[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 17

- 11363 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 2:16

- cv - 00237

- SPC

- CM KEVIN JORDAN, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, DONALD SAWYER, in his individual capacity as Facility Administrator at Florida Civil Commitment Center, REBECCA JACKSON, in her individual capacity as Clinical Director at Florida Civil Commitment Center, MARK SNYDER, Inspector, Defendants

- Appellees.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

________________________ (January 19, 2018) Case: 17-11363 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 1 of 92 Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and FAY, Circui t Judges.
PER CURIAM: Kevin Jordan, an involuntary civil detainee at the Florida Civil Commitment Center (“FCCC”), proceeding pro se , appeals the district court’s order that dismissed, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), his pro se

com plaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Florida state law ; and denied his motion for leave to amend his complaint

. Jordan was involuntarily committed to the FCCC in 2014 as a sexually violent predator. In March 2015, Mark Snyder, the inspector at the FCCC, initiated criminal charges against Jordan for indecent exposure in the FCCC for exposing himself and masturbating in front of staff . The charges were dismissed, and Snyder later initiated new charges when Jordan allegedly committed indecent
exposure again. Based on the filing and prosecution of these charges, Jordan sued (1) Kristina Kanner, the Secretary of the Florida Department of Children and Family Services; (2) Donald Sawyer, the facility administrator at the FCCC; (3) Rebecca Jackson, the cl i nical director at FCCC; and (4) Snyder in federal
district court

. He alleged malicious prosecution , due

- process violations , Fourtee nth Amendment violations, equal

- p rotection violations , negligent hiring

Case: 17-11363 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 2 of 93 and retention of Snyder, and defamation. He did not refute that he had committed indecent exposure in the manner alleged

. Defendant s - Appellees Sawyer, Jackson, and Snyder 1 moved to dismiss. In response, Jordan moved to amend his complaint. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismis s, denied Jordan’s motion to amend his complaint, and dismissed the case. On appeal, Jordan argues that his complaint should not have been dismissed because he was maliciously prosecuted by Snyder, who knew that Jordan could not control his deviant behav ior and knew that Jordan had been diagnosed with a
sexual illness and could not control himself

. Jordan also contends that he was singled out from comparators at the FCCC who also committed indecent exposure but were not prosecuted

. In addition, Jordan asserts that Sawyer and Jackson neglig ently hired and retained Snyder and that Snyder defamed his characte r by filing criminal charges. Finally , h e argues that his motion for leave to amend should have been granted. After careful review, we affirm the d istrict court’s dismissal and denial of leave to amend.
I. We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing

1 Kanner was not served. Case: 17-11363 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 3 of 94 them in the light most favorable to the p laintiff. Leib v. Hillsborough C ty. Pub. Transp. Comm’n , 558 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2009). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege enough plausible facts, on the face of the complaint, to support the claim stated. Bell Atl

. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). We begin with Jordan’s malicious

- prosecution claims. To establi sh a federal
malicious

- prosecution claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures , in additio n to the elements of the common

- law tort of malicious prosecution. Wood v. Kesler , 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003). We have determined that, among other elements, a lack of probable cause for the arrest is a required element of a § 198 3 malicious

- prosecution claim. Id . at 882. Similarly, under Florida law, a plaintiff must establish, among other elements, an absence of probable cause for the original proceeding in order to support a claim of malicious prosecution . Durkin v.
Davis , 81 4 So. 2d 1246, 1248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). Here, Jordan’s behavior, which he does not deny, fell under the umbrella of indecent exposure as defined by Florida law

. See Fla. Stat. § 800.03. Under Fla. Stat. § 800.03, “[ i ] t is unlawful to expose or exhibit one’s sexual organs in public or on the private premises of another, or so near thereto as to be seen from such private premises, in a vulgar or indecent manner, or to be naked in public except in any place provided or set apart for that purpose. ” Fla. Stat. § 800.03. Since Jordan

Case: 17-11363 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 4 of 95 does not deny that he engaged in conduct satisfying this description, probable cause for his arrest and prosecution existed . As a result, Jordan did not have a viable claim for malicious prosecution under Florida law o r § 1983

. See Durkin , 814 So.2d at 1248; Wood , 323 F.3d at 881

- 8; Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570. And b ecause the arrest was based on probable cause, Jordan’s complaint did not sufficiently show that D efendants inflicted mental or physical abuse on him by

mere ly reporting his crime

. See Kyle K. , 208 F.3d at 943. Jordan’s constitutional claims fare no better. We first note that a plausible claim that those charged with the responsibility of providing daily care to an involuntarily civilly committed patient inflicted physical or mental abuse on him does state the denial of a constitutional right fo r purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Kyle K. v. Chapman , 208 F.3d 940, 943 (11th Cir. 2000). Here, though, Jordan’s complain t states no such c laim. Concerning the specific rights Jordan alleges were transgressed, we begin with Jordan’s equal

- protection claim. A plaintiff states an equal

- protection “class
of one” claim if he alleges that he has been intentionally treated differently from other people who are similarly situated to him and that no rational basis supports the difference in treatment. Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin , 496 F.3d 1189, 1200

- 02 (11th Cir. 2007). To be similarly situated, the comparators must be prima facie identical in all relevant respects. Grider v. City of Auburn , 618 F.3d 1240, 1264

Case: 17-11363 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 5 of 96 (11th Cir. 2010). In addition, a plaintiff must allege more than broad generalities in identifying a comparator. Griffin Indus ., 496 F.3d at 1204. Here, Jordan did not p rovide sufficient facts about comparators to show that they were similarly situated and that he was treated differently from them

. See Griffin Indus., Inc. , 496 F.3d at 1202

- 05 ; Grider , 618 F.3d at 1264. As a result, he
did not allege enough plausible fa cts on the face of the complaint to support the claim stated. See Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570. Turning to Jordan’s due

- process claim, 2 Jordan bases it on claims of defamation and slander. But i njury to reputation, by itself, does not constitute the deprivation of a liberty or property interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. Behrens v. Regier , 422 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005) . In order to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause, a plaintiff must establish the fact of the defamation plus the violation of some more tangible interest. Paul v. Davis , 424 U.S. 693, 701

- 02 (1976). Jordan , however, failed to establish even the fact of defamation. See Paul , 424 U.S. at 701

- 02. He never described how he was defamed, how his reputation

2 Jordan also couches his § 1983 malicious

- prosecution claim as a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due

- process clause and as a taking of liberty without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment

. But e ven if the filing o f charges against a prisoner could , in some ci rcumstances, violate the Eighth Amendment

— a question we need not address

— as we have explained, here, probable cause supported the charges. And charges supported by probable cause do not violate the Eighth Amendment. Similarly, the mere filing and prosecu tion of charges supported by probable cause

— without more

— do not even arguably violate the Fourteenth Amendment.

Case: 17-11363 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 6 of 97 was harmed, or what untrue statement was made about him. See Paul , 424 U.S. at 701

- 02; Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570. Nor did he deny that he committed indecent exposure in the way t hat Snyder reported to police. The district court therefore did not err in dismissing this claim. Finally, we address Jordan’s state claims. The supplemental

- jurisdiction statute provides that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction ov er pendent state

- law claims if, in relevant part, the district court has dismissed all claims over whi ch it has original jurisdiction . 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Under the circumstances of Jordan’s case, t he district court did not err in dismissing without prejudice the s tate

- law claims. See Leib , 558 F.3d at 1305. Jordan’s neglige nt

- hiring

- and

- retention claim was a state

- law claim, and his defamation claim may also be characterized as a state

- law claim. See Behrens , 422 F.3d at 1259. Because , as we have discussed, the district court properly dismissed the federal claims, it had the discretion to dismiss the pending state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). In short, t he district court did not err in dismissing the complaint as to all of Jordan’s claims

. See Leib , 558 F. 3d at 1305.
II.
We now consider the district court’s denial of Jordan’s motion to amend. Generally, we review the district court’ s refusal to grant leave to amend for abuse

Case: 17-11363 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 7 of 98 of discretion, but we exercise de novo review as to the underlying legal conclusion that an amendment to the complaint would be futile. SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC , 600 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2010). Rule 15 , Fed. R. Civ. P., states that courts should freely give leave to amend when justice so require s. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Nevertheless, a district court need not grant leave to amend where, among other things, the amendment would be futile. Bryant v. Dupree , 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001). On this record, t he district court did not err in concluding that an amendment would be futile

. Consequently, it did not abuse its discretion in denying Jordan’s motion for leave to amend. See SFM Holdings, Ltd. , 600 F.3d at 1336; Bryant , 252 F.3d at 1163. Jordan rais ed the same claims in a similar manner in his proposed amended complaint as in his original complaint . Notably, in the proposed amended complaint, he did not allege that no probable cause existed for his arrest, did not contend that he did not expose himself to staff or masturbate in front of staff, did not provide comparator information, did not explain how he was defamed, and did not make fu rther arguments as to his state

- law claims. As a result, allowing the filing of the pr oposed amended complaint would have been futile. See SFM Holdings, Ltd. , 600 F.3d at 1336; Bryant , 252 F.3d at 1163.

Case: 17-11363 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 8 of 99 For these reasons, we affirm the order of the district court dismissing Jordan’s case and denying leave to amend his complaint

. AFFIRMED. Case: 17-11363 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 9 of 9