success would be greater if the United States

could achieve the following priorities: 

■ Strengthen the leading role of the Department of State in dealings with Iraq. Except for

security threats and military operations and training, the U.S. Ambassador should have the same

authority over U.S. personnel and presence

throughout Iraq that Ambassadors have in other

countries. It is imperative, moreover, that the

United States gain internal agreement on how and

when its Ambassador can be assured of receiving

military support in the protection of critical transitional activity, such as upcoming elections.

■ Treat the new interim government as a

partner, not a client. The previous Governing

Council was hampered by a series of rotating

presidents with no agenda other than to enhance

the status of their support networks and push

through temporary bits of self-serving legislation.

For the most part, they failed to win any appreciable popular support. Prime Minister Allawi’s base in

Iraq is also negligible, but his efforts to deal with

the United States as a partner rather than as a

client, to rein in the militias, and to broaden the

base of the government could gain him a significant degree of popular support.

■ Give the new interim government real decisionmaking authority. If any Iraqi official in the

cabinet or ministries must look to the foreign political adviser before making decisions, then he or she

will lose all credibility and nothing will have been

achieved but a change of face. More than a change

of label—to liaison instead of adviser—will be

necessary if the new government is to function with

any degree of self-respect.

■ Promote the new leaders and civil society

that are appearing in Iraq after decades of political

repression. Competent people eager to serve are

emerging from exile and from inside Iraq and

creating professional unions, trade associations,

social welfare groups, and university and technical

the success of the transition will depend on the

U.S. willingness and

ability to empower the

new Iraqi authority

No. 208, June 2004 Strategic Forum 7
associations. This rebounding middle class needs

encouragement and a hands-off approach from

outsiders eager to reshape Iraq in their own image.

■ Support efforts to disband the militias. Most

Iraqis recognize that private armies cannot coexist

with a new national military and security forces, but

they have felt powerless to deal with well-armed and

dangerous factions that owe loyalty to a virtual

warlord or local political leader. Allawi has announced a plan to disarm and disband some of the

militias by offering members posts in the new Iraqi

military and security forces and in local police forces

or by encouraging retirement. His effort is aimed

specifically at the nine militias that were part of the

anti-Saddam movement, including the militias

belonging to the Kurdish factions, Iraqi National

Congress, Iraqi National Accord, SCIRI, Dawa Party,

Hizballah of Iraq, and Iraqi Communist Party. It

does not include the Saddam fedayeen, ex-Ba’thist

factions now fighting as so-called insurgents or

terrorists, or Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army. The

hard question remains of how to maneuver the

sponsors of militias into a cooperative posture. While

the preferred mode is cooptation, utilizing financial

and economic inducements, and offering security

guarantees, the direct use of American military

power against recalcitrant militias may be necessary—despite obvious risks—if the militias refuse to

cooperate or directly impede the formation of new

governmental structures. 

■ Avoid extreme military reactions to insurgent attacks. Protection of forces and civilians must

be a priority, but overreaction can be detrimental to

the objectives and impede protection concerns in

the long run. The use of local mediators, especially

prominent Iraqis whose opinions carry weight, to

resolve pockets of resistance and negotiate an end

to local conflicts has proven successful. If the

United States does not do this and shuns all elements that served in Saddam’s military and prominent tribal leaders, it will miss a key component to

transition. The focus now should be on reconciliation and loyalty to the new Iraq, not retribution for

having served in Saddam’s armed forces. The worst

thing the United States could do would be to kill or

capture Muqtada al-Sadr—making him a martyr

and symbol of national resistance will do more

damage than letting the Shi’a establishment

marginalize him.

■ Balance carrots and sticks in approaching

Syria and Iran. These two countries are part of the

current problem but are also part of the solution.

Their tacit or active support for insurgent elements

inside Iraq and efforts to build operational bases in

the north, in the so-called Sunni center, and the

predominantly Shi’a areas of southern Iraq must be

8 Strategic Forum No. 208, June 2004

discouraged by the many instruments of U.S. national power, not just military. The goal in Washington should be to use economic and trade sanctions,

diplomatic isolation, and international pariah

status to remind Damascus and Tehran that there is

a cost to exploiting unrest in Iraq. 

■ Avoid replacing all symbolic vestiges of the

old regime. Designing a new flag and destroying

Saddam’s palaces will be seen as a U.S. effort to

destroy not Saddam’s identity but rather that of Iraq.

Turning these facilities over to the people for use as

hospitals, schools, theaters, or libraries would serve

to remind future generations of past legacies. 

Can the Transition Work?

Managing the multifaceted transitions

that are now unfolding—from Coalition Provisional Authority to Embassy, from Governing

Council to interim government, from coalition

forces to Multinational Force–Iraq—is a

daunting task, one made all the more difficult

by competing egos and desired endstates here

and in Iraq. Success for the United States cannot be measured by wartime military standards

or election-year political slogans alone. Success

is not “getting” Muqtada al-Sadr or eliminating all insurgents or terrorists. Success should

be measured in the evolution of central government authority, in popular acceptance of the

legitimacy of the new interim government, and

in the ability of the new government to improve

public security, provide jobs, and raise living

standards. Success will also be measured in the

disarming of the private militias that roam

Iraq and the turnover of security to more and

better-trained Iraqi forces. All of this will take

time and patience and require a commitment

by the United States to stay the course.

The consequences of failure could be

devastating to Iraq and the region. If the new

government is unable to contain the insurgents

and terrorists and if it is unable to win the

support of the diverse ethnic and sectarian

communities in Iraq, then a weak and

discredited central government will be no

match for local warlordism and the growth of

terrorist infrastructures. If this happens, the

outcome will not be the hoped-for democratic

Iraq of 2005 and beyond, but a country more

like Lebanon in the 1980s or Afghanistan in

the 1990s—only in this case a country replete

with oil wealth and a great capacity to wreak

havoc beyond its borders.

Notes1

Three transitions have occurred: from the Coalition

Provisional Authority to the U.S. Embassy; from the Iraqi Governing Council to the interim government; and from the coalition

military force to the Multinational Force–Iraq. The first and third

will occur on July 1; the second transition occurred on June 1. 2

Bremer later authorized payment of wages for the rankand-file military up to the O–6 level. He did not rescind the

order, insisting that there was no Iraqi military to disband. Nor

did he sign Chalabi’s decree on expanding de-Ba’thification. As

long as the Coalition Provisional Authority was in control,

Bremer’s signature was required for a measure to become law. 

3

Saddam appointed Sadr’s father, Ayatollah Muhammad

Sadiq Sadr, to his position in Baghdad; when Sadiq Sadr tried to

restore practices banned by Saddam, Saddam had him and two

of his sons murdered in 1999. This Sadr clan is related to a very

important clerical family in Iraq that has figured historically in

Shi’a political activism. Muqtada seems not to have his father’s

brilliance or leadership skills, but he plays on the family’s

Arabism and loyalty to Iraq, saying they stayed and suffered

under Saddam while “others” (the al-Hakims and Supreme

Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) fled to safety in Iran. 4

Unlike Sunnis, Shi’a Muslims must follow a living

mujtahid (religious scholar such as Khomeini or Sistani) who

can interpret the Quran, collect tithes, and issue fatwas. While

clerics in both sects can issue fatwas, Shi’a authorities have

more latitude to interpret the law and tradition. 5

The Shi’a remember that Wahhabis from Arabia sacked

and burned the Great Mosque in Najaf in the early 19th century. 6

Zarqawi claims responsibility for some of the most

spectacular terrorist attacks in Iraq, including the bombing of

UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003, in which UN

Special Representative Sergio de Mello was murdered. His faction

also murdered a senior U.S. official in Jordan last year. 7

The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) allows any

three governates to form a regional government unit similar to

the Kurdish Regional Government and to veto national legislation, should a majority in three governates agree. The Kurds

believe that pressure from Ayatollah Sistani kept the TAL from

being included in the draft United Nations Security Council

resolution recognizing the new government.

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