Psychological Operations

Principles and Case Studies

Editor

Frank L. Goldstein, Col, USAF

Co-editor

Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., Col, USAFR

Air University. Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

September 1996
p . cm.

At head of t.p . : AU Shield.

"September 1996."

1 . Psychological warfare-United States . 2. Psychological warfare-Case studies .

1. Goldstein, Frank L., 1945- 11. Findley, Benjamin F.

UB276. P82 1996

355.3'434-dc20 96-22817

CIP

ISBN 1-58566-016-7

Disclaimer

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest

of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts . The views

expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position

of the Department of Defense or the United States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for

public release .

For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents

US Government Printing Office

Washington, DC 20402
Contents

Essay Page

DISCLAIMER -------------------- ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lx

PREFACE ______________________ xi

PART I

Nature and Scope of

Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

1 Psychological Operations : An Introduction

Col Frank L. Goldstein, USAF

Col Daniel W. Jacobowitz, USAF, Retired

2 Strategic Concepts for Military Operations . , 17

Col Fred W. Walker, USAF, Retired

3 No More Tactical Information Detachments:

US Military Psychological Operations

in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Col Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., USA, Retired

4 Blending Military and Civilian PSYOP

Paradigms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 51

Col Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., USAFR
PART II

National Policy and PSYOP Planning

Essay Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

5 The Psychological Dimension in

National Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Dr Carnes Lord

6 When Are Political Objectives Clearly Defined?

A Historical Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Michael A. Morris

Some Thoughts on Psychological Operations . . . 97

William F. Johnston

8 The Role of Public Opinion . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Lloyd A. Free

9 A Critical Analysis of US PSYOP . . . . . . . . 121

Lt Col Philip P. Katz, USA, Retired

Ronald D. McLaurin

Preston S. Abbott

PART III

Strategic, Tactical, and Operational PSYOP

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

10 Soviet Active Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

DeWitt S. Copp

11 What Soviet PSYOP Mirror Imaging

Can Tell Us . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

James Melnich

12 Indoctrination of Hate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

Lev Yudovich

iv

Essay Page

22 The Role of Military Psychological Operations

in Support of National Antidrug Policy . . . . . 295

Maj James V. Keifer, USAF, Retired

23 Political-Psychological Dimensions

of Counterinsurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319

Gen Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Retired

24 The Psychological Dimension of the

Military Element of National Power . . . . . . . . . 333

Maj James V. Keifer, USAF, Retired

25 PSYOP in Desert Shield/Desert Storm . . . . . , , 341

Col Frank L. Goldstein, USAF

Col Daniel W. Jacobowitz, USAF, Retired

EPILOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357

Lt Gen Samuel V. Wilson, USA, Retired

CONTRIBUTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
Illustrations

Lire Page

1 Loudspeaker Message Handbook

(with extract) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

2 Safe conduct passes . . . . . . . . . . 259

3 "Money for Guns" handbill . . . . . . . 262

4 Christmas cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

5 "Wanted" poster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

6 "Wanted" handbill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266

7 PSYOP newspaper . . . . . . . . . . .267

8 ` -l\vin Flag" miniposter . . . . . . . .268

9 "Money for Guns" poster . . . . . . .271

10 Military Support Group (MSG) . . . . 273

Table

1 Exhibit I PSYOP Effort and Relative

Effectiveness in the Persian Gulf . . . . .~ . 349

Foreword

From a military commander's perspective, the role of

psychological operations (PSYOP) in the successful planning and

execution of modern military operations is absolutely essential .

The recent successes of PSYOP in Panama and the Persian Gulf

amply demonstrate its importance in achieving our military

objectives and national goals. PSYOP is an integral part of the

United States Special Operations Command mission. Today, the

military faces a dynamic and unpredictable world. PSYOP will

remain a valuable instrument in our overall defense posture and

will be a key asset in the fulfillment of US national policy.

Psychological Operations : Principles and Case Studies serves

as a fundamental guide to PSYOP philosophy, concepts,

principles, issues, and thought for both those new to, and those

experienced in, the PSYOP field and PSYOP applications . This

book clarifies the value of PSYOP as a cost-effective weapon and

incorporates it as a psychological instrument of US military and

political power, especially given our present budgetary

constraints. The authors contribute to the understanding of

psychological operations by presenting diverse articles that

portray the value of the planned use of human actions to

influence perceptions, public opinion, attitudes, and behaviors

so that PSYOP victories can be achieved in war and in peace. The

four sections classify articles with related themes into a common

category.

Part I offers an overview of the nature and scope of PSYOP and

serves as an introduction to the overall nature, historical

background, concepts, and principles of psychological

operations. These independent articles, which reflect the broad

scope of historical development and thought about PSYOP, are

intended to be a foundation for understanding the basic nature

and key elements of PSYOP.

Part II follows with issues and influences related to developing

effective US strategy, doctrine, and structure for conducting

psychological and political warfare. The authors focus on those
national policy, objectives, and strategy have been formulated

and implemented. They explain historical and contemporary

elements of the national policy process and the framework

within which national PSYOP policy is formulated,

administered, and implemented.

Part III deals with the objectives and activities of strategic,

tactical, operational, and other types of PSYOP. These authors

emphasize that all forms of PSYOP should primarily support

the attainment of national policy and objectives . They

conclude that the key to all US PSYOP is credibility of the

message as defined by the influencing or changing of

perceptions, 'attitudes, and behaviors through utilization of

words and actions .

In Part IV the authors use case studies to present and

clarify PSYOP goals, roles, and methods. One of the editors of

this book condenses and analyzes (1) US and Vietcong PSYOP

in the Vietnam War and (2) the Iraqi propaganda network. The

other writers examine tactical and consolidation PSYOP

activities in Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty in

Panama . They address (1) our national antidrug policy and its

relationship to the role of military psychological operations

and (2) the importance of the political-psychological

dimensions of conflict and insurgency.

By addressing the breadth and depth of psychological

operations thought, this collection of PSYOP articles serves as

a valuable knowledge base for those who read it . A major

purpose of the book is to pull together those previously

published articles under one cover in one volume.

Psychological Operations should stimulate your thinking and

reinforce the value of PSYOP.
Preface

This book explores the breadth and depth of fundamental

PSYOP roles, principles, and methods. Many of these readings

were previously published in professional journals. Psychological

Operations: Principles and Case Studies is not a collective work

and does not attempt to be. Each article is an independent effort

and together they represent a cross section of what the "best and

brightest" feel is key to both offensive and defensive psychological operations. What the 24 contributors share, besides their

own particular expertise in PSYOP, is a recognition that a clear

understanding of PSYOP is important to our national defense

and to the way PSYOP should be conducted in the future.

Understanding PSYOP is not a simple task. Historically, both

military and civilian discussions of PSYOP throughout the

leadership spectrum have regularly substituted cliches, myths,

and untruths for hard evidence or analysis of what PSYOP is and

how it can serve our national objectives. PSYOP policy and

doctrine have not received their deserved attention while hostile

PSYOP efforts against the US are misunderstood and often

ineffectively countered .

Although the Soviet threat has ended, three Soviet PSYOP

articles are deliberately included because the classic Soviet

PSYOP model has been taught and integrated into third world

countries all over the world and will continue to be an influence

in the international arena.

In 1984, a major effort began to revitalize the state of

psychological operations in the United States. That effort was

spearheaded in 1985 by a document known as the DOD PSYOP

Master Plan. The plan evolved over several years and revision

began again in 1990, just prior to the Persian Gulf War. The

plan directed the overall revitalization of US psychological

operations ; it directed that PSYOP be fully integrated into

planning and military operations ; it directed that PSYOP be

considered for immediate and effective use in crises and

hostilities ; and it directed the use of overt PSYOP programs in
peacetime. The plan presented an across-the-board baseline of

problem areas and laid out specific remedial actions for

fundamental improvements in our capability to employ PSYOP

in peace, crisis, and war.

This volume is also an ongoing effort. While the collected

articles will expand both the knowledge and understanding of

psychological operations past and present, many of these

authors would not have written their articles without the

initial revitalization-and Air University Press may not have

published them had they been written. The essays present

critical PSYO'p issues, problems, activities, and techniques in

the book's four sections, which classify articles with related

themes into a common category.

We must underscore the fact that these essays are independent of each other. Many were written and published decades

ago, and most were originally published in differing formats with

differing style requirements. Those that were written in the

present tense years ago have been edited to reflect the past

tense. We have retained the original flavor of each essay, but

some style changes have been made to conform more closely to

current Air University Press style. Some essays have notes, some

don't; some have bibliographies, some don't ; some have

appendixes, some don't. We have retained the original styles,

with this exception : Notes number 1 that appeared at the titles of

some original essays have been removed and the references

thereto have been moved to the bottom of the first page.

We are grateful to the 24 contributing authors and regret

that we could not include biographical information on all of

them; unfortunately, we were unable to obtain biographical

data on Preston S. Abbott. We thank J. Schmier, B . Karabaich,

and C. Williamson, who provided assistance to MSgt Blair and

Col Goldstein, and we are especially grateful to Maj Thomas P.

Sands, Florida ANG, who provided editorial assistance to the

entire project in its early stages. We also extend our gratitude

to those who provided outstanding administrative and

technical support. In particular, Majors Stephen Asher, USAF,

and James V. Keifer, USAF, Retired ; Ms Victoria L. Blessing

and Ms Eva E. Hensley; SFC Roger D. Crocker, USAR; SSgt

Sherri Adler, USAFR; Sgt Manuel D. Gonzalez, USAFR; and

AIC Jayme L. Laurent, Florida ANG.
PART

Nature

Psychological

(PSYOP)

Introduction

The scope of military PSYOP during World War II, the

Korean War, and in much of the 1960s was primarily limited

to combat propaganda and psychological warfare (psywar).

During those times, it was accepted as a specialized tactical

application and as a subordinate operation. The experiences of

these conflicts, especially the Vietnam War, convinced some

American military and political leaders that the psychological

dimension of national power and conflict encompasses diverse

elements 'and many activities-nonmilitary as well as

military-in both peacetime and war in support of our national

policy and objectives. Its scope can vary from the tactical

battlefield to the operational theater to the strategic levels of

conflict to national political and military goals.

Part I serves as an introduction to the overall nature,

historical background, and concepts of PSYOP, and to some

principles that can be used for training in the field of

psychological operations. The independent articles in this

section reflect the broad range of historical development and

thought about PSYOP and are intended to be a foundation for

understanding the basic nature and key elements of PSYOP.

Col Frank L. Goldstein, USAF, and Col Daniel W.

Jacobowitz, USAF, Retired, provide a general introduction to

and a commonly accepted definition of PSYOP. The authors

explore the three types of PSYOP and give several examples of

strategic, tactical, operational, and consolidation PSYOP. They

divide propaganda into white, gray, and black classes, and

present the various resources of psychological operations . The

six major military objectives of PSYOP are condensed for the

reader .

The late Col Fred W. Walker, USAF, Retired, presents

strategic concepts for military PSYOP to enhance the overall

understanding of the PSYOP dimension and its challenges. His

emphasis is on the public's understanding that the US

government does not engage in public disinformation activities

in pursuit of national policy. He addresses strategic rather

than tactical battlefield and operational PSYOP. He focuses on

the concept that "truth is the best propaganda" and analyzes
before the dissolution of the Soviet Union; however, the article

represents a clear and precise use of Soviet PSYOP between

1917 and 1990.

Col Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., USAF, Retired, provides a brief

perspective on the evolution of military PSYOP. He addresses

the 1985 Department of Defense (DOD) PSYOP Master Plan as

the major framework for rebuilding worldwide military PSYOP

capabilities in support of national objectives in peace and

crisis and at all levels of conflict. Colonel Paddock presents

several essential themes for remedial actions-developing

comprehensive joint PSYOP doctrine, developing an adequate

number of #PSYOP planners on joint staffs, and improving

commanders' understanding of PSYOP capabilities and

missions.

Col Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., USAFR, analyzes the many

similarities between civilian business marketing and military

PSYOP. His premise is that, just as marketing and promotion

processes in business have dedicated necessary resources and

utilized persuasive strategies and tactics to successfully

influence perceptions, motivations, attitudes, and opinions to

achieve results, so military PSYOP can and should employ

similar approaches to market our country. Colonel Findley

focuses on basic persuasion and marketing principles and on

business lessons learned.
Psychological Operations

An Introduction

Col Frank L. Goldstein, USAF

Col Daniel W. Jacobowitz, USAF, Retired

If your opponent is of choleric temper, try to irritate him . If

he is arrogant, try to encourage his egotism. If the enemy

troops are well prepared after reorganization, try to wear

them down. If they are united, try to sow dissension among

them.

- General Tao Hanzhang; translated by Yuan Shibing

Sun Tzu's Art of War: The Modern Chinese Interpretation

PSYOP is a vital element within the broad range of US

political, military, economic, and ideological actions. Properly

employed, PSYOP reduces the morale and combat efficiency of

enemy troops and creates dissidence and disaffection within

their ranks. Psychological operations can promote resistance

within a civilian populace against a hostile regime or be

employed to enhance the image of a legitimate government.

The ultimate objective of American PSYOP is to convince

enemy, friendly, and neutral nations and forces to take action

favorable to the US and its allies. Because of the nature of the

parent society and the comparative case of detecting falsehood

in a multimedia world, US overt PSYOP campaigns are limited

to presenting factually correct material. It would be

disingenuous to claim that a balanced picture is presented in

US propaganda, but the actual material presented in any

particular overt PSYOP message will be verifiable against

independent sources.

Truth and falsehood in propaganda must be separated from

overt and covert operations and the issue of white, gray, and

black (false) propaganda. Overt propaganda is produced by a

government or organization that takes responsibility for it .

Because of police state conditions or tactical considerations, it
may have to be disseminated by covert means, such as agents

who risk their lives to transport and distribute the materials.

Overt propaganda may be true or false. Since the effect of

propaganda depends on credibility, overt sources that utilize

falsehoods quickly lose all effectiveness. Overt propaganda is

also known as white propaganda because the source takes

responsibility for it . Gray propaganda is material that is

distributed without an identified source. It may be true or

false. Black propaganda is material produced by one source

that purports to have emanated from another source. Such

covert produytions may be used to damage the credibility of a

white (truthful) source by disseminating obvious falsehoods

under the label of the previously trusted source. Black

propaganda-if effective at all-quickly loses effectiveness

unless the populace is particularly susceptible to rumors,

manipulation, and distortion of fact. Nevertheless, black

propaganda can be highly effective if properly planned. For

example, should intel sources determine that an invasion is

imminent, broadcasting that fact under an aegis purporting to

be that of the potential invader removes all surprise and

falsifies all the invader's claims of a "just" war.

Propaganda may legitimately be economical of the truth. For

example, in describing the triumph of democracy there is no

particular obligation to discuss the role of Boss 'tweed in

urban politics .

Military psychological operations are inherently joint

operations. Unified, joint task force, and other military

commanders identify target audiences and develop PSYOP

themes, campaigns, and products. These are submitted

through channels to the joint chiefs for approval. The

principles of developing a PSYOP campaign are applicable

across the operational continuum. Although the complexity of

the methodology varies with the level of conflict,

considerations for development of PSYOP campaigns are the

same for counterterrorism as they are for global war.

The psychological dimension covers the battlefield as well as

the effects upon the soldiers fighting the battle, their military

leaders and staffs, the political leaders, and the civilian

population. On the field of battle, US forces want to face an

enemy who is both unsure about his cause and capabilities
unwilling to surrender, has little will to engage in combat.

It is US policy that psychological operations will be

conducted across the operational continuum. It must be

understood that psychological operations are conducted

continuously to influence foreign perceptions and attitudes in

order to effect changes in foreign behavior favorable to US

national security objectives . Any type or level of PSYOP can be

conducted at any point along the operational continuum. The

operational environment in which psychological operations are

conducted does not, by itself, dictate or limit PSYOP actions or

the level of PSYOP applied.

In environments short of declared war, national PSYOP

policy is normally derived from official policy statements and

declarations on US foreign policy as well as national security

policy. Interagency coordination is required. During declared

war, the policy emanates from the national command

authorities (NCA) upon approval of plans submitted by the

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). This national policy is

executed through a strategy of coherent international

information programs, which consist of US information

dissemination efforts dealing with policy and information. It is

essential that PSYOP themes and products reflect and support

national policy, these overt messages are as official as any

White House press release. Therefore, appropriate PSYOP

policy and strategy must fully integrate Department of Defense

(DOD) PSYOP into these international information programs to

alleviate the potential for disseminating contradictory

information.

Psychological actions such as show of force, cover, and

deception have been used throughout history to influence

enemy groups and leaders. Modern psychological operations

are enhanced by the expansion of mass communication

capabilities . Nations can multiply the effects of their military

capabilities by communicating directly to their enemies a

threat of force or retaliation, conditions of surrender, safe

passage for defectors, incitations to sabotage, support to

resistance groups, and other messages. The effectiveness of

this communication on the target audience depends on their

perceptions of the communicator's credibility-does the
communicator have the capability to carry out the threatened

actions?

PSYOP actions convey information not only to intended

target audiences but also to foreign intelligence systems.

Therefore, PSYOP messages must be coordinated with cover

and deception plans and activities, along with operational

security planners, to ensure that essential secrecy is realized

and that PSYOP messages reinforce cover and deception

objectives. Skillful content analysts can determine overall

intentions by carefully analyzing PSYOP messages and PSYOP

planners cark screen their own products to ensure that only

the overt intention is broadcast. The methodology of overt

propaganda analysis is arcane and difficult, as much derived

from art as science. Some practitioners believe the method is

more valid when aimed at totalitarian propaganda than PSYOP

produced by democracies. Democratic propaganda normally is

far less patterned, possibly because the products reflect a less

organized process-ad hoc arrangements, swiftly evolving

policies, lack of hidden agendas, or, frequently, no agendas at

all. Totalitarian-especially communist-propaganda may be

easier to analyze because it is highly formalized and patterned.

There is a psychological dimension within any element of

national power projection, particularly the military element.

Foreign perceptions of US military capabilities are fundamental

to strategic deterrent capability. Therefore, US policymakers

must articulate our national and military actions (if we don't,

others will). Communicating unambiguously to allies, enemies,

and neutrals is a key element of US national strategy. The

effectiveness of deterrence, power projection, and other strategic

concepts hinges on our ability to influence the perceptions of

others .

For these communications, any player in the US government

or overall body politic may become an important tactical

element regardless of the strategic position that the player

holds. In conveying the will of the United States, the firm set of

the president's jaw in drawing "a line in the sand" may have as

much influence on international, and especially adversarial,

understanding of US policy as the actions taken by the

government. Supporting statements by other officials,

including the secretary of state, congressional leaders, and
military commanders, similarly are tactical elements carrying

out the information strategy. Tactical actions of this nature,

delivered at the strategic level, are analogous to the actual

tactical delivery of weapons to targets of a strategic nature in a

shooting war. Since much of policy is devoted to achieving

national goals while ameliorating genuine conflict and

avoiding a shooting war, tactical performance of these roles by

strategic elements of the political/ military system is critical to

national policy. One of the benefits of the open political

process-disseminated and monitored by a free and aggressive

media-is that individuals who would be inadequate tactical

communicators tend to be shunted away from positions for

which the nation's fate requires skillful performance. Military

PSYOP may be undertaken at the strategic level, augmenting

other national communications systems, particularly in areas

for which the peacetime national systems-such as the United

States Information Agency-have no access.

In every case, it is crucial that military PSYOP be integrated

with other national communications, since the audiences will

accept military PSYOP messages as official positions. To

ensure this process, military psychological operations rely on a

planned, systematic process of conveying messages to, and

influencing, selected foreign groups. The messages conveyed

by military PSYOP are intended to promote particular themes

that result in desired foreign attitudes and behaviors.

Therefore, PSYOP may be used to establish and reinforce

foreign perceptions of US military capability, determination,

and responsiveness to US political goals and to support overall

US policy.

Psychological operations are an important dimension of

overall military operations. They may be used by commanders

to influence the attitudes and behavior of foreign groups in a

manner favorable to the achievement of US national objectives.

Thus, the principal purpose of DOD PSYOP is to persuade

foreign audiences to change or enhance attitudes or behaviors in

a manner favorable to one or more national security objectives.

Additionally, PSYOP can counter foreign propaganda that

adversely affects the achievement of US objectives.

The United States typically distinguishes between PSYOP on

n ctrntvssir- lvvvl and PCV"P nn n tnr-tir-nl_ hnttlvfivld 1d-VP]-
aspect of public diplomacy and are normally established and

guided by intergovernment working groups created for a

particular short-term situation or regional area of concern.

The intergovernment groups meet periodically to clarify

strategic PSYOP policy in light of political and military

developments of the day. At the present time, however, the US

government has no permanent mechanism to institutionalize

this process.

In tactical or battlefield PSYOP, commanders use such

techniques as loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet drops with

the intent of generating a force multiplier without having to

increase force size. Psyopsers support tactical deception,

counterterrorism, counterpropaganda, and other nontraditional

means as the tactical situation merits. PSYOP messages

cannot replace tactical performance or redeem inadequate

training, weapons, or tactics that result in poor combat

performance. However, the methodology can increase the

overall functional degradation of enemy capability. Missiles,

bombs, bullets, and maneuvers establish the context for

PSYOP multiplication and hastening the cumulative results of

tactical competence. Psychological operations speed the

positive effects of military prowess, and may, under certain

conditions, delay the consequences of military failure. Because

psychological operations multiply desired effects, positive

outcomes can result in quicker victory at lower cost in

material, time, and casualties. Whether strategic or tactical,

NYOP uses any available means of communication to achieve

desired ends. In Western circles, truthfulness is a desirable

goal in itself, and is the principal means for building credibility

among targeted audiences. Success in PSYOP rests on

thorough analysis and planning.

Modern PSYOP planning includes a target analysis that

consists of several phases. The first phase identifies possible

target audiences. Once the target audience is identified, such

target characteristics as vulnerabilities, susceptibilities,

conditions, and effectiveness are analyzed. Vulnerabilities are

the four psychological factors that affect the target audience:

perception, motivation, stress, and attitude. Susceptibilities

include the degree to which the target audience can be

10
influenced to respond to the message it receives. Conditions of

the target audience include all environmental factors-social,

economic, political, military, and physical-that influence the

target audience. Audience effectiveness is the capability of the

target audience to carry out the psyopser's desired response.

The concept of audience effectiveness is fundamental to

PSYOP success at strategic and tactical levels . If the goal is

functional destruction of an enemy tactical unit, the effective

audience may be individual soldiers, who may be persuaded to

desert, defect, or defect in place ; that is, simply fail to perform

without overtly resisting their commanders. Other goals may

require finding different effective audiences. The responsive

audience in a battlefield air interdiction campaign could be the

civilian workers who repair damaged railroads and bridges.

Truthfully reporting that they are at risk from restrikes of

previously damaged targets may dissuade them from

voluntarily working. However, if they are slave laborers, the

audience may be nonresponsive regardless of their susceptibility . The responsive audience may be taskmasters, or

high-level commanders. For example, the susceptibility of the

high-level audiences may be threats of war crimes prosecution.

Both audiences will have to be convinced, by multiple

messages, if the campaign is to be effective. Once the above

analysis of audiences is accomplished, the psyopser seeks to

determine the specific psychological plan that supports the

national objective.

Psychological operations have been a part of military

strategy since armies first took the field of battle . The Persian

Gulf War and the employment of PSYOP by both sides were

the most recent chapter in a long history of PSYOP as an

integral part of military strategy. Throughout much of military

history, PSYOP's presence has been felt in battlefield campaigns. Psychological operations were integrated into the

commander's scheme of maneuver before the label of PSYOP

was invented and without the benefit of thorough or scientific

planning. An early example of how PSYOP was planned and

applied in ancient battle is contained in the writings of the

Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, who stated that the most noble

victory was to subdue his enemy without a fight. Another was

the successful exploits of Genghis Khan (the Mongolian
gj), y

by spreading rumors about his own army's strength and

fierceness. His planning was simple and, seemingly, relevant

and effective.

As early as the Battle of Bunker Hill, colonial military

PSYOP operators used leaflets designed to work on the

susceptibilities of the effective audience. Leaflets distributed

among British troops in Boston by trusted colonial agents

were based upon analysis of the situation and the conditions

the British troops anticipated, as well as their motivation.

Thus, some leaflets reported that food and provisions among

the colonial troops were far superior to the hardtack fed the

British, and that switching sides would result in an immediate

improvement in diet. More important and effective was an

appeal to a basic desire to improve the British soldier's status

in life, an important factor in motivating enlistment. Many

troops had joined merely to obtain subsistence or with the

hope of achieving enough riches to obtain farmland. The most

effective message slightly pointed out that to obtain land in the

colonies, a soldier needed merely to desert and walk west until

he found a suitable plot. Hessian mercenaries in particular

responded to this appeal later in the war, and a considerable

number of the present-day Pennsylvania Dutch owe their

ancestry to the effectiveness of this appeal as these soldiers

settled in a language-compatible area in which they were

unlikely to be turned over to British authority. Colonial

strategic psychological operations were masterful from

inception, with Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine effectively

working their various chosen audiences while Benjamin

Franklin used his post in France to bolster not only continental

support-which eventually resulted in the Franco-American

force that was victorious at Yorktown-but also helped bring

Lafayette, Pulaski, and Kosciuszko to American shores. The

campaigns within Britain that drained political support for the

war were most effective. Battlefield competence was important

to the success of this effort and included not only victories at

Trenton and other places but also the amazing raids by John

Paul Jones upon English coastal towns, whose political effect

far outshone their minimal military importance. James H.

Doolittle's raid on Japan-undertaken for the same purposes

12
methodology and in equivalent technological means almost

150 years before.

In the American Civil War, both sides of the conflict directed

strategic campaigns at England in the hope of winning

support for their respective causes. It remains questionable,

however, that these campaigns had been formally planned and

that the proper resources were marshaled to execute them.

The Southern campaign was virtually undercut by the

Confederate refusal to sell cotton to Great Britain. This

economic suicide overwhelmed any positive effects that media

campaigns may have engendered.

During World War I, PSYOP came into its own as a formal

activity . Almost all countries involved in the war used forms of

strategic and tactical PSYOP. Many countries formed military

units specializing in propaganda. These units' primary duties

included distribution of leaflets by balloon and aircraft. The

linkage among planning, resource mobilization, and execution

by these agencies appeared to be an uncomplicated matter.

How the PSYOP details were integrated into the shooting war

of the day, or how well PSYOP induced surrenders, was not

recorded for history. What is known, however, is that

surrenders occurred with a positive correlation to PSYOP

activities. Thus, military analysts began taking a new look at

PSYOP as an ingredient with surprising impact on the battle .

Psychological operations were a resource because they

induced stress on both civilian and military forces of the

enemy.

During World War II, propaganda activities became known

as psychological warfare (psywar). Public broadcast radio,

about 20 years old at this point, was called into play.

Tank-mounted loudspeakers with a range of approximately

two miles amplified the ability of the human voice to reach

opposing combatants. Besides media programs, military

actions were undertaken for their PSYOP effect . The Doolittle

raid against Japan was considered an important PSYOP event

for at least two reasons. The carefully planned raid demonstrated credibly to the Japanese that the US could reach and

bomb their homeland, prompting them to take unnecessary

steps for home defense. More important perhaps, news of the

13
population desperate for a victory. Planning, mobilization, and

execution all worked in this one instance. However, it must be

noted that during this war, aircrews frequently expressed

reluctance to risk themselves on leaflet-dropping missions

because they lacked confidence in that methodology as a

means of bringing victory nearer.

In the years that followed, PSYOP matured as a combat force

multiplier, albeit through a series of starts and stops. During

the 1950s, the Soviet Union made great strides in both

strategic and internal PSYOP. Soviet client-states began very

elaborate psychological operations for foreign insurgents and

home consurhption. At the same time, little was apparently

being planned in Western PSYOP circles.

Although strategic and tactical psychological operations

were effectively integrated by the North Vietnamese during the

Vietnam era, US PSYOP planning was not effectively formalized

or coordinated with operations and troop mobilizations. It was in

Vietnam that propaganda activities assumed the current term

PSYOP-and television was a new medium. The North Vietnamese mastered the art of using the international media,

particularly television, for their PSYOP. The US government

was ineffective in both public information and public policy in

mobilizing its public for the war. As a result of this negative

experience in Vietnam, the US government learned the

importance of domestic and foreign support of major policy

goals.

In the more recent conflicts, PSYOP has been integrated

with combat operations . In the Falklands, Afghanistan, Africa,

South and Central America, Grenada, Panama, and the

Persian Gulf, PSYOP was included by all parties. PSYOP even

became a critical part of the terrorist mode of operations

during the seventies and were part of the Iraqi PSYOP plan

when they threatened terrorist activities .

Any student of PSYOP will quickly learn how important

PSYOP can be in political and military strategy. What every

student should strive for is an internalization of the concept

proposed by Sun Tzu, the Chinese military strategist, that to

fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence;

supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy's

14
civilians have not fundamentally changed in nature or

psychology since Sun Tzu wrote these observations, they

remain appropriate today.

Strategic Concepts for

Military Operations

Col Fred W. Walker, USAF, Retired*

For many years, people have indicated a lack of understanding -of exactly what military psychological operations

(PSYOP) entail . News media refer to PSYOP as psychological

warfare (psywar) and imply that there is some nefarious

objective or purpose in such action. They usually indicate that

there is some element of deliberate misinformation-or even

some public lies-involved in such activity . It is time that these

misperceptions were set straight. The public must understand

that the United States government does not engage in public

disinformation activities in pursuing national policy. This

article concentrates on peacetime strategic concepts, setting

aside the loudspeaker and leaflet activities of the battlefield.

Joint Pub I-02, Department of Defense Dictionary ofMilitary

and Associated Ternts (I December 1989) broadly defines

strategic psychological activities as "planned psychological

activities in peace and war which normally pursue objectives

to gain the support and cooperation of friendly and neutral

countries and to reduce the will and the capacity of hostile or

potentially hostile countries to wage war."

This is demonstrably any program that supports a long-term

effort to achieve a national or regional foreign policy objective

through persuasion. We might consider the term persuasive

communications to mean the same thing as psychological

operations.

How did we become focused on strategic psychological

activities? Quite fundamentally, various administrations

assessed that the United States was falling behind in world

*Deceased 1990 .

1 7
gppg

efforts of the Soviet Union were directed against US foreign

policy objectives. As a result of this assessment, President

Ronald Reagan directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to

revitalize its psychological operations capabilities and use

them to support national security objectives in all legal and

proper areas.

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger ordered an

extensive study on how best to implement the president's

direction. This action resulted in a master plan to revitalize

military capabilities and better apply them to support

long-term peacetime national security objectives . Key elements

in his plan involved (1) separating the profession of PSYOP

from the more narrow field of special operations and (2) significantly restructuring staffs and units. He also recommended

enhanced interagency coordination.

It is important to stress the fact that US military psychological operations in peacetime do not involve misinformation

or anything related to the Soviet concept of disinformation.

Truth must be our guideline in every undertaking. After World

War II, Dick Crossman, the British master of international

influence activities, counseled that truth is the very essence of

strategic peacetime foreign policy efforts and that it should be

our fundamental guideline. US policy must endorse his astute

recommendation.

DOD is still engaged in a period of transition to revitalize its

military PSYOP capabilities . We envision a number of strategic

roles and missions, all of which support objectives derived

from published national security policy .

According to the annual defense guidance document, our

fundamental national security objective is to deter conflict.

This is clearly a psychological phenomenon because it occurs

in the mind of a potential enemy. When an enemy perceives

that it would be too costly for him to attack or that he would

probably lose if he started a war, then he elects not to attack

and conflict has been deterred. His mental decision, based

upon his perception of our capabilities and resolve, is the key

element in the process of deterrence. Military PSYOP in

support of this fundamental defense objective, then, should

seek to clarify and focus this perception.

1 8
Military PSYOP programs designed to enhance deterrence

should include those that support arms control talks as well

as those that clarify and explain national aims for strategic

nuclear force posture. Efforts to clearly describe our policies

for peaceful military uses of space and the strategic defense

initiative (SDI) can readily be listed as contributing to

deterrence. The fact that the term star wars was publicly

attached to the SDI program aided the Soviets considerably in

their propaganda campaigns against it. There were two

reasons for this: (1) the term evoked subconscious perceptions

of scienV fiction and fantasy among various public audiences

and (2) "wars" is perceived as aggressive rather than defensive.

As a result, there was little support for the program. Nevertheless, little was done to decouple this negative terminology.

In the future, more must be done to properly support national

policy .

A simple thing like terminology can indeed be a major factor

in various public audiences' acceptance of-or support

for-any policy. Recent history shows that the term neutron

bomb was a key element in the Soviets' eminently successful

campaign a decade ago to prevent President Jimmy Carter

from deploying enhanced radiation weapons in Europe. In like

manner, we can recall how our national leaders were duped

into referring to Iranian terrorists and kidnappers as students

at the outset of the Iranian Embassy hostage debacle in 1979.

These are clear examples of how terminology can sway public

perceptions on a global basis.

Certainly, strategic military PSYOP programs should play a

significant role in countering terrorism. In addition to gaining

some control over media terminology, we need information

programs that will disassociate terrorist groups from pockets

of popular support. Such programs should publicly impugn

the worth of the terrorists' objectives and denigrate their

leadership. We should also seek to reduce their internal

cohesion and cause them to waste their resources defensively;

for example, in hiding and vetting new members.

Above all, we should seek to positively influence foreign

policy efforts to reduce or eliminate foreign governmental

support to terrorist groups. With firm evidence that the

governments of Libya, North Korea, and Cuba support various

1 9
gppy pp

diplomatic efforts against such governments. Although we

have the capability to do this, there are tremendous

administrative and bureaucratic hurdles to surmount in

developing such programs.

There is a major role to play in countering global disinformation efforts as used by the former Soviet Union. A

thoroughly documented Soviet disinformation campaign

attributed the cause of acquired immune deficiency syndrome

(AIDS) to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DOD

experiments to develop biological warfare weapons. While this

was a total falsehood and seemed preposterous to most

Americans, the disinformation was found credible by several

audiences elsewhere in the world. We are only at the beginning

of the level of fear that this epidemic can cause in our world,

but the Soviets and others recognized early on that fear

inhibits rational thinking and vastly enhances the effectiveness of their propaganda and disinformation.

The second phase of their AIDS disinformation campaign

began surfacing in foreign public news items that accused US

military personnel stationed overseas of spreading AIDS in

various host nations. News stories and leaflets with this theme

appeared in the Philippines, Africa, and the Middle East. The

obvious objective was to undermine US military presence and

influence on a global basis. Still a foreign policy problem, it

could be helped by a comprehensive and coordinated foreign

policy that vigorously exposes and describes disinformation

campaigns while pointing out extensive US efforts to control

the disease.

Many are probably not aware that the Soviet Union engaged

in a sinister and very dangerous game of economic warfare

against the United States. The area of strategic metals

provides a good example. Africa was the most visible battlefield

in this subtle economic struggle, having as it does an

abundance of these resources easily and economically

available. The US is about 10 percent self-sufficient (within

our borders) in supplies of this type; the USSR was about 90

percent self-sufficient. Metals such as chromium, cobalt,

zirconium, titanium, and tantalum are essential to any

modern high-technology industrial society. The military

2 0
dimension is obvious from the extent to which defense

systems depend on technology.

The Soviets attempted to keep their supplies in the bankmostly in Siberia, under the ice . They were content to compete

with the US on the world market, thus driving up the price. In

various countries of Africa, we saw propaganda, disinformation, and guerrilla warfare drive the price up and the

Americans out. In Zaire, this combination of activities caused

a 600 percent price increase for cobalt in a two-year time

period (1979-81) . Now, years later, we are still wondering how

to gain control of this issue.

Other areas on the economic warfare front were international financing (manipulating debtor nations and credit

extensions), protectionism (still an issue), and peaceful uses of

nuclear energy . Propaganda in these areas is increasingly

more subtle and less noticed, but it should be monitored .

Resulting evaluations should be placed in our national security and foreign policy development processes . And we must

ensure that the military dimension is properly coordinated .

There is a military dimension in negotiations on the law of

the sea-treaties involving fishing rights, oil drilling, navigation rights, and seabed mining . We also have legitimate

national security interests in extradition treaties for terrorists

and drug traffickers .

Persuasive communications in peacetime may be accurately

likened to advertising and public relations programs. Secrets

to success involve getting the facts out in clear and

understandable ways, relating these facts to perceived human

needs, and ensuring enough repetition so that the message is

received and reinforced. Various target audiences have

differing perceived needs, scripts, and priorities ; therefore, the

same message must be packaged in different ways in order to

appeal to a wider spectrum.

The United States government has a wide variety of communication channels . Each major government agency has

offices whose purpose is to announce its policies and explain

how its activities support national policies and goals. The

United States Information Agency is specifically charged with

informing peoples in foreign nations about US policies and

describing American culture and our democratic way of life.

2 1
This is done through speakers and seminars, press conferences, and various publications. Radio and television

programming, such as the "Voice of America" and the new

"Worldnet," are able to reach vast audiences.

Areas where there is the most room for improvement are in

(1) coordinating various government agencies and (2) packaging the message to fit the audience. Often in crisis situations

or periods of tension, the need for rapid response inhibits

coordination among various branches of the government.

Officials tend to couch their statements in terms they are

comfortable with and to speak from their personal points of

view, neglecting to consider the cultural aspects and

aspirations of foreign audiences. Improvement in these areas

is absolutely essential for more effective communications.

Repetition is also necessary. Government officials are busy

people ; they tend to make policy statements once, and then

get on to the next item of business. But policy statements

don't necessarily have a life of their own. Unless repeated in

various ways and related anew to emerging situations, they

tend to submerge in piles of records and gather dust in

archives.

The Soviets clearly demonstrated that the most blatant lies

can be successfully put across through massive repetition of

disinformation and propaganda. In fact, repetition was the

secret of their success. Some Soviet propaganda lines were

constantly repeated for 50 years; although there was not a

single economic success story arising out of a communist or

socialist system, belief in this big lie continued over much of

the world. People are still willing to give up their freedom for a

dream that is inconsistent with the human condition. This is

the threat we face from the competition.

Initial changes by Mikhail S. Gorbachev to the Soviet global

propaganda machine reflected a stepped-up effort to supplant

US power and influence. After the Twenty-seventh Party

Congress in the spring of 1986, their propaganda apparatus

was restructured and even more centralized. The International

Information Department was disestablished and its

responsibilities were consolidated within the International

Department (ID) and the Propaganda Department (PD). The PD

had been responsible for internal domestic propaganda. After

2 2
g; p, 

well as Radio Moscow. This move reflected the theory that

foreign propaganda and domestic propaganda are intimately

linked, and that greater efficiency can be gained through

centralization .

At the same time, Gorbachev's reforms (under his program

of glasnost) were being widely touted in the West. Many were

led to believe that this change represented a welcome softening

of formerly hard Soviet propaganda lines. In fact, one of the

major propaganda efforts to sugarcoat this program sought to

convince people that the term glasnost meant "openness." A

more acourate translation would be "publicity." Proper

translation is not simply a semantic game ; it shaped the

debate on effective policy response toward the USSR.

Most analysts feel that the real intent of glasnost was not to

create an open society, but to consolidate Gorbachev's power

by modernizing the system and ending economic stagnation.

Carefully staged events, such as the Moscow Peace Forum,

dissident releases, rock concerts, and television shows, sought

to take advantage of easily co-opted Western participants in

order to improve external opinion of the Soviet Union, further

Soviet propaganda lines, and secure badly needed Western

technology.

Those events should have been viewed with extreme distrust,

inasmuch as they represented a quantum leap in Soviet

propaganda sophistication. We saw significant improvements

beginning under Yuri V. Andropov's administration, with

expanded use of professional psychology and psychiatry along

with infusions of equipment and talent that increased the

quality of Soviet PSYOP. Under glasnost, we watched a merger

between these professional propagandists and the innocent

Western media. It was and is a dangerous and threatening

evolution.

Still, the Soviets lost control of glasnost, affording an

opportunity to project democratic messages to various Soviet

audiences while those channels were open.

If US government agencies can improve their coordination

and persuasive communications capabilities, we may be able

to slow and then reverse our losing trend in exerting world

2 3
people to trade freedom for lies is a most insidious and

dangerous threat, and freedom is far too precious a thing to be

defended by haphazard efforts . We do have one significant

advantage: There is no need to lie because properly packaged

truth is the very best propaganda.
No More Tactical Information

Detachments

US Military Psychological

Operations in Transition

Col Alfred H. Paddock, Jr ., USA, Retired

US military PSYOP today faces an uncertain future. This

paper provides a brief perspective on the evolution of US

military PSYOP during the twentieth century, examines the

conditions that led to a revitalization of these capabilities

during the 1980s, contrasts this revitalization with the international and domestic environment faced by the Department

of Defense (DOD) today, and outlines some of the major

challenges for the US military PSYOP community during a

transitional period. 1

A broad definition of psychological operations details the

planned use of communications to influence human attitudes

and behavior. They consist of political, military, and

ideological actions conducted on target groups to create

desired behavior, emotions, and attitudes . If used properly,

PSYOP will precede, accompany, and follow all applications of

force. The military should carry out this course of action under

the broader umbrella of national policy. In addition, it should

coordinate fully and carefully the military component of the

overall PSYOP effort with other agencies of government.

More specifically, PSYOP can demoralize, disorient, and

confuse hostile groups. Against such groups, psychological

operations are employed as offensive weapons to enhance the

overall effectiveness of military operations. They also can

unite, inform, and bolster the morale of nonhostile groups.

When targeting neutral or friendly groups, they are used to

support military objectives by developing cooperative attitudes

and behavior in the targeted group.

2 5
Evolution of US Military

Psychological Operations

The level of interest in military psychological operations

during this century has been episodic, basically rising and

falling during and after the major conflicts in which US forces

have been committed. Over this period, most of the activity in

military PSYOP centered on the Army. The following brief

historical perspective, therefore, focuses on the Army's

experience to illustrate the fortunes of military PSYOP.

While giving psychological warfare (psywar) only token

recognition' in World War I, the Army established both the

Psychological Warfare Subsection of G-2 in the War Department and the Propaganda Section of G-2 in General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces. Military tactical

psychological warfare centered on the production of leaflets ;

radios did not exist as a means of communication, and loudspeakers were primitive. Military propaganda concentrated on

producing surrender appeals; balloons and airplanes were the

primary method for their dissemination.

From 1918 to 1941, no psychological warfare office existed

in the War Department. The lessons of experience were lost,

and by 1941 only one officer on the War Department staff had

had psychological warfare service in the previous war.

During World War II, most of the Army's operational work in

psywar took place at the theater level, where the responsible

organization was normally designated a psychological warfare

branch (PWB). The largest of these organizations at the theater

level, the PWB at Allied Forces Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ),

was activated in North Africa in November 1942 at the order of

Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower. It was expanded in February 1944

to the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters,

Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF). Psychological

warfare was defined as "the dissemination of propaganda

designed to undermine the enemy's will to resist, demoralize

his forces and sustain the morale of our supporters." Z

The basic Army field operating unit for psywar was the

Mobile Radio Broadcasting (MRB) Company. The equipment

for this company was unlike anything conventional soldiers

had seen in the field: public address systems, radios,

2 6
presses, and leaflet bombs. MRB units were usually divided by

the separate Army groups and field armies into small teams,

often to work in direct support of frontline conventional

combat units. Five such units eventually served under

PWD/SHAEF. Although these units resulted from improvisation in 1943 and 1944, the doctrinal and organizational

concepts they embodied reappeared in the psychological

warfare units formed during the Korean conflict .

During 1945-46, Army psychological warfare staffs and

units dissipated with the general demobilization of the military

establishment. Despite the efforts of a few senior civilian and

military officials to retain a military PSYOP capability, the

Tactical Information Detachment was the only operational

psychological warfare troop unit in the US Army when the

North Koreans attacked South Korea in June 1950. Organized

at Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1947, this detachment had been reorganized as the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company.

Sent to Korea in the fall of 1950, it served as the Eighth Army's

tactical propaganda unit throughout the conflict. Tactical

propaganda, sometimes called combat propaganda, was directed

at a specific audience in the forward battle areas and used in

support of localized operations . Mobile loudspeakers mounted

on vehicles and aircraft became a primary means of conducting tactical propaganda in Korea.

To conduct full-scale strategic operations, the 1st Radio

Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group was organized at Fort

Riley and shipped to Korea in July 1951. The 1 st RB&L Group

was specifically designed to conduct strategic propaganda in

direct support of military operations. This propaganda was

intended to further long-term strategic aims and was directed

at enemy forces, populations, and enemy-occupied areas. The

1st RB&L Group had the equipment and capability to produce

newspapers and leaflets, and to augment or replace other

means of broadcasting radio propaganda. The group

supervised a radio station network, known as the "Voice of the

United Nations," and often produced more than 200 million

leaflets a week that were disseminated by aircraft or by

specially designed artillery shells . The leaflets expressed various

themes. Some leaflets, for example, offered inducements for

2 7
y pg pp

Although the RB&L Group was a concept accelerated to

meet the requirements of the Korean conflict, it performed functions similar to those used in psychological warfare in World

War II. Its MRB Company bore a direct linkage to the mobile

radio broadcasting companies formed under PWD/SHAEF to

conduct operations in North Africa and the European theater

during 1944-45. However, the MRB companies were organized

during World War II to perform tactical psywar; radio later

became an essentially strategic weapon that had no place in a

purely tactical psychological unit. The strategic concept

embodied ;n the RB&L Group was destined to figure

prominently in the psywar capability that was subsequently

formed as part of the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952.

The tactical idea expressed by the L&L Company also influenced

the capability that was developed there. As originally

established at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the Psychological

Warfare Center consisted of a psychological warfare school,

the 6th Radio and Broadcasting Group, a psychological

warfare board, and the 10th Special Forces Group. The

mission of this unprecedented center:

To conduct individual training and supervise unit training in

Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Operations; to develop and

test Psychological Warfare and Special Forces doctrine, procedures,

tactics, and techniques; to test and evaluate equipment employed in

Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Operations . 3

After an initial burst of activity fueled by the Korean conflict and

by fears of a possible outbreak of war in Europe, interest in the

Psychological Warfare Center began to dissipate. Its -title was

changed to the Special Warfare Center in 1956, but the Army's

psychological operations capability had eroded by the early 1960s.

Consequently, an insufficient base of PSYOP-trained officers

were available when the 6th Psychological Operations

Battalion was activated in Vietnam in 1965. By 1967, the

Army's PSYOP forces in Vietnam had been expanded to a

group (the 4th) with four battalions, one in each of, the four

corps tactical zones (CTZ). The group served under the

commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, with

the J-3's Psychological Operations Division exercising direct

2 8
provided US PSYOP policy guidance not only to the civilian

agencies but also to all military PSYOP elements.

In addition to providing tactical support to field force

commanders, the 4th Psychological Operations Group assisted

the South Vietnamese government in its communication effort

down to the hamlet level. The group headquarters operated a

50,000-watt radio station and high-speed heavy printing

presses, published a magazine for Vietnamese employees

working for US government and civilian agencies, and could

research and develop propaganda materials.

In contrast, PSYOP battalions had light printing presses, a

research and propaganda development capability, personnel to

work with the US Air Force Special Operations units for aerial

leaflet and loudspeaker missions, and ground loudspeaker

and audiovisual teams. Loudspeaker and audiovisual teams

operated with US divisions and brigades or with province

advisory teams. The 7th Psychological Operations Group in

Okinawa provided valuable backup support in printing and in

disseminating leaflets at high altitudes.

During the height of US involvement in Southeast Asia, the

Army stationed PSYOP units at Fort Bragg and in Germany,

Panama, and Okinawa. These units were established in

addition to the 4th Psychological Operations Group in the

Republic of Vietnam. By the mid-1970s, however, all that

remained in the active component was an inadequately staffed

and antiquatedly equipped group at Fort Bragg-a condition

that did not improve significantly for 10 years.

Revitalization of PSYOP in the 1980s

The 1980s saw an upturn in the fortunes of military PSYOP,

made possible by several conditions. President Ronald Reagan,

who assumed office with a strong anticommunist orientation,

characterized the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" early in his

tenure. He directed that a program be developed to support

noncommunist insurgencies (the "Reagan Doctrine") around

the world. With public opinion supporting him, President

Reagan embarked upon a large buildup of the US defense

establishment-a buildup that benefited military PSYOP.

29
The president then outlined, in a number of national security directives, his approach to the psychological dimension

of national power. His initial national security strategy,

announced in the summer of 1981, contained four basic components: diplomatic, economic, military, and informational.

This emphasis on the psychological component was retained

in subsequent Reagan national security strategies .

In January 1983 s President Reagan signed National Security

Decision 77, "Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to

National Security." This directive defined public diplomacy

rather broadly, stating that it "is comprised of those actions of

the U.S. Government designed to generate support for our

national security objectives." The term generally evolved to

embrace a broad range of informational and cultural activities .

The decision also established an interagency mechanism to

plan and coordinate public affairs, information, political, and

broadcasting activities of the US government.

In early 1984, the president directed DOD to rebuild its

military PSYOP capabilities. In response to this directive,

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger launched a major

evaluation of the department's capabilities and needs in

psychological operations. This evaluation concluded that

DOD's PSYOP capabilities had been allowed to atrophy over

the previous decade. Across-the-board deficiencies had developed in policy guidance, roles and missions, doctrine,

organization, force structure, operational concepts, planning,

programming, training, logistics, intelligence support, readiness, personnel programs, and-most importantly-attitude,

underscoring the need for education and heightened awareness at all levels of military and civilian organizations.

DOD PSYOP Master Plan of 1985

Secretary Weinberger elected to use a DOD PSYOP master

plan as the framework for rebuilding military PSYOP

capabilities . Approved in mid-1985, the plan served as a

comprehensive design for the fundamental improvement of the

department's capabilities to effectively perform worldwide

psychological operations in support of national objectives in

peace and crisis and at all levels of conflict.

3 0
fact-to be implemented over several years. Several essential

themes manifested themselves.

The first theme highlighted the need to develop a comprehensive joint doctrine for the formulation, direction, coordination, and conduct of PSYOP in peace, crisis, and war. In effect,

this doctrine provided a foundation for the revitalization effort.

Among other things, it sought to enunciate the function of

PSYOP as a force multiplier in all military activity, establish the

conceptual framework for planning and implementation, and

delineate roles and responsibilities of the several components.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) published this doctrine in 1987. It

was later revised to reflect US experience with PSYOP in support

of military operations in Panama and the Persian Gulf.

The development of doctrine was to be paralleled by major

improvements in PSYOP planning, the second theme of the

1985 Master Plan. It devoted insufficient human talent to

full-time, meaningful, sustained PSYOP planning at appropriate staff levels. The report card on this major deficiency

offers mixed reviews, but some evidence of progress exists.

Creation of a small psychological operations directorate, the

first such office to exist in the Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD) in over 20 years, indicated the seriousness with

which Secretary Weinberger undertook the revitalization effort.

The PSYOP staff element in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff (OJCS) was upgraded from a branch to a division. It also

showed an increase in personnel, but later reverted to a

branch and lost a few personnel spaces. The Department of

the Army staff created a psychological operations and civil

affairs division, where before only one full-time officer had

been assigned to this activity.

Outside the Pentagon, a few changes occurred. Among the

unified commands, United States Southern Command

(USSOUTHCOM) created a PSYOP detachment to augment its

staff capability. The US Special Operations Command

(USSOCOM) was established in 1987 at MacDill Air Force Base,

Florida. Included in this unified command staff was a directorate

for psychological operations and civil affairs (J-9) . More recently,

in 1990, the Army created the Civil Affairs and Psychological

Operations Command at Fort Bragg. Commanded by a USAR

3 1
personnel on varying periods of active duty, this headquarters of

146 personnel (later reduced to 80) serves all active and reserve

component Army civil affairs and psychological operations units.

This new organization reports to the US Army Special Operations

Command (USASOC) at Fort Bragg.

Much more remains to be done in this area, however. Perhaps

the key requirement is that staff officers receive formal training

in this specialized area and that psychological operations

become an integral part of the operational course of action in any

plan. A few innovative and resourceful staff officers can make a

vast differgnce if they have access to a command's major

planning activities. Because of the paucity of trained PSYOP staff

officers in major commands, the burden for planning too often

falls upon the Army's 4th Psychological Operations Group, the

only active duty unit of its type among the services.

Development of adequate numbers of PSYOP planners is

where the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps can make an

important contribution to the revitalization envisaged in the

1985 Master Plan. The conduct of psychological operations is

not the exclusive domain of such specialized units as those in

the Army. In the current resource-constrained environment,

only a small possibility exists that the other services will opt to

field new PSYOP units. On the other hand, there is every

reason to expect those services to develop fully qualified

PSYOP planners to meet their own needs and to provide their

proportionate share on joint staffs.

To help address this need and in response to the 1985

Master Plan, the Army's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare

Center and School at Fort Bragg developed a joint PSYOP staff

planning course in 1988. A large proportion of its students

have been from the Army's reserve component PSYOP

community. Too few representatives from the other services

have participated, and it is uncertain how many of them

actually were assigned to staff positions where their expertise

could be utilized. Reportedly, the Army plans to eliminate the

course in 1996. If it does, this will be unfortunate-it is the

only formal joint PSYOP planning course currently available.

What is needed instead is a renewed and continuous emphasis

that would enable the course to fulfill its original purpose. This

3 2
positions where their training can be utilized.

Closely related was the need to educate our officer corps on

psychological operations, the third theme. As indicated earlier,

the 1985 Master Plan stated that the root cause of the atrophy of

our military PSYOP capabilities was a lack of understanding of

psychological operations, their value, and their application.

Some improvement was made in this critical area as a result of

frequent briefings to senior commanders and staff officers by

PSYOP personnel, the professionalism of PSYOP units in

contingency planning and in support of conventional forces on

joint training exercises, and the steady improvement of PSYOP

studies and assessments in support of the unified commands

and national level agencies. Certainly, the credible performance

of PSYOP forces during combat operations in Panama and the

Persian Gulf also played a key role in this regard.

Additionally, the PSYOP courses being presented by both the

Air Force and the Army help to address the deficiencies in this

area of PSYOP awareness and understanding. The Air Force's

Joint Senior Psychological Operations Course, held four times a

year by their Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field,

Florida, provides selected senior officers and civilians with an

awareness of how psychological operations can support national

objectives throughout the spectrum of conflict. This course

initially showed considerable promise as an educational tool, but

it attracts too many personnel whose duties have little relationship with psychological operations. Again, this situation requires

renewed and continuous emphasis to interested senior officials

in key positions. Unfortunately, these personnel too often find it

difficult to fit a three-or four-day course away from the office into

their busy schedules. A shorter orientation-perhaps four hours,

presented by a traveling team-should be considered as an

addition to the present course.

As was the case before the Vietnam War, the 1985 Master

Plan stated that PSYOP instruction in our mainstream service

school system-where our future commanders and staff

officers are trained-was limited or nonexistent. This situation

not only made more difficult the PSYOP community's job of

educating supported units on this unique weapons system-it

3 3
modernization were being set.

To address this loss of PSYOP institutional memory, the

under secretary of defense for policy, Dr Fred Ikle, sent letters

in 1986 and 1987 emphasizing the secretary of defense's

intention to revitalize our military PSYOP capabilities and

offering an OSD presentation on psychological operations to

commandants of the colleges and the command and staff

colleges. The intent was to stimulate interest in a more

extensive treatment of PSYOP in service school curricula. The

military services were asked to review all levels of their

professional military education (PME) curricula, both officer

and enlisted, and to develop new educational goals that would

upgrade their psychological operations PME. As a second part

of this approach, OS" initiated a contract to develop

applicable PSYOP curriculum materials for the services .

These materials were in fact provided to the services, but there

is little evidence to suggest that the services integrated PSYOP

into the curricula of their schools. Nor have great speakers made

presentations on PSYOP to service schools in a coherent and

consistent manner (some presentations are made in electives).

Institutionalization of PSYOP understanding will not occur until

service schools have removed this deficiency .

The fourth broad theme in the 1985 Master Plan encompassed the need to modernize our PSYOP force structure in

terms of both personnel and equipment. With the exception of

an increase of the 4th Psychological Operations Group's

strength, the force structure today is essentially the same as

in 1985. The Navy has an excellent radio and television

capability in its reserves and a 10-kilowatt (kW) mobile radio

transmitter that is assigned to its Tactical Deception Group

(Atlantic), both of which can be used to support PSYOP

activities . The Air Force has a National Guard squadron of

specially fitted C-130 aircraft for radio and television support

of PSYOP along with other duties. Also, a handful of Air Force

officers with PSYOP expertise are serving in key positions in

the Pentagon, among the unified commands, and at their

Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field. The Marine Corps

has two civil affairs groups with PSYOP as a secondary

34
mission in its reserves. Only the Army has active duty forces

dedicated solely to psychological operations.

The 4th Psychological Operations Group at Fort Bragg is all

that remains of the Army's active PSYOP capability . Assigned

to the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations

Command, and to a part of the US Army Special Operations

Command, the 4th Group has many worldwide missions and

responsibilities . The 4th provides support to all levels of DOD,

from unified command through division. It supports both

conventional forces and special operations forces. In addition,

it is often nailed upon to provide support to national level

agencies and organizations. If any one military unit can be

adjudged a "national asset," surely the 4th Psychological

Operations Group fits the requirements.

Essentially, a military PSYOP unit engages in two broad

activities : (1) research/ analysis and (2) operations. The first

activity consists of continually monitoring and assessing

psychological environments in specific foreign nations to

determine how those situations affect the formulation and

execution of US policies and actions. This research and

analysis results in published studies and assessments that

are unique ; they provide the foundation for establishing

psychological objectives that support US goals related to

foreign nations or groups. Research and analysis is therefore

essential to accomplishment of the second broad activity:

planning and executing PSYOP campaigns that employ

communications media and other techniques designed to

cause selected foreign groups and individuals to support US

national and military objectives .

In peacetime, a military PSYOP unit conducts research and

analysis of specific geographic regions and target audiences,

develops PSYOP plans to support conventional and special

operations units, and participates in field exercises that

employ these plans. Because of the paucity of PSYOP expertise

at unified commands, the 4th Psychological Operations Group

provides staff assistance and advice to headquarters and to

other major commands.

It should be eminently clear from the foregoing that one

active duty PSYOP organization cannot support all unified

command requirements for mid- or high-level intensity

3 5
ypy

mobilization capability lies in its reserve component units.

Serving as the Army's planning agent to align the AC and RC

units program (CAPSTONE, which links reserve units with the

units they would support upon mobilization), the Civil Affairs

and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) provides training assistance to, and coordinates the contingency

planning efforts of, reserve units . The 4th Group assists

USACAPOC in this effort.

Generally speaking, then, USACAPOC and the 4th Psychological Operations Group act as a "strategic nucleus" for the

PSYOP community; they provide the bulk of peacetime and

low-intensity conflict requirements, give direction and

guidance to the PSYOP community for contingency planning

and participation in peacetime exercises, and serve as the

command and control nucleus for generally or partially

mobilizing reserve component forces . The reserve component

performs its planning and training responsibilities under the

CAPSTONE program and prepares for general or partial

mobilization in support of the unified commands.

Paradoxically, the successful CAPSTONE program underscores one of the PSYOP community's most glaring weaknesses : its limited capability to respond to peacetime and

low-intensity conflict requirements . While mid- and highintensity conflict requires either partial or general mobilization

of the reserve component, the active component must provide

most PSYOP activities during peacetime and at the lower end

of the conflict spectrum.

As a result of initiatives undertaken in the early_ 1980s, the

Army increased the strength of the 4th Group by 500 personnel, roughly doubling its size by the mid- to late 1980s . The

1985 DOD PSYOP Master Plan provided additional impetus for

this increase. The reserve component PSYOP structure has

remained relatively stable in recent years, with a little over

3,000 personnel.

In terms of personnel quality, the Army's military occupational

specialty (MOS) for PSYOP enlisted personnel was a welcome

accomplishment . Reports of the high quality of personnel being

trained under this specialty have been encouraging .

3 6
to remove its officer PSYOP and civil affairs MOS from the

foreign area officer (FAO) specialty. The change was disturbing

because it separated psychological operations from the

specialty that had provided its intellectual lifeblood . The core

of the area expertise (knowledge of foreign cultures) and the

analytic capability of psychological operations fell within the

FAO specialty .

The Army's initial decision included both PSYOP and civil

affairs in the special operations functional area. Subsequently,

however, the Army developed separate functional areas for

PSYOP (FA 3913) and civil affairs (FA 39C). It remains to be

seen whether this decision will provide the quality officers that

previously had been produced by the FAO program.

With respect to the modernization of psychological operations

equipment, the progress has been more positive. Several Army

initiatives in the early and mid-1980s upgraded active and reserve component print, radio, loudspeaker, and audiovisual

capabilities . The 4th Group's media production center, built in

the mid-1980s, represented a quantum leap in the military's

PSYOP capability to operate in a modern audiovisual environment. Similarly, the Air Force allocated funds to modernize its

National Guard aircraft dedicated to support PSYOP.

Nevertheless, modernization of PSYOP-unique equipment

requires continued emphasis. For example, with one exception, the old, relatively immobile 50,000 kW radios (the

TRT-22s) in the PSYOP community have not been replaced.

PSYOP loudspeakers once again need upgrading, and the Air

Force needs a device that can rapidly release leaflets in

high-altitude operations .

Two of the most controversial themes of the 1985 DOD

PSYOP Master Plan were the organizational separation of

psychological operations from special operations and its

corollary, creation of a joint psychological operations center.

Indeed, these were the only truly revolutionary initiatives in

the original plan-and both failed.

The authors of the 1985 Master Plan believed that, in

general, the subordination of psychological operations to

special operations detracted from recognition of the overall

applicability of PSYOP in times of peace, crisis, and war. The

3 7
1985 Master Plan, therefore, called for separating psychological operations from special operations throughout DOD,

including departmental levels and all headquarters and staffs

of the JCS, the services, the unified and specified commands,

and the component and subordinate commands. The plan

outlined several reasons for separating PSYOP from special

operations.

Planning, particularly in the unified and specified commands, suffered because the sole PSYOP planner was usually

located in the special operations staff element and was employed

only part-time in psychological operations. This subordination

detracted frdm the broader responsibility of planning psychological operations support for the theater's total requirements,

particularly in those missions that link military psychological

operations and national objectives, policy, and strategy, and that

require in-theater interagency cooperation.

Further, the subordination of psychological operations units

to the special operations field, including its command and

control structure, contributed to the lack of understanding of

PSYOP, its uses and capabilities, by military officers and senior

civilians . This association and subordination caused many in

the field to conclude that psychological operations were focused

primarily in support of special operations missions.

While PSYOP does have a mission in support of special

operations, it also has a much broader application in peacetime and in crisis-with or without accompanying military

operations-and across the entire spectrum of conflict. In the

1980s, only 10 percent of the Army's psychological operations

forces-active and reserve-were designated by contingency

plans to support special operations units in wartime.

Similarly, the argument for separation of PSYOP from

special operations was implicit in the Army's and JCS's

arrangements for wartime command and control of psychological operations. In wartime, most of the PSYOP forces are

aligned (within the unified commands) with a chain of command

that is totally separate from that of special operations forces.

PSYOP units are combat support forces and are employed at

both strategic and tactical levels from the theater to the division

as a matter of routine; special operations forces are employed

primarily as strategic assets only on an exceptional basis.

3 8
the 1985 Master Plan was slow in implementation. To be sure,

some important initial steps were taken. Anew OSD psychological operations directorate established in January 1986 was

assigned to the principal deputy under secretary of defense for

policy and was separated from special operations in terms of

overall policy responsibilities. On the joint staff, PSYOP was

removed from the Joint Special Operations Agency and placed

under the J-3. An important precedent was established on the

Department of the Army staff when a separate PSYOP and civil

affairs. division was created; and two unified commandsUSSOUTHFOM and USCENTCOM-effected the separation

(PSYOP from special operations) within their staffs.

But for the large part, separation did not take place among

the unified commands, subordinate service headquarters, or

at the operational level. The Army, for example, took the

position that separation applied only to staff levels, not forces .

Amajor reason for the delay, of course, was the uncertainty

resulting from the congressionally mandated reorganization of

special operations forces. This subject will be discussed later

in more detail . Suffice it to say at this point that full separation did not occur.

The separation issue was closely related to the final major

theme of the original master plan: creation of ajoint psychological operations center. According to the master plan,

psychological operations was sufficiently important to warrant

the creation of a separate center dedicated to the long-term

development and nurturing of this unique capability. This

center eventually became the organizational and intellectual

font of PSYOP within the Department of Defense.

The responsibilities for the center envisaged in the 1985

Master Plan included long-range strategic psychological

operations plans ; continuing education and training of personnel research and analytical studies; and development of

equipment. The center was also to assist OJCS and OSD to

develop, plan, and coordinate the defense portion of interagency activities, and to assist the unified and specified

commands in their planning of psychological operations. To

best accomplish these tasks, the plan favored the Washington,

D.C. area for the center's location.

39
jpygp

two separate but mutually supporting elements, one operational and the other developmental, each indispensable to the

other. These elements were to have been the 4th Psychological

Operations Group along with PSYOP spaces in the Army's

John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. This

concept would have used existing PSYOP units and personnel

spaces to provide the nucleus of initial manpower requirements.

The plan indicated that initially the center probably would

be under Army management because the other services had

few personnel to contribute . However, as representation from

the other services increased to more than token level, the joint

character of the center was to be emphasized by making its

command rotational among the services. As with the separation theme, however, the joint psychological operations center

envisaged by the original plan met with fierce resistance,

particularly from the Army-which, of course, would have

been the most heavily affected by the initiative.

Implementation of both initiatives-the separation of PSYOP

from special operations and the creation of a joint psychological operations center-became, in effect, hostage to the

resolution of several issues that resulted from the congressionally mandated reorganization of special operations forces.

In October 1986, Congress passed a special operations force

(SOF) reform package sponsored by Senators William Cohen

(R.-Maine) and Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.) . The law created a unified

SOF command under a four-star general or flag officer, an

assistant secretary of defense for special operations and

low-intensity conflict, and a board for low-intensity conflict

within the National Security Council (NSC) . It recommended

the appointment of a deputy assistant to the president for

low-intensity conflict. Particularly important, it directed the

secretary of defense to create a major force program category

for DOD's five-year defense plan for special operations forces.

After passage of this legislation, a major question arose on

whether to include PSYOP and civil affairs units in the

assignment of forces to the new USSOCOM. Good arguments

were presented on both sides of this issue. Two of the major

advantages advanced for inclusion were that these forces

would benefit from the sponsorship of a unified commander

4 0
special operations-as part of his decision concerning implementation of the 1985 DOD Psychological Operations Master

Plan-had to be considered. After a lengthy review of this issue,

Secretary Weinberger decided to assign Army and Air Force

active and reserve component psychological operations and civil

affairs units to USSOCOM, effective 15 October 1987.

Secretary Weinberger's decision, of course, sealed the fate of

the two most controversial and far-reaching initiatives of the

original plan : separation of PSYOP from special operations and

creation of a joint PSYOP center. Separation at the operational

level had ever taken place, since the Army's PSYOP forces

remained under their special operations command at Fort

Bragg. And separation at the staff level-which had seen some

initial progress, at least in the Pentagon-would inevitably fail

as well. On the joint staff, PSYOP was transferred back to

special operations . And in May 1992, overall policy responsibility for PSYOP in OSD was moved to the Office of the

Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) for Special Operations

and Low-Intensity Conflict.

The secretary's decision also made moot the creation of a

joint PSYOP center, as originally conceived in the 1985 Master

Plan. The forces and personnel spaces scheduled for the

nucleus of this project remained under the Army's special

operations command and as part of USSOCOM. Even the

creation of a much smaller version of the joint PSYOP centerlocated in the Washington, D.C. area and concentrating

primarily on strategic PSYOP-has become unlikely in the

current environment.

A candid assessment of the 1985 plan, therefore, provides

mixed reviews . The most significant initiatives on increasing

the strength of the 4th Psychological Operations Groupestablishing an enlisted PSYOP MOS, modernizing PSYOPunique equipment for both active and reserve component

units, and undertaking detailed PSYOP contingency planning

in support of the unified commands-were all undertaken by

the Army in the early 1980s, prior to the 1985 plan. To be

sure, the plan provided additional emphasis to help bring

these initiatives to fruition, but the initial impetus came from

4 1
the Army. Improvements undoubtedly occurred in the formulation of joint doctrine, indoctrination of the officer corps, and

staff planning, but these areas still require attention. And the

two truly revolutionary themes of the original master planseparation of PSYOP from special operations and creation of a

joint PSYOP center-did not become a reality. In the final

analysis, perhaps the greatest benefit to the PSVOP

community was the morale-enhancing evidence of senior-level

interest, due in large part to the dedication of the late Gen

Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Retired, who spearheaded the 1985

plan while serving as the deputy under secretary of defense for

policy .

Nevertheless, while the plan's ambitious goals were not fully

realized, the revitalization efforts of the 1980s made possible the

highly credible performance of PSYOP forces in Panama

(Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty) and the Persian

Gulf (Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm). The early

integration of PSYOP into military planning for these operationsheretofore all too often a serious deficiency-contributed

significantly to its successful utilization. In both contingencies,

PSYOP forces employed a wide range of media, including

loudspeaker broadcasts, radio transmissions, posters, and leaflets.

Principal PSYOP objectives were to (1) cause the enemy to cease

resistance and surrender, (2) solicit information and the tum-in of

weapons, (3) inform civilians and keep them out of the battle areas,

(4) establish a favorable image of friendly forces, (5) deflect hostile

propaganda, and (6) support civil affairs units in emergency relief

and consolidation activities. Overall, the goal was to enhance

combat operations and reduce casualties on both sides. Successful

accomplishment of this goal would have been doubtful without the

increased personnel strength of the 4th Psychological Operations

Group and the modernization of equipment for both active and

reserve component PSYOP units brought about by revitalization . 4

Thus, the revitalization of military PSYOP capabilities that

took place during the 1980s was fueled by a presidentially

inspired public perception of the common threat (i.e., the

Soviet Union), a "defense consensus" which enabled massive

increases in military budgets, several key Reagan administration national security directives that provided impetus for

DOD, and the "top-down" emphasis of Secretary Weinberger

4 2
PSYOP Master Plan.

The Changing International

and Domestic Environment

A comparison of these earlier conditions with the present

environment provides some rather stark contrasts . The most

dramatic change has occurred in the American public's

perception of the threat.

An important stimulus for this change in attitude was the

emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet leader in 1985. His

domestic political and economic reforms, the withdrawal of

troops from Afghanistan, the cessation of "Voice of America"

jamming, his announced intention to reduce Soviet military

forces by 500,000 men and cut their budget by 14.2 percent,

and the intermediate nuclear forces arms control agreement

were just some of the actions that helped to lessen international tensions. Polling data of US public attitudes depicted

a startling change in just over a two-year period ; by July 1988,

94 percent of voters believed that US-USSR relations were

stable or getting better. Mr Gorbachev's policies led Margaret

Thatcher to conclude in November 1988 that the cold war had

come to an end.

If onlookers thought Thatcher's conclusion a bit premature,

they should consider that the subsequent years have been

truly mind-boggling. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and

the liberation of Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany

and its emergence as a major power, and the disintegration of

the former Soviet Union have been revolutionary geopolitical

changes that few could have foreseen. Russian Republic

President Boris Yeltsin's signing of a historic strategic arms

control agreement with President George Bush in June 1992 is

only the most recent indicator that the cold war as we knew it

has, in fact, ended.

During the same period that these momentous events have

occurred in the international arena, Americans have become

more preoccupied with domestic concerns. A lingering

economic recession and high jobless rate, concerns over the

burgeoning federal budget deficit, and deep-rooted problems of

4 3
the cities (as vividly seen in the Los Angeles riots) have taken

their toll. In February 1992, the conference board's measure of

consumer confidence registered its lowest level in 17 years ;

and in April, four-fifths of Americans surveyed said they

believed the country was seriously on the wrong track. 5 These

domestic anxieties, coupled with the absence of a clearly

discernible external threat, have led to growing pressures for

steeper cuts in the defense budget and in foreign aid. The

"defense consensus" of public and congressional support

during the early Reagan administration has disappeared.

Thus, thei context within which defense planning takes place

is in transition, as William Hyland, editor of Foreign Affairs,

reminds us:

This time the cliche is true : this is a new era, but we are only in the

opening phases. It is fruitless to search for a politically correct concept

of the national interest to justify American foreign policy. Debating in

these categories is itself an intellectual hangover from the Cold

War. . . . The US defense posture is only in the preliminary stages of

the restructuring that will follow the end of the Soviet threat. 6

Challenges for Future

US Military Psychological Operations

The challenges for military psychological operations are

formidable. To be sure, inclusion of PSYOP forces in USSOCOM

provides some assistance in meeting these challenges: a

four-star proponent (the commander, USSOCOM) and, ostensibly, full participation in the major force program (MFP-11) for

SOF. The clout of an assistant secretary of defense (ASD/SOLIC)

also should benefit psychological operations at the policy level.

Nevertheless, three broad areas must be addressed if the

PSYOP community is to emerge from this period of transition

to play a viable role in our nation's security: (1) education of

senior civilian and military officials on the value of the

psychological dimension; (2) planning for the use of military

PSYOP in a changing world; and (3) continued modernization

of the PSYOP force structure.

Planning should begin now to ensure that the psychological

dimension receives appropriate attention by the new

administration-and OASD/SOLIC should play a leading role.

4 4
(March 1990 and August 1991) placed a much less explicit

emphasis on the informational element of national power than

did those of Ronald Reagan. The Reagan administration directives that created interagency public diplomacy mechanisms, and

that played a vital role in revitalizing DOD's psychological

operations, have lain dormant. The NSC has paid little attention to

this area.

A review of our national security strategy suggests that

OSD, OJCS, and USSOCOM must continue to coordinate their

efforts to have psychological operations considered by the

NSC. DOY must intensify its efforts to educate new players on

the NSC staff and to build allies among the key agencies in

order to resuscitate existing national security directives-or

create new ones-that provide guidance to psychological

operations and public diplomacy activities . To address a longstanding deficiency, DOD sorely needs a senior-level NSC

mechanism to integrate and direct the information and

psychological operations activities of the various agencies.

Such a forum also would provide a vehicle to overcome the

differences in operational terminology that have plagued past

efforts to integrate interagency planning in these areas.

To meet its needs in a changing world, DOD should undertake once again to update its bilateral agreements with the

United States Information Agency (USIA), the Board for International Broadcasting, and the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA). With diminishing budgets almost a certainty, it will

behoove these agencies to pool their resources and accomplish

common goals in the psychological dimension.

Another major task facing PSYOP advocates after every

election is that of educating the new players in DOD. This

process should begin after a major turnover of senior civilian

officials has taken place. A good vehicle to accomplish this is

the DOD PSYOP Master Plan. Inclusion of key advisors in the

final staffing of the document would provide an opportunity for

them to educate themselves on psychological operations.

There is some symbolic value attached to having the secretary

of defense sign the master plan: It provides visible evidence of

top-down emphasis.

4 5
pygp

Involving key civilian players in this process would provide an

excellent opportunity to educate them about PSYOP. The same

holds true for staffing the defense planning guidance and the

national military strategy, both of which should follow

publication of the president's national security strategy.

Indeed, the current national military strategy, published in

January 1992, contains no mention of the psychological

dimension.

Renewed efforts must be made to indoctrinate the mainstream of the officer corps on psychological operations. Highlevel emphasis, continuously applied, will be necessary to

remedy the long-standing absence of PSYOP instruction in

most of PME. Until this is done, OSD, JCS, and USSOCOM

should coordinate their efforts and provide annual presentations to the senior service schools and the command and

staff colleges. Formation of a traveling team to provide

instruction on PSYOP to major commands should be considered. Examples of the successful use of psychological

operations in Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf would

enhance the learning experience for commanders and staff

officers. PSYOP should be integrated into computer-assisted

war games and simulations. High-quality articles on psychological operations in professional military journals would help

to publicize the successful use of this valuable forcemultiplier. Institutionalization of military PSYOP will take root

only when commanders are convinced that it is indispensable

to combat effectiveness .

This education process must continue with planning for the

utilization of military psychological operations. This will be a

critical task during a period in which there is no apparent

clear consensus about either US national security interests or

the military's post-cold-war missions. Consider these words of

Paul Hammond:

Where strategy used to be something that we could think of as a plan

to be executed, now it must be increasingly a set of capabilities for

dealing with contingencies . Where strategy once was a matter of

inventing the future, now it is increasingly a matter of adapting to it . 7

4 6
and National Military Strategy attempt to provide: a broad focus, regionally oriented, and a "base force" to deal with an

uncertain and rapidly changing world.

Within this context, military PSYOP advocates must demonstrate the applicability of psychological operations in all

environments: support of conventional forces, low-intensity conflict, and special operations forces . Similarly, military PSYOP

can play a valuable supporting role in the peacetime activities

of the CINCs and other government agencies, such as the USIA

and CIA.

First priority, however, must go to planning military PSYOP that

will assist the unified commands-the combatant commandsand the conventional forces assigned to support them for

various contingencies. As the military services reduce in size

and units are withdrawn from Europe, a major realignment of

Army PSYOP forces to other unified commands will take place.

The CAPSTONE program provides an excellent vehicle to link

these forces to the combatant commands for planning and

participation in exercises. As the unified commands identify

their priorities for contingency planning-a process of

"emerging missions" that is likely to go on for some time-the

PSYOP community must be alert to offer their services early

on. In many cases, existing regional analytical studies will require revision, or the development of new ones, to provide the

foundation for detailed PSYOP planning. Finally, supporting

PSYOP plans should anticipate the new contingency plans of

the unified commands and their assigned forces .

In addition to planning for mid- or high-intensity conflicts,

the PSYOP community must plan for, and be prepared to

participate in, peacetime and low-intensity conflict requirements. These requirements may include humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, disaster relief, counterdrug operations,

civic action, unscheduled studies and assessments oriented to

crisis areas, advisory mobile training teams for the military

forces of friendly nations, staff assistance to unified commands, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, and support for DOD and non-DOD agencies. PSYOP forces-indeed,

all special operations forces-provide versatile capabilities for

4 7
future environment.$

Closely related is this major challenge: to continue

modernization of the PSYOP force structure in terms of both

personnel and equipment. For the PSYOP community, the

corollary to Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan's oft-quoted

"no more Task Force Smiths" is "no more Tactical Information

Detachments" (the only operational psychological warfare

troop unit in the US Army when the Korean War erupted in

June 1950; it consisted of two officers and approximately 20

enlisted men). In the face of continued pressures to reduce

even more the size of the military, strenuous efforts must be

made to avoid the fate experienced by the PSYOP community

after every major conflict in this century. As recently as the

early 1980s, the 4th Psychological Operations Group consistently reported the lowest readiness ratings in both personnel and equipment-and many reserve component units

lacked items vital to mission accomplishment, including

loudspeakers. This oversight must not recur.

In particular, the modest-but crucial-gains in personnel

strength by the 4th Group during the revitalization of the

1980s must be preserved ; the bulk of requirements for support

of peacetime activities and low-intensity conflict will

necessarily fall upon the active component. Over the long

term, the key to military PSYOP viability will be the health of

the Army's functional area for psychological operations (FA

39B). Continued high-level emphasis is needed to attract

quality officers for this specialty, to provide them with

excellent training, and to offer sufficient field grade billets for

their utilization and career advancement.

The modernization of PSYOP-unique equipment undertaken

in the 1980s, while beneficial, still has not been completed.

The replacement for the TRT-22 radio, in particular, needs to

be fielded. New loudspeakers are needed. Modernization,

however, should be an ongoing process ; emphasis needs to be

placed on developing more mobile equipment for the future.

Being assigned to USSOCOM should help the PSYOP

community in its perennial battle to obtain a proportionate

share of dwindling resources or, put another way, to ensure

that they do not suffer a disproportionate share of reductions .

4 8
pppp

needed.

At the same time, the PSYOP community must demonstrate

a fiscally responsible attitude by making maximum use of

existing resources. This usage includes not only continued

reliance on the reserve component for mobilization in mid-and

high-intensity conflicts, but also in investigating ways in

which specially trained reservists can be used to augment

active component units for peacetime and low-intensity

conflict requirements. Establishment of redundant capabilities

should be avoided. For example, in the absence of a joint

PSYOP cen-er in the Washington, D.C., area, the 4th Psychological Operations Group's regional analysts should provide

maximum support to the JCS and OSD PSYOP offices-in

neither of which have area experts been assigned. The use of

new technologies to enhance military psychological operations

capabilities without increasing personnel requirements also

must be pursued. Overall, the keys will be cost-effectiveness

and the utility of military PSYOP in both peace and war.

Summary

US interest in military psychological operations during this

century has been episodic, basically rising and falling during

and after major conflicts. The Reagan administration interrupted this pattern by providing the impetus for a revitalization of US military PSYOP during peacetime. The international and domestic conditions that made this possible have

changed significantly, however, and the PSYOP community

faces formidable challenges in maintaining a viable capability

for an uncertain future. To address these challenges, emphasis

must be placed on educating senior civilian and military

officials concerning the value of psychological operations, on

aggressive planning to support the emerging contingency and

peacetime missions of PSYOP within the unified commands,

and on continued modernization of the PSYOP force structure.

After having prevailed in the battle to gain control of military

psychological operations forces and policy, the commander in

chief, USSOCOM, and the assistant secretary of defense for

4 9
ppy py y

roles in facing these challenges. For their part, the PSYOP

community must demonstrate fiscal responsibility, maximum

utilization of existing resources, and continued professionalism in accomplishing new missions. Working together, the

goal of both the PSYOP community and its special operations

leadership should be to ensure "no more Tactical Information

Detachments" during this period of transition .

Notes

1. See Alfred H. Paddock, Jr ., U.S . Anny Special Warfare: Its Origins

(Washington, ID.C . : National Defense University Press, 1982), 12.

2. Ibid., 143.

3. Ibid.

4. Dennis P. Walko, "Psychological Operations in Panama (Just Cause

and Promote Liberty)" ; Frank L. Goldstein and Daniel W. Jacobowitz,

"PSYOP in Desert Shield/Desert Storm," in US Special Operations Command

unpublished manuscript "Psychological Operations: Principles and Case

Studies" May 1992, 45.

5. Norman J. Ornstein, "Foreign Policy and the 1992 Election," Foreign

Affairs, Summer 1992, 3f.

6. William J. Hyland, "The Case for Pragmatism," Foreign Affairs, American and the World, 1991-1992, 42f.

7. Paul Y. Hammond, "The Development of National Strategy in the Executive Branch: Overcoming Disincentives" in Grand Strategy and the

Decisionmaking Process, ed. James C. Gaston (Washington, D.C. : National

Defense University Press, 1992), 16.

8. For a more complete discussion of the versatility of SOF, see Carl W.

Stiner, "U.S . Special Operations Forces: A Strategic Perspective," Parameters, Summer 1992, 2-13 .
Blending Military and Civilian

PSYOP Paradigms

Col Benjamin F. Findley, Jr ., USAFR

This article compares and contrasts the concepts, philosophies, processes, strategies, and major elements of the civilian

business marketing system (BMS) with the military PSYOP

system. The purpose is to inform the reader of the many

similarities and successful applications of proven BMS

approaches, both macro and micro, and how they relate to

strategic and tactical objectives in PSYOP scenarios. The goal is

to improve the reader's understanding that integrating the

effective practices of civilian marketing systems into the military

PSYOP sector is very important. A related goal is to offer

recommendations.

In a business firm, marketing generates revenues by

persuading specific customers to do something. Whenever you

try to persuade somebody to donate to the United Way, refrain

from littering the highways, save energy, vote for your

candidate, or buy your service, you are engaging in marketing.

The challenge that faces the BMS is to generate those

revenues and results by satisfying a targeted customer and

making a profit in a socially responsible manner. Since every

aspect of our lives is affected by business marketing practices,

often in ways we do not even consider, we need to understand

the basic principles and concepts of effective marketing. Then

we need to apply them to PSYOP.

Business Marketing Philosophy

The American Marketing Association defines marketing as

"the process of planning and executing the conception,

pricing, promotion, and distribution of ideas, goods, and

services to create exchanges that satisfy individual needs and

5 1
exchange process where two or more parties give something of

value to one another to satisfy felt needs. The marketing

function, simple and direct in subsistence-level economies, is

more complicated in industrial societies. Nevertheless, the

basic concept of exchange is the same. To understand the

BMS philosophy, we must distinguish between a sales

orientation and a marketing orientation . A sales orientation

assumes that customers will resist purchasing products and

services not deemed essential and that the task of selling is to

convince them to buy something even if they do not need it . It

is a "push'; effort, focusing on selling after the product exists .

A marketing orientation is different-it begins with the

customer and integrates marketing into each function of a

business. Marketing will initially establish what the customer

wants and needs; it should play a lead role in planning,

coordinating, and directing the organization's activities. It

certainly does involve selling, but only after the customer's

need has been established. If the marketing job has been done

well, the customer doesn't need much persuading.

Military Psychological

Operations Philosophy

Military PSYOP is a specialized field of persuasive communications. It involves formulation, conceptualization, implementation, and evaluation of government-to-government and

government-to-people persuasion. It is a planned use of

human actions to influence the attitudes of populations that

are important to national objectives. Lt Col Philip Katz, USA,

Retired, emphasizes that the critical variable in military

PSYOP is that of influencing the perceptions, and thereby the

will, of foreign populations . PSYOP can modify the opinions,

emotions, attitudes, and behaviors of a target audience. It can

be directed at enemy forces to demoralize, disorient, and confuse them. It can induce defection, encourage dissident elements, and reduce combat effectiveness by adversely affecting

the enemy's discipline and command and control functions.

Directed toward neutral or friendly target audiences, it can be

5 2
tion designed to foster their understanding and cooperation.

To enhance the total opportunity for success, PSYOP must

be integrated into, and considered in, all military decisions.

Certainly, PSYOP planning should be concurrent with-and

coordinated with-all operational planning. A few commentators imply that there is some nefarious objective and some

element of deliberate misinformation involved in PSYOP.

Therefore, it is important that the public understand the truth:

the United States government does not engage in public

disinformation activities!

Business Marketing Process

Acompany's complete marketing system consists of many

processes and variables, some controllable and some uncontrollable. Marketing mix is the term that describes the combination of the four main controllable inputs that constitute

the core of a company's marketing process : (1) the product or

service, (2) the promotional activities, (3) the distribution

system, and (4) the price structure. Each input has its own

process, with key decisions to be made and activities to be

accomplished.

The product mix involves policies, procedures, services, and

activities related to the product lines to be offered, the markets

to sell to. and the degree of product differentiation. The

product mix also involves decisions about which product

quantities to offer with which brands, in which packages,

where, and when.

The promotion mix process begins with an analysis of the

organization's overall mission, from which specific promotion

objectives are determined. The promotion process consists of

decisions and activities related to advertising, personal selling,

publicity, and sales promotion. Activities include analyzing the

promotion's target audience; selecting appropriate themes and

symbols, following market segmentation strategies ; deciding

on the optimal blend of print, broadcast, and other media;

setting sales quotas ; conducting message pretests ; and

analyzing selected characteristics of the target market.

Motivation, perception, attitudes, opinions, and stress are

5 3
considered. The promotion mix directly relates to the military

PSYOP process and will be addressed later.

The distribution mix involves decisions about transportation, storage, and inventory. It also includes decisions about

the type, quantity, and quality of wholesalers and retailers

required.

The price mix includes methods for setting the right base

price for a product. Discounts, allowances, markups, breakeven points, and pricing strategy are elements of the price mix.

Aside from these four controllable elements in the marketing

mix, the manager must be concerned with uncontrollable

forces in the environment. Marketing is affected by cultural

factors, laws, economic conditions, competition, technology,

and demography, none of which are controllable; neither are

the firm's microenvironment of suppliers, marketing intermediaries, and customers.

Military Psychological Operations Process

Psychological operations can be divided into three general

categories : strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategic

psychological operations are conducted to advance broad or

long-term objectives designed to create a favorable global

environment for military operations. Operational PSYOP seeks

to achieve midterm objectives in support of regional campaigns and major theater operations. Tactical psychological

operations are conducted to achieve short-term objectives

against an enemy force, in direct support of tactical units.

According to Field Manual 33-1, Psychological Operations, the

mission of PSYOP forces is to support conventional as well as

special operations forces at all levels of war and within all

degrees of the conflict spectrum-low intensity, midintensity,

and high intensity. Overlapping missions and objectives can

blur the distinction between the categories of PSYOP.

Propaganda development for PSYOP involves a multistep

process that is very similar to the promotion mix process for the

BMS. Initially, the unit's mission must be analyzed so the

military PSYOP mission can be derived. Information must be

collected and the target must be analyzed. Just as in the business promotion process, the vulnerabilities and susceptibilities

5 4
are developed and pretested. Campaign approvals are

acquired, propaganda is disseminated, and the impact of the

psychological objective is assessed according to specific

indicators .

Just as there are strategic, operational, and tactical levels of

military PSYOP, there are corresponding levels in marketing

planning. Louis E. Boone and David L. Kurtz define strategic

marketing planning as "the process of determining the primary

(long-term) objectives of an organization and the adoption of

courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary to

achieve those objectives." Tactical planning in marketing

focuses on the implementation of short-term plans that must

be completed near-term to implement overall strategies . Boone

and Kurtz emphasize the necessity of adequate resource

allocation in tactical planning. Certainly, this necessity should

be recognized by military PSYOP planners.

Cultural Differences

The marketing manager in business and the military PSYOP

specialist must understand a variety of influences on the

promotion and persuasion processes in trying to satisfy the

needs and wants of the target audience. Culture is at once the

most basic and the broadest environmental determinant of

individual behavior. Culture is comprised of values, ideas,

attitudes, and other symbols that shape human behavior. The

influence of culture is difficult to define because so many

crucial elements are hidden from the participants of the

system itself. Cultural patterns often exist as unrecognized

assumptions that are taken for granted. Culture affects how

and why people live and behave as they do, which affects the

target audience's susceptibility to promotional themes and

their buying/ accepting behavior. America has many ethnic,

religious, racial, and economic groups, each of which has its

own cultural values. And each of these groups has subcultures with norms and values that are used to define

meanings and to specify needs and wants. Thus, individuals

respond uniquely to persuasive messages and appeals.

5 5
gy 

marketing must use symbols and themes that are easily

recognizable and meaningful to the culture they are trying to

reach. A key persuasion guideline is that one should not

substitute one's own judgment and cultural values for the

values and cultural characteristics of the audience being

targeted. No market has been more frustrating and difficult for

American business marketers than the Japanese market.

Japanese culture has produced marketing institutions and

promotional relationships that differ from those found in the

United States.

While leading some university students on an industrial

tour of Japan in 1981, for example, I found that the food

distribution system there was different from that in the United

States. Japanese wholesalers, unlike their US counterparts,

are specialized sellers. They do not carry a complete line of

products for a select group of stores. Instead, they carry a

select line of noncompetitive products that they supply to all

supermarkets. Japanese wholesalers take great pride in

supplying all retail stores with an exclusive but narrow

product line. The goal of American wholesalers is total

distribution of a complete product line to a captive set of

stores ; the goal of the Japanese wholesaler is distribution of a

limited set of products to all retail outlets. Culture is a major

influence on marketing and PSYOP.

Social Influences

The social groups to which people belong or aspire -to belong

help explain why they buy certain types and brands of

products, shop in one type of store and not another, accept

and believe certain ideas and persuasive messages, and spend

their money in certain ways. Aperson's social class is a major

influence on his style of life and an important factor in

determining his social and economic behavior. A social class is

a group of people whose members are nearly alike in terms of

a characteristic that is valued in their group and that clearly

differentiates them from others.

PSYOP specialists and promotion managers must be aware

of social class influences on the acceptance of ideas and the

5 6
be needed to promote the same product to different social

classes. An upper-middle-class wife may want products, ideas,

and brands that are clear symbols of her social status. She

may be highly susceptible to preselling through mass media.

Conversely, a lower-lower-class wife may buy largely on

impulse and may be influenced by point-of-purchase promotion materials. She may not care to read much, and the

broadcast media may be of great importance in communicating with her.

When social influences are combined with foreign culture

influences,,we see how difficult it is to understand needs and

behaviors well enough to persuade an individual to accept a

PSYOP message. One way to exert influence on a social class

in a culture is to identify and target opinion leaders. They are

chosen on the basis of expertise as well as social position.

Exposure to mass media is significantly greater among opinion

leaders than among nonleaders-and mass media directly

influence opinion leaders. It is important to note that opinion

leaders are far more effective in securing opinion changes

among followers than are the mass media. Thus, it is

important in PSYOP as well as in marketing to identify and

aim persuasive messages directly at opinion leaders.

Family Influences

An individual is born into a family and inherits a certain

social status . That status remains until he becomes an adult.

Of all face-to-face groups, a person's family plays the strongest

role in basic value and attitude formation.

Early family training is not cast off easily ; it remains to

affect one's individual values, ideas, and behaviors. Even as

the adult individual strives to acquire the prestige symbols of

another class, latent family influences remain to sway

acceptance of ideas and products. Most buying decisions and

idea acceptances are made within a framework of experience

developed within the family.

5 7
Needs and Motives

Personal determinants of behavior include needs, wants,

motives, and self-concepts. All of these variables combine with

the previously presented interpersonal and group factors to

influence one's acceptance of an idea or purchase of a product.

People have a need when they lack something useful, required,

or desired. When a few needs are fairly well satisfied, others

emerge. Some say needs are insatiable, incapable of ever being

fully satisfied; thus, PSYOP specialists and marketers do not

have to satisfy one need before progressing on to other needs.

Several needs at several levels can be present concurrently to

influence an individual's behavior, but this approach complicates the prediction of behavior. Abraham H. Maslow

proposed a hierarchy of needs that includes the most basic :

physiological, safety, social, esteem; and the highest: selfactualization. Motives are inner states that direct people

toward the goal of satisfying a felt need. Examples of motives

include high quality, conformity, low price, performance, ease

of use, long life, prestige, friendship, the opposite sex, and a

desire to be different.

One's self-concept includes feelings, perceptions, and

evaluations of oneself as a person. How one perceives and

evaluates one's own status in relation to others in the same

social class and reference groups-and to one's own levels of

aspiration-are prime forces in shaping one's self-concept . The

self-concept is learned ; it emerges through experiences with

the environment and through interactions with other people.

By observing socially acceptable and unacceptable behavior

and comparing one's own behavior to them, one lays the basis

for one's own self-concept. The self-concept is useful in PSYOP

and marketing because, through their actions and purchases

of products, individuals let others know who they are and

what they hope to be or to do. The purchase of goods and the

expression of ideas serve as social symbols that communicate

meaning. The behavior of an individual will be directed toward

enhancing his self-concept through the consumption of goods

and the expression of ideas as symbols, allowing a prediction

of events.

5 8
Everything a person knows about the world and what it

contains comes from perceptions . Perception is the reception

of stimuli through the senses and the attachment of meaning

to them. Sound, light, odor, taste, and pressure are received

by one's sensory receptors-ears, eyes, nose, tongue, and skin.

These sensations are translated into perceptions that are

altered by previous learning, beliefs, values, and attitudes, and

then organized into meaningful concepts. People perceive

things that make sense within the context of their beliefs,

values, attitudes, and experiences. Since we cannot possibly

perceive all i stimuli at any given time, our perceptions are

highly selective and subjective ; we see what we want to see

and hear what we want to hear. Further, if we do not like what

we perceive, we often distort or modify it.

Mass-marketing messages and PSYOP messages are based

on selective perception. Because a large number of persuasive

messages are directed at different target audiences, PSYOP

specialists and marketers must carefully test the messages to

be employed with representative targets. They must make

every effort to ensure that the various target groups perceive

the messages that were intended.

Attitudes are predispositions to respond in particular ways

toward people, ideas, activities, or things. An attitude is not

neutral; rather, it is for or against some person, object, or idea.

An attitude is composed of three dimensions : cognitive (factual

information), affective (feelings and emotions), and behavioral

(tendencies to behave in a certain way). Attitudes affect both

perception and behavior, and people resist changes- in their

attitudes. The more closely an attitude is related to one's

self-concept, the greater will be one's resistance to changing it .

To change an attitude, a PSYOP specialist must (1) provide

new information to enlarge and change the cognitive dimension ; (2) attack the affective dimension of the attitude by

associating the end-state of change with the desirable

consequences that result; and/or (3) induce the person to

engage in "attitude-discrepant" behavior (behavior that contradicts held preferences). Successful attitude-change approaches

include using a trustworthy and credible source, drawing

5 9
conclusions for the target, repeating the message, and using

both one-sided and two-sided messages.

Successful and Unsuccessful

Business Marketing

Businesses spend several billions of dollars each year on

marketing, a fact that indicates the importance they place on it.

According to an Advertising Age article, the top 100 firms spent

more than $34 billion in 1989 for advertising. Advertising

represents 'about 20 percent of total marketing expenditures.

The top 10 advertisers spent more than $10 billion for advertising alone in 1989. Those companies have been successful.

Failures do occur, however. A 1988 Advertising Age report, for

example, lists these $100 million failures: Campbell's Red Kettle

Soups, Ford's Edsel, DuPont's corfam, Hunt's flavored ketchups,

and Gillette's Nine Flags Cologne.

Newspapers account for the largest annual advertising

expenditure ($31.2 million in 1988). Other 1988 expenditures :

television ($26.1), direct mail ($21.2), radio ($7.7), and magazines ($6.1). Use of advertising, however, does not guarantee

success even if it is planned and implemented well. A key

reason is that most people do not systematically process the

information they receive through the marketing message. We

are largely emotional, influenced by testimonials and emotional appeals-we do not logically consider pertinent criteria

when we purchase products. It seems we are more influenced

by the skill, appearance, and character of the presenter than

the content of the message. A 1988 Advertising Age survey

mentioned three of the most powerful ads in US history :

Volkswagen's "Lemon," Marlboro's "Country," and Coca-Cola's

"Real Thing." Aside from getting commitments from dealers to

carry the product, the Coca-Cola ad was successful because it

capitalized on the affective domain and the unsystematic

emotional responses of people. A critical conclusion for PSYOP

specialists and marketers is that the ad created a psychological idea of a unique and better taste. It focused on image

and emotional themes through heavy repeat advertising and

readily identifiable names, symbols, and packages. It also

60
implied associations of Coca-Cola with youth and authenticity .

Business Marketing Models

Marketing lessons can be learned from business failures as

well as from effective marketing models. Burger Chef did not

realize that economic conditions are major factors, did not

adapt to changing consumer preferences, and did not meet

target market expectations. Coors did not recognize changes in

the environment that necessitated adjustments in marketing

strategies' and did not take the time to continue developing an

image of quality and great desirability. The World Football

League lost credibility by taking actions counter to prior

promises and by not paying strict attention to environmental

variables.

After analyzing five leading models of consumer behavior, I

have blended optimal elements from each to suggest a

marketing model for the buyer's decision process. The model

focuses on systematic thinking and defining relevant elements

for making a buying decision. It attempts to explain the

progressive process that a consumer might experience in

buying products or accepting ideas. PSYOP specialists and

marketers can anticipate effective messages if they understand

the process through which buyers can progress. They can

then address those messages to bring about the desired

change in behavior. My buyer decision model is like any

scientific problem-solving model except that it focuses on

buyer behavior. It consists of five stages : problem recognition,

information gathering, alternative evaluation, the decision to

buy, and postpurchase evaluation. Initially, the target consumer recognizes a problem because of inadequate supplies,

changing needs, or other internal or external activities. This

first stage forces buyers to succinctly state the problem based

on specific unfilled needs. Then the second stage begins the

planned search for specific, relevant, and identical information

on all possible products. Buyers must weigh the pros and cons

of the various products based on a set of criteria during this

third stage. In the next stage, they make the decision that best

meets their needs and wants, and that satisfies the

6 1
expectations of influencers in their social groups. The fifth and

final stage is the evaluation of that decision; it should not be

omitted.

Effective Objectives

Specific marketing and promotion-persuasion objectives,

based on the organization's general goals, should be established .

Clearly stated objectives should exist for each promotion tool so

that results can be measured against them. Advertising,

personal selling, publicity, and sales promotion functions should

have specific expected objectives that are measurable. Print,

broadcast, and audiovisual media should also have specific

objectives. Marketing objectives should meet certain criteria and

should be built on a solid foundation of research that reveals

what the targets want to buy. The objectives should be stated in

terms of target benefits-and in quantitatively measurable

terms. They should help attain and reinforce the firm's overall

objectives, and they should be reviewed periodically.

The Ethics of Persuading

Many critics of marketing contend that persuasion is really

manipulation-or even control-of consumers, unethically

coercing them into buying products they do not want. Is it

immoral to arouse fears of inadequacy to sell an antiperspirant? Is it wrong to use reference-group concepts to make a

product more appealing? Is it improper to design products and

appeals that enhance a buyer's self-concept in order to gain a

sale? Some observers argue that embellishment and distortion

are legitimate and socially desirable activities and that

illegitimacy enters the picture only if there is falsification with

larcenous intent.

That argument notwithstanding, however, truth is the best

persuasion approach ; it should be the fundamental principle

in both business marketing and military PSYOP. Truth, which

is basic to strategic peacetime foreign policy, should be our

fundamental guideline. The ultimate questions concern "What

is the truth?" and "Can consumers really be convinced to buy

something they do not want?"

6 2
Target market analysis is performed every time a marketing

or PSYOP campaign is developed. It includes selecting a target,

determining conditions that affect the target, analyzing target

vulnerabilities, specifying target susceptibilities, formulating

the persuasive objective, determining target effectiveness, and

assessing campaign impact indicators . Once the conditions

and vulnerabilities of the Iraqi soldiers were identified in the

Persian Gulf War, individual susceptibilities for each vulnerability were specified. Because the coalition's bombing

campaign was effective, the Iraqis had needs for food, shelter,

water, megical attention, and basic safety . They were,

therefore, driven to respond in an expected way. Target market

analysis is key to successful marketing and PSYOP.

Recommendations

My recommendations, which are based on my own analysis,

are intended to serve as suggestions for improved business

marketing and military psychological operations. They

emphasize the transfer of proven marketing and promotion

strategies, concepts, and techniques from the civilian business

marketing system to the military PSYOP system.

" A primary recommendation is to accept the marketing

orientation (as opposed to a sales orientation) . The marketing

orientation begins with the customer's needs and wants, then

integrates marketing into each function of the business to

design the desired product. (The sales orientation focuses on

the product characteristics and attempts to sell the existing

product.)

Both PSYOP planning and marketing planning should be

concurrent with, and coordinated with, all operational

planning. Together, they should address the target audience's

needs in any given situation. This relates to the function of

PSYOP as a force multiplier in all types of military activity.

" Another recommendation is to ensure that marketing and

PSYOP support all operations, to include production and

finance in business or conventional and special operations in

the military. This support should be for all levels of business

63
A commensurate resource and budget commitment to

support adequate PSYOP and marketing is required so that

PSYOP and marketing can be integrated into all operational

planning. It is an absolute necessity that military PSYOP and

business marketing planners understand the level of resourcing necessary to conduct a successful campaign; undercapitalization may doom an otherwise promising organization

to failure.

" The business community and the military services must

accept culture as the most basic environmental determinant of

individual pehavior, and they must gather sufficient quantitative and qualitative information about it. Individual judgment and cultural values should not be substituted for those

of your target audience.

" PSYOP specialists and marketing managers must be

aware that social-class membership influences the acceptance

of ideas, the willingness to behave a certain way, and the need

to use different persuasive techniques and concepts.

" Persuasive messages should be aimed directly at opinion

leaders; they are far more effective in securing changes among

followers than are the mass media.

" It is important to make maximum utilization of family

influence; research shows that it plays the strongest role in

basic value and attitude formation.

" The PSYOP specialist and the business marketer must

know the various needs of individuals and the corresponding

specific persuasive appeals that can be employed to influence

each need.

" Marketing and PSYOP professionals must recognize the

dominant influence of the self-concept-and how consumption

of goods and expression of ideas are directly based on that

concept and on selective perception. They must understand

the main behavioral dimensions of attitudes, so that appropriate techniques can be employed to change them.

" My final recommendation is an all-encompassing one. It

refers to the need to educate our military and civilian leaders

about marketing philosophy and psychological operations (as

a unique weapons system). Also, managers and specialists

6 4
fessional military education service school system should

include courses designed to improve the awareness and

understanding of PSYOP. The primary goal would be to

enhance the understanding of strategic PSYOP and marketing,

their benefits and long-term capabilities, and their applications in support of our national objectives.
Air Force Field Manual (FM) 2-5. "Psychological Operations."

Tactical Ait Operations, Special Ait Warfare. Washington,

D.C. : Government Printing Office (GPO), 1967.

Army FM 33-1. Psychological Operations. Washington, D.C.:

GPO, 1987 .

Black, M.A. "Tactical Psychological Operations." Canadian

Defense Quarterly. Summer 1987, 30-33.

Boone, Louis E., and David L. Kurtz. Contemporary Marketing.

Chicago, Ill. : Dryden Press, 1989.

Bovee, Courtland L., and William Arens. Advertising. Homewood,

Ill. : R. D. Irwin, 1982.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael

Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, N.J . : Princeton

University Press, 1976.

Crane, Barry, et al. "Between Peace and War: Comprehending

Low-Intensity Conflict." Special Warfare. Summer 1989,

4-25.

Cunningham, William H., et al. Marketing: A Managerial

Approach. Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western Publishing

Co., 1990.

Department of the Army. The Ait and Science of Psychological

Operations: Case Studies of Military Applications, vol. l .

Washington, D.C. : Institute for Research in the Behavioral

Sciences, 1976.

Department of Defense. Headquarters 2d PSYOP Group, US Army.

Psychological Operations . Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1989.

Findley, Benjamin F. "USSOCOM's Foreign Internal.Defense

Mission Is Real and Critical ." United States Special Operations

Command Update. Spring 1990, 6-7.

Garth, S. Jowett, and Victoria O'Donnell. Propaganda and

Persuasion. Newbury Park, Calif. : Sage Publications, 1986.

Goldstein, Frank L. "Psychological Operations, Terrorism and

Glasnost." United States Special Operations Command

Update. Spring 1990, 18-19 .

Gordon, Joseph S. Psychological Operations : The Soviet Challenge.

Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1988.

Hart, R_H_ Liddell- Strn New York: Frederick Praeger

Publishers, 1968.

6 6
y y 

Terms. Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1984.

Katz, Philip. "PSYOP and Communications Theory," in The Art

and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of

Military Application. Washington, D.C. : Department of the

Army, 1976.

. 'Tactical PSYOP in Support of Combat Operations," in

Ron D. McLaurin Military Propaganda Psychological Warfare

and Operations. New York: Frederick Praeger Publishers,

1982.

Kaufman, Louis. Essentials ofAdvertising. New York: Harcourt

Brace J,ovanovich, Inc., 1980.

Kriesel, Melvin E. "The Use of Psychological Operations In

Counterinsurgency ." Langley AFB, Va. : Army-Air Force

Center for Low Intensity Conflict, November 1988.

Lord, Carves, and Frank E. Barnett. Political Warfare and

Psychological Operations. Washington, D.C. : National

Defense University Press (NDUP), 1989.

McCarthy, Jerome, and William Perreault. Basic Marketing.

Homewood, Ill . : R. D. Irwin, Inc., 1987.

McLaughlin, Mark W. "The Future of Psychological Operations."

Perspectives . Spring 1991.

McLaurin, Ronald D. "Perceptions, Persuasion, and Power."

Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations.

New York: Frederick Praeger Publishers, 1982.

Office of the Secretary of Defense. Psychological Operations

Master Plan. Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1990.

Orth, Richard. "Source Factors in Persuasion." The Art and

Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of

Military Application. Washington, D.C. : Department of the

Army, 1976.

Paddock, Alfred H. "Military Psychological Operations and U.S .

Strategy," in J.S. Gordon, ed., Psychological Operations :

The Soviet Challenge. Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press,

1988.

U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origin. Washington,

D.C. : NDUP, 1982.

Pedersen, Judith. Fundamentals Of Modern Marketing. New

York: American Management Association, 1978.

6 7
Marketing Management and Research Institute, 1978 .

Reppert, John C. "Psychological Operations: The Oldest Weapon

of Mass Destruction." Special Warfare l, no . 2 (July 1988) :

28-33 .

Resource Book forPsychological Operations. Hurlburt Field,

Fla. : United States Air Force Special Operations School,

1988.

Romerstein, Herbert. Psychological Operations and Political

Warfare in Long Term Strategic Planning. New York:

Frederick Praeger Publishers, 1990.

Runyon, Kenneth E. COnsumerBehavior Columbus, Ohio :

Merrill Publishing, 1987.

Sconyers, Ronald T. "The Information War." Military Review.

February 1989, 44-52 .

Stanley, Richard E. Promotion. Englewood Cliffs, N.J . :

Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982.

Stanton, William J. Fundamentals of Marketing. New York:

McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1987.

Sun Tzu. TheArt of War. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith .

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963 .

Volkogonov, D. A. The Psychological War. Moscow: Progress

Press, 1986.

Walker, Fred W. "Strategic Concepts for Military Psychological

Operations ." Joint Chiefs of Staff Unpublished Report,

Washington, D.C ., 1987.

. "Truth Is the Best Propaganda." National Guard. October

1987, 27.

Yudovich, Lev. "Assessment of the Vulnerability of the Soviet

Soldier." Fort Bragg, N.C . : John F. Kennedy Special

Warfare Center and School, 1987.
PART 11

National Policy

and

PSYOP Planning

This section presents articles about recurrent psychological

issues and roles in formulating and implementing our national

policy, objectives, and strategy. The authors explain historical

and contemporary elements of the national policy process in

PSYOP and the framework within which national PSYOP policy

is formulated, administered, and implemented.

Dr Carnes Lord explores the historical influences on

developing effective US strategy, doctrine, and organizational

structure for the conduct of psychological and political warfare. While accepting that a psychological-political component

is inherent in every use of the diplomatic, economic, and

military instruments of national power, he urges a rethinking

of the role of political and psychological factors and a

revitalization and integration of their capabilities into US

national strategy. Dr Lord analyzes the influences of American

cultural inhibitions and the media on psychological conflict.

Michael A. Morris reminds us that national policy objectives

must be clearly defined so that military objectives and strategy

can be precise. He emphasizes that clarification of political

objectives is the responsibility of political leaders rather than

military leaders . Morris concludes that propaganda advantages

can be gained through clearly stated political objectives . He

suggests guidelines for distinguishing clear political objectives

from vague ones.

William F . Johnston focuses attention on psychological

operations as a vital instrument in national liberation wars . He

believes governments of countries threatened with insurgency

should regard PSYOP, particularly face-to-face communications, as a first line of internal defense-the Vietnam lesson.

He also wants more recognition of PSYOP as a major

instrument of low-intensity conflict and the elevation of PSYOP

planners to "first-team" status.

Lloyd A. Free examines the role of public opinion and the

psychological dimension in international security affairs. He

believes that while public opinion cannot be slavishly followed,

psychological data should be collected and analyzed so that

government can take this factor into account in planning.

7 1
They focus on the communications aspect of international

relations and PSYOP, identify and assess the principles and

critical developments in this field, and advance ideas for

progress. They stress that intelligence is the most commonly

overlooked prerequisite to effective PSYOP. Their focus on

evaluating the effectiveness of PSYOP challenges the reader to

systematically concentrate on results . This article is clearly a

historical piece that sets the groundwork for producing

effective PSYOP.
The Psychological Dimension

in National Strategy

Dr Carves Lord

To recall the time when psychological-political warfare was

widely, aclfnowledged by Americans as an important

instrument of national strategy requires a certain effort of

historical imagination. Such was indeed the case, however,

from the early days of the Second World War until the

mid-1960s. The experience of World War II convinced many

American political and military leaders that the psychological

dimension of conflict had become critical in the contemporary

world.

Totalitarian regimes that employed modern communications

technologies to specialize in ideology and subversion

constituted a qualitatively new strategic problem for the West.

The postwar years witnessed an outpouring of academic

studies in this area, most of which took for granted the

necessity and legitimacy of a vigorous American response to

the emerging political-ideological threat posed by the Soviet

Union and the international communist movement.'

The US government allowed its propaganda, and political

warfare capabilities to wither in the years of rapid demobilization immediately following World War 11 . Creation of the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947, however, provided a

fresh impetus and an organizational vehicle for covert

psychological operations and political action in peacetime. The

deteriorating political situation in Western Europe in the late

1940s; created urgent objectives for the CIA's covert action

directorate.

The coming of the Korean War stimulated improvements in

US overt capabilities as well. In 1950, President Harry S

Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board in the White

House to provide a high-level focus for government-wide

7 3
activities in this area. The new International Information

Administration was established within the State Department;

military psychological operations were given new life (the Army

established the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg,

North Carolina, in 1952); and the Psychological Operations

Coordinating Committee attempted to provide operational

coordination among the various involved agencies . 2 President

Dwight D. Eisenhower moved to create the US Information

Agency (USIA) as an autonomous agency reporting directly to

the National Security Council. 3

It can be questioned whether the US government as a whole

was able, in the 1950s, to develop an effective doctrine and

organizational structure for the conduct of psychological and

political warfare. Sharp differences of opinion existed over

fundamental questions of strategy toward the Soviet bloc and

over the roles of key agencies such as CIA and USIA-and

coordination among the agencies left much to be desired. 4

It could perhaps be argued that militarization of the

Vietnam War was the key factor underlying the progressive

atrophy of US political warfare capabilities after the mid-1960s .

However, it seems evident that larger issues of governmental

organization and national style or culture also figured critically

in this development. It should have been clear that the

assignment of political warfare responsibilities to new agencies

would not eliminate-and in certain respects would probably

fortify-the sources of bureaucratic resistance to this new

instrument of national power. 5 Finally, mention must be made

of the cultural revolution that took place in the United States

beginning in the mid-1960s. The shattering of the foreign

policy consensus of the postwar decades (a result of Vietnam)

meant, in the first place, a questioning of American values and

the legitimacy of a leading world role for the United States.

Such attitudes could only spell trouble for any strategy that

depended on the confident projection abroad of America's

political identity and values.

Any attempt to rethink the role of political and psychological

warfare in US strategy today must take account of these

fundamental and persisting obstacles . Before turning to

consider them more systematically, however, it is necessary to

sketch briefly the basic features of political and psychological

74
national power.

One problem is the general tendency to use the terms

psychological warfare and political warfare interchangeably,

not to mention a variety of similar terms-ideological warfare,

the war of ideas, political communication, psychological

operations, and more. The uncertainty of reference derives

partly from the fact that this sort of warfare is waged to a

considerable extent with weapons that are not truly distinctive.

There are indeed distinctive psychological instruments-radio

broadcasting, publications of various kinds, and educational and

cultural prpgrams-that are capable of communicating

information and ideas. But because these capabilities are easier

to conceptualize, and to handle bureaucratically, the tendency

has been to give them undue weight when it comes to defining

the overall phenomenon.

There is a psychological dimension to the employment of

every instrument of national power, emphatically including

military force at every level. Similarly, major increments of

military and economic power necessarily generate political

effects. In thinking about psychological and political warfare,

the tendency has been to think about the conflict of ideas,

ideologies, and opinions. Yet the concept is in fact seriously

misleading. Psychological-political warfare is also about

cultural and political symbols, perceptions and emotions,

behavior of individuals and groups under stress, and cohesion

of organizations and alliances.

Using the term warfare to describe US psychologicalpolitical strategy in its broadest sense is itself problematic.

Psychological-political operations need not be directed only to

adversaries; neutral, allied, and semiallied nations potentially

constitute highly important targets because our enemies will

target them in efforts to break those alliances.

The English language apparently does not include a good

term for designating psychological-political operations in their

broadest sense. In recent years, and especially since the arrival

of the Reagan administration, the term public diplomacy has

gained considerable currency in Washington. Public diplomacy

appears to encompass three distinct though closely related

functions : international information, international political

7 5
public affairs. The inclusion of public affairs is a recognition

that it is impossible in a modern democracy to separate

sharply information communicated to domestic audiences

from that communicated to international audiences, but the

domestic function associated with public diplomacy differs

from traditional public affairs by virtue of its strategic

approach and its active effort to shape the domestic political

agenda. 6

The public diplomacy rubric serves a useful purpose, but it

is not and was not intended to be comprehensive. Covert

political warfare was excluded from its purview from the

beginning. Nor does it have any clear relationship to military

psychological operations, to educational and cultural affairs,

or to the range of US government activities that may be

grouped under the general label of international aid and

humanitarian affairs.

I would propose, if only for the sake of clarity, the following

anatomy of basic psychological-political warfare functions.

Political warfare is a general category of activities encompassing political action, coercive diplomacy, and covert

political warfare. In general, the first of these functions is

performed by diplomatic personnel, the second by military and

diplomatic personnel, and the third by intelligence personnel.

Political action refers to a range of activities, including certain

kinds of multilateral diplomacy, support for foreign political

parties or forces, and support for or work with international

associations of various kinds.? Coercive diplomacy refers to

diplomacy presupposing the use or threatened use of military

force to achieve political objectives.$ Covert political warfare

corresponds roughly to the covert aspects of what the Soviets

called active measures; it includes support for insurgencies,

operations against enemy alliances, influence operations, and

black propaganda. 9

Psychological operations, once frequently used in a general

sense to designate psychological-political operations as a

whole, is probably best reserved for use as a term of art to

designate military PSYOP.I° Military PSYOP can encompass

both overt and covert activities in both peacetime and war, and

its scope can vary from the tactical battlefield to the operational

76
military interest in PSYOP has focused heavily on tactical

applications in wartime. Battlefield PSYOP is sometimes

distinguished from consolidation PSYOP, which is geared to

securing the loyalty and cooperation of civilian populations in

combat areas and is closely related to civic action conducted

by military forces in low-intensity conflict situations . Another

related function is troop information or education, which

serves among other things-much like public affairs in

relation to public diplomacy-to counter the psychological

operations of the enemy.

International communications encompasses international

information and international educational and cultural affairs.

USIA performs this range of functions, though other

organizations-in particular, "Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty"

but also the Departments of State and Defense-perform

information functions of political or strategic importance as

well. 11

A further general category is international aid and humanitarian affairs. This category includes foreign economic and

development aid, food aid, humanitarian assistance (rescue

operations, disaster relief, famine relief, etc.), and technical

assistance of various kinds. Many agencies involved in such

activities, including the Defense Department, the Agency for

International Development, and the Peace Corps, are

organizations that have dedicated missions in this area.

Although these functions are bureaucratically scattered and

very largely autonomous, they have a very important

psychological-political component. Whether intentionally or

otherwise, they serve as significant instruments of US foreign

policy and national strategy.

Finally, to repeat what was said earlier, a psychologicalpolitical component is inherent in every use of the diplomatic,

economic, and military instruments of national power. The art

of negotiation rests on an understanding of individual and

group psychology and a sensitivity to cultural contexts.

Similarly, the exercise of military command at all levels

involves an assessment of the psychological strengths and

vulnerabilities of the enemy commander and his forces;

deception and surprise are key elements of the military art. A

7 7
weight that can be exploited in a variety of ways to advance

the national interest.

The impetus for rethinking the role of political and

psychological factors in US national strategy has come

primarily from the renewed attention given these matters by

the Reagan administration. IZ Since 1981, a major effort has

been under way to modernize and expand US government

capabilities in the area of international communications,

particularly radio and television broadcasting.

It remains doubtful that the administration has succeeded

in overcoming the obstacles, both internal and external, to a

thorough revitalization of US psychological-political capabilities

and their full integration into national strategy.

13 In many

respects, the cultural pressures working against such an effort

are as strong as-or stronger than-ever. In addition to a kind

of generic resistance to such activities on the part of Americans

as Americans, there has been a wholesale loss of understanding

and support of them among American elites in recent years.

But perhaps equally troublesome is the resistance stemming

from the national security bureaucracy itself and from the

continuing weakness of integrated strategic planning and

decision making at the national level.

Painful as it may be to face squarely the question of

American cultural inhibitions in the area of psychologicalpolitical conflict, the effort is necessary-in order not only to

develop intelligent approaches for dealing with them but also

to achieve cultural self-consciousness, which is essential for

effective participation in this kind of conflict. It is essential

because Americans tend to assume that people everywhere are

much like themselves, with similar fundamental motivations

and views of the world. But blindness to differences in national

characteristics is apt to be a fatal handicap for anyone

attempting to affect the psychological orientation and political

behavior of foreign audiences.

Perhaps the most severe single limitation in the American

outlook is its tendency to discount the relevance of

nonmaterial factors such as history, culture and ideas.

Americans tend to assume that concrete interests such as

economic well-being, personal freedom, and security of life and

7 8
yg y 

prevalent in a country as fundamentally idealistic as the

United States while the importance the Soviets attributed to

ideological factors stands in some tension with the materialistic

basis of Marxism.

Connected with this emphasis on material considerations is

the fact that Americans, unlike many peoples, are uncomfortable

with personal confrontation and argument and do not

customarily debate political and ideological questions in their

private lives. Americans tend to look on the political realm as

an arena not of conflict and struggle but of bargaining and

consensus, where strongly held opinions and principled

positions and disruptive of the process and to be discouraged.

This tendency makes it extremely difficult for Americans to

deal effectively in international settings where basic American

values are under challenge. Furthermore, American notions of

fair play and due process are subject to serious misinterpretation abroad. Americans' insistence on a presentation of both

sides of any argument is frequently seen as reflecting a lack of

self-confidence. In general, the openness and penchant for

self-criticism in American society strike many foreigners as

manifestations of weakness rather than strength.

Manifest or latent in the attitudes of many Americans

toward the practice of psychological-political warfare is a

distaste for any sort of psychological manipulation or

deception. The idea that psychological-political warfare is a

black art that can be morally justified only under the most

extreme circumstances is a derivative of such attitudes. That

such activities necessarily involve misrepresentation or

deception is in any case far from the truth. (The conveying of

purely factual information under certain circumstances can

have powerful psychological effects .)

Military psychological operations, such as battlefield

broadcasting, have as their primary purpose the saving of

lives-enemy as well as friendly lives. Indeed, such activities

make both moral and strategic sense. According to the

Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, "what is of supreme importance in

war is to attack the enemy's strategy. . . . Next best is to

disrupt his alliances . . .. The next best is to attack his army. . ..

79
The worst policy is to attack cities ." As Sun Tzu puts it, "To

subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." In

other words, competence in the psychological-political sphere

is the essence of a rational approach to war. 14 Failure to attain

such competence within the limits of one's possibilities is a

failure that is all too likely to be paid for in blood.

As important as the effect of these general cultural biases is

the role of the American media. Developments in the culture

and operating style of the prestige media in the United States

in recent years have substantially complicated any effort by

the US government to engage seriously in psychologicalpolitical conflict. Before the late 1960s, it may be argued, a

satisfactory understanding existed between journalists on the

one hand and American military and government officials on

the other regarding the proper scope and limits of press

coverage of national security and foreign policy matters. In

particular, the press in wartime tended to adopt the national

cause and to accept broad responsibility not only for

protecting sensitive information but also for safeguarding the

morale both of the troops at the front and of civilians at home

Since Vietnam, there has been a dramatic change. 15 In the

general wreck of the national foreign policy consensus

resulting from that experience, the media have adopted an

increasingly skeptical attitude-not only toward the specific

policies and actions of the incumbent administration but also

toward many of the fundamental assumptions that had

underpinned the global position and role of the United States

since World War II. The legitimacy of the American defense

and intelligence establishments in particular has been sharply

questioned and subjected to scrutiny by the new style of

investigative journalism inaugurated by the prestige press.

Most significantly, the media ended their deference to and

informal cooperation with an incumbent administration in

favor of a posture of neutral observer or critic . One result of

this shift has been a general refusal to take responsibility for

the consequences of media coverage's effect on national

security policy outcomes. 16

This change in media attitudes is worth dwelling on, since

the role of the media on the battlefield of the future is likely to

decide whether the United States will be capable of conducting

80
media now acknowledge a responsibility to avoid jeopardizing

the lives of American soldiers engaged in military operations.

But they do not recognize an obligation to refrain from

publicizing information that demoralizes American troops,

reveals aspects of American intelligence or military planning,

undermines American diplomatic initiatives, or gives psychological aid and comfort to the enemy. This obligation is denied

even though the ultimate effect of such disclosure may be to

prolong military operations and cost American lives, not to

speak of more generally damaging the international position of

the United States and its ability to avoid future conflicts. Nor

do the media recognize any obligations with respect to the

domestic audience.

Of particular importance in this connection is the wartime

role of television. To argue (as media spokesmen regularly do)

that television coverage is essential to informed debate on the

merits of a particular military action is unconvincing, not to

say disingenuous. The information content of TV pictures is

typically low or nonexistent, and the emotions such pictures

arouse are more likely to defeat than to promote rational

discussion. The rapid juxtaposition of death and destruction

images torn out of any intelligible context, so common in

television coverage of war, inevitably encourages the feeling

that the war is futile, immoral, or absurd.

17

Equally harmful is the practice-pursued well beyond the

point of abuse by the networks in Lebanon in 1983-of

interviewing American GIs on their feelings and views about

the situation they happen to be involved in. To portray soldiers

(and if they are looked for they will be found) who are

confused, inarticulate, naive, or bitter about the reasons why a

war is being fought or the way it is being conducted serves no

purpose. The immediate danger to morale and the effect on

allied and enemy perceptions are only part of the costs of such

behavior. As in the case of media obsession with the families of

terrorist victims, the effect is to pander to private concerns and

emotions and to mobilize them in a way that greatly complicates the pursuit of rational policies by the US government.

All of this suggests that serious thought needs to be given to

restricting or even eliminating at least television's presence on

8 1
the battlefield of the future, with or without the cooperation of

the media. Particularly difficult, of course, is the question of

censorship or restraint of the media during limited contingencies or undeclared wars such as Vietnam, Lebanon, or

Grenada. Because the stakes in such conflicts are relatively

low, the pressures for preserving peacetime rules of media

engagement are difficult to resist. Yet it is precisely these

conflicts in which the political and psychological element in

war is predominant. These conflicts are therefore most directly

susceptible to influence by media reporting . Devising acceptable

arrangements for limiting media coverage of such wars in the

future may well be critical if the United States is ever to engage

in them successfully.

Is

The American media have also affected the US government's

international information programs. Despite the popular image

of the "Voice of America" and "Radio Free Europe/Radio

Liberty" as propaganda organs fully comparable to "Radio

Moscow," they have been profoundly affected by the American

media's evolution over the last two decades, as well as by the

general cultural climate these media have reflected. Objectivity

and balance as understood by the new journalism have

become the standards for these radios as well. The point here

is not that a balanced treatment of American or Soviet virtues

and vices is not in some sense desirable, but rather that the

domestic cultural context shapes-to an unhealthy degree-the

aims and methods of the US international radios.

The effective conduct of psychological-political warfare by

the United States is perhaps more immediately constrained by

bureaucratic and organizational weaknesses within the US

government itself. There is a connection between the inadequacy

of US psychological-political warfare efforts in the past and the

inadequacy of strategic planning and decision making at the

national level. Precisely because the instruments of

psychological-political conflict are not altogether distinctive,

this arena requires fully integrated planning and coordinated

operations throughout virtually the entire national security

bureaucracy.

We need not dwell at length on the causes of the resistance

to psychological-political warfare throughout the US diplomatic,

military, and intelligence establishments ; they are apparent to

8 2
most of those who have had direct experience in this field. The

State Department continues to ply its trade very much in the

spirit of the foreign ministries of nineteenth-century Europe,

with only grudging accommodation to the role played by

modern communications, public opinion, ideology, and

political theater in contemporary international affairs. 19 The

military services-in their preoccupation with technology,

major weapon systems, and the big war-tend to neglect

low-cost approaches to enhancing operational effectiveness,

especially at the lower end of the conflict spectrum; and they

tend to regard psychological-political warfare as someone

else's busindss. 20

The failure of both the State Department and the military to

assume psychological-political responsibilities might seem to

point to the intelligence community as the natural home for

such activities . Yet the CIA has generally been unwilling or

unable to allow the degree of coordination with other governmental entities that is essential for an integrated national

strategy in this area. There is also a feeling at the agency that

the era of CIA involvement in political or ideological struggles is

essentially past-that an aggressive agency role can only

jeopardize more important institutional equities .

What, then, would be involved in a revitalization of US

psychological-political warfare capabilities? The foregoing

discussion is not meant to suggest that fundamental change is

a hopeless proposition-only that it is essential for us to be

conscious of the obstacles to it . We must be particularly

conscious of the less tangible obstacles that cannot be fixed by

organizational rewiring or other short-term measures. At the

same time, useful steps undoubtedly can be taken without

creating a revolution in the way Americans behave or the US

government conducts its business.

Perhaps the most promising area for change is in the field of

military psychological operations. The fact that military

psychological operations have generally been treated as a

subspecialty of special operations is a good indication of the

conceptual and operational limitations under which it has long

labored . 21 Of course, the very identification of PSYOP as a

special forces mission has tended to isolate it from normal

military activities and bring it under a certain suspicion,

8 3
which its black connotations have further strengthened. But

PSYOP has perhaps suffered most from identification with the

hardware and missions of the tactical battlefield-that is,

leaflet delivery, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasting. As a

result of all this, PSYOP has had very low priority in terms of

personnel, equipment, training, exercising, and doctrine. In

addition, it has suffered from low visibility at senior command

levels within the military (particularly outside the Army, which

owns most PSYOP assets), not to speak of other US government

organizations.

This situation is now beginning to change as a result of

renewed interest within the military as well as at the national

level. The rethinking of PSYOP roles and missions is still at an

early stage, however, and basic doctrinal and organizational

questions remain to be worked out. The Air Force and Navy

appear not yet fully persuaded that PSYOP can be a responsibility of all the services and of all higher command echelons.

There is increasing recognition that PSYOP need not be limited

to the hardware-supported missions of the tactical battlefield

but can have important applications at the operational and

theater levels, particularly in low-intensity conflict situations .

But there is as yet little apparent consensus on the role of

PSYOP at the strategic level or in peacetime.

The tendency to think of PSYOP in terms of direct verbal

communication is a strong one, and it reflects the nature of

tactical PSYOP as historically practiced by the United States .

However, this is a tendency that must be resisted if the full

potential of nontactical PSYOP is to be realized and if the

services are to embrace the full range of PSYOP activities as

legitimate and proper military missions. The uniformed

military generally acknowledge that the overriding purpose of

US military forces is not to fight wars but to deter them. But

deterrence is a psychological phenomenon, not a simple

reflection of the quantity and quality of military forces; and

there is every reason to suppose that foreign perceptions of US

military power can be shaped in various ways to strengthen its

deterrent effect . 22

Even if one accepts that it would be difficult to shape

Russian and Chinese perceptions of US power, a strong case

can be made for the potentially high payoffs of efforts to shape

8 4
g pp, qy

supplied with intelligence, lacking in orderly staff procedures,

strongly influenced by the passing impressions and phobias of

a small leadership element, and subject to sudden internal

political challenge.

Much could be accomplished simply through deliberate

exploitation of normal US military activities such as exercises,

deployments, air and naval displays, and technology

demonstrations . At a higher level of activity, with the movement

of military forces dedicated specifically to a psychologicalpolitical mission, PSYOP measures shade into traditional

coercive diplomacy. With activities such as naval port visits

and presence, missions have generally not been understood as

belonging within the PSYOP framework and do not appear to

have been approached in a systematic or highly coordinated

manner.

A characteristic weakness of America's approach to the use

of force has been the tendency to draw sharp distinctions

between wartime and peacetime. One result is the penalty

exacted (in terms of organization, planning, and general

readiness) in any transition from peace to war. Psychologicalpolitical warfare could compensate for temporary inadequacies

in deployed US forces in severe crises or in the initial stages of

war. In fact, this could be an important function for the United

States . In general, a compelling case can be made for reviewing

and enhancing the psychological-political component of US war

planning and national-level crisis management operations.

The entire area of strategic war planning is of critical

importance in this context, since it is the point at which the

military, diplomatic, and psychological-political components of

national strategy most closely converge. Efforts to enhance

and better integrate strategic planning at the national level

should focus on the difficult substantive and procedural

issues involved in war planning. More generally recognized is

the need for integrated interagency planning in crisis situations ;

but here as well the potential of psychological-political warfare

seems not to have been fully realized.

The foregoing discussion highlights the part of this field that

is the most neglected and at the same time the most

8 5
conflict theaters such as Central America, there is scope for

application of, the full range of US psychological-political

capabilities. The strategic importance of peacetime political

warfare and international communications-with respect to

the third world as well as the major powers-can hardly be

overestimated. It seems clear that the best hope for diminution

of political-military threats from major powers lies in the

relentless exposure of their populations to information and

ideas from the West. The opportunities for short-term gains

should not be allowed to distract us from this fundamental

strategic imperative.

Notes

I . See, for example, Paul Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (Washington,

D.C. : Infantry Journal Press, 1948); Leonard Doob, Public Opinion and

Propaganda (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1948) ; Daniel Lerner, ed.,

Propaganda in Warand Crises (New York: Stewart, 1950); William

Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, eds., A Psychological Warfare Casebook

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958); and W. Phillips Davison,

International Political Communications (New York: Praeger, 1965).

2. On the early history of military psychological operations, see Alfred H.

Paddock, Jr., U.S . Anny Special Warfare: Its Origins (Washington, D.C . :

National Defense University Press [NDUP], 1982).

3. The originally top secret report of the president's Committee on

International Information Activities, headed by William H. Jackson, is now

available in Department of State (DOS), Foreign Relations of the United

States, 1952-1954, vol. 2, pt. 2 (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing

Office [GPO], 1984), 1795-1867 . Hereafter referred to as Foreign Relations.

4. Ibid., 1836-60. According to the Jackson committee report,

the national information program has suffered from the lack of

effective central direction. In spite of the establishment of the

Psychological Strategy Board, coordination has been lacking and

the various agencies concerned have largely gone their separate

ways. Opportunities have been missed to take the offensive in

global propaganda campaigns. . . . The headquarters staffs of all

agencies engaged in information work should concentrate more

on the conception, planning, and coordination of global campaigns and less on detailed control and execution of day-to-day

operations (1840).

For pertinent remarks on the confusion regarding the mission of US

information agencies, see pages 1836-38; also of interest is this remark

concerning the military role:

86
limited by the lack of definition of the military role by higher

authority, and by an inadequate understanding on the part of

military authorities that they and their commands are full

participants in the political aspects of the present struggle and

must conduct themselves accordingly. Military commanders and

planners tend to regard the allocation of military resources to

current political operations as an unauthorized diversion from

tasks for which the armed forces are explicitly responsible,

(1860) .

Eisenhower abolished the Psychological Strategy Board on the committee's

recommendation, apparently on the grounds that psychological-political

warfare was too closely boundup with US policy or strategy generally for

such an arrangement to work effectively.

5. Consider, for example, John Franklin Campbell, The Foreign Affairs

Fudge Factory (New York: Basic Books, 1971), 147-77 .

6. A thoughtful discussion of the functioning of public diplomacy under

the Reagan administration is provided by Gifford D. Malone, "Functioning of

Diplomatic Organs," in Richard F. Staar, ed., Public Diplomacy: USA versus

USSR (Stanford. Calif. : Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 124-41 . See also

Carves Lord, "In Defense of Public Diplomacy," Commentary, April 1984,

42-50.

7. The argument for a more political approach to multilateral diplomacy

is cogently summarized by Richard S. Williamson, "U.S . Multilateral

Diplomacy at the United Nations," Washington Quarterly, Summer 1986,

5-18. On the Soviet approach to political action, see, for example, James

Atkinson, The Politics of Struggle: The Communist Front and Political Warfare

(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966); and Roy Godson, Laborin Soviet Global

Strategy (Washington, D.C . : National Strategy Information Center, 1984).

On the promotion of democracy as an objective of US policy, see William A.

Douglas, Developing Democracy (Washington, D.C. : Heldref Publications,

1972) .

8. See, for example, James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force (New York: Praeger, 1971) ; and Barry M.

Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War. U.S. ArmedForces as

aPolitical Instrument (Washington, D.C . : Brookings Institution, 1978).

9. See Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active

Measures in Soviet Strategy (Washington, D.C. : Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984).

Soviet active measures (activnyye meropriatia) encompass what is here

called political action as well as covert political warfare. For a general

discussion, see Angelo Codevilla, "Covert Action and Foreign Policy, II," in

Roy Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Covert Action

(Washington, D.C. : National Strategy Information Center, 1981), 79-104.

10. A collection of (generally older) materials on this subject is available

in Ronald D. McLaurin, ed. . Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and

Operations (New York: Praeger, 1982).

87
y 

overview of current US activities in this area, see United States Advisory

Commission on Public Diplomacy, 1986 Report (Washington, D.C. : GPO,

1986). Examples of public diplomacy materials produced by US government

agencies are DOD, Soviet Military Power 1986 (Washington, D.C. : GPO,

1986) and DOS and DOD, The Challenge to Democracy in Central America

(Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1986).

12. The role of information as an instrument of national strategy comparable to the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments was emphasized

in an address of then National Security Advisor William P. Clark to the

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 21

May 1982. Administration studies of international information policy resulted in a presidential directive on this subject (NSDD 130) in March 1983 .

See "rune #Up for Term Two," Chronicle of International Communication,

July-August 1984, 1.

13 . For some critical reviews by recent participants, see the remarks of

Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., and Gifford D. Malone in Staar, 297-99.

14. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans . Samuel B . Griffith (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1971) . 77-78.

15. Gen Dwight D . Eisenhower told a meeting of American newspaper

editors in 1944: "I have always considered as quasi-staff officers, correspondents accredited to my headquarters ." That reporters acquiesced in such

treatment is scandalous for a contemporary journalist; see the discussion in

Philip Knightly, The First Casualty (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovicb,

1975), 315-17ff.

16. The gross abuses involved in media coverage of the Vietnam War

have been well documented. See Peter Braestrup, Big Story (New Haven,

Conn. : Yale University Press, 1978); Robert Elegant, How to Lose a War.- The

Press and Viet Nam (Washington, D.C . : Ethics and Public Policy Center,

1982; originally published in Encounter, August 1981).

17. An excellent brief analysis may be found in Mark Crispin Miller,

"How TV Covers War." The New Republic, 29 November 1982, 26-33 . Also of

considerable interest is John Weisman, "Why TV Is Missing the Picture in

Central America," TV Guide, 15 September 1984, 2-14.

18. The controversy arising from the exclusion of the press from the US

action against Grenada in October 1982 led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to

initiate a review of policy regarding media participation in contingency

operations, in the form of a special commission of military and media

representatives headed by Gen Winant Sidle . Although this commission

reached informal agreement on the principle of press participation in all

military operations to the maximum degree consistent with operational

security, the DOD has since indicated some reservations on this score, and

there is little evidence that any significant movement has occurred on the

media side. As one retired admiral is reported to have said, "Operational

8 8
y, g

The War Goes On," New York Times, 29 January 1986: and "Material and

the Media," Essays on Strategy and Diplomacy 2 (Claremont, Calif. : Keck

Center for International Strategic Studies, 1984).

19. Pertinent observations on the role of the State Department in the

current administration's public diplomacy efforts are offered by Gifford

Malone in Staar, 132-37.

20. Consider the complaints of Fred W. Walker, "PSYOP Is a Nasty

Term-Too Bad," Air University Review 28 (September-October 1977),

71-76, as well as Edward N. Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare," in

William A. Buckingham, ed., Defense Planningfor the 19906 (Washington,

D.C . : NDUP, 1984), 197-209.

21. See the discussion in Alfred H. Paddock, Jr ., "Psychological Operations, Special Operations, and US Strategy," in Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh

Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz, eds., Special Operations in U.S. Strategy

(Washington, D.C. : NDUP, 1984), 231-51.

22. Of interest in this connection is Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow,

and Janis Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore : Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1985).

When Are Political Objectives

Clearly Defined?

A Historical Perspective

Michael A. Moms

National policy objectives should be clearly defined. Whether

the goals are strategic or tactical, they must be delineated and

articulated to those responsible for implementing them.

Since the difference between clarity and vagueness in political

objectives is only a matter of degree, incomplete conceptions of

vague political objectives obviously leads to incomplete

conceptions of clear political objectives. Nevertheless, a rough

distinction can be made between vague and clear political

objectives after the nature of their relative difference is

understood. Most observers acknowledge that political objectives

should determine the nature of military objectives and strategywhich cannot be precise unless political objectives are clearly

defined.

Clarity in political objectives is the responsibility of political

leaders rather than military authorities ; therefore, the military

services cannot be expected to impose limits on their

operations if the political objectives are vague. 1 In turn, if

military power is to be used efficiently and without risk of

major war, political objectives must not underestimate or

overestimate the military capabilities at their disposal.

Correct Generalizations

The attempts of many authors to define clear political

objectives are less perceptive than their analyses of the evils

that result from objectives that are vague. Most envisage clear

political objectives derived from an overall objective that

reflects our national purpose. They point out that limited

objectives determine the nature and extent of US involvement

in limited wars or interventions . Some authors add that clear

9 1
adjusted to meet changing conditions .

These statements about clear political objectives are correct

generalizations . Clear political objectives should be limited and

should not be achieved at the price of inflexibility . Changing

circumstances will always make the task of formulating clear

political objectives difficult . However, attempts to go beyond

generalities belie incomplete conceptualizations of vague

political objectives.

A Paradox

Political objectives evince much superficial continuity and,

hence, an aura of decisiveness, although they may actually

encompass and conceal considerable drift and indecision.

Thus, while flexibility is necessary for adapting to changing

circumstances, flexibility can also become largely synonymous

with drift and indecision.

Nevertheless, political objectives still may remain constant

in meaning over a period of time although different strategies

may be required to implement them. The difficulty is in

distinguishing between political objectives that only have

superficial continuity of meaning and those that really are

continuous in meaning.

This paradoxical nature of vague political objectives suggests a

definition of clear political objectives. A political objective is clear

when it continues to represent concern for the preservation of

the same specific vital interest or for the same kind of postwar

peace. If the objectives are clear in this sense, they can provide

adequate political direction for the choice of military objectives

and strategy.

Drift occurs when political objectives are not continuous in

meaning or when they are so vague as to permit several

divergent strategies to appear to be adequate ways of attaining

objectives. In either case, drift rather than political objectives

largely determines the nature of strategy.

However, this definition applies only to those specific

political objectives that guide military strategy in a specific

limited war or intervention. General foreign policy objectives

are, perforce, vague. For example, support of the United

9 2
foreign policy objectives that attract popular support through

their vagueness.

This suggested definition of clear political objectives needs

to be elaborated further by examining its relation to the

concept of vital interests. Since clear political objectives must

represent concern for the preservation of the same specific

vital interest, it is then necessary that vital interests also be

clear and specific.

Propaganda Advantages

Some propaganda advantages can be gained by grandiloquent

political objectives such as the Truman doctrine's aspiration to

support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by

armed minorities or outside pressures. However, even at that

early date in the cold war, the rhetorical exaggerations involved

touched off a debate charging that the United States was

overcommitting itself.

The US strategy of support to Greece and Turkey against

aggression refuted these criticisms ; it was a clear and limited

commitment. However, this clarity of strategy was due to the

US policymakers' clarity of purpose and their clear grasp of US

vital interests rather than to the clarity of publicly stated

political objectives.

Occasionally, vital interests may be precisely formulated

while political objectives are vague ; for example, the Truman

doctrine. Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult for political

objectives to be clear when vital interests are abstract and

vague.

The stark clarity of a direct Soviet confrontation with the

West in the late 1940s made the determination of US vital

interests relatively simple. The calculation of what were these

vital interests became more complex and ambiguous as the

communist threat became more diverse and subtle in the

1950s.

9 3
As the paradox of abstract vital interests began to loom

larger in US policy in the 1950s and 1960s, the need for clarity

of political objectives continued and, perhaps, even increased

as the nature of the threat changed and became more

ambiguous. However, the precedent of vague political

objectives set by the Truman doctrine's rhetoric continued to

be the observed norm.

One of Robert E. Osgood's main themes in a 1968 paper

illustrated the consequences of a heritage of vague political

objectives and of increasingly vague and abstract vital

interests. While the US postwar pursuit of policy objectives

has shown much continuity, the US concept of its vital

interests has been constantly expanding.

In Vietnam, where communist aggression was considered a

threat to US security, the general requirements of containment

led to an increasing US response with no question as to the

precise relevance of the Vietnam War to US security. Osgood

argued that the growth of multipolarity and the increasing

complexity of the communist threat necessitated more

precision in determining the extent to which our vital interests

are involved in communist aggression . 2

The paradox of abstract vital interests, then, reinforces the

paradox of vague political objectives and vice versa. Together,

they reinforce the indecision embedded in each vague paradox.

This tends to result in policy drift and in inadequately

considered, expanding commitments.

This vicious circle of vagueness and drift can be broken by

efforts to relate vital interests more specifically to contemporary conditions and conflicts, and can be weakened by

increasing the clarity of political objectives ; that is, clarification of vital interests leads to clarification of political

objectives and vice versa. More precise vital interests make it

harder for political objectives to equivocate in claiming they

are preserving the same specific vital interest.

On the other hand, greater clarity of political objectives

would increase pressures on vital interests to be more precise.

Greater clarity of political objectives would indicate the

respective advantages and costs of implementing different

9 4
strategies and combinations of political objectives, which

would in turn increase the chances that vague concepts of

vital interests would be exposed. Such exposure would surely

result in greater pressure for more precise definitions of vital

interests .

Guidelines

The peculiar characteristics of vague political objectives

suggest several guidelines for distinguishing clear political

objectives froru vague ones. Clarity of political objectives is

being achieved when the following questions can be answered

in the affirmative .

Is the nature of the paradox of vague political objectives

understood and consciously guarded against in defining political

objectives?

Do political objectives help undermine the paradox of abstract

vital interests? By indicating the respective advantages and costs

of implementing different strategies, do political objectives

expose vague conceptions of vital interests that unwisely require

prohibitive costs?

In choosing our military strategy, have we carefully

considered the costs and benefits of attaining objectives that

primarily demand military action versus the costs and benefits

of attaining objectives that are more closely related to

nation-building and internal security?

Are drift and indecision being reduced in our political

objectives, our conception of our vital interests, and our choice

of military strategy?

Notes

I . Robert J. Bower, "Military Objectives in the Nuclear Age," Military

Review, May 1966, 91-97.

2. Dr Robert E. Osgood, "Perspective on American Commitments," paper

presented at the Sixty-fourth Annual Meeting of the American Political

Science Association, Washington, D.C ., 5 September 1968, 11, 17-19.

9 5

Some Thoughts on

Psychological Operations

William F. Johnston

Governments of countries threatened with insurgency should

regard PSYOP, particularly face-to face communications, as a

first line o+f internal defense.

The intent of this article is not to proclaim PSYOP a panacea

for "wars of liberation."' The intent is to focus attention on

psychological operations as a vital instrument in Ho/Mao-type

wars of national liberation, especially the early stages where

revolutions are hatched from grievances of the masses by

communist incubation and kept at the right emotional

temperature by thousands of native agitators. 2 Without this

skillful and massive agitprop and organizational effort, which

has been characterized as "half the revolutionary task," there

could be no successful liberation wars.

Auxiliary or Primary?

Psychological operations should have more recognition as

important instruments of low-intensity conflict. 3 They have the

capability to compete with the communists' conflict doctrine,

which requires the integration of political, economic, psychological, and military factors of power. Aggressive nations can

successfully use PSYOP on a case-by-case basis in subversive

insurgency-threatened countries. PSYOP use, however, must

be carefully calculated in policy and operations to reach the

grassroots level. Whoever gets to the people first, with ideas

that stimulate self-interest, gains a decisive lead . . . and that

is precisely what happened in Vietnam. 4

9 7
Looking at the Vietnam War in retrospect, we see that the

communists used all available media, from instigation through

propaganda and guerrilla warfare to conventional military

operations. Such sophisticated mass media as printed materials,

leaflets, posters, pamphlets, and radio broadcasts were more

obvious than the workhorse of the revolution: the agitprop cadre

who operated on a face-to-face basis in the rural villages and

hamlets. The US discounted the sophisticated media in the early

days because it did not seem to play an important role. 5 What no

one understood at the time was that radio was being used to

communicate the Communist party line to the agitprop cadres in

the remote areas of South Vietnam. They, in turn, were

translating the party line into action among the masses. Based

on opportunities at the local level, the actions generally

consisted of study sessions (learning how to read and write

Vietcong propaganda), demonstrations, parades, rallies, and any

other activities that would get the people involved-ostensibly in

furtherance of the peoples' interests, but with the end objective

of strengthening the Communist party and weakening the

opposition. The US did not appreciate the magnitude of the

agitprop cadres-their numbers, their effectiveness, or the extent

to which they were able to get the people engaged in furthering

communist propaganda.

Douglas Pike, a noted expert, claims that the various social

organizations created by the Vietcong in South Vietnam and

used by the agitprop cadres were developed as "self-contained,

self-supporting channels of communication." In his view, these

organizations were the "secret weapon" and the "heart and

power of the National Liberation Front (NLF)." 6

Pike also revealed that the Vietcong "spent enormous amounts

of time, energy, manpower, and money . . . explaining itself to

itself, to the other side, and to the world at large." He said they

were "obsessed" with doing this. Pike found that the more he

studied the Vietcong, the more "it became evident that

everything the NLF did was an act of communication. ° 7 In

other words, everything the Vietcong did was calculated to

gain the optimum psychological effect.

9 8
In the communist world, psychological operations /warfare

experts are represented at the highest levels of government

and within the Communist party. One of their roles is to help

make policy. PSYOP experts in the United States and most of

the free world, however, (except for Nationalist China) appear

to have little status and not much influence; several reasons

are offered below.

I. Psychological operations /warfare, including propaganda,

has a distasteful image. It is thought to deal in lies and

variations Of the truth, and is looked upon in general as a dirty

business with which few wish to be associated.

2. Psychological operations cannot be scientifically evaluated

as to effectiveness . PSYOP activities that cannot produce fast,

measurable results are hard to sell. There are exceptions, of

course ; for example, when tactical PSYOP can be used to

encourage a beaten enemy to surrender or in an amnesty

campaign where the defectors can be counted.

3. There are very few professionally qualified and experienced

PSYOP experts who also have sufficient acquaintance with the

people of a specific foreign country. A major reason is that little

status, low prestige, few rewards, and no high-level promotions

are based on professionalism in psychological operations. There

is no psychological operations career program; yet, attaining full

qualification as a psychological operations expert on a specific

foreign country is a lifetime job, not unlike the type of

professionalism required of a psychoanalyst.

4. Insurgency-threatened countries do not give enough

attention or importance to psychological operations. They

often lack the know-how to start an effective psychological

operations program, and they tend to place the same priority

on PSYOP that the United States does in its support of that

country.$ This priority is usually relatively low in proportion to

the overall assistance provided by the US. While in the later

stages of an insurgency the US may help with such

sophisticated media as printed leaflets, radio, and TV, the US

usually lacks expertise in the language and ways of the people.

This expertise is necessary to provide advice on the content of

the message to ensure that the message achieves the desired

9 9
ggpp

Another problem is that of convincing an insurgencythreatened government to establish an uncomplicated but

credible amnesty program early in the insurgency. This

program would provide, for insurgents who have changed their

minds, a way out of the "victory or death" box that the

guerrilla is usually in.

Chieu Hoi

The Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Amnesty Program was one of

South Vietnam's most successful programs. However,

considerable time was required for the program to build up

credibility and to achieve the desired results. 9 Initially,

Vietcong who wanted to defect believed, as the Vietcong

indoctrination claimed, that they might be shot.

After the low point at the end of 1964, the Chieu Hoi

program showed a steady increase in the number of Vietcong

returnees. In 1966 there were over 20,000 defectors, double

the number of the preceding year. Total defections of Vietcong

returning under this program numbered more than 75,000. 10

If we accept the ratio of 10 government soldiers needed for

each insurgent guerrilla, this program saved the GVN and the

US a troop strength of over 750,000 soldiers. From the

dollars-saved angle, the total cost of the program, using a

figure of $127 to bring in a Vietcong defector, was around $9.5

million. Since the cost to kill a Vietcong is estimated at

$300,000, killing this number of soldiers would have cost

$2.25 billion.

Indigenous Armed Forces

The United States can and should give a higher priority to

encouraging insurgency-threatened governments to develop a

professional psychological operations capability. This

capability must include personnel, both American and

indigenous, who can conduct face-to-face psychological

operations. Indigenous PSYOP people must be able to

100
quantity of ideas related to peoplesdesires and fears if they

are to get the people motivated and committed to the

government.

Indigenous military forces, paramilitary forces, or police forces

would be good organizations to undertake increased PSYOP

responsibilities in the rural areas. One reason is that these

forces represent the best organized and most cohesive

institutions in many developing countries, particularly in the

rural areas . Also, better results will be achieved in the remote

rural areas if the peasants know that an iron fist is underneath

the velvet glove of the communists' friendly persuasion.

(Changing the'ways of peasants is a real challenge.)

Every member of those military and police forces that are in

contact with rural people should be trained to talk to the

people-and doing so should be required as part of their

duties . This would include interpreting news and participating

in educational activities. They must also be prepared to

discuss persuasively what the government is doing for the

local people.

The main focus should be on developing specialized PSYOP

units in the rural areas. These units should consist of local

natives. Very important, also, is the establishment of a twoway communication system to ensure that popular grievances

and good ideas get to the PSYOP planners and decision

makers at the top level-and that governmental PSYOP policy

guidance gets down to the lowest PSYOP level. This policy

guidance must be centralized and controlled at the top, but

implementation of the policy must be decentralized at the

grass roots .

Lower-level PSYOP people should spend about one-half of

their time in investigating and preparing so as to tailor their

talks and educational activities to fit the local needs. Once the

real needs of the rural people are ascertained and transmitted

to the top echelons, there is more reason to hope that the

government will help the people help themselves . This would

go a long way toward preventing the communist agitators from

generating revolutions out of grievances, hatreds, and social

injustices .
In conclusion, insurgency-threatened governments can be

expected to heed US advice if it is in the form of lessons

learned at great cost. Indigenous governments must put a high

priority on psychological operations, particularly on face-to-face

education and on countering communist agitators. These

governments must recognize that a face-to-face psychological

operations capability must be developed from the people, by

the people, and for the people of each particular language

group, tribe, clan, or area of the country-and this takes time.

Developing a successful capability requires careful selection

and training of candidates. This is not something that can be

"made in the USA" and exported.

The US military can and should develop mature, fully

qualified, professional PSYOP experts who are experienced in

the language and the thinking of a foreign people. Such

experts could help governments with PSYOP organization and

management, as well as providing support with our more

sophisticated mass media. Psychological operations planners,

both US and indigenous, must be raised to the first-team level.

This is crucial for success! PSYOP planners must have ready

access to top authorities. Governments must translate

top-level interest and support into meaningful terms for people

at the grassroots level. Feedback from the people to the top

level is equally important. This interest from government is

essential to winning and maintaining the support and loyalty

of the people. Such a psychological operations program would

be one of the cheapest and best security investments the US

could make in the developing world.

Notes

1 . This article consists of excerpts from "Neglected Deterrent: Psychological Operations in Liberation Wars'," Transition, nos . 12 and 13 (January

1968): 58-65. Reprinted with the permission of the Foreign Affairs Executive

Seminar, Foreign Service Institute, and its author . The communist psywar

instrument was simply a means to an end-communist domination over

everything that was not already under communist control.

2. Late in the China conflict, Gen George C . Marshall realized that the

battle for the mind waged with ideas and propagated by mass communications media could be decisive in countering the liberation war in China. In

10 2
China might have been saved by the massive use of radio and motion

pictures, on a scale hitherto unheard of." William Benton, "How Strong Is

Russia? And HowWeak?" New York Times Magazine, 10 June 1956, 70.

3. Robert Holt and Robert Van de Velde, Strategic Psychological Operations (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1960), 64. These authors state

that the US has never fully understood the nature of the psychological

i nstrument.

4. Stefan Possony in "Viet Cong Propaganda War," Los Angeles Times, 11

July 1967, gives a good analysis of international propaganda based on

captured documents . He concludes that although Americans are not conscious of it, the US was the target of a well-orchestrated and skillful

Vietcong propaganda offensive after 1961.

5. Radio Hanoi and Vietcong clandestine transmitters were important for

getting the Communistparty line and other instructions to the leadership

and agitprop cadres in remote areas-information which otherwise would

have been delayed for weeks. Broadcasts were made in all five major

languages used in Vietnam. Beginning in 1960, there was an increase in the

use of all types of media in an accelerated propaganda offensive against the

government of Vietnam.

6. Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the

National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass . : MIT Press,

1967), 124.

7. Ibid ., ix .

8. See Slavko Bjelajac, "A Design for Psychological Operations in Vietnam," Orbis, Spring 1966. Bjelajac concludes that "psychological operations

are indispensable" and in a Vietnam-type war "should be accorded a priority

at least equal to any other weapon or technique in the Vietnamese protracted conflict ."

9. The task of defecting a Vietcong in the Chien Hot Program was

primarily a psychological operations task. However, Aid for International

Development (AID) Vietnam played an important role, since AID furnished

the resources for most of the food, housing, and allowances given to the

Chieu Hot.

10. Bob Considine, "Pacification Cadres," Philadelphia Inquirer, 19

September 1967.

The Role of Public Opinion

Lloyd A. Free

Public opinion cannot be slavishly followed, but

psychological data should be collected and analyzed so that

government can take this factor into account in planning.

The following excerpts are from an exchange of letters that

took place at about the time of the Vietnam moratorium in the

fall of 1969. One writer was a Georgetown University

sophomore with the unknown name of Randy Dicks, the other

a president of the United States with the well-known name of

Richard Milhous Nixon.

Randy wrote the president:

I think that your statement at your recent press conference that

"under no circumstances" will you be affected by the impending

antiwar protests in connection with the Vietnam moratorium is

ill-considered, to say the least. It has been my impression that it is not

unwise for the President of the United States to take note of the will of

the people . After all, these people elected you. You are their President.

The president replied, in part:

There is a clear distinction between public opinion and public

demonstrations . To listen to public opinion is one thing; to be swayed

by public demonstration is another. . . . Whatever the issue, to allow

Government policy to be made in the streets would destroy the

democratic process. It would give the decision not to the majority and

not to those with the strongest arguments, but to those with the

loudest voices .

Introduction

What is the role-the actual and proper role-of public opinion

in international security affairs? And how, if public opinion

does and should count, is majority opinion to be determined?

10 5
abroad, is somehow important is borne out by the efforts of

political leaders to woo it and by the practices of governments

to influence it . All major governments in the world today, and

many of the minor ones, spend varying amounts of time,

money, and attention on attempts to influence the opinions of

their own citizens and the citizens of other countries.

Yet, even in our recent history, when a sense of the

importance of public opinion has become more self-conscious

than it used to be, there have been unbelievers. Harry

Truman, whom I nevertheless admire as one of our great

presidents, was one of them. When Mr Truman faced a

problem, hb would find a principle involved, often a moral

principle, and then make his decision accordingly. And he

would stick to that decision come hell or high water. With this

approach, public opinion and opinion polls are irrelevant, you

simply do what you think is right.

The late, great John Foster Dulles adopted this same

approach. He once said in my presence:

If I so much as took into account what people are thinking or feeling

abroad, I would be derelict in my duty as Secretary of State.

Another of our great secretaries of state, Dean Acheson,

claimed, disapprovingly, that Americans have a "Narcissus

psychosis." "An American," he wrote, "is apt to stare like

Narcissus at his image in the pool of what he believes to be

world opinion." After making the point that the only honest

answer people generally could give to questions about the

specifics of foreign policy would be a "don't know," he made

this observation:

World opinion simply does not exist on matters that concern us . Not

because people do not know the facts-facts are not necessary to form

opinions-but because they do not know the issues exist.

Thus, we are faced with some very basic questions: Does

such a thing as world opinion exist? Do people in the United

States and other parts of the world really have meaningful

opinions of any significant scope in regard to international

issues? If so, are these opinions of importance to foreign

relations and international security affairs? Your own

instinctive answer to these questions may be an unqualified

10 6
the public opinion field, my own answer is very equivocalnamely, it all depends.

Definitions and Assumptions

To start with, I must define some of the terms we will be

discussing. An opinion, in my terminology, is simply an

expressed attitude-an attitude that is communicated. An

attitude, on the other hand, is really more of a perception-a

way of looking at a given subject.

In the course of our lives, we build up all sorts of assumptions based on our experiences and these assumptions

influence what we perceive as the world in which we live. In

other words, we participate in creating our own realities and

our attitudes spring from these "realities." They are the result

of an interplay of our assumptions, as shaped and modified by

experience. In a very real sense, if an individual has no

assumptions concerning a given subject, or that are capable of

being related to that subject, he can have no attitudes-and

hence no opinions. And any opinions expressed by an

individual will be meaningful only if he in some way relates the

subject to his own purpose, no matter how narrow or broad it

may be. The range of his sense of purpose is delimited by his

"reality world."

Every individual has blind spots of greater or lesser

scope-that is, subject matter areas about which he has no

assumptions and, hence, no attitudes. It is difficult for many

people to realize what a large proportion of the people of the

United States, not to mention the underdeveloped areas of the

world, have no assumptions, attitudes, or information about

international affairs.

Let me cite from a study I did in this country a few years

ago. One-quarter of the American public had never heard or

read of NATO, only 58 percent knew that the United States is a

member of NATO, and only 38 percent knew that the Soviet

Union was not a member-facts which go to the very nature

and fundamental purpose of our most important alliance!

One-quarter of the adults in this country did not even know

that the government of mainland China is communistic!

10 7
roles as citizens of a nation that is the world's leader-and

only about one-fourth are really adequately informed. The

situation in most other countries of the world is far worse,

particularly in underdeveloped areas. For pollsters to ask

these uninformed people about specifics of foreign policy is

obviously an exercise in futility. Looked at in this perspective,

one can begin to see the validity of Dean Acheson's views and

to question the common assumption that, if enough people at

home and abroad are persuaded to adopt a given opinion, then

the policy of their government will be affected-at least in

democracies.

Opinion Leaders and the General Public

Before we write off the importance of public opinion in

international security affairs, however, let us introduce some

other aspects of the problem. First, we must recognize that

when it comes to the "nitty-gritty" day-to-day decisions on

specifics, public opinion usually has no effect . Either the

public has no opinions on the matter or people do not know

that decisions are being made. On a broad range of matters

that are publicly known, there is usually an educated elite who

do have meaningful opinions, in varying degrees of intensity,

about international security matters.

This elite may be of greater or lesser size, depending upon

which country is involved and which issue is in question.

However, the fact that it may be small does not derogate its

power. We can meaningfully define world opinion abroad or

significant opinion at home in terms of the publics that count

in the particular situation, whether limited or mass.

Beyond this, however, elements of the public can and often

do get into the act, not only in the United States, but also in

the underdeveloped areas. The people may lack meaningful

opinions on a wide range of specifics about international

matters, but their broader assumptions may come into play at

certain times and places to make a given international issue a

matter of public concern. Often this applies only to a minority

of the greater public; frequently the people are whipped up and

108
local leaders-but react they do!

Publication

The action may be as peaceable as signing a petition or

writing a letter to the local newspaper (both of which are apt to

be relatively ineffective), or to writing a personal letter to the

president (as Randy Dicks did), or writing to one's congressman. (The latter action may actually be of some influence ; the

attention paid by members of Congress to their mail is out of

all proportion to its significance as a barometer of public

opinion.)

But, increasingly, more extreme manifestations of public

action-demonstrations, picketing, and rioting-reflect attitudes

that are strongly held by at least some segments of the public.

These forms of public action have become a phenomenon of

worldwide scope. For example, rioting in Japan and Korea

made it exceedingly difficult for the two governments to

normalize their relations. Demonstrations in Panama were

unquestionably instrumental in causing the US-after a decent

interval, of course-to agree to revise the Panama Canal Treaty.

Demonstrations and potential riots in the Middle East have

made it difficult for the Arab governments to follow a policy of

moderation in the Arab-Israeli conflict . Anticommunist violence

in Indonesia strengthened the hand of the army against the

Communist party in a struggle that has had profound

international implications. Anti-Vietnam protests in the United

States unquestionably affected the calculations of the North

Vietnamese, not to mention those of our American leaders.

But the greater public also gets into the act in a more

regular and generally more peaceable way in the form of

periodic elections, not only in the democracies but also in

some of the semidemocracies (if not the "guided democracies").

In such elections, international matters can and often do enter

as central issues of the campaign.

But then, one does not have to search very far back in US

history for other examples: Woodrow Wilson's campaign

theme, "He kept us out of war," helped him win the election in

1916; and Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower's promise to go to Korea

10 9
axiomatic that whenever war or peace seems to be at issue,

the public in almost every country will exhibit deep concern in

ways that have political meanings.

Global Public Opinion

More broadly, a close study of the matter has convinced me

that there are widely shared attitudes on international

matters, amounting in many instances to consensuses which

governments simply must take into account. Sometimes these

consensuses are global . With apologies to Dean Acheson, there

are, on occasion, worldwide or virtually worldwide reactions on

matters that concern us.

One occasion was the Suez affair in 1956. I have little doubt

that the United Nations well-nigh universal condemnation of

the Israeli-British-French invasion of Egypt was supported by

what can only be called a consensus of world opinion-a

consensus shared even by many people in both the United

Kingdom and France.

A similar consensus of condemnation seems to have existed

over the Soviet Union's occupation of Czechoslovakia-a

consensus apparently shared even by a good many people who

were communists themselves.

Another is the worldwide impact of Russia's launching the

first two sputniks in 1957, followed by its subsequent achievements in space. These developments led to reevaluations of the

relative standings of the two superpowers, extending not only

through official circles and elites but to general publics as

well. In fact, data show that people throughout the world

ranked the Soviet Union and the United States just about

equally in terms of power and importance in those days, an

enormous contrast from the days before 1957.

This perceived equality contributed, along with other

developments, to the idea that a stalemate existed-a notion

that affected the foreign policies of most of the world's nations.
Regional and National Attitudes

Short of these global consensuses, some basic attitudes are

so widely held in certain regions or areas that they must be

taken into account, both by the governments which rule there

and by others dealing with them. The phobia in Latin America

against American intervention is one example. Similarly, in

almost all of Africa and Asia, basic attitude patterns opposed

to imperialism and neocolonialism are deeply rooted. Other

examples are the anti-Israeli "set" of the Arab world and,

fortunately for us, the anti-Chinese bias in much of Southeast

Asia.

In addition, there are many situations where there is a

meaningful consensus of public opinion in particular

countries. One example is the almost universal aspiration that

the West Germans held for Germany's reunification. Other

examples are the fear and hatred of Germans that were held

by most Russians and Poles, and the Japanese public's

opposition to full-scale rearmament.

The American people, too, have certain fixed ideas. One is

opposition to foreign aid: Six out of 10 Americans favor either

reducing economic aid to foreign countries or ending it

altogether. Another is the very high degree of concern to keep

our military defense strong at the same time that more than

one-half of the public thinks we are spending too much on

defense. In a related vein, almost six out of 10 Americans

think the US "should take all necessary steps to prevent the

spread of communism to any other parts of the free world, no

matter where." Anticommunism is, in fact, clearly one of the

strongest factors in Americans' ideas about US international

security policies .

Policies and Opinions

In any particular country at any given time, there are

programs and policies for which no government or leader can

engender public endorsement. In other words, the climate of

opinion imposes limits-sometimes very broad, sometimes

very narrow-on each government's area of maneuver. In the

extreme, certain things are virtually taboo; in other cases, thev
py p

opinion is either in agreement, nonexistent, divided, or lacking

in intensity, anything is acceptable. Although policymakers

sometimes appear blind to the fact, the achievement of

many-if not most-of the international security objectives

adopted by the United States presupposes certain perceptions,

attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors on the part of various persons

in this and other countries.

Usually, on day-to-day matters, the opinions of key members

of Congress and/or officials of foreign governments are

important for the accomplishment of particular US objectives.

On more important matters, the list of people who have

influential opinions may include members of elite groups that

have power or influence in our own or other societies. Often,

the educated elements of the general public may also have a

bearing on the success or failure of US policies. Frequently,

the opinions of peoples as groups are important, either

because popular support or cooperation is necessary or

because the people show their concern by way of protests,

demonstrations, or elections.

Often, psychological factors are critical to the success of US

policies. If these factors are absent, it is futile to adhere to a

policy which presupposes them. Taking into account, for

instance, the feelings of the majority of the Chinese people

toward the Chiang Kai-shek regime in 1949, no amount of

effort or determination on the part of the United States could

have prevented a communist takeover of mainland China. As

another example, consider that the US supported French rule

in Algeria for years, despite the fact that the psychology of the

Algerians-not to mention the French-made this goal

impossible.

In another aspect of French international security affairs, it

was public opinion, more than anything else, that forced the

French military to fight the Indo-Chinese war with one hand

tied behind its back; victory was impossible. The French

people would not condone the necessary national effort, so the

government found it impolitic to send draftees to fight in

Indochina. The current malaise in the European community

and the disarray in NATO are prime examples of the limits that

psychological factors can place on national objectives .
py

Finally, to prove what a valid prophet I can be on occasionand, of course, I like to forget those instances where my

judgment proved faulty-let me quote from a lecture I

delivered when the trends of American opinion about the war

in Vietnam were still pretty obscure.

Our own Government will undoubtedly now have to face up to the fact

that the American people are sick and tired of the war. It is my

considered judgment as a so-called "expert" that we are in the early

stages of an inexorable tide in favor of pulling out of Vietnam. There

may be riptidA from time to time which will temporarily obscure the

direction of the current, but it is my belief that however you and I may

feel about the matter, the movement down below will continue ever

more strongly in favor of disengagement. )

Of course, as usual when I stick my neck out, I had some

data to rely on. In the aftermath of the Tet offensive, studies

conducted in this country showed that in mid-February 1968,

immediately after the offensive, the majority of Americans

remained hawks. In fact, hawkish sentiment increased in the

immediate sense after the Tet offensive, favoring further

escalation of the war. One-quarter of the American people

advocated gradual escalation and no less than 28 percent

opted for "an all-out crash effort in the hope of winning the

war quickly, even at the risk of China or Russia entering the

war."

By June of the same year-1968-the picture had changed

materially. One-half of the public had shifted to the "dove"

side, with 7 percent favoring a cutback in the American

military effort and 42 percent wanting us to discontinue the

struggle and start pulling out of Vietnam-this latter figure

being almost double what it had been just four months earlier.

By June of 1970, Gallup had found that the proportion of

people thinking that the US had "made a mistake in sending

troops to right in Vietnam" had risen from 25 percent (in

March of 1966) to 56 percent. About one-half of the people

now favored withdrawal, either immediately or at least by July

1971.
Policymakers and Public Opinion

There is a real question about the sensitivity of our policymakers to psychological factors that have a bearing on the

success or failure of our international security objectives.

There is also a question about those policymakers' receptivity

to the results of public opinion polls and other forms of

policy-oriented psychological research. I can only speak on the

basis of my own experience and that of my late associate,

Hadley Cantril, plus years of personal observation of the

government process. And from these points of view, I would

say that the record is spotty at best. However, recent

presidents have shown an awareness of the importance of

psychological factors.

Oddly enough, the supreme example of sensitivity to public

opinion-and of consummate ability to influence it-came in

the earliest days of scientifically conducted polling. The man of

the hour was Franklin D. Roosevelt. Tommy Corcoran once

credited Roosevelt with having said, in effect, that he was the

captain of the ship but that events and public opinion limited

his power while providing instrumentalities for exerting power.

Particularly after the adverse reactions to his famous

"quarantine" speech, Roosevelt was determined not to get too

far out in front of public opinion in connection with the war in

Europe-nor to stay any farther behind than he thought he

had to. In this connection, he followed the polls with great

interest-particularly charts of American public opinion

specially prepared for him by Mr Cantril, who had conducted

surveys throughout this period.

President Eisenhower

President Dwight D. ("Ike") Eisenhower was less consciously

interested in domestic public opinion polls than Roosevelt had

been. This was probably in part because Ike was so popular

and his administration so relatively noncontroversial . But I

know from my own experience that he was deeply interested in

the opinions of people in other countries. While working with

Nelson Rockefeller, who was a consultant to the president in
situation abroad.

The president read these reports carefully and followed them

with great interest. (The common notion that he did not read

documents is ridiculous ; every single report I submitted to him

through Rockefeller was read-and annotated-by the following

morning. And this goes even for a 67-page document,

single-spaced, which I know he read in full because he corrected

a typographical error in his own hand on the next-to-last page!)

On more than one occasion, after John Foster Dulles had

given one of his masterful briefings to the National Security

Council (NC), the president was heard to say, "But, Foster,

you forget the human side," as he pulled out one of my reports

and read from it. As a result of that, I was the second most

hated man (by Dulles) in Washington, Rockefeller being the

first!

By 1955, my reports to President Eisenhower had shown a

sharp increase in skepticism abroad about America's peaceful

intentions. This skepticism helped to create receptivity to an

idea that Rockefeller had advanced and which had been

cold-shouldered-namely, the "Open Skies" inspection

proposal. When Eisenhower finally propounded Open Skies, it

had as great a psychological impact as any one-shot

propaganda move since World War II.

President Kennedy

Jerome Wisener says that John Fitzgerald Kennedy knew

clearly that he could exercise his power only if he had the

consensus of the people and the Congress behind him. As a

result, Kennedy was a fervent believer in polling. He depended

heavily on the findings of special surveys conducted for him by

Lou Harris on domestic opinion, including international

issues . He also followed closely the United States Information

Agency (USIA) data on opinion abroad. On a number of

occasions, he personally requested that certain surveys be

made-especially in Latin America.

In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, USIA found that Fidel

Castro was little known in Latin America and was generally

viewed by the public with considerable allergy. Subsequently,
approach to Castro and Castroism.

President Johnson

In the early days of his administration, Lyndon Baines

Johnson regularly used Oliver Quayle's polls, including those

on international issues . President Johnson kept a loose-leaf

notebook, not only of the latest surveys taken in the United

States by Quayle, Gallup, and Harris, but also of polls

conducted abroad.

Following ithe American intervention in the Dominican

Republic, I sent to the White House a report I had prepared in

June of 1962, Attitudes, Hopes and Fears of the Dominican

People. It showed that the Dominicans, as of then at least,

were the most pro-American, anticommunist, anti-Castro

people we had found in any part of the world. Not only did

President Johnson read the report; the White House had it

duplicated and distributed at the highest level and said that it

had proved "very helpful." I have little doubt that this report

was one of many factors that influenced the Johnson

administration to shift from supporting the military junta to

working toward a coalition solution.

Against such "successes" as these, however, must be set

some glaring "failures," where research findings were ignored

in framing US policies. The most cataclysmic of these had to

do with the Bay of Pigs invasion. A year before, I had managed

"by the skin of my teeth" to get a public opinion study done in

Cuba. It showed that Castro was overwhelmingly popular with

the Cuban people. There was a small opposition, but it was

confined almost entirely to the city of Havana. Thus, whatever

the expectations of those who planned the invasion, it came as

no surprise to many that there was no popular uprising to

assist the Bay of Pigs invaders .

The study had been made available to the government as

well as to the public, and had actually been sent up to the

White House. However, between the time the report was issued

and the attempted invasion, there had been a change of

administration-Kennedy had come into the White House. And

our findings were not called to the attention of the new
the question of invading Cuba.

Although called a "success" when submitted to President

Johnson after the Dominican intervention in 1965, a

Dominican study conducted after the fall of Trujillo found that

the invasion had been a "failure" when the results were

originally made available to the government in 1962. The

report included the following flat statement:

An extremely serious situation of popular discontent and frustration,

fraught with a dangerous potential for upheaval, exists in the

Dominican Republic. Never have we seen the danger signals so

unmistakably clear.

1

Yet, despite this urgent warning, the US government devised

well-merited but long-range solutions to Dominican problems

and neglected short-term emergency programs which might

have avoided later problems.

The neglect of such research findings demonstrates a fact

which has become crystal clear to me from my years of

experience within the State Department and my subsequent

observations as a researcher and government consultant. A

considerable proportion of our government, with particular

reference to the State Department and the Foreign Service,

tends to be insensitive to the importance of psychological

factors in international affairs. Within our US government

there is no systematic collection of such data and, despite the

interest of the White House, no systematic marshalling of

whatever material may be available. (It is not without

significance that the special polling of American public opinion

that was inaugurated by the State Department after World

War II and was conducted under the very distinguished and

able direction of Schuyler Foster, whom some of you probably

know, was discontinued in the latter half of the 1950s.)

As to psychological factors abroad, more than one ambassador has echoed the words of one of their colleagues: 'To hell

with public opinionl I'm here to deal with the government, not

with the public! " He said this, incidentally, while serving in a

country which later went into an acute crisis because of public

turbulence.

It is against this multifaceted background that I said the

record of our policymakers is spotty when it comes to paying
attention to the psychological.Some policymakers (particularly

at the highest level) have paid attention; some have not.

Conclusion

In closing, let's put this whole matter into broader perspective.

No responsible critic maintains that our government should

slavishly follow public opinion or that US foreign policy should

be based exclusively, or even primarily, upon courting

momentary popularity at home or abroad. Often, governments

that deserv4 the adjective "responsible" will have to fly squarely

in the face of domestic opinion while attempting to change it .

Bill Moyers once told a story that is pertinent in this respect:

During a period of crisis, President Johnson and his advisors

were meeting in the cabinet room to discuss alternative

courses of action. At a particularly exasperating moment,

when no option appeared likely to succeed, one of the men

exclaimed wearily: "If we only knew what the people of this

country really want us to dol" The president studied his

melancholy advisor for 39 seconds, then answered: "If we

knew what they wanted us to do, how could we be sure that

we should do it?"

Any government worthy of its name has to do what it thinks

necessary for the good of the country, but its course can be

greatly eased if it has public opinion on its side. Decision

making demands a knowledge of how the people are thinking

and feeling-and why.

Even more often, governments must fly in the face of

opinion abroad. This is especially true of the United States as

it pursues its role of world leadership : if we aid India to rearm

against the Chinese threat, we are bound to incur the wrath of

Pakistan; we cannot assist Israel without provoking an

anti-American outburst from the Arab world; fighting the war

in Vietnam enraged the "doves" in many parts of the world. It

is clear, then, that a certain price must be paid in at least

psychological terms-and it should be incurred knowingly,

after both a careful assessment of the benefits and risks and a

calculated attempt to devise ways to minimize unfavorable

impacts and maximize favorable ones.
After the Tet offensive, Gen William C. Westmoreland said that

the results were psychological, not real. Well, he and his

colleagues had better learn that when it comes to accomplishing

US objectives, psychological factors can be just as "real" as guns,

ships, planes, or nuclear weapons. This is because human

beings are always the ultimate movers and shakers, and

humans are psychological animals.

In short, psychological data needs to be systematically

collected and cranked into the intelligence appraisals of given

situations. And these data, both domestic and foreign, should

be taken into account in framing foreign policies and enunciating interfiational positions. The psychological requirements

for achieving US objectives need to be carefully calculated

from the start, and every effort must be made, through

leadership, persuasion, and public diplomacy, to secure their

fulfillment .

Simply put, psychological data is essential if the United

States is to be an effective leader in today's world. And its

employment is imperative if the president of the United States

is going to lead a unified American people into the future.

Notes

1 . Lloyd A. Free, "'The Role of Public Opinion," The Forum, Spring 1971,

55 ; lecture, National War College, Fort Lesley McNair, Washington, D.C.

Reprinted with the concurrence of the National War College and the

courtesy of the author.

A Critical Analysis

of US PSYOP

Lt Col Philip P. Katz, USA, Retired

Ronald D. McLaurin

Preston S. Abbott

i

In an era during which it has become very fashionable to

discuss the psychological aspects of international relations

and during which the study of that field has been greatly

influenced by psychological theories and research, particularly

in America, little attention has been focused on the communications aspect of international relations; that is, psychological

operations. In this essay, we identify and assess the principles

of-and some developments in-this field. We also advance

several modest proposals for further progress in analysis.

Introduction

Psychological operations is that specialized field of communications that deals with formulating, conceptualizing, and

programming goals, and with evaluating government-togovernment and government-to-people persuasion techniques.

Properly defined, PSYOP is the planned or programmed use of

human actions to influence the attitudes and actions of

friendly, neutral, and enemy populations that are important

to national objectives.) The critical variable is, then, the

perceptions of foreign populations . 2 Propaganda is only the

most obvious example of a persuasive communication.

Because psychological operations are designed to influence

actions or attitudes, the parameters of the field can be seen

in terms of Harold D. Lasswell's classic communications

model:
Who Says What

In Which Channel

To Whom

With What E, ffect. 3

We know that a government spokesman is saying something

in some channel to foreign populations with a view to influencing them. The specific operation is then defined on the basis of

what, in which channel, and with what effect. Psychological

operations, then, is a truly interdisciplinary phenomenon, lying

in the interstices of psychology, sociology, communication, and

political and military sciences. 4.5 PSYOP is communication that

"embraces the study of persuasiveness, on the one hand, and

persuadability on the other. It also involves the study of attitudes-how they are formed and how they can be changed." 6

In practice, however, psychological operations requires inputs

from linguists, ethnologists, historians, cultural anthropologists, and area specialists, along with others from the

humanities, natural sciences, and social sciences.

Historical Review

Leaders have used persuasive appeals as far back as

recorded history allows us to search; Americans, authors of

the Declaration of Independence and other brilliant psychological operations, were far from unfamiliar with this tradition.$

The process of psychological operations remains essentially what

it was when Gideon defeated the Midianites but, like many other

human enterprises, it has become infinitely more complex. The

development of mass communication-broadcasting, worldwide

wire news services, mobile printing presses, motion picturesprovides instruments of psychological operations previously

undreamed of, as may be seen from the scale on which they were

used in World War 11 as compared with previous wars.

No one who lived through or read about the collapse of

France in 1940 will ever forget Goebbels's development and

use of psychological operations as major political and military

weapons of attack. The Nazis orchestrated the use of radio, the

press, demonstrations, group meetings abroad, agents,

displays, fifth-column terrorism, and, once the attack started,

12 2
many) . The Nazis gave the first full-dress demonstration of

what psychological operations can accomplish with the new

tools of mass communication and the new weapons of military

warfare. And once the meaning of what they had done came to

be understood, all the major combatants who had not already

done so were compelled to institutionalize psychological

operations in their own plans and concepts of modern war.

Nevertheless, while there were many programs, no systematic,

centralized planning was undertaken in the United States

until World War 1191 °-and the organization and resources

developed during the war were quickly reduced following its

conclusion. There was some effort to study the lessons learned

from PSYOP programs, but the analyses were disseminated

unevenly in the government and military services. The civilian

Office of War Information (OWI) was disestablished and the

propaganda function was passed to the Department of State.

During the 1950s, however, American psychological

operations received renewed attention. The highly ideological

character of the cold war rivalry and the political nature of the

Korean War led to an emphasis on the psychological aspects of

conflict. Courses of instruction were developed and "PSYOP"

was rationalized within the services. In the civilian government

structure, PSYOP was rationalized within the United States

Information Agency (USIA). During this period, which was

characterized by a political more than a military conflict,

channels such as "Radio Free Europe," "Radio Liberation"

(later "Radio Liberty"), "Radio in the American Sector" (RIAS),

and the "Voice of America" (VOA) were primary PSYOP agents.

They communicated news, ideas, and opinions across political

boundaries-not infrequently with significant effects .

Unquestionably, the largest American effort in psychological

operations since the second World War occurred during the

Vietnam War. From the 1950s until the early 1970s, the US

government placed substantial emphasis on psychological

aspects of its world role, first in its rivalry with the Soviet

Union, second in its assumption of global leadership, and

finally in Vietnam and other local conflicts . However, the

growth of detente and the apparent failure of PSYOP in Vietnam

contributed to a continuation of the pattern whereby persuasive

12 3
is no longer a perceived immediate need for them.

General Principles

Effective psychological operations requires several basic

ingredients: adequate intelligence, coherent organization, sound

planning, and a systematic evaluation of feedback. Intelligence is

the most commonly overlooked prerequisite to an effective

PSYOP program. From a PSYOP perspective, intelligence is the

basis for understanding the communications, emotions, attitudes,

and behavipr of individuals and groups.

Basic to the understanding of persuasive communications is

the fact that audience factors are the principal constraint on

communication effects. Although studies have been conducted

on source attractiveness, trustworthiness, and background, it is

the audience's perceptions of credibility that count. 11 Explorations of the phrasing, ordering, and other presentation factors

continue to show that the critical variables in determining communication effects are audience factors-education, exposure to

opposing views (previous or subsequent to the message), extant

opinions, and culture. 12 In addition, such wholly audience

considerations as target composition and persuadability are

clearly beyond the influence of any communicator. 13

Since the target population in effect sets the parameters of

persuasion, intelligence must provide sufficient accurate data

to support the development of programs and messages to

optimally affect the audience in all its diversity. 14 Information

must be timely, thorough, and systematic.

Organization is important because it must unify the diverse

parts of the complex process of intercultural communications.

Without sound organization, no single aspect of the process

can contribute efficiently to the system. Breakdowns will occur

within as well as between program responsibilities. Examples

are given below.

Planning is essential at all levels, from tactical operations to

long-range, strategic activities. The psychological plan, the

basic instrument for integrated and concerted operations,

must be designed to exploit all of the source advantages

possible. The plan should use intelligence to determine the

12 4
attainment of national objectives .

To implement PSYOP plans, the program must extend

beyond words to actions-and actions must be an extension of

words. An effective program of persuasive communications

draws on real action attributes and elaborates a realistic and

concrete future course. Political and military actions are

critical elements in psychological operations .

In order to continue to improve the effectiveness of the

program, a system to collect, analyze, and exploit feedback on

past operations must be established. Because of the weakness

of traditional measures of PSYOP effects, this requirement has

too often beeA neglected.

Organization

It is perhaps a truism to say that an organization should be

so constituted that it is capable of effectively carrying out the

functions assigned to it. In this section, we emphasize the

essential functions of psychological operations and explain

how these functions are currently managed in the United

States .

An institutionalized structure is essential for the effective

implementation of psychological programs. There must be a

defined organizational structure with clear lines of authority

and responsibility for the development and implementation of

policy, plans, and operations. Whether strategic or tactical in

scope, the psychological operations mission requires the staff

and personnel necessary to develop and implement policy,

develop and execute plans, collect intelligence, evaluate

programs, and conduct operations.

Policy

Afirst requirement for conducting meaningful psychological

operations is the national-level development and implementation of clearly articulated PSYOP policy in support of

political, social, economic, or military goals. The government

must establish realistic policy goals to ensure consistent and

credible operations. Credibility of policy objectives is the core

12 5
inconsistent national policy can destroy the best plans and

programs.

One example of a poor policy and a lack of understanding was

Hitler's attitude toward the Vlasov movement in which he failed

to exploit the psychological aspects of Russian Nationalism in

1943. 1 5- 16 Based on policy, appropriate psychological objectives

to support operations can be articulated. Programs designed to

implement objectives should not be academic-they must be

credible and an integral part of the operational environment. For

example, if the psychological objective is to induce enemy

defection atld/or surrender, appropriate actions must be taken

by military commanders to ensure that friendly forces clearly

understand the surrender policy, will honor safe-conduct

leaflets, and will establish appropriate policy concerning the

good treatment of enemy prisoners in POW camps. In an

insurgency or political environment, the government must

develop and implement a credible amnesty policy regarding the

insurgents and their supporters.

In the United States, the development and implementation

of psychological policy is the responsibility of the executive

branch of government. The National Security Council, Department of State (DOS), USIA, and other appropriate departments

and agencies form a joint working group or task force to

develop psychological policy for an international crisis, event,

or a US overseas program. This is an ad hoc group, and policy

is determined by consensus.

In peacetime, the US ambassador is responsible for implementing PSYOP policy overseas. In the case of Vietnam, policy

was directed from Washington to the US Embassy in Saigon. It

was implemented by the Joint United States Public Affairs

Office (JUSPAO). More than 60 policy guidance directives were

issued by JUSPAO on such diverse topics as 'The Use of

Prisoners of War in PSYOP Output," "PSYOP Support of

Pacification," and "PSYOP Aspects of the Refugee Program." US

officials made every effort to develop and promulgate policy

directives in conjunction with the Vietnamese government, but

such coordination was the exception rather than the rule.

12 6
Planning

By definition, a psychological operation is the planned and

programmed use of communication media and/or other

actions to influence emotions, attitudes, and behaviors of

selected target audiences. Planning is the key to psychological

operations (random and isolated actions cannot produce

consistent results). Planning is essential for psychological

operations at all levels-from the strategic and long-range

national plan to the PSYOP annex for tactical operations at the

battalion command level.

When implemented, the plan becomes the basic instrument

and authority for the conduct of psychological operations . One

key element in conducting a psychological offensive is the

integration of all available assets and their concentration on

significant objectives and target groups based on the reality of

military, political, or economic operations . The PSYOP plan is

the crucial ingredient for integrated and concerted operations .

Generally, psychological plans should consist of (1) concept of

operations, (2) definition of target groups, (3) clear definition of

objectives, (4) general thematic guidance for each objective,

(5) injunctions or prohibitions in respect to themes, (6) timetable or schedule to ensure staged and fully orchestrated

multimedia operations, and (7) definitive instructions for

PSYOP units and assets .

Currently within the US government, there is no central

mechanism for the planning of psychological operations. The

USIA issues program guidances to its overseas services and

divisions. In turn, the United States Information Service (USIS)

(overseas) develops country plans which are annual information/

cultural programs tailored for a particular country. The

Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for developing

psychological plans in support of military contingency

operations . Military plans are informally coordinated with the

DOS, USIA, and other appropriate agencies.

United States PSYOP planning during the Vietnam period

was the primary responsibility of the US Embassy, Saigon. In

JUSPAO, the Office of Plans, Policy, and Research was

responsible for those plans relating to political, economic, and

social programs as well as Republic of Vietnam psychological

12 7
operations in support of Chieu Hoi (open arms), pacification,

and other programs.

1

7 On the other hand, the US Military

Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV, developed and implemented plans in support of military operations and selected

programs directed to target groups in North Vietnam. Generally,

PSYOP plans were coordinated with the Republic of Vietnam

through its Ministry of Information and/or the Vietnamese

Joint Military Command.

Intelligence

Intelligence is the basis for understanding communications,

emotions, attitudes, and behaviors of individuals and groups.

Y. Tanaka has proposed a three-step strategy of cross-cultural

communication that involves quantitative and qualitative

analyses of attitude components within a target population,

systematic use of a multichannel and multistep flow of communication, and a strategy in which communication is by

deed and words. 18 It is significant that the first step in his

strategy is the collection of PSYOP intelligence-the one critical

step that is often neglected by the political or military planner.

There are three basic requirements for collecting, collating,

and analyzing PSYOP data. First, it is essential that managers

and media personnel have a thorough understanding of the

psychological aspects of the target audience. Anyone engaged

in communication and propaganda programs must have

certain information about the audience-background, literacy,

preferred languages and dialects, art forms and symbols, and

key emotional symbols. In addition, PSYOP personnel should

have a thorough understanding of the social, political,

religious, economic, and military attitudes that are prevalent

in significant population groups. With such knowledge, communication programs can be developed to restructure hostile

or negative attitudes, reinforce friendly or favorable attitudes,

or reinforce /change neutral attitudes, when appropriate.

The second requirement is for timely and systematic

operational feedback. Specifically, information is needed

regarding the effort being made to support PSYOP objectives,

tasks, and themes aimed at definitive target groups. These

12 8
The third requirement is for timely and systematic feedback

from the target audience when a PSYOP campaign is in

progress-a substantial task when the full range of communication media is used. A careful and candid analysis is necessary

in order to determine which messages and channels of

communication worked well and why, what the mistakes were,

and what can be done to avoid future errors and failures.

In 1966, a senior foreign service officer of the USIA listed a

number of factors that were inhibiting the effectiveness and

measurement of PSYOP programs in Vietnam.

1 . We "fly by the seat of our pants" both in setting goals and

measuring our success.

2. Our assessment is superficial because we are not experts

and because reporting requirements tend to emphasize deeds

and statistics and not attitude, opinion, and behavior change.

3. USIA is oriented more to media than to audience.

4. We deal too frequently with accidents rather than

essences, which leads to confusion of ends and means.

5. There is a basic lack of research data.

6. We attempt to change rationally attitudes that are

basically emotional.

. We are often confused by changing goals in the field

versus our long-range basic mandate.

8. We lack orientation toward communications as a whole

and communications research in particular.

9. There is a communications gap between Washington and

the field, between media product and field need. 19

Weaknesses in measuring the effect of USIA programs were

stated by another senior officer .

1. The system is too simple in theory and too unclear in

practice.

2. Our objectives are very broad, our specific knowledge

very narrow. While we can never have all the knowledge we

need, we can narrow the gap in some respects.

3. Much basic data on which to base evaluations is

missing; e.g., the extent to which messages are directed to

12 9
whether they are understood.

4. There is at present too little operational research directed

at the question of results.

5 . Too much evaluation is being done by operators themselves. The evaluation is therefore subjective .

6. In the rush of day-to-day business, the hard questions

are often postponed indefinitely . 20

No single government agency is responsible for the systematic

collection of PSYOP intelligence . The Office of Research in the

USIA sponsors ad hoc research and conducts some overseas

field surveys in order to evaluate selected media output.

Intelligence specialists in the Bureau of Intelligence and

Research (Department of State) are primarily interested in

political information. In a similar vein, the Defense Intelligence

Agency is principally interested in the collection and analysis

of "hard" military intelligence such as order of battle and

weapon systems data. US Army PSYOP intelligence teams

generally do not possess the resources or the scope of

knowledge required to evaluate the psychological environment

of potential target groups around the world.

In Vietnam, as during the Korean War, an attempt was

made to overcome PSYOP deficiencies in intelligence by

sponsoring ad hoc studies and surveys. However, PSYOP

intelligence requirements do not lend themselves to ad hoc or

temporary measures : The problem is operational, it is

dynamic, and it requires constant attention by professionals

who are a permanent part of the team.

A computer-oriented system is being developed by the US

military to correct some of the inadequacies in PSYOP

intelligence, especially in appraising the success or failure of

propaganda programs. This system, known as the PSYOP

Automated Management Information System (PAMIS), will be

discussed in subsequent sections of this essay.

Operations

Within the US government, the USIA is responsible for

educational, cultural, and informational programs and

13 0
overseas audiences) include a broadcast service (primarily the

"Voice of America") ; information center services that support

overseas exhibits and information centers; a motion picture

and television service that prepares films and audio tapes for

release overseas; and a press and publication service that

prepares and distributes magazines and other printed matter

to overseas posts. Most of USIA's day-to-day operations are the

responsibility of the USIS,21 which is a part of the US overseas

mission. The organization and activities of the USIS are

dependent on various protocols and agreements between

Washington and the host nation.

The US military services have their own PSYOP units and,

when authorized by the president, can support USIA

operations overseas. Military PSYOP units are composed of

various teams that can be put together to accomplish specific

missions and functions. US Army PSYOP responsibilities

include propaganda development, audio visual production,

research and analysis, graphics production, printing, radio

operations from mobile studios and transmitters, and

loudspeaker operations.

In Vietnam, US military PSYOP favored an organizational

arrangement that heavily involved the USIA. JUSPAO was

established in Saigon in May 1965, a result of the National

Security Council directive. JUSPAO was a PSYOP command

supported by USIA, DOD, and USAID (US Agency for International Development). The director of JUSPAO (minister/

councillor to the ambassador) issued policy directives (to both

military and civilian agencies) and conducted the full range of

strategic and tactical operations. At its peak JUSPAO was

composed of about 250 US officers, more than half from USIA,

and about 600 Vietnamese employees. Within the staff of

MAC V was the Psychological Operations Directorate, a

separate staff section that was later put under the operations

chief, the J-3. The military also had operational control of a

large PSYOP field unit-the Fourth PSYOP Group. Additional

support was available from the Seventh PSYOP Group, which

was located on the island of Okinawa.
While it is true that Vietnam represented the largest postWorld War II American venture into psychological operations,

the magnitude and breadth of the US effort there makes

Southeast Asia an atypical example of American communications programs-even if a rich source of perspectives .

The major continuing US effort in this field is that of USIA,

including the VOA. 22 Through periods of attention to and

neglect of military PSYOP, USIA has been the principal 23

channel of American communications to foreign audiences. 24

The USIA was significantly affected by the detente in US-Soviet

relations ; fcor example, its once- anticommunist rhetoric has

become anachronistic. Its other functions in information

dissemination and cultural exchange have withstood the

passage of time far better. This is hardly surprising, since

persuasive communications have marginal value as opinion

changers but are much more effective in attitude reinforcement. 25

Pre-Vietnam

Specific efforts mounted by US psychological operations

before Vietnam include, most prominently, campaigns in

Lebanon (1958,26 196227) and the Dominican Republic

(196528), and American efforts concerning Africa also grew

after about 1960. Throughout the entire period, "Radio Free

Europe," 29 "Radio Liberty,,, 3, "Radio in the American Sector"

(Berlin),31 and other propaganda outlets were directed toward

the USSR and Soviet-dominated areas.

The evolution of the postwar world left the United States,

notwithstanding its early history and national values, in the

position of the world's most important status quo power. 32

American international communications were therefore

generally antirevolutionary, frequently supporting unpopular

regimes in the name of stability. 33 In some cases (e.g.,

Lebanon) the programs were reasonably effective, but psychological effort success is difficult to separate from the nature

and success of the overall political or military activity.

13 2
The importance and priority that the North Vietnamese and

Vietcong (VC) put on psychological operations are well known,

as in the slogans "Political activities are more important than

military activities," and "Fighting is less important than

propaganda." Vo Nguyen Giap in his People's War, People's

Army quotes as one of Ho Chi Minh's cardinal principles of

political warfare, "Do not attempt to overthrow the enemy but

try to win over and make use of him."

As noted above, in 1965 JUSPAO was established to coordinate the US policies and personnel involved in psychological

operations. A major portion of the new US PSYOP effort was to

be devoted too the Chieu Hoi returnee program (an attempt to

win over and make use of the VC). There was to be optimum

coordination and integration of both US and Vietnamese

operations at all levels, with overall supervision from JUSPAO

and the Republic of Vietnam Ministry of Information (MOI)

through the Vietnam Information Services vested in a combined US-Vietnamese coordinating committee at the national

level with representation from MACV, JUSPAO, General

Political Warfare Directorate (GPWD), and MOI.

" Guidelines to Chieu Hoi Psychological Operations: The

Chieu Hoi Inducement Program" was prepared in April 1966

by JUSPAO. It centralized policy planning and decentralized

operational planning. Execution was assigned to the local

level . Development and mass production of PSYOP materials

were done by JUSPAO in accordance with tactical needs

determined by the field . In addition to JUSPAO, MACV (the 4th

US Army PSYOP Group) operated an extensive program, much

of which was devoted to the Chieu Hoi inducement program.34, 35

Content of PSYOP material, targeted on the potential rallier,

was focused on his grievances, emotions, and aspirations-not

on ideological commitment (except in the case of hard-core

VC). The insurgent was encouraged to return to his home by

the creation of trust in the government as just and generous.

Former insurgents were used in preparation of the material to

the maximum extent possible-they, rather than the Americans,

knew the modus operandi of the enemy and were a part of the

indigenous culture.

13 3
to be the most practical means of disseminating the Chieu Hoi

message. The ubiquitous "safe conduct pass," which literally

blanketed South Vietnam, was probably the most effective

message. Though there were thousands of other leaflets

stressing many other themes, 36 the safe conduct pass was

most often described by ralliers during interrogation as the

one most seen and the one most conducive to rallying. After

one battle, 90 percent of those VC who could be searched-the

dead, wounded, and captured-had the safe conduct leaflet.

37

By the spring of 1971, JUSPAO had distributed nearly four

billion leaflets in the campaign to persuade "men to rally to the

GVN [Goverment of the Republic of Vietnam] under its

amnesty program." 38

No discussion of the factors motivating defection is complete

without mention of the carefully structured program of

rewards given to those who rallied and indeed even to those

who influenced a VC to rally. The Chieu Hoi weapons reward

program paid a returnee for weapons he turned in or for

weapons that he was able to recover after he rallied. This

program was successful in locating large weapons caches. The

weapons reward system was established by official decree of

the Chieu Hoi Ministry of the GVN.

The Vietcong military forces neutralized through the Chieu

Hoi program were equal to about one-fifth of the total of all

their forces killed or captured by military action. More than

4,000 men from the government of the Republic of Vietnam or

its allies would have been required to effect the same result

through military action.39

Besides the safe conduct leaflet and rewards program,

testimonials from Hoi Chanh (former VC) proved to be effective

in the total psychological process of attitude change. It was

determined that the Hoi Chanh testimonial should contain

four essential elements: a photograph and complete individual

description of the Hoi Chanh; an indication of why he rallied;

discussion of the good treatment he received; and an appeal to

his former comrades to rally. Experience in the field showed

that when a PSYOP person wrote a testimonial message for a

Hoi Chanh, it was usually recognized as propaganda. The best

approach was for the Hoi Chanh to address his message

134
comrades by name . He should tell enough about himself to

convince the recipients of the message that he is in fact alive

and well. The operative word in all Hoi Chanh testimonials

was credibility. Themes were suggested to the returnee, but

the language was his own. In many instances, audio tapes

were prepared of Hoi Chanh testimonials for broadcast by

air-to-ground loudspeaker systems and radio.

Poetry, music, and art were effective PSYOP media directed

to hostile as well as friendly target groups. The messages were

emotional in tone and concerned such time-tested themes as

love, family, religion, home, holidays, and national heroes. 40

It became apparent as a result of operational experience

that direct psychological operations, aimed at modifying

attitudes and behavior, must be preceded by propaganda that

is indirect in character, slow and general in nature. It should

seek to create an atmosphere of favorable preliminary

attitudes. No direct psychological operations can be effective

without a proper foundation. Safe conduct passes and

testimonials are one type of foundation; that is, they inform

the enemy soldier that if and when he decides to surrender,

certain protocol will be observed. The best psychological

operations involve face-to-face persuasion. The following

example of PSYOP messages being reinforced by face-to-face

persuasion was provided by a former deputy leader of a VC

surgical team who was also a Communist party member.

The Chien Hoi leaflets were dropped by airplanes very often. I read

some of them . . . At that time I didn't really believe in the leaflets

because I was told by the cadres that the government wanted to cheat

Front people by its Chien Hoiprogram. Although I didn't believe what

the leaflets said, I had something in my mind about leaving the Front.

When my friend, Mr. Thiet, came to tell me about the government's

treatment toward the ralliers, I believed him. I believed that I wouldn't

be beaten up by the GVN as the cadres had said, because my friend

was one of the ralliers, and he wasn't beaten up or punched down into

the sea. [This refers to VC claims that GVN troops took the Hoi Chanh

up in a helicopter and then threw them into the ocean.] On the

contrary, he was well-treated by the government . He was given ajob,

and he was free to visit his family when he wanted. 4 1

Another type of foundation used in an insurgency environment was a magazine disseminated in Vietnam called Long Me.

13 5
magazine was distributed bimonthly to villages and districts

known to be sympathetic to the VC. It was distributed by

priests, merchants, school teachers, bus drivers, fortune

tellers, armed propaganda teams, and others. Long Me was

also distributed through direct mail. It contained feature

stories, poems, short novels, cartoons, and art. The feature

stories were factual, and they emphasized the positive features

of the new life offered to former VC. Long Me ,S indirect

approach worked well. The staff of Long Me, with the exception

of one American (Philip Katz), was composed of former

communist propagandists.

Not all propagandists in Vietnam believed in the slow and

indirect approach. Many messages were harsh, explicit, and

direct ; for example, this leaflet was prepared and disseminated

by an American military unit:

The sky soldiers of the US 173d Airborne Brigade are here to destroy

you. We have killed hundreds of your comrades with our powerful

bombs and artillery and invincible ground troops . You will die a

senseless death and be buried in an unmarked grave in an unknown

jungle. Rally now before it is too late.

Propaganda must be continuous and lasting-continuous in

that it must not leave any gaps in logic and continuity of

themes, lasting in that it must function over a period of time.

The principle of repetition plays an important role in persuasive

communication.

PSYOP is not magic; effective communication is based on

slow and constant impregnation. PSYOP is not a stimulus that

disappears quickly ; it consists of successive messages and

actions aimed at various emotions or thoughts through many

instruments of communication. Effective psychological actions

should be continuous ; as soon as the effect of one message is

weakened, it should be reinforced by another.

Post-Vietnam

After the conflict in Southeast Asia, the United States once

again moved away from systematic, coordinated psychological

operations on a government-wide scale. As in the past, military

13 6
USIA had no intensive focus, and USIA efforts were only

marginally coordinated with other US persuasion programs.

The lessons of the past concerning the potential value of

PSYOP, the importance of coordinated, systematic planning,

and the value of continuous communications as facilitator

(even during periods of strategic security) were once again

ignored. 42

Effectiveness

Probably the most elusive single area in the analysis of

psychological operations is the evaluation of PSYOP effectiveness. How can effectiveness be measured? Polling dominates

much of our political life, and market research is considered

fundamental to sound business practices ; yet PSYOP operates

in an anachronistic world where direct audience analysis is

often impossible.

Effectiveness of persuasive communications is generally

viewed in terms of the degree to which attitudes are changed

or reinforced. However, studies have conclusively demonstrated that PSYOP directed at denied or hostile areas should

aspire to modify peripheral attitudes only, not fundamental

ones. 43 Our government's persuasive communications to

foreign audiences enjoy very limited parameters of only

potential effect . 44

The relatively small range of impact and the difficulty of

measurement are primary constraints in the evaluation of

effectiveness . The fundamental question is, how successful are

the communications in terms of the limited objectives?

Sometimes, however, practitioners have been forced into a

secondary question: Assuming the general principles we have

identified to be optimum, to what degree are the communications congruent with them?

Another major impediment to effectiveness assessment is

the nonpersuasive nature of psychological operations. One is

inclined to think in terms of the critical message directed at

the critical audience at the critical moment. In fact, the vast

majority of propaganda and other instruments of PSYOP

consist of what I, . John Martin has called facilitative com13 7
its credibility-in preparation for the critical movement,

message, and audience. Since the purpose of the messages

sent in facilitative communication is not persuasive, how do

we measure their effectiveness? To what extent should the two

types of communication, which are purposively related but

conceptually discrete, be evaluated by a single measure?

If we could select our audience on the basis of certain idiocratic

factors-objective physical and personal characteristics peculiar to an

individual, such as age, sex, race, education-we might increase by a

statistically significant fraction the proportion of those influenced by a

message. But we would have no control over such factors as

personality~ and susceptibility to persuasion, existing values, beliefs

and opinions or attitudes toward the objects, subjects and situations

involved in the persuasive message. We can choose our communicator

but not determine his image. We can select the vehicle of transmission

but not the channel of reception of the target of our communication .

We could maximize the effect of all these factors for a single individual,

especially if we were able to subject him to intensive precommunication analysis. But there is no way that this can be done for the

diverse assortment of individuals who normally make up the audience

of the mass media, the vehicles most commonly used in international

propaganda.46

For lack of a criterion, 47 as well as for the inability to secure

direct access to the audience and the recognition of the

inherent limits of persuasive communications, the most

common evaluations of effectiveness have been output

measures, despite their notorious limitations . 48 A second

approach has been to focus on reception, in general, this area

has not attracted much attention. The final type of analysiseffects measures-may be both direct and indirect.

Direct measures of effects can involve the use of polling or

survey data. In peacetime, such information can be gathered

in interviews with traveling foreign nationals, 49 direct mail

questionnaires, and polling in the audience's country. In war,

or when relations between the sender (source) and receiver

(audience) countries are strained, only some-or none-of

these may be practicable. In these cases, refugees 50 and

prisoners of war5l have been used to gather effects data.

However, such groups often have inherent disadvantages as a

population-they may not be a representative sample, and

13 8
decision to defect is usually elusive.

Indirect measures include the content analysis of intercepted

mail, mail drops, 52 captured documents, broadcasts and telecasts, and target area public media . 53

Trends

In an effort to institutionalize PSYOP intelligence, the US

military designed and developed a computer-oriented system

called PAMIS-This information system was designed to fulfill

several objectives : (1) to provide the spectrum of information

needed to support PSYOP organizational elements for the

planning, implementation, and evaluation of PSYOP programs;

(2) to encourage (indeed, to enforce) methodologies to support

information-gathering programs; and (3) to provide an appropriate automatic data-processing system for the storage,

analysis, and utilization of the gathered data.

PAMIS encompasses these three systems:

Foreign Media Analysis (FMA) System, 54

PSYOP Foreign Area Data System (PFAD), 55 and

PSYOP Effects Analysis System (PEAS).-56

The primary objective of FMA is to provide statistical data

obtained from publications and radio broadcasts of selected

foreign countries. The data collected includes information

about their propaganda objectives and strategy; propaganda

themes used to support these objectives ; propaganda trends ;

the tone and intensity of media coverage related to domestic

themes, foreign governments, international organizations or

political movements; and propaganda techniques and tactics.

Another FMA objective is to provide clear-text abstracts on

important events, subjects, and persons as they are treated in

the public media of the selected countries .

The objective of PFAD is to provide the US military PSYOP

community with uniform methods and procedures for the

collection, storage, and rapid retrieval of data needed for planning and operations. The PFAD was designed to accomplish the

following tasks :

13 9
" provide uniform procedures and methods for collecting

and reporting such data;

" provide a retrieval system that has a centralized data

bank, the core of which is a set of over 1,600 foreign area data

descriptors, and that permits retrieval of two types of reports:

annotated bibliographic material and narrative summaries of

subject data; and

" provide for continuous and rapid updating of PSYOP

foreign area information .

The compwter system provides the PSYOP community with

social, cultural, economic, political, communication, and other

information that is needed to make decisions on aspects of

PSYOP policy, planning, allocation, and deployment of resources

and operations.

PEAS was designed to collect, store, and process data from a

sample of a target audience in order to measure the success or

failure of PSYOP messages and programs . The system also

stores and processes data about friendly and hostile PSYOP

activities and actions . Timely, accurate reporting on the

purpose (objectives and tasks) of friendly PSYOP programs is

essential, as are facts about the distribution and intensity of

efforts expended on specific target audiences. Although hostile

PSYOP activities and actions usually do not directly affect

friendly messages, systematic monitoring of hostile propaganda and other actions provides analysts with many clues

about how enemy elites react to our PSYOP programs. In fact,

when respondents from the target population (such as

prisoners, defectors, and refugees) are not available, the

content analysis of hostile media can be the most valuable

source of feedback concerning the impact of friendly programs .

A significant objective of PEAS is to institutionalize methods

and procedures for analyzing PSYOP programs and strategies

so that the successes and failures of strategic and tactical

programs can be measured. PEAS was therefore designed to

provide the following :

14 0
pg g 

operations;

" rapid retrieval of command and control data to determine

how effort and cost relate to objectives and tasks ;

" the data necessary for analysts to correlate operational

data with specific military target groups and segments of the

civilian population;

" data for a continuous evaluation of the initial impact of

PSYOP messages (audio and print) directed to general or

particular target groups;

" uniform procedures and methods for reporting and

analyzing hoAtile propaganda and action directed to friendly

military and civilian populations ; and

" data needed for an independent audit and assessment of

military PSYOP by the joint or other appropriate command.

To accomplish the above, PEAS was designed to accept, store,

and process data inputs into three computer riles.

The ACTH file of PEAS was designed to institutionalize the

reporting of military psychological activities at each command

level. This reporting system provides commanders with

systematically collected data for command and control of the

full range of PSYOP activities. Specifically, the ACTIV file

provides information about the quantity of effort being directed

in support of specific programs or campaigns, in support of

PSYOP objectives, tasks, and themes, and toward definitive

target groups. In addition, this rile provides information about

the amount of effort allocated to each channel of communication (such as print, radio, and loudspeaker). Also available is

information about psychological actions such as show of force,

exploitation of new weapons, and supply drops.

Much basic data is needed for making evaluations : To what

extent are our messages directed to specific target audiences?

What are our objectives? Are our messages received and

understood? PEAS will provide many answers to these

questions.

The IMPACT file of PEAS was designed to institutionalize the

collection of data about the effect of specified propaganda

messages, activities, and programs. The data collection format
interrogations at any level of command. Each IMPACT computer record pertains to a respondent's (such as POW) reaction

to an electronic or printed message or action. In the first step

(of the interrogation process), the respondent is required to

select from a catalogue of PSYOP messages that he has seen or

heard. The IMPACT data record is then completed for those

messages identified by the respondent.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to present the details for

the multitude of inputs and outputs of the ACTIV file of PEAS,

but both quantitative (statistical) and qualitative (textual)

reports are available to analysts and other users of the system.

These reports provide gross information related to four

indicators of PSYOP impact.

" Understanding : Did the audience understand the

language and symbolism used in the message?

" Credibility : Was the content credible, or did the audience

view the message as obvious propaganda?

" Influence: Did the message influence the respondent to

act in a way favorable to the sponsor of the message?

" Irritation : Did the language, symbolism, or other aspect of

the message irritate the audience?

Statistical analysis of such data should reveal the specific

themes and messages that were successful ; it should also

reveal those messages that failed. In addition, PEAS should

provide analysts with a generous number of textual responses,

in the respondent's own words, that explain the reasons for

both success and failure .

PEAS will provide military commanders with the range of

information needed to evaluate the impact of psychological

operations. No longer will number of leaflets produced or

hours of broadcast time be the only-or even the basic-criteria

for evaluating PSYOP programs.

The POLWAR file of PEAS provides uniform procedures and

methods for reporting and analyzing hostile propaganda and

action directed to US military-and other friendly-populations.

Data from this file allow for the continuous monitoring of

hostile POLWAR activities at the tactical command level. It is

this file of the PEAS that interfaces with the FMA system. The

142
propaganda, and actions that take place in a combat environ

ment and are directed at friendly military and civilian audiences.

This contrasts with the FMA system, which is concerned

primarily with strategic objectives and which deals with data

obtained from newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasts

directed to their own domestic audiences.

Conclusions

Tanaka's concept of cross-cultural communication, noted

above, emphasized the systematic use of multichannel,

multistep flo* of communication, and a strategy in which

communication is by both deed and word.

Propaganda must be total. A modern psychological operation

must utilize all of the technical means at its disposal-the press,

radio, TV, movies, posters, meetings, and face-to-face persuasion.

There is no psychological operation when meetings and lectures

are sporadic, a few slogans are splashed on walls, radio and

television presentations are uncoordinated, and news articles are

random. Each communication medium has its own particular

mode of influence-alone, it cannot attack individuals, break

down their resistance, or make their decisions for them. A film

does not play on the same motives, does not produce the same

feelings, does not provoke the same reactions as a leaflet. The

very fact that the effectiveness of each medium is limited to one

particular area clearly shows the necessity of complementing it

with other media. A word spoken on the radio is not the same as

the identical word spoken in private conversation or in a public

speech. Nor does a word appearing in print produce the same

effect as the same word when it is spoken. To draw the

individual into the net of persuasion, each technique must be

utilized in its own specific way, directed toward producing the

optimum effect, and orchestrated with all the other media. Each

medium reaches the individual in a specific fashion and makes

him react anew to the same theme-in the same direction, but

differently . Thus, no part of the intellectual or emotional

personality is left alone.

Effective totalitarian regimes have a clear understanding of

the psychological aspects of military actions. These regimes

143
propaganda is fully institutionalized within the political and

military structure of these states. Furthermore, these regimes

are sensitive to the psychological environment of their target

audiences and are able to orchestrate the various instruments

of communication to promote unity in their own ranks and

unity with their own people while promoting divisiveness in

enemy forces.

As a democracy, the United States has tried to renounce

domestic propaganda; as a nation in a highly competitive

political world, America must use psychological operations. As

yet, however, the formula that would support both these aims

without their working at cross-purposes has not been

found-a fact made quite evident by the awkwardness that

characterizes US PSYOP efforts at home and abroad.

Psychological operations can be among the most suitable and

effective weapons in pursuit of US national objectives in this

unstable and sometimes threatening world. PSYOP exploits

military readiness already required for other purposes without

requiring the use of military force. It draws power from the

strength of Western democracy and the universals of civilization.

It can encourage masses of people to develop untapped natural

resources and to oppose totalitarian regimes.

The requirements for effective psychological operations are

considerable. Modern persuasive communication is not a

haphazard, hit-or-miss activity but a well-coordinated,

sustained effort. It demands a broad and thorough knowledge

of a wide variety of psychological, sociological, and cultural

factors. It also requires planning well in advance of events. It

must, at all times, serve under an appropriate form of

centralized direction with trained personnel and dedicated

resources. Contemporary psychological operations is not an

amateur's game.

Notes

l . This definition is adapted from Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense

Dictionary of Military andAssociated Terms, 1974. Psychological operations

is a broader term than psychological warfare in that it deals with friendly

and neutral, as well as hostile, audiences .

144
57-72. For an excellent study of the dynamics of international perception,

see Robert A. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics

(Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1976).

3 . Harold D. Lasswell, "The Structure and Function of Communication in

Society," in L. Bryson, ed., The Communication ofIdeas (New York: Harper

and Row, 1948).

4. Indeed, the four principal figures in the establishment of communications research-the fundamental PSYOP root-were two psychologists (Paul

Lazarsfeld and Carl Horland), a sociologist (Kurt Lewin), and a political scientist

(Harold Lasswell).

5 . Wilbur Schramm, "Communication Research in the United States," in

idem, ed., The Science ofHuman Communication (New York: Basic Books,

1963),1-16 .

6. Y. Tanaka, "Psychological Factors in International Persuasion," The

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 398 (1971) :

50-54 .

7. Historical literature dealing with US PSYOP is far from rich. It includes the following: W. E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, eds. A

Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore, Md. : Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1958) ; M. Dyer, The Weapon on the Wall (Baltimore, Md. : Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1959); Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique

in World War I (Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1971) ; D. Lerner, Sykewar

(New York: George W. Stewart, 1951); and P. M. A. Linebarger, Psychological

Warfare (Washington, D.C. : Combat Forces Press, 1954) .

8 . H. Butterfield, "Psychological Warfare in 1776: The Jefferson-Franklin

Plan to Cause Hessian Desertions," Proceedings of the American Philosophical

Society 94 (1950) : 233-41 .

9. Relatively little has been written in recent years about the so-called

Creel Committee, the Committee on Public Information, created by United

States President Woodrow Wilson after the United States entered World War

1. Substantial writing on the committee appeared in the interwar period.

Even about the Second World War it could be said that "U.S . propaganda

agencies created during [the war] were more the result of trial and error

planning and ad hoc improvisations than of careful blueprinting."

10. Daugherty and Janowitz, 126.

11 . C. I. Hovland, I. L. Janis, and H. H. Kelley, Communication and

Persuasion (New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press, 1953); C. W. Sherif,

M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, Attitude and Attitude Change (Philadelphia,

Pa. : W. B. Saunder, 1965); C. I. Hovland and I. L. Janis, Personality and

Persuasibility (New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press, 1959); R. L. Rosnow

and E. J. Robinson, eds., Experiments in Persuasion (New York: Academic

Press, 1967).

12 . C. I. Hovland, The Order of Presentation in Persuasion (New Haven,

Conn. : Yale University Press, 1957) .

13 . Hovland and Janis.

14 5
15 . In the summer of 1942 Russian Lt Gen Andrei A. Vlasov was

captured by the Germans. The Germans soon learned that Vlasov wanted to

lead a Russian national army of liberation into the Soviet Union. General

Vlasov (a Russian military hero) was willing to collaborate with the Germans

for the sake of Russian national independence. Hitler, however, sawVlasov

at most as a tactical propaganda tool to weaken the Soviet forces: "promises

might be given to himand deserters who came over to join him (the Vlasov

movement), but on no account should these promises be kept."

16. R. Gehlen, The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen

(New York: The World Publishing Company, 1972), 84.

17 . The Chien Hot program was the campaign to encourage "ralliers" (Hot

Chanh) to come over to the Republic of Vietnam side . Only South Vietnamese NO werejeligible . Substantial publicity was given to the act of "rallying"-

to the motivations and aspirations of the Hot Chanh, the benefits ofrallying,

and the like .

18 . Tanaka.

19 . US Information Agency, Proceedings of the Seminar on Effectiveness,

R-121-66 (Washington, D.C . : Office of Policy and Research, 1966).

20. Ibid.

21 . The agency responsible for programs and operations is USIA; the

overseas posts are USIS posts, and they form an integral part of the US

country team headed in each country by the chief of mission, usually an

ambassador.

22 . There have been many proposals over the years to sever VOA from

USIA, but for the present the tie remains.

23. Other US institutions principally involved on a continuing basis include the National Security Council, the DOS, the Agency for International

Development, and the DOD.

24. A major source on USIA is J. Henderson, The United States

Information Agency (New York: Praeger, 1969) ; M. G. Lawson et al ., The

United States Information Agency during the Administration of Lyndon B.

Johnson, November 1963-January 1969 (Washington, D.C. : Government

Printing Office [GPO], 1968) is an administration history of some value in

understanding USIA. T. Sorenson, The Word War (New York: Harper &

Brothers, 1968) gives an excellent overview of the problems and competing

principles with which such an agency must deal . Amore critical, briefer, but

equally stimulating presentation-is K. R. Sparks, "Selling Uncle Sam in the

Seventies," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social

Science 398 (1971): 113-23 .

'75 T T Manner The Effects ofMass Communication (Glencoe, Ill. : Free

Press, 1960) .

26. B. H. Cooper, Jr ., "The Undenounced Intervention," in Ralph D.

McLaurin et al., ed., The Art and Science of Psychological Operations Washington, D.C . : GPO, 1976), 241-46; Idem, "Accentuating the Positive," in

ibid ., 280-86.

14 6
pyg

28 . B. H. Cooper, Jr ., "Teamwork in Santo Domingo," in ibid ., 229-32;

Idem, "Divided Counsels," in ibid ., 262-66.

29 . R. T. Holt, Radio Free Europe (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota

Press, 1958); A. A. Mitchie, Voices through the Iron Curtain: The Radio Free

Europe Story (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1963); and J. R. Price,

Radio Free Europe -A Survey andAnalysis (Washington, D.C . : Congressional Research Services, 1971) .

30. J. C. Whelan, Radio Liberty-A Study ofIts Origins, Structure, Policy,

Programming, and Effectiveness (Washington, D.C. : Congressional Research

Services, 1972) .

31 . E. Taylor, "RIAS: The Voice East Germany Believes," The Reporter, 10

November 1953,28-32 .

32 . R. L. Heilbroner, "Counterrevolutionary America," Commentary 43

(1967): 31-38.

33 . G. V. Allen, "What the U.S . Information Program Cannot Do," in J. B.

Whitton, ed., Propaganda and the Cold War (Washington, D.C. : Public

Affairs Press, 1963).

34. The Chieu Hoi inducement program was a campaign to reward Hot

Chanh who turned over weapons . (The reward was money.)

35. J. A. Koch, The Chieu HoiProgram in South Vietnam (1963-71)

(Washington, D.C. : DOD, Advanced Research Projects Agency, R-1172-

ARPA,January 1973).

36 . See Philip P. Katz, Communicating with the Vietnamese through

Leaflets (Saigon: Joint US Public Affairs Office, 1968).

37 . Ibid., 66.

38 . Ibid., 68.

39. Ibid.

40. Philip P. Katz, A Systematic Approach to PSYOPInformation

(Kensington, Md. : American Institutes for Research, 1970).

41 . Joint US Public Affairs Office, PSYOP in Vietnam: Indications of

Effectiveness (Saigon: JUSPAO Planning Office, 1967), 120-21 .

42. See L. A. Free, VOA Language Priority Study, Washington, D.C., US

Information Agency, 1969 .

43 . D. Lerner, "Is International Persuasion Sociologically Feasible?" The

Annals of the American Academy ofPolitical and Social Science 398(1971):

41-49.

44. D. D. Smith, "Some Effects of Radio Moscow's North American

Broadcasts," Public Opinion Quarterly 34 (1970-71) : 539-51.

45 . L. John Martin, "Effectiveness of International Propaganda," The Annals ofthe American Academy ofPolitical and Social Science 398(1971):

61-70 .

46 . Ibid.

147
yg

Area Conflict Information Center, 1967).

48 . Daugherty and Janowitz, 681-84.

49. L. B . Szalay, "Audience Analysis," Congressional Record 148 (6

March 1972): 53426-28.

50. Whelan.

51 . Philip P . Katz. "A Survey of PSYOP Intelligence," in Ronald D .

McLaurin et al., ed., The Art and Science of Psychological Operations,

478-94.

52. Mail drops for these purposes are addresses purportedly for giveaways or other contacts . All mail arriving at these addresses is then analyzed

for background data-location, age, and sex of correspondent.

53 . McLaurin, chaps. 8 and 9.

54. Philip JP. Katz, PSYOP Automated Management Information System

(PAMIS): Foreign Media Analysis (Kensington, Md. : American Institutes for

Research, 1972).

55 . Philip P. Katz, PSYOP Automated Management Information System

(PA MIS): Foreign Area Data Subsystem (PFADS) (Kensington . Md. : American

Institutes for Research, 1973).

56. Philip P. Katz, PSYOP AutomatedManagement Information System

(PAMIS): PSYOPEffects Analysis System (Kensington, Md. : American Institutes for Research, 1976).
PART III

Strategic, Tactical,

and Operational PSYOP

This section deals with the objectives and activities of

strategic, tactical, operational, and other types of PSYOP. In all

forms, PSYOP primarily supports the attainment of national

policy and objectives. The key to all US PSYOP is credibility of

the message. Evaluation is based on changing perceptions,

attitudes, and behaviors.

Certainly, the ideology of a government plays a role in its

PSYOP methodology and its international communications.

The authors offer articles about Soviet PSYOP campaigns and

activities with a credibility/ disinformation perspective.

DeWitt S. Copp discusses Soviet active propaganda measures,

including forgery, agents of influence, and disinformation. His

discussion serves as a historical summary of Soviet campaigns

and ideology.

James Melnich emphasizes mirror imaging in Soviet propaganda. His essay is useful in understanding the overall Soviet

PSYOP threat and possible related weaknesses.

Lev Yudovich reveals the significant threat and impact of the

Soviet military doctrine of cultivating hate in their soldiers.

This doctrine was designed to make Soviet soldiers psychologically prepared to act in dangerous situations and to believe

in victory.

Dr Joseph S. Gordon focuses on research, target analysis,

pretesting and effects analysis, and propaganda analysis. He

concludes that intelligence activities are critical to PSYOP.

George V. Allen, former director of USIA, states that we must

be realists and understand that a combination of political,

economic, psychological, and military efforts are necessary. He

believes that propaganda alone in the short run can do little to

solve problems. Allen advocates an honest, objective, and

truthful information program that faithfully relies on the

individual to make right decisions.

Lt Col John Ozaki, USA, addresses the planning and

coordination of successful defector programs as another form of

combat power. He emphasizes the characteristics and techniques

of a sound program to defeat insurgency movements.
level can contribute to the major strategic objectives of a

government and a reacquisition of the loyalty and support of

the population .

Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., reviews and analyzes selected US

and Vietcong PSYOP in the Vietnam War.
Soviet Active Measures

DeWitt S. Copp

Although Vladimir I. Lenin did not coin the term active

measures lactivnee meropriyatia), he originated and set in

motion all its component parts. Those parts included the

International Department (ID) of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Section A of the

first chief directorate of the KGB, and the propaganda

department (PD) of the Central Committee.

The ID is the coordinating center for Soviet active measures.

Its lineage can be traced directly to Lenin's formation of the

Con-intern in 1919. Lenin's purpose for the Comintern, or Third

International, was to advance the cause of global revolution by

forming communist parties in noncommunist countries and

creating conditions for revolt through propaganda and agitation.

The approach was adaptable to political realities.

The International Department, formed in 1957, was a sophisticated apparatus at the summit of Soviet power. It carried the

view of the leadership, bringing influence to bear on any

area-political, military, or economic-that would aid or abet

Soviet policy. At the same time, it sought to denigrate and

undermine the policies of the noncommunist world, particularly

those of the United States. More politically realistic than its

Leninist ancestor, the ID's purpose was to manipulate public

opinion and gain the acceptance of Soviet ends. The ID's

secretary was Anatolii F. Dobrynin, who had served as Soviet

ambassador to the United States for 24 years. 14e was

appointed to his post by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail S.

Gorbachev in June 1986, several months after the important

Twenty-Seventh Congress of the CPSU.

153
y ppgp,

headed by Party Secretary Aleksander N. Yakovlev, who had

served for 10 years as Soviet ambassador to Canada.

The propaganda department employed dual courses of

action. It orchestrated the line of the party, utilizing Soviet and

bloc media, and overtly replayed disinformation generated by

the active measures apparatus. Since the PD embodied the

former international information department of the Central

Committee of the CPSU, it covered both the Soviet home front

and the foreign scene .

One of Lenin's first acts on seizing power was to establish

the Cheka, dr secret police . He knew that without such an

instrument of fear, his movement could not expect to survive.

That circumstance did not change, but the Cheka became the

KGB-and its activities were worldwide!

Section A of the KGB's first chief directorate worked in

liaison with the ID in carrying out covert Soviet active measures.

These efforts included disinformation operations, the

placement of forgeries, and the managing and directing of

knowing and unknowing agents of influence-professionals in

sensitive positions, both private and public-whose activities

were frequently of great value in the Politburo's plan to gain

acceptance of its position on major issues .

Together, the ID, the KGB, and the PD were the architects

and planners of Soviet active measures . With an estimated

annual budget of $4 billion, their combined efforts were a

major force in the mechanics of Soviet foreign policy.

Stanislav Levchenko, a former major in the KGB, was acting

director of line PR of the Soviet active measures group in

Tokyo when he defected to the United States in 1979. In his

13-14 July 1982 testimony at the Hearings before the Permanent

Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, he

gave the following appraisal.

The size of the overt and covert active measures is massive . . . I can

tell you from an insider's vantage point that the ID and the KGB

receive all the resources and personnel needed to carry out this

massive effort . There are never any shortages . Of course, this is not a

recent development. An examination of the history of the CPSU will

demonstrate the importance of such tactics . . . all active measures

operations are assessed against a set of standards . Success is a vital

154
Forgeries

Soviet active measures were carried out within a spectrum of

white (overt), gray (semicovert), and black (covert) operations. It

was in this last area that the crafting and placement of

forgeries was conducted by section A of the first chief

directorate of KGB. KGB's management of forgeries was global,

and was linked to the use of Soviet assets in whatever locale

the particular forgery was to be surfaced. The KGB's purpose

in placing fdrgeries was to undermine US relations with allies

and nonaligned governments and to influence public opinion

against US policies concerning sensitive issues. An additional

purpose was to convince those affected by the impact of the

forgery that decisions announced by the United States cannot

be believed because underlying them were secret plans that

were harmful in their implication and intent.

For example, an obscure French-language weekly newspaper

in Madagascar-Carrefour (Crossroads)-carried on its front

page (summer 1985) a purported letter from a US Army

medical doctor at Walter Reed Research Institute written to a

supposed superior at the Pentagon. The substance of the

forgery indicated that US and South African scientists were

secretly working on psychotropic chemical weapons and

so-called ethnic weapons that would kill only black-skinned

people.

The forgery contained numerous technical errors, and its

falsity was quickly exposed by the United States Information

Agency (USIA). However, this did not stop Tass (the Soviet

official news agency) at year's end from running the forgery as

a true account. Tass lifted it from Krasnaya Zuezda (Red Star),

the official publication of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, under

the headline "Sinister Plans."

The purpose of the forgery was to instill and spread the belief

that the US government is vicious, racist, and scientifically

willing to pursue inhuman ends. That KGB effort to arouse

black Africa failed-the forgery was not picked up by other

African newspapers and outlets. However, one of the basic

155
repetition. A lie once told is never discarded, no matter how

thoroughly exposed. In June 1987, in a meeting with USIA

Director Charles Wick, who was in Moscow for the opening of a

USIA cultural exhibit, the director of Novosti repeated the

ethnic weapon lie. Wick walked out of the meeting. Novosti, a

supposedly independent Soviet news agency, is heavily staffed

by the KGB.

The KGB made a practice of attacking US scientific and

medical activities on a broad scale, employing not only

forgeries but also disinformation by clandestine radio stations.

One such KGB effort was mounted through "Radio Halgan,"

operated by a communist-front group of Somali dissidents in

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The station reported that the president

of Somalia was negotiating with the US commander of Central

Command to lease Somali territory near the border of Kenya to

bury US nuclear waste in exchange for a large aid program

($400 million). This completely false broadcast was quickly

reported (as straight news) by newspapers in Kenya as well as

by the AP and other wire services, which replayed the message

as far away as Rome and Vienna.

In spite of US proof that no such meeting ever took place

(the president of Somalia was out of the country at the time)

and the fact that the US does not bury nuclear waste

anywhere outside its own borders, the account took on a

distorted life of its own. The false story, which was reprinted in

numerous publications throughout Africa, produced this

headline: "Africa a Global Dustbin for Nuclear Waste."

Soviet active measures operations, using forgery and disinformation, ran the gamut from clumsy and crude to sophisticated and clever. One example of the latter bore the unique

distinction of being a double forgery.

The point of attack was Cyprus. The intent was twofold : to

damage US-Greek Cypriot relations and to instill fear in the

minds of the European public regarding US and NATO plans.

The KGB target was the Greek Cypriot newspaper Sirnerini.

A document came into its possession, supposedly forwarded by a

Cypriot official who, in turn, had purportedly received it from a

British MP, Sir Frederic Bennett. His letter to an unnamed

official was a forgery: "Your Excellency, I have received a letter

15 6
ppy

country is located, I have decided to write to you and enclose

the attached letter ." The attached letter appeared on the front

page of Sirnerini. It, too, was a forgery. Its author was

supposedly the US Air Force vice chief of staff, who was

allegedly writing to US Secretary of Defense Caspar W.

Weinberger, on an urgent matter. The matter concerned the

US use of bases in northern Cyprus under Turkish occupation

for intended operations in the Middle East. Also, and most

importantly, it concerned the evacuation of US soldiers and

their families and other US citizens in case of nuclear war in

Europe. The forgery elaborated on the deployment of US

nuclear weapons in Europe and their possible use in support

of the president's strategic schemes.

Swift action on the part of USIA P/G, USIS Nicosia, and Sir

Bennett exposed the double forgery for what it was. Its

publication and Simerini :s failure to write a retraction

undoubtedly had a very negative effect upon Greek Cypriots

who accepted the forgery as valid, but it did not gain European

press attention.

To the KGB, a forgery's failure to attain the full effect in no

way impeded the continuing attack. Was the forgery's purpose

to convince Latin Americans that the US was plotting with

Chile to inject Chilean troops and weapons into Central

America? Was the purpose to disrupt the first legitimate elections

in Guatemala in 30 years by indicating US manipulation and

control of the election's outcome? Was its purpose to sway the

Indian public into believing that the CIA was responsible for

the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi? Or was its

purpose to "get away with" the murder of 269 KAL passengers

by claiming that the civilian airliner was on an espionage

mission?

Perhaps the forgery's purpose was all of these ; in any event,

the work of Section A of the KGB's first chief directorate

continued without letup. Its endeavors apparently were not

moderated in any form by the new spirit of Geneva or by

glasnost.

15 7
Of all Soviet active measures, the most effective and the

most difficult to expose was the KGB's utilization of agents of

influence. Agents of influence were individuals who, either

knowingly or unknowingly, sought to implant Soviet policy

positions into decisions made by international organizations

(such as the UN) and governmental departments. They also

sought to influence congressional actions, public beliefs, and

national attitudes concerning world affairs. A case in point is

the former senior Norwegian government official, Arne Trehold,

who frequently represented his government in negotiations

with the Soviets. In June 1985, Trehold was convicted of

espionage; he had been a known KGB agent of influence from

1974 to 1983.

Obviously, exposing such agents was a difficult task. At

times, there were 700 Soviet diplomats assigned to West

European posts. Additionally, 570 Soviets were attached to UN

organizations in Europe and 1,200 Soviet bloc diplomats were

serving overtly in similar capacities. Finally, and perhaps of

greatest significance, there were more than 200 Soviet

journalists in Western Europe. The CIA estimated that at least

one-third of the nearly 2,500 Soviet and Soviet bloc diplomats

and representatives (trade and commercial) were either KGB or

GRU (Soviet military) agents.

An unknown percentage were engaged in political espionage,

enlisting and utilizing agents of influence. Through the

testimony of Soviet and bloc defectors, who were previously

involved in active measures, we know that journalistic cover

was a KGB priority. It gave the agent an opportunity to

legitimately meet a wide range of potential contacts.

Such a person may have been an unwitting agent, a dupe of

KGB subtle persuasion and psychological manipulation. Not

infrequently, that person was also a journalist. Caught on the

hook of his own ego by a KGB operative, who appeared to be

anything but, the unwitting agent was slowly and gently

played through flattery and praise. He was given a chance to

contribute an article to a select group of Soviet intellectuals,

after which more articles were accepted and he received

payment. Inside information was exchanged for inside

158
broadcasting information that favored a particular Soviet line.

The line could be political, military, scientific-anything that

contributed to influence. In some cases the end result was

blackmail, in others it was not. In all cases, however, the

KGB's aim was served. There were no figures on agents of

influence-only the knowledge that they were in our midst.

The term communications warfare sums up the totality of

Soviet active measures-the use of words as weapons in all

forms of media. Participants in this strategy were Soviet

international fronts: propaganda organizations that conducted

their activities under the semicovert direction and control of

the ID. Lenin referred to the concept of fronts-groups that

denied their Soviet connection while pushing the Soviet

line-as transmission belts. Soviet fronts were in the vanguard

of preaching, publishing, and fostering Moscow's aims.

Soviet International Fronts

The Soviets had 13 major international fronts and numerous

smaller offshoots and satellites . Together they formed an

interlocking network that specialized in advancing the Soviet

propaganda line within noncommunist countries and the UN,

and in emphasizing peace and disarmament as viewed from

the Kremlin.

Months before General Secretary Gorbachev accepted

President Reagan's invitation to meet in Geneva in November

1985, the fronts had received their marching orders from the

ID. Meeting in Helsinki in April of that year, the leader of the

13 fronts drafted plans to launch an all-out campaign against

the strategic defense initiative (SDI) . The Helsinki gathering

was hosted by Romesh Chandra, President of the World Peace

Council (WPC, the largest and best known of the Soviet fronts) .

Chandra was also a member of the Politburo of the Indian

Communist Party. Several weeks prior to the conference, the

WPC had launched a global appeal against Washington's

"space madness," proclaiming "No!" to Star Wars.

After that, the Soviet campaign to attack SDI and generate

fear about it was unceasing. Through their publications,

demonstrations, and forums, the fronts churned out a stream

15 9
SDI is a nonnuclear system whose purpose is to destroy

missiles, not people.

A broad-gauged view of the campaign occurred in Prague in

July 1985 when the Christian Peace Conference (CPC) held its

sixth All-Christian Peace Assembly. The CPC had been a

Soviet international front since its formation in Prague in

1958; its purpose was to encourage noncommunist clergymen

and their congregations to support Soviet policy, including the

invasion of Afghanistan. Nearly 800 participants from 97

countries attended the assembly. At the weeklong sessions,

staged to address the social and economic ills of the world, a

single message overrode all else: SDI meant the militarization

of space. SDI was the promotion of an aggressive policy, a web

of deception. SDI was a frightening expression of human

hubris.

The Soviet propaganda efforts did not succeed in changing

President Reagan's strategic policy at the Geneva Summit or,

nearly a year later, at Reykjavik. This lack of success,

however, did not halt the ongoing Soviet effort against SDI.

Soviet international fronts never admitted defeat on any

issue, and they claimed victory in President Carter's 1977

decision to forego stockpiling the neutron bomb in NATO

arsenals. In following ID instructions, their emphasis could

shift from the neutron bomb to INF, to chemical-biological

warfare (CBW), to SDI. All Soviet policy issues played

continuing roles in the fronts' propaganda.

To conceal the obviousness of their real purpose, some

fronts (such as the WPC), formed additional fronts and

satellites . The Vienna-based International Institute for Peace

(IIP) is one example; its hierarchy was made up of high-ranking

officers of the WPC. The UP sought to attract noncommunist

academics and professionals who were willing to accept the

false notion that the institute was a place where scientists

from East and West could frankly exchange research results

on all aspects of the peace issue.

Another WPCoffspring was the International Liaison Forum

of Peace Forces (ILF), which was formed at WPC headquarters

in Helsinki in 1973. Like the UP, the ILF was heavily staffed by

WPC officers. The ILF held a series of dialogues on peace

16 0
y

connection carefully obscured. The ELF was turned on and off

as the Soviet International Department required.

Another Soviet front that was created through WPC organizational efforts was Generals for Peace and Disarmament

(GPD). Its membership comprised 13 retired senior NATO

officers . Foremost among them was Italian Gen Nino Pasti,

who had once served as NATO deputy commander. He and

four of his fellow members were closely associated with the

WPC. Unlike other Soviet fronts, the GPD held no conferences

on its own. Some of its members either attended, or sent

frequent statements of support to, the major front peace

congresses. The members also wrote books and pamphlets that

attacked NATO policies and that tacitly-sometimes vigorouslysupported the Soviet line. Based in London and chaired by

retired Brig Michael Harbottle, the GPD was found by the

British Foreign Office to have collective views that were

contrary to those of the British government and its allies.

Brigadier Harbottle and some others did a considerable

amount of traveling, seeking media interviews and public

forums from which to speak against allied military strategy.

Harbottle took credit for arranging four meetings with retired

Warsaw Pact generals in which there was unanimous agreement that the United States was a threat to world peace.

The propaganda drive of the Soviet fronts for 1986 was a

coordinated campaign to dominate the UN-proclaimed International Year of Peace (EYP). As nongovernmental organizations

(NGO) were granted consultative status with UN economic and

social departments and agencies, the fronts positioned

themselves to lead the IYP celebration. (The IYP chairman,

Viacheslav A. Ustinov, was under secretary general for UN

political and security council affairs.)

In all, there were more than 800 NGOs, only seven of which

were Soviet-directed fronts. Yet, when the 250-member

Conference on Non-Governmental Organizations (CONGO)

elected a 20-member board to direct operations, five of the

board members were representatives of the seven Soviet

fronts. In January 1986, the CONGO met again in Geneva to

hold conferences under the slogan "Together for Peace." Of the
ggp

Soviet international fronts-and the WPC was separately

selected to coordinate CONGO activities with the UN governing

body.

Throughout 1986, these particular fronts, calling themselves

closely cooperating NGOs, preached the Soviet propaganda

line on disarmament and peace. They collectively moved

toward a climactic assembly held in October 1986 in

Copenhagen under the rubric of a World Peace Congress. An

attempt was made to indicate that the congress organizers had

been drawn from a broad political spectrum. Such was not the

case, however: The WPC-at roughly three-year intervals-was

the planner, organizer, and director. The last world peace

congress was held in Prague in 1983. The WPC sought to

conceal its role in the Copenhagen Congress, but Denmark's

Social Democratic Party (SDP) exposed it and declared that

this widely heralded peace gathering was nothing more than a

Soviet front operation. The Danish press reported accordingly.

This exposure did not stop the event, but the SDP spokesman

issued this statement: "The members of the Congress

Preparatory Committee do not represent a broad selection of

political affiliations . We have checked the names of the people

on the organizing committee and the vast majority are

Communist."

Nevertheless, some 2,000 delegates and peace activists from

around the world assembled to attack US policies, support the

Soviet Union, and damn SDI. It seemed appropriate that the

five-day peace congress ended in a wild melee when protesters

against Soviet human rights violations attempted to make

their point. After that, the Soviet international fronts were less

vocal and more restrained, and Soviet propaganda was

promulgated more directly by Soviet entities; for example, the

Soviet Friendship Society.

The Gorbachev Era

When President Reagan met with General Secretary Gorbachev

in Geneva in 1985, their views of disarmament revealed major

differences. There was one area, however, in which all

162
need to have a greater degree of cultural and personal exchange

and a lesser degree of suspicion, animosity, and cold-war

propaganda.

Perhaps it was a new beginning. The media proclaimed it

the spirit of Geneva; Gorbachev called it glasnost (openness) . It

does not appear, however, that this spirit trickled down to the

purveyors of Soviet active measures. Consider, for example,

the following:

" The Tass disinformation report on US scientists developing

ethnic weapons to be used against South African blacks was

repeated as 'recently as June 1987.

" Post-Geneva Soviet and surrogate propaganda implied

that the CIA was behind the assassination of Swedish Prime

Minister Olof Palme.

" Post-Geneva Tass claimed that the US Air Force had

bombed Honduran peasants with poisonous substances at

night. (The charge was completely refuted by Honduran health

officials .)

" Lies emanating from Moscow and carried by Soviet

surrogates (e.g., the New Delhi Patriot) maintained that the CIA

was involved in the assassination of Prime Minister Indira

Gandhi, the Air India crash, and rebellion among the Sikhs.

" The Soviet press alleged that the United States continued

to create biological warfare weapons when, in fact, the United

States was in full compliance with the 1972 treaty that banned

the production of biological and toxic weapons.

" Soviet sources alleged that the CIA perpetrated the 1978

Jonestown massacre in Guyana (a US congressman and 918

cult members were killed) . The story appeared first in Izuestiya

on 30 January 1987 and again in the Leningrad Komsomol

(communist youth organization) newspaper on 10 April 1987.

A particularly gruesome account, containing photographs from

Jonestown, appeared in the 2-8 March issue of Nedelya, a

Sunday supplement of Izuestiya. Soviet media accounts were

based on the book, The Murder of Jonestown A CIA Crime,

published by a Soviet Ministry of Justice publishing house.

163
A recent campaign on acquired immunodeficiency syndrome

(AIDS) provides insight into the methods used by the Soviets to

spread a totally false story; that is, that the AIDS virus was

scientifically engineered in a US laboratory at Fort Detrick,

Maryland, and released into the mainstream by criminals and

homosexuals who had volunteered to be guinea pigs. In

October 1985, Literatumaya Gazeta attempted to launch such

a campaign through the New Delhi Patriot, but there was only

sporadic pickup by the foreign press. In May 1986, the Litgaz

newspaper of the Soviet writer's union tried again; again, there

was little outside response.

During these scattered Soviet attempts to sell the idea that

AIDS was a made-in-the-USA product, US Ambassador Arthur

Hartman wrote letters of protest to the editors of the publications involved, but the letters were not published. The ambassador later made the letters public, pointing out that the

accusations were false and that the scientific claims were

ridiculous.

The Harare Nonaligned Summit (NAM) became the launch

pad for another Soviet-directed AIDS disinformation campaign

that was to have far more success than the previous attempts

to sell the lie. For several months prior to the NAM, Soviet and

pro-Soviet media had claimed that the US government (CIA)

was out to wreck the NAM, but no mention was made of the

US being responsible for AIDS.

The opening attack came just prior to the summit with

articles in the Harare Sunday Mail and the United News of

India, reporting the distribution of a scientific tract to the

delegates titled AIDS U.S. Homemade Evil, NotMade in Africa.

(Its actual title was AIDS-Its Nature and Its Origin, but it

sought to sell the aforementioned thesis.) The false claims of

the document failed to take hold at the conference, due in part

to a swift retraction by the Harare Sunday Mail, which carried

an interview with an American virologist on the faculty of the

University of Zimbabwe. The virologist found the document to

be totally without scientific merit.

There was no further mention of AIDS until Novosti, the

Soviet news agency, reported from Moscow that two French

16 4
warfare testing in the United States . That same day in

Damascus, A1 Thawra ran the Novosti account on its front

page. Two days later, "Radio Prague" broadcast the same story

in its English language Afro-Asian service program. Tass then

repeated the disinformation that AIDS had been developed at

Pentagon laboratories at Fort Detrick, Maryland. This story

was also reported in Kampala in the leftist magazine Weekly

Topic.

Later, the London Sunday Express, certainly no part of the

Soviet active measures apparatus, ran an interview story with

Professor Jgcob Segal and his wife, Lilli, principal authors of

the Harare Summit AIDS document . The Express reported that

Segal, and to a lesser degree his specialist colleagues (Dr John

Seale of London and Dr Robert Strecker of Glendale),

contended that the killer AIDS virus was artificially created by

American scientists during laboratory experiments which went

disastrously wrong and that a massive cover-up has kept the

secret from the world until today. This totally erroneous

front-page claim had the effect the Soviets sought. Coming

from London in a conservative publication, the disinformation

caught hold .

In the week that followed, 14 USIS posts reported reprintings

of the Express story. By end of the month, the total approached

30. Publications in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East,

India, and Western Europe carried the disinformation. In

Wellington, New Zealand, The Dominion ran the story on its

front page under the heading, Bizarre Theory on AIDS Origin .

In Helsinki, although a tabloid carried the piece, it also carried

this quote from a noted Finnish AIDS expert, Dr Jukka Suni:

"I know of Doctor Segal and of his reputation. He is a 'prophet

of doom' who has been getting worse year after year."

In Eastern Europe, only in Poland was the Express article

replayed. It was featured in the Polish government daily, which

made a connection with the Literaturnoya Gazeta account of

October 1985 . Several days later, the Soviet press weighed in

through Tass and Pravda. The Soviet official news agency used

reports from its New York correspondent, who had cited out of

context a National Academy of Science report on AIDS . Tass

attempted to link factual scientific information with Segal's

16 5
inaccurately as a French scientist.

Pravda went a vicious step further, running an editorial

cartoon that showed a man in medical dress handing a beaker

full of swastikas suspended in liquid to a second man wearing

a US military officer's uniform. The officer is handing the

doctor a wad of dollars. The beaker is labeled "AIDS virus." A

number of corpses lie on the floor. Ambassador Hartman again

wrote letters of protest, this time to the editors of Tass and

Pravda As before, he received no response.

result of USIA/State Response

Although the disinformation campaign was initially

successful, rebuttals from USIA and State Department INR

quickly helped to reverse original media acceptance of the

Soviet effort . Adding to this was the stabilizing effect of two

widely attended AIDS conferences in Brazzaville and Berlin. In

Brazzaville, where representatives of 37 countries gathered

under the chairmanship of Dr Johnathan Mann, AIDS director

of the World Health Organization, no mention was made of the

campaign. In Berlin, it was dismissed as being unworthy of

comment.

As a result, many of the publications that had carried the

Sunday Express story printed retractions (which included a

modified backdown by the Express itself). In a stinging

editorial, the Hindustan Tunes declared that not a single

reputable scientific journal had supported the thesis that AIDS

was man-made. Almost every Western specialist is convinced

that the AIDS virus mutated naturally and spontaneously from

an animal virus.

In Brazil, OEstado de S. Paulo observed that AIDS and

disinfol7natza are very similar in their corrosive action: One

infects and destroys the body while the other succeeds in

shaking and disorienting the soul. There are two basic

questions at the root of this Soviet active measures campaign:

Where did the claim originate? Who are the scientists who

have attempted to spread them?

In July 1983, the New Delhi Patriot published a letter from an

unnamed "well-known American scientist and anthropologist

166
undocumented account of how the AIDS virus was developed

by the CIA and the Pentagon. Fort Detrick, Maryland, was

reported by the writer to be the place where the disease was

created. He added just as incorrectly that a similar US

laboratory in Lahore had bred super mosquitoes and other

insects that could spread dangerous diseases such as yellow

fever, dengue, and encephalitis . The only source the unknown

writer gave for any of this information was the totally

unreliable cult organization, the Church of Scientology.

Literatumaya Gazeta used this rambling piece of gobbledygook as its source in its October 1985 story. So did the Segals

in their document presented at Harare. Jacob Segal was born

in Leningrad and was a longtime resident of the Soviet Union

before moving to East Berlin. He is a 75-year-old retired

biologist and self-announced AIDS specialist who failed to

attend the mid-November Berlin conference on AIDS. He

maintained that AIDS was first tied to Fort Detrick by a British

researcher who published an article in a New Zealand journal.

Segal's wife, Lilli, however, offered a different source-the East

German Urania Press. Urania's prime function was to disseminate Soviet propaganda.

Lilli Segal is a retired researcher and professor of epidemiology. She survived Auschwitz and has been a resident of the

GDR since 1953. She and her husband worked as biology

instructors in Cuba for several years. Both have been retired

from Humboldt University since 1983. Their AIDS thesis was

absurd, according to world reknowned AIDS specialists. It had

no bearing on serious scientific knowledge of the virus. It was

on a par with the Segals' attempt to link the surfacing of the

disease in New York City with its proximity to Fort Detrick.

Their report stated that criminals who had engaged in

homosexual practices during the long time of their imprisonment "obviously" concentrated in the nearest big city after

their release and it was therefore logical that the first AIDS

cases should have been registered in New York. In fact,

however, New York is 250 miles from Fort Detrick while

Baltimore is only 45 miles and Washington, D.C., 50 miles

from that installation . Further, President Richard M. Nixon

called a halt to all offensive biological warfare experimentation

16 7
US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases.

The laboratory's work was focused on finding vaccines against

biological warfare.

Fort Detrick is not used entirely for military purposes. Of the

25 tenants on the installation, one is the Frederick Cancer

Research Facility . It operates under the direction of Health and

Human Services with a department devoted to AIDS research.

It has never been a military component. Other research is

conducted by the Department of Agriculture in both foreign

and domestic crop diseases. Fort Detrick's raison d'etre is to

cure, not to inflict ; to prevent, not to infect .

It should be added that neither Dr John Seale, London

venereologist, nor Dr Robert Strecker, California gastroenterologist, both of whom were quoted in the Sunday Express,

subscribed to the disinformation regarding Fort Detrick.

Conclusion

The twisted course of the Soviet active measures AIDS

campaign can be traced back to a Soviet-aligned Indian

newspaper. It quoted an unnamed individual whose line of lies

took root in the Soviet press and briefly flourished via a

Soviet-bloc document that was completely lacking in scientific

credibility. Later, a new piece of AIDS disinformation emerged

from India. It attempted to link the disease to a Union Carbide

pesticide. Still later, a Communist party member in the Indian

parliament sought to press the AIDS-made-in-the-US line.

Nevertheless, the disinformation boomeranged on the Soviets ;

many publications around the globe have come to recognize

and understand the nature of this Soviet active measure.
Appendix A

A few years ago, a forged document purporting to be a

speech by US Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger

surfaced in the Federal Republic of Germany. The document is

dated 25 November 1983. No such speech was ever made, and

Secretary Weinberger never made the remarks attributed to

him. The document was a complete fabrication. Its aim was to

convince Europeans that the US purpose in developing the

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was not only to gain US

military superiority over the USSR but also to dominate its

NATO allies . Both goals were supposedly to be accomplished

largely by U$ control of space through SDI, which was

described in the forgery as an offensive system.

The concepts used in the document did not reflect US

government thinking, but were, in fact, what the Soviets

wanted West Europeans to believe about US views. Although

for the most part the forgery was written in acceptable

English, several mistakes in word usage indicated that the

drafter's first language was not English. For example, it

asserted that the United States sought "prevalence" over the

Soviet Union at all (military) levels . The forger(s) confused

prevalence with superiority .

A major point made in the forgery was that the United

States would suffer a disastrous depression without SDI.

However, the key and distinctive error had the secretary of

defense commenting that the Soviets have not been engaged in

an SDI program of their own. In fact, Secretary Weinberger,

the president, and other leading US defense spokesmen had

pointed out repeatedly that Soviet scientists had been at work

on a similar project since 1968.

The Weinberger forgery is one of several addressed in this

report. All sought to undermine US policies and intentions .

Disinformation Hits Home

Soviet disinformation attempted to "hit home" with a forged

letter purportedly written by Herbert Romerstein, United

States Information Agency (USIA) Soviet active measures

coordinator to US news organizations. The Washington Post
had supposedly sent to Senator-Select David Durenberger

(R.-Minn.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence . The forgery was cleverly conceived but poorly

executed. Its purpose was to smear USIA by making it appear

that the agency was proposing that the United States should

make false claims about the Chernobyl nuclear accident.

The forgery alleged that Mr Romerstein proposed to Senator

Durenberger that USIA disseminate rumors about the accident.

The forgery suggested that "our associates in European information media" spread reports that would include the following

details:

" the "number of victims should be alleged to be somewhere

between 2,000 and 3,000" ;

a "mass evacuation of population from the 100-mile zone"

around Chernobyl should be alleged to have occurred; and

" "transport problems, shortage of various goods, chaos,

and panic should also be given publicity ."

The forgery also recommends that "our allies should be

influenced so as to make a request for compensation for

contamination of their territory." The document takes advantage

of the insights offered by hindsight. It is backdated to 29 April

1986, the day after the Chernobyl accident was first reported

by the Soviets and just before rumors (of exactly this nature)

began to appear.

Had the forgery been accepted by the press, it would have

given currency to the notion that rumors about Chernobyl had

been generated by USIA rather than by the Soviets' refusal to

release sufficient data about the events surrounding Chernobyl.

At the same time, USIA would have been cast as a manipulative, rumor-mongering propaganda apparatus free to dictate

to senators and unnamed "associates" in the European media.

Poor execution, however, ruined the Soviet attempt. The

forgery was not composed correctly and it contained an

incorrect address for Durenberger. Its falsity was easily

ascertained by journalists who telephoned the USIA and

Senator Durenberger's office .

Ironically, Romerstein's forged signature was taken from a

letter he had previously sent to Lt Gen Robert L. Schweitzer,

172
Schweitzer about a forgery purportedly written by him. Even

more obvious, the word copy in Romerstein's handwriting at

the top of the Chernobyl forgery is identical to a notation made

on copies of the letter to General Schweitzer.

The forgery had all the hallmarks of a Soviet active measure,

although its sloppiness probably indicated an operation

executed by personnel in the United States rather than those

in the Moscow Center, who could be expected to produce a

more professional product. In analyzing forgeries, one key is to

determine who benefits . Certainly, Soviet purposes would have

been served if the USIA had been blamed for the bad press

that was actually caused by Soviet intransigence and stonewalling over Chernobyl.

Levchenko on Dobrynin

At a USIA briefing on 20 August 1986, at Washington's

Foreign Press Center, former KGB major and active measures

specialist Stanislav Levchenko made some observations about

Anatolii Fedorovich Dobrynin, former Soviet Ambassador to

the US who later headed the Soviet Communist Party Central

Committee's International Department.

Mr Dobrynin's appointment to the International Department

post had been the subject of much speculation in the American

press . As a former staff member of the International Department,

Levchenko's perspective on this issue was instructive.

Basically, Levchenko discounted the theory that Dobrynin's

appointment was "positive for the future development of

healthy relations between the Soviet Union and the United

States ."

I dare to disagree with this point because if Mr Gorbachev really

wanted himto do that kind ofjob, he could have made him, let's say,

first deputy foreign minister in charge of bilateral relations with the

United States, and he could spend all his days and nights working in

that field. Instead, Anatolii Dobrynin becomes chief of the International

Department, which, in another parlance, is the largest subversive

mechanism in the world. The purpose of that department is not

enhancement or deepening of bilateral or multilateral relations at all.

It's just the contrary . It is the department which, among many other

173
politburo and running all sorts of operations in that field.

Levchenko believed that Dobrynin would reinvigorate the

active measures operations of the International Department

and use his knowledge of the United States to bring a new

professionalism to its activities .

He, of course, knows about some flaws which the active measures

machine had during the last couple of years when his predecessor,

Boris Ponomarev, was really getting old. I personally have no doubt

that Mr Dobrynin will try, within a rather short period of time,

probably within this year, to restructure the mechanism in such a way

that it will work better, on a much more professional basis, that

sloppiness, will probably disappear, and that the scale of operations

against primarily the United States and NATO countries on a global

basis will definitely be enhanced . That's my projection .

Levchenko's final assessment on Dobrynin : "He is the person

who has close to perfect knowledge of the United States. He's

probably one of the best specialists in the Soviet Union on the

United States, who is generally considered to be a very talented,

bright person who is, of course, a devoted Communist and quite

a devoted person to the cause of the politburo."

National Security Council Forgery

A very well-done and ambitious forgery surfaced in Lagos,

Nigeria. It bears the title, "US Strategy in Foreign Policy 1985-

1988" and falsely claims to be a "copy of a summary paper on

US foreign policy approved by the (United States) National

Security Council (NSC) in February 1985." Asection of the

forgery dealing with purported US policy in Africa was

published in Lagos in the weekly magazine Africa Guardian. Its

broad scope and relative professionalism increase the chances

that it may reappear in other areas.

The forgery was a 10-page, single-spaced document lacking

any identifying symbols and classification markings. It was

divided into eight topical sections dealing with US policy

toward important regions. It was cleverly crafted, skillfully

weaving together US policy with phony assertions that would

outrage foreign as well as domestic audiences. For example,

the United States was falsely portrayed as believing that "a

17 4
pppgg

cations and intelligence systems of high sophistication, would

guarantee our security to a degree which would permit us to

exert severe pressure on the Soviet Union to the point of

issuing an ultimatum if necessary."

Other false assertions were that:

" The United States was seeking "the establishment of an

effective first-strike (nuclear) capability by the year 1995."

" "Strategic superiority" was the goal of US policy, and

advances in military technology might "suggest" or "even

demand a preemptive strike."

" NATO allies should be pressured "to conform to US policies ."

" The US problem with the Greek leadership was that it had

an "independent attitude ."

" The United States is opposed to curbs on nuclear and

chemical weapons.

" In Nicaragua, "US military intervention cannot be ruled

out, keeping in mind the lesson of Grenada."

" The Organization of American States "should be made to

accord with our national interests."

" A negotiated settlement between Vietnam and an ASEAN

bloc over Cambodia "in no way corresponds with US interests."

" Japan must agree to a stronger US military presence in

that country and to increase its military strength through the

purchase of US arms.

" The United States will "seek to hold China to policies

corresponding with US global interests."

" The United States feels that China has an "unpredictable

political future" and an "absence of stable power succession

procedures ."

The United States opposes the successful implementation

of China's modernization program because it "might lead to

rivalry or even confrontation with the United States ."

" "Nothing short of Qadhafi's assassination will bring any

significant change in Libyan policies of support for international

terrorism."

" Israel is referred to as "the Jerusalem government," implying recognition of Jerusalem as the capital.

17 5
force for preemptive operationsif a threat to our interests

arises.

The Soviet presence in Afghanistan is seen as a "propaganda bonus" which can be utilized to increase US military

and political power in the Persian Gulf region, perhaps even

leading to "the restoration of American influence in Iran."

" The main lines of US policy in Africa are to exploit the

area as a necessary source of raw materials and to control

African affairs in conjunction with South Africa.

Many other themes and suhthemes were planted in this

lengthy forgery. As with the other forgeries mentioned above,

this one appears to be a product of the Soviet Union or one of

its surrogates. The themes cited reflect Soviet claims about US

policy.

The Assassinations of

Olof Palme and Indira Gandhi

If one were asked to name the major similarity between the

gunning down of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme and the

gunning down of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the

answer would be that the Soviet Union, by innuendo, falsely

accused the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of committing

both crimes and repeated the lie through its propaganda

outlets.

On 31 October 1984, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India

was assassinated by Sikh members of her bodyguard. Several

hours after the murder, "Radio Moscow" declared the assassins

had "received their ideological inspirations" from the CIA. "Radio

Moscow" broadcast a familiar litany of disinformation, accusing

the CIA of guilt in the assassination of world leaders over a

25-year period.

Pro-Soviet Indian publications were quick to pick up the

Moscow line. They added their own embellishments, some

directly accusing the United States of having murdered Mrs

Ghandi. These claims were replayed by the Soviet press.

Responsible Indian newspapers would have none of it,

however. A Hindustan Times editorial summed up public

17 6
ppy ppgg

States. . . . Cold War propaganda on such a tragic occasion by

the Soviet Union is uncalled for and most unfortunate."

President Reagan called the Soviet allegation, "the world's

biggest cheap shot in a long, long time."

The Soviet lie became a double lie when Secretary of State

Shultz confronted Soviet Prime Minister Tikhanov at Mrs

Ghandi's funeral and Tikhanov denied that his country was

making such claims. The Indian government, in a determined

investigation of the assassination, found no trace of any US

involvement.

These events occurred about a year before President Reagan

met with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva and some 15

months before the murder of Swedish Prime Minister Palme. It

was hoped that the Geneva meeting would bring a change in

the kind of outrageous disinformation that had been spewing

out of Moscow day in and day out.

Prime Minister Palme was killed on a Friday night. The next

day, Tass published a commentary on Palme's death. The

commentary was written by Anatoly Krasikov, deputy director

of Tass. Krasikov's commentary, according to the Swedish

daily Aftenpost, "indicated that CIA is behind the murder."

This commentary employed exactly the same kind of slippery

innuendo "Radio Moscow" had used in implying that the CIA

was responsible for Indira Ghandi's assassination.

The next day (Sunday, 2 March), Pravda, the official

Communist Party newspaper, added its commentary. The

writer, Chingiz Aytmatov, academician of the Soviet Academy

of Sciences and delegate to the 27th Congress of the CPSU,

raised a basic question and then answered it . Who was, or

who were, the assassin(s)? We do not yet know, but it is clear

even now that the terrorist crime was committed by forces that

are interested in shifting whole countries and regions to the

right and in intimidating the public, which heeds the voice of

an honest individual.

Response from the Swedish newspaper Morgenbladet was

swift. In an editorial titled "Grotesque," it attacked Gorbachev's

;mouthpiece" in choosing to exploit the situation at a "tragic

moment." It went on to say, "the real question is what Gorbachev

17 7
gppg

between the hopes he has expressed for a relaxation of

internal tension and his continued hammering on public

opinion with anti-.American propaganda."

On Monday, the New Delhi Hindi daily Navbharat carried a

Moscow dateline report : "The official agency Tass has alleged

that the assassination of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme was

the handiwork of the CIA." Other Indian publications,

particularly those that were pro-Soviet, repeated the accusation

and parallels were drawn between the political viewpoints of Mrs

Ghandi and Mr Palme.

In the course of the next few days, the Tass-Prauda effort was

replayed in a number of locales-Ghana, Malta, Australia,

Uruguay, Peru. In the latter two countries, the publications were

Communist Party weeklies. In Australia, the conservative daily

Australian concluded an account by its Moscow correspondent

with a quote from former Swedish Prime Minister FaIldin: "I

refuse to believe it is a political assassination . . . . This must be

the work of a lunatic."

Elsewhere around the globe, the Soviet accusation was

ignored ; but that was not the end of it. Seventeen days after

the murder, Aytmatov, the writer of the Prauda commentary,

was interviewed by the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter.

"Aytmatov was now clearly alarmed that his words would be

interpreted" to suggest the CIA had committed the crime. But

the Prauda writer's retraction was something less than

unequivocal: "The people who murdered Olof Patme do not

need to come from the United States or the CIA-even though

it does seem to be the case of reactionary forces."

The Soviet academician was simply following the standard

Leninist technique of hedging his Prauda commentary with

obfuscation. However, just as the Soviet-oriented accusations

of CIA guilt in the assassination of Indira Ghandi continued to

surface, so, too, did those about Olof Palme. His name was

added to the long list of assassinated leaders that Soviet

disinformation organs recited on a regular basis as victims of

CIA operations.

17 8
Certain characteristics in Soviet active measures operations

followed a consistent pattern. One was to try and reverse

blame for Soviet Military actions by accusing the United States

and its allies of carrying out exactly the same acts. This was

done not only by describing the Soviet techniques originally

followed, but also by employing the same terminology; for

example, yellow rain.

In March and November 1982, the US State Department

presented to the United Nations reports of "Soviet involvement in

provision and use of toxin weapons." The reports offered

"information, Vvidence and an analysis of results the United

States had obtained on the use of toxin and other chemical war

agents by the Soviets in Afghanistan, and by the Lao and

Vietnamese under Soviet supervision in Laos and Kampuchea."

The victims referred to chemical agents that had been sprayed

and dropped on their villages by plane, helicopter, and artillery

shell as yellow rain. Between August 1983 and February 1984,

further evidence of yellow rain attacks in Southeast Asia were

submitted by the United States to the UN. These charges were

angrily denied by the Soviets, who submitted their own scientific

paper. It maintained that Agent Orange, the defoliant used by

the US to clear jungle areas during the Vietnam War, had

contaminated the elephant grass. Its infected spores, the Soviet

government claimed, had been carried by prevailing winds into

Laos and Kampuchea where they had tainted the environment

and brought illness and death to those affected. Scientifically,

this explanation was recognized as hogwash.

By the end of 1985, reports of yellow rain in the aforementioned areas had "diminished in number." But on 7

February 1986, yellow rain was suddenly in the news again.

This time, the area was Honduras and the culprit was the US

Army. The newspaper Tiempo, reporting from San Pedro Sula,

quoted a leftist trade union publication which maintained that

the US Army was spraying lethal chemicals on civilians in

northern municipalities for experimental purposes. The

chemicals, it reported, caused fainting and convulsions.

Further, it said that strange sores appeared on the bodies of

17 9
requested investigations by health authorities .

In the first published accounts of the reported problem, no

mention was made of yellow rain. On 22 February, Tass quoted

Red Star, the official Soviet Ministry of Defense newspaper: "The

United States is carrying out criminal experiments with chemical

weapons in Honduras. . . . U.S. aircraft have been scattering

yellow toxin in the air similar in its characteristics to the highly

toxin 'Agent Orange.' . . . Eyewitnesses to the secret flights by the

US aircraft say that 'yellow rain' falls every time the aircraft

appear."

That same day, "Radio Moscow" offered a commentary,

repeating the same accusations and using the same terms.

But the accusation went even further. The commentator said

the Pentagon was preparing to launch chemical and biological

warfare against Nicaragua and was responsible for an

epidemic of dengue that had hit that country earlier. Some of

these charges were picked up by the Panamanian press, which

added that the yellow rain story had been born of a theory

"between groups of the Honduran Left."

Previously, the US Embassy in Tegucigalpa had denied that

US forces were testing chemical weapons anywhere in

Honduras, "least of all against the civilian population." Not

only had a US medical team investigated the charges, but so

had the US military and a Honduran congressional group.

Under the heading "Congressmen find downpour of calamities

instead of yellow rain," the newspaper La Prensa, along with

other Honduran publications, including Tlempo (which had

broken the original story), cited the cause of the problem as an

epidemic of mange stimulated by a lack of hygiene; the germ

had spread through physical contact.

The daily El Haraldo carried an interview with Honduran

Army Chief of Staff General Humberto Regalado Hernandez,

who said that a military investigation coincided with state and

private reports. The disease, he said, had been known since

biblical times as scabies and was not the result of chemical

gases dropped from unidentified aircraft on evening flights.

The only flying in the area had been done by Honduran crop

dusters who were spraying sugar cane.

18 0
Honduras. Another possibility, he said, "is that the USSR, via

Cuba and Nicaragua, is using sophisticated methods. . . . The

presence of 'yellow rain' in our homeland was ruled out, but

there is evidence that the local fifth column is carrying out

disinformation campaigns ordered by the Soviet connection in

Tegucigalpa." This Soviet yellow rain story was turned off by the

combined actions of the Honduran government and the press .

Appendix B

Front Organizations

Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)

Christian Peace Conference (CPC)

International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)

International Federation of Resistance Fighters (IFIR)

International Institute for Peace (IIP)

International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)

International Radio and Television Organization (OIRT)

International Union of Students (IUS)

Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)

World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)

World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW)

World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)

World Peace Council (WPC)

Appendix C

British Guiana

Generalmajor Gert Bastain

Canada

Major General Leonard V. Johnson

Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)

Generalmajor Gunter Vollmer

France

Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti

Greece

General Georgios Koumanakos

Admiral Miltiades Papathanassiou

Brigadier Michalis Tombopoulos

Italy

General Nino Pasti

Netherlands

General-major Michiel H. von Meyenfeldt, Chairman

Norway

General Johan Christie

Portugal

Marshal Francisco da Costa Gomes

General Rangel de Lima

United Kingdom

Brigadier Michael Harbottle OBE

189

What Soviet PSFOP Mirror

Imaging Can Tell Us

James Melnich

Soviet psyoperators were sometimes ignorant of significant

nuances concerning the societies they targeted for propaganda

development. Though time and experience tended to improve

certain technical aspects of Soviet PSYOP, Soviet psyoperators

sometimes continued to reach down into their own limited Soviet

experiences for examples and themes that they projected onto

the Western societies they were attacking in their propaganda.

Study of this mirror-imaging process can be very revealing and

may point out important weaknesses. This is true even though

some segments of the Soviet PSYOP hierarchy appeared to have

gained in sophistication. Identifying some of these tell-tale

characteristics will help us to assess the overall Soviet PSYOP

threat.

Glasnost, Gorbachev, and Disinformation

The campaign of glasnost in the Soviet Union under Mikhail S.

Gorbachev, with its emphasis on a more open Soviet press, by no

means signaled an end to Soviet disinformation. On the

contrary, since the press in the USSR began writing on many

topics previously considered taboo, there were more opportunities for mirror-imaging disinformation to present itselfperhaps with some new twists.

For example, we can examine one of Gorbachev's perceptual

blunders concerning the United States and see how it relates

to the concept of mirror imaging. In early 1987, Gorbachev

met with several US congressmen in Moscow. In the course of

their discussions, he suggested that America create separate

states for blacks, Puerto Ricans, and citizens of Polish background.' Apart from this being a ludicrous and insulting
system. To begin with, it demonstrates Gorbachevs ignorance

of the internal policies of the United States. Further, it

assumes that we have a Polish problem that must be dealt

with. From the standpoint of mirror imaging, it suggests that

the Soviets dealt with many of their minority problems by

sending minorities to autonomous regions somewhere in the

Soviet Union.

The Soviets had serious minority problems, especially with

their Central Asian Muslims. There have been riots in

Kazakhstan, demonstrations in the Baltic states, demands by

Crimean Tatars for their rights, and pressures for greater

Jewish emigration. Demographic analysis of the Soviet

population suggests that the Great Russian nationality itself

was becoming a minority in its own country as Central Asian

birthrates skyrocketed.

As Soviet policymakers sought answers to these problems,

Soviet propagandists were producing disinformation about an

alleged Western ethnic bomb supposedly targeted against US

minorities. This propaganda is an excellent example of mirror

imaging. What some in the Soviet Union undoubtedly wished

they themselves had, they projected as a policy practiced by

their ideological enemy. This disinformation example shows us

both the Soviet propagandists' intense prejudice and how

limited their worldview really was. It is an example that is

repeated over and over in a variety of contexts, whether one is

considering AIDS, baby parts, or chemical weapons.

One might add that, although the Soviet Union did have its

share of extremely sophisticated propagandists, such as

Georgii Arbatov of the Institute of the USA and Canada,

Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev, and Vladimir Posner of

Radio Moscow, the fact that Gorbachev himself could make

such an error should tell us something about the attitudes of

rank-and-file Soviet propagandists .

Ultimate Enemy Projections

Soviet propaganda was rife with allusions to the ultimate

enemy, whether that enemy be world imperialism, Nazi storm

troopers, supporters of SDI, Zionism, or religious activists in

19 2
as being antihuman and opposed to everything the Soviet

Union stood for. For example, Zionism was defined as a

"deadly enemy of the Soviet State from its very beginning." Z

There was usually a plurality of Soviet ultimate enemies,

depending on the international situation. An ultimate enemy

in Soviet propaganda was first dehumanized, then made part

of an anti-Soviet worldwide conspiratorial network (i .e., Afghan

freedom fighters became bandits righting as agents of US

imperialism; unofficial religious groups in the Soviet Union

were linked with dark forces from abroad).

In attempting to describe the ultimate enemy, whoever and

whatever that might have been at a given time, Soviet

propagandists sometimes drew from actual Soviet acts of

barbarism. Thus their disinformation, as a form of mirror

imaging, reflected back into the pool of Soviet reality. For one

example, I will draw from personal experience.

In the early 1980s, I met a Soviet emigre woman who was

convinced that evangelical Christians in the Ukraine sacrificed

babies by rolling them in barrels with spikes as part of some

religious ritual. She, of course, had never witnessed such a

thing, but said that she had heard about those people when

she lived in the Soviet Union. Obviously, she was the victim of

very gross Soviet disinformation-and there were other Soviet

campaigns in which other religious groups were under attack

by the state. One can find numerous articles accusing Soviet

Baptists of drowning children or performing other dark and

perfidious acts-the whole purpose being to defame the

targeted group and further isolate them from the general

population .

Nevertheless, the matter of the spikes continued to bother

me : why such a particular disinformation image? Where did it

come from? Did a propagandist simply make it up out of thin

air, or did it spring from some other source? I have no final

answer to this question, but a year or so later, when I was

reading Michael Voslensky's work, Nomenklatura: The Soviet

Ruling Class, a particular passage leapt out at me. Voslensky,

in quoting a 1920s account about the Cheka (the earliest

forerunner of the KGB), recounted various Cheka methods of

torture and execution of their victims. One such method was

19 3
barrels spiked on the inside and rolled them." 3 This account

and recent Soviet disinformation against religious groups are

separated by more than one-half century. Are they somehow

related, or did later Soviet propagandists simply make up the

recent vicious accusation out of thin air? One cannot be

certain, of course, but I would posit this as a possible example

of a mirror image projected out of the past.

Zionism and Nazism

In examining the concept of ultimate enemy in Soviet

propaganda, we might also consider Soviet disinformation that

compared and linked Zionists with Nazis. One would be

hard-pressed to find a more vicious lie, but such comparisons

fit Soviet concepts of the ultimate enemy very well. They also

furthered Soviet foreign policy goals in the Middle East.

Virulent anti-Semitism was imbedded in Soviet society, along

with fears of a Jewish conspiracy dating back to the fraudulent

Protocols of the Elders of Zion. There was also the memory of

Nazi fascism, which cost 20 million Soviet lives during World

War II and the fear that German revanchism would once again

rear its ugly head. Soviet propagandists simply combined the

two images.

What this tells us is that the Soviet propaganda machine

(regardless of its short-term goals for the propaganda, such as

defaming Israel in third world countries) was itself convinced

that there were many real enemies, both within and outside

the Soviet Union. 4 These were then reduced to extremely crude

and violent images and made a part of an ongoing international conspiracy. They probably also believed that such

ultimate enemy projections were both necessary and useful for

their own population. While many societies resort to ultimate

enemy projections and stereotypes in propaganda during

wartime, the Soviet Union appears to have been one of the few

nations to do it consistently over time during periods of peace.

As a footnote, one might consider how sensitive the Soviets

themselves were to being stereotyped in the West. The TV

series "Amerika" showed the Soviets as adversaries, but

adversaries possessing many human characteristics-a far cry

194
were made prior to its airing. Soviet propagandists continued

to show daily hatred against the West on a massive worldwide

scale, with only an occasional protest from the West when the

results of a given lie would have had serious and undeniable

consequences.

The Invasion of Grenada

In late 1983, the Soviet newspaper Izuestiya not only

attacked -he United States for invading Grenada but also

accused US forces (allegedly quoting the Mexican newspaper

El Dia) of using chemical weapons to poison some 2,000

Grenadens, including women and children, and of recording

their suffering and deaths on film. This gruesome fabrication,

which was read by millions of Soviet citizens, further stated that

the bodies were shipped back to the United States for additional

study. The author of that article was A. Kuvshinnikov. 5

For a long time I tried to discover who A. Kuvshinnikov was

or is, or whether it was a pseudonym. Then another article by

A. Kuvshinnikov appeared in Izuestiya on 21 August 1987.

This article was said to be from the US correspondent at the

USSR Foreign Ministry Press Centers It is likely that these

articles were written by the same person. In his especially

pernicious article about Grenada, Kuvshinnikov attempted to

set up a parallel between the WWII Nazi death camps with

their human experiments and the US invasion of Grenada.

This is another example of the ultimate-enemy image. No

citation was given for El Dia, which was described by Izuestiya

as an influential Mexican newspaper.

Soviet propagandists apparently believed that their audience

would accept such base lies to some extent. And were these

articles also designed to mitigate the effect of certain Soviet

actions? In my opinion, they may tell us in part what the

Soviets themselves have done or are capable of doing. The

horrors of Afghanistan, as recounted by refugee survivors of

Soviet atrocities, come to mind. Were the consciences of some

Soviet veterans returning from Afghanistan (who may have

19 5
they thought the United States had done worse?

Mirror imaging in Soviet propaganda is, I believe, an analysis

area of great value to all who study the former Soviet

Union-especially those who seek to understand the nature

and depth of Soviet PSYOP.

Notes

1. Novoe Russkoe Slovo (The New Russian Word), 19 April 1987.

2. See V. Alekseev and V. Ivanov, "Zionism in the Service of Imperialism,"

International Affairs 6 (1970) : 59, in Baruch A. Hazan, Soviet Propaganda: A

Case Study of the Middle East Conflict (New Brunswick. N.J. : Transaction

Books, Keter, 1976), 150.

3 . Michael Voslensky, Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class (New York:

Doubleday 8z Co., 1984), 279, in P. Milyukov, Rossiia Na Perelome 1 (Paris,

1927): 193.

4. For a fascinating account of alleged Politburo views of worldwide

conspiracies, see Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York:

Alfred A. Knopf, 1985).

5. A. Kuvshinnikov, Izvestiya, 9December 1983, 4.

6. Ibid., 21 August 1987, 4.
Indoctrination of Hate

Lev Yudovich

Soviet military doctrine required the soldier to develop a

strong feeling of hatred. This hatred was cultivated so the

soldier would (1) believe in victory, (2) be willing to act in a

dangerous situation, and (3) be psychologically prepared to

operate under the conditions of modern war.

In case of war, the Soviet soldier will face a strong and brutal enemy

who has been well indoctrinated in a spirit of irreconcilability toward

the Soviet people. The Soviet soldier must therefore have a clearly

defined attitude for the enemy: hate, contempt, and a feeling of

superiority over them. We must show the soldier the strong and weak

points of our enemies. We have to define the enemy in terms of his

psychological characteristics (or stereotypes) that are related to his

nationality or ethnic group . 1

The Soviet soldier was constantly being indoctrinated to

develop hatred for the West. The indoctrination of hate started

with the myth of a US threat to the Soviet Union. This myth

allowed Soviet political and military leaders to keep the entire

country in a state of tension and stress. The myth also made it

easier to justify military spending and the consequent lowering

of standards in domestic life. The American threat to the Soviet

Union was the fundamental thesis of Soviet propaganda.

The aim of Soviet propaganda was to create a stereotyped

pattern of thinking and reacting. The myth helped Soviet

military and political leadership instill prejudice in the soldier .

He was trained to become suspicious of foreigners and their

way of life. His suspicion and deep distrust became the basis

for hate. According to the Soviet view, "the political myth is an

This article provided courtesy of the US John F. Kennedy Special Warfare

Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Part of an original work

titled, An Assessment of the Vulnerability of the Soviet Soldier.

19 7
manipulation of the masses" (Col Gen D. Volkogonov). Thus

the Soviet authorities use the very same technique that they

accuse the enemy of employing.

The Soviets instilled hatred for the United States even in

peacetime. They justified this approach by explaining that, in

the past, the final moral hardening of the soldier could be

achieved during the course of combat. In the future war, however, there will not be enough time for psychological preparedness. The soldier must, therefore, be prepared through

training. He must put aside any moral convictions he might

have and bi; oriented only toward accomplishing his mission.

Hate produces excitement-and excitement can overcome

the soldier's fear. To develop hatred, political workers used a

wide variety of indoctrination methods (e.g., discussions in

small groups, lectures, and political reviews) and every form of

media. Deception, falsification, discreditation of Western

leaders, and even cartoons became methods for building up

hate. The US soldier was shown as a hireling, a mercenary,

and a freelance murderer with a very low moral level. He had

no convictions, and his main reason for fighting was to get

money. The Soviets stated that the US soldier was not reliable

in Vietnam. As the military situation in Vietnam got worse,

said the Soviets, there were more deserters, and racial

tensions increased. The reason they presented such distorted

views was simple-to cultivate hate.

In 1952 the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of

Defense of the USSR published a book written by Col

Polkovnik B. W. Karpovich titled The Ideological Indoctrination

of Soldiers in the Armies of the United States and Great Britain.

This book was aimed at military readers. The author pictured

American soldiers as fascists and animals. 2 When a young

man enters the US Army, he stated, all training is aimed at

turning him into a skilled murdererr 3 American officers

encourage US soldiers to be murderers and rapists. In the

Korean War, according to the colonel, all American soldiers

raped Korean women and girls, and officers created special

brothels in which Korean women were forced against their will

to provide sexual services for the soldiers . 4 American soldiers,

198
and greed. 5

Although those statements were made around 1952, this

method of describing American soldiers persisted. Despite

detente, indoctrination of hate continued. In 1986, for

example, the Main Political Administration ordered the use of

a film, "Hate the Imperialists, 6

and a 1968 article, "The

Psychology of Murder and Torture," which purported to picture

the American soldier.? Political workers indoctrinated hate

during every major maneuver from Dnepr to Shield '84. 8 One

dramatic example of such indoctrination utilized the site of

Nazi victims' mass graves. Veterans and former partisans

assembled for ceremonies at those sites and stated their

recollections of Nazi brutalities. The political workers pointed

out that imperialists had produced these atrocities and had

also committed acts of brutality in oppressing national

liberation movements that developed in other countries. These

comparisons were used to unmask the imperialistic threat of

Soviet enemies-the Americans.

Political workers in the Strategic Rocket Forces used every

moment of their contact with soldiers, even appealing to the

soldiers while they were on combat alert duty. Soldiers on duty

in underground rocket bunkers were visited by political

workers. 9

Even in the face of new political thinking aimed at reducing

the mutual military threat of the Soviet Union and the United

States, the Soviets continued to instill hatred for Americans in

their regular indoctrination programs. For example, a Soviet

military journal included an article stating that hatred should

be developed because "hate is the most important quality of

the soldier and sailor since it promotes vigilance and combat

readiness. Our hatred for imperialist plunder has deep roots.

Our class adversaries are stained with the blood of millions of

Soviet people who were killed during the wars initiated by

imperialist aggressors . These imperialists are responsible for

the trouble and suffering of millions of people all over the

world. Our right to hate the imperialists is justified by their

current blood policy and their intent to invade our homeland

with weapons of mass destruction." 10

199
arguments to justify it and explain to the Soviet soldier why he

should hate the Americans. An important reason for hatred

was to overcome the Soviet soldier's interest in the American

lifestyle and any sympathy he might have for such American

items as jazz, cars, and freedom to travel. Hatred was used to

build up a distrust of everything foreign.

During the fifties, there was little difference between the

Soviet military evaluation of the American soldier and the

evaluation used in propaganda. Both evaluations were

summarized by F. O. Mikchei : "American soldiers are very

dynamic and have good technical skills, but they lack

discipline' and have low moral qualities. They have only a

narrow political mental outlook."" In the seventies, that

evaluation started to change.

The majority of Soviet military writers pointed out that, in a

future war, American soldiers would be well indoctrinated for

fighting the Soviet Union.

12 "The future war will be very severe

because the American soldier has a very strong anticommunist

view. He is aggressive and ready to carry out his officers' orders.

He is ready to be exposed to reasonable risks. He is obsessed

with the idea that he is a superman. However, he is a selfish

person, wants to make a profit, uses drugs and alcohol, and he

is inclined to desert." 13

Although Soviet military leaders changed their assessment

of the American soldier, Soviet propagandists clung to their old

picture of the American military gangster-murderer. Because

the good fighting quality of the American soldier was

recognized, propaganda was increased. Every attempt was

made to show that the American soldier was actually an object

of scorn. The propagandists stressed the message that the

American soldier must be thoroughly hated. Such hatred

produced the Nazi holocaust.

Notes

1 . M. P. Korobeinikov, Sovremenniy Boy I Problemi Psikhologii.

2. Polkovnik B . W. Karpovich, "Ideologicheskaya Obrabotka Soldat A rmiy

USA Mnglii" (Moscow: Voyenizdat Ministerstva Oboroni, 1952), 10.

3 . Ibid., 53 .

4. Ibid.

20 0
7. Voyenniy Vestnik 4, 1968, 119.

8. Voyenny-Istoricheskiy Zhumal 3, 1987, 67.

9. Kommunist Vooruzennikh Sil, no. 3, 1987, 39.

10. Communist ofArmed Forces 14, July 1986, 71 .

11 . F. O. Mikchei, Atomnoye Oruzhie V. Armii (Moscow: lzdatelstvo Inostrannoi Literaturi, 1956), 39-40.

12. Korobeinikov, 9.

13 . K. Volkogonov, Psihologicheskay Voyna (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo, 1984), 263.

Intelligence and

Psychological Operations

Col Joseph S. Gordon, USAR

Intelligence is an inextricable element of PSYOP in all

phases of its activities, from the planning and conduct of

operations to the evaluation of its effectiveness. For this

discussion, PSYOP intelligence includes that which is generated

by a PSYOP organization's own research and analysis assets

as well as the intelligence which is obtained from other

agencies. The major areas of intelligence activities in support

of PSYOP are research, target analysis, pretesting and effects

analysis, and propaganda analysis. 1

Research

Research is geared to support the mission of PSYOP, which

is to create in hostile, friendly, or neutral foreign groups the

emotions, attitudes, or behavior to support the achievement of

national objectives. The effective PSYOP campaign requires

systematic research of the highest scholarly standards. Intelligence required for PSYOP can be divided into two categories:

basic and current.

Basic PSYOP intelligence consists of general information on

such topics as the history, society, politics, economy, communications media, and military forces of a given country or

region. Such information is kept in files of pertinent

documents and a library of area studies books. When time and

resources permit, the general information is digested in the

production of studies that are tailored to support PSYOP. One

example is the basic PSYOP study, which supplements area

studies by focusing on relevant PSYOP issues, defined as

highly emotional matters, deeply rooted in a particular

country's history, customs, fears, or foreign policy . The issues

20 3
objectives that are classified as either cohesive or divisive.

Cohesive issues exploited could help strengthen or more

closely unite the total society or particular target group.

Divisive issues exploited could contribute to the separation of

a group from the greater society or to the disorganization of a

people. The basic study should also provide information on

national symbols, emotive music, or pertinent graphics that

could be used in the development of PSYOP materials . PSYOP

intelligence analysts also produce special studies in response

to timely events or to the need for greater focus and depth on

an aspect of a country or society not covered elsewhere.

Current intelligence is obtained from all possible sources

and is used to update studies and files. Should a PSYOP

campaign be implemented, it is essential that current intelligence be considered to ensure that the issues already identified

still pertain and that the themes and materials developed for

use in the campaign are still valid.

The sources of PSYOP intelligence are diverse. But most of

the intelligence required to conduct PSYOP is generally

obtained from unclassified sources : newspapers, magazines,

books, academic journals, studies, and foreign broadcasts.

Classified reports on pertinent subjects are distributed to

PSYOP organizations. Such organizations may also request

intelligence collection for specific items of factual information.

Liaison with other agencies outside the Department of Defense

(DOD) often can produce valuable information . Some agencies

that can assist PSYOP in obtaining information about local

conditions in foreign areas include the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA), Department of State, Foreign Broadcast

Information Service (FBIS), the Library of Congress, and the US

Information Agency (USIA) . USIA not only conducts public

diplomacy, telling America's story to the world, but it also

undertakes extensive foreign media analysis, audience research,

and public opinion polls. Finally, human intelligence is

important-especially to gather information about denied areas

in both peace and war. The sources of human intelligence

include emigres, refugees, and prisoners of war.

No discussion of intelligence research is complete without

mentioning the qualifications of the analyst. Because PSYOP

204
y() 

given area, research is usually a team effort . However, the

individual analyst qualifications should include mastery of

research and writing techniques, earned advanced academic

degrees, considerable experience living in a foreign culture,

and knowledge of languages pertinent to the region. The

complete analyst should also be able to read the French and

German languages, and should have as much information as

possible on countries of the third world. Highly capable

intelligence analysts are essential for a successful PSYOP

program.

Target Analysis

The intelligence effort in target analysis can be divided into

five elements, the first of which is to determine key audiences.

Based on systematic research, one determines the major

elements of a given society delineated by such factors as

geography, ethnic origin, religion, race, economic status, and

social position. Two basic criteria are used to select PSYOP

targets. One must first consider the importance of the target to

the PSYOP mission, then the probability that the target can be

moved to support the objectives of the campaign. In other

words, one asks whether the target has influence and whether

it can be persuaded to use this influence in ways that would

aid US national interests.

The second element of target analysis is to determine the

attitudes of key audiences. Basic research provides intelligence

on long-standing attitudes toward political, military, economic,

and social subjects. This information is refined as much as

possible to delineate the views of various age cohorts, social

strata, and occupational groups.

The third element is an analysis of current vulnerabilities

within specific audiences-in essence, an updating of the

preceding element to determine the level of dissension, fear, or

complaints at the time of the PSYOP campaign. When properly

assessed in a timely manner, such fears and anxieties can be

exploited as target vulnerabilities in a PSYOP program.

20 5
and means of communication. The vulnerabilities and attitudes

of the target provide a foundation on which to build thematic

materials for a PSYOP campaign. These materials must

support the plans and policies of the campaign, and the

vulnerabilities/attitudes they are based on must be an accurate

assessment determined by scientific analysis and evaluation.

Further, it is essential to determine which means of communication (e.g., radio, television, leaflets, face-to-face) are most

capable of reaching the target .

The fifth element of target analysis, testing the contents and

measuring the effects of a PSYOP message, is an extensive

one. It requirfs a separate discussion.

Pretesting and Effects Analysis

The pretesting of PSYOP materials is a crucial phase of a

campaign. It is good to determine in advance that the message

is clear and potentially effective. It is also good to avoid the

small errors, which are easily made, in idiomatic language or

cultural incongruities that can immediately destroy credibility.

There are several methods for pretesting PSYOP materials,

many of which can also be used to analyze the effects of

communication. But testing is usually highly problematic in

that the targets of the campaign are generally located in

denied areas. To partially compensate for this problem,

prisoners of war, refugees, or other emigres from the denied

area can be utilized .

The general sample survey is perhaps the best systematic

method for determining the effects of media content. It can be

used before, during, and after a PSYOP campaign. The survey

involves asking significant questions of a relatively small sample

of scientifically selected persons to ensure representativeness.

This technique determines whether the message is

understood, credible, evokes the desired response, or has

provoked undesirable effects.

Another method of testing PSYOP material is the panel,

which differs from the survey in that the panel participants are

repeatedly questioned at regular intervals in the course of the

campaign. There are at least two variations of this technique.

206
g gp pp

represent some larger population segment. The success of the

representative panel is, of course, dependent on the selection

process. Success also requires rather free access to the

audience. The second variation attempts to compensate for the

lack of access by assembling a group of knowledgeable

panelists to discuss the merits of the PSYOP materials in

question. The discussion panel has a weakness, however:

significant views can be suppressed by peer-group criticism.

A final method of testing is the individual interview. Ideally,

it should be performed by a trained psychologist. The main

purpose of the individual interview is to obtain insights into

the deeper meaning of events and to clarify the mechanisms

by which these meanings are formed, perpetuated, and

changed.

Measuring the effects of a PSYOP campaign is a most

complex and frustrating task. One is reminded of the Madison

Avenue executive who lamented that half of his firm's

advertising was effective, but he did not know which half. The

above-mentioned techniques of analysis can also be used in

an attempt to determine the effects of a campaign. There are

also two other indicators, the first of which is physical

response to the campaign. If the audience acts as the PSYOP

message suggested (e.g., to defect, surrender, or cause a

disturbance), there is evidence of effectiveness. One must be

aware, however, that this action could have been caused

entirely or in part by other factors. The other indicator of

PSYOP effectiveness is through analysis of the opposing

media. By monitoring the press, radio, propaganda, and other

documents and publications, one can rind evidence of the

opposition's response to our campaign.

Propaganda Analysis

Analysis of propaganda is most valuable for a number of

purposes. Examination of the opposition's domestic propagandathat directed at its own population-can be exploited in two

ways. First, it can reveal general intelligence about the political,

economic, social, and military situation in a given country (if

not the possible intentions of action in a given situation) .

20 7
ppgg 

may also disclose vulnerabilities that can be used in our

PSYOP campaigns. Further analysis of external propaganda

directed at our side can serve as a basis for our own counterpropaganda activities as well as a basis for our public

information efforts to defend against the effects of opposition

propaganda or our own population or armed forces. 2

Regardless of the purpose or kind of propaganda, one focuses

basically on seven questions in its analysis. What is the source?

What is the objective? Who is the target? What attitudes are

being exploited? What techniques are used? What media are

employed? How successful is the propagandist in accomplishing

the objective?

Although these analytical questions may seem rather

simple, answering them can require sophisticated examination

of the propaganda materials. It is not sufficient to merely deal

with the themes and the logic conveyed in the propaganda

message, one must pay much attention to the psychological

meaning of the total package, including its symbols, use of

language, and other emotional accouterments. One should be

thoroughly familiar with the myriad of propaganda techniques

(one author listed 77 different ones). Our counterpropaganda

and public-information efforts must deal with the techniques

as much as the themes of opposition propaganda if they are to

be effective.

Although good intelligence is important in all military

operations, it seems even more important to PSYOP. It is

critical throughout the spectrum of operations from the initial

planning to the campaign evaluation. PSYOP is not only a

user, it is also a producer of intelligence. It is capable of

contributing to the overall national effort as well as servicing

its own needs.

Notes

1 . A valuable source of this paper was Ronald D. McLaurin, ed., Military

Propaganda. Psychological Warfare and Operations (New York: Praeger,

1982) . Especially useful was Part IV: "Intelligence and Research," which

included among other pertinent articles the following: Philip P. Katz, "Intelligence for Psychological Operations," and "Exploiting PSYOP Intelligence

20 8
Sources,121-54. Also very useful was Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 33-1, Psychological Operations, 1979.

2 . In addition to FM 33-1 cited above, the following works were consulted

for propaganda analysis: Leonard W. Doob, Public Opinion and Propaganda

(New York: Henry Holt, 1948); D. Lincoln Harter and John Sullivan, Propaganda Handbook (Media, Pa. : 20th Century Publishing, 1953); and William

Hummel and Keith Huntress, The Analysis of Propaganda (New York: William

Sloane, 1949).
1 . Quick Studies of Foreign Countries

Foreign Area Studies Division, Special Operations Research

Office . Area Handbook. Washington, D.C. : The American

University. Best one-volume survey of individual countries .

Contains extensive bibliography. Recently taken over by

Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

Skye Corporation . The World Today Series . Washington, D.C. :

Stryker Post Publications.

United Stags Department of State. Background Notes. Washington, D.C. : Bureau of Public Affairs. Useful handbooks

of regions of the world with regional and individual

country chapters. Covers all parts of the world. Updated

each August.

11 . Intelligence

Bibliography of Intelligence Literature ; A Critical andAnnotated

Bibliography of Open Source Literature . 8th ed. Revised.

Washington, D.C. : Defense Intelligence College, 1985.

The Secret Wars: A Guide to Sources in English. Vol. A, B, C. Santa Barbara, Calif. : Clio, 1980. Extensive bibliography

includes categories of covert operations, terrorism,

espionage, and psychological operations.

Zell, Stanley. An Annotated Bibliography of the Open Literature

on Deception. RAND Note N-2332-NA, December 1985.

Contains many references on PSYOP.

111 . Guides to Periodicals

Book Review Digest. Useful to evaluate works consulted in

research.

Public Affairs Information Service. Guide to scholarly journals

such as Foreign Affairs and Orbis. A similar service is

provided by the Social Science lrwfex, not listed here.

Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. Guide to articles in

many popular publications such as Time and Newsweek.

21 0
Air University Library. Air University Library Index to military

Periodicals. Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

The Military Press. Current Military Literature . Oxford, UK.

Valuable Service. Includes foreign language publications .

Quarterly Strategic Bibliography. Good on military affairs but

also considers broader aspects of power.

V. Foreign Broadcast Information Service

TransdeX Index. Guide to the FBIS Daily Reports and JPRS

Translations (see below).

VI. Newspapers

The New York Tinges Index. Guide to newspapers. Considers

itself the "Book of Record" for the US.

VII. Various

Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments.

Updated monthly.

Current News. Pentagon clipping service of US newspapers on

defense-related issues . Distributed daily in the Washington,

D.C. area.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Daily Report.

Newspaper and radio broadcasts translated into English

each day.

. JPRS Special Translations. Translations of lengthier

pieces or groups of clippings on given subjects from

foreign sources.

VIII. Style Guide

College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education. AU

Press Style Guide. Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University,

1994.

Turabian, Kate L. AManualfor Writers of Term Papers, Theses,

And Dissertations. 4th ed.

What the US Information

Program Cannot Do

George V. Allen

An international information program cannot change the

basic attitudes and opinions in foreign countries .

One of the great American fallacies is the notion, prevalent

among people in all walks of life, that we need to explain

ourselves, our policies, and our way of life to foreign peoples so

they will love us-or at least will understand and sympathize

with our point of view. I submit, however, that this point of

view is not realistic and that those in the academic world and

other professionals in communications should be tough-minded

enough to face certain facts squarely and realistically .

While I was director of the United States Information Agency

(USIA), I was often asked by congressmen to explain why the

"Voice of America" (VOA) seemed to have difficulty in getting the

American story across to the people of foreign countries. It

should be very simple, I was told. You need to explain that the

American way of life-including our democratic principles, our

respect for human rights, and our private enterprise-has

produced the highest standard of living in the world. Everybody

admitted that not only the upper strata but the comr cicm man in

the United States had more of the good things in life-more shoes,

clothes, leisure time, music, vacations, and opportunities for

advancement than people of other countries. Why can't you just

keep pointing that out to them on VOA?The job should be easy.

However, Uncle Sam was regarded as Mr Rich. We were

presumed, with some justification, to want things to remain

Excerpts from John Boardman Whitton, ed., "What the U.S. Information

Program Cannot Do," Propaganda and the Cold War (Washington, D.C. :

Public Affairs Press, 1963) . Reprinted with the permission of the Public

Affairs Press, copyright holder.

21 3
evolution instead of revolution, and we made it clear that we

did not want the government of Cuba to seize American-owned

sugar refineries or other American property without adequate

and prompt compensation. We insisted on reforms (e .g ., Latin

America under the Alliance for Progress) but we wanted them

to be instituted by orderly legal process while the miserably

poor wanted to turn the world upside down overnight. They

regarded the United States as basically in favor of the status

quo . (All rich people are supposed to be that way.)

More significant, perhaps, is the fact that Moscow was

regarded by most of the poor people around the world as the

friend of the poor and of the rebel . When one asks how it is

possible that so many Cubans were attracted towards Moscow

rather than the United States, the painful but realistic answer

is because they thought Moscow was more likely to support

them than we were . Demagogues such as Fidel Castro or Juan

D. Peron, who depended for their chief support on the rabble,

were likely to shout defiance at Uncle Sam-and their followers

were likely to cheer them for it.

The "Voice of America" could not change the basic fact that

the US was rich while most people in the world were poor. The

more we talked about our high standard of living, the fewer

friends we had.

What is the answer? For those of us concerned with communications, we must recognize the facts of life. We must try

to see ourselves as others see us. We must understand their

motivations and reactions as we try to help them understand

ours. We have put too much emphasis on explaining our point

of view and not enough on understanding theirs.

Let us turn now from economic to political matters . One of

the principal foreign policies of the United States has been the

decision to participate in and foster collective security for the

nations of the free world. The purpose of the USIA, in the

words of President Eisenhower shortly after the agency was

established in 1953, "shall be to submit evidence to peoples of

other nations, by means of communication techniques, that

the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony

with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom,

progress, and peace." In other words, we must make our

21 4
presuming that our policies are in harmony with their proper

aspirations .

I was in India when the United States gave military aid to

Pakistan under our collective security policy. The archangel

Gabriel could not have made this palatable to the Indians or

convinced them that it was compatible with their aspirationslegitimate or otherwise. There was no policy we could have

adopted that could have convinced both sides we were their

friends.

The heavy responsibilities of the United States sometimes

require us to take positions that please nobody. There is

danger in expecting too much of communications techniques. I

was once told that only the VOA could win the Berlin disputel

There is a tendency for college professors to claim too much

for the growing field of communications (sometimes improperly

called psychological warfare) . Many universities are rapidly

developing studies, and even faculties, in this specialized field.

But if those in the academic world and we in government

overstate our case for communications, we are likely to make

trouble for ourselves. Propaganda can do little to remove the

basic problems of the have-nots, the national rivalries of

Pakistan and India, or the racial animosities of Africa. And

whatever communications can do will take a long time. Like

education, communication is not likely to avoid takeovers in

third world countries .

We must put forward an honest, objective, and truthful information program and then make it available in comprehensible

terms to as many people as possible by the most effective

media. Then we must rest our case with the common sense of

mankind. I suppose one must have a mystic faith, as Jefferson

did, in the ability of the common man to make a right decision

when given adequate information and freedom of choice. If you

do not have this faith, I doubt that you should be in the

communications field .

Let me repeat, however, that we must be realists. Nations

will be saved from aggression by a combination of forces,

including political, economic, psychological, and military-the

latter being possibly the most significant in our present sad

state of international chaos.

21 5

Defector Operations

Lt Col John Ozaki, USA

Defector operations must be carefully planned and

coordinated at all levels .

Because of the economic and political instability that

prevails during internal defense operations, many insurgents

can be persuaded to return to their government's cause if a

sound defector plan is instituted. The successful campaign

against the Huks in the Philippine Islands and the more recent

Chien Hoi (open arms) defector program in Vietnam tell us it is

possible to formulate a defector program for internal defense

and development. Success, of course, depends upon proper

implementation.

The successful defector program requires national coordination, and it should have the objective of supporting the

existing government. Specifically, that objective may be met by

any of the following:

" Inducing the maximum number of insurgents to discontinue voluntary support of the insurgent program and to

support the legally constituted government.

" Exploiting for intelligence and psychological operations

those individuals who have returned to the side of the

government.

" Fulfilling promises to defectors by providing to them and

their families security and economic support, to include

vocational and job opportunities that help them become

self-supporting.

Reprinted by permission from Military Review 49 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans. :

Army Command and General Staff College, March 1969), 71-78.

21 7
where their knowledge of the enemy

s techniques can be

utilized.

To increase the chances of a successful defector program,

US representatives to the host country at the national level

should seek approval of the following policies, especially in

cases where the United States is advising a host country on

military matters:

" The host country should' establish an agency to be

responsible for execution of all aspects of the defector program,

which should be equal in status to major components of the

government such as the military departments and the national

police . This agency's organization should function on the

principle of centralized direction and decentralized execution

from the national to the lowest level.

" US agency responsibilities and policies for defector

operations must be clearly established from the national level

down to receipt of a defector by a combat unit.

" Combined agreements should be made whereby a review

of performance can be accomplished for the purpose of

replacing ineffective administrators.

" The responsible US agency should have control of funds

provided by the United States that are used in direct support

of the defector program.

" Combined civilian and military counterparts should be

established at each level where major defector operations take

place. These would include district, sector, regional, and

national levels as appropriate to the territorial organization of

the country.

The objective of the inducement program is to prepare the

members of the insurgent forces to quit their cause and join

the legitimate government. The overall effect lets the

insurgents know that the government is aware of their plight

and wants to forgive and welcome them back. Closely

associated with this program is the requirement of informing

loyal citizens and military organizations about the program.

These are the groups that play an important role in the

rehabilitation of the defectors. The loyal citizens must accept

21 8
py g

Inducement operations are the responsibility of PSYOP

personnel although intelligence organizations also play a

major role in this part of the program. The intelligence

community provides PSYOP personnel with information gained

from interrogations designed to determine why insurgents

have quit their cause. If feedback provided by intelligence is

timely and valid, this information can be used to induce more

insurgents to quit their cause. Intelligence organizations

benefit from this type of mutual support because, with more

insurgents defecting, there is the probability of increased

intelligence.*

Themes

Before a PSYOP program is implemented, a careful analysis

is made to determine the vulnerabilities of the insurgents.

Common vulnerabilities of insurgent forces are hardships,

disillusionment because of slow progress, and fear of getting

killed. To be effective, the term hardship must be translated

into meaningful facts such as insufficient medical services,

low pay, and long family separations. The success of any

PSYOP effort depends on close coordination with intelligence

agencies.

Maximum use of radio, loudspeakers, newspapers, leaflets,

and other publications will be the mainstay in the dissemination

link. The PSYOP operator, however, constantly seeks new and

unusual techniques to spread the word of the government

concerning the promises of the defector program. Innovations

such as badges, postage stamps, and imprinted balloons publicize

the defector program. Encouraging local government officials to

speak about the program may also help.

PSYOP Utilization

Former insurgents are used to the maximum extent possible

in inducement operations. They are extremely effective in

developing PSYOP material because they know the environment and the modus operandi of the insurgent. If defectors are

21 9
customs, and idiom of the insurgents will make the PSYOP

effort more effective. Additionally, these individuals are used in

evaluating PSYOP material before it is disseminated.

Small units of armed defectors are organized to perform

propaganda missions in locally contested areas. Such units

are effective because they speak with firsthand knowledge. For

security purposes, selected individuals of known loyalty are

incorporated in these special units.

An effective system of rewards is one of the most important

aspects of a defector program. Rewards are coordinated to

ensure that each defector is paid for the assistance he

provides to the government and that the pay is equitable. A

central office monitors all rewards and establishes a

well-publicized standard scale to ensure that rewards are in

line with those previously paid. Defectors are questioned to

determine whether they have received all rewards due them.

Speed in making payment is necessary so that the impact of

the deed is not lost ; consequently, funds should be made

available to local officials so that rewards can be paid

immediately. When security permits, rewards should receive

wide publicity so all can see that the government lives up to its

word. This added emphasis may induce other defections,

particularly when large sums of money are involved.

Exploitation of the returnees involves obtaining information,

disseminating the intelligence derived from this information,

and using the intelligence to defeat the enemy. The following

major considerations concern the exploitation of defectors :

" Treatment promised to returnees must be delivered.

Initial reception is particularly important because it has an

important bearing on how much an individual will contribute

to the government. A returnee who is properly treated may

even volunteer for intelligence and PSYOP roles. On the other

hand, an individual improperly treated becomes an easy target

for reindoctrination by antigovernment forces .

" Qualified interrogators are available at the lowest level

possible, which is important because of the insurgent's

characteristic of frequently moving. It is imperative that

defectors be interviewed within the first few hours after

22 0
y 

responsive units. When the number of qualified interrogators

is limited, consideration should be given to pooling and

dispatching them by air as the situation requires.

" Security must be provided for both the defector and the

defector's family. Insurgent forces are likely to place maximum

effort on retaliating against a defector (and the defector's

family) to discourage other defections.

" Clearly defined policies on exploitation must be established .

One of the major problems confronting a commander is that

many of his, officers and men will not trust the returning

defectors. To counter this logical distrust, the commander

implements a massive command information program that

includes handling, treatment, and use of defectors. Experience

proves that one of the best ways to reverse the feeling of distrust

is to publicize the help that defectors give to the friendly forces.

The returnee's knowledge of the insurgents' tactics, terrain, and

current situation is invaluable to the countering forces.

One of the government's most difficult tasks is to identify the

enemy and the defector is often the only person who knows the

enemy; consequently, a major task of friendly military personnel

is to exploit this knowledge. Former insurgents may be used as

scouts, guides, members of collection and reconnaissance units,

and monitors for interpreters.

Special interrogation procedures are necessary for working

with a defector. Experience has shown that most defectors will

talk freely without the use of pressure. Generally, the best

technique is to employ the interview method. The interviewer

first must gain the confidence of the defector, and interviews

should not be continued unless the interviewer believes that

good rapport and communication have been established.

Because most defectors are highly apprehensive immediately

after their escape, it often requires several interviews to

establish communication. It may be useful to have earlier

defectors talk to all new returnees, telling them that they have

made the right decision by defecting.

The interview environment is extremely important. Although

a private room is desirable, elaborate equipment is not

22 1
requirements mentally fixed so that resort to paper and pencil

is not necessary. The defector should be convinced that he is

important and has valuable information that can be used to

help defeat the enemy.

Rapid and accurate interrogation of knowledgeable returnees

is necessary if effective exploitation is to be accomplished.

Generally, the best procedure is to use normal military

communications to report information gained from interrogations. Communications between police, government officials,

and other sources are coordinated because many insurgents

defect to governmental agencies other than military units.

Reporting by those agencies helps to speed information to the

user.

If the country is so organized, there is a military reporting

headquarters at district, province, and region. Forms used for

reporting must be simple, and some basic information should

be reduced to blocks for check marks. It often will be beneficial

if the forms are bilingual.

Intelligence agencies keep the lower echelons informed of

any special requirements so that special reports can be

forwarded. Each echelon in the reporting channel keeps a

reference file on all defectors. The file contains basic information, such as date of rally, area of operation, former job

with insurgents, special knowledge, and disposition. The

information is readily available so that an individual can be

quickly located for exploitation at any time.

Security

Security for defectors is essential. If the exploitation

program is working well, the insurgents will counter it with

attacks against individual returnees and compounds where

returnees are kept. Normal active and passive security measures

are improved by organizing the defectors into self-defense

units. Special protection is given to high-level defectorsperhaps evacuating them from the immediate battle area even

though they may be able to provide exploitable tactical

information.

22 2
Special consideration must also be given to a defectors

family. Immediately after a person defects, the family should

be located. If they are in an enemy controlled area, their

identity may have to be concealed before the defector can be

exploited. When defectors cannot be exploited because of the

family's location, plans should be made to evacuate the family

to a secure area.

Asuccessful defector program includes effective means for

returnee rehabilitation, a phase that requires national support.

Planning and coordination of national resources are required

when jobs, arable land, and educational facilities are to be

provided.

Reception Centers

Rehabilitation begins at the reception center as soon as a

returnee has been exploited for intelligence and PSYOP.

Centers are established in secure areas near the defectors'

homes, if possible. It is of utmost importance that all promises

disseminated by the PSYOP program be fulfilled as soon as

possible.

A new returnee is made to feel welcome. Experience has

shown that an effective way to help a new returnee overcome

initial shock is to assign him a sponsor-a returnee who has

been at the center for some time. Aspecial ceremony (such as

a retreat formation) is held to introduce this individual to the

rest of the group. In addition to temporary jobs, such as

sponsoring members, returnees are hired to fill as many of the

permanent administrative jobs at the center as possible. They

know the problems of the returnee; therefore, they are very

effective in rehabilitating the former enemy.

While at the centers, individuals are given reindoctrination

courses on government objectives and the responsibilities of

individual citizens. Detailed programs of instruction are

centrally prepared, and supporting reference materials are

provided to the rehabilitation administrators.

Vocational training may be centralized because of limited

facilities and qualified instructors. This training is on a

voluntary basis, and national coordination is required to

22 3
vocational training become gainfully employed.

To assist in their own protection, defectors should be

organized into self-defense groups. The rehabilitation complex

should be tied into the defense plan of the area, with some

government forces placed in the center or located close by.

Within the center, planted returnees are used to determine

whether the enemy is trying to infiltrate the program. These

specially trained individuals determine whether the center is

providing the defectors all benefits due them. They also

evaluate the center's overall effectiveness.

The defector program must include a follow-up phase to

determine whether the defectors are remaining loyal to the

government and becoming self-supporting. Field representatives

working with the police receive information from defector

program administrators when defectors have moved into their

areas. These representatives determine what problems, if any,

the defectors are having in being accepted by the general

population. As a minimum, a system must be established

whereby a former insurgent is required to register with the

police in the area where he resides. The police would then be

responsible for the security and surveillance of these

individuals.

Returnees whose home areas are under insurgent control

may require temporary homes. It is not advisable to place

them in defector villages because they then become easy

targets for the insurgents, which makes it harder for them to

be accepted by the general public. Defectors resettle where

they can find employment in trades learned during the

rehabilitation portion of the program.

History demonstrates that a sound defector program is a

valuable aid in defeating an insurgent movement. A good

defector program supports the existing government by

reducing the number of active insurgents, gaining support

from the general population, and providing information that

can be exploited to defeat the enemy. A good defector program

is another form of combat power. To neglect it invites a longer

conflict and unnecessary casualties .

224
Tactical PSYOP and

Strategic Objectives

Ronald D. McLaurin

Exploitation of tactical opportunities for strategic PSYOP can

be crucial to achievement of long-term goals.

A major cause of disaffection from the government during the

early years of the Hukbalahap insurgency (1946-64) in the

Philippines was the mistreatment endured by the populace at

the hands of Philippine security forces. Accounts of individual

abuses by police powers in the Philippines are legion. From

independence until 1950, the poorly trained security forces

suffered from bad morale and worse discipline. In the field,

troops typically foraged for supplies at the expense of poor

peasants. Indiscriminate weapons firing resulted in unnecessarily high noncombatant casualties. Worse, the Philippine

constabulary sometimes shelled whole villages when some

residents were suspected of harboring or abetting Huks.

Suspects were seized without due process of law, then beaten or

otherwise treated inhumanely. Police corruption was widespread

and resulted in such bitter, frustrating experiences for the

peasants that many of them supported or joined the Huks.I

After Ramon Magsaysay became secretary of national

defense in September 1950, however, many important and

effective steps were taken to protect noncombatants during

tactical operations and to build confidence in their military

forces.

The first step, an innovation in tactical organization, improved

the supply situation in the armed forces. (Inadequate supplies

had led to foraging by troops in the field.) The introduction of

self-sufficient battalion combat teams (BCT) reduced the

interdependence level, which had slowed army responsiveness.

The BCTs displayed initiative, flexibility, and resistance to Huk

intelligence-gathering . BCTs were "autonomous in almost

22 5
country. "2

Second, in those cases where security forces abused their

authority or did not treat civilians with respect, an effort was

made to ensure that prompt and appropriate punishment was

meted out. Because the objective was popular sympathy, not

merely appropriate punishment, a certain degree of publicity

attended these self-administered acts of justice on the part of

the military. 3

Third, civil affairs officers were attached to each unit to

contact and work with the people-to inform them of the

government's objectives and to make the military aware of the

needs, interests, and problems of the local citizenry. This

activity was designed to overcome the troops' previous lack of

positive contact with the Filipino masses. It resulted in close

relationships, more effective civic action programs, and better

tactical intelligence . Civil affairs officers were also responsible

in large measure for the implementation of the population

protection progamm 4

A further instrument to ensure that the armed forces acted

with self-restraint toward the civilian population consisted of an

arrangement with the Philippine telecommunications facilities

whereby any citizen, for the equivalent of five cents, could send a

telegram of complaint about troop behavior directly to Secretary

Magsaysay's office. The secretary maintained a pledge to respond

to each complaint and initiate an investigation into the circumstances that gave rise to it within 24 hours. The availability of

this means to redress grievances, and the government's

determination to follow through, were impressed upon the armed

forces for maximum deterrent effect

Yet another change involved the dispatch of military doctors

with individual units in the field. This function served both the

military and noncombatants in the area. The doctors provided

medical aid to civilians who were injured through either

combat or accident. They also gave general medical attention

to people who in many cases had never seen a doctor before. 6

As the program to protect and work with the indigenous

population progressed, even more flexible approaches were

essayed in an effort to ensure the protection of civilians from

226
resort." 7 Through these and other initiatives, PSYOP at the

tactical level contributed to the major strategic objective of the

government reacquisition of the loyalty and support of the

population.

Notes

1 . See, for example, Richard M. Leighton, Ralph Sanders, and Jose N.

Tinio, The Huk Rebellion: A Case Study in the Social Dynamics of Insurrection

(Washington, D.C. : Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1964), 29, 33,

35, 58 ; Albert Ravenholt, "The Philippine Republic: A Decade of Independence," in Britannica Book of the Year (Chicago: Encyclopaedia

Britannica, 1950, 51; The Philippines: A Young Republic on the Moue (Princeton, N.J . : D. Van Nostrand Company, 1962), 79-80; Carlos P, Romulo,

Crusade in Asia: Philippine Victory (New York: The John Day Company,

1955), 87, 124, 130-31 ; Carlos P. Romulo and Marvin M. Gray, The

Magsaysay Story (New York: The John Day Company, 1965), 109, 123;

Alvin H. Scaff. The Philippine Answer to Communism (Stanford, Calif. :

Stanford University Press, 1955), 28, 35, 36, 49-62, 119 ; Frances Lucille

Sterner, Magsaysay and the Philippine Peasantry: TheAgrarian Impact on

Philippine Politics, 1953-1956 (Berkeley and Los Angeles : University of

California Press, 1961), 26, 224 (n. 12); Napoleon Valeriano, "Military

Operations," in Counter-Guerrilla Operations in the Philippines, 1946-1953:

A Seminar on the Huk Campaign held at Fort Bragg, N.C., 15 June 1961,

mimeographed), 29: and Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T. R. Bohannan,

Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience (New York: Frederick

A. Praeger, 1962), 98, 133.

2. J. Gualberto Planas, "One Year of Secretary Magsaysay," Philippine

Armed Forces Journal 4 (August-September 1951): 14; and Valeriano.

3. Republic of the Philippines, Executive Order 113 April 1950: Alfonso

A. Calderon, "Philippine Constabulary," Philippine ArmedForces Journal 3

(September-October 1950): 4; Romulo, 131 ; Romulo and Gray, 124, 127 ;

Scaff, 36 ; Robert Ross Smith, "The Philippines, 1946-1954," in D. M.

Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et al., Challenge andResponse in Internal

Conflict, vol. 1, The Experience in Asia (Washington, D.C. : The American

University, Center for Research in Social Systems, February 1968), 496; and

"The State of the Peace and Order Campaign," Philippine Armed Forces

Journal 4 (January-February 1951) : 12, 13.

4. Valeriano and Bohannan, 106, 211-13, 221.

5. Ibid. ; Charles Wolf, Jr., Insurgency and Counterinsurgency : New

Myths and Old Realities (Santa Monica, Calif. : RAND, July 1965), 22.

6. Charles W. Thayer, Guerrilla (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 41 .

7. Scaff, 135 .

22 7

PART IV

Case Studies

of

PSYOP Applications

Introduction

These case studies present and clarify PSYOP goals, roles, and

methods. Col Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., USAFR, condenses and

analyzes US and Vietcong PSYOP in the Vietnam War. He

analyzes the Chieu Hoi campaign, the vulnerabilities of the North

Vietnamese army and the Vietcong soldier, and summarizes the

key US and Vietcong PYSOP appeals and techniques.

MSgt Richard A. Blair, USAFR, and Col Frank L. Goldstein,

USAF, 'present the Iraqi propaganda network used during the

Persian Gulf' War. They explore Iraq's skill in creating and

using a variety of media outlets, internally and externally.

Col Dennis P. Walko, USA, details tactical and consolidation

PSYOP activities in Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty

in Panama. He presents major PSYOP lessons learned.

Laurence J. Orzell shows that Poland's underground media

were nongovernmental PSYOP in action as well as a significant

part of the Polish sociopolitical scene. According to Orzell, this

underground media enabled the Poles to resist the enforcement of the adoption of communist ideals and values.

Colonel Goldstein refers to the 1986 Libyan Raid as a PSYOP

effort and reports the results.

Maj James V. Keifer, USAF, Retired, discusses national antidrug policy and relates the role of military psychological operations in solving drug problems.

The late Gen Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Retired, discusses the

importance of the political-psychological dimensions of conflict

and insurgency . He explores, through several examples, the failure of the American public, the media, and even our bureaucracy,

to recognize and counter political and psychological warfare

conducted against US policies.

In Major Keifer's second piece, he gives an overview of the

psychological dimension of the Persian Gulf War relative to the

diplomacy process and the quick end to the war.

Colonel Goldstein and Col Daniel W. Jacobowitz, USAF,

Retired, in case studies on Operations Desert Shield/Desert

Storm, support the urgent need to increase US sensitivity to the

psychological dimension of warfare. They not only solidify the

23 1
future challenges .
US and Vietcong Psychological

Operations in Vietnam

Col Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., USAFR

This paper reviews and analyzes selected US and Vietcong

PSYOP strategies, tactics, and problems in the Vietnam War.

Included are the Chieu Hoi campaign, the vulnerabilities of the

North Vietnarhese Army and the Vietcong, and key PSYOP

techniques of both the US and the Vietcong.

Coordination of Decentralized United States

Psychological Operations Agencies

The US PSVOP effort during the Vietnam War was

decentralized among the US Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam (MACV), the US Information Service (USIS), and the

Agency for International Development (AID). Each agency was

responsible for one or more aspects of the foreign

information/ PSYOP effort conducted in South Vietnam. The

agencies "operated independently of each other," according to

Ronald D. McLaurin of the American Institute for Research in

Washington, D.C. In 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson

established the Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) to

integrate the PSYOP activities, to avoid duplication of effort,

and to increase the overall effectiveness of the effort .

According to then 4th PSYOP Group Conimander Taro

Katagiri, the variety of agencies involved made it difficult to

coordinate the PSYOP effort as well as to establish centralized

control and direction in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in

1968-69. There were repeated examples of lack of coordination.

Mr Katagiri recalled that on 16 February 1969 there was an

airborne leaflet mission in which a total of 84,000 leaflets were

disseminated without prior coordination with the area task

force PSYOP officer. And US PSYOP teams sometimes

233
only to discover a province team conducting a similar mission.

Roles and Goals in Vietnam

PSYOP responsibilities grew during the war without the

guidance and control necessary to accomplish the

corresponding goals. The breadth of American roles and goals

led to rapid growth in the size of US PSYOP elements. PSYOP

goals:

1 . undermine popular support for the insurgents,

2. enhance the image of the government of the RVN,

3. increase Vietnamese understanding of, and elicit support

for, US policies in Vietnam, and

4. engender international support for US policy in Vietnam.

Relatively few PSYOP-experienced personnel were available,

however, and those few were spread among the many groups

involved in PSYOP. According to MACV, the US PSYOP mission

in Vietnam included the following entities:

" the American Embassy in RVN,

" the Mission PSYOP Committee,

" the JUSPAO,

" MACV,

" Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support

(CORDS),

" US Army Republic of Vietnam (USARV),

" the 4th and 7th PSYOP Groups,

" Naval Forces, Vietnam (NAVFORV), and

" the Seventh US Air Force.

In PSYOP Policy number 51, 28 December 1967, the

JUSPAO Planning Office established the following PSYOP

priorities :

1. the Government of Vietnam (GVN) image,

2. Chien Hoi (come home),

3. revolutionary development (agriculture and improved

living standards self-help projects),

4. refugee program,

23 4
6. the US image,

7. GVN mass media advisory effort, and

8. telling the Vietnam story.

The Chieu Hoi Campaign

Two special PSYOP targets were the Vietcong (VC) and the

North Vietnamese Army (NVA) soldiers in South Vietnam. Two

Chieu Hoi operations carried out in the Delta during 1970 and

1971 proved that PSYOP and combat pressure working

together could get results. The operations were Operation

Roundup in Itien Hoa Province and Project Falling Leaves in

Kien Giang Province. Operation Roundup produced hundreds

of enemy defectors, according to Colburn Lovett, a USIS

foreign service information officer. One PSYOP technique was

to take pictures of ralliers/defectors and have them sign a

simple message on a leaflet, encouraging their comrades to

join the cause. Another technique was to use loudspeaker

teams of former VC soldiers who were sent back into the areas

of their units to speak to their comrades in the bush. Project

Falling Leaves combined Vietnamese and US personnel

working in joint PSYOP activities. Armed propaganda teams

(100 percent ex-VC) made deep penetrations and extensive

face-to-face communications. All possible media were used,

including boat-carried loudspeaker teams, leaflet drops, radio

tapes, and television appeals by former VC.

There are significant PSYOP lessons here for all commanders. During the two-month period in 1971 when intense

PSYOP supplemented military action, there were 1,150

defectors, while in the six weeks before and the four weeks

after the intensive PSYOP campaign, there were only a total of

211 defectors. PSYOP, if applied on an intense scale, is of

significant value to commanders in securing the surrender of

enemy forces. The author believes that military operations

conducted without PSYOP support will not be as successful as

those conducted with it .

A PSYOP project initiated by Special Forces in conjunction

with a detachment of the 245th PSYOP Company, JUSPAO,

and the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) had as its

23 5
objective bringing Vietnamese government presence back to

the area around Due Co in Pleiku Province. The area had

slipped into the contested category. Using the Due Co Special

Forces Camp as its base, the PSYOP effort was aimed at all of

the villages and hamlets within a 10-kilometer radius. This

Chieu Hoi campaign, adopted in 1963, offered communist

soldiers forgiveness and exoneration for temporarily slipping

into the alien communist path. They could return home to

their families and the just cause of the republic. The term

surrender was not used. Medics held sick calls over a four-day

period to attract the sympathetic attention of the villagers.

Over 800 villagers were treated during this four-day period.

Face-to-face contact allowed the representatives of the VIS to

stress the theme that the VC were preventing peace while the

government of Vietnam was working for peace. Valuable

information concerning the popular resentment toward VC

methods came to light and the team members were careful not

to make the same mistakes, particularly with regard to

pressures exerted to bring villagers to propaganda sessions. At

the end of four days, the operation wasjudged to be a success,

so much so that the wives of eight VC persuaded their

husbands to seek amnesty as Chieu Hoi returnees.

Vulnerabilities of the North Vietnamese

Army Communist Soldier

The NVA soldier in South Vietnam presented a particularly

difficult target for GVN/US PSYOP aimed at inducing surrender or defection. He had a relatively high state of indoctrination, which was reinforced by a range of psychological

controls that included self-criticism sessions, the three-man

cell, and endless repetition of communist themes. A contributory reason for the resistance of NVA soldiers to Chieu Hoi

inducements was that defection for most did not hold the

promise of an early family reunion. (Defecting Vietcong were

South Vietnamese who were going home.) Moreover, unlike the

VC guerrilla who may be a teenager conscripted from his

hamlet and sent into battle without much party schooling or

political indoctrination, the NVAsoldier was the product of a

closed totalitarian society. He had been subjected to com23 6
him more resistant to PSYOP entreaties. Further, the NVA

soldier found himself fighting in a region unfamiliar and semiantagonistic to him, usually in relatively uninhabited areas

and with little chance for contact with the civilian population.

US/GVN PSYOP messages pointed out three options : (1) to

rally, take advantage of the Chieu Hoi program and quickly

become a free citizen of the RVN; (2) surrender as a prisoner of

war and await repatriation at the end of the war in the safety and

relative comfort of a prisoner of war camp ; and (3) counsel NVA

soldiers to devote all their efforts to individual survival rather

than getting killed or maimed for an unjust cause. Even a partial

success in this PSYOP effort would contribute to shortening the

war by reducing the combat effectiveness of NVA units.

The vulnerabilities of NVA soldiers did not change much

throughout the war. Separation from families, the hardships of

infiltrations, fear of allied arms, and, perhaps most significantly, the contrast between what they had been told by the

cadre and what they actually experienced, were the major

exploitable weaknesses.

The surrender program for the Northern troops (Chien Hoi)

received the greatest amount of American emphasis and money.

Reception centers for defectors (hoi chanh) were built at various

locations throughout the country. They usually remained in the

camps from 45 to 60 days before being released and resettled.

They were given rewards (e.g., money to buy food) for turning in

their weapons. NVA soldiers realized that defecting might

prevent them from ever going home to the North.

Key Psychological Appeals

According to Vietnam veteran and former Air Force

intelligence officer Lt Col Robert Chandler, five major US

PSYOP appeals were applied in Vietnam:

1 . fear of death,

2. jungle hardships,

3. loss of faith in victory,

4. concern for family, and

5. disillusionment.

23 7
g gg 

with the communists. Message themes included "death lurks

everywhere," "born in the north to die in the south," and "no

shelters are safe from the bombs of the B-52." Not all fear

appeals were successful, however: In one appeal, fear leaflets

imprinted with the ace of spades as a sign of death were

dropped and decks of cards with prominent aces of spades

were left along VC trails ; unfortunately, Vietnamese card

decks did not include the ace of spades. Another example of

fear-appeal failure was the use of gruesome leaflets depicting

corpses. This had a boomerang effect because the hoi chanh

felt that thq government was gloating over the deaths of fellow

Vietnamese.

The hardship appeal reminded enemy soldiers of their loneliness, homesickness, poor living conditions, and insufficiencies in food and medical supplies. The "loss of faith in

communist victory" appeal sought to convince the enemy that

the Republic was winning the struggle. It emphasized battlefield losses and the number who had already rallied. The

"concern for family" appeal, one of the most effective, was very

emotionally based. Loneliness, nostalgia, and the desire to

return home to loved ones were primary factors motivating

communist soldiers to defect or surrender. The disillusionment appeal was based on the idea that the North Vietnamese

soldier might be able to withstand fears and hardships as long

as he was convinced that Hanoi's aims were just, but would be

more willing to defect when he became skeptical of them.

Four special PSYOP techniques were employed in Vietnam:

distribution of safe conduct passes, money for weapons, focus

on returning home to celebrate during the Tet New Year, and

armed propaganda teams composed of hoi chanh. Many

PSYOPprofessionals believe these teams were effective

because of their personal touch to the Chien Hoi invitations.

Important Nonmilitary Considerations

There were several misconceptions about PSYOP. Taro

Katagiri, former 4th PSYOP Group commander in Vietnam,

believed that many people considered PSYOP a separate and

23 8
PSYOPwas not amply exploited to support economic

programs such as rural construction, political programs,

medical assistance, or humanitarian efforts. Another misconception was that PSYOP involves just verbal communications and, thus, many Americans were insensitive to

nonverbal gestures, posture, signs, and physical appearance.

An individual's response to persuasive communication in

any culture is based on and reinforced by his regular

interpersonal relationships. An individual usually consults a

member of his/her primary group, a friend or relative, before

taking action in response to persuasive messages. A great

number of the VC rallied/ defected to the Chien Hoi program

through an intermediary who was a relative or trusted friend.

Many did not defect until they received assurance from a

relative or friend that the government would keep its promises

concerning good treatment and other aspects of the amnesty

program.

Cultural Considerations in Vietnam

For the Westerner, one of the most important elements to

understand about Vietnamese culture is the completely

personal basis of the society. "'Truth" for the Vietnamese is not

the factual statement or actual occurrence of an event; it is in

the pleasantness of personal relationships. A Vietnamese's

entire character lies in not giving or receiving personal

embarrassment or shame. For example, it would not be

culturally correct for a Vietnamese to shout at or reproach a

waiter over bringing the wrong meal order.

He would either quietly request a change or simply eat the

wrong meal and pleasantly smile. Understanding and progress

are less important than pleasant associations. Distrust of

strangers is a part of Vietnamese culture, and Vietnamese

people politely keep their distances. Vietnamese answers to

questions will reflect what the questioner may want to hear. A

Vietnamese will avoid lengthy associations with strangers but

will be pleasantly polite . The Vietnamese culture places a very

high value on the family and on elder citizens .

239
According to Philip Katz, the reverse of the trusting value

was used by the VC in their attempt to deter defection. His

example is of a VC or NVA soldier who claims to his comrades

that he was captured by the GVN or US forces and had

subsequently escaped. He testifies that while a prisoner he

was treated badly and that he had firsthand knowledge that

the government of Vietnam did not abide by their good

treatment promise.

Katz says that research findings substantiate the fact that

intimate Vietnamese associates tend to hold opinions and

attitudes in common and are reluctant to depart unilaterally from

their groul3 consensus. They talk frequently among themselves

and establish a trusting bond of friendship upon which to

primarily base their decisions. Interpersonal communication is

highly valued; mass media are of secondary importance. I

Vietcong National Liberation Front

Douglas Pike presents the three VC PSYOP programs of dan

van, dich van, and binh van. Dan van was the VC effort to

develop support in areas that it controlled while dich van was

the effort to develop support in GVN-controlled areas. Binh

van was the recruiting program among Army of the Republic of

Vietnam (ARVN) troops and GVN civilian servants. Destruction

of South Vietnam's armed forces was the overriding priority for

the VC; violence, armed attacks, assassinations, kidnappings,

terrorist acts, and binh van were employed.

The top objective of binh van was to induce unit desertions,

preferably accompanied by an act of sabotage. The next

highest objective was to induce individual military desertion or

civilian defection, preferably accompanied by an act of

destruction or a theft of key documents. Next was to induce

major and significant opposition within the military or civil

service, either covertly or overtly .

Binh van PSYOP techniques included the following:

1 . enunciation and constant restatement by all possible

means of a liberal VC policy toward recanting military and civil

servants, including prisoners ;

24 0
gy y , g

killing every person;

3. use of penetration agents to infiltrate and develop support

within the military and civil service;

4. use of family ties and friendships to induce or coerce

military personnel and civil servants to desert, defect, or

covertly serve the VC;

5. tangible and intangible rewards for those who deserted or

defected, (for example, the VC announced it gave $2,000 to a

group of deserters in Long An Province) ;

6. encouragement among potential draftees to oppose the

military draft; and

7. distribution of two songbooks containing 20 songs. The

emotional songs were about the homeland and total victory.

They contained communist ideas, praised party leadership,

and presented the great qualities of the communist guerrillas.

Cultural dramas were also used to promote the cause.

US PSYOP objectives in the Vietnam War were ill-fated from

the beginning, primarily because of the "foreign invader" image

of the United States. US psychological operations were used

simultaneously as a means of achieving US foreign policy

goals and as a substitute communications tool for the Republic

of Vietnam to create nationalism. We misjudged the will of the

communists to prolong the revolution and bring about

reunification . We also misjudged Vietnamese reluctance to

support any central government. In addition, we could not win

the support of the US Congress to fight the type of war that

needed to be fought. Instead, we fought a protracted war that

was doomed. We lost the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese

and our fellow Americans ; we lost them to the PSYOP of the

Vietnamese communists. We must learn the values of .strategic,

operational, and tactical PSYOPfrorn this devastating

experience.

Notes

1 . Philip Katz, PSYOP and Communication Theory .

24 1

The Iraqi Propaganda

Network

MSgt Richard A. Blair, USAFR

Col Frank L. Goldstein, USAF

During the Persian Gulf War, Iraq had considerable success

in mounting a psychological warfare (psywar) campaign that

reached a wide domestic and foreign audience. While some

might attribute this success (at least in part) to overzealous

international media providing newsworthy coverage of events

in the Gulf, the bulk of the accomplishment is a credit to Iraq's

skill in creating and using a variety of media outlets as

propaganda dissemination mechanisms.

Following his established pattern, which was designed to

prevent the accumulation of power within any one governmental entity, Saddam Hussein distributed propaganda duties

among many offices within the government and the Baath

Party. While most of these offices officially answered to the

Ministry of Culture and Information (MCI), they were actually

managed through informal channels by the Baath Party, the

Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), and Saddam Hussein

himself.

Within Iraq, all broadcast facilities are owned and operated

by the Broadcasting and Television Organization of the MCI.

Prior to the invasion, Iraqi broadcast capabilities included two

prime-time television broadcasts, two domestic radio services-

"Baghdad Domestic Service" and "Voice of the Masses" (VOM)-

and shortwave radio broadcasts of VOM in Kurdish, Turkoman,

and Assyrian.

Shortly after the invasion, Iraq took over Kuwait's radio

facilities and began operating the Provisional Free Kuwait

Government Radio program. They also implemented at least

five additional shortwave radio programs designed to undermine

the Saudi and Egyptian governments and the morale of Arab

troops in the Gulf. 1

243
g py y pq

capability was completely destroyed and the only radio

broadcasts noted were "Baghdad Domestic Service" and "Voice

of the Masses"-both operating at greatly reduced signal

strength.

The printed media within Iraq was also largely controlled by

the government. The Baath Party published the largest daily

newspaper in the country, Al-Thawrah. The MCI managed

Al-Jahameer Press House, which published two other widely

read dailies in Iraq, the Arabic-language Al JUmhuriyah and

the English-language Baghdad Observer. The Ministry of Defense

also published an Arabic daily newspaper, AZ-Oadisiyah, and

other ministries and agencies of the government sponsored the

majority of some 12 weekly papers and monthly magazines

published in Iraq. Even where they did not control a publication directly, the government still influenced its contents-the

MCI's General Establishment for Press and Printing licensed

and censored every publication that appeared in the country.

The Iraqi government also expended considerable resources

to reach foreign audiences. Iraqi television aired video clips to

foreign broadcast organizations over both ARABSAT and

INTELSAT. The Iraqi News Agency (INA) gathered and translated news and commentary from Iraqi press, radio, and television sources and disseminated reports by wire to subscribers

around the world. The INA distributed its material even further

through its participation in the Non-Aligned News Agency Pool,

a service of the Non-Aligned Movement that facilitates the

sharing of news items among member nations.

Iraq also controlled several other significant media resources,

the most notable of which was the "Voice of the Palestine

Liberation Organization," a radio program produced by Palestinian

elements in Baghdad and broadcast over the Iraqi shortwave

radio network. They had varying degrees of influence over

some ideologically compatible media like the Libyan news

agency JANA and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

radio in Algiers. By mid-November, Iraq was successful in

rallying information officials of Palestine, Tunisia, Jordan,

Yemen, Mauritania, and Sudan to issue a joint statement

endorsing the Iraqi position and discussing ways of bolstering

244
Additionally, Iraq took advantage of every opportunity to

provide its views to foreign news agencies through government

officials, both at home and abroad. For example, an informal

examination of three days' worth of Iraqi propaganda in

mid-August revealed official statements made to the press in

various countries by three RCC members, seven government

ministers, 10 ambassadors, a governor, a military commander,

and the speaker of the National Assembly.

Iraq also displayed great success in varying the spokesmen

mouthing their propaganda. Sometimes this simply took the

form of issiling statements in the name of various groups or

individuals ; for example, the children and vanguards of Iraq or

the American hostage Golden Johnson. More often, it

consisted of quoting pro-Iraqi statements elicited from various

amenable personalities such as Palestinian leaders George

Habash and Nayif Hawatimah or of distorting statements by

world leaders whose condemnations of Iraq left room for

misinterpretation.

Iraq allowed the first Western journalists into Baghdad on

18 August 1990. Eater, however, all foreign journalists except

a news team from Cable News Network (CNN) were expelledand these journalists were always strictly controlled. They

were escorted everywhere, and all news reports leaving Iraq

were censored by the government. Although most of the world

knew that Iraq was censoring these journalists' reports, use of

this link to the CNN network still greatly enhanced many of

Iraq's propaganda campaign objectives.

Additionally, Iraq used covert methods to access outlets that

could not be influenced openly or directly. Stories of widespread Iraqi bribery surfaced continuously throughout the

crisis . Supposedly, influential members of various countries

were offered valuable gifts and monetary compensation to

promote pro-Iraqi sentiment. One confirmed report of this

activity resulted in the expulsion of an Iraqi Embassy official in

Pakistan for "providing financial assistance for the publication of

propaganda materials against the state [of Pakistan]."2

Iraq also financed several newspapers in Western Europe to

gain Arab support throughout that region. However, toward

24 5
down or reduced operations. It is uncertain whether Iraq gave

up this project due to budgetary reasons, lack of discernible

positive results, or a combination of both.

Iraq's counterpropaganda efforts completed the network.

With some modifications, Iraq took the approach that nearly

all hostile themes and attacks should be countered openly and

vociferously. Therefore, the Iraqis collected hostile propaganda,

analyzed it, developed appropriate themes in response, and

inserted them into their own campaigns within hours. For

example, within hours of President George H. Bush's address to

the US Congress on 11 August 1990, INA carried a lengthy

rebuttal and Aent it out over the newswire. Shortly thereafter,

INA carried a second long rejoinder composed by Foreign

Minister Tariq Aziz. By the evening of the 12th, the editors of

every Iraqi daily paper had prepared, for publication in the

morning papers of the 13th, their own attacks on the speech. To

complete the cycle, INA then compiled a summary of the

newspapers' criticisms that was circulated on the newswires

early on the 13th.

In analyzing Iraq's success in disseminating propaganda to

foreign and domestic audiences, three key components are

easily identifiable . First, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait grabbed

world interest and focused international media. Second, the

government's skillful use of modern technology in mass

communications provided it with instant access to the world

populace. And third, Iraq used aggressive and imaginative

propaganda campaigns to obtain and retain the widest

possible mass audience.

By combining these three elements, Iraq not only made

significant contributions to its national objectives but also

created a powerful force multiplier. This multiplier presented

the illusion that the Iraqi military capabilities and will to fight

were much stronger than reality proved them to be.

Iraq's achievements in coordinating their internal and

external propaganda efforts resulted in significant success in

reaching world audiences. Although ultimately unsuccessful,

the Iraqi effort clearly demonstrates that imaginative use and

integration of today's mass communications technology allows

any country to influence audiences well beyond their borders.

24 6
1. These five shortwave radio programs were "Holy Mecca Radio," first

observed on 10 August 1990; "Voice of the Egypt of Arabism," first observed

on 11 August 1990; "Voice of the Peninsula and the Arabian Gulf," implemented on 29 August 1990; "Voice of Peace," implemented on 11 September

1990; and "Voice of Arab Awakening," first observed on 13 October 1990.

2. Pakistani newspaper Markaz, 16 January 1991 .

Psychological Operations

in Panama During

Operations Just Cause

and Promote Liberty

Col Dennis P. Walko, USA

US military psychological operations units figured prominently in 013eration Just Cause in Panama. Even US television

viewers gained some appreciation of PSYOP; they saw broadcasts from the former Panama Defense Force-dominated national

television channel that included "mysterious" US and Panamanian

nation symbols. They saw safe conduct passes dropped on

Panama Defense Force and "Dignity Battalion" (DIGBAT)

positions, and they heard tactical loudspeakers appealing to

enemy forces to cease resistance and surrender. Perhaps our

country's last television view of PSYOP activity in Panama was

that of the loudspeaker in front of the Papal Nunciature blaring

heavy metal rock music to "drive Noriega out of his mind" or

"keep him awake."

Military PSYOP disappeared from US public view immediately after Noriega surrendered to US authorities, only to

reemerge during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Americans once again were exposed to news articles featuring

PSYOP leaflets and loudspeakers.

In each case, the attitude of our mass media and the ensuing

public response were favorable to PSYOP. Articles in newspapers and journals portrayed PSYOP as both cost effective

and critical to success. Official and unofficial US military

circles said PSYOP was a valuable force multiplier that had

induced enemy forces to abandon their positions or surrender,

thereby reducing loss of life on both sides.

Less conspicuous was the bulk of psychological operations

during Just Cause. Most PSYOP activities and accomplishments in Panama were hardly noticed by either the US public

24 9
community, however, did notice. The lessons learned in Panama

were incorporated into standing operating procedures. Where

possible, immediate changes were made to capitalize on the

PSYOP successes of Just Cause and Promote Liberty. This led

to improved production, performance, and effect in the next

contingency, which took place within six months after the

return of the last PSYOP elements from Panama. Operations

Desert Shield and Desert Storm employed PSYOP at an order of

magnitude and effectiveness that many credit to the lessons

learned from Panama.

Recognizing that much of Just Cause and its complementary

civil-military restoration operation, Promote Liberty is still

classified, this article has been prepared to informally discuss

PSYOP during the Panama contingency . It will briefly cover the

evolution of PSYOP plans and operations, describe their

objectives, and show how PSYOP were successfully executed.

Hopefully, this piece will show there was a lot more to PSYOP

during this contingency than rock music and surrender

appeals, and that PSYOP did, in fact, contribute significantly

to the overall success of the operation .

Panama contingency plans had been under development for

years prior to Just Cause. These contingencies were to range

from evacuation of US and third country nationals to full-scale

combat operations against Noriega, his Panama Defense

Forces (PDF), and (later) the DIGBAT goon squads. The latter

targets were increasingly viewed as threats, not only to

Panamanians, but also to US dependents. Contingency

planning culminated with consolidation and reconstruction

operations to follow any combat scenario.

Psychological operations were well integrated into the

planning process . The worst-case scenario involved combat

operations in Panama. For this option, planners recognized

the importance of promoting prompt cessation of hostilities

and minimizing civilian casualties . The following were key

concerns for this option:

" US casualties

" Panamanian civilian casualties

" Collateral damage

250
Disinformation and hostile propaganda

The five concerns were interrelated. If the PDF offered

concerted resistance to US troops, casualties on both sides

would escalate, civilians would likely suffer, Panama City and

US military installations might sustain severe property

damage, and US troops could become bogged down in an effort

which would increasingly be susceptible to counterproductive

local, US, and worldwide criticism. Related to all this was the

concern that the Noriega-controlled Panamanian mediaessentially a propaganda machine-would continue to broadcast material detrimental to US interests and stir up doubts as

to the effectiveness of our operations.

Additional concerns for consolidation or reconstruction

operations included repairing the government and economic

infrastructure and establishing a functioning democracy.

Specific PSYOP missions and requirements were identified to

support contingency plans and address all the aforementioned

concerns.

On the tactical level, loudspeaker teams were scheduled to

accompany all major ground combat units. Their objective was

to convince the enemy to cease resistance and surrender while

advising innocent civilians how to stay out of harm's way. As

the plan matured over time, loudspeaker teams received

increased emphasis : a few months prior to the operation, the

designated commander for Joint Task Force-South (CJTFSouth), then Lieutenant General Stiner, directed that loudspeaker teams be provided to each infantry battalion (Army

and Marine Corps) and each SEAL battalion-equivalent participating in the assault phase of the operation. This was

probably the highest loudspeaker-to-combat force ratio in the

history of the US military.

On the national-strategic level, a PSYOP task force would be

formed, based upon the regionally oriented 1st PSYOP

Battalion (Bn) augmented with additional loudspeaker, radio,

and television assets from the 4th PSYOP Group (Gp). The

PSYOP task force (TF) main body was to deploy early, assume

control of ongoing tactical PSYOP, and provide general PSYOP

support to the operation, employing full media production and

25 1
resistance, and to foster support for US military operations

and efforts by the Panamanian government to restore law and

order.

Various prepackaged PSYOP materials-prerecorded TV,

radio, and loudspeaker tapes ; radio and loudspeaker scripts ;

music ; and designs for printed leaflets and posters-were

developed from 1987 to 1989. These were approved by an

interagency committee headed by the commander of US Army

South.

The commander of the lst PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP

Group, based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was the designated commander of the PSYOP TF in the eventuality of any

Panama contingency. He was responsible for developing

detailed contingency PSYOP plans, annexes, and products, and

for coordinating all PSYOP-relevant details with USSOUTHCOM

and XVIII Airborne Corps. Prior to the actual operation, often

during routing trips to Panama, the commander and other

members of his command visited many of the principal target

locations and identified potential production facilities-a precaution against a late arrival of PSYOP production equipment.

Facilitating this planning process was the fact that successive I st PSYOP Bn commanders served as CINCSOUTH's

senior theater PSYOP officer, knew most key players on the

USSOUTHCOM and USARSO staffs, and had a small liaison

cell located in the USSOUTHCOM J-3 directorate. Furthermore, once the XVIII Airborne Corps commander (General

Stiner) was designated CJTF for the contingency, coordination

between the battalion and that headquarters (including oneon-one meetings with General Stiner) became a frequent affair .

General Stiner would later assume overall responsibility for

planning and commanding the operation. He took a personal

interest in PSYOP, further enhancing their planning, coordination, and execution.

By March and April 1988, Noriega had increased provocative

actions against US forces in Panama, having sent harassment

patrols into the US-controlled Arraijan tank farm (fuel storage

and distribution depot adjacent to Howard Air Force Base) and

the nearby US Army ammunition storage facility. At this point,

25 2
forces deployed to Panama, with additional deployments in

May 1989. Included among these forces were an additional

infantry brigade, military police, and three PSYOP loudspeaker

teams. These forces remained in Panama until hostilities were

initiated.

The three loudspeaker teams deployed as a tactical detachment with sufficient personnel, vehicles, radios, and speaker

systems to permit reconfiguration as five teams if the need

were to arise. As time dragged on, soldiers and equipment

were rotated to and from Panama to such a degree that

virtually every battalion in the 4th PSYOP Gp had an opportunity

to deploy soldiers to Panama. This would prove extremely

important: by the time of the contingency, a large number of

PSYOP soldiers had firsthand knowledge of the area, the

equipment, the supported commanders already in Panama,

and the Spanish language.

As tension in Panama grew, loudspeaker personnel became

integral members of US tactical exercise and security forces.

These units often became embroiled in PDF and DIGBATorchestrated protests during several of the increasingly

frequent exercises conducted by US forces to reassert US

treaty rights. The loudspeaker teams not only effectively

employed prerecorded tapes which would also be useful later,

during the contingency; they prepared other announcements

on the spot. These encounters served as valuable training and

experience for PSYOP soldiers who would support Just Cause

and Promote Liberty .

Two events in Panama were to have a significant effect upon

PSYOP planning for the contingency. The first was Noriega's

nullification of the May 1989 Panama presidential elections.

Besides the obvious worsening of Panama's internal conditions

and international relations, this act gave US PSYOP a number

of obvious themes for use against Noriega and his "inner

circle." It also heightened the probability of a combat contingency and energized even greater attention to the contingency planning process (including PSYOP planning and

preparation). From this point forward, both the 1st PSYOP Bn

commander and the 4th PSYOP Gp commander spent increasing time in Panama, providing PSYOP planning expertise to

253
within 72 hours of the events that precipitated Operation Just

Cause.)

The second event was the failed 3 October 1989 coup

attempt by members of the PDF against Noriega. After the

coup attempt, Noriega rapidly purged the PDF of its more

moderate leaders and boosted training for the paramilitary

DIGBATs. Prior to this coup attempt, the US combat contingency plan had focused on removing Noriega and his cronies

from power while leaving the PDF institution alone; under

these new conditions, it became increasingly clear that, in the

eventuality of,a contingency operation, the JTF would not be

able to operate within those limited US objectives. Therefore,

PSYOP materials that had been prepared prior to the coup

required revision. The most time-consuming revisions were

those associated with audiovisual products that had been

prepared for possible broadcast over television.

As time passed and the situation in Panama worsened, it

became clear to the 1st PSYOP Bn commander that he could

no longer keep television and radio broadcast tapes up to date.

To have done so would have worn out personnel of both the

battalion and the 4th PSYOP Gp's Strategic Dissemination

Company. Since these products were classified TOP SECRETSPECAT, they could only be produced at night and on holidays

when noncleared soldiers were off duty and away from the

media production facility. Furthermore, this activity was

beginning to tie up personnel who were key to other ongoing

PSYOP activities in the USSOUTHCOM area of operations.

Thereafter, for initial operations the PSYOP TIT would depend

upon the battalion's prerecorded music tracks, silent footage

and logs, and written scripts that could be modified at the last

minute and read "live" by PSYOP broadcast announcers. In

fact, such modifications for radio and television broadcasts

were made by the commander, from Panama, over

long-distance telephone within hours prior to commencement

of hostilities. All were used during the first 24 hours of Just

Cause, constituting the first official US broadcasts in Spanish

heard by the Panamanian population.

25 4
p, p py ,

and General Stiner's designation as CJTF-South, conditions in

Panama continued to deteriorate . US concerns for the safety

and protection of US lives and property were heightened;

preparation and coordination for a Panama contingency

involving full-scale combat operations were intensified .

As a result, 4th PSYOP Gp loudspeaker personnel at Fort

Bragg were placed on recall status for possible deployment on

short notice. Loudspeaker system shortfalls were identified

and additional systems were obtained from Army Reserve

PSYOP units . Loudspeaker broadcast scripts in English and

LfESSAGEt1Ut.10Ell J__Cf IASE1

ATTUN7KN . AT I LNnON AT'ILNTK)N

EVERYONE CLEAR TTIE BUILDI7iC, . LAY

DOWN YOUR WEAPONS. COME OUT

ONE AT A TIME WTTH YOUR RANDS ON

YOUR HEAD AND YOU WON'T GET HUP

THE BUILDING IS SURROUNDED.

MEa5Aal=NU1ACEfi 1. PlY$U

ATTENTION, ATTENTION, ATTENTION

EVERYONE IN THE BUILDING, YOU HAVE

5 MINUTES TO LAY DOWN YOUR

WEAPONS AND COME CUT WITH YOUR

HANDS ON YOUR HEAD WE INTEND 70

DESTROYTHE ENTIRE BUILDING AND

KILL ALL OF YOU IN IT UNLESS YOU DO

AS YOU ARE TOLD YOU GAM

ESCAPE TTiE BUILDING IS

SURROUNDED DON'T DIE Y-TiLN YOU

DONT .HAVC 70. YOUR 5 MINUTES HAS

STARTED.

TIENE ,

l

r~ i

SUSARr .

MANOS sooREsu,

_

icI

DCLTRUIRCMOS 1000 E: Y SE

MATARAN A TOOOS SI NO LO

OVE LE DECIMOS. USTEOC S P40 SE

PULDCN ESCAPAN . TCNEMOS Et

EDIFICIO RODEADO USTEDCS NO

TiENEN OUE MORIR, SUS 5 MRiUTOS

EMPIE7AN AHOftA

Source : 1st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 1 . These bilingual booklets were carried by tactical PSYOP

loudspeaker teams, along with prerecorded tapes of the same

messages in Spanish. Note the messages in the extract ; US troops did

not mince words.

25 5
small handbook. Prerecorded tapes for loudspeaker broadcast

were revised and additional announcements were recorded.

Tapes and booklets were taken to Panama for use by the

deployed teams if the time came to execute the contingency.

The 1st PSYOP Bn commander was designated by General

Stiner as a member of a 20-man JTF-South staff element

identified to predeploy to Panama in advance of the assault

forces if the contingency were to be executed. As it turned out,

this predeployment would prove important to the success of

PSYOP in the Panama contingency. With the exception of the

three loudspeaker teams already in Panama and the loudspeaker teams accompanying the airborne and special

operations assault forces, the PSYOP TF would not arrive in

Panama until after initial assault operations.

The commander, his forward liaison cell, the loudspeaker

detachment, a prepositioned 4th Gp AM radio broadcast team,

Volant Solo PSYOP TV/radio broadcast aircraft from the 193d

Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Pennsylvania ANG, and

the USSOUTHCOM J-3 PSYOP office would comprise the

PSYOP planning, coordination, development and dissemination

capability in Panama until D + 3. Late arrival of the main body

notwithstanding, PSYOP employed a full range of media and

other activities in support of initial combat operations-and with

good effect.

During the early morning of 18 December 1989, two days after

the fatal shooting of a US serviceman and the harassment of

another and his wife by members of the PDF, the 20-man

advance JTF-South staff element administratively and clandestinely deployed to Panama. The 1st PSYOP Bn commander

assumed control of his forward elements in accordance with

prior arrangements with USSOUTHCOM headquarters, although

the members themselves still had not been informed of the

pending operation, and in fact were not to be told until the

night of the assault.

At 1900 hours, 19 December, the 1 st PSYOP Bn commander

assembled the members of his liaison element, the loudspeaker

detachment commander (now the company commander who,

coincidentally, was in Panama conducting his assumption of

command property inventory), and the commander of the

25 6
commander then organized the element to function on a

24-hour basis as his ministaff, interim PSYOP development cell,

and radio broadcast team. Consistent with the JTF OPLAN, the

loudspeaker detachment would break down into five teams

which would link up with their designated supported units. The

other loudspeaker teams and PSYOP liaison officers that were

called for in the plan would deploy with their supported combat

units and would operate in an attached or OPCON status-a

command and control relationship which caused problems, as

will be discussed later.

This sri jail PSYOP force was prepared to work in shifts until

the PSYOP TIT arrived. Although envisioned to function only for

about the first 24 hours of the operation, it was this small

group which planned, coordinated, and ran psychological

operations for the first three days of the contingency. Once the

remainder of the PSYOP TIT had commenced operations, the

liaison element continued as the JTF PSYOP staff section and

PSYOP TIT liaison at the JTF-South headquarters, maintaining

continuous coordination with all elements of the JTF and

coordinating aviation requests and leaflet drops.

In addition to AM radio broadcasts, initial PSYOP activities

involved TV broadcasts of prepackaged materials from the

193d SOG's Volant Solo aircraft. The recently revised scripts

were read live by PSYOP soldiers who had been picked up at

Pope AFB, North Carolina, while the aircraft was en route to

Panama. These broadcasts-all in Spanish-notified the

Panamanian population of US intent and advised how to avoid

accidentally becoming a casualty. (These were the "mysterious"

broadcasts that puzzled some of the US media in Panama.)

The TV channel used for broadcasts by Volant Solo was

Channel 2, the national channel commandeered by the

Panamanian military shortly after the 1968 coup d'etat and

controlled by the military until 20 December 1989. It was

targeted for psychological impact, to deprive Noriega of his

principal TV media, and to ensure prompt reception by the

populace. To this end, and according to the OPLAN, Channel

2's broadcast capability was neutralized by special operations

forces at approximately H-hour, and Volant Solo began

25 7
down in such a manner as to enable prompt restoration of

capabilities once the US and new Panamanian government

were in full control of the situation.

The PSYOP element commenced activities by making use of

the same previously prepared scripts and recordings being

broadcast via Volant Solo. Soon it was heavily involved in

preparing scripts and acquiring news items and music

adequate to keep the Panama City area receiving Volant Solo's

broadcasts and the nationwide audience receiving the AM

radio station's broadcasts 24 hours per day. This was a major

undertaking: Scripts would have to be developed, coordinated

with the staff, and translated into acceptable Spanish so the

Panamanian population would listen and understand. All of

the PSYOP soldiers were actively engaged in this process.

Fortunately, all were bilingual and thoroughly familiar with

the situation in Panama. Tapes of popular music were available

to maintain audience attention between announcements .

Safe conduct passes were prepared at and distributed by the

printing facilities at the main US military print plant at

Corozal. (Later versions, as well as other products, were

printed on presses deployed with the PSYOP TF and on

captured presses at Noriega's former PSYOP facility on Fort

Amador.) It should be noted that Gen Marc A. Cisneros, CG

USARSO, signed the leaflet, as opposed to CINCSOUTH

(General Thurman), or CJTF-South (General Stiner). General

Cisneros had already established a good reputation among the

Panamanian population and the PDF, and therefore was

expected to have greater credibility as a known entity. As

events proved, his reputation would be a valuable commodity,

not only as endorser on subsequent surrender appeals, but in

personally arranging the surrender of regional PDF garrisons

by telephone.

These first safe conduct passes were printed on newsprint.

Three hundred thousand of them could be printed and

chopped into bundles rapidly in a form that could be handled

by two of the cell's PSYOP sergeants with a pickup truck.

Furthermore, US helicopter crews could easily take on 30,000

or more leaflets and toss them over target areas without

difficulty due to their compactness and small size. If the

258
ls,l r-r. cs .- n vs0 Mr.cw- of u1J .OA. uTA(LON O( U ~I U

ooo(1Aa . LXN11MMIA (1T( OOIATO Ot LOS (STAd0S N"00S.LAGAAAKTUAMOS 3"

1(GUft0AA, ACGLSO " FAOLTOAO(S YtD- COWOAL T u% IUGAA OE OCSGT<W Y A(C1 W[AAa0" .

wlcvumlN: ~a HAr Gul SUFI .an3.

cfPlxA1 MARC A. IXPKPM

comAmowm a rnwA3 Da Exwcryo sew

PASAPORTE A LA LIBERTAO

SAFE CONDUCT PASS

THIS PASS tS FOR USE BY POF, OIGMTY nATTAUON . AHO COOEPAOI MEMBERS .

THE BEARER OF THIS PASS, UPON PRESfH7R(OIT TOANYUS. autTARY uplaul, wtt .L

ZIE GUARANTEED SAFE PASSAGE TO U .S. FACILMES THAT WILL PROVIDE MEDICAL

ATTENTION, FOOD. ANO SNELTER.

GENERAL 1AAAC A . CISNEROS

CG, US ARMY SOUTH

SAFE OONOUCT PASS

Source : 1 st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 2. Three hundred thousand of these safe conduct passes were

printed on newsprint as an expedient. They were printed in Spanish on

one side but in English on the other so that US troops understood

what was being promised. These were proven effective in the early

stages of Just Cause, especially when accompanied by loudspeaker

broadcasts .

contingency had taken place during the rainy season, this

approach might not have worked very well since the newsprint

would have rapidly disintegrated on contact with water. Had

heavier paper stock been used, however, the leaflets would

have taken longer to print and might have been too bulky and

heavy for the small detachment to handle.

These safe conduct passes were dropped by helicopter on

targets of opportunity and on locations identified by PSYOP

soldiers. Helicopter pilots often carried bundles of leaflets just

in case an opportunity would present itself for their use. Later

versions of these passes were also distributed as handouts

from loudspeaker teams and other US forces.

25 9
successful employment of loudspeakers and leaflets in support

of US Marines at La Chorrera, a small village on the outskirts

of Panama City and Howard AFB. The Marines had encountered heavy resistance from PDF and DIGBAT members

for the first 24 hours. The Marines ceased fire for the night.

Surrender appeals were then blared over loudspeakers as safe

passage leaflets were dropped. Resistance ceased early the

next morning without an additional shot being fired. Surrendering personnel came forward clenching the safe conduct

passes.

Colocated with the PSYOP cell was the commander of the

Joint Audiovisual Detachment (JAVDET), a unit comprised of

multiservice elements from the Joint Combat Camera Center.

Although not in command of the JAVDET, the PSYOP TF

commander could request specific video coverage by the

detachment. He then had a significant amount of footage

already available when the main body of the PSYOP TF arrived

with organic camera teams and audiovisual production

capability. One copy of every cassette produced by the

JAVDET was delivered to the PSYOP TF.

The JAVDET's transportation asset were extremely limited,

but the PSYOP TF commander was able to match up these

cameramen with several of the vehicle-mounted loudspeaker

teams already in-country. It was largely the videos obtained by

these photographers that were used in initial PSYOP audiovisual operations. Also, since these videos were not PSYOP

products, they were provided by the JAVDET to the US media

through program action officer (PAO) channels. PSYOP loudspeaker soldiers and activities therefore wound up receiving

higher visibility in the US media than would have been the

case otherwise.

Immediately upon activation of the 10,000-watt AM PSYOP

radio station and commencement of the initial assaults on 20

December, the new president of Panama, Guillermo Endara,

communicated with the Panamanian masses principally via

this station. Among Endara's first announcements was the

promise that anyone turning a weapon in to US forces would

be paid $150 for it.

26 0
qp

Results during Urgent FYiry in Grenada had been successful,

even though undertaken late in the operation. In the case of

Panama, the initiative was taken early ; it paid off. The PSYOP

radio station explained and promoted turn-in procedures to

combatants and to the Panamanian population. The newly

arrived PSYOP TF commenced preparation of numerous printed

leaflets and posters to convey information leading not only to the

rapid surrender of PDF and DIGBAT personnel, but to their

turning in individuals and cached weapons as well.

Early in the operation, PSYOP soldiers supported civil

military operations, including the displaced persons (DP) camp

hastily established in Balboa Village. A tactical PSYOP loudspeaker team set up full-time operations in the compound and

amplified PSYOP radio broadcasts over the loudspeaker

system to put the people at ease and keep them informed. This

team, along with other PSYOP soldiers, moved throughout the

camp, handing out newspapers prepared by the PSYOP TF,

pretesting proposed PSYOP products, chatting with the people,

observing their actions, and reporting potential problems to

the camp administrators-members of the 96th Civil Affairs

Battalion.

A primary problem associated with the DP activity was

rumor control. By building rapport and establishing information programs with the DPs over time, PSYOP soldiers

established their credibility and were able to neutralize rumors

before they expanded to crisis proportion. When an improved,

expanded DP facility was completed at the Panamaniancontrolled portion of Albrook Field, PSYOP soldiers helped

prepare the population of the Balboa camp to minimize

apprehension about the move to the new site and to enhance

control during the move itself.

The tempo of PSYOP increased dramatically as time progressed and the PSYOP TF became fully operational. Additionally, the 4th PSYOP Gp commander arrived as senior

PSYOP commander in-theater-serving as special PSYOP

advisor and expeditor for General Thurman. The group commander used the full range of media to convey public

information while soliciting cooperation and support from the

26 1
ES TU DEBER

MASIMO QI;F SY PAGARA:

SISPORSUFICLENTE CANTIDAD BE MUNICION

s 15 o rou RIFLE AUTOIIATICO I

1130 FOR ,1I I NA

$5000 MAXIMO

FOR ALMACENAMIENTOS DE ARMAS

COOPERA CON NOSOTROS

Source t st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 3. A series of posters and handbills advertised the reward

program for weapons . (Interestingly, a Panamanian showed up in an

armored vehicle and asked what the reward was for it . Since the

maximum authorized amount for any one item was $150, US troops

offered $150 . After a short negotiation session, the Panamanian

accepted the offer .)

26 2

$25 POR GRANADA

$30 FOR GRANADA RP(; ~--~

S 100 FOR PISTCLA

S 115 FOR ESCOPETA 0-~

RECOMPENSA MAXIMA POR

ALMA CENAMIENTOS DE ARMAS

PUNTOS DE F;NTRE( :A

Oey.n.memu a Poi.- ctrc. d, 11 y na de+o-++d<i n<r,< AI-l

G.wmoO N-l (Franm .I Anon Ise)

.V+ .mrur . ..Q+O+++ob-nl-nnro+Lpm+don- ...d< 7

4 Vwuru ] 4 1+ iuh

PROCEDIMIENlOS I)E EN'TREGA

AFMUEQYICARGAIXMYMUNICTONFSDELARAB

LATAUN PANG RLANCO AL ARMA.

1 ~OONn. AMASOSTT7110A UIFI, FN ALTO r0a ELGMAON.

< gCIlE1w5MSTADCYlON13fX1^SwIfIORIDADFS

COOPERACON TU GOBIERNO YAYUDAA

LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS ESTADOUNIDENSES

UNIDOS ALCANZAREMOS LA LEY, EL ORDEN Y

LA SEGURIDAD PUBLICA

SINTONIZA A A.M . 1160
PROSPERO ANO 1990

SON NUESTROS MAS

SINCEROS DESEOS

PANAMA,

CORAZON DEL MUNDO

PUENTE DEL UNIVERSO .

5--q-" A

qo' ~ w~ libno' Io +odo+ wi+

'-fey.

Seto*$ JI:I

R-pnwdirwde J,r.+ k. die:

T+nrd /t en Uiu+

Al-o+ 11 .22

Source : 1 at PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 4. Christmas cards were distributed during Just Cause to

enhance relations and rebuild national spirit; 10,000 of the first and

30,000 of the second were distributed-mostly by hand and by helicopter drop.

263
members and arms caches.

Posters, leaflets, radio broadcasts, and television announcements solicited information and provided telephone numbers

to be called by those wishing to volunteer information

regarding weapons or PDF and DIGBAT fugitives. These

techniques were effective. Within minutes after dissemination

of printed material or broadcast of the information, the

designated telephones began to ring and information poured

in. It was also found that new posters, especially "wanted"

posters bearing photographs of PDF and DIGBAT fugitives,

had to be printed and distributed continuously because people

removed them from walls to avoid identification, to keep as

souvenirs, or possibly take them home for study and future

reference.

Other products focused on establishing a favorable image of

US forces, explaining US motives, and providing information

needed to reestablish the normal routine. Products of the latter

category were in demand because the former PDF-dominated

Panamanian media was essentially shut down. In fact, the

newspapers printed by the PSYOP TF were so sought after by

the public that enterprising Panamanians grabbed bundles of

them and sold them to passers-by .

At this point, it should be stressed that all products were

tested prior to dissemination. Product review and approval was

extended to the level of the executive office of the Panamanian

government in order to reduce the probability of error. (A

classic example of such an error on the part of an enemy

occurred during Desert Shield/Storm when an Iraqi propaganda announcer warned US military personnel that their

wives were fooling around with movie stars such as Bart

Simpson!)

A short case study is presented here for the purposes of

clearly demonstrating the complexity of PSYOP product

development during Just Cause and, later, Promote Liberty.

During the operation, the PSYOP TF developed a product

bearing the multicolored image of the Panama national seal.

The insignia was surmounted by an eagle. Due to the poster's

size and complexity (five colors), the prototype was assembled

and sent to the Corozal print plant. The workers at the plant

264
SE BUSCA

TTE CNEL LUIS A. CORDOBA

Ex jefe official do intcligcncia . Ex-micmbro del

Conscjo Estrat6gico Militar CENT. Rcsponsablc por

el arresto do los oficialcs del G-2 cnvucltos en cl

golpe de rnarzo do 1988 . Ex-jefe del DNTT y la 5ta

zona militar . Trigucrio, complex16n mcdiana,

cabello ncgro, ojos castanos, estatura 5'8' y

peso 160 Lbs .

SI TIENES INFORMACION ACERCA DEL

PARADERO DE ESTA PERSONA, LLAMA

AL TELEFONQ:

2555-24

Source : 1 st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 5. Several versions of these kinds of posters were employed by

members of the Joint Task Force in attempts to round up former

members of the Panama Defense Forces and Dignity Battalions . These

posters, along with radio and television announcements, not only

contributed to the prompt identification and capture of fugitives but

also served to reassure the Panamanian populace that US forces were

actively seeking to round up those individuals most capable of

orchestrating retaliatory actions or restoring the "old order."

26 5
SE BUSCA

MAJ. CARLOSSALDANA HUMBERTOLOPEZ TIRONE

r- -'I . . .A . . .wu. s4... .. 6- . .n . E.-

Iw w 4. Srw oua~rr )

MAY GONZALO GONZALEZ

ampw .7.s .+.crr .

.bop" L .o.ob" W .I.gM

ROLANDO ESTERLING

S 1 w. . ,1 -ma CPT ASUNCIONGAITAN

ova.a- sr . raww.

CPT BENJAMIN SODS

LI- II In W6fmw 17-3613. 974963 o L7-4346 i Uer i>f~i6. a fgolnf.-

u 4 e "&Igvl~ d" 1" u ymmu "qui 11-An. Ll.m 1--b- Prn app W.-

d . la 6arl.pa de dis .w.d 6 "" 6S "A I- ~ emu-

-~d. ri- aw M u . .

9 .r . w wit .- n .xu . eau

. .7.A7~

FA . A.w J . 4 ..

a . . 4~ . .r. . ..,..

C-14 AR .IIa Co

onr w..m.. .

riY . AwNll. M . ...I Yr .n u

~. . " ru Vl.r. urr,..

SIr41W " - AW... N.6-

Ayd "ad . u D:u r IIeG..

t.r .r9

:. a ". .. gat, . M .4.

R . .1. .~u " ... . ... .n Cal . w... .

A"- a .m ." A.- o.a.

Lp,-. 1 Crw r A . w.

L11< UU~ L°" n1n

wJ GNw W} . cl.N . . . 1..fi.~ .mw n""

Od.w C . "Iq [.~ . r.4

wd. C.. . .r .iw L.I r.7- All.,r C.... .. E.i/.li. p.41

LA,- c..... Rte. G 1.4 v4.. u. . . . .i r.r . "1 ..

I.w u M..w

A. ...Y Diu . .4i.. R . ~ "~

N .d. L-Nn " J..1 S .. . ... .

rd.r. mdw Udn 1 .u r.

R ... . h ..uN . A4 " p SrL .

r.. .r . .... .

3er w o.r .. o. ..i W.C.rtsr... wmA . ",.77w".1jad I Cw1.. G- .

A U 11, T .W. w CL-1

Rw- N.a

M 4M.i .

Caw A.r:1 . ww .V...,1

.,1

A"w "'Y..".

Source : 1 st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 6. "Wanted" handbill

26 6
< Gout

.ad r ru Me w

1 .n kcal

a -al. . jI -w" . .. -.

S-.- G.wJ 1 " OE, ., r""" "" .

-

R-I "e . k

. . T,, I - E,l "~Y

. fu " J7

EkWle W. Co . w .l K

.r.. ~W kb..u d K loin p. .u. .u 4

w .p" o In Tree.

FNea hTh

.-'- J r ..b ~ureee M G<".

EtI . E

~

Gee- . 4.

IrtMIIM r YN.ro-HI7 . rc -

S.p... K lw-l- v n H I--- k

1 s1 s

M~ 1 W kar Sa M"10 k 1<.F L.'Nk . 4 r""~P1. c-«d

1719 r~ a lalrr<bw < ."N°..d. F7

M.. .....

ck.l. r.n bW.u.e luI7Y

~e<en.o

A

m

M.HroAff NBXB.

- COLANGELALBERTO MINA

	n ""s.1u<u e. w .^ao..~«u . v wlne« w r~ H1. m.~.ie. Coo 1

"OPMddn Im caqunltmo. " w

	e-l_a Ir wool. J Lfo. .. 1« a.l . U- .

NErcb H.« 11.1llef- 7774 .53 . 137

r"Y- ..~IIW ~.. T .

14"

3961

n

teaks x-L. Hb r...~

"

w

i ...... .I ... b- .d.i . .l .. .. . u.6e" .« I..I l. ..Yr« d U"

CON CA UIESADISCUIFSI rg1W Mr .. Wbul M"Jwr.

n H ib,W k 79N

..r....e.« w. 1 wa.we ,.,. LAS RIJMwNOS EL FLfCURO

"nka. IM

H1 .

H' I ne.l .«IM " W

~ilnal". i.RW.h.EI.tr- N

~I .,

Y.'~j TIW30ARA, RUMANIA (UPI) "T~eJ

enJk.1 .W u N3 .uY ,. .b.e ... 1"4. Ir7 ...1.W 4W. . ti .:...w.

H b rM. wkr" vIYI.b H

M.tlnne " T.f.y A//_ N nr;e.d kl ./.nWe r.-- Mwl".

IJNEAS PARA REPORTAR INFORMAC30N

u- w. .y..".-kr---. .rw. e. . . .. -- <

ol .we.. ..w H~ h1Me"_ ..aw. .. r. :..;e " a b

... ." HYGh. 1 N rmod. ,, n..k.".

SINTONIZA A A.M . 1160

a. "y," .«c4 ~ br.«eo

.ul« ".... el ....~ 1 ..~ 1"

b YM"N

H

H"«

M-.n. I. .w ..... .

, .. -.«,. . «

b ,. ... . H

rn . .. o..«m.w a. ."«. n.l..n

".E-. " I

.'

;M r1.n11- P.I-

.M .- IIYe / Lib.." e. ""r. .0".

"reie.

V

T ...

r r Wv v -.i .r "

H . .. HWi..... H ,yvry, WwY

lade , 1. nw eJ r"e . ' b _-- INrs

W.i .n. W f..nu ..r .a

S .oOO r . .».u I« ...

na .e..e t-- r Iwro "~

r

r

w. ...... ." .e -.a .Mre

wl ." Id. ll . .quue H

.r .... ..

M.Nl.1

M-."I e. "Ti.lw.n, rb L

W" .e

HF .1 "Y. .

1.~e.err

H b ._, .W" 1. r,ellY. HI

-r~r .n

r

. n- _Ir a ....

Or

J

r rM4ia "rtr.lrrc" Ik .r . V

¢el ..

A 77H Wa.yr7u Oa"rsr. .

. n .p .. . . . wI . . e .W. .

.1

rt

rgd"cYe

..L .. .m ... . I. om w .r.^er eel

.waa L "¢mla .

Source : 1st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 7. Note that this PSYOP newspaper advertises the radio station

frequency, announces a recent capture of a PDF officer, and provides

telephone numbers for reporting locations of arms, munitions, criminals,

and criminal activities. Panamanians picked up bundles of these

newspapers and sold them.

26 7
gy py 

used these plates . The resulting product was indeed beautifully

done. Only one problem: the PSYOP TF S-3 realized that, instead

of the traditional eagle atop the Panama crest, there was a North

American bald eagle-not exactly the kind of thing that would

make us popularl

When redone, the revised poster with correct eagle and

crest, was tested again "just to be sure ." Again, a problem

surfaced-according to the National Code of Panama, the crest

was supposed to appear in a field of green, and the proposed

poster would have done just that. Unfortunately, the proposed

green was the color of one party of the Panama coalition

government-one which was becoming increasingly viewed by

Panama political opponents as trying to muscle out the other

two coalition parties .

The poster finally came out with the eagle and crest on a

neutral background. The lesson here is that pretesting and

posttesting, including the actual colors to be used, are fundamental to the PSYOP development and production process .

Source : 1 st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 8. This small red, white, and blue poster was printed on heavy

stock paper and was distributed throughout Just Cause and Promote

Liberty. It was displayed on military vehicles and handed out by US

troops. Its objectives were to portray US-Panamanian teamwork and to

reduce perceptions of US forces as military invaders or occupiers.

Within days after dissemination commenced, Panamanian commercial

vendors were peddling T-shirts and other paraphernalia bearing the

same logo.

268
ypgpq

extensive staff coordination and personal review by the PSYOP

TF commander.

As the situation further stabilized, it became increasingly

important to get the commercial media "back in business."

Shortly after the first day of operations, the PSYOP TF

commander began to receive personal telephone calls from

media representatives willing to get their TV and radio stations

back on the air in support of the US and the new governmentbut only if they and their personnel would be escorted by US

soldiers or transported under guard while their facilities were

guarded by troops of the JTF. There existed considerable

concern for possible terrorist acts by DIGBAT goons still at

large, including possible murder or sabotage.

Initially, soldiers and vehicles could not be spared by either

the PSYOP TF or JTF-South to satisfy all commercial media's

conditions. Nor did the PSYOP TIT have the weapons necessary

to provide appropriate security. However, at about 2 100 hours

the night after Noriega obtained sanctuary in the Papal

Nuniciature, a team of PSYOP soldiers entered the TV Channel

2 broadcast facility and began broadcasting prerecorded tapes

of cartoons from the station library. By morning, most of the

commercial broadcasting crew had arrived, along with a large

crowd of Panamanians enthusiastically waving Panamanian

and US flags. They were celebrating the arrival of US troops

and the "grand reopening" of their singing channel.

The commercial crews volunteered to restore operations as

the PSYOP team temporarily observed and screened their

material to ensure that it was not counterproductive to US

aims or those of the new government. Another TV channel (4)

was similarly reactivated the same day.

Most of the principal radio and television stations in and

around Panama City were back on the air within days,

temporarily under observation by or supervision of either US

PSYOP personnel or Panamanian officials with whom PSYOP

had established a working relationship. These media not only

broadcast materials prepared by the PSYOP TF, but also prepared and broadcast excellent programs on their own. Their

26 9
Panama.

By 8 January, the PSYOP TF had produced and disseminated over one million leaflets and handbills, 50,000 posters,

550,000 newspapers, and 125,000 units of miscellaneous

other printed materials. Volant Solo had conducted TV broadcasts for the first several days, the PSYOP AM radio station

had been operating 24 hours a day, and countless messages

had been aired on commercial radio and television stations

and published in commercial newspapers. Loudspeaker teams

continued to support tactical units by broadcasting advisories,

interacting with the population, and providing timely PSYOP

advice to US commanders.

Psychological operations figured prominently in the successful

US efforts to flush Noriega out of the Papal Nunciature, where

he had sought refuge. They played a significant role in

establishing the Panama Public Force-the new police force

designed to replace the old PDF. PSYOP teams circulated

through Panama City and other population areas, assessing

conditions and public attitudes, interacting directly with the

public and with US combat and security forces, and resolving

difficulties when they arose.

All of the first series of US PSYOP objectives were accomplished during Just Cause. US combat elements began to

depart in early January 1990. Focus shifted to the consolidation of the new government in Panama and the restoration

of the public information infrastructure. The PSYOP TF was

stood down, replaced by a PSYOP support element comprised

of 48 personnel.

This element, consisting of stay-behind PSYOP soldiers from

Just Cause and a civilian analyst from the 1st PSYOP Bn,

provided PSYOP support to the newly created Military Support

Group. This unit then provided US military support to the

government of Panama during the nation assistance and

civil-military operations of Promote Liberty. From mid-January

to the end of February, the PSYOP support element produced

and disseminated more products and planned and executed

more activities than all those in support of Just Cause combat

operations.

27 0
ENTREGUE SU 2RH~ D~E

LA SIGUIENTE MONERR

I. SOSTENGA EL

ARMA AS1 .

LOCAL: DAVID

DIA: 21 ENE 90 -

HORARIO: 0800-1800

LOCAL: VOLCAN

DIA: 22 ENE 90

HORARIO: 0800-1300

LOCAL: PUERTO ARMUELLES

DIA: 23 ENE 90

HORARIO: 0300-1800

ARMAS

MUMS

Source 1st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 9. One of many later versions, this poster not only indicates

procedures for surrendering arms but also identifies turn-in locations

and their hours of operation . Subsequent versions left some of the

data blank so that Special Forces soldiers in the countryside could fill

n the information and administer similar programs.

27 1
ingly worked in conjunction with the new government, the commercial media, the US Embassy, the Military Support Group,

and JTF-Panama to create conditions favorable for restoring

democracy, the economy, and public security. Major emphasis

was placed on these objectives :

" Maintaining support for US objectives in Panama.

" Professionalizing the newly formed Panama Public Force

and Panamanian Police Force (PNP)-constituted principally

by former members of the PDF.

" Gaining public support for the Public Force and PNP.

" Enhancing the effectiveness and prestige of the new

government.

" Neutralizing disinformation and hostile propaganda directed

against the government, the Public Force/PNP, and the US.

By the end of February, these PSYOP soldiers had been

redeployed to Fort Bragg. They were replaced by 8th PSYOP Bn

soldiers augmented by linguists and area experts from the 1st

PSYOP Bn and by camera and audiovisual technician teams

from the 4th PSYOP Gp's Strategic Dissemination Company.

This group continued operations, employing the full range of

dissemination media, until stood down in May 1991 . The final

PSYOP objectives envisioned for Panama contingency operations

had been accomplished.

From beginning to end, PSYOP supported all stated US

military and political objectives . During the initial stages of the

assault, PSYOP loudspeakers, leaflets, TV and radio announcements successfully appealed for cessation of hostilities ;

surrender of weapons and members of the PDF and Dignity

Battalions; and compliance with measures promulgated by the

newly formed Panamanian government. Psychological operations enhanced credibility of US military forces, assisted in

gaining and retaining popular support for US actions, and

helped reduce the potential for damaging disinformation and

hostile propaganda.

As the operation progressed, psychological operations and

PSYOP forces were fully integrated into consolidation operations and emergency relief activities while fostering an

27 2
Source : 1st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 10. The PSYOP support element coordinated directly with JTFPM, ground forces, other elements within the MSG, the Panamanian

government, and the US Embassy.

atmosphere of return to normalcy. Announcements via US

military PSYOP and commercial news media supported this

process. Through programs and information developed or

disseminated by PSYOP soldiers, 193d SOG Volant Solo

technicians, and host-nation affiliates, Panamanians knew

when and where to go to satisfy their fundamental needs.

Through this process, PSYOP supported not only the theme of

legitimacy of the US operation, but also the legitimacy of the

newly formed government of Panama.

During the final phase of military operations, US PSYOP

supported an orderly return of control to the host-nation

government, addressed major sanitation and health threats,

and continued military information programs. All of this

facilitated prompt return of the deployed US military personnel

to CONUS.

Finally, as a natural consequence of these accomplishments,

psychological operations and PSYOP units gained recognition

among many important US commanders of combat and combat

support units participating in the operation . Not only did PSYOP

affect them personally by assisting in the reduction of casualties

27 3
most favorable image of their commands to the Panamanian

population and to the world.

Many of these accomplishments cannot be measured in

quantifiable terms. However, there were obvious indicators of

success:

" surrender of enemy forces after exposure to loudspeakers

and leaflets ;

" immediate public response to posters, loudspeakers, and

TV/radio announcements, resulting in valuable information

and intelligence ;

civilian compliance with instructions conveyed via PSYOP

media;

" virtual absence of hostile propaganda and disinformation

which could have obstructed the mission; and

" prompt restoration of commercial information services,

which contributed to the legitimacy of the new democratic

government.

Many valuable lessons were learned by the PSYOP community itself:

" The PSYOP TF commander simultaneously serving as JTF

PSYOP officer, theater PSYOP officer, and PSYOP TF commander enhanced initial planning and coordination. As the

operation progressed, however, these duties overextended the

capabilities of the commander to the extent that he encountered

difficulty supervising and controlling the many disparate and

geographically separated PSYOP elements and operations.

The requirement that PSYOP TF simultaneously provide

JTF staff support, control tactical assets, and develop and

disseminate PSYOP products stressed the capabilities of the

task force to the breaking point. The battalion staff and company

configurations did not easily adjust to the requirements of a

task force much larger and more complex than experienced

before. Of particular concern was an inability to control the

tactical PSYOP teams, which were vital to successful PSYOP

campaign planning and evaluation. Attaching these teams

OPCON to combat commanders while optimizing on-site

responsiveness during the assault phase detracted from

274
pp

under operational command of the PSYOP TF as soon as that

force had the ability to fully exercise that function. Unfortunately, that capability did not materialize until the majority

of the teams had returned to the US.

Augmentation from other battalions of the 4th PSYOP Gp

was essential to the success of the PSYOP TF. However, due to

the peacetime configuration and functioning of the group,

which only occasionally involved an integration of effort across

battalion lines, the full talents and capabilities of soldiers and

equipment were extremely difficult to exploit in Panama.

" The L-Peries modified table of organization and equipment

(MTOE) for the 4th PSYOP Gp and its subordinate units was

not optimally suited to requirements of the contingency.

Some of the "good things" that were either learned or reinforced are listed below.

" Early integration of PSYOP into the contingency planning

process helped ensure overall success of the operation.

" Tactical loudspeaker teams contributed to demoralization

of the PDF and DIGBATs and to cessation of hostilities and

surrender. The teams used prepackaged scripts and recordings, but frequently employed their own ingenuity and

linguistic capability "on the spot" to deal with both hostile

forces and the civilian population. Tactical commanders of

Army forces, Marine Corps forces, and Navy SEAL forces

placed considerable importance on these teams.

" The Panama population listened to, and complied with,

instructions and advisories from US military PSYOP TV, AM

radio, and loudspeaker broadcasts.

" The working relationship that the 4th PSYOP Gp commander

and the 1st PSYOP Bn commander enjoyed with the XVIII Airborne

Corps commander and stag, and with CINCSOUTH and his staff

prior to Just Cause and Promote Liberty, undoubtedly resulted in a

degree of understanding and trust which were critical to the

success ofjoint PSYOP throughout the contingency operation.

" Psychological operations soldiers and airmen were well

trained, motivated, self-confident, and effective.

27 5
py 

formalized. However, in June 1991-less than six months after

the Panama contingency was executed and only weeks after

return to CONUS by the last 8th PSYOP Bn members of the

PSYOP Support Element-the 4th PSYOP Gp was provisionally

reorganized. Regionally oriented battalions remained, but the

group was now organized according to an operational concept

suitable for a wide variety of contingencies.

The reorganized 4th's basic tenets:

" The 4th PSYOP Gp commander would deploy to the theater

headquarters, along with a small headquarters element, to

provide PSYbP advice and assistance to the supported theater

CINC and act as "expeditor" for PSYOP-related actions. (This

happened informally in Panama, when the 4th PSYOP Gp

commander performed this function not only for the PSYOP TF

but also for the 96th Civil Affairs Bn, the 112th Signal Bn, and

the 528th Support Bn-three units which were at that time

under the 4th's peacetime command and control. The concept

proved so beneficial to both the PSYOP TF and to CINCSOUTH

that it was formalized.)

" The PSYOP TIT would continue to be commanded by the

theater PSYOP battalion commander, but with two other

PSYOP battalion commanders working for him:

1. A tactical commander (the commander of the reconfigured 9th PSYOP Bn) would control all PSYOP loudspeaker

teams and other tactical PSYOP assets and ensure support

to other tactical elements of the JTF. The 9th PSYOP Bn

would train for these support missions worldwide.

2. A media production commander (the commander of

the new provisional PSYOP Dissemination Bn) would

produce all printed products, recordings, and audiovisual

products, and would run all radio and television broadcast

operations.

Since the 4th PSYOP Gp would now be provisionally organized

to operate the same in peacetime as in war, it was presumed

that overall effectiveness of contingency PSYOP would improve.

The opportunity to validate the new concept presented itself

sooner than anyone could have expected. Within one month

276
pyy

did so in the configuration described above. It worked, and

worked well! It is estimated that 29 million leaflets and many

hours of loudspeaker and radio broadcasts During Desert

Shield and Desert Storm resulted in thousands of Iraqi soldiers

being influenced by PSYOP to abandon their positions and

equipment and to surrender.

One can only speculate on what might have been the results

had PSYOP forces not participated in these contingencies, but

the indicators of success are pretty clear. In the author's

opinion, these successes are a tribute to the PSYOP soldiers,

civilians, anal airmen-past and present-whose competence,

dedication, and ingenuity most certainly saved US and

Panamanian lives and contributed to mission success. Their

accomplishments have resulted in increased recognition of the

value of PSYOP by senior military commanders and their

staffs, and by other agencies of the US government. However,

this renewed interest and understanding is highly perishable .

We still have a long way to go before the potential of strategic,

operational, and tactical PSYOP-and the forces which plan

and execute these operations-is fully realized.

Psychological Operations

Poland's Underground Media

Laurence J. Orzell

Poland offers a fascinating example of nongovernmental

psychological operations in action. Drawing upon that

country's long tradition of a conspiratorial press, dissidents

affiliated with the banned Solidarity trade union and other

organizations engaged in the large-scale production of underground newsletters, leaflets, books, and other printed materials

designed to influence popular perceptions. The dissidents also

utilized electronic media such as radio and cassettes.

Those activities reflected a broad range of antiregime

opinion, but their overall purpose was twofold: to supply

uncensored information on political, social, and economic

issues, and to maintain a spirit of opposition among the

populace. While the dissidents would probably have described

their efforts as purely informational or journalistic, their

activities could accurately be described as peacetime, nongovernmental PSYOP. This article places the Polish opposition's

PSYOP efforts within their historical context but focuses on the

period following the imposition of martial law (December 1981).

In particular, the analysis examines the type of underground

print materials produced, the means used to prepare and

disseminate them, the government's response, the main themes

the dissidents sought to propagate, and the opposition's use of

electronic media. The article concludes with an assessment of

the overall significance of those efforts .

The Polish resistance, whether directed against czarist

Russia, Nazi Germany, or native communist rulers, recognized

the value of PSYOP. When the Poles revolted against Russia in

January 1863, they formed a conspiratorial government that

not only conducted urban guerrilla warfare; it also organized

an underground press which contained manifestos directed at

27 9
this effort failed, it contributed to the maintenance of armed

resistance. The underground media played a much greater role

during World War 11 . The Home Army (Annia Krahiwa),

Poland's chief resistance group, regularly published an

Informational Bulletin (Biuletyn Informacyjny), copies of which

circulated from hand to hand and thus indirectly supported

diversions and armed opposition to the Nazis. Other groups,

ranging from the far right to the extreme left on the political

spectrum, also produced leaflets (ulotki) and other publications .

So extensive was this network that the London-based Polish

government-in-exile issued a postage stamp in 1943-itself a

form of PSYOP-commemorating the underground press (prasa

podziemna).

Armed resistance to foreign domination proved impractical

following the communist consolidation of power after World

War 11, but dissident psychological operations eventually came

to assume even greater importance. Antiregime intellectuals

benefited from their government's reluctance to engage in

extensive repression during the 1970s-lest Poland risk losing

the economic benefits of detente-and they established a

variety of illegal publishing ventures . One group in particular,

the Workers' Defense Committee (later renamed the Social

Self-defense Committee), distinguished itself through its publications : Communique (Lomunikat), Information Bulletin (Biuletyn

Informacyjny), and The Worker (Robotnik). Dissidents also set

up an Independent Publishing House, better known by its

Polish acronym NOWA, which produced numerous literary

works and several periodicals . Despite periodic harassment by

the authorities, NOWA and similar illegal publishing enterprises prepared materials targeted at laborers, students,

farmers, and other social groups. There can be little doubt that

these publications, which advocated political pluralism and

respect for human rights, helped forge the broad social

alliance which led to the formation of Solidarity during July

and August 1980 .

Both the regime and the workers used PSYOP extensively

during the 1980 strikes. For instance, when the authorities

distributed leaflets questioning the striker's motives, the

workers responded with broadsheets of their own, counseling

280
formation. The governments acceptance of the strikers

"Twenty-one Demands" effectively extended legal recognition to

unofficial publishing activities . The subsequent "Gdansk

Agreement" obliged the regime "to respect freedom of speech

and .. . not to suppress independent publications." Solidarity

quickly took advantage of this unprecedented concession . The

union published its own national organ, Solidarity Weekly

(7'ygodnik Solidamosci), and regional branches followed suit

with a plethora of journals and newsletters. The union press

both reflected and shaped the popular perception that the

government could not be trusted to carry out the Gdansk

accord. Not surprisingly, these publications represented one of

the principal targets of repression when the authorities

declared martial law on 13 December 1981.

Despite internment, arrests, and confiscations, the underground press quickly reappeared and assumed an even greater

importance due to the fact of dissatisfaction. Some activists

who were placed in internment camps in 1981-82 even

managed to produce handwritten newsletters. For instance,

internees at a detention camp in Nowy Lupkow prepared

several issues of a newsletter entitled OurBars (Nasza Krata),

named after the prison bars which isolated them from society.

Copies of OurBars, reportedly circulated outside the camp,

counseled the maintenance of worker-intellectual ties in the

face of government repression. The vast majority of underground publications produced during and after martial law

emanated from small groups of individuals in larger cities and

towns who had avoided capture. The importance of these

PSYOP efforts in dissident strategy became clear when

Solidarity's underground Provisional Coordinating Committee

issued a declaration in 1982, stressing the need to "organize

the independent circulation of information" and thereby

"expose the propaganda goals of the authorities."

The underground press produced nearly 1,000 different

periodicals, approximately 400 of which appeared repeatedly,

some on a regular basis. While it is difficult to estimate the

total readership, the sheer number of publications suggests

that these materials enjoyed wide circulation, primarily in

urban areas. During the first four months of martial law, the

28 1
underground published 100 different titles . Many of the early

editions bore the simple yet historically significant title

Information Bulletin (Biuletyn Informacyjny) and consisted of

one or two pages. As might be expected, the majority of these

materials were prepared in Warsaw, Poznan, Wroclaw, Lodz,

and Gdansk. Press runs varied from several hundred to over

10,000, depending largely upon available equipment and

printing supplies. During the martial law period (December

1981~July 1983), most of these publications emanated from

the remnants of these periodicals, including Mazouian Weekly

(7`ygodnik Mazowsze), which was prepared by union activists

in Warsaw! but Solidarity cells in factories and other local

enterprises also issued short newsletters.

Solidarity activists did not, however, constitute the only

source of clandestine periodicals in Poland. The publications

of other underground groups assumed somewhat greater

prominence after 1985, due at least in part to the increasingly

dim prospects for the union's revival. Nearly all of these groups

professed loyalty to Solidarity's ideals, but they also expressed

a variety of opinions that distinguish them from the Solidarity

mainstream. Three of these organizations merit particular

attention. One, known as the Committees for Social Defense

(Koinitety Obrony Spolecznej), issued a journal called KOS,

which was directed primarily toward an intellectual audience.

The Fighting Solidarity (Solida171OSC Walczaca) group published a

paper of the same name, advocating a more confrontational

stance than that favored by most Solidarity leaders. The

Confederation for an Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski

Niepodleglej), a right-of-center group that antedated Solidarity,

disseminated its strong critiques of the regime through its

journals Independence (Niepodleglosc) and We Don't Want

Commies (Nie chcemy komuny). Further, publications targeted

at specific social groups such as teachers, university students,

and medical workers also attained greater prominence.

Several clandestine publishers branched out into the production of full-length books, an effort that gave rise to greater

coordination among the underground media. In October 1986,

representatives of several underground journals formed a Social

Council for Independent Publishers. At the same time, several

publishers concentrated on books rather than periodicals

282
gppg

products, some activists called for renewed emphasis on

journals. Much of the debate centered on the role of the

Consortium of Independent Publishers, a group founded in

1986, which sought to promote greater cooperation and

minimize duplication within the underground media. Defenders

of the consortium claimed that periodicals would continue to

play a key role. In June 1986, the consortium helped found an

Independent Publishers' Insurance Fund to reimburse members

whose operations were closed by the authorities .

Leaflets, handbills, and other ephemera were also used by

the Polish opposition, but they declined significantly with the

decline in large-scale demonstrations. During the martial law

period, the underground produced leaflets in connection with

local strikes and other public protests. For example, activists

printed and distributed a small leaflet announcing the place

and time of a pro-Solidarity rally in Warsaw scheduled for May

Day 1985. Leaflets were also used to alert the populace of the

time and frequency of Radio Solidarity broadcasts. Still other

broadsheets were designed to identify and disgrace those who

cooperated with the regime during martial law. For instance,

one handbill, entitled "List of Collaborators," purported to be a

commendation from the government. The citation praised the

recipients for their assistance and contained a blank space for

insertion of the collaborators names.

Polish underground PSYOP also relied heavily upon the

dissemination of nonverbal symbols by means of mock postage

stamps and currency. In 1984, for example, the opposition

produced a series of stamps portraying dissident leaders such

as Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik. That same year, the

Solidarity organization in Krakow issued a stamp in honor of

George Orwell. During 1986, dissidents printed a set of

stamps commemorating " 150 Years of the Underground Press

in Poland." In addition, the underground produced forged

Polish currency bearing the portrait of Lech Walesa in place of

the figures who appeared on genuine banknotes. Dissidents

reportedly printed a banknote containing the likeness of Gen

Wojciech Jaruzelski and the inscription, "30 Pieces of Silver."

Crude forgeries of US currency, designed as novelty items, also

28 3
ppp

place of Benjamin Franklin's portrait.

The producers of underground publications faced a variety

of obstacles. Dissidents understandably were reluctant to

discuss openly the details of production and dissemination

techniques. Most individual publishing enterprises were

comprised of small numbers of people who strived to keep

their identities and the location of their equipment wellconcealed. Materials were first produced on typewriters using

carbon paper or on mimeograph machines but the opposition

increasingly came to rely on offset and silk-screen presses.

The printing process was itself dispersed, particular functions

being assigned to different locations. According to the

production chief, Warsaw's Tygodnik Mazowsze needed 37

apartments, 30 of which were used in preparing each issue.

Funds to acquire and maintain equipment came from publication sales, but Solidarity sympathizers abroad also collected

financial assistance and made it available. The dissemination

of underground publications necessarily involved significantly

large numbers of people and great risk. Once printed, copies

were reportedly sent to a variety of locations, where kolportery

(literally, "hawkers") collected them for delivery to subscribers.

In the case of Tygodnik Mazowsze, this led to the creation of a

huge distribution network.

The Polish government responded to underground publishing

with a curious strategy that blended harassment, repression,

propaganda attacks, disinformation, and apparent neglect.

The regime attempted to limit underground publications

through strictures on the availability of printing supplies.

Stationery shops were required to record all purchases of more

than 1,000 sheets of paper. Agents of the Security Service

(Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa) reportedly monitored such purchases

and penetrated several underground organizations. From time

to time, officials arrested individuals connected with dissident

publications. Anyone engaged in such activity could be

detained for 48 hours and fined up to 50,000 zlotys-the

amount earned by an average Pole in two months. The

authorities sometimes confiscated automobiles belonging to

distributors, presumably to hamper the latter's ability to

28 4
The regime also conducted a major PSYOP effort of its own

to discredit the underground media. This campaign contained

a variety of themes, one of which posited that underground

publications were tools of the West-especially the United

States. For example, the official press frequently claimed that

US dollars were sent to the underground to ferment unrest in

Poland. Also, infrequent factual errors in the underground

media offered opportunities for the regime to attack their

credibility. Moreover, government agents periodically engaged

in black propaganda. In some instances, portions of genuine

publications, were excised and replaced with forged texts. On

other occasions, security officials produced forgeries of entire

journals. And in still other cases, erroneous or otherwise

embarrassing information was covertly supplied to publishers

who reproduced it in good faith. For the most part, however,

underground publishers discovered and exposed such activities .

Despite governmental attempts to close them down, Poland's

underground media remained prodigious by East European

standards. True, the sheer extent of underground publishing

rendered it difficult for the regime to suppress such activity

entirely, even if Polish officials had made a concerted effort to

do so. Nevertheless, why they did not adopt even stronger

measures raises some interesting questions. It may well be

true, as one Westernjournalist suggested, that the government

could not stamp out the underground media without causing

uproar at home and making Poland an international outcast.

This consideration might have grown even greater after

Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in the USSR. The regime

might also have concluded that it could not hope to win

genuine popular support and must therefore tolerate the

phenomenon. Then, too, government officials might have

believed that the underground press allowed dissidents to vent

their frustrations in a relatively harmless manner so long as

opposition remained largely confined to the realm of theory.

The underground press criticized and challenged the

political, social, and economic status quo. During the martial

law period, dissident media served primarily to report

instances of repression and to encourage resistance among the

28 5
prisoners, endorsed strikes and demonstrations, and advocated

noncooperation with the regime (e.g., election boycotts) . When

it became apparent that direct confrontation would not bring

about the restoration of Solidarity (or other reforms), the

underground press as a whole resigned itself to a long-term

struggle with the authorities.

Underground publishing reflected a variety of political trends,

from right-wing Polish conservatism to liberal democratic

socialism. However, nearly all publications shared some

common goals. According to a report issued in early 1987 by

the Social, Council for Independent Publishers, they strived to

propagate undistorted Polish history, Poland's struggles for

independence, the postwar rule of communism in Poland, and

methods of national resistance. In this way, they hoped to

expose "ideological myths" and "propaganda falsehoods of the

communists."

In its attempts to achieve these goals, the underground

press addressed a wide range of domestic and international

issues. Violations of human rights and the absence of genuine

democracy in Poland continued to bulk large in its reportage,

but it also devoted significant attention to economic affairs in

light of the chronic shortages and debt problems that plagued

the Poles. It reflected and encouraged debates over the extent to

which dissidents might work for reform through participation

in legal organizations such as the workers' councils that were

set up following the banning of Solidarity.

Significantly, the emergence of the Freedom and Peace

Movement (Wolnosc i Pokoj), which encouraged arms reduction

and resistance to compulsory service in the Polish People's

Army, also received favorable attention from the underground

media, as did environmental issues. Particularly noteworthy was

the underground media's increased coverage of international

questions such as US-Soviet arms negotiations, Gorbachev's

apparent efforts at internal reform, and economic developments

in China. Despite glasnost and perestroika, however, the

underground media generally continued to criticize the Soviets

and praise the Americans.

The underground press clearly constituted the principal

means for the dissemination of opposition PSYOP, but

28 6
media. Radio broadcasting proved to be highly vulnerable to

jamming and to detection by the authorities, but it continued

to resurface from time to time. Dissidents with some

experience in electronics constructed ersatz transmitters and

made brief broadcasts on FM frequencies from the roofs of

large buildings. Collectively called Radio Solidarity, such

transmissions first appeared on the airwaves during April

1982, after which they were broadcast in several different cities .

Program content was necessarily limited, but broadcasts

usually addressed such current affairs as price hikes or the

significance,of historical anniversaries . In some instances,

these transmissions successfully overrode television signals in

order to convey a brief verbal message or a "still" image of the

slogan Solidarnosc ztd. fe (Solidarity lives) .

Dissident psyopsers also made good use of videocassette

recorders (VCR), audiotape recorders, and even microcomputers.

Poland contained an estimated 500,000 to 700,000 privately

owned VCRs. The NOWA underground publishing enterprise

distributed not only Western films but also videocassettes on

Polish subjects produced by the Paris-based Videoknotakt

organization. Domestic productions, such as filmed interviews

with Lech Walesa, also circulated widely. Government authorities attempted to suppress this activity-primarily by confiscations at the border-but the trade continued to flourish. The

underground also prepared and disseminated a large variety of

audiocassettes containing antiregime songs, news commentaries, interviews, and lectures on Polish history. Some of

these tapes reportedly were broadcast over factory loudspeaker

systems. Finally, several clever computer owners managed to

generate antiregime texts or games. According to an acerbic

report published in the hard-line military newspaper Zolnierz

Wolnosci (Soldier of Freedo", Western interests inspired some

programmers to create programs that promoted anticommunist

attitudes.

Despite various crackdowns by the authorities, the underground media remained a part of the Polish sociopolitical

scene. Dissidents stood in a centuries-old tradition of conspiratorial information activity, and their eagerness to utilize

modern technology rendered it virtually impossible for the

28 7
government might have decided to tolerate this situation ;

nevertheless, the opposition media in Poland provided a

real-world example of the success that can be attained

through nongovernmental PSYOP.
The Libyan Raid as a

Psychological Operation

Col Frank L. Goldstein, USAF

The use and employment of US forces in psychological

operations is a basic but little understood part of US doctrine.

The use of US forces to achieve national strategic and tactical

security objectives is the basis of PSYOP planning. Security

objectives include the influencing of friendly, neutral, and/or

enemy audiences to behave favorably or unobstructively

toward US national security. A psychological operation is any

operation that conveys selected information and indicators to

foreign individuals and groups and influences emotions,

motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of

the target audience. Such an operation should also induce or

reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior that are favorable to

US objectives. The target audience is a foreign group that may

include hostile military forces but can also be neutral or

friendly .

The stated purposes of the US raid on Libya as reported in

the press were to emphasize the cost of state-sponsored

terrorism, to damage terrorist operations, and to encourage

internal insurrection (New York Times, 5 May 1986). 1 view the

US Libyan raid as strictly a psychological operation, an

operation planned and carried out to achieve a psychological

point of view.

An analysis of the Libyan situation prior to the US raid

would have revealed the following scenario.

Was a psychological operation required? The answer

would be yes. The United States needed to influence attitudes

and behaviors concerning terrorism among enemy, friendly,

and neutral audiences, especially with Libya and Muammar

Qadhafi.

28 9
The best approach in consideration of prior attempts to

influence Qadhafi and others would be a limited tactical air

strike .

" What was the psychological situation? The psychological

situation revealed that many nations, friendly, neutral, and

enemy, were not taking seriously the US concern about statesponsored terrorism. Colonel Qadhafi had revealed himself to

have mood swings and to be susceptible to depressive

episodes. Intelligence and the media revealed that there was

underlying dissatisfaction within the Libyan government with

the current policies of Qadhafi. Additionally, the world had

just been --objected to a series of terrorist acts and appeared

receptive to such a raid.

" Would an air strike have a strategic psychological effect?

A successful air strike against Libya and Qadhafi could

produce the following: (a) notice to all nations that the US

would not tolerate state-sponsored terrorism, (b) notice to

Qadhafi that his power was not absolute, (c) notice to

anti-Qadhafi forces in Libya that the current actions of Libya

could reap dire consequences for all, (d) a reduction in

terrorist acts as Qadhafi and his forces would be forced to

regroup, and (e) additional time to get other Western nations

more involved in antiterrorist operations . On 15 April 1986,

the United States, using Air Force and Navy resources, carried

out a bombing raid on Libyan targets.

The results of that raid among enemies:

" Qadhafi instructed his operatives to deemphasize attacks

on US military targets but to look for easier US targets

(Washington Post, 4 May 1986).

" The Soviets contended that Libya's failed defense was a

failure of men, not weapons-some Libyan officers were purged.

" The absence of any promised Soviet military support and

the fact that the Soviet Union and Libya did not negotiate a

formal treaty pledging Moscow to come to Colonel Qadhafi's aid

demonstrates that the USSR was not willing to back up Qadhafi

with more than words (Christian Science Monitor, 24 April

1986).

29 0
y gg py 

" The Soviets openly questioned Qadhafi's wisdom-a high

Soviet official was quoted as saying "Khadafy is a madman on

top of a pile of gold" (Washington Post, 24 April 1986).

" Syria publicly and openly rejected the idea that Syria has

any connection with terrorist activities .

" The Soviets found themselves in a double bind: if they

helped Qadhafi too much they would drive him further away

from conservative Arab support. If they didn't help him, he might

destroy himself and the Soviet foothold in the Middle East.

Results of the raid among neutral nations:

" Sixty-five percent of the French people supported the United

States and were critical of their own government's nonsupport

(Washington Post, 24 April 1986).

" Saudi Arabia rejected a Libyan appeal for financial aid

(Washington Post, 1 May 1986).

" Several Arab nations, while delivering perfunctory denunciations of the United States, privately expressed congratulations. Two Arab countries didn't even issue any complaints

(Iraq and Tunisia). Egypt's, Oman's, and United Arab Emirates'

official responses were noticeably mild. The newspapers of

Jordan and Tunisia did not run editorials on the action (Los

Angeles Times, 27 April 1986).

" A Libyan call for an emergency Arab summit meeting

resulted in Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia stating they

would be unable to attend.

The raid's results among friends:

" There was strong support against terrorism at the Tokyo

Economic Summit.

" European allies were persuaded to take basic concerted

action against terrorism-a blow for reason as well as

deterrence (New York Times, 24 April 1986).

" Despite an initial outcry, west European countries moved

with quiet determination on four fronts : They kicked out a

number of Libyan diplomats and suspected agents, significantly increased intelligence through sharing and coordination,

29 1
much of their trade with Libya (Boston Globe, 25 April 1986).

In terms of Colonel Qadhafi's own personality, he made no

major radio, TV, or personal appearance for almost six

months. On the 16th anniversary of his expelling the US from

Wheelus Air Base, a major event in Libya to which the foreign

press was invited to hear a major speech, Qadhafi did not

appear. Fewer than 2,000 attended. Videotapes were presented,

revealing an exhausted-looking Qadhafi fidgeting in his chair,

speaking in a hoarse voice, and making a speech devoid of his

usual fiery rhetoric. This lackluster performance reinforced the

belief that' Qadhafi was slow to recover from the shock of the

15 April raid (Tune Magazine, 23 June 1986) . He began to

reappear late in August 1986 in both public and TV formats.

The raid's effect on underlying dissatisfaction within Libya

can be supported by the following comments:

Qadhari is still in control but soul-searching is under

way. He began relooking at Libyan efforts in Chad and Sudan.

Some senior Libyan leaders have talked openly about a lower

Libyan profile in terrorism (Washington Post, 4 May 1986).

" The US raid forced Qadhafi to share power with the four

members of Libya's ruling Revolutionary Council (Tune Magazine,

23 June 1986) .

" A summary of several stories can equate to the notion

that the raid may have strengthened Qadhar in the limited

sense that the masses may now not be ready to overthrow

him. However, the regular officer corps and influential citizens

may be more willing to attempt to modify his behavior.

" It should be noted that without US intervention, 10

attempts to remove Qadhar by members of his military have

occurred since 1980 (Los Angeles Times, 27 April 1986).

The reception of the raid by the countries of the world was to

some extent known before the raid and should be judged more

as action taken than in words spoken. The European allies,

recipients of most terrorist acts carried out against the West,

are always fearful of additional acts. Since the raid, there has

been unprecedented security and the sharing of antiterrorist

information. An economic summit took place in which terrorist

29 2
gg

set up by the Western allies .

The raid on Libya appears to have been extremely successful

as a psychological operation; yet it is doubtful that it was

originally planned as a psychological operation. While any

operation can have a psychological component, often that

component is not a major consideration in planning and its

effects are underestimated. If the raid had been originally

planned as a psychological operation, the attack on Qadhafi's

personal dwelling would have had to remain on the target list .

But the tactical air strike would not need to be as accurate in

a PSYOP mission. For example, the use of sonic booms and

attacks on less-defended targets would most likely have

produced the same results. However, in the final analysis, if

senior planners considered the Libyan raid as a psychological

operation, it achieved all its goals.

The Role of Military

Psychological Operations

in Support of National

Antidrug Policy

Maj James V. Keifer, USAF, Retired

War does not belong in the realm ofarts and sciences; rather

it is partAf man's social existence . . . . Politics, moreover, is the

womb in which war develops.

-Carl von Clausewitz

The United States is engaged in a war against a drug culture

that threatens to destroy the nation's social-political-economic

fabric . The war is being fought on both domestic and foreign

fronts against a culture of users and providers of illegal drugs.

The national drug control strategy targets both supply and

demand. National policy statements by Congress in the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988 and by the president's 1990 strategy

statement imply this to be a war of annihilation, but limited

two- and 10-year goals make deterrence more realistically the

objective of this strategy-deterring illegal drug use and

trafficking. The US military, as an instrument of national

policy, has been brought actively-although with definite

limits-into this engagement. To fight the war, the US military

establishment has decided-or has had decided for it-to avoid

using one of its most potent weapons: PSYOP. Ironically, the

US government believes it is important to bring other

psychological instruments on both domestic and foreign

fronts. If this country expects to achieve victory over illegal

drugs, biases against the use of US military PSYOP should be

recognized and put aside.

Is the nation truly at risk? What is the national antidrug

policy, and what are its priorities, goals, tools, and strategies?

What is the role of the US military in pursuing national

antidrug policy? How can US military PSYOP be employed to

29 5
ppgg

questions, this essay examines how our national leaders

define the threat. It also reviews recent drug policy, strategy,

goals, and objectives, concentrating on those roles in which

the military and PSYOP are most likely to become engaged.

The Threat Defined

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 221 of 1986

defines international drug trafficking as a national security

threat to the United States. With the signing of this directive,

the president placed illegal international drug trafficking on

the official agenda of the National Security Council (NSC). This

action established a requirement for the secretary of state to

coordinate, through the chiefs of missions, all drug-related

assistance, information, and activities within foreign countries.

The State Department also served as the link between Central

Intelligence and insurgency. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was assigned responsibility to collect, analyze, and

disseminate intelligence on the trade of illegal drugs. The

secretary of defense was tasked to manage military drug-related

activities, including plans, operations, intelligence support,

drug interdiction, training of foreign military counterparts, and

other related support. I

Even with the threat established, national policy and objectives were ambiguous at best. Activities reflected need for a

national mechanism to coordinate interagency efforts and to

provide expert, professional guidance. The political community

saw the need for a clear-cut policy to attack the drug problem

and put substance behind rhetoric. Things began to move-in

the terms of Clausewitz, "If war is part of policy, policy will

determine its character. As policy becomes more ambitious

and vigorous, so will war." 2

The President of the United States and the US Congress

declared war on drugs with the passing of the Anti-Drug

Abuse Act of 1988.3 This legislation established the National

Drug Control Program (NDCP) and created the Office of

National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) within the Executive

Office of the President, effective January 1989.4 William J.

Bennett was named director of ONDCP to orchestrate the

29 6
guidance, consistency, and continuity, and to resolve jurisdictional disputes.

Bennett's assignment to head ONDCP, leading a serious combined interagency effort, and to implement a comprehensive

program to fight a burgeoning social-economic-medical

problem, signaled an increased resolve in antidrug policy.

Legislation directed the ONDCP director to set policies,

objectives, and priorities for the NDCP and to provide the

annual national drug control strategy for the president's

presentation to Congress by 1 February each year. Congress

required the strategy to include both long-range goals and

short-ternt (achievable within two years) measurable objectives . Further requirements were to (1) define the balance

between expenditures for supply reduction and demand reduction and (2) submit a review of state and local government

efforts to support the program' 5

National Drug Policy

Responsible directly to the president for recommending

changes in the program's organization, management, and

budget, the director of ONDCP serves as the executive branch

representative on drug issues before Congress. He or she

coordinates and monitors the implementation, execution, and

fulfillment of the program's policies, objectives, and priorities

by designated agencies. When agencies' policies fail to meet

the responsibilities required by the national drug control

strategy, the director notifies the agency head and directs that

measures be taken to comply. The director also serves as chief

consultant to state and local governments on national drug

control matters.s

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 provided the director with

three principal subordinates: a deputy director for demand

reduction, a deputy director for supply reduction, and an

associate director to head a Bureau of State and Local Affairs.

The president was responsible for nominating appointees to

these positions . When confirmed by the Senate, they were

prohibited from simultaneously holding other federal govern297
security of the United States." 8 Disavowing proposals to

decriminalize drugs, the act went on to say that "legalization of

illegal drugs . . . is an unconscionable surrender in a war in

which, for the future of our country and the lives of our

children, there can be no substitute for total victory." 9 It then

proclaimed, "It is the declared policy of the United States

Government to create a Drug-Free America by 1995." 10

The primary executive branch departments and agencies

responsible for illegal drug supply reduction activities include

the departments of Justice, Treasury, State, Transportation,

Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Interior, and Defense;

the Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency for International

Development, the United States Information Agency (USIA),

and the United States Postal Service. Those designated as

primaries for demand reduction activities include the departments of Health and Human Services, Education, Housing and

Urban Development, Labor, and Veterans Affairs . Additionally,

the judicial system and various state and local agencies

support the NDCP activities.

As the lead federal agency for the war on illegal drug trade,

ONDCP was tasked to outline the national strategy, establish

tangible short- and long-term goals, and coordinate and monitor

those departments, agencies, and bureaus designated to take

the battle to the enemy. The office published National Drug

Strategies in September 1989 and January 1990. These

documents served as the president's reports to Congress on

the status of activities and intentions of the National Drug

Control Program. ii

Prior to establishing the ONDCP, the Executive Office of the

President had promulgated the National Drug Strategy and

Implementation Plan of 1988. This document identified six presidential goals : drug-free workplaces, drug-free schools, expanded

treatment, improved international cooperation, strengthened

drug law enforcement, and increased public awareness and

prevention. Strategy focused on reducing the supply of illegal

drugs, both grown in and imported into this country, and on

reducing the demand for illegal drugs in the United States.

The plan characterized the drug problem as multidimensional,

29 8
educational aspects. The threat was defined in terms of drug

type, production source, production increase, international

cartel control, use of high technology, increased violence, and

high-profit low-risk crime. 12 President George H. Bush, in a

September 1989 televised address to a nationwide audience,

introduced the first strategy produced by the Office for National

Drug Control Policy. His presentation outlined domestic and

foreign objectives of a multifaceted attack on illegal drugs. On

the domestic front, the president said the battle would be

fought through programs of deglamorization, education,

rehabilitation, and punishment. Foreign measures centered

around programs of eradication, interdiction, extradition, and

certification .

In his introduction to the 1989 National Drug Control

Strategy, the director acknowledged that the national policy as

articulated in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988-"it is the

declared policy of the United States Government to create a

Drug-Free America by 1995" 13-is admirable but unrealistic . 14

Bennett proposed in its place, "the highest priority of our drug

policy must be a stubborn determination further to reduce the

overall level of drug use nationwide-experimental first use,

,casual' use, regular use, and addiction alike. 15

This report from ONDCP concluded that the situation concerning illegal drugs was deteriorating rather than improving.

Crime, health, and economic factors pointed to a growing

problem. (Evidence at the time-figures showing declining

casual use-suggested that the problems were primarily

caused by addiction.) On both the foreign and domestic fronts,

illegal drugs were cited as being imminently available ; and the

problems were readily evident. Commenting on the need to put

realism into the national antidrug abuse policy statement,

Bennett charged that a de facto policy vacuum existed. He said

it was time to accept the fact that the war on drugs, to be

effective, would be protracted in both time and reach. Serious,

coordinated efforts and significant resources were needed to

get a grip on the demand for and supply of illegal drugs. 16

Saying it would lead to a national disaster, Bennett articulated

his adamant opposition to proposals for legalizing drugs.

11

299
more than mere restatement of the 1988 plan. Unrealistic goals

were rewritten and valid strategies were reorganized. The 1989

document outlined the national priorities as : (1) the criminal

justice system, (2) treatment programs, (3) education, community, and business actions, (4) international initiatives,

(5) interdiction activities, (6) research, and (7) intelligence . As

mandated by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, two- and

10-year objectives were listed . A statement on the process of

implementing the national priorities was submitted with

funding requirements. State- and local-level legislation

initiatives were proposed to add consistency to activities below

the federal level. The report articulated the importance of

comprehensive information management to the program. 18

The strategy recognized the contributions of a comprehensive information management program to the success of

the antidrug campaign. In Bennett's introduction of the

strategy, he expressed that coherent and coordinated policymaking depended upon the timely sharing of information.

"Our national policy must be to maximize the sharing and use

of relevant information among appropriate government

organizations and to minimize impediments to its operational

use."1 9 He focused on improving automated data-processing

systems and command, control, and communications (C 3)

networks. In this context, information management referred to

the intelligence function and communications systems rather

than programs to provide people with educational material or

persuasive information.

While the 1989 National Drug Control Strategy outlined

initiatives that targeted supply-side activities, no relevant

clear-cut policy statement on them was articulated. To remedy

this omission, Bennett stated in the 1990 report that "the

policy of the United States is to disrupt, to dismantle, and

ultimately to destroy the illegal market for drugs." 2 o

The 1990 National Drug Control Strategy was essentially a

continuation of the previous year's strategy. Its major goals

included (1) restoring order and security to American neighborhoods, (2) dismantling drug-trafficking organizations,

(3) helping drug users break their habits, and (4) preventing

300
the supply and demand sides of the drug problem. In addition,

the program's purpose was (1) to reduce to the maximum

degree possible illegal drug supply and availability, (2) to

provide treatment for users of illegal drugs and to actively

discourage people from becoming involved with illegal drugs,

and (3) to provide robust enforcement of drug laws by holding

traffickers, sellers, the money-laundering structure, buyers,

and users accountable. 21 National priorities for the strategy

were directed as follows :

1. strengthening the criminal justice system,

2. expanding and improving drug-treatment programs,

3. developing programs to keep illegal drugs out of education systems, communities, and the workplace,

4. pursuing international initiatives,

5. enhancing interdiction efforts,

6. building on the research agenda, and

7. coordinating the intelligence agenda. 22

Both supply and demand aspects were targeted for attack by

the criminal justice system through actions to deter the use of

illegal drugs, to disrupt the trafficking network, and to arrest,

prosecute, and punish drug criminals. The 1990 strategy

reinforced the 1989 strategy, which called for dismantling trafficking systems by apprehending and prosecuting organization

leaders and accomplices, and by taking away their illegally

acquired wealth. The goal of additionally holding buyers,

sellers, and users accountable was to make illegal drugs less

desirable, more expensive, and harder to get. 23

The Office of National Drug Control Policy recognized that

the US could not expect to unilaterally win the war against

illegal drugs. The 1989 international strategy was designed to

disrupt and dismantle the multinational criminal organizations

that support the production, processing, transportation, and

distribution of drugs to the United States and to other nations.

Building on that strategy, the 1990 programs were aimed not

only at drug-producing, transit, and consumer countries, but

also toward nations still experiencing few or no problems with

illegal drugs by helping to strengthen resolve and resistance to

30 1
were to be met.

Three near-term goals the national strategy sought to attain

in the international arena were as follows:

1 . providing support to help strengthen the political will

and institutional capabilities of three Andean Ridge countries

(Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia) by enabling them to fight illegal

drug-producing and drug-trafficking organizations in their

respective countries,

2. helping law enforcement and military structures of the

three countries to combat cocaine trade more effectively, and

3. incapacitating trafficking organizations that operate in

the three countries. To ensure understanding of and to

develop support for the measures, the 1990 strategy tasked

that "U.S. information and public awareness programs will

explain and support the attainment of the three goals outlined

above." 24

The 1990 strategy added a new dimension-the implementation of international public information initiatives to directly

support other international policies and programs. "An active

public information campaign will provide vital information to

foreign publics, leaders, and government officials to build

support for United States and host country actions to combat

drug production, trafficking, and consumption. "25 Receiving

policy guidance from the Department of State (DOS), the USIA

(with support from other federal agencies) was assigned

responsibility for coordinating and leading the international

information effort. These initiatives focused on informing

foreign audiences about the problems caused by illegal drugs

with respect to their national security, economic welfare, and

environment. International information programs were to

educate foreign audiences about the consequences of using

illegal drugs. Another initiative of the international information

program was to describe the US domestic drug problem and

the progress experienced in fighting it. 26

The 1990 National Drug Control Strategy included a

commitment to long-term research in the fields of treatment,

education and prevention, criminal justice, and drug use.

30 2
problem and a foundation for future strategies . Research

projects included these:

1 . developing enhanced databases on drug production and

consumption, and on the economic impact of drugs, including

cost/benefit analyses of programs designed to reduce drug

use;

2. developing regional and state drug-related data to improve

the analysis and accuracy of assessing drug control effectiveness ;

3. expanding domestic programs to collect information on

illegal drugs and their use ;

4. increasing scientific and technological research projects

focused on strengthening drug enforcement and interdiction

capabilities ; and

5 . increasing research into drug treatment to emphasize complications caused by addiction, acquired immunodeficiency

syndrome (AIDS), and pregnancy.

27

The intelligence agenda, designed to understand and fight

illegal drugs better, included acquisition, analysis, and

management of information. The National Drug Intelligence

Center was tasked to coordinate, consolidate, and distribute

pertinent information to appropriate agencies. Responsibility

for coordinating and overseeing drug-related intelligencegathering activities of the national foreign intelligence community was tasked to the DCI. The strategy required all

members of the nation's foreign intelligence community to

share data relevant to drug trafficking and drug-related money

laundering. This included requiring DOD's intelligence components to actively support the collection of foreign drug-related

intelligence requirements outlined in the National Drug Control

Strategy. 28

To effectively manage the National Drug Control Program,

ONDCP established coordinating mechanisms, developed

report and study requirements, and set up systemic measures

to oversee priority objectives . The Supply Reduction Working

Group, the Demand Reduction Working Group, the Research

and Development (R&D) Committee, and the Drug-Related

Financial Crimes Policy Group were created to coordinate

30 3
created within federal departments, agencies, and bureaus to

manage the organizations' internal activities and serve as

single points of contact for responding to drug issues. Lead

agencies were designated to direct, coordinate, and provide

expertise to specific activities. Management studies included

the Executive Reorganization Study, the Department of Justice

Reorganization Report, the R&D Facilities Plan, and reports on

communications and automated data-processing initiatives.

The Office for Treatment Improvement was created within the

Department of Health and Human Services to lead the federal

effort to improve the nation's drug-treatment activities. Information clearinghouses were set up in departments, agencies,

and bureaus to access data readily. The National Drug Intelligence Center was established to oversee information management. Statutes were implemented at state and local levels to

deny convicted drug offenders access to specific federal benefit

programs. A programming and budgeting system was created

within ONDCP. Model legislation on drug-free workplaces was

provided to state and local governments.

29

Information management initiatives-developing command,

control, communications, and intelligence networks-were

built on the previous year's strategy. The only notable difference

was in the change of the terms from communications to

telecommunications. The strategy again focused on upgrading

hardware, integrating systems, and providing means for secure

communications. The DOD, as executive agent for implementing

communications systems, created the Counter-Drug Telecommunications Integration Office within the Defense Communications Agency to serve as the focal point for all telecommunications activities related to the enforcement of drug policy. 30

An Assessment

Both the president (NSDD 211, 1986) and Congress (AntiDrug Abuse Act, 1988) unambiguously articulated official

positions that illegal drugs are a threat to national security.

They agreed that the political objective, elimination of demand

for and supply of illegal drugs, deserved an extensive effort

and merited significant expenditure of resources. The problem

304
declared-not the conventional sense of a military shooting

war (although blood most certainly was to be shed), but one of

police actions, economic sanctions, information activities,

social programs, and other nonmilitary means.

The enemy in this war is the drug culture-drug cartels and

drug users. The drug cartels cannot be likened to the contemporary economic entities; a cartel is a flexible system of

organizations involved in growing, producing, transporting,

distributing, selling, and money-laundering processes. High

profitability has provided them an immense resource base.

The cartels are motivated by profit rather than ideology. Users

of illegal drugs cut across the full spectrum of society, from the

homeless to professionals to influential leaders. The group

includes both casual and addicted drug abusers. Their motivations for using illegal drugs are equally diverse.

just as the war against illegal drugs is not fought against a

conventional enemy, it should not be considered an ideological

conflict. It is unlike most other political wars including the

War on Poverty waged by the Great Society during the 1960s.

Because the drug problem transcends many cultural boundaries, care must be taken to consider relevant issues such as

social, health, safety, and economic factors, and to avoid

morality issues. In seeking international cooperation, the

perception of selling American values to other countries must

be avoided. Actions and propaganda should be controlled, so

as to preclude being tagged "Yankee imperialism" or "American

hegemony."

The closest parallel we have to this war is the battle against

alcohol that took place during prohibition-a war that was lost

but that certainly compromised national objectives . Proponents

of legalization can be expected to argue the logic of prohibition

repeal in their efforts to sway the public to support such

measures. The reasons for prohibition's failure must be

understood if history is not destined to repeat itself. Care must

also be taken in arguing against legalization to avoid the

pitfalls of incomplete truths and invalid logic that cannot

stand the tests of intense scrutiny or time.

30 5
policy was to make a drug-free America by 1995, reflected

election-year rhetoric . Remarkably, the political process that

created this legislation didn't prevent the promulgation of a

generally comprehensive3l and reasonably good product-but

it did serve to dilute some of the potential it carried. While

putting together a product calculated to appeal to the American

public, members of Congress ensured that their power would

not be diminished. 32 Appropriately, the legislation directed

attacks against both supply and demand of illegal drugs . 33 It

also stressed both counterforce and countervalue strategies.

With respect to one strategy that has been suggested by somethe legalization of certain drug offenses-Congress refused to

compromise. 34 On the positive side, the single-point manager

established a mechanism for coordinating efforts and resolving

disputes. The requirement that leaders of the ONDCP not hold

any other public office kept the president from appointing

part-time people. 35 On the negative side, the political nature of

the legislation tied the effectiveness of the program to (1) its

position on the president's agenda and (2) its proximity to

election day.

Supply-side measures receive the attention of Congress, but

the trafficking of illegal narcotics isn't their exclusive target.

Prevention and treatment programs for this legislation demand

side attention. Certification requirements focus on governments of countries in which drugs are produced and through

which they transit. Measures to break up money-laundering

schemes put pressure on a shadowy support structure that

helps the cartels to reap the huge profits of their trade.

Opposition to decriminalizing illegal drugs, while supportive of

the national policy stated by Congress, will eventually generate

the requirement to produce facts from research to support this

stance.

The most notable shortcoming of the legislation is the comparatively little formal authority given the director's position,

particularly in the light of its extensive responsibilities. The

director has few immediately assigned resources and only

limited fiscal control. While Congress is expected to keep its

control over the purse, authorizing the director to manage the

30 6
position with a significant carrot for resolving turf battles.

Most of the combatants in the drug war are assigned to the

numerous supporting departments, agencies, and bureaus.

With no formal control over them, the director must resort to

convincing, persuading, or otherwise getting these supporting

elements to do the work according to plans. Resolution of

problems and conflicts tends to be a matter of Capitol Hill

politics, 36 a personality-dependent requirement ideally suited

to a person with good diplomatic skills . Disagreements of

consequence must be resolved by the president or significant

others in the Washington community. Further, few would

argue that the director's position holds stature equal to such

leaders as the secretary of state, secretary of defense, attorney

general, or national security advisor. Not a formal member of

the cabinet or the NSC, the director sits in only when the topic

of illegal drugs is on the agenda.

Articulating the national policy for demand-side measures,

Bennett's September 1989 National Drug Control Strategy

changed Congress's declaration from unrealistic (drug-free

America by 1995) to inconsequential (reduce overall level of

drug use) . Only one of the strategy's two- and 10-year goals 37

serves to measure the ultimate objective of the national policy

statement for supply reduction to destroy the illegal market for

drugs. The objectives and strategies formulated by the ONDCP

represent a significant step forward from the Just-Say-No!

domestic policy and interdiction instruments of the Reagan

administration. Recognizing the complexity of the problem, the

strategy addresses supply and demand, domestic and foreign

arenas, law enforcement and prevention and treatment

programs, counterforce and countervalue measures, and

casual use and addiction. Quantified objectives are provided to

measure some effects of the program. The two- and 10-year

goals appear to be realistically achievable, even possibly

unambitious. (Figures show a steadily diminishing demand for

illegal drugs.) Bennett's uncompromising position on decriminalization is based on emotional grounds. Research needs to

be directed to prove the validity of this position; that the effects

of the drugs themselves, rather than their criminal status,

30 7
safety decay.

The strategy outlined in the reports by ONDCP has many

strong points. It states that one strategy alone will not win the

war. Efforts to reduce the demand cannot be expected to work

without measures against supply production and vice versa.

The high profitability of drug trafficking will lead to aggressive

marketing efforts by the cartels to counteract gains of demandside programs. Interdiction efforts may thwart transportation

networks and make smugglers think twice before trafficking

the products, but cartels will fight these measures by cultivating

new markets, developing new transportation strategies and

transit rodtes for their products, and increasing rewards to

their couriers. By the same token, supply-side measures alone

can be unsuccessful. As long as drugs are available to tempt

people, a portion of the population will use them. Treatment

programs are extremely costly and none has escaped problems

with recidivism. Incarceration is likewise costly and has hardly

proved effective when not supported by other measures.

Research and development (R&D), essentially an investment

process, is the primary way this nation will come up with

different and improved ways to fight illegal drug use. It serves

as the tool for innovating new ideas and technologies. The

commitment to R&D acknowledges the long-term nature of the

war against drugs. One of the foremost obstacles the ONDCP

faces is a dearth of accurate, up-to-date information concerning

illegal drug use. Previous surveys were conducted too infrequently and were of limited or irrelevant scope. They lacked

sufficient scientific rigor to be reliable measures. This was one

of the primary factors for understated program goals of the

initial strategy published in September 1989. Funding for

databases will enable them to be expanded and updated more

frequently, increasing both the reliability and utility of the

information gathered. Some R&D projects are being designed

to improve the effectiveness of prevention and treatment

programs by helping to reduce the demand side of the

equation. Other programs are being advanced to improve

technology for detecting drugs and for systems to compile,

communicate, and coordinate information to help supplyreduction efforts.

308
g

important element of the program. Not only are bilateral

agreements needed with drug production and transit countries

to help them fight their internal enemies, but worldwide

cooperation is also an instrumental part of finding a solution

to this global crisis. Crop eradication projects will still take

place, but the program has been deemphasized because of

some counterproductive effects. (As drug-producing plants

constitute the primary cash crop in many Andean Ridge

countries, many farmers side with revolutionary factions,

creating additional problems for their governments.)

Another lgey element to the strategy is the importance given

to information, education, and publicity programs (essentially,

programs of advocacy under politically palatable titles) on both

domestic and foreign fronts. The success of information

strategies relies on communicating in understandable terms

the consequences of illegal drug activity . Some initiatives are

designed to persuade nonusers not to start, users to seek

treatment, and traffickers to cease their activities . Because

international understanding and backing are imperative to the

ultimate success of this program, other initiatives seek

support from the world community for our national objectives .

The formation of coordinating committees is another program

strength that promotes the sharing of ideas, resources, and

information. 38 These committees establish mechanisms to

prevent one agency from unwittingly doing something that

conflicts with other efforts. This initiative improves costeffectiveness and prevents potential fratricide . A notably

missing committee is one to coordinate publicity, information,

education, diplomacy, and persuasion activities of federal,

state, and local agencies.

The strategy is not without its share of weaknesses. Because

it is a long-range program, it will test the national patience of

people who are accustomed to instant gratification. This

constituency in turn will challenge the resolve of politicians

whose primary concern is their own reelection. These same

policy architects, if they don't perceive the threats-the threat

drugs pose, and threats to reelection-as imminent, will most

likely prove unwilling to commit sufficient assets over the long

run to achieve success.

30 9
pggpp

made by drug traffickers gives the impression that the

administration is still trying to win votes rather than the drug

war. This is particularly true because funding is dedicated to

supply-reduction measures. Less than one-fifth of antidrug

funding goes to prevention and treatment programs. Funding

for prevention and treatment, as well as alternative programs,

gets the short end of the stick when compared to the amount

given to the interception of smuggled goods.

The strategy for providing support to state- and local-level

government programs relies on the provision of matching

funds by the lower levels to qualify for the federal money. This

reliance depends not only on the availability of funds for these

purposes but also on political popularity. To attract popular

support to raise the taxes needed to fund these programs,

results will have to be visible with high payoffs.

The inclusion of measurable objectives is laudable, but the

selected objectives-with the noted exception of drug availability

reduction-tend to measure only the demand side of the

program. While this helps to dissuade "body-count" tactics,

these objectives fail to measure the effectiveness of component

strategies and programs.

The national policy of interrupting cartels as a departure

point to their eventual dismantling and destruction implies a

short-term goal of harassment. It serves to challenge cartels to

produce new ways to circumvent measures. The absolute

nature of the national policy-ultimately to destroy the illegal

market for drugs-represents the objective of annihilation. If

this is not wishful thinking but the true goal, then half-hearted

measures will fail in the long run.

Bringing the military into the counternarcotics strategy was

an expedient decision for the political leadership, but one the

military leadership looked upon with skepticism. The political

side saw it as a way of putting defense dollars to a tangible

use. Political reasoning generally followed this theme: while

ships and planes are out on training missions, they can be on

the lookout for drug smugglers. The military establishment

saw itself being dragged into a war with no measurable

objectives; a war that could not be won. Through appropria31 0
of the operating budget. Defining the Defense Department's

fiscal authority for 1990, Congress dedicated $450 million to

counterdrug activities. 39 This funding included $28 million for

R&D projects and $40 million for catchall expenses defined as

additional support to the Office for Drug Control Policy.4o. 41

The bulk of the spending authority, $182 million,42 was to

support interdiction in its lead role of detecting and monitoring

aerial and maritime smuggling activities. While the added

fiscal authority generated interest, the lack of significant

measures of effectiveness make military counternarcotics

activities a, readily available political and media target.

Coupled with operating restrictions, in spite of the loosening of

the posse comitatus statute, DOD resources offer more

potential than support. Its role as lead agency in the C 3 arena

should easily show more cost-effectiveness than interdiction

responsibilities when networks are completed and figures

come in.

If national objectives in the war against illegal drugs are

met, the achievement will ultimately be a psychological one.

Activities must be carried out on both domestic and foreign

fronts. They must target both supply and demand cultures,

support counterforce and countervalue measures, and address

prevention and treatment. National resolve must be communicated in clear and concise terms. Persuasion will require both

action and propaganda.

43

For political reasons and other expediencies, these messages

will have to be carried to their audiences by many different

agencies. The 1990 strategy announced campaigns to provide

information to foreign audiences. In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act

of 1988, Congress established the requirement for the Office of

National Drug Control Policy to activate a program to publicize

the penalties for violating the legislation. 44 Agency turf battles

during World War II and the American cultural distrust of the

psychological instrument led to prohibitions against the

USIA's communicating directly to a domestic target audience.

Similarly, the posse corn itatus statute and other restrictive

measures prevent US military resources from conducting ac-
therefore, must be carried out by other agencies.

In the foreign arena, the psychological dimension must be

exploited by all agencies involved in activities . Actions must be

reinforced by publicity campaigns to ensure that maximum

benefits are reaped. Successes must be underscored and

punctuated, letting others know that alternatives exist and

that consequences are in store for unacceptable behavior.

Co-opting the support of nongovernment special interest

groups is another potential role for the psychological instrument.

Informing the public of the harm illegal drugs do to the

environment, the economy, the health, and ultimately the

strength ofa nation could serve to coalesce and polarize

"watchdog" groups, directing outrage and magnifying public

opinion against cartels and their support structures. For

instance, environmental groups such as Greenpeace might

find that the rape of the Andean Ridge ecosystem is a target for

one of their campaigns. The focus of attention by television

programs such as "60 Minutes" on chemical companies that

exercise irresponsible management of precursor materials

might cause them to rethink their motives for profit and to

tighten control mechanisms.

The top echelon of the cartel structure is not invulnerable to

psychological inducements. For all their wealth, they are

virtual prisoners, unable to attain status or to travel any

appreciable distance from their fortified homesteads. Psychological initiatives can highlight and amplify the social isolation

these people face. Rivalries between cartels can be exploited,

as can rivalries between ideology-motivated revolutionary

movements and the greed-motivated cartels.

The across-the-board rejection of any form of decriminalization places an even greater demand on the psychological

dimension. Diplomacy has been described as a process of

political compromise between nations. 45 Because the drug

culture has no national identity and because compromise has

been determined unacceptable, diplomacy would seem to be

limited to securing international cooperation from nations

predisposed to strong antidrug policies . The goal is to convince

people not to use illegal drugs, to convince cartels that it isn't

in their profit-motivated interest to traffic illegal drugs, and to

312
g ggg pp

guide the psychological effort : (1) truth is the best propaganda;

and (2) words must follow action. 46

To support the first principle, the government needs to

intensify its R&D studies to come up with irrefutable reasons

not to decriminalize drugs. These studies should compare

health and safety, sociological, and economic factors upon

which illegal drugs are claimed to have an impact, comparing

states and nations that have and have not decriminalized

drugs. This type of research should then establish a mechanism

to control the impact of the criminal status of drugs. Emotional

appeals will,only have temporary effects on the behavior of their

target audiences. A comprehensive interagency campaign using

facts should be developed by a coordinating committee. Likewise,

morality inferences concerning drugs must be carefully tailored

to the morals of target cultures.

While it has been written that words are mightier than the

sword, they must be based on substance. The principle that

propaganda must follow action recognizes that the propagandist shouldn't make claims he is not willing to back up or

promises he can't keep. Credibility is ideally established

through performance of actions that serve as examples of what

may be yet to come. This performance establishes both

capability and resolve. If the government seeks to alienate

cartels from their surrounding populaces by promising to

reward and protect informants, it must be prepared to back up

its words or suffer from challenges to its resolve .

Alternatives must be either available or provided. For instance,

coca-growing campesinos cannot be expected to voluntarily

stop growing a profitable cash crop without the assurance they

will receive a reasonable price for harvesting something not

considered illegal. Likewise, others throughout the cartel

structure must see some viable way to generate an income if

they are to be induced to get out of the drug-trafficking

business.

Where then does the US military PSYOP community fit into

the equation? First and foremost by ensuring that the actions

of DOD (maritime and aerial interdiction and detection;

monitoring and developing C3 networks) are favorably

31 3
premise of following actions with words-making would-be

smugglers aware of the diminished likelihood of their success

and profit, and broadcasting the nation's resolve to stop drug

trafficking. Another role is in working with foreign counterparts

to help them master the use of psychological instruments

against illegal drugs. For countries whose military forces are

used to combat drug traffickers, US military PSYOP forces can

conduct seminars on the value of psychological operations, train

their contemporaries, and participate in bilateral exercises to

hone skills. For those countries whose enforcement agencies are

civilian, US military forces can support USIA programs of

assistance.

Direct measures to communicate with foreign civilian populaces, while not out of the scope of possibility, are more appropriately the responsibility of the USIA. That doesn't preclude a

military PSYOP role but suggests coordination of ideas, information, and efforts . This role can be particularly important

because the lead agency suffers from a significant funding

lack, given its responsibility to execute the national strategy.

If the US government is to destroy the market for illegal

drugs successfully, the psychological dimension will be a

significant factor . Military PSYOP resources can contribute to

achievement of the national objectives, but only if they are

allowed to be used. To that end, institutional biases will have

to be broken. Ironically, such a breaking of biases is a psychological phenomenon. This process will include overcoming

Western cultural fears of manipulation, resolving interagency

turf battles, motivating the military establishment to consider

nonlethal weapons, and educating the members of the media.

These audiences must be made to understand that psychological activities are amoral,47 that they support national

policy, and that advances in technology have made far-reaching

communications faster and stronger.

Dyer states the need for a national college to educate leaders

on the nature of the instrument and how it helps them to

implement policy. 48 The public, he says, "must be educated on

what these activities are and how they contribute to functioning

of the government." 49 Within the military community, education

on the psychological dimension needs to be expanded. In

31 4
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort

Bragg, North Carolina, blocks of instruction should be

included in service academies and in professional military

education courses at all levels. The Defense Information

School at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, should include

psychological operations orientation in its military public

affairs training curricula . Select members of the media should

be invited to attend military orientation courses.

Bennett resigned from his position as director, commenting

that he had accomplished what he had set out to do.

Acknowledging that the war was not yet won, he offered that

indicators were showing great promise. 50 His abrupt departure

provided focus on a national program whose status was being

subordinated by events in the Middle East. The war is still far

from over, and it will not be over until the national policy is

achieved or rescinded. While national policy is likely to

undergo redefinition, particularly as accurate and up-to-date

information enhances the nation's databases, rescission is

unlikely. Changing peoples' attitudes, opinions, and behavior

will be a long-term psychological process-a process to which

the military PSYOP community has much to offer. The sooner

political and military leaders recognize this, the sooner the

problem will be resolved.

Notes

1 . Betac Corporation, Department of Defense Counterdrug Baseline Report (21 July 1989), 2-10 through 2-11.

2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans . Michael Howard and

Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J . : Princeton University Press, 1976), 606.

3. US Congress, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Public Law 100-690, 100th

Cong., 18 November 1988. Sec. 4801 states that problems caused by illegal

drugs pose a threat to the national security of the United States .

4. Ibid., Title 1, Subtitle A, sec. 1002, 102 Stat. 4181.

S. Ibid .

6. Ibid., Title 1, Subtitle A, sec. 1003, 102 Stat. 4182-83.

7. Ibid., Title 1, Subtitle A, sec. 1002, 102 Stat. 4181.

8. Ibid., Title N, Subtitle 1, sec . 4801, 102 Stat. 4294.

9. Ibid., Title V, Subtitle A, sec. 5011, 102 Stat. 4296.

10. Ibid., Title V, Subtitle F, sec . 5251, 102 Stat. 4310.

31 5
13 . Public Law 100-690, Title V, Subtitle F, sec. 5251, 102 Stat. 4310.

14. Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy

(Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1989), 9.

15. Ibid., 8.

16. Ibid., 1-4.

17. Ibid., 9.

18. Ibid ., 43-44, 84-90, and 131-36.

19. Ibid ., 93-97.

20. Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy

(Washington, D.C . : Government Printing Office, 1990), 1 (hereafter cited as

ONDCP 1990 Strategy) .

21 . Ibid., 1-?.

22. Ibid., 12-85.

23 . Ibid., 12-27.

24. Ibid., 51 .

25 . Ibid., 59.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., 74-81 .

28 . Ibid., 82-85.

29. Ibid., 107-16.

30. Ibid., 123-28 .

31 . One hundred eighty-seven pages detailing everything from American

Indian cultural exceptions to penalties for the use of firearms in conjunction

with a criminal drug offense.

32. Congressional oversight committees provided the director power to

influence but not control their agencies' activities .

33. Public Law 100-690, Title V, Subtitle F, sec. 5251, 102 Star . 4309.

34. Ibid., Title V, Subtitle A, sec. 5011, 102 Star. 4296; and Title VI,

Subtitle F, sec. 6201, 102 Stat . 4359.

35. Probably most noteworthy, the vice president, the office that ran this

program under the Reagan administration, is excluded.

36. Capitol Hill gamesmanship is well covered by Morton Halperin s Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C. : Brookings

Institution, 1974).

37. ONDCP 1990 Strategy, respective 10 and 50 percent reductions in

drug availability, 120.

38. ONDCP 1990 Strategy, 107-16.

39. Defense Authorization Act for 1990-1991, 103 Stat. 1562, Public

Law 101-89,29 November 1989, Title XII; and Public Law 101-65,21 November 1989, Title VII; Stat . 1128 .

40. Ibid., sec, 1 ?n5

1 Th; d1 . . sec. 1202 .

42. Ibid ., sec. 1204.

31 6
Action demonstrates capability and resolve; propaganda communicates and

intensifies the actions' effects.

44. Public Law 100-690, Title V, Subtitle A, sec . 5011, 102 Star . 4296.

45 . Martin Wright, PowerPolitics, ed. Hedley Ball and Carsten Holbraad

(Leicaster, U.K. : Leicaster University Press, 1978), 27.

46. From premises outlined by Dyer in chap. 2.

47. Dyer claims they "cannot make the necessary decisions . . . only

explain and interpret them," 213 .

48 . Ibid., 187-90.

49 . Ibid., 199.

50. The price of cocaine had risen sharply and street supplies were

down.

Political-Psychological

Dimensions of

Counterinsurgency

Gen Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Retired

This paper concentrates on the psychological aspects of

conflict because the psychological dimension deserves discrete

treatment as the least appreciated dimension-and the least

employed-by the United States and most of its allies. Conflicts

erupt among groups of men, nations, or coalitions of nations

from collision of aims or objectives for which the antagonists are

prepared to fight and die. The conflict ends, at least temporarily,

when one side makes the decision that there is more to be

gained-or less to be lost by allowing the antagonist to prevail.

The side that desists has simply lost the will to continue the

conflict.

An adversary's will can be eroded and broken in a number of

ways: by military force (the application, or threat of application,

of violence) ; by economic strangulation ; by loss of external

support; by apathy ; and by military defections. Normally, it

takes a combination of these to bring about an adversary's

calculus that the ",jig is up." Sometimes, one master stroke will

suffice. Hopefully, nations can resolve the issue without the

application of military force. To win without fighting, in the

words of Sun Tzu, is "the acme of generalship." Any political

leader or military commander should accomplish the mission

in the most expeditious fashion and at minimum human cost.

The term psychological warfare (psywar), for all its shortcomings, succeeds in combining two meaningful subjects,

both as old as man. Certainly, it is better than psychological

operations which, as my mentor Paul Linebarger once said,

leaves the issue entirely neutral. Psychological warfare seeks

to achieve the objective where military force is unavailable or

31 9
minimize expenditures while maximizing effects .

The Old Testament's "Book of Judges" provides one of the

earliest and most effective examples of psychological warfare.

Gideon-an imaginative fellow-and his troops were on the verge

of being annihilated by a Midianite force of vastly superior

strength. The Midianites were encamped in preparation for

decisive assault on the morrow. But Gideon had an

inspiration: Since the basic fighting unit of all armies in the

thirteenth century B.C. was a 100-man formation, each with

one trumpeter and one torch bearer, he reckoned he could

create the impression of a 30,000-man force with 300 men

properly equipped. Gideon selected 300 men and provided

each with a lamp, a water pitcher, and a trumpet (we are not

told where he found the extra trumpetsl). At nightfall, he had

the 300 light their lamps (which were placed inside the

pitchers so as to hide their light) and deploy at designated

intervals around the Midianite camp. On his signal, they all

broke their pitchers, lighting up the perimeter, and blew madly

on their trumpets. The Midianites were startled out of their

sleep and their wits. They fought among themselves, then gave

up and retreated. (The Hebrew chronicler gives credit for this

to the Lordl)

Gideon's deception is not an isolated example, as any serious

student of ancient military history can confirm. Psychological

warfare seeks to persuade by nonviolent means. By its very

nature, psychological warfare is open-ended ; it defies an

accurate all-encompassing definition. The best descriptoralthough by no means all-inclusive-is propaganda, which

unfortunately, has severe political handicaps on the American

domestic scene. It ought not be in such disrepute ; after all, it

derives from the name of that department of the Vatican Curia

which had the duty of propagating the faith. Propaganda is

simply the planned use of any form of communication

designed to affect the minds, emotions, and actions of a given

group for a specific purpose. This is precisely the aim of what

we see on the television screen at all-too-frequent intervals-a

field of endeavor in which the United States is preeminent.

So, psychological warfare is really not all that esoteric or

mysterious. Whether in support of the national security or for

320
aim or purpose, a well-defined target audience, a credible

message, and a reliable means of communication or dissemination. Gideon met these criteria in spades. His aim was to

demonstrate that he had been greatly reinforced; his target

audience was the immediately opposing army; the established

rules of counting made his message credible; and the light and

noise ensured that the message was received. To be sure, it

is rarely that easy ; or as quickly mounted; or as clearly

measurable.

The American View of Psychological Warfare

The psychological weapon has never been accepted as a permanent instrument of national security policy by the executive

branch, the Congress, or the American people. Its use, under

various names, has been supported as an essential expedient

only in periods recognized as war. To be sure, in the early days

of the cold war, there was considerable enthusiasm for institutionalizing a national structure and capability to exploit international communications as a psychological tool in furtherance

of national policy.

The concept was never implemented, due in part to substantial differences within the executive branch about the

value and propriety of this genre of activities . These differences

precluded the enunciation of an integrating doctrine and the

necessary coordination of departmental programs. In greater

part, however, the failure to implement was due to the

American character, which is at once idealistic and pragmatic,

distrustful of political intrigue, and impatient for quick

solutions. These traits are reinforced by the rather simplistic

and innocent view of the world that most Americans have.

For these reasons, instances of US attitudinal readiness-and

US capabilities-to engage in psychological warfare have been

rare, coinciding with the two world wars. Those efforts were

indeed national because the target audience conspicuously

included the American public itself. But while psychological

operations in the two world wars (particularly the British in

World WarI) provided important support, they were not

32 1
militarily, with political and psychological assistance.

Wars of national liberation reverse the weighting of factors.

They are fought politically and psychologically, with the

assistance of military capabilities. They integrate political,

psychological, social, and military aspects to exploit national

vulnerabilities, erode all national institutions, and support an

eventual insurgent takeover. Their choice of weapons puts a

conventional high-technology force at a disadvantage. The

psychological challenge is explicit in the hallmarks of the

insurgent force: its tight, inner political structure; the strong

motivation of all ranks; the ability to find concealment within

the civil population; and identification with one or more

popular causes.

Past Experience in Counterinsurgency

The wars of national liberation that have erupted in the

third world over the past four decades document the crucial

role of the psychological weapon in determining the final

outcome. Not all involved the United States, even indirectly;

but all were replete with useful lessons for those perceptive

enough to appreciate and assimilate them. In those instances

where the United States was in some way engaged, its record

in exploiting the psychological dimension is uneven. Two

examples will serve to support this judgment.

The Philippine government campaign against the Huks in

the early 1950s stands as a model of the imaginative employment of psychological warfare, strategically and tactically. The

charismatic and insightful Secretary of National Defense,

Ramon Magsaysay (who was later to become president), and a

small cadre of exceptionally gifted US advisors, achieved

spectacular success in arresting the momentum of the insurgency and then breaking its back with a wide-ranging series of

programs which integrated military, political, and psychological actions. Most of the ideas and initiatives were conceived

by the advisors, but-and this is important-the detailed

planning, the message content, and the operational execution

were all Filipino .

322
guerrillas was to deprive them of support within the rural

population and to swing that support to the government. He

also recognized that the soldier was the most visible symbol of

government in the countryside and that the government would

be judged by the actions of its soldiers .

As a first order of business, therefore, Magsaysay set about

reindoctrinating the entire Philippine army. Its multiple roles

were protector of the people, guerrilla fighter, and contributor

to the morale and welfare of the civil population. He made this

indoctrination meaningful by promoting only those who were

demonstraply effective ambassadors of good will and were also

effective combat soldiers. He provided rations for the troops

that were adequate not only for their own consumption, but

also for donations to villagers in dire need, and he made

extensive use of medical and engineer personnel for civic

actions of the most basic sort. Finally, Magsaysay established

a "hotline" to his immediate office for complaints about troop

malperformance and a staff to immediately investigate those

complaints in the field, convincing one and all that he was

serious about making the army a credible symbol of good and

caring government.

Every effort was made to publicize, nationwide, the new

order in the army and what was being accomplished thereby.

To accomplish this, Magsaysay used press releases, unit

newspapers for troop consumption (and for subsequent

distribution to local civilians), movies of operations and civic

actions (for showing in remote areas by civil affairs officers),

and traveling road shows. Programs to win the support of

civilians were complemented by others directed at the insurgents themselves.

One such program provided surrenderees (and even those

who had been captured) the wherewithal to start life anew for

self and family : substantial acreage in a resettlement area and

a loan of building materials, tools, food, and seed. This program stimulated many surrenders, but its indirect effect was

even greater. Much of the population had supported the

guerrillas because their avowed motive was to gain "land for

the landless." When it became apparent that the objective

32 3
A second program involved liberal rewards for the death or

capture of Huk leaders who were brought in or killed by their

own comrades. The principal values of this program lay in

widening the gulf between civilians and guerrillas, and in

heightening hostilities within the guerrilla ranks. Accompanying these major programs were more specifically targeted

initiatives: appeals from mothers to their guerrilla sons;

rumors to destroy the credibility of those politicians who were

deliberately obstructing the Magsaysay programs; widespread

distribution of posters exposing Huk leaders as criminals

wanted for documented murder, kidnapping, and rape; and

exploitation 'of native superstitions.

The concomitant of steadily increasing popular support for

the government-as symbolized by the army in the field-was

better intelligence and more effective operations against the

guerrillas . By 1953, the insurgency was no longer a menace to

the national security of the Philippines.

What lessons can be drawn from the significant contribution

of psychological warfare to the success of the Philippine

counterinsurgency campaign? One is that Magsaysay had his

priorities right. In most third world countries, the soldier in

the field is the embodiment of the government. His conduct

will determine the nature of the relationship between the

population and the government in rural areas. The soldier

must therefore be made the most useful symbol possible,

demonstrating the moraljustification for government. It is a

nondelegable command responsibility, at all levels, to ensure

this .

Another is that several factors combined to swing popular

support to the government through actions of the Philippine

military:

1 . leadership and command emphasis (notably including

careful indoctrination of the soldier) ;

2. a dedicated element in each headquarters to plan and

supervise implementation ;

3. psywar programs carefully tailored to the attitudes and

needs of the groups at whom targeted; and

324
empathy, and passion for anonymity to gain and maintain

access to the decision makers.

No one spent any time attempting to define boundaries of, or

responsibilities for, conduct of psychological operations . It was

everybody's business to support the overarching aims : develop

confidence in the government and render the insurgency futile .

This was achieved by the remarkable integration of concrete

and useful actions, increasingly effective field combat operations,

and support from information/psywar initiatives.

Vietnam was an entirely different story. There was an illuminating exchange between Col Harry Summers and a North

Vietnamese officer in Hanoi during the prisoner of war exchange

negotiations in 1973. Summers made the point that the

American army had never been bested in battle to which the

response was "Quite true, but that is totally irrelevant." The

communists' political and psychological campaigns were

decisive-on the international scene, within the American

body politic, and in-country. The tragedy is that our failure to

mobilize international and domestic support for the Nicaraguan

Freedom Fighters mirrored our Vietnam experience in those

key arenas.

A comprehensive and authoritative account of psychological

operations in Vietnam has yet to be compiled. When accomplished, it will record some brilliant successes at the tactical

level and some failures at the strategic level. The latter

included an inability to cope with the impact of modern mass

communications (history's first televised war) ; the lack of

psychological/ political actions to condition audiences and

establish context for major military activities as, for example,

the invasion of Cambodia; inability to erase the perception that

it was our war, not a South Vietnamese war; and ineffectiveness of advice and resources devoted to aid the government

of South Vietnam to make its case, improve its image, and enhance its performance on and off the battlefield. Responsibility

for these failures did not rest solely-or even predominantlywith Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO). It was shared

with the political and military leadership in Washington and

in-country, with United States Information Agency (USIA)

32 5
ambivalence about the merits of psychological warfare and its

role therein, and with a military educational system that failed

to inculcate in all ranks the fundamental tenets of

counterinsurgency.

This evaluation in no way denigrates the dedication of the

JUSPAO leadership and members. And, in all fairness, even

programs of heightened impact would not have resulted in a

different final outcome. Psychological warfare can enhance

political, social, and military programs ; but if those programs

are seriously deficient, it cannot erase their faults.

The differences between the Philippine and Vietnamese

experiences acre dramatic.

" In both cases, the key objective was to win the support of

the population. In Vietnam, that objective was not achieved.

Admittedly, the Vietnamese government faced much more

difficult challenges, explicit in a more numerous, better

organized, more deeply imbedded, and more highly motivated

opposition .

" Unlike in the Philippines, psywar personnel in Vietnam

did not have direct and continuing access to the top political

and military leadership or to the high-level planners. A number

of first-class research projects, which were developed by social

scientists, political psychologists, and cultural anthropologists,

constituted guidelines for effective psychological initiatives.

For the most part, these projects were simply filed .

" The Philippines' psychological programs were indigenous

in content and means of communication. In Vietnam, impatience

(to which short tours contributed) stimulated the Americans to

do too much themselves. Not only was this conceptually

wrong, it was also operationally ineffective because most of the

Americans involved had no more appreciation of the political

and cultural realities of Vietnam than we did of Lebanon in

1983.

Prospects for the Future

As the decade of the sixties ended and that of the seventies

began, many observers believed that the United States would develop a comprehensive and prudent doctrine for psychological

32 6
no choice but to do so. Some even thought there would be

extensive research to determine the most efficient and effective

methods of applying psychological techniques and weapons.

Alas, it was not to be! The United States is still without the

requisite national doctrine. Worse yet, there is less acceptance

of the legitimacy of psychological warfare as a tool of statecraft

by the State Department and the USIA than was the case in

1970. There has been scant modification of the long-held view

that the conduct of psychological operations is an exclusively

military task-appropriate in war, but deplorable in peace. The

recognition has not dawned that such activities are fundamental to effective counterinsurgency efforts and must be

primarily conducted by non-DOD agencies.

There have been some modest advances under the current

administration. In 1984, a landmark National Security Defense

Directive (NSDD) established international communications as

a major instrument of national security policy and assigned

specific tasks to executive departments and agencies. Only one

section dealt with psychological operations-and then solely in

a military context. It directed the revitalization of the armed

forces' capabilities to conduct such activities in support of

military operations in crisis and in war. Typically, the NSDD

did not establish any effective interagency mechanism for

orchestrating and coordinating the various international

communication capabilities.

Using the NSDD as leverage, the secretary of defense directed

the preparation of a Psychological Operations Master Plan

(which he subsequently approved in toto). Its purpose was to

remedy the deficiencies that had developed since Vietnamdeficiencies in force structure, operational concepts, planning,

research, training, intelligence support, personnel programs,

and understanding the potential of psychological operations as

a military force multiplier. The plan included these important

actions :

I . JCS development of a comprehensive joint doctrine to

cover employment to strengthen deterrence, in crisis and in

war, as the foundation of the revitalization effort;

32 7
;

3. functional separation of special and psychological operations at staff and organizational levels, formally recognizing

that the latter is inherent in all military activity across the

spectrum of conflict;

4. reindoctrination of the officer corps through appropriate

instruction within the mainstream service school systems and

including psychological operations in training exercises;

5. modernization of equipment and force structure; and

6. most significant of all, the phased development of a joint

Psychological Operations Center as the font for doctrine and

conceptualisation, for the direction of research and analysis,

for planning support of the unified and specified commanders,

and for assistance to the secretary and the chairman in

developing defense positions on national psychological plans

and campaigns.

It will take much hard work and continued command

prodding to see these initiatives through to fruition. Absent an

institutionalized mechanism at the national level, the

psychological dimension of contingency planning is handled

on an ad hoc, fragmented basis. DOD has repeatedly urged the

establishment of a national psychological operations committee, which would, inter alia, do detailed planning for the

marshaling and orchestration of all government and quasigovernment communication capabilities in support of military

contingency plans or external crises short of direct military

involvement.

It is understood that the concept of the committee has been

approved in principle, but has not been activated due to the

strong reservations of the USIA. Conceivably, the congressionally mandated Board for Low-Intensity Conflict at National

Security Council (NSC) level will provide impetus for the

interagency psychological operations structure as an essential

adjunct for sound planning.

Meanwhile, one Army unit (the 4th PSYOP Group) strives

valiantly to plug the national gap. It has produced excellent

how-to-do-it plans for focusing all relevant national capabilities

in support of several countries under threat. The professionalism

32 8
national security community. Both the groups planners and

its colleagues on the ground can take much credit for the

improvements that were wrought in the Salvadoran army.

Clearly, we are ill-prepared for the psychological dimension of

the next major counterinsurgency that will engage the United

States. The guidelines for enhancing performance are the

major lessons gleaned from our past experience .

The first guideline--a truism meriting underscoring-is that

the message communicated must be indigenous in content and

in execution, leastwise within the confines of the supported

country. The United States will have major tasks in ensuring

political support for a beleaguered country on the international

scene and here at home. In-country, the burden will fall on the

shoulders of a few carefully chosen and highly qualified

individuals who will operate in an advisory role, either formally

or informally . The proportions of civilian and military advisors

must be aligned to the structure of the host government; and

while under the general supervision of the chiefs of the US

Diplomatic Missions, they must work with and for their foreign

colleagues.

Collectively, the US advisors must have a profound knowledge

of the country-its culture, its customs, its political and social

substructures, and the characteristics of its population. To

ensure that depth of confidence, the group must be reinforced

by-or be able to draw on the support of-the expertise of

sociologists, clinical psychologists, and cultural anthropologists. They must, of course, be equally well informed

about all aspects of the insurgency, its operating methodologies, its motivations, and its vulnerabilities. The challengea cross-cultural one-to those advisors will be to help the

supported government shape and articulate value-based themes

to which the population can relate. They must then ensure

that all actions of the government and its personnel are

consistent with-and reinforce-those themes.

A second, closely related guideline is to eliminate the

mind-set that the practice of psychological warfare is the

province of odd fellows steeped in the occult. To be sure, there

are pressing requirements for full-time specialists and dedicated

(albeit all-purpose) equipment. But these requirements deal

32 9
insurgency: the detailed target research and analysis within

both the native population and the insurgent structure;

analysis of, and counters to, insurgent propaganda ; and the

offensive against the insurgents to confuse, confound,

exacerbate vulnerabilities, and induce defections.

That sector aside, psychological operations (how badly we

need other terminologyl) do not have a separate compartment.

They may at times be a part of public affairs, civic action, troop

information, civil affairs, public diplomacy, humanitarian aid, or

political action. As exemplified by the campaign against the

Huks in the 1950s, everyone can and should aid in the

psychological' enhancement of all programs to gain and maintain

the allegiance and support of the target audience : the population

itself. The sine qua non for attainment of that objective are

concrete programs that are sound in design, sound in content,

and professionally implemented.

The complementary-usually crucial-task is to multiply the

impact of those programs and underscore the relevance of

those programs to national aspirations. Completion of this

task will require unceasing exploitation of every medium of

communication, from ensuring the proper deportment of

soldiers in face-to-face contact with villagers to sending

traveling shows throughout the countryside to presenting

sophisticated TV programs.

Conclusion

My advocacy of the extraordinary importance of the psychological dimension at any level of conflict notwithstanding, I am

not sanguine about our government's capacity to exploit this

nonintrinsic instrument of national power (or, indeed, even to

comprehend its potential for enhancing national security).

Most worrisome is the failure to recognize-let alone take

measures to counter-psychological and political warfare

waged against our policies with the intent to undermine them;

here, the cost of inaction is real and heavy. The stark fact is that

the American public, the media, and even the bureaucracy,

are generally oblivious to the scope and sophistication of this

genre.

33 0
still ongoing) psychological warfare campaign. It was carefully

orchestrated, replete with misinformation, and aided and

abetted by our own gullible media. The Sandinista regime in

Nicaragua had similar success. Thanks almost exclusively to

the efficacy of its propaganda, there was more active support

among the American public for the Sandinista regime than for

the freedom fighters that our own government backed. Awareness that the integrity of our own political and decision-making

base is under threat should lead to actions that would expose

and neutralize our adversaries' efforts. Hopefully, such awareness will stimulate utilization of psychological and political

warfare initiatives to further the positive goals of American

foreign policy.

The Psychological Dimension

of the Military Element

of National Power

Maj James V. Keifer, USAF, Retired

War does not belong in the realm of arts and sciences; rather

it is part of man's social existence. . . . Politics, moreover, is the

womb in which war develops.

If war is part ofpolicy, policy will determine its character. As

policy becomes more ambitious and vigorous, so will war.

-Carl von Clausewitz

The six-month Persian Gulf War, popularly called the OneHundred-Hour War, recently took us through the continuum

of the policy process. Economic sanctions were applied by a

world community united with a degree of resolve seldom seen;

but because these actions take time, and time favored Saddam

Hussein, they were never given the opportunity to prove their

effectiveness. Through diplomacy, essentially a governmentto-government process of negotiation and compromise, the

political leaders of the world tried to defuse the situation.

Because both sides held nonnegotiable positions, with no

room for compromise, the prospects for a diplomatic solution

were nonexistent. Diplomacy did, however, play an instrumental

role in uniting coalition forces. Was a peaceful resolution out

of the picture? It evidently wasl

While the political and economic elements of national power

played out their hands, two others came to the forefront. These

were the military and the psychological elements. These two

elements, working together, seemed to constitute our best

opportunity for a peaceful resolution; and after failing to

achieve a peaceful solution, these two elements worked

together to enable us to win, win quickly, and win with the

least possible bloodshed and destruction.

33 3
itself, not at all. However, with the psychological element . . . ?

At the turn of the century, under Theodore Roosevelt's motto,

Walk Softly and Carry a Big Stick, the United States practiced

a policy called gunboat diplomacy. We built a reputation for

"sending in the Marines" to achieve our national objectives .

After a while, all we had to do was steam a ship to the coast ;

through intimidation, we achieved our objective.

Turning now to the recent Gulf conflict, we hoped to persuade Saddam Hussein to unconditionally withdraw from

Kuwait through our military buildup in the Middle East. We

felt that qur recent excursions to Libya, Grenada, and Panama

would certainly have impressed upon Saddam that we had the

ability and resolve to settle the score militarily. And part of the

psychological factor was Saddam's knowledge that his forces

were equipped with hardware that was no match for our

high-tech weapon systems. Another psychological factor was

that, while Saddam didn't mind sending tens of thousands of

Iraqis to martyrdom, he had no intention of becoming a martyr

himself. The world community isolated Saddam and communicated unity on the issue through strategic psychological

operations. Through theater PSYOP, we tried to convince him

that it wasn't worth the cost to fight for a losing cause. Unfortunately, Saddam wasn't convinced; and neither were the

Tikritis who supported him.

The psychological dimension played an important role in

limiting the loss of lives and property. On the field of battle, we

wanted to face an enemy who was unsure about his cause and

capabilities but sure about his impending doom; an enemy

who, even if unwilling to surrender, had little will to engage in

combat. Through tactical PSYOP, we hoped to convey to the

Iraqi military the futility of their position; we succeeded.

In the Middle East, the Andean Ridge, the Philippines, and

throughout the world, the psychological dimension plays an

important role in the achievement of national objectives. It

serves the same purpose, and can be likened to, the aggressive

marketing campaigns of Madison Avenue ; that is, to affect the

behavior of a target audience. Where Madison Avenue sells

products and services, psychological operations sell ideas and

ideology.

334
make use of psychological tools during peacetime as well as

during war. Activities are organized at two levels: international

(we call these publicity, public diplomacy, and psychological

operations) and in-country (we call these publicity, public

relations, and public affairs). i

The use of any and every element of national power carries

with it psychological effects. 2 To this end Murray Dyer wrote,

"the highest levels of government now recognize that in any

decision on national policy there are psychological factors that

must be taken into account." 3 He cited the psychological

dimension's cutting across departmental boundaries as the

reason for an ongoing turf battle between the Department of

Defense and the Department of State for control of the

psychological instrument. 4

The term national power describes the ability of a nation to

influence other nations. 5 Deterrence, a fundamental national

security objective of the United States for years, is essentially a

psychological phenomenon. 6 Potential enemies perceive the

cost of attack to be far greater than any possible gains. The

assessment is based on the perception of this country's capabilities and resolve. Military psychological operations reinforce

this perception by clarifying and repeating it. Edward N.

Luttwak says it is an important message-one that must be

communicated across the range of social and economic

classes.?

Ronald D. McLaurin, author of Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations, says that the reason for much

of America's diplomacy and policy, both actions and words, is

specifically to influence the behavior of other governments.

8

Martin Wright distinguishes diplomacy from propaganda :

Diplomacy is the attempt to adjust conflicting interests by negotiation

and compromise: propaganda is the attempt to sway the opinion that

underlies and sustains the interests . Conversion therefore undercuts

the task of compromise. 9

How does the military element of national power support the

psychological dimension? One fundamental foreign policy

objective is to concentrate and optimize power. Other things

equal, a nation that can back up its policies with coercive force

holds a distinct advantage over less-capable nations. The

33 5
Luttwak states that power, the influence of one state over

others, may be measured in terms of the perception of the

audience. To be effective (powerful), perceptions are precisely

what foreign policy must affect. 10 The projection of US military

power is often used as a force of political persuasion. 1 i Such

activities as port visits, bilateral exercises, firepower demonstrations, and special deployments help project power, as does

the high-technology aura of US military hardware. Propaganda

can be used effectively to reinforce and intensify these

measures, but it must be carefully crafted to prevent counterproductive perceptions.

How, then, do psychological operations support strategic

military objectives? The ability of nations to gather information,

and to assess and interpret its relevance, isn't equal; what is

perceived can be quite disparate from reality. With effects

multiplied by differences in culture, experience, and expertise,

the gap between perception and reality-misinterpretations-can

lead to the misunderstanding of intentions, problems in resolving

differences, and other dangerous situations.

12 Psychological

operations bridge the gap.

If psychological operations are so important, why do they

carry the stigma that seems to be attached? In the foreword to

Political Warfare and Psychological Operations : Rethinking the

U.S. Approach, Bradley C. Hosmer, president of the National

Defense University, observed that "the negative connotations

in the West of the word propaganda suggest we have treated

political war as incompatible with democratic values and

traditions." Frank R. Barnett, in the afterword to the same

book, expressed also that "some would argue that the ethics of

democracy preclude too strenuous a concern with propaganda."

These statements unmasked American cultural bias toward

the terms propaganda and psychological operations. Dr Carries

Lord, in "The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy,"

also noted this phenomenon:

Manifest or latent in the attitudes of many Americans toward the practice

of psychological-political warfare is a distaste for any sort of

psychological manipulation or deception. The idea that

psychological-political warfare is a black art that can be morally

justified only under the most extreme circumstances is a derivative of

33 6
assuming that some such element is inseparable from effective

psychological-political operations, the moral calculus is by no means

as clear as is frequently made Out . 13

The American attitude toward fair play reflects a disaffection

for the use of any psychological manipulation. Gen Robert C.

Kingston, commenting on "Political Strategies for Revolutionary

War," by Richard H. Shultz, Jr., attributes this apprehension

to past abuses of psychological tools by totalitarian regimes:

"Many people in this country think that psychological operations equate to the Big Lie, suggestive of Goebbels and Hitler,

and that we should not use it." 14 The late Gen Richard G.

Stilwell, USA, Retired, provided comments on the institutional

reluctance to consciously resort to perception for influencing

activities. "The psychological weapon (and the political premises

which govern its employment) have never been accepted as a

permanent instrument of national security policy by the Executive Branch, the Congress, or the American people." 15 Cultural

will, readiness, and the ability to conduct psychological

operations have tended to surface only during wars. Ironically,

it has been during wartime that the American public has

become a primary target audience for national nonmilitary

psychological operations .

Dr Lord credits the American media with helping to intensify

cultural biases of the public through implications that underhanded objectives or purposes constitute the basis for such

activities. He notes that claims of disinformation or public lies

are often attached to media comments on psychological

activities.

Dr Lord writes that the employment of psychological tools is

further hampered by systemic weaknesses of the bureaucracy.

From the top, he says, inadequate strategic planning and decision

making prevent PSYOP from being considered, much less employed. The US diplomatic, military, and intelligence establishments distrust and resist any use of political-psychological

warfare. Dr Lord charges that the State Department hasn't

changed its diplomatic techniques in 200 years, ignoring the

shrinking of the world brought about by dramatic advances in

communications technology.

16

33 7
both similar to and different from those of State, military

leaders have likewise tended to overlook the value of the psychological dimension, particularly outside tactical applications :

The military services, in their preoccupation with technology, major

weapon systems, and the big war, tend to neglect low-cost approaches

to enhancing operational effectiveness, especially at the lower end of

the conflict spectrum; and they tend to regard political-psychological

warfare as someone else's business . 17

Even the PSYOP community itself has struggled with its name

for years, proposing such terms as perception management,

public diplomacy, political communication, influence operations,

and international information. In his article "By Any Other

Name" in Perspectives (the magazine of the Psychological

Operations Association), Col Thomas Taylor offered the title

"Perception and Deception," suggesting the acronym, P&D.I 8

Lt Gen Michael Carnes, director of the Joint Staff, urged a

name change in his address to the Psychological Operations

Association at the 1989 Worldwide Psychological Operations

Conference, commenting that "you can't call soap 'dirt' and

expect it to sell ."

This struggle for a new name begs a couple of questions.

General Carnes's "soap/dirt" analogy is faulty . First, the term

psychological operations is amoral and the community is not

responsible for bias against it. It would be more to the point

that people think of "earth" or "topsoil" in terms of dirt, filth, or

grime. And second, terms considered more acceptablepolitically and popularlyfail to aptly describe the activity. A

soldier in the battlefield making loudspeaker appeals to the

enemy is not performing "political communications" or

"international information."

Personally, I don't find the terms psychological operations or

propaganda objectionable. What is needed is to market these

words so that their pejorative connotations die out. Psychological operations help to save lives by using words, instead of

bombs and bullets, to deter, or in the failure of deterrence,

help win wars. In The Weapon on the Wall, Murray Dyer opines

that the profession "is an honorable and important means,

ranking with instruments of diplomacy, the military art, and

33 8
p

He's quick to point out, however, that this premise does not

apply in a totalitarian state . Dyer says the way to overcome the

institutionalized bias is through education. I agree: Education,

coupled with advocacy, is the answer. The challenge is to

encourage others to become disciples, too .

Notes

I. Ronald D. McLaurin, ed., "Organization andPersonnel," in Military

Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 55.

2. Field Maihual 33-5, Psychological Operations (Washington, D.C. :

Government Printing Office, 1962), 78.

3. Murray Dyer, The Weapon on the Wall (1959; reprint, New York: Arno

Press, 1979), 231 .

4. Ibid., 69-73.

5. Martin Wright proposes that nations came into being with the decline

of medieval Christendom when man's loyalty shifted to the state (king) and

away from the estate (baron) and church (pope) . He states the word nation

came into being at the end of the French Revolution. Anationality was a

collective people with a consciousness of historic identity expressed in a

distinct language. Martin Wright, Power Politics, ed. Hedley Ball and Carsten

Holbraad (Leicaster, U.K. : Leicaster University Press, 1978), 27 .

6. Fred W. Walker, "Truth Is the Best Propaganda," National Guard

Magazine, October 1987, 28.

7. Edward N. Luttwak, "Perceptions," in Ronald D. McLaurin, ed.,

Military Propaganda, 267.

8 . Ronald D. McLaurin, ed., "Psychological Operations and National

Security," in Military Propaganda, 2-3.

9. Wright, 89.

10. Luttwak, "Perceptions and the Political Utility of Armed Forces," in

Ronald D. McLaurin, ed., Military Propaganda, 2'75 .

11 . Refer back to opening comments on gunboat diplomacy.

12. Luttwak, 267-68.

13 . Dr Carnes Lord, "The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy,"

in Carnes Lord and Frank R. Barnett, ed., Political Warfare and Psychological

Operations: Rethinking the U.S . Approach (Washington, D.C . : National Defense

University Press, 1988), 22-23 .

14. Robert C. Kingston, "Comments," in Carnes Lord and Frank R.

Barnett, ed., Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the

U.S . Approach (Washington, D.C. : National Defense University Press, 1988),

142.

33 9
16 . Lord, 23-28.

17 . Ibid., 27.

18 . Thomas H. Taylor, "By Any Other Name," Perspectives 5 (Spring

1989): 9.

19 . Dyer, 194.
PSYOP in Desert Shield/

Desert Storm

Col Frank L. Goldstein, USAF

Col Daniel W. Jacobowitz, USAF, Retired

Understanding the role of psychological operations in the

Gulf War requires more than a glimpse of its contributions to

military conflicts. To understand PSYOP, we must place it

within the context of the times; specifically, in the sequence of

events that led to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

When Saddam Hussein began to build his military strength

along the Kuwaiti border, the United Nations (UN) began to

react. Through a series of 13 resolutions, the UN demanded

that Iraq end its aggression and pull out of Kuwait. Embargoes

were established and ultimatums were delivered. Member

states, including the US, Egypt, United Kingdom, France, Italy,

Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, deployed forces and/or equipment.

Virtually the entire Western world-and a majority of Arab

nations-opposed Iraq. Americans at home overwhelmingly

came to the support of the president's actions (in contrast to

the domestic situation during the Vietnam conflict) .' The US

government clearly articulated its policies and goals, having

developed them through full, rapid, public debate, involving

the executive branch, the Congress, and even the judiciary,

which rejected various legal challenges to the evolving policies.

A new force, the international electronic news media, became

a critical element in the successful execution of the war. In

particular, coverage by the Cable News Network (CNN)

demonstrated the power of international broadcasting and

involved itself as a medium both to aid and to deter Iraqi

PSYOP plans. In true democratic media tradition, the accumulation of factual reporting allowed knowledgeable audiences to

correctly characterize Saddam's plans and behavior.

The Iraqi propaganda system is pyramidal, with the top spot

occupied by Saddam Hussein. Control is maintained at the

34 1
Information (MCI) under the strict supervision of the Baath

Party, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), and

Saddam Hussein. Iraq's propaganda system was closely

modeled after the Soviet system and is similar to that of most

other totalitarian states .

An overriding aspect of Iraqi propaganda is the use of religious

words and phrases. The techniques of Iraqi propaganda during

the course of the crisis reflected the same style used by the

Iraqis before the Gulf War. This campaign emphasized religious

symbolism, Arab nationalism, and praise of Saddam Hussein.

These themel reflected Iraqi culture and politics, demonstrating the fallacy of planning PSYOP based on the characteristics of the sender (rather than the nature of the receiver).

The Iraqis selected the following four objectives for their

initial PSYOP campaign:

I. Rationalize their invasion of Kuwait.

2. Gain support of Arab masses.

3. Discourage nations from participating in the UN

embargo.

4. Discourage or hinder military attacks on Iraq.

Four themes were generated from these objectives :

a. The revolutionary forces in Kuwait had asked for Iraqi

help.

b. Iraq is the champion of oppressed Arabs.

c. The West is depriving the Iraqi people of food and

medicine.

d. Iraq will withdraw from Kuwait after a short time. 2

Later, a fifth objective-rationalizing the incorporation of Kuwait as a permanent province of Iraq-was established.

The MCI distributed the themes to the various media outlets

for dissemination. This system worked very well, enabling the

MCI/Baath Party to coordinate the campaigns, to react to impact

indicators of current campaigns, and to initiate new campaigns

on short notice. Some of the campaigns were selectively

distributed to increase the stress impact on the target. Other

342
Few limitations were placed on the type or content of Iraqi

propaganda. At no time did missing or contrary facts interfere

with Iraqi operations. If needed, documentation was simply

manufactured. In the Iraqi PSYOP system, few restrictions are

placed on efforts used to further an Iraqi goal. Furthermore,

their campaigns did not have to follow any consistency, logic,

or form ; it was acceptable to criticize the Multinational Force's

(MNF) bombing as being inaccurate on one day and, on the

next day, to rest a theme on the destruction wrought by highly

accurate MNF bombing. As far as Iraqi media were concerned,

MNF bombing accuracy varied with the need to enhance the

Iraqi propaganda campaign.

Saddam's use of PSYOP had varying results. Saddam used

Scud attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia as a political weapon

to divert coalition attention and military effort from the main

battlefield. The ever-present threat of chemical warheads was

a major factor in his plan. According to Lt Gen Tom Kelly,

operations chief for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Scuds were

of little military significance." Nevertheless, they produced

emotional and psychological effects. Although Saddam induced

fear among the Israelis and Saudis, and consternation among

the coalition in general, his plan ultimately grounded on the

rocks of military reality. However, Saddam's combination of

useless military technology and a politically diverse targeting

policy did serve to divert valuable coalition resources from

other targets to the difficult task of Scud hunting.

Saddam's tactical purpose was achieved, but his strategic

purpose was thwarted by dual coalition responses. Coalition

tactical air efforts against the Scuds helped the Israelis

maintain their policy of restraint, while the technological

breakthrough of Patriot missiles calmed both Israeli and Saudi

publics and further demonstrated coalition invincibility.

Tactical military response, based on military competence and

technological superiority, blunted a political weapon aimed at

the heart of the coalition .

Iraqi efforts to use Western television as a relay for propaganda programs failed to convince important world audiences,

although they may have been somewhat effective within the

343
Arab world. Among those efforts were Saddams personal

appearances with hostages, whom he attempted to characterize

as "guests" of the Republic of Iraq. But Saddam's campaign

was doomed by the perfectly natural and spontaneous

negative reaction of a little British boy whom Saddam tried to

convince of his good will. In this case the attempt to

manipulate Western media completely backfired, as repetition

of this scene throughout the Western world established public

opinion of the true nature of the hostage situation. Further, it

exposed Saddam's manipulative efforts and seriously eroded

whatever credibility he retained.

Later Iraqi broadcasts were to fall flat as a result of Saddam's

loss of credibility. For example, scenes of bomb damage at the

otherwise unidentified building presented by the Iraqis as the

Baby Milk Factory (with signs and workers' jacket logos

conveniently in English) were quickly dismissed as crude

propaganda by all except the most gullible or anti-Western.

The nonsequitur of the signs and the behavior of the Iraqi

media escort personnel (who limited reporter access within the

site) conflicted with Iraqi claims. And when Western intelligence analysts demonstrated that the claimed bombing damage

to cultural facilities in Iraq (the bombing of which is forbidden

by the accepted laws of war) had in fact been faked by Iraqi

wrecking crews, the remaining shreds of Iraqi television

propaganda credibility were destroyed

Controversy still rages, particularly within the TV news

industry, on the wisdom of continuing censored and pressured

TV broadcasts from within the enemy capital. The TV broadcasts had both positive and negative tactical effects. Coalition

operators were able to conclude from viewing scenes from

Baghdad, or from the disappearance of live TV from Baghdad,

that certain targets had been effectively struck.

In addition, the televised appearance of downed coalition

pilots proved counterproductive for Iraq's objectives . Instead of

convincing the coalition partners to acquiesce, a worldwide

audience was appalled by the battered physical condition of

the captives-and their orchestrated, mechanical admissions

of guilt were painfully transparent. A backlash effect inspired

greater support for the coalition.

34 4
clarify the propaganda process. The Iraqi goal of this propaganda

campaign was to break the coalition. The Iraqi leadership

concluded that if US public opinion could be marshaled

against the war in the same way it was during the Vietnam

conflict, the US would withdraw. Toward that end, the

propagandists attempted to mimic some of the successful

tactics used by the government of North Vietnam. One of the

tactics employed was on-camera interviews of captured

coalition pilots. The Iraqis thought that presenting these

interviews would stimulate the US public to call for the

withdrawal of US forces and the pursuit of peaceful options .

Instead, outrage at Iraq's obvious violation of the Geneva

convention resulted in even greater backlash against Saddam.

The highest echelons of the MCI/Baath Party made the

decision to use captured allied pilots for propaganda purposes .

The Iraqi News Agency, one of the principal media outlets to

the West, managed the entire campaign. The plan to exploit

allied pilots for propaganda included this strategy :

" capture several pilots,

" parade them through the streets,

" put them on television with prepared questions and

answers,

" view the impact of the broadcasts through the Western

media, and

" disseminate broadcasts to media and determine their

impact. 4

The initial problem that Iraq faced was how to disseminate

their product; the coalition had damaged most of Iraq's television

broadcasting capability early in the conflict. The Iraqis were

forced to use a surviving low-power television transmitter,

which they used to televise the parade of coalition pilots

through the streets of Baghdad. But Iran was the only country

that could receive their transmissions, and the Iranians did

not share them with the world in a manner that suited the

Iraqi purpose .

To circumvent this problem, the Iraqis videotaped interviews

of the pilots and delivered them to various Western news

34 5
specific questions and answers.

Interviewer: What's your opinion of this aggression against

Iraq?

Pilot: I think this war is crazy and should never have

happened. I condemn this aggression against

peaceful Iraq.

Interviewer: What do you think about this aggression against

Iraq?

Pilot: I think our leaders and our people have wrongly

attacked the peaceful people of Iraq. 5

In the interviews the pilots told their families that they were

being treated well. The MCI/Baath previewed and approved

the interviews before releasing them to the media.

The response to the broadcast came very swiftly. All Western

government, public, and media severely condemned the broadcasts and use of the downed pilots in this manners The worldwide condemnation was so overwhelming that the broadcasts,

which had begun on 20 January, ended on 24 January. On 25

January, the MCI announced that the interviews of captured

pilots would stop.

Another of Saddam's PSYOP efforts were the radio broadcasts to US troops in the field by "Baghdad Betty," reminiscent

of those by Tokyo Rose during World War II. Intended to lower

US troop morale, Betty's messages veered into the farcical as

she warned American servicemen that their wives back home

were sleeping with famous movie stars like Tom Cruise, Arnold

Schwarzenegger, and Bart Simpson.

PSYOP, as used by Iraq, was intended to produce the greatest

amount of negative stress within the coalition forces, the civilian

population of those governments, and upon the civilian and

political leadership of surrounding Arab states . As previously

stated, the PSYOP efforts against the military forces of the

coalition had minimal effects. However, the PSYOP effort

aimed by Iraq at certain segments of the coalition countries

and surrounding Arab nations was notable.

Saddam's propaganda effort as a stress-inducing instrument

appears to have been as intense as the effort put forth by

North Vietnam during the latter part of the Vietnam War. The

34 6
supporting the coalition and those UN resolutions imposed on

Iraq. Another Iraqi effort was to gather support for economic

sanctions as an alternative to military action. Later, efforts were

made against economic sanctions . Iraq portrayed the US, and

specifically President George H. Bush, as the main opponent to

Saddam. Some of the key themes used in these campaigns:

The war was really about access to oil .

The US was using the war as an excuse for imperialism.

The US was propping up a corrupt government in Kuwait.

These attacks, targeted at the populations of Great Britain,

Germany, France, Australia, Canada, the United States, and the

Arab nations of the coalition, had varying degrees of success.

The Iraqi campaign against imperialism was a carbon copy

of earlier Vietnam-era themes. Saddam spoke of the Gulf crisis

as another Vietnam and painted a portrait of the US and

coalition partners as embarking on another mistake. A great

deal of effort was put into the following propaganda themes :

" The US was embarking on another dirty war.

" The war would be very bloody and would last a long time.

" The US would again be divided over the war.

" Again, the poor and the minorities are fighting a war for

the rich and powerful.

Saddam Hussein's speeches were filled with images of certain

doom, Vietnam-style-body bags returning home by the

thousands, an enemy who could wait out the bombing to fight a

bloody ground war, and an environment that would be as

inhospitable as the jungle. He expected average citizens to recoil

from the horror of such a war and spread more propaganda to

dissuade the voters from supporting the coalition effort . A wedge

between the Western nations would, in his mind, eventually

result. The strategy is reflected in media writing around the world.

Iraq is no Panama and Saddam Hussein no General Noriega. . . . The

United States might be mired in the sands of the Arabian deserts just

as they were bogged down in the paddy fields of Vietnam. (New Straits

Tunes, 13 August 1990.)

It was clear from the beginning that the Persian Gulf conflict would not

only be resolved in the hot dunes of the desert, but also in the

34 7
developed very quickly [for the Middle East] . . . This is a fortunate

development. (La Jotnada, 22 October 1990.)

[Saddaml seeks to break Western solidarity and above all to put the Bush

Administration in a corner . Time is in favor of Iraq now that US public

opinion is gaining a clearer dimension of the high cost in human life of

military action in faraway lands . (La Nacton, 22 August 1990.)

The military force building up against Saddam Hussein is such that a

spark may be struck at any moment. The United States will be in

danger of sinking into the sand, as it once did in the rice paddies of

Vietnam. (La Suisse, 23 August 1990.)

There's the strongly-held belief that the [Vietnam] experience has

rendered America incapable of marshalling public support to launch

another war. (Itish Independent, 20 September 1990.)

While the Iraq propaganda effort certainly caused some

confusion, and increased the stress of susceptible segments of

the audience, neither public opinion nor the world media were

moved as the Iraqi president had hoped. The public within the

US and other coalition countries was determined to show

support for their soldiers stationed in the Gulf. Neither slogans

nor disrespect of military forces gained popularity during the

war.

The failure of most Iraqi propaganda was in its credibility.

While Saddam himself believed much of his propaganda, it

appears that most of the world did not. His biggest successes

were in the Arab world; and even in those countries, success

was neither significant nor complete on any issue. The

propaganda, in general, was far below the level of

sophistication of effective audiences. Politically aware

segments of the population, who would be inclined to be

antiwar in general, were, if anything, turned off by the crude

Iraqi attempts to manipulate their sincere beliefs. The clear

articulation of goals, international support through the

coalition and the UN, and the effective, low-casualty military

action, rendered Iraqi propaganda ineffective.

Coalition Psychological Operations

In contrast to Saddam's efforts, coalition PSYOP efforts

significantly affected Iraqi soldiers. First, the coalition efforts

34 8
troops to surrender). Second, the combining of PSYOP with the

air and ground campaigns was intended to affect both soldiers

and senior military leadership.

Tactical PSYOP in the Persian Gulf proved effective and

efficient in terms of four principal sets of operations: 7

" radio transmissions,

" loudspeaker broadcasts,

" leaflet disseminations, and

" enemy prisoners of war (EPW) team actions .

Operational success resulted from effective innovation in the

field and from well-executed, time-sensitive planning. To a

lesser extent, tactical operations proceeded from the deliberate

planning model. Using the four identifiable sets of operations,

PSYOP was implemented by various agents and organizations,

ranging from theater-level cells to small, three-person teams

serving in direct support of the forward combat units. 8

The four operations showed different levels of effectiveness

as to their impact on the Iraqi target audience. Table 1 lists

the efforts and the relative effectiveness resulting from the four

operations collectively.

Table 1

Exhibit I PSYOP Effort and Relative Effectiveness

in the Persian Gulf

. ------------ FEE ffort -------------

29 Million Leaflets Dropped In-theater

17 Hours Per Day of Radio Transmitting

19.5 Hours Per Day Aerial Broadcasting

- _ _ _ - - _ _ - Relative Effectiveness -------

73 Thousand Iraqis Reached through PSYOP

70% EPWs Report Messages Had Impact on Surrenders

Source : United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), "Post Operational Analysis : Iraqi Psychological Operations During Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM," SOJ9, 1992 .

34 9
because PSYOP had been slighted in the theater operational

plan, this combination was not used at first. The result of this

combined PSYOP, air, and ground effort was the influencing of

an unexpectedly large number of Iraqi prisoners to surrender.

The four sets of operations-radio transmission, loudspeaker

broadcasts, leaflet drops, and the actions taken by EPW

teams-were conducted in January and February 1991.9 The

coalition initiated its tactical leaflet and radio activities in

January 1991 to coincide with the start of the air campaign

and terminated them in March and May, respectively. The

loudspeaker and EPW actions began in February with the

start of the groufid campaign and ended in March and April.

An important precept at work in the radio and leaflet

operations was reinforcement. Tactical PSYOP personnel

announced to Iraqi ground units that a bombing was to occur

at a specified time and place. i° The next day, they announced

that a bombing had indeed occurred as warned (only if the

event had occurred as planned). The repeated cycles of

announcement and execution helped persuade the Iraqis that

the message and delivery means were credible and that

surrender was a viable alternative to useless death. I I

Radio Transmissions

Six broadcast platforms were established and used in the

Persian Gulf theater of operations. Three were Volant Solo

using EC-130 aircraft platforms (retransmissions made via

modified USAF C-130 aircraft) and three were ground radio

stations : "Voice of the Gulf," "Voice of America" (DOD-loaned

equipment), and "Free Kuwaiti People." According to now

declassified message sources, the radio stations were managed

and run almost exclusively by US Central Command

(USCENTCOM) as part of its theater operational plan. Thus,

these stations were integrated into the overall combat-PSYOP

effort relatively early. Programs consisted of pretaped

messages broadcast continuously each day for about 17

hours. Messages conveyed such themes as the inevitability of

defeat, Saddam's inappropriate leadership, and surrender

35 0
appeals. A typical message transmitted over an established

"surrender hotline" : "YOUR DIVISION WILL BE BOMBED

TOMORROW. ABANDONYOUR EQUIPMENT, LEAVE YOUR

LOCATION NOW, AND SAVE YOURSELVES."

The relative effectiveness of these radio transmissions, in

terms of audience exposure, was approximately 58 percent

(versus zero for no transmissions). The degree of persuasiveness

relative to no transmissions was estimated to be 46 percent.

Impact on surrender reached about 34 percent.

Iz

Such moderate values, according to some thinking, may be

reflective of a culture whose primary representational systems

(or language channels) seemed not to be auditory, but visual

(as with leaflet drops) and kinesthetic (as with the humane

actions of EPWteams).

13

Loudspeaker Broadcasts

Typical PSYOP was accomplished in the theater of operations

by two- or three-person loudspeaker teams in direct support of

forward combat brigades. Teams consisted typically of one or

two noncommissioned officers and an interpreter or communications specialist.

Loudspeaker teams broadcast messages that had been

prepared and dubbed onto audiotapes and distributed to them

and other teams by the 4th PSYOP Group by way of its

product dissemination battalion. Occasionally, a team would

ad-lib a broadcast if pressures of the moment demanded

variation from the prepared script and if the language skill and

initiative of the team so permitted.

Loudspeaker broadcasts generally produced moderate

effectiveness in terms of audience exposure, persuasiveness,

and impact on surrender. The rather uneven successes of the

loudspeaker operations were found to be similar to those of

radio transmissions, although some results, arguably positive,

were obtained through the convincing appeals of enterprising

loudspeaker teams. At least one team induced a captured Iraqi

sergeant to make heartfelt appeals to his comrades across a

berm using the very loudspeaker system that induced him to

surrender. 14 Feedback from some EPWs indicated that, while

35 1
teams told us [exactly] where [to do it]. 

IS

The following account by SSgt Edward Fivel, 9th Battalion, 4th

Psychological Operations Group (POG), illustrates the operation

of his loudspeaker team and its unusual effectiveness .

We had to convince the company commander of our parent unit to let

us PSYOP people try ousting those Iraqi soldiers from their

underground bunker. We kept telling him there was nothing to lose by

trying, especially since the pounding all morning by the 101st

[Airborne Division] hadn't done anything.

So the three of us gave it a try. We arranged for the Blackhawk

[helicopter] to ride us to the site of the bunker and we began dropping

surrender leaflets. Then we returned to base and found that nothing

had happened-no surrenders, no movement, nothing.

We tried something else. We hopped back on the Blackhawk and

returned to the bunker area, this time intending to use our loudspeaker

system and a pretaped message given by headquarters . We picked a

spot on the ground about 800 meters from the bunker and started

broadcasting . Nothing happened. I guess we couldn't be heard over the

loud racket of our helicopter .

We asked the pilot to land us on the ground not too far from the

bunker. With what you might call serious reservations, he eventually

landed us, feeling a little protected, I guess, by the three Apaches and

one Blackhawk whopping above our heads and to our right. He took off

immediately, saying he'd stay in contact by radio.

The three of us were now on the ground. We were facing this enemy

bunker that Intelligence says has 20 enemy soldiers who might be

waiting to greet US . We picked up our loudspeaker equipment-the

transmitter and the speaker-and ran about 200 meters closer to the

bunker. We sat the equipment down and again started playing the

cassette surrender tapes. Still no movement.

Then our team leader decided to lift up the speaker. He lifted it and

began carrying it even closer to the bunker. He toted that speaker

exactly 50 more meters. I knew the distance because that's the length

of the electrical cord he stretched out to the end, 50 meters . The team

leader was very close to the enemy now.

Then he suddenly stood straight up and pushed the speaker high over

his head [like some kind of statue showing a big trophy to a crowd far

away] . I told the other guy back with me watching all this, our

communications man, to quit playing the taped message and go live,

and to keep doing it . The guy had just gotten out of language school,

so he could handle the Iraq language pretty well. He talked loudly

through the speaker in four message sets .

352
helicopter pilot who was still hanging up there with us . The pilot had

spotted some movement. Then we saw Iraq soldiers begin climbing out

of the bunker in front of our team leader . They were waving little white

flags and carrying no weapons .

That was about it for us in that scene because our pilot said over the

radio that he was landing to pick us up so he could refuel back at 101

division base. He was running real low on fuel. We didn't see how

many Iraqis came out of that bunker, although we had counted up to

about 20 of them before we took off.

When we got back to base, the three of us and our pilot began

receiving weird congratulations . We weren't sure why . Seems that over

400 Iraqis eventually came out of the bunker, all without a fight.

For the next couple of days every helicopter the 101 had was flying

back and forth carrying Iraqi soldiers from the bunker to a forward

EPW camp. The camp must have been getting pretty crowded. The big

thing we realized later was that these actions had kicked off the "Hail

Mary" play in the ground war because they fixed the Iraqi units on line

in front of us, letting our endrunners in the other division make their

wide sweep around the main Iraqi force.

Leaflet Drops

Leaflets and other forms of print PSYOP proved especially

effective. Of the targeted audience-300,000-plus Iraqi troopsapproximately 98 percent of them read or were otherwise

exposed to the 29 million leaflets dropped in the theater. Is

Many EPWs were found clutching leaflets in their hands or

hiding them somewhere on their uniforms as they raised their

arms to surrender.

17 An estimated 88 percent of the Iraqi

forces were influenced by the leaflet drops as intended, and 77

percent were persuaded to quit the fight through the combination of combat-leaflet operations and credible tactical military

threats and actions.

18

Leaflets appeared to be effective in the Persian Gulf crisis.

Their language was simple and straightforward . Appeals were

visual for an audience that seemed to respond psychologically

and emotionally to visual means. Whether the leaflets' effectiveness stemmed from psychological reasons or simply from

the sheer volume of leaflets that descended on the Iraqis daily

is open to interpretation. Weather conditions and low leaflet

loss, combined with a generally effective theme, audience

353
in an unprecedented success in inducing surrenders. The

leaflets enabled many Iraqi soldiers, who were not highly

motivated to support Saddam's war of conquest, to avoid

sacrificing their lives in a doomed cause.

Still, some curious effects were attributed to at least some of

the leaflet designs. These were effects that startled even the

Arab partners who had supposedly provided input to the

format. 19 PSYOP personnel later learned that the leaflets'

effectiveness would likely have been enhanced had design

consideration been given to the nonverbal, cultural cues that

were read by the Iraqis as subtext. 20

If this concept (subtext in language) escaped or seemed vague

to designers and others at first, the application certainly

became clear with each EPW whom they later interviewed

during Desert Storrn and similar situations . 21 Theater PSYOP

personnel came to realize that they had missed an important

dimension of cultural communication when designing the

leaflets. In some cases, the PSYOP personnel were able to

make adjustments and manage reprints ; in others, they

learned the cultural lessons after the cessation of hostilities .

An important illustration of this concept was the subtextual

message transmitted by the color red. When red ink was

included in leaflets, presumably for function or appeal, Iraqi

soldiers typically hesitated or avoided approaching a leaflet

sticking out from the sand nearby. They simply feared and

disdained red as a signal for danger. 22

Whenever Iraqis read a leaflet that showed a coalition

soldier without a chin beard gesturing affably to an Iraqi, the

reader became distrustful. To an Iraqi a chin beard signals a

certain Muslim holiness and trust he could not find on a

clean-shaven chin. 23

When the Iraqis scrutinized a leaflet that showed Iraqi EPWs

enjoying a bowl of fruit given by their captor, they were

disappointed at seeing no bananas in the bowl. Bananas are a

favored delicacy in Iraqi culture .

When an Iraqi soldier saw words encircled in the familiar

thought bubble of Western comic strips, he became thoroughly

confused. Unlike the English-speaking world and some other

cultures, Iraqi culture does not link bubbles, words, and

35 4
by the leaflet designers, that they were unaware that some

cultures use other clues to indicate which cartoon character is

speaking.

Overall, PSYOP in Desert Storm was among the most successful media-based PSYOP campaigns ever undertaken.

Planners incorporated PSYOP into air operations from the

outset and relied on leaflets to multiply the stress induced by

unopposed bombing raids. Desert Storm coalition PSYOP

proved the value of this combat adjunct at the tactical level

and reaffirmed the overriding importance of credibility. Iraqi

disdain for truthfulness contrasted vividly with Western

punctiliousness in behavior and leaflet preparation. Coalition

determination to stick to truthful overt PSYOP, relying on

credible military performance to override minor cultural missteps in message preparation, proved successful in inducing

thousands of early surrenders. The bottom line of coalition

policy was met-casualties were reduced on both sides.

Notes

1. Newsweek, 25 February 1991 .

2. USSOCOM, "Post Operational Analysis: Iraqi Psychological Operations

During Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM," SOJ9, 1992.

3. The US is not signatory to the 1954 Hague cultural property convention, but the US Army integrated the treaty interdictions in 1955 . W. Hays

Parks, fn 212, 60.

4. USSOCOM.

5. Ibid.

6. Such use of prisoners is forbidden by the laws of warfare. The failure

of the Iraqi plan was partially engineered by such clever Yankee air pirates

as Lt Jeffrey Zaun, who adapted the methods used by US airmen and sailors

in the Vietnam War. Zaun augmented the battering of his face and exaggerated his inappropriate behavior to inform the world the Iraqis were

maltreating him. What is more amazing is that the Iraqis would peddle these

devastating tapes. The coalition pilot's actions were so effective that future

conflicts may finally see the end of such illegal exploitation of prisoners .

7. USSOCOM.

8.Ibid.

9.Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

355
15 .Ibid.

16. Commander, 4th Psychological Operations Group, interview with

author, 1991.

17 . Ibid .

18 . Ibid .

19. USSOCOM.

20. Ibid.

21 . Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23 . Ibid.

24. Ibid.
Epilogue

Lt Gen Samuel V. Wilson, USA, Retired

If past events are indeed prologue to the future, then understanding the early nature and scope of psychological operations,

synthesizing the PSYOP lessons learned from historical

national policy planning and from strategic, tactical, and

operational PSYOP applications, can foreshadow even greater

progress and success in accomplishing our national interests

and objectives in political and military environments.

Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies is the

catalytic framework toward that end, since it reflects the

foundation of PSYOP knowledge and wisdom.

It is critical that those involved with PSYOP-whether they

are military commanders, political leaders, new PSYOP technicians, or experienced PSYOP practitioners and staff officers

become familiar with this book to better understand the

importance that military PSYOP plays as a cost-effective,

force-multiplier instrument of US military and political power.

Such understanding is especially necessary today, given our

military budgetary constraints, the existing nuclear, biological,

and chemical threats, and our dynamic, complex, and

worldwide arena of operations. Sun Tzu's strategy in 500 B .C.

of subduing the enemy without engaging him is not only apropos

but quite probably necessary for our very propagation .

The reader can learn much from parts II and III, which

present various articles on national policy, PSYOP planning,

and strategic and tactical PSYOP. Part III is especially

significant since today much of the third world still uses Soviet

PSYOP doctrine. In fact, those who would argue that the

communist ideological threat has diminished with the demise

of the Soviet Union, and that the US PSYOP focus should be

abated, need to take heed of the various strategic and global

resurgencies and the Vietnam legacy presented in part IV. One of

the most important reasons for the communist "ideo-military"

35 7
PSYOP had no political or moral acceptance as a necessary

foundation of our national policy. We should not minimize the

urgent need to increase American sensitivity to the psychological

dimension of warfare, and these articles and case studies

support that theme. The articles on our recent actions in

Panama and in Desert Storm not only solidify the PSYOP

requirement but also point out our weaknesses and future

challenges.

These authors lead us to believe correctly that the PSYOP

weapon system, if employed properly, must precede, accompany, and follow all military force employments while being

closely codrdinated with all agencies of government and while

being systematically integrated with US national security

policy and objectives throughout the spectrum of conflict and

in peacetime. PSYOP is indeed a phenomenon in itself.
Contributors

Preston S. Abbott

George V. Allen, retired career foreign service officer, has

served as ambassador to Iran, Yugoslavia, India, and Nepal,

and as Greece's assistant secretary of state for Near East,

South Asia, and African Affairs. Other positions he has held

include director, US Information Agency; president, Tobacco

Institute; and director, Foreign Service Institute.

MSgt Richard A. Blair, USAFR, a military intelligence analyst

in the Reserve, is staff assistant to the senior military liaison

and defense advisor, United States Information Agency,

Washington, D.C. He was recalled to active duty during the

Persian Gulf War to provide ongoing analysis of Iraqi psychological operations for Headquarters US Special Operations

Command.

DeWitt S. Copp served as an Army Air Force Air Transport

Command pilot in North Africa and the Middle East in World

War II. Since the war, he has specialized as a book, film, and

news writer in military aviation and foreign affairs. Copp has

served on the staff of "Voice of America" as a writer-editor and

with the United States Information Agency as policy officer on

Soviet disinformation.

Col Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., USAFR, is a politico-military

affairs officer with the Directorate of Psychological Operations

and Civil Affairs, J-9, Headquarters US Special Operations

Command. He holds a PhD degree in business. Colonel Findley

has been a regular speaker at the USAF Special Operations

School and a guest instructor at the Air University Center for

Professional Development. He previously won the PSYOP

Outstanding Instructor's Award and was the outstanding USAF

Academy liaison officer for the Alabama-Northwest Florida

35 9
the author of several books.

Lloyd A. Free, president, Institute for International Social

Research, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns

Hopkins University. His former positions include editor, Public

Opinion Quarterly ; director, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence

Service, during World War II; assistant military attache,

Switzerland; acting director, Office of International Information,

State Department; advisor to Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy,

and Johnson; and advisor/consultant to Vice President Nelson

Rockefeller.

Col Frank L. Goldstein, USAF, is dean, Education and

Research, Air Command and Staff College, Air University.

Formerly he served as deputy chief, Policy and Concepts

Division, Directorate of Psychological Operations and Civil

Affairs, J-9, Headquarters US Special Operations Command

and as chief, Psychological Operations Branch, at the USAF

Special Operations School. Colonel Goldstein earned a PhD

degree in educational psychology and is a graduate of the

USAF, British, NATO, and German PSYOP courses. He is a

well-known writer and speaker among military audiences.

Col Joseph S. Gordon, USAR, professor of European studies

at the Defense Intelligence College. He has taught history at

Campbell College and at Duke University, where he earned a

PhD degree in European history. Colonel Gordon's interest in

psychological operations derived from three years as an

intelligence analyst with the 4th Psychological Operations

Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He is a graduate of Army

War College.

Col Daniel W. Jacobowitz, USAF, Retired, is assigned to

strategic missile operations and the political-military field at

Air University. Following his Titan II missile assignment, he

had consecutive tours in Military Civic Action in Thailand.

Colonel Jacobowitz has previously been on the faculties at

Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College

and was operations officer of the Psychological Operations

36 0
Operations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as

director of the Center for Treaty Implementation, US Southern

Command, Panama. He joined the Gulf War Air Power Survey

team in 1991.

William F. Johnston is a member of the staff and faculty,

National Interdepartmental Seminar, in the Office of the Chief

of Psychological Warfare at the Foreign Service Institute. He

has had several special warfare-type assignments, including

command of a psychological warfare (psywar) battalion in US

Army, Pacific . -Johnston is a former chief of the Joint United

States Public Affairs Planning Office, Vietnam.

Lt Col Philip P. Katz, USA, Retired, is a senior research

scientist, American Institute for Research. He has been a

psychological operations (PSYOP) instructor and lecturer at

the Army Special Warfare Center, a PSYOP officer at the

Department of Army, senior PSYOP officer for US Army, Pacific,

and senior program manager for Development of Strategic

Psychological Operations in Support of Field Activities, Vietnam.

Colonel Katz developed a computerized PSYOP management

information system for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the

Department of the Army. He is the author of several studies on

psychological operations .

Maj James V. Keifer, USAF, Retired, is a psychological

operations staff officer in the Directorate of Psychological

Operations and Civil Affairs, J-9, Headquarters US Special

Operations Command. He earned his master's degree in public

administration from the University of Oklahoma and is a

graduate of PSYOP courses instructed by the US Air Force and

Army, the British army, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Major Keifer's career has included experience in space

operations, audiovisual media production and management,

and public affairs.

Dr Carnes Lord earned PhD degrees from both Yale and

Cornell Universities . He has been a distinguished fellow at the

36 1
y , g

the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He has had

consultant and director positions at the National Security

Council and at the National Institute for Public Policy . Dr

Lord's assignments at universities and colleges have been as

assistant professor in the Department of Government and

Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, instructor in the

Department of Government at Dartmouth College, and lecturer

in the Departments of Classics and Political Science at Yale

University.

Ronald D., McLaurin is a research scientist, American Institute for Research . His previous positions include assistant for

Africa, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) and management assistant, Office of

the Secretary of Defense. McLaurin is the author and contributor

to studies on the analysis of foreign policy, international

politics, and social and international conflict.

James Melnich is an analyst, Soviet Internal Affairs, Defense

Intelligence Agency. He holds an MA degree from Harvard

University. Melnich formerly served as director, Russian

Emigre Center in Chicago .

Michael A. Morris is a fellow at the Canadian Institute of

International Affairs. He formerly served on the faculty at

Gallaudet University.

Laurence J. Orzell served as European branch chief, 6th

Psychological Operations Battalion, Ist Special Operations

Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He taught European

and American history at Marywood College and the University

of Scranton. Orzell's publications on Polish history and

immigrants have appeared in Polish Review, MidArnerica, and

Polish American Studies.

Lt Col John Ozaki, USA, is a career military officer assigned

to the Department of Army. He has served with the Army

Security Agency, Headquarters 7th Army, Military Assistance

Command, Vietnam, and in the infantry in Korea. Colonel

36 2
Col Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., USA, Retired, served three

combat tours with Special Forces units in Southeast Asia and

held positions on the faculties of Army Command and General

Staff College and Army War College. Other assignments

include the Department of the Army Staff and the Secretary's

Policy Planning Staff, Department of State. Colonel Paddock

was commander of both the 6th Psychological Operations

Battalion and the 4th Psychological Operations Group, and

was director for Psychological Operations, Office of the

Secretary of Defense. He earned his MA and PhD degrees from

Duke University and is author of U.S. Army Special Warfare:

Its Origins .

Gen Richard G. Stilwell (1917-91), USA, Retired, served in

a number of key military and civilian positions throughout his

professional life. He was commandant of cadets at the US

Military Academy, commander of the 1st Armored Division and

the 24th Army Corps, Vietnam, and chief of staff for General

Westmoreland . As a civilian, the late General Stilwell served as

under secretary of defense for policy and chairman of the DOD

Security Review Commission.

Col Fred W. Walker (1942-90), USAF, Retired, was the first

chief of the Psychological Operations Directorate, J-9, United

States Special Operations Command. The late Colonel Walker

was a pilot, parachutist, and past chief, PSYOP Division,

Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. An

author and speaker on special operations throughout DOD, he

was a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College, Air War

College, and the US Air Force Academy.

Col Dennis P. Walko, USA, master parachutist and licensed

professional engineer, is chief of the Command Support and

Coordination Division, Directorate of Psychological Operations

and Civil Affairs, J-9, Headquarters US Special Operations

Command. He has served in the Civil Affairs-PSYOP Exchange

Office to the Colombian Army General Staff, as civic action

36 3
Colonel Walko is a graduate of Command and General Staff

College and the Inter-American Defense College.

Lt Gen Samuel V. Wilson, USA, Retired, is president,

Blackburn College, Carlinville, Illinois. Before his retirement in

August 1977, he had served in combat during World War II

with the Office of Strategic Services, in the 1944 North Burma

Campaign with "Merrill's Marauders," with the US Defense

Attache/Moscow, in Vietnam as associate director for field

operations at the US Agency for International Development

and, later, as US mission coordinator and minister-counselor

for the US Embassy in Saigon. General Wilson has been

Special Forces Group commander; assistant commandant of

the Army's Special Warfare School; deputy assistant to the

Secretary of Defense for Special Operations; deputy to the

director of Central Intelligence; director, Defense Intelligence

Agency; adjunct professor of political science, Hampden-Sydney

College; chairman, Military Board of Virginia; chairman of the

Secretary of Defense's Special Operations Policy Advisory

Group; staff consultant to House and Senate Armed Services

Committees; advisor on foreign technology, Los Alamos

National Laboratory; and senior consultant at the Betac

Corporation, Arlington, Virginia.

Lev Yudovich, born and educated in the USSR, emigrated in

1977 to the West. He is an international author of numerous

articles on Soviet political and military subjects. He was a

platoon and company commander in the Red Army during

World War II and a former practicing defense attorney in

Moscow. Yudovich has served on the staff of the US Army

Russian Institute as professor of military and political science.

He has written more than 200 articles for "Radio Liberty/Radio

Free Europe" on Soviet political, military, and economic policy.

364

ISBN 1-58566-016-7