Japan’s Constitution and Defense

Policy: Entering a New Era?

by Rust Deming

Strategic Forum

C

hanges in the security environment and

the rise of a new generation have

ended Japan’s taboo on discussion of

amending the 1947 “peace constitution.”

While many wish to maintain the current

document, the center of gravity in the debate

has shifted.

The movement to amend the constitution is connected to and stimulated by a

parallel debate on defense policy. The

Japanese government’s third National Defense Program Outline is due in late 2004,

and its recommendations will affect the

ongoing constitutional debate.

Few Japanese leaders suggest that the

nation should become an independent strategic actor, and the vast majority of the public

supports a nonthreatening posture dedicated

to cooperation. Thus, the philosophy behind

Article IX—that Japan forswears the threat or

use of force to settle international disputes—

is not seriously at issue. Rather, the focus is

on the need to legitimize the existing SelfDefense Forces fully and their right to selfdefense; the issue of collective self-defense;

and the future direction of defense policy.

However this debate plays out, the alliance with the United States almost certainly

will retain a central place in Japan’s defense

policy. At the same time, the emerging policy

will likely emphasize expanding Japan’s

capacity for a more autonomous defense as

well as its wherewithal to participate fully in

internationally sanctioned operations.

Japan’s postwar defense policy was set by

the 1947 constitution. Early in the occupation,

General Douglas MacArthur and his staff concluded that the 19th-century Meiji constitution

needed to be revised or entirely replaced if

Japan were to become a true democracy, with

the Emperor removed from any political role.

In January 1946, convinced that the elitist and

authoritarian Japanese establishment was

incapable of producing a democratic constitution, MacArthur ordered his staff to produce a

draft. One week later, an entirely rewritten

constitution emerged and was presented to the

Japanese. Included in the draft was Article IX:

War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. The threat or use of force is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with any

other nation. No Army, Navy, Air Force, or other

war potential will ever be authorized and no

right of belligerency will ever be conferred upon

the state.1

War and defeat had produced strong

pacifist sentiment in Japan, and there had been

previous discussion between MacArthur and

senior Japanese leaders about the possibility of a

“no war” clause in the constitution, along the

lines of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Nevertheless,

some Japanese were shocked by the American

version, which went beyond their intentions.

During the course of Diet deliberations over

the draft, Hitoshi Ashida, chairman of the Lower

House Committee on the Constitution, proposed

the addition of two clauses. The clauses, accepted by both MacArthur and the Diet, have

provided the basis for the argument that the

article does not impinge upon Japan’s inherent

right of self-defense. Article IX as it now exists

(with Ashida’s changes in italics) reads:

(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace

based on justice and order, the Japanese people

forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the

nation and the threat or use of force as a means of

settling international disputes.

(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as

well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will

not be recognized.

Ashida later testified that the new phrase

at the beginning of the second paragraph

preserved Japan’s inherent right of self-defense

and “clearly recognizes that (the article) does

not constitute the unconditional renunciation

of military force.”2 This interpretation was far

from universally accepted in Japan, and a

Talmudic debate developed over the meaning

of Article IX that continues to this day.

Interpreting Article IX

When Japan regained sovereignty in 1952,

several attempts were made to amend the

constitution, including Article IX, but the

debate became frozen by the Cold War polarization of Japanese politics.

The Political Setting. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), representing conservative

business, agricultural, and bureaucratic interests, controlled the Diet and dominated the

policy process. The LDP argued that the best

course for Japan was to focus on economic

recovery and to align itself strategically with

the United States. This meant relying on American extended deterrence (the nuclear umbrella) implicit in the U.S.-Japan Security

Treaty, supporting the basing of American

No. 213

November 2004

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

No. 213, November 2004 Strategic Forum 1
forces in Japan, and responding cautiously to

U.S. requests that Japan build up its own selfdefense capabilities.

The Japan Socialist Party (JSP), representing labor and the intellectual left, countered

that alliance with the United States and the

existence of American bases in Japan were

lightning rods that would only drag Japan

further into the Cold War and endanger Japanese security. The JSP advocated unarmed neutrality centered on the United Nations (UN)—

a stance that appealed to the strong pacifist

sentiment in postwar Japan.

The JSP leadership recognized that its

party had little chance of winning a majority of

lower house seats and forming a government.

Thus the only way it could have any influence

on defense policy was to be the guardian of the

peace constitution by blocking attempts to alter

it and by challenging the constitutionality of

the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) themselves and

specific defense programs as they developed.

Pacifism versus Pragmatism. The fundamental position of the JSP and the intellectual left has been that Article IX prohibits even

defensive wars and the maintenance of defensive war potential on the grounds that it is

difficult to distinguish between wars of aggression and wars of defense. Thus, they conclude,

the Self-Defense Forces are unconstitutional.

In the 1960s, when faced with the reality

of the Self-Defense Forces and the fact that 80

percent of the Japanese public supported their

existence, then-JSP Chairman Ishibashi

Masashi suggested the oxymoronic formula

that while the forces were unconstitutional,

they were legal since the law establishing the

SDF went through the legislative process.

But the LDP and its supporters argued

that while the constitution prohibited “wars of

aggression,” the concept of defensive wars was

constitutional. To assuage pacifist sentiment in

Japan, however, the LDP adopted the position

in 1954 that maintaining “war potential,” even

for the purposes of self-defense, was not permissible. Thus, it concluded that the SelfDefense Forces are constitutional, but their

armaments must be restricted to “the minimum requirement for self-defense.”

The debate between the left and the right

has focused on the definition of war potential

and the minimum needs for self-defense.

Specific issues have included:

WEAPON SYSTEMS. There has been broad

agreement that Japan cannot possess offensive

capability, but the definition of such capability

has steadily evolved. For example, F–4 fighters

acquired in the 1960s were not equipped with

air-refueling capability, which was seen as

potentially “offensive.” When the next-generation F–15 was acquired in the 1980s, however,

refueling equipment was included without

much debate. Now Japan is acquiring longrange tankers. While strategic bombers, aircraft

carriers, and long-range missiles are still considered out-of-bounds, the government has

argued that the constitution does not ban

defensive nuclear weapons, although it

acknowledges that Japan’s self-declared three

nonnuclear principles and its adherence to the

Non-Proliferation Treaty forbid Japan from

developing such weapons.

OVERSEAS SDF DISPATCH. When the SelfDefense Forces were established in 1954, the

law did not provide for units to be sent abroad,

although the government maintained that the

constitution permitted overseas dispatch for

missions that did not involve the use of force.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Diet

passed specific legislation in 1992 to allow SDF

units to participate in peacekeeping operations

in Cambodia, basing its decision on language

in the preamble of the constitution calling for

Japan to achieve “an honored place in an

international society” and by the obligations

Japan undertook in joining the United Nations.

In response to September 11, the Diet authorized, by specific legislation, the dispatch of

units to Afghanistan and, later, to Iraq for

noncombat support operations. The Japanese

government plans to submit to the Diet in 2005

generic legislation to allow the SDF to participate in similar missions.

RIGHT OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE. The

Cabinet Legislative Bureau, which has the

responsibility for interpreting the constitution,

maintains that Japan possesses the sovereign

right to engage in collective self-defense (the

right to respond to an attack against an ally or

against a partner in a UN operation) but that

under Article IX the exercise of this right exceeds “the minimum needs of self-defense”

and is therefore unconstitutional. The use of

the right of self-defense is only permissible if it

involves defending Japan itself. This principle

has proved one of the most inflexible of all the

limitations on Japan’s defense activities, primarily because the left in Japan has seen this

constraint as essential to preventing Japan from

being pressured by the United States into defending American interests.

RIGHT OF PREEMPTION. The Japanese government has maintained since 1956 that in the

event of an imminent missile attack upon

Japan and with no other recourse, it would be

an act of self-defense and thus permissible to

attack the missile base before launch. Defense

Minister Shigeru Ishiba recently reiterated this

right in the context of the North Korean threat.

The question that has been debated is how

Japan could be certain that the threat was

directed at it and not a third party.

2 Strategic Forum No. 213, November 2004

Ambassador Rust Deming recently completed a tour as distinguished visiting fellow in the Institute for

National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Questions and comments may be sent to the

Institute at ndu-inss-research@ndu.edu.

Liberal Democratic Party Democratic Party of Japan Komeito Social Democrats

Authorize military Stipulate a limited right Uphold Article IX, with Maintain Japan’s 

capability for self- to self-defense based possible additional independence by updefense purposes on Japan’s strictly defense- clarifying language holding Article IX; 

oriented policy oppose any amendment to the constitution

Define the right of Specify Japan’s right to

collective self-defense* join collective security

operations based on a 

United Nations Resolution

*In a June 27, 2004, television debate, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was more explicit. He said he would like to amend the constitution “so that Japan will

be able to take joint action with the U.S. in the event of an armed attack against Japan.”

Positions of Political Parties on Article IX 

(based on position papers for the July 2004 upper house election)
Over the last 57 years, Japan has

stretched the interpretation of Article IX to

allow it to develop a small (240,000) but

highly capable military, with a navy (Maritime Self-Defense Force) that may rank

behind only those of the United States and

United Kingdom in size and proficiency. Its

defense budget ($40 billion) ranks fourth in

the world (behind France and ahead of Germany), although personnel costs consume

more than half of defense expenditures.

In the last 5 years, however, there has

been a growing feeling in Japan that to meet

the challenges of the post–Cold War world,

Japan needs greater flexibility in its defense

policy that may require not only further reinterpretation of the constitution but also its

formal amendment.

Pressures for Change

A number of factors have ended the taboo

on advocating constitutional change:

Generational Change. The generation

that experienced war, defeat, and occupation

has all but disappeared from the political

scene, taking with it the reflexive pacifism and

risk avoidance that has colored Japan’s international posture for the last 50 years. The new

generation is much less encumbered by history,

more overtly nationalistic, and more willing to

see Japan play an assertive international role.

The End of the Cold War. The collapse of

the Soviet Union was less profound in East Asia

than in Europe, but the repercussions undermined the Japan Socialist Party and ended the

ideological split in Japanese politics. When the

LDP persuaded JSP chairman Tomiichi Murayama in 1994 to endorse the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as the price of becoming prime minister of a coalition government, the left in Japan

was fatally compromised. Over the last decade,

Japanese politics has evolved toward two large

groupings, one center-right (the LDP), and one

center-left (the Democratic Party of Japan), with

one potential swing party (the Komeito) and

several fringe elements, including the Japan

Communist Party. Divisions on national security

policy remain, but the debate now crosses party

lines and is more pragmatic than ideological.

More fundamental, there is no longer a “blocking one-third” in the Diet committed to preserving the 1947 constitution intact.

The Gulf War. Notwithstanding Japan’s

$13 billion donation to the effort, the United

States and the international community broadly

criticized Japan for failing to make a “human

contribution” to the coalition that responded to

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991. This criticism

had a profound effect on the way Japanese

regarded their role in the world, with a consensus quickly developing that Japan could no

longer limit itself to financial contributions. In

1992, the Diet passed the Peace Keeping Operations Law that allowed Japan to send SDF units

to Cambodia as part of UN peacekeeping operations. The SDF subsequently carried out successful peacekeeping missions in Mozambique,

the Golan Heights, and East Timor, building

public support for such deployments.

Changing Attitudes toward North Korea.

During the post–Korean War period, the left in

Japan supported North Korea, while the conservative establishment supported South Korea,

with the majority of the one-million-member

Korean community in Japan sympathetic to the

North. Japanese of all political persuasions

feared the implications of a renewed conflict on

the peninsula because of the polarizing effect it

would have on Japanese politics and the likely

outflow of refugees toward Japan, but did not

view North Korea as a direct threat.

All of this has changed over the last 10

years. The revelations about the North Korean

nuclear program in the early 1990s, the testing

of long-range missiles over Japan in 1998, and

the acknowledgment by Kim Jong-Il in 2003

that North Korea had in fact kidnapped a

number of Japanese have combined to change

Japanese attitudes. Even the North’s traditional

friends on the left have distanced themselves

from the regime.3 In addition, the North Korean missile and nuclear programs have increased Japanese public support for ballistic

missile defense (BMD) cooperation with the

United States. Some senior Japanese have

linked growing public support for revising the

constitution directly to North Korean provocations.4 In any event, Pyongyang’s behavior has

stimulated the reexamination of Japanese

defense policies.

China’s Growing Power. Official relations

between Beijing and Tokyo are correct, and

economic ties are booming to the extent that

China is on the verge of replacing the United

States as Japan’s largest economic partner. At

the same time, while reluctant to characterize

China as a threat, Japanese leaders watch with

misgivings the rise of China’s economic and

military power and political influence in East

Asia. There is also a growing backlash in Japan

to Chinese leaders’ perceived use of the “Japan

history card” as a tool to stimulate nationalism

at home. The effect has been to increase appreciation in Japan for the strategic importance of

the alliance with the United States.

Efforts to Redefine the U.S.-Japan Security Relationship. Three documents over the

last 8 years have played an important role in

stimulating and shaping the debate in Japan

about defense policy. The first was the 1996

U.S.-Japan Security Declaration, issued at a

summit meeting in Tokyo between President

Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro

Hashimoto. The declaration set forth a

post–Cold War rationale for the alliance based

on providing the regional stability necessary for

economic growth and political development

and helped reaffirm public support in Japan for

the continuing relevance of the U.S.-Japan

security relationship.

The Revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation that followed in 1997 established the

framework for U.S.-Japan cooperation in response to “situations in areas surrounding

Japan,” not only improving the alliance’s

ability to plan for and respond to a crisis, but

also stimulating a debate in Japan about the

appropriate limits of its defense activities in the

post–Cold War world.

The Armitage-Nye Report5 may have

played an even more important role in stimulating debate on amending the constitution.

The report, compiled in October 2000 by a

bipartisan study group, held up the U.S.–U.K.

relationship as the model for the United States

and Japan and called for enhancing bilateral

defense cooperation in East Asia and globally.

In addition, the report stated unequivocally that “Japan’s prohibition against collective self-defense is a constraint on the alliance.

Lifting this constraint would allow for closer

and more efficient security cooperation.”

Several LDP Diet members have said that they

saw this statement as a clear signal of bipartisan support in the United States for amending

Article IX, removing lingering doubts among

Japanese leaders about American attitudes, and

opening the door within the LDP to all-out

advocacy of constitutional reform.

September 11 and Iraq. Prime Minister

Junichiro Koizumi, determined not to repeat

the mistakes of the Gulf War, was among the

first foreign leaders to voice total support for

the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and he moved

No. 213, November 2004 Strategic Forum 3
4 Strategic Forum No. 213, November 2004

quickly to pass special legislation allowing

Japan to send Maritime Self-Defense Forces to

the Indian Ocean to provide rear-area support

for coalition forces in Afghanistan. Koizumi

also used the heightened security awareness in

Japan to move forward with long-stalled defense-related issues, including legislation to

give the government emergency powers in a

crisis and deployment of a BMD system in

cooperation with the United States. The most

dramatic step taken by the prime minister was

his decision in 2003, in the face of strong

domestic opposition, to obtain Diet approval for

the deployment of Ground Self-Defense Force

Units to southern Iraq to engage in humanitarian and reconstruction activities, putting

Japanese forces into a “semi-combat zone” for

the first time since World War II.

In response to charges from then-Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) leader Naoto Kan

and others that sending SDF units to Iraq was

unconstitutional, Koizumi, in a December 9,

2003, press conference, argued that sending

units to Iraq to engage in humanitarian activities and reconstruction was in accord with the

ideals of the constitution, citing language from

the preamble pledging Japan to international

cooperation in pursuit of peace.6

Koizumi’s argument apparently struck a

chord with the Japanese: public support for the

dispatch of SDF forces has increased to over 50

percent. Public support for amending the

constitution has also increased, reaching on

April 2, 2004, a record high 65 percent, 11

points higher than the year before. The most

common reason given (52 percent) for amending the constitution was “Japan is expected to

make international contributions, and there

are various challenges that Japan cannot meet

under its current constitution.”

Thus, over the last 14 years, changes in

the external setting, combined with generational and political evolution within Japan,

have created the environment for the most

fundamental review of Japan’s constitution and

defense policy since the end of World War II.

Focal Points of Debate

The Japanese decisions to cooperate with

the United States on BMD and to dispatch SDF

units to Iraq have brought the constitutional

issue to the fore. Defense planners, conservative

politicians, journalists, and other right-ofcenter opinion leaders argue that if Japan is to

be able to cooperate effectively with the United

States on BMD and in other areas, as well as to

participate fully in international peacekeeping

and humanitarian operations, Article IX needs

to be adjusted to clarify the nation’s right to

engage in collective self-defense.7

Within the Japanese political world, there

are still many, including some members of the

LDP,8 who argue against amending the constitution. Some express concern that tampering

with Article IX will end Japan’s “exceptionalism” and open the door to the nation becoming a major military power. Others fear that

amendments will not be limited to Article IX

and may include provisions that erode civil

liberties. However, even some staunch defenders

of the current constitution, faced with the

possibility of amendments that could remove

all constraints on the role of the Japanese

military, are now considering proposing their

own revisions in order to lock in Japan’s defense-only policy by spelling out more specifically what Japan can and cannot do.

Both houses of the Diet have established

committees on constitutional reform, as have

the LDP, DPJ, and Komeito. To obtain the twothirds vote in both houses necessary for an

amendment, the LDP will need the support of

not only its coalition partner, the Komeito, but

also the DPJ, so there will need to be consensus

before a specific text is submitted to the Diet for

ratification. The LDP and DPJ are also working

on legislation to establish the procedures for

the national referendum called for in the

constitution as the final step in the ratification

process, and this legislation is likely to be

submitted to the Diet next year.

While Article IX is not the only element of

the constitution open for amendment, it is the

focus of attention. Suggestions on specific

language have yet to emerge, but the outline of

the debate is forming, with particular focus on

several issues.9

Whether to Rewrite or Amend the Constitution. Although there are proponents of completely rewriting the constitution (former

Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone is in the

process of writing his own draft), a consensus

appears to be emerging that it would prove

extremely difficult to gain ratification of a

completely new text and that the only practical

route is to amend the current document.

How to Handle Paragraph One of

Article IX. While some on the political right

want to change or scrap this paragraph, there

is a consensus in the LDP, DPJ, and Komeito to

maintain at least the spirit and probably the

language that renounces war as a sovereign

right and the threat or use of force to settle

international disputes. This is seen as necessary to maintain Japan’s postwar legacy as a

nonthreatening nation and to respond to the

strong pacifist sentiment that still exists.

Fall 2004

Advisory Commission on the

National Defense Policy Outline

(NDPO) submits report to the

government of Japan

Winter 2004

Government issues new NDPO,

setting policy objectives on

ballistic missile defense

deployment, weapons, exports,

force structure, international

cooperation, and so forth

Winter 2004–2005

New Mid-Term Defense Plan

is developed, incorporating

NDPO recommendations

Spring 2005

Generic legislation is

submitted to Diet authorizing

security defense forces to

engage in international

peacekeeping

Winter–Spring 2005

Legislation submitted to Diet

establishes procedures for

referendum on constitutional

amendments

Spring 2005

Lower and Upper House

Committees issue reports on

recommendations for constitutional reform

Fall 2005

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)

Committee issues report on

recommendations for

constitutional reform

Fall 2005–Spring 2006 (?)

Democratic Party of Japan

(DPJ) issues reports on

recommendations for

constitutional reform

2005–2010

Budgeting implements MidTerm Defense Plan

Defense Policy Reform

Constitutional

Reform
The Need to Legitimize Military Forces

and to Clarify the Right of Self-Defense. The

LDP and DPJ proponents of constitutional

revision agree that the second paragraph of

Article IX needs to acknowledge current reality

and to give Japan greater flexibility in the

future. The LDP is considering proposing

language that would authorize “war potential”

for self-defense and international cooperation.

The Komeito wants to keep the existing language but add a clarifying third paragraph.

Whether to Specify Japan’s Right to Engage in Collective Self-Defense. This is the

heart of the debate, and there is no consensus.

This issue is being driven by Japan’s decision to

cooperate with the United States on BMD and by

the desire to give the SDF more flexibility as it

engages in peacekeeping and humanitarian

activities. A number of conservatives argue that

this issue should be dealt with, at least initially,

either by another Cabinet Legislative Bureau

reinterpretation or by special legislation, since

full cooperation on BMD should not be held

hostage to the drawn-out amendment process.

Other defense hawks in the LDP and DPJ want

to use this issue as pressure to amend the constitution, arguing that it is important to gain

public support and understanding by “going

through the front door.” A third group—made

up largely of doves in the DPJ, JSP, and LDP and

many in the Komeito, and supported at this

stage by a majority of the Japanese public—

remains cautious about specifying in any form

the right of collective self-defense unless it is

carefully circumscribed, out of concern that this

could prove to be a slippery slope that will lead

to Japan’s increasing military engagement

abroad, particularly at the behest of the United

States.10 Some in the DPJ, including current

chairman Katsuya Okada and former vice

chairman Ichiro Ozawa, want a distinction

drawn between Japan’s right to engage in “collective security” under a UN mandate and the

ban on “collective self-defense” (for example,

defending the United States), which should

continue to be prohibited.11

Defense Policy Debate

While the debate on altering the constitution is not likely to come to fruition for many

years, a parallel discussion (see above) on the

direction of defense policy is moving much

faster. Tokyo is preparing its third National

Defense Program Outline (NDPO) that establishes the framework of defense policy. The first

NDPO in 1976 focused on “the minimum level

of defense capability” needed to maintain the

credibility of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. The

second outline in 1995 pointed to the need for

Japan to rationalize its defense posture with the

end of the Cold War and raised WMD and

international peacekeeping as new challenges.

Prime Minister Koizumi has just inaugurated

the Advisory Committee on Japan’s Security and

Defense Capabilities, which submitted its report

in October on recommendations for the next

NDPO to be completed by the government by

the end of 2004. The defense policy that

emerges from this process will in turn shape

the ongoing constitutional debate.

The development of a new defense policy

will be shaped by interplay between adherents

of three broad schools of thought: the alliance

nationalists, who argue that Japan should

place primary emphasis on expanding cooperation under the framework of the U.S.-Japan

Security Treaty; the internationalists, who give

greater importance to cooperation with the

United Nations; and the neo-nationalists, who

focus on building up Japan’s autonomous

defense capabilities.12 These groups are not

necessarily mutually exclusive. Some neonationalists, for example, advocate increased

cooperation with the United States in the

midterm as a path to greater Japanese longterm independence.

Alliance Nationalists

Led by former ambassador Hisahiko

Okazaki, the alliance nationalists argue that

Japan’s future security policy should remain

centered on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and

that the boundaries of U.S.-Japan defense

cooperation should be steadily expanded, both

in areas around Japan and globally. They

believe that Japan can best maximize its interests through close association with the world’s

only superpower and that it can better influence American positions by becoming its indispensable partner. In the background is their

concern about China’s growing power, instability on the Korean Peninsula, and the need to

ensure energy supplies from the Middle East.

This group does not advocate an offensive

combat role for Japan or the modification of

the first paragraph of Article IX, but it does

support a broad interpretation of the right of

self-defense and collective self-defense, including more active rear-area support for U.S.

forces, full cooperation with the United States

on BMD, and the right of Japan to take preemptive action against missiles sites that are

preparing to launch.

The alliance nationalists accept the need

for Japan to participate more actively in UN

peacekeeping and peace enforcement activities

and indeed argue that the current constitution

No. 213, November 2004 Strategic Forum 5

2006 (?)

Joint Diet committee

established and consolidates

recommendations

Wildcard possibilities

New constitutional

interpretation and/or

legislation to authorize/

redefine collective self-defense

Fall 2006–2007

LDP, DPJ, and Komeito put

forward their respective texts

as basis for lower house

election

2007 (?)

Winning party attempts to put

together a “grand coalition” to

gain required two-thirds

majority, possibly provoking a

fundamental realignment of

Japanese political parties

2007–2010 (?)

Diet approves constitutional

amendments

2008–2012 (?)

National referendum 

approves constitutional

amendments
places no limits on Japan’s ability to participate

fully in such activities, given the obligations that

Japan undertook in subsequently adhering to

the UN charter to support such operations.13

To accomplish these objectives, the alliance nationalists urge removing the constraints on collective self-defense, either by

constitutional reinterpretation, amendment,

legislation, or even a political declaration by

the prime minister, and giving priority to

Japan’s obligations in the U.S.-Japan Security

Treaty and the UN charter over the constraints

in its constitution. A few in this group argue

that after the constitution is amended, the U.S.-

Japan Security Treaty should also be revised to

include a reciprocal obligation by Japan to

come to the defense of the United States.

Most observers describe the alliance nationalists as an important but limited group.

Prime Minister Koizumi, JDA Minister Ishiba,

Transportation Minister Taro Aso, and former

Prime Minister Hashimoto are sometimes

identified as fitting in this category.14 However,

many in the group appear to be older “American school” diplomats and LDP members, with

fewer adherents among the new generation of

bureaucrats and politicians.

Internationalists

A large group in the center of Japanese

politics, including members of the LDP,

Komeito, and DPJ, wants to see defense policy

increasingly oriented toward cooperation under

a UN or other multinational or regional framework. They recognize UN limitations and

importance of the Security Treaty, particularly

with respect to a potential crisis in the Far East,

but argue that Japan’s defense activities beyond

this area should be under some kind of an

international umbrella. Some also would like

to develop a formal East Asian security framework, along the lines of the Six-Party Talks on

North Korea, to complement and perhaps

eventually supplant the U.S.-Japan bilateral

security arrangements in the region around

Japan. Internationalist leader Ichiro Ozawa,

the former deputy chief of the DPJ, advocates

that Japan lift the restrictions on engaging in

collective security under the United Nations, as

opposed to “collective self-defense” under the

alliance with the United States, and that Japan

establish a separate force outside the SDF

dedicated to participation in UN-led operations.

Members of this group put forward various arguments for putting Japan’s defense

policy under a more international umbrella.

These include reassuring the international

community that Japan is not becoming an

independent military power; continuing its

legacy of contributing to human security in

cooperation with the UN system; and serving as

an obstacle to U.S. pressure for Japan to participate in missions that do not have broad international support, such as the Iraq venture. 

With respect to amending Article IX of the

constitution, this group generally supports

language to legitimize the SDF and clarify the

right of self-defense but tends to be cautious

with respect to specifying the right of collective

self-defense unless focused on operations in

“areas around Japan” or under a UN umbrella.

Neo-Nationalists

The neo-nationalist school advocates that

Japan become a “normal” country, with few

legal constraints on defense policy. While few in

this group call for major change in Japan’s

military posture or an abrupt rupture with the

United States, they do argue that Japan needs a

more independent security policy, both as a

hedge against a weakening of the U.S. commitment and to give Japan more foreign policy

and strategic room for maneuver. Implicit here

is the position that Japan should keep open the

possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons,

although few publicly advocate that Japan

move in this direction now.

Members of this group generally advocate

replacing the “MacArthur-imposed constitution” as a matter of national pride and independence. Some want to see not only the removal of restrictions in Article IX but also other

changes in the document, including reinstating the emperor as head of state, allowing state

support for the Shinto religion, and instilling

patriotic values (for example, reforming the

education system and requiring respect for the

national anthem and flag).

By most accounts, the neo-nationalists

represent no more than 10 percent of the

political spectrum and have little chance of

becoming the dominant voice in Japan, barring a catastrophic collapse of the U.S.-Japan

alliance or a major conflict in the region. At

the same time, a growing number of younger

politicians across the political spectrum are

attracted by the theme of greater independence

from the United States, and Ishihara himself

enjoys wide personal popularity.16

These schools represent areas of emphasis

rather than mutually exclusive divisions. All

three groups accept the importance of the

alliance with the United States, particularly

with respect to defense of Japan and areas

around Japan, and all advocate an active

Japanese role in UN peacekeeping operations.

The major difference between them is the

degree to which Japan should allow itself to

participate in military activities unrelated to

the defense of Japan that are not sanctioned by

the UN Security Council.

Emerging LDP Vision

The new NDPO will be shaped not only by

the results of the work of the advisory committee appointed by Prime Minister Koizumi, but

also by thinking within the LDP. The LDP

Policy Research Council Subcommittee of

Defense Studies issued a report on March 30,

2004, entitled “Recommendations on Japan’s

New Defense Policy.” To address both traditional threats of state aggression, focused on

North Korea and 21st-century threats by nonstate actors, the LDP report argues that Japan

needs to enhance the credibility of the U.S.-

Japan alliance, play a more active role in

international organizations such as the United

Nations, and strengthen regional cooperation

by utilizing the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations Regional Forum and Six-Party Talks.

With respect to amending Article IX of the

constitution, the report recommends:

■ a clear statement that Japan possesses the

right of individual and collective self-defense

■ a new definition of the SDF as a national

defense force that is tasked not only with the

defense of Japan but also with participation in

activities for the maintenance and restoration of

international peace

■ a delineation of emergency powers that the

prime minister may exercise in response to an

internal or external crisis or a natural disaster,

subject to subsequent Diet approval.

With respect to the exercise of the right of

collective self-defense, the report argues that

the constitutionality of this “natural right to

which Japan is already entitled” can be made

clear through either an amendment to or

reinterpretation of the constitution, new legislation defining the constitutional boundaries,

or parliamentary resolutions.

Concerning the specifics of defense policy,

the LDP report recommends, inter alia:

6 Strategic Forum No. 213, November 2004
■ enacting a general law governing international cooperation activities of the SDF to replace

the ad hoc approach of passing specific legislation

for each overseas mission

■ transforming SDF force structure with an

orientation toward rapid-response units for ground

forces and increased maritime and air transport

capability to support the new importance of Japan’s

involvement in international activities

■ ensuring the smooth introduction of a BMD

system by streamlining command and control

arrangements in view of the compressed decisionmaking timeframe, spelling out the operational

arrangement with U.S. forces, and examining

whether Japan should develop the capability to

strike preemptively enemy missile bases 16

■ deepening U.S.-Japan defense cooperation

by building on the 1997 Guidelines for Defense

Cooperation to allow SDF and U.S. forces, “whenever Japan deems necessary,” to work together

beyond the treaty area of the Far East in such areas

as international peace and stability operations and

in response to other emerging threats.

Viewed in the context of the larger debate,

the views put forward by the LDP Defense

Policy Subcommittee tilt toward the alliance

nationalist and neo-nationalist schools by

calling for a more activist Japanese role with

respect to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and

reducing the constraints on Japan’s autonomous defense activities. However, the group

also gives a nod to the internationalist school

in supporting Japan’s expanded cooperation

with UN activities. 

The Advisory Committee report issued in

October is consistent with the LDP Defense

Policy Subcommittee views in that it emphasizes

the need to strengthen both the alliance with the

United States and Japan’s ability to contribute to

building a peaceful international environment.

The committee did not directly address the

issues of constitutional revision and collective

self-defense, arguing that while these questions

were of great importance, no national consensus

had yet been reached. However, in an addendum, the committee did make two important

comments stating that Japan needs to:

■ distinguish between, and debate separately,

the right of collective self-defense by the nation

itself, and collective actions undertaken by the

United Nations (implicitly supporting the positions

of Okada and Ozawa of the DSP) 

■ distinguish between the use of force to

protect U.S. troops that are in and around the

nation to defend it from an armed attack, and to

help the United States expel invaders from a third

country. No committee member found the latter use

of force acceptable, but the group agreed that the

former needs further discussion. 

Most commentators expect that, following the

lead of the Advisory Committee, the National

Defense Program Outline will also avoid addressing directly the constitutional and collective self-defense issues. 

The Road Ahead

The LDP’s poor showing in the July 11,

2004, upper house election, coupled with the

gains of the DPJ and Komeito,17 has weakened

Koizumi’s ability to take on major new initiatives and likely delayed substantial movement

toward revision of the constitution until after

the next lower house election, expected in late

2006 or early 2007.18 The process, however, will

keep moving forward.

The next step will be the release of the

reports by the various committees studying

constitutional reform. The Lower House Committee will issue its report in May 2005, followed by the Upper House Committee. The

LDP Research Committee on the Constitution

is due to conclude its work in November

2005,19 and the DPJ will issue its report in late

2005 or early 2006. Once these reports are out,

the plan is to form a joint Diet committee to

consolidate the findings and make specific

recommendations.

Most observers believe that it will prove

impossible to come up with a consolidated text

and that the three major parties—the LDP,

DPJ, and Komeito—will put forward their own

proposals for amending the constitution as the

basis for their campaigns in the 2006–2007

lower house election. The winning party will

then use its text as the basis for trying to negotiate a “grand coalition” with the necessary

two-thirds vote to pass amendments, a process

that some predict could provoke a major realignment of Japanese political parties.

In the interim, the process of revising

Japan’s defense policy will gain momentum.

The government’s new NDPO is due by the end

of 2004. The next step will be to implement the

report recommendations in the form of a new

Mid-Term Defense Plan, followed by legislative

and budget authorizations, a process that could

take years. A key question will be the degree to

which the NDPO makes policy recommendations that go beyond the current constitutional

constraints on collective self-defense, without

waiting for the constitutional amendment

process to catch up. The domestic political

balance of forces and the external security

environment in turn will influence this.

With respect to the domestic political

scene, the impact of Koizumi’s weakened position on the substance of the NDPO is unclear.

On the one hand, Tokyo may be reluctant to

push the boundaries of existing constraints too

far in view of the strengthened position of the

DPJ and Komeito. On the other hand, with the

prospects fading for early amendment of the

constitution, the defense hawks will want to use

the NDPO process to advance on collective selfdefense as far as possible. Much will depend on

the priority that Koizumi gives to breaking new

ground on defense policy in comparison to his

domestic legislative priorities.

External Influences?

The future direction of debate on both the

NDPO and the timing and substance of the

constitutional question will be influenced by a

number of external factors. First, there is Iraq.

If the Iraqi transition turns out well, both those

advocating a closer alliance with the United

States and a more active Japanese role in

international peacekeeping activities will be

strengthened. Conversely, if the Iraqi experience

is widely seen as a mistake, both advocates of a

more autonomous defense and of a more

explicit UN mandate for the future dispatch of

SDF units will gain strength.

Within the region, the Korean situation

will loom large. A breakthrough on the kidnapping issue and success in the Six-Party Talks

would reduce the threat perception in Japan,

thereby lessening pressure to strengthen the

U.S. alliance. On the other hand, a crisis in

North Korea would cement support for BMD

cooperation and harden Japanese defense

policy. With respect to China, a Taiwan Strait

crisis, particularly if provoked by Beijing, would

strengthen Japanese support for the alliance

with the United States and for increasing defense capabilities and loosening legal and

policy constraints. But a breakthrough in crossstrait dialogue, coupled with a softer Chinese

line toward Japan, could reduce pressure to

strengthen Japan’s defense posture.

Harder to gauge, but also influential, will

be the broader question of confidence in the

United States. The Bush administration’s emphasis on the importance of the alliance and

Japan’s support for the United States after

No. 213, November 2004 Strategic Forum 7
September 11 and in Iraq have resulted in what

many on both sides of the Pacific call the “best

ever” U.S.-Japan relationship. There is growing

criticism of Koizumi’s “lock-step” alignment

with Washington, however, not only from the

opposition DPJ and the media, but also from

many in the bureaucracy and LDP. This objection relates to the American strategy in Iraq,

but there are also those who question U.S.

unilateralism and self-centeredness more

broadly. Perceived American missteps with

respect to a provocation on the Korean Peninsula or to a Taiwan Strait crisis, for example,

could give further ammunition to both the

Japanese left and right advocating more independence from the United States. If Washington is seen as fully consulting Tokyo and renewing its commitment to multilateral

cooperation and institutions, however, these

concerns in Japan are likely to dissipate.

Japan is turning a historic corner toward

amending Article IX of its constitution, but the

process is likely to be protracted and the implications for Japan’s defense policy evolutionary

rather than revolutionary. Japan will almost

certainly maintain the spirit if not the letter of

the first paragraph of Article IX, thereby preserving to some degree its unique status. At the same

time, the second paragraph of Article IX is likely

to be amended to legitimize the Self-Defense

Forces and clarify Japan’s right of self-defense.

A key question will be how Japan handles

the issue of collective self-defense. There is a

near-consensus in the LDP and among the DPJ

hawks that either by amendment, reinterpretation, or legislation in order to allow more

effective cooperation with the United States on

BMD and to give Japan more flexibility with

respect to international peacekeeping operations. Many in Japan remain concerned, however, that the removal of this constraint risks

Japan’s being drawn into adventures abroad,

particularly at the behest of the United States.

The most likely outcome is a compromise that

will establish the right of collective self-defense

but, at least initially, restrict its application to

the areas noted above.

Both the new NDPO and the later emergence of a revised constitution should provide

the framework for strengthening the U.S.-Japan

alliance. Bilateral cooperation is likely to increase with respect to ballistic missile defense,

support for contingencies on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait, and on sea line

protection. Japan also will likely emphasize

developing the force structure, transportation

capabilities, and policy flexibility it needs to

participate more fully in UN and other peacekeeping operations.

Indeed the biggest variable in the evolution of Japan’s defense policy will be the degree

to which Japan continues to consider the

United States a reliable partner that gives full

weight to Japan’s interests and international

norms as it carries out its responsibilities as

the world’s only superpower.

Notes1

“The Price of a Constitution,” Tetsuya Kataoka, 8. 

2

Ibid., 10.

3

In a recent poll, 80 percent of the Japanese public

supported placing sanctions on North Korea now. 4

The report, issued on October 11, 2000, by the Institute

for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University,

is formally titled “The United States and Japan: Advancing

Toward a Mature Partnership,” but it is universally known as the

Armitage-Nye report, or, more often, as the “Armitage Report.” 5

“We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone,

but that the laws of political morality are universal; and that

obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would

sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations. We, the Japanese people, pledge our

national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with

all our resources.” 6

One of the most straightforward statements in this regard

was made by Prime Minister Koizumi in a June 27, 2004, NHK

Television interview when he stated, “In order to defend Japan,

the U.S. has worked with Japan under the Mutual Security Treaty,

but Japan cannot take joint action with U.S. forces and is not

allowed to exercise the right of collective self-defense. Such a

situation is strange.” Asahi Shimbun, June 29, 2004. 7

Former LDP president Yohei Kono openly opposes

amending the constitution; former LDP secretary general Koichi

Kato is described by one monthly magazine as “hidden protector

of the constitution.” 8

Article 96 of the current constitution stipulates that an

amendment must receive a two-thirds affirmative vote of both

houses of the Diet, followed by a majority of all votes cast in a

national referendum, but leaves to the Diet the specific arrangements for the latter. 9

Analysis in this section is based upon Japanese press

reporting and the author’s conversations with Japanese politicians, scholars, bureaucrats, and journalists. 

10 The April 8, 2004, Mainichi Shimbun reports that at an

April 7 meeting of the Upper House Research Commission on the

Constitution, a number of LDP supporters of the right of collective self-defense voiced concern that Japan will become involved

in “America’s unilateralism” unless “limits are put in place.” 11 Okada, in a July 29, 2004, address in the United States,

took the position that Japan could use force overseas only if the

constitution was revised and if there was a “clear UN Security

Council resolution.” Ozawa argues that Japan can participate in

UN-sanctioned military actions under the present constitution.

Both agree that Japan should not be permitted to join the United

States if it takes “unilateral” military action in the absence of a

UN Security Council resolution. 12 This analysis is based upon the author’s interviews with

more than 50 political leaders, senior bureaucrats, academics,

journalists, and other opinion leaders. 13 For example, Article 43 of the Charter which states, inter

alia, “All member of the United Nations . . . undertake to make

available to the Security Council . . . armed forces,

assistance... necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.” 14 The May 2004 edition of the monthly magazine

Shokun! produced a diagram purporting to show the orientation

of Japanese political leaders on an axis of “reliance on the U.S.”

or “Independent Defense.” 15 In an April 24, 2004, Yomiuri Shimbun poll that posed

the question, “Who would you like to see as the next Prime

Minister?” Ishihara topped the list with 26.5 percent. 16 As noted above, the government of Japan has taken the

position since 1956 that such action represents a constitutionally

permissible act of self-defense. 17 The constitutional issue figured little in the election

campaign. The poor LDP showing is attributed to unhappiness

with the handling of pension reform, continuing economic

stagnation at the local level, and Koizumi’s announcement at the

G–8 Summit, without prior consultation with the Diet, that

Japan would put its forces in Iraq under the control of the

multinational force established after the transfer of sovereignty. 18 In July 6, 2004, remarks at a Center for Strategic and

International Studies conference in Washington, DC, former LDP

policy chief and defense expert Taku Yamazaki predicted that the

next lower house election would be fought over specific recommendations on constitutional reform. 19 According to the May 10, 2004, Tokyo Shimbun, the LDP

Commission has already decided to maintain the first paragraph

of Article IX and to rewrite the second paragraph to stipulate

Japan’s right of self-defense and to maintain armed forces.

8 Strategic Forum No. 213, November 2004

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