UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 16-63 (TJK) CYNTHIA L. ROSEBERRY-ANDREWS, Plaintiff , v. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Defendant

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Cynthia L. Ros eberry-Andrews, proceeding pro se , has filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act ( “FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, seeking ce rtain records from the Department of Homeland Security ( “DHS” or “Defendant”) regardin g her employment with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Freedom of Inf ormation Act Office (the “ICE FOIA Office”). Defendant ha s moved for summary judgment, arguing that it has conducted a reasonable search of i ts records and produced all r esponsive, non-exempt information. Roseberry-Andrews has cross-moved for summary jud gment, alleging that Defendant did not conduct a proper search, was dilatory in resp onding, did not properly apply FOIA exemptions, and failed to com ply with FOIA’s “segregabilit y” requirement. The Court agrees with Defendant on many of the issues raised by the parti es, but ultimately concludes that Defendant has failed to provide s ufficient evidence that the IC E FOIA Office conducted an adequate search or complied with F OIA’s “segregability” require ment. Thus, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part, with leav e granted to file a renewed motion within 60 d ays. Accordingly, the Court w ill reserve judgment in part and deny in part Roseberry-Andrews’ c ross-motion for summary judgme nt.2 Background A. Roseberry-Andrews’ FOIA Request and Lawsuit On December 29, 2014, Roseberry-Andrews filed a FOIA request wi th the ICE FOIA Office. See ECF No. 1 (“Orig. Compl.”) Ex. 1 at 8-9. 1 The request sought information pertaining to her employment in t hat same ICE FOIA Office from eight different program offices within DHS. Id. at 8. Those offices were: (1) t he Office of the Principal Leg al Advisor (“OPLA”); (2) the ICE FOIA Office; (3) the ICE Privacy Office; (4) “HR [Human Resources]”; (5) “EEO [Equal Employment Oppor tunity]”; (6) “Reasonable Accom modation”; (7) the Office of Employee and Labor Relations ( “ELR”); and (8) the Office of the Assistant Secretary (“OAS”). Id. 2 Roseberry-Andrews also listed the names of individual employe es in the ICE FOIA and ELR offices from whom she requested records. Id. That same day, ICE confirmed receipt of Roseberry-Andrews’ FOIA request. Orig. Compl. Ex. 1 at 11; ECF No. 14 (“Am. Compl.”) ¶ 10. On Decembe r 31, ICE followed up with a formal acknowledgment letter and assigned her request a case number. Orig. Compl. Ex. 1 at 12-13; Am. Compl. ¶ 11; ECF. No. 22-1 (“Def.’s SoMF”) at 2. Th e acknowledgement letter also stated that, “[a]lthough ICE’s goa l is to respond within 20 bus iness days of receipt of your request,” FOIA permits, and ICE would invoke, a 10-day extensio n because RoseberryAndrews’ request “seeks numerous documents that will necessitat e a thorough and wide-ranging search.” Orig. Compl. Ex. 1 at 12 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6) (B)).

1 Citations to pages numbers in Roseberry-Andrews’ filings refer to the page number generated by the ECF system at the top of the page.

2 Human Resources, EEO, and Reasonable Accommodation were office s listed by RoseberryAndrews in her FOIA request, butneither party has supplied the Court with the full names of these offices.3 On November 13, 2015, having not hear d or received anything further from the government, Roseberry-Andrews f iled an administrative appeal. Id. at Ex. 2; Am. Compl. ¶ 11; Def.’s SoMF at 2. ICE received the appeal on the same day. De f.’s SoMF at 7. On December 21, 2015, ICE remanded the appeal to the ICE FOIA Office to com plete processing of her FOIA request. Id. at 2. On January 13, 2016, Roseberry-Andrew s filed this lawsuit again st Catrina PavlikKeenan, an ICE FOIA Officer. O rig. Compl. On April 20, 2016, she filed an amended complaint, replacing Pavlik-Keen an with Jeh Johnson, then the S ecretary of DHS, as the defendant. Am. Compl. The amende d complaint asserts that Rose berry-Andrews did not receive the records she seeks and reque sts wide-ranging r elief, includi ng damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorney’s fees. Id. at 20.
B. DHS’s FOIA Productions Although the ICE FOIA Office collected responsive records from the various program offices, it was also a subject of Roseberry-Andrews’ request. Therefore, to ensure objectivity in reviewing and processing the rec ords, it handed over responsibi lity for these tasks to the DHS FOIA Office. Def.’s SoMF a t 9-10. On July 1, 2016, Defendant produced 1,826 pages to Roseberry-Andrews. Id. at 10. On July 24, Plaintiff provide d Defendant’s counsel a li st of redactions and withholdings that she did not disput e, which the parties agreed would not be included on Defendant’s Vaughn Index during summary judgment briefing. Id. at 10. After Defendant’s production to R oseberry-Andrews, it discovere d that some documents had been released without certai n necessary redactions, and clawed the production back to include them. Id. On August 16, 2016, Defendant rep roduced the same 1,826 pages to Roseberry-Andrews with additional redactions. Id. In October 2016, Defendant represented to Roseberry-Andrews that, during the course of preparing its Vaughn index, it determined that4 some redactions should be removed and that it would provide her with a replacement release. Id. Ultimately, of the 1,826 pages Defendant produced to Roseberry- Andrews, 601 pages were withheld in full and 867 pages redacted. Id.
C. The Parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment In October 2016, Defendant moved for summary judgment. See ECF No. 22; ECF No. 22-2 (“Def.’s MSJ Br.”); ECF No. 27 (“Def.’s Reply”). In respo nse, Roseberry-Andrews filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and a cross-motion for summary judgment. See ECF No. 24; ECF No. 25 (“P l.’s Cross-Mot. Br.”). Defendant maintains that it c onducted a proper FOIA search and that its redactions and withholdings are proper. It ha s submitted a declaration from F ernando Pineiro, the Deputy FOIA Officer of the ICE FOIA Office , describing its search. ECF No. 22-3 (“Pineiro Decl.”) ¶ 1. Pineiro explains that when the I CE FOIA Office receives a FOIA request, it “identif[ies] which program offices, based on their e xperience and knowledge of ICE ’s program offices, within ICE are reasonably likely to possess r ecords responsive to that req uest, if any, and to initiate searches within those program offices.” Id. ¶ 19. Once the ICE FOIA Off ice has determined the appropriate program offices for a particular FOIA request, it p rovides points of contact in each component office with “a copy of the FOIA request and instructs them to conduct a search for responsive records.” Id. According to Pineiro, “[p]er th e ICE FOIA Office’s instructio ns, the individuals and component offi ces are directed to conduct searc hes of their file systems, including both paper files and ele ctronic files, which in their judgment . . . would most likely be the files to contain responsive documents.” Id. Once these searches are complete, any potentially responsive documents are sent to the I CE FOIA Offic e. Id. In this case, the ICE FOIA Offi ce instructed seven program offi ces to search for responsive documents. Id. ¶ 24. Those seven offices include d five that Roseberry-Andrew s5 asked to be searched (ELR, OPLA, P rivacy, ICE FOIA, and OAS) an d two that she did not ask to be searched (the Office of D iversity and Civil Rights (“ODCR ”) and the Office of the Chief Information Officer (“OCIO”)). T he search did not include thre e offices named in RoseberryAndrews’ request (HR, EEO, a nd Reasonable Accommodation). See Orig. Compl. Ex. 1 at 8-9. Pineiro’s declaration identifies the search terms that five of the seven offices used for their searches. Pineiro Decl. ¶¶ 33-35, 37-38. Those offices genera lly searched for terms that included Roseberry-Andrews’ name ( e.g. , id. ¶ 37) or the names of the ICE employees identified in the complaint ( e.g. , id. ¶¶ 35, 38). All of the offices searched provided records that were ultimately released to Roseberry-Andrews except OAS, which repo rtedly did not have any responsive records. Id. ¶¶ 32-38. Defendant also submitted a Vaughn index and a declaration fro m Kevin Tyrrell, the Associate Director for FOIA A ppeals and Litigation at the DHS F OIA Office. ECF No. 22-4 (“Tyrrell Decl.”) ¶ 1 & Ex. G (“ Vaughn Index”). DHS withheld or redacted information pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 5, 6, 7(C), and 7(E). See Tyrrell Decl. ¶¶ 21-39 & Vaughn Index. The Vaughn Index contains a document-by-document accounting of which exem ptions were applied and why. Roseberry-Andrews’ cross-motion for summary judgment can be dif ficult to follow, but, as the Court reads it, she raise s four principal arguments why Defendant allegedly failed to comply with FOIA. First, she arg ues that DHS impermissibly del ayed responding to her request.
See Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Br. at 6. Ind eed, she argues both that DHS’s delays were so severe that they rise to the level of a “policy-or-practice” claim ( i.e. , that DHS has established a policy or practice of failing to comply with FOIA requests) and that DHS’ s delay violated her constitutional right to due process because she needed the documents DHS produced in advance6 of a court proceeding she asserts took place on August 29-30, 2 016. Id. at 5-8. Second, she argues that the ICE FOIA Office failed to conduct an adequate s earch because it “provided no explanation of the nature of a ny search that it conducted.” Id. at 12. Third, she contests many of the agency’s specific withholdi ngs under certain FOIA exemption s. Id. at 8-12. And last, Roseberry-Andrews alleges the agency failed to “[c]onduct a seg regated . . . review of the information withheld.” Id. at 10. Legal Standard “Congress enacted the FOIA in order to ‘pierce the veil of admi nistrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.’” Morley v. CIA , 508 F.3d 1108, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose , 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “FOIA ‘mandates that an agency disclose record s on request, unless they fall within one of nine exemptions.’” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. DHS (“ EPIC ”), 777 F.3d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Milner v. Dep’t of Navy , 562 U.S. 562, 565 (2011)). “[T]he vast majority of FOIA cas es can be resolved on summary j udgment.” Brayton v. Office of U.S. Trade Rep. , 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011). “Summary judgment is appropriately granted when, viewi ng the evidence in the light m ost favorable to the non-movants and drawing all reasonable inferences accordingly, no reasonabl e jury could reach a verdict in their favor

. ” Lopez v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. , 826 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2016). “The evidence presented must show ‘that ther e is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matte r of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “Where the nonmoving party is proceeding pro se , courts in this jurisdiction will construe the non-moving party’s filings liberally.” Cunningham v. DOJ , 40 F. Supp. 3d 71, 82 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d , No. 14-5112, 2014 WL 5838164 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 21, 2014). “How ever, a
pro se litigant still has the burden of establishing more than ‘[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of7 evidence’ in support of [her] position.” Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). “In the FOIA context, a distric t court reviewing a motion for s ummary judgment conducts a de novo review of t he record, and the responding fed eral agency bears the burden of proving that it has complied with its obligations under the FOI A.” MacLeod v. DHS , No. 15- CV-1792 (KBJ), 2017 WL 4220398, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2017) ( citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)); see also Cable News Network, Inc. v. FBI, 271 F. Supp. 3d 108, 111 (D.D.C. 2017) (“Unlike the review of other agency action that must be u pheld if supported by substantial evidence and not arbitr ary or capricious, the FOIA expressly pl aces the burden on the agency to sustain its action . . . .” (quoting DOJ v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press , 489 U.S. 749, 775 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, “cons istent with D.C. Circuit precedent,” judges in this Circui t have “proceeded to review th e agencies’ facts and evidence to determine whether summary judgme nt in favor of the agency defen dants is warranted despite the lack of a coherent opposition from the plaintiff.” MacLeod , 2017 WL 4220398, at *8. “[T]he Court may . . . treat the Departmen t’s factual proffers as conc eded, but it must address the Department’s legal arguments on their merits.” King v. DOJ , 245 F. Supp. 3d 153, 158 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Winston & Strawn, LLP v. McLean , 843 F.3d 503, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2016)),
reconsideration denied , 2017 WL 5449803 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2017). “To prevail on summary judgment [in a FOIA case], an ‘agency m ust show that it made a good faith effort to conduct a se arch for the requested recor ds, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested,’ whic h it can do by submitting ‘[a] reasonably detailed affidavit, s etting forth the search terms a nd the type of search performed, and averring that all files likely t o contain respons ive materials (if such records exist) were8 searched.’” Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. FBI (“ RCFP ”), 877 F.3d 399, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (second alterati on in original) (quoting Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army , 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). “The agency fails to meet this burden su ch that summary judgment is inappropriate when the agency fa ils to set forth the search terms and the type of search performed with specificity or otherwise provides ‘no informatio n about the search strategies of the [agency] components charge d with responding to [a] FOIA request’” and “no indication of what each [component’s] sear ch specifically yielded.” Evans v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , No. CV 16-2274 (BAH), 2018 WL 707427, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2018) (quo ting RCFP , 877 F.3d at 402 (alterations in original)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “At a bare minimum, the agency’s affidavits need to specify ‘what records were searched, by whom , and through what process.’” Rodriguez v. DOD , 236 F. Supp. 3d 26, 38 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Steinberg v. DOJ , 23 F.3d 548, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). “In addition to demonstrating the adequacy of the search, the a gency must ‘demonstrate that the records have not bee n improperly withheld.’” Evans , 2018 WL 707427, at *3 (quoting Ctr. for the Study of Servs. v. HHS , 874 F.3d 287, 288 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). “The burden is on the agency to justify withholding the requested documents, and the FOIA directs district courts to determine de novo whether non-disc losure was permissible.” EPIC , 777 F.3d at 522. “Summary judgment is warranted on the basi s of agency affidavits when th e affidavits describe the justifications for nondisclosure w ith reasonably specific detai l, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls withi n the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evi dence of agency bad faith.” Larson v. Dep’t of State , 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Miller v. Casey , 730 F.2d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). The agency cannot rely on “concluso ry and generalize d allegations o f exemptions.” Morley , 5089 F.3d at 1114 (quoting Founding Church of Scientology of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. NSA , 610 F.2d 824, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). FOIA also requires that “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). The court has an affirmative duty to ensure that this requirement is satisfied, even if it must do so sua sponte

. See Morley , 508 F.3d at 1123. Analysis As described above, Roseberry-Andrews alleges that Defendant vi olated FOIA in a number of ways. Her complaints fall into four categories: Defe ndant (1) took too long to respond to her request, (2) did not perform an adequate search, (3) improperly claimed certain exemptions, and (4) failed to comply with FOIA’s segregability requirement. The Court addresses each argument in turn. 3
A. Defendant’s Delay Roseberry-Andrews argues that DHS’s delay in responding to her FOIA request gives rise to a cognizable legal c laim. The Court cannot agree.

3 In its brief, Defendant, in addi tion to defending its FOIA pro duction, also argues that Roseberry-Andrews’ case should be dismissed because only federa l agencies may be sued under FOIA, and thus the head of an agency is an improper defendant. Def.’s MSJ Br. at 16. “While it is true that the FOIA authorizes a cause of action against fede ral agencies only, ‘pleadings [in general] must be construed so as to do justice,’ and pro se filings in particular must be construed liberally.” Schotz v. Samuels , 72 F. Supp. 3d 81, 88 (D.D.C. 2014) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)) (substitutin g DOJ for Director of Bureau of Prisons as defendant). Thus, the Court hereby substitutes the Department of Homeland Security as the real party of interest and dismisses the complaint again st Secretary Johnson under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Consequently, Defendant’s request to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction is denied.10 1. Defendant’s Failure to Meet FOIA Deadlines Roseberry-Andrews’ first argumen t is that “FOIA requests are re quired to be completed within twenty days of receipt.” Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Br. at 6 (cit ing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6 )(A)(i)). But that is not what the statut e says. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) only requires the agency to communicate its “determination” w hether to comply with a FOIA r equest and “the reasons therefor” to a requestor with in 20 days (or, in “unusual circum stances,” 30 days, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B)(i)). It does not require the agency to complete processing the entire request within this period. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. FEC (“ CREW ”), 711 F.3d 180, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“To be clear, a ‘determinat ion’ does not require actual production of the records to the requester at the exact same time that th e ‘determination’ is communicated to the requester.”); Daily Caller v. U.S. Dep’t of State , 152 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[T]he agency is plainly correct that FOIA does not require production of all responsive, non-exempt documents within twenty days of receivin g a request.”). Indeed, as the D.C. Circuit has noted, it would be a “practical impossibility for agencies to process all [FOIA] requests completely within twenty days.” CREW , 711 F.3d at 189 (alterati on in original). Defendant does not contest that it did not comply with these ex plicit timeframes. Although it provided Roseberry-Andr ews notice that her case inv olved unusual circumstances, Orig. Compl. Ex. 1 at 12, it does no t present evidence that it ultimately communicated its “determination” and “the reasons therefor” within 30 days. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B)(i). Where Roseberry-Andrews’ argument fails, however, is that an ag ency’s failure to comply with these statutory deadlines is not a n independent basis for a cla im. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “if the agency does not adhere to FOIA’s explicit ti melines, the ‘penalty’ is that the agency cannot rely on the administrative exhaustion requirement to keep cases from getting into
court.” CREW , 711 F.3d at 189; see also Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. DOJ , 15 F. Supp. 3d 32, 4111 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Thus, far from EPIC ’s reading of the FOIA to re quire an agency to immediately hand over all of the requested documents as a result of its fai lure to meet the deadline, CREW makes clear that the impact of blowing the 20-day deadline rela tes only to the requester’s ability to get into court .”). Thus, in this case, Defe ndant cannot—and did not—argue th at RoseberryAndrews failed to exhaust her admi nistrative remedies. But Def endant’s failure to communicate its initial determination with in 30 days does not provide Roseb erry-Andrews a separate claim that it violated FOIA. 4
2. Defendant’s Alleged Policy or Practice of Delay In addition to the delay in her indi vidual case, Roseberry-Andr ews also argues that Defendant has a “policy or prac tice” of delaying responses to F OIA requests. See, e.g. , Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Br. at 6 (“Defendanthas established a pattern and p ractice of failing to comply with FOIA request processing time requirements . . . .”); id. at 7. “The D.C. Circuit has . . . recogni zed that, separate from clai ms seeking relief for specific requests made under the FOIA, requesting parties may also assert a ‘claim that an agency policy or practice will impair the party’s lawful access to informatio n in the future.’” Nat’l Sec.
Counselors v. CIA , 898 F. Supp. 2d 233, 252-53 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Payne Enters., Inc. v. United States , 837 F.2d 486, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). “To state a policy-or-p ractice claim, a plaintiff must plausi bly allege ‘that the agency has adopted, e ndorsed, or implemented some policy or practice that constitutes an ongoing ‘failure to abid e by the terms of the FOIA.’” Am. Ctr. for Law & Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of State (“ ACLJ ”), 249 F. Supp. 3d 275, 281-82 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Muttitt v. Dep’t of State , 926 F. Supp. 2d 284, 293 (D.D.C. 2013)) (internal

4 Roseberry-Andrews also asserts that DHS violated FOIA because it “processed over 104,000 FOIA requests after receiving Pla intiff’s FOIA request.” Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Br. at 7. It is not clear how Roseberry-Andrews calculate d this number or on what basis s he alleges it represents a violation of FOIA.12 quotation marks omitted). “That FOIA policy or practice may be ‘informal, rather than articulated in regulations or an official statement of policy.’ ” Id. (quoting Payne , 837 F.2d at 491). “Claims targeting agencies’ internal FOIA workings usual ly also involve instances where conduct is ‘sufficiently outrageous.’” Id. (quoting Payne , 837 F.2d at 494). Here, Roseberry-Andrews’ argumen ts about Defendant’s delay in r esponding to FOIA requests are insufficient to s tate a policy or practice claim. She baldly asserts that DHS has a policy or practice of violating F OIA both because it fails to c omplete FOIA requests within twenty days and because it does not provide written notificatio n of the “unusual circumstances” that underlie its decisions to e xtend the time to provide an in itial determination. See Pl.’s CrossMot. Br. at 6-7. But Roseberry -Andrews “points to no fact or s tatement to establish why

. . . requests were delayed or how the delays were the result of a n either formal or informal DHS policy or practice to violate FOIA ’s requirements, rather than an inevitable but unintended delay attributable to a lack of resources.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DHS , 211 F. Supp. 3d 143, 146 (D.D.C. 2016). Indeed, courts in t his Circuit have repeatedly recognized that “a plaintiff ‘cannot rest on the mere fact of delay a lone to establish a [policy or practice] claim.’” ACLJ , 249 F. Supp. 3d at 283 (quoting Judicial Watch , 211 F. Supp. 3d at 146) (collecting cases); see also Cause of Action Inst. v. Eggleston , 224 F. Supp. 3d 63, 72 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[D]elay alone, even repeated delay, is not the type of illegal policy or practice that is actionable under Payne Enterprises .”). Simply put, “[w]hile [Rosebe rry-Andrews] has shown that [ DHS] is indeed slow, [she] has not plausibly alleged t hat the government subscribes to some policy or practice of13 slow-walking its requests for information.” ACLJ , 249 F. Supp. 3d at 278. Thus, this argument fails. 5
3. Defendant’s Alleged Violation of Roseberry-Andrews’ Due Process Rights Roseberry-Andrews also suggests th at her constitutional due pro cess rights were violated because she did not receive records from Defendant in advance o f a hearing that she asserts occurred on August 29-30, 2016. See Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Br. at 5-8. The Court disagrees. As a factua l matter, Roseberry-Andrews’ a rgument fails because Defendant produced documents to her before the hearing in question. DHS produced responsive documents to Roseberry-Andrews on July 1, 2016, and then again on August 16, 2016 (with additional redactions). See Def.’s SoMF at 10. Both of these productions occurred before August 29, 2016. Thus, there was n o due process deprivation. After Roseberry-Andrews’ hearing, while Defendant was preparing its Vaughn index, it did determine that some additional redactions could be removed, id. , but Roseberry-Andrews provides no basis to conclude that this later-released information was necessary for or even relevant t o her hearing. Moreover, even if Defendant had f ailed to provide documents to Roseberry-Andrews in advance of the hearing, her due pr ocess argument also fails as a matter of law because, as courts in this Circuit have conclude d, “FOIA does not offer a remedy f or alleged violations of constitutional rights arising f rom the handling of a FOIA reque st.” Houser v. Church , 271 F. Supp. 3d 197, 204 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Johnson v. Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys , 310 F.3d 771, 777 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). That principle holds even when the delay allegedly prejudiced the

5 Roseberry-Andrews cites Open America v. Watergat e Special Prosecution Force , 547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976), at length in the context of delay. Pl.’s Cro ss-Mot. Br. at 6-7. But Open America addresses the circumstances unde r which “an agency is entitled to a stay” in FOIA litigation. Clemente v. FBI , 71 F. Supp. 3d 262, 266 (D.D.C. 2014). Here, DHS has already made its production, so a stay it not at issue.14 plaintiff in some other proceeding. Sanchez-Alanis v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 270 F. Supp. 3d 215, 219 (D.D.C. 2017) (“Plaintiff al so asserts that the delay violated his due process rights, but ‘the comprehensiveness of FO IA . . . precludes the creation of a . . . remedy’ predicated on a constitutional violation.” (quoting Johnson , 310 F.3d at 777)). 6 In light of the above, Roseberry -Andrews’ cross-motion for sum mary judgment will be denied insofar as it alleges a FOIA violation grounded in Defen dant’s alleged delay.
B. Adequacy of Defendant’s Search To establish that it conducted a n adequate search, Defendant “must show that it made a good faith effort to conduct a sear ch for the requested records , using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce th e information requested, whichit can do by submitting [a] reasonably detailed affidavit, s etting forth the search terms a nd the type of search performed, and averring that all files likely t o contain respons ive materials (if such records exist) were searched.” RCFP , 877 F.3d at 402 (alteration in ori ginal) (internal quotations marks omitted). Roseberry-Andrews appears to sug gest that Defendant did not per form an adequate search. See Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Br. at 12 (“To da te the Defendant has provided no explanation of the nature of any search that it c onducted for the requested re cords concerning the preparation of Plaintiff’s FOIA request . . . .” ). She does not explain, howe ver, why the search was inadequate. Nevertheless, this Court “must a ddress the [agency’s] legal arg uments on their merits.” King , 245 F. Supp. 3d at 158. In order to ca rry its burden that it c onducted an adequate search, Defendant must establish that it searched the proper offices an d that the searches it did conduct were adequate. Defendant comes up short on both counts.

6 Roseberry-Andrews cites Wade v. Kirkland , 118 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 1997), to support her position, Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Br. a t 7, but she provides no explan ation about how this case—which involved an exception to the mootness doctrine for the purposes of a class-certif ication motion, Wade , 118 F.3d at 669—helps her argument.15 1. Offices Searched The Court concludes that Defe ndant has not provided an adequate explanation for the offices it searched. “To prevail on summary judgment, . . . the defending ‘agency mu st show beyond material doubt [ ] that it has conducted asearch reasonab ly calculated to uncover all relevant documents.’” Morley , 508 F.3d at 1114 (alteration i n original) (quoting Weisberg v. DOJ , 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). It can do so by submitting a “reasonably detailed affidavit . . . averring that all files lik ely to contain responsive mate rials (if such records exist) were searched.” RCFP , 877 F.3d at 402 (quoting Oglesby , 920 F.2d at 68). In her FOIA request, Roseberry-A ndrews requested information fr om eight program offices within ICE. See Orig. Compl. Ex. 1 at 8-9. Pineir o declared that the ICE FOIA Office “determined that because of the s ubject matter of the FOIA requ est, there were seven (7) offices reasonably likely to have records responsive to the Plaintiff’s request.” Pineiro Decl. ¶ 24; see also id. ¶¶ 32-38. Five of those offices (ELR, OPLA, Privacy, ICE FOIA Office, and OAS) were identified by Roseberry-Andrew s. Orig. Compl. Ex. 1 at 8-9. I t also searched two offices that Roseberry-Andrews did not identif y: ODCR and OCIO. Pineiro Dec l. ¶ 24. DHS did not search, as Roseberry-Andrews requested, Human Resources, EEO, o r Reasonable Accommodation. Id. The Court concludes that Defenda nt has not adequately justified its selection of the offices it searched. In particula r, DHS has not explained why it chose not to search the three additional program offices that Roseberry-Andrews identified as having responsive records, which were, after all, records re lating to her own employment. See, e.g. , Rodriguez , 236 F. Supp. 3d at 36-37 (concluding search unreasonable where agency did not search an office identified by plaintiff as likel y to have responsive records). It may be that it is not likely these16 program offices possess records re lated to Roseberry-Andrews’ r equest; it is also possible that these offices were in fact search ed as subcomponents of the oth er program offices. But “[t]he Court cannot fill in these gaps for the agency.” Nat’l Sec. Counselors v. CIA , 960 F. Supp. 2d 101, 154 (D.D.C. 2013); see also Am. Immigration Council v. DHS , 21 F. Supp. 3d 60, 72 (D.D.C. 2014) (denying summary judg ment because “the Court cann ot judge the merits of [plaintiff’s] contention [that a dditional sub-offices should be searched] without knowing Defendants’ position on whether any of those locations are like ly to have responsive documents”). The need for Defendant to expl ain why it did not search the thr ee additional offices identified by Roseberry-Andrews is underscored by the fact that Pineiro’s declaration is also deficient insofar as it does not “aver[] that all files likely to contain responsive materials (if such records exist) were searched.” RCFP , 877 F.3d at 402 (quoting Oglesby , 920 F.2d at 68). To be sure, Pineiro states that Defe ndant identified seven offices th at were reasonably likely to have responsive records. Pineiro D ecl. ¶ 24. But he does not speci fically state that those were the only such offices, or that no other o ffices would likely have respo nsive records. See Elkins v.
FAA , 103 F. Supp. 3d 122, 131 (D.D.C.) (“Nowhere in the FAA’s decl aration does [the declarant] aver that all files likely to contain responsive rec ords were searched or that no other offices would likely contain responsive documents.”), on reconsideration , 134 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2015). Thus, in light of Ros eberry-Andrews’ specific r equest that Defendant search these three additional offices and Defendant’s failure to expla in why it did not do so, the Court denies Defendant’s request for s ummary judgment as to the adequ acy of its search.17 2. Search Terms Employed With regard to the program offi ces ICE did search, the Court co ncludes that Defendant’s affidavits are also insufficient because they do not adequately describe the searches that Defendant conducted. “A federal agency has discretion [ to] craft[] a list of search terms that [it] believe[s] [is] reasonably tailored to uncover doc uments responsive to the FOIA request.” Coffey v. Bureau of Land Mgmt. , 249 F. Supp. 3d 488, 498 (D.D.C. 2017) (alterations in origin al). But summary judgment is inappropriate “when t he agency fails to set forth the search terms and the type of search performed with specificity or otherwise provides ‘no inf ormation about the search strategies of the [agency] co mponents charged with responding t o [a] FOIA request.’” Evans , 2018 WL 707427, at *2 (quoting RCFP , 877 F.3d at 403 (alterations i n original)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Although a court should not second guess an agency with respect to its choice of reasonable search terms, it must nonetheless conf irm that the agency’s choice was reasonably calculated to l ead to responsive documents.” Coffey , 249 F. Supp. 3d at 498 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Pineiro’s declaration fails in two respects: it does not provide the search terms that two of the offices used to search a nd it fails to explain why t he other offices used inconsistent

terms. Failure to Provide Search Terms . Defendant failed to provide the search terms that two of the offices—ELR and OAS—usedwhen conducting their search. See Pineiro Decl. ¶ 32 (“The administrative support staff searched ELR’s paper files a nd internal shared drive.”); id. ¶ 36 (“[OAS] searched the share d computer driv e, and searched e mail records for records relating to the Plaintiff or the Plaintiff’s employee complaint s or personnel actions.”). Without even knowing which search terms t hese offices used to search el ectronic files, the Court cannot18 conclude that these searches were adequate. See DeBrew v. Atwood , 792 F.3d 118, 122 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (concluding “declaratio n is not sufficiently detaile d to support a summary judgment because it does not disclose the search terms used by the BoP a nd the type of search performed”); Morley , 508 F.3d at 1122 (rejecting affidavit that “merely identifies the three directorates that were responsib le for finding responsive docum ents without ‘iden tify[ing] the terms searched or explain[ing] how the search was conducted’ ineach component”) (alterations in original) (quoting Oglesby , 920 F.2d at 68); Walston v. DOD , 238 F. Supp. 3d 57, 65 (D.D.C. 2017) (“Without a complete list of the search terms used in res ponse to [plaintiff’s] FOIA request, the Court is unable to c onclude that [defendant’s] sea rch was adequate.”); Defs. of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol , 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 92 (D.D.C. 2009) (rejecting a declarationthat “simply states that searches we re conducted” without providing search terms). Indeed, courts in this Circuit have found similar d eclarations from Pineiro to be insufficient to warrant summary judgment. See, e.g. , Parker v. ICE , 238 F. Supp. 3d 89, 104 (D.D.C. 2017) (denying summary judgment to ICE because declaration from Pineiro “provided insu fficient detail” about the search terms and the “nature of that electronic search process”); Tushnet v. ICE , 246 F. Supp. 3d 422, 434-35 (D.D.C. 2017) (denying summary judgment to ICE because P ineiro declaration stating that offices had “full discreti on to search their records” was inadequate). Failure to Explain Inconsistent Search Methodology. Defendant’s desc ription of its search methodology suffers from an other flaw: it does not expla in why different program offices used varying search terms. In her FOIA request, Roseberry-Andr ews identified the offices she wanted searched and listed indivi dual employees in the ICE FOIA Office and ELR whose records she presumably believed c ontained relevant documents. Orig. Compl. Ex. 1 at 8-9. In their searches, some program o fficers searched the names of the ICE employees Roseberry-19 Andrews identified. See Pineiro Decl. ¶ 35 (“OCIO search ed archived e-mails by the name s of specific former ICE employees ide ntified in the FO IA request.”) ; id. ¶ 38 (“The ICE FOIA Office manually searched its pape r central file system by the n ames specified in the FOIA request.”). 7 Other offices, however, only search ed for Roseberry-Andrews’ name. See id. ¶ 34 (ICE Privacy Officer “searched h er computer hard drive and e-ma il by the Plaintiff’s name and complaint number”); id. ¶ 33 (“[T]he program office’s inte rnal shared computer drive wa s searched using the name of the appl icable case manager and the name of the Plaintiff (employee who requested accommodations).”); id. ¶ 37 (“OPLA (the Deputy Chi ef and the OPLA attorney named in the request) searched an internal case management syst em, as well as OPLA shared drives by the Plaintiff’s name.”). There may well be a good explanat ion for these inconsistent sea rch methodologies, but Defendant does not provide it. As a result, these inconsistenc ies provide anothe r reason that the Court cannot conclude that Defe ndant’s search—or at least its d escription of that search—is sufficient to warrant summary judgment. See Tushnet , 246 F. Supp. 3d at 434-35 (denying summary judgment where ICE declar ations “fall short of explaini ng why such disparate searches were reasonable for particular offices”); James Madison Project v. Dep’t of State , 235 F. Supp. 3d 161, 169 (D.D.C. 2017) (“But the age ncy misses the point: th e problem with the declaration in this case is that it is concl usory, and the searches are def icient because the agency—for no discernable reason—searched diffe rent data sets using different search terms . . . even within the same bureau or office. So the age ncy must do more to explain i ts methodology, and it must explain its reasoning more clearly.”).

7 The Court also notes that it is unclear why the ICE FOIA Offic e searched only paper files, and not any electronic files, f or responsive records.20 In light of these deficiencies a s to the adequacy of its search , the Court will deny Defendant’s motion for summar y judgment without prejudice, and allow it to file a renewed motion for summary judgment w ithin 60 days of the date of this Opinion. In support of any such motion, Defendant may either condu ct additional searches to ens ure that it adequately looked for records responsive to Roseberry -Andrews’ request or provide add itional representations describing the searches it has already conducted. Accordingly, the Court also reserves judgment on Roseberry-Andrews’ cross-motio n for summary judgment on this issue.
C. Exemptions Claimed by Defendant Turning to the FOIA exemptions Defendant has invoked, “[t]he ag ency bears the burden to establish the applicability of a claimed exemption to any re cords or portions of records it seeks to withhold.” Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. E xec. Office for Immigration Review (“ AILA ”), 830 F.3d 667, 673 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Indeed, FOIA exemptions “a re ‘explicitly made exclusive and must be narrowly construed.’” Id. (quoting Milner , 562 U.S. at 565). In this case, DHS withheld some or all of responsive records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(5), (b)(6) , (b)(7)(C), and (b)(7)(E). See Tyrrell Decl. ¶ 7. Roseberry-Andrews appears to challenge at least so me of Defendant’s withholdings under at least Exemptions (b)(5) and (b)(7)(E), but does not contes t withholdings pursuant to other exemptions. Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Br. at 8-12. Nevertheless, “[t]he court is mindful that the pl aintiff is a pro se litigant whose pleadings and other submissi ons are construed liberally . . . [ and] will address each of the claimed exemptions below.” Concepcion v. FBI , 606 F. Supp. 2d 14, 27 (D.D.C. 2009).
1. Exemption 5 Exemption 5 protects “inter-agencyor intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party o ther than an agency in liti gation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). “This exemption ‘has been interpreted as protecti ng against disclosure [of] those21 documents normally privileged in the civil discovery context.’” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOD , 245 F. Supp. 3d 19, 27 (D.D.C. 2017) (alteration in original) ( quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
DOJ , 365 F.3d 1108, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). Exemption 5 “allows t he government to withhold records from FOIA disclosure und er at least three privileges: the deliberative-process privilege, the attorney-client privilege , and the attorney work-product pr ivilege.” Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers v. Dep’t of Justi ce Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys (“ NACDL ”), 844 F.3d 246, 249 (D.C. Cir. 2016). In this case, DHS invokes all three of these privileges.

a. Attorney-Client Privilege The attorney-client privilege pr otects “confidential communicat ions between an attorney and his client relating to a lega l matter for which the client has sought professional advice.” Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. EPA , 213 F. Supp. 3d 1, 22 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force , 566 F.2d 242, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). “In the FOIA context, the agency is the ‘clien t’ and the agency’s lawyers ar e the ‘attorneys’ f or the purposes of attorney-client privilege.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury , 802 F. Supp. 2d 185, 200 (D.D.C. 2011). “To be privilege d, a communication must be ‘for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii ) legal services or (iii) a ssistance in some legal proceeding.’” Muttitt , 926 F. Supp. 2d at 308-09 (quoting In re Grand Jury , 475 F.3d 1299, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). “The purpose of the privilege is to en sure that a client’s confidences are protected, encouraging clients t o be honest with their attorney s.” Competitive Enter. Inst. v.
EPA , 232 F. Supp. 3d 172, 184 (D.D.C. 2017). Under the attorney-client privilege, DHS withheld emails betwee n agency employees and agency attorneys regarding Roseberry-Andrews’ employment and an EEO complaint. Def.’s MSJ Br. at 7 (citing Tyrrell De cl. ¶ 27). DHS also redacted le gal opinions provided by its attorneys regarding the requireme nts of the Americans with Disabilities Act and federal22 regulations regarding p robationary periods. Id. Roseberry-Andrews claims that there is no attorney-client privilege because “ the termination was complete d” and there was no pending litigation but only “EEOC disclosure.” Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Br. at 10. The Court concludes that DHS pr operly withheld materials pursua nt to the attorney-client privilege under Exemption 5. The information withheld involves communications with agency attorneys regarding compliance w ith employment laws and legal a dvice from attorneys about the requirements of certain federal statutes and regulations. Suchinformation is covered by the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g. , Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor , 273 F. Supp. 3d 214, 231 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[C]onfidential di sclosures between an attorney and her client regarding factual and legal matters are certainl y protected by attorney-client pr ivilege . . . .”). As to RoseberryAndrews’ arguments, it is not cl ear what “termination” and “EEO C disclosure” she is referencing. But in any event, the attorney-client privilege “ is not limited to communications made in the context of litigati on or even a specific dispute.” Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y v.
IRS , 89 F. Supp. 3d 81, 103 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. DOE , 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
b. Attorney Work Product “Courts have long recognized tha t materials prepared by one’s a ttorney in anticipation of litigation are generally privil eged from discovery by one’s adv ersary.” NACDL , 844 F.3d at 250 (citing Hickman v. Taylor , 329 U.S. 495, 510-12 (1947)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). “The doctrine protects both ‘factual and deliberative’ matters, beca use ‘the risk is apparent that an attorney’s discussion of factual matters may reveal his or her tactical [or] stra tegic thoughts.’”
Conservation Force v. Jewell , 66 F. Supp. 3d 46, 65 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Shapiro v. DOJ , 969 F. Supp. 2d 18, 28 (D.D.C. 2013)), aff’d per curiam , No. 15-5131, 2015 WL 9309920 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 4, 2015). But “[n]ot every document created by a gov ernment lawyer . . . qualifies for23 the privilege (and thus, the exemption).” NACDL , 844 F.3d at 251. The D.C. Circuit has “long required a case-specific determi nation that a particular docume nt in fact was prepared in anticipation of litigation befo re applying the privilege to gov ernment records.” Id. In ascertaining whether a documen t was prepared in anticipationof litigation, the D.C. Circuit has applied a “‘because of ’ test, asking whether, in li ght of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation.” Id. (quoting United States v. Deloitte
LLP , 610 F.3d 129, 137 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). “ For that standard to b e met, the attorney who created the document must have ‘had a subj ective belief that litigation was a real possibility,’ and that subjective belief must have been ‘objectively reasonable.’” Id. (quoting In re Sealed Case , 146 F.3d 881, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Here, “[a]lthough Plaintiff does not mount any defense challeng ing Defendant’s reliance on the [work product] privilege, th e Court must nevertheless ‘s atisf[y] itself that the record and any undisputed facts justify gran ting summary judgment.’” Wisdom v. U.S. Tr. Program , 266 F. Supp. 3d 93, 107 (D.D.C. 2017) (third a lteration in original) ( quoting McLean , 843 F.3d at 507). Defendant asserts that it withheld communications and documents drafted to assist agency attorneys in litigat ing and managing cases (although it does no t say what kind). Def.’s MSJ Br. at 7-8 (citing Tyrrell Decl. ¶ 29) . While it would have been u seful for Defendant to have provided additional information about precisely which cases the se communications involve, the Court concludes that these withholdings were proper.

c. Deliberative Process Privilege “The deliberative process privileg e protects ‘documents reflect ing advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberati ons comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.’” Loving v. DOD , 550 F.3d 32, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2008)24 (quoting Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n (“ Klamath Water ”), 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001)). It “rests on the obvious realization that o fficials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news, and its object is to enhance ‘the quality of agency decisions,’ by protecting open and frank discussion among those who make t hem within the Government.” Klamath Water , 532 U.S. at 8-9 (quoting NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975)). “To fall within the deliberative process privilege, materials m ust bear on the formulation or exercise of agency policy-oriented judgment .” Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. EPA , No. 14-cv-2056 (RC), 2017 WL 6333969, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 20 17) (quoting Petrol. Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior , 976 F.2d 1429, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). “The deliberative process privilege does not . . . prot ect material that is purel y factual, unless the material is so inextricably intertwined with the deliberative sections of docu ments that its disclosure would inevitably reveal the government’s deliberations.” Wallick v. Agric. Mktg. Serv. , No. 16-cv2063, 2017 WL 5592665, at *12 (D.D. C. Nov. 20, 2017) (citing NLRB , 421 U.S. at 150-54). “For the deliberative process pr ivilege to apply, a court must first determine whether the withheld materials are both ‘pr edecisional’ and ‘deliberative.’ ” 100Reporters LLC v. DOJ , 248 F. Supp. 3d 115, 150 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Access Reports v. DOJ , 926 F.2d 1192, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). “[A] document [is] pr edecisional if it was genera ted before the adoption of an agency policy and deliberative if it reflects the give-and-take of the consultative process.” Worldnetdaily.com, Inc. v. DOJ , 215 F. Supp. 3d 81, 83-84 (D.D.C. 2016) (alterations in original) (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FDA , 449 F.3d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]henclaiming the deliberative pr ocess privilege, the agency must, at the very least, explain in its Vaughn Indices and/or declarations , for each contested document25 withheld in part or in full, (1) what deliberative process is i nvolved, (2) the r ole played by the documents in issue in the course of that process, and (3) the n ature of the decisionmaking authority vested in the office or person issuing the disputed d ocument[s], and the positions in the chain of command of the part ies to the documents.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA , 279 F. Supp. 3d 121, 147 (D.D.C. 2017) (second alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Defendant withheld discussi ons regarding Roseberry-Andrew s’ workplace grievances and the application of ICE policies to potential per sonnel actions under the deliberative process privilege . Def.’s MSJ Br. at 9. It also withheld draft documents regarding, for instance, how to respond to R oseberry-Andrews’ complaint. Id. ; see, e.g. , Vaughn Index at 7-10. In response, Roseberry-Andrew s points to certain “office r’s notes” that in her view should not have been withheld under the de liberative process privilege ; she asserts that there are “facts” in those notes that can be disclo sed. Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Br. at 8-9. It is unclear to what “notes” Roseberry-Andrews refers here, a lthough it appears this argumen t may have been lifted from a brief in another case. 8 Nevertheless, upon r eview of DHS’s Vaughn Index, the Court is satisfied that the agency’s withholdings under the deliberative process p rivilege were proper. See, e.g. , Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, Local 2782 v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce , 907 F.2d 203, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (deliberative process privilege covers predecisional documents regarding personnel actions); Nat’l Sec. Counselors v. CIA , 206 F. Supp. 3d 241, 278 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Judges on this

8 Defendant argues that Rosebe rry-Andrews’ failu re to respond to its arguments in support of its application of the deliberative process privilege means that sh e has “conceded” the issue. See Def.’s Reply at 2-3 (citing Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gene ral Bd. of Global Ministries, 284 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003)). But a pro se plaintiff’s failure to r espond to an argument does not automatically relieve the government of satisfying its burd en on summary judgment. See, e.g. , Wisdom , 266 F. Supp. 3d at 107; MacLeod , 2017 WL 4220398, at *8.26 Court have repeatedly held tha t drafts may be withheld under Ex emption 5 where the withholding agency carries its normal burden of demonstrating that withheld materials are both predecisional and deliberative.”).
2. Exemption 6 Exemption 6 provides that agenc ies may withhold “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearl y unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). 9 Courts “follow a two-step pro cess when considering withholdings or redactions under Exemption 6.” AILA , 830 F.3d at 673. First, they “determ ine whether the [records ] are personnel, medical, or ‘similar’ files covered by Exemption 6.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Multi Ag Media LLC v. Dep’t of Agric. , 515 F.3d 1224, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). “The Supreme Court has interpreted th e term ‘similar files’ broadly so as ‘to cover detailed Government records on an individual which can be identified as applying to that individual.’” Ayuda, Inc. v. FTC , 70 F. Supp. 3d 247, 264 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash.
Post Co. , 456 U.S. 595, 602 (1982)). “Second, if . . . the records are covered by the exemption, [a court] ‘determine[s] whether their disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasio n of personal privacy.’” AILA ,

9 Defendant notes that “[a]lthough all withholdings [on its Vaughn Index] are properly marked with (b)(6), not all withholdings marked (b)(6) are also marked with (b)(7)(C).” Vaughn Index at 2. Thus, the Court will evaluate DHS’s withholdings under Exem ption 6, even though courts will often evaluate Exemption 7(C) in lieu of Exemption 6. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. DOJ , 854 F.3d 675, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“When information is claimed to be exempt from disclosure unde r both provisions, courts ‘foc us . . . on Exemption 7(C) because it provides broader privacy protection than Exemption 6 and thus establishes a lower bar for withholding material.’”) (quoting Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. DOJ (“ CREW II ”), 746 F.3d 1082, 1091 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).27 830 F.3d at 673 (quoting Multi Ag Media LLC , 515 F.3d at 1228) (internal quotation marks omitted). This requires a court to “balance the public interes t in disclosure against the interest Congress intended [Exemption 6] to protect.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting DOD v. Fed.
Labor Relations Auth. (“ FLRA ”), 510 U.S. 487, 495 (1994)). To do so, acourt “follow[s] another two-step process.” Id. It must first determine that “disclosure would compromise a substantial, as opposed to a de minimis , privacy interest,” id. at 674 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home
Builders v. Norton , 309 F.3d 26, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2002)), and then, “if so, . . . we igh the privacy interest at stake ‘against the public interest in the release o f the records,’” id. (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders , 309 F.3d at 33). Exemption 6 “does not categorically exempt individuals’ identities . . . because the ‘privacy interest at stake may vary depending on the context in which i t is asserted.’” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FDA , 449 F.3d 141, 153 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President , 97 F.3d 575, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). “[T]he only relevant ‘public inter est in disclosure’ to be weig hed in this balance is the extent to which disclosure would serve the ‘core purpose of the FOIA,’ wh ich is ‘contribut[ing] significantly to public unde rstanding of the operations or activities of the government .’” FLRA , 510 U.S. at 495 (second alterati on in original) (quoting Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press , 489 U.S. at 775). In this case, Defendant withhel d “the names, telephone numbers, email addresses, work locations, and other personally ide ntifiable information for no n-leadership, low er-level ICE employees,” as well as the “names[,] signatures, and home addre sses for other individuals and third parties (such as family m embers and contractors).” Def.’ s MSJ Br. at 11. The Court concludes that Defe ndant’s withholdings under Exempti on 6 were proper. The Court agrees with Defendant tha t the information redacted “can be identified as applying to”28 particular individuals. Ayuda , 70 F. Supp. 3d at 264. Moreover, indiv iduals have a substant ial privacy interest in personal in formation such as their telephon e numbers and addresses. AILA , 830 F.3d at 673. And releasing the per sonal information of thi rd parties and “lower-level ICE employees,” Def.’s MSJ Br. at 14, does not “contribut[e] signif icantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government.” FLRA , 510 U.S. at 495 (emphasis omitted). The Court’s conclusion is in accord with other courts in this Circu it. See, e.g. , Henderson v. DOJ , 157 F. Supp. 3d 42, 51 (D.D.C. 2016) (“EOUSA properly withheld the third-party information under Exemption 6.”); Conservation Force , 66 F. Supp. 3d at 67 (“It has long been held that personal data and information ca n be redacted from documents pr oduced under the FOIA in the interest of privacy.”) (collecting cases). Roseberry-Andrews’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing. S he argues that DHS’s redactions were not proper because the names of GS-14 and above employees are already public, and the titles of third parties cannot be redacted. Pl.’s Cros s-Mot. Br. at 11. But she does not point to any specific instances w here Defendant allegedly redac ted the name of a GS-14 employee and, in any event, DHS rep resented that it only redact ed the names of “non-leadership, lower-level ICE employees,” Def .’s MSJ Br. at 11. Roseberry-An drews also cites no evidence that Defendant redacted the titl es of third parties or that suc h redactions, if t hey occurred, would be improper.
3. Exemption 7 “Exemption 7 protects from disclo sure ‘records or information c ompiled for law enforcement purposes,’ but only to the extent that disclosure o f such records would cause an enumerated harm listed in Exemption 7’s subsections.” Miller v. DOJ , 872 F. Supp. 2d 12, 24 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing 5 U. S.C. § 552(b)(7)).29 a. Exemption 7 Threshold “To fall within Exemption 7, documents must first meet a thresh old requirement: that the records were ‘compiled for law enforcement purposes.’” Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int'l Boundary & Water Comm’n, U.S.-Mexico (“ PEER ”), 740 F.3d 195, 202-03 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing 5 U .S.C. § 552(b)(7)). “Agencies classified as law enforcement agencies . . . receive deference to their assertion that documents were compiled for a law enforcement purpose.” 100Reporters LLC , 248 F. Supp. 3d at 159 (citing Pratt v. Webster , 673 F.2d 408, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). But “not every document compiled by a law enforcement agency is compiled for a law enforcement purpose.”
Id. Instead, “the agency’s activity‘must be relat ed to the enfor cement of federal laws or to the maintenance of national security ’” and “the nexus between the [ activity] and one of the agency’s law enforcement duties must be based on information sufficient to support at least ‘a colorable claim’ of its rationality.” Pinson v. DOJ , 202 F. Supp. 3d 86, 101-02 (D.D.C. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Pratt , 673 F.2d at 420-21). If the recor ds at issue do not involve an ongoing law enforcement investigation, “materials may still meet the th reshold requirement of Exemption 7 if they are akin to ‘guidelin es, techniques, and procedures f or law enforcement investigations and prosecutions outside of the cont ext of a specific investiga tion.’” Pinson v. DOJ , 236 F. Supp. 3d 338, 365 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Tax Analysts v. IRS , 294 F.3d 71, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). As an initial matter, this Cour t concludes, consistent with man y other decisi ons in this Circuit, that ICE is a l aw enforcement agency. See, e.g. , Am. Immigration Council v. DHS (“

AIC ”), 950 F. Supp. 2d 221, 245 (D.D.C. 2013) (“As Defendants corr ectly note, ICE is an agency specializing in law enf orcement, and, consequently, its decision to invoke Exemption 7(E) is entitled to a m easure of deference.”); Barnard v. DHS , 598 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C.30 2009) (“[T]here is no question that ICE . . . perform[s] law en forcement activities.”). Thus, Defendant’s determination of wheth er records are compiled for l aw enforcement purposes receives deference under Pratt

. 10 With these principles in mind, the Court turns to the records t hat DHS redacted or withheld pursuant to Exemption 7.
b. Exemption 7(C) “FOIA exempts from disclosure ‘records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent t hat the production of such la w enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.’” CREW II, 746 F.3d at 1091 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)). If Defen dant satisfies the Exemption 7 threshold that the information being withheld w as compiled “for law enforcement purposes,” the Cour t’s “task, then, is ‘to balance the [ ] privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Archives & Records
Admin. v. Favish , 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004)). “Although the balancing test is applied to both Exemption 6 and 7(C), ‘Exemption 7(C) is more protective of pri vacy than Exemption 6 and thus establishes a lower bar fo r withholding material.’” 100Reporters LLC , 248 F. Supp. 3d at 158-

10 Defendant seems to suggest tha t any records created by a progr am office that provides support to ICE meet the Exemption 7 threshold. See Def.’s MSJ Br. at 13 (“All of the ICE records that are the subject of withholdings under Exemption 7 in this case originate from offices that are responsible for management and a dministration functions in supp ort of ICE’s operations. . . . As such, they are critical components of ICE’s law enforcement mis sion and their records are subject to Exemption 7.”). The C ourt rejects such a blanket as sertion. See Pinson , 202 F. Supp. 3d at 101 n.1 (rejecting a similar argument as “erroneous” because “the Pratt test was articulated specifically for law enforcement agencies, and details two cond itions that even law enforcement agencies must meet to pass the threshold with r espect to partic ular documents”). Thus, the Court will evaluate whether each category of documents that Defendant seeks to withhold under Exemption 7 satisfies the thr eshold for thi s exemption.31 59 (quoting Prison Legal News v. Samuels , 787 F.3d 1142, 1146 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2015)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to Exemption 7(C), DHS withheld the names and personal ly identifiable information of ICE employees who “handle a myriad of tasks rela ting to the enforcement of federal immigration law.” Ty rrell Decl. ¶ 39. Moreover, DHS a sserts that “[i]f their identities are released, they could become targets of harassment” and “[t] here is no public interest to be served by releasing the identitie s or personal information of t hese government employees.” Id. Consistent with other opinions i n this Circuit, this Court agre es that this information was properly withheld under Exemption 7(C). See, e.g. , Isiwele v. HHS , 85 F. Supp. 3d 337, 359 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding agency prope rly redacted names of law en forcement personnel); Gosen v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. , 75 F. Supp. 3d 279, 290 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Because these redactions do not appear to impli cate any public interest at al l, USCIS properly applied Exemption[] . . . 7(C).”); Brown v. FBI, 873 F. Supp. 2d 388, 404 (D.D.C. 2012) (“In light of the employees’ privacy interests, the potential for violence, and t he insubstantial public interest in the names of clerical employ ees, defendant properly withholds the names and identifying information of FBI [Special A gents] and support personnel.”).

c. Exemption 7(E) Exemption 7(E) authorizes the government to withhold records an d documents if they were “compiled for law enforcemen t purposes,” provided that the ir publication “would disclose techniques and procedures for lawenforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement i nvestigations or prosecutions i f such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumven tion of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552( b)(7)(E). The “requirement that disclosure risk circumvention of t he law ‘sets a relatively low bar for the agency to justify withholding.’” PEER , 740 F.3d at 205 (quoting Blackwell v. FBI, 646 F.3d 37, 42 (D.C. Cir.32 2011)). “Rather than requiring ahighly specific burden of sho wing how the law will be circumvented, exemption 7(E) only requires that the [agency] de monstrate logically how the release of the requested infor mation might create a risk of cir cumvention of the law.” Gilman v.
DHS , 32 F. Supp. 3d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2014) (al teration in original) ( quoting Blackwell , 646 F.3d at 42). Here, Defendant seeks to redac t a handful of documents pursuant to Exemption 7(E) to withhold information about ICE data bases, such as internal reso urce-location add resses and case numbers. See Def.’s MSJ Br. at 14-15; Vaughn Index at 7, 14-15, 19. According to DHS, this information can reveal “the type of activity unde r investigatio n, the location of a case or investigative effort, and the sc ope and size of an investigatio n.” Def.’s MSJ Br. at 15. Moreover, it asserts that the i nformation is “not widely known and its revelation may allow persons seeking to circumvent the law to take proactive steps t o counter operational and investigative actions.” Id. In response, Roseberry-Andrews argues that Exemption 7(E) is in applicable because it only “applies to criminal invest igations.” Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Br . at 11. She also argues that Defendant “failed to show that r eleasing information about its databases would disclose investigative or prosecutorial techniques, procedures, or guide lines” or that harm “could reasonably be expected” from disclosure. Id. at 12. The Court agrees with Defenda nt that its withholdings under Exe mption 7(E) were proper. As an initial matter, Roseberry-Andr ews is incorrect that Exemption 7(E) applies only to criminal investigations. The term “law enforcement” in Exempti on 7 “refers to the act of enforcing the law, both civil and criminal.” PEER , 740 F.3d at 203. And it “entails more than just investigating and prosecuti ng individuals after a violatio n of the law.” Id.33 The Court is also satisfied tha t the information DHS withheld p ursuant to Exemption 7(E) was “compiled for law enfor cement purposes.” ICE is an ag ency located within DHS, which is responsible for “admi nistration and enforcement of law s related to immigration and naturalization.” Def .’s MSJ Br. at 12-13 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 11 03). ICE uses databases to “assist . . . with deporting people who are unlawfully in the United St ates, to arrest those who violate federal immigration laws, and t o track investigations and court proceedings of those apprehended.” Long v. ICE , 149 F. Supp. 3d 39, 49 (D.D.C. 2015). The Court therefore concludes, particularly in light of the deference that Defendan t receives under Pratt , that “the withheld portions of the record are ‘related to the enforcement of federal laws’” and “based on information sufficient to support at least a colorable claim of its rationality.” Bayala v. DHS , 264 F. Supp. 3d 165, 178-79 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Pratt , 673 F.2d at 420-21). The Court’s conclusion is consistent with othe r decisions in this Circuit. See, e.g. , id. at 178-80 (authorizing DHS to withhold information about “el ectronic database systems” ); Isiwele , 85 F. Supp. 3d at 360 (“[T]he Court finds that IC E properly redacted . . . databa se codes, case numbers, and numeric references . . . under FO IA 7(E).” (internal quotation mark omitted)); Gosen , 75 F. Supp. 3d at 290 (database informati on such as codes and descrip tions of documents “is precisely the type[ ] of information c ontemplated by the exemption, and . . . properly is withheld under Exemption 7(E)” (alteration in o riginal) (internal quotation ma rks omitted)). The Court also agrees with DHS t hat the information withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(E) would disclose “techniques and procedures for law enforcem ent investigations.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). Defendant explaine d that information it withhe ld can reveal information about the type, scope, and location of an investigation. Def.’s MSJ Br. at 14 (citing Tyrrell Decl. ¶ 39). Such information involves “techni ques and procedures” for law e nforcement because it reveals34 how ICE organizes information reg arding its investigations. An d the fact that the redactions at issue are not related to a n ongoing investigation is of no mome nt. Tax Analysts , 294 F.3d at 78. The Court also concludes that t hese withholdings meet the “rela tively low bar,” PEER , 740 F.3d at 205, to establish that di sclosure “could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7 )(E). Tyrrell’s declaration explains that “[d]isclosure of these techniques and practices for navi gating law enforcement databas es could permit people seeking to violate or circumvent the law to take proactive steps to counter operational and investigative actions taken by ICE.” Tyrrell Decl. ¶ 42. As other courts in this Circuit have found, that is sufficient to meet Exemption 7(E). See Parker , 238 F. Supp. 3d at 100 (“The Court agrees that disclosing this information c ould reasonably be expected to cre ate a risk of circumvention by revealing how ICE’s databases work and rendering them more vuln erable to manipulation.”); Abdelfattah v. ICE , 851 F. Supp. 2d 141, 145 (D.D.C. 2012) (permitting withholdin g of “program codes . . . and internal instructions” by ICE under Ex emption 7(E)). The Court thus upholds Defendant’s redactions under Exemption 7(E). For the foregoing reasons, on the r ecord currently before the C ourt, the Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary j udgment as it relates to its wi thholdings under FOIA, and denies Roseberry-Andrews’ c ross-motion on this issue.
D. Segregability FOIA requires that an agency pr ovide “[a]ny reasonably segregab le portion of a record . . . after deletion of the portions which are exempt,” 5 U.S.C . § 552(b), “unless the exempt portions are ‘inextricably inter twined with exempt portions,’” Johnson , 310 F.3d at 776 (quoting
Mead Data , 566 F.2d at 260). “The agency is ‘entitled to a presumption that [it] complied with the obligation to disclose reasonabl y segregable material,’ butthat does not excuse the agency from carrying its evidentiar y burden to fully explain its decis ions on segregability,”35 100Reporters LLC , 248 F. Supp. 3d at 165 (quoting Hodge v. FBI, 703 F.3d 575, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (alteration in original)) . Indeed, the agency “must . . . provide descriptions of excerpts deemed to be non-segregable, with explanations as to these deci sions.” AIC , 950 F. Supp. 2d at
248. Here, Roseberry-Andrews baldly a sserts that DHS failed to “[c]o nduct a segregated line by line review of the informati on withheld.” Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Br. at 10. Tyrrell asserts in equally conclusory fashion that he “reviewed each record line-b y-line to identify information exempt from disclosure,” and tha t any records released in part were “correctly segregated and non-exempt portions were release d.” Tyrrell Decl. ¶¶ 44-45. U ltimately, the Court denies Defendant’s motion for summar y judgment on the question of segr egability because it is unclear on the record before the Court wh ether Defendant withheld any i nformation on the grounds that it was non-segregable (and, if s o, what explanation it would of fer to justify such withholdings). The Court notes that similar attestations have been met with sk epticism by other courts in this Circuit. See, e.g. , AIC , 950 F. Supp. 2d at 248 (similar ICE a ttestation “will not suf fice to discharge [the agency’s] burden” ). If Defendant has withheld i nformation as non-segregable, it should, in any future motion for su mmary judgment, clearly iden tify that information and “provide the reasons behind [its] conclusions in order that the y may be challenged by FOIA plaintiffs and reviewed by the courts.” Id. (quoting Mead Data , 566 F.2d at 261).36 Conclusion and Order For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 22) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART WITHOUT
PREJUDICE . The Court will permit Defendant to file a renewed motion for summary judgment within 60 days explaini ng how it conducted an adequate search—whether by conducting additional searches or providing additional informat ion about the searches already conducted—and setting forth whether it withheld any non-segregable information and why. The Court will also RESERVE JUDGMENT IN PART on and DENY IN PART RoseberryAndrews’ cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 24).

SO ORDERED. /s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: March 13, 2018