J-S69039-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DALE SAUNDERS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 497 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 15, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0001310-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 26, 2018

Dale Saunders (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed after a jury found him guilty of indecent assault,1 unlawful contact 

with a minor,2 and corruption of minors.3 After careful review, we affirm. 

The trial court detailed the evidence presented at trial:

Shannon Peiffer testified that she is a mother of five children. At 

the time of the October 24, 2017 trial, her two oldest were 

[Victim], a 12-year-old daughter, and [N.P.], a 10-year-old son. 

Ms. Peiffer separated from [the children’s] father and she met 

[Appellant], who she began dating in 2008. They started living 

together in Dauphin, and then moved in with Ms. Peiffer’s parents 

at 26 Willow Street in Harrisburg. Ms. Peiffer, [Appellant], 

[Victim][,] and [N.P.] lived there for approximately six months, 

after which they purchased a trailer in Middletown. The four of 

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1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7). 

2

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(1). 

3

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(i). 
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them lived together in Middletown until Ms. Peiffer and [Appellant] 

broke up seven months later. They had lived together for a total 

of one and one-half years at that point. [Appellant] moved in with 

Ms. Peiffer’s parents after the split and Ms. Peiffer stayed in the 

trailer. 

Ms. Peiffer testified that [Victim] was three and [N.P.] was 

one when she and [Appellant] began dating, and [Appellant] took 

on a fatherly role in his relationship with the children. She and 

[Appellant] had a good relationship after the break-up and stayed 

very close for the sake of the children. There was no animosity 

between them. The kids did not have a good relationship with 

their biological dad and looked to [Appellant] as their father. 

[Appellant] eventually moved out of Ms. Peiffer’s parents’ home 

and moved into an apartment two houses down from them. The 

apartment was above a house, with one bedroom, a kitchen, a 

living room, and a bathroom. 

[Appellant] still had contact with [Victim] and [N.P.], and 

there were occasions when they would stay overnight with him. 

Ms. Peiffer had not observed any problems with [Appellant’s] 

interactions with [Victim]. Ms. Peiffer did recall an occasion when 

[Victim] and [N.P.] spent the night at [Appellant’s] place around 

Christmas time in 2012. [Appellant] had sent Ms. Peiffer a 

message telling her that he had gifts for the kids and asked to 

have them overnight. Ms. Peiffer and the kids were fine with that, 

and Ms. Peiffer transported them to and from the home. [Victim] 

did not say anything to Ms. Peiffer about any problems the night 

they stayed there. [Appellant] did not live at that location much 

longer after that visit; he relocated to the Mechanicsburg area and 

[Victim] and [N.P.] did not visit him at that location. 

Ms. Peiffer testified that when [Victim] was in fifth grade, in 

December of 2015, she had a conversation with her about “good 

touch/bad touch.” The conversation was prompted by [Victim’s] 

request to go to a male teacher’s house with her classmates, and 

Ms. Peiffer had expressed concern. Ms. Peiffer told [Victim] that 

men can do inappropriate things to little girls, like touching them 

in places that would not be okay. Ms. Peiffer testified that the 

next day, [Victim] approached her and said, “Do you remember 

what we were talking about yesterday?” Ms. Peiffer replied, 

“About the teacher, about going to his home?” [Victim] responded 

yes, and told her mom she had to tell her something. Ms. Peiffer 

recalled [Victim] crying at this point and said, “Well [Appellant] 
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did touch me. He touched me down there.” [Victim] pointed to 

her vagina. 

Ms. Peiffer did not question [Victim] further at that point 

because she was “having a panic attack.” Ms. Peiffer called her 

father, who told her to call the police. The police were called that 

day, December 15, 2015, and Ms. Peiffer was told to take [Victim] 

to the Children’s Resource Center for an interview. Prior to 

[Victim] telling her about the incident with [Appellant], it had been 

about six months since Ms. Peiffer and her kids had last seen him. 

They had all been at a playground together. Prior to that, the last 

time [Victim] spent time alone together was three years earlier. . 

. .

[Victim] was the next Commonwealth witness called to the 

stand. [Victim] testified that she was twelve years old, a straightA student, member of National Junior Honor Society, band, and 

math counts [sic]. She resides in Middletown with her mom, 

mom’s boyfriend (Mr. Paduani), two younger sisters and two 

younger brothers[.] [Victim] confirmed that she and her mom 

and brother lived with [Appellant] at different residences, 

including one in Dauphin and her current home in Middletown. 

[Victim] testified that she got along well with [Appellant] and he 

was like a dad to her. The last time [Victim] stayed with 

[Appellant] overnight was when she was in second grade around 

Christmastime. It was in the apartment he lived in near her 

grandparents’ house. [Victim] and her brother [N.P.] were 

sleeping in the living room in front of the TV on the floor, and 

[Appellant] was in his bedroom. [Victim] testified that at some 

point [Appellant] called [her] into his bedroom. She laid down 

with him on his mattress and they started talking. [Victim’s] back 

was facing [Appellant] and he started rubbing her stomach from 

behind her. He had lifted her night gown to do so. She was 

wearing a Hello Kitty night gown and underwear. [Victim] 

attested that [Appellant] then started to move his hand down to 

the front of her underwear, and said, “Don’t tell anyone that I’m 

doing this because I can get in serious trouble.” His hand was not 

inside her underwear, but on top of it, in front. He rubbed his 

hand on her private area on top of her underwear. [Victim] recalls 

[Appellant] wearing a tee shirt and boxers, and they were 

underneath the bed covers at the time of the incident. [Victim] 

remained still, facing the wall. When [Appellant] moved his hand 

aside, she got up and went back into the living room, feeling 

insecure and uncomfortable. [Victim] testified that she was afraid 
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to tell her mom what happened because she feared [Appellant] 

might hurt her. She eventually told her mom what happened 

when she was in the fifth grade. 

Detective Lee Tarasi of the Susquehanna Township Police 

Department was the final Commonwealth witness. He testified 

that once the police receive a complaint in reference to a potential 

child abuse case, they will either contact Childline or it will get 

turned over to the Criminal Investigation Division, which is 

Detective Tarasi’s division. Two investigations take place 

concurrently: Children and Youth as well as a law enforcement 

investigation. The child is then forensically interviewed by a child 

interview specialist at Children’s Resource center, and the 

interview is recorded. In this case, Detective Tarasi got the case 

and made the initial call to Childline. He was present for [Victim’s] 

interview, but observed from another room by closed circuit 

television. The interview took place on December 29, 2015. A 

copy of such interview was admitted and published to the jury.

[Appellant] was the last to take the stand. He confirmed 

the prior testimony that [Victim] and [N.P.] did not have a 

relationship with their biological father, and he took on that role 

with them. He testified that he was affectionate with the children, 

encouraged them, disciplined them, and took care of them. He 

said that several times during his relationship with Ms. Peiffer, 

they spoke to the children together about appropriate versus 

inappropriate touching. He and Ms. Peiffer broke up after 

[Appellant] caught her cheating with Mr. Paduani, the father of 

Ms. Peiffer’s younger children. After the break-up, [Appellant] 

confirmed that he still saw [Victim] and [N.P.], and that such 

contact was encouraged by Ms. Peiffer. [Appellant] attested that 

he saw [Victim] after the night in question and it was not the last 

time she stayed the night with him. [Appellant] moved back to 

the Carlisle area to care for his mother and claimed that his 

relationship with [Victim] and [N.P.] was still a good one. 

[Appellant] testified that throughout the five years he spent with 

the kids, he never had sexual thoughts about them, he never 

touched [Victim] inappropriately, and was distraught when he was 

being investigated for such allegations. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/18, at 2-6 (citations to notes of testimony omitted). 
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On October 25, 2017, a jury found Appellant guilty of indecent assault, 

unlawful contact with a minor, and corruption of minors. Appellant’s 

sentencing was deferred by the trial court for the preparation of a presentence investigation report. On February 15, 2018, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to a total of one to seven years of incarceration followed by a fiveyear probationary period. 

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court 

denied. Appellant filed this timely appeal on March 20, 2018. Both the trial 

court and Appellant have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925. 

Appellant presents two issues for our review: 

1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 

DENYING APPELLANT’S POST-SENTENCE MOTION BECAUSE THE 

JURY VERDICT WAS SO CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE AS TO SHOCK ONE’S SENSE OF JUSTICE WHERE THE 

COMMONWEALTH FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE 

DOUBT THAT THE APPELLANT HAD INDECENT CONTACT WITH 

THE COMPLAINING WITNESS, COMMUNICATED WITH HER FOR 

THE PURPOSE OF ENGAGING IN PROHIBITED SEXUAL ACTIVITY, 

OR CORRUPTED THE MORALS OF A MINOR? 

2. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHERE 

THE SENTENCE IMPOSED WAS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE AND 

UNREASONABLE IN LIGHT OF THE APPELLANT’S REHABILITATIVE 

NEEDS AND WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE 

COMMUNITY? 
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Appellant’s Brief at 6.4

In his first issue, Appellant argues that his verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence.5 This claim was properly preserved below,6 and we 

therefore address the merits of Appellant’s argument. We have stated,

When the challenge to the weight of the evidence is predicated on 

the credibility of trial testimony, our review of the trial court’s 

decision is extremely limited. Generally, unless the evidence is so 

unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any verdict based 

thereon pure conjecture, these types of claims are not cognizable 

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4

 Appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement raises a sufficiency of evidence claim 

not presented in his appellate brief. See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 4/6/18, at 

2. However, because Appellant abandoned the claim in his brief, we will not 

address it. See Appellant's Brief at 6; see also Commonwealth v. Briggs, 

12 A.3d 291, 310 n.19 (Pa. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 267 (2011) 

(refusing to address claim appellant raised with trial court but subsequently 

abandoned in brief).

5

 While substantively Appellant’s first issue attacks the weight of the 

testimonial evidence against him, his statement of the issue purports to set 

forth a sufficiency of the evidence argument as well. Appellant’s Brief at 6

(“[T]he Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

Appellant had indecent contact with the complaining witness, communicated 

with her for the purpose of engaging in prohibited sexual activity, or corrupted 

the morals of a minor[.]”). Appellant has waived any sufficiency of evidence 

claims by failing to develop them as separate issues in his appellate brief. See 

Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281 (Pa. Super. 2009) (claim of 

insufficient evidence for multiple convictions was underdeveloped, did not set 

forth the elements of the crimes, did not argue which specific element was not 

met, and thus was waived); Commonwealth v. Plante, 914 A.2d 916, 924 

(Pa. Super. 2006) (“We have repeatedly held that failure to develop an 

argument with citation to, and analysis of, relevant authority waives the issue 

on review.”). 

6

 In compliance with Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 607, Appellant 

preserved his weight of the evidence claim for this Court’s review by initially 

raising the claim in a motion for a new trial. Appellant’s motion was included 

in his post-sentence motion filed with the trial court on February 23, 2018. 

Appellant’s Post-sentence Motion, 2/23/18, at unnumbered 3-4. 
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on appellate review. “Moreover, where the trial court has ruled 

on the weight claim below, an appellate court’s role is not to 

consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence.” “Rather, appellate review is limited 

to whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling 

on the weight claim.”

Gibbs, 981 A.2d at 282 (citations omitted). “[I]t is for the fact-finder to make 

credibility determinations, and the finder of fact may believe all, part, or none 

of a witness’s testimony.” Id. (citation omitted).

Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth’s witnesses were not credible 

and therefore his convictions are against the weight of the evidence. 

Specifically, Appellant avers that the Victim’s “failure to report this incident 

within a reasonable time frame diminishes the weight of her testimony,” and

her credibility is severely negated by Appellant’s close relationship with the 

Victim’s family and Ms. Peiffer “testifying that she never suspected [Appellant] 

of hurting the children in any way.” Appellant’s Brief at 19-20. Appellant 

therefore argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial 

because “the verdict was so contrary to the weight of the evidence as to shock 

one’s sense of justice.” Id. at 18. 

Appellant’s claim rests solely on the weight given to the Victim’s 

testimony. See id. at 18-20. At trial, Victim testified that she was twelve 

years old. N.T., 10/24/17, at 57. She testified that the last time she spent 

the night at Appellant’s apartment was when she was in the second grade. 

Id. at 62. That night, Appellant called her into his bedroom and proceeded to 

rub the Victim’s vaginal area with his hand on the outside of her underwear. 
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Id. at 64-66, 69. Victim further testified that Appellant remarked: “Don’t tell 

anyone that I’m doing this because I can get in serious trouble.” Id. at 67. 

When asked about the delay in reporting, the Victim testified that she was 

scared Appellant would hurt her if she reported the incident. Id. at 72-73. 

However, in the fifth grade, approximately three years later, Victim testified 

that she reported the incident to her mother. Id. at 73.

To allow Appellant “to prevail on a challenge to the weight of the 

evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the 

verdict shocks the conscience of the court.” Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 

A.3d 536, 545 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal citation omitted). Appellant takes 

issue with the delay in which the Victim reported the sexual abuse to her 

mother. Our Supreme Court has specifically held that such a delay is relevant 

to the credibility of a victim’s testimony. Commonwealth v. Snoke, 580 

A.2d 295, 298 (Pa. 2004) (citing Commonwealth v. Lane, 555 A.2d 1246, 

1250-51 (Pa. 1989)) (“[U]nquestionably, a prompt complaint is a factor which 

must be assessed with all of the other pertinent evidence bearing upon the 

question of the credibility of the complaining witness . . . consideration should 

be given to factors inherent in cases involving minor victims which may explain 

the delay without reflecting unfavorably on the minor witness’ credibility.”). 

Moreover, we have held that a lack of prompt complaint is something to

consider, but “by itself it doesn't mean that the event didn't occur.” 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 672 A.2d 1353, 1358 (Pa. Super. 1996) 
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(emphasis in original). “[T]he law is that lack of a prompt complaint should 

cause the jury to look more critically upon the credibility of the victim.” Id.

Instantly, Appellant is asking this Court to re-weigh the testimonial 

evidence presented at trial and replace the credibility determinations of the 

jury with our own. That is not our function as an appellate court. Talbert, 

129 A.3d at 546 (internal citation omitted). The jury found that the 

Commonwealth’s evidence proved Appellant committed indecent assault, 

unlawful contact with a minor, and corruption of minors. Appellant points to 

no evidence that the verdicts are “so contrary as to shock the conscience.” 

Id. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Appellant’s weight claim. 

In his second issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of 

his sentence, averring that the “sentence imposed by the sentencing court is 

manifestly excessive such that it constitutes too severe a punishment where 

the court failed to consider that the Appellant has no prior record and was a 

productive member of society.” Appellant’s Brief at 22. 

“The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence 

is not absolute, and must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.” 

Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014), 

appeal denied, 104 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014). “An appellant must satisfy a fourpart test to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction when challenging the discretionary 
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aspects of a sentence.” Id. We conduct this four-part test to determine 

whether:

(1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at the 

time of sentencing or in a post[-]sentence motion; (2) the 

appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth 

a concise statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the appellant raises 

a substantial question for our review. 

Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 86 A.3d 231 (Pa. 2014). “A defendant presents a 

substantial question when he sets forth a plausible argument that the 

sentence violates a provision of the sentencing code or is contrary to the 

fundamental norms of the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Dodge, 

77 A.3d 1263, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quotations and citations omitted), 

appeal denied, 91 A.3d 161 (Pa. 2014).

Appellant has complied with the first three prongs of this test by raising 

his discretionary sentencing claims in a timely post-sentence motion, filing a 

timely notice of appeal, and including in his brief a Rule 2119(f) concise 

statement. See Appellant’s Brief at 15-17. Therefore, we examine whether 

Appellant presents a substantial question for review.

Appellant argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence 

where it failed to consider Appellant’s criminal history and societal 

contributions. Appellant’s Brief at 22. This argument presents a substantial 

question. See Dodge, 77 A.3d at 1272 (“[A]n excessive sentence claim, in 

conjunction with an assertion that the court did not consider mitigating 
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factors, raise[s] a substantial question.”). We thus review Appellant’s 

sentencing claim mindful of the following: 

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge. The standard employed when reviewing the 

discretionary aspects of sentencing is very narrow. We may 

reverse only if the sentencing court abused its discretion or 

committed an error of law. A sentence will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an 

abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. 

Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, 

that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised 

its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. We must accord 

the sentencing court’s decision great weight because it was in the 

best position to review the defendant’s character, defiance or 

indifference, and the overall effect and nature of the crime. 

Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11-12 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

The relevant portion of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) states: 

In selecting from the alternatives set forth in subsection (a), the 

court shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed 

should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection 

of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact 

on the life of the victim and on the community, and the 

rehabilitative needs of the defendant. . . . In every case in which 

the court imposes a sentence for a felony or misdemeanor . . . the 

court shall make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court 

at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons 

for the sentence imposed.

Id.

This Court has also held, “[w]hen a sentencing court has reviewed a 

pre[-]sentence investigation report, we presume that the court properly 

considered and weighed all relevant factors in fashioning the defendant’s 
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sentence.” Baker, 72 A.3d at 663 (citing Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893 

A.2d 758, 767 (Pa. Super. 2006)). Additionally:

[i]n imposing sentence, the trial court is required to consider the 

particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the 

defendant. The trial court should refer to the defendant’s prior 

criminal record, age, personal characteristics, and potential for 

rehabilitation. However, where the sentencing judge had the 

benefit of a presentence investigation report, it will be presumed 

that he or she was aware of the relevant information regarding 

the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along 

with mitigating statutory factors. 

Fowler, 893 A.2d at 767-68 (citing Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 

154 (Pa. Super. 2004)) (some internal citations omitted). 

At the outset of the February 15, 2018 hearing, the Commonwealth

noted that Appellant’s sentencing was deferred for the preparation of a presentence investigation report. N.T., 2/15/18, at 2. The trial court also 

acknowledged that “a pre-sentence report was prepared and considered.” 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/18, at 11. Before imposing Appellant’s sentence in 

open court, the trial court commented: 

[T]his Court has sat now for well over 20 years and we’ve 

seen all types of crime that’s been committed in various degrees 

and levels. And in this particular case there’s not the penetration 

types of concerns. And the first view of the case is although it is 

a victim crime, although it is a heinous crime, it is not as 

outrageous as it could have been. That doesn’t mitigate it, it just 

tries to put it in the light of trying to balance where, when you’re 

weighing the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, which you 

have to do, and where you weigh the circumstances under which 

it occurred, each crime occurs. And when you weigh the crime 

itself you have a type of sliding scale. 

What this case brings out, and I think it widened my eyes a 

little more than my sometimes more callus objective attempt to 
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analyze criminal activity, is impact. Here the impact had a 

reverberating reaction that all too often is ignored by the [c]ourt. 

And I dare say the impact statement -- and noting the trial as it 

went -- became really apparent. 

N.T., 2/15/18, at 8-9. 

Based on our review of the record – including the notes of testimony 

from the sentencing hearing and the above remarks by the trial court – we 

conclude that the trial court considered the appropriate factors when imposing 

Appellant’s sentence. The trial court specifically discussed the severity of 

Appellant’s crimes, the rehabilitative needs of Appellant, and victim impact. 

Ultimately, and in its discretion, the trial court determined that Appellant’s

convictions warranted a one-year minimum sentence. Thus, we find no merit 

to Appellant’s second issue. 

Judgment of Sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/26/2018