Recent titles 

in the McNair

Paper series:

65

Agricultural Bioterrorism:

A Federal Strategy to

Address the Threat

Henry S. Parker

64

The Strategic Implications

of a Nuclear-Armed Iran

Kori N. Schake and

Judith S. Yaphe

63

All Possible Wars? 

Toward a Consensus View

of the Future Security

Environment, 2001–2025

Sam J. Tangredi

62

The Revenge of the

Melians: Asymmetric

Threats and the Next QDR

Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.

61

Illuminating 

Tomorrow’s War

Martin C. Libicki

From the introduction to

Europe’s New

Security Vocation

For the United States, having

more militarily capable allies who

are ready to shoulder heavier burdens has been a long-time goal,

one that became more 

compelling in light of the wars 

in the former Yugoslavia. Allies

able to do the difficult job of

peacemaking and peacekeeping

could ease the demands on 

the United States to police a 

continent where nationality conflicts, which do not affect core

American interests, are the 

main threat to peace. Furthermore, the cumulative effects of

protracted peacekeeping engagements on military resources and

morale are a growing concern. 

A more equitable distribution 

of duties also conforms to the

U.S. reluctance to back committing its troops to missions

that risk casualties in doubtful

causes that affect West

Europeans more directly than

they do the United States.
About the Author

Michael J. Brenner is professor of international relations at the

University of Pittsburgh. He researched and wrote this paper while

serving as a distinguished visiting fellow in the Institute for National

Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Dr. Brenner

earned his Ph.D. at the University of California, Berkeley. He has

published several works on Euro-American relations and European

security, including Terms of Engagement: The United States and the

European Security Identity (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic

and International Studies, 1998), NATO and Collective Security

(London: Macmillan, 1997), and articles in Politique Etrangere,

Internationale Politik, International Affairs, Survival, and Foreign

Policy. His latest work, coauthored with Guillaume Parmentier, is

Reconciliable Differences: U.S.-French Relations in the New Era

(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

■■■■

The National Defense University (NDU) is a joint professional military education institution

operating under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its purpose is to

prepare military and civilian leaders for service at the highest levels of national defense

and security. The principal operating elements of NDU are the Industrial College of the

Armed Forces, National War College, Joint Forces Staff College, Information Resources

Management College, Institute for National Strategic Studies, and Center for Hemispheric

Defense Studies.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) conducts strategic studies for the

Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and unified commanders in

chief; supports national strategic components of NDU academic programs; and provides

outreach to other governmental agencies and the broader national security community. 

The Publication Directorate of INSS publishes books, monographs, reports, and

occasional papers on national security strategy, defense policy, and national military

strategy through National Defense University Press that reflect the output of university

research and academic programs. In addition, it produces Joint Force Quarterly, a

professional military journal published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Europe

s New

Security Vocation

Michael J. Brenner

McNair Paper 66

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

2002
within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the vi

of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Gov

ment. This publication is cleared for public release; distribution unlimi

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without fur

permission, with credit to the Institute for National Strategic Studies

courtesy copy of any reviews and tearsheets would be appreciated.

First printing, January 2002

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office. To order, con

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, W ashington, D

20402–9328

(ISSN 1071–7552)
Contents

Foreword ................. ................. .............

Acknowledgments ................. ................. ..

Chapter One

Introduction ................. ................. ..........

Chapter Two

Perspectives on the Use of Force ................. . 

Chapter Three

EU–NATO Cooperation ................. ............

Chapter Four

Conclusion ................. ................. ............

Appendix

Principal Institutions of the European Union ....

Endnotes ................. ................. ..............
Foreword

T

he quest of the European Union (EU) to develop capabilitie

security and defense affairs has been a surprisingly contenti

issue in transatlantic relations over the past decade. Official

EU governments have been perplexed that European Security 

Defense Policy (ESDP), which they see as integral to building the EU 

all of its dimensions, is viewed in some American political circles w

trepidation, or even as a grave threat to the North Atlantic Tre

Organization (NATO).

Most Europeans believe that ESDP will actually strengthen 

Alliance by allowing Europeans to assume a larger share of the burd

of transatlantic security. While Washington has long professed supp

in principle for ESDP, American objections to specific EU defe

initiatives have led some European governments to doubt the strengt

that support. However, European efforts to press the developmen

ESDP in the context of recent crises have heightened American conce

that the project is designed to displace rather than bolster NATO. So

of the controversy can be attributed to periodic rhetorical flourishes 

European officials that greatly overstate near-term ESDP capabilitie

long-term goals. Certain American concerns are due, in part, 

misperceptions and misunderstanding of ESDP structure and activi

on this side of the Atlantic.

Michael Brenner’s fluid and incisive analysis chronicles 

development of ESDP and assesses its durability and driving polit

motivations. In the process, he helps to demystify the functioning 

ESDP, which is of particular value to American readers unfamiliar w

this initiative. Professor Brenner also advances a number of so

recommendations for U.S. policymakers about handling ESDP. A

argues, if Washington consults with European allies in ways 

diminish concerns about American unilateralism, reduces restriction

technology transfers critical to European defense modernization, 
develops reliable modalities for NATO–EU military cooperation, t

the prospects that ESDP will evolve in a manner consistent with lo

term U.S. interests will greatly increase. This paper sheds much ligh

a European project whose outcome is critical to American security.

Stephen J. Flanagan, Director

Institute for National Strategic Studies
Acknowledgments

I

n writing this paper, I have been the beneficiary of the hospita

encouragement, and intellectual stimulation provided by the Insti

for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defe

University (NDU). I had the exceptional opportunity to spend a yea

INSS as a distinguished visiting fellow at the invitation of H

Binnendijk, then Director of the Institute. The INSS Director 

Research, Stephen A. Cambone, and his colleagues engaged me in t

project on the nascent European Security and Defense Policy where 

study originated. The rich program of seminars and stream of Europ

visitors created the ideal setting for tracking and interpreting po

trends on both sides of the Atlantic.

I wish to thank Dr. Cambone and Richard A. Kugler for t

comments on an earlier draft of this paper. A special word of appre

tion goes to Stephen J. Flanagan who, as INSS Director, guided i

completion through multiple drafts with patience, good humor, and 

unfailing critical eye. James A. Schear gave the manuscript attent

judicious editing that helped refine the final product. My thanks go 

well to Robert A. Silano, Director of Publications, for his professio

ism and friendship.

Thanks are also due to the editorial staff of NDU Pres

William R. Bode, George C. Maerz, Lisa M. Yambrick, and Jeffrey 

Smotherman—who brought this publication to completion under 

supervision of Mr. Silano.
Introduction

T

he idea of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) 

been a feature of the transatlantic security dialogue for a deca

The 1991 Maastricht Treaty foresaw an eventual incorporatio

the Western European Union (WEU) as the defense arm of the Europ

Union (EU). Endowing the Union with military capability was a log

extension of the commitment to a Common Foreign and Security Po

(CFSP) as stipulated in the treaty. Both ideas, promoted by France 

Germany, expressed the general desire of member states to play a m

active role in securing the peace and stability of postcommunist Euro

Extending the principle of integration into the foreign policy field ser

two purposes. It was a means to tighten community bonds in the n

unsettled strategic environment by providing reassurance against 

renationalization of defense policies. At the same time, it laid the b

for a collective effort to influence continental affairs consonant with 

European venture in an orderly transition to democracy and ma

economies. The perceived need to add a security building block to 

project of “constructing Europe” also reflected apprehension abo

possible retreat of the United States from a Europe now free of 

Soviet military threat. That possibility added further reason for W

Europeans to make contingency plans for an uncertain future.1

For the United States, having more militarily capable allies w

are ready to shoulder heavier burdens has been a long-time goal, one 

became more compelling in light of the wars in the former Yugosla

Allies able to do the difficult job of peacemaking and peacekeep

could ease the demands on the United States to police a continent wh

nationality conflicts are the main threat to peace. Furthermore, 

cumulative effects of protracted peacekeeping on military readiness 

morale are a growing concern. A more equitable distribution of du

also conforms to the U.S. reluctance to back committing its troop
missions that risk casualties in doubtful causes that affect W

Europeans more directly than they do Americans.

A decade of American experience in the Balkans and elsewh

has left unresolved the vexing question of whether and how to interve

The prospect of more helpful allies in itself does not resolve how 

measure national interest and judge whether intervention is justified

does relieve, though, American worries that problems will go unatten

unless the United States takes the lead. It also reduces the numbe

American troops needed for combined mission effectiveness. 

accepting the terms of a more egalitarian Alliance partnership imp

in ESDI touches sensitive issues of cardinal importance to the Un

States: the institutional integrity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ

tion (NATO), its primacy on matters of European security, and 

preservation of Washington’s leadership prerogatives. The emerge

of the European Union as a potential actor in the security re

heightens the challenge for American policymakers to retain 

discretionary choice to abstain without losing substantial influence o

collective crisis management.

Considerable diplomatic energy and political capital have b

invested in efforts to reconcile claims on behalf of ESDI with es

lished NATO arrangements. Through innovation and accommodat

a good measure of success has been achieved. In particular, the 1

landmark agreement on Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) in Be

allowed for an ESDI to develop within NATO without compromisin

integrated structures.2 The Berlin accord explains, in part, why the 

drive to create an autonomous security entity linked to it faltered at 

Amsterdam Inter-Governmental Conference in 1997. Staunch Bri

opposition, exploiting the NATO breakthrough, was instrumenta

restricting advances to a set of procedural reforms. The principle 

building ESDI within NATO was punctuated at the Fiftieth Annivers

summit in Washington in April 1999. There, the allies took a further 

in officially welcoming an ESDI “under the political control 

strategic direction either of the WEU, or as otherwise agreed.”3 Th

“Berlin-plus” accords were heralded as another landmark in Allia

accommodation to European aspirations. Ironically, that cons

affirmed in the new Strategic Concept, was granted just as the polit

momentum behind a renewed push to constitute an EU-based ESDI 

cresting. At the later June summit of the European Union in Colog

member states made the historic decision to give the Union
the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities

regarding a common European policy on security and defense. . . . To this

end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up

by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a

readiness to do so . . . without prejudice to the actions by NATO.4

The European Council Declaration at Helsinki in December of 1

further “underline[d] its determination to develop a capacity to t

decisions . . . and to launch and conduct EU-led military operations

The question of European defense was reopened and reform

lated by the formal commitment to equip the Union with dedica

military forces supported by an organizational infrastructure. The se

of initiatives—catalyzed by the Anglo-French Joint Declaration 

European Defense issued at St. Malo in December 1998 and culmina

in the Helsinki Declaration a year later—set in motion a process aim

at generating the means and political will for the European Union 

play its role fully on the international stage.”6 The renamed Europ

Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) commits members to an ambiti

program for building a rapid reaction force at the corps level. The 

of this Helsinki Headline Goal is to have in place by 2003 a 60,0

person force, which is deployable within 60 days and sustainable fo

months. A marked expansion in airlift and sealift is projected to m

the force operational, and a complementary set of mechanisms 

directing military operations and conducting a concerted diplomac

being put in place. Detailed provisions for reifying the ESDP w

formally approved at the Inter-Governmental Conference at Nice 

December 2000. From the outset, this ambitious project has evo

approval from official Washington, along with some skepticism a

whether force-planning targets would be met and concern that redund

institution building might outpace capability building.

Plans to reify ESDI within the Union have been propo

debated, and shelved on several occasions in recent years. The recor

aborted takeoffs prompts the question of how serious the cur

enterprise is. The stakes are high, for, if the envisaged ESDP becom

reality, a rebalancing of the transatlantic partnership is inescapable.

ESDP is the logical outcome of the larger EU project of build

an expanded set of supranational structures to deepen the commu

while enlarging its membership. The success of the ESDP enterpr

therefore, cannot be measured only in strict terms of military capabili

created. In the eyes of European leaders, it serves both a pract

defense function and an institutional development function. Ameri
leaders will concentrate on the former even while understanding 

showing sympathy toward the latter, which makes it all the m

important that the evolution of ESDP receives the careful managem

and skillful diplomacy needed to handle the issues that have b

divisive in the recent past, such as burdensharing, the capabilities g

the question of a legal mandate for peacemaking/peacekeeping op

tions, and rules of engagement for the use of military force. The grea

need is for sustained consultation in the adaptation of modes 

methods for Euro-American cooperation. Reining in the impulse to 

unilaterally is vital. If this delicate process is well manag

NATO—and the United States—will benefit from a stronger Europ

Union more active and more competent in addressing security matt

Is ESDP Real?

Notable qualitative differences exist between the present stat

affairs and previous initiatives. Militarily, the EU states have 

themselves the ambitious objective of constituting self-sustaining for

able to perform the full range of Petersburg tasks.7 As stipulated in 

landmark declaration by the Union in June 1992, whereby it agree

build a defense component, projected forces could be employed 

humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and crisis mana

ment, including peacemaking. The ESDP initiative carries through 

that intention. In the language of the Nice Declaration:

the aim of the efforts made since the Cologne, Helsinki, and Feira

European Councils is to give the European Union the means of assuming

its responsibilities in the face of crises by adding to the range of instruments already at its disposal an autonomous capacity to take decisions and

action in the security and defense field.8

Characterizing the envisaged rapid reaction force as autonomous me

that it will have the potential to undertake missions without U

participation. Autonomy does not imply total independence from 

United States, either in the sense of acting contrary to American po

or of preferring to strike out alone.

The question of independence was clarified at Nice. Indepe

ence as concept and objective had been a leitmotif of French comm

tary on ESDP.The use of the term by French President Jacques Ch

to characterize the force in creation was challenged by British Pr

Minister Tony Blair, who firmly rejected the idea that a defense en

separate from NATO was in the works. Blair, under pressure from 
skeptics at home, was taking pains to distance himself from anyth

that smacked of a federal European Union. Eager to avoid provok

American opposition and suspicion of French ambitions, most Europ

governments tilted in the Blair direction. France prudently backed aw

from its espousal of a wholly independent ESDP. President Ch

affirmed that “NATO is the very foundation of our defense . . . ther

no reason to get anxious.” He went on, though, to make the point 

“this European defense . . . should be independent with regard 

SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe]” since “Eur

is determined to make its own contribution to its own security.”9 

allies did agree that any major operation undertaken in the foreseea

future would require access to some NATO assets (deployable headqu

ters and planning units) and U.S.-held assets assigned to NATO (

command and control, intelligence).

Reiteration of the term autonomous conveys the Europ

conviction that they must achieve a measure of self-reliance in proj

ing forces capable of operating at the lower and middle levels of 

combat scale. St. Malo broke new ground in stressing that the Europ

Union should have the capacity for independent action “in order tha

voice be heard in the world.”10 The United States, for its part, 

conceded that “development of a foreign and security policy . . . 

natural, even an inevitable, part of the development of broader Europ

integration.”11 An ancillary benefit of augmented force capabilitie

that Europeans would have more say in how combined operations w

the United States are conducted. The former concern reflects 

widespread belief that U.S. readiness to put American troops in har

way cannot be taken for granted, as well as the judgment that the 

role in maintaining continental order should be expanded as a matte

principle. The latter encapsulates the lessons drawn from the Kos

experience. Foremost, the European ability to shape intention 

determine modalities of the air campaign was restricted by its relativ

small contribution to Operation Allied Force. That reinforced 

predominance of not only American officers but also American think

in the NATO command structure. European leaders are sensitive to 

fact that the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), wa

times overridden by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. A

consequence, military action was not as well integrated with diplom

as most Europeans wanted. Interventions by the North Atlantic Cou

(NAC) were both sporadic and uncoordinated and did not prov

consistent guidance on the overall operation. Arrangements 
American commanders experienced as intermittent obstruction wi

coherent military plan were equally frustrating to some allied leaders 

opposite reasons. The hand of those European governments 

dissented from the tactics followed was weakened by the lack o

mechanism for consultation among themselves within the loose N

framework. In sum, the conclusion drawn was that Europe sho

establish itself as a presence in handling security problems.

This conclusion was the theme of the WEU ministerial mee

in May 1999. With frustration over Operation Allied Force ris

German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer expressed the ubiquit

sense that there should be “a rapid build-up of common EU force

master crises and conflicts in Europe even without the participation 

the United States. The Kosovo conflict expresses how urgent 

indispensable this build-up will be for the future of Europe.”12 

conviction that Europe should raise its profile on security matters 

unmistakably clear, even if its pertinence to the seeming stalemat

Kosovo was obscure. Now, by setting specific force level goals an

timetable for reaching them, EU governments are staking the credibi

of their avowed commitment to ESDP on reaching an unambigu

objective. That attests to their seriousness of purpose—even if mee

those goals fully by the stipulated date of 2003 is anything but certa

The fact that American officials and Congress have seized on 

Headline Goal as the acid test of whether the Europeans are genu

about preparing to perform a versatile set of missions raises the sta

of the Union making good on its commitment. The United States 

made clear that support for an autonomous EU security entity 

conditioned on Europeans strengthening their forces in line with 

NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), agreed upon at 

Washington summit, which calls for the upgrade of allied forces with 

emphasis on deployability, viability, and sustainability.13

Although the stress that leaders on both sides of the Atla

have put on building capabilities is genuine, conceptions of the ES

project are not identical. Most European governments are dedicate

winning for the Union some measure of political autonomy. The crea

of a rapid reaction force and supporting structures contributes to 

end. As a report drafted by a group of influential security exp

attached to the WEU (now EU) think tank in Paris puts it: “an essen

dimension of the European approach aims . . . at a redefinition of 

transatlantic structure of decision-making and action . . . through 

realisation of capabilities.”14
Organizationally, an extensive apparatus to support both 

putative CFSP and the envisaged military forces is rapidly taking sha

It includes the standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) and 

European Union Military Committee (EUMC) backed by the perman

European Union Military Staff (EUMS). Adding to institutio

resources are a situation center, a policy unit to receive and proc

intelligence data, and a satellite center. The appointment of Ja

Solana—who served as Secretary General of the WEU until its f

disposition in 2001—as both High Representative for the CFSP 

Secretary General of the Council places in experienced hands the tas

shaping the new security bodies. Solana’s remit covers the preroga

to place items on the Council agenda when he deems that they are in 

purview of ESDP and the responsibility to prepare materials 

ministerial decision. More broadly, he can voice publicly Europ

sentiment on outstanding issues, as he did in questioning the wisdom 

the U.S. national missile defense initiative. This institutional deve

ment, fulfilling the Helsinki mandate, will by its very existe

encourage EU states to take their own counsel, to act when conf

prevention or crisis management measures are indicated, and to activ

military forces as necessary and appropriate. In short, ESDP is be

institutionalized within the EU Council. By supplanting the WEU, ES

ceases to be derivative of NATO, the formal acknowledgemen

continued NATO primacy notwithstanding.

Politically, for the first time the 15 members are agreed on 

value of an autonomous ESDP. Britain’s volte face has made the crit

difference. By aligning itself with France and entering the mainstre

of continental thinking about the virtue of a defense component in 

Union, Britain paved the way for launching the project while mak

available military assets crucial to its success. Britain and France n

are slated to be the engines of ESDP construction, much as the Fran

German engine has been for other dimensions of European construct

The Blair government takes every occasion to reaffirm its bond to 

United States, to reassure Washington that a European army is not in 

making, and to pronounce the precedence of the Alliance. Nonethel

Britain’s promotion of ESDP has created a new political reality 

Europe. As a senior British diplomat has put it, “Rather than creatin

new security body, we are replacing an existing body that has not pro

effective enough—the Western European Union—by one with 

greater political, financial, and organizational muscle—the Europ

Union. We are trading up for a more useful instrument.”15 A defe
acquis is being added to the uncontested givens of the European Unio

Inclusion of a defense dimension among legitimate EU areas 

competence is now unanimously accepted as a necessary and nat

extension of Union common foreign policy.

Strategically, ESDP is a piece of a larger project for enhanc

EU means and aptitude for promoting the development of a Europ

system cast in its own image. The motor forces behind ESDP, and 

potential significance, can be understood only in reference to o

major initiatives. The European Union is four historic enterprises: 

launching of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); eastw

enlargement; the program for restructuring community institutions 

procedures begun at Nice and to be concluded at the Inter-Governme

Conference scheduled for 2004; and ESDP. Together, these enterpr

form a strategy in which the Union progressively moves from servin

model and mentor for its eastern cousins to being an active agen

consolidating a Europe “whole and free.” Simultaneously, it is equipp

itself to be a force in world affairs more broadly. This is, by no me

solely a French aspiration; Tony Blair has echoed Jacques Chirac 

proclaiming that the Union has reason and means to establish itself 

superpower on the international scene, albeit while avoiding the build

of a superstate.17 As a consequence, the meaning that Europeans att

to ESDP goes beyond its instrumental value.

A rolling process is likely to occur over several years as 

European Union moves to accomplish its quartet of projects. Altho

target dates have been set for reaching proximate goals in each proj

the consequences of progress made (or not made) will not regi

according to a timetable. Adjustments will have to be made to acco

for unforeseen contingencies, including those resulting from 

interplay between ESDP and the enlargement project. Over time, 

Union may acquire characteristics that change its institutional form 

outlook. Javier Solana has alerted Washington that “in a few years ti

Americans will be talking to a larger and more influential Europe.”18 

instruments and methods through which Europe will assert itself 

something that no one is able to predict confidently. Accordin

adaptations in existing mechanisms for Euro-American cooperation 

be expected to occur in phases at irregular intervals. That increme

approach is all to the good; the complexity of the EU internal restruc

ing and enlargement precludes master plans or blueprints for renova

transatlantic structures. Consequently, the process of adapting transat

tic arrangements must be open and flexible.
This is not to say that American policy should be purely react

The United States can do much at the practical level to facilita

smooth working partnership between NATO and the European Un

The Europeans share a need and expectation that the United States 

lay down a clear and consistent policy line, emanating from both 

White House and Congress, affirming that the ESDP enterprise 

neither weaken the American resolve to remain more than a detac

underwriter of European security nor engage in rearguard actions to s

its becoming a functioning reality. The Department of Defense (DO

report, Strengthening Transatlantic Security, expresses an encourag

message. Commenting on European efforts, it concludes that

These efforts are part of Europe’s longstanding and natural trend toward

greater cooperation and deeper union . . . a trend supported by the United

States since the early post-World War II period. America’s leadership role

has adjusted before to changes in Europe, and we are prepared to adapt

ourselves in the future to work with stronger, more versatile, and more

united European partners.19

The Legacy of Kosovo

Kosovo, rather than Bosnia, boosted ESDP, even though 

West European performance was far more positive in Kosovo. 

French and British took the diplomatic lead at Rambouillet, w

American blessing (but with the United States looking over t

shoulders). They and fellow EU members agreed from the outset o

tough stance against former Serbian President Slobodan Milosev

systematic oppression of Albanians. Their readiness to engage 

signaled early in the crisis, in October 1998, in dispatching a 5,0

person extraction force to Macedonia to backstop the Organization 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) corps of monitors, wh

was assigned to oversee compliance with the ill-starred accord en

neered by Richard Holbrooke. Most important, the European al

supported Operation Allied Force without exception. In some instan

most strikingly that of Greece, they did so in the face of widespr

popular opposition at home. Germany crossed an historic watershed 

using its forces in a combat role for the first time since World Wa

Operation Allied Force also was noteworthy for the French and Germ

willingness to act without an explicit enabling resolution from 

United Nations (UN) Security Council. Their qualms about tak

military action despite the lack of legal cover have not been laid a

entirely; official policy in both countries still stresses the need for a p
mandate from the world body. This remains a point of transatla

friction. However, the demonstrated willingness to run military risk

a kind that were assiduously avoided in Bosnia is undeniable. Sustai

unity of purpose and coordinated action throughout 3 months of h

stress is an accomplishment that should not be disparaged—particul

when placed against the backdrop of hesitation and recrimination 

characterized the European allies’ conduct in Bosnia.

At the diplomatic level, EU governments showed a desire and 

ability to move in formation. They pushed for a prominent role in 

end game diplomacy and gave their full backing to Finnish Presid

Martti Ahtisaari, who was acting in the capacity of the EU envoy 

nomination by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright for 

assignment notwithstanding). The Europeans worked with the Un

States as close partners and on more even terms than they were in the 

campaign. The German government in particular is proud of its rol

bringing Russia back into the diplomatic game and the success 

winning Moscow’s backing for the uncompromising ultima

presented to a beleaguered Milosevic. President Ahtisaari was joined 

former Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin in bearing 

message to Belgrade. The Germans, and other Europeans, make a p

of noting that Ahtisaari returned to report the success of his mission 

to Bonn, where Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott had hel

launch the mission, but rather to the EU summit meeting in Colog

The message was clear: It was Europeans who were restoring peac

Europe. In the wake of the settlement, the Union stepped forward to t

charge of the civilian administration of what had become a de fa

protectorate. It provides the lion’s share of the financial aid (over 

billion), and member states supply the bulk of the troops for Kos

Force (KFOR). In April 2000, Eurocorps took command of KFOR un

a Spanish general, although relying heavily on a NATO “headquarte

In addition, the European Union has promoted the Stability Pact 

Southeastern Europe, a multifaceted, long-term program for 

economic and political stabilization of the entire region. It is the m

ambitious undertaking of the community beyond its own borders.20

What explains this striking departure from the reticent beha

in the recent past? Most commentary on ESDP concentrates 

European embarrassment at the demonstrated disparities between 

sophisticated military arsenal of the United States and the Union’s o

meager contribution to the air war. This discrepancy had a shock ef

on the military, the foreign affairs experts, and government leader
deployable forces along with deficiency in precision guided muniti

(PGMs) concentrated attention on the inefficiencies and redundancie

European defense establishments. The prospect of a widening 

roused fears of a two-tier Alliance. A functional differentiation dicta

by qualitatively different weapons capabilities could result in strate

decoupling. Unless the Europeans take strong measures to redress 

technological obsolescence of current arsenals, their value to the Un

States as a military power will decline—or, at least, be so perceived 

those disposed to disparage the European contribution to mee

defense needs in and around Europe. Awareness of how Europ

technological inferiority risks reviving in new terms the hoary issu

burden sharing has quickened interest in developing a European defen

The American “high tech” versus European “cannon fodder” parad

was deeply troubling to contemplate.

Support for the initiatives embodied in ESDP is part o

growing consensus that the European Union must assume a custo

responsibility for political order across the continent. Many Europ

political, business, and intellectual elites make a connection between 

judgment that the Union should attempt to exert more control over 

security environment and the conviction that the United State

becoming too preemptory in using its leadership prerogatives. For so

ESDP is “part of a broader EU attempt to balance the preponderanc

U.S. hegemony”; to many, it is a tool for gaining more influence 

NATO decisionmaking that is dominated by Washington.21 In stud

emulation of the American “3Ds” mantra, which set the conditions o

de-coupling, no discrimination, and no duplication for Washingto

approval of ESDP, Europeans have formulated the “3Es” to portray 

policy. Some EU officials, including the American ambassador, Guen

Burghardt, refer to emancipation, Europeanization, and efficiency.

2

Emancipation connotes liberation from excessive dependenc

the United States and the perceived need to restrict U.S. unilateralism 

building the European Union as a countervailing force within 

overarching Euro-American partnership. Europeanization means 

realization of a defense entity integral to the Union. Doing so b

advances the continuing process of fostering an ever closer and m

comprehensive union and serves the practical purpose of strengthen

the EU capacity for promoting its external interests. The more effic

utilization of defense resources through integrated EU-wide projects 

structures advances these purposes. The two ends are mutually reinf

ing. For a growing segment of Western European policymakers, the i

of Europe having a security identity and role is a natural expression 
a maturing political community. ESDP is an element in a qu

constitutional process that is conceding EU attributes of sovereignty 

degrees. An increasing number of Europeans reject the domin

subordinate relationship with the United States—however much t

wish to maintain the active American presence in Europe. The integra

military command structure of NATO embodies that uneven relat

ship, which accounts for efforts to substitute for, circumvent, or plac

under more stringent political oversight. Some share the Fre

dedication to establishing a “Europe puissance” insofar as it stresses 

imperative of Europe constituting a political force per se across a w

span of international issues. It conveys the common sense idea that 

EU states should consult among themselves on questions that affect t

well being as a matter of course and be prepared to act togethe

necessary. The erection of a security policy apparatus within the Un

means that, over time, two multinational entities will occupy the polit

space of the West.23 The potential ramifications of the ESDI initia

are wide-ranging even as attention focuses on the specifics of mee

force capability goals.
Perspectives on the Use of Forc

T

his link between the projected augmentation of the Europ

allies’ military capabilities and the promotion of an autonom

political entity contributes to the hesitancy of the United State

embrace ESDP wholeheartedly. On strictly military grounds, a m

competent set of allies is an attractive prospect—but on what term

Does a larger allied contribution translate automatically into a challe

to American predominance in managing Alliance affairs? Will Europ

governments be more inclined, and able, to promote an approach 

conflict management distinctly different from the American one? H

would the United States react to such an approach? The difficulty 

U.S. officials have in giving clear-cut answers to these questions st

from their ambivalence as to the appropriate role for the United St

in dealing with a post-Cold War European security agenda dominated 

nationality conflicts. A distillation of Alliance experience in the Balk

has not produced a definitive set of policy guidelines. Howeve

discernible American approach exists, composed of three eleme

selectivity, a broad, flexible mandate (when necessary), and appro

ately robust rules of engagement. The capabilities and policies of 

Europeans bear on each of them.

Selectivity

Retaining the discretion of when to act and when not to 

serves the American interest. That decision is based on consideratio

national concern and of domestic political factors. The former inclu

the assessment of stake, risk, situation tractability, and the part pla

by other parties. That appraisal is not in itself a determining factor. 

aversion of the American public to the hazards of dealing with lo

nationality conflicts at the margins of their attention and comprehens

is a fixed feature of the political landscape. So, too, is a deeply skept
Congress that consistently has been reluctant to support fully pea

enforcing operations in the Balkans. Indeed, during the Kosovo conf

as Charles Kupchan has pointed out:

A month into a war that had not produced a single U.S. casualty, the

House of Representatives nevertheless expressed grave misgivings, voting

290 to 139 to refuse funding for sending U.S. ground troops to Yugoslavia

without Congressional approval. On the air war, the House’s tie vote (213

to 213) on a resolution backing the bombing campaign was hardly a

ringing endorsement.24

The Bush administration does not view public and Congressio

reluctance as a policy constraint in the same way that the Clin

administration did. Its own higher standard of what is worth 

commitment of resources and the possible loss of American lives bri

its official thinking more into line with skeptical opinion. However, 

Chief Executive prefers to have the latitude to decide when conditio

including Alliance considerations, call for U.S. military deploym

Selectivity retains its value.

The prospective effects of the ESDP initiative on U.S. procli

to intervene in local European conflicts are complex. Overall, ES

would seem to strengthen the viability of the selectivity principle. 

pertinent EU documents explicitly recognize that NATO, and ther

the United States, has the first right of refusal on a proposed operat

On any matter judged important enough to justify possible Ameri

involvement, there is no question of jurisdictional competit

Moreover, the improved EU readiness to perform the Petersburg ta

means that it will be in a position to take on responsibilities in circ

stances where a decision on American intervention otherwise would 

a close call. It eases the pressure on the United States to decide eithe

assume a potentially onerous burden or to allow a local conflict to fes

A militarily competent European Union, with the deliberative mec

nisms and planned force capabilities of ESDP, might well h

interposed a force between the Serbs and Croats in the early phase

the Yugoslav crisis that could have forestalled rapid intensification 

spread of civil strife. The odds are now better that an all-European fo

with the wherewithal to do the job would be deployed.

More competent, more forthcoming allies are not an unmi

blessing. Although they take some of the pressure off an Ameri

administration, they can also reduce American influence. Enhan

European capabilities strengthen the position of those, especially 
Congress, who take a jaundiced view of any U.S. participation in pea

enforcing and peacekeeping missions. Their thinking is that if someb

else wants to tackle the problem and seemingly is able to do it, w

should Washington simply not step aside. That will give pause t

White House already sensitive to the political risks of putting Ameri

troops and airmen in the line of fire. Signs that the United States pre

to abstain or that Washington is equivocating could encourage hawk

EU governments to show Union mettle. Conversely, an early deci

commitment by the European Union to act (however out of cur

character such speediness might be) could force an American admi

tration to join in whatever mission is being considered so as not to l

leverage in the crisis-management process. That may leave inadequ

time to build the requisite political support at home.

In the past, the United States has taken advantage of 

discretion that it enjoyed by virtue of its indispensability, and 

incoherence of its European partners, to alter the direction of Ameri

policy according to its own shifting assessments and mood swing

public opinion. Bosnia was the most striking case in point. The think

of the Clinton administration oscillated between a policy of absten

and a policy of activism, and periods of benign neglect alternated w

bouts of diplomatic energy as Washington importuned its allies to fol

a strategy of “lift and strike.” Over the protracted life of the crisis, 

vacillation repeated itself in multiple cycles. The European distres

American instruction from the sidelines was compounded by the err

advice being offered. Ultimately, the United States overrode its allie

taking firm charge of the situation and pressing the aggressive campa

that concluded in Dayton (with the sympathetic cooperation of Presid

Jacques Chirac’s newly elected government in Paris). While Bosnia 

singular characteristics that are not likely to repeat themselves, it 

instructive in underscoring the extraordinary latitude that the Un

States had to change its mind. That freedom was due in great meas

to the tentativeness and self-doubts of Western European governme

In the future, they will be less divided and more resistant to Ameri

control—whatever the exact degree of unity and concert they achie

Some backers view ESDP as self-protection against erratic sh

in American policy, some of which are forced by a willful Congress. 

Byrd-Warner resolution of spring 2000, which would have forced 

withdrawal of American troops from KFOR, was a notable exampl

the latter. Barely defeated by a last-ditch defense by the White Ho

the resolution struck a nerve among the allies. In some capitals
provoked reconsideration of how ESDP should be presented to 

United States. European leaders have presumed that by strengthen

their ability to act with authority in handling conflicts, they bolstered 

position of those in Washington dedicated to maintaining Ameri

commitments in Europe. Tangible evidence of allied burdensharing 

seen as key when a President sought to bring the country and 

Congress along with him in supporting American participation in 

intervention on the lines of Bosnia or Kosovo. This logic shifts if 

image of a militarily able set of allies is used to strengthen the cas

those arguing that the American stake in Balkan-like ethnic conflict

minor, and, therefore, Uncle Sam should stay on the sidelines. App

hension has deepened with clear indications from President Bu

foreign policy team that they will reexamine with a jaded eye the po

of contributing substantial American ground troops to peacekeep

missions. They envisage a new division of labor in which an empowe

set of allies relieves the United States of the need to participate 

Stabilization Force (SFOR) and KFOR types of missions.

The allies perceive a new danger on the horizon that distu

their picture of a healthy, rebalanced Atlantic Alliance: a poss

political decoupling of the United States from Europe in manag

substrategic security problems. Consequently, some parties have beco

inclined to underplay European autonomy and not to overstate curr

capabilities. Striking the right balance in meeting American expectati

about reaching the Headline Goal without encouraging the force

insularity in the American body politic has complicated how 

architects of ESDP manage the delicacies of both transatlantic 

domestic American politics.

Looking to the future, a cardinal U.S. concern will be that 

European proclivity to act is commensurate with their ability to ma

means to ends. The nightmare scenario for American officials is be

called upon to salvage a failed mission or to rescue an allied force. 

anxious point of reference is the acute dilemma in which the Clin

administration found itself in the summer of 1995. It stemmed fro

confused, UN-directed allied mission and transatlantic dissonanc

Committed to extricating the UN Protection Force if its mission wer

collapse, the administration found itself faced with the prospec

choosing between dispatching a U.S. expeditionary force to punctu

a Western humiliation (incurring the high risk of casualties along 

way) or dealing a heavy blow to Alliance unity by staying aloof. A h

of errors and miscalculations over the preceding 4 years brought 
Alliance to that precipice. The European lack of preparedness for tak

collective action was a major factor in putting the Western powers in 

dire a predicament. A capable ESDP that prudently seeks to engage 

United States wherever possible and acts with sobriety when ventur

out on its own would largely remedy that defect.

The EU concentration on the Petersburg tasks has an ancil

benefit. Peacemaking and peacekeeping missions often entail a con

phase followed by a policing-cum-reconstruction phase. The U

interest in avoiding the need to place military personnel in a peaceke

ing role is served by the availability of allies adept at, and prepare

commit themselves to, those noncombat functions. Thus, the Un

States has sound practical reasons to encourage ESDP government

conserve their strictly peacekeeping capabilities even as America ur

them to build up warfighting capabilities. In this respect, EU neut

have a notable contribution to make. The Scandinavians especially h

extensive experience serving in UN missions and the backing of pu

opinion for performing what are broadly seen as classic peacekeep

functions of mediation and monitoring.

Evolving plans for ESDP do take note of the exceptional a

represented by neutral members. On the initiative of Sweden, the Un

has set itself a goal of constituting a reserve corps of civil police offi

specifically trained for light peacekeeping duties. The goal is to h

available 5,000 officers earmarked for such crisis missions. A c

contingent of 1,000 could be deployed and in place within 30 d

Plans envisage using the force either as part of a stabilization prog

intended to calm political unrest or to restore civil order in the wak

armed strife. In principle, the contingent would be available for j

operations that the European Union might undertake in conjunction w

other international bodies (for example, the UN, OSCE, or NATO

Creation of a police corps to perform peacekeeping duties is particul

attractive to neutral EU members as a congenial way to demonst

solidarity with other governments. However, early indications are 

constituting such a force is more difficult than foreseen. The diversit

experience, training, and organization among earmarked national po

units complicates the task of melding them into a body capable 

operating under what would be exceptional conditions. Still, 

potential value of such a force as a component of the overarching ES

structure taking shape is evident and the commitment to developing 

firm.
Speculation about ESDP plans and operations should take 

account that EU governments value ESDP for what it adds to the 

Common Foreign and Security Policy. Governments aim to play 

Union strengths by linking the defense component to existing 

security instruments. They see the PSC as the pivotal body wh

properly embedded within the wider EU system, cooperates closely w

the European Commission (EC) and observes the rules of full consu

tion and consensus-building that govern other parts of the commun

Italy and Sweden are most forthright in conditioning their backing 

ESDP on its integration into the EU core—that is, autonomous vis-à

NATO but not autonomous in distancing itself from preexisting 

structures. German policymakers generally share this perspective. Be

will play a crucial role in reconciling the building of hard mili

capabilities (and a readiness to use them) with a mode of approach 

conflict management that sees military action as the option of last res

Meeting the Headline Goal will provide the necessary condi

for the European Union to take effective military action. The suffic

factor—the will and sense of purpose of EU governments—rem

problematic, however.

The Mandate Issue

Having the maximum latitude in setting the terms for 

military operation is in American interest and is a natural complem

to safeguarding its right to be selective in choosing when it will 

Peace-enforcing and peacekeeping missions are no exception to 

principle of Washington retaining the ability to determine how it 

engage and use its military forces. A legitimizing resolution from 

UN Security Council (UNSC) is generally desirable but is no

precondition. Despite its initial fixation on “assertive multilateralis

the Clinton administration ultimately adopted a qualified, cauti

attitude toward international legal mandates.

To be sure, acting under the legal authority of the UNSC 

have other benefits. An enabling UNSC resolution can provide the b

for mobilizing military and diplomatic support, as it did during 

Persian Gulf crisis. It also sets a legal norm of acceptable internatio

conduct, thereby constraining others who might be inclined to use fo

for malign purposes. Russia’s impulse to police the Commonwealth 

Independent States, for example, could more readily be held in check 

proscriptive rules on unendorsed interventions. U.S. hopes for meld

UN and NATO multilateralism have not been realized. Taking 
UNSC route has entailed restrictions as well as opportunities 

collective intervention. The early optimism raised by Russian collabo

tion and Chinese indifference gave way to pessimism as both count

increasingly perceived their national interest in curbing what they 

as a hegemonic United States arrogating to itself, and to NATO, br

powers to use force according to its own dictates—as it did in Bos

Iraq, and Kosovo.27

The difficulties encountered in setting new terms for collec

action with the Western allies are aggravated by differences over 

need and value of obtaining UNSC endorsement for undertaking mili

operations. The two planes of collective action have intersected inso

as most allies insist on prior UN approval as the sine qua non for t

participation in missions directed against a sovereign state. Hence, 

move to underscore the consensus principle within NATO (or am

any coalition of the willing) will bring to the fore disagreements ab

the principle of having UN imprimatur. This truth was obscured by 

tacit agreement to launch Operation Allied Force without clear le

authorization. Allied governments chose to override the opinion of le

advisors who claimed that they were acting with dubious author

France, which has been most forceful in asserting the UN mandate a

essential precondition for military action, found it convenient to aban

its strict constructionist position. French flexibility in using a lo

interpretation of existing UNSC resolutions on Kosovo (1160, 11

1203), which were passed on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Cha

to legitimate the air assault, was a case of expedient interest prevai

over procedural principle. While declaring that those resolutions w

“sufficient unto the day,” in the words of Foreign Minister Hu

Védrine, French leaders went out of their way to make clear that Kos

did not constitute a precedent-setting departure from the norm.28

Likewise, the German government cited the compelling need 

prompt, decisive action in explaining its readiness to deviate from 

country’s otherwise firm position that its armed forces would 

deployed only outside its borders when acting on behalf of the UN 

derivatively, the OSCE). The Schroeder government’s historic decis

is all the more noteworthy for the legal and political hurdles it ha

overcome. The 1994 ruling of the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe 

cleared the way for German participation in the Implementation Fo

and SFOR in Bosnia explicitly cited the requirement that any pea

enforcing or peacekeeping operation have legal authorization from 

international community. As for public opinion, the long-standing ta
against engaging German troops for any reason other than natio

defense, coupled with skepticism about the morality and utility of us

force generally, posed a serious challenge to the government.

The presence of the Green Party in the coalition governm

meant that the issue would be joined at the highest decisionmaking le

Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was the critical figure who passi

ately made the case for intervention on moral grounds to the pac

elements in his own party and to the country at large. In effect, 

German leadership used the principles and ideals of Germany’s post

political culture to generate support for a righteous cause that ha

claim on the national conscience. In this respect, their appeals sha

something with those of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosev

whose calls to arms were made in the name of defending American c

values by which the country defined itself rather than in strict secu

terms. German solidarity with allies in the air campaign, its flaw

conduct as the loyal partner, lent authority and credibility to its energ

campaign for negotiations. Fischer persistently pressed the German p

for “bringing Russia back on board the boat” and turned it into a 

instrument for breaking the deadlock with Slobodan Milosevic. In 

way, the Schroeder-Fischer team was able to maintain the br

consensus in the Bundestag for the war while acting, in Europe’s na

to promote a peace formula that met allied conditions.29

The idea of acting in the name of Europe provides legal as w

as political cover for a German foreign policy that skillfully is build

its stature as a large power able and willing to act without comple

Germany has a pervasive feeling that EU partners are attentive to 

virtue of acting with international legality—in contrast to the mave

ways of the United States. An operation that represents a collec

decision by the 15 members, in this sense, is perceived as dou

authoritative since it is generated through the legitimacy-produc

supranational process of the European Union, whose members adher

similar norms of “correct” international behavior. Thus, Berlin wil

inclined to involve the Union in crisis management, as well as con

prevention, whatever NATO role is dictated by military needs, 

however highly the Euro-American partnership is valued. As a 

effect, the Franco-German co-leadership of the European Union 

thereby strengthened insofar as France trumpets most loudly the the

of UN-based legality and the cause of Europe puissance. On nei

count can Great Britain, the other member of the ESDP leadership t

compete with France.
Germany and France share the conviction that authorization 

the UNSC normally should be a precondition for military intervent

Their motivations, though, are not identical. Paris seeks to constrain 

overweening United States whose self-confidence and turbu

domestic politics together impel it to act unilaterally and, at tim

impetuously. French insistence on seeking a UNSC mandate aim

imposing a procedural restraint. It complements the French po

objective of developing the European Union into a force capable 

countervailing American power—within the Alliance and on the w

international stage. It also conforms to the French campaign to empo

NATO political bodies—the Political Committee and the North Atla

Council—to set the strategic parameters for and to oversee mili

operations directed through Alliance integrated force and comm

structures. Foreign Minister Védrine sketched the French strate

perspective this way:

A major factor in the world today [is] the overriding predominance of the

United States in all areas and the lack of any counterweight. We have to

methodically broaden the basis for agreement among Europeans. We have

to coordinate with the United States all along the line on a basis agreed by

all European states, combining a friendly approach with the need to be

respected, and defending organized multilateralism and the requirements

of the Security Council under all circumstances. Finally, we have to plan

politically, institutionally, and mentally for the time when Europe has the

courage to go further.30

That is, France needs to strike out on an independent course free 

moral obligation to the United States.

Viewed in this perspective, the stress that France places 

working through the UN system expresses its belief in the value 

concert approach to managing world conflicts as much as it d

devotion to the idea of collective security. The Security Council 

venue in which the major powers, including France, with broad inter

in a stable, equilibrated international system, can convene and delibe

with the objective of coming up with a commonly acceptable strate

From the French standpoint, countries with a significant interest 

latent conflict situation, too, should contribute to the process 

collective conflict prevention and crisis management. This is why Fra

(like Germany) so strongly encouraged Russian involvement in seek

resolution of both the Bosnian and Kosovo crises—within and out

UNSC. For the same combination of reasons, Paris resists expanding 

functional and geographical scope of NATO, inveighing against U
inspired plans allegedly designed to turn it into a modern-day H

Alliance that arrogates to itself the authority to decide where and ho

might intervene. Accordingly, it led the rearguard at the NA

Washington summit to narrow the scope of the Alliance’s Strate

Concept.

France, therefore, embeds the mandate issue in a larger const

that draws from traditional conceptions of international politics: bala

of power, national interest, relative rather than absolute security—

the diplomacy to operationalize them. Germany, by contrast, has gre

faith in the UN potential for collective action on behalf of the wo

community. In practice, the thinking of the two countries converges 

the mandate issue, as it does on the necessity for bringing Russia in

working partnership with the West. German success in engaging Ru

as an honest broker between NATO and Slobodan Milosevic reinfor

the conviction that collaboration need not be based on exped

calculations of narrow national interest but rather on a comm

enlightened interest in a stable European order. The German-Rus

“strategic partnership” pronounced by Chancellor Gerhard Schroe

and President Vladimir Putin at their Berlin summit in June 2

conforms to that line of thinking.31 Building on that premise, Germ

stress the practical wisdom of a resort to UNSC for the authority to t

military action.

Most other European allies of the United States have an outl

akin to that of Germany. (Britain is the exception, and the Netherla

a partial one.) Various reasons and reasoning include, inter a

constraining perceived American unilateralism; satisfying inte

political requirements; or cleaving to a narrowly drawn peacekeep

mandate so as to avoid the risks of more ambitious peace-enforc

missions. Together, they can be expected to generate heavy pressur

seek UN cover in cases where crisis management carries the possibi

of military action. Within the ESDP structures, the PSC and Coun

this approach may predominate. It will not readily be offset by agg

sive American lobbying as occurs in the North Atlantic Coun

Moreover, neutral EU members are among the strongest advocates o

absolutist position on the mandate issue. Their influence will 

magnified by the high value that EU institutional culture places 

consensus. The Union is itself also highly legalistic and observan

rigid rule-bound procedures, strengthening the preference to act un

UN aegis. The inclination to place greater faith in conciliation than 

confrontation will further reinforce this preference. Recognition of th
truths spurred the vigorous American effort to narrow the scope 

opportunity for ESDP structures to function separately from NA

structures. Arrangements agreed to at the NATO and EU summit

December 2000 that provide for joint meetings and elaborate consu

tions are designed to preclude any kind of EU crisis-managem

strategy from crystallizing.

Despite those American-inspired safeguards, presuming a re

EU consensus when faced with a real-life security problem would 

erroneous. Divisions could open between member states with an acti

bent (Britain and France) that will seek a way to balance considerati

of legitimacy and effectiveness and those inclined to link the 

traditional caution with UN proceduralism in a soft approach to cr

management. Paradoxically, so orienting ESDP may give France pa

at being locked into a rigid process of consensus-building with partn

who do not share its attitude on how to deal with potential con

situations and who are more devoted to the principle of legal mand

than France is. For this reason, Paris as well as London places high va

on provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty and the Cologne/Hels

Declarations that allow for coalitions of the willing.

Ironically, the latent interest of some EU governments, P

especially, in direction by a concert roughly parallels the logic tha

leading some American security planners to think seriously about 

relative merits of U.S.-led ad hoc operations. They visualize coaliti

acting under some form of NATO endorsement and relying on NA

command structures. France, by contrast, would prefer to act with an 

endorsement while relying on European command structures 

military assets to as great an extent as possible. In a situation where 

two organizations were to convene to address a conjectural prob

(whether sequentially or concurrently), the cumulative proced

complications, including pressures for some form of referral to UN

could have the effect of making ad hoc action an attractive option 

both Paris and Washington.

American policymakers, overall, have some issues in regar

the European preoccupation with the mandate question. Americans 

this focus tiresome because the repeated proclamations of the le

imperative to obtain UNSC authorization are disconnected from 

practicalities of crisis management and coercive diplomacy. T

believe that it is illogical because, in Kosovo, all Western lead

recognized the compelling need to act with or without formal author

tion. It was a precedent, whether admitted, and a sound one at that
make any conjectured military action in future contingencies depend

on the political backing of China and Russia is to handcuff the Wes

powers at times when common interests may call for timely action. H

can acceptance of that constraint be reconciled with the mult

commitments made to upholding standards of acceptable conduct acr

the continent? Washington also finds the mandate preoccupa

irksome because it sees its European partners as unjustified in enlis

other states to hinder the United States in what it views as the judici

exercise of its influence to meet exceptional obligations and leaders

responsibilities.

These divergent outlooks stem from contrasting histor

experiences and different locations in today’s international syst

Americans believe that the U.S. force carries its own legitimacy sinc

serves no selfish interest; rather, it serves the enlightened cause

defending freedom, fostering democracy, and opposing threats 

international peace—all seen as collective goods for the world comm

nity. Europeans instinctively are more sensitive to how destructive 

play of power has been in the past and how it can be counterproduc

today unless employed with prudence and discretion. Although allie

not question American ideals and motives, some do doubt Washingto

judgment and take exception to its alleged self-righteousness. As lo

allies who are also partners in the great enterprise of building a wo

order on enlightened principles, they believe it is their duty to coun

prudence and restraint in American use of its enormous power. To 

way of thinking, insistence on acting under the aegis of the Un

Nations serves that end. Grievances about the alleged failure of 

United States to consult fully with its allies before the fact add to 

desire to find methods for ensuring that collective deliberation prece

and informs any decision to use, or threaten the use of, military fo

Developing ESDP points in that direction.

The United States has succeeded in finessing the mandate is

At the Washington Fiftieth Anniversary summit in April 1999, Ame

foiled attempts to introduce precise language in the new Strate

Concert that would have required an enabling UNSC resolution. 

communiqué states:

We recognize the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security

Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. . . . We

look forward to developing further contact and exchanges with the United

Nations in the context of cooperation in conflict prevention, crisis

management, and response operations, including peacekeeping and
humanitarian assistance. . . . The Alliance will consider on a case by case

basis future cooperation of this kind.32

With American encouragement, a similar compromise 

written into the Helsinki Declaration that leaves some ambiguity a

whether such an explicit resolution was necessary or merely desira

The Presidency Conclusions affirm:

The Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Union

recognizes the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security

Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. The

Union will cooperate . . . in a mutually reinforcing manner in stability

promotion, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict

reconstruction.33

The European Union, like NATO, has left itself considerable room 

liberal interpretations of the commitment in principle to act in ac

dance with UN rules.

Still, in actual cases, the United States will come under press

to seek a UN mandate. Unless a compelling, immediate threat exist

serious Western interests or an equally compelling humanitarian cr

is in the offing, diverse allied preferences will arise. If a pronoun

European viewpoint emerges different from the American one, line

allied consultation could become entangled. To alleviate that probl

the United States should strive to fashion a common line of think

with its most militarily competent allies (Britain and France) 

politically influential ally (Germany) as to what are the minimal fo

of authorization needed for diverse contingencies. Depending 

circumstances, the United States might also find common ground w

allies in a liberal reading of a preexisting UN resolution, as occurred 

Kosovo—however much some allies insist that it is not a preceden

case can be made for a similarly liberal reading of provisions in Cha

VII of the UN Charter. In principle, the United States has a third opt

It can refrain from participation in a UN-sanctioned mission if it fi

the terms inimical to achieving its desired ends or securing the wel

of its personnel (as was the case in Bosnia between 1991 and 19

Abstention, though, could be considered only if the matter in ques

were of marginal interest to the United States. Then, the readiness of 

European allies to step into the breach would make it easier 

Washington to stand aside—even if doing so exposes it to criticism 

not doing its international duty.
Prudent officials will anticipate situations where disagreem

over the interpretation of a mandate are a surrogate for serious dif

ences between the United States and the European Union, as a collect

ty, on the appropriateness and acceptable limits of military action. Al

may agree that an ambiguously worded UNSC resolution provi

sufficient basis for taking action but diverge in their views of the sc

of action it permits. That was the case with regard to enforcement of 

no-fly zone over Iraq where America and the United Kingdom wer

loggerheads with France. A clear-cut line of division between 

Europeans en bloc and the United States is unlikely. Were s

circumstances to arise, it could be taken as an occasion to force 

ESDP states to confront the reality of acting on their own, assuming 

neither major American interests nor credibility were at stake

reasonable test for ESDP could have the salutary effect of testing 

newfound will and capabilities of the Europeans. Indications 

inadequacy would demonstrate the need to redouble efforts to add

insufficiency.

Effectiveness

Enhanced European capabilities mean that the tradeoff betw

achieving an equitable burdensharing and effectiveness is less st

Consequently, the United States can be somewhat more relaxed ab

ceding a larger role for allies in combined missions. That in turn sho

assuage anxieties among the American public and Congress ab

dangerous deployments where no compelling national interest 

threatened. It should also help the Bush administration to achieve 

objective of concentrating its force planning on first-order threats w

retaining broad discretion about whether and how to participate in pea

enforcing and peacekeeping missions. How the perception of m

forthcoming and capable allies will play in American policy deb

cannot be accurately predicted. A good starting point is the proposi

that a skeptical public opinion is a healthy check on the impulse tow

indiscriminate interventions driven by the Cable News Network (CN

factor. That skepticism could be reinforced by expectations 

somebody else is doing the job. However, the evident readiness of 

Europeans to shoulder more of the load could have the opposite eff

that is, more equitable burdensharing may be justification for Americ

joining an operation.

Similar uncertainty surrounds the question of how an opera

ESDP will affect U.S. options for structuring collective operations. T
question is especially salient for those who judge harshly Opera

Allied Force as the epitome of warmaking by committee. Rejecting 

proposition that the undeniable flaws in the design and conduct of the 

campaign are inherent to combined operations undertaken throug

formal alliance structure still leaves reason to ponder the terms 

American collaboration with more self-assertive allies—whe

individually or as a tacit caucus whose sense of collective identity, 

perhaps common viewpoint, has been strengthened by ESDP experien

This concern prompted the Clinton administration to take a tough 

on the contours of the EU–NATO framework agreement. It pres

successfully to minimize how much room EU bodies would hav

deliberate and act on their own in the earliest stages of managin

manifest crisis. The accords provide for frequent and intense consu

tions at every level.

Enmeshment notwithstanding, differences over how to cond

combined operations are expected at times to be more acute and m

resistant to resolution when the United States has a less dominant r

A larger European contribution commonly means more influence—

unmistakable and unavoidable aim of its promoters. The alternatives 

the United States are to go it alone (at considerable diplomatic cost 

the loss of backing in sections of American public opinion) or to lea

coalition of the deferentially willing outside of the formal Allia

structure along the lines of Operation Desert Storm. That course, thou

may deny the United States the help of countries that it would lik

have alongside it. The latter option has some appeal for those impat

with the delays and tensions associated with truly multilateral form

decisionmaking. One cannot know in advance whether the m

orthodox option of working with allies through the formal NA

apparatus will produce superior performance or instead impede 

efficient application of military force. The problematic element increa

as a consequence of ESDP, however tightly interwoven are NATO 

EU bodies. Indeed, those arrangements could expand Europ

opportunity to influence American strategic preferences. Ready acc

on objectives and on the contours of a strategy for reaching them m

hold the promise of smooth cooperation that is belied in practice as 

operation unfolds. In Kosovo, disagreements on how to conduct the 

campaign emerged incrementally, largely due to the absence of 

agreed strategic plan at the onset of hostilities and inadequate con

gency plans. Achieving agreement in advance is no easy ma

especially when force is part of a larger exercise in coercive diploma
To face squarely the hard choices about taking military action that co

arise puts governments (or their publics) on the spot who fin

unpalatable except under the most exigent circumstances. Yet in 

future, the importance of being explicit about the planned scope 

intensity of a military campaign will increase because the United St

no longer could be cast as the “heavy” whose irresistible pressure for

reluctant governments to take action more drastic than they prefer

Accountability for Europeans is companion to the augmented capab

ties that they are building.

Does an appreciable gap remain between American 

European attitudes toward the use of force? The Kosovo experie

increased the tendency to assume that the gap has narrowed marke

if not closed entirely. The Helsinki Goals and the concrete st

registered at the Capabilities Commitment Conference in Novem

2000 point to the same conclusion. There, EU governments underli

their “determination to develop an autonomous capacity . . . wh

NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led mili

operations in response to international crises.”34 A closer reading of 

situation, however, suggests a less sanguine assessment. While the tr

line in the thinking of political elites indisputably leads to a grow

readiness to take military action, a discernible European approach 

conflict remains, as does a body of public opinion deeply skeptica

using coercion to settle disputes. This is especially so on the co

nent—except in France—where the “civilian” mentality is pronounc

In Germany, Italy, and elsewhere, more weight is placed on seekin

prevent conflicts through political engagement and construc

dialogue; confrontation and military action are seen as measures of 

resort. That inhibition was shed on Kosovo because of the overrid

need to act with all means available to prevent a perceived humanita

disaster. A decade of experience with Slobodan Milosevic’s ruth

ways, moreover, gave little hope that milder methods would work.

If the question of military action arises in future crises, 

balance might be struck otherwise. Germany, above all, will hav

contend with a public opinion being pulled in opposite directions by 

pacifist inclinations and its finely honed sense of international mora

ESDP may heighten the tension, for the issue of what should 

expected of a good European citizen will permeate the domestic deb

with unpredictable effects on the outcome. As Hanns Maull has coge

argued, “Germany will continue to be guided by the old principles, 

it will continue to try to reconcile them as much as possible with the n
exigencies of a radically different security environment. A di

challenge to the civilian power role concept is therefore unlikely in 

foreseeable future.”35 Germany’s backing for utilization of the ES

machinery will remain strong. The restructuring of the Bundeswehr 

a more professional and mobile force will continue to the extent 

financial constraints permit. Equally, devotion to creating a Europ

rapid reaction corps will be accompanied by a policy that continue

accord precedence to political means and methods.

The conduct of the air campaign over Kosovo demonstrated 

the United States and several of its European allies differ as to h

military force should be applied.36 The Europeans generally favore

more restrained, incremental strategy. For them, coercive force wa

instrument for signaling intent. By leaving room for Milosevic and 

Serb leadership to make the necessary adjustments in risk calculatio

the way for a diplomatic resolution would be cleared. Most mili

opinion on the American side strongly favored a sharp, sustained att

against high-value enemy assets at the onset of the air campaign. Yet 

Clinton administration took an approach roughly analogous to that o

allies in its first phases. Positions began to diverge as administra

thinking shifted in the direction of a more intense strike extended to 

a wider array of high-value economic (and politically symbolic) targ

in Serbia proper. Frustrated by meager results from attacks on S

forces in Kosovo, Milosevic’s recalcitrance, and erosion of popu

support on the home front, the United States sought to force a chang

calculations being made in Belgrade. Its underlying premise was th

higher level of pain had to be inflicted for maximum shock effect be

a reversal of Serb policy could be expected.

A corollary element in the current, and different, European 

American modes of approach was the level of tolerance for dam

inflicted and damage suffered. Europeans had greater sensitivity 

collateral injuries to the civilian population in Yugoslavia and to th

suffering severe economic deprivation. Queasiness was more p

nounced in some European countries than others, with Britain at one 

of the continuum and Germany, Italy, and the Scandinavian countrie

the other. Overall, the allies were distinctly less stoic on this score t

was the United States. All governments suffered pangs of conscie

and popular revulsion at casualties caused by errant missiles and bom

but nothing cracked the solidarity of the Alliance. How much longer 

unity could have been maintained in the face of stubborn Serb resista

to intensified air strikes is unknown, however.
Dismay in Europe at the bombing impact on civilian popula

stemmed in part from an incomprehension of the Clinton adminis

tion’s zero-casualty standard for Operation Allied Force. The appa

link between the readiness to take military action relying on PGMs 

the expectation that it could do so at minimal risk to American person

disturbs some Europeans: They infer that American leaders may fin

politically difficult to sustain a military engagement if U.S. forces w

to incur significant losses. As General Klaus Naumann has put it: “

know what Americans are ready to kill for; we do not know what t

are ready to die for.”37 The worst-case scenario that critics of the U

approach envisage is that a confrontational, gung-ho America pulls 

allies into a shooting war and then lowers the chances of success 

bending the military strategy to the unrealistic requirements of Ameri

politics. The result could be precipitous action to resolve it—whet

drastic escalation or an expedient diplomatic escape hatch. The la

was belied by the Clinton administration’s apparent willingness 

consider a ground campaign rather than accept an embarrassing polit

defeat in Kosovo. A strain of skepticism remains, though, about 

tolerance for risk-taking in the American body politic generally 

whether the President actually would have climbed out on that dan

ous political limb. The Bush administration has raised the bar for w

is “worth the commitment of resources and the potential loss 

American lives,”38 but has offered no more fixed standards for U

allies to plan against than did its predecessor. The reaction of 

American public to the events of September 11 certainly has stiffe

the resolve to accept the full consequences of military action 

Afghanistan. How far that attitude change extends is less certain.

Consequently, the move to develop ESDP and associa

military capabilities is visualized as serving multiple purposes, al

which derive from a perceived overdependence on a dominant 

unpredictable American ally. This logic points to a need to estab

Europe within NATO as well as outside it. Preparation for the latte

at the level of political psychology, linked to the former. The Fre

government is the only one to make this point explicitly. Defe

Minister Alain Richard has repeatedly presented the argument th

European defense serves two purposes: to be able to act independe

of SHAPE by creating an option for a self-reliant EU-only opera

without recourse to NATO assets and to “provide for a firm handle 

. . . the levers of influence” on a common NATO operation. As Rich

has said, “the Kosovo experience has reminded us that each na
weighs on the whole in proportion to its own military contribution

The French are not alone in their conviction that a revamping 

arrangements for political oversight of military operations is necess

Some of the smaller allies mildly resent that some serious points 

difference are sorted out among the United States and its major partn

before consideration by the North Atlantic Council. They fear a sim

modus operandi taking hold within ESDP security structures. Indisp

ably, Washington made certain unilateral decisions as to the use 

stealth aircraft and some cruise missile strikes without prior consultat

even informing officially allied governments after the fact. O

problematic questions concerning targeting, strategy, and weap

deployments were sorted out in the complex interplay betw

SACEUR, General Wesley Clark, and senior decisionmakers in DO

Allied governments were not party to that discourse.40

Understandably, some European leaders were dismayed 

decisions on matters of capital importance were being deliberated 

channels inaccessible to them. One answer to the issues raised 

American predominance in Alliance policymaking, reinforced by a d

chain of command, is more European input and better coordina

efforts to exert influence. Whatever form that might take, it would en

more formal, regularized oversight by the North Atlantic Council. T

would prove hard to square with the discontents of American comma

ers who chafed at the NAC intrusions. Their frustration over 

restrictions imposed by the diplomatic dynamics of a 19-nation coali

has left a sour taste that is all the more irritating because Kosovo se

to be the model for coalition operations to come, at least those that 

military and political elements as did Operation Allied Force.

41 Gen

Michael Short (USAF), for one, has extolled the virtues of a coalitio

the willing with the United States at its head, as opposed to another 

conducted by committee. Considering the Kosovo experience, 

concluded: “It’s my evaluation that NATO cannot go to war in the 

against a competent enemy without the U.S. If that is the case, and 

are going to provide 70 percent of the effort—then we should have m

than 1 of 19 votes.” What he thinks we should have said is, “We 

take the alliance to war and we’re going to win this thing for you, but 

price to be paid is we call the tune.”42 His is a minority view, bu

underscores the strain between the American formula for effective ac

and Alliance dynamics.

This strain was eased in the response to September 11 by a t

understanding that the United States would decide what military acti
it would take (with Britain the sole active allied partner) but wo

consult through Alliance channels as to its plans and operations. 

historic invocation of article 5 did not give Washington a “blank chec

as a number of member governments were quick to point out.

It still remains the intention of some allied governments (m

notably the French) to make sure that they will have a greater say in 

planning and execution of any future combined operations. This sho

be seen as a constant factor in the Alliance equation, deference to 

American lead in the antiterrorist campaign notwithstanding. Presid

Chirac was the most assertive of allied leaders in critiquing Ameri

plans, whether originating with General Clark or General Short, f

more extensive or more intensive air assault in Serbia proper. On sev

occasions, Chirac telephoned General Clark to protest what he saw 

targeting decisions that ran counter to what he understood were agr

guidelines. He was especially irked by the independent line of decis

that denied European governments any say in designating the missi

for cruise missile and stealth bomber strikes. His general complaint 

U.S. commanders were not sufficiently sensitive to the diplom

aspects of the situation took on a sharper edge during the tense nego

tions at the drama’s end. Anxious that a diplomatically corne

Milosevic not retreat into obstinacy, Chirac urged a cessation of atta

on high-profile targets in and around Belgrade (as well as those 

Montenegro). Renewed strikes against the Belgrade powergrid 36 ho

later reminded him of both the limits of his influence and the v

different judgments being reached by American leaders as to h

Milosevic’s mind worked.43

A genuinely combined operation—that is, one in which 

United States and allied governments share mission planning 

execution—has the advantage of reducing the danger that any failur

consequence could lead to recrimination. Otherwise, were things to 

badly, critics at home may well be inclined to blame the presum

shortcomings of allies, their misguided strategic ideas, or both. In 

future conflict, the American strategy will continue to aim at reconci

the ambitious but conflicting objectives—“no compromise with eth

cleansing” and casualty avoidance—by intensively using firepow

especially PGMs. Proponents of a German-style European strategy 

face a mirror-image problem in trying to minimize both their own fo

casualties and civilian casualties from collateral damage. The o

logical answer to that puzzle is to scale down military expectations w

redoubling diplomatic efforts. On Kosovo, Germany could not do 
former, but it took full advantage of its position in holding the rota

EU presidency to press the latter. With conditions ripe for a n

initiative and the allies agreed on the question of bringing in 

Russians, Germany could act within its comfort zone and succeed.

Nonetheless, the inner tension that all allies experience about 

conduct of peace-enforcing missions could handicap future operatio

Allowance must be made for the particular sensibilities of each. Th

complete reconciliation may be impossible. Still, the principle of 

consultation prior to the initiation of military action should be obser

to keep the risks of debilitating interallied frictions at tolerable levels

this respect, the EU–NATO accords that provide for close coordina

at all stages of the crisis management process are a significant acc

plishment. Their refinement and implementation should be gi

priority. The United States should lend its full weight to the eff

cognizant that most allied governments expect that “Washington 

serious about sharing the burden of crisis-management.”44

Capabilities

ESDP will challenge the ability of the United States and 

European allies to work in concert whether conducting coerc

diplomacy, managing crises, or launching peace-enforcing operatio

Their success in avoiding serious strains will be influenced, if 

determined, by the degree of disparity in force capabilities. 

commitment of EU members to strengthen capacity for force projec

has been at the center of attention. Highlighted as the Headline Goa

has become the litmus test of how dedicated the Europeans are ab

giving teeth to ESDP. The gap in PGMs and command, cont

communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) is equally great 

growing. European forces are falling further behind those of the Un

States in keeping up with the revolution in military affairs produced 

the application of sophisticated new technologies to weaponry 

communications. As General Naumann has depicted the worrisome s

of affairs, “None of the steps taken to fill the gaps will enable Europ

forces to act alone.” He argues for an urgent effort to develop 

technologically advanced command and control structures and inte

gence capabilities essential to field a credible expeditionary force.45 

costs of bringing the projected ESDP force up to U.S. standards wil

high, even if EU governments are able to draw on American technol

via a more liberal export licensing policy and the full utilization 

Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) provisions for tapping NA
assets. Simply pooling current national capabilities will not suff

although some saving in defense spending would be realized fr

moves toward the denationalization of procurement practices and cro

national industrial mergers and joint development projects. Moreo

in some measure an unavoidable tradeoff exists between the finan

requirements for building airlift and sealift capacity to make Europ

forces more mobile, on the one hand, and requisite investments in PG

and C4I, on the other.

The tally sheet to date indicates some progress toward mee

the Headline Goal. The process of constituting the envisaged forces 

making the requisite adjustments in national force structures has b

disciplined. EU governments established a working group on capabi

goals at the Feira summit in June 2000. This group set in motio

program for systematically reviewing present assets, estimating fu

needs, and devising a coordinated strategy for meeting them. Integra

its efforts was close coordination with NATO to ensure that its prog

of force enhancement would be “mutually reinforcing” of the Allia

DCI. The aim was to harmonize the existing NATO force planning w

the ESDP project. The interim military committee worked with NA

experts in teams called the Helsinki Task Force.

46 Meeting under 

French EU presidency during fall 2000, these teams began by ident

ing four crisis scenarios that served as the basis for designing fo

packages and specific requirements for constituting and deploying th

The four scenarios covered forceful separation of belligerent part

conflict prevention; humanitarian aid; and evacuation of nationals fr

conflict situations. They provided benchmarks against which to meas

the capabilities and suitability of existing forces and to identify gap

be filled. At the initiative of France, a detailed catalogue of requi

items, the Helsinki Headline Catalogue, was drawn up.

The EU Military Committee organized itself in an ad hoc form

the Headline Goal Task Force, which brought together experts fr

national military establishments and members of the embryonic 

Military Staff. NATO planners joined them on several occasion

present complementary needs assessments to factor into the elabora

of the Force Catalogue. At the Capabilities Commitment Confere

meeting in Brussels in November 2000, participating governm

identified assets that they had to contribute or the means to collabo

in developing them. Based on that inventory survey, the confere

focused on existing deficiencies and drafted an action program 

dealing with them. The plan covers the restructuring of existing for
methods for pooling national resources (including technological on

and the formation and financing of joint development projects.

The Conference was occasion to emphasize progress made 

to register pledges by the EU 15 earmarked for ESDP operations. (N

EU NATO members and candidate members also offered pledges; 

Turkish pledge was the most substantial.) The ensuing Mili

Capabilities Commitment Declaration (MCCD) listed an impres

array of pledged contributions set out in the Force Catalogue.47 

quantitative terms, they constituted a manpower pool of 100,000 re

for deployment, backed by a total of 600 combat aircraft and 100 na

vessels. Each of the four largest EU countries—Britain, Fran

Germany, and Italy—pledged forces accounting for at least 15 perc

of the total. The aggregate was deemed sufficient to “make it possibl

satisfy the needs identified to carry out the different types of cr

management missions within the Headline Goal.”48 By June 2001, 

European Union was prepared to announce an “Initial Opera

Capability” to deploy a force of 20,000 without relying on NATO as

by the end of the year.

This goal may be overly optimistic; to meet the objective 

keeping the full rapid reaction force of 60,000 in the field for a year, 

pool of qualified personnel would have to be closer to 200,000 than 

100,000 pledged. Also, the means to move and supply the force 

equipment are not yet available. MCCD recognizes the critical nee

increase strategic mobility. It cites a number of projects under way 

planned that will meet that need. Seven European countries 

committed to acquire approximately 185 A400M transport aircraft, 

military version of Airbus. Britain has announced procurement plans 

C–17 aircraft. A similar investment in sea transport vessels—includ

roll-on, roll-off amphibious ships and troop transp

helicopters—should bolster overall projection capability. These plan

acquisitions presuppose a broad-based reversal of the trend tow

downsizing European military forces and at least a slight increas

defense budgets.

A NATO report card of December 2000 that graded prog

toward reaching the goals laid down in DCI cited 11 out of 15 Europ

members as committed to real increases in defense spending in t

2001 budgets.49 That projection proved to be overly optimistic; only 

actually appropriated more money for defense, while five others 

stabilized spending after years of a steady decline. Overall, the defe

budgets of the 15 have been static since 1997. In constant dollar ter
they have declined by 5 percent per annum, but that figure is disto

by the 15 percent decline of the Euro vis-à-vis the dollar. Me

keeping the spending level may not provide sufficient funding to achi

the augmentation and upgrading of European capabilities in the crit

areas of force projection, PGMs, and C4I. Germany is of card

importance in this regard. Its program of restructure and reform aim

raising the number of well-trained operation forces (Einsatzkrafte) fr

50,000 to 150,000. Available on a rotational basis, they would b

central component of the EU rapid reaction corps. Present financ

though, is inadequate to reach those objectives. Currently, f

operational forces are barely adequate to meet Balkan deployments

The Schroeder government deflated hopes for streamlining 

German armed forces by cutting defense spending by 1.4 percent in 

fiscal year 2002 budget. It placed Berlin, and especially Defe

Secretary Scharping, in the embarrassing position of being unabl

finance Germany’s substantial share of the nine-nation A400M transp

aircraft project. In the absence of a direct budgetary allocation, offic

scrambled to find a formula that would keep its participation in 

program alive. The deferred payment deal eventually agreed upon 

kept the project afloat, though not without adding to strains with Fran

which feared the negative repercussions for reaching ESDP go

Moreover, it has cast a shadow over EU plans to close the capability 

through ambitious multinational weapons programs.51 The designer

ESDP are paying close attention to the uncertain prospects for augm

tation of German forces and the shortfalls of other EU states. 

evaluation mechanism approved at the Nice European Council enab

a systematic follow-up and assessment of progress made in mee

pledges and force goals. It operates in tandem with a counterpart NA

evaluation program, relying on technical data generated by the Defe

Planning Process and the Planning and Review Process.52 A highligh

issue, and one that will not be readily resolved, has been the compe

claims on limited defense funds of augmented projection capability 

the upgrading of technologically advanced weapons. Stringent budge

conditions are not likely to be eased any time soon, in part becaus

the Economic and Monetary Union. The growth and stability pact 

undergirds EMU sets strict ceilings on permissible budget deficits

such, it has perpetuated the fiscal austerity required by the converge

criteria. The pickup in growth rates over the past 2 years has crea

some room for increased expenditures. However, priority is accorded 

claims of electoral constituencies keen to ease the social and polit
pressures created by the curtailment of civilian programs, especi

welfare and pension programs. Present forecasts indicate that littl

anything will be left over for hikes in defense spending. A slowdow

growth rates could quickly endanger them altogether.

Some qualitative improvement of European capabilities in ar

of advanced military technology is under way. Britain and France 

expanding their inventory of PGMs; the Euro-fighter will be equip

with new air-to-air missiles; the Netherlands has led a program by 

European countries with F–16 aircraft to purchase PGMs on a mult

tional basis; Germany, after long equivocation, has agreed to inves

the French-led Helios II optical satellite; and several countries 

upgrading their communications. The scope and pace of progress rem

unclear. Improvements will not be uniform from country to country 

across the span of capabilities.

However, continued enhancement of U.S. capabilities means 

whatever absolute gains the European allies achieve, differentials 

remain or even widen. The prospect that such capability gaps betw

American and allied armed forces may not narrow markedly 

troublesome implications. The first is that interoperability on 

battlefield could be jeopardized. Fully integrated combined operati

will prove more difficult. A de facto division of labor might re

whereby the United States performs missions that rely on PGMs 

high-tech communications, while its allies are restricted to conduc

more basic military tasks. An alliance in which Europeans are relega

to the military equivalent of unskilled laborers will suffer a loss 

cohesion and create the kind of strains that surfaced during Opera

Allied Force. A corollary effect is that the United States will come un

pressure to join in operations that it might otherwise stay out of beca

its weaponry is indispensable for doing the job at tolerable risk.

The second potential implication is that the projected Europ

force will be restricted in the missions that it can undertake to one 

of the conflict spectrum—that is, essentially, the Petersburg tasks. T

limitation may well cover the most likely contingencies in Europe, 

it problematizes a Europe-only operation even closely equivalen

Allied Force, much less the ground assault that was being contempla

Ally contribution to a serious challenge outside of Europe would 

similarly limited. Although envisaging scenarios in the latter categ

from which the United States would abstain is difficult, the nettleso

issue of roles in a division of labor could be aggravated. The net ef
would be an exacerbation of transatlantic tensions over how 

reequilibriate the Alliance.

Marked qualitative differences in advanced weaponry also 

spawn political problems. Disputes over the use of depleted uran

shells turned on judgments as to what level of health risk should 

tolerated for the sake of enhanced effectiveness. The lines were quic

drawn between those who had the weapons in their arsenal (America 

Britain) and those who did not (Germany, Italy, and Belgium, am

others). The calls for a moratorium, if not an outright ban, that ca

from the latter group polarized the Alliance. The technical issue 

weapon health risks was implicitly tied to the question of Ameri

prerogatives in determining what weapons are needed and should 

available in the Alliance arsenal.

Critical public opinion on the continent was bolstered, 

Alliance disagreement was underscored by EU entry into the fray. 

Political and Security Committee addressed the issue and inaugurated 

expert review of the safety question. They were encouraged to t

action by European Commission President Romano Prodi, who ur

that depleted uranium munitions be banned. The EU Parliam

seconded Prodi in passing a resolution by near unanimity that rec

mended an indefinite suspension of the use of the weapons until t

safety had been established through exhaustive testing. All of the st

panels concluded that in fact the use of depleted uranium shells posed 

apparent health hazard to troops in the field. Even so, the activatio

EU bodies to debate a matter arising from NATO military action 

indicative of the politically sensitive environment in which contenti

issues of a quasi-security kind will be considered in the future.

Full parity between the United States and its European allie

neither realistic nor an appropriate goal. Expanding the functional ra

of European aggregate forces is important, however, for it can determ

what feasible options exist for distributing responsibilities and assign

roles in dealing with security problems in Europe. It is also a precon

tion for extending their strategic partnership into other regions.
EU–NATO Cooperation

B

olstering European military capabilities is the precondition 

realizing the potential of ESDP. Reaping its full benefits 

healthy Euro-American strategic partnership will requir

joining of the embryonic EU structures with the established NA

infrastructure. The harmonization of the two is not a straightforw

exercise in architectural engineering, though. It entails linking 

institutions that have distinct constitutions, modes of operation, 

approaches to collective decisionmaking. Moreover, since ESDP 

integral to a multidimensional building process, it carries a meaning 

significance that goes beyond its stipulated task-specific objectives

From the moment that the idea of an ESDI associated within 

European Union was resuscitated at St. Malo, American policymak

were worried by the prospect of an independent entity that could wea

the unity of NATO and challenge its preeminence. That concern w

constant in the ongoing, and intense, diplomacy of the ensuing 2 y

that culminated in December 2000. Together, the EU Council summ

Nice, sandwiched between the NAC meetings in Defense Ministers 

Foreign Ministers session, sealed a complex set of agreements 

conferred status on ESDP while linking it closely to NATO structu

The terms of association between NATO and the new EU secu

bodies represent a Euro-American bargain. The United States ackno

edges that the European Union has autonomy in decisionmaking; that 

Union and NATO are “organizations of a different nature”; that th

differences “will be taken into account in the arrangements concern

their relations”; and that “each organization will be dealing with 

other on an equal footing.”53 Washington also accepts and respects (w

however, little enthusiasm) the validity and potential utility of 

organizational infrastructure that accompanies the buildup of mili

capabilities. In return, the United States has demanded and w
European acceptance of interlocking structures and intersec

procedures between the two organizations and EU reliance on NA

assets (tangible and intangible) for the foreseeable future. The functio

independence of ESDP is circumscribed in all respects by enmeshin

in a dense network of coordinated arrangements. That EU concess

was exchanged for firm assurances that it will have guaranteed acces

NATO assets for conjectured EU-led operations. This reconcilia

reins in more ambitious conceptions of ESDP even as it places 

Alliance seal of approval on the European enterprise. The pre

specification of how the two organizations will relate to each o

notwithstanding, the evolutionary path and ultimate destination of ES

is not within Washington’s control. The issue of European defense 

continue to demand close, sustained attention.

The diplomatic process that produced the December 2

accords was a shaky one. It reveals the recurrent points of content

and highlights the different interpretations of key terms such 

autonomy and NATO primacy, which bedeviled well-intentio

attempts to vitalize and accommodate ESDP. That process began at 

Malo, where attention was refocused on how a European defense en

would be related to NATO. The declaration left unresolved question

to the status of the CJTF accords that had been negotiated so laboriou

and whose procedures were still being elaborated. The British mo

quickly to reassure the United States that nothing in the new conc

called into question NATO primacy or the principle of “separable 

not separate” forces that was at the core of the Berlin agreement. 

French stressed the new departure represented by ESDP while mak

a ritual bow to NATO. The Clinton administration sought to secure 

essence of the Combined Joint Task Forces while protecting NA

from the sort of jurisdictional challenge that had been warded off in 

early 1990s. The three famous red lines it laid down encapsulated 

essence of the American position.

The Washington summit seemed to register an Ameri

diplomatic success. The communiqué underscored that “effective mu

consultation, cooperation, and transparency” between NATO and 

European Union would “avoid unnecessary duplication” while “ensur

the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European allies in EU

operations.” It declared NATO readiness to “define and adopt 

necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to 

collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance,” in a manner 
would “respect . . . the coherence of the command structure.”54 F

principles were enunciated:

1. assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to

contribute to military planning for EU-led operations

2. the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified

NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led

operations

3. identification of a range of European command options for

EU-led operations, further developing the role of Deputy

SACEUR [DSACEUR] in order for him to assume fully an

effectively his European responsibilities

4. the further adaptation of NATO’s defence planning system 

incorporate more comprehensively the availability of force

for EU-led operations.

55

Differences in interpreting and applying those principles s

surfaced. Nuanced differences in wording in the Washington sum

communiqué and the Cologne Declaration revealed differences 

conception. The Clinton administration was so vexed by discrepan

in the communiqués that it vigorously protested. The points in con

tion were summarized in a “Sins of Cologne” memorandum, prepa

by the State Department, that compared wording of the two declaratio

One concern was that the Cologne Declaration implied a division 

labor whereby the NATO role would be restricted to collective defe

(article 5 contingencies), while the European Union would “contrib

to the vitality of a renewed Alliance” by assuming a more “effective 

. . . in conflict prevention and crisis management” (article 4 conting

cies). A second concern was the blurring of the principle of NATO r

to “first refusal.” The Washington Declaration was explicit that the 

capacity for autonomous action be activated only on condition 

NATO as an institution had decided not to act. The Cologne langu

used the looser phrase “without prejudice to action by NATO.” Th

Cologne treated an EU operation relying entirely on its own resour

on a co-equal basis with EU-led operations using NATO asset

conformity with CJTF arrangements. In the American view, a f

autonomous operation should not be considered so long as the C

option was viable.

The American campaign was largely successful, thanks in 

to British efforts to craft formulations that allayed American anxiet

The subsequent Helsinki Declaration was most explicit in pledging 
non-EU members would be enabled to participate in any EU

operation. Also, it reverted to the language of the Washington Decl

tion that a European force only would be activated “when NATO 

whole was not engaged.” In addition, the word autonomous was clari

to make explicit that the reference was to the envisaged ES

decisionmaking organs and should not be interpreted as implyin

desire to acquire assets that would duplicate those of NATO. Hels

retained the option of an autonomous EU operation on a par with a C

structured operation. This option would be reiterated at Nice. At 

institutional level, the Union remained resolute in its commitmen

creating the institutional apparatus for ESDP. Clinton administra

uneasiness about the Union endowing itself with the full panoply 

organizational assets for a security policy reflected a concern that 

latent influence the United States kept under the terms of the C

arrangements would be seriously weakened. That concern was e

stronger in Congress.

Parallel Senate and House resolutions were passed in Novem

1999 that stated in the strongest language that Congress supporte

European Security and Defense Identity so long as the European al

explicitly recognized continued NATO primacy and devoted themse

to meeting the objectives laid out in the Defense Capabilities Initiativ

The aim of the resolution sponsors—Representatives Benjamin Gilm

(R–NY) and Douglas Bereuter (R–NE) and Senator William R

(R–DE)—was twofold: to rally supporters of a continued U.S. comm

ment to an active role in European security matters behind an Atlanti

version of a new EU initiative and to warn the West Europeans 

backing for their enterprise was contingent on their observing the 

redlines and that to transgress them would strengthen the hand of th

who preferred a policy of selective unilateralism to modified form

Alliance multilateralism.

The intensity of Congressional feelings about the projec

ESDP was driven home to allied governments who responded wi

concerted campaign to explain and reassure. Capitol Hill became 

obligatory stop on the schedule of European officials visiting Wash

ton. The allies succeeded in neutralizing opposition to the EU defe

initiative, but they retained a sense of uneasiness about Congr

establishing itself as an independent actor in transatlantic diploma

They were especially troubled by the widespread view that the Un

States should devolve full responsibility for peacekeeping mission

Europe onto its allies. The latter worry deepened in reaction to rema
by members of the Bush foreign policy team that it was time for a n

Alliance division of labor.

Reconciling Structures

Possible modification of the Combined Joint Task Forces 

related arrangements was the subject of extensive negotiations betw

NATO and the European Union. Begun informally at the Perman

Representative level in early 2000, French objections that EU st

should first reach consensus on the ESDP structural format preven

them from acquiring official status until the EU Council at Santa M

da Feira in June 2000 agreed on a set of principles to guide consultati

on developing modalities for EU–NATO coordination. They stres

each organization’s distinct identity and equality. The princip

amounted to a declaration that EU supercedence of the WEU represen

a qualitative change in the status of the European party to the Be

accords. The United States had a somewhat different perspective. On 

key question of asset transfer, the American preference was to retain 

Berlin accords and the specific provisions flowing from them essenti

intact—substituting EU for WEU in the documents. The American 

throughout has been to keep SACEUR and SHAPE in the picture a

activation of the CJTF provisions. Taking a lenient attitude tow

making available planning and headquarters assets, whose transfe

“assured,” Washington has sought to keep some element of discre

about the presumed transfer of other hard assets.

The problem for American policymakers was to avoid insis

on so strict a set of conditions as to encourage European allies to s

maximum autonomy, even if that meant investing in the “duplicati

of NATO (that is, U.S.) assets while concurrently withholding 

approval of a “help yourself” policy toward asset transfer.

Not surprisingly, the ground rules for NATO–EU coopera

became the subject of intense bargaining. At Feira, four ad hoc work

groups were created. The goal was agreement on a permanent se

arrangements to be ratified along with the ESDP permanent structu

at the end of the year.

57 The first group was charged with put

together a set of provisions that would be the basis for a for

EU–NATO security agreement. It covered, inter alia, informa

exchanges and access for EU officials to NATO planning structures. 

second group, focused on capability goals, was mindful of the nee

enter into consultation with NATO officials to ensure that the 

program of force enhancement would be “mutually reinforcing” 
Alliance plans to implement DCI. The third ad hoc working gr

tackled the critical issue of EU access to NATO assets. The fourth 

to draft a code of procedures to lay down a permanent set of arran

ments for across-the-board EU–NATO consultation and coordination 

the principles stated in the presidency report on the Feira summit.

The prickly issue of what place non-EU NATO members wo

have in EU military crisis management proved most resistant 

resolution. Turkish sensibilities about possible marginalization 

matters of European security, its status deprivation vis-à-vis ESDP, h

remained acute. The United States has held to its firm position 

nondiscrimination, urging the Union to accommodate what it deem

legitimate Turkish concerns. European governments, at first reluctan

compromise the organizational integrity of the Union, modified t

position substantially. At the Feira summit, they introduced arti

designed to satisfy Turkish demands into the provisional cha

establishing ESDP bodies. EU governments were eager to prevent 

dispute from aggravating already tender relations with Ankara, to wh

they extended candidate member status with the greatest reluctan

Moreover, they were properly apprehensive that an estranged, em

tered Turkey could obstruct efforts to conclude an EU–NATO ag

ment on the terms of access to Alliance assets.

The proposed modes of consultation and coordination betw

EU bodies and third parties incorporated into the Nice accords allow 

the participation of all NATO states who are Union members 

participate in EU-led crisis management operations. They would h

equal rights in the design and direction of military actions per se

addition, they are guaranteed consultation as a matter of course when 

ESDP body considers a problem that falls within their sphere of strate

interest. In the latter circumstances, they are invited to contribute 

forming policy initiatives. These provisions are comprehensive 

highly detailed. The Nice accords contain an entire annex devoted 

“Arrangements Concerning non-EU European NATO Members 

Other Countries Which are Candidates for Accession to the EU.” T

stipulate an elaborate set of concrete provisions covering the routine p

operational and operational phase of crisis management, including

single inclusive structure in which all the countries concerned can en

the necessary dialogue, consultation, and cooperation with the EU”; 

meetings in the EU+15 format on ESDP matters during each (6-mon

presidency; and a ministerial level meeting in each presidency in 

15+6 format. In the routine phase of a crisis, regular meetings in 
EU+15 format, along with at least two meetings in the 15+6 format, 

occur. At the operational level, the provisions are somewhat less prec

The relevant clause reads: “Upon a decision by the Council to launch 

operation, the non-EU European NATO members will participate if t

so wish, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO as

and capabilities. They will, on a decision by the Council, be invite

take part in operations where the EU does not use NATO assets.”58

Turkey took a dim view of the discretionary element that 

Council has granted itself in the latter contingency. Ankara drew 

unfavorable comparison between the qualified rights that it has under 

ESDP design and those it was given as an associate partner of W

The latter allowed Turkey to initiate matters for consideration and m

proposals for collective action. It now sees itself as a fringe particip

that will be briefed but not consulted and that will be invited 

participate in predefined missions rather than taking part 

decisionmaking about form and function. As the Turkish ambassado

NATO, Onur Oymen, bluntly put it, “Consultation means nothing. 

should have the right to take part, in the real sense of the word, f

planning to implementation to strategic command and control.”59 

resulting acrimony spurred some EU governments to ask the Clin

administration to intercede by reassuring Turkey that the Nice plan 

a reasonable one that went as far as the European Union could, shor

granting Turkey full membership rights. Washington had spurned 

earlier request in the wake of Feira because it believed that the Un

could go further. By December, it was persuaded, and it sough

persuade the Turks that the proposed terms of reconciliation were 

sufficient. The words of the lame-duck Clinton administration were 

compelling to Ankara. While Turkey withdrew its veto preven

NATO experts from cooperating with their EU counterparts on 

ESDP Military Committee in refining force requirements, it remai

adamant that the codification of CJTF provisions for EU access 

NATO assets, including planning units and headquarters, would 

move forward until its grievances had been addressed satisfactor

Turkey came under strong diplomatic pressure by the Bush adminis

tion and the British government at the NATO foreign ministe

meeting in May 2001. In exchange for EU pledges to increase 

frequency and scope of consultation, Ankara was urged to accept 

terms of the asset transfer agreement worked out the previous Decem

An accord to remove the last stumbling block to the conclusion of a f

EU–NATO security agreement remained elusive, however.
Sharing Assets

The intense diplomacy that surrounded the NATO and 

summits in December 2000 succeeded in establishing a framework 

cooperation between the two organizations. The most critical of m

tense moments pitted the United States, which was dedicated 

preventing the fledgling European defense institutions from develop

separately from NATO, against France, which wanted to deve

independent facilities ensuring that the Union retained the powe

evaluate situations and plan and launch missions in which NATO 

not organizationally involved. Washington sought ironclad commitm

to arrangements leaving no ambiguity that force and operatio

planning capabilities remained with NATO; that there be complete 

open communication in the consideration of any matters that might l

to an EU request to use Alliance assets; and that the Union “tak

flexible and generous approach to participation by non-EU allies”—

is, Turkey. In exchange, the United States reiterated its pledge 

“assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities and the presump

of availability to the EU of pre-defined . . . assets.”60

The question of planning capabilities emerged as the sharp

point of contention. A strongly worded address by Secretary of Defe

William Cohen at the NATO defense ministerial meeting triggere

mini-crisis. He warned that “NATO was in danger of becoming a re

unless the European Union abandoned the idea of building a sepa

planning apparatus that “would be in competition with rather bein

complement to NATO itself.”61 To avoid “inconsistencies between 

military standards and requirements of the two organizations,” Co

proposed a common planning process involving all 23 NATO or 

countries “as the only logical cost-effective way to ensure the 

possible coordination of limited forces and resources.”62

The strong American campaign was set off by what Washing

officials interpreted as a French-inspired design to create a rival plann

unit to guide ESDP programs and operations. France indeed 

depicted EUMS and EUMC as bodies capable of planning not o

small-scale humanitarian missions but also perhaps medium-

operations. Deciding who would plan what would be approached o

case-by-case basis. The French conception of the 100-strong mili

staff is more ambitious than the British idea. In pointed public exchan

between London and Paris on the eve of the Nice summit, Bri

Minister of Defense Geoff Hoon pictured EUMS as “intelligent cons
ers” of the NATO planning product who thereby would be positione

provide “strategic guidance” to the PSC.63 The EU documents, w

worded loosely enough to allow differing interpretations, do in 

sketch a military bureaucracy able to facilitate the application of NA

plans to EU missions by adapting the plans according to their b

judgment and generating their own ideas.

French officials do not conceal their conviction that the Un

should be equipped with “the capabilities for analyzing crisis situatio

to search for solutions through all types of action, including mili

ones, and to be able to employ these means” if it is to fulfill 

obligations the ESDP bestows on it.64 Defense Minister Alain Rich

responded to Secretary Cohen’s strong remarks by noting, “We certa

have a different view of planning” even as “we appreciate the size 

capacities of the planning assets that exist in NATO.”65 Contrasting 

emerging ESDP apparatus with allegedly rigid NATO structu

Richard has stressed that EU institutions “will permit a tighter contro

national governments than in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance

particular, the pivotal role given the military committee ought to invo

them in the formulation of strategic decisions and in the planning 

operations.” Autonomous planning capabilities are especially attrac

to France since it “is not integrated into the planning apparatus 

integrated command of the Alliance.”66

France was forced to cede ground on the planning issue. It 

to accept the consensual view of its partners that a challenge to 

American position was not called for. The Final Communiqué of 

NAC Ministerial Meeting has remained close to the American line on 

aspects of EU–NATO linkage. It specified a comprehensive se

arrangements (most of which already had been laid out in the docume

approved at Nice the preceding week) that was ready to be codified 

a final framework agreement once Turkish recalcitrance was worn do

The NAC communiqué made clear that assured EU access to NA

planning capabilities would be integral to the military planning of E

led operations, and it looked ahead to “the further adaptation of 

Alliance defence planning systems [to take] account of relev

activities in and proposals from the EU” and it specified “procedure

be followed for the EU to access pre-identified NATO capabilities 

common assets.” The stipulation is made that the “Allies will 

consulted on the EU’s proposed use of assets and capabilities, prio

the decision to release” and will be “kept informed during the op

tion.”67 As to command arrangements, provisions are made for 
“identification of a range of European command options for EU

operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for 

to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities.”68

These agreements in principle have not laid to rest the ques

of self-sufficient European operational planning units and comm

headquarters. The French continue to press the argument that exis

national facilities could be upgraded to conduct operations involv

20,000 or more troops (the size of the NATO force in Bosnia a

2001). The two most capable headquarters are the British Perman

Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) located in an underground bunker northw

of London and a similar facility beneath the French Defense Ministr

Paris. British officials already are working on provisional arrangeme

to incorporate military personnel from other EU countries to plan 

direct an operation out of PJHQ. Its capability for running a signific

operation was demonstrated in autumn 2001, when Britain directed 

exercise in Oman involving 24,000 fully equipped troops.69 The Bri

and French motivations for studying the possible utility of natio

headquarters for ESDP operations differ. France clearly prefers to k

as much distance between EU bodies and NATO as is practical 

diplomatically feasible. Britain is acting pragmatically to deve

whatever assets are available for conducting operations under a num

of contingent circumstances, without preference for independent 

capabilities. That the most Atlanticist of American allies should h

this attitude is a sign of more fluid Alliance conditions. Now that th

no longer is a presumption that European security matters will be trea

within NATO, with active U.S. participation, allied governments wil

attentive to what they can do on their own and how. This focus sho

not be interpreted as a devaluing of established Alliance arrangeme

and procedures; rather, it reflects the evolutionary path marked ou

the initial Berlin accords on the Combined Joint Task Forces.

Whatever the eventual disposition of autonomous ES

planning capabilities, the essence of the agreement between NATO 

the EU—agreed by the United States—remains intact. It represen

deal whereby a concession of relatively liberal terms of EU access to 

Alliance assets are matched by an EU commitment in turn “to inten

consultation in times of crisis.” An intricate pattern of consultation 

joint meetings is agreed. It achieves the American objective of ensu

that the legal autonomy of ESDP institutions in practice does not lead 

or even allow for, a separate process of deliberation and decision. 

Final Communiqué proclaims the EU–NATO dialogue “should 
pursued . . . in full transparency, consultation, and cooperatio

Although the new EU security structures appear tightly circumscrib

the Presidency Conclusions on ESDP attached to the Nice Cou

Declaration draw the portrait of institutions with broad scope 

extensive authority. The Political and Security Committee, characteri

as “the linchpin of the European security and defence policy,

accorded an impressive list of functions. In addition to its “central 

. . . in the definition of and follow-up to the EU’s response to a cris

the committee was tasked to

# send guidelines to the military committee

# lead the political dialogue

# take responsibility for the political direction of the developm

of military capabilities, under the auspices of the Coun

taking into account the type of crisis

# deal with crisis situations and examine all the options that m

be considered as the Union’s response.70

The military committee is envisioned as working in partners

with the PSC. It is served by the military staff. The chief of the EU

is a four-star flag officer; the head of EUMS a three-star flag offic

German General Rainer Schuwirth has been appointed to the la

position; British General Graham Messervy-Whiting is his deputy. Th

combined functions include “the risk assessment of potential crises

draw up and present strategic military options . . . to provide e

warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for the Petersb

tasks.”72 The EUMC and EUMS are enjoined to ensure compatibi

with NATO “as far as possible.” These are substantial responsibilit

In effect, the European Union has equipped itself with the infrastruc

that, if fully developed, would enable it to act with a high degre

independence from NATO. Current intentions and overall capabili

place that prospect well into the future. Still, these organizational as

are an indication of the dedication to ESDP and the new EU secu

vocation in general.

Taken together, the NATO Final Communiqué and the 

Council Presidency Conclusions closely bind the two organizatio

Those ties address indirectly the fundamental question of when and h

the Union becomes involved in the handling of a security probl

When a crisis poses the question of military action immediately or in 

near term, a reasonable expectation now exists that deliberations 

whether, when, and how armed force should be deployed be reserved 
NATO. The difficulty in making that proposition universal and abso

is that such a clear-cut case may be the exception. The Balkan crise

the 1990s certainly did not fit that specification. (The Iraqi invasion 

Kuwait, by contrast, did.) Even in situations where NATO is given 

primary responsibility, the PSC may meet for consultation and poss

declaratory action given the pronounced institutional identity of 

Union and expansive sense of its responsibilities despite the overla

the membership of the two organizations and their dedication 

coordination. Differing viewpoints conceivably could emerge betw

an EU majority position and the United States that would have to 

composed or accommodated, which would occur through delibera

processes that are transparent to other governments and to Europ

publics, too, in accordance with the procedural guidelines agree

Nice. The EU Council, Parliament, Commission and the peoples t

represent cannot realistically be expected simply to step out of the w

In all likelihood, the European Union will be a player “willy-nil

which may well complicate either the mounting of a concerted dip

macy or a smooth division of labor. That may even be so when mili

operations are being planned or threatened. A case therefore can 

made for the United States seeking to marginalize the PSC, and 

European Council, in such a crisis situation. Can it reasonably expec

do so?

Probably not—for two reasons. First, a serious attempt by 

United States to preempt the European Union presupposes a c

judgment that America has a stake important enough to justify tak

control of Alliance policy and has a decided view as to the prefer

course of action. Such cases are liable to be rare, however, and c

with them a domestic political priority to keep the allies engaged, wh

could be imperiled by damaging EU institutions, whether intentio

Second, some crises are liable to evolve over time. In a given instan

potentially serious ramifications may be foreseeable, but the appropr

means for effective crisis management may not be obvious or the wi

act too weak (for example, the early phase of the conflicts of the for

Yugoslavia, circa 1991). Conditions of latent or low-grade conflict 

continue for a considerable time, during which the European Union 

be doing its perceived duty by taking responsible measures to dam

or eliminate the combustible elements, as it has sought to do in Mace

nia. The point of crossing the imaginary line between latent or mi

conflict, on the one hand, and conflict of manifestly major consequen

on the other, may not be obvious. In the earlier phases, the Union 
have deployed an array of soft measures aimed at conflict prevent

The PSC is slated to play the key role in integrating the diverse me

available into a coherent strategy and in directing its implementatio

 Consequently, the United States can best ensure its influence 

being diplomatically engaged and in constant contact with its Europ

allies. Arrangements agreed at the December 2000 summits are desig

to interlace EU and NATO deliberations and actions in crisis mana

ment. The processes outlined in fine detail in the pertinent EU–NA

documents have the advantage of curtailing EU autonomy. Th

disadvantage is a stifling proceduralism better suited to preven

decisive action than facilitating it. An alternative is informal mec

nisms that do not raise prickly issues of organizational jurisdiction 

precedence. The setup that brings together the United States, Brit

France, Germany, and Italy for regular consultation and coordinatio

dealing with Kosovo and Yugoslavia post-Operation Allied Force of

one model. Concerts of this kind, which have included Russia and co

continue to do so, are convenient and diplomatically cost effective. T

are not a substitute for authoritative, collective action by more for

bodies. But they can be useful in avoiding cumbersome procedure

well as shaping and giving impetus to more encompassing forms 

political and economic action. They also can shape and give polit

impetus to more formal actions taken by either NATO or the Europ

Union. The main impediment to activating such informal concerts 

be prior EU engagement; the Union is a rule-bound organization with 

the nimbleness of a supertanker. Once under way, it cannot easily 

turned back to port or even set on a new course.

The principle that a constant American presence is essentia

incontestable, as was shown during the unfolding Kosovo cri

Washington had learned in Bosnia the harsh lesson that abstentio

costly. Sustained involvement facilitates the shift into a military m

with NATO coming to the fore. However, the new EU security bo

cannot reasonably be expected to cease and desist from conven

Realistically, in a multifaceted conflict situation, the Union will 

engaged in some way at various stages in the crisis for functional as w

as geographical reasons. As EU leaders never tire of remind

Washington (and themselves), ESDP is part of a larger engagemen

the Union to promote stability and progress across the continent.

That engagement was evident in the alacrity with which 

Union interjected itself into the Macedonian crisis in March 200

Armed Albanian ultranationalists, the self-styled National Libera
Army (NLA) from Kosovo, sought to foment secessionist sentim

among the disaffected Albanian community in Macedonia. It provo

a sharp military response by the Skopje government that threatene

upset the country’s fragile ethnic equilibrium. EU governments mo

swiftly in dispatching Javier Solana to counsel prudence to Macedon

authorities while placing the full weight of the Union behind effort

build a consensus among the major political formations, ther

isolating the rebels. Over the ensuing months, Solana became point m

for a concerted campaign to broker an accord while preventing 

spread of armed conflict. The campaign was bolstered by the indu

ment of closer ties with the European Union via a stabilization 

association agreement that held out the prospect of eventual members

for Macedonia.

Solana’s intermediation was complemented by the involvem

of NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson. They worked 

tandem, as did their respective organizations. NATO forces in Kos

stepped up efforts to seal the Kosovo-Macedonian border, a cru

element in the strategy for quieting the crisis. The United States too

low profile. The deliberate decision to yield the lead to actors conform

to the newly installed Bush administration conception of what the Eu

American division of labor should be. No high-level American env

shuttled into Skopje, nor was an American plan energetically promo

to resolve the problem. Washington also ruled out the participation 

American troops in any conjectured peacekeeping force for Macedo

That reticence notwithstanding, the United States exerted its influe

behind the scenes in support of the EU initiatives.

How the Macedonian crisis was handled did not touch dire

the most sensitive issues of how ESDP and NATO should relate to e

other. It is noteworthy, nonetheless, on four counts. First, it showed 

EU governments are taking seriously their self-defined role as custod

of political stability in southeastern Europe. Their unhesitant inter

sion, in striking contrast to their behavior in the early 1990s, g

credence to pledges in both the Amsterdam and Nice Declarations to 

as one to deal with security challengers. Second, the newly crea

ESDP apparatus was employed to formulate a common approach an

concert diplomacy. Solana, in his role as High Representative of 

Council, was the agent for a unified, activist policy. In so doing, he 

the cooperation of Chris Patten, the Commissioner for Exte

Relations, with whom he formed an effective partnership. Third, 

potential for turbulence among Washington, European governments, 
the multinational organizations through which they acted again 

evident. Finally, the contribution of NATO and the United St

notwithstanding, the Union established itself as the primary agent for 

West in the Macedonia crisis.

Form, Function, and Culture

The European Union is destined to be part of the pic

whenever security problems arise in Europe. The rhetorical prim

accorded NATO should not be read as relegating the EU structure

some sort of back-up role. EU member governments realistically can 

expected to acquire the habit of deliberating among themselves o

broad range of matters. The intermingling of NATO and EU commi

personnel lowers the risk that conclaves of the allies meeting un

ESDP auspices will formulate policies and take decisions without 

full knowledge of the United States. Yet the avowed U.S. interest of 

ESDP in becoming militarily competent by meeting its Headline G

in practice cannot be separated from the maturation of its civi

structures and consultative procedures. The sense of a common secu

identity and the sufficient will to act, which are crucial to mak

strengthened forces credible, are also the ingredients for the conduc

an active CFSP.

ESDP is but one dimension of the Union Common and Fore

and Security Policy. Solana’s two roles as High Representative for 

Common Foreign and Security Policy and Director-General of 

Council’s secretariat exemplify that overlap. The PSC, which he cha

has as one of its functions the steering of the CFSP. The Commit

composed of permanent representatives at ambassadorial rank, by 

very existence will foster a collective European ethos and will encour

an early, active involvement of the Union in dealing with nascent

even latent, European security problems.74 The debate about the pre

ESDP terms of connection with NATO and the United States 

concentrated on defense. However, the Helsinki agreements, 

explained in the Presidency Conclusions, cover “major political issu

Indeed, one of Solana’s tasks is to contribute to Council deliberation

identifying “foreign and security policy matters” that deserve 

attention of the PSC or the ministerial Council and to present alterna

courses for its consideration. In a sense, he can be visualized a

national security advisor serving a plural executive.

The responsibilities of the High Representative cum Secre

General of the Council overlap those of the Commissioner for Exte
Relations, Chris Patten. Considerable potential exists for friction 

mutual interference. Only in the strictly military area is it clear that 

Commission has no competence and no ambition. On all other mat

that fall under the general heading of security, it has the legal author

the means, and the practice to act in the name of the Union. The Tre

on European Union (TEU), as amended at Amsterdam, states that 

High Representative “shall assist the Council in matters coming wi

the scope of the CFSP . . . through contributing to the formulat

preparation, and implementation of policy decisions, and, w

appropriate, acting on behalf of the Council.”75 The Nice accords exp

those powers. But they do not explicitly alter the overlapping 

responsibilities the High Representative shares with the Commissio

for External Relations. 

Patten’s conception of his role is as wide-ranging as is 

reading of the Cologne and Helsinki Declarations is broad. It confo

with the ambitious conception of the European Union as a global a

advanced by France, among others. He has boldly proclaimed 

“When EU governments sign treaties proclaiming a common fore

policy to match the common market and economic and monetary un

they are staking a claim for an effective presence in international affa

and they are stating this claim to politicians and policymakers throu

out the world.”76 That presence is vital for Europe to become “a seri

counterweight to the United States.”77 As Patten stated frankly i

speech at the French Institute of International Relations, Europ

mission is to “project stability” by exercising a sobering influence o

United States that more and more acts as a maverick with little reg

for the thinking and concerns of others—including its European partn

Europe’s approach to security is not identical with that of the Un

States, even if they share a basic set of interests. However, the Unio

not prepared for this challenge. It is handicapped by “lousy procedur

a category that includes “some new institutional complications” crea

by the appointment of Solana as High Representative.78

Patten’s blunt remarks were aimed at both Washington and 

governments. To the United States, his message was: Curb your impu

toward unilateralism, and treat Europe as a respected partner. To 

governments, Patten was laying down a double challenge. He 

alerting them that he took seriously his duty to “act as a reality che

on common foreign and security initiatives that “too often languish 

lack of political follow-up or funding.”79 He also was calling atten

to the Commission’s substantial CFSP obligations, which were 
vitiated by the appointment of Solana and the setting up of the Cou

ESDP apparatus. Under the terms of the TEU as amended by the Tre

of Amsterdam, the Commissioner for External Relations is expecte

follow “the principles . . . and general guidelines” defined by 

Council. The Council “shall also decide on common strategies to 

implemented by the Union,” which embraces the Commission.80 

Commissioner in this sense derives his authority from the Counci

does the High Representative. However, in both EU law and pract

the Commissioner, as well as the High Representative, has a cer

discretion in how he conducts relations with other parties. The Comm

sioner deals directly with them and engages in diplomatic dialogue

long as it does not transgress the bounds set by established guideline

entail binding commitments of the Union. He has considerable latit

in stating rhetorically his own views (as Patten did in Paris). If 

deviates too far from prevailing thinking among Council governme

they will take steps to rein him in. Legally, however, he is accounta

to the President of the Commission and, ultimately, the Europ

Parliament, not the Council. 

The Parliament gave dramatic and unprecedented demonstra

of its powers in 1999 by forcing the resignation of President Jacq

Santer and his entire Commission due to alleged derelictions 

administration and the abuse of funds. The Parliament thereby streng

ened its place in the EU system of separate but interlocking treaty-ba

structures. The Parliament also has been paying closer attention 

Common Foreign and Security Policy. Although having only lim

oversight powers, it can act as a tribune of popular sentiment on hi

profile issues and can launch investigative task forces. The Parliame

call for an outright ban on depleted uranium weapons is a case in po

A skillful Commissioner can use the Parliament as a counterweigh

the Council, indirectly strengthening Patten’s hand (in this case

relation to the High Representative.

The issue of Solana’s status vis-à-vis the Commission 

sharpened by Commission President Romano Prodi’s call for 

position of High Representative to be integrated within the Commiss

In an address to the European Parliament, Prodi criticized the crea

of a post that sowed confusion as to who spoke for the Union 

concentrated powers in the hands of the Council that excluded Par

ment from performing its function of ensuring proper oversigh

actions taken in the name of the Union. Prodi’s initiative was part of 

campaign to resist attempts to wrest power from the Commission 
relocate it in the Council, as promoted by Jacques Chirac and Tony B

in their proposals for a revamping of EU institutions. Its effect has b

to cloud the outlook for resolution of the inner tension built into 

multidimensional EU common foreign and security policy.81

Thus, an essential feature of the EU setup is that the authorit

propose action, the capacity to implement policy, and especially the r

to speak for the Union are shared. A definitive determination 

responsibilities is unlikely. Of course, any decision involving 

European Union in the use or possible use of military force would be 

preserve of the Council. But the conduct of diplomacy prior to

association with, or independent of such action may very well eng

the Commissioner for External Relations. Patten gave further evide

of this predilection in his blunt attack on Russian use of coerc

methods against Georgia by cutting off gas supplies in retaliation 

alleged Georgian acquiescence in allowing Chechen guerrillas to ope

from its territory. Linking Russian behavior to its brutal treatmen

civilians in the breakaway republic of Chechnya, he admonished 

Russian audience in a talk to the Diplomatic Academy in St. Petersb

to observe the rule of law if they wished to develop a healthy relat

ship with the European Union.82

Conflict prevention strategies and crisis management—broa

construed—cannot be presumed to be the exclusive domain of Sol

and his Council-based apparatus. As a consequence, the United St

will find itself dealing with a plural European Union. When Washing

wants to call “Europe,” it still must dial more than one number, an

may be a conference call. Predictions about the effect these institutio

complexities will have on ESDP as it materializes are premature. T

ambiguity is not a reason for the United States to disparage the n

initiatives as little more than high-sounding verbiage. Rather, it calls 

close attention to the inner workings of the Union. The handicap

mixed mandates and overlapping powers will not invalidate 

commitments the EU governments have made. They will, though, m

the European Union a singularly difficult party with which to deve

a smooth partnership.

The Council itself is not a unitary body. Any EU action in 

security field will be undertaken by a collectivity. NATO is a mult

eral organization that operates on the consensus principle, but 

inherent shortcomings are offset by American leadership. The dr

backs of a coalition that is weakly led or that has no acknowled

leader at all will be manifest. They will be especially pronounced 
body where the process of consensus-building is highly valued. A st

toward consensus biases collective deliberation and decision in favo

agreement on a lowest common denominator basis. Differences—

interest, of interpretation, of philosophy, of means—tend to get glos

over through selection of the least contentious alternative. Avoida

behavior is typical. Convenience can too easily prevail, and cop

becomes the norm. Containing troublesome situations takes priority o

achieving optimal outcomes. As EU conduct in the first year of 

Yugoslav conflict vividly demonstrated, discretion may be valued m

highly than valor. Standard avoidance behavior devices are to focus 

the least dangerous aspects of a problem, to emphasize procedure o

substance, and to surround agreed courses of action with “fail-sa

provisions that provide bolt-holes for unwelcome contingencies.

The institutional culture and workings of the European Un

give reason for concern that ESDP structures too will suffer from 

defects of a formal multilateralism. The EU ethos generates str

pressures to reach agreement and to act as one. Protracted discours

the norm. It has proven itself necessary both to bridge national dif

ences and to build solidarity. It is a modus operandi that has evolved 

dealing with internal business. The inevitable delays and comprom

are accepted as a natural price to pay for an accord that presumptiv

will provide benefits for all concerned. In other words, the imp

assumption is that all parties will be winners and that the outcom

superior (in terms of a cost/benefit calculus) than what might reasona

be expected from members acting individually. This logic is compel

on economic matters: trade, agriculture, regional support fun

monetary union—the essence of what the community has been ab

The same logic does not hold for foreign and security policy.

The designers of ESDP were not blind to the obstacles to tim

decision and decisive action by standard EU operating procedures. 

emphasizing that the amended TEU concentrates authority in 

Council rather than the Commission, they hoped to avoid the m

entangling procedures. However, the legal basis for typically cumb

some decisionmaking processes is easier to get around than 

customary one. The premiums placed on consensus building will rem

Moreover, the Amsterdam Treaty provisions for “constructive abs

tion” help to mitigate their negative effects.83 They facilitate coaliti

of the willing acting in the name of the Union. Member government

longer must choose between supporting an action they disagree wit
running the risk of opprobrium by exercising their veto. Unanimity 

not be a condition for joint action.

That said, the preference for fashioning a consensus amon

broad majority of members will remain. As Alyson Bailes has poin

out, “To formally abstain or to ‘opt out’ completely from an opera

which bears the EU’s official name [could] be seen as a failure for 

European idea.” She goes on to counsel that “If the EU is to avoid 

pitfall, it will demand some effort for self-control both from the la

states who may be impatient with the hesitation of smaller ones—

smaller states who may have to learn to bridle their consciences 

override some national particularities when larger European interests 

at stake.”84

The argument can be made that the more compelling 

circumstances—in terms of interests threatened or humanita

principles affronted—the greater will be the pressure to act with dispa

in making the necessary commitments. However, those circumstan

are likely to be the same ones that raise the most serious risks of com

and casualties. Hence, in some situations, the European Union may h

the nominal capabilities to handle a problem on its own, yet so

members may choose to pursue the option of soliciting U.S. participa

for a variety of reasons. Activist, militarily competent states (such 

Britain and France) could find themselves hamstrung by the resista

of a competent but politically inhibited Germany backed by a numbe

small neutral members. Some small states may prefer being subordina

to disinterested America within the wider Alliance framework ra

than accepting the dictates from an unofficial directoire of their fel

EU states.85

The EU readiness to move to the fore, therefore, could be inv

to the need to consider military action. Were the issue of possible tr

deployments to arise in reference to a mission for monitoring a ce

fire or establishing an interpositional force, the Union likely would h

little reason to defer to NATO. Indeed, features of the emerging EU r

as an international actor militate toward a collective European appro

The idea of a concert providing political impetus and direction to ES

was cast in a new light by the French proposal of a “pioneering gro

to lead the Union. Addressing the Bundestag at the end of Ju

President Chirac invited Germany to join France in heading the gro

Defense was cited as one area amenable to this approach.86 Anticipa

revision of the Union treaty at the end of the year, Chirac stressed 

prospect of a new flexibility that could allow a set of like-min
members to launch projects without the participation or even consen

all members (which the current principle of “constructive abstenti

presumes). The French plan met with strong objection in some capi

while getting a cool reception from erstwhile French partner, Germa

The newfound German willingness to join in military actions 

requires as much protective cover as it can get. Acting as co-chief 

breakaway group that operates outside the formal ESDP structures r

against the grain of Berlin’s policy of emphasizing the affirmation 

collective Union interest and of observing the stipulated procedures 

activating the appropriate provisions of the TEU. To circumvent th

would erode the legitimacy of the ESDP. The Chirac initiative d

underscore French dedication to exploit fully the opportunity that ES

opens for a “Europe puissance,” Europe being defined as any group

of states that includes France and excludes the United States.

An informal concert could in principle mitigate the dila

nature of decisionmaking among 15 states in an organization that i

rule-bound as the European Union. But a concert cannot usurp enti

the rights of small states to approve or reject a proposed policy or act

On internal matters, the Franco-German tandem is a powerful engin

European integration. Their close collaboration was crucial in bring

the EMU project to completion despite formidable obstacles 

ambitious goals. The Paris-Berlin partnership is showing signs 

fraying, as was evident at Nice where recrimination over whethe

adjust the weighting of national votes in the Council and Parliament 

both sides feeling ill-used. Relations have been aggravated by Chan

lor Gerhard Schroeder’s promulgation of a grand plan that wo

constitute the European Union as a full-fledged federation.87 Publici

without any prior consultation with Paris, it shook French officials b

by its manner of presentation and its outstanding features, wh

conform to characteristics of the Federal Republic. All the sche

tabled in the emerging great debate about the future EU constitu

would result in more, rather than less, formal procedures and mec

nisms for taking decisions.

Already, the amount of Union business that can be directed 

a concert has definite limits. The credibility of each government with 

electorate to which it is accountable turns on clear evidence that Un

decisions on CFSP matters are openly arrived at. European publics 

becoming more questioning of what is done in their name and ostens

on their behalf in Brussels. Skepticism is concentrated on the recon

workings of the anonymous Commission. The Council, too, is be
carefully scrutinized. This wave of public skepticism has generate

movement for more transparency in all EU decisionmaking. Expec

an exemption to be made for ESDP would be erroneous. Indeed, 

European Parliament in May 2000 passed a resolution calling for 

record of the Political and Security Committee meetings to be put in 

public domain. Only military operations per se would require so

qualification of the public’s right to know. Otherwise, the very sensi

ity of the Union entry into the hard security field demands pu

reassurance through assiduous efforts to explain fully the whys 

wherefores of EU actions. The pressures for strict observance 

procedural norms and the principle of open government are especi

strong in countries that have not yet fully reconciled themselve

participation in combat missions, whether for reasons of history (suc

Germany) or traditions of neutrality.

From the U.S. standpoint, the more transparent the working

ESDP bodies, the better. The only concern it might have about 

transparency movement is that the EU–NATO tie may strengthen 

hand of those NATO governments, France above all, that would lik

extend the transparency principle to cover communications betw

SACEUR and SHAPE, on the one hand, and the U.S. Departmen

Defense, on the other.

A “Holy Alliance”?

Another notable aspect of the maturing EU political persona

is its acute sense of its moral underpinnings. The readiness of 

governments to address security issues collectively through Un

institutions is heightened by the growing sense of responsibility 

forging a pan-European community of democracies. Political elite

not publics, are rediscovering the moral grounding of Europ

construction. Spurring wealth creation and raising living standa

remain the community’s core functions. Success provides the f

foundation on which political cooperation depends. However, the lar

purpose of overseeing a permanent break from Europe’s fractious p

is gaining revived prominence. Europe’s peace may be divisible in 

narrow sense that EU states will not revert to the historical pattern 

lethal rivalries no matter what mayhem may erupt in the Balk

Awareness is sharpening, however, that they have a mission in nurtu

a continental environment in which their values and standards 

conduct—or, at least, close approximations to them—prevail. In sh
a commitment has been made to giving practical expression to the i

of a Europe whole and free.

The EU expanded sense of responsibility links its inte

cohesion and geographical expansion with an obligation to deal w

upwellings from Europe’s atavistic past (including a readiness to re

to military force). What explains this striking contrast with the retic

behavior demonstrated during the earlier Balkan conflicts has bee

shift in moral perspective with practical implications. The Europ

Union is exhibiting traits of a “holy alliance,” albeit in the name 

secular values. Its members perceive that they have a stake in preven

and, if necessary, opposing behavior in their vicinity that is an affron

the values and norms by which they define themselves. To tolerate 

sort of brutal repression occurring in Kosovo would increase the chan

of its occurrences elsewhere in Eastern Europe, thereby undercut

their project of extending their Kantian community. Unlike the fea

leaders of the post-Napoleonic holy alliance, the heads of EU gov

ments do not see themselves in direct danger from contagions that co

undermine their legitimacy and challenge their regimes. The stake t

see is securing a permanent peace beyond their borders by promoting 

cause of democracy.

The stern, impulsive reaction to the entry of Jorg Haid

Freedom Party into the Austrian government conforms to the patter

a holy alliance. The 14 nations that ostracized their fellow EU gove

ment were at once upholding the unstated terms of their polit

compact to exclude nondemocratic elements from governing positi

and discouraging like-minded parties in other countries that sh

Haider’s xenophobic agenda. The EU enlargement project might 

jeopardized were its vocal ultranationalist opponents in France, It

Belgium, Denmark, and Germany emboldened by the enhan

credibility given their cause. Kosovo and the Haider affair in diffe

ways challenged the unfolding of the EU design for a Europe wh

peace and stability were based not on contingent judgments of natio

interest but on undifferentiated adherence to principles that preclu

any return to the noxious past.

What practical consequences for the EU security role flow fr

this rekindled moralism? One is to provide a justification for interven

to resolve nationality conflicts or prevent gross abuses of human rig

The crucial importance of moral outrage and obligation in swing

German public opinion behind the country’s historic participation 

Operation Allied Force and KFOR is a matter of record. It was 
important factor elsewhere as well, albeit without the drama. In neu

member countries and in those with little military tradition, it was 

moral imperative that generated support for the military interventio

Moral outrage as well as the imperative to maintain Wes

credibility sustained the will and unity during the trying weeks 

seemingly fruitless, accident-prone bombing. Imputing a crusading sp

to the post-Kosovo European Union would be an exaggeration. Prude

and proportion are not being thrown to the wind. Still, some things m

certainly have changed. Member governments could not possibly beh

with the hesitancy, timidity, and divisiveness that marked their beha

in Bosnia. Even the distancing of the community from the Alban

crisis of 1997 could not repeat itself in today’s climate. Europ

acquiring a political personality and a moral sense of which ESDP i

once effect and reinforcing cause.

The emerging EU self-image as a moral force adds a compli

ing element to the ongoing effort to re-equilibrate the Euro-Ameri

partnership, laying the basis for a modified division of labor. 

discourse in Brussels that stresses EU identity as a community of va

makes some American officials uneasy. The United States of course 

its own pronounced moralistic streak. It sees itself as the cynosure of 

democratic principles that bind together the Western democracies 

the fountainhead from which flowed the powerful ideas that insp

opposition to communism in Eastern Europe. America’s unique m

authority, in the minds of Americans, has legitimized and confirmed 

leadership of the West as much as its military might and econo

strength have. The political construct of the West that guides Ameri

policy has the overarching transatlantic community as its essen

element. Its institutional expression in the security domain, NA

rightly is presented as the primary venue for collective consultation 

the instrument for collective action. Moreover, the NATO enlargem

process, complemented by an active Partnership for Peace progr

confirms the crucial role of the United States in the enterprise 

building stable democracies eastward across Europe.

Correspondingly, the self-conscious effort by EU states 

distinguish themselves from America implicitly raises questions a

how the parallel processes of NATO and EU enlargement will relat

each other. The rhetoric of European leaders engaged in an innovat

values-based move to building ESDP may be somewhat inflated; a

all, it is intended to boost European self-confidence as much as it i

boast to the Americans. It can be counterproductive, however. W
Javier Solana, speaking on Capitol Hill in January 2000, waxed eloqu

on the European Union as a community of values, he was widely view

as slighting the United States and the larger Atlantic community. 

seeming suggestion that Europe had its own political and moral comp

could mute enthusiasm at the prospect of having more self-rel

European allies. The lasting effect is to deepen Congressional skeptic

about ESDP while concentrating its attention all the more intensely 

performance in meeting the Headline Goal. A suspicious Congress 

be looking over the shoulder of any administration as it engages 

Europeans in working out the terms of collaboration between NATO 

the new EU defense organs. That could reduce the flexibility of U

negotiators and complicate acceptance of the ambiguity that is inesc

able in whatever documents are written.

If one believes that the details of exactly how the two organ

tions will relate to each other can only be determined in practice (

that the wiring diagrams and procedural manuals cannot be expecte

provide for every contingency), then it is important not to be stymied 

abstract formulations. If, on the other hand, one sees precise language 

jurisdictions and procedure as essential to safeguard NATO prima

then it would be all the better to approach the process with skept

concern about European presumption of autonomy in all its 

pects—including that of values.

Ironically, the conviction with which European political el

are moving to take a larger hand in building a continent undivided 

stable adds to their incomprehension as to why the United State

fixated on the Headline Goal. Even those who are most earnest in t

commitment to closing the capabilities gap for the most part would 

to see more understanding of the larger purpose the European Unio

dedicated to serving. They miss the centrality of the capabilities issu

the wider American debate over interests, obligations, and deployme

in troubled regions, above all the Balkans. Demonstration that 

European allies are absolutely serious about taking up the burden 

policing their own neighborhood is crucial for advocates of an inter

tionalist American foreign policy in countering the forces of insula

and disengagement. Moreover, it strengthens the hand of those w

favor a multilateral approach. By fulfilling the longstanding deman

allied burdensharing, it cuts the ground under those opponents 

American involvement in peace-enforcing missions such as th

undertaken in the Balkans who base their case on a claim of un

American risk and cost in the interest of allies who should be abl
look after things themselves. In this way, the crude indicator of 

Headline Goal serves the cause of enlightened Atlanticism.

Engagement with the European Union

The sharpened sense of an EU security identity buttressed 

dedicated structures for concerted action will complicate efforts 

achieve more regularized and thorough consultation across the Atlan

The status quo in Euro-American methods for dealing with each o

is inadequate. It combines routine dealings in selective areas 

cooperation to handle household tasks and high-level meetings 

relatively long intervals to address weightier matters. 

institutionalization of ESDP may be making that approach outmod

We have to prepare ourselves for a better organized Europe, whic

likely to be more engaged across a wider span of international issues 

less deferential to the United States. The frequency of meetings at 

ministerial and senior official level, as well as now within the PSC, 

be expected progressively to strengthen the sense of solidarity w

providing ready opportunities to align common positions.

Hence, the question: should the United States engage 

European Union, as a body, in formal policy exchanges? If so, wha

the most suitable format? Should it concentrate on troubleshoo

thorny problems or opening a strategic dialogue?

The Joint U.S.–EU Action Plan 

Promulgated in 1995, the plan inaugurated a series of reg

meetings between the U.S. President and the presidencies of 

European Commission and Council biannually; at the ministerial le

and in working groups. The latter have proven useful for thrashing 

contentious transatlantic issues. At a meeting of the Senior Level Gro

an understanding was reached to suspend the EU case against 

Helms-Burton Act that had been brought before the WTO. T

initiated to take the sting out of the confrontation over the Iran-Li

Sanctions Act bore fruit in the breakthrough accord reached at 

U.S.–EU summit a year later. It included putting in place a mechan

to provide each other with “warnings” of impending action by either 

that could be disputatious—whether it be legislation by the U

Congress, a directive of the European Union Commission, or a dip

matic initiative by the Council.88

Until now, these meetings have not been taken as the occas

for a strategic dialogue, much less the planning and implementation 
major diplomatic initiatives. They have concentrated on “deliv

ables”—items whose basics already have been agreed. Impor

security issues have been left to other venues, mainly NATO. Once 

full panoply of ESDP elements is in place, that logic may change

more encompassing U.S.–EU dialogue, more structured and w

administrative support, becomes an institutional possibility once 

European Union has the requisite apparatus of its own. The attractio

such an arrangement in most European eyes is that it would add to 

status of the Union as an international actor while augmenting collec

European influence on those occasions when there is strong consen

on an issue of consequence.

In one respect, that arrangement conforms with the goa

strong supporters of ESDP (for example, France) to establish a “Eur

puissance.” Yet a current of thinking, most pronounced in Paris 

within the Commission, suggests that “too much” dialogue along w

the promised complete transparency of EU (and NATO) deliberati

and decisionmaking could undermine the autonomy of EU bodies 

opening them to American influence. The present informal practic

giving the U.S. delegation an advance look at major initiatives un

consideration (especially in the area of trade) is below the tolera

threshold of EU governments and officials. Proposals to formalize 

practice while extending it to ESDP will meet resistance. Nonethel

a push by the United States for an expanded set of consultations an

strategic dialogue is likely to win favor among enough mem

governments and Brussels officialdom to turn the idea into reality.

However, does it serve the U.S. interest to deal with its Europ

partners on this basis? The positive element is that it provides 

sustained contact, thereby keeping the United States better informe

current attitudes and emerging policies. A hands-on approach provi

an opportunity to gain first-hand understanding of the workings of 

complex, multifaceted EU institutions while facilitating the formin

personal ties. That cannot fail to open the way to American influence

some measure, on the internal EU process while weakening the han

those who prefer to keep the United States at arm’s length. Finally

creates incentives for the Europeans to clarify the authority 

accountability of its representatives, whether they be Solana, Patten

holders of the rotating presidencies and chairmanships.

One possible drawback of these formal exchanges for strate

dialogue and joint action is that they serve to consolidate the Union 

a unitary actor. The United States in effect would be validatin
European entity and conferring on it the status of a strategic part

Could this lead to the very bifurcation of the Alliance that the Un

States has so strongly resisted? Dealings between co-equals can rea

become the norm—as they have in the trade sphere, where the conc

tration of power in the hands of the Commissioner for Trade 

strengthened considerably the European bargaining position. To red

the chances of that occurring, the United States could seek to limit 

scope of the agenda for U.S.–EU meetings, blacklisting hard defe

issues such as national missile defense (NMD). That action could 

justified by the presence of non-NATO countries in the European Un

In practice, though, delimiting what are appropriate subjects to place 

the U.S.–EU agenda may prove difficult. The argument can be made 

any matter of significant concern to the EU member states should 

treated collectively. Although manifest differences exist between 

American outlook and that of most European allies, the case for 

latter to forge a common position is strengthened. NMD is just such 

issue—one that to date has not figured on the agenda of the Political 

Security Committee. But Solana’s venting of European opposition 

forthright public criticism of U.S. policy in April 2000 may b

harbinger of future trends.89 If the High Representative sees fit to m

NMD an issue for the European Union without being brought to hee

members of the Council, there is no compelling reason to presume 

NMD—or some other strategic issue—should not be the subjec

deliberation and perhaps a collective diplomatic initiative.

American interests still might be best served by restricting 

agenda for U.S.–EU meetings while striving to preserve their infor

character. Ultimately, Washington’s ability to do so will depend in 

on how ESDP consultative bodies develop. The more they serve 

generate common positions and policies, the harder it will be 

America to avoid dealing with a European bloc. Outright refusa

engage the European Union on soft security matters probably is n

viable option. A less drastic alternative is to encourage the m

Atlanticist of EU states to work for an “open” deliberative process 

leaves space for the U.S. voice to be heard and avoids locking them 

fixed positions. That option also could be attractive to the smaller 

states that worry about ESDP, and the Union common foreign polic

general, being dominated by an implicit directoire of Britain, Fran

and Germany. Italy also has shown a lack of enthusiasm for m

ambitious conceptions of ESDP, in part because of a concern tha

would be excluded from the circle of the big three. The interest of I
and smaller EU states is best served by the combination of a transpa

set of ESDP structures and a NATO more open to European influen

In a sense, the two organizations can be seen as counterweights to e

other, the outcome being less American dominance of NATO and 

ESDP without protective walls sealing it off from American influen

The United States should not reject such an outcome out of hand, si

it ensures against decoupling while encouraging its European allies to 

more forthcoming in assuming responsibilities.

On strategic matters, several venues for dialogue with 

Europeans already exist, inter alia: NATO ministerials, sum

meetings, and the weekly meetings of Permanent Representativ

outside of NATO, G–8 conclaves and a host of more informal gath

ings. The use of the “quint” to deal with ongoing business in the Balk

shows the advantages of a concert approach with limited participa

and high flexibility, albeit on nonstrategic issues.

Overall, a mixed strategy is best suited to advancing U

interests in a changing transatlantic relationship. The new transatla

agenda can be productively expanded while maintaining certain redlin

The risk of ensconcing an excessively formal U.S.–EU mode 

interaction can be minimized by keeping the supporting secretariat sm

and actively pursuing bilateral dealings. Some recognition of the uni

status of the Union in these meetings conforms to an inescapable rea

Insisting that the Europeans recognize the U.S. interest in how ES

evolves and the imperative that authority be clearly designated 

accountable should be an objective of American dealings with 

institutions in Brussels as well as of high-level diplomacy. The adv

tages of a hands-on approach to working with the European Union 

security matters are numerous. It deepens knowledge about the worki

of the EU system through invaluable first-hand experience; adds to 

U.S. Government’s pool of resources and collective memory abo

complex, multifaceted organization; and tightens potentially us

personal bonds.

At the same time, the United States should work assiduousl

conserve the ability to treat directly with allied governments on mat

of mutual cardinal interest to us. In the short term, that task should 

readily manageable. In the longer term, the centripetal forces genera

within the European Union may make that challenge more daunt

Engagement now will facilitate meeting that later challenge.
Asymmetries

Reconciliation of NATO and the European Union is complica

by their asymmetries. NATO is a military alliance whose core is 

integrated military command, which is answerable to an intergove

mental council (NAC). Its political side was relatively underdevelo

until after the Cold War. NATO acquired the ability to react quickly 

agilely in part by streamlining (and, at times, circumventing) its for

structures and processes. The European Union, by contrast, evolve

a regulatory body, developing and executing common European ru

through a necessarily time-consuming procedure entailing numero

lengthy consultations, and a technocratic style of management. Hen

as Wim van Eekelen has written, “The two organizations have wor

in splendid isolation, to all intents and purposes existing in diffe

worlds.”90 ESDP is a functional departure from past experience. In 

sense, it could benefit from its status as a component of a supranatio

omnicompetent organization, in particular when addressing laten

combustible, problems.

The European Union possesses more numerous and va

instruments of influence than does NATO. Even if the emergent 

entity meets its headline objective by 2003, it will not match the mili

capability of NATO. However, the European Union has m

versatility—especially at the level of conflict prevention. It offers o

stop shopping for commercial, financial, monetary, political, 

military tools to inflect the behavior of other parties. Short of situati

requiring a direct, immediate need for the application of high-

military force, EU members may well see the organization as havin

comparative advantage over NATO for managing potential con

situations. The inclination to work through the Union will be reinfor

by the predisposition of some member governments to use the “s

power of economic inducements and disincentives rather than the b

threat of military force in strategies for dispute settlement. One 

question whether the European Union is better suited to take on the t

of conflict prevention. The inventory of resources available as ins

ments of influence is impressive. However, the mechanisms 

activating them expeditiously and applying them skillfully are unprov

By contrast, the United States in its individual capacity ha

equivalent range of assets at its disposal and a half-century of experie

in deploying them diplomatically. The demonstrative ability to m

timely decisions and to orchestrate the diverse elements of influenc

a function of practices and persons long accustomed to the exercis
power. These tangible and intangible assets are American. They are 

NATO assets to the extent that the United States shapes the policies 

directs the collective actions of the Alliance. NATO involvemen

Bosnia and Kosovo—missions that had a political component as wel

a military component—suggests that melding those assets in a mult

eral strategy is not easily accomplished, however.

The use or threatened use of military force as part of a strat

of coercive diplomacy entailed a process of consensus building that 

strained. It produced a consensus that was tenuous. Integrating mili

and nonmilitary policy elements was difficult in part because the Un

States shared the prerogatives of initiation and coordination with 

allies and in part because NATO mechanisms for diplomatic concer

not work as smoothly as the integrated military command structures 

In the postcombat phases of the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts, NA

shared responsibilities for policing and constituting civil institutions w

other organizations (particularly the European Union in the latter ca

America did not seek to control or actively supervise either effort

reticence was due to a number of factors: belief that the European al

had the major stake in Balkan stability, a desire to minimize the finan

costs to be borne, and the constraining influence of Congress 

opposed long-term commitments of money and manpower.

The common thread in the handling of Bosnia and Kosovo is 

unavoidability of multilateralism—within NATO or among NATO, 

European Union, and other international bodies. The less leeway 

United States has to devise and direct policies, the less pract

advantage there is to Washington’s unified decisionmaking abi

Consequently, in situations where the European Union may be incli

to take the lead in conflict prevention or crisis management—with 

confidence that it has a full panoply of instruments at its disposal—

alternative likely will not be American direction in the traditio

manner, certainly not within the European theater, but a sharing 

responsibilities. Enhanced military capabilities as envisaged by 

ESDP initiative have focused critical attention on who might do w

under whose aegis in various contingencies in which European secu

is threatened. The broader significance of ESDP may well be to shar

the question of where the authority for integrating elements of collec

Western influence will be located and who will exercise it.
Conclusion

M

ounting the ESDP project has preoccupied strategic planner

both sides of the Atlantic. The sharp focus on EU–NA

coordination quite naturally has magnified differences, real 

imagined, between the United States and Europe. On balance, howe

Europe’s progressive integration carries with it enormous benefits 

the United States. The European Union is bringing stability and orde

post-communist Europe in important respects. Having the Wes

Europeans play the role of model, mentor, and economic magnet 

Central and Eastern Europe has been a central element of Ameri

strategy for more than a decade. First sketched by Secretary of S

James Baker in his Berlin address of December 1989, the po

accorded the European Union the lead in knitting together the two e

of the continent.91 It is now launched fully into that endeavor, 

hesitations of the early 1990s having given way to bolstered confide

and an expanded sense of responsibility. Union efforts dovetail with 

security framework created by an enlarged, reoriented NATO. The 

processes are mutually reinforcing even if they are not parts o

carefully synchronized strategy.

ESDP should be placed in this context. It is emerging on a fi

underlying agreement on what a Europe of the future should look 

and on its critical ingredients: democracy, enlightened thinking about 

settlement of disputes by peaceful means, and dedication to resisting 

containing upwellings from Europe’s past. The Western Europ

commitment to achieving an ESDP should be read above all as a sig

mutual trust and collective obligation. That steps toward its realiza

force some rethinking and some reconfiguration of the Euro-Ameri

security partnership is inescapable. All parties in this are “victims

our collective success. Perspective and patience should be the wa

words as American foreign policy takes up this new challenge.
ESDP is a work in progress whose shape, competence, and m

of action will evolve over time. While the United States is able 

influence that process, the determining forces lie within the Europ

Union itself. To exercise its influence constructively, it behooves 

United States to think through which manifestations of an ESD

welcomes, which it can tolerate, and which it should resist as inim

to American interests. Devising suitable policies follows according

Capabilities

Reaching the Headline Goal for rapidly deployable force wo

be an unalloyed good; it would bolster European self-confiden

strengthen the American commitment to maintaining a military prese

in Europe, and put the Euro-American security partnership on a m

equitable (and thereby sounder) footing. Allocating and consolida

the necessary European assets, financial and otherwise, for achiev

that end is a wrenching process—one that must overcome budge

constraints dictated by the Maastricht formula for monetary un

entrenched organizational interests, and residual national parochiali

Gentle reminders from Washington that it is monitoring progress 

have a salutary effect, especially so given the varying seriousness w

which EU governments take the pledges they made at Cologne, Helsi

and Nice and the domestic pressures to give priority to social progra

Unceasing chiding from across the Atlantic, though, can be counterp

ductive. Issuing regular report cards on performance to date will 

European leaders and foster domestic opposition to a project that enj

only thin popular support. The days when the allies accepted Ameri

instruction and tutoring as part and parcel of their strategic protection 

gone.

NATO Primacy 

A consensus presently exists within the Alliance that NA

remains the primary venue for deliberation and coordinated action. 

public declarations affirm that it take charge of any situation that po

a serious threat to European peace and security. However, unanimity 

not been achieved on the question of what political role EU structu

could and should play before NATO has engaged an issue or, sub

quently, in parallel with it. Another question arises as to what discre

the Union would have in mounting its own operations from which 

United States has absented itself. Primacy is a non-issue in the sense 

there is no dispute among Alliance members that the United States 
the right to participate in any operation it chooses to join. Unlike 

situation in the early 1990s, no one (including France) is promoting 

European Union (as it did formerly the Western European Union) 

rival instrument for handling peacemaking and peace-enforcing ta

such as those considered in the early phases of the Yugoslav confli

If the United States wants in, it gets in—with the applause of alm

everyone, in almost all circumstances.

If the United States opts out, the Europeans theoretically hav

choice of either mounting an operation under NATO auspices avai

themselves of CJTF provisions (as revised to account for the 

substitution for WEU) or acting under EU auspices employing their o

assets. As a practical matter, it will be some time, if ever, before 

allies will possess the necessary capabilities (such as project

headquarters, C4I) to perform any mission beyond basic peacekeep

ones without tapping NATO resources. Were there a genuine oppo

nity to choose one course or another, how much of a difference wo

it make for the United States? Under the CJTF scenario, the Un

States would retain some influence on how the operation were con

tuted since the transfer depends on a unanimous decision by the No

Atlantic Council. According to some interpretations of such a framew

agreement, subsequent consent agreements also would be needed 

certain specific asset transfers to be made, as noted earlier. The Un

States, however, cannot realistically expect that it could indire

influence a European-only operation by exercising these latent pow

to give or withhold consent. Unless Washington has strong reason 

oppose the contemplated action, the costs in Alliance solidarity from 

attempt to control it remotely would far outweigh the presumed g

from insisting on a place at the table.

A more important set of questions is raised by differ

assessments of NATO diplomatic primacy. Foreseeable secu

problems in Europe are more likely to manifest themselves firs

political conflicts than as military ones—meaning the Union is alm

certain to be engaged via its Political and Security Committee. 

principle of NATO primacy, if strictly applied, would require that 

PSC defer to the North Atlantic Council. Two arguments can be m

in support of the contention that the United States should insist 

observance of this strict constructionist interpretation of NATO and 

Declarations. One cites the disadvantage to the United States of be

excluded from a body whose deliberations could prejudice free and o

consultation within the North Atlantic Council. The other concern 
to do with the danger of delay and confusion created by the conven

of both the EU and NATO bodies. The interlocking arrangements 

consultation and coordination agreed in December 2000 do not prov

an answer in themselves.

Whatever probability one attaches to either of these eventuali

materializing, no obvious foolproof method is apparent for avoid

them completely. What clear, persuasive criteria could be applied 

decide when a situation has passed from a political phase to a poten

military phase? Furthermore, EU efforts to deal with the question m

already have involved economic measures and diplomatic initiatives 

in all likelihood would remain elements of a collective Western cr

management strategy. The United States, in any event, would su

have been party to those actions—whether directly or tacitly.

If one visualizes a Kosovo crisis (1998–99) as it might h

unfolded with the ESDP structures in place, the PSC most certa

would have convened with the purpose of exchanging views o

problem of cardinal interest to member states, including explor

methods for preventing an aggravation of ethnic hostilities and 

halting the growing violence. Such meetings would not have preemp

the deliberations of the North Atlantic Council. Rather, the aim wo

have been to affirm a position in the name of “Europe.” For

consultations would be supplemented by informal talks, centered 

initiatives offered by the larger states.

Were the United States to deem the complications created 

these overlapping roles intolerable, it could pursue a strategy 

systematically subordinating the European Union to NATO. Thwar

the ambitions of ESDP would require convening the NAC, or at least 

NATO Political Committee, at the first signs of an emerging secu

problem. Activating NATO to address the preconditions of a poten

conflict would preempt the EU Political and Security Committee. 

primacy of the Atlantic Alliance thereby could be asserted. Suc

drastic strategy, however, would entail serious costs, and not so

diplomatic ones. It implicitly would commit the United States to be 

leader in managing all manner of disputes as might arise across 

continent. That open-ended commitment runs against the grain of pu

opinion, the prevailing attitude in Congress, and the widely h

conviction in policy circles that the United States should be more ra

than less reticent about its engagements in places where core natio

interests are not at stake. Moves to reduce the American contributio

peacekeeping in the Balkans, along with the questioning of whe
future Kosovo-type situations would justify so heavy an Ameri

military role, cannot be reconciled with a strategy of expanding 

NATO remit and honing its instruments for quick diplomatic action

The issues raised by the emergence of distinctively Europ

political and security organs should be treated more deftly. A reali

approach should think in terms not of supercedence by NATO but ra

of coordination. NATO primacy would be established implicitly 

virtue of its encompassing membership. Asserting that primacy 

reference to the terms of the EU–NATO accords that have b

negotiated may not be necessary. Those accords cannot anticipate 

contingencies or lay down so rigorous a set of procedural rules a

preclude differing interpretations of what each organization, singly 

jointly, is permitted to do. Inescapably, a political process will determ

a EU–NATO division of labor and the exact modes of Euro-Ameri

cooperation. Consequently, the United States can best ensure tha

position is acknowledged and its interests respected by a sustai

diplomatic process.

Official declarations at Cologne, Helsinki, and Nice restrict 

contingencies for activation of the postulated rapid reaction co

functionally, to performance of the Petersburg tasks, and geographica

to Europe. The scope of the EU Common Foreign and Security Pol

for which Mr. Solana is High Representative, knows no such lim

however. The Council-based structures and the Commissioner 

External Relations have the latitude to address any aspect of the 

external relations as far afield as the Union determines it has an inter

The quick EU decision to intercede with North Korea to prevent wh

feared was a breakdown in ongoing negotiations over Pyongyan

nuclear program and the jeopardizing of the promising South Kor

“sunshine policy” was a striking example of how the Union strate

vision is becoming globalized. The practical realization that 

European Union could not substitute for a cautious United States sho

not conceal the fact that the 15 European governments were ready to 

in unison, far afield, to offset a perceived dereliction of the Un

States. As the Treaty of Amsterdam states, “Member states shall inf

and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign 

security policy of general interest.”92 Given the global range of 

commercial and financial activity, it implicitly has some interest 

about everywhere. More concretely, its technical aid and assista

programs span the globe. Serving the humanitarian ends of econo

development and amelioration of affliction, these programs canno
separated completely from the political setting in which they oc

More pertinent are aid programs associated with strategies designe

achieve political purposes—for example, bolstering the embryo

Palestinian state and contributing to the peace process, engaging Ira

the hope of encouraging pragmatic political elements—and the exten

network of programs directed at Eastern Europe, the Commonwealt

Independent States, and Russia itself with whom it has a wide-rang

partnership and cooperation agreement.

For the United States, the issue is how to accommodate itsel

a European Union that is certain to become a more and more signific

actor on the world stage yet whose degree and type of involvement 

vary greatly in manner and extent from place to place. The ambigu

nature of this strange superpower complicates American calculations 

relating to it. Simple choices do not present themselves. Once one 

beyond the platitude that a vibrant European Union is a force 

economic growth and stability in the world (especially on the Europ

continent), no obvious benchmarks exist to guide American policy. 

possible, though, to trace certain trajectories for the Union as 

international actor. They in turn can inform the formulation of 

American approach to dealing with it.

Some EU governments, and the ESDP secretariat, will be ea

that ESDP make its mark. They may avidly seek out opportunitie

demonstrate resolve. That could mean variously:

# convening the PSC, Council, or both with the intention 

forging a declaratory policy that affirms a common EU posi

(for example, on renewed tensions in the Balkans, dealing w

“rogue” states, the strategic implications of the National Mis

Defense initiative); or voicing a “European” viewpoint in

mally but publicly by the High Representative

# volunteering to take charge of combined operations (as 

Eurocorps has done in Kosovo)

# taking the diplomatic lead in response to an imminent crisi

None of these conjectured actions would be taken without so

form of prior consultation with the United States. Rather, the str

would be on doing something distinctly, positively “European.” It m

be independent of, or in collaboration with, the United States (when 

in reaction to a U.S. policy). Hesitation by an American administra

will heighten the expectation in allied capitals that the United States m

act in a manner they judge as unsound. The more upset allied gov

ments are by a seeming U.S. bent toward unilateralism, the greater 
likelihood that the European Union will be tempted to seize the occas

to promote itself. Unsure of its unity, competencies, and prerogati

the ESDP will want to establish a favorable precedent and confirm 

new security vocation. A more assertive attitude toward pressing th

views on the United States may also form part of this pattern. It wo

not be impulsive or insensitive to circumstances. But there is a grow

feeling that Washington’s chronic failure to consult fully and in a tim

way has gotten out of hand. A way to make discontent felt is to 

uninhibited about airing differing points of view. ESDP could mak

difference.

The EU states have gotten into the security business fo

combination of self-interested reasons: to strengthen their collec

identity, to better balance their dealings with the United States, and 

cope with local threats to European peace and stability. Only a few s

the status and attendant burdens of a world power.93 Yet the objec

reality of the sheer weight of the European Union as an econo

powerhouse and its expanding geographical boundaries point in 

direction. So too will the enhanced self-confidence in bringing 

fruition its trio of historic projects, the inevitable jolts along the w

notwithstanding. How the process unfolds is of the utmost importa

for the United States. American interest lies in doing what it can to m

each piece of the composite fall into place. ESDP offers the m

immediate challenge to American policy.

Recommendations

The primary contribution that the United States now can m

to ensuring that the ESDP project achieves its laudable goals in a man

that conforms to American interests is to resolve the remaining eleme

of uncertainty about the U.S. commitment to making it work. F

matters need to be addressed.

Remove most restrictions on the transfer of technology 

equipment that can accelerate European defense moderniza

programs. Enhanced allied capabilities in PGMs are essential if we 

to avoid a two-tier alliance in which the Europeans are limited 

performing missions at the lighter end of the force spectrum, whethe

conducting operations on their own or participating in combi

operations with America. Possible leakage of sensitive technology 

legitimate concern. All reasonable precautions should be taken to ens

that appropriately stringent controls are in place before transfers 

made. Zero risk is not achievable, though, and it should not be 
reference mark for determining the suitability of granting export licen

or approving joint ventures between transatlantic industrial partners

The established practice of differentiating among al

governments in terms of their trustworthiness in handling proprie

technology is losing its viability. In the past, the United States 

provided knowledge to Britain in several sensitive areas (for exam

cruise missiles and the product of satellite intelligence) on the und

standing that the information would not be passed on to other al

governments—such as France. That practice must change. The Europ

pooling of assets, along with their promotion of cross-national a

consortia, obviates the discretionary judgment that the United States 

had in deciding who is eligible to possess what American-held techn

ogy.94 To the extent that trust is a measure of practices and procedu

it is reasonable to encourage all ESDP governments to emulate th

now in force in the most “responsible” countries. To the extent that 

a measure of policy, it is appropriate and desirable that Washing

make transfers conditional on observance of a clear code of conduct

raising the stakes for the European Union as a whole of any transg

sions, peer pressure should lead to strict standards and close monitor

The Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI) launched at the N

ministerial in Florence in September 2000 is a major step in the r

direction. Reconciling the more restrictive State Department posi

with the more liberal DOD position, the initiative represents a seri

reform of the U.S. defense export control system. As presented by t

Secretary of State Albright, the DTSI “facilitates U.S. companies’ eff

to enter into joint arrangements with allies’ companies; allows Europ

companies to participate more easily with U.S companies in bidding 

U.S. Defense Department programs; and provides for exped

licensing for defense trade . . . with a ten-day turnaround in m

cases.”95 This landmark initiative deserves to be expeditiously im

mented and actively pursued. Where Congressional approval is requ

to act on certain elements of the initiative, the administration sho

present it as integral to the much desired strengthening of al

capabilities.

Redouble efforts to finalize accords between NATO and 

European Union on CJTF arrangements and procedures. Sound reas

exist for putting in place expeditious procedures for the European al

to gain access to U.S.-held Alliance assets. The United States has wi

accepted the principle that access to NATO assets will be made availa

as an overall package based on agreements reached through j
PSC/NAC talks. A liberal, forthcoming approach in handling th

matters serves the American interest in avoiding the creation 

incentives for the allies to invest monies from static defense budget

acquiring means that the United States is in a position to provide.

This approach is especially true for command, control, com

nications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissa

assets. While carefully targeted investments by the Europeans to upgr

their capabilities in this area are necessary and desirable, sca

resources should be concentrated in the areas of most acute need. T

readiness to rely on the United States for such things as satellite imag

and headquarters using command, control, communications, 

computers under the terms of arrangements now being worked 

between NATO and the European Union is qualified by what so

allied governments have perceived as an American reluctance to sh

satellite intelligence fully. To whatever extent this reading of the rec

is justified, the perception itself needs to be addressed. Reassurances 

the activation of CJTF arrangements will yield a good faith effort on 

part of the United States to make fully available intelligence, surv

lance, and reconnaissance assets and products pertinent to the miss

could allay doubts. The forthright offers made by the United States

talks between military experts of the EU 15 and SHAPE, to sh

strategic reconnaissance and intelligence are steps in the right direct

Follow-up is in order to refute the arguments of those who dispar

them as gestures intended to dilute European interest in acquir

independent capabilities.96

Move to build a consensus with the Congress on the framew

of American policy toward ESDP and related issues. The Europ

experience in dealing with a dual government in Washington distu

their attempts to find common ground with the United States on 

terms of a modified transatlantic security partnership. Congressio

initiatives such as the Byrd-Warner resolution to set a definite date 

withdrawal of American troops from KFOR trigger anxiety that t

initiative may have unwanted consequences—such as calling 

question continued and future American participation in missions wh

U.S. weight and standing are indispensable. They need consis

policies and stable commitments to keep their own planning on a stra

course. The Executive, in turn, should seek explicitness from 

Europeans about their designs and intentions so as to be better p

tioned to address Congressional concerns.
Find new ways to improve transatlantic consultation bef

deciding and acting on matters that affect Alliance interests. Percepti

of American unilateralism are antithetical to the goal of keeping 

Europeans committed to working in tandem with the United States 

their continued willingness to accord NATO primacy. The handlin

the NMD issue illustrates the costs of a failure to observe this max

We need to be more conscious of how sensitive the allies are to si

that the United States believes that its dominance allows it to disreg

the views and interests of its partners.

The scope of issues addressed through the ESDP machin

along with their geographical range, will expand over time. A key 

translating that movement into a strategic concert is frank and o

exchanges on matters that the United States has tended to treat as 

private preserve. Modification of existing practices is well justified 

the potential benefits of a vital Euro-American partnership.

The European effort to make a success of ESDP will b

struggle—often perplexing, at times vexing for the United Sta

However, we cannot afford to treat it as a spectator sport. The Ameri

national interest is linked to the outcome of the “European” enterpr

It is incumbent on the United States to stay engaged with the Europe

as ESDP develops in the context of a Union striving to reconsti

itself. Engagement means sustained discourse with national governm

and representatives of supranational bodies: the Commission, 

Council secretariat, the European parliament. It also means attentiven

to how the several spheres of Union initiative and activity inters

enlargement, monetary union, Constitutional reform, trade negotiati

and the intra-Union politics associated with each. For the United St

both to have some constructive influence on these processes and to r

the common benefits from their successful completion, that engagem

should involve parts of the government whose contact with the Europ

Union in the past has been slight or episodic. ESDP poses that challe

for the American defense establishment in particular. Engagem

entails routine consultation informed by in-depth knowledge o

political entity that is becoming a superpower, albeit an unconventio

one, with whom the United States has common business of card

importance.
Principal Institutions of the

European Union

European Council. The European Council is composed of heads of s

and government and the Commission President who meet at least o

every half year. It “shall provide the Union with the necessary imp

for its development and shall define the general policy guidel

thereof” (article 4, TEU). The European Council is “to decide 

common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where 

Member States have important interests in common.” The di

involvement of the European Council in CFSP and ESDP adds polit

weight and commits the highest political authorities in member stat

Council of Ministers. EU Foreign Ministers meet at least once a mo

as the General Affairs Council (GAC) in which the Commission 

represented by the competent commissioner in charge of exte

relations. According to the Treaty (article 13), the Council “shall t

the decisions necessary for defining and implementing” the CFSP 

ESDP “on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the Europ

Council.” It “shall recommend Common Strategies to the Europ

Council and implement these, in particular by adopting joint actions 

common positions” and “ensure the unity, consistency, and effectiven

of action by the Union.” The Council is the general forum for infor

tion and consultation on CFSP and ESDP matters among Member St

(article 16, TEU). The GAC has overall responsibility for prepara

work for the European Council; consequently, matters to be submi

to the European Council must first be submitted to the GAC. 

Council and the Commission are jointly responsible for “the consiste

of the Union’s external activates as a whole in the context of its exte
relations, security, economic and development policies” and “shall 

operate to this end” (article 3, TEU).

Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). Perman

Representatives of Member States to the European Union and 

Commission Deputy Secretary General meet once a week to prep

Council meetings and decisions, including those related to CFSP 

ESDP. COREPER has overall responsibility for preparing the work 

the Council in all its compositions. This means that all items submi

to the Council must previously have been placed on the agenda 

COREPER, which, if need arises, endeavors, at its level, to reach 

agreement to be submitted for adoption by the Council. (COREPER 

attach comments and recommendations to opinions submitted to 

Council by the Political Committee.)

European Commission. The Commission is the operating executiv

the European Union. It proposes legislation, is responsible for admi

tration, and ensures that the provisions of the treaties and the decisi

of Union institutions are properly implemented. It manages the bud

and represents the Union in international trade negotiations. The 

Commissioners are appointed for 5-year terms; their appointmen

confirmed by the European Parliament. The Commission Presiden

appointed by agreement among the member governments also for a t

of 5 years. The Commissioner for External Relations shares responsib

ties with the Commissioners for Trade, Enlargement, Developm

Policy, and Economic Affairs. He chairs a committee composed of 

five Commissioners, charged with coordinating the external policie

the Commission and defining strategic objectives. He is supported b

Directorate General created specifically to deal with the Comm

Foreign and Security Policy.

European Parliament. The European Parliament is consulted and k

informed regularly. According to the Treaty (article 21), “The Pr

dency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and 

basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and s

ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken 

consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly inform

by the Presidency and the Commission of the development of 

Union’s foreign and security policy. The European Parliament may 

questions of the Council or make recommendations to it. It shall hold 
annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign 

security policy.” The Presidency and/or the Commission can attend 

meetings of Parliament’s committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 

participate, if need be, in Parliamentary debates in plenary session

Council meetings, the Presidency informs the Council of Parliame

reactions, communications, questions, recommendations, or resoluti

concerning CFSP and ESDP.
1 A u niqu ely insightful European pe rspe ctive on the genealogy of ESDI is p rovided by one 

progenitors, former Secretary General of the Western Union Willem van Eekelen, in Debating E

pean Security (The Hague: SDU Publishers, 1998). See also Cameron Fraser, The Fo reign an d Se c

Policy of the European Union (Sheffield, England: Acad emic Press, 1999 ).

2

 North Atlantic Counc il, Final Communiqué, June 3, 1996.

3

 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Comm uniqué, Washington, DC, April 24, 1999.

4

 Cologne Eu rop ean Council, Presidency Conclusions, June 3–4, 1999.

5

 He lsinki European Cou ncil, Presidency Conclusions, December 10–11, 1999.

6

 U.K .-France sum mit, Joint Declaration on Europ ean Defence, St. Malo, December 4, 199

7

 Western European Un ion Council of Ministers, The Petersburg Declaration, Bonn, Jun

1992.

8

 European Cou ncil, Presidency Conclusions Report on the European Security and Defence P

Nice, December 4–5, 2000, introduction.

9

 Jacques Chirac, press conference, Nice, December 12, 2000.

10 Joint Declaration on Europ ean Defence.

11 Department of D efense , Strengthening Transatlantic Security: A U.S. Strategy for th

Century (Wa shington, DC: Government Printing Office, 200 0).

12 Joschka Fische r, press conferenc e at WEU summ it, Bremen , May 10, 1999 . A perce

appraisal of European ambivalence toward the United States and their continued depend

relationship is given by François Heisbourg in “American Hegemony? Perceptions of the U .S. Abr

Survival 41, no. 4 (W inter 1999/20 00). 

13 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Defense Capab ilities Initiative, Washington, DC, Apr

1999.

14 François Heisbourg et al., European D efence: Making It Work, Chaillot Paper 42 (Pa ris: Ins

for Security Studie s, 20 00), 38. A m ore drastic set of proposals, which would lead to a binary U.S

alliance, has been put forward by three prominent figures in the European policy debates; see 

Andreani, Christoph Bertram, and Charles Grant, Europe’s Military Revolution (London: Cen t

European Reform, 2001).

15 Christopher Meyer, speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Confer

Washington, DC, October 10, 2000.

16 The term acquis is used in the Eu ropean Union and European discou rse gene rally to re

policy areas where there is an established, fixed commitment to supranational approaches.

1 7

 Tony Blair, speech to the Polish Stock Exchange, Warsaw, October 6, 2000; Jacques Ch

speech to the Bundestag, July 28, 2000. The Blair and Chirac speeches were prompted in pa

German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s evocation of a federal union in his studiously provoc

speech, “From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration,” B

May 12, 2000.

18 “Toward a Strategic Alliance,” European Affairs, no. 2 (April 12, 200 0).

19 Strength ening Tran satlantic Security, 5.

20 Cologne European Cou ncil, Presidency Conclusions.

2 1 He isbourg e t al., 36. The dive rsity of European governm ents’ attitud es tow ard m i

intervention is exam ined by Martin Ortega, Military Interv ention a nd the Europea n Union, Ch

Paper 45 (P aris: Institute for Se curity Stud ies, 200 0). 

Endnotes
22 European Un ion Counc il, Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira, June 20, 2000.

2 3

 Shifting European perceptions for U.S. leadership are analyzed by Heisbourg in “Am e

Hegemony?”

24 Charles A. Kupchan, “In Defence of European Defence: An American Perspective,” Sur

42, no. 2 (Summ er 2000). Kupchan notes that “After the war, despite the success of the air cam

and the abs enc e of a single NATO c ombat casualty, the U .S. S ena te’s m ain re action was to 

unanimously a resolution bemoaning the ‘significant shortcomings’ in European defense capabi

and u rging the Europe an Union to rec tify the ‘overall balance’ within the Alliance.”

25 Richard Holbrooke has sketched a vivid picture of that fren etic period in his personal ac

of adm inistra tion p olicymaking, To End a War (New Y ork: Random House, 1998). For an

perspective, see Ivo H. Da alder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia P

(Wa shington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2000).

26 European Cou ncil, Presidency Conclusions, annex II (Civilian Asp ects of Crisis Managem

Feira, June 20, 2000.

27 The broad deba te on intervention is ex amined by Richa rd H. Ha ass, Intervention: The U

Am erica n Power In the Post-Cold W ar W orld (Wa shington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994

28 Hubert Védrine, in terview, l’Exprèss, February 28, 1999.

29 The evolution of German thinking about the scope and form of its role in Europ ean sec

affairs is analyzed by Daniel Vern et, “Shrewd Exploitation of Limited Sovereignty,” Internati

Politik 1 (Spring 2000). See also the thoughtful, skeptical appraisal of Germany’s future ro

European security by Hanns W . Maull, “Germany and the Use of Force: Still a ‘Civilian Pow

Survival 42, no. 2 (Summer 200 0). 

30 Hubert Védrine, in terview, Libération, November 24, 1998.

31 Germ an-Russian sum mit, Comm uniqué, Berlin, June 16, 2000.

32 North Atlantic Treaty O rganization, Comm uniqué, article 38, Washington, DC, April 24, 

33 European Cou ncil, Presidency Conclusions, annex IV, H elsinki, Decem ber 10 –11, 1999. 

34 Ibid.

35 Maull, 77.

36 For a critical review of this deb ate, see D onald A. Byman and M atthew C. W axman, “Ko

and the Great Airpower Debate,” Internatio nal S ecurity 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000 ).

37 Klaus Neumann, remarks, Conference on Implementing the ESD P: The Transatlantic Dime

at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC, Feb

14, 2000.

38 Michael Cooper, “Cheney Urges Rethinking U se of U .S. Ground Forces In Bosn ia and K os

The New York Times, September 1, 2000.

39 Alain Richard, “Défense Européenne et souveraineté,” Paris, October 20, 2000.

40 Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Pu blic Affairs, 2001).

41 The benign attitude toward ESDP that some senior U.S. officers express reflects the hop

a better-armed set of allies could relieve them altogether of disagreeable missions they could do wi

as well as reduce the demands placed on overextended American forces called upon to per

unconventional missions.

42 Michael Evans, “General Wanted U.S. To Call the Shots in Kosovo,” The Times (Lon

January 27, 2000. The definitive account of the policy debates and strategic calculations by the Cl

administration is provided by Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’H anlon, Winning Ugly: NATO ’s 

to Save Kosovo (Wa shington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2000).

43 See the critique of NA TO decisionmaking by G uillaume Parm entier, “Redressing NA

Imba lance,” Survival 42, no. 1 (Sum mer 2 000); see also Lessons From Kosovo (Paris: Déléga

l’Inform ation et a la Commun ication de la Défense, November 1999). The official DO D post-mo

on the Kosovo crisis is Kosovo/Op eration Allied Force, After-Action Report to Congress, Januar

2000. The issues of m ilitary strategy are treated in the wider context of crisis management by Dav

Yost, “The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union,” Sur vival 43, no. 2 (W inter 2000/2

44 Heisbourg et al., 38.

45 Klaus Naumann, “Implementing the European Security and Defense Policy: A Practical V

for Europe,” Bulletin of the Atlantic Council of the United States 11, no. 3, August 2000.
46 A Turkish veto on NATO cooperation in building ESDI suspended this collaboration ea 

2001. Closely related to Ankara’s obstruction of accords on terms of EU access to other NATO a

it was lifted in April. See Judy D emp sey and Alexan der Nicoll, “EU an d NA TO to hold talks on mi

planning,” The Financial Times, April 24, 2001.

47 European Cou ncil–Ge neral Affairs/Defense Com mittee, Military Capabilities Commi

Declaration, November 20, 2000.

48 Ibid.

49 Jim Geramone, “More Work Needed on Defense Capabilities Initiative,” Armed F

Information Service, December 5, 2000.

50 See the analysis of ESDP capab ilities and military spending in the Strategic Survey 2000–

(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001).

51 See Robert Graham, Alexander Nicoll, and Haig Sim onian, “Paris to Press Berlin on Mi

Aircraft,” The Financial Times, June 11 , 2001. In contrast to Germany, the French 5-year mi

program budget kept sp ending at present levels for 2002–2003 wh ile increasing p rocurem ent b

percen t. Th at represented a compromise between President Chirac, who pressed for an increase 

defense budget, and the Jospin governm ent. Se e “La loi de programmation militaire 2003– 2

announced August 1, 2001.

52 Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration, paragraph 6.

53 North Atlantic Counc il Ministerial Me eting, Final Communiqué, Brussels, December 1

2000. 

54 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Comm uniqué, article 10, Washington, DC, April 24, 

55 Ibid.

56 U.S. Congress, House Resolution 59, November 2, 1999; U.S. Senate Resolution 208, Nove

8, 1999. For a detailed analysis of the Congressional role in the debate over ESDP, see Stanley R. S

The Un ited States and Europea n Defense, Chaillot Paper 39 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2

57 European Un ion sum mit, Presidency Conclusions, appendix II, Feira, June 20, 2000.

58 Chris P atten, speech, “The Futur e of European Security and Defense Policy (ESD P) and th 

of the Comm ission,” London, December 16, 1999.

59 Quoted by Judy Dempsey and Alexander Nicoll, “When push comes to shove,” The Fina

Times, April 29, 2001. The Turkish position was fully spelled out by Foreign Minister Ismail Ce

“A necessary role in defence,” The Financial Times, May 29, 2001.

60 North Atlantic Counc il Ministerial Me eting, Final Communiqué, De cember 14 –15, 2000. 

61 William Cohen, comments at the Defense Ministers Session, North Atlantic Council, Bru

December 5, 2000. U.S. Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow voiced American apprehen

about the building of ESD P som e weeks earlier; see Simon Taylor, “U.S. am bassador de livers 

warning on defence planning,” European Voice , November 8, 2000. Intense negotia tion s to reco

American concerns with ESDP institution building succeeded in producing the compro

formulations incorporated in the Nice and Brussels Declarations.

62 Alexander Nicoll, “Cohen says European rapid reaction force mu st use NA TO mi

planners,” The Financial Times, December 7, 2000.

63 “Meet Your New European Army,” The Economist 357, no. 81 98 (Novemb er 25, 200 0).

64 Jean-Pierre Ke lche, Le Monde, December 9, 2000.

65 Quoted in N icoll, The Financial Times, December 7, 2000.

66 Richard, “D éfense Européenné et sou veraineté.”

67 North Atlantic Counc il Ministerial Me eting, Final Comm uniqué, December 15, 2000, 10

68 Ibid.

69 Alexa nde r Nicoll and Judy Dem psey, “EU force may plan apart from NA TO,” The Fina

Times, April 30, 2001.

70 European Cou ncil, Presidency Conclusions Report on the European Security and Def

Policy, annex III, Nice, December 4–5, 2000.

71 Ibid., annexes IV, V.

72 Ibid.

73 EU repr esen tatives also played a role in a rranging for the voluntary removal of K LA e lem

from the Pesevo valley in southern Serbia. They worked with NATO officials to ensure an a

whereby the KLA renounced violence in accepting the return of Serbian police authority 
international supervision. 

7 4

 The implications of where the point of gravity for the EU’s CFSP is located are examin

Gilles Andréani in “Why Institutions Matter,” Survival 42, no. 2 (Summer 2 000).

75 Treaty on European Union, article 26.

76 Ibid.

77 Chris Patten, speech at Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris, June 11, 200

78 Ibid.

79 Patten, “The Future .”

80 Treaty of Amsterdam, article 5.

81 Romano Prod i, address to the Eu rop ean Parliam ent, O ctober 3, 2000. Prodi elaborated o

idea for a prominent Comm ission role in EU foreign and security policy in a speech at the In

d’Etudes Politiques in Paris, May 29, 2001.

82 See Andrew Jack, “Patten hits at Russia over Georgia,” The Financial Times, January 19, 

83 Ibid.

84 Alyson Bailes, “Europe and the U .S.: O rganizing th e Coope ration Between NATO 

WEU /EU,” Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ad hoc-Publizität, summ er school, August 20, 1999.

85 How the complex inner dynamics of the European Un ion interse ct the evolving sec

relationship between Europe and the U nited State s is the subjec t of a rigorous and insightfu l an

by the contributors to European Defence: Making It Work. Se e esp ecially the essa ys by Fra

Heisbou rg, Nicole Gnesotto, and Karl Kaiser.

86 Jacques Chirac, address to the Bundestag, July 28, 2000.

87 See the appraisal of Schroeder’s plan in “Gerhard Schroeder’s EU vision,” The Economist, 

30, 2001. The French reaction was voiced by Pierre Moscovici, Minister for European Affairs

reponse a Schroder ne sera pas fade,” Le Monde, May 11, 2001.

88 The Transatlantic Partnership on Political Cooperation contains a joint EU–U.S. commi

to “resist the passage of econom ic sanction s legislation based on foreign policy goals,” Washington

December 1998.

89 Javier Solana’s rem arks are r eported in J ane Perle z, “U.S. M issile Plan Could Hurt Security 

European Says,” The New York Times, May 2, 2000.

9 0

 Willem van Eekelen, “Building European Defence: NATO’s ESD I and the European Un

ESDP ,” Rapporteur NAT O Pa rliamentary Assem bly Defence and Security Committee, April 18, 

91 James A. Baker, speech to the Berlin Press Club, December 13, 1989.

92 Treaty of Amsterdam, article 16.

93 See Pete r Rodman’s appraisa l of the u nste ady EU c limb towa rds w orld powe r status: Dr

Apart? Trends In U.S.-Europe Relations (Wa shington, DC: The Nixon Cen ter, June 1999 ).

94 An overview toward consolidation in the European defense sector is given by Burka rd Sch

From Cooperation to Integration: Defence and Aerospace Industries in Europe, Chaillot Pape

(Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2000 ).

95 Intervention by Madeleine K. Albright at the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headqua

Brussels, December 14, 2000, 7.

96 See the well-informed, incisive treatment of thes e issues by Charles Grant in H eisbourg 

chapter five.
About the Author

Michael J. Brenner is professor of international relations at the

University of Pittsburgh. He researched and wrote this paper while

serving as a distinguished visiting fellow in the Institute for National

Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Dr. Brenner

earned his Ph.D. at the University of California, Berkeley. He has

published several works on Euro-American relations and European

security, including Terms of Engagement: The United States and the

European Security Identity (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic

and International Studies, 1998), NATO and Collective Security

(London: Macmillan, 1997), and articles in Politique Etrangere,

Internationale Politik, International Affairs, Survival, and Foreign

Policy. His latest work, coauthored with Guillaume Parmentier, is

Reconciliable Differences: U.S.-French Relations in the New Era

(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

■■■■

The National Defense University (NDU) is a joint professional military education institution

operating under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its purpose is to

prepare military and civilian leaders for service at the highest levels of national defense

and security. The principal operating elements of NDU are the Industrial College of the

Armed Forces, National War College, Joint Forces Staff College, Information Resources

Management College, Institute for National Strategic Studies, and Center for Hemispheric

Defense Studies.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) conducts strategic studies for the

Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and unified commanders in

chief; supports national strategic components of NDU academic programs; and provides

outreach to other governmental agencies and the broader national security community. 

The Publication Directorate of INSS publishes books, monographs, reports, and

occasional papers on national security strategy, defense policy, and national military

strategy through National Defense University Press that reflect the output of university

research and academic programs. In addition, it produces Joint Force Quarterly, a

professional military journal published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Recent titles 

in the McNair

Paper series:

65

Agricultural Bioterrorism:

A Federal Strategy to

Address the Threat

Henry S. Parker

64

The Strategic Implications

of a Nuclear-Armed Iran

Kori N. Schake and

Judith S. Yaphe

63

All Possible Wars? 

Toward a Consensus View

of the Future Security

Environment, 2001–2025

Sam J. Tangredi

62

The Revenge of the

Melians: Asymmetric

Threats and the Next QDR

Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.

61

Illuminating 

Tomorrow’s War

Martin C. Libicki

From the introduction to

Europe’s New

Security Vocation

For the United States, having

more militarily capable allies who

are ready to shoulder heavier burdens has been a long-time goal,

one that became more 

compelling in light of the wars 

in the former Yugoslavia. Allies

able to do the difficult job of

peacemaking and peacekeeping

could ease the demands on 

the United States to police a 

continent where nationality conflicts, which do not affect core

American interests, are the 

main threat to peace. Furthermore, the cumulative effects of

protracted peacekeeping engagements on military resources and

morale are a growing concern. 

A more equitable distribution 

of duties also conforms to the

U.S. reluctance to back committing its troops to missions

that risk casualties in doubtful

causes that affect West

Europeans more directly than

they do the United States.