NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: 

THE DIPLOMATIC ROLE OF 

NON-WEAPONIZED PROGRAMS 

Rosalind R. Reynolds

INSS Occasional Paper 7 

Proliferation Series 

January 1996 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

US Air Force Academy, Colorado 
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 The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Air 

Force, the Department of Defense or the US Government. This report is 

approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

********

 This paper was originally presented at the annual conference of the 

International Studies Association, Chicago, Illinois, February 1995. 

******** 

 Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded 

to: Director, Institute for National Security Studies, HQ USAFA/DFE, 2354 

Fairchild Drive, Suite 5D33, US Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO 

80840, 719-472-2717. 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Introduction 1 

Typology of Weaponization 2 

 Nuclear Weapon States 2 

 Early U.S. Nuclear History 2 

 Nuclear Blackmail 4 

 Nuclear Bargaining 5 

 Deterrence 6 

 The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime 9 

 Nuclear Non-Weaponized States 

 10 

Case Studies of Successful Non-Weaponization 13 

 South Asia 13 

 Stopping on the Weaponization Ladder 14

 Indo-Pakistani Deterrence 16 

 Impact on the Nonproliferation Regime 18 

 North Korea 19 

 Rationale for the North Korean Program 20 

 Impact on the Nonproliferation Regime 24 

Nuclear Non-Weaponized States and Non-Proliferation 24 

Endnotes 28
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FOREWORD 

 We are pleased to publish this seventh volume in the Occasional Paper

series of the US Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). This 

monograph represents the results of graduate research first presented at the 

February 1995 conference of the International Studies Association. 

 INSS is co-sponsored by the National Security Negotiations Division, 

Plans and Operations Directorate, Headquarters US Air Force (USAF/XOXI) 

and the Dean of the Faculty, US Air Force Academy. The primary purpose of 

the Institute is to promote research done within the DOD community in the 

fields of arms control, proliferation, national security, regional studies, the 

revolution in military affairs, information warfare, and environmental security. 

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various disciplines and across 

services to develop new ideas for USAF and DOD policy making. The Institute 

develops topics, selects researchers from within the military academic 

community, and administers sponsored research. We also host conferences and 

workshops which facilitate the dissemination of information to a wide range of 

private and government organizations. INSS is in its fourth year of providing 

valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of the Air Staff and our other 

sponsors. 

 This paper presents a nontraditional, almost revisionist approach to the 

vital topic of nuclear proliferation and the search for answers as to why 

proliferation has not progressed as far as it might have. Reynolds points out that 

states can achieve many of their national security goals through the mere 

capability of producing nuclear weapons. Existential deterrence may occur 

without even having any weapons, as long as the potential adversary believes 

that a state could develop them. This is not a good finding for the current 

nuclear nonproliferation regime, which attempts to stop the spread of weapons 
viii

knowledge as well as the actual hardware, but it is good for nuclear 

nonproliferation in general. If states can deter other states by merely possessing 

the knowledge and skills necessary to make nuclear weapons, they do not have 

to proceed to the next step of actually weaponizing that capability. As Bill 

Kincade said in Occasional Paper 6, the most difficult and costly step in a 

proliferant’s decision to go nuclear is the final one, that of weaponizing the 

system, of turning a concept into an actual warhead on the end of a delivery 

vehicle. Reynolds suggests that non-weaponization can achieve the same goals 

as nuclear weapon status, saves everyone enormous time and resources, and 

keeps the nuclear genie, while still out of the bottle, at least of manageable size. 

 Reynolds’ paper is an important addition to the debate over the role of 

nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world and the pros and cons of 

traditional nonproliferation efforts. She recommends a new type of arms control 

agreement that focuses on tight state control of fissile materials, rather than 

traditional preventive approaches like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 

 We appreciate your interest in INSS and its research products. We 

hope we are meeting a need for this type of analysis and reflection, and we look 

forward to publishing these papers on a regular basis. 

JEFFREY A. LARSEN, Lt Colonel, USAF 

Director, Institute for National Security Studies 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

 The end of the Cold War has not seen the end of reliance on nuclear 

weapons for deterrence or diplomacy purposes. The use of nuclear weapons for 

such purposes is as evident in the threshold states as in the nuclear powers. The 

nuclear weapon states used their nuclear weapons for deterrence, bargaining, 

and blackmail, even during the early years of the Cold War when the U.S. was 

essentially non-weaponized. In the nuclear non-weaponized states in Asia a 

non-weaponized deterrent relationship is developing between India and 

Pakistan, and North Korea has used its nuclear program to restore diplomatic 

relations with the international community. 

 The role of nuclear weapons in the post Cold War world is determined 

by the role of non-weaponized programs in proliferating states. This paper will 

describe examples in South Asia and the Korean peninsula and show that while 

an increased reliance on nuclear weapons programs may be a threat to the 

current non-proliferation regime, the focus on non-weaponized programs rather 

than on weapons themselves actually improves international security by 

reducing the threat of nuclear war. 
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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY 

Lieutenant General Paul E. Stein 

Superintendent 

Brigadier General Ruben A. Cubero 

Dean of the Faculty 

HEADQUARTERS, US AIR FORCE 

PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE 

Major General Robert E. Linhard 

Director of Plans 

Lieutenant Colonel Todd A. Bodenhammer 

Chief, National Security Negotiations Division 

USAF INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES 

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Larsen 

Director/Editor 

Ms Cari Gast-Mulherin 

Editor 

Ms Marsha Taylor 

Cover Design 
3

INSS OCCASIONAL PAPERS

1. Explaining Weapons Proliferation: Going Beyond the Security 

Dilemma. Gregory J. Rattray, July 1994 

2. The Ukrainian Military: Instrument for Defense or Domestic 

Challenge? Oleg Strekal, November 1994 

3. North Korea’s Nuclear Program: The Clinton Administration’s 

Response. William E. Berry, Jr., March 1995 

4. Environmental Assistance as National Security Policy: Helping 

the Former Soviet Union Find Solutions to its Environmental 

Problems. Robert L. Dunaway, November 1995 

5. Economic Power in the Sino-U.S. Relationship. Kevin F. 

Donovan, December 1995 

6. Nuclear Proliferation: Diminishing Threat? William Kincade, 

December 1995 
4

Nuclear Proliferation: 

The Diplomatic Role of Non-Weaponized Programs 

 In August 1945 the United States depleted its tiny arsenal of atomic 

bombs on the Trinity test and on the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

Still, the U.S. emerged from World War II and began the Cold War as the sole 

nuclear superpower. Its status as a nuclear superpower was a result of its 

demonstrated nuclear capability rather than the size of its nuclear arsenal. 

 Since the first use of nuclear weapons, the U.S. and other nuclear 

weapon states have relied on the mere existence of these weapons for 

deterrent, political, and diplomatic uses. Although the Cold War has ended 

and significant arms reductions are occurring, the benefits that nuclear 

weapons bring are still being counted by nuclear weapon states as well as by 

a new type of non-nuclear weapon states. 

 Today, many proliferating states use their actual or potential 

capabilities for producing nuclear weapons in much the same way as nuclear 

weapon states have used their nuclear weapons. While this trend of using 

nuclear capabilities as weapons may lead to the proliferation of nuclear 

weapons programs and become a threat to the international non-proliferation 

regime, it also presents benefits to international security. The foremost benefit 

is that non-weaponized nuclear programs are more easily managed than 

nuclear arsenals. Nor do they present the same risk of nuclear war. 

 This paper examines three states--India, Pakistan, and North Korea--

which have crossed some of the steps on the weaponization threshold and 

have programs designed towards producing weapons, but have stopped short 

of actually developing and deploying nuclear weapons--at least publicly. 

These three states are particularly interesting because they act in many ways 

like the nuclear weapon states and use their nuclear programs as if they were 
5

weaponized. Non-weaponized programs used like nuclear arsenals--perhaps 

this is the reason for the restraint shown by the nuclear non-weaponized states. 

Typology of Weaponization 

Nuclear Weapon States

 To show how nuclear non-weaponized states have used their nuclear 

programs, it is necessary to first look at the various ways the nuclear weapon 

states have used their arsenals. While nuclear weapons have not been 

detonated against another country since 1945, such weapons have been used 

in other ways. This phenomenon was particularly evident in the early years of 

the Cold War, for during that time the U.S. was arguably non-weaponized, yet 

it still used its nuclear capability for diplomatic purposes. 

 Early U.S. Nuclear History. The size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal 

during the first few years of the Cold War remained a secret until 1982, when 

the information was declassified and published by David Rosenberg in The 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

1

 The released figures indicated the numbers 

of "nuclear components" and "mechanical assemblies" available on June 30th 

of each year from 1945 to 1950. Rosenberg described the numbers as 

"surprisingly small." In June of 1945 the U.S. had two plutonium weapons, 

presumably those used on the Trinity test site and on Nagasaki. The uranium 

weapon used on Hiroshima was not completed until July. The figures suggest 

that there were no weapons ready for use in the months following the end of 

the war. The released figures show that only nine bombs were available in 

June of 1946, and two were used the following month on the Bikini tests. 

Rosenberg considers the numbers for 1947 the "most intriguing." In this 

crucial year of the Cold War, the U.S. had thirteen nuclear components, just 

four more than the previous year. These numbers were closely guarded. 

President Truman probably did not learn just how few available weapons 
6

existed until April of 1947, when the Atomic Energy Commission took over 

the management of the nuclear weapons. The bombs were few in number, not 

necessarily assembled, and not available for immediate delivery. Rosenberg 

writes that through 1948 the bomb storage site was an hour's flight from the 

nearest Air Force bomber base, and only 23 of the 46 "nuclear modified" 

Boeing B-29's were operational.2

 Gregg Herken presents an even more dismal view of the American 

arsenal, based on interviews with David Lilienthal, Chairman of the Atomic 

Energy Commission in 1947. In the spring of 1947 there were only about a 

dozen bombs, and these were not available for immediate use. Lilienthal told 

Herken, "Actually we had one [bomb] that was probably operable when I first 

went off to Los Alamos; one that had a good chance of being operable...The 

politically significant thing is that there really were no bombs in a military 

sense."3

 In the first three years after World War II the U.S. was not 

weaponized, as the bombs were not assembled or available for immediate 

delivery. Nonetheless, the U.S. used its nuclear status for political purposes 

soon after the end of World War II. The U.S. was the first state to use its 

nuclear program as a non-weaponized tool for diplomacy. 

 While theories of how to use nuclear weapons to deter Soviet attacks 

on U.S. territory were developed early in the nuclear age, American national 

security thinking also focused on other potential uses for nuclear weapons. In 

particular, Herman Kahn believed the U.S. should not rely on nuclear 

weapons simply for deterrence, because deterrence might fail. In Thinking 

About the Unthinkable, Kahn developed strategies and scenarios in which the 

U.S. must plan how to "fight, survive, and win a thermonuclear war."4

 The 

belief that a nuclear war could be fought, and should therefore be planned, led 

to the development of tactical nuclear weapons designed for battlefield use. 

 Others believed that if U.S. nuclear weapons were developed for use 

in war, areas outside the U.S. could be defended. Henry Kissinger, in his 

famous 1957 book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, described how 
7

nuclear weapons should be used to prevent Soviet aggression in Europe.5

 He 

believed that the policy of using nuclear weapons merely as retaliation against 

a Soviet nuclear attack limited U.S. options and played right into the hands of 

the Soviet Union, thereby rendering the weapons useless. Kissinger believed 

that planning to launch a limited nuclear war to contain various forms of 

Soviet aggression would be both possible and advantageous to the U.S. As a 

result, the U.S. granted security guarantees to NATO by threatening a nuclear 

attack on the Soviet Union in the event of any attack--nuclear or conventional-

-on NATO countries. 

Nuclear Blackmail. While some theorists and policy-makers 

advocated planning for nuclear weapons use, others believed that merely 

threatening the use of nuclear weapons could achieve political benefits. In 

Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, Richard Betts described many 

instances in which the U.S. threatened to use nuclear weapons in situations 

which were clearly not vital to U.S. national security interests as a way "to 

convince the enemy that any war could turn into all-out war."6

 He defined 

"nuclear blackmail" as "coercion by the threat of punishment, a threat 

designed either to deter or compel action by the opponent."7

 In this study 

Betts showed how both nuclear superpowers used combinations of bluff and 

blackmail to reach political goals. Richard Betts, Daniel Ellsberg, and 

McGeorge Bundy all described instances beginning in 1946 in which states 

threatened, either directly or indirectly, the first use of nuclear weapons.8

 

These events included Truman's threatening the use of the bomb in 1946 if 

Soviet troops did not leave Iran; announcing that "atomic-capable" aircraft 

were being sent to Germany during the 1948 Berlin Blockade, claims from 

Truman and Eisenhower that atomic bombs could be used in the Korean War; 

and threats to use nuclear weapons against China in 1958 to defend the islands 

of Quemoy and Matsu. Although these and other attempts at atomic 

diplomacy and blackmail may not have been totally successful, it is important 
8

to note the frequency of the threats. Ellsberg provides examples of every 

president from Truman to Reagan (except Ford) threatening the use of nuclear 

weapons and writes that the effect of the threats on the opponents' policies is 

not the issue: 

What matters...is that presidents believed that past 

and current threats had succeeded; this was why, as 

they understood it, they or their predecessors had not 

been forced to carry them out, and why they and their 

successors kept making such threats, and buying 

more and more first-use and first-strike nuclear 

weapon systems to maintain and increase the 

credibility and effectiveness of threats they expected 

to make in the future. It is why, after all, each 

president has refused to make a "no-first-use" 

commitment.9

Nuclear Bargaining. Not all the uses of nuclear weapons for 

political purposes involved threats. Nuclear weapons were also used for 

bargaining and negotiation. Throughout the Cold War, nuclear weapons 

provided a foundation for U.S. and Soviet negotiations. During tense periods 

of U.S.-Soviet relations, discussions regarding nuclear weapons offered a 

chance for returning to a diplomatic relationship, for example, the "Hot Line" 

agreement and Limited Test Ban Treaty were signed in 1963, shortly after the 

Cuban Missile Crisis. The past few decades of using nuclear weapons for 

diplomatic purposes has led to what Emanuel Adler calls a "growing 

international understanding that arms control and diplomatic measures are 

closely intertwined and that conflict resolution, wherever needed, requires a 

measure of arms control."10 

 It is important to recognize that there are positive and negative 

effects of using nuclear weapons as a foundation for negotiations. While 

communication and information are important for maintaining good 

diplomatic relations, there is the problem of developing a "bargaining chip" 

mentality. Blacker and Duffy describe this "'bargaining chip' rationale" as a 
9

reason why ABM deployment received influential support in the U.S. 

Congress in the 1960s.11 Many believed that having a deployed system that 

could then be given up was essential to negotiating a favorable arms control 

deal in the more important realm of strategic weapons. A similar situation 

occurred two decades later with the strategic defense initiative (SDI). Strobe 

Talbott called SDI "the greatest sting operation in history," describing how 

the "arms control potential" of SDI brought in powerful supporters such as 

Robert McFarlane and Paul Nitze. They hoped that limiting the SDI program 

could be exchanged for a reduction of Soviet MIRVed ICBMs.12 While 

weapon systems are not usually built for the sole purpose of giving them up in 

negotiations, weapons can receive an unusual level of support from arms 

controllers who view them as potentially valuable negotiating concessions. 

Deterrence. Despite repeated efforts to the contrary, many scholars 

and policy-makers contended that nuclear weapons had but one use--to deter a 

nuclear attack with the threat of a nuclear response. Much of the debate has 

centered on what is necessary to achieve effective deterrence. Bundy writes: 

The more we learn about living with nuclear arsenals, 

the less we are able to find any good use for them but 

one--the deterrence of nuclear aggression by others--

and the more we are led to the conclusion that this 

one valid and necessary role is not nearly as 

demanding as the theorists of countervailing strategy 

assert.13

 Bernard Brodie realized the value of nuclear weapons as a deterrent 

early in the nuclear age, even when the U.S. was the sole nuclear weapon 

state. He wrote these famous words in the autumn of 1945: 

Thus, the first and most vital step in any American 

security program for the age of atomic bombs is to 

take measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of 

attack the possibility of retaliation in kind...Thus far 

the chief purpose of our military establishment has 
10

been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose 

must be to avert them. It can have almost no other 

useful purpose.14

 When the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in 1949, the 

question of how nuclear weapons could be used to deter became even more 

urgent in both the academic and policy-making communities. The basic 

concepts of deterrence were understood and built upon, even though it would 

be years before the U.S. had a nuclear adversary, an advanced arsenal, a 

variety of delivery systems, or a second strike capability. In 1945, simply 

knowing that the U.S. had the capability to produce atomic bombs, even 

without an arsenal of completed bombs, changed the dynamics of the U.S.-

Soviet relationship. 

 During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy centered on the issue of 

ensuring effective deterrence. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 

described the importance of deterrence and the necessary capabilities in 1968: 

The cornerstone of our strategic policy continues to 

be to deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the U.S. or 

its allies. We do this by maintaining a highly reliable 

ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon any 

single aggressors at any time during the course of a 

strategic nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a 

surprise first strike. This can be defined as our 

assured-destruction capability.15 

 In the next two decades, the theory that the concept of deterrence was 

more important to national security than superiority of weapon systems 

received further attention, primarily by McGeorge Bundy. Bundy is credited 

with developing the term "existential deterrence." He alluded to the theory in 

1969 by writing that having superior weapons does not strengthen deterrence. 

No matter what the level of arms control, he added, any first strike would be 

"an act of utter folly:” 
11

unthinkable level of human incineration is the least 

that could be expected by either side in response to 

any first strike in the next ten years, no matter what 

happens to weapons systems in the meantime.16

In 1984 Bundy gave the name "existential deterrence" to the theory that 

retaliation can be expected at some point. He wrote: 

Terrible and unavoidable uncertainties have great 

meaning for the theory of deterrence. They create 

what I will call existential deterrence. My aim in 

using this fancy adjective is to distinguish this kind 

of deterrence from the kind that is based on strategic 

theories or declaratory policies or even international 

commitments. As long as we assume that each side 

has very large numbers of thermonuclear weapons 

which could be used against the opponent, even after 

the strongest possible pre-emptive attack, existential 

deterrence is strong.17

In the same year, Jonathan Schell's The Abolition used the theory of existential 

deterrence as an argument for disarmament rather than merely arms control. 

He wrote that "the capacity for retaliation would consist less and less of the 

possession of weapons and more and more of the capacity for rebuilding 

them, until, at the level of zero, that capacity would be all."18 

 The theory of existential deterrence was not accepted by either of the 

nuclear superpowers. In fact, both sides emphasized increasing the quality 

and quantity of nuclear weapons. While this vertical proliferation was 

occurring, the nuclear weapon states were also actively campaigning against 

horizontal proliferation, or the spread of nuclear weapons to new states. This 

dilemma was problematic for the non-proliferation regime. Nuclear weapon 

states asserted that the possession of nuclear weapons was viewed as 

beneficial to international security, since the weapons promoted peaceful 

deterrence. However, if additional states acquired these same weapons, the 

effects would be destabilizing and disastrous for international security. 
12

 These are a few examples from the Cold War period which show 

how nuclear weapon states have used nuclear weapons for political goals. 

Nuclear weapons may or may not have successfully attained political goals. 

Nonetheless, nuclear weapons were used for blackmail, bargaining, and 

protecting close allies with the threat of nuclear retaliation. 

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

 Despite these and other problems related to non-proliferation, nuclear 

weapon states and international organizations created a non-proliferation 

regime, resulting in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty and supporting 

institutions such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. This regime 

effectively established a taboo against further acquisition of nuclear weapons. 

Nearly all non-nuclear weapon states agreed to remain non-nuclear and to 

cooperate with the terms of the treaty, and the few who rebelled have not 

openly produced, tested, or deployed nuclear weapons. States which have 

developed or are developing capabilities to produce nuclear weapons have 

kept their programs either hidden or non-weaponized. These non-weaponized 

programs have been used by states in much the same way as nuclear weapon 

states used their arsenals throughout the Cold War. 

 During the Cold War the nuclear weapon states set several examples 

of how nuclear weapons could be used to improve national security. It is 

therefore understandable that nuclear non-weaponized states would seek 

similar security advantages. With the end of the Cold War and the increase of 

superpower arms control, it is necessary to consider the changing role of 

nuclear weapons. An evaluation of the nuclear non-weaponized states 

indicates that advanced weapons arsenals may not be needed to achieve the 

same goals of deterrence and bargaining. Today's nuclear non-weaponized 

states are following the example set by the U.S. in the early years of the Cold 

War: using a non-weaponized program for diplomatic purposes. David 

Rosenberg used the figures of the early U.S. nuclear program to support the 
13

contention that nuclear weapons are not as important as the idea of nuclear 

weapons. According to Rosenberg: 

The phenomenal growth of the nuclear weapons 

stockpile during the past three decades has apparently 

not reduced U.S. vulnerability or increased U.S. 

security. Release of these stockpile figures 

reinforces the conclusion that, despite its vast power, 

the atomic bomb itself is less critical in global 

diplomacy than the ideas, beliefs and policy choices 

surrounding it.19 

Nuclear Non-Weaponized States

 The non-proliferation regime, consisting of the 1968 NonProliferation Treaty and the organizations which support and enforce the 

treaty, attempted to address the spread of nuclear weapons by dividing the 

countries of the world into two types of states. The nuclear weapon states are 

the five countries that detonated a nuclear device before 1967--the United 

States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China. The non-nuclear 

weapon states are all other countries. This classification system is ineffective, 

for the states which are most important to understand fall somewhere between 

these two types. These countries are most properly labeled "nuclear nonweaponized states." These states are important for two reasons. First, they 

are considered a threat to the non-proliferation regime, as they have the 

capability to produce nuclear weapons. Second, they are important because 

they have restrained their nuclear capabilities. None of these states have 

crossed the same nuclear threshold as the five nuclear weapon states, despite 

their capabilities. The nuclear non-weaponized states, for numerous reasons, 

have not followed the lead of their nuclear counterparts. Examining why 

states do not feel the need to weaponize might prove helpful in determining 

the future of nuclear proliferation. 

 The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) specifies three 

threshold requirements a proliferant must complete before having the 
14

capability to produce nuclear weapons. First, a state must acquire sufficient 

fissile material to produce a chain reaction for each weapon. There are two 

routes a state could take to obtain weapons grade material. Taking the 

uranium route would require mining natural uranium and separating U-235 or 

acquiring low enriched uranium for light water reactors, and then enriching 

the U-235 to very high levels (about 80 percent). The plutonium route 

requires using uranium to fuel a reactor, and reprocessing the spent fuel to 

separate plutonium. This initial step is by far the most difficult, as either route 

involves complex and expensive processes and technologies. 

 The second step of weaponization is to design and assemble a fissile 

core and other non-nuclear components into a weapon. These weapons must 

be made small and light enough to be attached to delivery systems and 

deployed.20 

 In addition to the OTA prerequisites, it is also necessary for the states 

to develop arsenals and integrate the weapons into military and national 

strategic planning, if they are to be on the same level as the acknowledged 

nuclear states. This, however, requires a public admission of nuclear status. 

By declaring and preparing a nuclear arsenal, states indicate their readiness to 

use the weapons--to have a first strike capability. By not crossing this final 

step, on the other hand, states show that although they have the capability to 

become nuclear weapon states, they do not have immediate plans to do so and 

are not planning for a first use of nuclear weapons. 

 Many different kinds of states fall into the category of nuclear nonweaponized states. There are states with highly advanced capabilities such as 

Japan, Germany, and Sweden who choose to cooperate fully with the nonproliferation regime. States which could have become nuclear weapon states, 

yet have decided not to take that path, strengthen the non-proliferation regime. 

States which develop nuclear weapon programs but do not cross the final 

threshold are also valuable to the regime. Israel, which almost certainly has 

an undeclared nuclear arsenal and has crossed all but the final threshold, has 
15

clearly stated for decades that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear 

weapons into the Middle East. The reasons that these states have shown 

restraint should be closely examined. 

 It is possible for states to realize substantial security benefits without 

possessing or using actual weapons. The next section examines three states 

which have successfully used their nuclear programs in the same manner as 

nuclear weapon states have used their arsenals. 
16

Case Studies of Successful Non-Weaponization 

South Asia

 South Asia is the prime example of a region in which nuclear 

programs share many of the same traits as nuclear weapons. Both India and 

Pakistan have advanced nuclear capabilities which have been developed for 

decades. An interesting phenomena has occurred between the two rivals. A 

nuclear deterrent relationship has developed between the two states, even 

though both programs are non-weaponized. 

 India began its nuclear program in the 1960s, using the plutonium 

route to weapons capability. In 1974, India publicly demonstrated its nuclear 

capability with a "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE). India claimed that the 

1974 PNE was not a test of a nuclear weapon; rather, it was a test of mining 

techniques and underground nuclear engineering.21 India began separating 

plutonium in the mid 1980s and began stockpiling plutonium entirely free 

from international controls. There have been reports that India developed 

weapons designs and non-nuclear weapon components in the 1980s. By 

1990, India had the capability to produce plutonium for 5 to 10 devices a year, 

and had probably stocked enough plutonium for 40 to 60 bombs. During this 

period India also began developing a delivery capability, in the form of the 

short range Prithvi and intermediate range Agni ballistic missiles, both first 

tested in the late 1980s.22 Albright and Hibbs estimated that by the end of 

1995 India had enough plutonium for 65 weapons.23 

 With few exceptions, Indian officials have come out in favor of 

disarmament and denied that their nuclear program is geared toward weapons. 

For example, Ambassador Kanwal Sibal, deputy chief of mission at the Indian 

Embassy in Washington, wrote in a policy statement for Arms Control Today, 

"We have demonstrated our capability in 1974, but our record in not 

weaponizing the option since then has been exemplary, and stands out as a 

singular example of unwavering restraint in the atomic age."24 India has a 
17

great incentive not to build or deploy nuclear arsenals, for doing so would 

disrupt its peaceful reputation in the international community. 

 Responding to India, Pakistan began its nuclear program in the early 

1970s. Pakistan initially tried both routes to producing nuclear weapons, 

seeking capabilities to extract plutonium and to produce highly enriched 

uranium. It had more success with the latter, and by the mid-1980s Pakistan 

had enriched uranium to a weapons-grade state. Pakistan has not acquired as 

much fissile material as India, but probably has enough for 5 to 10 bombs. 

Pakistan also began testing missile systems in the late 1980s. Pakistan's 

missile system consists of the Haft I and Haft II surface-to-surface ballistic 

missiles, both of which are capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.25 Like 

India, Pakistani officials generally have admitted to the capability but have 

denied assembling nuclear weapons. For example, Ali Sarwar Naqvi, minister 

counselor for public affairs at the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, wrote, 

"In its peaceful nuclear pursuit, Pakistan has achieved a certain capability 

which we consider very important in the security context of the subcontinent, 

but a political decision has been made not to manufacture, acquire or develop 

a nuclear weapon."26 Pakistan has admitted to having elements which, if 

assembled, would be a nuclear device.27 

Stopping on the Weaponization Ladder. Using the four steps on the 

weaponization threshold outlined earlier, India and Pakistan can both be 

considered non-weaponized. They have crossed the first two steps: acquiring 

weapons-grade materials and having the capabilities and components to 

assemble deliverable nuclear weapons. It is uncertain, however, if either 

country has followed through with the third step of assembling and deploying 

weapons. They have not taken the final step that the five nuclear weapon 

states took of integrating nuclear weapons into their military and strategic 

doctrines. While U.S. government officials and members of the academic 

community frequently wonder about the nuclear status of these countries, they 
18

generally agree with India's reports that their programs are essentially nonweaponized. Arms Control Today editor John Schulz writes that few serious 

observers to believe that India has actually assembled and deployed nuclear 

weapons, though nearly all believe India could do so in a short amount of 

time.28 Scholarly literature implies the same about Pakistan. The U.S. 

government generally believes that Indian and Pakistani claims of not 

assembling nuclear weapons are true. CIA Director Robert Gates testified to 

Congress in 1992 that though the U.S. had "no reason to believe that either 

India or Pakistan maintains assembled or deployed nuclear bombs...such 

weapons could be assembled quickly."29

 Both states have chosen to remain non-weaponized and have taken 

this stance within the international community. There are several advantages 

inherent in maintaining this status. India can respond to the nuclear threat of 

China, and receive respect and admiration for testing a nuclear device, while 

still being a leader in international organizations by promoting disarmament. 

Much of India's reputation derives from its strong pro-disarmament stance. 

Pakistan can counter the Indian program while still attempting to reestablish 

good terms with the U.S. This would allow it to become eligible for foreign 

aid, or at least get the F-16s that Pakistan previously purchased but did not 

receive from the U.S. Their nuclear programs allow the two countries to 

maintain a sense of security similar to that enjoyed by the nuclear weapon 

states. Furthermore, both states seem content with the present situation and 

have established a relationship of non-weaponized deterrence. Both states are 

restrained from crossing further thresholds of weaponization because there is 

little incentive to deploy arms and build arsenals. 

Indo-Pakistani Deterrence. George Perkovich used Bundy's phrase 

“existential deterrence” to describe the situation in South Asia. He defined 

existential deterrence as 
19

the mere possibility that one's actions could provoke 

a nuclear encounter," and wrote that "an existential 

deterrent relationship has been established [between 

India and Pakistan], probably without construction of 

actual nuclear weapons, and both countries at the 

moment feel no compulsion either to renounce this 

deterrent or to 'bolster' it by weaponizing and arms 

racing."30 

Perkovich believed that their deterrence is much simpler than that which was 

built between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, as neither India nor Pakistan 

show great interest in the concepts of war-fighting, worst case scenarios, 

extended deterrence, or second strike capabilities. It is enough that both 

accept that each state has the basic capability to retaliate by dropping a nuclear 

bomb on the other, which prevents each from launching a nuclear strike 

against the other. Nuclear arsenals are not necessary to that assumption. 

Perkovich wrote: 

Most Indian and Pakistani elites show little interest in 

postulating how nuclear war could be managed, how 

deterrence could be extended across a range of 

conventional and nuclear scenarios, or whether 

worst-case analyses require an ambitious program to 

deploy nuclear weapons. Instead, at least for now, 

they simply seem to accept the basic and mutual 

deterrent effects of one's capability to drop a nuclear 

weapon on another.31

 George Questor agrees that existential deterrence in the region 

provides a sense of security, particularly as a sort of no-first-use pledge. He 

writes that non-weaponization: 

is an assurance that neither South Asian power is 

planning to introduce nuclear weapons on a firststrike basis early in any war. One does not 

nuclearize a conventional war, in hopes of winning 

the victories that otherwise would go to the other 

side, without first exercising the command and 

control arrangements that will be required, without 
20

first carefully training one's troops in the targets to be 

attacked.32

 Questor concludes that there is reason to be optimistic, as India and 

Pakistan are not overly concerned about each other’s capabilities. Booth and 

Wheeler agree that South Asia provides empirical support to the idea that the 

benefits of deterrence can be achieved without the dangerous presence of 

assembled arsenals. They write, "each additional day there is no major war 

between India and Pakistan is a testament to 'weaponless deterrence'."33

 Indian and Pakistani officials and scholars frequently make 

comments which show that they feel that their nuclear programs are a 

deterrent to the other, and that they feel deterred by the other state. Often 

these statements are made while denying that their nuclear programs are 

weaponized. Retired Chief of the Indian Army General Sundarji said in an 

interview, "For all practical purposes, one must plan today on the fact that 

[Pakistan has] a limited nuclear-weapon capability. And that India has similar 

capability... If clear deterrence signals go out from one country to the other, 

chances of peace are brighter.”34 Denying that India has assembled nuclear 

weapons, but leaving little doubt that the capability would be assembled if 

necessary, Indian Atomic Energy Commission Chairman P.K. Iyengar said, 

"In how much time we make it, will depend on how much time we get."35 On 

the other side, retired General Beg wrote that Pakistan ceased to enrich 

uranium in 1989 "because we thought that Pakistan had acquired the 

maximum deterrence level that is needed to avert the threat that we 

perceived."36 Federal interior minister and retired Major General Nasirullah 

Khan Babar agrees, saying that Pakistan is safe from Indian aggression 

because India is aware of Pakistan's "deterrent power."37 From these and 

similar statements, it is clear that many in India and Pakistan see their nonweaponized programs as deterrents. 

 Cold War deterrence theory, developed over many years to describe 

the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, created a list of 
21

requirements necessary for effective deterrence. This list included possessing 

a second-strike capability and the ability to create massive destruction in a 

very short amount of time. Neither of these traits are evident in a nonweaponized country. Furthermore, it is not known whether a state can 

credibly deter a nuclear attack without a large, complete, weaponized, 

deliverable, and declared nuclear arsenal. What is significant in these 

scenarios is that the states feel deterred and are, therefore, prevented from 

launching a first strike against the other. Regardless of the deterrent formula, 

the U.S. and the Soviet Union never launched a nuclear strike, and India and 

Pakistan are following their example. 

Impact on the Nonproliferation Regime. While India and Pakistan 

feel secure in their situation, the non-proliferation regime does not. Both 

states have large quantities of unsafeguarded fissile material and have refused 

to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. India and Pakistan remain strongly 

opposed to the treaty and all that it represents. India opposes the NPT because 

of its discriminatory nature, and has a similar dislike of regional agreements. 

India also maintains that as long as a nuclear armed China remains in the 

region, it will not enter into an agreement which does not involve China. Yet 

India favors universal arms control agreements such as a nuclear test ban and 

a ban on the production of fissile material.38

 Pakistan's policies on non-proliferation vary slightly from that of 

India. Pakistan favors regional agreements, such as a nuclear weapon free 

zone, or bilateral agreements with India. In fact, Pakistan frequently 

introduces such resolutions to the United Nations. Most notable of these 

efforts was Pakistan's proposed creation of the Five Power Conference--

Pakistan, India, China, Russia, and the U.S.--to “discuss and resolve" South 

Asian proliferation.39 Despite this apparent support for non-proliferation and 

arms control, it must be noted that Pakistan sacrifices little when it proposes 

negotiations to which India will most certainly not agree. 
22

 There are some common policies between the two states: neither will 

unilaterally limit its nuclear program, and neither accepts the current nonproliferation regime. The challenge to managing the future of South Asian 

proliferation is to find a solution which reconciles the views of the nonproliferation regime with those of India and Pakistan. The restraint that India 

and Pakistan have shown in keeping their nuclear programs non-weaponized 

may offer a solution to handling the proliferation of nuclear weapons 

programs. 

North Korea

 While India and Pakistan are examples of states using nonweaponized programs for deterrence, North Korea is an excellent example of 

a non-weaponized state using its nuclear program for political and diplomatic 

purposes. 

 North Korea began its nuclear program in the mid-1960s, receiving a 

small research reactor from the Soviet Union with possibly some assistance 

from China. In the 1980s the North Korean program became increasingly 

suspicious to the non-proliferation regime as it built facilities to produce and 

separate plutonium.40 Under pressure from the Soviet Union, North Korea 

signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, but refused to allow IAEA 

inspections. By the time IAEA inspection teams finally entered North Korea 

in the summer of 1992, the reprocessing facility had been operating for 

several years. While North Korea admitted to only separating 100 grams of 

plutonium, closer inspections showed that North Korea had separated more 

than 100 grams on several occasions. Meanwhile, intelligence reports 

indicated that North Korea had two hidden nuclear waste sites.41 Over the 

next two years, North Korea played a political game with the U.S. and IAEA, 

which were attempting to determine past nuclear activities, freeze these 

activities, and prevent the further acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. 
23

 After two years of intense negotiations and the occasional crisis, 

North Korea and the U.S. finally concluded the October 1994 Agreed 

Framework.42 The agreement provides for a complete dismantlement of North 

Korea's nuclear program in three phases over ten years. In the first phase, 

North Korea will freeze its present activities in return for oil from the U.S. 

and a light water reactor from South Korea. In the second phase, the U.S. will 

remove and examine the fuel rods from the reprocessing facility to determine 

the extent of North Korea's past activities. At this time the first South Korean 

reactor will be completed, installed and ready to generate electricity. Finally, 

North Korea will receive the second completed reactor in exchange for tearing 

down the previous reactors. 

 While North Korea's nuclear activities were a significant violation of 

the Non-Proliferation Treaty, its nuclear program was far less advanced than 

that of India or Pakistan. The most plutonium North Korea's facilities could 

have produced and separated was 6 to 13 kilograms, enough for one to two 

weapons.43 With this action, North Korea would barely surpass the first 

weaponization threshold. David Albright mentions U.S. intelligence sources 

which believe North Korea could have designed a bomb, but there is no 

evidence to suggest that it developed an assembled and deliverable device.44 

Rationale for the North Korean Program. Now that the crisis has 

subsided, some wonder if North Korea ever truly sought a nuclear weapons 

capability. There are two schools of thought on this question. Some believe 

that North Korea's uncooperative stance was a game of diplomacy to receive 

political and economic awards. Others disagree, thinking that North Korea 

needed to develop its nuclear program for security reasons, in order to deter a 

nuclear power which threatened its existence. Both ideas are valid 

motivations for North Korea's developing nuclear facilities, and either shows 

that a nuclear non-weaponized state acts very much like a nuclear power. 
24

 As discussed earlier, nuclear weapon states have used their arsenals 

as bargaining chips and for purposes of blackmail. In the past few years 

North Korea has successfully used its program in a similar manner. If the 

nuclear facilities were developed primarily as a bargaining chip to be given up 

when something more valuable was offered, North Korea succeeded in 

gaining considerable rewards in exchange for cooperation. North Korea also 

succeeded at blackmail, for the threat of a North Korean arsenal prompted the 

U.S. to grant payments. A short review of events during the North Korean 

nuclear crisis substantiates these claims. 

 In the first stage of the crisis, from 1989 to 1991, North Korea was 

reprocessing plutonium and refused to enter into a safeguards agreement until 

U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were removed from South Korea. The U.S. 

removed its nuclear weapons in December 1991, and a month later North 

Korea signed the IAEA safeguard agreement and opened its facilities for 

inspection. The second stage began when the IAEA learned in the summer of 

1992 that North Korea had separated more than the 100 grams of plutonium 

that it had admitted. North Korea responded by refusing further inspections 

and withdrawing from the NPT on 12 March 1993. Its reward for suspending 

its withdrawal was the cancellation of annual U.S. "Team Spirit" military 

exercises in South Korea. It also garnered a series of high level talks with the 

U.S.--quite an improvement for a small country which had been isolated from 

the international community for decades. The final stage of the crisis began in 

May 1994 when North Korea removed spent fuel rods to prevent the IAEA 

from determining the extent of plutonium separation. This crisis ended with 

the October 1994 Framework Agreement, which resulted in the dismantlement 

of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities in exchange for light water 

reactors and oil. 

 Paul Bracken believes that North Korea played the game of 

diplomacy, but does not think that either side lost. He calls it a "non-zero sum 

game" in which economic and diplomatic favors were traded by the U.S. and 
25

South Korea in exchange for North Korean cooperation. As he said, "such 

joint gains [are] from the bedrock of international arms control: each party in 

a negotiation benefits."45

 Another scholar, Andrew Mack, discards the theory of the bargaining 

chip, and believes that North Korea wants and needs a nuclear capability as a 

strategic asset. He writes that North Korea has legitimate security needs and 

would find deterrence useful: 

Nuclear weapons would provide a countervailing 

deterrent against U.S. nuclear threats. These threats 

still exist in the form of the "nuclear umbrella" held 

over South Korea--"nuclear umbrella" simply being a 

polite way of saying that, under certain 

circumstances, the U.S. would use nuclear weapons 

against North Korea.46

 Selig Harrison agrees that the American threat prompted the North 

Korean nuclear program. He writes that North Korea began developing a 

nuclear program after the U.S. continually acknowledged the possibility of 

using nuclear weapons against the state.47

 North Korea could very well have been striving for a nonweaponized deterrent to address the threat from the U.S. While it seems 

unlikely that a small state with only a few kilograms of fissile material could 

deter a large nuclear power, if North Korea felt its sovereignty and national 

survival was at stake, it would have used all its resources to protect itself. 

North Korea is surrounded by nuclear powers (U.S. and China), and by states 

that North Korea believes have nuclear weapons (Japan and South Korea). 

Living by the value of juche, or self-reliance and independence, North Korea 

faced its perceived nuclear threat with the most obvious response--developing 

a nuclear capability itself. A North Korean journalist depicts a sentiment 

which is typical of many reports coming out of North Korea: 

Our people oppose war but will never show mercy to 

aggressors who try to encroach upon the dignity of 
26

our nation and the sovereignty of our country. We 

have strong self-defensive power that can reliably 

safeguard the country's sovereignty and the might of 

singlehearted unity that can never be shattered by 

anything.48

A potential nuclear capability offered a sense of security to the North 

Koreans, and gave them the possibility for a response to a nuclear attack--

even if that response would be a long time coming. The concept that the mere 

possibility of response would deter a potential attack provided security for the 

troubled state, as North Korea had much to lose. Unlike the game of 

diplomacy, Bracken writes, the game of sovereignty is a “zero-sum game” and 

only one side will control the peninsula. "In any game of control for an 

indivisible resource, there can only be one winner; coming in second has no 

value."49

 The nuclear crisis in North Korea has only recently come to a close, 

and it is too early to know the motivations and purposes behind its nuclear 

program. Regardless whether the few reactors and small amounts of fissile 

material were used as blackmail, bargaining chips, or a deterrent, North Korea 

treated its non-weaponized program in much the same way as nuclear weapon 

states use their arsenals. 

 Impact on the Nonproliferation Regime. Although a signatory of the 

NPT, North Korea remained outside the non-proliferation regime for years 

before it was forced back into it, and North Korea acquired unsafeguarded 

fissile material while a member. Some values of the regime were lost in order 

to end North Korea's nuclear weapon capability. The 1994 Agreed 

Framework instituted a policy of forgiveness--past mistakes would be not be 

punished as long as they were disclosed. Furthermore, the U.S. may have 

started a dangerous precedent of paying off a state which has not carried out 

its treaty obligations. However, the crisis also brought good news for nonproliferation. If North Korea had been seeking a nuclear arsenal, it would 
27

have never agreed to the deal, and when the state had the opportunity to 

withdraw from the NPT, it chose not to do so. North Korea gained 

considerable security, diplomatic, and economic benefits by acquiring a 

nuclear capability. That this state was satisfied with the benefits of nonweaponization is an important observation in determining the future of nonproliferation. 

Nuclear Non-Weaponized States and Non-Proliferation

 Nuclear weapon states use their arsenals for deterrent and diplomatic 

reasons. Today, nuclear non-weaponized states are using actual or potential 

capabilities for the same reasons. This trend, which goes back to Bundy's 

theories of existential deterrence, suggests that weapons systems matter less 

than the idea of nuclear weapons and the potential harm they can cause. This 

observation provides insight into the future of non-proliferation and nuclear 

weapons. 

 William Kincade discussed the "proliferation paradox" and 

questioned why fewer states choose to develop nuclear weapons even as the 

capabilities to produce nuclear weapons increase.50 States are not choosing to 

become nuclear weapon states because having nuclear capabilities is sufficient 

to meet their security needs. Future years will probably bring a proliferation 

of nuclear programs with capabilities of producing weapons, even among 

states that have previously not been a proliferation concern. If the acquisition 

of weapons-grade material (highly enriched uranium and reprocessed 

plutonium, which are not necessary for nuclear power plants) proves to be a 

valuable tool in international relations, states will have incentives to go 

beyond the boundaries of the NPT. This is a threat to the non-proliferation 

regime. It is also, however, a restraint. If states with the capability to produce 

nuclear weapons find utility and security in non-weaponized programs, they 

will not test, deploy, or integrate nuclear forces into the military. 
28

 Non-weaponization has numerous advantages for international 

security. When states are content to remain non-weaponized, they will not 

enter into destabilizing arms races. By not acquiring working weapons, states 

show that their intentions are not aggressive and commit themselves to 

something resembling a no-first-use agreement. Furthermore, when nuclear 

programs are months, weeks, or even days away from being weaponized, the 

delayed time factor decreases the possibilities of inadvertent or accidental uses 

of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the non-proliferation regime would, very 

likely, actually be more successful in preventing weaponization than in 

stopping proliferation. 

 It is important to note, however, that non-weaponization is not a 

perfect scenario. Dangers remain in large quantities of fissile materials spread 

throughout the world. States which possess a nuclear weapons capability also 

possess the capability to supply other states. In addition, nuclear programs 

which are not secured are highly susceptible to theft. However, if these 

dangers can be addressed, a non-weaponization regime can be an alternative 

to the non-proliferation regime. 

 While the non-proliferation regime has had many successes over the 

past 25 years, and the NPT was strengthened by the indefinite extension 

granted in 1995, not all states have chosen to join the treaty. It would be best 

for international security to bring the states not currently parties to the NPT 

into a regime that provides for protection of fissile materials, rather than 

attempting to prevent proliferation outright. The situations of India, Pakistan, 

and North Korea have confirmed that non-weaponized programs can provide 

security benefits. A non-weaponized regime might also include the following 

provisions : states would provide an open acknowledgment as to the extent of 

their nuclear programs; fissile material would be secured and protected from 

smuggling and theft; states would offer a formalized statement that any fissile 

materials in their possession have not been assembled into weapons and are 

not intended to be used in an aggressive first strike against another state; and 
29

mutual inspections would enforce non-weaponization. Finally, states would 

agree to conditions similar to those found in the NPT--they would not transfer 

nuclear materials or technology to other states or groups. 

 Such an agreement could be more attractive than those proposed in 

the past, and would not have the discriminatory stigma of the NPT. A 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a treaty banning the production of 

weapons-grade fissile materials would have the advantage of both limiting 

nuclear weapon states and freezing existing non-weaponized programs. 

Acting on the similarities between the needs and wants of nuclear and nonnuclear weapon states is the best way to address the concerns of the future of 

nuclear proliferation. If non-weaponized programs can be frozen and 

safeguarded, serious proliferation problems such as arms races and nuclear 

detonations can be prevented. In the long run, international security will 

benefit more from the prevention of nuclear war than it will from additional 

signatures on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

 Nuclear non-weaponized states act very much like nuclear weapon 

states, and nuclear weapon states are naturally reluctant to give up their main 

source of national security. While the next few years will likely bring further 

cuts in superpower arsenals, a nuclear weapon free world is not an immediate 

option. Nuclear weapon states depend too much on their arsenals. Like 

nuclear weapon states, non-weaponized nuclear states with serious security 

concerns will not easily sign away their most important form of security. 

However, if nuclear capabilities and the ideas about existential nuclear 

weapons are more important than the number and type of weapons, there is 

potential for arms control. Although continued reliance on deterrence appears 

to be in the future of nuclear weapons, the decreased significance of nuclear 

programs and arsenals allows many opportunities for arms control and nonproliferation. 
30

ENDNOTES 

 

1

 David Alan Rosenberg, "U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, 1945 to 1950," The Bulletin of the 

Atomic Scientists (May 1982), pp. 25-30. 

2 Ibid., p. 29. 

3

 Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945-1950 

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 197. 

4

 Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), p. 

59. 

5

 Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Washington: Council on 

Foreign Relations, 1957), p. 7. 

6

 Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington: The 

Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 2. 

7 Ibid., p. 4. 

8 Ibid; also McGeorge Bundy, "The Unimpressive Record of Atomic Diplomacy," The 

Nuclear Crisis Reader, Gwyn Prins, ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1984); Daniel 

Ellsberg, "How We Use Our Nuclear Arsenal," in The Nuclear Predicament: A 

Sourcebook, ed. Donna Uthus Gregory (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), pp. 94-5. 

From Protest and Survive, E.P. Thompson and Dan Smith, eds. (New York: Monthly 

Review Press, 1981). 

9

 Ellsberg, pp. 94-5. 

10 Emmanuel Adler, ed., The International Practice of Arms Control (Baltimore: John 

Hopkins University Press, 1992), p. xiii. 

11 Coit D. Blacker and Gloria Duffy, eds., International Arms Control: Issues and 

Agreements (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), p. 223. 

12 Multiple Independently targeted Re-entry Vehicles on InterContinental Ballistic 

Missiles. Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace

(New York: Vintage Books, 1988), pp. 203-206, 288. 

13 Bundy, "The Unimpressive Record of Atomic Diplomacy," p. 53. 

14 . Bernard Brodie, "Implications for Military Policy," in The Absolute Weapon, 

Bernard Brodie, ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946), p. 76. 

15 Robert S. McNamara, "Mutual Deterrence," in The Nuclear Age Reader, Jeffrey 

Porro, ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), p. 194. (Excerpted from Robert S. 

McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (New York: Harper & Row, 

1968), pp. 51-55.) 

16 McGeorge Bundy, "To Cap the Volcano," Foreign Affairs (October 1969), p. 10. 

17 McGeorge Bundy, "Existential Deterrence and Its Consequences," in The Security 

Gamble, D. McLean, ed. (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanhead, 1984), pp. 8-9. 

18 Jonathan Schell, The Abolition (London: Picador, 1984), p. 153. 
31

 

19 Rosenberg, p. 30. 

20 Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993), 

pp. 130-131. 

21 David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "India's Silent Bomb," The Bulletin of the Atomic 

Scientists (September 1992), p. 28. 

22 Leonard Spector with Jacqueline Smith, Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder: Westview 

Press, 1990), pp. 63-75. 

23 Albright and Hibbs, p. 29. 

24 Kanwal Sibal, "India: Seeking a Democratic and Non-Discriminatory New World 

Order," Arms Control Today (June 1993), p. 9. 

25 Spector and Smith, pp. 89-112. 

26 Ali Sarwar Naqvi, "Pakistan: Seeking Regional Peace and Progress in a NonNuclear South Asia," Arms Control Today (June 1993): 9. 

27 Arms Control Reporter (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Defense and Disarmament 

Studies, 1995), p. 454.A.2. 

28 John Schultz, "Riding the Nuclear Tiger: The Search for Security in South Asia," 

Arms Control Today (June 1993), p. 5. 

29 George Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia," Foreign Policy (Summer 

1993), p. 88. 

30 George Perkovich, "Trip Report. Pakistan and India," September 10-22, 1992, pp. 5-

6. 

31 Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia," p. 88. 

32 George Questor, "Nuclear Pakistan and Nuclear India: Stable Deterrent or 

Proliferation Challenge?" Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1992, p. 

9. 

33 Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler. "Beyond Nuclearism," in Security Without 

Nuclear Weapons?, Regina Karp, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) p. 33. 

34 Michael O'Rourke, "Nuclear Standoff," Far Eastern Economic Review (13 

September 1990), p. 26. 

35 David Albright, "India and Pakistan's Nuclear Arms Race: Out of the Closet But Not 

in the Street," Arms Control Today (June 1993), p. 12. 

36 Mirza Azlam Beg, "General Assesses Development of Nuclear Program" (text). 

Islamabad The News in English. (23 April 1994). FBIS Daily Report: South Asia, 4 

May 1994 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS NES-94-086; p. 69). 

37 "Minister: India Aware of Country's 'Deterrent Power'" (text). Islamabad Radio 

Pakistan Overseas Service in English. (18 May 1994). FBIS Daily Report: South Asia, 

24 May 1994, (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-NES-94-100; p. 71). 
32

 

38 Albright and Hibbs, p. 28. 

39 Samina Yasmeen, "Pakistan's Bomb: Conflicting Incentives." Pacific Research

(May 1992), p. 7. 

40 Spector and Smith, pp. 118-124. 

41 David Albright, "How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?" The Bulletin of 

the Atomic Scientists (September/October 1994), pp. 46-47. 

42 For an in-depth review of the chronology of this period, see William E. Berry, Jr., 

North Korea’s Nuclear Program: The Clinton Administration’s Response, INSS 

Occasional Paper No. 3 (Institute for National Security Studies, Colorado Springs, CO: 

March 1995).

43 Albright, p. 53. 

44 Ibid.

45 Paul Bracken, "Nuclear Weapons and State Survival in North Korea," Survival

(Autumn 1993), p. 147. 

46 Andrew Mack, "A Nuclear North Korea: The Choices are Narrowing," World Policy 

Journal (Summer 1994), p. 27. 

47 Selig Harrison, "Breaking the Nuclear Impasse: The U.S. and North Korea," 

prepared for a Hearing of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee 

on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, November 3, 1993, p. 31. 

48 Nodong Sinmun, "We Do Not Beg for Peace" (text). Pyongyang Korean Central 

Broadcasting in Korean (18 May 1995). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast 

Information Service. FBIS Daily Report - East Asia, 19 May 1995 (PrEx 7.10: FBISEAS-95-097; p. 35. 

49 Bracken, p. 148. 

50 William Kincade, "Nuclear Proliferation: Diminishing Threat?" paper presented to 

the 36th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 22 February 

1995, Chicago, Illinois. Also published as INSS Occasional Paper No. 6, Nuclear 

Proliferation: Diminishing Threat? (Institute for National Security Studies, Colorado 

Springs, CO: Dec 1995).