12 July 2010

Foreign Internal Defense

Joint Publication 3-22
i 

PREFACE 

1. Scope 

 This publication establishes joint doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States 

involved in or supporting foreign internal defense (FID). It discusses how joint 

operations, involving the application of all instruments of national power, support host 

nation efforts to build capability and capacity to free and protect its society from 

subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. 

2. Purpose 

 This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance 

of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis 

for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations 

while conducting or supporting FID. It provides military guidance for the exercise of 

authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and 

prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military 

guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the 

intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and 

executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of 

effort in the accomplishment of the overall objectives. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders 

of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate 

components of these commands, the Services, and defense agencies in support of joint 

operations. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances 

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the 

contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of 

joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination 

with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and 

specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or 
Preface 

ii JP 3-22 

coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified 

by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, 

commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and 

procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

LLOYD J. AUSTIN III 

Lieutenant General, USA 

Director, Joint Staff 
SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-07.1, DATED 30 APRIL 2004 - 

RENUMBERED AS JOINT PUBLICATION 3-22 

iii 

• Changes title from Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal 

Defense to Foreign Internal Defense and the publication number from Joint 

Publication (JP) 3-07.1 to JP 3-22 

• Adds discussion of foreign internal defense (FID) within the range of military 

operations 

• Elevates the internal defense and development appendix to a chapter, explaining 

FID construct, functions, principles, and organizational guidelines for FID 

• Adds paragraph on United States FID capabilities 

• Introduces FID assessment paragraph 

• Expands training chapter into a section on training joint forces for FID and a 

section on training host nation forces 

• Provides discussion of site survey considerations and health service and medical 

civil-military operations as part of employment considerations 

• Integrates psychological operations (PSYOP) paragraph into the direct support 

section, explaining PSYOP goals within FID

• Incorporates discussion of security force assistance (SFA) and explains the 

relationship between FID and SFA. 

• Adds section on transition and redeployment, to include termination of operations, 

terminations approaches, military considerations, mission handoff procedures, and 

post mission debriefing procedures 

• Removes appendices on civil affairs estimate of the situation, PSYOP and estimate 

of the situation, and health service support 

• Updates the definitions of FID, security assistance, and security cooperation 

organization 

• Creates new terms and definitions security force and security force assistance 

• Removes the term and definition for security assistance organization 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-22 

Intentionally Blank 
v 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. ix 

CHAPTER I 

 INTRODUCTION 

• General ....................................................................................................................... I-1 

• Background ................................................................................................................ I-2 

• Relationship of Foreign Internal Defense to Internal Defense and Development ..... I-3 

• Foreign Internal Defense Within the Range of Military Operations .......................... I-4 

• The Foreign Internal Defense Operational Framework and Instruments of 

National Power............................................................................................................ I-5 

• Department of Defense Foreign Internal Defense Tools ......................................... I-10 

CHAPTER II 

 INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT 

• General ..................................................................................................................... II-1 

• Construct .................................................................................................................. II-1 

• Functions .................................................................................................................. II-2 

• Principles .................................................................................................................. II-4 

• Organizational Guidance .......................................................................................... II-6 

CHAPTER III 

 ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR 

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE 

• General .................................................................................................................... III-1 

• National-Level Organizations ................................................................................. III-3 

• Combatant Commands ............................................................................................ III-6 

• Subordinate Unified Commands ............................................................................. III-9 

• Joint Task Forces .................................................................................................. III-10 

• The United States Diplomatic Mission and Country Team .................................. III-10 

• Multinational Foreign Internal Defense Force ...................................................... III-15 

CHAPTER IV 

 PLANNING FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE 

• General .................................................................................................................... IV-1 

• Planning Imperatives ............................................................................................... IV-2 

• Department of Defense Guidance ........................................................................... IV-4 

• General Theater Planning Requirements ................................................................ IV-5 

• Planning Procedures and Considerations ................................................................ IV-7 
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vi JP 3-22 

• Planning for Force Protection ............................................................................... IV-13 

• Foreign Internal Defense Assessment ................................................................... IV-14 

• United States Foreign Internal Defense Capabilities ............................................ IV-15 

CHAPTER V 

 TRAINING 

SECTION A. TRAINING JOINT FORCES FOR FOREIGN 

INTERNAL DEFENSE ........................................................................................... V-1 

• General ..................................................................................................................... V-1 

• Training and Skills Needed for Success in Foreign Internal Defense ..................... V-1 

• Foreign Internal Defense Training Strategy ............................................................. V-3 

SECTION B. TRAINING HOST NATION FORCES................................................. V-4 

• Training Plan ............................................................................................................ V-4

• Training and Advising .............................................................................................. V-5 

CHAPTER VI 

 FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS 

SECTION A. EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS .............................................. VI-1 

• General .................................................................................................................... VI-1 

• Employment Factors ............................................................................................... VI-1 

• Site Survey Considerations ..................................................................................... VI-9 

• Health Service Support and Medical Civil-Military Operations............................ VI-10 

SECTION B. INDIRECT SUPPORT ....................................................................... VI-11 

• General .................................................................................................................. VI-11 

• Security Assistance ............................................................................................... VI-11 

• Joint and Multinational Exercises ......................................................................... VI-16 

• Exchange Programs ............................................................................................... VI-17 

SECTION C. DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING 

 COMBAT OPERATIONS) .................................................................................. VI-18 

• General .................................................................................................................. VI-18 

• Civil-Military Operations ...................................................................................... VI-18 

• Psychological Operations ...................................................................................... VI-27 

• Military Training to Host Nation Forces ............................................................... VI-29 

• Logistic Support .................................................................................................... VI-34 

• Intelligence and Information Sharing .................................................................... VI-35 

SECTION D. COMBAT OPERATIONS ................................................................. VI-36 

• General .................................................................................................................. VI-36 

• Considerations for United States Combat Operations .......................................... VI-37 

• Command and Control .......................................................................................... VI-39 

• Sustainment ........................................................................................................... VI-39 
Table of Contents 

vii 

SECTION E. TRANSITION AND REDEPLOYMENT ......................................... VI-40 

• General .................................................................................................................. VI-40 

• Termination of Operations .................................................................................... VI-40 

• Termination Approaches ....................................................................................... VI-40 

• National Strategic End State ................................................................................. VI-41 

• Military Considerations ......................................................................................... VI-42 

• Mission Handoff Procedures ................................................................................. VI-42 

• Considerations ....................................................................................................... VI-43 

• Post Mission Debriefing Procedures ..................................................................... VI-45 

APPENDIX 

 A Legal Considerations .......................................................................................... A-1 

 B Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment to Support 

Foreign Internal Defense ..................................................................................... B-1 

 C Illustrative Interagency Plan for Foreign Internal Defense ................................. C-1 

 D References .......................................................................................................... D-1 

 E Administrative Instructions ................................................................................. E-1 

GLOSSARY 

 Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................. GL-1 

 Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-6 

FIGURE 

 I-1 Characteristics of Foreign Internal Defense ................................................. I-5 

 I-2 The Foreign Internal Defense Framework, 

Instruments of National Power, and Selected Sources of Power................. I-6 

 I-3 Foreign Internal Defense: Integrated Security Cooperation Activities ........ I-8 

 I-4 Security Cooperation Activities...................................................................I-11 

 I-5 The Relationship of Security Cooperation, 

Security Assistance, and Foreign Internal Defense .....................................I-12 

 II-1 Internal Defense and Development Strategy Model.................................... II-2 

 II-2 Counterinsurgency Planning and Coordination Organization..................... II-7 

 III-1 Foreign Internal Defense Coordination ..................................................... III-2 

 III-2 Notional Foreign Internal Defense Interagency Working Group .............. III-8 

 III-3 The Country Team Structure ................................................................... III-11 

 III-4 Security Cooperation Organization (Departmental Alignment).............. III-14 

 III-5 Security Cooperation Organization (Functional Alignment) .................. III-14 

 III-6 Embassy and Security Cooperation Organization 

Working Relationships ............................................................................ III-16 

 IV-1 Foreign Internal Defense Operations Functional Areas 

Associated with the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan................................ IV-5 

 IV-2 Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products .................. IV-7 

 IV-3 Concept Development ............................................................................... IV-8 
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viii JP 3-22 

 VI-1 Force Employment Factors in Foreign Internal Defense Operations ........ VI-2 

 VI-2 Indirect Support in Foreign Internal Defense .......................................... VI-12 

 VI-3 General Objectives of Training Programs Under Security Assistance.... VI-14 

 VI-4 Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations) ............................... VI-19 

 VI-5 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Employment Considerations ............. VI-24 

 VI-6 Foreign Security Forces............................................................................VI-31 

 VI-7 Security Force Assistance.........................................................................VI-32 

 VI-8 Post Mission Debriefing Guide ................................................................VI-47 
ix 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

 Provides an Overview of Foreign Internal Defense 

 Discusses Host Nation Internal Defense and Development 

 Outlines Organization and Responsibilities for Foreign Internal Defense 

 Discusses Planning for Foreign Internal Defense 

 Covers Training for Joint and Host Nation Forces 

 Discusses Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

Overview of Foreign Internal Defense 

Foreign internal defense 

(FID) refers to activities that 

support a host nation (HN) 

internal defense and 

development (IDAD) 

strategy. 

Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by 

civilian and military agencies of a government in any 

of the action programs taken by another government or 

other designated organization, to free and protect its 

society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, 

terrorism, and other threats to their security. The focus 

of US FID efforts is to support the host nation’s 

(HN’s) internal defense and development (IDAD), 

which can be described as the full range of measures 

taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect 

itself from the security threats described above. 

While historically, the United States provided notable, 

and largely unconditional, assistance to friendly 

foreign nations following World War II (Truman 

Doctrine and the Marshall Plan), FID as conducted 

today has its genesis in the post-Vietnam era when US 

policy shifted to emphasize that the United States 

would assist friendly nations, but would require them 

to provide the manpower and be ultimately responsible 

for their own national defense. 

It is important to frame the US FID effort within the 

context of the US doctrine it supports and to 

understand how it fits into the HN IDAD program. US 

military support to FID should focus on assisting an 

HN in anticipating, precluding, and countering threats 

or potential threats and addressing the root causes of 
Executive Summary 

x JP 3-22 

instability. Emphasis on internal developmental 

programs as well as internal defense programs when 

organizing, planning, and executing military support to 

US FID activities is essential. Although the FID 

operation is considered military engagement, security 

cooperation, and deterrence, FID may include or 

support operations from across the range of military 

operations to support the HN’s IDAD strategy. 

Accordingly, US military operations supporting FID 

provide training, materiel, advice, or assistance to local 

forces executing an IDAD program, rather than US 

forces conducting IDAD military missions for the HN. 

The FID effort is a 

multinational and 

interagency effort, requiring 

integration and 

synchronization of all 

instruments of national 

power.

Military officials often have greater access to, and 

credibility with, HN regimes that are heavily 

influenced or dominated by their own military. 

However, the characteristics of FID involve the 

instruments of national power beyond the military 

instrument (diplomatic, informational, and economic) 

through which sources of US power (such as financial, 

intelligence, and law enforcement) can be applied to 

support an HN IDAD program. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) employs a number 

of FID tools. Security cooperation is DOD 

interactions with foreign defense establishments to 

build defense relationships that promote specific US 

security interests, develop allied and friendly military 

capabilities for self-defense and multinational 

operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and 

contingency access to a host nation. The Guidance for 

Employment of the Force contains DOD guidance for 

SC. This guidance provides goals and activities for 

specific regions and provides the overarching 

framework for many FID-related activities. Indirect 

support, employing security assistance (SA), military 

exchange programs, and joint and multinational 

exercises, focuses on building strong national 

infrastructures through economic and military 

capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency. Direct 

support (not involving combat operations) involves 

the use of US forces normally focused on civil-military 

operations (CMO) (primarily the provision of services 

to the local populace), psychological operations 

(PSYOP), communications and intelligence 

cooperation, mobility, and logistic support. The final 

tool is US combat operations in support of FID 
Executive Summary 

xi 

operations, which requires a Presidential decision and 

serves only as a temporary solution until HN forces are 

able to stabilize the situation and provide security for 

the populace.

Internal Defense and Development 

An IDAD program focuses 

on building viable political, 

economic, military, and 

social institutions that 

respond to the needs of the 

(HN’s) society.

The construct of an IDAD program should integrate 

security force and civilian actions into a coherent, 

comprehensive effort. The strategy, therefore, 

includes measures to maintain conditions under which 

orderly development can take place. Furthermore, the 

successful IDAD strategist must realize that the true 

nature of the threat to the government lies in the 

adversary’s political strength rather than military 

power. Military and paramilitary programs are 

necessary for success, but are not sufficient alone. 

An IDAD program blends four interdependent 

functions to prevent or counter internal threats. 

Balanced development attempts to achieve national 

goals through political, social, and economic 

programs, allowing all individuals and groups in the 

society to share in the rewards of development, thus 

alleviating frustration. The security function includes 

all activities implemented in order to protect the 

populace from violence and to provide a safe 

environment for national development. The security 

effort should establish an environment in which the 

HN can provide for its own security with limited US 

support. Neutralization, a political concept, 

physically and psychologically separates an insurgent 

or criminal element from the population, thereby 

making threatening elements irrelevant to the political 

process. It includes all lawful measures (except those 

that degrade the government’s legitimacy) to discredit, 

disrupt, preempt, disorganize, and defeat the insurgent 

organization. Mobilization provides organized 

manpower and materiel resources and includes all 

activities to motivate and organize popular support of 

the government. Mobilization allows the government 

to strengthen existing institutions, to develop new ones 

to respond to demands, and promotes the 

government’s legitimacy. 

Certain principles guide efforts in the four functional 

areas in the IDAD strategy to prevent or defeat an 
Executive Summary 

xii JP 3-22 

internal threat. The principles are unity of effort, 

requiring cooperation among all forces and agencies 

toward a commonly recognized objective; maximum 

use of intelligence requires that all operations be 

based on reliable, accurate, and timely intelligence to 

protect friendly FID operations and to counter and 

penetrate opposing force intelligence collection 

operations; maximum use of CMO and PSYOP,

which helps generate active and tacit popular support 

of the HN government and buys the time for the HN 

civil authorities and government to eliminate or 

mitigate valid popular grievances; minimum use of 

force, appropriate (and proportional) to the incident at 

hand, to maintain order and incorporate economy of 

force; a responsive government, whose ability to 

mobilize manpower and resources as well as motivate 

the people reflects its administrative and management 

capabilities; and use of strategic communication, 

characterized by defense support of public diplomacy, 

public affairs (PA), and information operations (IO) 

messages that are coordinated early during the 

planning process and continually throughout the 

operation and that are derived from harmonized 

themes lest the credibility of some of the agencies 

involved in the FID effort, particularly the HN’s, 

becomes compromised or lost. 

The organization that is created to coordinate, plan, 

and conduct IDAD activities may vary from country to 

country in order to adapt to existing conditions. The 

organization should be structured and chartered so that 

it can coordinate and direct the IDAD efforts of 

existing government agencies; however, it should 

minimize interference with those agencies’ normal 

functions. A national-level organization’s major 

offices normally correspond to branches and agencies 

of the national government concerned with insurgency, 

illicit drug trafficking, and terrorist or other internal 

threats. At the subnational level, area coordination 

centers (ACCs) may function as multinational civilmilitary headquarters at subnational, state, and local 

levels. ACCs perform a twofold mission: they provide 

integrated planning, coordination, and direction for all 

internal defense efforts and they facilitate an 

immediate, coordinated response to operational 

requirements. There are two types of subnational 

ACCs that a government may form — regional and 
Executive Summary 

xiii 

urban. Regional ACCs normally locate with the 

nation’s first subnational political subdivision with a 

fully developed governmental apparatus (state, 

province, or other). Where higher level ACCs are 

lacking, urban ACCs that include representatives 

from local public service agencies, such as police, fire, 

medical, public works, public utilities, 

communications, and transportation, are appropriate 

for cities and heavily populated areas. 

Organization and Responsibilities for Foreign Internal Defense 

The lines of organization 

and coordination during 

FID operations are complex.

For FID to be successful in meeting an HN’s needs, 

the United States government (USG) must integrate 

the efforts of multiple government agencies. Such 

integration and coordination are essentially vertical 

between levels of command and organization, and 

horizontal between USG agencies and HN military and 

civilian agencies. Management of the FID effort 

begins at the national level, with the selection of those 

nations the US will support through FID efforts. This 

decision is made by the President with advice from the 

Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and 

other officials. The US will consider FID support 

when the existing or threatened internal disorder 

threatens US national strategic goals, or when the 

threatened nation requests and is capable of effectively 

using US assistance. 

The National Security Council (NSC) will generally 

provide the initial guidance and translation of nationallevel decisions pertaining to FID. The Department of 

State (DOS) is generally the lead government agency 

and assists the NSC in building and carrying out 

national FID policies and priorities. The United 

States Agency for International Development 

carries out nonmilitary assistance programs designed 

to assist certain less developed nations to increase their 

productive capacities and improve their quality of life. 

The Director of National Intelligence and the 

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency support 

the FID mission in both a national-level advisory 

capacity and at the regional and country levels through 

direct support of FID activities. 

The Department of Defense national-level 

organizations involved in FID management include the 
Executive Summary 

xiv JP 3-22 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint 

Staff. OSD acts as a policy-making organization in 

most FID matters. The Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy exercises overall direction, authority, and 

control concerning SA for OSD through the various 

assistant secretaries of defense. The Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is the principal DOD 

organization through which SecDef carries out 

responsibilities for SA, conducting international 

logistics and sales negotiations and serving as the 

DOD focal point for liaison with US industry 

regarding SA. Finally, DSCA develops and 

promulgates SA procedures, maintains the database for 

the programs, and makes determinations with respect 

to the allocation of foreign military sales 

administrative funds. 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 

plays an important role in providing strategic guidance 

to the combatant commanders for the conduct of 

military operations to support FID. This guidance is 

provided primarily through the National Military 

Strategy (NMS) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities 

Plan (JSCP), the key components of the Joint Strategic 

Planning System (JSPS). 

United States Coast Guard, within the Department 

of Homeland Security is specifically authorized to 

assist other federal agencies in the performance of any 

activity for which especially qualified, including SA 

activities for DOS and DOD. 

Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) are 

responsible for planning and executing military 

operations in support of FID within their area of 

responsibility (AOR). Other combatant commanders 

play a supporting role by providing resources to 

conduct operations as directed by the President or 

SecDef. All staff elements contribute to the overall 

support of the FID operation. For example, the plans 

directorate incorporates military support to FID into 

theater strategy and plans; the operations directorate

monitors the execution of military operations in 

support of FID; and the intelligence directorate

produces intelligence that often supplements estimates 

produced by the national intelligence agencies. Other 

staff functions may be given primary responsibility 
Executive Summary 

xv 

for specific military technical support missions and 

will usually focus on the direct support (not involving 

combat operations) category of military support to 

FID. 

When authorized by SecDef through the CJCS, 

commanders of unified commands may establish 

subordinate unified commands (also called 

subunified commands), either geographic or 

functional, to conduct operations on a continuing basis 

in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified 

commands. Theater special operations commands are 

of particular importance because of the significant role 

of special operations forces (SOF) in FID operations. 

Coordination between the joint force special 

operations component commander and the other 

component commanders within the combatant 

command is essential for effective management of 

military operations in support of FID, including joint 

and multinational exercises, mobile training teams, 

integration of SOF with conventional forces, and other 

operations. 

The President gives the chief of the diplomatic 

mission, normally an ambassador, full responsibility 

for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all 

USG executive branch employees in-country. Close 

coordination with each chief of mission (COM) and 

country team is essential in order to conduct effective, 

country-specific FID operations that support the HN’s 

IDAD program and US regional goals and objectives. 

The principal military member of the country team is 

the senior defense official/defense attaché 

(SDO/DATT), who functions as the COM’s principal 

military advisor on defense and national security 

issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DOD 

military officer assigned to a US diplomatic mission, 

and the single point of contact for all DOD matters 

involving the embassy or DOD elements assigned to or 

working from the embassy. Additionally, in the 

majority of countries, the functions of a security 

cooperation organization (SCO) are carried out under 

the direction of the SDO/DATT. The SCO is the most 

important FID-related military activity under the 

supervision of the ambassador. The specific title of 

the SCO may vary; however, these differences reflect 

nothing more than the political climate within the HN. 
Executive Summary 

xvi JP 3-22 

As examples, an SCO may be referred to as a military 

assistance advisory group, military advisory group, 

office of military cooperation, or office of defense 

cooperation. 

Planning for Foreign Internal Defense 

FID planning is designed to 

bolster the internal stability 

and security of the 

supported nation.

A comprehensive planning process at both the national 

and theater level is vital in order to provide the means 

to bolster the internal stability and security of the 

supported nation. The type of planning necessary is 

dictated by the type or types of support being 

provided. Support in anticipating and precluding 

threats is preventive in nature and is likely to require a 

mix of indirect support and direct support not 

involving combat operations. Depending on whether 

the mission has originated through DOD or DOS, how, 

where, and at what level the planning, coordination, 

and resourcing takes place will vary. 

FID has certain aspects that 

make planning for it 

complex.

Some basic imperatives when integrating FID into 

strategies and plans are:

Maintain HN Sovereignty and Build Legitimacy. 

Ultimately, FID operations are only as successful as 

the HN’s IDAD program.

Understand long-term or strategic implications and 

sustainability of all US assistance efforts. Building 

HN development and defense self-sufficiency may 

require large investments of time and materiel. 

Tailor military support to FID for the operational 

environment and the specific needs of the 

supported HN. The tendency to use a US frame of 

reference can result in equipment, training, and 

infrastructure not at all suitable for the nation receiving 

US assistance.

Ensure Unity of Effort/Unity of Purpose. Planning 

should consider and, where appropriate, integrate all 

instruments of national power and intergovernmental 

organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and 

HN capabilities in order to reduce inefficiencies and 

enhance strategy in support of FID and HN IDAD 

efforts.
Executive Summary 

xvii 

Understand US Foreign Policy. NSC directives, 

plans, or policies are the guiding documents; however, 

US policy may change as a result of developments in 

the HN or broader political changes in either country. 

DOD planners should seek guidance from the COM 

and country team in interpreting foreign policy and 

guiding US efforts in a particular country.

Understand the Information Environment. In an 

environment characterized by “instant 

communications,” proactive PA and PSYOP programs 

can address regional, transregional, and even global 

audiences that may have (or perceive they have) a 

stake in US FID operations.

Sustain the Effort. Plan for the US sustainment effort 

as well as the efforts necessary for the HN to sustain 

its operations after the US or multinational forces 

depart.

GCCs base strategy and military planning to support 

FID on the broad guidance and missions provided in 

the JSPS. The NMS supports the aims of the National 

Security Strategy (NSS) and implements the national 

defense strategy. Through the guidance and resources 

provided in the JSCP, the GCCs develop their 

operation plan and operation plan in concept format to 

support FID. The Guidance for Employment of the 

Force provides the foundation for all DOD interactions 

with foreign defense establishments, and supports the 

President’s NSS. The GCC, using an integrated 

priority list, also identifies requirements to support 

FID efforts and request authorization and resourcing. 

Military activities in support of FID requirements are 

integrated into concepts and plans from the strategic 

level down to the tactical level. Theater strategy 

translates national and alliance strategic tasks and 

direction into long-term, regionally focused 

operational tasks and direction to accomplish specific 

missions and objectives. In peacetime, FID is an 

integral part of the strategy of deterring hostilities and 

enhancing stability in the theater. The GCC’s theater 

campaign plan is the primary document that focuses on 

the command’s steady-state activities, which include 

operations, SC, and other activities designed to achieve 

theater strategic end states.
Executive Summary 

xviii JP 3-22 

Training 

The strategic imperative to 

assist allies, coalition 

partners, and the 

governments of threatened 

states in resisting aggression 

demands that joint forces 

strengthen their abilities to 

assist, train, and advise 

foreign military and security 

forces. 

Joint forces training requirements and skills needed for 

successful military operations in support of FID 

include: overall US and theater goals for FID; area and 

cultural orientation; language training; standards of 

conduct; relationships of FID programs to intelligence 

collection; coordinating relationships with other USG 

agencies; legal guidelines; rules of engagement (ROE); 

and tactical force protection training. Training to 

prepare for military operations to support FID requires 

that a broad range of areas be covered. The training 

also must be designed to support a mix of personnel, 

ranging from language-trained and culturally focused 

SOF to those totally untrained in the specific area 

where the FID program is located. A combination of 

institutional and unit-conducted individual and 

collective training will be required.

In addition to training for the joint force preparing to 

conduct FID, FID operations include training of HN 

security forces to build the capacity to support the 

IDAD strategy. After completing a thorough 

assessment and site survey, the JFC develops a training 

plan based on a thorough mission analysis and 

assessment of the IDAD strategy, HN capabilities and 

needs, and the operational environment. This plan 

should be developed in conjunction with both the 

country team and with commanders of HN forces to 

ensure that comprehensive objectives are detailed. 

Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

FID operational activities

emphasize interagency 

coordination. 

Several areas deserve special attention when 

discussing employment of forces in FID operations, 

including IO impact, psychological impact, 

intelligence support, SOF and/or conventional force 

selection, public information programs, logistic 

support, counterdrug operations in FID, combating 

weapons of mass destruction operations in FID, 

counterterrorism and FID, operations security, and 

lessons learned. 
Executive Summary 

xix 

Additionally, units assigned a FID mission must 

implement procedures to help DOS and the country 

team vet HN forces to ensure the identification of 

personnel with a history of human rights violations. 

The military will primarily 

provide equipment, training, 

and services to the supported 

HN forces. 

Indirect Support. GCCs are active in the SA process 

by advising ambassadors through the security 

assistance organization (SAO) and by coordinating and 

monitoring ongoing SA efforts in their AORs. In 

addition, through coordination with HN military forces 

and supporting SAOs, the combatant commander can 

assist in building credible military assistance packages 

that best support long-term goals and objectives of 

regional FID programs. Joint and multinational 

exercises can enhance a FID program. They offer the 

advantage of training US forces while simultaneously 

increasing interoperability with HN forces and offering 

limited HN training opportunities. Exchange 

programs foster greater mutual understanding and 

familiarize each force with the operations of the other. 

Exchange programs are another building block that can 

help a commander round out his FID plan. Some of 

these programs include reciprocal unit exchange 

programs, personnel exchange programs, individual 

exchange programs, and combination programs. 

Direct support involves US 

forces actually conducting 

operations in support of the 

HN. 

Direct Support Not Involving Combat Operations. 

Direct support operations provide immediate 

assistance and are usually combined in a total FID 

program with indirect operations. Several types of 

direct operations are important to supporting FID. 

CMO span a very broad area in FID and include 

activities such as civil affairs activities, foreign 

humanitarian assistance, humanitarian and civic 

assistance, and military civic action across the range of 

military operations. Using CMO to support military 

activities in a FID program can enhance preventive 

measures, reconstruction efforts, and combat 

operations in support of an HN IDAD program. 

PSYOP supports the achievement of national 

objectives by influencing behaviors in select target 

foreign audiences. Military training to HN forces 

may focus on subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency 

problems encountered by the HN that may be beyond 

its capabilities to control. Logistic support operations 

are limited by US law and usually consist of 
Executive Summary 

xx JP 3-22 

transportation or limited maintenance support, 

although an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement 

can allow additional support in areas beyond those.

Authorization for combatant commanders to provide 

logistic support to the HN military must be received 

from the President or SecDef. Intelligence and 

information sharing, although two separate areas, are 

closely related and have many of the same 

employment considerations. Assistance may be 

provided in terms of evaluation, training, limited 

information exchange, and equipment support. 

US participation in combat 

operations as part of a FID 

effort requires Presidential 

authority.

Combat Operations. Many considerations, including 

CMO and PSYOP, must be discussed and reviewed 

when employing combat forces in support of FID. 

They include: maintaining close coordination with the 

HN IDAD organization; tiering of forces; establishing 

transition points; maintaining a joint, interagency, and 

multinational focus; identifying and integrating 

logistics, intelligence, and other combat support means 

in US combat operations; conduct combat operations 

only when directed by legal authority to stabilize the 

situation and to give the local government and HN 

military forces time to regain the initiative; strict 

adherence to respect for human rights; following the 

ROE; preventing indiscriminate use of force; 

maintaining the US joint intelligence network; and 

integrating with other FID programs. The command 

and control relationships will be modified based on the 

political, social, and military environment of the area. 

The HN government and security forces must remain 

in the forefront. Finally, sustainment of US forces is 

essential to success. Political sensitivities and concern 

for HN legitimacy and minimum US presence do 

change the complexion of sustainment operations in 

FID.

Transition and Redeployment. Redeployment of 

units conducting FID operations does not typically 

indicate the end of all FID operations in the HN. 

Rather, in long-term FID operations as security and 

other conditions improve and internal threats become 

manageable for HN personnel, direct military-tomilitary activities by units will continue, but these 

activities may become more intermittent with gaps 

between regular exercises and exchanges. In both 

immediate mission handoff and intermittent FID 
Executive Summary 

xxi 

operations, capturing lessons learned in thorough 

postmission debriefings is essential to continue to 

build institutional FID knowledge and refine FID 

doctrine and training. 

CONCLUSION 

This publication establishes joint doctrine for the 

Armed Forces of the United States involved in or 

supporting FID. It discusses how joint operations, 

involving the application of all instruments of national 

power, support HN efforts to build capability and 

capacity to free and protect its society from 

subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
Executive Summary 

xxii JP 3-22 

Intentionally Blank 
I-1 

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. General 

a. Military engagement, security cooperation (SC), and deterrence encompass a 

wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power supports other 

instruments of national power to protect and enhance national security interests and deter 

conflict. Within this range of military operations, nation assistance (NA) is civil or 

military assistance (other than foreign humanitarian assistance [FHA]) rendered to a 

nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or 

emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States 

and that nation. NA operations support the host nation (HN) by promoting sustainable 

development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term 

regional stability. NA programs include security assistance (SA), humanitarian and 

civic assistance (HCA), and foreign internal defense (FID). FID is the participation 

by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs 

taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect 

its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to 

their security. Internal threats in the context of this publication means threats 

manifested within the internationally recognized boundaries of a nation. These threats 

can come from, but are not limited to, subversion, insurgency (including support to 

insurgency), and/or criminal activities. 

b. The focus of US FID efforts is to support the HN’s internal defense and 

development (IDAD). IDAD is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote 

its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and 

other threats to their security. It focuses on building viable institutions that respond to the 

needs of society. It is important to understand that both FID and IDAD, although defined 

terms and used throughout this publication, are not terms used universally outside the 

Department of Defense (DOD). Other terms could be used to encompass what are called 

FID and IDAD herein. 

c. Military engagement during FID supports the other instruments of national power 

through a variety of activities across the range of military operations. In some cases, 

direct military support may be necessary in order to provide the secure environment for 

“Although on the surface, FID [foreign internal defense] appears to be a 

relatively simple concept, that appearance is deceptive; FID is a much more 

nuanced and complicated operation than its definition at first implies. FID is 

often confused with or equated to training foreign forces, when in reality, there 

is much more to it.” 

Lieutenant Colonel John Mulbury 

ARSOF [Army Special Operations Forces], 

General [Conventional] Purpose Forces and FID 

Special Warfare, January-February 2008 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-22 

IDAD efforts to become effective. However, absent direction from the President or the 

Secretary of Defense (SecDef), US forces engaged in NA are prohibited from engaging in 

combat operations, except in self-defense. 

d. From the US perspective, FID refers to the US activities that support an HN 

IDAD strategy designed to protect against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, 

terrorism, and other threats to their security, consistent with US national security 

objectives and policies.

2. Background 

a. The United States has a long history of assisting the governments of friendly 

nations facing internal threats. In the chaos after World War II, the United States 

followed its massive wartime Lend Lease Program with postwar assistance through the 

Marshall Plan by providing up to 90 percent of the support to the United Nations Relief 

and Rehabilitation Administration in support of war-stricken Europe and the Far East. 

New balances of power and the devastation of Europe had permanently changed the 

strategic role and interests of the United States. This new role was vividly demonstrated 

by the economic, equipment, training, and advisory support provided to Greece and 

Turkey to stabilize their governments. This postwar US policy was reflected in the 

staunchly anticommunist Truman Doctrine that established US policy as that of 

“...supporting free peoples who are attempting to resist subjugation by armed minorities 

or by outside pressures.” 

b. Both the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were US-designed and USimplemented programs concentrating on repelling the external threat of communist 

aggression as well as thwarting internal threats to supported nations. Although this 

concept of support differs significantly from today’s FID concept, these programs set the 

precedent for US support and assistance to friendly nations facing threats to their national 

security. Early postwar arms transfers were carried out as grant aid (giveaway) under the 

Military Assistance Program, often through a military assistance advisory group. Later, 

as the economies of recipient nations regenerated, arms transfers, economic aid, and 

collective security began to merge under a program that was to be known under the 

Nixon administration as SA. 

c. The US policy of assisting friendly nations to develop stable governments and 

prevent the spread of communism continued through the US experience with Cuba 

beginning in 1959. This policy reached a new level during the 1960s with the Alliance 

for Progress, which involved Central and South America. This era of assistance 

culminated with the war in Vietnam, a major turning point for US policy that shaped the 

concept of FID as the United States now conducts it. In 1969, with US public and 

congressional opinion moving strongly against the war in Vietnam and against US 

intervention in general, President Richard M. Nixon announced a new US approach to 

supporting friendly nations. The Nixon Doctrine (also called the Guam Doctrine) 

expressed this policy with emphasis on the point that the US would assist friendly 

nations, but would require them to provide the manpower and be ultimately responsible 

for their own national defense. This principle of nations developing their own IDAD 
Introduction 

I-3 

programs, supported through US training and materiel assistance, has become the basis 

for today’s FID doctrine. 

d. In recent times, the United States has provided the same type of NA in El 

Salvador, Colombia, Kuwait, the Philippines, Afghanistan, and the Republic of Georgia. 

Although not of the same magnitude as the post-World War II efforts, the United States 

contributed to restoring stability in the various regions after crisis situations. 

 e. Although FID is a core task of US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 

and special operations forces (SOF) maintain the capability to conduct such operations, 

conventional forces (CF) also possess capabilities to conduct FID. FID is not a militaryonly operation; rather, it includes an interagency approach to assisting an HN. The joint 

force commander (JFC) supporting a FID effort may employ capabilities provided by 

both CF and SOF. A robust FID operation may be conducted through the command and 

control (C2) structure of a joint task force (JTF) or a joint special operations task force 

(JSOTF). When CF and SOF are integrated, appropriate C2 or liaison elements should be 

exchanged or provided to the appropriate components of a joint force. 

For additional detail on CF and SOF relationships, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-

05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, and USSOCOM Pub 3-33, 

Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability 

Handbook and Checklist, Version 2, September 2006. 

3. Relationship of Foreign Internal Defense to Internal Defense and Development 

a. It is important to frame the US FID effort within the context of the US doctrine it 

supports and to understand how it fits into the HN IDAD program. 

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE 

The concept of foreign internal defense as a way to provide US support to 

a host nation’s internal defense and development (IDAD) plan originated 

from the Kennedy administration with National Security Action 

Memorandum (NSAM) 182 in August 1962. It was referred to as the “US 

Overseas Internal Defense Plan.” This NSAM also provided the first US 

counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine issued from the executive level. 

Resident within the narrative of this NSAM and COIN doctrine is the 

concept of the IDAD plan as central to aligning US support to other 

nations while striving to ensure that the strategic emphasis remains with 

the host nation government. In NSAM 341, the Johnson administration 

made minor adjustments to the approach, mainly structural in nature, as 

to how the National Security Council was organized, along with other 

minor changes, and re-issued NSAM 182 with the short title, “Foreign 

Internal Defense Policy,” issued as executive policy, and as such, 

applicable to all government departments and agencies. 

Various Sources
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-22 

b. As previously noted, FID falls under the NA construct. NA supports the HN by 

promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The US goal 

is to promote long-term regional stability. 

c. US military support to FID should focus on assisting an HN in anticipating, 

precluding, and countering threats or potential threats and addressing the root causes of 

instability. Emphasis on internal developmental programs as well as internal defense 

programs when organizing, planning, and executing military support to US FID activities 

is essential. 

d. US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused toward 

counterinsurgency (COIN). Although much of the FID effort remains focused on this 

important area, US activities may aim at other threats to an HN’s internal stability, such 

as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, 

predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and 

ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. 

Focusing on the internal development portion of IDAD expands the focus beyond 

COIN. 

For additional information on COIN, refer to JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations. 

e. US military operations supporting FID provide training, materiel, advice, or 

assistance to local forces executing an IDAD program, rather than US forces conducting 

IDAD military missions for the HN. Military operations are, at least to some degree, 

intertwined with foreign assistance provided by non-DOD agencies in the form of 

development assistance, humanitarian assistance, or SA described in legislation such as 

the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). 

4. Foreign Internal Defense Within the Range of Military Operations 

a. Use of joint capabilities in military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities 

helps shape the operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between 

nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global 

influence. NA operations, including FID, are applied to meet military engagement, SC, 

and deterrence objectives. 

b. FID operations occur throughout the range of military operations, most often as 

persistent and enduring cooperative security engagements, including SA and other 

shaping activities, but can function during limited contingency operations and larger scale 

activities to support an HN’s COIN operations. Although the FID operation is considered 

military engagement, SC, and deterrence, FID may include or support operations from 

across the range of military operations to support the HN’s IDAD strategy. For instance, 

FID in one country may include training the HN to improve functions to deal with 

criminal activity such as drug trafficking, while in another country FID may include 

training the HN to conduct COIN operations. Although FID may include, as part of 

supporting the HN’s IDAD strategy, capacity building across the HN, the focus is on 
Introduction 

I-5 

combating internal threats to assist the HN in maintaining legitimacy and influence over 

the relevant population, especially as it pertains to irregular warfare (IW). IW is a 

primary focus of FID. 

For additional detail on the range of military operations and/or IW, refer to JP 3-0, Joint 

Operations. 

5. The Foreign Internal Defense Operational Framework and Instruments of 

National Power 

a. As shown in Figure I-1, characteristics of FID involve the instruments of national 

power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) through which sources of US 

power (such as financial, intelligence, and law enforcement) can be applied to support an 

HN IDAD program. Although this publication centers on the military instrument’s 

contribution, it is also important to understand the overlying national strategy that directs 

FID activities and how all instruments of national power support these activities. 

b. The FID operational framework, shown in Figure I-2, is discussed in more detail 

throughout the remainder of this chapter. 

c. Diplomatic Instrument. FID makes extensive use of the diplomatic instrument 

of national power. A dysfunctional political system in a nation results in internal 

instability. Diplomacy is often the first instrument exercised by the United States and 

depending upon the decisions made by the President or the President’s designee, the 

Involves all instruments of national power

Can occur across the range of military operations

Is conducted by both conventional forces and special 

operations forces

Supports and influences the host nation's internal defense and 

development program

Includes training, materiel, technical and organizational 

assistance, advice, infrastructure development, and tactical 

operations

Generally, the preferred methods of support are through 

assistance and development programs 

CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Figure I-1. Characteristics of Foreign Internal Defense 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-22 

THE FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE FRAMEWORK, INSTRUMENTS 

OF NATIONAL POWER, AND SELECTED SOURCES OF POWER

Foreign internal defense (FID) makes extensive use of the diplomatic instrument of national power 

and is often the first instrument exercised by the United States. 

DIPLOMATIC

Economics influence every aspect of FID support. It is used in a variety of ways, ranging from direct 

financial assistance and favorable trade arrangements, to the provision of foreign military financing 

under security assistance.

ECONOMIC

FINANCIAL 

Selected Sources of Power Applied Through the Instruments

This involves United States Government (USG) agencies working with the governments of other 

nations and international financial institutions to encourage economic growth; raise standards of 

living; and to the extent possible, predict, prevent, or limit economic and financial crises.

This seeks to provide national leadership with information to help achieve national goals and 

objectives and to provide military leadership with information to accomplish missions and implement 

national security strategy. Attention is focused to identify adversary capabilities and centers of 

gravity; protect friendly course of action; and to assist planning of friendly force employment. 

Whereas informational power projects information to shape environments, intelligence seeks to 

gather information to understand environments and to inform decisionmaking.

The USG is accountable to its people and expected to govern effectively through administration and 

enforcement of the law. This also requires ensuring public safety against foreign and internal threats; 

preventing and controlling crime; punishing unlawful behavior; and fair and impartial administration 

of justice. Because the threats to US security and public safety are global, extensive work is required 

outside US borders to combat and counter these threats.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

Effective use of public diplomacy, public affairs activities, and psychological operations is essential 

to FID. Accurate portrayal of United States FID efforts through positive information programs can 

influence worldwide perceptions of the FID efforts and the host nation's (HN’s) desire to embrace 

changes and improvements necessary to correct its problems.

INFORMATIONAL

The military plays an important supporting role in FID. Military FID activities can generally be 

categorized into:

Indirect Support: FID operations that emphasize building strong national infrastructures 

through economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency.

Direct Support (not involving combat operations): FID operations providing direct 

assistance to the HN civilian populace or military when the HN has not attained selfsufficiency and is faced with threats beyond its capability to handle.

Combat Operations.

INTELLIGENCE

MILITARY

Figure I-2. The Foreign Internal Defense Framework, Instruments of National Power, and 

Selected Sources of Power 
Introduction 

I-7 

diplomatic instrument of national power may be the only practical instrument of national 

power that can be brought to bear. Indirect and direct military support provided through 

training, logistics, or other support all make significant diplomatic statements by 

demonstrating US commitment and resolve. 

d. Informational Instrument. The United States Government (USG) uses strategic 

communication to provide top-down guidance relative to using the informational 

instrument of national power in specific situations. The predominant military activities 

that support USG strategic communication themes and messages—information 

operations (IO), public affairs (PA), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD)—

are essential to FID. FID activities may lead to public misunderstanding and may be 

exploited by elements hostile to the United States and its allies. US foreign assistance 

(development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and SA) has often been met with 

skepticism by the American public and typically has been the target for adversary 

propaganda. FID offers a mechanism to portray US support in a positive light, but 

not at the expense of the supported nation that may be sensitive to accepting aid. 

Accurate portrayal of US FID efforts through positive information programs can 

influence worldwide perceptions of the US FID efforts and HN desire to embrace 

changes and improvements necessary to correct its problems as well as deter those 

opposed to such changes. Additionally, some HNs may be willing to accept 

informational or intelligence support more readily than more transparent military support 

to internal and external audiences. 

e. Military Instrument. The military plays an important supporting role in the 

overall conduct of FID activities and this role cannot be conducted in isolation. In some 

cases, the role of the US military may become more important because military officials 

have greater access to, and credibility with, HN regimes that are heavily influenced or 

dominated by their own military. The ability of the US military to influence the 

professionalism of the HN military, and thus its democratic process, is considerable. In 

such cases, success may depend on US representatives being able to persuade host 

military authorities to lead or support reform efforts aimed at eliminating or reducing 

corruption and human rights abuse. The FID effort is a multinational and interagency 

effort, requiring integration and synchronization of all instruments of national 

power. US military support also requires joint planning and execution to ensure that the 

efforts of all participating combatant commands, subordinate joint force commands, 

and/or Service or functional components are mutually supportive and focused. FID is 

conducted by both CF and SOF as appropriate. Generally, joint force activities that 

support FID are categorized as indirect support, direct support (not including 

combat operations), and combat operations. See Figure I-3 for examples of indirect 

support, direct support, and combat operations. These categories represent significantly 

different levels of US diplomatic and military commitment and risk. It should be noted, 

however, that various activities and operations within these categories can occur 

simultaneously. As an example, certain forms of indirect support and direct support (not 

involving combat operations) may continue even when US forces are committed to a 

combat role. 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-22 

f. Economic Instrument. Economics influence every aspect of FID support. 

Often, the internal strife a supported nation faces is brought on by unfavorable economic 

conditions within that nation. These conditions weaken national infrastructures and 

contribute to instability, particularly when the HN government is perceived as not being 

able to meet the basic needs of the people. These instabilities may produce an 

environment ripe for increasing subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The economic 

tool is used in a variety of ways, ranging from direct financial assistance and favorable 

trade arrangements to the provision of foreign military financing (FMF) under SA. 

g. Selected Sources of Power Applied Through the Instruments of National 

Power

 (1) Financial. The financial activities of the nation promote the conditions for 

prosperity and stability in the United States and encourage prosperity and stability in the 

rest of the world. The Department of the Treasury (TREAS) is the primary federal 

INDIRECT SUPPORT

Security Assistance

Exchange Programs

Joint/Multinational Exercises

DIRECT SUPPORT

 (not involving combat operations)

Civil-Military Operations

Logistic Support

 Intelligence Cooperation

Psychological Operations

Military Training to Host Nation Forces

COMBAT OPERATIONS

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE:

INTEGRATED SECURITY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES

Security Cooperation

Security Cooperation

Security Cooperation

Security Cooperation

Figure I-3. Foreign Internal Defense: Integrated Security Cooperation Activities 
Introduction 

I-9 

agency responsible for the economic and financial prosperity and security of the United 

States. In the international arena, TREAS works with other federal agencies, 

governments of other nations, and international financial institutions to encourage 

economic growth; raise standards of living; and predict and prevent, to the extent 

possible, economic and financial crises. 

 (2) Intelligence. Intelligence activities provide the national leadership with the 

information needed to realize national goals and objectives and to implement the National 

Security Strategy (NSS). It also provides the military leadership with the information 

needed to accomplish missions and implement the National Military Strategy (NMS). 

Planners use intelligence to identify the adversary’s capabilities and centers of gravity, 

project probable courses of action (COAs), and assist in planning friendly force 

employment. Intelligence also provides assessments that help the JFC decide which 

forces to deploy; when, how, and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a 

manner that accomplishes the mission at the lowest human and political cost. 

Intelligence support to USG FID may involve the identification of critical infrastructure, 

mapping of significant activities that may be threats, and products that support safety of 

navigation or provide increased situational awareness for strategic decisionmaking. 

 (3) Law Enforcement

 (a) The mission of the Department of Justice (DOJ) is to enforce the law 

and defend the interests of the United States according to the law, to ensure public safety 

against both foreign and domestic threats, to provide federal leadership in preventing and 

controlling crime, to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior, and to 

ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans. The Attorney 

General represents the United States in legal matters and advises the President and heads 

of the executive departments of the government when so requested. DOJ is the central 

agency for enforcement of federal laws. 

 (b) Terrorism poses a grave threat to individuals’ lives and national 

security around the world. The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) 

(the largest international police organization) has therefore made available various 

training opportunities and resources to support member countries in their efforts to 

protect their citizens from terrorism, including bioterrorism, firearms and explosives, 

attacks against civil aviation, maritime piracy, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 

The United States National Central Bureau of INTERPOL operates in conjunction with 

the Department of Homeland Security and within the guidelines prescribed by DOJ. 

 (c) Other law enforcement agencies include the United States Secret 

Service, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. Additionally, the Department of State (DOS) Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), while not a law enforcement agency, can 

be instrumental in the development of policies and programs to combat international 

narcotics and crime. The DOJ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms can also 

provide information about international crime and explosives trafficking. 
Chapter I 

I-10 JP 3-22 

 (d) The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is a unique, multimission 

organization that is at all times a law enforcement agency (Title 14, United States Code 

[USC], Section 89) as well as a military service and a branch of the Armed Forces of the 

United States (Title 10, USC, Section 101; Title 14, USC, Sections 1 and 2). The ability 

to handle evolving scenarios as a federal law enforcement agency or an armed force is a 

unique characteristic of the USCG. Congress established the USCG as a maritime 

constabulary force of the United States by specifically assigning it the duty to enforce or 

assist the enforcement of all applicable federal laws on, under, and over the high seas and 

waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 

6. Department of Defense Foreign Internal Defense Tools 

a. Security Cooperation. SC involves all DOD interactions with foreign defense 

establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security 

interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and 

multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access 

to an HN. SC is the means by which DOD encourages and enables countries and 

organizations to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. The 

Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) contains DOD guidance for SC. This 

guidance provides goals and activities for specific regions and provides the overarching 

framework for many FID-related activities. The GEF includes the SC tools/resources 

shown in Figure I-4, some of which will be discussed (as they apply to FID) further 

below. Additionally, Figure I-3 shows how SC encompasses FID, which consists of 

indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), and combat 

operations. Each of these is discussed below. Relationships among SC, SA, and FID are 

depicted at Figure I-5. 

For further guidance on SC tools/resources, refer to the current GEF.

b. Indirect Support. These are FID operations that emphasize the principle of HN 

self-sufficiency. Indirect support focuses on building strong national infrastructures 

through economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency. The 

US military contribution to this type of support is derived from SC guidance and 

provided primarily through SA, supplemented by multinational exercises, exchange 

programs, and selected joint exercises. 

(1) Security Assistance. SA is a principal element in the US FID effort. Like 

FID itself, SA is a broad, encompassing topic and includes efforts of civilian agencies as 

well as those of the military. SA is the provision of defense articles, military training, 

and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance 

of US national policies and objectives. SA, while integral to FID, is much broader than 

FID alone. SA is predominately aimed at enhancing regional stability of areas of the 

world facing external vice internal threats. Note that only a portion of the overall SA 

effort fits into the FID area, but that it is a large part of the overall FID indirect 

support effort. Also, it is important to note that the direct support (not involving combat 

operations) category typically makes up the preponderance of the remaining military 

operations. The SA program is authorized by the FAA of 1961 as amended, and the 
Introduction 

I-11 

Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 as amended, and is under the supervision and 

general direction of DOS. SA is the military component of foreign assistance 

implemented by DOD in accordance with policies established by DOS, and has as its 

principal components foreign military sales (FMS), FMF, international military 

education and training (IMET), peace operations (PO), and excess defense articles 

(EDA). DOS provides financial support to international peacekeeping operations (PKO), 

a subset of PO, through a PKO fund. These components, combined with the Economic 

Support Fund and commercial sales licensed under the AECA, are SA tools that the 

United States can use to further its national interests and support the overall FID effort. 

(a) Foreign Military Sales. FMS is a nonappropriated program through 

which foreign governments can purchase defense articles, services, and training from the 

United States. Eligible nations can use this program to help build national security 

infrastructures. A limitation of this program is that the nations that require assistance are 

often unable to finance their needs. 

SECURITY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES































Multinational Education

Multinational Exercises

Multinational Experimentation

Multinational Training

Counternarcotics Assistance

Counter / Nonproliferation

Defense and Military Contacts

Defense Support to Public Diplomacy

Facilities and Infrastructure Projects

Humanitarian Assistance

Intelligence Cooperation

Information Sharing

International Armaments Cooperation

Security Assistance

Other Programs and Activities

Figure I-4. Security Cooperation Activities 
Chapter I 

I-12 JP 3-22 

(b) Foreign Military Financing. FMF falls inside the military assistance 

budget process of DOS. FMF provides funding to purchase defense articles and services, 

design and construction services, and training through FMS or commercial channels. 

FMF can be an extremely effective FID tool, providing assistance to nations with weak 

economies that would otherwise be unable to afford US assistance. 

(c) International Military Education and Training. IMET, also part of 

the DOS military assistance budget process, contributes to internal and external security 

of a country by providing training to selected foreign militaries and related civilian 

THE RELATIONSHIP OF SECURITY COOPERATION, 

SECURITY ASSISTANCE, AND

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Security

Assistance

FID

Direct

Support

FID

Combat

Operations

FID

Indirect

Security Cooperation

Support

Security Cooperation

Security Cooperation

Security Cooperation

Security assistance directed at bolstering capabilities to defend against 

external threats

Security assistance directed at supporting a host nation's internal defense and 

development program under foreign internal defense

Foreign internal defense (FID)

LEGEND

Figure I-5. The Relationship of Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, and 

Foreign Internal Defense 
Introduction 

I-13 

personnel on a grant aid basis. The program helps to strengthen foreign militaries 

through US military training (and exposure to culture and values) that are necessary for 

the proper functioning of a civilian controlled, apolitical, and professional military. This 

program has long-term positive effects on US and HN bilateral relations. IMET serves as 

an influential foreign policy tool where the US shapes doctrine, promotes self-sufficiency 

in maintaining and operating US acquired defense equipment, encourages the value of 

rule of law, and occasionally has a marked effect on the policies of the recipient 

governments. Foreign students—many of whom occupy the middle and upper echelons 

of their country’s military and political establishments—are taught US defense doctrine 

and employment of US weapon systems, values, and management skills, resulting in 

greater cooperation and interoperability. 

(d) Peace Operations. This program funds US PO, such as the 

multinational force and observers in the Sinai and the US contribution to the United 

Nations Force in Cyprus. These operations are limited in scope and funding levels and, 

although related to FID operations, are generally considered separate activities with very 

focused goals and objectives. 

For further information on PO, refer to JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations. 

(e) Excess Defense Articles. EDA are DOD and USCG-owned defense 

articles no longer needed and declared excess by the Armed Forces of the United States. 

This excess equipment is offered at reduced or no cost to eligible foreign recipients on an 

“as is, where is” basis. EDA are used for various purposes including internal security 

(including antiterrorism [AT] and nonproliferation). The EDA program works best in 

assisting friends and allies to augment current inventories of like items with a support 

structure already in place. 

For further information on SA, refer to DOD 5105.38-M, Security Assistance 

Management Manual. 

(2) Exchange Programs. Military exchange programs also support the overall 

FID effort by fostering mutual understanding between forces; familiarizing each force 

with the organization, administration, and operations of the other; and enhancing cultural 

awareness. Exchange programs, coupled with the IMET program, are extremely valuable 

in improving HN and US relations and may also have long-term implications for 

strengthening democratic ideals and respect for human rights among supported 

governments. It is important, however, that such exchange programs (funded with Title 

Security assistance has been and still remains an important instrument of US 

foreign policy. Arms transfers and related services have reached enormous 

dimensions and involve most of the world’s nations, either as a seller/provider 

or buyer/recipient. 

Secretary of State Colin Powell, 

Written testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 8 March 2001 
Chapter I 

I-14 JP 3-22 

10, USC, monies) do not themselves become vehicles for SA training or other services to 

the HN in contravention of the FAA and AECA. 

(3) Joint and Multinational Exercises. These programs, which fall under the 

geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) theater campaign plan (TCP), strengthen 

US-HN relations and interoperability of forces. They are joint- and Service-funded and 

complement SA and civil-military operations (CMO) by validating HN needs and 

capabilities and by providing a vehicle for the conduct of HCA programs. There are very 

strict legal restrictions on the type of support that can be provided and on the monetary 

limits of such support. 

For further information on CMO support to FID, refer to Chapter VI, “Foreign Internal 

Defense Operations,” paragraph 10, “Civil-Military Operations;” Appendix A, “Legal 

Considerations;” and JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

c. Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations). These operations 

involve the use of US forces providing direct assistance to the HN civilian populace 

or military. They differ from SA in that they are joint- or Service-funded, do not usually 

involve the transfer of arms and equipment, and do not usually but may include training 

local military forces. Direct support operations are normally conducted when the HN has 

not attained self-sufficiency and is faced with social, economic, or military threats 

beyond its capability to handle. Assistance will normally focus on CMO (primarily, 

the provision of services to the local populace), psychological operations (PSYOP), 

communications and intelligence cooperation, mobility, and logistic support. In 

some cases, training of the military and the provision of new equipment may be 

authorized. 

(1) Civil-Military Operations. The purpose of CMO is to facilitate military 

operations, and to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives, through the 

integration of civil and military actions while conducting support to civil administration, 

populace and resources control, FHA, NA, and civil information management. CMO are 

the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations 

among military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and 

authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in 

order to facilitate military operations, and to consolidate and achieve operational US 

objectives. CMO not only can support a COIN program, but also can enhance all FID 

activities. CMO may be used in a preventive or rehabilitative manner in order to address 

root causes of instability; in a reconstructive manner after conflict; or in support of 

disaster relief, consequence management, civil defense, counterdrug (CD), and AT 

activities. 

(a) Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). CAO are those military operations 

conducted by civil affairs (CA) forces that enhance the relationship between military 

forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; require 

coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations 

(IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), indigenous populations and institutions, 
Introduction 

I-15 

and the private sector; and involve application of functional specialty skills that normally 

are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of CMO. In FID, CAO 

facilitates the integration of US military support into the overall IDAD programs of the 

supported nation. 

For further information on CMO support to FID, refer to Chapter VI, “Foreign Internal 

Defense Operations,” paragraph 10, “Civil-Military Operations,” and to JP 3-57, CivilMilitary Operations. 

(b) Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. FHA operations relieve or reduce 

the impact of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human 

suffering, disease, or privation in countries or regions outside the United States. FHA 

provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. Although not part of NA, FHA 

may complement FID. 

For further information on FHA, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 

(c) Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. HCA is assistance to the local 

populace provided in conjunction with authorized military operations as specifically 

authorized by Title 10, USC, Section 401. Assistance provided under these provisions 

must promote the security interests of both the United States and the HN and the specific 

operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the 

activities. These activities must also be in accordance with HN laws. GCCs integrate 

and coordinate HCA activities within their areas of responsibility in the SC portion of 

their overall TCP. In the context of FID, HCA may be an important part of helping to 

build relationships between the local population and the joint force. When possible, 

HCA should give way to military civic action (MCA) as the FID operation progresses. In 

contrast to emergency relief conducted under FHA, HCA generally encompasses planned 

activities and includes: 

1. Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural or 

underserved areas of a country, including education, training, and technical assistance 

related to the care provided. 

2. Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.

3. Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.

4. Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities such as 

schools, health and welfare clinics, and other nongovernmental buildings. 

5. Activities relating to the furnishing of education, training, and 

technical assistance concerning detection and clearance of landmines. Note: US forces 

are not to engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of landmines (unless it is 

part of a concurrent military operation other than HCA). 
Chapter I 

I-16 JP 3-22 

(d) Military Civic Action. MCA is the use of predominantly indigenous 

military personnel to conduct construction projects, support missions, and services useful 

to the local population. These activities may involve US supervision and advice but will 

normally be conducted by the local military. MCA is an essential part of military support 

to FID to assist the local government in developing capabilities to provide for the security 

and well-being of its own population. 

(2) Psychological Operations. The focus of joint military PSYOP objectives 

during FID operations is to support US national objectives, to support the GCC’s 

regional security strategy objectives, and to support the objectives of the country 

team. Additionally, PSYOP is used to promote the ability of the HN to defend itself 

against internally and externally based insurgencies and terrorism by encouraging the 

civilian populace to actively support the HN military and government. PSYOP also may 

be used to modify the behavior of selected target audiences (TAs) toward US and 

multinational capabilities. 

For further information on PSYOP support to FID, refer to JP 3-13.2, Psychological 

Operations. 

(3) Military Training to HN Forces

(a) US military training support to FID should focus on assisting HNs 

in anticipating, precluding, and countering threats or potential threats. Emphasis on 

the HN’s IDAD program when organizing, planning, and executing military training 

support helps the HN address the root causes of instability in a preventive manner rather 

than reacting to threats. 

(b) Security Force Assistance (SFA). SFA is DOD’s contribution to a 

unified action effort to support and augment the development of the capacity and 

capability of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions to facilitate 

the achievement of specific objectives shared by the USG. The US military engages in 

activities to enhance the capabilities and capacities of a partner nation (or regional 

security organization) by providing training, equipment, advice, and assistance to those 

FSF organized in national ministry of defense (or equivalent regional military or 

paramilitary forces), while other USG agencies focus on those forces assigned to other 

ministries (or their equivalents) such as interior, justice, or intelligence services. 

For additional discussion of SFA, see Chapter VI, “Foreign Internal Defense 

Operations,” paragraph 12, “Military Training to Host Nation Forces.” 

(4) Logistic Support. US military capabilities may be used to provide 

deployment and distribution, maintenance, supply, and construction support to the 

HN military or civilians in operations that do not expose US personnel to hostile fire. 

The FAA does not generally authorize the transfer of equipment or supplies. Logistic 

support must be provided with consideration of the long-term effect on the capability of 

the local forces to become self-sufficient. 
Introduction 

I-17 

(5) Intelligence Cooperation. Intelligence cooperation is enabled by an 

information sharing environment that fully integrates joint, multinational, and 

interagency partners in a collaborative enterprise. US intelligence cooperation ranges 

from strategic analysis to current intelligence summaries and situation reporting for 

tactical operations. Intelligence collection and dissemination capabilities are often 

weak links in an HN military capability. US military communications hardware and 

operators may also be supplied in cases where HN infrastructure cannot support 

intelligence operations. The release of classified information to the HN is governed by 

national disclosure policy. Detailed written guidance may be supplemented with limited 

delegation of authority where appropriate. 

d. US Combat Operations. The introduction of US combat forces into FID 

operations requires a Presidential decision and serves only as a temporary solution 

until HN forces are able to stabilize the situation and provide security for the 

populace. If combat is authorized, normally this will include major operations. In all 

cases, US combat operations support the HN IDAD program and remain strategically 

defensive in nature. While joint doctrine and Service tactics, techniques, and procedures 

provide guidance for specific operations and activities, there are certain principles that 

should guide employment of US forces conducting FID. These principles, and the 

specific C2 and employment considerations for joint and multinational tactical operations 

in FID, serve as the focus for discussions of tactical operations in this publication. 

(1) The primary role for US military forces in tactical operations is to support, 

advise, and assist HN forces through logistics, intelligence or other combat support, and 

service support means. This allows the HN force to concentrate on taking the offensive 

against hostile elements. 

(2) If the level of lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency reaches a level that HN 

forces cannot control, US forces may be required to engage the hostile elements with 

offensive operations in order to return the situation to a level controllable by HN forces. 

In this case, the objective of US operations is to protect or stabilize the HN political, 

economic, and social institutions until the host military can assume these responsibilities. 

(3) In all cases, the strategic initiative and responsibility lie with the HN. To 

preserve its legitimacy and ensure a lasting solution to the problem, the host government 

must bear this responsibility. A decision for US forces to take the strategic initiative 

could amount to a transition to war. 

(4) Given the multinational and interagency impact of conducting combat 

operations supporting FID, JFCs can expect complex C2 relationships. More information 

on C2 relationships and issues is provided in Chapter III, “Organization and 

Responsibilities for Foreign Internal Defense.” 

(5) The nature of US tactical participation in HN internal conflicts requires 

judicious and prudent rules of engagement (ROE) and guidelines for the application of 

force. Inappropriate destruction and violence attributed to US forces may easily reduce 
Chapter I 

I-18 JP 3-22 

the legitimacy and sovereignty of the supported government. In addition, these incidents 

may be used by adversaries to fuel anti-American sentiments and assist the cause of the 

opposition. 
II-1 

CHAPTER II

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

1. General

 An IDAD program focuses on building viable political, economic, military, and 

social institutions that respond to the needs of the HN’s society. Its fundamental goal is 

to prevent an insurgency or other forms of lawlessness or subversion by forestalling and 

defeating the threat and by working to correct conditions that prompt violence. The HN 

government mobilizes its population to participate in IDAD efforts. Thus, the IDAD 

program is ideally preemptive/Phase 0; however, if an insurgency, illicit drug, terrorist, or 

other threat develops, the IDAD program evolves to combat that threat. Commanders 

and their staffs must understand the HN’s IDAD program and its objectives if they are to 

plan effectively to support it. The objectives of FID will be to assist the HN in 

formulating an appropriate IDAD program, which often includes fusing several separate 

strategic plans and programs into one broader strategy. 

2. Construct 

a. An IDAD program should integrate security force and civilian actions into a 

coherent, comprehensive effort. Security force actions provide a level of internal security 

that permits and supports growth through balanced development. This development 

requires change to meet the needs of vulnerable groups of people. This change may in 

turn promote unrest in the society. The strategy, therefore, includes measures to maintain 

conditions under which orderly development can take place. 

b. Often a government must overcome the inertia and shortcomings of its own 

political system before it can cope with the internal threats it is facing. This may involve 

the adoption of reforms during a time of crisis when pressures limit flexibility and make 

implementation difficult. 

c. The successful IDAD strategist must realize that the true nature of the threat to the 

government lies in the adversary’s political strength rather than military power. 

Although the government must contain the armed elements, concentration on the military 

aspect of the threat does not address the real danger. Gaining support of the population is 

vital to any IDAD strategy. Any strategy that does not pay continuing, serious attention 

to the political claims and demands of the opposition is severely handicapped. Military 

and paramilitary programs are necessary for success, but are not sufficient alone. 

“Arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror[ism] is 

not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our 

partners to defend and govern themselves. The standing up and mentoring of 

indigenous army and police—once the province of Special Forces—is now a 

key mission for the military as a whole.” 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 26 November 2007 
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-22 

3. Functions 

a. An IDAD program blends four interdependent functions to prevent or counter 

internal threats (see Figure II-1). These functions are balanced development, security, 

neutralization, and mobilization. 

b. Balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through political, 

social, and economic programs. It allows all individuals and groups in the society to 

share in the rewards of development, thus alleviating frustration. Balanced development 

NATIONAL OBJECTIVE

Prevent and/or eliminate lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency

OPERATIONAL STRATEGY

SECURITY FORCE OPERATIONS

RESULTS

FEEDBACK

LEGEND

Balanced Security

Development

Neutralization Mobilization

GRAND STRATEGY

Internal defense and development

Develop, deploy, and employ resources 

to assist security, neutralization, 

balanced development, and 

mobilization

MILITARY STRATEGY

Diplomatic Information Military Economic

Unity of effort

Maximum intelligence

Minimal force

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT 

STRATEGY MODEL

CMO civil-military operations

PSYOP psychological operations

Responsive government

Maximum use of 

PSYOP/CMO

Strategic 

communication

Figure II-1. Internal Defense and Development Strategy Model 
Internal Defense and Development Strategy 

II-3 

satisfies legitimate grievances that the opposition attempts to exploit. The government 

must recognize conditions that contribute to the internal threat and instability and take 

preventive measures. Correcting conditions that make a society vulnerable is the longterm solution to the problem. 

c. Security includes all activities implemented in order to protect the populace from 

violence and to provide a safe environment for national development. Security of the 

populace and government resources is essential to countering the threat. Protection and 

control of the populace permit development and deny the adversary access to popular 

support. The security effort should establish an environment in which the HN can 

provide for its own security with limited US support. 

d. Neutralization is a political concept that: 

(1) makes an insurgent or criminal element irrelevant to the political process; 

(2) is the physical and psychological separation of the threatening elements 

from the population; 

(3) includes all lawful activities (except those that degrade the government’s 

legitimacy) to disrupt, preempt, disorganize, and defeat the insurgent organization; 

(4) can involve public exposure and the discrediting of insurgent and criminal 

leaders during a period of low-level unrest with little political violence; 

(5) can involve arrest and prosecution when laws have been broken; or 

(6) can involve combat action when the adversary’s violent activities escalate. 

Note. All neutralization efforts must be legal. They must scrupulously observe HN laws 

and policy provisions regarding rights and responsibilities. The need for security forces 

to act lawfully is essential not only for humanitarian reasons but also because this 

reinforces government legitimacy while denying the adversary an exploitable issue. 

Special emergency powers may exist by legislation or decree. Government agents must 

not abuse these powers because they might well lose the popular support they need. 

Denying the adversary an opportunity to seize on and exploit legitimate issues against the 

government discredits their leaders and neutralizes their propaganda. 

e. Mobilization provides organized manpower and materiel resources and includes 

all activities to motivate and organize popular support of the government. This support is 

essential for a successful IDAD program. If successful, mobilization maximizes 

manpower and other resources available to the government while it minimizes those 

available to the insurgent. Mobilization allows the government to strengthen existing 

institutions, to develop new ones to respond to demands, and promotes the government’s 

legitimacy. 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-22 

f. The HN continuously analyzes the results of its IDAD program, establishes 

measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and should have a methodology to provide feedback 

for future planning, refinement of strategy, and continued formulation of strategic 

national policy. 

4. Principles 

a. Although each situation is unique, certain principles guide efforts in the four 

functional areas to prevent or defeat an internal threat. Planners must apply the IDAD 

strategy and these principles to each specific situation. The principles are unity of effort, 

maximum use of intelligence, maximum use of CMO and PSYOP, minimum use of 

force, a responsive government, and use of strategic communication. 

b. Unity of Effort. Unity of effort is the product of successful unified action and is 

essential to prevent crisis and defeat credible threats. Unity of effort requires cooperation 

among all forces and agencies toward a commonly recognized objective regardless of the 

command or coordination structures of the participants. 

c. Maximum Use of Intelligence. Maximum use of intelligence requires that all 

operations be based on reliable, accurate, and timely intelligence. Successful 

implementation of operations necessitates an extensive operations security (OPSEC) and 

counterintelligence (CI) program to protect friendly FID operations and to counter and 

penetrate opposing force intelligence collection operations. Intelligence and CI 

operations must be designed so as to assess accurately the opposing force’s capabilities, 

to provide timely indications and warning to HN and US forces, and to penetrate and be 

prepared to compromise hostile operations on order. If the HN is not capable of 

performing these missions effectively upon the commitment of US forces, then US 

intelligence and CI elements must be deployed to accomplish these missions. In these 

cases, FID operations may need to focus on support to HN efforts to develop its internal 

intelligence and security forces in order to perform these missions effectively. US 

elements may assist the HN in developing intelligence capability in accordance with USG 

directives and as deemed appropriate by the supported GCC in coordination with the US 

ambassador to the HN. 

d. Maximum use of CMO and PSYOP. The effective use of CMO and PSYOP 

that are fully coordinated with other operational activities can enhance the legitimacy of 

HN forces and ultimately the stability of the HN. Stability operations, enabled by CMO, 

are the “deeds” that US and HN forces use to demonstrate and reinforce the “words,” 

delivered through dedicated PSYOP and a broad based IO campaign. Use of CMO 

mitigates grievances exploited (or potentially exploited) by insurgents or other internal 

threats to HN stability by actively demonstrating an HN force’s commitment to the well 

being of the population, and reinforces to key elements of the population their importance 

as the center of gravity and government’s legitimacy. CMO is an initial step to reinforce 

and enhance the HN’s image as a responsive government, both internally and 

internationally. The application of CMO integrated with PSYOP helps generate active 

and tacit popular support of the HN government and buys the time for the HN civil 
Internal Defense and Development Strategy 

II-5 

authorities and government to eliminate or mitigate valid popular grievances. CMO is 

executed by all forces and can be better enabled and facilitated by the application of CA 

forces to train, advise, and assist other forces, as well as plan and execute specific and 

targeted CAO to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Examples of coordinated 

CMO and PSYOP objectives in FID/IDAD include: 

 (1) Mitigate the grievances exploited by insurgents/threats to stability that 

generate popular support for resistance elements. 

 (2) Reduce the impact of military operations on the civil populace. 

 (3) Reduce civil interference with military operations. 

 (4) Facilitate civil order. 

 (5) Increase the effectiveness of, respect for, and cooperation with HN law 

enforcement and security forces. 

(6) Set conditions and prepare the populace for elections. 

e. Minimum Use of Force. A threatened government must carefully examine all 

COAs in response to internal violence. The government should stress the minimum use 

of force to maintain order and incorporate economy of force. At times, the best way to 

minimize violence is to use overwhelming force; however, normally the use of force 

should be appropriate (and proportional) to the incident at hand. In all cases where force 

is to be applied, clear rules on its use should be established, broadcast to the civilian 

populace, and understood by all members of the police, military, or paramilitary force 

being employed by the government. 

f. A Responsive Government. Positive measures are necessary to ensure a 

responsive government whose ability to mobilize manpower and resources as well as to 

motivate the people reflects its administrative and management capabilities. In many 

cases, the leadership must provide additional training, supervision, controls, and 

follow-up. 

g. Use of Strategic Communication. Strategic communication is an important 

element of strategic direction during all FID operations. DSPD, PA, and IO messages 

should be coordinated early during the planning process and continually throughout the 

operation. In FID operations, the use of strategic communication and PSYOP are closely 

related. Effectiveness and efficiency require the continual sharing of information. 

Although the messages may be different, they are derived from harmonized themes and 

must not contradict one another or the credibility of some of the agencies involved in the 

FID effort, particularly the HN’s, could be compromised or lost. 
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-22 

5. Organizational Guidance 

a. The following discussion provides a model for an organization to coordinate, 

plan, and conduct IDAD activities. Actual organizations may vary from country to 

country in order to adapt to existing conditions. Organizations should follow the 

established political organization of the nation concerned. The organization should 

provide centralized planning and direction and facilitate decentralized execution of the 

plan. The organization should be structured and chartered so that it can coordinate and 

direct the IDAD efforts of existing government agencies; however, it should minimize 

interference with those agencies’ normal functions. Examples of national and 

subnational organizations show how to achieve a coordinated and unified effort at each 

level. 

b. National-Level Organization. The national-level organization plans and 

coordinates programs. Its major offices normally correspond to branches and agencies of 

the national government concerned with insurgency, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorist 

or other internal threats. Figure II-2 depicts a planning and coordination organization at 

the national level. 

(1) The planning office is responsible for long-range planning to prevent or 

defeat the threat. Its plans provide the chief executive with a basis for delineating 

authority, establishing responsibility, designating objectives, and allocating resources. 

(2) The intelligence office develops concepts, directs programs, and plans and 

provides general guidance on intelligence related to national security. The intelligence 

office also coordinates intelligence production activities and correlates, evaluates, 

interprets, and disseminates intelligence. This office is staffed by representatives from 

intelligence agencies, police, and military intelligence. 

(3) The populace and resource control office develops economy-related policies 

and plans, and provides general operational guidance for all forces in the security field. 

Representatives of government branches concerned with commerce, as well as law 

enforcement and justice, staff this office. 

(4) The military affairs office develops and coordinates general plans for the 

mobilization and allocation of the regular armed forces and paramilitary forces. 

Representatives from all major components of the regular and paramilitary forces staff 

this office. 

(5) Five separate offices covering PSYOP, information, economic affairs, 

cultural affairs, and political affairs represent their parent national-level branches or 

agencies, and develop operational concepts and policies for inclusion in the national plan. 

(6) The duties of the administration offices are self evident and as directed. 
Internal Defense and Development Strategy 

II-7 

c. Subnational-Level Organization. Area coordination centers (ACCs) may 

function as multinational civil-military headquarters at subnational, state, and local 

levels. ACCs plan, coordinate, and are staffed with commanders who exercise 

operational control (OPCON) over military forces made available. ACCs control civilian 

government organizations within their respective areas of jurisdiction. The ACC does 

not replace unit tactical operations centers or the normal government administrative 

organization in the operational area. 

(1) ACCs perform a twofold mission: they provide integrated planning, 

coordination, and direction for all internal defense efforts and they facilitate an 

immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements. ACCs are headed by 

senior government officials who supervise and coordinate the activities of the staffs 

responsible for formulating internal defense plans and operations in their areas of interest. 

COUNTERINSURGENCY PLANNING AND

COORDINATION ORGANIZATION

Chief Executive

Director

National Planning and

Coordination Center

Subnational or State

Area Coordination 

Planning Office Administration Office

Populace and 

Resource Control

Psychological

Operations Information CulturalAffairs

Intelligence Military

Affairs

Economic

Affairs

Political

Affairs

Figure II-2. Counterinsurgency Planning and Coordination Organization 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-22 

The staffs contain selected representatives of major forces and agencies assigned to, or 

operating in, the center’s area of interest. Each ACC includes members from the: 

(a) Area military command. 

(b) Area police agency. 

(c) Local and national intelligence organization. 

(d) Public information and PSYOP agencies. 

(e) Paramilitary forces. 

(f) Other local and national government offices involved in the economic, 

social, and political aspects of IDAD. 

(2) There are two types of subnational ACCs that a government may form—

regional and urban. The choice depends upon the environment in which the ACC 

operates. 

(a) Regional ACCs normally locate with the nation’s first subnational 

political subdivision with a fully developed governmental apparatus (state, province, or 

other). These government subdivisions are usually well established, having exercised 

government functions in their areas before the insurgency’s onset. They often are the 

lowest level of administration able to coordinate all COIN programs. A full range of 

developmental, informational, and military capabilities may exist at this level. Those that 

are not part of the normal government organization should be added when the ACC 

activates. This augmentation enables the ACC to coordinate its activities better by using 

the existing structure. 

(b) Urban areas usually require more complex ACCs than rural areas. 

Urban ACCs are appropriate for cities and heavily populated areas lacking a higher level 

coordination center. Urban ACCs are organized like the ACCs previously described and 

perform the same functions. However, the urban ACC includes representatives from 

local public service agencies, such as police, fire, medical, public works, public utilities, 

communications, and transportation. 

(c) When a regional ACC resides in an urban area, economy of force and 

unity of effort may dictate that urban resources locate in that center where planners can 

coordinate and direct urban operations. The decision to establish an urban center or to 

use some other center for these purposes rests with the head of the government of the 

urban area who bases the decision on, among other things, available resources. 

(d) If the urban area comprises several separate political subdivisions with 

no overall political control, the ACC establishes the control necessary for proper planning 

and coordination. 
Internal Defense and Development Strategy 

II-9 

d. Civilian Advisory Committees. Committees composed of influential citizens 

help coordination centers at all levels monitor the success of their activities and gain 

popular support. These committees evaluate actions affecting civilians and communicate 

with the people. They provide feedback for future operational planning. Involving 

leading citizens in committees such as these increases their stake in, and commitment to, 

government programs and social mobilization objectives. 

(1) The organization of a civilian committee varies according to local needs; 

changing situations require flexibility in structure. The chairman of the committee 

should be a prominent figure either appointed by the government or elected by the 

membership. General committee membership includes leaders in civilian organizations 

and other community groups who have influence with the target population. These 

leaders may include: 

(a) Education officials (distinguished professors and teachers). 

(b) Religious leaders. 

(c) Health directors. 

(d) Minority group representatives. 

(e) Labor officials. 

(f) Heads of local news media, distinguished writers, journalists, and 

editors. 

(g) Business and commercial leaders. 

(h) Former political leaders or retired government officials. 

(i) Tribal or family leaders. 

(j) Agricultural leaders, farmers, and stakeholders. 

(2) The success of a civilian advisory committee hinges on including leading 

participants from all major political and cultural groupings, including minorities. 
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-22 

Intentionally Blank 
III-1 

CHAPTER III

ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR 

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE 

1. General 

a. Integrated Effort

(1) When it is in the interests of national security, the United States may employ 

all the instruments of national power in order to assist friendly nations in conducting 

IDAD programs. 

(2) For FID to be successful in meeting an HN’s needs, the USG must 

integrate the efforts of multiple government agencies, thus interorganizational 

coordination and cooperation becomes extremely important as it is the best way to 

integrate complementary efforts and effectively and efficiently use available resources. 

Effective integration is difficult and requires a consistent, focused effort that adjusts and 

evolves as the situation changes and different organizations and groups become involved. 

(3) Such integration and coordination are essentially vertical between levels of 

command and organization, and horizontal between USG agencies and HN military and 

civilian agencies. In addition, integration and coordination requirements may extend to 

allied nations and coalition partners participating with the US in multinational FID 

efforts. As Figure III-1 illustrates, the lines of organization and coordination during 

FID operations are complex. This factor, combined with the breadth of potential FID 

operations, makes complete integration and coordination of all national FID efforts a 

daunting challenge. 

b. Organizing for FID Operations

 (1) Management of the FID effort begins at the national level, with the selection 

of those nations the US will support through FID efforts. This decision is made by the 

President with advice from the Secretary of State, SecDef, and other officials. Funding 

for these programs is appropriated by Congress. The US will consider FID support when 

the following three conditions exist: 

“I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who 

are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 

pressures.” 

Harry S. Truman, 

Message to Congress, 1947 
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-22 

 (a) The existing or threatened internal disorder threatens US national strategic goals. 

 (b) The threatened nation is capable of effectively using US assistance. 

 (c) The threatened nation requests US assistance. 

 (2) The level and type of assistance required is determined and a countryspecific plan is developed. No two FID operations are exactly alike. 

President

Department of 

Defense

Department of 

State

Allied 

Nation/Coalition 

Partner 

Government

Country Team

Host Nation 

Internal 

Defense and 

Development 

Program

Combatant 

Commanders 

Foreign

Internal

Defense 

Activities

Allied Nations/

Coalition 

Partners

Foreign Internal 

Defense 

Activities

Lines of coordination

Foreign internal defense

program administration

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE COORDINATION

Figure III-1. Foreign Internal Defense Coordination 
Organization and Responsibilities for Foreign Internal Defense 

III-3 

 (3) The GEF describes SecDef’s priorities for creating new partnerships and 

building the capacity of existing partnerships. The joint force conducts FID in 

compliance with this guidance. 

 (4) Ordinarily, when the decision limits FID support to minor levels of SA or 

CMO, there is no requirement to establish a special management program to facilitate 

interagency coordination. In these cases, standard interagency coordination should be 

adequate. The major FID efforts (i.e., those in support of nations important to US 

national interests) demand levels of management and coordination beyond what is 

normally found at the interagency, combatant command, and country team levels. 

2. National-Level Organizations 

The National Security Council (NSC) will generally provide the initial guidance and 

translation of national-level decisions pertaining to FID. Specific guidance will also be 

provided to government agencies and departments. Key government agencies that 

normally take part in FID are: 

a. Department of State. DOS is generally the lead government agency in 

executing US FID operations. Major responsibilities of DOS related to the planning 

and execution of FID include: 

(1) The Secretary of State has responsibility for advising the President in 

forming foreign policy and has other major specific responsibilities key to the overall 

planning and execution of the national FID effort. 

(2) DOS assists the NSC in building national FID policies and priorities, and is 

the lead government agency to carry out these policies in the interagency arena. DOS 

involvement extends from policy formulation at the highest level to mission execution at 

the HN and country team levels. The Policy Planning Staff, Bureau of Political-Military 

Affairs (PM), and the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization are 

the elements of DOS most involved with interagency planning for FID operations. The 

Bureau of Finance and Operations provides financial and operational support services to 

all of the department’s program areas. 

(3) The Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security is 

the principal advisor and focal point for SA matters within DOS. Control and 

coordination of SA extends from this office to the Assistant Secretary of State for 

Political-Military Affairs. These lines of supervision and administration interface with 

DOD at the individual country teams and security cooperation organizations (SCOs) in 

the HNs (see Figure III-1). DOS directs the overall US SA program; DOD executes the 

program. 

(4) At the national level, the DOS PM is the principal channel of liaison 

between DOS and DOD. This bureau has primary responsibility for assisting the 

Secretary of State in executing the responsibilities of managing the military portion of 
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 3-22 

SA. PM is also the focal point within DOS for providing policy direction in international 

security, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense trade. 

(5) INL (DOS) is especially important in FID operations as a coordinating link 

in US support of HN CD programs. 

(6) The Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) supports US foreign 

policy objectives by informing the public in other nations about US programs and 

policies, and administering overseas cultural and exchange programs. These activities 

enhance US military operations in support of HN IDAD programs through public 

diplomacy to the supported government and its populace. DOD and DOS IIP efforts 

must be mutually supportive. Close coordination among embassy public affairs officers 

(PAOs) and cultural attachés, military PA offices, and PSYOP elements is essential. 

 (7) United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 

Although USAID and DOS are separate organizations, both report to the Secretary of 

State. USAID activities have a significant impact on military activities in support of FID. 

USAID carries out nonmilitary assistance programs designed to assist certain less 

developed nations to increase their productive capacities and improve their quality 

of life. It also promotes economic and political stability in friendly nations. The mission 

of USAID and the parallel DOD developmental activities supporting FID underscore the 

importance of employing an integrated interagency effort. 

b. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Director of the Central 

Intelligence Agency (D/CIA). The DNI and D/CIA support the FID mission in both a 

national-level advisory capacity and at the regional and country levels through direct 

support of FID activities. The DNI advises the NSC in matters concerning the 

coordination and implementation of intelligence activities in support of national-level 

FID efforts. On the regional level, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provides 

intelligence in support of FID threat analysis and needs assessments and supports the 

chief of mission (COM) with intelligence at the country team level. This intelligence 

support is extremely important in determining the level and degree of required resources 

and in determining the effectiveness of these committed resources. Military intelligence 

activities are linked with CIA activities, either directly or through the country team, 

to ensure the exchange of information necessary to support FID. 

c. Department of Defense. The DOD national-level organizations involved in FID 

management include the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff. 

(1) Office of the Secretary of Defense. In most FID matters, OSD acts as a 

policy-making organization. Numerous activities at the OSD level affect FID efforts. 

The five activities listed below are directly involved in the areas of SA and in the general 

areas of low-intensity conflict- and FID-related issues. 
Organization and Responsibilities for Foreign Internal Defense 

III-5 

(a) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) exercises overall 

direction, authority, and control concerning SA for OSD through the various assistant 

secretaries of defense. 

(b) The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and LowIntensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities) (ASD[SO/LIC&IC]) oversees DOD 

special operations (SO) and has far-reaching policy responsibilities that can impact on 

virtually all areas of FID policy and programs. 

(c) The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Security Affairs) 

establishes SA policy and supervises SA programs through the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency (DSCA). 

(d) DSCA is the principal DOD organization through which SecDef carries 

out responsibilities for SA. DSCA administers and supervises SA planning and 

formulates and executes SA efforts in coordination with other government programs. 

DSCA also conducts international logistics and sales negotiations with representatives of 

foreign nations and serves as the DOD focal point for liaison with US industry regarding 

SA. Finally, DSCA develops and promulgates SA procedures, maintains the database for 

the programs, and makes determinations with respect to the allocation of FMS 

administrative funds. 

(e) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs supervises and 

establishes policy for PA programs with DOD. PA is an integral part of military support 

to FID. 

(2) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The CJCS plays an 

important role in providing strategic guidance to the combatant commanders 

(CCDRs) for the conduct of military operations to support FID. This guidance is 

provided primarily through the NMS and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the 

key components of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). This guidance is 

provided after, and often modified as a result of, the interagency coordination and policy 

development process described earlier in this chapter. Because of their familiarity with 

the needs of the friendly nations in their regions, the GCCs are given great latitude in 

managing and coordinating their military activities in support of FID. 

d. United States Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security. 

The USCG is specifically authorized to assist other federal agencies in the performance 

of any activity for which the USCG is especially qualified, including SA activities for 

DOS and DOD. The Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense 

and the Department of Homeland Security on the Use of US Coast Guard Capabilities 

and Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy identifies certain national 

defense capabilities of the USCG, including theater SC, and improves the process by 

which the USCG serves as a force provider for DOD missions. 
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-22 

3. Combatant Commands 

a. GCCs are responsible for planning and executing military operations in support 

of FID within their area of responsibility (AOR). Other CCDRs play a supporting role 

by providing resources to conduct operations as directed by the President or SecDef. 

b. The GCC has the responsibility of coordinating and monitoring all the military 

activities in the AOR in support of FID. GCCs develop TCPs that include SC programs 

and activities in accordance with the GEF. Organizing for military operations in FID will 

vary, but there are fundamental principles that apply when planning or executing FID 

operations. For example: 

(1) Military activities in support of FID are an integral part of the long-range 

strategic plans and objectives for the GCC’s AOR. These plans must reflect national 

security priorities and guidance. 

(2) GCCs may request to expand the military presence in the country team. In 

most instances, the application of US military resources in support of an HN’s IDAD 

programs will function through the framework of SCOs. However, should it become 

necessary to expand US assistance by introducing selected US military forces, a JTF or 

JSOTF normally will be established to coordinate this effort. 

c. Staff Organization. The general purpose and functions of the CCDR’s joint staff 

are provided in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-33, 

Joint Task Force Headquarters. The purpose of this discussion is to outline general 

organizational requirements for FID oversight and management at the combatant 

command level. 

(1) Plans Directorate. The plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5), as the staff 

planner, incorporates military support to FID into theater strategy and plans. The J5 has three ways to accomplish this: the plans division prepares the GCC’s vision and 

strategy, looking out 5 to 10 years and providing long-term and mid-term objectives for 

military support to FID; the political-military affairs division links the combatant 

command to the SCOs; and the SA section provides oversight of military SA efforts and 

coordinates integration of regional SA activities into theater-wide activities. The SA 

section may be organized within another directorate of the combatant command staff, 

depending on the desires of the GCC. 

(2) Operations Directorate. The operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) 

monitors the execution of military operations in support of FID. Additionally, the J-3 

may use the CMO and the PSYOP sections to orchestrate specifically designed programs 

to maximize the positive effects of military activities in support of FID. The J-3 also 

employs an SO staff element that assists in the planning and employment considerations 

for SOF in support of FID. GCCs may elect to assign the above programs and planning 

for SOF in support of FID to the theater subunified special operations commander (SOC) 

or designated element. 
Organization and Responsibilities for Foreign Internal Defense 

III-7 

(3) Intelligence Directorate. The intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J2) produces intelligence that often supplements estimates produced by the national 

intelligence agencies. The J-2 leads the staff’s effort to conduct joint intelligence 

preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). Intelligence requirements (IRs) in 

support of FID include assessment of economic, political, and social conditions; as well 

as the accurate detection of internal instability. Through the counterintelligence support 

officer (CISO) the J-2 is also responsible for planning for CI support to the military 

portion of the FID operation. CI support is critical to the execution of FID operations and 

can provide commanders with valuable tools for force protection (FP) planning as well as 

maintain the integrity and OPSEC of FID operations. Additionally, in those instances 

where a force protection detachment (FPD) is stationed in the HN, the CISO or 

designated CI coordinating authority is responsible for coordinating FID support. 

Cooperative intelligence liaisons between the US and the HN are vital; however, 

disclosure of classified information to HN or other multinational FID forces must be 

authorized. CI support needs to be included and executed from the initiation of the FID 

operation. Due to the nature of CI, it cannot be relied upon to be fully effective or 

productive if included as an afterthought or brought into action after FID operations are 

underway. 

(4) Political Advisor (POLAD). GCCs may be assigned a POLAD by DOS. 

The POLAD serves as a link between DOS and the GCC’s staff. An effective use of 

the POLAD’s skill in FID-intensive theaters may be for the GCC to establish a FID 

interagency working group (see Figure III-2) consisting of interagency representatives 

and military staff from country teams and the GCC’s staff. This group acts as a focal 

point for the coordination and integration of military and nonmilitary support to FID. 

(5) Legal Advisor. The legal advisor should evaluate all military operations in 

support of FID because of the legal restrictions and complex funding sources. See 

Appendix A, “Legal Considerations,” for additional considerations when supporting FID. 

(6) Public Affairs. Integral to successful military operations in support of FID 

is public awareness and support. A coordinated public information program to support a 

FID operation is essential. The PAO must be an early and active participant in military 

planning to support FID. 

(7) When formed, a joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) can 

provide the GCC with an increased capability to collaborate FID operations with other 

USG civilian agencies and departments. 

For more information on JIACGs, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During 

Joint Operations.
Chapter III 

III-8 JP 3-22 

(8) Other Staff Elements. All staff elements contribute to the overall support 

of the FID operation. Some, such as the logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4) and the 

communications system directorate of a joint staff, may be given primary responsibility 

NOTIONAL FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP

FID

J-1

J-2

J-3

J-4

J-5

PAO 

J-6

J-9

foreign internal defense

manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff

intelligence directorate of a joint staff

operations directorate 

logistics directorate 

plans directorate 

civil-military operations staff section

public affairs officer

of a joint staff

of a joint staff

of a joint staff

communications system directorate of a joint staff

LEGEND

POLITICAL ADVISOR

(Chairman)

FID

INTERAGENCY 

WORKING

GROUP

Geographic 

Combatant

Commander

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

J-1

J-2

J-3

J-4

J-5

J-6

J-9

PAO COUNTRY TEAMS

Coordination and Liaison

Interagency

Representatives

Security

Assistance

Organization

Defense

Attaché

Legal

Subordinate

Unified Commands

Joint Task Force(s)

The FID interagency working group may consist of representatives of all the 

activities shown, plus special operations forces, medical, engineer, 

and others as the geographic combatant commander sees fit.

Figure III-2. Notional Foreign Internal Defense Interagency Working Group 
Organization and Responsibilities for Foreign Internal Defense 

III-9 

for specific military technical support missions. These staff elements will usually focus 

on the direct support (not involving combat operations) category of military support to 

FID. 

4. Subordinate Unified Commands 

a. When authorized by SecDef through the CJCS, commanders of unified 

commands may establish subordinate unified commands (also called subunified 

commands) to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set 

forth for unified commands. 

b. A subordinate unified command (e.g., United States Forces Korea) may be 

established on a geographical area or functional basis. The responsibilities for FID 

support in these commands closely parallel those discussed for the combatant commands. 

Specific authority for planning and conducting FID depends on the level of authority 

delegated by the CCDR. However, basic principles and staff organization remain 

consistent. 

c. Functional subordinate unified commands such as Special Operations Command 

South, which is the theater special operations command (TSOC) for United States 

Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), control a specific functional capability. These 

functional commands contribute to FID planning and execution through management of 

FID areas related to their functional areas of expertise. 

d. TSOCs are of particular importance because of the significant role of SOF in 

FID operations. The theater SOC normally has OPCON of SOF in the theater and has 

primary responsibility to plan and execute SOF operations in support of FID. SOF 

assigned to a theater are under the combatant command (command authority) of the 

GCC. The GCC normally exercises this authority through the commander of the TSOC. 

When a GCC establishes and employs multiple JTFs and independent task forces, the 

TSOC commander may establish and employ multiple JSOTFs to manage SOF assets and 

accommodate JTF/task force SO requirements. Accordingly, the GCC, as the common 

superior, normally will establish supporting or tactical control command relationships 

between JSOTF commanders and JTF/task force commanders. Coordination between the 

joint force SO component commander (who is also the TSOC commander) and the other 

component commanders within the combatant command is essential for effective 

management of military operations in support of FID, including joint and multinational 

exercises, mobile training teams (MTTs), integration of SOF with CF, and other 

operations. 

For further information on JSOTFs, refer to JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task 

Force Operations. 
Chapter III 

III-10 JP 3-22 

5. Joint Task Forces 

 GCCs may form JTFs to execute complex missions. For example, United States 

Northern Command’s Joint Task Force North provides US military assistance to US civil 

law enforcement agencies to combat transnational threats to the homeland. Another 

example, JTF-BRAVO, which is subordinate to USSOUTHCOM, was formed by the 

CCDR for the primary mission of coordinating and supporting US military training 

exercises in Honduras during a time when a US forward presence in Central America was 

deemed necessary. The large number of training exercises and related HCA projects 

conducted were a primary factor in the decision to form the JTF. Other JTFs may be 

organized to accomplish specific functional missions such as road construction and 

support for transportation and communications efforts. Much of the training, CAO, and 

PSYOP conducted by a JTF may warrant the creation of a subordinate JSOTF, a joint 

CMO task force, or a joint PSYOP task force. In some instances a JSOTF may be the 

initial or follow-on task force structure when conducting FID operations. As seen in 

recent experience during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-Philippines, the JSOTF 

structure may include a subordinate CF element. 

For further information on JTFs, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

6. The United States Diplomatic Mission and Country Team 

a. The US diplomatic mission to an HN includes representatives of all US 

departments and agencies physically present in the country. The President gives the 

chief of the diplomatic mission, normally an ambassador, full responsibility for the 

direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG executive branch employees incountry. The COM has authority over all USG executive branch employees within the 

mission and host country except for employees under the command of a US military 

commander (Title 22, USC, Section 3927). However, this authority does not extend to 

personnel in other missions or those assigned to an international agency. Close 

coordination with each COM and country team in the GCC’s AOR is essential in order to 

conduct effective, country-specific FID operations that support the HN’s IDAD program 

and US regional goals and objectives. 

b. Organization. The country team structure (see Figure III-3) denotes the 

process of in-country, interdepartmental coordination among key members of the US 

diplomatic mission. The composition of a country team varies, depending on the desires 

of the COM, the in-country situation, and the number and levels of US departments and 

agencies present. The principal military member of the country team is the senior 

defense official/defense attaché (SDO/DATT). In addition to being the diplomatically 

accredited DATT the SDO is the chief of the SCO. In some instances the COM may use 

the term security assistance organization/officer for the organization or his or her staff 

members. Although the US area military commander (the GCC or a subordinate) is not a 

member of the diplomatic mission, the commander may participate or be represented in 

meetings and coordination conducted by the country team. The following discussion 
Organization and Responsibilities for Foreign Internal Defense 

III-11 

provides an outline of typical country team representatives and explains the military 

elements important to the FID mission. 

(1) The COM coordinates much of the FID effort in the assigned country and 

accomplishes this task either through the assigned SCO or through the country team. 

(2) DOS is generally represented on the country team by the following: 

(a) The deputy COM serves as executive officer and chief of staff for the 

ambassador and directs the diplomatic mission in the ambassador’s absence (then called 

the chargé d’affaires). 

(b) The political counselor directs the political section and is often third in 

command of the mission. The political section may also contain a political and/or 

military officer to assist in the coordination of military activities supporting FID 

operations. 

THE COUNTRY TEAM STRUCTURE

Ambassador

Chief of Mission

Deputy Chief of Mission

Political

Counselor

Becomes charg d'affaires when ambassador is out of the country or when an 

ambassador has not yet been appointed

é

Director

United States 

Agency for

International

Development

Consular

Office

Cultural 

Attaché/Public 

Affairs

Officer

Other Agency

Representatives

Administrative

Counselor

Senior Defense Official/ 

Defense Attaché Commercial

Attaché

Defense Attaché 

Office

Defense 

Cooperation 

Organization

Figure III-3. The Country Team Structure 
Chapter III 

III-12 JP 3-22 

(c) The commercial attaché is trained by the Department of Commerce and 

promotes US commercial interests. 

(d) The cultural attaché is a DOS public diplomacy officer responsible for 

implementing the US information program throughout the HN. This individual will often 

double as the PAO. 

(3) USAID is represented by the in-country director of USAID. The director 

directs the nonmilitary US developmental efforts in the HN. 

(4) Other USG departments, agencies, and interests may be represented by the 

following: 

(a) Treasury attaché. 

(b) Agricultural attaché. 

(c) Labor attaché. 

(d) Air attaché. 

(e) Science attaché. 

(f) DEA representative. 

(g) Director of the Peace Corps. 

(h) Legal attaché (representing DOJ). 

(i) USCG representative. 

(5) The DOD organization and representation within the diplomatic mission and 

country team can range from as little as an envoy to a full complement of Service 

attachés or a major SCO. In nations with active FID operations, there is likely to be a 

larger military presence with most of these resources centered in the SCO. 

(a) The SDO/DATT is the principal DOD official in a US embassy, as 

designated by SecDef. The SDO/DATT is the COM’s principal military advisor on 

defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military 

officer assigned to a US diplomatic mission, and the single point of contact for all DOD 

matters involving the embassy or DOD elements assigned to or working from the 

embassy. All DOD elements assigned or attached to or operating from US embassies are 

aligned under the coordinating authority of the SDO/DATT. Where separate SC and 

DATT offices exist, they remain separate with distinct duties and statutory authorities. 

The SDO/DATT represents SecDef and the appropriate GCC for coordination of 

administrative and security matters for all DOD personnel not under the command of a 
Organization and Responsibilities for Foreign Internal Defense 

III-13 

US commander. The SDO/DATT in each embassy exercises coordinating authority over 

DOD elements under COM authority, subject to the authorities of the GCC and DOD 

component commanders. This coordinating authority does not preempt the authority 

exercised over these elements by the COM, the mission authority exercised by the parent 

DOD components, or the command authority exercised by the GCC under the Unified 

Command Plan. As required by the COM and with concurrence of the GCC, the 

SDO/DATT assumes tactical control of DOD elements assigned or attached to the 

embassy for country team support to significant embassy events. 

(b) The SDO/DATT is the officer in charge of the US defense attaché 

office (USDAO). The SDO/DATT and other Service attachés serve as SecDef’s, 

CJCS’s, and CCDR’s diplomatic representatives to their HN counterparts. USDAOs are 

operated by Defense Intelligence Agency. The attachés also serve the ambassador and 

coordinate with and represent their respective Military Department on Service matters. 

The attachés assist the FID effort by exchanging information with the CCDR’s staff on 

HN military, social, economic, and political conditions. In the majority of countries, the 

functions of an SCO are carried out within the USDAO under the direction of the 

SDO/DATT. 

(c) In nations where large concentrations of US military personnel are 

resident or transit, FPDs may be deployed to support DOD CI. The primary mission of 

an FPD is to provide AT/FP indications and warnings to DOD personnel. FP personnel 

are specially trained, area-oriented, and language-qualified. FPDs interface with HN 

local law enforcement and security services to enhance CI and security support to FP for 

US troops in theater. OSD-sponsored FPDs may also be deployed to locations where 

DOD military criminal investigative organizations are not currently present. 

(d) The SCO is the most important FID-related military activity under 

the supervision of the ambassador. The specific title of the SCO may vary; however, 

these differences reflect nothing more than the political climate within the HN. As 

examples, an SCO may be referred to as a military assistance advisory group, military 

advisory group, office of military cooperation, or office of defense cooperation. SCOs 

may have up to six members of the Armed Forces before congressional approval is 

required. Usually, a US military officer serves as the chief. When programs involve 

more than one Service, the SCO organization will be joint. The organization 

(departmental and functional alignments) of a typical SCO are indicated in Figures III-4 

and III-5. 

1. The chief, SCO (sometimes referred to as the security assistance 

officer) operates under the direction of the US ambassador (COM) and reports 

administratively to the GCC and is funded by DSCA. The SCO assists HN security 

forces by planning and administering military aspects of the SA program. The SCO also 

helps the US country team communicate HN assistance needs to policy and budget 

officials within the USG and combatant command for recommended inclusion in the 

Foreign Operations Budget. 
Chapter III 

III-14 JP 3-22 

SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

(DEPARTMENTAL ALIGNMENT)

Joint Programs

Management Section

Chief,

Security Cooperation 

Organization

Army Section Navy / Marine Corps 

Section Air Force Section

Programs and

Training Branch Programs and

Training Branch

Programs and

Training Branch

Logistics

Branch

Logistics

Branch

Logistics

Branch

Figure III-4. Security Cooperation Organization (Departmental Alignment) 

Training Section

Plans Section

Logistics Section

Administration Section

SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

(FUNCTIONAL ALIGNMENT)

Chief, Security

Cooperation Organization

Figure III-5. Security Cooperation Organization (Functional Alignment)
Organization and Responsibilities for Foreign Internal Defense 

III-15 

2. The SCO is essentially a management organization that helps 

assess the HN needs and articulate them through the instruments described above. 

SCOs manage equipment and service cases; manage training; monitor programs; evaluate 

and plan HN military capabilities and requirements; provide administrative support; 

promote rationalization, standardization, and interoperability; and perform liaison 

exclusive of advisory and training assistance. In addition, the SCO provides oversight of 

training and assistance teams temporarily assigned to assist the HN. The SCO is limited 

by law from giving direct training assistance that is normally provided through special 

teams and organizations assigned to perform limited tasks for specific periods. These 

include technical assistance field teams (TAFTs), MTTs, technical assistance teams 

(TATs), language training detachments, weapon system logistics offices, quality 

assurance teams (QATs), as well as site survey and defense requirement survey teams. 

The SDO/DATT has the command responsibility to expeditiously determine the status 

and whereabouts of all assigned or attached DOD-affiliated personnel in conjunction with 

a natural or man-made disaster and accomplish reporting. The GCC’s manpower and 

personnel directorate of a joint staff (J-1) will establish the actual report format and direct 

submission timelines and procedures. 

(6) Extensive and effective lines of coordination in an organization such as the 

country team are critical to its effective functioning. Effective coordination from the 

national level down to the smallest independent agencies operating within the HN is 

essential. This arrangement and lines of coordination are illustrated in Figure III-6. 

7. Multinational Foreign Internal Defense Force 

a. Multinational operations require clear C2 and coordination procedures for 

FID planning and execution in order to facilitate unity of effort.

b. Each multinational operation in support of FID is different, and key 

considerations involved in planning and execution may vary with the international 

situation and perspectives, motives, and values of the organization’s members. 

c. Multinational Resources. Multinational partners can assist materially in training 

HN security forces. Some nations more willingly train HN forces, especially police 

forces, than provide troops for combat operations. Some multinational forces come with 

significant employment restrictions. Each international contribution is considered on its 

own merits, but such assistance is rarely declined. Good faith efforts to integrate 

multinational partners and achieve optimum effectiveness are required. 
Chapter III 

III-16 JP 3-22 EMBASSY AND SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION WORKING RELATIONSHIPS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Secretary of Defense President Secretary of State Ambassador Combatant Commander US Military Bases Consulates General Consulate Deputy Chief of Mission SCO Advise Training Supplies Grants Loans Sales DEFENSE ATTACHÉS Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps Coast Guard Reporting COMMERCE Trade Promotion Development US Exports Tourism USAID Technical Assistance Loans Grants STATE CULTURAL ATTACHÉ AGRICULTURE Reporting Analysis Marketing Negotiate Advise Sales OTHERS DEA Legal Science DOE USCIS Labor Foreign Assistance Act Maritime Treasury LOC Veterans Administration Internal Revenue Service Minerals Customs Other US Government personnel assigned to the mission PEACE CORPS Basic human needs INM Drugs POLITICAL Reporting Analysis Political / Military Labor Biographies Convey Views CONSULAR Passport Citizenship Visa Welfare Legal Assistance Federal Assistance Shipping ADMINISTRATION Communications Budget Finance General Services Personnel Medical Community Liaison Information Systems SECURITY CULTURAL Libraries Centers Cultural Exchange Educational Exchange Exhibits Lectures INFORMATION Press Radio TV - Film Publications PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE COUNTRY TEAM COORDINATING Functions and staff vary between countries REGIONAL FUNCTIONS Security, Communications, Medical, Finance, Management DEA Drug Enforcement Administration DOE Department of Energy INM international narcotics matters LOC line of communications SCO security cooperation organization TV television US United States USAID United States Agency for International Development USCIS United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Figure III-6. Embassy and Security Cooperation Organization Working Relationships 
IV-1 

CHAPTER IV

PLANNING FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE 

1. General 

a. FID is designed to bolster the internal stability and security of the supported 

nation. Only a comprehensive planning process at both the national and theater level can 

provide the means to reach this goal. 

b. NSC Directives Promulgate US FID Policy. JSPS documents reflect the 

military responsibilities for carrying out this broad guidance. 

c. The entire focus of US assistance under FID is to assist an HN, if possible, in 

anticipating, precluding, and as a last resort, countering an internal threat. The type of 

planning necessary is dictated by the type or types of support being provided. Support 

in anticipating and precluding threats is preventive in nature and is likely to require 

a mix of indirect support and direct support not involving combat operations. An 

existing threat is likely to require responses that span all categories of FID support, to 

include US combat operations. A detailed discussion of employment considerations is 

included in Chapter VI, “Foreign Internal Defense Operations.” 

d. Prior to a training team or JTF conducting a FID mission in a foreign country, 

many levels of policy development and operation planning will take place. The specific 

mission to be conducted can range from participating in a multinational exercise to 

training an HN force on basic infantry skills. FID missions will fall under two major 

categories—those under the responsibility of DOD and those under DOS. To a training 

team in the HN, the category may seem irrelevant; however, the activity or program a 

training team has been deployed to participate in is governed by specific rules, funding, 

and conditions, depending on if the program falls under DOD or DOS oversight. The 

majority of DOD and DOS activities are incorporated into the theater planning process. 

Through the theater planning process, identified activities are intended to help shape the 

theater in which the activities will be conducted. Depending on whether the mission has 

originated through DOD or DOS, how, where, and at what level the planning, 

coordination, and resourcing takes place will vary. For example, Title 22, USC, governs 

DOS programs and indicates participants in these programs are noncombatants. 

Programs under Title 10, USC, authorities do not restrict participants from being 

combatants. 

“The security of the United States is tightly bound up with the security of the 

broader international system. As a result, our strategy seeks to build capacity 

of fragile or vulnerable partners to withstand internal threats and external 

aggression while improving the capacity of the international system itself to 

withstand the challenge posed by rogue states and would-be hegemons.” 

National Defense Strategy, June 2008 
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-22 

2. Planning Imperatives 

FID has certain aspects that make planning for it complex. Some basic imperatives 

when integrating FID into strategies and plans are: 

 a. Maintain HN Sovereignty and Build Legitimacy. If US military efforts in 

support of FID do anything to undermine the sovereignty or legitimacy of the HN 

government, then they have effectively sabotaged the FID efforts. Ultimately, FID 

operations are only as successful as the HN’s IDAD program. 

 b. Understand long-term or strategic implications and sustainability of all US 

assistance efforts before FID operations commence. This is especially important in 

building HN development and defense self-sufficiency, both of which may require large 

investments of time and materiel. Comprehensive understanding and planning will 

include assessing the following: 

 (1) The end state for development. 

 (2) Sustainability of development programs and defense improvements. 

 (3) Acceptability of development models across the range of HN society, and 

the impact of development programs on the distribution of resources within the HN. 

 (4) Second-order and third-order effects of socioeconomic change. 

 (5) The relationship between improved military forces and existing regional, 

ethnic, and religious cleavages in society. 

 (6) The impact of improved military forces on the regional balance of power. 

 (7) Personnel life-cycle management of military personnel who receive 

additional training. 

 (8) The impact of military development and operations on civil-military 

relations in the HN. 

c. Tailor military support to FID for the operational environment and the 

specific needs of the supported HN. Choices in equipment and training conducted 

during FID operations may affect future interoperability capabilities. Consider the threat 

as well as local religious, social, economic, and political factors when developing the 

military plans to support FID. Overcoming the tendency to use a US frame of reference 

is important because this potentially damaging viewpoint can result in equipment, 

training, and infrastructure not at all suitable for the nation receiving US assistance. 

d. Ensure Unity of Effort / Unity of Purpose. As a tool of US foreign policy, FID 

is a national-level program effort that involves numerous USG agencies that may play a 
Planning for Foreign Internal Defense 

IV-3 

dominant role in providing the content of FID plans. Planning considers and, where 

appropriate, integrates all instruments of national power and IGOs, NGOs, and HN 

capabilities in order to reduce inefficiencies and enhance strategy in support of FID and 

HN IDAD efforts. An interagency plan that provides a means for achieving unity of 

effort among USG agencies is described in Appendix C, “Illustrative Interagency Plan for 

Foreign Internal Defense.” 

e. Understand US Foreign Policy. NSC directives, plans, or policies are the 

guiding documents. If those plans are absent, JFCs and their staffs must find other means 

to understand US foreign policy objectives for an HN and its relation to other foreign 

policy objectives. They should also bear in mind that these relations are dynamic, and 

that US policy may change as a result of developments in the HN or broader political 

changes in either country. DOD planners should seek guidance from the COM and 

country team in interpreting foreign policy and guiding US efforts in a particular country. 

 f. Understand the Information Environment

 (1) With the advent of instant or nearly instant communications and media 

access in even the most remote regions, US FID efforts in any HN may be scrutinized 

more closely within the region, surrounding regions, or even globally. In addition, FID 

operations may affect countries throughout the region or even cause international debate 

and opposition. In some theaters, traditional rivalries and hostility toward the US will be 

a factor. For example, US assistance to a nation with long-standing adversaries in the 

area may be perceived by those adversaries as upsetting the regional balance of power. 

Although it is increasingly an untenable position, some nations within a region or 

elsewhere internationally may consider the HN to be within its “sphere of influence.” 

The ethnic rivalries in the Balkans and the quasi-religious dogmas of the jihadists 

promulgating the war on terrorism show that history, even a millennium old, can still 

foster fanatic resistance to US FID efforts. These examples highlight the propensity of 

some internal threats to use revisionist history in their propaganda. 

 (2) Proactive PA programs can accurately depict US efforts. Adversary 

propaganda requires a concerted US PSYOP program to defeat it. The US can pursue a 

proactive PSYOP effort in the HN and neighboring regional countries to prepare key TAs 

for US FID operations. In addition, PSYOP can exploit early successes in the HN. US 

commanders must consider friendly, neutral, and hostile nations in the supported HN 

region and envision how they will perceive US support. PSYOP and PA can be 

coordinated to address regional, transregional, and if applicable, global audiences that 

may have (or perceive they have) a stake in any US FID operations. 

 (3) Planners must be mindful that all FID operations have the potential to move 

quickly from obscurity to the center stage of global media. Properly trained, culturally 

and politically attuned forces are necessary for successful mission accomplishment. 
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-22 

 g. Sustain the Effort. This includes planning for both the US sustainment effort 

and also the efforts necessary for the HN to sustain its operations after the US or 

multinational forces depart. 

3. Department of Defense Guidance 

 a. Military planning for FID is initiated at the combatant command level. 

GCCs base strategy and military planning to support FID on the broad guidance and 

missions provided in the JSPS. This section will briefly discuss the major JSPS guidance 

documents and their relation to the CCDR’s FID planning process. Only those 

documents most relevant to the FID planning process will be discussed. 

For further information on joint planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01B, Joint Strategic 

Planning System. 

 b. The NMS supports the aims of the NSS and implements the National Defense 

Strategy (NDS). The NMS conveys the CJCS message to the joint force on the strategic 

direction the Armed Forces of the United States should follow to support the NSS and 

NDS. It describes the ways and means to protect the US, prevent conflict and surprise 

attack, and prevail against adversaries who threaten our homeland, deployed forces, 

allies, and friends. 

 c. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The JSCP implements the strategic 

policy direction provided in the GEF and initiates the planning process for the 

development of campaign, contingency, and posture plans. The GEF integrates DOD 

planning guidance into a single, overarching document and contains DOD guidance 

previously promulgated by several documents. Through the guidance and resources 

provided in the JSCP, the GCCs develop their operation plan (OPLAN) and 

operation plan in concept format to support FID. Generally, the JSCP provides 

guidance important to FID in the following areas. 

 (1) The JSCP provides general taskings to the GCCs that may mandate military 

support to a FID operation or provide the strategic guidance and direction from which 

GCCs may deduce military missions to support FID. 

 (2) The JSCP supplemental instruction provides additional planning guidance, 

capabilities, and amplification of tasking for planning in specified functional areas. 

The supplemental instruction impacts the military planning and execution to support FID; 

however, four functional areas are directly tied to FID, as described in Figure IV-1. 

 d. Guidance for Employment of the Force. The GEF provides the foundation for 

all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments, and supports the President’s 

NSS. With respect to SC, this guidance provides direction with respect to IW, building 

partnership capacity, and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction. SC tools are 
Planning for Foreign Internal Defense 

IV-5 

discussed in Chapter I, “Introduction,” paragraph 6, “Department of Defense Foreign 

Internal Defense Tools.” 

 e. The GCC, using an integrated priority list, also identifies requirements to support 

FID efforts and request authorization and resourcing. 

4. General Theater Planning Requirements 

 a. GCCs may develop theater strategies and campaign plans that support taskings by 

the CJCS in the JSCP. Regardless of how commanders may tailor the planning process, 

military activities in support of FID requirements are integrated into concepts and 

plans from the strategic level down to the tactical level.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS 

FUNCTIONAL AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE JOINT 

STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN 

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

OTHER JOINT

OPERATIONS CIVIL AFFAIRS

JOINT STRATEGIC 

CAPABILITIES PLAN

Establishes objectives

Provides planning guidance

Identifies forces for each

Service

Assigns planning tasks to

combatant commands/

selected defense agencies

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Identifies objectives and

resources to meet objectives

Covers all aspects of missions

Contains guidance 

concerning support to

intelligence planning objectives,

guidance and tasks, logistics,

mobility, and other operations

Provides specific planning

tasks to the Services and

combatant commands

Identifies civil considerations

Missions include

surveying, assisting, and 

coordinating

Figure IV-1. Foreign Internal Defense Operations Functional Areas Associated with the 

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-22 

 b. Theater strategy translates national and alliance strategic tasks and direction into 

long-term, regionally focused operational tasks and direction to accomplish specific 

missions and objectives. The NMS, GEF, and JSCP guide the development of this 

strategy that incorporates peacetime and war objectives and reflects national and DOD 

policy and guidance. Peacetime goals will normally focus on deterring hostilities and 

enhancing stability in the theater. FID is an integral part of this strategy. The 

determination of the desired end state for the theater is an important element in the 

strategy process. This determination establishes the theater’s strategic direction on which 

commanders and their staffs base campaign plans as well as other plans. In general, the 

theater strategy will normally include an analysis of US national policy and interests, a 

strategic assessment of the AOR, a threat analysis, the commander’s vision, and a 

statement of theater missions and objectives. 

 c. TCPs are operational extensions of the theater strategy. They provide the 

commander’s vision and intent through broad operational concepts and provide the 

framework for supporting OPLANs. 

For further information on campaign plans, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, 

Joint Operation Planning.

 d. Security Cooperation Planning. SC is the means by which DOD interacts with 

foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US 

security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and 

multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access 

to an HN. The GCC’s TCP is the primary document that focuses on the command’s 

steady-state activities, which include operations, SC, and other activities designed to 

achieve theater strategic end states. Direction for the GCC is provided through the GEF 

and the JSCP. This guidance provides regional focus and SC priorities. Services develop 

campaign support plans that focus on activities conducted to support the execution of 

their GCC’s campaign plan, and on their own SC activities that directly contribute to the 

campaign end states and/or DOD component programs in support of broader Title 10, 

USC, responsibilities. 

For additional information on SC planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 

and the Guidance for Employment of the Force.

 e. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the approved 

system for conventional operation planning and execution. The JOPES contingency 

planning process interrelates with the NMS and other planning documents to develop 

OPLANs. The contingency planning process is particularly applicable to FID 

planning, since most military activities in support of FID should be planned well in 

advance as part of a larger strategy or campaign.
Planning for Foreign Internal Defense 

IV-7 

5. Planning Procedures and Considerations 

 a. JOPES provides the framework for planning functions that form the basis for both 

contingency and crisis planning. Figure IV-2 depicts this framework and the 

relationships between operational activities, planning functions, and products. This is 

fully described in both JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01A, JOPES Volume I, Planning Policies and 

Procedures. FID planning follows these guidelines and is further described below. 

 b. Strategic Guidance. There are three methods by which the GCC identifies 

requirements for military activities to support FID. Plans for these specific military 

operations in support of FID become part of the overall theater effort and are 

incorporated into all levels of planning. 

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING ACTIVITIES, 

FUNCTIONS, AND PRODUCTS

Plan Assessment

(Refine, Adapt, 

Terminate, Execute)

Plan

Development

Concept

Development

Strategic

Guidance

Plan Review Cycle

Base Plan

Concept Plan

Execute 

Order

Deployment

Order

Alert 

Order

Operation 

Order

Planning 

Order

Warning 

Order

Approved

Plan

Approved

Concept

Approved 

Mission

Operational Plan

Situational Awareness

Operational Planning

Activities

Planning 

Functions

Products

Execution

IPR IPR IPR

LEGEND

IPR in-progress review

Figure IV-2. Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products 
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-22 

 (1) Top down through the JSPS.

 (2) Bottom up from an HN or country team in the GCC’s AOR. These 

include both SA and other SC requests. SA requests are forwarded by the SC officer on 

the country team directly to the implementing agency. The GCC is informed of such 

requests but execution is outside the JSPS. For other SC requests the GCC may forward 

those requests to SecDef for authorization. The GCC may authorize these support 

missions whenever they are in accordance with US law and directed through the JSPS. 

 (3) GCC Initiated. Military support to FID efforts that is not directed under an 

existing specified or implied mission may be identified. The GCC endorses these 

requirements and obtains authorization from SecDef. 

 c. Concept Development. Figure IV-3 provides an overview of the major concept 

development stages. FID considerations include the following. 

 (1) Mission Analysis. Before beginning FID planning, the commander’s staff 

will conduct a thorough mission analysis of the operational environment and threat. 

This mission analysis establishes the operational framework for FID concept 

CONCEPT

DEVELOPMENT

Step 1

Mission

Analysis

Step 2

Planning

Guidance

Step 3

Staff

Estimates

Step 4

Commander's

Estimates

Step 5

Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Review

Figure IV-3. Concept Development 
Planning for Foreign Internal Defense 

IV-9 

development and planning. The following areas are considered when developing the 

concept. 

 (a) Threats to HN IDAD. Threats may be specific, such as illicit drugs or 

terrorism, or they may be more general as in social unrest and instability. Identification 

of the root cause is key so that military activities in the FID plans may target long-term 

causes rather than short-term symptoms. Appendix B, “Joint Intelligence Preparation of 

the Operational Environment to Support Foreign Internal Defense,” provides detailed 

guidance for conducting intelligence preparation of the operational area necessary for 

effective FID planning. 

 (b) The HN Social, Economic, and Political Environment. FID efforts 

are intended to support IDAD programs in a manner that is acceptable to the HN’s 

cultural and political realities. The capability of the HN government and leadership 

as well as existing treaties and social infrastructure are all factors that planners 

must consider. This step may result in the conclusion that the best solution from the US 

perspective may not be the best solution for the supported HN. This proposed solution 

may be outside the realm of FID and may be better accomplished through other means. 

This situation must be resolved in diplomatic channels between the USG and the HN. 

For example, a treaty may meet US goals and objectives independent of the HN IDAD 

program and interests. 

 (c) Mission analysis for military operations in support of FID normally will 

be conducted in conjunction with normal operation planning. During this phase, 

commanders and their staffs must analyze the assigned tasks, develop a mission 

statement, formulate subordinate tasks, and prepare guidance for the commander’s 

approval. The first two of these are discussed below. 

 1. Analyze Assigned Tasks. Tasks to support FID will be specified 

and implied and may range from supporting SA efforts to providing forces to conduct 

FHA efforts. 

 2. Develop a Mission Statement. The mission statement guides much 

of the remaining planning process. The mission statement will provide the who, what, 

when, where, why, and possibly how. The theater mission established by the GCC may 

be general, but could also identify FID-related tasks. The mission statement focuses on 

the priority threats to the security and stability of the HN. 

 (2) Planning Guidance. During planning guidance, the commander outlines 

tentative COAs, additional assumptions, and a planning directive to the staff and 

subordinate commanders. Several important FID guidelines must be considered to 

ensure that future planning results in the most efficient employment of the commander’s 

resources. 

 (a) Legal Authorizations and Restrictions. The legal restrictions 

governing military activities in support of FID are complex and subject to changing US 
Chapter IV 

IV-10 JP 3-22 

legislation. The staff legal advisor has an active role in the FID planning process. 

The basic funding authorizations for military activities in support of FID come through 

either the FAA, AECA, or through DOD operation and maintenance (O&M) funding 

sources. While GCCs may use O&M funding for specified and limited FID activities 

such as HCA, they may not use O&M funds for SA or exceed strict dollar limits on 

military construction projects. Appendix A, “Legal Considerations,” provides a look at 

the legal aspects of FID. 

 (b) Third Country Interests. US FID efforts may impact countries 

throughout the region. US FID activities may impact conditions and perceptions 

throughout the region, particularly in neighboring countries. These factors will not 

dictate US policy, but require careful evaluation and consideration and may impact the 

design of specific operations. Commanders should use active information programs to 

accurately depict US efforts to influence perceptions and to defeat adversary propaganda 

efforts. 

 (c) Restrictive Use of Force. US combat operations in FID will generally 

require a judicious selection and employment of forces. The purpose of such selection 

and employment is to ensure that the HN military and other civilian security forces 

rapidly accept the responsibility for its security and to minimize HN civilian casualties. 

Employment of nonlethal capabilities significantly enhances options for force application 

and provides a means to achieve scalable levels of force. 

 1. Specific ROE are developed and approved to support FID 

operations. They will normally differ from country to country, may differ within regions 

of the same country, and are likely to be more restrictive in FID than in other operations. 

However, the existence of such restrictive ROE does not preclude the US from 

employing a proportional level of force or using the force required to protect the lives of 

deployed US personnel. It also will not restrict the authority of on-scene commanders to 

respond with appropriate force and use all necessary means available and take all 

appropriate actions in self-defense when they perceive a threat to the safety and security 

of US personnel. 

 2. Standing rules of engagement (SROE) are provided for US forces as 

stand-alone guidance that can be tailored to meet mission-specific requirements. SROE 

apply in the absence of specific ROE from higher authority in the form of supplemental 

measures; these supplemental measures may be provided by, or requested from, higher 

authority to tailor ROE for a particular mission. GCCs may also augment the SROE in 

order to respond to mission and threat in their AOR. SROE do not apply to DOD civil 

support missions (i.e., support to civil authorities and civilian law enforcement agencies); 

routine Military Department functions, including FP duties, within US territory and 

territorial seas; homeland defense land missions within US territory; law enforcement and 

security duties on DOD installations (and off-installation, while conducting official DOD 

security functions), within or outside US territory; USCG units (and other units under 

their OPCON) conducting law enforcement operations; and US forces assigned to the 
Planning for Foreign Internal Defense 

IV-11 

OPCON or tactical control of a multinational force (the ROE of the multinational force 

will be followed, if authorized by SecDef). 

For additional information on SROE, refer to CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of 

Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces. 

 (3) Staff Estimates. The staff analyzes and refines tentative COAs during the 

staff estimate process of concept development. These detailed options serve as the 

foundation for the commander’s decision to select a COA. Military options to support 

FID under consideration can involve any of the categories of indirect support, direct 

support (not involving combat operations), or combat operations. The following three 

estimates have specific implications for the development of an effective FID plan.

 (a) The intelligence estimate is essential to accurately identify the 

threat upon which to base FID efforts. The intelligence estimate supporting FID 

operations will have an orientation quite different from that of a conventional estimate. 

A comprehensive and intimate knowledge of the operational environment is essential in 

building this estimate. The intelligence estimate concentrates on adversary situation; 

adversary capabilities, to include their capacity to produce chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and the location of CBRN materials, 

including toxic industrial materials, that could be used to produce such weapons or 

makeshift devices; an analysis of those capabilities; and finally, conclusions drawn from 

that analysis. In FID, however, analysis must focus more on the local population and 

its probable reactions to potential US or opposition actions. This requires knowledge 

of the ethnic, racial, economic, scientific, technical, religious, and linguistic groups in the 

HN, as well as their locations and an understanding of how they may perceive future 

operations. Understanding the operational environment and the HN’s social, economic, 

and political systems is essential in order to effectively and efficiently support the HN’s 

IDAD program. Appendix B, “Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational 

Environment to Support Foreign Internal Defense,” discusses the FID-specific aspects of 

intelligence preparation that must be considered in order to successfully plan and execute 

FID operations. 

 (b) The CMO estimate examines each military COA and how best 

CMO may influence the various COAs the commander is considering. The focus of 

the CMO estimate development is on situation assessment rather than COA development. 

The purpose is to assemble information underlying a CMO concept of support that can be 

modified to support the overall concept of operations. CA will also complete area studies 

where operations are likely. For military operations to support FID, these assessments 

focus on social, economic, and political factors that relate to existing or potential 

lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency. These assessments may include overlays that 

show local demographics, civil supply support, public utilities, and population 

displacement. The CMO estimate shows how CMO can best be integrated into the 

overall operation and supports decisionmaking throughout an operation. CA support, like 

PSYOP, should be incorporated into all FID operations. 
Chapter IV 

IV-12 JP 3-22 

 (c) The PSYOP staff estimate process examines the potential impact of 

proposed US military operations. Internal stability is closely connected to the HN 

populace’s perceptions; thus their perceptions should be continually assessed and PSYOP 

adjusted accordingly. More specific guidance is included in the PSYOP annex to the 

appropriate plan. At the combatant command level, PSYOP concepts and plans must 

be coordinated through the country team. This coordination is discussed in more 

detail in Chapter VI, “Foreign Internal Defense Operations.” 

 (d) In addition to the planning imperatives previously discussed, there are 

several important FID guidelines to consider when developing possible COAs. These 

guidelines are: 

 1. Maximize Intelligence and CI Capabilities. Identify political, 

economic, scientific, technical, and social threats, in addition to the conventional hostile 

military factions. This is a complex task, especially when working in an unfamiliar 

culture in which US personnel may have little or no experience and in which hightechnology collection and processing equipment may be of little use. Despite this 

challenge, commanders and their staffs must integrate all available assets and use 

culturally trained specialists to define these threats and to appropriately tailor the COAs. 

 2. Force Protection. Commanders and staffs must evaluate operations 

closely in order to determine the increased risks of large deployments of US personnel in 

the area. In a high-threat condition, it may be prudent to delay the FID mission or 

commit a smaller element, rather than to commit a larger force that has a higher profile 

and is more difficult to protect. Depending on the mission, the JFC may consider 

seabasing some of the force as an alternative to reduce the footprint ashore. 

 3. Account for Sustainment. Commanders and staff must be 

cognizant of HN culture and their appreciation for sustainment, maintenance, and 

budgeting. IDAD programs are frequently at risk in the out years because they may not 

receive adequate HN investment. This applies both to physical infrastructure and 

programs to improve human capital, good governance, and other intangibles. 

 4. Measures of Effectiveness. Clearly define and focus on MOEs. 

The success of US FID activities can be measured only in terms of the success of the 

HN’s IDAD program. MOEs should focus on long-term, attainable objectives rather than 

short-term targets, limited objectives, or over-ambitious development goals. In addition, 

establish transition points that define when the supported HN will, incrementally, assume 

responsibility for the total IDAD effort. 

 d. Plan Development. Plan development (Figure IV-2) begins after the GCC’s 

strategic concept is fully developed. This phase matches mission requirements against 

available resources. This action is particularly important because a large portion of 

the force needed to conduct FID is in the Reserve Component (RC) and, in most 

cases, is unavailable (short of use of Presidential Reserve Call-up Authority) for 

long-term operations. In major military operations in support of a FID operation, the 
Planning for Foreign Internal Defense 

IV-13 

commander must consider availability of forces (both Active Component [AC] and RC) 

to support the mission requirements. Use of RC forces, including USCG Reserve, may 

alleviate shortfalls and assist organizing and tailoring resources to carry out the military 

support to FID as efficiently as possible. Similarly, leveraging the mutually supporting 

capabilities of the US Navy (USN) and USCG can serve as a force multiplier for FID 

activities in the maritime domain. HN, third-party nations, and USG interagency 

coordination (country team) remains paramount during plan development. This is an 

extension of the coordination that began during the plan initiation phase. 

 e. Plan Assessment. Commanders and their staffs should consider that many FID 

objectives will involve a long-term effort, and that MOEs may be difficult to evaluate in 

the short term. 

 f. Supporting Plans. Supporting FID plans may come from a variety of units 

such as Service or functional component commanders, subordinate unified 

commanders, JTF commanders, supporting CCDRs or subordinate CA, PSYOP, 

engineer, medical, transportation, special forces (SF) or other combat units. 

Supporting plans cover mobilization, deployment, and employment, and are the “how to” 

of the plan. 

 g. Other Planning Considerations

 (1) For personnel recovery operations that may occur during FID, refer to JP 

3-50, Personnel Recovery. 

 (2) A key component of developing the training plan will be an agreement 

(memorandum of agreement or letter of agreement) between the HN and the joint force 

conducting the training. These are, in effect, signed contracts detailing the specifics of 

what is being provided by each party and should be carefully reviewed by the legal 

advisor for any instrument that is potentially an international agreement. Training plans 

at the operational level will vary based on HN needs and unit training capabilities. An 

assessment for the training to be conducted should begin with a pre-mission site survey 

by all joint force units deploying in the HN. 

6. Planning for Force Protection 

 a. JFCs and their subordinate commanders must address FP during all phases 

of FID operations, from planning through deployment, employment, and redeployment. 

All aspects of FP must be considered and threats minimized to ensure maximum 

operational success. JFCs and their subordinate commanders must implement FP 

measures appropriate to all anticipated threats, to include terrorists and the use of CBRN 

material as a weapon. 

 b. Supported and supporting commanders must ensure that deploying forces receive 

thorough briefings concerning the threat and personnel protection requirements prior to 

and upon arrival in the operational area. 
Chapter IV 

IV-14 JP 3-22 

 c. In addition, JFCs and their subordinate commanders must evaluate the 

deployment of forces and each COA for the impact of terrorist organizations supporting 

the threat and those not directly supporting the threat but seeking to take advantage of the 

situation within the HN. 

 d. JFCs also must plan for CI support to the FID operation and should incorporate 

umbrella concepts for CI FP source operations in the planning process. 

 e. For the foreseeable future, the threat of terrorism is a constant factor, even in 

those nations with advanced domestic security infrastructures. FID operations require 

proactive FP measures and consideration of the following: 

 (1) Street or organized crime. 

 (2) Foreign intelligence services. 

 (3) Local populace animosity or demonstrations. 

 (4) HN regional transportation systems. 

 (5) HN military equipment, training, and procedural deficiencies. 

 (6) WMD active defense and CBRN passive defense. 

 (7) Weather, terrain, and environment. 

 (8) Contaminants and pollution. 

 (9) Health threats and HN health care capabilities. 

 (10) Mines and unexploded ordnance. 

 (11) Political groups, parties, or individuals. 

 (12) Regional cross-border threats. 

For further information on FP, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 

3-07.2, Antiterrorism. For further information on CBRN, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments, and JP 3-40, 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

7. Foreign Internal Defense Assessment 

 a. Commanders and staffs must realize that planning for joint FID operations is an 

integrated process. It is totally integrated into theater planning and is reflected in 

planning documents extending from the JSCP and the GCC’s strategy down to 
Planning for Foreign Internal Defense 

IV-15 

subordinate joint force and Service component supporting plans. During the concept 

development of FID planning, a broad approach to JIPOE must be considered. In 

addition, PSYOP and CMO estimates are included in the decision-making process to 

formulate adequate and feasible COAs from the FID standpoint; how best CMO can 

influence the operational concept. Finally, the staff must review FID plans for adequacy, 

acceptability, feasibility, and compliance with joint doctrine, and they must ensure the 

creation of appropriate supporting plans to support theater-level operations. 

 b. Primarily, those responsible for conducting FID operations assess what activities 

to conduct. DOS representatives work with foreign governments and DOD 

representatives work with foreign military personnel to develop IDAD programs that are 

consistent with US foreign policy objectives and useful to the country concerned. The 

theater SC planning process is used to assess currently implemented programs and 

exercises. Representatives assess the previous programs for relevancy and success in 

relation to country-specific objectives and to the overall goals within the region. 

Programs are assessed on the basis of key trends, shortfalls, future opportunities, and 

challenges. 

8. United States Foreign Internal Defense Capabilities 

 a. Military Resources. SOF have traditionally been the forces of choice for FID 

due to their extensive language and cultural training and their regional focus. However, 

FID requirements in modern conflict zones far outsize the capability of limited SOF. CF 

can, and should, be prepared to conduct FID operations where appropriate. In fact, CF 

have a distinct advantage in certain FID operations where their HN counterparts have a 

similar conventional mission. Conventional commanders must assign the best qualified, 

mature, and culturally attuned Service members to training and advisory missions. Both 

CF and SOF participating in FID operations outside of their normal area of expertise will 

require augmentation from interpreters fluent in the HN language and cultural training. 

 (1) US Army 

 (a) Army FID operations are primarily aimed at developing and improving 

HN ground force and landpower capabilities through ground force advisor operations in 

coordination with SA programs. A principal US activity for conducting FID is the 

transfer of major items (weapon systems and related support items) to selected HNs, 

primarily through SA. The Army often facilitates such transfers through operational and 

strategic assessments, ground force studies, SA-funded equipment refurbishment, training 

on specific weapon systems and support items through SA-funded MTTs, and SA case 

management and oversight. Delivery of FMS items can be performed in conjunction 

with multinational operations and contingencies and with other training programs 

conducted by the GCCs and USG agencies. FID operations can establish a US presence, 

build rapport, achieve integration of forces, and build a foundation for future regional 

cooperation. If necessary, commanders can employ an even greater range of capabilities 

and resources in more direct forms of FID support when HN ground units are 
Chapter IV 

IV-16 JP 3-22 

inadequately sized or structured to make necessary and timely contributions to their own 

defense effort. Principal initiatives to accomplish FID objectives include the following: 

 1. Facilitate the transfer of US defense articles and services under the 

SA program to eligible foreign government aviation units engaged in IDAD operations. 

 2. Assess foreign military ground force capabilities and provide 

direction or recommendations toward improving HN landpower employment and 

sustainment methods. 

 3. Educate foreign military force senior officers and civilians in how to 

appropriately use military power. 

 4. Train foreign military forces to operate and sustain indigenous 

ground resources and capabilities. 

 5. Advise foreign military forces and governmental agencies on how to 

employ ground forces in specific operational situations. 

 6. Assist foreign ground forces in executing specific missions or 

contingency operations. Assistance can take on many forms, but generally includes 

hands-on assistance in enabling capabilities such as intelligence operations, military 

police/detainee operations, CA/civil-military cooperation, sustainment/logistical support, 

and health services support. 

 7. Facilitate force integration for multinational operations. 

 8. Provide direct support to host countries by using Army resources to 

provide intelligence, communications capability, mobility, logistic support, and Army 

aviation support. 

For further guidance and detail on US Army FID capabilities, refer to Field Manual 

(FM) 3-07, Stability Operations, and FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance. 

 (b) US Army Special Operations Forces. Army special operations forces 

(ARSOF) may conduct FID operations unilaterally in the absence of any other military 

effort, support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the 

employment of CF. The ARSOF core task of FID is only one component of an HN’s 

IDAD policy and programs. The strategic end state of FID is an HN capable of 

successfully integrating military force with other instruments of national power to 

eradicate internal threats. From an SOF perspective, FID efforts are successful if they 

preclude the need to deploy large numbers of US military personnel and equipment. FID, 

as part of NA, takes place in an arena that may include support to COIN, 

counterterrorism (CT), PO, DOD support to CD operations, and/or FHA. These activities 

may include FID operations as an integral component in supporting the fight against 

internal threats. Small teams may conduct FID training in remote areas in HNs where the 
Planning for Foreign Internal Defense 

IV-17 

US force commitment is small. When this is the case, ARSOF units may be the primary 

or sole trainers of HN military or paramilitary personnel. In other cases, large numbers 

of forces and units may be involved in direct support (not involving combat operations). 

Training of HN military may continue while US forces are providing direct support and, 

to some degree, even during combat operations. A commander must balance the need to 

operationally employ ARSOF against their unique abilities (possibly unparalleled by the 

CF available) to train critical capabilities in the HN military. 

For further guidance and detail on ARSOF FID capabilities, refer to FM 3-05.137, Army 

Special Operations Forces Foreign Internal Defense. 

 (2) US Marine Corps 

 (a) Marine Corps forward deployed forces provide flexible, protected, and 

self-sustained sourcing solutions to a wide range of SC missions. Marine Corps SC 

Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) may be tasked with building HN security 

capacity and supporting partner nation security efforts in a specific regional area. 

 (b) Marine Corps Special Operations Forces (MARSOF). MARSOF is 

the USMC component to USSOCOM. MARSOF supports FID operations through the 

Marine special operations advisor group (MSOAG), which provides tailored military 

combat-skills training and advisor support for identified foreign forces in order to 

enhance their tactical capabilities and to prepare the environment as directed by 

USSOCOM. Marines and Sailors of the MSOAG train, advise, and assist friendly HN 

forces—including naval and maritime military and paramilitary forces—to enable them 

to support their governments’ internal security and stability, to counter subversion and to 

reduce the risk of violence from internal and external threats. Marine Corps Special 

Operations Command (MARSOC) teams engage globally as directed by USSOCOM in 

support of TSOC engagement priorities and conduct FID with partnered foreign SO and 

CT forces. MSOAG deployments are coordinated by MARSOC, through USSOCOM. 

 (3) US Navy. Support to FID is a core competency for Navy CF. The Navy 

Expeditionary Combat Command is composed of several subordinate commands that are 

able to provide unique capabilities in support of FID. Navy military CA units work 

directly with the civil authorities and civilian populations within a maritime area of 

operations helping to enhance security and stability. Expeditionary training units deliver 

focused maritime capabilities training to HN personnel across a wide array of maritime 

competencies. 

 (a) Construction capabilities in support of operating forces, as well as civic 

projects for other nations, to include building roads, bunkers, airfields, and bridges, as 

well as providing responsive support for disaster recovery operations. 

 (b) Expeditionary support capable of conducting port and air cargo 

handling missions, customs inspections, contingency contracting capabilities, fuels 
Chapter IV 

IV-18 JP 3-22 

distribution, freight terminal and warehouse operations, postal services, and ordnance 

reporting and handling. 

 (c) Expeditionary diving support capable of conducting salvage, search and 

recovery, harbor clearance, underwater cutting and welding, construction, inspection, and 

repair of ocean facilities including wharves, piers, underwater pipelines, moorings, boat 

ramps, and limited repairs on ships. 

 (d) Maritime expeditionary security forces capable of defending designated 

assets and maritime infrastructure in the near coast environment in support of SFA 

missions. 

 (e) Riverine forces capable of establishing and maintaining control of rivers 

and waterways for military and civil purposes, denying their use to hostile forces, and 

combating sea-based terrorism. 

 (f) Global Fleet Stations (GFSs) support HCA missions. GFSs are able to 

conduct shaping and stability operations in support of FID missions. 

 (g) US Navy Seals and Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical 

Training School also perform FID operations as a core mission. 

 (4) US Air Force 

 (a) Air Force FID operations are primarily aimed at developing and 

improving HN airpower capabilities through air advisor operations in coordination with 

SA programs. A principal US instrument for conducting FID is the transfer of major 

items (weapon systems and related support items) to selected HNs, primarily through SA. 

The Air Force often facilitates such transfers through operational and strategic 

assessments, airpower studies, SA-funded aircraft refurbishment, airlift of SA-funded 

defense articles, training on specific weapon systems and support items through SAfunded air advisory and technical MTTs, and SA case management and oversight. 

Delivery of FMS items can be performed in conjunction with multinational operations 

and contingencies and with other training programs conducted by the GCC and USG 

agencies. Air Force FID operations can establish a US presence, build rapport, achieve 

integration of forces, and build a foundation for future regional cooperation. If necessary, 

commanders can employ an even greater range of capabilities and resources in more 

direct forms of FID support when HN aviation units are inadequately sized or structured 

to make necessary and timely contributions to their own defense effort. Principal Air 

Force initiatives to accomplish FID objectives include the following: 

 1. Facilitate the transfer of US defense articles and services under the 

SA program to eligible foreign government aviation units engaged in IDAD operations. 

 2. Assess foreign military aviation capabilities and provide direction or 

recommendations toward improving HN airpower employment and sustainment methods. 
Planning for Foreign Internal Defense 

IV-19 

 3. Train foreign military forces to operate and sustain indigenous 

airpower resources and capabilities. 

 4. Advise foreign military forces and governmental agencies on how to 

employ airpower in specific operational situations. 

 5. Assist foreign aviation forces in executing specific missions or 

contingency operations. Assistance can take on many forms, but generally includes 

hands-on assistance in combat support capabilities such as aircraft maintenance, fuels, 

health service support (HSS), and aviation medicine. 

 6. Facilitate force integration for multinational operations. 

 7. Provide direct support to host countries by using Air Force 

resources to provide intelligence, communications capability, mobility, logistic support, 

and airpower. 

For further guidance and detail on Air Force FID capabilities, refer to Air Force 

Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense. 

 (b) Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF). AFSOF support FID 

operations by working by, with, and through HN aviation forces from the ministerial 

level to the tactical unit. When required, AFSOF provide persistent manned and 

unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), mobility, and precision 

engagement. AFSOF maintain specially trained combat aviation advisors to assess, train, 

advise, and assist HN aviation capability thereby facilitating the availability, reliability, 

safety, and interoperability of these forces. Additionally, AFSOF special tactics teams 

enhance air to ground interface, synchronizing conventional and special operations 

during COIN operations. 

 (5) US Coast Guard. The USCG possesses broad authorities across the 

spectrum of military, law enforcement, regulatory, and intelligence activities in support 

of FID. The USCG serves as a model “maritime service” for the navies and coast guards 

of emerging democratic nations. 

 (a) Many of the world’s navies and coast guards have a mix of military, 

law enforcement, resource protection, and humanitarian functions very similar to those of 

the USCG. A common constabulary and multi-mission nature promotes instant 

understanding and interoperability and makes USCG a valued partner for many naval and 

maritime forces. The USCG has a long history of providing training and support to 

maritime forces around the world. 

 (b) Building effective maritime governance requires engagement beyond 

navies and coast guards. It requires integrated efforts across agencies and ministries, as 

well as private sector commitment. The USCG has this expertise by virtue of its broad 

statutory missions, authorities, and civil responsibilities; membership in the intelligence 
Chapter IV 

IV-20 JP 3-22 

community; and strong partnerships with industry. USCG routinely engages other 

nations through multiple ministries and can offer a model maritime code that countries 

can use to improve their laws and regulations. 

 (c) The USCG is the lead agency for maritime CD interdiction, and it is the 

principal maritime law enforcement agency of the US. In addition, subject to 

international agreements, the USCG may patrol or conduct pursuit, entry, and boarding 

operations in the territorial waters of other countries. 

 (6) The National Guard’s State Partnership Program establishes partnerships 

between foreign countries and participating US states sponsoring and contributing 

through reachback to support DOD’s SC programs. 

 b. Interagency Resources. JFCs consider capabilities and availabilities of 

interagency resources when planning for FID operations. During execution, coordination 

and synchronization of military operations with interagency initiatives and activities is 

normally coordinated by the country team. This allows for the most capable and similar 

organizations to work together in developing effective and efficient HN resources. For 

example, DOJ and DOS can send law enforcement specialists overseas to train and advise 

HN police forces; police are best trained by other police. The nature of the operational 

environment and legal considerations are also important. USCG theater SC activities 

reach beyond normal military-to-military relations to a broader HN maritime audience, 

including, but not limited to, law enforcement agencies, maritime administrations, and 

transport ministries. The USCG is uniquely positioned to engage through traditional and 

non-traditional defense, law enforcement, and maritime safety operations. 

 c. Contractor Support. In some cases, additional training support from contractors 

enables commanders to use joint forces more efficiently. For example, contracted police 

development capabilities through the DOS’s INL can provide expertise not resident in the 

uniformed military. Contractor support can provide HN training and education, including 

the following: 

 (1) Institutional training. 

 (2) Developing security ministries and headquarters. 

 (3) Establishing administrative and logistic systems. 
V-1 

CHAPTER V

TRAINING 

SECTION A. TRAINING JOINT FORCES FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL 

DEFENSE 

1. General 

 a. A tenet of our national military strategy is to assist allies, coalition partners, and 

the governments of threatened states in resisting aggression. This strategic imperative 

demands that joint forces strengthen their abilities to assist, train, and advise foreign 

military and security forces. 

b. FID may be conducted by a single individual in remote isolated areas, small 

groups, or large units involved in direct support (not involving combat operations) or 

combat operations. In many of these situations, conventional US forces will be operating 

in unfamiliar circumstances and cultural surroundings. 

c. FID operations may be conducted in uncertain and hostile environments. 

Combined with the stresses of operating in a foreign culture, this may require training 

that is not routinely offered to CF. 

d. Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM) 

is charged by legislation with training assigned forces to meet mission taskings (including 

FID) and to ensure their interoperability with CF as well as other SOF. Continuing 

individual education and/or professional training peculiar to SO are the responsibility of 

CDRUSSOCOM. 

For further information on CDRUSSOCOM training and education responsibilities, refer 

to JP 3-05, Joint Special Operations.

2. Training and Skills Needed for Success in Foreign Internal Defense 

The following subparagraphs highlight some of the training needed for successful 

military operations in support of FID. 

a. Overall US and Theater Goals for FID. Personnel engaged in FID operations 

must understand the overall goals and objectives of the supported GCC. This knowledge 

is similar to understanding the commander’s intent in conventional operations. An 

“A government is the murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field 

uninformed and untaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and 

strength, mechanized by education and discipline for battle.” 

Light-Horse Harry Lee III, 1756-1818 
Chapter V 

V-2 JP 3-22 

understanding of these goals provides a framework to determine if his or her actions and 

operations support overall theater objectives. 

b. Area and Cultural Orientation. Knowledge of the operational area is required 

to maximize the effectiveness of military operations in support of IDAD programs. It is 

difficult to successfully interact with the HN if individuals conducting FID do not have 

an understanding of the background of the nation, the culture, and the customs. 

c. Language Training. It is very important for all personnel conducting FID 

operations to be able to communicate with HN personnel in their native language. 

Language capabilities can significantly aid trainers and others who have daily contact 

with HN military personnel and the local population. Personnel can function much more 

effectively if they receive language training in the target language prior to deployment. 

Even if they do not have extensive familiarity with the language, their use of basic 

expressions can help establish rapport with HN counterparts. Although language training 

is important, it is equally important for personnel conducting FID operations to conduct 

training on working with and speaking through interpreters. 

d. Standards of Conduct. It is extremely important that all US military personnel 

understand the importance of the image they project to the HN population. This 

impression may have a significant impact on the ability of the US to gain support for FID 

operations or the HN to gain long-term support for its IDAD program. US standards of 

conduct are, to a great extent, an example of the professionalism and respect inherent in 

our system—a respect and professionalism that can be passed by example to the HN 

military and police forces and population. Refresher training in standards of conduct, 

which complement cultural awareness training, should be mandatory for all personnel 

involved in FID operations. 

e. Information Collection. Because of their proximity and access to the local 

populace, personnel conducting activities in support of FID are passive information 

collectors and have valuable information for the intelligence system. These units and 

teams absorb information on the social, economic, and political situation that is essential 

to the operational area evaluation (OAE) discussed in Appendix B, “Joint Intelligence 

Preparation of the Operational Environment to Support Foreign Internal Defense.” This 

information would be very difficult for more distant collectors to obtain. Care must be 

taken, however, to ensure that the relationship with their HN counterparts is not damaged 

by these activities. Personnel involved in FID operations must know and understand their 

responsibilities in these areas. 

f. Coordinating Relationships with Other USG Agencies, NGOs, and IGOs. 

FID operations are likely to interact at all levels with other USG agencies, in addition to 

NGOs and IGOs. For example, SF, PSYOP, and CA elements may coordinate with the 

embassy PAO or cultural attaché, and CA may work closely with USAID. This type of 

coordination may be new to some military personnel; therefore, specific training or 

procedures may be required. 
Training 

V-3 

g. Legal Guidelines. In order to function effectively, personnel supporting FID 

activities must be aware of a variety of legal guidelines. These include provisions of 

applicable status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) as well as restrictions on the transfer of 

equipment and on other types of assistance that may be provided. Because many military 

activities take place within the HN, applicable legal guidelines may include those of the 

HN government and the status of US personnel while in country (for example, existing 

SOFAs). Accordingly, a country law briefing, cultural orientation, and review of any 

international agreements affecting status-of-forces should be included in training. 

Appendix A, “Legal Considerations,” provides a look at the legal aspects of FID. 

h. ROE. A thorough understanding of the ROE is very important to units involved 

in combat operations and for individuals involved in any military activities in support of 

FID. 

i. Tactical Force Protection Training. FID activities often require small US 

elements to deploy in isolated areas to support threatened HN governments. This 

requirement makes for a potentially dangerous situation for US personnel. US forces 

must be prepared for these situations, with proper training in self-protection programs 

and measures. Training should include individual and collective techniques. 

3. Foreign Internal Defense Training Strategy 

a. Training to prepare for military operations to support FID requires that a broad 

range of areas be covered. The training also must be designed to support a mix of 

personnel, ranging from language-trained and culturally focused SOF to those untrained 

in the specific area where the FID operation is located. Some training, such as language 

qualification, requires an investment in time and money that will not be practical for all 

personnel. A combination of institutional and unit-conducted individual and 

collective training will be required.

b. Institutional Training. SOF receive extensive institutional training in language, 

cultural considerations, and instructional techniques as qualifications in their basic 

specialty. When available and in sufficient numbers, these personnel should be 

extensively used to train HN forces and facilitate liaison with the HN. CF that are tasked 

to provide training and serve as advisors and MTTs and to conduct joint and 

multinational operations with HN forces require language, cultural, and other training to 

prepare them for these missions. Some institutional courses are available that can be 

used by commanders in order to train personnel for FID missions. Listed below are some 

of the types of institutional training that is provided by one or more of the Services. 

Consult appropriate training catalogs for DOD course listings. 

(1) Language training. 

(2) Cultural awareness and interpersonal communications training. 
Chapter V 

V-4 JP 3-22 

(3) General FID and IDAD principles training. 

(4) FP and AT awareness training. 

(5) SA team orientation training. 

(6) SA technical training. 

c. Unit Training. Much of the training necessary to prepare personnel to support 

FID activities may be conducted within the unit. This training can be individually 

focused or, in the case of unit-size participation, may involve large-scale collective 

training. Training resources may be drawn from a variety of sources, but SOF are 

particularly valuable because of their area orientation and FID focus. When feasible, 

units should conduct operational rehearsals of the FID mission. These rehearsals allow 

participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan. Such 

rehearsals should replicate, as much as possible, the potential situations that a unit may 

encounter during a FID mission. 

SECTION B. TRAINING HOST NATION FORCES 

4. Training Plan 

 a. In addition to training for the joint force preparing to conduct FID, FID operations 

include training of HN security forces to build the capacity to support the IDAD strategy. 

The JFC develops a training plan based on a thorough mission analysis and assessment of 

the IDAD strategy, HN capabilities and needs, and the operational environment. This 

plan should be developed in conjunction with both the country team and with 

commanders of HN forces to ensure that comprehensive objectives are detailed. 

 b. Assessment and Site Survey. The first step in developing the HN training plan 

is the conduct of a site survey. In addition to identifying logistics requirements for 

trainers, the site survey must include an assessment of HN capabilities, drawing 

conclusions about gaps between capabilities and needs as identified in the IDAD strategy. 

The training assessment should, as a minimum, consider: 

 (1) HN doctrine and training literature, including differences from US doctrine; 

 (2) Constraints in HN resources and funding; 

 (3) Societal and military culture; 

 (4) Current level of HN proficiency; 

 (5) HN’s ability (or inability) to field systems or equipment; 
Training 

V-5 

 (6) Potential training facilities and areas based on projected training (e.g., 

ranges, urban terrain training sites); 

 (7) Proficiency of HN trainers; 

 (8) Equipment availability (e.g., radios, weapons, vehicles); 

 (9) C2 systems and procedures; 

 (10) Logistics systems and procedures; 

 (11) Cooperation level with US and HN intelligence agencies during operations 

and training exercises; 

 (12) Constraints on US IO and past HN IO miscues and history; 

 (13) Background and analysis of the main interagency actors in the region; and 

 (14) FP assessment. 

 c. Training Plans

 (1) Upon completion of the assessment and site survey, the JFC should develop, 

with the HN leadership, a training plan for HN security forces. Because training all 

echelons of forces helps to achieve synchronized execution of mission-essential tasks 

throughout the HN force, HN training strategies must include multi-echelon training 

whenever possible. The training plan should include, as a minimum: 

 (a) List of agreed upon training objectives at each echelon of HN forces, 

 (b) Identification of units, commands, and leadership personnel requiring 

training across each echelon, 

 (c) Identification of FID resources required and how they will be provided, 

and 

 (d) An instrument (such as a memorandum or letter of agreement) between 

the HN and the JFC identifying what will be provided by each party. 

 (2) Individual units will develop plans for execution of the JFC’s training plan. 

5. Training and Advising

 a. There is no distinct boundary between training assistance and advisory assistance. 

In general, training assistance is typically nonoperational in areas and under conditions 

where joint force personnel are not likely to be forced to engage any armed internal 
Chapter V 

V-6 JP 3-22 

threat. In equal generality, advisory assistance may entail some operational advice and 

assistance beyond training in less secure areas. Joint force personnel render advisory 

assistance in relatively low-risk situations. However, the current global situation proves 

that any member of a joint force is, to some degree, in harm’s way. Advisory assistance 

(and to a lesser degree training assistance) may involve situations that require personnel 

to defend themselves. Therefore, the commander and the US embassy accept greater 

risk. The difficulty in putting exact and unqualified definitions on either type of 

assistance is that both may take place through the entire range from indirect support to 

direct support (not involving combat operations) during the same FID operation. As long 

as risk is clearly defined, planned for, mitigated where possible, and, most importantly, 

deemed worth the potential cost, this lack of definition causes no inherent problems. 

Mitigation, however, may translate into exclusion of trainers or advisors from certain 

areas or dictate what type of force is deployed (i.e., SOF or CF with robust organic 

security capability). 

 b. Joint force elements typically develop, establish, and operate centralized training 

programs for the supported HN force. The joint force can also conduct individual, leader, 

and collective training programs for specific HN units. Training subjects run the gamut 

of military tasks, and training focus ranges from individual instruction through leader 

development to specialized collective training. The joint force can provide both training 

and advisory assistance in two ways. In either case, assistance may be provided under 

the chief, SCO in his role as the SDO in-country, other designated embassy official, or 

the TSOC, or JTF, depending on the C2 arrangement. 

 (1) Small teams may provide training or give operational advice and assistance 

to HN civilian, military, or paramilitary organizations. 

 (2) Individual personnel may be assigned or attached to the SCO to perform 

training and advisory assistance duties on a temporary or permanent basis. 

 c. Training Assistance. The agreement negotiated between US and HN officials 

provides the framework for the who, what, when, where, how, and why of military 

training assistance. Often, US doctrine, as prescribed in applicable publications, must be 

modified to fit the unique requirements of the HN forces being trained. Procedures may 

vary, but the fundamental techniques and thought processes still apply. Training 

assistance should focus on the materiel, fiscal, and logistical realities of the HN. 

 d. In general, those skills, concepts, and procedures for FID taught to US forces are 

also applicable to HN forces for IDAD. Training emphasis varies according to the HN 

requirements, force composition, and US and HN agreements. The training to be 

conducted depends on the situation and varies considerably. Existing military personnel, 

new military personnel, or paramilitary forces may receive training assistance. 

 e. HN counterpart personnel must be present with US trainers. The goal is for these 

counterparts to eventually conduct all instruction and training without guidance from US 
Training 

V-7 

personnel. Initially, US personnel may present all or most of the instruction with as 

much HN assistance as is feasible. US trainers use the train the trainer concept. 

 f. Training assistance consists of all formal training conducted by joint force units. 

However, all personnel engaged in training assistance must be cognizant that they are 

typically under the sharp and sometimes magnified scrutiny of HN government 

personnel, military, media, and ordinary citizens. Part of preparing personnel for 

providing training assistance is making them aware of the less tangible elements of 

training assistance that can have a deep impact. Their words and actions at all times 

serve as examples of professionalism. Joint force personnel should know that in many 

HNs their mere presence alongside their counterparts often bolsters that counterpart’s 

prestige within their organization and among the populace. Those providing training 

assistance should be aware that many HNs have a domestic PSYOP program and 

exploiting the presence of highly skilled US trainers may be part of their agenda. 

Generally, none of the less tangible offshoots of providing training assistance will be 

detrimental toward the joint force mission or US national policy as long as trainers are 

prepared for them. 

 g. Advisory Assistance. Within DOD, the principal element charged with 

providing advisory assistance is the SCO. The SCO includes all DOD elements, 

regardless of actual title, assigned in foreign countries to manage SA programs 

administered by DOD. The US advisor may often work and coordinate with civilians of 

other country team agencies. When he does, he must know their functions, 

responsibilities, and capabilities, because many activities cross jurisdictional borders. 

Together, the advisor and his counterpart must resolve problems by means appropriate to 

the HN without violating US laws and policies in the process. Advisors operate under 

very specific ROE to ensure that advisors remain advisors. 

 h. The joint force advisor must understand the scope of SCO activities. He also 

must know the functions, responsibilities, and capabilities of other US agencies in the 

HN. Because many joint force (notably SOF) activities cross the jurisdictional 

boundaries or responsibilities of other country team members, the advisor seeks other 

country team members to coordinate his portion of the overall FID effort. 

 i. In some situations, the HN may refuse US advisors. HN military leaders may 

instead request and receive other types of assistance such as air or fire support. To 

coordinate this support and ensure its proper use, US liaison teams accompany HN 

ground maneuver units receiving direct US combat support. Language-qualified and 

area-oriented SOF teams are especially suited for this mission. The HN government may 

refuse lethal support but eagerly accept support from engineer, medical, PSYOP, CA, and 

various intelligence capabilities. 

 j. Trainer/Advisor Checklists. The predeployment site survey (PDSS) leader—

along with any subordinates he may specify—establishes effective initial rapport with the 

HN unit commander. The PDSS leader: 
Chapter V 

V-8 JP 3-22 

 (1) Conducts introductions in a businesslike, congenial manner using the HN 

language. 

 (2) Briefs the HN commander on the joint force advisors’ PDSS mission and 

the restrictions and limitations imposed on the unit by the higher US commander. The 

PDSS leader should use the HN language and, if required, visual aids translated into the 

HN language. 

 (3) Assures the HN commander that all PDSS team members are fully 

supportive of the HN’s position and that they firmly believe a joint and HN-unit effort 

will be successful. 

 (4) Assures the HN commander that his assistance is needed to develop the 

tentative objectives for advisory assistance to include advisory team agreements with the 

HN commander on training objectives. 

 (5) Deduces or solicits the HN commander’s actual estimate of his unit’s 

capabilities and perceived advisory assistance and material requirements. 

 (6) Explains the PDSS team’s initial plan for establishing counterpart 

relationships, obtains approval from the HN commander for the plan, and requests to 

conduct the counterpart linkup under the mutual supervision of the PDSS leader and the 

HN commander. 

 (7) Supervises the linkup between PDSS team members and their HN 

counterparts to determine if the HN personnel understand the purpose of the counterpart 

relationship and their responsibilities within it. 

 (8) Identifies reachback requirements. 

 (9) The PDSS leader should not make any promises or statements that could be 

construed as promises to the HN commander regarding commitments to provide the 

advisory assistance or fulfill material requirements. 

 k. The PDSS team members analyze the HN unit’s status according to their area of 

expertise for the purpose of determining the HN requirements for advisory assistance. 

The PDSS team members: 

 (1) Explain the purpose of the analysis to counterparts. 

 (2) Encourage counterparts to assist in the analysis, the preparation of estimates, 

and the briefing of the analysis to the advisory team and HN unit commanders. 

 (3) Collect sufficient information to confirm the validity of current intelligence 

and tentative advisory assistance COAs selected prior to deployment. 
Training 

V-9 

 (4) Collect and analyze all information relating to FP. 

 (5) Prepare written, prioritized estimates for advisory assistance COAs. 

 (6) Brief, with their counterparts, the estimates to the PDSS team and HN unit 

commander. 

 (7) Inspect, with their counterparts, the HN facilities that will be used during the 

assistance mission. 

 (8) Identify deficiencies in the facilities that will prevent execution of the 

tentatively selected advisory assistance COAs. 

 (9) Prepare written or verbal estimates of COAs that will correct the 

deficiencies or negate their effects on the tentatively selected advisory assistance COAs. 

 (10) Supervise the preparation of the facilities and inform the JFC of the status 

of the preparations compared to the plans for them. 

 l. Once received, the PDSS leader supervises the processing of the survey results. 

The PDSS leader then: 

 (1) Recommends to the HN unit commander the most desirable COAs 

emphasizing how they satisfy actual conditions and will achieve the desired advisory 

assistance objectives. 

 (2) Ensures that his counterpart understands that the desired COAs are still 

tentative contingent on the tasking US commander’s decision. 

 (3) Selects the COAs to be recommended to the follow-on joint units, after 

obtaining input from the HN unit commander. 

 (4) Ensures the higher in-country US commander is informed of significant 

findings in the team survey for HN assistance. 

 m. The PDSS team plans its security in accordance with the anticipated threat. 

Adjustments are made as required by the situation on the ground. The PDSS team 

members: 

 (1) Fortify their positions (quarters, communications, medical, command) in 

accordance with the available means and requirements to maintain low visibility. 

 (2) Maintain a team internal guard system, aware of the locations of all other 

joint force advisors, and ready to react to an emergency by following the alert plan and 

starting defensive actions. 
Chapter V 

V-10 JP 3-22 

 (3) Maintain a team internal alert plan that will notify all team members of an 

emergency. 

 (4) Maintain communications with all subordinate team members deployed 

outside of the immediate area controlled by the team. 

 (5) Establish plans for immediate team defensive actions in the event of an 

insurgent or terrorist attack or a loss of HN rapport with hostile reaction. 

 (6) Discuss visible team security measures with HN counterparts to ensure their 

understanding and to maintain effective rapport. 

 (7) Encourage the HN unit, through counterparts, to adopt additional security 

measures that have been identified as necessary during the analysis of the HN unit status 

and the inspection of its facilities. 

 (8) Establish mutual plans with the HN unit, through counterparts, for defensive 

actions in the event of an insurgent or terrorist attack. 

 (9) Rehearse team alert and defensive plans. 

 (10) Encourage the HN unit, through counterparts, to conduct mutual, full-force 

rehearsals of defensive plans. 

 n. Executing the Mission. The senior joint force advisor assists the HN unit 

commander in providing C2 during the execution of the operation. Accompanying an 

HN commander on missions will afford the advisor visibility on the interactions between 

the HN forces and the populace. The senior advisor: 

 (1) Monitors the tactical situation and recommends changes to the present COA 

to gainfully exploit changes in the situation. 

 (2) Monitors the location of the HN commander and recommends changes so 

that he can provide leadership at critical points and not deprive himself of the ability to 

maneuver his force in response to tactical changes. 

 (3) Monitors the information flow to the HN commander and recommends 

improvements needed to: 

 (a) Make continuous use of intelligence-collection assets. 

 (b) Keep subordinates reporting combat information. 

 (c) Screen the information given to the HN commander to prevent 

information overload. 
Training 

V-11 

 (d) Keep the command communications channels open for critical 

information. 

 (4) Monitors the HN commander’s control of the execution and recommends 

improvements to: 

 (a) Focus combat power on the objective. 

 (b) Keep movement supported by direct and indirect fire. 

 (c) Maintain mutual support between subordinate elements. 

 (d) Maintain fire control and discipline. 

 (e) Consolidate and reorganize during lulls in the battle or after seizing the 

objective. 

 (f) Conduct effective stability operations to gain popular support. 

 (g) Support progress in such areas as governance, infrastructure, 

humanitarian assistance, and economic development. 

 (h) Support activities with effective IO. 

 (5) Monitors any command succession and assists the new HN unit commander 

to smoothly and rapidly take control of the execution of the operation. 

 o. The joint force advisory team members also assist their counterparts during the 

execution of the operation. The advisory team members: 

 (1) Monitor staff functions and recommend improvements or corrections, as 

needed. 

 (2) Monitor the technical or tactical execution of individual tasks and 

recommend improvements or corrections, as needed. 

 (3) Remain continuously aware of the tactical situation. 

 (4) Execute joint force unilateral contingency plans, as required by the situation. 

Note. Document recurring or significant problems or events for reference during end-ofmission debriefings and reports. 
Chapter V 

V-12 JP 3-22 

 p. The advisory team presents the instruction. Trainers/advisors: 

 (1) Adhere to the lesson outlines consistent with the cooperation from the HN 

forces and changes in the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support 

available, time available, and civil considerations. 

 (2) State clearly the task, conditions, and standards to be achieved during each 

lesson at the beginning of the training (to include training exercises) and ensure the HN 

students understand them. (Human rights should be emphasized in the appropriate period 

of instruction.) 

 (3) Demonstrate the execution or show the desired end result to clearly illustrate 

the task. 

 (4) Stress the execution of the task as a step-by-step process, when possible. 

 (5) Monitor the HN students’ progress during practice and correct mistakes as 

they are observed. 

 (6) State (at a minimum) all applicable warning and safety instructions in the 

HN language. 

 (7) Monitor periodically instructions given through HN interpreters to ensure 

accurate translations using HN-language-qualified joint force personnel. 

 q. The joint force ensures the security of the training sites. Advisors or designated 

security personnel: 

 (1) Analyze the threat to determine any capabilities to attack or collect 

intelligence on the HN unit’s training at each site. 

 (2) Prepare estimates of COAs that would deny the training sites to the 

insurgents or terrorists. 

 (3) Recommend to the HN unit commander that he order the adoption of the 

most desirable COA, stressing how it best satisfies the identified need. 

 (4) Ensure before each training session (using, as a minimum, brief back 

rehearsal) that all personnel—both US and HN—understand the defensive actions to be 

taken in the event of an insurgent or terrorist attack and any OPSEC measures to be 

executed. 

 r. Designated advisory/training team members maintain written administrative 

training records. These members: 

 (1) Encourage HN counterparts to assist. 
Training 

V-13 

 (2) Record all HN personnel and units who receive training and identify the 

type of training they receive. 

 (3) Organize records to identify training deficiencies and overall level of HN 

proficiency. 

 (4) Identify specific HN personnel or units who demonstrate noteworthy (good 

or bad) performance. 

 (5) Identify to the joint force and HN unit commanders the noted training 

deficiencies, noteworthy performances, and required additional or remedial training. 
Chapter V 

V-14 JP 3-22 

Intentionally Blank 
VI-1 

CHAPTER VI

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS 

SECTION A. EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS 

1. General 

a. Thus far, the discussion of FID has generally centered on the strategic and 

operational levels. This chapter transitions to a more focused examination of the 

employment principles, tools, and techniques used in conducting FID operations. 

b. FID activities are part of the unified actions of the combatant command and 

emphasize interagency coordination. Even small tactical operations will usually 

require interagency coordination, most likely through the SCO. 

2. Employment Factors 

As in planning, several areas deserve special attention when discussing employment 

of forces in FID operations (see Figure VI-1). 

a. Information Operations Impact. IO involve actions taken to affect adversary 

information and information systems while protecting one’s own information and 

information systems. IO apply across all phases of an operation, throughout the range of 

military operations. IO and related activities affect the perceptions and attitudes of 

adversaries and a host of others in the operational area. During FID operations, IO 

disciplines must be closely integrated in all aspects of planning and execution. 

b. Psychological Impact. Regardless of where or when PSYOP is conducted, the 

FID and IDAD objectives are kept in mind. The impact of these efforts may occur 

incidentally, as a result of another unrelated operation, or may be the result of an 

operation specifically executed for its psychological effect. 

c. Intelligence Support. A thorough intelligence analysis must focus on the 

political, social, scientific, technical, medical, and economic aspects of the area as well as 

on an analysis of hostile elements. Active intelligence support must continue through to 

the end of the employment of military forces. This continuous intelligence effort will 

gauge the reaction of the local populace and determine the effects on the infrastructure of 

“The war on terrorism will be fought with increased support for democracy 

programs, judicial reform, conflict resolution, poverty alleviation, economic 

reform, and health and education. All of these together deny the reason for 

terrorists to exist or to find safe haven within borders.” 

Colin Powell 

Secretary of State 

United Nations Security Council, 12 November 2001 
Chapter VI 

VI-2 JP 3-22 

US efforts as well as evaluate strengths, weaknesses, and disposition of opposition groups 

in the area. 

(1) Appendix B, “Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment 

to Support Foreign Internal Defense,” provides intelligence considerations and a format 

for intelligence preparation of the FID operational area. Although the considerations 

must be modified for the specific FID operation, generally the operational area must be 

FORCE EMPLOYMENT FACTORS IN FOREIGN INTERNAL 

DEFENSE OPERATIONS

INFORMATION OPERATIONS IMPACT

COUNTERTERRORISM AND FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

FORCE SELECTION

PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAMS

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

OPERATIONS SECURITY

LESSONS LEARNED

Information operations disciplines must be closely integrated in all aspects of foreign 

internal defense (FID) planning and execution.

Subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency can all contribute to the growth of terrorists and 

terrorism.

The psychological effort is relevant to the entire FID operation.

A thorough intelligence analysis must focus on the political, social, scientific, technical, 

medical, and economic aspects of the area as well as on an analysis of hostile elements.

Success is most effectively achieved through employing operational designs that provide a 

combination of conventional forces while leveraging the unique capabilities of special 

operations forces.

Public information is an important ongoing effort during the employment phase of any FID 

mission.

Logistic operations in support of FID are both supporting missions to United States forces 

and primary operational missions when supporting host nation civilians or military forces 

with medical, construction, maintenance, supply, or transportation capabilities.

United States military support of the national counterdrug effort has increased 

tremendously in recent years.

A major problem in all FID activities is denial of critical information about friendly 

intentions, capabilities, and activities to hostile elements.

As FID activities are conducted, it is critical to document lessons learned to allow the 

commander to modify future operations and activities to fit the special circumstances and 

environment.

Figure VI-1. Force Employment Factors in Foreign Internal Defense Operations 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-3 

surveyed for an OAE; a geographic, population, and climatology analysis; and a threat 

evaluation. These factors will dictate the employment techniques and FID tools to use. 

For further information on JIPOE, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of 

the Operational Environment. 

(2) Human intelligence (HUMINT) resources support is likely to be the 

most important type of intelligence support of FID. The analysis requires a large 

HUMINT effort. This requires a more decentralized intelligence gathering approach than 

in conventional operations. Small units and teams deployed in the operational area are in 

a good position to evaluate the social, economic, and military situation in the HN. The 

best US intelligence may come from units and teams that work closely with the local 

population and HN military forces. These units and teams must be prebriefed and 

debriefed for priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), and this information should 

contribute to the data used in conducting the intelligence preparation of the operational 

environment. 

(3) Information sharing across USG and national boundaries is an 

important concept in FID. There are likely to be several government agencies 

operating in an HN, and all are exposed daily to information valuable to FID operations 

and the success of the IDAD program. This requires a strong focus on the development 

of an effective process for interagency information exchange and coordination. In 

addition, the very nature of FID denotes the sharing of information between the supported 

HN and the US joint force headquarters controlling the FID effort. This information 

exchange may be further complicated by a friendly third nation participating in FID 

operations or the HN’s IDAD program. 

For further information on interagency coordination, refer to JP 3-08, 

Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 

(4) The nature of FID missions and the high degree of dependence on 

HUMINT sources necessitate an active CI and OPSEC program. At a minimum, US 

forces must be able to: 

(a) Accomplish liaison with HN CI and security forces. Preestablished 

relationships with the country team are necessary and should be regularly maintained in 

advance of FID operations, wherever practical, as they will maximize efficiency and 

effectiveness. 

(b) Provide a conduit to country team CI and security elements. 

(c) Conduct analysis of opposing force intelligence collection, security, CI, 

and deception capabilities, and propaganda. 

(d) Conduct the full range of CI operations. 
Chapter VI 

VI-4 JP 3-22 

(e) Conduct CI vulnerability assessments of US forces. 

(f) Provide CI input to US FID plans. 

(5) US force deployments for FID missions must be structured to provide 

adequate CI resources and plan for reachback to the national strategic CI community to 

accomplish these missions. 

d. Force Selection. US forces in general have some ability to assess, train, advise, 

and assist foreign forces. The degree to which they can be tasked to do so depends on 

their preparation in terms of language and other skills and the knowledge necessary to 

function within the operational environment. Success is most effectively achieved 

through employing operational designs that provide a combination of CF, while 

leveraging the unique capabilities of SOF. The selection of the appropriate ratio of 

SOF and CF forces must be a deliberate decision based on thorough mission analysis and 

a pairing of available capabilities to requirements. The most important factor informing 

this decision is the capability and expertise required rather than the size of the force 

required. Additional factors include the political sensitivity of the mission and 

requirements for cultural and language experts or other special requirements. JFCs must 

be aware that operations may change rapidly in character, and that their force structures 

may need to adapt as well. Both the integration of SOF with CF and vice versa are 

increasingly the norm. 

 (1) Special Operations Forces. SOF may conduct FID operations unilaterally 

in the absence of any other military effort, support other ongoing military or civilian 

assistance efforts, or support the employment of CF. 

 (a) SOF units possess specialized capabilities for FID, including support 

for COIN and, when applicable, for unconventional warfare. Other support includes 

CAO, PSYOP support, and training in specific areas, typically with HN SOF. In 

addition, SOF may support combat operations by conducting highly specialized missions. 

However, the typical SOF role in FID is to train, advise, and support HN military and 

paramilitary forces. 

 (b) In addition to the specific capability requirements that may call for 

selection of SOF, the nature of the FID mission itself may dictate the use of SOF. SOF’s 

unique capabilities for language, cultural awareness, regional focus, etc. may be required 

when the environment involves particular political sensitivities. Additionally, SOF’s 

ability to conduct short-notice missions, with only modest support, makes them adept at 

initiating programs for hand-over to CF. 

 (c) USSOCOM provides SOF in support of GCCs. SOF contribute to the 

FID effort normally under OPCON of the theater SOC, which has primary responsibility 

to plan and supervise the execution of SOF operations in support of FID. SOF also 

provide dedicated theater forces. When planning for use of SOF, command, control, 

communications, and computers requirements among the combatant command, the 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-5 

country team, and SOF must be assessed. Communications requirements for C2, 

administration, logistics, and emergencies must be clarified. 

 (2) Conventional Forces. When the FID effort requires broader action to 

support HN IDAD efforts, the JFC may predominantly employ CF in the FID mission. 

CF contain and employ organic capabilities to conduct FID indirect support, direct 

support, and combat operations. This may include providing intelligence and logistic 

support to HN units, serving as military advisors, conducting MTTs, embedding US units 

into HN units, conducting joint/multinational operations with HN units, and serving as a 

quick reaction force in support of HN units. Unit commanders must be given clear 

guidance on unit mission requirements that include the need to prepare their forces to 

conduct FID. USCG training teams, personnel, and platforms are well suited to support 

the development of stable, multi-mission maritime regimes to respond to many 

transnational threats. USCG FID activities reach beyond normal military-to-military 

relations to a broader HN maritime audience, including, but not limited to, law 

enforcement agencies, maritime administrations, and transport ministries. 

e. Public Information Programs. Public information is important during all 

phases of any FID mission. While it is important to correctly portray the FID effort to 

HN personnel through PSYOP, it is also important to employ an effective PA program to 

inform HN and US publics of current FID actions, goals, and objectives. History has 

shown that without popular support, it may be impossible to develop an effective FID 

operation. At the US national level, public diplomacy programs will accurately depict 

US efforts. This national program is supported through the CCDR’s (or subordinate 

JFC’s) information programs designed to disclose the maximum amount of information 

possible within applicable security restrictions and the guidelines established by the 

President or SecDef. Coordination is essential between the PA staff and the media, the 

country team, the PSYOP element, and other information agencies within the HN and 

region. 

f. Logistic Support. Logistic operations in support of FID support both US forces 

and primary operational missions (supporting HN civilians or military forces with 

medical, construction, maintenance, supply, or transportation capabilities). General 

guidelines for logistic issues in support of US forces conducting FID operations include: 

(1) There may be a ceiling imposed on the number of US military personnel 

authorized to be in the HN to conduct FID operations. Commanders should determine 

how sea basing forces impacts this decision. Maximum use should be made of hostnation support (HNS) capabilities, but where reliance on the HN is not feasible, logistic 

support requirements must be minimized. FID and its support may include contractor 

personnel, which could complicate legal, diplomatic, administrative, budgetary, and 

logistical issues. Efficient use of throughput of supplies (an average quantity that can 

pass through a port on a daily basis), airlift resupply, and inter-Service support 

agreements should also be considered. 
Chapter VI 

VI-6 JP 3-22 

(2) Commanders must carefully balance the advantages of using HNS with the 

danger of establishing dependence on potentially unreliable sources. 

(3) Logistic operations are tailored to the type of mission. Service logistic 

support elements will be integrated into the overall joint force. Logistic support for the 

deployed forces, however, will remain a Service responsibility. 

(4) HNs often require support beyond their organic capabilities. Accordingly, 

when conducting FID with multinational partners, there becomes a need to establish 

multinational logistic support agreements. The need for such non-organic support 

must be identified during the planning phase of FID support and arranged for prior to 

participation in the operation. Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs) 

negotiated with multinational partners are beneficial to the FID effort in that they allow 

US forces to exchange most common types of support. Authority to negotiate these 

agreements is usually delegated to the GCC by SecDef. Authority to execute these 

agreements lies with SecDef and may or may not be delegated. 

For further information on international logistics, refer to JP 4-08, Multinational 

Logistics. 

g. Counterdrug Operations in FID. Narcotics production and trafficking can 

flourish in countries where subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency exist. Accordingly, 

FID operations complement CD efforts by reducing those problems in partner 

nations. CD focused programs are integrated into theater strategies as a coordinated 

effort to support HN governments’ IDAD strategies. 

(1) DOD resources may be used in connection with CD activities in nations 

receiving military assistance in support of an IDAD program. This military assistance is 

often centered on source operations, but can be involved with in-transit CD operations. 

(a) DOD is the lead agency of the USG for the detection and 

monitoring (D&M) of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the US. This 

mission is performed with O&M funds, notwithstanding the possibility of incidental 

benefit to the HN. Such activities may include nonconfrontational intercepts for 

intelligence or communication purposes and gathering and processing of tactical 

intelligence from a variety of sources, including fixed and mobile surveillance assets and 

certain intelligence sharing. 

(b) In a CD support role (subject to national policy and legislative 

guidance) DOD may offer certain direct support to HN CD personnel, and certain 

enhanced support to US civilian law enforcement agencies that may be operating in the 

HN, and to DOS, INL. 

(2) Absent direction from SecDef, DOD forces engaged in CD activities are 

prohibited from engaging in direct law enforcement activity. They may not directly 

participate in an arrest, search, seizure, or other similar activity. DOD personnel are not 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-7 

authorized to accompany HN forces on actual CD field operations or participate in any 

activities where hostilities are likely to occur. USN ships contribute significantly to the 

D&M phase of CD operations, as they are frequently in a position to intercept and 

apprehend maritime drug smugglers. Because DOD does not directly participate in 

search, seizure, arrest, and other similar activities, USCG law enforcement detachments, 

who are authorized to perform law enforcement activities, are frequently embarked in 

USN and allied ships to act in this capacity as prescribed in Title 10, USC, Section 379.

(3) As directed by SecDef through the CJCS, GCCs will be given the authority 

to plan and execute HN programs using a combination of SA, training and advisory 

assistance (non-SA-funded), intelligence and communications sharing, logistic support, 

and FHA. These efforts are designed to bolster the HN’s capability to operate against the 

infrastructure of the drug-producing criminal enterprises. 

(4) CCDRs and subordinate JFCs must coordinate closely with the country team 

DEA and DOS international narcotics matters representatives. Liaison with the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is also vital. ONDCP is legislatively charged 

with the responsibility of establishing the national drug control strategy and with 

coordinating and overseeing the implementation of the consolidated National Drug 

Control Program budget. This coordination is crucial to an efficient national CD program 

to combat illicit drug trafficking in source regions. 

For further information on joint CD operations, refer to JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug 

Operations. 

 h. Combating WMD Operations in FID. Combating weapons of mass destruction 

(CWMD) is one of the greatest challenges facing the US. FID operations have 

significant potential to build our partners’ capacity to combat WMD. 

For further information on CWMD operations, refer to JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction. 

i. Counterterrorism and FID. Subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency can all 

contribute to the growth of terrorists and terrorism. FID can complement CT by reducing 

these contributing factors. Specific AT and CT efforts can be conducted during FID 

operations in support of an HN’s IDAD program.

(1) Enhancing the will of other states to fight global terrorism primarily is the 

responsibility of DOS. Effective FID, however, can improve public perceptions of the 

HN and USG and facilitate more active HN policies to combat terrorism. More directly, 

military-to-military contacts can help make HN officials advocates of potential operations 

against terrorist capabilities. 

(2) In many cases, measures increasing the capacity of a state to fight terrorism 

also will strengthen its overall IDAD program. These measures can include the 

following: 
Chapter VI 

VI-8 JP 3-22 

(a) Developing the ability of the HN financial transactions, break funding 

streams for criminal and insurgent groups, and prosecute their members. This may 

involve greater US-HN cooperation in developing regulated financial institutions. 

(b) Ensuring that HN security personnel have access to appropriate 

equipment and training to conduct all phases of combating terrorism operations. 

(c) Training personnel at entry and exit points (including airports, seaports, 

and border crossings) to identify and apprehend individuals and materials being used by 

international terrorist groups. 

(d) Assisting HN security and intelligence agencies to be included into 

international networks that can share information on terrorist activities. 

(e) Developing effective judicial systems, and minimizing corruption and 

intimidation of HN officials. 

For further information on COIN, refer to JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency. 

For further information on CT, refer to JP 3-26, Counterterrorism. 

j. Operations Security. A major problem in all FID activities is denial of critical 

information about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities to hostile elements. The 

nature of FID implies that many HN officials and populace will know of certain US 

activities as they occur. Criminal and insurgent groups may have members or 

sympathizers within HN institutions that could be informants. US and foreign personnel 

involved in FID and IDAD programs should be provided extensive OPSEC training to 

ensure effectiveness of their operations. 

For further information on OPSEC, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

k. Lessons Learned. As FID operations are conducted, it is critical to document 

lessons learned to allow the commander to modify future operations and activities to fit 

the special circumstances and environment. Comprehensive after-action reviews and 

reports focusing on the specifics of the FID operations should be conducted to gather this 

information as soon as possible after mission execution. The Joint Center for Operational 

Analysis within the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), the Services, and 

other government agencies’ (OGAs’) lessons learned programs provide readily available 

sources of information to FID planners and operators. In addition, USSOCOM’s Special 

Operations Debrief and Reporting System, an internal USSOCOM-only program, also 

can provide additional information on peacetime FID missions. 

For further information for specific reporting procedures, refer to CJCSI 3150.25D, Joint 

Lessons Learned Program. 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-9 

3. Site Survey Considerations 

 Units assigned a FID mission must implement procedures to help DOS and the 

country team vet HN forces before they can receive training. Any personnel who are not 

vetted must be removed from training. The primary purpose of vetting is to ensure the 

identification of personnel with a history of human rights violations. US policy as well as

the 1978 “Kennedy Amendment” to the FAA (Title 22, USC, Section 2304[a][2])

prevents US cooperation with and SA funding to a government of any country that 

engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human 

rights. Ideally, a site survey team gathers this information. Such teams should include a 

CI representative, preferably an FPD or foreign area officer (FAO) asset. To properly 

conduct the training, units assigned to FID operations need to determine or identify: 

 a. The HN unit mission and its mission-essential task list and its capability to 

execute them. 

 b. The organizational tables for authorized personnel and equipment and for 

personnel and equipment actually on hand. 

 c. Any past or present foreign military presence or influence in doctrine, training, or 

combat operations. 

 d. The unit’s ability to retain and support acquired skills or training from past MTTs 

or foreign training missions. 

 e. The organization and leadership level that is responsible for training the 

individual soldier. Does the HN have institutional training established? Is it effective? 

 f. Any operational deficiencies during recent combat operations or participation in 

joint or multinational exercises with US personnel. 

 g. The maintenance status, to include maintenance training programs. 

 h. The language or languages in which instruction will be conducted. 

 i. The religious, tribal, or other affiliations within the HN forces that need to be 

considered (notably the differences between HN forces and the local populace). 

 j. The potential security concerns with employing US members (and allies) in the 

HN training areas. 

 k. The local infrastructure and possible positive or negative impacts of training on 

the local populace. 
Chapter VI 

VI-10 JP 3-22 

 l. The local populace’s attitudes toward US military and government personnel, as 

well as ordinary US citizens (to include presence and behavior of expatriate US 

populations). 

 m. The local populace’s prejudices or fears. 

 n. Any key local leaders, communicators, and potential spoilers. 

 o. The presence, agendas, capabilities, influence, and attitudes of NGOs and IGOs. 

 p. The FID operations unit’s area assessment needs. For example - local media for 

deploying PSYOP. 

4. Health Service Support and Medical Civil-Military Operations 

 a. US joint medical personnel and forces can be employed as indirect support or 

direct support during a FID operation. The predominant types of engagement applied 

will depend on the make up of the HN military medical forces and the HN civilian health 

sector and their respective roles in that nation’s IDAD program. For US joint medical 

forces, health engagement will include varying degrees of military-military activities and 

medical civil-military operations (MCMO). In some countries the military and civilian 

health systems may be completely separate while in other nations the two systems may be 

integrated, necessitating a unified approach. Medical input and involvement in indirect 

support to FID such as SA, exchange programs, and multinational exercises must be 

provided at the onset of planning and targeted toward the health problems facing the HN 

military and, in conjunction with other US agencies, civilian health initiatives through 

CAO and FHA. Possible MCMO activities during FID operations include: 

 (1) Providing public health activities, to include preventive medicine and 

veterinary care, food hygiene, immunizations of humans and animals, childcare, 

preventive dental hygiene, and paramedic procedures. This includes: 

 (a) Medical civic action programs. 

 (b) Dental civic action programs. 

 (c) Veterinary civic action programs. 

 (2) Providing triage, diagnostic, and treatment training. 

 (3) Developing logistic programs. 

 (4) Developing education programs. 

 (5) Developing HSS intelligence and threat analysis. 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-11 

 (6) Developing HN military field HSS support system for treatment and 

evacuation. 

 (7) Assisting in the upgrade, staffing, and supplying of existing HSS facilities. 

 (8) Developing wellness and preventive care, including public information 

programs. 

 b. Military forces should be employed in MCMO missions that are affordable and 

sustainable by the HN. This includes pursuing realistic training and acquisition 

programs. In addition to training HN personnel during FID operations, medical 

education opportunities for HN personnel through IMET may be pursued. Following a 

course of realistic HSS measures and programs may also entail mitigating unrealistic 

expectations among the HN populace. Other second order effects can emerge from HSS 

as well, such as a real or perceived imbalance in health care development. Resources 

should be shifted to areas where imbalance exists. 

 c. FID units typically can provide only a small portion of the HN’s HSS needs; 

therefore, close cooperation with OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs can enhance the support 

provided by the military. Commanders should seek to increase the effectiveness of other 

USG agency programs such as USAID whenever possible. Working with or near IGOs 

and NGOs may be untenable due to their desire to preserve the perception of neutrality. 

Military units may have to settle for awareness of IGO and NGO activities and employ 

themselves so as not to duplicate efforts in HSS. 

For further information on HSS, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support. 

For information on MCMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations 

SECTION B. INDIRECT SUPPORT 

5. General 

 a. This category of support provides equipment or training support in order to 

enhance the HN’s ability to conduct its own operations. 

 b. Three subsets of indirect support include SA, joint and multinational exercises, 

and exchange programs. (See Figure VI-2.) 

6. Security Assistance 

a. This section will discuss specific military SA operations and how the GCC may 

use this tool to further support FID activities. The military will primarily provide 

equipment, training, and services to the supported HN forces. In the SA arena, GCCs 

and subordinate JFCs do not have authority over the SA program, but have responsibility 

for planning and executing military activities to support FID within the SA process. 
Chapter VI 

VI-12 JP 3-22 

GCCs are active in the SA process by advising ambassadors through the SCO and by 

coordinating and monitoring ongoing SA efforts in their AOR. In addition, through 

coordination with HN military forces and supporting SCOs, the GCC can assist in 

building credible military assistance packages that best support long-term goals and 

objectives of regional FID operations. The following paragraphs describe the SA support 

areas of equipment, services, and training as well as the employment considerations for 

each. 

b. Equipment. The GCC and subordinate JFC can have the greatest impact in this 

area during the planning and resource identification phase of developing the theater 

strategy. Regional threats identified and level of HN technology will determine the 

general equipment needs of the supported HNs in the theater. Each SCO will 

coordinate resultant military equipment requests with the GCC’s staff and country team. 

Finally, the HN provides a letter of request to the SCO, who forwards it to the appropriate 

Military Department to determine price and availability. Throughout this process, HN 

needs must be evaluated in terms of the threat and existing social, political, and economic 

conditions. Care must be taken to guard against a US solution or to support unnecessary 

requests, as explained below. 

(1) The FID planning imperative to tailor support to HN needs is extremely 

important in providing equipment support. Environmental factors, level of HN 

training, ability to maintain equipment, HN infrastructure, and a myriad of other factors 

will determine what equipment is appropriate to the HN’s needs. If equipment in the US 

inventory is not appropriate for use by the HN, the commander may recommend a 

nonstandard item to fill the requirement. Sustainability of nonstandard equipment, as 

well as interoperability with existing equipment, must be considered. 

Equipment

Services

Training

Reciprocal Unit Exchange

Personnel Exchange

Individual Exchange

Combination

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL

EXERCISES

EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

INDIRECT SUPPORT IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Figure VI-2. Indirect Support in Foreign Internal Defense 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-13 

(2) HNs may request expensive equipment as a status symbol of regional 

military power. This is often done in spite of the fact that the overall strength of the 

military would be best enhanced by improved training and professionalism among the 

existing force. This is a delicate political situation, but one that the ambassador and the 

GCC may be able to influence. 

c. Services. Services include any service, test, inspection, repair, training, 

publication, technical or other assistance, or defense information used for the purpose of 

furnishing military assistance, but does not include military education and training 

activities. Services support is usually integrated with equipment support. The 

CCDR has oversight to ensure that the equipment is suitable for HN needs and that the 

HN is capable of maintaining it. These types of services will almost always be required 

to ensure an effective logistic plan for the acquired equipment. There are two common 

types of service teams: QATs and TATs. QATs are short term and are used to ensure that 

equipment is in usable condition. TATs are used when the HN experiences difficulty 

with US-supplied equipment. For detailed information on teams available for initial and 

follow-on equipment support, see DOD Manual 5105.38-M, Security Assistance 

Management Manual. 

d. Training. The training portion of 

SA can make a very significant impact on 

the HN IDAD program. The GCC is 

actively involved in coordinating, 

planning, and approving training 

support with the SCO and HN. The 

Services, through their SA training 

organizations, are the coordinators for SAfunded training. 

(1) The following are the general 

objectives of training programs under SA 

(see Figure VI-3). 

 (a) Professional Military 

Education. To further the goal of 

regional stability through effective, 

mutually beneficial military-to-military 

relations which culminate in increased 

understanding and defense cooperation 

between the United States and the HN. 

(b) O&M Skills. To create 

skills needed for effective O&M of 

equipment acquired from the US. 

Equipment that is delivered to a host nation 

must address needs in terms of the threat 

as well as the existing social, political, and 

economic conditions. 
Chapter VI 

VI-14 JP 3-22 

(c) Effective Management. To assist the foreign country in developing 

expertise and systems needed for effective management of its defense establishment. 

(d) Development of Training Self-Sufficiency. To foster development by 

the HN of its own training capability. 

(e) Rapport and Understanding. To promote military-to-military 

understanding leading to increased standardization and interoperability. 

(f) Increased Awareness. To provide an opportunity to demonstrate the 

US commitment to the basic principles of internationally recognized human rights. 

(2) The following force structure, training plan, and training activities 

considerations should be understood before implementing an SA training program. 

(a) Training Force Structure. Services administer SA training with a 

combination of military and contracted trainers. SOF may be preferred for some types of 

training if the situation requires language or regional skills. HN forces can also receive 

education or training in US schools or contractor facilities. 

(b) Training Plan. The training portion of SA is identified and 

coordinated by the SCO with the HN military. GCCs and subordinate JFCs will 

incorporate the SA training, planning, and requirements into the overall military planning 

to support FID operations. 

1. The SCO will develop a 2-year plan, known as the combined 

training and education plan (CTEP), which consolidates HN needs from a joint 

perspective, taking into consideration all sources of training and funding. These plans 

will be approved by the appropriate combatant command. 







Professional Military 

Education

Operation and 

Maintenance Skills

Effective Management







Development of Training 

Self-Sufficiency

Rapport and 

Understanding

Increased Awareness

GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF TRAINING PROGRAMS UNDER 

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Figure VI-3. General Objectives of Training Programs Under Security Assistance
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-15 

2. Each year the GCCs will host an SC education and training working 

group. During this working group the SCO and Service training coordinators, along with 

the GCC, DOD, and DOS will refine and coordinate the previously approved CTEP, 

finalize the budget year training program, and announce and discuss changes in the 

command’s training policy or procedures. 

3. The SCO must ensure that the HN looks beyond its current needs 

toward the future. A tool to accomplish this is the 2-year plan. 

4. Commanders and their staffs must also ensure that US forces 

involved in providing SA-funded training to HN personnel in-country are fully aware of 

restrictions on their involvement in HN combat operations and that they employ vigilant 

FP measures. US training teams should be considered likely targets of attack if supported 

forces are facing an active armed threat. 

(c) Training Activities. The GCC has a number of training activities that 

should be considered when reviewing individual country training plans. These programs 

may be carried out by HN personnel attending military schools in the US or by deploying 

teams of SOF, CF, or a combination of both. Consideration should be given to language 

capabilities, cultural orientation, theater objectives, complexity of tasks/missions to be 

performed, and the supported HN’s IDAD program when selecting forces. The following 

are the primary types of training that may be employed as part of military support to the 

SA program. 

1. Mobile Training Teams. MTTs are used when an HN element 

requires on-site training and to conduct surveys and assessments of training requirements. 

An MTT may be single-Service or joint, SOF or CF, but is tailored for the training the 

HN requires. An MTT is employed on a temporary duty (TDY) basis for a designated 

period of time. If HN forces require training for a longer period, training in the United 

States should be considered as an alternative. 

2. Extended Training Service Specialists (ETSSs). ETSS teams are 

employed on a permanent change of station (PCS) basis (usually for 1 year) in order to 

assist the HN in attaining readiness on weapons or other equipment. These teams train 

the HN’s initial instructor cadre so that they can assume the responsibility for training 

their own personnel. They consist of DOD military and civilian personnel technically 

qualified to provide advice, instruction, and training in the installation, operation, and 

maintenance of weapons, equipment, and systems to HN personnel. 

3. Technical Assistance Field Teams. TAFTs consist of DOD 

personnel in a PCS status, assigned to provide technical or maintenance assistance to HN 

personnel. TAFTs are also deployed on a PCS basis and train HN personnel in 

equipment-specific military skills. 

4. International Education and Training. The US international 

education and training program provides HN personnel with military education and 
Chapter VI 

VI-16 JP 3-22 

training opportunities in the US. This type of training not only meets the immediate HN 

requirement of increased training, but also has a longer term impact of improving US-HN 

relations. 

5. Contractors. Contractor personnel can be utilized in the execution 

of SA as outlined in the DOD 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual. The 

provisions of DOD Instruction (DODI) 3020.37, Continuation of Essential DOD 

Contractor Services During Crises, should be fully understood should a situation escalate 

from indirect to direct support. 

6. The Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship 

Program (RDCTFP). RDCTFP is a critical tool for DOD to provide grant aid education 

and training to support regional nations in our collective efforts in support of combating 

terrorism. RDCTFP offers education and training to foreign military officers, ministry of 

defense civilians, and other foreign civilian security force personnel. The DOD funded 

program is implemented through the US Services’ SA training management systems. 

 (3) Medical Civil-Military Operations in Indirect Support. MCMO indirect 

support to FID operations is generally accomplished by medical training teams and 

advisors. The focus is on identification of health threats that affect the efficiency and 

effectiveness of the HN military forces and designing programs to train and equip those 

forces. Typically, the main effort of such training has been conducted by SF with support 

from other SOF units. PSYOP has historically supported and advised HN counterparts in 

programs and series to support MCMO missions. Wellness and instructional PSYOP 

series can seek to simply increase participation in medical or veterinary programs that 

some TAs may be reluctant to use due to cultural bias. In addition, introduction of new 

behaviors such as sanitary food or water practices can be pursued as well. This type of 

support can cross boundaries into the realm of direct support as well and may involve 

simultaneously conducting both indirect and direct support. 

7. Joint and Multinational Exercises 

 These exercises can enhance a FID operation. They offer the advantage of 

training US forces while simultaneously increasing interoperability with HN forces 

and offering limited HN training opportunities. The participation of US forces in 

these exercises, primarily designed to enhance the training and readiness of US forces, is 

funded by O&M funds of the providing Service or USSOCOM if SOF are involved. 

Airlift and sealift may be provided by the combatant command from its airlift and sealift 

budget. Certain expenses of HN forces participation may be funded by the developing 

country multinational exercise program as arranged by the conducting combatant 

command. These expenses differ from SA funding because SA is designed to train 

HN forces, whereas multinational and selected joint exercises are designed to train 

US forces in combination with HN forces. Legal restrictions on what FID activities can 

be conducted in conjunction with these exercises are complex. Appendix A, “Legal 

Considerations,” provides general guidelines on these restrictions. Prior legal guidance is 

important to the concept of the exercise and related FID operations. Exercises should be 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-17 

planned as part of the overall training program for the theater, and other FID activities 

should be integrated into the framework of these exercises. Examples of this integration 

are found in the conduct of HCA missions. The implementation of HCA programs into 

exercises will be examined in detail later in this chapter. Multinational and selected joint 

exercises can yield important benefits for US interests and the overall theater FID 

operation. The most significant of these benefits: 

a. Enhance relationships and interoperability with HN forces; 

b. Demonstrate resolve and commitment to the HN; and 

c. Familiarize US forces and commanders with HN employment procedures and 

potential combat areas. 

8. Exchange Programs 

a. These programs allow the commander to use O&M money for the exchange of 

units or individuals and may be used to expand the efforts of the SA programs funded 

under IMET that allow HN personnel to train in the US. These exchange programs 

foster greater mutual understanding and familiarize each force with the operations 

of the other. Exchange programs are another building block that can help a commander 

round out the FID plan. These are not stand-alone programs; however, when 

commanders combine them with other FID tools, the result can be a comprehensive 

program that fully supports the HN IDAD program. The general types of exchange 

programs that commanders should consider are described below. Appendix A, “Legal 

Considerations,” provides a more detailed explanation of the legal aspects of these types 

of training. 

b. Reciprocal Unit Exchange Program. This program is for squad-to-battalionsize elements. Each nation’s forces trains the other in tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

This program is a good vehicle for US commanders to use in order to sensitize their 

forces to the cultural and social aspects of the HN while simultaneously increasing the 

training readiness of HN forces. The proficiency of the units must be comparable to 

preclude exchanging fully trained US forces for untrained HN forces. 

c. Personnel Exchange Program (PEP). The PEP is a 1- to 3-year program in 

which one person from the HN is exchanged with a US member. This program, like 

reciprocal unit exchanges, requires that the exchanged personnel be of comparable 

proficiency in their area of expertise. 

d. Individual Exchange Program. This program is similar to the PEP. It is 

different, however, because it is a TDY assignment in theater. This program gives the 

commander flexibility, since personnel will not be lost for extended periods and the 

commander is able to expose a larger portion of the force to the program. 
Chapter VI 

VI-18 JP 3-22 

e. Combination Programs. Commanders should consider combining SA efforts 

with joint or multinational exercises in order to obtain maximum benefit for all 

concerned. For example, exchange of key personnel during exercises will gain more in 

terms of interoperability than exchanges during normal operational periods. Also, the 

exchange of units with similar equipment, especially if the HN is unfamiliar with the 

equipment, may be very beneficial. 

SECTION C. DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING 

COMBAT OPERATIONS) 

9. General 

a. This category of support involves US forces actually conducting operations in 

support of the HN (see Figure VI-4). This is different from providing equipment or 

training support in order to enhance the HN’s ability to conduct its own operations. 

Direct support operations provide immediate assistance and are usually combined in a 

total FID effort with indirect operations. 

b. Two types of direct support operations critical to supporting FID across all 

categories are CMO and PSYOP. Because these operations involve US forces in a direct 

operational role, they are discussed under direct support (not involving combat 

operations). Also included in this direct support discussion are military training to HN 

forces, logistic support, and intelligence and information sharing activities. 

10. Civil-Military Operations 

CMO span a very broad area in FID and include activities across the range of 

military operations. Using CMO to support military activities in a FID operation can 

enhance preventive measures, reconstructive efforts, and combat operations in support of 

an HN’s IDAD program. This discussion is limited to those portions of CMO that most 

directly contribute to a commander’s support of a FID operation. 

For further information on CMO relationships to CAO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military 

Operations. 

a. Civil Affairs Operations. CAO enhance the relationship between military forces 

and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present. CAO, usually planned, 

directed, and conducted by CA personnel because of the complexities and demands for 

specialized capabilities involved in working within areas normally the responsibility of 

indigenous civil governments or authorities, enhance the conduct of CMO. CAO are 

vital to theater FID operations in areas from planning to execution. They are a 

valuable resource in planning and facilitating the conduct of various indirect, direct 

support (not involving combat operations), and combat operations in support of the 

overall FID effort. CAO also support the reconstitution of a viable and competent civil 

service and social infrastructures in areas of the HN that were previously ungoverned or 

under-governed or in the direct control of threat forces or shadow governments. CAO 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-19 

can also assist the HN civilian government by providing civil administration assistance 

within its governmental structure. 

(1) Force Structure. Each GCC is aligned with both an AC Army CA element 

and with an Army CA command, which are found only in the US Army Reserve and 

staffed with functional experts possessing a wide range of functional specialty areas. 

 (a) Civil Affairs Liaison. CA liaison personnel may be assigned or 

attached to a combatant command to augment the CA staff planning element. These 

personnel can be instrumental in assisting in the planning of military operations to 

support FID and incorporating FID operations into the overall theater strategy. 

 (b) Civil Affairs Commands, Brigades, and Battalions 

 1. US Army CA deploy as teams, detachments, or larger units in 

support of a JFC. US Army RC CA typically support CF requirements, while US Army 

AC CA are SOF and support SOF requirements. Accordingly, US Army RC CA are 

sourced through USJFCOM (via US Army Headquarters), whereas US Army AC CA are 

sourced through USSOCOM. CAO planners at United States Army Civil Affairs and 

Intelligence 

Cooperation

Military Training

to Host Nation

Forces

Psychological

Operations

Civil-Military Operations

Civil Affairs Operations

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance

Military Civic Action

DIRECT SUPPORT

(NOT INVOLVING COMBAT OPERATIONS)

Logistic

Support

Figure VI-4. Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations)
Chapter VI 

VI-20 JP 3-22 

Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) and USSOCOM have the ability to 

determine the proper doctrinal structure or task organization to meet requirements. 

 2. US Marine Corps CA deploy as teams, detachments, companies, or 

groups integral to a MAGTF or, when made available, in support of a JFC. 

 3. Navy Civil Affairs. The maritime civil affairs group (MCAG) 

represents the US Navy’s CA capabilities. MCAG has the capability to deploy maritime 

CA teams, maritime CA planners, and functional team specialists. MCAG was 

established to support the joint force maritime component commander, the Navy 

component commander and the GCC’s SC strategy contained in the TCP by meeting 

Navy unique requirements in delivering CMO within the maritime domain. Three 

maritime-specific capabilities are available, in addition to the 14 found in the US Army: 

 a. Port operations; 

 b. Harbor and channel construction and maintenance; and 

 c. Marine and fisheries resources. 

 (2) Civil Affairs Capabilities. CA units (both AC and RC) are regionally 

focused, possess varying levels of language capability, and country expertise. Only the 

RC have all six CA functional specialty areas: governance (public administration; public 

safety; environmental management); rule of law (judicial administration; corrections; 

public safety; law enforcement); infrastructure (public transportation; public works and 

utilities; public communications); economic stability (food and agriculture; economic 

development; civilian supply); public health and welfare (public health and cultural 

relations); and public education and information (public education; civil information 

services). Commanders should consider using their CA assets in the following roles to 

support the overall FID effort. 

(a) Planning, supporting, and controlling other military operations in FID 

such as training assistance, FHA, MCA, HCA, and logistic support. 

(b) Providing liaison to civilian authorities, IGOs, and NGOs. 

(c) Facilitating the identification and procurement of civilian resources to 

support the mission. 

(d) Supporting and conducting civil administration. 

(e) The Coast Guard does not maintain CA. However, the Coast Guard can 

provide a variety of capabilities, assistance, equipment, and training in helping a country 

organize and establish a coast guard. Generally, maritime USCG forces have four 

principal missions: military operations and preparedness, law enforcement, maritime 

safety (including search and rescue), and enforcement of shipping and navigation laws. 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-21 

The Coast Guard Model Maritime Service Code is a valuable reference for other nations 

to use for establishing a maritime force. 

(3) Civil Affairs Employment Considerations in FID. The following are 

areas that commanders must consider when employing CA assets in planning, supporting, 

and executing FID operations. 

(a) CA expertise must be incorporated in the planning as well as into the 

execution of military activities in support of FID operations. 

(b) Successful FID operations hinge upon HN public support. Integrating 

CAO and PSYOP with FID operations can enhance that support. For specific 

humanitarian and indigenous religious leader liaison missions, chaplain support may 

offer mission credibility. 

(c) The sovereignty of the HN must be maintained at all times. The 

perception that the US is running a puppet government is counter to the basic principles 

of FID. This is important to remember when providing civil administration assistance. 

(d) HN self-sufficiency must be a goal of all CAO. 

Additional information on CAO planning guidance, force apportionment, logistics, and 

joint forces C2 of CAO can be found in CJCSI 3110.12D, Civil Affairs Supplement to the 

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (U). 

b. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. FHA programs are conducted to relieve 

or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions. 

FHA provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration. The assistance 

provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities 

or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA may be 

planned into the GCC’s military strategy to support FID as a component of the overall 

program to bolster the HN’s IDAD capability. Often, however, FHA efforts are in 

response to unforeseen disaster situations. FHA efforts may also extend outside the FID 

umbrella. When FHA is provided to a nation that is experiencing lawlessness, 

subversion, or insurgency, these efforts must be considered as part of the FID effort. As 

such, all of the PSYOP and CMO/CAO considerations discussed earlier must be 

considered as the FHA programs are planned and executed. 

(1) FHA Missions and Assistance. A single FHA operation may contain one 

or more FHA missions. Common missions include: relief missions, dislocated civilian 

support missions, security missions, technical assistance and support functions, and 

consequence management operations. Common examples of FHA that commanders may 

provide and/or restore are temporary shelter, food and water, medical assistance, 

transportation assistance, or other activities that provide basic services to the local 

populace. These services are often in response to a natural disaster such as an 

earthquake, a volcanic eruption, or a flood. In addition, FHA support may include 
Chapter VI 

VI-22 JP 3-22 

assistance to the populace of a nation ravaged by war, disease, or environmental 

catastrophes. Missions also could be conducted within the profile of consequence 

management. 

(2) FHA Coordination and Control 

(a) DOS. The US ambassador to the affected nation is responsible for 

declaring the occurrence of a disaster or emergency in a foreign country that requires US 

FHA support. This declaration is sent to the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance 

(OFDA) and DOS to begin possible USG assistance. USAID, which is under the direct 

authority and foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State, acts as the lead 

federal agency for US FHA. USAID administers the President’s authority to provide 

emergency relief and rehabilitation through OFDA. Should OFDA request that DOD 

conduct certain FHA operations, DOS would reimburse DOD for those operations. 

Appendix A, “Legal Considerations,” covers the legal authorizations and restrictions for 

these operations. 

(b) DOD. The USD(P) has the overall responsibility for developing 

military policy for FHA operations. The ASD(SO/LIC&IC) administers policy and 

statutory programs. Policy oversight is executed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (Stability Operations). Program management and funding of these programs is 

the responsibility of DSCA. Much of FHA is provided through the excess property 

authorization under Title 10, USC, Section 2547, which permits the transfer of excess 

DOD property to authorized nations. 

(c) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CJCS is responsible for 

recommending supported and supporting commands for FHA operations. The Joint 

Staff’s Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development has the primary 

responsibility for concept review of OPLANs in support of FHA; the J-4 oversees 

Medical assistance programs employ joint forces to 

promote nonmilitary objectives.
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-23 

Service logistic support; and the J-3 will be involved when a military force is inserted 

into a foreign country as part of a US humanitarian response. 

(d) Geographic Combatant Commander. The GCC considers FHA 

when formulating and establishing theater strategic objectives. Planning is conducted in 

accordance with JOPES. The supported GCC structures the force necessary to conduct 

and sustain FHA operations. In certain circumstances where coordination and approval 

lead times are not adequate, the GCC is authorized to commit the command’s resources 

to provide immediate assistance. 

(3) FHA Employment Considerations. Certain major points that CCDRs and 

other JFCs should consider when planning or executing FHA operations are listed in 

Figure VI-5. 

For further information on FHA, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

c. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. These HCA programs can be very 

valuable to the GCC’s support of FID operations, while at the same time offering 

valuable training to US forces. It is important to understand the difference between HCA 

and FHA programs. FHA programs, as discussed above, focus on the use of DOD excess 

property, emergency transportation support, disaster relief, or other support as necessary 

to alleviate urgent needs in a host country caused by some type of disaster or catastrophe. 

HCA programs are specific programs authorized under Title 10, USC, Section 401 

funding. These programs are designed to provide assistance to the HN populace in 

conjunction with a military exercise. These are usually planned well in advance and 

are usually not in response to disasters, although HCA activities have been executed 

following disasters. Specific activities for which HCA funds can be used include 

medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a country that are rural or are 

underserved by medical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively; construction 

of rudimentary surface transportation systems; well drilling and construction of basic 

sanitation facilities; rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities; and detection 

and clearance of landmines and other explosive remnants of war, including activities 

relating to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to 

the detection and clearance of landmines and other explosive remnants of war. 

Assistance fulfills unit training requirements that create humanitarian benefit to the 

local populace. 

(1) HCA Coordination and Control. The coordination requirements for HCA 

projects are similar to those for FHA. HCA activities (other than De Minimis HCA, as 

defined in DOD Directive (DODD) 2205.2, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided 

in Conjunction with Military Operations) conducted in a foreign country require the 

specific approval of the Secretary of State. Within DOD, the USD(P) oversees HCA, and 

the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, 

acts as the program policy lead. GCCs develop a proposed annual execution plan for 

HCA activities within their AORs and execute HCA activities in conjunction with other 

military operations. Coordination with USAID and the country team is also very 
Chapter VI 

VI-24 JP 3-22 

important to efficient HCA operations. The HCA program is a more decentralized 

program than FHA. This allows the GCC to have greater influence and to plan for a 

larger role in this area. 

(a) In past years, Congress has established a ceiling on HCA 

authorizations. Funds are included in the GCC’s budgets. This allocation is made based 

on national security priorities and guidance from SecDef. 

(b) Valid HCA priorities within the AOR are identified and included in the 

FID planning process. These priorities then compete with those of other combatant 

commands for approval and funding. The resulting exercises and projects should then be 

managed as both FID and US training. 

Constructing likely event joint operation plans. Theater joint operation 

plans should be established for likely events that may require a foreign 

humanitarian assistance (FHA) response. For example, if the 

combatant commander's area of responsibility covers a likely 

earthquake region, the command's response for an earthquake should 

be included in a joint operation plan to decrease response time and 

make execution easier and more effective.

Incorporating psychological operations and civil affairs operations into 

the FHA program. FHA programs that are not properly coordinated 

with local government officials, improperly assessed, or are 

misrepresented by opposition propaganda efforts may severely 

damage the theater foreign internal defense operation.

Coordinating all FHA activities with the country team. The US Agency 

for International Development and its subordinate element, the Office of 

Foreign Disaster Assistance, must be carefully consulted on disaster 

assistance. In addition, ensure that all proposed FHA efforts are 

coordinated with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent 

Capabilities). The Department of State is the lead agent for this type of 

support and all FHA programs must be thoroughly coordinated to 

ensure an efficient national-level program.

Monitoring the legal authorizations carefully. These authorizations are 

subject to change and misinterpretation. A legal review must be 

conducted before planning FHA missions.

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Figure VI-5. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Employment Considerations 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-25 

(2) HCA Employment Considerations. The nature of HCA operations makes 

the employment considerations for this type of operation quite different than for FHA. 

The following are the key employment considerations for HCA. 

(a) Plan for use of RC as well as AC forces. The medical, veterinary, 

dental, construction, and well drilling activities of HCA are well suited to skills found in 

the RC forces. Typical HCA missions allow these forces to get the realistic training they 

may not receive at their home stations or at other US training sites. 

(b) Incorporate PSYOP and CA into HCA just as in FHA operations. 

(c) Subject all HCA plans to close legal scrutiny. Like FHA operations, the 

legal aspects of all HCA operations must be understood. 

(d) Plan adequate deployed FP measures. HCA operations are sometimes 

conducted in areas that are subject to unrest and internal instability. US forces may 

become targets of opposition forces’ terrorist attacks. Security measures must be 

included in each operation. 

(e) Establish the primary purpose of HCA missions as training for US 

forces. Incidental to this purpose are the benefits received by the civilian population. 

Nevertheless, every attempt should be made to ensure activities support HN capacity 

building. 

(f) Conduct all HCA operations in support of the host civilian populace. 

No HCA projects/programs may be provided to HN military or paramilitary forces. 

For further information on HCA, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 

Humanitarian and civic assistance as part of 

foreign internal defense activities.
Chapter VI 

VI-26 JP 3-22 

d. Military Civic Action. MCA programs offer the JFC a CMO opportunity to 

improve the HN infrastructure and the living conditions of the local populace, while 

enhancing the legitimacy of the HN government. These programs use predominantly 

indigenous military forces at all levels in such fields as education, training, public 

works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and other 

areas that contribute to the economic and social development of the nation. These 

programs can have excellent long-term benefits for the HN by developing needed skills 

and by enhancing the legitimacy of the host government by showing the people that their 

government is capable of meeting the population’s basic needs. MCA programs can also 

be helpful in gaining public acceptance of the military, which is especially important in 

situations requiring a clear, credible demonstration of improvement in host-military 

treatment of human rights. MCA is a tool that GCCs and subordinate JFCs should use, 

whenever possible, to bolster the overall FID plan. 

For further information on MCA, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

(1) MCA Examples. US forces may advise or assist the HN military in 

conducting the MCA mission. This assistance may occur in conjunction with SA training 

or as a GCC’s separate initiative. In all cases, the actual mission must be performed by 

the HN military. Some of the most common MCA projects are in the area of 

construction. 

(2) MCA Coordination and Control. Coordination for MCA missions is 

slightly less involved than for FHA and HCA missions. First, the US level of 

involvement is generally less than that required for other types of FID missions. Second, 

the program is essentially a US military to HN military project. As with all FID 

operations, however, the US ambassador and country team should be aware of all 

operations in their assigned country. If the US military support to MCA is provided 

through SA, normal SA coordination procedures apply, but if it is provided through a 

separate GCC’s initiative using O&M funds, most of the coordination will be internal to 

the command. 

(3) MCA Employment Considerations. Many of the same considerations 

apply when employing US military personnel in support of MCA as in supporting FHA 

and HCA. The essential difference is that in MCA, US personnel are limited to training 

and advisory roles. In addition to this general point, commanders should also consider 

the following employment guidelines when planning or executing MCA programs. 

(a) Select projects that are simple and achievable and can be maintained by 

the HN. If the HN military is unable to accomplish the mission, confidence in the local 

government and military may be significantly damaged. 

(b) HN forces will do the work required to accomplish the mission. 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-27 

(c) Because of the nature of MCA missions, commanders will normally 

include CA, PSYOP, other SOF trainers, and combat support and combat service support 

elements to support MCA missions. 

(d) Coordinate projects with the country team. The USAID representative 

should be consulted for assistance on any major MCA developmental project and should 

be informed of all MCA efforts. 

11. Psychological Operations 

a. PSYOP supports the achievement of national objectives by influencing 

behaviors in select target foreign audiences. During FID, PSYOP units design series 

that may include both PSYOP products and actions to convey to the TA US resolve, and 

the extent to which national objectives will be attained. The main objectives of PSYOP 

during FID are to build and maintain support for the host government while decreasing 

support for insurgents. 

(1) Target Groups and PSYOP Goals Within FID

(a) Insurgents. To create dissension, disorganization, low morale, 

subversion, and defection within insurgent forces. 

(b) Civilian Populace. To gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support 

for the HN government and its IDAD program. 

(c) Military Forces. To strengthen military support, with emphasis on 

building and maintaining the morale of HN forces. 

(d) Neutral Elements. To gain the support of uncommitted groups inside 

and outside the HN. 

(e) External Hostile Powers. To convince hostiles that the insurgency 

will fail. 

(2) PSYOP Activities

(a) Improving popular support for the HN government. 

(b) Discrediting the insurgent forces with neutral groups and the insurgents 

themselves. 

(c) Projecting a favorable image of the HN government and the US. 

(d) Supporting defector programs. 

(e) Providing close and continuous support to CMO. 
Chapter VI 

VI-28 JP 3-22 

(f) Supporting HN programs that protect the population from insurgent 

activities. 

(g) Strengthening HN support of programs that provide positive populace 

control and protection from insurgent activities. 

(h) Informing the international community of US and HN intent and 

goodwill. 

(i) Passing instructions to the HN populace. 

(j) Developing HN PSYOP capabilities. 

(3) PSYOP Force Structure. Similar to the CA force structure, over 85 

percent of PSYOP assets are in the RC force. The Army has the preponderance of 

PSYOP assets. The US Air Force has a variety of assets capable of supporting PSYOP 

including a limited number of EC-130 COMMANDO SOLO aircraft. The EC-130J 

COMMANDO SOLO is a specially modified C-130 that conducts PSYOP and CA 

broadcasts. A typical mission consists of a single-ship orbit offset from the desired 

audience (either military or civilian personnel). 

(4) PSYOP Capabilities. PSYOP personnel prepare an in-depth analysis of the 

target nation’s social, political, religious, cultural, and economic environment as 

background for the development of the supporting PSYOP plan. Taking into 

consideration social groups, key communicators, and centers of gravity the PSYOP 

planner will recommend a theme (subject, topic, or line of persuasion used to achieve a 

psychological objective) to the GCC. The PSYOP planner recommends certain symbols 

that have a psychological impact on the TA. Once the commander chooses a theme and 

symbols, the tone and general parameters for much of the PSYOP to support the FID 

operation have been established, and all military operations should be evaluated against 

these parameters. Objectives, supporting objectives, and themes frame the program that 

will reach foreign TAs and reflect national and theater policy and strategy. Approval of 

broad themes and messages is reserved by USG policy at OSD levels where the 

interagency process can address PSYOP products with a broad range of 

considerations. In addition to establishing the psychological theme and symbols, the 

PSYOP element will project a favorable image of US actions, using all resources to 

channel the behavior of the TA so that it supports US objectives. Given these extensive 

capabilities, commanders should use their PSYOP assets to complement the FID plan in 

the following roles: 

(a) Providing planning assistance for military support to FID. Planning 

tasks include identification of those military operations conducted primarily for their 

psychological effects and review of other military operations that have a psychological 

impact. 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-29 

(b) Working with the military PAO and DOS PA personnel to build an 

extensive information effort to inform the local populace of US intentions in the FID 

effort and to strengthen the credibility of the HN government. 

(c) Gathering information through PSYOP assessments of the local area 

that assist in determining FID requirements and MOEs. 

(5) PSYOP Employment Considerations in FID. The following are areas 

that commanders must consider when employing PSYOP assets in support of FID 

operations. 

(a) Accurate intelligence is imperative to successful PSYOP and FID. An 

inadequate analysis of the TA could result in the use of improper themes or symbols and 

damage the entire FID effort. 

 (b) Early integration of PSYOP to FID planning is imperative at all levels. 

PSYOP planning for FID requires an extensive knowledge of the TA vulnerabilities, 

social and cultural dynamics, and languages. Late integration of PSYOP to the FID 

operation may degrade the USG efforts to strengthening the HN credibility to the 

populace. 

(c) PSYOP programs are audience driven; an analysis is required for each 

new TA and must be updated as attitudes and vulnerabilities change. 

(d) PSYOP is a combat multiplier and should be used as any other 

capability. This use includes evaluation of targets through joint targeting procedures. 

(e) Military PSYOP programs should be coordinated and synchronized 

with other USG information efforts. 

b. Peacetime PSYOP Programs. GCCs may develop such programs, in 

coordination with the chiefs of US diplomatic missions, that plan, support, and provide 

for the conduct of PSYOP in support of US regional objectives, policies, interests, and 

theater military missions. 

For further information on PSYOP, refer to JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations.

12. Military Training to Host Nation Forces 

a. The HN FID situation may intensify and increase the need for military training 

beyond that of indirect support. Direct support operations should provide more 

immediate benefit to the HN and may be used in conjunction with various types of SA 

indirect support training. 
Chapter VI 

VI-30 JP 3-22 

b. Increased emphasis on IDAD becomes important and training may focus on 

specific subversion, lawlessness, or insurgency problems encountered by the HN that 

may be beyond its capabilities to control. 

 c. Security Force Assistance

 (1) The current strategic environment is seen as one of persistent conflict in 

which US national strategic objectives require unified action to achieve unity of effort. 

These synchronization, coordination, and integration activities of both governmental 

organizations and NGOs with military operations also require close relationships with US 

coalition partners, key friends, and allies. A key to achieving unity of effort is 

strengthening interagency coordination, working with international allies and partners, 

and reliance on strategic communication by the US and its international partners. 

 (a) Security sector reform supports unity of effort in FID by enabling allies, 

coalition members, and other nations to improve the way they provide safety, security, 

and justice. 

 (b) Within the context of security sector reform, the USG, including DOD, 

has long engaged in a range of activities to enhance the capacity and capability of partner 

nations by organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and building, and advising and 

assisting FSF. See Figure VI-6. This is known as SFA. 

 (2) SFA encompasses joint force activities conducted within unified action to 

organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, and advise and assist FSF in support of an HN’s 

efforts to plan and resource, generate, employ, transition, and sustain local, HN, or 

regional security forces and their supporting institutions. This includes activities from 

the ministry level to the tactical units, and the national security sector. 

 (a) SFA spans the range of military operations from military engagement, 

SC, and deterrence activities to crisis response and contingency operations, and if 

necessary, major operations and campaigns. It can include combat advisory and support 

activities not falling under SA. SFA does not include direct combat by US forces, as 

direct combat does not build the capability or capacity of FSF. Direct combat may assist 

the FSF in the same sense as a US unit assisting another US unit. This assistance, 

however, is in a generic sense, not in the sense of building capability or capacity and 

consequently is not SFA. SFA may be conducted in both permissive and uncertain 

security environments. 

 (b) Joint forces can conduct SFA unilaterally when necessary; however, 

when conducted within unified action, joint forces collaborate closely with interagency 

and multinational partners. See Figure VI-7. 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-31 

 (3) Relationships Between FID and SFA

 (a) The basis for FID is established in US law; involves application of the 

instruments of US national power in support of a foreign nation confronted by internal 

threats; and focuses on the US efforts within unified action to enhance that nation’s 

IDAD programs. FID military operations support the other instruments of national power 

through a wide variety of activities. 

 (b) As addressed in Chapter I, “Introduction,” SFA is DOD’s contribution 

to unified action to develop FSF capacity and capability from ministerial down to units of 

those forces. At operational and strategic levels, both SFA and FID focus on preparing 

FSF to combat lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism from internal threats; 

however, SFA also prepares FSF to defend against external threats and to perform as part 

of an international coalition as well. 

 (c) FID and SFA are similar at the tactical level where advisory skills are 

applicable to both. 

FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES

Foreign security forces include but are not limited to the 

following:

Military forces

Police forces

Border police, coast guard, and customs officials

Paramilitary forces

Forces peculiar to specific nations, states, tribes, or ethnic 

groups

Prison, correctional, and penal services

Governmental ministries or departments responsible for the 

above forces

Infrastructure protection forces

Figure VI-6. Foreign Security Forces 
Chapter VI 

VI-32 JP 3-22 

 (d) Both FID and SFA are subsets of SC. Neither FID nor SFA are subsets 

of each other. 

 (4) CF and SOF conducting SFA will find that initial and continuous 

assessment of the HN security forces is essential for successful advisory efforts. 

Particular attention is required to the organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and 

advising of the forces involved. Continuous assessment is essential throughout advisory 

operations. A comprehensive assessment will help advisors develop program objectives 

and milestones and a baseline to measure FSF progress and success. 

 (a) Organizing. SFA includes organizing institutions and units, which can 

range from standing up a ministry to improving the organization of the smallest 

maneuver unit. Building capability and capacity in this area includes personnel, logistics, 

and intelligence, and their support infrastructure. Developing HN tactical capabilities 

alone is inadequate; strategic and operational capabilities must be developed as well. HN 

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

Security force assistance (SFA)

capability

capacity sustain

is unified action to generate, 

employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces 

in support of a legitimate authority.

SFA actions include joint, interagency, intergovernmental, 

multinational, nongovernmental, and private company 

cooperative efforts to ensure and support unity of effort / 

unity of purpose.

US forces assist foreign security forces (FSF) development 

and operation across the range of military operations -- 

combating internal threats such as insurgency, subversion, 

and lawlessness, i.e., foreign internal defense.

To be successful, SFA must be based on solid, continuing 

assessment and include the organizing, training, 

equipping, rebuilding, and advising of the forces involved. 

It is critical to develop the institutional infrastructure to 

sustain SFA gains.

The resulting FSF must possess the to 

accomplish the variety of required missions, with sufficient

 to be successful and with the ability to 

themselves as long as required.

Figure VI-7. Security Force Assistance 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-33 

organization and units should reflect their own unique requirements, interests, and 

capabilities—they should not simply mirror existing external institutions. 

 (b) Training. Training occurs in training centers, academies, and units. 

Training includes a broad range of subject matter to include security forces responding to 

civilian oversight and control. 

 (c) Equipping. Equipping is accomplished through traditional SA, foreign 

support, and donations. The equipment must be appropriate for the physical environment 

of the region and the HN’s ability to operate and sustain it. 

 (d) Rebuilding and Building. In many cases, particularly after major 

combat operations, it may be necessary to rebuild existing or build new infrastructure to 

support FSF. This includes facilities and materiel but may also include other 

infrastructure such as C2 systems and transportation networks. 

 (e) Advising and Assisting. Advising HN units and institutions is 

essential to the ultimate success of SFA. This benefits both the state and the supporting 

external organizations. To successfully accomplish the SFA mission, advising requires 

specially selected and trained personnel. 

 (5) The SFA Imperatives. Successful SFA operations require planning and 

execution consistent with the following imperatives: 

 (a) Understand the Operational Environment. This includes an 

awareness of the relationships between the players within the unified action framework, 

the HN population, and opposing threats. 

 (b) Provide Effective Leadership. Both coalition and HN leadership must 

fully comprehend the operational environment and be prepared, engaged, and supportive 

in order for the SFA effort to succeed. 

 (c) Build Legitimacy. The ultimate goal of SFA is to develop security 

forces that contribute to the legitimate governance of the HN population. 

 (d) Manage Information. This encompasses the collection, analysis, 

management, application, and preparation of information. 

 (e) Ensure Unity of Effort/Unity of Purpose. The command 

relationships must be clearly delineated and understood. Supported and supporting 

relationships will change over time. 

 (f) Sustain the Effort. This includes two major efforts: the ability of the 

US/coalition to sustain the SFA effort throughout the campaign, and the ability of the HN 

security forces to ultimately sustain their operations independently. 
Chapter VI 

VI-34 JP 3-22 

For additional information on each of the six SFA imperatives listed above, refer to 

Commander’s Handbook for Security Force Assistance, 14 July 2008. 

 (6) Plan and Resource. The plan and resource SFA activity begins as 

commanders understand the operational environment and determine the requirements of 

FSF. It also ensures that the US provides SFA that achieves the objectives and end state 

of both the HN and US. The HN and US should then analyze the resource requirements 

and efforts so that developing FSF have sufficient and appropriate resources. 

 (7) USSOCOM is the designated joint proponent for SFA, with responsibility to 

lead the collaborative development, coordination, and integration of the SFA capability 

across DOD. This includes development of SFA in joint doctrine; training and education 

for individuals and units; joint capabilities; joint mission essential task lists; and 

identification of critical individual skills, training, and experience. Additionally, in 

collaboration with the Joint Staff and USJFCOM, and in coordination with the Services 

and GCCs, USSOCOM is tasked with developing global joint sourcing solutions that 

recommend the most appropriate forces (CF and/or SOF) for validated SFA requirements 

referred to the global force management process. 

13. Logistic Support 

a. Logistic support as discussed here does not include activities authorized under 

SA. Logistic support operations are limited by US law without an ACSA. Such 

support usually consists of transportation or limited maintenance support, although 

an ACSA can allow additional support in areas beyond those. However, ACSAs 

permit the reimbursable exchange of logistics support, supplies, and services with HN 

personnel. The existence, potential application, and limitations of an ACSA with the 

HN’s military forces should be considered when planning. 

b. In some cases, the President or SecDef may direct a show of force exercise to 

demonstrate support for the HN and to provide the vehicle for provision of logistic 

support. An example of such a show of force was Operation GOLDEN PHEASANT 

conducted in support of the Government of Honduras in 1987. In this case the internal 

threat was less severe than the combined over the border threat of an interventionist 

Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. 

c. Logistic support is integrated into the overall theater FID plan. This is even more 

important if the supported nation is involved in an active conflict. 

d. The following are major employment considerations that should be considered 

when providing logistic support as part of the theater FID effort. 

(1) Develop definitive ROE and FP measures. 

(2) Educate all members of the command on permissible activities in providing 

the logistic support mission. 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-35 

(3) Build a logistics assessment file on logistic resources available in country. 

This database should include information of local supply availability, warehousing and 

maintenance facilities, transportation assets, line of communications (LOC), and labor 

force availability. 

(4) Tailor the proper types of equipment maintenance and training sustainability 

packages to the needs of the HN. 

(5) Consider utilizing a sea base to provide logistics support, if naval assets are 

available and if geographically supportable. 

14. Intelligence and Information Sharing 

 a. Information cooperation is enabled by an information sharing environment that 

fully integrates joint, multinational, and interagency partners in a collaborative enterprise. 

An active intelligence liaison should be ongoing among the HN, country team, and 

CCDR’s intelligence staff, thus establishing the basis for any intelligence and 

communications sharing. CI elements can provide this support with HN military CI 

elements, security service, and police forces when deployed in support of FID operations. 

Other national-level baseline intelligence support (e.g., geospatial intelligence 

[GEOINT]) may be provided via established or ad hoc memorandums of agreement or 

through national-level liaison teams as required. During the GCC’s assessment of the 

operational area, the HN intelligence and communications capabilities should be 

evaluated. Based on this evaluation, the GCC is in a good position to provide or 

recommend approval of intelligence or communications assistance. The sharing of US 

intelligence is a sensitive area that must be evaluated based on the circumstances of 

each situation. Cooperative intelligence liaisons between the US and HN are vital; 

however, disclosure of classified information to the HN or other multinational FID forces 

must be authorized. Generally, assistance may be provided in terms of evaluation, 

training, limited information exchange, and equipment support. 

b. Any intelligence assistance must be coordinated with the country team 

intelligence assets to benefit from operational and tactical capabilities. 

c. The initial focus of assistance in this area will be to evaluate HN intelligence and 

communications architecture. Based on this evaluation, the GCC will be able to 

determine the HN’s requirements. 

d. Examine the intelligence process as it applies to the current situation. The needs 

of the HN as well as their technical expertise and equipment must be considered when 

evaluating their systems. The HN intelligence and communications systems must reflect 

the HN’s environment and threat. 

e. Following the evaluation, a determination must be made as to how the US FID 

operation may assist. Any intelligence sharing must be evaluated against US national 

security interests and be both coordinated and approved at the national level. 
Chapter VI 

VI-36 JP 3-22 

f. Equipment deficiencies should be identified in the assessment. US assistance in 

equipment normally will be provided through the SA process. 

g. Training support for intelligence operations, which is indirect support, will also 

normally be conducted under SA. Some limited informal training benefits may also be 

provided during exchange programs and daily interface with HN military intelligence and 

communications assets. 

h. Employment Considerations. The following items summarize the major 

considerations that commanders and planners must be aware of as they conduct 

intelligence cooperation activities in support of the FID operation. 

 (1) If the HN is not capable of performing intelligence and CI missions 

effectively upon the commitment of US FID forces, US intelligence and CI elements 

should be deployed to accomplish these missions. The effectiveness of CI assets is 

significantly increased with early introduction. Additionally, engaging existent CI 

resources through FPD and FAO should be considered in the planning stages to 

maximize CI resources. 

(2) Direct most intelligence and information efforts toward creating a selfsufficient HN capability. US assistance that creates a long-term reliance on US 

capabilities may damage the overall HN intelligence and communications system. 

(3) Scrutinize any training assistance to ensure that it is provided within legal 

authorizations and ensure that information or processes are not revealed without 

authorization. 

(4) Tailor assistance to the level of the threat, equipment, and technology within 

the HN. 

(5) Initial and limited use of US ISR technology may benefit the HN but must 

be balanced with the more lasting solution of realistically upgrading the HN’s ISR 

capability in a manner it can sustain. HN intelligence professionals must understand the 

temporary nature of such US support. 

(6) Because FID inherently involves extensive work with HN personnel, special 

attention should be given to releasability considerations of intelligence products, as well 

as available bandwidth and other potential interoperability concerns. 

SECTION D. COMBAT OPERATIONS 

15. General 

a. US participation in combat operations as part of a FID effort requires Presidential 

authority. 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-37 

b. In some cases, the Armed Forces of the US may be required to conduct COIN, 

CT, CD, or other sustained operations directly in the place of HN forces, particularly if 

HN security force capacity is still being developed. In other cases, the Armed Forces of 

the US may support HN forces conducting such operations by directly participating in 

combat operations. 

16. Considerations for United States Combat Operations 

a. This section discusses areas at the operational and strategic levels of war that 

should be considered when conducting combat operations in support of an HN’s IDAD 

program. Many of the considerations discussed in the other two categories of FID remain 

important in tactical operations. The most notable of these involve the coordinated use of 

PSYOP and CAO as well as coordination with other USG agencies operating within the 

HN. The following are areas that the JFC also should consider when employing combat 

forces in support of FID. 

b. HN IDAD Organization. Maintain close coordination with the elements of the 

government responsible for HN IDAD efforts. If a nation has reached a point in its 

internal affairs that it requires combat support from the US, it should have already 

developed a comprehensive IDAD strategy. The organization to effect this strategy 

will vary among nations. It may simply be the normal organization of the executive 

branch of the HN government. The important point is that an organization should 

exist to pull together all instruments of power to defeat the source of internal 

instability. JFCs must be involved in this coordination and control process. Chapter II, 

“Internal Defense and Development,” provides a detailed explanation of an IDAD 

strategy as well as a sample IDAD organization. US commanders supporting an IDAD 

program must be integrated into the organizational structure that controls the program. 

c. Tiers of Forces. Historically, COIN and stability efforts are led initially by SOF 

(principally SF, PSYOP, and CA). If HN capabilities are not sufficiently improved and 

MOEs are not attained, CF may be required. This is particularly true if the HN has one or 

more porous borders that internal threats operate across and even more likely if a 

bordering nation-state is providing support to the internal threat. 

d. Transition Points. Establish transition points at which combat operations are to 

be returned to the HN forces. This process establishes fixed milestones (not time 

dependent) that provide indicators of success of the HN IDAD program. 

e. Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Focus. Combat operations supporting 

FID will normally be joint, and may also include multinational operations involving the 

HN, the US, and other multinational forces. Interagency coordination should also be 

anticipated, given the inherent nature of FID operations. 

f. US Combat Operations. A priority for US combat operations should be to 

identify and integrate logistics, intelligence, and other combat support means. When 

tactically feasible, actual combat operations and support for them should be done by HN 
Chapter VI 

VI-38 JP 3-22 

forces, thus increasing the legitimacy of the HN government and reducing the 

dependency on US forces. US forces will conduct combat operations only when directed 

by legal authority to stabilize the situation and to give the local government and HN 

military forces time to regain the initiative. In most cases, the objective of US operations 

will be FP rather than to focus on destruction of adversary forces. Gaining the strategic 

initiative is the responsibility of the HN. Commanders must evaluate all operations to 

ensure that they do not create the impression that the US is executing a war for a nation 

that has neither the will nor the public support to defeat internal threats. 

g. Human Rights Considerations. Strict adherence to respect for human rights 

must be maintained. This includes US forces as well as forces from the HN and other 

participating multinational forces. Repression and abuses of the local population by the 

legitimate government will reduce the credibility and popular support for the HN 

government and also may cause the President to consider withdrawing US support; 

therefore, commanders must consistently reinforce human rights policies. In many FID 

combat situations, the moral high ground may be just as important as the tactical high 

ground. 

h. Rules of Engagement. Judicious and prudent ROE are absolutely required in 

combat operations in FID. A balance between FP and danger to innocent civilians as 

well as damage to nonmilitary areas must be reached. Each individual must be trained in 

order to prevent unnecessary destruction or loss of civilian life. Commanders must 

closely monitor this situation and provide subordinate commanders with clear and 

enforceable ROE as well as the flexibility to modify these ROE as the situation changes. 

i. Indiscriminate Use of Force. Indiscriminate use of force is not authorized. 

Force may be employed only in accordance with US legal, policy, and applicable ROE 

standards. 

j. Intelligence. The US joint intelligence network must be tied into the country 

team, the local HN military, paramilitary, and police intelligence capabilities, as well as 

the intelligence assets of other nations participating in the operation. Deployed military 

CI elements can provide this liaison with local HN military CI and security and police 

services in their areas of operations. In addition, social, economic, and political 

information must be current to allow the commander to become aware of changes in the 

operational environment that might require a change in tactics. Appendix B, “Joint 

Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment to Support Foreign Internal 

Defense,” provides detail on the type of information necessary for a thorough evaluation 

of the area of operation. The nature of the required information places a greater emphasis 

on HUMINT efforts than on technical collection capabilities. 

k. FID Integration With Other Activities. The initiation of hostilities does not 

mean that other FID operations will be suspended. In fact, PSYOP, CMO, SA, FHA, 

intelligence, and logistic support are all likely to increase dramatically. The FID 

planning imperatives of taking the long-term approach, tailoring support to HN needs, 

and the HN bearing IDAD responsibility remain important throughout both combat and 

noncombat operations. 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-39 

17. Command and Control 

 The C2 relationships established for the combat operation may be modified based on 

the political, social, and military environment of the area. In general, the following C2 

recommendations should be considered when conducting FID combat operations. 

a. The HN government and security forces must remain in the forefront. The 

HN security forces must establish strategic policy and objectives, and a single 

multinational headquarters should be established to control combat operations. 

b. The chain of command from the President to the lowest US commander in 

the field remains inviolate. The President retains command authority over US forces. It 

is sometimes prudent or advantageous to place appropriate US forces under the OPCON 

of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making that 

determination, the President carefully considers such factors as the mission, size of the 

proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and ROE. 

For further information on C2, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 

United States.

18. Sustainment 

 As with any operation, sustainment of US forces is essential to success. Sustainment 

of combat operations in FID is similar to sustainment for other types of operations. The 

political sensitivities and concern for HN legitimacy and minimum US presence do, 

however, change the complexion of sustainment operations in FID. The general 

principles that should be considered in planning and executing sustainment of combat 

operations in FID are: 

a. Maximum Use of HN Capabilities. This includes routine services, supplies, 

facilities, and transportation. This approach reduces US overhead and the number of US 

personnel required in the HN. 

b. Maximum use of existing facilities such as ports, airfields, and 

communications sites.

c. Minimum Handling of Supplies. For short duration operations (90 days or less), 

support will be provided through existing organic support packages, through air LOCs, or 

through the use of logistics flowing through a sea base. 

d. Medical Self-Sufficiency. Many areas of the world where the US is likely to 

conduct FID do not have adequate medical capabilities. Since commanders cannot rely 

on local capabilities, they must plan for self-sufficient HSS for combat operations in FID. 

At a minimum adequate hospitalization, medical logistics resupply, patient movement, 

and preventive medicine must be established to support these operations. 
Chapter VI 

VI-40 JP 3-22 

e. Optimum use of mobile maintenance capabilities that stress repair as far 

forward as possible. Equipment evacuation for repair should be kept to a minimum. 

f. Routine use of both intertheater and intratheater airlift and sealift to deliver 

supplies.

SECTION E. TRANSITION AND REDEPLOYMENT 

19. General 

a. Redeployment of units conducting FID operations does not typically indicate the 

end of all FID operations in the HN. Rather, in long-term FID operations as security and 

other conditions improve and internal threats become manageable for HN personnel, 

direct military-to-military activities by units will continue, but these activities may 

become more intermittent with gaps between regular exercises and exchanges. In 

ongoing FID operations, continuous coverage by US units generally involves mission 

handoff from one unit to its replacement. Redeployment, if conducted haphazardly or 

prematurely, can set FID operations back substantially. 

b. Commonalities exist between redeployments that involve direct handoff and 

redeployments that involve intermittent deployments. In the latter case, the possibility 

always exists that situations during routine activities and military-to-military contact will 

arise causing handoff to a relieving force. Typically, this will involve the original unit or 

select members of it extending their presence in-country to provide continuity or to stay 

in place as part of a more robust force. Redeployment may also involve a transition from 

DOD execution of programs to DOS or OGA execution. In both immediate mission 

handoff and intermittent FID operations, capturing lessons learned in thorough postmission debriefings is essential to continue to build institutional FID knowledge and 

refine FID doctrine and training. 

20. Termination of Operations 

The nature of the termination will shape the futures of the HN and regional countries. 

It is essential to understand that termination of operations is a vital link between national 

security strategy, national defense strategy, national military strategy, and the national 

strategic end state. A poorly conducted termination of FID operations can have a longterm impact on USG relations with the HN, the region, and, potentially, in more than one 

region. Some level of operations normally will continue well after intensive FID support 

has ended. The possibility of an extended presence by US military forces to assist FID 

operations should be considered during the initial planning and recommendation for 

execution. 

21. Termination Approaches 

a. There are three approaches for achieving national strategic objectives by military 

force. The first is to force an imposed settlement by the threat of or actual occupation of 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-41 

an enemy’s land, resources, or people. Supporting the threat of actual occupation may be 

accomplished by the selective destruction of critical functions or assets, such as C2, 

infrastructure, or making the adversary unable to resist the imposition of US will. In FID, 

this approach typically is only taken with intransigent internal threats and the approach 

differs from other operations in that it still involves a preponderance of HN effort in any 

imposed settlement. 

b. The second approach seeks a negotiated settlement through coordinated 

political, diplomatic, military, and economic actions, which convince an adversary that to 

yield will be less painful than continued resistance. In FID, military power alone will 

rarely compel an internal threat to consider a negotiated conclusion. Rather, military 

success in providing security to the HN populace coupled with the other functions of the 

HN IDAD program may induce an internal threat to negotiate under terms acceptable to 

the HN government. Negotiating an advantageous conclusion to operations requires 

time, power, and the demonstrated will to use both. However, some internal threats by 

their nature may not be viable candidates for negotiation. In addition to imposed and 

negotiated termination, there may be an armistice or truce, which is a negotiated 

intermission in operations, not a peace. In effect, it is a device to buy time pending 

negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of operations. The efficacy of an 

armistice or truce must be weighed against the potential damage done by legitimizing an 

internal threat. 

c. The third approach for achieving national security objectives in relation to the 

irregular challenges posed by non-state actors is an indirect approach that erodes an 

adversary’s power, influence, and will; undermines the credibility and legitimacy of its 

political authority; and undermines an internal threat’s influence and control over and 

support by the indigenous population. This approach is necessary with an internal threat 

unwilling to enter into discussion. 

22. National Strategic End State 

a. The first and primary political task regarding termination of intensive FID 

operations is to determine an achievable national strategic end state based on clear 

national strategic objectives. For specific situations that require the employment of 

military capabilities (particularly for anticipated major operations), the President and 

SecDef typically establish a set of national strategic objectives. Achieving these 

objectives is necessary to attain the national strategic end state—the broadly expressed 

diplomatic, informational, military, and economic conditions that should exist after the 

conclusion of a campaign or operation. In FID, this is determined with the HN civilian 

leadership to ensure a clearly defined national strategic end state that is mutually 

beneficial. Specified standards are approved by the President or SecDef that must be met 

before a FID operation can be concluded or transitioned to a less intensive level of 

support. 

b. Commanders clarify their desired end state for training programs early. The 

characteristics of effective HN security forces include flexible, proficient, self-sustained, 
Chapter VI 

VI-42 JP 3-22 

well led, professional forces which are integrated into society. The well-trained HN 

security forces should: 

(1) Provide reasonable levels of security from external threats while not 

threatening regional security. 

(2) Provide reasonable levels of internal security without infringing upon the 

populace’s civil liberties or posing a coup threat. 

(3) Be founded upon the rule of law. 

(4) Be sustainable by the HN after US and multinational forces depart. 

23. Military Considerations 

In its strategic context, military success is measured in the attainment of military 

objectives supporting the national strategic end state and associated termination criteria. 

Termination criteria for a negotiated settlement will differ significantly from those of an 

imposed settlement. Military strategic advice to USG and HN leadership regarding 

termination criteria should be reviewed for military feasibility and acceptability, as well 

as estimates of the time, costs, and military forces required to reach the criteria. An 

essential consideration is ensuring that the longer-term stabilization and the enabling of 

civil authority needed to achieve national strategic objectives continue upon the 

conclusion of sustained operations. Premature reduction of FID support can trigger a 

rapid and dramatic upsurge in internal threat activity, strength, and political viability. 

Proper use of the informational instrument of national power mitigates the possibility of 

any vestigial internal threat elements characterizing a reduction in military commitment 

to a US or HN strategic or tactical reversal. 

24. Mission Handoff Procedures 

a. During long-term continuous FID operations, commanders may elect to replace 

teams for a variety of reasons. Time is not the only governing factor. Changes in the HN 

operational environment may require reshaping force packages as situations change for 

better or worse. In addition, internal administrative concerns might prompt or support a 

commander’s decision to rotate teams or units; for example, new equipment may be 

fielded to an incoming unit that the outgoing unit lacks. Regardless of reason, mission 

handoff is necessary and is defined as the process of passing an ongoing mission from 

one unit to another with no discernible loss of continuity. 

b. The overall authority for the handoff and assumption of command lies with the 

commander ordering the change. The authority for determining the handoff process lies 

with the incoming commander since he will assume responsibility for the mission. This 

changeover process may affect the conditions under which the mission will continue. 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-43 

c. The outgoing commander advises the incoming commander on the tentative 

handoff process and the assumption of the mission directly or through a liaison. If this 

advice conflicts with the mission statement or the incoming commander’s desires and the 

conflict cannot be resolved with the authority established for the incoming commander, 

the commander ordering the relief resolves the issue. 

d. As a rule, the commander ordering the change does not automatically place the 

outgoing unit under the incoming unit’s control during the changeover process. Although 

this procedure would present a clear and easily defined solution to establishing the 

incoming commander’s authority, it is not the most effective control for US forces should 

hostile contact occur during the process. 

e. If the incoming US unit or the HN unit it advises is in direct-fire contact with 

insurgents or another internal threat during the handoff, the unit immediately notifies the 

higher headquarters ordering the exchange. If the incoming unit commander has not 

assumed responsibility, the unit immediately comes under control of the outgoing unit 

and is absorbed into that unit position. The outgoing unit commander and his or her HN 

counterpart will control the battle. If the outgoing unit commander has passed 

responsibility to the incoming unit commander, the outgoing unit comes under the 

OPCON of the incoming unit, and the HN unit coordinates its movements with the new 

unit. Units in advisory or combat support roles should follow these same procedures. 

25. Considerations 

Although the considerations listed below are intended primarily for a direct handoff 

between units, they also apply when handoff is made to an OGA. In addition, the 

considerations should be taken into account in a mature FID operation where there may 

be lag time between deployments. In this latter case, preparing an analysis of the 

considerations listed below will aid the incoming commander on the next iteration. The 

incoming and outgoing commanders or OGA lead representative should consider the 

following: 

a. Mission. The incoming commander must make a detailed study of the unit’s 

mission statement and understand the present mission tasks and the implied mission 

tasks. The mission may also require a unit with additional skill sets, such as specialized 

intelligence capabilities, near real time connectivity, CA functional specialists, or 

complex media production ability. Knowing the mission, commander’s concept of the 

mission, commander’s critical information requirements, PIRs, and IRs will help him or 

her understand the mission. After a complete in-depth study of the operational area, the 

incoming unit commander should complete the handoff in a manner that allows for 

continued, uninterrupted mission accomplishment. The changeover must not allow any 

adversary to gain operational advantages. 

b. Operational Environment. The in-country unit provides continuous information 

updates to the incoming commander. PIRs and IRs were established for the original 

mission along with operational, strategic, and tactical information. The incoming unit 
Chapter VI 

VI-44 JP 3-22 

must become familiar with the ongoing PIRs and IRs, and the upcoming mission PIRs 

and IRs. 

c. Adversary Composition. The incoming unit commander must have the latest 

available intelligence on all internal threats that affect the mission. This intelligence 

includes comprehensive data on terrorists and terrorist-related incidents, criminal activity, 

and specific environmental threats over the previous several months. In addition to the 

normal intelligence provided to the incoming unit commander on a regular basis, the 

situation may call for a liaison from the outgoing unit. OPSEC is critical to prevent the 

enemy from discovering the impending relief and then exploiting the fluidity of the 

change and the concentration of US forces. 

d. Friendly United States/Multinational Forces. To the incoming unit, learning 

about the friendly forces is as important as knowing the enemy situation. The unit must 

be familiar with the C2 structure it will deal with on a daily basis. The incoming unit 

must know all friendly units in adjacent operational environments and be aware of the 

capabilities of their mission support base in addition to other operations, units, and their 

capabilities. If US combat support units are to be relieved, their relief should occur after 

the relief of the units they support. 

e. Host Nation Forces. The incoming unit plans and prepares for a quick and 

frictionless transition in counterpart relations. However, potential or anticipated friction 

between the HN unit and the incoming unit may cause the relief to take place more 

slowly than desired. Therefore, the incoming and outgoing units need a period of overlap 

to allow for in-country, face-to-face contact with their counterparts before the mission 

handoff. If possible, the incoming unit members should receive biographical data on 

their counterparts, to include photographs prior to deployment. This information allows 

unit members to become familiar with their counterparts and may aid to determine which 

advisor techniques need more emphasis. Mission execution must continue within the 

capabilities of the incoming unit, the HN unit, and the available supporting assets. 

f. Civilian Populace. All incoming units must conduct an in-depth area study, 

giving close attention to local problems. General demographic data may be available 

from sister units that can be expanded upon for unit-specific needs. Popular support for 

US activities taking place within the operational environment may directly influence 

changes in the mission statement. The outgoing unit must provide this critical 

information and describe in detail all completed civic action projects and those that are 

underway. The incoming unit must understand the functioning of the HN government 

and the status of any international civilian or government agencies involved in or 

influencing the situation in its operational environment. 

g. Terrain and Weather. Some handoff operations may require select SOF units 

such as SF detachments, CA teams, or tactical PSYOP teams to move by foot or by 

animal mounts into and out of the area of operations. In such instances, the outgoing unit 

plans and reconnoiters the routes used for infiltrating the incoming unit and those used 

for its exfiltration. These routes must provide the best possible cover and concealment. 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-45 

If possible, the units make this exchange during darkness or inclement weather. SOF 

units must consider significant terrain or weather features that may impede movement. 

Limitations of media coverage or difficulties to civic action projects because of these 

features are two common examples. In addition, weather conditions and significant 

elevations can greatly affect air operations. These factors can critically affect resupply 

and health service and supply (notably medical evacuation procedures) as well. 

h. Time. The depth and dispersion of units and the number of operations conducted 

will determine the time required to exchange units. Ideally, there is an overlap period to 

allow the incoming unit to become familiar with the operational environment and to 

establish rapport between the incoming unit personnel and their HN counterparts. 

However, the handoff operation must take place as quickly as possible. The longer the 

operation takes, the more personnel in the operational environment become a vulnerable 

and lucrative target. A quickly executed relief will reduce the time available to the 

enemy to strike before the incoming unit has time to consolidate its position. The 

incoming unit should not sacrifice continued and uninterrupted execution of ongoing 

operations for speed. The incoming unit needs to have enough time to observe training 

techniques and procedures and to conduct debriefing on lessons learned. 

i. Other Government Agencies. For the unit being relieved of a function by an 

OGA handoff, procedures will typically take more time and entail more complex 

coordination. However, the other areas of consideration still apply and in fact may be a 

greater issue for an OGA. Outgoing units that have past, present, or future projects 

planned with OGAs must provide for the transfer of these projects to new responsible 

agents in the incoming unit. Outgoing unit personnel need sufficient time to put 

incoming unit personnel in contact with OGA counterparts. In addition, the outgoing unit 

should brief the incoming unit on any OGA programs affecting FID operations. 

j. Continued Joint Forces Involvement. The constant and unbroken presence of 

SOF or CF in FID operations is not a foregone conclusion. In FID operations, gaps in 

deployments of SOF, CF, or both types of units may be unavoidable. In addition, limited 

CF or SOF units or advisors may be present on an ongoing basis. In these instances, the 

SOF or CF with a constant presence must maintain continuity and brief sister-SOF units 

or conventional units on aspects of the operational environment. Various operational 

concerns can affect what sort of unit relieves another, for instance, a conventional force 

after completing the basic training of an elite but previously untrained HN unit might 

handoff to an SOF unit to complete the HN unit’s advanced training. 

26. Post Mission Debriefing Procedures

a. The unit commander conducts a debriefing that provides an overview of the 

mission and all relevant informational subsets. The debrief should begin with the 

updated area study, and continue with other relevant issues. The range of topics can 

include military geography; political parties; military forces; insurgents; security forces; 

underground, lethal and nonlethal targets and TAs; ongoing CAO; logistics; health 
Chapter VI 

VI-46 JP 3-22 

service and supply issues; and ongoing joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and 

multinational projects or operations. Figure VI-8 depicts a post mission debriefing guide. 

b. Documentation. As FID operations are executed and the joint force rotates, it is 

critical to document lessons learned to allow the commander to modify the FID operation 

to fit the special circumstances and environment. Debriefs by individual units of the joint 

force ensure internal continuity. Relevant portions of these debriefs are consolidated into 

a single joint force after-action report. Therefore, comprehensive after-action reviews 

and reports focusing on the specifics of the FID operations should be conducted to gather 

this information as soon as possible after mission execution. 

For further information on documenting lessons learned, refer to CJCSI 3150.25D, Joint 

Lessons Learned Program (JLLP). 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-47 

POST MISSION DEBRIEFING GUIDE 

MISSION 

 Brief statement of mission by joint force commander. 

EXECUTION 

 Brief statement of the concept of operation developed before the deployment. 

 Statement of method of operation accomplished during the operation, to include deployment, routes, activity in host 

nation (HN) areas, and redeployment. 

 Uniforms and equipment used. 

 Weapons, demolitions, and ammunition used and results. 

 Communications and media equipment used and results. 

 Organic. 

 HN force. 

 Contract. 

 Casualties (friendly and enemy) sustained and disposition of bodies of those killed in action. 

 Friendly contacts established, to include descriptions, locations, circumstances, and results. 

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY 

 Geographic name, Universal Transverse Mercator or geographic coordinates, and locations. 

 Boundaries (north, south, east, and west). 

 Distance and direction to nearest major cultural feature. 

 Terrain. 

 What type of terrain is dominant in this area? 

 What natural and cultivated vegetation is present in the area? 

 What is the density and disposition of natural vegetation? 

 What is the approximate degree of slope? 

 What natural obstacles to movement were observed, and what are their locations? 

 What natural or man-made obstacles to media or humanitarian distribution are there? 

 What natural or man-made drainage features are in the area? 

 Direction of flow. 

 Speed. 

 Depth. 

 Type of bed. 

 What is the physical layout of rural and urban settlements? 

 What is the layout of various houses within the area? 

 What is the description of any potential landing zones or drop zones? 

 What is the description of any beach landing sites, if applicable? 

 What are the descriptions of any areas suitable for cache sites, and what are their locations? 

 People. 

 What major ethnic groups or tribes populate each area? 

 What was (or is) their attitude toward other ethnic groups or tribes in the area? 

 What are the principal religion(s) of the area, and how are they practiced? 

o Main, secondary, etc. status. 

o Influence on people. 

o Influence or control on political or judicial processes. 

o Religious prayer times, regular observed days, and holidays. 

o Constraints, laws, and taboos. 

o Conflicts in or between religions, denominations, or sects. 

o Religious themes, symbology, and allegory or folklore. 

o View on conflict and martyrdom. 

 What is the description of the average citizen of the area (height, weight, hair color, characteristics)? 

o Is there a physically differentiated minority? 

o Is there a minority differentiated by other visual cues such as dress or hairstyle? 

 What type clothing, footwear, ornaments, and jewelry do they wear? 

 Is symbolism or status attached to certain items of jewelry or ornaments? 

 What are the local traditions, customs, and practices? 

o Between males and females? 

o Between young and old? 

Figure VI-8. Post Mission Debriefing Guide 
Chapter VI 

VI-48 JP 3-22 

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY (continued)

o Toward marriage, birth, and death? 

o Between the populace and local officials? 

 What is the ordinary diet of the people? 

o Self-imposed restrictions. 

o Chronic dietary deficiencies. 

o Cyclic, seasonal, or localized deficiencies. 

 What was the attitude of the populace toward US and HN forces? 

o Friendly target groups or specific target audiences (TAs). 

o Neutral or uncommitted target groups or specific TAs. 

o Hostile target groups or specific TAs. 

o Specific behavioral changes noted. 

o Anecdotal occurrences or spontaneous events during current deployment. 

 What was the general feeling and attitude of the populace and the HN troops toward the government and leaders, 

government policies, and general conditions within the country? 

 How did the populace cooperate with US Government (USG) elements? 

 What is the approximate wage and economic status of the average citizen? 

 What formal and informal educational practices were observed? 

o Internal threat interference. 

o Internal threat sponsorship. 

 What is the state of health and well-being of the people in this area? 

 Did the populace in this area speak the national language differently from others in the country? If so, how? 

 What percentage of the populace and the indigenous forces speak English or other foreign languages? 

 Did any member of the populace approach or ask questions about US presence or the mission? If so, describe in 

detail. Give names, if possible. 

POLITICAL PARTIES (Major, Minor, or Illegal Parties)

 Targeted by HN or US. 

 For Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) support or as FID target. 

 Lethal, nonlethal, or both. 

 Fundamental ideology. 

 Authoritarian or elitist. Populist or democratic. 

 Secular, theocratic, or mixed. 

 Attitude toward HN government. 

 Attitude toward USG. 

 Leaders. 

 Key communicators. 

 Willing or unwilling to support psychological operations (PSYOP) program. 

 Effectiveness as spoiler or antigovernment/anti-US firebrand. 

 Policies. 

 Influence on government. 

 Influence on the people. 

 Peaceful/cooperative or militant/front group. 

 Cooperative with PSYOP program. 

 Used in PSYOP series targeting another TA(s). 

 Overall effectiveness. 

 Percentage of electorate: claimed vs. actual turnout. 

 Money, real influence, covert influence, spoiler, etc. 

 Foreign influence. 

 Ethnic and/or ideological. 

 Regional or international. 

 Stability, strength, and weaknesses. 

Figure VI-8. Post Mission Debriefing Guide (continued) 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-49 

MILITARY

 Friendly forces. 

 Disposition. 

 Composition, identification, and strength. 

 Organization, armament, and equipment. 

 Degree of training and combat effectiveness. 

 Morale: general and specific: 

 General psychological strengths and weaknesses. 

 Degree of stratification—number of TAs. 

 Psychological vulnerabilities/susceptibilities. 

 Targeted by HN and/or US PSYOP—effectiveness. 

 Targeted by internal threat/foreign propaganda—effectiveness. 

 Mission. 

 Leadership and capabilities of officers and noncommissioned officers compared with those of the United States. 

 Logistics. 

 Maintenance problems with weapons and equipment. 

 Methods of resupply and their effectiveness. 

 General relationship between HN military forces, the populace, and other forces (paramilitary, police, etc.). 

 Influence on local populace. 

 Credibility. 

 Lingering effects of past bad acts/incompetence. 

 Anecdotal or empirical evidence of improvement(s). 

 Leaders or rank and file as used as key communicators/disseminators. 

 Significant operations and/or PSYOP actions with outcomes. 

 Recommendation for these forces (military and/or paramilitary) for unconventional warfare contact. 

INSURGENT OR OTHER INTERNAL DEFENSE THREAT FORCES*

 Disposition. 

 Composition, identification, and strength. 

 Organization, armament, and equipment. 

 Degree of training, morale, and combat effectiveness. 

 Mission. 

 Leadership capabilities. 

 Logistics. 

 Maintenance problems with weapons and equipment. 

 Method of resupply and its effectiveness. 

 Psychological strengths and weaknesses. 

 Relationship between insurgent forces, joint force units, and the populace. 

 Influence on local populace. 

POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES (Friendly and Adversary)*

 Disposition, strengths, and location. 

 Organization, armament, and equipment. 

 Logistics. 

 Motivation, reliability, and degree of training. 

 Psychological strengths and weaknesses. 

 Relationship with the government and local populace. 

Figure VI-8. Post Mission Debriefing Guide (continued) 
Chapter VI 

VI-50 JP 3-22 

AUXILIARY AND UNDERGROUND (Friendly and Adversary) *

 Disposition, strength, and degree of organization. 

 Morale and general effectiveness. 

 Motivation and reliability. 

 Support. 

 Logistics. 

 Intelligence. 

* Combined in example for brevity. Should be covered separately. 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

Describe the area:

 Rail system. 

 General route. 

 Importance to the local and general area. 

 Bridges, tunnels, curves, and steep grades. 

 Bypass possibilities. 

 Key junctions, switching points, and power sources. 

 Location of maintenance crews who keep the system operational during periods of large-scale interdiction. 

 Security. 

 Telecommunications system. 

 Location and description of routes, lines, and cables. 

 Location of power sources. 

 Location and capacity of switchboards. 

 Critical points. 

 Importance to the local general area. 

 Capabilities of maintenance crews to keep the system operating at a minimum. 

 Security. 

 Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) storage and processing facilities. 

 Location. 

 Capacity of storage facilities. 

 Equipment used for the production of POL. 

 Power source. 

 Types and quantities of POL manufactured. 

 Methods of transportation and distribution. 

o Rail. 

o Truck. 

o Ship. 

o Air. 

 Pipeline routes and pumping station capacities. 

 Security. 

 Electrical power system. 

 Location and description of power stations. 

 Principal power lines and transformers. 

 Location of maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction time. 

 Critical points. 

 Capacity (kilowatts). 

 Principal users. 

 Security. 

 Military installations and depots. 

 Size. 

 Activity. 

 Location. 

 Units. 

 Equipment. 

Figure VI-8. Post Mission Debriefing Guide (continued) 
Foreign Internal Defense Operations 

VI-51 

TARGETS 

Describe the area: 

 Reaction time. 

 Security. 

 Highway and road system. 

 Name and number. 

 Type of surface, width, and condition. 

 Location of bridges, tunnels, curves, and steep grades. 

 Bypass possibilities. 

 Traffic density. 

 Location of maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction time. 

 Security. 

 Inland waterways and canals. 

 Name and number. 

 Width, depth, and type of bed. 

 Direction and speed of flow. 

 Location of dams and locks, their power source, and other traffic obstructions. 

 Location and descriptions of administrative, control, maintenance crew, facilities, and reaction crew. 

 Location and description of navigational aids. 

 Natural and synthetic gas system. 

 Location and capacity of wells and pipelines. 

 Storage facilities and capacity. 

 Critical points. 

 Maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction time. 

 Principal users. 

 Security. 

 Industrial facilities. 

 Capabilities of plants to convert their facilities in wartime to the production of essential military materials. 

 Type of facilities. 

 Power sources. 

 Locations. 

 Sources of raw materials. 

 Number of employees. 

 Disposition of products. 

 General working conditions. 

 Critical points. 

 Security. 

 PSYOP actions. 

 Restricted targets for cultural, infrastructural, or psychological value. 

 Targets requiring nonlethal action. 

HEALTH AND SANITATION

 To what degree does hunting and fishing contribute to the local diet? 

 What cash crops are raised in the area? 

 What domestic and wild animals are present? 

 What animal diseases are present? 

 What is the availability and quality of water in populated and unpopulated areas? 

 What systems are used for sewage disposal? 

 What sanitation practices were observed in the populated and unpopulated areas? 

 What are the most common human illnesses and how are they controlled? 

 What basic health services are available in populated and unpopulated areas? 

Figure VI-8. Post Mission Debriefing Guide (continued) 
Chapter VI 

VI-52 JP 3-22 

EVASION AND RECOVERY

 From which element of the populace is assistance most likely? 

 What, if any, safe houses or areas for evasion and resistance purposes can be recommended? 

 What type shelters were used? 

 Were fires small and smokeless? 

 Were shelters adequate? 

 Was food properly prepared? 

 Were campsites well chosen? 

 Were campsites and trails sterilized after movement to a new one? 

 HN/US PSYOP support to evasion and resistance? 

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS (CAO)

 Has the end state been achieved for CAO supporting civil-military operations (CMO)? 

 HN transition plan. 

 Has coordination for handoff been conducted with appropriate commands, agencies, and other organizations? 

 If no, remaining benchmarks. 

 Have the underlying causes of the conflict been ameliorated? 

 To what degree? 

 If still existing, how do they influence future planning? 

 What arrangements have been made with other organizations to accomplish remaining civil affairs (CA) activities? 

 New humanitarian, governmental, and infrastructure assistance requirements during current deployment. 

 Will any ongoing operations (for example, engineer projects) be discontinued or interrupted? 

 CA functional specialists that remain behind and residual requirements for each: 

 Rule of law. 

 Economic stability. 

 Infrastructure. 

 Governance. 

 Public education and information. 

 Public health and welfare. 

 Who will support CA forces that remain behind? 

MISCELLANEOUS

 Weather. 

 Wind speed and direction. 

 Temperature. 

 Effect on personnel, equipment, and operations. 

Figure VI-8. Post Mission Debriefing Guide (continued) 
A-1 

APPENDIX A 

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 

1. Overview 

Unless otherwise stated, the conditions stated in this appendix apply to FID and SFA. 

Law and policy govern the actions of the US forces in all military operations, including 

SFA and FID. For US forces to conduct operations, a legal basis must exist. This legal 

basis profoundly influences many aspects of the operation. It affects the ROE, how US 

forces organize and train foreign forces, the authority to spend funds to benefit the HN, 

and the authority of US forces to detain and interrogate. The President is Commander in 

Chief of the US forces. Therefore, orders issued by the President or SecDef to a CCDR 

provide the starting point in determining the legal basis. Laws are legislation passed by 

Congress and signed into law by the President, as well as treaties to which the US is 

party. Policies are executive orders, departmental directives and regulations, and other 

authoritative statements issued by government officials. No summary provided here can 

replace a consultation with the unit’s supporting staff judge advocate (SJA). This 

appendix summarizes some of the laws and policies that bear upon US military 

operations in support of SFA and FID. 

2. Legal Authority for Security Force Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense 

 Without a deployment or execution order from the President or SecDef, US forces 

may be authorized to make only limited contributions during operations that involve FID. 

If the Secretary of State requests and SecDef approves, US forces can participate in FID. 

The request and approval may go through standing statutory authorities in Title 22, USC. 

Among other programs, Title 22, USC, contains the FAA and the AECA. Programs 

under Title 22, USC, authorize SA, developmental assistance, and other forms of aid. 

The request and approval might also occur under various provisions in Title 10, USC. 

Title 10, USC, authorizes certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, 

exercises, and limited forms of HCA in coordination with the US ambassador to the HN. 

This cooperation and assistance is limited to liaison, contacts, training, equipping, and 

providing defense articles and services. It does not include direct involvement in 

operations. Assistance to police by US forces is permitted but not with DOD as the lead 

government department. 

 a. Distinguishing Sentiment, Policy, and Law. The underlying international 

sentiment as to what is acceptable behavior in conflict and war often rapidly outpaces 

formal treaty adoption and ratification. In short, the collective, largely unwritten will of a 

majority of the international community can become customary international law. In 

addition, the USG often formulates and champions this emerging law and policy. In the 

fight against terrorism, contemporary operational environment, international policy, and 

sentiment have been greatly debated among the legitimate nation-states of the world, and 

terrorist forces and sympathizers have attempted to shape and exploit that debate to their 

advantage. Joint forces conducting FID operations face similar conditions unless and 

until international law codifies terrorism, insurgency, and other forms of violent 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-22 

lawlessness. Even as such codes, laws, and conventions emerge, joint forces conducting 

FID operations will likely always face disinformation and propaganda that vilifies 

legitimate military, reconstruction, and law enforcement efforts as violations of what the 

adversary will refer to as international law. 

 b. Planning Concerns 

 (1) Those planning and conducting FID operations may often need a detailed 

knowledge of international law, such as the Geneva Conventions, for two principal 

reasons. The first is to educate HN military staffs and forces. The second is to counter 

very specific points of adversary disinformation and propaganda. Advisors and trainers 

may have to build either a knowledge base on international law in HN military personnel 

or an adherence to portions that the HN military has routinely ignored in the past. In 

addition, this may carry over to transgressions of their own HN laws or building 

acceptance of new HN laws safeguarding civil liberties. Basic human rights also include 

other rights, such as the right of free speech, freedom of worship, and freedom of the 

press, that HN soldiers must uphold in FID operations, because of the concerns of 

international and US law. US personnel who notice suspected violations of basic human 

rights must report the facts to their chain of command. Under US law, the President must 

cut off SA to any country with a documented pattern of human rights abuses. 

 (2) Internal threat propagandists increasingly use factual, partially factual, or 

entirely fictitious violations of international law, policy, or even sentiment to discredit 

HN governments. These attempts are frequently graphic to have the maximum 

incendiary effect. They often address third countries or international agencies and may 

cite specific articles of the Geneva Conventions. Citing specific portions of the Geneva 

Conventions accomplishes two goals for them. If successful, they appear to have 

legitimate status as a state actor, and they make the HN look like a nation that ignores 

civil rights and the laws of war. FID forces must infuse an acceptance of the basic 

tenants of international law among the HN personnel they work with, advise, and train. 

3. Existing United States Law 

 a. The United States Constitution. The Constitution divides the power to wage war 

between the Executive and Legislative branches of government. Under Article I, 

Congress holds the power to declare war, to raise and support armies, to provide and 

maintain a navy, and to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying out those 

responsibilities. Balancing that legislative empowerment, Article II vests the Executive 

power in the President and makes him the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. 

This bifurcation of the war powers created an area in which the different political 

branches of government exercise concurrent authority over decisions relating to the use 

of Armed Forces overseas as an instrument of US foreign policy. 

 b. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (Article VI) states, in part, that all 

treaties made by the United States are the “supreme law of the land.” Therefore, ratified 
Legal Considerations 

A-3 

treaties, such as the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions, create legal obligations on 

US forces regarding their ability to perform various types of missions and functions. 

 c. The War Powers Resolution (WPR) of 1973. The stated purpose of the WPR is to 

ensure the “collective judgment” of both the Executive and Legislative branches in order 

to commit to the deployment of US forces by requiring consultation of and reports to 

Congress, in any of the following circumstances: 

 (1) Introduction of troops into actual hostilities. 

 (2) Introduction of troops, equipped for combat, into a foreign country, or 

greatly enlarging the number of troops, equipped for combat, in a foreign country. 

Note. The President is required to make such reports within 48 hours of the triggering 

event, detailing the circumstances necessitating introduction or enlargement of troops, the 

Constitutional or legislative authority upon which the action is based, and the estimated 

scope and duration of the deployment or combat action. Since the WPR was passed over 

the veto of President Nixon and became law, no President has either conceded the 

constitutionality of the WPR or complied fully with its mandates. 

4. International Law and Treaties 

 a. The UN Charter became effective on 24 October 1945 after being ratified by the 

US and a majority of other signatories. The UN Charter mandates that all member states 

resolve their international disputes peacefully and requires that they refrain in their 

international relations from the threat or use of force. The UN Charter also provides that 

all nations have the right to use self-defense to combat acts of aggression against them 

until such time as the Security Council shall take action. 

 b. The UN Charter provides the essential framework of authority for the use of 

force, effectively defining the foundations for a modern jus ad bellum (the law governing 

a state’s resort to force). Inherent in its principles are the requirements for necessity 

(which involves considering the exhaustion or ineffectiveness of peaceful means of 

resolution, the nature of coercion applied by the aggressor state, objectives of each party, 

and the likelihood of effective community intervention); proportionality (i.e., limiting 

force in magnitude, scope, and duration to that which is reasonably necessary to counter a 

threat or attack); and an element of timeliness (i.e., delay of a response to an attack or the 

threat of attack attenuates the immediacy of the threat and the necessity to use force in 

self-defense). 

 c. US forces obey the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts 

are characterized, and in all other military operations. The law of war is a body of 

international treaties and customs, recognized by the US as binding. It regulates the 

conduct of hostilities and protects noncombatants and civilians. The main laws of war 

protections come from the Hague and Geneva Conventions. 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-22 

 d. During SFA or FID operations, commanders must be aware of Common Article 3 

of the Geneva Conventions and the status of insurgents under the laws of the HN. 

Common Article 3 is contained in all four of the Geneva Conventions and is specifically 

intended to apply to internal armed conflicts. Common Article 3 states the following: In 

the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of 

one of the high contracting parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a 

minimum, the following provisions: 

 (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 

forces who have laid down their arms and those placed “hors de combat,” taken out of the 

fight, by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be 

treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or 

faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are 

and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the 

above-mentioned persons: 

 (a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, 

cruel treatment, and torture; 

 (b) Taking of hostages; 

 (c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 

treatment; and 

 (d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without 

previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 

guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 

 (2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial 

humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its 

services to the parties to the conflict. The parties to the conflict should further endeavor 

to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of 

the Geneva Conventions. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the 

legal status of the parties to the conflict. 

5. Application of Criminal Laws of the Host Nation 

 The final sentence of Common Article 3 makes clear that insurgents have no special 

status under international law. They are not, when captured, prisoners of war. Insurgents 

may be prosecuted as criminals for bearing arms against the government and for other 

offenses, so long as they are accorded the minimum protections described in Common 

Article 3. US forces conducting SFA should remember that the insurgents are, as a legal 

matter, criminal suspects within the legal system of the HN. Counterinsurgents must 

carefully preserve weapons, witness statements, photographs, and other evidence 

collected at the scene. This evidence will be used to process the insurgents into the legal 
Legal Considerations 

A-5 

system and thus hold them accountable for their crimes while still promoting the rule of 

law. 

6. Host Nation Law and Status-of-Forces Agreements 

 a. The military leader must be aware of and consider the impact of other bodies of 

law that impact the planning and execution phases, including HN law and any applicable 

SOFAs. 

 b. SJAs and planners must be familiar with any SOFAs or other similar agreements 

that may be applicable. In any given mission, there may be agreements short of SOFAs, 

such as diplomatic notes, on point. Relevant international documents affecting military 

operations may be difficult to locate. Several sources are available in which to locate 

applicable international agreements governing the status of US forces or affecting 

military operations. DOS publications, such as Treaties in Force, contain unclassified 

international agreements. Both the relevant combatant command’s legal office and the 

DATT or military assistance group at the embassy should also have access to host 

national or international agreements impacting the military operation. 

 c. SOFAs and other international agreements establish the legal status of military 

personnel in foreign countries. Topics that are usually covered in a SOFA include 

criminal and civil jurisdiction, taxation, and claims for damages and injuries. In the 

absence of an agreement or some other arrangement with the HN, DOD personnel in 

foreign countries may be subject to HN laws. It is essential that all personnel understand 

status of US forces in the area of operations and are trained accordingly. 

7. Legal Constraints on the Security Force Assistance and Foreign Internal 

Defense Mission 

 US law, regulations, and policy play a key role in establishing the parameters by 

which military forces may conduct SFA and FID missions. These factors tend to 

constitute constraints on the activities of military units. They range from the ROE in 

combat situations to the ability to spend government funds for a training or support 

mission. 

8. General Prohibition on Assistance to Police 

 Usually, DOD is not the lead government department for assisting foreign 

governments. DOS is the lead when US forces provide SA—military training, 

equipment, and defense articles and services—to HN military forces. The FAA 

specifically prohibits assistance to foreign police forces except within specific exceptions 

and under a Presidential directive. When providing assistance to training, the DOS’s INL 

provides the lead role in police assistance. The President, however, may delegate this 

role to other agencies. 
Appendix A 

A-6 JP 3-22 

9. Training and Equipping Foreign Forces 

 All training and equipping of FSF must be specifically authorized. US laws require 

Congress to authorize expenditures for training and equipping foreign forces. US law 

also requires DOS to verify that the HN receiving the assistance does not commit gross 

violations of human rights. Usually, DOD involvement is limited to a precise level of 

man hours and materiel requested by DOS under the FAA. The President may authorize 

deployed US forces to train or advise HN security forces as part of the mission. In this 

case, DOD personnel, operations, and maintenance appropriations provide an incidental 

benefit to those security forces. All other weapons, training, equipment, logistic support, 

supplies, and services provided to foreign forces by DOD are paid for with funds 

appropriated by Congress for that purpose. Moreover, the President gives specific 

authority to DOD for its role in such “train and equip” efforts. Absent such a directive, 

DOD lacks authority to take the lead in assisting an HN in training and equipping its 

security forces. 

10. Rules of Engagement 

 ROE are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the 

circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat 

engagement with opposing forces. Often these directives are specific to the operation. If 

there are no operation-specific ROE, US forces apply SROE. When working with a 

multinational force, commanders must coordinate the ROE thoroughly. 

11. Fiscal Law Considerations 

 a. In SFA or FID missions, like all operations, commanders require specific 

authority to expend funds. This authority is normally found in the DOD Appropriations 

Act. As a general rule, O&M funds may not be used for SFA or FID missions. Congress 

may appropriate additional funds to commanders for the specific purpose of conducting 

more complex stability operations that are not typically covered by O&M. Examples 

include the commander’s emergency response program, the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund, Iraq Freedom Fund, and Commander’s Humanitarian Relief and 

Reconstruction. 

 b. The legal authority for DOS to conduct foreign assistance is found in the FAA, 

Title 22, USC, Section 2151. 

 c. There are two exceptions to the general rule requiring the use of Title 22, USC, 

funds for foreign assistance: 

 (1) Interoperability, Safety, and Familiarization Training. DOD may fund the 

training (as opposed to goods and services) of foreign militaries with O&M dollars only 

when the purpose of the training is to enhance the interoperability, familiarization, and 

safety training. O&M funds may not be used for SA training. This exception applies 

only to interoperability training. 
Legal Considerations 

A-7 

 (2) Congressional Appropriation and Authorization to Conduct Foreign 

Assistance. DOD may fund foreign assistance operations if Congress has provided a 

specific appropriation and authorization to execute the mission. 

 d. The “Leahy Amendment” contains additional constraints on government funding 

of SFA/FID missions. The law, first enacted in the 1997 Foreign Operations 

Appropriations Act (the annual DOS appropriations act), prohibits the USG from 

providing funds to the security forces of a foreign country if DOS has credible evidence 

that the foreign country or its agents have committed gross violations of human rights, 

unless the Secretary of State determines and reports that the government of such country 

is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces to 

justice. 

 e. Congress specifically appropriates funds for foreign assistance. USAID expends 

such funds under the legal authorities in Title 22, USC. In addition, provisions of Title 

10, USC, authorize small amounts of funds to be appropriated annually for commanders 

to provide humanitarian relief, disaster relief, or civic assistance in conjunction with 

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES 

In January 2002, Joint Task Force (JTF) 510 made up in large part by 

special operations forces personnel deployed to the southern Philippines 

to assist the Republic of the Philippines (RP) government in the 

destruction of the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group. The initiation of Operation 

ENDURING FREEDOM-Philippines was only accomplished after 

considerable debate within the RP government and in the national press. 

The issue was debated on a constitutional level as the RP constitution 

banned foreign soldiers on Philippine soil except in time of war. Despite 

the ardent support of President Corazon Aquino and much of the 

government and with widespread public support, there was still 

considerable opposition to the presence of US troops. An eventual 

compromise had operational effects on JTF 510. A cap was placed on the 

number of US troops who could deploy, and troops were prohibited from 

conducting anything other than self-defense. Supplemental 

understandings to existing agreements were necessary. 

Early in the operation, political sensitivities among the populace were 

challenged when US personnel using an automated teller machine outside 

their base in Zamboanga City, Mindanao, in uniform and carrying 

weapons were photographed by the Philippine media. Further restrictions 

on US personnel were necessary to placate those politically opposed to 

the US presence. A culturally attuned approach allowed JTF 510 to assist 

and advise the Armed Forces of the Philippines in early tactical and 

operational successes against the Abu Sayyaf Group. Slowly, an 

expansion of the role of US forces, to include combined civil affairs 

operations, was possible because of early sensitivity to the host nation’s 

laws and political realities. 

Various Sources 
Appendix A 

A-8 JP 3-22 

military operations. These standing authorities are narrowly defined and generally 

require significant advance coordination within DOD and DOS. 

 f. The Coast Guard is specifically authorized to assist other federal agencies in the 

performance of any activity for which the Coast Guard is especially qualified. As a 

Service, the Coast Guard has very limited organic legislative authority to unilaterally 

provide training and technical assistance to foreign countries. With few exceptions, the 

Coast Guard is generally a service provider to other USG funding agencies whose 

international engagement authorities convey to the Coast Guard with the transfer of 

funding, for the specific mission. In accordance with the Economy Act, Title 31, USC, 

Section 1535, the costs incurred by the Coast Guard while delivering international 

training and technical assistance are reimbursable whenever the training/assistance is 

funded by or through another USG or foreign government agency. 
Legal Considerations 

A-9 

KEY SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 

FUNDING PROGRAMS 

The following programs have funds appropriated by Congress to allow the 

Department of State (DOS) to conduct its foreign assistance mission: 

 Foreign Military Financing Program 

 International Military Education and Training Program 

 Economic Support Fund 

 Peacekeeping Operations 

 Antiterrorism Assistance 

 Global Humanitarian Demining 

 Refugee Assistance 

 Personnel Details 

The following programs are administered by DOS, but do not have funds 

appropriated to sustain them: 

 Foreign Military Sales Program 

 Foreign Military Lease Program 

 Economy Act Security Assistance 

 United States Government Commodities and Services Program 

 Direct Commercial Sales Program 

There are additional special programs created by law to assist in the foreign 

assistance mission. These programs include: 

 Excess Defense Articles 

 Presidential Drawdowns 

DOS directly, or indirectly through the United States Agency for International 

Development, finances numerous development assistance programs to address 

the following needs: 

 Agriculture and Nutrition 

 Population Control 

 Health 

 Education 

 Energy 

 Environment Improvement 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). CERP is an example of a 

targeted humanitarian assistance fund program. CERP’s primary purpose is “[to 

enable] military commanders in Iraq [and Afghanistan] to respond to urgent 

humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their area of 

responsibility by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi [and 

Afghan] people.” CERP was originally funded with seized Iraqi assets, but 

Congress later appropriated US funds for the purpose. CERP is a program 

established to assist in missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is not applicable to 

missions outside of those countries. Future missions, though, may have similar 

funding sources established to facilitate a humanitarian assistance mission. 

Consult with the servicing judge advocate to determine the availability of funding. 
Appendix A 

A-10 JP 3-22 

Intentionally Blank 
B-1 

APPENDIX B 

JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL 

ENVIRONMENT TO SUPPORT FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE 

1. Introduction 

a. JIPOE is the analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce 

intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the 

JFC’s decision-making process. 

b. JIPOE is a four-step process that defines the total operational environment, 

describes the impact of the operational environment, evaluates the adversary, and 

determines and describes adversary potential COAs. 

For further information on the four-step process for JIPOE, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint 

Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

c. JIPOE for FID, like any operation, is accomplished through a mix of analysis 

utilizing all the intelligence disciplines. JIPOE utilizes seven intelligence disciplines, 

namely, GEOINT, HUMINT, signals intelligence, measurement and signature 

intelligence, open-source intelligence (OSINT), technical intelligence, and CI. The 

primary purpose of JIPOE is to support joint operation planning, execution, and 

assessment by identifying, analyzing, and assessing the adversary’s centers of gravity, 

critical vulnerabilities, capabilities, decisive points, limitations, intentions, COAs, and 

reactions to friendly operations based on a holistic view of the operational environment. 

The goal is to gain a solid understanding of internal factors as well as regional factors. 

Accordingly, JIPOE for FID is divided into five categories: OAE, geographic analysis, 

population analysis, climatology analysis, and threat evaluation. 

2. Operational Area Evaluation 

a. The JIPOE to support FID begins with a broad OAE, which covers the JFC’s 

operational area. During this phase, data is collected to satisfy basic IRs in the following 

areas: political, military, economic, religious, social, endemic diseases and health status 

of the population, geographic, psychological, cultural, friendly forces, threat forces, and 

nonbelligerent third party forces. Data is collected with respect to the specific 

operational area and mission and considers all instruments of national power from a 

strategic perspective. Of particular interest during this stage is the evaluation of the 

PSYOP and CMO estimate. 

b. The PSYOP OAE is initially composed of special PSYOP studies and special 

PSYOP assessments. These studies identify psychological vulnerabilities, characteristics, 

insights, and opportunities that exist in the operational area. Analysts doing PSYOP 

OAE also focus on, but do not limit themselves to, identifying: 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-22 

(1) The ethnic, racial, social, economic, religious, and linguistic groups of the 

area and their locations and densities. 

(2) Key leaders and communicators in the area, both formal (such as politicians 

and government officials) and informal (such as businessmen, clergy, or tribal leaders). 

(3) Cohesive and divisive issues within a community; as examples, what makes 

it a community, what would split the community, and what are the attitudes toward the 

HN. 

(4) Literacy rates and levels of education. 

(5) Types of media consumed by the community and the level of credibility 

each is perceived to carry within the community and/or segments within society. 

(6) Any concentrations of third country nationals in the operational area and 

their purposes and functions. 

(7) Scientific and technical developments, production, and trade, including 

significant trade agreements, restrictions, and sanctions, or lack thereof. 

(8) The use of natural resources, industry, and agriculture, and destruction or 

exploitation of the environment. 

(9) Location, type, and quantity of toxic industrial material. 

c. In the course of OAE, the PSYOP planners coordinate with the military PA 

office, the cultural officer, and PA staff within the country team to prepare a matrix 

identifying groups, their leaders, preferred media, and key issues that should be 

developed. Target groups are identified. The locations of mass media facilities in the 

area that can be used for the dissemination of PSYOP products, and the identification of 

their operational characteristics, are also important in the selection of the proper outlet for 

these products. In particular, the PSYOP planner must evaluate: 

(1) Studios and transmitters for radio and television and their operational 

characteristics (wattage, frequency, and programming). 

(2) Heavy and light printing facilities, including locations, types, and capacities 

of equipment that can supplement the capabilities of PSYOP units. 

(3) Accessibility of such facilities to PSYOP forces; as examples, who controls 

them and whether they will cooperate with the United States. 

d. CMO OAE in FID is composed of an evaluation of HN civic action programs, 

populace and resource control, civilian labor, and materiel procurement. Operational 

concerns may expand the evaluation to a CMO estimate. The CMO planner also 
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment to Support Foreign Internal Defense 

B-3 

evaluates future sites and programs for civic action undertaken in the operational area by 

the HN unilaterally or with US support through CMO. In making this evaluation, the 

planner often relies primarily on the local and regional assets of the HN and the 

supported command to get an accurate feel for the lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, 

or other related FID threats that may exist in the area. 

3. Geographic Analysis 

a. The next JIPOE category to support FID is the geographic analysis, which 

considers a wide range of factors that include the political, military, economic, religious, 

social, psychological, and cultural significance of the area. Although not relying 

exclusively on the two disciplines of GEOINT and OSINT, the geographic analysis 

accomplished during the JIPOE for a FID operation relies heavily on these two 

disciplines. The three components of GEOINT, namely imagery, imagery intelligence, 

and geospatial information, provide the whole of data (or nearly so) on some of the six 

overlays for FID geographic analysis, such as the cover and concealment overlay, and 

portions of data for other overlays, such as the logistics sustainment overlay. Similarly, 

the incident overlay may rely heavily on OSINT data. 

b. Normally, the six map overlays described below are a result of the geographic 

analysis. 

(1) Population Status Overlay. The generic population status overlay 

graphically represents the sectors of the population that are pro-government, antigovernment, pro-threat, anti-threat, and uncommitted or neutral. This overlay is 

important because the population can provide support and security to friendly or threat 

forces. This graphic may also display educational, religious, ethnic, or economic aspects 

of the population. A more refined product in an urban environment displays the home 

and work places of key friendly and threat military or civilian personnel and their 

relatives. In this instance, large-scale maps and/or imagery are used to conveniently plot 

information by marking rooftops of buildings, although care must be taken to derive 

coordinates only from non-displaced ground footprints of buildings. Such a refined 

product should be cross-referenced to order of battle (ORBAT) files that are analogous to 

the represented data such as personality files and/or faction and organization files. 

(2) Cover and Concealment Overlay. The cover and concealment overlay 

graphically depicts the availability, density, type, and location of cover and concealment 

from the ground as well as from the air. In areas of significant threat of aerial attack or 

observation, overhead cover and concealment may be important considerations for threat 

selection of base camps, mission support sites, drug laboratories, or other adversary areas. 

Surface configuration primarily determines cover, including natural and man-made 

features such as mines, bunkers, tunnels, and fighting positions. Vegetation is the 

primary feature that provides concealment. The canopy closure overlay is critical for the 

determination of areas that offer concealment from aerial observation, particularly in 

tropical rain forests, and is incorporated into the cover and concealment overlay for rural 

and other forested areas. In built-up areas, man-made structures are also assessed for the 
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 3-22 

cover and concealment they offer. When used with the population status overlay, the 

cover and concealment overlay can be used to determine dwelling and work places, safe 

houses, routes of movement, and meeting places. 

(3) Logistics Sustainability Overlay. Logistics is essential to friendly and 

threat operations. The detection and location of supply lines and bases are critical to 

finding and defeating hostile activities. Attention is given to basic food, water, medicine, 

and materiel supply. In rural areas, the logistics sustainability overlay depicts potable 

water supplies, farms, orchards, growing seasons, and other relevant items. In built-up 

areas, this overlay depicts supermarkets, food warehouses, pharmacies, hospitals, clinics, 

and residences of doctors and other key medical personnel. Key to preparing this overlay 

is knowledge of threat and friendly forces, their logistic requirements, and the availability 

and location of materiel and personnel to meet these requirements. 

(4) Target Overlay. The target overlay graphically portrays the location of 

possible threat targets within the area. In FID environments, this overlay depicts banks, 

bridges, electric power installations, bulk petroleum and chemical facilities, military and 

government facilities, the residences and work places of key friendly personnel, and other 

specific points most susceptible to attack based on threat capabilities and intentions. 

Hazard estimates are prepared for those targets with collateral damage potential. For 

example, the threat to a large airbase may focus on airframes, crew billets, and petroleum, 

oils, and lubricants storage as opposed to runways, aprons, or the control tower. The 

target overlay is significant to the friendly commander’s defensive planning because it 

shows where defenses need to be concentrated and, conversely, where defenses can be 

diffused. It also provides CI personnel with a focus for indicators of threat preparation to 

attack; for example, to discover an indigenous worker pacing off the distances between 

perimeter fences and critical nodes. The target overlay is useful in disaster relief 

operations by identifying likely locations for rioting, pilfering, looting, or areas of 

potential collateral damage. 

(5) Line of Communications Overlay. The LOC overlay highlights 

transportation systems and nodes within the area such as railways, roads, trails, navigable 

waterways, ports, airfields, drop zones (DZs), and landing zones (LZs). In urban 

environments, mass public transit routes and schedules, as well as underground sewage, 

drainage and utility tunnels, ditches and culverts, and large open areas that could be used 

for DZs and LZs are also shown. Where applicable, this overlay will also show seasonal 

variations. Care is taken to compare recent imagery and geospatial information to ensure 

that new LOCs are added to the final product. In many situations, LOC products will be 

readily available from the HN or other local sources. 

(6) Incident Overlay. The incident overlay plots security related incidents by 

type and location. Clusters of similar incidents represent a geographic pattern of activity. 

These incidents can then be further analyzed for time patterns, proximity to population 

grouping, LOCs, targets, and areas of cover and concealment. This analysis assists in the 

day-to-day application of security resources. 
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment to Support Foreign Internal Defense 

B-5 

c. PSYOP and CMO considerations also impact the geographic analysis as described 

below. 

(1) PSYOP considerations in a geographic analysis focus on how geography 

affects the population of the area and the dissemination of PSYOP products. This step 

may include, for example, preparation of a radio line of sight (LOS) overlay for radio and 

television stations derived from an obstacle overlay depicting elevations and LOS 

information. PSYOP terrain analysis will, for example, focus on determining the 

respective ranges and audibility of signals from the most significant broadcast stations 

identified during OAE and locations for cellular communication towers/stations. 

(2) CMO considerations in geographic analysis include the identification of 

critical government, insurgent, and terrorist threats and other threats to food and water 

storage facilities, toxic industrial material sites, resupply routes, and base locations. In 

addition, a primary consideration in FID is how terrain affects the ability of US and HN 

forces to conduct CMO. For example, extremely rugged or thickly vegetated areas may 

be unsuited to some CMO projects because of inaccessibility to the necessary manpower 

and equipment needed to initiate such projects. 

4. Population Analysis 

a. In FID, the local population is the key element to successful operations. The 

CMO planner in conjunction with assigned, attached, or supporting CA forces, is a 

critical contributor to this element of JIPOE. Elements of the CMO OAE provide the 

basis for this analysis, as well as CA area study and assessments previously created or 

created in support of the mission. During this analysis, the planner identifies, evaluates, 

and makes overlays and other products as appropriate for the following factors: social 

organization; economic organization and dynamics; political organization and dynamics; 

history of the society; nature of the insurgency (if applicable); nature of the government; 

effects on nonbelligerents; and COAs of the insurgents, the HN government, and 

nonbelligerents. 

b. In evaluating social organization, planners look at: 

(1) Density and distribution of population by groups, balance between urban 

and rural groups, sparsely populated areas, and concentrations of primary racial, 

linguistic, religious, or cultural groups. 

(2) Race, religion, national origin, tribe, economic class, political party and 

affiliation, ideology, education level, union memberships, management class, occupation, 

and age of the populace. 

(3) Overlaps among classes and splits within them; such as the number and 

types of religious and racial groups to which union members belong and ideological 

divisions within a profession. 
Appendix B 

B-6 JP 3-22 

(4) Composite groups based on their political behavior and the component and 

composite strengths of each; that is, those who actively or passively support the 

government or the threat, and those who are neutral. 

(5) Active or potential issues motivating the political, economic, social, or 

military behavior of each group and subgroup. 

(6) Population growth or decline, age distribution, and changes in location by 

groups. 

(7) Finally, planners perform a factor analysis to determine which activities and 

programs accommodate the goals of most of the politically and socially active groups. 

Then they determine which groups and composite groups support, are inclined to support, 

or remain neutral toward the government. 

c. In evaluating economic organization and performance, planners specifically look 

at: 

(1) The principal economic ideology of the society and local innovations or 

adaptations in the operational area. 

(2) The economic infrastructure such as resource locations, scientific and 

technical capabilities, electric power production and distribution, transport facilities, and 

communications networks. 

(3) Economic performance such as gross national product, gross domestic 

product, foreign trade balance, per capita income, inflation rate, and annual growth rate. 

(4) Major industries and their sustainability including the depth and soundness 

of the economic base, maximum peak production levels and duration, and storage 

capacity. 

(5) Performance of productive segments such as public and private ownership 

patterns, concentration and dispersal, and distribution of wealth in agriculture, 

manufacturing, forestry, information, professional services, mining, and transportation. 

(6) Public health factors that include, but are not limited to, birth and death 

rates, diet and nutrition, water supply, sanitation, health care availability, endemic 

diseases, health of farm animals, and availability of veterinary services. 

(7) Foreign trade patterns such as domestic and foreign indebtedness (public 

and private) and resource dependencies. 

(8) Availability of education including access by individuals and groups, 

sufficiency for individual needs; groupings by scientific technical, professional, liberal 

arts, and crafts training; and surpluses and shortages of skills. 
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment to Support Foreign Internal Defense 

B-7 

(9) Unemployment, underemployment, and exclusion of groups, as well as 

horizontal and vertical career mobility. 

(10) Taxing authorities, rates, and rate determination. 

(11) Economic benefit and distribution, occurrence of poverty, and 

concentration of wealth. 

(12) Population shifts and their causes and effects; as examples, rural to urban, 

agriculture to manufacturing, and manufacturing to service. 

(13) Finally, planners identify economic program values and resources that 

might generate favorable support, stabilize neutral groups, or neutralize threat groups. 

d. In evaluating political organization and dynamics, planners specifically look at: 

(1) The formal political structure of the government and the sources of its 

power; that is, pluralist democracy based on the consensus of the voters or strong man 

rule supported by the military. 

(2) The informal political structure of the government and its comparison with 

the formal structure; that is, is the government nominally a democracy but in reality a 

political dictatorship? 

(3) Legal and illegal political parties and their programs, strengths, and 

prospects for success. Also, the prospects for partnerships and coalitions between the 

parties. 

(4) Nonparty political organizations, motivating issues, strengths, and parties or 

programs they support such as political action groups. 

(5) Nonpolitical interest groups and the correlation of their interests with 

political parties or nonparty organizations such as churches, cultural and professional 

organizations, and unions. 

(6) The mechanism for government succession, the integrity of the process, 

roles of the populace and those in power, regularity of elections, systematic exclusion of 

identifiable groups, voting blocs, and patron-client determinants of voting. 

(7) Independence or subordination and effectiveness of the judiciary. That is, 

does the judiciary have the power of legislative and executive review? Does the judiciary 

support constitutionally guaranteed rights and international concepts of human rights? 

(8) Independence or control of the press and other mass media and the 

alternatives for the dissemination of information and opinion. 
Appendix B 

B-8 JP 3-22 

(9) Centralization or diffusion of essential decisionmaking and patterns of 

inclusion, or inclusion of specific individuals or groups in the process. 

(10) Administrative competence of the bureaucracy. Are bureaucrats 

egalitarian in practice or in words only? Can individuals and groups make their voices 

heard within the bureaucracy? 

(11) Finally, planners correlate data concerning political, economic, and social 

groups and then identify political programs to neutralize opposing groups as well as 

provide programs favorable to friendly groups. 

e. In evaluating the history of the society, planners specifically look at: 

(1) The origin of the incumbent government and its leadership. Was it elected? 

Does it have a long history? Have there been multiple peaceful successions of 

government? 

(2) The history of political violence. Is violence a common means for the 

resolution of political problems? Is there precedent for revolution, coup d’etat, 

assassination, or terrorism? Does the country have a history of consensus-building? 

Does the present insurgency have causes and aspirations in common with historic 

political violence? 

(3) Finally, the analysts determine the legitimacy of the government, acceptance 

of violent and nonviolent remedies to political problems by the populace, the type and 

level of violence to be used by friendly and threat forces, and the groups or subgroups 

that will support or oppose the use of violence. 

f. In evaluating the nature of the insurgency, planners specifically look at: 

(1) Desired end state of the insurgency, clarity of its formulation, openness of 

its articulation, commonality of point of view among the elements of the insurgency, and 

differences between this end view and the end view of the government. 

(2) Groups and subgroups supporting the general objectives of the insurgency. 

(3) Divisions, minority views, and dissension within the insurgency. 

(4) Groups that may have been deceived by the threat concerning the desired 

end state of the insurgency. 

(5) Organizational and operational patterns used by the insurgency, variations 

and combinations of such, and shifts and trends. 
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment to Support Foreign Internal Defense 

B-9 

(6) Finally, analysts determine the stage and phase of the insurgency as well as 

how far and how long it has progressed and/or regressed over time. They identify unity 

and disagreement with front groups, leadership, tactics, primary targets, doctrine, 

training, morale, discipline, operational capabilities, and materiel resources. They 

evaluate external support, to include political, financial, and logistic assistance. This 

should include not only the sources of support, but also specific means by which support 

is provided and critical points through which the HN could slow, reduce, negate, or stop 

this support. The planners determine whether rigid commitment to a method or 

ideological tenet or other factor constitutes an exploitable vulnerability and/or a weakness 

on which the government can build strength. 

g. When examining hostile groups, planners examine from hostile perspectives: 

(1) The leadership and staff structure and its psychological characteristics, 

skills, and C2 resources. 

(2) Patterns of lawless activities (as examples, illicit drug trafficking, extortion, 

piracy, and smuggling) or insurgent operations, base areas, LOCs, and supporters outside 

of the country concerned. 

(3) The intelligence, OPSEC, deception, and PSYOP capabilities of the hostile 

groups. 

(4) The appeal of the hostile groups to those who support them. 

h. In evaluating the nature of the government response, planners specifically 

examine: 

(1) General planning, or lack of planning, for countering the insurgency, 

lawlessness, or subversion being encountered as well as planning comprehensiveness and 

correctness of definitions and conclusions. 

(2) Organization and methods for strategic and operational planning and 

execution of plans such as resource requirements, constraints, and realistic priorities. 

(3) Use of population and resources and the effects on each group. 

(4) Organization, equipment, and tactical doctrine for security forces; for 

example, how the government protects its economic and political infrastructure. 

(5) Areas where the government has maintained the initiative. 

(6) Population and resource control measures. 
Appendix B 

B-10 JP 3-22 

(7) Economic development programs. 

(8) Finally, planners correlate government and insurgent strengths and 

weaknesses and identify necessary changes in friendly programs, plans, organization, and 

doctrine. 

i. In evaluating the effects on nonbelligerents, planners specifically examine: 

(1) Mechanisms for monitoring nonbelligerent attitudes and responses. 

(2) Common objectives of groups neither supporting nor opposing the 

insurgency. 

(3) Effects on the populace of government military, political, economic, and 

social operations and programs. That is, does the government often kill civilians in its 

counterthreat operations? Are benefits of government aid programs evenly distributed? 

(4) To whom is the populace inclined to provide intelligence? 

(5) Finally, planners determine the strengths and weaknesses of the 

nonbelligerents, the depth of their commitment to remain neutral, and the requirements to 

make them remain neutral and/or to support friendly or threat programs or forces. 

j. In evaluating COAs for threat forces, the government, and nonbelligerents, 

analysts balance the foregoing factors and determine likely COAs, as well as the probable 

outcomes for each element. 

5. Climatology Analysis 

 Relevant weather factors extend beyond short-term weather analysis to consideration 

of the broader and longer term climatological factors. The area’s climate, weather, and 

light conditions are analyzed to determine their effects on friendly, threat, and 

nonbelligerent third-party operations. Planners consider climate types by area and season 

and their effects on military, political, social, and economic activities. Historic weather 

data and weather effects overlays are developed during this step. The effects of weather 

and climate are integrated with terrain analysis. Special considerations are made for the 

effects of weather and climate on CMO projects, PSYOP media and dissemination, 

amounts of accessible food, storage of explosives, and population patterns such as 

seasonal employment. Examples of potential effects are periods of drought that force 

farmers to become bandits or insurgents, and flooding that causes isolation and 

interference with the distribution of food and medicine. 

6. Threat Evaluation 

a. In conducting the threat evaluation in FID, particular attention is paid to the HN 

government’s military and paramilitary police forces and the insurgent forces and 
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment to Support Foreign Internal Defense 

B-11 

infrastructure (guerrilla, auxiliary, and underground). Correlation of force evaluation in 

such environments includes a detailed analysis of the following factors for friendly, 

threat, and nonbelligerent forces: composition, strength (include number of active 

members, amount of popular support, funding method, and origin), training, equipment, 

electronics technical data, disposition (location), tactics and methods, operational 

effectiveness, weaknesses and vulnerabilities, personalities, and miscellaneous data. 

b. The FID planners determine how the friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent forces 

can use geography, offensive actions, security, surprise, and cross-country mobility to 

develop locally superior application of one or more of the instruments of national power. 

FID planners identify the strengths and weaknesses of friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent 

forces, and determine the political, social, economic, and psychological effects of each 

side’s COAs, tactics, and countertactics. Finally, the planners develop COAs that will 

optimize the application of the elements of national power by the friendly side. 

c. The PSYOP threat evaluation serves two purposes. First, it provides the 

commander with an understanding of the existing and potential opposing propaganda in 

the area. It is a safe assumption that if US forces are conducting PSYOP in an area, some 

other organization is also conducting PSYOP in the area. US PSYOP forces in the area 

must anticipate and be able to counter, if not prevent, threat propaganda directed at US 

and allied forces and the local populace. Second, the PSYOP threat evaluation provides 

the supported commander with the PSYOP consequences of US operations, and also 

provides alternative measures within each COA. To conduct an effective threat 

evaluation, the planner must determine the capabilities of threat organizations to conduct 

propaganda operations and to counteract US and allied PSYOP. (The demographics of 

any military or paramilitary threat should be evaluated at this step if they were not 

considered during OAE.) Specific capabilities to be evaluated include threat abilities to: 

(1) Conduct offensive propaganda operations targeting US or allied forces or 

the local populace. 

(2) Indoctrinate its personnel against US PSYOP efforts (defensive 

counterpropaganda). 

(3) Counteract US PSYOP efforts by exploiting weaknesses in US PSYOP 

operations (offensive counterpropaganda). 

(4) Conduct active measures. 

(5) Conduct electronic attack against US or allied PSYOP broadcasts. 

(6) Conduct electronic protection to safeguard organic PSYOP capability. 

d. The CMO threat evaluation focuses on determining the adversaries in the HN 

population. This determination is especially critical when the opponent is not a standing 

military force or when the opposing force is not equipped with standard uniforms and 
Appendix B 

B-12 JP 3-22 

weapons such as guerrillas or terrorists. These forces often blend into, or intermingle 

with, the civilian community. CMO threat evaluation identifies the threat, ORBAT, and 

modus operandi. Social, religious, and other types of fora through which threat forces 

employ the instruments of national power, as well as methods of countering such 

applications, are also identified. 
C-1 

APPENDIX C

ILLUSTRATIVE INTERAGENCY PLAN FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE 

1. Purpose 

 Illustrative interagency plans for FID accomplish the following. 

a. Employ all instruments of US national power (diplomatic, informational, military, 

economic) in support of an HN IDAD effort. 

b. Identify and sequence a checklist of taskings for each USG agency over time. 

c. Provide a mechanism for USG programs to be mutually supporting. 

d. Include clear MOEs and measures of performance working toward clearly defined 

goals. 

e. Integrate USG activities with those of HN and other interested parties. 

f. Justify future budget requirements. 

g. Establish clear criteria for transition of phases. 

h. Inform and guide agency future strategies and plans. 

i. Provide a final deconfliction of disparate or contradictory actions by individual 

agencies. 

j. Ensure all agencies communicate the same policies and strategic communication 

themes. 

2. Content 

 Because there is no set format for an illustrative interagency plan, the commander or 

lead agent for FID operations would set the form to use. The illustrative interagency plan 

would include the following components: 

a. Policy Planning Guidance. This section summarizes guidance provided by the 

President or other national security decisions pertaining to this situation. This section 

may include the guidance of the US ambassador. Limiting treaties or further policy 

guidance from HN policy makers or coalition partners (as endorsed by the President or 

the President’s designee) should be included in this section as well. 

b. United States Interests at Stake. This section states the US interests at stake 

that warrant US FID assistance. Clearly stated, transparent motives devoid of any 

unstated or hidden agendas greatly facilitate the application of the informational and 
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-22 

diplomatic instruments of national power. Examples include significant economic 

interests, reducing international criminal activities affecting US interests, and promoting 

the spread of human rights and democracy. 

c. United States Strategic Purpose. This section describes the overall purpose of 

conducting FID operations in the HN. Increasingly, the strategic purpose of FID 

transcends the borders of the HN to encompass a regional, transregional, or global 

strategic purpose. Examples include stabilizing a country for the sake of regional 

stability, countering narcoterrorism, reducing the potential for proliferation of WMD and 

the materiel, technology, and expertise necessary to create and sustain a WMD program, 

and stabilizing a country so that it does not become a haven for terrorists. 

d. Mission Statement. This section states the who, what, where, when, and why of 

a USG FID operation. Although not necessarily providing an exhaustive list of the who,

that is the agencies involved; this mission statement should be in sufficient detail to 

encompass generalities on how the instruments of national power are going to be brought 

to bear so that each agency involved in FID operations can infer its level of participation. 

A comprehensive overview is given with significant operations or known hard dates. For 

instance, the mission statement may include mention that during the FID operation 

national elections will occur on a specified date. The why of the mission statement 

should be one of the most complete and least general portions of the mission statement 

and should comply with and encapsulate US policy, interests, and strategic purpose in the 

context of the HN IDAD needs. 

e. Desired End State. This section describes the desired outcome of all FID 

assistance. The preparer should describe the end state in measurable and quantifiable 

terms rather than generalities. An example might be a situation where an HN is stabilized 

to the point that an insurgency is reduced from a national security threat to a minor law 

enforcement problem. In this case, the level of insurgents might be quantified by a 

specific number (expressed in an acceptable plus or minus range) coupled with an 

objectively verifiable metric, such as the actual number of insurgent attacks. 

f. Operational Concept. This section describes in broad terms how the USG will 

employ the instruments of national power in the FID operation. The operational concept 

is not the equivalent of a military concept of operation. The level of detail within an 

illustrative interagency plan operational concept will typically be less than in a concept of 

operation. It will instead focus on a holistic description of the interaction of the agencies 

involved in the FID operation to leverage all instruments of national power to effect 

political-military conditions in the HN. 

g. Phases. This section describes phases of USG assistance to an HN. Examples 

might be support to an HN’s transition to a new strategy, support to an HN’s operations 

to regain the initiative, support to HN offensive operations, support to HN consolidation 

of COIN gains, and rehabilitation. Each phase includes triggers or transition points for 

movement to the next phase. An alternative type of phasing could be geographical; for 

instance, pacifying the eastern three regions of a country, then the center, then the west. 
Illustrative Interagency Plan for Foreign Internal Defense 

C-3

h. Lines of Operation and Political-Military Objectives. A line of operations 

(LOO) is a logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in 

time and purpose with an objective or a physical line that defines the interior or exterior 

orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or 

decisive points related in time and space to objectives. This section describes the broad 

categories of FID activities that the USG will conduct and the objectives within each. An 

example of a LOO is support to HN security forces to enhance their capacity to deal with 

insurgency. Political-military objectives within that LOO could include training and 

equipping a counterguerrilla brigade, supplying 100 helicopters to an HN army, 

conducting intelligence cooperation, and training the HN police to defend their stations 

against guerrilla attacks. 

i. Agency Responsibilities. This section outlines the primary responsibilities of 

each USG agency involved in this FID operation. In the case of multiple agencies having 

areas of commonality, limiting or delineating points may be established. In addition, this 

section can include information on which is the lead and coordinating agency for a line of 

action that involves multiple agencies. 

j. Implementation Matrix. This section displays the political-military objectives 

for each phase in matrix form. Although there is no set format for the implementation 

matrix, all matrices must show objectives in chronological order. This is true whether the 

matrix displays hard dates or not. In this case, the matrix shows items in the order they 

will take place. 

k. Lines of Operations Annexes. Annexes contain key tasks, each with its MOE, 

measure of performance, costs, and issues for each LOO. Annexes may be broken down 

into consolidated multiagency annexes by LOO or by individual agency listing all 

relevant LOOs for that agency. 
Appendix C 

C-4 JP 3-22 

Intentionally Blank 
D-1 

APPENDIX D 

REFERENCES 

The development of JP 3-22 is based upon the following primary references. 

1. Public Laws 

a. Title 10, USC. 

b. Title 22, USC. 

2. Strategic Guidance and Policy 

a. National Security Directive Decision 38, Staffing at Diplomatic Missions and 

Their Constituent Post.

b. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1, Organization of the National 

Security Council System.

c. NSPD 8, National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating 

Terrorism.

d. NSPD 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and 

Stabilization.

e. National Security Strategy of the United States of America.

f. Guidance for Employment of the Force.

g. National Military Strategy of the United States of America.

h. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

i. National Defense Strategy.

3. Department of Defense Publications

a. DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism Protection.

b. DODD 2055.3, Manning of Security Assistance Organizations and the Selection 

and USDP Training of Security Assistance Personnel.

c. DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction Operations.

d. DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare. 
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 3-22 

e. DODD 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security 

Cooperation.

f. DODD 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign 

Governments and International Organizations.

g. DODD 5240.2, Counterintelligence.

h. DODI 2205.02, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities.

i. DODI 3020.37, Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During 

Crises.

j. DODI 5105.81, Implementing Instructions for DOD Operations at US Embassies. 

k. DOD 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual. 

l. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Guidance for Employment of 

the Force. 

m. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Guidance for Development 

of the Force. 

n. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the 

Department of Homeland Security on the Use of the US Coast Guard Capabilities and 

Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy. 

4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

b. JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations. 

c. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 

d. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

e. JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint 

Operations. 

f. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

g. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. 

h. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
References 

D-3 

i. JP 3-05, Joint Special Operations.

j. JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

k. JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations. 

l. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.

m. JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

n. JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations. 

o. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security. 

p. JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations.

q. JP 3-26, Counterterrorism. 

r. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

s. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

t. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

u. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

v. JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

w. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

x. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

y. CJCSI 3110.05C, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint 

Strategic Capabilities Plan. 

z. CJCSI 3110.05C-1, Joint Psychological Operations (Classified) Supplement to 

the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. 

aa. CJCSI 3110.12D, Civil Affairs Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities 

Plan.

bb. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of 

Force for US Forces. 

cc. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II 

(Planning Formats).
Appendix D 

D-4 JP 3-22 

5. Multi-Service Publications 

 a. FM 3-07.10 / Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-33.8A / Navy Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-07.5 / Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures 3-2.76, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Training 

Security Force Advisor Teams. 

 b. Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 1-14M, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 

(MCWP) 5-12.1, Commandant of the Coast Guard Publication P5800.7A, The 

Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. 

6. United States Army Publications 

a. FM 3-0, Operations.

b. FM 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces. 

c. FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations. 

d. FM 3-05.137, Army Special Operations Forces Foreign Internal Defense. 

e. FM 3-05.140, Army Special Operations Forces Logistics. 

f. FM 3-05.202, Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense. 

g. FM 3-05.301, Psychological Operations Process, Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures.

h. FM 3-05.302, Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures.

i. FM 3-05.401, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 

j. FM 3-07, Stability Operations. 

k. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. 

l. FM 3-24.2, Tactics for Counterinsurgency. 

m. FM 8-42, Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support 

Operations.

n. FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations.
References 

D-5 

7. United States Navy Publications 

a. Navy Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1, Naval Warfare.

b. NDP 5, Naval Planning.

c. NWP 3-05, Naval Special Warfare.

d. NWP 3-06.1, Navy Riverine and Coastal Operations.

e. NTTP 3-54.3, Operations Security.

8. United States Marine Corps Publications 

a. Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12-15, Small Wars Manual.

b. MCWP 3-33A, Counterguerrilla Operations.

c. MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency. 

d. Marine Corps Information Publication 3-33.01, Small Leader’s Guide to 

Counterinsurgency.

9. United States Air Force Publications 

a. AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare.

b. AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense. 
Appendix D 

D-6 JP 3-22 

Intentionally Blank 
E-1 

APPENDIX E

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

1. User Comments 

 Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: 

Doctrine and Education Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. 

These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and 

organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship 

 The lead agent for this publication is USSOCOM, and the Joint Staff doctrine 

sponsor for this publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5). 

3. Supersession 

 This publication supersedes JP 3-07.1, 30 April 2004, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID). 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: CDRUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//SOKF-J7-DD// 

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// 

 JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J4// 

 CDRUSJFCOM NORFOLK VA//DOC GP// 

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting 

Center, Doctrine and Education Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for 

Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/Joint Education and Doctrine 

Division via the CJCS Joint Electronic Library (JEL) at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. 

 b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change 

source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a 

proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services 

and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7 when changes to source 

documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 
Appendix E 

E-2 JP 3-22 

c. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

____________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________ 

5. Distribution of Publications 

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is 

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must 

be in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program.

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

 a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System 

at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil (SIPRNET) and on the JEL 

at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

 b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant 

commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments 

or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché 

Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Bolling AFB, 

Washington, DC 20340-5100. 

 c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the 

Joint Staff/J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. 
GL-1 

GLOSSARY 

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

AC Active Component 

ACC area coordination center 

ACSA acquisition and cross-servicing agreement 

AECA Arms Export Control Act 

AFDD Air Force doctrine document 

AFSOF Air Force special operations forces 

AOR area of responsibility 

ARSOF Army special operations forces 

ASD(SO/LIC&IC) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- 

 Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities 

AT antiterrorism 

C2 command and control 

CA civil affairs 

CAO civil affairs operations 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CCDR combatant commander 

CD counterdrug 

CDRUSSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations Command 

CF conventional forces 

CI counterintelligence 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

CISO counterintelligence support officer 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

CMO civil-military operations 

COA course of action 

COIN counterinsurgency 

COM chief of mission 

CT counterterrorism 

CTEP combined training and education plan 

CWMD combating weapons of mass destruction 

D&M detection and monitoring 

DATT defense attaché 

D/CIA Director, Central Intelligence Agency 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

DNI Director of National Intelligence 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DODI Department of Defense instruction 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-22 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DOS Department of State 

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency 

DSPD defense support to public diplomacy 

DZ drop zone 

EDA excess defense articles 

ETSS extended training service specialist 

FAA Foreign Assistance Act 

FAO foreign area officer 

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance 

FID foreign internal defense 

FM field manual (Army) 

FMF foreign military financing 

FMS foreign military sales 

FP force protection 

FPD force protection detachment 

FSF foreign security forces 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GEF Guidance for Employment of the Force 

GEOINT geospatial intelligence 

GFS global fleet station 

HCA humanitarian and civic assistance 

HN host nation 

HNS host-nation support 

HSS health service support 

HUMINT human intelligence 

IDAD internal defense and development 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

IIP Bureau of International Information Programs (DOS) 

IMET international military education and training 

INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

 (DOS) 

INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization 

IO information operations 

IR intelligence requirement 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

IW irregular warfare 

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff 

J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff 
Glossary 

GL-3 

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff 

JEL Joint Electronic Library 

JFC joint force commander 

JIACG joint interagency coordination group 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

 environment 

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

JP joint publication 

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

JSOTF joint special operations task force 

JSPS Joint Strategic Planning System 

JTF joint task force 

LOC line of communications 

LOO line of operations 

LOS line of sight 

LZ landing zone 

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force 

MARSOC Marine Corps special operations command 

MARSOF Marine Corps special operations forces 

MCA military civic action 

MCAG maritime civil affairs group 

MCMO medical civil-military operations 

MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication 

MOE measure of effectiveness 

MSOAG Marine special operations advisor group 

MTT mobile training team 

NA nation assistance 

NDS national defense strategy 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NMS National Military Strategy 

NSC National Security Council 

NSPD national security Presidential directive 

NSS National Security Strategy 

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures 

NWP Navy warfare publication 

O&M operation and maintenance 

OAE operational area evaluation 

OFDA Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance 

OGA other government agency 

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy 

OPCON operational control 

OPLAN operation plan 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-22 

OPSEC operations security 

ORBAT order of battle 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

OSINT open-source intelligence 

PA public affairs 

PAO public affairs officer 

PCS permanent change of station 

PDSS predeployment site survey 

PEP personnel exchange program 

PIR priority intelligence requirement 

PKO peacekeeping operations 

PM Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (DOS) 

PO peace operations 

POLAD political advisor 

PSYOP psychological operations 

QAT quality assurance team 

RC Reserve Component 

RDCTFP Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program 

ROE rules of engagement 

SA security assistance 

SC security cooperation 

SCO security cooperation organization 

SDO senior defense official 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SF special forces 

SFA security force assistance 

SJA staff judge advocate 

SO special operations 

SOC special operations commander 

SOF special operations forces 

SOFA status-of-forces agreement 

SROE standing rules of engagement 

TA target audience 

TAFT technical assistance field team 

TAT technical assistance team 

TCP theater campaign plan 

TDY temporary duty 

TREAS Department of the Treasury 

TSOC theater special operations command 
Glossary 

GL-5 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

USC United States Code 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USDAO United States defense attaché office 

USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

USG United States Government 

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command 

USN United States Navy 

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

WPR War Powers Resolution 
GL-6 JP 3-22 

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions 

found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, will reflect this publication as the source document for 

these terms and definitions. 

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and 

property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local 

military and civilian forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.2) 

campaign plan. A joint operation plan for a series of related major military operations 

aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

civil administration. An administration established by a foreign government in 

(1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, 

to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or 

(2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government 

exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil 

government can be established. Also called CA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, 

trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support 

civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

civil affairs operations. Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that 

(1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities 

where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency 

organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, 

indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve 

application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil 

government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. Also called CAO. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, 

influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and 

nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in 

a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military 

operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military 

operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions 

normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These 

activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They 

may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civilmilitary operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military 
Glossary

GL-7 

forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

conventional forces. 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear 

weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. Also 

called CF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

counterinsurgency. Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an 

insurgency and to address any core grievances. Also called COIN. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-24) 

counterterrorism. Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to 

influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist 

networks. Also called CT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-26) 

country team. The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by 

the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each 

represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic 

mission. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.4) 

force protection. Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against 

Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, 

and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the 

enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

foreign humanitarian assistance. Department of Defense activities, normally in support 

of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, 

conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or 

reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called FHA. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-29) 

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a 

government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other 

designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, 

insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID. (Approved 

for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or 

NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. 

Also called HN. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign 

forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on 

agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 4-0) 
Glossary

GL-8 JP 3-22 

humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by 

predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This 

assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, 

and funded under separate authorities. Also called HCA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-29) 

humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural 

or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, 

hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in 

great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces 

is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement 

or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may 

have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. Also called 

HA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of 

electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military 

deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related 

capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated 

decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-13) 

insurgency. The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that 

seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also 

refer to the group itself. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-24) 

interagency. United States Government agencies and departments, including the 

Department of Defense. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08) 

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, 

the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and 

engaged US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

intergovernmental organization. An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a 

treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, 

regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed 

to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include 

the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. 

Also called IGO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08) 

internal defense and development. The full range of measures taken by a nation to 

promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, 

terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called IDAD. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 
Glossary

GL-9 

joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment. The analytical process 

used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence estimates and other 

intelligence products in support of the joint force commander’s decision-making 

process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the operational 

environment; describing the impact of the operational environment; evaluating the 

adversary; and determining adversary courses of action. Also called JIPOE. (JP 1-

02. SOURCE: JP 2-01.3) 

joint proponent. A Service, combatant command, or Joint Staff directorate assigned 

coordinating authority to lead the collaborative development and integration of joint 

capability with specific responsibilities designated by the Secretary of Defense. 

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02 with SecDef Memo 03748-09 as the source 

document.) 

military assistance advisory group. A joint Service group, normally under the military 

command of a commander of a unified command and representing the Secretary of 

Defense, which primarily administers the US military assistance planning and 

programming in the host country. Also called MAAG. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02 with JP 3-22 as the source JP.) 

Military Assistance Program. That portion of the US security assistance authorized by 

the Foreign Assistance Act of l961, as amended, which provides defense articles and 

services to recipients on a nonreimbursable (grant) basis. Also called MAP. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-22) 

military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects 

useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public 

works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others 

contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to 

improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at 

times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by 

forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition 

or alliance. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-16) 

nation assistance. Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces 

within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based 

on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs 

include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other 

Title 10, US Code programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by 

Federal agencies or intergovernmental organizations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 
Glossary

GL-10 JP 3-22 

nongovernmental organization. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization 

dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, 

economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict 

resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil 

society. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08) 

other government agency. Within the context of interagency coordination, a non 

Department of Defense agency of the United States Government. Also called OGA. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 

paramilitary forces. Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any 

country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-24) 

peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a 

dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease 

fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a longterm political settlement. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.3) 

peace operations. A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis 

response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national 

power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the 

environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to 

legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, 

peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts. Also called PO. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.3) 

propaganda. Any form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or 

misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or 

behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.2) 

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and 

indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective 

reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, 

groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or 

reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. 

Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.2) 

public diplomacy. 1. Those overt international public information activities of the 

United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy 

objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and 

opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and 

institutions and their counterparts abroad. 2. In peace building, civilian agency 

efforts to promote an understanding of the reconstruction efforts, rule of law, and 

civic responsibility through public affairs and international public diplomacy 
Glossary

GL-11 

operations. Its objective is to promote and sustain consent for peace building both 

within the host nation and externally in the region and in the larger international 

community. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.3) 

public information. Information of a military nature, the dissemination of which 

through public news media is not inconsistent with security, and the release of which 

is considered desirable or nonobjectionable to the responsible releasing agency. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13) 

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 

1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other 

related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military 

training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in 

furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of 

security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be 

administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 

Also called SA. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

security assistance organization. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

security cooperation. All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense 

establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security 

interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and 

multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency 

access to a host nation. Also called SC. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

security cooperation organization. All Department of Defense elements located in a 

foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security 

assistance/cooperation management functions. It includes military assistance 

advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military 

cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform 

security assistance/cooperation functions. Also called SCO. (Approved for 

inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

security forces. Duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces 

of a state. (Approved for inclusion JP 1-02.) 

security force assistance. The Department of Defense activities that contribute to 

unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and 

capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Also called 

SFA. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military 

Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, 

and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-05.1) 
Glossary

GL-12 JP 3-22 

status-of-forces agreement. An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting 

military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating 

the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions 

pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or 

they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions 

describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force 

and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of 

local officials. Also called SOFA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-16) 

subversion. Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or 

political strength or morale of a governing authority. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-24) 

technical assistance. The providing of advice, assistance, and training pertaining to the 

installation, operation, and maintenance of equipment. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02 with JP 3-22 as the source JP.) 

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to 

inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the 

pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-07.2) 

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, 

normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous 

or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in 

varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla 

warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted 

recovery. Also called UW. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05) 

unified action. The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of 

governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity 

of effort. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATIONS

PLANS SYSTEMS

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the

development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-22 Operations