J-S21027-23

J-S21028-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DOMINIC O. ROACH 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1334 MDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-36-CR-0004806-2018

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DOMINIC O. ROACH 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1335 MDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-36-CR-0006318-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 23, 2023

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S21027-23

J-S21028-23

- 2 -

Appellant Dominic O. Roach appeals pro se from the orders

1 denying his 

first Post Conviction Relief Act2 (PCRA) petition. On appeal, Appellant claims 

that trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm.

The underlying factual history of this case is well known to both parties. 

See Commonwealth v. Roach, 88 MDA 2019, 89 MDA 2019, 2020 WL 

618574, at *1-2 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 10, 2020) (unpublished mem.). 

The PCRA court set forth the following procedural history:

A three-day jury trial commenced on September 10, 2018. The 

jury found [Appellant] guilty of [two counts each of involuntary 

servitude, trafficking in individuals (recruit/entice/solicit), 

trafficking in individuals (financial benefit), promoting prostitution 

(controlling prostitution business), [promoting prostitution 

(encouraging prostitution),] promoting prostitution (procuring 

prostitution), promoting prostitution (transporting), living off 

prostitutes, and one count each of criminal conspiracy and witness 

intimidation.

3] The [trial] court ordered a pre-sentence 

investigation (PSI) report. On November 20, 2018, the [trial] 

court imposed an aggregate sentence of eighteen to thirty-six 

years of incarceration. [Appellant] filed a post-sentence motion, 

which the trial court denied.

On January 9, 2019, [Appellant] timely filed a direct appeal to the 

Superior Court, in which he challenged an evidentiary ruling and 

discretionary aspects of his sentence. On February 10, 2020, the 

Superior Court issued a decision affirming [Appellant’s] conviction 

and sentence. [See Roach, 2020 WL 618574.]

[Appellant’s] trial counsel, Dennis C. Dougherty, Esquire, did not 

initially file for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme 

____________________________________________

1 We address the related appeals at 1334 MDA 2022 and 1335 MDA 2022 in a 

single memorandum.

2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3012(a), 3011(a)(1), 3011(a)(2), 5902(b)(1), 5902(b)(3), 

5902(b)(5), 5902(b)(6), 5902(d), 903(c), and 4952(a)(3), respectively.
J-S21027-23

J-S21028-23

- 3 -

Court. However, after [Appellant] filed a pro se motion for post

conviction collateral relief on May 14, 2020, counsel appointed to 

represent [Appellant] filed an amended petition, arguing that 

Attorney Dougherty provided ineffective assistance by failing to 

file for allowance of appeal as requested by [Appellant]. The 

amended petition was granted on June 25, 2020, and Attorney 

Dougherty was given 30 days to file a petition for allowance of 

appeal. On July 20, 2020, Attorney Dougherty filed a petition for 

allowance of appeal [nunc pro tunc] with the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court. The petition was denied on [December 29, 2020. 

Commonwealth v. Roach, 243 A.3d 725 (Pa. 2020).]

On November 24, 2021, [Appellant] filed a second pro se motion 

for post conviction collateral relief.[4] Attorney Daniel Bardo was 

appointed to represent [Appellant] on January 11, 2022. On 

March 9, 2022, Attorney Bardo filed a petition to withdraw as 

counsel pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 

(Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. 

Super. 1988) (en banc).[fn2] On April 29, 2022, [the PCRA court] 

issued a notice pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 907 alerting [Appellant] that his request for relief would 

be denied without further hearing and granting [Appellant] 20 

days to file an amended petition.

[fn2] Attorney Bardo’s petition to withdraw was granted on 

October 28, 2022, after it was brought to the [PCRA court’s] 

attention that his petition was inadvertently unresolved.

[Appellant] timely filed a pro se [amended first PCRA petition] on 

May 19, 2022. The Commonwealth filed an answer on June 27, 

2022. [The PCRA court] denied the amended petition on 

September 1, 2022[.]

PCRA Ct. Op., 11/22/22, at 4-5 (formatting altered). 

____________________________________________

4 Despite the PCRA court’s characterization of the instant petition as a second 

petition, because Appellant’s first PCRA petition resulted in the reinstatement 

of his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, the instant petition is treated as a 

first petition. Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 122 (Pa. Super. 

2014).
J-S21027-23

J-S21028-23

- 4 -

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement. The PCRA court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing 

Appellant’s claims.

Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

1. Trial counsel [was] ineffective for failing to challenge validity of 

unsigned invalid criminal complaint/affidavit of probable 

cause/arrest warrant.

2. [Trial c]ounsel was ineffective for failing to object to admission 

of prior bad acts evidence and the court’s denial of cautionary 

instructions.

3. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to challenge 

evidence and issues outside Commonwealth’s bill of 

information.

4. Trial court abused its discretion in allowing amendment of 

Commonwealth’s bill of information to add additional charges 

and dates on the first day of trial, and ineffective assistance of 

counsel for agreeing to amendment without objection.

5. Cumulative impact of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Appellant’s Brief at 7-40 (unpaginated, some formatting altered).

5

____________________________________________

5

In his statement of questions, Appellant raises one issue challenging the 

PCRA court’s denial of his PCRA petition generally. See Appellant’s Brief at 3. 

Despite identifying only one question for appellate review, the argument 

section of Appellant’s brief is divided into five sections. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) 

(stating that “[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are 

questions to be argued”). We do not condone Appellant’s failure to comply 

with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, but because the noncompliance does 

not impede our review, we decline to find waiver on this basis. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Levy, 83 A.3d 457, 461 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2013) (declining 

to find waiver on the basis of the appellant’s failure to comply with the Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, where the errors did not impede this Court’s review). 

For clarity, we list the issues on appeal as they appear immediately preceding 

each claim in the argument section of Appellant’s brief.
J-S21027-23

J-S21028-23

- 5 -

Our review of the denial of PCRA relief is limited to “whether the record 

supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA court’s 

decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). “The PCRA court’s credibility 

determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court; 

however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal 

conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1265 (Pa. 2014) 

(citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Davis, 262 A.3d 589, 595 

Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that “[t]his Court grants great deference to the 

findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those 

findings.” (citation omitted)).

[T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of 

the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process 

that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken 

place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the 

following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; 

(2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her 

action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of 

counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 

proceedings would have been different.

We have explained that a claim has arguable merit where the 

factual averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief. 

Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal 

determination.

The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for 

his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel would have 

chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not chosen, 

offered a significantly greater potential chance of success. 

Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if they 

effectuated his client’s interests. We do not employ a hindsight 
J-S21027-23

J-S21028-23

- 6 -

analysis in comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he 

may have taken.

Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis 

and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioner’s burden to 

prove that counsel was ineffective. Moreover, a failure to satisfy 

any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the 

claim of ineffectiveness.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043-44 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(citations omitted and formatting altered). Further, it is well settled that 

counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise meritless claims. 

Commonwealth v. Midgley, 289 A.3d 1111, 1120 (Pa. Super. 2023).

Validity of Criminal Complaint

In his first issue, Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to contest the validity of the criminal complaint and accompanying 

affidavit of probable cause. Appellant’s Brief at 7. Specifically, Appellant 

argues that the charging documents did not include a magistrate district 

judge’s (MDJ) signature and, therefore, “there was no recorded determination 

that probable cause existed and no written order to that effect.” Id. at 23. 

Appellant also argues that Officer Jones6improperly included a reference to 

the September 2017 incident in the affidavit of probable cause. Id. at 27. 

____________________________________________

6 Officer Christopher Jones was the affiant on the complaint and supporting 

affidavit of probable cause. See Criminal Complaint, 7/27/28.
J-S21027-23

J-S21028-23

- 7 -

The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate, inter alia, that 

each criminal compliant contain the signature of the affiant. Pa.R.Crim.P. 

504(13). “Before accepting a complaint for filing, the issuing authority shall 

ascertain and certify on the complaint that the complaint has been properly 

completed and executed[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 508(A)(1). Here, the PCRA court 

noted that the criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause at issue 

under Docket Nos. 6318-2017 and 4806-2017 were signed by a Magisterial 

District Judge and that trial counsel “would have had no legitimate basis to 

challenge the validity,” of the charging documents. PCRA Ct. Op. at 9. 

Further, with respect to Appellant’s claim that the affidavit of probable cause 

contained an improper reference to an uncharged offense, the PCRA court 

explained: “[t]he affidavit does not aver that any charges were filed relating 

to events that took place on September 26, 2017; instead, the incident is 

included merely for context about how the investigation into [Appellant] 

began.” PCRA Ct. Op. at 9.

Following our review, we conclude the record supports the PCRA’s 

court’s factual findings and we find no error in the PCRA court’s legal 

conclusions. See Lawson, 90 A.3d at 4. As noted by the PCRA court, 

Appellant’s underlying claims regarding the charging documents are meritless. 

Accordingly, because counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise a 

meritless claim, Appellant is not entitled to relief. See Midgley, 289 A.3d at 

1120.
J-S21027-23

J-S21028-23

- 8 -

Prior Bad Acts

We address Appellant’s next two issues together. First, Appellant 

argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission

of prior bad acts evidence and failing to request a cautionary instruction with 

respect to that evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 13-17. Appellant also claims 

that trial counsel was ineffective for allowing the Commonwealth to base its 

case on “evidence and issues outside the Commonwealth’s bills of 

information.” Id. at 21.

Initially, it is well settled that appellate briefs must conform to the 

requirements set forth in the appellate rules. In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 

1211 (Pa. Super. 2010); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a) (setting forth the rules 

for the content of an appellate brief). Specifically, Rule 2119(c) provides that 

“[i]f reference is made to the pleadings, evidence, charge, opinion or order, 

or any other matter appearing in the record, the argument must set forth, in 

immediate connection therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a reference to the 

place in the record where the matter referred to appears.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c). 

“Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a 

pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant.”

Ullman, 995 A.2d at 1211-12 (citation omitted). “This Court will not act as 

counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” 

Commonwealth v. Westlake, 295 A.3d 1281, 1286 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2023) 

(citation omitted and formatting altered). Indeed, we will “not develop an 

argument for an appellant, nor shall we scour the record to find evidence to 
J-S21027-23

J-S21028-23

- 9 -

support an argument; instead, we will deem the issue to be waived.” 

Commonwealth v. Pi Delta Psi, Inc., 211 A.3d 875, 884-85 (Pa. Super. 

2019) (citations omitted). 

Here, Appellant fails to identify any specific trial testimony to which trial 

counsel should have objected. Although Appellant makes broad references to 

prior bad acts testimony that was improperly elicited by the Commonwealth

in his brief, see Appellant’s Brief at 13-21, Appellant does not specifically cite 

any testimony from the record. Because Appellant has failed to adequately 

develop this argument with citations to the record, this claim is waived. See 

Pi Delta Psi, Inc., 211 A.3d at 884-85; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c).

Amendments to Bills of Information

Appellant next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to the Commonwealth’s amendments to the bills of information on the 

day of trial. Appellant’s Brief at 34.

Before addressing this claim, we must determine whether Appellant has 

adequately preserved the issue for our review. This Court has explained that

“PCRA claims are generally considered to be waived unless a petitioner first 

asserts them in a PCRA petition within one year from the date the judgment 

of sentence became final.” Commonwealth v. Crumbley, 270 A.3d 1171, 

1181 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 284 A.3d 884 (Pa. 

2022); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”).
J-S21027-23

J-S21028-23

- 10 -

Here, the record reflects that Appellant did not raise this issue in his 

PCRA petition. See Appellant’s Amended PCRA Pet., 5/19/22. Therefore, 

Appellant has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. See 

Crumbley, 270 A.3d at 1181; Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Accordingly, he is not 

entitled to relief. 

Cumulative Prejudicial Impact

In his final issue, Appellant claims that “the cumulative impact of 

[counsel’s] deficiencies [] resulted in the absence of adequate and effective 

assistance of counsel, thereby prejudicing [Appellant] and causing conviction 

of crimes [of which] he is actually innocent[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 40.

It is well settled that issues not included in an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) 

statement are waived on appeal. Commonwealth v. Becher, 293 A.3d 

1226, 1237 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2023); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (stating 

that “[i]ssues not included in the [Rule 1925(b)] Statement and/or not raised 

in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived”). 

In the instant case, Appellant failed to include a cumulative prejudice 

claim in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Therefore, this issue is waived. Becher, 

293 A.3d at 1237 n.7; Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).7 

____________________________________________

7 Even if Appellant had preserved this issue for appeal, Appellant would 

nonetheless not be entitled to relief. Our Supreme Court has explained that 

while “no number of claims which fail on their merits may collectively warrant 

relief[,] . . . [w]hen the failure of individual claims is grounded in lack of 

prejudice, then the cumulative prejudice from those individual claims may 

properly be assessed.” Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 180 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S21027-23

J-S21028-23

- 11 -

For these reasons we affirm the PCRA court’s orders denying relief.

Orders affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/23/2023

____________________________________________

(Pa. 2018) (citations omitted). We found that Appellant was not entitled to 

relief in his previous four ineffective assistance of counsel claims because 

either he failed to establish arguable merit or the issues were waived on 

appeal. See Crumbley, 270 A.3d at 1181; Pi Delta Psi, Inc., 211 A.3d at 

884-85; Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043.