inss.ndu.edu SF No. 289 1 

China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei all claim 

some or all of the land features and maritime territory in the South 

China Sea. One notable aspect of the South China Sea dispute is that 

its advocates argue past one another with little reference to a common set of 

facts. Another is the absence of comprehensive data on the actions claimants 

have taken to advance or protect their claims. The Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the National Defense University (NDU) set out to create a comprehensive database documenting the various tactics pursued by South 

China Sea claimants over an 18-year timeframe (1995–2013). This paper draws 

upon that data to analyze what tactics South China Sea claimants are employing 

and to present some potential considerations for U.S. and allied policymakers.

Methodology

The database was constructed using extensive open source searches of actions that South China Sea claimants took to defend or advance their territorial 

claims, cataloguing more than 1,200 discrete actions between 1995 and 2013.1

These actions were grouped into 9 categories encompassing 39 separate tactics. 

The nine categories are paramilitary actions; military actions; economic actions; 

diplomatic actions, including coalition diplomacy, negotiation, and dispute management; legal actions; informational actions; and administrative actions. The 

categories and tactics are described in the inset box.

Although the database allows empirical analysis of claimant behavior, it has 

a number of practical limitations. First, actions included in the database were 

gleaned from Open Source Center reports identified and translated by U.S. Government analysts; time and manpower limitations did not permit more comprehensive foreign language searches in the media of the claimant countries. Second, 

An Empirical Analysis of

Claimant Tactics in the South

China Sea

by Christopher D. Yung and Patrick McNulty

STRATEGIC FORUM

National Defense University

About the Authors

Dr. Christopher D. Yung was a Senior 

Research Fellow in the Center for 

the Study of Chinese Military Affairs 

(CSCMA), Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, at the National 

Defense University from 2009–2015. 

He is now the Donald Bren Chair 

of Non-Western Strategic Thought 

at the Marine Corps University. 

Patrick McNulty is a CSCMA Contract 

Researcher.

Key Points

◆ China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei have 

used a wide variety of tactics to 

protect and advance their maritime 

territorial claims in the South China 

Sea. China is the most active user of 

the nine categories of tactics identified in this paper, with the exception of legal actions, and accounts 

for more than half of all military 

and paramilitary actions since 1995.

◆ Empirical data support the argument that the 2011 U.S. rebalance 

to Asia did not spur disruptive 

behavior in the South China Sea. 

China became more active in 

protecting and advancing its claims 

around 2009, before the rebalance 

was announced.

◆ The unclassified database used in 

this analysis undercounts military 

and paramilitary actions, but captures enough activity to provide a 

representative sample. A classified 

version that captures more activity 

would improve the potential to develop the database into an Indications and Warning tool to assist in 

monitoring and managing tensions 

in the South China Sea.

August 2015

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CHINESE MILITARY AFFAIRS
2 SF No. 289 inss.ndu.edu

Nine Categories of Tactics

Paramilitary actions (PM) represent the use of law enforcement or other paramilitary organizations to advance a state’s claim. These are actions involving use of lethal force (PM1), movement into a disputed territory (PM2), movement in response to the movement of a rival (PM3), 

reinforcement of a presence already in place (PM4), and movement out of a disputed territory 

(PM5). Military actions (M) capture the use of military forces to advance a state’s claim. The associated tactics of this category mirror those of the paramilitary category (M1 to M5). 

Economic actions (E) reflect the use of economic statecraft by a state in an attempt to 

influence its rivals. The specific tactics involved range from imposing sanctions on a rival (E1) 

and entering into third-party deals to the exclusion of rival claimants (E2) to entering into joint 

economic or development deals with a rival claimant (E3) and bestowing generous or lucrative 

economic terms upon a rival as an inducement to agreement (E4). 

Diplomatic actions encompass a wide range of activities. For the purposes of this assessment, they were divided into three subcategories. Coalition diplomacy (CD) refers to actions 

by representatives of one of the claimant states to either form coalitions or to prevent their 

formation by rival claimants in diplomatic settings such as at the ASEAN Defense Ministerial 

Meeting Plus. Negotiation actions (N) refer to actions in which the claimants attempt to advance 

or protect their territorial claims by either seeking to resolve the dispute through a negotiation/

bargaining process or conversely by stalling or obstructing the resolution of the dispute diplomatically. Dispute management (DM) describes actions taken by the claimant to lower tensions 

and infuse stability in a tense security situation. They include recommendations for confidencebuilding measures and calls for codes of conduct. 

Legal actions (L) encompass the range of activities states can take within the legal sphere 

to protect or advance their territorial claims. These can involve refusing to participate in a legal 

proceeding (L1), obfuscating, delaying, or making participation in a legal proceeding difficult 

(L2), vigorously making a state’s case in a legal proceeding and forcing a rival claimant to participate (L3), vigorously making a state’s case before an international court but not forcing another 

claimant to participate (L4), and, finally, settling a legal dispute outside of an international court 

or an international legal proceeding (L5). 

Informational actions (I) represent the use of strategic communications to make the case 

for territorial claims. They range from government spokespeople making statements or press 

releases (I1) and government spokespeople or organs of the government writing newspaper or 

journal articles (I2) to the use of experts and other authorities writing in social media (I3). 

Administrative actions (A) represent domestic actions undertaken by the state to bureaucratically prepare or to give subordinate municipalities or enforcement units the authorization to 

take action in protecting the country’s territorial claims. Examples include passing a national law 

setting out a state’s maritime territorial boundaries and authorizing the state to protect the maritime territorial claim (A1), assigning responsibility of a local province or municipality to protect the 

country’s maritime territorial claim (A2), and assigning specific responsibility to a local military or 

paramilitary unit to enforce the maritime territorial laws and rights of the country (A3).
inss.ndu.edu SF No. 289 3 

the data are derived from open sources. As numerous 

commentators have pointed out, claimant countries may 

seek to keep their actions secret and not report them in 

the media. A classified version of this analysis would 

likely produce a larger pool of actions. Third, categorizing actions requires a degree of subjective judgment. 

China’s insistence that the dispute could be resolved 

only via bilateral negotiations at the 2012 Association 

of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM+) in Phnom Penh could be 

interpreted as a tactic to prevent a coalition from being 

formed against China or as a sincere effort to negotiate 

a resolution to the dispute. Finally, the study emphasizes 

discrete actions rather than ongoing efforts to maintain 

presence or to exert control over disputed waters or land 

features. For example, the May 2014 China-Vietnam 

oil rig standoff (an event not included in the database2

) 

involved dozens of Chinese vessels and scores of collisions, but would generate only a few entries in the database: China’s movement of paramilitary and military 

forces into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 

Vietnam’s response with its coast guard, and the information campaigns associated with both actions. This 

approach makes counting more manageable, but means 

that the database does not fully depict the magnitude of 

all claimant military and paramilitary actions.

Major Findings

Volume of Actions. Figure 1 provides a graphical 

representation of the data that the NDU team collected. 

The data illustrate that China took the most actions to 

support its claims in the South China Sea from 1995 to 

2013 (500). The next most active claimant is the Philippines (303), followed by Vietnam (161), Taiwan (154), 

Malaysia (70), and Brunei (27). China’s high level of 

activity reflects the wide range of instruments available. 

China not only used its military and paramilitary forces 

to pressure its rivals, but also utilized economic actions, 

legal actions, information actions (also known as strategic communications), and administrative actions. China 

also takes vigorous diplomatic actions to protect and advance its territorial claims

Military and Paramilitary Actions. Figure 2 confirms 

a point that many have argued: China is the most active 

user of military and paramilitary forces to protect and advance its claims. Chinese military and paramilitary actions 

since 1995 constitute over 50 percent of such actions in 

the South China Sea. By contrast, the combined military 

625

500

375

250

125

0

China Vietnam Brunei Military

Paramilitary

Economic

Legal

Coalition Diplomacy

Negotiation

Dispute Management

Administrative

Information

Philippines Malaysia Taiwan

Figure 1. Total Actions by State by Category, 1995–2013
4 SF No. 289 inss.ndu.edu

and paramilitary actions by other claimants roughly equal 

those of China. This analysis is based solely on unclassified data; classified data would likely reveal many more 

military and paramilitary actions, a point confirmed when 

presenting this data to international audiences.3

Information Actions. Information actions are relatively 

inexpensive, and thus all claimant countries have the ability to compete in this domain. China, however, uses information actions more frequently than any other claimant. 

During the 1995–2013 timeframe, China used strategic 

communications some 156 times. While the Philippines 

and Vietnam also actively used press statements, the media, 

and social media to shape domestic and international public opinion during this period (133 and 66 actions, respectively), China’s other rival claimants made less use of this 

instrument: Taiwan (93), Malaysia (28), and Brunei (10). 

Information actions are the most frequently used tactic and 

accompany almost every other recorded tactical action. The 

large volume of Chinese information actions likely reflects 

the fact that China has a well-developed and centralized 

propaganda apparatus and a strong desire to demonstrate 

that it is defending its sovereignty.

Economic Actions. Given the importance of economics in the Asia-Pacific region, it should not be 

surprising that economic actions make up part of 

the toolkit that claimant countries use to advance or 

protect their claims. China was the greatest user of 

economic actions to advance and protect its territorial 

claims (75 actions). Vietnam and the Philippines were 

competitors in this arena (16 and 36 actions, respectively), while Malaysia and Brunei rarely used these 

instruments of influence (3 and 2 times, respectively). 

Economic actions can involve positive inducements 

for a rival claimant to comply with a state’s interests. 

One example is the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking ( JMSU) agreement signed by China, the Philippines, and Vietnam in March 2005. As signatories, the 

three countries agreed to conduct joint research into 

petroleum resource potential as part of efforts to turn 

the disputed area into a zone of peace, stability, cooperation, and joint development in accordance with the 

1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea 

and the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties 

in the South China Sea.4

Figure 2. Military and Paramilitary Actions by State, 1995–2013

China Vietnam Brunei

Military Total Paramilitary Total

Philippines Malaysia Taiwan

89

59

43

17

4

9

5

4

5

22

10
inss.ndu.edu SF No. 289 5 

The Chinese government provided a number of economic inducements to get the Philippines to agree. After 

complaining about the bilateral nature of the agreement 

for 6 months, Vietnam ultimately joined. The JMSU 

could have served as a foundation for joint exploitation 

of South China Sea resources, but it unraveled when 

the government of then-President Gloria MacapagalArroyo came under fierce criticism from opponents in 

the Philippine legislature, causing the government to 

withdraw from the deal. China had offered generous 

economic inducements for the Philippines and Vietnam 

to agree to the JMSU, but once the agreement ended all 

of the parties quickly reverted to negative behavior and 

imposed economic sanctions. Vietnam also immediately 

initiated discussions and agreements with third-country 

oil companies from outside Southeast Asia.

Legal Actions. Because the legal system can empower weaker countries, it is not surprising that the Philippines has vigorously pursued the use of international 

courts, international arbitration, and other international 

legal venues to argue its case. As figure 1 illustrates, the 

Philippines made greater use of legal tactics to protect its 

claims (21 instances) than China (12 instances). China’s 

basic approach has been defensive, denying that the International Court of Justice, International Tribunal on 

Law of the Sea, or any other legal court has jurisdiction 

to rule on sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. 

The Philippines not only submitted its claim to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea in China’s 

absence, but also has cooperated with the International 

Court of Justice to select a group of highly qualified legal 

officers as arbitrators. China has attempted to lobby for 

its case in the informational sphere by publishing its position in legal journals.5

Diplomatic Actions. Because diplomacy represents 

the most direct path to conveying a state’s foreign policy 

objectives to others, it plays a central role in advancing 

or protecting a state’s position on territorial claims. The 

NDU database divides diplomatic actions into three distinct categories: “Coalition Diplomacy,” involving the 

formation of coalitions to support a claimant’s position 

or the breaking up of the coalitions of rivals; “Negotiations,” involving bargaining to advance one’s position or 

a refusal to negotiate; and “Dispute Management,” involving efforts to defuse tensions via confidence-building 

measures or codes of conduct. To assess diplomatic tactics in-depth, the database examined claimant actions in 

diplomatic venues such as the ADMM+ and negotiations on the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties and 

a potential Code of Conduct governing behavior in the 

South China Sea.

A number of key patterns emerged. First, it was clear 

that both Vietnam and the Philippines sought to bring 

in regional institutions such as ASEAN to help manage 

the South China Sea dispute and that China insisted on 

resolving disputes bilaterally, a position that favors stronger powers. China was quite vigorous in attempting to 

break up coalitions being formed by its rivals; it refused 

to engage in multilateral negotiations, and agreed in 

principle on confidence-building measures but remained 

unwilling to sign a binding code of conduct. Vietnam 

and the Philippines sought to build coalitions with the 

other ASEAN member states to strengthen their bargaining position with China. China sought to break up 

these coalitions by refusing to engage in multilateral 

negotiations and by offering generous economic incentives to some ASEAN states (for example, Cambodia) to 

obstruct multilateral diplomatic initiatives.6

 China also 

appealed to the “us versus them” aspect of the dispute by 

insisting that U.S. offers to broker a deal would complicate the issue and would not result in a resolution.7

Actions Linked to Military and Paramilitary Capabilities. One initial hypothesis was that the types of 

tactics employed by claimants would vary according to 

the extent of the capabilities of the maritime forces associated with the rival claimants or, in other words, the 

power that claimants can bring to bear in the South 

China Sea. Claimants can be divided into three groups: 

highly capable forces (China, with a sizable navy and 

coast guard able to project power far from its shores, sustain its force for prolonged periods of time, and surge 

additional numbers of vessels into a conflict situation); 
6 SF No. 289 inss.ndu.edu

medium capability forces (Vietnam, the Philippines, 

Malaysia, and Taiwan, each with either a navy or a coast 

guard able to provide modest protection for littoral areas for a short duration); and limited capability forces 

(Brunei, with a small number of naval and coast guard 

forces able to provide only minimal protection for a short 

period of time).8

 Research confirmed that the tactics 

employed by claimants vary according to the capabilities of their armed forces and law enforcement agencies. 

The country with the most capable naval and coast guard 

forces (China) was most willing to employ military and 

paramilitary forces, insisted on bilateral negotiations, was 

less reliant on legal actions and multilateral approaches 

to resolving the dispute, and was most insistent on leaving outside powers and organizations out of the dispute 

resolution process. By contrast, the country with the 

smallest maritime armed forces (Brunei) was least willing to use military and paramilitary tactics, relied heavily 

on multilateral organizations to represent its positions, 

adopted a “lay low” approach to the dispute, and did not 

use vigorous legal tactics to protect its claims. Countries 

with medium capability forces employed both bilateral 

and multilateral approaches, sometimes used military 

and paramilitary forces (not as much as China, however), relied more heavily on legal means to protect their 

claims, and sought to bring in outside powers to influence or counterbalance China. Despite its rather sizable 

maritime territorial claim, Taiwan behaved in accordance 

with its medium capability force. The one exception is 

Malaysia, whose medium capability force and “lay low” 

strategy more closely resembled the behavior of a limited 

capability force claimant such as Brunei.

Origins of Heightened Tensions in the South China 

Sea. Chinese and American experts disagree on the origins of heightened tensions over maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The Chinese blame the 

Obama administration’s rebalance to Asia policy for increasing regional tensions and encouraging rival claimants to take actions to challenge Chinese claims. Chinese 

experts argue that China is simply responding to the irresponsible actions of other claimants. Many U.S. experts 

deny that the rebalance is the root cause of the tensions 

in the South China Sea, and argue that China moved 

from its decade-long “charm offensive” to a more aggressive posture in early 2009.9

 Some analysts argue that the 

conclusion of China’s 2008 Olympics was a green light 

for the Chinese military and law enforcement agencies to 

start acting more vigorously in support of China’s claims.10

Figure 3 shows the number of actions undertaken by 

China from 2004 to 2013 and illustrates that China’s actions to support its claims spiked during the 2008–2009 

timeframe. This suggests that the U.S. rebalance to Asia 

2004 2006 2009

China

2005 2008 2010

10

2007

8 4

13

3 6 10

0 1 6 0 1 7 3

15

39

15

7

22

8 4

27 27 28

161

47

88

41

9

41

2011 2012 2013

Vietnam Philippines

Figure 3. Total Actions by China, Vietnam, and the Philippines, 2004–2013
inss.ndu.edu SF No. 289 7 

is not the source of tensions in the South China Sea since 

the rebalance policy was not formally announced until 

late 2011.11 At the same time, there is some evidence to 

suggest that China’s claim that it was responding to provocative actions by others is not entirely without merit. 

Figure 3 also shows increases in Philippine actions in 

support of its South China Sea claims in 2008, which 

exceed those of China in the same year. These spikes are 

not as large as the jump in Chinese actions in 2009, but 

demonstrate that the Philippines became more active at 

approximately the same time. However, a detailed examination suggests that increased Philippine actions in 

2008 were mostly related to domestic debates about the 

Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking agreement and did 

not cause China’s increased activity.

Taiwan. One surprising finding is Taiwan’s active 

defense of its maritime territorial claims. The total actions Taiwan undertook in defense of its claims rivaled 

Vietnam and exceeded Malaysia and Brunei. Taiwan 

used military and paramilitary assets to defend its claims, 

but made much less use of legal and diplomatic instruments than its rivals. Taiwan’s ambiguous international 

legal status limits its ability to defend its interests in 

many diplomatic and legal venues.

Action-Reaction in South China Sea Claimant Actions. The data show that one claimant’s action usually 

generates a response from others, a finding in accordance 

with the social science literature.12 The response is usually 

within the same category and in an action-reaction manner, with positive actions generating positive responses 

and negative actions generating negative responses. This 

dynamic can generate a chain reaction of negative responses to the original action that persists for some time.

The most obvious example of action-reaction behavior is the ongoing legal battle between the Philippines 

and China over the submission of claims to the International Tribunal on Law of the Sea. The Philippines’ use 

of this legal instrument was met by China’s denial that 

the court had any jurisdiction in the matter. A second 

example is the use of military and paramilitary force. 

As figures 4 and 5 illustrate, Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal represented prolonged efforts by both 

the Chinese and Philippine sides to wear out the other 

through increased military or paramilitary activity and by 

responding to the other’s actions with greater intensity. 

As figure 5 illustrates, China’s greater capacity eventually 

overwhelmed the Philippines. As these examples demonstrate, most of the action-reaction dynamics identified 

were negative actions undertaken by one of the claimants 

followed by a negative reaction by a rival with a potential 

to escalate. Although some positive action-reaction dynamics were identified (for example, the use of economic 

inducements) in the research, these activities were rarer 

than negative actions.

Responses Tend to Remain within the Same Category. Another interesting finding is that once an action 

takes place, actions and reactions tend to remain within the same tactical category. There is little evidence of 

horizontal escalation. If the Philippines files suit against 

China in an international court, China’s responses tend 

to remain within the legal sphere. An economic action, 

whether positive or negative, tends to generate responses 

within the economic domain. The main exception to this 

rule, mentioned previously, is that many actions are accompanied by an information campaign.

Another exception is when one claimant takes a serious military or paramilitary action, and the response by 

a rival begins a process of vertical escalation. In this case, 

claimants do employ tactics outside the military or paramilitary domain. Research showed some horizontal escalation. One interpretation is that once serious military and 

paramilitary actions and responses begin, claimants have a 

strong incentive to use all instruments of power to compel 

the other side to acquiesce. In other words, if a crisis escalates to a high level, the gloves come off. Another interpretation is that a horizontal escalation in tactics may begin 

early in a tense standoff but that outside observers may 

not observe the dynamic. By the time military and paramilitary forces are engaged in a crisis setting, the use of 

other elements of power is more apparent. In theory, such 

activities should be researchable. However, NDU found 

that data and reporting have not been precise enough to 
8 SF No. 289 inss.ndu.edu

track the cause and effect of related tactics early enough in 

a campaign leading to a crisis.

Changes in China’s Capabilities and the Mischief 

Reef and Scarborough Shoal Cases. Figures 4 and 5 compare the standoffs between the Philippines and China 

at Mischief Reef in 1995 and at Scarborough Shoal in 

2012. Over this period, China significantly expanded its 

naval and paramilitary capabilities, increasing its ability 

to project power and maintain presence throughout the 

South China Sea.13 In the Mischief Reef incident—in 

which Chinese troops occupied the shoal, well within 

the 200-nautical- mile EEZ of the Philippines, and then 

constructed three structures purportedly to house fishermen—a naval confrontation ensued.14 In the Scarborough Shoal incident, a confrontation between China and 

the Philippines began when two Chinese law enforcement vessels, six Chinese fishing boats, and a Philippine 

navy ship were involved in a standoff at the shoal. When 

the Philippine navy tried to stop Chinese fishermen from 

making off with sharks, clams, and rare corals poached 

from the area, the Chinese maritime surveillance ships 

intervened, leading to a diplomatic standoff that lasted 

several months.15

The first observation, based on analysis of the NDU 

database, is that in the Mischief Reef case, China relied 

on naval forces and did not employ paramilitary forces 

during the dispute. In the Scarborough Shoal case, China 

made extensive use of its paramilitary forces and much 

smaller use of its military. The second observation is that 

at Mischief Reef there was relative balance between Chinese and Philippine forces. In the Scarborough Shoal case, 

China was able to overwhelm the Philippines and can be 

considered the victor in the crisis. A third observation is 

that other claimants were much more active in the Mischief Reef case than in the Scarborough Shoal case. Both 

Vietnam and Taiwan took advantage of the crisis to move 

forces and reinforce their occupied territories.

Although not apparent from the data, another distinction is the pattern of de-escalation. In the Mischief 

Reef incident, China engaged in robust diplomacy with 

the Philippines, and Chinese diplomats and media 

strongly signaled the need to de-escalate and end the 

Figure 4. Mischief Reef Data, January–October 1995

30

23

15

8

0

M1

China

Philippines

Vietnam

Malaysia

Taiwan

M2 M3 M4 M5 PM1 PM2 PM3 PM4 PM5 I1

See inset box for key.
inss.ndu.edu SF No. 289 9 

crisis. China’s foreign ministry spokespeople used conciliatory language (for example, stressing international law as the basis for resolving the dispute).16 In the 

Scarborough Shoal case, China did not signal a desire 

to de-escalate and end the crisis.17 De-escalation occurred only after the direct intervention of the United 

States, which offered to serve as a go between for the 

two countries. Both countries agreed to remove their 

paramilitary and military ships, but China subsequently 

redeployed maritime surveillance ships to block Philippine access to the shoal. It has maintained a presence 

there ever since.18

Implications for U.S. Policy

The findings suggest a number of policy implications. First, China is using broad and varied instruments 

of influence and coercion to affect the decision calculus 

of its rivals. This suggests the need for an equally nuanced policy response from the United States and more 

effective interagency coordination and planning than has 

been the case in the past.

Second, the U.S. rebalance to Asia is not the source 

of heightened regional tensions over maritime sovereignty disputes, which predate the announcement of 

the rebalance. The empirical data used in this study do 

not support Chinese arguments that the rebalance has 

encouraged rival claimants to undertake provocative 

actions. The unclassified nature of the NDU database 

makes it a useful public diplomacy tool that U.S. policymakers can use to refute the Chinese narrative in both 

public and private discussions.

Third, the data suggest that the one area of competition where China does not enjoy an advantage is 

in the legal sphere. This is surprising given the Chinese 

emphasis on lawfare and the “Three Warfares” in its strategic literature.19 The Philippines has been more active 

in using legal tactics, and China has been in a reactive 

mode. The United States should not alter its policy of 

remaining neutral over the content of the sovereignty 

disputes. However, since legal venues offer one means 

of resolving these disputes peacefully, the United States 

might consider encouraging China’s maritime rivals to 

Figure 5. Scarborough Shoal Data, April–December 2012

20

15

10

5

0

M1

China

Philippines

Vietnam

Malaysia

Brunei

M2 M3 M4 M5 PM1 PM2 PM3 PM4 PM5 I1

25

Taiwan

I2 I3

See inset box for key.
10 SF No. 289 inss.ndu.edu

bring their claims before international courts. The United States might also consider aligning its South China 

Sea policy more clearly on the basis of international law. 

The Department of State’s recent publication of its legal 

interpretation of the South China Sea claims is a step in 

this direction.20

Fourth, China appears to have foresworn the use of 

lethal force for now and is carefully calibrating its coercive acts so as not to invite U.S. interference and to avoid 

the creation of an anti-China regional coalition. The fact 

that China has not used lethal force in the South China 

Sea since 1988 is significant. This suggests that Beijing is 

attempting to keep its actions beneath a threshold that 

invites adverse political or military responses. China may 

be engaging in a “status quo plus” approach to maritime 

territorial dispute management, maintaining the status 

quo until a rival acts to advance its territorial claims, and 

then responding vigorously to leave its rival in a disadvantaged position. The United States might respond by 

making greater efforts to build the capacity of its allies 

and partners through foreign military sales, combined 

exercises, other military exchanges and training, and 

by thinking through what the thresholds should be in 

responding to aggressive Chinese actions with tougher 

U.S. policy actions.

Fifth, the data illustrate that ASEAN plays an 

important role for all the claimants in the South China Sea dispute. The smaller claimants use the association as a venue to voice their positions on the dispute; 

the medium-size claimants use it as a rallying point to 

form a unified coalition against China; and China uses 

it and the ASEAN Regional Forum meetings to divide 

its rivals diplomatically and to portray itself as willing to 

pursue peaceful resolution of the disputes. For U.S. policy regarding the South China Sea territorial disputes, 

ASEAN is going to play some kind of role. The NDU 

research focused on diplomatic tactics shows that China 

is actively attempting to break up coalitions and forming coalitions of its own. These findings strongly suggest 

that deft U.S. leadership and involvement in diplomacy 

related to ASEAN gatherings can help amplify the costs 

of aggressive Chinese behavior.

Directions for Future Research

This paper illustrates the value of a database on 

claimant tactics; NDU is currently working to update 

and expand the coverage of the database. One analytic 

direction would be to identify actions that trigger escalation into a crisis and thereby gain a deeper understanding 

of escalation dynamics by creating a detailed chronology of military, paramilitary, and other actions associated 

with the Mischief Reef or Scarborough Shoal crises. 

Second, it would be interesting to explore correlations 

between claimant actions and seasonal or political calendars. Is there a relationship between national elections or 

power transitions and provocative tactics to assert maritime claims? Are fishermen more active or more likely 

to be harassed by the coast guards or law enforcement 

agencies of other claimants at certain times of the year? 

Third, are military or paramilitary confrontations more 

likely to occur near recorded boundaries, EEZs, or other 

territorial markers of the claimants? Fourth, are the tactics actually employed by individual claimants consistent 

with their national strategies? 

The current unclassified database has several advantages. The authors have been able to brief the findings to 

U.S. think tanks and academic conferences and to claimant 

embassies, foreign think tanks, and foreign military research 

institutes. The fact that the data and analysis are unclassified makes them useful in strategic communications efforts 

to transmit the U.S. foreign policy message. The data and 

analysis also have the potential to support conversations 

or dialogues between rival claimants and other interested 

parties. Although this unclassified database clearly does not 

capture all of the actions taking place in the South China 

Sea, audiences nevertheless believe it is a sufficiently robust 

sample to be representative and useful.

Conclusion

Empirical analysis of the South China Sea maritime 

territorial disputes reveals that rival claimants use a wide 
inss.ndu.edu SF No. 289 11 

range of tactics to advance or protect their claims. China 

has been the most active and prolific user of tactics as 

well as the most prone to use military and paramilitary 

forces. However, with the exception of Malaysia and 

Brunei, the other claimants have also been willing to use 

military and paramilitary forces to protect their claims.

One important note is that the 1995–2013 timeframe marked a period of relative restraint in the South 

China Sea dispute, with most countries (including China) seeking to avoid the use of lethal force or escalation 

into a shooting war. China appears to have a self-imposed upper limit on how much coercion it will use to 

protect its interests, but it is unclear how long this limit 

will remain in place. Some of China’s rivals also appear to 

have self-imposed limits on the tactics they employ. Although the Philippines has engaged in an aggressive use 

of international law to protect its claims against China, 

other claimants, such as Vietnam, have been reluctant to 

follow suit. Malaysia and Brunei have also been reluctant 

to use military and paramilitary instruments to assert 

their claims in the South China Sea.

Another larger conclusion is that actions and reactions usually stay in the same domain, accompanied by 

information actions to justify the tactics employed and 

reiterate territorial claims. The exception is when military/paramilitary action/reaction dynamics generate a 

crisis that attracts public attention. At that point, claimants begin to employ horizontal escalation and use tactics from other categories.

The current unclassified database has considerable 

value as a tool to inform and support U.S. policy, as a 

strategic engagement instrument, and as a platform for 

discussions with Asian countries about the South China 

Sea. However, a classified version might improve fidelity 

by capturing more claimant military and paramilitary activity, thereby permitting more detailed analysis of crisis 

and escalation dynamics. 

Feedback from U.S. Government officials also 

suggests that the NDU database could be refined to 

become a useful Indications and Warning tool. Future 

refinements might include identifying actions likely to 

trigger a crisis or conflict, exploring crisis and escalation dynamics, improving the ability to capture and 

analyze military and paramilitary presence, and examining seasonal or domestic political influences on 

claimant behavior.

Notes 1 The Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs research 

team conducted two open source searches to build the database. The 

first search involved an open source search using the six claimant 

countries and “South China Sea” as search terms. The team also collected data for Singapore, Indonesia, and the Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations, but these data were not analyzed in this paper. The 

second search involved targeted searches on case studies addressing 

major incidents, such as military and paramilitary cases (Mischief 

Reef and Scarborough Shoal), an economic case (the Joint Marine 

Seismic Undertaking agreement among China, the Philippines, and 

Vietnam), and legal cases (the 2009 submission of claims to the 

United Nations Commission on Limitations of the Continental 

Shelf and 2013 Philippine submission of a claim to the International 

Tribunal on Law of the Sea).

2 The data collection effort for this analysis was concluded in 

2013. Since that time, the claimants have undertaken additional 

actions that were not collected or analyzed in the database. These 

include recent attempts at land reclamation, commercial development 

of occupied land features, and the spring 2014 confrontation between 

China and Vietnam when China placed an oil rig within Vietnam’s 

exclusive economic zone and surrounded it with law enforcement and 

naval vessels. These activities will be assessed in follow-on efforts to 

analyze claimant tactics in the South China Sea.

3 The data have been presented at China’s National Defense 

University and National Institute for South China Sea Studies, the 

Washington embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and 

Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies.

4 “Philippines, China, Vietnam to Conduct Joint Marine 

Seismic Research in South China Sea,” People’s Daily, March 15, 2005, 

available at <en.people.cn/200503/15/eng20050315_176845.html>.

5 Gao Zhiguo, “The Nine-Dashline in the South China Sea: 

History, Status, and Implications,” American Journal of International 

Law 107, no. 1 ( January 2013).

6 Irwin Loy, “ASEAN Concludes, Exposing S. China Sea 

Rifts,” VOA News, July 13, 2012, accessed at <www.voanews.com/

content/South-China-Sea-rifts-exposed-as-ASEAN-meetingconcludes/1404171.html>. Additionally, interviews with selected 

Southeast Asian diplomats confirmed this to be the case.

7 Hao Zhou, “PRC FM Says China Not in Row with ASEAN,” 

Global Times, July 7, 2012.

8 Felix K. Chang, “China’s Naval Rise and the South China Sea: 

An Operational Assessment,” Orbis 56, no. 1 (Winter 2012), available 

at <www.fpri.org/articles/2012/01/chinas-naval-rise-and-southchina-sea-operational-assessment>.

9 For an overview of U.S. and Chinese interpretations, see 

Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Role in Asia: Attractive or Assertive?” in International Relations of Asia, ed. David Shambaugh and 

Michael Yahuda, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 

2014), 160–166. Also see Andrew Scobell and Scott W. Harold, “An 

‘Assertive’ China? Insights from Interviews,” Asian Security 9, no. 2 

(May–August 2013), 111–131.
12 SF No. 289 inss.ndu.edu

10 Yasuhiro Matsuda, How to Understand China’s Assertiveness 

Since 2009: Hypothesis and Policy Implications (Washington, DC: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014), 5, available at 

<http://csis.org/files/publication/140422_Matsuda_ChinasAssertiveness.pdf>.

11 See Phillip C. Saunders, The Rebalance to Asia: U.S.-China Relations and Regional Security, INSS Strategic Forum 281 (Washington, 

DC: NDU Press, 2013); and David J. Berteau, Michael J. Green, and 

Zack Cooper, Assessing the Asia-Pacific Rebalance (Washington, DC: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014).

12 The best-known academic work on this subject is Robert 

Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Cambridge, MA: Basic Books, 

1984). Also see Robert Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation: AgentBased Models of Competition and Collaboration (Princeton: Princeton 

University Press, 1997).

13 See Andrew Erickson, “Navy Intel Charts Chinese Sea 

Change: Office of Naval Intel Releases First Unclassified Report in 

Six Years,” China Analysis from Original Sources, available at <www.

AndrewErickson.com/2015/04/navy-intel-charts-Chinese-seachange-office-of-naval-intelligence-releases-first-unclassified-planreport-in-six-years>. See also Chang.

14 Christopher C. Joyner, “The Spratly Islands Dispute in the 

South China Sea: Problems, Policies, and Prospects for Diplomatic 

Accommodation,” in Investigating Confidence Building Measures in the 

Asia Pacific Region, Report No. 28, ed. Ranjeet K. Singh (Washington, 

DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1999), 73, available at <www.stimson.

org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/cbmapspratly.pdf>.

15 Jane Perlez, “Philippines and China Ease Tensions in Rift 

at Sea,” New York Times, June 18, 2012, available at <www.nytimes.

com/2012/06/19/world/asia/beijing-and-manila-ease-tensions-insouth-china-sea.html>.

16 Christopher Chung, “Southeast Asia and the South China 

Sea Dispute,” in Security and International Politics in the South China 

Sea, ed. Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers (New York: Routledge, 

2008), 99.

17 Perlez.

18 Ibid.

19 On the subject of Chinese use of legal warfare and the 

concept of “Three Warfares,” see Peter A. Dutton, testimony before 

the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China’s 

View of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control, February 27, 

2008, available at <www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/08_02_27_dutton_statement.pdf>. Also see Dean Cheng, Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Legal Warfare, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder 

#2692 (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, May 21, 2012). 

For Chinese writing on the subject, see Jin Hongbin, “Legal Warfare: 

Sharp Tool to ‘Seize the Opportunity to Grab the Initiative,’” Renmin 

Haijun [People’s Navy], May 29, 2006, cited in Dutton.

20 “Limits in the Seas: China,” Maritime Claims in the South 

China Sea, No. 143, A Report by the Office of Ocean and Polar 

Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and 

Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, December 5, 2014.

The Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs 

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the national goals and strategic posture of the People’s 

Republic of China. The center focuses on China’s ability to 

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The Strategic Forum series presents original research by 

members of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security affairs from the United States and 

abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 

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and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Defense 

Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. Visit NDU Press online at ndupress.ndu.edu.

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NDU Press

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