AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Rapid Dominance

Integrating Space into Today’s Air

Operations Center

MARK E. HARTER

Major, USAF

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 11

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

April 2000

AIR UNI V ERSITY
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air

University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other

US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Wright Flyer Paper, and others in the series,

is available electronically at the Air University

Research Web Site http://research.maxwell.af.mil

under “Research Papers” then “Special Collections.”
iii

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright

Flyer Papers series. In this series, Air Command and Staff

College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes the “best of the

best” student research projects from the prior academic

year. The ACSC research program encourages our students to move beyond the school’s core curriculum in their

own professional development and in “advancing aerospace power.” The series title reflects our desire to perpetuate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier generations

of airmen. Projects selected for publication combine solid

research, innovative thought, and lucid presentation in

exploring war at the operational level. With this broad perspective, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic range

of doctrinal, technological, organizational, and operational

questions. Some of these studies provide new solutions to

familiar problems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind in pursuing new possibilities. By making these

research studies available in the Wright Flyer Papers,

ACSC hopes to encourage critical examination of the findings and to stimulate further research in these areas.

John W. Rosa, Brig Gen, USAF

Commandant
Preface

Control of the vertical dimension—air and space—is

essential to preserving healthy commerce and situational

awareness during peacetime and sustaining military operations during conflict. Air and space forces must be integrated in order to achieve rapid dominance of the battle

space when necessary. While airpower has existed for

almost a century, military space operations are yet in their

infancy. Military leaders, planners, and operators are just

beginning to recognize the importance and legitimacy of

space as a center of gravity and war-fighting medium.

This paper is based upon research in current aerospace operations, exercises, doctrine, and command and

control (C2) warfare. It also draws on personal experience

as the first space warfare officer (1996–98) at the

Thirteenth Air Force, Andersen Air Force Base (AFB),

Guam. That experience included numerous Pacific Air

Forces and Pacific Command major joint/combined exercises and several real-world military operations including

noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance, peacetime cooperative engagement, and military

operations other than war. Many still believe and treat

space merely as just an extension of the air medium,

expecting little and receiving less from space operations.

Accordingly, the Department of Defense needs to address

significant issues in the areas of space training, doctrine,

equipment, personnel, and C2 in order to integrate space

into military operations. It is important for the United

States Air Force to make great gains in these areas in

preparation for the Expeditionary Aerospace Force.

I appreciate the assistance of my faculty research

advisor, Maj Daniel Blaettler, at Air Command and Staff

College and the space personnel at the Air Force Doctrine

Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. I also thank Col William J.

“Chip” Beck, Air University (AU) space chair; Col Victor P.

Budura Jr. (former AU space chair and current Air War

College [AWC] faculty); Col Edward Groeninger, 613

AOS/CC; and Maj Gen Lance L. Smith, AWC commandant,

Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 

v
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I extend gratitude to my wife, Kimberly, and our children Joanna, Noah, and Kristina for their patience and

support.
vii

Abstract

Rapid dominance—the ability of forces to exploit information and quickly destroy critical targets—is the key in

controlling the battle space of future warfare. The ability to

rapidly gain information, analyze it, and use it to make

sound military decisions is key to military domination and

victory. Huge volumes of critical war-fighter information

speed through the space medium to reach their destinations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Information provided via space systems is crucial to military planning and executing aerospace operations through

the entire spectrum of conflict and therefore a key to any

future military operation. Unfortunately, potentially

greater space power contributions are often limited due to

a lack of “space mindedness” by military leaders, planners,

and operations during theater campaigns.

This paper identifies the importance and legitimacy of

space as a center of gravity and military war-fighting medium, focusing on the realm of the joint air operations center (JAOC). It defines five key areas (with practical suggestions) that the Department of Defense needs to address in

order to integrate space into military operations: space

training, doctrine, equipment, personnel, and command

and control. The research first documents current deficiencies of space awareness in the typical JAOC and then

identifies and suggests methods to improve joint war fighting through space integration in the JAOC and the

Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) of the near future.

The research presented here is particularly important for

the United States Air Force to consider in preparation for

the EAF—it provides a framework to educate JAOC and

EAF personnel to more effectively employ joint aerospace

power throughout the spectrum of military operations.
Rapid Dominance

Future warfare depends on the rapidity of collecting information and making decisions.

—Gen Charles “Chuck” Horner

Rapid dominance—the ability to exploit information and

quickly destroy critical targets—is the key to warfare. The

military that most effectively collects, fuses, and delivers

information from sensors to shooters will be victorious. In

this realm, aerospace forces form the critical link in rapid

dominance. Today, aerospace forces are capable of delivering lethal military power anywhere on earth within hours

(aircraft, ballistic missiles, and space systems). Aerospace

power controls the vertical dimension with unparalleled

speed, range, precision, and flexibility. Space systems provide the crucial links and nodes in warfare by rapidly collecting information and delivering it to war fighters for

timely, accurate decisions. 

Unfortunately, there is a lack of space mindedness in

the planning and execution of joint air operations, which

significantly reduces battle space rapid dominance. This

research paper identifies the importance and legitimacy of

space as a center of gravity (COG) and military war-fighting medium. It offers practical, near-term solutions to a

space-minded aerospace force by focusing on improved

joint space training, space resources (personnel and equipment), joint doctrine, and theater command and control

(C2) of space forces.

Space: Important Yesterday, Necessary

Today, and Critical Tomorrow

Operation Desert Storm (1991), hailed by some as the

“first space war,”1 clearly employed significant force

enhancement contributions for the first time in combat.

Today, almost a decade later, all United States (US) services depend upon and use force multiplying space systems to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical military

objectives. Tomorrow’s twenty-first century space-enhanced

1
2 RAPID DOMINANCE

warfare will dwarf current space war-fighter operations

due to improvements in joint space doctrine, training,

equipment, personnel, and C2. Additionally, three simultaneous factors make space power even more essential in

achieving rapid dominance in current and future warfare:

the Department of Defense (DOD) drawdown of the 1990s,

the significant increase in DOD operations tempo, and the

emergence of the information age.

Department of Defense Drawdown

The daunting defense force structure drawdown of the

last decade (table 1) places a greater demand on space systems to deliver focused, accurate, timely information to

leaders, planners, and war fighters. The near 40 percent

decrease across the board of military personnel and 50

percent decrease in defense spending since fiscal year (FY)

1987 can be balanced by more effective real-time information systems, which depend on space operations.2 Space

forces provide indispensable contributions to US forces in

the absence of personnel through automated collection––

C2 systems delivering information at the speed of light to

war fighters.

Table 1

United States Drawdown

Force Component FY 87 Strength FY 97 Strength Difference

USAF Personnel 607,035 371,577 -39%

USAF Aircraft 1,764 ,912 -38%

USAF Wings ,34 ,21 -38%

Army Personnel 781,000 495,000 -40%

Navy Fleet (ships) ,538 ,339 -37%

Federal Budget ($FY99) ,,417.7B $267.0B -36%

Defense Percent

Gross Defense Product ,6.1% 3.1% -49%

Sources: Air Force Magazine, May 1998, 36–44; Strategic Assessment 1997, Fiscal Year 1987–97,

3–10; and data for FY 87–89 from Congressional Budget Office, January 1998, “The Economic and

Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 1999–2008,” constant FY dollars.
HARTER 3

Increasing Operations Tempo

The current strategic environment is one in which the

US military will engage increasingly in small-scale contingencies (SSC) and military operations other than war

(MOOTW) to protect our national interests.3 The formidable monolithic threat of the cold war has transitioned to

multiple, often unpredictable, international security

threats. The strategic environment remains complex, and

in addition to regional dangers, presents asymmetric challenges—terrorism, information warfare (IW), weapons of

mass destruction; transnational threats—organized crime,

drug trafficking, ethnic disputes, refugee flows; and “wild

cards.”4 The surge in operations tempo magnifies the reliance

on space systems due to their global presence, precision,

and reliability (fig. 1). DOD total force is deployed in support of 10 joint/combined operations and participates in

11 exercises in more than 70 countries.5 Once US military

forces are deployed to these operations, there is a propensity for “mission creep” to occur; the conflict escalates,

extending US military involvement beyond the original

intent (e.g., Bosnia, Somalia, etc.). This volume of deployed

personnel, exercises, and real-world operations demands

global space assets to provide communications, navigation,

weather, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance (ISR),

50

40

30

20

10

0

1947–50 1950–60 1960–70 1970–80 1980–90 1990–98

Figure 1. USAF Operations 1947–98
warning, targeting, and airlift/logistics support. Due to

their global nature, space systems are usually the first intheater, on-the-scene assets collecting valuable information for commanders and leadership to gain situational

awareness for planning and executing military operations.

Twenty–First Century: The Information Age

Military campaigns live and die according to accurate,

timely information or lack thereof. Warfare in the twentyfirst century—the information age—depends on real-time,

global information collection and dissemination to military

leadership, often only capable by space systems. Information

that is provided by an ounce of silicon in a computer chip

might have more effect than a ton of uranium.6 Informationbased precision weapons are replacing weapons of shear

firepower and mass destruction at a rapidly increasing

rate, as evident in recent military operations using exclusively precision-guided munitions (PGM).7 MOOTW and

SSC, usually constrained by politically sensitive environments and complex cultural and population factors, necessitate the need for accurate, timely space-based information.8 To illustrate the inextricable relationship between

space and information, US Space Command now has the

responsibility for DOD information operations.9 For the

United States to maintain global leadership and military

power, US forces must exploit the space medium to create

fully integrated aerospace campaigns and achieve rapid

dominance, especially in the era of the Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF).

The Challenge: Space Mindedness

Rapid dominance is achieved when war fighters at all

levels grasp and apply what space brings to the fight. To

fully exploit the space medium in war fighting requires military leaders, planners, and operators to understand how

to effectively integrate space power with air operations to

control the entire vertical dimension while supporting land

and sea forces. The rapid growth of military space operations, however, is depreciated and often perceived as trivial due to inadequate space awareness and training of

4 RAPID DOMINANCE
today’s war fighters. Unfortunately, a lack of space mindedness exists in today’s joint air operations center (JAOC)

where the aerospace campaign is planned, controlled, and

executed.10 The JAOC is pivotal—it is the nerve center and

senior C2 node for theater aerospace combat power. Air

Force Space Command’s (AFSPC) Fourteenth Air Force

recent initiatives to place qualified space experts (W-13SX)

and space support teams (SST) in-theater are a good start

in improving space awareness during JAOC campaign

planning and execution, but there is still a long way to go.

Compounding the problem, numbered air forces (NAF) do

not have complete JAOC staffs—JAOCs are usually augmented by other NAFs and joint/combined war-fighting

units for exercises and real-world operations. The result—

a high percentage of JAOC personnel do not understand or

appreciate the role of space in military operations and do

not know how space combat power is employed in their

specific JAOC function. This lack of space mindedness

prevents the application of space power in joint operations

and reduces force enhancement in every medium—air,

land, sea, and space.

To better gauge this deficiency, the author gathered data

from interviews, personal JAOC experiences, and a survey

of JAOC augmentees—the 1998–99 Air Command and

Staff College (ACSC) Prairie Warrior (PW) exercise team—to

determine their initial space mindedness as they began

their exercise in November 1998.11 The PW exercise team

demographics closely paralleled the composition of an

actual JAOC (personnel from all services). Despite the PW

team members being among the most planning and operations-minded people at their grade level (O-4), the survey

results indicate a lack of space mindedness at the operational level. Table 2 summarizes basic trends from the survey. These results indicate that the majority of today’s

JAOC personnel do not understand the entire spectrum of

what space offers; and, therefore, they are not prepared to

adequately integrate space into joint theater air operations. The problem is that most JAOC personnel have not

been educated on how space supports specific JAOC planning and operations, and “they don’t know what they don’t

know.” The end result—rapid dominance is neither as

HARTER 5
rapid nor as dominant as it could be due to lost space integration potential.

Table 2

Air Command and Staff College

Prairie Warrior Space Survey Trends

The Solution: Putting the

Aerospace Puzzle Together

Rapid dominance requires effective air and space integration, yet this is limited by the lack of space mindedness

among war planners and war fighters. Space operations

must be more than an afterthought in campaign planning

and combat operations. This paper addresses the trends

identified in current aerospace operations and recommends methods to improve aerospace integration in five

major areas to facilitate the understanding, application,

and integration of space combat power in the JAOC. These

6 RAPID DOMINANCE

—All services had similar knowledge levels of space support, with the Army

officers slightly higher than the other services in actual military application.

—Aircrew members had less knowledge of what space brings to the fight/

JAOC.

—Fifty-nine percent of the exercise team had no JAOC experience at all (typical JAOC augmentees).

—Of the 41 percent that did have some JAOC experience, only 43 percent

were ever briefed or educated on JAOC space support products and services related to their function.

—The majority had a reasonable understanding of basic space support but

didn’t know who in-theater was responsible for space or how to get specific space support.

—There was a general lack of understanding how space supports logistics.

—Thirty-six percent didn’t know where/how to request space imagery requirements (J2 collections manager).

—There was a general lack of understanding that the US military received

space support from non-US space systems.

—About one-third did not understand basic space threats and limitations.

—Only 11 percent felt that today’s military space operations were “good”; the

remaining 89 percent felt there was too much technical detail and not

enough war-fighter integration.
five interrelated elements—training, personnel, equipment,

doctrine, and C2—are all necessary to establish an integrated aerospace force capable of battle space dominance

(fig. 2).

Training. JAOC personnel need to receive better space

support training and education to capitalize on space force

enhancement capabilities and space limitations.

Doctrine. Individual service components have their own

space doctrine, but there is no joint doctrine on military

space operations. This must be corrected, and the first

step is a solid Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space Operations.

Personnel. Joint aerospace combat power requires permanent, qualified, and competent space operations personnel at JAOCs, NAFs, wings, and Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) units, augmented by flexible SSTs and

expertise reach back to space operations centers (SOC).

HARTER 7

TRAINING

EQUIPMENT DOCTRINE

C2

PERSONNEL

Figure 2. Aerospace Integration Recommendations
Command and control. Theater space forces C2 must

be clear, rapid, and structured to support theater campaign objectives. Space forces require centralized control

and decentralized execution. The JAOC must effectively

coordinate and integrate military, civilian, commercial,

and foreign space capabilities. 

Equipment. JAOCs and Expeditionary Operations Centers (EOC) need resident standardized space support

equipment, as well as deployable space support hardware

to effectively inform leaders and planners during en route

operations. 

This paper identifies methods to improve aerospace integration. It does not analyze space war-fighter applications

that are already documented in Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-1, Tactical Employment

of Space, the Aircrew Combat Information Guide (ACIG),

and at the Air Force Weapons School, Space Division, Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada.12 The first element of

space mindedness is for aerospace planners and operators

to understand the importance and legitimacy of space as a

war-fighting medium. This paper provides recommendations in training, doctrine, personnel, space C2, and equipment. The paper concludes with a discussion of integrated

aerospace power in the EAF, providing a military that

works better and costs less through smart use of aerospace application, resulting in rapid battle space dominance.

Space—Dominating the High Ground

Take the high ground, and hold it!

—Sun Tzu, circa 500 B.C.

Great military leaders realize the strategic, operational,

and tactical advantages of controlling the high ground.

Ancient warriors in Sun Tzu’s period understood the

advantages of security and situational awareness in securing the high ground—a hill or a mountain. Armies of the

US Civil War took the high ground to the next level with

manned balloons to gather battlefield intelligence. Great

aeroplane pioneers of World War I courageously took to

8 RAPID DOMINANCE
new heights with crude flying machines, demonstrating

the ability to weaponize the skies; and by World War II airpower proved the value of multidimensional warfare (land,

sea, and air). During the Persian Gulf War, coalition forces’

superb air power achieved unparalleled domination of the

battle space and witnessed the emergence of military operations in the ultimate high ground—space. Establishing

control over the entire vertical dimension is critical, as

stated by Gen Charles “Chuck” Horner––“Everything is

possible if you have it; little is possible if you lose it.”13

Importance of the Space Domain

The first element of space mindedness for aerospace

planners and operators is to understand the importance

and legitimacy of space as a COG and as a war-fighting

medium. The rapid growth of commercial, civil, and military activities in space suggests that space will soon be an

economic COG and perhaps already has achieved that.14

Approximately 600 functional satellites are in orbit, 220 of

which represent a US investment of more than $100 billion.15 Estimates indicate that during the 1998–2003 time

frame, the United States and other space-faring nations

will invest $500 billion into space systems and launch

between 1,000 and 1,500 satellites.16 The estimated annual revenues for the global space industry in 1998 exceeded

$88 billion and are expected to increase at a staggering 50

percent per year through 2001.17 Communications, navigation, environmental resources, weather, education, telemedicine, entertainment, and science are just a few of the

many applications migrating to space and driving this

space “gold rush.” The 1998 national security strategy

(NSS) equates space to an emerging vital national interest,

recognizing that US dependence on space could grow into

vulnerability and a target. “Space has emerged in this

decade as a new global information utility with extensive

political, diplomatic, military, and economic implications

for the United States. Unimpeded access to and use of

space is essential for protecting U.S. national security and

promoting our prosperity. Our policy is to promote development of the full range of space-based capabilities in a

manner that protects our vital security interests. We will

HARTER 9
deter threats to our interests, and if deterrence fails, defeat

hostile efforts against U.S. access to and use of space.”18

Space Power: What Does It

Bring to the Fight?

When you think about protecting this nation’s global interests,

you have to remember it starts with space . . . it is the fourth

medium of warfare.

—Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF

Force Multiplier: With Space Forces, 1 + 1 = 3

Space forces provide military leaders, operators, and

planners with enormous force enhancement products and

services that are essential in achieving rapid dominance of

the battle space. Today’s space systems provide key information via global communications, navigation, weather,

warning, and ISR to achieve full spectrum dominance

across the range of military operations (table 3).19 These

same space forces allow the USAF to execute the core

competencies of Global Engagement.20 Military space applications are growing at an increasing rate delivering products and services to military leaders, planners, and operators better, faster, and cheaper than many conventional

terrestrial systems.

Table 3 

Aerospace Power for the Twenty-First Century

Joint Vision 2010 Global Engagement

Full Spectrum Dominance Air and Space Superiority

—Dominant Maneuver Global Attack

—Precision Engagement Precision Engagement

—Focused Logistics Agile Combat Support

—Full Dimensional Protection Rapid Global Mobility

Information Superiority Information Superiority

10 RAPID DOMINANCE
Bullets Win Battles; Information Wins Wars 

Today, the primary military contribution from space is

information. With it a campaign is successful; without it

failure is almost certain, and JAOC planners must understand this. Joint force commanders (JFC) strive to

achieve information superiority—“the ability to collect,

control, exploit, and defend information while denying the

enemy the same.”21 Information operations (IO) is integral

to the joint force air component commander (JFACC) aerospace planning process, consisting of information in warfare and IW. The JFC must quickly gain and exploit information in warfare (ISR, communications, precision

navigation missile warning, etc.) for battle space situational awareness and rapid, solid decision making. Timely,

accurate information is equally as important (arguably,

even more important) as firepower; and combining information and firepower is lethal (e.g., PGMs). Some go so far

to say that the ultimate precision-guided weapon is the

electron, delivering or denying critical military information.22 Warfare in the information age is highly dependent

on global space forces, which allow forces to achieve dominant battle space awareness and decrease the “fog of war,”

providing the war fighter a clearer picture of the battle

space. Space-based information is key for US forces to

exploit battle space information for sensor-to-shooter

operations (fig. 3). Real-time-in-the-cockpit (RTIC) and

HARTER 11

Battle Space Situational

Awareness

Precision

Navigation

Real-Time Tactical and

Strategic Weather

Theater Missile

Defense

Combat Search and

Rescue

Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance

Real-Time-out-of-theCockpit Information

Real-Time-in-theCockpit Information

GPS Aided

Munitions

Strategic and Tactical

SATCOM

Figure 3. Rapid Dominance: Space/Information Operations

Provide Battle Management

GPS - Global Positioning System

SATCOM - Satellite Communications
real-time-out-of-the-cockpit (RTOC) information is emerging in exercises and deployments.23 Theater commanders

employ elements of IW to defend friendly IO and attack

enemy IO, both relying on space systems. 

Aerospace Campaign Planning

Space forces play an integral part in deliberate, crisis

action and adaptive planning by linking and leveraging

joint terrestrial operations to achieve JFC objectives. There

is one theater campaign—and four major pieces to it: land,

sea, air, and space. Space mindedness means consciously

making space as much a part of the campaign plan as

land, sea, and air. During campaign planning, space forces

provide critical information for intelligence updates and

real-time global communications to facilitate rapid campaign planning. The JFACC must know what space forces

are in the fight (friendly and enemy) and effectively integrate them into the overall campaign plan. As with air,

land, and sea power, space power requires careful thought

and planning to make it lethal and successful. Aerospace

campaign planning starts with the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP),24 which provides guidance to the commander in chief, US Space Command (USCINCSPACE),

apportions space forces, and assigns space tasks to combatant commanders and service chiefs. USCINCSPACE initiates space campaign planning in the operations plan’s

(OPLAN) Annex N (space operations). Space must migrate

and be expanded throughout the entire OPLAN.

The JFC normally designates a JFACC, who is responsible for exploiting air and space operations to support JFC

theater campaign objectives and accomplishes this

through the Joint Air and Space Operations Plan (JASOP)––

the aerospace part of the campaign that must effectively

integrate air and space theater operations and forces.25

Every JASOP section should reflect the space medium by

identifying friendly/enemy capabilities, space objectives,

enemy/friendly space COGs, space courses of action, and

strategy development. The JFACC executes the JASOP

through the JAOC, the JFC’s theater air and SOC.26

12 RAPID DOMINANCE
Space Warfare: What Is the Threat?

Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you

will never be in peril.

—Sun Tzu

The Art of War

Space mindedness includes the realization that the

United States is not the only nation that recognizes the

strategic use of space—there are more than 40 space-faring countries that have varied levels of space programs to

reap the contributions from space. There are 14 active

space launch sites worldwide, and 26 nations have astronauts/cosmonauts.27 More than 70 percent of the world’s

nations use satellite communications (SATCOM).28 There

are now more than 20 foreign and commercial imagery

systems (expected to be more than 30 in 2001) providing

imagery from 30 meters down to a one-meter resolution to

anyone who can pay for it. Global Positioning System (GPS)

navigation signals—standard precision service (SPS) < 100

meters accuracy—are available to any user who has a GPS

receiver. Potential adversaries already exploit space-based

communications, imagery, and navigation to further their

own interests.

As the United States increases its reliance on space

assets, potential adversaries will realize US dependence on

space systems and eventually use space in threatening

ways. Already nations have jammed regional SATCOM

because of turf wars over geosynchronous slots over the

equator.29 This friction intensifies as telecommunications

increase and satellites crowd the geosynchronous belt.

JAOC personnel must also understand that GPS, with an

inherently weak signal, has already experienced interference in signal saturated environments and is susceptible

to jamming.30 The DOD initiated the navigation warfare

(NAVWAR) program in 1996 to ensure US military access

to GPS signals in the face of enemy jamming while denying

enemy access to GPS signals. Solutions to the NAVWAR

challenge involve user equipment changes (near term) and

GPS satellite signal modifications (long term).31 Obviously,

any interference with GPS or SATCOM weakens the ability

to plan and execute joint aerospace operations.

HARTER 13
Space Control

Whoever has the capability to control space will likewise possess the capability to control the surface of the earth.

—Gen Thomas D. White

Today, space is a friendly COG, but it could easily be an

enemy COG in future conflicts. The United States must be

prepared to seize the initiative and control space, just as

we do in the land, sea, and air mediums. This is merely an

old problem in a new medium—as the sixteenth-century

blue water navy was created to protect sea commerce—the

twenty-first century requires protection of space assets to

secure space and information commerce. Space control is

a controversial, hotly debated topic due to internationally

and politically charged issues of national sovereignty, privacy, and weaponizing space.32 JAOC planners—especially

in the guidance, apportionment, and targeting (GAT) and

master air attack plan (MAAP) cells—need to recognize that

negating enemy space forces can be accomplished by controlling the adversary’s space links (electromagnetic signals) and nodes (ground stations, satellites, and user

equipment). These links and nodes represent space choke

points and lines of communication (LOC), lucrative targets

for any combat medium. Figure 4 illustrates links and

nodes that are vulnerable to attack. 

14 RAPID DOMINANCE

Space Segment

Ground Segment

Data Processing

User Segment

RTIC/RTOC

Space

Links

Figure 4. Space Control Links (Signals) and Nodes (Segments)

RTIC - Real-Time-in-the-Cockpit Information

RTOC - Real-Time-out-of-the-Cockpit Information
Primary nodes include ground control stations, the

satellites themselves, data-processing nodes, and user

equipment, which can be neutralized through physical

operations—bombs on target or antisatellite (ASAT)

weapons. Primary links (e.g., LOCs) include ground C2-

satellite links, satellite-user signal links, and satellitedata-processing-user links. Neutralizing the LOCs requires

signal disruption. The JAOC space and information operations personnel bring this expertise to the GAT and MAAP

cells to neutralize and/or negate the enemy space and IO

threat. The level of warfare depends on the desired outcome—temporary or permanent soft kills to deny, degrade,

disrupt, and deceive enemy space systems, or a hard kill

destruction. The point is that JAOC planners and leaders

must think with space in mind, understand what the

enemy space systems bring to the fight, and then determine the space control objective.

Space Forces Limitations

Space mindedness requires military planners, leaders,

and operators to understand the basic limitations of space

systems (force application, timeliness and availability, and

the space environment) and how to optimize what is available. The first limitation is that the United States currently possesses neither weapons in space nor an operational

ASAT capability.33 Therefore, force application and space

control is limited to the above discussion. A second limitation is asset availability. On-orbit space forces are not continuously in-theater; and space-based ISR are near-realtime information systems, not continuous, real-time global

systems. ISR systems are tasked via a complex priority

driven process. JAOC personnel must understand when

space assets are available to support military operations.

The JAOC space operations officer (SOO), JAOC space cell

(now a “specialty team”), and JAOC J2 collection manager

provide this information. A third limitation is the harsh

space environment itself. Space systems can be negatively

affected by solar activity (flares, electromagnetic storms,

etc.), and satellite signals can be distorted as they traverse

the earth’s atmosphere (scintillation, natural and intenHARTER 15
tional interference, etc.). The JAOC weather cell and SOO

advise the JFACC when this risk is likely.

This section addressed the necessity for aerospace planners and operators to become space minded warriors—

they must recognize the importance and legitimacy of

space as a COG and as a war-fighting medium. With this

foundation, the remainder of this paper will provide recommendations on how to build space mindedness and

achieve rapid dominance.

Joint Space Training:

Education and Exercises

The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in

weapons; and with that change must come a continual change

in the manner of fighting.

—Rear Adm Alfred Thayer Mahan

Rapid dominance requires military leaders, planners,

and operators to have space mindedness—a basic understanding of the importance and legitimacy of space as a

COG and military medium. In order to achieve this, JAOC

warriors must be educated and exercised on space warfare

capabilities, threats, and limitations.

Today’s JAOC personnel know very little about space

force enhancement that could directly improve their functional JAOC duties.34 There is no formal JAOC or NAF

space training and education program for JAOC personnel.

The JAOC space officer and SST champion space education; but this is a very slow, piecemeal process in the

absence of structured, mandatory space awareness education. Effective space education captures four critical elements: (1) strong senior leadership who demand JAOC

staffs understand and integrate space operations, (2)

space in professional military education (PME), (3) structured JAOC space education training, and (4) seriously

integrating space in joint and combined exercises.

Space: Leadership by Example

The first priority in building space-minded warfighting

is the commitment of senior leaders to recognize and

16 RAPID DOMINANCE
communicate that space is an important medium of warfare that must be exploited. Space superiority can no

longer be taken for granted and therefore needs to be as

much of a concern to the JFACC as achieving air superiority. The JFC, component commanders (air, land, sea,

and special operations), JAOC director, and senior JAOC

supervisors must adopt a space-minded attitude and

seek to make it a part of the joint force team. The Joint

Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer states that the

JFC is responsible to “exploit all forms of combat power

(land, sea, air, space).”35 This commitment must be sincere so that the chain of command will respond positively to space training and integration in exercises and realworld operations. 

Space Education: Not Just an Afterthought

The second step is solid education at all officer levels

of products and services space brings to the fight (not

just space systems themselves) and basic space threats,

to ensure that officers understand the basic space warfighting medium. This step starts with commissioning

sources and continues through the Aerospace Basic

Course, Squadron Officer School, ACSC, and Air War College. Although progress is being made, space is too often

an afterthought rather than a core objective. Perhaps

even more importantly, space education must be integrated into the backbone of JAOC/JFACC courses at the

C2 Warrior School, Command and Control Training and

Innovation Center (C2TIC).36 The C2 Warrior School treats

the JAOC as a C2 weapon system, provides JAOC initial

qualification training, and certifies personnel before they

are assigned to a JAOC. The C2 Warrior School is a key

target of opportunity in educating JFACC and JAOC personnel on the importance and legitimacy of space as a

war-fighting medium and specifically what space brings

to the JFACC/JOAC fight. These C2TIC courses as well as

the Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course need space

embedded throughout, particularly in the end-of-course

exercises, where a true appreciation of space is revealed

by application. 

HARTER 17
Third, each JAOC/NAF needs to provide space education during their mission qualification training (MQT) to

new personnel and augmentees prior to major exercises

and deployments so that they understand how space supports their specific function and how to take advantage of

space force enhancement. Most NAFs and JAOCs already

have tailored MQT (indoctrination briefings, documentation, and qualification tests)—space needs to be integrated

into this process.37 (See table 4.)

Table 4

Building a Space-Minded JAOC

Training/Exercise Audience Purpose

I. USAF Core Space Education

Commissioning Source Officer Trainees Basic Space Forces, Employment

Air and Space Basic Course O-1 Space Warfighter Products/

Services

Squadron Officer School O-3 Operational Level Space Focus

USAF Weapons School O-3 Tactics and Operational Space

Employment

ISS/ACSC O-4 Space Doctrine, Joint Operations

SSS/Air War College O-5/6 Space Strategy, Policy, Interagency

II. JFACC/JAOC Space Training

Joint Aerospace C2 Course NAF/JAOC (E-7/O-4)Aerospace Theater C2

JAOC Jumpstart Course NAF/JAOC ATO, MAAP/GAT, JTCB,

Weapons

Joint Aerospace Ops Sen Course NAF/JAOC (O-6) Joint JAOC Ops Training

JFACC Training Course/Plan Tool JFACCs Train JFACCs on space planning,

execution

JDACC (CADRE) NAF/JAOC (O-3/6) Air Campaign Planning

JAOC/NAF MQT NAF/JAOC (ALL) Unit MQT/Space Operations

III. Joint/Combined Exercises

Concept Development Conf NAF/JAOC/JTF Advocate/Prioritize Space MSELs

Initial Planning Conf NAF/JAOC/JTF Develop Joint Exercise Space

Objectives

Mid Planning Conf NAF/JAOC/JTF Space Forces,TPFDD/equip/

manning

Final Planning Conf NAF/JAOC/JTF Finalize Space Injects, Issues

Lessons Learned NAF/JAOC/JTF Document Lessons Learned 

Fight Like You Train, Train Like You Fight!

Space must be injected into major DOD joint and combined exercises much more intensively than in today’s

space deficient exercises. One of the leading inhibitors to

18 RAPID DOMINANCE
aerospace integration is the exclusion of space participation in service, joint, and combined exercises.38 When it

comes to integrating space into major exercises, the DOD

is simply guilty—we do not fight like we train or train like

we fight. Actual combat is not the time to develop space

procedures, C2, and force enhancement techniques. The

investment of a few key space exercise objectives will

return huge joint war-fighting benefits and develop space

as a powerful arrow in the JFC’s quiver. 

Solutions to integrating space into exercises are many,

but three stand out. First, the senior leaders responsible

for the specific exercise (the host command CINC, JFC,

JFACC, and their staffs) must recognize and articulate

the need to include space. In this respect, stronger

USSPACECOM pressure on the other CINCs is necessary

to include space objectives and training in major exercises. Second, it is essential for JAOC/NAF space planners

to be proactive, persistent, start planning early, and continue throughout the exercise planning cycle.39 The early

adoption of space exercise objectives and requirements

(personnel, equipment, and work space) cannot be

overemphasized, with follow through to inclusion on the

exercise time phased force deployment data (TPFDD).

Realistic space exercise scenarios train both space personnel and the entire JAOC/JFC. Exercises would do

well to integrate the AFSPC space aggressor teams (Space

Warfare Center/DOTW) that emulate adversary space

capabilities, a parallel to the traditional adversary tactics

flight in a flying squadron. The final step is to ensure that

space exercise experience is documented in joint universal lessons learned (JULL) so that resources (time, personnel, and money) are used wisely and we don’t reinvent

the wheel with each exercise.40

Structured space education and exercise integration

provides visibility to JAOC warriors of the necessity to integrate space operations, but it is not recognized as such in

joint doctrine. Joint doctrine must be created that recognizes the space medium as equal to land, sea, and air

mediums and provides guidance on fundamental space

employment.

HARTER 19
Space Doctrine

At the very heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the central

beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory . . . it is fundamental to sound judgement.

—Gen Curtis E. LeMay

There is a complete void of joint space doctrine in the US

military. There is no joint doctrinal guidance on the

employment of space forces in joint capstone, keystone, or

tactics, techniques, and procedures doctrine documents.

The US Army and USAF each has only one service level

space doctrine document—Field Manual (FM) 100-18,

Space Support to Army Operations, and Air Force Doctrine

Document (AFDD) 2-2, Space Operations; the US Navy has

none.41 Doctrine forms the backbone of unity of effort in

employing military forces—without it, space power will

never reach its force multiplying potential in battle space

rapid dominance.

Space Doctrine and Policy

Space employment is driven by two closely linked elements: space policy and space doctrine (fig. 5). Stated simply, doctrine is the set of fundamental beliefs and principles that guide the employment of military forces and

operations.42 Doctrine applies theory and past experiences, describing “how” to employ forces effectively; policy

takes precedence over doctrine and is “what” needs to be

done, concerning it with implementing political decisions,

cost, rules, and programs based on the current environment. Ideally, policy and doctrine balance each other and

allow military forces to be employed consistently with both

doctrine and current policy. Although joint space doctrine

is nonexistent, national space policy exists and provides

guidance for military, civil, and commercial space sectors

and articulates strategic objectives for military space

forces.43 To date, however, space policy has been improperly substituted in the absence of space doctrine, stunting

space war-fighting potential and effective aerospace

employment in joint operations.44 The result is an unstable, politically driven military space capability, rather than

a solid doctrine driven space force. Military space employ20 RAPID DOMINANCE
ment effectiveness will remain weak, fragmented, and disorganized until proper joint space doctrine is approved and

implemented.

Starting at the Top: Joint Space Doctrine

The closest joint doctrine for space today is the draft JP

3-14 in various draft forms since 1992 and never released

for coordination.45 Part of the reason for the long delay in

getting this joint doctrine approved has been due to the

rapid changing of the guard at USSPACECOM—every two

years a new CINC arrives, usually with a different vision

for space power. The draft JP 3-14 is revised to reflect each

CINC’s new vision––creating delays, and starting the joint

coordination process all over. There are other avenues to

reflect the CINCs vision, however. Joint doctrine is not necessarily the place to express vision; it is the place for guidance on how to employ space forces to support military

operations. Instead, USSPACECOM (the OPR for JP 3-14

via the Joint Warfighting Center, Atlantic Command) needs

to focus on Joint Vision 2010 for doctrinal foundation,

which will outlast the two-year CINCSPACE rotation cycle

and allow JP 3-14 to be developed regardless of rotating

CINCs. Joint space doctrine should focus on the operational

HARTER 21

DOCTRINE POLICY

Figure 5. The Balance of Space Doctrine and Policy

Space Force Employment
level to include C2, space support to joint war-fighting

operations (space missions: space control, force enhancement, force application, space support), space training and

exercise coordination, and campaign planning. JP 3-14

needs to make it clear who is responsible for space forces

in-theater—for example, JFC, JFACC, CINCSPACE, or a

separate joint force space component commander

(JFSCC)—to reduce confusion and provide unity of effort

in-theater. From this starting point, additional detailed

joint space doctrine needs to flow in the form of JP 3-14.1,

3-14.2, 3-14.3, 3-14.4, etc. (space control, force enhancement, force application, space support, etc.).

Service Component Doctrine

While joint space doctrine is in perpetual draft, service

component space doctrine isn’t much further ahead. USAF

space doctrine (AFDD 2-2, March 1998) outlines the fundamental principles and basic doctrine for space operations—

train, equip, organize, and operate space forces—but does

not address space tenets, C2 of space forces, and space support to the war fighter. On the USAF side, there are glaring

inconsistencies between service doctrine (AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power), the draft JP 3-

14, and the JP 3 series (specifically JP 3-56.1, Command

and Control for Joint Air Operations). These differences

revolve around the JFACC as extending to “air and space” or

“aerospace” component commander. AFDD 2 treats space as

an extension of the air medium and states that the JFACC

is responsible for air and space planning, employment, and

exploitation through the JASOP in the JAOC.46 AFDD 2-2 is

silent on who is responsible for in-theater space employment. JP 3-14 counters with several “options” to theater

space C2 but avoids recommending one. JP 3-56.1 is overdue to be rewritten and does not connect space at all with

JFACC responsibilities. The three documents are not congruent. Additionally, the USAF’s AFDD 2-1 series (counter

air, counter land, counter sea) omits a counter space doctrine document, neglecting a role that is becoming increasingly important. 

Until DOD develops solid, coordinated space doctrine that

is consistent with service doctrine, space employment will be

22 RAPID DOMINANCE
convoluted and fragmented, not achieving unified action with

air, land, and sea forces that the JFC is responsible to provide. The solution is to develop and approve a solid JP 3-14,

focused on Joint Vision 2010, as quickly as possible. 

Space Personnel: Warriors In-Theater

Space power will be as decisive in future combat as airpower

is today.

—The Honorable E. C. Aldridge Jr.

The Right People, at the Right Place,

at the Right Time

Rapid dominance requires the smart, timely application

of aerospace power throughout the theater campaign. This

application demands trained, competent space personnel

actively involved in JFC/JFACC staffs, planning the campaign, and executing space force employment. Fortunately,

it is possible via three separate but essential elements of

space support to theater operations. First, the USAF

Weapons School now graduates tactically and operationally

capable space operations officers, intended specifically for

JAOC, NAF, and major command (MAJCOM) duty. These

officers, referred to as W-13SX officers, are rigorously

trained in space war-fighter applications. Second, the SSTs

deploy personnel, equipment, and expertise to theater during exercises and real-world operations. Third, continental

United States (CONUS) SOCs parallel an air operations center (AOC) by providing detailed space information, tasking,

and C2 of space forces. Together, the permanency of the W13SX, the flexibility of the SSTs, and the expertise of the

SOCs form the triad of space warriors necessary to bridge

air and space integration in theater operations, providing

the JFC/JFACC tremendous in-theater space expertise and

capability (fig. 6).

The Permanent Fix: W-13SX Space Officers

War-fighting units need permanent, well-qualified space

personnel on their staff in order to adequately plan and

HARTER 23
execute unit war-fighting missions—the W-13SX officer.

The USAF Weapons School produces 24 W-13SX space

officers per year who become embedded in every USAF

NAF, MAJCOM, and many wings and operational support

squadron (OSS) units.47 Their objectives are to (1) educate

their unit on space warfare, (2) perform exercise planning,

(3) coordinate real-world space support operations, and (4)

advocate space power. C2TIC plans for six space personnel

in each NAF to integrate space operations in the Strategy

Division, Combat Plans, and Combat Operations. Headquarters AFSPC/DOTW is responsible for tracking and

recommending assignments to AFSPC for these critical

and limited W-13SX assets.48

The advent of the AEF increases the demand for W-13SX

officers. To prosecute an aerospace campaign and exploit

the aerospace medium, AEFs need space support—both

permanent (W-13SX) and temporary surge (SSTs). Just as

all NAFs and JAOCs now have permanent embedded space

officers, so must each AEF C2 structure. This need is particularly magnified due to the AEFs inherent need for rapid

24 RAPID DOMINANCE

Unity of

Effort

Space Support

Teams

Space Operations

Center

W-13SX Officers

Permanence

Flexibility

Expertise

Figure 6. Space Warrior Triad
en route mission planning, which is made possible by key

space systems onboard the airborne EOC. The AEF

requires experienced W-13SX officers in key AEF areas.

First, the two AEF management staffs (AMS)—the silver

and blue AEF planning teams that will assist the AEF lead

wings planning and deployment—each need at least two

W-13SX officers who will integrate space forces to leverage

the AEF’s aerospace combat power. Second, the two aerospace expeditionary wings (AEW), responsible for “pop-up”

contingencies, need permanent W-13SX officers to integrate space operations into AEWs. Third, space officers are

necessary during AEF preparation, exercises, en route AEF

operations (mission planning), and deployment to theater.

Ideally, W-13SX officers should be permanently embedded

in each of the 10 AEF combat lead wings and the five AEF

mobility lead wings to ensure this integration occurs

before deployment. AFSPC/DOTW now needs to shift the

highest priority for embedded resident W-13SX officers to

the EAF C2 (AMS, AEWs, AEF lead wings).

Flexible Surge Capability: Space Support Teams 

War fighters need the capability to temporarily bolster

their space support capability during exercises or realworld operations. This temporary surge is possible through

the joint space support teams (JSST) and service focused

space support teams: Air Force space support team

(AFSST, Fourteenth Air Force); Navy space support team

(NSST); Army space support team (ASST); and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Operational Support Office

(OSO) National Intelligence Support Teams (NIST). Due to

the rapid increase of new space war-fighting applications,

SSTs provide the knowledge and depth to augment any

service component or theater commander in any theater of

operation. SSTs are trained to provide space products and

services to deployed military forces worldwide, with SST

OPCON given to the theater commander they support (e.g.,

JFC, JFACC, etc.). In particular, the AFSST must not be

phased out (currently planned for 2002), but continue

space support in major exercises, MOOTW, and all AEF

deployments. Each additional AEF deployment heralds the

efforts and abilities of the AFSST in providing near-realHARTER 25
time en route mission planning and communications

capability, including real-world threat data, weather

updates, and air tasking order (ATO) changes.49 It is

imperative that the AFSST be provided adequate personnel

and equipment to support AEF units as the USAF progresses on its conquest of an EAF. Until each AEF C2

structure has resident space officers with all the necessary

space support equipment, the EAF/AEF concept demands

AFSST participation and availability in order to achieve

responsive precision aerospace combat power. 

Space Force Reach Back: Space Operations Centers 

The trend in current warfare is to move more information

and fewer people and things. Rapid dominance in MOOTW

and SSCs demands light, flexible forces with agile combat

support and precision war fighting—exactly what the AEF is

designed for. Reach back is critical—the ability to forward

deploy with the bare minimum necessary while receiving

support from fixed CONUS forces. As a form of reach back

for detailed space information and tasking, several unified

and service component SOCs provide invaluable information

to theater operations. USSPACECOM operates the SOC

(SPOC, Peterson AFB, Colorado), providing real-time,

detailed joint space force information via voice or

secure/insecure web sites. This information is key in preparing space orders of battle, courses of action, and campaign

planning (GAT and MAAP cells) for joint operations.50 Similarly, the NRO’s OSO provides valuable, focused theater

expertise on national systems collection and dissemination.

Likewise each service component has an SOC that supports

USAF, Army, and Navy operations. The AFSPACE SOC (Vandenberg AFB, California) provides information on all USAF

space systems, as well as the dissemination of the space

tasking order (STO), a parallel process to the ATO, which

orchestrates and tasks USAF space force employment in synchronization with the theater campaign battle rhythm.51 The

AFSPACE STO is a good start, but it is not joint and therefore does not capture the entire space war-fighting picture.

To achieve true jointedness, USSPACECOM should assume

STO planning and execution to include all services, plus

coordinated space support from the NRO, civil sector

26 RAPID DOMINANCE
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, etc.), and commercial/foreign space systems (INTELSAT, INMARSAT, IRIDIUM, SPOT, etc.). Synchronizing the ATO and STO provide

the JFC the ability to plan, control, and rapidly dominate the

vertical battle space. 

This triad—embedded W-13SX space officers providing

permanent space capability; the SSTs flexibility and

deployable space support equipment; and the SOCs critical reach back from the CONUS to theater—is the foundation for a space-minded NAF/JAOC/AEF. The AEF concept

is not and should not be considered complete without

space personnel and space support equipment. The right

people at the right time and the right place make all the

difference in planning and executing aerospace power, the

key to rapid dominance of the battle space. 

Aerospace Command and Control

Space is already inextricably linked to military operations on

land, sea, and in the air.

—Joint Strategy Review

January 1997

Imagine an air campaign without a JFACC, JAOC, or unified action among the other services’ air forces. The result

would be chaos, analogous to the fragmented, disjointed, and

largely ineffective air operations of the Vietnam War. With the

stunning success of Operation Desert Storm’s air campaign,

primarily through the JFACC C2 via the JAOC, it is unthinkable today to consider an air campaign without

JFACC/JAOC C2 to plan and execute joint air operations.

Space forces C2 shares many of the same characteristics as

joint airpower C2—most importantly—unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. By comparison,

however, today’s space forces are without clear theater C2,

there is no clearly defined “space component commander” to

coordinate space operations, and the SOC—the space equivalent to the JAOC—is still in its embryonic stage (fig. 7).

Today, confusion exists among JAOC and JFC staffs regarding who is responsible for space requirements and C2 in

planning and executing a theater campaign.52

HARTER 27
In order to prosecute legitimate and meaningful force

enhancement and space warfare, space forces C2 must be

clarified and agreed to in joint doctrine. Unfortunately, the

lack of joint space doctrine clouds the C2 issue even more

due to independent service views. Joint doctrine states that

the JFC is ultimately responsible for space warfare. The JFC

“synchronizes the actions of air, land, sea, and space forces

. . . through joint campaigns.” Unified action—“JFCs should

ensure that their joint operations are synchronized in time,

space, and purpose.” And synergy—“JFCs employ air, land,

28 RAPID DOMINANCE

USCINCSPACE SECAF/CSAF Supported CINC

COMARFOR

COMNAVFOR

COMMARFOR

COMAFFOR

NAF/CC

JFLCC

JFMCC

JFSOC

JFACC

SOC

AFSST

JAOC

AF Space

Command

Other 

Combat

Forces

SPOC/CMOC

COMARSPACE

COMAFSPACE

14 AF/CC

21 SW

30 SW

45 SW

50 SW

COMNAVSPACE

Figure 7. Space Command and Control—The Big Picture

AF - Air Force

AFSST - Air Force space support team

CC - Commander

CINC - Commander in chief

CMOC - Civil military operations center

COMAFFOR - Commander, Air Force Forces

COMAFSPACE - Commander, Air Force Space Command

COMARFOR - Commander, Army Forces

COMARSPACE - Commander, Army Space Command

COMMARFOR - Commander, Marine Forces

COMNAVFOR - Commander, Naval Forces

COMNAVSPACE - Commander, Navy Space Command

CSAF - Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

JAOC - Joint air operations center

JFACC - Joint force air component commander

JFLCC - Joint force land component commander

JFMCC - Joint force marine component commander

JFSOCC - Joint force special operations component commander

NAF - numbered air forces

SECAF - Secretary of the Air Force

SOC - Special operations command

SPOC - Space operations center

SW - Space Wing

USCINCSPACE - Commander in chief, US Space Command
sea, and space forces.”53 However, just as the JFC delegates

and designates joint forces land, maritime, and air component commanders (JFLCC, JFMCC, and JFACC), the JFC

needs to designate and delegate the responsibility for space

forces C2.

54 This commander should normally have the preponderance of theater space assets with the ability for space

forces C2. It must be a truly joint space structure to integrate

all service space capabilities and requirements, as well as

plan, coordinate, and synchronize all available space forces—

military, commercial, civil, and national (NRO) systems—to

provide unified action and full spectrum dominance within

the campaign plan. Figure 8 depicts three options for the C2

of space forces in a theater campaign: JFACC, JFSCC, or

CINCSPACE.55

The Leading Contender: JFACC

The leading contender (and the logical choice today) is

that the JFACC is responsible for exploiting joint air and

space operations, including planning, coordination, allocation, tasking, execution, and assessments to accomplish campaign objectives. USAF doctrine, Air Force

Instructions (AFI), and draft JP 3-14 already state the

HARTER 29

JFACC?

JFC JFSCC?

CINCSPACE?

Figure 8. Theater Space Command and Control Options

CINCSPACE - commander in chief space command

JFACC - joint force air component commander

JFC - joint force commander

JFSCC - joint force space component commander
JFACC is responsible for theater aerospace operations

conducted through the JAOC.56 Several strong arguments exist for the JFACC to lead theater space forces C2.

First, the JFACC now has W-13SX space personnel, a

space cell (now called a “space specialty team”), and SSTs

embedded in the JAOC to integrate aerospace operations.

Second, the JFACC space cell currently coordinates

space support with the JFC JSST, the AFSPACE SOC,

and the USSPACECOM SPOC, enabling joint space forces

to support the campaign directly. Additionally, in many

minds, space power is the natural extension of air power

and at least for the present most appropriately belongs to

the JFACC. A limitation of this approach is that the

JFACC is already triple hatted and busy with daily

JFACC, area air defense commander (AADC), and airspace control authority (ACA) responsibilities. If necessary, this could be countered by creating a deputy JFACC

specifically for theater space forces. With the JFACC

option, terminology needs to indicate the JFACC/JAOC

conducts theater space C2 and campaign operations, so

the term JFACC should be renamed to joint forces aerospace component commander and the term JAOC to joint

aerospace operations center.

The Future: Joint Force Space

Component Commander

The second option is to create and designate a JFSCC to

orchestrate all allied space forces in unified action against

the enemy.57 This approach establishes a separate joint

component commander, directly responsible to the JFC to

plan, synchronize, and execute space operations in support of the theater campaign (fig. 9). The JFSCC would

integrate a myriad of space capabilities including military

space components, NRO, civil, and commercial/foreign

space systems and focuses them on the theater campaign.58 The JFSCC may be the wave of the future in

twenty-first century warfare, but it has drawbacks and

may be premature for current use. First, it necessitates a

complete J-staff and a complex military-civilian organization in an already personnel-limited environment, which is

difficult to staff. Second, in the absence of space force

30 RAPID DOMINANCE
application weapons, the JFSCC concept lacks true combat power and may not be able to provide much more than

today’s current JFACC space C2 approach. 

CINCSPACE: Centralized Command, Decentralized

Execution

The third option is based upon the JSCP and Unified Command Plan (UCP), which directs CINCSPACE to conduct

space operations.59 As a unified commander, CINCSPACE

always maintains combatant command (COCOM) of space

systems, so there would be little C2 process change at the

strategic level. However, this approach presents a problem at

the theater and operational level—CINCSPACE resides at

Peterson AFB, distant to the theater, and even with nearreal-time state-of-the-art communications, is not able to rapidly and fully appreciate the theater campaign battle rhythm.

Typically, the more distant C2 is from the theater, the less

effective and responsive C2 is due to lack of situational

awareness, battle rhythm, and delayed intelligence. While

CINCSPACE will always maintain centralized space systems

C2 (COCOM), space forces OPCON should be delegated to the

theater (either JFC, JFACC, or JFSCC) for decentralized

planning and execution in support of specific theater campaign objectives.

Today, the JFACC represents the best theater space C2

option today, which will no doubt evolve into a JFSCC

HARTER 31

Joint Force

Commander

JFACC

Air Force Space Army Space Navy Space

National

Reconnaissance

Office

Commercial Civil

JFLCC JFSCC JFMCC

Figure 9. Theater Joint Force Space Component Commander

JFACC - joint force air component commander

JFLCC - joint force land component commander

JFMCC - joint force maritime component commander

JFSCC - joint force space component commander
structure as space force application emerges and provides

the JFC with true space warfare capability and theater

space C2 equipment that will shape the battle space. 

Space Forces C2 Equipment

Theater forces must acquire the equipment and develop the

operational expertise necessary to receive, process, act on,

and disseminate space data.

—Gen Charles “Chuck” Horner

Regardless of who is responsible for theater space C2, the

effectiveness of theater space C2 depends directly on spacebased information systems embedded in a well-orchestrated

C2 architecture. The JFC and JFACC need space systems

that provide high quality, near-real-time situational awareness, space order of battle information, GPS navigation accuracy predictions, strategic and tactical weather information,

ISR information, and secure, reliable communications.

Today, many of these are stand-alone systems requiring dedicated equipment and complex, often unsupported hardware

and software (table 5). Space support C2 equipment is not

standardized among war-fighting units and is often hastily

assembled on an availability basis by the in-theater space

operations officer. This is dangerous because it fosters stand

alone, stove-piped space tools in the JAOC and EOC, which

contradict joint war-fighting integration.60

The DOD space community needs to develop and field

standardized space support hardware and software, a “tool

kit” to bring to the theater, consisting of both fixed systems

(for JAOC use) and deployable space support equipment

(for AEF employment). Table 5 identifies current and near

future space-based information systems that more effectively provide the right information to the war fighter at the

right time—namely, the theater battle management core

system (TBMCS) and a deployable suite of space-based

systems for en route AEF operations.61 Space support C2

equipment completes the fifth and last part of the spaceminded puzzle.

32 RAPID DOMINANCE
The Future Is Now: The Expeditionary

Aerospace Force 

The major objective of AEF deployments—rapid, accurate combat power—is simply not possible without space contributions

in communications, navigation, weather, and ISR.

—Maj Gen Lance L. Smith

Rapid Dominance is the essence of the USAF’s emerging

EAF! Lean and lethal, the USAF will respond to future conflicts with rapid CONUS-based deployments of specially

tailored AEFs.62 Space forces clearly play a key role in AEF

preparation, en route mission planning, and theater aerospace combat employment. The success of the AEF concept is linked directly to space-minded AEF war fighters,

which is based upon solid space education, doctrine, personnel, C2, and fielded space support equipment. 

EAF: Lean, Light, Lethal Aerospace Combat Power

The EAF provides theater CINCs with tailored, rapid,

responsive aerospace power across the spectrum of operaHARTER 33

Capability Today’s Systems Future Systems

Fixed

Situational Awareness TSOC, SMAT, TSTT, MSTS SBMCS/TBMCS V2.0+

SSTS, Talon Vision, ADSI, 

SCENE

SATRAN SMAT, TSOC, SIPRNET SBMCS/TBMCS V2.0+

GPS Accuracy OMEGA, SNAPM, GPS, SEM SBMCS/TBMCS V2.0+

Space Tasking Order SIPRNET, GCCS, Intelink SBMCS/TBMCS V2.0+

TMD Support ADSI, GALE, WOTS SBMCS/TBMCS V2.0+

Space Databases SIPRNET, GCCS, Intelink SBMCS/TBMCS V2.0+

Space Based Weather Weatherfront––TSOC SBMCS/TBMCS V2.0+

ATO/SPINs Access CTAPS SBMCS/TBMCS V2.0+

Deployable (en route)

Situational Awareness MSTS (via TRAP/TIBS) TBD

Secure en route C2 COMBAT TRACK COMBAT TRACK II

ISR, Threat Data, Secure JDISS/INMARSAT TBD

Table 5

Space Tool Kit: Today versus Tomorrow
tions (humanitarian relief to combat operations). AEFs

leverage the inherent strengths of air and space power—

speed, range, and flexibility—giving the JFC a variety of

aerospace power capabilities, including bombs on target

any where in the world within 48 hours of deployment

order. While ballistic missiles and long-range bombers

have long been capable of limited alert combat operations,

the AEF will provide a rapidly deployed, sustained, composite aerospace force. The USAF Scientific Advisory

Board, a strong proponent of the EAF, stated that “the AEF

can respond in less than half the time, with half the airlift

and one-third the people forward, to unprepared locations

throughout the world. The AEF can operate eight times

more effectively, is consistent with other CINC requirements, is of relatively small cost, and is achievable in the

near future (by 1 Jan 2000).”63

En route Mission Planning: The Hub

of AEF Deployment

Two key concepts of the EAF are the ability to rapidly

deploy forces and moving information rather than people

and things. Space forces are uniquely positioned because

forward deployment and information flow are inherent in

space power. On-orbit space assets and many theater

space support systems are already globally deployed to

provide huge amounts of information, key to the AEF’s en

route mission planning. En route planning is critical to

rapid AEF deployments because it allows aircrews to plan

during deployment, saving precious pre-deployment time

and enabling combat operations to commence immediately upon arrival in theater. Space forces are key in the AEF’s

ability to conduct en route mission planning via the AEF

expeditionary operations center (fig. 10) planned for specially equipped C-141/135 aircraft.64 SATCOM, the lifeline

of EAF operations, links the planning and control functions of the airborne en route EOC with NAF headquarters,

JFACC/JAOC forward/rear (C2) elements, and deployed

aerospace forces. Overhead space systems provide the airborne EOC with near-real-time ISR (threat order of battle,

targeting information, warnings, and indications), and

allow en route mission planning (build mission packages),

34 RAPID DOMINANCE
retargeting, ATO changes, imagery transfer, and secure

E-mail communication. Recent AEF deployments prove the

war-fighting value of onboard deployable space systems in

receiving near-real-time information for mission planning.65 Already en route, AEF planning staffs depend on

space-based communications systems to receive huge

amounts of mission data, as demonstrated during several

recent AEF trial deployments to the Middle East.66 These

systems have reversed the norm in which JFACCs have

had only “dead time” during deployments but are now able

to do substantive planning and decision making due to

near-real-time data.67

Effectively Integrating

Space Power in the AEF

In today’s environment, you can’t waste 15 hours in the air—

you must use that time to prepare (mission planning) for combat operations so that when the AEF arrives in theater it can

immediately begin an air campaign. Space systems are key to

enroute planning and define the essence of rapid AEF deployments.

—Maj Gen Lance L. Smith

HARTER 35

Global

Attack

Air and Space

Superiority

Precision

Engagement

Rapid Global

Mobility

Information

Superiority

Agile Combat

Support

Spectrum

of Military

Operations Creating Strategic,

Operational and

Tactical Effects

EAF Rapid

Response

EAF Rapid

Response

Major Theater War EOC

XX AFB JAOC

Peacetime Engagement

EAF - expeditionary aerospace force

EOC - expeditionary operations center

JAOC - joint air operations center

Figure 10. EAF Global Engagement Via the EOC and Space

Forces
To accomplish these time-critical tasks, the USAF must

be able to draw upon the indispensable capabilities of

space forces that focus on the five interrelated elements

discussed in this research paper. Several trial AEF deployments to the Middle East proved the value of (and necessary improvements in) these space elements—training,

personnel, doctrine, equipment, and theater space forces

C2. 

First, the AEF needs space education and training

among AEF personnel. AEF leaders, planners, and operators who understand the legitimacy and importance of

space as a center of gravity and as a war-fighting medium

achieve far greater results due to the synergistic relationship of air and space forces. Now is the time for the USAF

to establishing a structured AEF space education and

training program where space is more than just an afterthought. Because AEF personnel are from all ranks and

career fields, space education must be embedded beginning at the commissioning sources, continuing through all

levels of PME, and integrated into JFACC, JAOC, and AEF

courses. Second, development of the USAF’s service doctrine forms the foundation from which the AEF construct

is framed, organized, and employed. USAF service doctrine

and joint doctrine must be congruent regarding aerospace

employment. Therefore, DOD must develop and approve

solid joint doctrine, specifically JP 3-14, which is based on

Joint Vision 2010 (not the revolving two-year USCINCSPACE’s vision) and forms the framework for space force

employment. 

Third, the EAF demands and the USAF must provide

integration of qualified space personnel to leverage aerospace combat power. Permanent space personnel (W13SX) need to be embedded in the AEF Management System teams, AEWs, 10 AEF lead combat wings, and five

mobility AEF lead wings to begin the process of integrating

AEF aerospace forces. The AEF concept demands the

AFSST’s flexible surge capability and deployable space

support equipment for en route mission planning, at least

until each en route EOC acquires deployable space support equipment and knowledgeable personnel to operate it.

Once deployed, AEFs already draw on the expertise of the

Fourteenth Air Force Space Operations Center (SOC); this

36 RAPID DOMINANCE
reach back will grow increasingly important as new space

threats and capabilities emerge. Fourth, the USAF/DOD

needs to identify, fund, and field standardized space support equipment so that AEFs, NAFs, and JAOCs have the

ability to receive and process space-based information.

Without deployable/en route and fixed (TBMCS-based)

space support equipment, theater space force C2 will suffer. Fifth, DOD needs to clearly define space C2, and identify who in-theater is responsible for planning and executing space force employment. The JFACC is the logical

choice for current and near-future theater space C2 due to

the close relationship of aerospace roles and functions, as

well as C2 capability. A space-smart JFACC more effectively employs AEF forces to achieve aerospace theater campaign objectives and operations. As enemy space threats

increase and friendly space warfare capabilities emerge,

theater space C2 will migrate to a JFSCC responsibility.

Conclusion: Rapid Dominance

Depends upon Aerospace Power

No one can predict with certainty what the ultimate meaning

will be in the mastery of space.

––President John F. Kennedy

The strategic environment at the dawn of the twentyfirst century demands an EAF ability to rapidly dominate

the battle space anywhere in the world within hours of

notification. This rapid dominance is based upon global

space forces providing time-critical precise information to

prosecute a theater campaign. Space forces provide critical

support throughout the entire spectrum of conflict, fostering an expeditionary aerospace force capable of shortnotice, rapid worldwide AEF deployments to engage in

MOOTW and SSC operations. But the aerospace community is not there yet. Today’s JAOCs, NAFs, and AEFs

require space-minded warriors who appreciate the legitimacy and importance of space as a center of gravity and as

a war-fighting medium. The USAF and DOD must concentrate on making straightforward changes in the five key

areas of education/training, doctrine, personnel, support

HARTER 37
equipment, and theater space C2, which can reverse current deficiencies in this area. 

Notes

1. Gen Merrill McPeak, Air Force chief of staff, address to the National War College on DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, 6 March 1991.

Quoted in “The Synergy of Air and Space,” Airpower Journal, Summer

1998, 7.

2. Air Force Magazine, May 1998, 36, 43–44. Defense drawdown facts

during FY 1987–1999: Air Force personnel strength dropped 39 percent

from 1987 to 1998.

3. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations

Other Than War, 16 June 1995. General reference document.

4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of

the United States, 1997, 1.

5. Ibid., 13.

6. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of

the 21st Century, chap. 12––Space Wars, 69. Quote from Col Alan D.

Campen, USAF, Retired, former US C2 DOD policy director.

7. For example, Bosnia (Deliberate Force, 1995), antiterrorism retaliation in Afghanistan (August 1998), and United Nations (UN) resolution

enforcement in Iraq (Desert Strike, Fall 1996, and Desert Fox, December

1998).

1Da9nF9Ddo6ecFlxmAg,nhtaesrulf(oaknFist1Uem,goUuis9ebrcoedoaiNSneroD(dtnx9re.,sNa1FtfBi8mnsau(i9o)taresqi)lt9oa7s8. Gen Michael E. Ryan, August 1995, Operation Deliberate Force, tesmnl,I.5e,nip)lient

Final Report of the Air University Balkans Air Campaign Study. General

Ryan’s statement, “every bomb is a political bomb,” was in reference to

the politically charged environment and civilian populace during Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, 1995. Quoted in Air Command and Staff

College (ACSC) Conflict Resolution Coursebook, Col Robert C. Owen, January 1999, 199.

9. USSPACECOM is now responsible for planning, coordinating, and

executing the DOD’s computer network defense (1999) and computer network offense (2000).

10. Author’s personal experience, Thirteenth Air Force joint air operations center (JAOC), 1996–1998, space warfare officer, numerous joint

and combined exercises: Cobra Gold 1997, 1998; Tandem Thrust 1997;

Ulchi Focus Lens 1997; Cope Thunder 97-4.

11. ACSC Research Survey 99-06.

12. Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-1, Tactical Employment of Space, OPR: Headquarters AFSPC/DOTW, SWC/

DOTW, February 1998; Aircrew Combat Information Guide (ACIG), Space

Warfare Center (SWC/DO), 1996 USAF Weapons School, 57th Wing, Air

Combat Command (USAF-WS/WSS) Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada.

Numerous weapons school research papers on space warfare, tactics

applications, space doctrine/theory. Web site: www.mil.nellis.af.mil/

usafws/Spacediv.htm.

13. Gen Charles Horner, 1997 Air Force Issues Book, 24, 1997.

38 RAPID DOMINANCE
14. Headquarters USAF/XPX-AITF, Beyond the Horizon ––Integrating

Air and Space, December 1998, 4-3. As an example of the United States’s

growing dependence on space commerce, reference the disruption of a

single communications satellite, Galaxy IV, in May 1998. In North America, 40 million pagers malfunctioned, self-service fuel pumps stopped

processing credit cards, hundreds of radio and television stations lost

their programming, airline flights were delayed due to lack of weather

information, and doctors on-call were delayed in emergency notifications.

Imagine the chaos if multiple communications satellites were temporarily or permanently disabled!

15. Beyond the Horizon, 6-2.

16. Robert S. Dudney, “The New Space Plan,” Air Force Magazine, July

1998, 22.

17. Frank G. Klotz, Space, Commerce, and National Security (New

York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998), 6.

18. A National Security Strategy For a New Century, October 1998,

25–26.

19. Joint Vision 2010, 26.

20. Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force, 7.

21. Joint Vision 2010, 14.

22. John T. Correll, “Warfare in the Information Age,” Air Force Magazine, December 1996, 3.

23. Maj Steve Lucky, 353d Combat Training Squadron, interviewed

by author during Exercise Cope Thunder 97-4, July 1997, Eielson AFB,

Alaska. RTIC demonstrated and fielded in the following aircraft: F-16CJ

Block 50 Wild Weasel Vipers, EA-6B, AWACS, ABCCC, RC-135, U-2, F15E, F-22 Joint Strike Fighter, Air Materiel Command airlifters (C-130, C141, C-5, C-17), unmanned aerial vehicles (Predator, Global Hawk, DarkStar), B-52, B-1B, and B-2.

24. Issued biennially from chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(CJCS).

25. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power, 28 September 1998, 47.

26. There is a movement among the Air Force Doctrine Center

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.) and Command and Control Training and Innovation

Center (C2TIC) at Hurlburt Field, Fla., to rename the JFACC to joint force

aerospace component commander, the JAOC to joint aerospace operations center, and the JASOP to joint aerospace operations plan. These

changes will be reflected in future USAF doctrine and classes at C2TIC.

27. BETAC, International Space Operations, ACSC briefing, November

1998.

28. Klotz, 11. Also located at the web site for the International Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), http://www.intelsat.int/cmc/info. As an

example of worldwide SATCOM use, the INTELSAT consortium has grown

from 10 original members in 1965 to over 140 in 1998.

N1n9TINE918iT4ELSw2dn0/a(IAOeLSx8on/a-mATcrevotnmp/u2elsiohwre:tomIhrnnfgogotewi.n1cshaeinmrA91lwct/sagdiftpons6cizftn1el,oSr5iswKb2atn9. Klotz, 42; Robert Wall, “Intelligence Lacking on Satellite Threats,” wtnC,.zomerali)ns8tbOialret.,Mues

Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1 March 1999, 54. Reference the 1997

incident where Indonesia deliberately interfered (jammed) Apstar1A, a

national communications Tongasat satellite launched for Tonga by China

into geosynchronous orbit over Indonesia. The International TelecommuHARTER 39
nications Union had assigned the slot to Tonga. Indonesia demanded one

of their own satellites occupy the slot. The issue is not yet settled. The

demand for geosynchronous slots and frequency allocations will intensify and has already seen additional disputes in Asia, the Philippines, and

INTELSAT. Gen Richard B. Myers, USCINCSPACE, recently indicated that

Iran and Turkey have attempted to degrade satellite operations using

primitive radio-frequency transmitter jamming. 

30. David Foxwell and Mark Hewish, “GPS: Is It Lulling the Military

Into A False Sense of Security?” Jane’s International Defense Review,1

September 1998, vol. 31, Issue 009, 32–40; and Aviation Weekly & Space

Technology, 23 November 1998, 57. There is speculation that GPS signals

have been distorted and interfered with in areas saturated with electromagnetic signals, such as parts of Europe. Numerous articles are available to the general public (magazines, Internet) on how to build crude

GPS jammers using common electronic components at local radio and

appliance stores. 

31. Headquarters AFSPC/DRN, 12 February 1999. 

32. Klotz, 18–19. International treaty and law do not prohibit

weaponizing space but there are some limitations. The 1963 UN Limited

Test Ban Treaty bans nuclear weapon tests in outer space. The 1967 UN

Outer Space Treaty (OST) provides the framework for international space

law by stating “the use of space is for peaceful purposes . . . in the common interest of all mankind.” It declares that outer space and all celestial

bodies are free for exploration by all states and are to remain free of military bases. No nation can claim sovereignty or impose restrictions on

space above any other nation. The OST bans earth-orbiting WMD

weapons and states must provide public and UN notification of space

launches. The 1972 US–USSR Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of space-based ABM systems. International space law does not prohibit conventional force application weapons in space, antisatellite weapons, and protection of space

assets.

33. The United States successfully demonstrated a direct ascent F-15

ASAT launch in 1985, but it has never been operationally fielded due to

military policy and US political agreements.

34. The author conducted a survey of typical JAOC augmentees. The

database was the ACSC academic year 1999 exercise Prairie Warrior.

35. Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer, 87.

36. C2TIC is located at Hurlburt Field, Fla., and is a field unit of the

Aerospace C2ISR Center (AC2ISRC).

37. JAOC/NAF space education ideally should consist of introductory space briefings during MQT, hard copy material describing military

space war-fighting applications, regular space updates, and detailed

information on how space supports NAF/JAOC planning and execution

in exercises and real-world operations.

38. Author’s personal experience at Thirteenth Air Force in Exercises

Cobra Gold 1997 and 1998 and Tandem Thrust 1997.

39. Author’s personal experience at Thirteenth Air Force, Andersen

AFB, Guam, during joint and combined exercises Cobra Gold 1997 and

1998, Tandem Thrust 1997, Tempest Express 1997, Ulchi Focus Lens 97,

40 RAPID DOMINANCE
and Northern Edge 1997. Space participation in joint and combined exercises must begin with the Concept Development Conference (CDC), sometimes as far as a year in advance of the actual exercise. The CDC is crucial because it is where space and missile play are be advocated for

inclusion in the exercise. Once the CDC approves space/missile objectives, then Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) and the master scenario events list (MSEL) are prepared. The space warfare officer, space

support teams, USSPACECOM, and space service components

(AFSPACE, NAVSPACE, ARSPACE) coordinate the JMETLs and prepare

the MSEL script of exercise events which will be injected by the controllers during the exercise. Space representation by unit space officers,

space support teams, and the theater’s USCINCSPACE limited nuclear

options need to continue throughout the remaining exercise planning

conferences (initial, mid, and final).

40. Air Combat Command (ACC) Center for Lessons Learned––“Don’t

Reinvent the Wheel.” Web site for all service Joint Universal Lessons

Learned (JULL). Collected information regarding space support strengths

and weaknesses in major US joint and combined exercises including Blue

Flag, Cobra Gold (Thailand), Tandem Thrust (PACOM), and Ulchi Focus

Lens (Korea). Web site location is http://www.mil.acc.af.mil/acccll/.

Headquarters AFSPC/DOTW is implementing a database method for

rapid access to space-related JULLs.

41. The US Army’s FM 100-18, Space Support to Army Operations, 20

July 1995, provides a solid discussion of Army space doctrine and policy, application of space systems, organization, operations, and training.

Notable is a much more detailed description of space force enhancement

with specific Army weapon systems compared to AFDD 2-2, Space Operations. The US Army also produced the Training and Doctrine Command

Pamphlet 525-60: Military Operations––Concept For Space Support To

Land Force Operations, 1 November 1994, which provides the basis for

Army doctrine, training, organizations, and materiel changes through the

use of space operations. Army doctrine (and personnel) reveal a better

basic understanding of space forces but are weaker on the big picture of

space warfare. The US Navy, although totally reliant on space-based navigation, communications, and ISR, has no service space doctrine at all.

42. Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer, 2.

43. Robert D. Newberry, Space Doctrine for the Twenty-first Century

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1998), 7–9. National space policy provided to DOD: (1) execute mission areas (force enhancement, space

control, force application, space support); (2) protect critical space-related technologies and missions; (3) act as launch agent for defense and

intelligence sectors; (4) integrate and enhance satellite control robustness; (5) establish requirements for military and national-level intelligence information; (6) develop, operate, and maintain space control capabilities; and (7) pursue a ballistic missile defense program.

44. Newberry, ix, 1–6.

45. USSPACECOM/J5, “Joint Doctrine: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space Operations,” draft V 1.3, November 1998.

46. AFDD 2, 47–48, 63–70.

HARTER 41
47. Headquarters PACAF/DOQ, 23 February 1999. For example,

PACAF has positions for 11 W-13SX officers, two 13SX, and one 1C6

spread throughout key PACAF units such as every NAF, several wings,

and numerous operational support squadrons. USAFE and the other

USAF major commands are following suit by populating their units with

space-smart people.

48. Richard Boltz, Headquarters AFSPC/DOTW, personal interview,

12 February 1999. Based on a three-year assignment, up to 72 W-13SX

officer billets are available to JAOCs, NAFs, and MAJCOMs.

49. Air Force Space Support Team, 76th SOPS, Fourteenth Air Force,

Schriever AFB, Colo., www.swc.schriever.af.mil/76sops/index.html.

50. Author’s personal experience during Exercises Cobra Gold 1997

and 1998 (Thailand), Tandem Thrust 97 (Australia), and Ulchi Focus

Lens 97 (Korea). The USSPACECOM SPOC was the critical link in providing the enemy and friendly space order of battle, space systems operational capabilities, and information feeding into courses of action and

campaign planning. SPOC unclassified web site: http://www.spacecom.af.mil/usspace/.

51. Headquarters Fourteenth Air Force /DOX, “Command and Control of AFSPACE Forces, A White Paper to Articulate COMAFSPACE’s

Vision,” draft version 2.0, September 1998, 6, 27–30.

52. ACSC Research Survey 99-06, Prairie Warrior Space Survey,

November 1998, ACSC, Maxwell AFB, Ala. The survey indicated that 47

percent believed the JFC was responsible for space in theater campaigns;

USCINCSPACE, 6 percent; the JFACC, 6 percent, and 41 percent did not

know. 

53. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995, ix, II-3, III9–10; and Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer, 15 July 1997, 32.

54. JP 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 14

November 1994, xiii, I-1 to I-3.

55. Dewey Miller, JFACC in Space, Air War College (AWC) research,

October 1998. Miller addresses options for theater space forces C2,

including the JFACC and creation of a JFSCC.

56. AFDD 2, 47, 63–69; Air Force Instruction (AFI) 13-1, vol. 3, Operational Procedures––Air Operations Center, April 1998; AFI 13-1 SOC, vol.

3, “Operational Procedures––Space Operations Center,” draft, October

1998.

57. USSPACECOM/J5, Long Range Plan: Implementing USSPACECOM

Vision for 2020, March 1998, 94. The JFSCC is cited as an option in

USSPACECOM’s Long Range Plan.

58. The coordination of space forces is daunting, consisting of multiple (and growing) space organizations, including military (USAF, Army,

Navy, NRO, DISA, DARPA), civil (NASA, NOAA, DOT/DOS, etc.), commercial (INTELSAT, INMARSAT, Iridium, etc.), and even friendly foreign systems (SPOT, RADARSAT, JERS, GOMS, GMS, etc.). This alone may conceivably justify a single JFSCC to coordinate effective space support to

the theater campaign.

59. USSPACECOM/J5, JP 3-14, “Joint Doctrine: Tactics, Techniques,

and Procedures (TTP) for Space Operations,” November 1998, draft V1.3,

I-4.

42 RAPID DOMINANCE
60. This makes space support unique and nonstandard in each theater, while requiring significantly more equipment with associated cables,

power systems, manuals, and supplies to operate the various systems.

Nonstandard equipment also creates interoperability problems, sometimes produces questionable information and data, and increases airlift

requirements for an already constrained and saturated airlift system.

61. TBMCS Version 1.1 is to be fielded by the USAF in mid-1999.

Unfortunately, there is no space support in TBMCS V1.1, but there is significant space integration in TBMCS V2.0, due for release in FY 2000.

62. Gen Michael E. Ryan, USAF chief of staff, “Expeditionary Aerospace Force––A Better Use of Aerospace Power for the 21st Century,”

address to ACSC on 18 August 1998. EAF driven by NSS, QDR, NMS,

DPG, AFDD 2, Joint Vision 2010.

63. USAF Scientific Advisory Board, Study on USAF Expeditionary

Forces, 25 November 1997.

64. 366th Wing, AEF Battlelab, Mountain Home AFB, Idaho. The en

route EOC is a modified KC-135, complete with up to four SATCOM

antennas, consisting of two UHF SATCOM (Combat Track II, voice/data),

one Iridium SATCOM (voice), one INMARSAT (voice), and SIPRNET reach

back.

65. Maj Gen Lance L. Smith, commandant, AWC, interviewed by

author, 6 January 1999. According to General Smith, commander for

AEF-3 (real-world AEF deployment to Qatar, August 1996) and AEF-4

(short-notice AEF deployment to Qatar, February 1997), space forces

were absolutely superb in providing time-critical, in-flight information for

en route planning and making changes to the air tasking order. General

Smith recalls that the space systems on board the C-141 were often the

only information systems providing war-fighting information which

enabled his staff to make real-time changes to the ATO.

66. During the March–June 1998 AEF deployment to theater

(Bahrain), en route AFSST space support equipment provided updates to

two ATOs (received and printed in flight), 18 weather images and text

reports, 12 point-to-point text reports, 19 imagery/graphics files, and

four INTSUMS, DISUMS, and SPINS. During AEF V (November 1997,

366th Wing) the AFSST’s MSTS provided the only comprehensive air picture via TADIL-A receive capability. (76th SOPS, Schriever AFB; 366th

Wing/XP, “AEF V Lessons Learned,” ACC Lessons Learned web site,

http://www.mil.acc.af.mil/acccll/).

67. John A. Tirpak, “The Long Reach of On-Call Power,” Air Force

Magazine, December 1998, 22–24. Tirpak describes basic EAF operations

and the importance of the EOC as demonstrated during EFX 98 in which

the EOC was palletized and rolled on board Speckled Trout, a specially

equipped KC-135R. The EOC received and provided intelligence and

weather analysis, mission planning, air defense integration, aircraft status monitoring, and command post functions.

HARTER 43
Glossary

AADC area air defense commander

ACA airspace control authority

ACSC Air Command and Staff College

AEF Aerospace Expeditionary Force

AEW Aerospace Expeditionary Wing

AFB Air Force Base

AFDD Air Force Doctrine Document

AFI Air Force Instruction

AFSPC Air Force Space Command

AFSST Air Force space support team

AFTTP Air Force Tactics, Techniques,

and Procedures

AOC air operations center

ASAT antisatellite

ASST Army space support team

ATO air tasking order

AU Air University

AWC Air War College

C2 command and control

C2TIC Command and Control Training 

and Innovation Center

(Hurlburt Field, Florida)

CADRE College of Aerospace Doctrine, 

Research and Education

CINC commander in chief

COG center of gravity

COCOM combatant command

45
CONUS continental United States

DOD Department of Defense

EAF Expeditionary Aerospace Force

EOC Expeditionary Operations 

Center

FM Field Manual

FY fiscal year

GAT guidance, apportionment, and

targeting

GPS Global Positioning System

IO information operations

ISR intelligence/surveillance/

reconnaissance

IW information warfare

JAOC joint air operations center

JASOP Joint Air and Space Operations

Plan

JDACC Joint Doctrine Air Campaign

Course

JFACC joint force air component

commander

JFC joint force commander

JFLCC joint force land component

commander

JFMCC joint force maritime component

commander

JFSCC joint force space component

commander

JP Joint Publication

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSST joint space support team

46
JTF joint task force

JULL joint universal lessons learned

LOCs lines of communication

MAAP master air attack plan 

MAJCOM major command

MOOTW military operations other than

war

MQT mission qualification training 

MSTS multi-source tactical system

NAF numbered air force

NAVWAR navigation warfare

NIST National Intelligence Support

Team

NRO National Reconnaissance Office

NSS national security strategy

NSST Navy space support team

OPLAN operations plan

OPR office of primary responsibility

OSO Operational Support Office

OSS operational support squadron

PGM precision-guided munitions

PME professional military education

PW Prairie Warrior

RTIC real-time-in-the-cockpit

information

RTOC real-time-out-of-the-cockpit

information

SATCOM satellite communications

SOC space operations center

47
SPS standard precision service

SOO space operations officer

SSC small-scale contingencies

SST space support team

STO space tasking order

TBMCS theater battle management

core system

TPFDD time phased force deployment

data

UCP Unified Command Plan

US United States

USAF United States Air Force

USCINCSPACE commander in chief, United

States Space Command

USSPACECOM United States Space Command

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