No. 183, July 2001 Strategic Forum 1

Strategic Forum

During the Cold War, strategic capabilities were synonymous with nuclear

capabilities, and U.S. strategic planning focused on nuclear deterrence and

response against a single adversary. Today,

more potential enemies are developing

asymmetric capabilities to inhibit or prevent

U.S. military intervention in regional conflicts—in short, to wage strategic warfare by

implicitly or explicitly threatening highvalue political, military, or economic targets

with weapons of mass destruction and disruption. U.S. security over the next several

decades will depend increasingly on the

ability to deter and respond effectively to

strategic regional conflicts with significant

escalation potential.

The Department of Defense faces the

task of ensuring that a comprehensive set of

responses is developed for the National

Command Authorities and is incorporated

into planning before a conflict begins.

To meet this challenge, the defense

establishment should analyze requirements

for deterring and combating strategic warfare

in regional conflicts, identify shortcomings in

plans and capabilities, and develop solutions.

Providing a broad mix of military options

could require changes in operational concepts, contingency planning, training, and

resource allocation. The effort will require

significant input from all the relevant commands and force providers, as well as the

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff,

services, and other agencies.

The strategic environment facing the

United States has changed radically in the past

decade. The United States needs to reexamine

traditional ways of planning for the use of

military force in conflicts that threaten vital

interests and that could escalate to the highest

levels of violence. Several characteristics define

the new environment:

■ Changed relationships between the

major powers. The bipolar world of the Cold

War has yielded to U.S. preeminence in virtually every facet of power, while Russia has

become a second-tier power. China now has the

seventh largest economy in the world and is

modernizing both its conventional and nuclear

forces—though it is unlikely to replace the

former Soviet Union as the second pole in a

reconfigured bipolar world. 

■ The rise of regional powers, such as

Iraq and Iran. These aspiring regional hegemons are unhappy with a status quo that is

preserved by American military power. The end

of bipolarity has brought this antagonism to

the fore. During the Cold War, regional conflicts played out within the context of the

broader ideological and strategic conflict

between the two superpowers, which also

tamped down pressures for escalation and

proliferation for fear that conflict would spiral

out of control. That all ended with the Cold

War. The collapse of the Soviet empire made it

impossible for Russia to continue supporting

its allies abroad, who were forced to become

responsible for their own security. 

■ The possibility that smaller rogue states

might try to keep the United States out of a

regional conflict. By credibly threatening that

the fight could escalate and even involve homeland attacks on the United States or its partners,

a regional pariah might hope to prevent the

United States from committing forces to the

conflict or hinder it from building coalitions

with European and regional allies. Failing that,

a regional adversary could seek to delay and

disrupt U.S. deployments to the theater and

hamper operations. Finally, the leadership of a

rogue state may be able to preserve its regime

even in defeat if it could strike the American

homeland or American allies. In short, regional

powers are developing the capability to conduct

strategic warfare against the United States. The

importance these countries place on asymmetric warfare probably has been encouraged by

the American distaste for wartime casualties

and worries about self-deterrence.

Planning Challenges

In the changing environment, the United

States must transform its thinking about deterring and defeating attempts to use strategic

warfare to force it to abandon the defense of its

vital interests in regional conflicts. During the

Cold War, planning for strategic warfare became synonymous with U.S.-Soviet nuclear

warfare for the simple reason that it was difficult to envision large-scale, conventional

warfare between the two superpowers that did

not quickly escalate to the use of nuclear

weapons. This is no longer the case. Thus, the

United States must rethink its plans, capabilities, and procedures for responding to the

challenge of strategic warfare in the broadest

sense. In other words, about whom is the

United States worried strategically, what is it

worried they will do, and how does it deter or

deal with those actions?

Regional Conflicts with Strategic

Consequences

by M. Elaine Bunn, David E. Mosher, and Richard D. Sokolsky

No. 183

July 2001

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points
Defense planners must consider a broader

range of countries that are potential strategic

adversaries, and deterrence must be tailored to

specific countries. In addition, within each

country, understanding the power structure of

any regime will be important in knowing whom

is to be deterred. The elements of state control

may include not only the national leader or

leaders, but also the military and elites. 

Planners face a second question: what does

the United States want to deter a country from

doing? Offensive actions can range from information operations through conventional, chemical, and biological attacks to nuclear strikes.

Moreover, there are gradations within each

category; for example, nuisance attacks against

government computers would have serious

consequences, but large numbers of fatalities

caused by disrupting the air traffic control

system would have far greater significance. 

The third question is more difficult to

answer definitively: by what means does the

United States deter an action against itself or

an ally? The goal of deterrence is to prevent

aggression by ensuring that, in the mind of a

potential aggressor, the risks of aggression

outweigh the gains. During the Cold War, the

U.S. doctrine of deterrence was offensive dominant and focused on increasing potential risks

to aggressors by threatening (or holding at

risk) targets they valued, particularly with

nuclear weapons. These targets included conventional and nuclear forces, defenses, chemical and biological weapons, leadership, critical

infrastructure, and economic targets. In the

future security environment, the United States

will need to broaden its conception of deterrence to include defensive means designed to

persuade a potential adversary that the likelihood of success is too low to make an attack

worth the price of certain retaliation against

highly valued assets.

Indeed, over the next 10 to 20 years, the

United States will be able to choose from a

larger, more flexible menu of offensive and

defensive military options to shape an adversary’s calculations of risks and gains. In past

regional conflicts, U.S. forces employed capabilities usually regarded as strategic, such as

B–2s and B–52s, not to dissuade escalatory

strikes against U.S. targets outside the theater

of operations, but to achieve specific operational objectives. This range of strategic capabilities could include not only nuclear

weapons but also defenses against missiles and

other means of delivering weapons of mass

destruction (WMD), precision-guided conventional weapons, offensive and defensive information warfare, air defense, passive defense,

special operations, space operations, nonkinetic weapons such as lasers, and intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

These capabilities could be combined in any

number of ways to deter potential adversaries

from threatening or using strategic warfare to

affect not only plans and operations, but also

U.S. objectives and calculations of its interests.

If deterrence fails, many of these tools could

also be employed to manage the escalatory

process so as to preserve U.S. objectives at the

lowest possible level of conflict.

Improving Capabilities

The transition to a formalized process for

thinking about employing military capabilities

in strategic regional conflicts has been slow

and is far from complete. One reason for the

delay is that military structures developed to

deter the former Soviet Union created organizational stovepipes that impede adaptation to the

new strategic environment. Any new

approaches to the asymmetric threat will have

to cut across these structures. To overcome

these impediments and develop an integrated

approach to planning for future strategic

regional conflicts, the national security community should institute a formal process that

injects these issues into exercises and war

planning. This effort should reengineer U.S.

plans and capabilities for regional conflicts

with significant escalation potential and provide as many options as possible to the National Command Authorities (NCA) to facilitate

effective decisionmaking in these contingencies. Specifically, this process should have three

goals—defining requirements, identifying

shortfalls, and implementing solutions:

Defining Requirements. The first step to

improving U.S. capabilities would be to carefully consider the range of strategic regional

situations the United States may face and how

it would deter or respond to strategic warfare.

That planning should be done in advance

because U.S. civilian and military leaders are

likely to have little time to consider their responses during a crisis. Advance planning

would also permit the United States to develop

a careful strategy for signaling its intentions if

the homeland, allies, or forces are attacked by

WMD, cyberweapons, or space weapons. Moreover, planners need to think through forceemployment options and operational concepts

for all phases of a crisis: regional enemies are

likely to start engaging in strategic warfare

before the crisis begins and continue through

conflict termination. Planners must ask themselves several important questions: At what

point in the conflict might different force

packages be most relevant or useful, and in

what sequence and combination? Are any of

these instruments uniquely suited to preemption or retaliation? What constraints might the

NCA face, and under what types of constraints

might various options be most useful? Which

military options require NCA authorization? In

what situations and in what phases of conflict

should there be predelegated authority and

standing rules of engagement? 

The key challenge is to develop a repertoire of possible responses to scenarios in gray

areas. For example, what would be the best

response if a regional adversary used a nuclear

weapon against a carrier battle group? This

action clearly would cross the nuclear threshold, and yet its collateral effects would be

localized and limited. Should the United States

attack military forces with a nuclear weapon,

or should it attack other targets with nuclear

or conventional weapons? Similarly, a nuclear

burst in space could have a significant effect

on satellites but cause no direct casualties.

How should the United States respond? Likewise, one of the most serious challenges for the

2 Strategic Forum No. 183, July 2001

This Strategic Forum was prepared by M. Elaine Bunn, a distinguished fellow in the Institute for National

Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University, David E. Mosher, a nuclear policy analyst at

RAND in Washington, and Richard D. Sokolsky, a visiting fellow in INSS. Please address any questions or

comments to Ms. Bunn at (202) 685–2366 or via e-mail at bunne@ndu.edu.

regional enemies are

likely to start engaging in

strategic warfare before

the crisis begins and

continue through conflict

termination
United States is developing credible responses

to chemical and biological weapon (CBW)

attacks. A biological attack against an American city could evoke a nuclear response. But

what about a biological attack that destroys

the agricultural sector of an ally in the

region, or one that kills scores of U.S. troops?

How should the United States respond to a

chemical weapon attack against a key military installation on American soil? Moreover,

responses depend not only on the type of

attack but also on the result. If a biological

attack against a city in the United States or

an allied nation produced only a handful of

casualties, the response might be very different from one that killed tens of thousands.

Geographic and regional constraints also

will condition the choices leaders are willing

to make. These gray areas put maximum

stress on U.S. capabilities for strategic regional conflicts and thus are in most need of

advance planning.

To identify possible solutions to these

challenges, the widest practical range of realistic and plausible scenarios for each potential

regional adversary must be developed. Defense

planners obviously cannot anticipate or plan

for innumerable scenarios in every region. But

they can examine a range of scenarios involving different countries and different mixes of

military capabilities to identify the most stressing combination of challenges and constraints

for each element of the force, then optimize

capabilities accordingly.

Simulation and gaming will be important tools in this endeavor, as will field experiments and exercises to test new operational

techniques and to acquire the experience to

use new technical solutions effectively. The

games and simulations should include as

diverse a group of experts as possible to develop a broad range of solutions. The participation of regional commanders in chief

(CINCs)—such as those of U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Central Command, with areas

of responsibilities where strategic regional

conflict may originate—as well as functional

CINCs—such as those of U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Space Command, and U.S. Joint

Forces Command—will be critical to the

success of this effort. Military and civilian

representatives from the Office of the Secretary

of Defense, Joint Staff, services, and other

relevant agencies should also be involved to

add greater military and political realism.

Because many regional conflicts could escalate

to CBW use or other attacks on the U.S. homeland and thus add a domestic political dimension to U.S. planning, it will be important to

include officials involved in consequence

management. Regional specialists should

participate to provide feedback on the diplomatic feasibility of proposed solutions and

expertise on the strategic personality of each

potential adversary. Wherever possible, allies

and likely coalition partners also should take

part to help U.S. planners understand allied

constraints and concerns and spur those countries to establish their own processes for developing effective military responses to strategic

regional conflicts.

Identifying and Correcting Weaknesses.

The second step is to identify the weaknesses

in U.S. and allied response capabilities and

develop remedies for those shortcomings.

Those shortcomings could be technical or

operational in nature. In some cases, the

United States may not have the technical

capability to threaten a particular type of

target, or operational constraints may preclude

using an effective weapon. Some shortcomings

may be common to many different scenarios

in several different parts of the world; others

may be unique to a specific threat or scenario. 

Once weaknesses have been identified, the

process of devising remedies would begin.

Addressing a weakness might involve developing a new technology or system. Or it could

simply require turning a technology that may

exist in a laboratory or in the commercial

world into a useful military tool. New operational approaches might also solve some shortcomings, as might new ways to organize planning and operations to make better use of

existing capabilities. Correcting some weaknesses might involve creating new types of

specialized forces or giving existing units new

tools and training to deal with specific strategic

warfare challenges. In some cases, the solution

might even be to make changes in U.S. declaratory policy.

Moreover, wherever possible, developing

more than one solution to a problem will be

useful. It will help improve the flexibility of

decisionmakers and operators and contribute to

the goal of providing commanders and the NCA

the broadest possible menu of strategic response

capabilities. Indeed, having several possible

solutions could be essential for addressing

particularly thorny problems for which no good

No. 183, July 2001 Strategic Forum 3

unless defense planners

cut across organizational

stovepipes, their ability

to deter or respond to

strategic warfare aimed

at the United States and

its allies will be hindered

Other recent titles in the Strategic Forum series:

John C. Holzman

A Golden Opportunity: The Next Steps in 

U.S.-Indian Relations

(No. 182, July 2001)

Anthony C. Zinni

A Military for the 21st Century: Lessons 

from the Recent Past

(No. 181, July 2001)

Eugene B. Rumer and Richard D. Sokolsky

Normalizing U.S.-Russian Relations

(No. 180, April 2001)

For on-line access to Strategic Forum, go to:

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/h6.html

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

Revising the Two-Major Theater War Standard

(No. 179, April 2001)

Richard D. Sokolsky

Renovating U.S. Strategic Arms Control Policy

(No. 178, February 2001)

M. Elaine Bunn and Richard D. Sokolsky

The U.S. Strategic Posture Review: Issues for

the New Adminstration

(No. 177, February 2001)
4 Strategic Forum No. 183, July 2001

solution exists; in those cases, innovative approaches should be encouraged. Once possible

solutions to U.S. weaknesses have been identified, their potential effectiveness should be

analyzed and vetted using games, simulations,

and exercises. The effort to develop solutions

should focus on the areas with the highest

payoff—either because the solution will be

relatively straightforward, apply in many scenarios, or meet a critical need, or because potential

resource constraints must be considered. Some

deficiencies could be extremely difficult to

overcome for technical or political reasons. But

even if planners cannot always craft effective

solutions, understanding weaknesses will help

them develop ways of deterring or mitigating the

effectiveness of certain types of attacks.

Implementing Solutions. The third goal

should be to develop the appropriate plans and

structures to increase military flexibility to

respond and, by extension, to maximize NCA

choices when a decision must be made. Thinking across traditional stovepipes will be critical.

Regional CINCs still have responsibility for

planning and executing the conventional

campaign and theater nuclear operations. U.S.

Strategic Command has the strategic nuclear

portfolio and deals with strategic warfare, but

almost exclusively in nuclear terms. The emergence of the information revolution has created

a new arena for waging strategic warfare

against U.S. military and economic targets.

Responsibility for the computer network operations aspect of this fledgling mission resides in

yet another organization, U.S. Space Command, which also has the national missile

defense portfolio. Unless defense planners can

devise a way to cut across organizational

stovepipes, their ability to develop capabilities to

deter or respond to strategic warfare aimed at

the United States and its allies will be hindered.

A few recent organizational innovations

have the potential to accelerate the transition

process, if preparing for strategic regional

conflicts became an explicit part of the mission of certain organizations. For example,

the joint concept development and experimentation mission of U.S. Joint Forces Command would make the command a useful

laboratory for innovation and testing of new

operational concepts. Similarly, assigning

responsibility for computer network operations

to a functional CINC, in this case U.S. Space

Command, should give greater visibility to the

problem of preparing for strategic information

operations. However, the potential of those

organizations to help defeat the strategic

warfare threat will not be fully realized unless

their particular talents and skills can be harnessed and focused on the issue in concert

with those of other relevant organizations.

One way to do this would be to establish a

formalized process for developing responses to

strategic warfare that reaches across the command and planning structures of the commands and the Joint Staff. Another option

would be to break down the stovepipes or at

least create some avenues for regular working-level coordination and planning.

Who should have responsibility and control

of the planning process for strategic regional

conflicts? Ultimately, the Pentagon must present

the NCA with options; hence, the responsibility

falls on them. Clearly, regional CINCs are responsible for developing war plans for their

areas of responsibility. But they are unable to

address the elements of operational plans that

deal with threats that transcend their regions

and extend to the United States or its potential

coalition partners. Some of those elements

would fall under the functional CINCs; however,

none of those functional commands can do it

alone because they are responsible for only a

piece of the problem. Therefore, planning for

strategic regional conflict must be coordinated

at a higher level with significant contributions

from all of the relevant commands and force

providers. Moreover, developing cost-effective

solutions to this vexing problem will require

innovation and creativity that can only come

with frequent contacts among regional and

functional commands and the research and

development community.

The conduct of strategic warfare by regional adversaries will become an important

feature of the international environment. A

growing number of states are developing strategic capabilities to deter the United States from

entering into conflicts where American interests,

commitments to friends and allies, or both

would otherwise dictate involvement. But the

United States has not yet replaced Cold War

structures, plans, and procedures that are inappropriate for today’s strategic warfare. As a

result, U.S. planning for this mission does not

fully reflect the changed world.

The Armed Forces should work to develop

integrated operational plans, capabilities, and

campaign strategies to provide the NCA with

the largest number of options for dealing with

regional conflicts that have significant escalatory potential. The first step is to institute a

comprehensive review of contingencies and

capabilities for deterring and conducting this

type of warfare in the emerging international

environment. Such a process will focus attention on U.S. strengths and weaknesses and

allow planners to develop a range of potential

solutions. It will also allow planners to identify

shortcomings in strategy and capabilities and

potential solutions. The final step is to make

the changes that are necessary to adapt the

Armed Forces to the needs of strategic regional

conflicts. The entire process should be repeated

every few years to ensure that it becomes a

permanent part of planning in the Department

of Defense. The United States will only be able

to realize its full potential for this military

mission by rigorously reviewing its requirements, addressing its shortcomings, and

adapting its plans and capabilities to meet the

challenge of future strategic regional conflicts.

developing cost-effective

solutions to this vexing

problem will require

innovation and creativity

that can only come with

frequent contacts among

regional and functional

commands

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by

members of the National Defense University as well as

other scholars and specialists in national security affairs

from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions,

and recommendations expressed or implied within are

those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect

the views of the Department of Defense or any other

agency of the Federal Government.

NDU PRESS

William R. Bode George C. Maerz

General Editor Supervisory Editor

The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes

books, monographs, and reports on national security

strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy.

For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at:

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/ndup2.html. INSS also

produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at:

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Stephen J. Flanagan Robert A. Silano

Director Director of Publications