In the Tracks 

of Tamerlane:

Central Asia’s Path 

to the 21st Century

In the Tracks 

of Tamerlane:

Central Asia’s Path 

to the 21st Century

edited by Dan Burghart

 Theresa Sabonis-Helf

���

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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

2004
The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

within are those of the individual authors and do not represent the views of the other 

contributors, the Department of Defense or any other agency or department of the 

Federal Government. This publication is cleared for public release; distribution 

unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without further permission, with credit to the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. A 

courtesy copy of any reviews and tearsheets would be appreciated.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in Publication Data

 / edited by Dan Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 1-57906-068-4

1. Asia, Central — Social Conditions — 1991 – 2. Asia, Central — Politics 

and government — 1991 – 3. Asia, Central — Economic conditions. 

Daniel L. Burghart. II. Title. 

First Printing, July 2004

NDU CTNSP publications are sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office. For ordering information, call (202) 

512-1800 or write to the Superintendant of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 

20402. For GPO publications on-line access their Web site at: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/sale.html. 

For current publications of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, consult Natioonal Defense 

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DEDICATION vii

D E D I C A T I O N

To the heroes working for reform in Central Asia, 

and to Gavin and the girls, and Susan and the boys, 

the heroes in our hearts

vii
viii
ix

ix

Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xv

Chapter One

In the Tracks of Tamerlane:

Central Asia’s Path to the 21st Century . . . . . . . . . . .3

Daniel L. Burghart

Part I—Political Changes

Chapter 2

The Politics of Central Asia: 

National in Form, Soviet in Content . . . . . . . . . . . .25

E.Wayne Merry

Chapter 3

Political Reform Strategies:

Early Starters, Late Starters, and Non-Starters . . .43

Gregory Gleason

Chapter 4

Legal Reform in Central Asia: 

Battling the Influence of History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65

Roger D. Kangas
x CONTENTS

Chapter 5

Human Rights in Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Michael Ochs

Chapter 6

Democracy-Building in Central Asia 

Post September 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115

Sylvia W. Babus

Chapter 7

Islam in Central Asia: 

The Emergence and Growth of 

Radicalism in the Post-Communist Era . . . . . . . .139

Tiffany Petros

Part II—Economic Concerns

Chapter 8

The Rise of the Post-Soviet Petro-States: 

Energy Exports and Domestic Governance 

in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . .159

Theresa Sabonis-Helf

Chapter 9

Cooperative Management of 

Transboundary Water Resources 

in Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .187

Daene C. McKinney
xi

Chapter 10

Central Asian Public Health:

Transition and Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

Genevieve Grabman

Chapter 11

From Rio to Johannesburg: Comparing 

Sustainable Development in Kazakhstan, 

Uzbekistan, and The Kyrgyz Republic . . . . . . . . . .245

Alma Raissova and Aliya Sartbayeva-Peleo

Chapter 12

Land Privatization and Conflict in 

Central Asia: Is Kyrgyzstan a Model?1 . . . . . . . . . 259

Kevin D. Jones

Chapter 13

Environmental Management in 

Independent Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .275

David S. McCauley

Chapter 14

The Future of Electrical Power 

in the Republic of Kazakhstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .305

Kalkaman Suleimenov
xii CONTENTS

Part III—Security Issues

Chapter 15

Forging Relationships, Preventing Proliferation: 

A Decade of Cooperative Threat Reduction 

in Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .321

Emily E. Daughtry

Chapter 16

Building Security in Central Asia: 

a Multilateral Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .341

Jennifer D.P. Moroney

Chapter 17

Who’s Watching the Watchdogs?: 

Drug Trafficking in Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .361

Nancy Lubin

Chapter 18

Migration Trends in Central Asia 

and the Case of Trafficking of Women . . . . . . . . .377

Saltanat Sulaimanova

Chapter 19

Beyond the Battle of Talas: 

China’s Re-emergence in Central Asia1 . . . . . . . . 401

Matthew Oresman
xiii

Chapter 20

Regional Security Cooperation 

and Foreign Policies in Central Asia: 

A 21st Century “Great Game”? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .425

Robert Brannon

Chapter 21

Friends Like These: Defining 

U.S. Interests in Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .445

Olga Oliker

About the Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .465

Abbreviations and Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .473
xiv CONTENTS
 PREFACE xv

xv

Preface

Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf

When examining the ebb and flow of events in the region called 

Central Asia, one is struck by the magnitude of the impact that this area 

has had throughout history. Yet in spite of this record, very little is known 

about this part of the world today. Central Asia always has found itself 

wedged between Europe and Asia, and as such, has been at the crossroads 

of relations between the two. In physical terms, this can be seen graphically in the trade routes of the Great Silk Road. In philosophical terms, it 

is an area where Western beliefs met and mingled with Eastern ways, often 

resulting in unusual and unique hybrids of thought and culture. Nor has 

the area’s significance been limited to that of providing a meeting place 

for other cultures. For over 100 years, between the thirteenth and fifteenth 

centuries, the armies of Genghis Khan and later Tamerlane spread from 

Central Asia to conquer and exert their influence over an area larger than 

the conquests of Alexander, Rome or Hitler. The repercussions of these 

conquests can still be seen today and serve as a reminder of the impact the 

region has had, and may again have, on world events.

Great though this influence may have been, history dictated that after 

Central Asia's zenith, there followed a period of decline. During this time, 

the region seemed to slip from the world stage, surpassed in importance 

by other areas, such as the newly discovered Americas. Though the reasons 

for this decline are many and varied, the end result was that the region 

seemed to fall from the attention of most scholars, political leaders and 

the public in general. That the region still held importance for its residents goes without saying; that it continues to be important to the major 

regional actors bordering the area will be shown. Still, little was known or 

written about Central Asia after the time of Tamerlane, other than that it 

was a far off and mysterious part of the world that few people traveled to 

or cared about. This remained the case throughout most of the twentieth 

century, until events following the breakup of the Soviet Union brought 

the region into new prominence and focus.
xvi BURGHART AND SABONIS-HELF

Many events can be pointed to as affecting the status of the region; 

however, three stand out beyond all others as having an impact both on 

the peoples of Central Asia and, in turn, their relations with the rest of 

world. The breakup of the Russian/Soviet Empire, just as with the fall of 

other great empires, sent shockwaves through the area and beyond. The 

opportunity for the region to rule itself, as opposed to being ruled by others, has meant significant changes in the politics, economy and social fabric found there. Yet as important as these changes have been, they would 

have little meaning or impact on the rest of the world were it not for the 

second major event associated with Central Asia: the discovery of potentially extensive reserves of gas and oil. Although the size of these stores is 

debated and in truth has yet to be determined, they are significant enough 

to warrant global attention and interest as an alternative fuel source in 

a world concerned with the dwindling stocks of hydrocarbons. These 

reserves hold the promise of economic development and prosperity, but 

as has been seen elsewhere in the world, this promise can be a two-edged 

sword with as many downsides as benefits. Finally, in the aftermath of September 11, the potential of terrorism both originating from and affecting 

the region need hardly be elaborated. For all these and other reasons, the 

world is showing renewed interest in Central Asia.

The genesis of this book is a response to that interest. While many 

works dealing with Central Asia appeared between 1991 and 1995, taking 

advantage of the fact that for the first time outside observers had relatively easy access to the region, far fewer texts have appeared since then. 

As often happens, general interest migrated to other parts of the world, 

leaving the area to be covered by a small community of specialists. Yet 

events continued to occur and changes continued to take place, so that 

ten years after independence, it seemed essential to “take stock” of what 

has transpired during this period, as well as to look at future prospects. To 

accomplish this, we have assembled a collection of scholars and regional 

specialists who are closely associated with Central Asia and whose works 

cover a broad range of problems facing the region. Rather than focus on 

a country-by-country analysis, each author was asked to write about a 

specific topic and how it played out in at least two of the countries of the 

region. They were further asked to project the potential significance of 

their observations for the region over the next 15 years and how the “lessons learned” to date might be applied in the future.

For the purposes of this book, the changes that have taken place in 

Central Asia have been grouped into three general categories, political, 

economic and security. The specific subjects included in each category re-
 PREFACE xvii

flect major problems or areas of concern. Although the list of these topics 

is in no way all-inclusive, it does reflect a general consensus of the specialists gathered here as to the key issues that must be addressed when discussing the region overall. Each of these topics has an impact that goes beyond 

individual country borders, and while some may affect certain countries 

more than others, all have consequences for the region as a whole. Because 

of this, the traditional approach which would look at each country individually has been eschewed in favor of an approach that focuses on problems that are regional in nature, and thus must be addressed in a regional 

context. In some cases, the authors compare how different countries have 

addressed the same problem; in others, the issues are transboundary in 

nature and the authors examine regional solutions. Although it is hoped 

that this work will appeal to a wide audience, three groups in particular 

may benefit from its approach: policy makers who need a general background on the issues associated with the region; regional specialists who 

are seeking information on specific issues that challenge the region; and 

technical specialists who wish to see how their areas of interest affect the 

region as a whole. Finally, the views of the authors reflected here represent 

a wide range of opinions that are often at odds with one another. No attempt has been made to resolve these differences, and they are presented 

to the reader for her or him to evaluate and make their own determination as to the weight they want to assign each. Out of a diversity of ideas 

and differences of opinion, better solutions to the problems the area faces 

hopefully can be found and better policies formulated to implement these 

solutions.

Contents

After an overview of the region by Daniel L. Burghart, Part I — 

Political Changes begins with a chapter on the international politics affecting the region. Written by Wayne Merry, a retired Foreign Service Officer 

with extensive experience in the former Soviet Union, the chapter provides 

a context for understanding the various external influences that can be 

seen in the region, as well as the reactions of the local political “apparat” 

to these influences. In the next chapter, Gregory Gleason looks in greater 

detail at the current domestic political situation in the region, and the 

prospects for meaningful political reform. In the chapter on legal reform, 

Roger D. Kangas summarizes the steps that already have been taken in this 

area, a necessary precondition for meaningful reform in the areas of politics and the economy. This is followed by a discussion of human rights by 

Michael Ochs, a Congressional staff member who has followed these issues 
xviii BURGHART AND SABONIS-HELF

for more than a decade. Human rights in Central Asia are arguably worse 

than anywhere else in the former Soviet Union, and must be improved if 

any of these states hope to be accepted into the community of nations. 

Sylvia W. Babus’ chapter furthers the political track by discussing outside 

efforts at democracy building. With first hand experience in many of 

these programs, she provides a unique insight into “what works and what 

doesn’t” on the ground. Finally, Tiffany Petros takes on the difficult task of 

assessing the role of Islam in defining the region and its future.

Part II — Economic Concerns begins with Theresa Sabonis-Helf’s 

examination of the impact of hydrocarbon development on the economics and politics of the energy-rich countries of the region. Next, Daene C. 

McKinney, a noted hydrographic engineer, addresses the complex topic of 

water in Central Asia, detailing its economic, political, and security implications, as well as ongoing efforts to resolve disputes over the equitable 

distribution of water in a peaceful manner. Genevieve Grabman examines 

issues of public health, and using the example of Kyrgyzstan, postulates 

the role that reform of health care systems can play in improving the wellbeing of the region’s most vital economic resource—its people. Kevin D. 

Jones does the same with regard to land privatization, probably one of 

the most difficult issues that all of the former Soviet Republics have had 

to face, given their socialist background and the state ownership of land 

associated with it. Economic development within the context of sustainable development is addressed by Alma Raissova and Aliya SartbayevaPeleo, two Central Asian scholars with extensive experience in this field. 

Although economic development has been a major goal of all of these 

states, these authors stress the need for such development to be moderated 

so as to achieve “sustainable development” goals. Closely related to these 

arguments, David S. McCauley enumerates the environmental challenges 

facing the region and also examines the efforts of international donors 

and the Central Asian states to meet these challenges. Finally, Kalkaman 

Suleimenov describes the steps being taken to rationalize the distribution 

of electricity in Kazakhstan and the surrounding area. As a regional government official, his piece is enlightening both in terms of the information it provides and as an example of how local officials are attempting to 

come to grips with the problems they have inherited from the old Soviet 

system.

In Part III — Security Issues, Emily E. Daughtry begins with a review 

of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program and its impact on 

Central Asia. CTR is often cited as the most effective program the U.S. 

Government has had with members of the former Soviet Union. She 
 PREFACE xix

documents the program’s efforts in the region and shows how its successes 

to date can be built in the future. Next, Jennifer D.P. Moroney examines 

existing security frameworks in Central Asia and the likelihood that these 

frameworks, and the organizations which comprise them, can provide the 

stability the region needs as a precondition for future development. Nancy 

Lubin examines what is characterized as the greatest threat to Central 

Asian security—drug trafficking and its impact on both the political and 

social spheres of society. Closely tied to this is the illicit trade in human 

beings. Here Saltanat Sulaimanova brings a regional perspective to this 

problem, as well as to the larger issue of migration to and from the area. Finally, three chapters are dedicated to Central Asian relations with the three 

major world powers that have active interests in the region—China, Russia and the United States. Matthew Oresman provides a detailed account 

of China’s interests in Central Asia, as well as the response of the Central 

Asian states to Chinese initiatives. Captain Robert Brannon summarizes 

Russia’s interests and concerns and also outlines U.S.-Russian relations 

with regard to area. Finally, Olga Oliker looks at U.S. concerns in Central 

Asia and postulates how these concerns might be addressed in the future.

With the new millennium a new cycle of history is beginning, one 

in which it seems clear that Central Asia will play an increasingly significant role on the world stage. Though its importance may have ebbed and 

flowed with time and the circumstances in which the region has found 

itself, Central Asia continues to exist at the crossroads of East and West. 

Wheras the technologies used to traverse these crossroads and the nature 

of the journey may have changed, the geography and the people who occupy it remain the same. Those from the region who follow in the tracks 

of Tamerlane, will face many of the same challenges their ancestors did. 

However, they have at their disposal a broad new range of resources to 

help them address these challenges, including many provided by foreign 

sources. Their success in using these resources effectively will, in turn, 

determine the course they take, as they advance into the twenty-first 

century.
xx BURGHART AND SABONIS-HELF
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xxi

xxi

Acknowledgments

The primary sponsor for this work has been the Pre-Conflict Management Project for Central Asia at the National Defense University (NDU). 

The goal of this project, done under the auspices of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP), is to lessen the likelihood 

of a crisis arising by addressing problem areas before they become crises 

and by being proactive with regard to their resolution. This book seeks to 

support achievement of this goal by bringing the problems endemic to 

the region to light. Also, as part of the preconditions for addressing these 

problems, the Project is developing a Central Asian Data Exchange, envisioned to be the largest single source of information on the region. It is 

hoped that with both knowledge of the problems that the region faces and 

sufficient information about these problems, solutions can be formulated 

and policies implemented that ultimately will assist in bringing about the 

peace and stability that the region so desperately needs.

In addition to the generous support of the Pre-Conflict Management 

Project and its Director, Joe Eash, several individuals and organizations 

have played key roles in bringing this project to completion. Thanks are 

particularly owed to the NDU Foundation and Frank Eversole, whose 

support early in the process allowed this work to be initiated. Hans Binnendijk and Michael Baranick of the CTNSP provided not only fiscal 

support, but also administrative assistance and most importantly, encouragement throughout the project. Kathleen Toomey Jabs and Leah Johnson 

performed above and beyond the call of duty in doing the technical edits 

for the work. Their efforts greatly improved the quality of the text and 

helped bring it to its final published form. Thanks are also due to the NDU 

Graphics Division, especially Rick Vaughn for his layout work and cover 

design and Holly Gannoe who brought the work to completion under the 

supervision of Alex Contreras, Chief of Graphics.

Gavin Helf provided equally valuable assistance by translating the 

chapters originally written in Russian into clear expository English. The 
xxii

staff of the NDU Library provided research assistance throughout the 

preparation of the text, and the NDU community overall, provided the 

supportive academic environment that helped to bring this work to its 

conclusion.

Finally, many thanks must be given to our contributors, whose work 

on this volume has gone beyond what might be expected for an academic 

work and passed into the realm of a labor of love. Not only have they been 

willing to share their hard earned expertise, but they have freely given that 

most precious commodity for any scholar, their time. Without their efforts 

there would be no book. By their efforts, they have helped to mark and 

define the path for those who follow in the tracks of Tamerlane, so all such 

travelers may find their way to a better future.

Dr. Daniel L. Burghart Dr. Theresa Sabonis-Helf
In the Tracks 

of Tamerlane:

Central Asia’s Path 

to the 21st Century

 TRACKS OF TAMERLANE 3

3

Chapter One

In the Tracks of Tamerlane:

Central Asia’s Path 

to the 21st Century

Daniel L. Burghart

While there is hardly a corner of the world that has not been affected in one way or another by the events of September 11, the repercussions are especially evident in the region known as 

Soviet Central Asia.2 The countries and people in this region were already 

in the process of adjusting to the major changes in their status brought 

about by the breakup of the Soviet Union a scant ten years before, when 

they were plunged into the international spotlight. Even though proximity 

to Afghanistan and the hiding place of Osama Bin Laden was the catalyst 

for this most recent round of attention, the fact that the region sits astride 

some of the largest known gas and oil reserves in the world already had 

brought the area a fair amount of notoriety.

Though interest in Central Asia appears to be a fairly recent phenomenon, this should hardly be the case. Throughout history, the area, 

bracketed roughly by the Caspian Sea and China, has served as the crossroads of Asia and Europe and been home to succeeding waves of migrating 

populations as well as the great Silk Road. Empires have risen and fallen, 

only to rise again in different forms; groups have been dominant and then 

been assimilated by succeeding dominant groups. Although history is 

filled with the names of these groups and their leaders, ranging from the 

armies of Alexander the Great to the Arabs and the Turks, the ones best 

known in the West are the Mongols and Tartars who, under Tamerlane, 

spread their influence to the gates of Europe in the late fourteenth century.3

 After the death of Tamerlane, the region fell under succeeding outside influences, most notably Russian and British, in what Kipling referred 

to as “The Great Game.” Yet even as the object of the game rather than a 

player, Central Asia retained an importance to those around it.

1
4 BURGHART

Today finds the countries of Central Asia in a period of rebirth, not 

only in terms of outside interest, but also in their own self-awareness of 

their potential importance on the global scene. Almost no one would be 

willing to predict that any single country from the region, or even the 

region as a whole, is going to rise up and attempt the type of political 

dominance exerted by Tamerlane 600 years earlier. On the other hand, 

through their control of hydrocarbon resources, the countries of Central 

Asia stand poised to exert an influence far beyond what anyone might have 

expected as little as a dozen years ago. Following in the tracks of Tamerlane, the countries of the region are seeking to carve a path that will define 

the nature of their existence well into the twenty-first century and beyond, 

a path whose repercussions will be felt throughout the world. With this 

in mind, it seems appropriate to examine where the tracks of Tamerlane’s 

successors may lead.

Picking up the Trail

Before one can successfully follow any trail, it is necessary to be 

familiar with the land on which it is located. Central Asia roughly can be 

considered bounded in the west by the Caspian Sea, which separates the 

region from the Caucasus. From west to east, the region stretches over 1500 

miles, encountering few natural obstacles until the mountains of western 

China. These mountains, the Tien Shan, literally “the Roof of the World,” 

run southwest into the Himalayas making up a large portion of presentday Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, before turning south into Afghanistan. The 

remainder of the southern border becomes desert in what is present day 

Turkmenistan. The bulk of the territory is arid grassland or steppe, which 

stretches from the desert and mountains in the south to the Siberian forest or “Taiga” of Russia that forms its northern boundary. Overall, the area 

comprises more than a million and a half square miles.4

 The land contained in this region, for the most part, is a vast plain. 

The soil, while fertile, suffers from a continental climate that does not 

guarantee sufficient moisture for most crops; as a result, the people in this 

area traditionally have been nomads. Substantial runoff from the mountains is carried to the region by several rivers, primarily the Amu Dar’ya 

and Syr Dar’ya, which fill the Aral Sea in the east-central part of the plain. 

Those areas without sufficient water have reverted to desert, as found in 

Turkmenistan. The climate, without the benefit of the moderating influence of an ocean, tends to be harsh, with temperatures ranging from 120 

degrees Fahrenheit in the summer to minus 40 and below in the winter. 

Although less than ideal for agriculture, the land possesses tremendous 
 TRACKS OF TAMERLANE 5

mineral wealth in addition to the already mentioned supplies of gas and 

oil. Almost every strategic metal can be found in Central Asia, especially in 

the mountains of the south, and new deposits continue to be discovered.

As might be expected, the geography of the region has influenced its 

history and development. With few natural borders to define or protect it, 

the region has been subject to the influences of wave after wave of tribes 

and peoples who have crisscrossed the landscape. Those who stayed to 

occupy the land for any time tended to be nomadic, grazing their herds on 

the abundant grasslands and then moving with the seasons, the weather, 

or at the prodding of their neighbors. While the original inhabitants have 

been all but lost in history, it can be determined that waves of Mongols 

from the east, Persians from the south, and Turkic peoples from the south 

and west all dominated portions of the region at one time or another, 

intermarrying with the local populations and making their contribution 

to the existing cultures. Arab invaders in the tenth and eleventh century 

brought with them the Islamic faith, which continues to be the dominant 

religious influence, though its practice tends to be far from the stringent 

form found in other parts of the world.

If there was one unifying influence at any time in the region’s history, it would be the period of conquest and domination by Tamerlane, 

or Timur as he is known locally. Born outside of Samarkand in the fourteenth century, Tamerlane claimed to be descended from the great Mongol 

leader Genghis Kahn, though other evidence exists that he was, in fact, of 

Tartar origin.5 After securing a local base of operations, he began a quarter 

of a century of conquest that has few rivals in history. He conquered Persia and the lands now comprising Iraq, Azerbaijan and Armenia. He then 

invaded Russia and moved west of the Ural River before being called back 

to put down a revolt in Persia. After conquering Mesopotamia and Georgia, he turned his attention to India, storming Delhi and advancing into 

the Himalayan foothills before withdrawing. He then turned west again, 

capturing Syria, defeating elements of the Ottoman Empire, and receiving 

tribute from both Byzantium and Egypt. Only his death en route to invading China in 1405 stopped the expansion of his empire to an area greater 

than that achieved under Genghis Khan.6

While successful on the battlefield, Tamerlane failed in creating a 

governing structure that could perpetuate his empire, and it soon broke 

up into a collection of tribes, khanates, and independent city-states after 

his death. This patchwork of entities exerted control over various portions of the territory, without any one being able to control the whole. 

However, starting with the rule of Peter the Great in Russia in the late 
6 BURGHART

seventeenth century, external influences began to make their presence felt. 

The Russians spread their influence from the northwest at the same time 

the British influence began spreading from India in the southeast. Central 

Asia was caught between these two great empires. Given the competition 

between Russia and Great Britain, Central Asia became the buffer, with 

each nation vying for the type of influence that would give it an advantage 

over the other. The consequences of this arrangement for the local population are brilliantly described in the works of Peter Hopkirk.7

 The collapse 

of Tsarist Russia did little to change this situation in the twentieth century, 

as the Bolsheviks were quick to establish themselves in the region, and 

continued to perform the same basic functions as the previous regime.

Although Russification meant that the local populations were, at 

best, second-class citizens with local rulers co-opted by, or at worst token 

figureheads for, Russian domination, there were benefits. Literacy was 

brought to the region, so that by the end of the Soviet rule better than 90 

percent of the local populations could read and write. Health standards 

were improved, and while agriculture continued to be the primary source 

of revenue, fledgling industries were introduced. Though the area’s mineral wealth was exploited, the necessity of introducing the infrastructure 

needed for this exploitation provided the region with essential communications and transportation facilities. In addition, security in the region was 

insured on two levels. Externally, the region’s borders were secured by the 

Soviet military; internally, the organs of the Soviet State provided stability. 

While possibly not an ideal existence, it was one that the local populations, 

for the most part, seemed willing to embrace.

Independence – Old Wine in New Bottles?

It has often been commented, and not without justification, that the 

states of Central Asia did not seek independence in 1991, but instead had 

it thrust upon them.8 Leaders such as Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbaev 

argued strongly for the continuation of some sort of union, which among 

other things would ensure the continuation of the power and perks enjoyed by the ruling elite. This elite was a mixture of local ethnic and Russian nationals, who were all products of the Soviet system and were less 

than enthused to see it go. Still, these leaders had gotten to the positions 

that they occupied by being astute politicians in the sense of reading the 

prevailing trends and being ready to jump on the train (or caravan) wherever it might lead. While it is sometimes commented that local national 

leaders were merely figureheads who did their Russian masters’ bidding, 

this is an oversimplification of an extremely complex working relationship. 
 TRACKS OF TAMERLANE 7

Moscow, for the most part, had recognized the need for ethnic leaders as 

a way of ennsuring the complacency, if not the loyalty, of the local populations. Those times when this lesson was forgotten, as when Gorbachev 

tried to appoint an ethnic Russian as head of the Kazakh republic in 1996, 

resulted in massive unrest.9 In truth, these local leaders were likely to be 

zealots in their allegiance to Moscow, since they owed their positions to 

“the center” and not to any local movements or activity. Having said that, 

local leaders already had developed their own local support structures, 

based among other things on family, tribal or clan affiliation. In this sense, 

the Soviet system actually had adapted and grafted itself onto the existing 

ruling patterns already in place in Central Asia.

With independence and without the need for vetting from Moscow, 

the local structures came into greater prominence, though it can be argued 

that this was more a matter of visibility than any great shift in the existing order. Russians who had been part of this structure either departed 

to return to Russia or were moved to less visible positions, allowing local 

ethnic populations to occupy a greater share of the leading roles. This did 

not occur overnight, as there were often not enough qualified locals to 

fill all these positions; however, there were sufficient numbers so that the 

predictions of social collapse due to removal of ethnic Russians from the 

existing order never materialized.10

The situations facing the newly independent states of Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan were strikingly 

similar in both number and nature. All of the countries shared a common 

geo-strategic location in the world, manifested among other things, by lack 

of access to the sea and general remoteness from established world trade 

routes. All of the republics were controlled by a small elite that had been 

molded by years in the communist party and a socialist (or what passed as 

socialist) system. As a legacy of that system, all of the republics had high 

rates of literacy and a body of trained workers, especially in comparison 

with other developing areas of the world, though the quality of that education and the skills possessed by those workers may have left something 

to be desired. Each country also inherited a crumbling infrastructure, in 

terms of industry, transportation and services, yet what was there did provide the rudiments required for a civilized society to function. A dependency on raw materials, both natural resources and agricultural products, 

was the basis for the economies in all of the new states and provided the 

majority of their income. One major aspect of these economies, closely 

related to the dependence on natural resources, was a legacy of environ-
8 BURGHART

mental problems stemming from the exploitation of these resources under 

the Soviet regime.

 Despite the similar situations faced at the outset, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan each have struck out 

on their own path since independence, leading each to come up with different approaches to deal with the problems they collectively faced. That 

such differences exist should hardly be surprising, since in spite of their 

similarities, each country has elements that make it different from the others, ranging from geographic and cultural peculiarities to those relating 

to the personalities of their leaders and composition of their elites. Parts 

of these differences are tied to their relations with each other, for each is 

unique in terms of the neighbors with whom they must deal. In Soviet 

times these differences were present, but had less significance under the 

overarching template put in place by Moscow. Now, with decision-making 

effectively decentralized to the respective regional capitals, the perspective has changed from the one that Moscow provided. Thus, to gain an 

appreciation for these differences in perspective, it is necessary to look at 

each of these countries in turn before returning to examine the region as 

a whole.

Kazakhstan

As the largest of the five former republics in terms of landmass, 

Kazakhstan’s location as the northernmost country in Central Asia gives 

it the distinction of being the only former republic in the region with a 

shared land border with Russia. In truth, it can be argued that Kazakhstan, 

on at least its northern portion, should not be equated to the rest of the 

area. Commentators during Soviet times would use the phrase Central Asia 

and Kazakhstan, indicating that the two were somehow different. During 

the 1930s, when the borders of the republics were drawn, it has been said 

that Stalin specifically included a large portion of what had traditionally 

been considered Russian lands, so as to ensure the loyalty of the region. 

Whether true or not, the result was that at the time of independence only 

40 percent of the population were ethnic Kazakhs, with another 40 percent Russian, and the remainder comprised mostly of other Slavic ethnic 

groups. This led to an early concern that the northern, ethnically Russian 

portion of the country would move to break away from the new state and 

attempt to reintegrate with Russia. While there have been scattered incidents caused by Russian nationalist groups, the majority of the Russian 

population seems resigned, if not content, with their current situation. 

This can be attributed to the fact that stories coming back from Russia 
 TRACKS OF TAMERLANE 9

indicated that conditions there were worse then those in Kazakhstan.11 In 

addition to other mineral resources, Kazakhstan possesses the largest oil 

reserves in Central Asia, with some estimates indicating that these reserves 

may make the country the new Saudi Arabia.12 Thus, the country’s future 

is inexplicably tied to the development of these reserves.

Externally, Kazakhstan’s security concerns were perhaps best described by the country’s Defense Minister, who on several occasions has 

commented that with Russia to the north, China to the east, Islamic fundamentalism to the south and disputes over the Caspian to their west, 

Kazakhstan finds itself in a tough neighborhood.13 Still, with an external 

border of approximately 6,000 miles, only the portion with China is 

guarded, representing the concerns of the Kazakhs themselves.14 In the 

south, Kazakhstan shares borders (and border disputes) with three of the 

other Central Asian States, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Of 

these, relations with the Kyrgyz are the most cordial, most strained with 

the Uzbeks, and fall somewhere in-between these two with the Turkmen. 

Kazakhs and Kyrgyz are extremely close ethnically, and the marriage of 

the daughter of Kazakh President Nazarbaev to a son of Kyrgyz President 

Askar Akaev led to speculation that the two would eventfully merge into 

one.15 This situation is reversed with Uzbekistan, which is viewed as a rival 

in terms of being the dominant power in the region. The border with 

Turkmenistan is composed largely of desert and is of little concern.16 What 

is of concern is the eventual division of sovereignty over portions of the 

Caspian Sea and the tremendous energy deposits there. Indeed, the division of the Caspian Sea and the oil wealth associated with it may be one of 

the thorniest security issues the country faces in the future.

Though less openly discussed by the Kazakhs themselves, there exist 

several equally telling concerns that may affect the long-term security of 

the country. In addition to the normal problems associated with a weak 

economy, the inability to generate sufficient jobs, especially outside of the 

large cities such as Almaty, has led to staggering levels of unemployment. 

In cities such as Termez, the only real option for young people to obtain 

money is to enter into the illicit drug trade, a growing concern throughout 

the region. Not only does this represent yet another level of illegal activity 

in a society known for corruption, but drug use among young people has 

skyrocketed as availability has increased.17 Also related to the weak economy is the inability of the government to address effectively the myriad of 

environmental problems left from Soviet times. The diversion of waters 

from the Aral Sea for irrigation use and contamination left at sites associated with the Soviet nuclear program are but two examples of large-scale 
10 BURGHART

problems that impact both the economy and health of the population, 

and add further burdens to a system unable to cope with either the scope 

or the costs of correcting such problems. Finally, the ruling establishment, 

beginning with President Nazerbaev, actively has taken measures to stifle 

dissent and ensure the continuity of their rule. While effective in the short 

term, by allowing no outlet for the frustrations arising from internal problems such as those described, this may create a situation in the long term 

where dissent turns violent and the fragile social structure of the country 

is torn apart.

Kyrgyzstan

In contrast to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan is the second smallest country 

in Central Asia in land size and population, and some would argue the 

least significant. Roughly 80 percent of its territory is taken up by the Tien 

Shan Mountains, limiting the amount of land available for agriculture. It 

also lacks the energy reserves of its sister states, and while the country does 

possess some mineral wealth, it is extremely difficult to extract at a profit. 

The one resource that it does possess, water flowing from runoff in the 

mountains, is a two-edged sword. Although the potential exits to harness 

this water for the production of badly needed energy, any interruption of 

the flow also has the potential of bringing the country into conflict with 

its downstream neighbors, especially Uzbekistan, which depends on this 

water for irrigation. In addition to Uzbekistan in the west, Kyrgyzstan 

shares borders with Kazakhstan to the north, China to the east, and Tajikistan to the west and southwest. There are border disputes with all of these 

countries, the most contentious of which center on the Ferghana region in 

the southwestern part of the country.

The Ferghana Valley is an extremely fertile area shared with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Besides containing some of the richest, and therefore 

most desirable land in the region, it is home to the most fervent brand of 

Islam found in Central Asia. While this in itself might not be a concern to 

the Kyrgyz, the area has served as a base of support for movements such 

as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and has been tied with 

outside radical groups, such as the Taliban. In 1999, IMU forces moved 

through Kyrgyz territory and engaged Kyrgyz security forces during an attempt to escape attack from Uzbekistan. This, in turn, sounded alarm bells 

in Bishkek, and President Akaev was quick to join in the chorus of other 

Central Asian leaders decrying the threat fundamentalists posed to stability in the region, not to mention their own positions of power.
 TRACKS OF TAMERLANE 11

Domestically, Kyrgyzstan suffers the same problems as the other 

Central Asian countries, though the way these problems combine is 

unique to the Kyrgyz situation. Ethnic Kyrgyz constitute a little more than 

50 percent of the population, with Russians the next largest group at 22 

percent. Uzbeks constitute 12 percent of the population, making them the 

largest Central Asian ethnic minority outside of their home territory and 

a concern for the Kyrgyz government, which has several disputed border 

areas with their far larger and more powerful Uzbek neighbor. Although 

the country suffered a severe economic downturn tied with the collapse 

of the ruble in 1998, the fact that a large number of people still owe their 

existence to subsistence agriculture meant they did not starve. In terms of 

domestic politics, President Akaev is the only Central Asian ruler who was 

not a party apparatchik at the time of independence. A university professor and physicist, not only was he popularly elected, but his early rule 

was marked by hopeful signs of genuine political and economic reform. 

Unfortunately, time and pressure from his neighbors have made him more 

politically repressive. This, in turn, has begun to radicalize the opposition, 

a trend the does not bode well for future stability, something that the 

country desperately needs.

Uzbekistan

Though Kazakhstan is the largest of the Central Asian states in terms 

of landmass, the largest in population and arguably the most dynamic is 

Uzbekistan. Geo-strategically located in the center of the region, it is the 

only country that shares a border with each of the other states. This allows it to claim concerns with regard to the affairs of all the others since 

they have the potential of affecting its own interests. Sitting astride internal lines of communication and commerce also places Uzbekistan in a 

position to exert influence to see that its concerns are addressed. At the 

same time, with the exception of a small border area with Afghanistan, 

Uzbekistan does not share a border with any of the external regional actors, specifically Russia, China or Iran, and thus is insulated from the sort 

of pressures that can be mounted on its neighbors. While not possessing 

the quantities of oil and gas that Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan do respectively, Uzbekistan does have sufficient energy reserves to be independent 

of outside sources, unlike Kyrgyzstan. If there is an external dependency, 

it is on water from Kyrgyzstan, which is used for the irrigation of cotton, 

the country’s primary cash crop.

This favorable turn of geography has allowed Uzbekistan a fair 

amount of leeway in its relations with its neighbors, as well as with other 
12 BURGHART

states in the region. Uzbekistan has been the most fervent of the five in 

asserting its existence as an entity separate from Russia. With no shared 

border and only eight percent of its population ethnic Russians, the political leadership has felt free to institute a number of measures to separate 

itself from its former “big brother,” ranging from refusing to participate 

in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) functions to eliminating 

the use of the Cyrillic alphabet.18 Likewise, Uzbekistan is far enough away 

from China to not feel particularly threatened. Within the region, Uzbeks 

believe themselves to be superior and often adopt an arrogant attitude in 

their relations with other states and people.19 This is particularly irksome 

to the Kazakhs, who openly resent their treatment as “country cousins.” 

Not surprisingly, Uzbekistan has border disputes with all of its neighbors. 

Although to date the Uzbeks have not resorted to the use of force to resolve these disputes, their size and economic potential, combined with 

their attitude, has led the other states to believe that the Uzbeks might 

resort to force if they felt it in their best interests. The Uzbeks themselves 

believe that they should be the dominant power in the region and give the 

impression that they are willing to take issue with anyone who does not 

share this belief.

While Uzbekistan seems to have been dealt a favorable hand in terms 

of its external security, this has not been the case with regard to its internal 

affairs. President Islam Karimov has established a regime that is one of the 

most repressive in the region. In an effort to insure no opposition to his 

rule, Karimov not only has silenced what little legitimate opposition there 

was to his regime, but gone on to suppress potential opposition in the 

form of new Islamic groups. Though nominally claiming to be a Muslim, 

Karimov views the more conservative variants of the faith who refuse to 

bend to his every whim and decree as representing a threat to his rule. His 

response has been to ruthlessly crack down on what he calls the threat of 

“fundamentalism” and arrest more than 7,000 dissenters. This, in turn, has 

only served to act as a catalyst for an actual Islamic opposition to form, 

the IMU. This movement has been blamed for the 1999 bombing of government offices in the capital of Tashkent and is responsible for an armed 

insurgency in the southern part of the state centered in the Ferghana region. Although Karimov has been quick to try to tie this movement with al 

Qaeda and the Taliban, it appears to be a domestic opposition movement 

that only has grown with efforts to repress it. Parallels have been drawn 

between this process and what took place in Iran under the Shah, where 

increasingly harsh efforts to suppress conservative Islamic leaders led to 

public discontent and the eventual overthrow of royal rule. Whether the 
 TRACKS OF TAMERLANE 13

same outcome will come to pass in Uzbekistan is yet to be determined; 

however, in spite of warnings of the possible consequences, Karimov has 

shown little or no inclination to change his policies.

Tajikistan

Of all the countries in the former Soviet portion of Central Asia, 

Tajikistan comes the closest to claiming the title for being the first “failed 

state.” Though sharing borders with two other Central Asian states, 

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as well as with China and Afghanistan, the 

country’s primary security concerns have been domestic rather than external. Part of this can be explained in the territory it occupies; the terrain is 

extremely mountainous with more than 50 percent of the country above 

10,000 feet altitude.20 While occupying a crossroads of sorts, the country is 

also extremely inaccessible to the outside world and difficult to travel even 

internally. The arable land is composed mostly of valleys running between 

the various mountains, which, with runoff from mountain snows, possess 

sufficient water for agriculture. The Tajik people themselves are descended 

from Iranian speaking people, making them the only republic in Central 

Asia not sharing a Turkic heritage. The Tajiks comprise 62 percent of the 

population of roughly 6.2 million, with Uzbeks in the northern part of the 

country making up the next largest group, 23 percent, and Russians filling 

in approximately seven percent.

Historically, based on their Persian background, the Tajiks occupied 

a type of elite status within the region. Yet always subject to the influence 

of regional actors, the area of Tajikistan was at one time controlled by 

the Emirate of Bukhara in Uzbekistan, the Afghanistan government, and 

eventually the Russian Empire, though control is used in the loosest sense, 

since both the terrain and the independent nature of Tajik mountain 

tribes were less than hospitable to outsiders. This became particularly apparent when Soviet forces tried to reestablish control of the region after 

the Bolshevik revolution, leading to the Basmachi revolt that was put 

down in 1924. With Kyrgyzstan to the north, China to the east, Afghanistan to the south, and Uzbekistan to the west, Tajikistan has long found 

itself in a far from enviable situation with regard to geo-strategic location. 

Only the ruggedness of the terrain, as well as its isolation, has served to 

preserve its sovereignty.

Neither of these, however, have been enough to ensure domestic 

stability. Falling prey to clan politics and animosities, Tajikistan rapidly 

degenerated into a protracted civil war between various domestic factions after independence, and the Russian military forces remaining in the 
14 BURGHART

country were left to try and preserve some semblance of order. This conflict, while originally not centered on religious differences, became more 

so as the losing side sought support from Islamic factions outside their 

borders, in particular from Afghanistan. This turn of events worried both 

Tajikistan’s Central Asian neighbors and Russia, which maintains the 201st 

Motorized Rifle Division in the country in an attempt to stem the influx 

of fundamentalist forces from the south. A ceasefire and power sharing agreement reached in 1997 brought an uneasy truce to the fighting, 

which continues to flare up now and again. As a result, President Imomali 

Rakhmonov, who first came to power in elections in 1994, continues to 

preside over an assembly of factions and clans whose sole unifying tenant 

would seem to be that everyone is exhausted from the continual fighting 

that has marked the country since the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Turkmenistan

Of all the former Central Asian republics, Turkmenistan is the one 

that, paraphrasing Lenin, has taken “two steps back” since independence, 

but has yet to take a step forward, and in fact may be continuing its backward path. A large but sparsely populated nation (4.5 million in an area 

equal to California plus half of Oregon), most of the country is occupied 

by the Kara Kum or black sand desert. Turkmen were originally nomads 

who drove their herds in search of forage; only with the coming of Russian rule and irrigation projects during the Soviet period did agriculture 

develop in importance, and this mostly tied with the cultivation of cotton. 

While hardly the type of environment that would at first be cause for optimism, the country sits astride some of the largest natural gas reserves in 

the world and early prospects for development fueled by the profits from 

gas sales seemed bright. Instead, Turkmenistan has found itself a prisoner, 

both of its geography and of a political regime that has been described as 

mirror imaging all of the worst aspects of Stalin’s cult of personality.

Externally, Turkmenistan’s problem is with finding a secure route to 

send its gas to world markets. Bordered in the north by Kazakhstan and 

Uzbekistan, in the east by Afghanistan, in the south by Iran, and in the 

west by the Caspian Sea, the primary existing pipelines used for Turkmen 

gas flow through Russia, which controls both the amount of this flow and 

its destination.21 To avoid this Russian chokehold, Turkmenistan has attempted to negotiate routes to the south and west. The former, involving 

Iran, has been frowned on by the United States, without whose support 

financing is all but impossible. The other alternative, some sort of transCaspian route exemplified by the long heralded Baku-Cheyhan line, has 
 TRACKS OF TAMERLANE 15

yet to get far beyond the drawing board. The gas that does make it to 

market via Russia is often routed to countries such as Ukraine, which are 

renowned for not paying for their energy supplies. Complicating this situation, in the early 1990s Turkmenistan borrowed heavily in international 

finance markets against profits from future gas production. Now these 

debts are beginning to fall due, and with still no reliable way to get their 

gas to market, Turkmenistan is increasingly finding itself in a cash-flow 

crunch.

Further compounding these problems is the nature of the Turkmen 

regime itself. Headed by Saparmurat Niyazov, Turkmenistan’s Communist 

Party head at the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union, the government 

has evolved into an autocracy that bends to the every whim of the ruler. As 

just one example of the control exerted by Niyazov, a referendum held in 

1994 on whether to extend his term in office to 2002 was passed by a margin of 1,959,408 for, to 212 against.22 Since that time, Niyazov has declared 

himself President for Life and has taken on the moniker of Turkmenbashi, 

roughly translated as father of the Turkmen people. Along with autocratic 

rule at home, he has adopted a policy of positive neutrality in his foreign 

relations. This policy can best be summarized as the forswearing of all 

foreign alliances and connections, resulting in an almost isolationist stance 

that has not helped attempts to gain outside assistance for development in 

Turkmenistan. Recently, this policy has been modified somewhat. While 

initially shunning contacts with Russia and other former Soviet republics, 

the fear of Islamic fundamentalism has brought Turkmenistan into regional security consultations with its neighbors. Likewise, in the aftermath 

of September 11, some agreements have been reached with the United 

States to allow the use of Turkmen facilities in the war against terrorism. 

Still, these negotiations have done little to soften the harsh nature of the 

Niyazov regime, whose sole concern appears to be its own self-perpetuation.

The Security Situation Post-September 11

Although much has been said and written about the effects of September 11, September 14 may well prove to be a more important date for 

Central Asia. On that day, the first mention was made in the open press 

about the stationing of American forces in the region as part of the Global 

War on Terrorism. Along these lines, three of the five former Soviet Central Asian states, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, were approached 

about using their territory to support U.S. military operations. Uzbekistan, 

in particular, was of interest because of the shared common border with 
16 BURGHART

Afghanistan and the presence of Termez, the former Soviet military base 

that had been a primary logistics staging area during the Soviet-Afghan 

war. While Tajikistan also shared a border with Afghanistan, the condition 

of facilities there required substantial work before they could be used. Kyrgyzstan, which did not share a border, did have a relatively modern airport 

and soon became the home to more than 3,000 U.S. Air Force personnel 

supporting air operations into Afghanistan. Kazakhstan, located further 

from the fray, also offered support to the Americans, while Turkmenistan, 

with the longest border with Afghanistan, continued its policy of positive 

neutrality, though making several pro “anti-terrorist coalition” statements 

and quietly allowing the transit of humanitarian assistance.

Though the speed with which this coordination was orchestrated 

was surprising to some observers, the groundwork for this effort actually 

had been laid throughout the 1990s. Shortly after the breakup of the Soviet 

Union, the United States established diplomatic relations with all of the 

former republics in Central Asia and opened embassies in each as soon 

as it was possible. Included in the embassy staffing were military officers, 

designated either as Military Representatives or fully accredited Defense 

Attachés. Their job throughout the 1990s was to establish ties with the 

host nation militaries, coordinate material assistance and military education programs, escort host countries officers on official visits to the United 

States, and perform an entire range of activities that fell under the Clinton 

Administration general policy of engagement. Central among these programs were: foreign military sales and assistance, International Military 

Education and Training (IMET), Partnership for Peace (PfP), courses 

offered at the Marshall Center in Germany, and the creation of a Central 

Asian Peacekeeping Battalion (CENTRAZBAT). While all these programs, 

as well as others, had specific goals in mind, the cumulative effect was to 

establish relationships and procedures for working with these counties, as 

well as to create a cadre of military within each of the countries involved 

who had experience in working with U.S. forces. Though difficult to quantify, there can be no doubt that these efforts facilitated establishing a U.S. 

military presence in Central Asia, once it was decided that this was necessary in the battle against terrorism. 

Perhaps more surprising than the speed of this deployment, or even 

that it should have taken place at all, was the response of the Russian 

government to Americans operating in what had been traditionally a Russian sphere of influence. Though protests rapidly appeared from military 

leaders and opposition politicians in the Russian press, these were just as 

quickly countered by none other than Russian President Vladimir Putin, 
 TRACKS OF TAMERLANE 17

who welcomed the American move as part of his overall support for the 

war on terrorism. While the changing nature of the U.S.-Russian relationship in the aftermath of September 11 is still being evaluated, it is enough 

to note that President Putin did much to stifle domestic criticism of U.S. 

deployments. Russians themselves seemed to be torn between the image 

of America as a former sworn enemy now conducting military operations 

on their very doorstep and the realization that American efforts would, in 

the long run, help Russia and the other countries of Central Asia counter what all now viewed as one of their greatest concerns—the spread of 

Islamic fundamentalism. For their part, U.S. officials, such as General 

Tommy Franks, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander, 

emphasized that although the United States did not know how long forces 

would remain, it was not America’s intent to maintain these forces and 

installations in the region on a permanent basis. 

From the standpoint of the regional actors, the events of September 11 may have served as a catalyst in a number of respects. While the 

threat of Islamic fundamentalism spreading from the south long had been 

pointed to as a significant security concern, other problems and regional 

disputes, combined with a lack of outside recognition for these concerns, 

had resulted in few concrete steps being taken to address this threat. Prior 

to September 11, the formation in 1998 of the “Shanghai Five” (Russia, 

China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and more recently the addition of Uzbekistan, to make “5 plus 1”) was the most notable attempt 

to form a regional security coordinating body.23 Since September 11, there 

has been a flurry of meetings, visits and continuing contacts designed not 

only to coordinate efforts in the war against terrorism, but also to take 

steps toward insuring regional security in the future. The most obvious 

result has been an increase in security assistance to the region, primarily 

from the United States, but from other nations as well. Though much of 

this effort is directly tied to the ongoing conflict, the attention focused on 

the region has brought about other assistance, such as the recent agreement signed between the United States and Uzbekistan to clean up the 

former Soviet biological testing site at Vozrazhdeniya (Rebirth) Island. 

However, assistance alone will not provide security. The greater significance in the long term may be that with a common cause uniting both 

the Central Asian States and the major external actors with interests in the 

region, a climate now exists where achieving a true cooperative security 

environment may be possible.
18 BURGHART

Some Thoughts for the Future

While outlining a comprehensive strategy for Central Asia is beyond 

the scope of this compendium, it might be worthwhile to point out the 

elements that must be considered as a starting point. It first should be 

noted that, in spite of the problem areas noted above, all of the states, to a 

greater or lesser degree, have achieved an element of success in orchestrating their affairs. All five continue to exist as sovereign states ten years after 

the breakup of the Soviet Union. At the time of the breakup, their viability 

as nations, and even their capability of continuing to exist, was highly 

questioned. With the exception of Tajikistan, all have managed to avoid 

major domestic conflicts, and while the form and policies of the governments that exist today may not be to our liking, the fact that they have 

been able to constitute and maintain themselves as sovereign states must 

be acknowledged. That the states did this with limited resources, little or 

no experience in governance, and in a geo-strategic environment that was 

less than ideal at best, speaks even more to the likelihood that with proper 

aid and nurturing the countries in this region can continue to exist and 

develop in the future.

To move forward will require several things. First, the states must 

possess sufficient means to ensure the continued integrity of their territory. All of the states inherited portions of the Soviet forces stationed on 

their territory, including a large number of armored vehicles and a force 

structure built along the Soviet model. Unfortunately, this has proven to 

be as much of a liability as a blessing. The forces they possess are not necessarily the ones they need. The money to maintain these existing forces 

uses up limited funding that would be better spent on meaningful military 

reform. All of the countries involved have plans for military reform that 

call for downsizing and modernization, with the goal of achieving small, 

high tech, and highly mobile force structures to act as deterrents to any 

outside threats.24 Unfortunately, limited resources, opposition from the 

existing military (which feels it might lose its perks and privileges if such 

reforms were carried out), and bureaucratic inertia all stand in the way of 

such changes. Cooperative programs with foreign militaries, such as PfP 

with NATO, have made some progress, and the more members of the regional militaries are exposed to Western ideas and ways, the easier reform 

will be. Training programs for other institutions normally associated with 

state security, such as interior troops and customs officials, also will help. 

The ultimate goal in all of these efforts is to achieve a balance, so that each 

country believes it has the capability to defend its own territory against the 
 TRACKS OF TAMERLANE 19

threats it perceives, without creating a force that is perceived as a threat by 

its neighbors.

Once stability and security can be guaranteed, the stage will be set for 

economic development. The long-term stability of the states in the region 

is not dependent on military capability as such, but on economic viability 

that ensures the well-being of the nation. One of the reasons often cited 

for the failure to attract the outside investment so desperately needed is 

the fear by such outside sources that regional instability will put their investments at risk. This is particularly true in the energy sector where large 

investments in infrastructure, such as pipelines and refineries, must be 

made up front. These types of facilities are extremely vulnerable to attack, 

both from external and domestic threats. Consequently, investors are reluctant to make long term commitments where they fear even a slight risk 

of regional conflict. If regional stability can be achieved, the area’s wealth 

in minerals and energy will bring the capital that can serve as the engine 

for other forms of development, thereby increasing the well being of the 

populations and heading off domestic sources of discontent by offering 

the prospect of a better future.

With economic development must come political change and the 

issue of political reform. One of the debates that continues, not only with 

regard to the countries of the former Soviet Union but also with almost 

all developing states, is whether economic reform, designed to create a 

market economy, can be carried out at the same time as political reform, 

designed to achieve some type of representational democracy. While 

certainly the ideal, there are numerous examples, beginning with Russia, 

that would seem to indicate that trying to accomplish both at the same 

time is just “too hard.” Focusing on political reform, while possibly more 

manageable, means that the creation of the economic basis to answer the 

needs of the people must be postponed. Any government pursuing such 

a policy places itself at risk no matter how democratically inclined and 

well intentioned. However, focusing on economics first brings its own set 

of problems, as seen in the number of dictatorships that have claimed to 

be ruling in the name of the people and stability, but ended up enriching 

their own pockets while doing whatever was necessary to maintain power 

for themselves. At best, advocates of the latter strategy point to examples, 

such as South Korea, where authoritarian governments were tolerated, but 

continually nudged toward democracy as economic conditions at home 

improved. At worst, the example of Iran under the Shah looms large, 

where toleration and support of an authoritarian regime was justified as 
20 BURGHART

a strategic necessity, but ultimately resulted in catastrophic consequences 

for the United States.

All of these concerns lead to the question of how the West in general, 

and the United States in particular, should approach Central Asia, so as to 

protect both its own interests and those of the people in the region. While 

there is probably no set answer to such a question, some general guidelines would seem apparent. First, the key to stability in the region depends 

on creating an environment where development of the area’s resources 

proceeds relatively unhindered and where profits from that can be put 

back into development of the region as a whole. To do this requires that 

the countries in the area themselves understand that there is more to be 

gained by regional cooperation than with traditional animosities. That the 

leadership of these countries can work together when faced by a common 

threat has been proven by recent events and the combined efforts to combat the threat perceived from Islamic fundamentalism. If this cooperation 

can be expanded to other spheres, a large step in the right direction will 

have been taken. Next, some sort of agreement must be made between the 

outside influences vying to achieve access and influence in the region, primarily among the “great powers.” The acceptance by President Putin of an 

American military presence in what has traditionally been Russia’s “home 

turf” is again an example that can be built on, where the players involved 

accept that there is more to be gained by all from a stable and prosperous 

Central Asia, than one that is not. Finally, the regional leaders must realize that their legacy will be measured by the condition in which they leave 

their countries, as opposed to their own individual wealth and power. 

While Tamerlane created a mighty empire, it quickly disintegrated after 

his death because he failed to establish any viable structure for ensuring its 

continuation once he was gone. If this lesson is lost on those who would 

follow in the tracks of Tamerlane, they must constantly be reminded of it, 

lest history repeat itself and the region, once again, fail to take the place in 

the world order it is capable of achieving.

Notes1

 An earlier version of this chapter was published in European Security, http://www.tandf.

co.uk,Vol. 11, no. 3, Winter 2002. 2

 Though specialists disagree on exactly what comprises “Central Asia,” this paper examines the 

five former Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. 3

 For a concise summary of Tamerlane’s accomplishments, see R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor 

N. Dupuy, Harper’s Encyclopedia of Military History (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. 1993), 

424-425.
 TRACKS OF TAMERLANE 21

4

 A complete listing of areas and distances cited here can be found in M. Wesley Shoemaker’s, 

Russian and the Commonwealth of Independent States 2002, (Harpers Ferry, Stryker-Post Publications, 

2002). 5

 Dupuy and Dupuy, 424.

6

 Ibid., 424-425.

7

 Hopkirk’s trilogy, which includes The Great Game, Like Hidden Fire, and Setting the East 

Ablaze (New York: Kodansha America, Inc. 1994, 1994 and 1995 respectively) combine to give the 

definitive history of the region from ancient times to the beginning of the twentieth century. 8

 Shoemaker, 74.

9

 Ibid., 182.

10 For detailed breakdowns of the percentages of various ethnic groups, see individual country 

listings in Shoemaker, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States 2002. 11 In a conversation with the author, a member of the Kazakh Foreign Ministry noted that, 

while everyone pointed to the fact that two million ethnic Russians left Kazakhstan to return to Russia 

in the period from 1991-1994, very few noted that some 600,000 returned between 1995 and 1999. 

While his figures cannot be confirmed, a return of ethnic Russians to Kazakhstan has been noted by 

several sources. 12 Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan—Unfulfilled Promise (Washington: Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace, 2002), 3. 13 The author was present when the Kazakh Defense Minister M. Altinbayev made this comment to Secretary of Defense Cohen during an official visit to Washington D.C. in 1998. 14 While formally maintaining that their goal was to have good relations with all of their 

neighbors, members of the Kazakh military, on multiple occasions, told the author that their greatest 

security concern relating to their neighbors was with China. 15 Though much speculation has surrounded this pairing, it appears that the two, who met 

while both were attending school in the United States, were genuinely in love. Unfortunately, as of this 

writing, the two have separated. 16 There have been discussions about closing this border, not because of any threat posed by 

Turkmen, but because Turkmenistan has no visa requirements on Iranians crossing their border, and 

several Iranians have been found to have entered Kazakhstan without documentation, in spite of 

Kazakhstan requiring such visas. 17 In a discussion with the author, one local official indicated that he believed up to 40 percent 

of the youth in his region were drug users. He further went on to say that, because unemployment in 

the area was 60 percent, the only work youth could get was in the drug trade, where they were paid 

with a portion of the drugs they were trafficking. 18 This made traveling in cities such as Tashkent extremely interesting in the early years after 

independence, when the Cyrillic street signs had been removed, but nothing was put up to take their 

place. 19 This type of attitude has been observed by the author on numerous occasions and is repeatedly noted by other Central Asian ethnic groups when describing Uzbek behavior. 20 Ibid., 186.

21 It has been a longstanding Russian policy that Turkmen gas is routed for CIS consumption, 

while Russian gas is sent to hard currency customers. This leaves Turkmenistan in the awkward position of trying to collect from countries like Ukraine that have a habit of not paying for the gas they 

use. 22 Shoemaker, 194.

23 C. Fairbanks, S. Frederick Starr, C. Richard Nelson and Kenneth Weisbrode, Strategic Assessment of Central Asia (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2001), 36. 24 Recognizing the near impossibility of maintaining a force capable of defending the long 

borders involved, each country envisions the type of force that could be kept in the central part of their 

country and then be rapidly deployed to repel any outside threat.
22 BURGHART
Part I

Political Changes

POLITICS OF CENTRAL ASIA 25

25

Chapter 2

The Politics of Central Asia: 

National in Form, Soviet in 

Content

E. Wayne Merry

The politics of Central Asia—limited in this discussion to the five 

states of former Soviet Central Asia—are neither as obscure nor as 

complex as is sometimes thought. Certainly, the region and each of 

its component societies are rich in indigenous traditions and culture and 

they did not merit the Western neglect, which was their lot during their incorporation in the Russian and Soviet empires. Nonetheless, the contemporary political institutions and prospects of the five states—Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—reflect little of the 

millennial history of the region, other than for purposes of propaganda, 

but are instead overwhelmingly the products of their recent Soviet past. 

Future Central Asian generations may draw on pre-Soviet traditions to 

deal with modern issues, whether for good or ill, but today’s ruling elites 

remain wedded to the Soviet way of doing things, which is how they came 

to power in the first place.

Alone among the nearly 30 successor states of the former “socialist 

camp,” ranging from Albania to Mongolia, Central Asia has experienced 

no regime change. The bosses and ruling elites today are those of the late 

Gorbachev era with some purging, especially of Slavs. Regime change 

elsewhere has not always been positive, for example, in Belarus, but every 

other socialist successor state has at least experienced a political or a generational transformation of top leadership, or both. However, in the five 

Central Asian states, the rulers that came to power within the Communist 

Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), with all that implies about methods 

and mentality, have stayed. They have remained in power by applying 

Soviet techniques to independent statehood. While some Communist parties have produced remarkably progressive figures, a few even validated by 
26 MERRY

genuine popular elections, this has not been true in Central Asia, where 

old-style CPSU politicians retain power indefinitely with periodic sham 

ballots of affirmation.

Thus, a key starting point in understanding the region is the recognition that these countries cannot be compared properly with the Slavic 

or Caucasian successor states of the Soviet Union, and still less with the 

Baltic or East European countries. Rather, the Central Asian regimes are 

in the same category of governance as those of Cuba and North Korea, 

with whom they have much in common. They are a combination of postcolonial nationalism and neo-Sovietism, and can be characterized as “national Soviet” in form.

The decade since the Soviet collapse and the emergence of the 

Central Asian republics as independent states (albeit, initially, reluctant 

ones) is a short period in political development, although other successor 

states experienced rapid changes in the same time. These are regimes of 

the first post-colonial generation, comparable to many African and Asian 

countries three or four decades ago. Present conditions in these states are 

neither stable nor reliable indicators of what they will be like in the second 

and third post-colonial generations. In common with other post-colonial 

experience, including that of North America, Central Asia will almost 

certainly undergo dramatic changes in the coming decades. Political and 

economic systems will alter, and borders may move. This analysis will not 

speculate about what Central Asia will look like in mid-century, other than 

to note that straight-line extrapolations of that future from the present 

will certainly be wrong. We can, however, reasonably look at the region’s 

prospects in the next decade, based on an examination of the twin identities which define its politics today—post-colonial and neo-Soviet—and its 

potential to respond successfully to the challenges it faces.

The Imperial Legacy in the Heart of Eurasia

Properly speaking, “Central Asia” is much larger than the five states 

under consideration, encompassing significant parts of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, plus much of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. In terms of culture, and especially of religious culture, 

much of Central Asia remains occupied by alien political systems based 

in Moscow and Beijing. The region sometimes known as “Turkestan” (to 

reflect the Turkic ancestry of many of its inhabitants) was divided into 

western and eastern areas of domination under Russian and Chinese rule 

in the nineteenth century. The famous “Great Game” rivalry between Imperial Russia and Imperial Britain in the same century drew lines defining 
POLITICS OF CENTRAL ASIA 27

the southern frontier of Western Turkestan, an identity reinforced by the 

violent imposition of Soviet rule in Central Asia in the twentieth century. 

Soviet nationality policy, under the motto “National in Form, Socialist in Content,” was in reality little more than the age-old imperial device 

of divide-and-rule. Stalin deliberately drew republic borders in Central 

Asia to separate large and potentially unruly ethnic groups—in particular, 

the Uzbeks and Tajiks—into ethnically-mixed areas for political administration and to create majority-minority tensions to facilitate Soviet rule. 

The states which emerged from the failure of Soviet power in late 1991 had 

external borders which no rational ethnographer would have drawn for 

titularly-ethnic “nation states” and reflect little more than Joseph Stalin’s 

nationality policies. These states should be seen first and foremost as political systems, rather than as reflecting national identities.1

Challenges of Post-Colonialism

Irrational borders spawning ethnic conflicts are common in the 

Third World as legacies of European imperialism. While one always 

should be cautious in applying general principles of political development to diverse societies, what European powers wrought on the African 

continent is, in broad outline, very similar to the imperial handiwork of 

the Soviet Union in Central Asia. This point, while seemingly obvious, is 

important because Western analysis of Central Asia sometimes treats the 

region’s problems as entirely sui generis and ignores relevant experience of 

other parts of the Third World. 

To simplify, if one wants to project in broad outline where Central 

Asia is likely to go, it is instructive to look at where Central Africa has 

been. The objective circumstances of the post-colonial experience of the 

two regions are sufficiently similar, despite obvious differences, to make 

the comparison useful. The parallels are particularly acute in the realm of 

politics, with the Central Asian regimes even less likely to adopt political 

pluralism or genuine rule of law than the bosses of Central Africa have 

been, because neo-Soviet regimes possess better instruments of domestic repression combined with the habits of an ideological monopoly of 

power. Central African rulers also have positive models in their former 

European overlords, while those of Central Asia are surrounded by the 

dubious examples of Russia, Iran, Pakistan and China. Central Asian elites 

dislike comparisons with other Third World regions and proclaim, and 

perhaps even believe, themselves to be exceptional. However, the assertion 

of national exceptionalism is well-nigh universal and is generally a poor 

excuse for rigid or reactionary policies. An objective observer cannot help 
28 MERRY

but notice how after ten years of independence the Central Asian states are 

traveling down a well-trodden Third World path. 

To be fair, the region’s problems are the poisoned legacy of imperial 

exploitation and would pose huge challenges even to progressive leaders. 

As with most imperialism in Africa and Asia, Russia conquered Central 

Asia for purposes of domination and exploitation, rather than for mass 

colonization. While Slavic people did enter and settle in the region, they 

did so slowly and without demographically displacing indigenous populations. The only major Slavic settlement region in Central Asia (analogous 

to South Africa) is the heavily-Russified northern part of Kazakhstan, 

which, at some point, could either attempt secession to join Russia or demand effective self-rule. Elsewhere, the Slavic inhabitants of Central Asia 

were not rural pieds noirs as in French Algeria or British Kenya, but urban 

dwellers and members of the administrative and technical elite. This set 

the stage for “white flight” after independence and a rapid loss of many 

skilled Slavic cadres who left the region for personal security or from loss 

of status and employment. In parallel, Soviet military formations in Central Asia were largely composed of local conscripts, led by both Slavic and 

native officers, thus allowing the new states to inherit established armed 

forces, though with a loss of many Russian officers.

The Enduring Mentality of Empire

In common with imperial practice elsewhere, the Soviet Union 

maintained its rule in Central Asia by developing and training local elites 

in ways that deliberately alienated them from the broad mass of the native 

population. These cadres were living extensions of the power of Moscow 

and often became more Soviet in mentality than the Russians themselves. 

They enjoyed great status and affluence, all dependent on their position in 

the Soviet nomenklatura with its shared attitudes, practices and imperial 

vernacular. While spoken Russian became common throughout Central 

Asia, though weak in rural areas, local elites employed the imperial language in preference to their mother tongues for purposes of prestige, education, communication within the broader Soviet elite, and for acceptance 

by their Slavic overlords. Higher education often took aspiring members 

of native nomenklaturas to Moscow (as Africans went to Paris or London) 

to acquire the habits, manners and lifestyles of the imperial “center.” Such 

persons often had little contact or empathy with the poor and semi-educated masses at home, who were a constant reminder of the privileges and 

comforts they obtained by serving the empire and potentially could lose 

in the post-colonial environment. In the Central Asian case there was the 
POLITICS OF CENTRAL ASIA 29

additional factor of ideology, which, however much cynicism may have 

attached to the ideals of communism, did reinforce the arrogance of elites 

in their possession of scientific socialism, making them even less inclined 

to accept political pluralism or accountability after independence.

While use of Russian is fading on the streets in Central Asia, it is likely 

to remain the elite lingua franca. The only regional substitute would be 

Uzbek, an unwelcome option for other nationalities. Although English as 

the world language has spread very quickly among younger and educated 

people in the region, this will not obviate the need for a regional language 

to communicate with other successor states, which can only be Russian. 

By way of comparison, English has not displaced French or Portuguese in 

much of Africa but occupies a place alongside. In Central Asia, the utility 

of maintaining Russian is obvious, from its use in technical manuals to 

ease of dealing with the region’s leading trading partners. However, as in 

other parts of the Third World, the persistence of the imperial language 

sustains imperial attitudes and behavior, especially in officialdom.

Manmade Economic Nightmares

Central Asia also has parallels with Africa and South Asia in the 

inherited burden of misdevelopment and unbalanced economies. In the 

Soviet plan, Central Asian economies were structured around commodity 

exploitation, with consequent massive ecological damage. While Soviet 

planners did not employ the terminology of plantation colonies, they 

were even more single-minded than their capitalist counterparts in fostering commodity mono-cultures, especially of cotton in Central Asia. The 

depletion of water supplies, degradation of soil, and destruction of the 

existing nomadic and farming environment are well-documented, in some 

places attaining ecocide, as in the overuse and near evaporation of the Aral 

Sea. The focus of the Soviet central plan on the extraction of minerals and 

hydrocarbons, combined with the use of Central Asia for testing nuclear, 

chemical and other weapons, produced a legacy of economic imbalance at 

least as severe as the coffee, hemp or cocoa-based economies of sub-Saharan Africa or of “banana republics.”

In addition, Central Asia is challenged by the results of the most benign of imperial policies, the spread of public health services and sanitation, 

which, in turn, have led to rapid demographic growth. In common with 

much of the Third World, these states face population increases far beyond 

their ability to generate new employment, especially given the deterioration of Soviet-era infrastructure and the limited job-producing capacities 

of high-capitalization commodity-extractive industries such as oil and 
30 MERRY

gas. The loss after 1991 of investment funds and subsidies from the Soviet 

central plan robbed the newly-independent states both of the wherewithal 

to maintain existing industry and agriculture and of the means to establish 

productive enterprises independent of the Russian market (even assuming 

that local political interference and corruption would have allowed such 

enterprise). A by-product of population growth is distortion of education, 

as schools established in the colonial period churn out graduates in excess 

of available jobs equivalent to their training, which in Central Asia is often 

oriented to Soviet-era standards. While public education is an area where 

Central Asia is ahead of some Third World regions, the advantage is eroding in many skills, especially in high technology where Indian and Chinese 

training models are more competitive.

Politics Following the Worst Models

It is in the political realm, however, that the post-colonial experience 

of the Third World is most relevant to Central Asia, in the replication there 

of what in Africa is called the “Big Man” regime type. Such regimes tend 

to be dominated by members of single ethnic groups or clans and by the 

enshrinement in power of a single individual or, more commonly, a Great 

Leader and his family (leading to the sotto voce witticism in several postSoviet states that Stalin’s quest to build “socialism in one state” has been 

replaced by the goal of “socialism in one family”). Such regimes do not 

distinguish public from private wealth, transforming corruption from a 

form of social deviance into effective state policy. These regimes maintain 

political control by strictly limiting participation in the political process; 

by extending state authority over a wide range of civil institutions, including business, labor unions, organized religion, and the media (or, as playwright Tom Stoppard once put it, by establishing a “relatively free press” 

in the form of a press run by one of the ruler’s relatives);2 and by lecturing 

Western critics that the local populations are “not ready” for democracy 

which “takes time.” Finally, such regimes almost invariably encounter a 

crisis when attempting a generational transfer of power within the ruling 

family or clan, as the authority and legitimacy of the first post-colonial 

“Big Man” creates shoes too large for a successor to fill. 

The Central Asian regimes, with individual variations, fulfill all the 

“Big Man” criteria. This is not only because of their former Soviet experience, but also due to policy choices by the new regimes. Among socialist 

successor states there have been cases of political maturation mostly in 

Eastern Europe and the Baltics; violent transfers of power as in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia; democratic transitions which made things no 
POLITICS OF CENTRAL ASIA 31

better or worse as in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova; and shifts of public 

opinion to either left or right, or, as in Bulgaria recently, in both directions 

at the same time. Alone among socialist successor states, the Central Asian 

regimes still are of the first post-colonial generation, while all the rulers, 

perhaps with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, intend to remain in personal 

control indefinitely. These are classic “Big Man” regimes of the type Africa 

has experienced to its continuing cost. In common with their African 

counterparts, these states will experience systemic crisis when they finally 

transfer power, especially difficult where there are dynastic aspirations as 

in Kazakhstan. 

A Genuine, if Grim, Exceptionalism

As the Central Asia regimes replicate the experience of “Big Man” 

states, they are also different and exceptional, although not in a positive 

sense. In contrast to other parts of the Third World, these five states remain 

strongly Soviet in institutions and practices. While the Communist Party 

is gone in a formal sense, its personnel and methods remain in revamped 

ruling parties under national banners. The leaders, to a man, are all former 

Soviet Communist Party bosses, who changed their Communist lapel pins 

for nationalist ones while retaining a purely Soviet approach to political 

power. While many of the Soviet successor states have regressed badly in 

recent years, only in Central Asia have the bosses of the Soviet era avoided 

competitive politics or the challenge of a legitimate ballot box. 

In sharp contrast to Third World leaders who took part in anti-colonial movements or at least aspired to independence, Central Asia’s rulers 

were propelled into independence by happenstance. These states entirely 

lack the genuine nationalist credentials of the Baltic States, Caucasian 

republics or Ukraine—let alone those of Eastern Europe. With the exception of Kyrgyz leader Askar Akaev, the rulers opposed Gorbachev’s efforts 

to reform the sclerotic Soviet system and welcomed the reactionary coup 

attempt of August 1991. At the time of the Soviet collapse, they hoped to 

remain within some kind of renewed Soviet system, with Moscow providing subsidies and support for their rule.3

 As cosmetic nationalists, the 

party bosses who chanced to be in power when their republics became 

independent could not inspire an “end of empire” boost in public morale 

common when Third World liberation movements come to power. For 

most inhabitants, very little changed politically other than the removal 

of the top tier of Moscow-based party icons and the suitable enlargement 

of portraits of the former republic CPSU First Secretary as new national 
32 MERRY

president. In other respects, daily life for average people became even 

harder and more repressive than under Gorbachev. 

The single factor that most sharply distinguishes the Central Asian 

states from most post-colonial countries is their possession of the fullyformed mechanisms of a modern authoritarian police state. While other 

imperial powers developed security agencies in their colonies and in some 

cases bequeathed them to the new governments, none bear comparison 

with the Soviet KGB which passed almost intact into the hands of the 

new Central Asian rulers. This advantage assured a high level of domestic 

control by the new regimes, except in Tajikistan, which quickly descended 

into civil conflict, and in the Ferghana Valley, an area of serious unrest 

during much of the Soviet period. The comparative social peace enjoyed 

by the Uzbek, Kazakh, Turkmen and, until recently, Kyrgyz regimes is in 

large measure due to the coercive Soviet institutions they have employed 

with greater vigor than had been true under Gorbachev. In particular, the 

repression of peaceful manifestations of independent religious activity is 

more severe in post-Soviet Central Asia than had been the case under late 

Soviet rule.4

In addition, these countries inherited the former Soviet armed forces 

deployed on their territories. These were not first-line units like those 

stationed in Germany or along the Chinese border; most were reserve or 

mobilization formations of limited operational capability. Nonetheless, 

they constituted substantial military establishments for newly-minted 

Third World states. In the Kazakh case the presence of parts of the former 

Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal engaged the United States directly in Central Asia for the first time, which brought substantial financial and technical benefits to Kazakhstan and provided some limited improvements to 

their conventional armed forces. At independence, Uzbekistan by accident 

possessed one of the world’s largest inventories of conventional heavy 

weaponry due to the Soviet practice of using the dry Uzbek interior as a 

parking lot for treaty-limited equipment (especially battle tanks, artillery 

and armored personnel carriers) withdrawn from west of the Urals under 

the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 

(CFE). While this weaponry greatly exceeded Uzbek defensive requirements, it fed Tashkent’s pretensions to regional hegemony. Uzbekistan also 

possessed the best officer corps in the region, significant training facilities, 

and a more balanced overall force structure than its neighbors. Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan inherited armed forces of greatly inferior quality and 

operational capabilities, and the prolonged civil conflict in Tajikistan not 
POLITICS OF CENTRAL ASIA 33

only dissipated its limited military strength but soon required intervention 

by Russian and regional troops.5

In sum, although some Western critics have perceived in Central Asia 

a reversion to a kind of pre-Soviet “Asiatic despotism,” the reality may be 

even worse. A form of medieval rule could not long succeed in the contemporary world, but a modern police state—with sufficient political will 

at the top—can be quite robust. Across the region, the will power has not 

yet faltered. Indeed, the regimes become more rather than less repressive 

with each manifestation of domestic unrest or attempts at political pluralism. Therefore, sadly, Central Asia is not so much moving in the tracks of 

Tamerlane, but regressing into those of the CPSU and KGB.

Geography and Geology as Destiny

Central Asia’s potential to meet its challenges is limited by objective circumstances in addition to its political makeup. First, it is the most 

land-locked region on the globe and suffered a long enforced separation 

from the outside world by the Soviet prohibition on interaction with 

historic neighbors, especially Iran and China. While most colonies are incorporated into an imperial trading system, they nonetheless retain some 

contact with the broader world. In contrast, Soviet policy insulated the 

Central Asian peoples from their ethnic and spiritual hinterlands, while 

all legal economic activity was oriented northward toward Russia despite 

natural trading routes to the east and south. 

The opening of the region’s external frontiers in 1991 introduced external influences, which the regimes perceived as challenges rather than as 

opportunities. To the west, Turkey initially saw itself as the natural leader 

of Turkic peoples of the former Soviet Union. However, as Turkey made 

efforts to exercise a benign hegemony in Central Asia, its leaders quickly 

encountered cultural tensions and conflicting agendas. The regional leaders rejected Turkish pretensions and disliked the Kemalist political model. 

To the southwest, Iran and some other Islamic states sponsored construction of mosques and training of religious personnel and introduced a radical tinge into the traditionally moderate Central Asian practice of Islam. 

Islamic proselytizers alarmed the elites of the region who exhibited their 

Soviet-trained incomprehension of religion and fear of any challenge to the 

state monopoly of belief. To the south, the Tajik-Afghan frontier had been 

fairly porous during much of the Soviet decline and ceased to be an effective barrier after 1991, contributing to the complex domestic conflicts in 

Tajikistan and greatly expanding the narcotics trade. More worrisome was 

the importation of Taliban and al Qaeda-inspired extremism into some of 
34 MERRY

the poorest parts of Central Asia, such as the Ferghana Valley. Finally, to 

the east, the immense and growing Chinese economy quickly established 

a major trading presence in Central Asia, while Beijing exhibited concern 

about separatist tendencies in its own slice of “Turkestan,” Xinjiang. Under 

the umbrella of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China is expanding its influence in Central Asia to include even military ties, probably with 

a long-term view to replacing Russia as regional hegemon.6

Of all post-colonial regions of the world, Central Asia is the most distant from any ocean and the most cut off from direct interaction with the 

global economy, and hence from the positive influences of globalization. 

The problem of transit through neighboring states, most with ambitions 

in Central Asia, limits regional economic prospects and potential for political reform. The countries of Central Asia remain critically tied to Moscow 

despite Russia’s own status as a semi-failed economy. The Central Asian 

states want to diversify their external trade, but have little to offer to the 

more balanced economies of Eurasia. At the same time, investment from 

First World economies is concentrated in commodity exploitation, mainly 

oil and gas. Western business engagement in the region in other than 

extractive investments actually has declined in recent years, due to disappointed expectations, corruption and regime interference. One business 

survey assessed Western investment potential in Central Asia beyond the 

hydrocarbon sector as negligible.7 The only important external economy 

now expanding in a broad range of commerce in the region is the Chinese, 

which is certainly freighted with political influence. 

A Future Built on Oil, Gas, Water, and Drugs

In the early 1990s, the Western vision of vast oil and gas wealth in 

Central Asia obscured the seriousness of the region’s economic plight, but 

even the substantial recent discoveries in the Northern Caspian basin can 

no longer conceal that these states are not Persian Gulf emirates in the 

making. Most of the region has little or no hydrocarbons. Only Kazakhstan has major proven oil reserves on a scale to become significant on 

world markets. Turkmenistan’s vast holdings of natural gas are an asset 

largely devoid of a market. Turkey was the logical customer, but Ankara 

already has contracted to purchase more gas from other sources than it 

may be able to use in the years ahead. The proposed trans-Afghanistan 

pipeline for Turkmen gas faces many obstacles, not the least of which is 

that India (the largest potential customer) does not want to depend on 

a pipeline crossing Pakistan for energy supplies. In addition, the global 

hydrocarbon market is much more diversified than it used to be, with the 
POLITICS OF CENTRAL ASIA 35

higher transport and transit costs of Central Asian energy creating a price 

disadvantage. Finally, as in other hydrocarbon-rich countries, oil investments tend to distort broader economic development, discourage enterprise, warp labor markets, and spawn corruption. In this regard, Central 

Asia is following the examples of Nigeria and Indonesia rather than that 

of Norway.

For the region as a whole, two other commodities are likely to be as 

or more important than hydrocarbons. The first of these is water, due to 

the inherent aridity of most of Central Asia and to the depredations of 

Soviet development policies, which drained the Aral Sea, over-exploited 

the few rivers and depleted water tables. The water-rich areas of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan might seem natural complements to the energy-rich 

but water-poor areas to the west and north, but the deal is not so simple. 

Water is a shortage item for most inhabited parts of Central Asia. The 

mountainous states are unable to satisfy the needs of their northern 

neighbors and face the dilemma that supplying water for summer use in 

the lowlands prevents hydroelectric generation in the winter. The Uzbek 

and Kazakh authorities prefer to sell their oil and gas on world markets 

for hard currency than swap it for Kyrgyz water, while Tashkent prefers 

saber-rattling toward Bishkek rather than commercial compensation. The 

regime in Ashgabad is fostering vast new irrigation schemes and a “Lake 

of the Golden Turkmen” which, if realized, would require the entire flow 

of the major regional rivers. Thus, rather than serve as a regional unifying 

factor, water is a cause of tension and rivalry.8

The other commodity likely to dominate Central Asia in the years 

ahead is narcotics, as the region is the main transit route toward growing 

European markets for the output of Afghanistan, today the largest raw 

opium producer in the world. As elsewhere, the vast illegal profits involved 

in the narcotics trade easily can overwhelm weak political institutions 

and dominate fragile economies. If comparatively mature republics like 

Colombia can be enervated by this commerce, how likely are the Central 

Asian states—much poorer than in Soviet days and already famous for 

corruption—likely to withstand the pressure? The fatal double impact of 

this burgeoning illegal trade is that it appeals to the dispossessed of society 

excluded from other economic opportunities while suborning law enforcement and politics. The narcotics traffic is also likely to fund extremist 

Islamist elements of the region, especially in places like the Ferghana Valley 

that combine population growth, poverty, religious ferment and political 

repression.9
36 MERRY

What Lies Ahead?

The probability is high that all five Central Asian regimes will suffer systemic failure. Failure in this context can mean one or both of two 

things. First, they can fail to achieve viability in the tasks of modernization 

and in reversing their decline ever deeper into the Third World. Second, 

they can fail as structures of political control. By the first definition, the 

Central Asian states already are failures, having all moved in the wrong direction on almost every relevant index, with little likelihood of more than 

cosmetic reforms in the years ahead. By the second definition, the regimes 

are currently successful, but in unsustainable ways.

The basis of regime failure in Central Asia is their Janus-like combination of post-colonial and neo-Soviet forms of governance. “Big Man” 

regimes throughout the Third World have demonstrated a very high failure rate in modernization and development. There are instances of limited 

success, for example, Tunisia and Malaysia, but they combine fairly moderate authoritarian rule with avenues for political pluralism, free speech 

and non-violent change. The Third World regimes most similar to those of 

Central Asia are case studies of lost opportunities for economic progress 

and eroding living standards since the end of colonial rule. Central Asian 

officials respond to such comparisons by saying their future will be better 

due to their stronger Soviet-style institutions. This is curious logic, as the 

Soviet model suffered systemic failure over a broader geographic area and 

in more varied conditions than any other form of governance in modern 

times. Even fascism did not collapse so completely, and often only under 

external pressure. Why should Soviet-style institutions and policies which 

failed in the Baltics and Balkans, in Albania and Ethiopia, in the Slavic 

states and the Caucasus, from Eastern Germany to East Asia, now prove 

viable in Central Asia to meet the demands of the post-Cold War world? 

Nothing is less probable. Indeed, the amalgam of “Big Man” and neo-Soviet ruling modes is almost a certain guarantor of systemic failure of the 

first type: failure to meet the needs of developing societies.

What are the prospects of failure of the second type? Cannot the 

addition of neo-Soviet police-state methods to Third World authoritarianism preserve regimes in power for long periods regardless of their substantive failings? Perhaps. This is the core political issue for Central Asia. 

Will these neo-Soviet regimes collapse more quickly than would a typical 

Third World dictatorship or can they prolong the process of decay behind 

a facade of nationalism for years to come? Will the internal contradictions of these systems (contradictions of a truly Marxian character) cause 
POLITICS OF CENTRAL ASIA 37

them to implode relatively quickly or will the rulers demonstrate that they 

learned well their lesson from Gorbachev’s experiment, the lesson not to 

ease up the strong hand of dictatorship? In short, are these regimes rigid 

and brittle or rigid and strong? The region’s rulers believe the latter, that 

the Soviet Union would have endured indefinitely under a forceful leader. 

They clearly credit themselves with the strength necessary to deny reforms 

at home and to defy pressure for reforms from abroad, especially after the 

2001 terror attacks on the United States.10

However, in the long term, the Central Asian states can avoid systemic failure only by true modernization, especially fostering development 

of active civil societies. Civil society refers to activity taking place between 

the institutions of the family and the state. In advanced countries, even 

those with very large state sectors, civil society encompasses most business 

activity, labor unions, organized religion, media, political parties, science 

and culture, and other organized human endeavors. In authoritarian regimes, the state seeks control if not outright monopolization of these roles. 

The importance of a vibrant civil society is that most creative human enterprise takes place there, as does essential pluralism and accountability of 

state institutions. The health of a country’s civil society bears a close correlation to its success in responding to political and economic challenges. 

By this standard, the Central Asian states rank extraordinarily low. All five 

regimes seek monopolies of civil institutions and treat independent organized activity as threatening to their control, which, indeed, it is. While 

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were initially somewhat amenable to civil society development, they reversed course to the comfortable Soviet norm. 

Barring regime changes, prospects throughout the region for expansion of 

civil society are very poor.

Diversity Within the Regional Pattern of Failure

A case-by-case examination of the five current regimes indicates 

they are likely to experience different fates, at least in terms of the timing 

of their ultimate failure as power systems. Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, 

the worst and least-repressive regimes, respectively, are the most likely to 

experience regime change or at least significant political turmoil in the 

near term. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have the wherewithal and authoritarianism to hold on considerably longer.

The megalomaniac ruler of Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Niyazov, 

emulates some of the world’s worst dictators in his cult of personality; 

Romania’s Nicolae Ceaucescu and Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the short-lived 

Central African Empire are legitimate comparisons. In addition to his as-
38 MERRY

sumed name of Turkmenbashi or Father of the Turkmen, Niyazov has been 

anointed by his stooge parliament as president for life, a field marshal, and 

“The Great,” among many other honorifics. However, for all his vainglory, 

Niyazov does not exercise the kind of bloodthirsty tyranny needed to 

maintain his rule for the long haul. While life in Turkmenistan certainly 

is marked by pervasive repression, it lacks the anxiety psychosis of a true 

Stalinist state. This weakness, combined with fatuous incompetence in 

running the economy (with fantasy statistics, such as the allegation of 21 

percent growth in 2001), make Turkmenistan a good candidate for regime 

change by disgruntled domestic forces. The supposed coup attempt in late 

2002, the facts of which are still unclear, may indicate the potential for an 

end to Niyazov. More recently, Niyazov has challenged Moscow in ways 

that inspired condemnation even by the Russian State Duma and is also 

verging on open conflict with Uzbekistan. How and when the transition 

will come is unclear (who could have said in advance what would expose 

Ceaucescu’s feet of clay?), but it is difficult to believe the sixty-two year old 

Niyazov will remain in power as long as his regional neighbors.11

Kyrgyzstan President Askar Akaev is a great disappointment to 

many in the West who naively saw him as a Jeffersonian democrat in the 

heart of Asia. Sadly, a better parallel is Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, who 

also won many admirers in his early years before his agenda narrowed to 

maintaining personal power. The two men betrayed supporters at home 

and abroad as they presided over corrupt regimes (the rot starting in their 

own households), moved to imprison former close political collaborators, 

became increasingly intolerant of criticism, suspicious of all domestic opposition, and unresponsive to Western pressures. Akaev has, so far, been 

less heavy-handed in his repression than Mugabe or his Central Asian 

counterparts. The mass popular unrest in Djalalabad province during 

2002 demonstrated genuine grassroots opposition, which could be difficult to control over time. Akaev has at least held out the public prospect 

of leaving office voluntarily at the end of his current term in 2005, but 

the common regional practice is to extend terms at will.12 Akaev’s blatant 

manipulation of a series of constitutional changes to shore up his hold on 

power in early 2003 does not bode well for a peaceful transition. Indeed, 

Akaev’s very moderation, by regional standards, may prove his undoing, as 

his poor stewardship of the economy gives little basis to appeal for public 

support of his continued rule.13

Tajikistan is something of a special case, due to the extended and 

complex civil violence of much of the post-Soviet period, which dominated domestic politics. So far, the 1997 arrangements that brought most 
POLITICS OF CENTRAL ASIA 39

of the fighting to an end have held up. Nonetheless, Tajikistan remains 

in many ways the most fragile of the Central Asian states and the one 

most dependent on external economic and military support to retain 

cohesion. The regime of Imomali Rakhmonov is little more than a Russian protectorate and resembles some of the weak states of Francophone 

Africa, which are sustained through French beneficence and occasional 

intervention. As a semi-failed state for most of its independent history, 

Tajikistan is a poor prospect for serious reforms or even basic steps toward 

modernization. In many respects, Tajikistan resembles Angola, where the 

enervating impact of prolonged civil strife deprives domestic political and 

economic life of normal incentives, replacing these with the distortions 

of a war society and its potential for corruption, official malfeasance, and 

deterioration of what remains of civil society. In such conditions, political 

reform faces huge hurdles.14

If Kazakhstan maintains its current political order, it will be because 

the regime of Nursultan Nazarbaev has petroleum revenues adequate to 

buy and bribe his continuation in power. While in different hands the oil 

wealth might create real development, it is clear from the past decade that 

Kazakhstan has the same kind of “kleptocratic” ruling system that dissipated the riches of Nigeria and Indonesia.15 These examples of oil-rich 

but probity-poor states demonstrate that money flow can prolong a “Big 

Man” in power for years, but the regime ultimately will fail due to the corrosion of social peace and the inability of the ruling clique to keep a firm 

grip on political realities. There is little prospect of a voluntary regime 

change in Kazakhstan, as Nazarbaev had his term prolonged in 1995, extended in 1998, and has openly spoken of a new term in 2007.16 In such 

circumstances, opposition elements have few alternatives but to encourage 

domestic unrest, hoping the security forces will abandon the rulers in the 

face of massive popular protests (as did occur in Indonesia and Nigeria). 

Thus far, Nazarbaev and his clan have met every manifestation of opposition with harsher and more repressive measures, including arresting 

moderate politicians and journalists despite Western protests. In severe 

circumstances the regime could experience a loss of will or an inability 

to have its orders obeyed, but for the time being Nazarbaev’s rule looks 

likely to continue for a considerable time, with the waste of the country’s 

petroleum earnings lasting for at least as long.17

Finally, Uzbekistan is likely to retain authoritarian rule for an extended period. Among the Central Asian regimes, the Uzbek is truest to 

its Soviet roots. Islam Karimov certainly does not lack will in using his 

security services to repress any manifestation of a genuine civil society, 
40 MERRY

including even moderate religious practice. However, as ever more moderate Moslem practitioners are imprisoned, tortured or killed, the trend in 

underground Islamic teaching moves in increasingly extreme directions. 

This trend can only go from bad to worse. How bad things already are 

is shown by the fact Tashkent treats statistics on use of the death penalty as a state secret. Although Uzbekistan began the 1990s with the best 

regional prospects for balanced economic development combined with 

moderate petroleum wealth, these opportunities have been wasted in an 

unreformed structure of state controls and disincentives for enterprise or 

investment.18

Karimov combines relative youth and a focused political intelligence 

with a boundless ambition in his control of Central Asia’s largest population. His aspirations for regional hegemony and his still-active dreams of a 

restored “Turkestan” centered on Tashkent (and himself) not only obviate 

effective regional cooperation but shift state priorities onto external ambitions at the expense of pressing domestic needs. Like the ill-fated Shah of 

Iran, it is difficult for such a self-absorbed ruler to accommodate change at 

home while lusting for regional great power status, especially as Karimov 

sees nothing really wrong with a Soviet-style centrally-directed economy 

and monopolization of civil society. The weakness of Karimov’s outlook 

is illustrated by the analysis of a courageous Uzbek human rights activist 

who noted that Karimov initially had considered following the Turkish 

Kemalist model of development, but ruled it out because it involved a free 

press and genuine political opposition; he then toyed with the post-Mao 

Chinese model, but thought it allowed far too much economic freedom; 

he then examined the South Korean model, but again judged its openness 

and vibrant civil society as intolerable for Uzbekistan; finally, Karimov 

settled on a model he could feel entirely comfortable with, that of North 

Korea.19 Therein lies Karimov’s near-term strength and long-term fallibility: He knows how to dominate but not how to adapt to changing circumstances. Such a regime—whether in Pyongyang or in Tashkent—may last a 

long time, but ultimately has painted itself into a corner with no exit.

What Is To Be Done?

Although prospects for the five Central Asian regimes vary, the 

countries all need the same things. First, regime change. The neo-Soviet 

“Big Man” leadership in every Central Asian state has demonstrated inability and unwillingness to adapt to the conditions of the modern world. 

New leadership is required, although one cannot have high expectations 

for what may come in the initial transition. Second, political pluralism. 
POLITICS OF CENTRAL ASIA 41

This need not mean participatory democracy in the Western sense, but 

at least the involvement of all ethnic, geographic and economic groups 

in governance and in accountability for policies. Third, expansion of the 

civil society. The state effort to control activities not related to the necessary roles of government effectively prohibits creativity and development. 

The challenges of modernization can only be met outside the stultifying 

embrace of a pervasive bureaucracy, while an active civil society is also the 

best antidote to state-sponsored corruption.

Obviously, such a program of political change in Central Asia is not 

currently in the cards, nor will change be easy or perhaps, even peaceful 

when it comes. The region’s periphery does not supply good role models, 

as Russia, Iran, Pakistan and China are themselves examples of regimes in 

need of reform. Even the more positive experience of Turkey and India 

show how slow, difficult and uneven progress can be, while also proving 

that current conditions in Central Asia are far worse than they need be. 

One thing is certain: “Stability” is no answer to the problems of Central 

Asia; indeed, a focus on stability is the heart of the problem. Central Asia 

needs profound political and economic transformations to escape its neoSoviet morass—changes comparable to those of Eastern Europe—and the 

sooner the better.

Notes1

 Zamira Eshanova, “Central Asia Border Issues: An Eighty-Year-Old Headache for Region,” 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Prague, October 18, 2002. 2

 Tom Stoppard, Night and Day (Faber,1978). 3

 Author’s diplomatic reporting from United States Embassy, Moscow, 1991-94.

4

 Briefing on Religious Liberty Issues in Central Asia, United States Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, March 7, 2002; “Central Asia: Islam and the State,” International Crisis Group (ICG), Osh/Brussels, July 10, 2003. 5

 Author’s experience as Regional Director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia in the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Washington, 1995-97. 6

 Discussed in the author’s “Russia and China in Asia: Changing Great Power Roles,” American 

Foreign Policy Council, Washington, 2002, 41-47; “Central Asia Fears Over China’s Power,” RFE/RL 

Newsline, Prague, June 17, 2003. 7

 Robert Cottrell, “Asian Entanglement,” Financial Times, April 17, 2002. 8

 Michael Wines, “Grand Soviet Scheme for Sharing Water in Central Asia is Foundering,” New 

York Times, December 9, 2002, 14; “Turkmen Lake Project Marks Third Birthday,” RFE/RL Newsline,

Prague, May 7, 2003. 9 Justin L. Miller, “The Narco-Insurgent Nexus in Central Asia and Afghanistan,” In the National 

Interest, 2, no. 18 (May 7, 2003); “The Globalization of Narcotics,” RFE/RL Organized Crime and Terrorism Watch, Vol. 3, no. 19 (June 5, 2003). 10 “Central Asia: Fault Lines in the New Security Map,” (Osh/Brussels: ICG, July 4, 2001); 

Hooman Peimani, “Abusing the ‘War on Terrorism’ in Central Asia,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst

(August 14, 2002); “Central Asian Perspectives on 11 September and the Afghan Crisis,” (Osh/Brus-
42 MERRY

sels: ICG, September 28, 2001); “Central Asia: Last Chance for Change,” (Osh/Brussels: ICG, April 29, 

2003). 11 “Turkmen Leader Renames Months After Himself, His Mother At Grand Council,” BBC 

Monitoring International Reports, August 9, 2002; RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 2, no. 31 (August 15, 

2002); Claudia Rosett, “The Real World,” Wall Street Journal, August 28, 2002; Sergei Blagov, “Turkmenistan and Its Leadership Cult,” Turkistan Newsletter, September 7, 2002; “Cracks in the Marble: 

Turkmenistan’s Failing Dictatorship,” (Osh/Brussels: ICG, January 17, 2003); RFE/RL Central Asian 

Report, 3, no. 22, (June 26, 2003). 12 RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 3, no. 9, (February 27, 2003). 13 “Kyrgystan at Ten: Trouble in the ‘Island of Democracy,’” (Osh/Brussels: ICG, August 28, 

2002); “Kyrgyzstan’s Political Crisis: An Exit Strategy,” (Osh/Brussels: ICG, August 20, 2002); RFE/RL 

Central Asia Report, 2, no. 32, (August 22, 2002); RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 2, no. 34, (September 

5, 2002); RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 3, no. 6, (February 6, 2003); RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 3, no. 

29, (August 29, 2003). 14 Konstantin Parshin, “Of Tajik War and Peace,” Transitions Online (August 22, 2002); “Tajikistan: A Roadmap for Development,” (Osh/Brussels: ICG, April 24, 2003). 15 Jeff Gerth, “Bribery Inquiry Involves Kazakh Chief, and He’s Unhappy,” New York Times, 

December 11, 2002, 16; Seymour Hersh, “The Price of Oil,” The New Yorker, July 9, 2002; RFE/RL 

Organized Crime and Terrorism Watch, 3, no. 17, May 15, 2003. 16 “Kazakhstan’s President Says He Might Run For Another Term,” RFE/RL Newsline, September 23, 2002. 17 Robert G. Kaiser, “Kazakh’s Season of Repression,” The Washington Post, July 22, 2002; RFE/

RL Central Asia Report, 2, no. 24, September 5, 2002; RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 3, no. 48, January 

2, 2003. 18 “Uzbekistan at Ten: Repression and Instability,” (Osh/Brussels: ICG, August 21, 2001); RFE/

RL Central Asia Report, 2, no. 33, August 29, 2002; “Uzbekistan: U.S. Rubber Stamps Human Rights,” 

Human Rights Watch, New York, September 9, 2002; “Uzbekistan’s Reform Program: Illusion or Reality?,” (Osh/Brussels: ICG, February 18, 2003); “Uzbekistan: Religious Freedom Survey,” Forum 18 

News Service, Oslo, July 16, 2003. 19 Briefing at RFE/RL’s Washington office, March 28, 2002.
POLITICAL REFORM 43

41

Chapter 3

Reform Strategies in

Central Asia: Early Starters, 

Late Starters, and 

Non-Starters

Gregory Gleason

For nearly a decade prior to independence, Central Asian governments had discussed reform in the context of economic “acceleration” and governmental “restructuring” (perestroika). Soon after independence in 1991, all five Central Asian states developed new strategies 

to meet the immense challenges of post-communist transformation and 

“de-statification.” Today, after more than 12 years of reform efforts, it is 

clear that none of these Central Asian states have been successful in attaining their goals for political and economic development. To date, no 

country has announced that reform has been brought to its conclusion. 

To the citizens of Central Asia, reform has become a permanent condition 

of governance and more of an explanation for why things do not work 

than for why they do. In order to change that perception, significant work 

remains to be done and many challenges must be faced.

On the whole, the governments of the Central Asia states have been 

more enthusiastic about economic than political reform. The reasons for 

giving priority to economic reform are straightforward and to a large 

extent understandable. First, existing political leaders and government officials sought to increase their states’ economic potential without limiting 

their own ability to benefit from their positions as public officials.1 They 

were inclined toward economic reforms that offered the promise of greater 

economic rewards, but shied away from political reforms that might give 

advantage to competing individuals or groups. Second, the leading analytical approaches to development stressed that economic reform should 

be ordered logically prior to political reform.2 According to many analysts, 
44 GLEASON

countries that suffer from poverty, insufficient investment in human 

capital, underdeveloped infrastructure, antagonistic or exploitative trading relationships, excessive bureaucracy and government over-regulation, 

cannot be expected to implement political reforms successfully. However, 

once economic reforms begin to create new opportunities, the theories 

maintain, new constituencies will form and political reform will follow. 

A third reason why economic reform has been more forthcoming than 

political is that the international community has provided more moral, 

technical and material assistance in this area. The level of external support offered by international donor institutions is a matter of academic 

debate. Some analysts view the post-communist support offered by the 

donor community as insufficient, misguided and generally irrelevant to 

the domestic circumstances of the countries. Whatever the real effects of 

international aid, international donors have, in fact, played a crucial role 

in communicating the expectations of the international community for 

political and economic practices.

While the Central Asian countries have made headway in economic 

reform, they face the criticism that economic reform alone cannot engender the long-term social and cultural changes that also are needed. 

For people to demand integrity, accountability, fair play, openness, and 

effective administration from their governments, they must be prepared 

to provide public support in the form of taxes and public participation 

in shared self-government. For democratic development to be truly sustainable, cardinal changes must take place in the relationship between the 

individual and the state. Moreover, some analysts argue that the long-term 

viability of economic change hinges upon the character of governance. 

Poor governance quickly cancels the benefits of economic transformation 

and growth.

What strategies for reform have been adopted by the Central Asian 

states? What is the relationship between economic reform strategies and 

political reform strategies? How successful have these strategies been? This 

chapter surveys the relationship between economic and political reform in 

Central Asia, arguing that the assumptions, methods, conduct, and results 

of political reform strategies have varied significantly by country. The 

chapter concludes with extrapolations of reform trends for future Central 

Asian political development.

Economic Reform and Political Reform

The principal development challenge to emerge from communism is 

one of transforming previously authoritarian, centrally planned societies 
POLITICAL REFORM 45

into market-led democracies, with vibrant economies and open political systems. The rationale for these changes is not primarily cultural, but 

functional. Globalization clearly tends to reward those countries that succeed in such practices and punish those who do not. In order to succeed 

in globalized commercial and information markets, governments find 

themselves under pressure to conform to accepted international standards 

of policy and practice.

Prevailing international standards tend to be those practiced and 

promulgated by the upper-income countries of the West. As a consequence, “best practice” in political and economic organization tends to be 

identified with practices that are prevalent in Europe and North America. 

Although political organization in the developed world exhibits a variety 

of institutional forms and procedures, a small number of principles are 

common to all economically advanced, stable democracies. The political 

organization of advanced countries tends to stress individual rights, voluntary contractual relationships, popular political participation, limited 

government, public accountability and financial transparency.

These features are common, but not necessarily self-initiating and 

self-regulating. They do not emerge from good intentions alone, but depend upon a finely tuned and continually evolving framework of public 

processes. Most often, public organizations are used to ensure that rules, 

standards, norms and procedures of openness are enforced. For example, 

although markets are elemental forms of human exchange and have been 

in existence as long as people have been free to enter into relationships and 

transactions on a voluntary basis, market relationships are not self-establishing and self-regulating in all cases. They require that governments or some 

alternative organizations solve collective action problems by discouraging 

free riding, opportunism and rent-seeking behavior.

Over the years, the world’s international financial institutions, led 

by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have 

developed a consensus on policy prescriptions to help their member 

countries solve problems of economic development. Informally, this set of 

policy prescriptions has come to be known as the “Washington consensus.” 

An externally motivated structural adjustment package usually involves 

policy correctives in a number of areas including: fiscal responsibility; 

disinflationary policies; price liberalization; trade liberalization; currency 

stabilization; and foreign investment attraction. A policy package may, for 

instance, seek to tighten fiscal discipline through reducing government 

budget deficits and subsidies to private sector, helping to privatize public 

enterprises that might work more efficiently in the private sector, and 
46 GLEASON

bringing interest rates into line with market forces. Another type of package may also seek to aid in opening national economies to foreign imports 

and establishing conditions to support foreign exports on the basis of 

comparative advantage. The policies of the “Washington consensus” have 

been criticized for differentially serving commercial interests represented 

primarily in developing countries. Critics claim that the Washington consensus tends to encourage underdeveloped countries to rely on importing 

industrial goods made in the advanced countries while exporting primary 

commodities and raw materials for markets in the developed countries. 

Prices for industrial goods tend to be less sensitive to changes in market 

cycles. Primary commodity prices, in contrast, tend to fluctuate widely, 

creating destabilizing cycles of boom and bust in the underdeveloped 

countries. These cycles are reflected in the instabilities and uncertainties 

that characterize political processes in developing countries. As the Central Asian states emerged from the Soviet period to become independent 

countries, they quickly became subject to the pressures of the international marketplace.

At the time of independence in Central Asia, all the governments and 

important political leaders of the region endorsed the ideas of democratic 

politics and market-oriented economics. Yet the countries adopted very 

different national strategies for achieving their goals.3 After more than 

a decade of independence, it is apparent that the differing development 

strategies adopted by the five new governments of Central Asia in the first 

years of independence have led to significantly different policy outcomes. 

In assessing how the contrasting strategies of these states affected 

their progress toward economic liberalization and democratization, it 

must be acknowledged that progress toward democracy in all the Central 

Asian states has been limited. Four of the five Central Asian states are governed by former leaders of the Communist Party, and each of the Central 

Asian republics are largely administratively run by former communist 

party officials. By the end of the first decade of independence, all the 

governments of Central Asia had “presidents,”4 but in all cases, these were 

officials from the Soviet apparat or high rungs of the Soviet establishment. 

Moreover, all the countries established “presidential” systems, giving the 

presidents the power to rule by decree.

Although all of the countries have conducted elections, none of the 

governments can be said to have conformed to international standards for 

free and fair elections. Three of the governments have former communist 

leaders who have extended their mandates in extra-constitutional ways. 

None of the governments has what could be described as an independent 
POLITICAL REFORM 47

judiciary. None of the governments has established a functioning legislature with true powers of the purse. Even in the most open and liberal 

of the countries—Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—the parliaments have 

been routed by presidential decree. Judging by the benchmark criteria 

for measuring democratic progress used by Freedom House,5 in the years 

since independence the Central Asian societies have failed to realize their 

potential for democratic change.6

Although the Central Asian states may have made limited progress 

toward establishing sustainable systems of democratic governance, important relative differences do exist among them. The status of democratic 

reform is quite different in each of the states. To some extent, these differences are the product of Fortuna—some of the Central Asian countries 

have significant natural resource endowments, some have advantages of 

position, some have simply been fortunate. But much of the variation 

can be attributed to the substantive policies pursued by the states in the 

a wide variety of areas, including governance, rule of law, adjudication of 

disputes, human and civil rights, treatment of dissidents and opposition, 

treatment of non-nationals, and tolerance for religious, ethnic, and territorial differences.

While the international community has urged the countries of 

Central Asia to adopt policies that would encourage democratization, 

by far the most important impetus for change—both in terms of donor 

resources and in steps taken by the countries themselves—has come in 

the form of international efforts to support relatively non-political “governance” reforms or “structural reform.” Structural reform of governance 

standards, policies, and practices generally is regarded as a way of inducing changes that will help bring countries into line with international 

standards—without compromising the countries’ national sovereignty 

and right to non-interference in domestic affairs.7 Structural reform is 

seen as a non-political process of improving the technical capacity of 

governments to carry out public policy. To the extent that this is accurate, 

structural reform does not entail “modernization” or “westernization,” 

rather, it implies conformance with standards, policies and practices of the 

international community.

Structural reform, in the broadest sense, is anything that happens 

within a country that allows the country to participate more effectively 

in the global economy. Structural reform entails a process by which a 

country’s institutions, policies and practices are brought into line with 

prevailing international standards. The purpose of structural reform is 

to create a favorable policy environment for accountable, transparent 
48 GLEASON

economic policy, with well-defined public and private sectors working in 

mutually reinforcing ways to promote prosperity and sustainable development. Countries undertake structural reform programs because they realize that participation in the global economy requires policy conformance 

with international standards. Some structural reform measures are narrowly economic in their purpose; others are more broadly oriented and 

aim to improve the policy environment that facilitates economic activity. 

Policy changes alter the status quo, producing winners and losers. As a 

consequence, all policy changes influence the balance of constituencies in 

a society. Moreover, economically oriented structural changes and politically oriented structural changes are linked in terms of reciprocal effects. 

However the relationship between structural economic reform and 

democratization is, at best, a probabilistic one. While free markets in the 

long run may lead to free minds, the effects of long run processes often are 

beyond the time horizons of most political systems. Political leaders rarely 

rely upon economic change to bring about desired political change. For 

this reason, political leaders often adopt conscious strategies of political 

reform to further their goals. All political leaders, even the most cynical, 

have some concept of the public interest.

There are typically two basic thrusts of political reform strategies, 

one formal and the other informal. The first method is to use political institutions to shape future political change. The formal political institutions 

offer ways of engaging elected officials, representatives and the public in 

the process of change. The other method relies upon political exchange. 

This method consists primarily of using economic reform to support 

favorable constituencies. All economic changes, even the most non-political, necessarily produce winners and losers. Political leaders recognize 

that no matter how strong or deep their support, they are surrounded by 

challenges and sometimes even by threats. Using the changes introduced 

by economic reform to reward friends and punish enemies is one of the 

most fundamental forms of political strategy, and far more important in 

most developing countries than using the formal political institutions 

themselves.

The formal institutions of democratic governance require an accountable executive branch, a deliberative legislature, an honest and fair 

judiciary, and the governance standards of probity, transparency, and 

efficiency necessary to carry out the public mandate. Promoting change 

through the use of the formal political institutions requires reliance upon 

civil procedure, elections, public participation, recognition of the professional independence of the judiciary, and the vetting processes of opera-
POLITICAL REFORM 49

tional independence of auditors and review commissions. None of these 

strike insecure political leaders as efficient mechanisms of rule.

Reliance on political exchange to reward supporters and punish those 

who dissent or oppose the government appears to many political leaders to 

be a more direct, and thus more efficient, means of achieving objectives. 

Even when political leaders are not so cynical as to see the political process 

as consisting primarily of quid pro quo exchanges, they nonetheless tend 

to interpret the public interest in terms of their own desire to garner support and avoid opposition.

The pages to follow survey the main features of structural reform in 

the countries of Central Asia. Extensive data and information are available 

regarding the results of economic structural reform. Much less is available regarding the results of political reform. What has not yet emerged is 

whether each country has arrived at its current state as a result of specific 

economic or political factors.

Kazakhstan: Outlines of a Petrocracy 

Many areas of Kazakhstan’s macro-economic reform have been successful and some provide a model for other post-communist countries.8

Soon after independence, the Kazakh government established a legal 

foundation and regulatory system for a private economy.9 The government 

introduced a convertible national currency, the tenge. It moved quickly to 

establish sound monetary and fiscal policies, including modern civil and 

tax codes as well as banking and investment laws in accordance with international standards. The government also carried out macroeconomic reforms including price liberalization and freeing markets from government 

controls. It turned major enterprises over to the private sector, including 

a majority of the power generation facilities and coalmines. Seeking to 

encourage international trade and foreign investment, the government 

passed environmentally sound oil and gas legislation that met international standards.10

In contrast with these economic policy successes, Kazakhstan has 

made less headway in other areas. On the whole, the economic benefits of 

Kazakhstan’s rapid economic growth have been available to only a small 

portion of the population. With an average per capita annual income 

of $1,300 in 2000, most Kazakhstan citizens still had not benefited fully 

from the transition to market based economics. Structural reform means 

that changes must take place in the country’s economic structure. These 

changes will benefit some, but will be detrimental to others. The costs of 

structural reform, that is the unemployment created by closing out-of-
50 GLEASON

date enterprises, the loss of value of tangible assets, and the psychological 

uncertainty introduced by the reforms, are rarely borne by the rich. The 

costs of structural reform usually are imposed upon the poor or the less 

well politically connected. In the wake of structural reform, Kazakhstan 

continued to rely upon oil sector revenues, fiscal redistribution and foreign donor assistance to finance the costs of structural adjustment. Unless 

exceptional steps are taken, further development of Kazakhstan’s oil and 

mineral sectors cannot be expected to lead to a wide redistribution of income. The situation is also grim in the agricultural sector where adequate 

investment in infrastructure, such as roads, processing equipment and 

farm inputs is lacking. Moreover, the banking reforms virtually ignored 

agriculture, failing to provide much needed credits for farm expansion. 

Although Kazakhstan has adopted a private pension system, moving ahead 

of other former communist countries, the social safety net has worn thin 

in many areas.

Given Kazakhstan’s decade of experience with structural reform, one 

of the critical issues for Kazakhstan’s future is how economic and political 

reforms will be linked in terms of policy cycles. Economic development 

strategies that emphasize a dominant economic sector under close government control run substantial risks. Too heavy a reliance on primary 

commodity exports could lead to the so-called “Dutch disease”—a situation in which oil-rich countries draw in large amounts of foreign capital 

for needed oil development, but find that the resulting strong exchange 

rates hinder their ability to competitively price other goods and services. 

While the government may be able to count on future revenue from rents 

on oil and gas extraction rather than from broadly based and relatively unpopular forms of taxation such as personal income tax or excise taxes, the 

political consequences of government dependence on such an easily monopolized sector as oil and gas can present real challenges to other aspects 

of liberalization. Government control of the natural resource sectors has 

led to policies that conceal incomes, compromise fiscal transparency and 

benefit insiders far more than the general public. The long-term success of 

Kazakhstan’s structural reform is likely to rest upon policies that serve to 

diversify the economy on a sector and regional basis.

The political reform strategy of Kazakh political leaders has put little 

emphasis on the formal political institutions, or, for that matter, reform. 

When the first post-Soviet legislature proved to be recalcitrant from the 

point of view of the executive, it was dissolved summarily in December 

1993 by the order of the president. The new parliament elected in March 

1994 proved not much more effective and also was dissolved. Since then, 
POLITICAL REFORM 51

the president has succeeded in winning overwhelming voter approval for a 

new constitution which greatly expanded his powers. In addition, Kazakh 

leadership has used adroitly the results of economic reform to politically 

enfranchise its supporters.

Privatization created a stratum of “new Kazakhs” who gained influence in government and society because of their wealth, which largely 

was acquired as a result of government supplied credits and special benefits. Back door privatization through “management contracts” and other 

stratagems allowed close supporters of the political leadership to profit 

in the early post-communist reform. The government’s emphasis on the 

development of an export-led economy, particularly energy and minerals, 

helped promote the expansion of a stratum of close supporters who had 

everything to gain from continuing their support and everything to lose 

by arguing in favor of new directions.

Kyrgyzstan: Winning Friends and Losing Ground

Kyrgyzstan’s enthusiasm for reform early on earned it a reputation 

as the “democratic showcase of the former Soviet Union.” Soon after independence, the Kyrgyz government embraced the international financial 

institutions’ policy prescriptions known as the “Washington consensus.”11

Following the standard policy prescription, the Kyrgyz leadership sought 

to liberalize prices, scale back the size and scope of government, introduce competition, and encourage foreign trade. Kyrgyzstan attempted to 

implement these prescriptions in good faith, but at the same time, faced 

substantial obstacles to successful economic reform. While the economic 

reform measures did result in rapid and significant advances in state capacity, they did not lead to expected economic growth, improvements in 

social welfare, or do much to improve the government’s capacity to protect 

civil rights. Furthermore, these economic policy changes had negligible 

effects and in some instances even negative effects on the processes of 

political liberalization.

Kyrgyzstan’s particular path is closely related to its unusual background and circumstances. Prior to independence, Kyrgyzstan occupied 

a highly specialized niche in the communist economic system, serving 

primarily as a provider of commodities for industries located in the 

European parts of the Soviet Union. When cut off from Soviet-era suppliers and customers, Kyrgyzstan’s small and uncompetitive industrial 

enterprises quickly became insolvent. The agricultural sector was blocked 

from access to farm inputs such as tractors and advanced agricultural 

technology. Unable to import expensive farm equipment and technology, 
52 GLEASON

the country quickly began slipping toward low-technology subsistence 

farming. The transition to an open trading economy also proved difficult. 

Between 1991 and 1994 farm and industrial output fell, trade dropped, 

inflation soared, and the government ran a large fiscal deficit. The Kyrgyzstan economy reached a nadir in 1994, at about the time that foreign 

development assistance began to arrive. The International Monetary Fund 

(IMF), the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank 

for Reconstruction and Development, and the other major international 

financial institutions began pumping money into the Kyrgyzstan economy 

to make an example of this small, rugged country that was willing to risk 

the unknowns of entering quickly into the world economy. 

Not until 1996 did the Kyrgyzstan economy begin to rebound from 

the post-Soviet Union collapse contraction. During the period 1995 

through 1997, inflation was reduced, the budget deficit as a proportion 

of GDP was cut in half, and with international donor assistance, the 

Kyrgyzstan government made good headway in establishing the legal 

and regulatory foundation for a market economy. Kyrgyzstan carried out 

privatization of small enterprises and overhauled the country’s banking 

and financial systems. In 1998, the Kyrgyzstan constitution was amended 

to allow for private land ownership and Kyrgyzstan became the first postSoviet country to join the World Trade Organization. The Kyrgyzstan 

government eliminated export registration in 1998 and export duties in 

1999.

Kyrgyzstan’s population has been growing modestly since independence. The estimated population was five million people in mid 2001.12

Prior to independence, Kyrgyzstan’s workforce was spread evenly among 

agriculture, industry and services. Yet in the past decade, industrial employment dropped to less than half of its 1991 level and industrial production 

saw steep declines, especially in the early years after independence. With 

the exception of a few mining sectors, the industries have not rebounded. 

Coal production in 2000 was less than a quarter of its 1991 level, although 

hydroelectric production did increase. During the same time, agricultural 

employment grew by 50 percent. Agricultural output, which dropped initially after independence, increased overall by the end of the decade. Russia, historically Kyrgyzstan’s largest destination for exports, was overtaken 

by Germany for first place among Kyrgyzstan’s export partners after the 

1998 Russian financial crisis. Russia continued to be the largest source of 

imports for Kyrgyzstan, followed by imports from neighboring Uzbekistan 

and Kazakhstan.
POLITICAL REFORM 53

While the numbers and trends are discouraging in many sectors, 

Kyrgyzstan, in absolute terms, has made the most visible progress of the 

Central Asian states toward becoming a democratic institution. Even 

though Kyrgyzstan retained a “presidential” form of government, the 

parliament has grown relatively independent and challenges presidential 

authority on key issues. Opposition political figures are often subject to 

harassment and intimidation, but the very fact that such figures do speak 

out indicates a domestic political context where competing views and 

constituencies have some room to maneuver. Non-governmental civic 

organizations are becoming more widespread and influential. In 2000, 

heads of local administrations were elected for the first time rather than 

appointed. While Kyrgyzstan’s human rights record receives criticism from 

international organizations, more open discussions and fewer instances 

of direct coercion and intimidation of human rights activists occur there 

than in other Central Asian states.13

Despite these promising signs, freedom of the press has suffered, 

aided in part by a growing government concern with terrorism and insurgency. The political reform strategy of Kyrgyz political leaders, like that of 

Kazakh leaders, places only minor emphasis on formal political institutions. In 2001, the World Bank Institute of governance indicators ranked 

Kyrygzstan as below the fortieth percentile in all six key governance categories.14 Electoral process, judicial independence, and human rights practices in Kyrgyzstan have been criticized by leading international human 

rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch and the Organization 

for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

In Kyrgyzstan, just as in Kazakhstan, when the first post-Soviet legislature proved to be recalcitrant, it was summarily dissolved by the order of 

the president. A new parliament that favored pro-government candidates 

was elected in a voting process managed by a central electoral commission. 

The Kyrgyz government has found that the informal processes of reform 

offer more easily manipulated mechanisms for influencing supporters 

and opponents. Kyrgyz officials also have found that their influence over 

government credits may be used to their advantage and many have profited from their connections. Conversely, some high ranking government 

officials who fell out of favor have been prosecuted for corruption.

Tajikistan: The Struggle for Reconciliation 

and Development

Physically remote and economically isolated from its neighbors by 

the specter of political instability, Tajikistan’s social and economic indica-
54 GLEASON

tors cascaded downward in the first five years of independence. Between 

1992 and 1996, the Tajik economy contracted by nearly 40 percent.15 As 

much as 40 percent of the country’s population was directly affected by 

the civil strife; as many as 50,000 people lost their lives; 600,000 were displaced; and 60,000 fled to neighboring countries.16 Thousands of women 

were widowed and tens of thousands of children were orphaned. The 

wartime damage was compounded by a series of natural calamities that 

beset the country, including torrential rains, floods and earthquakes. By 

the beginning of 1997, the year of the Tajik peace accord, Tajikistan ranked 

115 out of 174 in the United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) 

Human Development Index.17

In 1996 the Tajik government embarked on the first comprehensive 

effort at structural reform and the adoption of international standards of 

fiscal and monetary management. The economic program targeted reducing inflation, regularizing relations with external creditors, increasing 

foreign exchange reserves, liberalizing external trade and payments, and 

improving the social safety net. The government liberalized bread and 

grain prices, replacing bread subsidies with targeted price compensation 

payments. Trade restrictions were almost completely eliminated, as export 

and import licenses and duties were lifted. The state grain fund was terminated while liberalization of cotton marketing was begun. Shortly after 

these initial steps toward structural reform were taken, the continuing 

costs of the civil conflict, in addition to weak commodity prices, drove the 

government to abandon some aspects of its reform program and policy 

targets. Faced with a widening budget deficit, the government resorted to 

administrative measures late in 1996 to raise new revenue and imposed 

export and excise taxes and import duties, as well as halted foreign exchange auctions in favor of directed lending of foreign exchange by the 

National Bank of Tajikistan (NTB). Following a United Nations brokered 

peace agreement that was signed in June 1997, the Tajik economy began to 

turn around.18 In 1997, the country registered the first post-independence 

economic growth, as GDP grew by 1.7 percent, with most of the gain in 

the last quarter of the year. Since then real GDP has been growing in Tajikistan on an annual basis. Inflation, which had reached 164 percent in 

early 1997, declined to 2.7 percent in 1998 as the GDP grew by more than 

five percent.19

Significant changes still must take place for Tajikistan’s structural 

reforms to spur political liberalization. Tajikistan, like all of the countries 

of Central Asia, claims to support the principle of free trade. However, 

unsatisfactory arrangements regarding government subsidies, currency 
POLITICAL REFORM 55

controls, banking, customs and taxation, infrastructural development, and 

control over access to markets, continue to hamper trade and development 

in the country. At the urging of international financial institutions, the 

Tajik government undertook a comprehensive program of structural economic reform. The government’s program was established in the form of a 

policy matrix with timetable benchmarks. The priorities for the structural 

reform agenda were: improved governance, privatization, bank restructuring, land reform and energy sector reform. Governance measures included 

reform of the treasury system and establishment of a single independent 

auditing agency. The goal of privatization was to raise productivity and 

support growth targets, as well as assist in achieving fiscal goals, by bolstering revenues and lowering direct or indirect subsidies. In structural 

reform, particular emphasis was placed on measures that would lead to 

a greater use of monetarized commercial transactions and a reduction in 

inefficient and non-transparent barter relations.

Much of the legal and regulatory framework for reform was already 

in place. As early as March 1992, the Tajikistan Supreme Soviet, their parliament, had approved land reform legislation giving citizens the right to 

own, lease and inherit land. Both the Tajik constitution and the laws on 

privatization guaranteed property rights, including intellectual property, 

real estate and business property. Agricultural land remained under state 

ownership, but could be leased. Under the land code, lease rights are inheritable and may be sold. The initial privatization process in Tajikistan 

moved slowly, stalled by the civil conflict and a weak banking sector. With 

the assistance of the World Bank and the IMF, the “Law of the Republic 

of Tajikistan on Privatization of State Property in the Republic of Tajikistan” was passed on May 16, 1997. This law established the framework for 

privatization, including a legal framework, title registry, and procedural 

guarantees. New privatization legislation changed the process from a topdown to a competitive bottom-up program, with more rapid wholesale 

transfer of assets into the private sector. 

Banking reform followed a similar course. In 1994 a new law, “On 

Banks and Banking Activities,” established procedures for forming statutory capital and specified the processes for: starting and terminating commercial bank activities, issuing and recalling licenses for bank audits, 

filing bankruptcies, and operating non-banking financial organizations. 

A new tax code took effect in January 1999, while a reform in the valueadded-tax (VAT) took effect in July. These improvements in tax policy and 

administration contributed to an improvement in government revenue 

in 1999. However, the practice of tax offsets remained a hindrance to full 
56 GLEASON

monetization of the economy.20 To enhance the role of the domestic currency, the Ministry of Finance started collecting all taxes in Tajik rubles in 

September 2000.

The Tajik government has made major efforts in its foreign trade 

sector through improvements in the public infrastructure for transport, 

communication and banking services. As these efforts succeed, they can be 

expected to exacerbate the trends in the region regarding organized crime 

and drug trafficking. Traffickers use legitimate transportation infrastructure and banking operations in order to move their wares and to conceal 

the funds derived from trade in handguns, weapons materials, drugs, drug 

precursors and drug production materials.

Mirroring the economic reform strategy, Tajikistan’s political reform 

strategy is extraordinarily complex. The growth of the Tajik economy has 

not created a class of “new Tajiks” in the way that Kazakhstan’s economic 

development has. Moreover, most of the political competition in Tajikistan takes place in the context of civil war. While the civil war seemed to 

center on ideology, in fact, the most significant dimensions of the dispute 

were regional, reflecting Tajik traditions of long-standing. The winners 

in the early years of reconciliation were the battlefield commanders who 

had sided with the Rahkmonov government. Gradually, members of this 

coalition broke up as the leader of the Hujand faction fell from favor. 

More recently, the country’s political leadership has distanced itself from 

this group as the political situation has grown more stable. What is not 

clearly understood is the degree to which the government has benefited 

directly or indirectly from the region’s drug trade revenues. Journalists 

have speculated on relations between government officials and the drug 

traffickers, but these accusations have proven to be ephemeral, in part, 

because Tajikistan for a time is one of the most dangerous countries in the 

world to be a journalist.21

Turkmenistan: The New Sultanate

Among the countries of Central Asia Turkmenistan has been the most 

resistant to the adoption of genuine structural reform. Those changes that 

have taken place have been, for the most part, directed at increasing the 

capacity of the state and in particular at enhancing the glory and authority 

of the country’s authoritarian president, Saparmurat Niyazov. Bordered by 

Iran and Afghanistan to the south, Kazakhstan to the north, Uzbekistan to 

the north and east, and the Caspian Sea to the west, Turkmenistan’s deserts 

dominate the country’s physical terrain. Turkmenistan is a country with 
POLITICAL REFORM 57

great potential for economic development but is constrained by physical 

circumstances and poor governance.

In mid 2001, Turkmenistan had an estimated population of 5.5 million people, growing at an annual rate of 1.3 percent.22 Turkmenistan’s 

workforce historically had been predominantly agricultural and service 

oriented. However, since independence, the service workforce has diminished in size and the agricultural workforce and industrial labor sectors 

have each grown by about 25 percent. Official statistical materials on 

economic activity, supplied by the Turkmenistan government, are viewed 

with skepticism by outside observers. According to the statistical data provided by the state, agricultural production is reported to have increased 

substantially in the years since independence, especially the production of 

food and forage crop. Cotton production also is reported to have increased 

sharply.

While agriculture is the largest employer in Turkmenistan, the country’s energy sector is the largest revenue earner. Because gas and oil sectors revenues are so closely related to Turkmenistan government revenues 

(with allegations that gas revenues have enriched individuals responsible 

for public decision making) and because those revenues are critical to 

Turkmenistan’s official credit rating, statistical reporting on the energy 

sector is an item of great sensitivity for the Turkmen government. The 

government began concealing production figures for natural gas in 1997, 

and some suggest actual output levels for gas and other forms of industrial 

production in the latter 1990s are considerably below 1991 pre-independence levels. Turkmenistan’s foreign trade figures are similarly unreliable. 

Thus, it is difficult to develop a clear picture of Turkmenistan’s balance 

of payments. There are indications that the 1998 financial crisis in Russia 

impacted heavily on Turkmenistan’s balance of payments, by leading to 

the cancellation of Russian gas orders along with delays in outstanding 

payments. Some evidence also shows that Turkmenistan ran a significant 

balance of payments deficit in recent years. Despite Turkmenistan’s great 

potential energy wealth, problems of administration and governance have 

prevented the country from fully benefiting from its natural resource 

base.

Turkmenistan’s first and only president, Saparmurat Niyazov, was 

the former first secretary of Turkmenistan’s communist party during the 

Soviet period. Until the Soviet collapse, Niyazov appeared to be a staunch 

communist, ideologically committed to the Soviet Union. However, as the 

Soviet Union began unraveling, Niyazov changed his ideological colors, 

assuming the position of a Turkmen nationalist. Like other Central Asian 
58 GLEASON

communist party leaders who suddenly became presidents of independent 

states, Niyazov was a public proponent of building a democratic, marketoriented state. Since independence, however, Turkmenistan’s progress in 

democratization has been negligible. Political authority is concentrated 

in the office of the president, with little legislative or judicial autonomy. 

Non-governmental civic initiative is routinely curtailed, and political 

opposition figures are isolated and excluded from the political process. 

Human rights abuses are frequent and severe. While Turkmenistan was 

ranked in the top fiftieth percentile in terms of political stability in 2001 

by the World Bank Institute governance indicators, the country scored in 

the bottom tenth percentile in the categories of regulatory quality, voice 

and accountability, and government effectiveness.23

Turkmenistan’s political reform strategy does not warrant the dignity of being called a reform strategy. The political leaders have done little 

more than to pay off friends and eliminate enemies. Any idea of reform 

ended with the assassination attempt on Niyazov’s life in late 2002.24 In the 

wake of this event, the country’s human rights situation has deteriorated 

markedly as the sole criterion for advancement in the society has become 

unquestioned loyalty to the country’s leader.

Uzbekistan: National Consolidation and Social 

Consensus

Uzbekistan, with an estimated population of 25.1 million people in 

mid 2001, has the highest rate of population growth among the Central 

Asian countries.25 Traditionally, Uzbekistan’s workforce has been oriented toward the largest sector of the economy, agriculture. However, 

over the past decade, while the agricultural workforce has continued to 

increase, the largest employment growth has occurred in light industry, 

food processing, and the service sector. Cotton remains the mainstay of 

Uzbekistan’s agriculture, but crop diversification has occurred as Uzbek 

agricultural officials, in response to the demand for more foodstuffs, have 

placed greater emphasis on the production of cereals and grains. Industrial 

diversification, reflecting market forces, also has taken place. Coal production has fallen substantially, while oil, natural gas and electricity production have increased. Although Russia traditionally has been Uzbekistan’s 

primary trading partner, the Uzbek government has sought to diversify its 

trade patterns. Uzbek foreign trade began to develop in the early 1990s, 

but the import of manufactured goods and luxury items led to trade 

deficits in 1996. To restrain the growth of this deficit, promote domestic 

production, and curb capital flight, the Uzbek government introduced im-
POLITICAL REFORM 59

port substitution measures in 1996. Between 1996 and 2001, Uzbekistan’s 

self-reliance measures profoundly impacted both its domestic and foreign 

markets.

Under the stern leadership of President Islam Karimov, the country’s 

first and only president and a former communist party chief, Uzbekistan 

has become a highly authoritarian state. The executive branch dominates 

the administration, the legislature and the judiciary. The activities of 

non-governmental civic organizations as well as the media are tightly 

monitored and controlled by the government. Fundamental freedoms of 

speech, association and political expression are similarly limited by the 

government. However, strident political opposition, fueled by insurgency 

movements originating during the Afghanistan war and in the Tajik civil 

conflict, has grown increasingly active over the past decade, breaking 

into violence in the late 1990s. In response to the growth of political opposition, the Uzbek government mounted significant counter-insurgency 

efforts, which have had the effect of stifling civil and human rights. The 

2001 World Bank Institute governance indicators ranked Uzbekistan in the 

bottom third percentile in all six key governance measures.26

Still, Uzbekistan’s political reform strategy has been the most successful in Central Asia in terms of supporting the political stability of the 

leadership. It remains to be seen though, if this strategy has succeeded in 

consolidating political support within the country. Critics of the Karimov 

regime claim that the government’s stress on the “Uzbek path” with its 

go-slow approach to macroeconomic structural reforms has undercut 

the expected benefits of true market liberalization. Uzbekistan’s strategy 

emphasizes: self-sufficiency in energy and food grains; the export of primary commodities, particularly cotton and gold; and the creation of an 

internally oriented services market. Fundamental reforms in agriculture, 

state enterprises, state procurement, and the financial sector, (including foreign exchange) have been postponed. The reforms that have been 

enacted primarily have benefited middle-level government officials who 

tend to support the Karimov regime. It is quite possible that the economic 

rationale of these policies was much less important than the political considerations.

In the mid-1990s, a significant political opposition emerged within 

Uzbekistan, fueled by popular dissatisfaction with stagnating incomes, 

government intervention in the economy, and a dearth of opportunities 

for meaningful participation in public affairs. As the Uzbek government 

consolidated political control during the mid-1990s with heavy-handed 

methods, some government opponents were drawn to Islam as a natural 
60 GLEASON

counterforce to the new regime. Seeing this development as a threat, the 

Uzbek government identified Islam with the political opposition and 

began a series of campaigns aimed at isolating and neutralizing opponents 

of the regime by branding them as criminals, Islamic political fanatics and 

terrorists. The counterinsurgency campaign cast a wide net, ensnaring 

both the regime’s legitimate and illegitimate opponents alike.

The situation in Uzbekistan changed dramatically following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. The American response 

led to the formation of an international coalition to remove the Taliban 

from power. The realignment of strategic purpose in the region brought 

Uzbekistan’s foreign policy closely into sync with the strategic policies of 

the United States in the region. This new coalition fundamentally altered 

Uzbekistan’s role in international affairs. Central Asia, with Uzbekistan at 

its center, once again became a hotly contested area, a “Great Game” for 

influence in Asia. The country’s prominent role in the U.S. formed international coalition brought Uzbekistan considerable international goodwill within the global diplomatic community. In March 2002, President 

Karimov met with President George W. Bush in Washington, D.C. and 

reaffirmed Uzbekistan’s commitment to accountable, democratic government, an open economy, and the observance of international standards of 

civil rights. The year 2002 also witnessed a series of visits to Uzbekistan by 

high-level diplomatic and military delegations from a number of countries 

and international organizations, culminating with the visit to Uzbekistan 

by United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan in October. Uzbekistan’s 

political reform strategy clearly had acquired an international dimension 

to complement the domestic. The Uzbek government’s increasing emphasis on the importance of conforming to international standards of practice 

created rising expectations for substantive change. 

Conclusions 

This survey of the structural reform policies pursued by the Central 

Asia republics since independence leads to a few general conclusions about 

the process of reform, and the role of deliberate government strategies in 

promoting it. The success in economic reforms has not been uniform, but 

it has been notable and in some countries, particularly Kazakhstan, significant. Economic reform strategies are never purely economic in the sense 

that they always entail some political consequences. Every reform strategy 

has a political aspect. 

Reform is not free of risk. One of the most significant consequences 

of the disintegration of communism was the steep decline in government 
POLITICAL REFORM 61

revenues. Since independence the new leaders of the post-communist 

states have faced rising public expectations and declining financial resources. Even those reform-oriented leaders who sought to conduct real 

reforms found financing reform to be more challenging than expected. 

Financing reform, in fact, may be the single most difficult task confronting 

the political leader in any country undertaking post-communist transition. To support the changes they favor, political leaders must somehow 

mobilize resources, and this usually entails winning supporters and neutralizing opponents. The experience of the Central Asian states illustrates 

the myriad compromises involved in carrying out economic and political 

reforms.

Notes1

 See Beverly Crawford, ed., Markets, States, and Democracy: The Political Economy of Post-Communist Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); Richard Pomfret, The Economies of Central 

Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995 NJ); and Roald Z. Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower, 

eds., Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution and Change (Chevy Chase: CPSS Press, 1995). 2

 Janos Kornai, The Socialist State: The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton: Princeton 

University Press, 1992). 3

 Strategy is defined here as way in which ends are brought into line with means. 

4

 Nursultan Nazarbaev, now president of Kazakhstan, is the former first secretary of the Kazakh 

republic communist party organization. Islam Karimov, now president of Uzbekistan, is the former 

first secretary of the Uzbek republic communist party organization. Saparmurat Niyazov, now president of Turkmenistan, is the former first secretary of the Turkmen republic communist party organization. Imomali Rakhmonov, now president of Tajikistan, is a former Kuliab region communist party 

official. His predecessor as president, Rakhmon Nabiev (who died under mysterious circumstances in 

May 1993), was the former first secretary of the Tajik republic communist party organization. Among 

the Central Asian leaders, only the president of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akaev, did not belong to the former 

party nomenklatura, although in some respects even Akaev, a physicist who was trained in Leningrad, 

can be considered a member of the Soviet intellectual elite. 5

 Freedom House is an international philanthropic research organization established in 1937 

by Eleanor Roosevelt. It has grown to become one of the world’s most respected research organizations 

on subjects of human rights and governance standards. 6

 The Freedom House Annual Surveys measure progress toward democratic ideals on a sevenpoint scale for political rights and for civil liberties (with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least 

free). Changes in countries’ scores from year to year are monitored via annual surveys. The political 

rights measurement addresses the degree of free and fair elections, competitive political parties, opposition with an important role and power, freedom from domination by a powerful group (e.g. military, 

foreign power, totalitarian parties), and participation by minority groups. The civil liberties measurement addresses the degree to which there is a free and independent media; freedom of discussion, 

assembly and demonstration; freedom of political organization; equality under the law; protection 

from political terror, unjustified imprisonment and torture; free trade unions, professional and private 

organizations; freedom of religion; personal social freedoms; equality of opportunity; and freedom 

from extreme government corruption.
62 GLEASON

7

 The basic axioms of the Westphalian international system, following Grotius (1583-1645), 

assert that all states enjoy national sovereignty, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and the right of 

non-interference in domestic affairs. 8

 Nursultaqn Nazarbaev, Kazakhstan-2030: Prosperity, Security and Ever Growing Welfare of all 

the Kazakhstanis (Almaty: Ylim, 1997). 9

 The expression “Kazakhstan government,” as opposed to “Kazakh government,” is sometimes 

used to avoid the implication of ethnicity. While ethnic Kazakhs make up more than a majority of the 

country’s population, other ethnic groups, including Russians, Ukrainians, Koreans, and many others, 

also make up the country’s citizenry. To use the term Kazakh government, some observers contend, 

implies a “government of Kazakhs.” One convention that has been adopted to avoid this problem is to 

refer to the “Kazakhstani government.” This expression does seem to imply generality and thus refers 

to the “government of Kazakhstan citizens.” However, the Kazakh language is a Turkic language, and 

the “ani” suffix is Persian in origin, not Turkic. Persian is not spoken in Kazakhstan. The expression, 

therefore, does not represent an indigenous form. In this chapter, for the sake of simplicity, I simply 

refer to the governments by the national names. I intend no ethnic exclusiveness with this convention. 10 Sally N. Cummings, Kazakhstan: Centre-Periphery Relations (London: The Royal Institute of 

International Affairs, 2000). 11 One celebrated critique appears in the work of the former Chief Economist of the World 

Bank who came to see the international financial institutions’ policies as counterproductive. See Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002). 12 Population Reference Bureau 2001 World Population Data Sheet. Available on-line at www.

prb.org. 13 Assessment materials on civil and human rights are drawn from the annual and periodic 

reports produced by Amnesty International, Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, and from the 

annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices issued by the U.S. Department of State. See in 

particular the annual compilation on human and civil rights in post-communist countries, Nations 

in Transit. Nations in Transit appears annually under the editorship of Alexander J. Motyl, Arch Puddington, and Amanda Schnetzer and is published by Longman Publishers. 14 See the Governance Research Indicators Dataset maintained by the Governance Group at 

the World Bank Institute. These indicators are available on the internet at the World Bank’s site (www.

worldbank.org). 15 International Monetary Fund, “Republic of Tajikistan: Recent Economic Developments,” 

IMF Staff Country Report no. 00/27 (March 2000), 50. 16 “UNHCR Report on Tajikistan,” “January 1993-March 1996”; United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, May 1996, 4. Also see “Return to Tajikistan, Continued Regional and Ethnic 

Tensions,” Human Rights Watch/Helsinki (HRW/H), 7, no. 9, (May 1995), 4-7. 17 The ranking in the Human Development Index of the UN Human Development Report in 

1997 was 115; in 1998 it was 118. Tajikistan rose in the 1999 HDI rank to 108. The 2000 HDI ranking 

was 110. 18 IMF, “Republic of Tajikistan—Recent Economic Developments,” IMF Staff Country Reports 

no. 96/55 (July 8, 1996). 19 IMF, “Republic of Tajikistan—Recent Economic Developments,” IMF Staff Country Reports 

no. 98/16 (February 11, 1998). 20 Tax offsets occur when enterprises that supply the government with goods and services are 

not paid in cash but in compensating reductions of tax payments. Non-monetized transactions are 

more likely to lack transparency than cash transactions. 21 See Attacks on the Press in 1999 (New York: The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), 

2000). 22 Population Reference Bureau, “2001 World Population Data Sheet.” Available on-line at 

www.prb.org.
POLITICAL REFORM 63

23 Governance Research Indicators Dataset maintained by the Governance Group at the World 

Bank Institute (<www.worldbank.org>). 24 Although official accounts are contradictory, the Turkmenistan government has claimed that 

four former government ministers organized an armed attack on the Turkmen president on November 

25, 2002. A group of gunmen were said to have fired shots at the President’s motorcade after a truck 

blocked the path of the president’s car. The following day, the Turkmenistan government claimed to 

have arrested 16 people in connection with the assassination attempt. On December 2, the General 

Prosecutor, Gurbanbibi Atajanova, announced that 23 people had been arrested for involvement in the 

coup attempt. According to Atajanova, the government discovered proof that former Foreign Minister 

Boris Shikhmuradov masterminded the assassination plot from Russia in order to take political power 

himself. On December 18, Atajanova provided a public report on Turkmenistan national television in 

which she detailed a sequence of events and claimed that Boris Shikhmuradov directed the assassination attempt from inside Turkmenistan. She further claimed he had entered the country November 23, 

from Uzbekistan, with the help of the Uzbek Ambassador to Turkmenistan, Abdurashid Kadyrov. The 

report claimed that Shikhmuradov, together with other conspirators, remained in hiding in the Uzbek 

Embassy until December 7. On December 24, a website under the direction of Shikhmuradov issued 

a statement which claimed that Shikhmuradov had been in Turkmenistan since September 2002. On 

December 25, Turkmen President Niyazov announced that Boris Shikhmuradov had been captured. 

Four days later, Turkmen national television aired footage of Shikhmuradov in a purported confession 

admitting to masterminding the assassination attempt. A chilling account of these events is available 

in Emmanuel Decaux, “OSCE Rapporteur’s Report on Turkmenistan,” OSCE Office for Democratic 

Institutions and Human Rights (March 12, 2003). 25 Population Reference Bureau, “2001 World Population Data Sheet.” Available on-line at 

www.prb.org. 26 See the Governance Research Indicators Dataset maintained by the Governance Group at the 

World Bank Institute. These indicators are available on the internet at the World Bank site (<www.

worldbank.org>).
64 GLEASON
LEGAL REFORM 65

65

Chapter 4 

Legal Reform in 

Central Asia: Battling the 

Influence of History

Roger D. Kangas

For much of the past decade, discussions of legal reform in Central 

Asia have been couched in terms of “Soviet-era versus Western approaches” with respect to how laws are codified and how improvements might be made. More fundamental to the current debates and the 

problems facing the Central Asian states in the twenty-first century is the 

influence of pre-Soviet tradition on the contemporary legal environment.1

Specifically, the region must resolve the contradiction inherent in the impersonal nature of codified law, and the fluid, personal aspect of the current power relationships that reflect long-held traditions in the region.

Lack of true reform in countries such as Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan has created relatively high levels of mistrust, doubt, and concern 

among the respective populations, thus weakening the ability of states to 

carry out their constitutional and legal duties. This was a problem that 

faced great unifiers of the past, such as Tamerlane.2 The notion of creating 

a strong state structure and a concurrent legal environment was of utmost 

importance to this medieval leader of Central Asia. His contemporary 

counterparts face similar problems. Adherence to the law, as such, is 

tainted by mistrust among the general population and capricious violations by those supposedly charged with enforcing it.

This chapter is an effort to assess the developmental level of legal regimes in the five Central Asian states. When discussing such broad notions 

as legal reform, one must be mindful of defining terms. In this instance, 

the focus will be on the notion of rule of law, which can be defined as the 

ability to abide by an external, abstract set of norms that allow members 

of a society to co-exist. When there are disputes, the parties involved seek 

solutions through a mechanism framed by these very norms. The empiri-
66 KANGAS

cal evaluation of constitutions, legal and criminal codes, and the ability of 

law enforcement agencies to abide by such measures are fundamental.3 In 

evaluating the legal aspect of the Central Asian states, the basic developments of these concepts in Central Asian society will be outlined. With 

independence, the Central Asian governments had to quickly create their 

own structures, the products of which were largely follow-on measures 

from the previous era. However, in the past decade some changes of note 

have occurred, providing a modest base for comparison of the respective 

developmental paths of the five Central Asian states. Finally, the current 

challenges to true legal reform in the region will be assessed and the efforts of foreign assistance measures designed to address these concerns 

outlined. While the governments of Central Asia have been self-congratulatory in their own assessments of legal reform at home, the reality appears 

to be different.

Legal Antecedents

Central Asia has had a long history of legalism and legal studies. 

Documents and books showing early efforts at creating rule of law are 

often on display in national museums in Central Asia.4 Unfortunately, 

intertwined with the tradition of legal scholarship in the region are the 

results of despotism that prevailed for the past half-millennium. It was 

often the case that rather complex legal codes repeatedly were flaunted by 

ruling houses or dynasties at various times. This tension between “rule of 

law” and the absolute authority of the ruler is key to understanding legal 

traditions in Central Asia.

Given the rich history of the region, it is no surprise to find many 

layers of legal structures, political entities, and the interpretative framework for them. These influences have been both positive and negative, and 

reflect the tension between the need to standardize law and the ability of 

leaders to assert their own authority. While this tension parallels events in 

Europe throughout the past two millennia, unique aspects of the Central 

Asian environment ensured that the outcome would be different. Moreover, these differences themselves are often difficult for outsiders to fully 

understand, as they reflect cultural patterns specific to the region. These 

developments have been visible in both the pre-Russian and Russian/

Soviet eras, which have provided their own lasting legacies to Central 

Asian legal thought.
LEGAL REFORM 67

The Pre-Russian Legacy

It is impossible to assess thoroughly the pre-Russian legal tradition 

in Central Asia in a few pages. However, several key points can be stressed, 

as noted by past works on this subject.5 One can point to four specific 

waves of influence in the pre-Russian era: Islamic, Mongol, Timurid and 

Emirate/Khanate. Each of these periods created potential frameworks for 

legal discourse and action, but at the same time gave significant latitude to 

the ruling elite and, ultimately, the leader.

Islamic

First of all, in accounts of pre-Soviet Central Asia, a strong emphasis on the role of Islam is present in the creation of political and societal 

relationships. The adherence to the Muslim faith was, and remains, the 

cornerstone of interpersonal interaction. Law, as a system of governance, 

was rooted in the Islamic tradition introduced to the region as early as 

the late-600s A.D., but really took root when the region was consolidated 

a century later. Unlike past invaders, the Muslim forces of the eighth and 

ninth centuries sought to do more than simply conquer territory. As an 

example, when Alexander the Great traveled through Central Asia in the 

third century B.C. and subdued regional potentates, his goal was to pacify 

the region for territorial and financial gain, before proceeding to the next 

target of opportunity. He did not consider instilling new legal codes or 

frameworks within the region.6 In contrast, the Islamic invasion of the 

eighth century A.D. involved the actual conversion of communities and 

the total restructuring of belief and fealty systems. As happened in other 

territories conquered by Muslim armies, there was a fundamental understanding that Islam as a way of life would dominate, replacing what existed 

prior to its arrival.7

From a legal perspective, the central element of Islamic tradition 

in the region was Shari’at law. Based upon a mix of sources, such as the 

Qu’ran, hadith and subsequent documents, Shari’at law was, and remains, 

an evolving concept.8 Indeed, over the centuries, differences of interpretation within the Muslim community have arisen. Such law was critical in 

the settled regions of Bukhara, Khiva and other oases communities, as 

these were more regulated than nomadic regions. Bukhara and Samarkand, in particular, became centers of Islamic jurisprudence and learning 

for the entire Muslim world in the tenth and eleventh centuries. What was 

created in these cities eventually was applied to the surrounding region. 

However, as time passed, these cities represented a much more conserva-
68 KANGAS

tive and unreformed interpretation of Islam, especially as Central Asia was 

cut off from most of the Sunni Muslim world by the sixteenth century.9

The above sequence of events was particularly important to the 

settled regions of Central Asia. In contrast, the nomadic communities in 

Central Asia, while incorporating some aspects of Islamic law into their 

legal codes, also relied heavily on existing traditional measures. Called by 

different names, such practices often were honed to reflect the specific 

needs and communal priorities of a given group. The most common term 

used was Adat, which is often called customary law. Adat was regulated 

through precedent and past practices.10 Moreover, it took into account 

differences between tribal and clan grouping, with the variations found 

among Kazakh, Uighur, Kyrgyz and Turkmen clans. Power of arbitration 

often rested in the hands of a particular individual (the bey among the 

Kazakhs, for example).

Overall, the Islamic influence created a framework for Central Asia 

within which legal issues could be evaluated and discussed. It also linked 

the region to the broader, outside world and afforded legitimacy to the 

ruling elite. After all, if this elite could structure its authority under the 

auspices of Islam, the population could not legitimately seek an alternative form of government. The significance of Islam was thus profound: It 

offered both a way in which people could interact within society and also 

provided justifications for the form of government that dominated the 

region.

Mongol

The thirteenth century saw the introduction of the Mongolian public 

administrative system, the longer-lasting influence of the invasion and 

conquest by the armies of Genghis Khan.11 The great Khan introduced 

to the region a form of public administration that permitted a rather 

thin layer of Mongolian, Turkic and Chinese bureaucrats to rule over 

vast swaths of territory. For the next two centuries, the Mongol empire 

gradually broke up into a number of sub-regions, with Central Asia falling under the authority of Genghis Khan’s son Chaghatai. The Chaghatai 

dynasty ruled Central Asia until the beginning of the fifteenth century.12

During this period, the basic concepts of Islamic jurisprudence survived, but were subsumed under Mongol law. The reality of having such a 

far-reaching empire meant that at local levels, autonomy was allowed. As 

long as the subjects in the region paid their taxes and supported the larger 

empire at specific times, they were left alone. The Mongols were the first 

major empire in the region where the center of power was a significant 
LEGAL REFORM 69

distance away from Central Asia, and thus required the employment of 

indigenous bureaucrats and lawgivers. Ultimately, this proved to be the 

undoing of Mongol control over Central Asia.

Timurid

The collapse of the Mongol empire’s hold over Central Asia in the 

fifteenth century was due primarily to the rise of Tamerlane also known as 

Timur the Lame.13 The historic significance of this period is less a case of 

how the legal framework changed, as to how its legitimacy was articulated. 

For the most part, the Timurids adopted the same structure as their predecessors. The successive reigns of Shah Rukh and Ulugh Beg saw a greater 

emphasis on reinforcing Islamic precepts into the legal framework.

Perhaps more important was that legal authority was indigenous 

and not dependent upon an outside power. For the first time in almost 

700 years, the seat of power and the cultural roots of authority were from 

Central Asia itself. Interestingly, the Timurid dynasty exemplified the same 

caprice and omnipotent power that previous leaders had.14 This was because there remained the strong belief that the ruler was above the law, and 

that the personal qualities of Central Asian leadership were paramount. 

However, even today’s scholars note that this shift of legal authority from 

an outside source to a local one was a critical step forward for legal developments in the region. Though the Timurid period is often cast as one 

mired in violence and expansion, the very survival of the state depended 

on a cohesive legal regime.

Khanate/Emirate

Barely 100 years later, the unified, Timurid political system came 

crashing down. The armies of Shaybani Khan sacked the key cities of Samarkand and Bukhara and drove the Timurid dynasty out of the region. 

Babur, who was the ruler at the time, eventually re-established his authority in the South Asian subcontinent, founding what was to become the 

Moghul dynasty. Within Central Asia, Shaybani Khan was unable to solidify his authority over the entire region, and competing political entities 

soon emerged. Thus began an era of fragmented Khanates and Emirates 

in Central Asia.15

With the demise of any unifying force, rule of law also was fragmented. Dynastic leaders ruled the key political entities in Central Asia. 

Writers and poets of the succeeding centuries noted, often with despair, 

the lawlessness that prevailed across the region.16 Indeed, intellectuals 

from Bukhara found reason to criticize the form of government in the 
70 KANGAS

state, hoping to reform the system to reflect a more legally sound system. 

This was particularly true in the late-nineteenth century, when the rulers of the Emirate of Bukhara were Muzaffar al-Din and Abd al-Ahad.17

In short, while a written and precedent-based tradition of rule of law in 

Central Asia existed prior to the Russian conquest, it remained at odds 

with the political reality of the time. Ultimately, law became a mere shell 

for despotic rule.

The Jadidist movement exemplified the pressure for political and 

legal reform in Bukhara and Khiva. Much has been written on the competing reform agendas of the Jadids.18 Even the more conservative members 

of this movement advocated a change in the current legal regime in the 

protectorates. Whether it was a return to traditional Shari’a law or the 

introduction of Western (Russian) law, the consensus view was that the 

very nature of political power in the region was an impediment to order 

and progress. Because of the absolute authority of the Emir of Bukhara 

and Khan of Khiva, such reform efforts ultimately failed. Consequently, up 

through the Russian Revolutions of 1917, the legal reformers of Central 

Asia often remained in exile.

Russian and Soviet-era Law

For the present-day regimes in Central Asia, the Russian and Soviet 

eras hold special significance. The existing legal structures in the region 

are products of what transpired during this period, as is the current 

generation of political officials and legal experts. The institutional arrangements that developed were at odds with the traditional notions of 

law cited earlier, but in numerous instances, one finds a merger of such 

concepts and an accommodation of traditional forms of authority within 

the new Russian, and then Soviet, legal regime.

Imperial Russia

The territories fully incorporated in the Russian Empire saw a more 

forceful introduction of Russian law. The protectorates of Bukhara and 

Khiva, on the other hand, were able to rely on their own traditions. From 

the Russian perspective, the feeling was that Russian law was superior to 

local custom and law; however, the general policy allowed local law to exist 

in certain cases.19 As Russian political structures were established in the 

region—particularly in the area of today’s Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 

and parts of northern Uzbekistan—the Russian overlords had to decide 

the extent to which local law would prevail. These regions, designated 
LEGAL REFORM 71

Turkestan and Transcaspia, saw the development of Russian law not only 

for Russian subjects, but also for the indigenous population.

The application of law was always a challenge, as noted by evaluations coming from St. Petersburg. In the 1880s and again in the early 1900s, 

commissions were sent from St. Petersburg to evaluate the colonial rule in 

the region. For example, the Giers Commission of 1882 focused on how 

effective public administration could develop where there was a dearth of 

qualified officials and a lack of proper funding.20 Most critically assessed 

was the notion that bureaucrats resorted to relying on traditional, and 

often corrupt, forms of governance.

Bukhara and Khiva, the two remaining protectorates, remained 

stagnant in their own personality-based systems.21 The frustration experienced by reform-minded individuals in these territories prompted some 

to find common cause with various revolutionary and reformist groups in 

Russia itself, including the radical Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social 

Democratic and Labor Party—the precursor to the Communist Party of 

the Soviet Union (CPSU).22 Thus, ironically, the Jadidist reformers came 

to the conclusion that external assistance would most likely be required to 

enact change in their countries—and they sought assistance from groups 

that would eventually result in their downfall.23 Naturally, there were critical debates within the reformist community and a significant number did 

not side with the Bolsheviks, either joining the local insurgencies24 against 

the Red Army or simply emigrating.

The Soviet Period

The Soviet era actually began with a nod towards local custom. It 

was not until the mid-1920s that various diktats were announced which 

folded local courts and juridical proceedings into the Soviet experience.25

By the 1930s, the Central Asia region was under Soviet control, although 

this continued to be a struggle for Soviet officials in the ensuing decades. 

The tension between trying to enforce objective legal codes and the reality 

of personal rule continued through this period, often with tragic results. 

Soviet publications and contemporary studies are replete with accounts 

of how the Soviet government tried to quickly institute their own legal 

norms in the region. From the initial “unveiling” campaign in the 1920s, 

which advocated that women should remove their traditional veils as a 

sign of modernity, to the legal restrictions placed on Islamic organizations, the Soviet leaders sought to radically transform the concept of law 

in Central Asia.26
72 KANGAS

In the beginning, the Soviet leaders were keen to introduce law as a 

form of social engineering and development. As noted by Peter Solomon 

in his work on Soviet law, the ramifications were legion. Law played several key roles: it was an explanation of socialist legality, it possessed an 

educational function, and it legitimized the new economic system that was 

being put in place. It was imperative to ensure that the population understood how and why the centrally planned economic system was necessary. 

Indeed, economic crimes were often considered more severe than crimes 

of violence, with a greater share of capital punishment decisions made for 

embezzlement, forgery and bribery.27

While varying in practical importance, “socialist law and order” (sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost’ i pravoporiadok) was the defining framework 

during most of the Soviet period. During the 1920s and 1930s, Stalin 

flaunted these laws and the notion that a legal structure was in place 

seemed dubious at best. The arbitrary nature of the Great Purge has been 

well documented, and it was the object of Soviet legal reform in the 1950s 

and 1960s, when there was an attempt to return to “Soviet law.” Central 

Asia experienced all of these shifts within the Soviet system. In reaction to 

the Stalinist era, the emphases on institutions and frameworks were critical to the Soviet leaders. For example, in 1987, the CPSU Central Committee adopted a resolution entitled “On Measures to Increase the Role 

of the Prosecutor’s Oversight in Strengthening Socialist Legality and Law 

and Order.” Such cumbersome measures were designed to specify how the 

Procuracy, for example, could carry out its duties.28

Because of its subservient place in the Soviet Union, Central Asia did 

not become a source of reform or opposition. For the most part it was a 

passive participant in these discussions—with one important exception. 

During the Brezhnev era, there was a return to the sort of administrative 

policies that existed during the Mongol and Imperial Russian periods—

one of demanding fealty and loyalty from the region while simultaneously 

leaving the internal workings of the region to the devices of the local leaders.29 Up through the Gorbachev reforms of the 1980s, there were varying 

interpretations of the extent to which this de facto autonomy existed.

Contrast of Traditional and Soviet Structures

It was the emphasis on institutions and structures within the Soviet 

system that created problems for the Central Asians. Ultimately, the role 

of personalities remained important in Central Asia, in spite of measures 

adopted during the Soviet period. Highlighting the problems on Soviet 

law in the region was the “Cotton Scandal” of the 1980s, often referred to 
LEGAL REFORM 73

as the “Uzbek Affairs.” In it, Soviet investigators uncovered a widespread 

corruption network in the Central Asian republic of Uzbekistan that involved government officials fabricating cotton production figures. By recording higher-than-actual numbers for cotton harvests, extra income was 

provided to local officials. Scores of top officials in the Uzbek S.S.R. were 

indicted, tried and punished for a range of economic crimes centering 

around the misrepresentation of data on annual cotton harvests. Indeed, 

First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, Sharaf Rashidov, was suspected of being the key figure in this scandal, but his death in November 

1983 pre-empted any trial or serious investigation.30 However, the longterm damage of this event was that it pitted the Russian perception of local 

adherence to law (or the lack thereof) with the Uzbek feeling that law was 

really a tool of the Russians to repress the local community.31

The Gorbachev reform agenda further exacerbated tensions in the 

region vis-à-vis Moscow. Not only did Gorbachev replace key leaders in 

the republics, but he also stressed the need to combat lawlessness and corruption in Central Asia. Indeed, the stereotype within the Soviet Union 

of Central Asians as being lazy and corrupt had fallen to a new low. The 

legacy of the cotton scandal and Russian view of the archaic clan relations 

that permeated the systems in the region only worsened the situation.32

Limited attempts were made in 1989 and 1990 to reform the entire Soviet 

legal framework, divorcing it from communist ideology. However, any 

lasting impact was cut short as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet 

Union in 1991.

At the time of independence, the Central Asian states found themselves in difficult situations with respect to the legal regimes in the newly 

created countries. Previously, legislation had been dictated from the 

central government, with such efforts not being trusted. Now, the burden 

was on the new national governments to establish order. But serious questions faced these states: Should there be a return to past legal frameworks? 

Did this require a reconsideration of Islamic law? How did one factor in 

traditional custom, or even the historic legacies of individuals such as 

Tamerlane? These questions became the subject of discussion and debate 

within the region and among Western scholars, shaping the understanding 

of legal reform in Central Asia. As will be seen, each state approached these 

questions with great trepidation and concern, mainly as there was a sense 

that too much reform could lead to political and social instability.
74 KANGAS

Respective Frameworks of Legal Regimes 

in Central Asia

Common to all five Central Asian states was the suddenness of independence. Initial legal structures were often replications of the existing 

Soviet models. When reforms along Western lines were introduced, one 

saw slight divergence from the foundations of socialist legalism. However, 

the extent to which these new legal norms were adopted varied, often with 

a gap between what was on paper and what took place in practice. In the 

past decade, all five countries of Central Asia have introduced distinct 

structures, such as constitutions, legal codes and procedures for law enforcement agencies. At the same time, there are difficult challenges, including the forms of leadership, corruption and an inability or lack of desire by 

officials to actually enforce these very codes. Not surprisingly, the extent 

to which a given country has been able to develop legal reforms depends 

upon a number of internal dynamics.

Kazakhstan

Communist Party of Kazakhstan First Secretary Nursultan Nazarbaev assumed the position of “President of the Kazakh S.S.R.” in the 

waning months of the Soviet Union and has remained in office ever 

since. An erstwhile supporter of Gorbachev’s reform agenda in the 1980s, 

Nazarbaev took on the public persona of a reformer himself.33 As a result, 

there was a flurry of legislation in the early-1990s that suggested a real effort to transition from an authoritarian communist party system to one 

based on rule of law.34 He presented an initial constitution in 1993 and 

electoral laws in 1994 that supported a more vibrant notion of political 

pluralism. These provided a template for diversifying power and authority within the Kazakhstani political and legal system. Indeed, the electoral 

laws may have been too successful, for the legislature began to challenge 

Nazarbaev’s reform measures and sought to introduce their own.

By 1995, it was clear that the country was not developing into a democracy. The constitution had been re-written and extensive legislative reform was enacted in that year under the auspices of correcting potentially 

corruptive rules and regulations. In addition, the constitutional reform 

was carried out in order to minimize the importance of the legislature, 

which could have developed as a base of opposition to the president.35 To 

his critics, it was obvious that Nazarbaev passed criminal codes directed 

against his opponents and created legal support for maintaining his tenure 

in office.
LEGAL REFORM 75

Eventually, attention was directed at a broader range of legal issues. 

The 1997 criminal code currently sets the framework for legal actions in 

the country.36 For the most part, it remains a hybrid document, including 

some of the Soviet-era rights and responsibilities, as well as new concepts 

introduced from Western advisors and programs. These include the rights 

of citizens, criminal procedures, the rights of the detained, and other basic 

measures. Questions continue to arise as to how these are to be enforced. 

Either the wording is sufficiently vague, or the responsibilities of law enforcement agencies are simply not spelled out. Perhaps most troubling 

from a structural perspective is that the legal system is exclusively an 

executive branch prerogative. The Interior Ministry, which houses the 

police and security forces, is responsible for upholding the law. On occasion, these forces are unaware of legislative changes and ignore acts by the 

legislature. Law enforcement officials continually stress that they do not 

have the resources sufficient to fight real corruption and crime. When one 

sees police officials signaling cars for inspection at major intersections in 

Almaty in order to extort money from the motorists, it is clear that corruption hits at all levels of the law enforcement community.37

In addition to these structural challenges, other problems remain. 

While a legal regime exists in the country, the personal rule of President 

Nazarbaev remains paramount, and he has repeatedly used the legal system 

to undermine his political opposition. The apogee of these attacks came 

in 2001, when former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin was tried in 

abstentia for crimes ranging from corruption to abuse of power. Another 

individual who was targeted in recent years is the former Akim (Governor) 

of Pavlodar Oblast, Galymzhan Jakianov. Charged and convicted on corruption charges in 2002, Jakianov had reportedly challenged Nazarbaev on 

a number of procedural issues, specifically that Akims should be directly 

elected and not appointed by the President.38

In sum, legal reform in Kazakhstan is at a crossroads. After an initial 

flurry of activity and a de-Sovietization of the legal language, it is still difficult to conclude that the country has a strong sense of rule of law. Arbitrary enforcement, irregular funding of police and a leadership system that 

encourages the outright flaunting of the law by top officials underscore 

the range of problems that still confront Kazakhstan. That these issues are 

at least being discussed in the country is an indicator that reform is possible; however, recent signs are less than hopeful.
76 KANGAS

The Kyrgyz Republic 

Perhaps the most intriguing case of legal reform in the 1990s was 

the Kyrgyz Republic. Once cast as a showcase success story for the region, 

the government of President Askar Akaev received extensive support 

from international aid organizations and foreign governments to create 

an island of democracy in Central Asia. For much of the 1990s, foreign 

analysts continued to support this belief.39 However, electoral missteps in 

the late-1990s and a series of attacks on opponents to the president soured 

this belief.

Compared to the other states in the region, the Kyrgyz Republic does 

have a more developed sense of rule of law. The Kyrgyz legislature adopted 

its first post-Soviet constitution in 1993, a document praised by numerous 

outside organizations and governments as being the most progressive in 

Central Asia.40 Citizenship is not restricted by language competency or ethnicity, and basic rights of speech, assembly, religion, movement and even 

ownership of private property are all noted. It took another five years, but 

a completely new criminal code has been introduced in the country. Up to 

that point, a hybrid of Soviet-era and new measures were in place. In the 

new code, particular attention is paid to what the courts, procurators and 

law enforcement agencies can and cannot do. For the latter, detailed restrictions on search and seizure, detentions and arrests, and even evidence 

handling are provided.41 The new code represents certain innovations that 

have taken place in the areas of law enforcement and prosecution. The 

court system that was established is based on a prosecutorial model more 

in line with European countries than the former Soviet Union.

Similar to the situation in Kazakhstan, the reality is somewhat less 

encouraging. Ethnic minorities, especially the Uighurs, claim that they are 

purposefully targeted in police actions. In addition, they complain of unfair practices in employment and advancement in the government sector 

and in state-owned business. The sense of being second class citizens permeates such groups. Some, such as the Russians, Ukrainians and Germans, 

have left for their home countries. The government has made gestures to 

these groups by creating societies that can channel interests in cultural 

events and educational institutions, but these are often underfunded and 

poorly supported.42 Religious groups, in particular, feel pressure directed 

at them as part of the global war on terrorism. As a result of the actions in 

Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks in the United States, Kyrgyz officials have stepped up their own measures against suspected terror-
LEGAL REFORM 77

ist supporters in the country. Not surprisingly, this approach has targeted 

ethnic minorities and religious-based organizations.

Another noticeable shortcoming in the country’s rule of law is that 

key opposition figures remain subject to harassment. Daniyar Usenov 

and Feliks Kulov are undoubtedly the most celebrated cases, but other 

activists are targeted as well. These individuals have voiced their opposition to President Akaev’s administration and have questioned the reform 

measures enacted in the past decade. These figures were not allowed to 

run in the 2000 presidential election on dubious, technical grounds, thus 

Akaev avoided a situation where he might not actually continue in office.43

In fact, President Akaev repeatedly has used the legal system to target opponents and have them declared ineligible to stand for office. In addition, 

Zamira Eschanova, the editor of Res Publica, periodically spends time in 

jail for her articles criticizing the president, proving the fact that the media 

has limits, as well.

This emphasis on protecting the reputation of the president underscores an emerging trend in the country: the elevation of the status of 

Askar Akaev to that of supreme leader. While his authority is perhaps less 

secure than that of his neighbor, Nazarbaev, it is apparent that Akaev is 

not above obviating the rule of law to strengthen his position. As he maneuvers through restrictions on running for an additional term in office 

in 2004, it is likely that he will be declared immune from all prosecution if, 

or when, he eventually steps down as president.

Uzbekistan

Unlike the governments of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, 

Uzbekistan was reticent to accept Western assistance in attempting legal 

reform. Indeed, when the Uzbek constitution was under review for ratification by the Oliy Majlis (legislature), an external panel of the American 

Bar Association was given barely a week to assess, evaluate and make 

recommendations on the document. The constitution was accepted in 

December 1992, without including any of their cursory comments. As 

with the other Central Asian states, the Uzbek constitution lists a range 

of freedoms: speech, religion, assembly, property ownership, and the like. 

In an effort to stress the multi-ethnic nature of Uzbek society, the right to 

express one’s national heritage is also enshrined in the constitution.44

The current criminal code was enacted in 1994, with several amendments and additions taking place since that time. In 1998, the code was 

overhauled and the death penalty restricted for certain types of crimes. 

Further reforms took place in late-2001 and punishments were reduced for 
78 KANGAS

many non-violent crimes. Given troubles with the Islamic Movement for 

Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb ut-Tahrir and the conflict in Afghanistan, crimes 

related to acts of terrorism were given high priority, and are currently the 

only ones permitting capital punishment.45 In the years after the Afghan 

campaign, the government has expressed a sense of being under siege.

Structurally, the Uzbek judicial system is quite comprehensive. A 

Constitutional Court oversees the legality of parliamentary laws and 

executive decrees, a Supreme Court is the highest court for criminal and 

civil cases, and a Supreme Economic Court oversees matters such as privatization law, foreign investment and monetary disputes. The court system 

exists at multiple levels, with local level courts and appellate equivalents 

at regional and wiloyat (state) levels. Ostensibly, one can appeal cases to 

higher levels, much along the lines of the U.S. court system.46

Since independence, Uzbekistan has followed a path of solidifying 

the power of the executive, creating a rather feeble legislature, and establishing a legal code that is impressive on paper, but has enough loopholes 

to allow the government to do as it wishes. For example, the president is 

now above reproach with respect to prosecution, and those who criticize 

him are subject to investigation and trial. More important, with respect to 

the rule of law, the president has the ability to override Oliy Majlis decisions and circumvent normal legislative procedures if he deems it necessary. Rule by decree has been the norm for much of the past decade.

Perhaps the most common criticisms leveled against the Uzbek notion of rule of law is that it is arbitrary and that law enforcement agencies 

enact it with varying levels of excess. The government arrested thousands 

of individuals following the February 1999 bombings in Tashkent, often 

holding them for weeks and months before pressing charges. Human 

Rights Watch, a non-governmental organization that focuses on human 

rights conditions worldwide, has been particularly vocal on Uzbekistan’s 

record. Years after the February bombings, some individuals still remain 

in custody and have yet to be officially charged. Once an individual is 

charged, trials have become difficult to monitor and it appears that irregular standards are being used time and again.47

The Interior Ministry, which is responsible for the prison system in 

Uzbekistan, has been accused of being responsible for numerous deaths 

of prisoners under suspicious circumstances. These prisoners range from 

individuals suspected of being Islamic extremists to secular political opponents, most of whom find themselves in the Jaslyk prison, located in the 

far western reaches of the country. More recently, Human Rights Watch 
LEGAL REFORM 79

reported additional cases of mistreatment and persecution of secular opposition figures.48

The problem of Uzbek human rights abuses has been the topic of 

several protests by foreign Ambassadors to the country, most notably the 

Ambassadors from the United Kingdom and the United States. Of particular concern has been that Uzbekistan is of strategic importance to the 

United States. Human rights groups have often said that Uzbekistan is now 

using this connection to shield its own abusive policies. On the other hand, 

several amnesties of prisoners have taken place in recent years and it seems 

that the Uzbek government is being more receptive to the criticisms levied 

against it by the international community.49

As with the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan, the presidential system 

of Uzbekistan dominates the country’s political process, ultimately affecting the notion of rule of law. As in the other two states, Uzbek leaders tend 

to act as if personal connections and influence are much more important 

than impersonal laws. The fact that Uzbekistan was never considered to 

be a bastion of reform actually might help it in the near future, for unlike in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, the international community 

still has some interest in seeing if reforms can take place. Indeed, the U.S. 

government expressed this argument in the early-2000s.

Turkmenistan

Without question, the most dubious legal regime in Central Asia 

belongs to Turkmenistan. As with the other countries, a constitution and 

basic legal code were adopted in the first few years. Much of this was a direct regurgitation of the Soviet-era documents, replete with the same flowery verbiage. The reality remains much the same—rule of law is arbitrarily 

honored and the government itself does not abide by these documents.

The current constitution was ratified in May 1992. Not surprisingly, 

it harkens to the 1977 Soviet constitution with its emphasis on citizen 

responsibilities, as opposed to rights. There is the usual listing of rights, 

such as speech, assembly, religion and press. However, these are limited 

by Article 19, which notes that they cannot harm the social order and national security. The constitution is also silent on the issue of enforcement 

of rights. The criminal code finally was modified in June 1997. Like those 

of its neighbors, Turkmenistan’s code notes punishments, procedures and 

rights.

The court system of Turkmenistan is structurally balanced: Local 

and regional courts hear criminal and civil cases. Decisions can be appealed to the higher levels, if that level deems the case important enough. 
80 KANGAS

At the highest level is a Supreme Court, which ostensibly only will hear 

cases of national importance. The president appoints all judges and chairs 

the Supreme Court. The court system to date has not challenged the 

constitutionality of any presidential decree or law, nor has it established 

a strong legacy of legality. Making things more difficult, no independent 

lawyers currently practice, and the notion of fair legal representation is 

still wanting.50

The Interior Ministry is responsible for enforcing the criminal code. 

International human rights organizations repeatedly have criticized the 

means by which police and security forces uphold the law.51 Human 

rights violations are legion and the conditions of prisons are considered 

to be some of the worst in the former Soviet Union. Minority groups and 

religious organizations, in particular, have experienced the difficult legal 

environment. For example, the Law on Religious Organizations restricts 

the way in which faiths can be registered in the country. Given the number 

of signatures needed, only the Sunni Muslim and Eastern Orthodox faiths 

are technically legal.52

The personalistic rule of President Saparmurat Niyazov means that, 

ultimately, the caprice of a leader sets the tone for politics and society 

in Turkmenistan. Individuals who run afoul of the president often are 

convicted on trumped-up charges. President Niyazov has declared that 

a fundamental feature of Turkmen law is the adherence to the Ruhnama, 

or “holy book” that he supposedly wrote.53 It is a collection of sayings and 

narratives that suggest specific ways in which Turkmen must live. This 

book, representative of Niyazov’s leadership style, discards any form of 

structure and objectivity.

In short, Turkmenistan represents perhaps the widest gap between 

rhetoric and practice. However, it is also important to note that international organizations seldom are able to conduct interviews or collect 

data in the country independent of official Turkmen sources. Thus, it is 

difficult to gauge the extent to which rule of law issues are actually being 

addressed within the country’s judicial and political systems. At best, anecdotes from exiles or observations from foreigners working in the country 

are the most reliable information.54

Tajikistan

A possible exception to these rather pessimistic case studies is Tajikistan. Mired in a civil war for most of its first six years after independence, 

Tajikistan has been viewed as a country in perpetual crisis and lawlessness. 

A number of volumes have been published outlining the course of events 
LEGAL REFORM 81

that dominated the country between the years of 1992, when the fighting began, and 1997, when a peace accord was signed.55 To an extent, the 

government was never able to extend a rule of law to the entire country. 

Indeed, today pockets of Tajikistan remain effectively outside of the central government’s control.56

However, an important legal reform development in Tajikistan is 

the founding document of the National Reconciliation Committee that 

set the terms of the 1997 peace agreement. In it, the warring sides agreed 

to abide by certain rules, based on an equitable sharing of political offices 

in the government. The Constitution of 1994 remains the primary legal 

document of the country. Again, on paper, the constitution lists a range 

of individual freedoms and responsibilities. Yet the period of the civil war 

witnessed countless violations of constitutional authority. A reversal of 

this trend was, and remains, a key element of the post-war agreement. The 

criminal code has yet to be significantly reformed and the current structure resembles that of the Soviet period. In short, the notion of “guilty 

until proven innocent” prevails, and harsh penalties still apply to most 

levels of crime, including economic crimes, which were often deemed the 

most severe in the Soviet Union.

Tajik law does prohibit discrimination for ethnic, religious and gender reasons, although this is not always enforced. Uzbek minorities, for 

example, consistently complain of being left out of the political process. In 

addition, religious minorities have difficulties in Tajikistan. Jews, Baha’is 

and Zoroastrians are often relegated to fringe status in the country. Sunni 

Islam remains paramount in the country with the small Russian minority 

practicing Eastern Orthodox. In addition to the common problems of arbitrary enforcement and government caprice, regional and local warlords 

periodically use their own form of frontier justice. Every year, rival clans 

murder scores of officials and businessmen. This form of frontier justice 

is particularly problematic in the outlying regions, especially the Badakhshon region.57

Following the example of the other four presidents, Imomali Rakhmonov also has created conditions where ultimately he will be immune 

to any future prosecution if he steps down from office. Still, the focus on 

the leader does not exist as strongly in Tajikistan as it does in, say, Turkmenistan. However, it is clear that individual personalities and familiar 

relationships dominate the political process in Tajikistan. Moreover, the 

groups excluded from this inner circle, such as the Uzbeks of Sogd wiloyat, 

find themselves unprotected in the legal system.
82 KANGAS

Basic Dilemmas and Reform Efforts

To varying degrees, all five Central Asian states face the conundrum 

of trying to establish viable legal systems. At the same time, the respective 

presidents are reluctant to give up their power and actually abide by “rule 

of law” principles. These challenges have been the focus on international 

assistance programs, the success of which is dependent upon how diligently the countries accept and implement reform.

Challenges

Corruption

Without question, corruption is deemed critical in Kazakhstan and 

the Kyrgyz Republic, according to public opinion polls. One would suspect 

that such views are held in the other three states of the region, although 

full, clear surveys on the situation are not forthcoming. As opposed to notions of episodic corruption in the respective states, corruption in Central 

Asia is seen as being systemic.58 While much of what is known about corruption in Central Asia is based on a few studies and anecdotal evidence, 

they shed light on the general problem throughout the region.59

Not surprisingly, the effect of corruption on the legal system is profound. To ensure judgment, payments must be made. Judges are poorly 

and irregularly paid, and often are swayed by much-needed financial gain 

in their decision-making. Likewise, defense attorneys require fees beyond 

their salary, and even investigative police require some form of bribery. 

Studies by Transparency International and Freedom House indicate that 

such corruption exists in all five Central Asian states.60 However, because 

of access problems, it is not surprising that the only detailed studies have 

taken place in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic.61

Ultimately, this type of corruption erodes the moral foundation of 

the legal system and precludes citizens from truly respecting the judicial 

process. This lack of confidence means that citizens often go to alternative 

sources of justice, including tribal and clan leaders or even the mafia and 

other criminal elements. The former only reinforces traditional modes of 

authority while the latter perpetuates a lack of adherence to the law.

Retribution

The legal system in each of the countries has been used to punish 

political opposition, often on spurious charges. In Kazakhstan, political 

opponents of Nazarbaev, such as Akezhan Kazhegeldin, have been brought 

up on charges of corruption. The same can be said for Abdy Kuliev in 

Turkmenistan, Feliks Kulov in the Kyrgyz Republic, and Shukhrullo 
LEGAL REFORM 83

Mirsaidov in Uzbekistan. In Uzbekistan, such charges also befall regional 

hakims and other subordinates of Karimov, when they’re deemed to be 

getting too powerful. The Cabinet of Ministers today is a collection of 

survivors of these periodic, but not fatal, purges. In Kazakhstan, even a 

family figure has been recently charged with corruption: The previously 

mentioned Zhakianov, who was the Hakim of Pavlodar Oblast, is a relative 

of Nazarbaev’s wife.

Nowhere is the legal system used with such caprice as in Turkmenistan. For many years, President Niyazov has used the legal system to charge 

his opponents and subordinates who are acquiring too much power with 

various crimes to remove them from possible opposition. It is rare for top 

officials to remain in the same office for more than a year, and in the past 

three years, the president has completely re-staffed his cabinet on several 

occasions. The November 2002 assassination attempt was yet another pretext for reshuffling individuals in the power ministries.62 It is interesting to 

note that these charges, particularly the ones that deal with abuse of office 

or corruption, are probably grounded in reality. However, the arbitrary 

nature of filing charges against some corrupt hakims while letting another 

equally corrupt official go free is what many find disturbing. Indeed, all of 

the problems previously noted are accentuated when retribution against 

actual forms of corruption are unevenly applied.

Retribution is not only directed against political figures. In addition 

to the case of Zamira Eschanova in the Kyrgyz Republic, the political leaders have targeted other journalists. In October 2002, Sergei Duvanov, a 

journalist from Kazakhstan, was charged with sexual crimes. That he was 

about to embark on a speaking tour of the United States and Europe to 

discuss the state of the media in Kazakhstan was most likely more than a 

coincidence; previously, he had written negative articles about the Nazarbaev family.63 In general, due to such potential threats, journalists in the 

region tend to censor themselves and avoid such confrontations.

Transparency

Another factor is transparency, which is defined for this context as 

the ability to clearly see and evaluate the decision-making process in the 

legal system. In short, a transparent process is one in which there is an 

openly-understood logic, devoid of back-room deals and capriciousness. 

According to the non-governmental organization Transparency International, the states of Central Asia fare poorly in this respect. In recent 

reports where the states have been mentioned, their rankings are abysmal 

and charges of systemic corruption are rife. Besides these external evalua-
84 KANGAS

tions, anecdotal evidence from citizens and officials in the region indicate 

that this is a key concern for domestic stability and ultimately, regional 

security. Uncertainty plays a large part in the legal system and corrodes any 

confidence that citizens of the Central Asian countries have in a reform 

agenda.

This situation parallels that of the Khanate period in Central Asian 

history, as well as the Soviet era. The difference today is that foreign investment was not a factor during those times. Indeed, besides eroding 

the public confidence in the legal code, the impact on foreign investment 

must be noted. According to a number of impartial reports, the business 

climate in all five Central Asian states is abysmal, at best, for potential investors—unless they are the major corporations in the energy sector. The 

basic rule of thumb is that all discussions that are looked on favorably at 

the presidential level are most likely going to succeed.64 However, those 

that have to deal with the ministries and bureaucracies of the region more 

often than not fail. In the long run, the reality of an unstable business 

environment may be the most harmful effect of the lack of effective legal 

systems in Central Asia.65

Efforts at Reform

The question that remains, in light of this rather pessimistic appraisal, is what can be done? Indeed, legal professionals have been working for over a decade to rectify the current situation and infuse a more 

rigorous adherence to law. Surprisingly, there have been internal efforts as 

well, although these tend to be adversely affected by financial constraints. 

In Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, independent lawyers have established their own associations. In Uzbekistan, a similar effort is underway 

for defense attorneys. Because the legal professions in each of these states 

had been state-run for much of the past century, the level of independence 

remains rather low. In addition, human rights organizations within the 

countries have attempted to register in order to open up offices within 

the respective countries, with a recent success being the legalization of the 

Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan in 2002. It is hoped that if such offices do open—whether for international or country-based groups—they 

will provide the impetus for governments to be more transparent in the 

legal reform process.

The key obstacles for reform efforts, as noted, are financial and structural. In both areas, international organizations have played key roles. Initially, groups such as the American Bar Association provided expert advice 

on the drafting of legal codes and constitutions. However, the problem has 
LEGAL REFORM 85

been that with each re-write of constitutions, power becomes more centralized and obstacles for opposition groups greater. Indeed, advice offered 

by outside observers has largely been ignored.

In other areas, success has been greater. The American Bar Association continues to support one of the earliest efforts to aid the legal system 

in Central Asia: the Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI) 

Project. Working with lawyers in the region, CEELI lawyers and staff 

members conduct analyses of draft laws and civil codes, as well as train 

the newly-emerging cadre of lawyers within these countries. Initiated in 

all states, CEELI remains active in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz 

republic.66 Other non-governmental organizations are also engaged in 

the region, offering their services to governments and non-governmental

associations alike.

Because the obstacles noted above adversely affect the economic 

and business climate in Central Asia, the World Bank has remained engaged in the reform process. This international financial institution is 

devoting resources to stabilizing the legal regimes in the countries, so as 

to promote a more active investment climate. In addition, transparency 

is a central theme in recent Bank reports, which note the trend towards 

limited improvements in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, with more 

serious shortcomings in Uzbekistan.67 As one example, the World Bank is 

initiating a legal reform project in Kazakhstan that has a budget of up to 

$18.5 million.

This compliments an initiative by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) on court reform that is being offered to 

all five Central Asian countries. According to EBRD officials, this effort 

follows on legal reform measures that have included reform programs 

on transaction security, bankruptcy law, telecommunications, leasing, arbitration, and taxation. Finally, the European Union (EU) has focused 

its attention on strengthening the legal regime in Central Asia. Through 

its Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States 

(TACIS) Program, the EU has offered training programs for procurators 

and other legal experts. Perhaps more ambitious is the effort by the EU to 

create a common legal regime in the Central Asian and South Caucasus 

regions, paralleling the efforts to do the same within Europe. Such goals 

are long-term, but it is clear that support is available.

With each of these efforts, there are shortfalls and obstacles. The 

United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which 

contributes millions of dollars in assistance to the region each year, must 

balance out programs for legal reform with those devoted to economic, 
86 KANGAS

environmental, educational and health reform, to name a few. 

Moreover, as security assistance continues to be a high priority for 

the countries in the region, the receptivity of the governments for 

extensive legal aid is questionable.

Conclusion

In each of the Central Asian states, efforts have been made 

to resuscitate legal systems that many considered to be moribund. 

Both internal and external organizations have initiated reform 

measures, although it is too early to tell how effective they will be. 

More broadly speaking, several observations can be made regarding the status of legal reform in Central Asia. First of all, all of 

the countries have made efforts to use the discourse of Western 

legalism in their respective frameworks. Second, this has both 

been a product of, but also a reason for, substantial international 

assistance in reconstructing constitutions, legal codes, and procedures for law enforcement agencies. Third, in spite of this aid, 

much remains to be done. It is clear that many of the pre-Soviet 

and Soviet-era traditions and methods are still applicable to the 

current states, and a true transition to a rule of law society has yet 

to take place.

In all five states, while there is evidence that legal reforms are 

taking place, much work is still required. Indeed, it appears as if 

the initial flurry of activity involved in creating actual codes and 

constitutions was deemed sufficient and the actual enforcement of 

the laws has yet to be fully implemented. That said, it is also clear 

the respective states are attempting to reshape the legal discourse 

from the Socialist legalism framework of the twentieth century 

to a more Western-oriented legal code that focuses on rights and 

responsibilities of the individual, as opposed to groups. However, 

even this latest layer of legal discourse has yet to tackle what remain key dilemmas and challenges to the respective systems.

Admittedly, it has been just over a decade and to expect a 

complete transformation in such a short period of time is asking 

too much. Since a transition in logic, theory and belief is required, 

it is no surprise that common citizens and those who find themselves in the legal system are more than cynical. Fundamental to 

the problem of legal reform in Central Asia is the notion of trust. 

Do the respective populations actually believe in the authority of 
LEGAL REFORM 87

law in their countries, versus the notion of a powerful leader? Are those 

surrounding the leaders viewed as mere kleptocrats who are pillaging the 

system in manners little different than their Soviet-era predecessors? To 

date, the status is mixed. While the situation varies in the respective countries, the problems are still apparent in all.

The problem of trust is a significant legacy from the Soviet era. Because justice and law were deemed arbitrary, a general lack of trust and 

respect for the concept of law developed. Previous, indigenous forms 

of law were banned, leading some to insist that return to such practices 

would enhance the respect for law. That said, it is evident that even pre-Soviet/pre-Russian law was not always seen as just and fair. When given the 

option of having a case heard in a Russian or a Shari’at court, the parties 

involved often opted for the Russian court, where renumeration was in 

monetary terms, not in disfigurement or death. In the Soviet era, the legal 

system was seen as competent at the lower level for minor offenses. However, for politically designated crimes, it was seen as a tool of the Communist Party. Today, it seems, this mentality has not changed. Ultimately, for 

the political systems of Central Asia to survive past the current generation 

of autocrats, a sound and credible legal system must be firmly entrenched. 

The written and rhetorical foundations exist—now it is incumbent upon 

the five states to put meaning into these words.

Notes1

 For the purposes of this chapter, Central Asia is defined as the states of Kazakhstan, the 

Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Clearly, references to pre-1924 Central 

Asia will include names of states and empires that existed within the geographic setting of these five 

states. 2

 Harold Lamb, The Earth Shakers (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1949); Rene Grousset, The 

Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, translated by Naomi Walford (New Brunswick, NJ: 

Rutgers University Press, 1970), 409-469. 3

 The challenge remains trying to assess what is in writing and what is actually enforced. 

Throughout much of the Soviet period, laws were quite extensive and often appeared to be rather fair 

and judicious. The actual implementation of these laws, on the other hand, revealed a system that was 

often capricious and unbalanced. Often legal codes were used for political reasons and to maintain a 

certain power relationship. 4

 Many of these are designed to prove the origin of certain civilizations in the region, predating 

those outside Central Asia. Perhaps as a Soviet legacy, they are also presented as relics (“perezhitki”) 

of oppressive, pre-capitalist societies. This is particularly evident in the national museum in Bukhara, 

Uzbekistan. 5

 For an assessment of these periods, see Grousset, op cit. The strengths of these traditions are 

discussed in Edward A. Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present, a 

cultural history (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), and Vasiliy V. Barthold, Four Studies on 

the History of Central Asia, translated by V. Minorsky and T. Minorsky (Leiden: NL: E.J. Brill, 1958). 
88 KANGAS

6

 Peter Green, Alexander of Macedon 356-323 B.C.: A Historical Biography (Berkeley, CA: The 

University of California Press, 1992). This is also assessed in Russian scholarship. See I.S. Shiffman, 

Aleksandr makadonskii (Leningrad: “Nauka,” 1988). 7

 A basic precept of the growing Muslim world was to establish a broad framework within 

which various societies and cultures could live. These developments were evolutionary and reflected 

a maturation of Islamic thought over the first several centuries of the faith’s existence. See Wilfred 

Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), and Svat 

Soucek, A History of Inner Asia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 8 Shafi’is Risala, Islamic Jurisprudence, translated by Majid Khadduri (Baltimore, MD: The 

Johns Hopkins Press, 1961). 9

 The “decline” of these Central Asian centers of learning was the result of geographic isolation, the struggles of the Islamic world vis-à-vis the European Christian world, and even the opening 

up of trade routes to the orient that bypassed the “great silk road.” Consequently, Central Asian Islam 

did not experience the reform movements that took place in the Arab world in the eighteenth and 

nineteenth centuries. 10 For a concise discussion of Adat, see Anuar Galiev, “Traditional Institutions in Modern Kazakhstan” (1997), electronically published by the Slavic Research Center in Hokudai, Japan, 

<http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/sympo/97summer/galiev.html>.

11 Depending upon the source material and transliteration method, Genghis Khan is also 

referred to as Chinggis Khan or Ghenghis Khan, among others. See Leo de Hartog, Genghis Khan: 

Conqueror of the World (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989), and Robert Marshall, Storm from the East: From 

Genghis Khan to Khublai Khan (Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 1993). 12 Grousset, op cit., 326-346.

13 Of the Barlas tribe, Tamerlane (1336-1405) was a local political and military figure who 

quickly consolidated his authority by forging alliances or defeating opponents in swift attacks. At 

the time of his death, Tamerlane had conquered most of Central Asia and territories stretching into 

modern-day Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China. 14 Soucek, op cit. 15 Seymour Becker, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). See also Helene Carrere d’Encausse, Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asia (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988). 16 Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia. (Berkeley, 

CA: The University of California Press, 1998), and Faizulla Khodzhaev, Kistorii revoliutsii v Bukhare

(Tashkent: Uzbekskoe gosizdat, 1926). 17 In Central Asian history, these two Emirs were notorious for their corrupt regimes and 

opulent lifestyles at a time when the “forces of modernization” were slowly enveloping the Emirate. 

Critics from within the country wrote of the regime’s shortcoming, and Russian officials in Central 

Asia parlayed this into a dependency relationship by creating a “protectorate system” for Bukhara and 

the neighboring Khanate of Khiva. See Seymour Becker, op cit. 18 See Khalid and Carrere d’Encausse as two excellent studies of Jadidism at this time. 

“Jadidism” itself means “new school,” or “new method” and represented a reformist movement that 

existed in the Muslim regions of the Russian empire and the neighboring protectorates in the latenineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Modeled after the reformist movements that emerged in 

nineteenth-century Egypt and the twentieth-century Ottoman Empire, this reform movement had a 

number of sub-groupings. Some advocated political reform; others sought a return to a “more pure” 

form of Islam; and still others emphasized a greater unity of the various Turkic peoples. The Jadidist 

movement was eventually overtaken by events in the Russian empire, particularly the Bolshevik Revolution and the creation of the Soviet Union, at which time many either emigrated or were victims of 

the Stalinist purges for being “nationalists.” 19 Helene Carrere d’Encausse, “Organizing and Colonizing the Conquered Territories,” in Central Asia: 120 Years of Russian Rule, edited by Edward Allworth (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 

1989), 151-171. For a range of interpretations of this policy, see Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands 
LEGAL REFORM 89

and Peoples, 1700-1917, edited by Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 

University Press, 1997). 20 Carrere d’ Encausse, 155.

21 Khalid, op cit. 22 Tragically, the Jadidists believed that the Bolsheviks would ultimately leave the region alone, 

supported by Lenin’s concept of “national self-determination.” However, by the mid-1920s, J.V. Stalin 

had compromised the parameters of national self-determination so much that it was impossible for 

the minority regions to gain their independence. The respective leaders of the various ethnic regions 

were subsequently targeted in the purges of the 1930s. See Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet 

Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 (New York: Atheneum, 1980). 23 This was the dilemma faced by regional elite such as Faizulla Khojaev. A member of the 

Young Bukharans, Khojaev agreed to work with the new Soviet government and was instrumental in 

bringing Bukhara into the Soviet Union as a central component of the newly-formed Uzbek Soviet 

Socialist Republic. He remained active in Uzbek politics until 1937, when he was arrested for a range 

of anti-state crimes. He was executed the following year. The bulk of this “First Generation” of Central 

Asian leaders met similar fates. See Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslim National 

Communism in the Soviet Union (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1979). 24 The most prominent insurgency was the “Basmachi” movement, which lasted from 1919-

1923 as a full-fledged force and until the early 1930s as a less-effective guerilla force. See Glenda Fraser, 

“Basmachi (parts I and II),” Central Asian Survey (1987) 6, no. 1, 1-73, and 6, no.2, 7-42. 25 Gordon B. Smith, “The Legal System: Toward a Civil Society,” in Soviet Politics: Struggling 

with Change (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 202-232. 26 For a discussion of restrictions on Central Asian culture, see Shoshana Keller, To Moscow, Not 

Mecca: The Soviet Campaign Against Islam in Central Asia, 1917-1941 (New York: Praeger, 1991). 27 See Peter Solomon, Soviet Criminal Justice Under Stalin (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 28 For an assessment of the legal reforms that took place in the 1980s, see works by Eugene 

Huskey, including “Soviet Justice in the Age of Perestroika,” Christian Science Monitor, August 22, 

1989, 18 and “The Soviet Criminal Process: Expanding the Right to Counsel in Pre-Trial Proceedings,” 

American Journal of Comparative Law, 34, no. 1 (1986). 29 Gregory Gleason, “Fealty and Loyalty: Informal Authority Structures in Soviet Asia,” Soviet 

Studies, 43, no. 4 (1991).

30 Even today, there is controversy surrounding Rashidov’s death. Russian journalists claim 

that he committed suicide, while those sympathetic to him suggest a more sinister demise. Most 

likely, his death was through natural causes (officially, a heart attack). Through much of the 1980s, his 

reputation was tarnished in the Soviet Union. It was not until the 1990s that President Islam Karimov 

officially “rehabilitated” Rashidov. For an assessment of the “Cotton Scandal,” see Gregory Gleason, 

“Nationalism or Organized Crime? The Case of the ‘Cotton Scandal’ in the USSR,” Corruption and 

Reform, 5, no. 2 (1990), 87-108.

31 James Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic’s Road to Sovereignty (Boulder, 

CO: Westview Press, 1991). 32 James Critchlow, “Prelude to ‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke Moscow’s Grip on Elite Recruitment,” in Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation, edited by William 

Fierman (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 131-158. 33 Nursultan Nazarbaev, My Life, My Times, and the Future (London: Pilkington Press, 1998). 34 Martha Brill Olcott, “Nursultan Nazarbaev and the Balancing Act of State Building in Kazakstan,” in Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership, edited by Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (Boulder, 

CO: Westview Press, 1995), 169-190. 35 The drama of this intra-Kazakh power struggle is well noted in Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promises (Washington, DC: CEIP, 2002). 36 “Kazakhstan,” Nations in Transit, 2002 Report (New York: Freedom House, 2003), 217-220.
90 KANGAS

37 A common practice is for militsia (police) to occasionally flag motorists down and cite a violation. However, a modest “fee” will generally satisfy the arresting officer, and the motorist is allowed to 

proceed. While motorists dislike this occurrence, some do see it as the only way in which street police 

actually get paid (wage arrears are major problems in government departments). 38 Ironically, Jakianov was viewed as a “protégé” of Nazarbaev, distantly related to the president 

via Nazarbaev’s wife. 39 For writings that assess these conflicting reputations, see Bruce Pannier, “The Kyrgyz Republic: The Early Dawn of a Bright Day?,” Transition OnLine <www.tol.cz>, January 16, 1998 and John 

Anderson, Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia’s Island of Democracy (New York: Harwood Academic Publishers, 

1999). 40 Eugene Huskey, “Kyrgyzstan: The Fate of Political Liberalization,” in Conflict, Cleavage, and 

Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, edited by Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge, UK: 

Cambridge University Press, 1997), 242-276. 41 “Kyrgyz Republic,” Nations in Transit, 2002 Report (New York: Freedom House, 2003), 233-

235. 42 In the mid-1990s, the Kyrgyz government established the “Slavonic University” in Bishkek, 

which would be an institute designed to cater to Russian-speaking citizens of the country. Because of 

the relatively high number of non-Kyrgyz speakers, there is a greater effort to establish such entities. 43 Most likely, President Akaev would have received the plurality of votes in a potential second 

round and would have continued his term in office. However, the fear of receiving anything less than 

an overwhelming majority is perceived to be a weakness in the region—perhaps a holdover from the 

Soviet-era elections where 95 percent+ “voter approvals” were common. 44 Roger Kangas, “State Building and Civil Society in Central Asia,” in Political Culture and Civil 

Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, edited by Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk, NY: M.E. 

Sharpe, 1995), 275-277. 45 One can see a parallel with the Soviet death penalties for economic crimes. Terrorist groups 

today challenge the legitimacy of the current regime, much in the way that “speculators” and “capitalists” were seen as challengers to the legitimacy of the centrally-planned economy of the Soviet Union. 46 “Uzbekistan,” Nations in Transit, 2002 Report (New York: Freedom House, 2003), 423-425. 47 In mid-February 1999, a series of bombs exploded in Tashkent, killing and injuring scores 

of Uzbekistani citizens. While no group claimed responsibility, the government has concluded that it 

was the work of Islamic terrorists, specifically the IMU. Over 2000 individuals were arrested in the 

ensuing months, with over 100 receiving significant prison terms or the death penalty. The government explanation of these events can be found in the sensationalist book by Oleg Yakubov, The Pack 

of Wolves: The Blood Trail of Terror (Moscow: Veche Publishers, 2000). 48 Persecution of Human Rights Defenders in Uzbekistan (New York: Human Rights Watch, May 

1, 2003) is a recent example of these reports. Also see Uzbekistan at Ten: Repression and Instability, Asia 

Report N.21 (Osh/Brussels: International Crisis Group, August 21, 2001). 49 Critics of the United States’ global war on terrorism use the “geopolitical argument” in 

explaining why it maintains ties with Uzbekistan. The U.S. Congress has had several hearings on this 

issue since October 2001. 50 “Turkmenistan,” Nations in Transit, 2002 Report (New York: Freedom House, 2003), 395-

398. 51 Cracks in the Marble: Turkmenistan’s Failing Dictatorship, Asia Report no.44 (Osh/Brussels: 

International Crisis Group, January 17, 2003). 52 “Unrecognized” faiths include Baha’is, various Evangelical Christian groups, and Hare 

Krishnas, among others. Churches with strong missionary components find it particularly difficult 

to work in Turkmenistan. 53 Saparmurat Niyazov, Ruhnama (Ashgabat, TK: TurkGosIzdatel’stvo, 2002). The book is 

published in Turkmen, Russian, and English and is currently being translated into other languages 

as well.
LEGAL REFORM 91

54 For example, when the International Foundation for Election Systems conducted public 

opinion surveys in Central Asia on issues of politics, economics, and social welfare, four of the five 

countries permitted the surveys to take place, even allowing the U.S.-based Non-Governmental Organization to partner with local organizations. Turkmenistan refused to permit the survey to take place. 55 See Shirin Akiner, Tajikistan: Disintegration or Reconciliation? (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002) and Muriel Atkin, The Subtlest Battle: Islam in Soviet Tajikistan (Philadelphia, 

PA: The Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1989). 56 Tajikistan is over 90 percent mountainous, with the eastern part of the country including 

some of the most remote villages in the region. Outside of Dushanbe, the government’s control is 

sometimes challenged, although any violence is considered low-intensity as compared to the period 

of the civil war. 57 Central Asia: The Politics of Police Reform, 14-20. 58 Simply put, “episodic” corruption suggests that cases of corruption are isolated and are 

based on specific personalities and situations. They do not reflect on the legal or political system as a 

whole. “Systemic” corruption, on the other hand, is just that: corruption is required to function in the 

society, and the very nature of corruption permeates all levels of society—from politics to economy 

to healthcare and education. 59 Nancy Lubin, Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption, and Identity (Washington, DC: 

USIP, 1995). 60 While Transparency International has not conducted an in-depth study of Central Asia, they 

have included specific cases in the region for their annual reports. See <www.transparency.org> for 

further information, as well as the country reports in Freedom House’s Nation in Transit, 2002 Report, 

op. cit.

61 These “rates” refer to illegal fees that one must pay for items ranging from licenses for restaurants, building permits, entrance fees for schools, opportunities for certain jobs, etc., See Roger 

Kangas and Craig Olson, Anticorruption Assessment: Pavlodar Oblast, Kazakhstan (Bethesda, MD: 

Development Alternatives Incorporated, November 1998). 62 On November 25, 2002, shots were allegedly fired at President Niyazov’s car as he drove to office in Ashgabat. Almost immediately, key opposition figures such as Boris Shikhmuradov, Hudaiberdy 

Orazov and Nurmuhammed Hanamov were implicated. In addition, Niyazov went so far as to suggest 

the Uzbek and American ambassadors were somehow linked to the “criminal organization” that was 

out to assassinate him. Roger Kangas, “Memories of the Past: Politics in Turkmenistan,” Analysis of 

Current Events, Vol.14, no.4 (December 2002),16-19. 63 The investigation and trial have been covered extensively by the publication Eurasianet 

(<www.eurasianet.org>). 64 This is a theme addressed by a number of recent articles, including Charles William Maynes, 

“America Discovers Central Asia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, no. 2 (Mar/Apr 2002), 120-132; Martha Brill 

Olcott, “Pipelines and Pipe Dreams: Energy Development and Caspian Society,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53, no. 1 (Fall 1999), 305-323; and most recently Mark Berniker, “Despite Corruption Concerns, Kazakhstan Continues to Lure Investors,” <www.eurasianet.org> (April 28, 2003). 65 This view was most recently expressed in a report by the International Crisis Group at the 

time of the annual conference of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 

which was held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in May 2003. See Central Asia: A Last Chance for Change

(Osh/Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 29, 2003). 66 For a variety of reasons, Uzbekistan remains a difficult country for the ABA to work. However, when addressing less political issues, such as property law, progress has been made. For example, 

see Analysis of the Draft Civil Code Section on Property Rights for the Republic of Uzbekistan (Washington, DC: CEELI, January 19, 1996). 67 Anticorruption in Europe and Central Asia (Washington, DC: World Bank, May 2003).
92 KANGAS
HUMAN RIGHTS 93

93

INTRODUCTION 

Chapter 5 

Human Rights 

in Central Asia

Michael Ochs

The defining trend of political development in Central Asia has been 

the emergence of presidents far more powerful than the legislative 

and judicial branches of government. Central Asian constitutions 

generally sanction this imbalance by according the head of state extremely 

broad prerogatives. But the actual practice of presidential rule has transcended constitutional provisions, which also formally enshrine separation 

of powers. Only in Kyrgyzstan, for example, has parliament occasionally 

managed to frustrate the executive. Kazakhstan’s few opposition-minded 

legislators at best can try to embarrass their president. Elsewhere in the 

region, parliaments are rubber stamp institutions, while courts everywhere reliably rule in political cases as instructed by the powers that be. 

Official justifications for the phenomenon of “super” presidents in Central 

Asia emphasize the need for a strong hand to consolidate independence, 

ram through reforms and maintain stability during a difficult transition 

period. More cynical views point to still strong “eastern” and/or RussianCommunist traditions of exercising authority.

The most extreme case of authoritarianism is Turkmenistan, where 

Saparmurat Niyazov sponsors a full-scale cult of personality while overseeing the most repressive regime in the former Soviet Union. In Tajikistan, by contrast, President Imomali Rakhmonov has had to make concessions: a military stalemate in the 1992-1997 civil war forced him to come 

to terms with Islamic and democratic opposition groups and agree to a 

formal coalition government.

Rounding out the spectrum are Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, Kyrgyzstan’s Askar Akaev, and Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbaev. Karimov, after 

permitting some political opposition, in mid-1992 banned all dissidence. 

Akaev and Nazarbaev tolerate opposition parties but curtail their influence—Nazarbaev much more effectively than Akaev.

1
94 OCHS

Central Asian publics for the most part have accepted strongman 

rule, though not without grumbling, when possible. This is not surprising, considering the regimes’ control of security organs, law enforcement, 

and prosecutorial agencies; the region’s lack of democratic traditions; and 

the natural human focus on surviving severe economic decline. Moreover, 

after seeing the bloodshed in Tajikistan (or Azerbaijan or Georgia), many 

people are grateful for “stability.”

At the same time, a series of unfair elections has deepened popular 

disillusionment with “democracy.” Most people believe that presidents and 

lower level officials derive significant economic gain from their positions 

and will not willingly leave office. Consequently, relatively few protests 

have been lodged against the development of executive privilege. Only in 

2002, in the most liberal Central Asian country—Kyrgyzstan—has this 

pattern begun to change.

When the Central Asian countries joined the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)2

 in 1992, their leaders pledged 

to implement all past and future commitments of the Helsinki process. In 

fact, however, they want no part of democracy. The best evidence for this 

proposition is their miserable record of elections. It is unclear what the 

region’s presidents fear more—losing or not winning by an astronomical 

figure—but it is certain they rig elections and strive to eliminate all risk 

from electoral exercises.3

Apologists often point to Central Asian traditions and argue that 

democracy must be built slowly. But while an undemocratic history, real 

or alleged Islamic fundamentalism, the Soviet legacy, and poverty are all 

important, leaders determined to remain in office require repressive political systems. Implementing commitments on democracy, the rule of law 

and human rights would create a level playing field for challengers and let 

the media expose presidential misdeeds.

Another key factor in Central Asia’s poor human rights record is 

high-level corruption. Presidents wishing to continue enriching their 

families and friends (or “clans”) cannot allow a free press or an independent judiciary. Nowhere is the nexus between corruption and intimidation 

of the press clearer than in Kazakhstan, where journalists who write about 

foreign investigations into President Nazarbaev’s finances risk physical 

retribution or legal action.

Nor is normal politics possible. Fear of the consequences if an outsider should come to power and uncover the scale of abuse induces leaders to ensure that no serious rivals emerge and that elections are carefully 

controlled—when they take place at all. The result has been the emergence 
HUMAN RIGHTS 95

of an entire region in the OSCE space where fundamental freedoms are 

ignored. Along with large-scale conflicts like Kosovo or Bosnia, unresolved low-level conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia, and 

the trafficking in human beings, the systemic flouting of commitments on 

democratization and human rights in Central Asia is the single greatest 

problem facing the OSCE.

Consequently, human rights observance in these states has tended to 

reflect not the leaders’ commitment to reform, but rather goading from 

abroad. Such pressure, however, has had—and can have—only limited effect. While the United States had urged progress in democratization even 

before September 11, Central Asian leaders apparently had concluded that 

Washington is more focused on strategic and economic interests and the 

threat of Islamic fundamentalism. U.S. disapproval of lagging democratization never kept American businessmen from seeking to exploit Central 

Asia’s natural resources or restrained Washington from encouraging them. 

Nor did flagrant human rights abuses cause the United States to cut significantly programs such as Partnership for Peace, cease foreign aid, or 

otherwise slow the development of bilateral relations.

After September 11, the U.S. government moved to consolidate its 

relationships with Central Asian states, seeking cooperation in the war on 

terrorism. But Washington also made plain its expectations of some type 

of political reform, warning that without such reform, Islamic radicalism 

would threaten stability in Central Asia and the entire Western world. 

Kyrgyzstan’s Akaev and Uzbekistan’s Karimov faced incursions by 

the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in 1999 and 2000. They and 

other regional leaders quickly pledged support in the campaign against 

terrorism and seem happy to build closer ties with the United States. But 

loosening their grip on power is as unpalatable to them as ever. And if 

they saw little reason to fear sanctions or abandonment by Washington 

before September 11, they apparently feel even less concern now, with U.S. 

troops deployed in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and military and intelligence cooperation developing apace. By the end of 2002, all Central Asian 

presidents, except Turkmenistan’s Niyazov had been to the White House 

to meet President Bush.

Bush Administration officials deny that the U.S. human rights 

agenda has taken a back seat to military and anti-terrorism collaboration. They claim that working together on security facilitates the raising 

of human rights issues, more often and with greater success.4 As evidence, 

they point to incremental victories, such as Uzbekistan’s registration of an 
96 OCHS

independent human rights organization and the sentencing to jail terms 

of policemen who had tortured detainees.

Still, regional leaders have not shown any sign that they are ready for 

fundamental, systemic changes. On the other hand, indications of growing ferment abound. Since September 11, opposition and human rights 

activists have complained that growing U.S. closeness with Central Asian 

governments has emboldened these governments to indulge their repressive instincts with a greater conviction of impunity. Perhaps despairing of 

reliable American pressure for reform, opposition groups apparently have 

begun to count more on their own endeavors to create societies which 

respect human rights. These efforts have had mixed results so far, and the 

prospects for reform from below seem bleak.

Kazakhstan

In the early 1990s, Kazakhstan seemed to be building a democratic 

state with societal input into decision-making and relative freedom of 

speech. Today, President Nursultan Nazarbaev gives every indication of 

intending to remain in office for life. He has kept the legislative and judicial branches well in hand while not permitting any alternative sources 

of power to emerge, and turned energy- and resource-rich Kazakhstan 

into a virtual family enterprise. Meanwhile, the possibilities for opposition political activity or speaking one’s mind have narrowed and become 

increasingly dangerous.5

With normal politics impossible inside Kazakhstan, an important 

locus of opposition activity has gone abroad. Former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, whom Nazarbaev has accused of corruption and who 

cannot safely return home, has led a campaign of international lobbying, 

providing information about Nazarbaev’s regime to Western governments 

and anyone willing to listen. These efforts have helped publicize alleged 

corruption, which Nazarbaev has sought to stifle inside Kazakhstan 

through control of the media.

In late 2001, Nazarbaev faced several new threats, including an open 

rupture with his powerful son-in-law and an attempt to mount an intraelite opposition movement. Nazarbaev responded with a crackdown, in 

spite of U.S. government calls for political liberalization in Central Asia. 

He quashed all challenges and intensified assaults on the opposition 

media, indicating both his concern and his sense of impunity.

Nazarbaev, elected president in 1990 by Kazakhstan’s Supreme Soviet, confirmed his position in a non-contested election in 1991. In 1995, 

he inaugurated a period of presidential rule and convened an Assembly 
HUMAN RIGHTS 97

of the People, which extended his tenure until 2000. Official results gave 

Nazarbaev 81.7 percent of the vote in the first nominally contested, preterm presidential election in January 1999. Because of the exclusion of 

would-be candidates, intimidation of voters, and attacks on independent 

media, the OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 

(ODIHR) refused to send observers. A small reporting mission concluded 

that the “election process fell far short” of OSCE standards.

In October 1999, Kazakhstan held elections for parliament’s lower 

chamber, in which political parties, for the first time, could submit party 

lists for 10 of the 77 seats. Otan (Fatherland), Nazarbaev’s party, came in 

first, followed by the opposition Communist Party, the pro-presidential 

Civic Party, and the Agrarian Party. In the first round, ODIHR observers 

saw some improvements in the legislative framework and lauded the introduction of party list voting, but criticized the second round. Citing flagrantly falsified protocols and continued interference by officials, ODIHR 

judged that the election fell short of OSCE commitments.

Freedom of association is restricted in Kazakhstan. Opposition 

parties, such as the Communist Party and the Republican People’s Party 

(RPPK) have been registered and allowed to function, and some of them 

have parliamentary representation. But it was only after long delays that 

the RPPK registered, as a result of strong OSCE pressure before the October 1999 parliamentary election.

Recent attempts to create new opposition parties, especially the 

Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK), have been crudely suppressed. 

Two DCK leaders are in jail: Mukhtar Ablyazov, former Minister of Power, 

Industry, and Trade, and Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, former Governor of 

Pavlodar. In July 2002, Ablyazov was sentenced to six years in jail; in August of the same year Zhakiyanov received a seven-year term. Nazarbaev 

clearly wanted to make an example of them for any other would-be opposition activists among Kazakhstan’s officials.

On June 25, 2002, Kazakhstan’s parliament raised from 3,000 to 

50,000 the number of members needed for party registration and required parties to have a branch office and at least 7,000 members in each 

of Kazakhstan’s regions. The new law likely will lead to the de-registration 

of most of the 19 parties currently represented in parliament. The OSCE 

Center in Almaty strongly criticized the law for threatening political pluralism, but to little visible effect. Indeed, in recent months the number of 

parties has since shrunk to nine and the RPPK is no longer registered.

Freedom of assembly is restricted in Kazakhstan. A March 17, 1995 

presidential decree, issued while parliament was disbanded, remains in 
98 OCHS

force and limits the ability of citizens to participate in unsanctioned 

demonstrations. Gaining permission for such gatherings is difficult, and 

authorities have detained or jailed violators. For example, on April 25, 

2002, police in Almaty detained 12 members of the RPPK and other opposition groups to prevent them from picketing a hotel where a government-sponsored media conference was taking place. The demonstrators 

hoped to publicize the government’s systematic violations of human rights 

and media freedoms. They were held for seven hours before being charged 

and then put on trial.6

Freedom of speech is highly restricted in Kazakhstan. Dariga Nazarbaeva, the president’s daughter, runs Khabar, the main TV station. 

Newspapers and TV can report on intra-government discord and lowlevel corruption. But stories about Nazarbaev, his family or allegations of 

their corruption are likely to result in harassment or worse. In 1996 and 

1997, the government began closing down independent TV and radio 

stations by manipulating tenders for broadcasting permits. In 1998, the 

publisher of Karavan was forced to sell the country’s most popular newspaper, which is now widely believed to belong to the president’s relatives. 

Cruder methods were employed in September 1998, when the offices of 

the opposition newspaper 21st Century were firebombed.

As a result of these policies, the opposition press largely has been 

silenced. In May 2000, the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) placed Nazarbaev on its annual list of “Ten Worst Enemies of 

the Press.” The head of the OSCE office in Kazakhstan said in June 2002 

that independent and opposition media in Kazakhstan face increasing 

legal and economic pressures, while national media are concentrated in 

the hands of persons close to Nazarbaev.7

In May and June 2002, after official revelations about a secret Swiss 

bank account with $1 billion under Nazarbaev’s name, the assault on independent media intensified. Irina Petrushova, the editor of an opposition 

newspaper, found a decapitated dog hung by its paws outside her office. 

On a screwdriver driven into its torso was a warning: “There won’t be a 

next time.” The Almaty TV station TAN was forced off the air when its 

cable was sliced in the middle of the night.8

On August 28, 2002, independent journalist Sergei Duvanov was 

severely beaten by three men. He already had been charged with “insulting 

the honor and dignity of the president” after writing an internet article 

about the international investigation into alleged corruption by Nazarbaev. 

On October 27, Duvanov was arrested on charges of raping a teenage girl. 

He maintains his innocence and many human rights groups in Kazakhstan 
HUMAN RIGHTS 99

and abroad view the charge as politically motivated. If convicted, Duvanov 

could face a 10-year jail term. In January 2003, Duvanov—whose case attracted substantial international attention—was sentenced to three and a 

half years in jail. Another journalist who published an article on alleged 

corruption, Lira Baseitova, suffered the worst of tragedies: her daughter 

died in mysterious circumstances while in police custody on June 21, 

2002.

Kazakhstan initially permitted fairly unrestricted religious freedom, 

but in the mid-1990s the government increasingly sought control over 

new religious groups. In 1998, the national security apparatus (KNB), 

concerned about Islamic extremism, became more active in the surveillance and deportation of Muslim missionaries. KNB leaders openly stated 

that prohibiting the spread of Islamic and Christian “religious extremism” 

was a top priority.

Religious groups must register to rent or purchase property, employ 

workers, or obtain visas for foreign co-religionists. A new article in the 

Administrative Code, introduced in 2001, imposes criminal sanctions on 

leaders of groups refusing to register, and local authorities have detained 

and beaten leaders of groups which do not. In addition, parliament 

introduced a new religion law broadening the government’s ability to 

control and monitor religious groups. However, the Constitutional Council deemed the draft law unconstitutional in April 2002, and President 

Nazarbaev chose not to appeal. While officially the law may not be on the 

books, the number of fines and court orders closing down churches of 

Baptists who refuse to register steadily has increased.

Kyrgyzstan

Under President Askar Akaev, Kyrgyzstan was long the most democratic country in Central Asia. Parliament enjoyed some independence, 

and while several newspapers which covered high-level corruption were 

forced to close, criticism of the government and even of Akaev was possible. In this relatively liberal atmosphere, civil society blossomed. In 

the second half of the 1990s, however, the honeymoon ended. In 1999, 

when several politicians announced their intention to run for president, 

Akaev’s regime turned toward open repression. Since then, various opposition leaders have been arrested, co-opted or otherwise removed from 

politics, while independent media have come under severe pressure. Both 

Kyrgyzstan’s reputation as an oasis of freedom in Central Asia and Akaev’s 

democratic image have dissipated.
100 OCHS

In early 2002, pent-up popular discontent erupted after the arrest in 

January of a southern legislator, Azimbek Beknazarov, who opposed a border deal that would cede territory to China. On March 17, police fired on 

demonstrators denouncing his imprisonment and six people died. In the 

ensuing crisis, thousands of people protested all over the country; Akaev 

was forced to dismiss his government in May and agree, in principle, to a 

coalition government.

On August 26, Akaev decreed the formation of a Constitutional 

Council to redistribute powers among the president, government and 

parliament. Kyrgyzstan’s plan to hand over presidential prerogatives to 

other branches of government was unique in Central Asia and, if all sides 

had acted in good faith, could have served as an important precedent for 

neighboring countries. Yet well into 2003, tensions remain as high and 

some opposition groups—including several parliamentarians—are determined to bring down Akaev. To date, Kyrgyzstan remains the only country 

in Central Asia where civil society is powerful enough to pose a possible 

threat to the president.

In a snap presidential election held in December 1995, two wouldbe candidates were disqualified shortly before the vote. By the late 1990s, 

Akaev faced more serious challengers, especially from Felix Kulov, leader 

of the Ar-Namys (Honor) party, who had been Vice President, Minister of 

National Security, Governor of Chu oblast and Mayor of Bishkek. Another 

contender was entrepreneur and independent parliamentarian Danyar 

Usenov, who headed the El Bei Bechara or Party of Poor People.

In the February-March 2000 parliamentary election, the authorities 

barred three of four opposition parties. They excluded Usenov from running in the second round and ensured Kulov’s defeat; the ODIHR explicitly concluded that he had been robbed of victory. On March 22, 2000, the 

Ministry of National Security arrested Kulov for alleged abuse of power 

while he was Minister of National Security. He has since been sentenced 

to a 10-year jail term and is considered a political prisoner by Amnesty 

International and other human rights groups.

With his leading rivals jailed or out of the race, Akaev won easy reelection in the October 2000 election. Despite rumors that he would hold 

a referendum to extend his tenure from five years to seven, in August 2001 

Akaev denied any such intentions and has not done so.

In May 2002, the CPJ listed Kyrgyzstan among the world’s 10 

worst places to be a journalist. Newspapers critical of the government 

have been crippled by slander lawsuits. Such publications include Asaba, 

which has resumed publication with a new editor. After the editorial 
HUMAN RIGHTS 101

offices of Vecherniy (Evening) Bishkek were occupied by the militia in 

1999 and the chief editor forced out; it reportedly now is run by Akaev’s 

relatives.

In 1995, chief editor Zamira Sydykova of the opposition newspaper 

Res Publica received a suspended sentence for libel and was banned for 18 

months from working as a journalist. She was jailed again in 1997 for libel 

and Amnesty International condemned her sentence. Res Publica most recently had to pay $2,700 in fines for allegedly having offended a claimant’s 

“honour and dignity.” The paper was not published from January to May 

2002, until it paid the fine.

Freedom of assembly has been restricted in Kyrgyzstan. Hina Jilani, 

the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General on Human Rights 

Defenders, said in summer 2001 that “the right to denounce and protest 

human rights violations has been repressed . . . and that freedom of assembly and freedom of association, though guaranteed by the Constitution, 

are frequently violated in practice.” In 2002, however, large crowds demonstrated throughout the country, particularly in the south. The January 

arrest of parliamentarian Azimbek Beknazarov mobilized thousands of 

protesters who blocked the country’s main highway. They demanded the 

release of Beknazarov (which was done on May 19); the resignation of 

Akaev; the rescinding of the border accord with China; and the punishment of officials responsible for the March 17 shootings.

In September 2002, the opposition again organized a large protest 

movement which aimed to descend on Bishkek and force Akaev out. 

Another bloody confrontation seemed likely, with unpredictable consequences. On September 12, however, both sides blinked: the marchers dispersed after the authorities promised to punish those responsible for the 

Aksy shootings by November 15. Afterwards, the authorities became more 

adept at managing demonstrations, which for the most part have ceased.

More than 30 political parties now are registered in Kyrgyzstan. Four 

opposition political parties—Ar-Namys, Ata-Meken, El and the People

parties—have united to form the Peoples Congress. The imprisoned Felix 

Kulov was elected chairman of the movement.

Kyrgyz authorities have targeted non-government organizations 

(NGOs) critical of the government, especially the Kyrgyz Human Rights 

Committee, headed by Ramazan Dyryldaev. The Committee was de-registered in 1995 and 1998 and its members have regularly experienced harassment; about fifteen have been arrested at various times. In July 2000, the 

authorities occupied the Committee’s offices, which they sealed, effectively 

shutting down the NGO. Dyryldaev, in Vienna at the time, remained there, 
102 OCHS

fearful of arrest. He returned to Kyrgyzstan only in May 2002, accompanying Gerard Stoudmann, Director of the ODIHR, and continues his 

political activity. Still, several of Dyryldaev’s associates have been beaten 

by police. With large-scale demonstrations almost a daily occurrence in 

2002, NGO leaders, especially those with oppositionist leanings, have been 

singled out for criticism in the government-controlled media.

Kyrgyzstan has enjoyed a degree of religious freedom since independence, although recent government actions are troubling. The State 

Commission on Religious Affairs, created in 1996, oversees registration 

of religious groups and is charged with protecting freedom of conscience.

However, under a 1997 presidential decree, all religious communities 

now must register with the Ministry of Justice. While many Muslim and 

Christian religious communities have registered successfully, the government repeatedly has turned down the Catholic Church, whose members 

are mainly ethnic Kyrgyz.9 In addition, the registration of new churches 

has slowed, as the government fears creating religious-based conflicts in 

rural areas.

Due to security concerns about Islamic extremists, the government 

has intensified its surveillance of mosques throughout the country.In 2002, 

the government also issued a decree tightening publishing regulations for 

religious groups and called for an “audit,” which would affect Muslim and 

Christian groups equally.10 Work is underway on a new religion law. Input 

from an OSCE/ODIHR Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief 

is expected to try to safeguard religious rights.11

Tajikistan

Tajikistan is the only country in Central Asia that has endured a civil 

war. After the September 1991 declaration of independence, the United 

Tajik Opposition (UTO), a cluster of nationalist and Islamic groups, took 

up arms against the Russian-backed Popular Front led by Imomali Rahkmonov and elites from the southern Kulyab province. The conflict turned 

into a struggle between secularists and Islamists, leading to the death of 

at least 50,000 people, the displacement of some 800,000 and widespread 

economic devastation.

War weariness and military stalemate brought about the June 1997 

accord ending the hostilities. In return for disarming which occurred by 

1999, the opposition was to receive 30 percent of government posts until 

parliamentary elections in 2000 and, in fact, UTO members have been 

given government posts at national and local levels. Thus, Tajikistan is the 

only Central Asian country where the government has formally reached an 
HUMAN RIGHTS 103

agreement with the opposition about nominal power sharing, and where a 

legal Islamic political party may function openly.

While Rahkmonov largely has consolidated power and controls the 

countryside, former guerillas still hold sway in some areas, undermining 

overall stability. Several high-ranking officials have been assassinated, 

including a deputy interior minister, a former UTO political representative, a peace accords negotiator, a presidential foreign policy advisor, and 

a Minister of Culture. Democratic institutions and rule of law remain 

weak; most of the population is impoverished and the rebuilding of 

dysfunctional institutions has been slow. Drug use has risen sharply, and 

the country is a major transit points for narcotics. Moreover, the return 

of Islamist fighters from Afghanistan has raised concern about religious 

extremism. Tajikistan’s prospects hinge on whether, in this unpromising 

environment, the government can build democratic institutions, combat 

rampant corruption and develop the economy.

Tajikistan’s record on elections is poor. Rahkmonov became president in November 1994, subsequently extending his five-year term to 

seven. The OSCE declined to monitor the 1995 parliamentary elections, 

which the UTO refused to recognize while continuing its armed rebellion. 

In the November 1999 presidential elections, Rahkmonov ran alone: two 

candidates were excluded a month before the election, while Two others withdrew in protest. An Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) candidate 

was registered just before election day. On election eve, Rahkmonov and 

Abdullah Nuri, former UTO leader and now head of the IRP, agreed to 

hold fair, multiparty elections the following year to make up for the flawed 

presidential race.

But the February-March 2000 elections were preceded by violence, 

including bomb blasts in Dushanbe. A joint OSCE-UN mission cited 

many irregularities, concluding the election fell far short of OSCE standards. Still, six parties fielded candidates, giving voters some choice. The 

balloting itself was peaceful; all parties received free air-time on state 

media, and all candidates were permitted to hold rallies. Official tallies 

gave the ruling PDP about 65 percent, the Communist Party 23 percent, 

and the IRP 7 percent. By breaking the 5 percent threshold, the opposition 

was given two seats in parliament.

Though conditions for journalists have improved markedly since 

the civil war, the state controls many of the publishing and media outlets. 

The government offers “friendly advice” to reporters about content, and 

the State Committee on Television and Radio controls the issuing of licenses—which are expensive and require long waits. As a result, journalists 
104 OCHS

often exercise self-censorship. The government also maintains financial 

control by subsidizing nearly all publications and electronic facilities, as 

well as the country’s only publishing house. Still, the IRP maintains its 

own independent printing press.

Asia-Plus, an independent Tajik news agency, began broadcasting in 

September 2002, making it the capital’s first non-governmental source of 

information. Asia-Plus originally sought a license in 1998; its application 

was rejected in July 2002. President Rahkmonov, under international pressure, had to intervene to reverse the decision. Dushanbe remains without 

an independent television station, although independent stations do operate in other cities, particularly in the relatively liberal northern region of 

Soghd. In August 2002, TV Servis was granted a license to rebroadcast 12 

foreign television channels in Dushanbe.

Journalists who offend the government or powerful individuals risk 

arrests, beatings or worse. In May 2000, Saifullo Rahimov, the director of 

the state radio and television, was murdered. Saifadin Dostiev, correspondent of the Tajik-language service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 

(RFE/RL), was badly beaten the same month. However, Internews reported 

no beatings of journalists in 2002, and in July of the same year, charges 

were dropped against Dodojon Atovulloyev, exiled editor of Charoghi Ruz, 

which often had been critical of the government.

Freedom of assembly is limited in Tajikistan. NGOs and political 

groups must obtain permits from local authorities to demonstrate; demonstrations are rare and participants normally do not face reprisal. Permits for political rallies, however, are more difficult to obtain than those 

for NGO-related events. In May 2001, local Kulyab authorities obstructed 

an IRP meeting and briefly detained two members. The authorities 

strictly-controlled political demonstrations prior to the 1999 presidential 

elections.

Five political parties are registered in Tajikistan. Rahkmonov’s People’s Democratic Party is dominant; the leading opposition party is the 

IRP, which no longer calls for an Islamic state but rather a society in which 

“Muslims would be accorded a fitting place.” The IRP was registered in 

September 1999 following the reversal of a law prohibiting parties based 

on religious affiliation. Some IRP members occupy senior government 

posts (including Minister of Emergency Situations, Deputy Prime Minister, and most other deputy ministerial posts), and its members hold local 

positions as well.

Registration of political parties can be an arduous process. In several cases, applications were denied on technicalities, such as “insufficient 
HUMAN RIGHTS 105

membership,” or for unknown reasons. Six parties were banned in 1999 

alone, as was the Adolatkhoh (Justice) Party last year in two oblasts. Moreover, the government has “made politically motivated arrests, and there 

were credible allegations of cases of illegal government detention of rival 

political factions.”12

The NGO community is fairly active in Tajikistan; officials estimate 

some 2000 are operating. Freedom House (2002) reports that the government generally does not interfere in their operations, and that “groups 

that do not officially register are not necessarily illegal.” Advocacy by Tajik 

NGOs yielded Resolution 132, which slashed registration fees for community organizations and national-level NGOs. The number of registered 

NGOs dramatically increased in 2001: 320 NGOs were registered that year 

alone, a 35 percent increase from the previous year.

Though the Islamic party is legal and its representatives are in government, mosques and religious schools must be approved by the religious 

authorities (muftiate). Tajik authorities required all mosques to re-register 

two years ago, resulting in the closure of smaller and more radical ones, 

and religious schools had to submit their curricula to authorities. In an 

unpopular move, Tajik authorities also outlawed the use of loudspeakers for call to prayer in large cities. Although members of Hizb ut-Tahrir,

whose explicit goal is the non-violent restoration of the Caliphate, have 

been arrested in Tajikistan, the number of arrests is much smaller than in 

neighboring Uzbekistan, and trials appear to be more open.

Christian groups that do not comply with registration procedures 

have faced petty harassment, and others have had their applications turned 

down. In late 2001, three Christian churches were bombed. In one of these 

cases, Islamic extremists reportedly were involved; in the other two, three 

persons were accused and one escaped. Baha’i and Hare Krishna groups 

have experienced some instances of discrimination; in 1999, Abdullah 

Mugharebi, a prominent Baha’i leader, was murdered.

Turkmenistan

President Saparmurat Niyazov has created a near-totalitarian political 

system and one of the world’s most repressive regimes. He has not allowed 

alternative leaders, political parties, or movements to emerge and has 

maintained Soviet-style controls on a fearful populace. A defining feature 

of Niyazov’s political system is his cult of personality. He renamed himself 

Turkmenbashi “father of the Turkmen” and calls himself “The Great.” In 

2002, Niyazov released the Rukhnama, a book of his teachings that citizens 

must study, and he appears intent on displacing other sources of historical 
106 OCHS

information and spirituality.13 In August 2002, he renamed the months of 

the year, reserving two for himself and his deceased mother.

In November 2001, former Foreign Minister Boris Shikmuradov 

resigned from the government, fled the country, and declared his opposition to Niyazov. His move sparked other defections and marked the first 

time that a group of former high-ranking officials publicly declared their 

intention to topple Niyazov and formed a movement in exile to do so. Niyazov responded by purging the security apparatus—hitherto seen as his 

staunchest prop—and the military.

On November 25, 2002, official Turkmen sources reported an assassination attempt on Niyazov. Opposition representatives disclaimed 

any involvement and accused Niyazov of staging an attack to justify the 

mass arrests which followed. According to opposition and independent 

sources, scores of people, especially relatives of opposition leaders, have 

been jailed and tortured. Some, including Boris Shikmuradov, who was 

either captured or turned himself in at the end of December, have already 

confessed on television. At least two of those sentenced reportedly have 

died in prison.

Saparmurat Niyazov has never demonstrated the slightest inclination to loosen his control of Turkmen society, to rethink his views or to 

regard seriously his OSCE human rights commitments. There is no reason 

to expect any liberalization in Turkmenistan while he is in power or to 

believe that he will leave office voluntarily.

All elections in Turkmenistan have been farces. Races were uncontested in the December 1994 parliamentary election, and official figures 

claimed 99.8 percent turnout. Though seats were nominally contested in 

the December 1999 parliamentary elections, the ODIHR declined to send 

observers, concluding that the pre-election process “does not meet minimal OSCE commitments for democratic elections.”

Saparmurat Niyazov was the first Central Asian leader to cancel elections. In January 1994, he organized a referendum to extend his tenure in 

office until 2002; according to official results, 99.9 percent of the electorate 

cast ballots, and 99.99 percent of voters approved the initiative. In December 1999, the Halq Maslakhaty (People’s Council), ostensibly the country’s 

highest representative body but actually a rubber stamp for Niyazov, gave 

him the right to remain in office permanently. His virtual coronation as 

“president for life” flagrantly flouts OSCE commitments, which call for 

regular and competitive elections. Niyazov has since announced that he 

will remain in office until 2010, when contested presidential elections will 

be held.
HUMAN RIGHTS 107

There is no freedom of speech in Turkmenistan. All media are rigorously censored and glorify Niyazov. In May 2002, Freimut Duve, the 

OSCE’s Representative on the Media, offered the following assessment to 

the OSCE’s Permanent Council: “Turkmenistan . . . is the only member of 

the OSCE where currently media freedom . . . is non-existent . . . the notion of freedom of the media has not undergone any real changes since the 

days of the Soviet regime.” On December 12, Duve said, “In this ‘declared 

democracy’ the media are currently being used to humiliate and terrorise 

anybody who is even remotely contemplating the legitimacy of the current 

state of affairs. Some of the television programmes I have been informed 

about remind me of the show trials on Soviet radio and in the newspapers 

during the thirties.”

Freedom of association is forbidden in Turkmenistan, the only remaining one-party state in the former Soviet bloc. The Democratic Party 

is the sole registered party. No opposition groups were ever registered and 

none are allowed to function today. In May 2002, Niyazov said, “Turkmenistan will get a multiparty system and an opposition in time, but it 

has had more important things to do since independence, such as ensuring 

that the people’s living standards don’t plummet.” In fact, living standards 

have plummeted for the great majority of the population.

According to independent sources, there are about 500 NGOs in 

Turkmenistan, of which 60 are registered. However, no new NGOs have 

been registered since 1995, nor can NGOs engage in any activity that even 

hints of political opposition. In June 2002, representatives of various Turkmen parties and NGOs convened in Vienna. Turkmenistan’s oppositionin-exile formed a coordinating-consultative body, called the “Roundtable 

of the Turkmen democratic opposition.” Members include “Agzibirlik,” the 

Russian community of Turkmenistan, the Communist Party, the SocialDemocratic Party of Turkmenistan, the Board of Veterans of the Turkmen 

international warriors, the Turkmen diaspora in Afghanistan and Iran, the 

National Patriotic Movement of Turkmenistan, the National Democratic 

Movement of Turkmenistan, and the popular social movement “Mertebe.” 

To date, this body has held meetings and issued statements condemning 

ongoing human rights abuses but has not visibly been able to undermine 

Niyazov’s position.

There is no freedom of assembly in Turkmenistan. The atmosphere 

has been so repressive that one rarely even hears of attempts to organize 

demonstrations. Nevertheless, RFE/RL reported in April 2002 that protesters gathered outside the building of the Committee for National Security 

(KNB) in Ashgabat for the second day to complain about misdeeds by the 
108 OCHS

security organs and to demand the punishment of KNB members who 

violated the law.14 In August 2002, opponents of Niyazov’s regime reportedly distributed anti-government leaflets in the main bazaar in Ashgabat.

The most publicized demonstration in Turkmenistan took place in 

July 1995, when about 1,000 people marched in Ashgabat and called for 

new presidential and parliamentary elections. Subsequently, law enforcement officials described the marchers as “drug addicts” on television, and 

several participants remained in jails for years afterwards. They were released before Niyazov’s 1998 visit to Washington.

Turkmenistan allows no freedom of religion. The 1991 Law on 

Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, amended in 1995 

and 1996, requires religious groups to have 500 adherents in each locality 

wishing to register. Unregistered communities may not hold any religious 

meeting or proselytize. Individuals caught participating in such meetings 

risk monetary fines and criminal sanctions.15

Accordingly, approved religious communities are limited to government approved Sunni mosques and Russian Orthodox Churches. Government raids against unregistered religious groups are common, often followed by arrests and seizures of property. The government even bulldozed 

an unregistered Adventist Church in 1999, seized the property, and now 

is turning the site into a public park.16 While longtime Baptist prisoner 

Shalgeldi Atakov was released in January 2002, several Jehovah’s Witnesses 

remain jailed for refusing to swear an oath of loyalty to President Niyazov. 

Recently, Turkmen authorities forced a group of Protestants from a small 

eastern village to renounce their faith and swear an oath on Niyazov’s 

Ruhnama.

17

Uzbekistan

Under President Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan is a repressive police 

state, where opposition is banned, media are censored, and civil society has 

been crippled. Karimov apparently means to remain in power indefinitely 

and has manipulated elections for that purpose. None of the five parties 

in Uzbekistan’s parliament can even be remotely considered oppositionist. 

The courts are tightly controlled, sentencing those accused of political or 

religious crimes to long prison terms.

The most populous country of Central Asia, Uzbekistan is also the 

state where political Islam has emerged as a threat, particularly in the 

form of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which the U.S. Government has classified as a terrorist organization. For the last five years, 

Karimov’s regime has been engaged in a virtual war against religious Mus-
HUMAN RIGHTS 109

lims who want to worship outside state-controlled mosques. Uzbek and 

international human rights groups estimate that thousands of people have 

been jailed; planting of evidence is common, as is torture in prison. Karimov has ignored advice from many sources, including Washington, which 

warns that his crackdown only strengthens the radical Islamic dangers he 

claims to be combating.

Since the post-September 11 rapprochement with Washington, Karimov has made some gestures: He permitted the registration of an independent human rights organization, amnestied prisoners, and most recently, 

has claimed that pre-publication censorship has been lifted. In 2002, two 

cases were reported of policemen who had tortured detainees receiving jail 

terms. On August 29, 2002, Karimov urged “radical” democratic changes, 

telling parliament that the country is ready for freedom of the media, 

political activity, independent courts, and economic liberalism.18 Based 

on past practice, however, there is no reason to expect more than tactical 

concessions or to look forward to genuine political reform.

In the December 1991 presidential election, Karimov allowed Mohammad Solih, poet, writer, and leader of the opposition Erk party, to 

run. Abdurrahim Polat, leader of the opposition Birlik movement, was 

not allowed to register as a candidate. Official figures gave Solih about 12 

percent of the vote, in Uzbekistan’s last election with any suspense.

The OSCE refused to send observers to the 1999 parliamentary elections, in which five pro-government parties participated. In the January 

2000 presidential elections, which OSCE also did not monitor, the person 

permitted to run against Karimov said he would vote for the incumbent. 

Still, Karimov was not content with another five-year term. In January 

2002, Uzbekistan held a referendum which extended his tenure in office 

from five years to seven.

There is no freedom of assembly in Uzbekistan. Attempts to organize 

demonstrations are rare and participants are usually jailed. Still, on April 

23, 2002, more than 20 women protesting the torture of their relatives in 

prison gathered on a Tashkent street. They were quickly surrounded by 

militia and KGB and dragged into waiting buses. This was the second such 

attempted demonstration in recent months.19

On August 27, 2002, Uzbek authorities detained Elena Urlaeva and 

another woman who were protesting government abuses outside the 

Ministry of Justice. The next day, the two were transferred to a psychiatric 

hospital for compulsory treatment, including forced administration of 

drugs.20
110 OCHS

Freedom of association is not permitted in Uzbekistan. Karimov 

created several pro-government parties, perhaps to check the power of 

the National Democratic Party (successor to the Communist Party) and 

to create a semblance of pluralism. These parties include Adolat (Justice); 

Milliy Tiklanish (National Rebirth), and Fidokorlar, apparently Karimov’s 

favorite. However, since 1992, the opposition parties Erk and Birlik have 

not been able to participate in elections or distribute literature. Erk

spokesmen claim party members are in jail for their political activity and 

are tortured; Erk activists not in jail are closely monitored by police. A 

September 21, 2002 appeal by the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan 

listed eight of its members behind bars.

On April 4, 2002, Karimov said he would meet with opposition members in exile who return to Uzbekistan, particularly if they could promote 

economic reforms. His invitation extended only to those not involved in 

terrorist activities, especially the February 1999 explosions in Tashkent, 

and those who do not seek to reestablish the Caliphate, i.e., Hizb-ut-Tahrir. 

But there is no reason to expect sanctioned opposition parties soon.

After September 11, Karimov yielded to American pressure on behalf 

of independent human rights groups. Before Karimov’s visit to Washington in March 2002, the Ministry of Justice registered the Independent 

Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan, a breakthrough by Uzbek 

standards. Other independent human rights groups remain unregistered, 

although they do function. The best known is the Human Rights Society 

of Uzbekistan. Recently, several more have emerged, including Ezgulik

(Good Deed) and Mazlum (The Oppressed). On May 21, 2002, Ezgulik’s 

application for registration was rejected by the Ministry of Justice.

There is no freedom of speech in Uzbekistan. While stories about 

low-level corruption may appear, Karimov and his policies are off-limits. 

Those who try to print or distribute unsanctioned newspapers or bulletins, such as those associated with Erk or Birlik, risk criminal penalties. Karimov has himself criticized Uzbekistan’s media, skirting the issue of how 

media can develop in such a tightly run political system. On May 10, 2002, 

he raised the issue on national TV, acknowledging that, “Despite what is in 

our laws . . . we are still far from international standards. The media today 

is not the fourth estate that it is in all developed countries.”

Shortly thereafter, Uzbekistan’s chief censor lost his job and on 

May 13, for the first time, Uzbek newspapers were published without 

censorship. Nevertheless, the Committee to Protect Journalists declared 

in Tashkent on June 10 that little has changed, as the authorities “routinely encourage self-censorship by threatening critical journalists with 
HUMAN RIGHTS 111

imprisonment.” The CPJ called for the release from prison of journalists 

Mukhammad Bekjonov, Yusuf Rozimurodov, and Majit Abdurahimov.21

Karimov’s commitment to media freedom remains to be demonstrated 

and pending the publication of articles critical of government policy 

should not be taken seriously.

Uzbekistan’s government claims that Islam has regained its revered 

place after 70 years of Soviet atheism and indeed, many new mosques have 

been opened. But Karimov has always feared politicized Islam and sought 

to control religion. He has some reason to worry, especially about two organizations that openly challenge the state’s avowedly secular stance—the 

IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Party of Freedom). The IMU, which is linked 

to al Qaeda, has pledged to overthrow Karimov, and in 1999 and 2000 

staged incursions into Kyrgyzstan with the aim of establishing bases in 

Uzbekistan. Hizb-ut-Tahrir, though professedly non-violent, is openly 

anti-Semitic and anti-Western.

Accordingly, the Uzbek Government decides who may become an 

Imam and what can be preached in mosques.22 Moreover, Imams require 

periodic re-approval from the Muftiate, the State’s Committee on Religion 

and the National Security Committee. A 1998 law on religion restricts 

religious freedom to groups deemed a threat to national security, bans 

proselytizing and private religious instruction, and only permits government approved clerics to wear religious dress.23 Under 1999 amendments 

to the criminal code, individuals attending an unregistered group risk 

three to five years in jail for belonging to an “illegal” group. Individuals 

caught attending meetings of “banned” religious groups face up to 20 

years imprisonment.24

Since the February 1999 explosions in Tashkent, which Karimov 

called an assassination attempt and blamed on radical Muslims, thousands 

have been jailed for practicing Islam outside of government-regulated 

religious institutions, and for their affiliation with unregistered Islamic 

organizations. Human Rights Watch has documented more than 800 

such cases since 1999; detainees are held in secret, tortured, and denied 

access to counsel. At trial, judges ignore allegations of torture—used to 

extract confessions—and sentence defendants to as many as twenty years 

in prison for possessing or distributing unsanctioned religious literature, 

belonging to unofficial religious organizations, or adherence to religious 

ideals viewed as hostile to the state.

Christian communities exist in relative peace as long as they do not 

attempt to proselytize to indigenous groups not traditionally Christian. 
112 OCHS

Still, a Baptist church in a Tashkent suburb has been ordered closed, and 

Jehovah’s Witnesses have been fined and harassed.

Conclusion

In many aspects, citizens of Central Asian states enjoy less freedom 

than they did a decade ago. At that time, opposition movements could 

operate, even in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The press was freer in 

the early 1990s in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan than in 2002, and political 

pluralism had far better prospects. Tajikistan’s unhappy experience would 

seem to indicate that only violence can bring the region’s governments and 

opposition to terms.

Unfortunately, one cannot project with any confidence the development of democratic societies in Central Asia from today’s trends. More 

likely outcomes are variations of “strongman” regimes, where leaders-forlife control their country’s economic assets, while they and lower-level officials keep the press from informing the public about their misdeeds.

But the absence of even the possibility of normal politics leads to 

abnormal politics. The refusal of Central Asian leaders to allow turnover 

at the top or permit newcomers to enter the game means that outsiders 

have no stake in the political process and can imagine coming to power, 

or merely sharing in the wealth, only by extra-constitutional methods. 

Kyrgyzstan’s protest movement in 2002 is one form of the phenomenon; 

the recent reported assassination attempt on Turkmenistan’s Saparmurat 

Niyazov is another.

Only Kyrgyzstan offers some cause for cautious optimism. Akaev has 

pledged not to run for a third term in 2005. His stepping down would be 

unprecedented for the region, as would be a sincere, successful transfer 

of some of his presidential powers to other branches of government. The 

Kyrgyz model would not necessarily apply to neighboring states, whose 

leaders disdain Akaev as weak, but a redistribution of powers is a guidepost for reform. Perhaps more important, the 2002 demonstrations in 

Kyrgyzstan were the first large protests in Central Asia in years, indicating 

the depth of popular resentment and the capacity for public galvanization. 

They also showed Kyrgystan’s leaders, opposition and public, as well as the 

entire region, that “street politics” is effective, whereas no other vehicle of 

registering popular discontent and influencing government policy works. 

The lesson will not soon be forgotten.
HUMAN RIGHTS 113

Notes1

 This article is adapted from Ten Years After, a forthcoming report on the state of democratization and human rights in the twelve states of the Commonwealth of Independent States by the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, U.S. Congress. 2

 The organization was called the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 

until January 1995. 3

 The interested or skeptical reader can test this contention by looking up the reports of the 

OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which has monitored elections in Central Asia for years—except when ODIHR declined because the conditions were too poor 

to justify an observation mission. 4

 See, for example, the testimony of Assistant Secretaries of State Elizabeth Jones and Lorne 

Craner at a Helsinki Commission hearing “U.S. Policy Towards the OSCE,” October 10, 2002. 5

 For the best and most recent account, see Martha Olcott, “Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise,” 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington 2002. 6 RFE/RL Newsline, April 26, 2002. 7 RFE/RL Newsline, June 14, 2002. 8

 Peter Baker, “New Repression in Kazakhstan: Journalists Targeted After President Implicated 

in Scandal,” The Washington Post, June 10, 2002. 9

 International Religious Freedom Report-Kyrgyz Republic, Bureau of Democracy, Human 

Rights, and Labor, Department of State, 2001. 10 Igor Rotar, “Kyrgyzstan: New Decree Set to Tighten Religious Controls,” Keston News Service, February 8, 2002. 11 Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion and Belief of the OSCE/ODIHR, Analysis of the Draft Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On Freedom of Religion and Religious Organizations,” 

March 30, 2001. 12 U.S. State Dept. Country Report on Human Rights, March 2002.

13 In August 2002, he renamed the months of the year, reserving two for himself and his 

deceased mother. Claudia Rosett, “The Real World: Turkmenistan’s Dictator Is No Joke to Those He 

Rules,” The Wall Street Journal Europe, August 28, 2002. 14 An RFE/RL correspondent on the scene estimated the group to number 300 the first day, 

about 50 the next. Niyazov, in sacking high-ranking members of the KNB, complained the service had 

been selling drugs, as well as torturing suspects and raping young women. 15 International Religious Freedom Report-Turkmenistan, Bureau of Democracy, Human 

Rights, and Labor, Department of State, 2001. 16 Ibid.

17 Felix Corley, “Turkmenistan: Protestants Forced to Renounce Their Faith,” Keston News 

Service, May 17, 2002. 18 The Washington Post, August 30, 2002 19 Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, April 25, 2002.

20 Human Rights Watch, “Uzbek Rights Defender in Psychiatric Detention,” August 30, 2002.

21 Khabar Television, Almaty, June 11, 2002. RFE/RL Newsline, June 12, 2002.

22 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1993-Uzbekistan, Bureau of Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor, Department of State, (1994). Igor Rotar, “Special Report - Uzbekistan: 

Muslim Clergy Under State Control,” Keston News Service, April 23, 2002. 23 International Religious Freedom Report-Uzbekistan, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 

and Labor, Department of State, 2001. 24 Ibid.
114 OCHS
DEMOCRACY-BUILDING 115

115

Chapter 6

Democracy-Building 

in Central Asia 

Post-September 11

Sylvia W. Babus

Central Asia is back on the map of U.S. foreign policy. After the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the five 

“stans” of Central Asia became “frontline states” in the global war 

on terrorism, with important roles to play as strategic partners in military 

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Budgets for assistance funds soared. 

The bulk of the new funds paid for military equipment, training, and various forms of counter-terrorism programs. However, the heightened U.S. 

interest in closer strategic relationships with these states also was matched 

by renewed enthusiasm—and more money—for promoting democratic 

political development. In fact, the Bush administration’s new conceptual 

framework for national security strategy and foreign aid offered strong 

reasons to build democracy in Central Asia.

This chapter will examine the scope and character of the democracypromoting re-engagement in Central Asia. How much are we spending 

on such assistance, and what part does it play in our relationships with 

these states now? What kind of democracy promotion do we support, and 

how has our assistance changed over time? How does democracy promotion in Central Asia fit into the Bush administration’s plans for national 

security and foreign aid? Specifically, how has our assistance changed since 

September 11? Is our assistance worthwhile? Despite the persistence of 

obstacles in the Central Asian environment, and despite some fundamental contradictions and tensions in the U.S. policy formulations, optimism 

persists about the value and long-term promise of such assistance.

Foreign assistance practitioners are cheering America’s renewed 

interest in Central Asia and are eagerly expanding established democracybuilding assistance activities — or designing new ones. Some of these 
116 BABUS

initiatives are exciting, and all of them promise to enlarge the political 

space for political reform. However, all parties recognize that the room 

to maneuver is still extremely limited. None of the sitting governments 

appear ready to warm up to democracy just because the United States 

believes that repressive regimes produce discontent and potential terrorist 

recruits.

While some have charged that strategic-level alliances with today’s 

undemocratic strongmen in Central Asia ruin the chances for meaningful democracy promotion, this charge seems overdone. The path toward 

democracy in Central Asia was rough and steep well before September 11, 

and the follow-on U.S. rush to embrace these governments as partners in 

the war on terror. Most of those who are implementing America’s democracy-promoting assistance projects in Central Asia are both realistic and 

sophisticated about what can be accomplished. There is no reason to reject 

their faith that a prominent U.S. presence, coupled with greater visibility 

for Central Asia and attention to its societies, can enhance the possibilities 

for successful small steps forward in the coming years.

The Assistance Surprise: Suddenly, Close Ties with 

Central Asia

The Central Asian states did not take long to decide to support the 

U.S. war on terrorism, or the U.S. military action against the Taliban in Afghanistan.1

 By the end of September 2001, Russia had offered its support 

for a U.S. military presence in Central Asia, and all five states had offered 

use of their airspace, airports, roads, or bases in return for various forms 

of assistance. Agreements, memoranda, and joint declarations conveying 

these understandings were the subject of a number of high-level visits to 

and from the region in 2001 and 2002. In the case of Uzbekistan, a “nonspecific security guarantee” took the form of an American pledge to regard 

any external threat to Uzbekistani security “with grave concern.”2

Congress quickly granted President Bush’s request for more money 

to pay for expanded cooperation with the Central Asian (and other) 

frontline states, through supplemental appropriations in December 2001 

and March 2002 that designated nearly $150 million in additional funding.3

 The effect was to quadruple total assistance funds for Uzbekistan, 

nearly double funding for the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, while 

sizably increasing funds for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Some of the 

extra money did supplement assistance activities to support democratic 

and economic reform; however, the bulk of the funds were for securityrelated purposes. Much of this covered provision of equipment to support 
DEMOCRACY-BUILDING 117

enhanced border security capabilities by ground or airborne forces, communications equipment for interoperability with U.S. forces, as well as 

improved counter-narcotics capacity.4 The data for budgeted funds over 

the last four years is presented in Table 6–1. The trend in total obligated 

assistance funds appears also in Figure 6–1.

Table 6–1. Budgeted Assistance to the Central Asian States, 1999 – 2002 

(Millions)

1999 2000 2001 2002

Kazakhstan 74.49 71.04 74.92 86.25

Kyrgyzstan 64.19 50.11 41.60 93.53

Tajikistan 37.63 38.85 72.04 133.41

Turkmenistan 17.78 11.24 12.88 18.86

Uzbekistan 49.34 40.20 58.68 219.35

Data from the summary tables in “U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia, Fiscal Year 2002.” These figures 

represent total FSA and agency transfers budgeted, excluding the estimated value for donated commodity humanitarian assistance.

Figure 6–1. USAID Funds for Central Asia, 1996 - 2002
118 BABUS

Figure 6–2. Democracy Promotion as Part of USAID Assistance to the 

NIS, 1996-2002*

Just how much more money has been made available to promote 

democracy? Figure 6–2 gives a closer look at the trend in the proportion 

of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funds obligated 

for democracy and governance activities. These funds are not large when 

compared with the millions made available for security, military, and law 

enforcement, but they still represent an overall increase.6 Moreover, these 

funds were shared among a great many kinds of programs, ranging from 

activities to promote nuclear safety to medical advice about HIV/AIDS, to 

budget training, to student exchanges.7 On the other hand, most democracy promotion activities have been relatively inexpensive. Where other 

kinds of assistance provided materials or equipment, democracy promotion generally has emphasized training as well as conferences, seminars 

and materials and small grants for citizen groups.

Promoting Democracy While Fighting Terrorism

What is the role of democracy promotion assistance in the post-September 11 environment? Has the global war on terrorism swept aside the 

old dream of democratic transformation in the former Soviet republics?

*NIS refers to the 12 former Soviet republics (excludes the Baltic states); Obligated funds from Agency transfers. Data from USAID and the 

Annual Reports of the Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to Europe and Eurasia.
DEMOCRACY-BUILDING 119

Strategic partnerships with the decidedly undemocratic governments 

of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan certainly pose risks. Human rights groups quickly questioned the wisdom of 

closer ties to these states.8 Despite widespread agreement that the United 

States would need the broadest possible set of cooperative partners to 

exterminate the kind of terrorism that had so brutally attacked the U.S. 

homeland, the five Central Asian states were not attractive partners. In the 

words of one observer:

Courting these ex-Soviet republics has obliged the administration to 

cozy up to unsavory autocrats hitherto known chiefly for economic 

mismanagement, a contempt for democracy and human rights, and 

a single-minded determination to retain their hold on power by 

whatever means necessary . . . Freedom of religion does not exist, but 

then neither do most other freedoms, as the State Department’s own 

annual report on human rights demonstrates.9

Another critic pointed out that these states could try to exploit the 

partnership to avoid political and economic reform:

Clearly, these governments will wish to use the U.S. need for access 

to their territory to slacken pressure on them with regard to political 

and economic reform. Worse, aid money provided to autocratic governments may exacerbate corruption making better governance more 

difficult instead of less. They will also try to leverage their relationship 

with the United States in their regional rivalries with each other. And 

of course, the United States risks being associated with unpopular 

regimes in the eyes of the peoples of these countries, and suffering 

when those regimes eventually fall.10

From the outset, however, the Bush administration voiced their position that any partnership with these Central Asian governments would 

require the states to declare their commitment to democracy and market 

economies. Congress, too, wanted to ensure that the new security relationships would not eclipse U.S. support for democratic values. Proposed 

amendments to the legislation authorizing extra funding to the “frontline 

states” linked the new money to satisfactory human rights performance. 

There were no illusions: Everyone recognized that the Central Asian regimes were politically unsavory, and that it would be unwise—not to mention politically unacceptable—to neglect concerns about democracy and 

human rights when dealing with countries like the “Stans.”
120 BABUS

In every instance, agreements with the Central Asian states included 

provisions that renewed or confirmed their pledges to advance the reform 

agenda, both politically and economically. The U.S. side also affirmed its 

plans to continue efforts to promote democracy through foreign assistance 

to Central Asia, right along with heavy funding to re-equip and train 

military and security forces. While the increases in funding for democracy 

promotion are dwarfed by those for military and security assistance, more 

money for democracy really has been made available.

Fallow Ground: The Record of Democracy Promotion 

Prior to September 11

Initial efforts in the 1990s to promote democratic development in 

Central Asia did build contacts with reformers, exposed thousands to 

Western ideas, and helped local people experience the power of organized 

citizenry. However, the overall impact of the efforts by the United States 

and others was limited, given the authoritarian styles of the region’s firmly 

entrenched leaders. While not identical, all the Central Asian regimes to 

some extent restricted speech, limited citizen action, avoided competitive 

elections, stifled dissent, and suppressed or harassed potential opposition. 

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also resisted the emergence of markets and 

entrepreneurs, perhaps fearing the political consequences of a restructured 

economy they could not control. This restrictive environment retarded the 

emergence of local reformers, and limited the possibilities for democracy 

promotion by outsiders.

The bleak outlook for democracy promotion in Central Asia 

prompted a reorientation of assistance strategy. A five-year assistance 

strategy for Central Asia prepared by USAID in 2000 lamented the “overall lack of reform across the region.”11 Noting that the Eastern European 

model of a “rapid, structural transition to open market democracy is not 

appropriate for the Asian republics,” this new strategy called for a shift to a 

longer-term approach that would build pressure for change by expanding 

opportunities for citizen participation. That is, USAID would “concentrate 

assistance on selected organizations, enterprise and people at local levels to 

grow dialogue, pluralism, the non-governmental sector, and partnership 

to build common good and mutual interest in stable change.”12 In other 

words, USAID adopted a “democracy from below” approach, emphasizing 

indirect efforts to support a “more open, democratic culture, with emphasis on nongovernmental organizations, independent information and 

electronic media, and progressive parliamentarians.”13
DEMOCRACY-BUILDING 121

What had gone wrong? Primarily, it was anti-democratic behavior 

by governments. Each of the five Central Asian states provided some reason for disappointment. The bad news included Kyrgyzstan,14 which had 

seemed to be a success story for democracy promotion in Central Asia 

because of its “progressive leadership, vocal commitment to democracy 

and a market-based economy.”15 However, President Askar Akaev’s moves 

in 2001 to harass citizen groups and restrict independent media changed 

this assessment.16

Despite its initial pledges to join the world economy and create a 

democratic, secular system that would protect citizen rights, Uzbekistan 

proved resistant to both political and economic reform. USAID’s 2000 

report to Congress complained about the Uzbekistani government’s reluctance to introduce broad-based market reforms, and the “serious debilitating effect” of its restrictions on convertibility and access to foreign 

currency. “Citizen participation in economic and political life [in Uzbekistan] is limited and ill-informed. Political opposition to the regime is not 

tolerated, and the upcoming elections are not expected to meet international standards.”17 A more recent report charged that Uzbekistan’s leadership “remains entrenched in a closed and stagnant political and economic 

system . . . Citizens remain poorly informed and their participation in 

economic and political life restricted. Political opposition is not tolerated 

and interference with the independent media persists.”18

Kazakhstan, often praised for its economic reforms, began to draw 

criticism for its political shortcomings. Unfair presidential elections, 

crackdowns on the media, and restrictions of freedom of assembly provoked a complaint in USAID’s FY 2000 Congressional budget presentation 

that despite some “great strides” in civil society, “hoped-for changes have 

not occurred at the national level.”19

Very little serious democracy promotion could occur in Tajikistan 

until the civil war had ended and recovery was underway. A political settlement in 1997 eventually brought the opposition into the national political 

process and created important openings for U.S. assistance directed at 

democracy building. However, this was a late start, and the subsequent 

American assistance program was quite small.

Turkmenistan, with a government uninterested in change, was clearly 

the most difficult case. As USAID’s FY 2001 program summary noted, “the 

Government of Turkmenistan has not yet made a demonstrable commitment to democratic and economic reform. Turkmenistan remains a resolute one-party state with power vested in a communist-turned-nationalist 

leadership.”20
122 BABUS

These developments clearly showed that democracy promotion in 

Central Asia would be working, in practice, against governments. This 

seemed to make any real progress toward democracy building in this region part of a fundamentally political equation: Would the United States 

(and other democracy-promoting governments) be ready to pressure the 

governments of this region to tolerate and accept such programs? And 

how receptive would the Central Asian governments be to such pressures? 

Would further progress depend on unlikely political shifts within these 

states? 

Just two months before the September 11 attacks, Michael Parmly of 

the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 

outlined a rather depressing state of affairs in testimony on Central Asia 

before hearings on the Hill. While he indicated the United States would 

not give up its efforts to support the emergence of democracy in this region, his statement left little room for hope so long as the current Central 

Asian governments remained in power. Parmly’s statement on July 28, 

2001 is worth quoting at length:

The overarching goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia is to see these 

states develop into stable, free-market democracies, both as a goal in 

itself and as a bulwark against regional instability and conflict. This 

broader goal serves three core strategic interests: regional security, 

political/economic reform and energy development. While our security and energy interests are important, in the long run none of these 

goals can be achieved until these governments undertake comprehensive reforms to enfranchise their people both economically and 

politically. . . . 

We have therefore encouraged, both through across-the-board political engagement and a variety of assistance programs, the formation 

of democratic civil societies and the development of free-market 

economies . . . In some countries, there has been progress on economic reform. However, despite such efforts, progress towards democracy has been uneven at best, while in places like Turkmenistan, 

it is almost non-existent. Even more disturbing, however, has been 

the varying degrees of backsliding in countries like Kazakhstan and 

Kyrgyzstan . . . Political accountability, particularly as embodied by 

national elections, is the most obvious and well-monitored aspect of 

democracy. In this area, the Central Asian republics have performed 

abysmally . . . .
DEMOCRACY-BUILDING 123

Unfortunately, our efforts to promote democracy and respect for 

human rights in Central Asia have not been enough. Indeed, these 

governments seem to be giving up on the reality of democracy 

(though they cling to the rhetoric). As a result, we have altered our 

approach. Democracy and human rights issues take up more of the 

agenda in our bilateral discussion . . . In addition we have reoriented 

our assistance programs to these states, shifting our democracy, 

economic and humanitarian assistance more toward direct grants to 

local communities or via local NGOs [non-governmental organizations], and rely less on government to government aid.21

Ambassador William Taylor, then serving as the U.S. Coordinator 

for U.S. Assistance to the New Independent States,22 also appeared at 

these hearings. He raised the practical problem associated with the factors 

Parmly had described: “What can the United States do to help the people 

of Central Asia create democratic societies, given the fact that their governments are standing in the way of reform?”23 This constraint, he said, 

explained why our democracy programs in Central Asia are “targeted 

almost exclusively at the non-governmental sector, with the exception of a 

few programs that work with reform-oriented local governments.” He also 

noted the importance of support for local independent media outlets and 

praised the popular academic and professional exchanges that were exposing so many of Central Asia’s young generation to the West.

Based on testimony by Ambassador Taylor and other regional experts, U.S. assistance providers had lowered their expectations for democratic change in Central Asia well before September 11, and shifted gears to 

longer-range strategies. This might be described as “democracy promotion 

from below,” but how bold would such a strategy be? Whatever assumptions one makes about U.S. capabilities and resources, no foreign government can force change on an unwilling society. Even where groups and 

individuals in a foreign state are receptive or even eager for democratic 

change, official U.S. assistance programs to support them can only operate by agreement with the host government. Such governments may resist, 

inhibit, or forbid efforts to enhance civil society and empower citizens at 

the grass roots.24 How far would the U.S. government be willing to go, and 

how successful would its attempts to carry out democracy building be?

Long-time democracy assistance providers have reacted differently 

to the range of options available. Some of them have objected strenuously 

to any suggestion that the United States “give up” by limiting support for 

pro-democracy forces in undemocratic countries. Everyone seems to sup-
124 BABUS

port educational exchanges that may prepare more pro-democratic future 

generations, and sing the praises of support for the emergence of civil 

society in former socialist states.25 But for those impatient to see progress, 

educational exchanges and efforts to promote cultural change are not 

enough. The poor prospects for indigenous democratic reform in Central 

Asia brought new attention to the foreign policy priorities that would be 

set by the new U.S. administration under President George W. Bush.

The Bush Administration Reframes Assistance Policies

The conceptual framework behind the Bush administration’s new 

National Security Strategy, and a fresh approach to foreign assistance, give 

democratic values a prominent place. However, the new concepts have 

produced some still-unresolved tensions between national security and 

democracy promotion activities in Central Asia.

USAID, under its new Administrator Andrew Natsios, had already 

begun to redefine foreign assistance in ways that would emphasize performance, accountability, and cost-effectiveness. Essentially, this new approach stressed that assistance designed to support democratic development and market reforms would be wasted if it were given to governments 

unable or unwilling to pursue reforms. Early in 2002, USAID released a 

commissioned study26 that buttressed these ideas by examining the accumulated experience of development assistance. This work attributed 

some of the failures of development assistance to faults of the recipient 

states themselves, noting that those performing most poorly had failed 

to achieve either democracy or good governance. Accordingly, the report 

offered five suggestions for promoting—and rewarding—political will to 

reform:

■ Levels of foreign assistance must be more clearly tied to development performance, and to demonstrations of political will for 

reform and good governance.

■ Good performers must be tangibly rewarded.

■ If there is no political commitment to democratic and governance 

reforms, the United States should suspend government assistance 

and work only with nongovernmental actors.

■ The United States should use its voice, vote and full influence 

within the World Bank and other multilateral development banks 

to terminate development assistance to bad governments and to 

focus on countries with reasonably good governance.

■ The United States must work closer with other bilateral doors to 

coordinate pressure on bad, recalcitrant governments.27
DEMOCRACY-BUILDING 125

This analysis also reflected impatience with undemocratic, nonreforming governments:

Only if governance becomes more democratic and accountable will 

development occur in the poorly performing countries. And only 

with a comprehensive, consistent, ‘tough love’ approach from the 

international community is political will for governance reform likely 

to emerge and to be sustained . . . Political leaders must learn that 

they will pay a heavy international price for bad governance, forfeiting material resources and becoming more isolated diplomatically . . . 

Strategies for promoting democracy and good governance must focus 

relentlessly on generating and sustaining political will for systemic 

reform, with diplomacy and aid working hand in hand.28

President Bush incorporated the key elements of this incentive- and 

performance-based concept of foreign assistance in his proposal for a 

Millenium Challenge Account (MCA), announced in March 2002. His 

plan proposed a $5 billion annual increase in assistance to developing 

countries with the funds intended to support development projects by 

poor countries that have enacted sound policies and achieved some measurable progress. A key element of the MCA is the plan to fund projects 

proposed by developing countries themselves.29 Congress has accepted this 

program, but at much lower levels of initial funding. Considerable controversy remains over how to identify qualifying countries and administer 

the assistance. Despite tough talk about the need to promote political will 

for democratic development, the overall approach of the MCA makes it 

inapplicable to the Central Asian states. Instead, the MCA is directed at 

reducing poverty more efficiently by working with reform governments 

in very poor states.30

But while a shift toward a “tougher” development assistance strategy 

seemed at odds with the new funding commitment to the Central Asian 

states, the Bush administration’s strategy for dealing with terrorist threats 

appeared consistent with it. The National Security Strategy issued in September 2002 noted, “poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make 

weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels.”31 Repression 

also makes states vulnerable to terrorists. Hence, democratic reform—and 

efforts by foreign allies and supporters to promote democratic reform—

offer an antidote to the growth of terrorism. Democratic reforms are expected to promote good governance and improve prospects for prosperity, 

while also defusing unrest by assuring all citizens a voice and improving 

the prospects for justice. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Lynn Pascoe 
126 BABUS

in testimony to Congress on U.S. policy toward Central Asia made a practical link to assistance policy:

Authoritarian governments and largely unreformed economies, we 

believe, create the conditions of repression and poverty that could 

well become the breeding grounds for further terrorism . . . Thus, not 

only do we believe it is strongly in our national interest to engage fully 

with these governments to urge the political and economic reforms 

that we judge are essential to alleviate the conditions that breed terrorism, but we also firmly believe it is in these countries’ own national 

interests. When citizens, and especially youth, feel that they have a 

voice in how they are governed, when they believe that they have an 

economic stake in the future, then they are less likely to be attracted 

to a radicalized path cloaked in Islam that offers a utopian solution 

to their discontent. It is extremely difficult to convince Central Asian 

leaders that long-term economic and democratic reforms are necessary to 

eliminate the roots of terrorism if we are not willing to help them counter 

terrorism in the short term and prove that we will be engaged for the long 

term. (Italics supplied)32

How Does the United States Promote Democracy in 

Central Asia?

Dozens of programs, activities, and projects by many different U.S. 

government agencies and departments reflect the great variety of U.S. interests involved in our relationships with these countries. Most offer some 

form of technical assistance (advice and training), although a few provide 

equipment, and some give commodities, such as medicine, or surplus agricultural products that can be sold to support a designated purpose. Not 

all programs address development: U.S. assistance programs range from 

arms control efforts that involve dismantling and destroying weapons and 

support for safeguards to prevent the theft of nuclear materials, to training for public health and law enforcement officials. In contrast to the scale 

and costs of many of those programs, democracy-building activities generally involve relatively low-cost in-country training, advisors, and smallgrants. USAID is the main administrator of such assistance, planning and 

monitoring activities it funds primarily through U.S. NGOs or companies 

under contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements.33 USAID Missions 

abroad oversee implementation of the assistance, and play a critical role in 

ensuring that this aid is designed and assessed for results and impact.
DEMOCRACY-BUILDING 127

Since American assistance began in the wake of the collapse of the 

Soviet Union, USAID has modified its strategies, specific assistance objectives, and methods incrementally and often. While it is true that almost any 

U.S.-sponsored assistance can be considered to contribute to democratic 

development, at least indirectly, USAID has identified several categories 

of democracy-promoting assistance that apply in most countries. This is 

a long list that can be sorted in various ways. By purpose these activities 

promote the rule of law, including fair legal procedures, civil and human 

rights, free speech, and independent courts; citizen participation in public 

life; democratic political processes, including competent legislatures, competitive elections, political parties; independent media; responsible local 

government; independent trade unions; civic education; and civil society.

The activities funded in the Central Asian states present similar packages, with variations that have reflected the opportunities and constraints 

in each society, political and economic circumstances, as well as overall 

socio-political conditions as they have evolved. The mix of assistance 

activities also has responded to emerging problems, and shifted focus as 

experience closed off or opened new areas of concern—or as funding levels rose or fell. This process of adaptation and adjustment is supported by 

regular program reviews and reports, as well as by assessments and evaluations contracted in particular activity sectors for specific countries.

Democracy-Promotion Packages Before and After 

September 11

The five Central Asian states present different needs and problems. 

A closer look at the democracy promotion packages before and after September 11 shows both the similarities and the variations. Turkmenistan, 

led by Saparmurat Niyazov, opted for a foreign policy of “positive neutrality,” and remained uninterested in committing to Western-style reform. 

Tajikistan suffered civil war and faced recovery, political restructuring, 

and the need for reform, all at the same time. Desperately poor Kyrgyzstan 

embraced economic, fiscal and trade policy reform, and at first welcomed 

assistance that helped strengthen an emerging civil society. Kazakhstan, 

with key nuclear and space installations, quickly built solid security relationships with the West and set out to establish a market economy as well; 

however, democratic forms were shoved aside in the rigged elections of 

1999. Uzbekistan was blessed with many natural resources, but limited its 

economic development options by turning away from Western-sponsored 

economic reforms. The Uzbekistani government says it is threatened by 
128 BABUS

radical Islam, and uses this threat to justify harsh suppression of political 

and religious dissent.

In general, the political environment in all five Central Asian states 

has left little room for outsiders to encourage citizen empowerment or 

democratic laws and practices. All five governments have been unreceptive 

or actively hostile to some forms of democracy-building assistance activities, and all these governments stand accused of serious human rights 

abuses. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe (OSCE), none of the elections in the region have met international 

standards for fair practices.34 It is not surprising that the array of democracy-promoting assistance activities in each of the Central Asian states 

are somewhat similar, reflecting comparable circumstances and limitations as well as some common social features. The array of activities also 

reflects USAID’s choices of programs appropriate to the agency’s overall 

strategy for promoting democracy in the region. USAID’s shift toward 

the non-governmental sector, work with citizens at the grass roots, and 

long-range programs, such as student exchanges, affected portfolios in all 

five countries.35 By 2001, so little money was being spent on democracy 

promotion that even modest funding increases after September 11 meant 

doubling the resources for some existing activities, and unexpected funding for some new initiatives. USAID programming accounted for some 

of these increases, but grants issued by the State Department Bureau for 

Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) funded the most innovative 

steps. The DRL grants, made through the Human Rights and Democracy 

Fund, have emphasized political party building, training for human and 

civil rights advocacy, and support for free and independent media.36

In Uzbekistan, increasing citizen participation in non-governmental 

organizations was the chief emphasis through training, small grant programs, and civil society support centers. Counterpart International, the 

Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia (ISAR) and Winrock 

International implemented these activities. Specialized advice on NGO 

legislation to help Uzbekistanis secure a better legal climate for citizen 

groups was provided by the International Center for Not for Profit Law 

(ICNL). USAID also funded Internews, an organization specializing in 

media development, to provide support to some independent local television stations, and to train journalists, including training on media law 

and legal rights. The American Bar Association’s Central and East European Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI) provided modest programs of training 

and technical assistance to support legal professionals and help advance 

important reform legislation, as well as women’s legal literacy. In view of 
DEMOCRACY-BUILDING 129

Uzbekistan’s persistent failure to follow international standards for free 

and fair elections, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems 

(IFES) had bypassed technical elections assistance in favor of a civic 

education program for high school students, but this had ended before 

September 11.

How did this set of activities change after September 11? The activities underway or in the planning stages today represent a slightly different 

mix of old and new.37 In Uzbekistan, the established programs already 

underway received additional funding which enabled them to expand 

their work to reach more people. Counterpart started a new civic advocacy 

program for NGOs, and ABA/CEELI opened the first free human rights 

legal clinic at Tashkent’s main law school—to be followed by another in 

Namangan. Freedom House began a program to train and support human 

rights defenders and opened three resource centers for human rights 

NGOs that offer internet access, reference materials, and meeting space.38

Both the National Democratic Institute (NDI)and the International Republican Institute (IRI) received funding to support political party building through training and seminars. Complementing an extension of an 

internet access program to Uzbekistani schools, USAID established a new 

program to support basic educational reform. The new money also funded 

two information initiatives: one on anti-trafficking, and the other, a new 

civic education project for high schools that may start in 2004. The Community Connections program began taking Uzbekistani professionals and 

entrepreneurs to the United States for short-term internships and training. 

Another new idea is a Central Asia regional project called the Community 

Action Investment Program (CAIP). CAIP works to defuse potential ethnic conflict by stimulating multi-ethnic community problem solving. This 

project initially targeted communities in the Ferghana valley, a troubled 

border region between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan; but also 

parts of southern Uzbekistan, Lebap in Turkmenistan, and Shymkent and 

Turkestan in Kazakhstan.

In Kazakhstan, democracy promotion included a broad program of 

support for civic participation, as well as a set of activities to promote more 

effective and accountable local governments. Counterpart International 

provided training and grants to NGOs, supported civil society resource 

centers, and worked with ICNL and other donors to promote NGOfriendly legislation. ISAR promoted advocacy and community education 

by environmental citizen groups. Internews supported independent media 

and trained professional journalists. ABA/CEELI helped build professional 

associations of lawyers and judges, encouraged reforms in legal education, 
130 BABUS

and assisted those working for an independent judiciary. IFES introduced 

and supported a civic education program for high schoolers that spread 

widely. The International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) provided 

public access internet sites and training. The International City/County 

Managers Association implemented activities directed at local government 

officials designed to improve their management skills, their commitment 

to citizens, and their willingness to include citizen input.

After September 11, all democracy-promoting activities in Kazakhstan expanded somewhat. NDI received additional funding to support a 

full-time trainer, and thus increased its capacity for training political parties and democratic activists. NDI also expanded its civic advocacy work. 

The IRI established a presence and resumed its party-building work. More 

money has been allocated to support independent media through help for 

the National Association of Broadcasters and a production fund administered by Internews. Freedom House will be starting a new program of 

support for human rights defenders. Assistance to support judicial training is up, and the new CAIP began its work in ethnically mixed cities near 

the border with Uzbekistan. The National Endowment for Democracy 

received more money for grants to support public discussion on political 

issues.

Kyrgyzstan’s set of democracy promoting assistance activities included elements similar to those in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. However, 

greater progress in the development of civil society, citizen advocacy, legal 

reform, and elected local governments enabled these assistance programs 

to have more advanced objectives. Civic organizations had begun to form 

social partnerships at the local level, and had demonstrated skill in forming coalitions to advocate for or against proposed legislation on a national 

basis. ABA/CEELI’s rule of law program established legal information 

centers, and assisted Parliament with the development of a manual on 

legislative drafting. The NDI worked closely with a non-partisan national 

civic organization, the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, hosted 

seminars for political parties, and also conducted programs to support 

professional development of the members of Parliament.

New elements in Kyrgyzstan’s democracy promoting assistance activities after September 11 included funding for an independent printing 

press; a new program in basic education; training and grants through the 

National Endowment for Democracy for human rights NGOs; support for 

NGO advocacy campaigns; and the region-wide CAIP, designed to reduce 

the potential for conflict in ethnically mixed areas. Freedom House has 

begun a program to support human rights defenders. Additional funds 
DEMOCRACY-BUILDING 131

meant expanded efforts by existing activities—such as ABA/CEELI’s work 

with lawyers and law students, and ARD/Checchi’s commercial law training, and programs that support independent media. Both the NDI and 

the IRI received funding from the State Department’s Human Rights and 

Democracy Fund (HRDF) to support work in Kyrgyzstan.39 NDI and IRI 

programs work to promote the growth of democratically oriented political 

parties and parliamentary factions, foster the development of civil society, 

and encourage constructive dialogue between government and opposition 

groups. NDI has received additional support for its civic advocacy work, 

and its assistance to a dozen civil society resource and information centers. 

The Urban Institute’s local government program was reoriented slightly to 

stress work with local governments to cultivate a more democratic civic 

culture—including support for public hearings.

Funding for Turkmenistan’s democracy promotion assistance was 

tiny, even when compared with the budgets for the other Central Asian 

states. Assistance designed to promote democratic culture focused on 

Counterpart’s program to help build non-political, non-governmental 

organizations and develop citizen advocacy. ABA/CEELI and others provided a smattering of training, seminars, and technical assistance to law 

students, legal professionals, and journalists. After September 11, the 

increase in funding for Central Asia meant that the existing NGO-support activities could expand, and gave them more money for community 

development grants and for the kind of civil society resource centers that 

had proved so helpful in other countries. The regional CAIP would be active in Turkmenistan as well, but has been slow getting started because of 

host government reluctance. USAID decided to use some of the new funds 

to introduce a basic education project that would help retrain teachers 

and introduce a modern curriculum into Turkmen schools—a long-term 

method for promoting democratic culture.

In Tajikistan, democracy promotion began modestly after the end of 

the civil war. Support for NGOs that promoted reconciliation and encouraged citizen participation in elections were key aspects of the initial efforts. 

USAID also funded training for political parties and legislators, voter education, civic education, and development work with legal professionals, 

journalists, and teachers. Small grants to NGOs supported advocacy campaigns that pressed for citizen access to Parliament and helped secure laws 

friendly to citizen groups and independent media. After September 11, 

the programs already underway received some additional funding. New 

initiatives included a civic advocacy center; a civic education program; 

anti-trafficking activities; a training program for journalists; more train-
132 BABUS

ing for judges, lawyers, and law students; and a local government activity 

that offers training to city officials. With support from the Educational 

and Cultural Affairs Bureau at the State Department, IREX started a small 

grants program to train local media on anti-trafficking. The increased 

funds also supported new efforts in basic education, legal literacy campaigns, and a set of conflict prevention programs—including Tajikistan’s 

substantial share of the CAIP.

Renewed Democracy Promotion: Is It Worthwhile?

An in-depth assessment of the impact of U.S. democracy promotion 

in Central Asia is clearly beyond the scope of this brief account. Practitioners who implement the small but vigorous activities in Central Asia 

are enthusiastic, and believe much more useful work could be done there. 

From their perspective, democratic development and the outlook for 

those who seek democratic change benefits when the United States takes a 

stand in its favor. This may be especially true for those who speak against 

human rights abuses. They—and their foreign supporters—are convinced 

that U.S. interest in their fate helps keep them alive and active.40 Others 

are less hopeful about the merits of the re-engagement and more skeptical 

about the U.S. government’s commitment to promote democracy while 

pursuing strategic partnerships against terrorism, despite many official 

statements confirming that both goals are central ones.41

Many recent assessments are gloomy. Martha Brill Olcott claims 

“developments are not moving in directions that the United States would 

want them to go. Central Asian leaders have made many promises that 

they would support democratic reform, but most of them are proving to 

be quite hollow.” Acknowledging that U.S. assistance efforts “remain limited in scope and by necessity take the long-term view of the problem,” she 

nonetheless concluded that overall, “the past year has been a dismal one for 

anyone who supports the goal of democratic transition in Central Asia.”42

Fiona Hill of the Brookings Institution has said that the new spotlight on 

Central Asia “has had little positive impact on domestic developments . . . 

Indeed, in the case of Central Asia, the war on terrorism has empowered 

governments to continue aggressive campaigns against their opponents 

and given an added impetus to repression.”43

Lorne Craner, head of the State Department Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, has visited the region many times, and 

has spoken eloquently and often about the importance the U.S. places 

on the promises that our Central Asian partners have made to respect 

human rights.44 However, human rights organizations have objected to his 
DEMOCRACY-BUILDING 133

bureau’s report on human rights support efforts as unrealistically optimistic.45 The acting Assistance Coordinator, Tom Adams, recently provided an 

overall assessment that was upbeat, but offered frank appraisals of the “less 

than rosy” picture on democratic reform, where “noticeable backsliding” 

had occurred. Taking a historical view, he noted that “the Soviet successor 

states have faced more difficult transitions than initially anticipated – both 

due to their long tenure under Soviet rule and their lack of historical experience with democratic and market systems.”46 A similar tone of realistic, 

resigned, and unhappy appraisal appeared in USAID’s most recent budget 

presentation to Congress:

While economic growth for [Eurasia] has been positive, social conditions are dismal and trends in democratic freedoms are unfavorable . 

. . Lackluster reform in several countries has increased their economic 

and political isolation. With widespread corruption and an incomplete reform process, public trust in government and private institutions continues to deteriorate . . . Funding increases in Central Asia 

pose a different challenge. There, USAID is managing a greater magnitude of assistance resources with limited staff who manage activities 

in five countries. The program challenge is to continue pressing for 

progress in democracy and human rights within the context of high 

budget levels resulting from their cooperation in the war on terror.47

The Future: Keep On Keeping On

Clearly, the United States will continue its efforts to support democratic development in Central Asia. Whether or not the level of funding 

and energy applied to this task will survive the inevitable fall-off in intensity of our strategic cooperation with these states in the war on terrorism 

remains to be seen.48

Our approach to the newly independent states of Central Asia began 

with contradictions, and remains constrained by competing goals, assumptions and needs. In time, we learned that democracy building in 

these former socialist states will be a long process, and can become irreversible only if the next generation internalizes the norms, habits, and 

discipline of daily democratic practice. Experience has shown many ways 

that outsiders can help the process along, but also has taught respect for 

the complexity of the transformation task. To ensure success, each of these 

countries also must nurture its own democracy advocates who can and 

will lead the transformation, and forge a new civic culture to support and 

sustain the new system.
134 BABUS

Foreign assistance in support of fundamental political transformation is a tricky business. Realists recognized that a true restructuring of 

the political system in the former Soviet republics would be a mammoth 

challenge. And despite pro-democracy declarations by the new leaders, 

the lack of democratic experience and the strength of statist approaches 

and attitudes presaged a long and difficult road. It did not take long to 

learn that pro-democracy assistance programs were a hard sell in Central 

Asia. Across the region, assistance programs accordingly adopted a longer 

time frame for thinking about democracy building, and shifted toward 

programs that were less overtly political or threatening to the sitting regimes.49

The mix of U.S. interests in the region has lent an interesting dynamic to relationships with these states, with some interesting effects on 

our democracy building activities. Security interests and larger foreign 

policy concerns in the region appeared at first to complement the efforts 

to help these states transform their economic and political systems. For 

example, the United States established a large presence very early in Kazakhstan, in order to support the removal of this large state’s many nuclear 

weapons, employ its weapons scientists, and improve safety and security 

at its nuclear research institutions. This cooperative effort laid a solid 

foundation for security cooperation and good working relationships with 

its new government. Kazakhstan, along with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, 

also proved quite receptive to the various military training and exchange 

opportunities provided through NATO’s nonthreatening Partnership for 

Peace.50 All three states also helped build the Central Asian Peacekeeping 

Battalion, and participated in associated training. A steady traffic of military delegations to and from the United States paralleled a similar movement of administrators, educators, economists, and health officials invited 

to the United States for training. Promotion of trade and commerce in the 

region also seemed to have a reinforcing effect on our interest in economic 

transformation and serious movement toward world trade standards and 

free markets. 

The Global War on Terrorism drove an American re-engagement in 

Central Asia—one that has included a re-energizing of our support for 

democracy there. This has brought a re-examination of lessons already 

learned about post-socialist transformations, and a search for a more effective mix of techniques and approaches that can achieve real progress 

without alienating the current regimes that ultimately may be affected by 

such changes.
DEMOCRACY-BUILDING 135

The prospects seem mixed: The United States now has additional 

handicaps to overcome in convincing Islamic populations of its good 

intentions. Should the main currents of political reform in Central Asia 

takes an Islamic form, U.S. democracy promotion must remain appropriate to these cultural settings, while offering realistic and achievable alternatives to the region’s entrenched autocracies. The political space is small, 

and the tolerance of these governments to outside meddling is likely to be 

low. However, even if America and its allies cannot find ways to leverage 

their new strategic role into greater local tolerance for democracy promotion efforts, the renewed engagement in support of democracy in Central 

Asia will still nurture constituencies for future change.

Notes1

 See chapter 21 in this volume on U.S. security relations with Central Asia.

2

 For details about the reactions of Central Asian states to the September 11 attacks, and the 

first steps toward security cooperation with the U.S. against terrorism and the Taliban, see Jim Nichol, 

“Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” CRS Issue Brief 

IB93108, Updated April 1, 2003, 2-4 and 11-12. Previous versions of this IB were issued in August, October, and November 2002. The U.S.-Uzbekistan Declaration on their strategic partnership of March 

2002 is available at <www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/2002/11711pf.htm>. 3

 Details regarding assistance in FY2002 may be found in Nichol, IB93108 as updated for 

August 30, 2002, 1415. The supplemental funds came through existing instruments (the Freedom 

Support Act, which authorizes assistance to the former Soviet Union), as well as through the new 

Emergency Response Fund. 4

 Details are available in the country assessments, in “U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia, Fiscal Year 2002,” the Annual Report of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, at <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c10250.htm>. Another source 

for information about U.S. assistance programs by country and region is the annual USAID Budget 

Presentation to Congress, available at <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/>. USAID’s Washington 

headquarters houses specialists in development and democracy assistance, supports strategic planning, compiles lessons learned, and oversees adjustments to assistance strategy and implementation. 

As a results-oriented organization, USAID routinely re-examines its assumptions about development, 

and the models and expectations that underlie the goals and objectives of its assistance programs. 

Such models and strategies are not just academic exercises, as they build on accumulated experience 

in many countries and incorporate awareness of the tools and methods appropriate and acceptable to 

their foreign hosts. While USAID is not directly involved in designing assistance sponsored by other 

government agencies, its staff and specialists often indirectly contribute to such plans. Some of these 

other-Agency assistance programs contribute to the promotion of democracy directly or indirectly. 

The most important such pro-democracy programs are lodged in the State Department. These include 

educational exchanges run by the Education and Cultural Affairs Bureau, visitors and educational assistance programs run by the Public Affairs Bureau, and grant funding to support human rights and 

democracy from the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. The office for coordination of 

U.S. assistance to Europe and Eurasia (housed in the State Department) holds responsibility for overall 

coordination and tracking and covers all sources of U.S. assistance in its annual reports. 5

 It should be noted that identifying which assistance funds support “democracy” can be tricky, 

and practices vary somewhat. Some accounts do not include educational exchange programs. 6

 The diversity of these assistance categories and activities can be reviewed in the annual reports of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, available on the internet at <http://
136 BABUS

www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c10250.htm>. An excerpt from the table of contents of the FY2001 report 

(Appendix A) provides a handy list of all the agencies that provide assistance. 7

 See, for example, Bonnie Docherty, Dangerous Dealings: Changes to U.S. Military Assistance 

Since September 11 (Human Rights Watch, 14:1, February 2002) available at www.hrw.org and Jennifer Windsor, Executive Director of Freedom House, Testimony before the House Committee on 

International Relations, July 9, 2003 on the State Department’s report on “Supporting Human Rights 

and Democracy.” (The testimony is available at <www.freedomhouse.org>.) Note that Freedom House 

(Nations in Transit 2002) rates all five Central Asian states as either “autocracies” or “consolidated 

autocracies.” 8

 Andrew J. Bacevich, “Steppes to Empire,” The National Interest (Summer 2002), 44. 9

 Charles Fairbanks, “Being There,” The National Interest (Summer 2002), 40. Among the 

many others who raised such questions are: Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, “New Friends, 

New Fears in Central Asia,” Foreign Affairs (Mar-Apr 2002), 61-70; Elizabeth Wishnick, Growing U.S. 

Security Interests in Central Asia (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2002); Jessical T. 

Mathews, “September 11, One Year Later: A World of Change,” Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace Policy Brief 18, August 2002 [available at <www.ceip.org>]; Thomas Carothers, “Promoting 

Democracy and Fighting Terror,” Foreign Affairs (Jan-Feb 2003), 84-93; and the pair of articles on 

America in Central Asia by Charles Fairbanks and Andrew J. Bacevich in The National Interest (Summer 2002), 39–53. 10 USAID’s Assistance Strategy for Central Asia 2001-2005, USAID Regional Mission for Central 

Asia, July, 2000. Available at <www.usaid.gov/regions/Europe_ eurasia/car/PDABS400.pdf> (accessed 

in November 2002) Hereafter: USAID Central Asia Strategy 11 USAID Central Asia Strategy.

13 While the state is commonly called “Kyrgyzstan,” the Constitution of 1993 refers to the 

government as the “Kyrgyz Republic.” 14 From USAID’s FY2001 Budget Justification program summary for Kyrgyzstan, available at 

<http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001/ee/kg/>. 15 The statement of Michael Parmly, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of 

Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, before the Subcommittees on International Operations and 

Human Rights, and Middle East and South Asia of the House Committee on International Relations, 

July 18, 2001, is available at <www.Eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav072701a.html> 

(Acessed June 2, 2003). 16 From the USAID Congressional Presentation for FY 2000, section on Uzbekistan, available 

at <www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/eni/uzbekist.html> (accessed in June 2003). 17 From the program summary for Uzbekistan in USAID’s FY2003 Congressional Budget Justification, available at <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2003/ee/uz/> (accessed September 15, 2003). 18 From the program summary for Kazakhstan in USAID’s FY2000 Congressional Presentation, available at <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp2000/eni/kazak.html>. 19 From the Turkmenistan overview in the USAID FY2001 budget justification, available at 

<http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001/ee/tm/>. 20 The statement by Michael Parmly, in Congressional testimony on July 18, 2001, is available 

at <www.Eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav072701a.shtml>. 21 This State Department position, established by the Freedom Support Act, has now been 

renamed the “Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia.” 22 William Taylor’s remarks and prepared statement are available through the site in Note 

21, or at <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/group8/summit01/wwwh01071805.html> (accessed 

6/2/03).23 Ukraine’s government, for example, has chafed under U.S. criticism of its elections, its treatment of journalists, and its business practices. The activities of U.S. organizations that work with 

Ukrainian political parties and democratic activists (some of which oppose the current President, 

Leonid Kuchma), have clearly been an irritant. The Ukrainian authorities withheld registration from 

both the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute for more than two 
DEMOCRACY-BUILDING 137

years (2001– September 2003), yielding only after considerable pressure from the U.S. made it clear 

the bilateral relationship would suffer otherwise. (Ukrainian law requires foreign organizations to reregister when funding instrumentalities change, as they did for both NDI and IRI in 2001.) 24 See, for example, Charles William Maynes, “A New Strategy for Old Foes and New Friends,” 

World Policy Journal (Summer 2000, 17:2), 68-76. Maynes is President of the Eurasia Foundation, an 

organization that funds many civil society activities in former socialist states. 25 Foreign Aid In the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity (USAID, 

2002) is available at <www.usaid.gov>.

Ibid., 10-11.

Ibid., 50-52.

28 See the articles by Lael Brainard, “Compassionate Conservatism Confronts Global Poverty,” 

and Steve Radelet, “Will the Millennium Challenge Account be Different?” Washington Quarterly

(Spring 2004, 26:2), 149-87. Recent Congressional action is discussed in Susan B.Epstein, “Foreign Relations Authorization, FY 2004 and FY 2005: State Department, The Millennium Challenge Account, 

and Foreign Assistance,” CRS Report RL 21986, Updated September 2, 2003. 29 See the analysis by Steven Radelet, “Bush and Foreign Aid,” Foreign Affairs (September-October 2003, 82:5), 104-117. 30 The National Security Strategy is available at www.whitehouse.gov.

31 B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, “The U.S. Role 

in Central Asia,” Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Central 

Asia and the South Caucasus, June 27, 2002. Available through www.state.gov. 32 A helpful short overview of the instruments of U.S. assistance to the former Soviet republics 

is included in Curt Tarnoff, “The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance,” CRS Issue Brief 

IB95077 (Updated July 24, 2003), and previous versions. Tarnoff noted that USAID transfers some of 

the funds obligated to it for these states to other agencies (such as the Commerce, Justice, and Labor 

Departments). These transfers have grown from about one fourth to over 40 percent of the total—an 

indication that other agencies are more involved in designing and overseeing assistance to the region. 

This Issue Brief points out that very little cash is involved (except for equity investments and loans to 

the private sector), that close to three-fourths of our assistance goes to the private or non-governmental sector, and that roughly 78% of funds used for programs run by USAID are spent on U.S. goods 

and services. 33 Reports of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights may be located 

through the organization’s website, <http://www.osce.org/>. 34 Details about all assistance activities from all agencies and funders is available in the Coordinators Reports, available through the Department of State website. As sited above, the Report for 2002 

is available at <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c10250.htm>. 35 The State Department’s Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (<http://www.

state.gov/g/drl/>) has taken on a more important direct role in democracy promotion through its 

administration of the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF). The Fund has grown from $9 

million in 2000 to over $31 million in 2003. The Fund was intended to permit highly responsive 

support for unique or especially timely short-term human rights or democracy promotion projects. 

In 2003, $4.5 million was committed for projects in the non-Middle East Muslim world (including 

Central Asia), with the following priorities: 1) Empowerment of Muslim women, including projects 

that promote capacity building and/or networks of women or women’s organizations, especially as 

they relate to human-rights; 2) Addressing the problem of disenfranchised youth and the need to 

reach out to this group to prevent growth of extremism; 3) Political reform programs that would 

entail support for conducting free and fair elections, issues of good governance and corruption; 4) 

Independent media and access to a diversity of sources of information; 5) Judicial systems, especially 

in the context of Shari’a; 6) Promotion of the compatibility of democracy with Islam; and (7) Civil 

society and increasing political participation.
138 BABUS

36 See Appendix B for a summary of USAID activities prepared by the USAID Central Asian 

Regional mission in Almaty. Again, the Coordinator’s Report for 2002 is the best source for detail on 

the activities of all funders. See <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c10250.htm>. 37 Two of the Freedom House centers were open as of November 2003 in Tashkent and Namangan; a third is planned, probably to open in 2004. 38 IRI is currently in the process of re-establishing a resident office to support its work in 

Kyrgyzstan. 39 The author interviewed representatives and officers of Counterpart International, ABA/

CEELI, Freedom House, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, 

and IREX, and is grateful for their assistance in preparing this chapter. 40 In testimony before the subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the House 

International Relations Committee, October 29, 2003, Beth Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for 

European and Eurasian Affairs, reaffirmed that democracy promotion is a key pillar of U.S. policy 

in Central Asia. The testimony is available through the State Department website, <http://www.state.

gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/25798pf.htm>. 41 Martha Olcott, “Taking Stock of Central Asia,” Journal of International Affairs (Spring 2003), 

3-17. 42 Fiona Hill, “Central Asia and the Caucasus: The Impact of the War on Terrorism,” in Nations 

in Transit 2003 (Rowman and Littlefield: Freedom House, 2003), 39-49.

43 See, for example, his remarks at a media roundtable in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on June 7, 2002 

at <www.state.gov/g/drl>. 44 Jennifer Windsor, Executive Director of Freedom House, Testimony before the House 

Committee on International Relations, July 9, 2003 on the State Department’s report on “Supporting 

Human Rights and Democracy.” (The testimony is available at <www.freedomhouse.org>.) 45 Thomas C. Adams, Acting Coordinator of U.S. assistance to Europe and Eurasia, “U.S. Assistance Programs in Europe: An Assessment,” Statement to the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, March 27, 2003 (<www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/19203pf.ht>, 

accessed 6/2/2003). 46 Europe and Eurasia, USAID Congressional Budget Justification, FY2004. (<www.usaid.

gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/europe_eurasia/>, accessed June 2003). 47 Budget levels for U.S. assistance to the former Soviet republics are coming down. While the 

largest drops are for Russia and Ukraine, this trend will affect Central Asia too. President Bush’s FY 

2003 budget cut the total outlay by four percent; his request for FY 2004 represented a cut of 24 percent 

from 2003. See Curt Tarnoff, “The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance,” (Updated July 

24, 2003), 1, 4. 48 I disagree with the analysis of Thomas Carothers, author of many works analyzing U.S. 

democracy assistance, who has suggested that the “transition paradigm” has died. See the debate in 

Journal of Democracy on this issue, beginning with the Carothers article, “The End of the Transition Paradigm” in the January 2002 issue, and continuing two issues later with essays by Guillermo 

O’Donnell, Kenneth Wollack, Ghia Nodia, and Gerald Hyman. 49 All the Central Asian states but Tajikistan joined the PFP in 1994. Tajikistan joined after 

September 11, in 2002.
ISLAMIC RADICALISM 139

139

Chapter 7

Islam in Central Asia: 

The Emergence and Growth 

of Radicalism in the PostCommunist Era

Tiffany Petros

The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 allowed for the revival of 

Islam in the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan after seventy years of religious 

repression. Despite long-standing efforts by the Soviet regime to eliminate 

religious identity across the empire, the Central Asian populations maintained Islamic beliefs and traditions that had been handed down over centuries. The collapse of Communism and opening of state borders not only 

offered Central Asian Muslims new opportunities to practice their faith, 

but also allowed for the importation and development of radical forms of 

Islam.2 Although the majority of Central Asian Muslims do not support 

radical Islam, radical Islamic movements have attracted followers among 

a growing minority of the population. Increased support for radical Islam 

in Central Asia over the past decade has been attributed to foreign influences, coupled with a rise in government corruption and oppression, 

and deteriorating economic conditions. Radical Islamic groups active in 

Central Asia have capitalized on public discontent and provided a voice of 

opposition to the secular authoritarian governments. Regional rulers have 

responded by outlawing all non-government sanctioned Islamic activity 

and have cracked down aggressively against both Islamic organizations 

and their followers.

Radical Islam in Central Asia also has attracted U.S. attention, particularly in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. In 2001, 

the Central Asian states found themselves on the front lines of the global 

war on terrorism, as a U.S.-led coalition entered neighboring Afghanistan 

1
140 PETROS

to topple the hard-line Islamic Taliban regime. The Taliban was a known 

sponsor of al Qaeda—the network held responsible for the attacks on U.S. 

targets—and maintained ties to radical Islamic elements active in Central 

Asia. Central Asian leaders offered varying degrees of assistance to the 

U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in an effort to enhance ties with the 

United States and further their fight against “Islamic terrorists” whom they 

blamed for anti-government activities at home. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 

were particularly active in this effort, offering the U.S. military basing rights 

in support of the operation. Although U.S.-led action in Afghanistan ultimately disrupted Taliban sponsorship of radical Islamic activity in Central 

Asia, Islamic radicalism continues to draw support from Central Asian 

populations.

This chapter will examine the roots of Islam in Central Asia and provide a brief historical overview of the changing relationship between Islam 

and the Central Asian peoples. This background is essential for understanding the emergence and growth of radical Islam in Central Asia since the 

early 1990s. The chapter will also examine the three Islamic elements that 

have had the greatest impact on Central Asia in recent years, the Islamic 

Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), and the Islamic 

Renaissance Party (IRP). Finally, it will seek to answer two questions: Why 

is radical Islam being embraced by a growing segment of Central Asian 

populations today? Does support for radical Islam in Central Asia pose a 

threat to regional regimes and/or U.S. interests in the region?

A Brief History of Islam in Central Asia

Early History

The radical Islamic elements that have gained support in Central Asia 

over the past decade differ greatly from strains of Islam indigenous to the 

region. Since Central Asian Islam traditionally has diverged from Islam 

found in other parts of the world, including the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, the recent drive toward radicalism in the region must be viewed in the 

context of the global Islamic movement.3 However, before examining the 

factors that have given rise to radical Islam in Central Asia in the 1990s, one 

must briefly consider the history of Islam in the region. This history demonstrates that Islam has served and continues to serve as an important part 

of Central Asian identity. Although the populations of Central Asia have 

long embraced Islam, the identity has played a limited role as a vehicle for 

political mobilization. Given this history, the question arises as to whether 
ISLAMIC RADICALISM 141

or not radical Islam will serve as a mobilizing factor in Central Asia in the 

twenty-first century.

The path of Islam in Central Asia has been one of continuity and 

change. Islamic traditions have been passed down for centuries, despite 

periods of repression of the faith. The religion was first introduced to 

Central Asia in the seventh century by Arab invaders arriving from the 

Middle East. It was not until the ninth century, however, that Islam was 

adopted by local rulers and became the predominant religion in the region. During this period, Islam was promoted from the top down, rather 

than forced upon the Central Asian populations by foreign conquerors.4

Central Asian rulers viewed their endorsement of Islam and its acceptance 

among the people as one means of creating and maintaining their bases 

of power. Support for Islam continued to grow in the tenth century, with 

the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara in present-day Uzbekistan becoming 

great centers of Islamic learning and culture.6

The majority of Central Asian Muslims embraced Sunni Islam, 

although Shia Muslims also can be found throughout the region. Shia 

minorities exist primarily in Tajikistan, but also have a presence in the 

cities of Bukhara and Samarkand.6 Sunni Islam was first embraced by the 

settled populations of today’s Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, while the nomadic peoples of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan maintained 

stronger ties to their pre-Islamic culture and beliefs. Sunni Islam eventually spread to Central Asia’s nomadic populations by incorporating local 

traditions and aspects of Sufism—an indigenous form of Islamic mysticism.7

 Sufism appealed to the nomadic peoples by emphasizing a direct 

experience with God, as well as preaching tolerance and respect for other 

forms of worship.9 Early differences in how Islam was embraced in Central 

Asia continue to be reflected in local practices in the region. In the twentyfirst century, identification with Islam remains stronger in Tajikistan and 

Uzbekistan than in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.9

Islam under Soviet Rule

Islam was an important aspect of Central Asian culture up to and 

including the period of Russian colonization of the region in the nineteenth century. Central Asian Muslims did not begin to experience repression at the hands of the Russians until after the Bolsheviks came to 

power at the end of World War I. In the 1920s, the Soviet state launched 

an attack on Islamic beliefs, traditions, and institutions as it initiated the 

process of replacing religion with a new form of “scientific atheism.”10 The 

crack down on Islamic identity coincided with Soviet leader Josef Stalin’s 
142 PETROS

creation of the five Central Asian republics between 1924 and 1936. The 

republics, including Uzbekistan (1924), Turkmenistan (1924), Tajikistan 

(1929), Kazakhstan (1936), and Kyrgyzstan (1936), had not existed previously as separate entities and had no historical basis for division. According to Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace, “Stalin drew the map of Soviet Central Asia not 

with an eye to consolidating natural regions, but rather for the purpose 

of reducing the prospects for regional unity.”11 Upon division, the five 

republics contained multiple ethnic groups, which had not yet come to 

view themselves as independent nationalities. As part of a larger effort to 

eliminate loyalty to the Islamic identity and replace it with loyalties to the 

newly formed republics, purges of the Muslim leadership also took place 

throughout the 1920s and 1930s.12

Official hostility toward Islam in the Soviet Union lifted slightly following World War II. The Soviet policy of suppression, which had marked 

the earlier period, turned to one of religious co-optation. Soviet authorities attempted to regulate Islam by creating an “official” authorized version 

of the religion. A Muslim Religious Board was formed and charged with 

overseeing “Official Islam” in the Central Asian republics. This body was 

one of four religious boards established in the Soviet Union. Despite these 

efforts to suppress and then co-opt Islam, the religion continued to serve 

as an important marker of identity for the Central Asian populations. 

Central Asian Muslims also continued to practice their own unofficial or 

“parallel Islam” underground.13

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked another significant turning point for Islam in Central Asia. The mobilization of thousands of Central Asian men to fight in the Soviet army against the Afghan 

Mujahedeen put many Soviet Muslims in contact with foreign Muslims for 

the first time. The Central Asian Muslims were impressed by the commitment the Afghan people had for Islam. They also recognized shared ethnic 

and linguistic ties with the people they were fighting. This reminded them 

of how the Soviet Union had incorporated their lands and deprived them 

of their true identity and national pride.14 Contacts that were made between Central Asians and Muslims from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi 

Arabia during this period later would weigh heavily on the resurgence of 

Islam in Central Asia, following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The relationship between Islam and Central Asia again entered a new 

phase with President Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power in the Soviet Union 

in the mid-1980s. Along with the introduction of Gorbachev’s policies of 

glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) came greater religious 
ISLAMIC RADICALISM 143

freedom. Gorbachev’s reforms led to a religious revival in which many 

Central Asian Muslims were allowed to make a pilgrimage to the holy city 

of Mecca, Saudi Arabia for the first time. The reforms also allowed outside 

Islamic influences to begin filtering into Central Asia. Foreign Islamic governments, organizations, and individuals began sending money to Central 

Asia to fund the construction of new mosques and reinvigorate Islamic 

practices.15 These influences would come to play an important role in the 

development of radical Islam in Central Asia in the 1990s.

The Rise of Radical Islam in Central Asia Post-Independence

External Factors

The renewed interest in Islam that developed in Central Asia in the 

1980s gained momentum following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 

1991. Although the Soviet state actively tried to destroy the multiple loyalties of clan, family, republic, and religion, Islam remained an important 

source of identity for many Central Asians. Communism had promoted 

the idea that religion was incompatible with the Soviet ideology. Now that 

the ideology was discredited by the collapse of the Soviet empire, a new 

opportunity emerged for Central Asians to embrace their Islamic past.16

Once the Central Asian republics’ borders were open to the world, 

among the first visitors were Islamic missionaries from Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan and Afghanistan played a particularly 

significant role in influencing the revival and radicalization of Islam in 

Central Asia.17 In addition to providing funding and religious training to 

support mosques and madrassas (religious schools), these sources distributed free copies of the Koran, which had been translated into Russian and 

other Central Asian languages.18

Sources in Saudi Arabia also contributed to the rise of Islam in Central Asia. In early 1990, these sources funded the development of Adolat 

(Justice)19—an Islamic movement that arose in the Uzbek part of the 

Ferghana Valley.20 The movement worked not only to introduce Islam, but 

also to expose corruption and social injustice among the ruling regime. 

Adolat quickly gained support and began to spread across the Ferghana 

Valley in 1991. However, by March 1992, following the break up of the 

Soviet Union, the movement was banned by independent Uzbek authorities.21 Leaders of this movement then fled to Tajikistan where they helped 

prepare for the Tajik civil war.

In addition to developing schools, mosques, and movements inside 

Central Asia, foreign actors also provided opportunities for future mem-
144 PETROS

bers of the radical IMU and HT to receive religious training abroad.22 

Through their activities, supporters of the Taliban in Afghanistan, militants in Pakistan, and followers of the Wahhabi movement (an extreme 

Sunni Islamic doctrine) found in Saudi Arabia, brought new strains of 

Islam to the region. These strains differed greatly from the form of Islam 

that had long-standing roots in Central Asia.

Internal Factors

Although external factors played a significant role in the emergence 

of radical Islam in Central Asia, they have not been alone in affecting the 

changing nature of Islam in the region. If there were not fertile ground for 

the radicalization of Islam in Central Asia, foreign radical elements would 

have been unable to attract support among the local populations. Support 

for radical Islam in Central Asia developed in large part as a form of opposition to authoritarian governments in the region. As government corruption and oppression increased and economic conditions deteriorated 

throughout the 1990s, segments of the Central Asian population viewed 

radical Islam as an alternative to the status quo. Not surprisingly, the rise 

of radical groups has been most pronounced in Uzbekistan where government repression has been most severe. There also has been a strong 

show of support for radical Islamic movements in northern Tajikistan and 

southern Kyrgyzstan, particularly among ethnic Uzbeks who have experienced discrimination based on their ethnicity.23

Immediately following the collapse of communism, Central Asian 

leaders initiated the restoration of mosques and other symbols of Islam as 

a means of distinguishing themselves from the Soviet system and increasing their legitimacy among the local populations. As evidence of their use 

of Islam to gain support, Central Asian leaders, including Uzbek President 

Islam Karimov, made the pilgrimage to Mecca and were sworn into office 

on the Koran.24 Although Central Asian leadership made an effort to reembrace Islam, the regimes kept a watchful eye on religious activity. This 

was particularly true in southern parts of Central Asia where Islam had 

developed deeper ties, such as in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the Ferghana 

Valley region of Kyrgyzstan.25

As it became clear that Islam was growing in importance and providing Central Asians a link with their past, regional rulers increasingly came 

to view Islam as a threat rather than an avenue for harnessing support for 

their leadership. The ruling elites wanted to ensure that Islam would not 

develop into a base of political opposition and, therefore, began to repress 
ISLAMIC RADICALISM 145

Islam, as had been the tradition under the Soviet system. This reaction, in 

turn, pushed some moderate Muslims to embrace more radical views.26

The failure of Central Asian leaders to introduce democratic and/or 

economic reforms, coupled with the repression of Islam, increased support for radical Islamic elements.27 Participating in radical activities also 

has provided many Central Asian youth with a sense of purpose and accomplishment not available elsewhere, given the lack of jobs and educational opportunities. The Central Asian governments must address these 

systemic issues, if the trend toward radicalism is to be halted.

Central Asian Government Responses to Radical Islam

The Central Asian regimes have been deeply concerned by the rise 

in radical Islam, which they attribute to meddling from Islamic movements abroad. Despite their shared concerns, the leaders of the Central 

Asian republics have responded differently to the emergence and growth 

of radical Islam in the region. Uzbek President Islam Karimov introduced 

a swift and severe crackdown on Islamic activity beginning in the early 

1990s. In 1992, Islamic supporters gathered in Namangan, Uzbekistan to 

directly challenge President Karimov’s policies and demand the legalization of Islamic structures. In response to this pressure, Karimov outlawed 

Adolat and began to suppress the Islamic opposition.28 Repression against 

Islam became even more severe following an alleged attempt on the 

President’s life in February 1999. Although Karimov was not killed in a 

series of six car bombings that ripped through the capital city of Tashkent, 

13 others were left dead and several more injured.29 Karimov and other 

Central Asian leaders used this incident, as well as the previous outbreak 

of civil war in Tajikistan, to justify outlawing political opposition. Mass 

arrests were instituted in Uzbekistan followed by the subsequent torture 

of Islamic opponents. Karimov’s response to Islam throughout the 1990s 

forced many Uzbek Muslims to flee to neighboring Tajikistan and Afghanistan, where they helped to form and strengthen the radical IMU—an ally 

of Afghanistan’s Taliban.30

As of 2003, President Karimov continues to keep a tight reign on 

Islamic activity in Uzbekistan. At present, an estimated 6,500 people are 

jailed in Uzbekistan due to their religious or political beliefs. Approximately half of those held have been accused of belonging to the radical 

Islamic movement HT, while the majority of the rest have been branded 

Wahhabis.31 Not only has Karimov jailed a large number of Muslims, but 

the Uzbek government—like the Soviet government before it—monitors 

the Spiritual Board of Muslims in Tashkent. In addition to monitoring the 
146 PETROS

Board, the state frequently dictates to official clergy what they may or may 

not say in their religious sermons.

The other states of Central Asia have introduced similar policies, 

though they vary in degree of severity. In Turkmenistan, laws on religion 

are very restrictive. Although Islam does not have strong roots as an organized religion in Turkmenistan, President Saparmurat Niyazov “has combined widespread repression of any independent religious activity with 

attempts to create a pseudo-Islamic spiritual creed centered on his own 

personality.”32 Turkmenistan has seen the number of mosques operating in 

the country rise from four during Soviet times to 318 in 2003. The spending of millions of dollars on mosque construction, however, has primarily 

been aimed at Niyazov’s “own glorification, rather than the religious needs 

of the people.”33

Official response to radical Islam has been less in Kyrgyzstan and 

Kazakhstan, since these countries have not seen significant opposition 

from extremist groups. Unlike in Uzbekistan, religious communities have 

been tolerated in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and laws on religion have remained more liberal. There have been arrests, however, particularly among 

individuals found distributing banned HT literature. In November 2002, 

Kyrgyz officials also introduced legislation restricting the licensing system 

for religious publications.34

Tajikistan has taken a different approach to dealing with the rise of 

Islam than have the other countries in Central Asia. It is the only country 

in the region that did not outlaw the emergence of an Islamic political 

party. Shortly after Tajikistan gained independence, a civil war broke out 

between members of the Communist elite and the opposition, which had 

Islamic backing. Although this conflict led to the other Central Asian states 

banning opposition parties in their own countries, in the case of Tajikistan, the IRP ultimately was able to gain seats in the government as a result 

of the negotiated ceasefire.

While Tajikistan may appear to have taken a more moderate stance 

on Islamic participation than the other republics, it should be noted that 

many view the Islamic party in Tajikistan as having been co-opted by the 

government, and therefore not a true voice of opposition. Others argue 

that despite Tajikistan’s slightly more liberal laws on religion, compared to 

the other Central Asian republics, in reality the practice of respecting such 

laws has been undermined.35 For example, the Tajik government requires 

the collection of 15,000 signatures for the building of a Mosque, whereas 

only 10 to 15 signatures are required to build a Christian church.36 Tajik 
ISLAMIC RADICALISM 147

authorities also have cracked down on the expression of Islam in Soghd, 

the Tajik-controlled territory of the Ferghana Valley.

Although the Central Asian governments have taken different approaches to the rise of radical Islam in their respective countries, each is 

cautious about what public support for radicalism might mean for their 

leadership. This concern has led to the arrest of thousands of ordinary 

practicing Muslims along with the militants. Not only have prisoners been 

subjected to long jail terms, but they also have been tortured at the hands 

of the regimes.37 In an attempt to gain tacit support for their repressive 

practices, the Central Asian governments have argued that their domestic 

fight against Islamic radicalism is but a small part of the global war on terrorism. By violating human rights in the name of cracking down on “radical Islamists” and “terrorists,” however, regional rulers have strengthened 

support for the very opposition they have attempted to eliminate. The 

Central Asian leaders have tried to convince the United States that their 

secular, albeit authoritarian leadership, is the only alternative to the acceptance of radical Islam in the region.38 This puts the United States in the 

position of choosing between two unwelcome options, and in the process 

legitimizing the actions of the current regimes.

Islamic Opposition in Central Asia

In order to translate support for radical Islam and opposition to 

regional governments into action, several organizations have been formed 

in Central Asia in support of radical ideals. These organizations differ in 

their tactics (violent vs. non-violent) as well as their goals (overthrow of 

existing government vs. becoming a viable opposition party). The three 

most significant organizations to emerge are the previously mentioned 

IMU, HT and IRP.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

Among Islamic groups active in Central Asia, the IMU has received 

perhaps the most attention. Prior to the U.S.-led Operation Enduring 

Freedom, the IMU was considered the most radical Islamic organization 

operating in the region. The IMU was known to have close ties with the 

Taliban and had set up training bases in the north of Afghanistan. The 

IMU also reportedly was receiving financial backing from Osama bin 

Laden and his al Qaeda network, as well as from Saudi Arabia. Given the 

IMU’s cooperation with known terrorists and involvement in violent attacks against regional regimes in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the U.S. State 
148 PETROS

Department designated the group as a foreign terrorist organization in 

September 2000.39

The IMU began forming in 1992-1993, when future IMU members 

fled Uzbekistan in response to President Karimov’s crackdown on Islamic 

activities. Some of these members, including future IMU military leader 

Juma Namangani, fled to Tajikistan and joined the Islamic Tajik opposition (later United Tajik Opposition) in its fight against the Communist 

government of Tajikistan from 1992 to 1997.40 During the course of the 

Tajik civil war, Uzbek fighters met up with Afghan groups and began 

forging relationships with members of both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. This led to the initial military training of Uzbek fighters in 

Afghanistan.

The IMU was founded officially in 1998 by ethnic Uzbeks dissatisfied 

with the more moderate stances of the IRP in Tajikistan. The initial goal 

of the IMU was to topple the Uzbek leadership. The organization’s mandate was later enlarged to include overthrowing all of the region’s secular 

governments and replacing them with regimes based on Shari’a (Islamic 

law). The IMU promised to form a state in the Ferghana Valley—a center 

of Islamic traditionalism for centuries.41 In order to achieve their goal of 

removing Uzbek President Karimov from power, the IMU launched terrorist attacks against the Uzbek government in 1999, 2000, and 2001 from 

bases in neighboring Afghanistan and Tajikistan.42 Although the IMU 

mainly operated out of Afghanistan, the movement also had set up bases 

in Tajikistan prior to 2001 and the beginning of the U.S.-led Operation

Enduring Freedom.

43

As of September 11, 2001, between 3,000 and 5,000 members of 

the IMU were believed to be operating in Central Asia. It was reported 

in early 2001 that the IMU had formed an umbrella organization called 

Hezb-e Islami Turkestan (Islamic Party of Turkestan) with the intention of 

expanding its areas of operation to include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and China’s Xinjiang region.44 IMU activities were significantly curtailed by U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. In November 2001, the IMU’s 

military commander, Juma Namangani, was killed in a U.S. attack, and its 

political leader went underground. Most observers argue that the IMU no 

longer poses a significant threat in Central Asia, having lost its bases in 

Afghanistan, as well as its Taliban and al Qaeda sponsors.45 Although the 

IMU is no longer active in Afghanistan, it continues to maintain ties to the 

IRP, which remains active in Tajikistan.46
ISLAMIC RADICALISM 149

Hizb-ut-Tahrir

HT, the Party of Islamic Liberation, is a second well-known Islamic 

movement that has taken hold in Central Asia and is steadily increasing 

its influence. It draws a large base of support among ethnic Uzbeks, as 

well as recruits among Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks. HT shares with the 

IMU the desire to overthrow the secular governments of Central Asia. In 

their place, HT proposes to introduce an Islamic Caliphate across present 

state borders in Central Asia similar to that established in seventh century 

Arabia following the death of the Prophet Mohammed. Like the IMU, HT 

does not offer a specific social, economic, or political agenda for governing 

the Caliphate. An important difference between HT and the IMU is that 

HT rejects violence as a means of bringing about political change. This has 

allowed the group to gain a broader base of followers than the IMU, which 

was in part discredited as a result of its support for violence. 

The HT movement, headquartered in London, was first founded between 1952 and 1953 in the Middle East, and has since grown to operate 

in approximately fourty countries worldwide. The movement was originally established by Palestinian activist Taqiuddin an-Nabhani Filastyni, 

who served as a judge in the Jerusalem appeals court. Filastyni’s successor, 

Abd al-Kadim Zallum, oversaw the introduction of HT to Central Asia in 

1995 when the party opened its headquarters in Uzbekistan. HT activities 

quickly spread to the Ferghana Valley between 1995 and 1996, where it 

has been particularly successful in attracting support. By 2000, HT activities had branched out further to include parts of northern Tajikistan and 

southern Kyrgyzstan. As of 2003, the organization claimed to have 80,000 

members from across Central Asia.47

HT originally drew its support from educated urban youth, mainly 

in Uzbekistan, who then helped to spread the HT message among poorer 

segments of the population living in rural areas.48 HT has successfully 

drawn upon networks of family and clans in Central Asia, particularly in 

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, to recruit new members and increase participation in group activities. HT has relied on traditional social networks to 

distribute leaflets on HT goals. It also has developed a Web site to circulate 

information on the organization and its activities.49 Although HT has increased its membership in recent years, there is little evidence that Central 

Asian Muslims support the introduction of Shari’a, or other strict Islamic 

practices as the organization advocates.50 Instead, HT has gained support 

in Central Asia by serving as a voice of opposition in otherwise repressive 

political environments.
150 PETROS

In response to growing popular support, the governments in Central 

Asia have cracked down on HT activities, and the organization has been 

banned across the region. In 2001, hundreds, if not thousands, of alleged 

HT members were arrested in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. 

Despite the arrests, HT continues to attract followers, especially in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In southern Kyrgyzstan, 10 percent of the population is believed to be involved in HT activities.51 The success of HT in 

Central Asia has been attributed in part to its ability to target its message 

to post-Soviet grievances. Unlike HT activities in London and elsewhere 

in the West, where the organization distributes leaflets and holds meetings 

denouncing the United States and Israel, in Central Asia the organization 

criticizes local governments for their inability to fight corruption, poverty, drug use, HIV/AIDS, and other social and economic ills. Since the 

outbreak of war with Iraq in 2003; however, there has been an increase of 

anti-Western/anti-U.S. sentiment expressed in HT literature being distributed in Central Asia.

HT has not been as broadly successful in Kazakhstan as it has been in 

other Central Asian countries, since Islam is not as widely embraced there 

as in the other former Soviet republics. Further, Kazakhstan’s oil-economy 

has not left it in the dire conditions shared by other Central Asian states. 

Although HT is not likely to make significant inroads into Kazakhstan by 

capitalizing on poor economic conditions or anti-U.S./Western sentiment, 

support may be gained as popular disillusionment with Kazakh President 

Nursultan Nazarbaev increases. There is evidence that HT has made some 

headway in Kazakhstan, where HT literature has become more aggressive 

since the recent war in Iraq. In April 2003, two members of HT were detained by Kazakh authorities in the South of the country for distributing 

leaflets with statements against the United States and its British ally.52

Unlike the IMU, the United States has not designated HT to be a 

foreign terrorist organization, since it has not used violence to achieve its 

political goals. Although the United States distinguishes between the IMU 

and HT with respect to the “terrorist” label, the U.S. government continues to closely monitor HT activities.53 There is concern that since the start 

of Operation Enduring Freedom and the global war on terrorism, the HT 

message has become increasingly militant. The fliers distributed by the 

group throughout Central Asia have begun to denounce the presence of 

coalition forces in Central Asia and have praised suicide attacks in Israel. 

Although HT has not been directly linked to involvement in violent activities, it is believed to incite violence, and could become a stepping-stone for 

disenfranchised youth who could be recruited into more violent Islamic 
ISLAMIC RADICALISM 151

groups. Some also fear more radical members of HT could break away 

from the organization and promote the use of violence to increase the pace 

of reforms in Central Asia.

Islamic Renaissance Party

The IRP was established in 1991 as an outgrowth of Gorbachev’s 

reforms for the purpose of protecting the Islamic identity of the Muslims 

in the former Soviet Union. Given its objective, the party was able to gain 

publicity not only in the Soviet Union, but also among academics and 

strategists in the West.54 IRP sought to increase awareness and understanding of Muslims in the Soviet Union, while representing their voice within 

the Communist framework.55 However, the party remained fragmented 

with regional branches introduced throughout the Soviet Union.

The IRP gained increased attention during the civil war in Tajikistan 

from 1992 to 1997. The party, which claimed to support a moderate, nationalist version of Islam, was part of a larger anti-government coalition 

active during the Tajik civil war.56 Although many labeled the party “fundamentalist,” the IRP sought to unite clans during the civil war, and did 

not use the party to push for establishment of an Islamic state in Tajikistan.57 The IRP is the only legally recognized religious party in Central Asia 

and entered the Tajik government as a result of a peace agreement ending 

the conflict.58 Since becoming part of the government, the IRP has kept its 

commitment to work within the constitutional framework of Tajikistan. 

IRP Deputy Chairman Muhiddin Kabiri has emerged as the face of the 

party. He says that the IRP supports the existence of a secular democratic 

Tajikistan, but notes that the party approves of increasing religious traditions and values in state political life. According to Kabiri, Turkey is an 

example of a state that has been able to incorporate these values and could 

serve as a model to other states in the region.59

Although IRP has entered the Tajik government, its position as a 

voice of opposition has been weakened. Tajik President Imomali Rakhmonov has increasingly consolidated power in his own hands. While the 

ruling elite continues to view the IRP as “too Islamic for the government,” 

radical Islamic forces have accused the party of selling-out to the state’s interests. According to Kabiri, this view could serve to benefit radical Islamic 

elements, which can attract support from a population that continues to 

view itself as having little to no voice in general.60

Some observers have argued that the success of the IRP in working 

within the Tajik coalition government must not go unnoticed. Referring 

to IRP’s participation in Tajikistan’s governance, President of the Eur-
152 PETROS

asia Foundation Charles Maynes said, “Unfortunately, the world largely 

ignored this experiment, the success of which could have had profound 

implications for the way that the Western world reacts to resurgent political Islam elsewhere . . . The Tajik example could well inform political developments in the region and elsewhere—and should help define Western 

perceptions of Islam.”61 Although Tajikistan continues to face multiple 

political and economic challenges, there is evidence that it remains one of 

the more open countries in Central Asia.

U.S. Interest in Central Asia and the Future

No single factor can fully explain the emergence and rise of radical 

Islam in Central Asia. The states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 

Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have faced multiple and varied internal 

and external pressures since gaining independence, which have contributed to differing levels of support for Islamic radicalism. These pressures 

include: increasing government corruption and repression, declining economic conditions, and growing influence from foreign Islamic elements. 

The rise in popular support for radical Islamic groups in Central Asia can 

be viewed as a sign of discontent with the status quo, rather than a voice in 

support of Islamic government and radical views. The majority of Central 

Asian Muslims do not support the end of the secular state and many perceive radical Islamic groups as a threat to state and regional stability.

Scholars and practitioners continue to debate the nature of the threat 

posed by radical Islamic elements in Central Asia to regional regimes and/

or U.S. interests. The majority of the Central Asian regimes have labeled 

all non-government sanctioned Islamic activity as “radical” and banned Islamic groups as “terrorist” organizations. The United States should guard 

against this hardline approach and consider that not all forms of Islam are 

dangerous or antithetical to U.S. interests. This is especially true in Central 

Asia, where Islam has long been respected as a tolerant religion and an important source of identity. In order to combat the spread of radical Islam 

in the region, the U.S. government and the Central Asian regimes should 

work to promote and incorporate moderate strains of Islam in a way that 

does not allow it to destroy the current order.62 By banning all unauthorized Islamic activity, the regional regimes have effectively eliminated independent, moderate voices of Islam, which could be used to attract people 

away from radical groups and activities.63

In order to neutralize the influence of radical Islamic elements in 

Central Asia, significant political and economic changes also are needed. 

The introduction of reforms leading to political change and economic 
ISLAMIC RADICALISM 153

growth could lessen the appeal of radical Islamic organizations as a voice 

of opposition in Central Asia. However, if the current regimes disregard 

the worsening political and economic conditions, membership in organizations such as HT will grow and could have an increasingly destabilizing 

effect. Another danger is that HT or other radical Islamic groups could 

resort to violence in order to ensure that their message is heard.64

The United States is likely to maintain a long-term interest in Central Asia, given the region’s strategic location, natural resources, and contributions to the global war on terrorism. While the United States seeks 

to maintain stability in Central Asia, it must not be perceived as blindly 

backing authoritarian secular governments without recognizing the need 

for opposition and reform. Recent global events have clearly demonstrated 

the importance of encouraging voices of moderation, while simultaneously promoting state stability. The United States does not want to see 

a situation in Central Asia where the only alternative to authoritarian 

regimes is radical Islam.

Notes1

 The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 

those of DFI Government Services or the U.S. government. The author would like to thank Daniel 

Burghart, Sylvia Babus, Daniel Chiu, and Erin Craycraft for their comments on this chapter. 2

 In this chapter, the term “radical” refers to anti-Western forms of Islam that espouse the overthrow of secular regimes and introduction of Shari’a (Islamic law). It is recognized that the majority 

of Central Asian Muslims do not support this radical strain of Islam, though there is concern that 

support may rise and, in turn, threaten regional regimes and U.S. interests. 3

 Radical Islamic movements are not entirely new to Central Asia. For example, during WWI, 

Islamic militants forcefully opposed Russian government attempts to deploy Muslims to work near the 

front. Again in the 1920s, Muslim partisans in the so-called Basmachi movement opposed the takeover 

and advance of Soviet power into Central Asia. See Fiona Hill, “Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious 

Extremism, and Regional Stability,” Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia (July 23, 2003), 2. 4

 Nazif Shahrani, The Islamization of Central Asia: Politics, Economics and Society, Woodrow 

Wilson Conference Participant June 11, 2003. 5

 The cities of Samarkand and Bukhara grew in wealth and prestige as a result of their location 

along the Silk Road, the trade route between the West and East. See Edward W. Walker, “Roots of Rage: 

Militant Islam in Central Asia,” Panel presentation at the University of California, Berkeley (October 29, 

2001), 1-9. Available at <http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~iseees/>, accessed July 2003. 6

 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University 

Press, 2002), 26. 7

 Walker, 3.

8

 Rashid, Jihad, 27. 9

 Walker, 3.

10 Shahrani

11 “A History of Islam in Central Asia, Part II,” July 25, 2002. Available at <http:www.muslimuzbekistan.com/eng/ennews/2002/07/ennews25072002.html>, accessed July 6, 2003. 12 Walker, 3.
154 PETROS

13 Walker, 4.

14 Rashid, Jihad, 6. 15 Walker, 4.

16 Rashid, Jihad, 5. 17 Rashid, “Islam in Central Asia: Afghanistan and Pakistan,” 213.

18 Rashid, Jihad, 5. 19 Michael Fredholm, Uzbekistan & the Threat From Islamic Extremism, Conflict Studies Research Centre (England: Defense Academy of the United Kingdom), 3. 20 The Ferghana Valley encompasses bordering areas of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan 

and claims a population of more than 10 million. 21 Fredholm, 3.

22 Rashid, Jihad, 10. 23 Hill, 1.

24 Shireen Hunter, The Islamization of Central Asia: Politics, Economics and Society, Woodrow 

Wilson Conference Participant, June 11, 2003. 25 Svante E. Cornell and Regine A. Spector, “Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists,” The 

Washington Quarterly (Winter 2002), 194. 26 Rashid, Jihad, 11. 28 Central Asia: Islam and the State, (Osh/Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 10, 2003), 

4. 29 Walker, 7.

30 Central Asia: Islam and the State, i. 32 “Islam in Central Asia: Contrasts between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan,” The Economist (May 

15, 2003). Available at <http://www.uzland.uz/2003/may/16/11.htm>, accessed July 6, 2003. 33 Central Asia: Islam and the State, i. 34 Mike Redman, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Making Inroads into Kazakhstan?,” Central Asia-Caucasus 

Analyst (June 4, 2003). Available at <http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1460>, 

accessed July 6, 2003. 35 Central Asia: Islam and the State, i. 36 Hunter.

37 Rashid, Jihad, 8. 38 Rajan Menon, “The New Great Game in Central Asia,” Survival 45(2003), 191. 39 “Frequently Asked Questions about U.S. Policy in Central Asia,” U.S. Department of State Fact 

Sheet: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (November 27, 2002). Available at <http://www.state.

gov/p/eur/rls/fs/15562.htm>, accessed July 6, 2003. 40 Cornell and Spector, 196.

41 Fredholm, 2.

42 Rashid, Jihad, 8. 43 “Frequently Asked Questions about U.S. Policy in Central Asia”

44 Fredholm, 10.

45 “Islam in Central Asia: Contrasts between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan”

46 Cornell and Spector, 196.

47 Fredholm, 13.

48 “Frequently Asked Questions about U.S. Policy in Central Asia”

49 For more information on Hizb-ut-tahrir see www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org

50 David Lewis, ICG. Guest speaker at the Brookings Institution on July 11, 2003.

51 Cornell and Spector, 200.

52 Redman.

53 “Frequently Asked Questions about U.S. Policy in Central Asia”

54 “A History of Islam in Central Asia, Part III,” July 27, 2002. Available at <http:www.muslimuzbekistan.com/eng/ennews/2002/07/ennews27072002.html> accessed July 6, 2003. 55 “A History of Islam in Central Asia, Part III”
ISLAMIC RADICALISM 155

56 “Islam in Central Asia: Contrasts between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan”

57 “A History of Islam in Central Asia, Part III”

58 Neighboring Uzbekistan was disturbed by this development.

59 “Islam in Central Asia: Contrasts between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan”

61 Charles William Maynes, “America Discovers Central Asia,” Foreign Affairs, 82 (2003), 120-

132. 62 Cornell and Spector, 203.

63 Azizulla, ICG. Presenter at the Brookings Institution on July 11, 2003.

64 Cornell and Spector, 203.
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Part II

Economic Concerns

159

Chapter 8

The Rise of the Post-Soviet 

Petro-States: Energy Exports 

and Domestic Governance 

in Turkmenistan and 

Kazakhstan

Theresa Sabonis-Helf

The future prospects for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are presumed to be better than the prospects for most post-Soviet states, since they are fortunate to have two of the most desirable commodities in the world: oil and gas. Oil is the most important internationally 

traded commodity—both in terms of value and volume. It would seem to 

follow, then, that possessing oil offers hope to a state that it also will have 

wealth and power. Hydrocarbons have indeed captured the lion’s share 

of foreign and domestic investment in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, 

and both investment—and the returns that will follow—are expected to 

increase in the coming years. But even as Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan 

are beginning to enjoy signs of success in the international oil arena, their 

domestic economies and political structures are already beginning to show 

some of the classic negative side effects of becoming “petro-states,” nations 

which are defined and to an increasing extent structured by their role as 

oil/gas exporters.

In spite of the perception that oil is a source of wealth for nations 

and can be an engine for development, the actual history of political and 

economic development in petro-states has not been one of success. In the 

words of one analyst, OPEC “is never far from disaster . . . partly because 

it’s a cartel of mostly undemocratic, mostly impoverished nations that can 

balance their budgets only if oil prices stay above $25 a barrel.”1 In spite of 

the original goal of the OPEC states to “sow the oil wealth” and encourage 
160 SABONIS-HELF

development that would last after their oil monies ran out, OPEC members on the whole now suffer double-digit inflation, cost overruns on vast 

public projects, insolvent banking sectors, and a collapse of agricultural 

and manufacturing sectors in those states that have them.2 Most experts 

in the political economy of energy agree that being an oil exporting state 

is associated with certain pathological development tendencies, including 

lack of transparency, lack of separation of powers within the government, 

a conspicuous lack of equitable distribution of wealth and power, high 

levels of state debt, and a “permanent tendency toward rent seeking by 

state officials.”3

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan both already exhibit some “petrostate” tendencies. Are the classic political and economic instabilities of 

petro-states unavoidable? What are the larger global security ramifications 

if Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan continue to fail locally, while succeeding—or at least capturing market share—in global energy markets? This 

chapter begins with an overview of the classic problems of the petro-state. 

It will review the political and economic trends in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan associated with their increasing reliance on energy exports, and 

conclude with the potential security implications of these developments.

The Problem of the Petro-State

One commonly known impact of oil booms in countries that have 

other, non-oil industries is Dutch Disease, so-called because of the unexpected impact the discovery of North Sea gas had on the Dutch economy. 

The discovery of gas caused the relative strength of the guilder to increase 

dramatically. This, in turn, made Dutch-manufactured products noncompetitive, causing unemployment and inflation within the country. 

The nation found itself unexpectedly impoverished by its riches in natural 

gas. The Dutch experience has been replicated in many other countries. 

In sum, newfound success in oil or gas tends to take a toll on all other 

industrial sectors within a country. Persistent Dutch Disease can cause 

domestic resources to shift away from traded commodities, such as manufactured goods and agriculture, toward non-traded goods, such as services 

and transportation.4 This is not inevitable, but aggressive state policies are 

needed to protect against such effects.

Kazakhstan has been studying the problem of Dutch Disease since 

the early 1990s, and has made an effort to learn from Norway’s successes 

in particular. However, Kazakhstan may have chosen to focus on the 

wrong petro-state pathology: a single economic effect rather than the 

political-economic interactive effects. Evidence from Turkmenistan and 
POST-SOVIET PETRO-STATES 161

Kazakhstan suggests that if Dutch Disease is a factor, it is but one of many 

pathologies and perhaps one of the lesser challenges these states are likely 

to face as they increasingly embrace energy exporting. 

In 1979,5 (during the second oil crisis of the 1970s) one of OPEC’s 

two founders, Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo, said about the oil in his native 

Venezuela: “It is the devil’s excrement. We are drowning in the devil’s 

excrement.”6 Within a few years the oil boom had caused dramatic, unanticipated economic and political problems in Venezuela, nearly destroying 

the government and the economy. In her book, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil 

Booms and Petro-States, Terry Lynn Karl examines Venezuela as a classic 

example of a state that found oil booms holding it captive to a particular 

path of underdevelopment, rather than providing the hoped-for resources 

that would serve as an engine for wider development.

Karl notes that the capital-deficient oil exporting states of Algeria, 

Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela—although otherwise very dissimilar—evolved along the same lines following the oil booms of the 1970s. 

She demonstrates that these states followed a common trajectory in which 

the policy environment first became “petrolized,” serving the interests 

of the oil industry, but not the larger state. Vested private interests, once 

entrenched, reinforced the further petrolization of the state. Increasingly, 

the state relied on “the progressive substitution of public spending for 

statecraft,” and state capacity became even weaker. In the final, weakest 

stage, oil booms actually had “pernicious effects,” leading to the economic 

decline and destabilization of the regimes.7 This grim picture suggests that 

oil is a hidden curse, rather than a blessing, for a developing state. Why 

does oil appear to have the effect of weakening the state that relies upon 

it?

First of all, Karl makes the point that all her case states are “late developing” states, ones that were on the periphery of an already established 

global trading system. Boundaries were given them by colonialism, rather 

than established through conflict or negotiation by the states themselves. 

As a result, these states experienced oil booms before they had strong national identities or administrative structures. More important, these states 

depended on revenues from export rather than revenues from taxation. 

In states that tax a commodity, such as oil, instead of taxing their people, 

the state fails to develop a basic accountability link: government spending 

tends not to become an issue for public consideration.8 The net result of 

reliance on export revenues is that the state is largely free to build a “no 

taxation, no representation” system of governance.9 The state tends not to 

develop a coherent budgeting system, and since revenues are closely tied to 
162 SABONIS-HELF

fluctuations in the price of energy exports, annual revenues are highly unpredictable. Instead of building a coherent public bureaucracy (the origins 

of most government bureaucracies are in taxation), the petro-states tend 

to engage in uncontrolled public spending. In years when oil revenues 

are less than expected, the promise of oil enables them to borrow. During 

times of high revenues, the public perception that oil booms should mean 

new benefits for all often leads the state to extend subsidies and take on 

expensive projects which cannot be abandoned when oil prices fall. Further complicating the problem of fiscal governance, oil booms can throw 

the entire petro-state economy into hyperinflation, causing the state to go 

further into debt even when revenues are at their highest.10

The limited capacity of a fledgling or weak state makes it more easily 

captured by the strongest interests within the state—the energy interests. 

Absent transparent democratic institutions, oil interests become the only 

actors invited by the government to develop business policies, and hence 

become the only non-state (or parastatal) voice that the government hears. 

This means that the government increasingly tends to favor the energy 

industry over time, and that politicization of the industry is inevitable.11

Limited state capacity also makes it impossible for the state to put in place 

policies to protect against the economic effects of Dutch Disease. In the 

absence of strong policy measures to diversify the economy, oil tends to 

crowd out other sources of national productivity and state revenue, pushing the oil exporting state further along the trajectory Karl describes.

The Post-Soviet Petro-State?

If we apply Karl’s definition of the “petro-state,” four post-Soviet 

states qualify: Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. In each 

case, the oil and/or oil and gas sector is at the center of the state’s economy, 

accounting for a high share of total exports and a high share of gross domestic product (GDP).12 For Kazakhstan, oil and oil products constituted 

52.8 percent of exports in 2002.13 For Turkmenistan, gas constituted 57 

percent of exports in 2002 with oil accounting for an additional 26 percent.14 Karl divides the oil exporting countries into “capital deficient oil exporters” and “capital surplus oil exporters.” Her analysis focuses on capital 

deficient oil exporters, which have larger populations, smaller reserves, and 

lower per capita incomes than the capital surplus oil exporting states. She 

asserts that capital deficient oil-exporting states feel their oil dependency 

more acutely because “their opportunities are so clearly bounded.”15

At present, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are capital deficient oil 

exporters by this definition,16 possessing skilled labor forces and relatively 
POST-SOVIET PETRO-STATES 163

diversified economies. They have been net importers of capital and appear 

to be capable, in the mid term, of absorbing all the revenues from energy 

market booms. In terms of reserves to population ratios and gross national 

product (GNP) per capita levels, (measures Karl uses in dividing capital 

surplus and capital deficit oil exporting states), they are also comparable to 

Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela, all capital-deficient case 

states according to Karl.17 Table 8–1 shows these states in comparison with 

key OPEC members.

Table 8–1. Examples of Oil/Gas Exporting States18

State Type: 

(Capital Surplus or 

Capital Deficient)

Oil 

Reserves 

(billion 

bbls) 

Nat Gas 

Reserves 

(trillion 

cubic feet) 

Population 

(millions) 

Oil Reserves 

per capita 

(billion bbl 

per million 

persons)

GNI per 

Capita 

(US$) 

Capital Deficient

Russia 60.000 1680.00 144.8 0.4140 1,750

Kazakhstan 9.000 65.00 14.9 0.6040 1,350

Azerbaijan 7.000 30.00 8.1 0.8642 650

Turkmenistan 0.546 71.00 5.4 0.1011 950

Iran 89.700 812.30 64.7 1.3860 1,680

Venezuela 77.800 148.00 24.6 3.1626 4,760

Capital Surplus 

Saudi Arabia 261.800 224.700 21.4 12.2336 8,460

Iraq 112.500 109.80 23.8 4.7269 --

Kuwait 96.500 52.70 2.0 48.2500 18,270

Libya 29.500 46.400 5.4 5.4629 --

 All reserves estimates from Energy Information Administration, World Crude Oil and Natural Gas Reserves, Most 

Recent Estimates,” from 

PennWell Corporation, Oil & Gas Journal, Vol. 100 No. 52 (Dec 23, 2002), can be accessed at: http://www.eia.doe.

gov/emeu/international/

reserves.html

 World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank

 Gross National Income per capita, World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank

Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan both reject the suggestion that they 

are developing economies, preferring the World Bank term “economies 

in transition.” They do have some characteristics that differentiate them 

from typical developing countries: high literacy, full electrification, and 

an industrial infrastructure (albeit decaying in many places). Yet although 
164 SABONIS-HELF

the distinction between transition economy and developing economy can 

be analytically useful, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan also share important 

characteristics with developing states that are relevant in examining oil export dependency: lack of transparent democratic institutions, a post-colonial legacy of limited state capacity (in the Soviet era, all critical decisions 

were made in Moscow), bloated public bureaucracies, and incompetent 

budgeting systems.

Both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have made fundamentally different choices about the ownership of their oil resources and the appropriate role of the state. In a sense, they are the most-different cases of postSoviet petro-states. Is the petro-state model useful given the considerable 

differences? What, if anything, can be learned from the experiences of the 

OPEC states that might be applicable to both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan? Sovietologists may be troubled to see the pathologies of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan explained in oil terms, since non-oil exporting postSoviet states share some of the most significant pathologies of corruption 

and imploding state capacity. The question of interest here is how, if at all, 

these states have managed to use their new-found oil wealth to offset the 

difficulties of transition from Soviet rule to independence, and how the 

exploitation of hydrocarbons is likely to shape their futures. 

The OPEC states, like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, had to overcome social capital deficits to achieve independence and international 

economic power in their post-colonial era. In some important respects, 

OPEC states have failed to establish strong governments with internal and 

external legitimacy. Might there be a resource-driven model for post-Soviet transition that can draw usefully from their experience? This chapter 

will examine elements of similarity and difference in Turkmenistan and 

Kazakhstan, with an eye towards highlighting what a petro-state based 

analysis can contribute to understanding the evolution of post-Soviet 

governance.

The Case of Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan is the post-Soviet state most nearly resembling an 

OPEC-style petro-state. One also could observe that it is, perhaps, the 

post-Soviet state most nearly resembling the pre-perestroika Soviet Union. 

The “Sedar” (Great Leader) and “Turkmenbashi” (Father of the Turkmen), 

President-for-Life Saparmurat Niyazov, was a Communist Party boss in 

the 1980s, and had significant differences with Gorbachev over the desirability of reforming the Soviet system. After the collapse of the Soviet 

Union, Niyazov took his own Republic, renamed the Communist Party 
POST-SOVIET PETRO-STATES 165

the Democratic Party (now the only legal party in Turkmenistan), and set 

out to preserve a Soviet-style authoritarian welfare state in a post-Soviet 

world. Mixing Soviet experience with classic OPEC enthusiasm for state 

ownership, state welfare, and state interventionism, Turkmenistan appears 

to have moved further along Karl’s petro-state trajectory than the other 

Caspian states.

Political Factors in Turkmenistan

Politically, Turkmenistan is a highly authoritarian state. The Kalkh 

Maslakhaty (The People’s Council) and the Mejles (Parliament) are not 

permanent legislative bodies; instead they are convened annually or at 

the pleasure of the President. There is virtually no free press. In 2002, 

the Special Representative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) summarized the situation in Turkmenistan by 

saying there existed an “absolute lack of any freedom of expression . . . 

unseen in the OSCE region since the establishment of the organization.”19

Turkmenistan has been described as a “sultanistic regime,” a category of 

regimes first named by Max Weber, and characterized by personal rule, 

large-scale corruption, and manipulation of fear and rewards.20 The key 

political aspects of Turkmenistan today include nation-building (that is, 

establishing a strong Turkmen identity among citizens), demographics, 

and Turkmenistan’s international relations.

Nation-Building 

The project of nation-building in a post-colonial state is a critical 

task for preserving identity and security. In Turkmenistan, nation-building has been helped somewhat by the fact that Turkmen constitute 78.5 

percent of the population.21 This population is divided among five key 

tribal/clan groups, which comprise the five welayats (oblasts) of Turkmenistan. Some scholars believe that divisions among these groups are possibly 

important faultlines.22 In an effort to build a collective national identity, 

Niyazov has incorporated the symbols of each of the five key clans in the 

flag. His symbol for the nation, the five-headed eagle, also emphasizes this 

unity in diversity.

Russians were previously the largest ethnic minority in the country, 

but are currently second with an estimated 5.2 percent.23 Turkmenistan’s 

recent unilateral abrogation of the dual-citizenship pact with Russia 

means that Turkmenistan no longer recognizes dual citizenship and this 

has forced citizens to choose (and has raised significant protest in Russia). 

However, it also has had the desired effect of limiting the ability of expa-
166 SABONIS-HELF

triate Turkmen to mount opposition movements from abroad. Currently, 

the largest ethnic minority is Uzbek, at 9.8 percent.24 The ethnic Uzbeks 

are a matter of some concern, as they are geographically concentrated near 

Bukhara, and have more cultural and geographic ties to Uzbekistan than 

to their own distant capital of Ashgabad.

Niyazov has made some aggressive efforts toward building a common national identity. As of 2000, Turkmen is the only state language and 

Cyrillic letters have been eliminated systematically from public view. The 

state is attempting forced assimilation through actions such as requiring 

Turkmen national dress in all schools even for non-Turkmen students.25

The entire nation has adopted the president’s book, Ruhname, for use in 

schools at all levels. First published in October 2001, this book is part 

history, part religion, and part mythology, placing the Turkmenbashi at 

the center of development of the Turkmen state, and Turkmenistan at the 

center of the history of mankind. In spite of the sometimes-absurd elements of the President’s cult of personality, discernable popular discontent 

remains low.26 In OPEC states and elsewhere, large-scale prestige projects 

are almost always justified in terms of nation-building, and increasing the 

pride of citizens in their government. In Turkmenistan, prestige projects 

abound. Niyazov has overseen the construction of a new monument every 

year since independence, the most recent being a statue in honor of his 

book.

Population

Although popular discontent remains low, and services relatively 

high, the number of citizens to supply is growing. Population explosion is 

a pattern typical of the OPEC states and markedly untypical of the postSoviet states. Population explosion, coupled with rising expectations of 

that population, could make sustaining the level of state subsidies increasingly difficult over time, as has been the case in OPEC states. Curiously, in 

spite of the fact that the population is clearly growing rapidly, it appears 

that Turkmenistan is over-reporting its growth. 

The Turkmen government claims a population of 5.73 million, an 

estimate that the United States has modified to 4.6 million.27 Beneath the 

dubious state statistics, there is evidence that the state is having trouble 

providing its citizens with full services. Although Turkmenistan’s absolute 

poverty level is lower than other Central Asian states—approximately 7 

percent in 1998—mortality indicators are worse. At the same time, some 

state services have been reduced, most significantly in education. Compulsory schooling is now nine years, down from eleven, and free university 
POST-SOVIET PETRO-STATES 167

education has been abolished. Evening classes also have been eliminated 

at the university level.28

International Relations

Key characteristics of the evolution of Turkmenistan in its first decade of independence include state weakness in international relations and 

extreme concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the Presidentfor-Life. Turkmenistan espouses “positive neutrality towards all states,” 

an official state policy registered with the United Nations. In practice, 

positive neutrality has been a means for Turkmenistan to avoid alliances 

and remain isolationist in all matters, except those dealing with the export 

of gas. This isolation is seen as necessary for the success of the socialist 

experiment at home.

Turkmenistan’s geographic situation as a landlocked, gas exporting 

state, poses some persistent challenges. The pipelines built in the Soviet era 

all run through Russia, giving the Russians a near-monopoly on transit. 

Although Turkmen gas mixes in the pipes with Russian gas, Russia has ordered that all Turkmen gas be sold to the “near abroad,” which means the 

states of the former Soviet Union. This policy, in place since 1994, forces 

Turkmenistan to collect from states with high payment arrears, such as 

Ukraine. It also affords Russia the luxury of being able to say to successor 

states that it is unable to trade gas debt for political favors. The only existing non-Russian line to which Turkmenistan has access is the KorpejeKord Kuy pipeline, a small gas line which runs from Turkmenistan to Iran. 

This line was opened in 1997 during a period when Turkmenistan had 

halted gas exports to Russia, due to Russia’s lack of payment deliveries.29

However, other export routes are possible. The prospective future 

pipeline which holds the most attraction for Turkmenistan is the TransAfghan pipeline, a line which would originate in Turkmenistan and then 

extend across Afghanistan (avoiding Iran), continue to Pakistan, and possibly end in India. The Asian Development Bank currently is conducting 

a feasibility study on this project, based on a similar project that had been 

designed before the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s 

enthusiastic pursuit of this pipeline has been an irritant to Russia, as has 

Turkmenistan’s decision not to join a “Eurasian Alliance of Gas Producers,” which Russia attempted to form in 2002. At that time, Turkmenistan 

noted that it preferred to engage in bilateral trade.30 Since then, Turkmenistan has been securing long-term contracts with former Soviet republics, 

most notably Ukraine. Turkmenistan also has secured a favorable rate 
168 SABONIS-HELF

for its gas from Russia, although Russia persists in paying nearly half the 

amount in barter.31

In spite of the need to access as many markets as possible and the 

fact that Turkmenistan’s share of offshore resources in the Caspian Sea is 

considerable under any agreement, Turkmenistan has contributed significantly to the stalling of development in the Caspian Sea.32 Turkmenistan’s 

position in the Caspian Sea dispute has been inconsistent. Its current 

position is that it “favors division of the seabed and water surface with a 

condition to keep 20 miles zones (sic) for free navigation.”33 Yet at times, 

Turkmenistan has supported Iran’s position—that the sea should be managed as a lake, or divided evenly among the states. Under the median line 

approach to the Caspian, Turkmenistan would receive 18 percent, rather 

than the 20 percent it would be entitled to under an even division. 

The key issue for Turkmenistan is a set of disputes with Azerbaijan 

over a field they both claim in the Caspian, called Kyapaz or Serder. The 

case has been referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and some 

expect their decision to resolve the dispute.34 Until this issue is resolved, 

the extent of Turkmenistan’s reserves is difficult to determine—which 

accounts, in part, for the wide disparity of estimates among sources. However, the disagreement is also said to be connected to the personal rivalry 

between Niyazov and Azeri former President Heydar Aliyev.35 It may be 

the case that a resolution will be possible, now that Aliyev has passed the 

presidency to his son. Only a negotiated solution is possible; no scientific 

precedent has been set on how to objectively determine if a body of water 

is a lake or a sea. The decision of which body of law applies must be made 

by the states themselves.

Economic Factors in Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan has a statist, highly indebted economy. Its currency remains unconvertible, and hence the legal and black-market exchange rates 

have a great discrepancy. By Turkmen reporting, real GDP has exceeded 

1989 levels since 2001; if true, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are the only 

former republics with this level of success.36

Structure of the Economy

During the era of OPEC’s rise to power, optimism concerning stateled development was high. It was believed that the state would “allocate oil 

windfalls . . . in such a way as to optimize popular satisfaction.”37 In OPEC 

states, state ownership of a majority of the oil industry continues to be 

a necessary component of membership. Turkmenistan resembles OPEC 
POST-SOVIET PETRO-STATES 169

states in its economic structure, in that the state owns an overwhelming 

majority of the oil and gas industry. However, state ownership in Turkmenistan is even more extensive than in most OPEC states, since the government owns and manages all land and industrial structures. In fact, the 

state has used its gas wealth to prevent transition away from Soviet-style 

welfare authoritarianism.

Turkmenistan is proud that it is the one former Soviet republic that 

has not attempted to follow an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program for economic restructuring.38 Rather than succumb to the “Washington consensus” as to the appropriate sequencing of economic transition, 

Niyazov has instead pursued an older (and largely discredited) development strategy—import substituting industrialization (ISI), and is financing this ISI strategy with natural gas exports. Turkmenistan has continued 

to invest in infrastructure, including non-oil infrastructure. In addition to 

the natural gas supply mentioned earlier, railways and motorways also are 

under construction, and a rail link was opened with Iran in 1996.39

The price of Niyazov’s “socialism in one country” has been an increasing reliance on gas and oil for state revenues. The statistics in Table 

8–2 end with 2001, the last year for which full data is available, but indicators suggest that Turkmenistan’s reliance on hydrocarbon exports is 

continuing to increase. This means that the state is increasingly bound to 

hydrocarbon revenues, hence, increasingly hostage to fluctuations in price 

and increasingly likely to be responsive to the needs of only one industrial 

sector: oil and gas.

Table 8–2. Energy as a Percentage of Exports

1998 1999 2000 2001

Turkmenistan 54.7 63.7 79.8 82.9

Kazakhstan 34.9 38.0 50.2 58.1

Russia 36.7 38.9 62.9 61.0

IV Energy data are aggregated somewhat differently for Russia. Estimated from tables in (EIU Russia), including 

mineral products and 

chemicals. Data from EIU Turkmenistan, and The Economist Intelligence Unit, Kazakhstan Country Profile 2003, and 

Russia Country Profice 2003, The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, (Henceforth EIU Kazakhstan, EIU Russia), London: 2003

As is common among petro-states, Turkmenistan has suffered from 

persistent problems with taxation; personal income tax accounts for only 

seven percent of revenues. Of this amount, approximately 68 percent of 
170 SABONIS-HELF

revenues collected are in money, with the remainder paid in barter of 

goods and services.41 Most tax revenues are from value added taxes (VAT) 

and profit tax. The central bank, which had some limited autonomy from 

1997 to 1999, now has none. Since the dismissal of its pro-reform director 

in May 1999, the Bank’s role is confined to printing money to cover budget deficits and extending credit to state owned companies.42 Even strong 

advocates of State Oil Funds for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan concede that, 

in a state as strongly presidential and non-transparent as Turkmenistan, a 

fund would be unable to have any positive impact.43

Investment Climate

Turkmenistan has sought to attract foreign investment, but the 

perception that the business environment is unfavorable and the legal 

and regulatory systems non-transparent have caused investors to forgo 

most opportunities. The size of the shadow economy in Turkmenistan is 

estimated as 60 percent of the official GDP, which is in the upper half of 

Central Asian economies.44 As is typical in petro-states, political power 

is closely intertwined with the hydrocarbons sector. President Niyazov is 

said to approve all contract awards personally.45 Another indicator of the 

flow of energy and power is that the President’s son, Murad Niyazov, is an 

owner of an offshore firm, registered in Cyprus, which is responsible for 

receiving payments for gas consumed by Ukraine.46 The government has a 

reputation for shifting policies and demanding changes in already existing 

contracts, at the whim of the President. Consequently, Turkmenistan has 

one of the lowest private sector-to-GDP ratios in the region, estimated by 

the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to be 25 

percent.47 Of an original list of 4,300 small enterprises and 280 mediumsized enterprises supposedly available for privatization, only 200 of the 

smaller and six of the medium had been sold by June 2000.48 Even the oil 

and gas enterprises have trouble attracting investment.49

A key barrier to investment remains the lack of transparency of all 

government statistics. Uncertainty about the population of Turkmenistan 

already has been mentioned. There is also uncertainty about as basic an 

issue as whether Turkmenistan possesses the eleventh largest proven gas 

reserves in the world50or the fifth largest.51 With such information being 

self-reported,52 Turkmenistan’s statistics in all sectors continue to be regarded as highly suspect. GDP is similarly difficult to estimate. EBRD, 

using a weighted average of official and unofficial exchange rates, arrives 

at the figure of $538, while the Economist Intelligence Unit, by estimating 

purchasing power parity, proposes $2574 as a more accurate reflection.53
POST-SOVIET PETRO-STATES 171

Corruption, a standard feature of petro-states, is a definite problem. In 

spite of the high level of authoritarianism, corruption is widespread and 

borders are notoriously porous. In addition, Turkmenistan has a reputation for being a significant transit point for trafficking in narcotics and 

arms.54

Debt

Hydrocarbon industries dominate the economy, while the second 

largest industrial sector—construction—is financed largely by Niyazov’s 

enthusiasm for prestige projects. As a result of large-scale subsidies, prestige projects, and state mismanagement of the economy, Turkmenistan 

already qualifies as a highly indebted country under World Bank classifications.55 In contrast to the Russian experience (where windfalls in oil were 

immediately used in part for debt reduction), Turkmenistan appears to be 

continuing along a path of increasing indebtedness.

Table 8–3. Debt as a Percentage of GDP

1997 1998 1999 2000

Turkmenistan 50.6 64.6 NA NA

Kazakhstan 19.2 27.3 36.2 36.4

Russia 31.5 65.6 89.0 61.7

Data from (EIU Turkmenistan), (EIU Kazakhstan), (EIU Russia), Reference Tables from the appendices

Part of the debt can be accounted for by problems in 1997, when 

Turkmenistan ceased exporting gas during disputes with Russia about 

non-payment. But this does not fully account for the sheer magnitude of 

debt as shown in Table 8–3. High spending on domestic subsidies is typical 

of petro-states. It is estimated by a former Iranian Finance Minister that 

subsidies in the Persian Gulf ran as high as 10 to 20 percent in some years 

of the 1970s and 1980s.57 Turkmenistan follows in this tradition. Domestic 

energy consumption is highly subsidized. Every citizen has a free natural 

gas quota, and far more households are connected to gas now than were 

10 years ago. By 1999, fully 92 percent of households were connected, up 

from 40 percent in 1990.58 This demonstrates a significant state commitment to expanding subsidies. In Turkmenistan a driver pays 400 manat 

(two cents) for a liter of gasoline, which is less than half the 1000 manat 

(four cents) he would pay for a liter of bottled water.59
172 SABONIS-HELF

The World Bank estimates that currently in Turkmenistan, 21 percent of GDP is spent on subsidies for oil and gas alone.60 One side effect of 

this high level of energy subsidies is that consumption of energy per unit 

of GDP is estimated to be 13 times the U.S. level, making Turkmenistan 

the least efficient in a region of relatively inefficient countries.61 Although 

energy is the most significant sector in terms of government subsidies, 

water is also heavily subsidized, which has important implications for the 

viability of agriculture in Turkmenistan.

Threats and Patterns of Governance

The governance strategy in Turkmenistan is one familiar to many 

OPEC states: following the “no taxation, no representation” model, the 

state is failing to establish competence in taxing or budgeting. A complete 

lack of transparency has made even the most basic statistics suspect, yet—

based on the promise of hydrocarbons—the international community 

remains willing to lend money where it is unwilling to invest. President 

Niyazov has relied on hydrocarbon revenues to support a high level of 

uncontrolled public spending. In years of low gas export revenues, he has 

been willing to assume vast national debt in an effort to keep his people 

from experiencing a decline in their Soviet-era living standard. In effect, 

President Niyazov has implemented—for the time being—the system that 

Brezhnev attempted to apply to the whole Soviet Union: use of energy 

export revenues as a substitute for economic reform. 

The key threats to Turkmenistan appear to be continued high debt 

levels and the complete absence of an apparent line of succession. The debt 

will be inherited by any subsequent government, even one that decides 

to make less of a commitment to state subsidies. The lack of an apparent 

successor (Ministers who attain too high a level of visibility are sacked, 

and the Parliament is generally regarded as being laughably weak) almost 

ensures that chaos will follow in the wake of the “Great Leader’s” passing. 

Due to Russian and Iranian interests in the stability of the gas fields in 

Turkmenistan, a period of chaos in Turkmenistan could leave both Russia 

and Iran tempted to intervene.

The Case of Kazakhstan

Key characteristics of the evolution of Kazakhstan in its first decade 

of independence include continuing state weakness and limited state 

capacity, as well as increasing concentration of wealth and power in the 

hands of a few. Like Turkmenistan, it can be classified as a “sultanistic 

regime,”62 a state that runs on highly personalized leadership, corruption, 
POST-SOVIET PETRO-STATES 173

fear, and systematic rewards. In three significant areas—ownership, geography, and demography—Kazakhstan differs from the typical petro-state. 

Kazakhstan’s approach to ownership reflected the post-Soviet pessimism 

about state-led development. Instead of considering oil revenues as belonging to “the nation as a whole,” as do all the OPEC member states,63

Kazakhstan has chosen to allow privatization and an unusually high level 

of direct international investment in extraction and development of the 

oil sector. In March 2002, in recognition of the openness of its market, 

Kazakhstan became the first CIS country to be granted a “market economy 

country” status by the United States.64

Political Factors in Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is nominally democratic, but in reality it is a highly presidential, authoritarian state, though much more open and pluralist than 

Turkmenistan. The Senate (upper house) and the Majilis (lower house) 

are permanent legislative bodies, although they typically rely on leadership 

from the Ministries and Presidential apparat. Key opposition leaders are 

in exile, and political parties other than those supportive of the President 

do not tend to endure. Members of President Nursultan Nazarbaev’s extended family own substantial stakes in promising private and parastatal 

industries. Key political aspects of Kazakhstan include the task of nationbuilding (that is, establishing a strong Kazakh identity among citizens), 

demographic information, and Kazakhstan’s international relations.

Nation Building

Nation-building in a post-colonial state is a critical task for preservation of identity and security. Like many late-developing states, Kazakhstan 

faces significant challenges in its efforts towards nation-building. With the 

collapse of the Soviet Union, it inherited boundaries that do not reflect 

a polity with strong national loyalties or identity. In fact, Kazakhs, who 

constitute 53.4 percent of the population,65 only achieved the status of an 

absolute majority in Kazakhstan following independence. Russians make 

up the largest minority ethnic group, with 30 percent of the population. 

Ukrainians and Uzbeks make up the next largest minorities with 3.7 and 

2.5 percent, respectively.66 The state was not unified by a struggle for independence. Rather, independence was thrust upon it when the Kazakh 

President and Communist Party Chief Nursultan Nazarbaev failed in his 

long-standing efforts to negotiate a compromise between Gorbachev and 

Yeltsin to prevent the Soviet Union from collapsing. With the onset of 

independence, Nazarbaev became the leader of a state with limited capac-
174 SABONIS-HELF

ity to govern. Under the Soviet empire, all bureaucracy in the Soviet-era 

capital of Almaty was designed to require direction from Moscow.

In OPEC states and elsewhere, large-scale prestige projects are almost always justified in terms of nation-building, and some do increase 

the pride of citizens in their government. In Kazakhstan, the key prestige 

project has been construction of the new capitol city, Astana. Although the 

reason for moving the capitol is oft-debated, it probably was done for a 

mix of reasons, including an effort to better integrate the northern portion 

of the country, a desire to bring the center of power closer to Russia, and 

a desire of President Nazarbaev to create a new post-Soviet city to his own 

specifications, in the region of his own clan.

Population

Kazakhstan’s demography and declining population appear to pose 

something of an opportunity to the state. In contrast to most OPEC states, 

which experienced dramatic population growth with their prosperity, 

the Kazakh government is more concerned about stemming population 

decline. The 2000 census delivered the unwelcome news that the population since independence had declined from 16.1 million in 1989 to 14.8 

million. Much of the decrease can be attributed to emigration. A disproportionate share of emigrants have been ethnic Russians, which has caused 

a “brain-drain” of some key skills. At the same time, however, this has enabled ethnic Kazakhs to become a majority in their own territory for the 

first time since the 1920s.67 Declining population eventually may lead to a 

shortage of manpower and other challenges, but it does spare Kazakhstan 

the classic developing petro-state challenge of meeting the rising expectations of a burgeoning population.

International Relations

Kazakhstan’s geographic situation poses some persistent challenges 

for the country. As a landlocked, oil-exporting nation, distant from all its 

prospective consumers,68 Kazakhstan is faced with the strategically critical 

choice of how to bring its oil to market. As in the case of Turkmenistan, 

this geographic factor forces the government to commit to long-term export strategies. The pipelines built in the Soviet era all run through Russia, 

giving the Russians a monopoly on transit of Kazakh oil. Russia has allocated irregular space in its pipelines to Kazakhstan since independence, 

consistently favoring Russian oil. In an effort to create a pipeline just for 

Kazakhstan, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) was founded in 1993 

and the pipeline opened in the summer of 2001. This pipeline also runs 
POST-SOVIET PETRO-STATES 175

across Russian territory, but is owned by a mixture of state and private 

actors. However, problems with Russia over transit fees and privileges 

have persisted. In just one example, Russia is seeking to extend access to 

the pipeline to non-shareholders at shareholder rates.69 Until an alternate 

route is constructed that does not cross Russia, Kazakhstan will remain 

reliant on Russian goodwill to get its oil to market. 

Non-Russian possibilities for the future export of Kazakh oil do 

exist. China, for one, has expressed interest in an eastbound pipeline. Yet 

Russian-Kazakh trade relations remain fairly positive due to the power 

asymmetry between the states. Since September 11, the United States has 

encouraged Russia to make good-faith agreements with Kazakhstan to 

discourage the Kazakhs from moving more towards OPEC’s sphere of influence. Kazakhstan and Russia, together with Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, are striving for a “harmonization of legislation” as a component of 

an eventual free trade zone. This movement towards harmonization gives 

Kazakhstan the opportunity to avoid capacity building. It also means that 

Kazakhstani legislation, in many sectors, is based very closely on existing 

Russian laws. Critics claim that the harmonization amounts to “legislation 

by white-out.” It also ensures that weaknesses in Russian laws will most 

likely be passed on to the other four states.

One aspect of Russian-Kazakhstan cooperation has been on the Caspian Sea issue.70 Kazakhstan consistently has supported the Russian position. When the positions of the other littoral parties remained unchanged 

after several years of negotiations, Russia and Kazakhstan were the first to 

sign a bilateral agreement in 1998, which marked borders on the seabed 

in keeping with the “Median Line” solution.71 One cost to Kazakhstan of 

the Caspian Sea dispute that remains unresolved is that several pipeline 

options cannot be pursued without a resolution. The United States has 

expressed interest in Kazakhstan joining the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 

currently under construction. While the government of Kazakhstan expresses interest in each new option, at present no non-Russian routes are 

under construction.72

Economic Factors in Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan has an open economy. The currency is fully convertible 

and has been relatively stable since 1998. Real GDP has yet to exceed 1989 

levels, but Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian state to have attained a 

GNP of over $1,000 per capita.73 Kazakhstan also has a relatively small 

shadow economy, estimated at only 39 percent of its official GDP.74 Wealth 

is very unevenly distributed, however, with 26 percent of the population 
176 SABONIS-HELF

below the poverty line.75 Due, in part, to the high level of foreign investment, the UN Human Development Index ranks quality of life in Kazakhstan as the highest in Central Asia and the Caucasus.76

Structure of Economy

Kazakhstan, like most post-Soviet states, came to independence with 

a profound skepticism about the state’s role in all sectors of social and 

economic development. Turkmenistan, in which the state retained control 

of most sectors, was the exception rather than the rule. In Kazakhstan, the 

state made little effort to cushion its population from the economic impacts of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Instead, in the early years of independence, the population (like that in many other post-Soviet states) had their 

expectations dramatically reduced, even as oil production was beginning 

to provide windfalls to the state and elites.

Kazakhstan received enthusiastic support from international financial institutions and from the oil interests for its early decision to privatize 

most of the economy, including the oil sector. This privatization had the 

positive effect of preventing the state from sharply expanding, as happened in OPEC states during oil booms. Instead, Kazakhstan’s oil industry 

rapidly became dependent on foreign investment; in the first quarter of 

2002, foreign investors underwrote 80 percent of oil production.77 Foreign 

investment was attractive initially because it had the short-term effect of 

providing emergency revenue in the wake of the Soviet collapse. Privatization was used to fill the budgetary gap, particularly during the time period 

of 1996 to 1998.78

Because of the dramatic opening of its industry to foreign investment as well as the simultaneous privatization of the domestic energy 

sector, by 1998 Kazakhstan was the largest per capita recipient of direct 

foreign investment in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).79

Yet in retrospect, the rush to privatize is sometimes regretted. As the state 

enjoys more success in oil exports, the government on several occasions 

has expressed a desire to renegotiate its contracts with foreign investors, 

many of which it now feels were not designed sufficiently in its favor. 

Although the government is reluctant to improve its capacity in 

terms of its ability to tax or provide services, it has not been immune 

to the temptation of “prestige” projects. Such projects are a hallmark of 

petro-states and the new capital of Astana is a classic example. A richer and 

more established state, Germany, opted in recent years to move its capital 

slowly to Berlin, in order to reduce the cost. By contrast, government ministries in Kazakhstan were ordered to relocate to Astana within a year of 
POST-SOVIET PETRO-STATES 177

the presidential announcement designating the new capital. Converting a 

small, provincial town in the Virgin Lands of the steppe into the nation’s 

capital has been an expensive project, and a top investment priority for 

the government. Construction in Astana is estimated to have cost at least 

$500 million by 1999, not including the power and water infrastructure 

that was sorely needed.80 In addition to direct government projects, oil 

companies, both foreign and domestic, also were expected to contribute to 

the President’s new city. Luong estimates that Kazakh oil alone has spent 

$25 to 30 million in improvements in Astana.81

The Kazakh state also has failed to address the issue of taxation. 

State revenues declined to 20 percent of GDP by 1995, and dropped by 

an additional six percent in 1996. By 1997, the government acknowledged 

that it had been failing to collect taxes effectively, and created a new State 

Revenues Ministry. This Ministry was tasked with responsibility for fiscal 

policy, tax regulation, and customs. Tax revenues, as a percentage of GDP, 

continued their decline in 1998.82 This lack of success is best explained by 

the government’s conviction that it can rely primarily on oil and gas revenues; in 1998, it borrowed money rather than improving tax collection 

methods. The lack of success in raising tax revenues for the federal budget 

also may be explained by the simple fact that the State Revenues Ministry, 

like most lucrative Ministries, is headed by a relative of the President and 

has the power to determine the type and level of taxes applicable to each 

new oil contract. These contracts must be made directly with the government, each is unique and each is reviewed by President Nazarbaev.83

With the failure of other forms of taxation, increasing reliance on 

oil for state revenues has been inevitable. Energy exports constitute an 

increasing share of all exports in Kazakhstan, rising to the current level 

of 58.1 percent of total exports (see Table 8–2). Although energy as a percentage of exports remains lower in Kazakhstan than in Turkmenistan, the 

rates of increase are similar; Kazakhstan’s reliance increased 23.2 percent 

from 1998 to 2001, only slightly less than Turkmenistan’s increase of 28.2 

percent during the same time period. Again, increased reliance means the 

Kazakh state is increasingly hostage to fluctuations in price and export 

levels, and the state is therefore increasingly likely to be responsive to the 

needs of the oil sector alone. One very good sign in Kazakhstan is the establishment of a new State Oil Fund, designed to provide consistent funding to the social sector. This is an oft-recommended strategy for improving 

the fiscal competence of petro-states.84 Its success, however, depends on it 

being run in a transparent manner.
178 SABONIS-HELF

Investment Climate

Although privatization may have limited expansion of the state, it has 

not begun separating money from power. The presidential family remains 

vital to all oil deals, and the President himself is the principal partner of 

a number of major energy companies operating in Kazakhstan. The link 

between economic and political outcomes is both typical of petro-states 

and reminiscent of the former socialist systems.85 It also leads inevitably to 

corrupt practices on the part of the foreign oil companies attempting to do 

business in Kazakhstan, as evidenced by the investigation of Exxon Mobil, 

said to be the largest U.S. investigation of alleged bribery abroad under 

the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.86 The level of corruption at the highest 

levels is widely recognized: in June 2000, a bill in parliament assured the 

President and his family lifetime immunity from charges of corruption.87

Kazakhstan has managed to put a spin on privatization that is a curious inverse of the tendency of the petro-state to expand. Instead, multinational corporations operating in Kazakhstan were asked, in the early crisis 

years, to assume certain social costs—in lieu of paying taxes. Hence, companies took on tasks such as paying back wages, building roads, and funding schools. Such participation had the short-term effect of making the 

regions more welcoming to foreign investment, but the long-term effect 

has been to deprive the federal government of revenues (tax exemptions 

were offered in exchange for these services at the local level). This practice 

also has served to trap the foreign companies into running Soviet-style 

“company towns,” rather than devolving the management of such towns 

to local, elected authorities. The predictable consequence of such schemes, 

as Luong notes, has been “to place both the responsibility and the blame 

for local socioeconomic conditions on foreign investors rather than on 

government officials.”88

A similar strategy was pursued when the insolvent electricity sector 

was sold to foreign investors; the government was able to direct the inevitable citizen hostility about higher tariffs towards the foreign investors and 

away from the state. The Belgian electricity company, Tractebel, is under 

investigation in Belgium for allegedly paying $55 million in bribes to its 

Kazakh business partners. Apparently, the money bought Tractebel very 

little, since regulators refused to raise the electricity rates, the life of the 

chief Tractebel representative has been threatened, and Tractebel ended 

up selling its holdings to a state company for $100 million—about half the 

amount it had invested.89
POST-SOVIET PETRO-STATES 179

Debt

With the inability to tax or provide social services, coupled with 

presidential fondness for the new capital city, it is not surprising that Kazakhstan’s external debt is rising. Although Kazakhstan’s debt as percentage of GDP (36.4 percent in 2000—see Table 8–3) seems low compared 

to Turkmenistan (64.6 percent in 1998 and rising), in absolute terms Kazakhstan, by 1997, had accumulated the third largest debt among former 

Soviet republics, following Russia and Ukraine. As early as 1996, the state 

was spending almost 10 percent of its budget on debt service, while cutting back on domestic social programs.90 A local journalist estimates that 

public expenditures by 1998 were running a half to a third of pre-independence levels.91

Threats and Patterns of Governance

Although a much weaker—and less ambitious—state than Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan also appears to follow the “no taxation, no representation” model familiar to OPEC states. Kazakhstan has failed to establish 

competence in taxation or budgeting. Transparency and high levels of 

corruption remain problematic. Rapid privatization was a short-term solution to offset the costs of collapse of the Soviet Union, but the one-time 

influx of revenues did not solve the deeper problems. In an effort to protect the weak state, without making efforts to strengthen its competence, 

Kazakhstan apparently has relied on a strategy of privatizing and using 

that privatization to shuttle blame for government deficiencies to foreign 

investors.

Kazakhstan does have some characteristics that may enable its development to depart from the classic petro-state pattern. Privatization is an 

encouraging sign, offering the potential of some market controls on government behavior. The State Oil Fund, if properly managed, may provide 

some fiscal discipline. The demographic decline of Kazakhstan suggests 

it will not be subject to the kind of social pressures caused by dramatic 

population increases in OPEC and other states such as Iran, Nigeria, and 

Indonesia.

However, if we match the evidence from Kazakhstan with Karl’s 

trajectory, it appears that Kazakhstan has more in common with the 

“petrolization” trajectory than not. “Petrolization,” that is, “a process by 

which states become dependent on oil exports and their polities develop 

an addiction to petrodollars,”92 does appear to be under way. The state has 

not yet moved to dramatic public spending, but neither has it improved its 

state capacity or bureaucratic competence. Instead, the state appears to be 
180 SABONIS-HELF

capturing oil rents without accepting obligations to its people. This may be 

the first of the anticipated “pernicious effects,” which will lead to economic 

decline and destabilization of the regime, but it is too early to say. For the 

moment, Kazakhstan watchers are more concerned that, as Luong notes: 

if current trends continue, Kazakhstan will emerge as a quasi-state 

– that is, one with international legitimacy but without the domestic 

capacity to generate sufficient revenue, address basic social problems, 

and promote even minimum levels of economic growth.93

As Kazakhstan continues to increase reliance on oil exports, and 

continues to fail to develop bureaucratic competence, one troubling 

trend is that, as a state with significant oil reserves, it can continue to 

borrow money in the international community. It thereby avoids structural changes and ensures that future generations will inherit substantial 

debt, as well as incoherent political and bureaucratic structures. Another 

troubling trend is that economic success in oil has not motivated the state 

to increase its provision of social goods, in spite of having acquired the 

resources necessary to do so. Public expectations for state support remain 

low. Instead of taking an OPEC-style approach toward “sowing the oil 

wealth,” elites, and particularly the presidential family, have treated their 

own state as a colony to be exploited. This, in the end, will constitute the 

greatest threat to stability.

Petro-State Pathologies

An analysis that fails to take petro-state behavior into account may 

simply conclude that the problem in Turkmenistan is too much state, 

whereas the problem in Kazakhstan is not enough. A petro-state based 

analysis, on the other hand, offers some insight into the similarities of 

these states and their problems. Given the trajectory of oil-led development in other states, we cannot assume that the problems of either state 

will recede as they develop. Instead, we should expect that the transition to 

truly strong states will simply not occur here. Karl notes:

That the petro-state depends on revenues generated by a depletable 

commodity, that this commodity produces extraordinary rents, and 

that these rents are funneled through weak institutions virtually 

ensure that the public sector will lack the authority and corporate 

cohesiveness necessary to exercise effective capacity.94

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are best understood as states tempted 

by the “no taxation, no representation” model characteristic of OPEC 
POST-SOVIET PETRO-STATES 181

states. Because there is wealth to be had, and because all decisions are 

political, rent seeking by state officials promises to be a permanent tendency.95 The states have not developed coherent budgeting systems or 

public bureaucracies—and wealth from hydrocarbon revenues means that 

they may indefinitely delay in these tasks. The two have different spending 

patterns, but both have been free to borrow against the future, since the 

international community has faith in the value of the energy resources, 

even if not in the wisdom of the states managing it. Early evidence suggests 

that the energy interests within the states are already capturing the state, 

and that these interests do not serve the cause of expanding democracy. 

In both states, although evidence of Dutch Disease is difficult to separate 

from the problems inherent in moving away from Soviet economies, there 

is evidence that other sectors continue to be pushed out by the oil sector, and that the state is falling further into disrepair in spite of increased 

wealth.

A petro-state based analysis offers a useful framework for outlining 

what is likely to happen to these states, and what trends should be most 

closely monitored. It is also useful in explaining how the future of the 

energy-rich post-Soviet states (including Russia and Azerbaijan as well 

as Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan) is likely to differ politically, as well as 

economically, from other post-Soviet states.

Global Security Implications

The centrality of hydrocarbons to the economies of Turkmenistan 

and Kazakhstan should not be confused with their significance to international energy markets. The resources of Central Asia represent incremental 

not large additions to the potential world supply. They may be significant 

at the margins, but the proven reserves suggest that these resources will be 

more important to the region and for would-be importing states such as 

Turkey and Pakistan, than to world markets overall. What these resources 

do represent are new avenues that could support diversity of supply, the 

possibility of new oil and gas supply routes to regions currently facing 

energy deficits, and new opportunities for investment for hydrocarbon 

companies long locked out of Middle East development.

There is little doubt that, in spite of important gains in efficiency, 

rising standards of living necessitate rising energy needs in the developing world. Hence, world demand for energy will continue to increase. The 

International Energy Agency predicts that world oil demand alone by 2010 

will be 90 million bbl/day, which is 17 percent greater than present.96 The 

age of oil is not yet past, nor is the boom and bust cycle that has character-
182 SABONIS-HELF

ized oil markets. The age of gas has barely begun, as European states establish policies that make gas an attractive source of energy. Turkmenistan 

and Kazakhstan offer the promise of an alternative to OPEC. The risks, 

however, are evident.

In the case of Turkmenistan, its resemblance to OPEC states is already striking. The high debt levels, over-extension of the state, absence 

of a line of succession, as well as the strategic sensitivity of its location, 

all make it difficult to argue that reliance on Turkmenistan for resources 

is in any way more sound than reliance on the OPEC states. In the case of 

Kazakhstan, one cannot be too sanguine about the ability of privatization 

to offset the pathologies associated with petro-states. Even if assets are 

nominally privatized, Kazakhstan remains a state politicized in the manner of other petro-states. Western states and investors should not be so 

enamored as to forget that:

private sectors are just as rent-seeking as political authorities in oilexporting countries, and systematically pressure these authorities to 

funnel oil money in their direction to finance inefficient and unproductive activities.97

A climate in which a wealthy state remains weak, accepting little obligation to provide social benefits for its population, is not superior to an 

over-extended state with limited capacity, and no more secure.

The possible regional and global implications of petrolization of 

either Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan need to be examined in a security 

context—especially if oil booms in an era of increasing scarcity actually 

have the “pernicious effects” of economic decline and regime destabilization. If diversification from OPEC sources leads to expanding the number 

of states with OPEC-like instabilities, the problem of avoiding petrolization should receive the active attention of both the oil importing, as well 

as exporting states.

Notes1

 Justin Fox, “OPEC Has a Brand-New Groove,” Fortune, October 14, 2002, 115. 2

 Terry Lynn Karl, “Crude Calculations: OPEC Lessons for the Caspian Region,” Chapter 3 in 

Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, eds. (Maryland: 

Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 35. 3

 Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 

University of California Press, 1997), 63. 4

 See Jahangir Amuzegar, Managing the Oil Wealth: OPEC’s Windfalls and Pitfalls (London 

and New York: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2001), 19-21, for a fuller discussion. Amuzegar is more skeptical of 

the economics of Dutch Disease than most analysts. He asserts that the Dutch Disease effect does not 

necessarily hold in countries with high unemployment.
POST-SOVIET PETRO-STATES 183

5

 During this crisis, the price of oil jumped from $13 to $34 per bbl.

6

 Qtd. in Karl, Petro-States, 4. 7

 Karl, Petro-States, Chapter 1. 8

 See Karl, Petro-States, Chapter 3 for a full discussion of the importance of a citizen tax base. 9

 The application of “no taxation, no representation” to oil states is frequent in the literature. 

Its origins are unclear. 10 The OPEC states have seen debt increase with each oil boom. See tables in Karl, Petro-States, 

appendix. 11 See Karl, Caspian, 39. 12 The World Bank uses 10 percent of GDP and 40 percent of total merchandise exports to 

classify a mineral economy. Karl applies the same formula to classify an oil economy. See Karl, PetroStates, Chapter 1. At the present time, Azerbaijan is the most reliant of the four on oil exports, at 90 

percent of exports in 2002. 13 CIA World Factbook, section on Kazakhstan. 14 Ibid., section on Turkmenistan.

15 Karl, Petro-States, 18. 16 Karl has postulated that Kazakhstan may become a capital surplus state in the future, since 

it is more sparsely populated, and additional reserves are likely to be discovered (see Karl, Caspian, 

29). However, Kazakhstan’s population is large by capital surplus state standards: Iraq, with its 1973 

population of 10.41 million, is the most populous of the capital-surplus states. In spite of its limited oil 

reserves, Turkmenistan is presumed to have the fifth largest gas reserves in the world. Given its sparse 

population, it may become a capital surplus state. At the moment, however, its export routes and options are sufficiently constrained that it is not functioning as a capital surplus state. 17 Karl, Petro-States, Chapter 2. 18 For a similar chart of non-FSU countries, see Karl, Petro-States, 18. 19 Quoted in Turkmenistan Country Profile 2003 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit 

Limited, (Henceforth EIU Turkmenistan), 2003), 16. 20 See Tanya Charlick-Paley, with Phil Williams and Olga Oliker, “The Political Evolution of 

Central Asia and South Caucasus: Implications for Regional Security,” Chapter 2 in Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the US Army, Olga Oliker and Thomas S. 

Szayna, eds., RAND Document Number MR-1598-A, 2003, 13-14. 21 Thomas Szayna, “Potential for Ethnic Conflict in the Caspian Region,” Chapter 6 in Faultlines 

of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna, eds. (California 

and Washington DC: RAND, 2003), Table 6.8. 22 See Nancy Lubin, “Turkmenistan’s Energy: A Source of Wealth or Instability?” Chapter 6 in 

Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, eds. (Maryland: 

Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000). 23 Szayna, Table 6.8.

24 Ibid., Table 6.8.

25 EIU Turkmenistan.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., 12.

28 Ibid., 13 and 20.

29 Lubin, 108.

30 “Turkmenistan Undecided on Whether to Join Eurasian ‘Gas OPEC’” Interfax News Agency, 

Petroleum Report, July 24, 2002. 31 The current price, $44, is actually more than Turkmenistan would be likely to get from 

Western users, but Russia is currently paying half the amount in barter. Industry experts, personal 

interviews, Sept. 2003. 32 In a condominium agreement, all littoral states would have an equal share in the lake’s 

resources, regardless of the extent of their coastline, and would confer with each other on activities 

taken in the lake. Under a sea agreement, the littoral states would have exclusive economic zones and 
184 SABONIS-HELF

free passage under the Law of the Sea. For a detailed discussion of the Caspian Sea issue, see Gawdat 

Bahgat, “Splitting Water: The Geopolitics of Water Resources in the Caspian Sea,” SAIS Review, Vol. 

XXII, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2002). 33 “Caspian Legal Regime,” summarized by the International Center for Caspian Studies, 

<http://caspiancenter.org/info_sp.shtml>. 34 CIA World Factbook, Turkmenistan. 35 See Martha Brill Olcott, “Regional Cooperation in Central Asia and the South Caucasus,” 

Chapter 7 in Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, eds., 

(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000). 36 EIU Turkmenistan, 25.

37 Amuzegar, 14.

38 EIU, Turkmenistan, 21.

39 Ibid., 16.

40 Data from EIU Turkmenistan, and The Economist Intelligence Unit, Kazakhstan Country 

Profile 2003, and Russia Country Profile 2003 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 

(Henceforth EIU Kazakhstan, EIU Russia), 2003). 41 EIU Turkmenistan, 22.

42 Ibid., 8.

43 Svetlana Tsalik, “The Hazards of Petroleum Wealth,” Chapter 1 in Caspian Oil Windfalls: 

Who Will Benefit?, Svetlana Tsalik and Robert Ebel, eds. (Washington, DC: Central Eurasia Project, 

2003), 12. 44 Phil Williams, “Criminalization and Stability in Central Asia and South Caucasus,” Chapter 

4 in Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna, 

eds. (Washington, DC: RAND, 2003), Table 4-1. 45 Lubin, 114.

46 Centrasia, Daily Report 29 November, Russian-language Central Asian news site, at: <www.

centrasia.ru>. 47 EIU Turkmenistan, 18 and 22.

48 Ibid., 22.

49 Dragon Oil from UAE and Monument from the UK are involved in exploration--a small 

list, compared to activity in other post-Soviet, energy-rich states. 50 EIU, Turkmenistan.

51 CIA World Factbook, Turkmenistan. 52 This is also because Turkmenistan prefers to count reserves that are in a Caspian Sea area 

where their ownership is disputed by Azerbaijan. 53 EIU Turkmenistan, 20.

54 See Lubin. Also see Williams.

55 EIU Turkmenistan, 36.

56 Data from EIU Turkmenistan, EIU Kazakhstan, EIU Russia; Reference Tables from the appendices. 57 Iranian Finance Minister Jahangir Amuzegar, cited by Karl in Caspian, 36. 58 EIU Turkmenistan, 16.

59 Interviews, taxi drivers in Ashgabad, October 2003.

60 EIU Turkmenistan, 16.

61 Ibid., 16.

62 See Charlick-Paley.

63 See Amuzegar, Chapter 1.

64 Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Kazakhstan in Brief,” June 2002.

65 Szayna, Table 6.5.

66 Ibid., Table 6.5.

67 EIU Kazakhstan, 15.
POST-SOVIET PETRO-STATES 185

68 As Karl notes in Caspian, 33, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are the only oil 

exporting states without sea access. 69 EIU Kazakhstan, 21.

70 Russia has long supported the notion of free passage, with clear allocation of seabed rights. 

(This is usually known as the Median line solution). For a full discussion, see Bahgat SAIS. 71 A median line solution would divide the Caspian Sea in accordance with the Law of the Sea 

treaty. See earlier section on Turkmenistan’s international relations issues for an explanation of the 

median line debate. 72 As noted, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route is a non-Russian route, but for Kazakhstan to connect with it will require construction of undersea lines in the Caspian. 73Abraham S. Becker, “Some Economic Dimensions of Security in Central Asia and South Caucasus,” Chapter 3 Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the US 

Army, eds. Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna, RAND Document Number MR-1598-A, 2003.

74 Williams, Table 4-1.

75 CIA World Factbook, Kazakhstan. 76 Williams, 74.

77 EIU Kazakhstan.

78 Pauline Jones Luong, “Kazakhstan: The Long-Term Costs of Short-Term Gains,” Chapter 5 in 

Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, eds. (Maryland: 

Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 80. 79 Luong, 88.

80 Ibid., 84.

81 Ibid., as of 1999.

82 Ibid., 85.

83 Karl, Caspian, 46. 84 See Tsalik for details

85 Karl, Caspian, 40 86 Steve LeVine, “US Bribery Probe Looks at Mobil-Firm’s Role in Payments to High Kazakh 

Officials is Under Investigation,” Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2003, A2. 87 Charlick-Paley, 18.

88 Luong, 90.

89 Douglas Frantz, “Generating Much Heat but no Kazakh Profits,” The New York Times, May 

13, 2001, start page 3.8. 90 Luong.

91 Cited in Luong, 87.

92 Karl, Caspian, 37. 93 Luong, 80.

94 Karl, Petro-States, 58. 95 Ibid., 63.

96 International Energy Association, International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2000, 

The International Energy Agency, Paris: 2000. See website: www.iea.org/ 97Karl, Caspian, 37.
186 SABONIS-HELF
187

Chapter 9

Cooperative Management 

of Transboundary Water 

Resources in Central Asia

Daene C. McKinney

S

ince independence a little more than a decade ago, the Central Asian 

republics have been striving to develop fair and rational bases for 

sharing and using their water and energy resources. Inheriting a 

legacy of unsustainable economic development and environmental mismanagement, these former Soviet countries have faced extreme economic 

inefficiencies and ecological damage in their attempts to transition to market economies. The Central Asian republics depend on the rivers of the 

Aral Sea Basin for drinking water, irrigation, and hydroelectric power. In 

the upstream countries of the Basin, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the rivers 

are used for hydroelectric power, especially during winter months, while 

downstream, in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, they are used 

for agricultural purposes in the summertime. The post-independence 

upstream shift in water use away from irrigation has created disputes 

between the upstream and downstream countries over how the region’s 

transboundary waters should be managed. Successful cooperative sharing 

of water and other natural resources is essential for the long-term prosperity and security of the region.

Agriculture is the largest water consumer in the region and a major 

employer of the region’s workforce, producing a large percentage of each 

country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Yet water diversions for irrigation have resulted in severe problems in the downstream areas of the Syr 

Darya and Amu Darya Basins near the Aral Sea. Improving water quality 

and increasing water quantity to meet basic human needs in these environmentally damaged and economically depressed areas is an urgent need. 

However, providing this water through reduced agricultural water use may 

impose great economic damage on the basin countries. How does one 
188 MCKINNEY

choose? The ongoing questions of water management in Central Asia center on such paradoxical and too often restrictive choices. Finding solutions 

will not be easy because the problems are inherently complicated.

The main infrastructure systems of Central Asia were developed 

when the countries were part of one centrally administered area, in which 

natural and economic resources were shared and costs were subsidized. 

This is no longer the case, and the countries of Central Asia have each developed their own national approaches to resource use and economic development. The past decade has brought greater national self-sufficiency 

and governance but, at the same time, has contributed to a decline in economic integration and personal living standards among the republics.

Given the great dependence of the Central Asian economies on irrigated agriculture, the issue of water allocation, involving both quantity 

of water and timing of allocations, has emerged as a major factor in the republics’ development. Agreements on the use of the region’s shared water 

resources are evolving. How the use of water resources is finally settled 

will have substantial consequences for the long-term prosperity of these 

nations. In addition, the ongoing process of regional cooperation in the 

arena of natural resources management is a major factor in the long-term 

security of the region.

The Central Asian states have made great progress during the past 

10 years in cooperative management of shared water resources. However, 

many issues remain unresolved and need continued development, including:

■ Harmonizing, or at least coordinating, water management strategies 

and water codes among the nations of the region;

■ Enhancing and strengthening the roles of regional water management bodies;

■ Improving the 1998 Agreement on water and energy use in the Syr 

Darya Basin, which is due to renew itself for an additional five years 

in 2003;

■ Improving water allocation in the Basin to account for the developing agricultural and hydropower sectors in the upstream countries, 

and the use of the water in downstream countries; and

■ Proper financing of water infrastructure of interstate significance.

Central Asia is a region perpetually dependent on its water resources 

for existence and prosperity. Recent political changes in the region have 

created a situation in which a resource once managed by a single, cen-
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 189

tralized authority must now be jointly developed and managed by five 

sovereign nations. Many past decisions must be dealt with by the new 

governments, such as the tragedy of the Aral Sea decline and the legacy of 

over-developed irrigation systems. While new relations between the fledgling countries have been established in the area of water resources, much 

remains to be done to achieve secure and productive use of this resource. 

This chapter will examine the history of the region in terms of water issues, 

examine the ongoing strategies to deal with water management and finally 

discuss conclusions and challenges which remain within the region.

Figure 9–1. Aral Sea Basin.

The Aral Sea Basin

The Aral Sea Basin, the dominant geographic feature of the region in 

terms of water, comprises parts of Afghanistan and Kazakhstan, and most 

of the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Figure 

9–1 shows the size of the Basin in relation to the region. The Aral Sea Basin 
190 MCKINNEY

occupies 1.51 million square kilometers (km2) of the total four million 

km2 area of these countries. Topographically, the Aral Sea Basin ranges 

from the vast Turanian plains in the west to the tremendous mountain 

ranges of the Pamirs and Tien Shan in the east.

The climate in the northern part of the Basin is continental, whereas 

the southern part is subtropical. The high mountain areas are humid and 

account for the high volume of runoff in the Amu and Syr Darya rivers 

which run from the mountains through the desert to the Aral Sea. Water 

resources are mainly surface waters formed in the Tien Shan and Pamir 

mountain ranges. Melt water from extensive permanent snowfields and 

glaciers (more than 18,000 km2 of ice cover) feeds the major rivers of the 

Aral Sea Basin, the Syr Darya, and Amu Darya, mostly during the spring 

and early summer thaw.

The Amu Darya Basin covers a broad area, about 1.33 million km2, 

and the river—the largest river in Central Asia—has a length of 2574 km 

from the headwaters of the Pyanj River on the Afghan–Tajik border to the 

Aral Sea.1 The Syr Darya Basin occupies about 484,000 km2 and the river 

stretches some 2,337 km from the Naryn River headwaters in Kyrgyzstan 

through the Ferghana Valley, the Hunger Steppe, the Kyzyl Kum desert, 

before finally reaching the Aral Sea.2 These two rivers account for about 90 

percent of the region’s annual river flow and provide roughly 75 percent 

(by area) of the water to Central Asia’s irrigated agriculture. The Amu 

Darya has an average annual flow of 79.3 billion cubic meters (bcm), and 

the Syr Darya has a flow of 37.2 bcm.

Figure 9–2 and Table 9–1 show that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 

together produce about 77 percent of the water in the Aral Sea Basin. 

Afghanistan contributes about 10 percent of the inflow to the Basin, but 

it has not been a party to the recent Aral Sea Basin management because 

of its political instability. However, this is likely to change in the future as 

agricultural development proceeds in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s participation in Amu Darya management notwithstanding, eventually its water 

needs will have to be considered along with the other Central Asian states. 

Historically, demand for water in Central Asia has been dominated by the 

needs of agriculture, which accounts for more than 90 percent of total 

water use. The downstream countries use about 85 percent of the Aral Sea 

Basin waters, while the upstream countries use the rest. Most of the countries have increased their demands for water in the last few years and there 

is little likelihood this situation will change any time soon.

Central Asia’s agricultural expansion and population growth over 

the past three decades have placed a great strain on the water resources 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 191

of the region. In 1960, the Aral Sea occupied an area of 66,000 km2 and 

had a volume of 1060 bcm. Since 1960 the population in the Basin has 

grown from 13 million to more than 40 million people, water diversions 

have increased from 60 to 105 bcm, and irrigated lands have risen from 

4.5 million hectares (ha) to just over eight million. As a result, the Aral 

Sea has lost half of its surface area and two-thirds of its volume and become an environmentally challenged area. Figure 9–3 charts the increase 

in irrigated lane and the corresponding diminished flow. In addition to 

the dwindling flow, inefficient irrigation systems and mismanagement of 

irrigation water diversions have resulted in elevated water and soil salinity 

levels, widespread environmental degradation, and diminished agricultural productivity.

Figure 9–2. Aral Sea Basin Selected Characteristics: Population; Surface 

Water Flow Formation; ICWC Water Allocation; and Irrigated Lands.

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192 MCKINNEY

The Aral Sea Tragedy

Increased diversion of water from the Aral Sea Basin rivers over the 

past several decades allowed the development of a massive agricultural 

complex in Central Asia, while at the same time degrading the ecosystem 

and environment of the region. The Aral Sea level has decreased by more 

than 20 meters since 1950, causing the sea to separate into two water bodies, the Southern and Northern Aral Seas, each fed by the Amu Darya and 

Syr Darya, respectively. More recently, the Large Sea has split into western 

and eastern portions.

The desiccation of the Aral Sea has had major consequences for the 

population of the region in terms of employment and health. In some 

villages the majority of the population get their drinking water from irrigation canals and the Amu Darya. In dry years, the population considers the water too saline for drinking, tap water is limited or unavailable, 

and groundwater and surface water is saline and polluted by bacteria.3

In Karakalpakstan and the lower delta of the Syr Darya, the incidence of 

common diseases associated with poor drinking water quality (typhoid, 

paratyphoid, dysentery, and viral hepatitis) is much higher than in the 

Figure 9–3. Decline of the Aral Sea with Increased Irrigated Area in 

Central Asia
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 193

rest of the Aral Sea basin. The salt content of Aral Sea now exceeds 60 

parts per hundred and has killed the sea’s ecosystems, eliminating the once 

commercially-valuable fishery and causing salt laden windstorms that are 

detrimental to the population’s health. Most of the fish species that once 

flourished in the Aral Sea have perished as the salinity of the sea has increased over the past decades.4

 The Aral Sea has completely lost all of its 

commercial and most of its ecological importance as a fishery.

Karakalpakstan, an autonomous republic located in the delta of the 

Amu Darya within Uzbekistan, has suffered more than any other region 

in Central Asia from the cumulative effects of the Aral Sea crisis. Due to 

decades of agricultural development that paid more attention to centrallyTable 9–1. Aral Sea Basin Characteristics Kazakhstan* Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Afghan. Total

Population

Mln 2.6 2.2 6.1 5.4 24.3 - 40.6

% Ag 23 55 50 44 44 - 44.2

GDP

$ 1,228 265 177 916 312 - -

% Ag 10 39 20 25 28 - -

Flow 

Formation 

(bcm)

AD** 0 1.6 59.9 1.5 4.7 11.6 79.4

SD 2.4 27.6 1 0 6.2 0 37.2

Total 2.4 29.2 60.9 1.5 10.9 11.6 116.6

Water 

Allocation 

(bcm)

AD - 0.24 9.08 22.02 33.9 - 65.24

AD 12.29 4.03 2.46 - 19.69 - 38.47

Total 12.29 4.27 11.54 22.02 53.59 - 103.71

Water Use bcm 8.24 3.29 12.52 18.08 62.83 - 104.96

Irrigated 

Area 

(‘000 ha)

AD - 15 449 1.86 2.39 - 4.714

SD 786 400 269 - 1.869 - 3.324

Total 786 415 718 1.86 4.259 - 8.038

 Source: Global Environmental Facility, Water and Environmental Management Project, Component A.1 Joint 

Report 2 and Regional Report 2, 2002.

 *Aral Sea Basin oblasts of Kazakhstan only, South Kazakhstan and Kyzl Orda oblasts.

 **AD = Amu Darya Basin, and SD = Ayr Darya Basin.
194 MCKINNEY

planned quotas than the state of the environment, nearly the whole of 

Karakalpakstan is either salinized or waterlogged. Key factors in this disaster are the discharge of highly mineralized, pesticide-rich return flows into 

rivers; the use of unlined irrigation canals leading to waste and seepage of 

salts into groundwater; waterlogged fields leading to salty groundwater 

and salt runoff; and the lack of drainage facilities to remove unwanted 

water and chemicals from the fields.

The Aral Sea cannot be returned to its prior grandeur without totally 

disrupting the economies of the Basin states. In fact, there is little hope 

for even stabilizing the large, Southern Sea at its present level. Efforts are 

underway to stabilize or reverse the shrinkage of the Northern Sea, including a World Bank funded program of rehabilitation and reconstruction of 

hydraulic structures in the lower Syr Darya Basin; however, the area still 

ranks as one of the world’s largest manmade ecological disasters and the 

outlook for future improvement is grim.

Regional Water Management in Central Asia

Pre-Independence

Soviet Water Management

Spurred by major directives for land reclamation and increased agricultural production beginning in the 1950s, Soviet planners developed 

comprehensive plans for the utilization of Central Asia’s river basins. During this period, central planning organizations and ministries in Moscow 

directed water management in Central Asia. Each republic developed 

five-year plans that were coordinated by the state planning agencies and 

funded through the republican or central budgets of the Soviet Union. 

For transboundary basins, such as those in Central Asia, basin plans were 

developed by regional design institutes and included inter-republic and 

multisectoral aspects, as well as allocation of water for various uses. For 

the Syr Darya Basin, the last plan of the Soviet period was approved in 

1982; for the Amu Darya Basin, in 1987. These plans included limits for 

water allocation between republics and targets for the development of irrigated lands within these limits.

During the drought years in the late 1970s, local authorities interfered in water allocation among the Aral Sea Basin republics. In the Syr 

Darya Basin, the situation became so tense that Moscow had to send authorities to ensure that water from the upper and middle areas of the Basin 

reached lower areas. In order to ensure compliance with inter-republican 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 195

water allocations, region-wide Basin Water Organizations (BVOs) were established in 1986 in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Basins. The BVOs were 

charged with managing water resources of the Basins according to the 

plans approved by the Soviet Ministry of Water Management. The BVOs 

had barely begun to function when the Soviet Union began its decline in 

1988 and finally collapsed in 1991. As discussed below, these institutions 

were some of the only regional Soviet institutions to survive into the postSoviet era.

Post-Independence

Interstate Coordination Water Commission (ICWC)

Given the heavy dependence of the Central Asian republics economies on irrigated agriculture, it was necessary to stabilize interstate water 

relations immediately after independence. In October 1991, the heads of 

the Republican water sectors developed a regional water resources management mechanism to replace the centralized system of the Soviet period. 

The newly independent countries signed an agreement “On Cooperation 

in the Field of Joint Management and Conservation of Interstate Water 

Resources.”5 This agreement established the ICWC for control, rational 

use, and protection of interstate water resources. The agreement acknowledged the equal rights of member states to use, and their responsibility 

to protect, the interstate water resources of Central Asia. The agreement 

affirmed the continuation of existing Soviet structures and principles of 

interstate water allocation, and was approved by the presidents of the Central Asian Republics.6

 The presidents later signed a declaration confirming 

the validity of previously signed agreements on water resources in the Aral 

Sea Basin.7

The ICWC is the highest level of transboundary water resources 

management in Central Asia. It is responsible for water management in 

both the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Basins. The ICWC makes decisions 

related to water allocation, monitoring, and management. It is comprised 

of the most senior water sector officials of the member countries, and it 

meets quarterly to determine water allocations to member counties. Decisions of the ICWC are by consensus, with each State having an equal vote 

in decisions. Scientific and information support to the ICWC is provided 

by the Scientific Information Center (SIC). The two Basin water management organisations, BVO Syr Darya and BVO Amu Darya (holdovers from 

the Soviet days), the SIC, and the ICWC Secretariat are the executing bodies of the ICWC. 
196 MCKINNEY

Basin Water Management Organizations (BVOs)

Created at the end of the Soviet era, and operating as the executive 

organs of the ICWC, the BVOs Amu Darya and Syr Darya are responsible 

for the day-to-day operation of the main water supply facilities in the two 

Basins. The BVOs’ duties include the following: 

■ Development of plans for water allocation to users in the Amu 

Darya and Syr Darya Basins, water diversions, and reservoir operation modes;

■ Water supply to users, including those in deltas and the Aral Sea, 

according to approved limits for water diversion from transboundary water sources; 

■ Operation of all major hydraulic structures on both rivers, including reservoirs; 

■ Measurement of water flow through the main water intakes and 

across national borders;

■ Design, construction, rehabilitation and operation of hydraulic 

structures, head water intakes, and inter-republic canals; and

■ Maintenance of water quality in the rivers.

Using forecasts from the Central Asian Hydrometeorology Services, 

the BVOs prepare water allocation plans for ICWC approval at critical 

times during the year. These plans set the water releases from reservoirs 

and delivery to each water management region. The water allocation to 

each republic is established in accordance with previously mentioned 

schemes devised during Soviet times. Water delivery to the Aral Sea and its 

coastal zone is based primarily on the principle of “whatever is remaining.” 

Even though the BVOs have the responsibility to monitor water quality, 

they do not fulfill these obligations. In addition, they are not responsible 

for water use in each country. As such, their role is mainly regional flow 

monitoring organizations. This provides some information that is useful 

in water management, but operational control and management is largely 

out of the hands of the BVOs and rests with the national water management agencies, resulting in a conflicting and contradictory role for them, 

since they were originally established as regional water management 

institutions and their current status (mainly monitoring water flow with 

staff and facilities exclusively on Uzbek territory) does not allow them to 

execute this role effectively.
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 197

International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS)

The Central Asian presidents created the IFAS to attract outside 

resources to coordinate and finance regional programs to overcome the 

problems associated with the desiccation of the Aral Sea.8 Later the same 

year, the presidents established the Interstate Council for the Aral Sea 

(ICAS)9 to manage regional programs.10 The following year, the Central 

Asian presidents approved a “Program of Concrete Actions” on improving 

the situation in the Aral Sea Basin.11 The program called for the development of a general strategy for: water sharing among the countries; rational 

water use; conservation of water resources in the Basin; and interstate legal 

acts on the use and protection of water resources from pollution. In 1997, 

ICAS and IFAS were merged and streamlined as a new IFAS under the 

rotating chairmanship of the president of one of the five member states.12

The new IFAS’ primary activities include:

■ Raising funds for joint measures to conserve the air, water, and land 

resources of the Aral Sea Basin, as well as the flora and fauna;

■ Financing

◆ Interstate ecological research, programs, and projects aimed at 

saving the Aral Sea and improving the ecological situation in the 

region surrounding the Sea as well as resolving general social and 

ecological problems of the region;

◆ Joint studies and scientific-technical efforts to rehabilitate the 

ecological balance, establish efficient use of natural resources, and 

manage transboundary waters;

■ Establishing a regional environmental monitoring system in the 

Aral Sea Basin;

■ Participating in implementing international programs on saving the 

Aral Sea and improving the ecology of the Basin.

An IFAS Management Board, consisting of Deputy Prime Ministers 

from each member country, also was formed. The Board develops priority 

measures for alleviation of the Aral Sea problems and organizes and coordinates the implementation of all regional programs associated with the 

problems of sustainable development in the Aral Sea Basin countries.

These main regional water and energy institutions have very limited 

capacity and function according to sometimes contradictory principles. 

The operation modes of hydrosystems in the Aral Sea Basin are determined and approved by ICWC without participation of the energy sector. 
198 MCKINNEY

The operation plans are implemented by the energy sector without participation of the water sector. All of the executive bodies of the BVOs are 

located in Uzbekistan, and their staffs are formed entirely of Uzbeks. These 

organizations have, in principle, the status of interstate organizations, yet, 

due to the predominant influence of Uzbekistan, they do not rotate management staff or hire specialists from other republics. Until this system is 

remedied, the increased coordination necessary to ensure equitable water 

allocation and control is unlikely.

Framework Agreement on Water and Energy Use

Syr Darya Basin Agreements

Toktogul Reservoir in Kyrgyzstan is the largest in the Syr Darya Basin 

and the only one with multiyear storage capacity (14 bcm active storage 

volume). The reservoir was designed to operate in an irrigation mode with 

non-growing season (October through March) releases providing minimum electricity generation. Commissioned in 1974, the reservoir did not 

operate according to design until 1990, after the high water winter of 1988 

filled the reservoir to capacity for the first time. The irrigation release regime follows natural cycles, but the reservoir’s large storage can be used to 

continue these releases in periods of drought.

Before 1991, surplus power generated by irrigation releases in the 

growing season (April to September) from the Toktogul system was 

transmitted to neighboring regions of the Soviet Union. In return, these 

regions sent electric power and fuels (natural gas, coal and fuel oil) for 

Kyrgyzstan’s two thermal power plants for winter heating needs.

This situation changed drastically in 1991 when independent states 

were established in Central Asia. Because of complications in intergovernmental relations and account settlements, the introduction of national 

currencies, and the increasing prices of oil, coal, natural gas and transportation, the supply of fuel and electricity sent to Kyrgyzstan from the other 

republics was reduced. This radically affected the structure of the Kyrgyz 

fuel-and-energy balance. Because of decreased fuel production in Kyrgyzstan, the output and distribution of heat from thermal power plants 

decreased by half and organic fuel consumption fell, resulting in a marked 

increase in the demand for electric power by the population for heating, 

cooking, and hot water supply. The Kyrgyz government responded to this 

demand by increasing wintertime hydroelectric generation from the Toktogul system.
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 199

Intensive use of water resources for power generation, along with 

changes in the Toktogul operating regime from summertime irrigation 

releases to wintertime energy releases, created serious problems in the 

Syr Darya Basin in the winter. Downstream reservoirs were not able to 

store the increased releases, and, in order to prevent flooding of the lower 

reaches of the Syr Darya Basin, discharges into the Arnasai depression in 

Uzbekistan were required. With no means to store the water, the discharges 

in Uzbekistan, more than one cubic kilometer per year, were, essentially, 

wasted for agricultural use.

Beginning in 1995, to alleviate these problems and reduce the waste, 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed interstate protocols and 

agreements on the use of water and energy resources in the Syr Darya 

Basin. These specified the amount of compensatory deliveries of fuel and 

energy resources and releases from Toktogul reservoir. Based on these 

agreements, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan receive excess energy from Kyrgyzstan generated by Toktogul reservoir in the summer, and in winter, they 

provide Kyrgyzstan with energy, respectively, by deliveries of natural gas 

and coal. To monitor this delicate arrangement, the Heads of State of the 

countries involved turned to their regional integration and development 

organization, the Executive Committee of the Interstate Council of the 

Central Asian Economic Community (EC CAEC). In 1996, the EC CAEC 

formed a Water and Energy Uses Round Table to develop a framework 

agreement addressing the Syr Darya Basin riparian republics competing 

uses for water. The work of the Round Table resulted in an agreement that 

created a framework addressing trade-offs between the competing uses of 

water for energy and agricultural production in the Basin.13 Compensation 

is associated with a water release schedule that takes into account both 

upstream winter energy needs and downstream summer irrigation water 

demand. To date, the system has remained stable without major conflict 

and the agreement has entered the second five-year implementation period without major revision.14

Regional Cooperation Organizations

Over the past decade, the Central Asian states have sought to promote their separate national interests while also acting to enhance their 

common goals.15 However, in many areas the losses from interstate competition exceed the gains from cooperation. The presidents of these countries have acknowledged the need to create a regional concert of interests. 

Several Central Asian organizations have been formed or joined over the 

past decade, many concerned with regional cooperation, security, and 
200 MCKINNEY

economic development. Some of the organizations, the most important 

being the CAEC and IFAS, have had a mandate to consider problems of 

the water, environment, and energy sectors.

As previously mentioned, IFAS was formed in 1993 as the leading 

institution for raising and administering funds to address the Aral Sea 

crisis. Constraints on IFAS, its credibility as a neutral broker, and its lack 

of a clear mandate to deal with multi-sectoral issues have, so far, kept it 

from successfully developing regional water management strategies or 

negotiating regional water and energy sharing agreements. This is why, in 

1996, the CAEC stepped in to mediate the annual agreements on water 

and energy management for the Syr Darya Basin. IFAS recently has moved 

its Presidency and Secretariat to Dushanbe, Tajikistan and initiated a series 

of activities to revitalize this dormant and discredited organization. In late 

August 2002, the fist IFAS Board meeting in three years was held in order 

to assess the past activities and propose a new agenda. These ideas were 

confirmed and approved by the IFAS Heads of State in an early October 

2002 meeting. In November 2002, the international donor community 

was asked to support the development of a new phase of IFAS activities. It 

remains to be seen if the new IFAS management can overcome the poor 

performance of the past and attract support for new activities.

The CAEC was formed to promote regional integration through 

economic cooperation in Central Asia. It had a broad mandate to promote 

regional economic cooperation and to organize and broker negotiations, 

such as those leading to the 1998 Syr Darya Agreement. Since the CAEC 

did not have direct competence in water or energy technical matters, it 

wisely relied on the national water and energy ministries, as well as the 

ICWC, the BVO Syr Darya, and the United Energy Dispatch Center (UDC 

Energia) to support negotiations.

The Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) was established in 2002 by the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 

Uzbekistan under the leadership of the President of Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan has strong reasons for maintaining good relations with Uzbekistan 

due to the division of the Amu Darya River. However, Turkmenistan puts 

less emphasis on Central Asian regional cooperation and more emphasis 

on relations with the Caucasus, the Middle East, Iran, and Caspian egress 

routes.16 This is evidenced by Turkmenistan’s observer status in most 

regional cooperation organizations and refusal to participate in most regional water management activities. The four participating Central Asian 

states have yet to establish a CACO secretariat, although one is planned. 

There is some speculation that CACO was created to be the successor or-
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 201

ganization to the CAEC; however, no decision has yet been made on how 

CACO will work. Communiqués from recent meetings of the organization 

have indicated that it will take up the issues of water and energy.17

Summary of Post-Independence Experience

The experience of the Central Asian countries in addressing transboundary water management issues reveal several lessons:18

■ It is essential that the body organizing interstate discussions be 

considered sufficiently neutral in order to gain the trust of all parties. 

External support from similarly neutral third parties can play a crucial role in helping participants gain access to international expertise 

and add credibility to the process, but the riparians must work out the 

final details themselves.

■ Given sufficient high-level commitment to regional cooperation, 

the primary focus of regional organizations’ discussions should be 

on technical issues, with legal and political matters held for later in 

negotiations. Without a firm sense that technical issues can be solved, 

no political progress can be made. However, regional cooperation 

is unlikely to be achieved through technical activities and projects 

alone; political will is the key.

■ It is important to take on a manageable set of issues rather than attempting to solve the full range of problems. The Central Asian Water 

and Energy Round Table group achieved positive results by focusing 

attention on the Syr Darya Basin, rather than taking on the full menu 

of issues in the Aral Sea Basin.

Country-Specific Issues19

Afghanistan

Though not part of Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan borders three 

other Aral Sea Basin countries: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. 

About 8 percent of the flow of the Amu Darya is formed in Afghanistan. 

The Afghan portions of the Amu Darya Basin include the territory rimmed 

by the Panj and Amu Darya Rivers on the north, by spurs of the BandiTorkestan and the Hindukush Ridges on the south, the Kowkchen River 

valley in the east, and the Shirintagao River valley on the west.20 Irrigable 

lands in this area exceed 1.5 million ha. About two-thirds of Afghanistan’s 

GDP is derived from the agricultural sector, and although the country has 
202 MCKINNEY

large tracts of irrigable lands, only a small portion is used due to the past 

instabilities and low level of development.

Even though the Afghan lands in the Amu Darya Basin were the least 

developed in the past, many expect this will change in the future, placing 

even greater stress on the Aral Sea Basin countries downstream. Some estimate that Afghanistan may divert as much as 10 bcm from the Amu Darya 

in the future (compared to about 2 bcm today) if development plans are 

realized.21 In October 2002 the Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources, 

and Environment issued a list of short-term priorities which include rehabilitating irrigation canals and existing systems. Longer-term priorities 

include the Khushtapa, or “Good Hill” Project, which would pump water 

from the Amu Darya River into a canal to be transported to Mazar-ISharif to irrigate a large area there.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan, a small, mountainous country covering 139,800 km2, is 

made up of a number of distinct and relatively isolated regions, separated 

by high mountain ranges. The Vaksh and Pyanj Rivers, the main tributaries of the Amu Darya, rise in the mountains of Tajikistan and Afghanistan. 

The flow formation within Tajikistan’s portion of the Aral Sea Basin is 

60.9 bcm and the interstate allocation of water to Tajikistan is 11.5 bcm. 

In 2000, 718,000 ha were irrigated in the Tajik portion of the Aral Sea 

Basin, requiring the diversion of 12.5 bcm of water to irrigation systems. 

Irrigated agriculture, using about 85 percent of the water, is the largest 

water consumer in the country. Still, the great elevation differences and 

large volumes of flow in the rivers of Tajikistan give the country important 

hydropower potential. Even now, Tajikistan is one of the world’s largest 

producers of hydroelectric power. Whether this potential is tapped will 

depend upon future water negotiations and the ability of the Central Asian 

countries to achieve a sound policy.

In the past decade, the economy of Tajikistan experienced a sharp 

decline as industrial and economic relations with Russia were broken 

and civil war inflicted much damage on the country’s infrastructure and 

human resources. Approximately 70 percent of Tajikistan’s six million 

people live in rural areas, with about 50 percent of the population working 

in the agricultural sector, making Tajikistan the most rural of the former 

Soviet Republics. Tajikistan’s main agricultural production areas lie in the 

irrigated valleys of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya tributaries. Cotton is the 

major cash crop accounting for about two-thirds of the gross production 

value of the agriculture sector. 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 203

Tajik water law, typical of all the countries of Central Asia, claims 

water to be the property of the national government. Water management 

in Tajikistan is transforming from the old command administrative system 

to newer market based incentives. In November 2000, a new Water Code 

was adopted that allowed transfer of irrigation systems management to the 

private sector with collective farms as the base for development of privatization and support of irrigation system operation. In an effort to provide 

the population with a secure food supply, the Tajik government intends 

to increase irrigated lands by 350,000 ha by the year 2010. Most of the 

water required for this agricultural expansion is predicted to come from 

water saved through increased irrigation efficiency. Efforts are in place to 

improve irrigation efficiency through the introduction of water charges 

and the improvement of infrastructure with the proceeds, as well as the 

introduction and development of cooperative water user associations. The 

new water code also establishes principles for Tajik cooperation in international water relations based on international water law principles. 

Tajikistan is experiencing rapid population growth, a major factor affecting its economic development and water management policy. 

Achieving food security is an objective for the country, which will require 

improved agricultural productivity through increased irrigation efficiency 

and expansion of irrigated lands. During the Soviet period, the development of irrigated lands in Tajikistan was limited. The Soviets favored developments in downstream areas of the Basin. Hence, Tajikistan has inherited the consequences of this legacy and the allocation of the Amu Darya 

and Syr Darya waters according to the old Soviet scheme which favors 

downstream cotton production at the expense of expanded hydropower 

and agricultural development upstream. Tajikistan supports the creation 

of a new system of water allocation among the countries of the Basins that 

recognizes conjunctive use of water for agriculture and hydropower generation, prevention of pollution of transboundary waters, and elimination 

of adverse effects, but does not view this as a pressing issue at this time. 

However, Tajikistan is a strong supporter of the concept that the institutional structure of Central Asian water management should be improved 

through integration of the water and energy sectors at the regional level. 

Kyrgyzstan

The Kyrgyz Republic is a mountainous country with an average 

height above sea level of 2,750 meters and a maximum height of 7,439 

meters. This wide range of elevations, complex relief, protracted geologic 

development, and other factors result in a variety of natural conditions 
204 MCKINNEY

and a richness of natural resources. The Naryn River rises in the mountains of Kyrgyzstan, and, along with the Karadarya and Chirchik Rivers, is 

one of the main tributaries of the Syr Darya. The main watercourses of the 

Kyrgyz part of Aral Sea Basin are the Naryn, Karadarya, Sokh, and Chatkal 

rivers (Syr Darya Basin) and the Kyzyl Suu River (Amu Darya Basin). The 

flow formation within the Kyrgyzstan portion of the Aral Sea Basin is 29.2 

bcm, and the interstate allocation of water to Kazakhstan from the Syr 

Darya is 4.27 bcm. The population of Kyrgyzstan in the Aral Sea Basin is 

about 2.2 million. Approximately 39 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP is derived from a severely disorganized and undercapitalized agricultural sector 

where about 55 percent of the total population works. In 2000, 415,000 ha 

were irrigated in the Kyrgyz portion of the Aral Sea Basin, requiring 3.3 

bcm of water.

Like Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan finds its agricultural development constrained by the Soviet-era water allocation scheme for the Syr Darya, which 

the Central Asian countries have agreed to honor until a new scheme can 

be developed and approved. In the meantime, Kyrgyzstan would like to 

expand its agricultural sector and needs additional water to do so. No 

transboundary water enters Kyrgyzstan from any source and about 44 bcm 

of runoff are formed within the country each year. These are transboundary waters since they feed the Syr Darya and, ultimately, the Aral Sea. 

The presidential decree “On foreign policy of the Kyrgyz Republic 

in the sphere of water resources generated in Kyrgyzstan and flowing into 

neighboring countries” (June 1997) mandates the solution of interstate 

water problems, water allocation, and the use of economic instruments 

for promoting water conservation and efficient use of water and energy 

resources. The law “On interstate use of water objects, water resources 

and water facilities of the Kyrgyz Republic” (July 2001) confirmed the 

principles of cooperation of Kyrgyzstan with other countries in the field 

of water resources. However, the law states that all the waters in the territory of the country belong to the State and demands that the downstream 

countries pay for water emanating from Kyrgyzstan. This has caused a 

certain amount of conflict with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, both of which 

demand that Kyrgyzstan continue providing water free of charge, which 

would be available without regulation by reservoirs.

Regional water use agreements may be of little help to Kyrgyzstan. 

The 1998 Syr Darya Water and Energy Use Agreement regulates water 

use in the Syr Darya Basin. This agreement is based on the concept of 

compensation to upstream countries for lost energy production following a release. Yet this regime favors irrigated agriculture in downstream 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 205

countries. Although Kyrgyzstan receives energy resources (electricity, coal, 

gas, and oil) in exchange for its water, these resources must be transported 

and transformed into electric power or heat at Kyrgyzstan’s expense. As 

a result of this compensation arrangement, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 

receive water at very low cost.

The Kyrgyz energy sector depends on power generation from the 

Naryn cascade to satisfy a major portion of the domestic demand, which 

existing thermal generating facilities cannot handle. The continued use of 

the Toktogul reservoir in an energy generation mode, i.e. with increased 

water releases in the fall-winter period, seems inevitable without new 

generating facilities and capacity at thermal power stations. As recent 

experience has shown, providing the required energy generation and irrigation releases results in large fluctuations of accumulated storage in the 

Toktogul reservoir. Several proposals for the solution of this problem are 

being explored, such as energy conservation and demand management, 

and construction of new hydroelectric generating capacity. For now, Kyrgystan must continue to rely on the 1998 water-energy trade agreement 

with its downstream neighbors to obtain needed wintertime fuels.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan contains vast regions of steppe and most of the downstream portion of the Syr Darya Basin. The population of Kazakhstan in 

the Aral Sea Basin (South Kazakhstan and Kyzl Orda oblasts) is about 2.6 

million. Approximately 10 percent of Kazakhstan’s GDP is derived from 

agriculture, with about 23 percent of the population working in that 

sector.

Water availability in the Kazakh portion of the Aral Sea Basin depends on the water policy of upstream states, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and 

Kyrgyzstan. The Syr Darya flows 1,650 km through Kazakhstan from the 

border with Uzbekistan at the Chardara reservoir to the Aral Sea. The 

river’s flow formed within Kazakhstan is 2.4 bcm and the interstate allocation of water to Kazakhstan from the Syr Darya is 12.3 bcm. Since 1990, 

Kazakhstan has reduced its irrigated area in the Syr Darya Basin because 

many unproductive farms have been taken out of production. Kazakhstan 

irrigated about 786,000 ha in 2000, requiring about 8.2 bcm of water. In 

recent years, productivity has declined due to low irrigation efficiency, lack 

of technical inputs (fertilizer and machinery), and lack of funds for proper 

technical and operational measures.

The most recent agreement on management and operation of the 

Naryn-Syr Darya cascade of reservoirs (March 1998) places certain obliga-
206 MCKINNEY

tions on Kazakhstan in order to receive irrigation water under the agreement. In particular, surplus summer electricity is delivered to Kazakhstan 

and, in return, Kazakh coal must be supplied to Kyrgyzstan in the wintertime. For Kazakhstan to accept large amounts (1.1 billion kWh) of Kyrgyz 

electricity in the summertime when demand is low requires restructuring 

the Kazakh national power distribution system and shutting down some 

thermal power stations in South Kazakhstan.22 This has been very disruptive to the Kazakh power grid resulting in the need to sell expensive power 

to Kazakh customers reluctant to pay the combined price of power and 

water. If the Kazakh agricultural sector compensated the power sector 

for the increased price of the summertime electricity, the situation might 

improve.

The Water Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan was approved in 1993 

and constitutes the legal basis for water policy in the country. Water use in the 

country is still determined by centrally controlled economic interests, with little 

regard for social and environmental consequences. There are eight Basins in 

the republic, each with its own BVO. The Kazakh portion of the Aral Sea 

Basin water management is carried out by the BVO Aral-Syr Darya. The 

BVOs manage water resources in the Basins, including water distribution 

between users, development of water supply plans, water use limits, and 

reservoir operation modes. Water Users Associations have been created 

in some areas, but so far they are insufficient to support many activities, 

particularly drainage and water supply works.

Since it receives most of its water resources from external sources, 

Kazakhstan recognizes transboundary rivers as a security problem and 

is motivated to seek international agreements on shared waters. Kazakhstan has a large agricultural sector dependent on an adequate supply of 

irrigation water. At times, the delivery of this water is complicated by 

upstream water use tradeoffs between energy and irrigation. This results 

in water shortages during growing seasons and flooding of lowland areas 

in winter seasons. Being a downstream country, Kazakhstan experiences 

difficult water quality problems, resulting from agricultural return flows 

discharged by mid-stream irrigation water use. Poor water quality (high 

salinity, fertilizer, and pesticide levels) impacts the health of populations 

in the downstream areas that must use this water for drinking as well as 

for agricultural production.

Believing that common positions and mutual interests can provide 

regional stability, Kazakh officials have suggested that a new regional water 

strategy for Central Asian be developed. This new framework would be 

based on standards of international water law; utilize an ecosystem ap-
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 207

proach; minimize limitations on riparian countries; and be based on common interests in water resources development, use, and protection within 

each country.23 Common principles of the water strategy would include 

considering water needs in the lower reaches of Central Asian rivers, balancing water use between irrigation and energy production, and recycling 

return flows from agriculture. The main international water law principles 

that the new strategy would be based on include the following:24

■ Transboundary water resources are the common property of Basin 

states;

■ Basin interests take priority over those of individual states;

■ Water supply is guaranteed to highest priority uses;

■ States’ obligation to observe the “equitable and reasonable use”25

and to follow the “no harm”26 principles;

■ States’ obligation to consult with other Basin states on development 

plans; and

■ States’ obligation to participate in joint monitoring of water quantity and quality.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan, with a population of over 24 million and 447,400 km2

of territory in the Aral Sea Basin, is at the center of Central Asia. About 60 

percent of Uzbekistan’s land area is desert steppe broken by irrigated, fertile oases along the Amu Darya and Syr Darya. Approximately 25 percent 

of Uzbekistan’s GDP is derived from agriculture with about 44 percent 

of the population working in that sector. In western Uzbekistan lie the 

ecologically damaged Amu Darya delta and the autonomous Republic of 

Karakalpakistan. Overuse of the Amu Darya has reduced the sea to twothirds its former size and salinization of the area around the sea threatens 

the environmental and economic viability of a region in which more than 

one million people live.

Being dominated by desert and only partially mountainous, Uzbekistan contributes a modest amount of the flow to the Aral Sea Basin, 10.9 

bcm, while the interstate allocation of water to Uzbekistan is 53.6 bcm. In 

2000, 4.259 million ha were irrigated in the Uzbek portion of the Aral Sea 

Basin requiring 62.8 bcm of water. The large amounts of water needed by 

Uzbekistan to sustain the agricultural sector of its economy require that 

it negotiate with its upstream neighbors on an almost continual basis. By 

and large, the relations between Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan 
208 MCKINNEY

in the Amu Darya Basin are good. However, the same is not true between 

Uzbekistan and its upstream neighbor, Kyrgyzstan, in the Syr Darya Basin. 

As previously discussed, there continue to be difficulties over the delivery 

of natural gas from Uzbekistan in return for delivered irrigation water. 

A major difficulty in efficient implementation of the 1998 water-energy 

agreement stems from Uzbekistan’s need for, and Kyrgyzstan’s lack of, hard 

currency. Monetizing the exchanges under the agreement would go a long 

way toward normalizing these trade relations.

Transboundary sources make up the bulk of the water resources 

available to Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is therefore very concerned about 

transboundary water management. The main concerns of Uzbekistan 

regarding this issue include: further development of regional cooperation 

between Aral Sea Basin countries in management and use of transboundary water sources; availability and compliance with international agreements between the riparian countries of the Basins; the operating regime 

of transboundary reservoirs in the Basins, primarily, Toktogul, Kayrakum, 

and Nurek reservoirs; and the environment and effectiveness of the 

ICWC.27 In addition, Uzbek officials call for improvement of information 

systems for water management and expansion of these systems to consider 

water quality, especially for transboundary sources.28

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan covers an area of 488,100 km2, but 80 percent of this 

area is desert. The desert is bounded by a series of oases watered by the 

Amu Darya in the north and by rivers (the Murgap, Tejen, Atrek) descending from the Kopetdag, Gershi, and other mountains in the south. The 

central and western regions have no significant natural waterways, but the 

Kara Kum Canal (more than 1300 km in length) brings water from the 

Amu Darya west to the Mary Oasis and onward past Ashgabat. Approximately 25 percent of Turkmenistan’s GDP is derived from agriculture with 

about 44 percent of the population working in that sector.

The amount of river flow generated within Turkmenistan is extremely 

small, 1.5 bcm, whereas the interstate allocation of water to Turkmenistan 

is 22 bcm. In 2000, 1.86 million ha were irrigated in the Turkmen portion 

of the Aral Sea Basin requiring 18.1 bcm of water. The government expects 

irrigated lands to reach 2.2 million ha by 2010. The source of water to implement this expansion is somewhat of a mystery; however, it may come 

from reclaimed agricultural drainage water. The Kara Kum Canal is perhaps the most important water facility in Turkmenistan, supplying water 

to irrigate more than one million ha of farmlands. An average of 11.5 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 209

bcm is diverted into the canal each year from the Amu Darya. More than 

half of Turkmenistan’s total agricultural products are grown in the Canal 

Zone. Today, the Canal is in a precarious condition with most of its control 

structures inoperative. Water flows according to hydraulic conditions, not 

management decisions. This situation may prove to be unsustainable in 

the future as the system continues to deteriorate.

Agricultural runoff is a major transboundary problem for Turkmenistan, causing downstream pollution affecting population health and 

reducing agricultural productivity in the Basin. Turkmenistan receives 

transboundary flows at several locations, including source water from the 

Amu Darya and agricultural drainage water from the Khorezm region 

of Uzbekistan. There is great concern about the quality of these waters, 

especially the return water, since it is a large volume and heavily polluted. 

Currently, Turkmenistan assumes responsibility for the disposal of this 

drainage water to the Sary-Kamush Lake, which has become polluted with 

salts and chemicals. In addition, the passage of this water through unlined canals creates drinking water pollution problems by contaminating 

groundwater sources. At present, no agreements exist on transboundary 

water quality in Central Asia. In order to prevent increased environmental damage from transboundary irrigation drainage water, Turkmenistan 

has proposed to the Uzbeks the development of a Transboundary Water 

Quality Agreement for the Amu Darya Basin, but there is no progress on 

this yet.

Regional Water Management Issues

The following are issues that must be addressed by the Central Asian 

republics if true progress is to be made on water issues at the regional 

level.

Financial Obligations of Regional Institution Members

The current provisions for financing the Executive Committee of 

the Intestate Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (EC IFAS) require that the host 

member country must cover the costs (salary and living expenses) of two 

representatives from each member country. The host country rotates between the members every two years. This has created an undue burden 

on the poorer countries of Central Asia, like Tajikistan, the current host 

country, which do not have the resources to cover many of these expenses. 

In the case of some host countries, this may be feasible, but in the case 

of others, it is impossible. This has resulted in an inability of EC IFAS to 

function properly.
210 MCKINNEY

The March 18, 1992 ICWC agreement does not reflect current conditions characterized by a severe lack of financing for water infrastructure 

and the varying rate at which the countries are making the transition to 

market economies. The member countries have not shared equitably in 

the financial obligations of joint water management and development 

under ICWC. Although the ICWC budget is confirmed each year, only 

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have met their obligations for operation 

and maintenance works. Only Uzbekistan has met the obligation for research, with a small contribution from the other states. The result is that 

the BVOs, as the operational arms of the ICWC, are desperately short on 

resources with which to carry out their work.

BVO Functions

According to the foundation documents of the BVOs, all main 

structures for controlling transboundary waters on the Syr Darya and 

Amu Darya rivers should be transferred to the temporary (but long-term) 

control of the BVOs. However, the only structures currently under BVO 

control are the main interstate canal structures in Uzbekistan. This situation creates uncertainty as to the role of the BVOs in managing regional 

water resources because the BVOs presently are not operational organizations controlling the critical structures in the Basins. If the ICWC member countries truly intend for the BVOs to be operational management 

organizations, then the main structures outside of Uzbekistan should 

be transferred to BVO control. On the other hand, if BVOs are intended 

as planning organizations to monitor system functioning and prepare 

operational plans, then the structures currently under BVO control in 

Uzbekistan should be transferred to Uzbek Ministry of Agriculture and 

Water Management (MAWR) control.

Water Quality Monitoring and Control

Water quality problems in Central Asia have yet to be addressed in 

any comprehensive way. One major problem is the disposal of agricultural 

return flows. The agricultural return flows with transboundary impacts 

are not strictly controlled. Adequate and up-to-date equipment for acquisition and processing of water data (both quantity and quality) in the 

main river Basins is still lacking. Agreement on appropriate interstate 

water quality standards have yet to be established and alternative mechanisms to achieve different water quality standards have yet to be explored. 

If these issues continue to be ignored there will be a continual degradation 

of drinking water quality in the lower reaches of the rivers.
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 211

Citizen Participation

Citizens are essential participants in forming national and local 

water and environmental policy. Informing citizens of opportunities to 

participate in such a system is often an important role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs take on various roles in this regard, 

including education campaigns, assistance to government ministries in 

forming policy, legislation and regulations, independent assessment of 

conditions, and preparing legal actions when there is evidence of a threat 

to human health or to the environment. The participation of NGOs in the 

formation of policy requires access to accurate and timely information. 

The public should have the right to know what the standards are for potable, industrial, and irrigation water and for the concentration of certain 

elements at particular times. When the information is available to citizens 

about the real state of the environment, then citizens can formulate educated opinions about and demand environmental protection. 

Syr Darya Agreement

The 1998 Syr Darya Agreement has achieved modest success in relieving tensions over water and energy use in the Basin. The signing of this 

Agreement by the four Prime Ministers demonstrated a show of support 

for cooperative management of the Basin’s resources. This has provided an 

impetus for the parties to conduct difficult and serious negotiations each 

year since 1998. 

Nevertheless, implementation of the agreement is difficult. A mechanism by which dry and wet year hydrologic conditions can be reflected in 

compensation needs to be established. In addition, Kyrgyzstan in particular suffers from a lack of longer-term assurance that compensation will, in 

fact, be made by downstream countries. The 1998 agreement specifies that 

surplus electricity from growing season releases is to be transferred to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and compensation for irrigation storage in the 

reservoirs is to be made in amounts of fuel equivalent to this surplus energy. In recent wet years, the downstream countries have called for below 

average releases during the growing season. This has resulted in reduced 

surplus electricity deliveries to downstream countries, accompanied by 

reduced deliveries of fuel to Kyrgyzstan the following winter season. On 

the other hand, in dry years, downstream countries have called for above 

average releases in the growing season, resulting in additional surplus electricity delivered to downstream countries accompanied, in theory, by increased deliveries of fuels to Kyrgyzstan in the winter season. If the system 

is to be run fairly, Kyrgyzstan should receive credit for additional dry year 
212 MCKINNEY

electricity deliveries and be able to make “withdrawals” in fuels on dry year 

credit during wet years when there is a fuel deficit. Currently, this is not 

the case. Further negotiation and compromise will be needed to ensure an 

equitable method of compensation for water storage services during wet 

periods with attendant water releases during drought periods.

Amu Darya Agreements

The Amu Darya Basin is shared by Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Afghanistan has not been an active partner in 

managing the water in the Basin. During the 1940s to 1970s, several agreements were reached between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan regarding 

the waters of the Amu Darya, including an allocation of nine bcm to Afghanistan. Despite these agreements, no more than two bcm per year has 

been diverted to Afghan use. 

In the accounting and allocation of the Amu Darya waters to Basin 

states by the ICWC, neither 9 nor 2 bcm of water is considered. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan signed a bilateral agreement in 1996 agreeing to split 

the waters of the Amu Darya below the river gauge at Kerki. Uzbekistan 

and Turkmenistan also have an informal, technical level agreement in 

operation and maintenance of the transboundary drainage water collectors which originate in Uzbekistan (Khorezm region) and terminate in 

Turkmenistan. These agreements should, but currently do not, take into 

account Afghanistan’s water needs. Further amendments likely will be 

required to meet the increasing demands of all parties in the Amu Darya 

basin.

Conclusions

While not as effective as it could be, the capacity for shared water 

management exists in Central Asia. High level political will is needed to 

achieve such cooperative management of water resources, and that will 

seems to be lacking in Central Asia. Government officials from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan often exhibit a desire to handle water management 

and other regional issues through the development of strictly bilateral 

arrangements and agreements. Yet consensus is needed among high level 

advisors to the Central Asian presidents that regional cooperation can lead 

to increased benefits, stability, and security for each individual country. 

Regional development assistance could demonstrate the mutual economic 

benefits to be derived from a multi-sectoral approach to regional cooperation in water resources management.
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 213

Multi-sectoral Paradigm for Regional Water Cooperation

Energy and agriculture sector policies have a large impact on water 

management in Central Asia. Currently, no mechanism is in place to coordinate or manage this inter-sectoral problem within most of the countries, 

let alone at the regional level. A new paradigm for regional water cooperation in Central Asia is needed. Water sector managers cannot solve the 

problems of regional cooperation alone. The Central Asian Heads of State 

need to motivate this approach or the various concerned sectors will not 

participate.

No new agreements on water or energy have reached the Heads of 

State for signature since 1998, and none are presently under development. 

Since it is a uni-sectoral, technical body, the ICWC is not the right forum 

to achieve this sort of government-to-government interaction. Interaction 

must occur at a higher level and it must be multi-sectoral. International 

donor agencies should try to promote consensus at the Prime Ministerial or Presidential level on principles of regional cooperation. In the Syr 

Darya Basin, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan already understand 

this, only Uzbekistan remains to be convinced. In the Amu Darya Basin, 

increased downstream water stress in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, due 

to upstream Afghan water diversions, may convince the countries to contend with this serious problem.

Upstream-Downstream Priorities

Previous water management rules, based on the priority of irrigated 

agriculture, do not conform to current power generation needs of the upstream countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Attempts to resolve this issue 

on the basis of interstate energy barter have been moderately successful, 

but implementation of annual barter agreements has been complicated 

by difficulties in negotiating timely annual agreements. Renewed efforts 

are needed to: prepare annual agreements in a timely manner; develop 

multiyear schedules for compensation; include compensation for storage 

services as well as flow regulation; and move away from the barter system 

to a monetized exchange between the countries.

The present method of water allocation, based on Soviet era rules, 

does not take into account the emerging priorities of the now independent 

republics. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan often claim that the old water allocation rules limit the development of irrigation on their lands, and that 

they need to reassess their future water allocation. Downstream countries 

complain that poor water quality in the middle and lower reaches of the 

Basins is reducing agricultural production and damaging public health, 
214 MCKINNEY

and that remediation of this problem must be undertaken. In addition, 

growing water demands of Afghanistan may cause new stress on the system of water allocation.

Kambarata I and II Dams

Kyrgyz domestic energy demand has increased above the equivalent of the surplus summer electricity resulting from Toktogul irrigation 

releases. Negotiating higher winter fuel deliveries in exchange for the irrigation releases seems out of the question, and new energy generation 

capacity may be needed that can supply energy to Kyrgyz customers in 

the winter. Several organizations, such as the World Bank and U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID), are considering the economic 

feasibility of two dams designed in Soviet times, Kambarata I and II, 

which would be located upstream of Toktogul reservoir in Kyrgyzstan. 

Given the expected cost of the projects (about one billion U.S. dollars), 

Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are considering the formation of 

a consortium to jointly develop the projects. The projects would result in 

cheap summertime electricity which the consortium partners would try to 

market to third parties.

Non-governmental Stakeholder Participation

Non-governmental stakeholders are not active participants in Central Asian water management at the present time. The way that NGOs 

might participate is through public awareness and information exchange 

activities. In addition, NGOs can link local community opinion to the 

national debate on water policy.

The Central Asian water management officials have, for the most 

part, a negative reaction to the participation of NGOs in this sphere. 

Officials recognize that many NGOs take a very proactive approach and 

promote ideas of rapid change that are threatening to the water management structures of Central Asia. It will take time and patience on the part 

of both the NGOs and the water management officials to develop a complimentary, rather than antagonistic, relationship. There are now some 

NGOs not engaged in highly controversial activities who are accepted by 

the water management officials as participants in some activities. NGOs 

could function more effectively if they identified key water management 

stakeholders both geographically (upstream versus downstream) and 

topically. Such stakeholders would include water user associations or at 

least key collectives along the entire system of rivers; those involved with 

fisheries like Arnasai, reservoirs, and deltas; those providing river-based 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 215

transport; those living in the areas subject to flooding based on alternative management regimes including new dam construction; industrial 

water users; municipal water users; and environmental groups working on 

aquatic ecosystems conservation, river pollution, and other issues. 

Promotion of Regional Cooperation

Regional cooperation is unlikely to be achieved solely through technical activities and projects. On the national level, plenty of these are ongoing, and more are in the design stages. Regional cooperation will come 

by illustrating the benefits of participation in the development of joint, 

coordinated projects and the adoption of policies that bring benefits or 

reduce damages to multiple participants. These activities are not going to 

arise in a single sector, but they will span two or three sectors. Sustainable 

regional cooperation will most likely be achieved by creating a basis for 

assessing the national and regional benefits from technical investments, 

but these must be complemented by supportive national policy and institutional reforms, coupled with empowerment and capacity building for 

regional institutions.

Improved or appropriate technology is important in achieving increased water use efficiency and agricultural production. However, this 

does not address or promote regional cooperation. By and large, a drop 

saved by an Aral Sea Basin nation is viewed as another drop for expanding 

the nation’s agricultural production, not for the Aral Sea. Improvements 

in irrigation efficiency in upstream areas will not necessarily result in more 

water flowing to the Aral Sea, rather the saved water will be diverted to 

new irrigated areas. In many cases, improvements in efficiency can significantly improve the economic benefits from national participation through 

regional approaches to water resources management.

The Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan 

have expressed a strong desire to develop new agreements that satisfy these 

international concepts. However, there is still reluctance on the part of the 

major water using countries, in particular, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 

to enter into discussions on this issue. One of the major hurdles in achieving regional cooperation in shared water resources in Central Asia is the 

focusing of the Republics’ attention on international water law. Another 

issue is the lack of coordination in national water policies and legislation 

across the region. While the principle of national sovereignty must be 

upheld, there is no reason why the benefits from synchronization cannot 

be achieved.
216 MCKINNEY

Financing Regional Water Management Projects

A few projects have been proposed that might be considered for 

joint financing by the governments of Central Asia in the area of regional 

water management. Most prominent of these are the development of the 

Kambarata I and II dams in Kyrgyzstan. However, Kyrgyzstan is not in 

a position to finance this project alone and the proposal has been made 

for an international consortium of Central Asian countries for the joint 

financing of the project. Kazakhstan has expressed interest in participating in this consortium—if the conditions are favorable. By joining the 

consortium, Kazakhstan would change its water management position 

from being the most downstream country in the Basin to assuming a 

position in the uppermost part of the Basin and being able to exert some 

control over the water management decisions in that part of the Basin. 

Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are both interested in attracting Uzbekistan 

into the Kambarata consortium. However, the direct benefit to Uzbekistan 

of joining the consortium is not as clear as that of Kazakhstan and, to date, 

Uzbekistan has not expressed much interest in joining such a consortium. 

However, Uzbekistan would be very concerned to see its neighbors working with each other and gaining additional control over the Basin’s waters 

without a place reserved for its own interests in these matters.

Any decisions regarding major water management investments affecting the overall regional water management regime should be made 

with the full participation of all countries affected; otherwise this will 

undermine trust and the basis for regional cooperation in this sphere. 

The future management regime adopted for both the Syr Darya and the 

Amu Darya should be based on a comprehensive evaluation of options 

including new physical infrastructure, upgrading of existing physical infrastructure, and improved water management by user groups throughout 

the Basin. Such analysis, which must include Afghanistan for the Amu 

Darya, should amply demonstrate the benefits to be derived from regional 

cooperation as compared to unilateral or even bilateral decision-making 

and actions.

Coordination of Donors’ Activities.

Coordination among donors is desperately needed in Central Asian 

regional water management activities. Lack of coordination in the past 

has been noted as a cause of duplication of efforts, reduced effectiveness 

of programs, inefficient use of funds, and lack of recognition of achieved 

results. Most of the major donor agencies active in the region are in a 

transition period at the moment. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 217

is entering the area; the World Bank is considering options for new initiatives; USAID is receiving expanded resources; the Swiss Development 

Commission is developing a new long-term assistance plan; and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is also considering new 

initiatives.

A uniform set of principles and objectives for the donors would serve 

to focus the efforts more effectively to achieve results. Although donor 

coordination cannot occur in the absence of government representatives, 

there is a need for a donor-led mechanism for information exchange and 

coordination. In the past, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) helped to organize periodic meetings. 

Areas Not Yet Addressed

The technical issues of water use and management in Central Asia 

are well developed and sufficient studies have been carried out that provide a sound technical base for future work on water saving, efficiency 

increases, information and decision system support, and capacity building 

for regional institutions. Other areas not related to water use and management currently demand attention. These areas include the following:

■ Water quality, including pollution from point and nonpoint sources 

and especially transboundary effects. This issue requires a mandate 

from a high government level before efforts can be undertaken to 

mitigate the effects of water pollution.

■ Information and data exchange.

■ Past experience in Central Asia has made the governments and 

donor agencies wary of the creation of regional water management 

databases, due to efforts to limit access to or use of these databases. 

What is needed is a new concept, where the raw data stays in the 

initiating country and reports are sent periodically to the other 

countries. The five national hydrometeorological services have been 

working on the development of regional cooperation and data sharing in their area for the past year or so, and the lessons learned from 

their efforts could be applied on a broader scale.

■ Agricultural policy and its effect on national economies, water use, 

and environmental effects. Some of the food security measures 

implemented by some of the Central Asian states have had large 

economic impacts that have not been studied. Food security is 

primarily a national issue, but it does have regional environmental 

impacts.
218 MCKINNEY

■ Water allocation.

Water allocation has been identified by several of the Central Asian 

countries as an important issue, but Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are reluctant to discuss this issue for fear of disrupting existing patterns of water 

use in their agricultural sectors. High-level governmental cooperation is 

required to tackle this issue.

As has been seen in this chapter, water management in Central Asia 

is a complex and critical issue affecting the security of all the nations of 

the region. Cooperative management of this vital resource could lead to 

great benefits in the future, while ignoring the opportunities for cooperation will lead to roadblocks in the development pathways of the countries. 

Many issues must be addressed to achieve regional management, but a 

firm foundation exists from which progress can be made.

Notes

1

 Y. Khudaiberganov, “About BWO Role in Amudarya Basin Water Resources Management 

Issues,” ADB Regional Consultation Workshop, Cooperation in Shared Water Resources in Central 

Asia: Past Experience and Future Challenges, Almaty, September 26-28 2002.

2

 M. Khamidov, “Syr Darya River Water Resources Management and Environmental Effects 

Caused by Changing Natural River Flow Regime,” ADB Regional Consultation Workshop, Cooperation in Shared Water Resources in Central Asia: Past Experience and Future Challenges, Almaty, 

September 26-28 2002. 3

 O. Atanyazova,“Health and Ecological Consequences of the Aral Sea Crisis,” paper presented 

at the Third World Water Forum, Kyoto, March 18, 2003. 4

 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), “State of Environment of the Aral Sea 

Basin Regional Report of the Central Asian States 2000,” <http://www.grida.no/aral/aralsea/english/

fish/fish.html>. 5

 Almaty, February 18, 1992.

6

 Kyzyl Orda, March 26, 1993.

7

 Nukus, September 20, 1995.

8

 Tashkent, January 4, 1993.

9

 ICAS had as executive bodies: an Executive Committee (EC ICAS); the International Sustainable Development Commission (ISDC), and the ICWC (including the BVOs and SIC ICWC). 10 Kyzl Orda, 23 March 1993.

11 Nukus, January 11, 1994.

12 Almaty, February 27, 1997; Tashkent March 20, 1997; and Tashkent May 30, 1997.

13 Agreement on the Use of Water and Energy Resources of the Syr Darya Basin, Bishkek, 

March 17, 1998. 14 Under the framework agreement, during 1998-2001, Kyrgyzstan met, on average, 86.5 

percent of the planned irrigation water releases and 77.8 percent of the planned surplus electricity 

transmission. During the same period, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan supplied to the Kyrgyz energy 

system 87.8 percent of the planned natural gas and 60.5 percent of the planned coal (A.K. Kenshimov, 

“Interstate Water Allocation in the Aral Sea Basin,” Royal Haskoning, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 2002). 15 G. Gleason, “Inter-State Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum”, 

Europe – Asia Studies, Vol. 53, no. 7, 1077–1095, 2001.
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 219

16 Ibid., 1084.

17 RFEL, “Four Central Asian Presidents Meet in Dushanbe,” <www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/10/2>. 18 D. McCauley, “Establishing a Framework for Transboundary Water Management in the Syr 

Darya Basin of Central Asia,” Issue Paper, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington 

D.C., 2002; E. Weinthal, “State Making and Environmental Cooperation: Linking Domestic and International Politics in Central Asia,” (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002). 19 The data and statistics used to characterize the countries of the region come mostly from 

the reports of the Global Environmental Facility, Water and Environmental Management Project, 

Component A.1 Joint Report 2 and Regional Report 2, 2002. 20 I.S. Zonn, “Water Resources of Northern Afghanistan and Their Future Use,” presented at 

Informal Planning Meeting: Water, Climate, and Development Issues in the Amudarya Basin, Philadelphia, June 18-19, 2002. 21 Ibid., 9.

22 In 2000, the Kyrgyz hydroelectricity production cost was 0.006 USD per kWh, and the export 

price was 0.01 USD per kWh. This price for the Kyrgyz electricity exceeds the cost of generation at the 

Kazakh thermal plants (about 0.006 USD per kWh). At these prices and without consideration of the 

value of the delivered water (0.004 USD per kWh or 0.0034 USD per cubic m), the Kyrgyz electricity 

is not competitive in the Kazakhstan power market. 23 A.D. Ryabtsev, “Country Perspectives on Regional Cooperation in Shared Water Resources: 

Water Resources of Kazakhstan,” in Cooperation in Shared Water Resources in Central Asia: Past Experience and Future Challenges; D. C. McKinney, ed., Proceedings of the Regional Consultation Workshop 

on Cooperation in Shared Water Resources in Central Asia: Past Experience and Future Challenges, 

Asian Development Bank, Manila, 2003, 168. 24 UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), “Convention on the Protection and Use 

of Transboundary Water Courses and International Lakes”, Helsinki, 1992, and the UN “Convention 

on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses”, 1997. 25 The obligation of a country to utilize a watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner 

and to cooperate in its protection and development. This principle affects economic policy of each 

Basin country. 26 The obligation of a country to prevent, control, and reduce pollution of waters causing or 

likely to cause transboundary impact. This principle affects economic and environmental policies of 

the region and each nation in the basin. 27A.A.Jalalov, “Water Resources Management in Uzbekistan: Legal aspects and Directions of 

Improvement,” in Cooperation in Shared Water Resources in Central Asia: Past Experience and Future 

Challenges; D. C. McKinney, ed., Proceedings of the Regional Consultation Workshop on Cooperation 

in Shared Water Resources in Central Asia: Past Experience and Future Challenges, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 2003, 168.

28 Ibid., 47.
220 MCKINNEY
221

Chapter 10 

Central Asian Public Health: 

Transition and

Transformation

Genevieve Grabman

A dramatic demographic and epidemiological transition has occurred in Central Asia during the past decade, concurrent with the region’s political and economic transition. This chapter attempts 

to explain the changing public health status in Central Asia by depicting 

the historical and social context in which public health is evolving. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan inherited 

their public health systems from the Soviet Union, and the demise of that 

empire has greatly impacted Central Asian public health. The collapse 

of centrally-controlled health care finance and planning precipitated an 

increased risk of sickness and death for the public. The newly independent Central Asian states began in the late 1990s to reform their national 

health systems in order to make public health care fiscally sustainable and 

responsive to health challenges. Still, Central Asia faces some critical health 

needs in the new millennium. Reflecting the region’s transitional status, 

both chronic and infectious health conditions urgently require intervention from each nation’s public health system.

Data and Statistics

Any study of Central Asian heath requires a caveat on the data it 

presents: data collection in all Central Asian countries is notoriously difficult, statistical analysis may be poor, and reported figures are often skewed 

for political purposes. The infant mortality rate is only one of many government-reported statistics that may have little resemblance to a real figure. Doctors’ use of Soviet death criteria results in a systemic mislabeling 

of infant deaths as stillborns, thus the true number of babies who die after 

birth is higher than the reported infant mortality rate indicates.1 Regional 

governments’ human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency virus (AIDS) statistics also may significantly underestimate infection rates, as legally-required residency permit systems discour-
222 GRABMAN

age many groups particularly vulnerable to HIV infection from registering 

with authorities.2 In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, official statistics are 

particularly suspect, given the autocratic nature of these governments.

A less distorted picture of public health in the region can be obtained 

by focusing on data from the Kyrgyz Republic, or Kyrgyzstan. Although 

data verification remains problematic, recent government-provided health 

data is relatively reliable. Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Health has received 

extensive technical assistance from the World Health Organization in 

reporting health statistics. Kyrgyzstan was also the site of an extensive 

United States-led Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) in 1997, permitting comparison of official statistics with independently collected 

information.

Kyrgyzstan: A Proxy for Central Asia

In its population’s longevity, morbidity, and mortality, Kyrgyzstan 

represents the mean of Central Asian public health.3 Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, poorer countries than Kyrgyzstan, have higher mortality rates. 

Uzbekistan, a richer country than Kyrgyzstan, has lesser infant and underfive mortality rates and longer life expectancies. Until 1999, Kazakhstan’s 

relative wealth also contributed to lower child mortality and higher life 

expectancy than in Kyrgyzstan.4

All of Central Asia is also mirrored in Kyrgyzstan’s internal public 

health variations.5 Kyrgyzstan’s poorest oblasts or states, Talas, Naryn, and 

Batken, have the country’s highest rates of infant and maternal mortality. 

In cold, dry Talas and Naryn, with climates similar to Kazakhstan, acute 

respiratory infections and tuberculosis are more problematic than in the 

rest of Kyrgyzstan. In the southern oblasts of Jalal-Abad, Osh, and Batken, 

as in Tajikistan and southern Uzbekistan, diarrheal diseases are the major 

cause of morbidity and mortality in children. In these Kyrgyzstani states, 

fertility rates are also much higher than in other oblasts, due to the cultural and religious beliefs of the southern Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbek and Tajik 

populations. Further, during the late 1990s and until 2001, the southern 

portion of Kyrgyzstan suffered invasions by Taliban-backed militants. 

This armed insurrection undoubtedly crippled the health care system and 

caused higher death rates in the affected areas, a result similar to that seen 

in war-torn Tajikistan.

Northern oblasts Chuy and Issyk-Kol have the most favorable health 

indicators in Kyrgyzstan. Similar to all Central Asian capitals, wealth is 

concentrated around the capital city in Chuy oblast, and the population 

here has better access to higher quality health care than do people in other 
PUBLIC HEALTH 223

oblasts. Bishkek residents, like the inhabitants of all Central Asia’s capital 

cities, enjoy the country’s best health outcomes. Chuy and Issyk-Kol also 

have a high proportion of Russians living in them, similar to the demographics of Kazakhstan and many Central Asian capitals. Russians tend 

to have lower fertility rates and better mortality and morbidity outcomes 

than do native Central Asian peoples.

Finally, like the other Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan is reforming its Soviet-inherited health care system. Kyrgyzstan’s health reform is 

the most advanced and widespread in Central Asia, having begun in the 

north of Kyrgyzstan, expanded to the south, and recently spread to Naryn 

and Talas. This health reform is expected to improve health outcomes 

throughout Kyrgyzstan.6

The Soviet Health System

The Soviet Union’s Constitution was the first in the world to guarantee the right to health, stating, “Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to 

health protection.”7 The Soviet health care system therefore was designed 

to provide all citizens—and especially rural populations—with access to a 

basic level of care. At the expense of preventative care, provider choice, and 

efficiency, Soviet socialized medicine achieved impressive public health accomplishments. The ratio of doctors and nurses to population was among 

the highest in the world. Many diseases once endemic, including diphtheria, smallpox, cholera, polio, whooping cough, and typhus, were virtually 

eradicated. On average and indicative of results seen in the Central Asian 

Soviet republics, USSR. life expectancies doubled between the 1917 October revolution and 1970.8

The Soviet health system was a single-payer scheme, where the government provided all health care free of charge, according to norms formulated by the Ministry of Health in Moscow and resource distribution 

determined by the Semashko All Union Research Institute in Moscow.9

Republic-level health ministries were responsible for implementing Moscow’s policies through oblast-level health departments. In turn, the oblast 

health departments directed health care through rayon (county) and at the 

city health administrations. In each republic and oblast, a sanitary epidemiological service (Sanepid or SES) oversaw the control of communicable 

diseases and acted as a “check” on the health departments’ work.10

To provide universal health care coverage, the Soviet system automatically assigned each citizen to a polyclinic that assumed responsibility 

for the person’s health and served as the portal of entrance to the medical care system.11 The patient could not choose his or her physician; the 
224 GRABMAN

patient’s residence in a micro-district usually determined her polyclinic 

assignment. However, high ranking members of the Communist Party and 

employees in some collective enterprises, such as factories and farms, were 

assigned to clinics and hospitals reserved for their use. The one polyclinic 

per micro-district, staffed by an internist for men, a pediatrician for children, an obstetrician for women, a dentist, and a nurse, provided routine 

outpatient care to the micro-district’s approximately 4000 people. In rural 

areas with long distances between polyclinics called selskaya vrachebnaya 

ambulatorya, or SVAs, people could receive basic care from first aid specialists and midwives at health posts feldsher accousherski punkt or FAPs.

If referred by their polyclinic or if self-referred, Soviet citizens could 

seek more advanced health care at the rayon’s central town hospital and 

specialty polyclinics. In rural areas, limited medical care was available at 

small hospitals selskaya uchaskovaya bolnitsia, or SUBs. Still more specialized and better equipped hospitals for specific diseases and conditions—

cancer, tuberculosis, sexually transmitted infections—could be found in 

the main city of each oblast and in republic’s capital city.

Kyrgyzstan was a beneficiary of the Soviet health care system in many 

ways. Although costly and hospital-heavy, the Kyrgyzstan’s Soviet health 

care system successfully decreased infant and child deaths and increased 

life expectancy. The Soviet system also provided all children and expectant mothers with free health care.12 As a result, Kyrgyzstan’s official infant 

mortality rate dropped from 111 in 1970 to 52 in 2001, and the under-five 

mortality rate decreased from 146 in 1970 to 61 in 2001.13

While it sounded like a positive situation for all involved, the Soviet model of health care had many drawbacks.14 The system relied on 

vast numbers of specialists and multiple, redundant specialist facilities.15

In turn, the system produced few community-level health professionals 

skilled in preventive care, such as generalists and nurse practitioners.16

Many doctors were trained only to address the needs of a specific sex or 

age group suffering from a specific disease, while nurses had limited skills 

and undertook only basic tasks. As an example of the extreme overspecialization of Soviet health care, Kyrgyz obstetricians neither owned nor knew 

how to use stethoscopes. Clinical management required lengthy hospital 

stays for many conditions, such as tuberculosis and influenza, which could 

have been treated in outpatient facilities.17 The system’s financing structure encouraged this tertiary care focus by funding hospitals according to 

their bed quantity, rather than their number of patients. Such treatment 

and financing regimes required a large number of hospital beds, which led 

to low occupancy levels. Finally, the Soviet system failed to encourage a 
PUBLIC HEALTH 225

sense of health responsibility among the citizenry or innovation amongst 

the providers.18 Government subsidies supported health care and the 

population grew to expect free healthcare services. No private health care 

or health insurance was necessary or permitted.

Soviet Collapse

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the disruption 

caused by a forced transition from a collectivist system to a market economy brought about a near collapse of the health care system in the newly 

independent states.19 Like the other Central Asian nations, Kyrgyzstan was 

left utterly without money to support its social sector, including its public 

health systems.20 The share of the government budget going to health care 

fell by about a third between 1991 and 1992.21 At the same time, the percentage of the gross domestic product spent on health care fell from just 

over four to two percent.22 The country’s poor economic situation led to 

health services deterioration as equipment became antiquated, drug stocks 

dwindled, and buildings decayed.23 Salaries for doctors and nurses, if paid 

at all, fell from 79 percent of the average salary in 1995 to just 59 percent 

in 1998.24

The resource requirements of Kyrgyzstan’s socialized public health 

system became untenable in the 1990s. Hospitals swallowed 73 percent of 

the healthcare funds, while the primary healthcare system received only 16 

percent of the already diminished health budget.25 Focus on tertiary care 

resulted in resources being spread too thin, and in under-financing of local 

level services. In turn, this led to mandatory informal payments to healthcare providers, a practice particularly detrimental to the poor. The World 

Bank bluntly states, “Resources wasted on half-empty facilities, poorly 

insulated buildings, or medical technologies that do not function rob the 

system of resources that could be put to effective use” on the primary 

health care level.26 A well-functioning health care system is the single most 

important element in reaching the poor with prevention and treatment.27

Central Asians’ health status declined due to the effects of poverty 

and lack of health care access. In Kyrgyzstan and particularly in the country’s rural areas, the poverty rate increased from 40 percent to 63 percent 

between 1993 and 1996.28 Lack of funding for the state health care system 

barred large segments of the population from basic medical services,29 as 

the need to pay for health care prevented or delayed some poor families 

from seeking care.30 Lack of adequate health care and poor nutritional 

status played pivotal roles in the significant growth in Kyrgyzstan’s infant 
226 GRABMAN

and child mortality rate.31 Life expectancy also dropped by several years, as 

Kyrgyzstanis struggled to obtain food and health care in the mid-1990s.32

Further indicating the dire state of Central Asia’s post-Soviet public 

health, Kyrgyzstani tuberculosis (TB) incidence rates increased 100 percent from 1991 to 2000. While the upsurge followed trends expected for 

the Central Asian region,33 Kyrgyzstan’s TB incidence grew faster than any 

other former Soviet state.34 New TB infections in Kyrgyzstan may soon 

approach Tajikistan’s very high TB incidence of 250 cases per 100,000 

people.35

Tuberculosis is a disease of poverty, easily spread in crowded conditions and infecting the sick and malnourished.36 Through coughing, 

talking, or spitting, each person with active, untreated TB will infect on 

average between 10 and 15 people every year.37 In infected people, the TB 

bacilli can lie dormant for several years; when an infected person’s immune system is weakened, his or her chances of falling ill with active TB 

increase. Populations lacking food or adequate living space, alcoholics, and 

people living with HIV/AIDS are at particular risk of becoming infected 

with TB and in developing the active disease. As it spreads, TB further 

strains the already under-funded Central Asian public health systems by 

requiring them to provide needed treatment to the sick. Tuberculosis also 

greatly increases the burden on the poor, as the disease spreads through 

families and as its debilitating effects limit the ability of the poor to work 

and better their situations.

Post-Soviet Reforms

The Soviet health care system was wasteful and, as the system’s 1990s 

collapse showed, unsustainable.38 In response to the region’s unabated 

economic crisis, Central Asia’s health care systems have been forced to 

undergo a comprehensive reform to rationalize their financing and to 

emphasize primary care.39 The type and pace of change differs in each of 

the countries, and Kyrgyzstan’s reforms are the most complete and institutionalized.40

The national health reform program began in the north of Kyrgyzstan in 1996 and more recently expanded to the south and to Talas and 

Naryn oblasts. Kyrgyzstan’s health reform fosters lower-cost primary care 

through the creation of family medicine practice groups (FGPs), rationalization of the health system’s excess physical capacity, and development of 

a tax-supported healthcare financing system.41 Supported by a World Bank 

structural assistance loan and U. S. Agency for International Development 
PUBLIC HEALTH 227

(USAID) technical assistance, the Kyrgyz government determines the 

reform’s objectives and implements and monitors its performance. 

Radically departing from the prior system of assigning patients to 

doctors, the reformed health system permits families to choose their FGP 

from among those in the district. Each FGP is composed of a pediatrician, 

an internist, a gynecologist, and at least two nurses, all retrained in modern family medicine protocols. The FGP structure allows family members 

to receive their health care at one location, and FGPs act as gatekeepers to 

higher levels of care.

The architects of the health reform hoped that, if Kyrgyzstanis took 

personal responsibility for their own health and used FGPs’ preventative 

and primary care services, the cost of Kyrgyzstan’s system would decrease, 

and the health status of the population would improve. Consistent with 

these goals, a national Ministry of Health marketing team informs the 

Kyrgyz population about the ongoing reforms and conducts health promotional campaigns. Systemic reform cannot depend on health education 

efforts alone, however. “Financial investment in family group practices 

and outpatient drugs is necessary to give patients access to medicine at 

the primary healthcare level and to allow FGPs to function and to expand 

their scope of services.”42

As a method of freeing funding for health reform, poorly utilized or 

redundant hospitals or specialized polyclinics are to be closed. Most of the 

facilities slated for closure are SUBs in rural areas or city hospitals. Despite 

being located close to remote population enclaves, these facilities have 

little or no supplies and offer very limited services when compared with 

hospitals and polyclinics in the rayon center cities. Staffing and heating 

excess buildings drains oblast health budgets, taking funds sorely needed 

for basic drugs, food, supplies, and salaries. Although individual doctors 

oppose closing health facilities, which provide them informal payment opportunities, the oblast health departments are committed to rationalizing 

the health sector’s resources.43 Money saved from closing high cost, underutilized hospitals creates pools of funds for FGP capital investments, provider salaries, and oblast drug supplies.44

Even with this rationalization of the systems’ capacity, the revenues 

of Central Asian governments are insufficient to support national public 

health systems. In Kyrgyzstan, a mandatory health insurance fund (MHIF) 

provides additional resources for the health reform. The MHIF receives 

funds from earmarked payroll taxes and pools this money. Using innovative payment methods and based on information collected through new 

health information systems, the MHIF then allocates the funds to oblast 
228 GRABMAN

health departments for essential drugs. For hospital services, patients must 

pay formalized, government-approved co-payments, although the MHIF 

covers the costs of medication.

The MHIF mechanism has given impetus to the health reform’s implementation.45 The availability of outpatient drugs provides an incentive 

to reduce hospital admissions and to expand primary healthcare services.46

A government decree to include all children as MHIF beneficiaries in 2000 

expanded the fund’s role to include coverage of health services.47 Further, 

formal patient co-payments have significantly reduced informal payments 

to health providers and corruption in the health system.48 Providers now 

have a legitimate means of increasing their salaries, and patients are given 

prior notice of the charges for their health care.

Currently, among the Central Asian Republics, only Kyrgyzstan has a 

functioning MHIF. The other Central Asian republics are reluctant to replicate this off-budget financing system. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan have not developed a health insurance fund, and Kazakhstan’s 

MHIF lasted three years before it was eliminated due to political wrangling 

and because of the lack of legal and regulatory systems necessary for the 

MHIF’s support.49

Kyrgyzstan’s willingness to implement health sector reform has 

served as a catalyst for attracting and coordinating international health 

aid in Kyrgyzstan. A variety of governments and organizations, including the World Health Organization (WHO), World Bank, the European 

Bank of Reconstruction and Development, and the Asian Development 

Bank, have provided training and support for doctors, nurses, and midwives throughout the country. Other donors, such as the United Nations 

Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and USAID, have provided immunizations 

and nutritional supplements and have conducted breastfeeding training 

classes.50 Initial studies demonstrate that the reformed, rationalized, retrained, and refunded health care system also provides better quality services.51 Improved public health and infant and child survival are expected 

from these efforts.52

Demographic and Epidemiological Transitions

The transitional state of Central Asia’s public health system has precipitated changes in the area’s patterns of population and disease growth. 

Immediately before and after the Soviet collapse, Central Asia’s health 

indicators resembled those of a developing country with high birthrates 

but high infant and maternal death rates. The leading causes of death were 

infectious diseases. More recently, the causes of Central Asians’ deaths are 
PUBLIC HEALTH 229

changing; chronic conditions more often found in developed countries, 

such as heart disease, are increasingly producing a greater percentage of 

deaths. At the same time, infant and under-five mortality rates appear 

to be improving throughout the region. Maternal mortality, preventable 

deaths due to pregnancy, childbirth, and abortion complications, is also 

decreasing. In 1990, 110 Central Asian mothers died for every 100,000 

women having a live birth.53 By 2002, the average maternal mortality ratio 

had dropped to 65 women per 100,000 having a live birth.54

Demographic Transition

Like the rest of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan is undergoing a transition 

from high fertility and mortality rates to low fertility and mortality rates. 

Kyrgyzstan’s total fertility rate is officially 2.5, which is relatively low.55 Yet 

a high prevalence of abortion in Kyrgyzstan, as in all former Soviet countries, may obscure a much higher actual total fertility rate, suggesting that 

the country still is in the middle of a demographic transition.56

Central Asia’s children face a moderate risk of death during their first 

five years of life. In 2001, for every 1,000 babies born alive in Kyrgyzstan, 

52 died before their first birthday.57 Of children under five years of age, 61 

died for every 1,000 children.58 Again, these official rates may understate 

the true number of deaths of Kyrgyz children. Others estimate that 76.5 

infants die for every 1000 born alive.59

Most of Central Asia’s population is slow-growing due to the effects 

of migration. In Kyrgyzstan, the crude birth rate is estimated at 26.06 

births per 1,000 population; the crude death rate is expected to be 9.10 

deaths per 1,000 population.60 Rapid population growth is expected where 

a country’s crude birth rate exceeds its crude death rate; yet Kyrgyzstan’s 

population grew only by an estimated 1.46 percent in 2003.61 This lower 

population growth resulted from 2.37 per 1,000 people migrating from 

Kyrgyzstan.62

Uzbekistan is an exception to Central Asia’s demographic trend of 

lower birth and death rates. With 40 percent of its citizens younger than 

16 years old, Uzbekistan’s population is expected to double in 50 years to 

50 million people.63 Such rapid population growth clearly will exacerbate 

the deteriorating post-Soviet health system. To merely maintain its current 

level of health care, Tashkent will need to more than double the amount of 

resources dedicated to health services.64
230 GRABMAN

Epidemiological Transition

Central Asia represents a pre- and post-epidemiological transition 

mix, where new health concerns, especially alcoholism and smoking, 

compound the effects of diseases spread due to poverty and the collapsing 

healthcare system. Throughout the region, the top causes of adult morbidity and mortality are both chronic and infectious conditions found in 

developing (pre-transitional) and developed (post-transitional) countries. 

Most adult deaths in Kyrgyzstan, for example, are attributed to respiratory 

infections, chronic cardiovascular conditions, and accidents or injuries.65

High mortality due to chronic, preventable conditions is characteristic of post-transitional countries. Cardiovascular disease is the largest contributor to the gap in mortality between Central Asia and industrialized 

countries, with rates about five times higher than in Western Europe.66 The 

high prevalence of smoking, especially among Central Asian men, is the 

cause of much cardiovascular mortality.67 Alcoholism is also contributing 

to a rising rate of mortality and morbidity due to cardiovascular disease 

deaths68 and to injury, including injuries caused by alcohol-fueled domestic and gender-based violence.69

Rising rates of deaths from non-communicable diseases notwithstanding, sickness caused by infectious diseases indicates that Central 

Asian countries remain, in many ways, “developing countries.” In Central 

Asia, infectious respiratory and diarrheal diseases kill many infants and 

young children.70 Sexually transmitted infections are also spreading rapidly 

among Central Asian youth and adults.71 Further, the region faces growing 

rates of tuberculosis and drug resistant tuberculosis infection.72 For the 

Central Asian region, more years of life are lost to disability from communicable diseases, maternal and perinatal conditions, and nutritional 

deficiencies than from all non-communicable conditions combined.73

The effects of Central Asia’s demographic and epidemiological transition can be summarized through a description of Kyrgyzstan’s population. 

If they survive their early childhood, Kyrgyzstan’s ethnically diverse 4.6 

million people can expect to live, on average, for 68 years before succumbing to either a disease typical of a developing country or a lifestyle-related 

sickness common to a developed country. Given Kyrgyzstan’s mortality 

rates due to respiratory disease, which are the highest in the former Soviet 

Union, Kyrgyz’s risk of dying due to tuberculosis is particularly acute.74
PUBLIC HEALTH 231

Pressing Health Challenges

Central Asia in transition exhibits some of the worst features of both 

developed and developing countries, with high rates of heart disease and 

childhood infections.75 This pattern indicates the importance of strengthening health education and addressing malnutrition and other infectious, 

chronic, and injury-caused health threats.

Health Promotion/Education

The lack of basic health education and health awareness promotion in Central Asia is perhaps the most important problem facing the 

region’s health sector.76 The region’s top causes of mortality and morbidity—both infectious and chronic—could be addressed through education 

programs targeting both adults and children and focusing on behavior 

change. For example, if parents and children were taught the importance 

of handwashing after defecation and before food preparation, this would 

help prevent the incidence of diarrhea. Similarly, educating people about 

the risks of smoking and of non-monogamous, casual sexual behavior 

might cause people to avoid these behaviors. Given Central Asia’s many 

childhood deaths from diarrhea, and the region’s rising rates of mortality 

from smoking and morbidity from sexually transmitted diseases, health 

education is essential.

With decreasing health budgets, the Central Asian states’ crumbling 

public health systems have scarce resources to develop and implement 

health promotion programs. The region’s ongoing health reform gives 

the international community opportunities to assist Ministries of Health 

in the creation of health education projects. Consistent with the goals of 

health reform, preventative, community-level health initiatives are less 

expensive than the Soviet curative health system, and involve people in the 

health decisions that affect them.

In Kyrgyzstan, USAID formatted a health promotion pilot project in 

Chuy oblast. Through this project, FGPs give health talks in schools and 

businesses, set up information centers in communities to distribute health 

educational materials, and show video spots on prevention of various 

diseases, including sexually transmitted infections (STIs).77 In Uzbekistan, 

this program trained Ferghana Oblast schoolteachers to develop plans for 

primary school health lessons. Lessons covered topics such as bodily and 

oral hygiene, nutrition and anemia, acute respiratory infections, diarrhea, 

“bad habits” (including smoking, alcohol, and drugs), and reproductive 

health focused on puberty.78
232 GRABMAN

Health promotion work requires improving the communications 

skills of front-line, community health workers.79 Increasing the skills of 

nurses is of particular importance in Central Asia, where 70 percent of 

the population is rural-based with little access to doctors.80 In many cases, 

nurses and midwives at rural FAPs are the first and only health care providers available to the population. As part of the health reform in Kyrgyzstan, FGP nurse retraining programs in management of childhood illness 

and reproductive health are active in six of the country’s seven oblasts.81

Nutrition

Malnutrition is one of the primary causes of under-five child mortality in Central Asia.82 However, the effects of micronutrient deficiency 

reach far beyond mere mortality; both goiter and anemia are extremely 

prevalent in the region’s women and children. In the Ferghana Valley, between 60 and 80 percent of women and young children suffer from anemia 

caused by an iron-poor diet.83 Throughout the Central Asia republics, only 

non-iodized salt is commonly available, resulting in a steep rise in iodine 

deficiency disorders over the past five years,84 and disabling up to 90 percent of young children in some areas of Kyrgyzstan.85 Since a mother’s iron 

or iodine deficiency may impair the cognitive and physical development 

of her children, the health of future Central Asians depends on addressing malnutrition now. To call attention to the problem of malnutrition 

in Uzbekistan, international donors created a three-part television series 

entitled “Simple Truth” that promotes the consumption of meat and other 

iron-rich foods.86

Another nutritional intervention, exclusive breastfeeding, could play 

an important role in reducing Central Asian infant and child mortality 

from causes other than malnutrition. Diarrhea and acute respiratory infection are responsible for much of the region’s infant and child mortality 

and morbidity. Breastfeeding helps to prevent and reduce the incidence of 

diarrheal and respiratory disease in infants. Despite this beneficial effect 

of breastfeeding, many Central Asian mothers wean their infants or give 

their babies tea and other liquids.87 Thus, increasing the number of mothers who exclusively breastfeed their children up to six months of age could 

reduce the infant and child mortality rate.

Infectious Disease

AIDS

In 1999, Central Asia had the world’s steepest increase in HIV infection;88 yet the true extent of AIDS—caused by HIV—in Central Asia is un-
PUBLIC HEALTH 233

known, due to the lack of accurate reporting.89 Kazakhstan’s government 

reported the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in Central Asia, with 

1,122 HIV positive cases and 31 AIDS cases, but only 92 HIV infection 

cases are confirmed across the border in Kyrgyzstan.90 Broader regional 

data may be a harbinger of an imminent AIDS epidemic, much worse 

than official figures indicate. From 1995 to 2000, the estimated number 

of HIV infections in Eastern Europe and Central Asia increased by more 

than twenty-fold, from less than 30,000 to more than 700,000.91 The infection incidence similarly continues to grow exponentially in the region, 

with 250,000 new infections in 2000 alone. In Kyrgyzstan, the majority of 

new HIV cases are among injecting drug users (IDUs) living in Osh and 

the Ferghana Valley. In Osh and Bishkek, over 5 percent of IDUs are likely 

HIV infected.92

The AIDS epidemic will soon spread from IDUs to their sexual partners and to the general heterosexual population, indicated by a rapid rise 

in other STIs in the region. Central Asia syphilis prevalence rates exploded 

in the 1990s, jumping almost 150 percent in Kyrgyzstan from 1990 to 1996 

and a staggering 225 percent in Kazakhstan during the same period.93 In 

1999, one in every 90 Kyrgyzstani men had syphilis.94 Syphilis and HIV 

are both transmitted through unprotected sexual intercourse, so groups at 

risk for syphilis also are at risk for HIV. In addition, STI infection increases 

the likelihood of HIV transmission during unprotected sex.95

Central Asian adolescents are a particularly high-risk group for sexually transmitted infections, including syphilis and HIV. In Kyrgyzstan, the 

1998 incidence of STIs in urban youth was 170 per 100,000, an infection 

rate considerably higher than the average urban population (100 infections per 100,000 people).96 The causes of the disproportionate STI youth 

infection rate are likely due to adolescents’ hazardous sexual activity and 

lack of disease prevention ability or knowledge. Indeed, 40 percent of 

sexually active urban adolescent Kyrgyz girls reported receiving remuneration for sexual intercourse.97 This information about risk taking behavior 

portends a serious challenge to Central Asian public health.

Tuberculosis

Despite recent efforts to diagnose and control TB, the disease is 

spreading unabated in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan is combating the most 

serious new epidemic of TB in the former Soviet Union. Of the country’s 

4.6 million people, 126.9 out of every 100,000, approximately 5837 people, 

are currently infected;98 and the new infection rate may soon reach 250 per 

100,000.99
234 GRABMAN

The development of multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) 

makes addressing tuberculosis infection a public health priority for all 

of Central Asia. MDR-TB is rising at alarming rates in the former Soviet 

Union and threatens global TB control efforts.100 MDR-TB is virulent because the disease cannot be controlled by isoniazid and rifampicin, the two 

most powerful, and least expensive, anti-TB drugs.101

Drug-resistant TB is caused by inconsistent or partial chemotherapy—when TB patients do not take all their drugs regularly for the required period.102 Central Asians often treat themselves for TB, purchasing 

antibiotics from street vendors and discontinuing treatment once they 

feel better, but before the TB bacilli are killed.103 Health workers also may 

prescribe the wrong treatment regimens for a patient’s TB. These TB drug 

treatments are individualized and do not follow WHO recommendations, 

resulting in low cure rates, cases of chronic infections, and drug-resistance.104 Further, the TB drug supply is unreliable and treatment may be 

interrupted when delivery of medication is delayed.105 Whereas during 

the Soviet period patients were treated with at least three anti-TB drugs, 

health personnel now often have to rely on only two drugs, isoniazid and 

rifampin. Given the high likelihood in the region of pre-existing resistance 

to one of these agents, this situation will lead to the generation and transmission of multidrug-resistant strains.106

TB infection is particularly rife in Central Asia’s prisons. Prison 

inmates are more susceptible to the disease because TB spreads in the 

overcrowded, poorly ventilated cells, and because the prisoners themselves 

are often sick and malnourished.107 Due to lack of treatment and medication, many prisoners develop MDR-TB.108 Statistics from Kazakhstan 

show that the TB morbidity rate among prisoners is more than 20 times 

higher than among the general population.109 In Kyrgyzstan, more than 10 

percent of all inmates are likely infected with TB—close to 2,000 people 

in 40 prisons.110 Of these, roughly 30 percent are likely to be infected with 

MDR-TB.111 When prisoners are released and return home, they spread 

their MDR-TB to their communities.112 In an effort to reduce prison 

costs and overcrowding, Kyrgyzstan offered amnesty to individuals convicted of petty crimes—nearly 50 percent of the prisoners in the country. 

Among the first groups scheduled to receive amnesty were prisoners with 

tuberculosis.113

Tuberculosis control in Central Asia is needed immediately before 

the disease spreads from Central Asia to other countries. The WHO is 

attempting to assist Central Asian governments in implementing a rapid 

TB detection and treatment strategy called Directly Observed Treatment, 
PUBLIC HEALTH 235

Short Course (DOTS).114 DOTS has been effective in controlling traditional TB, producing cure rates of up to 95 percent even in the poorest 

countries. DOTS also prevents the development of MDR-TB by ensuring 

the full course of treatment is followed. The World Bank has ranked the 

DOTS strategy as one of the “most cost-effective of all health interventions.”115

Kyrgyzstan’s government has prioritized TB eradication.116 With 

WHO help, DOTS protocols are being taught to primary care practitioners 

at the community-level.117 Generalists’ wide coverage places them in a position to reach a much larger segment of the population than that attended 

by the Soviet vertical TB control system.118 Yet the under-financed primary 

healthcare system in Kyrgyzstan is limited in the care it can provide. A sixmonth supply of drugs for DOTS costs eleven U.S. dollars per patient,119

thus $50,000 is needed to treat those currently infected in Kyrgyzstan. A 

comprehensive TB control program also requires funds to support home 

visits to the most seriously ill in their communities, to ensure that the sick 

follow their treatment regimes.

Lack of funding in the health care system prevents countries from 

providing the expensive medicines needed to fight MDR-TB. Although 

international donors provide some TB medication, Central Asian Ministries of Health have no available funds to extend TB-control services to 

underserved populations, such as those in prison. While the WHO and 

others have vigorously promoted the DOTS program in Kyrgyzstan, little 

can be accomplished without targeted monetary support for the new TB 

protocols.

Gender-Based Violence

Central Asian women are suffering a growing incidence of domestic 

and other gender-based violence. Post-Soviet economic hardships, changing social roles of men and women, and men’s alcohol consumption all 

contribute to a greater incidence of spousal beatings, and the revival of 

“traditional” practices harmful to women.120 In particular, bride stealing, 

that is, the kidnapping, rape, and subsequent forced marriage of a young 

woman, has increased in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and in some regions of 

Uzbekistan.121 Ethnographers attribute the recent increase in bride stealing 

to young men’s newfound ability to abuse women with impunity122 and 

men’s desire to avoid the “inconveniences” of courtship and a wedding.123

In Karakalpakstan, Uzbekistan, bride stealing is related to the revived 

practice of “qalym,” or bride price. Prospective grooms who wish to avoid 
236 GRABMAN

paying a sizable qalym often resort to stealing their intended spouse without her consent.124

Only scant data is available describing the incidence of bride stealing, 

the prevalence of stolen brides, or the characteristics of the victim. A late 

1990s study of women in a region in southern Kazakhstan found that 80 

percent of these women were stolen as brides.125 In 1996, The Economist

estimated that one in five marriages of Kyrgyz (approximately 240,000 

women) were a result of bride stealing.126 Only one sociological survey 

has sought to depict both the practice and the characteristics of men and 

women involved in Kyrgyz bride stealings. A convenience sample of over 

300 bride stealings found that the abducted brides ranged in age from 16 

to 28 years old (average 19.4 years), while abductors ranged from 17 to 45 

(average age 23.5 years).127

Bride stealing apparently occurs at such a rate that its harm to women 

constitutes a public health problem.128 The tradition affects women’s physiology and psychology. A woman may suffer physical trauma at the time 

of abduction. Many stealings involve the use of blunt force to “capture” 

the bride.129 Following capture, the woman may be raped,130 resulting in 

severe damage to her external and internal reproductive organs.131 The 

bride stealing practice also may put women at risk for sexually transmitted 

infections. The stolen bride is not able to negotiate her sexual initiation 

with her new husband, and it is very unlikely that she will be able to insist 

on condom use during intercourse.132 Similarly, bride stealing renders a 

woman completely vulnerable to her abductor and his family. This power 

imbalance puts the bride at risk of future domestic violence at the hands of 

her new husband.133 For adolescents, bride stealing may result in a greater 

risk from maternal mortality due to obstructed labor, a problem in women 

whose physical development is not complete at the time of pregnancy.134

Bride stealing also harms women’s psychological health.135 A woman 

kidnapped and raped by a stranger is subject to severe mental trauma136

and lingering post-traumatic stress disorder.137 Even if a bride is able to 

reject her abduction and return to her home, she may suffer rejection from 

her peers and family.

Central Asian governments’ prevention of bride stealing and other 

forms of gender-based violence is demanded by domestic and international 

law. The Kyrgyz Criminal Code, for example, imposes a two-year prison 

sentence on those who “steal” a person for the purposes of marriage.138 In 

addition, Kyrgyzstan is party to human rights treaties that demand countries protect and promote women and girl’s rights.139 Despite these obligations to protect women, however, out of hundreds of thousands of women 
PUBLIC HEALTH 237

stolen, only two bride stealing cases were litigated in Kyrgyzstan from 1985 

to 1996.140 By failing to address violence against women, the Central Asian 

states also fail to protect the public’s health.

Conclusion

With their transition from dependent Soviet states to independent 

countries, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan have undergone massive economic, social, and political upheaval. 

These rapid changes have resulted in the Central Asian states’ inability to 

maintain their Soviet-inherited health system. The Soviet Union obtained 

its public health successes through extensive financing of regional medical and epidemiological departments that operated according to centrally 

established goals. The system relied on a massive infrastructure of tertiary 

care facilities and required lengthy patient management by medical specialists. These public health protocols and systems were not financially 

or medically effective for independent, but bankrupt, Central Asia. The 

Central Asian governments’ failure to provide preventative health care 

programs, coupled with the population’s increasing poverty, created favorable conditions for the spread of infectious disease and the expansion of 

chronic, lifestyle-related health conditions.

Driven by their legal obligations to address the causes of sickness 

and death, and their desire to maintain their citizens’ health, Central Asian 

republics began in 1992 to reform their public health systems. At least in 

Kyrgyzstan, these reformed health care systems focus on preventative care 

provided by better-trained generalists, and are supported by innovative 

financing schemes. The health reforms offer a mechanism for the Central 

Asian republics to increase the population’s involvement in and understanding of health care decision making, thus decreasing the population’s 

need for costly curative care. However, Central Asia’s nascent public health 

systems already face challenges from the health problems of the region’s 

epidemiological and demographic transition. In some areas, the majority 

of women and children suffer the effects of malnutrition. Simultaneously, 

HIV/AIDS and other sexually-transmitted infections, TB infection, and 

gender-based violence are increasingly prevalent.

Failure to take rapid action to meet these health challenges will have 

grim results for the whole of Central Asia. Governments and public officials who blindly ignore some public health threats, such as those affecting 

women or other marginalized groups, will contribute to the weakening 

of norms and laws that could lessen vulnerability and that could serve 

as tools for improving health status. In addition, lack of response to one 
238 GRABMAN

health challenge can lead to the spread of incurable diseases throughout 

the region, even to areas yet untouched. The region’s most pressing health 

conditions interact with one another, each rendering the population 

vulnerable to the others. As discussed in this chapter, abused women are 

likely to be infected with STIs; people infected with an STI like syphilis are 

more likely to contract HIV; and malnutrition weakens the population’s 

resistance to TB, as does HIV infection.

Although it may have increased the health risks to the public, Central Asia’s demographic, epidemiological, and political flux also offers the 

region unique opportunities for improving individuals’ health knowledge, 

raising standards of care, and empowering women. It has been only a little 

more than a decade since the Central Asian republics’ independence, and 

the countries are still searching for the most effective and efficient ways to 

structure their public health systems. In each nation, ongoing discussions 

about the potential for health care reform and engagement with international donor organizations indicate a willingness to exchange new ideas 

for old responses. The form such reforms take may differ in each Central 

Asian country, according to that country’s needs and context, yet no more 

can the region afford curing its sick population primarily with hospitals 

and specialists. Central Asia’s pressing health problems of malnutrition, 

sexually transmitted diseases, tuberculosis, and gender-based violence 

can be prevented only through increasing awareness about and by giving communities the resources (vitamins, condoms, DOTS medications, 

trained police, respectively) to address these conditions. Of paramount 

importance is for Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 

Uzbekistan to reaffirm a focus on community-based health promotion 

and education and a commitment to allocate funding to such programs.

Notes1

 W. Ward Kingkade and Eduado E. Arriaga, “Mortality in the Newly Independent States: Patterns and Impacts,” in Premature Death in the New Independent States, eds. J.L. Bobadilla et al., eds. 

(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997), 157. 2

 Renata Rutman, “Antiquated Residency Rules Pose Public Health Threat in Central Asia,” 

Eurasia Insight (December 29, 2001). 3

 United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF), “Basic Indicators” Statistical Table 1, State of the 

World’s Children (2003) (reporting statistics from 2001), available at <http://www.unicef.org/sowc03/

tables/table1.html>. 4

 Kazakhstan’s reported infant and under-five child mortality has risen dramatically in the 

past two years; during the same time, life expectancy in the country has decreased. Compare UNICEF, 
PUBLIC HEALTH 239

supra note 3 with UNICEF, State of the World’s Children, “Basic Indicators” Statistical Table 1 (2001) 

(reporting statistics from 1999), available at <http://www.unicef.org/sowc01/tables/table1.html>. 5

 See generally, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Kyrgyzstan: Common Country Assessment (Bishkek: UNDP 2001), 99-100 (noting regional variations in Kyrgyzstan). 6

 See generally, Republican Medical Information Center, Characteristics of the Health Care 

Delivery Network (Bishkek: Ministry of Health of the Kyrgyz Republic, 1999). 7

 Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Article 42 (1977).

8

 Anita Parlow, “The Central Asia Health Care Collapse,” Eurasia Insight (December 21, 2001). 9

 Martin McKee et al., eds., Health Care Systems in the Central Asian Republics (European Observatory on Health Care Systems (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002), 7. 10 N.N. Brimkulov and S.M. Kuchuleev, “Primary Health Care in Kyrgyzstan” (Rotems Foundation, 2001). Online, available at http://www.rotem.ro/engl/pages/kyrgyzstan.html, retrieved Aug. 31, 

2003. 11 McKee et al., supra note 9, 71.

12 World Bank, Making Transition Work for Everyone: Poverty and Inequality in Europe and 

Central Asia (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2000), 258. 13 UNDP, “Kyrgyzstan,” Human Development Report 2003 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 

2003), available at <http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/cty_f_KGZ.html>. 14 McKee et al., supra note 9, 7.

15 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “Quality Primary Health 

Care,” USAID Central Asian Republics Briefs (2003), available at <http://www.usaid.gov/regions/europe_eurasia/car/briefers/primary_health.html>. 16 Julie DaVanzo and Clifford Grammich, “Dire Demographics: Population Trends in the 

Russian Federation” (Washington, DC: RAND, 2001), 50, available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1273/. 17 USAID, supra note 15.

18 McKee et al., supra note 9.

19 Alexander Casella, “Health Care Systems Under the Weather,” Asia Times Online (January 18, 

2001). Reprinted by Asia Human Rights Commission, online, at <http://www,ahrchk.net/news/mainfile.php/ahrnews_200201/2292/>, retrieved September 30, 2002. 20 Cf. N. Almagambetova, “Overhauling the Health-care System in Kazakhstan,” Lancet 354 

(9175) (1999): 313 (discussing the financial crisis in Kazakhstan’s social sector). Also cf. S. Keshavjee 

and M.C. Bacerra, “Disintegrating Health Services and Resurgent Tuberculosis in Post-Soviet Tajikistan: An Example of Structural Violence,” JAMA 283(9) (2000):1201 (discussing the results of the 

financial crisis in Tajikistan’s health sector). 21 McKee et al., supra note 9, 38.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., 7.

24 Ibid., 29.

25 European Observatory on Health Care Systems, Health Care Systems in Transition: Kyrgyzstan (Copenhagen: European Observatory on Health Care Systems, 1996), 16. 26 World Bank, supra note 12.

27 Ibid.

28 Peace Corps of the United States, Kyrgyz Republic: Country and Culture (2000). Online, 

available at <http://www.peacecorps.gov/countries/kyrgyzrep/culture.htm> retrieved Sept. 30, 2002. 29 Casella, supra note 19.

30 McKee et al., supra note 9, 103.

31 World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, July 2002. Online, available at 

<http://www.devdata.worldbank.org/data-query, retrieved Sept. 30, 2002>. 32 World Bank, supra note 12, 260; USAID, supra note 15.

33 Kabar News Agency, “U.N.: 55 Percent of Kyrgyz Population Below Poverty Line,” BBC 

Worldwide Monitoring (January 20, 2000).
240 GRABMAN

34 UNDP, supra note 13.

35 Keshavjee and Becerra, supra note 20. At 88 cases per 100,000 people, tuberculosis prevelance 

in Kyrgyzstan already exceeds that in Tajikistan (83 cases/100.000 people), see UNDP, supra note 13. 36 WHO, “Tuberculosis,” Information Fact Sheet No. 104 (2000).

37 Ibid.

38 USAID, “Kyrgyzstan,” FY 1998 Congressional Presentation (June 1998), available at <http://

www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp98/eni/countries/kg.html>. 39 Ibid.

40 McKee et al., supra note 9, 7.

41 Brimkulov and Kuchuleev, supra note 10.

42 Personal communication with Sheila O’Dougherty, Regional Director, ZdravPlus, USAID/

World Bank Central Asian Health Reform Project, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (October 10, 2000). 43 Personal communication with Mary Murphy, Kyrgyzstan Program Manager, Zdrav Plus, 

USAID/World Bank Central Asian Reform Project, Washington, DC (August 25, 2002). 44 See generally, ZdravPlus, Six Month Report, January - June, 2002, (Almaty, Kazakhstan: Abt 

Associates 2002), 44. This report states, “Under the old health financing system, the MOH or providers 

were unable to reinvest any savings they created, as they [the savings] would revert to the [Ministry of 

Finance]... Pooling funds allows reinvestment of savings as all the money is in one pool, not in budget 

line items. Provider payment systems allow providers the autonomy to create and reinvest savings.” 45 Michael Borowitz et al., “Conceptual Foundations for Central Asian Republic Health Reform 

Model,” Technical Report of the ZdravReform Program (Almaty, Kazakhstan: Abt Associates, 1999). 46 ZdravPlus, supra note 44, 45.

47 McKee et al., supra note 9, 104.

48 ZdravPlus, supra note 44, 46-47.

49 Ibid., 4-5, 18. See also McKee et al., supra note 9, 104.

50 USAID, supra note 38.

51 ZdravPlus, “Quality Improvement System Improves Reproductive Health Services, Enhances 

Client Satisfaction, and Empowers Health Workers in Kyrgyzstan,” Road to Results (Almaty: Abt Associates, 2001). 52 Republican Medical Information Center, Characteristics of the Health Care Delivery Network (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: Ministry of Health of the Kyrgyz Republic, 1999). 53 World Health Organization (WHO), “Annex Table 1: Basic Indicators,” World Health Report 

1999 (Geneva: WHO, 1999), available at <http://www.who.int/whr/2002/en/whr2002_annex1.pdf>. 54 UNICEF, supra note 4 at “Women,” Statistical Table 7.

55 United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Kyrgyzstan,” CIA World Factbook 2003 

(Washington, DC: CIA, 2003), available at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/

kg.html>. 56 Population Resource Center, The Replacement on Abortion by Contraception in Three Central Asian Republics (Washington, DC: The Center, 1998). 57 UNICEF, supra note 3.

58 Ibid.

59 B.A. Anderson and B.D. Silver, “Issues of Data Quality in Assessing Mortality Trends and 

Levels in the New Independent States” in Bobadilla et al., supra note 1. 60 CIA, supra note 55.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid. 

63 Antoine Blua and Bruce Pannier, “Central Asia; Uzbekistan Races to Reverse Health Trends as 

Population Booms (Part 3),” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) (March 22, 2002), available 

at <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/03/22032002125509.asp> . 64 Ibid.

65 C.M. Davis, “Health Care Crisis: The Former Soviet Union,” RFE/RL Research Report (October 8. 1993).
PUBLIC HEALTH 241

66 McKee et al., supra note 9, 61.

67 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), “Kyrgyzstan,” Tobacco of Health: A 

Global Status Report (2000), available at <http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/who/kyrgyzst.htm>. 68 Alexandra Poolos, “East:Taking the Pulse of Post-Soviet Health Care (Part 1),” RFE/RL 

(March 22, 2002), available at <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/03/22032002125429.asp>. 69 Expert Center for Social Research (Uzbekistan), “Consultations with the Poor: Participatory 

Poverty Assessment in Uzbekistan for the World Bank World Development Report 2000/01,” National 

Synthesis Report (1999), 22. 70 WHO, supra note 53, Annex Table 3. See also UNICEF, supra note 3 (showing that Kyrgyzstan’s infant mortality rates and under-five mortality rates rates are similar to other Central Asian 

countries). 71 World Bank Group, “Improving Health Status and Reforming Health Systems in Europe and 

Central Asia,” ECA Sector Brief - Health (September 2000). 72 Ibid.

73 WHO, supra note 53, Annex Table 4.

74 World Bank Group, supra note 71. 

75 McKee et al., supra note 9, 7. 

76 Cf. DaVanzo and Grammich, supra note 16.

77 ZdravPlus, supra note 44, 33.

78 Ibid., 55.

79 Ibid., 30.

80 See generally, “Tajikistan: Urgent Need for Health Education,” Integrated Regional Informational Networks of the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (IRIN) - Kofarnihon 

(July 25, 2002). 81 ZdravPlus, supra note 44, 36.

82 WHO, “Annex Table 3,” World Health Report 2000 (Geneva: WHO 2000).

83 Blua and Pannier, supra note 63.

84 “Kazakhstan: Boosting Nutrition with a Pinch of Salt,” IRIN - Almaty (August 8, 2002).

85 Personal communication with Rudy Rodrigues, Resident Project Officer, UNICEF-Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (1998). See also, World Bank, supra note 12, 261. 86 ZdravPlus, supra note 44, 36.

87 Personal communication with Dr. Damira Tursunbekova, Technical Advisor, BASICS, 

USAID Child Survival Project, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (1998). See also, World Bank, supra note 12, 260. 88 USAID, “Health Issues,” USAID Central Asian Republics Briefs (2003), available at <http://

www.usaid.gov/regions/europe_eurasia/car/briefers/health_issues.html>. 89 Renata Rutman, “Antiquated Residency Rules Pose Public Health Threat in Central Asia,” 

Eurasia Insight (December 29, 2001) (noting that the dearth of HIV data is related to Central Asia’s 

continuing reliance on the residency registration system which hinders unregistered residents, such 

as refugees and internally displaced people, from seeking government-provided HIV counseling and 

treatment). 90 WHO and UNAIDS, “Kyrgyzstan, 2001 Update,” Epidemiological Fact Sheet (Geneva:UNAIDS/WHO, 2001). 91 Doris S. Mugrditchian, UNAIDS, UNICEF, and USAID, Report from Conference on the 

Prevention of HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections in Central Asia, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 

May 16-19, 2001, 4. 92 Ibid.

93 WHO, “Syphilis Prevalence Rates in the Former Soviet Union Countries, 1990-1996,” Global 

Prevalence and Incidence of Selected Curable Sexually Transmitted Infections (2001), 23. The incidence of syphilis has decreased from its 1997 apex to 73.5 per 100,000 population, see WHO and 

UNAIDS, “Kyrgyzstan, 2002 Update,” Epidemiological Fact Sheet (Geneva:UNAIDS/WHO, 2002). 94 Personal communication with Dr. Ainagul Isakova, Family Practice Group Director, Ministry 

of Health of the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (1999). See also, UNDP, supra note 5, 100.
242 GRABMAN

95 UNAIDS, “Questions and Answers about AIDS: Prevention and Care” (2003), available 

at <http://www.unaids.org/Unaids/EN/Resources/Questions_Answers/Q_A+III_Selected+issues_

prevention+and+care/Section+VIII_Sexually+Transmitted+Infections+(STIs).asp>, stating, “The 

prevention and treatment of STIs are key strategies in the fight against HIV/AIDS because the presence 

of STIs magnifies the risk of HIV transmission during unprotected sex tenfold.” 96 Mugrditchian, supra note 91 11.

97 Ibid.

98 UNDP, Kyrgyzstan 2000 program website. Online, available at <http://www.undp.kg/english/country.html>, retrieved September 30, 2002. Website notes an increase of TB over data reported 

in UNDP, supra note 5. 99 Keshavjee and Becerra, supra note 20, 1201.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid.

103 K. Lally, “As the Aral Sea Retreats, Dust and Disease Flourish,” The Sun (Baltimore, MD) 

February 14, 1999, 1A. 104 World Bank, supra note 12.

105 WHO, supra note 25.

106 Keshavjee and Becerra, supra note 20.

107 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, “Kyrgyzstan,” Annual Report (1999), 

available at <http://wwww.ihf-hr.org/reprots/ar99/ar99kyr.html>. 108 Project Hope, News website (2000). Online, available at <http://www.projecthope.org/news/

prisons.html>, retrieved September 30, 2002. 109 Ibid.

110 Roy Walmsley, UK Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, “Research Findings,” World Prison Population List (1999), 88. See also, International Helsinki Federation 

for Human Rights, supra note 107. 111 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, supra note 107.

112 Cynthia Long and Doug Rekenthaler, Jr., “Phoenix-Like, Tuberculosis Rises Again to 

Threaten World Health,” Disaster Relief website (March 26, 1999). Online, available at <http://www.

disasterrelief.org/disasters/990319tuberculosis/>, retrieved September 30, 2002. 113 “Kyrgyz Mull Amnesty for Half of Prison Population,” Reuters (December 26, 2000).

114 M.C. Raviglione et al., “Assessment of Worldwide Tuberculosis Control,” 350(9078) Lancet 

(1997) 624-29. 115 Ibid.

116 Kabar News Agency, supra note 33.

117 ZdravPlus, supra note 44, 43 (noting that the Kyrgyz MOH announced that it is developing 

an order making FGP doctors responsible for the continuation phase treatment of tuberculosis). 118 A. Pio and K. Western, “Tuberculosis Control in the Americas, Current Approaches,” 10 

Bulletin Pan-American Health Org. 3 (1976). 119 WHO, Treatment of Tuberculosis: Guidelines for National Programs (Geneva: WHO, 2nd 

ed., 1997). 120 Expert Center for Social Research (Uzbekistan), supra note 69.

121 Sue Lloyd-Roberts, “Plight of Kyrgyzstan Brides Who Are Kidnapped, Raped and Abandoned,” Independent, March 6, 1999, 18 (arguing economic reasons for the revival of bride stealing). 

See also, Lori Handrahan, “Political Participation and Human Rights in Kyrgyzstan: Civil Society, 

Women, and a Democratic Future,” 1 Women: Personal is Political, Local is Global (1997) (arguing 

that the renewal of bride stealing is a form of “political or national expression”). 122 U. Babakulov, “Kyrgyz Women Suffer in Silence,” ISAR (April 10, 2001). Online, available at 

<http://www.isar.org>, retrieved September 30, 2002. 123 Personal communication with Gulnara A. Aipaeva, Kyrgyz Ethnology Dept., American 

University in Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (March 30, 2001).
PUBLIC HEALTH 243

124 Expert Center for Social Research (Uzbekistan), supra note 69.

125 Cynthia Werner, “Marriage, Markets, and Merchants: Changes in Wedding Feasts and 

Household Consumption Patterns in Rural Kazakhstan,” 19 (1/2) Culture & Agriculture 6. 126 “The Stolen Brides of Kyrgyzstan,” 341 The Economist 40 (1996). 127 Russ L. Kleinbach, Kyrgyz Bride Kidnapping: Third Edition (2001), available at <http://faculty.philau.edu/kleinbachr/new>. 128 Compare with tuberculosis, which afflicts about 0.5 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s population 

and is considered an epidemic warranting immediate action; see UNDP, Kyrgyzstan: Country Report 

(2000), available at <http://www.undp.kg/english/country.html>. 129 Kleinbach, supra note 126, 12-14.

130 Ibid.

131 S.A. Baker & B. Beadnell, “The Role of Domestic Violence in Heterosexual Women’s Sexual 

Safety,” Nat’l. Conf. Women HIV 122 (1997) (abstract no. 122.3).

132 Ibid.

133 CDC, Family and Intimate Violence Prevention Team, Power and Control (September 12, 

1998). Online, available at <http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/dvp/fivpt/spotlite/power.html>, retrieved 

September 30, 2002. 134 WHO, Division of Reproductive Health, World Health Day 1998: Maternal Mortality 

(1998). Online, available at <http://www.who.int/archives/whday/en/pages1998/whd98_01.html>, retrieved September 30, 2002. 135 Monee Project, UNICEF, Innocenti Center, “Chapter 5,” Regional Monitoring Report, 77 

(6th report 1999). 136 See generally, L. Miriam Dickinson et al., “Health-Related Quality of Life and Symptom 

Profiles of Female Survivors of Sexual Abuse,” 8 Arch. Fam. Med. 35 (1999). 137 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders:

DSM-IV 4th ed. (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1994).

138 Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, Normative Acts §155 (1994).

139 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex, Agenda 

Item 108, at 12-13, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/25 (1989). Signed by Kyrgyzstan on July 7, 1990; ratified on 

October 21, 1991. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 

21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 53-54, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); acceded to by Kyrgyzstan on October 7, 

1994. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 

21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 51, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); acceded to by Kyrgyzstan on October 7, 

1994. Treaty for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, 

U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 80, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980); acceded to by Kyrgyzstan on 

February 10, 1997. 140 “The Stolen Brides of Kyrgyzstan,” supra note 125.
244 GRABMAN
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 245

245

Chapter 11

From Rio to Johannesburg: 

Comparing Sustainable 

Development in Kazakhstan, 

Uzbekistan, and The Kyrgyz 

Republic

Alma Raissova and Aliya Sartbayeva-Peleo

The 1992 “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro led to a conceptual 

breakthrough in the theory of sustainable development. By agreeing on “Agenda XXI,” participating countries laid the groundwork 

for a new, long-term global partnership. Increased economic growth, social and political stability, and the rational exploitation and protection of 

natural resources were identified as inter-related and mutually reinforcing 

components of sustainable development.

One of the reasons the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan participated in the Rio conference was their eagerness for recognition by the international community as newly established, 

independent governments. They hoped to make themselves known by 

taking on the obligations of sustainable development formulated at this 

historic summit. The theory was that the implementation of these commitments would allow the countries of Central Asia to integrate into the 

international system, and collaborate on economic, environmental and 

social issues. Unfortunately, this has not happened—or at least not at the 

pace previously hoped. A decade later in Johannesburg, the World Summit attempted to speed up the process of attaining sustainable development. The result was another set of measures inadequate for the rapidly 

changing economic, environmental and political situations on the planet. 

The developed countries did not move far enough on implementing Rio’s 

commitments to fighting poverty and promoting political stability in the 
246 RAISSOVA & SARTBAYEVA-PELEO

world. The remaining countries, unfortunately, also could not live up to 

their lofty goals. Interethnic and religious conflicts in the Commonwealth 

of Independent States (CIS) countries speak to the failings of economic 

and sociopolitical development in these states and highlight the difficulties 

which lie ahead.

Sustainable development means different things to different people, 

but the most frequently quoted definition is from the UN report Our Common Future (also known as the Brundtland Report), which states, “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present 

without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 

needs.”1 According to this definition, sustainable development, as well as a 

commitment to the environment, must include a social and humanitarian 

context. Hence, sustainable development focuses on improving the quality 

of life for all of the earth’s citizens, without increasing the use of natural 

resources beyond the capacity of the environment to supply them. 

The notion of “sustainable development” in the countries of Central 

Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, is usually 

interpreted from the narrow perspective of environmental protection. 

The economic, social, and political aspects of sustainable development 

are given a secondary priority at best. In reality, sustainable development 

includes three independent elements of equal value and importance: economic, environmental and social:

Sustainable development . . . assumes that all three of these areas are 

in balance, harmoniously interacting among each other to create the 

conditions for a blossoming of the human potential and self-actualization. Failure in one of the areas may lead to an unbalanced society 

and crisis, and ultimately to an implosion of society.2

Figure 11–1. Components of Sustainable Development.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Economic

Development

Social and

Political

Development

Environmental

Development
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 247

Figure 11–1 presents a simplified schematic of sustainable development and its components. It is important to point out that undervaluing 

one component inevitably will lead to imbalance in the entire system. For 

example, unemployment caused by differing levels of economic development across the states of Central Asia inevitably leads to poverty, interethnic tension, a decrease in the effectiveness of the economy and disregard 

for environmental security. Some states, especially recently independent 

ones, are unable to address simultaneously problems in each area of sustainable development. Clear examples of this are the efforts of Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to address the issues raised in “Agenda XXI.” In 

the recent progress review of Agenda XXI implementation in Central Asia, 

there was a proposal to establish the institutional partnership through a 

regional agreement for effective management improvement in the areas 

of sustainable development and security in Central Asian countries. This 

proposal was supported by the statement of the Interstate Commission 

on Sustainable Development at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, which proposed “to put in place an economic mechanism 

and the signing of a subregional agreement” for strengthening the efforts 

of sustainable development in the region.3 However, the introduction of 

economic mechanisms for reaching overall sustainable development goals 

presupposes the stable development of a market economy and the established institutional framework for using market techniques to reach social 

and environmental goals in an efficient way. The outlook for how well 

these countries will transition from the market-economy system perspective toward overall socioeconomic sustainability is uncertain and many 

policy-makers and theorists are skeptical.

Analyzing social and economic development in Central Asia over the 

past decade, it is possible to note certain tendencies toward reform in the 

region. The periods of reform may be divided into two stages. Table 11–1 

shows that during the period 1991-1994, the new countries set almost 

identical tasks for themselves, and consequently achieved very similar results. During this initial stage, the countries attempted to prevent a sharp 

decline in the gross domestic product (GDP), which averaged about 10 

percent annually, fight inflation, stabilize recently introduced national 

currencies, and control social and political tensions in the region. Reforms were aimed at stabilizing the principal macroeconomic indicators, 

particularly inflation. As an example, Kazakhstan’s annual rate of inflation 

was brought from triple digits to 60 percent in 1995.
248 RAISSOVA & SARTBAYEVA-PELEO

Beginning in 1995, the countries of Central Asia adopted different 

approaches to social and economic reform, which consequently led to differing results. A summary of these differences is shown in Table 11–1.

Table 11–1. Stages of Social and Economic Development in Central 

Asia, 1991-2001 (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan)

First Stage

(1991 - 1994.)

Second Stage

(1995 - 2001.)

■ Transition from Moscow-led (Soviet) system 

of economic management to republican level 

of management;

■ Introduction of national currency;

■ Establishment of two-level banking system;

■ Price liberalization;

■ Privatization of state-owned property 

■ Pension reform (Kazakhstan);

■ Educational reform (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan);

■ Health system reform (Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan);

■ Trade policy reform (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Uzbekistan);

■ Tax reform (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan);

■ Discussions on land reform (from stateowned to private property) (Kyrgyzstan, 

Kazakhstan).

After the financial shocks of the 1997 and 1998 global economic 

crisis, stabilization of world financial markets and favorable consumer 

prices led to a global economic revival in the year 2000. Global economic 

growth in 2000, when compared to the previous year, was up by 4.1 percent. Financial indicators for the majority of CIS countries were relatively 

stable, owing to improvements in principal macroeconomic indicators, 

and sound fiscal and monetary policies.

The countries of Central Asia were included in these macroeconomic 

improvements. Economic indicators of the International Monetary Fund 

(IMF), the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), all 

show positive tendencies in recent years in the principal macroeconomic 

growth indicators. According to the Fitch IBCA4 investment rating, one of 

the main reasons for macroeconomic improvements in the region is an 

increase in national income from the extraction and export of natural resources. While the increase is good news for the CIS countries, it also has a 

downside. The states’ increasing dependence on natural resources, such as 

oil, natural gas, coal and metals, causes more economic sensitivity to sharp 

price fluctuations in the world markets and presents budgetary challenges 

because of the uncertainty. However, it is possible to limit the negative 

consequences of these fluctuations through both direct government action 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 249

(establishment of state funds, banks, and development of legislation) and 

through market-based regulation (tax, budget and monetary policies.).

One regulatory example is the National Oil Fund and Development 

Bank in Kazakhstan. The National Oil Fund can be used to counteract 

fluctuations in public finance resulting from changes in world market 

prices for oil exports. The Fund is modeled on the Norwegian oil fund 

experience, and managed by the National Bank of Kazakhstan.5 The goals 

of the Development Bank of Kazakhstan are to: 

■ increase the effectiveness and efficiency of public investment 

activity,

■ develop the production infrastructure and manufacturing industry, 

and

■ promote the attraction of domestic and foreign investments into the 

national economy.6

To better understand the differences in approaches to stabilizing 

sharp fluctuations in the economic development and to establishing a 

market-based policy system in decision-making processes, it is necessary 

to examine each of the Central Asian countries in turn.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan has adopted a number of measures aimed at moving 

toward sustainable development. The country actively participates in the 

“Environment for Europe” and “Environment and Sustainable Development for Asia” processes as well as the preparation of the regional Central 

Asia Environmental Protection Plan. Active support is also given to the 

preparation of the Central Asian Sustainable Development Strategy (Subregional Agenda XXI for Asia).

In comparison with other CIS countries, Kazakhstan appears to have 

done well. There is relative social and political stability, the economy is on 

the upswing, and considerable attention is being paid to the rational use 

of natural resources and environmental protection.

Figures 11–2 and 11–3 show that in Kazakhstan, per capita GDP in 

2002 was $1,645.80 compared with $382.61 in Uzbekistan, and $321.24 

in Kyrgyzstan.7 However, in spite of the marked difference in the GDP 

of Kazakhstan from other countries, this does not reflect the level of true 

sustainable development. As mentioned above, sustainable development 

should be measured in terms of interrelated indicators, which include 

social, economic and environmental variables.
250 RAISSOVA & SARTBAYEVA-PELEO

Kazakhstan’s critical social policy problem is the imbalance between 

the low level of public funding of the social sector, and the high level of 

state-mandated entitlements to the population. This is because of the 

contrast between promised social reforms announced by the government 

and those actually provided. During the economic crisis of 1998, these 

discrepancies caused a sharp deterioration in social welfare. Public funding 

for education decreased to 3.3 percent of GDP; for healthcare to 2.5 

percent; and for poverty reduction to a mere one percent. The de-funding 

of social programs has led to a sharp decline in the condition of the 

physical plants as well as personnel safety in the education and healthcare 

sectors. As medical and educational services have deteriorated, skilled 

personnel have fled to other sectors of the economy and the costs for 

preschool and daycare, public utilities and other services have increased 

precipitously. Similarly, cuts in public expenditures for health care have 

caused a radical drop in the quality and quantity of medical services 

provided to the population.

Hasty reform of the educational system caused a near collapse of the 

preschool, elementary and secondary systems as well as professional and 

technical post-secondary education. The 1999 Education Law, in contrast 

to the draft 1996 Law, does not include state guarantees for preschool 

education, nor does it provide mechanisms to guarantee technical, professional and post-secondary education for low-income groups. There are 

also no provisions for providing student loans, without which, non-subsidized education is much less viable.

Unemployment remains the most serious problem in Kazakhstan. 

According to best estimates, the unemployment rate in the country may 

be as high as 30 percent. As a result, living standards have declined sharply. 

Real income in 1999 was a mere 10 percent of its 1991 level. By way of 

comparison, in Moldavia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan this figure is 25 percent, 

while in Russia it is about 50 percent.8 A large portion of Kazakhstan’s 

employed population has fallen below the poverty line. This, in turn, has 

caused a substantial reduction in average basic food consumption per 

capita. In 1999, consumption of meat and meat products, together with 

milk and milk products was only half of the 1991 level.9

One of the more pressing problems in the social sphere remains the 

“war on poverty,” which is one of the main goals of the Earth Summit’s 

Agenda XXI introduced at the Rio de Janeiro meeting in 1992. The poverty index in Kazakhstan shows that 28.1 percent of the population can be 

categorized as poor, that is, below the established poverty line. The main 

causes of poverty are involuntary unemployment and the low aggregate 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 251

income of the population. Anti-poverty initiatives have taken the form of 

a number of efforts to develop and support small business and open access 

to capital through micro-credit programs.10 At present, a new anti-poverty 

program is being developed with the assistance of international finance 

organizations and outside donors.

In accordance with the Program on Privatization and Restructuring of 

State Property in Kazakhstan, the vast majority of institutions in the social 

sphere (health care facilities, educational, cultural and arts facilities) were 

quickly privatized between 1996 and 1998. The process was completely 

undifferentiated: The simple sale of all assets took place with no provision 

for post-privatization financial support, state regulation or quality control. 

There was also a lack of enabling legislation to codify new relationships 

in the social sphere. By 1997, for example, more than 70 percent of preschools simply were closed.

In accordance with the Social Security Law of the Republic of 

Kazakhstan passed on June 20, 1997, a reform of the pension system was to 

have begun. The new pension system proposes a transition from collective 

entitlement to a more progressive system of individualized retirement 

savings. However, the transition to a new system has not been well thought 

out, and the main emphasis on speed rather than equality raises questions 

as to the viability of the new system. During the first decade of independence, Kazakhstan succeeded in creating a stable and peaceful country and 

putting in place much of the institutional infrastructure needed for the 

functioning of a market economy. However, the sustainability challenges 

of the socio-economic development have been more addressed at the central national level with institutional establishments and regulations, rather 

than through implementation of the centrally-approved policies/agendas 

and participation at the lower levels of local administration and district 

communities. All in all, the challenges which must be faced are daunting 

and sustainable development remains, at this point, a distant goal. 

Uzbekistan

According to official Uzbek statistics, almost all of the main macroeconomic indicators are on the upswing. However, foreign observers are 

of the opinion that the most important economic indicators are inflated 

by the Uzbek authorities. According to Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 

GDP growth in 1998 was not the 4.4 percent attested to by the Uzbek 

government, but a mere 2.5 percent. Individual successes in financial 

policy, particularly the reduction of the budget deficit to 3 percent of the 

GDP, were negated by the non-convertibility of the national currency.11
252 RAISSOVA & SARTBAYEVA-PELEO

Furthermore, curtailment of the free market has led to a decline in direct 

foreign investment.

On paper, Uzbekistan enjoys the lowest level of “official” unemployment in Central Asia. During 1995-1997, this indicator was 0.3 percent; in 

1998-1999, 0.4 percent; in 2000-2002, 0.5 percent. However, most experts 

reject the official data. The low level of unemployment in the country is 

explained by the fact that most of the unemployed are not registered with 

employment centers, and thus are not included in official estimates.

Privatization throughout Uzbekistan is proceeding exceptionally 

slowly. Implemented for the most part in name only, in the majority of 

cases, it has not saved the economy from overwhelming government influence, especially in the agricultural sector. Official numbers on privatization are also questionable. IMF data suggests that less than 30 percent of 

Uzbek enterprises were even partly privatized in 1998. Yet, according to 

official government information, 45.3 percent of enterprises during that 

period were in non-state hands.

In a majority of cases in Uzbekistan, privatization of small and 

medium state-owned enterprises has been completed. However, of those 

enterprises which have attempted to privatize, most have encountered 

serious problems. The registration process is exceptionally complicated. 

Many companies do not have access to foreign currency accounts and 

pressure from tax authorities remains strong. Moreover, the tax officers 

have direct access to the bank accounts of any enterprise. As the availability 

of capital in the country is limited, businesses are forced, in turn, to limit 

their activities or close shop altogether.

According to official data, privatization of agriculture also is nearly 

complete. Nonetheless, agricultural labor remains under the dominating 

influence of the government, just as in Soviet times. Agricultural enterprises and dehkane12 cannot independently select which crops to grow. 

Seeds and agricultural equipment remain under state control, the harvest 

is sold to the government at fixed wholesale prices and private ownership 

of the land is forbidden.

The primary cause behind weak direct foreign investment in Uzbekistan, despite the adoption of new legislation, is the unfavorable investment 

climate. Foreign investors complain of the numerous bureaucratic hurdles 

they must overcome to do business and the few guarantees they receive 

that their investment will be protected from the sometimes arbitrary 

nature of official decision making. According to Western sources, official 

statistics issued by the Uzbek Ministry of Macroeconomics and Statistics 

do not reflect the true economic situation in the country. The data has 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 253

a tendentious character and is the object of direct state manipulation. 

Independent observers point to evidence of a deterioration of the social 

and economic situation in Uzbekistan. In Uzbekistan, until recently, there 

were two official state-controlled exchange rates: a commercial rate for 

business transactions and a special rate for individuals. The official rate 

in 2002 was, on the average, 750 sums to one U.S. dollar; the commercial 

rate was 990 sums per U.S. dollar. However, on any given day, the black 

market rate might raise the rate to 1,150 sums for one U.S. dollar.13 In 

addition, the government placed a restriction on the purchase of foreign 

currency for businesses operating in Uzbekistan. All of this represented 

serious obstacles for foreign investment, trade and business development 

in the country.

A recent IMF mission to Uzbekistan in fall 2003 brought some positive results. The mission pointed to monetary and fiscal policy dialogues 

and progress in implementing the Action Plan to Achieve Current Account 

Convertibility of the National Currency. One of the achievements of the 

government and Central Bank of Uzbekistan was the successful elimination of all multiple currency practices and exchange restrictions that were 

previously in place.14

Recently, tight monetary and fiscal policies have had some positive 

effects on the economy, including a decline in the inflation rate and the 

unification of the exchange rate. The introduction of convertibility provides a solid foundation for further liberalization of the economy, including free trade, agricultural reforms, privatization, banking sector improvement, and mitigation of investment climate.

Uzbekistan has very low levels of import and export activity. Exports 

increased from $2.8 billion in 1995 to $3.2 billion in 2000, with the highest volume of export reached in 1996. Export revenues come mainly from 

agricultural production of cotton and wheat. Imports to Uzbekistan are 

insignificant. As a result, the trade balance for 2000 was estimated at $100 

million.15 Uzbekistan still suffers from the highest inflation rate in the region, which causes further declines in real incomes; as a result, an increasing percentage of the population is living below the poverty line.16

Kyrgyz Republic

On January 1, 2002, the total external debt of Kyrgyzstan was estimated at $1.4 billion, while the forecasted GDP for 2002 was about $1.824 

billion (at 46.1949 soms to the dollar). In 2003, Kyrgyzstan was supposed 

to pay out $103.7 million for debt service to foreign creditors. This is the 

largest annual debt payment in the past decade, amounting to some 50 
254 RAISSOVA & SARTBAYEVA-PELEO

percent of state income for 2002. According to Ministry of Finance forecasts, the country will not be able to cover all of its obligatory payments; 

even in optimistic scenarios, the government will cover only about $62 

million. The situation is aggravated by insufficient gross hard currency 

reserves held by the National Bank of Kyrgyzstan. The January 1, 2002 reserve estimates were $285 million, that is, $24 million more than in 2001. 

However, according to independent estimates at the beginning of the 2003, 

the reserves actually may be down by $10 to $12 million.

In the early years of independence, Kyrgyzstan pursued a market 

reform program of liberal policies, agreeing in 1994 to an IMF economic 

restructuring program. Kyrgyzstan began the first phase of privatization in 

1995. The second phase—privatization of medium-sized industry—was 

suspended in 1997, when it was approximately 60 percent completed, 

amid allegations of corruption. Privatization was resumed in 1998, and 

Kyrgyzstan joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in October 

1998.17 The government still retains ownership of some strategic industries, and although it moved to privatize the telecom and energy sectors 

in late 2002, these privatization efforts have been unsuccessful, due to 

domestic opposition combined with a lack of investor interest.18 Land 

privatization has had some limited success.

Kyrgyzstan inherited one of the least competitive and underdeveloped economies of the former Soviet Union. This condition was aggravated by weak governance, ethnic tensions, limited access to trade routes, 

a heavy burden of external debt, and a weak banking sector. The current 

outlook for the economic situation in Kyrgyzstan is tied closely to the 

remote geographical location of the country, and to resource endowments—for example, a single gold mine, Kumtor, accounts for 7 percent 

of GDP.

Some hope relief will be provided by the IMF whose forecasts revised 

the 2002 GDP growth estimate for Kyrgyzstan from 4.5 to 1.5 percent. As 

a result, a loan will be provided through the IMF Poverty Reduction and 

Growth Facility (PRGF). Since December 2002, the IMF already has provided two payments amounting to $30 million, with double that amount 

promised. 

For Kyrgyzstan, however, many economic problems remain unresolved. Positive movement is not apparent in many of the social and economic indicators, and the improvement of others is inconsistent. There 

are problems with production; arrears in wages, pensions, allowances and 

stipends; unemployment and underemployment of labor; and the repayment and installment payments for external debt of the state. Low wages, 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 255

pensions, and social allowances have brought much of the population to 

the brink of catastrophe. Existing pensions and allowances, as well as the 

minimum wage, do not provide a minimum subsistence. At the present 

time, approximately half the population lives below the poverty line, and 

GDP remains 27 percent below 1991 levels in real terms.19 Official estimates put unemployment at 12 percent, but multilateral agencies working 

in Kyrgyzstan estimate the level at closer to 20 percent.20 Current account 

deficits have been consistently high and the debt burden heavy, making 

it impossible for Kyrgyzstan to invest in sectors that would contribute 

to long-term sustainable development. Infrastructure, education and the 

health sector have all deteriorated significantly since the collapse of the 

Soviet Union.

Conclusions

To date, the reforms that have been implemented do not give due 

attention to sustainable development. The economies of Kazakhstan, 

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, first and foremost, were formed under conditions of an inter-republican division of labor within the Soviet Union. 

In this respect, the national economies of the Central Asian countries are 

complementary to a certain degree, and self-interest should favor cooperation as a more direct path to sustainable development for all. Moreover, 

these countries are physically contiguous and share common transboundary economic and environmental problems, as well as common interests 

in the areas of the rational use of water resources, energy, and land use. 

Effective solutions to these problems will require close cooperation among 

these countries, something that has not always occurred in the past.

At the basis of global cooperation among the countries of the world 

is the concept of sustainable development, which captures the reality 

of the modern economy. This is reflected in the high degree of interdependence and interactive complexity in economic, social, political, and 

environmental areas. Globalization provides greater access to markets and 

wider opportunities for technology transfer, which promises productivity 

growth and increases in living standards. Globalization also brings with 

it more competition for locally produced goods, and threats to domestic 

employment. Foreign capital influences also present some dangers to each 

country’s economy. Capital inflow with significant increases in money 

supply and unbalanced trade with inflow of cheap imports as well as 

decreases in the competitiveness of domestic exports due to low-price 
256 RAISSOVA & SARTBAYEVA-PELEO

import expansion from neighboring countries are a concern of all these 

states.

One solution might be regionalization, the creation of regional economic blocs with the potential to better fit in with the “new niches” of the 

international economy. As an example, the Eurasian Economic Association (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) represents 

a market of roughly 200 million people. Its vast natural resources and remaining scientific and intellectual potential could allow these countries to 

develop together new technology-intensive products that could compete 

in the world economy.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which consists of 

China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, has 

good prospects as well. In this case, internal markets account for one 

third of the world total. Working with its regional neighbors, as well as 

with other more distant countries, it is possible to see Central Asia moving along the road to sustainable development. To do this, however, the 

proper balance must be struck between the economic, political/social and 

environmental elements of sustainable development—something that has 

not been achieved to date. 

Currently, there is a strong need for new, effective policies for businesses in the commercial sector, and regulatory policies for the public 

sector in Central Asia. Even in those cases where such policies have been 

created, the implementation has been weakened, due to Soviet style 

managerial tools and the lack of information regarding basic concepts of 

competition, market structure and business performance rooted in central 

planning. The most constructive mechanisms of change can occur only 

through a partnership among state actors, private enterprises, non-government organizations, the mass media and the public in general.

When these states realize they must act not as competitors, but as 

partners, they will better be able to pursue coherent and combined policies 

that can achieve the goal of sustainable development. 

It is reasonable to hope that the Central Asian states will conclude 

that they have more to gain from cooperation than competition. In the 

face of common environmental problems (water, land degradation and 

desertification), economic concerns (trade regulations, unemployment, 

underemployment of resources, and flexibility of capital and labor movements), and disproportion in social development (poverty, harmonization 

of legal policies, ethnic and religion identity), common solutions that arise 

from cooperative action hold the key to success.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 257

Notes1

 Gro Harlem Brundtland, “Our Common Future,” Report from the United Nations Commission, 1987. 2

 Kanat Berentayev, independent expert, Institute of Economic Research, Kazakhstan.

3

 Environment for Europe, Fifth Ministerial Conference, Invitation to Partnership on Implementation of the Central Asian Sustainable Development Initiative, submitted by the Governments of 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan through ad hoc working group of 

senior officials, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Kiev, Ukraine, May 21-23, 2003. 4

 Fitch IBCA Rating Agency, <http://www.fitchibca.com>.

5

 Kazakhstan Economic and Energy Update. January 29 - February 9, 2001, <http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/isa/010222kzenupd.html>. 6

 Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan of May 18th, 2001, 659, <http://

www.kdb.kz>. 7

 Asian Development Bank (ADB) - Key Indicators 2003 <www.adb.org/statistics>.

8

 Integration in the framework of Eurasian Economic Commission in metallurgy area may 

increase sustainability of Kazakhstani economy, Panorama, no. 31, August 2002. 9

 “Kazakhstani society has the social stratification form of Eiffel Tower”, Panorama, no. 21, 

May 2002. 10 State Program on Poverty Reduction, August 2001, Ministry of Labor and Social Protection 

of the RK, <http://www.enbek.kz/publik/>. 11 The Uzbek currency, the Sum, became fully convertible on October 15, 2003.

12 Uzbek farmers

13 “Uzbekistan: IMF Ready To Support Tashkent, But Keeping Its Eyes Open”, by Antoine Blua, 

June 2002, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, <http://www.rferl.org>. 14 Joint Press Statement of the Government and Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan 

and the Mission of the International Monetary Fund, <http://www.imf.uz/pressrelease3.html>, Tashkent, October 8, 2003. 15 “Western sources on current condition of Uzbekistan economy”, Panorama, no. 17, May 

2002. 16 Ibid.

17 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Kyrgyzstan 2003, Economic Policy Initiatives 

timeline, 25.

18 Ibid., 27.

19 Ibid., 27-28.

20 Ibid.,18.
258 RAISSOVA & SARTBAYEVA-PELEO
 LAND PRIVATIZATION 259

259

Chapter 12

Land Privatization and 

Conflict in Central Asia: Is 

Kyrgyzstan a Model?

Kevin D. Jones

I

n the summer of 1990 one of the most violent ethnic conflicts on the 

territory of the former Soviet Union exploded in the southern Kyrgyz 

town of Uzgen and spread from there to the neighboring villages that 

sit astride the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. Lasting almost six days, 171 Uzbeks, 

Kyrgyz, and Russians were killed, and more than 5,000 assaults, rapes and 

robberies were committed.2 In March 2002, five people were killed and as 

many as 62 wounded when police fired on a crowd protesting outside the 

city of Kerben, Kyrgyzstan.3 At first look, these discrete events 12 years 

apart have little in common. One involves local citizens attacking each 

other based on their ethnicity; the other centers on government forces 

responding to political protests. While each event had multiple causes, one 

contributing factor in both instances was the dispute over the allocation 

and access to land.

With the breakup of the Soviet Union and subsequent independence 

of the Central Asian republics, large scale civil conflict was predicted by 

both regional scholars and State Department officials.4 In Kyrgyzstan, 

after more than 10 years of independence, significant advances have been 

made toward privatization of land and the development of nascent land 

markets, without widespread civil violence. However, as the events of 2002 

demonstrate, widespread inequities exist in the distribution of land, and 

tensions over these inequities can erupt without warning.

One of the difficulties in identifying indicators for conflict in Central 

Asia is caused by the extreme fragmentation of the region. Ethnic, religious, socio-political, economic and geographical fault lines exist, yet none 

of these is likely to cause conflict on its own. Rather, it is the interaction

of these issues combined with other influences that could result in the 

1
260 JONES

escalation or prevention of civil conflict. For example, existing ethnic 

tensions combined with the discrete event of a water scarcity could result 

in civil conflict, or concurrently, economic stagnation followed by the 

liberalization of the tax policy could prevent conflict through the increase 

in business and personal worth. One discrete influence contributing both

to the current stability and to the potential for conflict in Kyrgyzstan is the 

privatization of agricultural land.

Each of the five Central Asian countries developed very different 

paradigms for conducting economic reforms. In comparison with its 

neighbors, Kyrgyzstan chose to move the quickest to a market economy. 

The actions and consequences of these efforts provide a unique opportunity to examine the entire process of land reform, as well as the impact 

of land reform on civil conflict and violence, within the setting of a fractious ethnic environment, poor economic growth, and a weak central 

government.

In its broadest sense, land reform can be defined as “agriculture policies designed to improve productivity and profitability of small farms.”5

Often, the term land reform is used interchangeably with agrarian reform; 

however, land reform has a much broader context and is critical to ensuring full market reform. Two other types of reform—urban land reform 

and water law reform—are also necessary components of full market 

reform. However, for the purposes of this chapter, land reform will refer 

only to rural agriculture land.

This chapter provides a concise background on the benefits of land 

privatization for a rural society, examines the relationship between land 

reform and civil conflict, and presents a brief history and comparison of 

land reform in the Central Asian Republics. The primary goal is to examine the process of land reform in Kyrgyzstan and its relationship to civil 

conflict, with the purpose that lessons may be applied to other countries 

and regions.

In the context of this chapter, three broad analytic questions are 

raised:

■ How has the land reform process in Kyrgyzstan affected its stability 

(or lack thereof)?

■ What results has the land reform process had on the Kyrgyz citizens’ 

economic and social well being?

■ Is the land reform process increasing the potential for violent conflict throughout the region?
 LAND PRIVATIZATION 261

Benefits of Land Reform

Privatization of land is a vital component for the development of a 

functioning market economy. In classical economics, land is one of three 

necessary factors of production, and the only one that is naturally limited.6

However, the value of the land is much more than simply the use gained 

from planting and harvesting; land has a “parallel life,” that is, its value as 

a market asset.7

According to legal scholars and land experts, multiple components 

are necessary for a functioning land market. At a minimum, a nascent legal 

land market must posses: simple land tenure and ownership laws; land 

registration with mapping; land evaluation; and markets with open price 

information; and transparent legal recourse.8 These components provide a 

foundation for a legal land market that allows the owner to make informed 

decisions regarding the use of his land. This, in turn, encourages longrange planning and commitment to development of the land, which is of 

general benefit to society. The more people who are able to participate in 

the land market, the more the market’s benefits spread beyond the physical 

plots of land. But none of this is possible without private ownership and a 

legal structure capable of enforcing and recognizing this process.

Conflict and Land Reform

The history of land re-distribution and privatization throughout 

much of the world has been marked by extensive bloodshed and violence. 

In the past century, unresolved issues over land rights and ownership 

were important components of revolutions in Mexico, Russia, Spain and 

China.9 There are almost as many different theories about the causes of 

conflict as there have been instances of civil unrest, but the two primary 

theories of conflict are the greed-rebellion and the grievance models.10

The greed-rebellion model is based mainly on economic considerations 

and supported by several different studies, which have concluded that economic performance is a statistically significant variable in predicting the 

potential for conflict.11 The grievance model states that ethnicity or political tensions are the underlying cause of conflict, which also may be fueled 

by economic inequalities.12 These models are not mutually exclusive, and 

understanding the causes of land conflict can be gained by recognizing the 

relationship between the two.13

Conflicts over land in Central Asia can be motivated by either ethnic or economic causes as well as some combination of both. One way to 

mitigate either cause is through an efficient and fair allocation of land re-
262 JONES

sources. The next sections look at the process of land reform in Kyrgyzstan 

and its results on mitigating or exacerbating the potential for conflict.

Land Reform in Central Asia

The history of Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union and now the newly independent Central Asian states is one of massive upheavals and numerous 

failed land policies that have left millions of people dead, starving or barely 

surviving. From the Stoylpin Reforms of Tsarist Russia to the Bolshevik 

Revolution and Stalin’s collectivization program, agricultural land reforms 

have a long and tumultuous history affecting the lives of millions of rural 

citizens.14 In Central Asia, an average of 28 percent of each country’s population is defined as agrarian; however, the real number of people who actually depend on agriculture for their primary livelihood is much harder to 

quantify. This number varies between countries; Kyrgyzstan is just below 

the average with 26 percent while Tajikistan has more than 33 percent.

The unique geography of Central Asia, with arid deserts in one 

country and 7000m mountain ranges in the next, has contributed to the 

unusual way in which agriculture and land policies have developed for 

that region. Central Asia encompasses a land area of 400 million square 

miles, with a population of 56 million people living within borders 

drawn as if the cartographer’s eyes had been closed.15 These geographical 

obstacles present natural difficulties which directly affect the allocation, 

management and economic benefit from the land.

One key indicator for measuring the economic benefit and dependence on the land is the amount of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that is 

derived from agriculture. Table 12–1 shows some key economic and social 

indicators for all five Central Asian republics. Kyrgyzstan is distinct in having the greatest amount of agricultural production as a percentage of GDP 

along with the second smallest total land area and percentage of arable 

land. Yet in 2000, it was the only country to have surpassed its pre-1990 

production levels. Another important variable for evaluating dependence 

on the land is the amount of agricultural production that is state owned, 

and the amount that is privatized. In Uzbekistan, almost all of the agriculture process is still controlled by the state, while in Kyrgyzstan the majority of all farm activity has been or is in the process of being privatized. 

Almost 100 percent of agriculture land in the south is in private hands.16

The individual farmer in Kyrgyzstan has a much greater stake in obtaining 

the legal right to land, and in being able to use that land effectively and efficiently. Dependence on the land is cause for intense competition over the 

dwindling amount of land and water resources available. This increases 
 LAND PRIVATIZATION 263

the need to protect and defend these scarce resources. If legal means are 

not viable, then physical force or violence may be used.

Table 12–1.Key Economic and Social Indicators. GDP, (millions US$) GDP growth, (annual %) GDP deflator (annual %) Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)iii

Population, (‘000)Surface area(sq km)Agriculture Populationiii

Kazakhstan 22,635 13% 13% 9% 14,825 2,724,900 20%

Kyrgyz Republic 1,525 5% 7% 37% 4,967 199,900 26%

Tajikistan 1,057 5% 32% 19% 6,223 143,100 34%

Turkmenistan 5,961 21% 12% 27% 5,293 488,100 33%

Uzbekistan 11,269 4% 44% 34% 25,100 447,400 28%

i Data from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and World 

 Bank Development Indicators (WDI) database.

ii All numbers for 2001, unless noted.

iii 2000 data.

Land Policy Development in Kyrgyzstan

Writing in spring of 2002, long-time regional land researcher and 

scholar Peter Bloch stated, “If land reform is narrowly defined as an initial 

distribution of land and other assets from state-owned to private entities, 

then land reform in Kyrgyzstan is almost complete.”17 If Bloch is right, 

how has this happened and what does it mean for the potential for civil 

conflict? Several excellent studies have been conducted which analyze the 

extent of land reform in the former Soviet Union and specifically Kyrgyzstan, therefore it is only necessary here to briefly summarize and comment 

on their findings.18

First Legal Conceptualization (1990-1995)

In 1990, virtually 99 percent of all Kyrgyzstan land, as well as all 

other factors of production, were held by the state, and the parliament had 

passed laws regarding land ownership. The first law was passed in February of 1991, giving authority to local councils to create peasant farms.19

The second important law was passed two months later and created a land 

fund comprised of “unutilized or underutilized land.”20

While many of the new farms were unprofitable, by the beginning of 

1994 approximately 10,000 private farms existed, totaling 150,000 hectares 

of arable land.21 From early 1994 through most of 1995, important events 

occurred in privatization and land reform. The government undertook 
264 JONES

numerous activities and passed several laws. Foreign advisors began to 

work directly with the government to undertake the first of many extensive field research projects, and advisors from the Land Tenure Center were 

invited by the government to assist in the development of land reform. 

This began a process of a high degree of collaboration between foreign 

advisors, bilateral and multilateral donors, and the government on land 

reform.

Passage of Modern Land Laws and Moratorium (1995-1999)

In a November 1995 presidential decree, land use rights were extended to 99 years. This decree remained in place until 1998, when in a 

county-wide referendum, a constitutional amendment was passed which 

“converted all land-use certificates into ownership documents.” This was 

followed by the landmark new Land Code of 1999 which, while simplifying 

the process, contained some unusual and hotly contested provisions.22

One line in the 1999 Land Code stated, “Purchase and sale transactions of land are permitted, but in the case of agricultural land the 

right is delayed for five years.”23 This “moratorium” on land sales was 

an unexpected consequence of the fierce debates in the parliament over 

moving land privatization forward. The exact reasons for the parliament 

implementing this change may never be known, but the reasons why they 

continued to support it for several years provide an important clue to the 

perceived and actual relationship between land reform and conflict. 

Several different stated reasons were given for concern about complete land privatization. Among these were the fear of accumulation of 

land in the hands of a few wealthy individuals; the desire to prevent accumulation of land in the hands of foreigners; high levels of ignorance 

by rural population of land rights; and the lack of an existing registration 

and documentation process.24 Politics is about perception, and at its root, 

so is conflict. The perception within the government was that immediate 

land privatization would spark civil unrest, leading to general violence.25

Regardless of whether the government was right or wrong in their estimation, the important point is that fear of conflict was one of the motivating 

factors for many parliamentarians and government officials in delaying

the lifting of the moratorium.

Gradual Lifting of Moratorium (2000-2002)

Even with the moratorium, the process of land reform did not stagnate, but moved forward substantially with a presidential decree issued in 

June 2000.26 With this presidential decree, the moratorium was not overturned, but instead partially circumvented. The idea was that pilot areas 
 LAND PRIVATIZATION 265

would move forward with complete registration and allow the possibility 

for the sale and transfer of land in discrete geographic regions. Because of 

the ambiguities of the law, the presidential decree provided a means for 

those that were pushing forward land reform.

Until this time, the public was largely ignorant of key policy decisions. On one side, the government of Kyrgyzstan had promised foreign 

donors and governments that they would move forward with broad land 

reform.27 At the same time, many parliamentarians, administrative officials 

and foreign government representatives still were fearful of widespread 

conflict, based on the region’s history and the potential for inequities in 

the process.28

In January 2001, the parliament passed a law On Agricultural Land 

Regulation, which stipulated the legal purchase and sale of land under the 

condition of lifting the moratorium. But the actual purchase and sale of 

lands did not go into effect until September 1, 2001. The new law outlined, that in addition to the state, only citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic 

who were at least 18 years old and had been residing in the rural area for 

at least two years, could own agricultural land. The law clearly delineated 

that no foreign citizen or foreign organization could own land. Many of 

the limitations on ownership were placed in the law out of fear of Uzbek 

or Chinese citizens buying land and driving off the local citizens.29 Yet with 

the passage of the January 2001 law, it was finally accepted that barring any 

last minute legal maneuvering, private purchase and sale of agriculture 

land finally was going to become a reality.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Reform

For a comparison to the success of the Kyrgyzstan land reform it is 

useful to briefly look at the current status of reform in the other two countries in Central Asia attempting land reform, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Kazakhstan is an anomaly, in that it has the greatest amount of land 

area (two times more than the combined land totals of the other four 

countries), with the fewest number of citizens working on farms. The Kazakh economy does not depend on agriculture or the efficient use of land. 

Because of this, the country has been quite slow to implement land reform 

policies. However, in the summer of 2003, through a series of unusual 

events, the Prime Minister resigned ostensibly because of land reform issues. Whatever the behind the scenes machinations, the President and the 

Parliament wanted to send a message that privatization of land was now a 

key policy objective. In his 2002 address to the nation, President Nursultan 

Nazarbaev made the passage of a new land code a priority. In contrast to 
266 JONES

the Kyrgyz land process, the Kazakh land reform process was less burdened 

by fears of ethnic and civil conflict. While there are significant policy 

differences on the best legal structure for the farms, the contentions are 

generally between large farmers and small farmers.30 Because of a stable 

economic environment and the lack of historical ethnic strife, these problems likely will not result in conflict. Although the Kazakh land reform has 

started very quickly, one key problem is Kazakhstan’s lack of institutional 

process for the registering, buying or selling of land. In addition, several 

local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and institutes opposed 

the law as a not very well hidden “land grab” by the ruling elite.31

Uzbekistan, on the other hand, has resisted efforts at privatization in 

any areas of production. While a few efforts have been made to break up 

collective farms, agricultural land reform is virtually non-existent, “with 

the result that the agrarian sector looks on the surface very similar today 

to what it looked like in 1991.”32 Accurate data is difficult to obtain on agriculture production, but through individual interviews, the conclusions 

are that individual workers on farms are much worse off than they were 

five or ten years ago, with no signs of future improvement. Anecdotal stories tell of entire farms not having received any type of payment—cash or 

in-kind—for several years. This severe economic decline is driving local 

Uzbek peasant farmers to go across the border into southern Kyrgyzstan 

and work illegally, exacerbating border tensions.33

Land Reform’s Impact on Conflict

The moratorium in Kyrgyzstan on land sales was finally lifted in 

September 2001. The change in law was not greeted immediately with 

widespread panic or conflict as had been feared. Yet given the expected potential, two central questions remain from the land privatization process:

Are the farmers economically better off now then before the breakup of 

collectives? Has the tendency toward conflict increased or decreased? Both 

of these questions demand empirical data that is not available at this time; 

unfortunately, few field studies of the entire process have been conducted. 

However, some excellent field work has been done on the rapid rural 

appraisal technique, which provides significant insights into the current 

trends in development.

The first trend is toward smaller and smaller farms. As Malcolm 

Childress, a land researcher, commented, “There is currently no efficient 

rationalization of resources.” Individual farmers are “moving back to 

farming their own strip of land.”34 This does not imply that it would be 

better for the farmers to still work on the collectives; however, most farm-
 LAND PRIVATIZATION 267

ers are worse off economically then eight or ten years ago. As the national 

economy continues to stagnate, and off-farm jobs are not available, the 

individual farmer believes that subsistence farming provides a better 

living. A very small percentage of farmers are starting to improve their 

individual situations, but most remain very poor. The second observation is that the majority of people, in spite of their small land plots, appear to accept the redistribution as equitable. (However, there have been 

some gross violations in the distribution of land). The third observation 

is that farmers would rather own their own land and be poor, than work 

on the collectives. As Renee Giovarelli points out the belief is that “there 

is greater security in owning your own land.”35 While some farmers may 

speak nostalgically of the stability and predictability of the collectives, 

when pressed, they admit to preferring their own plots.36 The fourth observation is that there are few, if any, markets for farm products, so little 

incentive exists to increase productivity or enhance quality. Most farmers 

produce enough for themselves and sell any extra in small, local markets. 

There is little amalgamation or redistribution of produce.37 As a result of 

these observations, it can be said that the individual Kyrgyz farmer is poor, 

getting poorer, but would rather have his own land, and views the process 

as relatively equitable.

From the greed model of conflict analysis, as individuals get poorer, 

the probability of conflict would seem to increase. But in Kyrgyzstan, this 

would-be trend is assuaged by the increase in personal security and independence gained from owning one’s own land. At this time, it appears that 

the tendency towards conflict is diffused, as people focus on increasing 

and maintaining their small parcel of land.

The lack of significant internal conflict over land also raises the question of the impact of the grievance model or the ethnic disparity factor. It 

appears that while definite ethnic tensions exist, primarily between Uzbek 

land owners and Kyrgyz farmers, these have not yet resulted in conflict. 

However, these exceptions still could provide the impetus for conflict.

Unresolved Land Issues

The primary unresolved issues facing the government of Kyrgyzstan 

are managing the economic failure in spite of land privatization and the 

ethnic polarization increased by land privatization. Within the broad 

themes of economic and ethnic problems, five specific ones come to mind: 

a scarcity of land in the south; an abundance of land in the north; Uzbeks 

moving to available land in the north; an overall lack of irrigated land; and 

the inequities of the land distribution fund. The agriculture land in the 
268 JONES

south of Kyrgyzstan is almost completely in the hands of private owners. 

Most of the available arable land is being used, while land in the north, 

especially the Chi valley, has not been privatized and some available land is 

not being farmed or managed.38 In addition, natural market forces cannot 

provide balance, since the current land law (On Agricultural Land Regulation, 2001) prohibits owning land which is more than 50 km from one’s 

residence. This creates a natural tension between the north and the south:

lack of resources in one region and the inefficient waste of resources in 

another. This dynamic is increasing since the southern farmers who want 

more land tend to be ethnically Uzbek, while the landowners in the north 

are ethnic Kyrgyz. According to Giovarelli’s field studies, “some Kyrgyz say 

that they would rather have land sit unused then used by Uzbeks.”39 This 

situation grows more volatile each year as available resources decrease. 

Unless specific policy action is taken by the government, this is an ethnic 

and economic flashpoint which could lead to civil conflict.

Another resource problem is the overall lack of irrigated land. Unlike 

much of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan is rich in water resources; however, the 

country lacks the financial resources to maintain irrigation systems. Because of poor or nonexistent management of water resources, land which 

could be irrigated and farmed is now unusable. The second issue with 

water is that irrigation lines run between borders. Due to the geographical 

fragmentation of the southern region, many villages receive their water 

from pipes which must cross portions of Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. Communities or individuals in one community divert water for their use and

prevent the flow into the downstream communities. This situation exacerbates ethnic, regional and economic tensions.

The final unresolved land issue, which is a significant source of 

tension and potential violence, is the land distribution fund. The land distribution fund was cited by every international consultant interviewed as 

well as numerous local government officials as one of the most significant 

sources of tension and problems with current land distribution. The Land 

Fund consists of 20-25 percent of all arable land in the country, which is 

set aside to be privately leased through an auction process by the regional 

governments. In the south of the country, this land is the only new land 

available to farmers who want to expand their holdings.40 One key problem 

has been that the process for allocating this land has not been consistent 

across regions, as each regional leader establishes their own process and 

the proceeds from the land sales go directly to the local government. In a 

time when allocations from the central government are decreasing, sales of 

land are often one of the few significant sources of income for a regional 
 LAND PRIVATIZATION 269

government.41 Cravens commented that farmers say that “they [the government] gave us this land, so they can take it away.” Because the land is 

only leased to the farmer and not sold, “it perpetuates the illusion that the 

government can seize the land, which discourages the development of land 

and increases waste.”42 To diffuse latent attitudes toward conflict within 

the regions, the central and regional governments must be perceived as 

equitable and legitimate.

Lessons Learned and Steps Forward

This chapter began by outlining the benefits and concurrent dangers 

of land reform, one of many variables which contribute to widespread civil 

violence and conflict. While it is a potential source of conflict, it is not the 

land reform per se, but the process of reform, which initiates unrest. This 

implies that it is both the process which has been successful in mitigating 

conflict, and the process which must be carefully monitored to prevent 

conflict in the future.

Lessons Learned

What can be learned from the process of land reform in Kyrgyzstan, 

and applied to other countries in the region? Four general successful accomplishments should be noted: active internal political debate; a high 

degree of international assistance; the early creation of the mechanisms 

for land privatization; and an informed populace. The active internal 

discussion and debate over land reform policies provided a non-violent 

forum for resolving many disagreements on land reform in Kyrgyzstan. 

This does not imply that there was always a unified, clear voice within the 

government, but rather that the parliament and the President were forced 

to deal with the issue of private land through political debate. While many 

of the discussions were behind closed doors and a general lack of citizen 

involvement was noted, the process did allow disparate views to be heard. 

As noted earlier, for better or worse, the moratorium was put into place by 

the Parliament after extensive debate and heated disagreement.

The result of all the international assistance to the privatization 

process is difficult to quantify. However, the support from a wide range of 

international organizations and diplomatic missions has provided continued political pressure and financial assistance which has tended to move 

the reform process forward. Overall, international assistance was critical 

in the design of the original legal framework for the land laws. While not 

always in agreement, the international community consistently provided 

a reference point for the local government officials while they tackled the 
270 JONES

tough issues of reform. It is unlikely that the land reform process would 

have succeeded without the international financial support for land registration, the legal advice for laws and amendments, and the training and 

funding for dispersing information. 

Creating and implementing the mechanisms needed for efficient 

land transactions is still an ongoing process. But without starting this 

process in the mid-1990s, reaching the point of successful land transactions in 2003 would have been impossible. This is an issue that will affect 

the process in Kazakhstan. The Kazakhs want to move swiftly toward land 

privatization, but almost no mechanisms or safeguards are currently in 

place. In Kyrgyzstan the process is not complete, but it has a solid foundation of laws and practices.

Informing the populace of their rights and responsibilities with regard to land laws is also still ongoing. The information process, initiated 

and funded by international organizations, has now reached a critical 

mass, where the average citizen can obtain answers to general legal land 

questions through a variety of forums. Both foreign and local development workers in country have claimed that increases in information available could raise the possibility of conflict.43 The argument is that people 

now know that some of their rights have not been honored. The relative 

dangers of increasing access to information begs a question too large 

for discussion here; however, it appears that the growth of legal material 

available has mitigated conflicts, by providing accurate, timely, and understandable land law answers.

Steps Forward

Enforcement of a fair and equitable legal process and the removal of 

barriers in the land law which prevent economic rationalization are needed 

to move forward land reform and the wider development of Kyrgyzstan. 

While most of the key legal statuary components of the land privatization 

process are completed in Kyrgyzstan, this does not mean that the process is 

over or that the responsibility of the government is finished. In many ways, 

the most difficult part remains—making the new laws a reality. Granting 

rights is an easy step; enforcing, protecting and honoring these rights is 

much more difficult. Although Bloch and other land specialists have noted 

the need for several specific land reform steps to be completed, such as the 

need for the completion of the registry and functioning secondary markets, broader governmental steps still are required.44

If we accept that a fully functioning legal land market is greater than 

its separate laws, then the greatest need is for fair, impartial enforcement of 
 LAND PRIVATIZATION 271

the current laws by judges and regional government officials. If the population does not believe that they will receive a fair and open hearing, then 

they will have no interest in pursuing a legal process for their grievances. 

The former director of the Legal Aid to Rural Citizens (LARC) project 

commented that in Kyrgyzstan, “only the people with no other alternatives use the law; people with power, money, or connections don’t need the 

law.”45 Calculated arbitrary decisions will destroy any vestige of hope that 

the populace has in the legal process with the result that they will resort to 

other extra-legal means to present their grievances. In short, legal reform 

is as critical as land reform in moving the country forward. Open appointment processes, publicized decisions and accountable judges are but a few 

of the important steps critical for providing a legal system in which rural 

citizens feel that their rights are respected. 

Agricultural land is being used inefficiently. The government should 

remove the barriers to efficient economic utilization of land including laws 

prohibiting certain sale transactions and the restrictions on ownership by 

region. One way to stimulate economic growth is to allow a broader movement by landowners and sellers to maximize their return and efficiency. 

Much of the responsibility now lies in the hands of the national and regional government officials. Laws have been implemented and the public’s 

awareness of their rights is growing. Protests and marches increased in the 

spring of 2002 in the south of Kyrgyzstan, and while the primary concern 

was over broader political issues, such as support for local politicians, protesters are demanding more land and shouting that their rights have not 

been honored. A foreign worker living in the south stated that the current 

civil strife consists of “popular uprisings against years of arbitrariness.”46

The issue for Kyrgyzstan is not the speed of land reform, but the perceived 

equity of the process and its results.

Land reform historically and empirically has been correlated with 

civil conflict, and while Kyrgyzstan has been singed a few times, it has 

managed to avoid the fire of widespread civil conflict. This is a critical time 

for the government of Kyrgyzstan: They have successfully implemented 

wide reaching land reform and have catapulted themselves years ahead 

of their nearest neighbors. The population is learning about their rights 

and the structural reform process is moving forward. Failure to follow 

through with fair land allocations or judicial decisions will endanger the 

entire process.

In any society citizens will have grievances and will seek to express 

their displeasure with the government on these grievances. As long as 

government officials arbitrarily can affect the land tenure or security of 
272 JONES

a rural landholder while the landholder believes they have no recourse to 

the legal process, land reform will be incapable of mitigating conflict. Land 

reform can only mitigate conflict if it provides a fair and equitable process 

for the farmer to increase or stabilize his personal welfare. This is perhaps 

the greatest lesson that needs to be learned throughout Central Asia.

Notes1

 Much of the information and data concerning events in Kyrgyzstan is based on interviews 

conducted by the author or from meetings and conversations where he was present. The author thanks 

those who agreed to be interviewed and to participate in discussions regarding these events and issues. 

Where possible, specific attribution is made; however, there were times when, for political or personal 

reasons, the individuals quoted wished to remain anonymous. 2

 Valery Tishkov, “Don’t Kill Me, I’m a Kyrgyz!: An Anthropological Analysis of Violence in the 

Osh Ethnic Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research, 32, no. 2, 1995, 133-149. 3

 RFE 21 March 2002, 2, no. 11. <http://www.rferl.org/centralasia/2002/03/11-210302.asp>. 4

 Strobe Talbott, “A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia,” 

speech delivered at the Central Asian Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., July 21, 1997, <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/pubs/speeches/talbott.

html>. 5

 John D Montgomery, “Land Reform as an International Issue.” International Dimensions of 

Land Reform, John D. Montgomery, ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), 5. 6

 Capital and labor being limited through society’s influence.

7

 For a careful analysis and empirical evidence on the amount of capital that is trapped in thirdworld countries, see Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 8

 For a comprehensive analysis of legal issues in land reform, see Roy Prosterman and Tim 

Hanstad, eds., “Legal Impediments to Effective Rural Land Relations in Eastern Europe and Central 

Asia,” World Bank Technical Paper no. 436 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999). 9

 See Roy L. Prosterman, and Jeffery M. Riedinger, Land Reform and Democratic Development 

(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987). 10 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” World Bank Report, 

October 21, 2001, 3. 11 The purpose here is not to present an exhaustive analysis of causes of civil conflict. Unfortunately, the literature is quite weak in identifying key causes through robust models. For a broad 

overview see Daniel C. Esty, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Pamela T. Surko, and Alan N. Unger, 

State Failure Task Force Report, Working Papers, November, 30 1995 and Paul Collier and Nicholas 

Sambanis, “Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46, no. 1, February, 2002. 12 Donald L Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 

1985). 13 James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and War,” unpublished manuscript, 

Stanford University, 2000, cited in Nicholas Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Non ethnic Wars have the Same 

Causes?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45 no. 3, June 2001. 14 For a brief summary of Russian land history see Stephen K. Wegren, Agriculture and the 

State in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998) and Stephen K. 

Wegren and David J. O’Brien, eds., Rural Reform in Post-Soviet Russia (Baltimore, London: The Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 2002). 15 All statistics from World Band Development Index, 2001 or Food and Agriculture Organization, 2000.
 LAND PRIVATIZATION 273

16 In the north of the country, especially the Chi valley, large enterprise reform has not occurred. 17 Peter Bloch, “Kyrgyzstan: Almost Done, What Next?” Problems of Post-Communism, 49, no. 

1, January/February 2002, 61. 18See the Land Tenure Center at University of Wisconsin and the Rural Development Institute 

for additional surveys and field research on land reform in the region. 19 “Kyrgyzstan: Almost Done, What Next?” 54.

20 Ibid. 

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., 56.

23 As quoted in Ibid., 56.

24 In several discussions with the author between 1999 and 2000, parliamentarians and government officials privately expressed many of these concerns, but some were hesitant at the time to 

publicly state their reasons. 25 Author’s interviews and meetings with government officials, 1999 and 2000.

26 On pilot projects on land market and registration of rights for agricultural lands.

27 Specifically, the President had committed to both the World Bank and the International 

Monetary Fund. 28 Author’s interviews and meetings Spring of 2000 with U.S. and other foreign officials.

29 Views expressed to the author immediately after the passage in January 2001 by two senior 

government officials. 30 Author’s interview with Timour Otobekov, USAID, CAR, EDF, July 7, 2003. 

31 Medet Ibragimov, “Kazakhstan: Land Privatization Prompts Fears,” Institute for War and 

Peace Reporting, RCA no. 142, August 30, 2002. 32 Peter Bloch, “Agrarian Reform in Uzbekistan and Other Central Asian Countries,” Working 

Paper, no. 49, Land Tenure Center (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2002), 1. 33 Author’s interviews with local farmers and workers along the southern Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan border, July and August, 2003. 34 Author’s interview with Malcolm Childress, World Bank, August 1, 2003.

35 Author’s interview, Brian Kemple, ARD/Checchi and Renee Giovarelli, World Bank, June 

27, 2003. 36 Author’s interview, Kyrgyz farmers in Osh and Batkin, July and August, 2003.

37 Author’s interview, Richard Tracy, Pragma Southern Regional Director, July 28, 2003.

38 Kemple and Giovarelli, 2003.

39 Giovarelli, 2003.

40 Ibid.

41 Childress, 2003.

42 Author’s interview with Lamar Cravens, former senior legal advisor to LARC project, July 

2003. 43 Author’s interview with local lawyers and two foreign aid workers, September and October, 

2002. 44 Bloch, “Kyrgyzstan: Almost Done, What Next?”, 59,61.

45 Cravens, 2003. 

46 Author’s interview with foreign aid worker, 2002.
274 JONES
275

Chapter 13

Environmental Management 

in Independent Central Asia

David S. McCauley

On achieving independence from the Soviet Union, the five Central 

Asian Republics (CARs) faced a daunting legacy of problems derived from nearly categorical neglect of environmental management in their previously planned economies. While simultaneously coping 

with the creation of new nation-states and the transition to market-oriented economies, the CARs have struggled to establish new environmental 

management systems consistent with their economic and social development goals.

Efforts to improve environmental management in the CARs since 

their independence have ranged from the restructuring of national and 

regional institutions to enhancing environmental planning and programming at both the country and regional levels. In the initial stages of their 

transition, emphasis was given to stabilizing and defining a new set of 

environmental and resources management institutions—still primarily 

based on those inherited from the Soviet period. Former agencies of 

the five Soviet Socialist Republics were upgraded to ministries and departments within the newly formed national governments.1

 As in other 

spheres, balance was sought between central and local government roles 

in environmental management, though such determinations and adjustments are far from complete. Following the path of other economies in 

transition, each of the five countries developed National Environmental 

Action Plans (NEAPs) with international assistance, each varying significantly in their quality and practicality.2

Efforts also have been made to develop new ways to handle environmental and natural resources management concerns at the regional level.3

Building on the NEAPs, a Regional Environmental Action Plan (REAP) 

has been produced covering high priority transboundary environmental 

challenges in the region as well as some problems common to several or 
276 MCCAULEY

all of the countries.4 In 2003, the CARs also presented a common environmental and natural resources management vision for the region5

 at both 

the United Nations (UN) World Summit on Sustainable Development in 

Johannesburg and the UN Economic Commission for Europe conference 

on Environment for Europe held in Kiev.6 Since the five former Soviet 

countries previously had been under the same governmental system and 

planned economy, their efforts to develop new regional mechanisms for 

the allocation and trade of water, energy, and other resources had a common starting point. However, such regional issues remain contentious and 

in need of careful analysis and resolution emphasizing mutual interests. 

Externally introduced institutional distortions which relate to regional 

versus national environmental management are also present. For convenience, regional international assistance programs often have grouped 

together issues that are truly regional (such as transboundary water management or air pollution) with national or even local topics that happen 

to be of common concern in the region.

Nevertheless, the international donor community has played a vital 

role in helping the CARs emerge from their isolation and come to terms 

with inherited environmental problems as well as new challenges. Donor 

programs continue to assist these countries in developing new ways to 

better incorporate environmental considerations into their transitions to 

market-based economic development. Whether at the national or regional 

levels, the primary target of and counterpart for this assistance has been 

the national environmental ministries or state committees, but institutions 

responsible for agriculture,7 energy and natural disasters management also 

have received important support. 

This chapter begins with an overview of key environmental and 

natural resources management issues in Central Asia. This is followed by 

a review of environmentally-related policy and program developments at 

the country and regional levels. Some brief conclusions also are offered 

concerning common directions observed.

Environmental Challenges Facing the Region

Geographical Characteristics and Determinants

From the days of Amir Timu, or Tamerlane, Central Asia has served 

as a crossroads for cultures, trade and ideas. It is emerging from the isolation of its colonial period and still holds the promise of becoming a dynamic region of growth and prosperity in the heart of Asia. Bounded by 

the Russian Federation to the north, the Caspian Sea and Iran to the west, 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 277

Pakistan to the southeast, and the People’s Republic of China to the east, 

the five former Soviet countries of Central Asia span an area larger than 

the Indian subcontinent.

Aside from a densely populated strip across the north of Kazakhstan 

bordering Russia, most of Central Asia’s more than 55 million people 

reside within the area drained by the two great rivers flowing to the Aral 

Sea: the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya. The upstream states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are mountainous and largely dependent upon their 

agricultural economies, whereas the downstream states of Kazakhstan, 

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan show a greater balance between agriculture 

and industry. Northern Afghanistan also is hydrologically and ethnically 

linked to the Central Asian states.8 The downstream countries of Central 

Asia possess fossil fuel resources—especially oil and gas in the Caspian 

Sea region of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, gas in Uzbekistan, and coal 

in Kazakhstan—that place them among the most energy rich countries in 

the world.9

The major natural resource and environmental management questions facing the region can be grouped into six areas: water resources 

management, urban and industrial pollution, land and natural systems 

degradation, mountain ecosystems management, and environmental 

management policies and institutions. Central Asian efforts to shape national responses to global environmental challenges also have influenced 

domestic policies and programs. The remainder of this section briefly 

reviews current developments relating to each of these topics. Additional 

detail on country and regional responses in the context of international 

assistance programs follows.

Water Resources Management

Water and environmental management problems in Central Asia first 

gained international notoriety in response to the ecological crisis brought 

on by the shrinking Aral Sea. From 1960 to 1990, the area of this inland 

sea was halved as inflows were diverted to support cotton, wheat and rice 

production in the deserts of the downstream states. The results included 

destruction of a vibrant fishery (including the likely loss of 24 indigenous 

species of fish), devastation of surrounding ecosystems, and an undermining of the livelihoods and/or health of more than three million people.

The challenge of regional water management for these semi-arid 

lands is no less acute today. The mountains of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 

and Afghanistan serve as the principal sources of water for the region 

(see Chapter 9 by Daene McKinney for full details). If it were not for the 
278 MCCAULEY

mountain relief capturing and redistributing moisture from precipitation 

(mostly through snowmelt into rivers), the arid downstream states would 

not be able to support their current populations. The three downstream 

CARs receive only about 13 percent of the Aral Sea Basin’s rainfall but have 

86 percent of its irrigated area.

The mountains also hold tremendous hydropower potential, which 

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are eager to develop. Attention has turned in 

recent years from a focus on the downstream problems in the immediate 

Aral Sea region to the need for a stable balance between upstream hydropower and downstream irrigation interests and to wide-ranging issues of 

land degradation due to water mismanagement. Nevertheless, some steps 

continue to be taken to address the economic and social hardships facing those living around the Aral Sea. All five CARs have a mutual stake 

in the establishment of a stable post-independence regional water and 

energy management regime, and this has become a principal interest of 

the International Fund to Save the Aral Sea (IFAS) and its affiliate body, 

the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC). Agreements 

were made in 1992 and 1995 establishing the mandates of these organizations. A landmark interstate agreement on irrigation and hydropower for 

the Syr Darya River also was signed in 1998 (outside of IFAS), but much 

remains to be done if long-term stability is to be achieved in these matters. 

Preliminary interstate agreements also have been reached between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, covering the Chui and Talas Rivers, and between 

Kazakhstan and China, covering the Ili-Balkash and Irtysh Rivers.

In addition to water allocation issues, water quality concerns were 

reiterated as a key issue during development of the REAP. Pollution from 

industrial point sources as well as municipal and agricultural wastes 

are causing serious health problems in some locations, especially where 

communities face shortages of potable water.10 The heavy silt load of the 

region’s rivers caused by soil eroded from upstream states creates costly 

downstream problems through sedimentation of reservoirs and irrigation 

canals. There also are close and confounding interactions between water 

quantity and quality problems.11 Chemical, biological and sediment pollution discharged into the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers eventually 

finds its way to the Aral Sea—aggravating other environmental and social 

problems from low water flows and further threatening delta ecosystems.

Issues of river pollution crossing international boundaries are commonplace. The salinity of the Syr Darya River is significantly heightened 

in Uzbekistan before it passes into Kazakhstan. Industrial pollutants flow 

from Russia to Kazakhstan through the Ural River and from Kazakhstan to 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 279

Russia through the Irtysh River.12 The Chui and Talas Rivers flow from Kyrgyzstan into Kazakhstan, with the former carrying effluents from a paper 

mill in the capital city of Bishkek and the latter having its salinity increased 

from agricultural drainage waters. Similarly, the Surkhandarya River is 

heavily polluted by the large Tursunzade Aluminum Works in Tajikistan 

before flowing into Uzbekistan.13 The uranium tailings of Kyrgyzstan have 

raised considerable international concern because of the risks they pose 

to downstream river contamination in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan 

should poorly constructed containment structures be compromised.

Urban and Industrial Pollution

Pollution problems are not limited to waterways but also extend to 

the air and to solid wastes. Soviet-period environmental neglect established patterns of urban and industrial development that, even today, pay 

scant attention to environmental considerations. The exposure of Central 

Asian industry to market forces has caused many of the worst polluters to 

shut down, but concern remains high in many communities over urban 

and industrial pollution. As is often the case, the poorest segments of society generally pay the greatest price for environmental mismanagement in 

terms of their sacrificed health and quality of life. Industrial pollution in 

northern Kazakhstan and in Uzbekistan’s portion of the Ferghana Valley 

are of particular concern.

Poorly-contained stockpiles of potentially dangerous wastes, including uranium and heavy metals, have accumulated across the region. Efforts 

are underway to locate toxic and hazardous waste depositories and to arrange for their safe disposition—mostly through containment, stabilization and isolation, since clean-up tends to be prohibitively expensive. Such 

pollution continues, especially from the mining and industrial sectors. 

Mining results in 25 billion tons of waste annually that often is improperly 

disposed. Current and previous mine tailing dumps occupy vast areas.

A considerable proportion of the region’s pollution is associated with 

energy production and consumption. Significant negative environmental 

impacts from past oil and gas exploitation—and associated urban and 

industrial development—are found in the coastal region of the Caspian 

Sea within Kazakhstan, concentrated around the city of Atyrau, as well as 

in Turkmenistan. Pressure has been placed on oil companies operating in 

and around the Caspian to follow internationally accepted environmental 

management practices for new exploration and exploitation as well as for 

pipeline construction. While hydropower meets an appreciable amount 

of the region’s peak energy needs, reliance on inefficient fossil fuel-based 
280 MCCAULEY

power plants mostly burning coal and natural gas contributes significantly 

to urban air pollution and drives Central Asian carbon dioxide (greenhouse gas) emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) to among 

the highest in the world. This is threatening the region’s industrial competitiveness and thus is of both local and global concern. 

Land and Natural Systems Degradation

The region faces a host of pressures on the productivity and even 

viability of its natural systems, especially from inappropriate land management practices. Soviet-period agricultural policies sought to open socalled “virgin lands” in defiance of sustainability principles, and surrounding deserts are now encroaching on many of these areas. Marginal lands 

face desertification driven by wind and water erosion and exacerbated by 

the cultivation of inappropriate lands or overly intensive tilling practices, 

deforestation, overgrazing and windborne salinization especially neighboring the bed of the former Aral Sea. The pollution of otherwise productive arable lands with high concentrations of pesticides and herbicides 

also is a widespread problem.14 Radioactive contaminants remain around 

the former nuclear test site of Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan and there are 

other troubling military wastes as well, including those at former biological weapons development sites in Uzbekistan. 

Decades of stresses placed on fragile natural systems—deserts, wetlands, riparian zones and mountain ecosystems—have severely damaged, 

,sometimes irreversibly, their natural regenerative capacities and reduced 

the region’s biological diversity. According to the REAP, the area of forest 

in Central Asia has fallen by 75 to 80 percent since the beginning of the 

twentieth century. Large areas of saksaul and riparian forests (tugai and 

juniper) have been converted to arable land. The area of this vegetation 

in the Amu Darya River basin has been reduced from around 150,000 

hectares in 1928 to 22,000 hectares in 1993, and the trend continues. 

Extinction threatens a growing number and range of indigenous species, 

with several having been moved from “rare” to “disappearing” status due 

to various habitat pressures since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Linking 

biodiversity loss to land degradation processes will be important, as it is 

likely to constitute a crucial element of future efforts to generate international support for programs to address these problems.

Mountain Ecosystems Management

The sustainable management of mountain ecosystems is of such 

special concern in the region that it warrants separate mention and ac-
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 281

tion. This is particularly so in the upstream states of Kyrgyzstan and 

Tajikistan—which straddle the westernmost expanse of the Tien Shan 

and Pamir Mountain Ranges—though Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan each have mountainous areas as well. The predominantly downstream states have a heavy stake in the wise management of mountain 

areas, given their dependency on these water sources. 

Mountain ecosystems provide habitats for a diverse range of flora 

and fauna and are under a variety of threats, including: overgrazing; 

cultivation on steep slopes; non-sustainable fuelwood and timber harvesting; introduction of alien and sometimes invasive species; illegal wildlife 

poaching; and poorly planned development in the transport, tourism, 

housing and other sectors. The most significant physical impacts are increased erosion and sedimentation of rivers and reservoirs, deforestation, 

decreased pasture productivity, altered patterns of water flow and loss of 

biodiversity. In turn, these changes are adversely affecting the livelihoods 

of mountain communities, who already have the lowest incomes in the 

region and face a disproportionate degree of threat from natural disasters 

such as earthquakes, landslides, avalanches, mud flows and floods. 

Environmental Management Institutions

While education levels in the region are among the highest in Asia, 

the environmental management institutions inherited from the Soviet 

period were rigid and top-heavy. Though well trained, most officials and 

scientists had virtually no exposure to the development of international 

advances and thinking in environmental fields over the crucial decades of 

the 1970s and 1980s when most of the analytical tools and management 

practices prevalent in the West were devised. Post-independence restructuring in Central Asia also has created uncertainties regarding the roles 

and responsibilities of various central and local government entities. This 

has left the region with weak human and organizational resources with 

which to tackle its wide array of environmental challenges.

All of the Central Asian countries have some form of national environmental management ministry or state committee represented at the 

cabinet level. These bodies incorporate pollution control functions, and in 

most cases they also include oversight of the protected areas system and 

broader environmental planning roles (though generally only a portion of 

environmental monitoring responsibilities). Except where combined with 

line functions controlling natural resources management, these environment agencies remain relatively weak. Powerful departments, such as those 

covering finance, energy, agriculture and industry, have thus far given only 
282 MCCAULEY

limited attention to environmental considerations in development activities despite environmental protection laws meant to be enforced by the 

environment agencies. The lack of good data and analysis translating the 

consequences of environmental mismanagement into economic costs also 

contributes to a weak appreciation for their significance. This indicates 

that a long road remains ahead for efforts to “mainstream” environmental 

considerations into economic development plans, policies and programs, 

and it also helps to explain why Central Asian environment ministries are 

so keen to assert themselves internationally and tap into newly available 

aid to address global issues.

A range of regional organizations have evolved to help these countries deal with environmental and natural resources issues. The principal 

mandate of IFAS—with membership of all five former Soviet states—

should be obvious from its name.15 IFAS recently has undertaken a wider 

range of environmental and social development objectives in the Basin.16

Under IFAS, the ICWC serves an important function in managing the 

seasonal allocation of water for irrigation within the complex array of 

water management systems and uses in the Aral Sea Basin. Also technically under IFAS, the Interstate Commission for Sustainable Development 

(ICSD) operates as a standing committee of the finance and environment 

ministers, though it and IFAS itself suffer from a lack of core professional 

staff.17 Partly for this reason, both European Commission (EC)-IFAS and 

ICSD have drawn upon the recently created Central Asia Regional Environment Center (CA-REC) for analytical and organizational functions 

on several occasions. However, CA-REC’s primary mandate is to facilitate 

public participation in decision making for improved environmental 

management, and it is playing an increasingly proactive role in the region, 

despite the severe challenges posed by civil society restrictions, corruption, 

and legal weaknesses in most countries of the region. In the past, regional 

economic integration bodies, particularly the Central Asia Cooperation 

Organization, have played important roles in helping to broker interstate 

agreements on environmental and natural resources subjects—covering 

water and energy management, environmental information sharing and 

transboundary protected areas management. Today, however, none of the 

several regional organizations devoted to improving regional economic 

cooperation and security is much concerned with or able to tackle these 

issues.18 The Central Asia Mountain Information Network (CAMIN) was 

created with much fanfare when Kyrgyzstan hosted the Global Mountain 

Summit as a culmination of the International Year of the Mountains 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 283

(2002). But CAMIN’s post-summit goal of serving as a focal point for 

mountain ecosystem management in the region has yet to be realized. 

Global Environmental Concerns

Many of the environmental issues facing the region are large enough 

in geographic or physical scale to be of concern at the global level. A good 

deal of attention has been paid to global environmental concerns by the 

countries of the region—especially their environmental authorities—due 

primarily to the availability of assistance from international donor agencies on these topics. Certainly the transboundary water management 

issues of the Aral Sea Basin have attracted strong international attention 

and financing. As noted, Central Asia also has some of the least energy efficient countries in the world, with associated implications for greenhouse 

gas emissions and corresponding global interest. The region is now waking 

to the long-term threats from periodic droughts, desertification, and land 

degradation, while both its desert and mountain ecosystems represent important repositories of often unique—and threatened—biological diversity. The aftermath of and response to Soviet-period use of ozone-depleting substances and persistent organic pollutants also are of global interest. 

The participation of Central Asian Republics in the major multilateral 

environmental agreements is summarized in Table 13-1.

Because of the scale of the water management challenges in the Aral 

Sea Basin, the international community has supported a wide range of 

grant- and loan-financed investments under the framework of the IFASled Aral Sea Basin Program (ASBP-1). This phase of capacity-building and 

planning assistance—combined with selected water and environmental 

management investments—has now concluded. With a mandate from the 

heads of state of its five member countries, IFAS has prepared a new set of 

program plans under the Second Aral Sea Basin Program (ASBP-2), meant 

to serve as a blueprint for further international support to the region’s 

improved water and environmental management.19 However, neither the 

Central Asian governments nor their international donors now speak of 

“saving” the Aral Sea. The new goal is its division—by means of a levee financed by the World Bank—and stabilization to protect what is left of the 

two delta ecosystems and some measure of fisheries restoration, at least 

in the northern “Little Aral Sea.” Disappointments over IFAS’ handling 

of ASBP-1 and a weak strategic framework underlying the proposals of 

ASBP-2 suggest that the next phase of regional water and environmental 

management efforts is unlikely to attract the same degree of international 
284 MCCAULEY

interest seen during the 1990s. Thus far, the REAP also has failed to galvanize the attention of international environmental aid donors. 

Central Asia’s part in addressing the issue of global climate change 

also has received considerable international notice. Table 13–2 shows that 

the region has some of the highest per capita CO2 emissions levels in 

the world, and its economies are also among the most energy intensive. 

According to the Pew Center on Global Climate Change,20Kazakhstan 

is ranked second and Uzbekistan sixth in energy use per GDP. The 

other countries of the region are ranked only slightly better: Turkmenistan–eleventh; Tajikistan–thirteenth; and Kyrgyzstan–twentysixth. The energy inefficiencies of the region’s economies, however, 

also have created opportunities for them to engage with developed 

countries as a global market for greenhouse gas emissions credits 

emerges. Kazakhstan already has completed a transacion with the GovTable 13–1. Central Asian Participation in Multilateral Environmental 

Agreements

Agreement

KazakhstanKyrgyzstanUzbekistanTajikistanTurkmenistan

Climate Change (GCC) x x x x x

Ozone Depletion (Montreal) x x x x x

Hazardous Wastes (Basel) x x x

Bio- Diversity (CBD) x x x x x

Endangered Species (CITES) x x

Wetlands (Ramsar) x x

Environmentnal Information 

(Aarhus)

x x x x

Trans-boundary Waters (Geneva) x

Persistent Organic 

Pollutants (Stockholm)

x x x

Land Degradation (CCD) x x x x x

Source: Convention Websites

X denotes ratification and/or signature.
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 285

Table 13–2. Economic, Demographic and Environmental Statistics for 

Central Asia

CountryPopulation (millions)Population in poverty (percent)2001 GNP per capita (US$)Total land area (1000 km2

)

Land in protected area status (percent)Annual CO2emissions per capita (MT)

Kazakhstan 14.70 34.6 1,230 2,717.3 2.7 10.9

Kyrgyzstan 4.97 55.3 300 198.5 3.6 1.3

Uzbekistan 24.78 22.0 720 447.4 2.1 4.1

Tajikistan 6.29 83.0 290 143.1 4.2 1.0

Turkmenistan 5.28 n/a 660 416.0 n/a 7.4

Total or 

Average 56.02 36.5 763 3,922.3 2.7 5.6

Source: ADB Developing Member Countries Statistical Summary, 2002 (based on published Government data).

ernment of Japan involving the annual creation of 62,000 tons of CO2 reduction credits, and more deals are likely to follow. Projects for improved 

efficiency of district heating systems, thermal power generation, industrial 

production, increased use of renewable energy sources and reduced energy 

loss from fossil fuel extraction are but a few of those likely to seek funding 

through either the Clean Development Mechanism or the Joint Implementation window under the Framework Convention on Climate Change 

and its Kyoto Protocol (assuming it enters into force).

The arid to semi-arid region of Central Asia is defined, in part, by its 

two great deserts: the Karakum and Kyzlkum. Concern is increasing over 

the advance of these deserts brought on by periodic drought coupled with 

unsustainable land management practices. As noted, this process of land 

degradation is driven especially by mismanagement of irrigation waters, 

unsustainable pasture lands management, and weak protection of mountainous watersheds. In response, a regional strategic partnership has been 

formed to prepare and implement national and regional strategies under 

the UN Convention to Combat Desertification and Drought (UNCCD). 

This is receiving organizational support from the UNCCD Global Mechanism (GM), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Canadian and 

German governments, while the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 

is expected to provide project funding at the country level in the years 

to come.
286 MCCAULEY

Biological diversity losses also are gaining increased attention in 

the region. The main targets of natural systems protection are mountain 

and desert ecosystems, the aquatic ecosystems of the Aral Sea deltas and 

other marshlands, as well as the flora and fauna of the Caspian Sea and 

its shoreline. Activities are underway with support from the World Bank 

and GEF to conserve the deltas of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers. 

Several transboundary park projects in mountainous areas also have been 

proposed or are underway. Further efforts of this kind certainly are warranted, particularly in the fragile mountain ecosystems of the upstream 

states and in Uzbekistan.

While production of ozone-depleting substances has been phased 

out, concern still lingers over the control of persistent organic pollutants 

(POPs)—particularly residual pesticides dating from the Soviet period. 

This topic has only recently begun to receive systematic attention under 

the initiative of the UN Environment Program (UNEP), and additional 

effort will be needed to define the POP problems facing the region and to 

identify and implement appropriate remedies. 

Responses to Environmental Challenges

Country Level Trends and Responses

This review would not be complete without a stock-taking of current 

national and regional efforts to address these environmental and natural 

resources management problems. Environmental management at the 

country level is strongly influenced by and correlated with each republic’s 

economic development strategy. There remains almost the same degree of 

variation in approaches to and progress with environmental governance 

in the region as is seen in broader political and economic spheres. The 

country summaries which follow begin with the two upstream states of 

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and then move to the downstream republics—

providing a snapshot of the key environmental issues as well as policy and 

institutional responses playing out at the national level.

Kyrgyzstan21

The basic environmental policies of Kyrgyzstan are embodied in the 

Law on Environmental Protection of 1999 (as amended in 2003), which 

includes environmental standards, the establishment of protected areas as 

well as rules regarding the management of natural resources and disasters. Interpreting the provisions of the constitution, this law emphasizes 

individual rights to environmental protection, provides for respecting the 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 287

sustainable development principle, and establishes the structure of regulatory and economic incentives governing environmental policy and the 

involvement of civil society in environmental management. A list of key 

environmental laws as an example of how this Central Asian Republic is 

addressing these concerns is given in Table 13–3.

As in the other CARs, the NEAP adopted in 1995 represents the best 

overall statement of Kyrgyzstan’s environmental policies and objectives. 

Taking economic growth and poverty reduction as its starting point, the 

Kyrgyz NEAP lays out a range of environmental management activities 

meant to contribute to these goals and is particularly commendable in 

its attempt to develop an environmental policy framework grounded on 

the use of market-based incentives. Although seminal in its review of 

Table 13–3. Major Environmental Legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic

Legislation

Main Subject or 

Resource Protected

Year Passed 

(Amended)

Law on Specially Protected Areas Parks and reserves 1994

Law on Waters Water and floods 1994 (1995)

Law on Fisheries Fish habitats 1997 (1998)

Law on the Subsoil Mining rehabilitation 1997 (1999)

Law on Biosphere Territories Biosphere reserves 1999

Law on Drinking Water Water quality 1999 (2003)

Law on Protection of Ambient Air Air quality 1999 (2003)

Forest Code Forest management 1999 (2003)

Law on Radioactive Safety of the Population Radioactive hazards 1999 (2003)

Law on Ecological Expertise Projects and EIAs 1999 (2003)

Law on Wildlife/Fauna Endangered species 1999 (2003)

Law on Environmental Protection Basic protections 1999 (2003)

Land Code Land management 1999 (2003)

Law on Chemicalization and Plant Protection Pesticides/agrochemicals 1999 (2003)

Law on Protection of Historic & Cultural Heritage Cultural preservation 1999

Law on Protection and Use of Flora Biodiversity conservation 2001

Law on Tailings Ponds and Dumps Tailings management 2001

Law on Waste Production and Consumption Waste management 2001

Sources: UNECE, 2000 and www.law.gov.kg.
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environmental management priorities and pragmatic in tone, the nowdated NEAP has served as only a very broad guidance document for 

environmental policy development in the country. Nevertheless, many of 

its overall recommendations have been implemented or otherwise have 

helped to shape the strong evolution of the country’s environmental laws 

and regulations.

The Ministry of Environment and Emergency Situations (MEES) 

is the lead executive branch agency for the environment subject, with 

its minister serving as the principal environmental advocate within the 

cabinet. MEES is directly responsible for implementing provisions of the 

Law on Environmental Protection, as well as environmental standards and 

regulations associated with most other environmental legislation that is 

not specifically tied to a line ministry or delegated to the President’s Office, 

including environmental monitoring and impact assessment. Committees 

on Environmental Protection at the oblast and city levels complement 

these national institutions, and the country continues to undergo a decentralization process that is encouraging ever greater self-governance at the 

regional and local levels. Several other government agencies and ministries 

also play crucial roles in environmental and natural resources management—most notably the Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources, and 

Processing Industry and the State Forestry Service.

Both the legislative and judicial branches of government also are 

awakening to new roles in environmental governance in Kyrgyzstan. As 

demonstrated by the proliferation of new environmental laws, it is clear 

that these subjects are receiving a high degree of attention from the national parliament. The Parliamentary Commission on Agriculture and 

Environment serves as the lead body for the legislative branch. Attention 

to environmental subjects has been less prevalent in the judicial branch, 

though this too is growing. Thus far an environmental/green bench within 

the judiciary has had only limited development, though several successful environmental cases have been brought to court in recent years. This 

represents a significant institutional challenge, however, because of more 

generic shortcomings of the Kyrgyz legal system.

Though considerable challenges remain, the Kyrgyz Republic is the 

most open to civil society participation in decision making—including 

environmental—within Central Asia. There are many non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs) with environmental and/or natural resources management interests, ranging from scientific and educational groups to those 

exercising advocacy functions. Though there is room for even further 

government transparency and collaboration, environmental NGOs have 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 289

participated in the debate on environmental policy since the 1995 NEAP 

exercise and have helped to shape the many environmental laws passed 

since 1998.

Depite the country’s impressive array of environmental laws and 

regulations, weak enforcement remains a serious constraint to the protection and sound management of natural resources and protection of environmental quality. Some existing regulations and incentive structures are 

inherently difficult to enforce, but capacity constraints among responsible 

government institutions—coupled with severe funding shortages and corruption—lie at the core of this problem. Despite attempts to improve data 

collection and management, shortages of accurate, timely and appropriate 

environmental information to assist decision making continue.

While a range of programs are financed as a part of government 

agencies’ routine activities, the most visible responses to environmental 

protection and management needs are those involving international cooperation. Many of these have been linked with the country’s fairly active 

participation in global affairs associated with multilateral environmental 

agreements. In particular, several capacity-building activities have been 

funded by the Global Environment Facility (mostly through UNDP). 

These are meant to strengthen the institutions responsible for overseeing 

the country’s participation in global conventions, such as those covering climate change, land degradation and biodiversity conservation. The 

country consistently has called for international aid to help it address the 

high national and regional risks associated with poorly contained uranium 

tailings inherited from the Soviet period, and the World Bank and the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) now are 

leading a coordinated donor response. Kyrgyzstan has been something of a 

trend-setter in the region with regard to market-oriented land reform and 

restructuring of water management at the local level, with World Bank and 

ADB projects serving as the principal vehicles for developing demonstration activities and replicating them at the oblast and national levels.

Tajikistan22

Though Tajikistan’s policies and institutions have deviated somewhat from those of Kyrgyzstan since independence, these mountainous 

neighbors share many of the same environmental and natural resources 

management problems. Unfortunately, Tajikistan’s post-independence political struggles have diverted attention and resources away from natural 

systems and resources management. There also has been a significant 

inflow of international aid coupled with better communications since the 
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end of the civil conflict, and these have strongly affected the country’s ability to respond to environmental management challenges. Civil society’s 

participation is relatively high, and this includes involvement in both the 

debate over and actions to address environmental concerns. 

The country still lacks a clear set of environmental policies and programs to guide government and private interventions. Though considerable analysis and dialogue has been devoted to determining environmental 

action priorities, little consensus has emerged. More important, the fundamental land and water resources underpinnings of the economy are only 

weakly recognized. The prevailing policy view seems to be that environmental management can be adequately handled by the Ministry of Nature 

Protection. Though this Ministry is doing its best with limited staff and 

funds, it has only weak influence over the more powerful interests governing urban and rural development in the country. The State Environment 

Program (1998-2008) deals with general principles and goals but does not 

offer an implementable strategy for improving environmental and natural resources management in the context of efforts to promote economic 

growth and alleviate poverty. While the development of a NEAP could 

potentially help, this ongoing exercise again has been concentrated largely 

within the network of the Ministry of Nature Protection and delayed by 

differences over its scope and structure.

The considerable international assistance rendered to the country 

also has not made a substantial contribution to improving the coherence 

of either environmental policies or programs. Though some local-level 

initiatives have produced promising results, these have been poorly documented and seldom replicated. National-level assistance has been highly 

fragmented, and much of it has centered on Tajikistan’s role in addressing 

regional or global concerns with only weak attention to national or local 

priorities. This includes such topics as biodiversity conservation, land 

degradation, climate change and waste management.23 Reliance on donor 

support for environmental analysis and programming also has undermined nascent efforts to establish routine government funding channels 

for environmental and natural resources management topics through line 

ministries or the legislature. 

The key to progress in Tajikistan—as elsewhere in the region—will 

be incorporating an understanding of and concern for sound environmental and natural resources management into the mainstream of economic 

development planning, policy-making and programming. This principle 

is gradually coming to be understood, though it requires a departure 

from the traditional patterns of designing “environmental” projects and 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 291

the conduct of environmental analysis in isolation from economic planning and programming of development resources for key sectors such as 

agriculture and energy. The Ministry of Nature Protection appreciates 

the importance of its reaching out to the government bodies—executive 

or legislative—which govern such economic interests and using its links 

to civil society to advocate for expanding attention to the environmental 

underpinnings of the country’s development path.

Kazakhstan24

Kazakhstan is set apart from the other CARs on the basis of several 

characteristics. Its sheer size and oil-based economic growth are perhaps 

the most important distinguishing factors. Along with Kyrgyzstan, it 

also has embraced open-market policies to a much greater extent than 

its neighbors. Despite its geographic scope, population densities remain 

low—further affecting its special circumstances. 

The country’s natural resource base remains degraded from unsustainable practices dating from the Soviet period. The “virgin lands” policy 

opened many semi-arid steppe regions to agricultural production beyond 

their long-term potential.25 Mining wastes in the East, industrial pollution 

in the Northeast, oil industry pollution in the West along the Caspian, 

and land degradation in the South present a diverse and far-flung set of 

environmental challenges.

Isolated rural populations cut off from Soviet-era subsidies are 

struggling to survive, and agricultural production has fallen substantially 

since independence. Efforts such as the World Bank/GEF-funded Drylands 

Management Project are testing the environmental, social and economic 

viability of shifting from currently unsustainable cereal-based agricultural 

production systems back to traditional livestock-based systems.26 Decentralized and renewable energy systems also are receiving increased attention as potential means for overcoming rural productivity losses and the 

high cost of keeping distant communities linked to the national electricity 

grid.

Kazakhstan enjoys by far the highest level of foreign investment 

among the CARs, and—though environmental regulation of industry 

remains a contentious issue—interactions with multinational firms are 

leading to a gradual adoption of internationally-accepted environmental 

management norms. This is most clear in the oil and gas industry located 

along the Caspian Sea, though international firms are balking at being 

asked to clean up pollution problems left over from Soviet times.
292 MCCAULEY

After a period in which the government mixed responsibilities for 

both resource extraction and environmental regulation under a large 

umbrella ministry, these functions now have been divided. Regulatory 

authorities under the Ministry of Environmental Protection are gradually gaining some ability to enforce compliance with environmental laws 

despite continuing and widespread corruption. As elsewhere in the region, 

environmental considerations are only weakly incorporated into—or even 

acknowledged by—development plans and programs of key sectors such 

as energy, transport or agriculture. The formation of a National Sustainable Development Council to coordinate such mainstreaming efforts 

holds some promise. Some indications show progress being made in some 

areas, since both the intensity of pollution and energy use per unit of GDP 

have begun to fall.

At the regional level, Kazakhstan continues a strong policy of political engagement and economic integration with its neighbors (though not 

limited to the CARs). Consistent with this stance, it has been perhaps the 

most solid member of IFAS from the start and is taking direct measures to 

address the ecological crisis in its territory surrounding the former boundaries of the Aral Sea, particularly with assistance from the World Bank. It 

also is working with neighboring China and Kyrgyzstan on bilateral river 

basin management issues—having concluded agreements governing the 

Ili-Balkash and Chui-Talas Basins, respectively. Kazakhstan also actively 

participates in the Caspian Environmental Program.

The country is an often vocal participant in meetings of the major 

multilateral environmental agreements, and, as noted in Table 13-3, is a 

signatory to most. This stance has attracted considerable international 

assistance to develop national assessments and action plans for national 

compliance with agreement provisions—sometimes distracting from 

higher priority domestic concerns.

Turkmenistan

Like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan is well endowed with oil and especially gas resources, but continued reliance on a planned economy and rigid 

political and social controls have limited foreign trade and investment. 

The country’s political and economic isolation places it at something of a 

disadvantage within the region with respect to its access to international 

expertise and assistance to improve environmental and natural resources 

management. While a few NGOs have begun to address environmental 

issues, the scope of their influence is limited by the closed attitudes of the 

government toward the participation of civil society in public policy de-
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 293

bate. Government agencies—including those managing natural resources 

and meant to protect the environment—are often tentative in their decision making due to rigidities in the authoritative structure.

Most of the country is uninhabitable desert, and the population is 

largely concentrated along the courses of the Amu Darya River and the 

Karikkum Canal which supports the capital, Ashgabad. Turkmenistan 

is almost completely dependent upon water flowing from its upstream 

neighbors, so it has an enormous stake in efforts to improve regional water 

cooperation. Nevertheless, it has been a reluctant partner within IFAS and 

other regional mechanisms promoting regional cooperation on resources 

management.27 It also inherited significant land degradation challenges 

from the Soviet period. These comprise waterlogging and especially salinization in agricultural areas due to over-irrigation and severe drainage 

problems—with half of the country’s irrigated lands considered to be in 

an unsatisfactory state.28 The rapidly growing urbanized population also 

is posing increasing challenges for adequate provision of water supply and 

wastewater management. The country is still prone to grand construction 

schemes, and the proposed creation of an enormous “Golden Lake”—as a 

collector of agricultural drainage water just upstream of the Aral Sea and 

for uncertain additional uses—has been met with skepticism in the region 

and beyond.

A NEAP was completed in 2002, and it has begun to shape thinking about priorities for incorporating environmental considerations into 

national economic development plans. An ecological information network 

also is expanding. Much of the NEAP centers on addressing the severe 

land degradation problems. Though the NEAP is an important forward 

step, much remains to be done if it is to receive broader ownership among 

key government and civil society stakeholders as a necessary basis for its 

implementation.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is able to support the largest population in the region in 

large measure because of the fertility of the irrigated Ferghana Valley and, 

more generally, due to the abundance of water resources flowing through 

its predominantly arid landscape. Its territory straddles the courses of 

the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers. Yet its ability to maintain land and 

water management systems is increasingly threatened by severe resource 

degradation—due largely to mismanagement of irrigated agriculture for 

cotton and wheat production—coupled with intensifying regional competition over shared water resources. The most extreme problems are in 
294 MCCAULEY

the Autonomous Region of Karakalpakstan, where the Amu Darya meets 

the Aral Sea. Here drought and desertification have combined with the 

dislocations associated with the Sea’s desiccation to impoverish most of 

the population.29

Beyond the constraints on rural development imposed by land 

degradation, the country also faces a range of environmental problems 

affecting the health and productivity of urban populations. These include 

air pollution, industrial water pollution, deteriorating infrastructure for 

wastewater collection and treatment, weak systems of solid waste management, and energy-related environmental issues. Although both air and 

water pollution from industrial sources has declined since independence 

(with the fall in heavy industry’s output), there remain localized pockets 

of air pollution that can have wide-ranging impacts when atmospheric inversions trap pollution for days on end. Likewise, some areas immediately 

downstream of operating industries suffer from poor water quality. Problems from industrial air pollution are exacerbated by weakly controlled 

and gradually expanding vehicular pollution sources. Uzbekistan’s air pollution problems would be far worse were it not abundantly endowed with 

natural gas which is widely utilized as the principal energy source—except 

for vehicles—throughout the country.30 Though Uzbekistan had one of 

the most developed urban water supply and wastewater collection and 

treatment systems in the former Soviet Union, maintenance and management have suffered in recent years with a corresponding decline in service. 

A similar pattern may be seen with respect to solid waste management. 

The “ecological safety” of the young and rapidly growing population31 is guaranteed by the Constitution, and environmental legislation 

since independence has emphasized this notion along with generally 

accepted principles of environmental protection and rational natural resources use. The State Committee for Nature Protection serves as the lead 

government body in implementing environmental laws and regulations, 

but it is weak relative to, for example, the powerful ministries governing 

agriculture/water, industry, and energy. It also shares responsibilities for 

monitoring and managing air and water quality with other agencies such 

as the hydrometeorological service—often competing for budgetary and 

project resources. The strong scientific base in the country has led to perhaps the most rigorous analysis of environmental problems and processes 

in the region. However, environmental policy-making remains fragmented 

and outside of the mainstream of economic planning structures, which 

have changed only marginally since the Soviet period. Further, the high 

degree of state control has limited the participation of NGOs and other 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 295

elements of civil society, including the media, in environmental planning 

and decision making.32

The country has been a sometimes reluctant partner with its neighbors in addressing regional environmental and natural resources challenges. A core member of IFAS, Uzbekistan has not lent strong support to 

its efforts since the EC-IFAS secretariat moved from Tashkent in the late 

1990s. It became a signatory to the 1998 Framework Agreement on the Syr 

Darya River’s management, but it subsequently ceased participating in the 

associated energy-for-water swaps. In 2003, it hosted discussions on land 

degradation in the region under the auspices of the Strategic Partnership 

for UNCCD Implementation in Central Asia, and efforts are underway to 

lay the groundwork for a tougher domestic policy stance on addressing 

severe land and water management problems. It has taken part in discussions under the framework of the REAP, but has made little commitment 

to implement projects emanating from the planning exercise. A recently 

created regional environmental planning integration and information 

networking activity supported by ADB achieved buy-in from all CARs 

except Uzbekistan. While the country hosted the ADB-organized Second 

Ministerial Conference on Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation 

held in late 2003, it vetoed inclusion of reference to the obvious connections between water and energy in the Ministerial Statement. More than 

any of its neighbors (save Turkmenistan), it has viewed regional cooperation from a position of very narrow national self-interest. 

Its highly scientific approach to problem analysis can be seen in the 

country’s responses to its obligations under the key multilateral environmental agreements to which it is party. A National Strategy and Action 

Plan for Biodiversity Conservation was produced in 1998. A National Action Plan for implementation of the UNCCD was finalized in 1999, and 

an Initial National Communication under the Framework Convention 

on Climate Change was completed in 2001. All three of these documents 

place a strong emphasis on documenting the environmental problems in 

technical terms and scientifically identifying the underlying ecological or 

bio-physical processes. Conversely, they are weak in their analysis of poverty-environment linkages and the root causes of environmental problems 

lying in past and current government policies. These documents—and 

the planning exercises that led to them—are similarly lacking in strategic 

thinking concerning appropriate policy and institutional responses. Such 

weaknesses pervade the environmental governance atmosphere and need 

to be directly addressed if Uzbekistan is to incorporate environmental 

considerations into its economic development and poverty alleviation 
296 MCCAULEY

planning—taking full advantage of its scientific skills and relatively strong 

information base to address the wide range of environmental and natural 

resources management problems it faces.

International Assistance

Improving land and water resources management in the region remains the highest priority for international environmental assistance to 

Central Asia. The World Bank has been perhaps the most active multilateral aid agency, having served as the lead donor for ASBP-1. In addition to 

the analyses under ASBP-1, the World Bank’s land and water management 

programming has included country-level investments in the irrigation 

sector as well as a project to divide the remainder of the Aral Sea into two 

parts.33 It also has produced an insightful review of agricultural water use 

and needed reform measures in the CARs.34 The ADB is playing an active 

role in encouraging greater regional economic integration, and it also has 

provided considerable environmentally-related technical assistance to the 

CARs—including for improved water management.35 The ADB sponsored 

Central Asia’s participation in the third World Water Forum of 2003 and 

co-sponsored the 2003 Forum on Strategic Partnership for UNCCD Implementation in Central Asia. It remains actively engaged in various efforts 

to address water, land and environmental management problems at the 

local, national and regional levels. UNDP has made regional water management one of three focal areas in its environmental program for Central 

Asia—centering efforts on strengthening the institutional, programming 

and legal framework for water resources management by assisting ECIFAS with completion of the ASBP-1 problem analysis and helping to formulate a coherent ASBP-2.36 The EU37 has begun a third phase of regional 

water assistance focusing on demonstrating principles of integrated water 

management in pilot sub-catchments.38 The OSCE is leading an activity 

supporting creation of a Joint Commission for the Chu and Talas Rivers, 

and also is involved in an Environment and Security Initiative dealing with 

regional water issues.39 The Global Water Partnership’s Caucasus and Central Asia program is also building regional relations to support improved 

integrated water management. 

Several bilateral aid agencies also are assisting at the regional level. 

Among others, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 

provided the aid that led to the initial brokering of the 1998 Syr Darya 

Framework Agreement as well as much of the core international environmental assistance to the region in the immediate post-independence 

period. USAID no longer supports environmental management programs 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 297

and most of its water management activities—other than a modest regional effort on the upper Syr Darya Basin—have now shifted to field-level 

demonstrations of irrigation systems and hydrological monitoring. The 

Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation is supporting a multi-year 

pilot-level effort on integrated management of internationally shared 

canals in the Ferghana Valley, involving the Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan, 

and Tajikistan, and the German development aid agency (GTZ) has a 

region-wide program to address land degradation problems dealing extensively with salinization and waterlogging. The Canadian International 

Development Agency also has been active, though its programs are now 

almost exclusively focused on alleviating poverty in Tajikistan as the poorest Central Asian country.

The Central Asian REAP represents another effort to identify and 

organize responses to high priority environmental problems of regional 

significance. The REAP was initiated in 2000 with financial and institutional support from UNEP, ADB, and UNDP. It began by identifying 

“regional” problems in five areas: air pollution; water pollution; land 

degradation; waste management; and mountain ecosystem degradation. 

Project concepts were developed in each of these five areas, and regional 

work groups were to have prepared and overseen the funding and implementation of corresponding projects or programs. A number of the project ideas generated under the REAP framework also are not necessarily 

“regional” in nature (requiring interstate cooperation for their solution), 

but rather constitute problems common to two or more countries. The 

lack of emphasis on truly regional environmental issues, such as those of 

an obvious transboundary nature, has interfered with efforts to appropriately focus institutional attentions and resources. Progress with funding 

and implementing these projects has lagged, while considerable attention 

has been expended in further discussion and planning at the national and 

regional levels. This is partly due to the Interstate Commission for Sustainable Development (ICSD) having been entrusted with guiding REAP 

implementation; during this period ICSD has been struggling to get itself 

fully operational. In response to the institutional constraints encountered, 

the focus of Central Asian REAP teams as well as the key donors (UNEP 

and UNDP) has shifted to establishing the enabling conditions for REAP 

implementation through: creating a mechanism to support regional environmental cooperation in Central Asia; developing a REAP decision support system; encouraging stronger public awareness of and participation 

in REAP-related activities; and building capacities for REAP implementa-
298 MCCAULEY

tion. Despite these constraints, a proposal has been submitted by UNEP to 

the GEF for the financing of further REAP organizational activities. 

Mountain ecosystems management is another environmental problem area that has attracted considerable regional as well as international 

attention. As noted, Kyrgyzstan played host in 2002 to the Bishkek Global 

Mountain Summit, which capped a series of events around the world 

marking 2002 as the International Year of Mountains.40 A detailed strategy and action plan for sustainable mountain areas development was 

developed for Kyrgyzstan that was meant to serve as a model for similar 

national plans covering all five CARs,41 and several papers at the Mountain Summit outlined the threats to fragile mountain ecosystems in the 

region—including the proposition that the region’s glaciers are receding 

rapidly and contributing to a troubling over-estimation of available freshwater resources in the Aral Sea Basin. Though global in scope, the Bishkek 

Mountain Platform that resulted from the meeting was significantly shaped 

by the Central Asian experience and venue of the Summit.42 Unfortunately, 

meaningful follow-up has not occurred at the national or regional levels, 

and international attention to the subject has waned somewhat after the 

conclusion of the Year of Mountains. Effectual responses also have been 

inhibited by land tenure conflicts, security concerns and a confusing array 

of government jurisdictions in the region’s mountainous areas.

The international community, including particularly the World 

Bank, EU and UNDP, already has invested heavily in regional institutions for natural resources and environmental management. EC-IFAS 

has received considerable support through the ASBP-1, though questions 

within the donor community about the likely effectiveness of the ASBP-2’s 

strategic framework have thus far limited further substantial international 

support. The ICWC under IFAS has continued to function as a committee 

of the region’s water ministers while its Scientific Information Committee 

(SIC-ICWC) has cobbled together assistance from a variety of sources to 

support ICWC decision making and the training of water professionals in 

the region. The network of national REAP working groups represents yet 

another effort to establish institutional capacity for improved environmental management at the regional level, but the REAP’s progress is being 

constrained by continuing concerns over ICSD’s ability to oversee project 

implementation. There are corresponding networks of national focal 

points covering each of the global environmental agreements to which 

all CARs are party (climate change, land degradation, biodiversity, and 

ozone depletion). Another recent innovation at the regional level has been 

the creation of the CA-REC in Almaty, chartered by agreement of the five 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 299

states at the Aarhus Ministerial in 1998. CA-REC, working with EC-IFAS 

and ICSD, has conducted analyses of regional issues and helped to catalyze 

preparations for international environmental meetings such as the WSSD 

and the UNECE Environment for Europe ministerial conference. Some 

regional stakeholders believe this may have detracted somewhat from 

CA-REC’s mandated responsibility to facilitate public participation in 

environmental decision making. 

Finally, although only Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan—among the 

CARs—are littoral states of the Caspian Sea, their active participation in 

the Caspian Environmental Program (CEP) should be noted.43 The CEP 

was established to coordinate the resource management actions of the 

five countries bordering the Caspian Sea, interact with efforts under the 

Ramsar Convention on the protection of wetlands and, more generally, 

“to halt the deterioration of environmental conditions of the Caspian Sea 

and to promote sustainable development in the area”.44 The CEP intergovernmental process is primarily supported by the GEF, UNDP, World

Bank, UNEP and the EU, but it also includes cooperation with the private 

sector—particularly the oil and gas industry. CEP has developed and adopted a Strategic Action Program for the protection and rehabilitation of 

the Caspian environment covering high priority environmental concern 

areas as well as helping each littoral state develop its own National Caspian 

Action Plan. This has proven to be quite positive for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, as participation in CEP has led both nations to adopt enhanced 

pollution control measures in their oblasts bordering the Sea.

Conclusion

Since achieving their independence, all Central Asian countries have 

sought to improve their understanding of environmental and natural resources constraints on their economic development. Varying efforts also 

have been made to strengthen policy and institutional responses to these 

challenges. The need for much more effective plans, policies and programs 

to address land degradation and water mismanagement is an important 

recurring theme in the region, while environmental dimensions of urban 

and industrial restructuring also are receiving increased attention. The 

capacity of most environmental agencies has been improved, and it is becoming more widely accepted that environmental considerations must be 

built into all aspects of economic and social reform. Broader results will 

require further outreach to government agencies directly charged with 

resource management, such as those managing the agriculture and energy 

sectors.
300 MCCAULEY

At the regional level, institutions have been formed and initiatives 

undertaken to address problems of common concern to the region. Most 

prominent among these are efforts to address the Aral Sea crisis through 

IFAS. More recently the REAP process has sought to identify other transboundary or common environmental problems for action through the 

IFAS subsidiary ICSD. The Strategic Partnership for Implementation of 

the UNCCD in Central Asia is becoming an important mechanism for 

coordinating efforts to address land degradation in the region. Institutions 

such as CA-REC have much to offer as resource bodies to encourage more 

active dialogue between government and civil society, though the rigid political atmosphere pervasive in the region continues to inhibit a participatory approach to developing and implementing environmental policies.

After quickly joining most of the key multilateral environmental 

agreements, Central Asian countries have taken advantage of available 

funding to prepare associated national strategies. Some of this analysis—

such as air pollution assessments tied to the climate change treaty—have 

had positive cross-over benefits of improved understanding of the domestic costs of pollution and inefficient resource management. Others have 

had weaker links to national environmental issues, and some even have 

distracted attention from higher priorities at home. Few of the efforts 

addressing global environmental issues have engaged those policymakers most responsible for managing the resources or allocating funds to 

improve their management, though more recent initiatives have sought to 

rectify this shortcoming.

Each of the Central Asian countries faces its own set of social, economic and environmental challenges, but they also share a common heritage and many mutual development goals. Socio-political development 

varies greatly among the countries, and the degree of market orientation 

and transparency exhibited in environmental management efforts tends 

to mirror broader country-level trends. This suggests that environmental 

management gains should result from broader governance improvements, 

and that environmental considerations need to be woven into the very 

fabric of economic development policies and programs. This must go 

beyond mere pronouncements, the publishing of national action plans or 

even legislative reform to encompass fresh political will and the accompanying resources needed to realize real change. With proper attention to 

the strengthening of key environmental management institutions, to using 

renewable natural resources only within their sustainable limits, to avoiding adverse environmental impacts from other forms of development, to 

reducing waste while improving economic efficiency and to encouraging 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 301

public engagement in decision making regarding these matters, the page 

can be turned on the old story of environmental neglect and a new chapter 

opened to wise environmental and natural resources management forming the basis for healthy and prosperous societies in the lands that straddle 

the Great Silk Road.

Notes1

 The State Committee structure was retained in Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan has recently reverted to this structure. 2

 See: <http://www.grida.no/aral/main_e.html> for both the NEAPs available and national 

State of the Environment Reports prepared in cooperation with UNEP in anticipation of the Johannesburg Earth Summit. The NEAP for Tajikistan is scheduled to be completed by early 2004. 

Environmental Performance Reviews (EPR) conducted by the UN Economic Commission for Europe 

(UNECE) supplement the NEAPs as do Country Environmental Analyses (CEAs) prepared by the 

Asian Development Bank. See: UNECE, 1999. Environmental Performance Review: Kyrgyzstan (United 

Nations: Geneva; UNECE 2000); Environmental Performance Review: Kazakhstan (United Nations: 

Geneva; and UNECE 2001), Environmental Performance Review: Uzbekistan (United Nations: Geneva). 

Also see: Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2003. Country Environmental Assessment: Kazakhstan, 

ADB: Manila; ADB. 2003; Country Environmental Assessment: Kyrgyzstan, ADB: Manila; and ADB. 

2003; Country Environmental Assessment: Tajikistan, ADB: Manila (an EPR for Tajikistan and CEA for 

Uzbekistan are planned for 2004). 3

 Afghanistan often is excluded from such activities due to its very different relationship with 

the former Soviet Union and because many international assistance agencies treat it as part of “South 

Asia” rather than “Central Asia.” 4

 UNEP 2001. Regional Environmental Action Plan for Central Asia. UNEP.RRA: Bangkok. 5

 Or at least concurrence with analysis and positions put forward by CA-REC.

6

 UNECE 2003. Report of the Fifth Ministerial Conference on Environment for Europe, UNECE 

Secretariat: Geneva, and UNECE 2003. Invitation to Partnership on Implementation of the Central Asian 

Sustainable Development Initiative, Fifth Ministerial Conference Environment for Europe, Kiev, May 

21-23, 2003, UNECE: Geneva. 7

 Generally including the agencies responsible for water resources management.

8

 Though not covered in this review, Afghanistan lies in the upstream watershed of the Amu 

Darya River, and it is ethnically linked with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan with which it 

shares a common border. For a summary assessment of its contemporary environmental issues, see: 

McCauley, 2003. 9

 For further detail on environmental and natural resources conditions and issues in the region, see: ADB. 1997. Central Asian Environments in Transition. ADB: Manila (covering Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan); ADB. 2000. Environmental Profile of Tajikistan. ADB: Manila; McCauley, 

D. 2001. Central Asia: Summary Assessment of ADB Environmental Assistance, ADB: Manila; as well as 

the EPRs and CEAs footnoted above. 10 Pollution levels were considerably higher in the CARs during the Soviet period and declined 

thereafter with the demise of many high-polluting industries. 11 Mismanagement of irrigation water is resulting in widespread waterlogging of soils and 

salinization, both from poor drainage and through a process whereby soil salts are brought to the 

surface on waterlogged lands. In addition to the section of the REAP on this subject, see also: IFAS. 

2002. Water and Environmental Management Project Sub-Component A1: National and Regional Water 

and Salt Management Plan Phase III Report – Regional Needs and Constraints. GEF Agency of the IFAS 

Aral Sea Basin Program: Tashkent. 
302 MCCAULEY

12 The impending diversions by the People’s Republic of China of waters from the Irtysh and 

Ili Rivers upstream of Kazakhstan also are of concern due both to the potential impacts on the rivers’ 

pollution flushing capacities as well to their overall water volumes. 13 Tursunzade also is a major source of air pollution.

14 The consequences of over-irrigation, including waterlogging and salinization, have already 

been mentioned, as have the unstable uranium tailings of Kyrgyzstan. 15 IFAS’s role and history are discussed at length in Daene McKinney’s chapter.

16 This is under the Aral Sea Basin Program–2 (ASBP-2) described in further detail below. 

17 ICWC is slightly better off in this regard, as it is able to draw upon its Scientific Information 

Committee (SIC-ICWC), which serves as an analytical secretariat. ICSC also has an SIC, though it is 

more weakly staffed and recognized. 18 In addition to CACO (with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as members 

and Turkmenistan as an observer), other leading regional groupings include: the Eurasian Economic 

Community (EurAsEc; with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan as members); 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO; with China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and 

Uzbekistan as members); and less formal groupings such as that organized by the Asian Development 

Bank (CAREC; with Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 

as members and Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey and Turkmenistan as observers). 19 IFAS, 2003. Program of Concrete Actions on Improvement of the Environmental and Socio-Economic Situation in the Aral Sea Basin for the Period of 2003-2010, EC-IFAS: Dushanbe. 20 1995 data, see: Eileen Claussen and Lisa McNeilly. 1998. Equity and Global Climate Change: 

The Complex Elements of Global Fairness, Annex 1. Pew Center on Global Climate Change: Washington, DC.21 This country is given slightly greater coverage as an introduction to national-level institutional and program trends common in the region; additional details may be found in ADB, 2003b, 

prepared by this author. 22 This section draws particularly from ADB, 2003c, and further background information may 

be found in ADB, 1999. 23 An initiative funded by the GEF and UNDP to coordinate and integrate national action 

plans in response to the Biodiversity, Land Degradation and Climate Change conventions represents a 

promising counter-trend. As far as I know, National Capacity Needs Self-Assessment deals with analyzing the capacity needed to implement national actions plans and strategies on biodiversity, climate 

change and desertification. 24 This section draws upon ADB, 2003a, and further detail may be found therein.

25 An indication of the remaining constraints to official perceptions in this regard may be found 

in the early 2004 “celebration” of the 50th Anniversary of the Virgin Lands Policy in Kazakhstan. 26 World Bank-GEF, 2003. Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Global Environment Facility Grant to the Government of Kazakhstan for Drylands Management Project, World Bank Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region: Washington, DC. 27 The country’s more active participation in the Caspian Environment Program represents 

something of an exception to this trend. 28 Ministry of Nature Protection, 1999. State of the Environment of Turkmenistan, Ministry of 

Nature Protection and UNEP: Ashgabat and Saigal, S., 2003. Issues and Approaches to Combat Desertification: Turkmenistan, Report of ADB RETA 5941: Manila. 29 The consequently high rate of out-migration threatens to undermine the very Karakalpakstani identity. 30 Rising domestic and export demand for Uzbekistan’s natural gas against an essentially fixed 

supply is expected to alter the status quo over the next decade, requiring both economic and environmental adjustments. 31 Almost one-half are 16 years of age or younger.

32 Uzbekistan in the only Central Asian country which has not acceded to the Aarhus convention on environmental information transparency.
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 303

33 As noted, a levee is being constructed just south of the Syr Darya River’s delta to preserve 

aquatic ecosystems and partially restore fisheries but also effectively splitting the Aral Sea into two 

separate lakes. 34 Bucknall, et al., Irrigation in Central Asia: Social, Economic and Environmental Considerations

(Washington: World Bank, 2003). 35 See McCauley, 2002. 36 The former analysis is co-financed by the United States State Department.

37 European Union Technical Assistance for Commonwealth of Independent States (EU/

TACIS).38 Covering the Chui-Talas and Vakhsh River Basins.

39 For the work to establish the Chui-Talas Rivers Commission, OSCE is partnered with the UN 

Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia 

and the Pacific (ESCAP); for the Environmental Security Initiative, it is partnered with UNDP and 

the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). The United Nations Educational and Scientific 

Cooperation Organization (UNESCO) also is supporting research on sustainable water management 

in the region. 40 See the Summit materials given at: <http://mountains.unep.ch/mtn/home_page.html>. 41 See: Kyrgyz CAMIN Working Group 2001. National Strategy and Action Plan for Sustainable 

Mountain Development in the Kyrgyz Republic, CAMIN: Bishkek. 42 See: <http://mountains.unep.ch/mtn/papers/BMPlatform.doc>. 43 The others are Iran, Russia and Azerbaijan. 

44 <www.caspianenvironment.org>.
304 MCCAULEY
305

Chapter 14 

The Future of Electrical 

Power in the Republic of 

Kazakhstan

Kalkaman Suleimenov

Kazakhstan is rich in all forms of energy. With current production 

rates, the country not only can be self-sufficient in energy for 

the foreseeable future, but also may be able to export substantial 

amounts. The Republic of Kazakhstan, which covers some 1.8 percent of 

the land surface of the earth, enjoys roughly one half percent of the world’s 

proven reserves of mineral fuels, or 30 billion tons. Of this, 80 percent is 

coal, 13 percent is oil and gas condensates and 7 percent is natural and secondary gas.1

 These resources are distributed unevenly across the Republic, 

as displayed in Figure 14–1. The coal deposits, for the most part, are concentrated in Northern and Central Kazakhstan. These same regions have 

rich deposits of minerals, which provide raw materials for Kazakhstan’s industry. Here also are located the main sources of electrical energy. Western 

Kazakhstan is very rich in hydrocarbon reserves, while at the same time 

being poor in electrical power. Southern Kazakhstan does not have sufficient primary energy sources, and those found are inaccessible or as yet 

unexploited. The anticipated scale of hydrocarbon extraction in Southern 

Kazakhstan hardly can cover the region’s need for electrical energy in the 

future. At the same time, however, this region possesses great hydroelectric 

potential.

The primary goals of the electrical energy sector for power generation on the domestic market and production for export are:

■ To provide the country with energy security, which includes:

◆ access or access rights to energy markets; 

◆ quality control and an uncompromising adherence to established 

standards; 
306 SULEIMENOV

◆ fair pricing that helps create reserves for development while taking into consideration social factors and line losses; 

◆ ecological responsibility. 

■ Optimization of the fuel regimen of electrical stations, with an emphasis on gas wherever possible and economically acceptable, and 

the use of fossil fuel secondary gas;

■ Utilization of international experience to mitigate the ecological 

side effects of coal, Kazakhstan’s basic energy resource; 

■ Restoration of electricity production at existing electric installations, through their rehabilitation or reconstruction, whichever is 

the least expensive and quickest;

■ Maintaining the designed capacity of electrical stations through 

the timely replacement of equipment that has outlived its designed 

service period, with new generation equipment; 

■ Construction of new electrical generation capacity to replace that 

going off-line, while meeting increased demand for electricity.

In 1990 Kazakhstan’s electrical power plants produced 87.4 billion 

kilowatt hours (kWh) of electrical power. 2 Of this, thermal power plants 

accounted for 91 percent, hydro 8.4 percent, and nuclear 0.6 percent. In 

subsequent years, owing to the completion of projects that had been under 

construction, a number of new plants were brought on line at Ekibastuz-2 

District Electrical Plant, the Karaganda-3 Thermal Power Plant, and the 

Aktube Thermal Power Plant (Akturbo). This has brought total electrical 

power generation capacity up to 95 billion kWh.3 Thus, electrical power 

generation in Kazakhstan is characterized by efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in electrical power and provide the necessary infrastructure for 

generating capacity with appropriate increases in reserve capacity for 

future needs. The realization of these tasks will allow Kazakhstan to trade 

energy profitably with its neighbors, and ensure a competitive electricity 

market. 

For the purpose of examining the issue of power generation, Kazakhstan can be divided into three basic regions: Southern, Northern, and 

Western. Each of these regions will be discussed in the following sections 

,with emphasis on the amount of energy produced and the issues surrounding this production.
ELECTRICAL POWER 307

The Southern Region

The Southern Region consists of Almaty, Jambyl, Kzyl-Orda, the 

South Kazakhstan oblasts, and the City of Almaty. This region comprises 

roughly 38 percent of the country’s population, and its growth has always 

been above the average for the Republic. Industry here consists primarily of the energy-intensive chemical production sector (which in 1990 

accounted for more than 40 percent of electricity consumption in the 

region), as well as metallurgy, machine-building, light industry, and other 

enterprises. In addition, a significant part of the railway system has been 

converted to use electricity. This zone has a favorable climate with fertile 

arable land that has allowed the region to develop a highly productive 

agriculture and agricultural processing sector. 

Demand for electricity in this zone in 1990 reached 26.43 billion 

kWh,4 while producing only 16.27 billion kWh,5 with the shortfall being 

delivered from electrical power plants of the Central Asian Unified Energy 

System.6 In light of the region’s deficiency in primary energy resources, 

electricity production is based on outside coal, imported natural gas, and, 

in part, on locally produced fuel oil from petrochemical processing plants. 

The southeastern part of the region is potentially rich in hydro-electrical 

resources, yet only an insignificant part is utilized. It may be exploited in 

the future.7 In order to connect to the energy systems of other Central 

Asian countries, a power grid was built with 500 and 220 kV overhead 

transmission lines and a throughput capacity of more than 10 billion 

kWh per year.8 Thus, a very good material base is in place for subsequent 

cooperation with neighboring states as well as Kazakhstan’s participation 

in the Central Asian energy market.

At present, the largest electrical plant in the southern part of the 

country, the Jambyl District Electrical Plant, which has a design capacity 

of 230 megawatts using fuel, gas and fuel oil, is practically idle. The underutilization of this station is the result of the non-competitiveness of the 

electricity it produces on Kazakhstan’s wholesale electrical energy market, 

which, in turn, is affected by increases in the price of gas and fuel oil on 

the international market. The stoppage of the Jambyl Plant has led to the 

creation of a palpable deficit in electricity, especially in the fall and winter 

seasons. At present, the shortfall is being covered by transferring electrical 

power from the Northern region of Kazakhstan (3.0 to 3.5 billion kWh per 

year) and importing power from other Central Asian countries. It is worth 

noting that in the Fall-Winter season of 2001-2002, the Government of the 

Republic of Kazakhstan appropriated a subsidy grant from the Republic 
308 SULEIMENOV

budget to acquire fuel for the Jambyl District Electrical Plant, in an effort 

to make its electrical production competitive.

Domestic sufficiency and even, in the long run, export potential in 

this region of traditional shortfalls could be achieved, both through the 

reconstruction and reequipping of existing thermal power facilities, as 

well as through new construction. As the Southern region experiences 

sharp shortfalls in peak load regulating capacity, priority must be given to 

new construction. According to official government sources, this can be 

achieved through:9

■ Installing a second 500 kilovolt (kV) North to South Kazakhstan 

transmission line, for a total throughput capacity (two 500 kV and 

one 220 kV) of 6 to 7 billion kWh of electrical energy per year;10

■ Constructing the planned Mainak Hydroelectric Station on the 

Charyn river with a capacity of 300 megawatts (0.7 billion kWh);11

■ Building the Kerbulak Hydroelectric Station on the Ili River with a 

capacity of 50 megawatts (0.3 billion kWh);

■ Building a co-generation plant of 100 to 200 megawatts capacity, 

using secondary gas recovered from petroleum processing at the 

Kumkol fields (0.6 to 1.3 billion kWh);12

■ The creation of mini hydroelectric stations along mountain rivers, 

with an overall output of 500 to 600 megawatts (2.0 to 2.5 billion 

kWh);

■ Completion of wind energy projects, with a capacity of 500 to 600 

megawatts (1.2 to 1.5 billion kWh).13

The Southern Kazakhstan zone shares borders with several other 

Central Asian countries. Preliminary analysis suggests significant shortfalls in electrical power will occur in this area in the future. The risk of 

energy surplus is less than the risk of shortfalls, as any overproduction of 

electricity in Southern and Northern Kazakhstan could be offered to the 

Central Asian energy market. Supply can be provided through the existing 

network of electrical 220 and 500 kV transmission lines between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which have 

an overall transmission capacity of no less than 10 billion kWh per year.

The Northern Region

The Northern Region consists of East-Kazakhstan, Pavlodar, Karaganda, Akmola, North-Kazakhstan, and the Kostanai oblasts. This region 
ELECTRICAL POWER 309

possesses ample cheap and accessible fuel resources, and has a well developed energy production sector. The country’s primary coal regions are 

located in this area: Ekibastuz, Karaganda, Maikuben, Turgai, and others. 

Coal mined from these deposits is used at all the thermal power plants 

of the southern and northern regions of Kazakhstan, and is exported to 

Russia as well. Electrical power generation in the Northern Region of Kazakhstan also includes very powerful hydroelectric stations located in the 

East-Kazakhstan Oblast, which has very high hydro electrical potential. 

In the Northern Region of Kazakhstan, it would be possible to increase the output of electrical power to meet not only local demand and 

transmission to the south of Kazakhstan at the necessary levels, but also 

for export to the Central Asian countries and Russia. Currently, the electrical power produced in the Northern Region is transmitted to the south of 

Kazakhstan along a 500 and a 220 kV North-South Kazakhstan overhead 

line. A small portion (300 to 400 megawatts) is exported to the Siberian 

regions of Russia.14

In all potential scenarios, demand in the Northern Region, including 

transmission to the south of Kazakhstan, as well as export to Russia and 

Central Asia, can be met through reconstruction as well as by re-equipping 

and increasing capacity at existing electrical generation facilities. With 

minimal investment, this would transform the zone into a net supplier of 

energy with a significant (10 to 15 billion kWh) surplus production.15

The Western Region

The Western Region of Kazakhstan, in energy terms, is comprised 

of three regions and energy systems: the Atyrau-Mangistau (Atyrau and 

Mangistau Oblasts), Aktyube Oblast, and the West-Kazakhstan Oblast. 

The Atyrau-Mangistau system is self-sufficient and has surplus production of more than 800 megawatts. Aktyube and West-Kazakhstan Oblasts 

are net consumers of energy. Demand for electricity, 1.2 and 0.5 billion 

kWh, respectively, is covered through import from the border regions of 

Russia.

Since the Caspian coastal zone is rapidly developing its oil and gas 

sector, including the exploitation of the Caspian Shelf, the creation of 

elaborate oil pipelines will increase significantly the demand for electrical 

power. According to growth estimates and the pace of implementation 

of the oil and gas production program to 2015, it will be necessary to increase energy production capacity by 2,000 to 3,000 megawatts. The fuel 

resources in the region make it possible to meet this demand and even 

create an export capacity in electric power. 
310 SULEIMENOV

Current production capacity in Atyrau-Mangistau can fully satisfy 

demand in Mangistau Oblast in the short to medium term, since the capacity of the electrical plants of Aktau is 1350 megawatts, while current 

demand does not exceed 500 megawatts. Although there is a surplus at the 

present time, the Mangistau utility cannot be transferred completely to 

the Atyrau oblast because of the limited electrical capacity of the interconnecting lines.16

The intense growth of the oil and gas sector in Atyrau Oblast demands the construction of new electrical power generation capacity, using 

steam and pipeline cogeneration technologies. By 2015 new capacity likely 

will be needed. It is anticipated that no less than 14 billion kilowatts per 

hour of electrical energy will be needed for production on the offshore oil 

platforms of the Caspian Sea.17 Since the increased demand for electricity in Atyrau Oblast is tied to the growth in oil production, the growth 

of energy capacity can be realized by the building of electrical plants and 

by the oil companies developing the oil and gas deposits of the region. 

For example, the TengizChevroil Company, which already has a pipeline 

cogeneration plant with a 144- megawatt capacity, has built new gas-fired 

turbines for a 120-megawatt electrical station. A portion of this facility is 

currently operational, and full production capacity should be reached by 

2005.

The energy resources of Atyrau Oblast, in the form of secondary gas 

from the oil industry, will not only cover local demand but will also make 

it possible to create a large electricity export capacity. In the medium to 

long term, there is a proposal to create a high voltage, high capacity electrical network to transmit Atyrau electricity to Aktyube and the West-Kazakhstan Oblasts, and on to the northern regions of Kazakhstan, as well as 

to Russia and other countries.

In order to make Aktyube Oblast self-sufficient, new generating 

capacity is needed. The planned doubling of oil production in the Oblast 

could increase secondary gas production by some 600 to 700 million cubic 

meters, which is sufficient for the construction of a cogeneration plant 

with a 250 to 300 megawatt capacity and production of more than 2 billion kWh per year.18

In the West-Kazakhstan Oblast, it would be possible to construct 

natural gas pipeline cogeneration plants, especially at the Kapchagai 

condensed gas deposits, where a cogeneration plant with a 240-megawatt 

capacity is already under construction.19 In light of the planned exploitation of a group of oil and gas deposits in the immediate vicinity of Uralsk, 

and the corresponding release of large volumes of secondary gas, electrical 
ELECTRICAL POWER 311

power generation will increase sharply. These gas resources translate into 

potential electricity production of more than 80 billion kWh. This gas 

would suffice to cover the demand for electrical power in the region for 

some 30 to 40 years at current levels of demand.20

In addition to creating electrical connections between Atyrau, Aktyube, and Uralsk, plans are under review to construct a 500 kV overland 

transmission line between Aktyube (Ul’ke) and Zhitigora across the 

breadth of Kazakhstan. The realization of this 500 kV line project across 

Western Kazakhstan would make it possible to unite the energy network of 

this region with the Unified Energy System (UES) of Kazakhstan.

Patterns of Demand: Past and Future

Kazakhstan’s primary electrical energy production relies on cheap 

Ekibastuz coal. It should be noted that the highest production levels of 

electricity in Kazakhstan were reached in 1989, when it produced 88.9 

billion kWh.21 In spite of the aging of large portions of the existing plants, 

Kazakhstan’s electrical power plants at present have a known capacity potential which can fully cover domestic demands as well as create an export 

potential. Nonetheless, due to peculiarities within the network, southern 

and western Kazakhstan, as noted above, import electrical power.

The period between 1990 and 1999 in Kazakhstan was characterized by a drop in both demand and supply of electricity. In 1990, demand 

for electricity was 104.72 billion kWh and production was 87.38 billion 

kWh. In 1999, the numbers were 50.74 billion kWh and 47.47 billion 

kWh respectively, while in 2000, these numbers reached 54.38 billion kWh 

and 51.42 billion kWh.22 The installed capacity of Kazakhstan’s electricity 

plants on January 1, 2001 was 18,100 megawatts with a usable capacity of 

13,416 megawatts. Table 14–1 summarizes the basic data of energy production for the decade. Tables 14–2 and 14–3 show installed capacity and 

electricity production.

Table 14–1. General Characteristics, 1990-2000

Item Units 1990 1995 2000

Demand Billion kWh 104.7 74.38 54.38

Per Capita Demand kWh 6,236 4,480 3,664

Installed Capacity Megawatts 17,570 18,420 18,100

Supply Billion kWh 87.4 66.98 51.42

Balance (Imports) Billion kWh 17.34 7.4 2.96
312 SULEIMENOV

Table 14–2. The Structure of Installed Capacity (Jan 1, 2001)

Type Megawatts Percent

Thermal, Steam Pipeline, 

and Organic Fuel 15,541 85.9

Gas Pipeline 332 1.8

Hydraulic 2,228 12.3

Total 18,101 100

Table 14–3. The Structure of Electricity Production (Jan 1, 2001) 

Type

2000 2001

Billion kWh Percent Billion kWh Percent

Coal-Burning Thermal 37.3 72.5 40.52 73

Fuel-Oil and Gas-Burning 6.61 13 6.66 12

Hydro 7.51 14.5 8.06 15

Total 51.42 100 55.24 100

Table 14–4 provides the electricity balances (demand and production) by region and for the Republic for the past decade, and estimates 

to 2005 and 2010.23 As is clear from Table 14-4, the economic crisis of 

the transition period in Kazakhstan led to a significant drop in electricity 

demand. It is assumed that the country’s economic reform policies will 

lead to a gradual recovery from this crisis, a subsequent resurgence of 

demand for electricity, and eventual growth past old levels. According to 

the Kazakhstan 2030 Program,24 the 1990 level of electricity demand (104.7 

billion kWh) will be reached even in the worst-case scenario by 2030, and 

in the best-case scenario, by 2020.25 The pace of electricity production will 

depend on the development of the overall economy of Kazakhstan.

It is important to note that Kazakhstan is no longer a centralized 

command economy and is moving in the direction of a free market. Since 

1995, significant market reforms and transformations have been carried 

out. During this period, privatization of the most important enterprises 

in different branches of the economy was begun, including in such strategic sectors as electrical power and ferrous and precious metallurgy. This 

transformation will have a significant effect on the energy sector’s ability 

to meet the country’s future needs.
ELECTRICAL POWER 313

Table 14–4. Regional and Republican Electricity Balances to 2010 

(Billions kWh)

1990 1992 1994 1998 2000 2001 2005 2010

Electricity Demand

Total 104.72 96.87 79.43 53.40 54.38 56.66 59.00 72.00 

North 66.42 64.01 53.73 37.04 37.92 39.11 40.00 48.00 

South 26.43 21.63 16.45 9.70 9.49 10.13 11.00 14.00 

West 11.87 11.23 9.25 6.66 6.97 7.42 8.00 10.00 

Electricity Supply

Total 87.38 82.86 66.40 49.59 51.42 55.24 59.00 72.00 

North 63.89 61.27 52.04 37.42 40.43 44.02 41.90 49.80 

South 16.27 14.77 9.20 7.40 5.82 5.60 9.10 12.20 

West 7.22 6.82 5.16 4.77 5.17 5.62 8.00 10.00 

Balance

Total (17.34) (14.01) (13.03) (3.81) (2.96) (1.42) 0.00 0.00 

North (2.53) (2.74) (1.69) 0.38 2.51 4.91 1.90 1.80 

South (10.16) (6.86) (7.25) (2.30) (3.67) (4.53) (1.90) (1.80)

West (4.65) (4.41) (4.09) (1.89) (1.80) (1.80) 0.00 0.00 

Transformation of the Electricity Sector

Substantial transformation already has taken place in the electrical 

power sector of the country. It is important to note that the reconstruction 

and reorganization of the electricity sector started much later than did 

other sectors of the economy of Kazakhstan.26 Yet, at this point, the level 

of implemented market reforms in the electricity sector of Kazakhstan is 

far ahead of other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. 

The organizational structure of Kazakhstan’s energy sector has undergone 

significant change since the country became independent, and this reorganization itself has gone through several stages.27

Stage One

Stage One was the separation of the state regulatory systems from 

the economic functions of the industry. In February 1992, the Ministry of 

Energy was reorganized into the Ministry of Energy and Fuel Resources, 

with responsibility for regulating these branches of the energy sector. 
314 SULEIMENOV

Operations were transferred to the newly created vertically integrated 

State Electrical Energy Company KazakhstanEnergo, which was charged 

with the production, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity and 

heat, as well as the centralized financial management of its constituent 

Territorial Energy and Electrification Utilities. The company also took 

control of the departments of planning, construction, installation, maintenance, and repair of electrical plants, and the heating and electrical 

networks. The creation of this company coincided with the liberalization 

of prices on goods and services in the larger economy, but excluded subsidized prices on energy.

Stage Two

Stage Two started in 1995, when the sector was broken up through a 

decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan that created a Republican-level State-owned Enterprise called “KazakhstanEnergo National 

Energy System.” This enterprise was based on existing intersystem electrical transmission lines, the Republic’s largest electrical power plants (as 

subsidiaries), and nine “Territorial Energy Systems,” which also were to be 

State-owned. The design, research and development (R&D), construction, 

installation, and repair organizations were reorganized as independent 

contractors.

Stage Three

Stage Three of the reorganization of the electricity sector began in 

1996. The Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan issued a decree on 

the need to reform the state monopoly of generation and distribution of 

electric power, which created the prerequisites for the development of a 

competitive electricity market. To this end, a privatization and restructuring program was developed for the electricity sector, adopted by Government Decree Number 663 in May 1996.28 The basic idea of this program 

was a fundamental change in the form of ownership of generation plants 

in the electricity sector. 

Stage Four

 Stage Four was set into motion when Decree Number 1188, adopted 

in September 1996, created the Kazakhstani Electricity Management 

Company KEGOC, from the transmission and distribution assets of KazakhstanEnergo along with the transmission lines previously belonging to 

the territorial energy utilities and eighteen joint-stock electrical distribution companies. As a result of this stage, the basics of a market in electri-
ELECTRICAL POWER 315

cal energy and capacity emerged, based on mutual agreements between 

sellers and consumers of electrical energy, as well as between consumers 

and electricity distributors.29 Most important, the price of electricity was 

determined by the market and set by the producers themselves.

Stage Five

Stage Five occurred when the Government adopted a program for 

the further development of the electricity market during the 1997 to 2000 

period, which improved the initial model of a competitive electricity market that had been operating up to that time.30

In this way, the reorganization of the electrical power sector of Kazakhstan, and particularly the privatization program and sector reorganization, has:

■ Separated the competitive sector of the electricity industry (production and consumption) from the naturally monopolistic sectors 

(transmission and distribution); 

■ Realized the large-scale privatization of generating capacity:

◆ The powerful electrical plants of “national importance” (national 

importance means electrical plants that are essential for the 

economy of the country), which are located in the immediate 

proximity of the main deposits of cheap coal (Ekibastuz) have 

been privatized;

◆ High-capacity hydroelectric stations, used for regulating the grid 

load of the Unified Energy System (UES) of Kazakhstan, have 

remained the property of the State, and are managed as concessions;

◆ Industrial electrical plants, which supply electrical energy to 

major industrial enterprises, have been transferred to these industrial enterprises;

◆ Regional-level district thermal-electric systems—a source of both 

heat and electrical energy—have, for the most part, been privatized along with the regional electric distribution companies. The 

remaining systems have been transferred to municipal ownership.

■ Accomplished de-statization of the electrical network through the 

creation of: 
316 SULEIMENOV

◆ A joint-stock company “Kazakhstan Electricity Network Company” (KEGOC) on the basis of the main high-tension networks 

of 1150, 500, and 220 kV;

◆ Joint-stock distribution companies, on the basis of regional electrical networks of 110-135 kV and local networks of 6-10 and 

0.4 kV.

Structures that are defined as “natural monopolies of the electrical 

sector” come under the control of the State (within the Ministry of Energy 

and Mineral Resources). Tariffs for electrical transmission and distribution services are regulated by the Republic of Kazakhstan Agency for Regulation of Natural Monopolies, Fair Competition, and Small Business.

Conclusion

The wholesale electricity market in Kazakhstan accounts for about 

60 percent of consumption, which has allowed the decrease of tariffs on 

electrical power within the country.31 At present, the Government of Kazakhstan is discussing the concept of organization of the electrical power 

and services retail market. The development of a retail market for electrical power is a serious step in preparation for joining the World Trade 

Organization. Another problem under consideration is related to the price 

parity between the regions and inside of each network company. Also, 

there are questions related to the effective organization of electrical power 

retail trading.

In the Government’s view, it is necessary to separate the selling of 

goods (electricity) from services (provision of electricity) in retail trading. Thus, regional electricity companies (RECs) will purchase electricity 

from traders on the wholesale market, and then sell it to final consumers. 

The Government Anti-Monopoly Committee will regulate REC services, 

and the trading will be competitive. It also is suggested that selling electrical power be accomplished using electronic-commerce methods, which 

would offer consumers the opportunity to choose their source of power. 

The sale of electrical power to large-scale customers also has been 

suggested. In this case, factories and plants able to purchase 500 and more 

kWh in one transaction time may buy directly from a producing electric 

company. Minor consumers can form groups and jointly participate in 

such trading as well. Energy experts in the country support the concept of 

retail market formation; however, a pilot project will be required before it 

is introduced to the whole economy. The retail market is scheduled to start 

at the end of 2004.
ELECTRICAL POWER 317

The successful realization of the government’s program for reorganization of the electrical power sector of the economy, including State 

monitoring of the development of the sector and the relationship between 

market actors, will make it possible to ensure the energy security of Kazakhstan, the reliability of the electrical supply, the reconstruction and 

restarting of existing electrical plants and the construction of new sources 

of energy.

Editor’s Note

The electricity sector in Kazakhstan is deeply intertwined with regional water issues. 

See Daene McKinney’s chapter in this volume for a discussion of the importance of the regional electricity grid in resolving transboundary water disputes. The tendency to focus on 

supply-side issues in energy is quite common among energy scholars in the region. International Financial Institutions, however, have tended to focus on improving transmission and 

management. Future demand remains difficult to predict, since it depends on the evolution 

of the economy: The structure of industrial development in Kazakhstan will determine 

its energy needs. Predicting demand is further complicated by the fact that Kazakhstan, 

although it has improved collections rates dramatically, still does not recover the full price 

of electricity. Economists focus on “effective demand,” that is, demand among those who 

can pay full price. In Kazakhstan, the levels of “effective demand” remain unclear.

Notes 1 Kazakhstan’s Energy: Movement to the Market, (Russian language) (Almaty: Galim Publishing 

House, 1998), 582. 2

 GoK, Program of Development of Electric Energy to the Year 2030 confirmed by resolution of 

the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on April 9, 1999, no. 384, 2. 3

 Ibid., 3.

4

 Ibid.

5 Kazakhstan’s Energy, 582, table 2.6.1. 6

 The Unified Energy System was the all-Soviet system, which integrated Central Asia into a 

single electricity grid. 7

 K.D. Dukenbayev, E.G. Ulriks, and G.A. Papafansopulo, “Volume of the Market for Electric 

Energy and Demand for Investment in Energy,” Energy and Heat Resources of Kazakhstan, 2002, no. 

8, 4-12. 8

 Ibid., 5.

9

GoK, Program of Development of Electric Energy to the Year 2030, 10 K.A. Bozumbaev, “Five Years of Work of the National Company OAO ‘KEGOC,’” in Energy 

and Heat Resources of Kazakhstan, 2002, no. 9, 5, 11, and 25-26. 11 GoK, Program of Development of Electric Energy to the Year 2030, 5, 11, and 14. 12 Ibid., 5, 11, and 14.

13 Ibid., 14.

14 V.M. Barsukov and A.A. Zeibel, “Account of Electricity Output of Kazakhstan in 2002,” Energy and Heat Resources of Kazakhstan, 2003, no. 10, 5-19. 15GoK, Program of Development of Electric Energy to the Year 2030
318 SULEIMENOV

16 K.D. Dukenbayev, E.G. Ulriks, and G.A. Papafansopulo, “Volume of the Market for Electric 

Energy and Demand for Investment in Energy,” Energy and Heat Resources of Kazakhstan, 2002, no. 

8, 64. 17 Ibid., 6.

18 Ibid, 4-12.

19 Ibid., 12.

20 Ibid., 7.

21 Kazakhstan’s Energy, 99. 22 V.M. Barsukov and A.A. Zeibel, no. 6, 10-25.

23 Maximal scenarios in 2005 and 2010 are taken from the Ministry of Energy’s Kazakhstan 

2030 Electricity Development Program. 24 Plan 2030 for Kazakhstan, adopted as Government policy in 1998, set out the long-term goals 

of development for Kazakhstan. 25 GoK, Program of Development of Electric Energy to the Year 2030, 12. 26 Depending on the process of privatization in the energy sector.

27 Kazakhstan’s Energy, 4. 28 GoK, Program of Privatization and Restructuring in Electrical Energy, Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, no. 663, May 30, 1996. 29 GoK, Concerning Several Measures for Restructuring of the Regulatory System for Electrical 

Energy in Kazakhstan, Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, no. 1188, September 

28, 1996. 30 GoK, Concerning Additional Measures for Fulfillment of the Program of Privatization and 

Restructuring of the Electrical Energy and Long-Term Reform of the Electricity Market, Order of the 

Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, no. 1193, July 31, 1997. 31Tulegen Izdibaev, “Government Develops Concept for Organization of Differentiated Markets for Electrical Energy and Services,” Panorama, October 2003, no. 39.
Part III

Security Issues

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION 321

Chapter 15

Forging Relationships, 

Preventing Proliferation: 

A Decade of Cooperative 

Threat Reduction in Central 

Asia

Emily E. Daughtry

On December 21, 1991, as leaders of eleven Soviet republics gathered in the Central Asian city of Almaty, Kazakhstan, to formally dissolve the Soviet Union,1 the newly independent Central Asian 

states found themselves the unwilling hosts to some of the world’s most 

dangerous weapons. More than 1000 nuclear warheads were in place on 

over 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles stored at two remote locations 

on the Kazakhstani steppes.2 Covering a significant corner of northeastern Kazakhstan was the primary nuclear test site for the Soviet Union, 

where 456 nuclear tests were conducted.3 Several hundred miles to the 

west, Soviet specialists were working at one of the largest factories ever 

created for the manufacture and production of anthrax. To the south, the 

world’s only known open-air test site for biological weapons lay under a 

blanket of snow on an island shared by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the 

Aral Sea.4 West of the sea, a Soviet chemical weapons test site stretched 

over the Ustyurt plateau in Uzbekistan. A partially constructed chemical 

weapons production plant lay dormant in Northern Kazakhstan.5 Nearly 

600 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium fuel from an abandoned Soviet 

submarine program lay stored, forgotten, in a Kazakh metallurgy plant.6

A fast-breeder nuclear reactor, used for desalination, was operating on the 

shores of the Caspian Sea, capable of producing over 100 kilograms of 

plutonium annually.7 Yet these particular sites and weapons comprise only 

321
322 DAUGHTRY

a portion of the legacy of Soviet weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

bequeathed to the Central Asian states upon independence. 

As of spring 2003, almost all of these threats have been, or are being, 

eliminated by a relatively small U.S. Government initiative known as the 

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The achievements of this 

program have been, in short, phenomenal, and few could have predicted 

such success back in 1991. For the past decade, the United States has used 

the CTR program to help the states of the former Soviet Union dismantle 

and destroy infrastructure related to WMD and put in place safeguards 

to prevent their proliferation. While Central Asia has not been the focus 

of the CTR program, developments in that region have had interesting 

and significant effects on the program’s evolution. CTR has been critically 

important to Central Asia and has played a key role in the development of 

U.S. relationships with individual countries in this strategically vital part 

of the world. 

History 

The CTR program grew out of legislation sponsored in 1991 by 

Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA, now retired) and Richard Lugar (R-IN), in 

response to their concerns about control over the nuclear arsenal in a 

rapidly disintegrating Soviet Union.8 The goal of the initial legislation 

was to make available a relatively modest sum of Department of Defense 

(DOD) money each year to work cooperatively with Russia to safeguard 

and dismantle the Soviet nuclear arsenal.9 For the first two years, the legislation provided $400 million per year in transfer authority to DOD, which 

meant that the Department had to take $400 million from already existing 

projects and use it instead on cooperative dismantlement projects with the 

former Soviet Union.10 Senators Nunn and Lugar did not envision CTR as 

a foreign aid program and made efforts to restrict the money to tangible 

projects.11 Their intent was that CTR would contribute directly to U.S. 

national security by helping to eliminate nuclear weapons aimed at the 

United States, while simultaneously helping to prevent those weapons and 

their components from falling into the hands of rogue states and terrorist 

organizations.12

After some initial reservations, the first Bush administration supported the CTR program. However, the program did not come into its 

own until the change of administrations in 1993.13 Part of the initial 

inspiration behind Senators Nunn and Lugar’s introduction of the CTR 

legislation had been their exposure to work on the state of Soviet nuclear 

weapons done by Dr. Ashton Carter and his colleagues at the Harvard 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION 323

Center for Science and International Affairs.14 In 1993, Carter joined the 

Clinton administration as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 

Security Policy, which gave him direct responsibility for the CTR program 

and propelled the program forward.15 CTR also embodied the ideas of 

cooperative engagement and preventive defense, philosophies espoused by 

Carter and Dr. William Perry, who became Clinton’s Secretary of Defense 

in early 1994.16 With dual CTR supporters at the helm of DOD, the Clinton administration embraced CTR and made it a key foreign policy initiative.17 The new team included a request for an additional $400 million for 

CTR in its proposed budget to Congress for fiscal year 1994, and Congress 

promptly approved it.18 From that year on, CTR became a regular part of 

the DOD budget, and it was no longer necessary to reprogram funds from 

other DOD projects.

Initially, and to this day, the CTR program has been directed primarily at Russia rather than Central Asia. The vast bulk of the literature 

analyzing and evaluating the CTR program reflects this fact by concentrating on the program’s implementation in Russia alone. Such a state of 

affairs is hardly surprising, as Russia is the sole legal successor to the Soviet 

Union’s nuclear weapons arsenal and host to the overwhelming majority 

of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons infrastructure, materials and 

technologies. In addition, the program initially focused on reducing the 

nuclear threat, which also was understandable given that nuclear warheads 

were the defining weapons of the Cold War. As a result, literature on CTR’s 

presence in Central Asia is scarce. Nonetheless, several success stories have 

materialized over the past decade, and these stories are worthy of our attention. This chapter will document some of the ways in which the CTR 

program has contributed to the security of Central Asia while deepening 

U.S. diplomatic relations with the region and encouraging the development of strong, independent Central Asian states. 

Early expansion of CTR beyond Russia was limited to Belarus, 

Ukraine and Kazakhstan—the only three non-Russian Soviet successor 

states with nuclear weapons on their territories. The primary reason these 

three additional states were included in the CTR program was to provide 

incentives for them to voluntarily give up their inherited nuclear weapons,19 a decision that has been widely touted as one of the most significant 

and concrete accomplishments of the CTR program.20 As the program 

developed, however, it began to be seen as more than a narrow technical 

initiative designed to accomplish specific goals related to weapons dismantlement. In fact, CTR evolved into a means to engage these new states, 

develop relationships with their leaders, and emphasize U.S. concerns 
324 DAUGHTRY

about the importance of nonproliferation policies in the region.21 In Kazakhstan, for example, implementation of the CTR program became one 

of the most important aspects of the U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship, and 

gave the United States key insights into the largely unknown and unfamiliar Central Asian region. 

In the first part of the 1990s, U.S. policy makers treated Kazakhstan 

as a smaller, less complicated Russia, with many of the same proliferation 

threats and nonproliferation opportunities. As in Russia, CTR projects 

focused on reducing the nuclear threat. However, in succeeding years, 

CTR was recognized as an important tool that could be used not only to 

deal with threats, but also to take advantage of opportunities unique to 

Central Asia. For example, U.S. and Kazakhstani officials were able to build 

upon their existing CTR relationships and the trust they had established 

to expand the program into an area where it had been almost impossible 

to work in Russia: biological weapons nonproliferation.22 Once that door 

had been opened, it become logical to draw Uzbekistan into the program 

as well, and as in Kazakhstan, CTR cooperation became an important 

means of strengthening and deepening the U.S.-Uzbekistan relationship. 

DOD now plans to expand the program to include border security, an 

area all the more critical in the post-September 11 world.23 Thus, the CTR 

program is likely to have lasting benefits for U.S. security, and indeed for 

the security of the world. 

CTR in Kazakhstan: The Early Years

After the Soviet Union fell apart, a key U.S. foreign policy goal was to 

prevent the emergence of three new nuclear-armed nations, by convincing 

Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine to relinquish their nuclear weapons.24

On May 23, 1992, these three countries signed the Lisbon Protocol, becoming parties to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) between 

the United States and Russia, which had become the legal successor to the 

Soviet Union for all international treaties.25 Under the Lisbon Protocol, 

all three countries pledged to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT) as non-nuclear-weapons states, which meant relinquishing legal 

ownership of all nuclear weapons on their territories.26

It fell to the Clinton administration to ensure that these countries 

followed through on their pledge, and that they did so as quickly as possible. To achieve this goal, administration officials turned to the CTR 

program.27 According to one insider, the promise of CTR assistance “was 

the most consistent and productive tool available to U.S. diplomats” in 

negotiations on denuclearization.28 Senator Lugar stated this fact even 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION 325

more forcefully when he noted, “Without [the] Nunn-Lugar [program], 

Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus would still have thousands of nuclear 

weapons.”29

Once the Kazakh Parliament ratified the NPT in December 1993, 

effectively ensuring a nuclear-weapons-free Kazakhstan, the United States 

was obligated to fulfill its end of the bargain by providing assistance under 

the CTR program. Together, the two countries had to figure out what 

types of projects to develop using this assistance. Because Kazakhstan was 

inclined to see CTR assistance as a blanket reward for denuclearization, 

it was often difficult to reconcile what the Kazakhs wanted and felt they 

needed, with the restraints on the program in the CTR legislation.30 The 

initial legislation was quite specific, restricting the use of CTR funds to 

activities that were clearly related to the nonproliferation, safeguarding, 

destruction or dismantlement of WMD.31 In the face of these restrictions, 

the United States took the path of least resistance, simply modeling the 

CTR projects in Kazakhstan on existing CTR projects in Russia, which 

clearly fit within the scope of the legislation. 

The process of providing CTR assistance involved two important 

legal steps: first, an umbrella agreement was negotiated between the U.S. 

government and the recipient country governments, providing the basic 

legal framework for assistance.32 Then, for each specific CTR project area, 

a separate implementing agreement was negotiated and signed on the 

agency-to-agency level. In Kazakhstan, the umbrella agreement and the 

first set of implementing agreements were signed December 13, 1993, 

the same day that the Kazakh Parliament ratified the NPT. The implementing agreements enabled projects in the following areas: provision of 

emergency response equipment for use during the transport of nuclear 

weapons to Russia; establishment of a government-to-government communications link to facilitate data reporting for the START and INF arms 

control agreements; strategic offensive arms elimination for the dismantlement of SS-18 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos; nuclear 

warhead storage elimination; strategic bomber elimination; improvement 

of material control and accounting and physical protection (MPC&A) of 

nuclear materials; improvement of export controls; and establishment of 

defense and military contacts.33

All of these program areas paralleled CTR projects in Russia. Over 

the course of the previous year-and-a-half, implementing agreements also 

had been signed in Russia for provision of emergency response equipment, strategic offensive arms elimination, improvement of MPC&A, and 

establishment of defense and military contacts.34 A defense conversion 
326 DAUGHTRY

implementing agreement was signed with Russia in December 1993, and a 

Kazakhstani agreement on defense conversion followed just a few months 

later in March 1994. Additional agreements were signed with Russia for 

other CTR program areas, such as chemical weapons destruction and the 

conversion of plutonium-production reactor cores, but these were not 

relevant to Kazakhstan. In other words, every project area in Russia that 

could be copied in Kazakhstan was copied. 

The projects providing emergency response equipment and a continuous government-to-government satellite communications link were 

quickly and easily implemented. Projects to withdraw strategic nuclear 

weapons from Kazakhstan and eliminate ICBM missile silos, strategic 

bombers, and nuclear weapons storage facilities also were straightforward 

and considered highly successful. U.S. and Kazakhstani specialists worked 

together to implement these projects on the ground. One article from 

early 2000 found the projects for elimination of strategic offensive arms in 

Kazakhstan the “most successful” of all such projects in the former Soviet 

Union, as they were the first to achieve the complete elimination of all 

strategic weapons from a country.35 Withdrawal of all nuclear weapons 

and strategic bombers was completed by April 1995;36 the few remaining strategic bombers were eliminated in 1998, and all 147 missile silos 

were dismantled and destroyed by 1999.37 As a result, there are no further 

projects to be completed under the strategic offensive arms elimination 

implementing agreement in Kazakhstan. 

The next two project areas—of nuclear materials MPC&A and export controls—were inherently more complicated because they are premised not on the simple destruction of hardware, but on the creation of 

lasting systems and institutions. MPC&A projects involved the provision 

of equipment and training, and were established at the four primary locations in Kazakhstan where nuclear materials were located.38 For the most 

part, these projects ran more smoothly than analogous projects in Russia, 

due to, in the words of one analyst, “fewer nuclear facilities . . . , housing 

less nuclear material, with fewer bureaucratic obstacles.”39 In addition, 

because Kazakhstan is a non-nuclear-weapons state and its facilities are 

subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, it had 

fewer concerns about the protection of classified information.40 However, 

these projects were not without their problems. For example, concerns 

have been raised regarding the long-term sustainability of the MPC&A 

improvements and the development of a “safeguards culture” at the various nuclear installations.41 While it is difficult to quantify success in the 

development of such a “safeguards culture,” there is no question that nu-
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION 327

clear materials in Kazakhstan are more secure today than they were prior 

to the completion of U.S.-funded MPC&A projects there.

These projects began life as CTR projects run by DOD, but in fiscal 

year 1996 responsibility for them was transferred to the Department of 

Energy (DOE) where they took on a life of their own and became part of 

a larger program for the safeguarding of nuclear materials.42 In the same 

year, responsibility for export control assistance programs was transferred 

out of the CTR program at DOD and over to the State Department.43 The 

Department of Commerce and the DOE also developed export control 

assistance programs in Kazakhstan and some of the other Central Asian 

states, funded primarily through the State Department.44 Although export 

control projects involved the provision of some equipment (for example, 

it provided Kazakhstan with patrol boats for the Kazakhstani Coast Guard 

on the Caspian Sea), for the most part they focused on education and 

training. U.S. experts assisted Kazakh officials with the drafting of a comprehensive export control law.45 In addition, the program provided the 

United States with the opportunity to familiarize Kazakh officials with 

international export control regimes, which have been described as “a fundamental but largely unappreciated part of early Nunn-Lugar contacts.”46

Defense conversion stands out as the major exception to the success of the initial set of CTR projects in Kazakhstan. This was to be one 

of the most important projects for Kazakhstan, as it had the potential to 

contribute to the long-term development of their economy. According 

to Kazakh officials, “conversion to civilian and commercial purposes of 

industrial enterprises devoted to military production under the Soviet 

system is of paramount importance to Almaty.”47 However, CTR defense 

conversion projects were plagued by a number of problems caused by a 

variety of political and economic factors, and were dealt a death blow by 

the U.S. Congress in 1996, when it disallowed any new CTR funding for 

defense conversion activities in the former Soviet Union.48 CTR defense 

conversion programs were particularly susceptible to criticism, and Congressional opponents argued that such programs essentially subsidized the 

modernization of other areas of the post-Soviet defense establishments.49

Other arguments against defense conversion programs were that the 

money would be better spent converting the U.S. defense industry, and 

that the programs were too small to have any meaningful effect on the 

conversion of the mammoth Soviet defense industry. Thus, CTR defense 

conversion activities in Kazakhstan slowly dwindled. A few small-scale 

projects continued to be funded with CTR monies from earlier years, but 

others failed altogether.50
328 DAUGHTRY

In sum, the story thus far is one in which the United States aggressively pursued its goal of a nuclear-weapons-free Kazakhstan by first 

promising CTR assistance, and subsequently deciding the shape of that 

assistance through a series of specific projects. These projects focused primarily on nuclear weapons and nuclear materials, and were modeled after 

those CTR projects in Russia that were relevant to Kazakhstan. By and 

large these projects were successful, especially when compared with the 

more complicated and extensive corresponding projects in Russia.

CTR in Kazakhstan: Thinking Outside the Russian Box

If, during its early years, the CTR program helped to ensure the 

removal of nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan and provided concrete assistance for the dismantlement and nonproliferation-related projects discussed above, it also served another, perhaps equally important, purpose: 

providing the foundation for a strong, bilateral relationship between the 

United States and Kazakhstan. As one official explained, DOD recognized 

early on that a strong, strategic relationship with Central Asia was important to U.S. security and a useful counterbalance to Russia.51 The CTR 

program helped establish this relationship while simultaneously communicating the importance the United States placed on the development of 

nonproliferation policies in the region. Indeed, an article by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter and Steven Miller, his colleague 

from the Harvard University Center for Science and International Affairs, 

noted that the principle purpose of the Nunn-Lugar program was “less to 

finance specific technical steps than to set an agenda for denuclearization 

and cooperation and to command attention to this agenda.”52 Former administration officials have pointed out that negotiations and discussions 

over the CTR program were “the first in-depth direct channel of communication” between Almaty and Washington,53 and that the non-Russian 

CTR recipient states viewed CTR assistance as a “symbol of continuing 

U.S. commitment to their independence, national well-being, security, 

and a non-nuclear future.”54 An early Kazakhstani analysis of the program 

substantiated this position, warning that Congressional reductions in 

CTR funding “would reduce Kazakhstan’s basic trust in the policies of 

the United States.”55 As it turned out, trust did develop between the two 

countries as the initial CTR projects were negotiated and implemented. 

This trust led to a second wave of CTR projects in Kazakhstan, projects 

not modeled on CTR in Russia, but designed to address problems unique 

to Kazakhstan. 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION 329

The first such initiative was Project Sapphire, a secret endeavor that 

involved the removal and transport of a forgotten stash of highly-enriched 

uranium from the Ulba Metallurgy Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk to the Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee.56 Established in 1949, the Ulba 

Metallurgy Plant is a massive industrial enterprise that currently produces 

low-enriched fuel pellets for civilian nuclear power plants and processes 

strategic metals such as beryllium and tantalum. However, for a number of 

years during the Soviet era, the plant also produced weapons-grade, highlyenriched uranium fuel for use in naval propulsion reactors. Although 

production of such fuel apparently ended in the 1980s, when Kazakhstan 

became independent in 1991, a cache of 581 kilograms of highly-enriched 

uranium remained in storage at Ulba. Experts estimate this amount would 

have been enough to build more than 20 nuclear weapons.

Kazakh officials first informed the United States of the existence of 

this material in August 1993, and over the course of the next few months 

conveyed their concerns about the safety of the material, requesting assistance to secure it or remove it from the country altogether. This request 

would have been practically inconceivable without the existence of the 

ongoing dialogue between the United States and Kazakhstan on nonproliferation issues, begun in the context of CTR negotiations. By the time the 

United States confirmed the quantity and enrichment level of the material 

in February 1994, the CTR umbrella agreement, as well as the initial implementing agreements described above, were already in place, providing 

a legal framework for cooperation at Ulba. After confirming that Russia 

was not interested in taking the material itself (Russian officials claimed 

initially not to have any knowledge of the existence of the material), U.S. 

and Kazakh officials agreed that the safest option would be to remove the 

material. Although removal of the highly-enriched uranium clearly contributed to nonproliferation goals by eliminating the potential for the material to be stolen, it was a novel use of the CTR program. It also was not 

immediately clear that the compensation Kazakhstan sought for the fuel 

could be provided out of CTR funds. CTR agreements restricted assistance 

to in-kind support in the form of equipment, materials, technologies, and 

training; cash grants were not allowed. In the end, however, due to extraordinary efforts on both sides, the material was airlifted in November 1994 

from Ust-Kamenogorsk. Eventually, a compensation package was agreed 

upon that included the provision of computer equipment, vehicles, and 

medical supplies, all paid for using CTR funds. The delivery of this compensation was completed in August 1997.57 With Project Sapphire, U.S. 
330 DAUGHTRY

and Kazakhstani officials proved that CTR could be used for more than 

the regularly scheduled CTR activities. 

Another example of a unique use of CTR tailored to regional concerns was the project to destroy the nuclear test tunnels at the Degelen 

Mountain and Balapan underground test facilities on the Semipalatinsk 

nuclear test site. Between 1949 and 1989, 456 nuclear tests were conducted at Semipalatinsk, the Soviet Union’s primary nuclear test site.58

The Degelen Mountain project involved using conventional explosives to 

destroy the nearly 200 remaining test tunnels, rendering them useless for 

future nuclear testing. Kazakhstan was eager to prove its nonproliferation 

commitment to the United States, and every CTR project implemented 

in country represented jobs for Kazakhstanis. Although this project was 

clearly related to WMD, it, too, was not a traditional CTR project because 

it did not involve dismantlement and the tunnels did not represent an immediate proliferation threat. Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev 

officially closed the test site in August 1991,59 and it was highly unlikely 

that the test site would ever be used again as Kazakhstan had signed the 

NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Nonetheless, the project came to be 

seen as falling within the scope of the CTR legislation. One U.S. official 

commented that the project represented America’s recognition of the 

importance of engaging Kazakhstan for strategic and political reasons 

beyond proliferation threats, noting “there was a less restrictive approach 

to projects [in Kazakhstan]” than in Russia.60 A CTR implementing agreement for the project was negotiated between DOD and the Kazakhstani 

Ministry of Science and New Technologies, and was signed October 3, 

1995.61 A Defense Department press release hailed the agreement as “a 

symbol of both countries’ commitment to leadership in promoting global 

non-proliferation policies.”62

Probably the most significant set of second wave CTR projects in 

Central Asia involved former biological weapons facilities. The Soviet 

Union had a robust but illegal offensive biological weapons program, with 

numerous research and production facilities throughout Russia63 as well as 

a large anthrax production factory in Northern Kazakhstan, and a handful 

of research institutes in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. These outlying facilities conducted at least some research and development work for the Soviet 

biological weapons program.64 U.S. attempts to expand the CTR program 

into the biological weapons areas in Russia were met with complete stonewalling by Russian officials. Although President Boris Yeltsin admitted in 

1992 that the Soviet Union had conducted a secret offensive biological 

weapons program, in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention, the 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION 331

program is still shrouded in secrecy. According to one U.S. official, when 

the United States would raise the possibility of providing CTR assistance 

in the area of bioweapons, the Russians simply would deny the existence 

of bioweapons facilities on their soil. “Where can you go from there?” this 

official asked.65 In Kazakhstan, however, the situation was quite different. 

There, former bioweapons facilities were cut off from their former institutional structures, and there were no institutional actors in the central 

government in denial about the former Soviet program. The Kazakh leadership was able to show its commitment to nonproliferation by being open 

about the legacy of Soviet bioweapons in their country, and, at the same 

time, lobby for assistance from the United States to deal with that legacy. 

As a direct result of the personal relationships and trust that developed between U.S. and Kazakh officials during the implementation of 

other CTR projects, American officials finally secured permission from the 

Kazakh government to visit the anthrax production facility in Stepnogorsk 

in June 1995.66 Although they had known about the existence of the plant, 

U.S. officials were horrified by what they saw—the enormous scale of the 

plant, the level of decay within it, and the vulnerability of bioweapons 

scientists to recruitment. The plant was clearly a proliferation danger. It 

needed to be dismantled; and it was determined that CTR would be an 

appropriate tool for the job. In June 1996, one year after the first U.S. visit 

to Stepnogorsk, an amendment was signed to the 1995 implementing 

agreement governing work at Degelen Mountain.67 This new amendment 

provided the legal basis for biological weapons proliferation prevention 

activities in Kazakhstan under the CTR program. 

As of Spring 2003, all the equipment for production of biological 

weapons at Stepnogorsk has been destroyed, and the Defense Department 

is in the process of destroying the buildings themselves.68 In addition, new 

projects are underway to provide effective physical protection of biological 

agents at two research institutes: the State Agricultural Research Institute 

in Otar and the Anti-Plague Institute in Almaty.69 Finally, a new cooperative biodefense project seeks to develop cooperative research projects 

between Kazakhstani and U.S. scientists, to “prevent proliferation of biological weapons biotechnology, increase transparency, and enhance U.S. 

force protection.”70

Thus, in the second phase of CTR, assistance again has veered from 

its initial path of nuclear-related, Russia-modeled projects. Building on the 

relationships that CTR helped develop, DOD has used the agreement as a 

tool to address specific nonproliferation opportunities unique to Central 

Asia. In recent years, additional proliferation threats have been identified, 
332 DAUGHTRY

such as the partially constructed chemical weapons production plant in the 

city of Pavlodar in Northern Kazakhstan. The initiation of significant work 

in the former biological weapons sector in Kazakhstan was a breakthrough 

for CTR in this highly sensitive area, and now represents the greater part 

of CTR activity in Kazakhstan. In addition to preventing the proliferation 

of biological weapons-materials, these projects have the ancillary benefit 

of giving the U.S. important insights into the Soviet biological weapons 

program that Russia continues to obscure. Perhaps more important to the 

development of the CTR program, the biological weapons-related work in 

Kazakhstan has provided a road map for biological weapons-related CTR 

work in other countries, such as Uzbekistan, Ukraine and Georgia.

CTR in Uzbekistan and Beyond

The Defense Department’s expansion of the CTR program into Uzbekistan was very different from its expansion into Kazakhstan. The Uzbek 

government approached the United States for assistance with a discreet 

problem: the demilitarization of a remote facility for the research, development and testing of chemical weapons in the city of Nukus, in western 

Uzbekistan.71 Following the model for the second wave of CTR projects in 

Kazakhstan, the project was identified as one that fit into the CTR framework, and Uzbekistan quickly joined the CTR club without fanfare. In 

fact, DOD was so anxious to begin work that it started under a temporary 

agreement in 1997 with the Ministry of Defense while hammering out the 

CTR umbrella agreement over a period of several years.72

In addition to the Nukus project, which was completed in May 

2002,73 DOD has used the CTR program to implement a number of 

projects in the biological weapons-related sphere. After concluding a new 

implementing agreement for such work in October 2001, DOD began 

to demilitarize the former biological weapons test site on Vozrezhdeniye 

Island in the Aral Sea.74 In addition, DOD is in the process of establishing 

CTR projects along the lines of those in Kazakhstan for physical protection of biological agents and for collaborative bio-defense research at 

three research institutes: the Institute of Veterinary Science in Samarkand, 

the Institute of Virology in Tashkent and the Center for Prophylaxis and 

Quarantine of Most Hazardous Infections in Tashkent.75

DOD is currently developing a new set of CTR projects that is likely 

to expand CTR further within Central Asia. This major new initiative, 

called Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention (WMDPP), 

is designed to provide border security assistance to all eligible non-Russian 

states of the former Soviet Union, and has already received $40 million 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION 333

from Congress.76 Within Central Asia, initial WMDPP projects will occur 

in countries where CTR has already been established, such as Kazakhstan 

and Uzbekistan, but it is also likely that this initiative eventually will be 

expanded to Kyrgyzstan.77 The goal of WMDPP is to provide recipient 

countries with “self-sustaining, multi-agency capabilities to prevent, detect, and interdict WMD and related materials,”78 and the first priority will 

be to address indigenous operational capabilities at key border crossings. 

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in July 2002, 

Lisa Bronson, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense with responsibilities for 

the CTR program, noted that this initiative will further enhance U.S. security, not only by helping to prevent the proliferation of WMD to terrorists 

and “states of concern,” but also by “facilitating future U.S. activities in 

the region and reinforcing relationships with FSU [former Soviet Union] 

states” and “developing relationships with foreign counterpart agencies 

that will be useful in times of crisis.”79 This last comment could be a subtle 

acknowledgement that U.S.-Uzbekistan cooperation under the auspices of 

the CTR program played an important role in Uzbekistan’s prompt agreement to allow the United States to station troops in southern Uzbekistan 

during combat operations in the opening phases of the Global War on 

Terrorism in Afghanistan in late 2001.

Conclusion

A decade of CTR experiences in Central Asia has given the United 

States significant insights into this strategically important region of the 

world. While the CTR program has been and remains overwhelmingly 

focused on Russia, it is useful to note the evolution of CTR in Central Asia 

and the ways it has strengthened U.S. relationships there. It is clear that 

when the program was first introduced in Central Asia, there was not a 

systematic evaluation of the proliferation threats in the region nor a measured application of the program to counter those threats. Instead, a topdown approach was used, in which DOD copied Russian CTR projects to 

the extent that they were relevant. As the program evolved, this approach 

gradually gave way to a bottom-up approach where individuals on both 

sides identified specific proliferation threats and then used CTR as a tool 

to deal with those threats.

During this evolution, Central Asia has come to be understood as a 

region distinct from Russia, with a different set of nonproliferation problems and opportunities. Furthermore, in the context of the current war 

on terrorism, the future of the entire CTR program is increasingly focused 

on the threats posed by biological weapons proliferation, an aspect of the 
334 DAUGHTRY

program that has been particularly strong in Central Asia, and on border 

security issues addressed by the new WMDPP initiative.80 It is noteworthy 

that the CTR program has evolved to a stage at which an exclusively nonRussian initiative could be pursued. 

Over the course of a decade, the CTR program has provided Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with the resources to deal with specific problems that 

would have been difficult to address otherwise. It also has provided America with a concrete means of engaging with Central Asia on serious issues 

of mutual concern. This engagement deepened the relationships between 

the United States and Kazakhstan, and later between the United States and 

Uzbekistan. Each new project reinforces these relationships—and as new 

threats emerge, the countries will be better positioned to address them. By 

engaging with Central Asia to prevent the WMD proliferation, the CTR 

program has advanced U.S policies and contributed to U.S. homeland, 

regional and global security. CTR has proven flexible enough to address 

unanticipated threats, and at the same time maintained its primary focus 

on the dangers of proliferation. It has done so at minimal expense while 

yielding important side benefits. In an era obsessed with the control and 

elimination of WMD, CTR may prove to be an effective alternative to the 

more costly, more problematic resort to U.S. military force. 

Notes1

 David Remnick, “In New Commonwealth of `Equals,’ Russia Remains the Dominant Force,” 

The Washington Post, December 22, 1991, A39. 2

 In September 1990, there were 104 SS-18 ICBMs, each armed with 10 nuclear warheads, 

located at bases in Derzhavinsk and Zhangiz-Tobe in Kazakhstan. Table 1-C, Nuclear Successor States 

of the Soviet Union: Status Report on Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export Controls, no. 5, 

Monterey Institute of International Studies and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 

1998, 10. 3

 This test site, called the Semipalatinsk Test Site, is approximately 18,000 km2. See “Research 

Library: Country Information, Kazakhstan,” on the website of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, material 

produced by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/kazakst/weafacil/semipala.html>. 4

 The island is known as Vozrozhdeniye Island (translated as “Renaissance” or “Rebirth” Island), and the test site was officially referred to as “Aralsk-7” during the Soviet period. Gulbarshyn 

Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Yeleukenov, “Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities 

in Kazakhstan: Past, Present and Future,” Occasional Paper no. 1, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 

Monterey Institute of International Studies, June 1999. 5

 This was the Pavlodar Chemical Plant in the city of Pavlodar, Kazakhstan. Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, “The Pavlodar Chemical Weapons Plant in Kazakhstan: History and Legacy,” The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, 136. 6

 The fuel was located at the Ulba Metallurgy Plant, located approximately 20 miles outside 

Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan. William C. Potter, “Project Sapphire: U.S.-Kazakhstani Cooperation 

for Nonproliferation,” Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Co-
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION 335

operative Threat Reduction Program, John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds. (Cambridge 1997), 

345-346.7

 Jon Brook Wolfsthal, Cristina Astrid Chuen, and Emily Ewell Daughtry, eds., Table 4.6, 

“Mangyshlak Atomic Energy Combine,” Nuclear Status Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material and 

Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union, no. 6, Monterey Institute of International Studies and 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2001, 165. 8 See Sam Nunn, “Changing Threats in the Post-Cold War World,” Dismantling the Cold War, 

xvi, supra note 6; Richard Lugar, “Forward,” Defense by Other Means: The Politics of US-NIS Threat 

Reduction and Nuclear Security Cooperation, Jason D. Ellis (Westport 2001), xii. 9

 Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, P.L. 102-228. The program is also popularly 

referred to as the “Nunn-Lugar program.” 10 Jason D. Ellis, 80-81; Richard Combs, “U.S. Domestic Politics and the Nunn-Lugar Program,” 

Dismantling the Cold War, John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds. (Cambridge, 1997), 44. 11 For example, Senator Nunn has noted with frustration, “For some reason, [CTR] has come 

under attack as if it were a foreign aid program.” Sam Nunn, “Changing Threats in the Post-Cold War 

World,” Dismantling the Cold War, John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds., xvii. Senator Lugar has 

written, “Nunn-Lugar is not foreign aid. It is not charity.” Richard Lugar, “Forward,” Defense by Other 

Means, Jason D. Ellis, xii.

12 Congressional findings included in the first Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 

stated, “It is in the national security interests of the United States (A) to facilitate on a priority basis 

the transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear and other weapons in the Soviet 

Union, its republics and any successor entities, (B) to assist in the prevention of weapons proliferation.” Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, P.L. 102-228, available at <http://www.thomas.

loc.gov>. 13 See, for example, Ellis, supra note 10, 112; Combs, supra note 10, 47; Rose Gottemoeller, 

“Presidential Priorities in Nuclear Policy,” John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds., Dismantling 

the Cold War, 65. 14 See Nunn, supra note 11, xvi, referring to Kurt M. Campbell, Ashton B. Carter, Steven B. 

Miller, and Charles A. Zraket, Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating 

Soviet Union, CSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, November 1991); Gottemoeller, supra note 13, 67. 15 Ellis, supra note 10, 119. 

16 See Gloria Duffy, “Cooperative Threat Reduction in Perspective,” Dismantling the Cold War, 

John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds., 25. Also, see Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 

1999). 17 Duffy, supra note 16, 25; Gottemoeller, supra note 13, 65, 67.

18 Ellis, supra note 10, 82. 

19 Combs, supra note 10, 47-48; Gottemoeller, supra note 13, 65. 

20 See, for example, John M. Shields and William C. Potter, Dismantling the Cold War, 386; Ellis, 

supra note 10, 2, (Westport 2001); John W. R. Lepingwell and Nikolai Sokov, “Strategic Offensive 

Arms Elimination and Weapons Protection, Control, and Accounting,” The Nonproliferation Review, 

Spring 2000, 59. 21See John M. Shields and William C Potter, Dismantling the Cold War, 13-15; Combs, supra 

note 10, 48; Duffy, supra note 16, 26-27. See also, Ellis, supra note 10, 40-41. Ellis argues that there 

were “two major divergent approaches” to the CTR program. The first approach was broader and open 

to many ideas for reducing the nuclear threat from the NIS, including “intensive long-term attention 

to sustaining democracy in Russia and integrating it into the international community.” The second 

approach was more limited and short-term, focusing on specific destruction and dismantlement 

activities. 22 Author’s phone conversation with U.S. DOD official, October 2002. 

23 Ibid.
336 DAUGHTRY

24 Gottemoeller, supra note 13, 65; Ellis, supra note 10, 32 (“DOD officials ranked the denuclearization of the Non-Russian NIS Republics as the Chief Aim and `Ultimate Yardstick’ of the 

Program’s Success.”) 25 Text of Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (“Lisbon Protocol”) 

signed in Lisbon, Portugal on May 23, 1992, available on the Nuclear Threat Initiative website at 

<http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/fulltext/treaties/start1/s1lis.html> and on the U.S. Department of 

Defense website at <http://www.defenselink.mil/acq/acic/treaties/start1/protocols/start_1p.htm#VI>. 26 Ibid., Article V. 

27 Combs, supra note 10, 47-48.

28 Gottemoeller, supra note 13, 65. Another former official has noted that CTR, “played an important role in the decisions of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to forgo nuclear weapons capabilities.” Duffy, supra note 16, 25. See also, Ellis, supra note 10, 31. Ellis notes that CTR funds “provided a 

key incentive for Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to forgo the nuclear option . . . .None of these three 

states had the financial resources or capabilities to successfully undertake strategic denuclearization.” 29 Lugar, supra note 8, xiii. 

30 See Combs, supra note 10, 48; Gottemoeller, supra note 13, 66. 

31 The initial legislation for the Nunn-Lugar program limited assistance to “cooperation among 

the United States, the Soviet Union, its republics, and any successor entities to 1) destroy nuclear 

weapons, chemical weapons, and other weapons, 2) transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons 

in connection with their destruction, and 3) establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of 

such weapons.” Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, P.L. 102-228, available at <http://www.

loc.gov/thomas>. Although the subsequent versions of the authorizing legislation expanded the program to include prevention of “braindrain” of scientists with weapons expertise, defense conversion, 

and military-to-military contacts (P.L. 102-484), and later even programs for environmental restoration of military sites and the construction of housing for former military officers (P.L. 103-160), 

these expanded programs were quickly eliminated by subsequent Congresses. See Ellis, supra note 10, 

Chapter Four, 77-106. 32 CTR umbrella agreements typically include provisions that ensure that the assistance will not 

be taxed, that the U.S. will have the right to audit and examine assistance provided to ensure that it is 

being used for the purposes for which it was provided, that ensure that U.S. personnel have diplomatic 

protections in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and others. See Jack 

M. Beard, “Recent Development: A New Legal Regime for Bilateral Assistance Programs: International 

Agreements Governing the `Nunn-Lugar’ Demilitarization Program in the Former Soviet Union, ” 

Virginia Journal of International Law, 894 (Summer 1995), 35. 33 See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Kazakhstan 

Concerning the Destruction of Silo Launchers of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Emergency Response, and the Prevention of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed December 13, 1993 (United 

States – Kazakhstan Umbrella Agreement); Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the 

United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the 

Provision to the Republic of Kazakhstan of Emergency Response Equipment and Related Training in 

Connection with the Removal of Nuclear Weapons from the Republic of Kazakhstan for Destruction 

and the Removal of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and the Destruction of their Silo Launchers, 

signed December 13, 1993 (Emergency Response Implementing Agreement); Agreement Between the 

Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic 

of Kazakhstan Concerning the Provision to the Republic of Kazakhstan of Material and Services for 

the Establishment of a Government-to-Government Communications Link, signed December 13, 

1993 (Government-to-Government Communications Link Implementing Agreement); Agreement 

Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of 

the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the Provision of Material, Services, and Related Training to 

the Republic of Kazakhstan in Connection with the Destruction of Silo Launchers of Intercontinental 

Ballistic Missiles and Associated Equipment and Components, signed December 13, 1993 (Strategic 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION 337

Offensive Arms Elimination Implementing Agreement); Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning Control, Accounting and Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to Promote the Prevention 

of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, signed December 13, 1993 (MPC&A Implementing Agreement); 

Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry 

of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the Provision of Assistance to the Republic of 

Kazakhstan Related to the Establishment of Export Control Systems to Prevent the Proliferation of 

Weapons of Mass Destruction, signed December 13, 1993 (Export Control Implementing Agreement); 

and Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation on Defense and Military Relations Between the 

Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic 

of Kazakhstan, signed February 14, 1994 (Defense and Military Contacts MOU). 34 See Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the 

Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation 

and Storage of Nuclear Weapons Through the Provision of Emergency Response Equipment and 

Related Training, signed June 17, 1992 (Emergency Response Implementing Agreement); Agreement 

Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Economics 

of the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation in the Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms, 

signed August 26, 1993 (Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination Implementing Agreement); Agreement 

Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation Concerning Control, Accounting and Physical Protection of Nuclear 

Material, signed September 2, 1993 (MPC&A Implementing Agreement); and Memorandum of 

Understanding and Cooperation on Defense and Military Relations Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, signed 

September 8, 1993 (Defense and Military Contacts MOU). Unlike in Kazakhstan, there has never been 

an export control agreement in Russia, although it was not for lack of trying. The U.S. had hoped to 

provide CTR assistance for the improvement of Russian export controls, but negotiations on an agreement stalled and an agreement never materialized. Additionally, there was no need for a CTR agreement with the Russian Federation on a government-to-government communications link as Russia 

had inherited the Soviet Union’s link. 35 Lepingwell and Sokov, supra note 20, 60. 

36 Oumirserik T. Kasenov, Dastan Eleukenov, and Murat Laumulin, “Implementing the CTR 

Program in Kazakstan,” in John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War, 

194. 37 “Cooperative Threat Reduction: Kazakhstan Programs,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

website at <http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/ctr_kazakhstan.html>. 38 The four locations are: the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Alatau, a small village outside Almaty, and the Institute of Atomic Energy in Kurchatov City on the former nuclear test site near Semipalatinsk, both of which housed a few kilograms of highly-enriched uranium fuel for use in nuclear 

research reactors; the Mangyshlyak Atomic Energy Combine in Aktau on the coast of the Caspian Sea, 

the site of a BN-350 fast-breeder reactor and approximately 300 metric tons of spent fuel containing 

plutonium; and the Ulba Metallurgy Combine in the eastern Kazakhstani city of Ust-Kamenogorsk. 

The Ulba Combine manufactures low-enriched uranium fuel pellets and various other materials that 

have dual uses, i.e. that can be used both in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons and 

that have other non-weapons-related uses. Wolfsthal et.al., supra note 7, 160-165. 39 Jessica Eve Stern, “Cooperative Activities to Improve Fissile Material Protection, Control and 

Accounting,” in John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War, 327-328. 40 Ibid. 41 See Emily Ewell Daughtry and Fred Wehling, “Cooperative Efforts to Secure Fissile Material 

in the NIS,” The Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2000, 97. 42 MPC&A programs were transferred to DOE in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive-41, “U.S. Policy on Improving Nuclear Material Security in Russia and Other Newly Independent 
338 DAUGHTRY

States.” For a discussion of some of the reasons behind this move, see Ellis, supra note 10, 123 and 

Gottemoeller, supra note 13, 69-71. 43 Ibid.

44 These funds, which the Department of Commerce and Energy must apply for, come out 

of the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. See Scott Parrish and Tamara 

Robinson, “Efforts to Strengthen Export Controls and Combat Illicit Trafficking and Braindrain,” The 

Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2000, 114-115. 45 Kasenov et al., supra note 35, 197-201.

46 Michael H. Newlin, “Export Controls and the CTR Program,” in John M. Shields and William 

C. Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War, 305. 47 Kasenov et al. supra note 35, 203.

48 National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1997, P.L. 104-201. 

49 See Amy F. Woolf, “Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, Order No. 97-1027-F, updated March 6, 2002, available at < http://

www.fcnl.org/pdfs/nuc_nunn_lugar.pdf>. 50 For a discussion of CTR defense conversion activities in Kazakhstan and an in-depth analysis 

of the attempt to convert the former biological weapons production facility at Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, see Sonia Ben Ouagrham and Kathleen Vogel, “Conversion at Stepnogorsk: What the Future 

Holds for Former Bioweapons Facilities,” Cornell University Peace Studies Program, Occasional Paper 

#28, February 2003, available at <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ous01>. 51 Author’s phone conversation with U.S. DOD official, October 2002. 

52 Ashton B. Carter and Steven E. Miller, “Cooperative Security and the Former Soviet Union: 

Near-Term Challenges,” Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century, Janne E. 

Nolan, ed. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), 548. 53 Duffy, supra note 16, 26.

54 Gottemoeller, supra note 13, 65.

55 Kasenov et. al., supra note 35, 194.

56 For a detailed account of this story, see William C. Potter, “Project Sapphire: U.S.-Kazakhstani 

Cooperation for Nonproliferation,” John M Shields and William C. Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold 

War, 345-362. Factual information in this paragraph is drawn from that article. 57 “Cooperative Threat Reduction: Project Sapphire,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency website, <http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/project/projkaz/ctr_sapphire.html>. 58 See “Research Library: Country Information, Kazakhstan,” on the website of the Nuclear 

Threat Initiative, material produced by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/kazakst/weafacil/semipala.htm. 59 Ibid.

60 Author’s phone conversation with U.S. DOD official, October 2002.

61 See Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the 

Ministry of Energy Industry and Trade of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the Elimination of 

Infrastructure for Weapons of Mass Destruction, signed October 3, 1995 (Weapons of Mass Destruction Implementing Agreement). 62 “U.S.-Kazakhstan Agreement to Seal Up World’s Largest Nuclear Test Tunnel Complex,” DOD News Release, October 3, 1995, <available at <http://www.fas.org/news/kazakh/951004-

409811a.html>. 63 See Ken Alibek and Stephen Handelman, Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest 

Cover tBiological Weapons Program In the World--Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran It (New York

:Random House, May 1999). 64 For detailed descriptions of the Kazakhstani facilities and their former activities, see Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Eleukenov, “Former Soviet Biological Weapons 

Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present and Future,” Occasional Paper No. 1, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, June 1999. 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION 339

65 Author’s phone conversations with U.S. DOD official, October 2002. DOD is currently using 

CTR funds to pursue a limited number of biological weapons-related nonproliferation activities in 

Russia, but because DOD has yet to sign an implementing agreement for work in this area in Russia, it 

is forced to do so through the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow. From a legal 

perspective, this is less desirable than an implementing agreement as it does not provide the same level 

of protections to the United States. However, the work has been deemed important enough to U.S. 

policy goals that this awkward assistance mechanism continues to be used. 66 A detailed account of this first visit is provided in Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War (New York, 2001), 165-182. 67 Ben Ouagrham and Vogel, supra note 47, 36. The agreement is cited in supra note 59 and 

was initially amended to allow for work in the biological weapons nonproliferation sphere on June 

10, 1996. 68 “Cooperative Threat Reduction: BW Production Facility Dismantlement,” Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency website, <http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/project/projkaz/bw_secure_trans.html>. 69 “Cooperative Threat Reduction: BW Materials Security and Transparency,” Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency website, <http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/project/projkaz/bw_prod_facil_disman.html>. 70 “Cooperative Threat Reduction: BW Cooperative Bio Defense Projects,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency website, <http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/project/projkaz/bw_coop_bio_proj.html>. 71 Author’s phone conversation with U.S. Department of Defense official, October 2002. 

72 The temporary agreement was the Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the 

United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Uzbekistan Concerning Cooperation in the Area of Dismantlement of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Promotion of Defense and Military Relations, which 

was signed on June 27, 1997. The Umbrella Agreement is the Agreement Between the United States 

of America and the Republic of Uzbekistan Concerning Cooperation in the Area of the Promotion 

of Defense Relations and the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. It was not 

signed until June 5, 2001. 73 “Cooperative Threat Reduction: Nukus Chemical Research Institute Demilitarization [Complete],” Defense Threat Reduction Agency website, <http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/project/projuzb/ctr_

nukus.html>. 74 Alan Sipress, “U.S. to Help Uzbekistan Clean Up Anthrax Site,” October 23, 2001, A2.

75 “Cooperative Threat Reduction: Uzbekistan Programs,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

website, < http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/ctr_uzbekistan.html>. 76 Although both the State Department and the Department of Energy currently have programs that also focus on border security, neither of these programs is as well funded as the new DOD 

initiative. DOD plans to coordinate its new program closely with these other agencies. Author’s phone 

conversation with U.S. DOD official, October 2002. (Turkmenistan and Belarus are not eligible because they have not been certified by the State Department as required by the CTR legislation, due to 

poor human rights records.) 77 It is unlikely, however, that it will be expanded to Tajikistan or Turkmenistan any time soon. 

Tajikistan is still considered too unstable for the initiation of any major CTR projects. Furthermore, 

the heavy presence of border guards from the Russian Federation on the Afghan-Tajik border complicates any potential U.S. border-related assistance to Tajikistan. As indicated in supra note 75, Turkmenistan is not currently eligible for CTR assistance. 78 “Combating WMD Smuggling,” Testimony of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Lisa 

Bronson before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, July 30, 

2002. 79 Ibid.

80 Author’s phone conversation with U.S. DOD official, October 2002.
340 DAUGHTRY
BUILDING SECURITY 341

Chapter 16

Building Security 

in Central Asia: 

a Multilateral Perspective

Jennifer D.P. Moroney

Over the past decade, many actors—including Russia, the United 

States, and to a lesser extent multilateral security institutions—

have sought to deepen their ties to the five Central Asian states 

for a myriad of reasons, not least being the presence of large oil and gas 

reserves. Russia views this region as within its sphere of influence and 

interest, and as a bulwark to instability coming from the south, specifically from Afghanistan, Iran, and potentially, India and Pakistan. Russia 

has supported the development of closer relations with the Central Asian 

republics on an economic, political and military level through the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), by including them in the security 

framework, the CIS Collective Security Treaty (CST). With no shortage 

of bilateral and multilateral security treaties signed between them, the 

perception among many Western analysts in the mid 1990s was that Russia and Central Asia were clearly connected in the arena of security and 

defense.1

In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United 

States and the subsequent war in Afghanistan, a combination of support 

pledged by Central Asian states to the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism and the need for such support have brought Central Asia into the 

international spotlight. But in deepening ties with these states, the West 

has become more acutely aware of the plethora of security challenges in 

this region, including extremely porous borders, high-level corruption, 

economic and energy insecurity, and the presence of groups determined to 

overthrow the current regimes. In short, there is a new appreciation in the 

West of Central Asia as a strategically crucial region at the crossroads of a 

variety of influences. Western states and institutions now are taking seri341
342 MORONEY

ously the security problems of the region and concerns of Central Asia’s 

leaders. While Western governments continue to strengthen their security 

cooperation with these states, Western institutions continue to assist in 

the building of democratic regimes operating under the rule of law, the 

transition to market-oriented economies and the building of reliable security and economic institutions. Though progress in instituting reforms 

has been slow, security assistance to these states continues to grow. To date, 

security assistance to Central Asia has not been conditional on progress in 

the transition to democracy and other Western ideals. 

The lack of an overarching security institution to manage security 

problems is mirrored in the proliferation of security threats to the region. 

The West and Russia are both attempting to fill the security vacuum that 

appeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Because security concerns 

in this region are transnational by nature, it can be argued that transnational solutions are needed, and multilateral institutions could serve in 

helping these states build more effective regional ties on a number of 

security-related areas. However, finding multilateral solutions to regional 

security problems in Central Asia is no easy task. Regional cooperation is 

a contentious issue among these states as historic mistrust and animosity 

loom large, particularly between the two largest states, Uzbekistan and 

Kazakhstan. Multilateral programs, both military and non-military, have 

met with limited success due to the difficulties associated with regional 

cooperation in Central Asia. The danger stemming from a lack of regional 

military cooperation is twofold according to Martha Brill Olcott, a leading specialist on the region. First, if these states were to pursue separate 

military developments, the inherent distrust in the region would not be 

alleviated and, in fact, could be exacerbated. Second, all of these states are 

militarily weak, and even the two largest, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, cannot provide for their own security.2

This chapter will investigate the prospects for multilateral cooperation in Central Asia and the steps to necessary address these challenges. 

The multilateral institutions that are discussed and evaluated for their 

effectiveness in the region include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), the European Union (EU), the CIS, the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),3

 and GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova).4

The key questions this discussion will address include: 

■ What are the most visible security threats in this region? 

■ What are key Western and Russian security interests in this region? 
BUILDING SECURITY 343

■ What are the discernable benefits for the participants for their 

membership in multilateral or regional organizations? 

■ Which security issues tend to polarize the actors in the region? 

■ Which, if any, regional or multilateral institutions are best able to 

provide the types of security assistance that the Central Asian states 

really need? 

■ What are the implications for Central Asia in favoring one institution over another (e.g., NATO over the CIS)?

The challenges associated with improving security in this region 

will continue to capture the attention of Western states, Russia and also a 

growing number of regional organizations, in an attempt to improve the 

security situation and maximize influence in the region. There may be no 

quick fixes to the extreme security challenges in Central Asia. Yet it will 

be argued that an expanded involvement of Western multilateral security 

organizations can have a positive effect by facilitating regional security 

cooperation and helping to build mutual trust and confidence.

Security Environment Overview 

In order to better understand the consequences and potential benefits of multilateral engagement in Central Asia, it is first necessary to 

understand the security environment in which these states are operating. 

It should come as no surprise that the Central Asia region, a crossroads 

for a myriad of influences, including Slavic, Middle Eastern and Oriental, 

is experiencing instability along ethnic and religious lines. Moreover, a 

lack of economic reforms and free trade arrangements with the West, high 

levels of corruption and the remnants of a command economy structure 

left over from Soviet times add to regional stress. Although Kazakhstan 

and Turkmenistan inherited vast energy reserves from the USSR, the difficulty in extracting these resources thus far has hindered the economic 

development of the region. Non-military or “soft security” threats, such as 

the cross-border transit of terrorists, narcotics, small arms and materials 

associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), are among the primary security concerns for the West, Russia, China and the Central Asian 

republics themselves.

Because border security threats are transnational by nature, many 

institutions and states, as well as non-government organizations (NGOs) 

and the private sector (especially energy-oriented businesses), have sought 

to support Central Asian states in their attempts to improve the border security situation. Assistance offered varies, but is primarily focused on pro-
344 MORONEY

viding training and equipment, as well as improving regional dialogue by 

holding a plethora of international conferences and seminars. Uzbekistan 

and Krygyzstan have received the greatest attention and resources because 

of the threat posed by terrorist groups in the region, such as the Islamic 

Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The IMU is seen as having links with al 

Qaeda as well as other radical Islamic fundamentalist groups, and desires 

to overthrow the government of Uzbekistan and create an Islamic state. 

Until recently there have been few mechanisms for successfully regulating 

the border situation, although the United States has provided a significant 

amount of resources—over $82 million in FY02 for the largest program, 

the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) assistance program, as well as several other smaller initiatives.5

The Central Asia Security Vacuum 

For the first five years following the break-up of the Soviet Union, 

the Central Asian republics were not a priority for the West, primarily 

because these states were viewed as within Russia’s sphere of influence. 

As a result, the United States, NATO, and the EU paid little attention to 

the region, even given the presence of large untapped oil and gas reserves. 

America provided no substantial economic aid packages to Central Asia 

and focused instead on assisting the western Newly Independent States 

(NIS) of Ukraine and Moldova. The South Caucasus states (Georgia, 

Azerbaijan, and Armenia) were also higher on the priority list. The Central Asian republics had no “Western card” to play to counter Russia’s 

influence in the political, economic, energy or military spheres. Further, 

given objections from Russia to U.S./NATO military or political outreach 

to these states, NATO did not attempt to reach out to Central Asia. With 

no Western security option for Central Asia, they retained their relatively 

tight security cooperation within the CIS framework.

Russia attempted to fill the security vacuum in the Former Soviet 

Union (FSU) by encouraging greater cooperation among CIS members. 

The creation of the CIS, and subsequent attempts to deepen cooperation 

in a number of key sectors, was an attempt to increase dependency on 

Russia and to create some kind of “institutional normalcy” in the region in 

place of the Soviet Union. In the security sphere, the Tashkent CST of 1992 

was signed by seven states including Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Uzbekistan, 

Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, and accorded Russia leverage over 

its less powerful neighbors. The extent of these security ties between CST 

affiliates has varied over time in response to political and economic leverage exercised by Russia. Moreover, the individual members have differing 
BUILDING SECURITY 345

relations with other actors in the region and with the West, which impacts 

their participation in the CST collective security framework.

Importantly, Uzbekistan refused to sign the second phase of the CST 

when it was proposed, which took place prior to September 11. Therefore, 

Uzbekistan was not in Russia’s official security sphere when the United 

States went in to try to negotiate basing rights on Uzbek territory. As a 

result of Uzbekistan’s post September 11 role in the War on Terrorism, 

Uzbekistan’s security ties with America have been improved in the form 

of a “Strategic Partnership” signed in March 2002. This agreement calls 

for the United States to “regard with grave concern any external threat” 

to Uzbekistan.6 Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and to a lesser extent, Tajikistan 

and Turkmenistan also have become important U.S. coalition partners 

and like Uzbekistan have received a considerable increase in security assistance over the past year. Although Russia is no longer unilaterally able 

to dictate the foreign and security policy orientation of the Central Asian 

states, common interests still remain between the CIS states and Russia, 

and Russia remains influential in the region.

In the mid 1990s, Russia’s economic trade, as well as its military 

cooperation with Central Asian states, began to decline. Russia’s main 

security role centered on the sale of military supplies, a peacekeeping contingent in Tajikistan, and coordination with these states over anti-terrorist 

measures.7 During this time, the Central Asian states (with the exception 

of Tajikistan which was heavily involved in a civil war) also sought to 

diversify their international relations with actors outside the confines of 

the CIS. New trends included deepening relations with China, Turkey and 

Iran, in addition to the United States and other Western countries. Zbigniew Brzezinski noticed this shift in the late 1990s and called for a change 

in the U.S. strategy, to “consolidate and perpetuate the prevailing geopolitical pluralism on the map in Eurasia” in response to what he saw as a 

shift in the international orientation of some of the Central Asian states.8

The United States first showed interest in playing some kind of role 

in the security vacuum in Central Asia in the late 1990s as U.S. policymakers grew concerned over increases in small arms, narcotics trafficking, and 

terrorist movement across the porous Central Asian borders. Moreover, 

the shift of IMU to insurgency tactics as well as the increasing effectiveness 

of the IMU, encouraged the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct 

Special Forces exercises in the region. U.S. Special Operations forces thus 

began engaging in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2000 (more modestly 

in Kyrgyzstan). The widely held perception in the United States was that, 

left to their own devices, the Kyrgyz and Uzbek governments would adopt 
346 MORONEY

the same tactics as Russia in Chechnya, if they were not shown alternative 

methods for dealing with insurgencies.9

The strategic interest in Central Asia among the United States, Russia, China, Iran and Turkey in filling the security vacuum has led to a situation of free competition, which has the potential to result in a zero-sum 

game for Central Asia. The inherent danger is that the region will become 

further divided, with each state preferring to develop ties on a bilateral 

basis with prominent states and institutions to improve their individual 

security situation, without reference to each other. The inability of Western institutions to agree as to their specific roles or to identify gaps and 

redundancies regarding the kinds of assistance and programs offered only 

exacerbates this situation. Instead, what is needed is cooperative dynamics 

with common ground for joint solutions in the framework of multilateral 

groups and organizations.10

As will be discussed in the forthcoming sections, a variety of security 

arrangements are taking shape in Central Asia to fill this need. Included in 

these arrangements is the establishment of new bilateral and multilateral 

ties, focused on military and non-military security issues. The success of 

these new multilateral arrangements will depend upon three factors: the 

Central Asian states’ perceived value in participating; the internal and external dynamics that both reinforce and curtail the development of such 

ties; and the ability of the institutions to contribute in a tangible way to 

regional security. The following section is an overview and analysis of the 

more prominent multilateral security organizations and arrangements, 

and an evaluation of their ability to address real-time security concerns of 

the Central Asian nations.

Looking West

NATO

NATO’s philosophy of expanding security and stability eastward 

and southward in the region means that, in theory, NATO should become 

more intrinsically involved in the security of the states of the former Soviet 

Union, including Central Asia. But traditionally, NATO has placed much 

more emphasis on the Baltic states, Russia and Ukraine, showing less of an 

interest in engaging the South Caucasus and Central Asian states, the latter 

viewed until recently as almost entirely outside NATO’s purview within 

the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework.

While direct contact between NATO and the Central Asian states 

throughout the mid to late 1990s was modest, NATO allies did monitor 
BUILDING SECURITY 347

and participate in U.S.-led multilateral exercises with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan conducted “in the spirit of” PfP. Multilateral exercises 

such as the CENTRABAT/Regional Cooperation series, which consisted of 

tabletop and field exercises in the realm of peacekeeping, were held.11 Also, 

the Central Asian partners have participated for several years in the annual 

International Workshop on Emergency Response (IWER), also an “in the 

spirit of” PfP multilateral exercise aimed at improving their preparedness 

in consequence management and disaster relief. 

Operating under an “open door” policy, NATO uses the various tools 

at its disposal to work with partners. These tools allow for maximum cooperation between the Alliance and individual partners, assisting along a 

continuum to the extent desired by the partner. Beginning with membership in PfP, countries are encouraged to deepen their relationship with 

NATO by participating in specific mechanisms, while setting interoperability, defense, and economic reform goals to jointly measure progress 

along the way. Figure 16–1 is a sketch of NATO’s integration progress:

Figure 16–1. NATO Integration Progress

(PfP) = Partnership for Peace member

(PWP) Partnership Work Plan = Annual NATO drafted plan of activities under PfP

(IPP) Individual Partnership Plan = From the PWP, partners construct an IPP, which becomes the Forecast of Events for the year

(PARP) Planning and Review Process = Setting of specific interoperability goals 

(MAP) Membership Action Plan = NATO membership candidate/Aspirant status

There is no set time for how quickly a partner should move through 

this process; it is up to the individual partner to determine the level and 

scope of cooperation with the Alliance. Geopolitical developments play a 

large role, and the reaction of Russia has been an important concern for all 

FSU states. However, because Russia and NATO have improved their relations due in part to the War on Terrorism, Russia’s objections to the FSU 

states’ ties with NATO have waned. Ukraine and Georgia officially have 

stated their intention to join MAP (declaring the desire to join NATO); 

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan have joined the Planning and Review Process (PARP); and Tajikistan has recently become a PfP member.12
348 MORONEY

One could argue that the timing of these decisions is directly related to this 

new geopolitical environment, where Russia and NATO have established 

rapport in the NATO-Russia Council.

It is important to point out that NATO-Central Asia relations have 

met with some constraints, with more serious challenges along the way. 

Central Asian partners are, by and large, not enthusiastic PfP participants 

and prefer bilateral security ties with the United States and others, such 

as Germany. Indeed, Central Asian Ambassadors to NATO and their staffs 

do not actively participate in discussions at NATO Headquarters and in 

military planning discussions at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 

Europe (SHAPE).13 One reason why NATO has been less successful in 

drawing Central Asia closer to the West is that NATO advocates a model 

for its engagement with partner countries in Eurasia, which is focused on 

improving regional cooperation. Although this model has been successful 

in promoting regional cooperation in Eastern Europe, and even in the 

Western FSU, its application to a region in which deep distrust characterize the state of relations is a continuing challenge. However, given NATO’s 

positive track record for spurring regional cooperation elsewhere in Europe and Eurasia, hope still exists. The difficulty is finding the right ‘carrot’ 

to extend to the Central Asian partners, since the Central and Eastern Europe carrot of NATO membership is not viable in the near future. NATO 

either has to be more encouraging and accepting of Central Asian states 

as partners by offering increased resources to spur defense reform and 

military professionalization, or it has to offer a diversification of activities 

within the confines of PfP to address the security needs in this region, such 

as improved border security. 

Another challenge in bringing the Central Asian states closer to 

NATO and Western Europe involves providing training and equipment 

to improve their defense self-sufficiency. NATO is often a slow mover in 

terms of planning and executing security assistance programs, and does 

not have the money to provide extensive, capacity building assistance. The 

tool that NATO has at its disposal to improve interoperability, confidence 

building, and regional cooperation is the PARP. This process assists in 

both defense reform and restructuring, and is certainly noteworthy as a 

beneficial method of engagement. For the most part, participation in PfP 

has not been a political or military issue for Central Asian states, although 

the financial burden often stymies their involvement.14 PARP, on the other 

hand, requires partners to disclose information on the state’s range of defense and military capabilities, along with details about the force structure 
BUILDING SECURITY 349

and the defense budgets, all of which is viewed as extremely intrusive by 

the Central Asian states. 

Other FSU partners, such as Ukraine and Georgia, have participated 

in PARP, disclosing such “sensitive” information, and acknowledging the 

importance of improving regional cooperation, information sharing, 

interoperability and defense reform. As a result, they have moved closer 

to Western security structures. In theory, if Central Asian states follow a 

similar path, it is likely that they will move closer to NATO in the sense 

of improving interoperability and possibly, security agreements down 

the road. The challenge for NATO is to ensure that the mechanisms for 

building partnerships in Central Asia are appropriate to the needs of these 

countries in their threat-driven security environment. Both Uzbekistan 

and Kazakhstan joined PARP after September 11, which is a significant 

step forward, but the cooperation can still be improved.15 Elements of 

PfP could include, for example, more focused exercises to improve infrastructure, military support to civilian authorities in a crisis, and regional 

cooperation to counter the transnational security threats. In short, NATO 

must ensure that the PfP activities are relevant to the security needs of 

all of Central Asia. Otherwise, NATO runs the risk of being an ineffective multilateral engagement tool for this region, and encouraging these 

states to seek bilateral security assistance from the United States and other 

countries. However, NATO has something unique to offer to its partners: 

a proven forum for increasing security cooperation among actors in a 

given region, as well as a tested “open door” policy. The circumstances 

and incentives are different for Central Asia, but the institution has many 

mechanisms available to assist its partners in building solid relationships 

with NATO and with each other.16

European Union

In addition to NATO, the EU also offers some positive incentives for 

the Central Asian states. The EU’s relations with Central Asian partners 

have a legal basis in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), 

which guide political and economic discussions.17 Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan have concluded PCAs with the EU, though 

the agreement with Turkmenistan has not yet entered into force. No PCA 

has been concluded with Tajikistan yet, though with the civil war now 

ended, it is likely that negotiations could be underway soon. 

The PCA was intended as a mechanism to establish a stronger political relationship in the developing network of Central Asia’s connection 

with the EU. On the economic side, the PCA marks an important step in 
350 MORONEY

helping to bring these states in line with the legal framework of the single 

European market and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The PCAs 

concluded between the EU and its partners are intended to facilitate the 

development of free trade, and can be seen as a road map for the introduction of economic and trade-related policies in the fields of goods, services, 

labor, current payments, and capital movement. Although the document 

is in many ways evolutionary, its implementation is a precondition for the 

development of further trade and political relations between the parties. 

Moreover, the European Commission Technical Assistance to the 

CIS (TACIS) program assists partner states, including Central Asia, by 

focusing on the promotion of cooperation in the areas of environment, 

networks (telecommunications, energy and transport), justice and home 

affairs. Their focus is on certain cross-border issues, including the activities of sub-regional cooperation bodies and initiatives.18 In addition, the 

Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA) program of 1993 

aims to bring together trade and transport ministers from the original 

eight TRACECA countries (five Central Asian republics and three Caucasian republics). The goal is to develop a transport corridor on a west-east 

axis from Europe, across the Black Sea, through the Caucasus and the 

Caspian Sea, and onto Central Asia.19 Uzbekistan in particular is hoping to 

capitalize upon its geopolitical position as the pivot in regional trade once 

the TRACECA program establishes a new “Silk Road,” which will span 

from China to Western Europe. TRACECA hopes to attract investments 

from international financial institutions such as the European Bank for 

Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which have committed U.S. 

$250 million, and the World Bank, which has pledged an additional U.S. 

$40 million towards the completion of the project.20 TRACECA projects 

are deemed essential for the diversification of the traditional Moscow-centered trade and transport flows and for opening trade routes to the West. 

Moreover, while there appears to be some movement in the area of 

EU support for police training centers and potential cooperation with the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as 

improved border security measures in the region, in general Central Asian 

security issues are simply not at the forefront of the minds of bureaucrats 

in Brussels, and the EU does not have enough money to begin with.21 The 

EU, as opposed to NATO, primarily focuses on “soft security” matters such 

as trade, water management, and other environmental security concerns 

in Central Asia. Politically, the EU relies on the PCA to guide discussions 

between the Central Asian partners and the EU Commission. But until a 

partner reaches the status of “Associate Member” (i.e., candidate for EU 
BUILDING SECURITY 351

membership), the tangible benefits of this association are not as significant, particularly for Central Asia, which is still widely perceived by the 

EU as outside its immediate area of interest. Although NATO is taking a 

slightly more proactive role through PfP, Central Asia is still lower down 

on the totem pole compared to the Western CIS and the South Caucasus, 

particularly Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Looking Northwest 

Commonwealth of Independent States

In the security and defense sphere, the CIS CST serves as the primary 

means for Russia to maintain leverage over the Central Asian states. The 

Treaty, as well as a series of initiatives to develop a CIS customs union 

(CIS-wide and later between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan22

and Tajikistan), was given greater impetus by a 1995 decree issued by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The decree detailed a new direction for the 

CIS on closer security cooperation and embodied the belief that the CIS 

is the basis for Russia’s reconstitution as a great power. On defense and 

security matters, the decree sought to “stimulate intentions of the CIS state 

parties to unite in a defense alliance”23 and urged all states to conclude 

agreements in the military infrastructure and to encourage Russian military bases on the outward perimeter throughout CIS territory. A key goal 

was obtaining an obligation from the CIS member-states to refrain from 

participating in alliances and blocs directed against any of the other CIS 

members, specifically NATO.24

Although the CST created a formal system of collective defense, 

it has been activated only for the limited purpose of consultation over 

threats posed by Afghanistan. The important question is whether, if the 

CST continues to exist, it can serve any utility as a mechanism to discuss 

and deal with security concerns of its members, including terrorist activities, and the cross-border movement of items relating to WMD, narcotics 

and small arms. Uzbekistan, for one, already has determined that the CST 

does not have an important regional security role to play, as evidenced by 

its withdrawal from the arrangement, and Uzbekistan has strongly indicated its preference for developing security relationships with the West. 

If the Central Asian states themselves are continuing to develop security 

relationships with actors outside the confines of the CST and Russia is 

continuing to loosen the strings on the CST, then it is difficult to see how 

it can remain viable. 
352 MORONEY

The Central Asian states have attempted to distance themselves from 

Russia in a number of key areas, most recently in a collective proposal to 

establish a nuclear weapons free zone in the region, which was recently 

passed. The agreement has met with controversy in Moscow. Officials 

maintain that the CST allows Russia the right to redeploy nuclear weapons 

in Central Asia in the future, which is a disputed interpretation among the 

Central Asian states.25

The lack of enthusiasm for the CST and the CIS as a whole, with the 

notable exception of Russia, is exemplified by the fact that its members 

have not attempted to implement the economic and security agreements 

signed within the confines of the CIS, and actively seek to deepen their 

participation in other regional organizations. Overall, the CIS is widely 

viewed as an ineffective multilateral forum for dealing with regional security concerns. The rhetoric of the CIS is similar to that of the EU, but the 

CIS does not display the features of the EU, such as the Common Market, 

the Common Foreign and Security Policy, or the movement toward a 

shared identity.26

Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

The prospects for a longer-term U.S. military presence in Central 

Asia have raised eyebrows not only in Russia, but also in China, which 

borders Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. China has been looking to expand its influence in this region, and together with Russia has 

been instrumental in establishing the SCO, which includes China, Russia, 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.27 The SCO originally 

was created to resolve ongoing border disputes in the wake of the Soviet 

Union’s collapse. The broadening of the SCO’s focus to a more institutionalized security organization was in response to the increased threat in the 

region from non-state actors, such as the IMU.

The states in the SCO have reached agreements on military reductions and confidence building, and the SCO has become a mechanism 

for consultations on trade, water and border security. Its primary goal, 

however, is to counter the spread of Islamic extremism and terrorism. 

However, it is important to note that China has not indicated a desire to 

offer security guarantees or provide a military presence in Central Asia. 

This fact reinforces the perception that Russia and the United States are 

the only powers that wish or intend to develop policy toward Central Asia 

from a more broad strategic perspective. At present, China’s interests are 

more regionally or culturally defined, as opposed to strategic. China still 

perceives Central Asia as within Russia’s sphere of influence, and Russia’s 
BUILDING SECURITY 353

presence in Tajikistan has dissuaded China from developing an active 

strategy toward this war-torn country at its border. However, if Russia’s 

influence within Central Asia continues to weaken, China may assume a 

more active role in advancing its energy and economic interests. 

Looking Inward

Unlike the multilateral organizations discussed above, what distinguishes those who follow is the participant’s status in the organization—whether members are on an equal footing or whether there is a 

designated or implied leader. While members are supposed to have equal 

status in NATO, SCO, and CIS, this is not the case de facto. Russia is the 

dominant player in the CIS, Russia/China in the SCO, and the United 

States in NATO. However, in the OSCE; the Georgia, Ukraine, Uzebekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUUAM) group; and others discussed 

below, members are considered to have equal status. This is an important 

distinction to make, since Central Asian states have a long history of being 

dominated by a larger power and remain relatively weak in comparison 

with their neighbors. 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

One of the main benefits of membership in the OSCE, as well as 

some of the other regional multilateral organizations, is that this organization is not dominated by one or two of the more powerful states. Members 

are officially on equal status with every other state. Thus, the OSCE is 

perceived as a real opportunity to gain international experience in decision-making, consensus-building and diplomacy. 

The OSCE has prioritized Central Asia as a region in need of its support in the security arena.28 The increased flow of illicit drugs, the presence 

of criminal groups, as well as the growing trafficking in human beings 

and firearms have captured the attention of the OSCE in recent years. 

The OSCE has established centers in Almaty, Ashgabad, Tashkent, and has 

sent a Mission to Tajikistan. Missions are established when more serious 

security concerns are perceived. These centers promote the implementation of OSCE principles and the cooperation of the participating Central 

Asian states within the OSCE framework. They also promote information 

exchange between OSCE bodies and Central Asian authorities at a multitude of levels.

The OSCE has attempted to re-focus its support to Central Asia post 

September 11, as evidenced in the Bishkek Conference on Security and 

Stability held in December 2001. This conference was co-sponsored by the 
354 MORONEY

OSCE and the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention. Participants unanimously condemned terrorism in all its forms and 

expressed willingness to cooperate in improving their border security. The 

conference was deemed a success by participating authorities in terms of 

the discussions of counter-drug efforts and the establishment of new focuses, such as the transit of small arms and light weapons.29 According to 

the OSCE’s International Secretariat staff, some progress has been made in 

deepening cooperation in small arms and light weapons transfers within 

the OSCE forum, as well as the training of police officials in the five Central Asian states, although much remains to be done.30 One idea is for the 

OSCE to focus on control of small arms and light weapons by employing 

an Information Technology (IT) tool to track activities and to help record 

proliferation hot spots.31

The Central Asian states pay dues into the OSCE as members, but 

are also recipients of OSCE financial support. According to OSCE officials, 

these circumstances encourage the Central Asian states to be more proactive in their discussions within OSCE fora. For example, the Tajik government recently proposed the establishment of regional training centers in 

Central Asia, each of which would specialize in a particular field or skill, 

such as border security, peacekeeping, disaster relief, or “niche capability,” and provide for joint training across national lines, thus facilitating 

regional cooperation.32 The argument can be made that membership in 

the OSCE accords a certain perception of freedom and flexibility for the 

Central Asian states by proposing concrete options for improving the security situation in the region.

GUAM

The Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUAM) sub-grouping of pro-West, anti-CIS states is another example of a multilateral organization where the equality of members is emphasized. Uzbekistan 

was a member until June 2002 when it suspended its participation in 

the “GUUAM’s” formal structures because it did not see much benefit 

to membership since the United States already was providing significant 

military and economic assistance and the other GUUAM members were 

relatively weak. But while the role of GUAM in promoting security in 

Central Asia has come into question after Uzbekistan pulled out, it is still 

worth considering because of the potential to promote regional dialogue 

and information sharing on critical security matters.

GUAM was founded in 1996 as a political, economic and strategic 

alliance designed to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of these 
BUILDING SECURITY 355

former Soviet Union republics, and after much delay was formally institutionalized in 2001 with a legal charter and secretariat. GUAM has become 

an important structure for enhancing dialogue on regional economic 

cooperation through development of a Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport 

corridor. It has also become a forum for discussion at various levels of 

existing security problems, promoting conflict resolution and the elimination of other risks and threats.33

At a meeting of GUAM Foreign Ministers in Yalta in July 2002, the 

decision was made to extend observer status of the organization to interested states. A communiqué announced that third states and international 

organizations might participate in GUAM activities, provided that they 

were interested in GUAM’s work and promoted its objectives. No reference 

was made as to participation based on geographical location.34

Some of the key goals which unite GUAM’s members include improving the economic situation; developing an energy transport corridor 

from Central Asia to Western Europe; improving border security; promoting a respect for human rights; building civil society and empowered and 

legitimate state institutions; and most important, solidifying the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of GUAM members separate 

from Russia and the CIS.35 The latter is particularly important for Georgia, 

Moldova and Azerbaijan, though less so for Ukraine, which has been more 

successful in developing an independent status. 

GUAM’s geopolitical leanings toward NATO, the EU, and the West 

in general has led to backing from the United States and NATO since its 

inception.36 GUAM continues to receive American support (Congress and 

DOD, in particular) stemming from the Silk Road Act of 1999. In summer 

2003, with U.S. political and economic backing, GUAM announced an initiative to refocus its efforts on the war on terrorism, particularly on border 

security issues, such as immigration, terrorist movements, WMD, drugs, 

and small arms/light weapons transfers, which could very well improve 

GUAM’s importance for the Central Asian states. This refocus on border 

security, coupled with U.S. backing, may draw Uzbekistan back in to the 

formal structures, as well as encourage other states in the region such as 

Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, to take part. Overall, GUAM serves 

as a mechanism to increase security in the region, provided its membership is expanded and tangible projects result from political initiatives.

Beyond GUAM, Central Asian leaders have advanced several other 

multilateral frameworks that should be noted. The Central Asian European Community (CAEC), established in 1994 by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan 

and Kyrgyzstan, is a consultative framework for addressing security con-
356 MORONEY

cerns. However, though membership was expanded to include Tajikistan 

in 1998, the forum has proven to be unable to influence the development 

of the region’s economies in a significant way. Kazakh President Nursultan 

Nazarbaev has proposed the creation of a Eurasian Union as a CIS alternative, but this proposal has not moved beyond the discussion stage. Nazarbaev also suggested the creation of an Asian variant of the OSCE—the 

Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia 

(CICA). Uzbeks and Kyrgyz officials have offered their own proposals, 

one of which included an initiative to create a nuclear free zone, which 

has subsequently been approved by all five Central Asian states. However, 

it is clear that the majority of the proposals advanced by the Central Asian 

leaders remain on paper and thus are ineffective in terms of dealing with 

regional security concerns at this time. Still, the fact that proposals have 

been offered in the first place is significant, and should be encouraged in 

an effort to increase regional cooperation and to find common solutions 

to transnational security problems.

Conclusions

The post-September 11 geopolitical environment, manifested in 

the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism, has generated an unprecedented 

international interest in the Central Asian states from multilateral security 

institutions. Given the region’s proximity to Afghanistan and potential 

for spillover of instability, each state’s willingness (to varying degrees) to 

join the international coalition, and the potential for longer-term Western military presence in Central Asia, it is not difficult to understand the 

heightened interest in this region. 

NATO and the OSCE arguably offer the best opportunities for the 

Central Asian states from a multilateral perspective. NATO has been 

successful in encouraging regional cooperation in eastern and southern 

Europe through PfP, even when significant tensions have been present. 

PfP exercises, for example, offer a forum through which the Central Asian 

states could improve their consequence management, disaster relief and 

other capabilities to respond to transnational threats. But the challenge 

for NATO is ensuring that PfP activities evolve to address the real-time 

security needs of the Central Asia partners, which may mean adding more 

border security type training activities, and perhaps expanding to include 

more agencies, such as the border guard, customs, ministry of interior, national guard, military police/law enforcement or other front-line security 

services.
BUILDING SECURITY 357

The OSCE has representatives on the ground in each of the countries, 

which typically provides them with access to partner country officials. The 

OSCE tends to be more innovative in coming up with new programs for 

the Central Asia partners to address their security needs. The problem with 

the OSCE is that it does not have much money, and therefore, is dependent 

in part on the resources from other sources, such as the EU. But while the 

EU has limited money for projects in Central Asia, the EU member states 

are generally not that interested in this region, given its lack of geographic 

proximity and their own traditional focus on the Western Eurasian states. 

The EU, through the TACIS program, does offer a useful forum for multilateral discussions of transnational issues for the Central Asian states, 

but the EU tends to talk at the Central Asian partners, rather than to find 

common ground. Since the Central Asian states are also members of the 

OSCE, dialogue is generally better and on more even ground.37

The overall effectiveness of EU, NATO and OSCE activities in the 

region could be improved if these institutions collaborated to avoid duplication of effort and better identify gaps. The EU and the OSCE, in particular, tend not to coordinate their efforts very well. For example, the OSCE 

focuses on small/arms light weapons transfers and police training in the 

region, but collaboration with the EU on these matters is in its infancy. 

However, if these bureaucratic and resource issues can be resolved and 

working groups/activities established, the Central Asian partners would 

be well advised to take advantage of a joint OSCE/EU approach to the 

region. Such an approach would complement, without being in contrast 

to, the more capabilities-building assistance provided by the United States 

and NATO. Overall, the effectiveness of individual programs within multilateral institutions is hindered because of the overall lack of transparency 

and information sharing in the region, as well as a lack of understanding 

about the kind of assistance that Central Asian states truly need to address 

specific security threats.

In addition to Western multilateral avenues, if GUAM can come up 

with tangible projects for its members in the realm of border security, it 

would certainly be in the interest of the Central Asian states to take part. 

Even an informal network that facilitates the sharing of information and 

intelligence on border security issues would certainly be a worthwhile 

endeavor. The United States, NATO, OSCE and the EU are likely to take a 

greater interest in GUAM with a border security dimension, and may even 

provide the financial and political backing to move these initiatives along, 

thereby, attracting additional members from Central Asia and perhaps 

drawing back in Uzbekistan. But the original premise should come from 
358 MORONEY

the partners themselves in a coordinated fashion in an effort to improve 

their own security—it should not be jumpstarted by the United States or 

other, more influential multilateral institutions. 

The uncertain and often volatile security environment coupled 

with the authoritarian nature of the regimes in power present challenges 

for Western institutions. Given trends over the past five years or so, it is 

highly likely that the Central Asian states will continue to seek external 

assistance, and the authoritarian leaders of these regimes will continue 

to play up or even exaggerate the presence of an external threat, since an 

outside threat is useful in garnering additional resources from Western 

institutions on a bilateral basis. Although there is no doubt of the region’s 

geopolitical importance, it is not in the long term interest of the West to 

provide security assistance and even security guarantees to undemocratic 

and corrupt regimes. Therefore, while multilateral institutions continue 

to deepen security cooperation with these states, simultaneous emphasis 

should be placed on building democratic regimes, governed by the rule 

of law and transitioning to market-oriented economies. After progress is 

made in these areas, these governments will be in a better position to deal 

with internal and external security challenges effectively and reduce their 

dependency on external actors. 

The internal weaknesses of these states render them extremely vulnerable to outside influences, especially from Russia. Although Russia is 

itself rather weak, it is far stronger than all of the states in Central Asia 

combined, and while its direct influence over their domestic affairs has 

wavered in recent years, Russia is still the dominating military, political 

and economic force in the region. Russia’s cooperation is also required in 

terms of bringing stability to the region. The extent to which Western-oriented multilateral institutions will be successful in developing closer relations with Central Asia from a security standpoint will depend on Russia’s 

reaction and on the ability of these states to realize opportunities accorded 

to them through multilateral cooperation. It is therefore in the interests 

of the Western actors and institutions to actively work with the states of 

Central Asia to ensure that Western methods for dealing with instabilities 

are adopted.

But as Roy Allison points out, it is not clear yet whether the impulse 

to cooperate through multilateral initiatives is stronger than the pressures 

among the Central Asian states for fragmentation.38 However, the opportunity exists for the prominent Western-backed security institutions 

to demonstrate the benefits of multilateral cooperation as a means of 
BUILDING SECURITY 359

improving regional security, and with this the condition of the region as 

a whole.

Notes1

 Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, eds., Central Asian Security (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001), 1. 2

 Martha Brill Olcott, “Central Asia: Common Legacies and Conflicts” in Roy Allison and Lena 

Jonson, eds., 32. 3

 Formally known as “Shanghai Five,” which includes Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 

Kazakhstan, changing its name after the accession of Uzbekistan in 2001. 4

 This organization previously also included Uzbekistan, at which time it was referred to as 

GUUAM. Uzbekistan suspended its membership in early 2002. 5

 Interview with U.S. Department of State, Europe/Eurasia Coordinator’s office, August 2002.

6

 Dana Milbank, “Uzbekistan Thanked for Role in War: U.S., Tashkent Sign Cooperation Pact,” 

The Washington Post, March 15, 2002. 7

 Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, eds., 19.

8

 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “A Geostrategy in Eurasia,” Foreign Affairs, 76, no. 5, (September/October 1997), 50-64. 9

 Interviews with U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) officials in March 2001, Tampa, 

Florida.10 Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, eds., 18.

11 For a more detailed discussion of U.S./NATO activities in Central Asia, see Jennifer D.P. Moroney, “Western Approaches to Security Cooperation with Central Asia”, in Graeme Herd and Jennifer 

D.P. Moroney, eds., Security Dynamics in the Former Soviet Bloc ( London: Routledge/Curzon, 2003). 12 Interviews conducted at NATO Headquarters with Defense Planning and Operations 

(DPAO) staff, Brussels, Belgium, May 14, 2002. 13 Interviews at NATO Headquarters with US Mission to NATO, International Staff (Political 

Affairs), Brussels, Belgium, and U.S. Eurasia specialists at SHAPE, Mons, Belgium, May 15-16, 2002. 14 NATO requires the partners to contribute a certain percentage to pay for the exercises.

15 Interview with NATO official, NATO Headquarters, Brussels Belgium, May 14, 2002.

16 Interviews conducted at NATO Headquarters with Political Affairs Division and Special 

Advisor’s office, Brussels, Belgium, May 15, 2002. 17 The PCA is the framework document by which progress is assessed in each of the FSU 

partners in bringing their economic, political, social, and legal structures in line with the acquis communitaire of the European Union.

18 TACIS Strategy Paper, Strategic Consideration 2002-2006 and Indicative Programme 

2002-2003 (europa.eu.int). 19 Interview with EU Commission officials, Brussels, Belgium, May 15, 2002.

20 See URL <http://www.traceca.org> for further information.

21 Interview with EU official responsible for Central Asia issues, London, October 15, 2003.

22 Uzbekistan left the CST in 1999 to join the GUUAM regional subgroup of anti-CIS states, 

and subsequently withdrew from GUUAM in June 2002. 23 As discussed in Sherman Garnett, Keystone in the Arch (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), 65. 24 Ibid.

25 Nuclear-free Zone for Central Asia, The Washington Post, October 5, 2002, A14. 26 Martha Brill Olcott, Anders Åslund, and Sherman Garnett, Getting it Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace), 232.
360 MORONEY

27 Vernon Loeb, “Footprints in the Steppes of Central Asia: New BIses indicate U.S. Presence 

Will Be Felt After Afghan War,” The Washington Post, February 9, 2002. 28 Interviews with OSCE International Secretariat Staff, Vienna, Austria, May 23, 2002.

29 Interview with UN ODCCP office, New York, July 16, 2002.

30 Interviews with OSCE International Secretariat Staff (External Affairs), Vienna, Austria, May 

23, 2002. and discussions held at a Wilton Park (UK) conference on Central Asia and the Caspian, 

October 2003. 31 URL: <www.osce.org>, International Conference Held on Terrorism, Biweekly briefing, 

March 13, 2002. 32 Multiple interviews with OSCE, U.S., and Danish officials, OSCE, Vienna, Austria, May 23, 

2002. 33 “The GUUAM Group: History and Principles,” briefing paper, <www.guuam .org>, November 2000. 34 See Communiqué of the Yalta GUUAM meeting, July 20-21, 2001 (www.guuam.org).

35 <www.guuam.org>

36 For a more detailed discussion of Western Support to GUAM, see Jennifer D.P. Moroney and 

Sergei Konoplyov, “Ukraine, GUUAM, and Western Support for Subregional Cooperation in Europe’s 

Security Gray Zone,” Jennifer D.P. Moroney, Taras Kuzio, and Mikhail Molchanov, eds., Ukrainian Foreign Policy: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives (Westport, CT: Praeger/Greenwood, May 2002). 37 Interviews with OSCE International Secretariat Staff (External Affairs), Vienna, Austria, May 

23, 2002 and discussions held at a Wilton Park (UK) conference on Central Asia and the Caspian, 

October 2003. 38 Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, eds., 254.
DRUG TRAFFICKING 361

Chapter 17

Who’s Watching the 

Watchdogs?: Drug 

Trafficking in Central Asia

Nancy Lubin

A U.S. Customs Service agent won awards and accolades for seizing 

more than 100 tons of marijuana over four years—but was then 

found to have conspired with the drug traffickers themselves so 

that other, far more lucrative drug shipments would make it safely to the 

United States.2 His story is far from unique. In early 2003, for the second 

time in six years, the Mexican government dismantled an elite federal 

anti-drug unit because the unit was found to be working closely with drug 

traffickers. “Virtually no Mexican anti-drug agency has remained free of 

infiltration by powerful drug gangs,” the American press reported, largely 

because of “scant public oversight.”3 A recent report on National Public 

Radio (NPR) describes “a systemic and ongoing problem of corruption 

among officers” of U.S. law enforcement agencies in charge of patrolling 

the border with Mexico. “Easy money is an obvious factor,” the report 

states, but blood ties among people with links on both sides of the border, as well as other factors, also play a large role.4

 And even with tough 

legislation, independent judiciaries, and an aggressive investigative press, 

many other countries have discovered that corruption in counter-drug law 

enforcement units can still be exceptionally high.

But not in Central Asia, this author was told last spring.5 Or at 

least not until very recently. On the Tajik border of Afghanistan in May 

2002, as they watched 55 kilograms of seized heroin, raw opium and 

hashish being incinerated in fat rubber tires, Russian military officials 

of the Moskovskii border guard detachment assured an onlooker that 

virtually none of Tajikistan’s border guards had been apprehended for 

involvement in trafficking, at least over the past decade. Perhaps in the 

1980s, the officials considered, but they couldn’t remember.

361

1
362 LUBIN

Back in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, officials declared that 

corruption was categorically absent from the elite drug control units, 

and that government officials are uniformly committed to fighting this 

scourge. The same story was repeated by high government officials farther north in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. It was the rare exception when 

someone went bad—a case of a bad apple, rather than the “bad barrels” 

reported by NPR.

In countries with only a limited free press and no investigative journalism, where the courts and entire judicial system are heavily in the hands 

of the state, where living standards are low and cross border ‘blood ties’ 

extensive, and where there is no independent oversight over law enforcement, how have they done it? Or how would one know? Recently, Tajik officials say they have started a crackdown in Tajikistan, and many offenders 

at all levels have been arrested. Why the sudden change?6

These questions lie at the heart of international counter-narcotics 

trafficking efforts in Central Asia today. The history of Central Asian drug 

trafficking, and the attempts to stop it, is one of smoke and mirrors; sorting through the nature of the problem itself and how best to address it has 

become an often unfathomable challenge. What is the nature and scale 

of the drug trafficking problem through Central Asia today? Where have 

local and international efforts been successful in combating this problem, 

and where has their impact been controversial, or even counterproductive? 

What does this say about the challenges being faced today?

Sparked by the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the United 

States has increased significantly its previously modest commitment 

to fight the drug trade there. In 2002 alone, the United States committed close to $100 million to counter-narcotics trafficking programs in 

Afghanistan and Central Asia,7 and an army of U.S., international and 

local Central Asian officials and specialists have been tasked to fight this 

trade. But with oversight extremely weak, both from within and without 

these countries, the allocation of greater resources also has meant greater 

challenges regarding how these resources should be applied. It is critical 

to examine these challenges, and to examine the record of the past, if the 

substantial investments being made today are to address the range of drug 

trafficking problems in this part of the world—and to avoid inadvertently 

making them worse.

Background

Opium poppy used to grow wild in Central Asia. Throughout the 

Soviet period, Soviet authorities declared their commitment to eradicate 
DRUG TRAFFICKING 363

drug cultivation on Soviet soil, but their efforts were slow in addressing 

this problem. However fairly or unfairly, most Central Asians believed that 

Soviet leaders themselves were benefiting from the drug trade. If leaders 

were really committed to wiping out the crop, the thought went, it would 

have been done much more quickly and effectively. Still, by the beginning 

of the 1990s, drug cultivation in Central Asia had been severely curtailed, and over the past decade, Central Asia has been relevant to the 

drug trade primarily as a transit point for narcotics from Afghanistan 

on their way to Russia, Europe and beyond. Some locals say the collapse 

of the Soviet Union triggered a commitment on the part of the leaders 

of these new states to eradicate the drug trade altogether; others more 

cynically suggest it triggered a commitment from those benefiting from 

the trade to shift their efforts to reap the profits from drug trafficking 

rather than cultivation. In either case, after a decade of wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent 

political unrest, economic strains, and social upheavals, the flow of 

raw opium and heroin from Afghanistan grew dramatically throughout 

the 1990s. Opium poppy production in Afghanistan reached a peak of 

between 2,900 and 4,600 metric tons in 1999 and 2000.8 The United 

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that by 2000 

some three-quarters of the world’s heroin supply was originating from 

opium cultivated in Afghanistan and smuggled through mountainous 

terrain that is particularly difficult to control.9

In early 2001, the Taliban regime began enforcing its long-stated 

but long-ignored ban on opium production. The sudden reversal of 

the Taliban, which since coming to power had drawn great profit from 

taxing the opium trade, led to an almost total eradication of the annual 

poppy crop in Afghanistan.10 But due to huge stockpiles, the trade did 

not diminish dramatically. With the onset of the war in Afghanistan and 

the defeat of the Taliban, Afghan farmers have renewed the planting of 

opium, bringing the 2002 harvest almost to its 1999-2000 record levels.11

Afghanistan is again dominating the world market for opium, and Central 

Asia is experiencing, in the words of the United Nations (UN), “a dramatic 

increase in drug trafficking across all its five countries.”12

While there is some disagreement over the actual volume of narcotics transported through Central Asia today, the role of Central Asia as a 

transit point has grown significantly. Until the turn of the twenty-first 

century, most of the drugs grown in Afghanistan reached Western consumers through Pakistan and Iran, but a clampdown on drug trafficking 

in Iran, and the increasingly porous borders of Central Asia, have shifted 
364 LUBIN

that balance. By the turn of the century, the UN and others reported that 

as much as half to two thirds of all narcotics trafficked from Afghanistan 

passed through the Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan on their way to European and Russian 

markets as well as sometimes the United States and Canada.13 Others estimate that the actual proportion is lower but maintain that Central Asia’s 

role remains significant.14 Most of this heroin finds its way to Russia and 

Western Europe, and often brings vast profits along the way. Some experts 

have estimated that by 2000, the opium cultivated in Afghanistan, sold in 

the form of heroin at retail prices, was worth roughly $100 billion. In Afghanistan, one kilogram of opium cost about $30; in Moscow, one kilogram of heroin (made from 10 kilograms of opium) cost up to $30,000; 

and in Western Europe, the same kilogram of heroin, sold at the retail 

level in gram units or smaller, cost as much as $150,000.15

These drug profits reportedly have been shared generously with 

local law enforcement and other key actors throughout Central Asia. 

Western observers have pointed to widespread corruption among police, border guards, customs and other government officials as one of 

the most important factors sustaining the large drug flow in Central 

Asia.16 Customs and other law enforcement officials in all five countries customarily pay some thousands of dollars in bribes just to get an 

entry-level job. Even though the salary is low, it is understood that they 

will earn back their investment in a short amount of time. Citizens who 

have been detained by customs officials for possession of small amounts 

of narcotics independently list the same types of bribes requested for 

different kinds of offenses. One destitute woman, who decided to make 

one run as a courier to make ends meet, was detained with 200 grams 

of heroin. She said she was told to pay $5000 and the whole case would 

go away. If she had that kind of money, she lamented, she wouldn’t have 

become involved in the first place. But clearly, she added, other people 

do pay.17

In elite forces where salaries are higher, former border guards 

report additional pressures to collaborate with traffickers, even for the 

disinclined. “Imagine a smuggler approaches,” said one former border 

guard, describing how guards patrol in groups of two or three over 

sparse terrain. “He tells you that if you turn the other way for five minutes, you can be a millionaire. But if you don’t, he will send your corpse 

to Moscow. What would you do? Two hundred dollars each month isn’t 

enough to lose your life over.”18 A recent U.S. government interagency 

report on heroin trafficking concluded that “increasing heroin transit 
DRUG TRAFFICKING 365

through Central Asia is contributing to endemic political and bureaucratic corruption, including in the security services and law enforcement agencies, throughout the region.”19

Indeed, even Central Asian leaders have criticized their own law 

enforcement officials for being deeply involved in the drug trade in one 

way or another. Yet many local observers believe that corruption and 

drug trafficking may be directed from top leadership levels as well. Customs officials and border guards say it is not uncommon to be called 

by “higher-ups” and told to look the other way when particular vehicles 

reach the border. A previous Tajik Minister of Interior was seen to be in 

charge of major trafficking operations; in Kazakhstan, a Tajik Ambassador was picked up with a stash of heroin in the trunk of his diplomatic 

car.20 The president of Turkmenistan is himself accused of being a major 

drug kingpin, perhaps explaining why the Turkmen borders are so open 

to trafficking in the first place.21 The 2002 U.S. State Department report 

on narcotics control gives further credence to these kinds of allegations.22

A Russian correspondent who has lived in Central Asia for many years 

recently shared the same skepticism towards its leaders: borders could be 

kept much more secure, he said in June 2002, if there were not “high level 

interest” in keeping them at least partially open.23

Yet the biggest offenders may be the Russians themselves, long-time 

locals lament, specifically the Russian military personnel stationed on 

Central Asia’s border with Afghanistan who allegedly have their piece of 

the action, too. High-ranking Central Asian officials and low-level citizens 

alike—from Osh, Kyrgyzstan to Tajikistan and Kazakhstan—have long 

taken for granted the direct lines by which the Russian military allegedly 

ships heroin and other narcotics directly to Russia. At countless airports in 

Central Asia, locals have pointed out the Russian military helicopters that 

stop en route to Russia from Afghanistan: they refuel quickly and continue 

to Moscow; no one is allowed to check the cargo. These allegations have 

emerged recently into the open, prompted in part by a January 2003 article in the Russian newspaper Trud about the successes of Russian border 

guards in the fight against narcotics trafficking.24 The article states that 

90 percent of Tajikistan’s border guards are Tajiks under the command of 

Russians, of which two percent have connections with narco-businessmen. 

The article’s failure to address corruption among Russian border guards 

has sparked a firestorm of criticism, including allegations that Russian 

forces are more culpable of collusion with traffickers but ready to pass the 

blame to the Tajiks.25
366 LUBIN

Few of these allegations can be confirmed, but they reflect widespread perceptions that large profits are made both within Central Asia 

and outside of the region. While only a small portion of these drug 

profits have made their way to farmers in Afghanistan and low-level 

couriers throughout Central Asia, the drug trade still has benefited them 

in crucial ways. Opium poppy cultivation has allowed Afghan farmers to 

make ends meet in a way that few other crops could. For some, advances 

paid for their opium crop have provided their only access to credit and 

sometimes their only source of survival during the winter months. In 

Central Asia, the drug trade has enticed a sometimes overwhelmingly 

destitute population to risk the harsh penalties imposed for drug trafficking—including the death penalty—in the hope of making ends 

meet. These couriers not only are the rural poor and uneducated but 

include educated professionals as well. A former secretary at the main 

university in Tajikistan, for example, could not support her two children on the token salary she received (the State has not, to this day, 

had the budget to pay anything but token salaries). After trying her 

hand at business and falling deeply into debt, she decided to make one 

drug run to Moscow in the mid 1990s to get back on her feet. In an 

obvious setup, however, she found herself in prison for three years for 

possession of 200 grams of heroin, before being amnestied in 2001.26 

As the former Kyrgyz chairman of the Commission on Drug Control 

admitted in 1997, “In some regions, the only way to survive is to take 

part in the drug trade.”27

The Societal Toll

The secretary’s fate highlights the wide array of societal problems at all levels that the drug trade has produced. The growth in the 

proportion of Central Asian women involved in the drug trade; the 

growth in drug addiction, particularly among the young; and the concomitant growth in the spread of HIV/AIDS have led to serious social 

problems among rich and poor alike that may have serious political 

and societal ramifications in the not too distant future.

Although consistent figures are difficult to come by, all Central 

Asian governments have expressed serious concern about the growing 

involvement of women in drug trafficking, particularly as couriers, 

or so-called “camels.” In Kyrgyzstan, for example, an estimated 30 

percent of drug addicts and drug traffickers are women; in Tajikistan, 

the proportion of women traffickers is estimated to be even higher 

and rising.28 Most of these women, and especially rural women, are 
DRUG TRAFFICKING 367

enticed into the drug trade because of rampant poverty, discrimination and despair. Significantly, women have become particularly valuable to traffickers as a cover, or shirma, in a world where corruption 

and collusion between traffickers and customs officials is widespread. 

Customs officials allegedly are often informed in advance of whom to 

search so that the “bigger fish” carrying large amounts of drugs can 

pass through freely. The net result is that women increasingly have 

become the targets of law enforcement, and they comprise a growing 

proportion of Central Asia’s prison population. They are also increasingly subject to humiliating body searches and other indignities at 

Central Asian borders.29

The impact on women is only compounded by other societal consequences of the drug trade. For example, more corrupt and stringent 

border control has decreased contact between family members on different sides of Central Asia borders; drug-related domestic violence is on the 

rise; and youth are becoming increasingly involved in trafficking. Indeed, 

the drug trade is now viewed as one of the key factors jeopardizing family life, traditional communities, and general social stability throughout 

Central Asia. This has only been further compounded by the rapid growth 

of HIV/AIDS associated with drug injection: Current estimates put the 

number of addicts with HIV/AIDS in Central Asia anywhere from about 

1,500 to 10 times that amount. The rapid spread of AIDS over the past few 

years, however, has led adherents of even the most conservative estimates 

to predict a possible epidemic within the next decade.30

In response to these challenges, the past few years have seen increasingly strong stated commitments by Central Asian leaders to attack the 

drug trade and its concomitant societal problems head-on. While a strong 

constituency in support of the drug trade survives among those reaping 

huge profits—and while some argue that by addressing serious gaps in the 

economy that the state cannot fill, the trade has been a stabilizing force in 

Central Asian society—leaders say they regard the trade today as inherently destabilizing. By widening the gap between rich and poor, sharpening rivalry among criminal groups, distorting and inhibiting any serious 

reform of the formal economy, and creating its own system of rules and 

laws that challenge those of the state, the drug trade is viewed as a threat 

to the very domestic stability it was previously believed to preserve. These 

concerns have come center stage with the recognition that drug trafficking 

now is likely a key source of financing for terrorism—and perhaps a key 

source of the very disaffection that can give rise to further terrorism in its 

own right.
368 LUBIN

International Counter Narcotics Program

Nonetheless, the commitment of Central Asian leaders to crack 

down on the drug trade has been uneven. Loath to address issues of 

corruption beyond a rhetorical level, Central Asian officials blame their 

countries’ traditionally weak interdiction records on the difficult border terrain and the lack of funding needed for training border guards 

or for purchasing specialized equipment to challenge well-financed 

narcotics smuggling rings. Central Asian leaders have begun to warm up 

to the idea of addressing the problems associated with growing drug addiction, but this has been slow in coming. Again, they cite lack of funding 

and expertise as major impediments. They have turned increasingly to the 

international community for assistance with resources to fight trafficking 

on Central Asia’s international borders and to help address the serious side 

effects of the drug trade at home.

Over the past decade, and particularly since September 11, the international community has tried to support Central Asia’s struggle with 

trafficking and addiction. The impact of these efforts to date, however, has 

been decidedly mixed. Beginning in the 1990s, international donors instituted crop reduction programs in Afghanistan and institution-building 

programs in Central Asia to limit the flow of narcotics across the Central 

Asian-Afghan borders. Tajikistan’s Drug Control Agency (DCA), created 

with UN assistance, boasts an impressive seizure rate. Recently, the focus 

of international programs has begun to include broader societal concerns 

as well, including greater attention to educating the young, supporting 

women’s groups, and instituting other demand and harm reduction programs throughout the region. Yet while these endeavors have produced 

impressive successes, they also have been controversial; indeed, each new 

success has prompted criticism that Western programs may be a doubleedged sword, where success in one arena may be balanced by inadvertent 

harm in another.

Throughout the 1990s, for example, international donors focused 

their efforts in Central Asia’s drug battle on institutional development. In 

each country, donor programs have assisted in developing a centralized 

counter-narcotics infrastructure and have provided training and equipment to support those efforts. In addition to creating and sustaining 

the DCA, donors claim success in their efforts to strengthen indigenous 

counter-narcotics agencies; to help draft counter-narcotics legislation, 

such as laws on money laundering, asset seizure, and financial crimes; and 

recently, to establish special courts for prosecuting crimes associated with 
DRUG TRAFFICKING 369

narcotics consumption or trafficking. Today, each of the five Central Asian 

countries has a national drug control administrative structure, and with 

the help of international advisors, the Central Asian governments have set 

up inter-ministerial coordination bodies to centralize counter-narcotics 

policies and administration.

Donors also count among their successes the high number of law enforcement officials trained both domestically and abroad in counter-narcotics techniques and the large quantity of modern equipment provided 

to enhance interdiction and investigative capabilities among Central Asian 

law enforcement. Their programs have included training and equipment 

transfers to border guards, customs officials, and other counter-narcotic 

forces throughout the area, in addition to more equipment to improve 

forensic capacities and to store, analyze and destroy narcotic and psychotropic substances. From 1998 to 2000, for example, the U.S. State 

Department sponsored projects that trained some 500 Central Asian 

law enforcement and judicial officials per year, and these efforts are 

expanding. More recently, the United States has expanded its law 

enforcement presence on the ground in Central Asia, including the 

opening of an office of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan and the placement of a regional narcotics officer 

in the U.S. Embassy in Kazakhstan to coordinate counter-narcotics 

activities throughout Central Asia.

These efforts have helped to raise interdiction rates significantly. 

UN and U.S. officials praise the high volume of drugs seized on the Central Asian and Afghanistan borders. According to the UN, Central Asian 

heroin seizures more than tripled between 1998 and 2000, rising from one 

to 3.2 metric tons, and continue to grow.31

But while some praise these efforts, others question whether quantitative indicators, such as the volume of narcotics seized, the number of 

people trained or the amount of equipment delivered, are useful measures 

to assess their full impact. Instead, some argue, they may mask serious 

failings that greatly impact the drug flow as well as exacerbate broader 

problems throughout Central Asian society.

For example, some observers question whether seizure rates on Central Asia’s borders have increased significantly as a byproduct of higher 

trafficking rates rather than as a result of more effective law enforcement 

or border initiatives.32 Critics point out that while seizures may have increased, so, too, has drug production in Afghanistan, and to this day, the 

amount of drugs interdicted continues to represent a very small percentage of the overall amount of drugs trafficked. Critics also argue that the 
370 LUBIN

focus on keeping interdiction rates high may have created detrimental side 

effects, such as further encouraging harassment by law enforcement officials of low-level drug traffickers, often women, in order to increase arrest 

totals; further eroding the fairness of interrogation and judicial proceedings in order to keep conviction rates high; and thus also contributing to 

growing incarceration rates in already overcrowded prisons.33

The net effect, they believe, is ultimately weakening the war on drugs 

overall as well as hindering efforts to encourage democratic reforms and 

establish an effective rule of law.

For example, some locals and Westerners alike fear that providing training and equipment in a corrupt environment without highly 

intrusive local and international oversight could be feeding the drug 

trade with one hand as it tries to eradicate it with the other. They 

express concern that international donors, like their Central Asian 

counterparts, are sweeping aside issues of corruption while providing significant funds and equipment to entities widely regarded as 

complicit in the trade itself. How does one know, they ask, if such 

training is helping governments to eradicate drug smuggling or simply 

allowing one cartel to eliminate another? How can one evaluate whether 

training programs are creating more honest, efficient law enforcement or 

are only empowering officers involved in trafficking to smuggle more effectively? Or, like the U.S. customs officer mentioned in the introduction, 

could training and equipment be helping well-placed officials to play both 

sides?

Donors argue that international organizations have attempted to 

identify untrustworthy individuals through a vetting process, or, in the 

words of one agency head, through “intuition.” But donors also agree that 

both vetting and intuition are woefully inadequate in highly centralized 

and authoritarian countries where corruption is not an individual affair 

in the first place. Corruption in Central Asia is not a matter of corrupt 

individuals acting purely for personal gain; it is part of a highly organized 

system of economic crime that permeates all aspects of life.34 Yet few international programs have had the capability, or the inclination, to sort 

through how this system works and apply that knowledge explicitly to 

donor programs. Limited resources and regional expertise often limit the 

ability of programs to assess who wins and who loses from the rampant 

trafficking in Central Asia—or from the Western programs introduced to 

combat it.

The same concerns have been expressed regarding the impact of 

counter-narcotics trafficking programs on human rights and other abuses. 
DRUG TRAFFICKING 371

Throughout Central Asia, the war on drugs often has been used for political ends—to repress political opposition, target particular religious and 

ethnic groups, limit civil liberties and tighten political control—as well as 

for extracting greater financial gain through bribes and extortion.

The possibility that international training and equipment may further empower authoritarian governments to crack down more forcefully on their own populations has raised new concerns. In Uzbekistan, 

for example, law enforcement officers are widely known to plant drugs 

on political opponents or religious figures and then prosecute them on 

trumped-up drug charges. The crackdown on the Islamic Movement of 

Uzbekistan (IMU) and on human rights activists has employed these 

tactics to increase sentences, as drug trafficking carries some of the most 

severe penalties, including death. Special drug courts reportedly avoid challenging police accounts or forced confessions, particularly in trials with 

political repercussions.35

How then, skeptics ask, should one evaluate the impact of training 

and equipment transfers when the number of human rights abuses associated with interdiction may rise along with the number of drug seizures? 

How useful are new laws and new courts if there are few mechanisms to 

ensure that they are applied fairly? And how does one prevent the courts 

from becoming new tools for state repression? Does the provision of more 

equipment to law enforcement—widely viewed as corrupt—run the risk 

of further strangling citizens’ rights? One U.S. State Department official 

stated, off the record, that transferring night vision goggles to a repressive 

government is “abhorrent.” “They might be used to fight drugs,” he said, 

“but they’re just as likely to be used to fight the opposition.”36

These questions rarely have played a role in international law enforcement programs, which traditionally have viewed their mandate as 

transferring interdiction capabilities and encouraging high incarceration 

rates. Instead, observers and participants in these programs state that 

Western trainers tend to turn a blind eye to human rights abuses when 

they may interfere with the main goals of interdiction.37

Recently, international organizations have made a more concerted 

effort to address the range of societal problems emerging from the drug 

trade. The UNODC and the Organization for Security and Cooperation 

in Europe (OSCE)—one of the key organizations dealing with human 

rights as well as a range of other concerns in Central Asia—have begun 

efforts to coordinate more closely on the ground. They have sponsored 

meetings and conferences to discuss such issues as the role of the mass 

media in countering drug-related problems and corruption, and the root 
372 LUBIN

causes and economic impacts of the drug trade. The UNODC states that 

it recently has instituted an educational project on prevention through 

mass media and public events. U.S. State Department officials tasked with 

drug trafficking issues have spoken of the need to coordinate more closely 

with the State Department’s human rights bureau, and U.S. aid programs 

have initiated seminars on promoting drug-free schools, including tips on 

fighting drug trafficking. The U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) has contributed funds to needle exchange and other harm reduction programs in Central Asia conducted by the Open Society Institute 

and others.

Most of these efforts, however, are in their infancy and face major 

hurdles in the years ahead. One of the key points to emerge from media 

and corruption conferences, for example, is that the media is extremely 

reluctant to cover corruption and at times may be deeply corrupt itself. 

Education and public relations programs require far more funding to impact societies where, in a race against time, drugs are assuming an increasingly entrenched role. And an equally difficult hurdle is determining how 

to design and shape law enforcement programs themselves so that they 

incorporate these concerns and fit the informal economic and political 

realities of the Central Asian countries themselves.

Conclusion

What began as a law enforcement challenge in Central Asia, then, has 

unfolded into a multifaceted set of challenges—social, economic, political 

and security—emanating in all directions. Drug trafficking in Central Asia 

has been defined as a target of the war on terrorism, as a key component 

in the struggle for human rights, and as a part of one of the most serious 

health tragedies to beset our planet. It is potentially destabilizing at a time 

when the need for stability in this part of the world is at a premium. And 

it embraces such issues as widespread corruption that traditionally have 

been swept under the rug by all parties.

As U.S. policy makers and the international community commit to 

major investments to address this challenge, it is critical that strategies be 

refined, particularly in assessing priorities when these goals conflict. Past 

experience in other parts of the world demonstrate that supply reduction 

cannot work without a concurrent reduction in demand; but it is unclear 

what the balance should be between interdiction efforts on one hand, and 

demand and harm reduction programs on the other. Drugs and terrorism 

have been linked in U.S. policy as if they are part of the same battle, but 

they can be qualitatively different battles, where the strategies and tactics 
DRUG TRAFFICKING 373

for combating one may conflict with those of the other. Which should take 

precedence? The same question can be asked for human rights, stability 

and humanitarian concerns.

At the tactical level, programs and projects demand far more attention, particularly in how they are designed, implemented, monitored and 

evaluated.38 Perhaps most glaring is the need for greater local and international oversight and evaluation—particularly at a time when the trend has 

moved in the opposite direction. To date, mechanisms have been weak in 

this area, and resources for evaluations and follow-up have been limited 

on the part of implementing agencies. The U.S. State Department and law 

enforcement officials acknowledge that no formal evaluations of the counter-narcotics programs have been carried out to date in Central Asia; that 

they have yet to develop a standard mechanism for reporting and evaluation in the first place; and that the few evaluations that have taken place 

have been cursory “trip reports,” focusing on numbers of people trained 

and equipment transferred. Other donors have conducted more formal 

evaluations, but the evaluation teams rarely, if ever, include any expertise 

on the region or local language capability, limiting their ability to conduct 

any kind of independent investigation.

In a region of “smoke and mirrors,” programs must be closely 

monitored to ensure that equipment and training are applied as intended. 

While this should be done through both local oversight and Western personnel on the ground, ultimate responsibility for oversight and monitoring should lie with the donors who design and implement the programs.

In short, then, with record opium poppy yields and limited governmental control in Afghanistan, there is more pressure than ever before on 

the Moskovskii border guard detachment mentioned at the beginning of 

the chapter—and every detachment along the border of Afghanistan—to 

interdict some of the largest estimated drug flows in Central Asia’s history. 

Donor organizations and local drug-control agencies have made important strides in Central Asia, but this should be seen as just a beginning. For 

these border guards and the multitude of others fighting the drug trade 

to succeed, much more is needed. Donor efforts must be broadened and 

made more nuanced and transparent, with particular attention paid to the 

impacts of counter-narcotics trafficking programs on corruption, as well 

as on human rights, gender, local economies and the like. More funding 

must be targeted from the international community, not only for the expansion of programs, but to support broadened oversight, transparency, 

and accountability on the ground. And a wider range of international and 

regional actors must become more involved if any “war on drugs” is to 
374 LUBIN

have a chance of success. Specialists in the informal workings of these societies must be encouraged to work hand-in-hand with technical experts to 

create programs that neither can accomplish alone; and the Central Asian 

public must be engaged to inject far more public oversight, both local and 

international, into every program. The confluence of drug money and 

terrorism, coupled with burgeoning societal ills in this part of the world, 

suggest the stakes may never have been higher.

Notes1

 An earlier version of this chapter was published in Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, 

no. 2, Spring 2003..

2

 John Burnett, “Corruption at the Gates,” Two-part Series for National Public Radio, All Things 

Considered, September 12-13, 2002. 3

 Kevin Sullivan, “Citing Corruption, Mexico Shuts Drug Unit,” The Washington Post, January 21, 2003, A14. 4

 John Burnett.

5

 For the purposes of this article, Central Asia is comprised of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 6

 For a good review of questions concerning drug trafficking, including corruption, in these 

countries and Western assistance, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2003, at <www.

state. ov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2002/pdf>. 7

 The 2000 Congressional Supplemental allocates about $60 million to counter-narcotics and 

law enforcement efforts in Afghanistan, $22 million to counter-narcotics and law enforcement in 

Central Asia, and additional funds to the Caucasus. Coupled with prior 2002 appropriations and other 

agency and security funds applied to counter drug trafficking in this area, the total begins to approach 

$100 million--if not, some say, exceeding it. 8

 Estimates for 1999 range from 2,700 to 4,600 metric tons, and for 2000, from 3,300 to 3,700 

metric tons, due to discrepancies between U.S. and UN estimates. In 1999, the U.S. estimate was 1,700 

metric tons, subsequently revised upward to 2,860 metric tons, but was still only some 60 percent of 

the UN estimate. In 2000, however, the U.S. estimate of 3,700 metric tons exceeded the UN estimate 

of 3,300 metric tons. The discrepancy is due largely to different methodologies used by the different 

agencies.9

 UNODC (formerly UN Office on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP)), World 

Drug Report 2000, 160, at <http.//www.unodc.org/odccp/world-drug-report.html>. 10 Barbara Crossette, “Afghan Heroin Feeds Addiction in Region, UN Report Declares,” New 

York Times, February 29, 2000; John Pomfret, “Drug Trade Resurgent in Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, October 23, 2001. Although the Taliban blamed opposition forces for the high production 

and trafficking of opium and state its commitment to eliminate opium cultivation, the Taliban government, in fact, sanctioned the growth of opium through the late 1990s. It reportedly imposed, as on 

other agricultural goods, a 10 percent tax on the opium poppy and a 20 percent tax on its production 

and trade. Estimates of revenues the Taliban received from the opium trade range from $30 million 

to as high as $75 million--funds which enabled the government to finance ongoing wars against opposition forces and terrorist activities. UNODC estimates the farm-gate value of the 2000 crop of 

opium at roughly $91 million. See UNODC (formerly ODCCP), Afghanistan Annual Opium Poppy 

Survey 2000. Some argue that incursions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Central 

Asia at the end of the 1990s were not intended to found an Islamic state, but instead sought to open 
DRUG TRAFFICKING 375

new drug routes. See Scott Peterson, “Fabled Silk Road Now Paved With Narcotics,” Christian Science 

Monitor, January 8, 2000. 

11 The UN reports 2002 production at 3,200 to 3,600 metric tons; other sources claim it 

may be as high as 4,000 tons. See UNODC (formerly ODCCP), Strategic Programme Framework: 

Strengthen Drug Control and Crime Prevention Activities in the Central Asian States: 2002-2005; 

and “Afghan Drug Crop Increasing,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Crime and Corruption Watch 

2, no. 8 (October 25, 2002). 12 UNODC, Strategic Programme Framework, 6.

13 Some experts assert that as much as 50 to 60 percent of all drugs produced in Afghanistan 

are traf-ficked through Central Asia. For the 50 percent estimate, see, for example, Prepared Testimony 

of Ralf Mutsche, Assistant Director, Criminal Directorate International Criminal Police Organization 

Interpol General Secretariat, before the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, 

December13, 2000; for the 60 percent estimate, see U.S. Government Accounting Office, “Southwestern Asia Heroin Production,” June 21, 2000. 14 See, for example, David Mansfield and Chris Martin, Strategic Review: The Role of Central 

Asia as a Conduit for Illicit Drugs to Western Europe, April 2000; Peter Reuter, RAND Corporation, 

private communication to author. 15 See “As Kyrgyzstan Calculates Drug Barons’ Profits,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline 4, no. 204 (October 20, 2000). The international drug trade was estimated to produce $400 billion 

per year for criminal syndicates. 16 See survey results from Central Asian law enforcement personnel and the general population in Nancy Lubin, Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption and Identity (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Institute of Peace, 1995). 17 Private communication to the author.

18 Private communication to the author.

19 Cited in Nancv Lubin, Alex Klaits and Igor Barsegian, Narcotics Interdiction in Afghanistan 

and Central Asia: Challenges for International Assistance, Open Society Institute, January, 2002. See also 

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2003. 20 See, for example, Marat Mamadshoyev, “Tajik Drugs in Kazakh Capital: A Victory for the 

Special Services or for Diplomatic Intrigue?” Eurasia Insight, June 15, 2000, at <http://wwweurasianet.

org/departments/insigt/articles/eavO6l 500.shtml>. 21 See, for example, Rustem Safronov, “Turkmenistan’s Niyazov Implicated in Drug Smuggling,” Eurasia Insight, March 29, 2002, at <http://www.eurasianet.or departments/insight/articles/

eav032902.shtml>. 22 Regarding Tajikistan, for example, the report states: “It is impossible to determine how pervasive drug and other forms of corruption are within government circles; salaries for even top officials 

are extremely low and, at times, clearly inadequate to support the lifestyles many officials maintain. 

Even when arrests are made, the resulting cases are not always brought to a satisfactory conclusion... 

The lavish lifestyles of some, as noted, do give some credence to corruption allegations.” See U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, ix-120. 23 Private communication to the author.

24 Rakhim Abdukholikzoda, “Ch to skryvaet ‘geroinovaia zavesa,”’ (What’s Behind the ‘Heroin 

Veil?) January 28, 2003. 25 E-mailed commentary on “Chto slcryvaet ‘geroinovaia zavesa,”’ (“What’s Behind the ‘Heroin 

Veil? 26 Author’s interview with courier, May 2002.

27 “The Right Moves Aren’t Working ... So the Drug Trade is Roaring,” Business Week, June 

23, 1997. 28 Open Society Institute employee interview with Kyrgyz counter-narcotics official. For further discussion of these issues, see Lubin, Klaits, and Barsegian. 29 See Erika Dailey, “Drug Searches and Human Rights Violations on the Tajikistan Border,” 

EurasiaNet, February 18, 2000, at <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/hrr02l800.
376 LUBIN

shtml>; see “Governmental and International Responses to Human Rights Abuses at Tajikistan’s 

Border Crossing,” EurasiaNet, May 16, 2000, at <http://www.eurasianet.orWdepartments/rights/articies/hrrO5l600.sNtml>. For an excellent discussion of women and the drug trade, see Tatiana 

Bozrikova, “Women and Drugs in Tajikistan,” Open Society Institute Assistance Foundation, 

Tajikistan, February 2001. Many women view strip searches as so common they avoid cross-border travel whenever possible. The situation has contributed to further destruction of formerly 

strong social ties that united relatives living in different republics. Private communications to the 

author.30 The UN estimates that some 7,500 people were living with HIV/AIDS in Central Asia by 

2001, most of whom were injecting drug users. Given methodological problems in assessing these 

totals, however, others believe that the actual number may be 10 times that amount. See, for example, 

Interfax-Kazakhstan News Agency, Almaty, reported in Russian, May 21, 2002 and reported by the 

BBC, May 21, 2002. 31 UNODC, Strategic Program Framework, 6.

32 Janeis Makerenko, Intelligence Review 12, no. 1 I (Nov 1, 2000). At the global level, this is 

what UNODC reports in the 2000 World Drug Report. 33 See Lubin, Alex Klaits and Igor Barsegian, Narcotics Interdiction in Afghanistan. 34 For broader description, see Lubin, “New Threats in Central Asia and the Caucasus: An Old 

Story with a New Twist,” Russia’s Total Security Environment, Institute for East/West Studies, 1999. 35 For fuller discussion, see Lubin, Klaits, and Barsegian.

36 Cited in Lubin, Klaits and Barsegian.

37 Private communications to the authors and their first-hand experience in these programs.

38 Previous testimony and reports by JNA Associates outline specific recommendations. See 

Lubin, “U.S. Policies in Central Asia,” and “Aid to the Soviet Union,” Congressional Testimony before 

the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on International Relations, March 17 1999; and 

JNA Associates, Inc., U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet Union: When Less is More, 1996.
MIGRATION TRENDS 377

377

Chapter 18

Migration Trends in Central 

Asia and the Case of 

Trafficking of Women

Saltanat Sulaimanova

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the elimination of state 

regulation of population movements, migration from, to and 

within Central Asia has become an acute and continuous process.1

It has substantial political, social and economic implications, negatively 

affecting the economies of the countries from which the migration outflow occurs. Traditionally, the Russian workforce in Central Asia tended 

to dominate the industrial, technical, educational and medical care sectors.2

 However, in the years since 1991, with the dramatic outflow of 

highly qualified professionals of Russian, German and Jewish origin, 

most Central Asian societies have experienced a “brain drain” and deterioration in the quality of education, medical fields, and other sectors of 

the economy.

Central Asian republics rightfully have been called “an astonishing ethnic mosaic.”3

 Such multi-ethnicity is the result of the 

following factors:

■ Pre-Soviet Russian Tsarist imperialistic expansion policies, which 

encouraged resettlement of Russians in Central Asia;4

■ Repression and massive deportation of people to Central Asia by 

Stalin;

■ Forced relocation of ethnic Germans, Greeks, Crimean Tatars, 

Koreans and Turks during World War II;5

■ World War II and post-war reconstruction-era relocation policies, 

when industrial plants and factories with their entire workforce 

were relocated to Central Asia;

■ Soviet policies of sending young graduates and professionals to 

work in the Central Asian republics.6
378 SULAIMANOVA

The migration of non-titular ethnic groups to the region continued 

to increase until the end of the 1950s. It reached its peak in 1959, when 

45 percent of the region’s population (over 10 million persons) were immigrants.7

 However, in the following 30 years, the number of indigenous 

populations in Central Asia increased threefold due to a higher birth rate, 

while the immigrant population grew by half.8

Nonetheless, by the late 1970s, migration trends began to change: 

some regions of Russia experienced labor deficits and became attractive 

areas for relocation because of the higher wages. In the 1980s, the Russian labor market became more favorable and the government actively 

promoted migration to Russia and Ukraine, not only by Slavs but also 

by the ethnic populations of non-Slavic republics.9 During President 

Gorbachev’s “perestroika” reforms, restrictions on travel outside the Soviet Union finally were lifted, though at first only the selective emigration 

of Jews, Germans and Greeks was allowed.10 Eventually, from 1988 on, all 

individuals were permitted to migrate out of the country, although many 

republics still retained exit visa policies.

Migration within and outside Central Asia can be classified as internal, external and transit migration, as well as permanent and temporary 

(labor) migration. In general, ethnic minorities tend to migrate permanently out of Central Asia. Most of the migrants are ethnic Russians, who 

numbered more than eight million in Central Asian republics as late as 

1995.11 Table 18-1 shows the extent of this migration by country. In 1989, 

there were 388,000 Russians in Tajikistan, making up 7.6 percent of the 

population;12 more than 100,000 Russians left the republic in 1992 alone.13

By 1996, the Russian population in Tajikistan had decreased by a factor 

of two and represented 3.4 percent of the population. The civil war that 

broke out in 1992 and the rapidly deteriorating economy were among the 

reasons for the massive exodus of Russians as well as much of the Tajik 

population.14 During the war years, approximately 300,000 Tajik citizens 

left the country, while another 692,000 were displaced to other parts of 

Tajikistan. 

Similarly, in Uzbekistan before independence, 60 percent of the 

population of Tashkent, the capital, were Russians. By 1993, Russians 

composed only 40 percent of Tashkent’s inhabitants.15 The overall Russian 

population in Uzbekistan decreased from 8.3 percent in 1989 to 5.6 percent in 1996, spurred by the departure of 363,000 people.16 Tatars also left 

Uzbekistan: between 1989 and 1996, their number decreased from 657,000 

to 343,000.17
MIGRATION TRENDS 379

In Kazakhstan in 1989, ethnic Kazakhs were a minority in their own 

country, making up only 39.7 percent of the population. By 1999, the proportion of Kazakhs had increased to 53.4 percent. This increase was again 

partly caused by migration of ethnic people, specifically Russians who 

comprised 37.8 percent of the population in 1989 dropped to 30 percent 

in 1999. Overall, between 1989 and 1999, the “European”18 population in 

Kazakhstan decreased from 44.7 to 34.7 percent.19

In Kyrgyzstan, out of 102,000 ethnic Germans living in the country, 

80,000 left between 1991 and 1996.20 In addition to the typical causes 

behind the migration of minorities from Central Asia, the main impetus 

for the German exodus was the program run by the German government 

to accept and assist German descendants from the Commonwealth of 

Independent States (CIS). Russians also departed in significant numbers. 

Where they once comprised 21.4 percent of the Kyrgyzstan population in 

1989 the figure had dropped to 12.5 percent by 1999.21

Turkmenistan has had the lowest migration rate among the Central 

Asian states. The proportion of non-Russian minorities in Turkmenistan 

decreased only slightly, from 18.5 to 18 percent between 1989 and 1996. 

The Russian population decreased from 9.5 percent in 1989 to 6.6 percent 

in 1996. Such low rates of migration can be explained by the absence of 

ethnic violence in the country, the dependence of the Turkmen gas industry on Russian personnel,22 and government policies that allowed dual 

citizenship with Russia. However, this policy was reversed in 2003: Turkmen citizens now have to either give up Russian citizenship or leave the 

country. As a result, it has been reported that emigration of non-titular 

citizens from Turkmenistan is on the rise.23

Motivating factors behind the decision of non-titular populations 

to migrate from Central Asia include: ethnic motives,25 economic motives, uncertainty about the future and desire to provide a better future 

for children, isolation from Russia, anti-democratic regimes, social and 

political instability, poor ecological conditions, criminal situations, and 

other personal motives (family unification, health problems, desire/need 

for a different climate, etc).26 In addition to the permanent external migration, people from Central Asia have begun to migrate to other countries 

for temporary jobs, and engage in shuttle trade and other kinds of commercial migration. A substantial number of migrants (mostly women) 

engage in the shuttle trade, traveling to other countries to purchase goods 

to be resold in their home countries. Typical destination countries include 

China, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Russia. The traveling 
380 SULAIMANOVA

Table 18–1. Population Change in Central Asia by Ethnicity, 1989-199624

Percent Thousands

1989 1996 1989 1996

Tajikistan

 Tajiks 62.1 68.1 3,172 4,006

 Uzbeks 23.4 24.4 1,198 1,435

 Russians 7.6 3.4 388 199

 Other 6.9 4.1 350 244

Uzbekistan

 Uzbeks 71 76.6 14,142 17,614

 Russians 8.3 5.6 1,653 1,280

 Tatars 3.3 1.5 657 343

 Jews 0.5 0.1 94 18

 Germans 0.2 0.1 40 22

 Other 16.7 16.3 3,318 3,730

Kazakhstan

 Kazakhs 39.5 47.0 6,535 7,781

 Russians 37.7 33.9 6,228 5,615

 Germans 5.8 2.6 957 426

 Other 17 16.4 2,817 2,721

Kyrgyzstan

 Kyrgyz 52.0 59.9 2,230 2,721

 Russians 21.4 15.6 917 707

 Uzbeks 12.8 14.1 550 640

 Ukrainians 2.5 1.6 108 73

 Germans 2.4 0.5 101 21

 Jews 0.1 0.0 6 2

 Other 8.9 8.3 379 381

Turkmenistan

 Turkmen 72.0 75.4 2,536 3,163

 Russians 9.5 6.6 334 278

 Other 18.5 18.0 653 757

Population changes due to natural increase/decrease as well as emigration/immigration. Source: Tim Heleniak. The Changing 

Nationality Composition of the Central Asian and Transcaucasian States.” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 38, No. 6: 357-378.
MIGRATION TRENDS 381

conditions of such migrants are usually miserable, and they are subject 

to harassment from corrupt customs and law enforcement officers. They 

also may have to pay high “passage fees.”27

Hundreds of thousands of Central Asians have left their homes for 

other CIS countries in search of better work opportunities. Many leave 

their families behind and send remittances back home. Russia is the most 

popular destination country for such labor migrants. It is estimated that 

over 160,000 Tajik citizens work in Russia, primarily in the construction 

sector and open markets where unskilled labor is in demand.28 They tend 

to concentrate in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Samara, Volgograd and major 

cities of Western Siberia. Overall, anywhere between 200,000 to 400,000 

Tajik citizens are labor migrants in other Central Asian countries and the 

Russian Federation.29 Similarly, the Kyrgyz also migrate in large numbers 

to the Russian Federation for work. In addition, it is estimated that 6,00030

to 50,00031 Kyrgyz migrants are working in Kazakhstan.32 Many of them 

work on tobacco plantations, often living in horrendous conditions and 

abused by the plantation owners. The United States is also a growing 

destination for emigration. Over 500 Kyrgyz citizens are estimated to be 

working in the New York area, as nannies, maids, care-givers to senior 

citizens and other low-level jobs. Typically, these migrants arrive in the 

United States on tourist visas and stay to work for a few years with the 

intention of saving their wages to take back home and support families in 

Kyrgyzstan.33

Internal migration is also an acute problem in Central Asia. The 

collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the breakdown of industry, the 

collective farm system and the rural infrastructure of the region. Unemployment soared as land was privatized, and jobs that were traditionally 

available at collective farms disappeared. Salaries for teachers, doctors and 

others became irregular, and many schools and hospitals were forced to 

close. Even those institutions that remain open, experience chronic shortages of personnel. These circumstances forced rural residents to move to 

the cities in search of employment and educational opportunities.34

Internal migration includes internally displaced persons (IDPs), 

who have to move within the territory of their country. For example, over 

100,00035 persons were displaced during the 1980s and 1990s because 

of the environmental disaster in the Aral Sea region.36 In addition, over 

161,000 persons37 were forced the leave the Semipalatinsk area, a nuclear 

testing site.38 In Kyrgyzstan, at least 17,000 people had to migrate between 

1992 and 1997 because of landslides, mudflows, floods and earthquakes.39

Overall, according to the estimates of the United National High Commis-
382 SULAIMANOVA

sioner for Refugees (UNHCR), at least 250,000 people have been forced to 

leave their homes in Central Asia because of ecological disasters.40

Another aspect of migration that affects Central Asia is transit migration of third country nationals en route to more developed countries. 

The lax border control that accompanied the demise of the Soviet Union 

opened the region, to human smuggling criminal networks and migrants 

from as far away as South Asia and Africa en route to Western Europe.41

This issue presents a particular challenge to law enforcement agencies in 

the region, as the smuggling of migrants often involves fraudulent passports and/or visas. Central Asian republics have reported irregular migrants originating from China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Iran.42

Refugees who had to flee their homes because of the brutal civil war 

in Tajikistan, the ethnic violence against Meskhetians in Uzbekistan, the 

continuous fighting in Chechnya, and the crimes of the Taliban regime 

in Afghanistan constitute another major group of people on the move 

in Central Asia. UNHCR estimates that 600,000 refugees were displaced 

within Tajikistan as a result of the civil war that killed at least 20,000 

people. Over 60,000 Tajik refugees fled to Afghanistan, and another 13,000 

sought refuge in Kyrgyzstan.43 By 1996, almost all internally displaced Tajik 

refugees returned to their homes. Seventy five percent of Tajik refugees 

who fled to Afghanistan also have returned. Over 74,000 Meskhetians fled 

from the Ferghana valley in 1989 because of serious outbreaks of ethnic 

violence. Two-thirds of them found asylum in Azerbaijan, while the remaining group moved to Russia.44

Overall, it is likely that migration in Central Asia will continue as regional economies deteriorate. Since channels for legal labor migration are 

limited, irregular migration is likely to prevail. The consequences of this 

migration are serious for the countries concerned, as well as for labor migrants themselves. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) 

reports, “99 percent of labour migration in the Eurasian Economic Union 

formed of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and 

Belarus is irregular. Due to their irregular situation, most labour migrants 

do not benefit from the same protection rights other regular citizens enjoy 

and are thus more vulnerable to exploitation by underground employers.”45

The most despicable form of irregular migration is human trafficking. The 

trafficking of human beings for the purposes of sexual exploitation, which 

is becoming a salient characteristic of migration dynamics in Central Asia, 

is the most onerous form of migration throughout the region.
MIGRATION TRENDS 383

Human Trafficking: The Scope of the Problem

Trafficking in women is a modern form of slavery that exists in 

most countries of the world. It is a transnational global problem and one 

of the fastest growing criminal enterprises. Traffickers find it attractive 

because the profits are enormously high and the risks are low. Each year, 

illicit profits from trafficking in women generate an estimated seven to 

12 billion dollars for organized criminal groups.46 Trafficking in persons 

has increased significantly since the end of the Cold War, as borders have 

become more open, and more people, especially women, have become 

economically vulnerable. For many years, Thailand and the Philippines 

have been the main source of young women, but Eastern Europe and the 

former Soviet Union are rapidly becoming growing markets. The increase 

in trafficking in women is an unintended consequence and a “female 

underside” of globalization.47 This chapter seeks to illustrate trafficking 

patterns in Central Asia through analysis of existing data, conversations 

with women’s rights activists, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 

international organizations in Central Asia, and personal observations in 

the field.

Given the complex nature of trafficking, it is not surprising that there 

are many debates as to its definition. The IOM, a Geneva-based intergovernmental organization, defines trafficking as occurring when: “a migrant 

is illicitly engaged (recruited, kidnapped, sold, etc.) and/or moved, either 

within national or across international borders; Intermediaries (traffickers) during any part of this process obtain economic or other profit by 

means of deception, coercion and/or other forms of exploitation under 

conditions that violate the fundamental human rights of migrants.”48 A

Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially 

Women and Children supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000, offers a more comprehensive definition 

of trafficking.49

Political, economic and social changes, which took place after the 

Soviet Union collapsed, resulted in poverty and unemployment, and created a pool of women from which traffickers could recruit. Thousands of 

women are lured into prostitution under false pretenses of high paying 

jobs abroad as waitresses, dancers, models and au pairs. Impoverished 

women of Central Asia are an easy target for traffickers, who take advantage of the high level of unemployment among women, their poverty and 

the lack of a stable future.
384 SULAIMANOVA

Trafficking in human beings is a multifaceted problem and it takes 

various forms—sweat shop labor, domestic servitude, begging, trafficking 

of boys to be used as camel jockeys, and sexual exploitation. Trafficking in 

women for the purposes of sexual exploitation is a more dangerous form 

of trafficking in humans compared to others because victims are exposed 

to serious health risks, including sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and 

HIV/AIDS. Trafficking in children and men also occurs, but the majority 

of victims are women. In Central Asia, the trafficking of women is a new 

phenomenon. Prior to 1992 virtually no cases of trafficking in women 

were reported from this region to the West; since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the phenomenon has reached epidemic proportions.

It is difficult to determine how many women have been trafficked 

abroad from the former Soviet Union. The trafficking “business” keeps 

a low profile, victims are threatened by the traffickers to remain silent, 

and no official statistics are available. Estimates of how many people are 

trafficked worldwide vary significantly. The U.S. Government estimates 

that approximately 800,000 to 900,000 persons are trafficked each year.50

Other reports state that up to four million people are trafficked around the 

world annually.51 The estimates of the number of persons trafficked into 

the United States annually vary from 18,00052 to 50,000.53 Other sources 

estimate that up to 175,000 persons are trafficked from Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS annually.54 In the case of Central Asia, the IOM 

estimates that approximately 4,000 women from Kyrgyzstan, about 5,000 

from Kazakhstan,55 and 1,000 from Tajikistan are trafficked abroad each 

year. There are no estimates on the scale of trafficking from the other Central Asian republics, but the U.S. Government deems Uzbekistan to have a 

significant number of trafficking cases.56 

Most of the research on trafficking has been conducted in the traditional sending and receiving countries by the IOM, NGOs, and independent researchers. In light of the changes in the post-Cold War era, 

IOM has conducted studies in the newly independent states of the former 

Soviet Union (Ukraine, Moldova, the Kyrgyz Republic, Armenia, Georgia 

and Tajikistan) that have become a major source of trafficked women. 

These studies identify the scope of trafficking in human beings, trafficking 

routes, common destination countries, methods of recruitment, trafficking networks, profile of victims and estimates of the number of trafficked 

women.
MIGRATION TRENDS 385

Nature of the Problem

One of the first writings on sexual exploitation of women from a 

feminist and human rights perspective was undertaken by Kathleen Barry 

in the 1970s. Her Female Sexual Slavery was ground-breaking research on 

forced prostitution and trafficking in women, at a time when there was a 

belief that “women are not forced into prostitution; sexual violence is simply part of their work, and further, that some women are made for that.”57

Most of the prior research on prostitution looked at female motivation 

rather than the circumstances that got them onto the streets. Barry came 

up with the concept of female sexual slavery and defines it as follows:

Female sexual slavery is present in all situations where women or girls 

cannot change the immediate conditions of their existence; where 

regardless of how they got into those conditions they cannot get out; 

and where they are subject to sexual violence and exploitation.58

Barry’s definition of female sexual slavery reflects the situation in 

which many trafficking victims find themselves. The majority of trafficked 

women are kept in squalid conditions in a state of virtual house arrest 

and are transported only to and from work. Even when women have relative freedom of movement, their illegal immigration status, inability to 

speak the local language, lack of documents, and fear of being arrested, 

mistreated, or deported, keeps them from seeking help from local law 

enforcement authorities.59

Human trafficking is often viewed from the perspective of international migration. As Paul J. Smith points out, international migration is 

often explained by a basic “push” and “pull” model: “economic deprivation, high fertility, and unemployment (push factors) in lesser-developed 

countries work in concert with such elements as family reunification, 

higher wages, and increased demand for labor (pull factors) in industrialized countries, to create an influx of immigrants.”60 This model holds true 

for the trafficking phenomenon as well. Poverty, unemployment and lack 

of future perspectives are among the push factors; demand for “services” 

and potentially higher wages are the pull factors in receiving countries, for 

women taking the risk of going abroad and getting trafficked.

Bolstering the pull factors are “stories of better opportunities overseas,” which are often naive and unrealistic. During a study of trafficking 

from the CIS, one respondent said she knew she would have to engage 

in prostitution, but she thought it would be similar to the film Pretty 

Woman, where one man would support her.61 One could argue that this is 

an extreme level of naiveté, but considering that the former Soviet coun-
386 SULAIMANOVA

tries were totally isolated from the rest of the world for almost 70 years, 

these kinds of illusions are not surprising. Ideas of the lifestyle in Western 

countries, and especially the United States, are drawn mainly from the 

movies and soap operas televised on a daily basis. Women watching “Santa 

Barbara” and “Dallas” expect to have the kind of life they see in the movies once they get to the West. They do not anticipate being manipulated, 

deceived, or physically abused, and believe nothing bad could happen to 

them in wealthy countries.

Though limited, existing literature provides some insight into the 

links between human trafficking and organized criminal groups. In most 

cases, trafficking is carried out by organized criminal groups with extensive international links.62 These criminal groups intimidate the trafficked 

women and threaten retaliation against family members at home if the 

women do not obey them.63 In the same vein, Sietske Altink of the Dutch 

anti-trafficking NGO STV writes:

As the traffickers are highly organized, most of their victims dare 

not speak out. Ana from the Dominican Republic said, ‘They were 

like a mafia. I couldn’t even discuss my situation with other girls. 

Whenever I told someone my story, the next day the traffickers knew 

that I had talked. The man who kept me prisoner explicitly forbade 

me to speak to other girls. If these criminals have the address of your 

parents’ home, they can keep you a prisoner. They say you endanger 

your father and mother when you don’t obey them. That’s how the 

traffickers subdue us.64

Root Causes of Trafficking

In general, women get trafficked because of poverty, unemployment, 

the low social status of women in their home countries, lack of opportunities and prospects for the future, and in many cases, because of an idealistic view of the Western world and the wealthier countries in general. All of 

these rationales can be found in Central Asia. Poverty in Central Asia has 

reached unprecedented levels: 51 percent of the Kyrgyz population lives 

below the national poverty line, as do 34.6 percent of Kazakh citizens and 

26.5 percent of the Uzbeks. Forty four percent of Turkmen live on less than 

$2 a day.65 The population groups most affected by poverty are women, 

children, and the elderly. Women are the first ones to lose their jobs due 

to downsizing and economic shifts.66 The National Statistics Committee of 

Kyrgyzstan reports that 70 percent of women in Kyrgyzstan are suffering 

from financial difficulties.67 The unemployment rate is very high, and even 
MIGRATION TRENDS 387

those who are employed, make an average of $28 per month.68 As the 2000 

IOM survey of trafficking victims in Kyrgyzstan reports: 

Seventy nine percent of the respondents said that unemployment 

drove them to look for work abroad. The main reasons they were 

working as commercial sex workers abroad were said to be related to 

their lack of money and hopes for a better future. The lack of alternative opportunities encourages them to take risks. In focus groups 

discussions the women said that they want more for themselves and 

their families than to just earn enough money to feed themselves. 

They want a better life.69

Even when women are employed, they often face job discrimination 

and sexual harassment at work. In many businesses throughout the CIS, 

it is not uncommon for a male boss to demand that his female subordinate engage in sexual relations with him.70 Newspaper job advertisements 

targeting women often mention “no hang-ups,” as one of the qualifications required for the job.71 Not surprisingly, when women are promised 

payment of $60,000 a year to work abroad,72 an amount they could never 

dream of at home, it is not very difficult for them to be enticed by such 

lucrative “job offers.”

The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted not only in poverty and 

unemployment but also in the drastic deterioration of the system of social 

protection. Many of the social services taken for granted under the Soviet 

system are no longer offered. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, day 

care for children, education at all levels, and medical services were provided by the government. Now many day care centers have closed and the 

remaining ones are unaffordable to most parents. Health care and education systems also are closed or deteriorating, due to lack of funding.73

The social status of women in Central Asia has been on the decline 

in the last decade as well. As the economic situation continues to worsen, 

more and more men lose their jobs, often plunging them into a spiral of 

alcoholism and abuse of the family at home. Increasingly, women have 

become the victims of domestic violence, while local law enforcement 

officials refuse to take this offense seriously.74 Domestic violence is one of 

the major reasons why children run away from home. Street children, in 

turn, are especially vulnerable to being recruited by traffickers. Further, 

young girls from households where domestic violence is the norm, grow 

up “seeing women as inferior beings that men can use and abuse as they 

please.”75 The mistreatment or abuse they receive in trafficking situations 

only confirms their worst fears.
388 SULAIMANOVA

In addition, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian 

nations have witnessed a revival of “national traditions,” which often come 

into conflict with Soviet policies that promoted women’s equality. Not long 

after independence, politicians began advocating a return to “traditional 

roles” for women, which is interpreted by many as an attempt to “drive 

women out of the labor force and higher education and back into the 

home.”76 The Parliament in Kyrgyzstan has discussed seriously legalizing 

polygamy, and ultimately, rejected the proposal by only a small margin.77

Unofficially, polygamy is not uncommon in Central Asian republics.78 The 

deteriorating economic situation, high unemployment among women, 

religious and traditional sentiments, as well as the consequences of the 

civil war (in Tajikistan) are cited as some of the reasons why polygamy is 

spreading across Central Asia;79 traditional male chauvinism is another. 

This dramatic decline in women’s social status has created a situation favorable for traffickers.

Recruitment of Women in the Countries of Origin 

Traffickers use the following methods to recruit victims:

■ Advertisements in newspapers;

■ Marriage agencies or mail-order-bride agencies;

■ Friends, relatives, or acquaintances;

■ The “Second Wave” (trafficked women returning to recruit other 

women);

■ False marriages (women marrying a false groom who is, in fact, a 

trafficker);80

■ Kidnapping.

Advertisements in newspapers are the most popular recruitment 

method because traffickers can reach a wide pool of potential victims. 

Such advertisements usually offer young women highly paid work abroad 

as waitresses, dancers, or shopkeepers.81 When a woman responds to an 

advertisement, the traffickers sometimes sign a “contract” with her that 

promises high earnings, but also stipulates that travel expenses as well as 

room and board will be deducted. Room and board often can eat up over 

half of their daily earnings. Women also are bound to pay back the travel 

expenses that are “calculated” at rates often exceeding the real cost of 

transportation by as much as three to five times. According to the Global 

Survival Network, an NGO based in Washington, trafficking networks in 

Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS) charge women anywhere 

from $1,500 to $30,000 for their “services” in facilitating documentation, 
MIGRATION TRENDS 389

jobs, and transportation.82 This leaves victims with a huge debt that takes 

months, if not years, to pay off. The women often are deprived of all their 

earnings until this “debt” is paid in full, which makes them, in fact, indentured servants.

Mail-order-bride and marriage agencies via the Internet have become 

increasingly popular among women who want to marry a foreigner. Their 

hope is to improve their economic situation and/or escape their native 

country, where they see no prospects for the future. Most of these women 

are somewhat naively searching for happiness, and often become victims 

of men who “order” them only to sell them to pimps.83 The paramount 

problem is that mail-order-bride agencies do not conduct any screening of 

their male clients, some of whom may have a history of violence or criminal 

background. As a result, mail-order brides may become victims of abuse. 

In a recent case, a 20 year old mail-order-bride, Anastasia Solovieva-King 

from Kyrgyzstan, was murdered by her American husband, Indle King. He 

had been married twice before, both times through matchmaking agencies. Within a month of marrying Anastasia, the man was writing to other 

prospective mail-order-brides. Two years later, as his marriage to Anastasia started falling apart, he wrote to more women and began planning 

to marry another mail-order-bride.84 Following the murder of Anastasia 

King, the U.S. Congress proposed a bill in 2003, that would allow foreign 

mail order brides to check the criminal background (including protective 

orders issued because of domestic violence allegations) of their potential 

grooms. If such legislation had been in place, Anastasia Soloeiva may have 

learned that her prospective husband’s first wife had obtained a protective 

order against him in 1995.85

Some victims of trafficking have indicated that they have been recruited by friends, relatives or acquaintances. These people gained the 

woman’s confidence, then offered them highly paid work abroad, often 

sharing their alleged “experience” and showing off newly purchased goods 

or property.86 “Second wave” recruitment occurs when trafficked women 

return home to recruit other women. For some women this is the only way 

they can return home—a common ploy for pimps is to pose a condition 

that the trafficked woman find someone else to replace her. Other women 

become recruiters voluntarily, making a profit from other women’s victimization. One woman who had been trafficked from Kyrgyzstan expressed 

her intention to become a trafficker: “In the future I want to become an 

agent myself. I think I could be very successful. I could recruit girls to 

send to Kazakhstan, there’s money to be made there too. I can earn more 

working for just three months abroad, than I can earn in five years here. A 
390 SULAIMANOVA

pimp earns at least $5,000 from each woman he takes on.”87 The cycle can 

be self-perpetuating. There are also cases of women who have not been 

recruited being kidnapped off the streets.88

Transportation to Destination Countries and 

Involvement of Government Officials

In most cases traffickers arrange for a woman’s travel documents, 

visas and airline tickets. Occupations typically listed on a victim’s visa applications include dancer, entertainer, student or au pair. Tour firms are 

found to assist in the trafficking of women and girls abroad, claiming they 

are “shop-tourists” who buy goods abroad to resell them in their home 

countries.89 Having entered the country with fake passports, women usually overstay their visas, which makes them even more vulnerable because 

they are viewed by the local police as illegal immigrants. 

Almost every trafficking network in Central Asia has a contact who 

makes it possible for them to obtain genuine state issued passports at the 

passport issuing department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.90 This 

indicates that corrupt local law enforcement officials are an integral part 

of the trafficking chain. If a woman does not have a passport, or is underage, a fraudulent passport is arranged for a bribe, ranging from $10091

to $800.92 Corrupt law enforcement officials have a monetary motive for 

facilitating the trafficking of women—salaries at the government agencies 

are very low, and corruption is a way to supplement their income. Another 

reason why government officials are reluctant to intervene in human trafficking is due to fear of reprisals by organized criminal groups.93

It also has been reported that law enforcement officials in some receiving countries are involved in trafficking. For example, women under 

the age of 31 are not allowed to enter the United Arab Emirates, which 

is a major destination for women trafficked from Central Asia, unless 

accompanied by male relatives. When 15 and 16 year-old girls enter the 

U.A.E with passports that indicate they are over 31, traffickers bribe the 

immigration officials at the airport to let the girls pass through immigration control.94 Trafficking victims interviewed by the IOM in the Kyrgyz 

Republic, reported that 73 percent of them were harassed by the customs 

and law enforcement officers upon return. As one of the women recounts, 

“When I got to Almaty, the customs officials took $500 cash off me, they 

also took my jewelry. They said, ‘We know what you are. It’s written all 

over your face.’ Then the cops stopped us and said ‘We know what you’ve 

been doing.’95
MIGRATION TRENDS 391

The Role of Organized Criminal Groups in Trafficking

The former Soviet republics are experiencing an organized crime 

epidemic. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimates that some 8,000 criminal gangs operate throughout the NIS.96

About 200 are now global conglomerates and operate in 58 countries of 

the world.97 Twenty six of them have established a presence in the United 

States.98 Overall, organized criminal groups from the CIS are involved in 

all types of criminal activities, including, but not limited to: money-laundering, drug-trafficking, gambling, prostitution, trafficking in women and 

children, child pornography, contract killings, racketeering, banking and 

insurance fraud, extortion and kidnapping for ransom.99 The trafficking 

networks are controlled by criminal gangs that provide security, logistical 

support, liaison with brothel owners in many countries, and false documents. According to Marco Gramegna of IOM, there are large-, mediumand small-scale networks of trafficking women.100 Large-scale networks 

recruit women in a seemingly legal way, as language students or au pairs, 

which leads to the conclusion that these networks have extensive international contacts. The medium-scale networks usually traffic women from 

one country, while the small-scale networks traffic a few women at a time 

when a brothel owner places an “order.”101 In many cases, trafficking is carried out by organized criminal groups with foreign connections.102

The fact that organized criminal groups in various states of the 

former Soviet Union have links with each other allows them to organize 

illegal trafficking effectively. For example, Russian and Ukrainian women 

are trafficked through Georgia to Turkey and the Mediterranean.103 Tajik 

women are trafficked to the UAE, Russia, Turkey and other countries 

transiting through NIS states.104 Women from Kyrgyzstan are trafficked to 

the UAE, Turkey and European countries through Kazakhstan and directly 

from Kyrgyzstan.105 According to Louise Shelley, “While the links among 

the States have declined since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the organized criminals still manage to function effectively together. And in the 

Russian Far East you see links with Korean and Japanese organized crime 

groups that are facilitating the trafficking of women.”106

Methods Used by Traffickers to Control Women

The Dutch NGO working against trafficking in women, Stichting 

Tegen Vrouwenhandel (STV), reports that organized criminal groups involved in trafficking are extremely violent and use every kind of threat 

to intimidate women. The so-called “red mafia” are said to have made a 
392 SULAIMANOVA

woman dig her own grave and have taken women’s family members hostage in order to force them to comply or keep silent.107 As Shelley points 

out, “many of the women refuse to cooperate with the authorities because 

there is little or no protection, and they face deportation and threats 

against their families if they cooperate with foreign law enforcement.”108

Once a woman is in trafficker’s hands, the latter uses any and all 

means to control her: violence, including sexual assault, threats to the victim’s family, drugs, and threats to turn the woman over to unsympathetic 

local authorities. Traffickers take away women’s passports immediately 

upon arrival in the receiving country, either by force or by claiming that 

they need to extend the visas. Passports then are kept hostage to control 

the victims. According to Human Rights Watch, the most common form 

of coercion is debt bondage.109 Women are told they must work without wages until they repay their purchase price and/or travel expenses. 

Employers also maintain their power to “resell” indebted women into 

renewed levels of debt. In some cases, women find that their debts only 

increase and can never be fully repaid.110 It also seems that pimps/traffickers let some women keep just enough of their earnings to take back home 

to attract other potential victims. 

Trafficked women who do not obey the rules are treated severely. The 

corpses of several hundred trafficked women, strangled, shot or beaten to 

a pulp, are found in Europe every year.111 Europol believes that many more 

bodies are never discovered. The Russian organized criminal groups are 

especially known for their cruelty. As Friedman puts it, “Russian mobsters, 

in the United States, simply don’t play by the unwritten rules of the acceptable uses of gang-land violence.”112 And IOM reports that, “The organized 

gangs of traffickers who lure and smuggle young women into prostitution 

are ruthless.”113 One trafficked victim from Kyrgyzstan testified, “Russian 

pimps, unlike most European ones, are also hardened criminals. It’s no 

big deal for them to kill someone. They’re the greediest, cruelest people in 

the world. They warned me, ‘If you try to go to the police, we’ll kill you.’ I 

believed them.”114

What is Being Done to Fight Trafficking? 

The U.S. Government passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 

in 2000 to combat trafficking in persons. Among other provisions, this 

federal law provides for punishment of traffickers, protection of trafficking victims and monitoring of other countries’ efforts to fight trafficking. 

The law also requires the State Department to submit an annual report to 

Congress on the status of trafficking worldwide. This report rates coun-
MIGRATION TRENDS 393

tries’ efforts in combating human trafficking by placing them in “tiers.” 

Tier 1 countries are those whose governments “fully comply with the Act’s 

minimum standards.” Minimum standards for the governments include 

prohibiting and punishing trafficking, as well as making serious efforts to 

eliminate trafficking.115 Governments of countries in Tier 2 do not fully 

comply with the minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to 

do so. Tier 3 countries do not comply with the minimum standards and 

are not making significant efforts to comply with those standards.

Four Central Asian countries have been reported in the State Department’s 2003 trafficking report. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been placed 

in Tier 2, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been placed in Tier 3.116

Governments that are not making significant efforts to combat human 

trafficking might be subject to sanctions from the United States, including withdrawal of certain types of U.S. aid. Uzbekistan, until recently, did 

not even recognize trafficking as a problem. One of the limited preventive 

measures taken by the government of Uzbekistan is denying exit visas 

to young women.117 Despite numerous known cases of trafficking from 

Kazakhstan, and many reported investigations, the Kazakhs have not convicted any of the traffickers.118 However, new anti-trafficking legislation 

was passed by the lower houses of the Parliament both in Kazakhstan and 

Tajikistan in the spring of 2003.119 Kyrgyzstan is reported to be making 

“significant efforts” to combat trafficking and has introduced draft antitrafficking legislation to the Parliament.120 It is interesting to note that 

both Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan, U.S. allies in the war against terrorism, were 

moved up from their rankings as Tier 3 countries in 2002 to Tier 2 in 2003, 

raising the question of whether this was done for political reasons. 

Conclusions and Recommendations

Trafficking in women is a fundamental human rights violation that 

needs to be combated at the national and international levels. The consequences of trafficking are grave, both to the women and the countries 

involved. According to Marco Gramegna of the IOM, the consequences of 

trafficking are a threat to legal migration and growth in clandestine immigration.121 Both of these problems could have substantial implications 

for political, economic and diplomatic affairs of the sending and receiving 

countries. At the human level, victims of trafficking face intolerable situations, including sexual and physical abuse, and deprivation of their basic 

human rights and dignity.

There is a glaring need for comprehensive trafficking research in 

Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Such research is essential to 
394 SULAIMANOVA

thoroughly assess the scope of trafficking from these countries, identify 

the main destination countries, study how people are trafficked, and who 

the traffickers are. Based on the results of such studies, the respective 

governments should be able to design and implement strategies to fight 

trafficking.

Trafficking is driven by poverty and unemployment of women, as 

well as by demand in the receiving states. To solve the problem by tackling its root causes would be the optimal solution, which, unfortunately, 

is an enormously complex and multidimensional task. Such a solution, 

however, cannot wait until the local economies recover and all women are 

employed. The international community must confront this issue and take 

aggressive steps to stop the trafficking of women and children.

The following steps might be carried out in “sending” countries, including the five Central Asian states, to help alleviate the problem:

■ Foster creation of job opportunities for young women;

■ Improve law enforcement efforts to prevent and punish trafficking 

of women;

■ Crack down on official complicity in trafficking of women (including stricter control over issuing passports) and combat corruption 

which fuels organized crime;

■ Carry out information campaigns in the media and on TV about 

the nature, realities and risks of “lucrative” job offers;

■ Provide legal, medical and psychological assistance to victims of 

trafficking;

■ Guarantee safety to victims who testify against the traffickers 

through witness protection programs.

The following actions should be considered by “receiving” 

countries:

■ Amend laws, including immigration law, to exempt victims of trafficking and/or servitude from being prosecuted for illegal status 

that have resulted directly from these practices. Deportation may 

be appropriate, but punitive measures, including detention, should 

be waived;

■ Prosecute traffickers and enable victims to bring lawsuits against 

traffickers by granting temporary residence permits for the duration 

of the case;

■ Impose tougher penalties for trafficking. The United States has already taken such measures with the adoption of the Victim Protection Act of 2000;
MIGRATION TRENDS 395

■ Protect safety of victims of trafficking through strong witness protection programs;

■ Ensure that victims of trafficking have access to essential social services, including shelter and medical care;

■ Distribute information brochures at the receiving countries’ Embassies abroad with each visa issued to a woman, on the realities and 

risks of being trafficked and what to do if she finds herself trafficked 

and abused abroad.

Trafficking in persons is an acute problem in Central Asia and is 

likely to increase as the economies continue to worsen, unless the region's 

governments and the international community take serious measures 

to fight this phenomenon. Organized criminal groups in both sending 

and receiving countries are actively involved in trafficking. All countries 

involved, sending, receiving and transit, should continue their efforts to 

crack down on organized crime. International cooperation and coordination between law enforcement agencies is crucial for combating trafficking 

in women. When available, the information needed to prosecute the traffickers and protect the victims should be made available to all parties.

Trafficking occurs because women are poor and desperate, do not 

have any prospects for improvement in their lives at home, and possess 

illusions and unrealistic expectations about what awaits them abroad. 

Traffickers take advantage of these circumstances and exploit them. However, trafficking would not be so profitable if there was no demand in the 

wealthier countries. It is obvious that the government authorities in sending countries are involved in the trafficking process at various levels, but 

are the authorities in the receiving countries also looking away from the 

problem? How aggressively governments combat this problem in the next 

few years will determine if the international community is going to eliminate this modern form of slavery in the twenty-first century.

Notes1

 Rafis Abazov, “Economic Migration in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Case of Kyrgyzstan,” 

Post-Communist Economies 11, no. 2 (1999), 237. 2

 Paul Kolstoe, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 

Press), 219. 3

 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Central Asia on the Move.” Refugees Magazine, May 1, 1996; Internet available from <www.unhcr.ch>; accessed September 25, 2003. 4

 For example, 1,500,000 Russians had moved to Turkmenistan by 1917. More Russian immigrants arrived in Central Asia after 1918, seeking to escape hunger and civil war.
396 SULAIMANOVA

5

 See Yuriy Kulchik, et al., Central Asia After the Empire (Chicago, IL: Pluto Press,1996), 3; Rafis 

Abazov, “Economic Migration in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Case of Kyrgyzstan,” Post-Communist 

Economies 11, no. 2 (1999), 240. 6

 International Organization for Migration, 2001, “Internal Migration in the Kyrgyz Republic,” 

3. 7

 Yuriy Kulchik, et al., 4.

8

 Ibid.

9

 Zhanna Zaionchkovskaya, “Migration Patterns in the Former Soviet Union,” in the Conference Report Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Migration, RAND, 

1996, 15; Internet available from <http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF130/>, accessed September 19, 2003. 10 Ibid., 18.

11 Galina S. Vitkovskaya, “Relocation to Russia from the States of Central Asia: Understanding the Decision to Migrate” in the Conference Report Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet 

Union: Implications for Migration, RAND, 1996, 113; Internet available from <http://www.rand.org/

publications/CF/CF130>/, accessed September 19, 2003. 12 Tim Heleniak, “The Changing Nationality Composition of the Central Asian and Transcaucasian States,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 38, no. 6: 373. 13 “The Russians Say Goodbye to All That,” The Economist 328, no. 7827 (Sept 4, 1993), 38. 14 International Organization for Migration, 2001, “Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A 

Study of Trafficking in Women and Children,” 10. 15 “The Russians Say Goodbye to All That.” 

16 Tim Heleniak.,no. 6: 375.

17 Ibid.

18 Russian, Ukrainian, Belarus, Polish, and German nationalities.

19 Peter Sinnott, “Population Politics in Kazakhstan,” Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 2 

(Spring 2003), 105. 20 Rafis Abazov, “Economic Migration in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Case of Kyrgyzstan,” 

Post-Communist Economies 11, no. 2 (1999), 247. 21 International Organization for Migration. 2001. “Internal Migration in the Kyrgyz Republic,” 

11. 22 Tim Heleniak, no. 6: 374.

23 “Flight From Ashgabat,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting (Central Asia), no. 220, July 

25, 2003. 24 Population changes due to natural increase/decrease as well as emigration/immigration. 

Source: Tim Heleniak, no. 6: 357-378. 25 “Ethnic motives” are concerns about “ethnic policy,” including seizure of power by the titular 

ethnic group and intent to create a monoethnic state; “ethnic discrimination,” including non-titular 

ethnic groups becoming second-class citizens and experiencing civil rights infringements, employment discrimination, unequal access to higher education, etc.; popular nationalism, including experiences with harassment, hostility; “language barrier,” including lack of schooling in Russian, lack of 

information in Russian, unofficial status of the Russian languages, etc.; “other ethnic-based reasons 

for discomfort,” including local cultural traditions, communication difficulties, desire to live among 

people of the same nationality, ethnic barriers to family creation, etc. (Source: Galina S. Vitkovskaya, 

“Relocation to Russia from the States of Central Asia: Understanding the Decision to Migrate” in the 

Conference Report Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Migration, 

RAND, 1996: 126; Internet; available from http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF130/, accessed 

September 19, 2003. 26 Galina S. Vitkovskaya, “Relocation to Russia from the States of Central Asia: Understanding the Decision to Migrate” in the Conference Report Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet 

Union: Implications for Migration, RAND, 1996, 126; Internet available from <http://www.rand.org/

publications/CF/CF130>/, accessed September 19, 2003.
MIGRATION TRENDS 397

27 International Organization for Migration, 2001, “Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A 

Study of Trafficking in Women and Children,” 11. 28 Ibid. 

29 Ibid.

30 Official estimate is 6,000-7,000.

31 Unofficial estimate.

32 “Poverty Fuels Labour Migration in the South. Poverty is Rife in Some Parts of Southern Kyrgyzstan.” Gazeta.kg, August 15, 2003; Internet available from <http://www.gazeta.kg/view.

php?i=1852>, accessed on September 30, 2003. Also see Labor Migration Project documents, International Organization for Migration; Internet available from <http://www.iom.elcat.kg/labourmigration.html>, accessed September 30, 2003. 33 Personal communication with a Kyrgyz labor migrant, September 19, 2003.

34 “Internal Migration in the Kyrgyz Republic,” 4.

35 Over 50,000 persons from this area were displaced to Uzbekistan, 30,000 to Kazakhstan and 

13,000 to other CIS states. 36 “Unable to Cope: Out-Migration from Karakalpakstan,” Medicines Sans Frontieres: 24; Internet; available from http://www.msf.org/source/countries/asia/aralsea/2003/karakalpakstan/unable.

pdf; accessed September 25, 2003. Also see United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Central 

Asia on the Move.” Refugees Magazine, May 1, 1996; Internet’ available from www.unhcr.ch; accessed 

September 25, 2003. 37 45,000 persons relocated elsewhere in Kazakhstan, and 116,000 persons moved to other CIS 

countries. 38 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Central Asia on the Move.” Refugees 

Magazine, May 1, 1996; Internet’ available from www.unhcr.ch; accessed September 25, 2003.

39 “Internal Migration in the Kyrgyz Republic,” 16.

40 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Central Asia on the Move,” Refugees 

Magazine, May 1, 1996; Internet available from <www.unhcr.ch>, accessed September 25, 2003.

41 International Organization for Migration.,“Geopolitical Factors Shaping Migration in Central Asia,.” Internet available from <http://www.iom.int/austria/tcc/>, accessed September 25, 2003. 42 International Organization for Migration, “Compilation of Recent Migration Information 

from Eastern Europe and Central Asia”; Internet available from <http://www.iom.int/austria/tcc/>, 

accessed September 25, 2003. 43 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Central Asia on the Move,” Refugees 

Magazine, May 1, 1996: Internet available from <www.unhcr.ch>, accessed September 25, 2003.

44 Ibid.

45 “Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A Study of Trafficking in Women and Children,” 11.

46 Donna Hughes, “The ‘Natasha’ Trade—The Transnational Shadow Market of Trafficking in 

Women,” Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 2 (Spring 2000), 625. 47 Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie R. Hochschild, eds., “Introduction,”  Global Woman: Nannies, 

Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2003), 3. 48  International  Organization  for  Migration  (IOM).  1999.  “Trafficking  in  Migrants,  IOM 

Policy and Responses,” Working Paper (March). 49 The Protocol defines trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or 

receipt of persons, by the threat or use of force, by abduction, fraud, deception or coercion or the abuse 

of power or by the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having 

control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation; exploitation shall include, at a minimum, 

the exploitation of the prostitution or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, 

slavery or practices similar to slavery, the removal of organs for illicit purposes or servitude.” 50 U.S. Department of State, 2003. Trafficking in Persons Report, Washington, D.C.; Internet 

available from <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2003/>, accessed September 12, 2003. 51 Amy O’Neill Richard, “International Trafficking in Women to the United States: A Contemporary Manifestation of Slavery and Organized Crime,” U.S. State Department, November 1999, 3.
398 SULAIMANOVA

52 U.S. Department of State, 2003. Trafficking in Persons Report. 53 Amy O’Neill Richard, 3.

54 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Proposed Action Plan 2000 for Activities to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 

Warsaw, November 1999. 55 International Organization for Migration, “Trafficking in Migrants,” no. 23 (April 2001); 

Internet available from <http://www.iom.int//documents/publication/en/tm_23.pdf>, accessed September 12, 2003. 56 U.S. Department of State. 2003, Trafficking in Persons Report. 57 Kathleen Barry, Female Sexual Slavery (New York: Prentice Hall, 1979), vii. 58 Ibid., xi. 

59International Organization for Migration (IOM). 2000. “Trafficking in Women and Children 

from the Kyrgyz Republic.” 60 Ibid., 13.

61 Cited in Donna Hughes, 636.

62 Testimony of Louise Shelley at the Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on “The Sex Trade: Trafficking of Women and Children in Europe and the United 

States,” June 28, 1999, 19. 63 Ibid.

64 S. Altink, Stolen Lives: Trading Women into Sex and Slavery (London: Scarlet Press, 1995), 

vii. 65 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2002. Internet available from <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en>, accessed September 12, 2003. 66 Gillian Caldwell, Steven Galster, and Nadia Steinzor, “Crime & Servitude: An Exposé of the 

Traffic in Women for Prostitution from the Newly Independent States,” (Washington, D.C.: Global 

Survival Network, 1997), 11. 67 International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2000, “Trafficking in Women and Children 

from the Kyrgyz Republic,”11. 68 Cited in Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway <http://eng.gateway.kg>, last accessed on July 

6, 2003.69 “Trafficking in Women and Children from the Kyrgyz Republic,”11.

70 Ibid., 12.

71 Donna Hughes, “Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation: The Case of the Russian Federation,” 

International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2002. 72 “Slaves of Chicago: International Sex Trafficking is Becoming Big Business,” These Times, 

January 8, 2001. 73 “Trafficking in Women and Children from the Kyrgyz Republic,”12.

74 Human Rights Watch 2001, “Sacrificing Women to Save the Family? Domestic Violence in 

Uzbekistan,” 3. 75 Cited in Donna Hughes, “Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation: The Case of the Russian Federation,” International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2002. 76 “Sacrificing Women to Save the Family?,” 7. Also see the UN Press Release “Since Becoming 

Sovereign State, Kyrgyzstan Committed to Integrating Women into National Programmes of Action, Anti-Discrimination Committee Told,” Internet available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/

docs/1999/19990122.wom1081.html>, accessed July 6, 2003. 77 “The Stolen Brides of Kyrgyzstan,” The Economist 341, no. 7993, Nov 23, 1996. 78 See “Sacrificing Women to Save the Family?” Also see “Central Asia: Increase in Polygamy 

Attributed To Economic Hardship, Return To Tradition,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 

16, 2002, available from <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/10/16102002163911.asp>, Internet 

accessed July 6, 2003. 79 “Central Asia: Increase in Polygamy.”

80 “Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A Study of Trafficking in Women and Children,”15.
MIGRATION TRENDS 399

81 International Organization for Migration (IOM). 2000. “Trafficking in Women and Children 

from the Kyrgyz Republic,”13. 82 Gillian Caldwell, Steven Galster, and Nadia Steinzor, 1997. �Crime & Servitude: An Exposé of 

the Traffic in Women for Prostitution from the Newly Independent States.� Washington, D.C.: Global 

Survival Network, 14. 83 Donna Hughes, “The ‘Natasha’ Trade—The Transnational Shadow Market of Trafficking in 

Women.” Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 2 (Spring 2000), 635. 84 Jim Haley, “King Case Coming to End,” The Daily Herald, February 21, 2002. www.heraldnet.

com. 85 “Abuse of Mail-Order Foreign Brides Prompts Effort to Oversee Fast-Growing Industry,” 

Associated Press, July 5, 2003. 86 International Organization for Migration 2001, “Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A Study 

of Trafficking in Women and Children,” 15. 87 “Trafficking in Women and Children from the Kyrgyz Republic,” 52.

88 “Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A Study of Trafficking in Women and Children,”15; also 

see “Trafficking in Women and Children from the Kyrgyz Republic,” 14-15. 89 “Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A Study of Trafficking in Women and Children,” 14.

90 “Trafficking in Women and Children from the Kyrgyz Republic,” 29-30.

91 Ibid., 16.

92 Gillian Caldwell, Steven Galster, and Nadia Steinzor, 1997, 9.

93 Donna Hughes, “Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation: The Case of the Russian Federation., 

International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2002, 5. 94 “Trafficking in Women and Children from the Kyrgyz Republic,” 16.

95 Ibid., 45-46.

96 Global Organized Crime Project, Russian Organized Crime (Washington, D.C.: Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, 1997), 2. 97 Global Organized Crime Project, Russian Organized Crime and Corruption: Putin’s Challenge

(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), 7. 98 Russian Organized Crime, 2-3. 99 See Russian Organized Crime; also see Robert I. Friedman, Red Mafiya: How the Russian Mob 

Has Invaded America (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 2000). 100 Cited in Andrea Bertone, “International Political Economy and the Politics of Sex,” Gender 

Issues, 18, no.1 (2000), 4-22.

101 Ibid.

102 Testimony of Louise Shelley at the Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on “The Sex Trade: Trafficking of Women and Children in Europe and the United 

States,” June 28, 1999. 103 Ibid.

104“Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan: A Study of Trafficking in Women and Children,” 18

105 “Trafficking in Women and Children from the Kyrgyz Republic,” 17.

106 Testimony of Louise Shelley at the Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on “The Sex Trade: Trafficking of Women and Children in Europe and the United 

States,” June 28, 1999, 18. 107 S. Altink, 1995. Stolen Lives: Trading Women into Sex and Slavery. London: Scarlet Press, 

125. 108 Testimony of Louise Shelley at the Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on “The Sex Trade: Trafficking of Women and Children in Europe and the United 

States,” June 28, 1999, 17. 109 Human Rights Watch/Asia, Owed Justice: Thai Women Trafficked into Debt Bondage in Japan

(New York: Human Rights Watch, 2000), 86.
400 SULAIMANOVA

110 Ralph Regan, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. “International 

Trafficking of Women and Children,” Washington, D.C., February 22, 2000. Found online at <http://

secretary.state.gov/www/picw/trafficking/tralph.html>. 111 “In the Shadows,” The Economist, 356, no. 8185 (August 26, 2000), 38-39. 112 Robert I. Friedman, xvii. 113 “Trafficking in Women and Children from the Kyrgyz Republic,” 27.

114 Ibid., 27, 47.

115 U.S. Department of State. 2003. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington, D.C, Internet 

available from <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2003/>, accessed September 12, 2003. 116 Turkmenistan is not included in the report as no information on trafficking was available.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid.

121 Cited in Andrea Bertone, “International Political Economy and the Politics of Sex.” Gender 

Issues, 18, no.1 (2000), 4-22.
CHINA'S RE-EMERGENCE 401

Chapter 19

Beyond the Battle of Talas: 

China’s Re-emergence in 

Central Asia1

Matthew Oresman

I

n October 2002, China held its first military exercise in decades with 

another nation: the Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan. Aimed at 

training border forces on both sides to respond to a terrorist insurgency, this event highlighted the growing importance of Central Asia to 

China. Moreover, this exercise took place with a country that already had 

American and Russian forces deployed just outside of the Kyrgyz capital 

of Bishkek. Today U.S.-led counterterrorism coalition forces are located 

at Manas Airbase, and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) are at Kant Airbase. 

The presence in one Central Asian nation of Chinese, Russian, and U.S. 

military and security forces underscores the convergence of Great Power 

interests in Central Asia.

While Russia has maintained a strong presence in the region for 

more than a century, China and the United States are relative newcomers. 

Over the past 12 years, Central Asia has moved from a strategic to a vital 

interest of the United States, particularly given the events of September 

11, 2001 and subsequent operations in the region. Since the breakup of 

the Soviet Union, the newly independent states of Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—have become 

increasingly important on the global strategic landscape. In the wake of 

World Trade Center and Pentagon terrorist attacks against the United 

States, the countries of Central Asia have become integral allies in the war 

against terrorism with ongoing operations in Afghanistan and throughout 

Central Asia to stabilize the region and clean up the remnants of al Qaeda 

and other hostile groups.

401
402 ORESMAN

While U.S. and Russian involvement in Central Asia is not surprising, one of the more intriguing developments in the region over the past 

decade has been China’s diplomacy. China’s interest in building relations 

with Central Asia is not startling, given the country’s long history in the 

region dating back to the foundations of the “Silk Road.” Included in this 

history are such revolutionary events as the Battle of Talas in 751 and the 

Chinese conquest of Xinjiang beginning in 1757.2 The agility and creativity 

China has exercised in orchestrating its “re”-emergence has taken many by 

surprise though. China has moved rapidly from the difficult task of delineating and disarming its borders with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 

Tajikistan to building a multilateral organization and growing economic 

and security ties, all while working to alleviate traditional suspicions 

among Central Asian states about the true intentions of its government.

The prominence of China in Central Asia will grow over the next 

decade, particularly if the Russian position continues to wane and the 

strategic attention of the United States is drawn elsewhere. On the basis 

of geography and economic realities alone, China appears well placed to 

expand its influence in the region over the long run. Central Asian states 

will continue to seek robust engagement with China as their transportation infrastructure and developing economies become more intertwined. 

China likely will continue to exercise a light touch with its diplomacy to 

assure stable, productive relations along its interior frontiers, while dispelling fears that it is seeking regional hegemony.

Over the near- to medium-term, increasing activity by China in Central Asia does not present a pressing challenge to American interests in the 

region. Beijing appears to be attuned to U.S. sensitivities in this region in 

the post-September 11 environment and likely will try to avoid perceptions of a “rising China” as a regional hegemon. Instead, Beijing will seek 

a productive and cooperative relationship with Washington in this part of 

the world, as elsewhere around its periphery. At present the United States 

and China share similar goals in Central Asia, particularly with regard to 

combating terrorist activity emanating from the region. Even as the United 

States has moved counterterrorism forces close to China’s border—a 

fact that has not altered Beijing’s overall Central Asia policy—China has 

responded with restraint, seeing the current circumstances as an opportunity to improve its overall relationship with the United States. Beijing recognizes that its national priorities require benign engagement in Central 

Asia and will eschew balance-of-power games.

However, looking further ahead, Washington and Beijing could find 

themselves competing for influence in this region, as their regional priori-
CHINA'S RE-EMERGENCE 403

ties move beyond immediate security concerns to encompass such fundamental questions as Great Power influence, political change, and reform 

in Central Asia, as well as economic development and energy extraction. 

Moreover, China maintains a long-standing concern with “strategic encirclement” by the United States, and Washington remains wary of China’s 

long-term rise and its implications for U.S. interests.

China’s emergence in Central Asia has implications that go beyond 

bilateral U.S.-China relations. How the outside powers coordinate their 

policies in Central Asia and whether there is a common agreement as to 

the best method to combat regional security issues, which extend beyond 

terrorism to such factors as drug trafficking, political unrest, HIV/AIDS, 

and border security, will be a central determinant for the future of diplomatic relations between the United States, China and Russia, as well as 

the stability of the region. In addition, China’s continued emergence in 

Central Asia will impact the ongoing efforts to rebuild Afghanistan; the 

success of Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the role of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) in the region; the development and export of 

Caspian energy resources; and the future of U.S. relations with the countries of the region.

Overall, China, aided by the convergence of vital interest with Russia and the United States, has been extremely pragmatic in its approach 

to Central Asia. Over the next decade, it can be expected that China’s 

influence in Central Asia will rise. This does not have to be a threat to 

the United States’ global position, but it is critical to recognize China’s 

interests and priorities now, in order to prepare for such an eventuality, 

and begin to initiate policies that will decrease future tension, before they 

adversely affect Sino-U.S. and Sino-Russian relations.

China’s Interests and Policies in Central Asia

Understanding the immediate and long-term goals of China in Central Asia is the key to understanding its actions and intentions there, as 

well as how it plans to interact in the region with Russia and the United 

States. China has four principal sets of interests and policies in the region. 

First, China’s strategic and diplomatic goals in Central Asia, and how they 

play out vis-à-vis Sino-U.S. and Sino-Russian relations, are key aspects in 

China’s overall foreign policy. Second, and most pressing, China’s interests 

in Central Asia revolve around issues of national security, specifically the 

cutting of external support for separatists in Xinjiang, and ensuring radical forces in Central Asia do not destabilize friendly governments in the 

region. A third key interest for China has been the demarcation, demili-
404 ORESMAN

tarization, and stabilization of its borders with Central Asian nations, a 

goal that has been largely achieved, but will remain important to Beijing 

in the years ahead. Finally, Chinese economic and trade interests in the 

region, including the development of energy resources, are of growing 

importance.

Strategic Positioning

In its relations with Central Asia, China seeks to achieve key strategic 

and diplomatic interests on three fronts. First, at the broadest level, China’s 

approach to Central Asia helps promote its overall diplomatic strategy of 

establishing a more peaceful and constructive external environment, while 

fostering an image of China as a responsible power. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)3

 is a concrete manifestation of this overall foreign policy effort, giving substance to China’s widely-touted “new security 

concept” and its emphasis on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.4

The SCO also assists China in promoting other key principles of its foreign 

policy. For example, it provides Beijing an opportunity to demonstrate the 

value of a multilateral, consultative process versus unilateral or alliancebased approaches to regional security. The SCO also provides a prominent 

platform from which Beijing can voice, and in some cases act, on foreign 

policy on a range of issues, such as opposition to the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Moreover, in establishing and shaping 

the agenda for the SCO, Beijing has demonstrated its regional leadership 

and determination to contribute constructively to alleviating tensions and 

promoting mutual benefit.

Second, China’s relations with Central Asia help Beijing meet broader 

strategic and diplomatic interests such as establishing stable and productive relationships with foreign partners and especially those on its closest 

periphery, so that it can focus on pressing domestic and external challenges elsewhere. The specifics of China’s bilateral relations with Central 

Asian states will be discussed shortly; however, by and large Beijing’s approach to the region has succeeded in establishing a stable and productive 

security environment, as well as political and economic ties that are likely 

to endure.

Third, China’s policies in Central Asia assist Beijing in managing 

its bilateral relationships with the other two major powers in the region, 

Russia and the United States. On one hand, China seeks to use common 

interests in Central Asia to strengthen its relationship with Russia, the 

traditional “big brother” to the region, and foster a strategic environment 

that matches both their worldviews. On the other hand, China’s bonds 
CHINA'S RE-EMERGENCE 405

with Central Asia provide a certain strategic leverage in dealing with the 

U.S. presence in the region. As to Russia-China relations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization represents both the cooperative and competitive 

nature of that relationship. The advent of the SCO demonstrated Russian 

self-understanding that it can no longer single-handedly maintain Central 

Asian stability and that China has a positive role to play in the region. 

It also provides Russia a mechanism by which to monitor and restrain 

Chinese activity in Central Asia. In addition, SCO-related security activities may give China the opportunity to provide a potential alternative to 

the Russian dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), 

which serves as the collective defense arm for several of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).5

China also carries out its policies in Central Asia with an eye on 

managing and influencing Sino-U.S. relations. Beijing’s concerns over a 

growing American presence in Central Asia—beginning with NATO PfP 

initiatives in the early-1990s, the 1997 U.S.-led CENTRAZBAT military 

exercises in the region (which transported elements of the 82nd Airborne 

Division non-stop from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina to the middle of Kazakhstan), and the post-September 11 U.S. deployments to Central Asia, 

which now include a military presence in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—underscore its longer-term interests in establishing stronger ties 

with its Central Asian neighbors and countering a potentially antagonistic 

American presence on China’s western doorstep. However, in the postSeptember 11 environment, Beijing’s tactics have changed. Throughout 

the late 1990s and prior to the fall of 2001, China often would beat the 

“anti-hegemon drum” within the SCO, without taking on the United 

States directly. By using the SCO to call for a “new security concept” and a 

more just and fair international order, Beijing held up its foreign and security policy as a preferable alternative to the U.S.-led security order. Today, 

however, China has toned down this rhetoric in general, and within the 

SCO in particular, as it seeks a “constructive and cooperative” relationship 

with the United States.

By and large, Beijing has been successful in leveraging its relations in 

Central Asia and within the SCO to achieve these three key strategic and 

diplomatic interests. However, Beijing’s interests and policies in Central 

Asia still face challenges. First, to date, the SCO has been mostly a “talking 

shop,” with few substantive mechanisms putting words into practice. That 

may change since the SCO has become a “full-fledged” international organization in 2004, including a secretariat in Beijing, a budgetary mechanism, and an operating counterterrorism center in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.6
406 ORESMAN

Second, it should be noted that China has not entirely given up all of its 

heavy-handed ways and has used its size, power, and economic might to 

gain advantage in negotiations, particularly in discussions over border 

demarcation and security assistance to monitor the Uyghur diaspora in 

Central Asia. Central Asians continue to harbor concerns as to China’s 

long-range intentions in the region, which may ultimately limit Beijing’s 

room to maneuver. Most important, though, is the understanding that 

while China may offer great potential for economic and security cooperation in Central Asia, the United States and Russia will continue to offer 

more in the way of concrete security and economic benefits over the nearto medium-term.

National Security

While China’s broad strategic and diplomatic interests provide longer-term direction to its Central Asian policies, national security concerns 

present the most pressing and immediate factors shaping China’s approach 

in the region. These challenges include what Beijing terms “the three evils” 

of terrorism, separatism and extremism, and involve developments within 

and beyond Chinese borders. These national security concerns include 

separatist-minded Uyghur groups in China’s Xinjiang province, instability arising in Central Asian states, and elicit transborder activities, such as 

trafficking in drugs, guns and people. By strengthening its relationships 

with the Central Asian states and within the SCO, Beijing hopes to combat 

these pressing problems.

China’s northwestern province of Xinjiang, known officially as the 

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, presents a unique problem for Beijing.7 It is a province of roughly 12 million Uyghurs, a predominantly Muslim Turkic people, who were conquered by China in the mid-eighteenth 

century but not brought under full Chinese dominion until the Communists came to power in 1949. Over the last 50 years, China has exercised a 

policy of internal colonization, manifested in a three-pronged approach. 

China exercises political control under the nominal title of autonomy by 

tightly controlling many elements of politically active or organized civil 

society, especially religion. It supports investment, development, and Han 

migration to Xinjiang in order to both serve the needs of the entire nation (particularly with its large energy reserves)8

 and strengthen the bonds 

between Xinjiang and the rest of China. It also exerts total control on the 

region by the constant presence and use of the People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA), People’s Armed Police (PAP), and the paramilitary Xinjiang Production and Construction Corp (XPCC), or Bingtuan. For their part, the 
CHINA'S RE-EMERGENCE 407

Uyghur people have not welcomed Han rule of Xinjiang and many would 

like to see an end to Beijing control or, at the very least, a greater measure 

of autonomy in their own affairs. While there is no unified Uyghur resistance movement, several small groups do exist, though coordination is 

poor. Still, Uyghur terrorists do, in fact, pose a legitimate security threat to 

the Chinese government.9

The central fear of Beijing regarding the Uyghur resistance is the organizing ability of Islam, and mosques in particular. This fear underscores 

the lengths China has gone to prevent Muslim community groups from 

interacting with each other and operating beyond the most local level. 

Islam in Xinjiang, though much less conservative than that practiced in 

the Middle East, is still the biggest threat for China’s control of the region. 

China’s nightmare—one actually shared by many Uyghur leaders—is that 

radical Islamic groups, such as those who moved from the Middle East 

to Central Asia throughout the 1990s, will infiltrate Xinjiang and provide 

aid to the Uyghurs. Thus China’s primary goal in Central Asia is to cut off 

external support to its own internal problem.

To this end, China has sought common cause with Central Asian 

governments to counter Uyghur separatism and terrorist threats. The 

Central Asian states have large Uyghur populations of their own, the vast 

majority of whom are relatively peaceful and productive members of society. However, some groups maintain ties to militant Uyghurs in Xinjiang 

and to Pan-Turkic or Pan-Islamic radicals operating throughout Central 

Asia, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-utTahrir (HT), though the full nature of these ties is still unclear. China also 

is interested in ensuring these Pan-Turkic or Pan-Islamic groups do not 

destabilize the leadership of Central Asian states, and, in doing so, threaten 

Chinese interests in the region. If these nations cannot maintain their own 

sovereignty, the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, refugees, drugs, and 

terrorism would be devastating for the region.

The threat of Islamic radicals and militants is thought to be pervasive in the region, despite the widespread practice of more moderate and 

liberal forms of Islam throughout Central Asia. Though U.S. forces have 

dispersed al Qaeda and Taliban forces, many elements of these groups remain and are reconstituting. Moreover, recent reports indicate that Turkic 

groups, such as the IMU and HT, are gaining new strength across Central 

Asia. HT, an ostensibly non-violent political group that seeks to establish a 

theocratic caliphate across the Muslim world, has several thousand members throughout Central Asia, where it is proscribed by the ruling regimes, 

as well as in Russia and Europe. While there is no evidence that HT has 
408 ORESMAN

committed any terrorist activities, it is supportive of these activities and 

has reportedly agreed to be a partner with the IMU if either came to power 

in Uzbekistan.10 The goal of the IMU, based primarily in the Ferghana 

Valley, is the overthrow of the Uzbek government, though it is not as radical in its practice of Islam as HT. The IMU, which launched insurgencies 

against the Karimov regime in 1999 and 2000, has taken on a much stronger pan-Turkic identity, and has increased its operations in Tajikistan and 

Kyrgyzstan, including a bombing in Bishkek on May 24, 2003, that killed 

eight and injured more than 20. The IMU has also recently turned its attention against Western targets, such as U.S. government installations and 

travelers.11

Of particular significance to China have been reports that the IMU, 

al Qaeda, and other radical groups have ties to Uyghur separatists, including the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). ETIM recently was 

placed on the U.S. Department of State Foreign Terrorist Organization list, 

as well as on the UN terrorist organization list. Although ETIM primarily operates in Central Asia, it appears that the IMU also has ties to some 

groups within Xinjiang itself. Moreover, between 300 and 700 Uyghurs 

were detained in Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war and occupation to 

oust the Taliban regime, some of whom were transported to Guantanamo 

Bay for further questioning.12 This should not be seen as surprising, or as 

an Uyghur affinity for the politics of al Qaeda, but as the result of Chinese 

policies that leave little opportunity for peaceful resistance in Xinjiang, 

and diplomacy that has cut off support for the Uyghurs in neighboring 

Central Asia.

To stop cross-border cooperation between the Uyghurs in Xinjiang 

and those outside the country, as well as between pan-Turkic or pan-Islamic groups in Central Asia, China has developed bilateral and multilateral approaches to combating these terrorist threats, aimed to bolster 

both the Central Asian regimes and Beijing’s rule in Xinjiang. Through the 

SCO, China has pushed for the establishment of a counterterrorism center 

in Tashkent. It is unclear whether the center will be primarily an information exchange hub such as Interpol, or if it will have some sort of rapid 

response mechanism. Since the 1999 Bishkek summit when first proposed, 

the idea of using the SCO to fight terrorism and other regional security 

threats has become a centerpiece of the organization, and the most salient 

factor in building practical cooperation and moving the SCO beyond 

being a discussion forum. The SCO also has announced new initiatives to 

address security issues beyond terrorism. Plans are underway to cooperate 

on emergency response activities, drug trafficking, and law enforcement. 
CHINA'S RE-EMERGENCE 409

Perhaps most significantly, the nations of the SCO, except Uzbekistan as 

of now, hosted a major, multi-day exercise in early August 2003 simulating 

responses to various counterterrorism scenarios in Kazakhstan and China. 

This exercise, held in eastern Kazakhstan and Xinjiang, included over 

1000 troops, many of them special operations forces, and was much more 

prominent in scope, size, duration, and media coverage then the October 

2002 exercise held between only Kyrgyzstan and China.

Much of China’s bilateral aid to Central Asia consists of security assistance, particularly in the area of border control, military aid, and intelligence sharing. China recently donated 40 prefabricated border outposts 

to Kyrgyzstan. In addition, China is assisting Tajikistan to take over more 

responsibility for guarding its own border from the Russian 201st Motorized Division. In 2000, when Uzbek forces faced an IMU flare-up, China 

was the first to provide Uzbekistan with emergency military equipment, 

including flak jackets, night vision equipment, and sniper rifles. China 

gave 10 million Yuan (U.S. $1.2 million) worth of military-technical assistance to Kyrgyzstan in 2002, including firearms and telecom systems to 

combat terrorism, and, in February 2003, China donated police facilities 

to the Internal Affairs Ministry of Kazakhstan. In addition to this material aid, China has provided training for various Central Asian militaries. 

There is also intelligence sharing between the Central Asian republics and 

China, most of which is focused on counterterrorism.

Among the most notable developments for China-Central Asia security cooperation was the October 2002 joint border exercise held between 

China and Kyrgyzstan. The exercise—simulating an operation against 

terrorist cells within the mountainous region which forms the countries’ 

shared border—was relatively small in size and scope: it involved about 

100 soldiers from each side, operating at high elevations and using light 

weapons, such as anti-tank guns, helicopters, and armored personnel vehicles. The exercises took place in southern Kyrgyzstan near the Irkeshtam 

border crossing with China, and involved military and border troops from 

China’s Xinjiang Military Region and the Kyrgyz military, as well as some 

observers from the other four SCO member states.13 Most intriguing, 

this exercise marked the first peacetime joint military exercise China is 

known to have conducted. It signals a significant change in the way China 

understands the role of force, intervention, and international military cooperation in the face of transnational threats; it also marks an important 

advance in Chinese-Central Asian relations.

It is important to be reminded that currently Chinese aid to Central 

Asia in no way compares to the amount being provided by Russia and 
410 ORESMAN

the Unites States. Russian forces have historically operated throughout 

the region and continue to be present in Tajikistan. The United States has 

become vital to Central Asia. Not only has the U.S. military campaign 

struck a devastating blow against many of the groups challenging regional 

security in Afghanistan, but material and economic assistance provided 

by the United States has been a huge windfall for the Central Asian states. 

The U.S. military maintains a presence in several Central Asian nations,14

all of which bring these areas millions of U.S. dollars in the form of building and local spending. This is in addition to official U.S. assistance to the 

Central Asian states, which is substantial. Totaling almost $600 million 

in fiscal year (FY) 2002 (up from $230 million in FY2001), the Central 

Asian nations have begun to rely on this money heavily, as well as on the 

material support, in terms of food, medicine, security training, and more. 

While this overall amount will decrease in 2003 and 2004, pledged security 

assistance in 2004 will increase.

Finally, it is important to understand how the Uyghur diaspora living 

in Central Asia plays into Chinese diplomacy in the region. The diaspora 

is predominantly concentrated in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, with 50,000 

and 180,000 Uyghurs respectively, many of whom are entrepreneurs 

whohave achieved middle class status. Most Uyghurs in Central Asia are 

not politically active, but those who are make up a vocal minority, often 

petitioning the government to protect their rights in the face of Chinese 

pressures. Many also provide aid to groups operating within Xinjiang itself, with most interaction occurring along very active shuttle trade routes. 

The Central Asian states are loath to offend China and have been proactive 

in appeasing Chinese worries about the Uyghur populations living in their 

countries. As one analyst put it, China is having the Central Asians do its 

“dirty work” in the region.15 During the lead up to the first Shanghai Five 

summit in 1996, the Kyrgyz Justice Ministry prohibited one Uyghur group, 

Ittipak (Unity), from political activism for three months for failing to curb 

its “separatist activities,” sighting the public association provision of the 

constitution and the non-interference clause of its 1992 communiqué with 

China.16 This has been a balancing act between domestic and international 

pressures though, with the Central Asian regimes not wanting to appear to 

be suppressing a fellow Turkic people. Uyghur gangs operating in Central 

Asia, particularly Kyrgyzstan, also have been involved in sensational murders and robberies of both Han Chinese and Uyghur peoples, including 

prominent businessmen and diplomats, keeping this issue center stage for 

the Chinese and Central Asian authorities.
CHINA'S RE-EMERGENCE 411

Stability Along the Border

A third important set of goals and policies shaping China’s active 

Central Asian diplomacy concerns the settlement of border disputes. 

Reaching settlements on disputed borders, which had been sources of tension during the Cold War, was important for Beijing both in order to move 

forward on its cooperative agenda with Central Asia and so that it could 

devote more attention to greater post-Cold War strategic challenges. Demarcating and demilitarizing the borders with its Central Asian neighbors 

(including Russia) was a priority issue for China in the early 1990s, and became the foundation on which Sino-Central Asian relations were built. In 

retrospect, settling border disputes and reducing military personnel along 

these borders has been a major accomplishment of Chinese-Central Asian 

diplomacy. It has given China and its Central Asian neighbors a measure 

of peace and security, allowing them to expend their energy on more critical and worrisome issues, such as internal development and diplomatic 

crises, while setting out a model for cooperative security relations among 

former adversaries. The Shanghai Five played a critical role in legitimizing 

and institutionalizing these agreements and continues to do so.

The most significant accomplishment of the group is its package 

of military confidence building measures, including a pullback of some 

troops and equipment to 100 kilometers (km) off the common borders, 

verification procedures along the border, and pre-notification of exercises 

and other military activities. These steps largely were achieved by the mid 

to late 1990s, as border talks eventually led to the 1996 Shanghai Five 

“Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field Along the Border 

Areas” and the 1997 “Agreement on Reducing Each Other’s Military Forces 

along the Border Regions.” The 1996 agreement stipulates that: military 

forces in the border regions will not be used to attack one another, military 

exercises will not be aimed at one another and will be limited in frequency 

and scale, major military exercises within 100 km of the border require 

notification and invitation to the neighboring Shanghai Five states to send 

observers, and friendly military-to-military exchanges will be established. 

The 1997 agreement took steps to implement these measures more fully. 

By the July 2000 Shanghai Five summit, the five parties announced that 

implementation of the 1996 and 1997 agreements had “helped build for 

the first time, in the border belt of more than 7,000 km, a region of trust 

and transparency where military activities are predictable and monitorable.”17 The SCO continues to focus on border settlement issues, including 

a meeting as recently as April 2003 to expand border CBMs.
412 ORESMAN

However, not all border differences have been settled, or settled to 

all parties’ satisfaction. Negotiations continue on a bilateral basis between 

China and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. China’s border negotiations with Kyrgyzstan have caused many domestic political problems for 

the tiny republic. In March 2002, protests erupted in the Asky region of 

Kyrgyzstan in response to the signing of a border treaty with China. The 

demonstrators, calling for the resignation of President Akaev, claimed that 

he had ceded too much to China and had sacrificed Kyrgyz sovereignty. 

In response to these protests, police tried to quash the demonstration; 

six persons were killed and 60 injured in the melee. This event eventually 

led to the resignation of the Kyrgyz Prime Minister and a government 

investigation.

Still, the way China has handled its border negotiations with the 

Central Asians has been remarkable, both for its deftness and for its efficiency. While China often has received the better bargain, due to its size 

and power, rarely has it been seen as heavy handed or offensive, helping 

to allay fears held by many Central Asian elites of China’s true regional 

intentions. With border demarcation and demilitarization between China 

and its Central Asian neighbors virtually complete, remaining border security issues can be placed on the “cooperative security” column of their 

relationships.

Energy and Trade

China has important economic goals behind its growing interest 

and presence in Central Asia. During the visit by then-Premier Li Peng to 

Kazakhstan in 1994, he called for the construction of a new “Silk Road,” 

connecting Central Asia with China and acting as a conduit for trade between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. To date, this plan is still in the 

developmental phase. Nevertheless, many analysts see significant promise 

in economic and financial relations between China and Central Asia over 

the medium- to long-term, especially in the development of the region’s 

enormous energy resources to fuel China’s anticipated economic growth 

and burgeoning energy demands.

In 2015, China’s projected oil needs will be 7.4 million bb/d (up from 

3.4 million bb/d is 2002), 50 percent of which will be made up by imports. 

Natural gas, which is not yet imported, will also be a much-needed foreign 

produced commodity in the years ahead. In order to diversify its sources 

of supply and increase its energy security, China wants to establish Central 

Asia, particularly Kazakhstan and to some degree Turkmenistan, as guaranteed sources of oil and gas. In addition, Central Asia offers a potential 
CHINA'S RE-EMERGENCE 413

market for China’s export driven economy. This is particularly true as 

China aims to develop its vast, remote western regions, which would find 

a natural outlet for exports further west to Central Asia.

Chinese firms have made some investments in Central Asia. But such 

financial arrangements have been limited by the risky, cumbersome and, 

given the heavy-handed presence of gangs and mafia-like extortion rackets, even hostile investment environment in Central Asia. Current Chinese 

investment includes: a processing factory in Tekeli, Kazakhstan; a major 

stake in the Kyrgyz cloth market; an investment in the primary mine at 

Batken, Kyrgyzstan; a hotel in Taldy-Korgan, Kazakhstan; and cardboard 

box and noodle factories in Kyrgyzstan. In Kazakhstan, according to official sources, there are now more than 20 accredited Chinese companies 

and some 600 joint ventures.18

The most significant area of economic cooperation has been China’s 

investment in the Kazakh energy sector. As mentioned above, Chinese 

future energy demands will be enormous. To help meet that demand, the 

China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) invested $4.3 billion in the 

Kazakh state oil company Aktyubinskneft in June 1997, entitling China to 

a 60 percent (now 63 percent) stake in three fields with a total estimated 

oil reserve of one billion barrels. Also as part of this agreement, China 

and Kazakhstan agreed to build a 3,000 km pipeline from the Caspian Sea 

area to Xinjiang. This project is expected to cost over $3 billion and, at 

this point, has been deemed by most experts as uneconomical. Its current 

status is in limbo, though construction on some segments has begun and 

there is strong political pressure to make this pipeline a reality, especially 

as it fits into other plans to build a pipeline bringing oil and gas from 

Xinjiang’s Tarim Basin to China’s East Coast (a plan whose own future is 

also uncertain). At the same time, China and Russia have begun forging 

serious energy ties, including a pipeline from Angarsk to Daqing. If these 

plans fully materialize, Russian oil and gas may become more important 

to China than its Central Asian investments.

19

While these projects are still taking shape, Kazakhstan is exporting 

small amounts of oil to China. In 2002, China imported nearly 19,600 

barrels a day of crude oil, representing 1.4 percent of its total imports. 

This oil, imported primarily by rail, underscores the importance of building more transportation links between China and Central Asia. Projects 

to achieve this goal include a new rail link being built between Xinjiang 

and Uzbekistan, which will pass through Kyrgyzstan and possibly another 

that will include Tajikistan. This connects with the $250 million European 

Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) sponsored Transport 
414 ORESMAN

Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA) project to build the new Silk 

Road from China to Europe. Additional infrastructure projects include 

the already completed Urumqi-Almaty rail line and a new 360 km road 

between Lake Issyk-Kul in Kyrgyzstan and Aksu in Xinjiang, to be built by 

China at a cost of $15 million.20

Overall, China’s trade with Central Asia has been a boon to the region, and while the amounts are relatively low, the potential for growth 

is enormous. China’s dynamic economy could be a powerful engine for 

Central Asian development, and its close proximity could provide Central Asian states with an export route to the burgeoning markets of the 

Pacific.

The Future of the SCO

China’s future successes and failures in Central Asia will be determined, in large part, by the viability of the SCO. To date, the SCO has been 

little more than a discussion forum, but that appears to be changing with 

the formalization of the SCO as a “full-fledged” international organization 

in 2004. This includes an actual budgetary mechanism, a permanent secretariat to be located in Beijing (led by Zhang Deguang, the former Chinese 

Ambassador to Russia), and a counterterrorism center to be located in 

Uzbekistan. Still, many doubts remain. The member nations will have to 

commit even more resources, energy, and political capital to make this 

organization viable, a first in the history of Central Asian multilateral organizations. The political will seems to be there, but it remains to be seen if 

Russia and China actually will commit their scarce resources to this effort, 

though recent Russian actions and statements stressing the importance of 

the SCO and the newly reconstituted CSTO appear promising.

Three early tests will help determine the future of the SCO. The first 

is the formation of the Tashkent counterterrorism center. To be effective, 

this center will have to be able to coordinate responses to new terrorist 

threats, with special attention to de-conflicting the roles of China, Russia, 

and the United States. This center should not be expected to house a new 

rapid reaction force, but it has to be more than an information clearinghouse if the SCO expects to be a respected player on regional security 

issues. Second, the establishment of a permanent secretariat and budget 

mechanism will demonstrate the political and material commitment that 

members are willing to provide. A functioning budget and empowered 

bureaucracy are central to the success of any international organization, 

particularly one bringing together such diverse players. Finally, the SCO 

must prove that it can accomplish limited economic cooperation, a point 
CHINA'S RE-EMERGENCE 415

stressed with unusual frequency and detail at the last SCO summit in May 

2003. If the SCO can commit to a transportation pact by next year’s summit, it will have proven that it is more than a “talk shop” and can assist in 

practical economic integration in a troubled region.

Though it is clear that the problems of Central Asia are regionwide and cannot be solved by any state alone, Central Asian states seem 

reluctant to embrace the promise of multilateral collaboration. The May 

2003 SCO summit offered some hope that the region can pursue concrete 

and practical cooperative projects, an important step toward tempering 

interstate conflict, great power rivalries, and nationalist tendencies. In the 

short to medium-term the SCO represents China and Russia’s cooperative 

nature, as well as Russia’s understanding that it can no longer single-handedly maintain Central Asia stability. China also has a positive role to play 

in the region, particularly in funding security endeavors. However, with a 

new Russian push to establish the CSTO RDF to be stationed at Kant Airbase in Kyrgyzstan, tension between Russian and Chinese regional interest 

will become more apparent. Yet much of the future success of the SCO 

will be determined not by the outside powers, but by the cooperation of 

the Central Asian states, particularly Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, a mighty 

feat that is currently nowhere near to being achieved.

Bilateral Relationships

As previously discussed, Beijing has established a coherent regional 

strategy in Central Asia, best illustrated by Chinese leadership in the SCO. 

However, each Central Asian nation has its own set of circumstances, and 

Chinese policy faces different challenges in dealing with each of them. 

Moreover, the future of Central Asia’s relations with external powers will 

be determined in large measure by the dynamic between the various Central Asian states.

Kazakhstan

The China-Kazakh border stretches some 1,533 km, the longest 

frontier between China and the five Central Asian states. China’s relationship with Kazakhstan is probably its strongest in the region and best 

represents China’s most basic interests. Though Kazakhstan and Russia 

enjoy an extremely close relationship, Kazakh exports to China reached 

nearly $1 billion in 2001 (with a goal of $2 billion in 2003). With total official Central Asian exports to China equaling about $1.3 billion in 2001, 

Kazakh exports represented some 77 percent of that figure, further indicating the importance of China-Kazakh ties in the overall China-Central 
416 ORESMAN

Asia relationship. Moreover, Chinese President Hu Jintao’s June 2003 trip 

to Kazakhstan, only his third abroad as president, after Russia and the G8 

summit in France, indicates the high priority China places on its relationship with Kazakhstan. This relationship, which includes security and intelligence cooperation, as well as educational and cultural exchanges, likely 

will continue to grow in the coming years. Much of this growth will be 

fueled by increased Chinese investment in Kazakh energy and gas, as well 

as the long-expected construction of a pipeline between the two countries. 

Also, with roughly one million ethnic Kazakhs living in Xinjiang, in addition to the 180,000 Uyghurs living in Kazakhstan, Astana takes a particular 

interest in developments in China’s west, especially as the two populations 

make up a large segment of the shuttle traders.

Kyrgyzstan

Hosting military and security personnel from multiple outside powers, Kyrgyzstan stands out among Central Asian countries. With the U.S.-

run base at Manas and Russian-led forces at the CSTO Rapid Deployment 

Force base at Kant Airbase, not to mention a shared 858-km border, China 

has focused much of its strategic attention on Kyrgyzstan. China’s first 

external military exercise in decades was held with Kyrgyz border forces, 

and China likely will post some security-related personnel to Tashkent to 

take part in the new SCO counterterrorism center. In addition, Kyrgyzstan 

is one of the main transit routes for Chinese goods and a key recipient of 

Chinese infrastructure investment, including new rail and road links. It is 

also a source of concern for China on issues including drugs, organized 

crime, Islamic radicalism, Uyghur sympathizers, and perhaps most-worrisome in the long-run, the presence of U.S. forces just over the border. Kyrgyzstan sees China as a potential engine for economic growth and a source 

of foreign aid. China was one of the few countries that would engage in 

barter trade with the Central Asian nations after independence, winning 

their early gratitude. Kyrgyzstan takes its relationship with China very seriously, and, despite some tensions over the Uyghur diaspora and border 

negotiations, sees China as a strong and important partner. Its Beijing embassy is equal in size to that of the United States, and Muratbek Imanaliev, 

Kyrgyzstan’s two time former Foreign Minister and current ambassador to 

China, speaks fluent Chinese and is a central player in building relations 

between all of Central Asia and China.
CHINA'S RE-EMERGENCE 417

Tajikistan

Having suffered through a long civil war and still relying heavily on 

Russian forces to help stabilize its borders, Tajikistan does not yet have 

the ability to forge a more balanced foreign policy. It is possible that the 

presence of “gas-and-go” U.S. air operations in Tajikistan signals some 

closer ties to Washington. However, Tajikistan is in dire need of assistance 

from all quarters, and accepts aid from countries such as Iran as well as 

China. With a 434-km shared border, China has provided Tajikistan with 

significant security assistance, as well as limited economic aid, including 

a recent $3 million aid package. According to first-hand accounts, China’s 

defense attaché office in Dushanbe is one of the most active of its Central 

Asian missions. Economically, Tajikistan has little to offer China beyond 

a limited marketplace, but Beijing is keenly interested in making sure 

Tajikistan’s black market—including the massive trade in drugs—does 

not penetrate China. And while China has a theoretically historic claim to 

nearly one-third of Tajikistan’s territory, China has managed to negotiate 

its remaining border issues with Tajikistan in a constructive way. Overall, 

Tajikistan’s vital ties to Russia dictate much of the relationship, but China 

still maintains active diplomacy there, with an eye on the future and its 

own security needs.

Uzbekistan

Among Central Asian states, Uzbekistan has charted a fairly distinctive course in its foreign policy, clearly moving away from Russia 

and aligning itself more closely with the United States. As the only SCO 

member not sharing a border with China, its relationship with China has 

evolved much differently from the others. With a very active embassy in 

Tashkent, China has enjoyed fairly good security ties with Uzbekistan, 

highlighted by the aid provided to Uzbekistan during the 2000 IMU flareup. However, there have been reports that this aspect of the relationship 

has soured in the last years due to a Chinese sale of mortars and side arms 

to Uzbekistan that performed poorly, as well as the rise of significant U.S. 

security aid to the country. In economic terms, Uzbekistan’s harshly protectionist trade policy has blocked many Chinese exports to the region and 

the Tashkent government has increased its complaints about shuttle traders bringing cheap Chinese goods into the country. Uzbekistan’s self-appointed expectations to become the premier regional power may put it at 

odds with Chinese interests, particularly its obstinacy in committing more 

fully to the cooperative security agenda of the SCO. However, the two have 
418 ORESMAN

succeeded in establishing a practical relationship built on individual needs 

and pragmatic gains.

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan also does not share a border with China, and is even 

further west from China than is Uzbekistan. In addition, Turkmenistan’s 

adherence to a policy of “positive neutrality” has kept it out of the SCO 

along with many other international organizations. It appears Beijing will 

keep Turkmenistan and its leader, Turkmenbashi, at arms length. China 

has invested moderately in Turkmenistan’s oil and gas sector, but has limited its ties overall. Turkmenistan has little to offer China. Export routes 

for its oil and gas are not conducive to shipment to China and, politically 

and diplomatically, it is very difficult to deal with. China likely will only 

seek engagement with Ashkabat if it fits into its overall regional plans.

China and Other External Powers in the Region

The presence of other external powers, particularly the United States 

and Russia, provide China both partners and competitors for its goals in 

Central Asia. While China does not yet rank near the United States or Russia in terms of influence, its presence is growing. Because all three nations 

share the same vital interest in Central Asia—the elimination of the terrorist and radical Islamic threat—balance of power activities are limited. Still, 

China’s fear of “strategic encirclement” by the United States persists. China 

can count on Russia to resist a long-term U.S. military presence in the region, although China and Russia should not be mistaken as true allies. In 

fact, the two countries are becoming increasingly competitive for influence 

in the region. Russia’s deployment at Kant and its reinvigoration of the 

CSTO are primarily seen as countering a mounting U.S. and NATO presence in Central Asia, though it also can be viewed as solidifying Moscow’s 

ties to Central Asia in the face of growing Chinese influence via the SCO.

China also must take other important regional players into account 

for their growing influence in Central Asia. These players include Europe, 

India, Pakistan, Turkey and Iran. Europe’s presence is felt through the 

European Union, as well as NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the EBRD. European projects in Central 

Asia are specific and aimed at building stability. They include developing 

transportation infrastructure, combating drug trafficking, and making 

limited investments, in addition to Caspian energy operations. By and 

large, however, Central Asia does not “identify” with Europe. Similarly, 

ties with India and Pakistan are principally economic, though there is an 
CHINA'S RE-EMERGENCE 419

Islamic link to Pakistan and growing military and counterterrorism ties to 

India. As long as Central Asia can avoid getting entangled in the Kashmir 

problem, this relationship should continue to widen. Iran and Turkey 

share deeper cultural ties with Central Asia, but the prospects of close ties 

after the collapse of the Soviet Union have floundered. Turkey was unable 

to provide the material aid the Central Asians had hoped for, and many 

leaders felt that Turkey treated them as inferiors. Similarly, Iran has provided little to Central Asia, though this is also a reflection of U.S. policy 

towards Iran. In addition, Central Asian regimes are fearful of Iran-style 

Islamic fundamentalism. Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan are members along 

with all five Central Asian republics of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which has not developed much beyond the discussion 

phase. For most of the Central Asian states, relations with China probably 

hold out more promise than with any other external powers, excepting 

Russia and the United States.

In both its regional and bilateral policies in Central Asia, China is 

committed to steadily expanding its presence and has taken a long-range 

approach to its engagement in the region. Central Asians at the official 

level generally welcome China’s involvement, though there are some lingering suspicions of China as a hegemon-in-waiting. There are also concerns, not without reason, about Chinese migration to their nations, much 

as their Russian neighbors have. On the other hand, all Central Asian states 

are too much in need of assistance to say no to such an important and 

growing regional power as China, and see their large neighbor as a future 

driver of economic growth. 

Nevertheless, China’s long-term interests in the region will meet with 

a number of obstacles in the coming years, not the least of which is competition within Central Asia itself. These regional rivalries—including unfair 

trade practices, harsh border regulations, sovereignty disputes, and a failure thus far to truly institutionalize cooperative action—do not bode well 

for any enduring external presence, let alone a Chinese one. Attempting 

to exercise influence through the SCO has its challenges as well: the past 

decade has demonstrated that multilateral organizations have achieved 

few concrete gains, as self-serving national interests have trumped collective endeavors. China’s main regional entry point, the SCO, may very well 

fail, in which case China will have to continue its bilateral relationships 

individually with the Central Asian states or through another forum, if it 

hopes to achieve its regional goals.

China’s relations with Central Asia, in and of themselves, are not 

major foreign policy priorities for Beijing. For the foreseeable future, 
420 ORESMAN

Beijing’s Central Asian diplomacy and strategy is more of a means to other 

ends, including: the promotion of its “new security concept” and constructive regional and international image, management of Sino-American and 

Sino-Russian relations, continued domestic economic development, and 

dealing with security concerns in Xinjiang. By and large, China pays close 

attention to Central Asia so it does not become a problem. On the other 

side of the coin, Central Asian nations, at present, have more to gain from 

the United States and Russia than from China, making their ties with 

China a lower priority for them as well.

Taking these points together, it seems unlikely that China will be able 

to exert anywhere close to as much influence in the near- to medium-term 

as Russia or the Unites States. Beijing appears well aware of this, and is 

proceeding in a cautious and balanced way: on the one hand highlighting shared interests in the region with Washington and Moscow, while on 

the other avoiding the appearance of trying to “oust” either from Central 

Asia. Over the longer-term, China is likely to promote its interests and 

polices in Central Asia and its prominence will increase, especially as the 

U.S. presence diminishes and the Russians continue to focus their energies 

internally and toward the West. In this context, it is critical for the United 

States to understand and respond to China’s continuing emergence in 

Central Asia.

Issues on the Horizon

At this early stage, Chinese leaders and strategists appear to have 

been quite successful in identifying and pursuing their interests in Central 

Asia. However, several issues on the horizon will present some difficult 

challenges for China in Central Asia in the years ahead, particularly HIV/

AIDS, drugs and organized crime, and water.

HIV/AIDS cases are growing at an ever-increasing rate on both sides 

of the China-Central Asia border, especially in Xinjiang, which is China’s 

second-most infected region. Both Central Asia and Russia also face a 

looming problem with HIV/AIDS that will likely affect cross-border trade, 

security, and stability in the coming years. 

China, Russia, and Central Asia all have problems with narco-trafficking and the terrorist activities it often funds. The majority of the drug 

trade follows two separate routes, one from Central Asia west to Russia 

and Europe, and one from South East Asia up through China. There are 

indications of new collaboration between these groups, particularly where 

organized crime is involved, and reports that Chinese Triads are now operating in Kyrgyzstan.
CHINA'S RE-EMERGENCE 421

Water is one of the scarcest resources in both Central Asia and 

western China and will likely be an increasing source of tension as supplies diminish and downstream demand increases, particularly from the 

growing industrial and agricultural centers of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, 

and Xinjiang. Currently, China has plans to siphon up to 1.5 billion cubic 

meters of water per year from the Ili and Irtysh Rivers for oilfield development regions in Xinjiang. Both rivers originate in China and the Ili flows 

through Kazakhstan and terminates in Lake Balkhash, a body of water already devastated by decreasing water levels and increasing pollution from 

agriculture run-off. This issue alone has the potential to sour relations 

between China and Central Asia.

Conclusions

China’s emergence in Central Asia will continue to grow, and likely 

will have a more natural and longer-term fit relative to that of the United 

States, based on a long history of interaction and clearly defined interests. 

China has rediscovered its place in the region and is developing pragmatic 

channels to achieve its interests there. Successes are growing, particularly 

in the fields of security and natural resources extraction, and a future of 

intense interaction looks more certain. Still, China’s priority in Central 

Asia is maintaining stability along its borders, so that it can focus on more 

pressing matters elsewhere. Its objective is strategic denial; act to deny the 

rise of elements that will challenge China’s internal security, deny the use 

of Central Asia by the United States to contain China, and deny a Russian 

monopoly of influence on its border.

China will most likely give significant attention only to those problems that directly affect its vital interests, such as counterterrorism and 

other border security questions. Central to this will be the attention paid 

to the role of the Uyghurs and Xinjiang in China-Central Asia relations. It 

is also clear that China’s goal is to foster regional cooperation only to the 

point that it fits into its own national interest. If China can achieve its aims 

bilaterally and not through the SCO, it will, though the SCO provides a 

very useful vehicle to address transnational threats. Moreover, continuing 

problems in Central Asia and the region’s inability to use collective action 

will minimize China’s region-wide reach, leaving open the likelihood that 

Beijing will have considerable influence in some states, such as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, but considerably less in others. China’s region-wide 

presence will be most affected, though, by the action of the United States 

and Russia. The United States is the most important near-term ally of 

the Central Asian states and can dictate the future shape of the regional 
422 ORESMAN

security situation to a significant degree. Russia, too, has enduring importance to the region and can undermine many of China’s goals if Moscow 

so chooses.

In sum, China is on the rise in Central Asia and the United States will 

have to deal with a more comprehensive Chinese presence in the region 

in the years ahead. Diplomatic and strategic hedging by external powers 

has already begun, and Central Asia has become an important piece on 

the global chessboard. All sides are using it to advance their international 

agendas. This is not a return to the “Great Game” of the nineteenth century, however. China, Russia, and the United States are too integrated with 

each other to threaten a clash over what is still a second-tier priority when 

compared to more pressing issues like North Korea, Iraq, and the proliferation of WMD. However, given the intermingling of Great Power interests 

in this region, increased tension is possible. There is room for cooperation 

in Central Asia and no need for restrictive alliances. In the best scenarios, 

the United States, China and Russia will recognize their convergence of 

interests, and work together to shape a more secure, prosperous and stable 

Central Asia.

Notes1

 This chapter is drawn from a larger monograph published in August 2003 by the Freeman 

Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies entitled, China’s New 

Journey to the West: China’s Emergence in Central Asia and Implications for U.S. Interests. 2

 In the late 740s, the expansionist Tang spread its influence as far westward as Kabul and 

Kashmir, eventually coming into direct conflict with the Muslim people of greater Turkestan. At Talas 

River, in 751, a predominantly Muslim army of Arab, Tibetan and Uyghur forces defeated Chinese 

troops led by Kao Hsien-chih. The ramifications were significant. The Arabs were able to extend their 

Islamic influence throughout Central Asia and the major trading routes. Tang expansionary tendencies 

were halted, beginning a trend of military decline. Thus, the Battle of Talas became a demarcation line 

between the Muslim–Turkic and Chinese worlds and remains an important touchstone for ChinaCentral Asia relations today. The area know as the Uyghur Kingdom of East Turkestan, created by the 

migration of Uyghurs from Mongolia and Central Asia during the first millennium, was invaded by 

the Manchus in 1757 but was not brought under the control of the Qing Emperor until 1877 when 

it was named Xinjiang (meaning “New Territory”). Even then, resistance against Chinese dominion 

continued until 1949, including the establishment of an independent Uyghur State on two occasions, 

most notably from 1944-1949. 3

 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization—made up of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—is a Chinese-initiated international forum that evolved from the 

border demarcation and demilitarization process, known as “the Shanghai Five” and not including Uzbekistan, begun after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The SCO became a “full-fledged” international 

organization in January 2004 with a secretariat in Beijing and a regional counterterrorism center in 

Tashkent. 4

 Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual nonaggression; mutual noninterference in their respective domestic affairs; mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence 
CHINA'S RE-EMERGENCE 423

5

 The CSTO was recently reformed in 2002 from the ashes of the Collective Security Treaty 

(CST), the near-defunct collective security apparatus of the Commonwealth of Independent States. 

While the CST has some enduring success in the maintenance of a region-wide extended air defense, 

it has largely failed to materialize as a collective-defense organization, and the overall military capabilities of the members have decreased. The CSTO is another attempt to pull together these disparate 

militaries, this time by focusing on practical and specific tasks, particularly counterterrorism and rapid 

crisis response. 6

 This center was originally to be located in Bishkek, but it was announced in September 2003 

that it would be built in Tashkent. It is reported that Uzbekistan, a relatively apathetic member of the 

SCO, demanded the presence of the center in exchange for continued involvement. 7 For a more detailed description of the Xinjiang issue, see the forthcoming Xinjiang Project 

book being published by the Central Asian-Caucasus Institute, School of Advanced International 

Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Fall 2003. 8

 Encapsulated as the “Go West: campaign,” Beijing has encouraged the migration of Han 

Chinese to Xinjiang and the development of the western economies to benefit both the development of China’s interior and the continuing east coast boom. Beyond the eastern seaboard, Xinjiang 

represents the most developed and dynamic economy in the nation. It has become a center of trade 

and industry for both China’s west and Central Asia. Xinjiang’s greatest potential for growth lies in its 

natural resources. In particular, while estimates vary, nearly all experts agree that the Tarim Basin holds 

enormous potential as a source of energy resources. A 2000 study from the Organization for Economic 

Cooperation and Development (OECD) states the Tarim Basin holds at least three billion tons of oil 

in proven reserves and possibly 510 billion cubic meters of natural gas, all thus far untapped. Bringing Xinjiang’s potential wealth east will be critical to developing China’s interior and spreading the 

benefits of economic growth across the country. 9

 In response to Beijing’s repressive policies in Xinjiang, including several violent crackdowns 

that, according to some reports, left hundreds dead and thousands imprisoned, and emboldened by 

the independence achieved by its Central Asian neighbors in the early- to mid-1990s, the Uyghur 

separatist movement took a more aggressive and violent direction. On February 27, 1997, three 

bombs were set off in the Xinjiang capital of Urumqi, killing nine people. Two weeks later, on March 

7, a bomb exploded in Beijing, the seat of Chinese authority, killing 30. In September 1997, Chinese 

authorities disclosed that approximately 40 small uprising occurred, with Uyghur activists occupying 

a half dozen government buildings across China. The forced evictions left 80 dead and 200 injured. 

Eight hundred Uyghurs were arrested. Fifteen bomb attacks occurred over a five-month period in 1998 

and seven attacks in the first six weeks of 1999, but it is unclear if these were Uyghur actions or just 

another challenge to the government from some other group, possibly laid-off workers. According to 

Justin Rudelson, author of Oasis Identity, there have been more than 200 militant actions over the past 

decade, resulting in 162 deaths. These include attacks on police stations, communications and electric 

power infrastructure, the bombings of buses, movie theaters, department stores, hotels, markets, and 

trains, assassinations of judges, and strikes against military bases. In taking these actions, it appears 

elements of the Uyghur separatist movement have shifted to more blatant and violent expressions of 

protest and the expansion of targets from government infrastructure and instruments of their control 

to include innocent civilians. 10 Interviews with Central Asian security officials on background.

11 “Islamists Staged Explosion, Kyrgyz Says,” UPI, May 25, 2003; “Kyrgyz Republic Public 

Announcement,” U.S. Department of State, May 6, 2003; “Uzbekistan Public Announcement,” U.S. 

Department of State, April 5, 2003; Alexei Igushev, “Hizb ut-Tahrir Remains Active in Central Asia,” 

Eurasianet, February 5, 2003. 12 Thomas Sanderson, “China’s War on Terrorism,” presented at the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, March 5, 2003. 13 Description of this exercise drawn from “China Ends War Games with Kyrgyzstan,” Associated Press, October 11, 2002; “China, Kyrgyzstan Hold Joint Anti-terror Military eEise,” Xinhuanet, October 12, 2002; “Joint War Games Boost Terror Fight,” South China Morning Post, October 12, 2002.
424 ORESMAN

14 Two airbases in Uzbekistan in Khanabad and Kokaida, two “gas and go” operations in Tajikistan in Dushanbe and Kyulyab, and one major base in Kyrgyzstan at Manas outside of Bishkek, with a 

possible new locale at Shymkent Airport in Kazakhstan. 15 Off the record conference.

16 “Temporary Ban on Uyghur Society in Kyrgyzstan,” OMRI Daily Digest, April 9, 1996. 17 In July 1998, China and Kazakhstan reached a final agreement resolving remaining border 

disputes along their 1,700 km border; the first full border dispute resolution between China and one 

of its “Shanghai Five” partners. “China: Jiang Zemin on Nuclear Arms Race, Sino-Kazakh Border Pact,” 

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-98-187, July 6, 1998. The July 

2000 quote is drawn from “Xinhua: ‘Full Text’ of Dushanbe Statement of ‘Shanghai Five.’” 18 “Chinese Business Interests in Central Asia: A Quest for Dominance,” Central Asian-Caucasus 

Analyst, June 18, 2003; “Chinese Leader Hu Jintao Visits Astana,” RFE/RL, June 07 2003; and information provided by Fred Starr, Chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the School for 

Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. 19 Wu Kang, “China’s Quest for Energy Security and the Role of Central Asia,” presented at the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 22, 2003. 20 “Chinese President Urges SCO Economic Cooperation,” People’s Daily, Friday, May 30, 

2003.
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION 425

Chapter 20

Regional Security 

Cooperation and Foreign 

Policies in Central Asia: A 

21st Century “Great Game”?

Robert Brannon

At least three entities are engaged in crafting and implementing security policies in Central Asia—the United States, Russia and the Central Asian states themselves—each with its own set of perceived 

interests and threats. The United States is engaged in the Global War on 

Terrorism and views the region in terms of strategic access and resources. 

Russia still sees its relationship with the regional states in paternal terms, 

including perceived inherent rights of influence. Meanwhile, the Central 

Asian states are anything but monolithic in terms of foreign policy. While 

other international entities are certainly at play in the region, including 

China and the European Union (EU), this chapter focuses on the complexities of the U.S./Russian/Central Asian triangle and the national security issues at stake for all three players.

During the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in 

Prague on November 20, 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush said: 

Russia does not require a buffer zone. Instead, it needs to be surrounded by friends and neighbors. Russia is part of Europe and 

strong security in Europe is good for Russia. NATO enlargement does 

not threaten Russia because Russia has a special role in NATO, one 

that will strengthen the already strong ties between our two nations.1

Although the President was speaking about Russia and NATO enlargement, he might well have been thinking of Central Asia when he 

mentioned buffer zones. Russia has long seen this region as a safety zone 

against threats to its security both real and perceived. The United States 

425
426 BRANNON

thinks this is no longer necessary, arguing that collective security might be 

better achieved through closer alliances throughout the region.

What are Russia’s interests in Central Asia and how does Russia view 

U.S. security cooperation with the Central Asian states? While President 

Vladimir Putin appears to have been able to marshal support within his 

government to tolerate a short-term American presence in Central Asia, 

what are the implications for a longer-term presence? What, exactly, are 

Russia’s ultimate goals in the region? This chapter examines regional security cooperation from the standpoint of U.S. and Russian foreign policies 

in Central Asia. Within this context, it focuses on Russian tolerance for 

U.S. initiatives in the post September 11 strategic environment.

Before and After September 11

On June 28, 2000, barely six months into his term of office, President 

Putin issued a new foreign policy concept, asserting, “Today our foreign 

policy resources are relatively limited, and they must be concentrated in 

areas that are vital to Russia’s interests.”2 Although the concept was based 

on work begun during President Boris Yeltsin’s administration and put 

forth in Russia’s new strategic concept and military doctrine published in 

1999, the policy statements nonetheless reflected Putin’s pragmatism with 

regard to optimizing Russia’s position in world affairs, regardless of its 

faded superpower status. This foreign policy concept was again updated 

in October 2003.3

Described by Russia’s Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov as a pragmatic effort to help the country solve its domestic problems,4

 the June 2000 document offered a restrained but critical view of NATO and the West, highlighting the importance of Russia’s ties to the Group of Eight (G8) and 

the EU. Along with criticizing the United States for pursuing a uni-polar 

foreign policy instead of adopting a more stable (in Russian eyes) multipolar view of the world, the statement also took a swipe at U.S. plans to 

deploy a limited national missile defense system. Yet Putin appears to recognize the complexities of international relations for Russia as well as the 

United States and has thus far maneuvered adeptly. He told an interviewer 

in January 2001 that Russia “must get rid of imperial ambitions on the one 

hand, and on the other clearly understand where our national interests are 

and fight for them.”5 Putin further put his own stamp on Russia’s foreign 

policy for the future by declaring that Russia would be much better off 

“with” the West than “without.”

Russian foreign policy in Central Asia is still in transition. Deeply 

embedded in the Russian psyche is the notion that Central Asian states 
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION 427

427

are simply “nashi,” the Russian word for “ours.” In both Tsarist and Soviet 

times, Moscow controlled the region by force and by altering traditional 

demographic boundaries almost capriciously along the way. With the 

break up of the Soviet Union and subsequent independence of the Central 

Asian states, the relationship has been slowly shifting away from a paternal 

one. Many in Moscow never really expected these new nations to be able 

to exist without considerable aid and assistance, which helped lead to the 

creation of spheres of influence, represented to an extent by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). As the dynamics within the region 

change so does Russian policy, which might be best described as tolerant 

in varying degrees. 

Thus, even now, it is difficult to think of Russia’s policy toward the 

Central Asian states as “foreign.” After the break-up of the Soviet Union, 

most Russian analysts insisted that close ties with Central Asia were critical to national security interests. Many believed that geographic location; 

shared history; common production systems, infrastructure, and institutions; and old dependences on Soviet financial subsidies and the Moscow 

markets would guarantee a continued interest in extensive cooperation 

with Russia.6 They also believed that a shared sense of national identity, 

derived from a long history of cohabitation, had survived the dissolution 

of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, these assumptions proved wrong. 

While it was true that Central Asian leaders initially were reluctant 

to leave the Soviet Union, they soon realized that Russia had little role to 

play in their search for national identity and values. Throughout the early 

1990s, Russia’s often erratic behavior also served to distance the Central 

Asian states from Russia politically. This feeling was expressed by Kazakh 

President Nursultan Nazarbaev, Russia’s closest ally among Central Asian 

leaders, who spoke out in early 1997 about his disappointment with Russian policy.7

 What had once been shared values among the Soviet republics 

were replaced by new or “national” identities, suspicions about Russia’s 

intentions, and pragmatic calculations about what Russia actually could 

provide. Instead of a security community including Central Asian states 

grouped around Russia, a web of bilateral agreements developed with 

strongly expressed sensitivities about issues of sovereignty.

Russia watched with concern as along its southern border independently-minded states began to shift their orientation in other directions. 

Of the CIS members, Uzbekistan became the most outspoken critic of 

Russia and the most eager to enter into cooperation with the United States. 

Turkmenistan limited its military cooperation with Russia on the grounds 

of its declared policy of “permanent neutrality.” As Russia saw its influence 
428 BRANNON

in Central Asia decline, fears arose that its position in the region might 

be supplanted by other external powers. The reality of the September 11 

terrorist attacks caused Russia to re-evaluate its own policies and consider 

opportunities for exploiting new U.S. views on terrorism.

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, President Putin was 

the first world leader to place a telephone call to President Bush. In doing 

this, Putin ignored the objections of many Kremlin advisors and cemented 

his relationship, and personal bond, with Bush. Putin’s actions in this case 

symbolize his policy of support for, and integration with, the West and in 

particular the United States. In spite of opposition from inside his own 

government, he made a decision to show Russia’s support immediately, 

without waiting to build a consensus in his own government.

In the weeks that followed September 11, as it became apparent that 

America would court the Central Asian states for access to military facilities, rhetoric heated up in Russia as to what Russia’s policy should be. In 

spite of President Putin’s support for the United States, many of his closest advisors voiced strong concerns that America might exploit the new 

war on terrorism to gain a foothold in territories that had, until just 10 

years before, been part of the Soviet Union. On September 18, 2001, U.S. 

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the United States 

would seek approval from several states in Central Asia and support from 

Russia to deploy military assets in the region to support the war on terrorism. Rumsfeld’s statement seemed to imply that operations planned for 

Afghanistan might be launched from bases in nearby Central Asia. Russian 

Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov responded by saying there was no basis 

for U.S. claims to a requirement for access to military bases in Central 

Asia.8 Several other key government officials also issued statements denouncing U.S. initiatives in the region. Shortly thereafter, to Ivanov’s apparent surprise and perhaps consternation, Putin held a press conference 

to declare Russian support for the U.S. request.9

During his remarks at Harvard’s Kennedy School in February 2002, 

Russian Duma Deputy Grigory Yavlinsky told an anecdote about Putin’s 

decision to side with the United States in the war on terrorism. According 

to Yavlinsky, out of 21 people present in a September 24 advisory meeting 

Putin had called, only two voted to support the United States. One person 

voted to support the Taliban, and 18 said Russia should remain neutral. 

Shortly after the meeting, Putin announced “unconditional and immediate” support for the United States, including access to military facilities in 

the CIS.10 All of these statements sent confusing signals to the governments 

of Central Asian states. Yet despite his decision, Putin continues to oper-
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION 429

ate in a political atmosphere that has not been particularly positive about 

cooperation with the West in general, and the United States in particular. 

In Russia, some wrongly believe the United States wants to see Russia fail 

in its foreign policy and security objectives so that it can “clean up” in the 

aftermath to its own advantage.

Russia’s Interests in Central Asia

As Lena Johnson, Senior Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of 

International Affairs and noted regional scholar, has argued: 

Russia’s interests in Central Asia since the break-up of the Soviet 

Union are mainly related to strategic and security concerns. The strategic interests are two-fold: first to integrate Central Asian states in 

the CIS sphere and make them into close allies of Russia; and, second, 

to deny external powers strategic access to Central Asia. 11

First and foremost, Russia regards Central Asia as a buffer zone of 

strategic importance to its national defense. By the end of the 1990s, events 

in the region had increased fears about Islamic extremism and terrorism. 

This atmosphere gave Putin a convenient platform from which to suggest 

closer cooperation in the area of military security, as well as a renewed 

effort to reorient the Central Asian states toward Russia. The events of 

September 11 changed this dynamic. Early Russian opposition to the stationing of American military forces close to its borders for operations in 

Afghanistan did not play well in the Central Asian states. However, as Russia changed its position and received credit for a new cooperative policy 

in its dealings with the United States, Central Asian attitudes changed as 

well. Russia’s interest in the fall of the Taliban regime, and in expanding 

economic ties with the United States, overcame concerns about Central 

Asian states accepting American military bases in the region. 

To allay Russian concerns, American military and civilian officials 

stressed the short-term nature of the American military presence in Central Asia and emphasized that troops would be withdrawn once military 

operations were over. However, as was sharply articulated in the press by 

anti-American hard liners such as General Colonel Leonid Ivashov,12 Russia was well aware of the probability that America might try to exploit the 

opportunities created by the war on terrorism and remain in the region 

long after meeting announced military objectives.

Russia had to balance this concern against its fears that the rising tide 

of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia could evoke increased unrest in 

the region and cause instability that could threaten Russia directly. Many 
430 BRANNON

Russians believe that their greatest security risks are associated with the 

country’s southern flank. Related to this is the concern that Chechen separatists are being funded by the same terrorist organizations at war with 

the United States. Osama Bin Laden did nothing to allay this fear when he 

pronounced that no country that supported and aided America in their 

war would be safe.13 In the wake of the horrific hostage siege at Moscow’s 

“Nord Ost” theater during the week of October 22, 2002, Putin referred to 

Bin Laden’s statement and concluded that there was a direct link between 

his decision to support America and the attack at the theater (by then attributed to Chechen terrorists).14

President Putin quickly became adept at interpreting the new American National Security Strategy in ways that supported Russian goals and 

objectives in its own “war on terrorism” in Chechnya. After the United 

States released its new National Security Strategy in October 2002,15 Putin 

hailed it as a landmark document for its sharp focus on the threat of terrorism, not only to the United States, but also to the world. By December, 

Putin gave indications he would revise Russia’s National Security Doctrine 

along similar lines.16 Specifically, the aim was to identify terrorism more 

sharply as the primary threat to Russian interests. Since then, despite 

some acute frustration in his attempts to wield the ax of military reform 

against an intransigent General Staff, Putin and his Defense Minister, Sergei Ivanov, have achieved some progress in refocusing military doctrine. 

Recently, specific reforms have been aimed at further trimming the army’s 

forces and implementing plans to move away from conscripts as the primary source of manpower toward an all-volunteer force similar to what is 

the norm in most Western countries. These positive steps might not have 

been possible absent the forward looking security environment that exists 

in the wake of September 11.

The American Point of View

The United States needs access to Central Asian infrastructure in 

order to more effectively and efficiently fight the Global War on Terrorism. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks against the 

World Trade Center and the Pentagon, America focused on striking al 

Qaeda at the heart of its operations in Afghanistan. Sustained support for 

such a military campaign required logistics bases in Central Asia and almost immediately, the United States began to work to make arrangements 

in the region. According to Eugene Rumer, senior fellow at the Institute 

for National Strategic Studies, “After 10 years of working to maintain its 
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION 431

distance from Central Asia, the United States has landed squarely in the 

middle of it.”17

Initially, the United States secured an airbase in Uzbekistan and the 

right to use a similar facility in Kyrgyzstan. Although Kazakhstan initially 

turned down a U.S. request for an airbase in that country, subsequent arrangements allowed for such use if needed. Kazakhstan did grant the U.S. 

over-flight and emergency landing rights, and also received support for 

humanitarian efforts from Turkmenistan. In return for these concessions, 

the U.S. budget for assistance to the five Central Asian states has more 

than doubled from fiscal year 2001—literally, from $230 to $595 million.18

In response to the perceived rising threat of radical Islam in Central Asia, 

the United States is emphasizing security assistance and engagement with 

regional governments. Rumer states:

Since September 11, the United States has emerged as the principal 

power in Central Asian affairs. With the troop presence in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, the defeat of the Taliban government 

in Afghanistan, and all signs pointing to a long-term U.S. military 

presence in the region, the United States has become Central Asia’s 

security manager.19

Even though human rights groups have charged that Central Asian 

states have stepped up repression since the September 11 terrorist attacks, 

U.S. officials remain convinced that a positive engagement strategy can 

succeed in encouraging regional governments to embrace gradual liberal 

democratization. In an article for The Eurasianet in November 2002, Dr. 

Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation cited an unnamed U.S. National 

Security Council official who claims that the Bush administration views 

the foreign policy challenge in Central Asia as a balancing act between 

internal reform, security, and energy: “The focus on security is overriding, 

but not exclusive.”20

The upcoming years will prove critical to the United States as it 

further refines its policies with Central Asia. Meeting growing national 

security concerns must reflect a balanced view—not only for the United 

States but also for the Central Asian nations themselves.

Kyrgyzstan and Other Regional Deployments

When American forces were first deployed to Central Asia in October 2001, Washington stated they were there for a limited time and would 

be withdrawn once the mission was completed. The deployment was not 

welcomed by Russia, though President Putin chose not to oppose it. Since 
432 BRANNON

then, in Russian eyes, the U.S. build-up in the region has been out of 

proportion with stated intentions. More recently, leading American representatives have stated publicly that the U.S. presence in Central Asia would 

not only be long-term, but might even expand.21 

Given the deteriorating relations between the United States and 

Russia in the aftermath of U.S. military intervention in Iraq, the situation 

in Central Asia has the potential to become a destabilizing factor. Late in 

2002, Russian aircraft redeployed to Kant Air Base in Kyrgyzstan, ostensibly to support the war on terrorism.22 Some observers, however, believed 

the return of Russian troops to Kyrgyzstan might be a sign that a new 

rivalry was developing between Moscow and Washington in Central Asia , 

with the ultimate aim of establishing political and economic control over 

the region. This symbolic Russian presence is apparently the vanguard of 

a force that might ultimately include more than 20 Russian aircraft and 

about 700 troops, thus becoming the most significant military deployment 

outside Russia’s borders since the Soviet collapse. Russian aircraft will 

form the core of the air unit.23 According to RIA Novostii, the official Russian news agency, Russia plans to deploy five SU-25 attack jets, five SU-27 

fighters, two AN-26 transports, two IL-76 transports, five IL-39 training 

jets, and two MI-8 helicopters.

During a brief stopover in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital, on December 4, 2002, President Putin endorsed the recent Russian deployment of 

fighter jets, bombers and other aircraft in Kyrgyzstan.24 Speaking to journalists, Putin said that Russia’s new military presence was very important 

and brought “a new quality” to security arrangements in the region. Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev has urged Russia to become a “main strategic 

cornerstone of Central Asia.”25 At the same time, officials also signed a 

defense protocol called the Bishkek Declaration, pledging closer security 

and economic ties between the two countries. While some believe the 

move may be designed to reassert Russia’s military influence in a region 

where the United States now has its own semi-permanent military presence, Putin reassured the press that the agreement is not directed against 

any third country. Both presidents emphasized that the new relationship 

is multi-faceted, including a deal to write off some $40 million of Kyrgyz 

debt to Moscow. Along with Putin, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov 

also visited Kyrgyzstan to inspect the new facilities. He announced that the 

Russian task force would provide air support for a contingent of ground 

forces. Known as a rapid reaction force, this group could eventually total 

more than 5,000 troops from Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajiki-
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION 433

stan, as members of an alliance of former Soviet republics known as the 

Collective Security Treaty Organization.26

The Russian deployment to Kant Air Base now means that Kyrgyzstan 

is host to two foreign air bases, the other being the U.S. facility at Manas, 

a Bishkek suburb. The U.S. base, which was established in the aftermath of 

September 11, is designed to provide air support for regional operations 

by the anti-terrorism coalition in Afghanistan. Some 2,000 American personnel now occupy Manas, and up to 5,000 coalition soldiers (including 

the original 2,000 U.S. troops) are expected to be based there eventually.27

Although this force may help Kyrgyz authorities deal with terrorist threats, 

coalition troops are unlikely to back the government in disputes with 

political opposition forces, without additional security protocols. On one 

hand, the security deal between Moscow and Bishkek could indicate that 

the United States has failed to provide sufficient commitment to the Akaev 

administration in terms of security needs and domestic political problems. 

Therefore, Akaev is now turning to Russian backing in military, political 

and financial spheres. On the other hand, the new arrangements with Russia may be the harbinger of re-emerging Russian interests in a sphere of 

influence and a desire for enhanced credibility. 

Russia and Kyrgyzstan have long maintained close political and 

military ties. Akaev has tended to support the Kremlin’s policies in the region; in response, Moscow has backed Akaev’s regime and warned against 

interference in Kyrgyz internal affairs. However, Moscow has been careful 

to deny that the Russian deployment in Kyrgyzstan is related in any way to 

the American presence. Almost tauntingly, RIA Novostii commented that 

nobody was going to push the Americans from Central Asia. The same 

RIA Novostii article added that since the United States has been unable to 

rid the region of terrorists despite more than two years of concerted effort, 

it is possible that Russian troops eventually could help defend the Americans in the event of some undefined “worst-case scenarios.”28

Following his trip to Kyrgyzstan, Putin traveled to China and India 

where speculation re-surfaced about the three countries “ganging up” to 

form a China-India-Russia “strategic triangle,” in an effort to help balance 

the regional dominance of the United States. Despite the rumors, Russian 

sources concede that such a relationship would be unlikely since Russia, 

China, and India all are keen to strengthen good relations with Washington, and have backed the U.S. war on terrorism. 29 Both China and India 

have distanced themselves from the idea of an China-India-Russia strategic axis. However, foreign ministers of the three countries later met on the 

sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly session in New York for 
434 BRANNON

informal talks, with the understanding that such meetings might be held 

on a regular basis. Although the “strategic triangle” concept still has some 

supporters in Moscow, Putin’s Asian tour came in the wake of improved 

relations with the United States. Therefore, pursuing a strategic alliance 

between Russia, India and China is unlikely to become Russia’s primary 

goal at this stage, and merely indicates that Moscow wants partners in both 

the East and West.

Yet, perhaps coincidentally, soon after Putin returned from his trip to 

China and India, Tajik President Imomali Rakhmonov met with President 

Bush in Washington December 9, 2002. Media reports speculated that 

creation of a permanent U.S. military base in Tajikistan was among the 

main issues discussed at this meeting. Following an interview in December 

2002 with Professor Aleksei Malashenko, of Moscow’s Institute for International Relations (MGIMO), journalist Zamira Eshanova claims Putin’s 

visit to Kyrgyzstan and Rakhmonov’s reception at the White House were 

at least indirectly connected. Malashenko apparently believes the process 

of the military reapportionment of Central Asia is under way, with the 

United States and Russia as the main players, and has said:

I think that these visits and these cross-negotiations and cross-actions 

in the direction of creating military bases in Central Asia do not mean 

that the Russian military presence in Central Asia is simply being replaced by an American one. It means that there are attempts to adjust 

or provide political stability from the outside.30

Although the United States has given no signs that it may be preparing to court the government of Tajikistan in pursuit of any specific security related goals or objectives, there is reason to believe the Tajiks may be 

taken more seriously in Washington in the future. 

Elsewhere in the region, Uzbekistan is already hosting some 3,000 

American troops on its territory in support of operations in Afghanistan. 

Kazakhstan has offered an airport in the southern city of Shimkent to 

U.S.-led coalition forces. Thus, of the five Central Asian states, only Turkmenistan, which declared its permanent neutrality after independence, 

has remained apart from military developments related to the war on 

terrorism. 

U.S. and Russian National Interests Coincide

As time passes, radical Islam has become an increasingly potent force 

in Central Asia. Ahmed Rashid, the Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia 

correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review and the Daily Tele-
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION 435

graph, London, has written extensively on the region for the last 20years 

and argues that the Hizb-ut-Tahrir al Islami (HT) or the Party of Islamic 

Liberation and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) are both serious threats to the region. Followers of these movements derive inspiration 

from the Taliban and the extreme Wahhabi doctrine of Saudi Arabia, and 

were trained at militant madrassas in Pakistan. In his book Jihad: The Rise 

of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Rashid documents a September 2000 

meeting to discuss future cooperation between al Qaeda leader Osama Bin 

Laden and representatives from the IMU, the HT, and Chechen separatists 

in Kabul, Afghanistan.31 The potential for increasing linkages between terrorist organizations makes such threats transnational and sets the stage for 

growing international cooperation. 

In Russia, President Putin appears to be exploiting anti-terrorism 

sentiment to his advantage and has succeeded in linking Russia’s war in 

Chechnya with America’s war on terrorism. On November 11, 2002, at 

a post EU meeting press conference in Brussels, Putin unleashed an especially strong invective against a reporter from the Paris newspaper Le 

Monde. Responding to a question about the potential unintended consequences of using land mines in Chechnya and specifically whether this 

tactic was causing too many civilian casualties, Putin cited widespread 

aggression against Russia as far back as 1999 in Dagestan. Putin alleged 

this aggression stemmed from Islamic sources and was directed at Russia 

because these same forces would never be willing to coexist peacefully on 

Russia’s southern flank. He went on to point out that France must surely 

feel the same dangers since it, too, was an ally of the United States in the 

war on terrorism.32

Thus, despite 50 years of regional confrontation and tensions over 

the deployment of U.S. troops to Central Asia, the United States and Russia appear to be ready to cooperate in Central Asia in the war on terrorism. 

Neither side seems to be willing, or even able, to “go it alone.” Each has 

much to gain from cooperating with the other, and each also stands to lose 

much if cooperation sours. Russian foreign policy under Putin has evolved 

over the duration of his presidency. Pragmatic and forceful, his ability to 

exploit opportunities for gain has steadily improved. Accordingly, Russia 

may be willing to tolerate, if not openly encourage, a long-term presence 

of U.S. security forces in Central Asia if it means the United States will 

assist Russia in dealing with the threat of terrorism. From the American 

perspective, the United States has an opportunity now to create a more 

positive relationship with Russia, with significant benefits for both sides. 

Russia’s leadership wants integration with the United States, not only in 
436 BRANNON

the war against terrorism, but also in areas such as trade and energy. Both 

sides have a unique chance to exploit the current situation to craft foreign 

policy that will overcome old antagonisms and distrust.

The Future

Both Russia and the United States have recognized the importance 

of Central Asia. Their current competition for regional influence has been 

compared to the historical contest of Russia and Britain, referred to by 

Peter Hopkirk and others as “The Great Game.”33 In the current context, 

there is compelling evidence that the security of Central Asia has similarly 

high stakes for all concerned. One way to think about this is from the 

perspective of alternative futures. Peter Schwartz, in his research on developing a scenario planning model for business, begins with a set of visions 

that attempt to look 10 years into the future.34 To frame such possibilities, 

it is useful to begin with two contrasting alternative futures, from among 

the many that are conceivable. In adapting scenario planning to international relations, especially in the context of regional security cooperation 

in Central Asia, alternative futures in the U.S.-Russian relationship might 

resemble one of the following “tales.”35 Although hypothetical, it is not 

difficult to imagine the plausibility of each. These narratives highlight the 

interconnectedness and interdependence of the participants in a regional 

relationship that could be described as a new great game. As each unfolds, 

it is useful to consider what it might take to make them real.

A Tale of Two Possible Future Worlds

First, the nightmare scenario: The year is 2011 and the United States 

has been at war against terrorism since September 11, 2001. Things have 

gone badly for the United States since it has emerged as the sole nation 

fighting the war. Russia has pulled out of the coalition and decided to go 

its own way. Mission creep has led to pursuing objectives beyond simply 

crushing terrorism as a threat, including nation-building throughout the 

Middle East and into Central and South Asia. The conflict has become 

global. After Russia split from the coalition and abandoned any further 

attempts at integration with the West, Russian military forces rallied in 

support of the Communist Party. This led to a more independent minded 

senior military leadership, less inclined to accept guidance from civilians 

in government. Russian military bases in Central Asia exist side by side 

with those of the United States, often with resultant skirmishes as each 

side seeks to defend its territory. Political regimes in Central Asian states 

generally have become even more repressive and authoritarian. The Rus-
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION 437

sian economy is a shambles and corruption is deeply entrenched at every 

level. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is widespread 

throughout the region. Large stockpiles of dangerous weapons continue 

to disappear from controlled areas and show up in various theaters of war. 

In sum, the world is at war and Central Asia has become an exceptionally 

dangerous and highly unstable powder keg.

Next, an alternative, arm-in-arm scenario: The year is 2011 and the 

global war on terrorism has been over for several years. The United States 

and its coalition allies, including Russia and all the Central Asian states, were 

victorious. Terrorist organizations—state-sponsored and otherwise—have 

been beaten back into marginal threats that are easily tracked through the 

advent of highly developed regional security cooperation. Russia is fully 

integrated with the west. NATO has changed its name to the Euro-Atlantic 

Security Treaty Organization and Russia is a candidate for joining the alliance as a full partner. The Russian military, firmly under civilian control, 

is reforming along NATO-standard lines, leaner and more efficient. Central Asian military bases are jointly occupied by Russian, American and 

indigenous forces. Regional economies are stable and highly productive. 

The post war strategic environment has led to stability for oil pipelines 

and export of natural resources from Central Asian reserves. Membership 

in the World Trade Organization, debt restructuring, and debt forgiveness 

have given new strength to Russia’s burgeoning market capitalism. Russian 

leadership and influence in Central Asia are welcomed and encouraged by 

the United States. Corruption and proliferation of WMD are rare, as most 

of the reasons for black markets have been eliminated. In sum, the world 

is at peace and Central Asia has become model region of stability with U.S. 

and Russian forces cooperating side-by-side.

Getting Back to the Future

Considering the respective national interests of Russia and the 

United States in Central Asia, and in view of strategic security objectives 

that have been established by both, it is possible to see a degree of convergence in comparing these two entirely hypothetical scenarios. Regional 

stability, from the perspective of Russia’s national interests, depends on 

support for authoritarian political regimes committed to maintaining the 

status quo. The same regional stability so critical to Russia is also important for the national interests of the United States. In order to limit threats 

to its own security forces in the region, America needs Russian cooperation to prevent instability and its subsequent insecurities. Therefore, close 

cooperation between Russia and the United States in the war on terrorism 
438 BRANNON

translates directly to support for current political regimes in Central Asia 

that seek to restrict sources of instability.

American and Russian national interests in Central Asia coincide 

more often than they do not. Absent close cooperation with Russia and the 

Central Asian states, the United States would be forced to operate at significant disadvantages in Afghanistan. Similarly, if Russia has to conduct 

operations against terrorists in Chechnya without cutting off support for 

terrorists from Central Asia, the disadvantages are legion. Even after the 

war on terrorism is over, the peace that follows will be influenced for all 

concerned by the lines of cooperation established during the war. Close 

cooperation in wartime will doubtless lead to closer ties in peace. These 

partnerships could reap benefits in areas beyond security cooperation. Although scenario planning helps to imagine the possibilities in hypothetical 

terms, current events also are instructive.

Putin’s Real World

President Putin’s initiative to make Russia’s foreign policy more proWestern has not been well received by his country’s political and military 

elite. To some, the absence of widespread support among these groups 

has led to speculation about Putin’s credibility, sincerity, commitment to 

democratization and his ability to bring his nation along with him. Opinions have been divided. The most important question is whether Putin’s 

initiative really represents a true change in Russian foreign policy or just 

a political experiment. According to Dmitri Trenin of the Moscow Carnegie Center,36 Russia’s decision to support the United States in the war on 

terrorism was based on fundamental Russian interests. It is, however, still 

not clear whether other key elements of the Russian government share the 

President’s view of precisely what those interests are. 

The changes in Russia’s foreign policy following September 11 are 

often interpreted as a personal achievement for President Putin, despite 

Russian public opinion.37 His policy of supporting the United States in the 

fight against terrorism and Russia’s active participation in the antiterrorist 

coalition, as well as the warming of Russia’s relations with America and 

NATO, appears outwardly to be an extraordinary act of political courage. 

However, some political and social analysts38 have observed that deeply 

rooted anti-Americanism (a legacy of the Cold War), and the sometimes 

open hostility toward the United States as a world leader, are stronger than 

feelings of sympathy for the victims of the terrorist acts of September 11. 

A sense that the Russian and American peoples are in some way united in 

suffering from international terrorism is also lacking.
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION 439

The risks associated with those political factors driving Russian 

behavior in the war on terrorism center on President Putin’s ability to 

deliver on what he promises. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, it cannot 

be assumed that senior military leadership simply will fall in line behind 

Putin’s assurances to the United States about close cooperation in the war 

on terrorism. Retired General Leonid Ivashov, for one, is well known for 

his eagerness to warn Russian leaders of the perils of moving too close to 

the United States. Following a press conference in December 2000 at which 

President Putin announced that military cooperation with NATO would 

resume, General Ivashov emphasized the risks of closer cooperation.39 Not 

yet retired at that time, Ivashov called attention to aspects of the president’s 

policy that were of great concern to the senior officers of Russia’s armed 

forces. Nor is this example isolated; others in the government have spoken 

out in similar fashion. Despite some recently positive trends, it is not yet 

clear whether President Putin’s initiatives in support of broad integration 

with the United States ultimately will succeed. 

Conclusion

Most Russians have accepted that they cannot dictate security terms 

to Central Asian states simply by fiat. The Russian government is not 

financially capable of providing the region with the same measure of support it can hope to garner from the United States. In view of Russian fears 

that without hard line governments in Central Asia, the ground might be 

fertile for rising Islamic fundamentalism, it is clearly in Russia’s interests to 

support security solutions that favor the status quo, enhancing long-term 

stability. Toward this end, there are, and will continue to be, opportunities 

for Russia to supplement American initiatives in the region.

For their part, Central Asian governments remain suspicious of Russian intentions and motives. Most fear that any move to shore up relations 

with Russia alone might result in a loss of independence. Instead, these 

governments see the advantages of close ties with both Russia and the 

United States. If security cooperation with America is tolerated by Russia, 

then this is indeed the better path. Central Asia needs stability, for with 

stability and regional security will come improved financial and economic 

outlooks. Russian interests are similar, but are complicated by the war in 

Chechnya.

Perhaps Putin sees U.S. involvement in an even more pragmatic way 

than might have been suspected in the aftermath of September 11. It may 

be that Putin believes a U.S. presence in Central Asia will provide the necessary stability in the region, thus paving the way for increased domestic 
440 BRANNON

security for Russia at American expense. If this is the case, then it appears 

likely that Russia will tolerate U.S. military cooperation in Central Asia 

as long as it remains politically manageable. Russia’s position could be 

strengthened by further deployments, such as the one to Kyrgyzstan, calling attention to Russian capabilities. Putin’s 2000 presidential campaign 

emphasized his commitment to end the war in Chechnya. Now that he has 

linked international terrorism to this issue, it is even more important that 

he bring Russia’s security policies in line with its foreign policy. 

Finally, it is certainly in the best interests of the Central Asian states 

to embrace security cooperation with Russia and the United States to 

the extent that it supports (or, in some cases, even guarantees) their own 

political stability and national security. Valuable resources in the region 

are much more likely to be unlocked and converted into positive means 

for national wealth if there is a stable environment that encourages commercial interests. Oil extraction and marketing need strong state security 

guarantees in order to be safe from terrorist attacks. Even those states with 

limited natural resources have strategic assets, such as airfields or other 

defense related infrastructure, which could be useful to both Russia and 

the United States during the upcoming months or years in what increasingly appears to be a protracted war on terrorism. Airports may be the 

only marketable resource available in Kyrgyzstan, but these are important 

assets, on which all players seem willing to capitalize. Recent events show 

that Central Asia may be witnessing a new great game, with its fate in this 

latest round being decided not only by foreign interests, but also by its 

own policies. Regional security cooperation in Central Asia could be the 

key to success for all sides with prudently managed, security cooperation 

delivering enormous benefits to Russia, the United States and the Central 

Asian states themselves. Squandered, the negative implications are disproportionately worse. Now, more than ever, the next moves must be carefully 

considered. Even as one plays chess, strategic players think many moves 

ahead. Russians are traditionally superb at this game, and the United States 

should be aware of all the options and potential impacts before entering 

into agreements or implementing policies that might have far reaching 

consequences.

Notes1

 White House press release, November 20, 2002.

2

 Igor Ivanov, Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, (Moscow: Russian Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, June 28, 2000). 
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION 441

3

 Victor Litovkin, Security is Best Achieved Through Coalition: Russia’s New Military Doctrine 

Highlights Community of Goals with the World” (Moscow: RIA Novosti, October 2, 2003), <www.cdi.

org/russia/276-6.cfm>. 4

 Dale R. Herspring, Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain (Oxford, UK: Rowman & 

Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2002), 231. 5

 Ibid.

6

 Roy Allison and Lena Johnson, The Changing Security Policy Challenges in Central Asia: The 

New International Context (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 96. 7

 Interview with Nazarbayev in the Russian language newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 

16, 1997. 8

 “Bush was asked about comments made by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov that there 

is ‘no basis,’ as he put it, for Central Asian states bordering Afghanistan to offer their territory to the 

U.S. or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to launch strikes against Afghanistan,” <http://www.

cdi.org/russia/172-pr.html##5>, Washington, September 20, 2001 (RFE/RL) “Russia: Support For U.S. 

May Be Self-Serving.” 9

 “In an abrupt change of policy and heart, Russia’s President Vladimir V. Putin said this week 

that the United States could use Russian airspace to carry out strikes against Afghanistan. Putin, who 

until then had been eager to put more and more distance between himself and Washington, also 

withdrew his objections to a U.S. military presence in the former Soviet republics Uzbekistan and 

Tajikistan,.” <http://www.cdi.org/russia/173-pr.html##7>, Baltimore Sun, September 27, 2001 “In 

Russia, doubts, skepticism” (quoting from recent Russian press: Novaya Gazeta, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 

Izvestiya, Komsomolskaya Pravda, Kommersant). 10 Grigory Yavlinsky, Russian State Duma Member (Yabloko Party), “Russia and the United 

States: New Challenges, New Strategies,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA), 

John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, February 6, 2002. 11 Roy Allison and Lena Johnson, Central Asian Security: The New International Context

(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 97-101. 12 General Colonel Leonid Ivashov, recently retired from his post at the helm of International 

Military Cooperation for the Russian Ministry of Defense, gave an interview to Vladimir Mukhin, a 

journalist with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, appearing in The Russia Journal (December 17, 2001). In the interview, Ivashov said he thinks there is a lot wrong with President Putin’s new policy of moving Russia 

toward increased cooperation with the United States. Ivashov apparently believes Russia would be well 

served by maintaining a healthy distance from all things western. 13 In an audiotape released to Arabic television station Al Jazeera on November 11, 2002, 

Osama Bin Laden issued his first statement in many months. In a voice that intelligence analysts agree 

is probably authentic, Bin Laden indicts America for unjust war against Islam and specifically threatens to engulf in its vengeance any other nation that allies itself with the United States. 14 Gregory Feifer, “Russia: Moscow’s Vow to Fight Terrorism Criticized Amid Theater-Raid 

Fallout,” RLE/RL, Moscow, Russia, October 30, 2002, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/229-2.cfm>. Using 

rhetoric strikingly similar to that of U.S. President George W. Bush after September 11, 2001, Putin 

said Russia would take the initiative in combating threats to its national security. “Russia will respond 

with measures appropriate to the threats wherever there are terrorists, organizations of these criminals, 

or their ideological or financial sponsors.” 15 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, October 

2002. 16 Interfax News Agency, Moscow, Russia, January 30, 2003, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/242-

3.cfm>. According to the First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council’s Defense and Security 

Committee, Colonel General (ret) Valeriy Manilov, “A new edition of the Russian national security 

concept will take into consideration every threat the international community has encountered.” 17 Eugene B. Rumer, “Flashman’s Revenge: Central Asia after September 11,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Forum, no. 195, December 2002.
442 BRANNON

18 Ariel Cohen, “US Officials Relying on Engagement Strategy to Promote Change in Central 

Asia,” Eurasianet, November 14, 2002. 19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Hooman Peimani, “Military Buildup Ends US-Russian Honeymoon,” Asia Times, August 28, 

2002, and “US Presence in Central Asia Antagonizes Russia,” published in the Jamestown Foundation’s 

CDI Russia Weekly, Issue no. 228, Item no.11, October 23, 2002. Dr. Hooman Peimani works as an 

independent consultant with international organizations in Geneva and does research in International 

Relations. Peimani attributes the claim that U.S. military presence in Central Asia would not only 

likely be long-term, but might also be growing, to General Tommy Franks in his meetings with senior 

government officials in many Central Asian states during negotiations in the run-up to operations in 

Afghanistan. 22 On December 2, 2002, two Russian SU-25 attack jets and two IL-76 military transport planes 

(along with 70 troops to establish air traffic control systems and provide security) arrived from neighboring Tajikistan and landed at a military airfield in Kant, about 20 kilometers east of Bishkek. Two 

days later, three SU-27 fighter jets arrived from the Lipetsk base in Central Russia. According to Sergei 

Blagov, writing for the Asian Times on December 5, 2002, Russian pilots had dubbed one specific 

aircraft the “presidential plane” because Putin had used it to fly over Chechnya in an unprecedented 

public relations exercise two years before (supporting the conclusion that these aircraft were front line 

equipment in good working order). According to Blagov, official government statements revealed that 

the three SU-27 fighter jets were scheduled to return to Lipetsk soon, with the two SU-25s to remain 

in Kyrgyzstan indefinitely. 23 (AFP) “Russia’s Putin in Kyrgyzstan to boost waning influence in Central Asia,” December 5, 

2002, < http://www.cdi.org/russia/234-3.cfm>. 24Ibid.

25 Sanobar Shermatova, “Russia’s Motives in Kyrgyzstan: Russia’s intent in building an air base 

in Kyrgyzstan is clearly to counterbalance U.S. forces stationed in that region,” Moscow News, December 25-31, 2002, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/237-13.cfm>. 26 Valeriy Volkov and Nikolai Khorunzhii, “Sharing Central Asia With America: Russia Maintains its Presence in Central Asia,” Izvestia, December 5, 2002 (from WPS Monitoring Agency, < www.

wps.ru/e_index.html>). 27 Zamira Eshanova, “Central Asia: Diplomatic Visits Highlight U.S.-Russian Cooperation,” 

(RFE/RL) JRL, December 4, 2002, no. 18, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6585.cfm>. Note: This 

figure is widely disputed but seems to have the strength of popular credibility in press reports. Because 

of this, it is suspected that the data may represent “circular reporting” and is thus misleading. 28 Sergei Blagov, “U.S. and Russia Marching On Central Asia,” article published in the Asia 

Times, December 5, 2002, quotes RIA Novostii sources, December 6, 2002. <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6591-11.cfm>. 29 Sergei Rogov, Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Canada and U.S.A. 

Studies in Moscow, speaking at the Center for Naval Analyses in Washington, DC, September 25, 

2002. 30 Zamira Eshanova.

31 Ahmen Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University 

Press, 2001). 32 According to James Schumaker, Special Assistant to U.S. Ambassador Sandy Vershbow, in 

a newsletter from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow November 19, 2002: Working up his anger to a still 

higher level, all directed at the same hapless French reporter whose bad luck seemed to catch the Russian President in the mood for a good fight, Putin challenged the fellow to come to Moscow and “be 

circumcised in such a way as to be irrevocably identified with this Muslim horde.” 33 Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (Kodansha International, Reprint edition, April 1994).
REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION 443

34 Peter Schwartz, “Appendix: Steps to Developing Scenarios,” Art of the Long View (Doubleday, 

1996), 241-248, and Kees van der Heijden, “Dealing With Uncertainty,” “Scenario Development,” Scenarios: The Art of the Strategic Conversation, John Wiley (1996), 83-106, 183-237. 35 Robert Brannon, U.S.-Russian Relations in the War on Terrorism, (under commitment for 

publication by the Naval War College Review, Newport RI, 2004). Adapted to illustrate the application 

of scenario planning to regional security in Central Asia. 36 Alexander Mineev, Opinion Editorial, Russian language newspaper Novaya Gazeta, January 

21, 2002. 37 William Zimmerman, The Russian People and Foreign Policy (Princeton, New Jersy: Princeton 

University Press, 2002), 89-102. Actual figures, cited on page 91 of Zimmerman’s book, reveal that 62 

percent of elites and 68 percent of the mass population see the United States as a threat to Russian 

security. 38 Michael Kochkin, “Russia and the United States Post September 11: What do the Russians 

Think?” Jamestown Foundation, Russia and Eurasia Review 1, Issue 11 (November 5, 2002). Mr. 

Kochkin works for the non-governmental organization “Eurocontact” in Volgograd and is occasionally 

published in English language by CDI Russia Weekly (in this case, 230, no. 12). 39 Annual briefing for foreign military attaches, December 2000, author’s personal notes, 

American Embassy, Moscow, Russia.
444 BRANNON
DEFINING U.S. INTERESTS 445

Chapter 21

Friends Like These: Defining 

U.S. Interests in Central Asia

Olga Oliker

I

t is clear the United States will stay involved in Central Asia. It is less 

clear to what extent and in what ways. At a time when U.S. forces are 

deployed to this region in comparatively large numbers, it is worth remembering that if Central Asia is new to most of the soldiers and airmen 

who find themselves there, it is not new to the U.S. military as a whole. 

Amercian forces have provided training assistance to several Central Asian 

states over the past 10 years, and the U.S. government has built ties with 

the leaderships of these countries since they first gained independence.

This is not to say, however, that the present U.S. involvement in the 

region is a direct outgrowth of past activities. In fact, it is not. Past U.S. efforts in Central Asia were very limited and contacts with the leaderships of 

these countries were best described as “stop and go,” due to concerns about 

the reliability, human rights records, and various foreign and domestic 

policies of these regimes—as well as, quite simply, fairly limited perceived 

U.S. interests in the region.

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) created a more immediate need 

for U.S. military involvement, and the U.S. government did a masterful 

and precedential job of attaining access to several remote locations where 

American forces had never been before. At these sites, they set up facilities and promptly began successful operations. The extent to which prior 

contacts helped make this happen, as some have argued they did, is unclear. Doubtless, it was useful to know whom to talk to in Uzbekistan and 

Kyrgyzstan, countries where the United States had built military contacts 

in prior years. However, such contacts had not been built to anywhere 

near the same extent with, for example, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, and 

both of those states also were willing to provide access to U.S. forces. If 

anything, prior contacts influenced U.S. decisions to ask for access more 

than they did regional states’ willingness to grant it. This willingness had 

445

1
446 OLIKER

more to do with regional powers’ support for the U.S. effort to defeat the 

Taliban in Afghanistan and the hopes that U.S. presence would translate 

into tangible benefits for the country and the regime.

This experience has implications both for U.S. policy on access related issues2

 and for short and long term U.S. policy towards Central Asia. 

Beyond OEF, U.S. interests in this region are amorphous and predominantly non-military. Caspian energy, often touted as a justification for 

closer U.S. ties with Central Asia’s often unsavory regimes, is largely a matter of oil that will be sold on the global market (and not so much of that 

as to significantly affect prices and thus engender particularly strong U.S. 

interest), and gas that will be sold locally, thus having no particular impact 

on the United States. Other economic interests are minimal. America has 

little trade with these countries and few reasons to expect this to change in 

the foreseeable future. In terms of security concerns, the United States has 

few traditional strategic reasons to build and maintain closer ties with the 

five Central Asian states. Those who argue for stronger relationships say 

that U.S. ties could help stem Russian, Chinese, or Iranian influence in the 

region. Even the greatest proponents of close relations had, before OEF, 

tended to see Central Asia as low on U.S. priority lists, arguing that other 

allies, such as Turkey, could advance U.S. interests just as well. Finally, the 

dismal human rights records of many of these regimes continue to create difficulties in justifying with the U.S. Congress and general public the 

contacts that do exist.

This is not to say, however, that the United States has no interests 

in Central Asia. In fact, the experience of OEF has demonstrated not 

only that the United States can access this region, but also that the region 

is critical for battling a broader, more complicated set of threats. The 

region’s porous borders and proximity to Afghanistan have made it a key 

transit route for the narcotics trade and other criminal activities including 

human, weapons and other illegal goods trafficking. These problems must 

now be understood as part of a larger family of transnational threats to 

which global terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) belong. As the United States and others learn how to combat these 

threats, Central Asia may become a key battleground for it is an epicenter 

(unfortunately one of several) for these problems. The way to fight in this 

realm, however, may not be by means of military influence, but rather 

through a range of economic development and security assistance; not 

through competition with other great powers, but via cooperation with 

them to achieve common ends; and not by finding quick solutions, but 

by committing to long-term involvement and engagement. This would, of 
DEFINING U.S. INTERESTS 447

course, require a qualitatively different approach in Central Asia than the 

United States has taken in the past.

Background

Prior to September 11, U.S. interests in Central Asia were limited. The 

relatively low level of energy resources assessed by most estimates meant 

that although U.S. firms were involved, and the U.S. government was fairly 

vocal in its support of “multiple pipelines” for Caspian oil, Caspian energy 

was not a top priority for Washington. Strategically, the region appeared 

to be of little significance. Thus, U.S. interests in Central Asia were secondary economic concerns; interests derivative of the goals of others, such as 

concern about Russian imperialism or support for Turkish efforts to build 

influence in the region; and ideological goals such as democratization.

This did not mean, however, that the United States was not involved 

in Central Asia. As America sought to define national interests in the 

seemingly non-threatening global environment of the 1990s, it sought to 

prevent threats from emerging and to pursue ideological and humanitarian goals it felt it could afford. These included global peacemaking efforts, 

as well as the pursuit of democratization in a variety of regions.3 To a lesser 

extent, in part because solutions were difficult to define or implement, the 

Unites States sought to mitigate the non-immediate but dangerous threats 

of WMD proliferation, terrorism and international crime.

Thus, the United States built military and political relations with the 

Central Asian states, seeking to influence regional governments in a variety of strategic and ideological directions. U.S. policy focused first on the 

elimination of nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan, which were seen as the 

most significant security threat in the region. It then sought to build lowlevel military-to-military contacts with the Central Asian states, both on a 

bilateral basis and through NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. 

It provided democratization and economic assistance and sought to support U.S. firms, particularly energy companies, that were investing in the 

region. These activities also were intended to limit the capacity of Russia 

to strong-arm the Central Asian states, without directly confronting Russia in the region, by steering clear of promising security guarantees to the 

local regimes. 4

Military cooperation in the period leading up to 2001 focused particularly on Special Forces joint training with Uzbek, Kazakh and Kyrgyz 

armed forces, as well as providing non-lethal military equipment.5 After 

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) incursions in 1999 and 2000, the 

United States provided some support to Kyrgyzstan to enable it to better 
448 OLIKER

respond to such threats. Assistance was also provided by Turkey, Russia, 

and Uzbekistan at this time.6 The United States built a significant program 

of military cooperation with Kazakhstan, which began with Cooperative 

Threat Reduction assistance to eliminate the Soviet legacy of WMD and 

evolved into a more general program of cooperation with International 

Military Education and Training (IMET), export and border controls, 

and so forth.7 Such cooperation was limited in the wake of revelations 

of Kazakh arms sales to North Korea.8 Cooperation with Tajikistan was 

restricted significantly first by its Civil War, which lasted through much of 

the mid 1990s, and then by the limited capacity of the new government 

to support such programs. Turkmenistan in its increasing isolationism 

was also a difficult partner, with the result that few contacts and activities 

emerged. 

The regional states welcomed or rejected U.S. involvement and cooperation for a variety of reasons. Tajikistan’s civil war left it, in essence, a 

Russia protectorate and prevented much discussion of further ties with the 

United States. Turkmenistan rejected U.S. aid, as it did cooperation with 

other states. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan all welcomed U.S. assistance, although for different reasons. Kazakhstan felt its interests were 

best served by maintaining good relations with both the United States and 

Russia as well as, insofar as possible, China, Iran, and others, and it had 

little interest in playing one off against another. U.S. support for multiple 

pipeline routes for its oil and gas aided Kazakhstan’s goal of ensuring 

economic independence from Russia, but Russia’s proximity and a large 

ethnic Russian population made complete estrangement from Moscow 

impossible. Kyrgyzstan, too, sought friendship and assistance from a variety of countries, although where Kazakhstan was motivated by wealth, 

Kyrgyzstan, being small and economically and militarily weak, could not 

afford to alienate any of its neighbors or other interested parties. Uzbekistan, however, took a very different tack. President Islam Karimov made it 

a central facet of his foreign policy to turn away from Russia and to demonstrate Uzbekistan’s independence from Moscow’s control. He hoped in 

part to do this through closer ties with the United States, an effort that 

was limited by U.S. concerns about Karimov’s human rights record and 

Uzbekistan’s relatively low value to Washington at the time.

The OEF Experience and Subsequent Bilateral Ties

After the September 11 attacks, Washington moved quickly to expand 

its options in Central Asia. It rapidly secured permission from the states 

of the region to overfly their territories for humanitarian missions in Af-
DEFINING U.S. INTERESTS 449

ghanistan. Some also granted overflight permission for combat missions, 

although of the Central Asian states, only Kyrgyzstan did so openly. The 

United States set up substantial bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan after 

looking at facilities there as well as in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. It also set 

up a refueling mission in Turkmenistan. As it had in the past, Washington 

did not make any security commitments to these states, but it did sign an 

agreement with Uzbekistan that pledged Washington to “regard with grave 

concern any external threat” to Uzbekistan.9

In exchange for access, the United States promised, and delivered, 

a variety of assistance.10 Uzbekistan rapidly moved to the top ranks of 

U.S. aid recipients, picking up both economic and military aid packages. 

Among the things Uzbekistan either received or expects to receive are: 

patrol boats to be used on the Amu Darya River, language training, radios 

for communications, helicopter upgrades, Non-Commissioned Officer 

(NCO) training support, a military modeling and simulation center, psyop training, airport navigation system upgrades, and reportedly, joint 

construction of Il-114 aircraft.11

Kyrgyzstan, too, has received military communications equipment 

worth over $1.4 million and a variety of other systems, such as night vision devices. The Kyrgyz Foreign Minister has praised this aid, saying it 

is “extremely useful for the Army in guarding the country’s borders.” The 

cooperation program between the United States and Kyrgyzstan calls for 

continued military-technical cooperation and high level visits, such as 

that of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in November 2002.12

Kyrgyzstan also is receiving military medical assistance, education slots at 

the Marshall Center, and help in training NCOs. A joint exercise, Balanced 

Knife, had Kyrgyz forces and U.S. troops affiliated with OEF practicing 

mountain fighting and combat medicine in March 2003.13 Plans in 2004 

call for more joint exercises for special troops, rapid reaction forces and 

peacekeepers, as well as assistance with counterterrorism training and 

military reform.14 Both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan also have received assistance in the form of upgrades to the facilities that U.S. forces are using 

in those countries. Kyrgyzstan receives fees for each take off and landing 

by coalition aircraft at Manas. Informal joint exercises take place at KarshiKhanabad between U.S. forces and Uzbek Air Force personnel as well.15

From a U.S. perspective, the experience in both of these states, which 

have provided the bulk of the access and basing support, has been worthwhile, although it remains frustrating and difficult to “get things done” in 

these post-Soviet republics. Negotiating for the use of Karshi-Khanabad 

was a painful process. Uzbek authorities wanted to negotiate a new Status 
450 OLIKER

of Forces Agreement (instead of using the one in place for Partnership for 

Peace activities), and wanted the U.S. base to have as low a profile as possible (hence the choice of Karshi-Khanabad, which is relatively isolated). 

The Uzbeks also were concerned about ensuring the security of U.S. forces, 

another argument in favor of the Khanabad base. The base does, indeed, 

appear quite secure, with multiple rings of Uzbek and U.S. security forces 

encircling it.16

With regards to the current assistance program, U.S. personnel are 

concerned that Uzbek officials are seeking flashier equipment and assistance, rather than more effective or needed materiel and training, and 

report consistent difficulties with the lack of decision authority on the 

part of their interlocutors in the Uzbek Defense Ministry. However, the 

bases continue to be useful for the OEF mission, and to a large extent, the 

assistance packages, which fall far short of any long-term commitment or 

statement of strategic alignment, are perceived as “payment” for access.17

The United States also has developed its military relationship with 

Kazakhstan in the wake of OEF. While Kazakhstan was willing to provide 

base access to U.S. forces, their bases were not used. The offer itself, however, set more than one precedent. The base offered, Lugovoi, was one 

which Kazakh officials had refused to allow U.S. personnel access to in the 

past. An agreement that the United States could use Kazakh facilities in an 

emergency never resulted in any actual activity. However, permission to 

overfly Kazakhstan was appreciated by OEF planners, and the willingness 

of Astana to support the mission was noted. The United States continues 

to provide assistance with border security and the relationship with Kazakhstan has to some extent been reinvigorated.18 For example, U.S. experts have been working with the Kazakhs to develop an elite peacekeeping 

battalion.19 It is worth noting that in Kazakhstan, as well, U.S. personnel 

report frustration with interlocutors who remain very much products of 

the Soviet military system. Secrecy, bureaucracy and incompetence continue to be problems in the Kazakh military.20

Tajikistan also offered its bases to the United States and coalition 

forces for use in OEF. While some members of the coalition have reportedly used Tajik facilities, U.S. forces did not conduct any major operations 

from that country. The OEF experience did, however, pave the way for the 

beginnings of a cooperation program with Dushanbe. Although less ambitious than the assistance programs underway with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 

or Uzbekistan, the United States is providing a variety of assistance, much 

of it humanitarian, to the Tajiks, and has offered to help the Tajiks and 

the Kyrgyz improve their permanent communications so that they can 
DEFINING U.S. INTERESTS 451

better pass on warnings. There were complaints from Kyrgyz authorities 

that during the 1999 and 2000 IMU incursions, Tajikistan did not provide 

timely and effective warning.21

Turkmenistan, which provided facilities but has been leery of accepting aid, has presented a different set of circumstances. Based on past 

experience, the United States did not initially expect much in the way of 

Turkmen support for OEF. It hoped overflights would be allowed, and that 

Turkmenistan would cooperate in the seizing of al Qaeda assets. It also 

was hoped that there might be some support for humanitarian assistance. 

In fact, Turkmenistan agreed to host U.S. forces for a refueling mission 

for humanitarian support purposes and President Niyazov appointed his 

national security advisor and intelligence chief as the primary liaison with 

America in regards to OEF relief operations. 

However, even with this high-level support, problems remained. 

Turkmenistan did not want to negotiate a Status-of-Forces Agreement, 

arguing that this would violate its neutrality.22 Defining contractual relationships with civil aviation personnel was another hurdle, and despite 

clear language defining what the United States does and does not pay for, 

the Turkmen authorities have tried to bill the United States for items on 

the “not subject to billing” list.23

Unlike its neighbors, Turkmenistan has expressed little interest in 

building on the current situation to develop closer relations or to receive 

assistance from the United States. Although the payments associated with 

refueling operations are no doubt welcome, the government has remained 

leery of closer ties. Over time, it has become more difficult to work with 

the Turkmen government. The official initially responsible for negotiating 

with the United States has been purged, making it far more difficult to address problems that crop up, and to ensure continued smooth functioning 

of the refueling effort.24

U.S. Interests in Context

The bases and facilities set up in Central Asia in support of OEF 

have proven tremendously useful to the United States, and worth the cost 

of additional aid and payments. They are not, however, in and of themselves a reason for continued close relations with the Central Asian states 

beyond the present mission. Given other U.S. commitments, the current 

force posture in these countries is increasingly unsustainable. Refuelings 

in Turkmenistan have dwindled, as have supply flights through the other 

countries. Moreover, the OEF experience has demonstrated that, if necessary, the United States can set up shop in this part of the world with relative 
452 OLIKER

speed, if not ease. Thus, the continued presence beyond the needs of the 

OEF mission does not seem justified by possible future missions, although 

some sort of relationship to ease the way for such needs is advisable.

Energy interests are also not a compelling reason for a continued U.S. 

military presence in Central Asia. Although in March 2003, the Kazakh 

foreign ministry cited the situation in the Middle East as a reason for increased U.S. interests in Kazakh energy projects, the estimates for Caspian 

oil vary widely.25 Even at the high end the projections are that the region 

will produce perhaps one tenth of the world’s oil. Low end estimates suggest that even one-third of that is optimistic. Moreover, even if the most 

positive assessments turn out to be accurate, it will be some time before 

this oil is accessed.

Beyond energy, however, the United States has very few economic 

interests in Central Asia. Due to the legal and bureaucratic constraints 

on investors in Uzbekistan, foreign businesses which thought the country 

presented some real opportunities in the mid-1990s have been cutting 

their losses and leaving. Turkmenistan never presented a friendly environment for Western investors; Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have had little to 

offer; and Kazakhstan’s foreign investment is overwhelmingly tied to the 

energy sector. In fact, recent changes in the Kazakh government’s attitude 

towards business, which have made it more difficult for investors to operate and have involved efforts to renegotiate some existing contracts in the 

oil sector, may lead investors to have second thoughts about their involvement in this country. Without massive reforms, it is unlikely much U.S. 

investment will occur in this part of the world, and such reforms appear 

increasingly unlikely, as Uzbek and Kazakh laws and practices become 

worse rather than better. 

Despite the lack of potential economic gain, the United States has 

other interests in Central Asia. In the aftermath of September 11, U.S. national security agenda issues that had long been on the list of concerns, but 

had received little attention because they seemed insoluble rose to the top. 

Afghanistan presented a clear-cut illustration of the dangers of how state 

failure can create transnational threats, which when unchecked have the 

capacity to terrorize governments and populaces worldwide. Central Asia, 

with its combination of increasingly authoritarian regimes, limited central 

control, popular dissatisfaction, high levels of corruption, and criminal 

activity is both a waystation for and a source of these threats.

The solutions to these problems, however, are difficult to identify 

and implement. One thing that seems clear is that these problems cannot 

be solved through force alone. While security personnel and organizations 
DEFINING U.S. INTERESTS 453

have a role in controlling borders, most of the security tasks are domestic, 

police tasks and many of the long-term solutions must be political and 

economic, rather than military. Perhaps somewhat ironically, after years 

of debate about whether the pursuit of democratization and human rights 

was a worthwhile U.S. security policy goal, it now appears that such efforts 

are, indeed, critical to “hard” security goals—even as the task of advancing 

them appears even more difficult than before.

Interests, Goals and Pitfalls

It is imperative for the United States to remain involved in Central 

Asia. However, Washington has neither a clear-cut approach for how to do 

this, nor the tools in place to make an effective start. While some might 

argue that the U.S. military presence helps support stability and provides 

incentives for regional regimes to democratize, it is unclear that the existing evidence supports these assertions. Although U.S. policy statements do 

continue to pressure Tashkent on political and economic reforms, some in 

Uzbekistan report that the U.S. presence actually has made the Karimov 

regime feel more empowered to crack down on opposition.26 Similarly, 

some have argued that Tajik President Imomali Rakhmonov has used the 

Global War on Terrorism as justification for limiting the activities of the 

Islamic Renaissance Party, the main opposition force in that country.27

The goals of the regional states themselves, and their own approaches 

to the United States, must also be considered in this context. In many ways, 

these have changed little from what they were prior to 2001. However, in 

the context of a greater U.S. interest, it is critical to understand exactly 

why Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan 

have been willing to grant access and pursue ties, and what they hope to 

gain from this cooperation. It is critical as well for U.S. policy planners to 

be aware of how these interests differ from those of the United States, and 

what the expectations of regional regimes are regarding U.S. behavior.

The example of Uzbekistan is apt, and perhaps the most telling in 

this regard. As already noted, the Karimov regime had long hoped for 

closer ties with the United States as a counterweight to Russia. In addition to Tashkent’s long-standing effort to distance itself from Moscow, 

it is important to note Uzbekistan’s role in Central Asia, where it has the 

most capable military of the five states and is viewed as a fairly dangerous 

neighbor by Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Indeed, as part of its 

campaign against the IMU, the Uzbek government has pursued suspected 

insurgents into neighboring states’ territories and laid landmines both on 

their shared borders with them and on the territory of the other states. 
454 OLIKER

This, combined with its refusal to provide landmine maps to Kyrgyz and 

Tajik officials, has contributed to the deaths of numerous civilians.

The U.S. decision to place a substantial military force in Uzbekistan 

was taken by many in the Uzbek government as a clear demonstration of 

U.S. support. The Karimov regime sought to build on this by formalizing 

relations with new written agreements. While it wanted a low profile for 

the U.S. forces in Uzbekistan itself, it also wanted its neighbors and Russia 

to be aware of this new “partnership.” Uzbekistan also sought U.S. friendship by supporting the war in Iraq, even to the point of Uzbek experts telling television audiences that they had “ample” (if not actually presented) 

proof that Baghdad possessed WMD and had links to terrorism.28 The 

heavily censored Uzbek press reportedly had been instructed to present 

the war from a “pro-U.S.” perspective.29

Yet, it also seems likely that the Karimov regime has been disappointed in the actual benefits of the relationship with the United States to 

date. Although there have been real material gains in terms of defense and 

other assistance, America has clearly stopped short of any alliance-type 

commitments to Uzbekistan. Moreover, the U.S. government has been unable to deliver foreign investment while Uzbekistan continues to make the 

investment climate so hostile.30

Repercussions from Uzbek economic and social policies can be seen 

in a sharp increase in disaffection on the part of segments of the population. Anecdotal reports that “everyone” in Uzbekistan knows someone 

who has had unpleasant run-ins with the Uzbek security forces creates 

worrisome parallels with Stalin’s Soviet Union or revolutionary Iran. With 

opposition political parties banned, the fastest growing unofficial movement is probably the Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which advocates the overthrow of 

secular regimes worldwide and the establishment of a global Caliphate. 

Moreover, while the Karimov regime’s oppression is not new, the effects of 

its economic policies, which have sharply curtailed trade with neighboring 

states, have recently become felt. Prices have risen throughout Uzbekistan, 

and disaffection in cities such as Tashkent continues to grow along with 

them. Protests against officials at a wide range of levels, including on 

rural farms, are increasingly common as people find themselves trying to 

survive on what is left of their earnings after leaders at various levels have 

taken their share through punitive taxes and corruption.31

In a country where the potential for significant unrest is on the rise, 

and with few mechanisms available for peaceful resolution of conflict, it 

is likely that if a given situation escalates, bloodshed will result. Moreover, 

with an autocratic regime so centered around President Islam Karimov, his 
DEFINING U.S. INTERESTS 455

departure from the scene could well lead to potentially violent competition among those now in his inner circle, as well as those outside it, over 

who will take his place. Thus, with or without Karimov, Uzbekistan has a 

high potential for future trouble. 

For its part, the United States may find itself in the difficult position 

of being perceived as supporting a failing and increasingly unpopular 

regime. This situation is exacerbated by Karimov’s interest in tying the 

United States into such support, through public statements, assistance, 

and, insofar as possible, legal documents. The United States has wisely 

steered clear of the latter, but it must also be aware of the symbolic effects 

of the former two. Moreover, the potential for instability makes it particularly critical that the United States remain involved at some level and seek 

to find ways to improve the situation.

The other countries of the region are not in as critical a situation 

as Uzbekistan and are thus less worrisome in the near-term. Neither the 

Kyrgyz nor the Kazakh leadership seek U.S. assistance as a counterweight 

to other forces in the region, per se. Rather, they feel that the better their 

relations are with all powerful parties, the better their chances of survival 

and success. That said, the regimes in these two countries have become 

increasingly authoritarian and there is reason to believe that popular 

disaffection may be growing there as well. In Kyrgyzstan, in particular, 

the Hizb ut-Tahrir is said to be making inroads, and a series of popular 

protests with roots in both political activism and inter-clan conflict have 

occurred, resulting in a dangerous and complex situation. In Kazakhstan, 

increased difficulties for U.S. investors (albeit not to the extent of those in 

Uzbekistan) may yet lead the U.S. government to be increasingly at odds 

with Astana. 

One point of note in Kyrgyzstan is the possible attitude of opposition 

forces in that country to the U.S. presence. On one hand, local complaints 

have surfaced about noise caused by takeoffs and landings at Manas and a 

traffic accident involving a U.S. servicemember, which reportedly injured 

two local women. On the other hand, some opposition leaders have spoken about the U.S. military presence as the solution to all of Kyrgyzstan’s 

security problems, eliminating the need for cooperation with Russia.32

Both sides create concerns for U.S. interests.

If Uzbekistan is seeking strategic gain and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan hope for strategic parity, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan perhaps come 

closest to having provided the assistance for OEF purely out of support for 

the operation itself. Like Uzbekistan, both countries felt a significant threat 
456 OLIKER

was posed by the Taliban’s proximity, so much so that Turkmenistan had 

sought a “separate peace” with the Taliban prior to September 2001. 

Notwithstanding the perceived threat, Turkmenistan has largely 

refused U.S. offers of assistance, before and after OEF. While specific organizations, such as the airport that receives a fee for each refueling and 

the hotel where U.S. airmen stay, appreciate the influx of funds, there is 

no clear sense that the Turkmen government as a whole sees a benefit 

from the effort. According to U.S. personnel involved in negotiating and 

implementing the refueling operation, the Turkmen Ministry of Defense 

has gained nothing as a result of the refueling operation, while the top 

priority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to ensure that the operation 

remains low-profile. The Turkmen have continued to turn down offers 

of military contacts, have not used the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 

funds allocated them in five years, and have cut back on their participation 

in IMET. 

Nor has Turkmenistan done anything that suggests a general warming towards the United States in other areas. In August 2003, it took steps 

to evict the U.S. Embassy’s public affairs section from its building near 

the embassy grounds.33 While President Niyazov told the new U.S. Ambassador, Tracey Ann Jacobsen, that his country would like to see more 

cooperation with the United States in energy and natural resources, there 

is no sign that the government plans to relax the rules governing business 

and investment so as to support such cooperation.34

In short, the last two years of cooperation do not appear to have 

effected Turkmenistan’s attitudes towards the United States. Nor has the 

United States pushed particularly hard to affect changes, perhaps realizing 

its very limited leverage with this country. Thus, despite Turkmenistan’s 

atrocious human rights record and recent moves to deny joint citizenship with Russia to long-standing citizens of Russian origin, as well as 

the imposition of an exit-visa requirement on Turkmen residents seeking 

to travel abroad, the U.S. State Department assured Turkmenistan that it 

would not lose its Jackson-Vanik exemption in 2003.35

Tajikistan, too, appears to have a fairly limited view of what cooperation with the United States can bring. The new relationship did result in 

a state visit by the Tajik President to the United States, and the Tajiks have 

been far more willing to accept aid and assistance than have the Turkmen. 

However, like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan has been careful not 

to allow its relationship with Washington to be perceived as a counterpoint 

to its close ties to Russia. This has not, however, prevented speculation 

to that effect in Tajikistan’s more pluralistic press. Reports have repeat-
DEFINING U.S. INTERESTS 457

edly appeared in the media suggesting the United States would take over 

Russia’s role in guarding Tajikistan’s borders or that the delays in negotiating a Tajik-Russian base agreement were due to a payoff from the United 

States to Tajikistan to prevent that agreement from being signed.36 Despite 

repeated denials from both U.S. and Tajik officials, such rumors continue. 

Thus, as in Kyrgyzstan, the United States faces the danger of having the 

bilateral relationship become a pawn of domestic politics. Moreover, because the interplay between the United States and Russia is the focus of 

these rumors, this domestic game has international repercussions.

The Russian perspective here is critical. Because Central Asia has long 

been under Russian rule, and because it remains one of few areas where 

Moscow retains real influence, Russia throughout the 1990s tended to perceive U.S. efforts in Central Asia and the Caucasus as hostile encroachment 

and an attempt to woo Russia’s last natural allies away from it. Combined 

with increasing tension between Moscow and Washington on other issues, 

such as intervention in Yugoslavia and missile defense, U.S. involvement in 

Central Asia seemed to many in Moscow to be part of a concerted effort 

by the United States to lessen Russia’s influence. 

For the United States, the posturing of Russia and Central Asian 

regimes vis à vis each other has been difficult to follow, as leaders such 

as Uzbekistan’s Karimov alternated between calling Russia a partner and 

berating Moscow for exaggerating the Islamic fundamentalist threat to 

justify Russian bases in the region. But in times of stress, even Karimov has 

sought Russian assistance. In part, this is because these leaders recognized 

that they needed some outside support to deal with the threats near and 

within their borders, and Russia, with its strong interests in the region, remains the most viable partner available. Russia has both offered and provided assistance, including joint training efforts, cooperative planning and 

border police. Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division remains on the ground 

in Tajikistan as do thousands of Russian-commanded border guards deployed along the frontier with Afghanistan. Russia also views the radical 

Islamic threat in the same way the Central Asian governments have tended 

to see it—as a significant danger that justifies police crackdowns and less 

than liberal policies. Russia is also much less critical of human rights 

abuses and corrupt practices than the United States has tended to be.

At the start of OEF, it appeared to observers in Central Asia and 

elsewhere, that the United States could become the key security partner 

to the Central Asian states, with Russia’s acceptance. Russian President 

Vladimir Putin’s statement that U.S. deployments in Central Asia were 

“not a tragedy” was historic, and followed even more historic decisions by 
458 OLIKER

Central Asian leaders to allow U.S. basing—decisions taken, in most cases, 

without consultations with Moscow. These events marked a sea-change in 

Moscow’s relations with the Central Asian regimes, and with the Untied 

States.

From Russia’s perspective, not protesting the U.S. presence had real 

advantages. For one thing, stopping it was all but impossible. For another, 

it soon became clear that the United States was solving a problem that 

Russia had struggled with for a decade—successfully driving the Taliban 

from power in Afghanistan. Certainly, such action was in Russia’s interests 

as well as the Central Asian states’. However, Russia’s feelings about the 

U.S. presence remain mixed, and various actors in Russian politics have 

very different views about what should be acceptable to Moscow. Russia 

is therefore watching the U.S. presence in Central Asia with a good bit of 

concern and making much of statements that this presence is temporary. 

Increased tension between the United States and Russia over both 

countries’ activities and interests in Central Asia have the potential to create, to paraphrase Vladimir Putin, a real “tragedy.” First, the fact remains 

that Russia has a stronger and more immediate interest in Central Asia 

than does the United States. While U.S. interests in preventing instability 

and helping develop successful states are clear, they are no more critical 

than U.S. interests in doing the same elsewhere in the world. For Russia, 

Central Asia is the first line of defense—for the United States, it may not 

even be the third or fourth. Furthermore, for a wide range of reasons, 

which include the same transnational threats, as well as arms control and 

other global policy interests, the U.S.-Russian relationship is more important to the United States than are its relationships with the Central Asian 

regimes, together or separately.

When it comes to Central Asia, Russia and the United States are not 

the only interested parties. Turkey, India, China, Iran and various European states also are involved to different extents, and have a broad range 

of interests in the region. Many, if not all, of these states are critical to U.S. 

national security interests in their own right, over and above their interests 

in Central Asia. For these states, the primary goals are economic and focus 

on the energy resources of the region. For all of them, the development 

of economic ties with the Central Asian countries depends on stability 

and functioning governments. Several of these states also have other security concerns. India is concerned about extremism and the potential for 

Central Asian unrest to impact its ongoing conflict with Pakistan. China 

fears spillover to its ethnic Turkic minority, the Uighurs, in northwestern 
DEFINING U.S. INTERESTS 459

China. Thus, all of these states share American, Russian and Central Asian 

interests in stability.

All are also, to varying extents, willing to let others ensure that stability if possible, even as they want to remain both involved and aware 

of developments. Turkey generally has been willing to take the U.S. lead, 

although officials complain that the United States is not sharing information about its activities and goals sufficiently to enable Ankara to coordinate its own policy with Washington’s. China, while steering clear of 

antagonizing Russia, is seeking to build its own strategic relations with the 

Central Asian states, both on a bilateral basis, particularly with Kyrgyzstan, 

and through the multilateral Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 

which, despite its lack of activity to date, does have some real ambitions in 

regards to both counterterrorism cooperation and development of trade. 

India, for its part, has been developing security ties with Tajikistan since 

its years of support for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, and now has 

a limited military presence on Tajik soil.

For the United States, this means numerous potential partners for 

its efforts to promote stability and development in the region. However, 

as with Russia, cooperation would require a level of coordination and 

transparency that the United States has yet to achieve with Turkey, much 

less any of the other countries with an interest in Central Asia. Moreover, 

the interests of the surrounding countries in Central Asia, albeit quite real, 

pale in comparison with Russia’s and are of secondary concern.

Toward an Effective Policy

In principle, cooperation between the United States, Russia and 

other interested parties to attain the broad range of shared goals in Central Asia should be the answer to this dilemma. Indeed, it is unlikely that 

much progress will be made in this part of the world without Russian 

participation. Its proximity, its political and economic ties to the region, 

and its more immediate concerns about these problems are all parts of the 

equation. Russia is on the receiving end of transnational threats such as 

narcotics trafficking, weapons smuggling, transnational crime, and potentially terrorism that come from or through Central Asia, and in some cases 

is the source of other such threats. Resolving these problems with Russian 

cooperation will be far easier and more effective than attempting to resolve 

them without it. Involving others who share the same goals would help 

spread the burden, as well as ensure a greater stake on their part in the 

success of the endeavor.
460 OLIKER

However, in spite of significant discussions about the need for such 

cooperation, it has not been forthcoming as of yet. Several reasons are 

behind this, most having to do with the critical bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia. The first roadblock is the continued 

perception on the part of some—in Russia, the United States, and Central 

Asia—that influence and involvement in Central Asia is, in fact, a zerosum game. This viewpoint holds that the United States and Russia are 

competing for influence, and the Central Asian states are prizes to be won 

by one side or the other. This attitude could easily be dismissed as persisting only among those who have difficulty letting go of Cold War patterns 

were it not for its popularity in both governments. While in their public 

statements Presidents Bush and Putin appear committed to cooperation, 

both have advisors who feel there is no real alternative to antagonism, and 

who view gain by one country as a loss for the other.

In Central Asia, the perception of a zero-sum game has been more 

common in Uzbekistan than elsewhere, although it is also evident in statements and media reports from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. A microcosm of 

this belief can be found in the U.S. and Russian military presence at Manas 

and Kant Airbases, respectively, in Kyrgyzstan. These are seen by some as 

reflective of U.S. and Russian efforts to exert influence, even as Kyrgyzstan 

tries to balance between the two great powers. In fact, the U.S. deployment 

was driven first and foremost by the requirements of OEF. Russia’s decision to place a base so near the U.S. base can be seen both as a statement of 

Russia’s continued interest and as a marker that regardless of what the U.S. 

does, Russia still has a role to play that will continue long after the United 

States and other coalition members have gone. For Kyrgyzstan’s part, it 

has sought to maintain good relations with both countries, and it stands 

to gain, economically and in terms of security, from doing so.

If this is, in fact, Kyrgyzstan’s attitude, as it also appears to be 

Kazakhstan’s and Tajikistan’s, it is a remarkably rational one. These countries stand to gain much from cooperation with the United States, Russia 

China, and even, potentially, each other. A good deal also may be lost by 

playing into the notion of competition in the region. As noted, energy 

interests in Central Asia are not sufficient to drive U.S. policy, and true 

U.S. security interests suggest that from the U.S. perspective, the Central 

Asian states are not a prize to be won but a problem to be managed. It is in 

Central Asia’s interests, as well as in America’s, Russia’s and others, that the 

countries of Central Asia eventually graduate to managing their problems 

on their own. In the meantime, however, they will need assistance from a 

wide range of sources.37
DEFINING U.S. INTERESTS 461

In order for the Central Asian states to acquire this assistance and to 

move forward effectively, Russia and the United States also must do their 

part to eliminate the zero-sum game perception. From the U.S. perspective, many reasons exist to do this. It is not in the U.S. interest to be seen 

as a bulwark against Russia by any of these states. This will needlessly 

antagonize Russia and give the impression of unconditional support for 

increasingly unsavory regimes. Moreover, even if it wanted to, the United 

States does not have the resources or interests to be the primary partner to 

any Central Asian state. The less the perception of competition, moreover, 

the greater likelihood that other states will seek to become involved, without fear of being caught in the middle of a U.S.-Russian rivalry.

The experience of Afghanistan demonstrates that even limited Russian-U.S. cooperation towards common goals can be extremely fruitful. 

However, both countries have, to a large extent, failed to recognize that 

benefits can be gleaned from such cooperation. There seems to be little interest at the working levels in building better ties and little understanding 

of the repercussions of failing to do so. Indeed, some U.S. officials view the 

U.S. military presence in Central Asia as countering Russian neo-imperialism, while some Russian officials see it as critical to Russian interests to 

reassert not just influence, but control over Central Asia.

The keys to moving forward are cooperation, multilateralism, tangible goals and small steps. If the problems are transnational in nature, 

the solutions must be as well; solutions that do not involve all of the states 

concerned can only be partial solutions at best. Certainly, there are limits 

to what is possible. Turkmenistan, for example, will remain very difficult 

to engage as long as Niyazov is President, and possibly longer. However, 

insofar as Russia, the United States and all of its neighbors share an interest in reform in that country, their cooperative efforts likely would stand a 

better chance of success than sporadic and uncertain individual efforts.

Tangible goals are also critical. It is important to identify areas of cooperation where real benefits to all concerned can be easily achieved. Even 

during the Cold War, the United States and Russia were able to develop 

dialogues and reach cooperative decisions when it was in the interests of 

both nations to do so.38 More recently, the cooperation between the U.S. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Russian Emergency Ministry present another example of how effective coordination can 

be if it is perceived as necessary by both sides. A good first step in this case 

might be discussions of common use of the airspace over Kyrgyzstan, now 

that both an OEF coalition base and a Russian base are in place near Bishkek. This also qualifies as a small step in that its implementation would 
462 OLIKER

require little effort. Still, these building blocks of cooperation build trust 

while accomplishing mutual goals, and this is critical to moving on to the 

larger areas where cooperation is needed.

The other key component of success must be multilateralism. It is 

true that the Central Asian states themselves have been loath to cooperate 

too closely with one another. However, there is precedent for their doing 

so. The solution may be, in part, to involve a variety of other players, 

including the United States, Russia, India, China, European powers and 

others as viable. This will create strong incentives for most Central Asian 

states not to remain on the sidelines at the risk of missing out on the 

potential to build ties with a range of possible partners.39 This approach 

can be effective in both economic and security settings and can serve as 

a stepping stone towards easing some of the tensions between the states 

of the region, as well as helping to facilitate solutions to the transnational 

threats that plague them and their neighbors. The SCO was founded in 

part on such principles, and the United States might consider seeking 

observer status in that organization, so as to demonstrate its support for 

the efforts of others. 

U.S. interests in Central Asia all but guarantee some level of involvement in the region for the foreseeable future. But its military presence 

should be reduced, just as other areas of involvement should grow. The 

challenge for America will be to manage this in a way that leaves neither it 

nor the region worse off than before the United States got involved. Good 

relations with Russia are one component of this. Transparency and coordination with other current or prospective partners are another. No less 

critical, however, will be avoiding stronger than needed commitments to 

existing Central Asian regimes, even while maintaining cooperation with 

them. In the end, it will be a balancing act. But the alternative may be a 

very dangerous fall.

Notes1

 The author thanks RAND, and specifically Project Air Force within RAND, for providing support for research from which this paper is drawn. She also wishes to emphasize that the views reflected 

here are her own and do not reflect the views, attitudes, or policies of RAND, Project Air Force or the 

United States Air Force. 2

 For a discussion of the access issue more broadly, see David Shlapak, et. al, A Global Access 

Strategy for the U.S. Air Force (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003). 3

 While proponents of democratization have traditionally argued that it advances strategic goals 

due to a postulated lower propensity among democracies to fight wars (or, according to some, fight 

wars with one another), the literature is, in fact, inconclusive on this. Moreover, regardless of whether 

democracies are more or less war-prone, democratizing states are, according to some data, more likely 

to face conflict. Many of the key arguments in these debates can be found in Michael E. Brown, Sean 
DEFINING U.S. INTERESTS 463

M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 

The MIT Press, 1996). In addition to the papers in that volume, see also Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember 

and Bruce Russett, “Peace Between Participatory Polities,” World Politics (July 1992); Michael W. Doyle, 

“Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review (December, 1986). 4 See Oliker in Faultlines. 5

 “Central Asia: Fault Lines in the New Security Map.”

6

 Vladimir Socor, “Cheek by Jowl in Kyrgyzstan,” The Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2003. 7

 Similar activities were also underway with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

8

 A deal to supply North Korea with Kazakh MiG fighter aircraft was discovered in 1999. 

Over twenty aircraft were delivered before the deal was discovered and deliveries halted. The Kazakh 

government’s investigation report concluded that, although government officials were involved in the 

deal, they were acting independently. Defense Minister Mukhtar Altynbayev was removed from his 

post as a result of the deal (although he resumed it in December 2002). The United States sanctioned 

the firms involved and waived sanctions against the country of Kazakhstan as a whole. (“The High 

Price of Kazakhstan’s MiG Affair,” Stratfor.com, Update Weekly Analysis, November 18, 1999, reprinted 

by Asia Times, November 19, 1999; James P. Rubin, U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing No. 

142, November 22, 1999, 1:20 pm; Kazakhstan, Government and NGO Descriptions, NIS Nuclear 

and Missile Database, Nuclear Threat Initiative website, <www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/kazakst/govt/governme.html>, downloaded December 29, 2003.) 9

 “U.S., Uzbekistan Sign Military Cooperation Agreement,” RFE/RL Newsline, 6, no. 14, Part I, 

January 23, 2002. 10 Dana Milbank, “Uzbekistan Thanked for Role in War,” The Washington Post, March 13, 2002, 

A23; “U.S., Uzbekistan Sign Military Cooperation Agreement,” RFE/RL Newsline, 6, no. 14, Part I, 

January 23, 2002. 11 Interviews with and information provided by U.S. government officials, summer 2003; “U.S. 

to Help Finance Uzbek Aircraft Production,” RFE/RL Newsline, 7, no. 156, Part I, August 18, 2003. 12 “Kyrgyzstan, U.S. Sign Military Cooperation Agreement,” RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 6, no. 213, 

Part I, November 13, 2002. 13 This also reportedly involved a medical team from South Korea. Marina Kozlova, “Analysis: 

Kyrgyzstan Dances with US, China,” UPI, October 10, 2002; “Kyrgyzstan, U.S. Sign Military Cooperation Agreement,” RFE/RL Newsline, 6, no. 213, Part I, November 13, 2002; FBIS November 18, 2002; 

“Joint U.S.-Kyrgyz Military Exercises Held Near Bishkek,” RFE/RL Newsline, Vol.7, no. 51, Part I, 

March 18, 2003; Sultan Jumagulov, “Superpowers Compete in Kyrgyzstan,” IWPR’s Reporting Central 

Asia, no. 200, April 28, 2003. 14 Vladimir Socor, “Cheek by Jowl in Kyrgyzstan,” The Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2003. 15 Interviews with U.S. personnel at Karshi-Khanabad, May 2003.

16 Interviews with U.S. officials, personnel, Summer and Fall 2003; visit to Karshi-Khanabad, 

May 2003. 17 Interviews with U.S. officials, personnel, Summer and Fall 2003.

18 Interviews with U.S. officials, summer 2003.

19 “Turkey, U.S. Assist Kazakh Military,” RFE/RL Newsline, 6, no. 204, Part I, October 29, 2002. 20 Interviews with U.S. officials, Summer 2003.

21 There were complaints from Kyrgyz authorities that during the 1999 and 2000 IMU incursions, Tajikistan did not provide timely and effective warning. “Official: Danger of Extremist Incursions into Kyrgyzstan Still Exists,” RFE/RL Newsline, 7, no.50, Part I, March 17, 2003. 22 This problem was solved with an exchange of diplomatic notes.

23 Interviews with U.S. officials, Spring, Summer 2003.

24 Interviews with U.S. officials, Spring, Summer 2003.

25 “Kazakh Foreign Ministry Sees Increased U.S. Interest in Kazakh Oil,” RFE/RL Newsline, 7, 

no. 60, Part I, March 28, 2003. 26 Interviews in Uzbekistan, May 2003.
464 OLIKER

27 Antoine Blua, “Tajikistan: Government to Vet Islamic Clerics,” RFE/RL, August 7, 2002; International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Islam and the State,” July 10, 2003. 28 “Five Degrees of Separation: The Central Asia States’ Positions Towards War in Iraq,” RFE/RL 

Central Asia Report, 3, no. 12, March 21, 2003. 29 “Unofficial Censorship on War Reporting Instituted in Uzbekistan,” RFE/RL Newsline, 7, no. 

53, Part I, March 20, 2003. 30 It should be noted, of course, that Uzbekistan also had a good deal to gain from the elimination of the Taliban and that it had been working, with Russia, India, Tajikistan, and Iran, in a loose 

coalition that supported the Northern Alliance for many years. 31 Discussions in Uzbekistan, May 2003.

32 “Kyrgyz Opposition Party Official Questions Russian Base,” RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, no. 72, 

Part I, April 15, 2003. 33 “U.S. Embassy in Turkmenistan Protests Eviction of Public Affairs Section,’” RFE/RL Newsline, 7, no. 159, Part I, August 21, 2003. 34 “Turkmen President Wants More U.S. Technology,’” RFE/RL Newsline, 7, no. 163, Part I, 

August 27, 2003. 35 The Jackson-Vanik amendment denies unconditional normal trade relations to countries 

with non-market economies and restrictive emigration policies. 36 “U.S. Will Not Help Protect Tajik Border,” RFE/RL Newsline, 6, no. 217, Part I, November 19, 

2002; Yana Amelina, “Moscow Considers Tajikistan Options,” Rosbalt, July 23, 2003; “Defense Minister 

Says Tajikistan Still Wants Russian Base,” RFE/RL Newsline, 7, no. 141, Part I, July 28, 2003. 37 Recent Uzbek warming to Moscow, in contrast to its past antagonism, suggests that Tashkent 

may also be coming around to such an approach. 38 The Incidents at Sea talks and nuclear arms control are examples.

39 This approach may be of little appeal to Turkmenistan under its current regime, but it may 

be an effective way to, for example, bring Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan both to the table, a historically 

challenging task.
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 465

About the Contributors

Daniel L. Burghart (co-editor) is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University. 

A specialist in Russian, Commonwealth of Independant States (CIS) and 

Central European Affairs, he served for 30 years as an Army Foreign Area 

Officer before retiring as a Colonel in June 2003. Dr. Burghart has been 

a professor at the National War College, Senior National Security Policy 

Advisor at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, U.S. Defense and Army 

Attaché to Kazakhstan, and a Mission Commander at the On Site Inspection Agency, where he led arms control inspections in the republics of 

the Former Soviet Union. He also has been the Senior Russian Military 

Analyst and Eurasian Branch Chief on the Army Staff, Professor of Russian and East European Studies at the Military Academy at West Point, and 

Director of Area Studies at the U. S. Army Russian Institute. In addition 

to a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Illinois, Dr. Burghart 

has a dual Masters in Political Science and Russian Area Studies from the 

University of Wisconsin and a Ph.D.. in Russian and International Studies 

from the University of Surrey. He has published articles in defense and 

civilian journals and is the author of the book Red Microchip: Technology 

Transfer, Export Control and Economic Restructuring in the Soviet Union.

Theresa Sabonis-Helf (co-editor) is a Professor of National Security 

Strategy at the National War College in Washington, DC. She was previously Energy and Environment Policy Advisor for a Harvard Institute for 

International Development project, based in Central Asia. She received her 

Ph.D.. in Political Science from Emory University, her M.P.A. in International Relations from Princeton University, and her B.A. in Literature from 

Emory University. She has worked as a policy analyst, and as a visiting 

fellow at the U.S. Agency for International Development. Dr. Sabonis-Helf 

is a specialist in Environment Policy; Energy Policy and Energy Security; 

Climate Change Policy; and International Political Economy. She has lived 

and worked in seven countries of the former USSR, and has published 

articles on post-Soviet energy and environmental issues, as well as on postSoviet culture and contemporary history.

465
466

Sylvia Woody Babus is a Professor of Behavioral Sciences in the Department of Leadership and Information Strategy at the Industrial College of 

the Armed Forces at National Defense University. She is a graduate of the 

University of Chicago, and earned M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in International 

Relations and Sino-Soviet studies from Columbia University. Dr. Babus 

has taught political science and international relations at the University 

of Manitoba in Winnipeg, Canada, and at Goucher College in Towson, 

Maryland. During 10 years at the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute, she supervised training for Foreign Service Officers in negotiation, 

multilateral diplomacy, executive-congressional relations, arms control, 

and political military issues. Her assignments at State included tours in 

Belgium and Kyrgyzstan, as well as two years as a Foreign Service Officer 

in Uzbekistan. From 1998 to 2001, she managed democracy-building assistance programs in Ukraine and Belarus as a Civil Society Advisor for the 

U.S. Agency for International Development Mission in Kyiv. Her publications include an undergraduate text on current affairs, as well as works 

on Soviet-Third World Relations, Gorbachev, Soviet ideology and foreign 

policy, Central Asian security issues, and training of U.S. Government officials for interagency work.

Robert Brannon has served for 30 years in the U.S. Navy. During three 

years in Russia as the U.S. Naval Attaché, he was present for the economic 

crash of August 1998, the post NATO intervention in Kosovo armed 

riots at the embassy, and the submarine Kursk disaster. He has an M.A. 

in International Relations and is a Ph.D. Canididate in World Politics at 

The Catholic University of America, where he is currently working on a 

dissertation in Post-Soviet Russian civil-military relations. Following a 

year at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government as the senior 

national security research fellow, Captain Brannon now is an instructor in 

the Department of National Security Studies at the National War College, 

where he holds the Chief of Naval Operations Chair.

Emily Ewell Daughtry will join the Office of the Legal Advisor at the U.S. 

Department of State in September 2004. Previously, she worked for six 

years at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey 

Institute of International Studies, where she specialized in issues concerning Central Asia, export controls, and nuclear smuggling. From 1998 to 

1999, Ms. Daughtry founded and served as Co-Director of the CNS office 

in Almaty, Kazakhstan. She holds a J.D. from the University of Califor-
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 467

nia, Los Angeles and a B.A. in Russian and East European Studies from 

Middlebury College. 

Gregory Gleason is Professor of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of New Mexico. He is the author of Federalism and 

Nationalism: the Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR (1991), 

Central Asian States: Discovering Independence (1996), and Markets 

and Politics in Central Asia (2003) as well as scholarly articles in Europe-Asia Studies, Problems of Post-Communism, Asian Perspective, 

Comparative Strategy and other journals. Dr. Gleason has had research 

sponsored by the National Science Foundation, the National Council on 

Eurasian and East European Research, and the U.S. Institute of Peace and 

also has conducted research under the auspices of the Academies of Science 

of the USSR, the Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. In addition, he has worked as a consultant to the United States Information Service, Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National 

Laboratory. Dr. Gleason has worked in various capacities on market and 

political reform projects sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International 

Development and the Asian Development Bank. He currently focuses on 

the politics of Eurasian integration. 

Genevieve Grabman is a public health lawyer with expertise in Central 

Asia. She has a Master of Public Health from Johns Hopkins University 

and a Juris Doctor from Georgetown University. From 1996 to 1998, she 

served as a U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer in Kyrgyzstan where she worked at 

the United Nations Children’s Fund in health and human rights programming. Following her Peace Corps service, Ms. Grabman was the Kyrgyzstan program manager for a health sector reform project supported by the 

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the 

World Bank. She later was a consultant with the POLICY Project, a USAID 

reproductive health and HIV/AIDS initiative, where she helped integrate 

human rights law in developing countries’ health policies. Currently, Ms. 

Grabman is a legislative and policy associate at the Center for Health and 

Gender Equity.

Kevin D. Jones previously worked in Central Asia for the United States 

Agency for International Development (USAID) as the Private Sector 

Advisor, Kyrgyzstan Country Office. In this position he oversaw the 

implementation of the enterprise development, fiscal reform and regional 
468

energy portfolio for Kyrgyzstan. He was directly involved in the land 

privatization process as an advisor to the host countries policy makers, 

land reform development projects, and U.S. government officials. Prior 

to USAID, he was a Sustainable Economic Development Peace Corps 

Volunteer in Kyrgyzstan, providing private farmers with business and 

economic assistance. Jones is currently pursuing a Ph.D.. in International 

Economic and Security Policy from the University of Maryland,

Roger D. Kangas is a specialist on Central Asia and the Caspian Sea 

basin at the George C. Marshall Center in Germany. Prior to joining the 

Marshall Center in 1999, Dr. Kangas was Deputy Director of the Central 

Asian and Caucasus Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a Fellow of the Johns Hopkins University 

Foreign Policy Institute in Washington, DC. Dr. Kangas also served as a 

Research Analyst on Central Asian Affairs for the Open Media Research 

Institute (OMRI), and was an Assistant Professor of Political Science at 

the University of Mississippi, and an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown 

University. Since 1992, Dr. Kangas has worked with and advised a number 

of U.S. government departments and agencies, as well as private-sector 

firms and non-governmental organizations on issues relating to Central 

Asia, Russia, and the Southern Caucasus. Dr. Kangas graduated from the 

School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and earned his Ph.D.. 

in Political Science at Indiana University. Dr. Kangas has written numerous articles and book chapters on Central Asian politics and society.

Nancy Lubin is President of JNA Associates, Inc., a research/ consulting 

firm dealing with issues of the newly independent states (NIS), especially 

Central Asia and the Caucasus. She has lived, worked and traveled throughout this region for 30 years–as a Congressional staffer, university Professor, and now for JNA–and consults for international donors, the media, 

private foundations, the U.S. government, and corporations ranging from 

Fortune 500 to smaller, start up companies. She has been a Fellow at the 

U.S. Institute of Peace, the Woodrow Wilson Center, and elsewhere, and 

holds a Ph.D. from Oxford University, a B.A., Magna Cum Laude, from 

Harvard University, has studied at the Universities of Moscow and Leningrad, and was one of the first Westerners to conduct doctoral research 

for one year in Uzbekistan (1978-79). She is a member of the Council on 

Foreign Relations, the Board of Trustees/Advisors of the Eurasia Founda-
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 469

tion, the Board of Advisors of the Open Society Institute, Central Eurasia 

Project, and other organizations.

David S. McCauley is an environmental economist and policy expert with 

long experience in Asia. A frequent consultant and advisor to international 

assistance agencies and Asian governments, he is Adjunct Senior Fellow at 

the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii and Affiliate Graduate Faculty 

Member at the University of Hawaii, Department of Natural Resources 

and Environmental Management. His paper is based, in part, on an analysis commissioned by the Asian Development Bank, but the views and positions expressed are his own. Dr. McCauley’s undergraduate training was in 

the environmental sciences, and he holds a Ph.D. in Resource Economics 

from the University of Hawaii.

Daene C. McKinney is a Professor of Environmental Engineering at the 

University of Texas at Austin. He received his Ph.D.. and M.S. degrees in 

Civil and Environmental Engineering from Cornell University, and a B.S. 

in Environmental Resources Engineering from Humboldt State University. 

Dr. McKinney concentrates on research related to transboundary water 

and environmental issues, especially related to U.S.-Mexico border issues 

in the Rio Grande basin and countries of Central Europe and the former 

Soviet Union. He has completed various technical assignments in Russia, 

Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus that address the natural 

resources management legacy of the Soviet Union and the relationship 

between economic restructuring and environmental protection. Dr. McKinney has served as an environmental engineer for the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency and spent a two-year leave from UT Austin in Almaty, 

Kazakhstan as Chief of Party for the five-country U.S. Agency for International Development Environmental Policy and Institutions for Central 

Asia Program.

E. Wayne Merry is a Senior Associate of the American Foreign Policy 

Council in Washington. He was previously Director of the Program on 

European Societies in Transition at the Atlantic Council of the United 

States. During 26 years in the United States Foreign Service, he served 

twice in the Political Section of the Moscow Embassy, as a specialist on 

domestic Soviet and Russian politics. He also served in East Berlin, Athens, New York, and Tunis, while his Washington assignments included the 

State Department, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, the Office of the 
470

Secretary of Defense (as Regional Director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia), and the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

An Oklahoma native, he is a graduate of the University of Wisconsin, the 

Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, 

and the U.S. Army Russian Institute. Since retiring from the government 

in 1998, his writings have appeared in a variety of American and European 

publications. 

Jennifer D.P. Moroney is Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation 

where she manages and supports projects for the U.S. Departments of 

Defense, Homeland Security, Energy, and the National Security Council. 

Prior to joining RAND, Dr. Moroney worked for DFI Government Services, where she managed security-related projects for the Department 

of Defense. In 2000, Dr. Moroney worked in OSD/NATO Policy where 

she was responsible for the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Russia portfolios. 

Dr. Moroney has co-edited several books on security issues in the former 

Soviet Union, including Security Dynamics in the Former Soviet Bloc (Curzon/Routledge, 2003), Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical 

and Comparative Perspectives (Praeger, 2002). She also has published several book chapters, journal articles, and policy briefs on Ukraine, Central 

Asia, the South Caucasus, and NATO enlargement. Dr. Moroney received 

her Ph.D.. in International Relations from the University of Kent at Canterbury, United Kingdom, an M.A. in European Integration from the University of Limerick, Ireland, and a B.A. from Frostburg State University, 

Maryland.

Michael Ochs has been a Professional Staff Advisor at the Commission on 

Security and Cooperation in Europe [Helsinki Commission], U.S. Congress since 1987. He also has been a member of the U.S. Delegation to various OSCE meetings. Dr. Ochs specializes in the Caucasus and Central Asia, 

where he has traveled extensively. He has published numerous articles on 

politics and human rights in these countries. He also has observed and 

analyzed elections in virtually all of the former Soviet republics, and in 

fall 1995, headed the OSCE election observation mission for parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan. Dr. Ochs has been a member of the Advisory 

Board of the Central Eurasia Project of the Open Society Institute of the 

Soros Foundation, which runs foundations in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Dr. Ochs holds a Ph.D.. in Russian History from 

Harvard University.
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 471

Olga Oliker is an international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation. 

Her research focuses primarily on security and defense issues, as they relate 

to U.S. interests in the states of the former Soviet Union. She also writes 

on U.S. foreign policy and military diplomacy, and, most recently on U.S. 

military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Before coming to RAND, Ms. 

Oliker worked as an independent consultant and held positions in the 

U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy. Her recent publications include 

Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and South Caucasus (RAND 2003), 

co-edited with Thomas S. Szayna. 

Matthew Oresman is the Director of the China-Eurasia Forum and serves 

as Editor of the CEF Monthly. Previously, he was a researcher with the 

Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and coordinator for the Freeman Chair’s project on 

China’s Emergence in Central Asia. As such, He was the principal author 

of China’s New Journey to the West: Report on China’s Emergence in Central 

Asia and Implications for U.S. Interests (CSIS Press, August 2003). He received a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Pennsylvania and has studied in China at both Tsinghua and Fudan Universities. 

Tiffany Petros is a Senior Analyst at DFI Government Services where 

her work focuses on regional security issues in Europe and Eurasia. DFI 

provides tailored research, analysis, and consulting services to senior decision-makers in the U.S. national security community. Prior to joining DFI, 

Dr. Petros served as a consultant to the World Bank on Central Asia and 

the Caucasus. She taught politics courses at the American University of 

Armenia, Yerevan and in the Czech Republic at Palacký University and the 

Anglo-American College. Dr. Petros is currently a Research Associate with 

The George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and 

Eurasian Studies. She received her Ph.D.. from Miami University, Ohio.

Alma Raissova is a Regional Deputy Development Director of the Educational Network (EdNet) project, sponsored by USAID and CARANA 

Corporation, Almaty, Kazakhstan. Prior to EdNet, she was an Energy and 

Environment Policy Specialist for a Harvard Institute of International Development project based in Central Asia. She is a Candidate of Sciences in 

Economy (Ukrainian Scientific and Research Institute, 1991). Her specialization is in economic aspects of Energy and Environment Policy, Micro-
472

loans, and Securities Market. She has published several articles regarding 

Environmental, Microloan and Privatization issues.

Aliya Sartbayeva-Peleo is a lecturer in the Department of Economics 

of the Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic 

Research, under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Almaty, 

where she teaches Macroeconomics, Environmental Economics, Natural 

Resource Economics, and Energy Economics. She received a Master of 

Arts in International Development from the International University of 

Japan in Niigata as an Asian Development Bank scholar. Prior to that, 

she worked for four years in the U.S. Agency for International Development financed environmental projects in Central Asia led by CH2M Hill 

International, International Resources Group and the Harvard Institute 

for International Development. Her area of specialization is economics of 

development and transition in Asian and former Soviet Union countries, 

environmental economics and policy, as well as the issues of efficient allocation and management of natural resources in developing countries. 

She recently co-authored the Country Environmental Analysis (CEA) for 

Kazakhstan for the Asian Development Bank.

Saltanat Sulaimanova is a Ph.D.. candidate at American University in 

Washington, DC, researching human trafficking and international migration. She has worked for the International Organization for Migration, 

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations 

Development Program, and the World Bank in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 

Austria and the United States. Ms. Sulaimanova is also an international 

consultant on human trafficking issues, working with such institutions as 

the Protection Project of the Johns Hopkins University and the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX).

Kalkaman Suleimenov is Head of Section on Perspective Development, 

Department of Development of the Kazakh Company on Electricity Network Management. He worked previously with the Ministry of Energy 

and Mineral Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and was Head of 

Department of the Kazakh Energy Research Institute (the Sh. Ch. Chokin 

Institute). He is a Doctor of Technical Science with a specialization in thermal energy. Dr. Suleimenov holds six patents, and has published over 50 

articles and monographs. His research themes have focused on development of heating processes, and gasification of low quality fossil fuels.
ABBREVIATIONS 473

Abbreviations 

and Key Terms

ADB Asian Development Bank

Agenda XXI UN plan for sustainable development

BTC Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline

BVOs Basin Water Management Organizations on the Syr Darya and Amu 

Darya rivers (established in Soviet times, still functioning)

CACO The Central Asian Cooperation Organization, est. 2002, under 

Uzbek leadership, includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 

Uzbekistan. Intended to be the successor to CAEC.

CAEC Central Asian Economic Community (regional coordinating 

mechanism for economic, security and water issues)

CAMIN Central Asian Mountain Information Network

CARs Central Asian Republics

CBMs confidence-building measures

CENTRASBAT (Also Centrazbat) Central Asia Battalion (founded in 1995, regional 

peacekeeping unit)

CFE Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty

CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia 

(proposed as Asian variant of OSCE) 

CIDA Canadian International Development Agency

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CNPC China National Petroleum Company

CPC Caspian Pipeline Consortium

CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CRDF Collective Rapid Deployment Force includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Russia and Tajikistan. Component of CSTO

CST/ CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization (as of 14 May 2002) formerly 

CST Collective Security Treaty (est. 1992, includes Russia, Belarus, 

Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) 

CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction, US program in the region

473
474

DCA Drug Control Agency of Tajikistan

DEA Drug Enforcement Agency (of the United States)

DHS Demographic and Health Survey (conducted in Kyrgyzstan, 

supported by U.S. assistance)

DMC Developing Member Country of the Asian Development Bank

DOD Department of Defense (USA)

DOTS Directly Observed Treatment, Short Course (a swift TB detection and 

treatment strategy)

EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ETIM East Turkestan Islamic Movement, radical group with ties to Uyghur 

separatists

EU European Union 

EXBS Export Control and Related Border Security (U.S. program in Central 

Asia)

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency (of the United States)

FGPs Family Medicine Practice Groups (health care system established with 

U.S. assistance)

FMF Foreign Military Financing (U.S. program)

FPS Federal Border Service (Russian Program securing the Tajik border)

FSU Former Soviet Union

G8 Group of Eight (G-7 plus Russia)

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GEF Global Environment Facility

GM Global Mechanism of the UNCCD

GNI Gross National Income (New World Bank indicator, replaces GDP)

GUAM/ GUUAM Georgia, Ukraine, (Uzbekistan), Armenia and Moldova. Was 

originally established as GUUAM, as a non-aligned group, but 

Uzbekistan withdrew in later years. The organization is now GUAM

GWP Global Water Partnership

HIV/AIDS human immunodeficiency virus/ acquired immunodeficiency 

syndrome
ABBREVIATIONS 475

HT Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Party of Liberation (Islamist organization in Central 

Asia). Present in all five Central Asian states, illegal in several, but 

with a tendency to be non-violent.

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency (of the United Nations)

ICIMOD International Center for Integrated Mountain Development 

ICSD Interstate Commission for Sustainable Development 

ICWC Interstate Commission for Water Coordination

IDPs internationally displaced persons

IDUs injecting drug users

IFAS International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea

IFIs International Financial Institutions

IMET International Military Education and Training (U.S. program)

IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Banned political party, with a 

tendency towards violence 

IOM International Organization for Migration (Geneva-based 

International Organization)

IPP Individual Partnership Plan (from within the PfP program, partners 

construct such a plan)

IRP Islamic Renaissance Party

ISI import-substituting industry

KEGOC Kazakhstan Electricity Network Company

KGB Committee for State Security (Soviet era)

KOGG Commission for the Protection of the State Border (Tajikistan)

kV Kilo-volts

kWh kilowatt-hours

LARK Legal Assistance to Rural Citizens in Kyrgyzstan, established with 

Swiss support in 2000

LoS Law of the Sea Treaty

MAP Membership Action Plan (for NATO membership candidate)

MAWR Uzbek Ministry of Agriculture and Water Management
476

MDR-TB multi-drug resistant tuberculosis

MEAs multilateral environmental agreements

MGIMO Moscow’s Institute for International Relations

MHIF mandatory health insurance fund (in Kyrgyzstan)

MOU memorandum of understanding

MPC&A Material control and accounting and physical protection (of nuclear 

materials)

NAP National Action Program under UNCCD

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEAP National Environmental Action Plans in the United Nations

NGO non-governmental organization

NIS Newly Independent States

NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NTB National Bank of Tajikistan 

ODS ozone-depleting substances

OEF “Operation Enduring Freedom,” the U.S. military operations in 

Afghanistan

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PAP People’s Armed Police (of China)

PARP Planning and Review Process within PfP

PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the European Union.

PfP Partnership for Peace, a NATO program

PLA People’s Liberation Army (of China)

PRC People’s Republic of China

PREGA Promotion of Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency and Greenhouse 

Gas Abatement Projects, a project of ADB

POP persistent organic pollutant

PPTA Project Preparation Technical Assistance

PWP Partnership Work Plan (Annual NATO drafted plan of activities 

under PfP)
ABBREVIATIONS 477

RATC CIS Regional Anti-Terrorist Center, first based in Bishkek in 2001, 

now based in Tashkent.

RCLAR Republican Center for Land and Agrarian Reform established in 

Kyrgyzstan in 1995

RDF Rapid Deployment Forces of the CSTO

REAP Regional Environmental Action Plan

REC Regional Environment Center

RECs regional electricity companies in Kazakhstan

RETA Regional Technical Assistance under ADB

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization, est. 2000 (formerly “Shanghai 

Five,” est.1996)

SES sanitary epidemiological service (Soviet era. Also called Sanepid)

SIC Scientific Information Center

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)

STI sexually transmitted infection

STV Stichting Tegen Vrouwenhandel, Dutch NGO working against 

trafficking in women

SUB small rural hospital (selskaya uchaskovaya bolnitsia)

TA Technical Assistance

TACIS Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States, 

European Union assistance program

TB tuberculosis

TDCA The Tajik Drug Control Agency

TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (est. 1993, aims to bring 

together trade and transport ministers from the five Central Asian 

republics and three Caucasian republics to develop a transport 

corridor from Europe to Central Asia across the Black Sea.)

UES Unified Energy System of Kazakhstan

UNCCD United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and Drought

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
478

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNEP United Nations Environment Program

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

USAID United States Agency for International Development

UTO United Tajikistan Opposition

VAT value-added-tax

WB World Bank

WHO World Health Organization

WMD weapons of mass destruction (Chemical, Nuclear, Biological)

WTO World Trade Organization

XPCC Xinjiang Production and Construction Corporation, a paramilitary 

organization in China also known as Bingtuan

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