[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 17

- 14089 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 2:16

- cv - 00230

- WKW

- GMB

PONCE D. HOWARD, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING ALABAMA, Defendant

- Appellee.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama

________________________ ( October 26, 2018 ) Before MARTIN , JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges

. PER CURIAM:

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 1 of 242 Ponce D. Howard appeals, pro se , from the district court ’ s grant of summary judgment to his former employer Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama ( “ Hyundai ” ) in his race discrimination lawsuit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

- 2(a)(1) . On appeal, he argues that the district court erred in concluding that he failed , in stating his prima facie case of racial discrimination, to identify a similarly situated comparator outside his protected class who was treated more favorably or to show that Hyundai ’ s termination of him for workplace violence was pretext for race discrimination

. At all times relevant to this appeal, Hyundai operated an automobile manufacturing facility in Montgome ry, Alabama. In June 2012, Hyundai hired Howard to work as a paint inspector. In February 2015 , Hyundai terminate d Howard ’ s employment following an investigation stemming from a workplace confrontation involving H oward and one or more of his co workers. Howard, who is black, alleged in his complaint that Hyundai discriminated against him on account of his race when it terminate d his employment. In his complaint, Howard alleged the following facts surrounding a February 2015 incident between him self and a white coworker, Josh Denham. Denham began verball y attacking him for taking sick leave due to an illness and then gave Chris Arnold, a white superviso r, a broken tool to give to Howard as a part of the harassment. Denham cont inued the harassment, tellin g Howard that he would have

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 2 of 243 him fired a nd that Arnold and another white supervisor, Jeff Tod d, would serve as his witnesses to the argument. Arnold then went to inform the Team Relations Department about the incident a nd, upon his return, pulled Tod d and Denham to the side to tell them what to say when reporting the incident to Team Rela tions. Then, “ one by one, ” they reported the incident to Team Relations, saying what Arnold had told them to say. There were eight black people who witnessed the argument , including Irvin Smith and Carmen Paschal

. Howard was ultimat ely discharged due to the argument after a meeting with Team Relations. While a white manager was present at the meeting, neither his black manager, nor hi s black supervisor was present. Additionally, he was not given a hearing prior to his termination, as required by Hyundai ’ s Human

- Resources manual

. Denham was not fired, and was instead transferred to “ Hyundai Transformer

. ” Howard also attached his Equal Em ployment Opportunity Commissi on ( “ EEOC ” ) charge of discrimination. After conducting discovery, Hyundai filed a motion fo r summary judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, arguing, of relev ance, that Howard failed to state a prima facie case of racial discrimination and that all of i ts actions were taken for leg itimate, nondiscriminatory, and non - pretextual reasons. Hyundai asserted that, as a result o f its investigation of the 2015 incident

— during which it interviewed numerous individuals in add ition to Arnold, Howard, and Denham

— it had Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 3 of 244 determined that Ho ward had twice thrown a tool at Denham and made threatening statements and gestures towards Denham, which violated its Workpla ce Thre ats and Violence Policy and its Serious Misconduct Policy. Hyundai as serted that, at the time of Howard ’ s violation, he had been subject to a probationary Serious Misconduct Letter (also known as a Letter of Conditional Employment) , which had been issued in response to his prior violation of the Workplace Threats and Violence Polic y in August 2013, su ch that his new violations warranted termination. Hyundai further indicated that Denham was also term inated after an investigation of him related to the 2015 incident concluded that he had violated its Harassment Policy and Serious Miscondu ct Policy. Hyu ndai asserted that Denham
was not “ transferred ” to another job within the Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama company, and that Hyundai Power Transform ers (“HPT”) was a completely different company. Accordin gly, Hyundai argued that Howard could not meet h is burden to show that it did not actually believe he engaged in workplace violence and instead i ntended to discriminate against him, as he had merely argued with the conclusions of Team Relations and Human Resources , and offered no basis upon which to believe that its decision to terminate him was a product of discrimination. Also in support of its summary judgment motion, Hyund ai submitted numerous exhibits, including (1) Howard ’ s dep osition; (2) the declaration of Rick

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 4 of 245 Neal, the Senior Vice President of Human Resources and Administration, who was wh ite; (3) the declaration of Robert Clevenger, the Manager for Team Relations; and (4) all referenced exhi bits. The following facts were s et out by Clevenger ’ s and Neal ’ s declarations, Hyundai’s internal in vestigation memoranda relating to the 2013 and 2015 incidents, Hyundai ’s official disciplinary policies, and Howard ’ s Letter of Conditional Employment. According to Hyundai ’ s official polici es, Serious Misconduct Offenses

— which include, for ex ample, haras sment and workplace violence

— were punished outside of the norm al process and

resu lted in either termination or a Letter of Conditional Employment. The Letter remained active f or three years and required the employee to remain incident

- free. After an inve stigation into the 2013 incident, Team Relations found that Howard made derogatory and threatening remarks to a black coworker, concluded that he had violated the Workplace Threats and Violenc e Policy and engaged in Serious Misconduct, and iss ued him a Let ter of Conditional Employment instead of firing him. On the day of the 2015 incident, both a black supervisor and Denham separately made complaints against Howard about the incident. Team Relations investigated the incident by interviewing and taking statements from employ ees who witnessed the incident, including Denham, Arnold, Smith, and Pas chal. They made the following statements. Denham stated that Howard had twice thrown the

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 5 of 246 tool at him, hitting him in the leg one time, that Howard then got in h is face and made fists and told him that he would beat him up, and that he made a gesture in the shape of a gun and said, “ I ’ m going to come to your house and boom ” and “ I ’ ll be in prison, but you ’ ll be in the grave. ” Arnold stated that, after he gave the tool
to Howard, he turned his back to walk away and then heard them start to argue. Arnold stated that he saw Howard app roach Denham ’ s work area to intimidate him and heard him threaten to beat Den ham up, but that he did not see Howa rd make any gestures towards Denham. Howard ’ s statement was similar to the allegations from his complaint, adding that he threw th e tool “ up the line towards the upgrader station ” upon realizi ng that it was broken, that De nham cursed at him, and that he never threatened Denham. Smith corroborated the story that, after teasing and provocation by Denham, Howard twice threw the tool toward Denham and made threatening statements and gestures at him. Paschal st ated that she had tried to calm Howard down and that Denham had been regularly harassing him

. Based on these interviews, Team Relations f ound the following: (1) Denham
gave Arno ld a broken tool to give to Howard; (2) Howard twice threw the tool in Denham ’ s dir ection; (3) Denham told Howard “ you are gone [;] that ’ s your job ” ; (4) Howard walked over to Denham, made a fist gesture at him, and threatened to beat up and kill Denham; and (5) Denham instigated the incident and had harassed Howard on a daily basis. T eam Relations also compared Howard ’ s actions w ith

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 6 of 247 others who had been separated for Workplace Violence infractions to ensure consistency of punishment. Neal was the ultimate d ecision

- maker as to whether Howard would be fired. Upon review of the investigation and Howard’s disciplinary history , Neal determined that Howard ’ s actions during the 2015 incident amounted to workplace violence, which was a Serious Misconduct Offense, and decided to fire Howard. Neal ’ s dec ision was not influenced by Howard ’ s race, and no one in the Employment Review C ommittee disputed the investigatory findings or termination decision

. Neal also co nducted an investigation of Denham related to the 2015 incident and fired him because Denham also had previously been issued a Letter of Conditional Employment and his actio ns during the 2015 incident amounted to workplace violence, a Serious Misconduct Offense. Finally, HPT was not a subsidiary, affiliate, or parent of Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama, and the two did not transfer employees. Howard testified in his depos ition to the following. At the time of the 2015 incident, he was on the Letter of Conditional Employment based on the 2013 incident, which he conceded had nothing to do with race. As to the 2015 incident, Denham and Todd were harassing him, and Arnold st ood by, laughing. Arnold handed him the tool, which he threw in the trash can upon realizing that it was broken. He did not curse at, or threaten, Denham. Arnold went to Team Relations,

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 7 of 248 and then pulled Den ham and Todd aside. Howard believed that Arnold, Denham, and Todd collaborated to tell Team Relations the same story against him, but conceded that he did not actually hear them do this and just made an assumption because their stories matched. Nothing was said about his rac e on this occasion. While Denham had made derogatory racial remarks to him, no one else at Hyundai had ever done so. Further, he agreed that he had no reason to believe that any of the individuals listed on the 2015 investigation memorandum prepared by T eam Relations

— including Neal and Clevenger

— disfavored him because he was b lack. After Howard ’ s termination, Denham started working for HPT , which he assumed constituted a transfer because both companies had “ Hyundai ” in the name. He believed that his ter mination was based on his ra ce because he was fired and Denham was not, and because his white su pervisors did nothing about Denham ’ s harassment of him. Howard responded to Hyundai ’ s motion for summary judgment , arguing that he could establish a prima facie case of race discrimination and that Hyundai ’ s proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. In relevant part , he argued that he could establish pretext by arguing with the conclusions of Team Relations as to the 2015 incident and did so by adamantl y denying that he committed workplace violence against Denham, and by claiming that he was not fired on the basis of his second Serious Misconduct Offense beca use Denham was not fired even though he

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 8 of 249 had at least five prior reports of workplace violence and harassment. He asserted that swifter and stronger action was brought against him after the 2015 incident than after the 2013 incident because the 2015 incident involved a white victim and the 2013 incident involved a black victim. In support, Howard subm itte d declarations from himself, Smit h, and Paschal

. His declaration largely set out his pr ior allegations, adding that he believed that Denham attacked him during the 2015 incident because of his race, and that he had testified in his deposition that he had no reason to believe that two particular supervisors with whom he was familiar disfavored him because he was black, but that he did not know the other listed supervisors, including Clevenger and Neal. Smith declared that he saw Howard throw the tool “ up the line, ” but did

n ot see him throw the tool at Denham, and that Denham and his two friends regularly made derog atory statements to Howard. In addition to the statements she provided in h er investigatory interview, Paschal declared that she did not ob serve Howard taking any threatening actions against Denham during the 2015 incident, and that Denham had a history of making derogatory statements to coworkers and was only disciplined once. Upon review, a magistrate judge issued a report and reco mmendatio n ( “ R&R ” ), recommending granting summary j udgment in fav or of Hyundai and dismissing Howard ’ s complaint. More specifically , the R&R concluded that (1)

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 9 of 2410 Howard failed to state a prima facie case of racial disc rimination because he failed to show that he was treated less favorably than a similarly sit uated individual outside of his protec ted class, and (2) even so, Hyundai had proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination, and he failed to submit sufficient evidence suggesting both that its proffered reason was pretextual and that its true motivation was based on race. Howard objected to the R&R, arguing that it erroneou sly: (1) failed to focus on the overwhelming evidence that Denham had a long history of harassing Hyundai employees, which Hyundai fa iled to respond to; (2) weighed the evidence in Hyundai ’ s fav or and made improper credibility determinations; and (3) found that Hyundai ’ s objections to his declaration should be sustained. The distr ict court overruled the objec tions, adopted the R&R, and granted its summary judgment motion and dismissed with pr eju dice Howard ’ s complaint. Howard filed a motion entitled “ Motion for rec onsideration and to alter order and judg ment, ” reiterating his argu ment that the distr ict court erred in adopting the R&R because it misapplied the summary judgment standard by crediting Hyundai ’ s allegations over his own and relying on disputed evidence as to whether he committed workplace violence during t he 2015 incide nt and whether he suffered discrimination. The district court constr ued Howard’s motion as being brought

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 10 of 2411 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and denied the motion because he failed to present any newly discovered evidence or show any manifest error of law or fact.
Howa rd appealed and moved for leave to proce ed on appeal in forma pauperis ( “ IFP ” ), which the district court denied. Howard then moved this Court for leave to proceed on appeal IFP. We denied his motion on grounds that any appeal in this case would be frivolous. Howard paid his court costs, and t his appeal followed.
I.
We review the district court ’ s grant of summary judgment de novo , applying the same legal standards as the district court. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers,
Inc. , 610 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010). “ We will affirm if, after construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non

- moving party, we find that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law. ” Id. at 1263

– 64. A plaintiff must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence, and cannot rest his contentions on speculation or conjecture. Paylor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. , 748 F.3 d 1117, 1122 (11th Cir. 2014). Briefs submit ted by pro se litigants are construed liberally. Timson v. Sampson , 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Notwithstanding this liberal construction, however, i ssues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 11 of 2412 abandoned, and we do not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant ’ s reply brief. Id

. Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to “ discharge .

. . or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, co nditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual ’ s

race . . . . ” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

- 2(a)(1). A plaintiff may establish discrimination through direct evidence, circumstantial evidence , or statistical proof

. Alvarez , 610 F.3d at 1264. When evaluating a discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence , we primarily apply the framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973) , and Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 1 Id. Under this framework, a plaintiff is first required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff may show that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) who is qualified for the position; (3) but was subject to an adverse employment decision; and (4) a similarly situated employee who is outside the protected class was treated more favorably

. Alvarez , 610 F.3d at 1264.
If the plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

1 This Court has noted that establishing the elements of the McDonnell Douglas framework is not the only way to survive summary judgment in an employment discrimination case, and that a plaintiff may also present “a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisio nmaker.” Smith v. Lockheed

Martin Corp. , 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)

.

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 12 of 2413 action. Alvarez , 610 F.3d at 1264. If the defendant produces such evidence , the burden shifts then back onto the plaintiff, who must produce evidence that the employer ’ s proffered reason is actually a pretext for discrimination. Id

. “ [T]he ultimate burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff to show that the defendant intent ionally discriminated against [him]. ” Id. If the defendant ’ s proffered reason is one that would motivate a reasonable employer to take the adverse action, the plaintiff “ must meet that reason head on and rebut it, ” and cannot prove pretext by recasting th e defendant ’ s reason or by substituting his business judgment for the defendant ’ s. Id. at 1265

– 66 ( noting that the pretext inquiry focuses on the employer’s and not the employee’s belief). A plaintiff can show that an employer ’ s justification of his termination based on his violation of a work rule is arguably pretextual by submitting evidence that: (1) he did not violate the work rule, or (2) if he did violate the rule, other employees outside the protected class who similarly violated the rule were not similarly treated. Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc. , 196 F.3d 1354, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff must show both that the proffered reason was false, and that discrimination was the true reason for the adverse action. Smith v. Lockheed

- Martin Corp. , 644 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2011).
II. Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 13 of 2414 The district court properly granted summary judgment because Howard failed to state a prima facie case of racial discrimination. In applying the McDonnell Douglas framewor k, we note that there is no dispute regarding the first three elements of our analysis. Howard is a member of a protected class because he is black. Hyundai does not allege he was not qualified for his position as a paint inspector. Finally, Howard was s ubject to an adverse employment decision when Hyundai terminated his employment following the 2015 incident. It is with respect to the final element of the analysis

— the presence of a comparator outside the protected class who received more favorable treat ment

— that the parties differ. Taken as a whole, Howard ’s pleadings raise the prospect of three potential comparators: Denham, Todd, and Arnold. Hyundai responds by arguing that each of Denham, Todd, and Arnold is not an appropriate comparator because he is not similarly situated to Howard (Denham, as best we can tell, because his disciplinary history differs slightly from Howard’s , and Todd and Arnold because they played no significant role in the 2015 incident). With respect to Denham, w e can assume
arg uendo that he is an appropriate comparator

. Todd and Arnold, on the other hand, are not appropriate comparators. When determining whether employees are similar for purposes of the Title VII “similarly situated” analysis, this Court considers “whether the employees are involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct . . . .” Holifield v. Reno , 115 F.3d 1555,

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 14 of 2415 1562 (11th Cir. 1997). Although not dispositive, “ [m] aterial differences in ranks and responsibilities are relevant for considering whether an employee is a proper comparator.” Cyprian v. Auburn U. Montgomery , 799 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1282 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (citing Rioux v. City of Atlanta , 520 F.3d 1269, 1280

– 81 (11th Cir. 2008)). The disciplinary histories of the plaintiff and the proposed compar ator also are relevant to our inquiry. See Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. , 330 F.3d 1313, 1318

– 19 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding two employees to not be similarly situated where one employee’s documented history of misconduct was “much worse . . . in both number and nature”).
W e are ultimately persuaded that Todd and Arnold are not appropriate comparators because they are not accused of conduct that is the same or similar to Howard ’s

. In fact, t he record indicates only that Arnold handed Howard a non

functioning tool as part of a practical joke and later laughed as events unfolded. As for Todd’s part in the encounter, How ard speculates that Todd told Denham and Arnold what to report to Team Relations about the event, but Howard also admits that he did not hear a word that any of Denham, Arnold, or Todd spoke during their huddle. Importantly, there is no indication in the record of either Arnold or Todd using profane language , threating anyone, or throwing objects towards their co workers. Howard even admits that other than their limited involvement in the 2015 incident, Arnold and Todd essentially ignored him.

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 15 of 2416 Moreover, T odd is not even mentioned in the Team Relations memorandum interviewing witnesses to the 2015 incident, and neither Todd nor Arnold appears to have been subject to any Letter of Conditional Employment at the time of the 2015 incident

. As the magistrate judge’s R&R properly emphasized, “Todd’s and Arnold’s relevant conduct amounts to ignoring Howard, giving him menacing looks, huddling to speak with Denham following the incident . . . , and otherwise failing to stop Denham’s harassment o f Howard.” Because Denham is the only proper comparator, we proceed to determine whether he received treatment that

was more favo rable than that afforded Howard. In relevant part, Howard argues that Hyundai treated Denham more favorably following the 2015 incident because Hyundai (1) did not fire Denham promptly after the incident occurred , (2) assisted in arranging Denham’s transfer to
HPT , which Howard believed to be a related company , and (3) failed to appropriately address the earlier harassment Denham inflicted on Howard and other employees

. Hyundai responds by noting that it also terminated Denham for his part in the 2015 incident shortly after terminating Howard; that Hyundai and
HPT are unrelated corporate entities that do not transfers employees t o one another; and that Howard never properly notified Hyundai of Denham’s earlier harassment. Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 16 of 2417 Even construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Howard, we find that Denham was not treated more favorably than Howard after the 2015 incident. To begin, it is clear that Hyundai also fired Denham shortly after the 2015 incident. Once Hyundai concluded its investigation of Howard, Neal, Hyundai’s Senior Vice President of Human Resources and Administration , ordered an investigation of Denham’s rol e in the incident . Hyundai then undertook an investigation of Denham that, as in Howard’s case, culm inated in the development of a detailed memorandum describing the company’s findings. The memorandum is dated March 2, 2015, only six days after the Howar d memorandum. Like the Howard memorandum, the Denham memorandum detailed relevant witness testimony from many of the same witnesses who were present during the incident

. It reached written conclusions where facts were supported by the testimony of two or more witnesses

. It recounted Denham’s disciplinary history, including the fact that he was subject to an active Letter of Conditional Employment. Finally, i t presented the Hyundai policy at issue. After reviewing the findings, and without any notice th at Howard might file an EEOC complaint or lawsuit, Neal determined that Hyundai should terminate Denham’s employment, which it ultimately did. We also disagree with Howard’s assertion that Hyundai treated Denham more favorably by aiding in his “ transfer ” to HPT

. It is uncontroverted that Hyundai and HPT are separate legal entities

. Howard does not dispute Hyundai’ s

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 17 of 2418 claims that neither entity is a subsidiary, affiliate, or parent of the other and that the two entities do not share or transfer any managem ent or employees, so we accept them as true. Most importantly, we find no evidence in the record that Hyundai actually transferred Denham or otherwise assisted him in obtaining employment with HPT

. 2 Consequently , we find no disparate treatment on this gr ound. Lastly, we find no disparate treatment in Hyundai’s alleged failure to address Denham’s earlier harassment. First and foremost, Howard testified in his deposition that he never formally reported any harassment or discrimination, involving Denham or otherwise, before the 2015 incident. Given this, it is hard to conclude th at Hyundai should be faulted for failing to take action regarding Denham’s earlier alleged misbehavior. See Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc. , 208 F.3d 1290, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that an employer cannot be said to be on notice of alleged harassment unless it is reported to individuals designated in its anti

- harassment policy). Additionally, a review of Denham’s documented disciplinary histo ry as set forth in the March 2, 2015 Team Relations memorandum reveals a series of relatively minor infractions and two incidents of Serious

2 We also refuse Howard’s invitation to take judicial notice of the fact that, in most employment situations, an applicant is required to submit the n ame of his or her last employer to the new employer . Apart from the fact this this is not the kind of thing about which courts ordinarily take judicial notice, see Shahar v. Bowers , 120 F.3d 211, 214 (11th Cir. 1997) (describing well

- known scientific facts , matters of geography, and matters of political history as typical examples of judicially noticeable information) , we note that during his deposition Howard himself admitted to leaving two of his prior employers off the employment application he submitted to Hyundai. Moreover, Howard also failed to show us any similar case so extending the doctrine of judicial notice, and we decline to do so here.

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 18 of 2419 Misconduct involving an altercation and, separately, inappropriate behavior towards other Team Members. Denham rec eived Letters of Conditional Employment on each occasion, the first of which was inactive by the time of the 2015 incident. All in all, we take this as evidence that Hyundai was doing its best
to fairly manage a difficult employee, but nothing in the reco rd suggests that Hyundai departed from its documented procedures and afforded Denham any special treatment it did not later afford Howard. In particular, the record does not reveal that Denham committed any Serious Misconduct while subject to an active
Le tter of Conditional Employment and was permitted by Hyundai to keep his job. Accordingly, we find no evidence of disparate treatment on this ground either. Ultimately, we agree with the magistrate judge and the district court that Howard has not met his burden of demonstrating that a similarly situated employee outside his protected class was treated more favorably. As a result, he has failed to establish a prima facie case of race

- based employment discrimination , and the district court did not err in gr anting Hyundai ’s motion for summary judgment.
III. Although our analysis could end with the finding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment because Howard failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, we write br iefly to address his argument that Hyundai’s proffered work

- rule

- violation reason was pretext for discrimination.

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 19 of 2420 Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Howard established a prima facie case of

race discrimination, Hyundai has articulated and produced e vidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its termination of him

— its determination that he had violated its Workplace Threats and Violence Policy and its Serious Misconduct Policy while he was already subject to a Letter of Conditional Employme nt. See Alvarez , 610 F.3d at 1264; Jones , 874 F.2d at 1540. Because violating established policies by engaging in workplace violence twice within a three

- year period would motivate a reasonable employer to fire an employee, the burden shifted back to How ard to produce evidence that Hyundai’s proffered reason was actually pretext for discrimination. See Alvarez , 610 F.3d at 1264. However, Howard has failed to prove that Hyundai’s proffered work

- rule

violation reason was pretext for discrimination. While he claimed both that he did not violate any policies during the 2015 incident and that Denham was not similarly punished for his violations of those same policies, Howard has produced no evidence showing that Hyundai’s true reason for firing him was based on race. See Damon , 196 F.3d at 1363; St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (noting that it must be “shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason”). Rather, he largely relied on his conclusory opini ons and beliefs that Denham attacked him during the 2015 incident because of his race, that he received harsher treatment after the 2015 incident because the

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 20 of 2421 victim was white and not black, and that he was ultimately fired because of his

race. See Alvarez , 610 F.3d at 1264

– 65. Further, these conclusory opinions and beliefs are contradicted by: (1) his testimony that race was not mentioned during the incident; (2) his testimony that no one else from Hyundai other than Denham had ever made derogatory racial statements toward him; (3) his testimony that he had no reason to believe that at least some of the individuals listed on the Team Relations memorandum disfavored him because he was black; and (4) his failure to testify or otherwise produce any evidence t hat the remaining individuals listed on that memorandum did disfavor him because he was black. In his arguments on appeal, Howard makes much of his own testimony that he di d not actually threaten anyone or throw the worn

- down tool at Denham during the 201 5 incident. He argues that , because Hyundai’s Team Relations memorandum reached different conclusions, there is a dispute of fact that should have preclude d summary judgment. Hyundai responds by noting that the law does not require its conclusions regardi ng workplace misconduct to be free from error; inst ead, it only requires an employer’s conclusions to be honest ly made and free from evidence of unlawful discriminatory animus. Hyundai is correct.
W e have said many times that we are not a “super

- personnel department,” and it is not our role to second

- guess employers, “no matter how mistaken the firm’s managers.” Id. The fact that an employer’s legitimate belief is or may

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 21 of 2422 potentially be incorrect is immaterial so long as the employer’s decisions were not ultimately shown to be motivated by unlawful discriminatory animus. See id. at 1266 (“The question to be resolved is not the wisdom or accuracy of [the employer’s] conclusion that [the Title VII claimant’s] performance was unsatisfactor y, or whether the decision to fire her was ‘prudent or fair.’”); Damon , 196 F.3d at 1363 n.3 (“An employer who fires an employee under a mistaken but honest impression that the employee violated a work rule is not liable for discriminatory conduct.”); Jone s v. Gerwens , 874 F.2d 1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The law is clear that, even if a Title VII claimant did not in fact commit the violation with which he is charged, an employer successfully rebuts any prima facie case of disparate treatment by showing t hat it honestly believed the employee committed the violation.”); Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc. , 555 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Even if [the employer] wrongly believed that [the Title VII claimant] violated this policy, if [the employer] acted o n this belief it was not guilty of racial discrimination.”). A t the end of the analysis, our “sole concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivated the decision.” Alvarez , 610 F.3d at 1266 (quotation marks omitted). After a careful review of t he entire record, we are convinced that Hyundai decided to terminate Howard based on its honest belief that he violated its Workplace Threats and Violence Policy and its Serious Misconduct Policy while

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 22 of 2423 subject to a n active Letter of Conditional Employment

. But e ven if Hyundai’s conclusions regarding Howard’s conduct during the 2015 incident were wholly or partially mistaken, it cannot be held liable for discriminat ory conduct because Howard has also failed to point to any evidence that unlawful discriminat ory animus actually motivated Hyundai’s actions

. Aside from the fact that Denham

— who did not have the authority to terminate Howard’s employment and played no part in Hyundai’s decision to do so

— had previously made derogatory racial remarks to Howard, and Howard’s reference to his own skin color during the 2015 incident, the record presents no evidence that race actually played a part in any of the events leading to Howard’s termination. Further, Howard’s failure to show any evidence that Hyundai’s true reason for firing him was discrimination means that he also failed to show a “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence” raising a reasonable inference that Hyundai intentionally discriminated against him based on his race. See Smith , 644 F.3d at 1328.
IV

. We hold that t he district court properly granted Hyundai summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice Howard’s compl aint because he failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, and, even if the burden did shift to Hyundai , he fai led to show that Hyundai’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory

Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 23 of 2424 reason for his termination was pretextual and that racial discrimination was the real

reason for his termination

. AFFIRMED

. 3

3 Howard’s motion to seal the record on appeal is hereby DENIED. Case: 17-14089 Date Filed: 10/26/2018 Page: 24 of 24