NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM:

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE

William E. Berry, Jr.

INSS Occasional Paper 3 

March 1995 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

US Air Force Academy, Colorado 
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The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense or the US 

Government. This report is approved for public release by 

SAF/PAS; distribution is unlimited. 

******** 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Colonel William E. Berry, Jr., is 

Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science at the 

US Air Force Academy. A PhD from Cornell University, he has 

served tours of duty in Vietnam, the Philippines, Korea, and 

Malaysia, where he was the US Air Attaché. Colonel Berry has 

written extensively on US security interests in East Asia. His book, 

US Bases in the Philippines: The Evolution of the Special 

Relationship, is generally considered to be the most complete work 

on this subject. 

******** 

This paper is the result of research sponsored by the USAF 

Institute for National Security Studies during the summer and fall 

of 1994. 

******** 

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be 

forwarded to: Director, Institute for National Security Studies, HQ 

USAFA/DFE, 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 4K25, US Air Force 

Academy, Colorado Springs, CO 80840, 719-472-2717. Comments 

may also be conveyed directly to the author by calling him at 719-

472-2270. 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Introduction 1 

The History of the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program 2 

The Clinton Administration and the Counterproliferation Strategy 8 

US-North Korean Talks Begin 11 

The Implementation of the Counterproliferation Strategy in Korea 16 

Inspections Begin, Difficulties Remain 20 

North Korean Actions Increase Tensions 24 

The Carter Trip 27 

The 1994 Agreements 29 

An Evaluation of the Clinton Counterproliferation Policy 32 

The Policy Positions of the Key Allies 32 

The Clinton Policies 40 

Epilogue 44 

Endnotes 48 
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FOREWORD

We are pleased to publish this third volume in the 

Occasional Paper series of the US Air Force Institute for National 

Security Studies (INSS). This monograph represents the results of 

research conducted during the summer and fall of 1994 under the 

sponsorship of a grant from INSS. 

INSS is co-sponsored by the National Security 

Negotiations Division, Plans and Operations Directorate, 

Headquarters US Air Force (USAF/XOXI) and the Dean of the 

Faculty, US Air Force Academy. The primary purpose of the 

Institute is to promote research done within the DOD community 

in the fields of arms control, national security, regional studies, the 

revolution in military affairs, and information warfare. INSS 

coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various disciplines and 

across services to develop new ideas for USAF policy making. The 

Institute develops topics, selects researchers from within the 

military academic community, and administers sponsored research. 

We also host conferences and workshops which facilitate the 

dissemination of information to a wide range of private and 

government organizations. INSS is in its third year of providing 

valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of the Air Staff 

and our other sponsors. 

This paper highlights a potential source of unrest and 

instability in Northeast Asia. It addresses the suspected North 

Korean nuclear weapons program and the policies that the Bush 

and Clinton administrations employed to meet this perceived 

threat. In particular, the paper focuses on the counterproliferation 
viii

policy efforts of the Clinton administration over the past two years, 

leading to the arguable success of the October 1994 US-North 

Korean agreements. Col Berry then analyzes the 

counterproliferation policy and draws conclusions as to whether it 

can serve as a model for similar efforts to stem proliferators in 

other regions of the world. 

The problem, of course, is similar to the Cold War axiom 

that no one knew whether deterrence really worked. In the case of 

a potential nuclear proliferant, no one can be certain of that state’s 

motivations for either pursuing weapons of mass destruction, or for 

giving them up. In North Korea’s case, as Col Berry points out, if 

North Korea has tied its regime survival to a nuclear weapons 

program, it is much less likely to follow through with agreements 

to stop regardless of the incentives or disincentives provided by the 

US or the United Nations. On the other hand, if the Clinton 

policies work in the North Korean case, they are likely to work 

elsewhere, given the nature of the North Korean regime and its 

reputation as a hard test case for the new counterproliferation 

policy. 

We appreciate your interest in INSS and its research 

products. We hope we are meeting a need for this type of analysis 

and reflection, and we look forward to publishing these papers on a 

regular basis. 

JEFFREY A. LARSEN, Lt Colonel, USAF 

Director, Institute for National Security Studies 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The very real possibility of nuclear proliferation on the 

Korean peninsula threatens American national security interests in 

Northeast Asia and poses a challenge to the international 

nonproliferation regime. The suspected North Korean nuclear 

weapons program is the primary cause of concern. Although a 

signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International 

Atomic Energy Safeguards Agreement, North Korea's overt and 

covert behavior over the past several years has raised serious 

questions about its true intentions. 

The Clinton administration has responded to this 

challenge through a series of incentives and threats, the classic 

carrot and stick approach, in an effort to influence North Korean 

behavior. In particular, the United States has attempted to persuade 

North Korea's political leaders to abandon any nuclear weapons 

program. This research project addresses the most important 

developments from late 1991 to the present, with particular 

emphasis on President Clinton's counterproliferation policy and the 

October 1994 bilateral agreement between the U.S. and North 

Korea. The perspectives of both Koreas, Japan, China, and Russia 

are also presented. 

The final section provides some constructive criticisms of 

the Clinton policy and its implementation, and evaluates whether 

the President's non-proliferation efforts directed at the Korean 

peninsula can serve as an effective model for possible proliferation 

elsewhere. According to the author, if the difficult Korean case can 

be solved, so can most other regional proliferation problems. 
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1

NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM:

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE

The very real probability that the Democratic People's 

Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is developing a nuclear 

weapons program has been and remains a major foreign policy and 

national security issue for both the Bush and Clinton 

administrations. Former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, in a 

visit to the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) in late 1991, 

stated that a North Korea with nuclear weapons and missile 

delivery systems was “the most serious threat to peace and stability 

on the Korean peninsula and indeed in East Asia.”1

 William Perry, 

Secretary of Defense in the Clinton administration, echoed similar 

sentiments in a speech before the Asia Society in May 1994. In this 

speech, Secretary Perry indicated that the United States and its 

South Korean ally must take North Korea's large conventional 

forces, its nuclear weapons program, and its harsh rhetoric 

seriously and plan accordingly.2

 

The primary purpose of this paper is to address the 

suspected DPRK nuclear weapons program and the policies the 

Bush and Clinton administrations have employed to confront this 

perceived threat. The Clinton administration's counterproliferation 

policy efforts are a particular focus up to the time of the death of 

North Korean President Kim Il Sung in July 1994. In the final 

section, I draw some conclusions as to whether the Clinton policy 

should serve as a model for efforts to address other potential 

nuclear proliferators in the international political system. 
2

The History of the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program

North Korea is one of the most closed and isolated 

countries in the world. The secretiveness of this nation-state makes 

an analysis of any of its policies difficult, but some specifics 

concerning its nuclear weapons program are well established. 

North Korea joined the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) in 1974 and signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 

December 1985, allegedly under pressure from the Soviet Union 

and in exchange for the continuation of Soviet assistance to its 

nuclear power program.3

 However, after becoming an NPT 

signatory, the DPRK refused to sign the IAEA full-scope 

safeguards agreement which it was obligated to do within 18 

months under the provisions of the NPT. South Korea is also an 

IAEA member and a signatory of the NPT. Since 1975, all South 

Korean nuclear reactors and other related facilities have been 

subject to IAEA inspections.4

 

Although there were some administrative problems which 

contributed to the North Korean delay in signing the IAEA 

safeguards agreement (the IAEA sent the wrong forms), the more 

substantive reasons involved North Korea's concerns that these 

safeguards would adversely affect DPRK national security. North 

Korean officials established three preconditions which needed to 

be satisfied before their country would sign. First, the U.S. must 

remove its nuclear weapons which North Korea believed were 

located in South Korea. Second, the U.S.-ROK annual military 

exercise named Team Spirit and conducted in South Korea must be 

terminated. The North Koreans have consistently referred to this 

exercise as well as other U.S.-ROK combined training as “nuclear 
3

war games.” Third, North Korea wanted to reserve the right to 

abrogate the safeguards agreement if it perceived that the nuclear 

powers were acting in a hostile or suspicious manner toward the 

DPRK.5 

Concern over the North Korean refusal to sign the IAEA 

safeguards agreement and to allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear 

facilities increased in 1989 when U.S. intelligence reports 

indicated the DPRK was building what appeared to be additional 

reactors and possibly a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at its 

Yongbyon site, approximately 60 miles north of Pyongyang.6

 

These facilities supplemented the 5 megawatt (MW) reactor which 

the DPRK began constructing in 1980. This reactor uses natural 

uranium for fuel--which is readily available in North Korea--and is 

believed to have become operational in 1986. Work on the two 

additional reactors began in the mid 1980s. One of these is thought 

to be a 50 MW model which is also uranium fueled and capable of 

producing plutonium, as is the 5 MW reactor. Another 200 MW 

reactor is under construction at Taech'on, and both of these larger 

reactors are projected for completion in the mid to late 1990s. U.S. 

estimates are that by the end of the 1980s, North Korea had 

developed the capability to produce enough plutonium from its 5 

MW reactor to construct one Hiroshima-size nuclear weapon each 

year.7

 

At the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991, U.S. and other 

countries' concerns over the DPRK's nuclear weapons capabilities 

increased because Iraq's program turned out to be far more 

advanced than U.S. intelligence had detected before the war. One 

expert argued that the North Korean program was more dangerous 
4

than Iraq's because North Korea was more autarkic and not as 

dependent on outside assistance.8

 A North Korean diplomat who 

defected to the ROK in 1991 informed officials in Seoul that the 

DPRK had no intention of signing the IAEA safeguards agreement, 

and was only using the offer to sign as a ploy to gain more time to 

develop its nuclear weapons program.9

 As a result of Iraq's 

success in fooling U.S. intelligence and the defector's allegations, a 

series of initiatives began in 1991 which addressed North Korea as 

well as U.S. nuclear weapons in the ROK. 

The United States has consistently refused to confirm or 

deny the presence of its nuclear weapons in foreign countries. 

However, in September 1991, President Bush announced that the 

U.S. would withdraw all of its short-range nuclear weapons from 

abroad and return them to the United States either for destruction 

or storage. He subsequently extended this policy to include nuclear 

bombs.10 Bush was influenced by other negotiations ongoing with 

the Soviet Union and additional initiatives underway in Asia, but 

his announcement had a definite effect on the Korean peninsula. 

As indicated previously, the North Koreans had justified their 

refusal to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement in part on the 

presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in the ROK. That justification 

was no longer applicable.11 

South Korea's President Roh Tae Woo decided to press 

ahead with his own diplomatic efforts directly with North Korean 

authorities on nuclear issues in conjunction with talks which were 

also underway on a non-aggression pact and peace treaty. In late 

November 1991, South Korean officials announced that the U.S. 

had begun withdrawing its nuclear weapons, and Roh followed this 
5

in mid-December with a statement that all U.S. nuclear weapons 

were out of his country.12 Roh's announcement allowed the U.S. to 

maintain its neither confirm nor deny policy. In a televised speech 

in November 1991, Roh also announced that South Korea would 

not manufacture, possess, deploy, or use nuclear weapons nor 

would it build nuclear fuel reprocessing plants to extract 

plutonium.13 

On New Year's Eve 1991 the two Koreas signed an 

agreement entitled the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of 

the Korean Peninsula. This agreement, which required the 

ratification of the legislatures of both countries, committed the 

signatories not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, 

store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons.” Also included was the 

pledge that neither country would “possess nuclear reprocessing 

and uranium enrichment facilities,” and they agreed that in order to 

verify compliance each country would “conduct inspections of the 

objects selected by the other side and agreed upon by two sides.” 

In order to implement this agreement, both Koreas established a 

South-North Nuclear Control Commission. In another major 

announcement at the same time, the ROK and U.S. stated that the 

Team Spirit exercise was canceled for 1992 because of the 

progress made on resolving the nuclear issue.14 

In January 1992 North Korea signed an agreement with 

the IAEA that provided for international inspections of its nuclear 

facilities after ratification of this agreement by its legislature.15

Although there were several delays in this ratification process, the 

DPRK did ratify this agreement in April 1992.16 In accordance 

with IAEA regulations, North Korea was required to submit to 

outside inspections within 90 days of ratification. During May 
6

1992, North Korea provided the IAEA with detailed information 

about its seven nuclear power facilities, including those at 

Yongbyon. Although continuing to deny any nuclear weapons 

capabilities or intent, this cleared the way for international 

inspections. Between May 1992 and July 1993, the IAEA 

conducted seven ad hoc inspections of North Korean nuclear 

facilities. Each of these inspections lasted between one and two 

weeks.17 

Despite progress on IAEA inspections, the two Koreas 

were unsuccessful in their efforts to implement the bilateral 

denuclearization agreement. The DPRK continually rejected the 

ROK's calls for mutual inspections which would include 

“challenge inspections.” Under this proposal, each side would 

determine which sites in the other country were to be inspected and 

would give only a short notice before conducting each inspection. 

North Korea objected to this inspection plan, and, once agreement 

was reached with the IAEA on inspections, North Korea informed 

the ROK that this IAEA agreement resolved all inspection issues.18

After the first IAEA ad hoc inspection in May 1992, Hans 

Blix, the IAEA Director General, held a press conference. He 

related that North Korean officials had allowed him and the other 

inspectors to visit all of the sites they had requested, including the 

operational 5 MW reactor and the 50 MW and 200 MW reactors 

under construction. Of perhaps even more significance, they had 

access to a facility which the U.S. believed was a nuclear 

reprocessing plant at Yongbyon, but which the North Koreans 

referred to as a “radiochemical laboratory.” The North Koreans 

admitted to Blix that they had built this laboratory to experiment 
7

with plutonium extraction in the event they ever desired to build a 

breeder reactor, which uses plutonium as fuel. Additionally, these 

North Korean officials confirmed they had in fact extracted some 

plutonium, but claimed this extraction only amounted to a few 

grams.19 

During some of the subsequent IAEA inspections 

between May-November 1992, IAEA suspicions increased because 

of some apparent discrepancies discovered concerning the amount 

of plutonium the North Koreans admitted to extracting. These 

discrepancies involved North Korean claims that the plutonium 

extraction only occurred on one occasion, and the IAEA's opinion 

that fuel had been reprocessed up to three separate times. If true, 

this observation could mean that North Korea had stored more 

weapons-grade plutonium than the few grams they admitted.20 In 

late 1992, IAEA inspectors requested they be given access to two 

additional sites which the agency suspected of being storage sites 

for nuclear waste. DPRK officials denied these two facilities were 

waste sites and claimed instead that they were military warehouses 

and, therefore, not subject to IAEA inspection. By the end of 1992, 

North Korea had also broken off discussions with South Korea 

concerning bilateral inspections under the terms of the 

denuclearization agreement.21 

As the transition from the Bush administration to the 

Clinton administration took place in January 1993, progress had 

been made in clarifying some of the issues concerning nuclear 

proliferation on the Korean peninsula. However, problems had 

developed between the IAEA and the DPRK on nuclear 

inspections, and the talks between the two Koreas on the 
8

denuclearization process had ceased. Robert Gates, the Director of 

the Central Intelligence Agency, expressed some of his concerns 

when he warned that the IAEA inspections which had been 

conducted raised more questions than answers. He referred 

specifically to the 5 MW reactor which the North Koreans had shut 

down for a few weeks in 1989. Gates suspected that the DPRK had 

extracted much more plutonium during this shut down than its 

nuclear experts admitted, and he also criticized North Korea for 

not allowing IAEA inspectors access to the natural uranium core of 

this reactor. In his opinion, inspections of the core represented the 

best means of determining how much plutonium had been 

extracted and when.22 

The Clinton Administration and the Counterproliferation 

Policy 

Relations between the IAEA and North Korea continued 

to deteriorate during the first few months of the Clinton 

administration. In early February 1993 the IAEA requested 

permission to conduct “special inspections” of two sites at 

Yongbyon which inspectors believed were nuclear waste storage 

sites. North Korea refused this request based on its assertion that 

these two buildings were military warehouses and were not 

associated with its nuclear energy program in any way. An impasse 

developed between the IAEA and the DPRK in February with the 

North Koreans repeating more frequently that the IAEA was 

simply a U.S. tool, and, as such, was attempting to place increased 

pressure on their country.23 
9

In mid March, the UN Security Council voted 13-0 to 

adopt a resolution calling on the DPRK to allow IAEA inspectors 

access to the two suspected nuclear waste sites. China and Pakistan 

abstained. North Korea responded that such inspections of military 

facilities would be “an interference in the internal affairs and a 

grave infringement on its sovereignty.”24 When the IAEA, now 

backed by the Security Council, continued to press for these 

special inspections, North Korea announced on 14 March 1993 that 

it intended to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 

conclusion of the 90-day notification period as required by the 

NPT.25 This was the first instance in the history of the NPT when 

a signatory country officially announced its decision to withdraw. 

Several nuclear weapons experts at the time speculated 

that the DPRK decision was mainly predicated on its shock at the 

sophistication of IAEA inspections and the belief that access to the 

additional sites would reveal more conclusively that North Korea 

was developing a nuclear weapons program. Others thought that 

this decision may have been more related to domestic politics in 

North Korea, and that Kim Jong Il, the son of Kim Il Sung, was 

using the withdrawal threat to demonstrate his toughness to his 

own military and to indicate that he would be a worthy successor 

to his father.26 

Whatever the motivations for deciding to withdraw from 

the NPT, the Clinton administration took this threat very seriously-

-both because of the increased threat to U.S. national security 

interests in Northeast Asia, and because of the long-term 

implications a North Korean withdrawal from the NPT would have 

on the international non-proliferation regime. Secretary of Defense 
10

Les Aspin stated in an interview at the time that the U.S. would 

“go on a full court press to see if we can't get the North Koreans to 

change their policy.”27 Compounding the difficulties for the 

administration was the fact that there was no consensus on whether 

the DPRK already had enough plutonium to build a bomb. For 

example, former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger testified 

before a congressional committee that he believed North Korea 

already had at least one nuclear weapon. However, R. James 

Woolsey, the new CIA Director, expressed the opinion that the 

DPRK had enough plutonium to build a bomb, but had not yet 

done so.28 

International diplomacy continued in May 1993 when the 

UN Security Council considered a resolution once again calling on 

North Korea to allow IAEA inspections and not to withdraw from 

the NPT. This resolution passed once again by a 13-0 vote with 

China and Pakistan again abstaining.29 North Korea responded in 

late May by listing five conditions which must be met if it were to 

remain in the NPT.30 First, the U.S. and ROK must agree to cancel 

future Team Spirit military exercises. This demand had taken on 

increased salience from the DPRK's perspective because the two 

allies had resumed this exercise earlier in 1993 after canceling it in 

1992. They reached this decision based on the belief that 

resumption of Team Spirit would pressure the North Koreans to 

reopen negotiations with the ROK on denuclearization issues.31

Second, the ROK must allow inspections of its military facilities 

and those of the U.S. in South Korea. Third, the United States must 

guarantee not to launch a nuclear attack on North Korea. Fourth, 
11

the U.S. must remove its nuclear umbrella from the ROK. Fifth, 

the U.S. must recognize the socialist system in North Korea. 

U.S.-North Korean Talks Begin 

In late May 1993, the U.S. and DPRK agreed to hold 

high-level talks in an effort to resolve some of the outstanding 

issues. The 90-day notification period was due to expire on 12 

June, so this deadline provided a sense of urgency for this series of 

meetings. Kang Sok Chu, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 

led the North Korean delegation, and Robert L. Gallucci, Assistant 

Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, represented the 

U.S. Newspaper accounts at the time indicated that the U.S. would 

press North Korea to remain in the NPT and adhere to IAEA 

inspection requests and to resume its discussions with the South 

Koreans concerning denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. In 

return, the United States was willing to discuss a variety of 

political and economic incentives, to include the possible 

termination of Team Spirit.32 

Negotiators from the two sides met in New York at the 

United Nations between 2-11 June and in Geneva between 14-19 

July 1993. In the joint statement at the conclusion of the first of 

these negotiations, the U.S. and North Korea agreed to some rather 

broad and potentially ambiguous principles.33 Both expressed 

support for the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the 

Korean Peninsula and other non-proliferation goals and agreed to 

give “assurances against the threat and use of force, including 

nuclear weapons.” Further, both agreed to support “peace and 

security in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, including impartial 
12

application of full scope safeguards, mutual respect for each other's 

sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.” 

Finally, both agreed to “support the peaceful reunification of 

Korea.” In the final section of this statement, North Korea 

“decided unilaterally to suspend as long as it considers necessary 

the effectuation of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” 

After the discussions concluded in Geneva during July, 

the negotiators released another statement.34 They reaffirmed the 

principles agreed to during the June meetings in New York, and 

the U.S. “specifically reaffirmed its commitment to the principles 

of assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear 

weapons.” In another significant agreement, North Korea and the 

U.S. recognized the importance of the DPRK's intention to replace 

its aging graphite moderated reactors with light water moderated 

reactors (LWRs). The U.S. stated it was ready to support the 

DPRK's efforts to obtain LWRs. The DPRK agreed to begin 

consultations with the IAEA on safeguard inspection issues as 

soon as possible and to meet with ROK representatives “on 

bilateral issues including the nuclear issue.” 

In a separate statement released concurrently, Robert 

Gallucci made some interesting observations concerning the 

negotiations to that point.35 He indicated that some progress had 

been made convincing the North Koreans to continue discussions 

with both the IAEA and ROK on nuclear issues. Gallucci also 

noted that the U.S. motivation for offering some support to North 

Korea on LWRs was based on the fact that LWRs “are less suitable 

for nuclear weapons material production” than the graphite 
13

reactors. However, he cautioned that the United States would not 

support the acquisition of the more modern reactors until North 

Korea fully complied with IAEA safeguards and entered into 

discussions with the ROK. 

Although the bilateral negotiations in June and July 1993 

were important in that North Korea agreed to “suspend” its 

withdrawal from the NPT, the references to mutual respect for 

each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's 

internal affairs provided the DPRK with a degree of ambiguity 

which its negotiators would use effectively in subsequent 

discussions with the U.S. and others. During the first few months 

of the Clinton administration, the U.S. had primarily been reacting 

to events initiated by the IAEA and North Korea. However, in July 

1993 President Clinton visited South Korea and made a number of 

statements and speeches designed to clarify the new 

administration's policy involving the Korean peninsula. 

Even prior to his arrival in Korea, both President Clinton 

and Secretary of State Warren Christopher were quoted as taking a 

harder line on the possibility that North Korea either already had or 

was developing nuclear weapons. The President described the 

DPRK as the “scariest” place on earth, and when asked specifically 

about possible nuclear weapons capability in the DPRK, he replied 

“that is not something we can afford to let happen.”36 In explaining 

further why he described North Korea as the “scariest” place on 

earth, he stated that the Korean peninsula was one of the few 

places where Cold War confrontations remained, and that the 

DPRK had a long track record of unpredictable behavior. 
14

Speaking before the South Korean National Assembly on 

10 July 1993, President Clinton outlined his “new Pacific 

community” concept.37 The second priority for the development of 

this community involved “stronger efforts to combat the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” In providing more 

details in reference to the Korean peninsula, President Clinton 

warned that North Korea appeared committed to developing Scud 

missiles and related technology. He also expressed concern that the 

North Koreans would sell these missiles to countries in the Middle 

East. Concerning nuclear weapons, he urged the DPRK to reaffirm 

its commitment to the NPT and “to fulfill its full-scope safeguards 

obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency, including 

IAEA inspections of undeclared nuclear sites, and to implement 

bilateral inspections under the South-North Nuclear Accord.” 

The President then traveled to the Demilitarized Zone 

(DMZ) along the 38th parallel where he made even more specific 

comments regarding North Korea. Speaking before U.S. military 

forces forward deployed, President Clinton stated that if North 

Korea developed and used nuclear weapons, “we would quickly 

and overwhelmingly retaliate. It would mean the end of their 

country as they know it.”38 The DPRK immediately responded by 

referring to the President's statement at the DMZ as a “rash act” 

and warned him against taking any provocative measures.39 

The administration developed its official 

counterproliferation strategy in 1993 and published it in the 

“Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the 

Congress” in January 1994.40 This report indicated that deterrence 

in the post Cold War era may be more difficult and dangerous 
15

because during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the primary 

threat, and the superpower relationship was well established and 

understood. However, at present, countries possessing or hoping to 

possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have different 

strategies and motives. To insure continued deterrence, this report 

called for both preventive and protective measures to guard against 

WMD proliferation. The preventive tools include dissuasion, 

denial, arms control, and international pressure. Protective tools 

include defusing, deterrence, offense, and defense. 

Each of these tools requires more explanation in order to 

evaluate which of them the Clinton administration has employed in 

the case of North Korea and the effectiveness of these efforts. 

Dissuasion attempts to convince a potential proliferator that the 

economic and political costs of developing nuclear weapons and 

other WMD are too high. Positive and negative security assurances 

can be used in the effort to make this argument. Denial includes 

export controls, interdiction, and similar efforts to restrict access to 

nuclear weapons and related technologies. Arms control certainly 

includes support for the NPT and other international regimes as 

well as inspections and monitoring of nuclear programs. 

International pressure includes sanctions as well as attempts to 

isolate proliferators. On the protective side, defusing refers to 

cooperative disarmament efforts plus confidence building 

measures. Deterrence involves bringing military, political, and 

economic pressures to bear to convince the proliferator that the 

costs of using WMD are too high. Offense provides the means of 

protecting U.S. forces and those of allies by seizing, disabling, or 
16

destroying nuclear weapons and other WMD. Defense includes 

both active and passive measures to mitigate the effects of nuclear 

weapons. 

The Implementation of the Counterproliferation Strategy in 

Korea 

After the Clinton visit to South Korea in July 1993 and 

the two high-level talks that summer, direct negotiations between 

the U.S. and DPRK were limited to relatively low-level 

discussions at the UN. These talks attempted to find common 

ground to improve relations, but perhaps more important, the 

American negotiators attempted to break the impasse between 

North Korea and the IAEA. This task was becoming more urgent 

because the film, batteries, and other equipment the IAEA had 

installed at DPRK nuclear facilities would expire before the end of 

the year. If not replaced, the IAEA would not be able to guarantee 

the continuity of its safeguard inspection procedures.41 

In early November 1993, Hans Blix, the IAEA DirectorGeneral, delivered a report to the UN which explicitly stated that if 

the IAEA inspectors were not permitted to revisit the North Korean 

nuclear facilities, the agency could no longer verify the 

implementation of the nuclear safeguards accord. The General 

Assembly then agreed to discuss the IAEA-DPRK dispute. At the 

conclusion of these discussions, the General Assembly passed a 

resolution calling on North Korea “to cooperate immediately with 

the International Atomic Energy Agency in the full implementation 

of the safeguards agreement.” The vote was 140 in support of the 
17

resolution with only the DPRK voting against. China and eight 

other countries abstained.42 

Despite this General Assembly resolution, there was no 

progress in the IAEA-DPRK impasse over inspections even though 

North Korea had agreed to hold consultations with the IAEA and 

ROK in the June and July joint statements. In addition, the 

negotiations between the two Koreas concerning the 

denuclearization of the Korean peninsula had been unsuccessful 

and were not even being held by the end of 1993. 

Based at least in part on the failure of these negotiations, 

the U.S. decided to modify its diplomatic approach to the DPRK 

late in the year. The senior U.S. negotiator, Bob Gallucci, 

described this new tactic as “the broad and thorough approach” in 

an interview during May 1994 and indicated it was conceived in 

the September-October time period in 1993.43 According to 

Gallucci, the U.S. wanted to tie North Korean behavior to specific 

U.S. incentives which could include beginning the diplomatic 

recognition process, more normal economic relations, and 

assistance with the LWRs. In return, the DPRK not only would 

have to comply with all NPT and IAEA requirements to resolve 

the nuclear weapons issue, but also would have to redeploy its 

forces away from the 38th parallel and to cease its weapons sales, 

particularly those to the Middle East, among other demands. If 

these “carrots” did not work, then Gallucci indicated the U.S. 

would move ahead with efforts to have the UN adopt economic 

sanctions, although he cautioned there were dangers involved with 

this particular “stick.” The U.S. also hoped that if it did offer a 

comprehensive deal to North Korea, the Chinese would see this 
18

offer as a reasonable effort to resolve this dispute and not veto a 

subsequent sanction resolution in the Security Council if it ever 

came to sanctions.44 

In December 1993, the DPRK offered to allow IAEA 

inspectors access to five of its seven declared nuclear facilities to 

change the film and batteries in the cameras monitoring North 

Korean activities at these locations. However, the Korean 

authorities would not allow the inspectors to visit the nuclear 

reactor at Yongbyon or the suspected nuclear reprocessing plant 

there. This proposal was unacceptable to the IAEA which was still 

embarrassed by its failure to detect the Iraqi nuclear weapons 

program prior to the Gulf War. In addition, the IAEA refused to 

accept the premise that an NPT signatory country could determine 

the scope of IAEA inspections at any of that country's officially 

declared nuclear facilities.45

According to The New York Times, the need for further 

negotiations received an additional impetus in late December when 

American intelligence sources notified President Clinton that 

North Korea probably had developed one or two nuclear weapons. 

Furthermore, there reportedly was a “better than even” chance that 

the DPRK could have extracted as much as 26 pounds of 

plutonium from the spent fuel rods it collected from its Yongbyon 

reactor when it was shut down in 1989. Under optimum conditions, 

this amount of plutonium would be enough for two bombs.46 These 

reported findings put additional pressure on the administration to 

resolve the issue of the DPRK's nuclear weapons program 

expeditiously. 
19

Early in January 1994, diplomatic contacts did increase, 

and the North Korean Foreign Ministry announced IAEA 

inspectors would be allowed to visit all seven declared nuclear 

facilities, but only on a one-time basis. This announcement also 

indicated that the two suspected waste storage sites would remain 

off limits to the IAEA. North Korea justified its decision to allow 

only a one-time inspection based on the fact that it had only 

suspended its withdrawal from the NPT in June 1993.47 Therefore, 

it was not bound by the specific inspection requirements of a 

normal NPT member. 

Based on these North Korean assertions concerning only a 

one-time inspection agreement, the Clinton administration found 

itself on the defensive both in the U.S. and in South Korea. Lynn 

Davis, the Undersecretary of State for Security Affairs, stated that 

North Korea had agreed to carry out full inspections and denied 

any concessions which would have permitted anything less. 

President Clinton also got into the act. In response to the one-time 

inspection report, he responded that to “the best of our 

knowledge,” those reports were “not accurate.” Davis also 

indicated that no final decision had been made on whether or not to 

conduct Team Spirit 94, and the U.S. and ROK would hold this 

decision in abeyance until the results of the IAEA were known.48 

The South Korean response, at least as reported by the 

media, was highly critical of any agreement which would limit the 

IAEA inspections in North Korea. These criticisms focused on the 

differing interpretation of exactly what was agreed to as well as the 

perception in the ROK that the U.S. was making unsatisfactory 

efforts to convince the North Koreans to renew the negotiations 
20

between the two Koreas.49 Partially to assuage South Korean 

concerns, but also to meet U.S. forces' defense requirements, the 

United States announced in late January that the U.S. would deploy 

additional Patriot missile batteries to the ROK as well as Apache 

helicopters and advanced counter-artillery radar. The U.S. also 

agreed to increase the intelligence assets it devoted to the Korean 

peninsula as an additional indication of American resolve.50 

Inspections Begin, Differences Continue 

In mid February, the DPRK surprised many officials in 

the U.S. and ROK by announcing it would permit IAEA 

inspections of all seven of its declared nuclear facilities, and did 

not limit these to one-time inspections. However, it still refused to 

grant access to the two suspected waste sites. If these inspections 

of the declared sites did occur, this would allow the IAEA to 

maintain the continuity of safeguards which was essential from the 

agency's perspective.51 The South Korean Prime Minister also 

welcomed the DPRK's inspection decision, but once again called 

on the North Koreans to return to the North-South talks on the 

denuclearization process.52 Just a few weeks later in early March, 

the ROK Defense Minister announced that Team Spirit 94 was 

being suspended provided that North Korea did in fact allow IAEA 

inspectors access to all seven nuclear facilities.53 However, North 

Korea still remained opposed to the resumption of North-South 

negotiations. The First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs justified 

this reluctance based on what he referred to as the need for 

“simultaneous action” in the U.S.-DPRK talks. He criticized the 
21

U.S. position that North-South talks should be a precondition for 

direct, high-level U.S.-DPRK negotiations as violating the 

principle of simultaneous action.54 

IAEA inspections began in the second week of March, but 

immediately ran into difficulties when DPRK officials prohibited 

the inspectors from collecting samples at specific locations. What 

set off this particular confrontation was the discovery that the seals 

placed on the suspected reprocessing plant by the IAEA during the 

previous inspection in August 1993 appeared to have been broken. 

This suggested that North Korean technicians had entered the 

reprocessing plant in the intervening months. The IAEA requested 

access to the hot cell--a lead-lined room where plutonium is 

handled by remote control in the final stages of processing into 

weapons-grade material--but this request was refused.55 

The North Koreans also refused the request to take swab 

samples from what is referred to as the glove box. This is a 

specially designed area in front of the hot cell in which remotely 

controlled devices are used to handle the radioactive material. 

These samples would have indicated if any quantity of spent 

reactor fuel had been handled by the remotely controlled gloves 

since the IAEA sealed the facility the previous August. The IAEA 

inspectors also were unsuccessful in their efforts to convince the 

DPRK to allow them to conduct gamma-ray scans of the 

reprocessing plant. This “gamma mapping” would have 

determined whether nuclear materials had passed through or been 

present in the plant since the last inspection. Once again it 

appeared that North Korea miscalculated the technological 
22

sophistication of the IAEA inspections to determine whether or not 

the DPRK was developing a nuclear weapons capability. 

The Clinton administration responded to this inspection 

impasse by canceling the high-level talks which were scheduled to 

begin on 21 March and began consultations with the ROK 

concerning setting a date for the Team Spirit exercise. The two 

sides had agreed previously to suspend this exercise pending the 

completion of the IAEA inspection. In addition, and, perhaps more 

significantly, the administration began to lay the groundwork for 

introducing an economic sanctions resolution in the Security 

Council.56 President Clinton also sent a letter to the ROK's 

President Kim Young Sam in which he stated that the U.S. would 

consider any North Korean attack on South Korea to be an attack 

on the United States.57 At the same time, the IAEA Board of 

Governors passed a resolution which referred the nuclear dispute 

to the UN Security Council. The vote was 25 in favor of the 

resolution with Libya being the only country to vote against it. 

China and four others abstained. This resolution once again urged 

North Korea to allow the completion of IAEA inspections.58 

North Korean officials wasted no time in responding to 

what they perceived as aggressive acts on the part of the U.S., 

ROK, and IAEA. Concerning South Korea, the DPRK blamed the 

South for allowing the U.S. to deploy Patriot missiles and other 

advanced weapons there, supporting the rescheduling of Team 

Spirit, and discussing the possibility of economic sanctions. The 

charges against the U.S. included the alleged violation of the 25 

February 1994 agreement between the two countries on the 

resumption of the IAEA inspections and diplomatic discussions. 
23

These officials argued that the talks and inspections were to occur 

simultaneously, but now the U.S. insisted that the inspections be 

completed before the negotiations began.59 Concerning the 

recently released IAEA resolution, North Korea condemned this 

act as provocative and once again argued that since the DPRK had 

only suspended its withdrawal from the NPT, it was under no 

obligation to permit IAEA routine inspections but only those 

inspections which provided for the continuity of safeguards. 

Specifically referring to the glove box area, the spokesman stated 

that inspections of this location had “nothing to do with the 

maintenance of the continuity of safeguards.”60 

The North Korean decision to cancel further discussions 

was important, not because these talks had been fruitful, but more 

so because this decision tended to isolate the ROK even further on 

the resolution of this critical issue. The North Koreans sent a clear 

signal that the nuclear issue was strictly between themselves and 

representatives of the United States. Seoul had no role to play 

according to this scenario. 

After a series of behind-the-scenes negotiations at the 

UN, the Security Council decided in early April that the Council 

President would issue a statement requesting that North Korea 

allow the completion of the IAEA inspections. This represented a 

compromise between the U.S. and China in that the U.S. had 

desired a Security Council resolution making the same request, but 

China opposed the resolution as being too strong.61 In addition, 

the U.S. and South Korea decided to defer their decision on Team 

Spirit in the hope that this would persuade the North Koreans to 

allow the inspections and to resume negotiations. Later in April, 
24

Secretary of Defense Perry announced that Team Spirit would not 

be held until at least November.62 

South Korea also expressed a more conciliatory policy on 

the North-South talks when the Deputy Prime Minister stated that 

his country no longer insisted on the exchange of special envoys 

between the two Koreas as a condition for the resumption of highlevel negotiations between the U.S. and DPRK. However, he did 

insist that North Korea abide by the provisions established in the 

denuclearization accord concluded in late 1991.63 By so doing, the 

South Koreans seemed willing to allow themselves to be even 

further isolated if this action contributed to IAEA inspections and 

the resumption of negotiations between the DPRK and the United 

States. 

North Korean Actions Increase Tensions 

Despite these conciliatory gestures, the DPRK shocked 

the international community in mid May 1994 when it announced 

that it had begun to remove an estimated 8,000 spent fuel rods 

from its 5 MW reactor in Yongbyon. Prior to this time, the IAEA 

had demanded its inspectors be present before the North removed 

any fuel rods. If North Korea did remove fuel rods without an 

IAEA presence, this would violate the NPT according to an IAEA 

spokesman.64 North Korea justified its decision to remove the fuel 

rods based on safety factors, and its representative repeated the 

argument that because of its “unique status'“ following its 

temporary suspension of its withdrawal from the NPT, there was 

no requirement for an IAEA presence other than the cameras 

which were operating.65 
25

The IAEA did not accept this argument, however. Its 

spokesperson labeled the North Korean removal of spent fuel rods 

as a “serious violation” of the IAEA safeguards agreement. If the 

removal continued, the IAEA warned, “it would result in 

irreparable loss of the agency's ability to verify that plutoniumladen fuel was not being diverted for use in nuclear weapons.” 66 

Another IAEA concern was that if its inspectors did not have 

access to these 8,000 fuel rods, it would be impossible to 

determine how much plutonium the North could have extracted 

when the same reactor was shut down for approximately 100 days 

in 1989. An analysis of the fuel rods could determine age. If the 

vast majority of these fuel rods were not from the original core, 

this would suggest that the DPRK had probably extracted much 

more plutonium than it was admitting.67 

In early June, the Clinton administration announced that it 

intended to pursue global economic sanctions against North Korea 

if it did not permit IAEA inspectors to be present to examine the 

spent fuel rods at Yongbyon. The DPRK Foreign Minister 

responded that the implementation of economic sanctions would be 

treated as an act of war by his country.68 At this same time period, 

the IAEA's Board of Governors adopted a resolution condemning 

North Korea's actions regarding the spent fuel rods. The vote was 

28 in support of the resolution with only Libya voting against it. 

China and three other countries abstained.69 Shortly thereafter, an 

administration spokesman stated that the President intended to 

implement the sanctions in a phased approach. Initially, the U.S. 

would press for non-economic sanctions which could include the 

elimination of UN technical assistance and the cessation of 
26

scientific and cultural exchanges. If these measures failed to 

change North Korea's behavior, the U.S. was prepared to introduce 

an economic sanction resolution.70 The primary reason the 

administration proposed this phased sanction approach most likely 

was to garner international support, particularly that of China since 

it would be critical that the Chinese did not use their veto in any 

Security Council resolution. 

As the crisis deepened, North Korea sent mixed signals. 

An American specialist on the DPRK reported that during an 

interview with Kim Il Sung, the North Korean leader offered to 

freeze the extraction of plutonium from the nuclear fuel rods if the 

U.S. would give a firm commitment pledging assistance in 

providing North Korea with other types of nuclear power plants.71

However, a Foreign Ministry official rejected any special IAEA 

inspections of DPRK nuclear facilities and referred to such 

inspections as a “gross infringement upon our sovereignty and a 

graphic expression of the policy for stifling the DPRK.”72 

Shortly thereafter, North Korea announced that it was 

withdrawing from the IAEA. Foreign Minister Kim Young Nam 

cited the IAEA's recent resolution condemning the DPRK for 

beginning to extract the spent fuel rods. But he also made reference 

to his country's “unique status” involving the NPT as well as North 

Korea's charges that the IAEA was little more than a tool of the 

U.S. Furthermore, he alleged that the IAEA's actions threatened 

the DPRK's nuclear energy program.73 In response, the U.S. 

moved ahead with its plans to introduce a sanctions resolution in 

the Security Council. The proposed draft called for a one-month 

grace period before the sanctions would go into effect. During this 
27

month, the DPRK must re-establish its relationship with the IAEA. 

If the North failed to do so, the U.S. would move to ban the 

exports of all weapons to North Korea plus halt economic, 

technical, and cultural assistance programs.74 Just when it 

appeared an impasse had been reached, former President Jimmy 

Carter appeared on the scene and attempted to negotiate a way out 

of this crisis. 

The Carter Trip 

The Carter visit to meet with Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang 

during mid June 1994 was controversial both in the ROK and in 

the U.S. Because Carter planned to reduce the U.S. ground 

presence in South Korea when he was President and also because 

of his criticisms of Korean human rights violations in the late 

1970s, the former President was not the mediator ROK officials 

would have chosen. Many South Koreans feared that Carter's visit 

would provide additional legitimacy to North Korea in the 

international community and also give the North additional time to 

complete its nuclear weapons program.75 South Korean domestic 

political issues also were involved. There was some suspicion 

among President Kim Young Sam's supporters that Kim Dae Jung, 

a long-time rival of President Kim, had suggested to Carter that he 

visit North Korea. Although Carter stated that his trip to 

Pyongyang had been in the planning stages since the Bush 

administration and had nothing to do with Kim Dae Jung, these 

suspicions continued.76 Finally, ROK officials were concerned that 

there had been very little coordination with them before this visit. 

This fostered the fear that South Korea was being further isolated. 
28

In the U.S., the Clinton administration suffered some 

embarrassment when Carter held a news conference in Pyongyang 

and stated that the administration's effort to impose economic 

sanctions against the DPRK through the United Nations was “a 

serious mistake,” one that he hoped the U.S. would reconsider.77

Obviously, these comments, coming as they did at the same time 

President Clinton was trying to marshal international support for 

economic sanctions, did not enhance the administration's efforts or 

reputation. After Carter left North Korea, the administration 

announced that it would be willing to grant a 30-day grace period 

before introducing any sanction resolution against North Korea.78

This policy change was not popular with many critics of President 

Clinton who argued that the U.S. had made a significant 

concession without gaining anything of substance in return from 

Korea.79 It also reflected another policy shift which hurt the 

President's overall foreign policy agenda. 

Soon after the Carter mission, there was a spate of 

announcements outlining future negotiations. Kim Il Sung 

accepted Carter's suggestion that the leaders of the two Koreas 

hold a summit meeting. When Carter broached this offer to Kim 

Young Sam, the ROK President accepted it too, thus setting the 

stage for the first meeting between the leaders of the two 

countries.80 The U.S. and North Korea also agreed to resume the 

high-level bilateral talks which had been scheduled for March, but 

were canceled because of the impasse over IAEA inspections. In 

return for rescheduling these talks, North Korea agreed to three 

conditions which would continue as long as the negotiations made 

progress. First, the DPRK would not extract any plutonium from 
29

the 8,000 spent fuel rods now in cooling ponds at Yongbyon. 

Second, it would not refuel its 5 MW reactor there, and third, it 

would allow the IAEA inspectors to remain at Yongbyon.81

Although these conditions may have seemed like concessions, they 

really weren't since North Korea was committed to each either 

through the NPT or the IAEA safeguards agreement. 

Talks between the U.S. and North Korea began on 9 July 

with Robert Gallucci once again calling for a “broad and thorough” 

approach to the resolution of the nuclear issue. Both sides 

expressed satisfaction at the conclusion of the first day and found 

that “there is much in common” in their respective positions.82

Despite these encouraging statements, the talks were postponed the 

next day when North Korea announced that Kim Il Sung, the only 

leader the country had ever known, died of a heart attack at the age 

of 82. DPRK officials also canceled the planned summit with Kim 

Young Sam.83 

The 1994 Agreements 

In August 1994, the U.S. and DPRK resumed the highlevel discussions disrupted in July by the death of Kim Il Sung. 

The two sides released a statement at the end of these discussions, 

in which the DPRK decided to replace its graphite-moderated 

reactors with LWRs. In return, the U.S. pledged to help arrange for 

the acquisition of the LWRs and to help find alternate energy 

sources for the DPRK. North Korea agreed to freeze the 

construction of the two nuclear reactors at Yongbyon while the 

LWRs are being built, to forego reprocessing any more plutonium, 

and to seal what the North referred to as its “radiochemical 
30

laboratory” but what the IAEA suspected was a reprocessing plant. 

The U.S. also acquiesced to provide the DPRK with “assurances 

against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.” This is the negative 

security guarantee which North Korea had wanted for several 

months. Finally, the DPRK stated it would remain in the NPT and 

allow the implementation of IAEA safeguards.84 

After the release of this statement, the ROK proposed that 

it provide the LWRs to North Korea, in consultation with the U.S., 

and suggested that Japan assist with the financing.85 South Korea's 

motivations were interesting. First, this offer represents the South's 

confidence that eventually reunification will occur under the 

South's political and economic systems, so this proposal is nothing 

more than an investment in the future energy needs of a united 

Korea. Second, the ROK sees this initiative as a means to involve 

itself directly in the negotiations between the U.S. and the DPRK, 

thereby reducing its isolation. However, North Korea once again 

took a somewhat intransigent position when it rejected South 

Korea's offer of LWRs.86 

North Korea and the United States held two separate 

technical discussions in September: one in Berlin on acquiring the 

LWRs, and one in Pyongyang on the process of establishing 

diplomatic relations. Significant differences remained on both 

issues, but the two countries did agree that the high-level 

negotiations would resume in Geneva beginning on 23 

September.87 After a series of discussions the two sides reached an 

agreement on 21 October 1994.88 This agreement basically called 

for a three-phased resolution of the North Korean nuclear program. 

In the first phase, which could take as long as five years, the 
31

DPRK pledges not to refuel its 5MW reactor at Yongbyon and to 

stop building the two larger reactors. The North Koreans also agree 

to keep the 8,000 spent fuel rods in the cooling ponds and allow 

the IAEA to inspect them. In return, the U.S. and its allies 

indicated they would begin constructing two LWRs at a cost of 

approximately $4 billion, most of which the ROK and Japan would 

finance. During the time the LWRs are under construction, the 

U.S. will provide 50,000 metric tons of heavy oil for heating and 

electricity during the first year; this amount will increase to 

500,000 metric tons thereafter until the LWRs come on line. 

During the second phase, likely to begin in about five years, North 

Korea will allow IAEA inspections of the two suspected nuclear 

waste sites which should clarify how much plutonium the DPRK 

reprocessed previously. The United States and its allies will 

complete work on the first LWR and bring it on-line. In the final 

phase, which will take several more years, the DPRK will 

dismantle the 5MW, 50MW, and 200MW reactors as well as the 

radiochemical laboratory and the fuel fabrication plant. In return 

the second LWR will be completed and brought on-line.89 

On the diplomatic front, the U.S. and DPRK agreed to 

reduce trade barriers and to open liaison offices in the two capitals 

after resolving consular and other technical issues. North Korea 

also will take steps to implement the North-South joint declaration 

on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and talk with ROK 

officials. Finally, North Korea will remain in the NPT and allow 

IAEA inspections. 
32

An Evaluation of the Clinton Counterproliferation Policy 

The Policy Positions of the Key Allies 

Before this evaluation can be made, it is necessary to 

briefly review the policies of Russia, Japan, China, and the two 

Koreas on the nuclear issue because the Clinton administration has 

had to take these policy positions into account. Russia's basic 

position has been that North Korea does not have the capability to 

produce nuclear weapons at the present time and is using the 

suspicions that it does have this capability as a bargaining chip. For 

example, Mikhail Ryzhov, the Chairman of the Committee for 

International Relations of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, stated in 

September 1993 that “our view is that North Korea does not have 

the capability of developing nuclear warheads within a few 

years.”90 Russian views have a certain credibility in this regard 

because the Soviet Union was very much involved with North 

Korea's nuclear power program over the years. 

After a meeting of the Russian and Japanese Foreign 

Ministers in October 1993, they issued a joint statement which 

included a reference to the North Korean nuclear program. Both 

called for the DPRK to remain in the NPT and to comply fully 

with IAEA safeguard inspections in order to contribute to peace 

and stability in Northeast Asia.91 The Russian Ambassador in 

Seoul, Georgy Kunadze, made similar statements in February and 

April 1994. In the latter instance, he indicated that Russia would 

not block a Security Council resolution designed to punish North 

Korea for its intransigence on the IAEA inspection issue.92 In June 

1994, as the Clinton administration was attempting to marshal 
33

international support for economic sanctions, Foreign Minister 

Kozyrev told Secretary of State Christopher that Russia would 

support these sanctions. In return, the International Herald Tribune 

reported that the U.S. endorsed a Russian proposal for an 

international conference to address the North Korean problem.93 

Japan's role has been more important because of the 

foreign currency which ethnic Koreans living in Japan send to the 

DPRK. Although impossible to determine precisely how much 

money is involved, estimates range between $600 million to $1.8 

billion per year.94 Whatever the correct figure, it is the largest 

single source of foreign exchange that the DPRK receives. The 

Japanese government has been reluctant to take steps to reduce or 

eliminate this critical flow of hard currency to North Korea 

primarily because of fears that the ethnic Korean population in 

Japan might revert to violence. Also, there is concern that a cutoff 

would result in massive suffering on the part of the North Korean 

people. For whatever reasons, the New York Times reported that 

the Japanese government informed the U.S. in June 1994 that it 

could not support American efforts then underway to introduce an 

economic sanctions resolution in the Security Council.95 

China's support was even more important than Japan's. 

Although China does not want nuclear weapons on the Korean 

peninsula, it also has opposed the introduction of harsh measures 

against the DPRK. This policy is partly explainable in that China 

has historically opposed actions which could be interpreted as 

interference in the internal affairs of other states. Foreign Minister 

Qian Qichen made this point in a statement issued in March 

1993.96 President Jiang Zemin expanded on this position in 
34

November 1993 during a conference in Seattle. In a meeting with 

Japanese Prime Minister Mirohiro Hosokawa, he indicated that 

China really had very little influence to exert over North Korea and 

shouldn't be relied upon to moderate the North's behavior.97 

During a similar meeting with Kim Young Sam, Jiang stated that 

he supported a denuclearized Korean peninsula, but this should be 

accomplished through inter-Korean talks, negotiations with the 

IAEA, and efforts by the U.S. and North Korea rather than through 

economic sanctions.98 Prime Minister Li Peng met with UN 

Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in late December 1993 

and stated that “China favors a proper settlement of the issue (the 

nuclear problem) through dialogues and consultations instead of 

imposing pressure and sanctions.”99 

This Chinese opposition to sanctions forced the Clinton 

administration to be very deliberate as it has tried to bring pressure 

to bear on North Korea. Perhaps the best example of this was in 

March 1994 when the U.S. wanted to introduce a resolution calling 

on North Korea to allow the IAEA inspectors back into the 

country. Because of trepidation that China would use its veto to 

block this initiative, the administration agreed to a compromise 

whereby the Security Council President issued a statement urging 

DPRK cooperation with the IAEA. This statement was less serious 

than a Security Council resolution, and is indicative of China's 

influence. Obviously, the other major factor involving China and 

sanctions against North Korea was and is that China is a major 

supplier to the DPRK of critical products such as petroleum and 

food. Even if China would abstain on any Security Council action, 
35

the implementation would be in jeopardy if China would not or 

could not stop the flow of these products to the DPRK. 

North Korea's policy positions on a variety of issues have 

been referenced throughout this paper, particularly its “unique 

status” in reference to the NPT and IAEA safeguard inspections. 

However, it is important to note that DPRK officials have 

consistently denied having a nuclear weapons program. Kim Il 

Sung made such an assertion in a press conference covered by 

CNN shortly before his death. He stated unequivocally that his 

country did not have nuclear weapons, did not have delivery 

systems for nuclear weapons, and was too small to test these 

weapons.100 Despite these assurances, other comments made in 

1990 suggested otherwise. During discussions with Soviet officials 

in September of that year, the DPRK Foreign Minister cautioned 

that if the USSR established diplomatic relations with the ROK, 

which did in fact occur later that month, his country “would 

consider itself not bound by the pledges not to create its own 

nuclear weapons.” In a written memorandum, the Foreign Minister 

warned that if normal relations were established, “we will have no 

option but to take measures to produce ourselves those weapons 

that we have heretofore relied on from our alliance.”101 These 

comments plus the discrepancies noted by IAEA inspectors 

certainly cast doubt on Kim's assertions. 

Two additional points need to be made to help explain 

North Korean policies on the IAEA and special inspections. Ever 

since the Korean war when the United Nations Command fought 

against North Korea forces, the DPRK has been suspicious of the 

UN and its various agencies. Vice Premier and Foreign Minister 
36

Kin Young Nam reflected these suspicions and mistrust when 

Boutros-Boutros Ghali visited Pyongyang in December 1993.102 In 

short, North Korea has suspected that the UN and its agency, the 

IAEA, are nothing more than puppets of the U.S. and are not to be 

trusted. Concerning the special inspections, Kim Il Sung told his 

old friend King Sihanouk in December 1993 that he viewed these 

inspections as nothing more than an attempt by the U.S. to use the 

IAEA as a spy on North Korean conventional military 

capabilities.103 For a country which is one of the most secretive in 

the world, particularly concerning its national security, this is not a 

surprising position for its leader to express. 

The Republic of Korea has been caught on the horns of a 

dilemma for several years concerning the DPRK. It does not want 

a war on the Korean peninsula nor does it want the economic 

collapse of the DPRK. By the same token, the ROK does not want 

to be isolated and a non-participant in the negotiations addressing 

the nuclear weapons issue. In South Korea's view, there can be no 

settlement to his problem unless the South is intimately involved 

with determining what this solution is to be.104 This has caused 

some strains in the U.S.-South Korean relationship from time to 

time, although U.S. negotiators are adamant about the extensive 

coordination which exists in order to keep South Korean officials 

fully informed.105 This tension was reflected at the time of the 

Carter visit when the government in Seoul was not pleased with 

the consultations which occurred prior to the visit or after its 

completion.106 

South Korean fears about another Korean war and its 

likely devastating effects are well founded, based on what occurred 
37

between 1950-1953. The economic issue also causes much 

concern, particularly since the German example of reunification is 

well known in Seoul. The National Unification Board has 

estimated that the cost of Korean reunification could well be 

between $200-500 billion over 10 years. Of this amount, this 

organization predicts that the ROK would have to pay between 70-

85%.107 Based on these factors, the ROK has been very cautious 

about supporting any proposals which its leaders believe would 

lead to either war on the peninsula or the collapse of the North 

Korean economy and the resulting drain on the ROK's treasury. 

The shifts in South Korean policy toward North Korea 

have been frustrating to American negotiators and officials.108

There are many instances of these policy swings, but in general, 

when the Clinton administration has taken a tougher position, the 

South Koreans have urged caution and vice versa. For example, 

according to The New York Times in February and March 1994 

when the Clinton administration urged tougher measures as North 

Korea balked at IAEA inspections, the South Korean Foreign 

Minister warned against sanctions and building up U.S. military 

strength in the ROK.109 President Kim reportedly urged similar 

restraints involving sanctions and the military buildup just two 

weeks later.110 

By the same token, in June 1994 during and immediately 

after the Carter visit when the Clinton administration indicated it 

was willing to move ahead with high-level negotiations, the South 

Koreans took a tougher tack. President Kim held his first National 

Security Council meeting in the 16 months he had been in office at 

that time and stated that North Korea “should not be allowed to 
38

possess even half a nuclear bomb.”111 When the DPRK announced 

it planned to withdraw from the IAEA there was a strong reaction 

from Seoul, which pledged to follow “firm and consistent” policies 

in response.112 Even more ominous was the action taken by the 

Democratic Liberal Party, the plurality party in the National 

Assembly. At a meeting in mid-June, the party and local chapter 

chairmen passed a resolution calling on the government to reevaluate its non-nuclear weapons policies to include the 

denuclearization declaration.113 

A more recent example occurred in October 1994. At this 

time, the U.S. and North Korea were again negotiating, with South 

Korea watching carefully from the sidelines. In an interview with 

the American press, President Kim supported the overall objective 

of finding a diplomatic solution and praised the coordination 

between the ROK and the U.S. But he questioned American 

negotiating tactics by characterizing them as “naive and overly 

flexible.” He also expressed irritation with the administration's 

failure to raise human rights violations in the talks with North 

Korea. Foreign Minister Lee Hong Koo joined in this criticism by 

arguing that Robert Gallucci and other U.S. negotiators relied more 

in their preparations for negotiations on nuclear non-proliferation 

experts than on experts on Korea.114 The most salient point here is 

that the ROK still believes in the old dictum that “the road from 

Washington to Pyongyang must pass through Seoul.” However, 

President Kim and other officials frequently feel frustrated in their 

efforts to shape policies which they view as absolutely vital to their 

national security. 
39

One final issue involving South Korean policy needs to be 

mentioned concerning its policy on whether or not North Korea 

had developed nuclear weapons. The official government policy as 

stated by President Kim in June is that North Korea must not be 

allowed to have any nuclear weapons and that it does not now have 

such weapons. If South Korea was forced to admit that North 

Korea did possess nuclear weapons, this would cause Seoul serious 

problems in that it would be placed in an inferior position 

regardless of the impressive economic and political gains the South 

has made in recent years. Such a recognition would also force the 

ROK to re-evaluate its military strategy and doctrine, which it 

would rather not do.115 

However, on an unofficial level, there is a lively debate 

ongoing concerning how the ROK should respond to the 

possibility of the North having nuclear weapons. One argument 

expressed is that South Korea should support a policy which 

attempts to limit the DPRK's nuclear program and its delivery 

systems first, and then work toward final elimination of these 

weapons through subsequent negotiations.116 The other side of that 

argument is that the ROK should continue the policy that no 

nuclear weapons are acceptable in North Korea even in the short 

term. This argument rejects the India-Pakistan example of 

attempting to cap nuclear weapons at a certain level. One South 

Korean defense expert stated that if North Korea were allowed 

even a small number of nuclear weapons, this would lead to 

increased proliferation in Northeast Asia. In his view, North Korea 

would attempt to sell nuclear weapons and technology if it could, 

which also would lead to proliferation. Finally, this expert argued 
40

that the India-Pakistan example is unacceptable when applied to 

the Korean peninsula in that Pakistan developed its program 

because of India's nuclear weapons. Since South Korea has no 

nuclear weapons, there is no reason for the DPRK to build such 

weapons.117 

The Clinton Policies 

The primary reason for reviewing the pertinent policy 

positions of Russia, Japan, China, and the two Koreas is that the 

Clinton administration must take all of these countries and their 

policies into account in the formation and implementation of its 

counterproliferation policy as applied to the Korean peninsula. 

There has been no shortage of criticism directed at the 

Clinton administration's counter-proliferation policy involving 

North Korea. These criticisms range from those who support the 

use of military force to remove the nuclear weapons and facilities, 

to those who criticize Clinton for not being perceptive enough to 

understand there are moderates in the DPRK's government willing 

to find a mutual agreement. In between are those who argue that 

the administration's vacillation on North Korea is just another 

example of broader foreign policy failures in Somalia, Bosnia, 

Haiti, etc.118 The military option is not feasible, this group argues, 

for political, economic, and military reasons. While there may be 

moderates in the North Korean regime, with the death of Kim Il 

Sung and the ongoing succession process, it is unlikely these 

individuals will be able to play a significant role--at least in the 

foreseeable future. 

The “lack of consistency “ argument deserves more 

attention. An objective observer can identify at least three issues 
41

where the administration has not been consistent: whether any 

nuclear weapons are acceptable in the DPRK; whether Team Spirit 

should be held; and whether or not the IAEA should be allowed to 

conduct special inspections. In July 1993, President Clinton 

indicated that no nuclear weapons in North Korea were tolerable. 

Secretary of Defense Perry was even more explicit during his 

Asian Society speech in May 1994. In this speech, Perry stated that 

what the U.S. wants to achieve is a “nuclear-free Korean 

peninsula.” However, more recently, some administration officials 

have indicated that it is more important to eliminate the present 

and future nuclear weapons potential in North Korea with less 

concern for what the DPRK may have constructed in the past. The 

ROK has not reacted well to this policy change.119 

Concerning the Team Spirit exercise, in 1992 the Bush 

administration and the ROK canceled this exercise, but reinstated it 

in 1993. During 1994, President Clinton announced it, then 

postponed it, and finally canceled it. 

The special inspections question is closely associated with 

whether any nuclear weapons are acceptable. One of the primary 

means to determine whether North Korea may have built nuclear 

weapons in the past is to inspect the two nuclear waste sites. This 

would require a special IAEA inspection because North Korea has 

consistently maintained that these two sites are military 

installations. The administration has argued that this issue must be 

resolved before any deal with the DPRK can be finalized. 

However, in the most recent negotiations, it appears that this policy 

has changed, and the administration possibly is willing to defer 

special inspections until a later time.120 Since this is such a major 
42

issue, even the perception of inconsistency can be harmful, and it 

is almost a certainty that the ROK will not be pleased if this 

change in policy has occurred. 

Another criticism of the administration's policy is that the 

“broad and thorough approach” which Bob Gallucci and others 

have identified lacks a certain amount of specificity as 

implemented. Basically, this approach attempts to define the 

proper ratio of carrots and sticks to meet the general criteria of the 

counterproliferation strategy. For example, the U.S. has attempted 

to dissuade North Korea from building nuclear weapons by 

arguing that the political and economic costs would be too high 

and by providing certain security guarantees. The June and July 

1993 joint statements provide good examples of these assurances. 

But a legitimate question is how these negative security 

guarantees, which seem to suggest that the U.S. will not use 

nuclear weapons or attack the DPRK, square with extended 

deterrence, which is so important to the ROK's security? If there is 

not consistency in this approach, is it really credible? Finally, 

should North Korea be rewarded for simply complying with the 

obligations it has assumed, particularly under the terms of the NPT 

and IAEA? 

The last criticism concerns the administration's 

evaluations of the motives behind the North Korean nuclear 

program. The carrot and stick approach assumes that the other side 

is willing and able to make a deal. In the case of North Korea then, 

nuclear weapons are a bargaining chip that the DPRK will trade for 

certain political, economic, and military rewards--whether these 

rewards are diplomatic recognition or light-water reactors. This is 

basically the argument that the Russians have made, and it may be 
43

true. However, it may not be true. Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il 

may have decided to build nuclear weapons as the best means to 

insure regime survival and the succession process from father to 

son. Or they may have viewed nuclear weapons as the best 

deterrent against possible South Korean and/or U.S. attack as the 

conventional balance swings to the South's favor. Perhaps they 

chose this course because they believed that nuclear weapons 

would eventually drive a wedge between the U.S. and ROK, 

thereby contributing to the weakening of the South and possibly 

leading to reunification under North Korean control. 

The problem is that no one can know for sure what the 

correct motivation or combinations of motivations are. But if the 

DPRK leadership has tied the very survival of the regime to the 

presence of nuclear weapons, it is less likely to be willing to 

bargain them away regardless of the incentives the U.S. and others 

provide. One U.S. official argues that the importance of nuclear 

weapons to the North Koreans has led them to negotiate using the 

“3-D's strategy”--deny, delay, and deceive.121 Another American 

observer refers to this same strategy as the DPRK's “renunciation 

doctrine.” That is, they make an agreement and then immediately 

begin finding ways to avoid the obligations agreed to.122 The 

denuclearization agreement with South Korea is a good example. 

Only the final results will definitively answer this basic question 

concerning North Korean motives. Hopefully, the administration 

has it right. 

The final question is: does the Clinton administration's 

counterproliferation policy as applied to the North serve as a model 

for use against other potential proliferators? The qualified answer 
44

is that if this policy results in a satisfactory outcome on the Korean 

peninsula, it would probably be successful elsewhere. The reason 

for this conclusion is that North Korea is a very hard target for this 

policy. Its autarkic economy and self reliance policies reduce its 

vulnerabilities to external pressure. Similarly, it has developed its 

nuclear program with limited amounts of outside assistance, and it 

has plentiful supplies of uranium and other resources required to 

support its program. The use of international arms control regimes 

such as the NPT, UN threats of sanctions, confidence building 

measures, deterrence, and other forms of military preparedness can 

be successful if implemented correctly. The experience the 

administration has gained through its efforts to stop the North 

Korean program will be helpful in other proliferation cases. 

Epilogue 

The October 1994 agreement became controversial as 

soon as it was signed, with several critics arguing that the U.S. and 

its allies granted too many concessions without obtaining 

immediate inspections of the two suspected waste sites.123 Perhaps 

more significantly, after the November congressional elections, 

several prominent Republicans joined in the criticisms. Senator 

Robert Dole, the new Senate Majority Leader, stated shortly after 

the agreement was signed that “it was always possible to get an 

agreement when you give enough away.” More recently, Senator 

Frank Murkowski, who became the chairman of the Senate 

Subcommittee on East Asia, criticized the agreement because it did 

not provide for initial inspections of the suspected storage sites. 
45

Senator Larry Pressler has also been critical, charging that this 

agreement establishes a bad precedent for countries such as Iran 

which may prohibit IAEA inspections unless the U.S. and others 

provide new power plants.124 

Robert Gallucci, who negotiated this agreement, has been 

the primary administration respondent. He continues to argue that 

the DPRK pledged to give up far more under this agreement than it 

was required to do under the NPT. For example, he points to the 

decision not to refuel the 5MW reactor, to stop construction on the 

50MW and 200MW versions, and eventually to dismantle these 

graphite reactors. He also references initial IAEA reports that 

North Korea is cooperating after signing the agreement and 

emphasizes that the U.S. will not provide the critical core 

components for the two LWRs until North Korea satisfies the 

IAEA on all of its past, suspected nuclear weapons initiatives.125 

Concerning South Korea's involvement with supplying 

the LWRs to North Korea, the ROK and U.S. have agreed to form 

the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which will 

be responsible for the reactor project. South Korean officials have 

estimated this project will cost between $3.5-$4.0 billion with the 

ROK providing approximately $1.8-2.5 billion of this estimate.126

There are obvious political, economic, and security advantages 

which South Korea would achieve as a result. Politically, Seoul 

would gain status vis a vis Pyongyang if it provided the reactors, in 

that the North would be forced to acknowledge the South's 

technological superiority. Also, South Korea is intent on linking its 

participation in supplying the LWRs with the re-establishment of 

the North-South dialogue. This would counter the suspected DPRK 
46

ploy of isolating the ROK on the nuclear issue.127 Economically, 

South Korea is looking to the future of a unified Korea and how 

the LWRs could contribute to the improved economy in the 

northern half of the peninsula, thereby possibly reducing 

reunification costs. The security implications are apparent in that 

South Korean technicians would have access to some of the most 

critical sites in North Korea. 

The DPRK is well aware of these advantages and has 

attempted to derail South Korean participation to the extent that it 

can. It has threatened to break off discussions with the U.S. on the 

implementation of the framework agreement if the American side 

continues to insist on South Korea providing the LWRs. The major 

argument made by North Korean representatives is that the ROK 

LWRs have certain safety and technological problems, and that 

North Korea should be allowed to choose the country of origin for 

its new reactors.128 Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for 

East Asia and the Pacific, and Robert Gallucci have stated publicly 

that North Korea's position on the reactors is untenable and that 

only South Korean LWRs are viable.129 Since South Korea has 

agreed to provide more than half of the costs, they assert the 

reactors must be from the ROK and that this position is not 

negotiable. Gallucci also suggested that the DPRK agreed in 

Geneva to accept South Korean LWRs and, therefore, must 

comply.130 South Korea has remained adamant that it will not 

participate in KEDO if its reactors are not provided to the DPRK. 

Foreign Minister Kong No Myong recently stated that the LWR 

project could not proceed without ROK financial assistance. 

Therefore, no alternative to his country's reactors are acceptable.131 
47

Although the 1994 framework agreement appeared to be a 

major step forward, the implementation process has presented 

additional problems as evidenced by the dispute over which 

country should supply the LWRs. Nonetheless, the Clinton 

administration may be in a stronger diplomatic position in the 

international community if North Korea reneges on some or all of 

its pledges than it was before this agreement. Only time will 

determine this outcome, and the administration will have to pursue 

whatever objectives it deems most appropriate. 
48

ENDNOTES

1

Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter FEER), 5 December 

1991, p. 28. 

2

Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol 5, No. 1, July/August 1994. 

Secretary Perry's speech is located on pp. 26-29. 3

 Young Sun Song, “The Korean Nuclear Issue,” Korea and World 

Affairs 15, No. 3 (Fall 1991), p. 478. For another reference to 

Soviet pressure to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, see the New 

York Times (hereafter NYT), 25 October 1989, p. 9. 4

 Young Sun Song, “The Korean Nuclear Issue,” p. 480. 5

 Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, “North Korea's Nuclear 

Program” in Young Whan Kihl (ed.) Korea and the World Beyond 

the Cold War, pp. 235-236. 6

 Washington Post, 29 July 1989, p. 9 and NYT, 25 October 1989, 

p. 9. For a good chart on North Korea's nuclear chronology from 

1962 to 1994, see the data provided by the Wisconsin Project on 

Nuclear Arms Control as reported in the NYT, 20 March 1994, 

Sect 4, p. 4. 

7

 Oh and Hassig, pp. 234-235 and William C. Martel and William 

T. Pendley, Nuclear Coexistence: Rethinking U.S. Policy to 

Promote Stability in an Era of Proliferation, pp. 79-80. 8

 Francois Heisbourg, International Herald Tribune (hereafter 

IHT), 22 November 1991, p. 8. 9

 NYT, 14 September 1991, p. 2. 10 IHT, 30 September 1991, p. 5 and FEER, 10 October 1991, pp. 

10-11. For an article critical of the U.S. policy of neither 

confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons, see 

Andrew Mack, “North Korea and the Bomb,” Foreign Policy , 

Summer 1991, pp. 87-104. 

11 For a good argument that U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea 

were of little military or political value, see William J. Taylor, 

IHT, 27 June 1991, p. 6. 12 IHT, 29 November 1991, p. 7 and 19 December 1991, p. 1. 13 President Roh's three non-nuclear policies can be found in 

FEER, 21 November 1991, p. 13. 14 IHT, 2 January 1992, p. 1; 6 January 1992, p. 2; FEER, 9 

January 1992, p. 10. For the actual Joint Declaration of the 

Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, see Young Whan Kihl, 

Korea and the World Beyond the Cold War, Appendix C, pp. 347-

348. 

15 IHT, 31 January 1992, p. 4. 16 IHT, 10 April 1992, p. 4. 
49

17 IHT, 7 May 1992, p. 4 and Kongdan Oh and Hassig, “North 

Korea's Nuclear Program,” pp. 237-238. 

18 Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program,” 

CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, 2 May 1994, pp. 

1-2. 

19 Kongdan Oh and Hassig, “North Korea's Nuclear Program,” p. 

237. 

20 Ibid., p. 238. 21 Ibid., pp. 238-239 and Niksch, “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons 

Program,” P. Z. IHT, 2 February 1993, p. 2. 22 Gates's concerns were reported in the IHT, 14 January 1993, p. 

6. 

23 IHT, 2 February 1993, p. 2 and Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea's 

Nuclear Weapons program,” p. 2. For an argument that the IAEA 

had become closely associated with U.S. policy goals, see Selig S. 

Harrison, “Breaking the Nuclear Impasse: How North Korea 

Views the Nuclear Problem,” pp. 6-7. Paper presented at a 

symposium conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace in Washington D.C. 16 November 1993. 

Harrison argues that Hans Blix, the IAEA Director General, 

testified before a U.S. congressional committee in July 1992 which 

was the first time the IAEA head had done this. He also points out 

that this was the first time the IAEA had requested to conduct 

“special inspections” in any country. 

24 IHT, 12 March 1993, p. 6. 25 IHT, 13-14 Mar 93, p. 1. Article X.1 of the NPT requires 90 

days notice before a signatory country withdraws from the NPT. 26 IHT, 26 March 1993, p. 1. 27 IHT, 15 March 1993, p. 1. 28 Ibid., p. 1. 29 IHT, 13 May 1993, p. 6. 30 FEER, 3 June 1993, pp. 12-13. 31 See the statement by General Robert W. RisCassi, Commander 

of U.S. Forces in Korea, as reported in the IHT, 15 January 1993, 

p. 7. 

32 IHT, 26 May 1993, p. 4. 33 For a copy of the Joint Statement of the Democratic People's 

Republic of Korea and the United States of America, dated 11 June 

1993, see The U.S.-Korea Review, Vol II, No. 1, July-August 

1993, p. 6. 

34 For a copy of the “U.S.-North Korea Agreed Statement, July 19, 

1993,” see The U.S.-Korea Review, Vol II, No. V, SeptemberNovember 1993, p. 6. 
50

35 “On the U.S.-North Korea Talks,” in Ibid., p. 6. 36 IHT, 5 July 1993, p. 1. 37 “Fundamentals of Security for a New Pacific Community,” 10 

July 1993, in U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs 

Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 29, July 19, 1993, pp. 509-512. 38 FEER, 22 July 1993, p. 12. 39 NYT, 13 July 1993, p. 8. 40 “Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the 

Congress,” U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1994. The 

section on counterproliferation is found on pp. 34-43. 

41 NYT, 27 October 1993, p. 4. 42 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, East Asia Daily Report

(hereafter FBIS-EAS), 2 November 1993, p. 15. See also NYT, 2 

November 1993, p. 7. 

43 Author's interview with Robert L. Gallucci, Assistant Secretary 

of State for Political-Military Affairs, Washington DC, 17 May 

1994. 

44 FEER, 2 December 1993, pp. 16-17. 45 NYT, 7 December 1993, p. 4. 46 NYT, 26 December 1993, p. 1. 47 NYT, 2 January 1994, p. 3. 48 NYT, 6 January 1994, p. 6. For a particularly critical appraisal of 

these negotiations from the American perspective, see NYT, 9 

January 1994, p. 1. 

49 FBIS-EAS, 10 January 1994, pp. 26-29. 50 FBIS-EAS, 27 January 1994, pp. 20-22. For the expected critical 

North Korean response to the Patriot announcement, see FBISEAS, 28 January 1994, pp. 11-12. 51 NYT, 16 February 1994, p. 1. 52 FBIS-EAS, 16 February 1994, pp. 23-24. 53 NYT, 3 March 1994, p. 3. 54 FBIS-EAS, 4 March 1994, pp. 21-23. See also FBIS-EAS, 22 

March 1994, p. 12. 

55 For two excellent accounts of this inspection and its failure, see 

NYT, 16 March 1994, p. 1 and FEER, 31 March 1994, pp. 14-15. 

The following chain of events is taken from these two articles. 56 NYT, 17 March 1994, p. 1 and 20 March 1994, p. 1. 57 NYT, 22 March 1994, p. 1. 58 FBIS-EAS, 22 March 1994, pp. 21-22. 59 FBIS-EAS, 23 March 1994, pp. 8-10. 60 FBIS-EAS, 25 March 1994, pp. 9-10. 61 NYT, 1 April 1994, p. 4. 
51

62 NYT, 21 April 1994, p. 4. This decision probably was made 

more in consideration for South Korean farmers than as an 

incentive for North Korea to comply with the IAEA. Team Spirit 

can't be held when rice and other crops are under cultivation 

because to do so would ruin much of these crops. 

63 FBIS-EAS, 15 April 1994, pp. 37-38 and FEER, 28 April 1994, 

pp. 22-24. 

64 Washington Post, 15 May 1994, p. 29. 65 FBIS-EAS, 16 May 1994, pp. 8-10 and 23 May 1994, pp. 16-17. 66 Washington Post, 20 May 1994, p. 1. 67 FEER, 12 May 1994, pp. 14-15. 68 NYT, 3 June 1994, p. 1. 69 IHT, 11-12 June 1994, p. 1. 70 IHT, 13 June 1994, p. 1. 71 Ibid., p. 1. 72 FBIS-EAS, 8 June 1994, p. 22. 73 FBIS-EAS, 15 June 1994, pp. 12-14. 74 FBIS-EAS, 15 June 1994, pp. 36-37. 75 The Korea Herald, 14 June 1992, p. 2. This is an English 

language newspaper with a wide distribution in the ROK. 

76 Author's interview with Colonel William R. McKinney, U.S. 

Defense Attaché, Seoul, Korea, 13 June 1994. Colonel McKinnery 

was present when Carter addressed the Country Team at the U.S. 

Embassy in Seoul before traveling to North Korea. At this meeting 

the former President indicated he had been considering making this 

trip for some time. 

77 FBIS-EAS, 20 June 1994, p. 20-21. 78 IHT, 16 June 1994, p. 1. 79 NYT, 18 June 1994, p. 1. 80 NYT, 19 June 1994, p. 1 and FBIS-EAS, 20 June 1994, pp. 33-

34. 

81 NYT, 20 June 1994, p. 1. 82 IHT, 9-10 July 1994, p. 1. 83 IHT, 11 July 1994, p. 1. 84 FBIS-EAS, 16 August 1994, p. 32. Negative security guarantees 

are controversial in South Korea because of the possible effects 

these guarantees could have on America's extended deterrence 

which is so important to the ROK's national defense. For more on 

this issue, see Taiwoo Kim, “The United States and North Korea: 

A South Korean Perspective,” a paper prepared for a symposium 

sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 

Washington D.C., 16 November 1993. 

85 FBIS-EAS, 22 August 1994, pp. 43-44. 
52

86 FBIS-EAS, 22 August 1994, p. 24, and 29 August 1994, pp. 44-

45. 

87 NYT, 15 September 1994, p. 7. 88 “Agreed Framework Between the Democratic People's Republic 

of Korea and the United States of America,” 21 October 1994, is 

found in FBIS-EAS, 24 October 1994, pp. 34-35. The following 

specifics are taken from this document. 

89 NYT, 21 October 1994, p. 4. 90 FBIS-EAS, 22 September 1993, pp. 19-20. 91 FBIS-EAS, 13 October 1994, p. 6. 92 FBIS-EAS, 3 February 1994, p. 40 and 1 April 1994, p. 23. 93 IHT, 11-12 June 1994, p. 1. 94 NYT, 1 November 1993, p. 1. 95 NYT, 9 June 1994, p. 1. See also FEER, 7 July 1994, p. 20. 96 IHT, 24 March 1993, p. 1. 97 NYT, 28 November 1993, Section 4, p. 5. 98 FBIS-EAS (Daily Report Supplement), 23 November 1993, p. 

18. 

99 NYT, 27 December 1993, p. 3. See also FBIS-EAS, 10 January 

1994, p. 15. 

100 FBIS-EAS, 18 April 1994, p. 34. 101 These quotes can be found in Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea's 

Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 7. 

102 FBIS-EAS, 27 December 1993, pp. 12-13. 

FBIS-EAS, 15 June 1994, pp. 12-13 and FEER, 23 June 1994, pp. 

14-15. 

103 FBIS-EAS, 23 November 1993, pp. 14-15. 104 Author's interviews with Robert L. Gallucci and Thomas 

Hubbard at the State Department on 17 May 1994. Hubbard led the 

U.S. delegation which negotiated with the DPRK at the UN during 

late 1993 and early 1994. 

105 Author's interview with Colonel William R. McKinney, U.S. 

Defense Attaché, in Seoul on 13 June 1994. McKinney stated that 

originally Carter planned to spend only a few hours n Seoul on his 

return from Pyongyang. However, Embassy officials convinced 

him to spend at least one night and brief Kim Young Sam 

concerning his negotiations with Kim Il Sung. 

106 FBIS-EAS, 29 September 1993, p. 27, and NYT, 7 November 

1993, p. 6. 

107 Author's interviews with Gallucci and Hubbard in Washington 

D.C. on 17 May 1994 and with James Keith, First Secretary of the 

Political Section, U.S. Embassy, Seoul, Korea, 14 June 1994. 

108 NYT, 12 February 1994, p. 3. 
53

109 NYT, 24 February 1994, p. 6. 110 The Korea Herald, 9 June 1994, p. 1. 111 The Korea Herald, 15 June 1994, p. 1. 112 The Korea Times, 16 June 1994, p. 2. 113 NYT, 8 October 1994, p. 3. 114 Author's interview with Colonel McKinney on 13 June 1994 in 

Seoul. 

115 Author's interview with Brig General Kwon An Do, Deputy 

Director, Policy Planning Office, Ministry of National Defense, 

Seoul, Korea, 15 June 1994. 

116 Author's interview with Young Koo Cha, Director, Arms 

Control Research Center, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 

Seoul, Korea, 8 June 1994. 

117For examples of the hard-line approach, see a series of editorials 

in the FEER, 25 November 1993, p. 5; 27 January 1994, p. 5; and 

30 June 1994, p. 5. For critical comments by Brent Scowcroft and 

Richard Haas, see NYT, 5 January 1994, p. 11 and Donald Gregg, 

NYT, 19 May 1994, p. 25. For Charles Krauthammer, see IHT, 7 

June 1994, p. 1. See also William Safire, NYT, 2 June 1994, p. 15, 

and Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kanter, IHT, 16 June 1994, p. 6. 

For a longer article by Arnold Kanter, see “Carrot and Stick: The 

Nuclear Problem and the Normalization of Relations,” a paper 

prepared for the symposium sponsored by the Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., 16 

November 1993. 

118NYT, 15 October 1994, p. 5, and FBIS-EAS, 7 September 1994, 

pp. 50-51. 

119NYT, 15 October 1994, p. 5. 120Author's interview with Colonel McKinney in Seoul, Korea, 13 

June 1994. 

121Author's interview with Larry A. Niksch, Congressional 

Research Service, Washington D.C., 19 May 1994. Niksch also 

argues that the administration has made a mistake by offering 

negotiations or sanctions. In his view, the better course is to pursue 

sanctions at the same time as negotiating if North Korean behavior 

dictates this approach. 

122 See William Safire in the NYT, 25 October 1994, p. 11 and 

FEER, 27 October 1994, pp. 14-15 and 3 November 1994, p. 5. 123 NYT, 24 November 1994, p. 1 and 2 December 1994, p. 7. 124 NYT, 2 December 1994, p. 7. 125 FBIS-EAS, 28 October 1994, p. 40. 
54

126 For the ROK positions, see FBIS-EAS, 27 January 1995, pp. 

40-41, 7 February 1995, pp. 38-39, and 8 February 1995, pp. 30-

31. 

127 FBIS-EAS, 16 February 1995, pp. 20-22 and NYT, 9 March 

1995, p. 4. Also, FBIS-EAS, 6 March 1995, pp. 27-30. 128 FBIS-EAS, 9 February 1995, pp. 35-36, NYT, 9 February 1995, 

p. 6, and NYT, 24 February 1995, p. 5. 129 FBIS-EAS, 9 February 1995, pp. 35-36. 130 FBIS-EAS, 22 February 1995, p. 30. 

 
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