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RISE OF THE DRONES II: EXAMINING THE

LEGALITY OF UNMANNED TARGETING

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 28, 2010

Serial No. 111–120

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

PETER WELCH, Vermont

BILL FOSTER, Illinois

JACKIE SPEIER, California

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio

JUDY CHU, California

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana

RON STROMAN, Staff Director

MICHAEL MCCARTHY, Deputy Staff Director

CARLA HULTBERG, Chief Clerk

LARRY BRADY, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

PETER WELCH, Vermont

BILL FOSTER, Illinois

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

JUDY CHU, California

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri

ANDREW WRIGHT, Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on April 28, 2010 .............................................................................. 1

Statement of:

Anderson, Kenneth, professor of law, Washington College of Law, American University, member, Hoover Task Force on National Security and

Law, the Hoover Institution, Stanford University; Mary Ellen

O’Connell, Robert and Marion Short professor of law, Notre Dame

University; David Glazier, professor of law, Loyola Law School; William

C. Banks, director, Institute for National Security and

Counterterrorism, Syracuse University, Board of Advisers Distinguished professor of law and professor, Public Administration, Maxwell

School of Citizenship and Public Affairs ..................................................... 7

Anderson, Kenneth .................................................................................... 7

Banks, William C. ..................................................................................... 34

Glazier, David ............................................................................................ 26

O’Connell, Mary Ellen ............................................................................... 18

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Anderson, Kenneth, professor of law, Washington College of Law, American University, member, Hoover Task Force on National Security and

Law, the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 9

Banks, William C., director, Institute for National Security and

Counterterrorism, Syracuse University, Board of Advisers Distinguished professor of law and professor, Public Administration, Maxwell

School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, prepared statement of ............. 36

Glazier, David, professor of law, Loyola Law School, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 28

O’Connell, Mary Ellen, Robert and Marion Short professor of law, Notre

Dame University, prepared statement of .................................................... 20

Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Massachusetts, prepared statement of ................................................... 3

(1)

RISE OF THE DRONES II: EXAMINING THE

LEGALITY OF UNMANNED TARGETING

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN

AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Welch, Foster, Quigley, Flake,

Duncan.

Staff present: Andy Wright, staff director; Boris Maguire, clerk;

Talia Dubovi, counsel; LaToya King, fellow; Aaron Blacksberg and

Bronwen De Sena, interns; Adam Fromm, minority chief clerk and

Member liaison; Stephanie Genco, minority press secretary and

communication liaison; Tom Alexander, minority senior counsel;

Christopher Bright, minority senior professional staff member; and

Renee Hayes, minority Brookings fellow.

Mr. TIERNEY. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs’ hearing entitled, ‘‘Rise of the

Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting,’’ will

come to order.

I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking

member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening statements. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open

for five business days, so that all members of the subcommittee

will be allowed to submit a written statement for the record. Without objection, so ordered.

And I ask unanimous consent that written testimony from the

American Civil Liberties Union, Ms. Hina Shamsi and Mr. John

Radsan, be submitted for the record. Without objection, so ordered.

Good morning again. Today the subcommittee continues its oversight of the use of unmanned weapons systems in the conflict in

Afghanistan and around the globe. On March 23rd, the subcommittee held its first hearing on this emerging issue. We heard from a

number of experts who testified to the wide array of issues implicated by the use of drones, including operational, political and ethical questions. Today we will take a closer look at one important aspect of drone use: the legality of using unmanned weapons to target individuals who pose a threat to our national security.

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When the United States ratified the Geneva Conventions in

1955, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations characterized the

agreements as follows: ‘‘As a landmark in the struggle to obtain for

military and civilian victims of war, a humane treatment in accordance with the most approved international usage. The United

States has a proud tradition of support for individual rights,

human freedom, and the welfare and dignity of man. Approval of

these conventions by the Senate would be fully in conformity with

this great tradition.’’

Warfare has changed significantly since the Geneva conventions

were written. But the ideals cited by the Senate Committee in 1955

have not. Today we will examine how these laws apply in modern

times. The increasing reliance on unmanned weapons to target individuals has been well documented in the press. Over the past

decade, the number of unmanned vehicles used by the Department

of Defense has gone from a few hundred to several thousand.

Drones have been credited with eliminating senior leaders of the

Taliban and other insurgent groups. And accounts of the recent addition of an American citizen to the target list have received widespread attention. These reports have raised serious questions about

whether targeted killing and drone use comport with the relevant

international and domestic laws.

The use of unmanned weapons to target individuals, and for that

matter, the targeting of individuals in general, raises many complex legal questions. We must examine who can be a legitimate target, where that person can be legally targeted and when the risk

of collateral damage is too high. We must ask whether it makes a

difference if the military carries out an attack or whether other

government entities, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, may

legally conduct such attacks.

We must ensure that the administration’s understanding of the

authorities granted to it by Congress do not exceed what Congress

intended.

We have here today a distinguished panel of legal experts to help

answer some of these questions. I understand that you are not

going to agree on all of the answers, and probably not going to be

able to give us totally all the answers. But we are looking to learning quite a bit from your conversation.

On March 25th, the State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh

gave a speech at the annual meeting of the American Society of

International Law, in which he affirmed this administration’s commitment to following international law. In his words, this is a commitment to ‘‘following universal standards, not double standards.’’

It is in this context, then, that we turn to our witnesses today,

with the understanding that the United States is committed to following international legal standards, and that our interpretation of

how these standards apply to the use of unmanned weapons systems will set an example for other nations to follow. I do not expect

we will be able to answer any of these complex questions today.

But I do hope that this will be the beginning of a conversation, one

that this committee will continue with members of the administration, including Legal Adviser Koh.

And with that, I defer to Mr. Flake for his opening remarks.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]

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Mr. FLAKE. I thank the chairman, and I thank the witnesses for

coming.

Since we met last, obviously the administration has gone on

record to state that the use of unmanned drones in combat is legal

under international law. I look forward to hearing some further

clarification.

I look forward to hearing from Mr. Anderson. He was here last

time as a minority witness, and now he is a majority witness. I

hope that the Republicans in Congress follow the same trajectory

soon. Inside joke.

But anyway, we are glad to have you all here and appreciate

your coming and testifying, and for Mr. Anderson coming back.

Thanks.

Mr. TIERNEY. I could say that it shows that it is not the Senate,

we can actually do things and agree. [Laughter.]

Let me introduce our witnesses from whom we will be receiving

testimony today.

First on our panel is Mr. Kenneth Anderson, who was in fact

with us at our last hearing. He is a professor at Washington College of Law at American University and a research fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. He is an authority on international human rights, war, armed conflict and terrorism. He testified, as I said, at our first hearing. He has also previously served

on the board of directors of America’s Watch, the precursor to

Human Rights Watch and is the founder and former director of the

Human Rights Watch Arms Division. He holds a B.A. from UCLA

and a J.D. from Harvard University.

Ms. Mary Ellen O’Connell is the Robert and Marion Short professor of law at the University of Notre Dame Law School. Ms.

O’Connell’s primary research focuses on international legal regulation of the use of force, as well as conflict and dispute resolution.

She is the author of The Power and Purpose of International Law,

as well as three case books on international law, and is active in

a number of international law organizations, including the American Society of International Law and the Council on Foreign Relations.

Ms. O’Connell earned her B.A. from Northwestern University

and was awarded a Marshall Scholarship for study in Britain

where she received a Masters of science in international relations

from the London School of Economics and an LLB from Cambridge

University. She earned her J.D. from Columbia University.

Mr. David Glazier is a professor of law at Loyola Law School in

Los Angeles. Prior to joining Loyola Law School, Professor Glazier

was a lecturer at the University of Virginia School of Law and a

research fellow at the Center for National Security Law, where he

conducted research on national security, military justice and the

law of war. Before attending law school, Mr. Glazier served 21

years as a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy. In that capacity, he commanded the USS George Phillip, served as the Seventh

Fleet staff officer responsible for the U.S. Navy-Japan relationship

and participated in U.N. sanctions enforcement against Yugoslavia

and Haiti.

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Mr. Glazier holds a B.A. in history from Amherst College, earned

an M.A. from Georgetown University and holds a J.D. from the

University of Virginia Law School.

Mr. William Banks is the founding director of the Institute for

National Security and Counter-Terrorism at Syracuse University,

where he is also on the board of advisors, a distinguished professor

of law and a professor of public administration in the Maxwell

School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. He is recognized internationally as an expert in constitutional law, national security law

and counter-terrorism.

Mr. Banks authored a leading text in the field in 1990 entitled

National Security Law. In 2007, he published a second leading

textbook entitled Counterterrorism Law, to help define that emerging field as well. He is also editor and chief of the Journal of National Security Law and Policy. He holds his B.A. from the University of Nebraska and received his J.D. from the University of Denver.

So again, we have quite a bit of brainpower being thrust upon

us here today, and we do appreciate your taking the time and making yourselves available to share with us that substantial expertise.

It is the policy of this subcommittee to swear in our witnesses

before they testify, so I ask that you please stand and raise your

right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. The record will please reflect that all the witnesses

have answered in the affirmative.

I can tell all of you, and remind Mr. Anderson, that your complete written statement will be in the record by agreement, unanimous consent of the committee. We ask that you try to keep your

opening remarks to about 5 minutes if you could. You will see the

light is green for the first 4 minutes; amber for the fifth minute,

then red when it is about the time we would like you to come to

not a screeching halt, but a nice conclusion of your remarks, so

that we can have an opportunity to have a colloquy back and forth

and ask some questions.

So if that is understood, Mr. Anderson, would you please begin

with your remarks?

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STATEMENTS OF KENNETH ANDERSON, PROFESSOR OF LAW,

WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY,

MEMBER, HOOVER TASK FORCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND LAW, THE HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY; MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, ROBERT AND MARION

SHORT PROFESSOR OF LAW, NOTRE DAME UNIVERSITY;

DAVID GLAZIER, PROFESSOR OF LAW, LOYOLA LAW

SCHOOL; WILLIAM C. BANKS, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM, SYRACUSE

UNIVERSITY, BOARD OF ADVISERS DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR OF LAW AND PROFESSOR, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,

MAXWELL SCHOOL OF CITIZENSHIP AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

STATEMENT OF KENNETH ANDERSON

Mr. ANDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the

committee for having us here today.

The last time that this committee held a hearing on this subject,

I was a very strong voice of criticism of the administration and its

senior lawyers for not having expressed any views as to the legality

of the use of drones and targeted killing practices and the whole

cluster of issues that we are in fact here to discuss today. I have

been a very sharp critic of this, and in fact, was before this committee.

I am delighted to report, as everyone here knows, that a few

days after that, and not in response to this, I know that this policy

had been under consideration for a very long time at the State Department, Harold Koh, the Legal Adviser to State, delivered a

speech in which he addressed these issues.

And I am both delighted that the issues have been raised publicly by the administration, by its most senior international lawyer,

and as well, I am myself very happy with the contents. I am in the,

I guess I would say, unaccustomed position of attempting somewhat to channel Legal Adviser Koh on this occasion.

He said in those remarks that there were four objections that he

wanted to address in relation to targeted killing. One was that the

very act of targeting a particular leader was itself a violation of the

laws of war. And quite strikingly, in addressing that objection, he

went to state practice. He didn’t cite directly to law as such, he

didn’t cite court cases. He cited American state practice in the Second World War as a basis for stating that this was not contrary

to international law, which I thought was actually quite striking in

referring to the actual ways in which states behave as a source of

law in these areas.

Second, he addressed the question of, is there something just

really not OK, morally wrong or reprehensible or legally wrong

about the use of high advance weaponry drones. And he said no,

there is nothing particular about weapons systems, except in a very

few cases of indiscriminateness, that will outlaw them. And being

high-tech, and in fact, this is all good in this area, because it allows

discrimination in targeting that is otherwise not there.

Third, he addressed the question of whether this is extra-judicial

execution, and hence in violation of international treaties and covenants and so on, and whether in particular there is an obligation

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to provide process or warning to people before targeting them

where they have been identified by the United States as targets.

And here he introduced something that I think is of deep importance as a statement of U.S. policy. Because he very clearly distinguished between saying it is lawful to do this, both in an armed

conflict governed by the technical body of the laws of war, and it

is also lawful to do so when the United States is engaged in legitimate international self-defense as a category of the use of force

separate from armed conflict, specifically as a technical matter.

And he defended targeting without warning in each of those cases

treated separately.

And then finally, and I think of great importance within the

United States, the United States has had a long ban on assassination within its domestic rules. But it has never defined what it

means by that. And he was very careful to reaffirm something that

was said by his predecessor in 1989, Abraham Sofaer, and said

that this is not assassination within the meaning of U.S. law.

Now, I support all of those, and in particular the distinction that

was drawn between armed conflict and legitimate self-defense as a

category, and would reiterate what I raised in the last hearing,

which is, this discussion is not really about the use of drones on

the battlefield in the traditional, ordinary sense as used by the

U.S. military. It is for them a weapons platform like any other, and

all the considerations of collateral damage and all the usual stuff

that goes into targeting applies. But they don’t really think of it

any differently, as one can see from the last hearing.

The question here is, who and where. And it’s the question, first

of all, of whether it is lawful to target off of what one might consider a traditional battlefield, and whether there is in fact any

legal distinction between going after your enemies, wherever they

happen to be, on the one hand, and the CIA attacking people outside of traditional zones.

So let me bring this to a close by saying that the discussion that

we are having is really the discussion about the lawfulness of the

CIA using these kinds of weapons outside of the traditional battlefields. And that if for any reason that is considered not to be OK,

that is considered to be criminal, that is considered to be a war

crime, somebody had better tell the CIA about it, somebody had

better tell the President about it, somebody had better tell Vice

President Biden about it. Because they are all enthusiastic participants in this.

So it is a perfectly legitimate question to raise whether this is

OK and lawful and the rest. But whatever the answer is, we should

not leave the people who are carrying this out in legal uncertainty

as to what that answer is.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Anderson follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Anderson.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ms. O’Connell.

STATEMENT OF MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL

Ms. O’CONNELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to speak with you today about the law governing the use

of weaponized unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as combat

drones.

I should mention that I have been a professional military educator for the Department of Defense, and I will be drawing on that

experience and the learning I gained in that context in making

three points for you today.

First, combat drones are battlefield weapons. Second, the battlefield is a real place, where fighting occurs between organized

armed groups. Battlefields and armed conflicts are not fictions created by lawyers. Third, permissible battlefield use of combat drone

is governed by law regulating who may operate them, against

whom they may be operated and how they may be used.

Turning to my first point, combat drones are a battlefield weapon. They launch missiles and drop bombs, a significant kinetic

force. Such weapons are permitted on the battlefield, but we do not

permit our police to have missiles or bombs in their arsenals. They

are not allowed to use that kind of firepower in carrying out law

enforcement activities.

Today in Afghanistan, our armed forces are involved in an armed

conflict. They are facing an organized enemy capable of holding territory. In the coming battle for Kandahar, they will be permitted

to use drones. And indeed, I would suggest to you that the use of

drones in that context would be preferable to the use of airplanes

dropping bombs from high altitudes.

The drone, of course, as you learned at your last hearing, has a

video camera capability. It can send back very detailed information,

including on the location of civilians in a combat zone and with regard to the details of civilian objects. In that way, the pilot of the

drone, or the operator from a long distance can make much more

precise targeting decisions than can be made from an airplane.

General McChrystal has wisely called for strict avoidance of civilian casualties in our counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan. And I

believe that drone can help us accomplish this.

But outside of a war or an armed conflict, everyone is a civilian

when it comes to the use of lethal force. The combatant’s privilege

to kill on the battlefield without being charged with a crime applies

inside an armed conflict and not outside, which leads to my second

point.

Armed conflict is a real situation that we know by the facts of

fighting. Armed conflicts exist where organized armed fighting occurs, where there are intense hostilities. Armed conflicts cannot be

created on paper, in a legal memo, that then translates into the

right to kill as if you were on a real battlefield. The law I am explaining is derived from the Just War Doctrine. That doctrine has

held that killing is only justifiable in situations of necessity. Battlefields where intense fighting is occurring is a per se situation of necessity. Off the battlefield, we give the police the right to use lethal

force only in situations of immediate necessity to save a life. This

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rule means police do not have bombs and missiles in their arsenals,

they have handguns and rifles.

Even in places like Yemen and Pakistan, where there is armed

conflict going on, the United States would only have the right to

use combat drones in the armed conflicts that those governments

are participating in, and not in some rogue operation of our own

that has nothing to do with what those governments are trying to

accomplish. We recognize neither of those states as failed states;

indeed, we are very much dependent on both Yemen and Pakistan

having strong governments, strong identities and being stable

states.

In order to build that stability in both countries, we need to respect their sovereign rights as defined by international law. That

means that we do not have the right to use military force except

with their expressed permission and in pursuit of their aims.

Even when we are invited to join in an armed conflict, as we

have been in Afghanistan, it is that invitation that makes it lawful

for us to participate in that armed conflict. We have certain very

strict rules in terms of how we may operate combat drones. First

and foremost, only a combatant, lawful combatant, may carry out

the use of killing with combat drones. The CIA and civilian contractors have no right to do so. They do not wear uniforms, and

they are not in the chain of command. Most importantly, they are

not trained in the law of armed conflict.

That is why we have reason to fear that CIA-directed combat operations are having disproportionate impacts on civilians, and they

are pursuing their use of lethal force not in a way aimed at accomplishing the military objective, which in this case is to stop terrorists. We know from empirical data, and this is my final point, that

the use of major military force in counterterrorism operations has

been counterproductive. A Just War doctrine teaches that we

should always and only use force when we can accomplish more

good than harm. And that is not the case with the use of drones

in places like Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. O’Connell follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Glazier.

STATEMENT OF DAVID GLAZIER

Mr. GLAZIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to begin very quickly by thanking the chairman and

members of the committee for holding this hearing. Because so

much of the discussion after 9/11 has really been political. And as

a citizen and a law professor, I am very appreciative of the fact

that the committee really is interested in exploring the legal issues.

I think that there is no doubt about the fact that we are in an

armed conflict. First of all, as a matter of international law, the

world community has recognized 9/11 as an armed attack. And

more importantly, as a matter of our domestic law, Congress has

chosen to exercise its constitutional authority to authorize the use

of military force against the organizations responsible for the 9/11

attack and any organizations that harbored them.

So it seems to me that as a matter of law, there is no dispute

that we are in an armed conflict with al Qaeda and with the

Taliban. And that therefore allows the United States to call upon

the full scope of authority which is provided by the law of war.

Many people perceive that there is sort of a false dichotomy between compliance with stringent rules and the law of war and military and political success. The thing I would like to emphasize up

front is that I really feel that this is a false dichotomy. I think we

fail to recognize oftentimes how much the law of war was developed by warriors, and how much military necessity and the ability

to accomplish what a nation needs to do to successfully prosecute

an armed conflict is already addressed within that body of law.

I also want to suggest that the fact that many of the instruments

which comprise the law of war are dated is not necessarily a major

issue when it comes to dealing with modern technology like drones,

because much of the law of war is expressed in the form of general

rule and guiding principles, which can readily be applied to new

technical developments that weren’t anticipated at the time the

war is developed. So principles like necessity, which Professor

O’Connell has mentioned, requirements to discriminate in targeting

on proportionality, these rule are easy to apply to modern technology, just as easy as they are to apply to the technology that existed at the time.

There certainly is nothing with the law that prohibits the use of

drones. In fact, it is the ability of the drones to engage in a higher

level of precision and to discriminate more carefully between military and civilian targets than has existed in the past, actually suggests that they are preferable to many older weapons.

Now, there certainly are issues with existing law that can come

from bad choices made in their deployment. We know, for example,

that some of the early attacks, which resulted in larger numbers

of casualties, have caused significant fallout. But again, that is an

area in which compliance with the law of war, which requires careful discrimination between military and civilian tactics, suggests

that in fact following the rules enhances our ability to prevail in

the conflict.

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There are real issues, though, I think, with who can employ the

weapons. That is something that I find very, very problematic. The

law of war has rules as far as who can be combatants, who enjoy

immunity from domestic laws for engaging in armed conflict. So for

example, I think there is little doubt about the legality of the Air

Force and National Guard use of drones, which is an ongoing basis.

But it is interesting that the government is using CIA personnel

who clearly are not lawful combatants under the rules specified in

the law of war.

Now, we law of war scholars debate what is the legal significance

of that. I think, though, that the majority view is that if you are

not a privileged combatant, you simply don’t have immunity from

domestic law for participating in hostilities. And so the reality is

that it seems to me, for example, that any CIA personnel who participate in this armed conflict run the risk of being prosecuted

under the national laws of the place where they take place.

On the other hand, though, today our government is in the process of trying to hold some of our adversaries criminally accountable

at Guantanamo under a legal theory that being a non-privileged

belligerent and engaging in war constitutes a war crime. So if that

is in fact our government’s position, then our sense would be that

the CIA personnel participating in this program are committing

war crimes, and the individuals who have directed them to participate are committing war crimes.

So when we asked the government to sort of address these larger

issues, it seems to me that one of the things we need to call upon

them to do is to clarify the U.S. Government’s view on this aspect.

Because either we are wrong at Guantanamo or we are seriously

wrong in using the CIA to participate in the program.

There are also issues about where the conflicts are taking place,

which Professor O’Connell addressed. I think we will probably have

some spirited discussion and disagreement on those issues during

the questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Glazier follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Banks.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. BANKS

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Flake,

members of the committee. Thank you for the invitation to speak

with you today.

In these brief oral remarks, I am going to focus indeed on the

laws of the United States that govern the CIA’s involvement in unmanned targeting.

The decision to target specific individuals with lethal force after

September 11th was neither unprecedented nor surprising. In appropriate circumstances, the United States has engaged in targeted

killing at least since the border war with the Mexican bandits in

1916. In a time of war, subjecting individual combatants to lethal

force has been a permitted and lawful instrument of waging war

successfully.

But new elements of targeted killing policy emerged in recent

years in response to terrorism and to the threats against the

United States. Among the new elements, of course, is the significant role for the CIA in controlling pilot-less drones to carry out

the targeted killing policy.

It is important to emphasize that regardless of the policy efficacy

of the drone strikes, it is never sufficient under the rule of law that

a government policy be wise. It must also be supported by law, not

just an absence of law violations, but positive legal authority. Indeed, where the subject is intentional, premeditated killing by the

government, the need for clearly understood legal authority is

paramount. After all, legal authority is what distinguishes murder

from lawful policy.

The National Security Act of 1947 authorized the CIA ‘‘to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or National Security

Council may direct.’’ Although the original grant of authority in

1947 likely did not contemplate targeted killing, the 1947 act was

designed as dynamic authority to be shaped by practice and by necessity.

By the 1970’s, fitfully, the practice came to include targeted killing. After the Church Committee learned of and disapproved of

CIA assassination plots in the mid-1970’s, President Ford issued an

executive order prohibiting CIA involvement in assassination, notably not restricted targeted killing, something we will discuss later.

And Congress enacted intelligence oversight legislation that, as

amended, continues to require reporting to Congress by the President of significant anticipated intelligence operations.

In the weeks after 9/11, President Bush signed an intelligence

finding giving the CIA broad authority to pursue terrorism around

the world. By statute, the finding must accompany any covert operation approved by the President, including those that permit targeted killing. In this particular classified finding, the President reportedly delegated targeting and operational authority to senior civilian and military officials. The 2001 finding was apparently modified in 2006 by President Bush to broaden the class of potential

35

targets beyond Osama bin Laden and his close circle and also to

extend the boundaries of that authorization beyond Afghanistan.

In explicitly permitting the targeting of an individual with lethal

force, the finding also more narrowly focuses the potential to inflict

violence. Ever since the Hughes Ryan Amendment of 1974 Congress has authorized CIA covert operations if findings are prepared, delivered to select Members of Congress before the operation

that is described, or in a timely fashion thereafter.

So long as the intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed, the intelligence laws permit the President broad

discretion to utilize the Nation’s intelligence agencies to carry out

national security operations, implicitly including targeted killing.

Such an operation would follow intelligence law as ‘‘an operation in

foreign countries other than activities solely intended for obtaining

necessary intelligence unless it would be conducted pursuant to

statutory authority.’’

To some, it seemed that the 2001 finding ran counter to the longstanding ban on political assassination. Enshrined in that executive order first issued by President Ford in 1976, the directive forbids political assassination but does not define the term. Just what

does distinguish lawful targeted killing from unlawful political assassination?

The answer turns upon which legal framework applies, as we

will discuss further here this morning. During war, whether authorized by Congress or fought defensively by the President on the

basis of his authority, targeted killing of individuals combatants is

lawful, although killing by treacherous means through the use of

deceit or trickery is not. In peace time, any extra-judicial killing by

a government agent is lawful only if taken in self-defense or in defense of others.

But what rules apply when the United States is engaged in an

non-traditional war on terrorism or a war against al Qaeda? The

evolving customary law of anticipatory self-defense and intelligence

legislation regulating the activities of the CIA supply adequate, albeit not well articulated or understood legal authority for these

drone strikes.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Banks follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you all.

It certainly gives us some food for thought. I am going to begin

the questions and we will go around. I suspect more than one

round here.

So, if I am listening to all of you, you all sort of agree that the

who and the where are the principal issues here, who is using the

drones and where that use is. I will watch your heads bob or go

back and forth, or whatever, and stop if somebody disagrees with

that.

So if it is on the battlefield, and the military is doing it, fine. Nobody has a problem with that. If it is on the battlefield and the CIA

or some other civilian organization is doing it, some people have a

question, or not? Some people do have a question. Ms. O’Connell.

So even if we are on the battlefield, we are in Afghanistan, for

instance, engaged with who the military may think is al Qaeda or

the people that they are in contest with, but they have the CIA

doing the targeting of drones, or whatever, what is the issue there?

Ms. O’CONNELL. No, under international law of armed conflict,

the CIA does not have the right to carry out battlefield killings.

Professor Glazier and Professor Anderson both agreed with me on

that, that the international law regulating the battlefield does not

give the combatants privilege to kill without warning and not face

prosecution to persons who are not members of the regular armed

forces of a country, who are not under military discipline in a chain

of command and not trained in the law of armed conflict.

And those important characteristics, which as Professor Glazier

said, we are holding people at Guantanamo because they didn’t

meet those characteristics, those are failures, those are deficits on

the part of the CIA. They simply have no right. We are already facing, 17 of our CIA agents are under indictment in Italy for attempting to kidnap someone off the streets of Milan, an alleged

person with ties to al Qaeda. If that is what the rest of the world

thinks is the right result with regard to kidnapping, you can imagine how the rest of the world views killing persons by the CIA. It

is just a clear violation of international law.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Anderson, you wanted to explore that?

Mr. ANDERSON. I would disagree in part with that. But I guess

in terms of the framing issue that you raise, there are two issues

implied. One is, what is the ability, if any, of the CIA lawfully to

participate in something that is an armed conflict when they are

civilians. It is more complicated, I think, than Professor O’Connell

suggests, in the sense that their participation may or may not involve the combatant’s privilege, but does not make it per se unlawful under international law necessarily. That is, there are questions

about whether they are taking direct participation in hostilities.

There are questions about their status as civilians in the conflict

zone.

But then beyond that, there is a question as to where does this

armed conflict run? Does it run outside Afghanistan? Does it run

into——

Mr. TIERNEY. That was going to be the next extension of this on

that.

50

Mr. ANDERSON. But that will be the question for the CIA. Then

there are two different questions if one accepts that these are two

different situations geographically.

Mr. TIERNEY. Let me take this a little bit further. Suppose now

we are talking about the situation in Yemen with Anwar al-Awlaki.

So I guess you would have to accept the fact or make the argument

that he is associated with al Qaeda, or somehow an al Qaeda person, or you have a problem right off the get-go, if he is not associated with somebody that you can make an argument that you are

in a conflict with, you have an issue. Is it OK for our military at

that point in time, as this is an extension of our conflict, to use a

drone and target this individual? Is that acceptable under international law?

Ms. O’CONNELL. No. That was a point of my remarks as well.

Mr. TIERNEY. The battlefield issue?

Ms. O’CONNELL. Yes. In Yemen, this particular case again, in

2002, when we carried out our first drone strike in Yemen and

killed named individuals, the Air Force refused to carry out that

operation. They were the ones operating drones at that time. And

the CIA was willing to do it. The Air Force said, we don’t have any

right to kill in a situation in which we are not involved in a battle,

in an armed conflict. And the Air Force was right, that was the correct legal intelligence.

Professor Glazier said that he agreed with this lawyer-created

concept that we are in a worldwide self-defensive armed conflict

against al Qaeda and the Taliban and others. And he said that this

is supported by the world. In fact, after September 11th, the

United Nations Security Council did find that the attacks gave rise

to the right of the United States to engage in self-defense. But we

engaged in the self-defense that the law of state responsibility gave

us a right to engage in, and that was in Afghanistan. That was the

state responsible for carrying out the attacks, for supporting al

Qaeda in being able to carry out those attacks.

So we lawfully took the battle to Afghanistan. We engaged in

lawful self-defense on the territory of the state where we had been

attacked. But the rest of the world does not recognize the right to

carry out attacks of a battlefield all over the world, such as in

Yemen and in parts of Pakistan and in other places. There are

many other countries that have been attacked by al Qaeda: Great

Britain, Indonesia, Spain, Kenya. None of them consider themselves to be in an armed conflict all over the world against al

Qaeda. They consider themselves to be involved in

counterterrorism operations. And using the methods that they have

used, they have been very successful.

The British have said, you are never in an armed conflict with

terrorists. They are minor criminals, you do not elevate them to

combatants. And President Ronald Reagan said the same. I agree

with President Reagan, you cannot have an armed conflict with

terrorists. They are mere combatants, they are not warriors and

they should never be elevated to the level of warriors. Our warriors

are in an armed conflict in Afghanistan. We should be using

counterterrorism law enforcement techniques in other countries.

We just don’t have the right to bomb people where there is no

armed conflict.

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Mr. TIERNEY. This is where the 5-minute rule is particularly limiting.

Ms. O’CONNELL. I am sorry.

Mr. TIERNEY. No, it is for me, not for you.

Mr. Flake.

Mr. FLAKE. Let me expand on that a bit. When we talk about

Yemen, how many attacks, Ms. O’Connell, do we know of that have

been public, have we used in Yemen, as far as drone attacks?

Ms. O’CONNELL. I know of only three or four, one carried out in

the Bush administration and the others in the Obama administration. The Obama administration has clearly stepped up the policy

of using drones in non-armed conflict situations.

Mr. FLAKE. You were drawing some kind of distinction earlier

with regard to whether or not we have permission from those

states. But it seems from what you are saying, that shouldn’t even

make a difference.

Ms. O’CONNELL. There is a very key and often overlooked distinction. The invitation has to be to participate in the armed conflict

that the government of the country is participating in. So Yemen

right now is facing insurgencies in the north and the south. It has

two rather minor insurgencies going on right now. They are getting

some help from Saudi Arabia, they have requested that help with

regard to one of these insurgencies. If they had asked us, the

United States, to be also involved, we could use military force

there, on their invitation, in their armed conflict.

But what we have done, and in 2002, the case we know the most

about, this attack was not part of any armed conflict that the Yemeni authorities were involved in. It was six individuals in a vehicle

in a remote area, and we killed all six persons, including a U.S.

citizen. That is not an armed conflict that Yemen is engaged in. So

even having consent in that case is not sufficient.

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Banks, you mentioned the requirement that Congress be informed under the National Security Act. Is there any

evidence that Congress has not been informed sufficiently with regard to these activities?

Mr. BANKS. Not to my knowledge, Representative Flake. It is of

course a very broad grant of authority. And the reporting requirement is only ambiguously stated, but fully and currently informed.

So that language would suggest that Congress, the intelligence

committees, should know the details about those operations.

Mr. FLAKE. I take it you disagree, then, with the position that

we can’t or shouldn’t be involved in targeted attacks in Pakistan

or Yemen?

Mr. BANKS. Whether we should as a matter of policy is not my

expertise. I think that the law may permit that. I don’t think that

the paradigm of armed conflict is the only body of law that may

apply in that setting. I think the law of self-defense, part of customary international law, as well as the laws of the United States,

constitutional powers of the President, the authorities that you, the

Congress, have given to the President through the authorization for

the use of military force, along with the intelligence laws that I

made reference to in my remarks, I think all have a role to play

in deciding what authority the United States has to operate in

those non-traditional battlefield environments.

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Mr. FLAKE. In that kind of environment, would it make a difference at all to make it legal, if you will, that the country give

some kind of blanket or other kind of approval, as Yemen seems

to have done, or Pakistan has certainly done?

Mr. BANKS. I think this host state consent is a very important

ingredient, as Professor O’Connell suggested. But it is not necessary. I think Mr. Koh made that observation even in his March

25th address in articulating the posture of the administration on

these matters.

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Glazier.

Mr. GLAZIER. I do disagree with Professor O’Connell on one issue,

and that is this sort of narrow definition of battlefield. It seems to

me that battlefield is a descriptive term and not a legal term. And

that in an armed conflict, those members of the enemy’s forces who

are legitimately targetable are essentially legitimately targetable

anywhere.

Now, traditionally, armed conflict takes place in the country of

the state parties and in international airspace and waters. So there

are issues basically from the law of neutrality that talk about when

you can exercise an armed conflict in another country. And it is

certainly discouraged.

But if a neutral either were to give its consent or more importantly, if a neutral was not exercising its obligations to prevent its

territory from being used to the detriment of a warring party, then

in fact, as the United States went into Cambodia out of necessity

during the Vietnam War, it is lawful for a country to conduct some

limited operations under a high degree of necessity in countries

which are not direct parties to the conflict.

Mr. FLAKE. Let’s bring it to present day, real terms, the underwear bomber, we know now was trained in Yemen. If we had actual intelligence that he was being trained to do what he eventually did, and that he was in Yemen in one of these camps, the Yemeni authorities have given us blanket approval to go after, but it

wasn’t part of an armed conflict that the Yemeni government was

involved in, Ms. O’Connell, are you still saying that would not be

a justified action?

Ms. O’CONNELL. That is quite correct. Let me just say in response to Professor Glazier, international law clearly has a definition of what an armed conflict is and what a battlefield is. I chair

the International Law Association’s Use of Force Committee. We

have issued a report in 2008 that shows, without doubt, what international law supports as the definition of armed conflict. And it is

not in a place where there is no intense organized armed fighting.

And you do not have the right to use military tactics in those

places.

You have the right to use police enforcement measures. And that

is what the United Nations said when they reviewed our Yemen

strike in 2002. They said that was an extra-judicial killing. They

did not say what Professor Glazier said, that because these were

al Qaeda persons, they were related somehow to the armed conflict

in Afghanistan and they could be killed. That is not what the U.N.

said. The experts on this particular law said it was extra-judicial

killing. And nothing has changed in the case that you bring up of

the more recent so-called underwear bomber.

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But let me just say, because there is some kind of view, I think,

that we have come to have in the United States that this is somehow restrictive law, unreasonable law, that we should be able to

go out and kill these people wherever we find them, that this is

somehow making our country less safe. Quite the contrary.

I cite the Just War doctrine, because this is an ancient set of

rules that really are consistent with our principles, and our sense

of what works, how we can really repress violence, how we can

really build the rule of law. And it is not by finding loopholes, interpreting broadly and loosely and using more force than is really

necessary in these situations. Law enforcement works against terrorism, and that is what we should be doing.

But more importantly, when we don’t follow the rule of law, and

everyone knows that when these drone attacks occur in places like

Yemen or rural Pakistan, everyone in the world is watching us.

And they know there is something wrong with this. We are not

holding ourselves up to the beacons of the rule of law. We are not

sending a signal that we want to see all countries suppressing violence and promoting the rule of law.

This is a very dangerous policy, because it is not consistent with

the law.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Foster.

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Do any of you know how much training the drone operators receive in international law and these sorts of issues?

Ms. O’CONNELL. I quote Bill Banks as saying ‘‘none.’’

Mr. BANKS. I think Professor O’Connell is referring to a conversation we had about the known training of CIA personnel in

that regard. That is true, although I have read recently that there

may be some. But I have no inside information.

Of course, for members of the military, perhaps Professor Glazier

should comment on law of war training.

Mr. GLAZIER. Well, I can’t speak at all to what the CIA folks are

getting. But I also note that, it sounds sort of an odd thing to say,

perhaps, but the reality is that the U.S. military has always sort

of emphasized law of war compliance among the practitioners, sort

of in the form of giving them clear rules to follow. So the reality

is that there are many situations which American service personnel

may not even know that they have had law of war training, because they are given sort of specific rules to follow in carrying out

armed conflict, often in the form of pocket cards, which reflect a

combination of rules from the law of war, as well as policy judgments that the U.S. military hierarchy and civilian leadership has

made in terms of how they want a particular conflict covered.

So it is not necessary to be able to poll an individual service person and say, have you had training in the law of war for there to

in fact be law of war compliance. But I don’t know what the CIA

does.

Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Anderson.

Mr. ANDERSON. I think this is something of a——

[Remarks off mic.]

Ms. O’CONNELL. I just disagree a little bit with that. Mr. Foster,

I think your question is very well put, because the interviews I

54

have done with drone operators, they have the final say about

whether they press the button. So even if it has been cleared by

Chairman Panetta, and to my knowledge, I don’t believe he has

been trained in the law of armed conflict.

But anyway, the drone operators are the ones who finally have

the responsibility of pushing the button. So their training is highly

relevant. If they are going after a named individual, and he is in

a house with a number of other persons we have no information

about, so that we have to err on the side that they are civilians,

our fighting men and women know the rules of proportionality.

And they are not going to make that strike.

For the CIA person, that name on the list is his sign that he has

accomplished what he has set out to do. And that is a very different calculation for the strike.

Mr. FOSTER. My next question has to do with probably my ignorance of the exact definition of the battlefield. If we just look at the

supply chain, if you consider for example, an IED used in Pakistan

that is manufactured in Iran, say, and that may go through staging

areas in Pakistan and be shipped by means that we can identify

along the way, how far back in the supply chain can you go before

you leave the battlefield?

Mr. TIERNEY. Can I just interject? My apologies, Mr. Foster. We

are having some difficulty with the microphones. If I could ask

each of the witnesses to pull them closer to them and make sure

they are on when they speak, it will help with the recording of the

hearing. Thank you.

Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Glazier.

Mr. GLAZIER. Again, I respectfully disagree with Professor

O’Connell that the law of war provides a definition of the term

‘‘battlefield.’’ The law of war provides a definition of military object.

And military object is something that by its purpose or use creates

a military advantage. An IED therefore is clearly a military object.

The issue then about how far back in the logistics chain that we

can attack it I think then becomes a matter governed by sort of

broader rules of law. Because we are not in an armed conflict with

Iran, and there is nothing that makes it a crime for a nation to engage in the production of war materials and sell them to other

countries. In fact, even during World War II, Switzerland provided

war materials to other countries. And that was not a violation of

any law. Switzerland was a neutral power and was not a legitimate

object of attack.

So where the IED becomes a legitimate or lawful object of attack

becomes where it either comes into the hands of terrorists in a

country or location where it’s legal to attack them or arguably

where it comes into their possession in a neutral country and that

neutral country is allowing its territory to be used by that group

to the detriment of the country that is at war. So if we are in a

war with al Qaeda, if when al Qaeda comes into possession of a

weapon and if it is in a country which is not taking steps to prevent them from using their territory to our detriment, that, I think,

is where we draw the line and where an attack becomes lawful.

Ms. O’CONNELL. I have a different view of the matter. First, I

think it is important that the law, the current law is what we have

in our minds. So 1949 is the Geneva Conventions, 1945 is the

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United Nations Charter. These are the dates that we should be

working from.

There has been a lot of confusion about the right to use drones

in Pakistan because of events in Pakistan having an impact on our

battles in Afghanistan. I think this is where some people who even

understand that there is no such thing as a worldwide war against

terrorists do have some confusion about why we aren’t in a war in

Pakistan as well as Afghanistan.

But that sovereign boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan

is highly significant. It is highly significant for our efforts to help

support a stable and effective Pakistan, which is ultimately going

to be our protection from terrorism and lawlessness in Pakistan.

Respecting that border is essential.

Yes, there is some cross-border activity. There are people hiding.

There are some munitions going across the border. But a series of

cases from the International Court of Justice makes it clear in that

situation, Afghanistan, with our help, has to protect against that

kind of low level activity at the border. It can’t make strikes into

Pakistan against those kinds of activities. That is clearly unlawful.

And I would just use an analogy. Think about the way the

United States would feel. We have a lot of lawlessness on our border with Mexico. Mexico is justifiably unhappy that we are not able

to restrain narcoterrorists from getting across the border, bringing

weapons in, bringing persons back and forth. And they have made

complaints to us and they have told us to stop these criminals from

getting across the border. Should we allow their police or their

military to use combat drones to strike at hotels or places in Arizona where the Mexican military thinks that some of these people

are hiding? Absolutely not.

If Mexico asks us, and of course, we are making an effort, as

Pakistan is, and we will help Mexico even more. But we expect

Mexico to do the main job of defense at their border. And that is

what we have to expect Afghanistan to do, too.

Mr. GLAZIER. One thing I omitted from my statement is that

there is, though, an imminence requirement for a strike in a neutral territory. So in other words, when I said that we could potentially strike at an IED in the possession of al Qaeda in a neutral

territory, there does also though have to be an imminent nature to

the threat. So if it was simply in a warehouse or being stockpiled

or wasn’t going to be used against us in the near term, then we

don’t have a right to strike a neutral territory.

But I do think that the right is perhaps a little bit more extensive than Professor O’Connell presents it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Duncan, you are recognized for 5 minutes, or thereabouts.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t think I need 5

minutes. But I do have some concerns about this. I certainly have

no sympathy for any terrorists or anybody who is attempting to kill

Americans.

But I do have some concerns when I read, as I do in the committee briefing, that the number of drones has been increased in the

Defense Department from 167 in 2002 to over 6,000 today. I guess

it says in 2008, maybe there is more than 6,000 now. Unfortunately, I couldn’t come and hear your testimony.

56

But a few months ago, I read an interview in the Washington

Times which said that, where the top United Nations anti-terrorism official said that al Qaeda now had so few members that it was

‘‘having trouble maintaining credibility.’’ Those were his words. I

remember reading an earlier column by the conservative columnist

Walter Williams who said that the threats from al Qaeda have

been so exaggerated that al Qaeda had, I think fewer than 3,000

members at that time, and this was 2 or 3 years ago, I guess, and

had no money and was made up mainly of high school dropouts

who were living at home with their parents.

I saw another report after that said it had fewer than 1,700

members, and of course, all that was well before this interview by

this United Nations official.

What I am concerned about, I have long thought, I mean, we

have been in Afghanistan for 9 years, and in Iraq. I have long

thought that the threat that is there has been greatly exaggerated.

I am afraid that much of this is being done because of money and

power. When I see us increasing the number of these drones to

many thousands, I am very concerned that we are going to start

seeing more incidents of innocent civilians being killed, or mistakes

being made.

That is the concern that I have, more than anything else. I just

thought I would add that to the hearing here this morning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Duncan.

Mr. Welch, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you. My first observation is, every time I listen to Mr. Duncan, he makes more and more sense. Thank you.

Thank you very much for being here. Just a few questions. In the

last month, there have been several news reports, of course, you

had referred to this, I think, that an American citizen has been

added to the target list. Just go down the line quickly, if you can,

I don’t have much time, but can the United States in your opinion

legally target an American citizen?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes. As they have done, and the information has

been released on the basis that we know publicly, at least, the

basis on which he is targeted. And the emphasis on the statements

by the administration that this had gone from simply making

statements about various things to active assistance in planning

and operations.

Ms. O’CONNELL. An American citizen who takes up weapons

against his country and fights our combatants on the battlefield, of

course, may be killed in the course of that armed conflict. Otherwise that American citizen, as any person in the world, should be

detained through law enforcement measures. If that person resists

arrests, of course a very dangerous person may be killed in the

course of resisting arrest. The fleeing felon rule. Otherwise, we all

have human rights, Mr. Welch.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

Mr. GLAZIER. I will limit my answer to a strict law of war perspective. If the individual is affiliated with a legitimate adversary,

and has essentially the status of a combatant or an individual in

the chain of command of the combatant, then I believe they are a

lawful target. In fact, under domestic law, I mean, the Supreme

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Court held in Ex parte Quirin that it didn’t matter whether a combatant might have a claim to U.S. citizenship. It was the fact of

affiliation with the adversary that made them liable to targeting.

Mr. BANKS. I believe the answer is yes as well, and I would remind us that part of the authority here includes domestic law as

well. The President’s constitutional authorities and the law that

you enacted in 2001, the authorization for use of military force,

may permit targeting that individual.

Mr. WELCH. OK, thank you.

I want to ask you about this. Last year, the International Committee of the Red Cross put out interpretive guidance, as you know,

to help define what can be considered ‘‘direct participation in hostilities.’’ And again, I would like to just go down the line, I am sure

you are all familiar with that. Do you agree with the ICRC’s interpretation of the relevant law? If you don’t, what would you change?

Mr. ANDERSON. Most of what is in the interpretive guidance is

fine. But there are a number of provisions in there that I think are

completely over the edge, in fact, and I am very surprised that the

ICRC would put them out, given the fact that they could not command a majority of their own experts in that regard. Those primarily go to the question of part-time combatancy or civilians who

take some part in hostilities, and the question of where you draw

those lines. But I think that the way the ICRC has drawn them

is really quite unacceptable.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

Ms. O’CONNELL. I have spent a very good deal of time studying

the interpretive guidance. In fact, I believe Professor Anderson is

not quite right, there were a few of the experts who have a dissenting opinion, but not a majority. The few who had a dissenting opinion were from countries where they wanted to have an expansive

right to use military force and some of their allies.

And the unhappiness in the final product was that the ICRC, I

think, did in fact take a step away from the strict definition of who

is a direct participant in hostilities to appease these experts. But

at the same time, it said, if we are going to do that, we have to

add some other protections back in. So it actually raised the requirement of necessity for any killing.

I think on balance, taken together, those two elements, a looser

definition of who is a potential target, but a higher and more restrictive right of when you may actually kill, is a balanced outcome

in the end. If you are going to change the law, I think that is the

only way you could do it. I think by now, because the ICRC is so

influential, this is now becoming the standard.

I think in the end, we are going to be happy with it. But it has

certainly been a difficult development process.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

Mr. GLAZIER. Just two quick comments. The first is that the

higher standard may very well be a good idea. But I don’t think

it is reflective of the state of which nation states, nation states ultimately make the international law. I certainly think aspirationally

it is probably good. But I think it exceeds the current state of the

law.

The other thing I would just point out, as I am sure you are

aware, but for the record, is that the ICRC guidance only really

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comes into play if we are categorizing the adversary as civilians.

Because it relates to the direct preservation of civilians. If an individual is in fact a warrior, or is treated as a combatant, then under

the current law of war, that status makes them targetable at all

times and essentially all places. So it is only if we are choosing to

deny the adversary combatant status, which I think is a political

choice that we have, we can then invoke a whole different set of

rules.

Mr. BANKS. I would also make two comments. I think there are

problems with the part-time warriors. I think the ICRC interpretation doesn’t reflect the nuance that needs to be taken into account

to get at insurgents and terrorists who go home at the end of the

day. As Professor Glazier would say, an armed member of our

armed forces of course enjoys no such privilege to go home and

watch television at the end of the day. He is a target 24/7.

The second comment of course is that this, as I have said before

today, this paradigm of the laws of armed conflict is only one of the

spheres of authority that must be taken into account in deciding

who may be reached as a target.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you. I yield back.

Ms. O’CONNELL. Could I just add briefly that in fact the interpretive guidance understands the point Professor Glazier was making,

that it would be unfair to regular combatants if they were held to,

if they didn’t have the same necessity protection that direct participants have, non-traditional or unlawful combatants. So they have

actually added the necessity requirement even to regular combatants. And I think it is only fair that our serving men and women

in uniform get as much protection as somebody who is an unlawful

combatant, or a direct participant in hostilities without the right

to do so.

So I think that probably in the end, we would all agree, is a good

thing. I think it also goes to the point that I have been trying to

make, that the world does not accept that everywhere you go is a

battlefield because of the person who is there. Internationally, we

are coming to this understanding that killing really should be in

situations of necessity. That is not all these places everywhere in

the world. It is certainly not here in the United States, Germany,

England, etc.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you for your questions on that.

Mr. Quigley.

Mr. QUIGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To the panel, Mr. Bynam from Georgetown University, talking

about the need for greater oversight, said, ‘‘You need someone to

effectively act as a devil’s advocate within the system who is ideally

outside the decision loop of such programs. It could be a U.S. attorney or something like the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act

court that makes judgments on secret wiretaps, because the simple

requirement of going before a judge or an independent official to

make a case for a targeted killing introduces a measure of accountability.’’

So what I would ask the panel is, do you agree with Mr. Bynam,

should there be some sort of an independent third party to oversee

and approve drone activities?

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Mr. ANDERSON. I would disagree strenuously with the proposition that this is an area that should be judicialized. I think that

it is not the proper frame for the U.S. judiciary, and I don’t think

that they would have any expertise, and inevitably would wind up

turning it into something that would both make the intelligence

and military uses of force less effective. At the same time, I believe

it would also corrupt the domestic judicial process in the United

States, because they would be involved in a series of activities with

necessarily very murky lines to be drawn. I don’t think that it is

an appropriate role for the judiciary to be involved in.

I do think that there is a much greater role to be had for accountability and oversight coming from the Congress itself. Precisely as the prospect of drones raises the possibility of smaller and

more discrete uses of force, in which case that can in some sense

substitute for war. In that regard, I think that the right accountability mechanism actually rests with the Congress and not with

any other body.

Mr. QUIGLEY. But who is the person that does that on the battlefield?

Mr. ANDERSON. I think the questions about the use of force that

are most crucial here are ones that are actually being made by the

CIA, and that requires the processes that Professor Banks had referred to, I think they actually need to be strengthened to require

more consultation with Congress and more information to be given

to Congress. I think that one of the important roles that Congress

has in this is to be able to raise objections to particular things.

I think it is a much more complicated role for Congress, but I believe that it is actually the right mechanism to provide accountability.

Ms. O’CONNELL. I agree with Professor Anderson. Having a court

involved would not help us get into compliance with the law of

armed conflict. There is an assumption in the idea that somehow

what the CIA is doing just needs some oversight. In fact, there is

no justifying it, so how could a court help?

I agree with Professor Anderson that it is up to Congress to

make sure that the executive branch remains in compliance with

our fundamental obligations internationally to the extent that the

executive is not doing it itself.

Mr. GLAZIER. I would just say that if the attacks are being conducted under the law of war, under military authority, then these

issues are essentially addressed through the rules of engagement

as far as deciding what level of oversight is necessary within the

military chain of command. If this is activity that we are deciding

is taking place deliberately outside of the law of war setting, and

we are using basically national security laws and international

rights or asserted rights to self-defense, then that does seem to me

that is a matter for Congress to decide how they want to structure

the law governing those matters.

Mr. BANKS. I agree that the courts should not be involved. I also

share the view that Congress could do more than it has customarily. We have talked today about battlefield. It may be that in terms

of oversight, one thing that Congress could consider is establishing

criteria for the use of targeting outside of traditional battlefields.

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In other words, you need something to oversee. You need more

than what the law now says to be currently and fully informed.

Your Bynam quote suggests that there should be some measure

that could judge whether or not the efficacious behavior of our government has followed its policies. Could there be criteria for the

use of force outside the traditional battlefield? Could those be

statutorily conferred? Could they be then subject to oversight of the

type that we have been discussing here?

Mr. QUIGLEY. And what would the precedent for that be?

Mr. BANKS. The precedent might be, as Bynam suggested in his

comment, use of an intelligence court to review the surveillance requests of the Department of Justice, even though that is a judicial

forum. I think that for all the reasons that have been offered here

today, the courts are ill-equipped to be involved in that process.

They wouldn’t want to do it. The FISA court, I think, has a very

full plate. And you are much more equipped, I think, to make those

kinds of judgments in your role.

Mr. QUIGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

I am going to make some statements and ask you to react if you

disagree with them and move along with that. If we have a situation where we have a battlefield like Afghanistan, the military is

using drones, I don’t think I have heard any of you disagree with

that. I think all of you think there is question whether the CIA or

other civilian organizations can do that with authority.

If we take one of the people involved in that conflict, some al

Qaeda operative, and say he moves back over the border into Pakistan. Some of you think that it is fine for the military to go after

him there, but some of you think that, again, there is a question

and a problem with the civilians or the CIA doing it.

Is there a problem if you think that the Pakistanis have agreed

to have the United States exercise this type of force? Am I right

there? So if this al Qaeda person goes over the border in Pakistan,

we are fighting that fight too, and you can use your drones to get

them, and nobody on the panel seems to have difficulty there?

If that individual keeps traveling and goes to Yemen, I sense

that some of you don’t have a problem with the military going after

him there. OK. So there is one individual going into Yemen, being

targeted, and nobody has a problem with that, the military going

after them, even though they may not be involved at that particular time in anything eminent. OK, I am going to keep moving this

unless somebody jumps in on me here.

Ms. O’CONNELL. Mr. Chairman, when you said there is only one

person, it makes it sounds as though it is a majority vote and we

are the Supreme Court and we get to decide whether killing that

person in Yemen is lawful or not. I am really trying to be objective,

this is not my personal opinion.

Mr. TIERNEY. No, no, it is the law. I want you to interpret the

law for me.

Ms. O’CONNELL. This is what international law says. And the authorities that I am speaking of are the United Nations——

Mr. TIERNEY. I think we all understand that. Nobody is going to

pin this on you. We are asking you as professors and legal scholars

what the law of the land is out there.

61

Ms. O’CONNELL. I want to stand here with many, many others

who agree with me, even though the three who have been called

today don’t share that view.

Mr. GLAZIER. I would like to speak for myself, rather than have

someone else decide what my views are on this.

Mr. TIERNEY. Now is your chance.

Mr. GLAZIER. Exactly, sir. The international law that governs the

use of force preemptively in other countries was basically crafted

by the United States in discussion with the United Kingdom after

the Caroline incident of 1837. It does, I may have sort of seemed

a little bellicose in some of my earlier remarks, but it does in fact

impose constraints of necessity and imminence. So I do think that

this one individual as you have described, while they have moved

across the border in Pakistan, they may still reflect that imminent

threat.

But unless we actually had intelligence that said, ‘‘not only are

they in Yemen, but they are on the verge of doing imminent harm

to the United States from that position in Yemen,’’ then in fact

under the rules that the United States has taken the lead in

crafting, that is too far removed, and we would no longer have the

authority even for the military to use force at that point.

Mr. ANDERSON. I will round it out, I guess. I think one of the

things we have to keep very much in mind here is that the United

States has long had a policy, and has declared its legal view and

it is reiterated in Harold Koh’s statement as the considered view

that where a country is unable or unwilling to prevent its territory

from being used as safe haven for transnational terrorists, and this

goes back decades and decades and decades, the U.S. view is that

yes, there are imminence requirements and yes, there are Caroline

requirements, and yes, there are numbers of other considerations.

But important as sovereignty and territorial integrity are, the

United States regards it as lawful to be able to go and strike those

persons where a country is unwilling or unable to control its territory.

Mr. TIERNEY. So an individual like al-Awlaki, if somebody were

to go after him, are they using the combatant theory or the selfdefense theory?

Mr. ANDERSON. I believe that the administration is using the

self-defense theory at this point, because of where he is located and

because I am not—actually, I can’t tell you that. I wish I knew and

I think it would be something where Congress should actually ask

questions of the administration to find that out. I don’t know.

Mr. TIERNEY. My concern there is if al-Awlaki goes back to

Texas, is it then lawful to blow him up there?

Mr. ANDERSON. No. The territorial United States is a very, very

different proposition from Yemen or any other place.

Mr. BANKS. For the practical reason that an arrest may be effected there in Texas.

Mr. TIERNEY. That presumes then an arrest couldn’t be effected

in some other country where he is.

Mr. BANKS. It does. If that alternative is available, we should

pursue it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Is that generally agreed to by you, Mr. Anderson,

as well?

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Mr. ANDERSON. No, not entirely. I believe that as Harold Koh

stated in his testimony, there is not an obligation to give process

and there is not an obligation to give warning, once one has identified that person as being either a target in relation to an armed

conflict or self-defense.

Mr. TIERNEY. And there is no obligation to arrest him, if that is

possible, even if you could?

Mr. ANDERSON. There is no obligation to arrest him. Now, there

is an obligation to identify him as a target and to show that there

is some necessity about that. And the question of how much necessity may involve and probably should involve a question of, is this

London and could we go to the authorities there in order to do that.

But the reality is that Yemen and Britain are really different.

Mr. TIERNEY. Where does this, the imminence of the threat come

in on this? I know Mr. Koh spoke about that. A definition of that

would be helpful.

Mr. ANDERSON. He raises that as one of the considerations that

has to be taken into account as part of self-defense. So he is referring to what has been referred to as the Caroline doctrine.

But the United States has embraced for a very long time the idea

that self-defense includes an ‘‘act of self-defense’’ where one is looking to the character of the threat and things they have done in the

past and things that the group with which an individual is affiliated has done in the past, in order to decide that they constitute

a threat. It is not some idea in the United States’ mind, certainly,

that it is looking and saying, ‘‘oh, they are about to cross the border

with a nuclear weapon.’’ It is not that kind of eminence.

Ms. O’CONNELL. I don’t know what policy we have had for a very

long time on this. The targeted killing of individuals has really

begun after 9/11. We didn’t take this view that we could go around

with drones killing people of this kind. I think the comment that

there is somehow a distinction between what we can do in the

United States and the U.K. versus Yemen is really the telling

point. If there is a worldwide armed conflict that we are justified

in fighting out of self-defense and treating all the persons involved

in al Qaeda as combatants we can kill without warning, then why

isn’t there an armed conflict in the United States where we can do

the same thing? Or the United Kingdom or Germany?

In fact, the Bush administration took the view that we could do

this. There were statements made to the Congress that we could.

And that just shows that this is a fiction we are dealing with, created by lawyers. And it is not the reality and not what the law requires. There is no armed conflict happening in this country. Our

official view of Yemen and Pakistan is that in those countries, we

should be working with their authorities. We should not be dismissing them as unable or unwilling. And the more we do that, the

more we undermine the respect their people have for them and

their ability to do this job for us.

So it is counterproductive, it is non-factual, it is not our official

position that either Pakistan or Yemen are unable or unwilling.

Therefore we should not be treating them as combat zones.

Mr. TIERNEY. Does your opinion change if Yemen or Pakistan

said to the United States, we would like you to get that guy?

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Ms. O’CONNELL. No, because Pakistan and Yemen can only give

us the authority that they have to give. If they are involved in an

armed conflict, and Pakistan is now trying to clear the Swat Valley

of certain Taliban forces, if they ask us to join with them in carrying out that particular action, and really, there is question under

law of armed conflict whether named individuals can be targeted

and brought to bear. Mr. Koh only mentioned one case of this,

which was a World War II case involving Justice Stevens. And he

regretted killing a named person. So this is really a question for

warriors in an armed conflict.

The only thing that Pakistan or Yemen can ask us to do in terms

of carrying out battlefield killing is to join with them in their own

armed conflicts to try to support what they are doing.

Mr. TIERNEY. So if Yemen decided that this was a guy they wanted to have a conflict with, that he was part of some operation that

they thought, or whatever, then they could do it?

Ms. O’CONNELL. Yes. And we can certainly help them, and we

were helping them after the Cole attack. Our FBI people, with really good training in Arabic, who know terrorism networks, were

working effectively with the Yemeni authorities. That is the route

we should be pursuing and should have been pursuing in these last

years.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Flake.

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Anderson, Legal Adviser Koh, his statement

didn’t specifically mention the CIA. Is there a reason for that? By

saying there is authority, did that necessarily capture uniform or

civilian operators? What is your feeling there? And should he have,

and will they need to further clarify?

Mr. ANDERSON. I think that part of the difficulty is that although

Director Panetta is all over the newspapers, deliberately in order

to give information about the campaign that is taking place in

Pakistan and elsewhere, it has never actually been officially admitted. And so I think that the difficulty for the State Department is

how do you wind up providing official overt legal blessing to something that the agency itself doesn’t formally admit actually takes

place.

I believe that this has actually reached a counterproductive point

for the CIA. I think that we actually need to define a body of operations in which it is denied and deniable and not acknowledged as

such, but is not regarded as though it were covert. And yet the Director is in the newspapers talking about it. I think that we actually need to define some area between those things in order to be

able to talk precisely about these kinds of legal and policy issues.

So I think that there would actually be a great deal of utility in

inviting representatives from the intelligence agencies to come and

talk about how they classify these things. I would be very interested in what Professor Banks has to say in particular about this,

because I think he has much more experience.

But I think the failure to mention the CIA is largely on account

of the fact that there has been no explicit acknowledgment of it. I

think it needs to be named. I think the CIA needs that protection.

And somebody needs to invite them to do that.

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Mr. FLAKE. Before going to Professor Banks on that, if you were

a defense attorney, defending either uniformed or civilian operator

of drones, would you feel comfortable enough that the statement

from the administration gives your client sufficient coverage there?

Mr. ANDERSON. I feel comfortable that it does give sufficient coverage. But I also think that it is kind of missing the point in a certain way. We know what is going on, it is acknowledged, it is out

there on the table and I think that it has to be discussed in order

to lay out clearly what the legal rules are.

I also think that, I mean, if I were a defense attorney, I would

certainly assert that. I think that speaking as a neutral professor,

I think that it needs to be said, I think that the CIA personnel

need to know what the views of the political branches are on this,

and need to have it clearly and explicitly stated.

It cannot be left in limbo, so to speak, of having even a small

amount of uncertainty as to whether their actions are regarded as

lawful or not. If Professor O’Connell’s views about this are right,

somebody should say so and make that policy. If the views that I

have articulated are right, that needs—but the uncertainty needs

to be taken away here.

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS. I agree with Professor Anderson that greater clarity

for the role of the intelligence community in this area would be a

positive development. I think clearly Mr. Koh is speaking on behalf

of the State Department and he was articulating what he said to

be his view of the international legality of these operations. But he

made reference not only of course to international law and the laws

of armed conflict, but also to the Constitution of the United States

and the President’s powers as well as the authorization for the use

of military force.

He did not, of course, refer to the intelligence laws that I have

spoken about here this morning, and I think that is regrettable. In

part, I believe it is for the reasons that Ken suggested, they don’t

illuminate the issues or supply the criteria that we might have to

begin to evaluate these operations. Some kind of a middle ground

that Professor Anderson suggests between deniable and Mr. Panetta in the newspapers I think might be a helpful development.

Ms. O’CONNELL. I think we really do owe our CIA operatives very

good and clear legal advice. I think they were let down very badly

by the advice with regard to interrogation, tactics and I think they

are being let down now if they are being told that the drone operations are lawful.

It is one thing to develop a theory within the United States that

could somehow justify it and that you have heard from my colleagues today. It is another thing in terms of what foreign countries believe, especially where those CIA agents are operating in

Pakistan, Afghanistan or other countries. And in those countries,

I am confident that the position I have presented to you is the one

that is held there.

So our CIA agents who are involved in this activity are in jeopardy. We have 17 CIA agents who are under indictment in Italy

for kidnaping. And at any time, if the Pakistani authorities decide

that they are no longer friendly to us, or the Yemeni authorities,

they can arrest and put on trial for murder persons involved in the

65

CIA and these killings. That position should be clarified to our

agents.

It is one thing that we believe we are right in our theories, it is

another thing what the rest of the world thinks. And I believe that

our agents are in serious jeopardy.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you.

Mr. GLAZIER. Congress can certainly clarify as a matter of domestic law and help the CIA folks out that way. But I think as a

matter of international law, to participate in a killing, the best you

can hope for is to have the belligerent’s or combatant’s privilege

and immunity under the international law of war. But that we can

only confer upon our uniformed military personnel. So I don’t think

there is anything that we can do that, as a matter of international

law or as a matter of the laws of other countries, that is going to

get the CIA folks out of the risk of some sort of foreign prosecution.

Mr. ANDERSON. I would add to that, I am sorry to take more time

on this, but I would add to that Spain, for example, has been moving to alter its law in universal jurisdiction. They have had conversations with some people in Spain that were connected to that

process and said, was that because of U.S. pressure that was

brought about concerns about bringing prosecutions exactly of this

kind that Italy has brought? And the answer was, no, the answer

was nobody thinks that the U.S.’s view is important, because it will

never wind up backing it up. And what matters is actually that we

are concerned that China will be upset with this and that it would

wind up cutting us off from contracts.

So I think that there are political avenues by which the United

States can make it much, much more costly in order for foreign

countries to be able to go after its personnel in that way. When the

United States has formulated a view about what it thinks is the

proper view of international law on that, it has political avenues

that it is able to pursue, and it should be doing so.

Mr. TIERNEY. But as things stand right now, every single one of

you thinks that a CIA person in country X that is not Afghanistan

or Pakistan or whatever manipulating unmanned aerial vehicles

and killing people with them is liable under international law for

arrest and prosecution? Do we all agree to that? You do not. OK.

You think that they are somehow immune?

Mr. ANDERSON. I think it depends very much on where they are

doing it. If one is talking about Afghanistan or Pakistan——

Mr. TIERNEY. No, I excluded those.

Mr. ANDERSON. Sorry. Then, it depends again on where it is they

were doing it in relation to international law. They may be liable

under domestic law and that is one of the reasons that the CIA as

a civilian agency is a civilian agency, that we have concluded as

a country, as other states have, that we need to have a civilian capacity for covert action. Whether that is a good idea or a bad idea

is another question.

But we have decided that we need a capacity for covert action

that can involve civilian agents involved in violations of the domestic laws of other countries. And that may be a terrible idea, and

maybe the Church Commission should have pushed that all the

way to the point of saying, that will never happen again as a matter of U.S. law. But as it stands, it is lawful under domestic law,

66

even if it is unlawful under the local law of the place in which

those agents are operating.

And that is one of the conditions that separates the CIA from the

military. It may be a very bad policy or it may be a very good policy. But as a matter of law, that is, I think, where it stands.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Foster.

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you.

Do any of you know whether an adequate historical record is

being made of the activities of drones? Who signed off on which actions? No idea? OK.

I am just sort of looking at the mirror image problem. For example, if, let’s say, the Taliban had the technology to launch a drone

attack on the operators of the drones that are attacking them, so

would it be legitimate under international law and U.S. policies for

some Taliban that had the technology to go and launch drones?

First off at the control bunkers in Nevada or wherever they are,

and/or at the homes of where the operators live that do this, under

the same set of standards that we apply to taking out those?

Mr. GLAZIER. Absolutely. The drone operators are essentially fulfilling a combatant function. So my interpretation is that they then

become combatants. Now, of course, the CIA people, we might

argue that they are civilians and therefore they fall under the ‘‘directly participating in hostilities’’ standard. But certainly, they are

fulfilling such a military role that they are pretty liable. But the

military people, definitely, if we are in an armed conflict, then the

rules that govern armed conflict are supposed to apply even

handedly to both sides. And just as we can target, we can in fact

be targeted in turn.

Ms. O’CONNELL. I disagree with that, because I don’t see the

United States as the scene of an armed conflict. So there would be

no right for others to bring battlefield weapons to this country. The

right of persons in Afghanistan to resist our efforts, the persons

who are trying to topple Hamid Karzai, they have the right to fight

lawfully and to push the United States out of their country there.

But no, no one has a right——

Mr. FOSTER. It is the joystick operators, it is where the explosion

takes place but not where the joystick is operated.

Ms. O’CONNELL. If the persons in the CIA who are in the United

States are committing unlawful activities because they have no

right to kill in that setting. But that is a crime under international

law. It is not something that allows another person, another group

to come and use battlefield weapons here. They should follow law

enforcement procedures and make complaints to the United States.

Of course, they are in no position to do that.

So no, I really respect the battlefield. And I would never say that

any of these groups that are fighting us and have the right to fight

us in Afghanistan, for example, if they are carrying weapons openly

and displaying that they are members of an organized armed

group, they have the right under international law to fight us

there. But they don’t have the right to follow that here. There is

no necessity to bring that fight here, and they don’t have the right

even to attack persons who are committing unlawful——

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Mr. FOSTER. So you think command and control centers generally

outside the field of combat are off limits from your——

Ms. O’CONNELL. No, under international law governing the use

of force, the principle of necessity says that you can only use that

armed force that is necessary to accomplish the military objective.

The battle that we are fighting in Afghanistan now is to rid that

country of insurgents. The limits on necessity in terms of what

those insurgents can do have to do with our operations there.

And I would not say, there is some disagreement, I admit that

this is not as clear a view, but it is part of the modern, growing

trend toward focusing on necessity. So even I would say a command and control center outside the zone of armed conflict away,

far away from the battlefield, and of course, that conflict in Afghanistan is being run by Afghanistan. We are there at their invitation. So we are not really the command and control in terms of

international law.

So no, I think this country should be protected from those kinds

of battlefield attacks.

Mr. GLAZIER. Well, that is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Quirin. And it is contrary to the law of war as nations understand it. Because when a nation goes to war with another nation, the two places that are clearly legitimate theatres of military

operation are the territory of those belligerent parties.

And in Quirin, the Nazi saboteurs, the legal issue was not the

Germans came to the United States to blow up war industries. The

Supreme Court basically indicates in the decision that had they

kept their uniforms, they had every right to do that. It was the fact

that they shed their uniforms and buried them on the beach and

tried to blend in with our civilian population that made them unlawful combatants.

So I don’t believe that the United States can shelter itself from

counter-attack by launching missiles from our own territory. Under

Professor O’Connell’s theory, we can fire ballistic missiles from the

United States or we can fire cruise missiles from far offshore and

yet, because those individuals are not on the battlefield, as she defines it, they are immune from military attack. This would be a

theory that would be wonderful for the U.S. military. But it is simply not the law.

Ms. O’CONNELL. We are not at war with Afghanistan. We currently, since Hamid Karzai took over, we are there at their invitation. So no, they are not launching attacks. The state of Afghanistan, the state of Pakistan, are not at war with the United States.

We are assisting them in putting down insurgencies. So the theatre

of operations are in those countries under the leadership of those

governments.

So this has nothing to do with Kerin, in which we were at war

with Germany, another state that had sent those individuals here.

Not to mention that is old law. But it has nothing to do with the

current situation that we are talking about. We are not at war with

Pakistan or Afghanistan or Yemen.

Mr. FOSTER. So if they had declared war on us in whatever category, then that would give them the right to go after our operators?

68

Ms. O’CONNELL. After October 7, 2001, when we went to war

with Afghanistan, we took the fight there, if they had been capable

of making counter-attacks under this territory, of course they could

do that in self-defense or in a war with the United States. The

same with Iraq. In March 2003, when we launched an attack on

the state of Iraq, yes, Iraq, if they had had the capability, they

could have launched a counter-attack on us. Our leaders should always remember that when they attack foreign countries, that it

can come to the homeland.

But in both cases, our forces were far too strong and protected

the homeland. It didn’t come to that.

But in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, we are not at war with those

countries. We are in support of their leadership.

Mr. FOSTER. Does anyone else have any comments on this?

Mr. ANDERSON. I disagree almost entirely with the analysis that

has been presented. But I would actually make a slightly different

comment, which is, I think it is very important for the subcommittee here to understand just both how much support there is for the

various views if one goes to the international law community outside the United States, or if one goes to national security scholars

here within this country, in that there is really a sense of ships

passing in the night here, in which the consequences of one view

or another are really serious. We are talking about criminal law,

we are talking about acts of things that could potentially be considered as murder by the people that are carrying them out.

How one reconciles those things or doesn’t reconcile them really

matters. It matters as a matter of deep criminal law in this. My

view on this particular issue is to agree with Professor Glazier,

with one additional point, which is, we have long said, and I think

correctly so, that where we are dealing with a terrorist group, that

terrorist group doesn’t actually have any right to be taking up

arms at all.

So the idea that there is a reciprocal right to be able to come

after us, it would be the view that the British had when the IRA

said, ‘‘we are going to adhere strictly to the laws of war, and we

are just going to go after British soldiers in some base somewhere

abroad.’’ The view of the British, correctly, was, this is a terrorist

group, and they have no right to be taking up arms against us in

any form. That will all be considered criminal.

And our view of al Qaeda would be exactly the same way, that

the fact that we are launching attacks on them doesn’t actually

give them the right to launch attacks on us. It is not reciprocal in

that way, because of the nature of the group.

Mr. GLAZIER. It matters very much how we define the armed conflict. If Professor O’Connell’s view is correct, that we are simply

now in a non-international armed conflict with Afghanistan, in

other words, the conflict is simply between Afghanistan and remnants of the Taliban, and we are now there entirely at their invitation, that does make a difference. But I think that we are still in

the armed conflict that Congress constitutionally authorized in the

authorization of the use of military force. So I think that the

United States still essentially has the right to combat the Taliban

and al Qaeda in our own right. But if we do so, then the flip side

of that is it makes us liable to attack ourselves.

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I would also suggest that there is an alternative. One choice is

to use this paradigm of the law of armed conflict. But another paradigm is sort of the piracy, or essentially, I think it is the way that

Britain chose to treat the IRA, where because of the robustness of

the threat, it is considered to be beyond the scope of law that ordinary law enforcement agencies can deal with and military force is

required.

That is exactly how pirates were treated historically. But it was

essentially conducted under laws much more akin to law enforcement rules, so that the military was under an obligation, even with

pirates, little known, but they didn’t just shoot pirates first and ask

questions later. They at least made an effort to capture them. Then

when they were captured, they were dealt with under a law enforcement paradigm and brought home for trial, under the constitutional provisions that govern a normal civilian trial.

So that is an option that is available to this government as a policy choice, to choose to treat terrorists essentially as pirates, or as

terrorists have been treated in the past, using the military under

constraints that are much more akin to law enforcement than to

law of war.

Ms. O’CONNELL. I think David Glazier is exactly right, and we

have really come to a crunch point. Are we in an armed conflict in

Afghanistan and Iraq right now? Is that where we are engaged in

armed conflict? Or are we really actually in an armed conflict all

over the world with these non-state actors?

I just suggest to you again that the international lawyers who

are specialists in this law around the world do not view it this way.

Our armed forces know they are in an armed conflict in Afghanistan and in Iraq. That is the reality.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you all.

Mr. Welch, any more questions?

Mr. WELCH. Just an observation. I think that what you are saying now, the panel, goes to the heart of the challenge for us in Congress. Much of the analysis depends on what the nature of the conflict is, whether it is a police action. And as I understand it, many

other countries that have been faced with terrorist threats have

been the recipient of consequences of those threats have defined it

more as a police action. Our country has defined it as an international global war on terror. That really guides analysis as much

as anything else.

I appreciate all your contributions here. Thank you. Thank you,

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I think you have exhausted the panel

up here. We have a lot of different things to mull over and we will

continue to read. The ACLU statement has just come in and I will

share that with the other members of the committee as well.

Do any of you have any final words that you want to leave with

us?

Mr. BANKS. I would say that the metaphor that Professor Anderson used just now is quite apt, the ships passing in the night, different legal paradigm here. As Professor O’Connell just said, the

prospect of asymmetric war with non-state actors does not fit neatly within any of the paradigms that have been discussed here

today. It would behoove, I think, the Congress, to grapple with the

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possibility of making adaptations or recognizing new dimensions of

legal oversight that could allow us to adapt the laws that we have

been working with for more than 200 years to this new era of warfare.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you have any of those adaptations in mind in

particular?

Mr. BANKS. I have a few. I think that considerable oversight improvement could be made in the area of intelligence that we have

been speaking about here today. I think back to areas that are off

today’s topic, I think there is considerable work that is being done

in the academic community and elsewhere on changes in detention,

classification of fighters, targeting and the like that deserve congressional attention.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. GLAZIER. I would just like to offer the thought that, I tried

to focus my remarks today on the law. And as has been noted by

Professor O’Connell, there are real policy issues at stake as well.

My personal belief is that in confronting these threats that the law

of war is not an adequate solution, that there are, for many reasons, including the fact that we need to engage in activities in

other friendly countries, even European countries, where there may

be terrorist cells, we are dependent to a large measure on using

criminal law in its standard form. And we are depending on international cooperation.

So it seems to me that one of the most important reasons to try

to ground our conduct across the board in an area of law is to facilitate that international cooperation and to lay the groundwork

for the ability to call upon, even to demand upon, other nations to

cooperate with us in this effort. We have, for example, a whole series of terrorism treaties which basically require international cooperation in the field. Where we choose to exclusively treat this as

an armed conflict, though, we give other countries the right essentially to step outside the scope of those terrorism treaties and say,

look, the United States is at war, we don’t have to cooperate in an

armed conflict.

But if we don’t conduct those portions of the operations that we

choose to consider to be an armed conflict, in accordance with that

law, I think we damage our credibility and we impair cooperation

in those areas that we do want to treat under the law of criminal

law.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well stated.

Ms. O’CONNELL. I want to echo what Mr. Duncan said, that we

shouldn’t exaggerate what al Qaeda is. There was a report on National Public Radio on Monday of this week that in fact, al Qaeda

is losing significant support in the Muslim world because of their

lawlessness, because of their violence. I firmly believe that we, the

United States, can help bring about the final demise of al Qaeda

through our commitment to the rule of law, especially by strict

compliance with rules governing the use of lethal force.

We have rules, they are in place. We shouldn’t try to manipulate

them, to reinterpret them, to find loopholes in them, to say that

they are quaint, obsolete, no longer of use to this country. We

should uphold them, we should honor them, and we should distinVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:27 May 09, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\64922.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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guish ourselves from our enemies by our commitment to them.

Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. ANDERSON. I join Professor Banks particularly in what he

said about oversight. I would also again reiterate my support for

Dean Koh’s statement. I think that it provided a very solid base

for the United States to go forward. I think there are ways in

which the Congress could build on those and invite the administration to elaborate those further, starting in the first place with specifically identifying the CIA as an actor in this.

At the end of the day, I believe that it is not about drones. I

think that it is really a question about the proper role of the CIA

in this, the proper role of covert action, the proper role of the use

of advanced technologies by actors that may be outside of the military. I think those are enormously important policy and legal

choices that the Congress will have to confront.

Mr. TIERNEY. All of us are grateful for your intellect and your

time and your ideas that you have shared with us. I can only imagine that the people that study in your classes must enjoy being

there and must get a lot out of it.

So thank you very much. And again, we always try to hold out

the prospect that if we need to come back to you for your advice

and consent, we are hoping that you will welcome that.

Again, thank you all very much. This meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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