QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT 

OF THE ARMY 

A History of the Corps 

1775 - 1939 

by 

Enw Risch 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1989 
Library or Congress Catalog Ca rd Number: 62-60012 

First Printed J962 -CM H Pub 70-35 

For sale by lhe Supenmendem of Documems, U.S. GO"l"crnrncm l'riming Office 

Washinglon, DC 20402 
Foreword 

T he stud y of logistics in war a nd peace is fin all y coming into its own. 

After decades of conce ntrating on strategy and tactics, military historians a rc 

increasingly turning to the role of logistics in operatio nal art. It is well that 

they do so because, in truth. the histo rical professio n has fa iled to keep pace 

Wilh military planners a nd trai ners. These officers unde rstand the vital role 

that logislics-thc supply of penonncl and equipment for bailie- pl ays in 

modern warfare and for that reason are a nxious to know more about the 

logisti cal context of the nation's military past. 

To encourage Ihis new interest in logistical history, the Center of Milit a ry 

History is bringi ng back into print this important volume o n the Qua rter· 

master Corps, o ne of the oldest a nd most importa nt supply agencies of the 

United States Army. This history provides a documented record of the o.·igin 

a nd growth of the Corps and of the logistical SUppOI"l it gave the Army in 

wa .· a nd peace. The story's 1939 endin g was deliberately chosen to lead the 

reader into the comprehe nsive histories oflogistics in the U.S. Army in Wo rld 

Wa r II series. Simil ar studies a re now underway fo r bot h the Korean and 

Vietnam conniets. 

Particularly during this "Year of Training" I commend this useful account 

of the pre-World War II Army not only to those office rs a nd military students 

lI·aining for leadership positions in the combat suppo rt branches, bUI to all 

students of military history who wish to understand the contributio n played 

by the logistician to victory on the field of battle. 

Washingto n, D.C. 

1 September 1988 

iii 

WI LLIAM A. STOFfT 

Brigadier General, USA 

Chit.! oj Mibiary History 

Preface to New Edition 

This book was authorized by and first published under the auspices of 

the Office of The Quartermaster General (OQMG). On the eve of World 

War II, the Quartermaster Corps had long been one of the most important 

supply agencies of the United States Army, sustaining the troops when they 

took the field in active campaigns and supportin g them in peacetime when 

they we re stationed at posts and garrisons. In the course of its long existence, 

the Corps experienced many changes. Primarily responsible for the transportation of men and supplies when it was established in J775, the Corps, by 

1939, had become a supply service that procured and distributed clothing, 

rations, and equipment. An organization that originally was, to a large extent, civilian in character had evolved into a militarized Corps. The position of The Quartermaster General had changed from that of a G-4 who 

functioned as chief assistant to the Commanding General in the field, serving only during a war, to that of a bureau chief with permanent headquarters 

in Washington. 

Fragmentary accounts of some of these developments had been written 

before this volume, but what was needed was a comp rehensive, thoroughly 

documented account that would provide the continuity, hitherto lacking, for 

a history of the Corps. Quartermaster Support oj the Army traces the growth and 

evolution of the Corps, the changes made in its responsibilities, and the methods 

and procedures it developed for executing its functions. Both the successes 

and the failures of the Corps are included. 

The time span of the volume is from the appointment of the first Quartermaster General to Washington's Army inJune 1775 to President Franklin D. 

Roosevelt's proclamation of limited emergen..:y in September 1939. This terminal date was selected because the Corps' World War II operations are fully 

covered in four volumes in the United States Army in World War II series 

published by what is now the U.S. Army Center of Milita,'y History. This 

book, then, is the first in a sequence of volumes covering Quartennaster operations through World War II. 

The limitations imposed by a one-volume history covering more than 

150 years of Quartermaster developments prevented the inclusion of every 

facet of Quartermaster support in all theaters of operations in the wars from 
the American Revolution to World War II. Some activities receive only scanty 

treatment or are omined entirely, In addition, a background of combat operations is not included for the war periods, It was assumed that the reader would 

have some familia ,'ity with the battles a nd campaigns of those wars, In consequence, only some gu idelines and a few sketch maps arc offered; the emphasis 

is on analyzing Quartermaster wartime su pport operations, 

The largest a nd most important collections of War Department a nd 

Quartermaster Corps records used in the prepa ration of this volume a re 

deposil'ed at the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington, 

nc, Dr. Irvine Dallas, Chief Archivist, War Records Division of the National 

Arch ives, provided expe rt gu idance to the variou s collections. The writer is 

also gratefu l to the late Dr. Ca rl Lokke for the suggestions he offered in usi ng 

the Papers of the Continental Congress in his cha rge at the National Archives. 

Various manuscri pt collections provided a considerable body of supplementary and enli ghtenin g material. T he autho r wishes to acknowledge the 

help given by the staff of the Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, a nd 

the courtesies ex tended by the directors and libra rians of the America n 

Philosophical Society Library, the New York H istorical Society, the Pennsylvan ia Historical Society, the Chicago Historical Society. and the New York 

Public Libra .. y. 

My debts of g .. atitude to the many individuals who read portions of this 

manuscript are too numerous to permit me to exp ress my thanks publicl y 

to eadl by name. Some contributions, however, me rit particul ar mention. To 

Dr, Thomas M. Pitkin, a former chiefof the H isto rical Branch, OQMG, the 

aut ho r owes a special debt for his sustained encouragemem and for his constructive criticism of the entire manuscript. The then C hief Historia n of tbe 

Department of the Army, the late Dr, Stetson Conn, provided sou nd advice 

and slrong su pport in both the preparation and the publication of this volullle. 

The author is particularly indebted to M .,. Detmar Finke fo r his assista nce 

in obtain ing pe rmission from Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr .• editor in chief of the 

Company of Milita .'y Collectors and Historians, to reproduce the excellent 

drawings of H. C harles McBarron, J ... . James Hutchins, and J ohn Seve .. in, 

and the delightful pen sketch by Col. H.S. Pa .. ker. 

The au lilOr also wishes again to thank Houghton Mifflin Company for 

permission to quote from French's The First Year of tI,e American Revolution and 

Arthur H . Cla rk Com pany for permission to quote from Bandel's Frontier Lift 

iT! the Am!)'. 

vi 
Special thanks arc also still due to Miss Mary E. Kennedy, chic f of the 

Graphics Presentation Branch, OQMG, and her able stafT who prepared the 

sketch maps. I also wish to thank the secretarial staff of the former OQMG 

H istorical Office for the many hours of clerical and eyping assistance provided at various stages in the preparation of th is volume. 

Responsibility for any deficiencies in th is book is entirely mine. 

Washington, D.C. 

t September 1988 

'" 

ERNA R ISCH 

Contents 

Clw/'It:r 

1. THE ORIG INS OF QUA RTERMASTER SU PPLY, 

1775- 1778 . 

Origin of 'he Supply Deparlmel/ls 

Supervisory COll/mis . 

Supply Organization . 

Sllpplyillg Subsisle'!ce 

Development of Q1U1rlerlllosler Supply Procedures 

R eform Measures . 

BreakdoWIl of SUPpl)l, 1777 

I I. TI-IE I MPACT OF l NFLATION 

Admillistrative Deve/olm/ellls, 1778 . 

Improvement ill Supply . 

Impact of Spira /iug Prices 

Reol'ganiUl/ioll of Clot llill8 Department 

C.'edit (Imi DepreciaUd CUlTellCY 

/lIcreased Criticism (m d Tll refllenel{ Resiglllllirms 

H artis/lip at M an'is/oum . 

R esort to System of SjJUi/ic Supplies 

R eorgolliUllioll 01 the QI/(/rl nllflsle,~s D ejJf/rlmel1l 

EUect of COlltillUecl Lack 01 Funds 

Breakdowll of System of Specific Sup plies 

Preparn tiolls /01' the Last Cam/mign . 

R elrtmcllme,1/ . 

III. THE ERA OF C IVILIAN ASCEN DANCY 

Civiliall GOlltrol of SUJ)pfy . 

Supplying the H(mnar Expe(iitioll . 

Support of the St. Glnir Ex pedit ion 

Waylle's ExpeditiOlI 

Wh iskey R euellion 

Gonlimwtion of IlIe Post 0/ Qu(/rtermaster General. 

IV. DOMI NANCE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR 

Suusistellu Contract System 

Clothhlg Supply 

Trmupurtatioll of Supplies 

Introduction of M ili/nry Agents. 

" 

I 

4 

5 

9 

13 

23 

29 

39 

39 

.4 

48 

19 

52 

54 

56 

58 

59 

62 

64 

66 

70 

75 

76 

8. 

88 

100 

11 0 

III 

115 

117 

119 

127 

129 
Chapter Page 

V, SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 18 12 135 

Re-establishment of the Quart e rmaster's Deparllll enf 135 

Creatim! of CommissalY Gelleral of Purchases, 139 

Lack 0/ a Subsistellce Deparl1!lellt , 142 

Supply 0/ Clothing 144 

R eorganization o/the Quartermas/er's Department 152 

Tral1sporlalion 0/ Supplies 154 

Prep(Imtions /01' Hull's Campaign , 155 

Support of tile Northwestern A rmy 159 

Support 0/ Campaig;1IS 011 tile NingnrQ (wd Nor/hem Frontie rs 164 

Preparations /01' the Cnmpaigll 0/1813, 170 

Neglect o/the Southem Department 175 

Filial Cam/mign Preparations 176 

DemobiliUltioll, 177 

VI. JESUP SHAPES A DE PARTI\'IENT 181 

Estab/ishmellt 0/ Supply Bllreaus 181 

Departmell/a[ R egulat iolls 184 

Quartermaster SuplJOrl 0/ Expeditious 188 

Ecollomy Drive, 194 

Changes in Clothing Supply 198 

CommiSS(l1'iat Subsistence System 202 

Tra1!sportatioll Procedllres 201 

Construction R esfJ01ISibililies 210 

InLemal Improvements 212 

Supply Support ill the Semilwle Wa r . 218 

VII. LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 237 

P1't!liminl!JY Quartermaster Prepamtions 239 

Subsistellee Supply 247 

Clothing and Equipping the Troops 250 

Transportation Problems 258 

Supply 0/ Taylor'S Operations 263 

Support 0/ Gel/eml W ool. 273 

Supply 0/ Keamy 277 

Quartermaster Support 0/ ScaLI 283 

Demobilization, 296 

VlII. SUPllLY ON THE NEW FRONTIER, [848_1860 . 301 

Clothhlg Clumges 302 

Froutie)' Com/ructioll 303 

Lengthening Supply Lilles 304 

Contract Freighting , 308 
Chflpter 

Need lor Inlemal Improvemelils 

Experiment wilh Camels. 

Increased Expendilures . 

SUPP01·t 0/ Operations Agaimt the Mormo"s 

Organization Mid Pel'SO'1lllel 

Pf1.ge 

317 

319 

320 

322 

330 

IX. IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 333 

Impact 0/ Secessio" 0'11 Personnel 333 

Office OrganiUltion 337 

Supply Difficulties ill 186/ 338 

COlltract Procedures . M5 

Clot/ling Procurement 348 

Procurement 0/ Blatlhels 357 

T entage 359 

Shoe Procltremtmt . 360 

Rail Tramportatio11 0/ Men and Stlpplies. 361 

Military T elegrapll Office. 366 

Ocean T ransportation. 368 

Procurement 0/ Wagom and Ambulances . 373 

ProcuJ'emenL 0/ Animals 374 

Procurement 0/ Forage 379 

Subsisting the Troops . 382 

X. QUARTERMASTER FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL 

WAR . 389 

Field Organimtion. 389 

MilitaJ'Y Railroads. 394 

Role 0/ River Tmnspol'talio" 405 

OceaTl T ransporta tion. 415 

Wagon T rains . 420 

Depot System . 427 

Co"struc/io" 0/ Barracks aud Other Facilities. 440 

Clolliing the T roops 444 

Subsisting tile T roops. 447 

Subsistence Depm·tment 451 

SlImmM'Y 452 

XI. POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 453 

Demobilization Ope1'a tiolls 453 

Care 0/ the Dead . 462 

R eview 0/ Supply at Westenl Posts. 468 

Freigliti1lg Supplies 476 

., 
ella/Iter 

Tmnsporlalion by Tra71scontinenlal Railroads 

Distribution Difficulties , 

Quarters at Western Posts 

Surplus Supplies lind Procurement 

Return to Contmet Procedure 

Cml[liet Over Contract Control, 

Resl1'iclive Legislation Goveming ExPelidittll'es 

Resort to Covernme71t A1allufaeture. 

bltmdllction aud Productiou of Nell.! Clothing 

Ration Chatlges 

Administrative Developments 

Staff and Li71e CO'ltmversy , 

Proposed Consolidation of Supply Bureaus 

Retiument of Meigs 

Page 

477 

481 

484 

491 

492 

193 

495 

498 

500 

505 

507 

5 11 

512 

513 

XII, THE SPANISH·AMERICAN WAR 515 

Backg"olmd of Unprepm'edness 515 

C/otMug aud Equipping the Troops 520 

SubsislellCf: Problems . 528 

Procuumellt of Wagons, Amblt/al/ces, and Animals 535 

Distribution Problem 539 

Developing Crisis in Railroad TI'lHlSporlalioll 540 

Ocean Transportation 545 

Criticism and bwestigation 555 

XIII. CONVERSION OF A DEPARTMENT INTO A CORPS 557 

Root's Refon1l Meas1l1'es , 557 

Impact of Detail System , 559 

Re71ewed 11Iterest in a Service C01'PS 56 1 

EstablishmelH of the QllartermasteJ' Corp 562 

Creation Of (I Service Corps 565 

Development of the Army Tramport Service 565 

Attack ou Amly Transport Service 568 

EUorts to hnpmve YariOllS Aspects of Railroad Transportalion 569 

Clothing p,'oblems. 574 

COJJStntcti01I Demands 580 

Improvements iT! Rations, 

EC01wmy Measures, 

Decentm/iwtion of Procurement 

Establishment of Remount Service 

Development of Motor Transportalion, 

SlwlInary 

xii 

584 

589 

590 

593 

595 

597 
Chapt er Page 

XIV. SUPPLY IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR, 1917-1918 599 

War Department Orgallizatioll i,l April 1917 599 

OQMG Organizatiotl in April 1917 601 

Establishmellt of the Coullcit of Nat jOlla I Defense p03 

Sheltering the Tmops" 605 

Loss of Transportatioll Flillctioll 609 

Centraliud COlltrol of Subsistence Procurement 6 13 

Developmolts in Pmcuremellt of Textiles and Clothing 6 15 

Wool Supply 623 

Production of Cfothi11g 625 

ShOl"/ages and Investigation 626 

War Department Reform Measures 628 

OQMG Expansion Under Sharpe 629 

Reorganizalioll Uuder GoeO/Gls" 630 

ChMlges in Field Orgallizatioll 636 

A Consolidated Service of Supply 639 

XV. QUARTERMASTER THEATER O PERATIONS, 1917- 1918. fi '15 

Administrative Developmellts 645 

Q1Wl"termasler Ullits alld Personnel Strength 653 

Initial Sul)ply Prepamtiolls " 654 

Depot System 656 

Supply of Petroleum Pmducls 660 

Other QIIGJ"lel'masteJ" Activities 011 the Lille of ComlllUllicatiolls" 662 

Stomge for Combat UlIits" 663 

Introduction of Autom(ltic SItPt)ly 665 

Local Procurement 666 

ProductiOIl Activities " 670 

Establisllment of the Gm"dell Semice 671 

Wood and COld Procurement 672 

Growth of Salvage OpeMliolls 674 

Latmdry Operations 677 

Baths and Disjnlestjllg Pirm/s 678 

Wagons alld Hamess 679 

Remount Sen)jce 68 1 

Clothillg Clwllges 682 

Rations" 683 

XVI. AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 689 

Graves R egistratiOll Sel"Vice 689 

Progm7/1. lor the R eturn of the Dead 693 

Establishmellt of Overseas Military Cemeteries 694 

Pilgrimage of the Gold Star Mothe1"s 695 

xiii 
Chap'er 

Quartermaster R e-embarkatioll Duties 

Disposal of War Mathit'i 

Industrial Demobilizati011 

Surpltls Disposal in a,e Zone of Interiol' 

Zone of I nterior Salvage Operations. 

Postwar Reorganizatiml . 

Impact Of Retrellclmltmt . 

Postwar Construction Program 

Ann)' T ransport Sel1)ice 

Rail and Motor Transportation. 

Industrial M obifiUltjon and Procurement PI01l11ing 

PrOCllreme11t Policy 

Research 

QlIartermaster Suppm-t of Non-Militm'Y J>J"Ojects 

Impact of the Emergency . 

XVII. I N RETROSPECT 

BIBLIOGRAPH ICAL NOTE 

INDEX . 

Charts 

NQ. 

I. Organization of the Office of the Quartermaster General as of April 

PIIge 

697 

698 

700 

702 

705 

707 

711 

71~ 

715 

716 

720 

72~ 

726 

728 

73 1 

73~ 

719 

767 

6, 19 17 . 63 1 

2. Organiza tion, January 26, 1915 . 634 

3. Third Reorganization of the Office of the Quartermaster General 

June 1915 . 6!7 

4. Organization of Office Director Purchase and StOrage as of November 1915. 613 

No. 

1. Revolutionary War. 

2. Indian Campaign of 1794 

S. War of IS12 . 

4. Seminole War . 

5. Mexican War 

Maps 

6. Frontier Posts aud Lines of Communication . 

7. Map of France Showing Qro.·IC AEF Activities. 

xiv 

38 

86 

156 

219 

266 

~05 

618 
Illustrations 

Page 

Merry Christmas, 1776 12 

Webb's Continental Regiment, 1777- 178 1 14 

Transporting Cannon for Knox 20 

A Supply T rain En Route Through the Snow lO Va lley Forge 33 

Contine nta l Infantry, 1778- 1783 50 

Fort Harmar. 85 

Fort Washington in 1789 . 90 

Road to Fa llen Timbers . 109 

R iver Transportation al Cincinnati, 1802 128 

18th U.S. Infantry, 18 14-1815. 148 

Kentucky Mi litia, at the River Raisin, January 18 13 165 

Coioneillrisbane's Regiment, South Carolina Militia, 1836 225 

3d U.S. Infantry Regiment, 1846- 1851 252 

Defense of Pack Train 293 

March from Pueblo . 296 

Importation of Camels, 320 

36th Illinois Infa ntry Regimclll. 1863 349 

The Army Blackslllith . 377 

Beef on the Hoof . 385 

Quartcnmster Depol, Cily Point, Va. 399 

Engi ne and Cars o[ U.S. !'\,fiJitary Orange and Alexandria R.R. 400 

Transport Steamer Missionary 011 Tennessee River 405 

Gunboat of Eads Class. 413 

Hand ling Supplies on the Appomatox, Below Petersbu rg. 417 

Tramports in Mouth of the Pamunkey River, Wh itehouse Landing, Va. 418 

Land ing Suppl ies on the J ames River, Destined for City Poim, Va. . 421 

Sketch of City Point, Va. . 436 

Camp of 8th N.]. Vo lunteers, l\ofarch, 1862 442 

Wimer Huts and Corduroy Roads 443 

Government Horseshoeing Shop 444 

Fall in for Soup. 446 

Thanksgiving in Camp, 1861 . 447 

Cooks at Work . 448 

Dressed Beef at Regimental Commissary. 419 

Commissary Department at Headquarters, Army of the Potomac 150 

The Old Ferry on the Colorado River at Fan Yuma 474 

Stage Coach Sta tion, FI. Kearny, Nebr. . 475 

Bull Train Bringi ng Wood to FI. Reno, Okla. 477 

Guarding the Su pply Train 482 

Fort Phil Kearny, 1867 . 483 

General Plan of Fort Laramie, Wyoming Territory, 1874 185 
P(Jge 

7th U.S. Cava lry, 1867 . 501 

Fatigue Wear in the 1880's. 504 

Equipment of Soldier in 1898 526 

Issuing Beef at T ampa . 531 

Serving Di nner at Tampa. 532 

A Pack Train l\'loving Ammu nition to the Front 538 

Embark ing the Troops at Port Tampa . 552 

Landi ng the Troops at Daiquiri . 553 

A Small Boat Landing Troops at Daiquiri 554 

U.S. Army Uniforms, 1918 . 626 

Loading Car wi th Sacked Bread. Dijon . 66 1 

Sack and Tent Deparlment, Salvage Depot. St. ))ierre·des·Corps . 676 

Harness Department, S:lIvage Depot. St. Pierre·des·Corps 677 

Moving Supplies to the Front. 1 October 1918 680 

Unloading Stores of "Canned Willie" and "H<lnltack" 685 

Carrying Food to Men in Trenches 686 

16th U.S. Infantry, 1930 . 712 

Quartermasters General. 1775- 1939 742 

ui 
Credit for Illustrations 

lllustrations. pp. 14,50, 148, 165, 225, 252, 349, 501, 504, 712, are 

reproduced by permission of the editor in chief of the Company of Military Collectors and Historians. The drawings on pp. 14, 50, 148, 165, 

225,252,349 are the work of H. Charles McBarron. Jr., those on pp. SOl, 

712 are the work of J. S. Hutchins and J. Severin, respectively, and Col. 

H. S. Parker did the sketch on p. 504. 

The National Archives furnished the following illustrations (rom 

the Brady Collection: pp. 399, 400. 405, 4 18, 443, 448, 449. It also furnished, from Signal Corps files deposited at the Arch ives, the following 

illustrations: pp. 20, 33, 85, 90, 128,293,296,320,413,421,436,474,475, 

477, 482,483,485,526,53 1,532.538,552. 

Illustrations. pp. 377, 385, 417, 442, 446, 447, 450, are furn ished by the 

Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress. 

All other illustrations are from Department of Defense fil es. 

xvii 

CHAPTER I 

The Origins of Quartermaster Supply 

1775 -1778 

"No body ever heard of a quarter Master, in H islOry" lamented 

Maj. Gen. Na thanae l Greene who, on ly out of patriotism and personal 

devoti on to his commander-in-chi ef, General Washington, agreed to 

acccpllhe post of Quartermaster Ge neral in the Continenta l Army.' For 

that malleI' little or nothing has ever beetl heard of any suppl y officer; 

military history. so voluminous in its recording of combat operations, 

has been, until recent years, strange ly silent about the logistics of war. 

Origin of the Sup ply Depm"tments 

T he Q uartermaster Corps, one of the oldest suppl y agencies of the 

United States Army, traces its origin to 16 June 1775. O n that day, 

follow ing Washington's address accepting command of the Army, the 

Second Continenta l Congress passed a resolution prov iding for "one 

quaner maner general for th e grand army, and a deputy, under him, far 

the separa te army, " who were to be paid, respectively, $80 and $40 a 

month.- It thereby adopted for American usage an agency that had 

long been established in the British army. and whose functions had 

become familiar to th e colonists through th eir participation wit h British 

troops in the campaigns against th e French and their Ind ian alli es. 

Congress on that same day a lso provided for a Commissary Genera l 

of Stores and Purchases in whom it vested responsibility for feeding the 

troops. Later it established the office of Clothi er Gene ra l as wel l as 

oth er supply departments. Before the end of th e Revol utionary War, 

however, Quartermaster General T imothy Pickering was to suggest th at 

his Department absorb the dudes of the Commissary General of Purchases. " Is there no man in the United States whose abil ities can COIllI Washington Papen. vol. 101. f. 82 (fo Washington. 24 Apr 1719). Manuscript Dil'., 

Libr.ary of COngress. 

I J ounlals of the COfltillell/fll COIl8re", ed. 'Vorthington C. Ford and others (34 vols .• 

Washington. 1904-37). II, 94. 
2 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

prehend and execute the plans proposed." he cr cd ~ That point 

remained unrlemonstratcd because of Washington's objections to the 

proposa l. Such a merger did not occur until 131 years later. On the 

other hand. 65 years after the formation of the Clothing DepanlTIcnt, 

the Quartermaster's Department had graduall y absorbed all of its duties. 

Because fceding and clothing the American soldier have become so 

thoroughly identirled with the Quartermancr Corps today, early developments in these supply fields ha ve been included in this history o( the 

Corp5 despite lhe faCl that separate agencies were at one time responsible 

for these functions. 

In the years since 1775. the office of the Quartermaster General has 

evolved into that of a bureau chief who, administering a mil itari zed 

corps and employing a large body of civilians, is primarily conccl'Iled 

with the supply of food and clothing and the performance o( certain 

services that promote the health and welfare of the soldier. His functions 

bear little resemb lance to those assigned LO a Quartermaster General of 

an 18th century army. The latter was the right-hand man of the commanding genera l, in effect his chief of staff. As principal staff officer, 

he gathered information, assisted the commanding genera l in planning 

his marches. and distributed the march orders LO the general officcrs. He 

thoroughly explored the field of operations. opened and repaired all roads 

on the line of advancc and retrcat, chose proper points for bridgcs, and 

examined fords. He laid out the camp and assigned quarters. In addition to such direct service to the army in the fi eld, he was also rcsponsible 

for the procurement of certa in types of materiel. He and h is assista nts 

procured and furnished all camp eq uipmclll and tents and, when lhe 

army went illlo wi nter quarrel's, Ihey provided the lumber and ol her 

articles needed for hutting the troops. Hc transported all men and 

all supplies. Accordingly, he furnished horses and pack animals and provided the foragc for their maintenance. He supplied wagons when the 

army moved by land and boats when it resorted to water routes. In 

short, he took all measures to enable an army to march with ease and LO 

encamp with convcniencc and safety. In contrast lO the office of Ihe 

modern Quanermaster General that operatcs in peacc as well as in war, 

that of an 18lh century Quartermaster Gcneral functioned onl y during 

war because it was held that the staff properly existed only at that time} 

"(I) RG I l. J'apers of the Colllinenlal Cottgreu. item 1-1 7. vol. VI. f. 453 (Pickering to 

l'rc:s. of Congress. 21 Mar 1781). National Archiv". (2) Oclaviul Pickering and Charlc:s W. 

Upham. T/t~ Lilt: 01 Timolhy Pic/urill!; (4 vols .. RoslOn, 1867- H). I. 287 (I'iclo;t:ring 10 

S. Hodgdon. 22 Apr 178 1) . 

• Thomas Sim". The Ali/iIIH)' C"ide lor YOIIII!; 0Diterl (2 vols .• Philadelphia. 1776). 

I. 8-9. This was a Oritish !Cltt. popular with the American coloni$l5. and reprinted in Phila_ 

delphia in 1776. 
THE ORIGINS OF QUARTERMASTER SUI'PLY, 1775- 1778 3 

When Washingtoll arri ved al Cambridge on 3 July 1775 to take 

command of the Army, he found a heterogeneous and u ndisciplined 

fo rce of somc 17,000 Illen assembled th ere, all of whom were enlisted 

for short periods- some on ly to I December, none beyond 1 January 

1776. T he Second Continental Congress had accepted these troops as 

the nucleus of an Army, but, desirous of creating a COlllinental Army 

with troops and principal gene ral officers under its own aUlhorilY. it had 

ordered certai n troops ra ised in the pay of Congress. These consisted 

of len compa nies of riflemen, six frol11 Pennsylvan ia and tWO each from 

Maryla nd and Virgini a, who were enlisted for one year and were "to 

join the army near Boston, to be there employed as lig ht infantry, under 

th e command of the chie f Officer in that army." ~ T his was the origin 

of the Continental Army. Grad uall y it was expanded, and enlistments 

were extended LO two a nd three years and in some cases for th e duratio n 

of the war. The states never filled the ir quotas of men, and throughout 

th e war tli e Continental Army was always uncler strength . Militia, called 

o ut for short terms only, were used to build up strength during campa igns. 

Uncerta inty as LO Army strength COlHributed immeasurably to th e difficu lti es of supply. 

Although Washington had LO cope with th e problem of reorganizing 

the army, and in fact had the delicate task of replaci ng th at army, within 

ca nnon sho t of the enemy, with a nother army when e nlistments expired 

at the end of 1775, his immediate probl em was not a lack o[ men so much 

as a lack of su pplies. I-lis troops needed powder, lead, arms, tents, 

horses, carts, too ls, and medical stores, though th ey had eno ug h prov isions. 

J oseph Tmmbull, who had bee n appointed Commissary General of 

Stores and Purchases by Congress on 19 July, was mee ting subsistence 

requirements of the Army by widening o perations that he had been 

conducting as commissary fo r the Connecticut troops.G \Vhat 'Vashington most urgentl y needed was a Q uartermaster General, but he was 

relucta nt to make so important a n appo in tment without express authorization. H is judgme nt was sound, fOI" when Congress on 19 Jul y amhorized him 1O a ppoint his own Quartermaster General, as well as certain 

o th er officers of what now would be termed the general staff, John Adams 

thought tha t a major mistake had been made. In his view such officers 

o ught to be a check on the commander-in-chief and th eir appointments 

ought to rest with Congress.' 

Acting under the authority granted him, 'Washington on 14 Aug ust 

appoi nted a yo un g Pennsy lva nian, Maj. Thomas Mifflin as QuarterI jounwls 01 Ihe COllliuwll11 cOt/guS.I, II , 89 (14 JUIl 1775). 

' Ibid., II , t90. 

' I.e/Ius 01 Members 01 Ih e Coutimmtal Cougress, ed. Edmund C. Burnell (7 vots., Washinglon. 192t- 36). I. 174. 177- 78 (Adams [0 J ames Warrcn, 23 and 26 Jul 1775). 
4 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

master Genera1.s Fou r months later Congress established the rank of 

his office as tha t o[ a colonel in the Continental Army.9 Mifflin, who 

held the office twice, was the first of four men who served as Quanermaster 

General duri ng the Revolutionary War, his successors being Stephen 

Moylan, Na thanael Greene. and Timothy Pickering. Each of these 

men served with the main Army under Washingtoo .'o Congress itself 

appointed deputy quartermasters genera l to act with separate armies. 

fixing the ir rank as that of a colonel in the Army." In theory, a deputy 

quan ermaster general of a separate army was under the direction and 

supervision of th e Quartermaster General. In actual practice, he generally functioned independelllly and was encouraged to do so, for his 

field or activity was usually so remote from the area where the main 

Continental Army was operating that the Quartermaster General was in 

no position even to advise him on a course of act ion. 

SupenJisOJ)l Contmls 

T he Quartermaster Genera l and the Commissary General, as well 

as their deputies, were responsi bl e to the Continental Congress. At the 

beginning of the war, Congress, burdened with many problems, offered 

no supervisory control of the suppl y agencies, nor was there an executi vt: 

departmem to direct such supervision. Standing committees in Congress 

handl ed executi ve duties, and spec ial committees, sent to visit the Army, 

exercised such control of tht: supply departments as Congress provided. 

More often than not Congress dispatched such committees at periods o[ 

crisis, as, for example, after withdrawal of the Continental Army from 

Long Island in the summer of 1776, or during the encampment of the 

Army at Valley Forge in the winter of 1777- 78. 

Boards soon replaced standing committees in the course of the 

struggle to develop an executive departmentY When on 12 June 1776 

Congress established a Board of War and Ordnance, it took the first step 

toward the creation of an administrative War DepartmenLa T he Board's 

• The Wrilif/gs of Was/,i"SIOlI, cd. john C. Finpatrick (~O \"ols., Washington , 9~ 39), 

III. 419 (GO. 14 Aug 1775). Hereaft er cited W ritings 0/ iVlI5hi"gton . 

• JOlin/ills o/Ihe COlllillelltll1 Cmlgress, Ill. -1 -15 (22 Dec 1775). 

,. Analysis of supply problems has of necessity been limited to thOM: of the main Continental Anny. Only incidental mention has been made of either Northern or Southern Anny 

operations. or more information on supply problems encountered by the Southern Anny, 

see Theodore Thayer. Nothll>l(ltll Gre/!"e Stralegist 0/ the Am/!riclI7l Rroolutioll (New York, 

1960). 

"Sec, for exa.nple, the appointment of Donald Campbell as ueputy quartermaster general 

for the Northern Army. jou rullis of Ihe Contilletltal COllgUSS, 11 , 186 (17 jul 1775). 

11 For a detailed analysis of this problem sce j ennings 8. Sanders, Evolutioll of Exuulive 

Deparlmenl o/Ihe COll til/ttlMl COl/guu (Chapel Hill, ~5), -I If. 

lO j oun/als oflhe CmlNI/enlal CotlgrtlSs, V, 4~4 . 
THE ORIGINS OF QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY, 1775- 1778 5 

membership underwent a number of changes, but its duties remai ned 

relative ly constant. Primarily it was concerned with keeping accounts 

of ordnance and su pplies, layi ng before Congress estimates of military 

stores that were needed, and superintendi ng the building of arsena ls and 

fo undries. It was not lIntil 25 November 1779 that the Quartermaster's 

Department was placed under the direction of the Board of ' '''aI','' Some 

14 months later, however, Congress replaced the Board with a War Offi ce, 

headed by a Secretary at War, but it was 30 October 178 1 before Maj. 

Gen. Benjamin Lincoln was elected to fill that positionY His duties. 

originally much the same as those formerly performed by Ihe Board of 

\oVal', were somewhat expanded the (ollowing April. In any case, an 

executive departme nt had finally been evolved, and the Quartermaster's 

Department, as well as all other mili tary departments, were placed under 

its supervision. 

In June 1775, however, not only was there no indication of the 

nature of the supervision to be exercised, but Congress in creating the 

offi ces of Quartermaster General and of Commissary Genera l of Stores 

and Purchases defined ne ither their functions nor their bounds. In time 

it did undertake to do so by enacting regula LOry measures tha t became 

increasingly deta il ed, but in 1775 Congress permitted Miffl in and Trumbull to orga nize their departments as they saw fi t. Whil e certa in supply 

arrangements that had evolved before their appointments had to be 

drawn within the ir respective Departments, the fi eld organization of the 

Commissary and Quartermaster's Departmellls necessarily had to conform 

to the troop arrangements of the Army in the Boston area. 

In the summer of 1775, the American Army confronted the British 

troops, located at Bun ker Hill and Boston Neck, from an entrenched 

position that extended from Winter and Prospect Hills on the left to 

Roxbury on the right, with the central camp of the Army located at 

Cambridge. \Vash ington reorganized his Army into three divisions, each 

made up of two brigades, averagi ng six regiments each. One division 

" (I ) Ibid .. XVII , 511 - 12. (2) Originally. this Department was known as the Quartermaster 

General's Department. and in his corrcsJ>Ol1 dencc General Washington uses that tit le. Early in 

1777. howeve r. the Continental Congress began to rder to the Quarte rmaster'S Department. 

(See jUllmaiJ of lit" COllli""III(11 C(lUsr"$$. VII. 191 . 2'92. 355-59.) T here was no consistency in 

ilS use or the litle. The shortened ve rsion bet:ame the ol1e most commonly used and in 1812 

Congr~s officially designated the ageney as the Quartemlaster's Department. (2 Sial . 696). 

For consistency's sake. the title of Quartermaster's Department is used in this volume through. 

out the yean 1775 to 1812 . 

.. Lincoln accepted the office approximately one month later on 26 November 1781. 

j Ollrnals ollh" COlltinoltal C01lgrcss, XXI, 1087, 1141. 
fi QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE AR MY 

on the right held the Roxbury lines under the command of Maj. Gen. 

Artemus Ward; Maj. Gen. Charl es Lee commanded a second d ivision on 

the left at Prospect and Winter Hills; and Maj. Gen. Israe l Pulllam 

commanded a th ird division, th e ccm er at Cambridge. 

In the closing months of 1775 the Quartermaster's Department was 

also organized in th ree units. The largest of these, employing some 

17 clerks and assistants, was located at Cambridge where Quartermaster 

General Mifflin was stationed. FOllr of these clerks kept accounts and 

records. Two clerks, assigned LO an issuing store, d istributed camp 

utensils and other eq uipment to the troQPs at Cambridge, wh ile two 

other clerks received and delivered wood to them. The Department 

also operated a granary, a lumber yard, and stables. It employed two 

wagonmasters at Cambridge, one of whom, J ohn Goddard, had been 

appointed "wagonmaster ge neral to the Army of the twelve United 

Colonies" by 'Washington on 9 August-'6 Goddard was merely continuing the work he had been doing before the attack on Concord. From 

8 March to 14 April 1775, variolls people under his direction had been 

carting casks of balls, balTcls of linen, 'hogsheads of Aims, loads of beef 

and rice, quantities of canteens, and other articles through the quict 

country roads leading to Concord. At Cambridge, one man in the 

Quartermaster's Department superintended all the "smiths, armourers, 

and nailers in the Army," while another d irected the work of 50 carpenters. In addition to the lalter, an undesignated number of other 

carpenters in "Captain Ayers company" were constantly at work on the 

wagon trains that were used to haul supplies. 

An assistant quartermaster general headed each of two smaller units 

of the Department. John Parke directed one office at Roxbury; John G. 

Frazer admin istered the second office, serving Winter and Prospect Hills. 

Each office employed one clerk and one wagonmaster. Roxbury, W inter 

Hill, and Prospect Hill each had also one clerk to receive and deliver 

the wood used by the troops in those areasY 

Trumbu ll 's fi eld organization for the Commissary Department was 

also made up three units. He used issuing stores, supervised by storekeepers, at Cambridge, Roxbury, and Prospect Hill to service the two 

brigades stationed in each of these areas. There was also an issuing 

store at Medford. A varying number of clerks assisted each storekeeper 

who also employed several laborers, one cooper, and sometimes a cook. 

Trumbull established storage places, so-called magazines, at Cambridge 

and Roxbm'y, at each of which three clerks or magazine helpers and one 

,0Il'rili"8.1 o/IV'Isilillglo". ed. Fitzpatrick. III. 411 (GO. 9 Aug 1775). 

ttWa~hington Papers, I'O\' 23. f. 36 (List of PersonncJ.~Jan 1776). Parke's appointment 

was announced in a General Order. 16 August. ~nd Frater's on 22 September 1775. 
T HE O RIG INS OF QUARTERM ASTER SU PPLY, 1775-1778 7 

cooper were employed. A num ber of deposit points located some 20 mil es 

away on lhe roads lead ing 10 Cambridge and Rox bury backed up these 

two magazines. They also employed a number of magazi ne helpers. 

Trumbull deposited flour at these points and there, too, he had cattle and 

hogs dri ven to be slaughtered, sai led, and packed to meet Army demands. a 

T he clerica l help, slOl'ckcepers. anisa ns, and other personnel employed 

by Mifflin and Trumbull , and th e issuing stores and oth er faciliti es that 

they established in the Boston area were to be d uplicated by their 

successors wherever the Army moved. 

In addition to th e ir fiel d ol'b'<l nizations, bOl h Mifflin and Trumbull 

made lise of lhe services of IllCrCbalHs in vario us p.1.rts of the country to 

purchase subsistence fo r the Commissary De pa rtment a nd fo rage, tentage, 

cantcens, a nd o th er a rticles for th e Q ua rtermaster's Departmen t. Unlike 

the personnel in the fie ld o rgani za ti ons who wcre paid sal aries and ratio n 

a ll owa nces fi xed by Congress, th ese purchasing age nts worked on a 

commissio n basis. T he Depa rtments customarily paid th em abom 2 to 

21ft percent commission on the mOlley th ey expended in mak ing their 

purchases. 

During the fir-st 2 years of the war, thc suppl y orga niza tion remai ned 

fluid, bcing adapted to changing opcra tions. Some add it io na l personnel 

was requ ircd, bllt un fo rlll natcly in th e Commissary Depa rtment Congress 

LOok care of tha l need in such a way as LO threaten T rumbull's control 

of all commissary malleI'S. \Vith characterist ic lack of a ltcmio n to overlappi ng j urisd ictions, the COl1lincntal Congress promoted confusion by ap. 

pointing a number of indepe nd ent agents in Pennsylvan ia an d New York 

to procure food for th e Iroops in o.~c arcas.'V In New York, jealo usy 

bctwcen New Engla nders a nd Ncw Yorkcrs further a ugmented the 

discord. After severa l mo nths of con troversy be twecll the cOlllmissa ries, 

Congress resolved the problem by rcvok ing its suppo rt of independent 

agents and sllstain ing th e authority to procure subsiste nce for the Army 

thal it had o rigina ll y granted solcly to T rUlll bulJ.to 

Expa nsion of the Q uartermaster's Departmcnt was effected witho ut 

cOlllroversy. \Vh en th e Army moved to New York, a deputy quan er-

,. Ibid., vol. 22, r. 11 7 (Lis. of I'crllonnel. 20 Jan 1776); vol. 23. f. 5' rrrurnbull 10 Pres. of 

Congreu. 25 J an ]776). 

,. }OIlT1lal$ 01 Ihe COlltille"'a/ COllg'''U, II . 186 (]7 J ul 17711): III. 419 (9 DIle 1775): IV, 

159-60 (17 Feb 1776): 210 (16 Mu 1776). 

-(I) Ibid., V, 527 (8 Jul 1776): 752- 55 (12 Sep 1776). (2) America" Arc/rivt!s, cd. Peler 

Force (9 vols .. 4th and 5th Series. WUh ing.on. 18l7-!i5). 5th , I, 195 (\yuh;ngton 10 

Schuyler, II Jul 1776); II. i'4 (Tnun bull 10 Pres. or CongTCSS, 7 Sep 1776): 548 (Pres. of 

Congre51 to T rumbull. 16 Sep 1776). (5) For elaboration on the New York controversy see 

Victor L. Johnson , T ht! Admi"islrlllio" 0/ lire AlIuriCII1J Com",iu/lrilll During the R roo/u· 

tioll a? lVII' (Philadelphia, 194 1), 121 If. 
8 QUARTER MASTER SU PPORT OF THE ARMY 

master genera l was appointed at llosLOn to administer to the troops 

rema ining in th e Eastern Depanmelll. In New York, Mifflin found 

that th e services or a loca l man, familia r with th e resources of the state, 

would be desirable . Hugh Hug hes, a former school teacher oE New 

York City and then serving as commissa ry of stores, was appointed 

assista nt quartermaster general in May 1776.'1 Upon him fell th e main 

burden of carrying forward immediate Quartermaster preparations for 

th e New York campaign, since shortly after his appointment Mifflin 

resigned as Quartermaster General when Congress promoted him to the 

rank of brigadier genera l of the Army.22 As a result, Washington had 

to fill that importa nt post before th e impending battle in New York. 

He turned to another member of his military famil y for his candida te, 

selecting Stephen Moyla n, who sin<:e II August 1775 had been serving as 

Muster-Maner-General to the Army and Si lKC 7 March 1776, a lso as 

aide-de-camp to Washington. Congress appointed him to the post on 

5 June in the midst of active opera Lions that demanded administrative 

skill to provide ample transportati on and a steady flow of supplies. 2a 

Whether or not Moylan possessed such abili ty cannot be determined on 

the basis of present evidence, but Washington blamed his Department 

for th e loss of heavy guns, ammunition, stores, provisions, and tents, lert 

behind in th e evacuation of New York City in September. That evacuation , like th e one from Long Island after the disastrous battle in August, 

would have been effected without loss, the General ma intained, "but 

for a defect in t he department of th e Quarter Master General's not 

providing teams enough." 20 In consequence, a congressiona l committee 

persuaded Moylan to resign less than 4 months after his appointment. 

To the great sa tisfaction of Congress and th e Army, Mifflin reluctantly 

accepted rea ppointment to the office with the rank and pay of a brigadier 

ge a1.2~ H e was well acquai nted with its business, William Ellery, 

member of Congress from Rhod e Island, commented, and had "Spirit 

and Activity to execute it in a proper Manner." 28 

., W rilings of IYtJ ~"i "gl{)n, cd. Fitzpatrick. V. 38 (GO. II May 1776) . 

.. 101lnwis of till': Conl;nen/al Co"gress, IV, 359 (Hj May 1776) . 

.. !bin., V. 419 . 

.. (I) IVrilings ollVashingluu. cd. H tzpa trick. VI. 170 ( fo Sam. Washington. 5 OCt 1776). 

(2) The general found it eOlH'enient 10 a llribllle all blame to the Quartermaster General 

without admill ing that in the evacuation from Long Island all the wagons, ca r1$, and hol"$eS 

tha t had been sent there for the usc of Ihe Arm y had been los\. For the diffiCUlties that 

C.olonel Moylan encountered. see below p. 21. 

-(I) Papers of the Continental Congress. item 78, vol. XV. f. 101-08 (Moylan to Pres. of 

Congress, 27 Scp 1776). (2) 1o.mwl$ of Ihe COII/ill",,'al COllgrt"Ss, V. 838 (I Oet 1776). (3) 

~fimin s appointment, pending the action of Congress. w~ s announced in GO, 28 September 

1776. IVrili"gs of Washington, cd. Fitzpatrick. VI. 125-26. 

- LeI/us 01 Members of I/u COII/illelilal COllgress, cd . 8urnell, II, 11 6 {To Gov. of Rhode 

Island, 5 Oct 1776); sec a lso, ]]4 (Caesar Rodney to Tom Rodney, 2 Oct 1776). 
THE ORIGINS OF QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY, 1775-1778 9 

Supplying Subsistence 

During the first two years of the war, when detai ls of organization 

were being evolved, supply procedures were also developing. No supply 

need was more immediatel y urgent in the summer of 1775 than feed ing 

the hastil y assembled troops at Boston. Congress ordered ''''ashington 

" to victual at the Cont inental ex pense all such vol unteers as have joined 

or shall join the united army," 31 Impressed with the way in which 

Trumbull had subsisted the ConnccLicllt troops, Wash ington expected 

his Commissary Genera l to ma ke sa tisfactory provision for the Army. 

In this he was not disappoimed, for Trumbull, in his efforts to supply 

the Connecticut troops, had built up a ncuvork of purchasing channels 

that, as Commissary General, he cominued to use in order to bring to 

the Continental Army at Boston Oour (rom New York, via Norwich, 

Conn., and vegetables, pork, and other subsistence items from various 

pans of the fenil e Connecticut Ri ver valley. 

'Vhen the war began each colony had iLS own established ration that 

it furnished its t!"Oo ps, but by 4 November 1775 Congress had agreed upon 

a un iform ration for all the soldiers of the Continental Army. It fixed 

the components as follows: 

Resolved, Tha t a J';lt ion consist of the following kind and quantity of 

provisions: I lb. beef, or % lb. pork or I lb. salt fish, per day; I lb. bre:ld or 

flour, per day; .3 pi nts of peas or bea ns per week, or vegetables equ ivalent, 

at one d ollar per bushel for peas or beans; I pint of milk, per man pel da y, 

or at the rate of 1- 72 of a dollar; I half pint of rice, or one pint of India n mea l, 

per man per week; I quart of spruce beer or cider per Illan per day, or nine 

ga llons of mollasscs, per company of 100 men per week; .3 \bs. ca nd les to 100 

men per week, for gu,mls; 24 Ibs. soft, or 8 lbs. hard soap, for 100 men per 

week.2' 

This was not a bad allowance and compared favora bly with that issued 

the British soldier in the Revollllionary ' Var, but the soap ration was 

certainly meager if the men were expeCled to keep both themse lves and 

their clothes cl ean.tD 

As long as Trumbull remai ned Commissary General, he attempted 

to provide the troops of the Continenta l Army with a more generous 

allowance than that established by Congress. In the earl y months of: til e 

If jOllnrtolJ vllh" Co"li,I" "lal Co"g""u, II , 100 (20 Jun 1775). 

-(I) I bid., III. 525. (2) Spruce beer Wali a beverage made from spruce twigs and leaves 

boilc:tl "'ilh molaS5C!l or $ufI;ar and fennentc:d wilh yeast. 

- In a typica l oonl raC;1 of 1778-i9, Ihl' Briti$h ration pro,·idtd I lb. of nour per day; I lb. 

of bed per day or in lieu thereof slight ly llIore than 9 ounets of pork; 11 pints of pcas a week: 

~ lb. of oatmeal a week and either (j oz. of hu tter or 8 01. of cheese per week. Edward E. 

Curtis. ··I'rovisioning of Ihe Brilish Army in the Revolution," T he Magazine 0/ His/ory. 

XVIIl , 234. 
10 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF TI-IE ARMY 

war, he issued 8 more ounces of salted pork per man, per day, than the 

established ration called for. He a lso provided 6 ounces of butler per 

man, per week, and allowed 6 rather than 3 pounds of candl es per 100 

men, pCI' week. In other details the tWO rations were idclHical. The 

inclusion of milk in the ration established by Congress, however, appears 

to have been an idea l; Trumbull did not provide it nor is th ere any 

evidence to indicate thai a ny other commissary did . Spruce beer was 

not to be had in the Cambridge area, and Trumbull generally flll'nished 

molasses as part of the radon. On the other hand, when the troops moved 

to New York, he cou ld not procure molasses and he issued spruce beer 

to the troops,lO 

After the Middl e Atlantic area became the th eater of operations, 

Trumbull and his successors found it increasingly difficult to procure 

rations. As the war went on, th e Revolutionary soldiers were subsisted 

on a bread and meat di el. The Commissary Departmcm was judged 

successful in its later operations if it provided sufficie nt quantities of flour 

and beef. Vegetables were usually lacking, and vinegar, later included 

in the ration for antiscorbutic purposes, was of len omiued from issue by 

commissaries. Neither spruce beer and cider, nor rum and whiskey, 

subsequently a uth ori zed as part of the ration, were ever plentiful. SUllers 

plied their trade, and WaShington authorized markets at camp where 

farmers could sell their produce, but soldiers had little money 10 buy 

supplementary foods. Then, as in later wars, however, soldiers "seamed 

hearty in the Ca use of Liberty of leaking what came in the way first LO 

their hand." So when a patrol lOok up a sheep and two large turkeys, 

" not being able to give the countersig n," Sergeant John Smith, a good 

soldier and good provider, recorded in his diary that "they was tryed by 

fire, and executed by the whole division of the free boaters. " II Despite 

such occasional feasts, an unreli eved d iet of half-cooked meat and hard 

bread was responsible for much of the sickness that reduced the strength 

of th e Army when it frequently was most needed.3f 

Trumbull was so successful in subsisting the troops during the Boston 

campaign that Washington later wrote, " Few Armies, if any, have been 

better and more plentifully suppli ed than the Troops under Mr. Trumbull's care."' " The Commissary General deserved all the credit given 

him, but the Army was then encamped in the midst of a sympathetic 

people, the war was new, foodstuffs were genera ll y plentiful, and prices 

" 'Vashington PapeT$. vol. 25, r. 77 (Trumbull to Wuhingwn, 19 Apr 1776) . 

.. William Matthews and Dixon \Vectcr, Ollr Soldi~'l Sll~ah, 177J-J9/8 (Boston . 1913),21 . 

.. Wriliuss of Waslriug/(m, «I. Fitzpatrick. VIII, HI (To I'h ilip Livingsron cf al., 19 Jul 

1777). 

- Ibid ., V, 192 ero Pra. of CongTess, 28 JUIi 1776). 
THE ORIGINS OF QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY, 1775- 1778 11 

had not yet skyrocketed to unh eard of heigllls. The rea l test of provisioning the Army was yet [0 come. 

When the British evacua ted Boston and Washington moved his Army 

to New York, Trumbull, for the first time, had LO provision an evermov ing Army, and an Army whose strength changed repeatedly. When 

Washington arrived in New York, it consisted of some 9,000 men; by 

June it had grown to about 19,000, most of th e increase bei ng raw recruits 

and militia ; after the fall of Fe Washington in November, the Army 

dwindled to 14,000, and kept decreasi ng as terms of enlistment expired 

and the contagion of desertion pread ~ Instead of transporting food 

to a stationary force, Trumbull now had to loca te magazines at strategic 

points along the line of mardI. He and his deputies drew ample stores 

of Aour, beef, and pork from Connecticut, Pennsy lvania, and the rich and 

read il y accessibl e hinterland of New York City for the use of the troops 

on Manhattan and Long Island, but no sooner had they prepared we ll· 

stocked magazines than th e Continental Army was forced to evacuate 

New Yor k City, leaving behi nd large quantiti es of flour. So constant 

was th e movement of the Army in the aut umn of 1776, involving retreat 

up the Hudson and acl'Oss New Jersey, that it was impossible fOT Trumbull to develop permanent magazines. The best he could do was to 

attempt to pl'Ovide the soldiers with sufficient cooked rati ons to maintain 

4 days' su ppl y on ham1. He had to appeal La th e New York Con vention 

for assistance in accumu lating flou r:'" 

E"en as T l'llmb ull's commissa ri es strain ed to provide barrels of 

Hour for the retreating troops and kept, in the ir rear, droves of ca ttle, 

to be killed or moved as occasion requi red, the Department a lso had to 

make preparations La supply the Army during th e period of winter 

encampment and to build up reserves to support its active operations in 

the fo llowing yeaL M La te fall and th e early win ter were the months 

when commissaries had to procure cattle and hogs, slaughter the anima ls, 

cure th e meat, pack it in barre ls, and deposit it in designated magazines. 

They also had to build up Rour deposits. 

AboUl th e middl e of December 1776, Trumbull departed for Hartford to supervise personally these important preparations in New England, leavi ng a deputy, Carpenter Wharton, with the Army to suppl y its 

needs. T he lauer was unsuccessful in provisioning the troops at the 

very time that Washington was attempting to capita lize on th e advantage 

" Christophcr Ward. Til e 11'111' "f Ih", Il~lllliolJ (2 \·ols .. New York. 1952), 1.207.275. 

"'Ameriwn Al'chhlf 5.ed. Force. 51h «:1'. 11 . 699; 469 (rrumbull to N.Y. Convention. 16 and 

2! Scp 1776); 1 1 38-!9 (rench Titghman 10 William Ducr.20 OCI 1776). 

" (I) Ibid., 5t h SCT. II. ! 72 ( f rumbull 10 Prcs. or Congress. t9 Scp 1776). (2) Journals 0/ 

/lI e COlltin~lItnl Congress, V. 825 (25 Scp 1776). 
12 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

MF.RRV CHRISTMAS, 1776 

gai ned at Trenton. T he troops were unabl e to move for want of rations, 

and Wash ington charged that he was delayed for two days in crossing the 

Delaware and then had to permit the troops to "victual themselves where 

they could, " 31 Wharton was further accused of profiteering. and so 

uni versa l was the complaint aga inst him that 'Washington called on 

Trumbull to return and reg lll a~e his Department.

u T rumbull's supply 

procedures were effective in establish ing well-stocked magazines in Massachusetts and Connecticut from which suppl ies were drawn for the troops 

during the wimer of 1776-77. They did not suffer from a lack of Hour 

or meat. On the other hand, the fa ilure of the commissaries to provide 

vegetables, vinegar, and proper beverages led Elbridge Gerry to warn 

Trumbull that few men could subsist only upon bread , meal, and water. 89 

Criticism of the Commissary Department mounted in 1777 . 

.. WTiliflgS 01 Washinglon, ed. Fitzpatrick. VI. '1 57 [To Robert Morris, 30 Dt'C 1776); VII, 

60-61 [To Robert Ogden, 2'1 J an 1777). 

- (I) Ibid., VII. 160-61 (To T rumbull. 18 Feb 1777). (2) LeI/tITS of Members o/lile Con· 

tinental Co"greSJ, ed. Bu rnell . II. 31'1- 15 (R. Sherman to Trumbull. 18 Feb 1777) . 

• Le/Jers of Members of IIl e Con/il/ell/al Cougress, cd. Burnett. IT, 312 (Gerry to T rum· 

bull. 26 Mar 1777). 
THE ORIGINS OF QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY, 1775- 1778 13 

Development of Qum"le1"masle1" Su.pply Pmcedttres 

Quartermaster General Mimin approached the duties of his office in 

1775 without trepidation and, in fact, found opportunity to acq uire 

temporary responsibility for clothing su pply- a function not pertaining 

to his Department. Among the hastily assembled troops at Boston, 

uniformity in dress was nonexistent. The New Engla nd militia that 

formed the nucleus of Wash ington's Army came garbed in a variety o{ 

outfits. Some wore uniforms that had seen service in the French and 

Indian War; most of them were clothed in homespun, variously dyed 

and cut, and, since few of the men had brought any change of cloth ing, 

were be:;inning to be ragged as well. Washington wore the blue and 

buff of the Virginia militia. The ten companies of riflemen, having 

been instructed by Congress to find their own cloth ing, arrived at Cambridge in hunting shirts and round hats.~o The hunting shirt, worn 

with long breeches or overalls, made of the same tow cloth, gaither· 

fashioned about the legs and held down by straps under the shoes, was a 

popular and acceptable uniform during the opening months of the 

Revolution.'l Washington, knowing from ex perience its practical val ue, 

sought to have the hunting sh irt adopted as a uniform, but Congress 

took no action. During most of the war, green and brown predominated 

as the color of the clothing worn by the troops rather than the "bl ue and 

buff" popularly associated with the dress of the Revolutionary sold ier 

Blue was not adopted as the offic ial color of. the Army uniform until 

2 October 1779.<2 

Replacing the motley garb of the troops with an acceptable uniform 

was an immediate supply problem difficu il of sol ution since the colonies 

did not produce much cloth. Colonial women wove linen in their homes 

but wool and woolen cloth were scarce. At the beginning of {he war, 

the supply of clothing and of blankets was dependent upon what could 

be obtained by canvassing all sources of supply within the states, even 

to the extent of making coll ections from house to house of all articles 

that could be spared. Congress supplemented th is source by purchasing 

the importations of private adventurers and by utilizing the stocks of. 

textiles, clothing, and blankets found in the cargoes of ca ptured vessels. 

T hough a considerable number of prizes were taken, this source of supply 

was too precarious to depend upon despite the boldness of privateers . 

.. James Thacher. A Military Journal Dur;"g the America" Rf!l.ID/utimrary W"r (Boston, 

1827), ~O. 

"Americall Arc/rives, ed. Force, ~t h ser. VI, 426 (CO, 6 !\fay 1776): 5th ser, 1,677 (CO. 

25 Jut 1776). 

"(1) Washington Papen, vol. 108. f. 75 (Board of War est imate. 2.~ !\fay 1779). (2) W rit· 

j"gs 0/ Waslringto .. , ed. Fitzpatrick. XVI. 587- 88 (GO. 2 O(t 1779). 
WEBD'S CONTI NENT A L REGIMENT, 1777- 178 1 
THE ORIGINS OF QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY, 1775-1778 15 

To meet the cloth ing de fi ciency. Congress had to turn to purchase abroad, 

and clothing: and blankets were largely purchased on credit in France 

during the war.U Even before any agclH of the Continental Congress 

arrived in France, the French ministry had decided to offer secret assistance to the colonies. A series f)f loans and subsid ies from France and 

Spain provided much needed munitions of war. This included tC!Hage 

and clothing. Such a id became increasingl y important after 1777 when 

Continental currency depreciated rapid ly and French supplies began 

to arrive in vol ume. This suppl y was supp!cmcllled by a lively trade 

in the West Indies. centered particularly at St. Eustatius, and participated 

in by private American merchants and agents of both the stale governments and of the COlllinelllal Congress." 

Accepting British army proced ure as precedent, Congress directed 

that clothing for the Cominelllal Army be provided at its expense and 

bc paid for by the soldier at the ratc of I % doll ars per month deducted 

from his wages.u Since Congress had not established any agency to 

handle clothing supply, it temporarily thrust that responsibility upon 

the Quartermaster General in th e fall of 1775, largely, no doubt, because 

Mifflin had been actively promoting the procurement of clothing." As 

a rcsult, Mifflin cominued to uimulatc the procurement of woolens and 

accepted delivery of ca ptured cargoes of texti les and cloth ing sem to 

him for distribu tion to the troops. He set Army tailors to work making 

clothing and directed its sale to the troops at a commission to himseH of 

.5 percent for his trouble. Despite these efforts, a congressional COl 1-

miuee, probing the conditi on of the Army foll owing its evacuation of 

New York City, had to report that clothing suppl y had been neglected 

"as well from the wam of a proper Officer to su perintend the Business 

as from the Scarcity of these Articles." H 

The shortage of textiles a lso affected a basic funct ion of the Quanermaster General, namely, providing she lter for the troops. Canvas was 

at a premium, and, not onl y in 1775 but later, awn ings and ships' sails 

were utilized to provide tems. Sheller was as varied among the troops 

at Boston as uniforms were. The Rev. Wi ll iam Emerson found it divert-

•• j"uruIIls o/Illt. COI'li'l/mlnl Cougrt.ss. IV. 24 (5 J an (776); VII. 92 (5 Feb (777). 

" (I) For more back.groulld and details of this aid. see Samue l F. Ilcmis. TJu Diplollltlry 01 

III~ Allluicall R~!lollllio " (ntoolllillgton, 1957). passim. (2) J. Frank.lin J ameson, "51. EUSlaliUl 

in the Am~rican Revolulion," A"'~ri(lIl1 lIiJI"rical Rnli~w, V Ht guly 1903). 685-708 . 

.. (I) jOfJ.TI!tl/s of '''~ Co"li"~lItlil COlIgr~SJ, III. 325-24 (4 No\' (775). (2) Deduction of a 

fixed sum for clothing in the British army dated from the days of Eliubeth if not JIm ~arlier 

timn. Sir John W. Fortescue. A HiJ/ory O/I"~ British Arlll)' (13 \'ols., London. 1899-1950). 

T, 284 . 

.. jourrra/s 0/1I1~ COllli I~"'tll COIlgrns. III, 260 (23 Sep (775); 471 -73 Uohn Adam,. "Note. 

of Debates'') . 

.. Orid .. V, 844 (S Oct 1776). 
16 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

ing to wa lk among the camps in the Boston area, where every she ller, 

he though t. dep icted the taste o r the persons who encamped in it. 

Some arc made of boards. some of sa ilcloth, and some partly of one and 

partly of the olhel'. Ot hers are m;tde of stOlle and tu rf, ;md ot hers aga in of 

Birch and other brush. Some ilrc thrown up in a hu rry and look as j( they 

could not help it- mere necessity-othcrs are cu riollsly wrough t with doors 

and windows done with wrea ths and wi thes in the manner of a basket. Some 

arc your proper tents ,mtl marquees, and look like the regu lar camp of the 

enemy. These arc the Rhode-islanders, who arc furnished with tent equipage 

from among ourselves and every thing in lhe most exact English tasle. 4 $ 

Tents, providing accommodation for six men, were intended to 

afford sheller for the troops during campaigns though there were se ldom 

enough of them lO meet all needs. On the march, wagons carrying 

baggage, kettles, a nd lellLS frequently failed 10 reach th e troops when a 

halt was called for the night. In slLch a silliation, Sergeant John Smith, 

retreati ng through mud and WaleI' from King's Ferry to Haverstraw in 

November 1776, found lhal he and his comrades were "obliged to make 

us huts wilh rails and covered wilh straw" to sleep under." Once the 

campaign had ended, troops were lodged in barracks, provided they were 

stationed at posts. The Quanermaster's Department procured wood 

for the build ings and brick or stone and lime for chimneys and ovens. 

Under Quartermaster direction, carpenters erected the barracks. but in 

emergencies mi lit iamen were sometimes called o ut on fa tig ue duty to 

build them.lO When winter camp quarters were se lected in th e fi e ld at 

a suitabl e stratcgic location . th e troops thcmselves built their own huts. 

Sometimes th ey utili zed boards furnished by th e Q uanennaster's Department; more often they chopped down trees, building log hOllses that 

accommodated 12 men, with their bunks placed one above the other in 

tiers of three against each of the four wa lls. 

Beginning wilh the first winter of 1775-76, it became established 

policy that as soon as the men moved into their barracks or huts, they 

delivered all tents to the Quanermaster Genera l. Before the next campaign opened, he had them washed, re paired by artisans hired for the 

purpose, and stOred until needed.a, During the winter mo nths the 

Quartermaster Genera l not o nly d irected the salvage of old tents but, 

.. Allen .'rench. '1'ltt ,,'irs' Year o/Illt Amtritlill IInlO/,aim, {Boston, 19114).1100. (William 

Emel"$On to his wife. 11 Jvl 1175) . 

.. Matthews and Wecler. Our Sa/ditrs Sped, 21 . 

• Amerinlll Archivts, cd. FOTCe. 5th ser, II. 251 (f. Tilghman to Col. Moylan, 9 Sep 1776); 

1254 ("fimin 10 Ouer. 28 OCI 1776); III. 1102 (Resolmion of N.Y. Committee of Safety. 8 Noy 

1776) . 

.. Writings of Wruhingfo", ed. Fiupatrick. IV. 4 (GO. 22 Noy 1775); VI. 267-68 (fo Mimin. 

10 Noy 1176). 
THE ORIGINS OF QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY, 1775-1778 17 

utilizing all the duck that could be obtained, he had new tents manufactured. Replacements were always difficult to obtain and upon occa· 

sion that demand could onl y be satisfied at the expense of other needs. 

Foll owing th e loss of a large amount of tentage during th e evacuation of 

New York City, for exampl e, Congress insisted that " th e soldiers should 

have Tents if they stripped the Yards of those Continental Frigates and 

Cruisers that had sails made up." As a result a committee of Congress 

reported, "we have now a parce ll of flOe vessells lying here useless at a 

time they might have been most advantageously employed." II 

Repair of boats became a part of the Department'S maintenance 

program after the first winter of the war. As soon as the Army was 

shifted to New York, the Hudson became a vital supply artery and boats 

of every description were much in demand. ]n addition to those hired 

to transport supplies, the Quartermaster's Department began building 

boats. 1n anticipa tion of the arrival of the British in the summer of 

1776. Assistant Quartermaster General Hughes sent out orders for the 

procurement of ship timber, scantling. and oars for galleys and gondolas 

being built for the Army. He also shipped pitch, junk. and oakum up 

the Hudson to Albany where frigates were under conSlruction.1I Aware 

of the need to mai ntain an adequate number of boats ready for supply 

operations, Hughes. as the year 1776 drew to a close. proposed not only 

to repair Army boats on the Hudson but also to build additional ones 

if planks and boards could be obtained.·' The care and maintenance of 

Army boats remained an important aspect of Quartermaster activities 

on the Hudson throughout the war. 

]n the winter of 1775-76, Army demands for forage for th e animals 

and firewood for cooking and healing were filled by Mifflin's agents who 

purchased on a commission basis. Mifflin also had to transport ordnance 

stores and equip the soldi ers. At the same time, he had to build up 

reserve stocks of all types of supplies for active operations. Unfortunately, that effort was complicated by the fact that militia , called out to 

strengthen the Army in an operation, seldom brought equipment with 

th em. despite instructions to the state governments which were supposed 

initiall y to outfi t th eir troops before they were sent into Continental 

service. For example, Quartermaster General Moylan, Mifflin's successor, 

complained that in the New York campaign. " th e Auctuating state of 

.. LfillfiTI 01 M flmbflrJ of 1/111 COll/illfill/O/ COIIgrflss, tid. "Burnet!. n. 109 (R. Morris 10 

Maryland Council of 5;.feIY. I 0(1 1'1'16). 

-(I) Hugh H ughes Letter Book (To Schuyler. 4 Jun 1'1'16); (To J acob "kerly. '1 J un 1776); 

(fo John Cambell . 12 Jul 1776). New York H istorical Sociely. (2) Washinglon Papers. vol. 

27. f. 106 (Rellun of stores shipped to Schuyler. 4 Jun 1776). 

"Amflricon Archivts, «I. Force. 51h $Cr. III. 14'15--76 (To Wa$hinglon. 29 Dec 1'176). 
18 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

the Militia, coming in destitute of every necessary, drained ollr stores," U 

]n such circumstances, criticism of supply shortages was certain to be 

voiced long before replacements could be obtained. 

Estimating the amoun t o[ supplies required in any campaign necessarily fell short o[ accuracy not only in 1775 but throughout the war. 

In the procurement of Quartermaster items of supply, the procedures 

followed in 1775 and 1776 remained the pattern throughout the war. 

The Quartermaster General and his staff initiated preparations for the 

coming campaign late in the year, or as soon as the troops had retired 

to winter quarters. At that point, the deputy and assistant quartermasters genera l entered into contracts with master craftsmen for the 

production by their workshops of a given number of articles wanted, such 

as wooden canteens and pails. They set delivery usually for April or 

May- in other words, for the opening of the campaign. Unfortunately, 

lack of fu nds often delayed their arrangements so that supplies that 

should have been ready when the campaign began were instead hurried 

along in the midst of active operations. 

The Quartermaster's Department procured and issued to the indio 

vidual soldier wooden canteens and knapsacks. It also procured camp 

kettles, one of wh ich was issued to each company of men, and light axes, 

spades, and other eiurench ing tools. It issued most of the latter only 

as required, as, for example, when the troops were ordered to throw up 

fortifications or to erect huts for themselves in winter quarters. Entrench· 

ing tools had a strange way of disa ppearing once they were issued. T o 

prevent what he called "embezzlement of the public tools," Washington 

ordered the Q uartermaster Genera l to have each tool branded with the 

mark "CXIII," meaning the Continent and the thirteen colon ies. This 

brand was later changed to "U .S." after independence had been deciared.~G 

To make doubly sm e that tools did not disappear, 'Washington incorpo. 

rated the idea of property accountalJility in a general order published in 

the summer of 1776. All officers commanding a party or detachment 

from any regiment on the works were to be held accountable for the 

tools they received and any lost under their care were to be paid for by 

the officers. Any soldier who lost or destroyed a tool delivered to him 

was to have the price of it deducted from his next pay and moreover be 

punished "according to the nature of the offence." or 

.. Papers of the Continental Congreu, item 7S, vol. XV. f. JOI"'()S (Moylan to Pres. of 

Congress, 27 Sep ] 776). 

"(I) Writings of Washington, ed. Fit patfid(, V, 156 (GO. IS JUIl 1776); VII . 283 (fo 

Mimin, 13 Mar 1777). (2) Col. John W . Wriglll , "Some Notes on the Omtinenta] Anny." 

Willillm II"d Ma ry ColI~g~ Qllar/ rly His/oricai Maga:ilt ~, X I, second series, No.3 Uuly 1931). 

]88 . 

.., lI'r;/i"gs of IVashinglOlI, cd. Fiupankk, V, 157 (GO, ]8 J un ]776). 
THE ORIGINS OF QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY, 1775- 1778 19 

T he sliccess or fa ilure of a Quartermaster General was judged primarily by the ease with which he enabled an Army to take the field and 

by his ability to support that Army with a steady How of supplies both 

during th e campaign and a fter the troops had retired to winter q uarters. 

T he development of an adeq uate. smooth-functioning transportation 

system was never achieved du ring the Revolution. The vast extent of 

the country, its man y broad tida l rivers. its fo rests and marshes, and its 

lack of roads a ll impeded transportation. With the British in control 

of th e sea, suppl y was fo r the most pan restricted to land transportaLion 

and subj ect to a ll its hazards during the war. It is difficult to appreciate 

the de lays ca used by nalural o bstacles, th e hardships imposed by bad 

roads, a nd the lime cons umed in the slow, ponderous progress oE ox teams, 

or the impossibility of effecting speedy replacement of losses susta ined in 

baul e or on the road, resu lting from d iffi culties in transportation or th e 

mo re fam iliar pilferage tha t has amicted every supply line in every war. 

In 1775, the Quartermaster Genera l provided transportation both 

in the Army and o n th e supply lines by hiring teams a nd drivers. Washington instructed the wagon master general to maintain a sufficient number 

of wagons and teams to service each of the th ree di visions in the Boston 

area, but because of the scarc ity of forage the Q uartermaster's Department 

hired such teams with the understanding that th e owners would provide 

the necessary feed a nd be paid ac ordin ly ~~ Mimin soon enco untered 

d ifficulties in obtaining a sufficient number of wagons and teams to haul 

supplies. To rel ieve his d istress, Washingto n suggested that th e Massachusetts legislature adopt some expedient fo r drawing teams into service, 

or else invest the Quartermaster Genera l with authority to impress them. '& 

By th e time the Army moved to fortify th e heights of Dorchester in March, 

the move that finall y forced the British to evacuate Boston , Mifflin's 

exertions had obtained th e requisite number of ox teams and mo re than 

300 carts. They made severa l trips d uring th e night loaded with 

entrenching tools and with fa sci nes and hay, screwed into large bundles 

of seven or eight hundred weight.

8Q 

Apparentl y in 1775, as later in th e war, the Q uartermaster's Department could not re ly o n teamsters to de liver supplies to a designated 

destination. It was not at a ll unusual fo r a teamster to drop his load 

on the road, possibl y beca use he was disappointed in no t receiving his 

payor beca use he was lured by more a llractive opportunities in hauli ng 

goods for sutlers 01' merchants. To prevent a ny loss of Quartermaster 

fA A meriolll A .'rilivt'l . ed. Force. ~th ser. III. 809- 19 (Instructions to \Vagonmastcr General . 

2,". Scp 1775). 

" lVritings of IVas/ling/on , ed. Fitzpatrick. IV. 60 (I"Q Mass. legislature. 2 Nov 1775). 

" Thacher. Mili/ary Journal o/Ilte American RevO/lllioll, 40. 
20 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

~ '.', 

TRANSPORTING CANNON .' OR K NOX 

stores when the Army moved from Boston to New York in the spring of 

1776. the Department made an effort to hold each teamster accountable 

for the load he received. He was required to carry with him a copy of 

the bill of lading that the receiver of the goods endorsed. thereby converting it into a certifica te of delivery upon the presentation of which the 

teamster was paid. The wagons traveled by way of Norwich, Conn., 

the first of them carrying those artic1cs--camp equipage, entrenching 

tools, and cooking utensils- that the Army would need imincdiatcly 

upon assembling at the general rendezvous point." 

Although Quartermaster stores went overland in wagons, the troops, 

after marching as far as Norwich and New London, Conn., were· trans· 

ported by boat via Long Island Sound to New York. In this first move· 

ment of men and their equipment from one theater to another, 'Wash· 

ington dispatched his Quartermaster Genera l on ahead to arrange (or 

.. IVritingl 01 IVtrl llillgfOIl, «I. Fitzpatrick. IV, 465-67 (Orden 10 Parke, ! Apr 1776). 
THE ORIGINS OF QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY, 1775- 1778 21 

the necessary boats. When Mifflin had concerted his arrangements with 

Generals William Heath and John Sullivan. he hastened to New Yo rk 

to compl ete preparations th ere before th e troops arrived,n 

The Department found it easier to transport supplies in New York 

than at Boston because the navigation of both the Hudson and East 

Rivers was open, at least until the British arrived in mid-July. Quartermaster General Moylan added a few wagons and horses. sufficient he 

thought for al1 the exigencies of the Army. Many of the wagons and 

horses were sent to Long Island where a large part of the Army was 

deployed. Although in the brill iant withdrawa l across the East River 

to Manhattan on the nigh t of 29 August the troops and their equipment 

were saved, the wagons, carts, and horses could not be brought over. 8 ' 

This was a serious loss for with the navigation of the Hudson hampered by 

the presence of British vessels the Quartermaster's Department, "wanted 

Waggons to do that duty, which boats were accustomed to do." The 

shortage of transportation was made even more acute by the immediate 

necessity of removing stores from New York City to places of safety. 

Despite the Department's impressment of all horses and wagons in the 

lown and the shipment of cargoes up the Hudson in boalS, it had insu(-

ficient transportation available and Moylan's caree.r as Quartermaster 

General came to an abrupt cnd. 

Dependence on hired and impressed tcams to transport the Army's 

baggage and equipment was bound to hamper movement and result in 

losses. Even before the retreat in New York, Maj. Gen. Charles Lee, 

sent to counter the British threat to the southern states. was writing from 

Charleston that Congress ough t to make some "regular establishment for 

wagons." The purchase of at least one, if not twO, wagons for each 

company was necessary to permit expeditious movement. "At present, 

it is sometimes as much impossible to march an hundred miles, although 

the fate of a Province depended upon it, as if the soldiers wanted legs," 

General Lee informed the Board of War.u 

Thoroughly alarmed by what happened in New York, Congress 

resolved to furnish Miffiin with $300,000 to enable him to procure the 

supplies he had indicated to be necessary when he accepted reappo intment 

as Quartermaster General. 8S Among these items Mifflin had listed 

200 wagons with follt horses each; 50 ox teams with two oxen each; and 

50 drays with one horse each, besides 100 strong horses for the artillery 

- Ibid., IV, 429- 30 (Orden to Mifflin. 24 Mar 1776). 

- Papcl"lI of the Contincntal Congress, item 78. \101. XV. f. 101-08 (Moylan to Pres. of Congress. 27 Scp 1776). 

"'American Archivu, cd. Force, 5th ser, T, 720 ero Richard l'eters,2 Aug 1776) . 

.. jounltI/s 0/ fhe Contiflenl(li Congreu, V, 839-40 (2 OCI 1776). 
22 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

and 50 for expresses and commissary. He wanted and obtained a wagonmaster and a deputy as well as 20 conductors of wagons, onc to be 

allowed to each 10 wagons. He proposed to detail soldiers from the line 

as wagoners when sufficient teamsters could not be hired. For this extra 

duty. Congress authorized an allowance of one-e ighth part of a doll ar 

over and above their regu lar pay. 

A wagon service for the Army, with wagoners deta iled from the line, 

proved unsatisfactory and wasteful. Before the end of the year, Assistant 

Quartermaster General Hughes proposed changes because he was in a 

better position to observe its workings than M ifflin who was in Pennsylvania recruiting troops at the request of Congress. He suggested that it 

would be advantageous to the service to enlist teamsters and wagoners 

independent of the Army for a period of a year at least. Such separate 

enlistment, Hughes urged, would induce personnel to take better care 

of the ir teams and wagons than under the existing system of detailing 

men from the line. As long as the latter-knew they could return to their 

regiments when they chose, they felt no responsibility for their teams. 

In consequence, they neglected to give the teams proper care and the 

usefulness of the animals to rhe Army diminished rapid ly.u His wise 

suggestion stimulated no corrective action. 

As soon as the troops were settl ed in quarters at Morristown during 

the second winter of the war, Washington turned his attention to the 

problem of transportation. Convinced that the great losses of 1776 had 

flowed from a want of teams, he had informed Congress, in the midst 

of preparing his counter blow against the British in New Jersey, that he 

intended to have Mifflin provide each regiment with a certain number 

of wagons so that they might move "from place to place differently from 

what we have done, or could do, this campaign." Sf Ammunition carts 

and carts for carrying entrenching tools ought to be provided. Feeling 

that "too much regard cannot be pa id to the Waggons," he directed 

Mifflin to provide as many as would serve all the purposes of each battalion 

for their baggage, ammunition, and entrenching tools. Then returning 

to his idea of ammunition carts, he suggested the manufacture of light, 

strong, covered "Chaises marine"- two-wheeled wagons-to carry artillery and regimental ammunition. He d id not want the Army encumbered with heavy and unwieldy wagons when the purpose could be better 

served by light ones. 88 By March, Mifflin could write that the ammunition wagons were coming in fast and production of other types was also 

.. AmericlllI Archill~J, ed . Force. 5th ser. III. 1475-76 (Hughes 10 Washington, 29 Dec 1776). 

"iVritings of Washing/o .. , ed. Fitzpatrick. VI, 406 (To Pres. 01 Congress, 20 Dec 1776). 

eo Ibid., VII, 83 (To Miffiin, .!II Jan 1777). 
T HE ORIG INS OF QUARTERMASTER SU PPLY, 1775- 1778 23 

well under way. 8~ Prepa rations fOI" the next campaign were in general 

moving along we ll despite the difficulty o( obtaining funds. 

Refonn Mea.sul'es 

T he long, dishearten ing retrea t of the Army du ring the campaign 

of 1776, the th reat to Philadel ph ia in December, th e mo unting criticism 

of the purchasing activit ies of the commissaries in the Midd le Department, 

and investiga tion of suppl y fa ilures prod uced a veritable "rage for rcformaLicn" in Congress by 1777.'fl The first impetus in that d irection came 

from a report of the congressiona l committee sent to inspect the Army 

and determine the best means of supplying its wants following the evacuation of New York City.1I Acting on the committee's fi nd ings tha t the 

failure of clothi ng supply was at leaS( in part due to the lack of a proper 

supervisory officer, Congress passed a resolution calling for the appointment of a commissary of clothing for each of the armies. IL would be 

his d uty to submit reg imental clothing requi rements to the states, receive 

and pay for the deli veries made by them, and then deliver the clothing 

to the regimen ta l paymasters. T he latter would issue the clothing, 

ded ucting the costs from the soldiers' wages. A week later Congress 

appointed George Measam to fi ll that post in the Northern Army and 

authorized Washington to appoint stich a comm issary for the Army under 

his immediate command.12 

Preoccu pied with the campa ign, Washington did not get around to 

considering the matter until December when, thoroughly alarmed by the 

cloth ing shortage, he urged instead the appointment of a cloth ier general 

for the Army as a meam of centralizing control of all clothing supply. 

O ne week later, Congress authorized him to make this appoin tment, 

though it enacted no regul atory measure for the department. a James 

Mease, a Philadelphia merchant, promptly solic ited the appointment and 

obtai ned the post on the basis of his experience in executi ng supply orders 

for Congress .. ' Mease ass umed his duties at camp by February. By 

virtue of his commission he could appoi nt agents in each state to procure 

clothing on a commission basis, but Wash ington instnlCted h im to work 

.. Wa~ ing1(>n Papers, vol. 42. f. ] 16 (Mimin 10 Washinglon. 9 f-h r 1777); vol. 40, r. 81 

~l ug es to Washington, ! Feb ]777). 

"" T he Ullers 0/ /(iril(!rd H enry I.u. cd. J . C. Ilalla!!;h (2 vol$ .. New York. 1911), I, 352 

(Lee 10 Washington, 20 NOI' 1777) 

" JourFwls o//he Cou/iuell/al Cougress, V, 844 (3 Oct 1776). 

"' Ibid. , VI. 858. 859 (9 OCI 1776): 880--81 (16 Ocr ]776). 

"'(1) Writings o/Was/,iug/VII, cd. Fillpa lrick. VI, 404 (To Pres. of Con!!;ress. 20 Dec 1776). 

(2)J(mru,,/s of II,,: Cou/ iuell/a/ CougUll, VI. 1041 (27 Dec 1776). 

"(1) Washin!!;lon Papers. vol. 58. r. 123 (Mease to Washington, 6 J an 1777). (2) Writings 

vf lVasllillglOIl, cd. Filzpalrick. VI. 492-9! (To Mease. 10 J an 1777). 
24 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

close ly with agents already appoi nted by the states to purchase clothing 

for the ir respective regiments. Mease was to be allowed as many clerks 

alld storekeepers as necessary to carry o u t his busi ness. Washi ngton 

advised him that, like other heads of supply agencies, he wou ld have to 

be with the Army in order to execute his d Ul ies properly. Mease soon 

had purchasing agents in the field and added a deputy to his organization 

to assist him and remai n with the Army when he was absent. 

Clothi er Genera l Mease also became responsible for shoe procurement. Shoes were being bought under contract from loca l cobblers or 

imported from abroad , hut the d istress of the Army for want of shoes 

showed no improvement under Mease. Five months after his appoint· 

ment, Washi ngton complai ned that lack of shoes made some corps 

"almost entirely incapable of doi ng d uty." Such shoes as Mease supplied 

were too sma ll in size and therefore of little use. Imported shoes were 

" th in french pumps" that tore to pieces whenever they got wet-u 

Apparently convinced that supervision and a close contro l of materials 

were the keys to improvi ng suppl y, Congress resolved to establish a H ide 

Department under the direction of a w mmissary. Since the fa ll of 1776, 

the hides of the cattle that were slaugh tered for Army use had been dried, 

cured , and held for the use of the Continen tal Congress, subject to its 

orders.a It now directed the Commissary of Hides to receive all raw 

hides belongi ng 10 the Un ited Sta tes, exchange them for ta nned leather 

or for shoes at the customary rates of- exchange, and deliver the shoes to 

the Clothier General who would make d istribution to the Army. If he 

could not make such exchanges on reasonable terms, Congress authorized 

the Commissary of Hides either to provide la nyards, materials, and 

workmen himself, or to contract with proper persons for converting the 

hides ihto tanned leather. It then placed the H ide Department u nder 

the supervision of the Board of War. At the Board 's d irection, the Com· 

missary of H ides was also to make del iveries of leather to the Commissary 

of Mil itary Stores who in add ition to receiving and delivering all arms 

and ammun ition also procured all types of accou trements for the Army. 

Congress promptly selected a Commissary but when he declined to serve, 

6 weeks passed before it was able to fi ll the office by appointing George 

Ewing.'· 

In the mealllime, the Conti nental Congress also made some organizationa l changes in the Quartermaster's Department. Mifflin, who had 

been promoted to the rank of major general on 19 February 1777, had 

" Writing$ of Wusll i"glm •• cd. Fitzpatrick. VIII. 292. 4~2-~~ (To Mease. 2~ JUII and 

18 Jul 1777). 

TO JOllmu/s of Iht! Cofll;,u"tu/ Congress, VI. 973-74 (22 Nov 1776). 

Tl l bid .• VIll. 487-89; 607 (20 J un and 5 Aug 1777). 
THE ORIGINS OF QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY, 1775-1778 25 

been giving considerable thought to administrative reform in his Department. Washington approved of his ideas and submitted them to Congress. A committee to whom they were referred brought in a report 

that Congress adopted on 14 May.a The plan incorporated the essence 

of Quartermaster experience gained in the campaigns of 1775 and 1776 

and for the first time set forth detailed regulations for the Department. 

Congress provided for a more specialized division of duties by the 

crealion of both a forage department and a wagon department within the 

Quartermaster's Department. ]0 the forage department, it authorized 

the Quartermaster General to appoint a commissary of forage for the 

Army and one for each of the military departments, with as many forage 

masters as he thought necessary to receipt for deliveries of forage at 

magazines. The commissaries purchased all forage and stored it in 

magazines as directed by the Quartermaster Ceneral or his deputy in any 

military department. Congress also authorized the Quartermaster General to appoint a wagon master general for the wagon department and a 

wagonmaster for each military department. T hey received all horses, 

cattle, and carriages that the service required but neither purchased nor 

hired them without the express orders of the commanding general, the 

Quartermaster General, or one of his deputies. 

Congress further aUlhorized the Quartermaster General to appoint 

such assistants as he needed, transmitting to the Board of War the names 

of assistants, commissaries of forage, wagon masters, forage masters, and 

clerks. It retained deputy quartermasters general for the military departments, but in addition it provided for the appointment of a deputy 

quartermaster genera l for each grand division of the Army and an assistant 

deputy quartermaster general for each brigade. Congress also set forth a 

system of returns to be made by the offi cers of the Departments, designated 

the forage allowances to officers, more or less codifi ed orders previously 

issued to prevent the loss of tools, and enumerated details of rank and pay 

for personnel in the Department. 

Mifflin was seldom at Headquarters in 1777 but in his absence his 

three subordinates supervised Departmental business. Joseph Thornsbury whom Washington appointed Wagonmaster General in May, 

directed the wagon depanment. Clement Biddle. appointed Commissary General of Forage on 1 Jul y 1777. handled all matters pertaining to 

forage for the main Army. Mifflin's immediate deputy was Col. Henry 

Emanuel Lutlerloh whom. at Washington's suggestion, he appointed 

"'(I) Wash ington Papers. vol. 42. f. IIG (Mifllin to Washington. 9 Mar ]777). (2) Wrili"gJ 

of lVasllj'lg/Ou,cd. Fitzpatrick. V]. 283- 84 (13 Mar 1777). (3) Joumals of lilt COII/i'lim/nl COIIgress, \' 11 . ]91 (2.1 1'>lar): 272 (Hi Apr): 292 (23 Apr): 355-59 (]4 May 1777). 
26 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

deputy q uartermaster general with the main Army.1U Lutterloh had seen 

Quartermaster service in th e army of Brunswick and Washington thought 

his experience would make him useful to the Department. T he Quartermaster office at Headquarters included some other personnel- three clerks 

to keep the accounts, an assistant deputy quartermaster general to aid 

Lutterl oh, another assistant to supervise the Continental Yard with the 

hel p of onc clerk and four hostlers, and a second deputy to supervise 

an issuing store, presided over by a storekeeper and one assistant. 80 

The rage for reformation expended itself most full y in reorganizing 

the Commissary Department. Investigation of Carpenter Wharton's 

mismanagement of commissary affairs during the campaign of 1776 

resulted in the formulation of a report by the Board of War in February 

of the following year that proposed separation of the purchasing and 

issuing functions of the Commissary General. T his development was in 

agreement with organizational ideas entenained by Washington who had 

long been of the opinion that the work of the Depanment had become 

tOO extensive to be under the management of one man. 8 ' Congress took 

no action on that repon but it pursued its inquiry into the conduct of 

the commissaries in the Middle Department by appoi nting another com· 

mittee for that purpose in Marcil. When that committee brought in a 

report on abuses that developed from the use of agents paid on a per· 

centage basis, and recommended that in the future Congress appoint the 

commissari es and place them in designated districts under proper supervision and regulations, Congress immediately directed the committee to 

prepare a draft of regu lations to put their ideas into effect.u 

Fully 12 months earli er Trumbull had sought regulations for his 

Department, and now at the urging of Elbridge Gerry he hastened to 

Philadelphia to give the committee the benefit of his ideas on the subject. 

He was well pleased with the proposal to divide his office into two separate 

depanments, but he had definite opinions on compensation that were 

diametricall y opposed to the established mode of paying a fixed salary to 

the Commissary General. He had never been satisfi ed with that arrangement, and he reiterated a proposal made earlier that he be pa id on a 

commission basis-that is, Y2 percent for himself on all monies pasSing 

'" (I) Washington Papers. vol. 47, f. 116-17 (M imin to Washington . 27 Mal' 1777). (2) Wril· 

ings ollVlUhiflglOfl, cd. Fitzpatrick, VIII, 60 (GO, 14 Mal' 1777); !27- 28 (GO. I Jul 1777). 

" Papers of the Comincmal Congreu. item 192. f. 159 (List of J an 1778) . 

., (I) Journals of the CouliJlelltil/ Congre.lS, VII, 119-20 (14 Feb 1777). (2) See. fo r exam· 

pie, Writings of lVashiugtOfI, cd. Fitzpatrick, VIII , 25-26 (To Brig. Gen. A. MacDougall. 7 Mal' 

1777) . 

.. Journall of tile Co'!linenlal Congress, VII, 266 (14 Apr 1777). 
THE ORIGINS OF QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY, 1775- 1778 27 

through his hands and 2!;2 percent to the depmies purchasing subsistence." 

Assuming that he wou ld be consulted from time to lime about the 

preparation of the regulations, Trumbull remained in Philadelphia for 

4 weeks but the committee never again called for his assistance and he 

finally returned (0 camp. There he found discontent rife among his 

assistants and the Department in such a demoralized state, as a result of 

congressional investigation, that he contemplated resigning on 15 June. 

"An Angel from Heaven could not go on long in my Situation," he wrote 

his friend Gerry. It was apparent that his deputies would leave him to 

a man if satisfactory arrangements were not made and in the existing 

uncertainties "they were not worth a farthing each." 8. 

Although Trumbull had not yet been informed of the action, Congress on to June had adopted a regulation that was so minutely detailedthe text fi lls 15 pages of the JOllnwls- that "if regulations could have 

furnished supplies, the army storehollses should have been bursting with 

a superabundance." U The regulation established separate departments 

of purchases and issues, each headed by a commissary general. It provided for congressional appointment of four deputies in the purchase field 

and three deputies to control issues. It authorized each deputy to 

appoint as many assistants as were necessary, and assigned each deputy 

commissary general of purchases to a specific area within which he was 

to make his purchases, delivering the provisions to the deputy commissary 

general of issues in that distri ct. The organization provided was rela· 

tively simple, but the minutiae of detail in the regu lation prescribing 

among others an elaborate record-keeping system, the branding of government anima ls, the recovery and tanning of hides, the monetary evaluation 

of the rations, and the establishment or gardens were sllch as to make 

effecti ve administration of the measure an impossibility." 

In the course of the next 8 days Congress completed its arrangements. 

It resolved that the Commissary General of Purchases should maintain 

his office wherever Congress should be in session and that either he or 

his cl erk would have to he in constant attendance.'T It then settled the 

question of compensation for commissary personnel. In lieu of commissions, the use of which had become thoroughl y discredited, Congress 

.. I.ellt!r$ of Memb erJ of /h e CI)I!/iltf!>t/fI/ COflgUSS, ed. Burnett. II. 364 fn . (frumbull 10 

Wad, worlh . 17 May 1777); 39J-94 fn . ( I'nllnbull to Hancock. 15 Jun 1777). 

" 'bid .. II. 39J-94 fn . (Drafts o f leiters Ihal were apparently not senl to Hancock. Wa5h · 

inglOn . and Gerry. 15 Jun 1777). 

-Edmund C. Burnell, Tilt! COlltimm/fl/ COIIgrt!ss (New York. I!HI). 273. 

· l o,,",(l/s of lht! COlltillt!lItlli COIIgrt!SJ. VIII, 4~H8 (10 Jun 1777). 

or I bid., VIII, 452 (II Jlln 1777). 
28 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

substituted fixed pay and rations for a ll personnel in the Commissary 

Department. This was the most disturbing feature of the new system 

from the viewpoint of the deputies, though the allowance of $8 per day 

and six rations to the Commissary General o[ Purchases was a morc 

generolls remuneration than had previously been granted. On 18 June 

1777. Congress elected the officers needed to staff the new establishment. 

It continued Joseph T rumbull as Commissary General or Purchases, 

assisted by four deputies- Will iam Ay lett, William Buchanan. Jacob 

Cuyler, and Jeremiah Wadsworth. It designated Charles Stewart Com· 

missary Gencral of Issues. Three deputies assisted him- William Mumford, Matthew Irwin. and Elisha Avery. Until these appointees were 

prepared to assume direction of the business entrusted to them, Congress 

req uested that Trumbull and his deputies continue supplyi ng the Army 

as they had been doing. " 

Trumbull himself apparently was not officially notified of his appointment until 5 Ju ly. Aware that Trumbull had said he would serve only 

if paid on a commission basis, Eliphal et Dyer wrote to urge him to accept 

the new appointment on patriotic grounds of service to his country and 

the Army .. - But if Trumbull himself had been willing to reconsider, 

his assistants were not so disposed ; in fa ct, no one seemed willing to act 

under the new regu lations. During Ihe next few weeks there followed a 

dismaying Sllccession of resignations and new appointments. llo Trumbull 

allempted to keep the Department functioning, blll he had so few 

assistants that he himse lf had, on occasion, to stand at the scales to check 

the we ight of provisions." The effect of the confusion and the disorganization in the midst of the campaign of 1777 was such that Washington observed that almoSl exery expedition he formed was "either frustrated or greatl y impeded by the wanl of a regular supply of provisions."·2 

Efforts to get Congress to amend the regulation to make it morc 

workable proved fruitl ess because so many members were so "fond of 

their New plan" that it was difficult to "make them attend to the Obj ections against" it." The Continental Congress sent a committee to camp, 

but Trumbull soon learned that it was neither inclined to grant him 

- Ibid" VIII . 427 (]8 JUIl); 491 2~ Jun 1777) . 

.. L t!//UJ of M t!mbus of til e COJlJ;'MfI/al COflgrt!.IJ. ed. lIurnett. It. 592, 407-08 (- lun and 

8 Jul 1777). 

" j oumafJ of "", Coutil/ell/III COIrgrt!ss, VIII . 498 (26 1un): 5]7 (] Ju1); IKl I (4 Aug): 6 1'1 

(6 Aug): 627 (9 Aug); 629-50 (I I Aug); &10 (14 Aug 1777). 

"' L t! /IUJ of M embefl of Iht! COllti"t!fI /llf COflgreJJ. ed . Burnell . II. 594 Uames Lovell 10 

Trumbull. 50 Jun ]77'1). 

" Douglal S. Freeman . Ceorg~ IVn.lhillgloll (5 vol •. , New York. 1948--5 1), IV. 44 1 n. 

(fimolhy Pickering to Trumbull, 28 Jun ]7'1'1) . 

• LelftrJ of M embers of the COII/iut!lIlal COlIgreJJ, ed. Burnell. II. 414 (Dyer 10 Trumbull. 

15 Ju l ]'1'1'1). 
THE ORIGINS OF QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY, 1775- 1778 29 

control of his deputies nor pay him on a commission basis, and he submitted his resignation on 19 July. Two weeks later he notified Congress 

that he would not consider himse lf obliged LO perform th e duties of his 

office beyond 20 August. O n 5 August Congress appointed his successor, 

designa ting ''''illiam Buchanan as Commissary General of Purchases.9t 

The wave of reform spent itself in a reorganization of the Board of 

War. T hough Trumbull had resigned in Jul y and Mifflin submitted 

his resignation in October 1777, Congress was reluctant to lose the 

services of the two men in th e country most fam iliar with quartermaster 

and commissary problems. It appointed them members of the Board of 

'War to lend the we ight of their experi ence to the task of supervising the 

supply agencies. 

BTeakdown of Supply, 1777 

Most of the members of Congress, lacking military knowledge, were 

nevertheless certain that the measures they had adopted were good. 

They fully expected that the Army would not on ly be better cared for 

but also more economicall y supplied than in the past. But improvements 

did not result from new organi zations, new personnel, and in some cases 

new regulations. On the contrary, by the end of the year, with the Army 

encamped at Valley Forge, the supply system generally had broken down, 

key supply officers had submitted their resignations, and supply had 

deteriorated to such an extent that Congress, searching for ways to feed, 

clothe, and keep an Army in the fie ld, will ingly settled [or any arrangements that promised to do so. 

Mere appointment of supervisory officers-a Clothier General and a 

Commissary of Hides----could not of itself increase the amount of clothing 

and shoes sent to the Army, bu t a closer scrutin y of operations by them 

undoubtedly would have at least assured the troops full use of what was 

available. In 1776, the Army had hit upon the method of exchanging 

hides for shoes as a means of keeping the soldier fit for service. The 

Commissary Department obtained the hides fro m the cattle slaughtered 

to feed the Army and exchanged them wit h the owners of lanyards, 

farme rs, and tradesmen at a designated ratio of so many pounds of hides 

for so many pounds of tanned leather or a specified number of shoes. In 

the fa ll of 1777, the recently appointed Commissary of Hides found that 

fi ve pounds of hides could be exchanged for one pound of sole leather 

and eight pounds of hides for one of upper ather. ~5 Washington rightly 

•• (1) Washington l'apcrs. vol. 51. r. 96 (Trumhull to Wa5hingtOIl . 19 Jul 1777). (2) Jour· 

nals oflhe Co,,';m""lal Cougnss, VIII. 598 (2 Aug 1777); 607 (5 Aug 1777) . 

.. Washington Papers. vol. 62. f. 90 (Ewing 10 Washington. 2 Dec 1777). 
30 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

insisted that if all the hides of the catlle that were consumed by the Army 

were turned into leather, "they would mllch more than shoe the soldiers." we Unfortunately, there was often a sharp discrepancy between 

the weight of the hides turned in and the amount of tanned leather or 

the number o( shoes obtained in exchange. The method lent itse lf to 

abuses by dishonest agents not only under Ewing but also later on in the 

war. T he Department also sustained losses through pilferage of hides 

from wagons in the course of transportation, since hides were a val uable 

asset in the market. 

Clothier Genera l Mease was plagued by a continuing shortage of 

textiles and clothing that could onl y be re lieved by purchase abroad. 

Congress began importation on its account, but there was many a slip 

between placing an order and its deli very. In the spring of 1777, a committee of Congress assured Mease that there was "a Moral Certainty of 

being plentifully furn ished" with clothing in lime for the next campaign, 

but its non-a rri va l in lhe fall was attributed to a variety of causes not 

the least of which was the effectiveness of the British cruisers in patrOlling 

American shores." Even when deliveries were made, cargoes had to be 

landed at New England ports since New York and, for a time, Phila· 

delphia were in the hands of the British. Cloth ing had then to be hauled 

laboriously by wagons hundreds of mil es to the Continental Army operat· 

ing in New York, Pennsylvania, and New J ersey. 

This long overl and tra nsportation provided opportunities for loss 

and misapplication of clothing. Mease, whose abilities were mediocre, 

might have prevented losses en route by sending along conductors with 

the wagons to guard the clothing that was usuall y forwarded in small 

parcels. He miglu also have introduced the use of a system of certifica tes 

of delivery to further safeguard the clothing. Both devices were introd uced with considerable success later." On the other hand, when Slate 

authorities stopped shipments en route from Massachusetts to camp and 

or when commanding officers at posts along the way felt free to plunder 

clothing parcels coming to the main Army in order to clothe their needy 

troops. Mease, lacking authority. could onl y appeal to Congress and to 

Washington for rel ief from such practices whi le the intended recipient!! 

continued wearing their tattered rags. 99 

OO ll'riliugs 0/ II'nslliuglOft, ed. Fitzpal rick. X. "5-'Hi (To Mease. 12 Nov (777). 

"(1) Washington Papen. vol. "7. f. 11 (Mease to Washington. 12 May 1777). (2) )ollmnls 

o/lh~ CO"I;" "lol Cougr~JI. X. 88~. 968-{j9 (10 and 26 Nov 1777) . 

.. <I) II'ril;lIgs 0/ II'nJJij"gIOlr, ed. Finpalrir:k. XII, .... H8 (To Maj. Gen. William Healh . 

I-t Sep 1778). (2) Washinglon "apen. "QI. 85, r. I .. (Olis &: Andre\\'$ 10 Wa$hinglon. 19 Sep 

1778). 

"(I) Washinglon Papen. "01. 48, f. 74 (Mease to Washinglon 6 JUII 1777): \'01.51. f. 129 

(Mease to Washington. 22 J ul 1777). (2) IVrifillgJ 1>/ IVrulrillgfo/l, ed. Fillpalrick. VIII . 2~7-~8 

(To MeallC:. ~ JUII 1777): X. "1--42 (To Maj. Gen. 1'\llnam, H Nov 1777). ) 10Ilrll('/J of fll ~ 

COlltilltfltll1 COIrgr(ss, VIIT ... n (17 Jun 1777). 
THE ORIGINS OF QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY, 1775-1778 31 

The supply of clothing and shoes grew steadily worse during the 

fa ll of 1777. The prolonged campaign of th at year was particularly hard 

on clothing and shoes. To scarc ity was added poor qua lity. Shoes made 

of green leather wore O llt faster th an de liveries could be made. Sizes of 

both shoes and uniforms were genera ll y too sma ll. It was false economy. 

Washi ngton argued, to be so sparing in t he use of cloth; uniforms that 

were not la rge enough d id not "wear out fairly. but tear to pieces." .00 

Down through the years, criticism of sizes was to be a perennial complaint, 

and Mease's rebuttal was a lso to become only too familiar. It was not 

the sizes that were at fau lt but the fiuing. Clothing was being made in 

three sizes but " in general so little pa ins is taken by the officers to fit the 

Men that 1 have often seen a large coat hanging like a sack on a little 

fellow, whilst you see at th e same time a lusty fellow squeezed into a 

small one." 101 Stocks became so depleted tha t it was a wonder the Army 

co uld be kept in th e field, and even the men in the hospitals were naked 

and had to stay there for lack of covering. Of the 9,000 men at Vall ey 

Forge, 2,898 were unfit fo r duty on 23 December 1777 beca use they were 

barefoot and naked. By that time Mease had submitted his resignation. 

He offered to continue in office until a successor could be found, but, 

pleadi ng ill hea lth , he stayed at Lancaster, re fusi ng to stay with the 

Army.I02 

W ith food, th e hardiest of the soldiers at Vall ey Forge could have 

survived despite the win ter cold and the lack of cloth ing and blankets. 

But th e supply of rations had become increasingly precarious during the 

campaign of 1777 and by December the threat of starvation stalked the 

camp. WaShington was undecided whether these supply failures were 

attributable to '"a fau lt" in the constitution of th e Commissary Department or to "an unpardonabl e neglect in th e Executive pan," but Com· 

missary Genera l Buchanan was not neglectful of his duties. He was 

inexperienced and he did limit his activ ities toO much to attending Con· 

gress and to attempting to reduce "the extravagance of the time" by 

carrying on a singlehanded campa ign against spiraling prices. 'os Commissary support of Washington's Army as it moved to meet the British 

threat to Phil adelphia he left to Ephraim Blaine, deputy commissary 

general for the Middle Department. 

'''Writi''g.! af Washingtoll, ed. Fitzpatrick, VIII, 432-33 (To Mease:. 18 J u l 1777) . 

... Washinll:ton Papers, vol. 5 1, f. 129 (To Washinglon. 22 Ju l 1777). 

'''( I) Writillgs of Wllsh;"gloll, ed. t'ilzpalrick, x, 195 (To Pres. of Congress, 23 Dec 1777). 

(2) Washinglon Papers. vol. 63, f. 28 (Mease to Washinglon, 16 Dec 1777). 

'''(I) IVrili"g5 0/ JYlIs/tinglon, eel. Fil~palrick. IX, 238 (To Pres. of Congress. 19 Sep 1777). 

(2) Ephraim Blaine Letter Book. 1777- 78 (Blaine 10 A. Dunham, II Apr 1778). Manuscript 

Div .. Library of Congress. (3) For a more delai led Ireatmenl, se:e Johnson, The Admill;strat;on 

o/the Amuic"" CommiJ.lariat DUTi"g the Revo/utiollllry War. 
32 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Blaine worked energetically to obta in meat suppl ies to supplement 

the stores turned over when Trumbull resigned, but a variety of factors 

conspired to prevent procurement of adeq uate stocks. The British at 

Philadelphia dominated the area in the Middle Department where cattle 

raising was largely centered. The Army was also deprived of stocks 

of barreled pork and bacon that it had received hom Virginia in the past 

because the enemy, in possession of the Delaware River, had thereby cut 

the line of communication Wi lh th at Slale. Illaine had expected that an 

ample supply of beef would be forwarded from the Eastern Department. 

Unfortunately, mea t purchases had been suspended from August to 

November by reason of the long delay in completing the organization of 

the department of the commissary general of purchases in that area.'O' 

Moreover, forwardi ng of supplies on hand in the Eastern Department was 

completely frustrated by the muddleheadness of Samuel Gray, the newly 

appoi nted deputy commissary general of issues, who failed wbolly to 

understand instructions directing him to accept the transfer of subsistence stores from Trllmbu IJ.l °~ In the meantime, militia reinforcements 

swe lled ration requirements during the campaign of 1777 and "upwards 

of 800 head of Callie per week" were be ing consumed in October and 

400 barrels of flour a week were needed from Lancaster, Reading, and 

York but that quantity was not being delivered, large ly because the 

farmers feared their wagons would be detai ned indefinitely at camp once 

deli veries were made.'oa Fa ll brought the season for curing and packing 

mealS, but salt could not be hauled for want o f transportation, and the 

lack of wagons also caused the commissaries to charge the quartermasters 

with responsibility for the failure to deliver flour. 

In the early fall, advocates of the new commissa ry system had felt 

that suffici ent lime li ad not elapsed to permit a demonstration of its 

merits. By November, however, adversaries of the new organization 

were pronouncing it a failure., oT Alarmed by the supply situation, Congress appointed committees to devise ways and means for providing a 

sufficielll supply and to confer with the Pennsylvania assembly. These 

measures added little to the stock of food for the Army, the advance forces 

of which reached Valley Forge on 16 December 1777, with the main force 

under Washington arriving three days later to begin preparations for the 

... (I) Ephraim 81aine Letter Rook, 1777-78 (8Iain 10 Coil, 18 Nov 1777). (2) I'apel'$ of the 

Com inc:ntal Congress, ilem 78, vol. V, f. 4 11 - 16 (Coli to Hancock. 4 OCI 177'1) . 

.. Charles Stewarl Correspondence. 1777-82 (Su:wart 10 Gray. 8 jul - should be Aug 1777). 

'''(I) Ephraim Blaine Leller Book., 1777-78 (Chaloncr 10 Blaine, !I Ocl 1777): (Chaloner 10 

Buchanan, 11 Oct 1777). 

, .. L tilltlrs of AftlmlJtlrs Of lIu COlllillt llta/ COIIgrtlss, cd. Burnell. II. 5H (E. Dyer to Trumbull," Nov 1777): 563-64 (R. n . Lee to Washington, 20 Nov 1777). 
THE ORIGINS OF QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY, 1775- 1778 ~~ 

.. .~ , . , t·.;. ,. i ", " 

,/ 

--

A SUPPL Y TRAIN EN ROUTE THROUCH THE SNOW TO VALLY FORCE 

winter encampment. The troops were still in tents on Christmas Day, 

and the general cry of the soldiers was" 'No Meat! No Meatl ' " 108 

The troops at Valley Forge were not starving and freez ing because 

the sta tes had been drained of all food and clothing. Instead, a breakdown in transportation had made it impossible to haul these supplies 

from magazines and posts where they were deposited to the camp where 

they were so sorely needed. Quartermasters maintained some government teams at various posts and magazines throughout the country which 

they used for hauling suppl ies. But privately-owned wagons and their 

drivers, hired by deputy quartermasters general at a certain rate per day, 

conveyed the bulk of the provisions, forage, and stores along the various 

supply lines. Customarily the owners furnished the necessary forage for 

the teams; whenever the Quartermaster's Department provided it, tile 

cost was deducted from the amount due the owner. 

" .. .. Valley Forge. 1777-78: Diary of Surgeon Albigence 'Valdo, of the Continental Line." 

PemlS),lvauia Magazin e 0/ Hislory and Diograph y, XX I. 309. 
34 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

In 1777, the demand for wagons in Pennsylvania by both the State 

and the Continenta l Army was large and the cost of hiring th em, in 

common with the prices of a ll other articles and services, rose rapidly. 

To check the advancing COSts of transportation, Congress set 30 shill ings 

per day as the price at which a quanermaster could hire a driver, a wagon, 

and four horses. In view o[ th e high costs of maintenance, wagon owners 

considered this price much too low, particularly since they could obtain 

[3 to [4 a day from private merchallls.'o9 As a result, they did not willingly agree to employment of their wagons by the Quartermaster's 

Department. 

But if the owners would not of th eir own accord permit the Department to hire th eir wagons, they were compelled to do so by impressment. 

Ever since 1776, the Army had drawn a large share of its wagons and 

teams from Pennsy lvania. With the campaign of 1777 centered in Pennsylva nia, the burden of providing the Quartermaster's Department with 

transportation for hauling supplies fe ll heavily upon th e inhabitants of 

that State. For the most part, until late in 1777, wagons a nd teams were 

obtained by impressment not only by th e quartermasters but also by personnel in the Commissary Department, th e Clothing Department, and the 

Hide Department who, because of the fa ilure of the Quartermaster's 

Department to suppl y transportation, were authorized to impress th e 

wagons they needed. Impressment, however, always aroused resentment; 

it len t itself readily to abuses; and it worked hardships on some who by 

reason of their proximity to the Army were repeatedly called upon to 

furnish wagons and teams while others, more distantly located, escaped 

this burden entirely. Exasperated by repeated impressments, the inhabitants of Pennsylvania auempted to concea l the ir wagons when the Army 

sent out military press parties to bring supplies to Valley Forge."o 

Late in December 1777, the Pennsy lva nia Execlitive Council sought 

to eq ualize the burden o( impressment and make its impact uniformly 

felt by a ll its inhabitants. It appoin ted a wagonmaster in each county 

who had the power to appoint in tum a deputy in each townsh ip. The 

Co uncil required each deputy to report the names of all wagon owners 

in each township and the number of wagons each owned. Operating 

under orders of the state wagonmaster general, county wagon masters 

called out wagons in rotation so that every person would be required to 

perform his tour of d uty.l" To obta in wagons and teams, quartermasters of th e Continental Army thereafter had to apply to the state 

'· Pe""s),/vauia A ,chives, 1st ser, VI, tl6--17 (Wharton to Delegates in Congress. 20 Dec 

1777). 

'''Washington I'apers. \"01. 67, f. 7 1 (Greene to Washington, 15 Feb 1778). 

'" P~'msyl"'''';tl Arc/lives, 1st scr. VI, 124 (22 Dee ]777). 
THE ORIGINS OF QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY, 1775- 1778 35 

wagonmaster genera l for the number they needed, and they no longe r 

had authority to obtain wagons thro ug h their own impressment efforts. 

Unfortunately. this process of applyi ng for wagons oftcn entailed delay, 

particularly if the county wagonmastcr happened to be away at the time 

the order reached him. It also happened that on occasion he was unabl e 

to get the constable to execute a warra nt for bringing in some teams whose 

owners had been warned but who refused to serve with the Army. T here 

were instances. too, during the wimer of 1777- 78 when brigades of teams 

that were supposed to number twelve wem to camp with only seven. " ! 

Nor was there any certainty that the wagons call ed out would perform their duty. In February 1778, for example, some 20 to 30 wagons 

came to camp from Northampton coullly in response to orders to the 

county wagonmaster. They made one trip for provisions to the Head of 

Elk and then the wagoners deserted , losing severa l horses and d rivers in 

their efforts to get away across the Schuylkill. About the same time, a 

n umber of coumy wagons coming from Lancaster wit h flour " laid down 

their loads on the Horse Shoe road," and went home. on 

WashingtOn did not know whether it was the execution of the law 

or some other fa ctOr that hampered wagon suppl y, but, disappointed in 

getting wagons to transport suppl ies to camp, he sent Deputy Quarter· 

master General Lutterloh to confer with the Council in order that they 

might uncover the reason for " the great Delay and Backwardness of the 

People in forwarding Supplies and affordi ng the Means of Transporta. 

tion." IU The Pennsylvani a Council mailllained that it had always 

will ingly cooperated with the Quartermaster's Department. Transporta· 

tion difficulties, it claimed, stemmed not from any fault in the law but 

fTom the failure of the Department to pay for the wagon service it 

obta ined. T he Departmem made promises but when the time came 

for payment, the wagon owners rece ived only certificates, paper promises 

of payment at some future date. Moreover, the price set by Congress for 

the hire of a wagon was too low, and the Pennsylvania Council intimated 

that transportation would be improved if Congress ra ised the price 

allowed from 30 shillings to 45 or 50 shillings a day. III 

Added to this were other d ifficulti es. T he Deputy Quartermaster 

General at La ncaster reported that he was hampered in getting teams 

" " Ibid., 1st ser, VI. 524-25 (George Ross, deputy quartermaste:r gc:ne:ra.1 to Col. Gibson, 

2 Mar 1778), 

"' (1) Ibid" lst ser, VI, 520 (Chaloner 10 James Young. state: wagonmaste:r gc:ne:ra.l, 2 Mar 

1778): 521-22 (Chaloncr 10 Biddle. 26 Feb 1778). (2) Washington I'apen, yol. 68. f. 125 (Biddle: 

to Lt. Col. Jolin Laure:ns. 5 Mar 1778) . 

• " IVrifillgJ of IVlIShirrgtoll , ed. Fit7.plll rick. XI. 45-48 (To Whuton, 7 Mar 1778) . 

... (I) PemrsyilM";" Archivts, 1st ser. VI. 116-17 (Wharton to Delegates in Cong.-cu. 2Q alld 

26 Dec 1777); 352- 55 (I'a. Council to Lutlerloh . 10 ~hr 1778). (2) Washington Papers. yo1. fi9 , 

r . .015 (Lutterloh to Washington. 10 Mar 1778). 
36 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

because so many were being employed by the militia. Even more damaging was the effect that the law governing militia service had upon his 

ability to gel wagoners. The lauer offered to furnish their teams and 

go out on a 2-month tour of duty with the Continental Army provided 

they could be excused from their militia service. Otherwise, if they 

failed to appear when ca ll ed to duty they were subject to fines in the 

amount of their substitute money. l18 

Possibly if Mifflin had remai ned on duty and given the Department 

close supervision, transportation would not have failed so miserably. 

Ever since the wi nter of 1776-77, however, Mifflin had been in Philadelphia. At fi rst he had been detained by congressional efforts to reorganize his Department and he had prolonged his stay to put (he new plan 

into operation. Then, on the eve of the campaign, he had remained in 

Philadelphia at the request of Congress in order to stimulate recruitment 

as he had in the previous year. When he did return to camp, Washington, convinced that the British were about to move on Philadelphia, 

immediately sent him back to that city to remove stores and to "use 

his utmost endeavours to carry the designed opposition into effect." 111 

Washington was torn between his desire to have his Quartermaster Genera l a( Headquarters and the need to utilize Mifltin's talent for recruiting 

troops. Since M ifltin in the ead y weeks of the campaign was obeying 

the orders of Washington and those of Congress, he could not be justifiably accused of neglecting his Quartermaster duties. 

There is more reason to hold him accountable for the d istress of the 

Army in the closing months of the campaign and during the winter 

encampment at Vall ey Forge. On 8 October, Mifflin. distressed by the 

defeats of the American Army, by British occupation of Philadelphia. 

and by the Hight of the Continental Congress to York, pleaded ill health 

and submitted his resignaLion to Congress both as Quartermaster General 

and as a major general of the Army.'" He sent no notice to Washington 

blll retired to his home in Reading where society that wimer was gay 

and agreeable even if the enemy was in possession of Philadelphia. 

There he rema ined. "a chief out of war, compla ining, though not ill, 

considerably malcontent," brooding over his loss of favor at Headquarters 

and his failure to achieve his ambition of a separate command.no 

Congress was as neglectful of the Quartermaster's Department and 

the Army as Mifltin was in the winter of 1777- 78. For a month it took 

II. P""mylvll";1l Archillt:s, hI SCI'. VI. 69--70 (Ross 10 Col. Thos. Jones, 6 Dec 1771). 

'" Wrilings of lVashillglOlI. ed. Fillpatrick. VI II. 145 (fo MifHin. 31 May 1771): 293-95 

[To Reed, 23 Jun 1777). 

"" Papers of the Continental Congress, item 161, f. 16-18 (Mifflin 10 Hancock). 

""Aleunder Graydon , M( moir. Ilf Il Uf" (Harrisburgh, 1811).278; 282. 
THE ORIGINS OF QUARTERMASTER SUPPLY, 1775- 1778 37 

no action on his resignation. Not until 7 November did it accept his 

resignation as Quartermaster General. At the same lime, however. since 

Miffiin's friends in Congress were averse to losing his valuable services, 

Congress appointed him lO the Board of War, permitting him to retain 

his rank and commission though not his pay as major ge nera .'~/j Much 

graLificd by this action, Mimin proposed waiting on Congress for orders 

as soon as it had made arrangements for the Quartermaster's Department 

so that he could leave Reading "with out injury to the service." HI 

But on 8 November, Congress shunted considera tion of the vital 

question of choosi ng a new Quartermaster General into the indefinite 

future by adopting a resolution that Mimin, notwithstand ing the acceptance o[ his resignation as Quartermaster General, shou ld continue to 

carry out the functions of that office until a new appointee was named. U2 

Four mOlllhs passed before Congress made slIch an appo intment. Forgeuing about " injury to the servi ce," Mifflin did not atlend to the duties 

of the Department; instead he let Lulterloh know that he could "now 

take the whole" upon himself. 1U He had no funds to prepare for 

another campaign and he warned his deputy that he wou ld have nothing 

to do with the Department except to settle his accounts. Colonel 

Lutterl oh and h is subordinales at Headquarters tried lO keep the Department functioning, but Washington was obliged to act as his own Quartermaster General as he of len had during the campaign of 1777.''' Mifflin's 

neglect of Quartermaster d uties and Congress' delay in tak ing action 

led to the gross confusion in th e Quartermaster's Department that contributed to much of the suffering at Valley Forge in the winter of 1777-78. 

,. Jourullis of 01(: COllli" u/ol COIIgrl!'ss, IX . 8H. 

' O! Richard H. Lee, Ml!'moir o/I/I~ I.ifl!! 0/ Ukl,ol'd HI'''')' LeI!! (2 \'ols .. I'hiladelphia. 1825). 

II . I,. (Miffl in 10 Lee. 12 Nov 1777). 

,tI Jounml! of "lil l!! COII/ilII!!U/1I1 COl/gun, IX . 882. 

''' ''apers of the Continental Congrcu. ilem 192. f. 217- 19 (Anthony Butler to Luuerloh. 

17 Jan 1778). 

'"'George W. Greene. Til l!' Lifl!! of Nfllilrmotri Grl!!l!!lI ~vo s .. New York, 1871). II. 49. 
SARATOGA 

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CHAPTER II 

The Impact of Inflation 

Administmlive Developme11ts, 1778 

"No Man, in my opinion," protested General Washington at Valley 

Forge. "ever had his measures morc impeded than I have, by every departmem of the Army." I After months of delay in attacking the problem 

of reorgan izing the suppl y depanmems, Congress responded by sending 

a committee to camp ead y in Jan uary 1778." Two weeks lalcr, the commiuce members informed Congress (hat unless the Quartermaster's 

Department was administered " by very superior abilities. but liul e can 

be expected from our Exertions during the next Campaign." T hey at 

first suggested Maj. Gen. Philip Schuyler as a suitable chief for the 

Department, and, questioning the ability of William Buchanan as Commissa ry General of Purchases. they recommended his remova l and the 

appoi ntment of Jeremiah Wadsworth to that post.' 

Meanwhile. Congress, siuing at York, had been listening to a favorable report by the Board of War on a plan submitted by Mifflin for a 

better org-.mization of the QuartermaSler's Department. Out of his 

experience. he had proposed dividi ng the Department into military and 

civil branches, with the duties of the military branch being discharged 

by the Quartermaster General and those of the civil branch divided 

among three officers- a commissary of forage, a commissary for horses 

and wagons, and an agent for the purchase of lentS, tools, and other 

supplies. T he estimates and orders of the Quartermaster General or 

the Board of War were to govern the purchases made by these three 

officers. Congress adopted th is plan on 5 February 1778. 4 

Almost a month had elapsed since the committee at camp had been 

appointed and its members, concluding that their lettcr of recommendations had miscarried, again wrote to Congress stressing the urgent need 

for action. Although alarlllcd over the delay in bringing relief to the 

troops at Valley Forge, Congress waited another week after the receipt 

I Writi"gJ of IYlUlli"g/(m. ed. filll);llrick. X, 194 (To Pra. of Congress. 23 De<: 1777) . 

• JOI.,.",I, of t"~ COflli,,~"'nl Co"gr~.lJ. X. 39-10, 41 (10 and 12 Jan 1778). 

' RG II. I'apen of IhC Continental Congress. item 33. f. 71. 75 (To I'ra. of Congress. 28 

~nd 29 J~n 1778). National Arc:hiva . 

• J(llInlnb 01 II,~ Co,,'i"~"'fll Co"g'~.lJ. x. 102--03. 126-27. 
40 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

of this letter before it directed the committee. acting with General Washington, to make the proper appointments in the Quartermaster's 

Department. ~ 

By that time. the committee had received a copy of the plan adopted 

on 5 February. Analysis of the plan convinced the members that it 

would not work. They tactfull y calJed attention to its shortcomings, 

particularly to the infinite confusion and controversies that would result 

from having so many co-ordinate and independent officers in onc Department. In any case, success in the coming campaign, they held, would 

depend upon the character of the men appointed and not upon paper 

systems. They therefore discarded the plan of Congress and proposed 

instead the appointment of a Quartermaster General and two assistant 

quartermasters general. 

By dint of much persuasion and appeals to patriotism, they had 

prevailed upon Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene to head the Department 

and John Cox, an eminent Philadelphia mercha nt, and Charles Pettit, 

a lawyer and accountant who had been secretary to Governor Livingston 

of New Jersey, to accept appointment as his assistants if proffered by 

Congress. T he committee at camp proposed that General Greene should 

perform the military duties of the Department and d irect all purchases 

and issues; that Cox should make all purchases and examine all stOres; 

and that Pettit should keep all accounts and all cash. To compensate 

them for their trouble, the committee allowed these three men one 

percent lIpon the money spent in the Department, to be divided as they 

agreed among themselves. Greene subsequently d ivided this commission 

equally, each man receiving one·third of one percent.

s 

I (I) !bid., X, 186 (21 .'eh 1778). (2) I'apeu of the Contincrual Congress, item 33. f. 128-29 

(Col1l1n illee to Prt"$. of Congress, 12 Feb 1778) . 

• General Greene later remarked that the emolument$ of his office were equal to his 

"utmost wishes:· and these proceeds he invested in shipping, privateering. iron manufacturing. 

and real estate. the act ual investments being handled by friends. Greene was not as &erupulous as ' Vashington in avoiding anyt hing that might provide a base for calumny, but he was 

discreet enough to clothe with se<:re<:y his business operat ions, even to the extenl of resorting to 

Ihe usc in 1779 of a code in corresponding with his business partners, Jeremiah Wadsworth 

and Barnabas Deane. Historiall5 later spe<:ulated that the company they fonned might have 

been created to sell supplies to the Army. but a more re<:elU biographer of Greene, after 

exhaustive analysis of the records found Ihat most of the company's capital was invested in 

shipping and privateering. VenlurC$ in priva teering in Revolutionary days were not unethical: 

they were in fact considered beneficial to the country as well a! profitable to the ind ividual. 

The favors Greene granted to his brother Jacob and his cousin Griffin, who were also his 

pntnen in business, are not easily dismissed even through Jacob Greene and Company received 

no more than the market price for standard quality goods sold to the Army, as far as the 

r«ords reveal. (I) For a full analysis of Greene's business ventures while Quartermauer General, see Theodore Thayer, Nniltallllt!l GruII~, Siraltgid of Iltt ,fmu iCII'1 Rrooilltiou. (New 

York, 1960). pp. 229-38. (2) "Letters of General Nathanael Green to Colonel Jeremiah Wadsworth:· mlsy/lMu;a Maga~i'l ~ of Hislory lIud Biograplty, XXII, pp. 211- 16, provides an 

example of a coded leiter. 
THE IMPACT OF INFLATION 41 

The committee conceded that to pay such a commission was a temptation to speculation and should, in general, be avoided. It resorted to 

this method, however, because it was impossible to provide an adequate 

salary without creating fresh difficulties, since every other officer would 

expect a similar increase in pay. Only on the terms outlined and provided he was not deprived of his rank of major general in the line was 

General Greene will ing to accept the burdensome and thankless appointment. 1 With time running out and preparation still to be made for 

the approaching campaign of 1778, Congress had no alternative but to 

adopt the anangemcnts proposed by iu committee and it appointed the 

three men to office.s 

Aside from the creation of the two assistant~hips to the Quartermaster 

General and the elimination of divisional deputy quartermasters general, 

there were no other changes in the Department's organization. The 

subordinate departments for handling forage and wagons were retained. 

Clement Biddle continued to head the forage department, but, Wagonmaster Genera l Thornsbury having resigned about the same time as 

M ifflin, James Thompson had been temporarily appointed to that post 

on 22 December 1777 . Greene permanently assigned him to that office 

when he became Quartermaster General. Greene had no intention of 

dismissing deputies who had worked for Mifflin. As long as their conduct 

manifested their fitness for employment, he proposed to continue them 

in their respective districts. Most of them remained at their posts, 

although Hugh Hughes refused to serve under him. Such continuity 

of personnel in the Department prevented the complete disruption of 

supply channels. 

In view of Washington's assertion in December that the Army 

would have to "starve, dissolve, or disperse, in order to obtain subsistence," procurement of food for the troops at Valley Forge was the 

immediate need to which both Congress, through its Board of War, and 

the Pennsylvania assembly addressed their attention. ~ Their uncoordinated efforts promoted confusion, but gradua ll y the supply situation 

improved. Quartermaster General Greene's administration of his Department was vigorous, and the response of the states to Washington's 

appeals assisted materially, as did the beginning of milder weather that 

permitted wagoners to drive their teams and wagons to camp fully loaded 

with provisions. By April, the Army was fairly well supplied with beef, 

bread, and flour.tO 

T Papers of the Continental Congress, item 33, f. 187- 95 (To Pres. or Congress. 25 Feb 1778) . 

• JOUfflals of Ihe Conlinefllal COflgre5s, *. 210--1 1 (2 Mar 1778). 

· Wrili"gs of Was/rillgIOIl, ed. Fitzpatrick, X. 192-93 (To Pres. of Congress. 23 Dec 1777). 

,. Ephraim Blaine Letter 8ook. 1777-78 (Chaloner tQ, Uuchanan, 5 Apr 1778). Manuscript 

Di" .. Library of Congress. 
42 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

By that time, too, Congress had effected a reorganization of the 

Commissary Department. The regu latory plan of 1777 had long been 

under attack, but it was not until the end of thal year that its advocates 

finally gave up, "after distressing the Army, Congress, and the Continent 

with it for six or eight Months," 1\ In January 1778, Congress appointed 

a Committee to revise the system. Though it contemplated no alteration 

of the Issuing Department, Congress was now ready to remove Buchanan 

and rescind the 1777 regulation govern ing the Purchasing Department. 

Buchanan saved the members the necessity of removing him by resigning 

on 20 March 1778. 12 Many would have preferred the reappointment of 

Joseph Trumbull, but, failing that, the committee endorsed Jeremiah 

Wadsworth for the office. Earl y in February, Congress invited him to 

attend that he might be consulted on proposed amendments.a 

Unfortunately, that invitation apparem ly wem astray for it was not 

umil the end of March that Wadsworth came to York to consider the 

regulatory plan that Congress had in the meantime been drafting. As 

adopted on 14 April, the plan incorporated most of the suggestions that 

Trumbull had made in the summer of 1777. Congress vested full 

authority in the Commissary General of Purchases to appoint and remove 

any officer in his Department and to assign to the purchasing commis· 

saries specfic districts to which they were confined in making their 

purchases. To make these posts attractive to competent men, Congress 

provided for a commission of 2 percent, payable to purchasing commissaries on all money th ey disbursed. It allowed a commission of M! percent 

to the Commissary Genera l of Purchases on all sums paid by him to his 

deputy commissaries in their respective districts. Though the Commis· 

sary General was no longer obliged to reside at the place where Congress 

was in session, he did maintain an office there and made periodic reports 

to Congress." 

Congress appointed Wadsworth to the office on 9 April 1778. With 

some satisfaction, James Lovell, delegate from Massachusetts, informed 

Samuel Adams: 

We have got Col. Wadsworth at the Head of the Commissariate unfettered 

strictly so. Had the same steps as now been taken with Trumbull a year 

ago amazing Sums would have been saved . .. Let us look lanyard with 

hope.u 

"L~II~rs of Members of Ih~ COfllin.mlal Cougreu, ed. Burnell, Ill, 76 (Gerry to Samuel 

Adams, 7 Feb 1778). 

" Papers of lhe Cominental Congress. item 78, II. f. 411 (Buchanan to Pres. of Congrcu. 

20 Mar 1778) . 

.. lou",ols of Ihe COllti"e"la/ Co"greu, X, 51 (14 Jan 1778); 141 (9 Feb 1778). 

"Ibid., X, 34~8 (1-4 Apr 1778). 

"(1) Letlers of mb~rs of tlHr Coulj"e"la/ Co"gress, ed. BUTliett. III, 175 (19 Apr 1778). 

(2) loun.o/s of the Co"tineJlto/ Co"grtsS, X, 327-28 (9 Apr 1778). 
THE IMPACT OF INFLATION 43 

Wadsworth had a greater degree of comrol over his Department than 

had been granted to Buchanan. but, except for some adjustments in 

district boundaries, he made practically no change in organization or 

personnel. William Ay lett remained deputy comm issary general of purchases in the Southern Department as Ephraim Blaine did in the Middle 

Depa rtment. Jacob Cuyler continued to direct commissa ry purchases in 

th e Nort hern Department, and I)cter Colt and Henry Champion, who 

supervised cattle purchases in New England, weTe retained in the Eastern 

Department. 

Having abandoned its prev iolls measures for reorganizing these two 

suppl y departments. Congress was inclined, during most of 1778, to let 

Wadsworth and Greene work out the problems of their respective Departments without interference. Congress was also apparently willing 

to let the Clothing Department stumble along under the inept directions 

of Mease. It took no action to l'emove him despite Washington's 

demands for an investigation of th ~ Department in April and his denuncia tion of Mease in August as unfit for the post he occupied _'1 Acting on 

the General's pl ea for a bener regulation of the Clothing Department, 

a committee brought in a report recommending that the states in the 

future make provision fOT clothing their Tespective quotas of troops in 

lhe Continental ATmy, and that a court of inquiTY investigate the conduct 

of Mease and his agents,l1 But with a leisureliness chaTacteTistic of the 

time, Congress postponed consideration of the report until the fall when 

it was referred to still another committee that submitted a Slightly 

modified report. ' 8 There is no evidence that Congress ever acted upon 

it, and Mease reluctantly remained in office until a successor could be 

appointed.'· The arrival of numerous cargoes of clothing in the spring 

of 1778, however, had prompted Congress to limit the Clothier Ge neral's 

power to purchase by d irecting a sllspension of all further purchases of 

clothing on account of the United States by Mease or his agents. At 

the same time. it had directed that the states suppl y their respective 

quotas of troops with shoes, stockings, and shirts. Congress also directed 

the Board of War LO purcha se these items for the Continental ATmy until 

the Clothing Department was properly reorganized,to Because of the 

arrival of clothing from abroad and the initiative assumed by the Board 

of WaT, the clothing supply situation was much improved despite can· 

.. Writi"gs of Wnslli"gto" , ed, Fillpatrick. XI. 240; XII, 278-79 (1'0 I'res. of Congress. 

10 Apr and 1 Aug 1778). 

"Jourml/s 0/ tlu~ Co"t;,umtnl Co.'grI'U, XI, 8 12- 15 (19 Aug 1778), 

"Ibid., XI. 996-97 (9 0<:1 1778), 

"(I ) I bid .• XII, 937 (21 Sep 1778). (2) Papen of the Cont inetllal Congres.., item 78, XV, 

r. !l81 (Mease to Laurens, 19 Sep 1778), 

• J our"lIl, of tilt! COl1til1wtlll Co" grI'SS, XI. 517, 515~6 (21 and 28 May 1778), 
44 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

gressionai delay in reorgani zing the Clothing Department and appointing 

a new Clothi er Genera l. 

ImlnQvement m Sup/Jiy 

Fundamental to improvement in suppl y genera ll y was the provision 

of adequate transportalion fa cilities. Quartermaster Genera l Greene immediately applied himself to this probl em upon assumi ng the duLies of 

h is office on 23 March 1778. By that lime it was becoming increasingly 

evident that the British intended to evacuate Philadelphia. In preparation for the reinforcements arriving at Va ll ey Forge for the coming 

campaign- Washington had a large army of 11 ,000 to 12,000 men when 

the troops marched from Va ll ey Forge-stores deposited in magazines 

had to be increased. Greene needed a large number of wagons, teams, 

and drivers to transport such supplies along the lines of commu nications. 

He also required a sufficient number of them to permit the Army to take 

the field with its baggage, ammunition, tools, equipment, and supplies. 

In addition, be had to provide an adequate supply of forage for the 

an imals used in such transportation as well as for the artillery and rid ing 

horses. 

To haul food and forage along the supply lines, Wash ington and 

Greene sent out appea ls for wagons not on ly to Pennsylvania, where 

operations were centered, but also to Maryland and New J ersey. Greene 

directed the deputy q uartermaster general stationed at the Head of Elk 

to purchase, hire, or impress teams in order that provisions might move 

from there to camp.21 Greene developed no new procedures for pro· 

curi ng wagons and teams, but he sought re lief from hampering restric· 

tions. He visited the Pennsylva nia legislature at Lancaster, proposing 

amendments to the stale's wagon law. He also ind uced President 

Wharton to agree to instruct county lieutenan ts to exempt from militia 

fi nes such individ uals as were employed by the Army and could produce 

certificates to that effect.u Pennsylvania authorities had occasionall y 

used this procedure in the past. Greene also suppl emented land trans· 

portation with water carriage on the Schu ylkill until the water level fell 

so low in mid·May that naviga tion became obstructed. 

To provide transportation organ ic to the Army, Greene built upon 

the foundation laid by Mimin. The latter had established a wagon 

.. (I) PeIlIlS)'/vallia Archives, 1st ser. VI. %6-67 (Pett it to Vice Pres. Geo. Bryan. 17 Mar 

1778). (2) W ritings of W"shing/o", ed. Fitzpatrick. XI, 125- 24 (To Gov. T homas J ohnson . 

2 1 Mar 1778). (5) Greene. Ule of Nathanael Gru ne, II. !is-56 (To Washington. 26 Mar 1778): 

61 n'o Hollingsworth, 7 Apr 1778). 

" (I) Writings of Washington, ed. Fitzpatrick, XI. 24 1-42 (To Pres. Thomas Wharton. 10 

Apr 1778). (2) Pennsylv"nia Archives, hI rer. VI. 416 (Wharton 10 Washington. 15 Apr 1778). 
THE IMPACT OF INFLATION 45 

department, but failure to develop any regul ation for it, lack of supervision, and the resignation of Thornsbury 6 mOlllhs after his appointment 

as Wagon master Genera l had resulled in a breakdown in such transportation. As a consequence, when the committee at camp arrived at 

Valley Forge. it had reported that "almost every species of camp transportation is now performed by men, who without a murmur, patientl y 

yoke themselves to littl e carriages of their own making. or load their 

wood and provisions on their backs." 21 Deputy Qua rtermaster General 

Lutterl oh had tried to direct the wagon service, but the neglect of teams 

and wagons exhibited by soldiers detailed from the line. as well as the 

uUcr carelessness of civilian wagoners, had led him to advocate enlistment 

of wagoners for the duration of the war.t4 

Greene undoubtedl y appreciated the need for such enlistment, blll 

his immediate objective, with the campaign only weeks away, was to 

procure new wagons, repair old ones, and enlist wagoners on the best 

terms that he could. His Wagon master Genera l, James Thompson, was 

an able man who enlisted wagoners from various parts of the coun try, 

red uced the number of soldiers detail ed from the line as wagoners, and 

in the course of the campaign made some progress in improving the care 

of horses and wagons. At the end of the campaign, he, tOO, recommended 

enlistment of wagoners for the duration of the war and. in addition, 

proposed granting them the same bounty offered to soldiers as an ind uce· 

ment to enlist. Greene was unsuccesshll in his efforts to obtain favorable 

congressional action, and for the duration of the war short-term enlistments for wagoners remained the established policy. Yet so we ll had 

Greene succeeded in providing transportation duri ng the campaign of 

1778 that Washington praised him for the "great facility" with which he 

had enabled the Army and its baggage to move from Valley Forge in 

pursuit of the enemy and, after the battle of Monmouth. to march to 

the Highlands of the Hudson. 1S 

H is success must be attributed in large measure to the efficiency of 

Clement Biddle as Commissary General of Forage. Once again, Greene 

built upon a basis established by Mifflin. The latter had created a forage 

department but. by reason of his continued absence from camp. had 

.. Pape" of lhe Continenta l Congress, item ~. f. 128-29 (To Pres. of Congress, 12 Feb 

1778) . 

.. WlUhington Papen, vol. 63, f. 117 (Lutterloh , Remarks on wagon department. 25 Dee 

1717). Manuscript Div .. Library of Congress . 

.. (I) Writings 0/ WlUhinglon, ed. Fiup;iluick. XII, 'J.77 (To I>res. of Congreu, 3 Aug 1778). 

(2) Leu e" to and from Major.General Nathanael Greene, Quartemluter-General, IV, f. 100 

(Thompson to Green(!, 24 Feb 1779). American I>hilosophical Society. Hereafter briefl y cited 

as Greene Lellers. (3) ]ou mnls of tilt CO.lliflt ulnl Congress, XIII, '20-21 (16 Mar 1779); ~67

68 (17 Apr 1779). 
46 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

fa iled to develop it into an effective agency. Under Mifflin, Biddle's 

procurement activiti es had been strictl y limited to th e environs of H ead· 

quarters and he had esta blished magazines as directed by the Quartermaster Genera l. BUl since Miffiin resigned a few months after Biddle 

became Commissary General of Forage, the latte r had received little or 

no direction from him. During the wi nter of 1777-78, Biddle had tried 

to exe rcise a grea ter degree of control but had fai led because he had no 

authority over the many other purchasers of forage. 

Ever since 1776, when the war shifted from New England to New 

York and the chief British base became located at New York City. the 

Continental Army, on the defensive. had been moving along a line 

extending from th e Highl ands of the Hudson through New Jersey to 

the Head of Elk on Chesapeake Bay. Early in 1778, Biddle proposed 

to establish a chain of fo rage magazines of varyi ng sizt's along that line 

of cOllllllunications to sustain military opl';.rat ons. ~· H e also suggested 

th e amount of forage that would have to be accumulated, the personnel 

req uired to operate the magazines, and the records needed to alford a 

knDlvledge of stocks on hand. Greene st udied the plan, approved it, 

and, in consultation with Washington, perfected th e work ing of the lines 

of communications. 

'Within a week, after designating the general outline of the chain 

of magazi nes, he indicated that 200,000 bushels of gra in would be 

req uired on th e Delaware River: 200,000 at the H ead of Elk and th e 

intermediate posts 10 camp: 100,000 on the line of communications from 

the Susquehanna to the Schu ylkill River, from Readi ng through Lancaster to Wright's Ferry; 100,000 from the Delaware to the North River; 

and 40,000 bushels around Trenton. These magazines were to be "tolerably high up" th e river for security aga inst British men-of-war.n Biddle, 

who was now to direct the purchase of all forage for Ihe Army, lost no 

time in establishing magazi nes, in drafting instructions to his purchasing 

agents, and in issuing ml es to govern forage masters at magazi nes in the 

receipt and issue of forage.:' For the first time, a systematized procedure 

was introduced for supplying the Army with forage. 

While Greene was improving th e mea ns of transportation, Wadsworth was infusing new vigor into the Commissary Department. and. in 

preparation for the Army's movement, llIaine, his deputy in the Middle 

Department, was storing provisions in magazines along the familiar route 

• Papers of the Continental Congrt$$, ilem 155. I, r. 375-77 (Plan. 9 Mar 1778) . 

.. (I) Greene:, Li/~ 01 N/llhtWflttl G~Ufl~, II, 57-58 (Greene 10 Biddl e:. 50 Mar 1778). (2) 

1I' ~;l ilt gr o/ ll'asil;lt8'0fl , ed. Filtpatrick, XI, 177 (To Grcene,!l1 robr 1778) . 

.. Leller Books of Hugh Hughes (Riddle to Hughes and enclosures, 22 Apr (778). New 

York HiSTorical Socicty. 
T H E IMPACT O F INFLATION 47 

leading from Valley Forge via Coryell 's Ferry. Boundbrook, and Morristown LO the North River. I

' \Vadswonh found it unnecessary to make 

any changes in the supply procedu res originally deve loped in the Commissary Department by J oseph T rumbull. His problems were those of 

building Lip magazines, meeting sudden demands (or provisions, and 

combating practices that led to competition in the procurement of 

subsistence. 

T he Newport expedition in the summer of 1778. for example, 

brought a sudden demand for large quantities of provisions for the land 

and sea forces of the America n Army and the French Heel that were 

coopera ting in that venture. h produced a tempora ry shortage of some 

commodities. Flour was especiall y scarce in the New England area, but 

Wadsworth's effon s to take advantage of the presence o( the French fleet 

to ship flour from Virginia by sea werc thwarted by congressional delays. 

By the limc Congress got around to authorizing procurement, the Newpa n expedition had failed and the French fleet had sailed for Boston to 

refi t. Wadsworth had to abandon the pl an to ship flour by sa iling vessels 

as tOO dangerous. Instead, he deposited Aour at magazines on the inland 

line of communication [rom Fredericksburg, via New York City, to 

Boston, the supplies being tra nsported there at far grea ter expense by 

wagons fTom Pennsylvania." 

This first joint all ied operation at Newport produced results that 

were unfavorable to smooth commissary operations. T he intendant of 

the French fleet, unwilling to depend upon the American Commissary 

Department for his supplies, entered illlo his own contractual arrangements. The higher prices he offered handicapped the American commissaries in their efforts to provision the all ied force. Maj. Gen. John 

Sulli van, commanding the American forces, was equall y guilty of hampering the commissaries for he, tOO, purchased suppli es through his own 

agen ts because he fea red sufficielll provisions would not be made 

ava ilable." 

The net effect 

spiraling upwards. 

of these competitive practices was to send prices 

The arri val of the French fleet had helped unleash 

• w,·i/i"g.l of Washiltgtml, ed. Fitzpatrick, XI , 408 (To Blaine, 17 May 1178). 

-(I) I'apen of the Continental Congress, item 78, XXIII, f. 51!!' (Wadsworth to Blaine, 

23 Jut 1778); f. 557 (Wadsworth to Laurens, 24 Aug 1778). (2) ] ounlalJ oj /l,e Co"lillenlnl 

COl/grus, XI. 83 l (24 Aug 1778), (3) WritingJ 0/ Wasit;flgtOIt, ed Fitl patrick, XII, 490 (To 

I'rcs. of Congrns, 23 Sep 1778) . 

• (I> J ohnson, T he Aamiuislration 0/ the American CommiUllrial Dllring tile RevolutiQl'''')' lVar, 148-49. (2) W ritiugs 01 IVQJllillgton, 00. Fitzpatrick, XIII, 277- 78 (To Sullivan , 

18 Nov 1778). (3) O. G. Hammond, " Letten alld I'apen of Sullivan," CollectionJ 01 New 

H"mpshire fliJtoricnl Society. XIV, vol. II, 2!1' (Peter Colt to Su llivan, 6 Nov 1778): ~26-4 8 

(Sulliva n \0 Colt , 10 Nov 1778); ~"3-4 44 : H 6-<l47 (Sulliu n to Wu hillgton , 25 and 27 Nov 

1778). (4) Wu hingtOIl Papcn. vol. 100. f. 87 (Wadsworth to WashingtOIl, 15 Mar 1779). 
48 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T H E ARMY 

a wave of profiteering and everywhere Wadsworth found prices Steadily 

riSIng. Througholll Virginia and Maryland, engrossers werc busy buying 

flour, and, since they had ready money to pay (or their purchases, no 

commissary could compefe with them.

U Despite the reluctance of [armers to exchange their products for a deprecia ting clirrency, Wadsworth's 

efforts made food ava ilabl e to the Army, and the winter of 1778- 79 

brought none of the extremes of hardship that had been suffered by the 

troops at Valley Forge. 

Impact of SjJimiing P,-ices 

Preparations for the campaign of 1778 had required the expenditure 

of considerable sums of money. yet Greene had not been furnished with 

any sizable amoum until May, and bOlh the Commissary and Quartermaster's Departments had been compell ed, much to their disadvantage, 

to opera te on credit. By June, Greene had drawn upon the Treaslll)' 

for almost four million dolla rs, yet it was "but a breakfast for the 

department, and ha rd ly that." U As prices for supplies and services 

continued to rise, he became thoroughl y ala rmed. Upon a visit to Bonon 

in the fall of 1778, he found hay brought $60 to $80 a ton; corn sold 

for $10 a bushel; oa ts were priced at $4 a bushel; and carting cost 9 

shillings per mil e by the ton, and even that price satisfied no one. If the 

extravagance of the peopl e was not checked, he inFormed Washington, 

"there are no funds in the universe that will equal the expense. " H 

As prices soared and expenditures in the suppl y departments 

mounted, criticism o[ the Commissary and Quartermaster's Departments, 

that had subsided when 'Vadsworth and Greene were appointed earl y in 

1778, began to grow in vol ume. Berore the end of the year, Congress 

decided that more vigorous measures were necessary for their regulation. 

and it appoil1led a committee of three to superintend them. With some 

changes in personne l, that commiuee carried out its functions ror a 

litll e more than a year when its d uties were taken over by the Board 

of War. BS Other committees were also appointed during 1779 to promote 

reform in one phase or another of the activities of the suppl y departments, 

for in that year there aga in was no dearth of reforming zeal. 

• Papers of fhe Coluinental Congress, ite:m 78, XXIII, f. 561, 5(;9 (Wadsworlh 10 Laure:ns, 

6 and 29 Sc:p 1778) . 

• Greene:. Life 01 Nllilrafilld Grufle, II, 82-83 (To Gouve:rneur Morris, I Jun 1778). 

" I bid., II, 143 (16 Sc:p 1778) . 

.. Journa ls 01 tire COlllillell/111 COlIgras, XII, 11 1 .... 15 (10 Nov 1778); XV, 1512 (25 Nov 

1779). 
THE IMPACT OF I NFLATION 49 

R em"gal1izalioll of Clothing D et)arlmenl 

One result of that spirit was a tardy reorgan ization of the Clothing 

Department. Late in 1778, Congress SCnt a committee to camp to confer 

with Washington on Army problems in general. He seized that opportunity to review the problem of clothing suppl y and to reiterate views 

that he had been ex pressing for the past year. Although Congress would 

have to decide on the method for effecting a regular and constant flow 

of clothing. Washington thought it could be best achieved by relying on 

governmental contracts with France because he believed that only the 

united funds and credit of the ContinClllal Congress were sufficiently 

large for purchasing all the clothing needed. If procurement was left to 

the states alone, they would depend on private mercantile contracts and 

the clothing suppl y would be inadequate. But whether the Continental 

Congress or each of the states undertook to purchase clothing for the 

tfOOPS, Washington thought a definite organization, consisting of a 

clothier general, Slate clothiers, and regimental clothiers, was essentia l 

for handling distribUlion.38 

The commiuee passed his ideas along to Congress. When that 

body delayed acting for almost 2 months, Washington urged Congress 

to dec ide on a substitute measure if it could not approve his plan. T he 

Clothing Department would have to be reorganized, he insisted, since 

nothing but loss and discontent resu lted under the existing management, 

Enlarging on his difficulties, he pointed out that. on the one hand, 

considerable quantities of clothing were being imported. of which the 

Army gOt no share because they fell into the hands of private buyers. On 

the other, through inadequate supervision quantities of clothing were 

"wasting and rotting in different parts of the country." knowledge of 

which reached him only by chance, Meanwhile, the Army remained, 

as always, half naked." 

On 23 March 1779. Congress enacted an ordinance for regulating the 

Clothing Department that followed Washington's ideas on organizati on. 

Congress appointed the Clothier Ceneral, who was subject to the orders 

of the Board of War and the commander-in-chief. The states appointed 

Sta le clothiers. Handicapped by lack of fu nds, Congress made no provision for any central ized control of purchases but provided that all 

procurement was to be accomplished by the Board of War or by the 

states through their respective agems. Both would buy for the account 

of the Continental Congress, the Board of War for the Army generally; 

.. W riliflgs of 11//lslliugtou, cd. Fitzpatrick, XIV, 55-42 ( 1'0 Commi!!ee of Conferen ce, 

25 Jan 1779) . 

.. Ibid., XIV. 244-45 (1'0 Pres. of Congress, 15 Mar 1779). 
.' ) r 

~ 

CONTI NENTAL INFANTRY, 1778- 1783 
THE IMPACT OF INFLATION 5 1 

the sta tes for their respective troops. All cloth ing imported from abroad, 

charged to the account of lhe ContinclHal Congress, and all purchased 

by its agents in the Un ited States was to be turned over to the Clothier 

General. Of these supplies, each stale clothier was to receive that proportion assigned for the usc of the troops of his state, together with a ll 

clothing purchased by his state.u 

Althol;,gh Congress adopted the plan in March, its execution was 

delayed for 4 months because Congress failed to appoint a Clothier 

Ceneral immediately. It was not until 24 July, after two other candidates had declined serving. that it!! third appointee. James Wilkinson. 

accepted the post.n In instructing Wilkinson on preparations for the 

approach ing wi nter months, Washington expressed the hope that the 

lauer would soon "put ma lleI'S in a proper train" and would spend as 

milch time with the Army as was "consislent with the grea t Objects of 

your appointment." ·o Alas for Washington's hopes; they died wilhin 

2 months. By that time he was informing Maj. Gen. 'William Heath 

that "I am again red uced to the necessity of acting the part of Clothier 

Genera l." U Wilkinson was more often absent than present at Head· 

quaners, though he did retain at camp, to supervise the issue of clothing 

to the Army, an assistant , J ohn Moylan, brother of the former Quartermaster General. The steady and regular Row of supplies that \Vashington 

had hoped to see established did not materialize because the states 

depended on the Continental Congress and the Continental Congress 

depended upon the sta tes. 

W ilkinson had also been made responsible for supervisi ng the commissaries in the Hide Department. In lieu of a single Commissary of 

Hides, the Board of War had recommended and Congress had adopted 

a plan for appointing a commissary in each state or group of states where 

the business of the Hide Department required one. George Ewi ng 

having resigned as Commissary of Hides on 20 April 1779, the Board 

of War appointed under the new plan fi ve commissari es of hidesWilliam Henry. whose district included Pennsylvania, Maryland, and 

Delaware ; John Mehelm for New Jersey; Moses Hatfield for New York ; 

Raben Lamb for Massachusetts: and George Starr for Connecticut,u 

These commissaries were to be allowed as many assista nts and clerks as 

the Board of War thought necessary to accomplish their business of 

• j ourtrnlJ o/1I1t1 COlllillen/(J/ Co"..:rtlU, XIII. ~53--57 (2' Mar 1779). 

-Ibid., X IV, 844. 

- lI'ritill8J 0/ 1V.u1l ;"8tOIl, ed . • np~lr ck. XVI. 280--82 (To Wilkinson , L' Sep 1779). 

"Ibid., XVII . 123" (18 Noy 1779). 

"(I) j ot.mals o/Ihe Contilttlll/ttl COlIgreJS. XIV, 870-7 1 (2~ Jul 1779). (2) W;uhinglon 

Papers. yol. 116. r. 59 (Richard Pelen 10 W~shinglOn, ~ Se-p 1779). 
52 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

receiving hides, converting them into tanned leather, and manufacturing 

shoes either in factories under their supervision or by contracting for the 

work. W il kinson as Clothier General consolidated a quarterly return 

from those submitted by the commissaries and sent it to the Board of 

War. He also received and distributed all shoes to the Army. He had 

no authority, however, for removing a dishonest subordinate so that when 

he uncovered irregularities in the accounts of the Commissary of Hides 

for New York, he cou ld do no more than call it to the attention of the 

Board of WarY Reorganization of the Hide Department brought little 

improvement either in the quantity or the quality of shoes made available 

to the troops. 

Cl"edit and Depreciated Cunency 

At the same time that Congress was attempting to improve the 

organization of the Clothing and Hide Departments, it also initiated 

measures for reorganizing the two major supply departments, though these 

efforts did not come to fruition until 1780. Faced with the difficult and 

perplexing problem of devising ways to restore credit, place Continental 

currency on a sound basis, and avert bankruptcy, the members of Congress, wh ile recognizing other causes, were inclined to attrib ute mounting 

war expenditures and depreciation of the currency largely to the practices 

of quartermasters and commissaries. On the floor of Congress, Elbridge 

Gerry charged that the purchasing officers had been guilty of barefaced 

frauds- that, by inducing sellers to demand higher prices, they had 

deliberately enhanced prices in order to profit through larger commissions,H Of the ubiquitous commissa:'ies and quartermasters William 

Shippen wrote: 

Only think of a two penny jack who never in his life was ca pable by any 

business he had been engage in, of mak ing a Shilling more than maintained 

his fam ily and that hut in a very so so manner shall now be making 40 or 

50,000 pr. annum and tha t by lowering the value of our Money and raising the 

prices of every Article he purchases a truth acknowledged by all and yet the 

mischief suffered to go on and increase, , ,U 

By 'the end of 1779, the value of money had fallen to a point where $30 

of Continental money had not the purchasing power of one specie dollar, 

The supply departments attributed their woes to a lack of funds, 

Assistant Quartermaster Genera l Pettit was beset on all sides by applications for money and not infrequently the deputy quartermasters general 

"Washington PapulI, vol. 124 , f. 84-86 (Wilkinson to Board of War, 4 Jan 1780) . 

.. J.ellers of IIfwlbers of lir e Conliul!"/ol Co"greSJ, cd. Burnett, IV. 215 (Henry Laurens, 

Notes of Proceedings, 17 May 1779). 

'"Ibid., IV, 282 (fo Richard Henry Lee, 22 JlIn 1779). 
T H E IMPACT OF INFLATION 53 

kept messengers waiting in h is offi ce for wee ks at a time until he had 

funds to give them. Pettit charged th at the want of " timely supplies" 

of money had greatly retarded the preparations for the campaign of 

1779, and that if they had been furn ished "in due season," they could 

have been used more effectively and would have greatly lessened the 

indebtedness of the De ar ment. ~o Commissary offi cers voiced the same 

views, for the un iversa l lack of money in that Department made Wadsworth "despair of keeping the Army alive,"" 

However will ing Congress might have been to grant the n ecessary 

funds, the T reasury was in no cond ition to furnish them in proportion 

to the demand, and there were intermi nable delays because money came 

into the Treasury so slowly. Peuit might, for exampl e, receive an order 

for several million doll ars, but the Treasury would be able to give him 

only one or two hundred thousand dollars of the amount, and tha t weeks 

aftcr he had received the order. Nor could the T reasury even then 

inform him when he might receive the rest of the money. As a consequence, Pettit lamented that the money "moulders away in dri bs," and 

that he was unable to send any deputy a sum adequate to his needs. 48 

Hard pressed by their creditors, the deputi es were much in need 

of re lief. Many of them had extended their credit to the utmost, having 

en tered into contracts, the terms of which they could not discharge when 

d ue for lack of funds. "Twenty people havc been with me this day," 

Colonel Mitchell at Philadelphia wrote, beseeching funds; "as many more 

will be at the Office before Night, and 1 have nothing to satisfy them. " 4~ 

Additional credit for the Quanermaster's Department could be ob tained 

only on terms d isadvantageous to the government, that is, by contracting 

to fix the prices of articl es purchased at the lime of payment, which made 

it to the interest of the se ll ers to ra ise prices more rapid ly than they 

would otherwise have done. All of the deputies were greatl y in deb t; 

"we are out at the Elbows evcrywherc," Pettit informed Grecne.&O 

Congrcss had granted large sums of money to both Greene and 

Wadswonh since they had assumed the d uties of their respectivc offices. 

Bul Pettit maintained that these funds were only nomi na ll y large, for 

th rough deprcciation of the currency they fell far shon of the dema,nds 

and were insufficient to "keep the machine in motion. " &1 While some 

.. (I) Creene Letters. V. f. 28 (I'ellil to Pres. of T reasury Iloard. 19 May 1779). (2) l'apers 

of Ihe Continental Congress. item 15:'. 1. f. 2:'7 (Pettit to l',-es. of Congl·ess. 17 Nov 1779). 

"Papers of the Cont inenta l Congress, item 78. V. f. 42" (Chaloncr and White 10 committee 

of Congress. 24 Nov 1779): XXIV. f. 129 (Wadsworth 10 Pres. of Congress. 24 Nov 1779). 

" Greene LeIters. VIII. f. 86 (Penit to Greene. 30 Oct 1779). 

"Ibid., IX. f. 102 (Mitchell to Pettit. \S Nov 1779). 

" 'bid. , IX, f. 96 (S-9 Nov 1779) . 

• , Papcrs of the Continental Congress, item IS5, I. f. 257 (Pettit to l'res. of Congress, 17 

Nov 1779). 
54 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

members recognized the truth of Pettit's explanation, Congress was greatly 

alarmed by the spiral ing costs. T he expenditures of both the Commissary and Quartermaster's Departments in 1776 had been $5,399,2 19; the 

following year they had increased to .$9,272,534; and in 1778 they had 

morc than quad rupled to $37,202,421. By May 1779, the committee on 

the Treasury reported that unless measures were taken to put the 

country's fi nances on a better footing, expenditures for the two departments would amount to at least $200 million in that year.u It was 

imp}"acticable to carryon the war by paper emissions at the enormous 

rate of expenditures in the supply departments, and the Treasury Board 

recommended that they be put on "a d ifferent footing with regard to the 

expenditure of public money." "8 

/11C1'eased Criticism and Theatened Resignations 

No one practice was suspected of contrib uting more to the cost cif 

the war than the payment of commissions to pu rchasing agents. Earlier 

efforts to elimi nate such payments in tbe Commissary Department had 

proved unsuccessful, but the substitution of fixed salaries for commissions 

remai ned an attractive means of reducing expenses. Even the terms 

under which the heads of the Commissary and QuartermaSter's Departments served came under review earl y in January l779. ~ Greene was 

convinced that there were "measures taken to render the business of the 

quarter masters Department odious in the Eyes of the people." U It can 

not be denied that some agen ts waxed wealthy on profits made by 

increasing prices to fatten their commissions, but the subject of commissions had undoubtedly, as Greene con tended, "been improv'd into one 

great source of jealousy and d iscontent." He main tai ned that it was a 

comparatively sma ll evil since the grea ter part of the staff officers served 

upon a sa lary basis.u Little was heard of the hardships suffered by 

sa laried quartermaster personnel in the midst of infl ation. T hey were 

paid much less than were common laborers, and yet, Greene acknowledged, much was "due to their meri t." T heir salaries had not been 

changed since they had been set by Congress in 'the summer of 1777. 

Unfortu na tely, the activity of the purchasing commissaries and quartermasters was much more evident to [he public, and it was far easier to 

blame them for depreciation than for Congress to tackle the d ifficult 

.. jourlwlJ 01 /I'e Conli"e,,/a/ Congress, XIV. 561-62 (7 May 1779) . 

.. !bid., XIV, 662 (28 May 1779) . 

.. Papers of the Continental Congress. item 173. IV, r. 119-21 (Greene to Pres. of CongTes5, 

15 Feb 1779). 

" Washington Papers, vol. 104 f. 55,123 (Greene to Washington, 22 and 26 Apr 1779) . 

.. Papers of the Continental Congress. item 17g. n , 157- 7g (Greene ( 0 Jay, 28 Jul 1779). 
THE IMPACT OF INFLATION 55 

and complex problem of evolving effective measures for restoring the 

credit of the country's currency. 

As a result of the "unmerited ab use and slander indiscriminately 

heaped on" the Commissary Depanment by every "petty scribbl er," 

Wadsworth offered his resignation in June. Greene also had threatened 

2 months earlier to "quit a business wherein I cannot please:' but 

Congress had no intention of losing the services of either man. 07 It 

unanimollsly resolved that Congress had full confidence in the integrity 

and abilities of the Quanermaster General and the Commissary General. 

The resolution mollified both men and they continued in offi ce. 

Ever since the beginning of the year Greene had expected to hear 

of a new regulatory plan for his Department, but months had gone by 

without any news. It was July 1779 before a committee for regulating 

and retrenching the expenses of the Commissary and Quartermaster's 

Departments laid before Congress an elabora te, detailed plan, to which 

Congress evidently intended giving careful study since it ordered 60 copies 

printed.'s But it was 18 October before a committee oE the whole considered th e pl an, brieAy debated it during some pan of 2 days, and then 

laid it aside. It was not mentioned again until 4 December when 

Congress passed the plan over to a new commiuee."u 

By thal lime, Greene, who had directed supply arrangements (or 

two campaigns, was eager to resign. The continuing depreciation of 

the currency handicapped supply at every turn. Contracts could not 

be made nor could credit be obtained. More agents were required to 

collect su ppli es that would have been offered willingly if money had 

been stable. The increased number of agents only added to Departmental expenses and gave rise to suspi cions that economy was not bein g 

pr.acticed. Because the Treasury had no money, current expenses could 

not be met nor coul d past debts be discharged. As a result, creditors 

were beginning to slie purchasing quanennaslers, but such suits, as 

Greene pointed out, served only to promote LOta l loss of confidence in 

the Department's officers. When it was time to begin preparing for the 

campa ign of 1780, Greene thought the moment opportune for requesting 

Congress to appoint a new Quartermaster General. Even if the emoluments were five times as large as they were supposed to be, he insisted, 

he \IIould still wish to resign, and, in December 1779, he requested that 

Congress act promptly to fill his place. oo 

., Ibid .. item 1:;[" I. r. 127-3'1 (Greene to James Duane. IG Apr 1779): item 78, XXIV, r. 410 

(Wadsworth to I' res. of Co"grC$,~. : • .I "n 1779), 

.. Journals 0/ tli ~ C(m,i" ,,tal emlgress, XIV, 872- 80 (23 Jul 1779). 

" Ibill" XV. 1186 (18 Oce): L187 (19 Oct): 1349 (4 Dec 1779) . 

.. Greene, /.ift' of Nlllitll"llel c.I' It . II, 259- 63 [fo I'res. of Congress. 12 Dec 1779). 
56 QUARTERMASTER SUl'l'ORT OF T HE ARMY 

Two months earlier, Wadsworth had also submiued his resignation.1I 

The Commissary Depanment, grea tly in de bt and always in need of 

funds. had been attempting to operate on a credit basis with increasingly 

poor resu lts. By the end of September 1779, the quantity of nour and 

bread available for the Army was so small and credit so nonexistent that 

Wadsworth had been compelled LO evolve a plan for obtaining supplies 

from New York in exchange for salt, suga r, and other foreign commodities. grea tl y needed by the people of that Slale since they had been 

deprived of the use of the ir seaport for 3 years.&! The harvest of 1779 

had been good, but, as the yea r drew to a close, supply streams were drying 

up and the magazines were being emptied because no farmer was wiJling 

to exchange his gra in and li vestock for a depreciating currency. 

Long before the winter of 1779- 80 brought a crisis in suppl y, Congress had realized that the issuc of any more paper money would have 

to be halted. In September it had resolved to limit the amount of bills 

of credit in circu lation to $200 million, to emit no more on any accoun t 

whatsoever, and to rely thereafter on state taxes and loans in order to 

prosecute the war.n Unfortunately, the stales were not prepared to tax 

themselves or to create fu nds outside of their COntrol. There was neither 

money nor credit to replenish empty magazines, yet in December the 

cry for money came from every suppl y department. "Congress are at 

their wit's end," wrotc William Ellery.so 

Hardship at Morristown 

''''hile Greene and ''''adsworth waited for replies to their resignations, 

the Army once aga in scaled in to wi nter quarters. The troops were 

cantoned about Morristown, one brigade being left at Danbury, Conn., 

and four at West Point. With the suppl y departments all but paralyzed, 

their sufferings exceeded those endured by the soldiers at Valley Forge. 

for to the distress ex perienced by the Army from want of food was added 

that resulting from the extreme severity of the weather in the winter of 

1779- 80. "Those who have onl y been in Va ll ey Forge and Middlebrook 

d uring the last two winters, but have not tasted the cruelties of this one," 

de Kalb wrote, "know nOt what it is to suffer." n His division had left 

., I'apen or Ihe Cominelual Congress. item 78. XX IV. r. 97 (fo Pres. or CongrC$S. 10 Oct 

1779). 

"(I) j OllrllfJ/S 0/ tI, ~ llfill lIfal COlIg, ~$S, xv. 1130-32 (30 Scp 1779). (2) J. fI~r:s 0/ 

lIJbt!l's 0/ fll ~ Co,,/ill lI/al Gougru s. cd. Burnell. IV, 476 Ut'SSc Root to Wadsworth. 6 Oct 

1779) . 

.. j ountall 0/11It: ",j,,~,,'al "g $S. XIV. 1013 (I Sell 1779); \052 If. (13 Sel' 1779) . 

.. L~If rl 0/ mbt:rJ a/lilt: Co"/j,,u,'a/ Co"gr~.lS, ed. Burneu.IV. 5<15 (fa GOl'. of Rhode 

h land. 21 Dec 1779) . 

• Fredrich Kapl'. Th ~ u/~ of john Kalb (New York. 1884). 183. 
THE IMPACT OF INFLATION 57 

West Point on 26 November. The march to the wi nter camp site took 

6 days and "proved fatal to ma ny of the soldiers, in consequence of the 

cold. the bad wea ther. the horrid roads, the necessity of spending the 

night in the open air, and our want o f protection against snow and rain." U 

Some 2 weeks later, James Thacher, a surgeon in the Army. march· 

ing from Danbury to Morristown, recorded: "The snow on the ground 

is abom twO feet deep and the weather extremely cold; the soldiers are 

destitme of both tents and blankets and some of them are actuall y bare· 

footed and almost naked ." R! Anived at camp, the troops lodged on 

the frozen grou nd until they could feJl oak and walnut trees from which 

to build the shanties that afforded them shelter from the worst winter in 

the memory of the oldest inhabitant. Washington urged Wilkinson. 

who was absent from camp, to bring clothing, but lack of transportation 

de layed the supplies. Even when delivery of the woolen clothing was 

made, it was short of the amount req uired and had to be prorated among 

the troops. U 

To piercing cold was added hunger. The roads became so ob· 

structed by deep snow that cattle could not travel nor wagons move to 

bring badly needed provisions. In one lO·day period the troops received 

but twO pounds of meat per ma n. Frequentl y, they were entirely without 

meat for 6 or 8 days and often lacked bread for a week at a time.u In 

the ir distress, the soldiers plundered the neighboring inhabitants. an 

evil that Washington deplored but insisted he would find increasingly 

difficult to control unless the local magistrates came to the Army's aid by 

collecting designa ted quantities of cattle and grain. His appeal obtained 

results sufficiently satisfactory so that by the last week in January he was 

able La inform Congress that the Army had been " for some days past, 

comfortable and easy on the score of provisions." 10 But this happy state 

of affairs d id not long endure; melting snows turned roads into quagmires. 

Even th ough there was some grain at distan t mil ls in New J ersey, it could 

not be transported to camp where in mid-March there was no more than 

5 days' suppl y of bread on hand for about 10,000 troops. By a scanty 

and economical issue, Washington informed Congress, the meat supply 

might be made to last ulHil about the end of April. Unfortunately, the 

silllation was more desperate than he knew. The iSSU ing commissary 

had miscalculated his supplies, basing his estimate on the number of 

- I bi(/., 182, 

"'" Thacher. Mili/a,·y JOI/nUl/ 0/ Ih e Aml'rir.all RnlO/ul iou, ISO . 

• IVriliu/{$ 0/ IVa$hiugIO>I, cd. Fitzpatrick. XVII. 221. 287~88 (fo Wilkinson. 6 and 19 Dec 

1779). 

- Thacher. Militllry Journlll 0/ II' e Am ericou Rroolulioll, 181, 185. 

'" Wriling.! 0/ Wa.!hiugltJlI, cd. Filzpalrick. XVII, 459--60 (fo l'rC!i. of Congress, 27 J3n 

1780): 362-65 (fo Magistrates of New J eney, 8 Jan 1780). 
58 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

casks on hand instead of the amount of meat they actually contained. 

As a conseq uence, on 7 April there was only enough meat to afford a 

meager supply for 4 clays.n The pattern of subsistence supply through 

these months was one o[ acute shortages temporarily relieved by the timely 

arrival of sma ll q uantities of provisions. 

ReS01'l to System of St)ecific SU/Jplies 

Even when the supply situa ti on looked the darkest, some o ne always 

could dev ise a plan that he believed would solve all difficulties. If 

individ uals could sa tisfy the ir wants witho ut lIsi ng money by resorting 

to a system of barter, as they were doing to a certain extent, why could 

not Congress eliminate the use of money in the supply process by dev ising 

a method whereby the states could furnish food and forage d irectl y to 

the Army? T he resources of the coulllry had not been depl eted; only 

proper means were needed to draw supplies into public use.'2 

A(ter some pre li minary groping, Congress adopted the system of 

specific su pplies-a system, the operation of which always kept the Army 

on the verge of starva tion and the impact of which on supply brought 

changes in proced ure and in orga ni zation. T he system of specific supplies 

was one of requisitions upon all the states with the promise that the 

specific supplies-beef, pork, Aour, rum, sa lt, and forage-fu rn ished by 

a state would be credited toward the quota of the money that it was called 

u pon to raise by taxes for the Un ited Sta tes.13 T his initial general 

statement of the system had to be broken down into details-a complicated task that required extensive knowledge of existing and probabl e 

supplies in the states, the ba lancing o[ Army requiremen ts agai nst those 

supplies, and the proportionment of the burden equitably among the 

states. T he in numerable adjustments involved in working out these 

details afforded opportun ities for endless discussion, and it was 25 February 1780 before Congress set spec ifi c quotas to be furn ished by the states 

accord ing to their resources." 

T he adoption of the new system altered the former functions of 

the Commissary General in the procurement, storage, and forwarding 

of supplies and necessitated some changes in the organiza tion of the 

Department. State procu rement of subsistence eliminated the need for 

" Ibid.., XVIII. 121- 22 rI'o I'r{'$. of Congres~. 17 Mal' 1780); 127- 28 (To Board of War. 

7 Apr 1780). 

"L II~rj of mb s of IIr ~ Couliu ,,111i Co"gr n, ed. Burucn. V. 6 (Pres. of Congrcss to 

Gov.ofConnCCl iCUl.12 J 3n 1780). 

T> lOl/rul1is of II, ~ Conl;m:ulal COl/gun, xv. 1371- 72 (II Dec 1779): 1377·78 (14 Dec 1779). 

"(I) Ib id., XVI. 196-201 (25 Feb 1780). (2) See Edmund C. Uurnclt. "Continental Congress 

and Agricultur..r.1 Supplk-s." Agricullural History, II, No.3 Qui 1928).1 11 - 28. 
THE IMPACT OF INFLATION 59 

a deputy commissary general in each mil itary departmen t and for the 

horde of Continenta l commissaries who had purchased subsistence on a 

commission basis. Ephraim Blaine had been appointed Commissary 

General of Purchases on 2 December 1779 after Congress finally accepted 

the resignation of Wadsworth,'" Under the new organization adopted 

for his Department in January 1780, Blaine had only one assistant 

commissary who resided at Headquarters and acted in his absence. In 

the event that any state failed to make provision for furnishing its q uota 

of supplies, Congress authorized the Commissary General to appoint an 

assistant commissary for that state. Such commissaries were to be allowed 

2 percent on the money they expended, but, as a control, Congress 

determined that the prices given were to be no more tban twemyfold 

those paid for similar articles in 1774. In recogn ition of the uneasiness 

that the payment of commissions had excited, Congress reestab lished a 

fixed sa lary for the Commissary General, setting his remuneration at 

$40,000 a year.'8 That generous salary was drastically cut late in Novem· 

bel' to $2, 124 a year when Congress took cognizance of Blaine's reduced 

responsibil ities. At that time, a deputy commissary general for the 

SOUlhern Army was added to the Department's organization, and he and 

the Commissary General were each authorized to appoint one assistant 

commissary, one superintendent of livestock, two clerks, and as many 

butchers, coopers, drovers, and laborers as were necessary for conducting 

the business of the Department. In its efforts to reduce expenditures, 

Congress set the salaries of the clerks and assistants in the Department 

at such a low figure that Blaine complained he was left without a single 

person to assist him!' 

Reolganiz.ation 0/ the Q1uu'lennasle1"s Depal·tment 

In the meantime, Q uartermaster General Greene, who had submitted 

his resignation in December 1779, was still waiti ng for a reply in the 

summer of 1780. In the interim, he cooperated in the efforts being 

made to reorgan ize h is Department, and after prolonged delay Congress 

adopted a new regul atory plan on 15 J uly 1780.;8 No sooner did Greene 

receive a copy of that plan than he resigned, despite the fact that his 

Department was in the midst of preparations for supporting the Continenta l Army in its proposed operations with the French forces. He had 

intended serving until the end of the campaign, but the introduction of 

... Jounlals 0/ til e CoutillUIII1/' Collgass, XV, I!H2-'13 (2 Dec 1779). 

TO Ibid., XVI. 5- 7, 20--2 1 (1,5, and 7 J an 1780). 

"(I) Ibid., XVIII. 1109--11 (30 Nov 1780). (2) I'apen< of the Co"tinental Congress, item 

165, 1, f. 341-'14 (To ]'res. of Congress, 25 Feb 1781. 

TO JOllTIII1/s o( the Conlinental COllgress, XVII, 61!)- !l!). 
60 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

a new system in the midst of that campaign, the elimination of his two 

trusted assistants. Pettit and Cox, upon whom he depended for the 

conduct of the Department's business, and his apprehension that others 

would also leave made that impossible. Somewhat caustically he informed the President of Congress that: 

Systems without Agent.s are useless things; and the probability of gelli ng 

lhe one should be taken into consideration in fram ing the othe... Administration seem to think it far less illll)on anl to the public interest to have this 

department well filled, and proper y arranged, than it really is, and as they 

will find it by future experience.tII 

This letter of resignation precipitated a storm in Congress that for 

a short time seemed likely to sweep Greene out of the Army entirely, but 

in the end wiser counsels prevailed. Congress accepted his resignation 

as Quartermaster General on 5 August 1780, and appointed Timothy 

Pickering, who had helped to frame the new regu latory plan. He was 

given the rank of colonel but the pay and rations of a brigadier general. 

over and above that allowed the Q uartermaster General under the plan 

of 15 Jul y.sO At Washington's req uest, Greene continued to perform 

Quartermaster duties for the Army until Pickering's arrival at camp on 

22 September, 7 weeks after his appo intment. By that time, Quarter· 

master preparations for supporting a campaign in 1780 had, (or all 

practical purposes, come to an end. Pickering was therefore not immedi· 

ately involved in supplying active military operations. 

Pickering's delay in arriving at camp was occasioned in part by the 

necessity to reorgani ze his Department and to appoint new officers. 

Basically, the organization of the Department remained unchanged but 

congressional efforts had been directed to reducing its personnel. Over 

the years, the Department had become a sprawling domain. In 1775 

the Quartermaster General. his 2 assistants, and some 35 to 45 clerks, 

laborers, wagon masters, and superintendents had handled the busine~ 

of the Department. As military operations had widened , the number of 

Quartermaster personnel required to support the line had multiplied 

rapidly. By 1780, the Quartermaster Genera l was aided by 2 assistant 

quartermasters general, 28 deputy quartermasters general, and 109 assistant deputy quartermasters general. The Department also included 

storekeepers, clerks, barrack masters, express riders, laborers. and superintendents of government property, roads, stables, woodyards. and horseyards. In the Department's forage branch there was not only a com-

.. Papcrs of the Cominental Congress. itcm 155. I. f. ~99 (26 Jul 1780) . 

• Jorlrual, of fllC Coutinclrtal COIlgrc.ss, XVII. 700. In the plan thc salary of a Quarter· 

master CenelOll W~ 5 sel ~t $J66 ~ month. or $1.992 ~ yc~r in specie. A hrigidier general gol 

$125 a month , or $ 1.500 a yea,·, J'ickering's s.alary was thus $3,392 ~ year plus r~tions ~nd 

forage for his horse. 
THE IMPACT OF INFLATION 61 

missary general of forage and his assistant but also 25 depUlies and 128 

assistant depmy commissaries as we ll as clerks, forage masters, measurers, 

collectors, we ighers, stackers, superintendents, and laborers. The wagon 

branch employed, in addition to the wagonmaster general and II deputies, 

a large number of wagon masters, wagoners, packhorse masters, and packhorsemen. Among personnel in the boat department were superintenden ts, masters of vessels, mates, and boatmen. In 1780, the Q uartermaster's Department employed almost 3,000 peop le at an estimated 

monthly payroll of $407,593, exclusive of the commissions paid to the 

Q uarten naster General, tile assista nt quarten nasters general, the commissary general of forage, and some, though not all, of their respective 

deputies.8t 

Under the plan of 15 July, Pickering was aided by only one assistant 

q uartermaster general who was appo inted by, and resided near, Congress 

to keep the accou nts and make applica tions for money. As in the past, 

there was a deputy quartermaster for the main Army and one for each 

separa te army. Congre.ss further authorized the Quartermaster General 

to appoint one depu ty for each state if he judged such appointmen t 

necessary. In maki ng these appo intmems, Pickering gro uped sta tes, 

where he could, under one deputy, with .the result that he appointed 

onl y seven deputies. T hese state deputy q uartermasters were authorized 

to appoint as many assistants as they needed and as were approved by the 

Quartermaster General. They employed all necessary clerks, conductors, 

artificers, and laborers, but, if any of them rema ined in service longer 

than 2 months, the conditions under wh ich they served had to be 

approved by the Quartermaster General. To remedy a deficiency in the 

system of specific su ppl ies, the state dep uty quartermasters were made 

responsible for transporting all public properly in the state, for provid ing 

storehouses, and for appointing storekeepers to rece ive it, note defi ciencies, and reject all that was of improper q uality. 

With forage being procured by the states, personne l in the forage 

branch could also be sharply reduced. It was necessary to retain onl y a 

commissary of forage with the mai n Army and a deputy for each se parate 

army. The appointmen t of forage masters was limited to the armies. 

It was no longer necessary (0 appoint them at issui ng posts because the 

state dep uty quartermaster issued all forage at posts. Similarl y, personnel 

in the wagon branch was limited to the Army. Congress authorized the 

Quartermaster General to appoint one wagon master for the mai n Army 

and a deputy for each separate army and these appointments could be 

made specifically from the li ne of the Army. T he Quanermaster General 

" Washington Papers, \'01. ]6t, f. 77. 
62 QUARTERMASTER SU PPORT OF THE ARMY 

was to appoim onl y such assistants. clerks, and conductors as were 

required.

n 

Pickering was convinced that it was the need for economy that had 

given rise to the reorganization of the Quartermaster's Department in 

the summer of 1780 "a fter a [our years wasteful profusion." As a result, 

he impressed u pon his subordinates that it was their dULY to find "superfl uities" and "to lop them off," II He himse lf constantly sought to effect 

economies but it is doubtful whether these measures made any morc 

funds available to the Department. 

EUecl of COlltin'uecl Lack of Funds 

Only large amoun ts of hard cash could have produced any improvement in the su pply of clothing, eq uipmellt, provisions, and transporta tion 

for the Continen tal Army, but the Treasury could furnish littl e money. 

Early in 1780, the Board of War had pinned all of its hopes for clothing 

the troops on the supplies bought in France. In view of the lack of 

funds, the Board had thought it was "needless to involve either ourselves 

or the Officers under our directions in the persecution of being dunned 

for Debts it would have been impossibl e to pay." I. Unfortunately. when 

the French neel sa iled for America a great pan of the clothing that had 

been bought was left behind. Late in the year. with the Army facing 

another distressing winter encampment. it was no COlT. fort to know that 

10.000 complete suits rema ined in France because governmental agents 

could not agree whose business it was to ship them; nor that, for much 

the same reason, another quantity of clothing had been waiting in the 

West Indies for more than 18 months.sl Appeals had to be made to the 

states but there was so much disparity in the provision made by them 

for their troops that it bred discontent. Wash ington was not sure that 

all the clothing a\'a ilable to the Army between Boston and Phi ladelphia 

would suffice for more than half the men who would be left in service 

after December 1780. But even the cIOlhing that was available did not 

reach the troops. In November, for example. \Vashington was informed 

that 80 wagon loads of clothing had been lying in Springfield since the 

summer for want of transportation to forward it and the lack of care had 

resulted in large losses.n 

.. jourlUlIJ oJlht: Con/hulIlof COflgrt:S$, XVII, 615-35 (15 Jill 1780), 

.. Pickering Lelten, vol. 125, f. 118 (To Luuerloh. 21 Nov 1780). 

"Washington I'apen, \'01. 150. f. 90 (To Wash ington. 17 ~hr 1780) . 

• IVri/iu8s of lI'oJllill8tOIl, cd. Fitzpatrick. XX, 62-65 (To Maj. Gen. Lincoln, 11 D« 

1180). 

-Wo.shillgtoll Paller!, "01. 158, r. 25 (J. Trumbull !O Washington, 21 Nov 1780); f. 41 

(William Story 10 Washington. 22 No,' 1780). 
THE IMPACT OF INFLATION 63 

Though the Quartermaster's Department was supposed to provide 

transportation on the lines of communications, it could not do so because 

it lacked funds to hire wagons and teams. During the winter of 1780-81 

such transportation could be accomplished only by obtaining country 

teams. Applications to the justices for learns, however, frequently 

brought only excuses that the roads were bad, that their forage was 

exhausted, or that they d id not have the money to bear the expenses of 

turning out the tcams. Even when the justices instructed lcams to report, 

the quartermaster could not rely on as many appearing as were ordered. 

Calls had gone out, for example, for teams to move a considerable quantity 

of flour from R ingwood, N.]., to camp. But of the 82 double teams 

requested, only 11 reported; and of the 75 single teams, only 17 arrived 

at Ringwood. If the flour was to be moved it would have to be done 

by military impress and Washington reluctantly agreed to the usc of some 

dragoons. eT 

Lacking funds, some quartermasters resorted to whatever methods 

they could to move suppl ies to the ir destinations. When, for example, 

Deputy Quartermaster Hughes in New York was informed that no 

wagoner would transport pl'Ovisions until part of the money due for the 

service was paid on picking up the load and the remainder assured on 

delivery, he sold some of the pl'Ovisions to defray the cost of forwarding 

the rest in the spring of 1781. This was a method liable to abuse and 

was a wretched way of doing business. The Army needed the very 

pl'Ovisions sold to pay for forwarding the remainder to camp. Washington himself, in desperation, diverted to the Quartermaster's Department 

funds turned over to him by the paymaster general of Massachusetts to 

pay the troops of that line in order that the Department might relieve 

the Army's distress by paying for the transportation to camp of AoUl' from 

New Jersey and salt meat from Connecticut.88 

Lack of funds had hampered the Quartermaster's Department in 

supplying transportation for the Army itselF during the campaign of 1780. 

In preparing for the campaign, Greene had been dismayed because wagon 

manufacturers, see ing no prospect of payment, refused to complete orders. 

He had no funds with which to replace horses worn out in service. The 

appalling loss of animals could be attributed to the lack of forage supposed 

to be furn ished by the sta tes under the system of specific supplies. Such 

or (I) Ibid .• ,"01. IG9. r. 51 (DQM I'lau 10 LI. Col. D. Humphreys. 29 Mar 1781). (2) Pickering i..cncrs. \'01.125. r. 89. 97 (Pickering to Humphreys. G. 10 Apr 1781). (1I) W ritings of Waslling/on. cd. Fitzpatrick. XII. 5Q4--0.'> (To I'ickering. 2G Apr 1781). 

-(I) I'apers of the Continental Congress. item 192. r. 57 (Pickering [0 Pres. or CongTC55. 

110 Mar 1781). (2) Washington l'apeTS. 1'01. 171. f. 2~ (Pickering to Hughes. 17 Apr 1781 ). 

(11) Writings Of WI/shiugto", cd. Fitzpatrick. XXII . .'> (To Pickering. 28 Apr 1781). 21-22 (To 

Pres. of Congress. r ~fay 1781). 
64 QUARTERMASTER SUPI'ORT OF THE ARMY 

forage as the Army did obtain was impressed under {he authority of 

Washington's warralll. Even the horses needed by the Army during the 

winter of 1780- 81 had to be obtained by impressmcm,n 

IJrealulolVlI of System 01 Specific SU/Jplies 

Analysis of the system of specific supplies early in 1780 had convinced 

competent supply officers that it wou ld be a failure and the ensuing 

shortages in forage and provisions had promptly confirmed that predic. 

tion. For want of money. Blaine had been unable to keep up a temporary 

supply until the new system got into operation. Not only had the states 

been slow to put it into effect, but throughout the year they were often 

dilatory in responding to requisitions. Appeals LO forward their quotas 

fr equently weill unanswered. In November 1780, for example, the 

Delaware assembly adjourned until some time in January without pro· 

viding the supplies required in th e requ isition of that year.... On the 

other hand, some states, responding to urgent appeals, sent forward to 

camp such a large amount of supplies that a temporary over·abundance 

was produced, resu lting in waste and loss. This method of provisioning 

the Army Jeft supply fluctuating between want and over·abundance. In 

May 1780, at the very time that Lafayette brought news that a French 

naval and military force was being sent LO aid the American cause, the 

troops were "pinch'd for Provisions" and "reduced to the very verge of 

famine." For days they had been entirely without meat and at best only 

on half or quaner allowances of rations. Their patience ex hausted, 

mutiny had broken out and had threatened to spread." 

In this crisis, it was the patriotic merchants of Philadelphia who 

came to the relief of the Army by sending 500 barrels of flour to camp 

immediately. T hey then perfected a plan under which they proposed 

to subscribe a fund of [300,000 in hard money to be used to procure 

and transport 3 million rations and 300 hogsheads of rum to the Army, 

or enough to feed an Army of 40,000 men for 2 months. To carry out 

their plans, the associaLOrs, headed by Raben Morris, established a bank. 

Congress pledged the faith of the United States for its support and for the 

.. (I) Washington I'apers, ~01. 155. r. 22 (Greene 10 Washington. II May 1780). (2) Papers 

of the Cominenlal Conll;l·nl. item 192. f. 'II (I'iekerillg to Prn. of Congres.s, ~ Oct 1780). 

(!I) Pickering Lettel"$. yol. 125. f. 19 (I'ickcring to l..afa)·cttc. 19 Feb 1781) . 

.. Blaine Letter nook. 1780-83 (maine 10 l'rl'S. of ColIlI;rcss. 12 Nov 1780) . 

.. (I) Thacher. Mi/ilnry Journnl of tI,t' Amuicall 1l ~If)I'l'i , 197. (2) WrifiJlg5 a/Wad,· 

i"g'OI" 00. Fitzpatrick. XVIII. '113 (To Maj. Gen. Roben Howe. 25 May 1780); 427-28 (To 

Bo:trd of War, 27 May J78O). 
THE IMPACT OF INFLATION 65 

security and indemnification of its subscribers.'! This was only a temporary relief. T he states COlllinucd to be dilatory in filling the requisitions made upon th em, and by August Washington denounced this 

meth od of obtain ing supplies as " th e most uncertain, ex pensive, and 

injuriolls that could be devised ," To keep his Army from starving, he 

had to move his camp to another vicinity "with a view of attempting 

some relief from a forage." U 

By that time. with the rest of the French Heet blockaded at Brest 

and unlikely to reach American walers before October. the fair hopes 

that Washington had enterta ined in May of an allied offensive in 1780 

had van ished " like the Morning Dew,"'~ Washington still wanted to 

close the campaign "with some debJ'Tee of eclat," but his plans had to be 

reli nquished for lack of mea ns. The Army went into winter camps 

from West Point to Morristown, and it was with difficulty that the troops 

were moved to th eir places of cantonment. Of necessity. Washington 

was compe ll ed to dismiss the levies when the troops went into winter 

quarters. "Want of clothing rendered them unfit for duty, and wa nt of 

Flour wou ld have disbanded the whole Army if I had not adopted this 

exped ient," he wrote Greene. then commanding the South ern Army and 

equally desperate for provisions and clothing. He suggested that " it 

would be well for th e Troops. if like Chameleons. they could live upon 

Air. or like the Bear, suck their paws for subsistence during the rigour of 

th e approach ing season." 10 

The suppl y of food during th e winter of 1780- 8 1 remained as 

precarious as ever and the response of the states to requisitions was as 

dilatory as in the past. An a ll too familiar pattern of scanty ra tions, 

inadeq uate clothing and she ller, and no pay ex hausted the patience of 

the troops. When enlistment grievances were added to these hardships, 

the troops of the Pennsylvania line mutinied at Morristown on 1 January 

178 1. Their example was followed later in the month by three New 

J ersey regiments at Pompton. " It is in vain to think an Army can be 

kept together much longer. under such a variety of sufferi ngs as ours 

has experienced ," wrote \Vashington in one more appeal to the New 

"(I) ~II ' 01 Memlll':r.l 01 the Conli" ,,I'" Congr('ss, ed. Burnett. V. 224 (Sch\Jyl~r 10 

Washington . 18 Jun 1780); 235 (l\Iadi5(lll 10 Jefferson, 23 J un 1780); 280 (Prcs. of Congras 10 

Eastern Siaies. 21 J u l 1780). (2) JOt/r"nls ,,1111(' Conlill('l1/al COlIgTt"U, XVII, 549- 50 (22 J un 

1780). 

- lVrili"gs 01 lI'a.lllillg/,m. ed. t"ilZpatriek. XIV. 403. 4~7 (fo Prcs. of Congress. 20 and 

2~ Ault 1780). 

"'bid., XIX , 482 (fo Samuel WashinRlon. 31 Aug 1780). 

" Ibid" XX . 470 (To Greene, 13 De<: 1780); ~57 !i9 (To Gouv~meur ~forris. 10 Dec 1780). 
66 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

England slates. Confronted with an empty Treasury, Congress, too, 

could only respond to Blaine's report of the supply situation with onc 

more letter to the states urging them to fill their quotas. 96 

The supply departments for lack of funds could neither support 

the troops in winter quarters nor make timely preparations for another 

campaign. For 2 years the Continenta l Army had been compelled to 

lie idle in the Highlands of the Hudson for want of supplies and inadequate strength. Late in May 1781, prospcCls for applyi ng enough force 

against the British at New York brightened immeasurably when dispatches arrived confirming that a large fleet under Admiral de Grasse 

was on its way to cooperate with Rochambeau's troops at Newport and 

the COlllinental forces. Washington and Rochambeau mel and concerted 

plans for movi ng against the British at New York. ''''hen these became 

infeasible, they launched an alternative plan calling for a joint attack 

against Cornwallis in Virginia. Unfortunately, the supply situation 

remained unpromising. Only a few weeks before meeting with Rochambeau, Washington had recorded that: 

Instead of having Magazines filled with provisions, we have a scanty pittance scattered here and there in the different States. Instead of having our 

Arsenals well supplied with Mil itary Stores, they are all poorly provided, and 

the Workmen all leav ing them. Instead of h<lv ing various articles of Fie ld 

equ ipage in readiness to deliver, the Quarter Master General (as the dern ier 

resort, according to his aeel.) is but now app lying to the several States to 

provide these things for the Troops respective ly. Instead of having a regular 

System of Transportation estab lished upon credit- or funds in the Qr. Maslers 

hands to defray the contingent expences of it we h<lve neither the one nor the 

other and all that business, or a great part of it being done by Military Impress, 

we are daily and hourly oppressing the people- souring their tempers- and 

alienating their affections." 

PJ'epamtions tOT the Last CamJlaign. 

As he had so often in th e past. 'Washington persona ll y sought at 

that point to a ll eviate the distress of his troops. He d ispatched Maj. Gen. 

William H eath to New England to use h is influence to persuade the 

states to send supplies. By personal appeals 1O the state executives and 

assemblies, General Heath was to obtain a supply of cattle and to transport 

to camp all sal t provisions in western ConnecticUl and Massachusetls in 

"(I) IVri/iugs of IVllslliug/ou, cd. Fitzpatrick, XXI. 6] (Ci,·cu]ar .. ~ Jan ]781). (2) Papers 

of thc Contincntal Congress, itcm 165. ], f. 389 (Illaine to Pres. of Congress. 19 Jan 1781). 

(~) Ld/us Of M embcrs of Ihe COIi/illCII/lli Clmgu$S, ed. Burnet!. V. 5~5 (I'res. of Congress to 

Slates from Pennsylvania to New Hampshire. 27 Jan 1781) . 

.. The Diarie.l 0/ George li'Mhing/on, ]748-99, ed. J ohn C. Fitzpatrick (4 vols., New York, 

]925). II. 207-08 (I May 178]). 
THE IMPACT OF INFLATION 67 

order to relieve the immed iate wa nts of the troops of th e main Continental 

Army and those stationed at posts along th e northern front ier. H e was 

also to establis h a regu lar, systematic. and effective p la n fo r feed ing 

the Army throughout the coming campaign.

is General Hea th was most 

successful in his efforts and when the Yorktown campa ign got under way 

later in the summer of 178 1, the New England states contin ued to forward 

caltle until Washington directed otherwise. 

Shortly after Washington had in itiated his measures to bring beef 

to the Army, Congress took steps to rel ieve the bread shortage. T hose 

steps led to the adoption o[ a new system. Subsistence was to be furnished directly to the Army by priva te con tractors with whom the 

government entered into arrangements fo r the procurement, deli very, 

and issue of rations instead of relyi ng on the states to fill requisitions 

made on them or, where th at fail ed, depending upon commissaries, 

attached to the Army, to purchase and issue the needed rations. Robert 

Morris, the newly appointed Superintendent of Finance. dev ised ways 

and means. He firml y believed that private contracting afforded the 

best means of husbanding the coun try's resources, Like Washington , 

he fo und the system of specific supplies inordinately extravagant and 

wasteful. He concluded tha t. in the interests of economy, it would be 

best to modify that system and retu rn to a cash basis, At his request, 

Congress auth orized him to d ispose of specific supplies furnished by the 

states in any manner that he, with the advice of the comma nder-in-chief, 

judged best, n It was his idea to se ll provisions deposited a t distant 

locations and use the money so obta ined to contraCt for supplies nearer 

to the Army. As the system of specific supplies had operated, however, 

no large quantities of provisions fo r disposa l purposes had been accumula ted anywhere, 

In th e meantime, Congress, having given consideration since midMay to contracting for rations, specifically vested such power in the 

Superintendent of Fina nce in Jul y.tOO Use of th at power, however, 

depended on the revenues prov ided by the states, but in 178 1 on ly 

Pennsylvania gave Morris money out of which to provide their specific 

supplies. Consequently, the only contracts he made to take effect that 

year were con fi ned to that State. Oul of the funds provided, he not only 

defrayed the cost of those contracts but also furn isiled flour to the Army 

on the Hudson and in Virginia.'ol 

" (1) Wrilillg$ of Wash;Itglotl, ed. Fitzpatrick. XXII, 58-:,9. 6~ 65 (To Heath. 8 and 9 

Ma)' 1781). (2) See " Hea,h Papers" in ~Iassachusctls Historical $odel)' Clil/rc/h"'J, );Cries 7. 

\'01. V. 196--225, for correspondence co\'ering the details of Heath's mission . 

.. Journals ol/"~ COII/;lIell/lI/ COlIgl' U, XX, 597- 98 (4 Jun 1781). 

'''Ibid., XX, 734 (10 Ju l 1781). 

'., Robert Morris Letter]).ool: n. 2-15 (fo Gen. N. Greene. 19 Dec 1781). 
68 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Obviously, after the el ection of Robert Morris to the post of Superintendent of Finance, that office had gradually absorbed the few remaining 

responsibilities formerly exercised by the Commissary General of Purchases. With no duties left to execute, Blaine submitted his r esignation 

to Congress on 30 july.'02 No action was taken on his resignation but, 

since the Yorktown campaign opened shortl y thereafter, Blaine continued 

to serve as Commissary General, carrying out the orders of Robert Morris, 

obtaining specific supplies from Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, and 

supervising the establishment of magazines until the end of that campaign. 

Despite his lack of funds, the Q uartermaster General attempted to 

make preparations for the campaign of 1781 but was not too successful. 

He called upon the New England states for camp equipage in April. 

Only Massachusetts responded with any promise of tentage, knapsacks, 

and haversacks.'l>! Although the need for boats was urgent, repairs of 

the public boats on the Hudson moved slowly. Pickering found the 

artificers employed there "dejected & discouraged." It could scarcely 

have been otherwise since most of them had famil ies to support but had 

received no pay in 18 months. Wearied of serving unrewarded, some of 

the best hands had gone to the New England seaports to find more 

lucrative service and prompter pay. In June, when the boats should 

have been ready, Washington permitted a few artificers to be drawn 

from the line to speed repairs. lo, 

Although horses and wagons were required for the campaign, adequate numbers were not in readiness when the Army began to move. 

On the basis of informal estimates of the number of Army horses being 

wintered in Pennsylvania, western Massachusetts and Connecticut, Pickering had concluded in January that he would have an ample supply. 

But when returns of the horses fit for service were actually made in 

May and June, the number had dwindled so alarmingly that Pickering 

order ed his deputies to hire teams. T he deputies found it difficult to 

persuade owners of teams who remained unpaid for services rendered 

in the last campaign to agree to provide transportation in 178 1. Since 

many of their wagons had been worn out in service, Pickering hit upon 

an inducement to offer them. T he Army had spare wagons and he 

proposed that for each team of horses hired, the deputy quartermaster 

should offer to furnish the owner a wagon and harness, to be appraised 

and delivered as soon as the horses arrived. Depending on the appraised 

'''' Blaine Letter Book, 1780-83 (To Thos. I'ol cKean. 30 Ju 1 1781). 

""Washington Papers. \'01. 176. r. 32 (I' ickering to Lt. Col. D. Humphreys, 5 Jun 1781). 

lOt (I) Ibid., \'01. 176. f. 80 (Pickering tu Washington. 8 JUIi 1781). (2) IVrWngs of Wash. 

;"gI01l, ed. Fitzpatrick. XXII. 196-97 (To !'ickering, 10 Jun 1781). 
THE IMPACT OF INFLATION 69 

value, this offer WQuld, in effect, give the owner a momh's wages in 

advance. E,'cn with lhis inducement, the deputies doubted that enough 

teams could be hired. The lack of money either to hire teams or to 

forward public horses from winter quarters had a crippling effect on the 

ease with which the Army could move, so much SO that when the Army 

marched to Peekskill the park of anillery was not able to do so for want 

o{ horses 'o~ Pickering had to try to buy horses on credit, deferring 

payment for several mOl1lhs and allowing interest in the interim. To 

meet the payment when due he tul'l1cd to Robert Morris for help. Until 

the purchase could be completed, he proposed and Washington authorized 

impressment of horses in New J ersey to satisfy the immediate needs of 

the anillery.lot 

It cannot now be determined whether it was the inadequacy of these 

preparations, Pickering's inexperience in mee ting the demands of an 

active campaign, or the overriding importance of the ex pedition to be 

undertaken that raised doubts in Washington's mind as to the degree of 

reliance he could put lIpon his Quartermaster Genera l and caused him 

to assume dlilies thai officer should have directed. In any event, from 

the time that the allies llIrned to the alternative plan of attacking Cornwa llis in Virginia, Washington gave close supervision and direction to the 

logistical support of the campa ign. Wagon transportation was lert to 

Pickering's direction as was supervision of the crossing of men and 

supplies at King's Ferry.IO; Washinglon, however, directed the prepara· 

tion of water transportation on the Delaware; requested Morris to arrange 

for boats to tak.e the men and supplies down the Chesapeake Bay; issued 

combat loading instructions to Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln who super· 

vised the forwarding of men and supplies at Head of Elk; laid out the 

overland route from Head of Elk to Williamsburg; directed the prepara· 

tion of forage deposits; and called upon the Governors of Maryland and 

Virgi nia for additional supplies. IDS Through the cooperative efforts of 

the Quartermaster General, the state deputy quartermasters, and the 

Superintendent of Finance, Washington performed the prodigious feat 

of moving the allied forces from the Hudson southward 450 mil es to the 

James River and defeating Cornwa llis within the 2'l11onth period between 

''' (1) Wuhington I'apeu. "0 1. li9. f. 9i (I'id:ering to WashingwIl. 12 Jul 178 1). (2) Picker· 

ing Leiters. \'01. 82. f. 1 (1'0 Col. Neilson. 29 J UII 1781 ); r. II (To Col. Miles. 10 Jul 178 1). 

, .. Pickering Lene". \'01. 82. r. 37 (To Robert Morris. 20 Ju l 1781): r. 42 (To Dearborn. 

20 Jul 1781). 

"'(1) Ibid .• "01. 127. r. 226 (To Col. Hughes. 18 Aug 178 1); r. 2 17 (To Gen. Heath . 2! Aug 

1781). (2) Pickering and Upham. Li/e 01 -rimo/h), Piclurillg. I. 294. 

"' IVri/iflgs 01 Washing/Oil. ed. Fitzpat rick. XXIII. II. 40. 50-52 (To Robert Morris. 17. 

24. and 27 Aug 178]): 54-55 ( r o Col. MilC5. 27 Aug); 96·97 (Ci rcu ]ar to Gentlemen on Entern 

Shores of Marylan<l. 7 Sep 1781 ); 109- 10 (To Peter WagKoncr. 9 Scp 178 1); 82- 83 (To 

Rochalllbeau. 3 Sep 178 1); 98- 101 (To Maj. Gen. Lincoln. 7 Sep 1781). 
70 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T H E ARMY 

14 August, when he received the news that Admiral de Grasse had sailed 

with a French Reet from the West Indies for the Chesapeake Bay, and 

15 October 1781, the date set by the Admiral for the departure of the fleet. 

Rehenchment 

Ten days after the surrender of Cornwa llis, the plans for the dispersal 

of the allied forces had been agreed upon. All arrangements for returning the American troops to the North were left to Pickering. Much of 

the captured British materiel was turned over to him for disposal. Along 

with some of the troops, part of that materiel was sent to support Greene's 

Southern Army. En route to the north, Pickering made arrangements 

to provide straw and wood for the sick and wounded in the hospitals at 

Williamsburgh and Hanover. Claims for damages and debts incurred 

in Virginia demanded settlement by the Department and during the 

winter of 178 1-82 he was also much occupied' in settling all transportation 

accounts arising out of the Yorktown expedition.

lOP 

From Yorktown until the formal close of the Revolutionary War 

was signa led by the signing of the treaty of peace on 30 September 1783, 

the dominant theme in supply activities was retrenchment. ]11 view of 

the financial situation of the country and the necessity for consulting 

with the Superintendent of Finance on all expenditures, his office played 

an increasingly prominent role in supplyi ng the Army. As earl y as 

178 1, Morris had become responsible for the purchase of clOthing. ]n 

the summer of that year, Congress had adopted a new regulatory plan that 

suspended all state purchases on account of the Continental Congress. 

It further had provided that the Clothier General was to operate his 

department on the basis of an estimate of the clothing and disbursements 

required for a year, beginning with I November but submitted in June 

so th at Congress would have time to furnish the fu nds and adopt the 

necessary measures for procuring them. lin The Superintendent of Fi· 

nance made all contracts for needed supplies and upon application of the 

Clothier General provided funds for paying the workmen who made 

clothing. By the time these new procedures had been adopted, John 

Moylan had succeeded Wilkinson as Clothier General.lll 

.. (]) Calendar 0/ Virginia S/ale PaJIUS (II wis., Richmond. 1875-93). II. 589 (Pickering to 

GO\'. Nelson , 8 Nov 1781). (2) Pickcring Letters, vol. 82. f. 122 (fo Lincoln. 20 Dec); f. 126. 

136-39 (To Maj. Claiborne, 20 Nov, 7 Dt'C); f. 131 (To Greene, 23 Nov); f. 140 (To Yeates, 

8 Dec); f. 152 (To Capt. Mitchell, 27 Dec); f. 1!i8 (To condllctOT$. !IO Dt'C); f. 221- 24 (To Morris, 

8 Dec 1781); vol. 83, f. 9-10 (fo Maj. Cogswell ,.5 J an); f. 135- 37 (fo Yeates, 27 Feb 1782). 

110 jo"nwls !If tile CaMillenlal Congress. xx. 602-67 (18 Jun 1781). 

ILl (I) Papers of the Continental Congres.s, item 78. XX IV. r. 297- 98 (Wilkinson 10 Pres. of 

Congress. 27 Mar 1781). (2) Washillg\On J>apeT$, \'01. 160, f. 32 (Moylan to Washington, 18 Feb 

178 ]). 
THE IMPACT OF INFLATION 71 

He was more attentive to requisitions and more industrious in trying 

to meet Army needs than 'Wilkinson, but it did not necessarily follow 

that the Army was we ll supplied with clothing during the last years of 

the war. Considerable quantities of clothing. [or example, had arrived 

from abroad in the spring of 1781, yet lack of funds prevented that 

clothing being made available to the troops during the Yorktown campaign. Moylan could not obtain money from the General Court of 

Massachusetts to enable him to transport the clothing supplies on Morris' 

order until late in October, and it was 3 November before he had 35 

wagonloads on the way from Boston to Fishkill. l12 

The supply of clothing was dependent on what was obtained abroad, 

and though Morris was disposed to remove all compla ints the straitened 

financial circumstances always kept inadequate the amount of clothing 

available to the troops. To function at all Morris had to sell such 

imported clothing as was unsuitabl e for military use in order to obtain 

funds to pay off Clothing Department debts, including sums due for 

work done by tailors.''' By one means or another, however, Morris 

provided for the troops- not as fully as Washington desired but nevertheless more adequately than in earlier years of the war. 

As the Superintendent of Finance broadened his direction of purchases in the various supply departments during the last 18 months o[ 

the war, procurement methods changed and supply departments underwent organ izational changes. Once the Yorktown campaign was ended, 

the Office of the Commissary General of Purchases and the Office of the 

Commissary General of Issues passed out of existence. Both Blaine and 

Stewart relinquished the duties of their respective departments without 

waiting for any formal acceptance of resignations by Congress. As the 

year 1781 ended, Morris assumed complete direction of subsistence 

procurement, and, with the Treasury still hard pressed for funds, he 

again turned to his plan for reduci ng expenditures by contracting for 

the subsistence o[ the Army. Convinced that he would obtain funds 

from the middle and eastern states, he entered into contracts for supplying 

the Northern Army though a variety of fa ctors deterred him from making 

similar arrangements {or the Southern Army. He did empower General 

Greene to make such COOlracts whenever he had reason to believe that 

he could obtain sufficient money to fulfi ll his obligations. 1l1 

Morris entertained high hopes of the benefits that would flow from 

"'Washington I'apet"ll, 1"01. 1114, f. 112 (To Moylan , 24 Sep 1781); 1'01. 182, f. 91 (Moylan to 

Washington,!J Nov 1781). 

''"Ibid., vol. 208, f. 97 (MorriH.o Washington. 15 Oet 1782). 

" ' (1) Robert Morris Lcner Book n. 245-52 (To Greene, 19 Dec 1781). (2) Washington 

Papers, vol. 188, f. 122 (Example of contract, 6 Dec 1781). 
72 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

the use of tile contract system to obtain rations. He was certain that 

it would provide a more effectual and punctual supply than had been 

obtained under the commissariat; that it would effect great savings by 

eliminating all purchasing and issuing commissaries; and that it would 

reduce transportation costs since the cOntractors would make delivery to 

the troops through issuing stores that they would operate. Unfortunately, these expectations were not satisfied. Within less than 6 months 

Army officers were criticizing the contractors whose avarice led them to 

restrict the number of issuing stores to such an extent that the troops 

were grea tly inconvenienced and experienced much fatigue in obtaining 

their provisions. The Army soon accused the contractors of offering 

the troops taimed provisions and charged that su pply failures occurred 

as frequently as they had under the commissariat.ll& 

The contractors for their part became uneasy about the settlement 

of their accounts. They attributed all shortages and irregularity in 

suppl y to their failure to receive regu lar payments on their contracts. "$ 

Morris was having difficulty meeting his obligations, for his Department 

was adversely affected by peace rumors that brought a tota l stoppage of 

mercantile business. He was compelled to cancel one contract and 

make a new onc at an advance in price for the rations furnished. 

Though disill usioned about the advantages of the system, Morris still 

considered it the onl y feasible method of subsisting the Army and the 

contract system was to be used fOl' many years after thc Revolutionary 

War. 

The elimination of the commissariat made it possible to break up 

many posts, and, si nce Morris extended contracts to include delivery of 

forage and wood to the troops as well as subsistence, the services of many 

quartermasters became unnecessary. Pickering, who wholeheartedly 

approved of all economy measures, worked out a plan to reduce the total 

number of posts to 14 and to discharge all unnecessary personnel at the 

pOSts that were retained. In addition, he proposed, and the Secretary 

at War concurred in, the immediate discharge of all artificers and other 

personnel who were hired by the day or month at the posts. In the 

future, all work was to be contracted for and paid for by the piece.IlT 

Before the end of 1782, Congress itself acted to effect other economies 

by reducing both the number of personnel and the salaries in the 

Quartermaster's Department. Pickering's staff was reduced to 10 officers 

" . Writings QJ lVo5hi"gIQn, ed .• -itzpatrick. XXIV. 1:'8-59; 287- 91; 1148-51 (fo Morris. 

23 Apr. 17- 25 I\lay. 4 Jun 1782). 

'' Wa~hington Papers. 1'01. 200. f. 110 (Sands 10 Washington, 17 Jun 1782): f. 114 (Sands" 

Li~ingston 10 Morris. 17 Jun 1782); 1'01. 202, f. 78 (Sands 10 Heath, 28 JuI1 782). 

lIT J'ickering Leiters, '·o\. 811 , f. 96-98 (To Morris. 19 Feb 1782). 
THE IMPACT OF INFLAT ION 73 

-a deputy quartermaster in the main Army and one {or the Southern 

Army; a wagonmaslcT and a deputy, and a commissary of forage and a 

deputy. respectively. for the main Army and the Southern Army; and a 

d irector and one sub-director of a company of artificers for each of these 

armies. III Congress also authorized Pickering to appoint as many wagon 

conductors and assistants as both armies required. It cut the Quartermaner General's salary to $2.000 a yea r and red uced the sa laries of his 

staff so low that Pickering charged it would be impossible for him to 

relain men of ability and integrity. He suspended making any appointIllCIllS under the new plan because he ex pected it woul d be amended. 

but no action was ta ken before the war ended. Meanwhile. a decreasing 

number of offi cers handl ed the dwindling Quartermaster activities. l}:y 

the end of 1782, the former Stale organization of the Department had 

virtuall y disappeared. Onl y in New York and Pennsylvania were a few 

assistants retained to altend to Quartermaster duties. In the closing 

months of the war, personnel in the Quartermaster's Department employed with the mai n Army numbered 42, including the Quartermaster 

Genera l.u1 

In anticipation of peace, Pickering not only applied himself to 

red ucing the expenses of his Department but he also began the task of 

se ttling accounts and of disposing of government property no longer 

needed by the Army. He was impatient to be freed of his official duties 

but these demanded his attention for almost 2 years after the war. By 

the summer of 1785, however, he recommended that the Secretary at War 

be charged with the remaini ng duties, and on 25 Jul y 1785 Congress 

abolished the office of the Q uartermaster General. . 10 

,," } ollrllfllJ 01 ,,,~ Cou/iuulffll COIl8r~JJ, XX III , 682-86; 69~ (2! and 29 Ocl 1782). 

II. (I) I'allen or ~ Com inent al CongTcu. item 192. f. 12!> (I'icltc:ring 10 Pres. of Congreu. 

" 1)« 1782). (2) Pickc:ring Lenen. "01. 86. r. GO (fo Lincoln. 25 Feb 78~). (~) RG 94. E$t;· 

rnalC$ of I'ay, 1101. IO~, r. 157 (Rc: turn . 25 Fc:b 178~). Nat ional Arch i'·cs. 

'·(1) " ;ekc:dn!!: and Upham, J.if~ of 7';",0/1" J> icll~rillg, I. 516-17 (I'ickc:ring to King, 

I J Ull 1785). (2) j Oll nlfl1J ol/ll~ COII 'illt'lI/flt COlI gU$$, XX IX. 574. 

CHAPTER III 

The Era of Civilian Ascendancy 

"Standing armies in lime or peace are inconsistent with the principles 

of republican governments, dangerous to the liberties of a free people, 

and generall y converted into d estructive engines for establishing despotism," I So Elbridge Gerry argued in the spring of 1784 as motion after 

motion to establish a standing army was brought forward only to be lost. 

To these popular arguments other members added that Congress had 

neither power under the Articles of Confederation to create a peacetime 

army nor funds to maintain such a military establishment. 

Economy had dictated a rap id demobilization of the Continental 

Army. and by January 1784, Maj. Gen. Henry Knox. acting under 

instructions, had reduced its strength to one regiment of infantry, consisting of 500 rank and file. and one artillery battalion of 120 men_I Five 

months later the prolonged debate. occasioned by the need to raise troops 

to take possession or the western frontier postS, came to an end with the 

adoption of a resolution on 2 June directing the discharge of all the 

Continental troops in the service of the United Stales, except 25 privates 

to guard the stores at Fon Pitt, and 55 to guard those at West Point.' 

It was nevertheless still necessary to ra ise other troops to garrison 

the western posts which were expected to be soon evacuated by the British. 

On the following day. Congress. adopted the only alternative open to it. 

It recommended that the states "most conveniently situated"-Connecti. 

cut. New York. New Jersey, and Pennsyl vania- raise for this purpose 

700 men from their militia to serve one year.' British delay in sur· 

rendering the western posts and the growing hostility of the Indians 

compelled Congress to call upon the same states in 1785 to raise 700 men 

for a 3-year term of service, reenlisting as many as possible of those 

recruited the previous year.& The full quota was never raised then nor 

, JOII'''II/I 0/ the COlllinUilal COII&Tt'.lJ, XXVII. 433 (26 May 1784). 

·(1) Ibid., XXV, 606 (23 Scp 1 78!1). (2) iVrifill&J o/Washinglon. ed. Fitzpatrick, XXVII, 

256--58 (To Knox, 3 1)« 1783); 278-80 ( ro I'res. of Congress. 21 Dec 1783). (3) RG I I, Papers 

of the Continental Congress. item 38. f. 37!i-95 (Knox 10 I'res. of CongtUS. !I Jan 1784). 

Nat ional Archives . 

• JOlJrllnls o/Ihe Cotlfimmlnl COII&rt.lJ, XXVII, 52-1 (2 Jun 1784). 

'Ibid., XXVII, 5!1O-3 1; 5!18-39 (3 Jun 1784). 

I Ibid .• XXVIII, 22!1-24; 2!19---11; 247 .... 8 (I, 7,12 Apr 1785). 
76 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

in succeeding calls for troops made by Congress under the Articles of 

Confederation. 

Obviollsly. an Army of such small proportions required no extensive 

fi eld organization to supply its needs. Nor did such an organization 

exist; supply personnel of the Revolutionary War had either resigned or 

been discharged as rapidly as troops had been demobilized. Elimination 

of the Quartermaster General and his assistants was in accord with the 

theory of that day that the staff properly existed only in time of war. fly 

mid-summer of 1785, ne ither the Quartermaster's Department nor any 

other of the staff agencies of the Revolutionary\Var remained in existence. 

Yet the troops on the frontier, whether stationed at poSts or sent out on 

expeditions against the Indians, had to be provisioned. clothed, and 

eq uipped. 

Civilian Contl"ol of SUj)/)ly 

Military suppl y was placed under civilian control in the postRevolutionary War years. and such control persisted until the outbreak 

of the War of 18 12. In this period, civilian ascendancy was carried to 

such an extent that even the Quartermasters General appointed to take 

the field during the campaigns against the Indians in the 1790's were 

civilians, granted the pay and a ll owances of a lieutenant colonel but not 

the military rank. Unlike their predecessors who served during the 

Revolutionary War, these Quartermasters Genera l were little more than 

transportation agents. Procurement, storage, and issue of military supplies were functions that were now directed by the bureaus or agencies 

developing a t th e seat of government. Basica ll y, control over supply 

throughout th ese years was divided between the Secretary of the War 

Office and the Secretary of: the Treasury and their respective subordinate 

agencies. Supply was accomplished by extending the contract system, 

first appli ed by Robert Morris in 1781 to the procurement of subsistence. 

When Congress abolished Timothy Pickering's position as Quartermaster General in Jul y 1785, the Secretary at War, Henry Knox, took 

over the few duties still be ing performed by the Quartermaster's Department. His predecessor. Benjamin Lincoln, had retired as Secretary in 

mid-November 1783. For th e next 17 months the whole management 

of the War Office had devolved upon his assistant, Joseph Carleton, who 

had hoped to succeed him. At Washington'S suggestion, Henry Knox 

was appointed Secretary on 8 March, assuming the duties of his office 

on 25 April 1785. Congress did not adopt a proposal advanced by 

Washington and Knox for creating a post of master general of ordnance 

and combining its duties with those of th e Secretary. A considerable 

part of the Secretary's duties did, however, in volve the care and prescrva· 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY 77 

lion of military stores, the mailllcnance of magazines and arsenals, and 

the supervision of various olher ordnance matters, for the direction of 

which Knox, who had been Chief of Artillery during the Revolutionary 

War, was well qualified.e 

Shortly before his appointment, Congress had directed that the 

Secretary was to keep exact records and returns of all military stores 

and supplies in the magazines; to accept all supplies turned over to him 

by officers in whose possession they had heretofore been; and to mak.e 

estimates of all supplies needed by the troops and " for keeping up 

competent magazines." These estimates were to be submitted to the 

commissioners of the Treasury so that they might initiate procurement 

measures promptly. The Secretary was also to be responsible for the 

transponation, safe-keeping, and distribution of the supplies needed by 

the troops. Once a year he was to visit all magazines and deposits of 

public stores and report to Congress.T 

Since the Secretary at War was expressly charged with the care of 

all military stores. a separate department to have charge of all arms, 

ammunition, and accoutrements was unnecessary, and Congress abolished 

the office of Commissary of Military Stores in the summer of 1785. 8 

Presumabl y. Samuel Hodgdon, who began his career as a captain in the 

artill ery corps under Knox in 1776 and had been serving in one capacity 

or another in the department of Commissary of Military Stores since 

1777, was to be dismissed from office along with his assiStants. Actually. 

Knox needed his services and apparently Hodgdon's tenure as Commissary 

of Military Stores at Philadelphia COlllinued uninterrupted until 1800, 

though his titl e was later changed and his duties ex panded.- Knox 

appointed additional storekeepers or deputy commissaries at other arsenals. though permanent magazines and arsenals were nOt to be estab· 

lished for some time. Newly acquired. as well as surplus military stores 

of the Revolutionary War generall y. were deposited in various rented 

buildings. Such military stores included not only cannon. gunpowder. 

small arms. and accoutrements of the Ordnance Department, but also 

canteens, tools, equipment, and ironmongery of the Quartermaster's 

Department as well as military clothing. 

°(1) I bid., XXV, 262n, 75~ (29 Oct 1783); XXVIII, 121n (4 Mar 1785); 129 (8 Mar 1785); 

XXIX, 77 1 (9 Jun 1785). (2) Fra ncis S. Drake, Life afld Correspollneflce of Major·Gentral 

H Cliry Kltox (Boston, 1873), 85-86 (Knox to Wasll ington, 17 Scp 1783, ~ Jan 1784; Washington 

to Knox, 2 Nov 1783). (3) W ritings of 11'11$11;'181011, ed. Fitlpalrick, XXVII, 3~9 (fo Knox, 

20 Feb 1784) . 

• Journals 0/ thc Coltliucltlal Congrcss, XXVIII, 21-22 (27 J an 1785) . 

• Ibid .. XXIX. 56G-fi1 (20 Jul 1785). 

"(1) Ibid ., XXXIV, 587-90 (2 Ocl 1788). (2) RC 98, PO$I ·Revolutionary War Records, 

\'01. SO, Re-ceipl$, Samuel Hodgdon. Commiuary General Military Siores. 18 Apr 1782-6 Nov 

1789. Nat ional Archives. 
78 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Tbe commissioners of the Treasury, to whom Knox sent his estimates 

of the supplies needed by the Army, had replaced the Superintendant of 

Finance. Robert Morris had submitted his resignation on 24 January 

1783, but it was November of the following year before he actually 

retired from office.' ~ In the interim, Congress on 28 May 1784 adopted 

an ordinance creating a Board of Treasury to consist of three commissioners. They were lO superintend the T reasury. manage the finances 

of the United States, and exercise all the powers formerly vested in the 

Superintendent of Finance, includ ing that of contracting for food and 

clothing needed by the troops. Il was J anuary 1785 before Congress 

appointed the commissioners, and the Board of T reasury did not begin 

its administraLion until 21 April." 

The commissioners followed procedures established by Robert 

Morris in contracting For food. They advertised and awarded the contract to the lowest bidder, who made del ivery of the rations at designated 

posts. Their first contract for provisioning the troops at the frontier 

posts of Fon Pitt, Fort McIntosh, and Fort Harmar in 1785 went to 

James O'Hara, who later served as Quartermaster Genera l in the Army 

that Anthony Wayne led to victory in the Battle of Fallen T imbersY 

T he ration still provided a bread and meat diet, as it had during the 

Revollilionary War, but it had become even more austere in some of its 

allowances. The ration consisted of one pound of beef, or three.quarters 

of a pound of pork; one pound of bread or flour; and one gill of rum. 

For everyone hundred rations the COntractor also provided one quart of 

sa IL, two quarts of vinegar, two pounds of soap, and one pound of 

candJes.n T he soldiers suppl emented this ration with the produce of 

gardens tended at the posts and the abu ndant game made available by 

hunters. 

Contractor O'Hara, like his predecessors in the Revolutionary War, 

did not escape criticism for the manner in which he executed his contract. 

Col. Josiah Harmar, commanding the frontier troops, thought it was 

fortu nate that there was such an abundance of fish readily available at 

Ft. McIntosh that summer since the contractor was failing to suppl y beef. 

On the whole, the contract was "performed tolerably we ll " in the opinion 

" (I) j'mrnfll& of /h ff COfllj'Hm/al C""greu, XXIV, 15\ (6 Feb 1783). (2) Papen of the 

Contine,ual Congress. item 137. II. f. 11 5 (Morris to I'res. of Congress, 24 Jan 1783). 

"jour/lfIls aI/he Co,,/juff utal Co"grffSS, XXVII . 469-71 (28 May 1784); XXVIII, 18 (25 Jan 

1785). 223 (I Apr 1785); XX IX. 582 (27 ju\ I 785); XXX IV, 554 (30 Scp I 788). 

,. Fort MCIntosh "'~5 oc~tcd ~t the mouth of Beaver Creek. 29 miles rrom Fort Piu; Fort 

H~rll\ar was located in Ohio ne~r M;uiella . 

.. jouruals al/hff Call/i/'ffllial Cangrl"U, XXXIV, 585 (2 Oct 1788). 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY 79 

of a congressional commitlee; " the defects were perhaps inseparably 

connected with the state of the fronti ers and of public affairs." U 

The follow ing year, Turnbull , Mannie &: Co. of Philade lphi a obtained the contract by offering a price considerably lower than that of 

1785. The troops were grea tl y distressed for wam of food in 1786 

because the company failed to fulfill its contract. In extenuation of their 

shortcomings, the contractors argued that they had been unable to supply 

the troops adequately because they had been paid in the depreciated 

CUlTcncy of Pennsylvania. T he troops were better provisioned during 

the next ~ years when O'I-Iara aga in obtained the contract in 1787 and 

Elliot and Williams of Ba ltimore held it during the following 2 years. 

The cost of the ration steadily decreased at all the frontier posts during 

these years although the price quoted by contractors for the posts varied 

accordi ng to the d istance deli very had to be made, the cost being higher, 

for example, at Vincennes than at Fort Piu.u 

The commissioners of the Treasury Board attempted to £ollow the 

same procedure in awarding clothing COntracts. In the years following 

the Revolution, the troops were allowed one suit of cloth ing an nually, 

payment {or which was deducted from their pay as it had been in the 

war years." Morris had not advertised for bids for clothing contracts, 

largely because it was so difficult to guard against impositions. If, for 

example, the clothing provided by the contractor was of such sleazy 

qua lity that it wore Ollt rap idly, the soldiers nonetheless were compelled 

to wear those rags until a new issue was made the next year. Wishing 

to extend the system of public contractS, however, the Treasury Board 

advertised and awarded the clothing contract for 1785 to the lowest 

bidder, the firm of Thomas Lawrence and Jacob Morris of New York. 

As a protective fealUre, the contract made provision for inspection of the 

clothing and for arbitration in the case of disagreement over t.he rejection 

of any clothing.1T 

T he Treasury Board received no official complaints of the cloth ing 

provided by Lawrence and Morris, but the commissioners nevertheless 

conceded that the low price at which the contract was taken must have 

prevented the contractors from furnishing clothing of the desired quality. 

" (I) Ibid. (2) jourllal 0/ Capf. jOlwfhau fI~art . ~d . c . w. I\unerficld (Albany. 1885).75 

(llr. Hamlar to Col. Fnncis Johnson , 21 Jun 1785) . 

.. jourtlalJ 0/ fht 'lljll~'Ilal COlIg n 'SS, XXXIV. 585-86 (2 Oct 1788). 

Mi t consisted of I COll t. I vest. I pair of woolen and 2 pairs of linen overal ls, I pair of 

woolen breeches. I h~t. 4 shirts, 2 pai.., of socks. 2 pai.., of hose. 4 paLrs of shoes. 1 pa ir of 

5hoe buckles. I 5tock and ela5p. and 1 blanket. Pape.., of the Continental CongT~. item ~9. 

II. f. 144 (Contract, 16 Jun 1785). 

" Ibid. 
80 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

It was not on this ground that they justifi ed their abandonment of the 

practice of advertising {or bids on clothing contracts in 1786. It was the 

empty state of the Treasury that made it impossible for them either to 

promise payment in specie or set a precise lime for making any payment. 

both esscntial points in all contracts proposed by advertisement. As a 

result. they sculed on a method of payment that the Treasury Board could 

make by negotiating a contract with Turnbull, Mannie & Co. Lawrence 

and Morris protested the award of that contract to their competitors at 

a higher price than they had bid, but under the existing financial situation 

an investigating committee of Congress supported the Board's action. II 

All clothing contracts specified the delivery poim. In 1785, delivery 

was to be made at New York.; in 1786 Turnbull, Mannie &: Co. agreed to 

deliver at Philadelphia. There the clothing was inspected and subsequently, at the direction of the Secretary at War, the contractor trans· 

ported the clothing to a designated destination point. He agreed to 

charge no more than the customary transportation costs and was allowed a 

5 percent commission for superintending the deli very. It 

By 1788, the troops that had enlisted in 1785 had received only two 

complete suits of clothing instead o( the three to which they were 

entitled. Such was the financial stringency under which the Secretary 

at War operated that though provisions had been made for the t.hird 

year's clothing supply, he had been compelled to divert it to the use of 

the recruiting service. Recruits could not otherwise have been enlisted 

except by offering them a suit of clothing as an inducement. He anticipated that the third suit of clothing due the soldiers would be furnished 

them by October 1789.10 

The troops at the frontier posts also needed camp k.ettles, axes, 

canteens, tents, and Olher equipment- articles (or the procurement of 

which the Quartermaster's Department had formerly been responsible. 

Such supply, according to a congressional commiuee, was now arranged 

on " principles highly Oeconomical and beneficial to the public." Instead 

of being provided by a Quartermaster General with " his train of attendants," subsistence contractors furn ished such articles under contracts that 

they made with the Secretary at War. Such " indispensably necessary" 

articles were furnished only on a written order of the commanding officer 

of the troops, Colonel Harmar, or the commanding officer of a post. 

To compensate the contractors for this service, they were allowed 

II (I) j OllwnlJ 0/ the COlltinelltal COlIgreJJ, XXXI. 899-906 (5 ()(:t 1786), 912- 11 (26 ()(:I 

1786)_ (2) I'apc'n of the Continental Congress. item 39. II . f. 145 (Corltracl , 2 Sep 1786), f. 149 

(Law rence and Morris to ~'I. of Congress. 29 Sep 1786)_ 

'"Sec. [or example, contract with Turnbull . Mannie &: Co. in 1786. I'apen o[ the Con. 

tinerual Congress. item 19. II. r. \45-46. 

- j ounral5 Qlllre Curr/il/elltal Congress, XXXIV, 581 (2 Oct 1788). 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY 81 

.7 percent on such expenditures when they seul ed their accounts every 

6 months at the Treasury. On the other hand, the Secretary at War 

purchased, withoUl benefit of any commission or charge to the government, all such Quartermaster items of supply furnished to the troops 

stationed within the states rather than at frontier posts.tI 

Handicapped by lack of funds, neither the commissioners of the 

Treasury Board nor Secretary Knox could make adequate provision for 

the troops, Ill-fed and ill-clothed, many of the soldiers on the frontier 

deserted because they were also unpaid.n The government was in no 

position to wage a vigorous campaign against the lndians, who were 

growing increasingly hostile as settl ers began pushing across the Ohio. 

The only expedient that Knox could propose for meeting the Indian 

threat on the frontier was to post the few troops that he did have to the 

best advantage "to awe the savages" and to endeavor by treaties and 

presents " to incline them to peace." This was a policy that had been 

pursued since the end of the Revolutionary War. It had resulted in a 

number of treaties but had not brought lasting tranquility to the 

frontier. II 

About the time Knox was making these proposals, the advocates of 

a stronger central government had succeeded in calling a convention that 

threw out the idea of simply revising the Articles of Confederation in 

favor of drafting a new constitution for a national government consisting 

of a legislature, executive, and judiciary. Their efforts resulted in the 

inauguration of a new government on 30 April 1789 when Washington 

took the oath of office as President of the United States. 

As part of the executive branch of government, Congress now created 

a War Department. Washington continued Henry Knox in office as 

Secretary of War, a position he held until he resigned on 28 December 

1794. His duties were now increased since he was made responsible 

for all matters that the President might assign to him relating to the army, 

navy. and Indian affairs. To him was also entrusted the duty of furnish· 

ing "warli ke stores." If Congress also established a Treasury Department, 

headed by a Secretary of Treasury, to which post Washington appointed 

Alexander Hamilton. In assigning duties to the Secretary of the 

Treasury, Congress did not include the responsib ility formerly vested 

.. Ibid ., XXXIV, 581H17 (2 Oct 1788) . 

.. Leiters of M emberl of the Continental Congreu, rd. Burnett , VIII, 546 (Rurus King to 

Elbridge Gerry, 30 Apr 1786). 

· Cla rence E. Carter, Th e Territorinl Papers of lite Unit ed SIMes (24 ,'ols., Washington. 

19.54 -), 11, 55 (Knox' report to Congress, JO Jul 1787) . 

.. (1) 1 Sial. 19-50 (Aug 7. 1789). (2) j ournQ{ of lit e Ex .,t; l~ Proceedi"gJ of lite Se.tnle, 

1, 25, 26 (4, 12 Sep 1789), (5) Orake, 7.ife .md CorreJpo"dcltce of Mlljor·Ce.teml He,,? KflOX, 

109,110 (Kno" 10 Wash inglon, 29 O~ 1194 and reply. 3Q ~ 1794). 
82 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

in the Treasury Board (or suppl ying the troops with cloth ing and subsistence. Nevenheless, established procedures of the past persisted, and 

during the first 3 years of the new government both the Secretary of "VaT 

and the Secretary of the Treasury executed contracts for Army clothing 

and subsislence.u 

In the spring of 1792, Congress clarified responsibility for supply 

by directing that a ll purchases and COntracts for providing the Army with 

provisions, clothing. Q uartermaster supplies, and military SLOres and for 

furnishing the War Department with Indian goods, nava l stores, and all 

other supplies for its use were to be made by the Treasury Department.te 

It thereby returned to the Treasury control over clothing and subsistence 

contraCts that it had possessed since 1781. At the same time, it divested 

the Secretary of War of the procurement authority he had exercised in 

th e purchase of quartermaster and ordnance stores since his office had 

absorbed the duties of th e Quartermastcr's Department and of the office 

of Commissary of Military Stores in 1785. 

Under the new arrangement, the Secretary of War prepared estimates 

of supplies that were wanted and furnished the Treasury Department 

with standard samples or patterns of the articles to be purchased. The 

Treasury Department then made thc contracts and arranged for inspection 

of the items procured. By the spring of 1794, the procurement of War 

Department supplies had been placed in the ha nds of Tench Coxe, 

Commissioner of Reve nue in the Treasury Department. Coxe found 

this business so extensive that it interfered with the other duties of his 

office. When he requested that he be relieved of them, Hamilton pro· 

posed that an officer be specirlcall y appointed in the Treasury Department 

to direct procurement of all military supplies. He considered that such 

procurement had been properly vested in his Depanment because it had 

morc information on how to obtain supplies. Moreover, during most 

of the past decade, it had developed channels of communication with 

contracLOrs and procedures for handling contracts. H e funher assumed 

that the Treasury might be "expected to feel a more habitual solicitude 

for economy" than any other department. As a consequence, Congress 

established the post of Purveyor of Public Supplies. Under the direction 

and supervision of th e Secretary of the Treasury, th e Purveyor procured 

"all articles of supply requisite for the service of the Un ited States." II 

- (I) I 5/(1/.65 (Scp 2. 1789). (2) See RG 217. GAO, Registnr'l Offoce, Box 1-8,27 Nov 

1789-~1 Dec 1789. ror examples or contracts. National Archives. 

0015/11/. 2i9 (May 8, 1792). 

"'(1) I Stilt. 419 (Feb 2~. 1795). (2) Amerit:lllt Sla/e PIIPU$, '\/i/iIMJ ARII;rJ, I. 69 (Hamil . 

ton to President. 2])ec 1794). (~) RG 7!>, Dept. or Interior. Coxe Letter Book. r. I. 7 (Coxe to 

Secretary or War. 1<1 Apr. 2 May 1795); r. 27<1- 75 (C.oxc circular to Tre~ ul'y agents. 5 Jan 1795). 

National Archi,'es. 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY 83 

Tench Francis. who had been employed in the Treasury Department 

as a procurement agent [or War Department supplies, became the first 

!)urvcyor of Public Supplies.u 

Except for ralions, deli very of which continued to be executed by 

the contracLOrs directly to the pOStS or delivery points designated in the 

contracts, the Secretary of War directed the distribution of all military 

suppl ies. By 1794, experi ence had shown that it would be desirable to 

have onc officer in the 'War Department who would be responsible for 

receiving. distributing, and superintending the issues of supplies. In 

response to President WaShington's recommendation, Congress created 

the office of Superintendent of Military Stores in April 1794.21 Washington appointed Samuel Hodgdon, still serving in Philade lphia as Commissary of Military Stores, to this newly created office_ 

Under d irections from Secretary Knox and the Comptroller of the 

Treasury, Hodgdon organized his office to promote a more effective 

system of storage, a more adequate control of distribution, and a sounder 

knowledge of the stocks on hand. By Knox' orders all storekeepers at 

magazines and arsenals were brought under Hodgdon's COntrol. The 

latter furnished them with instl'llCl ions for separate storage of each type 

of al'licie, for lhe proper care and preservation of stores, and for the 

preparation of quarterly retu rns. The storekeepers issued all materiel 

on ol'ders of the Superi ntendent who acted on directions received from 

the Secretary of War. By personal inspection each year, he was to observe 

whether instructions were be ing carried out at the magazines and arsenals 

and whether the stores on hand compared with the returns being made. 

Unfortunately, Hodgdon later (ound that the demands of his office made 

an annual inspection LOur impossible so that all the anticipated benefits 

did not materialize. sCI 

By direction of the Comptroller of the Treasury Department, all 

contractors and purchasi ng agents deposited the supplies they purchased 

in the magazines or arsenals under Hodgdon's care, taking the SLOrekeeper's I'ece ipt for them so that their accounts could be adjusted at the 

Trcasury. In cases wherc from the nallire of the business such deposits 

could not be made, the Pmveyor furnished the Superimendem with 

statements indicating the stores pUl'chased and the persons responsible 

for them. T he Comptroller instructed Hodgdon on the forms to be 

used in keeping his accounts, proposing that all accou nts of Stores in the 

... jf)"JI'/ uf 'I.e Ex",,"liw: I',ueudi"gs af lIu S,male, I. 173. 174. His norninalion on 

24 Fchruary 1795 "'as confirmed Ihe nC')lI day. 

-(I) Amuictlfl Slale Pa peTJ,/IIilila'1 AnairJ.I . 61 (Pre. 10 Sen;u e. 7 J an 1794). (2) I SItU. 

352 (Apr 2,1794). 

-lnSlnlCtior'll and Correspondence or Samuel Hodgdon. 1794--1800 (Knox 10 Hodgdon. 

26 Jul 1794). Manuscript Div., Library of Congreu. 
84 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Superintendent'S office be kept according to the departments- Quartermaster, Ordnance, Navy, Indian, Clothing. Hospital, and Commissaryto which the stores belonged, with the stores of these respective departments subdivided into c1asses. 31 

In the summer of 1798, a threat of war with France brought some 

modification in the procurement arrangement. By that time, a separate 

Navy Department had been created, and apparently Congress intended 

to make the head of each Department responsible for the proper application of the funds advanced to him.32 Congress therefore directed that 

all procurement of supplies for the military and naval services was to be 

under the direction of the heads of the War and Navy Departments. 

The Purveyor of Public Stores continued to execute all contracts except 

those for subsistence which were handled direcLly by the Secretary of 

War. The Purveyor procured supplies on orders received from the 

Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy. He rendered his accounts 

for such supplies to the accountants of the proper Departments for which 

the supplies were procured, but his accounts continued to be subject to 

the inspection and revision of the Treasury Department.u By this act, 

the War Department resumed the procurement authority that it had 

exercised so brieAy in 1789. Until the War of 1812 brought changes in 

admin istrative organization, the Secretary of War directed [he procurement and distribution of military supplies Llnough the Purveyor of Public 

Supplies and the Superintendent of. Military Stores, respectively. 

Supplying the Hannm' Expedition 

During the years when these details for handling supply by bureaus 

were being worked out, the Army was involved in a series of Indian 

expeditions, in the course of wh ich Quartermaster supply in the fie ld 

progressed from admin istration by contractors to the re-establishment 

of a field organi zation under the direction of a Quartermaster General. 

As Governor of the Northwest Territory and Superintendent of the 

Northern Indian Department, Arthur St. Clair had been dispatched to 

the West under instructions to remove all causes of Indian discontent. 

Despite the conclusion of a new treaty at Fort Harmar on 9 January 1789, 

St. Clair's efforts to promote peace were futile. Indian raids continued 

against the small, scattered settlements in the Ohio Valley, and it was 

" Ibid .• (Ol iver Wolcott 10 Hodgdon. 2 OCI 1794). 

a RG 107, Office of Secrelary of War (OSW), Lenen Rc<:eived Uohn Sleele, Comptroller, 

10 James MCHenry, Secretary of War, 24 No\' 1798). National Archl\'<!$. 

-I Slat. 610 Gul 16, 1798). 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY 85 

FORT HARMAR 

obvious that a militant policy would have to be pursued for their protection. It had become increasingly evident, too, that the Army's offensive 

would have to be launched against the Indians living in the upper 

Wabash and Maumee va ll eys. Their hostility to the tide of emigration 

moving into the Northwest Territory was repeatedly fanned into new 

attacks against the settlers by the intrigues of the Canadian fur traders, 

operating under the covert protection of the nearby post of Detroit that 

was still held by the British. 

Having determined that peace could not be obtained without a show 

of force, St. Cla ir met with Colonel Harmar in mid-July 1790 at Fort 

Washington to plan an attack on the Indian villages in the Maumee 

valley. In order that Harmar might know the supply situation, St. Clair 

took with him to the meeting one of the contractors, Robert Elliot, of 

the firm of Elliot and Wil liams, who in 1790 held the contract for 

provisioning the troops on the frontier as it had since its first bid was 

accepted by the Treasury Board in 1788. Elliot assured St. Clair and 

Harmar that rations could be provided though corn might have to be 

substituted for flour. The contractors agreed to supply, before the first 

of October 180,000 rations of flour and 200,000 rations of meat. Since 

at that time Contractors were performing quartermaster duties as well as 

furnishing rations, they also agreed to provide 868 artillery and pack-
FT, 

WAYNE 

MAP 2 

Penn. 

" , 

'\PITTSBURGH 

" i eWHEELlNG t... 

\.--- ~ 

FT. HARMAR. 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY 87 

horses, the lauel" equipped with packsaddles, bags. and ropes. T hey 

were to furnish a horsemaster ge neral, 18 horsemastcl's, and 130 packhorse 

d rivers to supervise the transportation of supplies. Two months later. 

despite the short nOlice given them, th e contractors reported that they 

had fulfilled the terms of their agreement." 

In the meantime, St. Clair had hurried to New York where, on 

23 August, he laid his plans for the expedition before the War Department. Both Knox and the Presidclll approved them, and on the same 

day the Secretary of War took steps to support the expedition. He sen t 

an estimate to the Treasury, detailing the funds required and the amount 

that ought to be advanced at once to enabl e the contractors " to execute 

the duties of the quartermaster's department." He immediately instructed Hodgdon, Commissary of Military Stores in Philadelph ia. to 

forward , by way of Redstone and Wheel ing. two tons of riAe and musket 

powder and four tons of lead bull ets, cartridge paper. and case shot for 

5lAt -inch howitzers and for three and six pounders. Knox advised the 

contractors that sufficient funds had been advanced to their agent by the 

Treasury Department so that they would suffer no "want of pecuniary 

assistance" in mak ing their preparations. He also informed Harmar of 

the measures he had taken and transmitted to him a thousand dollars 

for contingencies. n 

To support the few regular troops. militia were called out from 

Pennsylvania and Kentucky. Knox suggested that it might be advisable 

for Harmar to persuade some of them to relinquish their rifles, which 

were not good for close fighting. for the spare muskets that were in store 

at Fort Washington. Knox did not foresee that instead of assembling 

fu ll y armed and accoutered as they were supposed to do. the militiamen 

would arrive at the Fort between 15- 25 September ill equipped with, and 

in many cases destitute of, camp kettles. axes, and arms. The best that 

Colonel Harmar could do in the few days before the departure of the 

expedition was to direct the issue of such arms as were available at the 

Fort and to order the repair of those that could be made fit for use," 

Harmar's combined force of 320 regu lars and 1.133 militiamen 

moved northward on 3 October, returning to Fort Washington a month 

laler. In the interim, they destroyed some abandoned Indian villages. 

loca ted about 170 mil es north of the Fort near the present site of 

"' Alllerit'1I1I SIll Ie Pllpers,lmlilll! Aflllirs, l. 92 (SI. Clair 10 Knox. 23 Aug 1790); 96 (Elliol 

and Williams to Knox. 14 Oel 1790). 

· ,bid., 1. 98 (Knox to Secrela...,. of the Treasury. 23 Aug 1790); 98-99 (Knox 10 St. Clair. 

23 Aug 1790); 99 (Knox 10 Ha nnar. 24 Aug 1790); 99 (Knox to Elliot and Williauis. 3 Scp 

1790) . 

• (]) 'hid., l. !)9 (Kno); to Harlll3r. 24 Aug ]790). (2) Amuiean SIM~ Papu s, Mi/illlry 

AnllirJ, I.:?O (Deposition or Maj. William Ferguson . IG Sep ]791). 
88 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T H E ARM Y 

Ft. Wayne, Ind., and in two engagements with the Ind ians wcrc rouled 

because of th e undisciplined, cowardly conduct of the militia. T he 

losses were heavy; 183 of the 1,453 soldiers were ill ed. T T he Indians 

had not been overawed by this show of force; rather they had been 

further infuriated by the burning of their villages and the destruction 

of their winter's suppl y of grai n. 

The expedition was also expensive in the loss of arms and equipment. 

in rations wasted. and in horses stOlen or ki ll ed. The large number of 

horses lost was attributable to the negligence of sentinels and the conni vance of the packhorse drivers and horsemasters. They were not only 

"ignorant of their duty, indolent and inactive," but by the terms under 

wh ich horses and drivers were hired by the COntractors it was to the 

advantage oE the drivers, "who were chiefl y parties in the business," to 

lose the anima ls instead of returning them to their owners. In that 

case, the owners were paid [or the loss of the animals which were appraised 

at a high rate, and also collected the dail,y pay [or their services umil 

they were lost." 

T he expedition afforded some supply lessons. It showed that 

contractor supervision of transportation would prove highl y expensive. 

It demonstrated that an Army relying on packhorses to transport its 

supplies would not be abl e to conduct a march in Indian country after 

froSt had destroyed the forage. It was also evident that either the federal 

government would ha ve to equip the militia when they were call ed into 

service, or some measures would have to be taken to ma ke certain that the 

states would maintain the militia full y equipped and ready to march when 

needed. Moreover, it was fully demonstrated that raw, untra ined militia 

might be used to augmem but could never strengthen the small, hard 

core of regular troops sem into the field. The lessons were cl ear enough 

but it did not [allow that they would be applied in the next expedition. 

Suppm·t of the St. Clai1' Expedition 

The failure of the force under Harmar in 1790 made another 

expedition indispensably necessary in 179 1. Winter imposed peace but 

spring would inevitably bring a renewa l of frontier raids, for the Indians 

had won just enough of a victory to encourage them to renewed efforts 

against the white men. Speedy preparations were in no way characteristic 

of the St. Cla ir expedition either in planning or execution, Knox took 

so much time in making his report to Congress, and both houses debated 

.. AmuiCQlI SllIl lI Pppllrs, Indinll AUDirs, I. 106 (RelUrn ." Nov 1790) . 

• America" SlaU Pa/Jllrs, Militllry AUllirs, I. 20. 2<1 (Del>osilions of Maj. William Ferguson 

and LI. Ebeneler Denny. 16 Sel' 1791 ), 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY 89 

so long about it, that it was generally doubted that men could be enlisted 

and march over the mOllntains "in season." 39 It was late in January 

1791 when Knox urged that at leaS{ 3,000 men be sent to establish a strong 

post at the Miami village. close to what is now the city of Ft. Wayne, Ind. 

Subordinate posts were to link it to Fort Washington, near the mouth 

of the Miami River. Incurring such expense had not been considered 

wise as long as there had been hope of obtaining possession of Detroit, 

but that hope had vanished for the present, and erection of the post at 

the Miami village was the only alternative. 

Arguing that their service would be more "efficacious" and economical, Knox proposed that, in lieu of militia, a corps of levies or volunteers 

be raised. They would serve under officers selected by the federa l 

government for the duration of the expedition which he thought would 

not last longer than 4 months. He also urged an increase in the Regular 

Army by the addition of anmher regiment of infantry, bringing its 

strength to 2,128.H 

On 3 March, Congress added the regiment of infantry and authorized 

the President to raise a corps of levies of no more than 2,000 men under 

federal control for a period of 6 months." T hough before the passage 

of this act the authorized strength of the Army had been 1,216, in 

January 1791 only 820 privates and non-commissioned officers were 

actually in service." Anticipating therefore that the ranks of the authorized second regiment would not be fi lled in time for the expedition, 

Congress directed the President to make up any deficiencies by raising 

additiona l levies or calling militia into service. On the following day, 

the President appointed Arthur St. Clair as major general in command 

of the expedition. 

Never was an expedition so bungled in planning, preparation, and 

execution. Knox expected that the regu lar troops and the levies would 

be recruited and rendezvous at Ft. Washington (later Cincinnati) by 

10 July. If at that date a peaceful settlement had not been made with 

the Indians, St. Clair, with a force of some 3,000 men, was to advance 

into the Indian country, building and garrisoning posts between Ft. Washington and the Miami village. Actuall y, St. Clair did not arrive at 

Ft. Washington until late in May. He might profitably have delayed 

his departure from Ph iladelphia until he had thoroughly reviewed the 

logistical support for his expedition, since at the time of his arrival the 

garrison consisted of only 75 men fit for duty. Not until 15 July, 5 days 

· William H. Smith. Th ~ SI. Cla;r Papus: Til e Life lind P!!blic Serv 5 of Anlhony 

SI. Cla'r (2 vols .. Cincinnati. 1882). II. 208 (Lt. Ebeneter Denny to Harmar. 9 Mar 1791) . 

.. Amu ;can Sial" Pa pU$, {"d'an ADa;rs, I, 112- 15 (Knox to I'res. Washington. 22 Jan 1791). 

" I Sial. 222- 24 (~far S. 1791 ). 

"Amu ican Slal~ Pap rs, Indiau ADairJ. I. liS' (Strength of Army. 22 Jan 1791). 
90 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

FORT W ASHINGTON I N 1789 

after the original rendezvous date, d id the first regimcnt-299 non· 

commissioned offi cers and privates-arrive at Fort ' ·Vashington. It was 

September before aU th e troops had reported. St. Clair advanced into 

the Indian country 2 months behind schedul e, and instead of the 3,000 

men that Knox had advised him he would have, he had a little more 

than 2,000, incl uding some Kentucky militia that had been called out. 

As in the previous Harmar expedition, the grea ter part of his force was 

un trained-a consequence that inevitably fo ll owed from the fact that 

Congress did not enact legislation for raising these troops until March. 

This was far tOO late in the year to permit recruiting and disciplining of 

an Army that was intended to move in to acti on agai nst the Indians in 

th e summer of that same year.n 

Defore his departure from Philadelphia, St. Clair had briefly met 

with Knox to discuss suppl y arrangements. As in the past, food for the 

troops was to be procured and transported by a contractor- in this case, 

William Duer, who as long ago as th e Revolutionary War had engaged 

in supplying th e Army. I)rovisioning the troops of St. Clair's expedition 

"(I) Ibjd., I, 171 (Knox instruct ions (0 St. Clair, 21 Mar 1791 ). (2) American Slale Papers, 

Mifilary "Unirs, I. M.-!l7 (Committee Rpt on 51. Clair EKp<xlition. 8 May 1792). 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY 91 

in 1791 formed only a small part of his business enterprises. It was 

impossible for Duel' to devote due attention to subsisting the Army 

while at the same time promOling a large manufacturing company and 

engaging vigorously in stock speculations. The consequence was that 

the Army suffered." 

In 179 1, Duel' held two contracts for provisioning the troops, onc 

of which he had obtained in an indirect man ner from the original 

recipient, Theodosius Fowler, who had been granted the contract in 

October 1790 by the Secretary of the Treasury. Even before Congress 

authorized troops for the St. Clair expedition, Duer's agents were busy 

supplying the western posts,U It was not until the spring of 1791, however, that Duer informed Hamilton of the transfer of the Fowler contract 

and applied {or certain advances of money that the Secretary of the 

Treasury agreed to make to Duer as the agent of Theodosius Fowler. 

Meanwhile, the expedition had been determined upon and Congress 

provided that the levies and militia were to receive the same rations as 

the regular troops. The Secretary of War also contracted with William 

Duer, on 26 April 1791, to furnish provisions for the troops that were 

being recruited until their arriva l at Fort Pitt. Duer entered into a 

$4,000 bond to execute this contract, hUl withom any security. This 

was customary procedure in the execution of small amounts. U 

Duer's problem was to provision the western posts and the troops 

en route to Fort Washington as well as to accumulate enough flOUf and 

cattle not only to support the expedition but also to enable him to 

deposit 6 months' supply of flour and sa lted meat at the posts to be built 

and garrisoned in the Indian country. T he main deposit of provisiOns 

was required at Fort Washington because the plan originally called for 

the troops to proceed there immediately without being detained at Fort 

Pitt. Thereafter he was to forward provisions from post to post as the 

troops advanced into the Indian country and contructed them. 

Between 22 March and 20 july 179 1, Duer obtained advances of 

$70,000 on the contract made with the Secretary of the Treasury and a 

littl e more than $5.400 on the one made with the Secretary of War.<1 

Since the contractor was so liberall y provided with funds, Knox anticipated no deficiencies in the supply of provisions. Ration shortages, 

however, developed as soon as the first recruits assembled at the rendez· 

.. N.s.n. C r,l$ and Henrietta M. La rson, C(I$tbooh I" Ama lea'l 8!1sl'ItlS History (New 

Yurko 1939).277. 

" Papers of William Ducr, II. f. 299 (Laban Bronson to Ducr, 17 Fcb 1791; f. 23 1 (same (0 

same. 17 Ma r 1791). New York Hislorical Socicty. 

" Aml:riC(lfI Sia/ e p(lf, r$. Military Affairs, I, '6, 42 (Comminct: Rpls. 8 May 1792; 15 Feb 

1793). 

"Ibid. 
92 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

VOliS points of Carlisle. Pa., Winchester. Va., and Hagerstown, Md., 

large ly because Duer failed to place funds in the hands of his contracting 

agents. To remedy the situation, Knox either advanced money to the 

agent on Dlier's account or sent his own representative, furnished with 

enough funds to correct the deficiencies in supply." By June, Maj. Gen. 

Richard Butler, second in command of the expedition, reported a beef 

shortage in the Fon Pilt area, mllch to Knox' surprise for Duer had 

assured him that supply would be adequate. In justice to the contractor, 

Knox recognized that the detention of troops at Fort Pitt, occasioned by 

\Var Department orders to Butler to use troops under his command for 

the protection of the settlements on the upper Ohio, "must occasion some 

change in the contractor's arrangements." U Meanwhile, the contractor 

was accumulating flour at Fon \Vashington and his agent, Israel Ludlow, 

had gone to Kentucky to purchase cattle for the expedition. 

What troubled St. Clair was how the contractor intended transporting Rour on the expedition. He was apparently unaware of Duer's 

proposal to use boats to ascend the Miami River. The contractor's plans 

called for the use of only a few hundred packhorses. Early in July, he 

directed his agent, J ohn 'Vilkins, who in a few years was to become 

Quartermaster General, to buy 200 packhorses. With characteristic 

ineptness in long-range dealings, Duer nOt onl y misdirected these instructions but failed to notify Israel Ludlow, his agent at Fort Washington, 

of them. Ludlow could only inform St. Cla ir that he had received no 

instructions to provide for the transportation of provisions on the campaign. Before the purchase orders finally reached Wilkins, St. Clair, 

acting on Knox' repeated instructions thal he was to take effective steps 

to supply any deficiencies, had ordered Ludlow to make a provisional 

agreement for 800 packhorses. This large number, so many more than 

the contractor had planned for, startled Knox, but he was sure St. Clair 

would order no more than necessary. Actuall y, Ludlow purchased about 

600 horses, drawing bills on Duer for about $17,000. These the Treasury 

paid over Duer's protests.~ 

Despite St. Clair's action, it was the breakdown in transportation 

of provision that caused the troops on the expedition to be placed on 

one-half and one-quarter allowa nces of flour. Actually, there were more 

horses available for supply purposes than could be used. Ludlow could 

nOt employ all of those he did have because he lacked drivers. As a 

.. Am..,icIIII Stlll~ Pllp~rs, Indillll ADlli." I, 186. 187 (Knox 10 8utler, 12 and 19 May 1791) . 

.. Ibid., I, 188--89 (Knox 10 nUileT. 16 Jun 1791) . 

.. (I) Papers of William Ouer. II (Duer to J ohn and Charles Wilkefu, S Jul 1791; 1- Wilkins 

10 Duer, 6 Jul 1791 and 23 Sep 1791). (2) Amuicllfl SIIII~ P"pr,fl,lndillfl Annirl. I, 180 (K nox 

10 SI. Clair. 4 Aug 1791). (3) Stnith. Sl . CltJifPII/I~rs. 11. 230 (SI. Clair 10 Ludlow. 6 Aug 1791). 

(4) Am~riclln SltJt~ Pa~rs, Mililnry AUllirs, I, ~8 (Commillce Rpl , 8 May 1792). 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY 93 

consequence, the troops li ved a hand-to-mouth existence and were kept 

from starvation only by the time ly arriva l of small quantities of flour 

and cattle forwarded by the contractor. Officers on the expedition 

charged that the contractor had no transportation system; tha t he could 

not be depended on for supplies; that in short, there was " unpardonable 

mismanagement in the provision department." 01 

The War Department directed all other preparations for the expedition, with results no less distressing than the efforts of the contractor. 

On Knox' recommendation that the business of the Quartermaster's 

Department- specifically the transportation of troops and all supplies, 

except subsistence--could be handled morc economica lly by a Quartermaster than it had been by COntractors, Congress authorized appointment 

of such an officer for the expedition in March 179 1. He was to have 

the pay, rations, and forage of a lieutenant colonel commandant, but not 

the rank.n When Timothy Pickering refused the appointment, Knox 

turned to his trusted old friend and subordinate, Samuel Hodgdon, who 

was appointed on 4 March 179 1.01 The latter was flattered by the honor 

accorded him, but, realizing the assignment was temporary, he accepted 

only on condition that he be allowed to reta in his position as Commissary 

of Military StOres at Philade lphia. He proposed that William Knox, 

youngest brother of the Secretary of War, who had been serving as a 

clerk in the War Department since 1786, should conduct the business 

of Commissary of Stores during his absence." 

Hodgdon was a competent businessman of great integrity, whose 

many years of experience as Commissary of Military Stores inclined him 

to be "exact in his Accounts, scrupu lously tenacious of the public 

property." His critics genera ll y agreed that he was indefatigable in the 

discharge of his duties, but that he did not comprehend the nature of the 

staff position he was now called upon to administer.u The task assigned 

.. (I) Smith , SI. Clair Pap~r!I, II , 245fJ. (Diary or Lt. Ebenezer Denny): 216-47 (St. Clair to 

Ludlow. B Oct 179 1). (2) "Winthrop Sargent's Diary," Oltio Archa o/osical and His/arleal 

Quarluly, vol. 33. NO.3 Uul 1924). PI'. 245, 246. 248. 

"(I) I Sla/. 222- 24 (Mar 3, 1791). (2) Am~ricall Slat e Papu$, l udlt'" ADairs, I, 120 (Esti_ 

mate or 22 J an 179 1). The remune ration amounted to 51.126.80 a year. or which the pay at 

$60 a month came 10 $720, the rations at 6 per day or 2,190 a yea r at 12 cents accounted for 

$262.80, and the rorage at $12 per month added $ 144 a year . 

.. (I) I'ieke ring and Upham, Life of Timothy Picheri"g, II, 282- 83 (Knox to Pickering, 

25 Feb 1791). (2) ExulJtiv~ j o,mHl1 of tI ~ 'wte, 1. 82-84. 

·' (1) RG 107, OSW, ~uen Sent and Received, Box 3 (Hodgdon to Knox, 14 Mar 1792-

should be 1791). National Archives. (2) Papeu of the Cont inental Congress, item 150, I. f. 171 

(Knox to Chainllan David Ramsay, 4 May 1786). (3) William Kno)( was subject to occasional 

fits of derangement at this time and d ied about 1797. Drake, Ufe and Corrnpmldellu of 

Maior·G~nual ll~nry Ktlox, lOi n . 

.. (I) Henry Knox Papers (Wilkinwn to Clement Biddle. 13" Mar 1792). Massachusetts 

HiMorical Society. (2) Ca rter, T~rrjtorial Pal, rJ of Ih e U" ited Statu , n . 399 (W. Sargent to 

rhe Secretary or War, 9 Jul 1792). 
91 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

him would have taxed the talents of a genius. Hodgdon was burdened 

with heavy responsibilities for both quartermaster and ordnance supplies, 

but he had no adequate organization or staff of officers upon whom he 

could depend for the execution of his orders. Aside from such few men 

as could be spared from the line, he acquired a few civilian assistantsWilliam Knox at Philadelphia, Issac Craig at Fort Pitt, and Robert 

Buntin at Fort Washington. He was St. Clair's most important staff 

officer but he was given no military rank, and consequently he had no 

authority over military personnel. He could be and was subjected to 

abuse from line officers. His place was with St. Clair as Quartermaster 

but he was compelled to combine the duties of a bureau chief at 

Philadelphia with those of a staff officer in the field for many weeks 

after his appointment. 

In accepting his appointment. Hodgdon promised to exercise economy in the conduct of his business. Economy was the watchword of 

the administration. It was practiced to such an extent by both the 

Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War that the quality of 

the supplies procured suffered as a result. They awarded contracts to 

the lowest bidders even though the bids accepted were often so low as 

to permit only a bare margin of profit and necessarily must have induced 

contractors to resort to sharp practices to increase their earnings. As a 

consequence. the troops on the St. Clair expedition received tents that 

afforded no protec.tion from the rain. clothing that wore out before the 

levies reached Fort Washington. shoes that were "vile in the extreem," 

and powder that was so weak it would carry a ball only a short distance.~8 

Following his appointment, Hodgdon promptly settled his accounts 

as Commissary of Military Stores in expectation that he would shortly 

join St. Clair at Fort Washington to be present at the "General Rendezvous of Men & Stores." n For 3 months, however, Knox detained him 

in Philadelphia not only to arrange for quartermaster supplies but also 

to direct the distribution of clothing and equipment to the levies. In 

addition. Knox relied upon his knowledge as Commissary to procure 

and transport ordnance and military stores needed for the expedition. 

Knox himself directed procurement of clothing while Hodgdon. 

as military storekeeper, receipted for the articles turned in by the contractors, gave them cursory inspection. and forwarded the clothing to the 

troops, employing the services of private wagoners to make delivery at 

rendezvous points. Clothing for those who were enlisted in the regular 

Army offered no problem; for some years contracts had regularly been 

.. (I) Smith, 51. Clair Papas, II, 289-91 (Testimony of General Hannar and Major Zeigler). 

(2) RG 107, OSW, Letters Sent and Received, Box 2 (Hodgdon to William Knox, 4 Aug 1791) . 

• , RG 107, OSW, Leuen-Scnt and Received, Box 3, (Hodgdon to Knox, 14 Mar 1791). 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY 95 

made for such clothing. Knox directed St. Cla ir to draw upon the 

surplus stocks tha t were deposited at Fort Washington to clothe the First 

Regiment. M 

Clothing the levies was another matter. Knox had o bserved that 

many militia were soon rendered unfit for service by want of clothing. 

Upon his recommendation therefore. Congress provided that the levies 

were to receive a proportiona l share of the annual clothing suppl y 

a ll owed the regu lar troops, paying for it by a proportional deduction 

from th eir pay. Since th e levies were enlisted for 6 months, this allowance amounted to one-half the annua l supply of the regu lar troops, for 

which th e levies paid one-ha lf as much as they did, or 45 cents a month ,n 

All of the cloth ing for the levi es had to be contracted for and hurriedly 

manufactured. It could scarcel y have been equal to the patterns the 

contractors were to follow. Except for overalls which were of good 

quality, th e inspector of th e Army later testified that th e clothing of the 

levies was inferior to that of the regular troops. nUl even if it had been 

"ever so good," he asserted, it would not have lasted because they took. 

no Care of it.eo -

While clothing the levies a t the rendezvous points and issuing arms, 

ammunition, and accoutrements to them on their arrival at Fort Pitt, 

Hodgdon was also forwarding there the quartermaster and ordnance 

supplies for shipment down the Ohio with the troops. Immediate ly 

following his appointment he had prepared a tentative estimate of th e 

supplies that wou ld be needed on the expedition. Ne ither that estimate 

nor the more specific one prepared by Knox a month later was adequate, 

particularly in respect to th e tools needed to clear a road through the 

wil derness for artill ery and to build posts. When th e troops began to 

construct Fort J efferson, for example, spades and mattocks were plentiful 

but th e Quartermaster could furnish only 80 axes, and 13 of these were 

harrowed from th e troops. There was but one saw and one frow, 

according to the Adjutant Genera l. St. Clair, to wh om the Hodgdon 

estimate had been shown before h is departure for Fort Washington, 

approved of it without pointing out any of its deficiencies, th ough later, 

in the midst of a congressional investigation, he was critical of it and 

attributed the fa il ure of his ex pedition to the shortcomings of the 

Quartermaster's Department.G' 

'" Amaic"" Sial" P(Jpers, iudillll Affairs, 1, 173 (Knox to 51. Clair. 21 Mar 1791). 

"(I) Ibid., I. 124 (Estimate of expenses of levies, 22 Jan 1791). (2) 1 SllIt. 22-24 (Mar ~. 

1791). 

·Smith. St. Clair PIII)as, 11 , 194 (Testimon y of Col. r.f ontgetz) . 

.. (1) "Winthrop Sargent" Diary," Ollio Archaeologicill olld Historicill QUllr/erl)', \'01. 33. 

No.3 Uu1y 1924), p. 245. (2) RG 94, AGO, SI. Clair Papers (Hodgdon estimate, 15 Mar 1791; 

Knox estimate. 17 Apr 179 1). Naliona1 Archives. (3) Narrillion of the Monner in W h ich tht 
96 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

The pursuit of economy and lhe fa il ure to exercise close supervision 

of all planning deta ils accounted for much of the difficulty encountered 

in the suppl y of military stores and accoutrements. Economy dictated 

the use, for exampl e, of cartridge boxes that for years had been lying in 

storage without adequate attention being given to their maintenance. 

Refurbished in appeara nce, they wcre forwarded without scrutiny of 

their serviceability. As early as 17 March, Knox ordered Hodgdon to 

forward 200 shot and shells for each piece of artillery on the expedition. 

To promote economy by saving the costs of transportation, Hodgdon 

depended on obta ining them from a furnace at Fort Pitt owned by 

Turnbull & Marmie. This laudabl e objective unfortunately "turned 

out ill," for the furnace was unable to produce the shells required, though 

tbat fa ct did not become known until late in July when efforts had to be 

made to obtain the supply elsewhere. In the meantime, as late as the 

first week in July when according to original plans the expedition should 

have been ready LO move against the Indians, St. Clair had to requisition 

additional suppli es of powder, lead, 3.pound cannon balls, and 5V2-inch 

shells for mortars. St. Clair's letters normally took at least a month to 

reach the War Department. Knox responded promptly in August by 

forwarding all the supplies requested, except the 5J;2-inch shells that 

could be obtained only at West Point. Obviously, delivery of them 

could not be made in time for the expedition though Knox apparently 

thought SL Clair had sufficient qual1lities on hand at Fort Washington 

for his immediate needs.62 

No charges of shortages of military stores were made during the 

congressional investigation but there was much criticism of their quality. 

As early as June, Maj. William Ferguson, an artill ery officer supervising 

military stores at Fort Washington, reported that powder casks were 

"very slight, and not properly secured; also the musket cartridge paper 

was not the proper SOrt, being too easily lorn, and of course the cartridges 

made of it will not bear much carriage." 63 The inspector of the Army 

later testified that when he examined the arms and accoutrements of the 

troops on their arrival at Fort Washington he found many of the arms 

broken and unserviceable, "owing to the negligence of the men and accidents on the march." Some of the weapons were unfit for use because 

they were too old. Under the direction of Major Ferguson, about 32 

Campaign Agai'!.ft tl, ,.; Indilws . !Vas Cm,ducted, U"d,.;r ''' e Comma"d of Major General 

St. Clair . .. (I'h iladclphia. 1812), p. 11 4. Hereafter brieHy cited St. Clair Narralive. 

"'(I) American Siale Papers, l1rdiau ADairs, I. 180 (Knox to 51. Clair, 4 Aug 1791 ); 195 

(Knox to Hodgdon, 4 Aug 1791); 195 (William Knox 10 Hodgdon, 18 Aug 1791). (2) St. Clair 

Narrative, 89-90; 115. 

"Smith, St. Clair Papers, 11 , 223 (Ferguson to St. Clair, 25 Jun 1791). 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY 97 

artificers werc employed to repair arms, build new carriages and mountings for the cannon, and make 300 dozen cartridges.l • 

Hodgdon should have been at Fort Washington to supervise th ese 

preparations but it was 4 June before he left Philadelphia for Fort Pitt, 

under instructions to provide the necessary boats for shipping men and 

supplies down the Oh io. He was also d irected to purchase 110 cavalry 

horses and 300 packhorses for transporting the baggage of the Army, the 

artill ery. and the hospital stores. Even before his departure. Hodgdon 

had ordered the purchase of 40 flatboats to transport the Virginia and 

Maryland levies from Redstone to PillSburgh,G' H odgdon arrived at 

Fort Pitt on IO June, further instructed to take the adv ice on prepa rations 

of Maj. Gen. Richard Butler, second in command of the ex pedition. 

Subsequentl y, when St. Clair ordered H odgdon to headquarters, General 

BUller th ought he was more profitably employed a t Fan Pitt and there 

th e Quartermaster remained.

6G 

He had many preparations to supervise at Fan Piu. Camp keules 

had to be manufactured from sheet iron that Hodgdon had fo rwarded 

in order that th e kettles might not be damaged in shipment from Philadelphia. Knapsacks had to be strapped and painted. Packsadd les were 

being manufactured by Butler's ord ers to replace those Hodgdon had 

sent from Philadelphia. T hough th e Q uartermaster had ordered them 

in various sizes and had taken the ad" ice of supposedly good judges, the 

fi rst deliveri es to reach Fort Pitt were tOO large to be used on western 

horses. John Wil ki ns, who undoubtedly wou ld have been pleased to 

furnish packsadd les at a profit to himse lf, derisively informed his fri end, 

Brig. Gen. William Irvine: 

We have had an opportunity of seeing oeconomy &- knowledge of this 

country displayed in sendi ng on the packsaddles from l)hiladelphi:l for the 

expedition. It is said they have cost carriage and first COSt four dollars, which 

I think the least they could have cost, for the carriage only was one Dollar, &-

when they are here they are not worth one fa rthing, for they would not fit on 

the largest Conestoga sta llion in Lancaster County, they would even roll on 

a Hogshead ... IT 

Viewi ng Butler's intervention in preparations, Hodgdon, with some 

exasperation reported th at packsaddles were "now th ree times providedand at last few will be wanted, as I shaH generally hire the horses for 

" I bid., II, 194-95 (Tcslimony of Col. Montgen) . 

• (I) RG 107. OSW, Letters Senl and Rtce;"ed, Uo,,; 2 (Hodgdon to Col. Jamtt Marshall , 

~ May 1791). (2) Amuicm! SllIh: Pll , 'rldill!! Anllirs, I. 9~ (Kno" 10 Hodgdon. I l\hy 

1791 ), 

-A"'~ri I"r SIIII ~ Pilpers, I"dilln Aooirs, I. 9~ (Kno,,; 10 Hodgdon , 3 JUII 179 1). 

"' Papen of n rig. Cen. William rv in , X. 88 (19 May 1791 ). Penn$ylnnia H isloriol 

Socicly. 
98 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

that service, and they will be completely furnished as is usual in th is 

country." n 

In the midst of the bustle of preparations at Fort Pitt there was 

much confusion. Hodgdon could not tell what suppli es had arrived at 

Fort Pitt because his assistant, Will iam Knox, had failed to report what 

stores he had forwarded. Files, be lls for the horses, shovels, spades, and 

grindstones were among the articles Hodgdon wanted William Knox to 

check upon. Two weeks la ter he was still waiting for a general return 

that apparently never arrived. Individual in voices sent along with boxes 

of articles often fai led to correspond to the contents, and Hodgdon 

cautioned Knox to be careful. 'Without accurate knowledge of the 

supplies that had arrived, Hodgdon was nevertheless certain that many 

of the stores were still detained on the road. s9 

Obviously the caliber of wagon dri vers showed no improvement in 

179 1 over those employed du ring the Revolutionary War. On 18 August, 

for example, Hodgdon was still waiting for the arrival of a load that had 

left Philadelphia a month earlier. Nor was he any more fortunate in 

other personnel hired for various duties. A conductor of military stores 

was sent back to Philadelphia from Fort Washington because he was 

drunk for weeks at a time. The conductor and forage master sent with 

100 cavalry horses was so lacki ng in knowledge of how to care for the 

animals that 70 of them wandered away the first night after they were 

d isembarked from the Aatboats that had brought them down the rivcr. To 

By 21 July, Knox thought it "proper" that both Quartermaster 

Hodgdon and General Butler should be at headquarters as soon as 

possible. But it was 3 weeks latcr before Hodgdon wrote St. Clair that 

the last of the packhorses had gone forward and that he and the hospital 

stores, together with General Butler and the last detachment of the 

troops, would be on their way, possibly arriving at headquarters before 

his letter." This oplimistic forecast was not reali zed; some 2 weeks later 

Hodgdon was still at Pittsburgh. Knox, complaining that expenses 

exceeded estimates, hoped that the troops were not detained at Fort Pitt 

(or want o( boats. At Fort Washington, St. Clair was apprehensive that 

the state of the river would prevent Bmler and Hodgdon from joining 

him. Indeed the lowness of the water made the river almost impassable 

- RG 107. OSW, leiters Sen! and Rccd~ed. Box 2 (Hodgdon to William Knox, 24 Jun 

1791). 

- Ibid., Box 2 (Hodgdon 10 William Knox. 14 J un: 110 Jun: 14 Aug 179 1) . 

.. (I) Ibid., Box 2 (Hodgdon 10 William Knox. 18 Aug: 18 Sep 1791). (2) 51. Clair Narra· 

lilll:, 41-42. 

"(I) Aml:riWI! Slllle PIlPUS, In dia" AD"irl, I, 191 (Knox 10 Butler, 21 Ju l 1791 ). (2) 

RG 107. OS\\', Leiters Sent and Received ; Box 2 (Hodgdon to SI. Cl3ir. 12 Aug 1791). 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY 99 

in places, and necessitated the employment of more hands and morc boats 

to transport all suppli es si nce the flatboats could carry only half loads.a 

Hodgdon, Butler, the last of the troops and the stores arrived at 

Fort Washington on 10 September. St. Clair could foresee no further 

de lays to the expedition and ex pected to move forward by 25 September. 

But it was already 100 late to begin a march into the Indian country. 

In little morc than a week, light frosts injured the pasturage upon which 

the cattle and horses depended, since no forage was carried with the 

expcdition.

n The Army slowly moved forward, averaging about 5 to 6 

miles a day, Slopping to build Fort Hamilton and then. 44 miles farther 

north. Fort J efferson. 

By then it was late in October and the subsistence suppl y had become 

so precarious that St. Clair dispatched Quartermaster Hodgdon back to 

Fort WashingLOn to take the necessary measures to make good any 

deficiencies after ascertaining the resources of the contractor and the 

transportation he had available for sending rations forward. With forage 

elllirely destroyed by frost, the horses fai ling and unable to keep up, 

transportation difficulties increased each day as the Army lengthened the 

distance from its base of supplies. It was obvious that with the season 

so far adva nced. continuance of the campaign was impracticable. f

• Nevertheles ~. St. Clair pushed on to the inevitabl e denouement that occurred 

on the morning of 4 November when the Indians surprised the camp and 

routed the militia who fled through the ranks of the regular regiment. 

throwing the entire force into disorder. With the artillery sil enced. all 

but one of the artill ery offi cers killed, and more than half of the Army 

fall en, a precipitate retrea t was made toward Fort Jefferson. " The troops 

abandoned wagons. horses, camp equipment, artillery, baggage, ammuniti on, and provisions. In their flight to safety, the greater part of the men 

threw away their arms and accoutrements. For miles the road was 

covered with " l'1relocks, cartridge boxes and regimentals. " 11 

T he shock of this disaster led to the appointment of a congressional 

"" (1) AlIlu icau ~Inl~ Pal/us, /t,diau Afln ~" 1. 19.~ (Knox 10 Hodgdon , I Sep 179 1). (2) 

Smith . SI. Claj~ Pn/lus, II, 24] (Knox to I'resident . 24 Sep 1791). (S) Pape" of William 

Dller. 1I Uohn Nevill 10 Huer, 2:, Aug 179 1). 

"Smith. Sf. Clair PaJ,erl, II. 24()-4 1 (SI. Clair to Knox. ] 8 Sell 1791): 254 (Denny Diary). 

"(1) Ibid .• n . 2048--49 (51. Clair to flodgdol1 . 21 Oct 1791 ); 255 (Diary of Lt. E. Denny). 

(2) "Winthrop Sargent'S Diary:' Ohi" Arrl!n~()lo1(ir:nl and HiJforir:td Q,jflrferly, vol. S5, No. S' 

Uu]y ]9204), p. 250. 

Am~~ir:tm Sltlle Pnpel"l./lIditlll Aflnil"l. 1. ]57- 58 (St. Clair to Knox. 9 Nov 1791). 

" (1) Ibid. (2) Smith. SI. Cln ~ PtlJIfI'rJ, II , 26] (Diary or LI. E. Denny). (S) For a ]is( of 

QII:lrterm3ster supplies lost in this act ion see a return preparc:d by Assistant Quartermaster 

R. IIl1l1tin . RC ]07. OSW. ullel"J Sent and Received , uox 2. (4) T he value of the military 

$IOrt'S, 100\S, 3nd Quartermaster supplie. lost was set at 552.8 \0.78. RC 94, AGO, 51. Clair 

Pape" (Return. I Feb 1792). 
100 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

committee of investigation. There was blame enough to go around. 

T he committee confessed that congressional delay in enacting legislation 

for the protecti on of the frontier had not permitted sufficient time to 

recruit and disci pline an Army for the ex pedition. It 3tlributed the 

fa ilure of that expedition to the want of discipline and experience in the 

troops, the lateness of the season at which the expedition was undertaken, 

and " th e gross and various mismanagemenlS and neglects in th e Quartermaster's and contractors' departments," 11 The committee completely 

exonerated General St. Cla ir, but it is clear that he, too, must share some 

of the responsibility. He procrastinated as much as Knox; he profited 

in no way from the experience of the Harmar ex pedition; and he persisted 

in waging a winter campaign that some of his officers had. and he himself 

ought to ha ve. acknowledged to be without hope of success. 

Wa)'ne'J Expedition 

St. Clair's defeat was also followed by the enactment of new legislation, on 5 March 1792, to make "more effectual provision for the protection of the fromiers of the United States." 18 Defense of the frontiers 

was no longer to be left to a few regular troops augmented upon occasion 

by militia or levies. Instead, the regular battal ion of artill ery and the 

two regimen ts of infantry, then in service, were to be brought up to 

strength. Congress also authorized three additional regiments of infan· 

try, one of which was to consist of two battalions of infantry and a 

squadron of light dragoons, who, if occasion demanded, might be required 

to serve dismounted. These men were en listed for 3 years but the three 

regiments migh t be discharged sooner if peace was made with the Indians. 

Washington appointed Maj. Gen. Anthony Wayne to the command of 

this Army. 

Congress also provided for a Quartermaster and a deputy quartermaster who were to be paid. respectivel y, $100 and $50 a month. During 

the time the Army bill was be ing debated and passed by Congress. Samuel 

Hodgdon remained at Fort Washington under instructions to make every 

preparation that he could.1t Issac Craig, his assistant at Pittsburgh, 

urged him to hurry to Philadelphia; his enemies were attempting to 

supersede him. But Craig's warni ng came too late. for on 19 April the 

Senate confirmed the appointment of James O'Hara as Quartermaster 

Genera l. J ohn Belli of Kentucky had already been appointed deputy 

quartermaster general on 16 April 1792.80 Hodgdon did not return to 

.. Americau SIDle PapeTl, Miiil(l ry "HairJ. 1. '8-'9 (Committee Rpl , 8 May 1792). 

" I Slnl. 241 - 0. 

'" RC 107. OSW. Letlcrs Senl and ~ci\"cd. Box 3 (Kn ux 10 Hod gdon. 4 Apr 1792). 

"(I) 1/lid •. Box 3 (Craig 10 Hodgdon. 22 Allr 1792). (2) EUrllliflt Jourunl al Ihe Seua/e, 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY 101 

Phi ladelphia until the summer o( 1792, at which lime he resumed his 

duties as Commissary o( Military Stores. 

In appointing O'Hara, President Washington had llIrned to a businessman, intimately familiar with the problems of the ''''CSt, whose 

career had been interrupted by service in the Revollilionary War, only 

to be resumed with morc aggressive vigor at Pittsburgh when the waT 

ended. The 40-year old O'Hara, like his predecessor, had no military 

rank as Quartermaster General, but he had a far better chance of being 

sliccessful because of his familiarity with the frontier, beca use he performed no duties other than those of his Department, and because he had 

lime to establish an effective organization. 

Profiting from experience, the \Var Department had no intention 

of rushing another unprepared expedition in to the field in the summer 

of 1792. Time was to be allowed to recruit troops as well as to train 

and discipline them. Both Wayne and O'Hara remained in Philadelphia 

for some time following their appointments, reviewi ng plans with Secretary Knox. Approx imately a month after his appoilllment, Quartermaster Ceneral O ' Hara submitted an estimate or the transportation, 

entrenching tools, artificers' tools, and other suppli es his Department 

would require for the year 1792. His estimate bore lillie resemblance 

to the tentative one prepared by Hodgdon in the previous year, including 

as it did 1,000 felling axes and hundreds of other tools, 750 packhorses, 

20,000 bushels of forage, 50 wagons to carry supplies to Fon Pitt, and 

120 flatboats at Fan Pitt as we ll as 5 40-foot keelboats. " It was evident 

that he was not inAuenced by th e spirit of economy that prevailed in 

government circles and that had dominated Hodgdon's preparations. 

All of O'Hara's estimates were on a generous scale .. There was seldom 

a noticeable relationship, however, between the estimates made and the 

supplies scm , and O'Hara, like his predecessor. suffered from materiel 

shortages. 

By June 1792, Ceneral Wayne and his Quartermaster Ceneral were 

at Pillsburgh. The fim load of supplies, including brass cannon and 

sheet iron for camp kettles, dispatched by William Knox , had arrived. 

The manufacture of camp kettles was well under way, but blacksmiths. 

carpenters, and wheelwrights were badly needed. They co uld not be 

I. IIi. 119. 120. Thoul/;:h the b,,' provided for the office of QU;lrtermaster and dqlUty quarter· 

malter. I'resident Washinl/;:ton nOnlinal( d O'Hara and nelli a$ Quartermaster Ge:ne:ral and 

depUly quartermaster gene:ral rcsp«til'ely and Congress so conllrme:d the:m. (3) Under the: act 

of March Ii. 1792. the quarte:nnaster. deputy quartermaster. and an adjutant general who abo 

$CTI'ed as lnspc:clOr constituted the General StafT of the Army. I Slnl. 241 . 

'L RG 98. J ournal of Quartermaster General Jamcs O'Hara , f. 2--4 (O'Hara 10 Knox. II May 

1792). National Archi\'cs. 
102 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

hired for less than $ 15 to $20 a month and extra provisions, so O'Hara 

requested instructions on paying snch high wages. He also discovered 

that Issac Craig would not continue as Quartermaster at Fon Pitt for the 

sa lary O'Hara could offer. Knox d irected him to offer the artificers a 

monthly wage of $ 15 and extra provisions and to pay Craig the salary of 

a deputy quartermaster general; he was worth it.u 

O'Hara soon met with many of the same difficulties as Hodgdon had 

in obtaining supplies from Philadelphia. Essential supplies mentioned 

in invoices failed to arrive. General Wayne thought there was "some 

very reprehensible conduct respecting the transportation of stores," 

O'Hara, too, condemned the existing mode of. transportation that permitted wagoners to pass their loads along from one to the other with a 

resultant exorbitant price for their carriage. He himself had seen "lading 

pass to the fourth hand" before it reached Pittsburgh. He suggested 

that the only remedy was to reduce the price of carriage 12 percent by 

changing the method of computation from nct to gross weight, and to 

requ ire delivery between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh to be made in 

25 days or suffer a penalty of $4 a day for each day's detention upon the 

road. n Though wagonel"S' receipts were scrutinized more carefully and 

transportation was more closely supervised, invoices checked against 

wagonloads that came from Philadelphia storehouses continued to reveal 

discrepancies, and Quartermaster Craig could only inquire whether the 

missing articles were lost or stolen.u 

By the summer of 1792, O'Hara had the organization o( his Depart. 

ment well established. To expedite Quanermaster business at Philadelphia, he appointed Hodgdon as his agent because his known integrity 

merited the Quartermaster Genera l's confidence and because his industry 

and "knowledge of the mode of doing business in the public offices" made 

him the logical appointee. To him O'Hara gave his power of attorney so 

that Hodgdon might apply to the Treasury for the funds required by the 

Department and take charge of and submit Quartermaster accounts to 

the Treasury.n 

O'Hara's fi eld organization consisted of two deputy quartermasters 

general-Craig at Fort Pitt who supervised the forwarding of supplies 

that arrived From Philadelphia, and John Belli at Fort Washington who 

gave support to General Wilkinson's troops. In addition, there were six 

assistant quartermasters and clerks. To this initial organization, O'Hara 

"(I) Ibid ., f. 8-9 (O'Hara to Knox, 20 Jun 1792). (2) Mary C. Darlington, Fori Pill (Ifld 

Ld tas Irom the Froutier I'ilt burgh, 1892), 2~7 ~8 (Knox \0 O'Hara, 29 Jun 1792). 

" (I) RG 107, OSW, Leiters SetH and Received, Box 5 (Wayne to Knox, 5 Aug 1792). (2) 

RG 98. Journal of QuarlermaS\er General James O·Hara. f. 12 (O'Hara \0 Knox. 17 Aug 1792) . 

.. RC 107, OSW. Leiters Sent and Received. Box ~ (Cra ig \0 Hodgdon. 9 Aug 1795) . 

.. Ibid., Box 5 (O'Hara \0 Hodgdou. 17 Aug 1792). 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCEN DANCY 103 

in the fall of 1792 added a commissary general of (orage who contracted 

fo r and issued a ll fo rage req uired by th e Army and upon occasion contracted for boats. To transport the forage he had forage boats built, and 

O'Hara gave him specific instructions on how the forage was to be 

carried.8G O'Hara also appoilllcd t WO assistant commissary generals of 

forage and four issuing commissaries. 

In the fall of 1792, he estima ted that the Army would require 500 

tOns of hay, 60.000 bushels of gra in, and would need for its transportation 

60 boats and 500 packhorses. Even th is n umber of horses would be 

insufficient unless sleds could be used fo r haul ing forage to the posts in 

Ohio d uring the winter. H e admitted tha t a request fo r 60 more boats 

with so many a lready at Pi nsbu rgh might seem extraordinary to the 

Secretary but those on hand were so nat and unwieldy in construction 

and navigation that he had to obwi n boa ts nearer to the cargo to be 

picked up. 

O' Hara planned to give mobility to Wayne's cava lry and pack trains 

by assuring them of an ampl e forage suppl y th rough the use of a system 

of forage boats. T hese would move up the Mononga hela as far as the 

Cheat River in present-day West Virgin ia, duri ng the course of which the 

boalS would be loaded with hay an d grai n contracted (or in th e area. 

T hey wou ld th en carry th eir cargoes to Legionvill e, the camp 27 miles 

be low Fort Pitt on the Ohio, to which ' Vayne had removed his troops 

latc in 1792, and to Fort Wash ington (or d istribm ion of the cargo to the 

cha in of posts north of it. O' Hara favored the use of keelboa ts, for too 

many suppl ies had been lost th rough the employment of " Kentucke 

Boats." 8T 

To his organization O'H ara addcd a wagonmast.cr general to take 

charge of all public teams and drivers and a supcrin tendent of packhorses. " H is instructions to the latter revealed some of the difficulties 

under which the packhorse system of transporta tion labored. For one 

th ing, receipts were to be taken from packhorse masters for a ll horses, 

saddlcs, bells, coll ars, lash ropes, bags, and other items of eq ui pment for 

which they were to be held accoun table. Inspections were to bc held at 

the end of. each trip which would revea l not onl y what articles needed 

repair but a ll losses or damages d ue to carelessness or neglect for which 

the delinq ucnt was to be pun ished, To reduce the heavy loss of horses 

through ncgligence, he ordered the packhorse masters to drive their 

animals at a slow, constant pace, traveling no more than 23 miles a day, 

.. RC 98, O'Hara JOllmal. f. ]5, 16-18 (O'H ara to Maj. Ceo. McCully. 10 and ]4 OCI 1792) . 

.., Ibid., f. 20-2 1 (O'Hara 10 Knox. 19 Oct 1792); 16-18 (O'Hara 10 Ceo. McCully. 14 Oct 

1 792): f. 39 (O'Ha ra 10 Belli, 26 J an 1793). 

" I bid., f. 26-27 (1'0 John Torrence. 5 Dec 1792): f. 78-80 (fo Robert Benham. 26 Jun 

1793). 
104 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

and seeing that their animals were properly fed. He put an end to the 

destructive practice of riding packhorses, either loaded or empty, by 

dismissing packhorse masters who permitted it and by punishing any 

packhorseman guilty of it. At the same time. O'Hara also att.empted to 

give better protection to the civilian personnel of this department. He 

directed that if military escorts offered any unprovoked insults or attempted any violence to personnel of the packhorse department, a report 

was to be made immediately to the proper offi ce. If the commissary of 

provisions of the lines showed any discrimination in the issue of food to 

packhorse department personne l, a report to the commanding officer 

would bring justice to them. B9 

The Quartermaster's Department also employed 6 master boatmen, 

120 boatmen, 46 artificers-saddlers, blacksmiths, carpenters, wheelwrights, tin men, coppersmiths, ropemakers, and coopers- under a superintendent of artificers. The Department paid the artificers $15 a month 

plus I V2 rations and provided the tools and materials they used. It also 

paid for the services of several armorers, though they and the artillery 

artificers were under the direction of the commanding officer of artillery. 

The Quartermaster's Department transported all ordnance. arms, ammunition, accoutrements. but Knox appointed a conductor of military stores 

to receive, keep. and deliver all such supplies on orders of the commanding officer of artillery or the commander-in-chief.eo 

Except for its transportation, Knox relieved O'Hara of all further 

responsibility for clothing. Hodgdon as Commissary of Military Stores 

kept a record of the stock of clothing on hand. When the supply fell 

low, the Secretary of War applied to the Secretary of the Treasury who 

made contracts for additional supplies on the basis of patterns furnished 

by Hodgdon. Upon delivery by the contractors, Hodgdon receipted for 

the clothing which was inspected by"an officer appointed for that purpose. 

though William Knox occasionall y acted as inspector. A reputable shoe 

manufacturer of Philadelphia usually inspected the shoes. Paymasters 

received, distributed. and accounted for the clothing transported to the 

Army by the Quartermaster's Department.el 

Inspection by no means guaranteed the receipt of good clothing by 

the Army. General Wayne complained of the very inferior quality of 

the hats and shoes his troops received. The hats when the least bit wet 

dropped over the ears and eyes of the men, lo.~i ng their form entirely. 

- Ibid., f. 7S-SO (To Robert Benham. 26 Jun 179~). 

to (I) I bid., f. 77-78 (Knox to Samuel Henley. Conductor of Military Stores. I Aug 1792: 

85-86 (O'Hara 10 Sup!. of Artificers); 71 (O'Hara to Knox. 26 Apr 179S). (2) RG 107. OSW. 

Lellers Sent and Received. Box ~ (Stagg to Hod~o , 7 Dec 1792) . 

.. RG 107. OSW. LeHers Sent and Received. Box ~ (Stagg 10 Hodgdon . 12 Oct 1792; 29 Nov 

1792; 8 Dec 1792); (Regulations. 8 J',far 179~). 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY 105 

As for the shoes, they wem to pieces by the time a soldier had performed 

onc tour of escort dUly between Fons Washington and Greenvill e. If 

shoes were not provided at once, he wrote in the spring of 1794, the 

troops would be barefoot before the midd le of June. So d issatisfied 

was he with the clothing provided that he suggested a substitute un iform. 

He thought that a well-made cocked hat in place of the t1 imsy round 

one, brown or blue woolen overalls instead of while ones, and a full 

coat in lieu of the coatee would much improve the uniforms for 1794. 

The long coats would give warmth in winter and provide patches for 

repairing clothing when they were shortened in the spring." Wayne's 

criticisms of clothing were relayed to Hodgdon who justly commented: 

As long as these articles are furnished in the present mode, complaints 

may be expected. As th ings go, it is impossible to furn ish a pair of shoes for 

;1 soldier for seventy-five eellls, and mOl'e irrational to expect a suitable Hat £01' 

seventy three and a third cents- for though the contract is absolu te, reference 

will be had, in the inspection to the price." 

Even if clothing of good q uality was received from the contractor 

by the storekeeper in Philadelphia, the troops on the frontier were still 

quite likely to receive it in poor condition. Improper storage facilities 

almost guaranteed that result. Wool hats. for example. were liable to 

damage from moths, yet one inspector found them dumped in bulk on 

the floor of a storehouse. Clothi ng might also receive considerable 

damage in the course of transportation to the troops. About this time, 

the practice was instituted of appointing boards of offi cers to inspect 

sh ipments of clothing as they were received to determine the extent of 

the damage sustained." 

Wayne had spent the first winter train ing h is troops at Legionvill e. 

With a view to moving to Fort Washington in the spring, O'Hara made 

the necessary preparations. Contracts were negotiated to provide 68 

flatboats. Forty of these were to be covered boats to transport the troops 

and their baggage; 8 were provided for the tra nsportation of the artillery, 

12 for the horses and oxen, and 8 for wagons and Quartermaster stores. 

In addition, four keelboats were ordered to be procured and sent as soon 

as possible to Fort Washi ngton loaded with corn.n T he ru n of th is 

la rge fleet of transports and forage boa ts was accomplished without loss 

.. Richard C. Knopf. "Waync's Wcslcl'n Campaign: T he Wayne·Knox Correspondence. 

94 ' 1't:lIIlsylvauill /lfllgll i"t: 01 His/ory lI11d Rivgrnp/,y, '·01. 78. No.~. pp. 530-~1 (Wayne 

to Knox. 10 Mar 1794) . 

• Wayne Manuscripts. \'01. . f. 80 (Hodgdon to Knox . 2 May t794). nn yl"ania HiJ· 

torica l Society . 

.. RG 107. OS\\'. Lcnrrs Sent and Recri"rd. Box 4 (Rpl of Board of offICers to Gen. Waynr. 

\! ~ Scp 179~) . 

• RG 98, O'Hara Journal. f. 46--47 (O'Hara to McCully. 15 Feb 179!). 
106 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

or damage. Wayne arrived at Fort Washington on 7 May, setting up 

his camp and headquarters a bout a mile west of Fort Washington at a 

place he call ed Hobson's Choice. T here the work of trai ni ng the troops 

went on while federal commissioners continued their efforts to make 

peace with the Indians. 

Supply preparations were stepped up by O'Hara. Forage deposits 

at Forts Jefferson and Hamil ton were small but because his request for 

money to purchase horses had been rejected, the supply could not be 

increased. At Wayne's d irection, he bought 300 packhorses and 20 

lcams in Kentllcky. ~~ Progress could then be made in transporting 

fo rage to the "outposts," but this was hampered by the lack of twilled 

bags ordered as long ago as February but still not received 4 months 

later. When still another month had gone by and neither the bags nor 

the 500 axes ordered in February had arri ved, O'Hara tartly reb uked 

Cra ig for fall ing " imo the fash ionable errol' of thinking for the Army, at a 

very grea t distance." The axes he ass ured Craig were needed; there were 

only 274 on hand at Fort Washington on the day he had received an 

order to issue 400.G' 

When news of the fa il ure of the peace efforts reached Wayne in 

September 1793, he prepared to move north. O'Hara estimated that the 

Army would need 573 packhorses, of which he had 273 on hand. He had 

ready for immediate service 20 teams of 4 horses each and 14 teams of 

4 and 6 oxen each. He estimated that he needed an additional 32 draft 

horsas.

DS Actuall y when the Army got ready to move and the packhorses 

had arrived from Kentucky, the superintendent was ordered to form them 

into brigades of 72 each, with 12 drivers and a packmaster in charge of 

each brigade. O'Hara instl'llCled him that the drivers had to be proportioned to the horses at the rate of one man for each six horses, except in 

the case of horses for the artillery pieces. T here the proportion was to 

be one man to each fou r horses. Of the seven brigades, n umberi ng more 

tha n 500 horses, he allOlted two for the transportation of ordnance and 

military stores, two for the baggage, one for Quartermaster and hospital 

stores, and two were loaded with forage.

99 

O'Hara also arranged for artificers to accompany the Army. He 

d irected his superintendent of artificers to have ready to march with the 

Army 12 carpenters, 9 blacksmiths, 4 sawyers, 2 wheelwrights, 2 coopers, 

8 saddlers, 2 hamessmakers, 2 nailers, 1 tumer, and I ti nman. For the 

transportation of their supplies, he directed the superintendent to lise 

" l/Jid., f.14 (O' Hara to Wayne, 11 May 1793): f. 76 (O'Hara 10 Hodgdon. 2 J UIl 1793) . 

., Ibid. , f. 83- 85. 91 (O'Hara to Craig. 17 jun. II Jul 1193). 

M Ibid .. f. 99-100 (O' Hara to Wayne. 13 Sep 1793). 

" Ibid., 117-18 (O'Ha ra to Benham. 2 Oct 1793). 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY 107 

whatever ox teams and wagons were available. He provided three 

traveling forges for the troops, onc of which was fitted up for the cavalry. 

and he ordered the superintendent to be prepared to erect and man three 

smith 's hearths. The latter was to provide extra bellows and anvils; 

examine an invoice of tools recently delivered at Fort Jefferson to determine what additional ones would be requ ired ; and (arry along on the 

march some bar iron, harness leather, rope, ax helves, horse shoes, nails, 

and other supplies that he might need to repair casualties on the march .'011 

On 7 October, the Army set out for Fort J efferson, making their 

camp about a week later 6 miles beyond it. There, on 24 October, 

Wayne received a dispatch from Secretary Knox informing him the Army 

was to halt its advance and take up winter quarters. On no account 

would President Wash ington risk a defeat during a season when supplies 

and forage were difficull to obtain. That order was reinforced by the 

failure of the subsistence contractors, Elliot & Williams, to maintain an 

adequate supply of rations. In consequence, the Army went into winter 

quarters at Fort Greenville, which the troops built and \Vayne named in 

honor of his friend, Gen. Nathanael Greene. 

One of the greatest difficulties was to furnish a sufficient escort to 

protect the supply convoys. On 17 October 1793, a convoy was attacked 

by t.he Indians a short distance from Fort St. Clair, and about 70 horses 

were carried off though the wagons and stores were left standing in the 

road. The loss of the horses was particularly injurious since they were 

needed to assist the contractor in bringi ng provisions forward.,Ot Wayne 

had not only ordered Elliot & Williams to furnish 3,000 complete rations 

(or dail y issue and provide supplies at the intermediate posts between the 

Army and Fort Washington but also to deposit, before the end of 1793, 

270,000 rations in advance of the head of the line as it moved toward the 

Miami village. Elliot & Will iams, however, supplied only enough to 

meet the Army's daily requirements. By great exertions, they deposited 

70,000 rations at Fort Greenvill e; Wayne expected an additional 120,000 

rations upon the arrival of a convoy late in October.'o2 To supplement 

the contractor's means of transportation, Wayne ordered Quartermaster 

General O'Hara to purchase 250 packhorses and 40 pair of oxen or 60 

wagon horses at the comractor's expense. IDS 

The situation had a familiar ring to those who had been with 

St. Clair 2 years earl ier, but supplies did arrive though never in the 

"" Ibid., 107- 08 (O·Hara to Superintendent or Artificers. 23 Sep 1793). 

'"'(I) AmeriClIII Sial e Pallers, Indillli Affairs, I. 361 (Wayne to Knox . 23 OCt 179.'1). (2) 

J ou","1 01 Gllt". Dlllrid lJmdley. €'d. Frazer E. Wilson (Gret:nI'ilIc. Ohio. 1935). 54. 

'''' (I) Wayne Papers, XXX (Wayne 10 Elliot &: Williams. 16 Oct 179 ~). (2) America" Slal e 

Pllpul, l"dilllt A"";rJ. I. 361 (Wayne to Knox. 23 Oct 179.'1). 

' '' RG 98, O'Hara Journal. 132-.'1.'1 (O'Hara to Belli. 24 OCt 179.'1). 
108 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

quantity ordered."" Before the year closed, Wayne had erected another 

post. Fort Recovery. 23 miles hom Fon Greenville on the site of St. Clair's 

defeat. T he subsistence contractors then bem all efforts toward accumulating supplies and completing preparations for the campaign of 1794. 

Elliot & Williams were still delinquent in their deliveries in April. 

Instead of a 90 days' supply, or 270,000 rations, on hand, exclusive of the 

daily issues, the contractors had only 19 days' suppl y of Aour and 9 days 

of bee[ on 22 April. Wayne demanded that they comply with his 

orders,loo The shortcomings of th e contraCtors in providing adequate 

transportation to forwa rd rations made Wayne affirm "the absolute necessity of some effectual &: certain mode of suppl ying the Army than that 

of private Contract." Avaricious individua ls, he insisted, would always 

consult their own private interest in preference to that of the public. 

They would never part with enough money to purchase sufficient provisions or adequate means of transportation to make required deposits, 

preferring to supply the troops from hand to mouth, "whilst the principal 

part of the money advanced by the treasury may profitably be otherwise 

employed." 108 

Prodded by Wayne, the contractors delivered provisions. When 

the Indians attacked in the summer, Wayne was prepared to move against 

them. Before the middle of August 1794, his troops were building a 

post that he called Fort Defiance at the confluence of the Auglaize and 

Maumee Rivers. On 20 August, they were victorious over the Indians 

in the Battle of Fall en Timbers. After laying waste the Indian houses 

and cornfields, the troops returned to Fort Defiance to improve that fort, 

to destroy other Indian villages and cornfields in the area, and to build 

Fort Wayne. During the building of that fort, completed on 21 October, 

and on the return march of the troops to Fort Greenville, the shortage of 

provisions kept the men on scant ration allowances, scarcely sufficient to 

keep body and soul together. 

The difficulty of transporting provisions 200 miles through the 

wilderness, together with the death of Robert Elliot, the contractor, who 

was kill ed by Indians near Fort Hamilton, on 6 October 1794, caused 

the Army to be put on half allowance of flour. W hat there was of flour 

was musty and the beef was poor. The lack of sa lt proved disastrous for 

the cavalry and packhorses, which died at the rate of four or five a day in 

October. lOT 'Wayne ordered O'Hara to supplement the efforts of the 

, .. RG 107, OSW, Letters Sent and Received. llox 4 (Capl. Joseph Shaylor to Hodgdon, 

24 Oct 179~). 

'''Wayne Papel1l, XXX IV (Wa~ e to Elliot II: Williams, 22 Apr 1794). 

''' I bid., XXXIV (Wayne to Knox, 7 Ma~ 1794), 

,0'1 (I> J orww/ of Capt. Dauid Bradley, ed. Wilson , 72-7~. (2) Journal 01 Thomos T aylor 

V"de""ood (Cincinnati, 1945), 19. 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY 109 

ROAD TO FALL EN T IMBERS 

contractor. It must have been of considerable interest to the Army to 

learn later that Congress had granted the President discretionary power 

under special circumstances to increase the ration issued to the troops on 

the frontiers. These increases were not to exceed 4 ounces of beef, 

2 ounces of flour, and ha lf a gill of rum or wh iskey to each ration, and 

half a pint of salt for each 100 rations. lOS 

Wayne remai ned at Fort Greenville for about a year, administering 

the Army and negotiating with the Indians. His efforts were crowned 

with success, on 3 August 1795, when the Indians signed the Trea ty of 

Greenvill e. under the terms of which they relinquished their claims to a 

considerable area of valuable land northwest of the Ohio River. Quartermaster Genera l O'Hara was a signatory of the treaty. The Jay Treaty 

of 1794, which provided for British evacuation of the northwest posts, 

contributed to Indian acceptance of the T reaty of Greenvill e. With 

the Army occupying those posts in 1796, settlers in the area thereafier 

enjoyed real security. 

O'Hara considered that his work was done when peace was estab-

"'1 SIal. 590 Qun 7, 17(4). 
110 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

lished. and he was eager to return 10 the more profitable pursuits of 

busi ness in the midst of a rapidly expanding frontier. He submitted his 

resignation, and, with the Army no longer engaged in active operations 

against the Indians, he believed no successor would be appointed to fill 

the office. lOG Many months were to pass before any action was taken on 

his resignation. 

O'Hara's duties as Quartermaster General had been limited to providing logistical support for Wayne's army. He had no responsibility 

for suppl yi ng the handful of troops stationed at West Point or those at 

posts in Georgia and in the old Southwest Territory. Their support 

was directed by the War Department. T he Superintendent of Military 

Stores, Samuel Hodgdon, forwarded their clothing, accoutrements, and 

military stores. He acted on orders received from the Secretary of War, 

drawing from stocks that had been procured by the Secretary of the 

Treasury. Contractors who had been successful in offering the lowest 

bids for a given area or group of Army posts furnished these troops with 

subsistence. In 1794, for example, Manning Wyckoff & Co. provisioned 

West Point. no 

Whiskey Rebellion 

The War Depanment also provided supplies for the militia army 

ca ll ed out by President Washington to que ll the Whiskey Rebellion. 

While Wayne had been pursuing the Indians in the Northwest Territory 

in the summer of 1794, rebellious citizens in western Pennsylvania were 

taking up arms against Ihe imposition of a federa l excise tax. It was 

Hodgdon who on orders furnished the stores, clothing, arms, accoutrements, camp equ ipage, and ammunition required by this militia army. III 

On the other hand, Ephraim Blaine of Carlisl e, who had served as 

Commissary General of Purchases in the Revolutionary War, was appointed to provide transportation for the militia and to furnish them 

with forage, straw, and fuel. When a quartermaster general for this 

militia army, as we ll as a state quartermaster and his deputies in Pennsylvania began to operate in the field, Blaine wished to be relieved since 

his services were unnecessary, but he remained on duty to furnish transportation home for the troops.llt In face of the prompt action taken by 

.... RG 107, OS\\', Leiters Sent and Received, Box 6 (Cra ig to Hodgdon, 23 Oet 1795). II. RG 107, OS\\', Lette" Sent and Received. Bol( 3 (John Habersham to Hodgdon, 28 May 

1793): Box 4 (Stagg to Hodgdon, 14 Jun 1793); Bol( 5 (Melancton Smith to Hodgdon, 15 Jan 

1794). 

'" 'bid., Bol( 4 (Stagg to Hodgdoll , 8 Scp 1794): nox 5 (Stagg to Hodgdon , 10 Sep 1794): 

(Invoice of supplies provided 1 I Scp--80 Oct 1794) . 

... Henry Miller was quartermaster general ror this militia army: Clement Biddle was 

quartermaster ror the Pennsylvania militia . Blaine Papers, IV, No. 2424 (Hamilton to Blaine, 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY I I I 

Washington, resista nce had q uickl y collapsed. To provide protection 

against similar occurrences in the fu ture, Congress enacted legislation 

for call ing th e militia into federal service to repel invasion or suppress 

insurrection. About the same time . it also provided fo r continuing 

th e existing Military Establ ishment and bri nging it up to authorized 

strength. ' U 

No sooner had Wayne negotiated the Treaty of Green vill e with 

th e Indians than Timothy Pickering, who had succeeded Knox as Secretary of War on 2 January 1795, characteristically bega n to th ink of ways 

to economize. T he transportation of provisions from the Oh io River 

to Fort Greenville "so prodigio usly enhances t he price," he wrote the 

President, tha t he proposed removing a considerabl e part of Wayne 's 

troops to the banks of th e Ohio. Washington , however, th ought it best 

not to "build l oa much " on the peace treaty; "sufficiently respectabl e" 

garrisons had better be left at th e pOSts. When J ames McHenry suct:eedcd Pickering a few months later, he foresaw no possible sav ings in 

the Quartermaster's Department because the expenses of transportation 

to th e western posts, whether by land or water, would remain large."· 

Conti1l1Jalio'l1 of Ihe Post of QlIaJ'lennaslcl" GClIcm,l 

O'Hara was still serving as Q uartermaster General for the frontier 

troops in th e spring of 1796 when Congress. in legislating for the Military 

Establishment, decided to continue th e general staff then in existence 

until 4 March 1797, As a matter of fact, even wh il e action on O'Hara's 

resignation was pending, Congress had in 1795 re·established the grade 

of Quartermaster General and had included that officer, as well as a 

Paymaster General and an inspector, who also acted as Adjutant Genera l, 

among th ose who constituted the general staff.m T his congressional 

action in 1796, contrad icting O'Hara's opinion that no new Quartermaster 

General would be appoi nted, showed an inclination to modify th e hereto· 

fore accepted theory that a Quartermaster Genera l served as a staff officer 

onl y in time of war. Obviollsly, with troops garrisoned a t a number of 

posts on th e frontier, some such offi cer was necessary at least to su pervise 

12 Sep 1794): No. 2437 (Miller to Blaine. fi Oct); No. 2457 (Biddle to Blaine. 11 Oct); No, 2489 

aod 2525 (Blaine to Hamilton, 21 OCt and 13 Dec 1794). Blaine wa ~ giYen the p~ y and a llow· 

ances of a lieutenant colonel. 

'" 1 Sial. 424 (Feb 28. 1795): 430 (Mar 3. 1795). 

' " (I) Carter, T errilorin/ Pn pas of lilt' Ullilt:d SIMes, 11 . 537-39 (Pickering to Washington . 

2 Oct 1795). (2) W rilillKS of It'ashillglon. ed. Fitzpatrick. XXX IV. 330 (Washington to Picker· 

ing.7 Oct 1795). (3) Bernard C. Steiner. Ute alld Correspolldt!lIu of James M cH t! lIry (Cieye· 

land. 1907), 182 (Rpt to Senate. 14 Mar 1796). 

I!II{ I) I Slat. 4M (May 30.1796). (2) 1 Slnl. 430 (Mar 3. 1795). 
112 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T H E ARMY 

the transponation of men and supplies if not to plan logistical support 

fOI" a campa ign. Though given the title. he no longer performed the 

military duties that had pertained to the office of Quartermaster Genera l. 

O' Hara's resignation was now accepted. and, on I June 1796, J ohn 

Wilkins, Jr., another Pittsb urgh businessman, was appointed Q uartermaster General of the Army, to have the same pay and emoluments as 

Ilis predecessor.

I I R H is appointment carried no military rank. A veteran 

of the Rc,'oiutionary 'War who had served as a surgeon's mate wh ile still 

in his teens and a bold. energetic clllrepreneur of the frontier since the 

dose of the war, Wilkins was only 35 years old when he became Quartermaster Genera l. For the next 6 years he administered the duties of 

his offi ce. 

These were years of peace on the inland front ier, a lime for negotiating new agreemellls with the Indians, particul arl y those south of the 

O hio: for building additional [ons; and for hacking new roads through 

the wilderness, T hese were the tasks that occupied the Army and 

changed the charaCler of Quartermaster suppl y from logistica l support 

for campaigns to routine delivery of the annual supplies needed by the 

small detachments of troops garrisoned at the fromier posts, For 

handling this suppl y, Wilkins made relative ly few changes in the organization of the Q uartermaster's Department. Peacetime supply did not 

require the services of a superintendent of packhorses, a wagonmaster 

general. or a superintendent of artificers. It did necessitate the employment of civil ian assistants to carry out Q uartermaster duties at the various 

frontier posts. Isaac Craig COlltinued as deputy at Pittsburgh, and a 

new deputy was stationed For a short time at Fan 'Washington, though the 

importance of that POSt was dwindling. As tbe number of frontier posts 

increased, a greater number of assistant q uartermasters were employed. 

Lest this imply the existence of a formal organiza tion, it should be 

pointed a li t that these titl es were used loosely. The same individualsCraig at Pittsburgh, Matthew Ernest at Detroit, or Henry Glen who 

directed the transportation of troops and supplies at Army posts in 

New York- were also simply ca ll ed agents, liT These men represented 

the Departmem in the fi eld. 

Since Qua rtermaster Genera l 'Wilkins also spent most of his lime in 

the fi eld, atlending the commanding general wherever his headquarters 

might be loca ted, it became desirable to have an agent of the Quarterma ster General stationed at the seal or government to handle all accounts, 

... E:UCllli.If' Jourrrill of /I", S~"III~, 1,214. 

,,' (I) RG 101. OSW, Ltlttrs SclI and Rrcth,td , 60)( 8 (Wilkins to Hodgdon, 24 Aug 1191). 

(2) AmeriCIlII Stnle Papt'fs, MiJuI/1I1U:OIIS, I. 312 (Roll or agents in Quarttnnasttr's Departmtnt, 

11 Feb 18O2}, 
THE ERA OF CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY 113 

to arrange all financial matters with the Treasury, and to direct the 

transportation of supplies issued by the Superintendent of Military Stores. 

]n effect, the establishment of such an office represented a groping for 

the beginnings of a Quartermaster bureau at the seat of government, a 

development that was not to come to fruition until after the War of 

1812. At the beginning of his administration, Wilkins, like O'Hara, gave 

Hodgdon his power of attorney to act as his agent in Philadelphia. liS 

By 1800, James Miller was acting as his agent in Philadelphia, the office 

having been separated from that of the Superintendent of Military Stores. 

In June of that year, the capital was moved to Washington, and Hodgdon 

informed Craig that he did not know whether an agent would be continued at Philadelphia but that one "must be at all times at the seat of 

Govemment." IH The Philadelphia office was closed in the summer 

01 180!. 

Utilizing the services of his assistan ts, many of whom were thoroughly 

experienced men, Wilkins perfomed his dmies as Quartermaster Genera l 

satisfactorily. In the beginning, his efforts were directed toward reducing 

expenditures, particularly in the well-established Pittsburgh area and 

among the posts immediately dependent upon it. There, public artificers, boatmen. and wagoners were removed from the Department's 

payroll . Freight could be hauled cheaper by hiring the services of 

commercial boatmen, fuel could be better supplied to the posts by 

contracts than by using public teams, and articles could be made or 

repaired more economically by contracting for the work to be done on 

the lowest terms.no Throughout his term in office, Wilkins was chiefly 

occupied with directing the transportation of supplies to the garrisons 

stationed at the western posts. 

110 Hodgdon Letter Book, 1795-98 (Hodgdon to Secretary of Trealiu ry, 29 Apr 1797). 

Manuscript Div., Library of Congress. 

"o RG 94. Hodgdon Letters, vol. 108, C. J...4 (Hodgdon to McHenry, 28 Aug 1799): C. 378 

(Hodgdon to Craig, 4 Ju l 1800) . 

.. RG 98, Book No. I I, Quartermaster General'! Report of 1797, f. 7- 8 (Wilkins to Wilkinson, 20 Apr 1797). 

CHAPTER IV 

Dominance of the Secretary of War 

A precarious peace on the inland frontier followed the treaty of 1794 

with the British and the treaties of 1795 with the Spanish and with the 

Indians, but new measures affecting the military establishment were soon 

evoked by a threat to the maritime frontier. The wars resulting from 

the French Revolution locked England and France in a struggle for 

empire and European domination, during the course of which both 

nations violated American shipping rights. By great effofts, President 

Washington averted war with England during his administration. and 

his successor, John Adams, was equally fortunate in settling differences 

with France peaceably. Commercial complications were no worse in 

1812 than they had been for years, but the country went to war with 

Great Britain a second time. driven to it by the land hunger of the West 

and the aggressiveness of the War Hawks. 1 

During most of these years. the Army's strength remained well below 

3,000 men and offi cers. The Army was ill-prepared for offensive action. 

except against the Indians. As long as England and France remained 

deadlocked and no external threat from land forces materialized. how· 

ever. there was no compelling need for expansion of the Army, A large 

part of military expenditures was disbursed for Naval preparations. Each 

new war scare, however, caused Congress to authorize additional new 

regiments for the Army. but before troops could be recruited and the 

new regiments activated the threat of danger passed. Recruitment was 

then suspended and the legislation superseded by a new enactment. In 

1798, for example, the possibility of war with France led to a flurry of 

legislation intended to afford better protection of the country's seacoast; 

to increase its stock of cannon. small arms, and military stores; and to 

strengthen the Army.1 Had this last law been fully implemented, the 

military force would have been expanded to some 40.000 men. By 1800, 

however, the threat of war had disappeared and the enlistments and 

'(I) See Juliul W. Pntt. Expan$iolli.lt.l of 18J2 (New York. 1925). (2) A challenge 10 the 

role that land hunger played in bringing on Ihe war is 10 be round in Alrred L. Burl, The 

United Stala. Crllat Brililin lind Briasll North Amllricll fTOm thll Rroolution to tli ll &llIblish· 

mllnt of PIIQU Altflr thll Wllr 01 1812 (New Haven , 1940). 

" I StilI. SS4 (May'); SSS (May 4); SS8 (May 28); 569 Qun 22); 604 Qui 16. 1798); 725 

(Mar 2,1799). 
116 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

appointments for the proposed expanded Army were suspended. Such 

officers and men as had been added to the Army were disbanded by the 

act of May 14, 1800, and the Army was reduced again to a little more 

than 5,000 men. 

When the Democratic Republicans came into office in 1801, they 

further reduced the size of the Army. In his Inaugural Address, Jefferson 

referred to "a well-disciplined militia, our best reliance in peace and for 

the first moments of war, till regulars may relieve them," a He embodied 

more specific defense recommendations in his first annual message to 

Congress. Henry Dearborn, Secretary of War, estimated that no more 

than 20 companies each of artillery and infantry were necessary to garrison 

the various posts and stations. This was fewer than authorized, and 

Congress hastened to reduce the enlisted strength to 3,040, the minimum 

required to police the frontier and guard the arsenals.· Unimpressed 

with the use of a standing army for defense purposes, Jefferson kept the 

officers and troops busy at work that was not essentially militarytreaty-making, roadbuilding, and exploration. 

Toward the end of his administration, the Chesapeake-Leopard 

affair in June 1807 stirred the wrath of the people. As the danger of 

war with England increased, Congress again enacted a law in the spring 

of 1808 increasing the size of the Army.B Recruitment moved slowly 

and was suspended entirely the following year so that in 1810 the Army, 

exclusive of the staff, numbered only 2,765. Not until Harrison defeated 

the Indians in the battle of Tippecanoe in the fa ll of 1811 was interest in 

defense needs renewed. 8 Then Congress ordered the existing military 

establishment completed, but a month after war had been declared against 

Great Britain that goal had not been achieved. 

Not only was the Army under strength and heterogeneously organized in the years from 1798 to 1812, but the troops-seldom more than 

company strength-were dispersed in small, isolated forts along the 

maritime and inland frontiers. As a consequence, their officers had little 

opportunity to learn the lessons either of command or of logistical support 

for large bodies of men. The small size of the Army made unnecessary 

the development of any organized system of staff departments that would 

be so essential to its supply in time of war. 

I ~ D. Richardson, Messagl!S alld Papl!rs of 111l! Prl!sidl!lllS (10 vols., Wash ington, 

1876-99), t, 525. 

• (I) Ibid., I, 329. (2) Amuiclln Siall! Papus, Mililary ADain, I, 155-56 (Dearborn to 

House Speaker, 23 Dec ISO I). (5) 2 Stal. 152 (Mar 16, 1802). 

• (I) Aml!rican Statl! Papu$, Milita ry Affairs, t , 227-28 Qefferson 10 Senale and House, 

25 Feb 1807). (2) 2 Stal. 481 (Apr 12, 1808). 

• (I) Aml!rican Stall! Papu$, Military Affairs, t , 250 (Army Return). (2) 2 Stat. 522 

Qun 28, 1809); 669 (Dec 24, 1811). 
DOMINANCE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR 117 

Supply became a wholly civilian-dominated operation between 1798 

and 1812. It was controll ed and directed by the Secretary of War, who 

discharged not only the duties of his office but also those of the Quartermaster General, Commissary General, Master of Ordnance, Indian Commissioner, Commissioner of Pensions, and Commissioner of Public 

Lands,Y A large part of those responsib ilities were transferred to his 

office in 1798 when the authority for the procurement of all Army supplies 

that had been vested in the Secretary of the Treasury was returned to the 

Secretary of WaL' Thereafter, all food, clothing. equipment. ordnance. 

and hospital stores were procured on orders of the Secretary of War. He 

could not direct any purchases. however, before Congress passed the 

annual appropriation bill for the military establishment. Congress 

further provided that all supplies, except ordnance, were to be purchased 

on a yearly basis. Q 

Subsistence Contract System 

Subsistence continued to be supplied under contract as it had been 

ever since 1781, the only difference being that after 1798 the Secretary 

of War executed the contracts. The procedure of soliciting bids by 

public advertisements and awarding contracts to the lowest bidder had 

become routine. There were more contractors in these years than in 

1781 because expansion of settlement beyond the mountains increased the 

number of states and territories in which contracts were let for the supply 

of troops stationed at posts within their boundaries.1o 

The obligations of the contractor remained unchanged. He agreed 

to deliver and issue to the troops the authorized ration at the price ·fixed 

in the contract. He was obliged to have on hand sufficient rations to 

feed the troops at all times. providing subsistence for at least 6 months in 

advance at the more distant posts. such as Michilimackinac or Detroit. 

and usually for 3 months at all other posts. In the event the troops were 

moved from a post. the government paid for the transportation of the 

rations if their removal was considered desirable. It was a risk of the 

trade. however, for it sometimes happened that the War Department 

transferred troops without notice to the contractor, and he was left with 

unwanted rations on his hands.lt As in the past, if a contractor failed to 

'Annals of Congrt'll, 12th Cong .. 1st sess .. vol. 2. pp. 1355. 1359, 1361-62. 

I I StIli. 610 Gul 16, 1798). 

I Ibid., I, 749 (Mar 3, 1799). 

"(I) RG 107. Office of the Secretary of War (OSW), Military Book, vol. 1. pp. 102-05 

(Advertisement, 18 Apr 1801). (2) RG 94. Orderly and Com pany Book, 1795-1813, pp. 98-103 

(Conll1lct with Hanson Kelly. I Jan IBOI). 

II RG 107, OSW, Lelten Rec:eived, M- 148 (5) Games Morrison to SW Eustis, 4 Jul 1810). 
118 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

make delivery, the commanding officer had authority to supply any 

deficiency by purchase at the risk and on the account of the contractor. 

During this period. subsistence contracts also carried a provision requiring 

the contractor, when directed to do so, to furnish quarters as well as such 

quantities of fuel and straw as were allowed by War Department regulations at any recruiting rendezvous at which the contractor was required 

to supply rations. He also provided the means of transportation when 

the recruits moved. For Ihese additiona l quartermaster services, the 

contractor was reimbursed for the money he spend and allowed a commission of 2 Y2 percent. 11 

The ration provided was substantial but nutritionally as unbalanced 

as in the past, for it still continued to furnish the troops a meat and bread 

diet. ]n 1798, the ration was increased over what it had been since 1790. 

It now consisted of the following allowances: 

I ~ pounds of beef or % pounds of pork, 

18 ounces of bread or flour, and 

1 gill of rum, brandy, or whisky. 

For every 100 rations, the contractor also provided 2 quarts of salt, 4 

quarts of vinegar, 4 pounds of soap, and I Y2 pounds of candles. " By 

arrangement between the contractor and the commanding officer it was 

possible to commute part of this ration for beans or other vegetables." 

This same ration was supplied during the War of 1812. 

The War Department made only one modification in the ration 

before the war. In 1803, the Secretary of War tried an experiment at 

New Orleans. He substituted ma lt liquor for spirits as being more 

beneficial to the health of the troops stationed in a warm climate. T he 

following year, malt liquor or light wines were made a component part 

of the ration to be supplied instead o[ rum, brandy, or wh iskey at such 

posts and at such seasons o[ the year as the President deemed necessary 

to preserve the health of the troops. II Difficulties soon developed; most 

wine had to be imported and could not be readily obtained. Beer had 

to be manufactured locally and good brew masters were scarce. In any 

case, the troops preferred hard liquor. The experiment therefore proved 

unpopular and the Secretary soon abandoned it. 

The quality of the ration showed no improvement during these 

"(I) RG 107, OSW, Military Book, vol. lA, pp. 64-6!i (Regulations. 28 Apr 1801). 

('2) RG lH. Orderly and Company Book, 1795-181S, Ilil. 98- 10S (Contract with Han$On Kelly. 

I Jan 1801). 

"I Stili. 601 Qui 16, 1798). The ration was slight ly ahered the following year but the 

$ame aliowancCl were rCitored in 1802 and repeated in January 1812. Ibid., I. 7S4 (Mar S, 

1799); 11 , 1!'2 (Mar 16. 1802); 671 Oan II , 1812). 

"RG 107, OSW. Military Book. vol. 4. p. 29S (SW to Jamdl Morrison, 5 Mar \810). 

"(I) RG 107, OSW, Military Book. vol. IA. pp. 459-00 (SW to Col. Constant Fn:-emen, 

17 Jun 1803). (2) 2 SllIt. 290 (Mar 26, 18(4). 
DOMINANCE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR 11 9 

years. Officers testified that the bread issued was often stale; that the 

Hour was frequen tly moldy. "sometimes full of bugs and worms;" the 

pork rusty; and the beef not fit to be issued.'ft As long as the contractor 

system prevailed, the soldiers would continue to be poorly fed. The 

margin for profits on contracts that required rations to be furn ished at 

prices ranging f.rom 13 to 19 cents per ration were exceedingly narrow. 

To increase their gains, the more greedy contractors resorted to every 

dubious means. Opportunities for graft were innumerable, ranging 

from deliberate omission of the small articles of the ration, such as 

candles and soap-to effect savings for the contractor-to collusion with 

a commanding officer at a posl, who might prevent a survey and rejection 

of poor, unwholesome subsistence and collect a reward sub rosa from the 

contractor for his officia l helpfulness. Some arrangement profitable to 

both is implied in the relations that existed between James Morrison, 

contractor in the New Orleans area, and Brig. Gen. James Wil kinson. 

"One thing I know with great Certainty, which is equally known to 

yourse lf," Morrison wrote Wilkinson in the summer of 1809, "and that 

is-that the Contract becoming ultimately profitable or otherwise depends on the Command~T ill Chi~/." Fearing a survey would be demanded, the contractor suggested that Wilkinson order an examination 

of the flour only as a last resort. If part of the flour on hand became 

unfit for use, his agents had been ordered to purchase and mix sweet 

flour with it, Morrison advised the general, in order to make the whole 

palatable. The implication is plain enough when he added: 

Should I visit Orleans in wind ing up my Contract will make such arrange. 

ments on th is head as will no doubt be satisfactOry to you- On this subject 

dont have a moments uneasiness- Be as servicea ble to me as you can, where yOll 

are; (keeping the public in view) and it may be in my power LO be in some way 

Serviceable to YOU_I? 

The Secretary of War, informed of the bad rations issued at New Orleans, 

did nothing morc than complain to the contractor.1I Then, as at a later 

date, the War Department considered the contract system the most ceo· 

nomical for subsisting the troops. 

Clolhing Supply 

The procurement and distribution of all other supplies for the Army 

were centralized in Philadelphia. The orders of the Secretary of War 

'tAmuiclln lllf ~ Pllp~rs, Mi/ifllry Allllirs, l. 2SI . 282 (Deposition of Maj. E. Backus; Capt. 

George Peler, 5 and II Apr 1810). 

"Wilkinson I'apen, "01. 111 , r. 81 (Morrison 10 Wilkinson. 28 Jul 18(9). Chicago 

HiJ(orical Sociely. 

lO Re 107. osw, r.fiIilary Book, vol. 4, pp. 262. 275 (Eustis 10 Morrison, IS Jan and 

2 Feb 1810); vol. 6. p. 94 (SW to Morrison, 28 MaT ISII). 
120 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

were executed by the Purveyor of Public Supplies of the Treasury Department, who contracted for all clothing. shoes, camp utensils, military 

stores, equipage, medicines, and hospital stores, and by the Superintendent 

of Military Stores, who stored and issued them. There were some 

exceptions; on orders of the Purveyor, agents procured hospital stores at 

Baltimore, New York, and New Orleans where they could be purchased 

on terms as reasonable as at Philadelphia and moreover saved the cost of 

transponation.u Purchases of clothing and equipment awaited passage 

of the annual Army appropriation hill. 

By law, the soldier was annually supplied with a uniform that since 

1790 had included a hat, coat, vest, two pairs of woolen and linen overalls, 

four pairs oE shoes, four shirts, two pairs of socks, one stock and clasp, and 

one pair of buckles as well as one blanket. Underwear was not issued 

to the soldier. Congress slightly increased the amount of clothing furnished him in 1802. The issue of overalls was increased to two pairs of 

woolen and two of: linen; two pairs of short stockings were added to the 

socks along with one pair of half gaiters. The soldier was also provided 

with one coarse linen frock and trousers for fatigue clothing.2I He could 

draw from surplus stocks for any replacements of these articles that he 

needed, paying for them at their contract prices by deductions from his 

monthly pay. Deductions from his pay of 25 cents for each coat and 

8 cents for each vest and pair of overalls were also made to cover the 

cost of altering such garments to obtain a better fit,lI 

These were the clothing items that had to be purchased after the 

appropriation bill was passed. Since passage of such legislation was 

usually not accomplished before February or March, the time allowed 

for purchase and the production of necessary articles was short. Shipments of clothing and such other annual supplies as stationary and 

hospital stores had to be ready to move from Albany and Pituburgh no 

later than the end of May if the troops at the western posts were to receive 

their annual supplies before winter set in.n T his time factor prevented 

the exercise of good management in the supply offices at Philadelphia 

because it precluded any deliberate operation, Instead, everything had 

to be hastily procured at a disadvantage to the government both in price 

and in quality. Medicines for the troops at southern posts should have 

been delivered by April, but, when appropriations were sometimes passed 

as late as March, it was impossible to procure and pack, let alone transport 

them, by that date . 

.. RG 92, Offic~ of P\lrv~yor of I'ublic Supplies, Lc ll n Sent, No. 249, p. 142 (Whelen to 

Lt. S. T. Dyson til 11/" ]8 Jun 1803). ercafl~r cited Purveyor. Lelfen Serll. 

-I SI/Il. 120 (Apr 30, 1790); II. 132 (Mar 16, 1802). 

" Ibid .. I, 749 (Mar 5, 1799). 

-RC 107, OSW, Mililliory Book, vol. 2A. p. 66 (SW to T . CoKe, 18 Feb 18(4). 
DOMINANCE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR 121 

As early as 1803 Israel Whelen, who had succeeded Tench Francis 

as Purveyor when the latter died in the midst of the campaign of 1800, 

attempted to ease the pressure on his office by taking advantage of existing 

conditions,U Large quantities of cloth that had been purchased by his 

predecessor to provide uniforms for a proposed expanded Army in 1799 

remained on hand when Congress cut back tTOOP strength in 1800 and 

1802. Since Whelen had been using these stocks to prepare the annual 

clothing supplies after he became Purveyor, the annual clothing appro· 

priations had not been used to any great extent. The funds on hand 

therefore afforded a sufficient sum for putting into effect a plan he 

proposed- that of providing in advance at least a year's supply of clothing 

at the Arsenal. Thereafter, he pointed out, the Purveyor would have 

a full year after the appropriation bill passed to prepare the annual supply 

for the troops.!4 'Whelen's sC!und suggestion evoked no action by the 

Secretary of War who apparently preferred to give the impression of 

economy in operation by requesting minimum clothing appropriations 

while using up the stocks on hand.1I 

Several years later, Tench Coxe, who became Purveyor when Whelen 

resigned in the summer of 1803, also offered a solution to this problem.H 

His proposal required the Secretary of War to seek a separate appropriation from Congress for the purpose of depositing at the Arsenal a stock 

of clothing and of hospita l stores sufficient for 10,000 men. After this 

appropriation, the an nual grants would only have to be large enough to 

procure additions to the supply eq ua l to the actual issues in the preceding 

year. 1T Though the need was urgent, Coxe was no more successful than 

Whelen had been in effecting advance procurement of supplies. 

Had procurement been corre lated with actual needs, appropriated 

funds might also have been used to better purpose. When the Secretary 

of War began to direct procurement in 1798, purchase orders for annual 

supplies were based on the authorized strength of the Army, though the 

regiments were usually under strength. It was not until December 1807 

• Whelen a$Sumed Ihe dIllies of his office on 22 May 1800. RG 92, Coxe and Irvine 

I'apen, Box 24. (SW to Jonathan Wi ll iams, Jr., 12 May 18(0) . 

.. RG!l2. I' urveyor, Leiters Sent, No. 249, pp. 116-18 (Whelen 10 SW, 19 Apr 180!!) . 

.. CIOIhing appropriations du ring h~'5C years ran as fo llows: 

1799-SI27.450 1802-$66,6!1O 

1800- 257.995 180!\- 59,000 

1801- 141 .5!!0 1804- 80,000 

For cach of the next four yean the apluoprialion was $85.000. I SIIII, 74 1; 2 SlId. 66, lOS, 

18!!, 227, 249. !! 15. 4OS, 412, 470 . 

.. llrael Whelen submilled a leiter of resignation on 9 July 180!. Teneh Coxe a$Sumed 

the dUlid of that office on 5 Augusl , He K rved until Ihe office was abolished and he was 

relieved from his duties on I June 1812. RG 92, l'urve)'<lT, Letters Senl, No. 449, p. 154 

(Whelen 10 Secretary of Treasury, 9 Jul 180!); p. 175 (Coxe 10 Complroller, 5 Aug 180!) . 

.. RG 107, OSW, Leiters Received, C· I20 (5) (Coxe 10 Eustis, 12 May 1810), 
122 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

that this system was changed. At that time, the Secretary of War directed 

the commanding officers of companies to make annual returns to the 

War Department, showing the surplus clothing on hand from the previous 

year's annual supply and the quantities needed to complete the current 

year's supply.1I The Secretary then forwarded these returns to the Purveyor to govern him in his purchases, and to the Superintendent of 

Military Stores to guide him in packing the supplies." 

In addition to overpurchasing in the past. the War Department had 

developed no consistent procedure for utilizing surplus stocks on hand 

at the Arsenal. Surpluses of clothing had accumulated for a number of 

reasons. Changes made in the uniform left Old-style clothing on hand. 

Over·ordering accounted for some of it. as did an unanticipated production of a larger number of clothing items from a specified amount of 

material. Most important of all. according to Coxe, was the failure to 

deduct from purchase orders the quantity of garments on hand.·o To 

permit such deductions to be made, Coxe proposed that every room and 

loft of the Arsena l be numbered and inventoried and that thereafter 

store books be kept posted every day for every article that wem into or 

was removed from each room. Purchase orders would then be executed 

by the Purveyor only after deductions of the suitable articles already in 

the Arsena l had been made from the orders. The military storekeeper 

approved of the plan and the Secretary of War ordered him to prepare 

such an inventory." Like so many plans, its execution was long delayed 

and apparently soon fell into disuse. 

In his procurement of hats. shoes. clothing, camp equipage. and 

hospital stores, the Purveyor followed the procedure--established from 

the time Robert Morris first applied it to subsistence contracts--of 

advertising and awarding the contract to the lowest bidder. The Pur· 

veyor introduced one innovation in procurement sometime in 1799. 

The impact of events at home and abroad brought changes in the practice 

of contracting for the clothing to be supplied to the troops. Europe was 

at war and its armies required large amounts of clothing. As the chief 

neutral carriers, American ships benefited by the European blockade, 

carrying materials to meet West Indian demands as well as the increased 

consumption that prosperity stimulated in the United States. War 

demands abroad and increased consumption at home promoted a scarcity 

of textiles. The shortage was made more acute by an increased demand 

• William Duane, MiIi/to" Die/iolln'1 (I'hiladelphia. 1810).590 (Regulation. I Dec 18(7) . 

• (I) RG 107. OSW, Military Book, vol. !A, pp. 172-75 (SW to T. Coxe. 29 J an 1808). 

(2) General James Wilkinson, M mwhs of My GWII Timr& (5 voh., Phil3delphia, 1816), II, 418 . 

.o RG 92, PU n'C")'or, Leiters Sent, No. 2S I. pp. 24 1-4J (Coxe 10 S\\', 2S OCt 1804). 

"' (I) Tbid. (2) RG 107. OS"', Milit3ry. nook. 1'01. 2A. p. 147 (S'" 10 Geo. Ingels, 29 Oct 

1804). 
DOMINANCE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR 123 

for military clothing for the American Army after Congress, fearing war 

with France, authorized twelve additional regiments of infantry and six 

troops of light dragoons in the summer of 1798. Apparently, the difficulty of obtaining sufficient cloth caused contractors to become delinquent 

on the ir uniform contracts and fail to make deliveries on time. To 

eliminate delays and prevent hardships to the troops, Purveyor Tench 

Francis began to purchase cloth for the government instead of contracting 

for finished clothing. givi ng rise to the first use of government-furnished 

materials in Army supply.1I 

When the cloth was delivered, the Purveyor had it deposited with the 

Superintendent of Military Stores. The Purveyor then contracted with 

master tailors in the Philade lphia area to make, in three sizes, a specified 

number of coats. vests, overalls. or complete suits of infantry or artillery 

clothing. He furn ished each ta ilor with an order on the Superintendent 

for delivery to him of the necessary yardage of materials and trimmings 

required to complete his contract. Shins were hand-sewn by seamstresses 

who also obtained the necessary thread and linen from the Superintendent. 'Vhen garments were ready, master tailors and seamstresses 

delivered them to the Superintendent who had them inspected to see 

whether they conformed to patlerns set as the standard for acceptance. 

If the garments passed inspection, the Purveyor paid the tailors and 

seamstresses for their work." This plan of government-furnished materials was utilized for years until tailors and seamstresses were brought 

in to work at a factory operated at the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot. 

The supply system operating at Philadelphia in these years before the 

War of 1812 was one of centralized COntrol. It ought to have been 

effective but persona l animosities between the Purveyor and the Superintendent prevented harmonious funct ioning of the system. Nothing was 

productive of more disagreement between the two agencies than inspec· 

tion. In the past, that had been a fu nction of the Purveyor, who had 

cntmstcd inspection of hats, shoes, and clothing to workers skill ed in the 

production of those articles. They were presumed to be the best judges 

of the quality and workmanship of the articles that were offered to the 

government by the contractors." Within 10 months after he succeeded 

- No It;Uemeni of policy or procedure by either the Secretary or the Pur\'eyor has been 

unOO\'ered but casual referenc('$ by others indicate this change was under way in 1799. 

Hamilton wrote of materiab "procured at distant places" being brought 10 Philadelphia 10 

iN: made up. (I) 1V0r'!u of AI~xll"d r Hilmi/Ion, ed . Henry C. Lodge (12 \'ols. New York. 19(4). 

VII. 78-79 (fo WaShington. 3 May 1799). (2) See also RC 107, OSW, Lelten Sent and 

Receil'ed, 1799-ISOI. Box 12 (Capt. James Bruff to Hodgdon. 9 Jun 1799). 

- See Accounl Book of Puo·eyor·s Office, 1802. for entries illustrative of procedures 

followed . Manuscript Coll«lion. New York Public Library . 

.. RC 107. OSW, Military Book. \'01. I. pp. 49-50 (SW to Whelen, 17 Apr ISO I). 
124 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Samuel Hodgdon as Superintendent, William Irvine became convinced 

that such inspectors were not doing their duty faithfully. and he informed 

Purveyor Whelen that he considered it his duty to inspect all articles 

"after the Inspectors." U 

To prevent the impositions that had been practiced in the past. 

Secretary Dearborn offered William Irvine the position of inspector of 

clothing. He was to perform this duty in addition to his function as 

Superintendent of Military Stores, inspecting every article in person. 

For this service the Secretary suggested an allowance of 5 or 6 cents a 

SU il, which would amount to $150 to $180 a year." Though Irvine 

accepted the POSt, he did not do the inspecting himself but delegated the 

duty to one of his clerks who spent most of his time inspecting to the 

detriment of the clerical work that had to be done at the ArsenaL" 

Shifting inspection from the Purveyor to the Superintendent did not 

still troop criticism of clothing. When the troops complained of some 

of the cloth ing they had received in 1803, Tench Coxe was quick to 

defend the Purveyor's office, though the articles criticized had been 

procured by his predecessor, Israel Whelen. Coxe was critical of the kind 

of inspection given by the office of the Superintendent of Military Stores. 

If the inspection was "duly attentive," he informed the Secretary of War, 

good items could be procured. But one clerk could scarcely possess "that 

qu ick eye, and that judicious eye to the qualities & maki ng" of such a wide 

variety of articles as had to be inspected at the Arsenal. As a basis for 

comparison in making inspections, he proposed the use of samples or 

models of every item procured.1I Commenting on the criticism to Irvine, 

Coxe infonned him that a return to inspection by qualified workers 

would be acceptable to him, and he also suggested that it would be well 

to pay particular attention "to the C011dition of goods at the moment of 

issue, lest time, vermin, insects, &c may have occasioned them to be unfit 

for use."" Storage conditions undoubtedly warranted that thrust. and, 

though the troops had criticized the quality of the shoes and shirts sent 

them, they had also complained of the receipt of moth-eaten woolen 

articles.u 

-(I) RG 92. OQMG Conwlidated Correspondence File, Box 457 (Irvine to Whelen. 

15 J an 1802). (2) Hodgdon was removed from office when the Federalists went out of power 

in 1801. Irvine. who had risen to the rank of brigadier general in the Revolutionary War. 

was appointed on 15 March 180 1 and served until his death on 29 July 1804. RG 107, OSW, 

Military Book. vol. 1, p. 75. 

-RG 107. OSW. Military Book. vol. IA. pp. 154--57 (22 Feb 1802) . 

.. RG 92. OQMG Consolidated Corrcspondente File. Box 1006 (Geo. Ingels. acting Supt., 

10 Dearborn. 5 Oct 1804). 

" RG 92. Purveyor. Letters Sent. No. 251. pp. 9--1 1 (Coxe 10 SW. 16 Jan 1804). 

" Ib jd., pp. 7-8 (16 Jan 18(4). 

" RG 107. OSW. Military Book. vol. 2. p. 1!i8 (SW to Irvine. 24 Jan 18(4). 
DOMINANCE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR 125 

The disagreement between Coxe and William Irvine widened to 

the proportions of a feud when Call ender Irvine was appointed Superintendent following the death of h is father in office." Lack of hamony 

developed at every point of contact between the two offices. It occasionally happened that the Secretary directed a purchase order to the 

Superintendent who then called upon the Purveyor to execute it. To 

keep his accounts clear with the Treasury, Coxe insisted that he must have 

an abstract of the Secretary's letter as an authorization for the expenditure 

of funds for which he was accountable. The argument dragged on until. 

his patience exhausted, the Secretary ordered both men to furnish SOUTce, 

date. and import of an order to any officer whose cooperation was required 

to execute any War Department order.'2 

The threat of war with Great Britain led Congress to authorize 

expansion of the Army in the spring of 1808.41 Providing clothing for 

the troops being recruited under this act was made more difficult by the 

impact of the Non-Importation and Embargo Acts upon the market. 

Imports dropped drasticall y as ships lay idle in the harbors. Cloth 

became increasingly scarce, and Coxe was compe lled to purchase the best 

fabrics available even though they fell far below previously acceptable 

standards. Irvine refused to concede that good cloth could not be procured because of the embargo. " I doubt the fact. It is possible that 

Cloths are considerably enhanced, but will that circumstance justify the 

purchase of such, as will not last a Soldier six months with decency? 

I presume not."" 

With rejections of garments submitted to Irvine for inspection 

running as high as one-third and frequently one-fourth of deli very, Coxe 

was unable to furnish clothing as rapidly as it was required. Ignoring 

textile shortages, Irvine thought supply could be better handled if the 

necessary materials were sent to the regiments to be made up by Army 

tailors. u The Secretary doubted the wisdom of adopting such a system 

while recruitment was under way. 

As delays continued in the production of acceptable uniforms, Irvine 

"Callender Irvine was appointed on 24 October 1804. Ibid., vol. 2A, p. 145 (SW to 

C. Irvine). He sen'ed as Superintendent until the summer of 1812 when he was appointed 

Commissary General of Purchases on 8 August. He filled that office for the next 29 yean 

until his death on 9 October 1841. 

"(I) RG 92. Purveyor. Letten Sent, No. 250, pp. 11 5-16 (Coxe to Irvine. 2 Nov 1805). 

(2) RG 107, OSW, Letters Received, Box 14 (Coxe 10 Irvine, 9 Oct 1806). (!) RG 107, OSW, 

Military nook, vol. 2A, PI'. 52!-24 (SW to Irvine, 17 Oct 1806). (4) RG 92, OQMC Consoli· 

dated Correspondence File, Box 1203 (SW to Coxe, 17 Oct 18(6). 

"2 Sial. 48 1 (Apr 12, 1808). 

"RG 92, Supt. of Military Stores, Lelten Sent, No. 398, pp. 261--62 (Irvine to SW, 

20 Sept 1808) . 

.. Ibid., No. !98, pp. 15Q-5!, 293-94 (Irvine to SW, 19 May and 22 OCt 1808). 
126 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

attributed the troubl e to the failu re of Coxc to hold the contraCLOrs to 

delivery of complete uniforms at Slaled periods. He charged that, as a 

consequence. tailors often compl eted one article of clothing but made 

little progress on other pan s of the uniform they werc under contract to 

deliver. Irvine further claimed that if the tailors had private work, they 

felt no obligation to complete governmental contracts. He asserted that 

if Coxe had been willing to adopt his suggestion and had also offered 

better prices, there would have been no delay in delivery of clothing. 

He was certain the mere fact that he had made such a proposa l was 

sufficient reason ror the Purveyor to reject il.4 & 

As the summer months waned and deli veries were still delayed, Coxe 

tried to get the Superintendent to adopt the practice of making partia l 

shipments to the newly recru ited troops of such clothing items as had been 

delivered and accepted instead of waiting until complete annual su pplies 

could be shipped to them. Thus the soldi er might at least have a blanket 

or a coat even if caps or overalls were not ready. Partial shipments, 

however, were onl y authorized to compa nies in the immediate vicinity of 

Philadelphia. In any case, Superintendent Irvine charged that the supplies Coxe urged him to forward existed only in the Purveyor's "fertile 

imagination." n 

In time. Coxe suggested that to exped ite clothing production Trvine 

might cooperate by examining parce ls of cloth before he bought them, 

or after they were Slored but before lhey were issued to the tailors and 

seamstresses and the garments cut out. Thus, rejection of the finished 

garments on the basis of qua lity of the fabric might be avoided. " If 1 

go on to buy and expend all the funds upon the best I can get," Coxe 

informed the Secretary, "and an officer wit h unknown standards in his 

mind refuses to examine goods before I make them public property or 

afterwards. till they are cut and made, and then rejects. expence. delay. 

and embarrassment must follow." tS 

Once again the Secretary intervened to promote "harmonious intercourse" between the two offices. The Purveyor, he wrote, must exercise 

d iscretionary power in making his purchases. When he had made the 

best selections the markets permitted, even though they were not all that 

might be desired, he had performed his dULY. The Secretary presumed 

" Ibid ., No. 398, pp. 198--99 (Irvine to Coxe, 23 J ul 1808): pp, 295-97 (Irvine to SW, 

22 Oct 18(8). 

" (I) RC 92, Purveyor, Letten Sent. No. 244. p. 271 (Coxe to Irvine. 16 Aug 18(8); 

pp. 355-59 (Coxe to SW, 15 Oct 1808). (2) RG 92, Supt. of Military Stores, Letten Sem. 

No. 298, p. 223 (Irvine to Coxe, 17 Aug 1808). 

" (I) RG 107, OS\\', Lellers Received. C·II] (5) (Coxe 10 SW, 4 May 1810). (2) RG 92, 

Purveyor, Letten Senl, No. 248, pp. 372~73 (Coxe to SW, 30 Mar ]810): pp. 395~96 (Coxe 10 

Irvine, 25 and 26 Apr 1810); p. 399 (Coxe to SW, !IO Apr 18]0). 
DOMINANCE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR 127 

that the inspector would make such allowances as circumstances, the 

public economy, and the public service required in performing his duty.u 

The controversy over inspection of cloth before it was used to produce 

finished garments continued. Irvine could see only some sinister plot 

in the kind of purchases the Purveyor was making. Irked by the inspection orders he received hom the Secretary, he informed him that after the 

clothing for 1810 had been completed he would have nothing further to 

do with inspection.50 

The Secretary of War thereupon made Coxe solely responsible for 

the procurement. production, and inspection of c1othing. 51 By December, Coxe had assumed the duty of inspection and had returned to the 

former practice of utilizing as inspectors men skilled in the production 

of the articles they inspected. 52 He was still harrassed by textile shortages, 

and he turned to the task of stimulating domestic production of textiles 

needed by the Army. As long ago as 1803 Coxe had exhibited considerable interest in the efforts of certain Massachusetts manufacturers to 

produce acceptable linens. ~1 Now with the need urgent, the Secretary 

of War in 181 1 directed him to solicit bids for cloth of domestic production for Army clothing.u Coxe worked energetica ll y and by November 

he reported optimistically that "the requisite supplies of woolen goods 

[or any probable force may be obtained from our own manufacturers 

even for 1812." He added that "any requisite supply of substantial goods 

of flax and hemp seems to be perfectly within our capacity." S~ 

T hese were the procedures followed in procuring clothing on the 

eve of the War of 1812. With slight modifications, they were used during 

the war itself though a new agency was created to take over the procurement of clothing and other supplies. 

Tmnsportation of Supplies 

With procurement and storage centralized at Philadelphia, direction 

of the transportation of supplies to the Army was also centered there . 

•• RG 107, OSW, Military Book, vol. 4, p. 336 (SW 10 Coxe and Irvine. 3 l\1a): 1810). 

"(I) RG 107, OSW, Letters R~'(:eived, ·119 (5) (Irvine to Eustis, 7 Aug 1810). (2) RG 107. 

OSW, Military Book, vol. 4, p. 413 (Eustis to Irvine, 3 Aug 1810). 

" RG 107. OSW. Military Book, vol. 4, p. 431 (To Coxe, 26 Aug 1810). 

"(I) RG 92. I'urveyor. Letters Sent. No. 243, p. 3 (Coxe to SW, 6 Dec 1810). (2) RG 92, 

OQMG Consolidated Correspondence File, Box 212 (Eustis to Coxe, II Dec ]810). 

" RG 92, I'urveyof. utters Sent. No. 249, pp. 177- 78 (Coxe to L. & T . Stibbins, 16 Aug 

]803); pp. 2()6..(}7 (Coxe 10 James Burham, 4 Oct 1803) . 

.. (]) RG 107, OS\\' , Military Book. vol. 5. pp. 138-119 (SW to Goxe, 24 May 1811). 

(2) RG 92. Commissary General of Pun:h~ses. Ordcrs Received. No. 246, pp. 211-24 (Eustis to 

Coxe, 14 and 25 Jun ]SII). (3) RG 92. Pu rvcyor, Letters Senl, No. 243, p. ]70 (Coxe to 

postmaSters. 10 Jill ]81 1). 

IORG 107, OS\\'. Letters Received, C· 13 (6) (Coxe to EUSli5, , Nov 1811). 
128 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

• 

RIVER TRANSPORTATiON AT C INCINNATI, 1802 

The clothing, shoes, equipment, stationary. and hospital stores from 

Philadelphia were delivered to the troops stationed at the maritime postS 

on coastal vesse ls, the owners of which COnlractcd to carry the supplies .. s 

Those destined for troops stationed at western posts were sent by way of 

two supply rouLes. One was from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh, a 300-mile 

overl and route along which hired wagoners and caners transported supplies when the season permitted. Only packhorses could bring supplies 

though in the wi nter months. At Pittsburgh, the Secreta ry of War ordered 

flatboats constructed to transport both troops and supplies to the posts 

on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. Such boats were capable of carrying 

twenty-five to thiny men and three to four tons of cargo.aT Transporta· 

tion of supplies to posts on the Mississippi by this route was time· 

consuming and expensive. so much so that it was more advantageous to 

ship by sea to New Orleans. Until 1803. use of this route was dependent, 

however, upon the good will of Spain in grailling the United States the 

"right of deposit" or permission to pass Army supplies through New 

Orleans without payment of duty. 

The second route to the western posts ran from New York via 

Albany, Schenectady. and Niagara, a rOute that combined both water 

and land transportation for supplies destined for the posts on the Great 

Lakes. While the War Department employed private commercial faci li-

.. RG 92, QM Philadelphia, Letter Book, No. 525. p. 78 (Linnard 10 Dearborn. II Sep 1802). 

" RG 107, OSW, Mililary Book, vol. 2. pp. !09-IO (SW 10 LI. Moses Hook. 21 Mar 1805). 
DOMINANCE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR 129 

ties to transport supplies to Albany and the Lakes, it used governmentowned boats, constructed for the purpose, to transport most supplies on 

the Lakes. Two 24-£oot yawls, provided with sails and oars, were built 

to ship supplies from Niagara to Detroit, Michilimackinac, Fort Wayne, 

and Fort Dearborn. On the other hand, the government owned no 

public vessel on Lake Ontario where transportation was obtained by 

hiring private boats.u 

At the beginning of this period, when the Secretary of War ordered 

supplies sent to the Army, the Superintendent of Military Stores arranged 

for their delivery to POStS on the eastern seaboard while the Quartermaster 

Genera l transported supplies in the west. Allhough Quartermaster 

General John Wilkins was executing the duties assigned to him satisfactorily in 1798, his functions had little in common with those of a Quartermaster General of the Revolutionary War. When conRict with France 

loomed as a possibility, the War Department, urged on by Washington 

and Hamilton, sought and Congress authorized the appointment of a 

Quartermaster General with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a major 

general." The law specifically excluded J ohn Wilkins from appointment 

to the post. directing instead that he serve as a deputy quartermaster 

general with the rank of a lieutenant colonel in the event a Quartermaster 

General was named under the act. Bearing in mind the qualifications 

needed in a wartime Quartermaster General, Hamilton wanted the 

appointment to go to Edward Carrington who had served as deputy 

quartermaster general to Greene's Southern Army during the Revolution. 

The President made no appointment under the act, however, and Hamilton was also unsuccessful in his effons to prod Secretary of War, James 

McHenry, into developing a better supply organization.t O Wilkins continued in office, his status unchanged except that thereafter he apparently 

enjoyed the pay and emoluments of a major genera1." 

Introduction of Military Agents 

More than 20 years had passed since the battle of Yorktown when 

Congress took under consideration the size of the military establishment 

-'bid .. vol. lA, pp. 29 1- 95; 500 (Dearborn to Gansevoort, 25 Sep, 5 Oct 1802); 2A, p. 26 1 

(SW to Wm. Hull , 15 May 1805). 

-(I) I 51111. 749 (Mar 5, 1799). (2) Worh of Alexamlu Hamilton , ed. Lodge, VII. 5'6 

(Washington to McHenry. drart by Hamilton. 13 Dec 1798). (3) American Stille Papers, 

Mi/itl!ry ADairs, I, 124--27 (Adams to Congress. 31 Dec 1798. enclosing Itr, McHenry to Adams, 

2-4 Dec 1798). 

-(I) Works of AleXllnder Hamiifotl, cd. Lodge. VII, 70-75, 107- 10, 12.5-32 (Hamilton to 

McHenry, 8 Apr, 19 Aug, 16 Scp 1799). (2) Steiner, Ufe IIlId Correspondenu of James 

McHenry, 409-10 (McHenry to Hamilton. 29 Aug 1799). 

"Based on a ulary of $11)6 a month, that or a major general, shown in a report made by 

President J efferson to Congress. Amerknn Stille PapeT$, jl,fiscelllllle(lIlS, I , 508 (17 Feb 1802). 
130 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

in 1802. If Congress saw no need to maintain and train more tfOOPS, it 

had even less appreciation of the necessity for staff officers. An Army 

of less than 3,000 men required no elaborate supply organization, and in 

the interests of economy the line could in fact be called upon to do much 

of its own supply work. As a consequence, while reducing the strength 

of the Army, Congress also eliminated the offi ce of Quartermaster General. 

The Secretary ordered Wilkins to discharge, as soon after I April 1802 as 

possible, all personnel in his Department who did not belong to the line 

of the Army. His own services were terminated on the last day of that 

month.S! 

In place of a Quartermaster General and his train of assistants, 

Congress provided a system of military agents. It d ivided the country 

into three departments-a Middle, Southern, and Northern Department- each headed by a civilian who, as military agent, was granted a 

monthly salary of $76. The President was to appoint at each post that 

req uired one an assistant military agel1l who was to be taken from the 

line and paid .$8 in addition to his regular monthly pay. Because 

Pittsburgh and N iagara were the gateways through which military supplies moved for shipment, either via the Ohio River or the Great Lakes, 

and the d uties to be per£ormed were in consequence heavy, the assistant 

military agents at these two posts were allowed $16 a month in addition 

to their pay in line. 

The use of military agents was not unfamiliar to the ' '''ar Department. It had employed agents for the past few years to carry out supply 

duties in Tennessee and in New York. Even personnel in the Quartermaster's Department under Wilkins had often been designated as agents 

rather than quartermasters. ''''hen the capital was moved to Washington 

in the summer of 1800, the offi ce of the Quartermaster General's agent 

in Philade lphia was closed. It still was necessary, however, for the War 

Department to keep an agent in that city to direct the transportation of 

all military supplies prepared for d istribution by the Superintendent of 

Military Stores. Appointed by the Secretary of War, this transportation 

agent operated under the direction of the Superintendent, who was 

ordered to keep a record of such expenditures under the head of the 

Quartermaster's Departmenl. Upon the Superintendent's recommendation, the Secretary appointed ' '''illiarn Linnard.u For the next 34 years, 

Linnard performed quartermaster duties in Philadelphia for he was 

appointed military agent in the Middle Departmen t on 5 May 1802 and 

01( 1) 2 Stat. 132 (Mar 16. 1802). (2) RG 107. OS\\'. Military Book, "01. I. pp. 161-62 

(Dearoorn to Wilkins. 18 Mar 1802). 

"(I) RG 107. OSW. Military Book. \'01. I. p. 99 (SW to William Irvine. 30 Jun 1801). 

(2) Expenditures in QM and Naval Departments. 313 (In'ine'S account. 4th Quarter, 1801)_ 

(3) RG 92, Purveyor. Letu:r5 Sent. No. ~49. p. 29 (Dearoorn to Purl'eyor. I Nov 1801). 
DOMINANCE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR 131 

was reappointed as quartermaster when the Quartermaster's Department 

was re-established in 1812, serving in that Department until his death 

in 1835. 

The office of the military agent was considered as a substitute for 

that of a deputy quartermaster general. Of the three agents appointed, 

Linnard held the most important post. His Department included all 

posts on the seacoast from Norfolk, Va., to Portsmouth, N. H., inclusive. 

and from Fort McHenry on the Chesapeake Bay to Vincennes, Massac, 

Kaskaskia, Chickasaw Bluffs, Fort Adams, and Mobile in the Ohio and 

Mississippi Valleys. By reason of his location at Philadelphia, his office 

was in effect a central transportation bureau. He not only forwarded all 

military supplies to the posts in his Department but he transported all 

articles procured at Philadelphia for the Northern Department, which 

was under the direction of Peter Gansevoort, and to the Southern Department, headed by Abraham D. Abrahams. These two agents, because of 

their great distance from Philadelphia-Gansevoort was stationed at 

Albany, Abrahams at Savannah- were authorized to purchase supplies 

at the request of the Purveyor when these could be bought in the vicinity 

at less expense than they could be transported from Philadelphia. For 

the most part, such purchases were limited to camp kettles and hospital 

stores with the Purveyor furnishing the money for such transactions. In 

addition to transporting military supplies, the three military agents also 

forwarded all Indian goods intended as annuities, presents, or as articles 

of commerce. They provided transportation for detachments of troops 

moving through their departments. Except in cases of urgent necessity, 

when any repairs were required at posts or fortifications or articles were 

wanted for the use of the troops the amount of which exceeded $50, the 

agent had first to apply to the Secretary of War for instructions before 

taking action. All assistant military agents in their departments, though 

not appointed by them, were under their direction and accountable to 

one of the three military agents. For the performance of his duties, each 

military agent posted a bond of $10,000. 84 

Lieutenants of the line were appointed assistant military agents at 

the various posts to perform the duties of former quartermasters. Each 

took charge of the public property at his post and became responsiole 

[or disposing of all unnecessary horses or teams, for transporting all 

military stores and Indian goods to their destinations, for furnishing 

transporta tion for any recruits or detachments passing through his district, and for keeping accurate accounts of all expenses with vouchers so 

that seltlemem might be made at the offi ce of the military agent. His 

.. RG 107. OSW. Military Book, vol. IA. pp. 199-206 (SW to Abrahams, Linnanl. Gansevoort, 5 May 1802). 
132 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

purchases were loca l and limited to providing wood, straw. and forage for 

the garrison. Except in case of urgent necessity. he made no other 

purchases without the direction of the military agent within whose Department his post lay. Even wood contracts, at least for the winter 

months. were arranged at the direction of the military agent. Applications to purchase had to be accompan ied with proper estimates, and any 

that involved sums larger than $50 had to be referred to the Secretary 

of War.u 

When the system of military agents was first established in 1802. 

there were 15 assistant mil itary agents in Linnard's "Department, 4 in the 

Northern Department under Gansevoort, and 2 in the Southern Department under Abrahams. The followi ng year, the United States purchased 

from France the Louisiana Territory. The Army, with American com· 

missioners, moved into New Orleans and by 1804 the troops had taken 

over St. Louis and had relieved and replaced the garrisons of the posts 

in both the Orl eans and Upper Louisiana territories. Though the 

strength of the Army was still be low 3,000, the troops were even more 

widely dispersed than before at a greater number of posts. With troops 

sta tioned at New Orleans and at other posts in the area, it became 

necessary to send a military agent to direct the transportation of supplies 

to them. The Secretary of War therefore transferred Abrahams from 

Savannah to New Orleans. The Southern Department was rearranged 

to include all the posts in the Territory of Orleans and that part of the 

Mississippi Territory lying south of the 32d degree north latitude. The 

states of the southern Atlantic coast that had fomerly been under Abraham's control were transferred to Linnard and thereafter formed part 

of the Middle Department. The Northern Department continued to 

incl ude as before all the posts in northern New York and on the Great 

Lakes and, in addition, Fort Wayne.u~ 

The procedures util ized in the production of clothing and in the 

procuremem and transportation of suppli es continued to be applied with 

some modifications during the War of 1812, but with the impact of war 

the supply agenc ies had to be reorganized. Central ized control and 

direction of supply by the Secretary of War had one advantageous effectit eliminated competition for su pplies and kept prices low. On the 

other hand, any delays in the delivery of the annual su pply of clothing, 

stationary, and hospital stores to the troops or any deficiency in the 

.. (I) Ibid., pp. 206-07 (Circular 10 A~$t. MililaTY Agent ~. G May 1802). (2) RG 92, QM 

Phila .. Letter Book. No. !)25, pp. 8-9 (Linnard to Lt. J. Saunder, 29 May 1802): p. G!I (Linnard 

to LI. MO$('$ Sweitt, 27 Aug 1802). 

" American S/D/t: P"/!""$, Mili/ary Af/n"·s, I, 175-77 (Army Returns). (2) RG 107. OSW, 

Military Book, \"01. 2A, p. 482 (S\\' 10 Abrahams, 21 May 1800): vol. 3. PI'. 40-41 (SW (0 

Abrahams, I Jul 18(6). p. 74 (SW to Li ~rd, 15 Oct 18(0). 
DOMINANCE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR 133 

rations supplied them necessarily meant hardships for the soldiers 5ta· 

tianed at frontier pOSLS.81 Lines of communication to Philadelphia and 

Washington were long and hazardous, and any corrective action was 

usua lly slow in making itself felt at the post. As long as peace prevailed 

and the Army remained sma ll in size, the Secretary of War could and did 

attend to the most minute details of supply. He could hope, most of the 

lime, to provision, clothe. and equip the troops satisfactorily, despite the 

fact that the War Department was vested with a variety of other responsibilities and lacked sufficient personnel to execute all its duties. Unfortunatel y, the training of supply officers and the reform of supply organizations that should have been accomplished during these years of peace 

had to be hastily initiated on the eve of war. The War Department 

itself had LO be expanded and the supply agencies both in the field and 

at Philadelphia had not only to be reorganized in 1812 but further 

refi ned in 18 13 after the country had muddled through the first year 

of the war. 

.. AmllriclllI S/a/Il Palll':rs, Mili/Ilry AUairs, I, 268 IT. Correspondence of the pt:riod and 

depositioll5 takell in the course or a congressional investigation of the mortality in the troops 

at New Orleans are revelatory of supply fa ilu res and the life of the soldier. 

CHAPTER V 

Supply in the War of 1812 

With the United States drifting imo a war it was unprepared to 

conduct, Congress leisurely inaugurated a reformation of the supply 

agencies. As eady as 1809. the Army and the War Department had 

accumulated enough ex perience to con vince them that the system of 

military agents was unsatisfactory. Brig. Gen. J ames Wilkinson at New 

Orleans complai ned that commanding officers could not perform certain 

services that required expenditures of more than $50 because, except in 

extraordinary cases, the military agent was limited to that amount. But 

the commanding officer was not the judge of when a case was extraordinary; instead. the General complained, the military agent, "a man without 

rank, commission, or a single ray of military information, or experience" 

made that decision.1 

Re·establishmetil of lhe Qtlaf·lamaslet·'s Department 

Shortly after he became Secretary of War in March 1809, William 

Eustis suggested to Congress that a new arrangement was required for 

the conduct of Quartermaster business. 2 Some months later he elaborated more fully on the defects of the existing system and the burden 

it imposed on the Secretary. The chief defects were a lack of control 

and an inability to enforce accountability on the part of subordinate 

military agents that led to large property losses. T hese defects had 

originated in the law that provided for Presidential appointment of all 

military agents. As a result, the three military agents possessed no power 

over their assistant military agents and were unable to call them to 

accou nt for malpractices or neglect of duty. Although Congress had also 

provided for brigade and regimental quartermasters in April 1808, they, 

too, were not under the control of the mi litary agents. Brigade quartermasters were appointed by the brigadiers and regimental quartermasters 

by the colonels of the regiments. For lack of an officer to regulate and 

superintend the distribution of all supplies and to whom all subordinate 

• Wilkinson. /If~moirs of /lfy Own Tim~J. II . 353 (To S\\'. 12 May 18(9). 

I American Slale P/l ~rl. ltfilitllry AUlIirJ, I. 244 (Eustis to Chairman Joseph Anderson. 

31 May 18(9). 
136 QUARTERMASTER SU PPORT OF THE ARMY 

officers in his department were accountable, the Secretary of War had 

been obliged to perform the duties of a Quartermaster General. 

In lieu of the system of military agents, Eustis proposed appointment 

of a Quartermaster General who should have military rank a nd be aided 

by an assistant quartermaster general , four deputy quartermasters general, 

and as many assistant deputy quartermasters as the service required. 

All of these officers were to be taken from the line. In support of his 

proposal, he pointed out that this system would provide more regular 

and rigid accountability, would be less expensive in the long run, and at 

the same time would instruct officers in a branch of service acknowledged 

by military men to be one of the first importance.s 

A bill to establish a Quartermaster's Department died in committee 

in ISIO. Eustis obj ected to another bill that was drafted the following 

year because it merged the duties of the clothing department with those 

of the Quartermaster General, and he thought the two were incompatible." It was December of lSI I before any progress was discernible in 

the efforts to establish a Quartermaster's Department. Congress finally 

enacted a law on 2S March ISI2, barely 3 months be[ore the organization 

was to be tested by war. ~ In general, the Department was set up along 

the lines that the Secretary of War had outlined. At its head was a 

Quartermaster General with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a brigadier 

general. To assist him, the law provided for four deputy quartermasters. 

an additional four deputies if necessary, and as many assistant deputy 

quartermasters as the public service required.. 

Immediately upon the passage of the bill, the President appointed 

Morgan Lewis as Quartermaster ra1. ~ Lewis and James Madison 

had been fri ends since their college days. Lewis, at 57, was much older 

than any of his predecessors on assuming the duties of that office. Unlike 

most of them, too, his experience was not in the fi eld of business but of 

law and politics. He was a lawyer who had served as judge, attorney 

general, legislator, chief justice of the supreme court of New York, and 

governor of that sta te. His military experience had been acquired in 

the Continental Army. He had served throughout the Revolutionary 

War, advancing to the rank of colonel. His administrative experience 

should have made him val uabl e in organizing the re-established Quartermaster's Department, but he was never much interested in its problems. 

had a limited view of its functions, preferred the prestige attached to 

' Ibid., I. 256-57 (Eust is 10 Chairman W. n . Giles, 1 Jan 1810). Sec also ibid., T. 257 (Lin -

nard to SW, 15 Sep 1809; 7 Dec 1809); 258 (Col. A. Parker to SW. 29 Nov 18(9) . 

• (1) Ammls of COJlgrt:ss, 11th Cong .• 2d 5esS •• vol. 2. pp. 1858. 1879. (2) RC 107. OSW. 

Reports to Congress, No. I, p. 149 (SW to Michl. Leib, 2 Jan 1811 ). National Archives . 

• 2 Stal. 696. 

" AG 107, OSW, Military Book, vol. 5, pp. 327- 28 (SW to Lewis, 4 Apr 1812). 
SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 1812 137 

command ing troops, and within a year had relinquished the post of 

Quartermaster General.' 

Upon being notified of his appointment in the spring of 1812. Lewis 

hurried to Washington to consult with the Secretary of War before accepting the office.' He objected to some of the provisions of the law establishing the Department because they made lhe Quartermaster General 

accountable for all money and property administered by his subordinates 

without giving him the privilege of selecting them. At the request of 

the administration, Congress amended the law, relieving the Quartermaster General of accountability. It substituted instead a provision 

requiring every officer of the Department to post bond for "the faithful 

expenditure of all public moneys, and accounting for all public property" 

that might come into his hands. The amendments also prov ided for 

clerical help and office rental and repealed a section of the March law 

that had imposed numerous restrictions on the right of the Quartermaster 

General to be interested in trade or commerce, ownership of vessels, or 

purchase of public lands or property. On the other hand, Congress 

rejected proposals to appoint two assistant quartermasters genera l and to 

give the Quartermaster General command in the line according to rank 

when he was speciall y assigned for that purpose.' 

The laws of March and May 1812 provided for other personnel 

necessary in any Quartermaster organization. They authorized the 

Quartermaster General to appoint a principal wagonmaster and as many 

wagon masters as the service of the Army required, though there was to 

be no more than one for each brigade. T he laws also provided for the 

appointment of one principal forage master and assistant forage masters, 

as well as a principal barrack master and deputy barrack masters. They 

funher directed that a corps of anificers be attached to the Quanermaster's Depanment. It was to consist of a superintendent, 4 assiStants, 

12 master anisans, 77 artisans, and 24 la borers.'1t 

Satisfied that appropriate action would be taken to meet the objections he had made to the law of March 28, 1812, Lewis accepted 

appointment as Quartermaster General and joined the commander of 

the Northern Depanment, Maj. Gen. Henry Dearborn, at his headquaners in Albany on 21 May 1812.11 In the meantime, the Secretary 

'Two mont hs afler he arrived at headq uarlers, he requested a command, and on 2 March 

18i5 he was promOied 10 major general. RG 107, OS\\', Lellers Received. L-199 (6) (Lewb 10 

sw, 29 ju] i 812). 

· Ibid., L-78 (6) (Lewis 10 SW, 17 Apr i8 12). 

"(i) 2 SIIiI. 472 (May 22, i 812). (2) AIllItIIs 01 CO>lgr .. .u, 121 h Cong., ht 5nI., vol. 2, pp. ]576, 

1578 (May i , 4, i812). 

"2 StilI. 7iO (Apr 23, 1812) . 

.. RG 100. OSW, Reg-isler o! Lellers Received, vol. 5, p. i 59 (Dearborn 10 SW, 21 May i 8]2). 
138 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

of War reappointed the former military agents and assistant military 

agents as deputy and assistant deputy quartermasters, respectively. ]0 

addition to William Linnard, who continued at Philadelphia as deputy 

quartermaster. Anthony Lamb be<:ame a deputy at Albany, Jacob Eustis 

at Boslon, and William Swan at New Orleans. T he latter was soon 

replaced by Bartholemew Shaumburgh. Until the Quartermaster's Department was fully organized and they received new instructions from 

the Quartermaster General. the Secretary directed these men to continue 

performing the duties they had executed as military agents.'i 

At Albany, Lewis gave thought to the organization of his Department. 

"To arrange a Department. Civil or Military," he informed the Secretary, 

"is a simple business, where you have the necessary officers," but at the 

end of May he was still waiting to learn what appointments had been 

made. For administrative purposes, he proposed dividing the United 

States into six districts, each to be under the direction of a deputy. He 

suggested that their offices be established at Bonon, Albany. Trenton, 

Philadelphia, vVashington, and the headquarters of the Western Army. 

He wished to make New Jersey a separate dinrict. he confided to the 

Secretary, in order to induce Colonel Rhea, then quartermaster general 

of that state, to accept appointment in his Department as a deputy 

quartermaster. Lewis had not been favorably impressed with Linnard's 

"talents and competence." Moreover. he wanted to make that state "the 

grand Laboratory for the supply of Carriages for the Army." II 

The Secretary of War accepted the idea of dividing the country into 

districts, but he expanded the number to eight to correspond with the 

number of deputies permitted under the law establishing the Depart· 

ment. U He then went on to indicate that the deputies assigned to the 

first four districts, comprising all the states on the Atlantic seaboard from 

Virginia northward, would draw funds from, and be accountable to, the 

Quartermaster General ; all the others would draw funds from. and 

account to, the War Department. The deputies under the control of 

the Quartermaster General would establish their offices wherever he 

" RG 107. OSW. Military Book. vol. 5. p. !S2 (SW 10 Linnard tI al., 7 Apr 1812): p. !94 

(SW to D. Baker tlill., 19 May 1812): p. 395 (SW 10 ·CoI. O. Shaumburgh. 19 May 1812). 

" RG 107, OSW. Leiters Received. L-I08 (6) (Lewi, to SW. 29 May 1812) . 

.. The distric" were divided as follows: 

1st-the {our easleru Itales (Connecticut. Rhode I5lanll, Mauachu&C:lIs. and New Hampshire): 

2d -New York and Vermont: 

! d -New J eney. Pennsylvana. and Dc:1awue; 

4th-l'ofaryland. Virginia. and District of Columbia: 

5th-North and South Carolina and Gc:urgia: 

6lh--Qhio and Michigan Territory; 

7th-Kentucky and Tenneu«' and Indiana. Illinois. and Louisiana Territories; 

8th-Louisiana. Florida and Mississippi Territory. 
SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 1812 139 

designated; the others would be located by the general commanding the 

department. Under this arrangement, Lt. Samuel Champlain, for example, was appointed deputy quartermaster in the Southern Department, 

commanded by Maj. Gen. Thomas Pinckney. with headquarters at 

Charleston.u As Lewis pointed out later, his superintendence of the 

Quartermaster's Department thus became restricted to the armies north 

of the Potomac, the Secretary taking under his immediate charge those 

of the South and Northwest. He gave Lewis no notice of any of their 

movements nor of the appointment of a single officer.18 At no time 

during the waT did the Secretary divest his office of more than a part of 

the Quartermaster duties it had administered before the war. 

Creation of Commissary Geneml of Purchases 

While these organizational details were being worked out, Congress 

reorganized other supply agencies. The same law that re·established the 

Quartermaster's Department abolished the office of the Purveyor of Public 

Supplies in the Treasury Department, replacing it with the offi ce of the 

Commissary General of Purchases under the direction of the Secretary 

of War. Congressional debate indicated that the legislators were seeking 

precedents in the Revolutionary War. Such an officer had existed then 

but unfortunately no one now recalled that he had been the head of a 

Subsistence Department rather than of a Purchasing Department. The 

law authorized the President to appoint a Commissary General and as 

many deputy commissaries as the public service required, but the latter 

were not made subject to military law. 

William Jones, a Philadelphia merchant, was appointed to the post 

on 4 April 1812.'1 After perusing the act, Jones refused the appointment; 

the salary offered-$3,OOO a year- and the restrictions imposed in reference to any connections with trade made acceptance impossible.1! While 

the Secretary searched for a man who would accept the office, Congress 

amended the law to eliminate some of the objectionable restrictive 

features. Purveyor Tench Coxe had solicited appointment before the 

bill had been adopted, but he was passed over and, under the terms of 

the law, went out of office on 1 June. u Someone had to direct the 

business of that office until a Commissary General could be appointed. 

Secretary Eustis therefore turned to Benjamin Mifflin who had been 

lO RG 107. OSW. Military Book. vol. 5. pp. 430-32 (SW to Lewis. 9 J une 1812); \'01. 6. 

pp. 85-86 (SW 10 Champlain. 18 Aug 1812). 

10RG 107. OSw. Lelfers Received. L- 20 (7) (Lewis to SW J ohn Armstrong. 8 Feb 1813). 

" RG 107. OSW. Military Book. vol. 5. p . 328 (SW 10 William Jones). 

"RG 107. OSW, Letters Received, J- 96 (6) (Jones to SW. II Apr 1812). 

10 Ibid., G-217 (6) (Co"e to SW, 6 Mar 1812). 
140 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

serving as chief clerk to Coxe. Eustis appointed Mimin a deputy commissary and instructed him to receive a ll public property transferred to him 

by Coxe as well as all goods delivered under contracts executed by the 

former Purveyor.1 0 

As though the suppl y agencies at Philadelphia were not disorganized 

and demoralized enough, Eustis sent word to the Superintendent of Military Stores tha t it had been proposed that his office should be merged 

with the Quartermaster's Department. Would it be "expedient to urge 

additional compensation." he queried. 2 1 Irvine thought such a merger 

wou ld result in many and serious disadvantages. T his was the first he 

had heard of the proposal and he was uncertain of the Secretary's meaning. 

Was it proposed, but afterwards, abandoned, that the offi ce of Supt of Mili· tary Stores should be merged in the Q M Department- has it been lately 

proposed &: is now under consideration; or am I to understand tha t the office is 

to be totally abolished? n 

He wanted an immediate ex planation to enable him to make suitable 

arrangements. Whatver had been intended, nothing more was heard of 

tha t proposal. In the meantime, Quartermaster General Lewis wrote 

that he hoped the system of the Superintendent and military storekeepers 

would be continued. " It renders the Quarter Masters and Issuers an 

excellent Check on each other." U 

While Mifflin directed purchases the search for a Commissary General 

continued. On 3 Jul y, Samuel Carswell of Philadelphia was appointed 

to the office. He was absent from P hiladelphia a t the time the Jetter 

of appointment arrived and did not return until 31 July when he accepted 

the office. Five days later, however, after talking to Mifflin and becoming 

acquainted with the duties of his office, Carswell wrote that he could 

not accept on account of his health. 24 

Seemingly as a last resort, the Secretar y on 8 August offered the post 

to Callender Irvine, Superintendent of Military Stores. Irvine accepted 

on condition that he be permitted to establish his offi ce at Philadelphia.u 

At Irvine's suggestion, William Linnard applied for the position of 

Superintendent, but his services as deputy quartermaster were badly 

• (I) RG 107. OS\\', Military Book, vol. 5. p. <107 (SW to Miffli n , 27 May 1812). (2) RG 92, 

Commissary General of Purchases (CGP), Miscellaneou" No. 246, p, 59 (Emt is to Mifflin. 

29 May 1812). National Archives . 

.. RG 107. OSW, Military Book. vol. 5. p. <12.5 (4 June 1812) . 

.. RG 107, OSW, Letters Received, 1- 156 (6) (Irvine 10 Eustis, 8Jun 1812). 

" I bid" J...-.128 (6) Ene. (Lewis to Eustis, 26 JUIl 1812). 

"RG 107. OSW, Military Book. vol. 6. p. 7 (SW 10 Carswell . 1\ Jul 1812). (2) RG 107, 

OS\\'. Letters Received, ()...j0!! (6); ()...j00t (6); ()...jl!) (6) (Carswell to Eustis. 25 Jul. 1\'1 J ul. 

5 Aug 1812), 

- (I) RG 107. OSW. ~f ilila fy Book, vol. 6. p. 71 (SW to Irvine. 8 Aug 1812). (2) RG 107, 

OSW, Letters Received, 1- 226 (6) (Irvine 10 Eustis, I~ Aug 1812). 
SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 1812 141 

needed and William Duncan was appointed instead.

u At long last the 

vacancies in the various supply agencies had been filled . Congress had 

established a separate Ordnance Department on 14 May and on 15 July 

the office of Commissary Genera l of Ordnance had also been filled by the 

appointment of Col. Decius Wadsworth.2f 

The war with Grcat Britain had been in progress for almost 2 months 

before the last of the staff appoi ntments had been made. Under the 

circumstances, it is not surprising that Quartermaster General Lewis. 

who had been promised reports of military stores issued, on hand. and 

under contract from both the Superintendent and Purveyor on which to 

base his operations. had received nonc by the end of May nor even by 

the middle of June." By Aug ust. when th e office of Commissary General 

of Purchases was finall y filled . supply arra ngements had deteriorated to 

such an extent thal Lewis complained to the Secretary. 

Your Commissary Oepartmelll embarrasses and paralizes every military 

operation. (we know nothing of the state of their preparations; nor does any 

article. forwarded to this quarter, come accompallied with any th ing like an 

invoice). Of coune we are cOIl1\>clled to unpack every thing at a great expence. and then to repack for their u timate destination. There is no remedy but 

confin ing that Department to the purchase of Cloathing alone and leave the 

residue (Hospital Stores, ordnance. Arms &: ammunition excepted) exclusively 

to the Quarter Master Department. We shall then provide what we want. 

at the nearest point where required. know at all times what we have. save much 

expense and more vexat on. ~~ 

Not only were the laws establish ing the suppl y departments enacted 

so late that their organization could nOt be completed before th e war 

started, but they were also so poorly drawn that the functions of the 

agencies were not clearly deli neated. Irvine feared that witho ut particular instructio ns defini ng the duties of the Quartermaster General. Commissary General of Ordnance. and Commissary General of Purchases, 

they would clash in the execmion of the ir duties a nd retard the public 

servicc.1o These fears were well fou nded. 

The law authorized the QuartermaSter Genera l and his subordinates. 

when directed by the Secretary of War. " to purchase military Stores, camp 

equipage and other anicles requisite for the troops." and. at the same 

time. ordered the Commissary General of Purchases "to co nduct th e 

-(I) RG 107. OSW, Lellers Received . L- 162 (6) (Lillllard to SW. II Aug 18 12). (2) RC 107, 

OSW. Mililary Rook. vol. G. p. 99 (SW 10 DUllCiJ.Il. 26 Aug 1812) . 

.. (I) 2 SIal. 7!12. (2) RG 107, OSW. Military Book, vol. 6. " . 28 (SW to Wadsworth, 15 J ul 

1812). 

-(I) RG 107. OSW. Military Book. vol. 5, pp. !l77-7R (SW to Lewis, 8 May 18 12). (2) RG 

107. OSW. ullers Received. 1..--108 (6): L- 11 8 (6) Ellc. (Lewis 10 SW. 29 May. 15 Jun 1812). 

- RG 107, OSW. Lelten Received. 1..--168 (6) (Lewis 10 SW. 7 Aug 1812). 

-Ibid., 1-252 (6) (lrville to SW. 20 Aug 1812). 
142 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

procuring and providing of a ll arms, military stores, clothing, and genera ll y all ankles of supply req uisite (or the military service." 3. Lewis, 

like Irvine, was at a loss to know what his functions were. He found 

himself transacting the duties of every other department, even to the 

arming of vessels on Lake Champlain.n The Secretary attempted to 

distinguish between the duties of commissaries and quartermasters. In 

general, the commissaries were to make the purchases; [he quartermasters 

were to receive and issue. When th e commissary could not make purchases on a reasonable basis because he was too far away or for any other 

reason, then the quartermaster was to purchase.3I In rvlay, the Secretary 

had also instructed Lewis that in the course of service, losses and 

deficiencies might be experienced in the clothing and subsistence depaTtmenu. In that case, if the proper officer was not at hand, the Quartermaster General was authorized to procure the supplies necessary for "the 

accommodation and comfort of the Troops." 3~ The Secretary increased 

confusion when he issued a regulation in May covering the duties of the 

general staff. The Quartermaster General found it was his function 

among other duties "to ensure a supply of provisions and a regular 

distribution thereof to the troops." If, he inquired, this has not "crept 

in by accident, I wish to know, as the Army is supplied with provisions 

by contract (the worst of all possible modes) what it means." 3~ 

Lack of a SniJs;stellce Depm·tment 

The procurement of subsistence was not a function of the Quartermaster's Department. Contractors supplied rations. In legislating for 

the supply departments, neither the War Department nor Congress had 

given any thought to the establishment of a Subsistence Department. 

Taking no cognizance of all the criticism that had been leveled against 

subsistence contractors, they relied upon the contract system to supply the 

troops in war as it had in the years since 1781. Before war was declared, 

the Secretary had executed contracts to supply the troops with rations 

for the year 1812. For purposes of administration, the states and territories had been grouped into districts, and each contractor supplied a 

given district. These districts, however, did not coincide with the military districts established later in 1813. Despite the War Hawks' incessant 

cry of "Canada! Canada! Canada!," none of these contracts made provision 

"2 Sial. 690 (Mar 28, 1812). 

n RG 107. OSW, Lellers Received, L- 181 (6) (Lewis to SW, 4 Sep 1812). 

n RG 107. OSW. Military Book. vol. 5. pp. 430-32 (SW to Lewis, 9 Jun 1812). 

"Ibid .. vol. 5, pp. 377- 78 (SW 10 Lewis, 8 May 18[2). 

- (I) RG 107. OSW. Leiters Received , L- 181 (6) (Lewis 10 SW. 4 Sep 1812). (2) RG 94. 

ACO. General Orders, 1812- 17 (Regulation , 4 May 1812). 
SUPPLY IN T HE WAR OF 18 12 143 

for supplying an Army that might invade the territory of the enemy if 

war occurred. 

As in the past. the commanding officer could take mallers into his 

own hands if the contractor failed to make deliveries. Obviously though, 

if the contractor fail ed to suppl y because food was scarce, transportation 

inadequate, or simply because he would lose money on the tra nsaction, 

the agent appointed by the commanding officer to make good the defi ciency would be able to do so only at enormous expense. " ll is madness 

in the extreme to attempt to carry on war with slich a system," wrote 

Lt. Col. Thomas S. Jesup, who within a few yean; was to become Quartermaster General. Either the contractors should be dismissed or made 

amenable to military law, and Jesup would have included not onl y the 

contractor's agent who accompanied the Army, "but the whole tribe From 

the principal, wheresoever he may reside, to the humblest bullock driver 

or sca lesman." 3e 

During the War of 1812, as in the Revolutionary War, the soldier 

and officer alike supplemented Army rations with such commodities as 

they could afford to buy from the sutler. T he latter offered fresh 

vegetables, fruits. coffee, liquor, and tobacco at greatly enhanced prices. 

Such prices did not entirely result from his desire to gouge profits. 

Because the troops were paid irregularly, the sutl er encouraged them to 

buy on credit, but he had no means of compelling payment of the debts 

contracted. T he sutl er often sustained heavy losses by the death or 

desertion of an indebted soldier. In consequence, his high prices cove 'cd 

that risk as well as the ex pense he incurred in purchasing his wares on 

long credit-IT The War Department pursued no consistent policy of 

licensing sutlers but genera ll y they were regul ated by Army officers. 

So much criticism of the contract system continued to be voiced that, 

in March 1813, Congress attempted to modify the system by authorizing 

the President to appoint special commissaries or to designate any officer 

of the Quartermaster's Department to procure and issue subsistence in 

all cases where deficiencies deve loped through the failu re of the contractor 

to suppl y the troops. Such special commissaries were to be entitled to 

the pay and emoluments of a deputy quartermaster genera1." 

Before the end of the war, J ohn C. Calhoun, then a member of the 

House of Representatives, offered resolutions directing an inquiry into 

the expediency of changing the system of subsisting the Army.1I The 

- J esup Papers, Box I Ooup to Col. --. 8 Scp 1814). Manuscript Diy., Library of 

Congrf'!W . 

.. Am~rit(lll St",~ P"~ rs. Milil",., AU,,;rs, I. 806 (Rpt. Surgeon Ceneral Loy~JI to Calhoun. 

16 Nov 1818). 

-25',,1.811 (Mar 5, 181 5). 

-"rlll"/s 0/ Co"gr~JS. 15th Cong., 5d 5CSI., vol. 5. pr. 550-51 (NOI' 10, 1814). 
144 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T HE A RMY 

resolutions were adopted, and in response to an inquiry of the Committee 

on Military Affairs, James Monroe, Secretary of War, replied in favor of 

a commissariat. In suppOrt of his position, he forwarded lhe views of 

Maj. Gen. Winfield ScOtt, Maj. Gen. Edmund P. Gaines, and Col. 

John R. Fenwick. T hese were severe ly denunciatOry of the comract 

system,OIl The House passed a bill providing for the establishment of a 

commissariat, and it was under consideration in the Senate when the end 

of the war caused its indefinite postponement." 

Supply of Clothing 

Except for its transportation, supplying tTOOpS with clothing was 

not a function of the Quartermaster's Department. Clothing for an 

expanding Army on the eve of wa r was procured under contract by the 

Purveyor and, for the troops during the war. by his successor, the Commissary General of Purchases. When Congress ex panded the size of the 

Army in J anuary 18 12, Secretary Eustis informed Tench Coxe that 20,000 

uniforms would be required in addition to those for the existing military 

establishment. By grea t exertions. Coxe managed to complete these 

preparations in the usual 5·month period it had taken in the past to get 

the ann ual clothing supply ready for a smaller Army.H In February, 

Congress added another 25,000 men to the Army, and Secretary Eustis 

ordered Coxe to begin purchasing clothing for that number. He was 

to solicit bids th rough newspaper advertisements. Eustis also directed 

Coxe to distribute the purchases and the manufacture of the clothing in 

Pennsylvania, New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts in order that 

preparations might be expedited and the finished clothing delivered at 

or ncar the places where it would be requ ired by the recruits. He 

instructed Coxe to se lect proper representatives in these states to make 

the purchases.·! 

Coxe worked di ligently, but he was seemingl y unable to depart from 

the established routine of suppl y preparation at Philadelphia because he 

neither advertised in the newspapers nor appointed purchasing agents 

as directed. By 21 March, under War Department prodding, seven 

agencies of the Purveyor's office were set up at Exeter, N.H .. Boston, 

Mass., Providence, R.I., Middletown, Conn., Baltimore. Md., and New 

York and Albany, N.Y., but Coxe still thought it would take at least 

" AmuiC<1II Sllll~ n~rJ, M ililil.-, AUil;rl, I, 599·601. 

" A flllil/.! of CO"8r~u, 13th Cong .. 3d $C$S .. vol. 3, pp. 228-30. 232, 234. 236, 11 01. 1131. 

U( I) RG 107, OS\\', Military Book, \'01. 5, p. 262 (SW to Coxe, 15 J an 1812). (2) RG 107, 

OS\\'. Leiters R«eivoo, C-213 (6) (Coxe to Eustis, 18 Mar 1812). 

U(I) RG 107. OS\\', Military Book. vol. .~, pr. 273- 74 (Eu$tis to Coxc, 14 Feb 1812). (2) RG 

92. eG I'. Miscellaneous, No. 246, p. 44 (E st ~ to Coxe, 19 Feb 1812). 
SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 1812 145 

3 months to get most of the clothing ready and that the supply would not 

include woolens. T he Secretary's expectations of an early and good 

supply of cloth, he thought, were "too sanguine." " 

The Secretary sent Lt. Col. John e hrYSlie to Philadelphia to expedite the clothing supply. Late in March, he advised that nothing was 

ready for the new Army, but Coxe was not idle and within 3 weeks 

ehryslie was reporting that supplies were daily pouring into storage.d 

To the additional uniforms needed for an expanded regular Army, there 

was soon added the clothing required by the militia called into the service 

of the United States and by the volunteer corps whose service the Presi· 

dent was authorized to accept. By law, the volunteers were to receive 

in lieu of clothing a sum of money equal to the cost of the clothing 

provided for noncommissioned officers and privates in the regular Army. 

In actual practice, both the militia and the volunteers received clothing 

provided by the Commissary General of Purchases, the cost of which was 

deducted from their pay.oe 

It is surprising that Coxe accomplished as much as he did for his 

organization was wholly inadequate to the demands made upon his office. 

He had only three clerks to help him yet he was responsible not only for 

the procurement of clothing but of all other Army supplies except subsistence. He employed some 5,000 tailors and seamstresses in making 

garments. As the supply poured into the Philadelphia Arsenal, Coxe 

lamented that there was but a single government cart to haul supplies 

to and from the Arsenal and that there were but two packing presses and 

only a few hands to pack clothing for shipment to the recruits." 

Under pressure to supply clothing rapidly and handicapped by lack 

of help, Coxe during these months must have been further harassed by 

the uncertainty of whether he would be retained in office. He sought 

appointment in the proposed Commissary Department. When Congress 

abolished the Purveyor's Office, however, the Secretary of War dismissed 

him with thanks for his "zeal and fidelity" barely 2 weeks before war was 

declared against Great Britain.os 

.. (I) RG 107, OSW, Military Book, vol. 5. pp. 291, 297-98 (Eustis 10 Colle. 6 and 12 Mar 

1812). (2) RG 107, OSW, Lellers Received , G-2 13 (6) (Colle to Eustis, 18 Mar 1812). (3) RG 92, 

Purveyor, Letters Sent, No. 243. p. 392 (Colle to Eustis, 8 Mar 1812): pp. 414- 15 (Colle to 

Chry5lie, 21 Mar 1812) . 

.. RG 107, OSW. Lellers Received. C-222 (6) C-2 .~ (6) (Chrystie to SW, 23 Mar and II Apr 

1812) . 

.. (I> RG 107, OSW, Military Book, vol. 6, p. 251 (SW to Gen. Harrison, 16 Dec 1812): 

p. 252 (SW to Gov. of I'enn .. 16 Dec 1812). (2) The provision of clothing to the militia and to 

the volunteers was governed respectively by the act of 2 J anuary 1795 and 6 February 1812. 

I Sial. 498: 2 Slat. 676. 

"(I) RG 107, OSW. Leiters Received. C-253 (6) (Colle to Eustis, 14 Apr 1812). (2) RG 92. 

Purveyor. ullers Sent. No. 243, pp. 471-72 (Colle to LI. Col. Winder, I I Apr 1812). 

" RG 107. OSW, Military Book, vol. .~, p. 423 (Eustis to Colle. 4 J un 1812). 
146 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

In the past, Coxe had obtained clothing by furnishing governmentowned materials to master tailors who contracted to produce complete 

uniforms for one or more regiments. The master tailor not only used 

his own workmen but also employed the services of subcontractors to 

complete such a contract. In 1812 the Deputy Commissary General of 

Purchases, acting on the advice of Callender Irvine, introduced modifications that were followed for many years after the war. As long ago as 

1808, Irvine had argued that it would be to the advantage of the government to have all Army clothing cut out at the Arsenal before it was issued 

to the tailors. Convinced that government-owned materials had in the 

past been stolen and that many thousand dollars annually would be saved 

"in a certain article termed by the Tailors Cabbage," Irvine was also 

certain that the new method would provide greater uniformity in cut and 

a better sizing of garments.4~ 

When Irvine became Commissary General of Purchases, he concentrated both the cutting and inspection of clothing in a building he rented 

for that purpose in Philadelphia, carting the finished clothing to the more 

distant Arsenal only when it was ready to be packed for shipment, He 

thereby reduced expenses and brought the whole operation more closely 

under his supervision, He obtained the necessary ren tal money from 

the sale of the waste fabric left over after the uniforms had been cut.IO 

In the fall of 1812, Irvine tried to improve other phases of production. Clothing was botched in the making, he charged, because the 

contractors or master tailors pocketed a good round sum annually, but 

the poor who were employed in actually making the clothing were 

" pinched almost to death." T heir necessities were such that they were 

compell ed to make the clothing at whatever prices the contractors were 

disposed to grant. These, Irvine charged, were scarcely enough "to give 

them salt for their mush." T he inspector ought to have rejected poorly 

made garments, but Irvi ne accused him of having a perfect understanding 

with the contractors. The result was that ill-made garments were sent 

to the troops. Irvine therefore req uested the Secretary to remove the 

inspector and to approve his plan to eliminate the master tailors by 

employing two or three men to issue cut-out garments directly to those 

who made them and to give these makers a just price.&> With the 

"(I) RG 107, OSW, Letters Received. 1- 198 (6) (Irvine 10 SW, 15 Jul 1812). (2) RG 92, 

Supe of Military Stores, Letlers Sent. No. 398, pp. 318--19 (Irvine to Coxe, 15 Nov 1808). (3) 

Coxe had rejected the proposal because I'urveyof WhcJen had tried and abandoned the 

melhod several years earlier. RG 92, I'un 'eyof, Leiters Sent, No. 248, pp. 33-.H (Coxe to Irvine, 

15 Nov 1808). 

"'(1) RG 92, CGP, Leiters Sent, No. !l81. p. 13 (Irvine to SW, 2 Scp 1812). (2) RG 92, 

eGp, Leiters Received from SW, No. 190, p. 4 (Eustis to Irvine, 5 Sep 1812) . 

• , For example, the contract of a master lailor gave him 65 cents for making a fOund jacket 

with sleeves, but he allowed the actual maker only 37 cenu. By paying the issuer 5 cents a 
SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 1812 147 

Secretary's approval, he immediately put this system into effect. He 

appointed new inspectors and drafted regulations to govern the operations 

of the Philadelphia clothing establishment.u 

In 1812, Irvine had a clothing establishment functioning at Philadelphia that was capable of turning out 2,000 to 3,000 suits per week. 

By the winter of the following year, he employed 3,000 to 4,000 people.u 

Deputy commissaries in other areas also procured considerable quantities 

of cloth and clothing. They had replaced the former purchasing agents 

of the Purveyor's office.&~ T hey purchased whatever doth of domestic 

manufacture they could find that met their needs even to drab and mixed 

cloths. and they scoured the markets for any imported textiles. Unfortunately, the quality of the cloth and the clothing they procured by 

no means equalled the high standards that Irvine was attempting to set 

at Philadelphia, and there were numerous complaints from the troops. 

Irvine attributed much of the difficulty to the law that allowed a 

commission of 2M! percent on the money the deputy commissary disbursed, though it limited the total sum to be paid him to no more than 

$2,000. Irvine feared that the "disposition to purchase largely & secure 

the commission" of $2,000 a year was so strong as to induce the commissaries to overlook the quality and the prices of the goods. He thought it 

highly desirable to give them fixed salaries, assign them to designated 

districts, and make them su bject to military law so that they might be 

ordered to any part of their districts. 05 T his particular reform, however, 

was not effected. By the spring of 1814, Irvine was promising to have 

the greater part of the clothing "made in future under my own Eye." ae 

In an effort to improve the quality of the clothing, he determined to set 

garment, the make r under Irvine's plan could be paid 60 cenu, or enough to satisfy his hunger 

and enable him to do his work well. RC 107, OSW, utlers Received, 1-365 (6) (Irvine to SW, 

24 Nov 1812). 

"(I) RG 107, OSW, Military Book, vol. 6, p. 239 (SW to Irvine. 2.5 Nov 1812). (2) RG 92, 

CGP, Letlers Sent, No. 88 1, p . 226 (Irvine to Francis Brown, 5 Dec ISI2), p. 2S4 (Irvine to 

Inspector Wm. MclJhenney. 12 J an ISI3) . 

.. RG 92, CGP, Letters Sent. No. 8S I. p, 94 (Irvine to Eustis, 6 Oct ISI2); No. 3S4, pp. 17 1-

72 (Irvine to Wm. James, 22 Nov. ISI4) . 

.. Among the first deputie!l appointed were the following: John Langdon at Portsmouth, 

N,H .. Elisha Tracy at Norwich, Conn ., William J arvis at Wethersfield, VI., Amasa Stetson 

at Boston, Mass" Samuel Russell at New York. Hansom Kelly at Wiilmington, N,C., j ohn 

Stith at I'etersburg. Va., Iknjamin Cudworth at Charleston, S.C., j ohn Cummings at Savannah , 

Ga., Thomas Buford at Lexington, Ky .. john McKinney at Washington, and Benjamin Morgan 

at New Orleans . 

.. (I) RG 107, OSW, Letlers Received, 1- 370 (6) (Irvine to Eustis, 4 Dec ISI2). (2) 2 SI/lt. 

696 (Mar 2S, ISI2). (!S) jackson charged the deputy commissary general at New Orleans 

governed his purchases to make sure of his salary. Sec RG 92, Coxe and Irvine Papers, Box 34 

(Robert Butler. AG at New Orleans, to Monroe, 17 Feb ISI5) . 

.. RG 92, CGP, Leiters Sent, No. 3S3. pp. 319-20 (Irvine to SW Armstrong, 13 May 1814). 
.41.';';". ~O#- N_. 

Wi .... F..u uoill .... 

18TH U.S. I NFANTRY, 18 14-1815 
SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 1812 149 

up a clothing establishment at Albany similar to the one at Philadelphia. 

T he war ended, however, before it could be put into operation. ~7 

Despite the difficulties of procurement and production, Irvine was 

satisfied that he had furnished sufficient garments to clothe the troops in 

the winter of 1812-13. Yet frequent complaints were made tha t companies had not received their suppl y of clothing. In some cases, deliveries 

had gone astray as companies were moved to other stations. In other 

instances, the lack of clothing was attributable to the fine aesthetic sense 

of certain commanding officers that forbade their accepting for their 

regiments coats made of drab cloth; that is, brown coats faced with red. 

In mid-October, they apparently preferred to risk the health of their 

men by keeping them in linen jackets. Seeking the aid of General 

Dearborn, Irvine arg'ued in terms reminiscent of those used by Tench 

Coxe-that color was of minor importance to the health of the men and 

besides "some allowance should be made for existing circumstances & 

some consideration had for the troops in other quarters." ss 

Like his predecessor, Tench Coxe, Commissary General Irvi ne discovered that separation of the procurement and the distribution of 

clothing and other military supplies had the effect of leaving him totall y 

uninformed as to the state of the stores that he and his deputies had 

provided. It was indispensably necessary that storekeepers make monthly 

reports to his office, showing the rece ipt and issue of stores and stating 

from whom they were received, to whom issued, and by what authority.u 

Irvine complai ned that if he ca lled for a statement of stores it was either 

incorrect or furnished so long after it had been requested that it was of 

little use to him. Earl y in 1813, he proposed that the Superintendent 

of Military Stores be relieved of directing the issue of supplies for the 

Army and that all storekeepers be ordered to make periodical reports to 

his office. o As a resu lt, the Secretary of War made the Commissary 

General of Purchases responsible thereafter not only for providing supplies but also for their storage and distribution. The Superintendent 

of Military Stores and the military storekeepers were brought under his 

control, and all orders for the transportation of military stores by the 

Quartermaster's Department issued from his office.&· 

With the Quartermaster's Department in the process of being 

organized, it was undobutedly true that some transportation orders were 

not promptly executed. Irvine charged that clothing had been permitted 

IT Ibid., No. !l84, p. 200 (Irvine 10 Wm. J ama, 14 Dec 1814). 

-Ibid., No. !l81, p. 11 8 (Irvine to Dearborn. 18 OCt 1812); p. 120 (Irvine to Adj . Gen. 

Cushing. 16 Oct 1812). 

- I bid., No. !l81, p. 99 (Irvine to Eustis. 8 OCt 1812). 

"Ibid., No. 38. pp. 283-84 (Irvine to SW Monroe, 18 Jan 1813) . 

.. RG 107, OSW, Military Book, vol. 6, pp. 275- 76 (SW to Irvine, 30 Jan 18U). 
150 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

to rema in at Albany, [or example, instead of being forwarded to its 

destinations. Quartermasters, however, had found it somewhat difficult 

to forward supplies. Quartermaster Genera l Lewis reported that there 

was too much inaccuracy in invoices, and that storekeepers followed no 

system of numbering invoices so that they could be identified with the 

parcels to which they belonged. The resu ltant confusion had serious 

consequences, such as tents being forwarded for clothing and camp kettles 

[or cartouche boxes.82 Deputy Quartermaster Linnard had received 

three sets of invoices requiring delivery of clothing for one company to 

be made at three different places many miles apart. Where, he inquired 

of the Superintendent of Military Stores, was the company stationed? 

It would make conveyance easier and less expensive, he suggested, if all 

clothing for recruits could be sent to the headquarters of the district and 

issued to the respective rendezvous in the military district by the 

commanding offi cers. 63 

Much clothing had been lost because it arrived at a recruiting district 

after the latter had been broken up. With no officer on hand to receive 

it, the wagoner, unauthorized to bring it back to the Philadelphia 

Arsenal, was likely to deposit the clothing with a private citizen at the 

delivery poinlo There it remained uncall ed for and unused.6< Moreover, in time, it became apparent that officers on recruiting service 

generally called (or too much clothing. To furnish a recruit with a 

6 months' to a year's su pply of clothing and to give him arms and accoutrements while he was still at a recruiting rendezvous inevitably resu lted 

in abuses and losses. Irvine later charged that the destruction of arms 

so issued was "beyond be lief" and that the injudicious issue of clothing 

had caused the government a loss of between half a mill ion and a mill ion 

dol lars.88 

It was just th is waste, the total lack of any system of accountability, 

the fact that clothing had been issued on the requisition of any officera subaltern officer could go into a public store and "turn it inside out"-

that led Irvine to urge the appointment of issuing commissaries as early 

as the fa ll of IBI2.u In addition, requisitions for clothing had been so 

loosely handled that Irvine charged that great waste had occurred. In 

one instance, three officers of the same regiment had made requisitions 

for the clothing of that regiment on three officers of the Commissary 

.. RG 92, CGP, Letters Sent, No. ~8 , pp. 108-09 (Irvine to Wm. Duncan , 120(1 1812). 

" RG 92, QM Phila., Letter Book, 1812- 13, No. 528, p . .!I21 (Linnard 10 Wm. Duncan, 

2 J an 181.!!). 

" Ibid., No. 528, p. 2.!1.!1 (Linnard to Wm. Duncan, 5 Nov 1812) . 

.. RG 92, CGP, Letters Sent. No . .!I84, pp. 265--66 (Irvine 10 Maj. R. H. Macpherson. 7 Feb 

1815). 

" Ibid., No. 38 1. pp. 99, 29.!1 (Irvine 10 SW, 8 Oct 1812 and 22 Jan 181.!!). 
SUPPLY IN T H E WAR OF 1812 151 

Depanment,lT T he lack of regularity in keeping clothing accounts had 

resulted in some troops receiving morc than they were entitled to. T he 

consequence was that they " trafficked away the surplus." 

In response to suggestions by the Secretary of War, Congress early in 

1813 initiated action to provide greater accountability on the part of 

supply officers. For this purpose, it abolished the office of Superintendent 

of Military Stores. the function of which had already been partially 

absorbed by lhe offi ce of the Commissary General of Purchases, and 

created instead a Superintendent General of Military Supplies who was 

to reside at the seat of government. He was not a staff officer but a 

civilian to whom was entrusted the d uty of keeping proper accounts of 

all military stores and supplies purchased for the Army, the volunteers, 

and the militia. He was to prescribe the forms of all the returns and 

accounts of the stores and supplies purchased, on hand, distributed, used, 

or sold that were to be rendered by the Commissary General of Purchases, 

the Quartermaster General, the Commissary General of Ordnance, the 

regimenta l quartermasters, the officers of the hospital and medical departmenlS, and any other offi cer to whom supplies were entrusted." William 

Duncan, the fonner Superinte ndent of Military Stores, applied for the 

new office, but the appointment went to Richard Cutts on 5 April 1813.8Y 

In the same law, Congress also authorized the President to appoint 

six assistant commissaries to receive clothing and other supplies from 

the deputy commissaries and d istribute them to the regimental q uartermasters for issue to the troops. T he law was passed in March, but it 

was July before the Secretary of War recurred to the need to appoint 

issuing commissaries, and it was 7 August before he instructed Irvine to 

appoint such officers at Niagara, Sackett's Harbor, Lake Champlain, and 

New Orl eans, and with the troops under Generals Harrison and 

Pinckney.TO By the following month, Irvine had made some of these 

appointments. He developed requisition forms and instructed issuing 

commissaries to make delivery only on the basis of actual strength.

lI 

Compliance with the new procedu res was difficult to obtain. The 

system of iss uing commissaries did check some of the abuses in clothing 

suppl y, but Irvine maintained tha t it did not go far enough. In the 

fa ll of 1814, he outlined a system for the suppl y and issue of clothing 

bid~ No. 58 1, p. 362 (Irvine to ))earborn. 28 Feb 1815). 

- 2 SIal. 816-11, Mar 5, IS15). 

-(I) RG 107, OSW, Letters Rec:eived, ))- 79 (7) (Duncan to SW, 21 Mar 1815). (2) RG 107, 

OSW, Military Book, vol. 6, p. 347 (SW to Cutis, 5 Apr 1815) . 

.. RG 107, OSW, Military Book, vol. 7, pp. 25, 55 (SW to Irvine, 2S J u1 and 7 Aug 1815). 

TO RG 92, CGP, Leiters Sent, No. 532, pp. 280-2S I (ln'ine to SW, 2 Sep 1815); No. 385, 

pp. 1- 2 (Irvine to Jam~ E. Herron el a/., 25 Oct 1815): pp. 199-200 (Irvine to Samuel Russell 

d a/., 28 Feb 1814). 
152 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

under which the cost of an annual supply of clothing for each soldier 

would be added to his pay. Instead of encumbering the soldier with 

ha lf a year's cloth ing at a time, as had been the custom, Irvine proposed 

placing issues on a monthly basis. At each muster or monthly inspection, 

the inspector would report to the paymaster the amount of clothing 

required by each man. T he paymaster would direct it to be furnished 

and deduct the costs of the clothing rrom the soldier's pay. The clothing 

would be obtained from a general depot of clothing that would be 

established in each military district under an issuing commissary.T2 

Before any action could be taken on this proposa l, however, the war ended. 

Reorganization. of the QuaJ·termaster's De/Jarlme71t 

At the same time. that Congress, early in 1813, was attempting to 

introduce a grea ter degree of accountability among suppl y personnel. it 

was also legislating to improve the organization of the general staff. 

When John Armstrong became Secretary of War in J anuary 1813, he 

rece ived numerous complaints on the shortcomings of the staff depart· 

ments. General Dearborn insisted that improvement in the Quarter· 

master's Department was an absolute necessity; otherwise it would be 

"utterly impossible for an Army to perform an active campaign with 

any probability of success." 11 W illiam Linnard felt that it was incumbent upon him to seek out the new Secretary and point our some of the 

defects of the Quartermaster's Department. The Quartermaster General 

himself gave the Secretary the benefit of his ideas on the reforms required 

in his Department.T4 If the Quartermaster General was to perform field 

duties. he argued. it was impossible for him to attend to more than one 

grand army. Lewis therefore proposed that each army have either a 

principal Quartermaster officer atlending it, or that the Quartermaster 

General have an assistant, with suitable rank and powers, attached to 

each army. 

The resu lt was that, on 3 March 1813, Congress passed an act for 

the better organization of the general staff of the Army.TS It caused 

radical changes in the organization of the Quartermaster's Department. 

Under the new arrangement, the Department had a sta ff of 8 quartermaSters genera l, 8 deputy quartermasters general, and 23 assistant deputy 

quartermasters general. The chief of the Department, attached to the 

principal army. had the brevet rank and pay and emoluments of a 

·' Ibid., No. !S4, pp. 17&-178 (Irvine 10 SW, 25 Nov 1814). 

n RC 107. OSW, Lellen Received, D-27 (7) (28 Jan 1815). 

"(I) RG 92. QM Phila .. Leiter Book, 1812- U, No. 528, unpaged (Linnard to Lt. H. John. 

$On,!O J an 1815). (2) RG 107, OSW, Lellen Received, 1.-20 (7) (Lewis 10 SW, 8 Feb 1815). 

'"2 Still. 819. 
SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 1812 153 

brigadier general. All the other quartermasters general were granted 

the brevet Tank and the pay and emoluments of colonels of infantry. 

The deputy and the assistant deputy quartermasters general had the 

brevet rank and the pay and emoluments of majors of cavalry and captains 

of infantry, respectively. The law authorized the President to take these 

officers from the line or not, as he thought expedient. The law retained 

the former provision for forage, wagon, and barrack masters, but they 

were to be appointed under the direction of the Secretary of War by 

each quartermaster general attached to a separate army, command, or 

one of the nine military districts into which the country was divided for 

administrative purposes. The latter were also to employ as many artificers, mechanics, and laborers as were required. 78 

Two and a half weeks after Congress had enacted this legislation, 

Robert Swartwout was appointed to succeed Morgan Lewis as head of 

the Quartermaster's Department.17 Swartwout was a New York merchant 

whose business experience, it was hoped, would enable him to overcome 

some of the difficulties that had been encountered in supplying the 

trOOps. His military experience had been confined to militia service, 

and at the time of his appointment he was serving as a colonel in the 

New York militia. As head of the Department, he was stationed at 

Albany in the 9th military district, but he did not control the Quartermaster's Department any more than Lewis had before him. Except for 

the preparation of estimates that included all forces, his aCtivities were 

restricted to Quartermaster support of the Army in the 9th District. 

Orders to the quartermasters general did not issue from his office but 

from that of the Secretary of War. Each quartermaster general operated 

independently of every other and consequently no greater degree of 

control or co·ordination was introduced in 1813 than had existed in 1812. 

Like his predecessor, Swartwout assumed the duties of his office at a 

time when the Department was being reorganized, and he, too, was 

discouraged by his inability to obtain promptly from the War Department 

the names of the deputies and assistants appointed under the new law.18 

He was more fortuna te than Lewis in receiving immediately upon his 

appointment a minutely detailed regulation covering the duties of his 

Department and clarifying its purchase responsibilities. 1D These duties 

" For the personnel of the reorganized Department see American Statt! Papers, Military 

ADairs, I. !89. 

"RG 107. OSW. Military Book. vol. 6. p. !5S (SW to Swartwout, 21 Mar lSI!). 

" RG 107. OSW. Letters R«eived. £-169 (7) (Swartwout to SW. 27 Apr 1813) . 

.. (I) Swartwout Papers. Box 1. Manuscript Collection . N.Y. Public Library. This 

regula tion was appended to the leiter of appointment dated 21 Mar lSI!. (2) See also 

AmericMI Slate Papers, Milila r)' ADairs, I. 425 If., for the rules and regulations of the Amly. 

1 May lSI!, which includes the same regulat ion for the QU3rterm35ter'~ Department. 
154 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

apparently held no great interest for him for within a year Swartwout 

offered his resignation.so Secretary of War Armstrong did not accept it. 

and Swartwout continued in office until the end of the war brought still 

another reorganization of the Department. 

Transportation of Supplies 

While the organization of the Department was altered and new 

appointments were made in the midst of the war, quartermasters carried 

out their basic function of transporting men and supplies, employing 

methods that differed in no way from those used in the Revolutionary 

War. In the Army itself, supplies and baggage moved in wagons, manned 

by civilian teamsters or soldiers detailed from the line. under the direction 

of wagonmasters. On the supply lines, clothing, equipment, medical 

supplies, and military stores were transported in wagons which quartermasters hired for the purpose. To prevent loss, such supplies were 

usually placed under the care of conductors who accompanied the wagons. 

Where wagons could not be used. and particularly in the winter months, 

quartermasters hired packhorses and in some areas used sleds. To save 

transportation costs, quartermasters moved supplies as much as possible 

by water routes. 

As compared with the cost of water transportation, land freights 

were excessive. When flour could be carried to Boston by boat in 1810, 

it cost 75 cents a barrel more than it did in New York City, but when 

British cruisers osed the Sound in 181!} and 1814, the difference was 

$5.03." Linnard regularly shipped supplies from Philadelphia to Albany 

by a commercial line that transported by land and water via Trenton 

and Amboy, keeping inside Staten Island to New York City. There the 

assistant deputy quartermaster received the supplies and shipped them 

north on one of the Albany packets." 

War increased enormously the cost of the overland haul from Philadelphia to Piusburgh. At the latter place, the assistant quartermaster 

hired barges and keelboats to carry supplies down the Ohio and Mississippi. Before the end of the war, the War Department entered into a 

contract with Robert Fulton to transport troops and munitions in steamboats on the Ohio and Mississi ppi. A warrant for $40,000 under this contract was issued to Fulton in January 1815. Though Fulton died about a 

month later, the Secretary requested Col. James Morrison to furnish him 

- RG 94. AGO. Letters Received (Swartwout to AnnJtrong. I Apr 1814) . 

.. Victor S. Clark, HiJtory of ManUfacturers in tile United StldCJ (Washington , 1916), 

pp. 335, 537- 58. 

- RG 92, QM "hila .. Letters Sent, No. 551 (Linnard 10 Lewis, SO J an 1812). 
SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 1812 155 

a report on (he time required for a steamboat trip from Pittsburgh to 

New Orleans, the number of troops a steamboat could carry, and, in 

general, the usefulness of such boats in transporting on the rivers. The 

Secretary directed the deputy quartermaster at New Orleans to utilize 

steamboats in all cases where their use would be more economical than 

the usual mode of transportation. s8 By that time, however, the war had 

ended, and there is no evidence that the Quartermaster's Department 

transported any supplies in steamboats during the War of 1812, even 

though some steamboats were in use on the Hudson and Fulton's competitor operated one on Lake Champlain during the war years.

s

, 

Prepamtion /01" Hull's Campaign 

Quartermaster wartime supply operations could not wait either on 

the organization of the Quartermaster's Department in 1812 or its 

reorganization in 181 3. War had in fact been declared against Great 

Britain on 18 June 1812 before the supply agencies required for the 

support of the Army were fully organized and staffed. War plans called 

for an invasion of Canada and the capture of Montreal, with the principal 

attack being launched by way of Lake Champlain from a base at Albany. 

Supporting movements were to be directed from Sackett's Harbor, 

Niagara, and Detroit. 

The first evelllS of the war developed in the West where the war 

spirit had long been running high. In response to President Madison's 

request, Return Jonathan Meigs, Governor of Ohio, called for 1,200 

volunteers from the militia on 6 April, 212 months before war was 

declared. More than the required number of men appeared at the 

rendezvous near Dayton before the end of the month. They were joined 

at Urbana by the 4th U.S. Infantry. that had been garrisoned at Vi ncennes. 

Governor William Hull of Michigan. a former Revolutionary War officer, 

was persuaded to take command of the troops and did so on 25 May. 

H e appointed James Taylor his quartermaster general. 

Taylor had been serving for some years as military agent in the state 

of Kentucky. 'When establishment of the office of Commissary General 

of Purchases was under debate early in 1812, Taylor solicited appointment in the Purchasing Department but the Secretary of War rejected 

his application. 85 In the meantime, he continued to carry out the 

0>( 1) RC 107, OSW, Military Book, vol. 8, p. 17 (SW to Fulton, II Jan 1815); pp. 44--45 

(SW to Morrison, 13 Feb 1815). (2) RG 107, OSW, Letters Sent to Quartermaster General 

and Purchasing Department, p. 31 (SW to Col. Simeon Knight, 13 Mar 1815), 

.. Seymour Dunbar, A History of Travtll ill America (New York, 1937), 382 If . 

.. RG 107, OSW, Letters Received, T - 71 (6) En~. (Taylor 10 tunis, 8 Feb 1812). 
ar of 1312 

MAP J 
SU PPLY IN THE WAR OF 1812 157 

Secretary's orders for providing tra nsporta tion for men and suppli es. 86 

Considerable qua ntities of military stores o n hand at the arsenal at 

Newport, Ky., were lIsed for supplying Hull's troops. As soon as the 

Ohio vol unteers began to assemble, they made demands upon Taylor 

for tents a nd camp eq uipage. T he arsenal had some camp kettles but 

no tents. Taylor proposed havi ng morc kettles made and ten ts prod uced 

from coun try line n. He purchased powder on the orders of General 

H ull and the Secretary of 'War and soon prepared a second ammunitio n 

wagon for the troops. H e ad vised Secretary Eustis that the cartridge 

boxes o ught to be inspected si nce many had been delivered to th e O hio 

troops unfit for lise. Many unservicea ble arms, too, had been retu rned 

to the arsenalY 

Taylor's efforts to supply Hull's troops were supplemented by those 

of th e assista nt deputy q uartermaster at Pittsburg h, appointed a fter th e 

re-establishment of the Q uartermaster's Department in March 18 12. 

T he latter forwa rded to Newport supplies sent by the Superintendent of 

M ilitary Stores from Philadelphia. He a lso executed the Secretary's 

orders for the purchase of axes, cartridge boxes. bayonet scabbards, belts, 

and other accoutrements at Pittsburgh, thereby saving the cost of transporting th ese su ppli es from Ph iladelphia .

8s 

On 9 J une. Taylor left Newport to join General H u ll at headq uarters 

and cont in ue on to Detroit with the troops. leaving h is nephew in charge 

of his agency d uri ng his absence. 89 At headquarters. Taylor soon found 

that th e costs of transportation were going to be enormOllS_ Baggage as 

well as contractor's provisions had to be transported through a wilderness 

of two to three hu ndred m il es. He had some 120 teams h ired by 

Ill Ju ne. ~o 

Rations for H ull's troops were supposed to be supplied by th e 

contractor, Augustus Porter, whose contract ca ll ed fo r supplyi ng all the 

troops stationed along the Grea t Lakes as far west a nd north as Michilimackinac a nd, of cou rse, incl ud ing Detroit. In mid-June, the Secretary 

of War directed h im to place 14,000 rations at Sand usky and 366,000 at 

Detroit in add ition to the usua l deposits req uired under his contract. 91 

" 'bid ... 7-85 (6) ( raylor to Eustis. 29 Mar 1812)_ 

" Ibid ., T - 92 (6): T - 102 (6) (Taylor to Eustis, 18 Apr and 24 May 1812) . 

.. RG 107, OSW, Military Hook., vol. 5, p. 456 (SW to Lt. Johnson. 2~ J UIl 1812): vol. 6. 

pp. -16-47 (SW to same, 25 J ul 1812: SW to Assc Conimissary T. Buford. 26 Jul 1812). 

" RG 107, 05\\', Letters Re<:eived. T - I04 (6) (Taylor to Eustis. 6 J un 1812). During 

his sen'ice with HuU's Army. that agency was abolished, and Lc J. Bryson was appointed 

assislant deputy quarlermaster at Newpon. lak.ing over the public propeny then in Ihe hands 

of Taylor'S agent . RG 107. OS\\'. Mililary Book. vol. 6, p. 94 (SW 10 Taylor. 22 Aug 1812) . 

.. RG 107. OS\\'. Leners Received, T - lil (6) (Taylor to F.ustis. 16 J un 1812) . 

.. (I) DocIl"''''''/(Ir'j Hil/(I» ' (II /lt e CIl",pnigll O il I/It Niagara Frolltier ill 1812 (8 voll., 

Weiland. Ont .. 1896-1907), III, p. 68 (Eustis to I'orter, 15 J un 1812). (2) Porter's contracl 
158 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

But Porter failed to supply the troops, and, instead, on 2 July. just when 

Hull received word that war had been declared, Porter wrote his brother 

that the most important thing was to send an express to General Hull, 

"notifying him that provisions arc on the lake but cannot be got up. and 

advise him to take his own measures to obtain supplies." U A lack of 

boats and the threat of seizure posed by the British Navy prevented 

deliveries. The contract system broke down as soon as the war began. 

In consequence, it became necessary for Hull to appoint a special 

agent or commissary to provision his troops. He selected John H. Piatt, 

a wealthy Cincinnati merchant, and ordered him to purchase 200,000 

rations of Aour and the same quantity of beef as well as 400 packhorses 

for transporting th e radons. He allowed Piatt 5 percent on his disbursements as payment.u Piatt procured the necessary provisions and informed the Secretary, upon whom he drew for money, that he intended 

sending the rations forward under the protection of the troops that were 

to reinforce Hull. · T he Secretary of War requested Governor Meigs 

to call into service the necessary troops of the detached militia from Ohio 

to guard the supply route and to convey the provisions to Hull without 

delay.u To make sure that the reinforcements coming from Kentucky 

should be provisioned, Eustis instructed the deputy commissary at Lexington, Thomas Buford, to purchase and issue to the troops on the march 

the necessary number of rations in the event the contractor fai led to 

deliver. He also directed him to purchase and send under the protection 

of these troops, or as soon after as practicable, 3 months' supply of 

provisions for 1,500 men. " 

The Secretary had also arranged to have medical stores sent to Hull 

from Ph il adelph ia via the lake route. By orders of the Quartermaster 

General, those stores were detained at Buffalo when war was declared 

because Morgan Lewis was sure they cou ld not get past the British at 

Fort Malden.D' A momh later, Taylor reported that he could procure 

no surgical instruments either at Detroit or in Ohio and requested that 

cKpired 31 May 1813. For its terms and the prices at which he agreed 10 furnish rations at 

Ille various posts. see C. M. Robinson, "The Life of Judge Augustus Porter," PublicaliOJls of 

the Buffalo H istorical Society, VII, 247 . 

.. Documentary History 01 Ihe Campaigll all Ihe Niagara FrOJllier in 1812, III. p. 90 

(To Gen. Peter 8. Porter, 2 Jul 1812) . 

• Piatt Letter Book (Hull to I'iat!, 9 Jul 1813). Manuscript Div., Library of Congress . 

.. (I) RG 107, OSW. Military Book, vol. 6, pp. 34-35 (SW to Augustus I'orter. 20 Ju1 1812). 

(2) RG 107. OSW, Letters Received, P- 210 (6) (Piatt to SW. 12 Aug 1812) . 

.. RG 107, OSW, Military Book, vol. 6, pp. 47-48 (SW to Meigs, 26 Jul 1812). 

H Ibid~ vol. 6, p. 53 (SW to Buford , 28 Jul 1812). 

" RG 107. OSW, Letters Received, L-128 (6) Ene. (Lewis to SW, 26 Jun 1812). 
SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 1812 159 

supplies be sent to him. The Secretary thereupon ordered the assistant 

deputy quartermaster at Pittsburgh to fill that requisition." 

Before that order co uld be executed, Genera l Hull had surrendered 

Detroit to the British. But the fon was not surrendered for lack of 

ammunition and provisions; on th e contrary, it was believed to be amply 

supplied with both. It was reported that there were 600 rounds of fixed 

ammunition prepared for the 24 pounders, of which 200 were grape 

shot; the same quantity had been made ready for the 6 pounders and 

200 rounds for the 4 pounders. T here was a considerable quantity of 

shells on hand , and 75,000 cartridges had been made up in addition to 

the 24 rounds prepared for each man's cartridge box. The magazine 

held 60 barrels of powder and 150 tons of lead. There were at least 

25 days' provisions in the contractor's stores and 150 horseloads of flour 

and 300 beeves were on their way from Ohio. Nearly 2,400 stand of arms 

were surrendered to the British, as well as 17 iron and 12 brass pieces of 

ordnance." 

SlIPJJOrl of the NorthwesteNi ATmy 

Shocked by Hull's surrender, the Administration was determined 

to regain the ground lost, and Brig. Gen. William Henry Harrison, of 

Tippecanoe fame, was given command of the Northwestern Army. 

Secretary of War Eustis continued to direct procurement of supplies for 

military operations in the west. To ensure ample provisions for the 

Northwestern Army, he instructed Ebenezer Denny, a contractor suppl ying the troops in the Piusburgh area, to purchase 1,098,000 rations for 

that Army in addition to his contract, and to provide the transportation 

for the flour, whiskey, and small parts of those rations as well as salt for 

packing the beef which would have to be purchased on the hoof and 

dri ven to the Army.loo 

General Harrison, convi nced that provisions could be procured more 

economicall y in Ohio than transported from Pittsburgh, cut back that 

purchase order to 400,000 rations and directed Denny to deposit them 

at Wooster, Ohio.lo, He then called upon contractor James White in 

Ohio to build up ration storage points at Urbana and Wooster. White 

-(1) Ibid., T- I!! (6) (Taylor to SW, 21 Jul 1812). (2) RG 107, OSW, Military Book, 

"01.6. p. 69 (SW to Lt. Johnson. 7 Aug 1812). 

-(I) Robert B. McAfee. HiJlory of tlu~ lA/t! War in flIt! iVt!Jlt!ffl Country (Lexington. 

1816). 92- 9!. (2) Docllmt!nlary HiJlor.v of Iht! Campaign 011 Ihf! N iagara in 1812, lIt, 220 

(John La,'elt to A. VanVf!Chten, 28 Aug 18!!). (5) AlllIOiJ of COlIgrt!:U, 15th Cong., 2d Sf!SS., 

1'01. 2. p. 2555. 

"" RG 10'. OSW, Military Book. vol. 6, p. 110 (SW to Denny. I ~p 1812). 

MoRG 107, OSW, Lelten Reccivi!d. -~85 (6) (Harrison to SW. 24 ~p 1812); D-196 (6) 

(lknny to SW, II Oct 18]2). 
160 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

held the contract for that section of the Sla le of Ohio below the 41st 

parallcl which included many of the recruiting stations. But White 

had neglected to sign his contract or post the necessary bond, and apparently intended to furnish supplies only when it suiled his convenience, 

Harrison charged that White let his contraCt for the northwestern part 

of the state to a subcontractor at so Iowa ralC that the latter was u nable 

to furnish rations. White himself cla imed he would make $100,000 by 

the contract.'!)' As deputy commissary with the Northwestern Army, 

Harrison appointed J ohn H. Piau, who had served in the same capacity 

under Hull, and directed him to transport 300,000 rations to Fort 

Defiance. deposit 200,000 rations of flour and 500,000 of beef at Urbana, 

and purchase and store 500,000 radons at Wooster., m, He planned to 

provision an army of 10,000 men. 

With so many purchasing agents in the field, competition inevitably 

occurred. Denny, unable to obta in Hour in Pennsylvania before November because lack of water prevented operation of the mills, sent his agent 

to Chillicothe, Ohio, to purchase in that area. His procurement activity 

deprived Commissary Piatt of flour that he might have obtained. Since 

Denny had engaged every mill ITom the Scioto River to Pittsburgh, 

Harrison in October revised his instructions and permiued that contractor 

to supply all the rations origi nally ordered by the Secretary. In December, he complained, however, that Denny and his agents had not "acquitted themse lves as they might have done," for in 2 months they had 

forwarded only 1,800 barrels of flour. lof 

Subsistence was only one of the items of suppl y required for Harrison's campaign. The Secretary of War directed the assistant deputy 

quartermaster at PittSburgh to expedite the shipment of ordnance stores 

and to furnish the necessary tents and camp equipage. To suppl ement 

his efforts, Eustis dispatched Maj. Amos Stoddard of the Artill ery as a 

temporary deputy quartermaster to Pittsburgh to prepare and speed the 

Shipment of arms, cannon, and ordnance stores to the Northwestern 

Army. The Secretary ordered entrenching tools forwarded by the Commissary General of Purchases at Philadelphia and instructed T homas 

Buford, deputy commissary, and the assistant deputy quartermaster, at 

Newport, Ky., to furn ish whatever General Harrison required. In 

- Log;ln Eua rey. "Messages and Lelten of William Henry Harrison," India/III HiJtorica/ 

Col/utio,,!, I X. 184 (Harrison 10 SW, 22 Oct 1812). 

-(I) RC 107, OSW, Letlen Received, P-266 (6) (Piau to SW. 50 Sep 1812); H-.58.f (6) 

(Harrison to SW, 27 Sep 1812. (2) Pia It Leiter Book (Harrison to Piatt, 21 Sep 181 2). 

"'(1) RC 107. OSW. Leiters Received, 0 - 172 (6) (Denny to SW, 22 Sep 1812); 0-213 (6) 

(Denny to SW. 22 Ocl 1812. enclosing hr. Harrison 10 Denny. 15 Oct 1812); H--459 (6) (Harrison 

to SW. 12 Dec 1812). (2) Euarey, "M<"$$iIges and Letters of William Henry Harrison ." India"a 

Hidorica/ ColiecliOlu, IX. 182 (Harrison (0 SW, 22 Oct 1812). 
SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 1812 161 

ShOTt, the Secretary alerted all agents concerned and set supplies flowing 

to the Northwestern Army. He gave General Harrison carte blanche 

in requisitioning supplies in order that he might be successful in recapturing DelToit.'ol 

To direct Quartermaster supply in the field, Harrison selected James 

Morrison as deputy quartermaster general to the Army and on 18 September the War Department commissioned him a lieutenant colonel of 

volunteers.1 " Morrison had long been engaged as a contraqor in provisioning the troops in the West. He saw no conflict of interest between 

the office he accepted and his private contracting business. He intended 

to conduct that business as usual. About a month after his appointment, 

he submitted a bid to provision the troops in Ohio that the War Department did not accept. IIIT As a cOntractor. he was thoroughly familiar with 

the transportation problems confronting him. He pursued his quartermaster duties energetica ll y and to the complete satisfaction of Genera l 

Harrison who praised him warmly. 

Morrison immediately consulted with the general. and advised the 

Secretary of War of the monetary arrangements that would be necessary 

for supporting a campaign in a wilderness where nothing would be 

available for the accommodation of the troops and all supplies would 

have to be transported from Kentucky and Ohio. Money. he warned, 

could not be raised by the sale of bills drawn on the Secretary; specie 

would have to be sent. He began by req uesting $50,000 to $100,000, 

upon reflection doubled that amount. increased it to $500.000 before 

many weeks had passed, and by I November wrote that only $1,000,000 

could be considered a sufficient sum. loa The Secretary sent $400,000 

in spec ie in mid-October, but before it arrived Morrison was compe ll ed 

to borrow on his own credit to meet demands made upon him.toe By 

December, the fund of $400,000 had been nearly exhausted and Morrison 

reported that the movement of the Army would be paralyzed in another month unless the Kentucky and Ohio banks consented to make 

advances.llo 

Morrison requisitioned supplies and forwarded woolen socks, mittens, and roundabout jackets donated by the state of Kentucky. But 

- RG 107. OSW. Military Book. vol. 6. pp. 11 5. 117. 156-57 (SW to Stoddard. I. 9, 

II Sep 1812); 154 (SW to Harrison. 10 Sep 1812) . 

.. Ibid., vol. 6, pp. 145---«, 162 (SW to P.(orrison. 18 Sep 1812) . 

.... RG 107, OSW, Letters Rcceived. M-451 (6); M-476 (6) (Morrison to SW, 5 and 20 OCt 

1812). 

"' Ibid., M-452 (6); M-498 (6) (Morrison to SW. 5 OCt. I Nov 1812). 

-(I) RG 107, OSW. Military Book, vol. 6, p. 198 (SW to Stoddard, 17 OCt 1812). (2) 

RG 107. OSW, Letters Received, M-498 (7); M-509 (6) (Morrison 10 SW. I and 5 Nov 1812). 

"' RG 107. OSW, Letters Rcceived. M-557 (6) (Morrison 10 SW, 15 Dec 1812). 
162 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

woolen coats, overalls, and blankets could not be procured in (he West, 

and he informed the Secretary that at least 10,000 of each ought to be 

sent without delay. T he militia, called out in the summer, were still 

wearing their thin, cotton clothing late in October and would have to 

be supplied. Harrison diverted to the use of the troops all the woolens 

that the Secretary had sent for the Indians.'" It was almost the end of 

December before Harrison could report that shoes, blankets, and clothing 

for the militia were on their way u p the Scioto River, although it was 

weeks later before those supplies reached the troops. III 

Though there was a shortage of clothing, blankets, and tents in the 

Wen, there appeared to be no scarc ity of provisions in Ohio, even though 

the troops were often on short rations. Elias Darnell, with the Kentucky 

volunteers under Brig. Gen. James Winchester, recorded on 16 December 

that the troops had drawn no flour since the 10th and that the volunteers 

were threatening to go home if they were not supplied. All the beef 

and pork had been issued that day but fortunately a drove of 300 hogs 

arrived on the following day. On 22 December a little Hour arrived. 

"Quarter-rations of that article were issued, which was welcomed by 

rejoicing throughout the camp." "' 

Transportation was the crux of the supply problem. Moving sup· 

plies through a wilderness where roads and causeways had to be constructed for wagons and packhorses was a problem difficult to solve and a 

task costly to execute. In northwestern Ohio, the Black Swamp stretched 

from the Sandusky River to the Maumee River, covering an area 120 

miles long and 40 miles wide. Except in winter, when the water was 

completely frozen, it was almost impassable. Rivers in the area of 

operations could be used for transportation only when freshets provided 

enough water to make them navigable, or when wimer's blast froze them 

solid enough for transportation by sleds. Dependence on such means 

could result only in irregularity and delay in the flow of supplies. 

Morrison hired wagons and teams of horses and oxen, and, upon 

occasion, the Army resorted to impressment. Unfavorable reports 

III Ibid ., M-475 (6) (Morrison to SW. 20 Oct 1812); M-!84 (6) (Harrison to SW, 27 Sep 

1812). 

'" (I) I bid., H-4 (7) (Ha rrison to SW, 21 Ott 1812). (2) Late in October, General 

Winchester was assuring h is troops that clothing has been sh ipped from Philadelphia on 

9 September and there would be an early supply. "Papers and Orderly Book of Brigadier 

Genen.1 J amct Winchester." "Michigan Pioneer and HistoriClilI Society. Historical Coffections, 

XXI. p . 279 (General Orders, 27 Oct 1812). (3) ParI of the clothing for the Kentucky troopl 

arrived on 27 December and the 1'011 of it Cilme almost a month later on 25 J anuary 1815. 

Elias Darnell . A Jo urnal Cou/ainillg All cc ral~ Alld III I~n$li"g Account of ... Thou 

Htroic Ktll/!'cicy "olm,l~erJ and Regulars, Commanded by Gtntml Win ,h~sl~r (Philadelphia. 

1854). pp. 41, 45. 

, .. Darnell, It JOl/rna{, pp. 58-59. 
SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 1812 163 

brought back from Fort Defiance by wagoners who clamored for their 

pay made it impossible to hire others. Morrison decided to purchase 

packhorses in Kentucky as the only means of transporting supplies in the 

winter of 1812-13. It was the enormous cost of this overland transportation that led him steadily to increase his demands upon the Secretary 

for funds. I H That cost included the supply of forage, the shortage of 

which in northern Ohio became so acute that the quartermaster was 

obliged to purchase corn below Chillicothe to make a deposit of forage 

120 miles away at Upper Sandusky.u ~ 

Supply difficulties were further complicated by the strange course 

the Secretary of War pursued in assigning, less than 2 weeks after Morrison's appointment, a second deputy quartermaster general to the Northwestern Army with powers equal to those of Morrison. The Secretary 

sent Capt. William Piatt to Pittsburgh to furnish transportation for the 

troops assembling there. He was also to forward all the cannon and 

ordnance stores to the Rapids of the Miami where the th ree columns of 

Harrison's Army were to converge. U6 Capt. Joseph Wheaton, assigned 

to Piatt as assistant deputy quartermaster, was ordered to let nothing 

impede the transport of the ordnance and ordnance stores that he conducted from PittSburgh by way of Canton and Wooster to Upper Sandusky. He was later accused of pocketing for his own use the greater 

part of the very large sums of money he obtained for the transportation 

of these stores. II T 

When, at the end of the year, both deputy quartermasters general 

were at headquarters with Harrison, confusion and difficulties over 

authority developed Lo such an extent that Harrison' requested an immediate decision by the Secretary of "Var. The latter replied that when the 

two deputies were on duty together, Colonel Morrison, being the senior 

'" A calculation made by General Winchester in November 1812 provides more specific 

details. I'ackhorses traveled anywhere from 10 to 20 miles a day. Winchester estimated 

that 200 packhorses, operating between Piqua and Fort Winchestcr on the Auglaize. would 

each be able to carry 150 pounds of flour as well as 2!i pounds of forage for their own supply. 

T he flour carried by the horses would equal 26,666 rations, at 18 ou nces to the ratioll . The 

trip would take 10 days----6 going and ~ returuing. Allowing 6 days for resting the horses 

before starting anolher round trip. Ihe 200 horses would transport every 16 days 26,6(16 rations. 

Many more rations than thai had to be transported for the Northwestern Army besides 

clothing. equipment, and militay stores and, in addit ion to wagons, horses. and oxen, many 

more Ihan 200 packhorses were used. Piatt Lctter Book (Winchester to Piatt. 17 Noy 1812). 

"" RG 107, OS\\', Leiters Receivctl. M--'l88 (6); M--'l97 (6) (Morrison to S\\'. 28 Oct 1812); 

H -20 (7) (Harrison to SW, 61an 1818). 

" " RG 107, OSW, Military Book. vol. 6. 1'. 177 (SW to Capt. William Piatt , 30 SCI' 1812). 

"'{I) Ibid., vol. 6. p. li6 (SW to Wheaton, 30 Scp 1812). (2) RG 107. OS\\'. LelteT$ 

Received. G- 133 (7) (Harrison to S\\'. 19 May 1813). (3) For the difficulties that Wheaton 

encountered in conducting these stores, see ibid., \\'- 1 (7) (Wheaton wSW, 14 Dec 1812). 
164 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

officer, would command.tII That decision must not have resolved the 

problem satisfactorily since Colonel Morrison insisted on resigning despite 

Harrison's reluctance to have him leave. The general thought so highly 

of his deputy's services that he recommended his appointment to succeed 

Morgan Lewis as Quartermaster Genera l when the latter was promoted 

to a major general. He proposed that John C. Bartlett of Kentucky, 

then acting as fie ld commissary. be appointed to succeed Morrison as 

deputy quartermaster general to the Northwestern Army.1n 

Large sums had been expended and tremendous efforts made to move 

men and supplies toward the frontier without achieving the goal of 

recapturing Detroit or laking Fort Malden. Conditions had not changed 

much since Wayne had campaigned against the Indians in the same area. 

The roads were indescribably bad. Men and animals slogged through 

an almost continuous swamp that mired wagons and rapidly wore out 

horses. The fine learns that arrived on IO December at Sandusky with 

the anillery were quickly worn out. "Two trips from McArthurs block 

House (our nearest deposit to the Rapids), " Harrison informed the 

Secretary, "will completely destroy a Brigade of Pack Horses." .20 River 

transportation could not be used until December because the water was 

too low. When the opponunity was then seized to send out pirogues 

loaded with provisions, powder, and clothing, a sudden freeze held the 

boats icebound. They had to be abandoned and the supplies hauled by 

sleds to their destination. III It is not surprising that under these conditions supplies did not accumulate as rapidly as desired at deposit points. 

The winter operations in the West came to an end when troops under 

General Winchester were overwhelmed at Monroe, Mich., then known 

as Frenchtown, on the River Raisin. 

Support of Campaigns on the Niagam and Northern FrontieJ".f 

Military operations in the East were no more successful than those 

in the West in 1812, Supply preparations were initiated shonly after 

Congress enacted legislation increasing the size of the Army early in the 

year. At the direction of the Secretary of War, the military agents at 

Philadelphia, Boston, and Albany purchased and had manufactured 

tems, knapsacks, canteens, canridge boxes, and belts. T he military 

agent at Albany also took steps to provide barracks, storehouses, and a 

'''(1) RG 107, Register. SW. ullen Received, vol. 7, p. 178 (Harri$On 10 SW, 20 Jan 1815). 

(2) RG 107. OS\\'. Military nook, vol. 6. p. 288 (SW 10 Harrison, II Feb 181 5). 

''' RG 107, OS\\', ullen Received. H-&f (7) (Harri$On 10 SW, 12 Mar 1815). 

1·lbid., H-459 (6) (Harri$On 10 SW. 12 Oec 1812). 

,n Ibid., H-4 (7) Ene. (Thomas Bodley. ACling QM of lefl wing. 10 Harrison, II Dec 1812). 
KENTUCKY MILITIA, AT THE RIVER RAISIN, J ANUARY 181!S 
166 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE A RMY 

hospital near that city for the troops to be quartered therc.m These 

same military agcllls- William Linnard at Philadelphia, Jacob Eustis 

at Boston, and Anthony Lamb at Albany- were reappointed deputy 

quartermasters general as soon as the Quartermaster's Department was 

established. At Linnard's suggestion, the Secretary appointed an assistant 

deputy quartermaster general for the harbor of New York. He not onl y 

speeded the transportation of supplies up the Hudson to Albany but also 

procured supplies in the New York area. 

Tentage and camp equipment for the troops on the Niagara and 

northern frontiers werc therefore drawn from Boston. New York, and 

Philadelphia, and funneled through Albany. At Philadelphia, Linnard 

also contracted for powder, for the production of which the Superintendent of Mil itary Stores rurnished the contractor with saltpeter and 

sulphur. 1U Some powder and shells were also obtained by COntract at 

Albany. Clothing was drawn principally from Philadelphia where the 

Purveyor and subsequently the Commissary General of Purchases contracted for such supplies. Deputy commissaries also purchased clothing 

at New York, Norwich. and Boston. They also furnished tentage and 

camp equi pment. T he troops were suppli ed with arms from the Springfi eld and Philadelphia arsenals. T his same Aow of supplies occurred in 

all subsequent campaigns on the Niagara and Northern frontiers. 

Soon after the war began, the subsistence contractors experienced 

difficulties in suppl ying rations on these frontiers. Augustus Pon er, 

whose contract incl uded Fort Niagara and its dependencies, became so 

uneasy about providing beef that he requested his brother, serving as 

quartermaster ge neral of the state of New York, LO contract for suppli es 

even i[ he had to pay $3.50 per hundredweight-It. Elbert Anderson, 1r., 

supplied rations to troops stationed anywhere else in the state of New 

York and in New Jersey and seems to have been called upon to subsist 

militia called into service. James Byers, a Vermont contractor, was also 

interested to some extent in provisioning troops in northern New York. 

As in the West, however, the system of COntraCt supply failed early in the 

war. When reports were received that troops were literally starving for 

bread and that Fon Niagara would have to be evacuated if provisions 

were not supplied , the commanding genera l ordered the deputy quartermaster to purchase provisions.m 

·With the appointment of Morgan Lewis as Quartermaster General, 

'h RG ]07, OSW, Military !look. vol. 5. pp. 5(H-.()5 (SW to J. Eust is and Anthony Lamb, 

16 Mar 1812); p. 31 1 (SW 10 Eustis, 19 Mar 1812); p. ~ (SW to Linnard, 2S Apr 1812). 

'· ' bid., vol. 5. pp. §-t . .%8 (SW 10 Lirmard, 1 and 5 May 1812). 

, •• DOClm.err/a'1 H is/ory 0/ the Ca",poigll 0 .. lht Niagara FrOll/ier if! 18/2, III. 122 

(I I J ul 1812). t. Ama icatl S/n/~ Papers, Milita.., AUairs, 1,508-10. 
SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 1812 167 

Quartermaster su pply support for operations in the East came under his 

direction. After a brief stop at Philadelphia en route from Washington, 

Lewis arrived at Albany to assume his duties on 21 May, barely a month 

before war was declared. He was at first preoccupied with the probl em 

of organizing his Department. Uninformed concerning the appointments already made of subordinate officers. confused about his responsibilities. and, because other staff departments remained for some time 

without chiefs, called upon to perform the functions of commissary and 

ordnance officer as well as those of Quartermaster General, Lewis never 

did establish an effective organization. As previously noted, he preferred 

commanding troops to supplying their needs. 

Early in July, Lewis made a tour of the posts on the northern frontier 

and reported that the troops were destitute of clothing, arms. and ammunition. no Neither the Office of the Commissary General of Purchases 

nor that of the Commissary General of Ordnance had as yet been filled. 

and Lewis was much concerned about supplies furnished by those depart· 

ments. He also ra ised questions about supplying camp equipage and 

transportation to militia marching to the lines. Militia were supposed 

to arrive at rendezvous points fully armed and equipped. 

By September, Lewis asserted that no amount of revenue raised 

would be adequate to support a war carried on by militia. The governor 

of New York, he informed the Secretary. ordered the militia to rendezvous 

by regiments at points often more than a hundred miles apart. There 

they waited. at the expense of the United States. to receive tents and 

camp equipage before they marched to their destinations. Even then 

they were unarmed. for the militiaman customa rily arrived at camp 

without weapons, having left at home his musket and everything but the 

clothes he was wearing. Lewis warned that when their terms of service 

expired the government need not expect to have returned Eor further use 

anything that was furnished to them. 12T Supply expenses under these 

conditions soared to unexpected heights. 

Lewis was frequently hampered by want of funds. but his lack of 

initiative was even more of a handicap in carrying out his functions and 

consequently he was not an effective Quartermaster General. He 

customarily acted only after consulting the Secretary of War and the 

commanding general. Providing adequate transportation facilities. for 

example. was a basic function of his office: yet he found it necessary to 

seek the advice of the Secretary when it became evident that use of 

portages and water transportation would reduce by half the expense of 

' .. RG 107. osw, uuers Received. L-157 (6) (Lewis to SW, 5 Jul 1812). 

1Z7 (I) RG 107, OSW, Lelten. Received, L-18 1 (6) (uwis to SW. 4 Sep 1812). (2) Dearborn 

Papers (Dearborn 10 Col. Clark, 11 Aug 1812). New York Historical Society. 
168 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

movmg supplies from Albany to White Ha ll at the entrance o[ Lake 

Champlain. With some impatience, the Secretary cited the act establishing the Quartermaster's Department and suggested that he should consult 

with the commanding genera l when in doubt. adopting the means best 

suited to the public imerest and the exigencies of the service.us 

Lewis was harassed by the delays in organizing the other staff 

departments and fi lling vacancies in them, but subordinates in his own 

organization lamented the lack of written instructions from him. "I am 

grovelling on in the Dark," Linnard wrote, sympathizing with the plight 

of the assistant deputy quartermaster general at New York who had 

received no word from Lewis.l1t The Quartermaster General, after 

what could only have been a brief interview with Linnard, had expressed 

doubts as to his competency. Linnard had accumulated a decade of 

experience in Quartermaster duties at Philadelphia by 181 2 and had 

favorably impressed both his associates in the supply agencies at Philadelphia and the successive Secretaries of War at Washington. Located 

at the most important center of supply, Linnard was a key figure in 

supplying the troops during the War of 1812, yet no close coopera· 

tion developed between the Quartermaster General and his deputy at 

Philadelphia. 

Shortly after Lewis arrived at Albany, Maj. Gen. Henry Dearborn, 

appointed to the command of the Northern Department, left for Boston 

to attempt to raise troops in the New England states, an area that was 

hostile to the war. During these weeks, Dearborn acted as his own 

quartermaster general. issuing orders to Jacob Eustis at Boston to furnish 

tents, camp kettles, knapsacks, wagons, saddles, and entrenching tools to 

the limited number of troops that he did raise. He also instructed the 

deputy quartermaster genera l to have cloth on hand made up into 

uniforms. ReAecting the confusion over staff funct ions, Dearborn de· 

cided that the dUly of purchasing horses belonged to the Commissary 

Department, and therefore directed the deputy commissary genera l of 

purchases at Portsmouth not only to purchase horses for a company o[ 

dragoons but also to provide forage for the animals. IIO 

Notwithstanding War Department plans for invading Canada, Dear· 

born lingered at Boston, concerned about the defense of New England. 

As late as 7 August he did not consider "any part of the borders of Upper 

Canada" as being within his command, despite War Department letters 

" (I) RG 107, OSW. Lellen Received, L-1 71 (6) (Lewis 10 SW,.50 Aug 1812). (2) RG 107. 

OSW, Military Book, vol. 6, p. 120 (SW 10 Lewis. 5 Sep 1812) . 

.. RG 92, QM Ph ila " Lener Book, No. 5.5 1 (Linnard to Van De VenIer, 18 Jul 1812) . 

.. Dearborn Papers (Dearborn 10 J. Eustis, S, 10, 12 Jun, 6 Jul 1812); (To SW. 5 Jun 1812); 

(To John Langdon, 7, 10 Jul 1812). 
SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 18 12 169 

to the comrary,ul He gave no orders to officers commanding at posts 

on the Niagara frontier before that time. Such defense measures as were 

undertaken earlier had been directed by the governor of New York and 

his militia officers. 

In mid-October, operations along the Niagara frontier got under 

way. A small number of troops under the command of Maj. Gen. 

Stephen Van Rensselaer of the New York militia crossed the Niagara 

River to take possession of QueenSlon Heights, only to lose it when the 

militia, standing upon their conStitutional rights. refused to set foot on 

foreign soil. General Van Rensselaer asked to be relieved. He was 

succeeded by Brig. Gen. Alexander Smyth who issued bombastic proclamations, assembled tTOOpS, and then abandoned his plan to cross the 

Niaga ra at Buffalo. Late in November, General Dearborn moved down 

Lake Champlain to Rouses Point on the state line. where the militia 

refused to advance into Canada. Nothing was accomplished. winter was 

approaching, and Dearborn sent his troops into winter quarters at 

Burlington and Plattsburg. 

T he failure of the 1812 campaign on the Niagara frontier was 

attributable largely to poor leadership. to raw. inexperienced regular 

troops, and to undependable militia. But if it was the unwillingness 

of the militia to invade Canada and not a lack of food that resulted in 

the miserable showing on the frontier, the inadequacies of the supply 

system contributed little to their morale. Dearborn repeatedly complained of "a Great deficiency" in whatever related to the Quartermaster's 

Department.m Horses starved for want of forage. Obviously, an active 

deputy quartermaster general was needed with the troops on the Niagara 

rrontier, but even after Capt. James Thomas had been appointed, it was 

charged that the soldi ers, particularly the volunteers. could not get 

one-ha lf of the articles to which they were entitled by law.1U When 

ample supplies of men and stores were finall y forwarded to Van Rensselaer. Dearborn feared they would arrive tOO late, for "a strong fatality 

appears to have pervaded the whole arrangement." ,10 His apprehensions 

were well grounded. Although some supplies arrived. in lieu of much 

needed musket cartridges, the Quartermaster General had to transport 

powder, lead, paper. and molds. and sold iers had to be detailed to make:: 

their own cartridges. Dearborn suspected, too, that the powder migh t 

prove unfit for use and advised Van Rensselaer to have it inspected.us 

.., Ibid., ero SW, 7 .",ug 1812). 

'·Ibid., ero SW. 29 Aug 1812: 10 Lewis. 26 Sep 1812) . 

•• Donimelllllry Hillary 01 lire CIIII/IMigll all Ih~ NilJl!,lIrll Froflliu ill 1812, IV, 342--4!! 

(Raptist Irvine!O General Parler, 6 Jan 181!!) . 

... Dearoom Papen (To Van Renuelaer,26 Sep 1812). 

" I bid., (To Lewis. 8 Oct 1812); (To Van Rensselaer. I!I Oct 18(2). 
170 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Inspection reports revealed that the quality of much that was supplied was exceedingly poor. Knapsacks and canteens were bad; arms 

were found to be in "infamously bad order; " the tents had never been 

any good and were so much abused on the march that they afforded little 

protection. Though it was October when the inspector made his report. 

troops of the 12th and 14th Regiments had not received any woolen 

clothing, and the men had to mount guard in cold, stormy weather clad 

in linen jackets and overalls. As noted before, this was not because 

clothing was unavailable, but because commanding officers refused to 

accept uniforms of drab and mixed cloth. T he list of sick increased 

steadily not only because of inadequate protection against the elements 

but also because of the lack of provisions. A steady diet of fresh meat, 

invariably cooked by frying, was not conducive to good health. u8 

T hough orders had been sent to Quartermaster General Lewis in 

September to construct winter quarters, not one barrack had been completed by December at Green Bush, Vt., nor were the troops adequately 

supplied with wood and straw. The situation was no better at Burlington and Plattsburg. In mid-December, Deputy Quartermaster General 

Lamb was directed to send tools so (hat the troops might compl ete their 

own shelters. u1 

P1'epamlio11S for th e Campaign of 1813 

With the troops settl ed in winter quarters, the time had come to 

make plans for the next year's campaign. T he Secretary called Lewis 

to Washington for consultation, but the latter questioned the wisdom 

of attending at that particular time. In addition to being Quartermaster 

General, Lewis was then also a member of the senate of the New York 

legislature. He thought his presence at a legislative session that was to 

open, in which "Questions of serious import to the general Administration 

will be agitated," would be more advantageous to the government than 

an immediate visit to Washington.

lSI 

General Dearborn, too, was giving thought to preparations for the 

coming campaign and to the need for improvements in the staff departments, especially in the Quartermaster's Department. For the benefit 

, .. Doclullelllary Hislory 0/ lire. Cam/HZig" 011 tir e N iagara Frontiu in 1812, IV, p. 191 

U. W. Li ... ingston!O Go .... Tompkins, 9 No ... 1812): pp. 242--0 (Inspection Rpts, Cap. Wm. King, 

5 O~t 1812). 

'"' Dearborn I'apen (fo Lewis, 21, 22 Se.p 1812:-Dec and 14 Dec 1812); (To Lamb, 15, 

21 Dec 1812), 

, .. (I) RG 107, OSW, Military Book, "'01. 6. p. 254 (SW to Lewis, 19 Dec 1812). (2) RG 107, 

OSW. Lellen Recei ... ed, L-8 (7) (Lewis to SW, 8 Jan 18l!1). 
SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 1812 171 

of the new Secretary of War, J oh n Armstrong, he outlined the qualifications of a competent Q uartermaster General. 

It is indispensable that the q..M,G. should be altogether a Man of business 

- In addition to talents General mformation &: integrity he must be habitually 

ind ustrious, perservering, energe tic and prompt in the discharge of the important duties of the office, and should possess capacity for inspiring all diose 

under him. with zeal &: activity in the discharge of their respective duties. In 

short a Q.M.G. should anticipate every thing, see every thing, and be prepared 

at all times as far as human foresight is capable of for all emergencies,m 

Obviously, Dearborn had long ago decided that Lewis did not possess 

these qualifications and he wished that Lewis could be transferred to 

the line. 140 

Secretary Armstrong assured Dearborn that a reorganization of the 

Q uartermaster's Department was already under consideration.l4I Early 

in March. Congress enaC[ed the necessary legislation, and on 21 March 

Robert Swartwout was appointed chi ef of the Department. In the 

meantime, Congress had also made provision for the appointment of six 

additional major generals, which permitted the promotion of Lewis.1H 

T he latter considered himself immediately removed from the office of 

Quartermaster General. Until the new chief of the Department arrived, 

the Secretary of War placed funds at the disposal of General Dearborn 

so that preparations for the coming campaign might nOI be delayed, with 

the result that once again Dearborn was enmeshed in the performance 

of Quartermaster duties ... • 

Military plans in 1813 call ed for a campaign aga inst upper Canada 

designed to take Kingston, where the British ships had been wintering. 

and to capture Forts George and Erie. The Northwestern Army was to 

lend support by keeping the British alarmed for the safety of Fort Ma lden 

though no ex pedition for its captu re was to be undertaken un til control 

of the Great Lakes had been wrested from the British. This was 10 be 

the primary obj ective in 1813. 

These plans ca ll ed for a concentration of suppl ies for supporting 

the troops under General Dearborn ra ther than for th ose of the Northwestern Army under Harrison, and the Secretary ordered a sharp cut in 

expenditures for that Army. Since the troops of the Northwestern Army 

would, for the most part, be stationed at posts and the maintenance of 

'·(1) Dearborn Papers (To SW. - Jan lSI!!). (2) See also RC 107, OSW, Leuers Received, 

D- 27 (7) (Dearborn 10 SW, 28 J an ISi!I). 

'''(I) Dearborn Papers (To SW, - Jan lSI!!). (2) RG 107. OSW. Letlers Received. D-6!! 

(7) (I>earborn 10 S\\'. 20 Feb lSI!!). 

' '' (I) RG 107. OSW, Mi litary Book. vol. O. p. 293 (1.Ii Feb ISI3). (2) See IIHle, pp. l!i2- M . 

'''251111.80 1 (Feb . lSI!!). Lewis was appointed on 2 March lSI!!). 

"' RG 107, OSW. Military Book. voJ. 6, p.!!02 (4 Mar lS I!!). 
172 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

long supply lines through the wilderness would not be required, the 

Secretary directed Harrison to get rid of his heavy trains of horses and 

oxen. He also instructed him to cunail sharply expenditures for any 

supplies to supplement those already on hand, to inform his special 

agents that their drafts on the War Department were to be limited to 

$20,000 a month, and to direct all supply officers to forward their accounts 

for settlement. In short, Harrison no longer had carte blanche for 

requisitioning supplies. 

Under the reorganization of the Quartermaster's Department. J ohn C. 

Bartlett became Quartermaster General of the Northwestern Army, and 

the Secretary of War entered into a new cOntract with Benjamin Orr 

and Aaron Greely for the supply of its rations. IH To prepare for 

transportation that would be needed on Lake Erie, the Secretary of 'War 

informed Harrison that Capt. Thomas S. Jesup, of the 7th Infantry, had 

been temporarily detailed as deputy quartermaster general and charged 

with the construqion of boats at Cleveland. These would be capable oE 

carrying from one destination to another on the lake 40 to 50 men with 

their baggage, arms, accoutrements, and provisions. By May, Jesup had 

three boatyards established and in operation, and the Secretary advised 

Harrison that the boats would be particularly useful in navigating the 

lake between the chain of islands and the west hore.u ~ 

Meantime, opposite Kingston at Sackett'S Harbor on Lake Ontario, 

further boatbuilding activity had been initiated under the supervision 

of another deputy quartermaster general. Early in 1813, the Secretary 

had instructed him to hire boatbuilders at New York City, transport them 

to Sackett's Harbor, and there supervise the construction of 100 batteaux 

before I April. Each boat was to be large enough to carry 40 men and 

their baggage and provisions.ll ~ To avoid competition with the Navy, 

the deputy quartermaster general employed the same ship carpenter to 

supervise the building of these boats for the Army as Commodore Isaac 

Chauncey did for the Navy.'" 

To supervise the erection of huts and to provide wood and straw 

for the troops assembling at Sackett's Harbor, the Secretary had sent 

"'(I) RG 107, OSW, Military Book, vol. 6, pp. 32;;, !lS!I (SW to Harri$On, 17 Mar,!I Apr 

1813). (2) Pialt Letter Book (Harrl$On to I' lall, 27 Mar 1813). (3) For the difficulties that 

developed with Orr and Greely see, Americau Sial e Papers, Militllry Anairs, I. 644 II. 

". (I) RG 107, OSW, Mi litary Book. vol. 6, p. 310 (SW 10 Jesup. 9 Mar IS I3); p. 35S 

(SW to Ha rri$On. S Apr ISI3). (2) RG 107. OSW, Leiters Received, J-95 (7) and J- ISI 

Ga up 10 SW, 27 Mar and 24 May IS ~). (3) American Slal e PajleTs, Military AUairs, J, 454 

(SW 10 Harri$Oll, S May ISI3). 

' .. RG 107, OS\\'. Military Book, \'01. 6, p. 463 (SW to Dearborn, 10 Feb ISI3): pp. 465-66 

(SW to Van De Vente r. 12 Feb IS13). 

U7 RG 107, OSW, Leltcl'$ Received, V- ]!; (7) (Van Dc Venter to SW, 16 Feb IS13). 
SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 1812 173 

Maj. William Swan as the commanding deputy quartermaster general. 148 

,.yhile these preparations were being made at Sackett's Harbor, Genera l 

Dearborn remained at Albany, complaining of the Quartermaster burdens 

imposed upon him and requesting to be relieved of the responsibility for 

handling Quartermaster funds. By 5 April, he reported that the affairs 

of the Quartermaster's Department had fallen into "a wretched state." 

He had not been able to join his troops at Sackett's Harbor beca use he 

was detained at Albany to perform Quartermaster duties. To continue moving men and stores without a Quartermaster General, a 

deputy, or funds, he warned the Secretary, would prove difficult. if 

not impracticable,H' 

Still awaiting the arrival of the new Quartermaster General weeks 

after his appointment, Dearborn wrote urging his prompt appearance at 

Headquarters. It was IS April, however, before Swartwout came to 

Albany.l5O There he found the Department in great confusion- no 

person was available to give him information (General Lewis was then 

at Buffalo) and drafts to the amount of $100,000 were presented to him 

for payment of articles furnished and transportation provided by his 

predecessor. Until he received reports from the deputies, assistants, and 

storekeepers of his predecessor, he could not formulate an estimate of 

supplies that would be needed. To preserve th e credit of the government 

and prevent delay, he notified the Secretary that at least $200,000 should 

be placed at the disposal of his Department.''' 

This information the Secretary received with some amazement since 

funds had been given to Lewis and his deputies to settle their accounts. 

"You ought not to entangle yourself with old Accounts," he advised 

Swartwout. He made $ 100,000 available, of which $60,000 was to be 

used by Swartwout and $40,000 by Col. Elisha Jenkins, who had replaced 

Lamb at Albany as quartermaster general in the 9th District under th e 

reorganization of the Department in March ISI3.1n Obviously, the 

transfer of property from the old to the new Quartermaster organization 

was not accomplished smoothly or efficiently. Receiving no reports from 

subordinates, Jenkins could only set about coll ecting the property on 

"' RC 107, OSW, Military Book, vol. 6, p. 289 (To Lewis, 15 Feb 1813); p. 463 (To Dear· 

born. iO Feb 1813). 

". (I) Dearborn Papers (To SW, 21 Mar 1813; 5 Apr 1813; H Apr 1813). (2) RC ]07, 

OSW, Leuers Received, 0 -85 (7) (Dearborn to SW, 26 Mar 1813). 

'''(1) Dearborn Papers (To Swartwout. 12 Apr 1813). (2) RC 107, OSW, Letters Received. 

S-161 (7) (Swartwout 10 SW, 19 Apr 1813). 

,., RG 107, OSW, Lellers Received. S-16 1 (7) (Swutwout to SW. 19 Apr 1813). 

lURG 107, OSW. Mililary Book. vol. 6, p. 381 (To Swartwout, 25 Apr 1813); p. 379 

(fo J enkins, 23 Apr 1813). 
174 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

hand at various places, inventorying all he found, and depositing it in a 

storehouse hired for that purpose.n8 

Dearborn had ordered Swartwout to report to Headquarters at 

Sackett's Harbor by 15 May with ample funds for Quartermaster disbursements during the coming campaign. But si nce the general could not 

inform him what force would be employed, Swartwout had no basis for 

estimating needs. He could only hope that his funds would be adequate. 

The Secretary of War tartly observed that the general had "altogether 

lost sight of the State &: usages of the Treasury." Only $1,400,000 per 

month could be drawn from the Treasury, and with that amount the 

Secretary had to "subsist, pay, equip, cloathe &: move five or six Armies 

of Regulars & Militia." The Secretary assured Swartwout that he would 

be supplied from time to time as means were available. but he warned 

that "economy must be your alpha & omGga as well as mine." I"' Preparations went forWal"d with the cost of transporting supplies under the care 

of conductors absorbing the greater part of the funds made available to 

the Department. 

A week after Swartwout arrived at Albany. the Canadian campaign 

began. With the Navy in temporary control of Lake Ontario. Dearborn's troops embarked on Commodore Chauncey's fleet. The batteaux 

and flatbottomed boats that had been constructed for the purpose of moving the troops could not be used to transport them safely.'M The force 

sa il ed from Sackett's Harbor on 25 April 1813 to take possession of York 

(Toronto), following up that success by capturing Fort George at the 

mouth of the N iagara River. At this point, lack of naval support stalled 

operations. 

The Northwestern Army fared better this year. Perry's naval 

victory at Put-in-Bay in September enabled Harrison to cross Lake Erie. 

defeat the British at Chatham where Tecumseh was killed, reoccupy 

Detroit, and regai n control of the Northwest. This notable success was 

offset by a sad fiasco on the St. Lawrence. A two-pronged operation 

aimed at Montreal under Wilkinson, who had replaced Dearborn in the 

Northern Department, and Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton, with Secretary 

Armstrong lending his personal supervision to the attempt. proved a 

dismal failure. Winter put an end to military operations, and Quartermaster personnel in the 9th District shifted their attention from moving 

men and forwarding supplies to providing winter quarters for the 

troops.'·f 

lU RG 107. OSW. Letters RC{;eivcd. J-169 (S) Uenkins to SW. 5 May ISI3). 

1N{ I) RG 107. OSW. Military Book, vol. 6. pp. 404-05 (4 May ISI5). (2) RG 107. OSW, 

Letters RC{;eivcd. S-169 (7) (Swartwout to SW. 27 Apr 1813). 

""American Stat e Papers, Military ADair" I. 442 (Dearborn 10 SW. 2 Apr ISI3). 

IHRG 107. OSW. Military Book. vol. 7. p. 11 0 (SW to Jenkins. 20 J an IS14). 
SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 1812 175 

Neglect of the Southern Department 

Obviously. with Canada the objective of operations in 1812 and 

1813, the Secretary of War could give little attention to troops stationed 

in the Southern Department. Their supply was neglected. It was late 

in September 1812, for example, before Eustis assured the commanding 

generals at New Orleans and Charleston that winter clothing would be 

scnt immediately. He then ordered Linnard to forward supplies. u T 

Meanwhile, the deputy quartermaster general at New Orleans, greatly 

hampered by the lack of funds, reported that the people employed in 

his department, unpaid for severa l months, were clamoring for their 

wages, and that owners of storehouses where government property was 

deposited were threatening to "turn the United States out of doors" if 

they were not paid.ue The frequency and the large size of the deputy's 

drafts on the War Department caused the Secretary to suspect that "there 

was much indiscretion in the use of the credit," and that abuses existed 

in the Department at New Orleans. He therefore protested the deputy's 

bills and, upon the reorganization of the Quartermaster's Department, 

did not reappoint him. Instead, William Piatt was sent there as quartermaster general. U1I 

Even when military operations were contemplated in the Southern 

Department, the Secretary directed no build-up of supplies for their 

support other than instructing the contractors of the area to furnish 

prOVISIOns. Following Hull's surrender of Detroit, the War Departm nt 

feared that the British migh t attempt action against the Gulf ports. The 

Secretary therefore called for volunteers from Tennessee to reinforce 

Wilkinson, then commanding at New Orleans. Andrew Jackson responded immediately by marching two regiments of infantry and a corps 

of cavalry to Natchez. Instead of being ordered to advance, Jackson, 

in February 1813, received a letter from the Secretary- countermanding 

the Florida venture. He had expected to receive Quartermaster supplies 

from the deputy quartermaster at New Orleans, but, as the head of a 

vol unteer force, he experienced much trouble. He had at once encountered difficulty in obtaining forage for his mounted force. When the 

expedition was called off, he was left to layout his own funds to get his 

men back to Nashville.'eo His troops fared no better in 1813 when he 

,.., l!Iid., vol. 6, pp. 158-59 (To Wilkinson, 21 Sep 1812); pp. 158, 174 (To Linnard, 21 and 

29 Sep 1812). 

' '' RG 107. OSW. Lettel'$ Received. 5-1111 (7) (Shaumburgh to SW, 12 Aug 1812). 

"(1) RG 107. OSW. Military Book. voJ. 6 pp. 336-37 (To Shaumburgh, 25 Mar 1813); 

pp. 481-82 (To Piau, 29 Jun 181 3). (2) RG 107, OSW, Reports to Congren . I. 2811 (SW to 

Chaimlan of Committee on Ways and Meahs, 24 Jul 1813) . 

... (I) rr sp(md IIC ~ 0/ Alldr w Jacksoll, cd. John S. Bassett (2 vols .• Washington. 1926). 

1,275n, 286, 289--90 (2) RG 107, OSW, [.ellen ·Ra::cived. 5146 (7) Ene. (Shamburgh to SW. 

16 Mar 1813). (11) Marquis James, Th e Li/e of Andrew Jacl!so" (New York, HMO), 148-50. 
176 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

led an armed force against the Creeks. Only J ackson's untiring efforts 

kept them [rom starvation. He charged that the Creek war could have 

been terminated in a few weeks if the contractors had not failed to 

forward provisions,lIl 

Final Campaign Preparations 

Supply preparations for the final campaigns of the War of 1812 on 

the Niagara frontier and at New Orleans followed established patterns 

previously described. T here were no funher changes in organization 

to delay Quartermaster supply operations, but lack of funds hampered 

all quartermasters as well as commissaries. 

As in previous years, the primary Quanermaster effort, supervised 

by Robert Swartwout and Elisha J enkins.in the 9th District, was directed 

toward transporting men and supplies to the Niaga ra frontier. There a 

vigorous campaign under Maj. Gen. Jacob Brown included the capture 

of Fort Erie, the victory at Chippewa, and the drawn battle of Lundy's 

Lane but produced no decisive results. With the repulse of the powerful 

British thrust at Plattsburg in September. active operations on the northern frontier came to an end. 

T he British raiding operations along the Atlantic Coast, culminating 

in the occupation of Washi ngton, resulted in the removal of Armstrong 

from the cabinet. James Monroe assumed the duties of both Secretary 

of State and Secretary of War. When the British launched an attack at 

New Orleans. Monroe was able to place $100,000 at Jackson's disposal. 

Some 1,110 muskets were also sent to him, but Jackson obtained most of 

the supplies for his successful defense by ransacking the city of New 

Orleans for additional arms as well as entrenChing tools, horses, and 

vehicles.ln 

T he COntract system of supplying provisions fa iled as miserably in 

the closing year of the war as it had in earlier campaigns.lu Despite 

Callender Irvine's efforts to improve clothing supply, Maj . Gen. Jacob 

Brown still asserted late in 1814 that winter cloth ing rarely reached the 

troops before the middle of winter. The allowance, he conceded, was 

abundant " if the quality was only good," but it se ldom was. Shoes were 

miserably put together, made of leather that d id not deserve the name 

for it was "a Substance as porous as Sponge." Owing to the "wretched 

policy" that assumed a soldier could bear "all the vicissitudes of the 

... Corr~spOlld~nc~ of Andrew l ac/uon, ed. Ba$5etl, 1,256, 525-26 (To Armstrong, 20 Noy 

and 30 Dec 1813) . 

... J ames. Lif~ 01 Alldr~w jac/uolI, pp. 215, 226 . 

.. RG 107, 05W, Lcttc:n Rec~ived, ) - 2 (8) Oenkins 10 5W. 2 Jun 18H); M- 187 (8) (Brig. 

C~ . Duncan McArthur to 5W, 10 Dec 18H). 
SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 1812 177 

climate and weather without requiring either quarters or covering, 

Brown charged, five men perished from disease to onc that fell by 

the sword.' ~ 

Secretary Monroe found complaints universal as he sought to infuse 

new vigor into supply preparations in the winter of 18 14- 15. Fortunately, early in February, news of the peace treaty, signed on 24 December 

18 14, put a n end to the extensive preparations that Swartwout had been 

authorized to make. The Secretary suspended purchases; he directed 

the commanding generals to discharge the militia at once; and he issued 

orders to preserve a ll arms, accOUlrements, camp equipage, and military 

stores,' u 

Demobilization 

The President submitted the treaty to the Senate on 15 February. 

Though in a specia l message 3 days later, he warned Congress against 

any immediate decrease in the size of the Army, motives of economy 

dictated that Congress lose no time in cutting expenses. On .3 March, 

it hurriedly reduced the size of the Army from its wartime peak of about 

60,000 men to 10,000. At Ihe same time, it abolished the existing 

Quartermaster's Department, substituting in its place four brigade quartermasters who were to be taken from the line.us All other officers in 

the Department were to be discharged. But demobilization problemsthe safekeeping of government property, the disposa l of surplus stores, 

and the payment of claims-permitted no such abrupt abolition of the 

Department. By Presidential authority, Swartwout and two deputy 

quartermasters general were provisionally retained in office. The Army 

having been reorganized into a division of the North and a division of 

the South under the command of Maj. Gen. Jacob Brown and Maj. Gen. 

Andrew Jackson, respectively. one of the deputy quartermasters general 

was assigned to each division. 

The economy drive also had its effect upon the personnel of the 

Purchasing Department. Ca.llender Irvine had long urge:d the desirability of placing all procurement responsibility in his hands, and upon 

his recommendation all deputy commissaries were discharged. Under 

Irvine's administra tion. supplies thereafter were largely procured anc!. 

concentrated at Philadelphia. Their transportation, however, necessitated retention of a deputy quartermaster general at that city. In conse-

" 'Official Leiter Book of J acob Brown, No. I, pp. 271- 72 (To Monroe, 28 Nov 1814). 

Manuscript Diy., Library of Congress. 

' .. RG 107, OSW, Military Book, yol. 8, p. 45 (SW to Swartwout, 13 Feb 1815): pp. 47-48 

n'o COs of all military districts, 16 Feb 1815). 

- 3 SIal. 224 (Mar 3.1815). 
178 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

quence, at lrvine's suggestion, the War Department also provisionally 

retained William Linnard as a deputy quartermaster general.'~T It 

permitted all other supply officers in the two departments to remain in 

service only long enough to settle their accounts. 

The provisional character of these staff arrangements was unsatisfactory, and, by the end of the year, the Chairman of the House Military 

Committee raised the question of providing for such appointments by 

law. In reply, William H. Crawford, who had become Secretary of War 

in August, wrote: 

The experience of the two first campaigns of the last war, which had furnished volumes of evidence upon this subject, had incontestably established 

not only the expediency, but the necessity of giving to the military establish· 

ment, in time of peace, the organization which it must have to render it efficient 

in a state of war.18' 

Since the "stationary staff of a military establishment" should be sub· 

stantially the same in peace and war, he recommended its organization 

provide for, among other officers, one Quartermaster General, who should 

be stationed in Washington. This was a revolutionary proposal, for 

until that time the Quartermaster General had always been regarded as 

a field staff officer, appointed only in time of war and serving with the 

principal army. Among this permanent sta ff, Crawford also included 

the Commissary General of Purchases who was to be stationed in 

Philadelphia. 

Crawford argued that the organization of the division staff in the 

field should be regulated by the number of individual corps into which 

a military force was distributed. Since the Army was then divided into 

two military divisions, and he saw no reason for change, he proposed that 

the staff at the divisional level include among its offi cers one quartermaster 

general and two deputy quartermasters general with regimental quarter· 

masters, as well as one deputy commissary general and two assistant 

commissaries of issue. 

Unfortunately, when Congress enacted legislation in the spring of 

1816, it ignored Crawford's suggestion for a permanent staff. Instead, 

it simply provided for one quartermaster general and one deputy 

quartermaster general for each division of the Army, with an assistant 

quartermaster for each brigade, who superseded the existing brigade 

quartermaster and inspector. The law also continued the office of the 

Commissary General of Purchases and provided in addition for one 

,t> (I) RG 92, CG I', Letters Sent, No. 384, f. 377 (Inine to Actg SW, 25 May 1815). 

(2) RG 107. OSW, Military nook, vol. 8, pp. 118, 142 (Actg SW 10 Linnnd. 27 May, 3 Jun 1815): 

pp. 14()-41 (Actg SW to Brown and Champlain, 2 Jun 1815) . 

.. Americall Sial e Paper5, Militar), ADair5, I, 636 (27 Dec 1815). 
SUPPLY IN THE WAR OF 1812 179 

deputy commissary for each division, for six assista nt commissaries of 

issues, and as many military storekeepers as the service required. l60 

These arrangements proved to be of relatively short duration. 

During the 2 years they lasted, the Quartermaster's Department was 

headed by not onc but two men, each of whom held the title of Quartermaster General and the rank of colonel. T hey shared equall y the 

responsibiliti es of the office. General orders, issued from the Adju tant 

and Inspector General's office on 3 May 1816, announced that James R. 

Mullany of New York and George Gibson of Pennsy lvania had been 

appointed Quartermasters Genera l of the Divisions of the North and of 

the South, respectively, their appointments to date from 29 April 1816. 

Both men had seen service during the War of 1812 and had been 

discharged in June of the previous year when the strength of the Army 

had been decreased. Only Gi bson was call ed upon to suppOrt an active 

military operation-namely, Jackson's campaign against the Seminoles 

in West Florida, in which Gibson so effectively suppl ied the needs of 

the troops that Jackson had warm praise for his efforts.lTO For the most 

part, both men, during their short tours of du ty as Quartermasters 

Genera l, dealt with problems that were the aftermath of war---claims 

and disposal of surplus supplies. The condition of much of this materiel 

made it worthless to the Army, and the supplies were sold for whatever 

sums they would bring. Gibson, for example, after inspecting supplies 

on deposit at New Orleans, contemptuously dismissed them as "a great 

collection of trumpery"- broken tools of all kinds, worm·eaten sadd les, 

and a variety of other articles, none of which were fit for issue and hardly 

worth repairingyt Settlement of claims was time-consuming but essentia l. Echoing arguments that were lIsed by quartermasters in the Revolutionary War, Mullany u rged prompt settl ement so that those who dea lt 

with the Army would no longer be compelled to charge extravagant 

prices [or supplies and services in order to offset delays encountered in 

obtain ing payment from the government.

l12 

Concurrentl y with the settlement of these immediate problems, 

others, more enduri ng in character, were developing in relation to 

frontier supply. The close of the war opened a new era in American 

history. For the first time since the Americans had won their independence, they could turn their backs on Europe, concentrating their 

attention on domestic problems. Peace brought the necessity of extend101 3 SIIlI. 297 (Apr 24.1816). 

''"(I) C(}Tr~$pOllde>lct: oj Ja ckson, ed. Hassen. II . 381 Uackson to Calhoun. 2 J an 1818). 

(2) RG 107. OSW, Leiters Received. J-91 (II) Uackson to Calhoun, undated). 

In RG 107, OSW. Lettcrs Reccived. G-G3 (10) (Gibson llJ Jackson. 14 Apr 1817). 

In/bid., M--417 (9) (Mullany to SW, 6 Dec 181 6); 1.1-352 (9) (Mu llany to SW. 9 Aug ]816). 
180 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

iog the military front ier in order to control the Indians. promote the 

fur trade, and exclude foreign traders. Construction of a chain of 

western posts was proposed. This program, with its problems of supply, 

was barely initiated. however, before a reorganization of the Department 

removed Quartermaster General Gibson and Mullany from office. The 

Department was reunited under the guidance of one Quartermaster 

General, Thomas S. Jesup. who, more than any other officer, was to give 

enduring form and character to the Quartermaster's Department. 
( 

CHAPTER VI 

Jesup Shapes a Department 

When Thomas Sidney Jesup was appointed Quartermaster General 

on 8 May IBIB.the Army and the War Depanment were being thoroughl y 

reorgan ized by John C. Cal houn. The latter had taken the oath of 

office as Secretary of War onl y 5 months earlier on 8 December 1817, but 

he quickly developed an apprec iation of the problems confronting him. 

Foremost among these was lhe necessity of reorga nizi ng lhe staff departments. He fully subscribed to the views expressed late in 1815 by his 

predecessor, William Crawford. Under Calhoun's vigorous and inte lli. 

gent administra ti on, a system of permanent staff supply agencies took 

form in Washington . Working with Senator J ohn 'Williams of Tennessee, Chairman of the Milita ry Affairs Committee, he drafted a bill that 

embodied his ideas.' The bill also benefited from the experience of 

high.ranking Army ollicers whom he consulted; from suggestions offered 

by his chief clerk, Maj. Christopher Van De Venter, who had served at 

various posts in the Quartermaster's Department; and from Ca lhoun's 

interest in the problem of provision ing the Army.! 

Esl.abiishme'1l1 of Sul)ply Buualls 

Simplicity and efliciency of management would be promoted, Ca lhoun asserted, by placing the administration of the Quartermaster's 

Department under the control of a single, responsible chief. On 14 

April, Congress enacted a law that reta ined the earlier provisions of the 

act of 1816 for the appointment of two deputy qua rtermasters genera l 

and four assistant deputy quartermasters general but eliminated the 

unsatisfactory arrangement that had called for administration by twO 

co·eq ual heads. It substituted instead a single Quartermaster General 

for the Department who was to have the rank, pay, and emoluments of 

a brigadier genera l. The act also permitted the President to appoint 

'(I) RG 107. OSW, Leuen Reo:::ein·t1 , W- 35 (1\) (Williams 10 Calhoun. II Feb 1818). 

(2) RG 1M. OSW. Reporu 10 O'.lIlVess. I. 436, 439-40 (Calhauu 10 Williams. 5 and \6 Feb 

1818). National A,rchivCl . 

• Frauklin J. Jameson, "Correspondence of J ohn C. Calhoun," American Historical AnocJa· 

don . AIIII1III/ Report fur 1899, vol. 2. PI" 791-92 (Virgil Maxcy 10 Calhoun, 2 Ma r ]827). 
182 QUARTERMASTER. SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

12 additional assistant deputy quartermasters general. The law repea led 

earlier provisions for forage. wagon, and barrack masters.' 

As organized in 1818. the Department consisted of 19 officers and it 

could also utilize the services of 18 regimental and battalion quartermasters. T he Quartermaster General and onc assistant q uartermaster 

genera l, Capl. Trueman Cross. constituted the personnel of the 'Washington office. The rema ining 15 assistant quartermasters general were 

stationed at various posts throughout the country. while onc of the deputy 

quartermasters general was located in lhe Southern Division and the 

other. Maj. William Linnard. was COlllinucd at Philadelphia in the 

Northern Division. 

Al Calhoun's suggestion, Congress also abolished in 18 18 the contract 

system of provisioning the Army that had been used since 1781, substituting in lieu of it a commissariat system. T he latter had been advocated 

by Army personnel ever since the War of 18 12, and Calhou n himself, 

while a member of the House of Representatives, had sponsored resolutions [or that purpose in the fall of 18 14." For the first time since the 

Revolutionary War, a Subsistence Department was established. The 

new system was to be instituted as soon as existing contracts expired. 

The law authorized the President to appoint a Commissary General of 

Subsistence with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a colonel of ordnance. 

He was to be aided by as many assistants as the service required. They 

were to be taken from the subalterns of the line and allowed $20 a month 

in addition to their pay in the line for the services they performed. Like 

the Quartermaster Genera l, the Commissary General of Subsistence was 

to maintain his offi ce in Washington. a Viewing the establ ishment of the 

commissariat system as an experiment, Congress limited its life to 5 years. 

Not until 1835, and after the utility of the system had been fully demon· 

strated £or 15 years, d id Congress make it permanent.' 

When Congress had under consideration a bill for regulating the 

sta ff departments in 1818, both George Gibson and J ames R. Mullany 

sought appointment as Quartermaster Ceneral. T The Secretary of War 

appointed neither. T he War Department gave Mullany an honorable 

• 3 Sial. 426. 

'A.mals Of CougnJS, 13th Cong., 3d se5$. , vol. 3. 1'1'. 550-51 (Nov 10. 1814). 

'(I) 3 Sial. 426. (2) RG 107, OS\\'. Reports to Congras. 1. 416-'17 (Calhoun to Williams, 

- March 1818). 

'(I) 4 SIal. 780 (Ma r 3, 1835). Sec abo 3 Sial. 72 1 Oan 23. 1823); 4 Sial. 360 (Mar 2,1819). 

(2) AlIIl!Ticau SIMI! Pa/1<'!rs, MilillJfY ADairs, V, 265-67 (Gibson to Chairman. HOUK Mililary 

Commilt~, 21 Feb 1834). 

t RG 94, AGO. Letten Received (Gibson file. itn, I'a. delegation to WD. - 18 18; Gaines to 

Calhoun, 7 May 18 18); (Mullany lHe; Itn, Daniel D. Tompkins to Pres. Monroe. 3 Apr 1818; 

Membc:n of HR to Calhoun , 10 Apr 1818; Mullany to Calhou n, 11 Apr 1818). Naliona l 

ArchiVal. 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 183 

discharge fTOm the Army. It designated Gibson to fill the newly created 

office of Commissary General of Subsistence on 18 April 1818, a position 

that he retained for the next 43 years until his death in 1861. Ca lhoun 

first offered the POSt of Quartermaster Genera l to William Cumming of 

Georgia, who had served as Adjutant General during the last year of the 

War of 1812. When he declined to serve, Calhoun. by general order on 

8 May 1818, appointed 29-year old Col. Thomas S. J esu p of lhe 3d U.S. 

Infantry. then Adjutant General of the Northern Division.' 

T hrough some unaccountable delay in the mail, that order was 

16 days on the road from Washington to Brownville. N.Y., where J esup 

was stationed. Eight days later, the new Quartermaster General arrived 

at the capital but too late to consult with the Secretary before the latter 

left the city. Jesup was in sympathy with Calhoun's objectives and 

youthfully confident that he could master the difficulties of Quartermaster 

administration, though he was well aware " that some reputation is risqucd 

in the attempt LO give system to a Deparlmem, which has hitherto in 

our service, been in a sta te of confusion and disorganization." He was 

convinced that with Ca lhoun's support he could make it the first Department of the Army as it was in all European services. "I wish," he wrote 

the Secretary, "to give LO it that character, and those feaw res, which will 

render it efficient in time of war, and which, both in peace and in war, 

will insure a strict responsibili ty in all its branches.'" 

He considered his offi ce "a military one," he advised Calhoun, and 

suggested the desirability of employing young, active, and intelligent 

subaltern officers to perform its duties. He was opposed to the use of 

proressional clerks, who, although competent to cast accounts and copy 

letters, were wholly unversed in the details of military service. He 

beli eved that on ly men who had seen active service in the field and were 

familiar with military procedures could be usefu l in helping achieve the 

objectives which both he and Cal houn desired. He thought of his offi ce 

as a school in wh ich you ng officers might acquire habits of business and 

"(I) RG 94. AGO. uuers Received 1815. No. 2670 (Cumm ing to Calhoun, 27 Apr 1818). 

(2) Jesup J>ape". Bm, I. Ace. 5276. Manuscript Div .. Ubnry of Congress. (3) Jesup's career 

in the Army began in ]808 whcn he was commissioned as a M:(ond lieutenant in the 7th 

Infan try. He served with distinct jon in the War of 1812, advancing to the rank of major 

in tho:: Regular Army. "'or his gallant conduct ~nd meritorioul service in the baltle of 

Chippewa and Lundy's Lane, in which he was se\'erely wounded. he was brevrolted liroutenanl 

colonel and colonel, resproctively. Though the Itrength of the Army was sharply reduced 

ahror thro war, Jnup wu among the officen retained. and he continual 10 H'rvro in thro Northrorn 

Division of the Army under Maj. Gen . Jacob Brown, becoming a colonel ~boUI 3 mOnlns 

before his appointment as Quartemluter Genef1ll l. J esup was fint a combal man and was 

10 command troops in Iho:: $o::minole War. This knowledge undoubtedly served him well as 

Quartermuler Genera l. 

" RG 107, OS\\', I.etto::" Received. J- 134 (1 1) (To Ca lhoun ,.') Jun 1818). 
184 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T H E ARMY 

educate themselves fo r the various duties of the staff. Officers thus 

trained in time of peace would provide a corps from which an efficient 

staff might be formed in the event of war. In Such ideas naturally won 

the approval of the Secretary of War. 

T he you ng men trained under J esup's strict discipline were among 

the quartermasters who supplied the troops in th e Mexica n "Var and the 

Civil War as well, for J esup served as Quartermaster Genera l fo r 42 years 

until his death in 1860. His long tenure, together with the unbroken, 

lengthy span of service of some or his subordinate offi cers, gave a continllity to Quartermaster training, methods, and procedures that had been 

utterly lacking in the past. 

Depm'tmental Regulations 

J esup assumed the duties oE his office on 15 June 18 18, and about 

a month la ter he drafted a set of m les and regulations covering the nature 

and functions of the Quartermaster's Department and th e duties of its 

officers. T hese were d istilled from his own experience both in the staff 

and in the line, and from information obta ined by studying, on th e one 

hand, past administrative procedures in the American Army as revea led 

in the correspondence of Mifflin, Greene, and Pickering, QuarlermaSlers 

General during th e Revolutiona ry War, and on the other, the procedures 

followed in th e French, Prussian, and British armies. Ca lhoun approved 

of his regulations.

1I 

About this same time, Maj. Gen. Winfi eld Scott, on the basis at his 

experience and study of French and British authorities, was completing 

his d raft of the first thoroughgoing regulatory code fo r the Army. This 

work he submitted lO Ca lhoun on 2 September 18 18. The similarity 

between its regulations fo r the Quartermaster's Department and those 

proposed by J esup suggests that th e two officers studied the same so urces 

and that th ey undoubtedl y benefited from a mutual exchange of ideas. 

W hen the code of regulations for the information and guidance of the 

Army was fi na ll y published in 182 1, J esup's regulations were incorporated 

in itY 

In his regulations, Jesup defined the three pri ncipal objectives of 

his Department. These were lO insure an ample and efficient system 

lO RG 92, OQMG Letter !.look, \'01. 2. pp. 408-()9 (To 5W. 3' ."eb [821). 

"Ibid., ~ol. I , pp. 13-16 (Jesu p to Calhoun. 17 Jul 1818). 

"(I) American Slnl~ Pnper$, /\filrln,)' AUnirs, 11 . 247-52 (ScOIL to Calhoun. 2 Sep 1818). 

(2) Scott's code, "General Regulatioils for the Army, " was appro"ed by Congress on 2 March 

182 1. 3 Slat. GIS. sec. 14. (3) Before publication , the code underwent further alteration and 

clarification at the hands of a board of scalf officers that included J esup. RG 107, OSW, Mili. 

tary Book, "01. 11 .205 (GO, 19 May 182]). (4) I1 rnl ~811In lio"s for Ih ~ Arm)" 1821, 

p. ]78 If. 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 185 

of supply, to give the utmost fac ility and effect to the movements and 

operations of the Army, and to enforce a strict accountability on the part 

of all officers and agents charged with monies or supplies. T he rules and 

regulations he laid down in 1818 still govern in general the conduct of 

the office of the Quartermaster General. 

Jesup emphasized the authority of the Quartermaster General by 

sening forth that he was to direct all correspondence of his Department. 

Under the direction of the Secretary of 'War, he was to have entire control 

of all subordi nate officers acting in, or making disbursements on account 

of, the Depanmcm in all that related to the administrative part of their 

duli es and to t.heir accountability. The commanding officer would have 

military control. Exce pt by order of the Secretary of War or of a general 

commanding a division, no Quartermaster officer was to be deta iled or 

employed on duties oth er than those of the Department. No Q uartermaster was to engage either d irectly or indirectly in trade. All officers 

of the Department were to furnish their accounts for settlement at 

prescribed times, and if anyone of them failed to do so he was to be 

replaced. 

Jesup felt himse lf competent LO originate and put into operation a 

proper system of accountability for his Department. He therefore proposed that all monies for the Department should be drawn by the 

Q uartermaster General and distributed by him, as the service required. 

to disbursing officers. Under his system, the rece ipts of those offi cers 

became his vouchers. and on producing them his accounts with the 

Treasury were closed and accou nts opened with these subordinate ofTicers. 

Whenever practicable, the senior quartermaster of each separate army 

or military department might be req uired to rece ive and account for all 

monies for that army or department. His accounts. both of money and 

property, were to be forwa rded quarterly to the office of the Q uartermaster General for examination and transmittal to the proper accounting 

offi ce. In the event the accounti ng officer suspended or disallowed any 

voucher, it was to be retu rned to the Q uartermaster Genera l, accompanied 

by a written statemel1l of the reasons for such action. The Quartermaster 

General then required a proper voucher or explanation from the quarter· 

master concerned. 

Jesup made it clear that he had a military responsibility to compel 

the settlement of accounts and to enforce the performance of any other 

Quartermaster duty. but that his own pecuniary responsibility ceased 

when he produced the receipt of his subordinates for the money rece ived.13 

H e also proposed that all books and accounts of quartermasters be 

lO RG 92. OQMG I.elter Book. vol. I. pp. 13. 16- 17 (To Calhoun. 17 and 29 Jul 1818). 
186 QUARTER MASTER SUPPORT OF T H E ARMY 

inspected whenever necessary. the inspection to incl ude property as well 

as money. T he books and accounts of the Q uartermaster General were 

to be open to a similar inspection. T hese provisions for accountability 

were also incorporated in the regulations published in 182 1. 

By September, when printed forms became available, Jesup instructed his su bord inates to submit quarterly abstracts showing all articl es 

p urchased by the officer, all expenditures and d isbursements other than 

the articles purchased, and all monies received and expended d uring the 

period for which the accounts were rendered. If they made purchases 

at the d irection of commanding officers that were not covered by the 

Quartermaster regulations, they had to obtain in each case a bill and 

receipt, accompanied with the authority on which the action was taken. 

All vouchers in proper form had .to accompany the abstracts. In addition, at the end of every month each officer had to submit a summary 

statement showing the amount for which he was accountable and desig. 

nating the ban k in wh ich that amount was deposited.a 

From the days of the first organization of the Quartermaster's Department in the Revolutionary War, efforts had been made to enforce 

accoun tability for money, if not for property, and from time to time 

regulations had been formulated covering the d uties of Quartermaster 

officers, but enforcement of such provisions had been gravely deficient. 

Confusion over duties had resulted in confusion in expenditures. J esup 

consistently and persistently enforced regul ations. He scrutinized vouchers closely and returned them to quartermasters for even minor corrections.u He examined abstracts for fu nds with equal care and corrected 

estimates by deleting from them supplies that regulations authorized 

other departments to procure. He instructed the assistant quartermaster 

general at New Orleans that the Purchase Departmen t furnished military 

stores and he call ed his subordinate's attention to the precise paragraph 

of the regulations. No pretext existed, he advised the assistant quarter· 

master general at Boston, for calling on the Quartermaster's Department 

to furnish drums, fifes, and musical instruments. T hey properly came 

from the Ordnance Department, being a "species of accoutrement and a 

substitute for arms in the hands of the musicians." T hough Jesup 

acknowledged that they had, in many cases, been furnish ed by the Purchases Department through the mili tary storekeepers, he was determined 

to put an end to the irregul arity of drawing supplies from one department 

that were prov ided by another. 't 

" I bid., vol. I. pp. 57-59 (Circular 10 T. F. Hu nt tl M., 9 Sep 1818). 

"Ibid., vol. I. p. 115 ([0 Capl. T. F. Hunl. 21 Nov 1818). 

'"Ibid., vol. I. pp. 155-5-4 ([0 Cap!. T . F. Hunt . 51 Dec 1818); 27~77 ([0 Capt. C. Bende r. 

U May 1819). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTM ENT 187 

Quartermasters oh en procured articl es on orders of commanding 

officers, but the Washington office quickly spotted unauthorized items. 

J esup, [or exampl e, recommended that Brig. Gens. E. P. Ripley and 

D. Bissell be held accollntable for the pen knives and spy glasses procured 

on the ir orders by Ca ptain Hunt, assistant quartermaster genera l at 

New Orleans.H He acknowledged that a commanding offi cer was responsible for ordering the supplies necessary for his command, for he 

alone, and not the q uartermaster, was the judge of what was needed. 

J esup insisted that he would meet with no difficulty in obtaining supplies 

provided he a pplied to the proper de partment and foll owed the regulations. " Experience in office only increased j esu p's faith in the efficiency 

of the system he had ina ugurated in 1818. Years later, a fter he had 

operated under those regulations in the fie ld as a commander of troops 

d uring the Seminole War, he wrote: 

I had, under the most difficult circumstances, an opportunity of testing the 

high efficiency of the system-an efficiency which I had never before willlessed 

in the Department when serving in the fie ld. I never fou nd lhe slightest diffi- culty from the work ing of the regu lations; nor do I believe that any difficulty 

is occasioned by the regulations; all the d ifficulties I have observed since the 

system has been in opera tion, have resulted from Commanding officers forgel- ting their own high position and descending to, and interfering with, the 

min utest details of the duties of Qua rter Masters--or in other words the diffi- culties have not resulted from the system, but from an un necessary interference 

with it.· D 

J esup obtained enforcement of the regulations, however, through 

persistent efforts. Repeatedly, he ca ll ed attention to the interference of 

line offi cers_ By diverting funds of the De partment from the objects for 

wh ich they were appropriated and applying th em to those for which no 

appropri ation had been made by Congress, they ca used th e development 

of large arrearages and aroused congressional dissatisfaction . Th is was a 

practice that J esup found less easy to bring under control at the more 

distant posts_IO In time, this difficulty was eliminated, but conflict between line and staff over their respective authorities was not so read il y 

resolved. For the first, but by no means the last time, a commanding 

oflicer charged th at an attempt was under way to render certain branches 

of the staff independent of th e proper military control. 21 Conflicts 

"Ibid., Yo l. I. p . 115 (fo Calhoun . 25 Noy ISIS). 

" Ibid ., Yol. 2. pp. 64-65 (1"0 Maj. J. G. CrlIne. 28 Feb IS20). 

- Ibid., Yol . .50. p. 106 Uc:sup to Col. S. W . Kearney ... Jun 18«1). 

Ibid~ YOI. 5. p. 85 (fo QM H. Stanton, II J an 1821); p. "SO (fo Maj. C. J. Noun<:. 

5 Mar IS22) . 

.. (1) Ibid., yo1. 5. pp. 250-5 1 (fo Col. J. Snelling. 1 Sep 1825); yol. 15. pp. 156--57 (fo 

Maj. Gen. A. Macomb. 17 Jun 1829). (2) For a specific example in the Purchases Deparunent 

see. RG 92. Conllniua ry General of Purchases (CG I'). Letters Sent. No. 5S7. p. 50 (In'inc 10 

Aut. Com mill&ary E. n . Clen15on. 12 J un 1818); Pl'. 159-60 (Irvine 10 Ca lhoun, 16 Oct ISI8). 
188 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

between the line and staff were to materialize from lime to time throughout the long history of the .Quartermaster supply bureau. 

Quarlel"master SuppoTl of Expeditions 

Jesup had been in office only 10 months when Calhoun ordered him 

to St. Louis on 27 March 1819.2 ! He was to supervise supply preparations 

for the support of troops who were being sem to execute Calhoun's 

military policy for the inland frontier. The policy was simply an extension of onc that had been developed immediately fOllowing the War of 

1812. The necessity of extending the military frontier in order to 

control the Indians, promote the fur trade, and exclude foreign traders 

had d icta ted that the War Department build a chain of forts (or these 

purposes.n At the Lime Calhoun became Secretary of War, the northern 

military frontier was marked by posts that stretched from Michilimackinac 

via Green Bay to Prairie du Chien. 

By 1817, the th rust of westward expansion was rapidl y outmoding 

the effectiveness of that military frontier. ]n that year an English 

observer, Morris Birkbeck, wrote that "Old America seems to be breaking 

up and moving westward." t. Settlement had crossed the Mississippi. 

Missouri would establish a territorial government in 1819 and achieve 

statehood 2 years yater. Fur traders ranged to the Rockies and beyond. 

The only course was LO push the military fromier farther westward to 

protect the settler and trader and to control the Indians. Ca lhoun 

therefore projected a new military (rontier, and for that purpose the War 

Department sent out two expeditions. The main one was to move up 

the Missouri River to the mouth of the Yellowstone Ri ver and erect 

posts at Council Bluffs and the Mandan Village, near the present site of 

Bismarck, N.Dak., the nearest point to the outpost on the Red River of 

the Hudson's Bay Company. The second expedition was to advance up 

the Mississippi to the mouth of the St. Peter's River (the Minnesota River 

of today) where it was LO establish a strong POSt in what has since become 

the metropolitan area of St. Paul. 

On 16 March 18 18, Calhoun instructed Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Smith, 

commanding officer at 51. Louis, to push a detachment of some 250 

riflemen to the mouth of the Yellowstone River.u With the staff departments then in process of reorganization, the supply of provisions and 

of transportation was placed wholly under his control. Calhoun anticito RG 107. OSW. Military Book, vol. 10. p. 290 (Calhl)un 10 P, 27 Mar 1819). 

""Ibid., vol. 8, pp. 100-00 (SW 10 Brm.o'U and II) Jackson, 22 May 1815) . 

.. Notes all a JourntIJ ill America (London, 1818). 51. 

- RG 107, OSW, Military Book, vol. 10, pp. 5~54. 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 189 

pated that th e lateness of the season migh t prevent the detachment from 

rcaching its destination during the summer, but he optimistica ll y suggested that the troops might establish a post at some intermediate point, 

such as the Mandan Village, that would serve as a starting point for 

operations th e following year. T he Mandan Vill age was 1,540 miles 

from St. Louis, and Council Bluffs, considered a half-way point between 

St. Louis and th e Mandan Vill age, was some 650 miles from the mouth 

of th e Missouri Rivcr. 28 Calhoun ordered the Ordnance Department 

and the Commissary General of Purchases to provide t.he necessary mil itary stores and cloth ing. but the preparations took far longer than he had 

anticipated. Col. Talbot Chambers, in charge of the troops, did not 

leave Belle FOlllaine, abou t 20 mil es west of St. Louis on the Missouri 

River, until late in August. Pushing up the Missouri in keelboats, the 

troops made slow progress. They did not reach the Mandan Village 

and, in fan, advanced only 400 mil es up the river before they had to 

establ ish winter quarters. 

By that ti me the reorganization of the sta ff departments had been 

accomplished, and supply preparations, in anticipation of spring operations, could be initiated in the wi nter o( 18 18-19. Since rations for the 

ex ped ition had to be delivered before June 18 19, when contracts could 

for the first time be executed by the newly created office of the Commissary General of Subsistence, the War Department had to depend upon 

existing contracts for the necessary supply of subsistence. In consequence, Calhoun ordered James Johnson of Kentucky, who held cOlHracts 

for supplying the troops stationed at various pOSts in the West, to deposit 

420,000 rations at Bell e Fomaine by 21 March 18 19. Later, the Commissary General req uisitioned an additional 250,000 rations for delivery 

before 1 May.2T 

Having learned that Quartermaster General J esup was then charged 

with all transportation of men and supplies for the ex pedition, Richard M. 

J ohnson, brother of the aforemelllioned contractor and Chairman of the 

House Committee on Military Affairs, solicited a transportation contract 

in behalf of his brother.78 Aware of the importance of military control 

and responsibility in such an expedition, Jesup was at first opposed to 

negotiating a contract. With some reluctance he entered into a transportation contract with James Johnson at Calhoun's orders. Johnson 

.. HOllse Ex . Doc. No. 11 0. 16th Cong .. 2d &eM •• pp. 223-24. 230. 

"'(]) RC 192. Commissary Ceneral of Subsistence (CGS). Leiters Sent. 1. 3' (G ibson to 

Calhoun . 20 Nov 18]8). (2) House Ex. Doc. No. lJO. 16th Cong .. 2d sess .. p. 226 (Gih.\OtI 

interrogatioll) . 

.. HOllse Ex. Doc. No. 110. 16th Cong .. 2d &eM •• pp. 178-79 (R. M. Johnson to Jesup. 

]7 Nov 18 ]8). 
190 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

a lso held a third contract, under which he transported from Pittsburgh to 

St. Louis th e clothing, ordnance, and medica l stores for the expedition .

20 

As earl y as the summer of 1818, J ohnson had proposed using steamboats to transport supplies up the Missouri Rivcr.30 The tra nsportation 

contract executed by Jesup on 2 December 1818 stipulated that Johnson 

was to furnish by I March 1819 two steamboa ts capable of navigating the 

Mississippi and its waters. They were to be placed subj ect to the orders 

of the Quartermaster Genera l. One or more additional steamboats were 

to be provided i[ such transportation proved successful and if they were 

req uired. Johnson was obligated to furn ish kee lboats if the steamboats 

were not able to transport the provisions and supplies. Since no steamboat had ever navigated the Missouri and no rates were established, the 

government agreed to allow J ohnson a reasonable compensation to be 

determined la te r. ~' Un til it was ascerta ined whether steamboat transportation would be successful or not, Jesup advised his assistant q uartermaster 

at St. Louis to reta in all his keelboats and barges for possibl e se. 2 

While these measures were taken, the War Department ordered 

additiona l troops to St. Lou is. T hese included the 6th Regiment of 

Infantry that moved from Plattsburg, via New York, Pittsburgh, and 

St. Louis, to Council Bluffs-a distance of 2,628 miles. It was the 

longest movement of an American expedition, aside from small exploring 

parties, undertaken to that time. The main body of the Mississippi 

expedition, consisting of a large detachment of the 5th In[antry, sailed 

from Detroit by way of the Great Lakes to Green Bay, traveling via the 

Fox and Wisconsin Rivers to Prairie du Chien, and then up the Mississippi to St. Peter's, a distance of 1,270 miles. Cal houn was well pl eased 

with the expeditious movement of these troops directed by Jesup through 

his Quartermasters at Pittsburgh and DetroiLII 

In December 1818, Johnson wrote that rations and every other 

article ordered would be ready to move in 30 ays.~· But returns of the 

military storekeeper at St. Louis later revealed that he failed to deliver 

subsistence stores at the time req uired. The steamboat Expedition did 

not arrive at Bell e Fontaine with provisions until 18 May, but J ohnson 

dared not land the cargo lest it and the steamboat as well be attached by 

• Ibid., pp. 242. 246 (Jesu p st3tement) . 

., RG 107. OSW. Military Book. vol. 10, pp. 94-95 (C. Van De VenIer to J ohnson, 24 JUII 

1818) . 

., House: E~. Dcx;. No. 110, 16th Cong., 2d se55 .. pp. 6-7 (Contract). 

a RG 92. OQMG Letter Book, vol. I. p. 154 (To J. McGunncglc, 51 Dec 1818). 

D{I) America'i Stille Pllpers, Mi/itllry AUII;rs, II, 31. (2) RG 92, OQr.fG Letter Book, 

vol. I, p. 179 (Jesup to Stanton. 8 Feb 1819); p. 181 (To Atkinson, 11 Feb 1819): pp. 198-99 

To H. Johnston , 3 r.far 1819). (3) J ameson. "Correspondence of J ohn C. Calhoun," AHA 

Annual R l!port for 1899, vol. 2, p. 163 (Calhoun 10 Brown. 5 Scp 1819) . 

.. House Ex. Dcx;. No. 110, 16th Cong., 2d 5CS5., p. 181 (To J esup, 27 Dec 1818). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 191 

the Missouri authorities in a civil suit that had been adjudged against 

him. In consequence, j ohnson's boats fe ll downstream to the Illinois 

shore where he landed the provisions for inspection, resalting. and 

repacking. U 

Obviously. if Johnson was using his steamboats in May to transport 

supplies, they were not made available to the Quartermaster General 

according to the terms of the transporta tion contract. Johnson did 

provide four rather than two steamboats-the Expedition, the Johnson, 

the Jefferson, and the Calhoun. The last, however, never reached St. 

Louis; it had insufficient power to ascend the Mississippi. J esup reported 

that the boats were badly constructed and that their management was 

worse than their construction. Even with partial loads, they experienced 

difficulty in navigating the Missouri, and one by one they were abandoned 

for keel boats. U 

As soon as he arrived in the West, J esup found that the contractor's 

arrangements were not as far along as he had been led to expect. Jesup 

protested that "something more than idle professions and ostentatious 

boastings" by the contractor would be necessary to insure success. When 

the 5th Regiment arrived at St. Louis, the Quartermaster General would 

have taken transportation entirely out of the contractor's hands, inasmuch 

as Johnson had failed to meet the terms of his contract, but such large 

advances had been made to him that his services were retained.

n 

As was customary, Johnson had received advances on his contracts to 

enable him to execute them. On the subsistence contract. for example, 

these had amounted to $35,000 for each quarter. The contractor acknowledged that Calhoun's policy had been liberal " for ordinary years" 

but unfortunately 1819 was a year of panic.J8 Loans could not be 

obtained from banks or individuals. Settlement of debts were being 

demanded, and nothing could be bought on credit. T he bubble of 

overexpansion following the War of 1812 had been pricked by the second 

Bank of the United States. Concerned for its own safety, it had demanded that the state banks redeem their obligations to it in specie. 

To preserve his own credit, Johnson had to obtain additional advances 

from the War Department. He Hattered, cajoled, and wheedled Calhoun, 

- (I) Ibid., pp. 15- 18 Oohnson (0 R. M. J ohnson. 30 Sep 1819). (2) RG 107. OSW. 

Letters Received. G-26 (I:'!) (CoL Chambers to General Bissell, 21 May 1819). 

- (I) House Ex. Doc. No. 110, 16th Cong., 2d scss .. pp. 22 1, 222. (2) RG 92, OQMG Lcucr 

Book., vol. I, p. 46 1 (Jesup 10 CalhoulI, 30 Aug 1821). 

"(I) RG 92. OQMG Lel(er Book.. vol. I. pp. 495-96 (Jesup to Calhoun. 16 Dec 1819). 

(2) RG 107. OSW, Letters Received. J- 30 (1!I) (Jesup to Calhoun, 26 Jun 1819); J-:,!5 (15) 

(Jesup to Cross, 25 Jun 1819). 

- RG 107, OSW. Letters Received. J-220 (12) Ene. (R. M. Johnson 10 Calhoun, 29 Mar 

1819). 
192 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T HE ARMY 

predicting disaster to the expedition if his picas for funds were not 

heeded.u 

Calhoun gran ted an advance of $50,000 on the transportation contract and accepted two drafts drawn by J ohnson to meet payments for 

the purchase of an additional stea mboat.~ Q J esup was greatly surprised 

at this turn of events. On his journey to St. Lou is, he had passed through 

Kentucky and at J ohnson's earnest solicitations had advanced him 

$ 10,000. That advance, with those J ohnson had already received. Jesup 

informed Ca lhoun, were more than th e whole expenses of the expedition 

should have been for the year. ~! Johnson's representation that the 

expedition would fai l without that S50,OOO-advance was entirely incorrect. 

Jesup advised the Secretary that he had made provisional arrangements 

that wou ld insure success independent of the J ohnson brothers!2 

Appeals to the Secretary of War, the Quartermaster General, and 

the Commissary General of Subsistence by no means exhausted the Johnson brothers' possibilities for obtaining advances. Early in July, Calhoun 

r ece ived a letler from President Monroe, then on tour in Kentucky. 

T he Johnson brothers had seized the opportunity to lay their problems 

before him and had been so persuasive that the President, to prevent 

failure of the expedition, directed Calhoun to advance the contractor 

$85,000 on his subsistence and transportation contracts. He was also to 

grant J ohnson an additional advance of $57,500 upon receipt of title to 

the four steamboats. Johnson immediately drew against th e adva nces 

Monroe had ordered.H 

Calhoun was stunned. T he advances on th e transportation contract 

had been large and those on the subsistence contract were within some 

$28,500 of all that would be due the contractor when he made his last 

delivery. The War Department would be embarrassed for want of funds 

before the end of th e year, and Calhoun begged Johnson to make no 

further drafts lest he be compelled to refuse payment." 

At St. Louis, Jesup, having refused to grant any further advances, 

charged tha t Johnson had furnished transportation for only four companies of men and abou t 350 tons of provisions and stores.t5 J ohnson 

insinuated that Jesup "this good man this gallant & fai thful officer has 

- Ibid., (R. M. J ohnson to Calhoun, 30 Mar. 3 Apr, 9 Apr 1819) . 

.. (I) Ibid., J- 2 (Ill) Gohnson to Calhoun , 30 May 1819). (2) RG 107, O$W, Military Book. 

vol. 10, p. 388 (Calhoun to J esup, 11 May 1819) . 

., RG 107, 05W, Leite" Received , J- II (Ill) Ga up to Calhoun, 12 Jun 1819). 

° I bid., J-30 (13) (To Calhoun. 26 Jun 1819). 

" I bid., P-40 (13) (Monroe to Calhoun. 5 Ju1 1819); J- 12 (13) Gohnson to Calhoun, 

5 Ju1 1819). 

"Ibid., P-'lO (Ill) Ene. (Calhoun 10 Johnson. 20 Jul 1819) . 

.. (I) Ibid., J-36 (Ill) J esup to Calhoun, 8 Jul 1819). (2) RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, 

vol. I, pp. 458-59 Gaup 10 JOhnson, 4 Ju l 1819). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 193 

permitted his mind to be poisoned & opera ted upon" by j ohnson's 

enemies at St. Louis.

tO Jesup reported that no reliance could be placed 

on the contractor's "fair promises." Some troops and stores had begun 

moving in mid-June in keelboa ts furnished by the Quartermaster's 

Department. Jesup advised the Secretary that three companies of troops 

under Col. Henry Leavenworth left Prairie du Chien on 6 August and 

would arrive at the objective, St. Peter's River, that year. On the other 

hand, the Missouri expedition, headed by CoL Henry Atkinson, would 

undoubtedly reach Council Bluffs by mid-October, but Johnson's failure 

to comply with his contracts would prevent any troops reaching the 

Mandan Vill age in 1819'" 

Though preparations were begun in the winter of 18 19-20 to carry 

the Missouri expedition to the Mandan Village, congressional investigation aired charges of extra vaga nce and prevented further appropriations 

for the expedition. The troops were halted at Council Bluffs and (or a 

time the policy of constructing forts on the northern inland fron tier came 

to an end. War Department entanglement with the Johnson brothers, 

however, was not yet ended. Late in 1819 they presented a bill for the ir 

services that included not onl y enormous charges for the use of their 

steamboats and kee lboats but cla ims for delays occasioned by the government. Jesup rejected these claims. but, under the terms of the contract, 

settlement was referred to arbitrators. Much to the gratification of the 

Johnson brothers, the arbitrators generously awarded them an allowance 

of l6~ cen ts per pound for all suppl ies shi pped at the mouth of the 

M issouri, St. Louis, or Bell e Fonta ine for Council Bluffs. either on board 

steamboats or keelboats. In effect, this amo unt was paid for all transportation the contractor performed as well as for al\ performed by the 

Quartermaster's Department. for if a steamboa t broke down, as the 

j eUe1'Son did after progressing only 144 miles up the Missouri, and the 

Q uartermaster's Department transported the cargo to Council Bluffs the 

contractor was still paid the full pr ce ~8 A House committee investigating the contract and arbitration findi ngs came to the conclusion that 

the award ougln to be set aside and recommended that the Attorney 

General be directed to use al\ lega l means not only to accomplish that 

purpose but to recover for the United States whatever might be due from 

James Johnson.H 

.. RG 107. OSW, Leiters Rcceivcu. 1'-40 (13) Ene. Uohnson 10 Calhou n. 26 J ul 1819). 

or Ibid., J- 30 (13): J-68 (13) UesuJl to Calhou n. 26 Jun and 9 Sep 1819). 

"RG 92. OQMG Leiter Book, vol. 2, pp. 397-407 Ucsup's Slalement on case, Feb 1820): 

pp. 167-68 (Cross 10 3d auditor. 12 J un 1820): vol. 8, pp. 220--21 Ucsup 10 Du ff Green, 

20 Scp 1825) . 

.. ...ttll ~ric,w State Pajlers, Milita ry ...tDairs, II, 324--25 (I Mar 1821). 
194 QUART ERMASTER SU PPO RT OF THE ARMY 

Economy Drive 

At Ca lhoun's request, J esup returned to Washington early in September 1819. The appropriation for his Department, the Secretary 

warned, was nearl y exhausted. and while advances to Johnson were partly 

responsibl e, still the current disbursements of the Department appeared 

to be greater than they should have heen."o J esup was not surprised. 

T he Department, he informed Calhoun, had been forced to furnish mOTe 

than two-thirds or the transportation for the two ex peditions despite the 

advances LO j ohnson ; large sums had been applied to the services of the 

Ordnance Department; and Congress had made no provision ror arrearages of the previous year. 5 1 Capt. Trueman Cross, who handled disbursements in the Washington office and had been acting as chief during 

J esup's absence, raised still another pertinent point- the Department 

lacked control o{ its appropriation. Of $200,000 transferred to the 

Department in 18 19, only $6,300 had been remitted on requisitions from 

the Quartermaster offi ce; the rest, except for $32,000 remaining to its 

cred it in October had been remitted on warran ts issued at the War Offi ce 

of which the chie f of the Department had no knowledge. T hus the 

chain of responsibility was broken and the Quartermaster General could 

nOt be held accountabl e for the appl ication of an appropriation that he 

did not control.A2 Obviously, retrenchment had to become the order 

of the day. Economy measures continued to be pursued with great care 

during the following year in the wake of congressional action that cut 

nearly $100,000 from Jesup's estimate of $526,500 needed for 1820. 

The congressional economy drive was reflected in renewed efforts 

to reduce the size of the Army, both in the line and the staff. Calhoun 

had warded off earli er attempts, but in the spring of 1820 Congress 

directed him to report a pl an for decreasing troop strength to 6,000 

men.n Calhoun advocated little or no reduction of the staff in the plan 

he submitted in December 1820. He based his views on the principle 

that a peacetime establishment should be so formed that at the commence· 

ment of hostilities "there should be nothing either to new model or to 

create. " The organization of the staff in a peacetime military establishment ought to be such, he argued, that every branch of it should be 

completely formed, with snch extension as the number of troops and 

• RG 107. OSW, Military Book. vol. 10, pp. 31 5-16 (Calhou n to J esup , 19 J ul 1819). 

J esu p did no t n:ceive th i$ leuer unti l h is return from . ' 1. Osage on 26 Augull . 

.. RG 107. OSW, Leuers Received, J-63 (13) Uesu p to Calhoun , 31 Aug 1819), 

.. RG 92, OQMG Leu er Book, \'0 1. I, pp. 4 16-17 (CrotS to Calhoun, I Oct 1819) . 

.. (I) A nmdJ 01 CongulI, 16th Cong., 1st SCS$., vol. 2, p. 2233 (May II, 1820). (2) For 

Calhoun's earlier report ice America/l ~I e PI'llflrJ. Mili/a ry ADairf, I. 779 If. (To House of 

Representatives, 11 Dec 1818). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 195 

posts occupied might render necessary. So that the government might 

at all limes be able to o btain a correct knowledge of the condition of 

the Army and also be able to introduce method, order, and economy 

in in disbursements, Ca lhoun bel ieved that every branch of the staff 

should termi nate in a responsible chief stationed at least in peacetime 

near th e seat of government. The burea u arra ngement, first established 

in 18 18, had been producti ve of economy, and further to perfect it the 

Secretary proposed that the office of the Commissary General of Purchases be established at Washington. This Department was also to 

include an assistant commissary general and two storekeepers. No 

change was recommended in the Quartermaster's Department, ·and the 

19 officers then serving in the Quartermaster's Department were to be 

retained , except that the 16 assistant deputy quartermasters general were 

to be taken from the line. M 

On 2 March 182 1, Congress enacted legislation that red uced the 

Army from 12,664 to 6,183 officers and men."' At the same time, it also 

decreased the number of staff officers. Among other staff arrangements. 

the act provided for one Commissa ry of Purchases and two storekeepers 

in lieu of the former Commissary General of Purchases, two deputies, 

and six assistant commissaries of issue, with as man y mil itary storekeepers 

as the service required. It cut the Quartermaster's Department from a 

tota l o[ 19 oflicers and 18 regimemal and baualion quartermasters to 13 

offi cers. In addition to the Quanermaster General, the Department 

consisted of two quartermasters with the rank, pay, and emoluments of 

majors of cava lry, and ten assistant quartermasters taken from the line 

and pa id an additional Slim of not less than $10 nor more til an $20. The 

law el iminated the 18 regimenta l and hatta lion quartermasters. T he 

Subsistence Department remai ned unchanged with a Commissary General at its head. T he number of assistant commissaries, all taken from 

the line, was not to exceed 50. They and the assistant q uartermasters 

were, on orders of the Secretary of War, to be subj ect to duties in both 

Departments. In enacting the law, Congress paid no attention to Cal· 

houn's advice. discarded h is recommenda tions. and attempted to make 

the staff efficient at the expense of the li e."~ 

T he law had intended to make up the limitation on the n umber of 

officers in the Quartermaster's Department by subjecting subsistence 

commissaries to the duties of quartermasters at stations where the latter 

.. A mericall Siale Papers, Mililary Affairs, II, 188 IT. (Calhoun 10 House of Representatives, 

12 Dec 1820). 

'"'(I) Ibid., 11 ,194, 4!i2 (Organization of the Army, Dec 1820, 2 Mar 1821). (2) !I Slat. 

615 IT . 

.. Bvt. Maj . Gen. Emory Upton, Th t Milita ry Po/icy of Ih t Uniltd Stalts (3d edition, 

Washington, 1912), p. 152. 
196 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

could not be located. As soon as it was passed, therefore, J esup requested 

that 33 assiuant commissaries of subsistence be placed under his orders 

for duty in the Quartermaster's Department.&l While these commissaries might prove efficient auxiliaries in preservi ng public property and 

issuing supplies, they could not be used to advantage as disbursing agents. 

Before the end of the year and in response to a congressional query, 

Major Cross, again acting as the head of the Department during Jesup's 

absence, recommended that the law be amended by adding eight morc 

assiSlant quartermasters to the Department to increase its efficiency .G8 

In ann ual reports submitted during the next 4 years, Jesup hammered at the need to expand the personne l of his Department. The 

labors of the Depanment depended not upon the number of troops 

in service, but on the number and remoteness of the posts occupied, 

the extent of the fronti ers, and the dispersed state of the military 

resources of the nation. Moreover, the responsibilities of the Department had been increased. The act of 182 1. whether through oversight 

or intent, by reducing the Purchasing Department to a Commissary and 

two storekeepers, left tha t Department unable to execute irs duties. 

T he Secretary of 'War had to transfer responsibility for both the issue 

and preservation of clothing to the Quartermaster's Department. By 

June I, the Commissary General had turned over to Jesup clothing 

deposits at Detroit, Sackett's Harbor. New Orleans. Norfolk, Boston, 

New York. Charleston, Pittsburgh, and Carlj ~9 Of necessity, the 

Secretary of War also transferred the Purchasing Department's duties 

relative to the administration of, and accoun tability for, Army clothing 

to the Quartermaster's Department, thereby doubli ng its labors and 

responsibility at the same time that its personnel was reduced nearly 

two_thirds. 60 By 1824, Congress began to consider the problems J esup was 

raising. but it was not until 1826 that it enacted legislation increasing 

the staff of the Quartermaster's Department by two more quartermasters 

and ten assistant q uartermasters, to be taken from the line of the Army.D' 

Between 182 1, when the Department's personnel numbered 13, and 

1826, when it was increased to 25, the Department, in order to carry 

Out its duties, made use of the services of subsistence commissaries, lieu-

" RG 92, AGO, LcttCr$ RL'Ccived, No. 12366 Ucsup 10 Calhoun. 28 May 1821), 

" RG 107, OS\\', Lettcrs Received, C-69 (15) (To Calhoun, 24 Dce 1821), 

.. (I) RG 92, CGI', Lcltcl"s Sent , No. 3-89, p. 19 (Irvine 10 Robert Irwin l1li111., 18 May 1821). 

(2) RG 92, OQMG Lwer Bool<., vol. 3, pp. 62- 63 Gaup 10 Capt. T, F, Hunt, 14 May 1821), 

.. A mericall State Papers, Militll ry Anllirs. II , 559-60. 707; III. 100-101: 161-67 Uaup to SW, 

22 Nov 1823; 27 Nov 1824: 9 F~b 1824; 26 Dec 1825) . 

• , (I) Ibid., III, 100---102 (Committcc on Military AfTairs to Scn3lc, 27 DL'C 1824 and enclosu res); pp. 161-65 (Commiuee on Military Affairs to House. 5 Jan 1826). (2) 4 S/III. 173 fT. 

(May 18, 1826). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 197 

tenants detailed from the line to serve as acting assistant quartermasters, 

and military storekeepers. By this means, J esup added between 25 

to 30 officers to th e staff of the Department.S! After the Department's 

personnel was increased in 1826, its staff was restricted to the officers 

regu larly appointed in the Department, and for th e next 12 years the 

25 officers, induding the Quartermaster General, admin istered an everincreasing burden of duties. As the Department's responsibilities 

increased, particularl y in the construction of barracks, roads, and other 

projects assigned to it, the Department employed a large number of 

civilian artisans, at least on a temporary basis. Its employment rolls 

also showed masters, mates, and sailors employed to operate certain 

government-owned boats as well as agents hired to safeguard dismantled 

posts and military stores_&3 These civilians and most of the officers were 

stationed at posts in the fi eld_ 

T he Wash ington office remained sma ll. In time, two other officers and a sergeant assisted Q uartermaster General Jesup and Major 

Cross. In accordance with Jesup's ideas, only military personnel served 

in the office during the first 5 years of its existence. As paper work 

increased, however, he added twO civilian clerks to the staff in the fa ll 

oE 1824.

80 For many years thereafter, J esup, assisted by two officers, 

one oE whom was usually Maj. Trueman Cross, and a few clerks executed 

the d uties of the \Vashington office.n 

Neither the Black Hawk War in 1832 nor the campaigns against 

the Indians in Florida that began in 1836 produced any reorganization 

of the Quartermaster's Depanment. In the annual report for 1836, 

Major Cross, aga in serving as Acting Quartermaster General, recommended an increase in the Department's personne l. Experience had 

shown that 4 majors, 6 ca ptains, and 14 lieutenants, drawn from the line, 

did not provide enough personnel to discharge the heavy duties of the 

Quartermaster's Department. It had been, both as to number and 

grades, barely sufficient to meet the demands of the service 10 years 

earlier. Maj. Thomas F. Hunt, who temporarily served as Acting 

Quartermaster Genera l earlier in the year, expressed similar views. UG 

" RG 92, OQMG Lener Book, vol. 6, pp. 463-64; vol. 10, pp. 16-17 (Personnel Lists, 

6 Aug 1824, 2 Sep 1826). 

- I bid., vol. 12. pp. 314-17; vol. 16, pp. 218-20 (Lists, 16 Oct 1829;.5 Oct 1831 ) . 

.. <I) I bid., vol. 6, P' 450 GcsuP to SW, 3 Aug 1824). (2) RG 92, OQMG, Estimates and 

Reports (1822- 1826) . 

• RG 92, OQMG Lcner Book. vol. 22. pp. 420-23 Gaup to Chairman. House Military 

AlfaiT!l Commince, 2 1 Dec 18115). 

"American Slate Papus, Milita ry Affairs, VI. 831 (Annual Rpt, 22 Nov 1836); 186-87 

(Cross to Sena te. 29 Mar 1836); 785-86 (Hunt to SW, 24 May 1836); 987-91 (Cross to SW, 

14 Jan 1837). 
198 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

The Secretary of "VaT forwarded these communications, with his 

approval, lO T homas' H. Benton, Chairman of the Senate Committee on 

Military Affairs, but it was the summer of 1838 before Congress, spurred 

on by the threat of complications with Great Britain on the northeastern 

fronti er, not only increased the staff of the Quartermaster's Department 

but also increased the size of the Army and mitigated some of the shortcomings that had been prod uced in it by the act of 182 1.n 

Largely in agreement with the recommendations that had been made 

by Major Cross, Congress increased the Department's personnel by 12 

offi cers, making a total of 37. It corrected the disadva ntages that had 

previously been created by the lack of a regular gradation of rank in 

the Department. or the 12 new officers added, two were to be assistant 

quartermasters general, with the rank of colonel; two were to be deputy 

quartermasters general, with the rank of lieutenant colonel; and eight 

were to be assistant quartermasters, with the rank of captain. T he 

assistant quartermasters already in service were given the same rank as 

the newly authorized officers of that grade. The pay and emoluments 

of the officers of the Department were the same as those allowed to officers of similar rank in the dragoon regiment. All appointments were 

to be made from the Army, and upon appo intment officers were to relin· 

quish their rank in the line and be separated from it. That provision 

was modified 2 days later to the extent that assistant quartermasters were 

not to be separated from the line. 68 For the first time since its establishment in 1818, the Department had a regu lar gradation of officers extending downward from the rank of brigadier general held by the Quartermaster General. The law also once again authorized the Quartermaster 

General to employ as many as 20 forage and wagon masters, who were to 

be paid $40 a month , three rations per day, and Forage for one horse. 

No further changes were made in the Army or the Quartermaster's 

Department until the 'War with Mexico began. 

Changes in Clothing Supply 

During the first decade of the Department's existence as a bureau, 

Jesup was not only concerned with increasing the strength of his staff 

and inculcating habits of responsibility and accountabil ity in Quartermaster officers, but he was also absorbed in developing procedures for 

carrying out new responsibiliti es vested in his Department. In 182 1, 

Quartermaster responsibility in suppl ying the Army with clothing was 

n (I) 5 Sial. 256 (Jul 5. 1838). (2) Upton. Th ~ Military Policy of Ih ~ Unil~d Slat $, 

pp. 162- 193. 

-5 Stat. 308 (juI7. 1838). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 199 

no longer restricted to its transportation. By order of the Secretary of 

War, the Quartermaster General also prescribed and enforced a system 

of accountability for all supplies derived from the P urchasing Departmenlo 

Commissary Genera l Irvine recommended th e readoption of a 

slightly modified system of accountability under Army paymasters and 

inspectors th at he had introduced in 18 16 and 18 17.6u In preparing 

th e Army regulatory code for publication in 182 1, Genera l Scott suggested that legisla tion would be required to make the change. Irvi ne 

cOllsidered it unnecessary and th e War Department sought no congressional authority.To 

J esup was opposed to any fe-introduction of Irvine's paymasterinspector system, and Ca lhon n did not adopt Irvine's proposal. J esup 

viewed th e recommendaLion as an attempt to introduce a part of the British clothing system. "Its principles," he insisted, " though plausible in 

theory, were found in practice like most of those borrowed from foreign 

service, without regard to the difference of circumstances, to be entirely 

inapplicable to the state of our army, d ispersed as it was, in small detachments throughout the union. " The Quartermaster General pointed 

out tha t it was impossible to have a paymaster a t each post. Moreover, 

the system, Jesup argued, was wrong in most of its details, and although 

some of its defects had been remedied in 18 17, Army opposition had 

caused its repeal. J esup made some improvements in accountability 

under th e regulations of 182 1, but by 1824 the lack of legal authority prevented him from enforcing a system th at, to be effectual, should have 

contained authority to mulct delinquents.lI 

T he provisions that he submitted to Ca lhoun as " indispensably 

n ecessary" in February 1824 were incorporated in an act Congress passed 

in May 1826. T his legislation provided that lega l sa nction that J esu p 

required. In compliance with the law, he drafted a system of regulations 

and forms that became the basis of accountability for clothing and eq uipage until World War 1. 12 

Under this system, every capta in or commander of a company or 

detachment opened an account book in which he entered against th e 

name of each individua l in his command the clothing and equipment 

issued to him. He kept a separate account for extra issues and soldiers 

settled for them at their next pay periods. T he officer also took dupli-

- RC 92, ccr , Letten Sent, No. 1189, p. 18 (Irvine to Calhoun. 17 May 1821); pp. 31 - 112 

(Irvine to William Lee. 26 May 1821 ). 

TOlUid., pp. 105-06 (Irvine to Paymaster General D. Parker. 211 Jul 1821). 

71(1) Americau Slal e Pal,eTS, lI1ililM)' Affairs, II, 559-60 (To Calhoun, 22 Nov 1823). 

(2) RG 107, OSW, Leuen Received, Q- 11I0 (17) (To Calhoun, 9 Feb 1824). 

n RC 92, OQMG Letter Book, vol. 10, pp. 96-11-4 (To SW, I! Oct 1826). 
200 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

calC receipts of the issues made, one of which he transmiued as his 

voucher to the Treasury. The other he filed away with the company 

papers to be used as a check on the account books when the final certified 

statement of a soldi er's clothing account was given to him at the lime 

his term of service expired or he was discharged. T he paymaster settled 

all clothing acounts. 

The regular supply o[ clothing was distributed semi-annuall y in 

May and September or April and October, depending on the latitude 

where distribution occurred. All issues of clothing were made and 

receipted for in the presence of a commissioned officer. Camp equipage 

was not entered on returns as issued to the companies but had to be borne 

there as on hand, in use, and not dropped from the returns until it 

became unfit for service. It was then turned over to the quartermaster 

of the post for sale or other disposition as directed by the Quartermaster 

General. 

When a quartermaster delivered clothing at a post, a board of officers 

made an immediate inspection of it. T he board reported on any damage 

or deficiency, filing a copy of the report with the Quartermaster General 

and the quartermaster who furnished the clothing, or the Commissary 

General of Purchases if it was supplied direct from the Philadelphia 

depot. ]f clothing in the hands of company officers or in store became 

damaged or unfit for issue, a board of survey examined it and assessed 

the amount of damage. This was charged aga inst the officer in whose 

hands the supplies became damaged unless he could show that it did 

not result from neglect. The officer turned over all cond,emned clothing and equipage to the quartermaster, who accepted the articles only if 

a survey had been made. The Quartermaster's Department funher promoted uniformity in accountability by supplying clothing company 

books." 

When in 182 1 Congress reduced the personnel in the Purchasing 

Department. the Secretary of War transferred to the Quartermaster's 

Department responsibility not only for the preservation and distribution 

of clothing but also [or the preparation of estimates. Previously, the 

Commissary Genera l of Purchases had prepared and laid before the 

Secretary for approval a consolidated report that was based on estimates 

submitted by the commanding officers of companies and detachments. 

These indicated the supplies of clothing and equipment needed during 

the ensuing year. 

From 182 1 until the Clothing Bureau was established in 1832, tht" 

commanding officers of regiments sent all annual clothing estimates to 

"RG 92, OQMG Clothing Book. Lctlel'1 Sent. I. 24 (jesup to Maj. T. emu, '1 Apr 182'1). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 201 

lhe Quartermaster General on or before I July. He scrutinized these 

estimates closely and modified them in the light of the clothing all owances permitted under the regulations. With the approval of the Secre· 

tary of War, he sent the revised estimates to the Commissary General of 

Purchases whose Department furnished the supplies from the Arsenal, 

packed them, and lUrned them over to the Quartermaster's Department 

for shipment to the troops. The Quartermaster General also used 

these same regimental estimates to prepare a detail ed annual estimate 

of the clothing and equipment needed for the whole Army during the 

ensuing year. When sanctioned by the Secretary of War, he transmit· 

ted that estimate to the Commissary General of Purchases and it became 

a guide for his future procurement and the basis of the monetary estimate the Commissary General prepared for submission to Congress in 

connection with the passage of the Army appropriation bill." Irvine 

made an attempt to secure a return of the estimating responsibility to his 

office in 1824, but the Secretary of War did not approve his proposal." 

Subscribing to the theory that Calhoun had put into practicenamely, that every branch ought to have a chief stationed in Washington- and feeling the need of an officer in his Department to whom he 

could submit all clothing problems, the Secretary of War in 1832 decided 

to establish a Clothing Bureau as an appendage to the War Office.u 

Irvine opposed its establishment but the Secretary appointed Maj. John 

Garland to head the bureau by I June 1823 and sent him to Philadelphia 

to confer with the Commissary Genera l of Purchases.n The Quartermaster's Department was still preparing the clothing estimates. Fearful 

that the mixed jurisdictions set up for the control of Army clothing 

would result in misunderstandings, Jesup recommended, in March of 

the following year, that the preparation of. estimates be transferred from 

his Department to the Clothing Bureau.a In consequence, until the 

Secretary of War abolished the Clothing Bureau 8 years later in 1841, 

it prepared the clothing estimates. The Commissary General of Purchases continued to submit thc monetary estimates for clothing and 

equipment. 

Throughout these years, Irvine made no basic changes in the mcthod 

.. (I) RG 92. OQMG Lenen Sent, vol. 6. pp. U2-35 (}esulI 10 editor of WnJ/li'l,(JDfl 

Gllul/e, 20 Fe:b 1824). (2) For examples of Quarterma51er review of I!Ilimaln from the field 

sec ibid., vol. 6. pp. 412-U (fo Col. T . Chamben. 21 Jul 1824): vol. 7. pp. 150-51 (fo 

Col. M. K. Armistead. 19 Nov 1824) . 

.. RG 92. CGP, une:n Sen!. No. '90. pp. 195-196. 198-99 (Irvine: to Calhoun. 2 and H Sep 

1824) . 

.. RG 107. OSW. Lelten Sent. vol. n . p. 163 (SW 10 Irvine, H Mar 1832). 

"(I) Ibid., vol. 15. p. 201 (SW 10 Garland. I .Tun 1832). (2) RG 92. CGP. Lellcn Senl . 

No. '92. p. 98 (f. Bangor to SW. 13 Feb 1832): pp. 11 3-17 (Irvine 10 SW. 2 Mar 1832). 

"RG 92. OQMG Clothing Book. Lelten Sent. IV. 332-35 (fo SW. 9 Mar 1835). 
202 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

of procurement or in the production of Army clothing. The possibility 

of returning to the contract method of obtaining clothing for the Army 

was agitated from 1833 to 1835. Commissary General Irvine professed 

to have no predilection for any particular method, but he recalled at 

length the disadvantages that the Army had labored under in obtaining 

clothing before 1812. To his relief and that of the War Department 

generally. the prices quoted by contractors were so much higher than 

those at which clothing was produced under the direction of the Clothing 

Establishment at Philadelphia that the Secretary of War abandoned any 

thought of returning to the contract method.TI 

Commissariat Subsistence System 

Establishment of the Subsistence Department as a bureau in Wash· 

ington in 1818 in no way altered the responsibility of the Quartermaster's 

Department (or transporting rations to the Army. The shift from the 

contract to the commissaria t system, however, did grea tly increase 

Quartermaster expenditures for the transportation of subsistence stores. 

Under the old system, the contractor provided rations at a stipulated 

price and delivered them to designated posts in a given district. Under 

the commissariat system, the Commissary General of Subsistence still 

purchased subsistence stores by contract on public notice, but the contractor delivered tbem in bulk to a given point or depot where a com· 

missary made inspection. The quartermaster distributed the subsistence 

stores to the posts in the area, arranging for the transportation of the 

rations and providing the necessary storehouses. Assistant commissaries 

issued the rations, requisitioning on the depots for their supplies. 

Whether the posts were located on the inland frontier or the maritime 

frontier, the Quartermaster's Department was required to provide a 

greater amount of transportation than when the contractors had made 

delivery to the posts. 

After I June 1819, when the old subsistence contracts expired and 

the commissariat system began to function, the new arrangement pro· 

moted economy. Improvement in the ration was also made possible 

by a provision of the act of 1818, incorporated at Calhoun's suggestion, 

which authorized the President to make such alterations in the com· 

ponents of the ration as the health and comfort of the troops and as 

economy might require.so Previously. Congress had determined the 

.. RG 92, CGP. Leiters Sent, No. 592. pp. 519-22: 5~ (Irvine to SW, 22 Mar, 5 Apr 1855): 

No. ~95, .p. 516 (Same 10 same, 6 Jan 8~5): No. 59-4, pp. II, 50 (Same to same, 21 OCI, 

19 Dec 1835). 

10(1) RC 107, OSW, Reporls 10 Congress, I, 446-f7 (Calhoun 10 Sen. John Williams, 

- March 18 18). (2) 5 StilI. 426 (Apr 14, 1818). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 203 

components of the ration, but though the quantity of the ration Congress 

had established in 1802 had been ample, it did not assure the health of 

the troops.u 

Considerable changes were made at once in the ration. Of greatest 

importance was the increase in the vegetabl e component. Twice a week 

a half allowance of meat, with a suitable quantity of peas or beans, was 

issued. Rice was introduced in the ration. Fresh meat was substituted 

twice a week for salted meat. At southern posts, bacon and kiln-dried 

Indian cornmeal were isued to a certain extent in lieu of pork. and 

wheat Hour. This last substitution was not successful. Cornmeal was 

generally disliked by the troops, and moreover it was far more perishable than Hour. Its use was tried for 3 years and then abandoned.82 

At the same time, and coincidental with the first powerful temper· 

ance movement in the United States, the Surgeon General of the Army 

proposed to promOle the health of the troops by eliminating the whiskey 

ration. The evils of il1lemperance in the Army were only too well 

known. By way of experiment, Commissary General Gibson, with 

Calhoun's approval, initiated a program of volunteer relinquishment 

of the whiskey ration in return for payment to the troops of the contract 

price of the wh iskey, the payment to be made either monthly or 

quarterly. The program met with little response and was soon aban· 

doned because it proved ineffective.

8s Another experiment at commuta· 

tion was tried by the War Department in 1830." In the meantime, 

Congress had shown considerable interest in the problem, but is was 1838 

before Congress enacted legislation authorizing the issue of coffee and 

sugar in lieu of whiskey and fixing the allowance at 6 pounds of coffee 

and 12 pounds of sugar to every 100 rations. Coffee and sugar were to 

be issued weekly and when not available were to be paid for in money.so 

Supplementing the efforts to introduce a better balanced ration 

in 1818, the War Department issued an order requiring the troops at all 

permanent posts where it could be done to cultivate vegetable gardens 

so that they might be supplied with fresh vegetables. At posts remote 

from the settled parts of the country, the Department broadened the 

"' American Stat e Papers, Military AUairs, I. 804-07 (Surgeon General Joseph Lovell 10 

Calhou n . 16 Nov 1818) . 

.. (I) Jameson. "Correspondence of John C. Calhoun," AHA Anlll/al Report for 1899, 

vol. 2. p. 137 (Calhoun to Monroe, 22 Aug 1818). (2) America'i Slate Papers, Military AUairs, 

I. 781 (Calhoun to House. 11 Dec 1818). (3) RG 192. CGS. Leiters Sent, II. 50~ (Gibson to 

Calhoun. II Dec 1821) . 

.. American Slate Papers, Milita ry AOahs, IV. 248 (Gib50n to SW, 6 Jan 1830) . 

.. See GO 72 . 

.. (I) 5 Stal. 256 Gul 5. 1838). (2) America n State Papttrs. Military ADa;rs, IV. 275-76 

(Gibson to Chairman of House Military Committee, 2 Feb 1830; Comminee 10 House, 8 Feb 

1830). 
204 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

order to include the cultivation o[ gra in to provide forage for public 

teams and the raising of stock to add to the meat supply. At the same 

Lime, the produce of the gardens would at all times assure a supply of 

food within the posts themselves. as The troops' efforts to raise their 

own meat supply were not always successful; wolves devoured the hogs 

the soldiers tried to raise at Council BluffsY Proposals to supplement 

the ration by using buffalo meat at fronti er posts met with Calhoun's 

approval. S8 

Obviously. the cultivation of vegetables in post gardens was not 

suggested for the purpose of meeting vitamin deficiencies, for know)· 

edge of these aspects of food requ irements was lacking. The main pur· 

pose was to add to available food suppli es, to give some variety to the diet, 

and to reduce transportation expenditures. Within a few years, complaints were to be made about converting soldiers into farmers, but 

despite such criticism the cultivation of post gardens continued throughout this period. 

Such cultivation by reducing tra nsportation costs was of immediate 

interest to the Quartermaster's Department. In the beginning, the 

Department was concerned with avoiding any additional costs arising 

out of the program itself, and it cautioned quartermasters in the field 

that seeds and tools were furnished by the Subsistence and Ordnance 

Departments, respectively.n Later in the 1830's, after a regiment of 

dragoons had been added to the Army, Quartermaster interest in gardens was stimulated by the large amounts of forage that had to be pro· 

vided for the cavalry. To diminish the cost. of the dragoon service, 

cultivation of hay and gra in was started at Ft. Leavenworth and the 

Acting Quartermaster General advised similar cultivation at Ft. Gibson 

on the Arkansas frontier. By that time, quartermasters contracted to 

to have the fi elds fenced and the first ploughing done. Where military 

duties prevented detailing troops to cultivate the fields, the quartermasters were authorized to hire the necessary laborers for the work." 

Tmnsporlation Pmcedures 

Additiona l responsibilities were carried olft by quartermasters but 

the basic function of the Department continued to be that of providing 

transportation. With troops stationed at posts on the maritime frontier 

.. Aml!ricnu Stntl! Pnpl!rs. Militnry Aflnirs, I, 781 (Ca lhoun to House, 11 Dec 1818) . 

.. RG 192. CGS, Leiters Sen!, vol. 3", p. III (Gibson 10 Col. J. Snelling. 5 Sep 1822) . 

.. Leiter Book of Maj. Gen. Jacob Brown, No.2, pp. 180-81 (SW to Col. Atkinson. 10 Apr 

1820). Manu$Cript Div., Library of Congrcu . 

.. RG 92. OQMG Leiter Book. vol. 2. p. 87 (To Linnard, .. Apr 1820). 

"" Ibid., vol. 25. p. 289 (CrO$S to Capt. Thomas Swords, 12 Oct 1837); vol. 26. pp. 137 ~8 

(Cross to LI. J. P. Davis. 26 Mar 1838). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 205 

and at widely dispersed poSls on the inland frontiers, transportation costs 

were the largest part of Quartermaster expenditures. involving as they 

did not only the transportation of supplies but the movement of troops 

and their baggage. For the most part, the Quartermaster's Department 

accomplished such transporta tion in privately owned conveyances, and it 

preferred to ship by water since land transportation cost morc. 

Actually, there had not been much change in the method of handling 

shipments by wagon since the days when William Linnard acted as 

military agent at Philadelphia in 1802. Twenty-one years later Major 

Linnard was still performing the same duties as deputy quartermaster 

general, furnishing transportation for the annual supplies of clothing 

and equipment that the Commissary General of Purchases had packed 

at the Arsenal and turned over to him. If the method of doing business 

was the same, its difficulties had increased as settl ement grew beyond the 

Appalachians. In the early years, merchants shipped their goods to the 

West only twice a year, in the spring and fall; for that matter, so did 

Linnard, for winter made roads impassable. During the War of 1812, 

however, Army employment of transportation became constant through 

the whole year, and Linnard had enjoyed virtually a monopoly of all the 

best wagoners. In the war years, wagoning was under the control of 

eight or ten master wagoners in Philadelphia. They owned several fine 

teams and sometimes even kept a tavern for the accommodation of the 

wagoners. The wagon masters stayed in Philadelphia, collected the loadings, sent out their wagons, and, because they knew the wagoners, made 

themselves responsible for the delivery of the loads." 

After the war, Army shipments fell off; hauling was no longer profitable, so the wagonmasters sold their teams and engaged in other businesses. In the 1820's, wagons were individually owned and driven by 

the owner, or they were owned by merchants in the country who took 

in large quantities of produce, or by rich farmers who operated mills and 

consigned their supplies to merchants in Philadelphia. Now the merchants had a compl ete monopoly of the wagons and wagoners. ru 

immigrants streamed westward and settlement grew, trade increased and 

the merchants shipped immense quantities of goods to the West. By 

comparison, Army sh ipments were small, and Linnard fou nd it exceedingly difficult to engage wagoners. So much was th is the case that in the 

spring of 1823, when supplies were packed for the troops at Council 

Bluffs and ready for hauling to Pittsburgh, Linnard applied to a wholesale 

grocer named Patterson for assistance in procuring wagons.n 

.. RC 92. CCP. uner Book (Linnard). I May 182~!1 Dec 1825. unnumbered volume 

(Linnard to Capt. H. Johnson. J3 rotay 182!). 

-Ibid., (Linnard to Johnson. J3 May 182~ ; Linnard to J esup, I May 1825). 
206 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

He made an agreemen t with Patterson, though not in writing. 

Other than the bill of lading, it was not customary to have a written 

contract in transporting goods by wagon or in shipping by boat. By his 

agreement, Linnard allowed Patterson $3.75 per 100 pounds and an 

additional 25 cents per 100 pounds fo r his trouble in obtaining the 

wagons, mak ing ou t the bills of lading, signing the receipts, and holding 

himself responsible for the safe delivery of the stores. Since others 

asking the same price would not assume this responsibility, Linnard felt 

the terms were advantageous. U8 

In addition, to get supplies hauled it was necessary to come to terms 

on the weight of a wagonload, and Linnard agreed with Patterson tha t 

the standard weight for a full wagon load of light goods would be 40 

hundred pounds. When goods were light- and public stores though 

bulky were often ligh t in weight and did not pack well in the wago s~ 

it was the practice to allow a given weight for a load at the market price 

equal to the general weight of heavier loads. T hat weight varied over 

the years. During the War of 18 12, for example, wagons were smaller, 

there were few turnpikes, and the standard we ight was calculated at 30 

to 33 hundred pounds at the market price. By the 1820's, there were 

turnpikes, wagons had become larger, and the standard weight for the 

second class of wagons was then calculated at 40 hundred pounds and up. 

according to demand, and for the largest class, at 50 to 55 hundred pounds. 

Among the supplies Linnard sent off in the spri ng of 1823 was a wagonload of boxes containing caps whose 'weight did not exceed 15 hundred 

pounds. When his arrangements were questioned, Unnard inquired: 

"Will any man acquainted with that business suppose that goods of that 

description could be got on at the rea l weight and market price especia lly 

when more profitable loads could be got_" 4 

Wagon tra nsportation of public stores was not only difficult to 

arrange but was subject to abuses in execution as it had been in the past. 

Wagoners charged that quartermasters were abusive and detained their 

wagons fa r longer than merchants did. Quartermasters. for their part, 

found wagoners unreliable and given to hauling private property at 

publ ic ex se 9~ Nevertheless, the bulk of Army supplies sent overland 

was transported in wagons during the first 20 years of the Department's 

existence as a bureau. In th e 1830's, ra ilroads began to be constructed 

and a number of short lines soon were in opera tion in the East. Quarter-

"Ibid., (Unna rd to Jesup. 29 Aug 18211). 

" Ibid., (Linnard to Johnson. 111 Jun 1823; Lillllard to J esup, 19 JUll 1823) . 

.. (I) For a cOlltroversy that developed between Patterson and Capt. H . Johnson, military 

storekeeper at Pittsburgh. see RG 92. OQMG Letter Book. vol. 5. pp. 124. 214-15. 258---59. 2711, 

27S-80. 28 1- 82. 1110. (2) RG 92. eGI'. Letter Book (Linnard). I May 18211-3 1 Dec 1825. 

unnumbered volume (Linna rd to J ohnson. 6 Oct 1825). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 207 

masters immediately made use of lhis new means of transportation. As 

early as the fall of 1833, a bill of lading carried the information that 

certain Army supplies were to be sent across New Jersey by railroad,Ds 

Before the end of that decade, the Quartermaster at New Orleans was 

proposing with Jesup's approval to construct a ShOTl ra ilroad line ovcr 

government land that would connect the barracks area below New 

Orleans with a railroad then being built to join New Orleans with 

Lake Borgne.11 

The Quartermaster's Department continued to prefer and use water 

routes when possible. Steamboats were in general use on the Great 

Lakes and on the rivers of the Mississippi Vall ey; packets plied the Erie 

Canal after 1825; and sailing ships and some steamboats carried coastal 

trade. Quartermasters employed all of them to transport troops and 

supplies. So many accidents befe ll steamboats on the Mississippi that 

frequently it was advisable to send supplies, despite the costs, via Pittsburgh rather than to New Orleans for transshipment up the river. The 

difference in cost was appreciable. Forty-four tierces of clothing intended for Council Bluffs and sent from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh, 

Linnard estimated, would fill four wagons and cost $400. The same 

amount shipped to New Orleans would cost $86.88." In making their 

transportation arrangements, quartermasters always had to make sure that 

supplies sent by sailing ships to New Orleans arrived before the river fell 

so low as to impede steamboat navigation. They insured all goods 

shipped by sea. RR 

Other factors hampered delivery of supplies. IE troops were stationed at posts not convenient to a seaport regularly visited by the sailing 

vessels, supplies were apt to be much delayed. Linnard, for example, 

had great difficulty in forwarding supplies to troops stationed at Pensacola, Fla. It was not yet a place of much trade in 1823, and few vessels 

sailed [or that port alone. Usually vessels went to Mobile, since it was 

a greater market for cotton and other produce, and then also stopped 

at Pensacola. The amount of supplies shipped by the Army was too 

triAing for a merchant to send a special vessel there. Army supplies 

simply formed part of the cargo, and Linnard as shipper could not 

stipulate to which of the two pOrts the vessel should go first. He asserted 

that merchan ts were disposed to give the United States the preference if 

Army freight was of nearl y equal value to private shipments, but if he 

- RG 92, Coxe and Irvine J>apcn, Box 21. 

.. RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, vol. 29, p. 65 UetUp 10 ~{aj . I. Clark, 21 Nov 1839) . 

• RC 92, CCP, Letter Book (Linnard), I May 1823-31 Dec 1825, unnumbered volume 

(Linnard 10 J etUp, 3 Mar 1824). 

- Ibid., (Linnard 10 J e5UP, 18 Mar 1824; To Cap!. T . F. Hunt. 24 Mar 1824; To huurance 

Co., I Mar 1825). 
208 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

did not have a sufficient portion of the cargo to command a preference, 

"merchants will always send their vessels in a way most profitable to 

themsdves." When the commanding officer at Pensacola therefore complained of delay and wished to punish the captain of the vessel delivering 

Army clothing by deducting a penalty from his freight charges, Linnard 

insisted that the captain could not be blamed under these circumstances.'oo 

The onl y alternative to using private shipping was the maintenance of an 

expensive army transport system, a development unlikely to be even 

considered in a Department hampered by lack of funds. 

The Quartermaster's Department did own and operate some transports at variOlls times. In the Southern Division, [or example, in the 

1820's it employed a government transport to move troops and military 

supplies between military posts extending from New Orleans to Tampa 

Bay on the west coast of Florida. Commercial intercourse between these 

points was too limited to be depended upon for the purpose.lUl 

Troops moving to the western posts were usually sent by steamboat 

via the western rivers or the Great Lakes. Contract agreements some· 

times stipulated a flat sum per man and baggage. At other times an 

entire vessel might be chartered. Capt. 1- B. Brant, assistant quarter· 

master at Detroit, chartered the steamboat, Walk·irHhe·Wat er, for $1,600 

in 182 1 to convey troops and their baggage from Buffalo to Detroit, 

Green Bay, and Mackinac. The contract stipulated that the provisions 

and stores sent along should equal in bulk 300 barrels.'01 

Regu lations granted officers traveling on duty without troops a 

transportation allowance. computed on the distance they traveled, and 

required them to use the most direct mail route to their destination. 

When J esup was appOinted Quartermaster General, considerable con· 

fusion existed in regard to distances, particularly the mileage between 

frontier posts. To correct this situation, Jesup adopted a geographica l 

authority as a uniform standard reference in computing allowances. He 

placed a copy of this work- Melish's The Travellers Directory-in the 

hands of each of his subordinates. It showed the distances on the princ\-

pal roads of the United States. In addition, they also used the book of 

post roads published by direction of the Postmaster General, which gave 

the distance between Washington and all other post offices, as well as 

between the capitals of the states and the post towns in them.'o3 

, .. (I) Ibid., (fo J esup. 31 Jan 1824). (2) RG 92, Coxe and Irvine Papen. Box 27 (Unnard 

10 Irvine. 21 Apr 1823). 

,., RG 92. OQl'ofG Leiter Book. vol. 8. p. 163 [To Secrelary of Treasury. 22 Aug 1825): 

pp. 182-83 [To Capl. D. E. Burch . 1 Sep 1825). . 

'''(1) Ibid., vol. 4. p. 45 Oesup to Pres. of Lake Erie Steamboat Co .. 13 May 1822). 

(2) RG 92. OQMG Estimates and Reports. 1821- 22 . 

.... RG 92. OQMG Letter Book. vol. 7. p. 367 (Circular. 11 Apr ]825): vol. 9, pp. 335--54 

[To Paymaster General . 6Jul 1826). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 209 

The transportation of troops acquired considerable proportions 

during these years. Not only did settlement expand westward at a rapid 

pace, but the United States acq uired additional territory. Ever since 

1803, when Jefferson made the Louisiana Purchase and convinced himself that it included West Florida, the desire to obta in all of Florida had 

been growing with the years. It was satisfied in 18 19 when Spain decided 

to sell Florida in exchange for assumption by the United States of cla ims 

of her citizens against Spain and relinquishment by the United States 

of claims to Texas. Occupa tion did not take place until 1821 after 

Congress finally ratified the trcaty. In the spri ng of that year, the Quartermaster's Department was ca ll ed upon to carry out one of the provisions 

of [he treaty by transporting to Havana the Spanish troops and officers 

who had been garrisoned at the posts in Florida. l Ot As the Spaniards 

were moved out, the Department arranged not only for the transportation 

of American troops to Florida but for quartering and suppl ying them 

at the newly acquired posts.lOD 

In the meantime. extension of the military frontier westward imposed additional transportation burdens and expenditures on the Quartermaster's Deputment. By 1822, troops were garrironed at a post 600 

miles up the Arkansas River; they were 20 miles beyond Natchitoches 

on the Red River; they were located at Council Bluffs on the Missouri, 

at St. Peter's on the Mississippi. and had pushed 125 mil es beyond 

Mackinac to maintain a post at the falls of St. Mary. Supply lines to 

some posts were well over 1.000 miles and transportation costs increased 

as distances lengthened. 

Moreover, after 182 1. the Army numbered little more than 6,000 

men and officers. It was far too small to occupy all the points that 

required protection on the extended inland front ier. The government 

was therefore compelled to supply the want of numbers by frequent troop 

movements. But whether transportation was required by the transfer 

of troops at frontier posts. by the redistribution of Artill ery regiments 

at the posts on the maritime frontier. or by the dispatch of troops to 

Florida, the quartermasters contracted for steamboat accommodations 

on the rivers and Great Lakes. utilized the advantage5 afforded by use 

of the Erie Canal after 1825, and hired sailing ships and some 5teamboats 

for coastal movements. Where these could not be depended upon, they 

used government transports in the Gulf of Mexico, and maintained keelboats and Mackinac boats on the inland waters to be used when the level 

of the rivers fell too low to permit steamboat navigation. 

""Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 16-17 (To DQMG Slanton, 21 May 1821); pp. 17. !2. §6 (To Maj. 

T. CTO$S, 22 Mar, 9 Apr, n Apr 1821). 

'- Ibid., vol. J, p. 185 (To SW, 31 luI 1821). 
210 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Construction Responsibilities 

The burden of executing other functions of the Department also 

increased as the country expanded. The first two decades of the existence 

of the Quartermaster's Department as a bureau saw tremendous expansion 

of its responsibilities for constructing not only storehouses, barracks. and 

hospitals. but also miiltary roads and other projects that were assigned 

to it. ]n an effort to place the United States in the best defensive position 

possible after the War of 1812. the War Department had projected plans 

for the establishment of posts along the northwestern frontier and an 

elaborate system of fortifications along the seacoast. Construction of the 

coastal fortifications was a responsibility of the Engineer Department. 

The War Department also ruled that all barracks, quarters, and storehouses at such fort ified places were to be erected by that Department and 

the expenses defrayed from the appropriations for fortifications. lOG Subsequently, it modified this interpretation to the extent of charging the 

Quartermaster's Department with responsibility for the construction and 

repa ir of all storehouses and sheds necessary to secure and preserve public 

property deposited at fortifications.' o7 

On the other hand, responsibility for all construction at posts erected 

on the inland frontier was vested in the Quartermaster General. The 

posts themselves, for example. those built on the upper Mississippi and 

Missouri Rivers between 1818 and 1820, were erected by the troops, who 

felled the trees and provided the necessary lumber. The quartermasters 

furnished the nails and tools. Since the beginning of the Army, this 

procedure had been followed and it continued to be the established 

routine as the military frontier was pushed westward. Troops were 

expected to be able to "cover themselves comfortably wheresoever timber 

is to be found." 108 Fort building on the northwestern frontier was 

temporarily halted in 1820 as Congress sought to reduce expenses, but 

within 5 years indispensable repairs had to be made at some of the posts. 

Yearly thereafter the Quartermaster's Department engaged in making repa irs or in erecting new barracks, storehouses, and hospitals. In his 

annual reports, the Quartermaster General pointed out the projects that 

needed to be initiated-sometimes to eliminate the necessity of paying 

rentals, as at New Orleans where barracks and storehouses had been sold 

following the War of 1812; sometimes to maintain defensive positions, 

as at Mackinac, Crawford, and Green Bay.'" Jesup prepared estimates 

'''RG 92, OQMG Letter Book. vol. 2. p. 258 (QMG to Lt. Col. McRea, 6 Sep 1820). 

"" RG 107, OSW. Military Book. vol. 12. p. 27 (SW to QMG d al., 19 Feb 1824) . 

... RG 92. OQMG Leiter Book. vol. II. p. ~02 Uesup to Maj. J. M. Glassel1. ·16 Aug 1827). 

, .. American State Papers, Military ADairs, III. 640-41 (Rpt. ~I Oct 1827); IV. 192- 95; 

747-49 (Rpt, 23 Nov 1829: 2 Nov 1831). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 211 

and Congress appropriated funds for approved works. Quartermasters 

supervised troop labor, made requisitions for materials and tools, and 

rendered accounts of the expenditures incurred. Troops could not 

always be spared from their military duties to altend to the construction 

of barracks. In such cases, the Quartermaster's Department hired civilIans. For example. when the War Department decided to erect a new 

post on the western boundary of Arkansas in 1838, Major Cross directed 

Assistant Quartermaster Charles Thomas to visit the eastern cities for the 

purpose of raising a corps of artisans and laborers to take out to Arkansas. 

The government agreed to pay their passage and allow them rations and 

whatever fixed rate of wages were determined upon at the time of hiring 

them, the wages to begin after the men started work. For their part, the 

artisans and laborers agreed, under penalty, to serve for at least one year." O 

Few of the barracks, storehouses, stables, and other faci lities erected 

were more than simple wooden structures. Occasionally, as at jefferson 

Barracks, where the War Department determined to erect an Infantry 

School in 1826, more elaborate plans were drafted because the Army had 

in mind permanent structures. At jefferson Barracks, stone and brick 

were used. The officers' quarters, for instance, were to be a two-storied, 

brick structure built on a stone basement, the building to be 66 feet by 

44 feet-Ill 

Carpenters among the soldiers deta il ed to construct barracks made 

simple, plain-finished bunks, tables, and benches that constituted the 

furnishings of these barracks. Soon assistant quartermasters were inquiring whether they were permitted to provide furniture for officers' 

quarters. Unfortunately, no authority existed for such expenditures, 

though j esup believed there was no logical reason why such articles should 

he furnished to the officers of the Navy and not to those of the 

Army. He was, however, unsuccessful in his requests for congressional 

appropriations. 1 12 

Candles furnished the light for barracks, but, since the amount 

allowed was small, men retired to sleep when darkness fell. Winter's 

chill was only partiall y dispell ed by wood-burning fires on open hearthsthe amount of wood rigidly controll ed by regulations. In 1831, wood 

in the vicinity of some posts was becoming extremely scarce. For the 

first time and by way of ex periment, the Secretary of War authorized the 

110 RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, vol. 26, pp. 27~74 (Cross to Thomas, 24 May 1818); 

vol. 29, p. 99 Oesup /0 Messrs. G. W. and T. Jacques 8< Co .. 4 Dec 1819). 

1J.l l bid., vol. 9, pp. 1192-911 (QMG to Capt. L. B. Drolnt, 111 Jul 1826); vol. 10, pp. 1I19--oi0 

(QMG to Lt. G. Wharton , 25 Jan 1827); vol. II, p.1I71 (QMG to SW, 29 Dec 1827). 

no (I) Ibid., vol. 12, p. 192 (Cross to AQM Harvey Brown); pp. 257-58 Oesup to Brown, 

28 Nov 1828); vol. 19, pp. 1112-34 (QMG to AQM J. Engle, 20 Jun 181111). (2) American Stale 

Papers, Military AUairs, V. 184 (QMG Report to SW, 'J:I Nov 18SS). 
212 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Quartermaster Genera l to furn ish six anthracite coal gra tes for the 

ho!pital at Fortress Monroe and six for usc in offi cers' quarters."1 Even 

at posts on the upper Mississippi and Missouri, it became increasingly 

d ifficult to procure an adequate supply of wood. and by the 1830's 

Franklin stoves wcrc be ing used in barracks to overcome the waste 

of heat-1I4 Obviollsly, the soldier of the Revolutionary Army would not 

have found tOO Illany improvements to make the barracks of the mid1830's unfamili ar to him. 

/'ltenlai Improvements 

No governmclll hUl'cau was morc vita ll y interested in the program 

of internal improvements that developed ahcr lhe War of 18 12 than the 

Quartermaster's Department. Since 1775, it had been responsible for 

opening and repa iri ng roads needed for th e movement of troops and 

supplies. The construction and maintenance of military roads to effect 

wartime suppl y and combat operations had been undertaken by troops 

d uring th e Revolutionary War, the Indian wars of the 1790's, and the 

War of 18 12. Some military roads had been built by the troops in the 

years of peace between Wayne's Indian campa ign and the War of 18 12, 

but Jesup reported that no details on troop labor or Departmental 

expenditures were available in reference to the construction of these 

roads. lU In any case, no policy appears to have been formula ted by the 

War Department until after th e War of 18 12. 

The disasters of that war had fu ll y demonstrated the impact of 

lack of roads on military operations and had led to the enunciation in 

18 16 of a policy to employ troops in opening military roads and in con· 

structing new and repa iring old fortifications to place the United Sta tes 

in the best defensive position possible. T hat policy, "believed to be no 

less necessary to the discipline, hea lth, and preservation of the troops. 

than useful to the public interest." was communica ted to the commanding 

genera ls of the Southern and Northern Divisions, Maj. Gen . Andrew 

J ackson and Maj. Gen. Jacob Brown, respective lyye In consequence, 

the troops bega n constructing roads that were designed to open essential 

communications on the southern, nonhern, and northwestern frontiers 

in th e event of war.1IT Though Congress appropriated funds for the 

,u RC 92. OQMG Leiter Book. \'01. 16. p. 549 (Cr05l 10 QM H. Scanlon. 29 Dec 1831). 

'''Ibid" vol. 18. p. 557; vol. 19. pp. <11 5-16 (QMG co aj . J. B. Branc, II Mar 1853: 

28 Nov 185.3) . 

... Americall Stille Ptlpers, /Hilittlry AUllirs, IV, 262 Un up co SW. 7 J an 1851). 

n. RG 107, OSW. Milicary Book, vol. 8. pp. 466-67 (SW co j ackson. 8 Mar 1816); PI'. 485-86 

(SW co Bmwn . 3 Apr 1816). 

". J ackson's noo.,. buill a mad from che Tenncsscc River near Muscle Shoals 10 Madison· 

ville. La .• between 1817 and 1820; cruops under Maj . Gen. Alexander Macomb built a milicary 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 213 

road jackson's troops built, the others were constructed by executive 

direction with funds taken from the general Army appropriation. In 

this period. the role of the Quartermaster Department was restricted to 

providing the necessary tools and paying the sums due for extra pay to 

the soldiers employed in road contruction,lI8 

Calhoun, a nationalist when he served as Secretary of War, thought 

that scarcely any road could be designated that was " highly useful (or 

military operations, which is not equally required for the industry or 

political prosperity of the community." 119 Calhoun had not yet become 

a proponent of stales rights and strict construction of the Constitution. 

In view of the adverse effect of inadequate roads on Army operations in 

the War of 181 2, he recognized the country's need for a good system of 

military roads. President Monroe was a strict constructionist, but nevertheless, he was wi Bing to approve acts appropriating funds for specifi c 

military roads as long as they included no broad approval of the principle 

of federal internal improvements. Yet even he retreated from that 

position when he signed an act in 1824 caBing for federal surveys of routes 

for roads and canals necessary for commercial, military, or postal purposes.'20 By the terms of the law, this work was to be carried out under 

the direction of the Corps of Engineers. 

Army regulations were accordingly amended in 1825 to indicate 

that the Corps of Engineers reconnoitered and surveyed for military 

purposes and for internal improvements, and that it superintended the 

construction of such internal improvements as Congress authorized and 

ordered the War Department to execute.'2' Many of the roads built 

by the government under the interna l improvements program were 

actually civil projects, but the topographical engineers surveyed and 

supervised their construction. Almost any road built by the government 

came to be call ed a military road whether it served a military purpose 

or not. 

Quartermaster responsibility for military road construction remained 

unchanged. It continued to be the duty of the Department to direct the 

survey and to superintend the opening and repairing of roads and bridges 

road from Detroit to Fe Meigs; and a Plattsburgh to Sackctt's Harbor road was begun by 

troops under General Brown but never completed . AlIlc riClw Siale Papers, Mililary AOairs, 

IV. 626-29 Onup to SW, 7 Jan 1831). 

""(I) RG 92. OQMG Leuer Book, vol. I. pp. 182- 85 (CrO$$ \0 Col. M. Arbuckle. 13 Feb 

1819); vol. I. p. 188 (Cross to ADQM Brant. 50 Jun 1820). (2) Letter Book of Maj. Gen. 

Jacob Brown. No.2. p. 182 (Calhouu to Brown. 9 Jun 1820). Manuscript Div .. Library of 

Congress. 

" ' AmcriCIIII Sill Ie 1>lIpers. Misu llilueolis. II. 536 (Calhoun to Speaker Clay. 7 J an 1819). 

''' 4 Slat. 22- 23 (Apr 30. 182~) . 

• n Gelltrll/ Regull1liOll$ /OT III ~ Army Q/ille U" ilcd Sll1tes, 182J (Wash ington. 1825). p. 167. 
214 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

that might be necessary to the movements of any part of the Army, or, 

as was specifically added after 1834, that might be needed as· communications between the posts on the frontiers, and between tbose posts and the 

interiof. 122 Because the War Department called upon Army engineers 

to build some of these roads and assigned to the Quartermaster's Department the duty of constructing some roads that were not strictl y military 

in character, a certain amount of blurring of responsibilities for road 

construction developed between the two bureaus. In 1838, Congress 

created a separate Corps of T opographical Engineers. 121 The assignment 

to that bureau of responsibility for surveying and opening the roads 

authorized by Congress relieved the Quartermaster's Department of some 

of the duties it had been performing in executing the program of internal 

improvements. Roads that were strictly military in character, however, 

were not included in this reassignment of duties. They continued to 

be the responsibility of the Quartermaster's Department. 12t Discussion 

here is limited to military roads built by the troops or by hired laborers 

under Quartermaster supervision. 

Between 1824 and 1828 Congress made provision for the construction 

of a number of military roads. us Most of the acts called for roads to 

be built in Florida and Arkansas, and that construction was administered 

by the Quartermaster's Department. A large share of the work was 

accomplished by troops detailed from the line under the supervision of 

a quartermaster. Since the Army was small, however, troop labor could 

not always be made ava ilable to build the roads, and consequently in 

some cases the Quartermaster's Department resorted to contracts or to the 

use of hired laborers. In 

By 1828, Calhoun's concept that roads could be made to serve both 

the military and the economic needs of the country at large had been 

full y accepted by his successors. Secretary Peter B. Porter advised 

Congress that while a part of the Corps of Engineers was employed in 

constructing works of military defense, another pan- the topographical 

engineers-"aided by scientific and enterprising offi cers detailed from 

the line of the army, is co-operating with our citizen engineers in develop· 

'""(I) Ibid., p. 213; ibid., 1841, p. 179. (2) GO 59 (28 Aug 1834). 

"°S Slat. 256 Gul 5, 1838). 

"'(1) Senate Ex. Doc. No. I. 25th Cong., 3d seM., 1'. 141 (QMG Annual Rpt. 28 Nov 1838). 

(2) For the duties of the Corps of T opographical Engineers. see GO 15 (30 Mar 1840). 

'·(I) 4 Stat. 5 Uan !I[, 1824); pp. !Hi (Feb 28, 1824); p. 135 (Mar 3, [825); pp. 227-28 

(Mar 2, 1827); p. 244 (Mar !I. [827). (2) For a more detailed account see Harold L. Nelson, 

"Mi litary Roads for War and J'eace-1781- 1836." Military ADairs, XIX , No. I, p. 7 fr. 

'-(I) America .. Slate Papers. Military ADairs, IV, 626 Uesup to SW. 7 J an 1831). (2) 

RG 92. OQMG Letter Book, vol. 6. PI'. 211H4 Uesup to AQM Isaac Clark. 14 Apr 1824); 

vol. 8. pp. 87-88 (QMG to AQM D. B. Burch, 7 Oct 1824); vol. 12, pp. 269-70 Uesup 10 SW. 

5 Dec 1828). (3) RG 107, OSW, Mililary Book, vol. 12, p. 280 (SW 10 QMG, 21 Mar 1827). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 2 15 

ing the capacities of the coumry for imernal improvement, and in building up works which belong exclusively to the department of political 

economy." At the same time. the Quartermaster General, assisted by 

other officers and soldiers of the line, was "engaged not merely in military 

erections and accommodations for the troops, but in the construction of 

roads and bridges for the citizens at large." With enthusiasm, he concluded that the Army was being exhibited "as a body of military and 

civil engineers, artificers, and laborers, who probably contribute morc 

than any other equal number of citizens, not only to the security of the 

coun try, but to the advancement of its useful arts." ItT 

In 1825, J esup had urged and built roads on the sOUlhwestern 

frontier to link up Natchitoches and Ft. Towson on the Red River with 

Ft. Gibson on the Arkansas as a defensive measure in the event of war.UI 

lly 1834. the growing political LUrmoil in northern Mexico that culminated in revolution and the achievement of independen,te by Texas 

2 years later served to re-emphasize the need lor additional roads in 

Arkansas Territory. At the same time, as the governm~nt pursued its 

policy of removing the Ind ians and resettling them on lands west of the 

Mississippi. the threat of Indian warfare grew. Not only was there 

danger of conRicl between the newly settled Ind ians and the native tribes. 

but depredations on the white settlements were likely to occur as the 

buffalo and elk retreated westward. d iminishing the Indians' means of 

support. In 1834, the troops under Quartermaster supervision built 

four roads in the Indian Territory beyond the western boundary of 

present Arkansas.

m In that year. Congress also authorized four roads 

in Arkansas Territory and Jesup directed his principal officer in that area 

to initiate measures for surveyi ng and opening these roads. IIO By 1835. 

a network of 13 military roads was in the process of being completed In 

Arkansas under Quartermaster supervision. 

With the growing menace of the Indians on the western frontier, 

defense was more and more emphasized as the factor to be considered 

in military road construction. TI.lat development reached its height 

in the projection of the great militar.y road of 1836. Plans for that road 

, .. Allu:ricau Stille Papers, Military AUair$, IV, 2 (Annual Rpt, ~ Nov 1828). 

'· Ibid .• III, 117 (Jesup to SW. 26 Nov 1825). 

'·These we re (I) from Flo Towson to the Fabe WlUhita River (now the Wa ita); (2) [rom 

Ft . Gibson to the Little Red River of ArkanslU; (!I) from Little Red River to the mouth of the 

False Washita; and (-4) from .·L Gibson to the north fork of the Canadian River. Ibid., V, !l84 

(QMG Annual Rpt, 22 Nov 18!14). 

"These roads were (I) (rom Helena to the moulh of Cache River; (2) (rom Jackson, in 

Lawrence county, by Liberty and Fayettesville, in Washington county, to Ft. Smith : (!I) (rom 

Strong·. (a point on the military road (rom Memphis to Little Rock) by Litchfield to Bates· 

ville, ~nd (4) h om Columbia in Chicot county to Little Rock. bid~ V, !l84 (QMG Annual 

Rpt , 22 Nov 18!14). 
216 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

precipitated a considerable amount of controversy over the tactics and 

strategy involved in handling the Indian probl em. During the next 

3 years, Quartermaster officers were divided in th eir views, some support· 

ing the plan and others opposing it. 

The plan stemmed from a letter th at J ohn Dougherty, Indian agent 

in Missouri. sent in December 1834 to Maj. J. B. Brant, quartermaster 

at St. Louis. who forwarded it to th e Washington office.''' Dougherty 

outlined his 'ideas on defense based on his many yea rs of experience on 

the frontier. He suggested establishing a line or posts along the boundary 

between the while settl ements and the Indians, extending [rom the 

Upper Mississippi River to the Red River in the sOlilh. He proposed 

to connect this cordon of posts by constructing a military road, along 

which dragoons, stationed at the posts, might patrol and keep th e Indians 

under surve illance. 

These proposaa ls fitted in very well with j esup's ideas of defense 

for the inl and frontier. Mounted Indians of the prairies could not be 

pursued by unmounted infantry, and as early as 1829 Jesup had been 

advocating putting at least a portion of the infantry on horseback. In 

1832, Congress tlad authorized a battalion of mounted rangers, and 9 

months later, with interest stimulated by the battles of the Regulars and 

militia with the Sac and Fox Indians under Black Hawk, it substituted 

a regiment of dragoons. II! Building well·fortified posts, garrisoned in 

sufficient strength to resist sudden attacks, J esup asserted, wou ld promote 

peace. H e strongly advocated the construction of good communicating 

roads between the posts and from them to the interior. The frequent 

movement of dragoons on the road would intimidate th e Indians inclined 

to become hostile and inspire confidence in those disposed to be friend ly. 

If war did occur the posts would constitute proper bases of operations. 

Since the authorized strength of the Army in 1836 was little more than 

6,000, Jesup conceded that his views on defense bore little reference to 

the existing military establishment that experience had shown to be 

wholly inadequate.1II 

When the citizens of Clay County, Mo., endorsed Dougherty's proposal and petitioned Congress in 1835 for protection, Acting Quartermaster General T homas F. Hunt, fu ll y aware of J esup's views, enthusias· 

tically backed Secretary Lewis Cass in supporting congressiona l efforts 

, .. I bid., VI. 14-15. 

'""( I» I bid., IV, 61 1 (Annual Rp!, 2' Nov 1850). (2)" Sldt. 5U Uun 15. 18'2); p.652 

(Mar 2, 183'). 

'""(I) Americli/l Stllte PfJf/ers, /lfi/i/fJry AUflirs, VI. 152-53 U~up 10 Cass, 15 Feb 1836). 

(2) Senate Ex, Doc. No. J. 26th Cong .. Is! $CSS •• pp. 11 '-14 Uesup 10 I'oinsell . 29 Nov 18'9). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 217 

to put the plan into effect."~ Jesup estimated that by using troop lahor 

the plan could he executed for $100,000. On 2 July 1836, Congress 

enacted the necessary legislation for erecting this "harrier" against the 

Indians.no 

Not all military men approved construction of the great military 

road of 1836. Maj. Trueman Cross, serving as Acti ng Quartermaster 

General in 1837 while Jesup took the field against the Indians in Florida, 

questioned its effectiveness. 

As a route of communication. it violates a fundamental principle of mili· 

tary science. T he lines of communication should be diverging or perpendicular to the [ranlier, not 'para llel with it. The resources o[ an army are always 

presumed to be in its rear, from whence it can draw its su pplies and rein force- ments under cover of its own protection and by lines of communications which 

are secured from interruption by the enemy. It is dear that no army can 

mai ntai n its position long under any other circumstances. Roads between the 

posts on the frontier might be fo und convenient for occasional passing and 

repassing in times of peace; bu t as routes of communication they would be 

wholly use less in time of war.US 

Joel R. Poinsett, who had succeeded Cass as Secretary of War 8 months 

after Congress enacted legislation for constructing the road, entertained 

similar views. He opposed construction of the road but reported that 

it would begin unl ess Congress, upon a deliberate review of the whole 

matter, adopted some more suitable plan of defense. U 7 Congress took 

no such action. Jesup continued to suppOrt the construction of the great 

military road upon his return to Washington, and, after some interruption, the road was completed under Quartermaster supervision by 1841, 

except for a small northern section that Poinsett managed to eliminate. 

In addition to road construction , quartermasters supervised river 

and harbor improvements that were specifica lly assigned to the DepartmenLue The most important of these was the construction of a breakwater at the mouth of the Delaware River. Originally that project had 

been assigned to the Navy Department, but, in the spring of 1829, the 

President re-assigned it to the War Department and the Secretary delegated respons~bility for managi ng and superintending that construction 

'"'Amtrican Slate Pa/Jers, Military ADairs, VI. 15-14 (Hunt to Casso 8 Jan 1835); p . 12 

(Committee: resolution, 23 Dec 1835); V, 729-31 (Petition to Congress, 24 Dtt 1835). 

1·(1) Ibid., VI. 149 (Committee: Rpt,.3 MaT 1836); pp. 149-52 (Cass to Chainnan, 19 Feb 

1836); pp. 152-53 Uesup to Cass, 15 "Feb 1836. (2) 9 Stal. 444. I. America" Slate Papers, Military ADairs, VII, 783 (Cross to Poinsett, 7 No,' 1837); 

see also pp. 778-81 fOT report of Chief of Engineers, Charles Cratiot, 31 Oct 1837. 

VI Ibid., VII, 575 (Annual Rpt of SW, 2 De<: 1837): p. 777- 78 (Poinsett to R. M. Johnson, 

30 De<: 1837). I. For mention of such projecLS see, Amer;Catl Slate Papers, MiliJary Affairs, IV, 193; 

V, 644 (Annual Rpt. Jesup 10 S\\', 23 Nov 1828; 6 Nov 1835). 
218 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

project to the Quartermaster's Department. m Administration of that 

public works required the services of two officers of the Quartermaster's 

Department for the next 7 years. 

By 1836, the demands made upon the Department were so numerous 

and burdensome-there were but 25 officers including the Quartermaster 

General to attend to them- that it had to seek relief. In addition to 

administering various construction projects and discharging their basic 

responsibility for transporting men and supplies, quartermasters were 

burdened with duties appertaining to other departments that involved 

much labor and heavy pecuniary responsibility. Among these were the 

payment of Indian annuities and the purchase of supplies for the department of Indian Affairs. In 1836, Major Cross reported the latter 

amounted to nearly $800,000.140 Quartermasters were often called upon 

"to make good the deficiencies in other branches of the staff." By law, 

they were subjected, when necessary, to duty in the Subsistence Department. When directed to do so by the Secretary of War, quartermasters 

in the field were also required to purchase camp equipage, medicines and 

hospital stores, and even occasionally arms and ammunition. H • 

Besides executing their regular peacetime duties in 1836, quartermasters were also being called upon to support the troops in their 

operations against the Seminoles in Florida. Under these circumstances, 

the Acting Quartermaster General requested that the Department be 

relieved from the charge of constructing the Delaware Breakwater as 

well as the roads in Arkansas.H z The War Department transferred 

construction of the Breakwater to the Corps of Engineers, but responsi· 

bility for road construction continued to be vested in the Quartermaster's 

Department. Lacking officers to supervise the building of roads in 

Arkansas, the Department was compelled to suspend that work during 

the next 2 years, and Quartermaster officers were assigned to the more 

urgent supply duties in Florida. 

Supply Suppm·t in the Seminole War 

The Seminole War afforded an opportunity for testing the effectiveness of the Department's regulations and the efficiency of its personnel. 

During the 7 years of that war, practically all officers of the Department 

were assigned to tours of duty in Florida, accumulating first-hand experi. 

'-RG 107, 05W, Military Book, vol. 12, p. 4211 (5W 10 Jesup, 5 Apr 1829). 

, .. American Slate Papers, Milifary ADaiu, VI, 85 1 (Annual Rpt, 22 Nov 1856). 

'''See, for example, RG 92, OQMG Leuer Book, vol. 24, pp, 177- 78 (Crou to AQM 

M. M. Clarke, II Nov 1856). 

". RG 107, 05W, Letters Receivt:'d, Q-27 (39) (Hunt to Cass, 24 May 1836). 
ALABAMA 

CfJimil70lt rlIt;; 

MAP 'I 
220 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

ence in the difficulties of wartime supply operations. Florida was the 

trai ning ground that provided an experienced cadre of quartermasters 

to man key su pply posts during the Mexican War. 

The Seminole 'War grew Ollt of the effort of the government to 

remove the Indians from Florida and resettle tbem on lanels west oE the 

Mississippi River. A treaty [or that purpose was repudiated by the 

Seminoles and their opposition to emigration flared into open resistance. 

When hostilities began late in December J835, th e sma ll number of 

regu lar troops in Florida left the seulements at the mercy o( the l nd ians. 

The troops posted at Sl. Augustine on the east coast. Fort Brooks at 

Tampa Bay on the west coast, Key "Vest at the southern extremity of 

the state. and Fort King in the north-central section. near the present 

city of Ocala. consisted of 9 companies of artillery and 2 of infantry, 

comprising 510 men and 26 officers. 143 Arrayed against them, according 

to the best-informed estimates, were 1,200 to 2,000 Indian warriors. 1H 

A large, experi enced force would have been req uired to pursue and 

subd ue the Indians who customaril y assembled in force to strike a blow, 

and then scattered in small panies, d isappearing into the swamps, leaving 

no track to guide soldiers to their hiding places. Congress did authorize 

a second regiment of dragoons and after 2 years of war increased the 

strength of the Army to 12.577, but when the Seminole War began the 

aggregate authorized strength of the Army was little more than 7,000. 

Of that number, only about 4,000 enlisted men were actually present for 

duty at all the posts scattered throughout the United States for the defense 

of the inland and maritime front ers."~ As a consequence, the War 

Department had to rely upon the support of volunteers and militia 

whose services were engaged for only 3-, 6-, and 12-month terms. The 

number of troops serving in Florida during the Seminole War were 

distributed as follows: 148 

Date I Regulars Volunteers I Indians I and militia 

30 Nov 1836 .. ..... 1,757 1,713 750 

30 Nov 1837 ...... 4,552 4,046 178 

30 Nov 1838 .. ...... 3.300 >7J ., 

SO Nov 1839' .. .... 3.031 '" ., , 

SO Nov 1840. ....... 4,191 1,843 ., . ~o Nov 1841. ....... S,801 ., , ., . 

'''Americall Stat e PalJers, Milita ry ADairs, VI. 57 (AG!O S\\'. 9 Feb 1836). 

,,, Ibid., VII, 218 (Gov. C. K. Call 10 Jackson, 9 Jan 1836). 

Total 

4,220 

8,776 

3.67 1 

3.824 

6.034 

3,801 

"'(1) Ibid., V, 633 (Rpt, Maj . Gen. A. Macomb, 30 Nov 1835). (2) Uplon, The Military 

Policy 01 t/, ,, Ullit"d Siales. 162. 184. 

' .. <I) Upton, Th" Mililar), Policy of /I,,, V"il ed Stal"s, p. 190. (2) See also J ohn T . 

Sprague, Th" Origiu, Progress, aud Cm'c/"sim, of til " f"lorida War (New York, 1848), 103--06. 
JESUP HAPES A DEPARTMENT 221 

Paying and equipping the volunteers and militia made the Seminole 

War expensive and it was protracted. lOT Broadened to include operations 

against the Creeks, the waT dragged on for 7 years under a succession of 

commanders, including General J esup, who, re lieved of his duties as 

Quartermaster General, was assigned as a brevet major general to the 

command of troops on 19 May 1836 and for 2 years directed operations 

in Florida,u· When the waT was finally brought to a close in 1842, 

forcible emigration or the Seminoles had not been accomplished. 

The first campaign against the Indians was characterized by the usual 

failure to make any advance preparations despite warnings that the 

Seminoles were unlikely 10 submit peaceably to removal from the land.u' 

The supply agencies acted prompd y but meager reserve stocks, lack of 

adeq uate lead time to produce new suppli es, and the distance supplies 

had to be shipped all conspired to cause delay. 

In anticipation of the demands that would be made on the Quartermaster's Department, Maj. T homas F. Hunt, Acting Quartermaster 

General, immediately reassigned quartermasters to key positions in midJ anuary 1836. He expected operations on the west coast of Florida to be 

supported by a general depot at Tampa Bay. drawing its supplies from 

the assistant quartermaster at New Orleans. On the east coast, operations 

would be backed up by a depot on the St. J ohn's River. obtaining its 

supplies from Charleston and Savannah. In addition to assigning as· 

sistant quartermasters to these depots and ports and remitting funds for 

their operations, Major Hunt directed Capt. Samuel Shannon, assistant 

quartermaster at Pensacola, to report to General Scott's headquarters. 

All quartermasters in the field were placed under Shannon's direction. 

Before Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott, who had been ordered to take command 

of operations, left Washington, one·fourth of the Department's personnel 

had been assigned to support his troops.ISO 

Without waiting for requisitions, Jesup ordered 5,000 bushels of 

corn, put up in bags of 2Jh bushels each, to be shipped from Baltimore 

to Savannah and directed the purchase and shipment of ten strong wagons 

with harness for six horses each.U1 Despite this foresight, it was May 

before the last of the wagons arrived at Savannah, and they were "poor 

things, bUl ill suited to the service for which they were designed." 

Under the pressure of immediate need. Maj. Trueman Cross, in charge 

,n Uplon, II~ lIfili/llry Po/iCJ 01 jll~ Ullit~d Slal a, pp. 192- 93, 

' .... merictlll Sltlle PtlPers.lIfililtlry ""lJirs, VII, 312-1!1 (SW 10 Jesup. 19 May 1836). 

'''Ibid., VII, 307 (Brig. Gen. D. L. Clinch 10 Cen R. Jones, 8 Ocl 1835). 

-RC 92, OQMC Leiter Book, vol, 22, p . 400 (Hunt 10 Clinch, 17 Dec 18J!i); pp. 45S-!>6; 

458-00 (Hunt 10 Engle. Dimmock. Shannon. 19 Jan 1836); pp. 467~9 (Hunt to Scon. 21 Jan 

1836); p. 475 Uesup to Shannon. 23 Jan IMG) . 

.... 'bid .• vol. 22, pp. 476-77 (QMC to Maj, T. Cross, 26 Jan 1836). 
222 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

of procurement, had been obliged to take what was avail able. He could 

find only four new wagons in the Baltimore market and picked up second· 

hand wagons to complete the order. Since the transportation of troops, 

provisions, and forage had top priority. wagons could be stowed on board 

the vessels bound for Savannah only when space was available. Two 

wagons arrived there on 7 February; six more came a month later; and 

the last two of the order arrived about I May. T he assistant quartermaster at Savannah forwarded all to the depot established at Picolata 

on the St. John's River, including seven wagons that he procured on 

Scott's requisition and 216 horscs. U2 

Not all means of transportation and forage for the campaign went 

to Picolata. Some went to an advance depot that was set up in March 

at Garey's Ferry, located where Black Creek emptied into the St. John's 

River; others were sent to the depot at Tampa Bay and to St. Augustine. 

The Acting Quartermaster General reported that between 15 January 

and 25 May 1836, the Quartermaster's Department supplied the Army 

in Florida with 75 wagons, 36 carts, 135 sets of harness, 98 packsaddles, 

61 8 horses, and 69 mules. It also furnished 934,518 pounds of hay and 

fodder, 49,563 bushels of corn and oats, and 11,882 forage bags. From 

I January to 25 May 1836, the Department remitted to its quartermasters 

and agents $612,100 to enable them to comply with requisitions for 

supplies and meet demands made by the military operations in Florida.lU 

The Department had not been remise in its efforts. 

]0 the meantime, Scott at Augusta, Ga., had found a large number 

of muskets at the arsenal but neither acCOutrements, cartridges, powder 

fit for service, nor knapsacks to equip his troops. U4 He wondered why 

the government took the trouble to build arsenals in the first place. 

Unfortunately for his needs, the supplies that had been stored at the 

Augusta arsenal had already been issued to Georgia volunteers called out 

to go to the relief of the beleaguered troops in Florida.'53 Reporting 

on the supply situation, Scott hoped that knapsacks and tents were on 

lheir way from Philadelphia. 

Commissary General Irvi ne forwarded such supplies as were on 

hand, but his reserve stocks were scanty. His purchases for some years 

had been restricted to meeting the needs of the small Regular Army. 

H e had, for example, 500 knapsacks then in the hands of the painters 

and a considerable number of others ready for delivery to them. In-

"'American Siale Papers, Military Affairs, VII, 1111 -112 (Deposition of DLmmock. 5 Dec 

1836). 

,.. RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, vol. 24, pp. 195- 200 (CTOSS to Re<:order of Court of Inquiry. 

211 Nov 8~6). 

, .. America" SIIIU Papers, Milita ry Affairs, VII. 244 (Scott to Jones, 111 Jan 18116). 

" I bid., VII, 1117 (Testimony of Col. William Linsay. 7 De<: 18116). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 225 

tcnded for the regular service in 1836. they were diverted to equip both 

the Regular troops and the Volunteers and militia in Florida. In March, 

5 weeks after Scott had hoped knapsacks were on the way. Irvine reponed 

that he would hav.c 2,000 additional ones made with the least possible 

deb,y.ue 

Irvine could supply only tents from stocks left on hand since the 

War of 1812, and by March 1836 such supplies were exhausted so that 

he had to begin contracting for wall and common tents. The Philadelphia Arsenal, the main depot from which supplies could be drawn, 

had in stock only limited quantities of other equipmenl-800 camp 

kettles. 1.500 mess pans, and no canteens. None of the latter had been 

p urchased since 1814.111 With troops already in the field, preparations 

to equip them had fi rst to be initiated. Irvine was effi cient and before 

the end of the year he had furnished 7,500 knapsacks, 9,000 haversacks. 

397 wall tents, 1,355 common tents, ],355 camp kettles. 2,608 mess pans, 

1,205 axes, and 567 spades.UI Unfonunately, most of the articles reached 

the field too late for use in ScOll'S plan of campaign in Florida early 

in 1836. 

Before leaving Washington, SeOlt and the Commissary General of 

Subsistence had agreed that rations of hard bread and bacon were more 

desirable than flour and pork on ma rches because of the weight factor. 

To preserve pork in warm weather it had to be pickled in brine. Allowing for the brine and the wooden casks, the weight factor was about 

51 percent in favor of bacon. In other words. a wagon capable of 

carrying 2,000 pounds of pork could carry 3,000 pounds, or a little more, 

of bacon. The difference in weight between a ration of 18 ounces of 

flOUT and one of 12 ounces of hard bread is evident. Sufficient quantities 

of hard bread, however. were not made available and no bacon reached 

the depot at Picolata before 15 April. Scott contended that to take with 

the columns on their marches nearly two·thirds of the subsistence in the 

heavier items of Aour and pork "was the same thing as if a larger portion 

of our otherwise deficient means of transportation had been captured 

or destroyed." 18. 

T he supply situation obviously must have hampered Scott. but his 

operational plan was completely disrupted by the unauthorized action 

"'RG 92. CGP, Lcllers Sent, No. 594. p. 108 (Irvine to Maj. J ohn Garland. 9 Mar 1836). 

"' Ibid., No. 594, p, 1S'5 (T. Bangor to Garland, 5 May 1836); pp. 130-51 (Irvine to Garland, 

16 Apr 1836); p. 59G (Irvine to SW. 15 Apr 1857). 

'- R G 92, OQMG Consol idated Correspondence File, 179+-191 5, Boxes 50!Hl8 (Irvine to 

SW, 5 June 1841 and cllc1osures) . 

.. AmuicaJl Stillc Papers, Military AOtl;rs, v n . 1M, 195 (Tcstimony of assistant oommiSila ry 

or l ubsislence, 22 Dec; 1856 and Scott Summary). 
224 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

of Maj. Gen. Edmund P. Gaines, who, without co-ordinating his plans 

with Scott, urought a sma ll force from New Orleans and moved inland 

to Fort King from Tampa Bay. Instead of helping. his troops only 

succeeded in eating up the rations accumulated there and intended (or 

the support of Scott's force in its three-pronged operations agai nst the 

Indians. Unable to usc the Ocklawaha River to replace supplies, $cOlt 

found himself deficient in wagons. The campaign barely got under 

way when the terms' of service of his troops, most of whom were 3·months' 

men, expired.. There was no alt ernative but to discharge them and end 

his campaign against the Seminoles. 

Subsequent campaigns profited from the experience gained and the 

greater length of time a ll owed for preparations. Callender Irvi ne. Commissary General of Purchases. now had time to proc ure duck for lents, 

and 2,288 common tents were made available to the troops in Florida 

in 1837. Large quantities of other camp and garrison equipage were 

procured in 1837 and during the subsequent years of the war. "0 Irvine 

continued to prepare the annual suppl y of clothing for the regular troops 

in Florida. ' GI In addition , volunteers and militiamen called into the 

service of the United States were entitled, by law, to the same camp 

equipage and clothing, or money in li eu of it. as was issued to enlisted 

men in the Regular Army. lI~ Irvine employed some 600 to 800 seam-

,. Among the major ilems of camp and garrison C<luipage furnished the Army in Florida 

by the Purchasing Department between 25 January 1836 and 51 May 1841 we re the following: 

Item 1856 IS57 1858 1859 ".0 1841 

A,a .. . ............... 1.205 1.5OR 

Camp Kettles ... ........... 1,555 1,6i2 '" Canteens. lin .............. 500 1.000 

Canteens. wood ............ 9. 100 

Mess I'an$ ................. 2.608 2.908 

Saddles, Dragoon .......... 200 .00 '00 "'" 250 

Spades ............... . 567 872 

Tems. Common 1.55" 2.288 "'" '00 1.000 '50 

T enlS. Hospital sa 20 

TelliS. Wall ... . " '" ~9:; '00 '00 '20 50 

RG 92. OQMG Consolidated Correspondence File, l!-ox 505--08 (Irvine to SW, 5 Jan 184 1 and 

enclosures). 

, .. Dislribulct.l over a 5·yea r en list ment period, that supply for the infantryman included 

in cach year 2 o\"erall$ made of wool and 5 of collon. 2 cotton shiru and 2 Hannel shirts, 

I cotton jacket. 5 pairs of OOots. and 5 pairs of siockings. In the 5·year period he also r«eivcd 

I forage cap , 2 wool jackets, I gTeal coal. 5 pairs of drawers, and 2 uniform caps. <I) Glmtral 

Regulaliolls Jor Ille Arm, of fi,e Ullit ed Slntt;s, 18H (Washington , 1855). p. 209. (2) Compare 

with allowances in IVllr DejJnrllllt'" Gell eTIII Orders, GO 26. 'J:l Apr 1857; GO 56. <I Dec 18!8. 

''' 5 SIIII. 7 (Mar 19. 1836). 
COLONEL BRISBANE'S REG IMENT, SOUTH CAROLINA M ILITIA, 1836 
226 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

stresses in the Philadelphia area to produce the clothing items needed by 

the Army. In the course of the war, his Department procured, on the 

basis of estimates received from the Clothing Bureau, the following 

q uantities of clothing and personal equipment for the troops in Florida: les 

Item 18116 1837 18.'18 18119 1840 1841 

Bootees, p' . . . . . ... . .. .. . .. 600 9,()oIO 6,92 1 6.00 9,700 1.375 

Caps, forage ... . .. .. .. . ... . .... 1S90 1.762 2, 100 7,600 800 

Drawers, pro .. ... .... ... ... 500 980 1.539 2,000 ',000 . ... JackeUl, cotton ... .. .. . ... . .... ... . 2,056 1,300 2.500 . ... Jacketli. wool ... ... .. ... .. . <50 3,090 3.675 2,300 4.268 1,000 

Overalls, oolton .. .. . .. . .... .... .... 5,77! 800 ',000 .. . Overals, wool .... .... ... .. . 500 11 ,936 6,318 '.200 5,536 1,000 

Shirts, cotton ....... . ... ... .. . . ... 5,4211 7.00 10,000 11,250 

Shirls. Hanne! .. ... .. ....... ,00 5,080 2.994 800 ',000 ... . Stockings, P' , .............. 600 6.070 7.491 6,000 12.000 lUllS 

lJIankeu ... ... ........... . 600 !I!IO 1,562 .... . . .. . . ... Haversack$ .. .. .......... .. 9,000 7.690 265 .... .. . . .. . ap ack$ .. .... ...... ..... 7.500 9.590 262 .... 1.000 . ... 

Depots not only of clothing but also of subsistence were built up on 

the east. and west coaStS of Florida. Difficulties at times compelled men 

to carry 5 to 6 days of rations with them, but there was no shortage of 

subsistence stores as in previous wars. The Subsistence Department 

functioned smoothly to sustain a steady flow of rations to the troops and 

even to modify the ration to promote the health of the soldiers. The 

components of the rations had remained unchanged since 1818, but under 

Presidential authority onions, potatoes, and other vegetables of an antiscorbutic nature were occasionall y substituted for beans. The Department issued low-priced French and Catalonia wines during the summer 

in lieu of hard liquor.,e. It also furnished coffee and sugar before the 

end of 1838. 

The climate and the exposure of RTovisions resulting from the 

frequent movement of the troops with their supplies caused the destruction of much subsistence. Such losses undoubtedly contributed their 

share to the large expenditures of the Subsistence Department during 

the Seminole War. Gibson estimated that his Department spent 

$1,038,662 for rations during the war.'U Subsisting the troops in Florida, 

'OORG 92, OQMG Con$Olidated Correspondence File. Boxes 50!H>8 (Irvine to SW, 3 Jan 

1841 and enclosu res). Data covers the period 25 Januny 1836 (0 51 May 184 1. 

' .. (I) American Stat e Papers, Military Affairs, VII. 6 14 (Gibson (0 SW. 20 Nov 1837). 

(2) RG 192. CGS, Letters Sent . vol. 14. p. 167 (Circu lar to assislanl commissaries, 10 Nov 

1857); p. 200 (Gib$On to Cross. 27 Nov 1857). (5) RG 192, CGS, U:tlers Received, No. 2057 

(Maj T. F. Hunt 10 Gibson, 2 Sep 1837). 

'. RG 192, CGS, Lcuel'5 to SW, 1840-54, pp. 59-00 (6 OCI 1841). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 227 

however, was only part of his responsibility. Teamsters, steamboat 

hands, mechanics, and laborers employed by the Quartermaster's Department also had to be subsisted. The Subsistence Department provided 

rations for such Seminoles as emigrated to the lands west of the Mississippi, and, under congressional authorization, it issued rations to the 

unfortunate inhabitants of Florida who had been driven from their 

homes by the Indians and who were unable to provide for themselves.'66 

Intended as a temporary measure to Sliccor the immediate needs of 

the distressed, the receipt of rations came to be looked upon as a right 

and the law was so liberally interpreted that the list of suffering inhabitants, it was charged, comprised some of the most opulent families. U7 

The relief system threatened to jeopardize the military operations by 

diverting both subsistence and transportation intended for the Army to 

the relief program being supervised by Army offi cers. The Secretary of 

War ordered measures taken to divorce the program from the Army 

altogether and to employ agents to attend to it.'u As a means of 

encouraging resettlement during the closing months of the war, the 

Secretary of War directed the Subsistence Department to issue rations 

to the settlers until their first crops were harvested. lncluding all of 

these expenditures, Gibson estimated that his Department had spent 

$1,155,585 from the beginning of the war until 30 September 1824. u~ 

Much of Quartermaster suppOrt of the troops operating against the 

Seminoles was effected on a basis of anticipating demands rather than 

waiting for requisitions from the field. Major Cross, Acting Quartermaster General at Washington, thereby made certain that supplies would 

be available when campaigns were initiated. Quartermasters in the 

field often lacked early information on operational plans, and their 

requisitions therefore frequently came in too late to be filled in time for 

the intended use of the supplies at the opening of a military operation. 

Late in September 1836, for example, the assistant quanermaster of the 

depot at Garey's Ferry ordered 20 two-horse wagons for use the first week 

in October. But even if the wagons could have been purchased on the 

spot when the order reached the Department, it still took 20 days to 

transport them to Florida. With good reason, the Acting Quartermaster 

General doubted that these wagons would be available at the time they 

were wanted yo Preparing for the campaign in 1837, Major Cross 

'-5 Slat. HI! (Feb 1. 1836) . 

... Sprague. Tile Origin, Progress, "ud CO>lc/!lsio'l 0/ /lI e Florida War, p. 519. 

- RG 107. OSW, Letlcn Scnt, vol. 17. pp. 352-53 (I'oinsetl to Jesup. 3 Aug 1837). 

,. RG 192, CGS. Lcttcn to SW. 1840--54, p. 96. 

'10 RG 92, OQMG Letlcr Book, vol. 24. p. 113 (Cross to AQM Clark, 1 Oct 1836). 
228 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

preferred to order supplies before General Jesup's requisitions arrived 

even if such action did involve th e I'isk of some duplication. 1n 

Information on mileage between depots and interior stations was 

soon acq uired, and data for the organization of an efficient wagon train, 

upon which the success of any campaign depended, was passed along to 

depot quartermasters. The distance from the various depots on the 

St. John's River to the Withlacoochee River, where the Indians were 

concentrated in 1836, varied but, for purposes of illustration, Major 

Cross set it at 100 miles. A rou nd trip, he advised depot quartermasters, 

might be accomplished in 12 days and the wagon train kept in constant 

motion by the use of a set of relief horses. A two-horse wagon could 

haul 6 barrels of flour or 1,332 pounds of su pplies; a four-horse wagon 

could carry 7 barrels of pork, or 10 to 12 barrels of Rour, or 2, 100 pounds 

of supplies. The depot at Garey's Ferry had 20 two-horse wagons and 

80 four-horse wagons that were capable of carrying a load of 194 ,64"0 

pounds. Rations for (he horses would have to be included in that 

amount. At 12 pounds a day per horse for 12 days for 360 horses the 

ration weight would amount to 5 1,840 pounds. To feed 3,000 men, the 

estimated force to be suppli ed, the depot quartermaster would have to 

estimate not on the basis of a complete ration that weighed 2% pounds, 

but on the basis of a meat and bread ration, equivalent to 2 pounds, 

including barrels. For 12 days, rations for the troops would amount to 

72,000 pounds, from which some ded uction could be made for beef cattle 

driven along with the train. The force to be supported also included 

500 mounted men whose horses would have to be supplied. Allowing 

a half ration per horse, the wagons would have to haul 36,000 pounds of 

forage every 12 days. Deducting rations for the troops and forage for 

the animals, the wagon train would then be capable of hauling every 

12 days 34,800 pounds of military stores and other supplies needed 

by the troops.l1~ 

At the beginning of the war, there was much d iversity of opinion 

concerning the best type of wagon to be used in Florida. Preference 

ranged from one-horse carts to fi ve-horse wagons. In this uncertainty, 

the Acting Quartermaster General decided it would be best to employ 

four-horse wagons for service between depots and the interior statiol1s 

where roads could be bu il t, and to use strong two-horse wagons, equipped 

with harness for four horses, for field service.ITs 

In 1837, the Department also added, at jesup's request, ponton 

wagons. These wagons, lined with Indi a rubber cloth and capable of 

'" Ibid., \'01. 25, p. 207 (Cross to J esup, 30 Aug 1837). 

"' Ibid., \"01. N, pp. 170-H (Cross to Clark and Dusenbery, 7 No\' 1836). 

,,0 Ibid., \'01. 26, p. 187 (Cross \0 Maj. J. B. Brant, 16 Apr 1858). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 229 

sustaining hcavy loads aAoat, were intended to afford ready means of 

passing dvers on the march. In all other cases, they were to be considered 

and used as light transports. Quartermaster Brant at Tampa Bay later 

complained tha t they were "wretched." Inquiry soon revealed that the 

ponton wagons had not been utilized as intended but had been employed 

with the common wagin train in transponing supplit"s bel\veen the 

depot and the interior.1H h was there[ore not surprisi ng that Lhey broke 

down in 6 weeks as Brant had charged. 

The ponton wagon was only onc of a number or items that had been 

under d evelopment using India rubber doth in their construction. 

General experimentation with India rubber cloth had been initiated 

in the summer of 183SY" 'When Jesup was ordered to the field a year 

later, he directed Lt. J. F. Lane, acting assistant quartermaster at Boston, 

who had been conducting the ex periments to join him and bring along 

all the ponton equipment that he had completed in order that it might 

be full y tested in the field. T he teu of the pomon equipment was 

completely successful and the bridge was enthusiastically recommended 

for usc by the U.S. Army.17ft Calls for such equipment were later to be 

made during the Mexican War. 

Adequate supplies of wagons and carts were sent to Florida, but it 

soon became apparent that defic iencies would occur because returns sent 

to the Washington office showed a large number dropped as unserviceable. 

Major Cross inferred that wagons were being thrown aside tOO readily 

for want of repairs that could not be made without a supply of seasoned 

timber unavailable in Florida. I-I e therefore ordered the quartermasters 

at New York and Philadelphia to suppl y the depots on the east and west 

coasts of Florida with a small quantity of wheelwright timber suited to 

ordinary repa irs as well as extra stokes. fell ies. and axles.

1fT 

In the past. soldiers had been deta iled from the line to make repairs, 

... <I) Ibid., vol. 26. pp. 75-77 (Cross to Brant. 26 Feb 1838); p . 90 (Cross to AQM McCrab. 

7 Mar 18S8); pp. 187-89 (CT(IM to Bran!, 16 Apr 1838). (2) The politOn wagon was an inven· 

tion of J esup·s. bUI he gave all the righls 10 LL J. F. Lane who conducted ex periments under 

his orders. Lane was later killed in Florida but though he had obtained patellu for all 

inventions. J e5Up had permi$S ion to use any of them for publi(: purprues. I bid., vol. 34. 

p. 499 UC$uII to Mackay, 5 J un 184 ~). 

"' (I) Ibid., \'01. 22. p. 189 QC$up to Lane. 28 Aug 1835). (2) Experimental tents using 

India rubber doth had also been made. RG 92, CGP. Letteri Sent. No. 394. p. 109 (Irvine to 

Garland. 9 Mar 1836). 

'" (I) RC 92. OQMG utter Book. vol. 2S. p. 221 (Jessup to Lane. 19 May 1836). (2) Jesup 

Papcn, Box ~ (Rpt. Bd of Examination on Bridge. 15- 16 Sep 1836). Manuscrillt Oiv .• Library 

of Congress. (S) The Army test~ Lane', India rubber ponton bridge in September 18.56 at 

Woolfork', Ferry on the Chattahoochie River. Over a bridge 290 feci long and IS fl!Ct wide. 

upport~ by 31 pontooru.200 men of the Regular Anny marched in full banle equipment. 

,n RG 92. OQMG uner Book. vol. 25. PI'. 185- 86 (Cross to Slanlon and Mackay, 23 Aug 

1837). 
230 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

drive wagons, and perform any other services the Army required. Jesup 

had been at his headquarters in Alabama only a few weeks before he 

requested the Secretary of War to authorize a corps of artificers and 

laborers. They were necessary, he asserted, because southern militia and 

volunteers could not be induced to labor at such tasks,H8 The Secretary 

approved a specifi c requisition for 20 mechanics and 50 laborers, and the 

quartermasters at Philadelphia and New York were directed to cooperate 

in engaging them. Though jesup's requisition specified no distribution 

among the trades, the Acting Quartermaster General apportioned the 

artisans as follows: 4 blacksmiths. 2 wagon makers, 2 harness makers, 

and 12 carpenters.lT~ In addition to the corps o( 20 artisans, the Department organized a corps of 30 teamsters and 50 laborers. By 17 December, 

the vessel on which they had been embarked for Tampa Bay waited only 

on a fair wind to sail from New York.180 The following year, the 

Department sent additional artisans to Tampa Bay and recruited a corps 

of artisans and laborers for the depot on the St. John's River. For 

the latter place, the corps included 6 wheelwrights and wagon makers, 

4 blacksmiths, 4 saddlers, 2 boatbuilders, and 12 carpenters among the 

artisans, as well as 50 teamsters and 50 laborers.'81 

It was deemed essential that the teamsters hired be "acquainted 

with the nature of mules," for an increasing number of mules were 

employed on the wagon trains. At Jesup's request, the Department 

ordered a corps of muleteers, or packhorse drivers recruited at St. Louis 

from among the mountain fur traders for service in Florida for the 

duration of the 1837 campa n. ~ Existing legislation made no provision 

for wagon or forage masters, both essential to the conduct of active 

operations. To circumvent this omission, the Department hired agents 

until, on 5 July 1838, Congress lega lized this practice by authorizing the 

appointment of no more than 20 wagon and forage masters.'U 

As the number of depots and subdepots increased during the war, 

the number of civilians supporting the military operations in Florida 

multiplied until a total of 1,063 persons were employed as of November 

". (I) Americau Slale Papers, Mililary AUairs, VII. 325 Uesup to Casso [[ Jun [836). (2) 

When ill 1836 all work in Ihe Quarlermasler's Department in Ihe fie ld was brought to a stand· 

still for want of teamsters. JcsuP inlerpreloo the law on payment for fatigue duty to permit 

h im to employ Volunlccrs. paying thcm wages as teamstcrs and also as soldiers. since Ihey were anned and compelled to serve as soldiers. RG 92. OQMG Leuer Book. vol. 30. p. 140 Uesup 

10 2d Comptroller, 13 Jun 1844). 

'''RG 92. OQMG Letter Book. vol. 24. p. 219 (CTOS!I lo Sianton and Mackay. 1 Dec 1836). 

uo I bid., vol. 24. p. 263 (Cross to Jesup, 23 Dec 1936). 

10\ Ibid., vol. 25. p. 155 (Cross to Mackay. 12 Aug 1837). 

" Ibid., vol. 25. p. 135 (Cr0S5 10 Brant. 5 Aug 1837). 

, .. (I) 5 SIal. 256. sec. 10. (2) RG 92. OQMG Lcuer Book. vol. 26, p. 352 (Cross to Clark. 

14 Jul 1838); p.457 (Stanton to WagonmaSler Shannon. 6 Scp 1838). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 231 

1840.184 By that time, the principal depots were established at Pal&tka 

on the St. John's River; St. Augustine on the east coast; Tampa Bay and 

Cedar Key on the west coast; and St. Marks on the Gulf below Tallahassee. 

Except for St. Marks, soon abandoned in favor of a better location below 

it, all of these depots had extensive warehouse accommodations. wheelwright shops, smith shops, saddlers shops, stables, quarters for officers and 

men employed at the depots, well-built wharves, and at Cedar Key. even 

a rail-way and other facilities for repairing vessels and constructing 

boats.lSi 

The Seminole War was the first war that required the Quartermaster's Department to furnish a considerable amount of water transportation both for operational maneuvers and supply support. The experience gained was put to good service later in the Mexican War. Regular 

troops transferred to duty in Florida and most of the forage, subsistence, 

clothing, equipment, and military stores procured for the Army's support 

were transported to Florida in ships chartered for the purpose by the 

Quartermaster's Department. In general, quartermasters at New York, 

Philadelphia, and Washington hired sailing ships to transport men and 

supplies to Florida. At these ports, there were few steamboats suited 

to navigation of the Atlantic. There were, for example, steamboats 

plying the North River and Long Island Sound, but they were not built 

and fitted for ocean service. The Sound steamboats were too lofty in 

structure and moreover burned wood. Called upon to send troops to 

Charleston quick ly in the summer of 1836, Quartermaster Stanton could 

report only two steamboats suited for the purpose in New York harbor, 

namely, two Charleston steam packets.188 On the other hand, quartermasters at Charl eston and Savannah chartered a considerable number of 

steamboats to transport troops and supplies from these ports to Florida. 

Quartermasters also hired steamboats to transport supplies across the Gulf, 

though not without raising criticism of the exorbitant rates of hire and 

the consequent "frightful amount of money" wasted on them.UT T he 

Quartermaster's Department chartered some 40 steamboats during 1836 

and 1837.188 

... RG 92, OQMG Consolidated Correspondence File. Boxes 305-08 (Stanton to J esup, 

20 Jan 1841 and enclosures). 

'- Ibid. 

'" (I) RG 92. OQMG Consolidated Correspondence File, Box 1147 (Stanton to Hunt. 

25 May 1836). (2) At Charleston, the assistant quartennaster was directed to arnnge for the 

tnnsportation of sevenl coml.anies of infantry and artillery by nilroad to Augu sta where 

wagom and teams were to be provided for the remainder of the journey to Fori Mitchell. Ala. 

RG 92. OQMG Letter 8ook. vo!' 23. p. 198 (Hunt to Engle and Dimmock. 14 May 1836). 

"" RG 92. OQMG Letter Book. vol. 25. pp. 298-99 (erms to Whiting. 22 Dec 1937). 

'" American Stal e Papers, Mi/itary Affairs, VII, 994-97 (List of steamboa ts, 16 Feb 1838). 
232 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Transportation was hampered by lack of control over chartered ships. 

Civilian pilots made their own decisions on when they would take a 

ship out. Two companies of infantry were embarked on 5 June 1836, 

for example, but the late hour and threatening weather caused the pilot 

to refuse to leave New York harbor. The next morning the storm was 

worse, and 2 days later the commanding general waiting the arrival of 

the troops could only be informed that no conjecture could be made as 

to when the storm would cease and the pilot be willing to leave the 

harboT.18D 

Subsistence and forage accounted for the larger part of the cargo 

that the Department had to ship to Florida. Some idea of the scope of 

operations is apparent in a report made by Major Cross. In a 3-month 

period, he chartered and supplied the cargo for 20 brigs and schooners 

and for one transport owned by the United States that sailed from the 

District of Columbia to Jacksonville, Tampa Bay, and Garey's Ferry 

loaded with forage (72,707 bushels of oats, 21.350 bushels of corn, and 

469,768 pounds of hay) and subsistence stores (605 barrels of Hour, 3,664 

barrels of hard bread, 162 barrels of bacon, 30 barrels of vinegar, and 

353 barrels of potatoes).1110 

Ships sailing directly to the depot at Garey's Ferry on the St. John's 

River ran some risks since sand bars obstructed the entrance to that 

river. Ordinarily, wrecks were not too numerous, but storms exacted 

a heavy toll. The Department advised quartermasters to regulate their 

shipments to the depot by chartering only vessels of light draught since 

the depth of the water at the mouth of tht: river and at Garey's Ferry was 

not more than 8 feet.'vi 

From the nature of the country, the Army used steamboats, barges, 

batteaux, and scows in military operations from the beginning of the war. 

In preparation for the extensive campaign projected by Jesup in 1837 

that call ed for penetration of the Everglades via the 81. John's, Indian, 

and Caloosahatchee Rivers, the Quartermaster's Department began construction of batteaux capable of carrying about 20 men each. Not too 

much was known about the navigation of these rivers but on the basis 

of one officer's experience in the country. these Hat-bottomed boats, built 

with square bows and sterns, were to be 20 feet long, 6 feet wide, and 

draw no more than 9 to 12 inches of water when loaded, Each batteaux 

was to be provided with an awning stretched over a ridge pole and 

fastened to the gunwales so as to shelter the men from rain as well as 

.. RG 92. OQMG Letter Book. vol. 23. pp. 282-34 (Hum to J esup. 8 Jun 18116). 

''' Ibid .• vol. 25, pp. 417- 18 (Cross to Stanton. 2 Jail 1838). I., Ibid., vol. 25. p.2!1!1 (Cross 10 Mackay, 4 Sep 18117); pp. 1125-26 (Cross to Whilillg. 2 Nov 

1837). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 233 

sun. Major Cross ordered 100 of these boats built at Charleston, Philadelphia, and New York, substituting on 50 of them a sharp for the square 

bow, since he believed it would be best suited for penetrating streams 

obstructed with grass,lIII He expected to use steamboats to tow the 

batteaux to their departure points. 

T he Department generall y employed steamboats along the west coast 

of Florida to forward supplies and transport troops to points at which 

penetration of the Everglades was to be attempted. It also lIsed steamboats to fonvard supplies on the St. J ohn's River and it was not uncommon to see a steamboat towing a schooner, both loaded with subsistence 

and fornge. IOa As earl y as the first campaign, Scott had ordered the 

steamer. Essayon, belonging to the Engineer Department. taken into the 

service of the Quartermaster's Department on the St. J ohn's River.'uo 

At least two steamboats were purchased by the quartermaster at New 

Orleans for service on the Chattahoochie against the Creeks in 1836. 

Originally manned by seamen and commanded by naval offi cers operating 

under the direction of General J esup. these steamboats were later transferred to the control of the Quartermaster's Department. since the services 

in which they were engaged were deemed not to be "professionall y 

rewarding" to the naval officers. lOa 

Transportation available for the campaign of 1837 included two 

government schooners and three steamboats on the west coast and one 

government steamer and two chartered steamboa ts on the St. J ohn's 

River. To expedite communication between the Army and Washington, 

the Quartermaster's Department, on orders of the Secretary of War, also 

purchased and put into operation a steamboat used as an express between 

the St. John's River and Charleston where it connected with the regular 

service from that port to Washington to provide IO-day mail service.m 

The heavy ex pense to which the Department was subj ected during 

the war in the hire of steamboats resulted from the tremendous amount 

of forage that had to be transported to fe ed the large number of horses 

used by the Army in Florida. In the fall of 1840, for example, there were 

1,008 horses used as teams and saddle horses as well as 1,133 mules. By 

that time. the ex pense of steamboat hire had been somewhat reduced by 

substituting steamboats owned by the United States for chartered boats, 

'·Ibid., vol. 25, pp. 117- 18 (Cross to Engle, 51 Jul 1857); pp. 160--61 (Cross !O Mackay and 

Stanton, 19 Aug 1857). 

- Ibid., vol. 24. pp. 167-68 (Cross to J esup. !i Nov 1856). 

'''Ib d~ vol. 25, p. 505 (Cross to Hunt, 25' Oct 8~8). The Department later reimbursed 

the Engineer Department for the value of the boat. 

'·'b d~ vol. 25, pp. 2~5-36 (Hunt 10 Clnk and J esup, 24 May 1836): vol. 25. p. 126 (Cross 

to Vinton, 2 Aug 1837). 

- RG lin, OSw, Letters Received , Q- 86 (45) (Cross to Poinsett, 10 Aug 1837). 
234 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

but there were still six hired boats employed in addition to the five 

government steamboats-all of them. principally engaged. at an average 

monthly rate of about $2,500, in transporting forage.'8T 

Enormous sums had been spent on a war that had been believed to 

be unimportant. 1t was no nearer conclusion in 184 1 than in 1838 when 

J esup wrote that " unless immediate emigration be abandoned, the war 

will continue for years to come, and at constantly accumulating expense." m J esup had approved and supported the government's policy 

of Indian removal, but he argued that it ought not to be applied until 

the white population was in contact with the Indians. 

In regard to the Seminoles, we have committed the error of attempting to 

remove them when their lands were not required for agricultural purposes; 

when they were not in the way of the white inhabitants; and when the greater 

portion of their country was an unexplored wilderness, of the interior of which 

we were as ignorant as of the interior of China. We exhibit in our present 

contest, the first instance, perhaps since the commencement of authen tic his· 

tory, of a nation employing an army to explore a country (for we can do little 

more than eXp'lore It), or attempting to remove a band of savages from one 

unexplored wilderness to another. 199 

He proposed letting the Seminoles remain in Florida, confined to the 

southern portion of the state, on condition that if they committed any 

depredations on the white inhabitants or passed the boundaries assigned 

to them, they would forfeit their right to the land. 

Approval of his proposa ls would have saved the nation millions of 

dollars and the lives of many valuable citizens and military personnel. 

The Administration, however, was committed to the policy of forcible 

emigration of the Seminoles. By 1841, Col. S. W. Worth, the commanding officer in Florida, voiced much the same views as those of Jesup. 20i1 

His proposals laid before a council of officers were rejected as neither 

politic, expedient, or judicious by all its members except Jesup. Preparations for continuing the war went on but every effort was made to reduce 

expenses. By May 1842, the government was at last willing to call a halt 

to operations and announce that the war would not be renewed unless 

provoked by new Indian aggressions. Retrenchment was now pursued 

more vigorously. Troops were gradually withdrawn until only customary 

garrisons were maintained in Florida. The Quartermaster's Department 

released steamboats and sailing vessels; broke up wagon trains; sold 

, .. RG 92. OQMG Consolidated Correspondence File, Boxes ~05-O8 (Stanton to Jesup, 

20 J an 1841 and enclOliures). 

'·Sprague, Th e Origill, Progress, mrd Com:/lisimr 01 lire FlQrida War, pp. 199-201 (Ltr, 

J esup 10 SW, II Feb 18~8). 

"' Ibid. 

*"' Ibid., pp. 441-44 (Ltr, Worth to Scott, 14 Feb 1841). 
JESUP SHAPES A DEPARTMENT 235 

horses and mules; and discharged teamsters, mechanics. and laborers. 

Supply activities in Florida rapidly dwindled to those normally associated 

with sustaining garrison~d troops. 

By 1842, Jesup had been directing operations of the Quartermaster's 

Department for almost a quarter of a century. He had molded and 

shaped it into an efficient supply agency. He had formulated its regulations; developed its methods of procedures; and trained a staff of officers 

who were thorough ly familiar with them. The Seminole War afforded 

an opportunity for testing these methods in practice and for evaluating 

the lraininggiven. Jesup found both sound. and the even morc thorough 

testing to which the Department was shortly to be subjected only served 

to emphasize how well he had accomplished the goals he had established 

in 1818. 

CHAPTER VII 

Logistical Problems of the 

Mexican War 

In the spring of 1846. the United States and Mexico drifted into 

war, and the Quartermaster's Department was call ed upon to apply the 

logistical lessons it had mastered during the 7 years of the Seminole 

War. So effectively did the Department contribute to the support of the 

armies in the field that the commanding generals achieved a series of 

brill iant victories. Unlike the disasters that overtook American arms in 

the War of 1812. every movement in the Mexican War was an "onward 

movement." Jesup proudly asserted that "with our depots farther from 

the sources of supply than Algiers is from Toulon or Marseilles, we 

accomplished more in the first six months of our operations in Mexico, 

than France, the first mil itary power in Europe, has accomplished in 

Africa in seventeen years.'" Supply failures in the Crimean War a few 

years later confirmed Jesup's conviction that the French army was far 

behind the American army in all administrative arrangements relating 

to the movement and supply of armies in the fi eld.

1 

The success of Jesup's well-organized Department was achieved 

despite the handicaps imposed by unpreparedness for war. The sums 

req uired to accumulate reserve stocks of military supplies in the depots 

in the years immediately preceding the Mexican War were denied to 

Jesup by successive Congresses bent on economy. The country was 

not only unprepared in supplies but also in men. No sooner had 

hostilities with the Seminoles been officially declared at an end in the 

summer of 1842 than Congress immediately enacted legislation reducing 

the size of the Army from 12,539 officers and men to 8,6 13.1 T hrough 

184-5. appropriations were limited to the wants of this small peacetime 

establishment.· 

So drastically were funds cut that no repairs o£ barracks or other 

, House Ex . Doc. No. 8, 50th Cong., hi se5$., p. 5<19 (QMG Annoal Report, 18<17). 

"(1) RG 92, OQMG. Reporu of QMG to SW and Heads of Departments, vol. ~. p. 629 

Qeaup 10 Hon. John J. Mason, 25 Apr 1857). (2) RG 92, OQMG Leiter Book. vol. 5~, 

pp. <l06-m Oesop 10 Maj. J. McKinstry, 6 Sep 1859). 

"(1) 5 Sial. 512 (Aug 2~, 1824). (2) Upton, TII~ Mi/ilary Policy of III~ U"ilt:d Slat~5, p. 19~. 

'The following table shows Ihe funds appropriated in the spring of 1842, a few month, 
238 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

buildings, except such as were indispensable to their preservation, could 

be ordered during fiscal year 1844. No civilians could be hired; all 

dependence had to be placed on the troops to insure their own comfort. 

Only by order of the Secretary of War were the quartermasters at Phila· 

delphia and at New Orleans each permitted to subscribe to one newspaper 

so that they might obtain shipping lists and current prices, knowledge of 

which was essential to the execution of their duties. The Washington 

office was allowed none-not even the newspaper that published the 

laws--and Jesup requested that the quartermaster at Philadelphia send 

him his newspaper "when you have done with it. " Jesup harked back 

to the early days or his administration and advised that "to save the army 

we must come back to the economy which characterized Mr. Ca lhoun's 

administration of the War Department." t Not until 111 May 1846, 

5 days after the battle of Palo Alto, did Congress enact the first appropriation bill passed with reference to a state of war. Until that time, the 

troops on the southwestern fTonrier had to be supported within the 

limited means at the disposal of the Quartermaster's Department. On 

13 May it became the duty of the Department to provide immediately the 

supplies and means of transportation for three separate armies- the first 

concentrating on the lower Rio Grande, the second at San Antonio, Tex., 

and the third at Fort Leavenworth, on the Missouri. 

There had been ample time [or preparation. Ten years earlier, 

Texas had won its independence [rom Mexico. When it sought to join 

the United States in the 1840's, the Mexican government insisted that 

annexation would be equivalent to a declaration of war. Beyond concentrating some troops at Fort Jesup, La., as an Army of Observation 

under the command of Brig. Gen. Zachary Taylor in the spring of 1844, 

before the Seminole War end(d, fOf the roscal year ending !-O Jun 18411, and in 18411, I&H. 

and 1845 [or the ensu ing fiscal year in each aile. 

Approprialion I "43 "44 1845 1846 for fiscal year 

Barracu ...... .... ........ $135,000 105,000 140,000 170,000 

Clothing and equipment .... !l74,876 100,000 140,000 180,000 

QM supplies . . ... ... ...... !l16,000 195,000 195,000 147,000 

Transportation .. .. .. ...... 242,000 170,000 170,000 140,000 

Incidentals .... .. .......... 12'1,000 115,000 90,000 90,000 

5 Stdl., passim. 

'(I) RG 92, OQMG Letters from Maj. Gen. Thomas S. J esup, 1839-1846. unnumbered 

box Oesup 10 Brig. Gen. W. K. A.nnistead, 12 J an 1844). (2) RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, 

vol. !l4, p. 450 (Jesup to CrO$S, I!I May 18411); vol. !IS. p. 65 (Jesup to AQM Ketchum. 18 Jul 

184!1); p. -"14 (Jesup to Stanton. 24 J an 1844). 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 239 

when the first unsuccessful efforts at annexation were being made, the 

government initiated no preparatory measures for war. Shortly after 

Congress adopted a joint resolution of annexation on I March 1845, the 

War Department ordered Taylor to hold his troops in readiness to move 

if Texas accepted the terms of admission proposed. In June it directed 

him, on receipt of information of such acceptance, to proceed to such 

place on or near the Rio Grande as was adapted to repelling invasion. ~ 

Early in June 1845, Taylor concentrated his forces at New Orleans 

preparatory to moving them later in that month to Corpus Christi on 

the N ueces River where he pursued a program of what at a later time 

was called "watchful waiting." Refusa l of the Mexican government to 

receive the diplomatic representative of the United States, John Slidell, 

made rejection of this country's overtures for amicable settlement of all 

issues look almost certain. When news of the rejection reached Washing. 

ton on 12 January 1846, Taylor was ordered to advance his forces to the 

Rio Grande. Communications being slow, the general received these 

instructions 3 weeks later, and it was not until 8 March that his troops 

began to move off on the road towards Matamoras, establishing a new 

base at Point Isabel on an inlet known as the Brazos de Santiago. 

Another month of "watchful waiting" followed until, on 25 April, a 

reconnoitering party of dragoons was attacked by Mexican forces, and 

Taylor reported to Washington on the following day that "hostilities 

may now be considered as commenced," T 

P1'eliminary QUa1'le1'masler Prepamtions 

What measures did the Quartermaster's Department take in the 

13 months that elapsed between I March 1845, when Taylor was ordered 

to hold his troops in readiness to move from Fort J esup, and 26 April 

1846, when he reponed that war had begun? Such measures as were 

taken were initiated by Col. Henry Stanton. He served as Acting 

Quartermaster General during the spring and summer of 1845 because 

J esup had left Washington in April on an extensive inspection tour of 

the western posts from which he was not expected to return until autumn. 

Mindful of the demands that might be made upon the Department, however, Jesup, before departing, had discussed with Stanton a certain redistribution of personnel to strengthen the Quanermaster organization in 

the southwest. 

In 1845, the personnel of the Department still totaled 37 officers as 

• House Ex. Doc. No. 60, 30th Cong., 1st Se$$., pp. 79-82 (SW to TayIo .. , 28 May, 15 JUII 

1845). 

' I bid., p. 2S8 (Taylor to AG, 26 Apr 1846). 
240 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

it had since 1838 when Congress had provided for 2 assistant quartermasters general, 2 deputy quartermasters general, 4 quartermasters, and 

28 assistant quartermasters under a Quartermaster General. This was 

the authorized legal orga nization of the Quartermaster's Department but 

its actual strength was far less. On the eve of the Mexican War, there 

were six vacancies in the Department. onc of quartermaster and five of 

assistant quartermaster. From the existing staff, one offi cer was permanently detached as superintendent of the clothing depot at Philadelphia 

and two served in the Washington office. onc charged with the administration of affairs and the other with disbursements. Of the remaining 

officers, one was entirely disabled and twO partially so. On the eve of 

the war, Jesup expressed the hope that Congress would increase the 

number of offi cers in his Department, and he urgently recommended that 

the Secretary of War at least fill the six vacancies immediately.s 

The existing staff was small for performing the tasks that lay ahead, 

but its officers were thoroughly experienced. Most of them had seen 

service in the field during the Seminole War. Moreover, all the senior 

offi cers of the Department had, as young men, served in the line in the 

War of 1812. For more than a quarter of a century they had held 

important posts in the Department. Trueman Cross and Thomas F. 

Hunt had been among the first officers appointed by Jesup when he 

became Quartermaster Genera l in 1818. Cross, Hunt, and Stanton 

had repeatedly been called upon to serve as Acting Quartermaster General 

during Jesup's absences from Washington. They had helped to shape 

the Department's organization, to formulate its regu lations, and to 

develop its procedures. 

The Department's strength was not increased until 10 months after 

the war began. Then Congress added four additional quartermasters 

and ten assistant quartermasters. It is to be understood that Congress 

authorized the appointment of additional regimental quartermasters, 

from subalterns of the line when it call ed the volunteers into service and 

when it increased the size of the Regular Army. It limited all of these 

appointments, however, to the duration of the war.e 

Colonel Stanton began strengthening the Quartermaster organization in the southwest by transferring Lt. Col. Thomas F. Hunt to the 

key post of New Orleans. The deputy quartermaster general, then 

serving in Florida, was thoroughly familiar with the resources of the area 

and the duties of that post by reason of his many years of service at 

• RG 92. OQMG Consolidated Correspondence File. Box 477 Uesup 10 Marcy. 14 Apr 1846). 

"9 Slat. 17. 124. 126 Oun 18. 1846 and Feb II. 1847). The legislation limiting the service 

of the four quartermasters and 10 assistant quartemlasters to the duration of the war was 

repealed by the act of July 19. 1848. but it provided. however. that no vacancy that might 

occur should be filled until authorized by subllCquent legislation. 9 Slat. 201, 203. 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 241 

New Orleans. Capt. Osborn Cross, son of Col. Trueman Cross, was sent 

to take charge of Quartermaster duties at Fort Jesup, and Capt. George W. 

Crosman, on duty at Boston, was reassigned to Taylor's headquarters.'o 

Months earlier, J esup had designated Col. Trueman Cross for service 

in the southwest. and in August the Secretary of War ordered the 

assistant quartermaster general, then on duty at New York, to General 

Taylor'S headquarters, charging him with the immediate direction of 

affairs of the Department in Texas and its vicinity. In addition to 

Captains Crosman and Cross. the Department sem two additional quartermasters and four assistant quartermasters to Texas, and placed them, as 

well as Hunt at New Orleans, under the direction of Colonel CrossY 

By the fall of 1845, IO of the Department's roster of 37 officers were on 

duty in the area. In the absence of provision for the service by Congress, 

Colonel Cross and Lieutenant Colonel Hunt were obliged to create the 

resources necessary to keep the Army in the fi eld and, in Jesup's opinion, 

contributed largely to its early victories on the Rio Grande." 

Undoubtedly, it would have been of great advantage in 1845 to 

have had in readiness a wagon train of 300 to 400 wagons, all of them 

made from one established standard pattern, so that by freely interchanging parts, as Colonel Cross suggested, a complete wagon might have been 

made from two or three crippled ones. Unfortunately, there were no 

wagons in readiness; in any emergency they had to be made in haste-

"taken from the stump" in the graphic phrasing of Colonel Cross-after 

troops were ordered to the fi eld.

a Under these circumstances and antici· 

pating that when Taylor's troops moved from Fort Jesup they would 

require additional means of transportation, Colonel Stanton, on 23 April 

1845, ordered the quartermaster at Philadelphia to contract for the con· 

struction of 30 four-horse wagons of the type that had been used in 

Florida. About a month later, these wagons with the necessary sets of 

harness were shipped to New Orleans to be held subject to Taylor's 

orders.u By 17 August, Stanton had shipped an additional 30 wagons 

from Philadelphia and had ordered 20 more procured, though he stressed 

good workmanship rather than speed in ordering their constTliction.u 

'· RG 92. OQMG Letter Book. vol. 36. p. 439 (Stanton to Hunt. 29 Apr 184.5); pp. !i46-47 

(Stanton to Taylor.!i Jun 1845); pp. 5&1-6!i. 590-91 (Stanton to Crosman. 7 Jun . 2 Jul 184.~ ). 

"(I) Ibid .. vol. 37, p. 69 (Slanlon to Cross. 18 Aug 1845), (2) House Ex. Doc. No. 119. 

29th Cong .• 2d feU .• 279 (Slanton to Cross, 9 Sep 1845) . 

.. RG 92, OQMG ReporLS of QMG to SW and Heads of Departments, I, 67 Oesup to SW. 

29 Jun 1849) . 

.. Hou$C' Ex. IRx. No. 60. p. 647 (Crou to QMG. 23 Nov 184.5) . 

.. RG 92. OQMG Letter Book. vol. 3.5. p. 481 (Stanton to Thomas. 23 Apr 1845); pp. 519. 

5<17 (Stanton to Taylor. 17 May and 5 Jun 1845). 

"Ibid .. vol. 36. pp. 6O!S-{l6 (Slanton to Hunt and Thomas. 16 Jul 11H5); vol. 37. pp. 66-67 

(Slanton to Hunt and Thomas, 17 Aug 1845). 
242 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

By that time, Taylor and part of his troops had arrived at Corpus 

Christi. Captain Crosman was attempting to organize an effi cient wagon 

train, but he had only 30 wagons though the dragoons marching overland 

were expected to bring about 50 with them. In any case, he estimated 

that, if a movement was made to the Rio Grande. a train of at least 100 

wagons would be required, and if the dragoon horses were to be foraged 

40 miles in the interior. 50 more wagons would be needed.'8 Stanton 

at once ordered 50 additional wagons procured at Cincinnati. 

Colonel Cross, who had been directing from New York the transportation of additional companies of Regulars to Texas, stopped at Washington before proceeding to Taylor's headquarters. Reviewing the available 

means of land transportation, he pronounced them inadeq uate. So far 

the Department had ordered 130 wagons, the last of which could not 

reach Corpus Christi before November. With 76 companies of Regulars 

either in or on their way to Texas, the baggage train alone for that 

number of men, he pointed OUl, would require 90 wagons. If the Army 

advanced to the Rio Grande, a line of operations would thereby be 

established 100 miles in length, over which all supplies including forage 

for dragoon and artillery horses would have to be transported. Cross 

estimated that a suppl y train of 175 wagons would be required for the 

purpose. making a total of 265 wagons. Allowing for the 130 wagons 

already ordered or delivered and the 50 the dragoons had with them, the 

Department would have to provide 85 additional wagons.!' Drawing 

on his experience in the Seminole War, Colonel Cross also advised that 

to permit repair of wagons in Texas th e Department ought to send out 

three good wheelwrights and three blacksmiths as well as a supply of 

1,000 seasoned spokes. 500 fellies. 50 pairs of hounds, and 50 tongues. IS 

Stanton immediately gave orders (or the procurement at Philadelphia 

of the additional wagons and repair supplies and for the hire of the 

needed artisans.' ~ 

At Corpus Christi. Quartermaster officers were exerting every effort 

to obtain the necessary draft animals. For a time. a brisk trade in mules 

was carried on along the Mexican border. The failure to procure mules 

and horses in the area to the extent anticipated, however, compelled the 

quartermasters to turn to the use of oxen. 2U By January 1846. Colonel 

Cross had 592 oxen with the Army. of wh ich 240 were daily at work 

'. House E.x. DOt:. No. 119. pp. 554- 55 (CrO$man to Stanton. 26 Aug 1845). 

"House E". Doc. No. 50, pp. 542-4~ (Cross to Stanton, 10 Sep 1845). 

"' lbid ~ p. 5411 (Cross to Stanton, 10 Sep 1845). 

,. House Ex. Doc, No. 119. p. 279 (Stanton to Thomas, 10 Sep 1845). 

"Ibid., pp. 1134-115 (Crosman to Stanton, 25 Aug 1845); pp. 114 1-42 (Cross to QMG. 21 Nov 

1845). 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 243 

hauling grass for the animals and wood for the regiments and for the 

general purposes of the depot.

u 

Even morc difficult to obtain than the animals were wagon drivers. 

In a frontier area, common laborers could scarcely be hired at any rate 

let alone experienced drivers. When drivers were brough t in from New 

Orleans, Cross charged that they often were anything but what they 

professed to be. After incurring the expense of transporting them to 

Corpus Christi, the quartermasters found them to be incompetent, and 

they were either discharged or they left of their own accord without 

having rendered any service. What was need ed, Cross suggested, was an 

efficient corps of enlisted train drivers, ready for service whenever the 

Army went into the field. The existing system, he maintained, could 

paralyze the Army's movements at any time, for these were dependent on 

a corps of hired drivers who might quit at their pleasure, or extort their 

own price by a general strike for higher wages. Such a strike had 

occurred in November and Cross had been compelled to yield to the 

drivers' terms.a 

T he Quartermaster organization at Corpus Christi worked strenuously to provide adequate transportation against the day when Taylor's 

forces moved to the Rio Grande. Colonel Cross assured Jesup that 

movement would not be delayed [or want of transportation. Although 

the fu ll number of wagons called £01' by his requisition in September 1845 

had not arrived by February 1846, he reported that he would be able to 

muster a train of nearly 300 wagons----one for every ten marching men 

in the Army which he thought would not exceed 3,000, He had assigned 

110 wagons for baggage and the hospital departmen t and 190 for a supply 

trai n. The lack of Engineer reconnaissance to determine whether the 

roads were feasible for wagon trains had compelled Colonel Cross to 

gather his own data by sending ou t an experimental train toward 

Ma tamoras. He added further that he had received no line of instructions, or any order wha tsoever from General Taylor respecting the means 

of transponation or other Quartermaster preparations.n 

While the quartermasters with Taylor's forces coped with the 

problem of furnish ing an adequate wagon train, upon Lieutenant Colonel 

Hunt fell the burden first of quartering the troops in New Orleans upon 

their arrival from Fon Jesup, then of providing for their transportation 

to the Nueces River, and finally of Forward ing supplies sent via New 

Orleans. Hunt had been obliged to quarter the 3d Infantry Regiment 

in an empty cotton press at a high rental. Without knowing to which 

.. ou~ Ex. Doc. No. 60. p. 649 (Cross 10 J esup. 16 J an 1846). 

tl l bid v pp. 646-48 (Cross 10 Jesup. 23 Nov 1845) . 

.. Ibid., pp. 649-50 (Crms 10 Jesup. 16 Feb 1846). 
244 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

point in Texas Taylor would want transportation, Hum solicited bids 

"being indefinite in regard to time and place." Under the circumstances 

he did not receive many. Use of schooners proved to be out of the 

question since there were no morc than enough to transport half the 

command. R iver steamboats had to be rejected as unsafe to send to sea. 

There were only two Gulf steamers in port, but they drew too much 

water to enter any port between Galveston and the Rio Grande. Taylor 

preferred Steamships and Hunt was finall y able to charter suitable transports. Anticipating the need for lighterage. he also purchased onc steam 

lighter and chartered a second.u 

The troops were establ ished temporarily on St. Joseph's Island until 

Taylor decided on a camp site at Corpus Christi on the west bank 

of the N ueces River. They then made a very rough passage of the bay 

in seven small fishing boats hired by the quartermaster for the purpose 

of transporting men and cargo. Supplies were landed with great difficulty, and under the supervision of Quartermaster Crosman a depot was 

established on the island.n He used a number of steamers to forward 

supplies from the depot to Corpus Christi. Captain Crosman also made 

preparations for handling the arrival of the additional companies of 

infantry and artillery, whose transportations to Texas from posts on the 

Canadian border and the Atlantic and Gulf coasts were arranged by the 

Q uartermaster's Department. By mid-October 1845, the forces present 

at Corpus Christi numbered not quite 4,000-but this was almost half 

of the entire Army.tG 

The troops were encamped in tents, but there was considerable 

dissatisfaction: A board of survey inspecting certain tents used by the 

7th Infantry Regiment pronounced the material from which they were 

made as unfit for use, being too thin to shed rain and, in many cases, so 

lacking in strength that it tore easily at the seams. Colonel Cross agreed 

with the report and requested an immediate shipment of some wall tents 

and common tents for at least 2,000 men. On 8 December, 110 wall 

tents and 333 common tents were ordered for the use of the Army in 

Texas. IT In the event the troops remained for the winter season at 

Corpus Christi, Taylor saw no necessity for hutting them. Instead, he 

.. RG 92. OQMC Consolidated Correspondence File. nox 660 (Hunt to Stanton. 27 Ju1 

1845). 

-(I) House Ex. Doc. No. 60. pp. 97- 98; 99-100 (Taylor to Adj. Gen .. 28 Jul . 15 Aug 1845). 

(2) Capt. William S. Henry. Cam/Jdign SIIf:lchts 0/ Ihe Wctr wilh Mexico (New York. 1848). 

pp.I6-17. (3) Maj. Gen. Ethan Allen Hitchcock. Fi/''1 Yect l'$ i" Cctmp ctlld Fidd (New York. 

19(9). p. 194. 

- House E.x. Doc. No. 60. pp. 11 0- 11 (Taylor 10 AG. 15 Oct 1845). 

or (I) RC 92. OQMG Consolidated Correspondence File. Box 659 (Cross !O QMG. 16 Nov 

1845). (2) RG 92. OQMG Letter Book, Clothing. \'01. 9, p . 91 Uesup 10 Cross, 6 Jan 1846). 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 245 

proposed to use sheds with platforms on which to pitch the tents-a 

practice that had been extensively used in camps of position in Florida. 28 

However willing the Quartermaster's Department was to provide 

for the troops, its efforts were hampered by lack of funds. By midOctober 1845, Colonel Stanton warned Cross that "OUf appropriations 

will be hard run before they can be reinforced," n When a requisition 

came in from Genera l Taylor for a complete set of ponton equipment, 

neither the Engineer Department nor the Quartermaster's Department 

had funds to procure the equipment estimated to cost from $15,000 to 

$20,000. The Acting Quartermaster General advised Captain Crosman 

that it could be provided only arter Congress had made the necessary 

appropriation. 11I By the time the ponton equipment reached Taylor, 

it was no longer needed. 

After Taylor had received instructions to advance to the Rio Grande 

on 4 February 1846, Quartermaster activities at camp hit a furious pace 

as supplies to be sent by water to the Brazos de Santiago were transferred 

from Corpus Christi to S1. Joseph's Island to await shipment. The 

organization of the wagon trains required the exertion of every effortformed as they were, according to Colonel Cross, "from the crudest 

materials:" 1,000 wild mules, "drawn by stealth from Mexico," (for the 

trade was contraband) and 600 half-broken oxen from the interior of 

Texas." 

The Army, carrying 20 days' subsistence and 16 days' gra in for the 

animals, began its march, the first of the troops moving Ollt on 8 March 

1846. Its forces were not concentrated un til they had crossed the Little 

Colorado River. A tota l of 1,900 horses and mules and 500 oxen moved 

with it. The entire train consisted of 307 wagons, of which 84 were 

drawn by ox teams. All were brought through with but few losses 0 1' 

casualties on the way-a creditable achievement, Cross reported, considering the distance by way of Point Isabel was 188 miles. An officer 

of the Department marched with each brigade of the Army. Quartermaster Charles Thomas remained at 51. Joseph's Island to conduct the 

fleet of transports to the Brazos de Santiago and establish the new depot 

at Point Isabel. Both Heet and troops arrived there on 24 March. 

Then began the backbreaking work of getting the supplies ashore. 

Vessels drawing more than 4Y2 to :; feet of water could not approach 

nearer than 5 miles to the landing. A double transshipment of every 

• House Ex. Doc. No. 60, p. 112 (Taylor to AG, 7 No ... 1845) . 

• RG 92. OQMG utter Book, \'01. 37, pp. 16G-61 (17 0<:( 1845). 

-(I) Ibid" "01. 37, p. 161 (Stanton to Crt»man, 17 Oct 1845), (2) House Ex, Doc, No. 119, 

pp. "35--56 (Crosman to Stanton, 4 Sep 1845 and indorsements). 

II House Ex. Doc. No. 119, pp. '45-46 (Cross to Jesup, 17 Feb 1846), 
246 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

cargo became necessary-first from the seagoing transports to the Department's light steamers, and then from the latter to flats and light 

boats. Colonel Cross hoped that much labor could be curtailed when 

a suitable wharf had been built from materia ls then on their way from 

New Orleans}2 After taking up IO days' subsistence and forage, the 

Army on 27 March moved to the Rio Grande to encamp opposite 

Matamoras and await events. 

Cross reported that he would go with the Army and then return to 

regulate the depot at Point Isabel. But time was running out for 

Colonel Cross. Ambushed and killed by banditti outside the camp at 

Matamoras, he was accorded a military funeral 2 days before hostilities 

began,U Esteemed as an officer "of more than ordinary attainments," 

he had for 28 years worked closely with Jesup in developing a wellregulated and well-organized Department. The War Department, in 

May, temporarily appointed Maj. Charles Thomas chief of the Quartermaster's Department with the Army. of Occupation, but it ordered him 

to remain at p:oint lsabel. supervising the establishment of the depot. 

The Department made Captain Crosman, the senior assistant quartermaster, responsible for the operations of the Quartermaster's Department 

with the marching force. B4 By 2 July 1846, Lt. Col. Henry Whiting, 

deputy quartermaster general, arrived at POilU Isabel to take over the 

duties of chief quartermaster with Taylor's Army.1I 

Before Taylor's dispatch on the beginning o[ hostil ities reached 

Washington on Saturday evening, 9 May 1846, the Regulars under his 

command had won the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. On 

receipt of the dispatch, Polk began to prepare his war message to be 

read in Congress the following Monday. With commendable speed, 

Congress 2 days later enacted legislation authorizing the President to 

accept 50,000 volunteers to serve for 12 months and appropriating 

$10,000,000 for war purposes.as On the same day, Congress also provided 

for expansion of the regular forces by authorizing the President to 

increase through volunteer enlistments the number of privates in each 

or any of the companies of dragoons, artillery, and infantry to not more 

than lOa, that number to be reduced to 64 when the exigency requiring 

the increase should have ceased.31 

" (I) Ibid., p. 347 (CTOSS to Hunt. 6 Mar 1846). (2) RG 92. OQMG Consolidated Corr('$' 

pondence File. Box 660 (Cross to Jesup. 10 Mar. 26 Mar. 4 Apr 1846) . 

.. Henry. Campaig" Sk etches of the War with Mexico, pp. 73. 75- 76. 81- 82 . 

.. House Ex. Doc. No. 119. p. 197 (GO 58, 7 May 1846). 

· (1) RG 92. OQr.fG Letter Book. vol. 37. pp. 443-44 GcsuP to Whiting. !I JUII 1846). (2) 

RG 92. Whiting. Letter! Sent, vol. T. p. 24. 

· 9 Stal. 9 (May 13, 1846) . 

.. 9 Stat. II (May I!I. 1846). 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 247 

The Secretary of War at once made requisitions upon the governors 

of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio. Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, Arkansas, 

Mississippi. Alabama, and Georgia for about 23.000 volunteers to be 

mustered into service immediately for a period of 12 months. The 

governors of the other states were asked to raise and enroll the rest of the 

volunteers, holding them in readiness to be called into service later at 

the discretion of the President. Such was the enthusiasm that a Kentucky 

regiment and a battalion from Baltimore and Washington were mustered 

into service as early as 30 May 1846. The other units were quickly 

filled during the summer." 

Subsistence Supply 

The rapid movement of the volunteers to the Rio Grande called 

[or an immediate supply of rations by the Subsistence Department. 

Like the Quartermaster's Department, the Subsistence Department was 

also understaffed. Its organization had remained unchanged since 1838. 

Headed by Col. George Gibson as Commissary Genera l of Subsistence, 

it had a staff of five officers, of 'whom one was an assistant commissary 

general of subsistence and four were commissaries of subsistence. These 

officers procured the rations and administered the subsistence depots. 

Assistant commissaries, who were line officers with rank of lieutenant, 

handled issue to the troops. When Congress called out volunteers, it 

authorized the President to appoint for each brigade one commissary, 

with the rank of major, and for each regiment one assista nt commissary, 

with the rank of captain. Their services were to continue as long as 

they were rc;quired." These appointments proved unsatisfactory, and, 

when new troops were to be raised in 1847, the Department recommended 

that they be discharged and the Regular Army system ·be followednamely, to allow the colonel of the regiment to select a subaltern for the 

duties of assistant commissary,tO 

It had become established practice to have procurement officers sta· 

tioned at the principal provision markets at New York, Baltimore, New 

Orleans, and St. Louis. By law, the Department was required to procure 

rations by soliciting bids and making COntracts from 6 to 18 months in 

advance, the subsistence being delivered for inspection in bulk at places 

designated in the contract. Ever si nce 1842. however, Colonel Gibson 

had been stressing the advantages of open-market purchases. The troop 

- (I) House Ex. Doc. No.4, 29lh Cong., 2d scu .. pp. 47. 54 (Rpt of 5W). (2) Justin H. 

Smith, Th e lVar willI Mexico (2 vol5., New York. 1919), T, 192- 93. 

- 9 Slat. 17 Uun 18,1846) . 

.. RG 192, CGS, Lencrs to SW, I 840-·M , p. 182 (Acting CGS to Marcy, 13 May 1847). 
248 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

movement to Texas in 1845 gave added force to his argument, for the 

movement took troops from posts where supplies were due under contract, 

and, except for the fact that the market price rose above the contract 

price, the government wou ld have been compell ed to receive provisions 

where they were not wanted or give a bonus to the contractors for 

surrendering their contracts." By direction of the Secretary of War, 

open-market purchases were permitted during the war. but at its termination the contract system was once again reinstated. much to the disgust 

of Colonel Gibson, who insisted the system was so objectionable that it 

ought to be abrogated altogcther.u 

Despite the rap id concentration of troops on the Rio Grande in the 

summer of 1846, Colonel Gibson reported that in general they were 

supplied with an abundance of wholesome provisions. At distant points 

on the line of operation, however- and th is was particularly true for the 

troops serving with Brig. Gen. Stephen W. Kearny- parts of the ration 

were necessaril y omitted or reduced." As far as Scott's Army was concerned, once the troops had penetrated into the interior of Mexico 

beyond Jalapa, they were almost wholly supplied with subsistence from 

the country in the vicinity of their operations, the chief commissary with 

the Army purchasing the provisions. 

The ration still consisted of much the same components as it had 

in the past." Potatoes were furn ished for antiscorbutic purposes, but 

failure of the potato crop induced Gibson to recommend the use of dried 

apples. On the other hand, he blocked all efforts to introduce a product 

ca ll ed "extract of beef" in the ration. This he found to be nothing 

more than an inferior quality of "portable soup" that had been tried 

during the Seminole War in the hope of lessening transportation costs and 

had been universa ll y rejected by the troops.4$ 

Although no officia l complaint of either the quality or the quantity 

of subsistence furnished to the armies was received by the Subsistence 

Department from any quarter, unofficial sources were not so reticent. 

William H. Richardson, a volunteer who marched under the command 

of Col. Alexa nder W. Don iphan, found his rmt meal in Indian territory 

was a supper of hard water crackers and mess pork. He boiled the pork 

for nearly 2 hours, he recorded, but it was still so tough that it was 

"harder labor than I had been at all day to eat it." A SOLIP the men 

"Ibid., pp. 147-48 (GitKon 10 Marcy. 27 Oct 1845). 

"Ibid., p. 170 (CCS Rpt . 17 Noy 1846). 

"Ibid., p . 170 (GGS Rpt. 17 Noy 1846) . 

.. <I) ~ aPlle, pp. 118. 203. (2) Jonathan W. Ruhoup. NnITn lroe 0/ Iii" CePltral Div;sio" 

(I'imburgh. 1847). p. "'5 . 

.. RG 192. CGS, Letten'to SW, 1840-54, p. 176 (Gibson 10 Marcy, 20 Jan 1847); (1 . 186 

(Same to same. 10 Aug 1847). 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 249 

made out of pork, buffalo meat, and fish boiled together was "a rare 

mess, but we pronounced it first-rate." os Customarily, commissaries 

issued hard ship biscuit on the march, hut when not available, the men 

drew Rour. O n the march, there was only one way to cook it-the Hour 

was mixed with water, poured into a pan in wh ich pork-fat was fry ing, 

and cooked into "slap-jacks," as they were called on the Rio Grande. 

"This mixture called bread, with the meat, which was from cattle on the 

hoof. driven with the column and slaughtered at the evening's halt, 

laid the foundation for the discharge of many soldiers from the army." 

a Maryland volunteer confided. "It took a strong man to stand it." H 

In the interior of Mexico, this mixture of fiour and water earned the 

name "musquit bread" because there commissaries frequently issued 

Mexican flour in lieu of American flour. It " reminded us of Dr. 

Franklin's celebrated sawdust pudding," wrote a volunteer who marched 

with Maj. Gen. John W. Wool from San Antonio. But worse was yet 

to come. Wool ordered nine ears of corn issued daily to each man 

and directed the troops to grind their own flour in steel mills that had 

been provided for the expedition (one for each company of the command). 

So grea t was the uproar aga inst the "all·fired, infernal, flambusted, 

penetentiary instruments" ca lled steel mills that the "corn laws" had 

to be rescinded. " 

Fortunately, the troops were usually able to supplement their rations 

with more appeiizing viands. Wherever there were villages, the inhabi· 

tants offered vegetables, bread, eggs, cheese, fruits, chickens, and other 

provisions for sale. Now and then a cow or goat was brought to be 

milked at the tent door." When the soldiers had no cash, they resorted 

to barter. Two needles were exchanged for six ears of corn and some 

onions; buttons and a little tobacco were handed over for a few peaches.fO 

lndian goods were carried along on the march to California for trade 

with the Indians en route. Where prices were too exorbitant for the 

delicacies offered them, "some of the boys were compelled to adopt the 

old mode of mustering into service." II Sutlers, too, had provisions for 

sale but at prices usually too high for the soldier's purse. 

The sutler's price for liquor apparently proved no deterrent to 

sales. Taylor tried to prevent the barter or sa le of any liquor by sutlers 

in the Army or by private dea lers. He also prohibited the sale of liquor 

.. Journlll 0/ William R. Richardson (5<1 ed .• New York. 1848). pp. 5. 15 . 

.. John R. Kenly. M emoirs 0/11 lIfllryill"d Yo/url/ttr (Philadelph ia. 1873). p. 211 . 

.. Buhoup. Narrptive 0/ tlu Cwtrt./ Dil/isiotl, pp. 67-72 . 

.. (I) John T. Hughes. Doni/lll(m's Expeditiorl (Cincinnati. 1850). p. 76. (2) Kenly. 

Memoirs 0/ a Maryland Yolunlttr, p. 153 . 

• Joumlll 0/ Wil/jam H. Richardson, pp. 29. 50. 

II Buhollp. NII""lIti~ 0/ tlu Cenlrlll Division, p. 55. 
250 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

in bars on steamboats plying the Rio Grande.~2 Nevertheless, the soldiers 

managed to get muscai, brandy, aguardiente, or some other spiritous 

liquor. Some of them even made a profitable business of buying it hom 

the Mexicans and selling it to their comrades in arms. "With a canteen 

on their sides, and a littl e cup in their pockets," they were ready. "when 

onc raised his finger, to step round a corner, or into some courtyard, 

and pour them Out a drink for a rea l or bit," These "traveling groceries," as they were call ed, could be met in any street.U 

Clothing and Equipping the Troops 

The volunteers who answered the call of arms in the summer of 

1846 had nOt only to be provided with rations but also equipped and 

transported to Mexico. As soon as news of war reached Washington, 

Jesup immediately turned to the problem of procuring the Quartermaster 

supplies that would be needed by the Army. For the first time, wartime 

procurement orders could be expedited by the use of the telegraph. Only 

2 years before the war, the government had, financed an experimental 

line from Washington to Baltimore, and private enterprise had extended 

telegraph lines to New York and Philadelphia in 1845. In less time than 

in the past, Jesup could order clothing and equipage from the Schuylkill 

Arsenal, arrange shipments from New York, or direct his quartermaster 

in Baltimore to speed up the procurement o[ wagons. It became estab· 

lished procedure to supplement the telegraphed order by a follow+up 

letter the same day. 

Even before Congress acted upon the war news, Jesup directed 

Colonel Stanton, assistant quartermaster general at Philadelphia, to 

ascertain the state of his supplies at the depot and "to strengthen yourself 

in such articles as you may not have an abundance on hand." at A large 

quantity of camp and garrison equipment would be required at New 

Orleans for issue to the vol.unteers moving through that port. By law, 

the government furnished them such equipment. In accordance with 

General Scott's recommendations for the support of an Army of some 

20,000 men. Jesup soon sent specific procurement orders to Stanton for 

650 wall tents, 3,523 common tents, 800 spades, 1,760 axes, 4,082 hatches, 

3.523 camp kettles, 7,045 mess pans, and 20,000 each of tin canteens, 

haversacks, and knapsacks.u 

.. (I) House Ex. Doc. No. 60. p. 497 (Order No. 94, 2 Aug 1846). (2) Whiti ng, LetlcnI Sem. 

I, 162 (\Vh iting 10 Capt. E. A. Ogden, 24 ]ul 1846). 

" George C. Furber, Th ~ Twdu~ Mouths Voluulu r (Cincinnati, 1850), p. 419. 

$ORG 92, OQMG Letter Book, Clothing, vol. 9, p. II~ (10 May 1846), 

"(I) Ibid., vol. 9, p. 157 (17 May 1846), (2) ':'louse Ex, Doc, No, 119. pp. 250-5 1 (Scott 

memoranda ror chieb or general staff of anny at Washington, 15 May 1846. 
LOGISTIGAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXIGAN WAR 251 

Such articles of equipment and Army clothing had been procured 

in the past by the Office of the Commissary General of Purchases, but 

in 1846 a separate Purchasing Depanmcnt no longer existed, Callendar 

Irvine, who had served as Commissary General of Purchases for 29 years, 

had died on 9 October 184 1. For some years before his death, there had 

been a growing dissatisfaction with the operations of the Purchasing 

Department, and late in 1838 the Secretary of War had appointed a board 

to inquire into the system of furnishing clothing and camp equipage. 

The board had been instructed to report all defects and submit its views 

on improvements.u A conviction- unfounded according to Jesup-had 

developed among the members of Congress that certain sections of the 

country were favored in letting the contracts for supplies." As a consequence, when the President gave 1. Washington Tyson a recess appointment as Commissary General of Purchases a few days after Irvine's death, 

Congress had not only rejected Tyson's nomination upon reconvening 

but had also abolished the Office of Commissary General of Purchases 

on 23 August 1842. Despite the opposition of the Secretary of War, 

it had merged the duties of the former Purchasing Department in the 

Quartermaster's Department.

6I On 29 August, Tyson had handed over 

the office and its records to Col. Henry Stanton who had assumed direction 

of all Quartermaster activities in Philadelphia. 

The Secretary of War had alread y abolished the Clothing Bureau 

in Washington in the fa ll of 1841, returning to the Quartermaster's 

Department the function of estimating clothing requirements that it had 

relinquished to that Bureau in 1832.u T he Mexican War became the 

first war in which the Department was wholly responsible for the procurement, storage, and distribution of clothing to the Army. 

T he outbreak of war found the Schuylkill Arsenal with only the 

scantiest of clothing supplies on hand. Reduction of clothing appropriations in the years immedi ately preceding the war had permitted the 

Quartermaster's Department to do no more than provide the annual 

clothing supply for the small peacetime Army and to accumulate clothing 

stocks only to the extent of a half year's allowance to that small peacetime 

establishment. In the spring of 1846, the Arsenal was therefore in no 

position to furnish clothing to the volunteers and it was not ca lled upon 

.. RG 107, OSW, Military Book, vol. 20, p , 45 (Po insett to ~nton, dill., 19 De<: 18!8), 

.. RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, Clothing, vol. 9, p , 170 Oaup (0 St~nto , J!" Jul 1846). 

-(I) RG 10'7, OSW, Milit~ry Book, vol, 24, p, 182 (SW to Tyson, I! Oct 1841). (2) R G 10'1, 

OSW, Reporu 10 Congress, vol. 5, pp. 172-75, 260-6 1 (SW to rm~n . Se ~te lit ~ry Affa irs 

Comminee. 25 , 20 J un 1942). (5) 5 StilI. 512 (Aug 25. 1842). 

-(I) RG 10'1. OSW. Military Book, vol. 24, p. 258 (SW to QMG. II Nov 1841). (2) RG 92. 

Coxe nd Irvine P~pen. Metal tray No. 68 (Inventory of property in Clothing Bu re~u turned 

over to the Dep~Tlment . !O Nov 1841). 
30 U.S. I NFANlltV R EG IMENT, 184&-1851 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 253 

to do so since Congress enacted legislation requiring the volunteers to 

furnish their own clothing. By law, each volunteer was allowed $3.50 

per month for clothing during the time he was in service. To enable 

the volunteer to provide himse lf with good and suffic ient clothing, the 

commutation allowance for 6 months-that is $2 1- was advanced to 

each volunteer after he was mustered into service.eo 

Even though the depot was not required to clothe the volunteers, the 

demands from the increased number of Regulars in the field put a 

tremendous pressure upon the clothing establishment at Philadelphia. 

The system of procurement and production instilUted by Callendar Irvi ne 

still functioned in 1846 under Quartermaster direction. Cloth was 

purchased from manufacturers, cut into garments at the Arsenal by 

government cutters, and issued to seamstresses and tailors who returned 

the finished garments to the Arsenal for inspection and acceptance. The 

clothing establishment was capable of rapid expansion to meet the 

demands made upon it. "The spindles and looms of d istant and 

neighboring manufactories were soon put in rapid motion;" the number 

of steamstresses and tailors was speedily increased from about 400 to 10 

times that number; and within a few weeks clothing began to flow into 

the depot. Before the end of the war, the expanded clothing operation 

at Philadelphia insured deli very to the depot of over 85,000 assorted 

garments per month. s1 

To relieve some of the pressure upon the Schuylkill Arsenal, a branch 

of the clothing establishment was set up toward the end of 1846 at New 

York un~ r the direction of Daniel Stinson, an experienced clerk who 

had served in the Department at that station for nearly a quarter of a 

century. Operations of the New York branch could also be en larged 

to meet any emergency. By mid·January 1847, Colonel Stanton was 

certain that the Department would be able not only to meet the wants 

of the regular service but to fill the requisitions which might be made for 

destitute volunteers.n 

By that time, many of the volunteers were indeed destitute. Commutation allowances had nOt been applied in every instance to the 

purchase of clothing, and even when they had, long marches were destructive of clothing and particularly of shoes. A Maryland volunteer 

recorded that "many of the men have made sandals from rawhide, which 

looks right well ; on parade, there are a good many without jackets, yet 

they look soldierlike and trim with their cross~ and waist·belts."" But 

-(I) 9 Slat . 18 Uun 18, 1&46). (2) HOliK' Ex . Doc. No. 119. p. 191 (SW 10 Governors of 

slales. - 18-16) . 

.. RG 92, CCI' . Lellen Sent. No. 402. p. 525 (Stanton to Jesup. 22 Nov 18-18) . 

• RG 92. OQMG Leller Book. Clothing, vol. 9. pp. 26 1-62 (Stanton to Jesup. 15 J an 1847) . 

• Kenly. Memoirs of a Ma ry/and I'ollmfeer, p. 154. 
254 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T HE ARMY 

the appearance of some of the volunteers led Ll. George B. McClellan to 

write that "Falstaff's company were regulars in comparison with these 

fellows-most of them without coats; some would have looked much better 

without allY pants than with the parts o[ pants they wore; all had torn 

and dirty shirts." $4 

Colonel Stanton had good reason to be lieve that the clothing establishment would be called upon to provide for the volunteers as well as 

the regular forces in 1847. He had called their need to the attention 

of the Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee. A resolution 

authorizi ng issue of clothing to vol un teers was carried through the House 

but was not acted upon by the Senate before adjournment. It was not 

until 26 January 1848, a week before the treaty of peace was signed, {hat 

Congress made provision for furnishing the volunteers with clothing in 

kind. It failed, however, to make any appropriation for carrying the 

measure into effect, and made no money available until July.85 

H clothing could not be issued to the volunteers in 1846. it could, 

by order of General Taylor, be made avail able to them for purchase in 

the field." Despite the law, several thousand suits of clothing, sent to 

New Orleans and Mexico for the supply of the old Army under Scou, 

were issued not on ly to the new regiments raised under the act of 

II February 1847 but also to volunteers." General Scott complained 

in December that his regiments had to remai n naked or be supplied with 

very inferior garments procured locally because the small depot at Vera 

Cruz had been exhausted "by the troops under Generals Patterson. 

Butler and Marshall, respectively. all fresh from home or the Brazos, 

and as in the case of other arrivals. since June. without clothingl"" 

But Jesup had placed thousands of forage caps, jackets, shirts, 

overa lls. bootees, and blankets in the Vera Cruz depot, and in his defense 

noted that he had not a single cent that he could lega lly apply to the 

purchase of clothing for the volun teers. He maintained that the generals 

named by Scott had no right to take for their commands supplies placed 

at Vera Cruz for Scott's old regiments, and that they ought to be held 

accountable by the general. In any case,. Jesup advised the Secretary 

.. TIII~ M exk,m JYIIT Dia..., 1>/ Ct:org" II. AleC/dIn .. , ed. William Starr Myers (Princeton. 

1917). p. 58. 

-(I) RG 92. OQMG Lener Book. Clothing. vol. 9. p.255 (Stanton 10 Maj. D. D. Tompkins. 14 Dec 1846); p. 285 (Stanton to J esup, 22 Mar 1847). (2) 9 $/11/. 2 10. (5) RG 92, OQMG 

Letter Book. vol. 40, p. 552 Oesup to SIan Ion. 29 Jun 1848). 

- RG 92, Whiting, Letten Sent, I, 560 (Whiling 10 Clipt. G. Crosman. 26 Oct 1846) . 

., RG 92. OQMC Cousolidated Correspondence File. noll 660 (Account or Clothing b sued 

to Volunteers at Vel'1ll Crux. 6 Dec 1847). 

-(I) House Ex. Doc. No. 50, p. 1047 (Scott to SW, 2S Dec 1847). Sec also pp. 1015, 1054 

(Scott to SW. 2S Jul. 4 Dec 1847): p. 1224 (Scott to SW. 24 Feb 1848). (2) RG 107. OSW. 

Military Book, vol. 28, p. 216 (SlY to J esup, 28 J an 1848). 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 255 

of War that at the time Scott was making his complaint suppl ies at Vera 

Cruz had not been exhausted as the genera l charged. Moreover, Capt. 

James R. Irwin, chief quartermaster with Scott's Army, had made a 

report on 27 September 1847 that warranted some delay in forwarding 

clothing: 

I have now a thousand people engaged in making clothing; the quality of 

the material is not so good as our own, and the price, on the average. is fifty 

per ccnl. higher. Still, supposing the road between this and Vera Cruz to be 

entire ly open, J think the government will lose liuie, i£ anything, by purchasing here. I shall be able to fill. in a very short time, every requisition which has 

been made on me, with clothing, which, though not exactfy of our uniform, 

will be comfortable and good. 80 

By December, however, and in anticipation of favorable congressional action on providing clothing for the volunteers, Jesup ordered 

from Philadelphia a supply of clothing sufficient for the whole Army, 

Regulars and volunteers. To do this, he applied, on his own responsibility, $368,000 of the Department"s funds, appropriated for other purposes, to the purchase of clothing and authorized the use of credit in the 

expectation that Congress would make an appropriation that would 

enable him to meet the bills when they came due. To By this means, 

J esup gave practica l application to the legal authorization for providing 

clothing in kind to the volunteers before the war ended. The Department made every effort to furnish the annual supply of clothing to the 

Regulars during the war. Except when lack of transportation hampered 

delivery or unlawful issue was permitted to be made to volunteers from 

stocks on hand, the Regu lars suffered no shortages of clothing. Where a 

deficiency did occur, as was the case among Scott's troops, the quarter· 

master took prompt measures to correct the supply situation. Not only 

was there littl e or no complaint of clothing shortages, but on the basis 

of the very large quantity of supplies returned to the Schuylkill 

Arsenal from different points in Mexico at the close of the war, Colonel 

Stanton was justified in inferring that the Army had been abundantly 

provided for. TI 

Supply of clothing to the regular troops in the field at the beginning 

• (I) RG 92, CGP Irwin, l.etters Sent, No. 97, n.p. E!{perience caused Irwin to change his 

views later on local procurement. He had been able to supply clothing but the oosu of 

p roduction in Mexico were far higher than he had anticipated, and in December he recom· 

mended lhac all clothing be drawn from the United Scates. I bid., (Irwin to J esup, 8 Dec 1847). 

(2) House Ex. Doc. No. GO, pp. 1060-61 Ocsup co SW, [8 Feb [848). (3) RG 92, OQMG Letter 

Book, vol. 39, p. 583 Ocsup to Slanton, 25 Oct 1847) . 

.. RC. 92. OQMG Letter 8ook, vol. 40. p. 194 Oesup to Capt. A. C. Myers, 22 Feb 1848). 

Myers succeeded Captain Irwin as assislanl quartennaster at Me!{ico City upon the death of 

that officer . 

.. RG 92, CGP, Letters Scm, No: 402. p. 526 (Stanton to Jesup, 22 Nov 1848). 
256 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

of the war followed the established procedure of forw:rrding annual 

supplies prepared in accordance with regimenta l estimates an~ drawn for 

accordingly. By October 1846, that system bad been modified at Taylor's 

request to conform to the practice that had been followed during the 

Seminole War. In consequence. the Quartermaster's Department established a genera l depot of dothing for the regular troops at Poim Isabel 

and at other depot points later. It deposited at the depot all clothing 

intended for specific regiments as a common supply_ The military 

storekeeper in charge requisitioned dircClly on Philadelphia for clothing 

and camp equipage, determining the quantity and kind needed by reference to the strength of the Army and the supply on hand. He issued to 

officers on requisitions approved by regimental or battalion commanders, 

restricting all issues to undress clothing.a 

During the Mexican War, a large part of the shoe production for 

the Army came to be centralized at Phi lade lphia. Unlike the system 

that had developed for the manufacture of Army clothing, Army shoe:! 

had always been obta ined by contract. Known as bootees, they werc 

still being procured exclusively by contract in the summer of 1847. By 

that time, the contract method had become productive of so much "delay, 

disappointment, imposition, and loss" that complete dependence on it 

could no longer be tolerated. To guard ag-ainst deficiencies and LO 

ensure a supply, the Quartermaster's Department set up a bootee.making 

establishmem at the Schuylkill depot. By the end of the war, it was 

turning out 12,000 pairs a month in correct sizes and of such qua lity as 

to still complaints. The system was so successful that the War Department contin ued it after the war. It abandoned the contract method 

completely inasmuch as the bootee establishment could fill all demands 

of a peacetime Army." 

Even before bootees were made at the Schuylkill Arsenal, a tcntmaking establishment had been put into operation there. By the close 

of the war, its employees were turning out over 700 common. wall , and 

hospital tents per ·month. During fiscal year 1848, they made 6,664 

common tents, 1,75 1 wall tents and flies, and 192 hospital tents and flies 

at a lower cost than the Department had been able to obtain in its most 

favorable contract. Only one tentmaker was hired on a monthly basis; 

the rest- there were 36 employed in 1847-were pa id by the piece.H 

.. (I) House Ex. Doc. No. 119, p. 15'1 (Taylor to AC, 28 Aug 1846); p. 218 (Order No. 13!, 

18 Ocl 1816). (2) RG 92, Whiting, Lellel'$Sent, I , 5!1 (Whiling 10 mililary storekeeper, 19 Ocl 

1816); pp. 5S8-oiO (Whiling 10 Stantoll, 20 Oct 1816). 

"(I) RG 92, CGP, Lellen Senl, No. 402, p. 522 (Stanlon 10 Jesup, 22 Nov 1818). (2) RG 92. 

Reporu of QMG 10 SW and Head, of Departments, I, 468-69 Oesup 10 SW. 28 Aug 185 1). 

TO RC 92, CGI', Lelten Senl, No. 102, p. 552 (Stanton to Jesup, 22 Nov 1848); p. !8B-89 

(Lin of I'ersonnel, !O Sep 1817). 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 257 

Throughout th e war, ten ts continued to be both procured under contract 

and manufactured at the depot. 

As in past conflicts, an acute shortage of tents and of duck, Out of 

which to make them, was immediate ly evident on the outbreak of war. 

Such tents as bad been furnished to Taylor's troops at Corpus Christi 

had been selected from stock on hand at the ArsenaL From 1842 to 

1846, Colonel Stanton had procured only 34 wall tents, 88 tcnt flies, 

and 8 hospital tents." T he appropriation for camp equipage thal 

J esup asked for in the spring of 1846 had been stricken out. Not a 

cent had been appropriated that could be legall y applied to the pUTchas,e 

of eamp equipage before May when Congress provided funds for the war. 

At that point, the Department had been obliged to procure wha tever 

material could be obtained in Philadelph ia, New York, Baltimore, or 

Boston. Tents equa l to the old stock could not be furnished and in 

order to give the troops some kind of shelter, J esup determined to use 

cotton canvas in lieu of the imported hemp canvas that was not available.a 

Well aware of the country's lack of preparation for war but preferrin g to ignore it in making a case for his own defense, if that should 

become n ecessary, Taylor, then at Camargo, wrote that his "crying 

defi ciency of camp equipage had been partia lly relieved by the issue of 

cotton tents of indifferent quality." n J esup was willing to concede that 

much of the material used was probably of that quality but he thought 

th at in the circumstances his officers deserved credit for their exertion 

rather than the censure they received. Recipien ts of the tents, however, 

found no shelter from the rain that turned the area around Camargo 

into a flooded quagmire. Criticism was voiced so universally that, in the 

fa ll of 1846, Jesup ordered Stanton to use raven duck in the production 

of tents, but there was still none to be found in the Philadelph ia market." 

Better tents could be made only as the market for d uck improved. 

While much of the procurement of clothing, shoes, and tents was 

centralized at Ph iladelphia, procurement of other items of equipment 

was spread to various parts of the country. T he Department directed 

quartermasters at Pittsburgh and Cincinnati in particular to cOntract for 

knapsacks, canteens, and iron camp kettles and mess pans to be sent to 

New Orleans for the volunteers rapidly concentrating there.n It made 

" RG 92. OQMG Leiter Book. Clothing. vol. 9. p. 9 1 (Jesup to Cross. 6 J an 1846). 

" I bid., vol. 9, pp. 142-43 (Jesup to Col. D. E. Twiggs. 20 May 1846); p. 158 (Jesup 10 

AQM Dusenbery, 9 Jun 1846) . 

.. House Ex. Doc. No. 50, p. 558 (Taylor 10 SW, I Scp 1846) . 

.. (I) I bid., p. 561 (Jesup to SW. 5 Dei: 1846). (2) RG 92, OQMG leiter Book, vol. 38, 

p. 263 (Jesup 10 Stanton, 6 Nov 1946). 

,. (I) RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, Clothing. vol. 9, p. 157 (Jesup 10 Maj. D. D. Tompkins, 

9 Jun 1846). (2) RG 92, .OQMG leiter Book, vol. 37, pp. 428-29 (Jesup to Capt. Ed. Harding, 

27 May 1846). 
258 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

every effort to speed production. If India rubber cloth could be used 

instead of painting the cover of the knapsacks to make them waterproof, 

J esup suggested, much time could be saved in equipping th e volunteers. 

He urged Stanton to accept onc firm's offer to make 500,000 knapsacks 

with India rubber covcrs.80 Some regiments were furnished with India 

r ubber bags, or cantee ns, to carry water. Whil e their use pcrmined a 

quiet approach to the enemy. the water in them became warm as in tin 

canteens. Many a volunteer threw away his cantee n, preferring to use a 

Mexican gourd instead because water in it remained cool through the 

hottest day.1I 

Transportation Problems 

At the same time, the Quartermaster's Department was pushing 

production of clothing and equipment, it was exerting every effort to 

transport volunteers and to ship supplies to the Rio Grande, New 

Orleans was the chief point of assembly and embar kation for the volun· 

teers. In 1846, mOSt of them were drawn from the states of th e Ohio 

and Mississippi valleys, and they began the ir long journey to Mexico on 

river steamboats." Landing at New Orleans, the vol unteers pitched th eir 

tents in the mud of th e old battlefield below the city and waited impa· 

tiently for Colonel Hunt to arrange their transportation to Point Isabel.·a 

H e purchased sea vessels, at prices ranging from $3,000 for a small 

schooner to $85,000 fot' th e steamship Massachusetts, and chartered others, 

usuall y paying about $7,000 for the service performed by each ship. 

The Department sent him other ships offered for its use, leaving it to the 

colonel to decide whether they were suitable. H e also established a 

coal depot at New Orleans of sufficient size to meet all probable demands 

of transportation ror an Army of from 20,000 to 25,000 men." 

His efforts were supplemented by those of Colonel Stanton at Phil a· 

delphia and Lieutenant Colonel Whiting a t New York who were ascer· 

taining on what terms sea steamers could e ither be chartered by the month 

or purchased at those ports. J esup advised that no troops were to be 

sent in sea steamers without the sanction of th eir commanding officers. 

- RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, vol. 9, p. EiS (I Jun ~6) . 

.. Furber, The Twelve Mouflls Po/un/eer, p. 127. 

- For announced arrivals of particular steamboau carrying volunteers, see The Dlli/y 

Pic4yune of Nc:w Orleans, beginning 29 May 11H6 and thereafter through the summer. 

-See, for ClCample, B. F, Scribner, C,.mp Ute 01 II I'olun/eer (Philadelphia, 11H7), 

pp, 11-15, 

.. (I) House Ex , 0«, No. 119, pp, 287-88 Uesup to Hunt, 9 Jun 18-16). (2) RG 92, OQh-fG 

Letter Book, vol. 51, p , . 11 (Same to lame, 17 Jun ~6) . (5) See the columns of T he Daily 

P ic"'Ylm e. New Orleans, for sh ips chartered and purchased. 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 259 

If the latter objected, sailing ships were to be provided.sa Outlining the 

qualifi cations that such steamers must have for use by the Department in 

the Gulf of Mexico, Jesup suggested that they needed sufficient strength 

to withstand the stormy weather and th e heavy sea common in the Gulf; 

their boilers and machinery had to be constr ucted for sea service; they 

should be provided with masts and sails to enable them to ride out a gale 

or make a harbor in the event of accident to their machinery; they must 

be able to carry at least 6 days' fue l besides cargo; they should be copperbottomed if they were not made of iron; and their draft of water should 

never exceed 7 feet. ae 

There were not too many sea steamers available. Americans, their 

eyes focused on westward expansion and the profits of inland tramport~ltion, had been content to concentrate on developing steamboa ts for 

use on the rivers of the Mississippi Valley, or on such inland or protected 

wa ters as the Chesapeake Bay or Long Island Sound, and to rely on their 

excellent sailing ships to carry their commerce on the seasY Their sea 

steamers were small, usually mere copies of river or sound cra ft though 

stouter built than such boats. Their speed was no better than that of 

well-designed sail packet boats. At the time of the Mexican War, they 

were freq uen tly designated as steam schooners, steam brigs, and steamships to denote the particular rig of the sea.going craft. 

In the summer of 1846, the Quartermaster's Department was able 

to charter a few steamships, such as the Galveston and the John L. Day, 

and to purchase a number of others, among them the Massachusetts and 

the McKim, to transport some of the volunteers to the Rio Grande. It 

also purchased several sea steamers, some of which were of the sidewheel 

type and others were steam propellers. The latter proved to be more 

satisfactory than the side-wheel steamers. To meet the tremendous demands for transportation imposed by Scott's expedition against Vera Cruz 

in the following year, the Department purchased additional steamers." 

A considerable number of the ships purchased were acquired for 

the transportation of supplies. For this purpose, the Department preferred the Iight-draft schooner. In the fall of 1846, Jesup, then in the 

fi eld, came to the conclusion that it would be necessary for the Department to have some flat-bottomed, light-draft schooners constructed. Only 

by having a sufficient number of them available could it insure a constant 

- RC 92, OQMC Lcuer Book, vol. n p. 400 Uesup 10 Whiling, 11 May 1846); p. 454 

Uesup 10 Sianlon, 50 May 1846); p. 440 Uesup to AQM Vinton, 2 Jun 1846). 

- Ibid., vol. ~7, p. 454 Uesup to Vinton, 6 Jnn 1846) . 

., See below for discussion of use of river steamboats during the war . 

.. (I) See Table, Government·owned Vessels of the Mexican War. (2) For list of vessels 

employed in the expedition to Venl. Cruz: see House Ex. DO(;. No. 50, pp. 1256-59. ~) Table 

compiled by author [rom the following sources: (a) RG 92. OQMG Consolida ted Correspond-
Table--Covemment·Ownrd Ve$Seb of the Mexican War 

Sail Steam 

T ypes NaUl e Gross TyJlC.' Co rou 

ton5 Na me ton, 

- - Sh ips AMERICAN .......... ,,. Screw. ASHLAND ........... 182 

RHODE ISLAND ..... " I EDIT U . . ...... ....... '07 

SAI NT LOU IS ........ "0 EUDORA .. .. ........ ... SUVIAU ........... ... m JAMES CAGE .. .. ..... l Ei 

MCK IM .............. ' 26 

Bark ROBERT MORRI S ... 2<0 MAJOR TOM I'K INS .. 1' 1 

MASSACH USt:TTS .... 700 

Brigs ARCHl"n:cr ......... 149 OCEAN ............... 1'1 

CRUSOE ............. 115 SECRETARY MARCY . I" 

J O HN l'orr ER ...... 163 TRUM n ULL ...... . .. 176 

MARY JANE ......... 162 WASHI NGTON . ... 22. 

Schooners ARl SI'E ......... ..... II' Sidewhl'Cl ALA BAM A .. .... ..... fi1fi 

BELLE ...... .. ....... .. ANSON . .. .. .......... 196 

BLANCH E E. SAYRE .. 167 COLONEL CROSS .... 160 

CA I'TA IN LI NCOLN .. 162 COLON EL: HARNEY .. 152 

CAPTAIN MOR RIS ... UO COLONEL STANTON . I" 

CA PTAI N PAGE .. .. 174 DE ROS.'iETT ......... 186 

CAI'TAIN WILLI AMS . I., FASH ION . . .. .... . ... <J9 

CO LONEL FANN ING I" Gt:N ERA L HAMER ... 168 

COLON EL YELL ..... 165 MA RIA BURT . ... ... ENFANTA ........... 170 MA RY SU MMERS .... "" 12.'1 

EQUIT Y . .. .. . .. .. .. .. " MENT O RIA ... . ... ... 108 

GENERAL NEI'TUNE .. . ... ..... Hr • 

PATTERSON .... ... 1.52 NEW ORLEA NS .. .... 760 

HENRY LONG .... . .. .. T ELEG RAPH . .. . ..... UO 

HERVINE .... ........ " -- INVINCIBU: .. ... .... 126 Unknown A. R. H ETZEL ......... - LOUISIANA ... ... .... 98 GENERAL BUTLER . . "0 

MAJ OR H . BACH E ... 67 J. D. T HOMPSON ..... 160 

MAJOR BARnOU R ... I" J. R. STEVENS ....... - MAJOR LEAR . . ... .. . 11' J ULIA . . ... . .. ..... ... - MAJOR VINTON .. ... 1' 1 MON MOUTH .. . . .... 23r • 

MARY PHOEBE ... . . . I., SECRET ARY 

PIONEER ......... . .. 69 BUCH ANAN ... ... . . - SARAH SECRET ARY MASON - CHURCHM AN ... .. 172 SF.CRt:T ARY 

SARAH J ANE ... ... 100 WALKER ..... . . . . - SUSA N ............. . - VIRGINIA . ....... .... . 00 

T. F. H UNT ........ . 

VELASCO ............ 1" 28 

WHIG ................ 59 

WILLI AM H. GATi'.NER .......... 80 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF T HE MEXICAN WAR 26 1 

River Steamboa ts 

Types Name G= TypC$ Name G= 

Ions tons 

Sidewhcel BROWNSVILLE ...... 99 Sternwht:el MAJOR BROWN ... . . 125 

COLON EL CLAy ...... 257 TROY ..... .. .. .. . ... 92 

COLONEL yELL ...... 

CORVETTE .......... '" 159 

GENERALJ ESUI> ..... m 

HATCHEE EAGLE ... 116 

J. E. ROBERTS ........ 118 Unl:nown ANN CHASE .......... - L1TrLE YAZOO ...... .. COLONEL H UNT . ... 21< 

NEVA ... .. .. .... ..... 141 COLONEL LONG .. . .. - ORt:L1 NE .. .. .. ...... til DRAGON ... .. . ... . .. - ROUGH A N D GOPHER .... . .. .. . .. . - READy ...•. .••..••. 150 MCKEE ........ .. .... - UNDI NE ...... ....... 197 PLANT,.: R ............ 147 

WHITEVILLE ........ 102 

WHITE WING ...... .. 100 

flow of supplies for the troops at the different ports on the Gulf.u 

Lieutenant Colonel Hunt agreed with J esup, for it had become increasingly difficult for him to hire such vessels on a freight basis. In the past. 

he had preferred to avoid the risks of ownership. choosing to charter 

light-draft schooners in all cases possible and to ship his supplies at a 

contract price of so much per barre l. Late in 1846, he, too. recommended 

ownership.oo In consequence, early in the following year, Colonel 

Stanton ordered IO light-draft schooners built for the Department. °l 

During the course of the war, the Department acquired through 

purchase and construction a total of 38 sailing ships-4 ships, 1 bark, 

4 brigs, and 29 schooners-and 35 steamships. Wrecks, accidents, and 

deterioration through constant lise reduced the size of the Quartermaster's 

fleet. Though a total of 72 vessels were government-owned during the 

war, by 15 May 1848 the Department could COUIlt only 52. Among these 

were 25 schooners, 2 ships, I bark, 7 steamships, and 15 sea steamers, of 

which IO were steam propell ers.o= Impressive as the Quartermaster fleet 

ence File. Box 660 (Tompkins Rllt, 15 May 1848; Swords Rpl. 2 J ul and 22 Aug 1848). (b) RG 

92, Vessels Engaged in Mexican War and on Western Riven during the Civil War. (c) RG 

92, OQMG Lette r Books, pnss;m, (d) Housc ~. Doc. No. 119, 1}lI$5;m. (e) RG 41, Vessels 

Boughl from u.s, (1) M'm:/UIIII SI~II'" ~SJds 0/ /,,~ UJ! i/ d S/a l~l, 1807- 1868, ed, Forrat R , 

Ho1dcampcr (Mystic, Conn., 1952). 

- House Ex . Doc, No. 11 9, p. 435 Uesup to Stanton, 15 Oct 11H6). 

""bid., pp. 387-88 (Hunt to Stallion, 9 Dec 11H6) . 

.. RG 92, OQMG Leller Book, vol. 38, pp. 450-51 (Stamon to J esup, 20 .·eb 1847) . 

• (I> RG 92, OQMG Consolidated Correspondence File, Box 660 (Tompkins to Jesup, 

15 May 1848). (2) Sec Table, Government ·owned Vessc:ls of the Mexican War. 
262 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

was In size, the Department chartered a far greater number of ships to 

transport both troops and supplies. 

The use of water transportation posed problems. Less than 3 

months after the war started, complaints began to be heard that the want 

of system in the discharge of cargoes from vessels a t Point Isabel was 

r esulting in demurrage that sometimes equalled $3,000 a day. T he 

Army was too small to permit detailing soldiers for the purpose of 

unloading ships and laborers were difficult to hire. Nevertheless, J esup 

thought that all transports, whether steam or sail, ought to be so regulated 

that not more than onc or two a t most should be in port at the same 

time. In his opinion, stevedores ought to be employed to unload all 

vessels as they arrived, placing the supplies on shore or in vessels used 

for storage purposes. In an effort to bring this transportation problem 

under control at the Brazos, Quartermaster Whiting appointed Capt. 

R. B. Lawton as superintendent of the harbor and put him in charge of 

unloading all cargo.~3 

In operating both government-owned ocean vessels and river cra ft 

during the war, it became the custom of the Department to pay the 

captain or master a fixed salary and to make it incumbent upon him to 

provide subsistence for himse lf and his officers.o, In the case of a 

chartered vessel, there was no need to hire personnel. The owner 

manned and operated his ship, for the services of which the Department 

paid him a fla t sum per trip, or so much per day over a period of time 

if the transportation involved troop movements, and a fre ight rate of 

so much per barrel if the ship was transporting Army supplies. The 

charter party might incl ude the privilege of purchase by the government 

after the quality of the ship had been demonstrated in one delivery of 

troops or cargo. Customaril y, the quartermaster who arranged the means 

of transportation for troops gave a copy of the charter party or lease of 

the vesse l to the commanding officer. Until the la tter handed over the 

charter party to the quartermaster at the destination point, the captain 

of the ship could not be paid his freight money. DO 

Whether troops were transported on government-owned or chartered 

steamships or sailing ships, they brought their own rations on board. 

Water, fac il ities for cooking, and deck accommodations were supposed 

to be provided for them but such arrangements were often neglected. 

Some 500 men of the batta lion of Baltimore and Washington volunteers, 

"(I) RG 92. OQMG Letter Book, vol. 37. p. 496 (Jesup to Whiling. I Ju11 846), (2) RG 92, 

Whiting. Letters Sent, I, 80 (Whiting to QM at Brazos Island, 15 Jul 1846), 

.. (I) RG 92. OQMG Letter Book, vol. 50, p. 558 (Jesup to Crosman, 25 May 1847). (2) For 

examples of such ag\"~ments see RG 92, OQMG Copies of Charter rarlies and Names of 

Crews of Vessels, 1847 . 

.. Kenly. M .. moirs of a Maryland I' ul""jur, pp. 280-81. 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 263 

[or example. were crowded on the 700-ton steamer, Massachusells, embarking at Fort Washington on the Potomac on 13 June 1846. Essentia ll y, the Massachwells was a sailing ship provided with aux.i liary 

machinery for steam power that could Le used only when the sea was 

smooth. Berths had been provided For only 200 men and carpenters had 

to be set to work after embarka tion of the troops to canst m et additional 

bunks. Before the ship set sail, no fireplaces for cooking purposes had 

been provided, and those that were imp'rovised afterwards were so insecure that the troops twice set the ship on fire. The blazing sun and the 

heal from the fiery furnace of the ship as it steamed across the Gulf made 

the men fearful that their dwindl ing water suppl y would be exhausted. 

Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the sick list swelled 

rapidl y. After 17 days' confinement in that "crowded pen," Brazos was 

sighted and a happy release from the ship was at last in prospect. e8 

The conditions described were in no way unusual but were dupli. 

cated on many another ship. An Indiana volunteer, who sailed on a 

chartered ship from New Orleans, found the quarters between decks 

" truly unenviabl e" and the heat and stench "almost insu pportable." G, 

Returning to the United Slates from Mexico, a Missouri vol unteer was 

one of 250 men who, with their artillery and baggage, were stowed in 

a small brig that was beauti[ul in its exterior but "worse than a hog·pen" 

between decks. Only 100 bunks-a bunk being a slight eleva tion made 

of plank- were provided. So many soldiers crowded arou nd the twO 

small fires built for them to cook with that a long time elapsed before 

he could ge t any coffee. As a matter of con ven ience, the men, he recorded, \'Jere supplied with hard crackers and molasses, a diet that "only 

increased my disease." T he ship running into a calm and the water 

becoming scarce, the allowance was reduced from a coffee pot full twice 

a day for coffee and a pim of drinking wa ter for each man to a quart for 

each man. We ll migh t th is Missouri volunteer write after his first night 

on board the brig that "for suffering I have not experienced its equal in 

all my peregrinations through lire."·t 

SUJJJJly of Taylm·'s Opemtions 

Supply was complicated by many [actors, not the least of which was 

a lack of knowledge of how many men would have to be fed, equipped, 

and transported. This was particularly true in the case of Taylor's 

forces. So quickly did the vol unteers respond to the call to arms in 

- I bid., pp. 25-55 . 

.. Scribner, Ctlmp if~ of fJ Yoltmleel", p. 14. 

-,Ollrlltl/ of W illiam H . RichIJI"r/jof1, pp. 81-82. 
264 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

May 1846 that Taylor and the suppl y departments were alike over· 

whelmed by the influx of vol unteers at Poinl Isabel. That flood of 

manpower resulted from a peculiar combination of good intentions, 

instructions, and legislation. To begin wid}, Taylor, in accordance with 

his instructions, ca lled upon the governors of Texas and Louisiana for 

nearly 5,000 men as soon as hostilities bega n in April. In advising the 

War Department of his action, Taylor expressed the hope that the 

necessary orders would be given to the staff dcpanments for the suppl y 

of this large addiLional force, but he made no specific requisitions .. ' 

At the same lime, he requested Maj. Cen. Edmund P. Caines, com· 

manding at New Orleans, to assist in orga ni zing and supplying these 

volunteer regiments. Ga ines. on his own responsibility, extended the 

ca ll for volunteers to other states and accc pted them with ollt any limitati on on numbers under terms of 6 months' enlistme nts. Consequently. 

Taylor could not be certai n how man y men he wou ld have to provide 

for. More than 8,000 troops were sent by Gaincs before he could be 

stopped by being relieved from command.'OG These volulHeers began 

arriving about the time Taylor occupied Matamoras in May 1846 after 

the immediate emergency had passed. Moreover, so hurriedly had they 

been sent out that they landed at Point Isabel destitute of equipment and 

the means of transportation, and Taylor reponed that " this force will 

embarrass rath er than facil itate our operations." .0. The War Department held that Gai nes' action was ill ega l. Since under the law o f 

13 May 1846 there was no place for these vol ullleers unless they re-en listed 

for a 12 mOl1lhs' terlll of se rvice, the Quartermastcr's Department returned 

most of them nome withom their having performed any sel'v ce.'o~ In 

the interim, their movemelll had absorbed a considerable amount of 

much needed transportation, and during their idl eness they had also to 

be fed and sheltered.,oa Gaines' proceedings proved to be both embarrassing and expensive to the government. 

Congress also had made provision for calling out volunteers on 

13 May 1846. and so enthusiastic had the rcsponse been that some of 

the 12-month volun teer regiments arrived on the Rio Grande du ri ng the 

" House Ex. Dor:. No. 119. p. 17 (Taylor to AG, 26 Apr 1846) . 

... (1) Upton , T ire l\1i/i/lfry '>o/icy o/ll!~ l! il~d SIII!eI, p. 20 1. (2) House Ex. Doc. No. 60, 

p. 299 (Taylor to AG , 20 May 1846). 

'" House Ex. Doc. No. 60, p. 300 (I'aylor to AG, 3 J Ull 1846), 

- (I ) I bid., p. 495 (nq Army of O((upation, Orde r No, 91. 21 Jul 1846). (2) House Ex. 

Doc. No. lt9, pp. 3G-!7 (Cov, of La . to S\\', 12 JUll 1846): pp. 37-41 (Marcy 10 Gov. of La .. 

25 Juo 1846) . 

... Meade slaled they ate u p 240,OQ) r.1.I ion5 and absorbed much of the river transportation 

10 gel them5elves to a shipping lKlint- transportation that was badly needed 10 move supplies 

and troops 10 Cama rgo, T he Li/e IIl1d Leller& 01 George Gordo/! Meade, ed, George G, Meade 

(2 vols., New York, 191 3), I, 115. 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEX ICAN WAR 265 

month of ] une, addi ng to the Quartermaster supply problem. T heir 

number increased rapidly bUl, for wam of transportation and uncertainty 

" in regard to the supplies that may be drawn from the theater of operations," Taylor took on ly a "moderate part" of the vol unteer force with 

him when he moved from Camargo and began his march to Monterey. 

His army of little more than 6,000 was composed of two divisions of 

Regulars and a field division of volunteers. The rest of the volunteers 

were left at camp to drill and train,lOi T he influx of 12-mont h volunteers, he wrote President Polk, "has even impeded my forward movement 

by engrossing all the resources of the Quartermaster's Department to 

land them and transpol'l them to hea lthy positions." 'o~ 

The general's plans for operating against Monterey called for establish ing his principal depot at Camargo, some 350 to 400 miles from the 

mouth of the R io Grande, using that river as the supply line. To get 

his supplies to Camargo and keep his wagon train free to move with 

the Army, he needed boats but there is no evidence to indicate that Taylor 

exercised any foresight in req uisitioning them or even in determi ning 

the feasibility of using the Rio Gra nde though he had been encamped on 

its banks since March. Two months later he still was uncertain whether 

the river would serve his purpo.~e, but he assured the War Department 

that he would lose no time in ascertaining its "practicability" for steamboats. ' M His plans were also made without any examination of the 

condition of the boa ts that the Quartermaster's Department had been 

using first at Corpus Christi and then at Point IsabeL -T he q uartermaster 

there employed twa government-owned steamers, the Neva and the 

Monmouth, and one chartered steamer to lighter cargoes from transports 

anchored inside the bar at the Brazos to the depot at Point Isabel. A 

fou rth steamer, the Colonel Long, had been obtained by transfer from 

the Topographical Department, b ut both it and the Neva were so wormeaten as to be utterly use\ess.'07 

When Taylor found his operations paralyzed for want of steamboats, 

he denounced the government for sendi ng a flood of vol unteers without 

the mea ns of transportation, decried "the extraord inary delay" shown by 

the Quartermaster's Department in getting boats, and expressed preposterous suspicions that "su perior authority" had given orders to suspend 

the forwarding of means of transportation (rom New Ori eans. IOS Obvi-

'"' House Ex. Dec. No. 1\9, p. 210 (Hq Army of Occupation, Order No. 108,28 Aug 18~6), 

""' Ibid., p. 61 (I Aug 1846), 

.... (I) Ibid" p. 28 (Taylor to AG, 21 May 1846)_ (2) Hitchcock, Fifly Years il! Camp lIud 

Field, p. 195_ 

'OT House Ex. Dac. No. 119, p. 388 (Thomas 10 Jesup, 15 May 1846). 

"'"(I) House E.~. Doc. No, 60. p. 547 (Taylor 10 AG. 10 JUII 1816). (2) House Ex. Doc. 

No, 119, p. 381 (Taylor to same, 17 JUII 1846). 
MEXICO CITV. • 

PUEBlA' AlV"RAIICI 

" Al.e Of' "" U!t 

. .. - -

MAP 5 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 267 

ously, if Taylor on the Rio Grande did not know wha t boats he would 

need or how much water they should draw, Jesup at Washington could 

not be expected to have the information. Maj. Charles Thomas, depot 

quartermaster at Point Isabel, had advised Jesup on 15 May of the 

condition of his boats and the need for one or two good river boats of 

moderate size. Three days later, on Taylor's orders, he requested Colonel 

Hunt to purchase and send a good, substantial river .boat. About a week 

later, with the number of troops increasing dail y, Taylor increased his 

requisition to four steamboats.'" 

These requisitions reached Colonel Hunt on 3 June and wefe the 

first notice he had "of the great and pressing demand fot so many 

steamboats." 11 0 Meanwhi le, General Taylor had call ed upon Col. John 

Winthrop, aide-de-camp to th e governor of Louisiana, for help in chartering two or three light-draft but strong freight boats, for which he engaged 

to insure employment at a fa ir and reasonable compensation. Colonel 

Winthrop chartered two but at rates considered to be rather high,llI To 

expedite the procurement of small steamboats, Taylor also sent Capt. 

J ohn Sanders of the Engineers to New Orleans to assist Colonel Hunt.l12 

Steamboats of the type required on the Rio Grande were not so 

easily procured at New Orleans, To supplement his efforts there, 

Colonel Hunt sent Captain Sanders up the Mississippi and Ohio to 

canvas the river towns for suitable boats. He also thought that Taylor's 

requisition for four boats had better be doubled.''' Jesup approved of 

th is action and authorized a further increase, if necessary. Taylor's 

requ isition was, in fact, almost q uadrupled, To susta in Taylor and 

d isabuse his mind of the idea that the Quartermaster's Department was 

not cord iall y supporting him, J esup, on his own responsibility and 

without waiting to obtain authorization from the Secretary of War and 

Congress, applied large amoun ts o[ the balance on hand to the needs of 

the active service, transferri tlg these funds from the specific items for 

which Congress had made the appropriation."t Hearing that certain 

lighl-draft steamboats were available at Cincinnati on the Ohio River 

and on the Chattahoochie in Georgia, Jesup directed his quartermasters 

,. House Ex. Doc, No. 119, p. 588 (Thomas 10 Jesup, 15 May 18-46); p. 5-4 8 (Thomas to 

H um, 18 May 18-46); pp. 5-49-50 (BiiN to T homas, 2-4 May 1846); p. 550 (Thomas to Hunt, 

51 May 18-46). 

, .. House Ex. Doc. No. 60, p. 65-4 (Hum 10 Jesup. -4 Jun 18-46). 

'" tlou!C' Ex. Doc. No. 119. p. 557 (AQM Crosman 10 Winthrop. 26 May and 2J Jun 1846). 

nt / bid .• p. 551 (Bliss 10 Sanden. 28 May 18-46). 

"' /bid., p. 552 (Hunl to Sanden . 5 Jun 18-46). 

'" Hou!C' Ex. Doc. No. 60. p. 554 Unup to Sanders. 5 Jul 18-46); p. 557 Uesup to Marcy. 

18 Feb 1847). 
268 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T HE ARMY 

in those areas to examine and procure the boats if they were uitabl e." ~ 

They were not purchased, however. for Hunt and Sanders obtained a 

sufficient number of boats.'" 

By mid-June. Lieutenant Colonel Hunt began to dispatch steamboats 

to the Rio Grande. It was a perilous feat of seamanship to take these 

fragi le. light.draft river boats from the Mississippi to the Rio .Grande. 

A terrific gale, which delayed Colonel Whiting's arriva l at Taylor's 

headquarters to assume his duties as chief quartermaster there, also 

prevented the early arrival of some of the steamboats, but by 3 July 

they were coming in fast in the wake of the calm weather following the 

stormY' On 23 July. 12 steamboats were at work on the Rio Grande 

conveying to Camargo the 300,000 rations that Taylor required there 

preparatory to his march on Monterey, T he river was not deep and 

the current almost too swift for the weakly powered, small steamboats 

whose operations were further hampered by a scanty supply of dry wood 

for fuel as a result of the prolonged storm.'" 

Before Taylor set out for Cerralvo early in September, he reviewed 

the shortcomings of the Quartermaster's Department. He insisted that 

only by "repeated efforts" directed from his headquarters had suitable 

steamboats been procured and now that a part of the Army had been 

brought forward to Camargo. steamboats procured at Pittsburgh were 

just arriving. Unfortunately. these boats were the very ones procured 

by his own agent, "I hazard nothing in saying that. if proper foresight 

and energy had been displayed in sending out suitable steamers to navi· 

gate the Rio Grande," Taylor wrote the War Department. "our army 

waul long since have been in possession o[ Monterey"- a statement that 

might well be applied to the general himself.1U 

In regard to land transportation, Taylor charged that though his 

forces had increased five-fold his wagon train was less in size than when 

he left Corpus Christi. " I wish it distinctly understood," he warned, 

"that our ability to move is due wholl y to means created here, and which 

could not have been reckoned upon with safety in Washington." no But 

Jesup did count upon it. and in a country abounding in mules-the 

,means of transportation best adapted to the country and the only means 

'''(1) House Ex. Doc. No. 119, p. 289 Uesup 10 Capt. M. M. Clark. 12 Jun HH6). (2) RG 

92, OQMG Lt:UCT Book. vol. 37. p. 473 Gesup 10 Maj . D. D. Tompkins, 16 Jun 1846). 

, .. House Ex. Dtx. No. 119, p . 351 (Hum 10 Jesup, II Jun 1846); pp. 382-85 (Same 10 same, 

4 Jul 1846); p. 421 (Sanden 10 Jesup, 28 Jun 1846). 

It, Ibid ., p. 3&1 (Whiling 10 Jesup. 3 Jul 1846». 

'''Ibid., p. 11 7 (faylor 10 AG, 22 Jul 1846); pp. 366-67 (Whiting 10 Jesup. 25 Jill 1846). 

II. House Ex. Doc. No. 60. pp. 557- 58 (farlor 10 AG. I Scp 1846): pp. 559-60 Gesup 10 

Marcy. 11 De<: 1846». 

"' Ibid., pp. 557- 58 (farlor 10 AG, I Scp 1846). 
LOGISTIGAL PROBLEMS OF T HE MEXICAN WAR 269 

used by the enemy..........a, general was expected to avail himse lf o[ the 

resources of the country in which he operated. Besides, Jesup also 

expected General Taylor to make lise of the train of abOLIt 300 wagons 

that he had on hand. UI T he Department, therefore, concentrated its 

efforts on furnishing sufficiclll wagons for the operations to be undertaken 

in the fal l. 

As soon as Congress enacted the first war measure in May. Jesup 

ordered the procurement of wagons. During the next month, he directed 

quartermasters at Philadelphia, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh to procure 

700 wagons fOT mules and oxen with the necessa ry sets of harness, delivery 

to be made as soon as possible.12! Contracts had to be made with scores 

of wheelwrights in all parts of the country because most firms were small 

and produced only a few wagons at anyone time. T he need was urgent 

and time was short. Quartermasters therefore also went into the open 

market to purchase whatever wagons they could obtain that would be 

suitable for service in Mexico. Hearing that a manufacturer at Pembroke, N.Y .. had some wagons for sa le. Jesup sent Capt. D. H. Vinton. 

assistant quartermaster at New York. to examine and purchase them on 

the best practicabl e terms. The Georgia penitentiary at Milledgeville 

was supposed to produce great numbers of wagons. "Ascertain whether 

the information is correct." Jesup wrote Assistant Quartermaster \\'ayne 

at Savannah, and "do the best you can, and in the shortest possible 

time." In Hum could procure few wagons at New Orleans and Capt. 

A. R. Hetzel found they were equally scarce at St. Louis. He scoured 

the markets of Memphis. Vicksburg, and Natchez. Wagons could be 

obtained in middle and east Tennessee, but their ava ilability was of no 

use to the Department, he reported. because the waters of the Cumberland 

and Tennessee Rivers were so low as to preclude transportation of the 

wagons to New Orl eans in any reasonable time.'t. 

The Department waived specifica tions, and increased payments per 

wagon to stimulate greater production. but factors over which the 

Quartermaster General had no control hampered procurement.

no Only 

seasoned timber could be used in the construction of wagons, but large 

quantities of it were not ava ila ble at Cincinnati. Workmen were also 

scarce there. So many had joined volunteer companies that production 

1ft I bid .• p. 560 (Jesup to Marcy. 5 Dec 1846). 

'·(1) RG 92. OQMG Letter Book. vol. 37. p. 425 (Jesu p to Tompkins. 26 May 11M6). 

(2) House Ex . Dot:. No. 11 9. p. 285 (Stanton 10 Tompkins. 15 May 11M6); p. 286 (Jesup to 

Harding. 2 Jun 1846). 

'- Hoult Ex. Dot:. No. 119. p. 303 (19 Jul 1846); p. 296 (Jesup to Vinton. 8 Jul 1846). 

''' I bid., p. 397 (Hetzel to J esup. 28 Jul 18<16). 

I- I bid., p. 288 (Jesup to Harding. I I Jun 1846); p. 303 (Jesup to same. 20 Jul 1846): p. 405 

(Clark to J esup. 21 Jul 1846); p. 401 (Maj. H. Bache to J esup. 21 Jul 18-f6». 
270 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

could not be increased by any inducement. al)d the approach of the 

harvest season threatened to reduce their number still furth c .. uS Under 

the competition of other means of transportation, former centers of wagon 

production had almost disappeared. York, Pa., for example, had formerly produced many of the wagons used during the Seminole War, but 

the operation of railroads had greatly diminished the wagon business in 

that part o[ the country,UT 

By August. wagons began to be delivered to the quartermasters in 

increasing n umbers. Some of them could be taken apart for shipment; 

others had to be placed intact on board the ships bound for Mexico. 

Usc of steamers made it possible to deliver them at Bra zos de Santiago 

in 15 days,lIS By 20 August. Jesup called a halt to wagon procurement. 

Enough wagons had been obtained to meet immediate needs. He 

advised that when a furth er supply was required in the autumn. proposals 

would be invited by notice in the newspapers.l2D 

In the meantime. the forces on the Rio Grande were in need of 

land transportation, but General Taylor had been as indifferent to this 

problem of logistical support as he had been to that of water transportation. Quartermaster T homas made the first call for 50 mule wagons 

and 20 ox wagons with complete harness on 18 May 1846 though there 

is nothing to indicate that Taylor prompted that requisition. 1III But even 

if he had, 70 wagons were a wholly inadequate addition to the train 

needed to support the force of 6,000 men with which Taylor intended 

to move against Monterey. The Army on the Rio Grande was supposed 

to have had on hand some 300 wagons. hut when Lieutenant Colonel 

Whiting reached headquarters he found the wagon train reduced to 175. 

To make up the deficiency. he S(nt Assistant Quartermaster Crosman 

out to hire or purchase pack mules with cond.uctors and arrieros, paying 

them so much per day. Later this mode was changed to payment by 

the cargo. that is, a mule load of 300 pounds. Crosman was also to hire 

ox learns and Mexican carLS. By these means, Whiting hoped to be able 

to pack enough for the companies and use the train for the general 

purpose of hauling ammuntion and provisions and for transporting the 

sick. tal By authorizing Captain Crosman to requisition for animals 

upon the alcaldes or civil authorities. when he could not procure them 

'· Ibid .. p. 558 (Tompkin. 10 J esup, 7 Jun 1846). 

"' Ibid., pp. 404-05 (Clark 10 J esu p. 20 Jul 1846): pp. 409-10 (Dusenbery 10 J esup, 24 Jul 

1846) . 

.. RC 92, OQMG Letler Rook, vol. 57. p. 584 Oesu p to Dusenbery. I Aug 1846) . 

.. House Ex. Doc. No. 119, p. 521 Oesup 10 Capl . Thistle and Capt. Clark, 2() Aug 1846). I. Ibid .. p. 390 (Thomas 10 Jesup, 18 May 1846) . 

... (I) Ibid., p. 367 (Whiting to Jesup. 28 Ju l 1846). (2) RG 92, WhitIng, Leuen Senl, I. 

447 (Whiling 10 Jesup, 29 Sep 1846). 
LOG ISTIGAL PRO BLEMS OF T H E MEXICAN WAR 27 1 

with the consent of th e owners, Whiling found little difficulty In 

obtain ing mul es. 

During the time th at rations were bei ng fo rwarded by boat LO 

Camargo and forage for 4,000 anima ls was being shipped lip the river, 

the wagon tra in was retained at Brazos to ha ul the cargoes to th e steamboats. O n 4 August, Taylor went to Camargo, the remainder of the 

10,000 troops hav ing been ordered th ere at the end of July. At that 

point, the mule Lra in bad to be withdrawn from the Brazos and sent 

forward LO Camargo. Only 40 or 50 ox lcams were left at Brazos, a 

number inadeq uate to fill one q uarter of the boats plying th e Rio Grande. 

Wagons were begi nning to come in from the United States, but un til 

sufficient num bers arri ved, Whiti ng hired a ll th e Mexican ox-carts li e 

could get and a lso called upon the alca ldes to deliver 500 m ules fo r which 

a fair price would be paid. As soon as the mules came in, they were to 

be " put to the harn ess," and by this means Whiting expected to have a 

new mule tra in at Brazos in 2 or 3 weeks. In Although Mexican horses 

were toO small to provide the dragoons with mounts or to be used for 

draft purposes, Mexican mules cou ld be used for supply purposes and 

hundreds were bought a t $ 18 to $20 each . 

When LieUlenant Colonel ·Whiting arrived at Camargo on 23 August, 

Captain Crossman had the transportation situation fairly well in hand. 

Some 1,500 pack mules were with the Army, forwa rding supplies to the 

temporary depot at Cerralvo where some troops were posted for its 

protection. ·With packs and drivers incl uded the pack mules cost about 

50 cents a day.' SI Ten days later, Taylor set Out [or Cerralvo. The 

number of hired pack m ules had been increased to 1,900 and a bout 180 

mule and horse wagons accompanied the An ny.'u By Taylor's orders, 

aile pack mule was allowed to every eight noncommissioned offi cers and 

priva tes, three to company officers, and four to the headquarters of a 

regiment. Each brigade and each division headquarters was allowed 

one wagon, whil e th ree wagons were assigned to each regimem-one to 

transport water and two to carry such articles as could not be packed on 

mules. T he Ordnance Department had fifty-three wagons, the Engineer 

Department one, and the Medical Director, four. U~ 

After h is arrival in Mexico, ·Whiting was certain th at the country 

could furnish all the mules the De partment would want. Bm back in 

Wash ington, Jesup had received no word throughout the Slimmer on the 

,10 HOllse ~. . Doc. No. 119. pp. 369-70 (Whiting to ~~ufl, 6 Aug 1846). 

lDlbid., pp. 371- 72 (Whiling 10 Jesup. 24 Aug 1846). 

,01 House Ex. Dnc. No. 60, flfl. 680-81 (Whiting 10 Jesup. 3 Scp 1846). 

,m (1) House Ex. Dm:. No. 119, p. 211 (Hq Army of Occupation, Ordcr No. 109, 29 Aug 

1846). (2) RG 92, Whiling, Letteu Sent, I. 407 (Whiling 10 Crosman. ~O Aug 1846). 
272 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T H E ARMY 

availability of mules and whether the Army intended using them. He, 

too, was procuring and shippi ng mu les and horses to the Rio Grande 

to insure mobil ity of the Army.l aG La te in August, Whiti ng assured 

J es up that pack mules might answer every purpose, "provided we could 

bring ourselves to make war as th e enemy makes it." But that was not 

likely to be the case, he admitted, vo icing a sentiment tha t was to be 

reitera ted in later wars. "We have customs which neither the officers 

nor the soldiers will forego, excepting in cases of extremity. Our camp 

equipage, so comfortable and yet so cumbrous, ollr rations, so full and 

bulky. all must be transported." 1ST In add ition to the Army's preference 

for wagons as a more convenient mode of transporta tion than pack ani· 

mals, the fact that only certain articles could be packed to advantage 

imposed a limitation on the number of pack animals th at could be 

usefully employed. Scarce ly anything, either subsistence or q ua rter· 

masters' stores, came to Mexico in shape for transporta tion by pack 

an ima ls. Conseq uently, a troublesome and expensive remode ling of 

nearly every package had to be made before it cou ld be put on the back 

of a mule.''' 

T he use of pack an ima ls had to be contin ued. however, for wagons 

did not become available to Taylor's forces in time for the fall operations 

as had been anticipated. Taylor ca ll ed allention to the fac t that the 

first wagons--only 125 in number---did not arrive in his headq uarters 

until 2 November. "The task of fighting and beating th e enemy," he 

informed the War Department, " is among th e least d iffi cult tha t we 

encounter; the great question of supplies necessaril y controls a ll th e 

opera ti ons in a country like this." ' 3U T he Q uartermaster's Department 

had not expected to have any wagons delivered at the Brazos before 

I September. By that time. th ey did begin to arrive but the initial 

deliveries were needL'Cl at the depot. and it was not until I October that 

the first new train of 125 wagons left the Bralos. H o It took a month for 

it to reach Monterey. Building up the depot at Monterery was accom· 

plished by the use of pack mu les, some 2.000 being employed to bring 

forward about 575,000 pounds of subsistence. Some 300 wagons were 

also used to ha ul su bsistence and quartermasters' stores. H ' 

By the first week in December, there were about 1,200 wagons at 

'-.see below. 

, .. (I) House Ex . Doc. No. 119. p. 372 (Whiling to Jesup. 28 .... ug 1846). (2) See Henry. 

Cllmptlis" SJIl~ldl~S 01 tilt Wa r wilh IIft xit;o, pp. 162-64 . 

.. House Ell . Doc. No. 60. p. 686 (Whiling 10 J esup. 50 No ... 1846). 

-·Ibid., p. 560 (Taylor 10 .... C. 8 No ... 1846). 

'·(1) RC 92. Whiling. Leiters Stnl. IT . 14-15 (Whiling loSlallloll, 5 No ... 1846). (2) HOIlJe: 

Ex. Doc. No. 119. p. 574 (Whiling to Jesup. 16 Stp 1846). 

'" House E.v:. Doc. No. 119. p. 376 (Wh iling 10 Stanlon. 24 No ... 1846). 
LOGISTICAL PROllLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 273 

the Brazos with th e necessary harness. M nl es werc also on hand, both 

procured in Mexico and sent in by Lieutenant Colonel Hunt.1U T he 

difficulty was that the Department lacked dri vers. W hiting complained 

that those hired were dissipated and unstab le and because the general 

objected none could be obta ined by detaili ng soldiers from the Army. 

He saw only onc remedy-to add onc or two men to each company of 

the Army who should be enlisted as teamsters or hostlers and a lways be 

liable to be called on for service with teams and animals. When OOl 

wanted for this specia l service, they would serve as soldiers. He proposed 

that the ir pay be equiva lent to that of an artifi cer. Efficiency and certainty. he maintained, wo ul d be doub led and th e cost of transporta tion 

cut in half. us Jesup endorsed tht: idea and urged congressional action. 

On 3 March 1847, Congress did enact legislation but not to the extent 

tha t Whiting had recommended. It provided for one principa l teamster, 

with the ran k and compensation of quartermaster·sergeant, for each regiment and two teamsters, with the compensation of artificers, for each 

company of dragoons, artillery, and mounted riflemen in the Regu lar 

Army ... • 

Despite all difficulties, Taylor's forces moved with reasonable promptness, yet he complained repeatedly that he was hampered by ' lack of 

transportation. T he means were ava ilable to him, and J esup, who went 

to Mexico to expedite Quartermaster operations, reported that he had 

contracted fo r 2,000 mules in one day to be delivered at Matamoras and 

th e Brazos in a month. "Ten thousand coul d have been obtained at 

any time since the army has been in Mexico," he advised the Secretary 

of War, " if proper measures had been adopted to obtain the ."" ~ It 

seems quite likely that Taylor's criticisms could only have been intended, 

as Brig. Gen. J. W. Worth intimated, to ward off responsib il ity in the 

event of failure and to augment his glory in case of success.H6 

At the same time that the Q uartermaster's Department was sup· 

porting Taylor's Army of the Rio Grande, it was also hu rryi ng supplies 

to San Antonio de Bexar where a force of Both Regulars and volunteers, 

"' RC 92. OQMC Consolidated Correspondence File. Bmr. 659 (Hunt Rpt. 18 Apr (846) 

shows that between 2 May 1846 and 7 Ju ly 1847 he scnt 9~2 wagons (or hoTSC$, 179 (or mules, 

2,1~9 horses and 1,570 mu les to Br..l~OS de S3ntiago. Of th3t number II wagons, 217 horses. 

and ~71 mules were lost in shipment. 

" " House E..>: . Doc. No. 119, p. ~77 (Whiting to Stanton, 2~ Nov 1846): p . 452 Uesup 10 

Stanton. 15 Jan 1847). 

"'9 SIal. 184. 

, .. House E.x. Doc. No. 50, p. 567 Uaup 10 Marcy, ~ Dec 1846). 

" ' Smith, The War witl, Mexico, I. 491, quoting Itr, Worth to Capt. S-, 5 Sep 1816). 
274 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

coming from distant points, was assembling. Among the Regulars were 

twO companies of the 1st Dragoons and two of th e 6th Infantry drawn 

from Fort Gibson, Indian Territory, and Fort Smith, Ark., respective ly, 

along with a company of light artillery that came overland from Carlisle 

Barracks, Pa. The volunteers included an Arkansas regiment of cavalry 

and two lJlinois regiments, the latter journeying by steamboat to New 

Orleans, by ship to La Vaca, and then marching overland to San 

Antonio.'·' U nder Brig. Gen. John E. Wool, assigned to command 

about the middle of June, this force was to operate against Chihuahua."s 

As early as 22 May, J esup advised Lieutenan t Colonel Hunt that 

3,000 or 4,000 men would be assembled at San Antonio de Bexar, and 

he ordered a 15- to 30-day suppl y of forage and subsistence to be placed 

th ere. To do this, a train would have to be organized and an entrepot 

established at the most con venient poim on the G ulf. J esup suggested 

La Vaca (now Port Lavaca on Matagorda Bay) as the site for th e 

entrepot. .. • T wo wee ks later, he repeated his instructions on the formation of a train to Ll. Col. Henry Whiting when that officer was appointed 

chief quartermaster with Taylor's Army."o But at Matamoras, Whiting 

was tOO far away to supervise Quartermaster operations at La Vaca, news 

of wh ich reached him onl y at long intervals via New Orleans. H e 

reported that Hum was sending suppli es, and he assumed that Capt. J. R. 

Irwin, then assigned as assistant quartermaster to Texas, was getting them 

forwarded to San Antonio.'"' En route to Mexico, Whiting had assigned 

Maj. Charles Thomas as quartermaster in charge of Departmental operations with the division under Wool's command. 

When more than a month passed without word of the formation of 

a wagon tra in at La Vaca, J esup renewed and widened his orders to Hunt. 

He was to purchase and send forwa rd aU well-broken mul es and all 

harness that could be obta ined in Louisiana. Captain Irwin was to 

buy in Texas 200 ox, horse, and mule teams, with wagons, harness, and 

yokes. Captain Osborn Cross was also to be sent to Texas to purchase 

all the wagons, mul es, and draft horses that he could obtain. Without 

waiting to accompany General Wool, Quartermaster Thomas, then at 

Memphis, Tenn., was ordered to proceed at once to San Antonio. J esup 

instructed him to purchase all th e horses, mules, and oxen necessary for 

the transportation of Wool's division.1n 

.. , Uouse Ex. Doc. No. GO. pp. "54--55 (AG 10 Taylor. 16 Jun UH6). 

,II Ibid., p. 528 (AG 10 Wool, II Jun 18-46) . 

• 11 RG 92. OQMG Lellcr Book. vol. 57, pp. 419-20 U e5UP to UUn! . 22 May 18-46). 

- Ibid., vol. 37. pp. H5 ...... " Unup 10 Whiling. 5 J un 1846}. 

III RG 92. Whiting, Lcu ers SeTH. I. 155 (Whiting to Jesup, 23 Jul 1846). 

to. House /ix. Dot:. No. 119. pp. 298-99: 301-02 Uesup to HU n!. 18 and 19 J ul 1846); p. 310 

Uesup 10 T ompkins, 10 and 25 Jul 1846). 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 275 

J esup had become increasingly alarmed about th e means of transporta tion not only fo r Wool's division but a lso for Taylor's Army. Since 

the death of Colonel Cross in April, he had received no information as 

to wheth er Mexica n horses and mul es could be obtained and used by 

the Army. Requisitions had come in for replacemen ts for Dragoon 

mounts lost in battle. and he feared that Taylor's Army needed artillery 

horses as well as draft anima ls. Subject to Taylor's approva l, he early 

au thorized Lieutenant Colonel Whiting to purchase in Mexico all the 

animals thal were necessary.I"3 

Even as he authorized quartermasters on the Rio Grande and in 

Texas to purchase, Jesup made doubly sure of the supply of animals by 

sending several assista nt quartermasters and agents to procure mules 

and horses in th e Mississippi Va lley. T he chief procurement officer was 

Capt. A. R. Hetzel, who, on orders of Genera l Wool then en route to 

San Antonio from Louisville, procured 200 mules and 24 horses. T hese 

he sent to La Vaca late in jul y.' ~ Hetze l and others were a lso purchasing 

for Taylor's Army, j esup's orders hav ing been increased during june 

a nd july to 1,000 mules and several hundred horses.'u Shipment to the 

R io Grande was accomplished by loading the animals on steamboats and 

sending them down the Mississippi to Hum at New Orleans, who, if 

the need was considered urgent, could sh ip them by water to Point 

Isabel. Norma ll y, however, an imals were unloaded at some point on 

the river above New Orleans and driven overland, via Texas, to the 

Rio Grande under the care of conductors. 

The use of this overland route made it possible in one instance to 

divert animals meant for Taylor's Army to Wool's division. Late in 

August 1846, th e Department had ready for shipment a drove of some 

400 mules and 400 horses. Though not requisitioned, the horses were 

intended [or Taylor's artillery and the mules were to serve the immediate 

needs of th e service resulting from th e arriva l of the mounted Kentucky 

and Tennessee regiments. T he drove of animals and the mounted 

regiments were both su pposed to arrive on the Rio Gra nde at the same 

time. Capl. S. H . Drum, assistant q uartermaster in charge of the drove, 

landed the animals at Vida lia, La., and drove them 615 miles to San 

Antonio, mak ing a stop there the fi rst week in October. Quartermaster 

Thomas, without auth ority, appropriated them for Wool's division, much 

to J esup's exasperation, and Wool refused to make any change in the 

disposition of the an imals even after Thomas had been instructed as to 

'''' Ibid" pr. 30l-{)2 Gaup 10 Hunl. 19 JII\ 1846); p.291 Gaup to Whiting, 17 J u l 1846). 

''' 'bid., pr. 395-97 (Heme! 10 Jesup. 9 and 27 JIll 1846). 

'Mlbid., pp. 290, 297,. 299 Gaup 10 Helzel. 13 Jun , 17 and 18 J ul 1846); Pl" 296. 306 

Ga up 10 Tompkins. 10 and 23 Ju l 1846). 
276 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

their proper destination. General Wool had also appropriated for his 

use, as he passed th rough New Orleans, some twO or three hundred 

wagons that were on their way to the Brazos. Whiting later complained 

that the loss of the wagons and anima ls had greatly inconvenienced 

Taylor's movements" SG 

Condemning Major T homas for his unauthorized action, Jesup 

maintained that "with proper energy, ox teams (the only means of transportation adapted to that country) could have been obtained in sufficient 

n umbers for all necessary purposes." He informed the Secretary of 

War that he feared General Wool " has embarrassed himse lf with an 

unwieldy train of severa l hundred wagons among the mountains of 

Mexico," The large trai n, "gotten up at great expense," would be 

lost for it could neither reach Chihuah ua, J esup maintained, nor be sent 

back. U7 It was for the general, however, to decide the means and the 

amount of transportation required. 

Unlike Taylor, Wool had been fo resighted in ordering supplies 

wh ile en route to San Antonio where he arrived in mid-August. Accumulating the necessary supplies of forage, subsistence, and ordnance 

was much hampered by the great distance from which they had to be 

drawn. Little or nothing could be obta ined in the sma ll town of 

San Antonio. All supplies were shipped from New Orl eans to La Vaca 

and then transported by wagon tra in, about 160 miles, to San Antonio. 

When rains tu rned the road into bottomless mud, it took 2 weeks (or 

loaded wagons to cover tha t distance. The amount of supplies required 

and the difficulty of forwarding them may be inferred from the fa ct that 

I, 112 wagon loads were taken from the depot at La Vaca to San Antonio. 

and 500 wagons were employed in the transportation of th ose supplies 

and the troopS.' 8 Preparations were in no way speeded by the shipment 

from New Orleans or pans of wagons from different lots so that Quartermaster Thomas was unable to assemble complete wagons until ships 

arrived bringi ng parts that had been left behind.109 Despite delays, 

supplies were accumula ted and when Genera l Wool was ready to stan 

for Chihuahua, he had more wagons with his column of less than 3,000 

men than General Taylor had wit h all his forces. uo 

After a topographical party had studied routes and made inquiries 

, .. (I) Ibid., pp. 423- 26 (Drum to Jesup. 10 Sep and 13 Oct 1846); pr. 441~2 (Jesup to 

Whiling. 17 Nov 1846); p. 39t (Thomas to Jesup. II Oct and 4 Nov 1816). (2) House Ex. Doc. 

No. 60. p. 6B6 (Whiting to Jesup. 30 Nov 1846). 

,., House Ex. Doc. No. 119. p. 110 (J esup to Stanton . 8 Nov 1846); pp. 269- 70 (J ~'S p to 

SW. 3 Dec 18-46). 

1M House Ex. Doc. No.8. p. 545 (Rpt of QMG. 21 Nov 1847). 

' '' House Ex. Doc. No. 60. p. 429 (Thomas 10 Wool. 9 Sep 1846). 

,. House Ex. Doc. No. 119. p. 378 ('Vhiling to J esup. 30 Nov 1846). 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXIGAN WAR 277 

about water, wood, and forage-the three essentia ls on any expeditionan advance section of Wool's forces of 1.244 men set Out on 26 September 

with 175 wagons and provisions for 2 months.''' Assistant Quartermaster 

O. Cross accompanied th is advance force. Wool took a circu itous route, 

practicabl e for his wagons and arti ll ery, to Monclova, and with grea t 

exertions he brought them through to that town O)n 29 October. T here 

the rest of his tTOOpS joined him, making a force of 2,688. He never did 

go to Chihuahua. At his suggestion and on Taylor's orders, he advanced 

his troops to Parras on 5 December, abandoning the long supply line to 

San Antonio and La Vaca in favor of a shorter line by way of the Rio 

Grande and Camargo."t Wool had marched his force some 600 miles 

without firing a shot at the enemy. Taylor pronounced the expedition 

to Chihuahua a failure. but when an urgent call came to 'Wool in midDecember to go to the aid of General Worth. threa tened by Santa Anna , 

he was abl e to march immediately, taking with his troops 350 wagons, 

provisions for 60 days, 400,000 cartridges, and 200 rounds for his cannon.1U 

Supply of Keamy 

In the summer of 1846, the Quartermaster's Department had to 

supply still a third armed force, assembling at Fort Leavenworth on the 

Missouri River, for operations against New Mexico and Ca lifornia. 

T he War Department placed Col. Stephen W. Kea l'll y in charge of the 

troops. T hese included some 300 Regulars of the 1st Dragoons; 860 

Misso uri mou nted volullleers under Col. Alexa nder W. Doniphan: 250 

volunteers from two light artillery companies; a Sl. Louis company of 

mounted volunteers, numbering about 100, ca ll ed (he Laclede Rangers; 

and two small companies of infantry. About 50 Indian scouts, a party of 

topographical engineers, and an interpreter were also attached to the 

expedition. In all, this armed force number somewhat less than 1,700 

men. It moved out by d etachments on 26 and 27 June 1846. 

Kearny's re inforcements-about 1,200 men, most of them mounted 

volunteers under the command of Col. Sterling Price- followed him on 

the Santa Fe (rail in mid.August. T his force also included a few 

Regulars in charge of a number of pieces of heavy artill ery. In addition. 

a Mormon Battalion of 500 was recru ited from among the Mormons 

driven from Nauvoo, Ill ., who had gathered at Council Bluff's with the 

intention of emigra ting to Ca liforn ia . 

... 8uhoup. NpTTPlive ollhe CUllrnl DiviJiOlr, pp. 17. 19 . 

.. House 1::1<. Doc. No. 60. pp. ~I . 577 (t'aylor 10 AG. 9 and 24 Nov 1846) . 

.. (I) Smilh. War wilh Mexico, I. 275. (2) Buhoup. NllrTnlive of tire Central DiviJion, 

pp. 96-98. 
278 QUART ERMASTER SUPPORT OF T H E ARMY 

All these tToop S had to be equipped and provided with rations and 

the means of transportation at Fort Leavenwonh. The speed with 

wh ich Kearny's exped ition moved out precluded any timely shipment of 

stores fTOm Philadelphia. In any case, they were morc readily obtained 

in Missouri and the nearby slates. As Quartermaster at St. Louis. 

Maj. Aeneas Mackay was undcr orders to procure and furnish camp 

ketll es, mess pans, hatches, and all other equipment needed. J esup 

directed him to procure by contract or otherwise 1,000 packsaddl es, to 

be held subject to Kea rn y's req uisitions. J esup had intended sending 

tents from Philadelphia, but such was the shortage of tentage at the 

Schuylkill Arsena l that he soon had to advise Major Mackay that none 

could be sent.''' 

Supplies moved from St. Louis to Fort Leavenworth by steamboat. 

There, Captain McKissack, assistant quartermaster at the fort, took 

charge of the supplies until Capt. R. E. Clary relieved him in Jul y. Jesup 

then sent McKissack and another assistant quartermaster, Capt. Robert 

Allen, to Santa Fe to take charge of Quartermaster duti es at that post. 

At the same time. J esup assigned Maj. Thomas Swords as Quartermaster 

to the Kearny expedition.m He not only supervised the preparations 

for the movement of the troops to Sante Fe but accompani ed Kearny 

to California, though he did not join him at Santa Fe until mid-August, 

when he arrived with the mai l and formal notice of Kearny's appoi ntment 

as brigadier general. 1U 

Meanwh ile, Swords and McKissack had been busy at Fort Leavenworth, equipping the troops as they moved Ollt and furnishing them with 

mules and wagons to haul their baggage and supplies. Wagons loaded 

with provisions had been sem ahead to Council Grove and the rendezvo us point on the Arkansas below Fort Bent, 100 of them havi ng been 

dispatched before the first detachment of Kearny's exped ition left Fort 

Leavenworth the last week in June. Captain McKissack had worked 

energetica ll y to purchase suffi cient mul es and ox teams to establish the 

wagon trains needed to maintain a Aow of su ppli es to Santa Fe. Such 

wagon tra ins were sent on the road in groups of 25 or 30 wagons. each 

train under a wagon master and the wagoners all armed so that they 

could defend themselves without need of an escort. 1ST 

The line of operations extending to Santa Fe, a distance of almost 

... RG 92. OQMG Leiter Book. vol. 37. pp . .0118-20 GcsuP 10 Mackay. 2 1 and 22 May 18.016). 

,. I bid .. p . .0125 GcsuP 10 Swords, 26 May 18.016); pp. 496-97 Uesup to Allen. I Jul 18.016); 

p. 50! Ucsup to Kearny. 2 Jul 18.016). 

'. (I) Hughes. Donipll,,,,', EXPl':diliotl, p. 71. (2) Home Ex. Doc. No. 50, Pi>. 153--55 

(Marcy 10 Kearny. 3 Jun 18.016) . 

... (I) Hughes, DOlliplum', EX/JI':dilioll, pp. 29--30. }t • .011 ...... 2. (2) RG 92, CGP, McKissack 

Leiters, No. 9 1, p. I (McKissack 10 J csuP, I Jlln 1&46). 
LOC ISTICAL PRO BLEMS OF T H E MEXICAN WA R 279 

900 miles. req uired vast tra nsporta tion fac ilities to enable it to move and 

keep up its supplies. J es up later repon ed tha t for the transportation 

of Kearny's army an d its reinforcCIllC1llS and supplies, the Q uan ermaster's 

Department had furn ished 459 horses, 3,658 mules, 14 ,904 oxen, 1,556 

wagons, and 516 packsaddles. 1G$ Nevertheless, John T. Hughes, a 

Missouri vol unteer, was extremely critica l of the provision made for 

the expedition. 

Cen. Kea rney's army was Ilot well prov isioned; nor \vas it fu rnished, in all 

its parts, with stout, able, and efficic!H teams, such as the difficuh nat ure or the 

country over wh ich it has to pass, requ ired. T he commissary and quartermaster departments were wretched ly managed. During much of lhe lime, 

owi ng cither to the neglect or incompetency of the heads of these departments, 

the ge neral fou nd it necess;lry to su bsist h is men on half rations. It repeated ly 

hal)pened that the wagons, pa rticularl y of the vo lun teer corps, were left so fa r 

be Bnd during a d ay's march that they did not come in to camp before midn igh t. T h lls lhe men had to feast or fa mish by turns, owing to the gross and 

culila ble neglect of governmem agen ts. The volu n teer troops were furn ished 

wit 1 vel·r sorry and ind ifferen t wagons and teams, wholly inadequate for such 

an expc( ilion, whilst the regulars were furn ished in the very best man ner.'''· 

In the march across the plains, water was scant, wood nonex istent, 

and food became so scarce that rations were reduced to half and, d uring 

the last 10 days of the journey LO Sam3 Fe, to one-third the allowance. 

Mired wagons had to be dragged Ollt by troops; repairs were frequent. 

Often bridges had to be constructed, ban ks dug down, and roads built 

before the wagons coul d pass. 13m Colonel Kearn y kept the ex ped iti on 

moving, and after a tiresome ma rc h of almost 900 miles in less than 

50 days, the whole command entered Santa Fe 0 11 18 August 1846 to 

take possession of the province of New Mexico. ITo 

A q uick reconnaissance having convinced Keam y that q uiet and 

peace preva iled in New Mexico, he proceeded to Ca liforn ia, leaving 

Colonel Doniphan in charge un til the reinforcemen ts arri ved. At that 

time, Doniphan's Regiment of Missouri volu nteers was to march to 

Chih ua hua to join General "Vool, while the Mormon Battalion Followed 

Kearny to Ca liforn ia. On 25 September, Genera l Keamy, 300 of the 

1st Dragoons, and a small party of topographical engineers, having 

exchanged their horses for mules procured by Capta in McKissack, left 

Santa Fe, taki ng about 65 days' prov isions and their baggage in wagons 

d rawn by eight mules each.'TI About 150 miles from Santa Fe, an express 

I. Bou$C Ex . Doc. No.8, p. 545 Q~ G Annual Rpl. 2~ No,· 18~7) . 

.. Hughes, DOllipll(III'S EXjJ<!ditioll, pp. 81-82. 

'''(I) I bid., pp. ~!I , 54, 66. (2) House Ex . Doc. No. 60. p. 169 (Kearny 10 Brig. Cen. 

R. JOlla, 24 Aug 1846). 

1n(1) Hughes, DOlliphall'J Expedition, pp. 204-05. (2) RG 92, eGI', McKiu.1ck Letters, 

No. 9[, p. 26 (1I.lcKi$S3ck to J esup, 50 Sep 1816). 
280 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

from th e Pacific Coast brought word that Ca lifornia was in American 

hands, and Kearny, in consequence, decided to proceed with only 100 

of the Dragoons, leaving the other 200 in New Mexico. He also 

discarded his wagons in favor of pack mules by which means be hoped 

to make quicker time, traveling 25 miles a day.l12 Instead of peace, 

Kearn y and h is men fOll nd coull terrevol ution in California, but a fter one 

engagement they arrived a t San Diego on 12 December 1846. 

\<Vhen Quarten nastCl' Swords left Fort Leavenwonh, he had not been 

informed tha t Kearny's ultimate destination was California . In conseq uence, he had 'broug ht no packsaddles th o ugh there were many at the 

fort. BeCore th e troops seL o ut for Californ ia, therefore, Swords had to 

have packsaddles made at Taos, for no sui ta bl e timber could be obtained 

at Santa Fe. Despite all the care that could be taken of the a nima ls, 

few of the mules tha t left Sama Fe managed to travel the 1,050 miles 

to Sa n Di ego. At San Diego, th ere were no supplies of any kind, excep t 

those belonging to the Navy, whose personnel were themselves o n short 

allowance. Noth ing bllt cattle could be procured in th e coun try. 

On Kearny's orders, Swords left for th e Sandwich (Hawaiian) Islands, 

in a ship chartered by the Navy Department, to obtain fu nds and to 

procure the provisions necessary for both the Army and the Navy. as well 

as articles needed by thc Q uartermaster's a nd :Medica l Departments. 

No funds had arrived at Santa Fc before his departure and Swords had 

not been able to bring any to California . Thc expedition had carried 

articles of Ind ian t.rade with them that it used in bartering with the 

Indians for provisions en route. To pay for th e articl es he procured at 

Honolulu and also to cover the necessary expenses of the Army in 

California, Swords issued a proposal fo r an excha nge for drafts which he 

drew upon Quartcn nasler General J esup and the heads of th e othcr 

supply de partments in Washington .

ta The ratc of exchange for bills 

was exorbita nt; Swords obtained .$ 1,100 at 18 percent and $4,500 at 

20 percent. His voyage to the Sandwich Islands took 18 days and the 

retu rn trip 25 days. Hc was then occupied in getting the stores he had 

purchased placcd in thc depot at Sa n Diego. Later, he joincd Kearny 

at rvrom el'ey where he erected a saw mill , furnished LOols and ma terials 

for the construct ion of a fi eld work by the Engineers, repaired the 

barracks, and superintended th e la ndi ng of storcs from ships d ispatched 

by the Q uartermaster's Department from New York in th e fall of 1846. 

' '"' (I) RG 92. CGI'. McKissa.ck LCl!ers. No. 91. p.!H ~[cKissack!o Mackay, 16 Nov 1846). 

(2) House E.~. Dat;. No. I. 50th Gong .. Is! scss .. p. 5 13 (Kearny to Brig. Gen. R. Jon('5. 12 Dec 

1846). 

,,> (I) RG 92. OQMG Consolidated Correspondence Fill::. (Swords) (Swords to J esup. 16 J an 

and 27 Sep 1847). (2) R t porl of 511', 18-18-19, p. 228 (Sword's Rp!. 80c! 1847). 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 281 

On 1 June 1847, Kearny set out on his return journey to the East. Swords 

accompanying him. 'T< 

Lack of funds at Santa Fe also handicapped Captain McKissack in 

furnishing transportation for the men of the Morlllon Battalion who 

were to follow Kearny to Ca liforn ia under the command of Lt. Col. 

P. St. George Cooke. The mules the Battalion brought from Fort 

Leavenworth were broken down by the lime they reached Santa Fe, but 

the replacements furnished by McKissack were not much beuer, supported as they had been on short rations. The Quartermaster calculated 

that he could Furnish transportation only for a pound and a half for each 

man for 60 days. But the rations alone should have amounted nearly 

to that, and, in addition, baggage, equipage, ammunition, tools, packsaddles, and other suppl ies also had to be transported_ The last oE the 

Battalion arrived at Santa Fe on 13 OctOber, and 6 days later the Mormon 

Battalion started west, its aggregate strength 397. There were three mule 

wagons to each company besides six large ox. wagons. There were four 

mule wagons for the field and staff, quartermaster's property, hospital 

department, and the paymaster, as well as four or five private wagons in 

the train. The expedition set out with 60 days' rations of Dour, sugar. 

coffee, and salt; 30 of salt pork: and 20 of soap. After incredible hardships on the trail. Lieutenant Colonel Cooke brought some of his wagons 

and his gaunt men, halE-naked and for the most part unshod. to San Diego 

by the end oE January 1847.

m 

To the men who had to iled overl and to California. President Polk, 

in the summer of 1846, decided to add a regimem oE volunteers. about 

800 strong, to be sent there by water and placed under Kearny's command 

on arrival in California. The Quartermaster's Department immediately 

initiated action to chaner the necessary vessels and equip and supply 

the regiment. Under the command of Col. J. D. Stevenson. a part of 

the men sailed on three ships rrom New York in September, the rest 

following shortly thereafter in three more chartered ships. all of which 

carried ordnance stores, camp equipage. baggage, and subsistence. They 

arrived on the Pacific Coast during March and April 1847 to be mustered 

out in California. each man being under obligation to rema in there and 

assist in colonizing the collmry.''' 

While General Kearny was marching to Ca lifornia, Colonel 

'''Report 0/ SII', 18-18-19. p. 229 (Swords' Rpl. 8 Ocl 1847) . 

• n LI. Col. I'. SI. George Cooke. "'Journal of the Much of Ihe Mormon Battalion," f.>/!S$im , 

in Senate Ex . Doc. No.2, 31s1 Collg .. Special Ses.s. 

'''(1) RC 92. OQMG Leuer Book, vol. 37, pp. 497, 541, 543 Uesup to Stanlon , I, 15. 

17 Jul \846); \'01. 38, pp. 108-09, 133-301, 218-19 (Same to same, 4 Sep, II Sep. 15 Ocl 1846). 

(2) House Ex. Doc. No. 50, pp. 159-62 (Marcy 10 Stevenson , II Sep 1846); pp. 162-63 (Mucy 

to Kearny, 12 Sep 1846). 
282 QUARTERMASTER SU PPORT OF THE ARMY 

Don iphan, at his orders and after the arriva l of re info rcements at Santa Fe, 

set o ut for the Navajo cou ntry to negotiate a trea ty. Q uartermaster 

McKissack provided the necessary wagons, mules, and oxenY1 By midDecember, tbis assignmclll had been comp leted and Doniphan, with 

856 effective men, started From Val verda to join General Wool at Chihuahua. EI Paso was taken witho ut opposition, tbe enemy was dcf<;atcd, 

and Doniphan 's fo rce took possession of Chihua hua a ll 1 March 1847. 

Wool, however, was at Saltillo. Do niphan's position was embarrassing. 

Most of his volu nteers had been in service since I June and though their 

terms -of service would expire in May, they had not received one cent 

of pay. Their marches had been hard and they were literally, Doni phan 

info rmed Wool, without horses, clothes, or money. Since his troops 

were not fi t for garrison duty at Chih uahua, he req uested that his fo rce 

be a llowed to join Wool before their term of service expired. After a 

600-mi le march through enemy territory, th e troops reached General 

Wool's camp on 2 April. O n orders of General Taylor, they then proceeded to Monterey and the Rio Grande, where they embarked [or 

New Orleans to be discharged a nd receive their first pay after an incredibl e journey of more th an 5,000 miles.1T8 

From th e time th e first troops of th e Army of the "Vest arri ved in 

Sama Fe, about mid-August 1846, th at town became the deposit point 

for provisions and th e depot for outfitti ng all expeditions setting out for 

California, other points in New Mexico, and Mexico itse lf. Santa Fe 

was alive with acti vity. Provision wagons came in da ily from Fort 

Leavenworth duri ng the fal I of 1846. The commissaries and q ua rtermasters were busy rece iving and storing prov isions and tak ing care of 

the stock. Q uan ermaster McKissack rented qual"lers for such troops 

and officers as were stationed in 5ama Fe as well as build ings for hospita ls 

and for storehouses. Exorbitam prices were charged and he proposed 

the construction of barracks if troops were to be stationed permanently 

in New Mexico. At Kearny's orders, he a lso set a bout building a saw 

mill that he hoped to compl ete before the end of the year, but he feared 

that "no calculations can be made o[ work performed by volunteers who 

only work when th ey please." 

T he co um ry, he repon ed, was destitute of a lmost all materials 

needed fo r outfitt ing expeditions, and prices of most things had doubled 

si nce the arrival of th e troops. The dema nd for packsadd les for tbe 

expedition had virtually drai ned the coun try, a nd LO equip the Mormon 

"., RG 92, eGI', McKissack Lellcrs, No. 91, p. 62 (McKissack \0 J esup. 8 Dec 18·16). 

, .. (I) Jotlmal of lI' i/li(lln N. Ric/wrr/SOll, p. 46 If. (2) House Ex. Doc. No. 60, pp. 1128-29 

(Doniphan to Wool , 20 Mar 1847). (!) Senate Ex. Doc. No.1. 30th Collg .• lsi ~s., PI" 497-502 

(Doniphan to Brig. Gen. R. Jones, 4 Mar 1847). 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 283 

Battalion be had made packsaddles ou t of broken wagons. It was difficult to recruit broken down animals. Crain was scarce; oats and hay 

unobtainabl e. He often had to purchase fresh oxen and send them to 

the assistance of wagon trains that bad broken down on the trail after 

crossi ng the Arkansas. As winter approached, the Indi ans below Bent's 

Fort attacked morc of the provision trains en route to Sante Fe. Snowstorms ca ught others and the expense of assisting them to reach Santa Fe 

ra n in to thousa nds of dollars. A considerable amoun t of that expense, 

Jl.IIcKissack held, resulted from the gross carelessness of the teamsters, 

for he found that private trains loSl one ox to the government's thirty. 

I-Ie resolved that when a wagon train lost over 100 oxen on th e journey 

hom Fort Leavenworth to Santa Fe that the wagon master's pay and 

rations wou ld cease at once and his back pay be ta ken to compensate, 

in part. for the 10ssYu 

Much of the Department'S troubles at Santa Fe stemmed from the 

lack of funds and it was not until January 1847 that any cash arrived. 

The post at Santa Fe required a quartermaster who could assume 

responsib ility without waiting for orders or directions from Washington . 

The great d istances and the poor means of communica tion meant that 

for months the quartermaster was left to his own devices. In midFebruary 1847. McKissack wrotc J esup that he had received no instructions since the Army had arrived at Santa Fe in August 1846. On 

5 Jul y. he noted that it was now some 6 or 8 months since he had received 

a letter from Washi ngton. 'so 

To th e best of his ability, McKissack equipped Kearny 's troops, the 

Mormon Battalion, and Doniphan 's Regiment, providing th em with 

transportation and provisions, and he supponed the troops stationed at 

Santa Fe and in its vici nity. Obviollsly. once th e expeditions were under 

way there was no way of maintain ing supply lines with Santa Fe and 

q uartermasters on th ose expeditions were as much on their own in provid. 

ing fresh mules or provisions en route as Captain McKissack was at 

Santa Fe. 

Q1.Ia1·lennasteT Su.p/Jort of Scott 

The operations of both Taylor's Army and the Army of the West 

had been successfu l in bringing under America n control a large part oE 

th e territor y belonging to Mexico. They had not been successful in 

terminating the wa r. Confronted with the prospect of a war of unlimited 

''' RG 92, CGI', McKissack Letters. No. 91, pp. 26-29. !()....~2. 48-51, 62- 65 (McKiSllack to 

Jt-suJ>. 30 Sep, G Oct, 11 Nov, 8 Dec 1846): p. 69 (McKissack to Cap!. R. E. Clary, 3"0 Nov 1846). 

L9D Ibid., pp. 78-81; 131 3~ (McKissack to Jesup, 9 Jan and 5 Jul 1847). 
284 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

duration and expense, the government soon gave consideration to the 

proposal to compel Mexico to sue for peace by attacki ng Mexico City 

by way of Vera Cruz. It was 18 November 1846, however, before Polk 

reluctantly appointed Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott to the command of the 

expedition. 

Scott had given much thought to the planning of such an expedition . 

He doubted whether the government ought to risk the attempt unless 

12,000 to 15,000 men were assigned to the task. He considered a 

minimum force of 10,000 as indispensable, but sooner than delay his 

start and run the risk of exposing his men to the dangers of the black 

vomito that would be preva lent on the coast after mid-April, he th ought 

the expedition ought to go forward with the first 8,000 men that might 

be embarked off Point Isabe l. For operations into the interior, an 

additional 10,000 men would be required as reinforcements. To obta in 

the u-oops for the Vera Cruz expedition, Taylor's Army was cut almost 

in half and ordered to stand on the defensive at Monterey. From 

Taylor's forces, Scott ca ll ed for Regulars- 4,000 infantry, 500 cavalry, 

and 2 field batteries of light artillery- and volunteers-4,OOO infantry 

and 500 cavalry- to be embarked from Tampico and the Brazos. Of the 

eight new regiments of foot volunteers to be sent from the United States, 

he expected to take three or four regiments, leaving the remai nder for 

Taylor's command. lSI 

Scott estimated that he wou ld need 140 flatboats to put ashore at 

Vera Cruz, at once, 5,000 men with eight pieces of light artillery. About 

1,000 horses for officers, cavalry, and anillery would be required as well 

as a ponton tra in to pass rivers. In the projets he submitted before his 

appointment to command, he recommended the immediate initiation 

of such preparatory measures. Ships to transport men and supplies 

ought also to be chartered, for the whole expedition should be afloat 

and beyond the Rio Gra nde by 15 January 1817, or, at the very latest. 

by 1 February to allow plenty of time for operations before the appearance 

of the yellow fever. Scott left Washington on 24 November, having 

made ample requisitions for ordnance, ordnance stores, and transportation facilities. 

Almost 2 months earlier. Quartermaster General J esu p, with the 

approval of the Secretary of War, had left Washington for New Orleans 

to assume direction of Quartermaster affairs there and in Mexico so 

that any exigency might be promptly provided for, withoul the delay 

resu lting from waiting for instructions from Washington. To eliminate 

.tt House: Ex. Doc. No. 60. pp. 839-40 (Scott to Taylor, 20 Dec 1846): pp. 851- 53 (Scun 10 

lIutlc:r. 3 Jan 1847): pp. 1268-70 (Scott pTOje:t, 27 Oct 1846): pp. 1270-73 (Scott projel, 12 Nov 

1846); pp. 1274-75 (Scott to sw, 21 Nov 1846). 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 285 

any opposition to his presence in the fie ld- J esup was the senior of every 

offi cer serving in Mexi<;o- he had d iscl a imed any desire for a military 

command and had proposed to go in his capacity as an officer of the staff, 

ready to obey the orders of Genera l Taylor or any other officer in 

command.'$2 j es up's inspection of Quartermaster operations in the field 

SOOI1 convinced him that the offi cers of his Department did not merit 

the criticism made of them. They had been obliged to guess what might 

be wanLed and, as a resul t, risk a n oversuppl y of some articles and an 

insufficiency of others. "No provident foresight," Jesup charged, had 

been exercised by anyone in command.' 83 

His inspection also resulted in unfavorable comment on th e performance of both the Ordnance and Topographical Departments whose 

duti es in the field, he charged, were being executed by quartermasters. 

He mail1lained that if a .proper LOpographical survey had been made of 

the Rio Grande, and of the bays and harbors through which the supplies 

of the Army had to pass, much inconvenience and ex pense would have 

been saved. J esup suggested th at various works o ught a lso to have 

been constl"llcted during the summer, particularly a railroad from the 

mouth of the R io Grande to Brazos. It would have saved at least half 

a million dollars during the present campa ign, he informed the Secretary 

of War, convenientl y forgetting that the Topographical Department had 

been as short of funds as the Quartermaster's Department- u o 

J esup did not simpl y ind ulge in criticism; he took ste ps to improve 

suppl y. Since the forwarding of supplies by steamers from the depot 

at Point Isabe l to the mouth of the Rio Grande had become hampered 

because so man y vessels had been disa bled and wrecked, and beca use the 

weather in the wi nter of 1846-47 was so bad as to obstl"llct naviga tion 

by th e remaining boats, Jesup ordered th e depot quartermaster to form 

a train of 200 wagons to keep up a direa communication by land. Use 

of th e land route required th e Department to build a bridge across a 

bayou, for although the distance was onl y about 10 miles th e transporting 

of supplies would have been delayed by th e necessity for ferrying wagons 

across the bayou.'M Since a ll supplies landed at th e Brazos had e ither 

to be reshipped or transported on wagon trains to a depot at the mouth 

of th e Rio Grande, J esup, to sa ve both time and expense , also directed 

that all quartermaster stores, destined for th e north ern part of Mexico, 

be shipped directl y to th e depot at the mOllth of the ri ver, exce pt when 

''' Ibill ., p. 562 UClIUP to Marcy. 26 SI'" ]816): p. 563 (Marcy 10 J esup. 1 Oct ]846). 

"'" Ibid., p. 566 OCSllP 10 Marcy. 27 No,· ]846). 

,.. House J,;." . /)m:. No. ]]9. pp. 273- 74 OCllUp to Marq. 2 ~n 1847): p. 274 (Col. J. J. Abert 

to r.h rcy. ]5 J an 1847); p. 275 (L1. Col. C. T alC()u 10 Marcy. 22 ~n 1847). 

" O{]) Ibid., pp. 273-74. (2) Housl' Ex. Doc. No.8. p. 546 (Rpl or QMG. 24 Nov ]847). 
286 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

weather or the size of the ship required delivery of [he cargo at the 

Brazos. Extensive sLOrehouses and workshops were erected th ere as well 

as a dry dock to permit repair of steamboats and other vessels. H e 

further suggested that the Commissary General of Subsistence a lso rou te 

his shipment of rations to the same depoL U & 

To expedite transportation in the field. he recommended changes 

in the packaging of ordnance and subsistence supplies. He urged the 

use of waterproof materials to protect the supplies scm to the Army and 

to decrease the heavy expense of replacement of damaged articles. H e 

a lso proposed red uction in the size of packages to promote ease of handling. H e recommended that the Secretary of War issue orders to that 

effect to both th e Ordnance and Subsistence Departments. lIT 

" Had we foreseen th e nature of the navigation of the Mexican coasts 

and harbors, and of the Rio de l Norte, and built suitable steamboats 

several months ago, a million dollars might have been saved by this time," 

j esup lamented in November 1846.188 Since the need had not been 

foreseen, he set about purchasing more ships and to expedite the lightering of cargoes a t the Brazos he had Col. S. H. Long, of the Topographical 

Engineers at Louisvill e, Ky., build a steamer to specifications for use 

there.' 8 D 

He found his Department deficient in personnel. He had little use 

for the newly appointed volunteer quartermasters. Not more than a 

fifth 0 1' a sixth of the quartermasters and assistants appointed from civil 

life, he declared, would make even tolerable wagon and forage masters. 

He feared that frauds had been committed, not with the concurrence of 

these officers but in spite of their "best exertions." To this charge of 

incapacity, Secretary Marcy Slyly replied that j esup surely could not be 

speaking wholl y from personal knowl edge since these appointments had 

been presented to the President "with the highest testimonials of qualifications." ,,.0 To promote efficiency and economy, j esup recommended 

and obtained the appointment of four additional majors and ten additiona l assistants from the Army.til 

H e was less successful in his efforts to obtain a militarized service 

corps to support the troops of the line. H is greatest difficulty during 

the war was to obtain the mechanics, teamsters, and laborers required 

for carrying ou l the operations of h is Department. The several armies 

.. RG 92. OQMG Consolida ted Correspondence File, Box 477 Uesup 10 Gibson. W Jan 

1847) . 

.or House Ex . Doc. No. 60. pp. 569-70 Uesup 10 Marcy. 1 J an 1847). 

''' I bid., 1;>. 564 Uesup to Marcy. 7 Nov 1846) . 

... HOllse Ex. Doc. No. 119, pp. 444-<15 Oesup to Long. 24 Nov 1846) . 

... RG 107. OSW. Military Book, vol. 27, pp. 195- 96 (Marcy to J esup. 8 Feb 1847). 

,., RG 107, OSW. Reporu; to Congress. vol. 6, p. 26 (SW to Benton. 29 J an 1847). 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 287 

were too small for him to obtain assistance from them by detail of soldiers. 

Civilians had to be hired- seve ral tho usand of them at times-at high 

rates of wages and taken at heavy expense to the points where their labors 

were required. Few would engage for longer than 6 months; fewer still 

would re-engage. At the moment when they became qualified to render 

efficient service they claimed the ir discharge, often in the midst of the 

most critical and importalll operations and a t places where it was impossibl e to replace them. The only sol ution, J esup urged, was the 

organization of a corps to serve d uring the war, subj ect to the laws 

governi ng the Army and emitled to all the advantages given to the troops 

of th e line. u~ His proposal brought no response, and, in fa ct, 65 years 

were to pass before Congress in 1912 enacted legislation bringing about 

this reform. 

J esu p was in th e fi eld at the lime preparations for the Vera Cruz 

ex pedition were undertak!!n. He me l with Genera l Scott at the Brazos 

to d iscuss the plan of campaign and its su pply problems. He personally 

supervised the arrangements made for the transportation of the troops 

from New Orleans and Mobile and fo r the shipment of su pplies from the 

Brazos, Tampico, and New Orleans. H e accompanied the expedition to 

Vera Cruz, landing there wit h Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson's division of 

volunteers. During the course of the siege, he twice went to Tampico 

to hasten forward troops, su ppl ies, and the means of transportation. Not 

until 31 March 1847, after Vera Cruz had been occupied, did he leave 

for Washington.lUs 

While General J esu p gave " the utmost possible efficiency" to Quartermaster service in the field, Colonel Stanton directed preparations (or the 

Vera Cruz expedition in Washington. One o( the most difficult tasks 

imposed on th e Departmem was the construction and dispatch within 

30 days of the 140 surf boats req u ired by Scott fo r land ing his troops 

at Vera Cruz. Lacking personnel for all the duties to be attended to, 

Stanton hired Capt. Richard F. Loper, of the firm of Loper and Baird 

of Philade lphi a, on a per diem basis as a special agent o( the Department. 

To Loper he assigned the task of contracting at Atlantic Coast shipyards 

for th e construction of the 140 barges, to be built in con formity with 

drawings and spec ifications furnished by the Navy. Lt. George M. 

Totten of the Navy was detailed to assist Loper.! ~f 

Each barge was intended to carry 50 LO 80 men. To facilitate 

,., House Ex. Doc. No.8. p. 548 (Rpt of QMG. 24 Nov 1847). 

' .. RG 92. OQMG Leller Book. vol. 41. p. 256 Oesup to C. M. 8 agbee. 20 Oct 1848). 

, .. (I) RG 92. OQMG Letter Book. vol. 38. pp. 302-{)3 (Stanton to Loper. 29 Nov 1846): 

pp. 343-44 (Stallion to Tollen. 21 Dec 1846). (2) RG 92. OQMG Consolidated CorrcsllOndence 

File, Bo" 582 (Loper to Stanton. 5 Dec 1846). 
288 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

shipment by permitting nesting of the boats, they were constructed in 

three lengths-40 fe ct, 37 feet 9 inches. and 35 feet 9 inches.m It was 

almost as difficult to transport the barges as it was to construct them. 

There were few ships capablc of carrying them on deck, and, in any case, 

StanWI1 found that they could not he sent as freigh t. Consequently, he 

had to purchase a number of ships and cut the decks open to permit 

placing the barges in their holds and between decks. When the ships 

sailed, Stanton sent along six experienced boatbuilders and ship carpenters to serve the Department in the field.'u The deadline of I January 

was mel; the sh ips were promptly dispatched with their cargoes of barges, 

but bad weather frustrated the efforts of the Department to deliver them 

at Vera Cruz. Only 65 of the 140 surf boats arrived in time to be used 

in landing the troops. 

Before General Scott left Washington, he had urged the War Depart· 

ment to send out a number of large sh ips in ball ast from the eastern 

pons because he feared that the expedition might be de layed. It would 

he impossible to obtain a suffic ient number of vessels at New Orleans 

and Mobile. Scott had estimated that to transport 14,000 men with 

horses, artillery, stores, and surf boats, a tota l of 50 ships of from 500 to 

750 tons each would be required.lUo Two weeks later, the Secretary 

of War, much concerned at the exorbitant costs of transportation on the 

Atlantic Coast where freight rates were high, inquired of Jesup just 

what amount of transportation could be furn ished at New Orleans and 

Mobile. Replying on 27 December, Jesup, then at the Brazos, assured 

the Secretary that transportation for all the troops that might he drawn 

from Taylor's Army and for all supplies taken from the Brazos depot or 

New Orleans could he provided there by the Quartermaster's Department. He estimated that the government-owned ships in the Gulf could 

carry 3,000 men, with all their supplies, and that if additional means of 

transportation were required they could be chartered at New Orleans 

on favorable terms. a8 

ln the meantime, on 15 December, Secretary Marcy sent Jesup a 

detailed statement on the means of transportation that would be required. 

He proposed sending out the Massachusetts, New York, Virginia, and 

''''Willi3m C. Temple. Memoir of the Llllld;>lg of til t: U"jud Siaies Troops III Vera Crrn 

;11 JB47 (Ph iladelphia, 1896). pp. 60-62 . 

• N RG 92, OQMG Lctler Book, vol. 11"8. PI'. 384-85, 404-05 (Slanlon 10 Jesup. 14 and 

22 Jan 1847). 

,or House Ex. Doc. No. 60, p. 1219 (Scott 10 S\\', 24 Feb 1848); p. 1274 (Scott 10 SW. 16 Nov 

1846). 

' .. (1) RG 107. OSW, Mi litary Book, vol. 27, PI'. 95- 96 (Mn cy 10 Jesup. II Dec 1846). 

(2) House Ex. Doc. No. ] ]9, pp. 270-71 Oaup to Marcy, 27 Dec 1846). 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 289 

North Carolina regiments from Boston, New York, Old Point Comfort, 

and Wilmi ngton, respective ly. T he Pennsylva nia, Mississippi, and 

Louisiana regiments would proceed via New Orleans while the South 

Carolina regiment would move out from Mobil e. Each regiment with 

its ordnance and stores would req uire 3 ships so that the regiments 

leaving from the Atlantic Coast would need a total of 12 ships. T he 

War Department estimated that an additional 5 ships would be required 

to transport the su rf boats besides the 10 req uested by Scott to be sent 

out in ball ast, unless Slores could be put on board. T ha t left 14 ships 

to be provided b y the Quartermaster's Department at New Orleans to 

make up a total of 41 ships for the expedition. IDa When Marcy received 

J esup's assurances that transportation could be provided at New Orleans, 

he coum ermanded the order he had given Colonel Stanton fo r charteri ng 

the 10 ships to be sent out in ballast. 

Scott later charged that the embarka tion of the expedition at the 

Brazos and Tampico was delayed, in whole or in part, from 15 January 

to 9 March 1847, because the 10 ships on which he had confidentl y relied 

were not furn ished!M Secretary Marcy was remiss in not notifying Scott 

and J esup of his action, but the expedition was not delayed for want of 

ships. J esup admitted th at he had ex pected those 10 ships, for he thought 

they would be on their way before his letter of 27 December was received 

at the War Department. T he weather had been so bad, however, that 

J esup considered it unsafe to de pend on their arrival, and he had ma de 

h is arrangements without coullling upon them and had so informed 

Genera l SCOlt. Instead of th e 27 vessels that it had been estimated wo uld 

be needed [or tra nsportation of troops and supplies from the Atlantic 

Coast, Colone l Stanton had actua ll y dispa tched 53 ships, barques, brigs, 

and schooners, a nd, in place of the 14 ships, th e Departmen t had furnished 

163 vesse ls at New Orleans, Brazos, a nd Tampico.

201 

Though want of ships caused no delay other factors d id. Under the 

most favorabl e circumsta nces, it would have required time to organize 

so extensive a transport service, but beca use of drenching rains throughout the mOlllh of J anuary, the shi ps chartered at New Orleans could not 

be prepared and scm to sea as rapidly as was desira bl e. Each transport 

was to carry enough fuel and water for 60 days and preferab le for 90. 

Ships were detained at New Orl eans first for want of ex tra water casks 

and then fo r lack of seamen. Su pposed to leave New Orleans by 

24 January and be at the Brazos by I Fe bruary, th ey had put in no 

'- RG 107. OS\\', Military Book, vol. 27, PI" 117- 18 (Marcy to Jesu p. 15 DL'C 1846) . 

.... House Ex. Doc. No. 60. PI" 1219- 20 (5<::011 to Iarc)". 2-1 'e b 1848). 

"'Ibid., pp. 1253-55 Ut'Sup to S\\', 17 Apr 1848). 
290 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

appearance by 12 February. and Scott reported that the expedition was 

running a month behind the schedul e he had set in November. 2D2 

Assembling the troops also ran behind schedule. Taylor's forces 

were dispersed at Parras, Saltillo, Monterey, Victoria, and Tampico, and 

the troops taken fo r service on the Vera Cruz expedition had to be drawn 

into Tampico and Brazos from distant pl aces. As a consequence, Scott 

reported that Taylor's troops were not likely to arrive at the embarkation 

points berore 25 January .... ~ The January storms that prevented prompt 

departure of the ships from New Orleans also delayed the arrival at the 

rendezvous point of ships hom the eastern ports carrying troops and 

supplies. Stamon had promptly chartered and dispatched the ships, 

yet, of (he ordnance stores and the siege train req uisitioned by Scott in 

November, only about one-half had arrived when the attack was made 

on Vera Cruz. ~o, 

During the last week in February, nearl y all of the Regulars and 

large numbers of the volunteers arrived at the Lobos Islands, the rendezvous point £01' the expedition. On 2 March, the fl eet of transports set 

off for Anton Lizardo, the next rendezvous point located about 200 miles 

from the Lobos anchorage, where the Navy squadron under Commodore 

David Conner was waiting to lend its assista nce. Originally, Scott had 

intended to land his troops directly from the large transports on which 

he had expected them to sail. But the use of a large number of small 

vessels for transporting the troops made that plan impi·acticable. When 

Commodore Conner offered to transport the Army on the vessels of the 

squadron, Scott accepted and revised his arrangements. This first amphibious operation had been worked out in detail and was executed with 

smooth precision by the Army and Navy. Using the 65 surf boats, each 

of which was conducted by a naval officer and rowed by sailors of the 

squadron, Scott's Army of 10,000, each man carrying in his haversack 

bread and cooked meal for a 2 days' supply, landed on the beach unopposed and witham accident.2~~ 

The surf boats were also used to land supplies. Horses and mules 

transported in small, light-draft vessels were brought as near the beach 

as the vessel could get, thrown overboard, and made to swim ashore. 

Those transported on large ships were first transferred to the Navy 

100 Ibid., pp. 841, 855 (Scott to Brooke, 2!1 Dec 1846, 12 Jan 1848); p. 891 (Scott to Marcy. 

12 Feb 1847); p. 89!1 (ScOIt \0 Patterson, 9 Feb 1847). 

"'" I bid., p. 847 (Scott to Commodore D. Conner, 26 Dec 1846); p. 855 (Scott to Brooke, 

12 J an 1847) . 

... (I) Ibid., Pl'. 1219-20 (Scott to SW, 24 Feb (848). (2) RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, 

\'01. !l8, Pl'. !l29--!l0 (StalliOn 10 Vinton, 111 Dec 1846); pp. 4!17-!8 (Stanton to Jesup. 16 Feb 1847) . 

... (I) T elllple, M emoir of I"t: Laudiug o/Ihe Ullited.Stalu T roops al f'era Gnu, pp. 63-66. 

(2) House Ex. Doc. No.8, pp. 216-17 (Scott to Marcy, 12-15 Mar 1847). 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEM S OF THE MEXICAN WAR 291 

steamer Pelri/a, taken in as far as poss ibl~ , and then made to swim ashore 

in tow of surf boats. In this way. nearly 500 got ashore in onc day by 

a single division of boats consisting of to surf boats. 208 

Many an imals were, however, lost. A storm interrupted operations 

and as many as 40 vessels were blown on the beach by the norther. 

Communication with the ships at anchor was disrupted until smooth 

seas made it possible to begin agai n the task of landing ammunition, 

heavy mortars, packsaddles, wagons, and rations. The beach, covered 

with piles of stores and crowded with men, looked like the levee of a vast 

commercial city.20T Whi le commissaries and quartermasters worked to 

get the ir stores under cover, the bombardment of Vera Cruz went on and, 

on 29 March , the Army occupied the city. 

Observers believed that months would elapse after the capture of 

Vera Cruz before an army would be able to advance into the interior, 

but 10 days later a d ivision of Regulars under Brig. Gen. D. E. Twiggs 

began a forced march to Jalapa in the hope of obtaining much-needed 

draft animals. Scott was handica pped by inadequate means of land 

transportation, and it was anticipated that mules as well as forage and 

subsistence could be more easily obtained at Jalapa than at Vera Cruz. 

Not a tenth part of the Army's needs in horses, mu les, and oxen, Scott 

reported, could be suppli ed at Vera Cruz. 

Supply plans had been formulated to meet the Army's need for land 

transportation. For his immediate needs, Scott had advised Capt. A. R. 

Hetzel. then senior quartermaster at the Brazos, that he would require 

100 wagons and mule teams to follow closely on the heels of the expedition to furnish the necessary initial means of transportation.

2QS Having 

attended to the transportation of troops and supplies from the Brazos, 

Hetzel, at Scott's orders, proceeded to Vera Cruz where he organized 

and, un til his death from yellow feve r, admi nistered the Quartermaster 

depot he established there. Early in April, Hetzel had 180 wagons ·and 

teams ready for the move to Jalapa. 

Far more land transportation was required for the Army as a whole 

and the need for such preparations had been call ed to Jesup's attention 

as early as January. For an army of 10,000 taking up the march into the 

interior of Mexico, Scott had later informed Jesup, he would need about 

800 to 1,000 wagons with 5-rnlile teams, 2,000 to 3,000 pack mules, and 

300 to 500 draft animals for the siege train. 2QO Jesup had already ordered 

the Philadelphia quartermaster to have 400 wagons made with 2.000 sets 

- T emple. MellJair of Ihe Llmdillg of Ihe a,riled Siaies Troops a/ " era Cnu, p. 69 . 

.." Fu rber. Twelve MOIl/irS VO/rlll/ur, pp. 505- 15. 

- House E;o;. Doc. No. 60. p. 884 (Scot! to Hetzel. 2 Feb 1847). 

- Ibid., pp. 912. 91 3 (Scott to Jesup. II Jan. 19 Mar 1847). 
292 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

of mule harness, to be kept on hand subject to further orders. Early in 

April, there were some 300 wagons on board ships, but Hetzel feared 

many had been lost in the storms that plagued the expedition.tlO 

Scott and J esu p had agreed before the expedition began that the 

Army would have to rely on the cOlll1lry about to become the theater of 

operations for two-thirds of the draft animals needed, and upon nonhern 

Mexico and the United Stales for the other third. According to J esup. 

these expectations were well founded at the lime since the country about 

Vera Cruz, Alvarado. and Tlacontalpan abounded in horses. mules. and 

cattle. On 30 March, Brig. Gen. J. A. Quitman, in a joint operation 

with Commodore M. C. Perry. was scnt against Alvarado to neutralize 

lhe people of that section, acquire a harbor for Perry's small vessels, and 

open and secure the resources of the area. "An injudiciolls movement 

in anticipation of General Quitman," made by the commander of a 

Navy ship, resulted in the surrender of both Alvarado and T lacotalpan, 

but withollt securing the resources behind them. That action defeated 

one of the prime objects of 'General Scott in sending out the expedition 

and also the expectations of the Quanermaster's Depanmem. In consequence, the Department had to procure most of the draft animals required 

by the Army at New Orleans, Brazos Santiago, and Tampico.1lI Quanermaster General J esup, then at Vera Cruz, had returned to these ports to 

hurry forward the land transportation that Scott required. Hunt at 

New Orleans reported that he sent a total of 336 wagons and 2,444 horses 

to Vera Cruz, while the assistant quartermaster at Tampico purchased 

and sent 548 wagons and 4,226 mules. U2 

The means of transportation slowly increased, and Capt. J ames R. 

Irwin, appointed chief quartermaster with ScOtt's Army, "showed great 

energy and powers of combination," Scott reported. By 20 April, there 

were 500 wagons on the rood and 250 pack mules.m The hope of 

doubling the means of tra nsportation by the forced move to Jalapa, 

however, was not realized. Contrary to expectation, subsistence, forage. 

and draft an imals proved to be scarce there. Large suppl ies of anima ls 

could not be obtained in the enemy's country until after the fall of 

Puebla. Getti ng essential supplies- ammun ition, clothing. salt, medi· 

"' (1) Ibid., p. 908 (Scot! to Marcy. 5 Apr 1847). (2) RG 92, OQMG Leiter Book, vol. "8, 

pp. 415--46 (Slanton to Jesup, 29 Jan 1847). (5) RG 107, OS\\', Military Book, vol. 27, p. 19-4 

(SW to J esu p, 8 Feb 1847). 

01'( 1) id ~ pp. 917- 18 (Quitman to H. L. Scoll , 7 Apr 1847). (2) Hou$e Ex. Doc. No.8, 

p. 547 (Rpt of QMG, 24 Nm' 1848). 

"0 (I) RG 92, OQMG Consolidated Correspondence file. Box. 659 (Hunt Rpl, 2 May 1846-

7 July 1847). (2) Rpf oJ SlY, "8~9, p. 218 (Rpl of Tampico Operation$). 

:>UI (I) House Ex.. Doc. No. 60, pp. 928-29 (Scott to Marcy, II Apr 1847). (2) RG 92, 

CG I', Irwin , Lellen Sent , No. 97 (Irwin to Jesup, 25 Apr 1847). 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 293 

D EFENSE OF P ACK TRA I N 

cines, and hospital stores- forward to Ja lapa was hampered by the deficient mcans of transportation. T he heat, the sand on the road below 

Cerro Gordo, the danger of yellow fever, the threat of having trains 

attacked and destroyed by the Mexicans, and the consequent necessity 

of escorting them on the 70 miles between Vera Cruz and Jalapa added 

to the difficulties of getting the supplies forward. 2U 

The greatest obstacle of all was the lack of effi cient teamsters. To 

man the wagons, Irwin got permission to hire as teamsters volunteers 

whose services were about to expire. Dragoons and infantrymen were 

also detailed as teamsters, but not one in 10, Hetze l reported, was capable 

of driving a team. zu T ime worked no improvement in this situation, 

the inexperienced teamsters, driving teams, in many cases, unbroken 

''' House Ex. Doc. No. 60. pp. 946-47 (Scott to Col. H . Wilson. 2!1 Apr 1847): p. 948 (Scot! 

to Worth, 2~ Apr 1847): pp. 944- 46 (ScOIt to Marcy. 28 Apr 1847) . 

... (I) RG 92. CGI'. Irwin. Letters Sent, No. 97 (Irwin \0 I'allenon. 25 Apr 1847). (2) RG 

92. CG I'. Hctzel. Lettcrs Sent. No. 85 (Hene] to Col. H . Wilson . 9 Jun 1847). 
294 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

to harness, over rough roads resulted in such a high ratc of wear and tear 

that Irwin was of the opinion th at wagons, harness, a nd animals would 

have to be replaced every 4 months.:tI 

Breadstuffs. bed, mutton, sugar, coffee. rice, beans. and Forage, 

Scott hoped to find on the line of operations. The Army expected to 

pay for such supplies because , without the pursuit of such a policy. all provisions and forage would be withheld, concealed, or destroyed by the Mexicans, and a ll military operations wou ld come to a halt while the troops 

spread out in search of food. m Both the Subsistence and the Quartermaster's Departments, however, were much hampered by a lack of funds. 

The Chid Commissary, Scott reported, had not received a dollar from 

the United States si nce the Army landed at Vera Cruz. By the end of 

Jul y, he owed more than $200,000 and was obliged to operate on credit 

at a great disadvantage. Chief Quartermastcr Irwin was equally hard 

pressed for fu nds. Both officers had sold drafts, though littl e could be 

obtained from them " this side of the capital," and both had borrowed 

so heavily from the paymaster that the troops had some 4 months' pay 

due th em.211 

The expenditures of the Quartermaster's Department were particu· 

larly heavy not onl y because of the outlay for animals and grain but also 

because it was furnishing supplies and making disbursements for the 

Medical and Engineer Departments.m On 30 April, Captain Irwin 

requested that $500,000 be placed to his credit at Vera Cruz. Only 

$300,000 arrived and Ca ptain H etze l retained $175,000 of that amount. 

or the $ 125,000 forwarded to him by H etzel , only $61,000 reached Irwin 

at Puebla in July, th e difference hav ing been spent on the road. no At 

tha t time. Captain Irwin protested against the use of the ruinous credit 

system. H e could not ra ise $20,000 at Vera Cruz on a premium of 

8 percent, he protested , and before he had received any part of the money 

rcq uested in April, he had been reduced to Ihe humiliating necessity of 

borrowing $500 at a time hom a gambler to enable him to furnish fuel 

for cooki ng and forage to keep the animals al ive. 

Without th e services of Louis S. Hargolls, an American merchant 

at Vera Cruz who acted as General Scott's financial agent, the Army would 

"·(1) RG 92. CGP. Irwin. Lclh:n Sent. No. 97 (Irwin 10 Hunt and 10 j esup. ~O Apr 1847). 

(2) Compare the elCperienccs of Col. J. S. Mcintosh in attempting to bring a wagon tnJin and 

reinforcements to I'ucblo. HOIl!e Ex. Doc. No.8. app-enclilC PI'. 4-9 (Mcintosh Rpt. 9 Jul 1847). 

OJ, House Ex. lJIX. No. 60. Pl'. 944. 963 (Scott 10 Marcy, 28 Apr, 2Q May 1847). 

"· ' bid .. pp. 994. OI2-1~' (Scon 10 Marcy, 4 jun, 25 J u l 1847). 

"· RG 92. CCI'. lrwin. Letten Sent . No. 97 (Irwin to Hunt and to Jo up. ~O Apr 1847). 

Irwiu latcr $Ought to be: relieved of the necessity of continuing to make disbunc:rnenls for 

the Engineer Depa rt ment. (Irwin 10 Capt. H. L. Scotl. 23 jul 1847). 

- Ibid., (Irwin to jesup and Hetlel. 18 Ju l 1847). 
LOG ISTICAL PROBLEMS OF T H E MEXICAN WAR 295 

have been even worse off fOI" funds. At Vera Cruz, his finn took $90,000 

of Irwi n's drafts when there were no funds there to redeem them, and at 

Puebla he was the onl y resource of both the Quartermaster's and Subsistence Departments after the funds bOlTowed from the Pay Department 

had been ex ha usted. W ithout knowing how th e Dcpanlllcill's credit 

would Sland when the Army reached Mexico City, Irwin had engaged 

at Puebla to take $450,000 from Ha rgous at par. His arrangements 

with Hargous termi nated abou t the end of October. By that time, the 

Army had occupied the capital and drafts drawn by Irwin on the Quartermaster's offices at Washington, New York, or New Orleans were readil y 

negotiated. In fact. they commanded a premium and if the old Mexico 

duty of 6 percent was kept upon the ex portation of specie and bullion. 

Irwin reported. they would always command a premium of that amount. 

In consequence. although the War Department had made arrangements 

with August Belmont. the New York agent of the Rothschilds. to make 

funds available to any paymaster or quartermaster designated by Scott. 

Irwin made no immediate contract with Belmont since the lauer req uired 

the payment of interest on drafts then worth a premium. U1 Irwin 

thought that he had served the Department to better advantage than the 

Secretary o[ 'War had in his COlUmct with Belmont. 

Scott had followed up the victOry at Cerro Gordo by send ing his 

troops on to Jalapa and then to Puebla. By mid-May, Puebla was 

occupi ed. but Scott's force was soon red uced to an effecti ve strength of 

5.820 mell because. the service of lhe volunteer regiments being about to 

expire, Scott sent them home early enough to avoid the season of yellow 

feve r at Vera Cruz. His force was now too small to keep open a li ne of 

communications with Vera Cruz. and consequently he decided to abandon 

Jalapa. concentrate his strength at Puebla. and await reinforcemellls there. 

By lhe first week in August, he was ready to begin his advance with about 

11 .000 men, the Chief Commissary and Quartermaster having used the 

interim to obta in funds by one means or another and to procure provisiam;, forage, and draft an imals. Scott's drive carried him to the gates 

of Mexico City before the end o[ the month. When a temporary armistice fail ed to produce peace, the battle was resumed. Scon occupi ed 

Mexico City on 14 September 1847. 

There, Captain Irwin set up a quartermaster depot in the custom 

house under a depot quartermaster, Capt. R. Allen, who was directed 

to lay in a supply of forage. horse shoes, and quartermaster stores. Capt. 

1- W. McK instry was put in charge of the cloth ing depot.IU On 

... (I) Ibid., (Irwin to J esup. 26 Oct 1847). (2) Hitchcock, Fil'y YI!IlrS i" Camp IIIId Fidd, 

pp. 258. 289, 291. 292. 

- RG 92, CGP. Irwin, Lew:" Sent, No. 97 (Order No. 17. 15 Sep IIH7). 
296 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

MARCH FROM PUEBLA 

I November, a train of 400 wagons left Mexico City for Vera Cruz to 

obtain supplies. Everything needed by the Army could be obtained at 

the capita l, but at such increased prices as LO make it expedient, when 

practicable. to transport supplies from the coast. Irwin had ample transportation available and on ly 250 loaded wagons were to return, the rest 

to be used by the troops between Puebla and Vera Cruz. T he supplies 

to be obtained were principally clothing, some few subsistence items for 

the sick, and a small quantity of particular descriptions of ammunition. 

The Army had taken more ammun ition in every instance than it had 

expended. The Army needed 300 good horses for the dragoons and 

artill ery. A month later, Irwin had heard nothing from Vera Cruz, and 

he complained about his idle transportation at the capital. But with a 

garrison of only 6,000 effective men there, sufficient escorts could not be 

spared for trainsY' 

Demobilization 

Peace negotiations had been de layed by internal political difficulties 

but, on 2 February 1848, a treaty was signed at Guadalupe Hidalgo. As 

soon as ratifications were exchanged on 30 May, the troops began 

ao Ibid., (Irwin 10 Jesup, 26 OCI, 8 Dec 1847). 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 297 

evacuating Mexico City. Captain Irwin had died on 10 January and 

Maj. Osborn Cross was appointed to succeed him. To him fell the task 

of returning the troops to Vera Cruz. When he called for transportation 

to rendezvous at Vera Cruz, Major Cross reported that 1,137 officers, 

26, 104 rank and file, and more than 5,000 mechanics. laborers, and 

teamsters would requ ire transportation home. 2U 

Once again the Quartermaster's Department had to charter and 

assemble a transport fleet to remove not only the troops at Vera Cruz but 

also at Tampico and at the Brazos. When confirmation of the treaty's 

ratification reached Washington, J esup ordered Colonel Stanton to 

chartcr 20 ships, averaging 600 tons each. or an equivalent number of 

smaller vesse ls on the Atlantic Coast. Only about 14 ships from the 

east coast were used. At the same lime, Maj. D. D. Tompkins, who had 

succeeded Hum at New Orleans in Jul y 1847, was directed to charter 

enough transports to carry 7,000 men. Sail vessels of not less tha n 300 

tons werc to bc preferred, and calcul at ing one man to each two tons' 

burden, some 45 ships would have been required at the minimum 

tonnage. On requisition from the depot quartermasters or the command· 

ing officers of the troops, Tompkins was to charter additional sh ips. All 

sh ips were to carry a 60-day supply of water, allowing one gallon per man 

per day independent of the waler required for the ship's officers and crew 

on the trip out and back. Charters were to be made for a designated 

sum per month, limited to lhe time they might be required by the 

Department.

as J esup esLimated tha t a total force of 40,890 troops and 

civilian mechanics, laborers, and teamsters would have to be brought 

home at a cost of $800,000 to $ I,OOO,ooo.ne 

To supervise the remova l of the troops and civili ans employed by 

the Army at Vera Cruz, Jesup sent Maj. Thomas Swords to act as general 

superintendent of embarkation. Swords arrived on 27 .June, but the 

embarkation of troops had begun on 30 May, under the local quartermaster and, by 2 July, 65 vessels had carried 18,331 troops to New Orleans. 

A month later, the last transports departed carrying the civilian employees 

and the horses. Almost all the ships sailed for New Orl eans, largely 

because it was impossible to provision them for a longer voyage from the 

supplies in the depot at Vera Cm z. Among the ships used in the first 

embarkation, 18 were chartered at Vera Cruz and 31 at New Orleans, 

while 16 were government-owned ships.m 

.. RG 92, OQMG Con$Ol idated Correspondence File, Bo" 660 (Cross to Tompkins. 

21 May 1848). 

- RG 92, OQMG lc:uer Book, vol. -10, pp. -188-89: -190--91 Ucsup 10 Stanton and Tompkins. 

8 Jun 1848). 

- Ibid., p. 5O'l Ga up 10 Hon. Jamcs J. McKay. 10 Jun 1848). 

- RC 92, OQMC Consolidated Corrcspondence File, Box 600 (Swords Rptl, 2 Jul 22 Aug 
298 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

There were considerable quantities of surplus property in the hands 

of quartermasters in Mexico when the war ended. All of them were 

instructed to sell such Quartermaster property as could not be conveniently moved from the country. Such instructions did not include animals 

and wagons. Jesup directed Major Cross to ship from Vera Cruz all 

good, serviceable wagons and all sound, well-broken mules and horses. 

He sent similar instructions to Maj. D. H. Vinton, quartermaster at 

Monterey, who had succeeded Colonel Whiting. Vinton did not ship 

the animals there, but sent 3,000 mules, 700 horses, and 400 wagons 

through the country to western Louisiana. Jesup then detailed a Quartermaster officer to arrange for the distribution of the best of them to the 

southwestern posts and for the sa le of the remainder.m Jesup also 

instructed Assistant Quartermaster McKissack at Santa Fe to dispose of 

unfit articles but lO retain all serviceable property for use at Santa Fe or 

at such other pOSts as might be permanently occupied by the Army in 

New Mexico. 2211 

At New Orl eans, Major Tompkins had to determine how many 

light-draft steamers would have to be retained for service on the Rio 

Grande by the Department, as well as the number of lighters required 

at Brazos and La Vaca, and the transportation requirements in the Gulf 

generally: If he could obtain fair prices, Jesup later instructed him to 

sell the public vessels, except for about a half dozen of the lightest'draft 

schooners and five designated steamers. He also suggested that three or 

four of the best brigs and barks might be useful on the Pacific. no By 

order of the Secretary o[ War, the steam propellers Massachusetts and 

Edith were sent lO the Pacific with troops and stores, and fOUT schooners 

were selected for service there. Most of the Q uartermaster fleet was 

disposed of, some oE the vessels being transferred to the Navy, and others 

turned over to the Topographical Department and to the Treasury 

Department for the coast survey. To avoid any criticism, Major 

Tompkins invited proposa ls in writing in the sale of vessels. The 

Department sold at auction all other property, but under specific contracts governing the compensation paid auctioneers. U1 By 1849, the 

1848). A third report coyering the period 2- 18 July is missing and no similar reports were 

found 't:oycring any embarkation of troops or shipment of property {rom Tampit:o or the 

BraWl! . 

... RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, '101. 40, p. 470 Uesup to Cross. 30 May 1848}: p.497 Uesup 

to Vinton. 9 JUll 1848); '101. 41, pp. 131- 32 Uesup to Mackay. 8 Sep 1848). 

" /bid ., '101. 40, p. !ill (14 Jun 1848). 

- Ibid., '101. 40. pp. 6 11 - 12: u53 Uesup 10 Tompkins, 19 Jul, 3 Aug 1848) . 

• , (1) Ibid., '101. 41 , pp. 249- 50 Uesup to Tompkins, 18 Oct 1848). (2) port 01 SW, 

18-18--49, p. 189 (QMG Rpt, 18 Nov 1848). 
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEXICAN WAR 299 

Edilh having been lost at sea and the Massachusetts turned over to the 

Navy, the Quartermaster's Department retained under its control four 

sail ships on the Pacific Coast, five steamers in service on the Florida 

coast, three steamers operating on the Rio Grande, and three schooners 

used as transports on the Gulf of Mexico.:!! 

Disposal of surplus property at the end of the war and, for that 

matter, supply operations during the war were not carried on without 

adverse criticism of the Quartermaster's Department. It was rumored. 

for example, that the assistant quartermaster at Vera Cruz had allowed 

enormous compensation to the auctioneer selling surplus public property 

there. Lieutenant Colonel Hunt at New Orleans was assailed for "enriching" himself and his relatives with the public money.U3 Such charges 

were groundless because the system of accountability under which 

quartermasters functioned made impossible the frauds of an earlier day. n. 

Under the pressure of immediate needs, higher prices were undoubtedly paid at times for Quartermaster articles than would otherwise have 

been necessary. Careless inspection permitted some poor horses to be 

sent to the Army. Public transportation was used upon occasion to haul 

sutlers' stores and, at least in one instance, some circus people and their 

baggage. ~u The Department was quick to take corrective action, however, and Jesup could take pride in its prompt support of the armies in 

the field and its clean record of accountability. The organization, regulations, and procedures he had hammered out since 1818 had withstood 

the test of war. 

- Report 01 SW, 1848--19, p. 194 (Qr-fG Rpt, 18 Nov 1848). 

- (I) RG 107, OSW, LelleB Sent, vol. 28, p. 431 (SW to J esup, 21 Oet 1848). (2) RG 92. 

OQMG Letter Book, vol. 39, p. 375 Ue:sup to Hunt, 4 Aug 1847). 

"See Report 0/ SU', 1848--19, p. 193 (Qr-fG Rpt, 18 Nov 1849) . 

... RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, vol. 39, p. 382 Ue:sup to Stanton, 5 Aug 1847): p. 207 Uesup 

to Heue\, 10 Jun 1847). 

CHAPTER VIII 

Supply on the New Frontier 

1848-1860 

During the years between the Mexican War and the Civil War, 

the Quartermaster's Department was primarily concerned with the problem of supporting the troops stationed in the new front ier area, most of 

which had been acquired as a result of the Army's victOries in the 

Mexican War. By the end of that war, the present continental boundary 

lines of the United States had been established. except for a small strip 

of land in the southwest acquired by the Gadsden Purchase of 1853. The 

northern boundary had already been set at the 49th parallel by agreement 

with Great Britain in June of 1846. To maintain the peace throughout 

this vast frontier area, in which the fur trader, the miner, and the settler 

were pushing forward re lentlessly, the Army spread its forces as widely 

as possible, though its reduced postwar stTength permitted only the 

thinnest of coverage. 

It was not a large Army that the Quartermaster's Department had 

to suppl y. In 1850, it had an aggregate strength of 10,763. Ten years 

later, arter Congress had authorized increases, the Army's actual aggregate 

strength was still no more than 16,006. The distriblllion and position 

of the troops was of more significance to the Department than the mere 

size of the Army. According to a report of the Adjutant General's Office 

in 1850, there were 2,109 officers and men stationed at33 posts east of the 

Mississi ppi and 6,385 officers and men at 67 posts west or the Mississippi. 

By 1860, the preponderance of troops located in the western frontier area 

was even more pronounced. Out of an actua l strength of 16,006, the 

Adjutant General reported 929 men and officers stationed in the Depanmelll of the East and 13, 143 in the Departments of the West, Texas, 

New Mexico, Utah, Oregon, and California.' 

'(I) House t;x. Doc. No. I, 51$t Cong., 2d 5eSS., J't, 2, p. 116, S.ll. 587. (2) Senate Ex. Doc. 

No. I, 56th Cong .. 2d scss .. p. 189 If, '.n. 1079 (AG Rpt, 20 Nov 1860). This total distribution 

figu re or U,072 does not include men at depots. the Military Academy, recruit rend«voUJ, 

and en route. 
302 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T HE ARMY 

Clothin.g Changes 

T erritoria l expansion and distribution of most of th e troops at postS 

west of the Mississippi had a tremendous impact on the work of the 

Quartermaster's Depanment. The execution of its basic functions. 

except that of providing clothing for the Army, became more burdensome 

and much morc ex pensive than in the past. T he size of the Army ra ther 

than its distributio n was the chief factor governing expenditures for 

clothing. T he n umber of troops in service d uring th ese years was sma ll. 

Moreover, so much clothing had been left o n hand from the Mexican 

War that there was no need to procure any add itio na l st<x;ks for some 

yea rs; th e immed ia te probl em was one of surplus disposaL T hat probl em 

was made morc difficult ea rl y in 1850 when the Secretary of War, yielding 

to the wishes of many officers, announced the adoption of a new and more 

practical lIniform. 2 Deve loped out of ex perience in th e Mexican War, 

the frock-coa t u yle u niform adopted in 1850 was, with a few mi nor 

changes, to be worn by the Union soldi er in lhe Civil War. 

T he general order an nouncing th e new uniform was no sooner 

published than the Superintendent of the Recmiting Service requisitioned a supply, much to J esup's exasperation . With more than a 

million dollars' worth of clothi ng on hand at the Schuylkill Arsenal and 

with a Congress bem on economy measures, the Qua rtermaster Ge neral 

considered it " injudicious and highl y prejudicia l to the interests of th e 

Army" to request funds for new uniforms.' In fact, the Secretary of 

War soon d irected th e Department to con tinue issuing th e old uniform 

until the suppl y was exhauned, and as late as 1855, though the Slock 

had become insufficient for a year's suppl y for the whole Army, certai n 

companies were niH designated to wear the old uniform.' For some 

years no appropria tions were made for clothi ng. 

If service on the fronti er had no effect upon either the procu rement 

or the prod uction of clothing at the Sch uylk ill Arsena l, it d id result in 

demands for clothing items betler suited to the needs of campa igning 

on the plai ns, as for exampl e, fc lt hats, in li cu of caps, and buffa lo 

overshoes. In the Mormon ex pedition, most of the soldi crs on th e sick 

report were rend ered un fi t fo r duty by frostbitte n feet. Soldiers who 

stood guard or marched in snow shod onl y in lea ther bootees were soon 

incapacitated . From his headquarters at Camp Scott, Brig. Ge n. Albert S. 

J ohnston recommended tha t the government provide a pail' of buffalo 

"Will" eJHIrl",~ ul Ge"un/ Order$, GO 2, IS Feb 1850. Within a rew monl h$ Ihis order 

was suspended by GO 25, 23 Augusl 1850 . 

• RG 92. OQMG, CIOl h ing Leuer Book., m i. 12, p.91 U"UP 10 Col. C. A. Waite, 22 Apr 

1850). 

'Ibid., vol. 14 , pp. 3I.~-14 O"UP to Col. I'. 51. George Cook.e, 28 Apr 1855). 
SUPPLY ON THE NEW FRONTIER 1848-1860 303 

overshoes [or each man servi ng in that climate, and he approved the 

admission of that item in the ann ual estimate of his chief quartermaster. " 

New items, however, had to be approved by the Secretary of War and it 

was not until the spring of 1859 that buffalo overshoes were shipped to 

Utah to be carried as organ izational items of issue to guards and to troops 

on detached service.e 

Since the govern ment during these years did not furn ish the troops 

with mittens, gloves, leggings. or other extra cold-weather garmellls, the 

soldiers made (or themselves Ollt of "old blankets, skins. pieces of old 

canvas and cast-off clothi ng, a nything that necessity prompted them to 

invent (or protection from the bitter cold."" Private Eugene Bandel of 

the Sixth Infantry wrote his parents that hides, tanned by the Indians 

a nd fi n ished by the soldiers, were made into warm clothing. W he n he 

was above Fort Pierre in 50lllh Da kota, his winter o utfit cOllsisted of a 

coat o[ tanned deerski n, tro users of buffalo·calf leather with the fur inside, 

and a head covering of wolfskin with the fur o utside. Two pairs of 

mocassins replaced his shoes, one pair being made of deersk in, ornamem ed 

in Indian fash ioll, and th e second, worn over them, of buffalo·calf leather 

with the fur side. ~ 

Not only in wimer blll also in slimmer the uniform issued to the 

troops tended to be worn at the post but was discarded on patrols or 

o ther service. ,\Vhil e o n escort duty with a survey party in southern 

Kansas Bandel described the "prairie outfit" of the soldier. 

Every man is wearing a broad·brimmed hat, each of a differen t color: whi te 

trousers of rough material; a woolen shirt o( red, green, blue, or brO\\,l1- in 

short, of any and every color, usua lly open in front and worn like a coat; the 

shoes (we still have shoes, though who knows how soon we Il\ay have to wcar 

mocassi ns) with the uppers slashed wherever they might chafe in marching. 9 

Purchasing extra ga rments and adapting his dothi ng to his necds, the 

soldier in the fiel d bore liule resemblance LO the smartly uniformed 

soldier at a post. 

Frolltier COl1stnlctioll. 

Unlike th e provision of clothing, tWO othcl' basic fu nctions 01' the 

Quartermaster's Depanment---constnlction and tra nsponatioll-were d i· 

• House Ex. Duc. No. 2, 3!'it h Coug .. 2d ~ess .. pp. 34·3!i. 5.n. 998 Uohn~ton 10 Army H11 . 

7 Jan 1858). 

" RG 92, OQMG Clothing Letter Book, \'01. 16. p. 3!'i3 Uesup to Thomas anu !O Crosman. 

29 Jan 1B59); vol. 17. p. 43 Ue~up 10 Crosman. 9 ApT 1859). 

T 'e v~1 Lowe, Fi"" Yt'lUS II Dragoun, 18./9- /85-1 (K~tlsas City. 1926). p. 45. 

" FrUUlia Lilt: iu /lI t:. Ar",)" 185-1- 1861. ed. Ra lph I'. Uicocr (Glendale. Calif .. 1932). 

pp. 221- 22. 

' Ibid., p. 124. 
304 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

reetly affected by the distribution of a majority of the troops in the 

newly acquired territories. The necessity of occupying numerous posts 

in the new area, and sometimes at points where construction of even the 

most temporary structure was attended with heavy expense, increased 

enormously Quartermaster expenditures for barracks, storehouses, and 

other military buildings. During fiscal year 1851 , {or example, Jesup 

reported that more than $451,000 had been spent for construction and 

repairs at posts in the new territories- about $73,000 on 19 posts in 

Texas, $58,000 on 13 posts in New Mexico, $242.000 on liar 12 posts 

in California, and about $78,000 on 2 or 3 posts in Oregon.'o Less than 

a third of that amount had been appropriated for barracks and quarters 

in 1844. Permanent installations in the East also frequently required 

repairs and added to the overall expenditures. 

The years brought no decrease in expenditures for construction 

and repairs of posts in the new frontier area. Because changes tn the 

location of posts were frequent, only temporary structures were usually 

built, and these seemingly needed almost constant repairs. Moreover, 

both distance and the nature of the service that was requ ired in areas, 

difficult of access and having so few resources that most supplies had to 

be purchased at high prices, put such expenditures beyond the control 

of the Department. During fiscal years 1856 and 1858, Congress appropriated $347,000 for construction and repairs in the Department of the 

Pac ific, but that depa rtment spent $693, 187. T he discrepancy between 

appropriation and expenditure in the Department of the West was 

almost as great.lI 

Lengthening Supply Lines 

To support troops stationed at distant posts on the frontier, supply 

lines had to be lengthened considerably. Transportation costs contributed even more than construction and repair costs to the increase of 

Quartermaster expenditures during 1850- 60. As J es up pointed out, 

western posts before the Mexican War had extended from the Gulf of 

Mex ico to Lake Superior, with most of them either on or near navigabl e 

waters and therefore easy of access.'2 In consequence, the troops could 

be readily and cheaply suppl ied. Moreover, many of these posts were in 

well-populated and well·cultivated areas from which they could draw 

su pplies. In contrast, the outposts in 1850 were on the Rio Grande, 

the Gila, the Pacifi c Coast, the Columbia River, and Puget's Sound, with 

"' Senate Ex. Duc. No. 1.32<1 Cong., ist SC$S .. p. 219, 5.11. 611 (QMG's Rpt, 22 Nov 1851). 

11 Honse Ex DQC, No.2. 35th Cong .. 2<1 SCS5 .. pp. 795--96. s.n. 999 (QMC's Rpl , 111 Nov 1858), 

.. See Map 6. 
) ~~ . /~. \ \ -- . . / [j] '. 

,>; . :I 'iI ' !:. ~7' P 

:S r; 

, "'''~ ' /. 

'1~ - " I' 

. ,, ~i;?" !";"i_ . \. ,- ~~ r ,\ 

I \ :::c .\, . ", :"'". " ......: ,~,~ £ " i""""" ( . , ,siJ ' J . ..... , . 3:::: 

'\\ t\~ ,~ ~. ~~\\ ~ ,~ ) 

.. II ~/ 

~ ~INU nOIlTllJl 01' COMMUNICATION 

POSTa ~\ '7 \ ;~~ ~b K tf ~ "- .... '_ ...... _- .= -" .. ,.". ~ 

~ ~ l'\ ___ ..... ('_-.-'-,"_"T_ .... _ _ "'., HH.H. ' _ ' '' ____ 

~ .. ,,-,--- - ..... , """- ,- , .. - -

~ ~ L 

-_ .....= '--"'----.. ~ .. - ....... 

i'- ~ . . ~::: ::"--

--'--"_."" 

I , 'r--:'-.,~ ' , , , 

MAP 6 
306 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

long intermediate lines of posts between the former frontier and these 

new outposts. Agricultural resources in the new territories were, for the 

most part, only partially deve loped and Indian hostilities in some areas 

hampered further developmcm . It was therefore inexpedient for the 

Subsistence Department to contract for subsistence in New Mexico, 

California, Oregon, and Texas. since in the even t a contractor failed to 

make deliveries, th e commissary would have found it impossible to 

purchase locally. Consequently, the Commissary General of Subsistence 

supplied troops stationed in th e new fronti er area by purchase in the 

open market of th e older Slates, and the Quartermaster's Department 

transported the rations to the distant posts.u Not only rations but also 

most of the forage and nearly all other supplies, as well as all troop 

reinforcements, had to be transported from the older states, over long 

land and water routes, at an enormous expense. Although the authorized 

strength of the Army in 1850 has increased by little more than 50 percent 

over that of 1844, the cost of transportation had increased by more than 

1,500 percent." 

These increased transportation costs resulted not only from th e great 

distances the troops had to be transported in going to and from the 

various frontier posts but also from the frequency with which changes 

in station were made in order to utilize to best advantage th e services of 

the small Army. In contrast to the period before the Mexican War, 

such movements were, for the most part, made by land. Even for the 

movement of a small number of .men, the Quartermaster's Department 

had to provide a large amount of transporta tion, since not only the troops' 

baggage but also suppli es of every kind, including subsistence, had to be 

carried with them. Other than grass upon which the animals might be 

foraged in the summer, the " uninhabited sol itudes and steril e deserts" 

through which the troops marched yielded nothing for their suppOrt. U 

Upon occasion, troops marched across th e continent to the Pacific 

Coast, the most notable march being that of the Regiment of Mounted 

RiAes. With Maj. Osborn Cross servi ng as quartermaster, the regiment 

left Fort Leavenworth on 10 May 1848 and some 5 months later, after 

more than 2,000 miles of marching arrived in Oregon,'" I n addition to 

the 700 horses belonging to the regiment, the Quartermaster's Department 

provided 1,233 mules, 60 oxen, 41 horses, and 171 wagons. Most of 

the regiment's horses and a large number of the animals o[ the wagon 

" House Ex. Doc. No. I, 31st Cong .. 2d SeM .. Pc 2. p. 338, $.n. 587 (CCS' Rpt . 19 Oct 1850). 

" I bid., pp. 121- 22 (QMC'$ Rpt. 20 Nov 1850). 

,. House Ex. Doc. No. 2. 35th Cong .. 2d sess .• p. 3. s.n. 998 (SW'$ Rpt. 6 Dec 1858) . 

.. House Ex. Doc. No. I, 31st Cong .• 2d SeM .. Pt. 2. pp. 128 ff, S.n. 587 (Cross' Rpt, 20 May 

1850). 
SUPPLY ON THE NEW FRONTIER 1848-1860 307 

train were lost on that march, along with thousands of dollars worth of 

clothing and other suppli es.

11 

For the most part, troops ord ered to the Pacific Coast were sent from 

New York by onc of two routes-by way of Cape Horn or by way of the 

Isthmus of Panama. T he voyage around the Horn, in sa iling ships 

chartered by the Quartermaster's Department, usuall y lasted over 5 

months. By way of the Isthmus, troops could arrive at San Francisco 

in a momh. The cost of transportation on that route was higher than 

by way of Cape Horn, for it included the use of first-cl ass steamers on 

-the Atlamic and Pacific Oceans and, until the construction of a railroad 

in 1855, passage across the Isthmus from Chagres to Panama was accom· 

plished on muleback and by canoe. The use of sail ships on this route 

was too hazardous since th ey might be deta ined too long at Panama, 

thereby exposing the troops to tile danger of cholera. The Department's 

contracts for the movement of troops by way of this sea and land route 

usually obliged the COlllractor to provide the subsistence required en 

route. In return, the Department paid the contractor an average of 

$225 for each commissioned officer and $150 for each enlisted soldier. 

as well as 15 cents per pound of extra baggage, each person being allowed 

100 pounds on the steamer and 25 pounds across the ISlhmus.'8 

The Department paid the owners a flat sum for ships chartered for 

the voyage around Cape Horn. Jes~lp preferred to charter the entire 

ship for Army use since annual supplies of medic ines and subsistence 

were sent with the troops who were also permitted to take more than the 

usual amount of baggage with them. Such long-distance water transportation at times ca ll ed for additional expenditures. On occasion, ships 

were wrecked at sea, necessitating payments for the work of rescue ships, 

[or replacement of stores lost, and for the charter of still another ship. 

Sometimes, demurrage had to be paid, as for example, when a ship was 

detained at Panama during an outbreak of cholera among troops en 

route to California.'9 

On the Pacific Coast itse lf, the assistant quartermaster had to furn ish 

transportation at San Francisco for troops ordered to Benecia, San Diego, 

Astori a, or Fort Vancouver. Early in this period, the Quartermaster's 

Department owned some transports, but the costs of operation were 

"Senale Ex. Doc. No. I. !J2d Cong .. 1st sess .. p. 22!J, S.n. 611 (QMG's Rpt. 22 Nov 1851). 

In Oregon the regiment conld be remounted only at enormous eltpense. Since most move· 

ments there were made by water and a mounted force was not requ ired, the regiment was 

shorliy transferred to Texas and fumished fVith hones there. 

lO RG 92, Reports of QMG 10 SW and Heads of Depts .. vol. 3, pp. 81-83 Oesup 10 SW, 

16 Nov 1854). (2) RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, vol. 41. p. 530 Oesup 10 Capt. J. L. Folsom, 

6 Feb 1849). I. House E .... . D oc. No. I, 33d Cong .• 2d sess .. I't. 2, p. 73., S.n. 778 (QMG's Rpt. 14 Nov 18M). 
308 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

extreme ly high. The lure of the gold fie lds made it difficult to hire 

operating personnel. No sailor would ship for less than $ 150 a month, 

Assistant Quartermaster Robert All en reported to J esup. Captains of 

steamers in private employment were paid from $700 to $1,500 a month, 

and masters o( sailing vessels, from $300 to $500.

2G It was cheaper to hire 

vessels than to maintain government transports, and it became Jesup's 

policy to replace none of the latter when the ir services were lost to the 

Department.

ZI 

T he cost of transporting supplies to sustain the troops at these 

distant posts also ran high. Quartermasters sent supplies to the posts 

on the Pacific Coast by sea, but they were never shipped by way of the 

Isthmus of Panama; the cost was too prohibitive. In 1854, it amounted 

to about $390 a ton, though it was expected that construction of a railroad across the Isthmus the following year would reduce the price of 

land carriage to a fourth of what it then was and bring the freight charges 

to $ 169 a ton for the whole distance.to All supplies for the posts on the 

Pac ific Coast were shipped via Cape Horn at so much per cubic foot. 

In 1854, for example, shippers charged 90 cents per cubic foot for subsistence stores and 60 cen ts for other packages, includ ing ammunition. 

To supply the posts on the western plains, the Quartermaster's 

Department depended upon land transportation. Fort Leavenworth was 

the frontier depot for all posts on the Santa Fe Trail and the Oregon 

route. All supplies were brought to Fort Leavenworth by water from 

St. Louis, 411 miles away. Wagon tra ins then made the long overland 

hauls-3 1O miles to Fort Kearny, 637 miles to Fort Laramie, 728 mil es 

to Fort Union, and 821 miles to Santa Fe. Indianola on Matagorda Bay 

was the depot for the greater part of the posts in Texas and supported 

the interior depot at San Antonio. From Indianola, itself, 540 miles by 

water from New Orleans, it was 420 miles by wagon to Fort Worth and 

803 miles to El Paso. 

Contmct Fl'eighting 

During the Mexican War, the Quartermaster's Department had 

operated its own wagon trains on the Santa Fe Trail. T hat experience 

had fully shown the disadvantages of using government.owned wagons. 

Quartermasters found it d ifficult to hire experienced wagonmasters and 

.. (I> Senate Ex. Doc. No. I, 32d Cong., lSI ses!I., p. 306, s.n. 611 (Allen's Rpt, 30 Jun 1851). 

(2) RG 92, Reports of QMG to SW and Heads of Depn., vol. I, pp. 592-95 Oesup to SW, 

15 Mar 1852) . 

... RG 92, OQMG Leller Book, vol. M. p. 121 GouP to Lt. Col. S. Casey. 17 Feb 1860) . 

.. RG 92, Reports of QMG 10 SW and Heads or Depts .. vol. 3. p. 82 Oesup to SW, 16 Nov 

1854). 
SUPPLY ON THE NEW FRONTIER 1848-1860 309 

teamsters, and none of the pleas made by Jesup and other Quartermaster 

offi cers, then or later, induced Congress to enlist a service corps. The 

cost of forage was high; wagons required repa irs; equipment had to be 

replaced; extra animals had to be kept on hand to replace those worn 

out; and animals had also to be fed and cared for during the winter 

months when freighting was suspended. During the winter of 1848-49. 

for example, Capt. L. C. Easton, assistant quartermaster at Fort Leavenworth, contracted to have a caretaker take charge of 3,862 oxen, 2,062 

mules, and 195 horses at 8612 cems per momh. An additional 700 mules 

were wintered at a Tate of 74% cents each per month.23 J esup was soon 

convinced that the system of transporting military stores by government 

trains was not only more expensive but also more complicated and 

troublesome than hiring private wagons. 

As early as May 1848, the Department resorted to the use of the 

contract system for overland transportation of some of the supplies 

destined for Santa Fe. On 17 May, Captain Easton made a contract 

with James Brown, under the terms of which the latter transported 

200,000 pounds of stores to Santa Fe at a rate of $11.75 per 100 pounds. 

The government disposed of some of its fre ighting equipment to Brown, 

who agreed to purchase 120 wagons at the price they cost the government, 

as well as such ox-yokes, chains, and other equipment as could be spared. 

He was to pay for them in specie, but apparently Brown encountered 

fiQancial difficulties, for about 5 weeks later Easton agreed to deliver 

all the wagons that the contractor had not already paid for. Brown was 

to discharge his indebtedness out of the first money due him on his 

contract for transporting supplies to Santa FeY 

In 1850, contract freighting for the government was in full operation 

at Fort Leavenworth. Contractors' wagons hauled more than five times 

the quantity of military supplies freighted in government wagons. The 

assistant quartermaster at Fort Leavenworth sent out 266 government 

wagons in 850.2 ~ They carried 580,000 pounds of supplies or about 

2,180 pounds per wagon. In the same year, 658 heavy ox wagons, owned 

by contractors among whom were such freighters as Joseph Clymer, 

David Waldo, James Brown, and Brown, Russell & Co., carried military 

supplies to Santa Fe, Fort Scott in Kansas, to a new post in Arkansas, and 

to Forts Kearny, Laramie, and Hall on the Oregon Trail. These contractors' trains, employing G,600 oxen and 780 men, transported 3,174,783 

pounds, averaging over 4,800 pounds per wagon.2~ 

"Scnate Ex. Doc. No. 26. 31st Cong., 1st Scss., p. 13, s.n. 554. 

·'Ibid., pp. 12- 15. 

· Of these 10 went to Fori Kearny. 23 to Fori Lar.lmie. 183 to Santa Fe, and 50 to a new 

poSI on Ihe Arkansas. 

"(I) RG 92, Reports of QMG 10 SW and Heads of Depls., vol. I, pp. 600-60 1 Qesup to 
310 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

By 1855, William H. Russell, Alexander Majors, and Will iam B. 

Waddell emerged as the chief freighters on the Santa Fe and Oregon 

Trails. The partners operated under the name of Majors and Russell, 

changing it 3 years later to Russe ll, Majors & Waddell. Since 1849, 

Russell, in partnership widl various freighters, had been engaged in 

transporting supplies for the ArmyY On the basis of. their past experience, Russe ll & Waddell in 1855 offered certain inducements in exchange 

for a monopoly of all freighting o( military suppl ies from Forts Leavenworth, Riley, Laramie, and Union, and the town of Kansas to posts or 

depots in Kansas and New Mexico, including EI Paso and its vicinity. 

and Utah and Nebraska Territories. Instead of limiting their operations 

to the usual months of July to October, Russell &: '-\'addell proposed to 

freight during all seasons of the year. The firm also offered to transport 

to any post within a large district instead of mak ing del iveries, as had 

been customary. only to such posts as the Quartermaster's Department 

specifica ll y designated in the contract. T hus, if troops were removed 

from one pOSt to another. or if a new post was established, the Department 

would not be obliged to make a new contract. Moreover, Russell &: 

Waddell did not propose to bind the Department to the delivery to them 

of any specified quantity of freight for transportation under penalty of 

being call ed upon to compensate the contractors if a lesser amount was 

shipped. Instead, they were to have the entire quantity of supplies 

the Department might have for transportation, which might vary from 

50,000 to 2,500,000 pounds. The firm offered a schedule of rates based 

on a new method of computing the prices- a fixed sum per 100 pounds 

per 100 miles. u The rates were considered favorable and the advantages 

to the government were so attractive that the Quartermaster's Department 

signed a contract with Russell &: Waddell on 27 March 1855 for that 

year and for 1856. z9 It signed other contraC[s with the firm in 1857. 

1858, and 1860, the rates still based on a fixed sum per 100 pounds per 

Chairman , Hquse Commince on Mililary Affairs, 27 Jan 185 1). (2) &nate Ex. Doc. No. I. 

S2d Cong .. In sess .. p. 295, s.n. 611 (Rpl of Maj. E. A. Ogden. 4 OCt 1851). 

"(1) House E . .". Doc. No. S8, 31st Cong., 1st scss .. p. 24. S,n. 576. (2) RG 92, OQMG 

Consolidated Correspondence File, Bo" 948 (Maj. E. A. Ogden to J ohn S. Jones and 

Wm. H. Russell, 15 May 1851); (same 10 Russell. Waddell & Co .. 16 J un 185S) . 

• Thc schedule was as follows; 

To Fl. Union and intemlcdiate posts....... .............. . ......... $1.l4 10 $2.00 

From Ft. Union to any other post in New Mex ................... .. ... 1.4010 1.80 

To Salt Lake City and intermediate points ................................... 1.30to 2.15 

House Ex . Doc. No. 17. 34lh Cong .. lsI sess .. pp. 9-10, s.n. 851. 

,. (\) RG 92. OQMG Consolidatcd Correspondence File, Box 949 (Ogden to Jesup, 24 Feb 

1855). (2) RG 92, OQMG Leiter Book, vol. 47, pp. 437-39 Uesup to Maj. E. S. Sibley, 28 Feb 

1855). 
SUPPLY ON THE NEW FRONTIER 1848- 1860 311 

100 miles but adjusted to the month in which shipment was made, with 

the lowest rate in the summer months. 

The system of contract fre ighting proved so much more economical 

than operating government wagon trains that the Quartermaster's Department wanted it used for the delivery of military supplies at all posts in 

the new frontier area. Most of the posts in Texas, supplied from 

Indianola or the main interior depot at San Antonio, had their stores 

delivered, for the most part, by government-owned wagon trains. Thus, 

in the fiscal year ending 30 June 1851, the assistant quartermaster at 

San Antonio sent out 752 government wagons and engaged the services 

of 99 ox-drawn wagons owned by contractors. The latter transported 

255,085 pounds of supplies; the mule-drawn government wagons carried 

1,930,207 pounds.u 

The post at EI Paso was an exception to the general rule of supply 

by government wagons in Texas; from the beginning of this period it 

was su pplied by contractors. In 1850, a freighter contracted to transport 

865,000 pounds at $12 per 100 pounds from San Antonio to EI Paso and 

at $13.50 per 100 pounds from Indianola. But a military escort had to 

accompany the wagon train and the quartermaster also paid the (ontractor for carrying the rations of the escort so that the cost actually 

amounted to $22 per 100 pounds of military supplies. That was a 

prohibitive rate, and in an effort to determine whether the cost could 

not be reduced, the Department sent to EI Paso, under Capt. S. G. French, 

assistant quartermaster, a government wagon train, loaded with subsistence to replace damaged rations that had been delivered by the 

contractor. The length and difficulties of the route made delivery of 

supplies, even by government wagons, cost $19 per 100 pounds. On the 

other hand, the long haul across Texas from San Antonio had the strategic 

advantage of showing the flag when troops escorted the wagons. It was 

counted upon to help check Indian activity in an area where the United 

States was bound by treaty to prevent raids into Mexican territory. In 

the meantime, the Quartermaster's Department had also let a contract 

in 1850 at Fort Leavenworth to de liver some supplies to EI Paso, via the 

Santa Fe Trail. at $13.87Ih per lOa pounds. Tests proved that El Paso 

could be supplied cheaper by way of the Santa Fe Trail than from 

Indianola and San Anton io. and reduction of expenditures outweighing 

strategic advantage, £1 Paso came to be included thereafter in the contracts for New J\-Iexico made by Ihe quartermaster at Fort Leavenworth. 3 • 

" Scnate Ex. Due. No. I. 32d Cong .. 1st scss .. p. 255. 5.n. Gil (Babbitt's Rpl. 30 Jun 1851) . 

.. (I) Ibid., pp. 211. 227 ff .• 295 (RplS ofQMG, 22 Nov 1851; Capt . S. G. French, 2 Nov 1851; 

AQM Ogden. 4 OCI 1851). (2) RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, vol. 42, p. 600 Oesup co Col. 

\\Pm. Gilpin, 22 Apr 1850); vol. 43. p. 216 Oesup to Gibson, 30 Nov 1850), 
312 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

In the summer of 1855, the Department recommended that the 

transportation of all regular Army supplies at the other posts in Texas 

be performed by contract. The Secretary of War approved that proposal, 

and the assistant quartermaster at San Antonio executed a contract with 

George T. Howard on 17 November 1855,32 Howard continued to do 

a large share of the freighting in Texas until the Civil War as Russell, 

Majors & Waddell did on the Santa Fe and Oregon Trails. By 1860, 

the system of contract Freighting had been extended to the transportation 

of supplies to posts in Arkansas and California,n 

During the 1850's, freighting on the western plains became a big 

business, employing large numbers of men, animals, and equipment that 

demanded a vast outlay of capital.u In the early years, the wagons were 

not overly large, being drawn by eight oxen or mules. But even by 

185 1, wagons with a carrying capacity of 5,000 pounds, drawn by 10 or 

12 animals, began to be specified in contracts.n In time, the mammouth 

wagons-the Murphy and the Espenshield made in St. Louis and the 

Studebaker of South Bend, Ind.-were loaded with three to five tons 

of freight. The profits of the trade were attractive. Russell &: Waddell 

noted that a trip to Fort Union, made at the most favorable time of [he 

year, that is Mayor June, yielded a return of a fraction over 10 percent. 

Where the risk was greater and only one trip could be made per season, 

as to Salt Lake City, the return was 18 percem.u 

Unfortunately, with so much at stake. the pursuit of government 

business led to the use of questionable methods to obtain contracts. Such 

developments were at least implied if not proved in the contracts obtained 

by William H. Russell for his firm from J ohn B. Floyd, who became 

Secretary of War in 1857. "One is forced to conclude that influence. 

favoritism, and possibly other factors which were never meant to receive 

publicity were involved in the Russe ll, Majors &: Waddell contracts." 11 

Since 185 1, the Quartermaster Genera l had not been able to make 

or authorize any contract for supplies or services that exceeded $2.000 

without the approval of the Secretary of War, a regulation that provided 

.. (I) RG 92. Reports or QMG to SW and Heads of Depts .• vol. 3. pp. 20S-OO (Actg QMG 

Thomas to SW. 15 Aug 1855). (2) House Ex. Doc. No. 17. 34th Cong .. ht sess .• p. 24. I.n. 85 1; 

ibid., No. 58, 35th Cong .. 1st 5eSS •• pp. 17-18, I.n. 955; ibid., No. 50. 35th Cong .. 2d sess .. 

pp. 11-12. s.n. 1006 

- (I) House Ex. Doc. No. SO. 35th Cong .. 2d sess., pp. 19-20, I.n. 1006. (2) RG 92. OQMG 

Lclter Book. vol. 54. p. 73 Uesup to AQM A. MOlltgomcry. 10 Jan 1860) . 

.. For a dctailed account of the operations of Russell, Majors &: Waddell. see Raylllond W. 

Settle and Mary Lund Settle, Empire Oil Wheels (Stanford University Press. 1940.) 

- RG 92, OQMG Consolidated Correspondence File, Box 948 (Con tract with Jones &: 

Russell, 15 May 1851). 

-Ibid., Box 948 (Russell &: Waddell to Col. Chas. Thomal, 19 Sep 1857). 

Of Settle and Settle, Empi~e 0" Wheels, p. 109. 
SUPPLY ON THE NEW FRONTIER 1848-1860 313 

that official an opportunity to show favoritism if such an inclination 

existed. When the War Department was unable to meet payments due 

to Russell, Majors &: Waddell on its contract for 1857 and the firm was 

threatened with ruin, Secretary Floyd decided to permit Russell to draw 

drafts or acceptances on the Secretary of War in anticipation of the firm's 

earnings under its transportation contract for 1858.

88 As long ago as 

1819. when the J ohnson brothers had used drafts on the War Department 

to bolster their sinking business enterprises, Quartermaster General Jesup 

had learned that the use of drafts or acceptances was unwise. His 

objections to permitting their issue in 1858 werc overruled by the Secretary of War, who also used his inAuence to help Russell obtain loans, 

using the acceptances as security.39 

When the acceptances matured, and Russell, to prevent their being 

protested for non-payment, became a party to the embezzlement of Indian 

trust bonds, obtained from Mr. Bailey, a clerk in the Department of 

Interior, a House committee investigated the whole complicated transaction. It portrayed Russell. Majors & Waddell as "chiseling" contractors 

who "not only absorbed all the sums earned by them under their contracts, and sold all the bonds they received from Mr. Bailey, but also 

raised very large sums of money upon the acceptances issued by the 

Secretary of War." on While not holding Floyd responsible for the 

"fraudulent abstraction" of the Indian trust bonds, the committee unanimously declared the Secretary's issue of acceptances to be "unauthorized 

by law and fraudulent in character."" Though proof was lacking, the 

committee suspected that Floyd had profited generously from the contracts 

given to Russell, Majors & Waddell . Floyd, however. did not profi t by 

the transactions with Army COntractors. 

Despite such developments, the lise of the contractor system of 

freighting had definite advantages for the Quartermaster's Department. 

It obviated the necessity for maintaining large wagon trains at depots 

and permitted the disposal of all wagons and teams, except such as had 

to be' retained to meet post requirements and emergency needs.42 As the 

number of government wagon trains declined, the demand for teamsters, 

for mules, oxen, and horses, and for forage decreased, at least on the 

supply lines. 

Competent, experienced drivers for government wagon trains had 

Hou~e Rpt. No. 78, 36th Cong .. 2d Se5$ .. pp. !ISO-52, s.n. 1105 (Floyd to Speaker of HR. 

27 De<: 1860). 

·See, for example. his leiter to A. Belmont. 15 February 1859. ibid., p. !l07. 

" Ibid., p. 17. 

"Ibid., pp. 19-20 . 

.. RG 92. OQMG Letter nook. vol. 48. pp. 48(1....81 (Actg QMG Thomas to AQM Chapman. 

270cI 1855): vol. 54, p. 7!1 Ocsup to AQM MOnlgomery, 10 J an 1860). 
314 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

never been readily available and certainly could nOt be hired at $15 per 

month, the wages offered in 1850. Major Cross Found that teamsters 

hired at such wages were "totally ignorant of their duty," their one object 

in accompanying tbe Regiment of Mounted Rifles on its march across 

the cominent was to reach the gold fIelds "with the least possible expense 

or trouble to themselves." Yet indifferent as these men were as teamsters, Assistant Quartermaster Cross had to depend on them, for soldiers 

could not be detailed for the duty. They were raw recruits-"some, not 

speaking the English language. were not capabl c of taking care of one 

horse, much less a team of six mules, " U Jesup agai n urged passage of 

a law authoriz ing the enlistment not only of all teamsters but of all 

mechanics, laborers, boatmen, farriers, and other personnel that the De· 

partment had to hire. He proposed enlisting such personnel for 2· or 

3-year terms of service and making them subject to military law.H 

Despite J esup's repeated recommendations, Congress enacted no law. 

Under these circumstances, it was much to the advantage of the Department to have private contractors furnish teamsters as well as wagons and 

to pmvide the mechanics and laborers needed to repair equipment and 

care for the animals. 

Any decrease in the number of learns used by the Quartermaster's 

Department helped reduce the demands for forage. As supply lines 

lengthened and teams and pack anima ls increased in number, forage 

demands reached huge proportions. Demand plus scarcity in the immediate vici nity of the troops and the necessity of transporting the supply 

long distances increased enormously the cost of gra in, hay, and fodder 

in the new territory. In 1845. when Fort Leavenworth was an OUtpost 

of the frontier, the cost of foraging a horse or mule thmughout the year 

averaged less than $4 per month. In 1850. the cost per month averaged 

$ 19.82 in New Mexico, $27.72 at Fort Kearny. and $34.24 at Fort 

Laramie.n 

For the most part. forage had to be brought in from the older. 

cultivated areas. In New Mexico. for example, the whole surplus prod· 

ucts of that territory in 1850, after its inhabitants had been supplied, 

would hardly have been sufficient to meet the demands of the Army, if 

all of the surplus had been availabl e for the Army's use. Much of it. 

however, necessarily went into fhe hands of emigrants moving to California by the rOute of the Gila. Only after the troops could be supplied 

" House Ex. Doc. No. I. 31s1 Cong .. 2d 5CU .. PI. 2. pp. I29-W. S.n. 587 (Crou Rpt) . 

.. (Il Ibid., p. 8 (SW Rpl. W Nov 1850); p. 125 (QMC's Rpl . 20 Nov 1850). (2) House 

Ex. Doc. No.5. 31$1 Cong .. hi sess .. p. 195. s.n. 569 (QMC'I Rpl. 10 Nov 1849) . 

.. (I) RG 92. Reports of QMG 10 SW and Heads of Depts .. vol. I. p. 292 Gesup 10 SW . 

.. Nov 1850). <I) See also House Ex. Doc. No. 1.31$1 ColIg .. 2d sess" PI. 2. p. 110, I.n. 587 

(SW Rpl, 50 Nov 1850). 
SUPPLY ON THE NEW FRONTIER 1848-1860 315 

by cultivation in the immediate vicinity of their posts could expenditures 

for the supply of forage be materially reduced. 

For that purpose. the Dcpanment encouraged the culti va tion of post 

fa rms. At Fort Leavenworth, farm culture by the troops had been 

practiced when it had been a fromier post. Troop farmi ng at the post 

had long si nce given way to cultivation of the farm's 1,332 acres by hands 

hired for the purpose by the Quartermaster's Department. I'n 1851, 

about 30 hands were on the payroll, and the assistant quartermaster 

reported that the farm was expected to yield some 18,000 bushels of corn, 

8,000 bushels of oats, 500 bushels of buckwhea t, 600 bushels of barley, 

528 tons of hay. besides straw, corn fodder, pumpkins. turnips. potatoes. 

and wheat.·e T he system of fa rm culture by the troops. as directed by 

general order, 8 January 1851, did not show successful results. In Texas, 

California, and Oregon. the Army undertook no cultivation in 185 1 or 

1852, for the troops were kept so connantly employed in pursuing Indians, 

establishing new posts to keep them in check, and protecting frontier 

settlements that they had no time for farmi ng. T he general-in-chief. 

Maj. Gen. Winfield Seou, reported that in New Mexico outlays for farm 

cultivation far exceeded the receipts. In any case, he mai ntained, troops 

could not be kept actively engaged in military duties and maintain 

discipline, if required to engage in cultivation beyond kitchen ga rdens. 

It might be wiser, he suggested, to discontinue the system and induce 

emigrants to settle near military Stations by offering them a ready market 

Cor their surplus produceY 

Despite the shift fTom the use of government wagon trai ns to 

freighting by contractors, QuartermaSter forage expenditures increased 

enormously during these years. Quartermasters at posts red uced the 

number of public teams to the minimum required for emergency operations, but they had to forage all the other animals employed by the 

Army- horses used on escort duty and [or expresses, and the animals 

required to transport baggage, rations, and supplies on each transfer of 

troops to a new station and on each march against the Indians. More· 

over, by 185 1 the mounted troops of the Army had been nearly doubled 

in number since 1845 and were to be further increased before 1860. All 

(he animals to be foraged by the Department increased from 847 in 

1845 to almost 8,000 in 185 1." Had the mounted force been at its 

authorized Strength, Jesup estimated that he would have been obliged 

.. Senate Ex. Doc. No. I, 32d Cong., 1st SCS5., p. 292. s.n. 61 1 (Rpt or AQM Ogden 

.. OCI ISSI). 

"Senate Ex. Doc. No. I. 32d Cong .. 2d SCS5., PI. 2. p. 35, s.n. 6 12 (Seou's Rpl to SW, 

22 Nov ISS2). 

"Senale Ex. Doc. No.1. 32d Cong., 151 SOlI., p. 218. s.n. 611 (QMC's Rpl , 22 Nov 1851). 
316 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

to provide forage for more than 10,000 animals in fiscal year 1851 at a 

cost of $2 million.n 

The amount of forage to be supplied was governed by the allowance 

per animal. For most of this decade, the forage ration was 14 pounds 

of hay and 12 pounds of corn or oa ts. This was the maximum allowance 

which could be, and usually was, reduced by the commander in the field 

whenever circumstances dictated such a course. 50 Fortunately, too, the 

Department did not have to provide the full amount of the forage ration 

for all the Army's horses, mules, and oxen. At a few of the frontier posts 

in Texas and New Mexico, hay was furnished by troop labor or by hired 

hands of the Quartermaster's Department.sl During the summer months, 

some of the animals could also be foraged on the grass of the prairies. 

Jesup always adjusted estimates for appropriations to cover the cost of 

foraging the Army's animals by including these supplies. Annual forage 

expenditures nonetheless hovered around the mill ion·dollar mark. 

Substitution of contractOrs' wagon trains for government wagon 

trains in the period 1848 to 1860 should have resulted in a saving in 

the procurement of animals by the Quartermaster's Department. It did 

mean that fewer draft animals' had to be purchased for hauling wagon 

trains on the supply lines. It had no effect, however, on the number 

of draft animals used in the movemeOl of troops. The increased use of 

mounted troops, moreover. required the purchase of more horses; nor 

was it only the initial mounting of these troops that was important. 

Service of the mounted troops was so severe that from one-fourth to 

one-third of their horses had to be replaced each year.u There is no 

data on replacement of mules and oxen llsed in the government wagon 

trains but the losses resulting from the careless handling of draft animals 

by incompetent drivers ran high. . 

The lack of care given the animals trou bled Jesup. In 1853. he 

recommended the establishment of a veterinary corps, under the direction 

of the Surgeon General, thereby an ticipating by 63 years the actual 

establishment of the corps. He proposed that the corps consist of a 

competent number of surgeons and assistant surgeons, who should be 

assigned to du ty at depots, with mounted regiments, squadrons. detachments, cavalry, artillery schools of instruction, and trains. More was 

lost every year by the sacrifice of horses and mules, for want of proper 

veterinary aid, Jesup argued, than would support the expense of such a 

•• RC 92. Rcporu of QMG 10 SW and Heads of DCpI5 .. voL I. p. 296 Uesup 10 SW. 

4 Nov 18(0) . 

.. RG 92. OQMG LellCT Book. voL 50, pp. 368-69 Uesup 10 M. K. Lawler. :'I Mar 1857). 

" Senale E."C. Doc. No. I. 32d Cong .. isl 5eSS .. p. 218, s.n. 611 (QMC's Rpt. 22 Nov 1851). 

" RG 92. Rcports of QMG 10 SW and Heads of DCpIS., vol. I. p. 298 Uesup to S\\'. 

4 Nov 1850). 
SUPPLY ON THE NEW FRONTIER 1848-1860 317 

corps for 2 or 3 years.n In 1856, he again urged the organization of such 

a corps and the establishment of a veterinary school, where Dragoon 

officers, mounted riflemen, and troops in the light artillery. as well as 

candidates for the veterinary corps itself. might rece ive competent instruction in the care, management, and diseases of horses and mules.~· The 

Secretary of War did not act upon J esup's fa rsighted recommendations. 

Meanwhile, though the law made no provision for veterinary surgeons, 

the Quartermaster's Department hired such personnel, utilizing funds 

appropriated for incidental expenses to pay for their services. 

Transportation costs for the Army in this decade were high. By 

1855, they were about $2 million and expenditures so frequently exceeded 

appropriations that defi ciency appropriations were often necessary. In 

the 5-year period 1852-57, J esup calculated that the average military force 

in service numbered 13,600 rank and file, whose transportation had cost 

more than $2 million a year. By way of comparison, he noted that in 

the 5.year period before the annexation of Texas, the average force in 

service had consisted of 9,900 rank and file, transported at a cost of 

$ 156,000 a year.u 

Need for In tenwl lmprovemenls 

Jesup was welJ aware that the economy as well as the efficiency of 

the service would be promoted by better means of communication with 

the d istant Army posts. In 1850, there was no established steamboat 

line that could be used beyond the Texas and Pacific coasts. There 

was not even an ordinary good turnpike in the new territories. Supplies 

had to be transported over routes that were long and entirely unimproved. 

Jesup recommended the improvement of harbors and rivers in Texas so 

that where possible \vater routes might be used. He also urged construction of turnpikes on the principal routes to important points on the 

frontier. ·~ 

Quartermasters in the fi eld, however, soon learned that many rivers 

in Texas and Arkansas were torrents in the rainy season and dry channels 

at all other times, unsuitabl e for naviga tion. T he use of turnpikes for 

the distances involved was too costly. By 1852, Jesup concluded that 

the only system of improvement, adapted to the country that had to be 

traversed, was that of railroads. He proposed the construction of a 

central railroad from some point on the Mississippi through Arkansas to 

.. House Ex. Doc. No. t, 53d Cong .. ht sess., pp. 1114-55, S.n. 711 (QMG's Rpt, 22 Nov 1855) . 

.. House Ex. Doc. No. I, 54th Cong., 5d SC$$., p. 257, S.n. 894 (QMG's Rpt, 26 Nov (856) . 

.. House Ex. Doc. No.2, 35th Cong., 2d SC$S., pp. 789-99, S.n. 999 (QMG's Rpt, 15 Nov 1858). 

" House Ex . Doc. No. I, 51st Cong., 2d sess., P{' 2, p. 124, s.n. 587 (QMG's Rpt, 20 Nov 

1850): Senate Ex. Doc. No. I, 52d Cong., 1st sess., p. 226, s,n. 611 (QMG's Rpt, 22 Nov 1851). 
318 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

the western frontier of Texas on the Rio Grande, with another road 

built through Texas to intersect it at some point. He suggested thal a 

third road might be built from the frontier of Missouri, at least as far 

west as Fort Riley on the Kansas River. O ther ra ilroads, he added, 

might be started on the Pacific Coast, being bui lt eastward to meet those 

projected westward from the Mississippi Valley,57 Military considerations, not sectional economic riva lries, dictated J esup's choice of railroad 

lines. Year after year in his annual reports, Jesup hammered at the 

need for railroads in the West and the benefits that could be derived 

from them in greater efficiency and economy of Army operations and III 

defense of the country. 

Experience, J esup insisted, had taught that in the transportation of 

its stores, the Q uartermaster's Department was better advised to fo llow 

the lines of trade established by private mercalllil e enterprise than to 

lead or direct trade into new routes. U The Department had always 

used the tested, established routes of trade in transporting its supplies. 

In advocating construction of a transcontinelllal railroad, Jesup was not 

pioneermg, In the decade before the Mexican War, J ohn Plumbe, Asa 

Whitney, and others had by speeches and writings been arousing an 

interest in the building of transcontinental ra ilroads that territorial 

expansion after the war made more keen and widespread." 

So great was the interest that, on 3 March 1853, Congress added 

funds to the Army appropriation bill to finance an extensive program of 

explorations and surveys. Military and sc ientific parties, working from 

both the Mississippi Va ll ey and the Pacific Coast, were to determine the 

most practicable and economical route for the construction of a railroad 

to the coast. Under the direction of Engineer officers, these parties took 

the fi eld, the Quartermaster's Department furnishing su pplies and tra nsportation.

8G T hey surveyed five routes, but though much geographical 

and scientific knowledge of the West was accumulated, no agreement as 

to the route of the railroad could be reached in the midst of the existing 

sectiona l riva lry. Not until the southern sta tes seceded could a decision 

be made in favor of a centra l route that permitted construction of the 

Union Pacific Railroad to be started . 

• 7 Senate Ex. DO('. No. I, 52d Cong .. 2d sess .. J't. 2, p. 74, S. tI. 612 (QMG'$ Rpt . 20 Nov 1852). 

" RG 92, OQMG Leiter Book, vol. 43. pp. 451-52 (Jesup to Le\'i j ones. 51 Mar 1851), 

vol. 52 (Jesup 10 Capl . j , G. Too, 10 jul 1858), 

.. See (I) 1.1, L, Brown, "A~ Whitncy and His Pacific Railrood l'ulJlicily C:unpa ign," 

MississiPPi I'nllt, H isloritnl Rroiew, vol. 2Q (Sep 1953), pp, 209- 24. (2) j ohn King, " j ohn 

Plumbe. Originator of the Jiacific Railroad," AmtilfJ of lOti'll, \'01. VI, 5d ser, Uatl 19<H), 

pp.289-96. 

- (1) 10 SllII. 214. (2) RG 92, OQMG Leuer Book, 1'01, 45, pp, 508, 510, 577-78 (Jesup 

to Vinton, 12 Apr; to Cross; 15 Apr; to Crosman, 24 May 1855). 
SUPPLY ON THE NEW FRONTIER 1848- 1860 319 

In the meantime, to reduce the heavy transportation costs of the 

Army, particularly in the arid regions of the SOllthwest. the War Department made an effort to introduce and use camels as carriers of military 

supplies. The possibility of using camels in the United States had 

first been broached in the late 1830's by George R. Glidden, who as 

U.S. Consul in the Mediterranean region, had written letters to the State 

Department on the subject. In the spring of 1843. CaPl. George H. 

Crosman, then an assistant quartermaster, tried 10 interest the Quartermaster's Department in the use of camels as transporters of troops and 

supplies in the southwest. Jesup t1l ollghl such projects might beuer be 

left to "enlightened private enterprise." In any case. the Treasury had 

no money. he informed Captain Crosman. He made much the same 

reply to Gales and Seaton, editors of the National Intelligencer, when 

they sent a letter on the same subject in the summer of 1849.

81 

In 1851, Jefferson Davis, then chairman of the Senate Military 

Affairs Committee, tried to get an 'amendment passed to the Army appropriation bill in order to provide funds for the purchase of about 50 

camels. Il fa il ed of action and thereafter Jesup attempted to get private 

contractors to try the experiment of transporting Army supplies on 

camels, but nothing came of these efforts.u On 3 March 1855, however, 

Congress appropriated $30,000 for the purchase of a number of camels 

and dromedaries. 

Jefferson Davis. then Secretary of War. lost no time in enlisting the 

services of the Navy Department to provide a ship for the transportation 

of the animals. He also obtained the services of Navy Lt. David D. 

Porter, and appointed Maj. Henry C. Wayne. assistant quartermaSler, 

to go to the Levant, purchase the came ls, and supervise their delivery 

to Indianola, Tex.n 

In the course of two expeditions, 75 camels were imported into 

Texas.' · Trial was then made of the camels as carriers of supplies. 

These experiments were successful in demonstrating the camel's ability 

OIRG 92. OQ!'.1G Letter Book. vol. 34. p. 431 (fo Cro!man. (j May 1843): vol. 42, p. 229 

(fo Ga les and Seaton. 9 Aug ]849). 

"(I) RG 107, OSW, RpLS to Congfe$$. vol. 6, pp. 445-4(j (SW to J. Davis. 25 Fl'b ]8!iI): 

vol. 7, pp. 164-66 (SW to J ames Sh il'lds, 5 May ]852). ('2) RG 92. OQMG Letter Book. vol. 4(j. 

pp. 347-48 Uesup to C. W. Wl'bber. 3() Nov 1835): vol. 47. p. 439 (DQMG Thomas to 

Col. H . L. Kinney. 1 J an ]855). 

"RC 107. OSW, Military Book. \'01. 36. p. 400 (Davis to Secy of Navy. II Apr 18;;!:t): 

vol. 37. pp. 12.42-44 (SW to Porter. 4 and 16 May 1855): pp. 20-22 (SW to Wayne. ]0 May 

]855) . 

.. For the correspondence relating to the importation of the amels sec. Senate Ex. DO(;. 

No. 62, 34th Cong., 3d .ses.s., s.n. 881. 
320 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

IMPORTATION OF CAM~:LS 

to carry heavy loads, to subsist on what food could be obtained by grazing 

and on lillie water, and to make far longer marches each day than mules 

or horses. Unfortunately. their appearance on the roads stampeded 

wagon and pack trains. Both the public and the Army turned against 

them and the camel experiment ended in failure." 

IncTeased Expenditw"es 

Apparently. there was littl e apprecia tion in the country either of 

the demands that would be made upon the Army by the acquisition of 

the new territory in the ,.vest or of the enormOlls expenditures that the 

supply departments would be called lIpon to make in supporting the 

tTOOpS stationed at western posts. At the end of the Mexican War, 

• For a delailed account H!e Will C. Bames, "Camels on Safari," The Quartermasler 

Revil!!W, vol. XVI Uan- Feb 1957), p. 7 If. 
SUPPLY ON THE NEW FRONTIER 1848-1860 321 

Congress was morc concerned with returning the Army to its prewar 

status than with analyzing the new problems that would confront the 

troops. President Polk, in sympathy wit h this objective. red uced j esup's 

estimate of expenditures for fiscal year 1850 by more than $900,000, 

despite the Quartermaster General's insistence that he had presented a 

mllllmum estima te. By April 1850, that appropriation was nearly exhausted, and Jesup reported that unless Congress provided additional 

funds the Department would be unable to meet the heavy drafts 

made upon it by assistant quartermasters in New Mexico and on the 

Pacific Coast.8~ No deficiency appropriation was passed and arrearages 

accumulated. 

Jesup was apprehensive that it would be impossible to obtain 

appropriations "to carry 011 the service" in the face of mounting expendit ures, and he called upon commanding officers to aid in reducing 

expenses in their departments. 81 His (ea rs were well founded for the 

House Ways and Means Committee, misinformed on data submitted. 

cut his estimate for fiscal year 1852 in half on every item of expenditure." 

Aroused by what he considered unwarranted abuse, Jesup determined to set his Department right before Congress and the country in 

his next annual reporl. To show the growth of Quartermaster activities, 

he ca lled for a full report from his principal subordinates in the field . 

At the same time, he also made every effort to reduce expenditures. He 

dispatched two of the Department's top-ra nking officers to Texas and 

New Mexico to inquire into and correct all abuses or extravagances th at 

might exist in those departments. He sent similar instructions to the 

chief quartermasters in Ca liforni a and Oregon.

u These offi cers uncovered no abuses but did recommend certain economies. In consequence, J esup issued innructions to dismiss civilian laborers and utilize 

troop labor to a greater extent. He also ruled that no agents were to 

be hired. He closely scrutinized tra nsportation costS and suggested that 

these might be cut by reducing the weight of supplies shipped. As a 

result, the Clothing Branch at Philadelphia changed its packaging methods. Instead of packing the clothing intended for the troops nationed at 

-(I) RC 92, OQMC Lettcr Book, vol. 42, p. 578 (Jesup to Lt. Col. B. Bragg, 5 Apr 1850). 

(2) RC 92, Reports of QMG 10 SW and Heads of Depu., vol. I. PI" 2~7-~9 (Jesup to SW, 

3 May 1850). 

or RC 92, OQMG Leiter Book. vol. ·0. pp. 3'4-55 (Jesup to Maj. CCfl. D. E. Twiggs, 

7 feb 185 1). 

- (I) Compare estimate and appropriation in RG 92, Reporu of QMC 10 SW and Heads 

of Dcpts .. vol. I, pp. 291-'08 (JL'Sul' to SW, 4 Nov 1850) and 9 Stat. 618 (Act of Ma r 3. 185 1). 

(2) Sellale Ex. Doc. No. I, 32d Cong .. lSI 5C$S .. pp. 223-24. s.n. 611 (QMC's Rpt, 22 Nov 1851). 

*(1) RG 92, OQMC Leller nook. "01. 43 , p. 507 (Jesup to Maj. E. R. Rabbitt , 23 Apr 

1851). (2) Senate Ex . Doc. No. I. 32d Cong., 1st ICU .. pp. 222-2', '.n. 611 (QMC'. Rpt, 22 Nov 

185 1); p. 2'5 If. (Appended Rpu of QM Swords and othCR). 
322 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

western POSts in wooden, iron-bound boxes and Lierces, it baled these 

supplies. The Department sent a packing press and baling material to 

Fon Leavenwonh LO permit the quartermaster there to effect the same 

economy in shipping cloth ing from that depot- TO Such measures d id 

result in savings but Lhey were necessaril y minor in character. The 

major expenditures could not be reduced until distance was overcome by 

cheaper and quicker means of transportation or supplies could be obtained closer to the posts as settl ements grew. Not fraud but the wide 

distribution of the Army and the growth of Quanermaster activities 

accounted for the increased expenditures of the Department. and so 

effective ly did Jesup analyze the increase in rentals, construction costs, 

transportation costs for the troops and supplies, mileage for officers, and 

prices for forage and horses that he won the baltle of appropriations for 

the rest of his administration. 

Although the Army had been rapidly reduced to its prewar status 

in 1848, its operations duri ng these years before tbe Civil War were 

not those of a peacetime establishment. T hroughout this period, the 

troops were employed in the pursuit of one mara uding party of Indians 

after another, and skirmishes with the Indians in the new fromi er area 

followed one after the other almost withoUl a break so that troop activities 

required considerabl e Quartermaster suppon . 

Slipport of Of)eration.s Agaill.st the Monnon.s 

The War Depanmem initiated on ly one major operation during 

these years- the expedition against the Mormons- and it fully demonstrated the tremendOliS logistical problems in volved in campaigning OI~ 

the western plains. Ever since a territorial government had been established in Utah in 185 1, the misunderstanding between the Mormons 

and the federal officials had engendered so much friction that by the 

spring of 1857 all but two of the latter had been forced to withdraw 

from Utah. The Mormons were not on ly challenging the sovere ignty of 

the United States, but, it was charged , th ey were instigating the Indians 

to hostilities against its citizens. Under these circumstances, President 

Buchanan thought it advisable to send a body of troops with the civil 

offi cers newly appointed for the telTitory. T he object was to establish 

them in their offices and to convert Utah into a geographical military 

department.

T1 

"" RC 92. OQMC Clot hing. Letter Book. vol. 12. p. 268 Uesup 10 Maj. Ceo. H . Crosman. 

17 Feb 185 1). Freight hOI1l Ihe tare of OOi<es and tien:c:s sent frOIU Fort Leavenworth in 

1850 had amounted to a ll1lost $8.000. 

n House: Ex. Doc. No.2. !15th Cong., 1st sc:u .• p . 8. '.n. 943 (5W'$ Rpt. 5 Dec 1857). 
SUPPLY ON THE NEW FRONTIER 1848- 1860 323 

About the cnd of Ma y 1857. the War Department issued orders to 

assemble as soon as possible at Fon Leavenworth a force of some 2,500 

men, consisting of the 5th and 10th Infantry, eight companies of the 

2d Dragoons, and a battery of the 4th Artillery." The Quartermaster's 

Department not on ly moved th e troops to the rendezvous point by rail 

and steamboat but also concentrated wagons and animals at Fort Leavenworth to transport the baggage. clothing. ordnance stores, and other 

supplies that accompan ied the expedition.

a Telegraphed instructions 

set the whee ls in motion. In rapid order. J esup called for the shipment 

of wagons on hand at Philadelphia and the manufaClUre of additional 

wagons, all now made with interchangeable parts; the delivery of several 

hund red kegs of mule and horse shoes; the procurement of 500 mules; 

and the purchase of 300 horses for the Dragoons." Under orders from 

General Scott, the Department also procured 250 Sibley tents {or the usc 

of the troops in the event they could not hUL themselves d uring the 

winter. This circular tent, patented by Bvt. Maj. H. H . Sibley of the 

2d Dragoons. had been under development since 1855 but had not yet 

been officially adopted for Army usc. The tem received its first test in 

the field on this expedition." 

While the Quartermaster's Department provided the wagons and 

animals to transport al\ the supplies needed by the command on its 

march . the COlllractors hauled all other material on the supply lines. 

CapL Thomas L. Brent, assistant quartermaster at Fort Leavenworth. 

advised Majors & Russell that they would have to transport to Utah 

subsistence and other stores, amounting to 3 million pounds. in addition 

to the supplies already sent out to other points under the terms of their 

coOlracl. fft The ex pedition had to carry with it not only a supply of at 

least 3 months' subsistence that the troops and civili an laborers would 

consume in crossing the plains but also sufficient rations, clothing. ordnance stores, tools, and other suppli es that the force might need unti l 

the fa llowing summer. Not until thell could it be resuppli ed From its 

depot over a thousand miles away. 

Majors & Russel l protested the demands made upon the firm. Their 

.. House Ex . Dot:. No. 71. 3;;th CUl1g .. 1st .'\CU., p. 4, s.n. 956 (Circular, 28 May 1857). 

:a RC 92. OQMC, Register of Contracts. 1M2- 59. vol. 12. PI'. 385. 387, 594, 597. 

TO RC 92, OQMG Leiter Book. \"01. 50. PI'. 573-74 Unu l' to Capl. T . L. Brent and 

LI. Col. Cw. H. Crosman, !IO May 1857); 1'1).59-4- 95 Ooup 10 ilabbiu, !) J un 1857). 

'"(I ) RG 92. Reporl ~ or QMC to SW and Heatb or Depu., \"01. 3, p . 605 (Joup 10 SW, 

lO Mar 1857). (2) RG 92, OQMC Clot hing. Letter I\ook, vol. 15, p. 326 (Jesup to J3abbill , 

13 Apr 1857). (3) The tcnl, 18 feel in diameter, was inlended 10 accom modate 13 cavalry 

and J5 rool $Oldiers. 

'"(I) HOII$r! Ex . Dot:. No. 58, 35th Cong., 1$1 SCI.5., p. 8, I.n. 955 (Colllraci. 27 Feb 1857). 

(2) RC 92, OQMC Letter I\ook. vol. 50. p. 573 (Jnup 10 Brent. 30 May 18.57); p. 595 (Jesup 10 

Thorna$, 5 JUIl 1857). 
324 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

trains were a lready on the road Wi Lh supplies for the various posts; the 

time was too short to assemble additional wagon trains; and to comply 

with the Department's demands would ruin them. Assured thal the 

government would not allow the contractors to suffer, Majors &: Russell 

yielded to the persuasions of Captain Brent and began to assemble the ir 

wagon trains. The expedition's demands had inflated prices so tha t the 

cOntractors had to pay 25 percent morc for oxen and had to meet a 

50 percent increase in wages demanded by the bullwhackers. Nevertheless, their wagons rolled toward Utah in the summer of 1857. A 

claim presented to Congress in 1860 showed that Majors &: Russell had 

dispatched 41 wagon trains, carrying 4,525,913 pounds of supplies.1I 

Under the name of Russell & Waddell, the COntractors also made a 

contract with the Subsistence Department in June 1857 to deliver 2,000 

head of cattle at Salt Lake City.a 

Aware that it was late in the season to be sending an expedition 

across the plains, Jesup regretted that he had not had the spring months 

in which to prepare, and he impressed upon his quartermasters in the 

field that they must expedite all measures "to conquer time and dis· 

tance." Tt Captain Brent at Fort Leavenworth and his immediate superior, Lt. Col. George H. Crosman, deputy quartermaster general at 

St. Louis, directed the preparations. Captains S. Van Vliet, W. S. Han· 

cock, and J. H. Dickerson accompanied the expedition. To superintend 

all arrangements, Jesup sent Assistant Quartermaster General Charles 

Thomas to Sl. Louis and Fort Leavenworth to do for the commanding 

officer of the expedition what he had done for General Wool in 1846.' 0 

To assure the Mormons that the troops would not molest or interfere 

with them and at the same time to arrange for the purchase from them 

of forage and lumber needed upon their arriva l, Captain Van Vliet was 

sent ahead of the expedition to Salt Lake City. The Mormans, however, 

would sell no products to the Army, and Brigham Young declared the 

troops would not be allowed to enter Great Salt Lake Valley." 

As the troops approached Utah Territory. the Mormons attacked 

their trains on 4 October, destroying about 75 supply wagons carrying 

rations. In addition, a considerable quantity of tools, supplies for 

.. Sell1e and Se1l1e, Empir~ 011 Whui.J, p. 18. 

" Hou3C E..y. Doc. No. 58, ~5th Cong .. lst !Ie$lI. , p. 9, U l . 955 (Contract, 26 jun 1857). 

" RG 92, OQMG ullcr 8001:., vol. SO, p. 591 Ucsup 10 Brig. Gen. W. S. Harney. 5 JUII 

1857). 

- Ibid., vol. 50. pp. 595- 96 Ucsup 10 Thomas. !i jun 1857). 

It HOU3C E" . Doc. No. 2. 1h Cong .. 151 !Ie$lI •• pp. 25- 27. S.n. 943 (Capt. Van Vliet to 

Actg AG. 16 Scp 1857). 
SUPPLY ON THE NEW FRONTIER 1848- 186u 325 

making wagon repairs, and other Quartermaster stores were destroyed.u 

The lateness of the season compelled Col. Albert S. Johnston, the commanding officer, to place his troops in winter quarters at nearby Fort 

Bridger. A terrific snowstorm that raged for days so hampered the 

movement of the force that it took 15 days to travel the 35 miles to Fort 

Bridger. Horses, mules, and oxen, unable to reach forage, died by the 

hundreds from starvation and cord. Lt. Col. Philip St. George Cooke. 

[allowing with the 2d Dragoons. found the road for 30 miles nearly 

blocked with dead and frozen anima ls and with abandoned and shattered 

property, marking " perhaps, beyond example in history, the steps of an 

advancing army with the horrors of a disastrous retreat." as 

By the time the command reached Fort Bridger, the expedition had 

lost on its journey from Fort Leavenworth 588 mules of some 2,400 

provided by the Department, ha ir the horses of the batteries, and twothirds of the mounts of the Dragoons. Since many more animals would 

die duri ng the winter for lack of (orage, Chief Quartermaster Dickerson 

thought it would not be safe for Colonel Johnston to count on more 

than 500 serviceable mules and 40 battery horses by I May. Before any 

movement could be undertaken in the spring, a new outfit would be 

requ ired, and he recommended sending a party to New Mexico to 

proclll'e 400 horses and 800 mules. Capt. R. B. Marcy of the 5th Infantry, 

with 40 enlisted men and 25 mountain men, herders, packers, and guides, 

made a heroic winter's march to New Mexico fot' that purpose." 

Meantime, at Camp Scott, the exped ition's winter qual'lers, the troops 

fa ced a winter of hardship. Despite the subsistence losses sustained in 

the destruction of wagon trains, the commissary had sufficient rations on 

hand to support the troops umil June. To be on the safe side, however, 

he recommended that a reduced ration be issued.'" A sufficient number 

of oxen, though poor, were saved to supply the meat portion of the ration 

6 days in the week. Of this supply, a newspaper correspondent wrote 

01(1) House F..~. Doc. No. 71. Mth Cong .• 1st sess .. pp. ~o-32. s,n. 956 (Col. E. B. AleKander 

to AG. 9 Oct 1857): p. 63 (List of stores burnt). (2) RG 92. OQMG Letter Book. vol. 52. 

I'p. 73-77 Uesup 10 nvl. Maj. Gen. I'. F. Smith. 17 Apr 1858). 

a(l) House Ex. Duc. No. 7t. 35th Cong .. lSI lesS •• p. 99, I.n. 956 (Cooke to AAG. 21 Nov 

1857). (2) Fronlit!f Lift i" tht Army IIIH-III6I, ed. Bieber. pp. 221 - 22 . 

.. (I) House Ex. Doc. No. 71. 35th Cong .. ]st Ses5 .. pp. 101-03. S.n. 956 (Dickerson 10 AAG, 

24 Nov ]857). (2) House Ex. Doc. No.2. 351h Cong .. 2d sess., p. 7- 8, s.n. 998 (SW's RpL 

6 Dec 1858). (3) RG 92. OQMG Letter Book. vol. 52. p. 77 UI'SUp 10 Maj. Gen. I'. F. Smith. 

17 Apr 1858). 

"The ration was to consist of 2 pounds of fresh beef and 12 ounces of flour. with beans 

to be issued three times in 10 days. rice. five times and desiccated vegetables twice in 10 days. 

Half rations of vinegar. candles. and soap were recommended. To each ]00 rations he allowed 

one gallon of molasses and 10 pounds of dried peaches. the former to be issued twice and the 

dried peaches once in 15 days. House Ex. Doc. No. 71. 35th Cong., lsi sess .. pp. 104-05, 

S.n. 956 (Capt. H. F. Clarke 10 AAG. 28 Nov 1857). 
326 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

from Fort Bridger that the oxen were frequently shot down a few mi nutes 

before they died a natural death from starvation and cold. " I often 

got a pi ece of this beef, as tcnder as a piece of sole leather. " 88 Enough 

bacon was on hand to allow a supply for I day in the week for 7 months. 

In the ration provided for the expedition, lea might be issued in lieu of 

coffee, and, for th e first time, th e War Department introduced in th e 

Army ration desiccated vegetables, long lIsed in th e Navy ration. According to regulaLions, desiccated vegeta bl es were to be issued once a week 

in lieu of beans or rice, but if a tendency to scurvy appeared among the 

troops the commanding officer might direct a morc frequent issue.s, 

Palatability of the meal and vegetables was not improved by the lack of 

salt. T he suppl y of that essentia l item had become exhausted in November. A train of 30 mul es, each loaded with 100 pounds of salt, was 

started from Ft. Laramie on 3 December.8s 

The troops at Camp Scott were not we ll supplied with clothing. 

They had left Fort Leavenworth with only a limited supply and by midOctober they were already reported as "nearl y destitute." Assistant 

Quartermaster Dickerson call ed for severa l wagon loads of socks, fl anne l 

drawers and shirts, shoes, and blankets to be brough t forward. A survey 

of the amount of clothing on ha nd at camp near the end of November 

showed 3,905 fla nnel shirts but onl y 723 blank ets.~9 Only 675 pairs of 

boots for mounted troops and 148 pairs of bootees for foot sold iers were 

on hand. With no shoes to be had at any price, it was reported that 

"men are at work making a covering for the feet of beef hides." gO A large 

supply of clothing items had been sent from Fort Leavenworth in the 

supply tra ins, including 1,800 blankets, 4,660 pairs of bootees, and 1,280 

pairs of boots. Unfortunately. large stocks of clothing destined for the 

troops in Utah were still at Fort Laramie in December but there were 

no means avail able for sending them forward. 91 

As the troops of the Uta h expedition waited for the long winter 

months to pass, the ' ·Var Department ordered reinforcements to assemble 

at Fort Leavenworth. A force of 3,018 officers and men were to march 

.. Froutiu Lift: iu Ih e Anny, ed Bieber. p. 5~. 

Of( I) lVar De/Hltl",e,,1 Genei'll/ O,'ders, GO 9. 2~ Jun 1857. (2) RG 192. Commissary 

General of Subsistence (eGS). Leiters to SW. 1854--1866. p . 56 (Gibson to Floyd, ~O May I 857). 

M( I) House Ex. Doc. No. 71. ~5t h Cong .. 1st scss .. p. 78. s.n. 956 Oohnston to AAG. 

~O Nov 1857), (2) HOl1se Ex. Doc. No.2. 35th Cong .. 2d SCSS •• p. 36, S.n. 998 (Maj. J. Lynde 

to AG. 2 Dec 1857) . 

• House Ex. Doc. No. 71. ~51h Cong .. 1st SCM" p. 66. s.n. 956 (Dickerson to Col. C. F. Smith. 

18 Oct 1857); pp. 1(l(H)7 (Dickerson 10 J esup. 29 Nov 1857). 

III Fronlier Lift: in /I, ,, ArlllV, ed. Bieber. p. 53 . 

.. (I) RG 92. OQMG Leu~r nook, vol. 52. pp. 89-91 Uesup to Maj. Gen . P. F. Smith. 

17 Apr 1858). (2) House Ex, Doc. No. 2. ~5th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 49-52. s.n. 998 (Maj. J. Lynde 

to AG, 24 Dec 1857).) 
SUPPLY ON THE NEW FRONTIER 1848- 1860 327 

as early in the spring as possibl e along with 850 recruits and 44 officers 

to bring the troops at Camp Scott up to the maximum standard. The 

supply bureaus were ca lled upon to provide for 3,912 men and officers 

on the march and an aggregate force of 5,606 when the whole army of 

Utah was united.02 

On the march, the troops had to be supplied with 3 months' subsistence for consumption en route . They were to carry with them a 

year's supply of rations for the entire army of Utah, and in addition the 

Subsistence Department was to throw forward to Fort Laramie an 8 

months' reserve supply before winter set in. Estimating that the force 

would also include 1,894 civilian employees, 300 servants, and 200 women, 

making a total of 8,000 to be subsisted, Commissary General Gibson 

reported that 4,880,000 rations would have to be provided for the year's 

supply and the depot reserve at a cost of $ 1,220,OOO. u Before the end 

of March, most of the subsistence had been purchased and turned over 

to the Quartermaster's Department at St. Louis for transportation to Fort 

Leavenworth. Contracts had also been made for beef cattle.e. 

In the meantime, the Quartermaster's Department made arrangements for the transportation o[ men and supplies. For service with the 

operating columns, the Department [urnished 988 baggage wagons as we ll 

as 29 light wagons, 6,447 mules, and 254 horses in addition to the horses 

provided [or the mounted troops. 9~ T he transporta tion of supplies to 

Utah and to the depots at Fons Kearny and Laramie from Fort Leavenworth required 3,908 wagons, 46,896 oxen, and 33 mules. D8 

Transportation o( clothing, tents, wagons, and other supplies [rom 

the East could be handled in a diffe rent way than in [ormer years. For 

the first time, the Departmem could obtain railroad transportation from 

Philadelphia, New York, and Baltimore to St. Louis. By December 1852, 

the Pennsylvania Ra ilroad had opened regu lar service between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, and one year later the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad reached Wheeling, but until lines were constructed in Ohio, Indiana, 

and Illinois no through service to St. Louis could be provided. In May 

1857, the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad began operating between Illinoistown, on the Mississippi opposite St. Louis, and Cincinnati, adding the 

last essential link to through transportation to Sl. Louis. 

At Jesup's directions, quartermasters in Philadelphia, New York, 

""House Ex. Doc. No.2. 35th Cong .. 2d St'S!l" p. 31. s.n. 998 (Circular. I] J an ]858) . 

.. House Ex. Doc. No. 33, 35th Cong .. ]SI sess .. I'p. 1- 2. S.n. 955 (Floyd 10 Speaker HR. 

15 Jan 1858). 

N RC 192. CCS, Leuen to SW. 195 ...... ]866. 1'1'. 75-78 78-80 (Actg CCS to SW, 22 Mar. 6 

Apr 18(8). 

" House Ex. Doc. No.2. 35th Cong .. 2d sess" p. 797. s.n. 999 (QMC'~ Rpt . 13 Noy 1858). 

" Ibid. 
328 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

and Baltimore made inquiries of railroad agents to ascertain the lowest 

price at which the companies would transport military supplies from 

those cities to St. Louis. It soon became apparent that railroad policy 

had changed. Formerly. the Quartermaster's Department had advertised 

for bids from the railroads and awarded the contract for a definite shipment to the lowest bidder. In 1858, however, the railroads were all 

under an agreement to charge the same price for the same articles. They 

had fixed rates and classification of goods for civilian traffic. T he 

Department thoroughly explored the problem of putting military items 

into the existing classifications. Colonel T homas fo und that the railroad 

classification system placed Army wagons, clothing, and tents in the first 

class and that the Department would therefore be charged the highest 

rates. With Army wagons we ighing nearly 1,900 pounds, the freight 

on them was 2Jh times greater by rail than by sea via New Orleans." 

Further exchanges brought an agreement with the Pennsylvania 

Railroad rather than with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad because the 

former was the first to entertain the idea of accepting emergency military 

orders and showed interest in classifying military stores into rate categories and at rates that would be more favorable to the Army than 

civilian rates. Moreover, T homas came to the conclusion that the 

Pennsylvania was a safer road than the Baltimore and Ohio because there 

were fewer streams to cross and less handling of freight-e, At the time, 

there were no railroad bridges across the Ohio at Wheeling or Parkersburg or across the Mississippi at St. Lou is, and passengers and freight on 

the Baltimore and Ohio necessaril y had to be ferried across the rivers in 

steamboats provided by the company. All freight was delivered to the 

terminal point of the Oh io and Mississippi Railroad opposite St. Louis, 

la ter known as East St. Louis. 

One other contract completed the transportation arrangements west 

of the Mississippi. On 1 March 1858, the Department made a contract 

with the Pacific Railroad Company that operated 125 miles of road 

between St. Louis and Jefferson City, Mo., and was in the process of 

constructing the railroad westward to Kansas City. By agreement with 

Weldon & Able, the company also provided daily packet service on the 

Missouri River. The contract gave the company the exclusive right to 

transport, by railroad and steamboats, all the troops and military supplies, 

except such as might be transported in government steamers, from 

St. Louis to Fort Leavenworth, or such other points on the Missouri 

River as might be selected for temporary depots. 1ID 

.. RG 92, OQMG Consolidated File, Box 869 (Thomas to J esup. 50 Jan 1858). 

- Ibid" (Thomas 10 Jesup. 25 Feb 1858) . 

.. (I) House Ex. Doc. No. 99. 35th Cong., 1st less., p. 5. s.n. 958 Gesup 10 Floyd, 6 Apr 
SUPPLY ON THE NEW FRONTIER 1848-1860 329 

Lack of fu nds considerably handicapped the preparations made by 

the Quartermaster's Department for supporting rein(orcements sent to 

Utah. The Departmem had exhausted its appropriation for the fiscal 

year ending 30 June 1858 by January. J esup reponed that no Quartermaster supplies could be procured , no transportation arranged, and no 

cava lry and artillery horses purchased until Congress provided funds or 

the Secretary of War, under the authority vested in him, au thorized the 

Department to purchase supplies by contract, to be paid for at a future 

time. To enable the reinforcements to move earl y in the spring and 

avoid the disaster that had overtaken the troops in 1857, the Secretary 

of War supplied funds hom private soul"cp.s and authorized the purchase 

of supplies by contracts to be paid for when Congress acted. ,~o Congress 

passed a deficiency appropriation bill in May. 

By tha t lime, the second column of troops was on its march to Utah, 

the first emergency units having left Fort Lea venworth with part of the 

wagon train on 10 March. T he first reinforcements of men and supplies 

arrived at Camp SCOtt between 8-10 June. About the same time, Captain 

Marcy arrived from New Mexico with horses and mules procured there. 

The Army of Utah, once again adequately equipped and provisioned, 

began its march to Salt Lake City on 13 June.

lOt There was to be no 

fighting, however, because in June peace commissioners sent by President 

Buchanan obtained a promise from the Mormon leaders to obey the 

constitution and laws of the United States and to make no resistance to 

the Army. On receipt of this news, part of the troops en route were 

diverted to other places. Rations for the ir supply accompanied them. 

A one year's supply for the posts on the plains was ta ken from the Utah 

trains, and the rest continued on to Utah to prov ide a partial supply 

there for another year. Quartermaster stores, being nonperishabl e, were 

sent on to Utah to provide a store of supplies for the next 2 years. 

Horses, mul es, and wagons that were not needed in the Department of 

Uta h were diverted to other destinations. 

1858). (2) The transportation rates were sct at $12 for each officer and $6 for each enlisted 

man, with the current rates charged by ste3mers on the Missouri River at the time of shipment 

being applied 10 all supplies. The company agreed 10 deliver in either 5 or 7 days. depending 

on the destination point. under a forfeiture of 20 percent on the enti re amount or freigh t 

thal might be due on the shipment. RG 92, OQMG. Register of Contracts. 1852-59. vol. 12. 

pp.442-411. 

"'. (I) RG 92, Reports of QMG to SW and Heads of Depts .. vol. 4. p. 206 Gesup to Floyd . 

17 Feb 1858). (2) House Ex . Doc. No.2. 35th Cong .. 2d SC$S., p. 8, $. 11 . 998 (SW's Rpt. (j Dec 

1858). 

to, House Ex. Doc. No.2, 35th Cong., 2d scss .. pp. 39--40, s.n. 998 (Cot. W. Hoffman to 

AAG.25 Feb 1858); pp. 105-00 (Brig. Gen. W. S. Harney to AAG. 27 May 1858); pp. 108-09 

(Brig. Gen. A. S. Johnston to AAG, II J un 1858). 
330 QUA RTERMASTER SU PPORT OF T HE ARMY 

01'ganizalion and Pel"SOnne{ 

Though the dispersed sta te of the troops had increased enormously 

the burdens of th e Q uartermaster's Department during these years, its 

administrative organiza tion rema ined unchanged . In the Washington 

office. th e Quartermaster Genera l continued to be a ided by one or twO 

assistant quartermasters. A chief clerk, five permanent d erks, and onc 

messenger made up the offi ce staff in 1849.'1I! T hese civilians gave can· 

tilluity to office proced ures by th eir long years of service in the offi ce. Two 

of the clerks had charge of the money accounts and the books in which 

they were entered; two kept the property accounts and were charged with 

a ll correspondence in connecrion with both property and money accoun ts; 

one clerk examined and recorded all contracts; and one analyzed and 

briefed the correspondcnce o[ th e officc and was responsible for bringi ng 

together all communica tions relating to any subject under consideration .tOS T hough Congrcss occasionall y authorized the appoin tment of 

temporary clerks for panicular duties, the inadequacy of his office staff 

led Jesup to appea l for more hel p, and, by 1858, Congress had increased 

the staff of permanent clerks to eleven, a number that was still modest for 

the records that had to be maintained.' ~ 

The number of offi cers that had to carry out the functions of the 

Quartermaster's Department and make its increasingly large d isburse· 

ments was a lso sma ll. At the time of the Mormon expedition, th e lotal 

number, including the Quartermaster General, was only 39. 103 Dming 

the Mexican War, Congrcss had incrcased the personnel of the Department from 37 to 5 1 by providing for the appointment of 4 additional 

quartermasters and 10 assistant quartermasters. When the war ended, 

none of these additional posts, under the provision of the law, could be 

filled when they fell vacant. By 1860, th e sta ff of the Depanmcnl had 

returned to its basic authorized strength of 37 offi cers. To take care of 

public property at the additional depots established dming these years, 

Congress in 1857 did authorize the appointment of more military store· 

keepers, bringi ng the tota l number to e ight. ")· This staff was not large 

enough to perrorm a ll the duties required of it and, in addition to regi. 

mental quartermasters and such commissaries of subsistence as could be 

employed, th e Depa rtment also used the services of more than 50 regi. 

mental officers either at posts or with marching detachments. 1Or 

•• HOIl$e Ex . DtH:. No. 35, 1st Cong., 1st seu .. p. 4, '.n. 576. 

- RG 92, Rc:poru to QMG to SW and Heads of Depts., vol. 2. pp. 14s-46 Uc:sup to 

Chainnan , Hou$e Ways and Means Committc:c, 2!) J ul 1852). 

- I bid .. vol. 4, pp. 195-96 Uc:sup to SW, 8 Fc:b 1858). 

- Sc:c Army Rc:gistc:rs for 1857 and 1858, Hou$e Ex . Doc. No. 66. 35th Cong .. 151 5eSS., 

pp. 4-(;, S.n. 955; No. 58, 35th Cong .. 2d seu .. pp. 4-6, ' .n. 1006. 

- I I StIli. 200 (Mar 3, 1857). 

"" Sc:natc: Ex. DIX. No. I, 32d Cong., 2d c:M., PI. 2, p. 73, S.Il. 612 (Qr.rG's Rpt, 20 Nov 1852). 
SUPPLY ON THE NEW FRONTIER 1848- 1860 331 

Except fo r assignments to the offices at Philadelphia and New York, 

most Quartermaster offi cers were stationed west of th e Mississi ppi. In 

general, too, the most important and responsibl e du ties of the new 

frontier during much of th is period devolved on lhe junior officers of 

the Department. T his was providential because the experience they 

gained during these years enabl ed them to fill with competence many 

of the key suppl y posts of the Civil War. Capt. Robert Allen, who had 

immense responsibilities as chief quartermaster in Ca lifornia during these 

years, was well qualified to reorgan ize Quartermaster affairs at St. Louis 

in 186 1 and supply the armi es in the Mississippi Valley during the Civil 

War. Capt. Ru£us Ingalls, who accompa nied the Steptoe expedition that 

crossed the continent in 1854-55 and served as quartermaster in the 

Department of Oregon, distinguished himself as chief quartermaster to 

the Army of the Potomac. Capl. John H . Dickerson, chief quartermaster 

on the Mormon expedition, directed depot operations at Cincinnati 

during the Civil War. Capl. Daniel H. Rucker, assigned to duties in 

New Mexico during these years, establ ished and directed su pply from 

the Washington Depot during the Civil War. 

T he senior officers o( the Department who should have been assigned 

to these important departments in the West were preoccupied after the 

Mexican War with the settlement of their accounts. They had acc umulated large money and property accoullls during that war, but delays in 

the Treasury Department prevented quick settlement of them. T hose 

delays resulted from the fact that their accoun ts, unlike those of every 

other supply officer, had to be submitted to two auditors [or settlement. 

That peculiarity had developed in the course of merging the Office of 

Commissary Ge nera l of Purchases and the Quartermaster's Departmenl. 

Different auditors had handl ed the accounts of the twb departments. In 

consequence, after the consolidation, not onl y difFerent vouchers in the 

same account but also different items in the same voucher had to go to 

different auditors in the Treasury.IUI Under such circumstances. t he 

settlement of accou nts often dragged on for years. J esup repeatedly 

urged amendment of the settlement procedures so that all accoullts and 

vouchers of the disbursing officers of the Department might be settled by 

one auditor of the Treasury Department. but this desirable reform was 

not enacted into law un til 1857.1'>11 

Aside from settlement of accounts, the age and health of somc of 

the senior offi cers of lilt: Department precluded their appointment 10 thc 

onerous duties of frontier posts. Many of these officers had seen service 

.. For example, a quantity of canvas used to repair a wagon cover would have to be 

accou m cd for to the 5d audicor, but a quantity of the same mate rial taken from thc same 

ba le of canv:u 10 repair a tcm would have \0 be ~ccountcd for to the 2d auditor. 

" (I) House Ex. Doc. No. I, 51st Con!!: .. 2d scss., 1'1. 2. p. 125, I.n. 587 (QMG'I Rpt, 
332 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

in the War of 1812 over 35 years ago; some, and among them were a number of junior offi cers, had their health impaired in the Mexican War. Discussing assignmellls in 1853, Jesup observed that Assistant Quartermaster 

General Henry Stamon was unable to perform duty ; Capt. Frederick H. 

Masten was so feeble that he was of no servi ce to the Department; Maj. 

Samuel B. Dusenberry had performed no important duty since the 

Mexican War; and CaPl. James C. Martin had but one arm, and the 

stump of the other gave him great pain. 11O There was no retirement 

program for disabilities or age in those years and quartermasters were 

carried on the rolls until death removed them. 

1n the 1850's, a number of the senior officers of the Department 

died; Col. Aeneas Mackay in 1850, Col. Henry Whiting in 185 1, Major 

Dusenberry in 1855, Col. Henry Stanton and Col. Thomas F. Hunt in 

1856. All bUl one of them- Dusenberry had been a cadet at the Military 

Academy in 1816-had served during the War of 1812. Colonel Whiting 

had been in the Army since 1808. Stanton and Hum were the last of 

the small group of officers originally appointed when the Depanmcnt 

was set up as a bureau in 1818. 

Many a junior officer must have looked at Jesup with awe. He 

was still Quartermaster General as the decade of the 1850's ended, though 

his health was much impaired. During most of 1859, he conducted 

Quartermaster business from his home with the help of Deputy Quartermaster General Sibley. His administration of the Department, begun 

shortly after the War of 1812, lasted until almost the beginning of the 

Civil War. T his period of tremendous territorial ex pansion, internal 

improvements, and industrial growth was reAected in Quartermaster 

operatitons. When Jesup became Quartermaster General in 1818, he 

felt that he was risking some reputation in trying to systemati ze a Department that had previously been so confused and disorganized. When his 

administration ended, he had converted the Department imo an efficient 

supply bureau, developed a body of trained Quartermaster officers, crea ted 

a satisfactory system of accountability, and evolved a set o[ regu lations 

covering the functi ons of the Department and the duties of its officers 

that stood the test of time. After 52 years of continuous service in the 

Army, and 42 of those years as Quartermaster General, J esup's long 

stewardship of the Quartermaster's Department came to an end with his 

dea th on 10 June 1860. 

20 Noy 1850). Similar pleas wen~ made in the annual rcporu of 1851. 1855. 18,54. 1856. 

(2) RG 107. OSW. Military Book. yol . .!I5. pp. 41-44 (SW to Seey of Treasury, 9 Nov 1853). 

(.!I) II SIM.200 (Mar .!I. 1857). 

"0 RG 92. OQMG Lener Book. vol. 46. p. 392 Uesup 10 Hunt. 21 Dec 1853). 
CHAPTER IX 

Impact of Civil War 

J es up's death, in the midst of the tense politica l campaign of 1860, 

brought to a close a 42-year period in the history of th e Quartermaster's 

Depanment. during which it was established as a supply bureau in 

WashinglOn and its development was shaped by the control of one man. 

Within a few months th e Buchanan administration was to end with the 

inauguration of Abraham Lincoln as president on 4 March 186 1, but in 

June 1860 Buchanan was ca lled upon to fill the vacant POSt of Quartermaster General. Promotion from with in th e Department would not 

have been unusual, but Col. Charles Thomas, assistant quartermaster 

genera l at Philadelphia and senior officer in th e Department. was not 

considered.' Instead, Secretary of War J ohn B. Floyd, who before the 

end of the year was to resign and la ter offer his services to the Confederacy, successfully ca rried through the appointment of a fellowVirginian, Ll. Col. j oseph E. j ohnston of the 1st U. S. Cavalry,! He was 

appointed Quartermaster Ceneral with the rank of brigadier general on 

28 june 1860 and assumed the duties of his office on 2 july. 

Impact of Secession 011 Personnel 

Quanermastcl' Ceneral johnston's administration of th e Department 

was so brief- it lasted bare ly 10 months-that he lefL no imprint on 

developments. H e tendered his resignation on 22 April l86 l, 3 days 

after he learned tha t Virginia had passed an ordinance of secession on 

17 April. President Lincoln immediately assigned as Acting Quartermaster Ceneral Maj. Ebenezer S. Sibley, an officer with 34 years of service 

, It is probable Ihat his age countC(! 3pilUi him for he had been in service l inee 1819. 

The numerous dealhs Ihat had bun occurri" g among officers who h.d been in the Anny 

since the War of 1812 and the yean immedi ~l ely thereafter undoubtedly influenced the 

Secretary of War to go outside Ihe Department in search of a younger man. 

' The Gene ral in Chief of the Army. Winfield Scott, called upo n 10 designate the officer 

hat filled in his opinion for Ihe ]>OlIt, had instead submitted a list of four names-Bv!. Brig. 

Gen. Albe rt S. Johnston. Lt. Col. Jo:scph E. J ohnslon , LI. Col. Roben E. Lee, and Lt. Col. 

Charles t'. Smith . The choice IIOOn narrowed down to the two JohnSlons, with Floyd favoring 

J oseph E. Johnston and J effenon J)avis, who had been Secretary of War and was then 

senator from Mississippi and chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, advocating the 

appointmem of Albert S. Johnston. 
334 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

in the Army. 23 of them in the Quartermaster's Department.! During 

the first 2 months of the war, Sibley was placed in the unenviable position 

of trying to execute the duties of th e Department while the new Secretary 

of War, Simon Cameron, intent on patronage, ignored the legitimate 

supply agency of the Army and infringed upon its duties by appointing 

"irresponsible temporary agents, through whom a system of favoritism 

could be consummated," to purchase and forward supplies and transport 

troops.4 

The southern sla les had threatened to secede if the " Black Republi. 

can" won the election of 1860, a threat that South Carolina promptly 

carried out in December. By the following February, six southern states 

had joined her, bUl President Buchanan, troubled by constitutional 

scruples, took no steps nor did th e new Lincoln administration , when it 

came into power, initia te any measures preparatory for war. There was, 

in fact, no conviction among the people and th eir leaders that war was 

inevita ble. No unanimity of opinion existed in th e North concerning 

even the action to be taken aga inst the seceded sta tes. When Fort 

Sumter was attacked on 12 April, however, doubts and uncertainties were 

dispelled. A war spirit was kindled that swept men inlO the Army fa ster 

than they could be clothed and equipped. 

At that time, the Quartermaster's Department had an authorized 

staff of 37 officers, including the Quartermaster General, and 7 military 

storekeepers. 5 ACLUall y, on 12 April it had only 35 officers. Capt. Henry 

Wayne of Georgia had resigned on 31 December 1860 and later served 

in the Confederate Army, while Capt. Abraham C. Myers of South 

Carolina, who was to become Quartermaster General of the Confederate 

Army, had resigned about a mOlllh after his native state passed an 

ord inance of secession.R When Li ncol n ca ll ed out the militia, four more 

southern states seceded , and the Quartermaster's Department lost six 

more officers, includi ng Quartermaster General Johnston. Four officers 

of southern birth remained loyal to the Union and non e of the military 

storekeepers resigned. The Department thus lost nearly one·fourth of 

its personnel at th e beginning of the war. 

Its remaining sta ff was thorough ly ex perienced. Approximate ly 

• rhe lVar of Ille Rebe/lio": Official Recordl 01 Ih e U,,;ou a"d Corlfederale Ann;es 

I~ vols .• Washington. 1880-19(1), ser. Ill, vol. I. p. 99 (SO 113, 22 Al'r 18(1). Herea fter 

briefly cited as OR. 

• "Government Contracts," House Rpl. No. 2, !17th Cong .. 2d 50S .. p. 55, s.n. 1142. 

" In addition 10 the Quutenlluu:r Ceneral. the staff consisted of 2 a55istam quartermasten general, 2 deputy (luarter11lasten genernl. 4 quartemlasten, and 28 assistant quartermasters, with the rank. respectively, of colonel , lieu tenant colonel, major, and captain. 

• RC 92, Rpts of QMC to SW and Heads of Oel't., vol. 5, pp. 410-15 (List o[ Offlcen, 

12 Apr 18131). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 335 

one-third of the officers had been in Quartermaster service since 1838. 

They had supplied the tfOOpS in the Mexica n War, and in 1861 they 

filled the top positions in the Department. At least half of the remaining 

personnel had from 12 to 15 ycars experience in the Department, and 

from among these younger orfJccrs came the quartermasters ultimately 

assigned to some of the key positions with the armies in the field and at 

supporting depots. 

Months were to pass, however, before some of these experienced 

officers could be brought Eau and reassigned, for, like the grea ter part 

of the Regular Army, most quartermasters in the years before the war 

were assigned to duties on the fromier. Some of them, stationed at 

southern posts. were captured at the beginning of the war and their 

services, at least temporarily, were lost to the Department. In addition, 

va luable officers were also lost by appointment to combat commands. 

Obviously, the scope of Civil War operations called for the services of 

man y more officers than were on the Department's roster in April 1861. 

The Department was soon seriously embarrassed by the lack of officers 

of experience and knowledge to execute its duties, and th roughout the 

conAict it was greatly hampered by the sma ll size of its staff. The 

Department's regular staff organi1.3tion was never ex panded during the 

war to an extent commensurate with the volume of business it handled 

or the number of troops it supplied. Onl y once during the war was the 

size of its staff increased. On 3 August 1861 , Congress raised the Department's authorized strength from 37 to 64.' 

For approximately the first 2 months of the war, Quartermaster 

operations were severely handi ca pped by the lack of a du ly appointed 

chi ef of the Department. It was natural that some of the senior officers 

should advance their claims to recognition. Genera l ScOlt would have 

been willing to give the appoilllment to Col. Charles Thomas in order to 

promote the va luable officers below him.' Such was the importance of 

the Quartermaster General's position that the office was mllch sought 

after by others outside the Department, and considerable maneuvering 

by interested parties occurred during these weeks. Senator John Sherman and his fri ends tried to obtain the appointment for his brother, 

William T. rm .~ Secretary of State \·Villiam Seward and Postmaster 

'(I) Congress ~ddcd one rolonel. 2 lieutenant colonels. 4 majors. and 20 capta ins to the 

Uepart mellt's staff. 12 Stal. 287. (2) By act of Jul y 5, 1862. tile number of mililary store· 

keepers ill the Department was abo increased from seven to a total of no more than twelve. 

12 S/Ill. 505. 

-(I) Tile U"cQ/n Paturs,~. ])a"id C. Meanls (2 vols .. Carden City, N.Y .. 1(48). II. 630 

(ScOIl to Lincoln. 5 Jun 186 1). (2) TlI~ Colluted Works 0/ Abrtlhtlm Uneo/II . ed. Roy P. 

Basler (8 VOII" Rutgers University Pre:s.s. 1953). IV, 394, fn. I. 

• Lloyd Lewis. SIHmlltlu Fightillg Prophet (New York. 1932). p. 162. 
336 QUARTER MAST ER SUPPORT OF THE AR MY 

General Montgomery Blair backed a rival nominee, Cap t. Montgomery C. 

Meigs of the Engineer Corps. 

Meigs was well known in Washington as the designer and builder 

of the aqueduct that su pplied the city with wa ter. He had also superin tended the constr uction of the wi ngs and dome of the Un ited States 

Capitol. His excellent Army record was further enhanced in April 186 1 

by his part in the successful Fort Pickens expedition- that astonishing 

affair, secretl y planned and executed not by the authorized military 

departments but by the Secretary of State and President Lincoln, assisted 

by Captain Meigs, Lt. Col. Erasmus D. Keyes. military secretary to 

General Scott, and Navy Lt. David D. Poner. For his part in that affair, 

Captain Meigs was appointed colonel of the II th Regiment of Infantry 

on 14 May. With considerable reluctance, he gave up h is more inRuential position in the Engi neer Corps and accepted the appointment only 

after it had been explained to h im that it woul d be a stepping stone to 

an early advance to a brigadier generalship and the pOSt of Quartermaster 

General. "They d id not like to excite the jealousy of th e army by so 

h igh a lift at once," he informed his father.'o 

His role in the Fort Pickens expedition had earned him the enmity 

of Secretary Cameron. who opposed his appointment as Q uartermaster 

General. Lincoln. on the other hand. was favorably impressed with the 

45-year old Meigs. who combined "the qualities of masculine intellect. 

learn ing and ex perience of the right sort, and physical power of labor 

and endurance," and he enlisted the inRuence of General Scott to remove 

Cameron's objections." Scott was successfu l and on 12 June Meigs was 

appoin ted Quartermaster General.n 

T he following day, Meigs entered upon the duties of his new offi ce. 

As Q uartermaster General, he was the second most important officer in 

the Army. not in military rank but in actual real infl uence. He proudly 

pointed out to h is father that a major general commanded a corps 

d'armee on a single line; a lieutenan t general commanded the whole 

army; but the Quartermaster General supplied the means of moving tha t 

army and his command extended from the Atlan tic to the Pacifi c, from 

the lakes to the Gulf." It would have been difficult to find an abl er 

' °(1) Meigs Papers, (21 May 1861). (2) Pod:r.:t Diaries of Mr.:igs, (r.:ntries for 17, 18, 

27 May: 8, II, 13 Jun 1861). Manusc ript Div., Libra ry of Congress. 

U(I) Tht Collt ctt d War/IS Q/ Abralram Linco/n, r.:d. Baslr.:r, IV, 394-95 (Lincoln to Scou, 

5 Jun 1861). (2) Tlrt Lincoln PapuJ, ed. Means, II , 630 (ScOU to Lincoln, 5 J un 1861). 

,. (I) Meigs Papers, (Appointment and leiter of acceptance, 13 J U\1 1861). (2) Originally, 

Meigs' rank of brigadier general was to dale from 10 Junr.:. Subsequently, Lincoln renomi· 

nated Mr.:igs wilh rank to date from 15 May in ordr.:r to correcl the error by wh ich his rank 

was da ted after that of olhr.:r officers. wh ile his appoilUlur.:nt was aClUally of an earlier date. 

li;JCccu/ivc Journal, X I. 5411-44. 

"Meigs I'apers, (12 J un 1861). 
I MPACT OF CIVIL WAR BB7 

Quartermaster Genera l. He had every q ualification for the post, General 

ScOll conceded-"high gen ius, science, vigor 8C administrative capacities." U He lacked specia l ex perience in Quartermaster business and, to 

function effectively. he had to wi n the cordia l suppOrt of the principal 

offi cers of the Depanmclll. He overcame both of these de fi ciencies 

withi n a short time. and after Edwin M. Stanton replaced Simon Cameron 

in Jan uary 1862 he had the sol id support of the Secretary of War. 

o U ice Organization 

Admin istrative detail necessaril y engaged a considerable part of 

Me igs' attention . He soon fo und that the Department'S cl erical force 

in Washington was inadequate to examine the thousands of accounts 

and reports that had to be submitted by quartermasters. Repeatedly 

during the war, Meigs called for more clerks, but although Congress 

authorized increases, the growth in Quartermaster operations was so 

extensive that its business contin ua lly outran .the means provided by law 

to examine and adj ust accounts in the Washington office.u He found it 

d ifficu lt to retain experienced clerks in the face of rising costs in the 

city. For the fi rst time in its history, the Department employed women 

copyists. Beginn ing modestly with three in 1862, the number rose to 

29 by the end o f 1864. By that time, the male cl erical staff numbered 

184 and Meigs was call ing for an additional 170.'8 

T he accounts handl ed by the Washi ngtOn office and the correspondence relating to them tended to fa ll into three categories-those relating 

to cloth ing and equipage, to transportation by land and water, and to 

regular and contingent su pplies of the Department. At the beginning 

of the war. on ly one of these ca tegories was organized as a bureau in the 

office and that was the clothing b urea u u nder the d irection of Capt. 

Alexander 1- Perry. Such a bureau had been in existence since the 

early days of J esu p. Grad uall y. under Meigs, other d ivisions of duties 

occurred. Captai n Perry continued to handle clothing and equipage 

accounts and correspondence, but by 1864 Colonel T homas had been 

brought into the offi ce to examine all contracts and superintend all money 

and property accoun ts. Deputy Quartermaster General Sibley took care 

of all duties connected with quarters, hospitals, and estimates of funds. 

Col. Robert E. Clary had charge of water transportation, Capt. Benja-

"Tire Lineol" Papers, cd. Means, II. 650 (Scott 10 Lincoln, 5 J un 1861). 

"See tf"'lUfll po~ts of Ihe QllfI~tenllflsle~ (;elle~lll, 1861- 186J, /Mssim. 

M(I) RC 92, OQMG Decision Book. No.2. p. 207 (ASW Watson 10 QMD. 15 Oct 1862). 

(2) RG 92. OQMG Leiter Book. vol. 64. p. 455 Meigs 10 Sen. T . Willey. 5 Dec 1862): vol. 

81, pp. 405-09 (Col. J. J. Dana to J. Boyd. 5 Dec 1864). National Arch ives. 
338 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

mine C. Card handled claims, and Capt. George V. Rutherford examined 

reports from the field." ]n 1864, Meigs sought legal authorization for 

the division of duties that had developed in the office. He proposed 

and Congress approved the establishment of nine divisions in the offi ce 

of the Quartermaster General, each under the direction of a colonel.18 

This organ ization was limited to the duration of the war and for one 

year thereafter. 

Supply Difficulties in 1861 

While administrative developments grew increasingly important as 

the war progressed, supply was the prime consideration of the Quartermaster's Department in 1861 and throughout the war. In April 1861 , 

Quartermaster supplies on hand were barely sufficient for the wants of 

the small peacetime Regular Army. The Schuylkill Arsenal was still 

the chief depository for clothing and equipage as it had been in the past. 

St. Louis, for example. was not a storage depot for supplies. It was a point 

at which purchases were made under orders of the Quartermaster General 

to fi ll requisitions of offi cers at other western posts. Accumulation of 

large reserve stocks of Quartermaster supplies was impossible since the 

funds Congress appropriated, for specific purposes and non-transferable. 

were usuall y sufficient to cover only immediate needs. 

On the eve of the Civil War, the Quartermaster's Department like 

the Army generally, had long been hampered by lack of funds. For 

years, it had been burdened with debts. Its liabilities had usually been 

greater than the balance reported at the end of each fiscal year, largely 

because unforeseen expenditures were incurred as a result of actions taken 

to prevent or subdue Indian disturbances in the pre-Civil War years.'~ 

Congress initiated no measures to improve its situation or that of the 

military department generally. Instead, in December 1860, the chairman 

of the Senate Military Affairs Committee had inquired whether expenses 

could not be further reduced without detriment to the public service.zo 

Already hampered by lack of funds that had compelled the adoption of 

"RG 92, OQMG Leiter Book, vol. 74, pp. 536-37 (GO 10. 24 Feb 1864). 

'· (I) 13 SIal. 394-95 Oul 4. 1864). (2) Briefly. the nine divisions were as follows: 

hi (horses and mules) under Col. James A. Ekin; 2d (clothing and equipage) under Col. 

Alexander J. Perry; 3d (ocean tra ~portation) under Col. George D. Wbe; 4th (rail and river 

transportation) u nder Col. Lewis B. Parsons; 5th (forage) under Col. Samuel L. Brown; 6th 

(military buildings) under Col. Benjamin G. Card. who was also charged with the duties of 

the 9th division (records and correspondenc.e): and 8th (inspection) under Col. George V. 

Rutherford. RG 92. OQMG Lencr Book. vol. 81, p. 405 (Col. Dana to J. Boyd. 5 Dec 1864). 

"See. for exam ple, Senate Ex. Doc. No. I, 36th Cong .• 2d se5II .. vol. II. pp. 233-36 (QMG's 

Rp.t. 1860) . 

.. RG 107, OSW. Leners Received. M- 232 (97) Uefferson Davis to Floyd. 13 Dec 1860). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 339 

policies of retrenchment. and by a reduction in its cl erical staff that 

prevented execution of a ll its duties, the Quartermaster's Department was 

in no position to cut cxpenditurcs. 2L Congress must share some of the 

responsibility for the inability of the Quartermaster's Department to 

meet the supply demands made upon it in April 186 1. 

When Fort Sumter was fired upon, Congress was not in session and 

Lincoln did not ca ll it into special session until 4 July 1861.22 Not only 

had the appropriated funds of the Quartermaster's Department been 

dwindling rapidly even before the impact of war was felt, but Congress 

had provided that no contracts or purchases could be made unl ess under 

an appropriation adequate to its fullfillmem. 23 Contracts for clothing, 

subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, or transportation in the War and Navy 

Departments were made an exception to this rule but purchases under 

such contracts were not to exceed the necessities of the current year. 

Such a provision hampered the accumulation of any reserve supply for 

the Regular Army and Congress had specifically appropriated no funds 

for supplying the Volunteers. 

Procurement measures had nevertheless to be initiated immediately 

when on 15 April Lincoln called out 75,000 militia for 3 months of 

service. It is one of the oddities o[ the war that General Johnston, who 

was to lead an army of the Confederacy, was Quartermaster General of 

the U.S. Army on that date and for a week therea fter. He dispatched 

the first procurement directive of the war to Colonel Thomas at Philadelphia, instructing him to purchase sufficient knapsacks, canteens, and 

camp equipage to supply the 75,000 militia. He followed this with an 

order to "direct all your energies to the preparation of fatigue clothing 

for Volunteers." 2~ 

Contracts had barely been Jet before suppl y demands were doubled 

by Lincoln's proclamation of 3 May.25 The President call ed for 42,034 

volunteers to be enlisted for 3 years of service and ex panded the Regular 

Army by an increase of 22,714 officers and enlisted men. More than 

91,000 men answered the April appea l. By summer, nea rly a quarrel' 

of a million men had rushed to arms in response to the various Presidential calls. In the fall , Meigs estimated for an Army of 300,000, but 

"(I) Senate Ex. Doc. No. 1, 86th Cong., 2d SCSS., 1'01. II, p. 236 (QMG's Rpt. 1860). 

(2) For examples of retrenchment sec, RG 92, OQMC Letter Book, voJ. 55, p. 195 UOhOSlO1l to 

Capt. S. Van Vliet. 17 J an 186 1); p. 236 (Same 10 Capl. R. E. Clary, II Feb 1861) . 

.. Oil, ser. III, vol. I, p. 68 (Proclamation, 15 Apr 1861). 

" ]2 SIal. 220 (Mar 2, 1861) . 

.. (1) RG 92, OQMG Decision Book, vol. 2, p. 69 (Cameron to QMG, Hi Apr 186 1). 

(2) RG 92, OQM G Leiter Book, Clothing. vol. 17, p. 427 Uohnston to Thomas. 17 and 20 Apr 

186 1); p. 440 (Same to same, 20 Apr 1861). 

· OIl,scr.lIl, vol. I. p. 146. 
340 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

even as Congress appropriated fu nds for that number it authorized the 

President to accept the services of 500,000 volunteers and increased the 

Regu lar Army to aboUl 50,000. 28 

Under these circumstances, contracting cou ld not be orderl y. and 

in any event the sma ll Quartermaster's Department of April 1861, gcared 

to supply the Regular Army of 16,000 men, was wholl y inadequate to 

meet the demands made by this rapidly expanding [oree. State governors 

clamored for arms and equipment to enable them to prepare their troops 

to take the field. Failing to obtain supplies from the War Department, 

they soon turned their attention to purchasing su pplies to equip their 

regiments, and Cameron approved,lT Colonels and quartermasters of 

these new volunteer regiments bought supplies. Lacking ex perience, 

they were often imposed upon by unscrupulolls merchants who se ized 

the opportunity to garner handsome profits. Not infrequently, these 

quartermasters shared in the profits.u Patriotic Union Defense Committees also quickly sprang into existence in the states to equip and 

forward troops. Thus, both federal and state agents were soon competing for suppli es not only in the domestic market but also in foreign 

markets. 

Secretary of ' '''ar Cameron, inexperienced in Army matters, was 

hampered both by a lack of. trained assistants and a well.organized War 

Department. Yet since his appointment he had done liule to improve 

his Department. Political patronage had been of primary concel'l1 to 

him, so much so that even in the midst of the burdens imposed by war, 

c1erkships in the Philade lphia Depot did not escape his anention. 

Colonel Thomas had to plead for Ihe retention of his trained personnel 

lest he be unable to attend to all his duties. 2

$ 

It is understandable that Cameron might not feel free to re ly on 

his Quarlermaster Genera l for assistance with supply problems, since 

Johnston was torn between duty to his country and loyalty to his native 

state, but the services of other loyal, competent, and thoroughly experi-

- Ibid., p. 866 (Meigs to Stanton. 28 Jan 1862). 

" Ibid., ser. III, vol. I. p. 73 (QMG of N.J. to Cameron. 16 Apr 1861): p . 89 (Cov. O. 1'. 

Morton to Cameron, 19 Apr 186 1): pp. 115- 16 (Cameron to !'olorton. 26 Apr 18(1).) 

· "Covernment Contracts," House Rpl. No.2, 37th Cong .. 2d sas .• pp. 69-7 1, '.n. 1142 . 

• (I) RG 92, OQMG Letters Received. Box 78 (fdegram. Thomas to Sibley, 8 Jun 186 1). 

(2) Rumon of impending changes had circulated as soon as the new Administration came into 

office but Colonel Thomas rdused to gi" e them credence. The depot commander had always 

had Ihe selection of his clerks and nllislants and his clerks had been with him for many years. 

sening through various Adminislr.llions of different politia. RG 92. AQMG Thomas, Letters 

Sent, 30 Jan- 12 Apr 1861 (fhomas to Johnston, 12 Mar 186 1). (3) The Commiuary General 

of Subsistence was similarly distressed by Cameron's contemplated action and al50 made a plea 

for the retention of his office personnel. RG 192. Records of CGS, Leiters to SW, 1854-66. 

p. 142 ('23 !'obI' 1861 ). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 341 

enced Quartermaster officers were available to him. Major Sibley had 

often served as Acting Quartermaster General during General Jesup's 

absences. Colonel Tompkins at New York bad handled complex transportation problems in the Mexican "Var, and Colonel Thomas, who had 

also served in that war, had long been purchasing clothing and equipment 

at Philadelphia. Assisted by additional agents, they might have been 

called upon to direct and supervise the equipping and forwa rding of 

troops in April 186po 

Instead. Secretary Cameron bypassed the Q uartermaster's Department and appointed his staunch political friends and supporters as War 

Department agents to purchase and forward supplies and to direct the 

transportation of troops. T his concentration of appointme nts among 

Pennsylvan ia Republicans of the Cameron school soon occasioned widespread criticism. Tbe congressiona l committee investigating government 

contractS en larged upon the harmful consequences resulting from the 

employment of such agents to purchase supplies and services." 

T he appoilHmem of Alexander Cummings was a case in point. 

Assistant Quartermaster General Tompkins and Maj. Amos B. Eaton of 

the Subsistence Department both were stationed at New York. But. 

when the Baltimore munic ipal authorities Cllt ra il communications in 

that city on 19 April and isolated Washington, Cameron, 4 days later, 

appoi nted Alexander Cummings, one o[ his campaign managers in the 

national convention of 1860, to purchase and push forward supplies 

from New York and transport troops to \ Vashington un til such time as 

commun ications could be restored between the capital and New York. ~ 

• It is said that the resigna tion of General Johnston left Cameron without a strong man 

in the Quartermaster's Department; only older and less aggressive officers remained to assist 

him. Bound by red tape, worn·out rules and regulations, they clung to the old ways as best. 

Samuel R. Kamm, TI. c Civil WIlT C(lretr of Thomas A. Scoll (Philadelph ia, 1940), p. 22; 

A. Howard Meneely, 'rll c llIa r Dellarimelll, 186/ (New York, 1928), pp. 108-{/'). It is true 

that the key posts were held by older officers whose actions were always governed by regula· 

tions, but there is nothing wrong with being governed by regulations. They are essent ial 

in operating any business, ~nd the regulations of the Civil Wa r years differed but little from 

those of the prewar years in the Quartennaster'S Department. The older officers-men in 

thdr late fifties and early sixties, all bllt two of whom SCn'ed throughout the war- possibly 

were not ~s aggressive as younger men might have been. but that was a characteristic necessary 

in the field. These men had the administrative and 5upen'isory experience needed to keep 

the Quartermaster offices in New York, Philadelphia. and Washington operating. They knew 

the laws and the regulations that hemmed in their operations and protected Ihe interests of 

the government, and it would have been definitely advantageous had all quartermasters 

during the Civil War known the regulations and applied them. 

at One of the first acts of Congress upon being called into extra scssion was to appoint a 

commiliCC all 8 J uly 1861 to investigate government contracts. Appointed by the Speaker of 

the House of RepresentatiVes. the commiltcc under the cha irmanship of Charles H. Van Wyck, 

held meetings in variOllS parts of the country. submilting its findings in two voluminous 

volumes. See "Government Contracts," House Rpt. No.2. 37th Cong., 2d scss., S.n. 1142 

and 1143 . 

.. Brid ~ on the Philadelphia, Wilmington I: Baltimore Railroad between the Susque· 
342 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Cummings was to work with Gov. Edwi n D. Morgan of New York. To 

cover expend itu res for defense purposes, the Secretary of the Treasury. 

without requiring security, placed a fu nd of $2,000,000 in the hands of 

J ohn A. Dix, Richard M. Blatchford. and George Opdyke, prominent 

members of the New York Defense Committee. Under Cameron's broad 

directive, this money was at the complete disposal of either Governor 

Morgan or Alexander Cummings, bUl, since the Governor was preoccupied with other duties, Cummings alone expended most of the funds,u 

Busi ness qualifications were certa inl y essential for this assignment, 

but Alexander Cummings gave li ttle evidence of possessing these and, 

moreover, had no general acquaintance with business in New York. 

For 12 years he had been a Pennsy lva nia newspaper editor and in 186 1 

was a publisher of a New York newspaper. Operating without restrictions, he purchased suppli es on an emergency basis, not in response to 

requisitions but based solely on his judgment oE what was needed in 

Washington. The congressional committee investigating government 

contracts aired all the details of his shortcomings as a purchasing agent 

and but two examples are needed to illustrate them. Cummings spen t 

over $2 1,000 in the purchase of linen pantaloons and straw hats because 

"hot weather was coming on" and he thought that they would be needed, 

though an inquiry at the Quartermaster offi ce in New York would have 

revea led that regulations provided for the issue of neither article. Uninformeri about business backgrounds, Cummings also purchased, without 

consulting Commissary Eaton, provisions and groceries from E. Corning & Co., a firm engaged in the hardware business at Alban y. New York.B< 

Regulations setting forth the items of issue to the troops and 

requisitions indicating the quantities of such items req uired by the troops 

governed the procurement of suppli es. Procedu res for the purchase of 

supplies and services were based on laws enacted by Congress. Early 

in 186 1, Congress had reiterated the basic policy that had long governed 

procurement. It had enacted legisla ti on providing that all purchases 

and contracts for suppli es and services in any goverOitienta l department 

were to be made by advertising for proposals, allowing a sufficient time 

for the submission of bids, and making the award 1O the lowest bidder. 

In any emergency demanding immediate delivery of articles or performance of the service needed, however,. the law had authorized procurement 

by open purchase or cont act.3~ 

At the outbreak of the war, much procurement was necessarily and 

hanna River and Baltimore and allIO on the Northern Central Railroad between Baltimore and 

the Pennsylvania state line were destroyed. 

""Government Contracts," House RJlI. No.2. S7th Cong .. 2d SCllS •• pp. 55- 58. 5.n. 1142. 

" Ibid., pp. 59-60, s.n. 11 42. 

· 12 Stat. 220 (Mar 2, 186 1). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 343 

rightly placed on an emergency basis. Unfortunatel y, the continued 

failure to invite competition, once the first emergency had passed. could 

not be justified. The congressional committee investigating government 

contracts concluded that the law on camract procedure was a dead Icuer, 

that the safeguards provided in the use of duly authorized public officers 

were disregarded by employing irresponsible agents. and that new and 

more precise legislation must be enacted to protect the interests of the 

government. 3G The committee condemned the irresponsible agents who 

sacrificed the public interests through lack of experience or integrity, 

but it praised the Regular Army quartermasters and commissaries as 

officers who, with a few exceptions, were men "of ample and equa l 

capacity and fidelity," ever jealous for the public welfare.3T 

One such exception exposed by the committee was Maj. Justus 

McKinstry, quartermaster at St. Louis, who was responsible for supplying the troops of the Western Department. first under Brig. Gen. 

Will iam S. Harney and then under Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont. 

St. Louis had not been a depot for Army supplies so that when volunteers 

crowded the city in response to Presidential calls, Quartermaster McKinstry had to procure supplies to equip them. He had no money with 

which to make purchases, and he later maimained that he could not 

depend upon the Sta te government of Missouri for aid. Moreover, 

troop movements occurred before he could obtain supplies from eastern 

depots. He therefore resorted to open-market purchases and made use 

of middlemen who could afford to extend the necessary credit.u The 

trying circumstances under which McKinstry operated condoned emergency procurement at the start of the war, but the law on contracts 

continued to be disregarded thereafter. He procured large quantities 

of supplies on what was termed " requisition," that is an order to a firm 

to supply a given quantity of certain articles, all made of the best material, 

conforming to Army regu lations and requirements. The cost of the 

material, manufacture, and transportation of the articles was to be furnished by the merchants to the quartermaster who then allowed them a 

fair profit. On the basis of such requisitions, one firm in St. LouisChild, Pratt 8c Fox- furnished over $800,000 worth of supplies without 

the price of any of them being previously determined. As it worked out, 

the "fair mercantile profit" allowed by the quartermaster came to 

40 percent.

3D 

.. ··Government ColilraCts," House RjJt. No.2, 37th Cong., 2d sess., p. 53, s.n. 1142 . 

., Ibid., pp. 54-55 . 

• RG 92, OQMG Consolidated Correspondence File. Box 641 (McKinstry's vindication . 

2 Jan 1862) . 

• "Government Conlracts," House Rpt. No.2, 37th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 53--54; 101--02; 104, 

S.n. 1142. 
344 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

It is only too true that General Fremom's peremptory demands for 

supplies resulted in McKinstry's viewing every requisition as necessitating 

emergency action. T he Quartermaster's Department furnished funds, 

but Fremont, busy build ing fortifications in St. Louis and arming and 

equipping his troops, appealed not only to the War Department for 

support but to Postmaster General Montgomery Blair and President 

Lincoln.<o Meigs sought to reassure Fremont that he would be fully 

supported by his Department, but Fremont nevertheless appointed agents 

who operated outside the Quartermaster Department in making contracts 

and disbursements. He delega ted to the Union Defense Committee of 

Chicago the power and duties of the Department in contracting for and 

providing clothing for the troops. Meigs doubted the propriety of 

placing Departmental funds under the control of a committee responsible 

on ly to public opinion." The government was soon appall ed by the 

costs that Fremont ran up in the Western Department. 

As a result of investigations, Quartermaster McKinstry was arrested 

on 13 November 1861 , brought before a general court martial, tried on 

charges of favoritism and corruption, convicted of some of these charges, 

and dismissed from the servke. 4 2 Quartermaster Robert Allen was 

tra nsferred from the Pacific Coast and assigned to St. Louis. He was 

on the job only a few days before he telegraphed the Quartermaster 

General that "unless the wanton, reck less expenditures in this command 

are arrested by a stronger arm than mine, the Quartermaster's Dept. will 

be wrecked in Missouri along with Gen. Fremont. The Army Regulati ons are a blank & the laws of Congress a contemptible farce." U 

Yet congressional committees dealt kindly with Fremont. for his 

earnestness, zea l, honesty, and patriotism were above question and his 

political influence was great. Fremont, however, was poorly fitted for 

command of the Western Department. He made numerous irregular 

appointments; he was no judge of men; he had on his staff persons directly 

and indirectly concerned in furnishing supplies; and extravagance and 

fraud flourished as a result. H 

All of Fremont's COl1lracts for fortificat ions, supplies, food, arms, 

steamboats, wagons, and horses, it is estimated, totaled only about $12 

million.u The wastefulness lay not in the amount expended but in the 

"'OR, s<:r. I. vol. III, pp. 409-10 (Fremont to M. BI~ir, 28 Jul 1861); vol. IV, pp. 416-17 

(Frcmont 10 Lincoln , 30 Jul 186 1). 

" RG 92. Rpts of QMG to SW and Heads of DepU., vol. 5, pp. 462-63 (Meigs to Camcron, 

3 Scp 1861 ) . 

•• AGO War Deparlnllmf Orders, GO 43. 1.'1 Feb 1862 . 

.. RG 92, OQMG Leiters Received, Box 79 (8 Oct 1861 ) . 

.. OR, s<:r. I. vol. IV. pp. 0-5 1 eRp!. AG L. ThomiU (0 Cameron, 21 Oct 1861) . 

.. Allan Nevins, FremO/l1 (2 vob., New York, 1928), II, 6 13. 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 345 

fact that so much of the money we nt into the pockets of dishonest contractors at the expense of the troops. After Fremont had been relieved. 

Maj. Cen. H. W. HalJeck, who LOok command late in the fa ll of 186 1, 

reported compl ete chaos in th e department. "The most astonishing 

orders and contracts for suppli es of all kinds have been made and large 

amou nts purport to have been rece ived but there is nothing to show that 

they have ever been properl y isslIed, and they cannot now be found." 4' 

Meantime. many of th e troops at d ifferent poi nts in th e Western Department were reported to he without arms and suffering from the lack of 

clothing and blankets. Such were the fruits resulting from neglect of 

regulations and laws intended to sa feguard public illlerests. 

For every quartermaster in the Civil War willing to profi t at the 

expense of the soldi ers, there seem to have been at least two contractors 

eager to show him how it could be done with advantage to both . Many 

manufacturers and merchants who previously had enjoyed good reputations were revea led by th e war to be rapac ious seekers after profits. From 

the lowliest q uartermaster to the Quartermaster Genera l himself, all fel t 

the Force of the pressure that Contractors, lobbyists, and speculators 

exerted to win a share of the lucrative government cOlllracts. Of th em 

de Trobriand wrote: 

These hu rried to the assau lt on the treasury, like a cloud of locusts alight. ing down upon the ca pita l to devour the llb tan ce of the country. They 

were everywhere; in the streets, in the hotels, in the offi ces. lIt the Ca \,itol, and 

in the White I-louse. They conti nua ll y besieged the bure'lUs of 3( ministration. the doors of the Sena te ;lIld House of Represelllati ves, wherever there 

was a chance to gain somethingY 

Quartermaster General Meigs urged and Secretary Stanton acted to dose 

the doors of th e War Department at 3 P.M. to a ll but officers of the 

United States so that they might at least have a few hours in the day in 

which th ey could do something besides answer applicants for contracts.·S 

Such was the business cl imate of the day, and businessmen of the Civil 

War years must shoulder a large share of th e responsibility for the 

unsavory suppl y situation of that period. 

Conlmci P"ocedw'es 

Over th e years, Congress had enacted legislation to protect the 

in terests of the governmenl. We ll aware that war provided opportunities 

fo r swindling the governmelll, Congress in the summer of 186 1 proposed 

.. OR. ser. I , vol. VIII, pp. 38S-90 (Halleck 10 McClellan. 28 Nov 1861) . 

.. Regis de Trobriand , I'our Yf"lIrs will, flul A rmy of 'hf" POlomac, Inms. George K. Dauchy 

(Boston. 1889), p. 135 . 

.. RG 92. OQMG LellC:r Book. "01. 5G. p. 168 (Meigs 10 Ch ief Clerk, WD. 7 Aug 1861). 
346 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

to cnact new legislation that would prevent frauds by supply officers 

entrusted with the making of contracts. The conditions it proposed 

to impose-reduction of all contracts to writing and appearance before 

a magistrate to obta in affidavits-would not necessarily have prevented 

fraud but would have delayed and hampered supply. Meigs courageously 

fought this attempt to bi nd his Department with new regulations, 

insisting that the existing law was sufficient to protect public interests. " 

For a time, Meigs' arguments prevai led. but the abuses exposed by 

the congressional comminec investigati ng government contracts brought 

renewed interest in remedia l legislation. and a year later Congress passed 

the act of June 2. 1862." The provisions, applicable to all supply 

bureaus, were much the same as had been proposed the year before, and 

in addition the law required that a copy of the contract, together with 

all bids, offers, and proposals and a copy of the advertisement published, 

all numerically arranged, be sent to a record office to be established in the 

Department of the Interior. Having failed to prevent passage of the 

law, Meigs advised the Secretary of War that it would be impracticable 

to execute it. Quartermasters in the field made many purchases of 

supplies during active operations. and the only way in which they could 

observe the law's provisions would be to have magistrates attached to 

their offices as clerks. In addition, creating a separate record office in 

the Interior Department to which bids were sent, Meigs argued, would 

deprive the Quartermaster Genera l of any opportunity to examine and 

control the award of contracts upon those bids. Meigs insisted that all 

that needed to be added to previously existing legislation were provisions 

imposing sufficient but reasonable pena lties for fraud, with quick and 

efficient processes for enforcing them.n 

Secretary Stanton thereupon ruled that in his opinion the law was 

to apply only to such contracts as had been required to be in writing 

under laws and regulations in force at lhe time of its passage. Any other 

interpretation would make the act impracticable of execution, and a 

general order to that effect was published on '16 June 1862.n A month 

later, Congress itself reconsidered its action and suspended the operation 

of the law until the first Monday of January 1863.u Me igs undoubtedly 

hoped that the law would be amended before that date, but despite his 

efforts to win members to his view, Congress adjourned without recon· 

"OR, Jer. III, vol. I. pp. 378-79 (Meigs to Sen. Henry Wilson, 2 Aug 1861). 

- 12 Slat. 4 11 - 12 . 

• t RG 92, Rpu and Lin rrom QMG to SW and Other Officials, vol. 2, pp. US-56 (Meigs 

10 Stanton , 15 lun 1862) . 

.. (I> RG 92, OQMG Leiters Received. Box 93 (Stanton 10 bUTeau ch ids, 16 lun 1862). 

(2) Cetlera/ Orders 0/ the lVar Department, 1861- 62, I. 298 (CO 69, 16 lun 1862). 

" 12 StM. 596 Gu l 17, 1862). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 347 

sidering the law which auwmatically went into effect in January L863. 

Stamon's general order of 16 June 1862 was once again put into effect 

during the rema inder of the war,H 

For the first 3 years of the war, Quartermaster supplies were procured 

by depot quartermasters or quartermasters in the field. either under 

cOntract or, in an emergency, by open-market purchase. When Congress 

reorganized the Quartermaster's Department in 1864, it provided for a 

morc centra lized control of contracts. T herea fter, th e chiefs of the 

several divisions in the Quartermancr General's offICe contracted for ali 

Quartermaster suppli es. The bulk of the supplies they procured were 

sent to depots, bUl, when it was more economica l or advantageous to 

do so, supplies could be sent direCl to a quartermaster in the field. 1n 

e ither case, supplies were subjected to inspection, and payment [or them 

was made at the direction of the d ivision chief only on the receipt of 

inspectors' certificates. In an emergency, when supplies could not be 

obtained from a depot or through the chief of a division, the chief 

quartermaster of an army or detachment could procure supplies without 

advertisement on th e order of th e commanding officer." 

By 1864, Congress also enacted legislation bringing inspectors of 

Army supplies under control. In the summer of 1862, it had passed a 

law providing th at any contractor found guilty by court martial of fraud 

or willful neglect of duty was to be punished by fme, imprisonment, or 

sllch other punishment as a court martial adjudged. The law further 

provided that anyone furnishing supplies to the Army was to be subject 

to th e r ules and regu la tions governing th e Army. T he provisions of that 

law were ex tended in 1864 to inspectOrs and to the agents of contractors. It 

Finally, a law passed in 1862, penali zi ng Congressmen who accepted 

compensation for services in connection with government contracts, was 

ex tended in 1864 to include department or burea u heads, clerks, or any 

offi cer of governmentY Thus, by th e last year of the war, all who might 

be considered infiuelllial in connection with contracts, contractors and 

their agents, inspectors, and qua rtermasters had been brought under the 

restrictions and pena lties set forth in the laws passed by Congress. Actua l 

enforcement of these laws appears, however, to have been limited. 

Under the legislation governing COlHractual procedures, the Quarter· 

master's Department procured clothing, shoes, b lankets, tents, knapsacks, 

haversacks, camp kettles, and canteens; it obtained ambulances, wagons, 

horses, mul es, harness, and forage; and it purchased stationery, straw, 

.. RG 92, OQMG Letter Book. vol. 65. pp. 518-19 (l'ofeigs to Sen. W. P. Fessenden, 9 Jan 

18(5): vol. 68, p. 201 (Meigs to Crosman , 25 Apr 1862). 

" 13 Sial. 394 (Jul 4, 1864). 

~ Sia l . 596 (J ul 17, 1862); 13 Sial. 9~ (Ju l 4, 18(4). 

" 12 SIIlI. 577-78 (Jul 16, 1862): J3 Sial. 125 (Jun 15. 86~). 
348 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

wood {or (uel, as well as hundreds of items used in construction projects 

and repairs. It chartered and purchased steamboats. tugs, barges, ferry 

boats, and gunboats; and it not only contracted for railroad transportation 

of troops and supplies during the Civil War but it also procured engines, 

cars, and items n,ceded for repairing military railroads. Each commodity 

fie ld posed problems. 

Clothing P,'ocuremenl 

During the Civil War, the Quartermaster's Department furnished 

the clothing needed by the troops either by contracting for the supply 

or manufacturing it in its own facilities. In 1861, clothing for the 

Regular Army was sti ll being manufactured at the Philadelphia clothing 

depot as it had been for morc than ha lf a century. Cloth, purchased 

under contract from manufacturers, was received, cut into garments by 

government cutters, and issued to seamstresses and ta il ors who returned 

hand·finished garments to the Schuylkill Arsenal for inspection and 

acceptance. Though the sewing machine had been invented by Elias 

Howe in the forties and improved later by Isaac Merrit Singer, it was not 

used in the production of clothing during the Civil War. Hand-sewn 

garments were considered to be more durable.6I Remembering how the 

clothing establishment at Philadelphia had been expanded to meet the 

requirements of the Mexican War, Acting Quartermaster General Sibley 

had Reuben M. Potter, a military storekeeper of many years' experience 

and a parolee but recently returned from Texa~, prepare a report describing the superiority of government production over procurement by 

contract and ouLiining a plan for expansion. Sibl ey submitted this report 

to the Secretary of ' '''ar with the recommendation that the proposed 

plan be adopted.1f 

Cameron approved and by July Sibley had established a clothing 

depot at New York. The manufacture of Army clothing under Quartermaster direction was accomplished not only at the Philadelphia depot. 

where operations were expanded until 8,000 to 10,000 sewing women were 

employed, and at New York, but also at other clothing depots set up 

.. (I) RG 92, OQMG Con$Olidated Corrnpondence File, Box 1004 (Capt. Roger Jones to 

Meigs, 28 Jun 1861 ). (2) RG 92, I'hila. Depot, ~tlen to QMG, 1 J u l- I!> Mar 1865, vol. t:, 

pp. 59--61 (QM to Meigs, 50 Ju l 1864). (3) Machine fCwing had b«n tried but its use had been 

abandoned for COlIts, trousel'l, jackets, and shirts. Machines were only u.sed for sewing caps 

and chevrons, articles that were not exposed to mw;:h hard u$age. RG 92. OQMG Leiter Book, 

Clodling. vol. 17, pp. 29-3-1 Oesup 10 Nechard lI< Co., 31 Mar 1859) . 

• (I) RG 92, OQMG Consolidated Correspondence File, Box 1()()4 (Potier to Sibley, I Jun 

1861 and ind., Sibley 10 Cameron , 7 Jun 1861 ). (2) RG 92, Pel'lOnal Narrati\'C Reports of 

Ollkcn, QMD, for Fiscal Year Ending 30 June 1865, vol. N-W. pp. 181-83 (Polter Rpt). 

Hereafter briefl y cited l'el'lOnal Narrative Rpu, F.Y. 1865. 
36TH ILLINOIS I NFANTRY REGIMENT, 1863 
350 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

during the war at Cincinnati and St. Louis. These were the chief 

clothing depots of the war, but the Quartermaster's Department also 

carried on manufacturing in so-called "government halls" at several 

branch depots. In January 1862, it opened a government hall for the 

manufacture of clothing at Quincy, III. , and the following year established another at Steubenville, Ohio. In March 1863, Military Storekeeper G. A. Hull initiated manufacturing operations at the Louisville 

clothing depot. Though their primary function was to assist in producing clothing needed by the western troops, the Department viewed such 

government halls partly as relie£ proj ects intended to give work to needy 

women whose menfolk were in service.u The Department also produced 

clothing at various times during the war at a number of other cities, among 

them Boston, Indianapolis, Detroit, Milwaukee, and Springfield. Ill.e, 

The branch depots did not contract for cloth but obtained their 

supply from the eastern depots. This was also largely tme for the 

manufacturing operations at the government halls in St. Louis. The 

Cincinnati depot procured some of the material. but the Philadelphia 

and New York depots purchased the bulk of the textiles used by the Army 

since most of the country's mi lls were in the East.u 

At the outbreak of the war. the stock of clothing on hand at the 

Philadelphia depot was small, the amount being suffici ent to meet tlie 

needs only of the 16,000 men constituting the peacetime regular Army. 

Cameron's order to prepare fatigue clothing for issue to the 75,000 

militia call ed out for 3 months' service must have been rece ived with 

dismay by the depot commander. He followed this order with a directive 

to procure forage caps, infantry trousers, flannel sack coats and shins, 

bootees, stockings, great coats, blankets, and such other articles as might 

be necessary to supply the wants of the troops of the different states.

n 

Specific orders to issue clothing to the militia under the command of 

Maj. Gen. R. Patterson went out on 20 April 1861.u 

Supplies that could be spared at the depot were limited in amount, 

• (I) RC 92. OQMG Letter Book. Clothing, vol. 19. p. 16 (Meigs to E. P. Blair. 6 J an 

1862): vol. 20, p. 461 (Meigs to QM Allen. 3 Dec 1862); vol. 21. pp. 276-77 (Capt. N. Flagg to 

Meigs, 2 Mar 1862). (2) RG 92, Crosman. Letters Sent. I Sep-18 Nov 1863. p. 1\4 (Crosman 

to Capt. A. Conn. 18 Sep 1863). (S) RG 92. Personal Narrative Rpts. F.Y. 1863. II, pp. 260-61 

(AQM Flagg Rpt): ibid., F.Y. 1864. III. p. 342 (Hull's Rpt) . 

.. Amrual Reports of the Quartermaster Ge>l eral, 1861- 1865. p. 17 (QMC's Rpt. 1862); 

p. 59 (Perry's Rpt. 19 Oct 1865. appended to QMG's Rpt . 1865). 

" See ibid., p. 92 (QMC's Rpt. 1865) Table. 12 for a statement of the quantity of material 

purchased by these depots during the war. 

-(I) RG 92. OQMG Letter Book. Clothing. vol. 17. p. 440 (Johnston to Thomas, 20 and 

21 Apr 1861). (2) RG 107. OSW, Military Book. vol. 43. p. 263 (Cameron to QMC. 211 Apr 

1861) . 

.. RC 92, OQMC Lener Book, Clothing. vol. 17, p. 440 Uohnston to Thomas, 20 Apr 

1861). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR ~5 1 

To manufacture clothing within the lime for wh ich the militia were 

mustered into service was difficult. Sibl ey therefore recommended that 

the militia provide their own clothing. the cost of which was not to 

exceed that of Army clothi ng and was to be paid for when Congress 

appropriated funds for that purpose. By mid-May 186 1, with the Secretary's approval, he sent orders to that effect to Colonel T homas at 

Philadelphia." The action, however, gave no respite to operations at 

Philadelphia for even before it was taken the size of the Regu lar Army 

had been increased and 3 year-vol un teers were being enlisted under the 

proclamation of.3 May 186 1. Clothing for both would have to be made 

ready as quickly as possible. 

Unfortunately. not only was it impossible to manufacture clothing 

at the depot within the time it was needed but also the mills of the 

country were not producing materia ls fast enough to clothe the troops. 

Only a small number of these were set up to produce the coarse and heavy 

woolens required by the Army. and it was going to take time to conve'rt 

their machinery for such production. T here was a scarcity of Army 

textiles of all types-for clothing. blankets. and tentage. When the 

Governor of Ohio ill-advisedly call ed for 22.000 overcoats in the midst 

of summer heat. Me igs informed him that "to cover nakedness and 

preserve health is as much as is now possible." " Troops would be 

comfortable. he assured him, with fatigue uniforms and blankets. 

Since troops were being received through state authorities, the 

Secretary oE War called u pon the governors to aid the Department in 

clothing them. But still thousands waited for clothing in order to take 

the field in the summer of 186 1. Regiments were ordered to Washington 

without clothing. and men went on guard duty. Me igs reported, in 

drawers for lack of pantaloons. Even regiments dispatched with clothing 

were soon ragged. owing to the bad quality of state supplies. Clothing 

wore out in 2 months of service.11 

Obviously, the Department could not depend solely upon production 

in its own facilities. In any case, Meigs, having observed conditions 

after he became Quartermaster Genera l and reviewed the situation, was 

not in favor of further expanding the government manufacturing establishment at Philadelphia. It ought to be kept up. he conceded, and 

worked to full capacity, serving as a source of suppl y and a model, bUl 

- (I) RG 92, Rpts of QMG 10 SW ilnd n eild. of Depts .. \'01. 5, pp. 418-19 (Sibley 10 

Cameron. !I Mily 1861). (2) RG 92. OQMG l..cner Book, Clothing, vol. 17, p. 467 (Sibley to 

ThomaJi, 15 Mily 18(1). (!I) OR, ser. III, vol. I, p. 2J!1 (GO 22. 18 May 186 1). 

- RG 92, OQMG Lcner 8ook, CIOIh ing, vol. 18. p. 192 (Meigs 10 AQM Dickerson, 26 J ul 

18(1). 

- I bid., vol. 18, pp. 80-81 (!\.{dgs 10 T homas, 2Q Jun 1861 ); pp. 160, 185-86 (Meigs to 

Vinlon, 15 and 21 Jul 1861). 
352 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

to meet the demands created by the large force being call ed into service 

he thought it best to resort to the contract system. It would bring into 

use and give employment to many large, well-organized establishmc'nts 

whose business had been cut off by war and whose workers were 

sufEering,n 

It was his idea to furnish material procured and inspected by the 

Philadelphia depot to the large clothing houses which would then make 

it up into garments.n In effect, he was return ing to a system that had 

been abandoned in 1812 by Callender Irvine as unsatisfactory. Contracts, however, were not restricted only to those in which the government 

furnished the material. They were also made with those manufacturers 

who were able to command their own supply of textiles. Within a short 

time, quartermasters and military storekeepers supervising manufacturing 

at clothing depots were repeating arguments used 50 years earlier to 

stress the advan tage of government operation over contract supply. The 

garments they produced were superior to those sent by contractors; they 

were ample in cut and provided a better distribution of sizes; and their 

operations saved the government large sums of money. Too often 

contractors increased their profits by skimping on the material used in 

garments with the result that sizes ran small and additional garments in 

larger sizes had to be procured to provide a proper distribution of clothing. All contractors considered as a perquisite any government-furnished 

material left over after garments had been cut out. Sale of such 

"clippings" from thousands of garments added to the profit on their 

contract.TO 

As an engineer in charge of construction projects, Meigs had gained 

considerable experience with contracts, knowledge that as Quartermaster 

General he applied to contracting for Army clothing. He insisted that 

in no case were existing contracts to be simply extended but, instead, 

new bids were to be invited for each additional supply of articles required 

by the Army. Moreover, contracts were to be let only for certain 

specified quantities. Meigs disapproved of the practice of advertising 

for a certain quantity of articles with the privilege of doubling that 

quantity later. He contended that it raised suspicions that the contractor 

was managing to increase his delivery of profitable articlesY Meigs 

also determined to exercise a greater degree of control over clothing 

contracts than had been custOmary in the past. To enable the Quarter-

-Ibid., vol. 18, p. 140 (Meigs to Thomas, 9 Jul 18(1). 

-Ibid., vol. 18. pp. 8G-81 (Meigs 10 Thomas. 2G Jun 18(1) . 

.. (1) RC 92. Penonal Narnllive Rpu. F.Y. 1863. III. 69-74 (Rpt of Capt. R. S. Hart): 

~42-4" (Rpl, MSK C. A. Hull). (2) RC 92. Crosman. Lellen to QMG, I Jul 1864-15 Mar 1865, 

vol. E. pp: 59-ii1 (30 Jul 1864). 

nRC 92. OQMC Letter Book. Clolhing. vol. 18. pp. 12 -2~ (Meigs to Vinton. 5 J ul 1861). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 353 

master General "to speak by the book from actual knowledge" and to 

afford greater protection to the Department and its officers, Meigs 

relieved the assistant quartermaster general at Philadelphia of part of 

his heavy burden of responsibility by directing that, before contracts for 

large amounts were concluded, all bids with their analysis and comparison 

and the contract proposed were to be sent to the Washington office for 

examination and final action,U 

One of the fim instances of the applica tion of this policy brought 

disagreement between Meigs and Colonel Thomas, then in charge at 

Philadelphia. Early in July 1861, John E. Hanford of the firm of 

Hanford .and Browning of New York offered to supply 50,000 uniforms. 

T he Quartermaster General, convinced that small orders and a wider 

distribution of them among clothing houses were more advantageous to 

the government, was unwilling to give him an order for more than 10,000 

suits and then only at government prices published in 1859. ]n view of 

rising prices in the market of 1861, this last stipulation was unrealistic. 

Hanford was referred to Colonel Thomas at Philadelphia who was 

authorized to contract in whatever mode he considered most expedient 

and cheapest. Colonel Thomas had unfilled orders at the depot for 

thousands of garments. Having satisfied himself that the company had 

the backing of manufacturers who could supply the material Hanford 

and Browning would need and that the prices to be paid, though somewhat higher than those of 1859, would not be more than it would cost 

the depot itself to produce the garments, Colonel Thomas concluded a 

contract. 

When Meigs found that the contract included more than 10,000 

uniforms and, in fact, called for $1,200,000 worth of clothing at prices 

higher than he had stipula ted, he disapproved the contract. He thought 

that Hanford and Browning had taken unfair advantage of Colonel 

Thomas and that, by forestalling the manufacture of the cloth for which 

he had directed Major Vinton at New York to issue advertisements, their 

contract embarrassed the Department. Colonel Thomas was much annoyed at this turn of events. Clothing was badly needed; Hanford and 

Browning was a reputable firm, able and willing to perform its contract; 

the price was lower than any he had received from other responsib le or 

irresponsible persons; and he considered that he had been given full 

authority to act. Meigs reconsidered and, concluding that it was "better 

to be the victim of the trick than to delay the supplies," authorized 

Colonel Thomas to receive and issue the clothing from Hanford and 

Browning. T8 

ft /bid .. p. 65 (Meigs 10 Thomas. 14 Jun 1861); p. 123 (Meigs to Vinton. 5 Jul 1861 ). 

10(1) Ibid., pp. 121-23; 179- 80 (!'.1eigs to Vinton. 5 and 20 Jul 1861 ); pp. 178. 180-81, 185 
354 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Meigs soon learned that more large contracts would have to be made 

to prevent suffering by the troops in the coming winter. He learned, 

too, tha t distribution to numerous small houses entailed delays and 

complications and that turning over val uabl e material to irresponsible 

persons or houses of second-rate reputation involved great danger of 

fraud. He therefore directed that bids that appeared to be at rates 

involvi ng "\oss to the contractors, oppression to the working hands or 

stea ling and cribbaging of materials" should be rejected. He advised 

Maj. David H . Vinton, who had been placed in charge of the New York 

clothing depot, that it would be we ll to employ two or three of the 

"most respectabl e hOllses in the trade" in New York to do the work at 

what experience at the Philadelphia cloth ing depot demonstrated to be 

firm rates"· 

T he Department pa id in time (or its unpreparedness. It took time 

for manufacturers to change their production li nes and it took time to 

expand government fa cilities. Meanwhile, Meigs received daily appeals 

from regiments complaining that they were naked. Several Ind iana 

regiments operating near Cheat Mountain pass in Virginia in the summer 

of 186 1, when the temperature suddenly plummeted, sent word that they 

were suffering from lack of overcoats. Contract for the coats, Meigs 

ordered, and "save time if it costs money." a Rather than detain regiments in camp for want of clothing, he ordered the purchase of ready-made 

garments. "Slop shop clothing I did not wish to buy," Meigs confided, 

but so urgent was the need that he also directed Colonel Thomas and 

Major Vi nton to buy any durable substantial cloth of any modest co10rgreen, blue, or grey-and have it made into uniforms. Clothe and 

suppl y the regiments, he directed. so as to "secure the Dept. from just 

charge of inefficiency or of want of care (or the comfort of the men." fe 

T he clothing made of such materials was often inferior to the Army 

standard goods and d id not wear well . Under the supply pressures that 

existed in 186 1, Q uartermaster officers were, in some cases, imposed upon 

by unscrupulous contractors who sold them worth less goods, and by 

unfaithful inspectors who passed such goods. Even more serious was 

the confusion promoted in the fie ld by the use of varied colors, and 

where both Union and Confederate troops wore grey. it resulted in some 

(Meigs to Thomas. 19, 20 and 22 Jul 1861). (2) RG 92, Thomas, ullea Sent, 17 Jul-2!1 Aug 

1861, pp. 2-4, 5-6, 27- !l0 (rhom:u to Meigs, 19 and 21 Jul 1861). (3) "'Government Contracts," 

House Upt. No.2, !17th Cong .• 2d SCSS ., pp. 466-68, 5.n. 11 42 . 

.. RG 92. OQMG Lcucr Book, Clothing, vol. 18, p. 407 (Meigs to Vinton, 9 Sep 18(il). 

"Ibid., p. 290 (Mcigs to Vinton, 19 Aug 1861). 

" I bid., pp. 160, 179-80, 185-86 (Meigs to Vinton, 15.20 and 21 Jul 1861); p. 18!! (Meigs to 

T homas. 22 Jul 1861). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 355 

instances of Union soldiers fi ring upon each other. Orders were thereupon issued forbidding the lise of any COIOf but the established uniform 

colors of light and dark blue. As fast as standard clothing CQuld be 

obtained in 1862, irregular clothing was withdrawn from service. T he 

Department was much criticized for its lise of irregular materials but 

Meigs was of the opinion that anyone "who saw sentinels walking post 

about the capital of the United States in freezing weather in their 

drawers, without trousers or overcoats," would not blame the Quartermaster's Department for its effort to clothe th em, even in materials that 

were not as durable as Army blue kcrsey,n 

With wi nter approaching and' production still lagging behind demand, the Quartermaster's Department turned to the foreign market. 

George P. Smith , a retired merchant of P ittsburgh, was sent to England 

to buy 1,200,000 yards of light and dark blue kersey, or th e best substitute 

to be found. Except for payment of his expenses, Smith served without 

compensation. Colonel Thomas wen t with him as disbursing agent.a 

Newspa per accounts of the amount of money to be spent varied from 

$25 million to $60 million. Actually, th e Department proposed spending 

only $800,000. The reports, however, were enough to ca use the Boston 

Board of Trade to register a vigorous objection to foreign importations 

that would glut th e American market, support the laborers of Europe 

rath er than American workmen, and take specie out of th e country 

instead of the governmen t paying what it owed to American merchan ts. 18 

T he Board was certain that by I December 1861, the woolen machinery 

of the country wo uld be producing at a rate uffi ci~nt to provide clothing 

for 400,000 men and to repeat this order every 6 weeks thereafter. 

Meigs, dubious of the ability of the woolen industry to produce the 

q uantity needed in time, opposed any move to revoke orders for foreign 

goods. If domestic manufacturers could suppl y the demand before the 

cloth coul d be imported, he reponed that he would gladly purchase the ir 

fabric.

81l It was Meigs' intention not only to get a much needed supply 

of cloth h om Europe promptly, but by turning to the fore ign market 

bring domestic manufacturers and middlemen, "both of whom seemed 

to have gone crazy," to an understanding that the government would not 

submit to extortion and compel th em to offer reasonable propositions. 

Apparently his move was effective fo r by December domestic prices were 

at least no higher than th ose in th e foreign market and supply, he 

.. R eports o/Ihe Q!i<1rlermflSl er General, 1861-1865, p. 17 (QMG's Rpt, 1862). 

" RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, Clothing, vol. 18, pp. 5~2-33 (Meigs to Thomas, 14 Oct 

1861); p . 534 (Mcigs to Vinton, 14 Oct 1861 ) . 

.. OR, ser. 111 , vol. I. pp. 583--86 (Special Committee, Boslon Board of Trade, 10 Cameron, 

18 Oct 1861). 

" 'bid., ser. 111, vol. I, pp. 582--85 (Meigs 10 Cameron, 22 OCI 1861). 
356 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T H E ARMY 

reponed, "promises to be sufficient here." I I He thereupon call ed a 

halt to an y morc foreign purchase because, with prices at the sa ~ level 

at home and abroad, the government preferred purchasing at home. Less 

than $380,000 had been expended for fore ign textil es.&! 

By the end of 186 1, the problem was not so much onc of inadequate 

supply as of building up a reserve and mai ntai ning a supply on hand at 

clothing depots_ By that time, the appropriation for clothing had long 

since been exhausted and the Quartermaster Genera l was more immediately concerned with avoiding the accumulation of surpluses." Initial 

demands had been met and the troops had been fe-outfitted after the 

losses sustained at the battle of Bull Run, where clothing and equipment 

had been thrown away in an effort to speed retreat. Meigs therefore 

directed that no more contracts be made until the stock on hand had 

been reduced.a• In the summer 0. 1862, the stock of cloth ing on hand 

amounted to a 6 months' supply for the Army. About 3,200,000 yards 

of cloth were also in storage at the Schuylkill Arsenal.'" 

Co-ordinating suppl y and demand was not easy. Because of the 

improvidence of inexperienced troops. the destruction. loss. and waste 

of overcoats and other articles of clothing were so large that the Department found it difficult to keep up the supply. The rate of consumption 

for fiscal year 1862, Meigs reported, ran far beyond all allowances fixed 

by regulations from the ex perience of the Regu lar Army in time of 

peace.88 T hen, in J ul y 1862, the Presidelll called for 300.000 volunteers, 

followed in a month by a call for 300,000 militia. The effect was to wipe 

out the surplus stocks, leaving nothing for the supply of the Army already 

in the field. Meigs clothed the volunteers from the stocks of clothing on 

hand and used the materia l at the Arsenal to make clothing for the 

militia. By agreement with the sta tes, Meigs sent material and trimmings 

for coats and pantaloons either to the U.S. quartermaster stationed within 

the states or, if such quartermasters were not available. to the governors 

of the states. T hey then made contracts for the manufacture of the 

clothes. By distributing the work in the states. Meigs hoped that it 

might be done quickly and give satisfaction to the states and their 

soldiers.

8T 

0' RG 92, OQMG Leiter Book, CIOIhing, vol. 18. p. 680 (Meigs 10 George P. Smith, 2 Dec 

186 1) . 

.. OQMG leiter Book. vol. 59. p. 176 (Thomas 10 Meigs, 14 Feb 1862). Thoma.s reported 

thai he had spent [J5,96IJ . 

• Ibid., vol. 57. p. 470 (Meigs to Col. Geo. H. Cmsman, 24 Dec. 1861) . 

.. RG 92. OQMG Leiter Book, Clolh ing, vol. 19, pp. 158-59 (Meigs 10 Crmman. 5 Feb 1862) . 

• OR, ser. III, vol. II, 371 (Meigs 10 Stanton, I! Aug 1862) . 

• Annual Reports 0/ Ille Quarlermasltr Gelleral, 1861- 186J, p. 17 (R.pl, 1862). 

"'"(I) OR, scr· II . vol. II , 372 (Meigs 10 Siamon, 15 Aug 1862). (2) RG 92. OQMC Leue.r 

Book, Cloth ing, vol. 19, pp. 693--9-4 (Meigs 10 Vinton, 12 Aug 1862); pp. 709-10 (Meigs to 

Cmsman, 13 Aug 1862). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 357 

To replace the stocks being used, Meigs ordered publication of 

advertisements inviting proposals at Philadelphia, New York, and Cincinnati. To avoid inflating prices by inviting bids for the whole amount 

at once, the advertisments announced that after 10 days the bids received 

to that time would be opened and contracts awarded, and that from time 

to time. as the service required, additional contracts would be given to 

the lowest bidder. In other words. the advertisements were published 

as standing invitations to manufacturers and were not withdrawn until 

January 1863.88 

Meigs directed Colonel Crosman, who had succeeded Colonel 

T homas at Philadelphia, to accumu late a surplus stock at his depot suffi· 

cient for the instant eq uipment of 100,000 men. He sent similar instructions to Major Vinton, depot quartermaster at New York. By 1863, 

with reserve stocks accumulated, the supply of clothing was well in hand 

and by the close of fiscal year 1864, Meigs could report that the supply 

was ample, the qua lity exce llent, and the complaints few.8Q 

Procurement of Blankets 

The Department fo und it even more d ifficult to procure blankets 

for the troops than clothing. Under Army regulations, two blankets 

were issued to each sold ier in a 5-year period, one in the first year and 

another in the third year." An Army blanket was a grey, all-wool 

blanket that we ighed 10 pounds a pair. Before the war, the quartermaster at Philadelphia procured blankets on contract for the Regular 

Army, but he had no large quantity in stock in April 186 1. 

Both state authorities and U.S. quartermasters were soon competing 

in the market for the supply needed to equip the troops. They promptly 

bought all available stocks of Army blankets and by August there were 

none to be had in the markets of New York or Philadelphia.Q' In the 

meantime, the mills had been set to work on orders from the Department. 

T o meet immediate needs, however, Quartermasters purchased any 

blanket, of any color and of any weight of material, as long as it was 

made of wool and not of jute, cotton, or grass. To supplement domestic 

production, the Department sent agents to procure blankets in Canada 

and they purchased 200,000 of them in England to be delivered before 

the end of the year. 9 :1 

• RG 92, OQMG Letter Book. Clothing, vol. ]9. pp. 698-700 (Meijp to Crosman, I3 Aug 

]862): vol. 21. p. 102 (Meijp 10 Crosman. 13 Jan 1863). 

· AlInual R eports of th~ Quarturtlltflu lI tral. 1861-1865, p. 12 (QMG', Rpl, 1864). 

00 Reviud R~gulalio"s for th e Arm)' of lh~ U'lit~d Stales, 1861, p. 170 . 

.. RG 92. OQMG Leller Book, Clothing. vol. 18. pp. 299. 333 (Meigs 10 C. C. Trowbridge. 

20. 28 Aug 1861 ). 

" I bid., vol. 18. p. 270 (Meigs to Johnston Townsend & Co., 14 Aug 1861); p. 399 (Meigs to 

Crosman and Vinton, 7 Sep 1861). 
358 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Despite inspection, the Dcpanmclll procured blankets of poor quality. Even those Meigs obtained from England were not up to the 

standard he had been led to expect. Old stock ing yarn was used in the 

manufacture of the blankets. he learned later, and rival dealers pronounced the material oddy.~a They undoubtedly were familiar with 

shoddy, {or the extent to which such fabric was palmed off on the government (or the use of soldiers was inexcusable," A journalist of the day 

vividly described shoddy as "a villainous compound, the refuse stuff and 

sweepings of the shop, pounded, rolled, glued. and smoothed to the 

externa l form and gloss of cloth, but no more like the genuine article 

than the shadow is to the substance," Sold iers, on the first day's march, 

or in the earliest storm, he reponed, found their clothes, overcoats, and 

blankets, "scattering to the winds in rags, or dissolving into their primitive elements of dust under the pelting ra in. " DS 

In the existi ng state of shortages during the first year of th e war, 

inferior blankets had nevertheless to be issued despite the objections oF. 

the troops to rece iving them and actions by boards of survey in condemning them. Captain Turnley, assistant quartermaster at S1. Louis 

who served on a board of survey, agreed that several bales of b lankets 

received for issue to th e troops were thin, light, and inferior in quality 

to the usual Army blankets, but he disagreed with other officers that they 

were therefore unfit for use. They were, he thought, as good an article 

as could be got at the price, and, depending on the weight of the blankets 

the soldier received, he recommended issue of them at the rate of two 

or three to a man_V6 Captain T urnley was rea list enough to know that 

if such blankets were not issued, the soldier was likely to end up with 

none at aiL In time, the supply situation did improve, but until the 

end of the war domestic production of blankets remained deficient and 

supplemental purchases had to be made in th e foreign market.$l 

It is interesting to observe that efforts were made early in th e war 

" Shoddy was a trade term applied to fabrics made hom remanufactured materials. Ihat 

is from materials which had already been spun into yarn and woven into dOlh and thcn 

wcre laler ground np inlO a fibrous mass. respun. and rcwoven_ T he clippings saved by 

clothing houses were used to produce shoddy . 

.. It was not uncommon for material rejected at onc depot to be offered at another. 

For examplc, an inspector at the l'hiladclphia depot rcjected a large amollnt of sky-blue 

kCT$ey offered by a contractor. The lattcr thercupon disposcd of it in thc New York market . 

Colonel Crosman, hearing this, alerted the {luartermastcrs at the New York and Cincinnati 

dcpots 10 be carefu l and not accept the inferior keT$ey, if offered to them . RG 92, Crosman. 

Lctters Sem, 19 Mar-8 Jun 18611, p. 150 (9 Apr 18611) . 

.. Robert Tomes, ""The Fortunes of War,'· HQrpu's New MOllthly MQgQzi'll~, XXIX Gu nc, 

1864), pp. 227- 28 . 

.. "Government Contracts,"" House R/JI. No.2, 37th Cong., 2d sess., pp. l2()"'21. $. 11 . 1142 . 

... RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, Clothing, vol. 23, p. 5113 (Perry to Meigs, 30 Mar 1864); 

vol. 24, p. 64 (Capt. Robinson to Vinton. 16 May 1864). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 359 

by interested producers to introduce the use or waterproof blankets in 

the Army. In May 1861, the Quartermaster's Department had indicated 

that it had no intention of adding that item to supply, but some of the 

states equipped their troops with Ind ia rubber blankets, other troops 

soon requisitioned them, and, by September, Meigs requested a policy 

decision from the Secretary of War.Q8 Cameron directed the Quartermaster General to procure and issue waterproof blankets for use in camp, 

chargi ng the soldiers with them as they were for articles of clothing. 

Meigs thereupon directed Colonel Crosman to procure blankets of several 

kinds of waterproof fabl' ic. At his orders, all were to be made with a 

straight slit and flap so that they might be used as ponchos, and also with 

grommet holes at 14-inch intervals around the edge so that by lacing 

the blankets together they might also be used as shelters in place of tents 

in bivouac.

gg India rubber and gutta pereha blankets were both used 

during the war, but ~e ports from the field were so conflicting on their 

performance that the Department had decided on no single standard for 

waterproof blankets by the time the war ended.'oo 

Tentage 

No textile was in shorter supply during the Civil War than duck. 

needed for the production of tents. The suppl y of tents on hand at 

the depot in Philadelphia in April 186 1 was soon exhausted. For years 

the Army had utilized the common A or wedge tent, the wall tent, and 

for winter use, the Sibley tent. These were the only large tents that 

had stood the test of actual service. T here was not enough material 

in the country, however, to provide such tents for all the troops being 

sent into the field although at the start of the war some troops were 

liberally supplied with tents.'O' Except for hospital purposes, the use 

of large tents was not practical in campaigns. To shelter the troops on 

active service, the Quartermaster's Department initiated procurement of 

tents made on the pattern of the d'Abri tent used by the French army. 

- (I) RG 92. OQM G Letter nook, vol. 55, p. 353 (Sibley to M. J. Gibson. 4 May 1861). 

(2) RG 92. Letters and Rpts of QMG to SW and Heads of Depts. vol. 5, p. 472 (Meigs to 

Cameron, 25 Sep 1861). (3) OR. st'r. III. vol. I, p. 615 (Cameron to QMG. I Nov 1861) . 

.. RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, Clothing, vol. 18. p. 677 (Meigs to Gov. E. D. Morgan. 

4 Dec 1861). 

"., Ibid., vol. 25. pp. 304-05 (Meigs to Col. H. S. Olcott, 9 Feb 1865). 

' .. Trobriand wrote of one regiment of 1,000 men that had 32 wall tents for its officers, 

250 wedge tents for its non·commissioned officers and p rivatcs, and 2 hospital tents. At the 

rate at which wedge lents we re issued---onc to every four men-Ihat regiment had m6(e than 

two and a half times Ihe tentage it needed. Four Years with the Army of the Potomac, 

p.79. 
360 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

T he use of the shelter-half, so familiar to every American soldier since 

1861, was thus introd uced in the American Army.' O~ 

Shoe Pmcurement 

No item issued to the soldier was morc essential to his well-being 

than durable, comfortable shoes, and nonc gave rise to more criticism 

from the troops, especially during the first year of the war. From the 

Western Department, Major General Halleck reported that shoes and 

boots wore out in 3 to 4 days' march. Major General McClellan telegraphed from the Army of the Potomac that a march by Smith's and 

Porter's divisions had worn out the men's new shoes, the soles of which 

had been filled with chips.10a Obviously. fraud in the production and 

inspection of shoes was as prevalent as in the manufacture and inspection 

of cloth. A so-called leather composition, that looked and smelled like 

leather but fell to pieces like paper when it became wet, was used as an 

inner sole, filling up the shoe between the welt and the outside sole.lo• 

Since the Mexican War. a bootee establishment had been in operation at the Schuylkill Arsenal producing bootees and boots for the 

Regular Army. In operating this establishment, the Quartermaster's 

Department purchased the leather, employed cutters in the Arsenal to 

cut out the shoes and boots, and then gave out the material to employees 

who lived and worked in the area outside the Arsenal. In June 1861, 

some 700 hands were employed in shoe production by the Arsenal. It 

was estimated that shoe production could be doubled by increasing the 

number of employees. About a year later, 15,000 pairs of bootees and 

boots pcr mOOlh were being manufactured at the Arsena .' o~ Many 

thousand more pairs of shoes were needed and, as in the case of clothing, 

the Department turned to contracting for its supply of shoes and boots. 

There was this difference; the Department did not furnish any material 

for production. All leather and findings were provided by the shoe 

contractor. 

Army regu lations call ed for all bootees and boots to be hand-sewn 

and made of oak-tanned leather. Demand at once raised the price of 

"" (I) RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, Clothing, voi. 19. p. 258 (Meigs to Cr05man, 26 Feb 

1862). (2) The small size of the shelter·haif caused the soldiers to refer to them as dog-sized 

tenls. It was nOt unusual for a soidier to stick his head ou t the tent opening and bark like 

a dog- hence the origin of the term "pup tent." 

,. (i) RG 92, OQMG Leiter Book, Clothing, vol. 19, p. 354 (Meigs to Crosman, 3 Apr 

1862). (2) RG 92, Rpts and Ltn. QMG to SW & Other Officials, 1862, I, 94-98 (Meigs to 

Stanton, 2 Feb 1862). 

tOO "Government Contracts," HOllse Rpl. No.2, 51th Cong., 2d 5("5S., pp. 280, 282, S.n. 1143 . 

... (1) RG 92, OQMG Consolidated Correspondence File, Box 1O(}4 (Capt. Roger Jones 

to Meigs, 28 Jun 1861). (2) RG 92, Crosman, Letters to QMG, 5 Apr 1862- 12 Feb 1865, 

vol. D, p. 148 (Crosman to Meigs, 24 Jun 1862). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 361 

such leather in the market and in fa ct soon exhausted lhe supply. Con· 

tractors then substituted a less expensive hemlock-tanned leather at the 

price of oak-tanned, but. since even the most experienced tanners found 

difficulty in d istinguishing between the two, most government inspectors 

passed it without a question. There was no appreciable difference in 

quality but, by its own specification, the Department was imposed upon 

and defrauded. 

The Department also increased its expenditures by insisting upon 

hand-sewn boots and boolees which COSt more than pegged shoes. Yet in 

the trade. sewed shoes had al most entirely disappeared from the market 

having been completely supplanted by pegged work. Shoemakers actually had to learn how to make sewed shoes when the government 

demand for them increased. The committee investigating government 

contracts be lieved thal not one in ten of the soldiers ever had worn, in 

every day use, sewed shoes until aftcr enlistment. los 

The Department insisted upon purchasing hand-sewn shoes because 

the poor quality of the pegged shoes initially procured by quartermasters 

had served to confirm its conviction that all pegged work was unserviceable. Meigs had therefore directed that no pegged shoes were to be 

bought.IOT That order was later changed and both pegged and handsewn 

shoes were procured during the war. In addition, machine-sewn shoes 

were also introduced. Early in the war, Gordon McKay had improved 

and patented a machine for sewing the sales of shoes to the uppers. The 

first inspection report of such shoes was u nfavorablc, but sample shoes 

tested in the field were so well received that procurement of shoes sewn by 

machine was soon ordered.'Ga Not only McKay but also other shoe manufacturers filled government orders, for McKay manufactured additional 

machines that he leased on a royalty basis to other shoe manufacturers. 

The use of machines entailed the outlay of considerable capital but 

even in those cases where shoes were made by hand, large amounts of 

money had to be invested in leather. Few small cobblers-and they constituted the largest proportion of shoe producers-were in a position to 

layout capital to that extent. In consequence, most shoe contracts were 

acquired by middlemen who handled the business with ample profit to 

themselves. 

Rail Transpm·tation of Men and Supplies 

The profiteering of middlemen and contractors who supplied clothing and equipment was matched by that of shipbrokers and transportation 

-"Government Contracts." House Rpl. No.2. 57th Cong .• 2d SCII., pp. xlii-xlv. I.n. 1145 . 

... RG 92. OQMG Letter Book. Clothing. vol. 18. p. 575 (Meigs to Crosrnan. 5 Sep 1861 ). 

'·Ibid., vol. 18. pp. 697. 757 (Meigs to Vinton . 12 and 28 Dec 18(1). 
362 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

agents. Since 1775, transportation of men and supplies had been a basic 

function of the Quartermaster's Department. but, in the crisis of April 

1861, that responsibility was placed largely in the hands of Pennsylvanians 

whom Cameron appointed as War Department agents. T he immediate 

transportation problem was to open communication between Washington 

and the East. There was no question of the ability of the men that 

Cameron called upon to co-ordinate and direct rail transportation of 

troops and supplies to Washington. lOU J. Edgar Thomson and T homas A. 

Scott. president and vice-president, respectively, of the Pennsylvania Rail· 

road, and Samuel M. Felton, president of the Philadelphia, Wilmington & 

Baltimore Railroad, were among the ablest railroad men in the country. 

T hey were effective operators. Within 4 days after communications 

h~d been cut in Baltimore on 19 April, T homson and Felton opened an 

alternative rail and water route to Washington over which troops and 

supplies from the New York and New England area moved for the next 

3 weeks until passage via the Baltimore &: Ohio Railroad could be 

restored. The route used the Philadelphia, Wilmington &: Baltimore 

Railroad, open to Perryvill e at the mouth of the Susquehanna River. 

There, an old ferry boat and all available steamers at Philadelphia were 

pressed into service to transpon men and supplies down the Chesapeake 

Bay to Annapolis where railroad' connections to Washington were reo 

sumed via the Elk Ridge Ra ilroad and the Washington branch of the 

Baltimore &: Ohio Railroad. un Scott, who on 27 April 186 1 was appointed by Cameron to take charge of the railways and telegraph lines 

between Washington and Annapolis, had tickets printed for a through 

trip on this rail and water route, establish ing the rate for passengers at 

$6 each.llt He directed traffic. repaired damaged tracks and bridges, and. 

by 14 May. had the line of communication reopened via Baltimore. U2 

Though troops moved over the altern ative route promptly, the 

handling of supplies was not accomplished without some confusion. 

Acting Quartermaster Genera l Sibley dispa tched Capt. Asher R. Eddy to 

Perryville as disbursing quartermaster to rece ipt for and forward supplies. 

The latter soon reported that although large quantities of goods were 

arriving and being forwarded via steamers, he received no invoices. 

T he entire business, he informed the Department, seemed to be in the 

hands of the railroad and steamboat companies whose representatives 

IJlf OR, ser. I, vol. LT . 1'1. I, p. 327 (Cameron to T homson, 17 Apr 18(1); p. 330 (Cameron 

10 Scott. 21 Apr 18(1); ser. III, vol. I, p. 228 (Cameron to ScOIl, 23 May 18(1). 

'10 "Government ContraCts:' House Rpl. No.2, 37th Cong., 2d leSS., pp. 689-93. s.n. 1143. 

'" He lixed the fare between Washington alid Annapolis at $1.75, and suggested a .charge 

of $2.25 for steamer passage and $2 for the rail fare belweell Perryville and Philadelphia. 

RG 92. OQMG ConSOlidated Correspondence File, BoK 869 (Scott to Felton , 27 Apr 186 1). 

1.11 For a discussion of military railroads see pp. 394--404. 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 363 

insiSlcd that the contract governing such shipments had been made by 

the Secretary of War. But when Sibley took the matter up with 

Cameron, the latter professed no knowledge of such a contract and could 

only assume that sh ipments were bei ng directed by the New York Defense 

Committee. The lack of system in forwarding supplies to Washington 

was so apparent that Sibley directed Captain Eddy to make certain that 

all stores arriving at Perryville were turned over to him and forwa rded 

under regular bills of lading. He was to employ additional clerks, if 

needed, and he was to make certa in that all agents and contractors employed in this transportation were governed by his orders.m It is 

doubtful that these objectives were achieved before shipment by way of 

the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad became feasible. 

The promptness with wh ich communication between Washington 

and the East was restored was admirabl e. What disturbed the critics of 

Cameron was that two of the men whom he had appointed were high 

ran king officials of the Pennsylvania Railroad -and that one of them, Scott, 

still retained his post with that company, though he drew no pay, after 

he was appointed assistant secretary of war in August and at a lime when 

he was contracting with that railroad for the transportation of troops 

and supplies. In addition, Cameron appeared to his critics to be more 

concerned with helping the Pennsylvania Railroad outstrip its competitor, 

the Baltimore &: Ohio Railroad, than he was with speeding the war effort. 

The congressional committee investigating government contracts charged 

that Scott and Cameron increased the revenues of the Pennsylvania and 

Cameron's own road, the Northern Central Railroad, at the expense of 

the Baltimore &: Ohio and of the government.'" 

It was the controversy over rates, however, that evoked most criticism. 

T he rate problem first came to light in St. Louis. Ever since railroads 

had been used to transport Army supplies, it had been the practice of the 

Quartermaster's Department to solicit bids from the carriers and award 

con tracts for definite shipments on the recommendation of the quartermaster concerned with the movement. The congressional committee 

investigating government contracts discovered that the practice of seeking 

competitive bids had been abandoned at St. Louis. There, Edward H . 

Castle had been placed in charge of railroad transportation in the Western 

Department by General Fremont and had put into effect a schedule of 

rates applicable to all roads. His testimony revea led that this schedule 

had originated with Thomas A. Scott. A copy had been sent from WashII. (I) RG 92, OQMG Leuers Received, Box 75 (Eddy to QMG, I May 1861). (2) RG 92, 

OQMG Lcuer Book, vol. 55, pp. 355- 56 (Sibley to Eddy, 4 May 1861). 

"'''Government Contracts:' House Rpl. No.2, 371h Cong .. 2d Ses5., pp. xv, xix·xx, S.n. 

1143. 
364 QUARTER MASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

ingtan, and Castl e, with Fremon t's approva l, had issued a circula r to the 

superintenden ts of ra ilroads in the Western Department establishi ng 

the ra tes.1U In general, the schedule had provided for a rate of 2 cents 

per mile per man for transporting soldiers by railroad and a charge of 

local first-cl ass freight ra tes for equ ipment and supplies accompanying a 

regiment. All other government freight was to be charged local rates 

according to their regular cl assification. 

A commission examin ing transportation cl aims at St. Louis was 

startled to learn from the claimants themselves that the fre ight rates 

a llowed in the schedu le were materiall y higher tha n their ordinary 

"through freight" charges and tbat the fare of 2 cents per mile per man 

was so profi tabl e that there was great competition among the roads to 

obtain the transportation of troops. Under these ra tes, unscrupulous 

railroad companies were in one case collecting as high as $20,000 in excess 

of a legitimate amount while in another the government was paying 

80 percent more fo r the transportation of horses " per car " than were 

private customers of the road." & 

An inq uiry addressed to Cameron brought the reply th at the circular 

on rates was not to be regarded as a contract but was only d esigned to 

fix the maximum rates beyond which no road wou ld be a llowed to 

charge.'LT Scott testified to the same effect. H e had d rafted a schedule 

of rates in July when call ed upon by th e Q uartermaster's Department 

for advice concerning rates to be a llowed in settling claims with railroad 

compan ies fo r the use of their facilities. His schedule was based on and 

conformed fa irl y closely with the agreement made by delegates from 

21 railroads who met at Harrisburg, Pa., on 4 June 186 1. Neither 

Cameron's nor Scott'S explanation was satisfactory. Sibley, to whom the 

original sched ule of rates had been sen t, had not construed it as setting 

maximum ra tes. In fact, Scon 's instructions had directed him to "ob· 

serve the following as a general basis." Quartermasters to whom the 

circular was sent and all agents of the ra ilroad companies accepted the 

circular as fixing a tariff rate, and no effort was made to barga in for 

lower ra tes. W hen he asssumed office as Quartermaster General, Meigs 

testified that he was led to believe that the circular represented a "bargain 

with the roads at a reduction of 33V3 percent." LIS 

T he insistence upon charging loca l rates, which were much the 

highest, for government fre ight rather than through ra tes increased 

'" (I) ··Government Contracts,'· House Rpl. No.2. 37th Cong .. 2d sess .. pp. 922. 929-30, 

s.n. 11 42. (2) OR, ser. III. vol. I. pp. 325-26 (Scott to Sibley. 12 J ul 1861). 

"'011., ser. III . vol. I. p. 749 (Comnlissione~ to Cameron. 17 Dec 1861). 

". 'bid~ pp. 751-52 (20 Dec 1861). 

'''''Covern ment Contracts." ou~e 11./)/. No.2. 37th Cong .. 2d scss .. p. 490. s.n. 11 43. 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 365 

transporta tion costs enormously. To avoid any doubt as to which rates 

were to apply, contracts for the shipment of beef cattle from the West 

provided for delivery at Harrisburg, Pa. The effect was to make the 

freight local on the Pennsylvania Railroad from Pittsburgh to Harrisburg, 

and again local on the Northern Central Railroad from Harrisburg to 

Baltimore, whereas if the cattl e had been shipped directl y from Pittsburgh 

to Baltimore through rates would have applied. This sharp practice was 

reflected in the increased earnings of these roads in 186 1, though their 

prosperity was also heightened by the advantageous position they enjoyed 

in carrying governmen t freight from the West as long as the Baltimore &: 

Ohio Railroad remained closed. In 

Following these revelations, Meigs on 29 January J 862 sent out a 

circular to his quartermasters, advising them that the former circular 

had been misunderstood; that they must seek to obtain lower rates from 

the railroads; and that they must pay no more than private individuals 

did in the transportation of freight. T he following month, Secretary 

Stan ton call ed the Northern railroad managers together to discuss the 

rate probl em and revise the existing schedule. As a result of their 

deliberations, the schedule was altered. Soldiers were still to be transported at 2 cents a mile but under the new schedule each was allowed 

to carry 80 pounds of baggage. T he military tariff for freight was to 

be IO percent below the printed local and through freight tariffs of the 

railroads in force at the time of service, with maximum rates definitely 

fixed for certain classes of commodities. uo T hough the congressional 

committee investigating government contracts continued to believe that 

transportation charges should be fixed by competitive bidding, Stanton 

felt that inasmuch as a definite schedule of rates had been arranged with 

the railroads, the government was obligated to support the arrangement 

as long as the roads placed their facilities at the d isposal of the War 

Department for the prosecution of the war. 121 

By the beginning of 1862, Meigs reasserted and tightened his Department's control over railroad transportation. Examination of transportation accounts had revealed that orders on railway companies for the 

transportation of troops and supplies had, in the initial rush to arms, 

been permitted to be given by officers of almost all grades. This 

"pernicious practice' ''' Me igs insisted, had to be eliminated if the Department was to exercise any control. He therefore requested that a War 

Department order be issued requiring all contracts for transportation to 

,It I bid., pp. xix-xx ; 633, 634. 

, .. Ibid., pp. xxx-xxxiii . 

... Stanton Papen. Proceedings of {he War Board, 13-27 Mar 1862, session of 14 Mar 

1862. Manuscript Div., Library of Congress. 
366 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

be made by officers of the Quartermaster's Department exciusively.U2 

Thereafter, only quartermasters contracted for transportation of men 

and suppli es via the nearest, cheapest and shortest route. By 3 March 

1862, the more favorable schedule of rates had been furnished to them as 

a guide, and they were also instructed that in scaling transportation 

claims before that date they were to allow no morc than 2 cents a mile 

per man nor any charge on freight exceeding the rates of the printed 

local or through tariff of the roads to the public at the time of the service. 

]n the settlement of claims for transportation on railroads built by 

the grant of lands from the U nited States, a general policy was laid down 

by the War Department early in the war. In the laws granting land to 

States to aid in the construction of railroads, a clause had generall y been 

inserted to the effect that such railroads should remain public highways 

for the use of the United States "free from tolls or other charges upon 

the transportation of any property or troops of the United States." 

Meigs, call ed upon to determine the rights of the government in the use 

of land grant railroads, interpreted the clause to give the government a 

clear right to use the roadway without compensation for the transportation of its troops and propeny, but the rate to be paid was to be a proper 

compensation for the motive power. cars, and other facilities incident 

to transportation. The rate set w<As 2 cents per mil e for passenger travel, 

subject to a discount of 331/3 percent due the government for charter 

privileges. In the transportation of supplies. payment was to be made 

on the basis of such reasonable rates as were allowed other railroad 

companies, subject to an abatement of 331/3 percent.m Directing the 

movement of men and supplies by commercial railroad remained a 

responsibility of the Department. though Scott. to promote what he 

considered more effective management. proposed the establishment of a 

separate transportation bureau to include rail and water transportation 

and telegraphic operations.'" No action was taken on this proposal. 

Mililm1 Telegmph Office 

Communica tions and ra ilroad transportation were so close ly related 

that when Thomas A. Scott had been called to Washington in 186 1, he 

was placed in charge of the telegraph lines as we ll as the railroads 

appropriated for government use, though legal authorization for such 

, .. RG 92. Rpls of QMG 10 SW and Hcads of Depls. vol. 5. pp. 508-09 (Sibley 10 SW, 

7 Nov 1861) . 

... RG 92. OQMG Leller Book. \'01. 811. pp. 25- 115 (Meigs 10 Sen. John Sherman, 14 Fcb 

1865). 

, .. OR, ser. III. vol. I. pp. 807--08 (Scoll 10 Slanton . 23 Jan 1862). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 367 

management was not granted until 31 January 1862. The first operators 

whom he brought to Washington were drawn from among the employees 

of the Pennsylvania Railroad. In the meantime, the governor oE Ohio 

had requested Anson Stager, general superintendent of th e Western 

Union Telegraph Company, located at Cleve land. Ohio. to take charge 

of the management of telegraph lines in southern Ohio. When about a 

month later George B. McClellan was appointed major general and 

assigned to the command of the Department of the Ohio. he appointed 

Stager superintendent of all military telegraph lines in his Department.m 

Scott, preoccupied with railroad matters, could give little attention 

to communications. In the absence of centra lized control from Washington, competition soon deve loped for telegraph ic supplies. Stager was 

thereupon recommended to Cameron as the ma n best qualified to undertake the general management of all military telegraph lines. In the 

fall of 186 1, the Secretary invited him to WaShington to submit his 

views_ Since Stager's suggestions ca lled for payment by the Quartermaster's Department of all bills incurred, Meigs insisted that legally only 

assistant quartermasters could serve as disbursing officers, and Stager 

would have to be appointed an assistant quartermaster in his Department. 

On II November 186 1, he was so appointed and detailed as general 

manager of government telegraphs. 120 

The organization that Captain Stager established was staffed with 

civilian assistants. Operating difficulties soon developed, however, because quartermasters had no legal authority for fi lling requisitions made 

on them by civilians. To overcome this· difficulty, Stager sought and 

obtained military commissions for his civilian assistants. He himself 

was commissioned colonel on 20 February 1862 and attached as aide-decamp to the Secretary of War. His chief assistant was commissioned a 

major and all the other assistant superintendents, assigned to the various 

military departments, became captains. All were appointed assistant 

quartermasters in the Quanermaster's Department. Telegraphers and 

other personnel employed in the organization remained civilians. 

Essentiall y, this was a civilian organization responsible to dle Secretary of War. The appointment of Stager and his supervisory officers as 

assistant quartermasters in the Quartermaster's Department was simply 

a device for lega lizing the flow of funds and imposing monetary and 

property accountability on them. The Department used the services of 

the military telegraph, but Meigs gave no orders to Stager. At the 

"William R. Plum, Tire Mililary TelegTapll D"riflg Ihe Civil lYa r ifl lhe Ulliled SIale5 

(2 vols., Chkago, 1882), I, 92-93. 

,. (I) Ibid" (, 13()-3 1. (2) RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, vol. 57, p. 263 (Meigs to Slager, 

16 Nov 1861). 
368 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

request of the Quartermaster General, Stager and his departmental 

superintendents submitted annual reports of their activities, expenditures. 

and property accountability.1n The Quartermaster's Department furnished funds for the support of the military telegraph from its appropriations and they were disbursed under the d irection of Colonel Stager. 

His chief purchasing officer, Capt. Samuel G. Lynch, procured telegraphic supplies. The Quartermaster's Department had no responsibilities for communications before the war, and. except for these financial 

arrangements and the provision of Quartermaster items of supply on 

requisition, the Department acquired nonc during the war.t2B 

Ocean Transpm'tation 

The use of rail transportation by the Army was still so new as to 

justify the ca lling in of experts to direct operations in April 1861, but 

no such reason existed for ignoring the Department's long experience in 

employing all types of water transportation.'2!t Secretary Cameron, however, chose to rely upon one of his Pennsylvania supporters. Following 

the riot in Baltimore, he urged John Tucker to come to Washington. 

Tucker, a former dry goods merchant and railroad president, arrived 

there on the first train that left Annapolis, and on 8 May 186 1 Cameron 

appointed him genera l agent of transportation for the War Department.'so 

He was authorized to purchase or charter all means of transportation 

necessary for the movement of troops or the forwarding of supplies. 

Since the making of railroad arrangements was among the first duti es he 

performed, it is obvious that there was a certain amount of overlapping 

in the authority given to the various transportation agents that could 

have promoted conflict rather than co-ordination had not Tucker's 

activities been soon confined to ocean transportation. The Secretary of 

War directed the Quartermaster Genera l and the chiefs of all other supply 

burealiS to inform Tucker of their transportation requirements and to 

give him such reasonable notice of their needs as circumstances allowed. III 

The desirability oE having a transportation agent in New York to 

work under Colonel Tompkins had been raised shortly after the first 

, .. For reports of Maj. Thos. T. Eckert, Capt. Samuel Bruch eI (Ii., .see RG 92, Personal 

Narrative Rpts, F.Y. 1863. 1864, 1865, passi.". 

,.. Meigs called attention to the fan that the duties of the officers of this organization 

brought them more directly under the notice of the Secreta ry of War than of the Quarter· 

master General. Amma/ lleparts at tilt: Quartermaster General, 1861- 1865, p. 25 (Rpt for 

1865). 

uo For discussion of transportation on western rivers, see below, pp. 405--15. 

UII OR, ser. III, vol. I, p. 175. 

U1 RG 107, OSW, Letters Sent, vol. 44, p. 175 (10 May 1861). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 369 

call went om for militia.132 Later, Thomas A. Scott informed the 

investigaling committee that Tucker was employed in order that one 

general agent, securing vessels at moderate rates, might eliminate competition among the quartermasters. 1n 

Indeed, considerable confusion had already developed in the opening 

weeks of the war. Assistant Quartermaster General Tompkins was the 

duly authorized representative of the government for handling transportation at New York, and he chartered a number of steamers during the 

first weeks of the \\Iar,134 Numerous other individuals, however, were 

also active in engaging vessels for government service. The New York 

Defense Committee and General Wool, commanding officer in the Department of the East, took prompt measures to aid Washington when the 

capital was reported to be in imminent peril. Ships were chartered and 

troops and supplies hurried off to Washington.1&' Meanwhile, at Philade lphia, the president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, J. Edgar Thomson, 

" in accordance with the authority vested in me by the Secretary of War," 

appointed Richard F. Loper of Philadelphia as an assistant to act as a 

transportation agent in procuring vessels [or use on the alternate rail 

and water route that he helped open to Washington. From 20 April 

through 7 May 1861 , Captain Loper chartered 24 steamers for government 

use before his services were terminated by the appointment of John 

Tucker.us 

The intent of placing one person in comrol of water transportation 

to reduce confusion and eliminate competition was meritorious. The 

ultimate end of reducing costs was not achieved by Tucker because he 

knew nothing about the business of chartering ocean vessels, and in 

addition he exercised no control over the agents he employed. By his 

own admission he had never built, purchased, commanded, or operated 

a vessel in his life.1ST As a result of his utter lack of experience, he paid 

excessive prices for vessels, some of which proved unse:nvorthy. 

Acting Quartermaster General Sibley assumed that Tucker wou ld be 

a subordinate in Colonel Tompkins' office and accordingly advised him 

that Tucker "will act as your adjunct and under your directions," but 

in fact he operated independently in executing the Secretary's orders 

and in carrying out th e purchase d irectives given later by the Quarter-

, .. RG 92. OQMC Letter Book. va!. 55. p. 335 (Johnston to Col. T ompkins. 19 Apr 1861). 

' .. .. Government Contracts." HOllse Rpl. No.2, 37th Cong .• 2d sess .• p. 567. S.n. 1143. 

'''Senate Ex. Doc. No. 37. 37th Cong" 2d sess., pp. 2, 14--15. s.n. 1122. 

" OR, scr. lll. vo!. l. pp. 179-81 (Wool to Cameron . 9 May 18(1 ) . 

.. (1) Senate Rep. Com. No. 84. 37th Cong .. 3d sess., p. 274, s.n. l iS!. (2) Senate Ex. Drx:. 

No. 37. 7th Cong .. 2d sess .. p. 2. s.n. 11 22. (3) This was the same Captain Loper employed 

by the Quartermaster's Department in the Mexican War. See above. p. 287. 

UT"Covemment Contracts," House Rpl. No.2, 37th Cong .. 2d scss., pp. 310-11. s.n. 1145. 
370 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

master General.138 Two days after Meigs assumed the duties of Quartermaster General, he wrote Colonel Tompkins that "by the personal 

attention and experience he brings to the business," Tucker could render 

valuable assistance in the shipment of stores, and he directed the assistant 

quartermaster general to consult the transport agent in making shipments. 

"He will enable you to make considerable reduction in cost," he informed 

Colonel Tompkins, naively assuming that Cameron's appointee must be 

well qualified.' u Queried later by the congressional committee investigating government contracts as to why the Department's responsibility 

for water transportation should have been taken out of its hands and 

delegated to Tucker, Meigs could only reply that the Secretary of War 

"exercised his own discretion." He was not bound to give reasons. 

When Meigs became Quartermaster General, he found Tucker employed 

as transport agent, and though he talked to the Secretary several times 

about the matter he was told that Tucker was to perform that particular 

duty. If the matter had been left to him, Meigs would have preferred to 

have the regular officers of his Department charter or purchase vessels, 

calling in the best advice and assistance they could getYo 

Customarily, shipowners employed shipbrokers or mercantile agents 

who were paid a commission to buy or sell ships, procure cargoes, and 

generally transact such business as related to insurance and the issuance 

of bills of lading. During the Civil War, public exigency made possible 

the extortion of enormous profits by sh ipbrokers and middlemen. The 

isolation of Washington in April 1861, for example, created an immediate 

need for two light-draught steamers to transport troops and supplies 

between Perryville and Annapolis. On General Wool's orders, Colonel 

Tompkins chartered the steamer Calaline on 25 April 186l. The congressional committee later brought out the fact that this IS-year old 

vessel had been purchased with notes given by four men, one of whom 

was Thurlow Weed. They paid $ 18,000 for the vessel and then chartered 

it to the government for 3 months at $10,000 a month, with a guarantee 

of $50,000 in case it should sink.u, 

That same emergency led to great activity on the part of Captain 

Loper to charter vessels at Philadelphia. Then and for many months 

thereafter, Captain Loper was busily engaged in amassing commissions. 

He asserted later that he had '"neglected everythi ng since the war broke 

out but to attend to and try to assist the governmem and serve his country 

as much as in him lay." He apparen tl y did work hard and he won 

- RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, vol. 55, p. '7S (16 May 1861). 

'. Ibid., pp. 445·46 (17 Jun 1861). 

,.· .. Government Contracts:' House Rpj . No.2, 37th Cong., 2d 5eSS., pp. 470-71, S.n. 11411. 

'" [bid., pp. 58-65, S.n. 1142. 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 37 1 

praise from Brig. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside for his "constant and 

untiri ng" zeal and from Lt. Col. Rufus E. Ingalls for his "generous aid" 

in procuring vessels for their respective needs,Hi His aid, however, 

came high. He charged 5 percent commission on every vessel obtained 

through his agency and these were chartered at extreme ly profitable daily 

or monthly rates. Anthony Reybold of Delaware City, who cl aimed his 

principal occupation was fa rming, chartered his fleet of vessels to the 

government through Captain Loper. His receipts fan about $ 1, 100 

per day, or at the rate of $401,500 per year. Captain Loper's commissions 

on these boats alone could not have been less than $20,000 a year, and 

in the opinion of the investigating committee it would have been cheaper 

for the government to have bought the vessels outright. 

Like many another businessman of tha t peri od, Captain Loper 

enjoyed a good reputation. His patriotism, however, was never permitted to come in conflict with his pursuit of material gain. A shipbuilder and owner of many vessels. he was also president of the Philadelphia Steam Propeller Company. Naturally his own vesse ls found 

employment by the government and so profitable were his exertions in 

behalf of the Philadelphia Steam Propeller Company that he was able 

to increase its dividends from 10 to 50 percent a year in 1862 and in 

addition save a large surplus. IH 

As is evident, Ca ptain Loper's services in behalf of the government 

d id not end on 7 May 1861. John T ucker was an old and valued friend 

who availed himself of the "practical knowledge and enlarged experience" 

of the captain not only during his term as general agent of transportation 

but a lso while he served as assistant secretary of war- a post Tucker held 

unti1 21 J anuary J863. 1H The new Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, 

who made Tucker his assistant, dismissed as unfounded the imputations 

being made against him in the winter of 186 1- 62. But Loper and a host 

of other greedy agents and subagents were employed by Tucker who 

chartered the vessels (or General Burnside's expedition to North Carolina, 

for General McClellan's expedition to the Peninsula in March 1862 and 

the return of his army in August. and for General Banks' expedition when 

he relieved General Butler at New Orleans.loo There was no evidence 

to indicate that T ucker profited in any way. but he did nothing to prevent 

the impositions practiced by his agents. The Senate Select Committee 

'''Senate Rep. Com. No. 84, 1I7th Cong., 1Id scss., pp. 2711- 74; 275, s.n. 1141. 

lbid., pp. 111- 19. 

, .. (I) Ibid., pp. 1125- 27. (2) ~a num Papcrs. vol. 2 (Stanton to H. Hamlin. 27 Jan 1862). 

"' Sec the voluminous testimony 3$$cmillcd in "Governmcnt Contracts:· House Rpl. No.2, 

1I7th Cong., 2d scu., s.n. 1142 3nd 1143; and Senate Rep. Com. No. 84, 1I7th Cong .. 1Id scss., 

s.n. liS!. 
372 QUARTERMASTER SU PPORT OF THE ARMY 

concluded tha t he "had more or less connection with these gigantic and 

shameless frauds on the government." 

Before the Civil War, the Quartermaster's Department had been 

accustomed to advertise for th e vessels it req uired. taking th e lowest b id 

offered. During the first year of the war, requisitions for transportation 

were urgent and in outfitting expeditions lime was not allowed for pub lic 

competition. Under T ucker. that procedure was abandoned in favor of 

making contracts through the agency of brokers. During T ucker's 

tenu re in office, Quartermaster duties in relation to water transportation 

were reduced to the clerical function of signing the contracts so that they 

might have the offi cial sanction of the Quartermaster's Department. 

As Meigs pointed out. the d uties of an assistant secretary of war were 

not clearly defi ned, but as the representative of the Secretary, he was the 

superior officer and necessarily had authority over any assistant quartermaster detailed to assist him.lt6 T he power to fi x the rate of charter, to 

determine the character of vesse ls to be employed. to inspect, and to 

charter were responsibilities carried out by T ucker and his agents. 

T he findings of the Select Committee of the Senate, whose probings 

in the winter of 1863 uncovered further abuses in the system of water transportation, were made known to the quartermasters at the chief pons. 

Meigs instructed them to annul charters tainted with fra ud and to take 

steps to restore to the T reasury all sums that had been extorted by agents 

or fraudu lentl y obta ined. Settlements of some of the most extravagant 

cla ims were made at greatly reduced rates, and in some cases vessels were 

taken possession of and fu nhercompensation refused when the amount 

already paid far exceeded the val ue of the ship. Meigs also advised his 

q uartermasters to compare tonnage stated in charter panics with the 

register at the custom house, since the government had paid out considerable sums on falsely reponed LOnnage.,n T he Department introd uced 

a clause in all charters that gave the Uni ted States the righ t to purchase 

a chartered vessel at any time duri ng its service on paying a reasonable 

percentage upon the original val uation of the vessel and the cost of her 

mai ntenance. T hus, should chartered rates be too high, the result was 

that the vessel soon became the property of the United States. Meigs' 

efforts at reform also led to a more adequate inspection system, with 

offi cers of the Navy detailed to inspect and appraise vessels offered [or 

charter or purchase.'·s After T ucker had resigned and control once 

'''Senate Ex. Doc. No. 84, 37th Cong .• 3d seu .. pp. 24- 26. s.n. J\!i l (Meigs to Grimes, 

4 Feb 1863). 

lIT RG 92. OQMG Letter Book. vol. 67. 11 11. 29-30 (Meigs to Maj. S. Van Vliet e/ 01., 

2 Mar 1863: p.!i5 (Meigs to Capt. W. W. McKim et 01. , 4 Mar 1863). 

''' Ibid., pp. 2{l I-03 (SO 3, 10 Mar 1863); vol. 75. pp. 175- 77 (SO 4, 25 Jan 1864). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 373 

morc rested fully with the Quartermaster's Department. it was by such 

measures that Meigs checked the irregu larities (ormerl y practiced in the 

coastal transportation of men and supplies. 

PmcU1'emenl of Wagons and Ambulances 

Responsibility for the land transportat ion used by the Armywagons. horses, mul es. and the forage necessary for the support of the 

anima ls-continued to be vested in the Quartermaster's Department as 

it had been since its origin. The wagons and harness used had long ago 

been perfected as a result of Army experience on the western plains. T he 

wheels. axles, and other principa l pans were made to standard measure· 

ments to permit interChangeability of parts. After the close of the 

Mexican War, production of Army wagons had again become centered in 

Philadelphia, procurement being handled by contracts made by the depot 

quartermaster. The first orders for Army wagons in the Civil War were 

fi ll ed at Philadelphia in May 186 1. Within a few weeks, it was obvious 

that Philadelphia could not be permitted to monopolize the manufacture 

of Army wagons. H R Production had to be distribu ted among many 

places along the East Coast and the Ohio valley. 

As troops assembled at Washington and a forward movement was 

planned, not only wagons but ambulances of both two- and four-wheel 

types and transport carts were needed. Orders to speed production 

went to the quartermasters at Philadelphia and New York, and Assistant 

Q uartermaster Morris S. Miller was sent out to aid them by "a judicious distribution" of contracts among carriage makers at Rahway and 

Newark, N.j., New Haven, Conn., Pittsburg, Pa., Wheeling, W. Va., and 

other po ims.I~Q 

Whenever time permitted, quartermasters advertised for bids, but 

Army demands often were sudden and urgent. Unlike clothing, wagons 

could not be stored at arsenals to permit the Department to fill from 

reserve stocks the emergency requirements created by losses sustained 

through capture on the battlefield or through wreckage of shipments 

sent by sea. Such emergency requisitions had to be filled by openmarket purchases from well-known carriage makers who kept on hand 

large supplies of the parts required- "some finished, some half put 

together, some not fitted or put toge ther." ,01 

Though at the beginning of the war orderly procurement was 

.lt lbid., vol. 55, pp. 426--27 (Sibley to Maj. M. S. Miller, 10 Jun 1861). 

"'''Ibid., pp. 4 15- 16 (Sibley 10 Tompkins. 5 JUIl 1861): p. 422 (Sibley to Thomas, 7 Jun 

186 1); pp. 426--27 (Sibley to Miller, 10 J un 1861); p. 439 (Meigs to Miller, 14 JUIl 1861). 

Ii' Jbid ., vol. 77, pp. 396-97 (Meigs 10 M. R. Hazard Wagon Factory, 17 J UIl 186-4). 
374 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

hampered by Jack of knowledge of how many troops would be involved 

and how much wagon transportation they would need, procurement of 

wagons and ambulances subsequently caused no difficulty. In Only the 

most careful scrutiny by reliable inspectors, however, could prevent 

impositions. It was not uncommon for inspectors to find panels in 

wagon bodies with knotholes broken out and puttied up; axles not welded 

soundly; poplar hubs and even poplar tongues that snapped at the gentlest 

pressure; and various unsatisfactory substitutes used for the well-seasoned 

white oak ca lled for in specifications. I n Some inferior wagons were sent 

to the field because inspectors could be bribed. Complaints were few, 

however, largely because spare parts, materia ls for repair, portable forges, 

and boxes of smiths', wheelwrights', carpenters', and saddlers' tools were 

carried with all the large d ivisions of the Army trains in the fie ld. 

Ordinary repairs could be made during the night halt, and it was seldom 

necessary to abandon a wagon on the march.'u 

PmCltrement of Animals 

Nowhere was more trickery practiced than in the sa le and purchase 

of horses and mules. Large numbers of them were needed for the 

Cavalry, Artillery. wagon trains, and ambulance trains. Because mules 

were hardy animals, capable of bearing the irregular care and hard treat· 

ment of a campaign better than horses, they were used to a great extent 

in the trains. Horses, however, had to be provided for the Cavalry and 

Artillery. The Army used pack tra ins only to a limited extent in the 

Civil War. Keeping up l'egularl y organized pack tra ins was expensive. 

]nstead, each corps carried 200 packsaddles in its wagon tra in, and where 

rough terrain made necessary the lise of pack trains, they were made up 

temporarily by taking mul es from the wagons.m 

'"" Tile ellorts of Deputy Quartermaster Gene ral Crosman to equip the 5 months' men 

serving under General Patlerson in May 186 1 was illustrative of the difficulty. To the bUer 

was assigned the task of preventing the enemfs forces in the Shenandoah Va lley from making 

a junction with thdr main body at Manassas when General McDowell moved toward the bailie 

of Bull Run. Crosman had difficulty learning the size of the force he was to supply. His first 

instructions called upon him to furnish 100 wagoru: shortly afterwards, another 100: and after 

a lapse of 2 or ~ weeks, in quick succession , 200 mo~, repeated four times at inte rvals of a 

few days to make a IOta I of 1,000 wagons, with 4.500 or 4.600 animals (or them and the 

batteries. Plaintively, Crosman wrote Ihat an admin istrative officer muS! know something of 

the aggregate force before he cou ld p roperly provide for its equipment. RG 92, CrOliman. 

Letter Book, I~ May-24 Aug 1861 , No. 555 (Crosman to Patterson, 10 Aug 1861). 

"'(1) RG 92, OQMG Letters. Recejved, Box 75 (Inspector Henry Dunlop to CrOliman. 

15 Oct 1861 ). (2) RG 92. OQMG Leiter Book, vol. 58, p. 266 (Meigs to QM Dickerson. 24 Feb 

1862). (~) RG 107, OSW Military Book, vol. 5~ C, p. 154 (ASW Watson 10 Meigs, 12 Mar 1864) . 

.... Annual Repurts o/Ille QUQrtumastu Gelleral, /86/- /86J, p. 14 (QMG's Rpl, 1864) . 

... Henry G. Sharpe, Tile Act of Supplying Armit:S ill the Fidd as EXt:mpli{ied Duri"g Ih e 

Civil War (n.p., n,d,), p, 78. 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 375 

There was no centralized procurement of horses and mules at the 

beginning of the Civil War. It was the policy of the government and 

of the Quartermaster's Department "to distribute disbursements as much 

as possible so as to equalize the compensation for the burdens of this 

war." m In addition to purchases made by some of the regular staff 

officers of the DepanmclU, governors of states, mustering officers, and 

quartermasters of regiments were authorized and encouraged to purchase 

horses in the districts in which regiments were raised. Numerous agents 

and subagents also participated in the procurement of horses and mules. 

Inevitably. agents came into competition with each other. Purchases 

were made subject to inspection. At some places. inspection was accomplished by the local quartermaster; at others, by civilian agents whom he 

hired for the purpose. In at least one instance, an agent both purchased 

and inspected the horses he bought. That agent was J ohn E. Reeside, 

appointed by Genera l Fremont as inspector of horses in the Western 

Department and allowed a commission of 2Y2 percent ror his services. 1n 

In some cases, impositions resulted from lack of knowledge, but in 

many others. regimental officers were exposed by the committee investigating government contracts as participams in the shameless defrauding 

of the government.,n Departmental quartermasters were also involved. 

The committee was convinced that Quartermaster McKinstry at St. Louis 

was himself in collusion with unprincipled men to swindle the govern· 

ment as was Quartermaster Hatch at Cairo, Ill. 

Purchases were often made in the open market to meet emergencies, 

but even when bids were solicited by public advertisement contracts fell 

into the hands of middlemen. The difference between what the owner 

received for his horse or mule and the price paid by the government went 

into the pocket of the middleman. liD The government was defrauded 

not only in the large sums paid to these middlemen but in the quality 

of the horses and mules it obtained. Broken-down wagon and dray 

horses and mules were acquired by contractors and sold to the government 

at maximum prices. By criminal collusion between government inspectors and civilian contractOrs, horses were accepted and forwarded to the 

Army that were under and over age, spavined, blind, stifled, and afflicted 

with ringbone, sweeny. and every other disease known to horses.

ao 

I. RG 92, OQMG l...cucr 8ook. vol. 55. p. 460 (Meigs to McClellan , 20 Jun 1861); vol. 56, 

p . 284 (Meigs to Col. F. M. Kellogg, 26 Aug 1861) . 

... "Government Conlracts," House Rpl . No.2, 37th Cong .. 2d se5S .. pp. ltXxv-ltX)Cvi; 

749-62, '.n. 1143. For further testimony illustrating how this $f$lem of purchase and inspeclion operated see pp. 523--36 and passim. 

1M lbid., pp. 69-71, I.n. 1142. 

1M Ibid., pp. 83--84. 

'- Ibid., pp. 78-82, 5.n. 1145. 
376 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T H E ARMY 

Not all of lhe thousands of an ima ls procured in the opening months 

of the war were worthl ess." 1 Many sound animals were obtained but 

none superior to the minimum specifi cations set by the Department. 

Moreover. though the q uality of the horses offered by contractors might 

differ considerably. the law required that the contract be given to the 

lowest bidder. Standards were further affected by the number of horses 

and mules required in a given time. When emergencies were pressing. 

standards undoubtedly were permitted to fall too low. Such an emergency existed at the lime preparations were being pushed for the movement that culminated in the battle of Bull Run. When dealers complained that the inspection of horses for Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson's 

troops was too severe, Meigs advised Quartermaster A. R. Eddy that 

alth ough inspections should be efficient, a military movement should not 

be delayed in order to get first-class horses-"a horse that will do a 

month's work, may in certain cases be worth his weight in silver." 111 

It is not surprising that complai nts came from the field. By ] 86~, 

the chief quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, Lt. Col. Rufus 

Ingalls, charged that the Cavalry and Artillery arms had been kept less 

efficient because of the inferior quality of the animals they had received 

under the existing laws and system of purchase and inspection. III He 

call ed £01' reform and endorsed remed ial measures that had been advocated by Col. Daniel H. Rucker, the commanding officer of the Washington Depot. 

Colonel Rucker had long th ought that the system could be improved 

by deta il ing experi enced cava lry officers to do the purchasing directl y 

from the owners in the stockraisi ng parts of the country, leaving the 

purchasing agents free to bargain for sound animals at prices below a 

fair maximum one fi xed by the Quartermaster General. Thus. with a 

number of cava lry officers purchasi ng and shipping in small lots. depots 

would be supplied with sufficient anima ls to meet any ordinary wants of 

the service. more time would be allowed to make selections by reliable 

persons, purchases would. in most instances, be made directly from the 

stock raisers, and both the standards used in selecting the animals and 

the efficiency of the mounted service would necessaril y be raised.'u 

'" According to the Depart ment's records 109.789 horses and 8.5.620 mules were procured 

du ring the fuca l year ending 50 June 1862. T h is is not a complete figure for reports were not 

sem in by many inexperienced officcl"$ purchasing in the field. No aeeunte statistical data is 

available on the number of animals procured during the Civil War. For fragmentary reports 

!ICC ArHlul..I Reportl 0/ the QUllrtermdsier Generlll, 1861- 186J, fHulim. 

- RG 92. OQMG Leiter Book. \'01. 56. p. 69 (15 Jul 1861). 

,. RG 92. OQMG Letlen Received. 80" liS (Iuplll to Adj. Gen. Seth Willianu. 1 Apr 

186!). 

-'bid. (Rucker to Meigli. 22 Apr 1865). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 377 

THE ARMY BLACKSMITH 

Along with these proposals, Colonel Rucker also call ed attention to the 

need to reduce the wane of animals in the Army. T housa nds of horses 

and mules had been rendered un fi t for service by " harsh and injudicious 

treatment" and by fai lure of the troops lO give them ordinary carc. 

In consequence of the compla ints of cavalry officers, a Cavalry Bureau 

was established, on 28 July 1863, under a chief charged with responsibility 

for organizing and equipping the cavalry forces and providing their 

moums and remounts. He was to establish depots for the reception, 

organization, and discipline of cavalry recruits and regiments. and for the 

coll ection, care, and traini ng of cava lry horses. As a result, a depot was 

established at Giesboro in the District of Columbia that became the 

principal remount depot for the suppl y of the armies in the East, as 

St. Louis and Nashville were in the Mississippi Valley. Quartermaster 

officers still purchased cava lry horses but under the direction of the chief 

of the Cavalry Bureau. and all horses for its service were to be inspected 

by cavalry officers. Quartermaster officers assigned to d uty in the bureau 

made their reports and returns of money and property to the Quartermaster Genera l, and all estimates for fu nds were submitted to the bureau 
378 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

chief before being finally acted upon by the Quartermaster GeneraLlS~ 

The basis for reform was laid, and under the able direction of Col. 

James A. Ekin. detailed to the Cavalry Bureau as chief quartermaster, 

the quality of the horses selected for the Cavalry was improved.1&8 

In the spring of the following year, these arrangements were modified. The Cavalry Bureau was placed under the command of the Chief 

of Army Staff who performed all the duties formerly assigned to the 

Chief of the Bureau. All duties in relation to both the purchase and 

inspection of horses. their subsistence. and their transportation were 

performed by Quartermaster officers especially assigned to the duty. 

Colonel Ekin continued as chief quartermaster of the bureau. leI Later 

in the year, when the Quartermaster's Department was reorganized, he 

also was appointed chief of the First Division in the Quartermaster 

General's office. As such, he had charge of the purchase and disposition 

of all horses and mules used by the Army. The purchase of animals 

could thereafter be made only on authority received from the Quartermaster General's office. By law, inspectors were made liable to punishment by fine and imprisonment by sentence of court martial or military 

commission for any corruption, wilful neglect, or fraud in the performance of their duties. Any contractor who sought to influence an inspector 

was to forfeit the full amount of his contract with the United States and 

his offense was to be given full publicity throughout the country. The 

Quartermaster's Department published rules and regulations to govern 

the purchase and disposition of horses and mules, and also prepared forms 

to be used in making reports to the First Division.te8 As a result of 

these measures, a more regular system and better control of supply was 

established and greater un iformity and greater skill was introduced in 

the inspection of horses and mules for Army use. 

So much did the system of procurement and inspection improve that 

in forwarding the estimate of public animals needed by the armies of 

the Potomac and James for December 1864, Chief Quartermaster Ingalls 

commented: "The supply is already very good, and it is proper to state 

that the artillery and cavalry horses sent to these armies during the past 

three months have been the best we have received during the war."·8& 

Much to the gratification of the Department, simil ar comments came 

'- War Dtparlmtml Ct ntral Orders, 1863, vol. 2. pp. 289-91 (GO 236 and 237. 28 Jul 1863). 

'''Colonel Ekin look charge on 27 December 1863. relieving Col. C. G. Sawtelle who 

tcmporarily filled the post (he firs( !i mOnlhs after thc bureau was established. RG 92. 

Personal Narrative Rpu. F.Y. 18&1. II. pp. 78-79. 

,., War Department Ge"erai Orc/uJ, 1864 (GO 162. 14 Apr 18&1). 

, .. Gel/eral Orc/us, Qllarlermastu G.mua/'s Office, 1864-/865 (GO 43. 23 &p 18&1). 

, .. Amlllal Reports oltht QIUlrltrmll$ltr Gtlleral, 1861- /865 (Ekin's Rpl to QMG. 17 Oct 

1865. p.46. 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 379 

from other armies in the field. By the last year of th e war, an efficient 

system for the purchase. inspection, and disposition of horses and mules 

had finally evolved. 

Procw'emel1l of Forage 

The great loss of horses and mul es in the Union armies can not be 

atlributed solely to hard usage and lack of care. In many instances, lack 

of feed brought much suffering and great loss among the anima ls when 

the armies went into wi nter quarters. Maintenance of an adeq uate 

supply of forage was at all times a d ifficult task beca use the amoUIl( to 

be supplied was 50 enormous. Each horse had to be supplied daily with 

14 pounds of hay and 12 pounds or oa lS, corn, or barley; each mule's 

ration consisted of the same amOllnt of hay and 9 pounds of oalS, corn, 

or barl ey. In the winter of 186 1- 62, the Army of th e Potomac requ ired 

about 400 tons of forage daily.un A certain amount of forage was also 

consumed by the animals of the wagon trains bringing the forage supply 

forward to the army. 

At the beginning of (he war. procurement of forage was completely 

decentralized. Chief quartermasters in the vari ous geographical departments, depot quartermasters. and chief quartermasters with armies in 

the fie ld were all procuring forage. Competition among them in the 

same markets resulted in higher prices for grain. By the fall of 1862. 

Colonel Tompkins at New York was having so much difficulty in procuring forage shipments for southern stations in competition with the 

procuring agents of the Army of th e Potomac and the Washington Depot 

that he suggested the desirability of vesting all responsibility for forage 

procurement in New York City in one competent agentY' Nothing 

came of the proposa l a l that time. 

The exceedingly high price of oats in the fa ll of 1862 led to an 

effort to economize that opened the door to fraud. Maj. S. Van Vliet, 

then serving as quartermaster at New York, proposed the use of a mixture 

of one-third corn to two·thirds oats in feeding the Army's horses and 

mules. His proposa l was approved, and Capts. C. B. Ferguson and 

W ill iam SLOddard, assistant quartermasters at the depot at Alexandria, Va., supporting the Army of the Potomac, began purchasing mixed 

feed (rom cOntraclOrs. 1U 

The following summer, Lt. Col. J ames L. Dona ldson , who was then 

quartermaster at Ba ltimore. began to hear rumors about the profits to 

." RG 92. Personal Na rrative Rpt5, F.Y. 1863. v. 544 (Van Vliet's Rpt . 3 Oct 18(5). 

171 RG 92. OQMC Letler nook. vol. 65. IIp. 174-75 (To Meigs, 25 Sep 1862). 

''' /bid., \'01. 64. IlP' 270-71 (Sibley to Ingalls. 21 Nov 1862). 
380 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

be made out of sell ing mixed grain to the Army. He directed the 

Department's attemion to the possibility of fraud inherent in a dishonest 

mixture of oats and corn. With oats weighi ng 32 pounds to the bushel, 

and corn, 56 pounds, the lighter the oatS the greater the fraud. Because 

of the difference in the weight and price of the grains, contractors were 

able to make a considerable profit on each bushel. Meigs requested a 

report from the ch ief quartermaster of the Army of lhe Potomac. Captain Stoddard in charge of the forage department at the Alexandria Depot 

explained that only the most reliable contractors furn ished this mixture 

to the depot. and that to prevent fraud he always tested the proportions 

of grain used by separating and we igh ing each component. If any 

deficiency existed, he made a proportionate deduction from the agreed 

price. Inga lls was satisfi ed that all necessary sa feguards were being taken 

and so informed Meigs.m 

The explanation, however. did not ha lt the investigation that was 

now pressed by Peter H. Watson, Assistant Secretary of War. The 

depot quartermasters involved were ordered to purchase no more mixed 

grai n. and in December both Capts. C. n. Ferguson, in charge of the 

Alexandria depot, and Stoddard were placed under arrest. Secretary 

Watson also had arrested the contractors directly involved in the swindle. 

Since they were politically important in Pennsylvania, great pressure was 

brought to bear to effect their release but to no avail. The fraud was 

fully investigated and future swindles of that kind made impossible. uo 

The Quartermaster's Department now instituted in the East a certain 

amount of control to avoid competition and high prices. It assigned 

responsibility to General Rucker [or superintending the purchase of all 

forage required by the depots at Washington, Alexandria, Fortress Monroe, Baltimore, and the cavalry depot at Giesboro, and for all troops and 

transportation dependent on these points. The Department directed 

him to ascertain the amount of forage on hand and the number of animals 

to be supported from each depot, and to contract for the necessary supply. 

Any existing shortages might be handled on an emergency basis and 

supplied through open-market purchases ull(il supply by contract could 

be established. 1lI 

Because a monopolistic combine had control of the ava il able supply 

of oats and corn, the Department experienced great difficulty in procuring 

forage for the Army of the Potomac. In consequence, it sent Capt. 

·" 'bid., vol. 71 . pp. 22-26 (Donaldson 10 Meigs. 10 Jun, " Aug 186!1); (Ingalls 10 Meigs. 

25 Jun 1863); (Meigs 10 Donaldson, 8 Aug 1863) . 

• TO Charles A. Dana, Ruollutions oJ/li e Civil JIIar (New York. 19(2), pp. 162-64 . 

... RG 92, OQMG Leller Book, vol. 73, pp. 188-89 (Actg QMG Thomas (0 Rucker, 7 Dee 

1863). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 38 1 

Samuel L. Brown to New York as the sole purchaser of forage for the 

tTOOpS in the East. He had been in charge of (he forage department of 

the Washington Depot and had also assumed the forage duties of Captains 

Ferguson and Stoddard when they were arrested. By "judicious purchases and drawi ng supplies from the interior," he was able to break 

the monopolyY' 

Though Captain Brown purchased large quantities of forage in the 

winter of 1863-64, supplies still failed to reach the Army of the Potomac, 

and Chief Quartermaster Ingalls complained bitterly that his animals 

were likely to starve to deathyr T he trouble was that the Potomac, the 

small streams and harbors at the northern end of the Chesapeake Bay, 

and the Delaware and Chesapeake Canal were all frozen over. With 

shipments by water made impossibl e by ice, the Department appealed to 

the railroads to forward the forage purchased on their lines.lTs Because 

of the ice and a shortage of railroad cars, forage trickled slowly to Wash· 

ington and the Army of the Potomac, the full daily ration for which 

amounted to 37,000 bushels of grain and 1.I 50 tons of hay.lT$ 

Early in 1864, Congress, seeking to promote reform by centralizing 

control of contracts in the office of the Quartermaster Genera l at Washington, incorporated such ideas in the reorganization act that it passed 

for the Department in July. Meigs was dismayed; he feared that such 

centraliza tion would require too many contracts to be made at "this 

centre of political influence and intrigue." . 8 0 In the past, he had tried 

to mitigate the evil of dealing too much with large contractors by establishing as many depots as he tould for contracting for supplies. Under 

the reorganization act, a Fifth Division, handling forage, was set up in 

the offi ce of the Quartermaster General, and Quartermaster Brown, now 

promoted to a colonel, was placed in charge of it on 7 September 1864. 

Because he was then supplying forage for all the armies of the East and 

for the depots along the Atlantic and Gulf seacoast, Colonel Brown was 

permitted to remain in New York supervising shipments until 1 January 

1865.181 

Forage for the armies in the West had largely been supplied through 

... RG 92, Penonal Narrative Rpu, F.Y. 1864 , I·, pp. 11511-57 (Brown's Rpt, 10 Ju1 1864). 

"' RG 92, OQMG Leuers Received, Box 1111 (Ingalls to Actg QMG Thomas 6 Jan 1864). 

,,. (I) Ibid~ box 129 (Rucker to Thomas. 7 Jan 1864). (2) RG 92. OQMG Letter Book, 

vol. 75, p. 67 (Meigs to Vanderbilt, 1 Mar 1864). (11) Meigs reported the railroads we re 

"jealous of the government's going into the market, purchasing in the country. and calling 

upon them to tramport the forage. a bulky and troublesome commodity at rates less than they 

receive from individuals." I bid., p. 120 (fo Brown , 4 Mar 1864). 

, ... RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, vol. 7>1, p. 155 (fhomas to Van Vliet, 20 J an 1864). 

"' Ibid., p. 546 (Meigs to Hon. Henry Wi lson, 20 Feb 1864) . 

... RG 92, Penonal Narrative Rptl. F.Y. 1865, vol. A- F, pp. 267-70 (Brown's Rpt, 17 Oct 

1865). 
382 QUARTERMASTER SU I'PORT OF THE ARMY 

the forage department of the St. Louis Depolo When Colonel Brown 

assumed his duties in Washington, he wished to extend his control, 

eliminate competition, and save the gove rnment large sums of money in 

procuring the vast quantity of forage required for both the East and the 

West. amounting to approximatel y 2,500,000 bushels of grain and 50,000 

tons of hay per month. He recommended that sui table officers be stationed at the sources of suppl y who, under his direction, would have 

charge of purchases o[ all forage needed in the different sections of the 

country. Meigs approved of forage officers but not under Brown's 

immediate direction. The chain of military command, responsibility, 

and oversight ought not to be broken, he advised Brown. Since most 

depots already had an officer espec iall y charged with the purchase of 

forage, Brown's instructions to them ouglillo go th rough their immediate 

chiefs at the depots. Me igs also warned Colonel Brown that the transportation of grai n in large quantities from Chicago and other western 

markets to eastern ports was in violation of the spirit of the agreement 

with the railroad companies. The Quartermaster Genera l had assured 

the latter that supplies would not be brought in from distant markets 

for the purpose of compell ing them to transport at reduced ra les. On ly 

when necessity compelled such purchases did the Department insist upon 

the government rate being paid for transportation.'u ·Within these 

limits, Brown was free to extend his alllhority, but further efforts to 

promote co-ordination and centralized control of forage procurement 

were shortly made unnecessary by the end of the war. 

Subsisliug lhe T mof)S 

Supplying the troops with rations was not a function of the Quartermaster's Department during the Civil War. That responsibility continued to be vested in a separate suppl y bureau headed by a Commissary 

General of Subsistence. Like the Quartermaster's Depanmen t, the Sub· 

sistence Department. since its establishment as a bureau in 18 18, had been 

administered by the same chief-Col. George Gibson. The latter had 

been a confirmed inva lid for some years, the duties of his Dcparllnent 

being execUled when the war began by Lt. Col. Joseph P. Taylor as 

Acting Commissary Genera l of Subsistence. Upon Gibson's death late 

in September 186 1, Taylor was appointed Commissary General of Sub· 

sistence. He served until he died on 29 June 1864. when, by promotion 

from within the Department. Amos B. Eaton succeeded him. I SS 

-"RC 92, OQMC Lefl er Book. vol. 82, pp. 496-99 (Brown 10 AClg QMC Thomas. 25 Jan 

1865); pp. 500-502 (Meip 10 Brown, 5 Feb 1865). 

- (I) Ge1!er(J/ Orders oflhe War D"fH!rlme"l, 1861- 62, 1 164-65 (GO 84, 50 Scp 1861). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 383 

Despite the appointment of successive Commissary Genera ls of Subsistence during the war, the Department enjoyed the advantage of con· 

tinued experienced leadership. It was greatly handicapped, however, 

in April 186 1, by the small size of its staff and the losses that secession 

brought to its ranks. Including the chid, the Department's authorized 

strength was onl y 12. At the beginning of the war, 4 officers resigned, 

3 of whom joined the Confederate Army. Obviousl y. 8 officers could 

not hope to provision an army of the size then being ca ll ed into the field. 

On 3 August, Congress enacted legislation that added another 12 commissaries to the Department's sta ff, to be taken from the line of the Army, 

either of the Volunt«r or Regular Army.18~ Four of these commissaries 

were to have the rank, pay, and emolumenlS of majors of cavalry and 

eight, of captains of cavalry. With the Commissary General of Subsistence holdi ng the rank of colonel and a lieutenant colonel designated as 

assistant, the staff of the Department now tota led 24 officers. About a 

year and a half later, Congress, to promote the efficiency of the Department, increased the rank of its chief to that o[ brigadier general and 

added fi ve commissaries so that the staff [or the rest of the war numbered 

29 olTicers.m These oRkers were the chief purchasing agents of the 

Department, commanded the general subsistence depolS, and served as 

chief commissaries with the armies in the field. 

For many years the Subsistence Depanment had been procuring 

rations by awarding contracts to those who submitted the lowest bids in 

response to the Department's public advertisements for proposals. This 

method o[ procurement was continued during the war. The legislation 

enacted by Congress to protect the interests o[ the government was as 

applicable to procurement by commissaries as by quartermasters.1n 

While the Subsistence Department procured most rations by contract, 

Taylor early in the war advised Cameron that wartime needs would also 

have to be filled by open·market purchases. Possibly to forestall any 

proposed changes, he added that the experience of the Florida and 

Mexican Wars had proved that the bulk of subsistence supplies were best 

procured in the large cities by officers who also s~perintended their 

packing. 1tT 

(2) Taylor had joined the Anny in 1813 and at the time of hb appoimment as Commissary 

Gener.ll of Subsistence had Krved for ! 2 yean in the Subsistence: Department. His successor. 

Am0i5 B. Eaton, a gr.lduate of West Point, had been an officer of the Department for 26 yean . 

... 12 Slat. 287. 

''"12 Sin/. 648 (Feb 9. 1863). The staff now consisted of the Comminary General of 

Subsistence, one colonel and one lieutenant colonel. both designated as auiltant commlu ary 

generals, and eight majors and 18 captains appointed as commissaries . 

.. Sec: above. pp. !45-48. 

'""RG 192, Records of eGS, Letters to SW, 18&1-66. p. 146 (7 May 1861). 
384 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

The crisis of April 186 1 made it possibl e for contractors to wring 

profitable contracts £Tom the Department. T he annual supply of rations 

for the troops stationed at the western posts had already been procured 

by contract and was then in transit. Since most of the Army until that 

time was stationed on he frontier, the Department possessed few sub· 

sistence stores on the Atlantic Coast to meet any emergency. The large 

force that collected at Washington and the isolation of the city in April 

made it necessary for the Department to procure beef without delay. 

Failing to obtain bids, the Department contracted with A. H . Sibley. 

Thomas Dyer, George W. Lawman, and H. Tyler for 2,000 to 10,000 

head of cattle to be delivered at Washington at 8 cents per pound gross 

and at some poim in Pennsylvania at 50/.1 cems per pound gross. 

Subsequently, the congressional committee investigating contracts 

uncovered the fact that these men were not dealers in cattle and that they 

sublet their contract to certai n New York dealers, Joseph H . Williams 

and David and Archibald M. Allerton, who furnished the cattle at 6Y2 

cents per pound gross we ight in Washington and 5 cents in Pennsylvania. 

The latter still made a profit but the original contractors secured an even 

greater profit as middl emen. Disregarding the supply and transportation 

situation at the time the contract was made, the committee condemned 

the manner in which it was awarded and charged "gross mismanagement, 

a total disregard of the interests of the government, and a total recklessness in the expenditure of the funds of the government. " 188 The rapid 

restora tion of communications between Washington and the East shortl y 

altered the supply situation, and the Subsistence Department promptly 

cancelled the contract. According to the Commissary General of Subsistence, onl y 2,000 head of cattle were delivered, of which a little more 

than 500 were received in Washington and the remainder at Harrisburg, Pa. I I ' The Department executed additional contracts at St. Louis 

and elsewhere d uring the early months of the war. 

T he Subsistence Department purchased subsistence supplies in the 

markets of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, 

Cincinnati, Louisville, Chicago, and S1. Louis during the war. In cach 

of these cities, commissaries in charge of the subsistence depot procured 

and rece ived supplies in bulk, subj ect to inspection. After the suppli es 

were packed, the Quartermaster's Department transported them to the 

depots in the fi eld. Flour and beef were exceptions to this procedure. 

Commissaries procured flour under contract but usually at points near 

the armies. Commissaries also procured fresh beef for the troops by 

""Government Contncu," House Rflt. No.2. !17m Cong., 2d 5eSS., pp. 67--68. I.n. 1142. 

~ also t~ imo y, pp. 160-69 . 

.. OR, seT. III. vol. I, pp. 676-77 [Taylor to Cameron. 26 Nov 1861). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR B85 

BEEF ON nlE HOOF 

purchasing cattle under contract, receiving them from the contractors at 

convenient delivery points. and then driving them to and with the armies 

in the numbers required.'" As the war progressed. the Department 

supplied rations not only to the severa l large armies occupying widely 

different fields o[ operations and to the troops garrisoned at posts throughout the country. but also to prisoners of war and to contrabands. 

During the opening months of the war, a considerable amount of 

confusion hampered the Department'S operations. It fai led to gel reports 

from the armies and knew little of the subsistence suPPOrt being given to 

troops outside of the Washington area. It learned that the troops at 

Cairo were being well supplied, but the army in West Virgi nia had 

suffered not only because of the difficulty of transporting rations over 

mountain roads. but because its officers had not known the proper depot 

from wh ich to draw rations. The total ignorance of their duties ex· 

hibited by many brigade commissaries appointed fTOm civil lire resu lted 

,00 RG 192. Re<:ords or CGS. Lett!! ... to SW. 1864-66. p. 295 (Annual Rpt . TayloT to 

Stanton. 29 Oct 1865); p . ,S62 (Annual Rpt. uton to Stanton. 14 Oct 1864). 
386 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

in numerous irregularities in accounts and increased th e work of the 

staff in the Washington office.U1 Time and experience corrected these 

difficulties. Despite speculative dealers and the attempts of some associated houses to monopolize and control the prices of particular sub· 

sistence items, the Subsistence Department supplied the troops with 

abundant rations. In the course of military operations. temporary 

scarcities did exist but the Commissary Ceneral of Subsistence could take 

pride in asserting that no campaign, contemplated movement, or expedition failed because the Department did not supply subsistence. " 1 

Obviously, the impact of war in April 1861 on the suppl y departments was overwhelming. They were called upon to provide for a force 

many times the size of the sma ll prewar Army, without the cushion 

afforded by ample reserve stocks. Under the demands of the emergency, 

the procurement efforts of the small sta ff of the Quartermaster's Depart. 

ment were supplemented by those of state authorities, regimenta l offi cers, 

and federal agents. Unfortunately, though patriotism ran high, igno· 

rance of regulations and laws protecting the government's interests, loose 

procedures, and inexperience provided a basis for procurement blunders 

and impositions. When coupled with cupidity, both in and out of the 

Army, they resulted in the scandals that marked the opening months of 

the Civil War. 

Under the able administration of General Meigs. control over 

Quartermaster responsibilities was reasserted, first in the procurement 

of clothing and equipment, and, by 1863, in the transportation of men 

and supplies. Procurement tended to become centralized in the Wash· 

ington offi ce, and, as will become evident in a review of field operations, 

greater regularity and control of Quartermaster fu nds was brought about 

in the field. ]n consequence, the opportunities for fraud became more 

limited, while, at the same time, the increased experience gained by 

Volunteer quartermasters reduced the possibi lities for imposition. 

Despite the record of scandals in the early months of the war, the 

majority of the Volunteer quartermasters were honest men, some of whom 

filling positions of heavy responsibility. were brevetted for their services. 

With few exceptions, the Departmental quartermasters holding appo int· 

ments in the Regular Army won praise, in th e midst of the scandals 

exposed by congressional in vestigating committees, for their fideli ty and 

capacity. The efforts of Meigs were, in fact, ably supported by the work 

of such outstanding and experienced Departmental quartermasters in 

the field as Rufus Ingalls, Chief QuartermaSter of the Army of the 

'''Ibid., pp. 175-76 (J'aylor to SW, 26 Nov 18(1) . 

... OR, $Cr. III , vol. V, p. 146 (Allnual Rpl, 20 Oct 1865). 
IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR 387 

Potomac; Daniel H. Rucker, Chief Quartermaster of the Washington 

Depot; Robert Allen, Chief Quartermaster of the Mississippi Valley; 

James L. Donaldson, Chief Quartermaster of the Department of the 

Cumberland; and Langdon C. Easton, Chief Quancrmaster of Sherman's 

Army. all of whom were brevetted major generals for their faithful and 

meritorious service during the war. 

CHAPTER X 

Quartermaster Field Operations m 

the Civil War 

T he Quartermaster organi7.alion in lhe fi eld absorbed the greater 

part of the Department personnel. Except (or the few officers who 

directed the work o[ the divisions in the office of the Quartermaster 

General in Washington. all quartermasters were assigned to posts in the 

fi eld. Some of them held key positions to carry out Quartermaster 

responsibilities in the military departments, but the great majority of 

them during the war were assigned to suppOrt the tactical units of the 

Army. 

Field OTganizalion 

For administrative purposes, the states and territories of the United 

States were grouped in geographica l areas ca ll ed military departments. 

Quartermaster duties had to be executed not only in those constituting 

immediate theaters of operations but also in areas remote from them, 

such as the Pacific Coast. It had been customary [or the Quartermaster 

General to assign a chief quartermaSler to each military department in 

the years of peace, but, in view of the shortage of personnel during the 

war, it was not unusual to group two or three military departments under 

one chief quartermaster. On the basis of troop strength, the latter 

prepared estimates of supplies and funds needed in his department, submitting them to the Quartermaster General through the departmental 

commander.' The chief quartermaster also closely examined all vouchers 

for supplies purchased in his department and through his hands passed 

the funds for their paymelll. He fill ed requisitions made upon him by 

troops Slationed at posts in his geographical area as well as by an army 

operating in the field. Normally, he had little direct contaCt with combat 

operations, though on occasion he might go forward to an advance area 

to eliminate confusion and delays occurring in supply operations. 

T he military department was the basic organizational unit for admi nistrative purposes. During the war, the number of such military 

' For later modification sec pr. 392- 9'. 
390 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

departments tcnded to increase and repeated changes were made in their 

geograph ical boundaries. In some cases, a dep.1.rtment was divided to 

form two military departments, in others, a part of a department was set 

up as a military district. O n th e olher hand, this tendency was offset to 

a certain degree by a move toward consolidation. In some few instances, 

several military departments were grouped LOgether to form a single 

geographical division, as for example. the Military Division of the 

Mississippi, which, under Sherman in the spring of 1864, included the 

Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland, Tennessee. and Arkansas. 

In addition to this Quartermaster administrative organization in the 

military departments, there was also a Quartermaster field organization 

that supported the tactical units of the Army. It expanded in direct 

proportion to the increase in the size of the Army. ''''hen Congress 

enacted legislation authorizing the President to accept the services of 

volunteers, it directed that they were to be formed into regiments, 

brigades, and divisions. At the same lime, Congress provided that each 

Volunteer regiment raised was to have a Quartermaster-sergeant and a 

quartermaster, and each brigade, an assistant quartermaster as in the 

Regular Army.· Unfortunately; volunteers appointed to such posts 

were, for the most part, inexperienced. Their ignorance of regu lations 

and of their duties and responsib ilities as Quartermasters promoted confusion in supply and irregularity in accou nting for the public property 

placed in their charge. It took several months for them to acquire the 

rudimentary knowledge needed to perform the ir duties, but if they had 

integrity and some business ability they could become satisfactory quartermasters. Until time provided the experience they needed, the regular 

quartermasters were overworked and calls poured into the Washington 

office from harassed quartermasters in the field for assignment to them 

of additional assistant quartermasters.· 

The colonel of a regiment appointed the Quartermaster-sergeant and 

the regimental Quartermaster, the latter holding the rank of lieutenant. 

The Quartermaster-sergeant issued supplies to the troops and, in general, 

assisted the regimental quartermaster who had charge of the property of 

the Quartermaster's Department with the regiment- that is, the tents 

and equipage belongi ng to the regiment, and of the wagons, harness, and 

animals of the regimental train. He also req uisitioned for the supplies 

• (I) 12 $'"'. 269, 270 Ou] 2'2. ]861). (2) The Quartermimer field organiution was funher 

expanded by the addition of more brigade, regiment al. and battalion quanemla5ten and 

(luanerrnaster·lICrgc:antS wh~ Congn:ss enacted legislation ~larging the size of the Regu]ar 

Army a week laler. 12 SIIII. 280 aul 28. 1861). 

'(I) RG 92. Grosman. Leiter Book, l'I May-24 Aug 1861 . No. 177 (Crosman to Meigs. 

20 Jun. 18 Jul 1861). (2) RG 92. OQ~fG Consolidated Correspondence File. Box 944 (Rpl of 

Brig. G~. D. H. Rucker. 2'2 Jul 1865). National Archives. 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 391 

needed by the regiment and received and issued to the proper officers 

the clothing, forage, and other supplies furnished by the Department for 

the use of the regiment. 

Two or morc regiments constituted a brigade. and to each brigade 

the President appointed an assistant quartermaster with the rank of 

captain. Usually call ed a brigade quartermaster, he received and transferred to the proper officer all property and supplies furnished for the 

use of the brigade. He also had charge of the brigade train, its material, 

and animals.' 

Two or morc brigades formed a division. There was no division 

without its quartermaster, for he performed duties for the d ivision similar 

to tbose executed at brigade level by the brigade quartermaster. Division 

quartermasters were indispensably necessary officers, but for the first 3 

years of the war, though they were recognized in general orders, they had 

no legal position in the Army. It was not until the summer of 1864 that 

Congress provided for the appointment of division quartermasters with 

the temporary rank of major while so assigned.' 

In addition to these regu larly appointed officers, the Department 

made use of the serv ices of hundreds of acting quartermasters during the 

war. Quartermaster General Meigs tried to get authority for the commanding general in the field to confer acting appointments as captains 

and assistant or brigade quartermasters upon officers of the Army, with 

the understanding that they would be nominated to the Senate by the 

President on the basis of the commanding general's recommendation. 

Meigs was induced to take this step by his inability to supply enough 

experienced quartermasters to the Army of the PotOmac in 1862. Un-

(ortunately, the pressure exerted by Congressmen in favor of their 

constituents who sought such posts made it difficult [or the President and 

the Secretary o[ War to grant such authorization.e Acting appointments 

continued to be conferred, but the recipients were not always confirmed 

in office by the Senate. 

Regular and Volunteer troops were organized at first in armies, but 

from the beginning of the war the idea of the army corps had prevailed. 

It was not until 17 July 1862, however, that Congress passed an act 

legal izing them and authorizi ng the President to appoint a chief quartermaster with the rank of lieutenant colone l to the staff of the army corps 

commander. Either Regular or Volunteer officers of the Quartermaster's 

• Anuual Reports of Ih e QlUlrlermllsler Gutu al, 1861- 1865, p. 20 (Rpt, 18(4). 

I (I) 13 Sillt. ~94 Uul 4, 18(4). (2) RG 92, Personal Narrative ReporLS of Officers, QMD, 

for Fisca l Year Ending 30 June 1863. vol. VI. 931 - 32 (Capl. J. F. Rusling's Rpl, 20 Sep 1863). 

Hereafter briefly cited as Personal Narrative RplS, F.Y. 1863. (3) RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, 

vol. 75. p. 206 (Meigs to Hon. R. C. S<;henck, II Mar 1864). 

' OR, ser.I, vol. X I, 111- 12 (Meigs to Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, 19 Apr 18(2). 
392 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Department could be designated by th e Quanermaster Ceneral for such 

assignment, but both rank a nd pay were temporary, ending with reassIgnment of the officer to other dULY or with the close of the war. l 

When severa l corps were united into an army, a chief quartermaster 

of the army was designated with the rank of colonel. H is duties were 

administrative and supervisory. He served as the chi ef disbursing agent, 

providing all funds for his subordinates in the army. as for exampl e, fu nds 

needed by corps quartermasters to meet the payrolls for a ll persons 

employed in the Quartermaster's Department in their several commands. 

He requ ired monthly and semi-monthly reports from all offi cers in his 

department on the condition of all property- wagons, animals, c1Olhing, 

a nd other supplies- in th eir charge, and th e amounts Ihey needed to 

complete the equipment of their troops. He caused supplies to be 

brought forward from the depots under h is control for distribution to 

the troops. He consolidated estimates of additional supplies needed and 

not available in the depots, and he a lso prepa red estimates of funds 

required. 

At the beginning of the war, a ll such estimates went to the Q uartermaster General. By 1863, to reduce the number of disbursing agents 

and bring about greater regularity and control over Quartermaster funds, 

Meigs designated senior a nd supervising quartermasters. There were 

two at that date in the M ississippi a nd Ohio valleys- Brig. Gen. Robert 

Allen at St. Louis, who acted as sen ior and supervisi ng quartermaster for 

the Departments of the Northwest, Missouri, Tennessee, a nd Kansas, and 

Colonel T homas Swords, stationed sometimes at Louisville and at other 

times at Cincinnati, who performed the same fu nction for the Departments of the Ohio and the Cumberl and. 

Not only the chief quartermasters of the military departments but 

the chief quartermasters of armies in the field in those areas forwarded 

their consolidated estimates for fu nds and for supplies to the senior and 

supervising quartermaster who supplied the funds or advised Washington 

of the best mode of sending a ny required, eith er by transfer from the 

office of the supervising quartermaster or by direct remittance to the 

chief quartermaster of the army. T he supervising quartermaster a lso 

forwarded supply estimates to th e Quartermaster Genera l with letters of 

advice to g uide the Department in the action to be taken. Thus, when 

Maj. Langdon C. Easton served as Chief Quartermaster with Sherman's 

• (I> 12 Stllt. 598-99. (2) In the past such officers had moved with the corps commander 

when he was reassigned. Under th is law the officer, once assigned, remained permanently 

attached to the corps, without regard 10 the mm'ement or the corps commander, until 

reassigned by Ihe President. General Orders of tht: Wlir Dt:Jxlrlmt:,jl 1861- 1862, I. 471 

(GO 2 12, 23 Dec 1862). 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN T H E CIVIL WAR 393 

army in its march to Atl anta in 1864, his estimates for supplies went back 

to th e depot at Nashville and his estimates for funds were sent to Lt. Col. 

James L. Donaldson, th en senior and supervising quartermaster stationed 

there as Chief Quartermaster of the Department of the Cumberland. 

On the other hand, this system was not applied in the military departments in the East or on the Gulf, chief quartermasters of which continued 

to send their estimates directly to the Quartermaster General. The 

Army of the Potomac also formed an exception; its Chief Quartermaster, 

Brig. Gen . Rufus Ingalls, sent his estimates directly to th e Quartermaster 

General. 1 

Each offi cer, from regimenta l quartermaster to chief quartermaster 

of an army, exercised a general supervision over th e officers and agents 

subordinate to him and within his command. Each took his orders 

and instructions from the commander of the body of troops to which 

he was attached and also from his immediate superior in the Quartermaster's Department. A corps quartermaster, for example, obeyed the 

orders of the corps commander and the chief quartermaster of the army. 

The chief quartermaster of a military department took his orders from 

the Quartermaster Genera l and also from the commanding general of the 

military department. T his last-named officer was also usua lly the commanding general of th e department's mobile forces, the latter being 

named the army of the military department. 

It was 1864 before the final deta ils of th is field organization were 

enacted into law by Congress. The system had existed from the beginning of th e war but compl ete gradations in rank had not been established. 

During the first 3 years of th e war, the Vol unteer quartermaster organization in the fi eld had onl y three grades- lieutenant for regimental q uartermasters, ca ptain for brigade quartermasters, and lieutenant colonel for 

corps quartermasters. Quartermasters assigned to depots usually were 

assistant quartermasters, with the rank and meager pay of captains, yet 

in some insta nces they conducted a business that amounted to millions 

of dollars a year. 

Early in the war, the low status of certai n key quartermasters was 

improved by assigning them to the staff of th e commanding general as 

additional or acting aides-de-camp, with th e rank of lieutenant colonel 

or colonel. For example, Lewis B. Parsons, an expert on transportation 

in civilian life, was appoin ted an assistant quartermaster with the rank 

of captain . Assigned to St. Louis under Chief Quartermaster Robert 

All en , Parsons supervised all river transportation first on the Mississippi 

and subsequently on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers as well. To 

give rank commensurate with his responsibilities, he was appointed an 

' Clloumd Ordllr.! of 11111 QllarlllTnlo.!ler Ctfltral, 1862- 186j (CO 21 , 8 Oct 186!!). 
394 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T HE ARMY 

additional aide-dc-camp on the staff of Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, 

with the rank of colonel. Not all quartermasters could be so accommodated. Assistant Quartermaster James J. Dana, for example, was in 

charge of the receipt and issue of all means of land transportationhorses, mules, wagons, ambulances, harness, and forage-used in the 

service of the Washington Depot during fiscal year 1863, as well as all 

that were issued to the Army of the Potomac and other troops serving 

in Virginia. He had over 1,000 teams in use ; employed, in any given 

month, 4,000 to 7,000 men; and expended millions of dollars. yet his 

Tan k remained that of captain. Because rank and pay were not given in 

proportion to the importance of the responsibilities carried by Quartermaster officers, dissatisfaction grew to such an extent that by the end of 

1863 the Department was threatened with the loss of many of its most 

experienced officers by esig at n. ~ 

Meigs solicited the support of commanding generals in the fi eld and 

worked hard to convince Congress that the need for gradation in rank 

was urgent. He secured recognition for his field officers in the reorganization act of 1864, though not to the extent that he had hoped to obtain. 

Congress extended the gradation of rank from lieutenant through colonel, 

and gave to quartermasters at principal depots the rank of colonel. It 

made all rank temporary, however, to last during assignment to tile 

designated post or to the cnd of the war.I O By the close of the fisca l year 

ending 30 June 1864, the War Department gave additional recognition 

for their valuable services to some Quartermaster officers who held important and responsible positions. It commissioned them as brigadier 

generals of Volunteers or as brevet brigadier generals." 

M ililary Railroads 

T he transportation of men and supplies was one of 

pOl·tant functions execUled by Quartermasters in the field . 

the most imT his entailed 

• RG 92. OQMG Letter Book, vol. 75. pp. 236-38. 396-98 (MeilJ$ to Chairman of Senate 

Military Committee, 12 and 28 Mar 1864); pr. 438-39 (~ ejlJ$ to Brig. Cen. Robert Allen. 

31 Mar 1864). 

'" 13 Sial. 394 Qui 4, 1864). 

U Among those 50 recognized we re the following: Chief Quartermaster of the Army of 

the Potomac, Rufm Ingalls. who was commissioned a brigadier general of Volunteers in 1863. 

Langdon C. Easton, Chief Quartermaster to Sherman's anny. and J ames L. Donaldson and 

Robert Allen. who supp lied lhal army from Nashville and Louisville, respectively, were 

breveued brigadier generalll in 1864 for distinguished service. All of these officers were 

brevetted major genera ls in 1865. For a list of Quarlemlasle r officers brevetted during the 

war, sec AnlllIal Rellorls of the Q!<arlermasler Geneml, 1861-186', pp. 390-93 (QMC's Rpt. 

1865). 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 395 

the provision and management of wagon trains, the employment of all 

forms of water transportation, and the use of military railroads. 

The Civil War saw the first large-scale use of railroads by the Army 

and marked the first infringement since 1775 of the transportation responsibility of the Quartermaster's Department. The first extension of 

government authority over the railroads occurred in April 186 1 when 

Brig. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler. without official authorization, took possession of the Annapolis and Elk Ridge Railroad, the tracks of which had 

been torn up for several miles, and began making repairs to enable him 

to move his troops to Washington. Before the end of the war, the government operated more than 2,000 miles of road in Rebel territory.t2 

Butler's action was soon followed by the temporary extension of government control over the Washington branch of the Baltimore and Ohio 

Railroad between Relay House and Annapolis Junction. Within less 

than a month, Cameron, who had appointed Thomas A. Scott to take 

charge of the railways and telegraphs between Washington and Annapolis, 

gave him jurisdiction over all such facilities appropriated for government 

use. 18 All instructions relating to the extension of such roads and their 

operation on government account had to emanate from Scott's office. 

For the first time, a transportation and communications office was 

established in the War Department, and for the first time the broad 

responsibility of the Quartermaster's Department for transportation was 

limited. The Department was to have nothing to do with the operation 

of military railroads. On the other hand, it was called upon to support 

railroad reconstruction. Even before Scott took over, the Secretary of 

War had directed the Department to supply the necessary means for 

repairing and keeping in order the railroad from Annapolis to Washington. a When Scott assumed control. he was bonded as a disbursing agent 

and the Departmenl's duties were restricted to signing requisitions upon 

his estimates.u Scott's efforts and those of Capt. R. F. Morley, whom 

Scott selected to serve as general manager under his authority, were 

directed primarily to reopening communication via (he Baltimore and 

Ohio Railroad and extending that road through Washington into northern Virginia where, at Alexandria, connections could be made with a 

.. House Ex. Doc. No. I, 39th Cong., ht sess., pp. 9, 28, 37, S.n. 1251 (Rpt of Bvt Brig. Gen. 

D. C. McCallum). 

" OR, .!oCr. I, vol. II , 603 (Cameron to Whom II May Concern, 27 Apr 1861); ser. liT, vol. I. 

228 (Cameron to Scon, 23 May 18(1). 

" RG 107, OSW, Military Book, vol. 43. pp. 301-02 (Cameron to Sibley. 7 May 18(1). 

'"(I) Ibid., vol. 45, p. 66 (Cameron to Meigs, 15 Jul 1861). (2) RG 92. OQMG Leiter Book, 

vol. 56, p. 125 (Meigs 10 2d Comptroller. 26 Jul 18(1). (3) RG 92, Rpf5 and Ltrs from QMG 

to SW and Heads o( Depts .. I, 270 (Meigs to Sunton, 28 Feb 18(2). 
396 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

branch of the Alexandria, Loudon and Hampshire Railroad and the 

Orange and Alexandria line. 

These initial arrangements were changed early in 1862. Edwin M. 

Stanton succeeded Simon Cameron as Secretary of War on 15 January, 

and about 2 weeks later Congress provided a legal basis for the seizure 

of railroads and telegraph lines by the government. In authorizing the 

President to take military possession of the country's railroads. Congress 

conferred upon the Secretary of War, and such agents as he might appoint, 

the power to control and supervise all railroad transportation of troops, 

munitions, military property, and supplies.' o The law was broad in 

scope, but there was no need to exercise that power in the loyal states, 

where the managers and superintendents of the railroads fully supported 

the war effort. When the armies advanced into the insurgent states, 

it became necessary for the government to take possession of, repair, and 

operate railways abandoned by their owners and stripped of their equipment or partially destroyed by the Confederate forces. T hat policy did 

not apply to such roads as the Baltimore and Ohio or the Louisville and 

Nashville Railroads whose lines lay partly in enemy territory. To a 

large extent, they made their own repairs and the government paid for 

their services. Because these lines were important to military plans, the 

government did assist in their reconstruction and provided track protection through the use of troops. 

In exercising the powers conferred upon him. Stanton eased Scott 

out of his supervisory position by sending him to the West on an inspection trip. On 11 February 1862, he appointed Daniel C. McCallum as 

his military director and superintendent of railroads in the United States. 

McCallum was responsible to the War Department and reported directly 

to Stanton. 1f The Secretary conferred full authority upon McCallumto enter upon, take possession of, hold and use all railroads, engines, cars, 

locomotives, equipments, appendages, and appurtenances, that may be required for the transport of troops, arms, ammunitton, and military supplies of the 

United States, and to do and perform all acts and things that may be necessary 

and proper to be done for the safe and speedy transport aforesaid. iS 

'· 12 SI(JI. 334-35 Oan !H, 1862). 

17 (I) House Ex. Doc. No. I. 39th Cong., ht sess .. p. 5, I.n. 1251 (McCallum Rpt, 26 May 

1866). (2) Meigs observed t.hat there was "I' liule confusion" in McCallum's position. Though 

the Secretary of War appointed him. he infonned Meigs that McCallum would be under 

his orders. Stanton . however. was apt to give McCallum instructions direct. and the laner 

enjoyed a quasi·independence and did communicate directly with the Secretary. Meigs 

considered the military rai lroad agency to be under his direction, and it was he who ordered 

McCallum to the West to take charge of the railroad operations on the Nashville and 

Chauanooga line. RG 92. OQMG Leuer Book. IS80-D, GelJeral and Miscellaneous. pp. 

2060-61. 

"Ibid., p. 5. 
/ 

FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 397 

Stanton indicated, however, that he wanted all procurement conducted through offi cers of the Quartermaster's Department. In effect, 

the Department became the procurement agency for the Office of the 

Director and Genera l Manager of [he Military Railroads." McCallum 

arranged for his sources of supply, and Meigs approved the requisitions he 

submitted for locomotives, cars, equipment. and railroad supplies. As 

soon as the initial demands of the service had been met, however, Meigs 

insisted that his Department "should be morc particularly advised in 

regard to the operations of that branch of the service which calls upon it 

so largely for money and supplies for Rail Road use." In consequence, 

McCallum also submitted reports to Meigs.10 

Under Meigs' orders, quartermasters executed contracts for the railroad equipment and supplies that McCa ll um required. Thus, in the 

spring and summer of 1862, McClellan in northern Virginia and Burnside 

in North Carolina requested locomotives and cars. McCallum directed 

a survey of the rolling stock that was excess to the needs of the ra ilroads 

in the Northeast and, under Meigs' orders, Colonel Crosman and his 

assistant quartermaster, Captain Boyd, at Philadelphia, and another as· 

sistant quartermaster in the New England area purchased surplus locomotives, flatcars, and boxcars.z, To expedite the Quartermaster business 

of the Office of the Director of Military Railroads, Meigs assigned an 

assistant quartermaster, Capt. H. R. Robinson, to that office. He served 

in that pOSt throughout the war and made numerous trips to New York 

and the New England area to purchase and direct the Shipment of equipment and supplies needed by the military railroad service as well as to 

sell by auction scrap iron collected along the rolltes of the military 

railroads in Virginia .z~ 

McCallum's appointment would appear to have conferred upon him 

all-incl usive authority, but while he was still preoccupied with the organization of his office, Stanton reduced his juriSdiction at least temporarily. He called in Herman Haupt, an outstanding railroad construction engineer, in April 1862 to reconstruct and open a military railroad 

between Fredericksburg and Aquia Creek to be used by Maj. Gen. Irvin 

McDowell as his supply line.u Subsequently, to clarify Haupt'S position, 

>O RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, vol. 58, p. 459 (Meigs 10 Tompkins. 26 Mar 1862). 

"'{I) Ibid., vol. 60. p. SOl (Meigs !O McCallum. 25 Feb 186l). (2) See. for example. 

RG 92, Reporl of Genl. D. C. McCallum. :w Jun 1864. U.S.M.R.R. 

*' {I> RG 92, OQMG Lener Book. vol. 60. pp. 228-31 (McCallum 10 Meigs. 21 May 1862). 

(2) RG 92, USMRR, Military Rai1ro~d Telegram Book. Uuly August 1862). pa5sim . 

a RG 92, Annual Reports of QM Officers, !lox 16 (Robinson's Rpts. 12 Sep 186l, 28 Nov 

1864,28 <xt 1865). 

"'General Hermall Haupt . Rt:milli5cerlcel (Milwaukee, 19(1). pp. 44--47. 
398 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Stanton named him Chief o( Construction and Transportation in th e 

Department of the Rappahan nock. He authorized him to lise whatever 

means were necessary to open all military railroads in that Department; 

prescribe rules and regulations; appoint assistants, defi ne their duties, 

and fix their compensation; requ isition details of men for purposes of 

construction or protection ; and purchase a ll machinery, rolling stock, 

and supplies required for the operation of the ra ilroads, certifying the 

same to the Quartermaster General, who was to make payment fo r them. 

In addition, he authorized Haupt to form a permanent corps of artificers, 

eq uipped as he ordered; supplied with rations, tools, and implements, 

obtained by making requisitions upon the proper supply departments; 

paid such rates of compensation as he deemed expedient; and governed 

by rules and regulations he prescri bed. 2' 

T his authorization was the basis for the organization of the Con· 

struction Corps, which not only bu ilt railroad bridges and laid and 

repaired track but a lso constructed wharves and, when not otherwise 

occupied, erected storehouses, offices, and hospita l facilities at depots, as, 

for example, at City Point, Va.u The personnel of this Corps received 

rations from the Subsistence Department and were clothed, equipped, 

supplied with materials for reconstruction purposes, and were paid by 

the Quartermaster's Departmem. From a few hundred men, the Corps 

expanded to nearly 10,000 before th e war ended. 

Haupt insisted on civilian operation of military railroads by qualified trained personnel-an objective not ach ieved without considerable 

opposition from commanding officers as well as quartermasters. When 

Maj. Gen. John Pope took over command of the newly created Army of 

Virgi nia in June 1862, he tried operating the military railroads without 

Haupt. He thought that since the railroads were used to tra nsport army 

supplies they should be under the control of the Quartermaster's Department, a viewpoint with which a number of quartermasters in the fi eld 

agreed. Since few Army officers understood rai lroad management or the 

strategic use of railroads. Pope soon found th e roads blocked, few trains 

moving, and the confusion so great as to hamper supply of his army. 

Haupt was recall ed after this expensive experi ment. 28 

Early in June 1862. Haupt had published regulations aimed at eliminati ng in terference with railroad transportation by Army officers. All 

orders in regard LO the movement of (ra ins had to be given by the superintendent or his local representatives, the dispatchers at stations. Nor 

"on, ser. I. vol. XII . 1'1. III . 274-75 (Stanton to Haupt. 28 May 18-62) . 

.. RG 92. OQMG Consolidated Correspondeuce File, 80:< 159 (Ingalls [0 Meigs. 24 JUIl 

[865) . 

.. Haupt. llemi>li.la:uct:.I, p. 270. 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 399 

QUARTERMASTER DEPOT, CITY POINT, VA. 

could orders from any other source be obeyed if they were in conflict 

with instructions, unless issued by the commanding general or the chief 

of transportation. No quartermaster, commissary, or any other officer 

had the right to detain a train or order it to Tun in advance of its scheduled timc. 21 On 25 June, he published additional orders, positively 

forbidding assistant quartermasters and commissaries to load cars with 

any freight that was not properly included among the stores of their 

respective Departments. This provision excluded the shipment of articles 

intended for the private lise of officers. individuals, or sutlers. The 

latter could transport goods only on the basis o[ a permit obtained from 

the Quartermaster Genera l. 2I 

Application of such regulations restored regularity to the railway 

service in Virginia, but it took persistent efforts to overcome the confusion 

resulting from detention of trains beyond schedul e time and the delays 

that occurred in unloading cars. 2& When the theater of operations 

... OR, seT. III, vol. II, 102- 05 (2 Jun 1862) . 

• Haupt, Remilli.lcflrlces, pp. 67-68 . 

• For an ellampie of the controversy that devcJopcd between quartermasters in the field 

and transportation agents on the military railroads. see OR, ser. I. vol. XIX, PI, II, 558-61: 

564--67, 
400 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

ENGI NE AND CARS OF U.S. MILITARY ORANGE AND ALEXANDRIA R.R. 

shifted from Virginia to Maryland in the fall of 1862, Haupt insisted 

that with proper management supply should present no d ifficulty. On 

the basis of causes that Haupt outlined as being prod uctive of blockades 

and irregularities in the railway service. Me igs issued orders that were 

to be followed by all officers and agents of his Department. On no 

account were they to detain trains beyond their regular starting time. 

If the sick and wounded were not ready for movement, or if supplies 

had not been prepared for shipment at the designated time, quartermasters were to call for extra trains rather than delay scheduled trains. 

Quartermasters also were cautioned not to forward supplies to advanced 

terminals of the military railroads until they were really needed. Nor 

were they to detain cars for use as storehouses but to unload and return 

them immediately.30 Continued application of these regulations brought 

an effective military ra ilroad system into operation in the East. 

Deve lopments in the western theaters of operations followed a differ-

.. (I) Haupl, RcminisCllllcts, p. 14!. (2) OR, ser. I, vol. LI, PI, I, pp. 867- 70 (Haupt to 

Halleck, 27 Scp 1862). (!) GC/l cr<ll Ordus 0/11111 Quorlllrmastllr Gllllllrol, 1862-/86' (Circular, 

lOcI 1862). 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 401 

em course. McCallum's authority was not extended to these theaters 

until 1864, and the wise regulations introduced by Haupt to put the 

military railroads in Virginia on an efficient operating basis were not 

applied in the West, though experienced railroadmen serving there, both 

in and out of the Army, were in complete agreement with his views and 

attempted to enforce similar regulations of their own. Until 1864, rail· 

road transportation in the western theaters was under the military control 

of the various commanding genera ls. Thus, after the capture of Corinth 

in the fall of 1862, General Halleck appointed Brig. Gen. James B. 

McPherson of his staff as superintendent of all railroads coming under 

government control by capture. To Brig. Gen. Grenville M. Dodge, 

an experienced railroad builder turned soldier, he assigned in June 1862 

the task of rebuilding and holding the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad between Columbus and Corinth. Dodge organized a pioneer corps 

of men from the troops under his command to reconstruct the road.8 1 

Subsequently, Col. Joseph D. Webster of Grant's staff succeeded 

McPherson, controlling all roads in western Tennessee. In the meantime, when Sherman was in command of- the forces in Kentucky at the 

beginning of the war, he appointed J. B. Anderson, formerly superintendent of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, as his confidential 

agent to look after and guard that road. When Buell succeeded Sherman 

and was intrusted with operations in central and eastern Tennessee, he 

continued Anderson in charge of railroads. The same course was followed by Rosecrans when he replaced Buell in October 1862. 

Quartermasters in the western theaters had no more responsibility 

for railroad operations than those in the East had. None of the railroad 

appointees of commanding generals reported to the chief quartermaster 

in the area concerned- that is, to Allen at St. Louis or Swords at Louisville-but. as in the eastern theaters, the Quartermaster's Department 

defrayed the costs of operation. On the orders of Halleck and Grant, 

Chief Quartermaster All en bought rolling stock amounting to over 

$292,000 by the summer of 1863. Swords also paid bills for engines 

and cars.n 

Commanding officers usually made requisitions for rolling stock on 

short notice. Colonel Parsons, who as transportation officer at St. Louis 

had to fill such requisitions, was highly critical of the lack of plans for 

securing a constant supply of equipment to be used on the roads acquired 

.. (I) Per.!ollal MUlIOirs of U. S. Or(101! (2 voll., New York, 1885-86). II, 48. (2) Jacob 

Randolph l'erkins, Trail.!. Rails (Iud Wllr (Indianapolis, 1929). pp. 87, 89-92 . 

.. (I) RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, vol. 70, pp. 42~24 (Meigs 10 Allen, 28 Jul 18M); vol. 71, 

pp. 172- 711; 175- 76 (Meigs 10 Haupl. 19 Aug 18(2). (2) RG 92, Lellers Issued, AQMG Oflke, 

Lou isville, 18 Feb-16 Jun 1862, pp. 170-71: 174-75 (Swords 10 Halle<:k, Anderson , Meigs, 10, 

I I , I II JUII 1862, respectively). 
402 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

as the armies advanced. Compelled to obtain engines and cars quickly, 

Parsons had to deprive some roads of their own rolling stock, equipment 

that they needed for effective operations. Annoying to the railroads, 

this method of procurement was also more costly and more productive 

of delays, Parsons argued. than if a supply of railroad equipment was 

kept on hand to meet emergency needs,aa No stockpiling of railroad 

supplies and equipment was effected in the Civil War. 

In addition to rolling stock, quartermasters in the western theaters 

had to furnish a wide variety of railroad supplies, such as cross ties, brake 

shoes, and innumerable types of tools. Markets for the purchase of these 

supplies were at Cincinnati, St. Louis, Chicago, and some of the eastern 

manufacturing towns. The local disbursing quartermasters in the field 

procured such supplies. ]n some cases, they also opened and operated 

machine shops, as, for example, at Columbus, Ky., and Corinth, Miss.1I 

As indicated, pioneer brigades carried out some of the reconstruction 

work in the western theaters. Such brigades were composed of mechanics 

and engineers who called for various supplies needed in their repair work. 

An assistant quartermaster in such a brigade was responsible for furnishing Quartermaster supplies, but, with his duties not precisely defined, 

he found great difficulty in distinguishing between supplies required to 

be furnished by his own Department and those by the Engineers.sa 

In some instances, local quartermasters in the West also had to 

undertake railroad repair work. Thus, on I October 1863. Capt. A. M. 

Tucker reported to the chief quartermaster at Louisville and was assigned 

to take charge of railroad construction in that city. Carrying out orders 

from Thomas A. Scott, he altered within 11 days the gauge of the tracks 

of the Louisville and Frankfort and the Lexington and Frankfort Railroads (some 95 miles in all) from 4 feet By:! inches to 5 feet. Cars and 

engines were made to conform. As a result. supplies could be loaded 

at Covington, Ky., and run through to the Army south of Nashville 

without transfer of freight at Louisville. At the same time, Assistant 

Quartermaster Tucker also constructed an extension of the Louisville 

and Nashville Railroad from its terminal to the banks of the Ohio River. 

On orders, he then extended the railroad track on the opposite shore from 

the terminus of the Jeffersonville Railroad at Jeffersonville to the river. 

By the end of November, it was possible to transfer 20 cars and 2 engines 

per day from the Jeffersonville Depot to the Louisville and Nashville 

Railroad terminus whereas before these extensions were constructed on 

- RG 92, Personal Narrative Rpn, F.Y. 186!1, IV. 558-61 (Panon's Rpt, 6 Oct 186!1). 

"' Ibid., II. 275-78 (Capt. C. Dutton. 16 Jan 1864). 

- Ibid., V, !l07-O8 (Rpl of Capt. John Stewart, 6 Oct 186!1). 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 403 

the Kentucky and Indiana sides of the river it had taken 2 weeks." 

These improvements had an important bearing on the ability of the 

Quartermaster's Department to supply the army at Chattanooga and 

Sherman's force in its campaign against Atlanta. 

Civilian laborers as we ll as troops were employed in the reconstruction of railroads in the western theaters and they were also hired for the 

operation of the roads. The disbursing quartermaster attached to the 

military railroads paid all wages due such employees. Capt. C. Dunon, 

assigned as assistant quartermaster at Columbus, Ky., when the Army 

with the Department o[ the Tennessee took over the Mobile and Ohio 

Railroad and the Mississippi Central. reported that an average of some 

1,100 men were employed on those roads and paid by him during fiscal 

year 1863.11 

A crisis in railroad transportation in the West developed in the fall 

of 1863 when Rosecrans, defeated by Bragg at Chickamauga and then 

besieged at Chauanooga, required men, munitions, rations, and supplies 

at once to enable him to hold on. Months earlier the War Department 

had become concerned about railroad transportation in the western 

theaters as rumors of corruption reached the Secretary of War. As a 

result. Stanton had sent an investigator, F. H. Forbes. who recommended 

that operation of the railroads by military authorities be abandoned." 

About the time Forbes submitted his findings. Stanton was obliged to 

meet the threat at Chattanooga by sending reinforcements at once. 

Under the direction of McCallum, ably assisted by the managers of the 

railway lines involved and the skillful direction of Scott at Louisville, 

the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, with their arms and equipment were 

transferred from the line of the Rappa hannock to the Tennessee, achieving what has been called "the accomplishment par exce ll ence in Civil 

War logistics."" 

Stanton sent Quartermaster General Meigs to Chattanooga to unsnarl 

the supply tangle. At Meigs' orders, Allen shifted his headquarters from 

S1. Louis to Louisville as the most convenient point for controlling 

suppl y intended for the army concentrating on the Tennessee River. 

T he Quartermaster General transferred L1. Col. James L. Donaldson from 

Baltimore to take charge of Quartermaster activities at Nashville, the 

advance base of operations. He relieved Maj. Langdon C. Easton of 

dULY at Fe. Leavenworth and assigned him as Chief Quartermaster of the 

Army of the Cumberland in the field near Chattanooga. To supplement 

- Ibid., F.Y. 1864. IV. 5U-38 (Rpl of Capl. Tucker. !SO Jun 1864). 

· ,bid., F.Y. 1863, II. 300 (Dullon's Ri" . 16 Jan 1864). 

- See RG 92, OQMG Con50lidalro Correspondence File, Box 517, for Forbes Reporl. 

- Feslus P. Summers. Tire Baltimore /lrrd Olrio ill lire Civil War (New York, 1939). p. 165. 
404 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

movement of supplies by rail, he made Colonel Parsons responsible for 

all transportation of supplies on the western rivers. This concentrated 

attack on the supply problem, ably supplemented by Grant's actions to 

secure a line of supplies, soon relieved the Army at Chattanooga from 

its distress}O 

In the meantime, a move toward civilian operation of military rail· 

roads in the West was also being made. On Stanton's orders, J. B. Anderson was appointed general manager of all railways in the possession of the 

government or that might be taken in the Departments of the Cumber· 

land, Ohio, and the Tennessee." The appointment and powers can· 

ferred on Anderson, however, were subject to Meigs' control. Stanton 

authorized the Quartermaster General to change, alter, or revoke them 

if Anderson failed in or neglected his duty. He also authorized Meigs 

to do everything proper to increase the efficiency of transportation.n 

Meigs directed his quartermasters to accumulate supplies at Nashville 

and, at his orders, Anderson soon had construction parties making repairs. 

After the victories at Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge had 

given the army "room to operate," as Meigs expressed it, he directed 

McCallum to hire a large number of men and send them with their tools 

and equipment to operate as a Construction Corps in the West. Meigs 

ordered McCallum, himself, to report to him at Chattanooga.n Anderson, unequal to the demands made upon him, was replaced by McCallum 

on 4 February 1864 as general manager. Thereafter, the system of 

civilian operation and maintenance of military railroads and Quartermaster procurement of railroad supplies and disbursement of funds that 

had been developed in the East was applied in the western theaters. So 

effective was the system that, in the Atlanta campaign, Sherman's forces 

were amply supplied although operating hundreds of miles from their 

base at Nashville and dependent on a single line of railroad in the heart 

of the enemy's country. So closely did the construction parties follow 

on the heels of the Army that, according to Sherman, "the locomotive 

whistle was heard in our advanced camps almost before the echo of the 

skirmish fire had ceased." H 

.. (I) Annual Rtports of tlu Quartermaster Gelleral, 1861-1865, pp. 6--7 (QMG's Rpl. 1864). 

(2) Personal M ellloirs of U. S. Grallt, II, !!2-40. 

"He was appoinled by Special Order on 19 OCI 1S6!!. General Orders of Ih e QuarterlIIaste r Gt neral, 1862- 1865 (GO 52, 25 Nov 1864) . 

.. on, XXXI. PI. Ill. pp. 190-91 (Slamon 10 Meigs. 19 Nov 186!!) . 

.. (I) OR, XII. PI. III, pp. 422- 2!! (Meigs 10 McCallum, 16 Dec 186!!). (2) House E:w:. Doc. 

No. I. 39th Gong .. ht se5S .• p. 12 (!'.f cCallum's Rpl , 26 May 1866) . 

.. <I) OR, ser. I, vol. XXXVIII, I'!. I, 8!! (10 Halleck. 15 Sep 1864). (2) RG 92. Inspection 

ReporL'l 10 Bvt. Brig. Gell. Jas. F. Rus1ing. ~5, I. 11- 18 (Rusling to Donaldson, 21 Aug 

1864). 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 405 

TRANSPORT STEAM~ R MISSIONARY ON T ENNY..s5R£ RIVIO.R 

R ole of River TmnstJ01'lation 

Allhough railroads pl ayed a primary role in the transportation of 

troops and supplies during the Civil War, river steamboats were as important as railroads in the western theater of operations, where the 

Mississippi, Cumberland, and Tennessee Rivers afforded passage into 

the heart of th e belligerent South. The means of transportation on the 

Ohio and Mississippi and their tributaries were all of the same lype. and 

generally ava ilable and adaptable to service at any point. River steamboats were so constructed as to make them well suited to the transportation of troops and supplies. They had a further advantage; they could 

be tied up almost anywhere along the river bank and unloaded without 

the necessity of constructing wharves or emptyi ng lighters as had to be 

done on the Atlantic coast, where the vessels employed were of such 

draught as to compel the use of these fa cilities. 

Enemy action did not stop ri ver navigation, though guerrillas and 

some rebel shore batteries fired at the steamboats. Such firing had to be 

most skillfully directed, however, to obstruct passage. Unlike the rail-
406 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

roads, there were no rails to tear up or bridges to destroy and thereby 

cut supply lines. When there were rumors of unusual guerrilla activity, 

quartermasters requested a gunboat escort for troop transports or steamboats carrying supplies. Thus, in the winter of 1862- 63, when guerrillas 

were reported to be infesting the Cumberland River, the transportation 

quartermaster at Louisville requested a convoy of gunboats to meet his 

fleet of II steamboats at the mouth of that river and escort it to the depot 

at Nashville.'IG Lower costs and the unlimited carrying capacity of river 

transportation gave it a decided advantage over railroads, particularly so 

if the road was a single-track line with accommodations for only a limited 

number of trains daily. A commissary officer estimated that an ordinary 

Ohio River steamer of 500 tons capacity could in one trip carry enough 

supplies to sustain for about 2 days a force of 40,000 men and 18,000 

animals requiring about 260 tons daily.u 

On the other hand, river transportation labored under certain 

handicaps that did not affect railroad transportation. Ice in winter and 

seasonal low water were disadvantageous factors that had to be taken 

cognizance of in planning campaigns and executing supply operations 

depending on the use of river steamboats. In addition, the management 

of river transportation was far more dilTlcult than in the case of railroads. 

The latter were large, established corporations, operating under the 

direction of able businessmen with whom the government could make an 

agreement for the transportation of troops and supplies at prices below 

the ordinary rates. But among steamboat owners, however able they 

were as individuals, their interests were as numerous and varying as the 

boats they operated, and it was impossible for the government to negotiate 

with any group of themY 

The War Department provided no focal point for management 

either because there was no one individual directing the use and employment of river boats for the government in 1861. Local quartermasters 

customarily arranged for the shipment of supplies and the transportation 

of troops. There were as many quartermasters chartering steamboats 

on the western rivers as there were posts located on the Ohio and Mississippi. Since each quartermaster was independent of the other, each made 

his own rules, regulations, and contracts. It inevitably followed that 

there was great variation in the rates allowed owners of boats chartered 

.. For criticism of the delays caused by the use of gunboats in convoying $teamboats, see 

RG 92, Quartermaster General Annual Reports, 80,. 14 (Rpt or Capl. John H. Ferry to 

l'anons, II May 18(3) . 

.. Sharpe, The Art 01 SU/lpl"ji"g Armies j" the Fie/d, p. 6~. 

"A1WUlli Reports 01 the QUIIT/emloster General, 1861- 186j, pp. 146-->17 (I>anon's Rpt, 

15 Oct 1865, appended to QMG's Rpl, 1865). 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 407 

by quartermasters at Cincinna ti, Louisvile, Cairo, and St. Louis. Since 

few quartermasters knew anything about the operation of steamboats or 

their fitness for special purposes, the opportunities for defrauding the 

government were numerous. Through ignorance and indifference as 

well as intentional connivance, some quartermasters allowed such extravagant rates that owners of every old boat, Colonel Parsons charged, saw, 

and "too often found, a fortune in its rotten ribs." 48 

Before November 1862, a small steamboat of 173 tons was chartered 

at St. Louis for a period of 18 months. first at $90 per day, the owner 

paying all expenses including fuel, and later at $80. the government 

furnishing fuel. A certified statement of the owners admitted that these 

rates yielded a fair compensation. In November, they sold the boat for 

$7,000, and the new owner, after making repairs costing $1,000, chartered 

his boat in another military department at a rate of $175 per day, the 

government furnishing the fuel. In 7 months, he cleared $14,752.38 

after all expenses had been paid and still claimed $2,000 more because of 

repairs. Still another boat valued at .$2 2,000 was paid at the rate of 

$73,000 per year. These were by no means isolated examples but were 

only two of the many sem to Washington by critics of the system.--

Colonel Parsons charged that "most boats in government employment, 

have paid their owners, net, more than their value, by a single year's 

service, while many have done it twice or three times over." 50 

Because there was no centralized supervision of river transportation, 

millions of dollars were wasted in unnecessary detention of boats. Even 

more important was the serious injury to the service that such detention 

might cause in an emergency. In other words, transports might be 

unnecessarily detained at a time when the principal point of supply for 

an army was dangerously short of transportation. For example, on 

2 October 1863, General Banks had sent an officer to St. Louis to hurry 

forward his requisitions lest his movements be seriously delayed, and 

General Sherman, hastening to the support of General Rosecrans, was 

equally urgent in demanding his supplies. On that date, the St. Louis 

transportation office had requisitions for the immediate transportation of 

over 6,500 mules, horses, and cattle, 600 wagons, and about 1,000 tons of 

other freight to General Banks' command at New Orleans, 1,200 miles 

distant. At the same time, over 4,000 animals and 3,000 tons of commissary and quartermaster stores and coa l had to be sent to Memphis, 

Vicksburg, and Little Rock. Colonel Parsons estimated that there were 

" RG 92, Personal Narralive Rpts, .'.Y. 1863. IV, 565 (Parson's Rpl, 6 OCt 1863) . 

.. (I) Ibid., pp. 565~7. (2) RG 92, OQMG Letter nook. vol. 59, p. 165 (AQM Wm. J. 

Kountz (0 SW, 19 Mar 1862). (3) Stanton I'apen, vol. 3 (Scott 10 Stanton, 12 Feb 1862). 

'"RG 92, Personal Narrative Rpts, F.Y. 1863, IV. 569 (Parson's Rpt. 6 Oct 1863). 
408 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

75 to 100 boats on the river below St. Louis, many detained unnecessarily. 

To transport the supplies requisitioned ,yould require 40 to 50 boats, 

but on 2 October there were no more than five at St. Louis that could 

properly be used for the service. ~' 

At the beginning of the war, demands (or the movement of troops 

and supplies came at a moment's notice. Quartermasters took steamboats where they could be found and at prices hastily agreed upon with 

the owners. Since their destination was often changed, it was convenient 

to pay each boat by the day for its services and so the charter system came 

into existence. Abuses of that system soon became evident, however, 

and, as early as mid-December 186 1, Capt. William J. Kountz offered 

plans for the reform and reorganization of river transportation. A 

prominent steamboat owner of Pittsburg, he had served as civilian superintendent of river transportation on the Ohio and Kanawha for his friend, 

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, when the latter was commanding the 

Department of the Ohio and operating aga inst the Confederates in what 

later became the State of West Virginia.u Commissioned a capta in and 

assistant quartermaster in November 186 1, Kountz was ordered to Cairo 

by Chief Quartermaster Allen, to whose department he had been assigned. 

Kountz had a positive gift for ferreting OUt rascality and a crusading 

fervor that led him to denounce fraud wherever he uncovered it, but he 

threw about "charges of infidelity." Meigs confided. "as though he was 

the only honest man in the West." n The Quartermaster General fou nd 

merit in his suggestions for establishing uniform charter rates and eliminating duplication. but, since his plan was predicated on the assumption 

that he was the only person with the knowledge and experience necessary 

for directing a centra lized bureau for river transportation. Meigs was 

noncommittal about putting it into effect. "While it is certa in that a 

one man power, if the one man is perfect. is best." he wrote Kountz. "all 

mankind agree that too much power in one hand is dangerous." U 

There was plenty of wrongdoing to be uncovered in Cairo where 

Capt. R. 8. Hatch. Fremont-appointed assistant quartermaster at the 

post. had practiced a regu lar system of defrauding the government until 

he was arrested in January 1862. Cairo had been an important post 

since the beginning of the war. A concentration point for JIlinois troops, 

it was also the place at which supplies were being accumulated for the 

down-river expedition to be launched by Grant. Moreover, it was the 

"Ibid., IV, 51 1-72. 

".see Theodore R. Parker, "William 1- KounlI. Superintendent or Rivcr Transportation 

Under McClellan, 1861-62," Tile WeJlern Pcn"Jylooflio H iJ/oricn/ Magolille. XX I. 237-54. 

" RG 92, Reconb of Volunteer Officcrs. QMD. 111 . 552- 53. 

NRG 92, OQMG Letter Book, vol. 57, pp. 476-77 (26 Dec 18(1). 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 409 

base for the gunboat flotilla being fitted out by Capt. Andrew H. Foote 

of the Navy. All these activities heightened its attraction for profiteers. 

When Thomas A. Scott visited Cairo early in 1862 on an inspection tour, 

he recommended a thorough reorganization of the whole post, except for 

the naval and commissary branches. He suggested that the government 

hire steamboats with everything provided by the owners by the day. by 

the mile run, or by lhe number of tons and passengers pcr mile carried. 

It would be preferable, he urged, for the government to purchase and 

operate its own steamboats and sell them when they were no longer 

needed. 6a 

Meantime, Col. Lewis B. Parsons, who had been placed in charge 

of river and rail transportation at St. Louis. instituted reforms. Under 

Fremont. transportation had been obtained by chartering boats and hiring 

officers. allowing them 60 cents per day for rations instead of the ordinary 

rate of 121'2 cents. Parsons did not favor the operation of a government 

fleet either by charter or through purchase. Boats ought to be purchased 

or chartered, he maintained, only for special or post service. Believing 

that private enterprise would always be able to transport cheaper than 

the government could, Parsons abandoned the charter system at St. Louis 

and turned to contracting for transportation by the piece or hundred 

pounds. He solicited bids and awarded contracts to the lowest bidders. 

In the winter of 1862, his river transportation to Paducah (250 miles) 

and New Madrid (275 miles) cost Y2 cent per mile for each soldier with 

the usual deck accommodations and I cent for each officer with cabin 

quarters. Horses and mules were shipped at 1 cent, wagons at 114 cents 

for each wagon, and freight at 7 cents for each 100 pounds for each 100 

miles. Even toward the close of the war, when prices generally had 

advanced. Parsons was transporting tTOOpS under contract at an average 

price of about 1;3 cent per man per mile."G 

His reduction of transportation costs was not accomplished without 

considerable complaints, since transportation agents in other departments 

allowed higher rates. Rates on the Ohio, he informed Meigs, were 

generally 25 percent higher than those he allowed on the Mississippi. 

He therefore recommended that. there should be one officer, located at 

a central point. who, subject to the chief q uartermaster of that military 

department, should have the general superintendence of all steamboat 

transportation on the Mississippi and its tributaries regardless of depart-

"Slanton Papers, vol. 3 (ScOI! 10 Slanlon, 12 Feb 18(2). 

" (I) RG 92, OQMG LeIters Re.;eived, Box 84 (Parsons to Meigs. 18 ApT 18(2). (2) RG 92. 

Personal Narrative Rpu, F.Y. 1863, IV. 575 (I'arson's Rpl . 6 OCI 1863). (2) Aml1lal Reports 

oJ the Quartermrultr Cerreral, 1861-65, p. 139 (Parson ·s Rpl, I:; Oc!. appended 10 QMG's Rpl 

of 18(5). 
410 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

mental Jines,lT As a result, in the midst of the supply crisis at Chattanooga, Meigs assigned Parsons to duty as Chief Quartermaster of Western 

River Transportation, with headquarters at St. Louis, and placed him 

under the orders of Brig. Gen. Robert Allen, Senior Quartermaster on the 

Mississippi,lI All quartermasters in charge of river transportation on 

the Mississippi and iu tributaries thereafter made reports to, and acted 

on instructions from Parsons. 

Parsons at once applied the contract system to the Cumberland and 

Ohio Rivers, effectively combating the steamboat interests who fought 

against the loss of the lucrative charter trade. Transportation became 

far more efficient because boats under contract carried twice the cargo 

that chartered steamboats had transported and discharged it in less time. 

Whereas it had taken 128 steamers on the Cumberland to supply General 

Rosecrans' army in the winter of 1862-68, it required only 66 to supply 

not only that army but those of Grant and Sherman as well in the winter 

of 1868-64. It was estimated that in the Department of the Cumberland 

alone a saving of from $2 million to $8 million was made by the change 

from the charter to the contract system." 

In addition to the ordinary transportation of soldiers, their munitions, and supplies, large expeditions had to be moved, frequently on 

short notice. In such cases, quartermasters used boats that they had 

under contract, but they also chartered and commandeered boats to meet 

the emergency need. On II December 1862. for example, Parsons received orders from General Allen, based on a telegraphic dispatch from 

Grant, to provide sufficient transportation to be at Memphis 1 week later 

to move Sherman's army of about 40,000 men, including cavalry, artillery. 

and land transportation, for an attack on Vicksburg. It being midwinter, there were no more than six or eight suitable boats at St. Louis, 

the rest being engaged in ordinary business and scattered in all directions 

on the rivers. In addition. low water had resulted in a scarcity of coal 

deliveries. By seizing privately owned coal as it came ~n to St. Louis on 

wagons, Parsons obtained a sufficient supply; and by taking all boats 

arriving at Cairo. he was able to reach Memphis, 450 miles from St. Louis, 

on 19 December with nearly 60 boats. T his was I day later than that 

fixed for embarkation, but since the expedition was delayed anyhow for 

other reasons, it was not detained for lack of transportation. Parsons 

personally supervised the loading of army divisions at Memphis on 

20 December and, 6 days later and some 475 miles down the river, they 

Wf RG 92, l'erKIual Narr~livc Rpu, F.Y. 1863, IV, 574 (I'arson's Rpt, 6 Oct 1863) . 

.. Cenerlll Orders, QUllrtermllster Ctmerlll, 1862-186j (GO 22~, 9 Dec 1863) . 

.. A IIIIIIIII Reports of the Qullrterm ... ster Ceneral, 1861- 186j, pp. 133-39 (Panon's Rpt, 

AS Oct 1865, appended to QMC', Rpt. 1865). 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 4 Il 

disembarked at Chickasaw bayou, on the Yazoo River, 5 miles in the 

rear of Vicksburg.&O 

Quartermasters transported many other expeditions on the western 

rivers during the war, but one of the morc spectacular transportation 

achievements, using both watcr and rail facilities, was the transfer of 

the 23d Army Corps, Major Genera l Schofi eld commanding, from Clifton 

on the Tennessee River to the Potomac to participate in Grant's opera. 

lions against RichmondY T he decision to attempt this mid-wimer 

transfer was not made until II January 1865 when Colonel Parsons, then 

chief of the Rail and River Transportation Division of the Quartermaster 

General's office in Wash ington, left the city to supervise this movement. 

T he Department wan ted the troops transported by boat as far as Parkersburg and sent forward from there by the Ba ltimore and Ohio Railroad. 

Knowing the extreme uncertainties of winter navigation on the Ohio, 

Parsons arranged with managers of the western railroads to have cars 

on hand so that on 12 to 24 hours' notice, transportation facilities would 

be available at Cairo, Evansville, Louisv ille, or Cincinnati for moving 

the troops eastward. At the same lime, assistant quartermaSlers at 

Cairo, Cincinnati, and other river ports were obtaining and dispatching 

steamboats to the mouth of the Tennessee. T here were only enough 

boals at Clifton on the Tennessee River to bring down about half of 

Schofield's command. Boats were required for at least 10,000 more men, 

and Parsons started up the Tennessee with a fleet of about 25 boats to 

accommodate the troops. 

The first troops left Paducah at the mouth of the Tennessee on 

18 January. The coldest weather of the winter set in, filling the river 

with floating ice, and arousing fears that the steamboats would not be 

able to reach Cincinnati. Quartermasters sent them forward, however, 

from Louisville, and the first troops arriving at Cincinnati on the 21st 

were disembarked, loaded on cars of the Little Miami Railroad, and 

started eastward. A dense fog halted further river operations at Cincinnati for 30 hours. On the strength of favorable reports on river 

navigation received from Wheeling and Parkersburg, Parsons prepared 

to send the rest of the troops on by boat. Bad weather again dosed river 

naviga tion, and one steamboat that had already departed had to be 

reca ll ed. T he troops were then loaded on cars, but even ra ilroad transpOl·tation was dangerous for the uncommon severities of the weather 

broke rails, causing cars to. be thrown from the track, and disasters were 

averted by only the narrowest of margins. At Wheeling, the troops were 

.. RG 92, OQMG Leiters Received, Box 108 (l'arsof15 10 Meigs. 29 Dec 1862) . 

.. For other illustrations of cxpe<litions see, A",,,,a/ Ilt/lorls of Ihe Quarlermaster Gellual, 

1861-1865, pp. 141--4;1 (Parson's Rpt, 15 Oct 1865, appended 10 QMC's Rpt, 1865). 
4 12 QUART ERMASTER SUPPORT OF T H E AR MY 

loaded on cars of the Ib ltimore and Ohio Ra ilroad for the journey to 

the POlomac, 700 cars be ing req uired for the ir movement. Parsons had 

taken espec ial pains to provide for the comfort of the men by having 

stoves p ut in the cars to warm them and by arranging with the Sub· 

sislence Department to have hot coffee served to supplement rations at 

designated points en routc. Despite snow, ice. and fog, a corps of 

20,000 men, with all its artillery, and over 1,000 animals werc tra nsferred 

a distance of 1,400 miles from the Tennessee to th e Potomac in less than 

17 days, though it had been anticipated that the attempt might take from 

40 to 60 days.n 

Quartermasters on the western rivers were not only concerned with 

the purchase, charter, and commandeeri ng of steamboats. but they also 

build steamboa ts and gave assistance to such projects. One of the earliest 

of these projects was the construction of the western gunboat flotill a. In 

anticipation of sending an expedition down the Mississippi, Lt. Gen. 

Winfield Scott requested. and the Secretary of War approved. the construe· 

tion or a gunboat flOlill a to protect the troop transports. Execution of 

this project was assigned to the Quartermaster's Department. It made 

a begin ni ng by ta king over three small steamboats converted into gun· 

boats on orders of General McClell an, then commanding in the Depart· 

ment of the Ohio." Having solicited proposa ls under an appropriation 

provided by Congress, Meigs negotiated a COl1lract with J ames B. Eads 

to construct seven gun boats.·' In time. this Aotill a was ex panded to 

include 10 ironclad steam gunboats, II wooden gunboats, 22 steam rams, 

and 13 steam tugs. In addition. there were other vesse ls serving as 

a'mmunition ships, dispatch boats, and transports. T he flotill a included 

a commissary store ship and a hospita l shi p. To this fl ee t the Depart· 

ment added 38 mortar boa ts, originally ordered constructed by General 

Fremont when he was commanding the Western Department.'· 

The Quartermaster's DepartmclH built and paid for the greater part 

of the vessee ls, though the Ordnance Department and the Navy furnished 

their armament and ordnance. Originally. ('.apt. John Rodgers of the 

• (I) AIllIUIlI R eporlJ of Ihe QIIIITUT1/UlJler G""ual, J,Y61 - 186J, pp. 132- 36 (Parson's Rpl. 

2 .'cb 1865, appcnded 10 QMG's Rpl. 1865). (2) RC 92, QU:lrlcrmaster Ann ua l Rcporls. 

Box 14 (I' arson's J ourna l, T elegrams, Letten sent in regard 10 1lI0vemelll of 23rd Anlly Corps) . 

• Meigs I'apcn: Lc:lten al Ihe Ilcginning of Ihe Rebellion , pp. 93-96 (MeIgs 10 McClellan. 

]7 J un 18(1), 

.. (I) RG 92. OQMG Leiter Book. vol. 55. p. 445 (Meigs 10 l¥aJhillglon SIIIT t!I at, 17 J un 

]86 1). (2) Capl. J ames 8 . • :ads, "Recollections of f OOie and Ihe Gun· Boom," BIIlIl~$ and 

.~ lId s of /II~ Civil IVII' (4 vols .• New York, 1956). I. 3~8 -3 , 

.. (]) RC 92, t ellers and Rpls 10 SW and Heads of Other Dcpts., V. 554 (Meigs 10 Seey 

of Navy, 5 Dec 186]). (2) RC 92, Persona] Narralive RplS, f .Y. 86~, V. 901-02 (Wise' Rpl . 

]4 Sep 1865). (~) A,mlllll R~po s 01 /I,,, Quarl~.mIlJ o!"r GlmulIl, 1861- 186J, p. 7 (QMG's Rpt, 

18(2). 
FIELD O PERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 4 13 

GUNBOAT OF T ilE EADS CLASS 

Navy was detailed to superintend the construction of the gunboats. but 

command of the fl eet was later transferred to Capt. Andrew H . Foote. 

The Navy furnished the commanding officers of the gunboats and partS 

of the crews, but other crew members were deta il ed from the Volunteer 

army. T he Quartermaster's Department employed the commanders and 

offi cers of the transports and o f some other vessels. T he Department 

pa id for the expenditures of the gunboa t flotilla, and assigned an assistant 

quartermaster, Ca pl. George D. Wise, to the Aotilla lO handle funds. 

process requisitions, audit accounts of acti ng assistan t paymasters on the 

g unboats, and perform th e duties no t onl y of an army quartermaster but 

of a navy paymaster, storekeeper, and commissary." 

The gunboats performed effective ly at Fort Henry and later at 

Memphis and Vicksburg. in the meantime, control of the fl eet was 

shifted from th e Army to the Navy. With the Navy Department de termined to build gun boats, Meigs recommended that the War Department 

relinquish a ll responsibility for such construction. Stanton approved 

his suggestion and, on 16 Jul y 1862, Congress authorized th e transfer, 

• (I) RG 92. OQMG Leiter Hook, vol. 56. p. <175 (Meigs to Wise. 2 Oct 1861). (2) RG 92, 

Personal Narrative Rpu. F.Y. 1863. V. 897-910 (Wise' Rpl . 14 Scp 1863). 
414 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

though it was I December before Assistant Quartermaster Wise was 

relieved from dUly.IT 

1n 1863, it became necessary to provide steamboat transportation 

and gunboat prOlcClion on the upper Tennessee River. Late in the 

summer, Genera l Rosecrans ordered Capl. Arthu r Edwards. assistant 

quartermaster, to determi ne the most practicable way of procuring steam· 

boat transportaLion on that part of the river. Since boats could not 

ascend the river above Muscle Shoals, Edwards recommended that they 

be constructed at Bridgeport. AJa., where he established his headquarters. 

His first efforts resu lted in the building of a small steamer that was of 

great service in carrying supplies to Kelly's Ford, 8 miles below Chattanooga where the Union forces were being besieged by the Confederates. 

At Rankin's Ferry, Lt. Col. W illiam G. Le Duc reported that the starving 

troops of Genera l CruEt's division mel the boat. 

Their joy at seeing the little Steamboat and scows afloat and loaded with 

ra tions can be faintly imagined-hardly described; they shouted and da nced 

on the bank of the river like crazy men. Hurrahed for the Steamboat, for the 

Capta in, for the Crew, for full rations once more, and when the bows of the 

barge touched the shore, they boarded her with a rush ... carried of( the 

rations, and wa lked into them like starved men, as they were." 

After the battles about Chattanooga, Captain Edwards opened a 

boatyard at Bridgeport, on Meigs' orders, and in 9 months rapidly built 

13 steamers, 4 of wh ich were gunboats. T he latter were p laced at the 

disposal of the Navy Department to be used in patroling the Tennessee 

from Muscle Shoa ls to Knoxville. In add ition, he also built skiffs, barges, 

and scows. When Edwards began operations, Bridgeport was a city of 

ten ts; not a building, except a sawmill, had been left standing by the 

Confederates when they departed. Around this sawmill, he built his 

boatyard, erecting 18 houses for the workmen and a machine shop. All 

the engines, machinery, nails, paints, and every other material, except 

lumber, used in the construction of these steamboats had to be brought 

from the Ohio Va ll ey and transported 600 to 800 miles over mi litary 

roads already greatly overtaxed. Under these circumstances, the construction of this Aeet in such a short time was a remarkable achievement. 6$ 

In the fall of 1864, when Parsons went to Wash ington as chief of 

the Rail and River Transportation Division in the office of th e Quarter-

.. (I) Stan ton l'al)CT'S. I'roceedings of the War l\oord. 1862 (Meeting. 25 Mar 1862). 

(2) Cenuaf Orders of lite W"r eparllll~"I. 1861-62, I. 406 (CO 150.2 Oct 1862). 

- (I) RC 92. I'crsonal Narl'<llivc Rpts. F.Y. 1864. 111 . 527- 28 (Lc: Due's Rl't . 25 ScI' 18(4). 

(2) William G. i.e Due, "The Liule SIe:lH,lJoat ThaI Opencd Ihe 'Craeker Line· ... nflilies a"d 

u"ders 01 l1! ~ Ci"il War, vol. III. I'!. 11 . pp. 676-78. (5) RG . 92. l'cl'$Onal Narl'<ltivc Rpu. 

F.Y. 1864. 11 . 67-69 (Edwards' Rpt. II J an 1865). 

- RC 92. I'crsonal Narl'<ltivc Rpts, F.Y. 1864. 11 . 61- 74 (Edwards' Rpt . II J an 1865). 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN T H E CIVIL WAR 415 

master General, he availed himse lf of Edwards' experience by having him 

appointed genera l superintendem for the purchase, repairs, and maintenance of steamers and Olher means of transportation on the Mississippi 

and its tributaries. In th e closing months of the war, a centralized 

control over repairs and ma intenance was developing with repair stations 

bei ng proposed at such poi nts as St. Louis, Ca iro, and New Orleans.10 

T he Q uartermaster's Department acq uired a considerable fl eet of 

river steamboats and other vessels lIpon the Mississippi and its tributaries 

in the course of the war by purchase, construction, and through capture. 

Colonel Parsons listed as bei ng owned by the Department during the 

war 599 boats, of which 9 1 were steamers, 352 were barges of d ifferent 

types, and the rest were wharfboats, coal boats, yawls, and other sma ll 

boats.7! The Quartermaster's Department built a total of 38 vessels on 

the western rivers during the war, of which 24 were steamboats. In the 

course of the war, the Department also cha rtered, hired, and pressed into 

service 822 vessels, of which 633 were steamers.72 

Ocean Transpm·tation 

The Quartermaster's Department also employed and purchased a 

large fl eet o( vessels [or ocean transportation. During the Civil War, 

it chartered or hired 753 ocean steamers, 1,080 sa iling vessels, and 847 

barges. T he Depanmem a lso purchased and built 183 ocean steamers, 

43 sa ili ng vessels, and 86 arges.' ~ The Department made most of these 

purchases after th e first 2 years of the war, when investigations had 

exposed irregularities and when Meigs had rega ined control of ocean 

transportation and had adopted remed ial measures." Among the latter 

was the insertion of a cla use in all cha rters which allowed the government 

to take possession of a vessel by pay ing 33 percen t prorlt on the valua tion , 

and the ru nni ng expenses and repairs, th e government being credited 

with the amount pa id fo r the charter. One or more officers of the Navy 

Department, detailed for th e pur pose, fixed t he va lua tion. By this 

.. RG 92, OQMG. Wcslem River Transportation, Leller Il.ook. I, 24 (I'arsons to Edwards, 

22 Nov (864). 

"(I) Amlllal Reporl$ uf Ih e QuarlermaSlliT Ge" eml, JS61-IS6J, pp. ] 16-125 (Pusons' 

Rpt, - Aug 1865. appended to QMG's Rpl. 186.'".). (2) T he a((uTa(Y of these figures is open 

to question. About 3 years ]'lIer when another listing was prepared for the House. 85 steamen 

and 726 barges. wharfboats. Aoats, and other v.esse ls were reported as having been purchased. 

House Ex. Doc. No. 3~7. 40th Cong .. 2d sess .. pp. 1 J8- ~9. (Sin(c this report covered a(quisi. 

tions through ]867. purchases made after lhe dOlie of the war must be deduaed to arrive at 

waflime purchases.) 

.. House Ex. Doc. No. 337, 40th Cong .. 2d scss .. I'p. 1(.0--227. 

" I bid., pp. 4-113; H O-J57 . 

.. See an/e, pp. ~72-n. 
4 16 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T H E ARMY 

mea ns, the Department purchased a large proportion of the ocean vessels 

that it acquired." 

T he Army made heavy demands for ocean transportation d uring the 

fi rst year of the war, and quartermasters as well as agents fitted out numerous ex peditions. Among the first of these expeditions was onc under 

the command of Brig. Gen . T homas W. Sherman that resulted in the 

capture of Pon Roya l, provid ing a base of operations along the southeastern coast. Capt. Rufus Saxton, serving as chief q uartermaster. chartcred most of the vessels engaged for this expedition. It then became 

necessary to provide vessels for Genera l Burnside's expedition to the 

North Carolina sounds and for General Butler's to New Orleans. In 

the spring of 1862, when McClellan had dec ided on the Peninsular campaign, a large n umber of vessels had to be obtained to transport his army 

from the lines in front of Wash ington to the lower Chesapeake Bay. 

Stanton d irected Assistant Secretary of War J ohn T ucker to obtain the 

necessary transporta tion and detailed Capt. Henry C. Hodges, assistant 

quartermaster, to help him charter vessels. In 37 days from the time he 

received the order in Washington, Tucker had engaged 11 3 steamers, 

188 schooners. and 88 barges. All Army of 121,500 men, with all its 

artill ery, cava lry, ammun ition. wagons, baggage, and supplies, was embarked at Perryville, Alexandria, and Wash ington." However remiss 

Tucker was in controlling his agents, he d id not fai l to supply the Army's 

transportation needs. 

Requisitions for ocean transporta tion were usually u rgent, and permitted no time for the solicitation of bids during the earl y days of the 

war. In any case, si nce the government employed nearl y all available 

steamers, there was little or no chance for competition. Many unsuitable 

vessels were chanered at exorbitant prices because of the inexperience 

of quartermasters, the unfaithfulness of agents, and the pursuit of profits 

by shipowners. Generally, quartermasters and agents chartered vessels 

for a limited period, with the right granted the government to keep them 

as long as needed. To cover the expenses of outfitting vessels for a shortterm service, owners se t charter rates at a high level. Frequently, the 

government retained vessels in service fa r beyond the time originally 

scheduled in the charter. Such detention of vessels sent to the Chesapeake laden with su pplies, Assistant Quartermaster General Tompkins 

charged in 1862, caused the Departmclll to pay as much for demurrage 

as for freight. Morcover. he found it increasingly d ifficult to obtain the 

.. AmlUal Reporll of /l,e Qllllrlermllsler Celler"I, 1861- 186J, pp. 99--100 (Rpl or Col. 

Ceo. D. Wise, 51 Aug 1865. appended 10 QMC', Rill, 18(5). 

'"Senate Rep. Com. No. 8<1, 57th Cong .• !d &es5 .. pp. 528-29, $.n. 1151 (Tucker to Stanton, 

5 Apr 1862). 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 

LANDING SUPPLl.ES ON THE ApPOMATOX, BELOW 

Pl.'"ERS8URG. Non: PONTON BRIDGE. 

417 

transportation he needed at New York, where his average daily shipment 

of subsistence stores alone amounted to about 7,000 barrels bulk. 1T 

Military necessities, however, often compelled retention of vessels. 

The McClell an Peninsular campaign was a case in point. To transfer 

the Army of the Potomac down the Chesapeake and furnish it with 

supplies during the campaign, the Quartermaster's Department provided 

405 vessels with a tota l tonnage of 86,278 tons. T8 Although it discharged 

many of these vessels after the transfer of the Army to the Peninsula, the 

greater number of them had to be retained because it was necessary to 

keep the Army's supplies afloat to follow its advance up the Peninsula. T$ 

Water transportation was needed not only to move expeditions to 

their destinations and to maintain a steady flow of supplies to the troops, 

but. upon occasion, huge fl eets were also required to evacuate troops and 

supplies. When McClellan abandoned his depot at White House and 

retreated from the Chickahominy to the James River and a new base at 

TT RG 92. OQMG Leiter Book. vol. 60. p. 329 (Tompkins to Meigs, 30 May ]862) . 

... Of the 405 vessels. 71 were side·wheel steamers of 29,070 tons; 57 propellers of 9,824 tons; 

187 schooners. brigs. and barks of lIG.631 IOns; and 90 barges of 10,749 tons. OR, ser. I, 

vol. XI, 1'1. I, p. ]58 (Chief Quartermaster Van Vliet's Rpt , 2 Aug 1862) . 

.. Ibid., ser. I. vol. XI, I'!. III, p. 149 (Van Vliet to Meigs. 7 May 1862). 
418 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

TRANSPORTS IN MOUTH OF THE PAMUNK~ Y R IVER, 

WHITE-HoUSE LANDlNC, VA. 

Harrison's Landing in the summer of 1862, Quartermaster Ingalls skillfully with drew all suppli es and property at White House without loss. 

Some 400 vessels laden with supplies moved out from the naTTOW and 

tortuous Pamunkey River to arrive most opportunely for supplying the 

troops as they reached the James. t O 

Troop movements at times made use of all available steamers on the 

coast. Earl y in August 1862, when the Army of the PotOmac abandoned 

operations on the Peninsula, Meigs assured Ingalls that he had at his 

command all the steamboats of the coast that could be procured for the 

rapid withdrawal of that Army. No additional vessels could be obtained 

without breaking up the great [erries and routes by which the new levies 

were to be brought to the front. The 30 steamers he already had at 

Harrison's Landing, Meigs estimated, could carry 20,000 to 25,000 men 

on a single trip. To supplement these, Meigs ordered all vessels, both 

steam and sail, used LO transport Burnside's troops to Aquia Creek reo 

turned to Harrison's Landing [or Ingalls' use. He further directed that 

all transports carrying the sick to New York and Philadelphia to hasten 

"(I) Ibid., ser. I, vol. XI, Pt. Ill, PI'. 273- 74 (Ingalb lO Meigs, 29 Jun 1862). (2) RG 92, 

I'ersonal Narralive RPlS, F.Y. 1863, Ill, 380 (Ingalls' Rpl , 29 St:p 1863). 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 419 

back to Harrison's Landing as quickly as possible. Meigs ordered his 

quartermasters to send to Fort Monroe all schooners to be found at 

Baltimore and Philadelphia fit for transporting tTOOPS, and he directed 

Tompkins at New York to obtain. if he CQuld, 200 additional sailing 

vessels. Meigs pointed out that almost as much transportation could be 

made available by sacrificing the deck loads of hay kept afloat on the very 

large fleet of supply vessels at Fort Monroe and on the James.n Horses, 

wagons. and ambulances would have to be shipped later. Bad weather 

and delays in retuming transports to Fort Monroe prolonged the transportation of such equipment through the first week in September.12 

Unnecessary detention of vessels was again stressed when Sherman's 

Army arrived on the Atlantic Coast late in 1864. Quartermaster Van 

Vliet, then stationed at New York, suggested that all quartermasters along 

the coast be reminded of the importance of ordering to New York all 

sea steamers as soon as they could be spared.8I In anticipation of the 

arrival of Sherman on the coast, Meigs had ordered Van Vliet to prepare 

to ship clothing and equipment to refit 30,000 men (later changed to 

60,000) and grain for 35,000 animals. In addition, the Department also 

had to get ready a large amount of Quartermaster stores, including 

200,000 pounds of horse and mule shoes. 

To provide for Sherman's troops in the event their path northward 

was blocked, Meigs sent a few vessels laden with supplies to Pensacola 

to await orders. Meanwhile, the Quartermaster's Department collected 

a great fleet of transports to carry the bulk of supplies needed to refit 

Sherman's army after its march to the sea, and held it in readiness at 

Port Royal, S.C., until Sherman established his base of supplies.Bt When 

Fort McAllister fell on 13 December, Meigs ordered the transport fleet 

to the mouths of the Ogeechee and Savannah Rivers, and quartermasters 

discharged the first cargoes at the dilapidated wharves of Savannah. In 

January, Sherman's forces moved northward and the Department ordered 

the fl eet and su pplies trans(erred to Beaufort, N.C. When Meigs arrived 

at Beaufort to see that supply was properly handled, he found 117 vessels 

loaded with supplies in the harbor.u Military operations were never 

hampered or delayed for want of water transportation. 

"' OR, scr.l, vol. XI. Pt. III, pp. 1117- 18 (Meigs to Ingalls, 12 Jul 1862): pp. 371-72 (Meigs 

to McClellan. 12 Aug 1862). 

-(I) Ibid., ser. I, vol. L1 X. p. 173 (Tucker to Meigs. 3 Sep 1862). (2) RC 92. Personal 

Narrat.ive Rpu, F.Y. 1863. V. 2- 3 (Rpl of Lt. Col. C. C. Sawtelle. 29 Oct 1863'. who super· 

intended the transportation from Fort Monroe). 

- RC 92. Van Vliet Leiters to the QMG, p. 133 (6 Jan 1865) . 

.. RG 92. OQMC Leiter Book. vol. 81. pp. 9-10 (Meigs to Van Vliet. 3 Nov 1864); 

pp. 417- 19 (Same 10 samc. 6 Dec 1864); vol. 82, p. 106 (Meigs to Col. S. L. Brown. 20 Dec 1864); 

pp. 123-24 (Meigs to Easton. 31 Dec 1864). 

- Meigs Papers: Leuer Book. 1865--ro (Meigs to his fa the r. 29 Mar 1865). 
420 QUARTERMASTER SU PPORT OF THE ARMY 

Wagon Tmins 

The lise of steamboats, steamships, and railroads increased enormously the mobil ity of armi es. \>Vhilc corps of an army not engaged in 

active operations could be tra nsferrcd to another army hund reds of mil es 

away in a few weeks. Supplies, too, could be shipped faster than ever 

before. Armi es in the fie ld, however, also required another type of 

transportation. Wagon trai ns not onl y had to accompany troops on 

active operations blll suppl y trains also had to be employed to distribute 

stores brought in bulk to railway termina ls and steamer wharves. As in 

lhe past, slich transportation rema ined under Quartermaster control, 

with wagon masters appoi nted to direct the work of teamsters. The 

Department employed civilians as teamsters, bUl th eir lack of subordination soon ca used large numbers of enliSled men to be detailed for this 

task. Recommendations that a corps of en listed teamsters be established , 

however, rece ived no more favora bl e consideration in the Civil War than 

they had in the Mexican War.

al 

T he Army wagon had been perfected by long years of experience 

and operation on the western plains, and Meigs th ought that its regulation 

pauern and harness probably could not be improved. Early in the war, 

the Department procured both horses and mul es for use with trains, but 

experience soon convi nced quartermasters that mules were much superior 

to horses for such service. By the last year of the war, horses had disappeared almost entirel y from th e trains. ]n 1864, Chief Quartermaster 

Inga lls ex pressed th e views of quartermaSlers generally when he reported 

that " the common six·mule wagon has proved to be the most economical 

and durable fo r years past of any ever tested." " 

An Army wagon, drawn by four horses, over good roads, could carry 

2,800 pounds. A good six-mule team, in the best season of the year, 

could haul 3,180 pounds plus its own forage of 270 pounds, or a tota l 

of 4,000 pounds." In practice, wagons seldom hauled such loads during 

the war beca use roads generally were not good and operations were not 

limited to the best season of the year. Six·mul e teams arriving at City 

M (1) RG 92. Pel'sonal Narrative: Rpts. F.Y. 186-'.1. 1056·57 (Cross' Rpt, 14 Sep 1865): ibid., 

F.Y. 1864. IV. 21 (Ransom's Rpt. 24 Aug 1864). (2) John D. Billings. Ha rd/a de aud C(JOt:t 

(Boston. 1888), p. -'66. 

Of AmJUal Rt:porlJ of Iht: Qllllrlt:mlllsler Ceut:rlll, 1861-186J, p. 35 (tnp lls' Rpl. 28 Aug 

1864, appcndc:tlto QMC's Rpt. 1864): p. 32 (QMG'I Rpt . 18(5). 

M (1) Nathanie:l S, I)odge. Hi,,'s 011 Army T .. WJ/Xlrlnlio .. (Albany. 1863), I)' '1. (2) 

Col. S. B. Holabird tlualilic:d the carrying capacit y of a lix,mule learn . On a good IOlid road, 

that i$ macadamizw. a , Ix·mule: team cou ld haul h om ",OCXl to 4.500 pounds; on a solid d irt 

road 3.0CXl to 3.500 pou nds: and in wild c:oun try d ist ricts, 1.800 to 2,500 pounds and from 

5 to 10 days' graiu ror thcrnsc:lvc:s. RG 92, I'ersonal Na rrative Rpu, r.Y, 18&1. tI, 764 

(Holabird Rpt, 21 Feb 1867). 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN T I-IE CIVIL WAR 42 1 

--- -,.- .. .. •• ... ..M 

• • 

LANI>ING SUI'!' Ul:S ON THE J AMES RIVER, D ESTINED FO R C ITY 

POI NT , V A . 

Point after a long, arduous, and difficult march from Culpeper. for 

example, carried 2.000 pounds of baggage, or 3,000 pounds of forage. or 

2,600 pounds of ammunition or hospita l stores.U 

The wagon trains of an army consisted of the headquarte rs, th e regimental. and the general suppl y trains. The supply trains operated 

between the principal base depots, to which points quartermasters transfcrred clothing. rations, and other slOres by rail and water, and the 

temporary, smaller depots established in immediate proximity to an army. 

where authorized supply officers d rew needed supplies and issued them 

to the troops. The number of wagons in a suppl y train could not be 

fixed by regulation . T he number necessarily increased as the army's 

distance from its base depot of suppli es increased . 

The headquarters and regimental trains transported baggage and 

such suppli es as always had to he with the Army. In th e early months 

• RC 92, Pcnonal Namuivc RplS, F.Y, 1864 , Ill. 1864 (Owcn$' Rpl, 13 Aug 18fi6). 
422 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

of the war, such trains were generally larger than necessary, and their size 

induced troops and officers to carry too much useless baggage with them. 

Even privates frequen tl y carried carpetbags and boxes in regimental 

wagons. Genera l Sherman described the troops he saw about Washington in 186 1 as being so loaded down with haversacks. knapsacks, len ts, 

and baggage that it took " from twenty-fi ve to fifty wagons to move the 

camp of a regiment from onc place to another, and some of the camps 

had bakeries and cooking establishments th at would have done credit to 

Delmonico.".o Sutlers' goods, too, were often transported in such wagons 

in the guise of commissary stores. 

Tn 186 1, no regu lation fixed the allowance of tra nsportation in the 

field . Some generals commanding active troops set the allowance at 15 

wagons to a regiment; others marched with 6. Capt. Nathaniel S. Dodge, 

mustered into service in Jul y 1862 as regimenta l quartermaster, reported 

the 119th N.Y. Volunteers, 1,000 strong, had 6 teams.'1 Regimen ts 

frequently were under strength, yet each was still allowed a minimum of 

6 wagons and some had 8 and even 9. Brigade headquarters, Captain 

Dodge charged, considered 7 wagons insufficient for fi eld and staff purposes, while the Medical Department of every regiment claimed one 

wagon besides the ambulances, though the gross weight of surgical, medical, and hospital supplies required during a march or on a fie ld of battle 

for an infantry regiment of 1,000 men was less than 320 pounds.Dz T he 

excessive amount of wagon transportation allowed brought general criticism from quartermasters in the fi eld.

1I 

"Ah, the freshness and flavor of those earl y war days come back to 

me," wrote John D. Billings, who served with the Army of the Potomac. 

T hat was the time when tent-floors were transported, when the shelter 

tent had not yet repl aced fh e larger varieties, when stoves had not yet 

" /'Ilrsolltlf M U"Di" 0/ Gil". w. T . Slu:rma" (2 vols .. <lih cd .. revi$Cd, New York. , 189 1). 

I, 200 . 

.. T he 6 wagons of a regiment at that time were usually employed as follows: 

wagon number one OI rried medical stores: 

wagon "two wa ll tenu and I)("l"5Onal luggagc of field and 

staff officenll: 

wagon three pcrsonal luggage of line offi(enll: 

wagon four kCllles and pam of 10 wmpanies: 

five} commisu ry stores and forage (2 days' rations 

si': for the mcn and 5 days' foragc for animals). 

wagon 

-(I) RG 92. I'ersonal Narrat ive Rpu, F.Y. 1863, II, 121-26 (Dodgc's Rpl. - Aug 18(3). 

(2) Dodge wrote and published a pa mphlct, Hi" IS 1;111 Arm)' T rtllujxJrlal;otl, that Meigs 

circu fated to the field . RG 92, OQMG Mi$Ce llaneous Letler Book. 10-27 Apr 186!1, 1'01. !I I 

(Mcigs 10 Lt. Col. J. Dunlop 111111., 18 Apr IM!I) . 

• Sec the comments of Col. Samuel n . Holabird who servcd a5 chief (IUanefln35tcr of 

Banks' Army of the Shcnadooh in 1862. RC 92. I'ersonel Narrative RplS, F.Y. 1864, II, 

74<HI (f-Iolabi rd Rpt, 21 Feb 1861). 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN T HE CIVIL WAR 423 

given way to camp fires, and when the men still had their big knapsacks, 

which they were always ready to ride with or toss into a wagon when the 

regiment moved.''' Mobility, however, was being sacrificed. On good 

!oads, a four-horse team averaged 2!;2 miles per houT. Captain Dodge 

found that even with his animals in prime condition and the roads good, 

it took 6 days to march from Centrevill e to Falmouth, Va., averaging less 

than 14 miles a day. Victories gained did not produce the usual results, 

General Ha lleck explained in the fa ll of 1862. because "the defeated foe 

was not followed from the battl e-field, and even when a pursuit was 

attempted, it almost invariably fa iled to effect the capture or destruction 

of any part of the retreati ng army." Halleck added that if the success 

of an army depended on its "arms and its legs," the Union armies had 

shown themselves defi cient in these essential requisites, a defeat he attributed to their enormous baggage and supply tra in s.G~ 

Meigs was as concerned as Halleck about this problem not only 

because military operations had been less successful as a result of armies 

being too profusely equipped with wagons, but also because the costs 

imposed a serious drain on his Department and the T reasury. Large 

trai ns were difficult to guard and the loss of wagons, horses, and mules 

had been very great. Every rapid retreat had resulted in the abandonment of some tra ins.Dc Meigs directed his efforts toward obtai ning a 

regulation that would fix the wagon allowances for army trains and 

baggage in the fi eld.G1 The provisions of the regulation, published in 

October 1862, were taken with little change from a general order issued 

by McClellan on to August.

GS 

A month before McClell an's order came out, Lt. Col. Rufus Ingalls 

had been announced as chief quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, 

succeeding General Van Vliet. Ingalls was primarily responsible for 

bringing about a red uction of transportation in that Army and a better 

organization of its trains. T he order of to August red uced the number 

of baggage wagons by cutting down on the amount of baggage and tentage 

that could be carried. Although it still allowed six wagons for each full 

regiment of infantry, the order prescribed that allowances were to be 

reduced to correspond as nearly as practicable to the number of officers 

and men actuall y present. By 1864, the regimenta l wagons had been 

.. Billings. H nrdlaclf. tHld CoUu, pp. 354-55, 

., OR, ser. I, vol. XIX. 1'1. I. p, 6 (Halleck's Rpt to Stanton, 25 Nov 1862). 

" I bid., ser. III, vol. II. pp. 654-55 (Meigs to Stanton , 9 Oct 1862). 

"' (I) RG 92, OQMG Leu er Book, vol. 62, p. 441 (Meigs to Halleck, 13 Sep 18(2). (2) OR, 

ser. III, vol. II. p. 544 (Wn GO 130, 14 Sep 1862); pp. 654-55 (Meigs to Stanton. 9 Oct 18(2). 

(3) War Depar/lllelll General Order.f, 1861-62, I, 409-10 (GO 160, 18 Oct 1862) . 

.. OR, set. I, vol. XI. 1'1. III. 365-66 (GO 153). 
424 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

reduced to two and hauled only baggage and camp equipage. V9 The 

August order further directed that all supplies in bulk---quartermaster 

stores, subsistence , hospita l stores, and ammunition- were to be transported in special trains, thus outlining the beginning of supply trains. 

In the course of the Maryland campaign that followed, Ingalls 

worked out much more spec ific details and applied his system of re lating 

the n umber of wagons to the number of men to be suppli ed. He introduced further refinemen ts by 1863, particularly in providing forage 

wagons for the Cavalry and horse batteries and in separating the ammunition train from other supplies. lOG Following the issue of these transportation orders, the Army of the Potomac turned in all its excess wagons to 

Quartermaster depots. It took repea led orders, however, to reduce 

transportation allowances in all armies and to maintain them at the levels 

set.'Ol Once accustomed to a certain amount of transportation, an army 

was unwill ing to do without the luxuries that it supplied in the fi eld. 

Sherman, leaving Chattanooga for the advance against Atlanta, reduced 

transportation for a regiment to one baggage wagon and one ambulance. 

He limited each headquarters to one wall tent, and set the example himself by using only a tent-Ay that was pitched over saplings or fence rails. 

But his orders were nOt strictly obeyed; General T homas could not give 

up his tent and Sherman reca lled that he "had a big wagon which could 

be converted into an offi ce, and this we used to call 'Thomas's circus'." .02 

Persistent efforts throughout the war did bring results, and under quartermaster management the size of the trains employed decreased in each 

successive campaign.loa 

It was Chief Quartermaster Ingalls who introduced in the Army of 

the Potomac the system of marking each wagon with the corps badge, 

division color, and the number of the brigade so that the particular 

brigade to which each wagon be longed could readily be discerned. He 

also caused all wagons to be marked to indicate their contents, and, as 

soon as a wagon of the supply train was unloaded, it was sent to the base 

depot to obtain another load of the same item of supply.1 04 

Not only did the size of the wagon train hamper movement at the 

beginning of the war, but its management was also at fau lt. Experience 

... A.lflual Reports of til e QUIlTUrnlll$ter G~flerlll, 1861 186~, pp. ~G-39 (Special Orders 

No. 44, H q. Armies of U.s., 28 Jun 1864, appended to QMG's RPL 1864) . 

... <I) Ibid ., p. 4~ (Ingalls' Rpt, 28 Sep 186~ , appended !O QMG's Rpl, 1864). (2) RG 92. 

OQMG Leiters R~eived. Box 120 (Ingalls 10 Meigs. 17 Jul 1863). 

'*' Despite orders, e>;tra wagons were smuggled along in the Army of the Potomac. 

Billings, Hardtack fwd CoOee, p. 362. 

'01 (1) Shennan , M emoirs, II. 22. (2) See also OR, ser. I. vol. XXXVIII. pr. 507-08 

(Shennan to Grant. 18 Jun 1864) . 

... See Sharpe, Tht: Art of Supplyillg Armit:S ill tht: Fit:ld, pp. 78--79 . 

... PU£OIIal Mt:moirs 0/ us. Grallt, II, 188-90. 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 425 

had not then taught the va lue of organization and the importance on a 

march of moving a train of a division or even of a corps in one body and 

under one director. At that time, the division quartermaster troubled 

himself very little about the movement of his brigade trains, the corps 

quartermaster not at all . Brigade trains generally moved as units, without connection with other brigades of the same division. In the same 

corps, therefore, there would be nine distinct and independent trains 

instead of one. ConRicting orders and conRicting interests produced an 

awesome confusion. 

No movement was more illustrative of the want of organization and 

control than that which occurred when the Army of the Potomac shifted 

its base to Harrison's Landing in the summer of 1862. No order of 

march was issued. "Each quartermaster acted on his own responsibility 

and according to the best of his judgment," reported Lt. Col. William H. 

Owen, " unenlightened by any knowledge of the roads, the position of the 

enemy, or the intended future movements of our own troops." 105 With 

no officer present with authority to prescribe the route that the trains 

should take or the order of march, each train struggled for the lead. At 

all narrow places or crossroads where other trains came in, there was 

conflict, "cutting in," and breaking up of the trains that at times degener· 

ated into personal conflicts between officers, teamsters, and wagonmasters 

and resulted often in the breaking of wagons and the maiming of animals. 

The weaknesses of train management having been glaringly revealed, 

Ingalls, lIpon assuming the duties of Chief Quartermaster, introduced 

remedial measures in the course of the Maryland campaign. No longer 

were quartermasters left to shift for themselves, but orders as to move· 

ments were cl ear and explicit, and the "law of the road" became so well 

understood that few disputes occurred in subsequent campaigns. Thereafter on the march, brigades and regimental q uartermasters were distributed equally among the train, each having charge of a given number 

of wagons. Moreover, they were required to remain with their trains, 

both on the march and in camp. In a forward movement, Ingalls 

explained to Meigs, the trains of the Army of the Potomac were never in 

the way of the troops; each corps had its train that followed it on the 

march, forming its "indispensable, movabl e magazine of supplies." 

Wagon trains, he insisted, should never be permitted to approach within 

the range of battlefields- a principle he applied at Fredericksburg, 

Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and on all subsequent battlefields of the 

tOO OR, ser. I. vol. L1 . Pt. I. p. 105 (Rpt to Meigs. 19 Sep 1863). Owen at that time was 

usistafll quartermaster with the Second Brigade. First Division . Third Anny Corps. Anny of 

the Potomac. See also RG 22, Personal Narrative Rpu. F.Y. 18611. III. 6811 ff. (Rpt of Lt. Col. 

Wm. G. LeDuc. 25 Sep 1864). 
426 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Army of the Potomac. When the battle of Gettysburg began, for 

example. he had the wagon trains assembled at Westminster. about 25 

miles in the rear of the Army. He allowed no baggage in front. Officers 

and men went forward without tents and with only a short supply of food. 

Quartermasters brought up to the immediate rear of the Union lines only 

pan of the ammunition wagons and ambulances. This arrangement. 

always made in the Army of the Potomac, on the eve of battle and marches 

in the presence of the enemy. enabled experienced officers to supply their 

command without risking the loss of trains, or obstructing roads over 

which columns marched. Empty wagons cauld be scnt to the rear and 

loaded ones brought up during the night. or at such times and places as 

would not interfere with the "movement 6f troops. lOt In the battles of 

the Wilderness, the empty wagons were also used to carry wounded 

soldiers from the field hospital to the depots, the Medical Department 

having no more ambulances than were abSOlutely necessary on the 

immediate fields of baule. The wagons then returned laden with forage 

and su bsisrence. 

Sherman's march to the sea posed a different management problem. 

While train management varied in the different corps, Chief Quartermaster Easton thought the best arrangement was that in which the train 

of the corps followed immediately after the troops with a strong rear 

guard. At the head were the baggage wagons of the corps, division, 

brigade, and regimental headquarters, followed by empty wagons to be 

loaded with forage and other supplies taken from the country. Then 

in order came the ammunition train, the ambulance train, and the general supply train. As the empty wagons reached points where supplies 

could be obtained, a sufficient number were turned off the road. Generally they had to go but a short distance from the line of march to obta~n 

supplies, and by the time the general supply train came up, the empty 

wagons were loaded. They then fell into their proper place at the rear 

of the general supply train without retarding the march. lOT The details 

of train management varied at different times and in different armies, 

but it is obvious that the war was more than half over before commanding 

generals and their fie ld quartermasters brought into effect a satisfactory 

system of train operation . 

... (I) Amilia/ ~porfS of Ihe QUllrlermll.ller Gelltrll/, /86/- 186j, p. 28 (Inplls' Rpl, 

28 Aug 1864); pp. 45--44 (Inplls· Rpl . 28 Sep 1865. appended 10 QMG's Rpl, 1864). (2) See 

a lso RG 92, Personal Na rrative RplS, F.Y. 1864, III. 5, 862-64 (Owen Rpl , 15 Aug 1866), 

... Allllual Reporls of Ihe Quartermaster General, 1861- 186', p, 554 (Easton·s Rpt. 18 Aug 

1865, appended to QMG·, Rpl, 1865). 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 427 

Depot System 

From repeated references already made to depots, it should be clear 

that the Union armies of the Civil War were supplied through a depot 

system. That system had been gradually developing since the time of 

the Seminole War. By the end of the Civil War, the system included 

general, advance, and temporary depots. In the years immediately before 

the Civil War, the large depots of both the Subsistence and Quartermaster's Departments, which supplied different parts of the Army, had 

been designated as general depots. Such depots- those at New York, 

St. Louis, Fort Leavenworth, and San Francisco, for example-were under 

the general direction of the heads of the respective staff departments, 

hut commanders of the geographical departments in which they were 

located also had authority over them for all the purposes of their commands.lOl The number of these depots was increased during the Civil 

War by the establishment of general depots at such places at Chicago, 

Indianapolis, Pittsburgh, and Detroit, among others. 1oi There were also 

other small depots within a military department, drawing supplies from 

the nearest general depot but under the control of the commanding 

officer of the military department. On the other hand, clothing depots, 

such as those at New York, .Philadelphia, and Cincinnati, remained 

directly under the authority of the Quartermaster General. nO All of 

these depots were located in the rear area, remote from theaters of 

operation. 

Some of the principal depots of the war-St. Louis, Louisville, 

Cincinnati, Washington, and Baltimore-served not only as general 

depots but also became the primary base depots from which the armies 

in the field drew their supplies. None was more important than St. Louis, 

and no chief quartermaster carried a heavier burden of responsibility than 

Maj. (later Bvt. Maj. Gen.) Robert Allen who served as Chief Quartermaster of the Department of the Missouri from October 1861 to November 1863 and thereafter, as Chief Quartermaster of the Mississippi Valley. 

Included under his supervision were the Division of the Mississippi and 

the Departments of the Northwest, Kansas, Missouri, and Arkansas. 

To write a full history of his transactions between 1861 and 1865 would 

be in effect to write a history of the war in the West and the Southwest. 

Out of the disorganized department that he took over at St. Louis 

in October 1861, All en built a powerful machine that supported farflung operations. He was ably assisted by two officers-Col. William 

"'- G'mcra/ Ordu s, AGO, 18'1- 1860, vol. 3 (CO 13. 17 Jun 1859). 

"" RG 92, OQMG Letter nook, vol. 71. pp. 248-49 (Meigs [0 Swords, 24 Aug 1863). 

lJ~/bid., vol. 57, p. 341 (Meigs [0 Gen. L. Thomas, 26 Nov 1861). 
428 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Myers and Col. Lewis B. Parsons. He assigned Myers as his chief assistant 

to purchase all Quartermaster stores and to fill all requisitions made on 

the St. Louis Depot; he placed Parsons in charge of river and railroad 

transportation. The purchase, manufacture, and transportation of clothing and equipment formed a separate department under an assistant 

quartermaster, as did the forage department. By the fall of 1863, when 

Allen established his headquarters at Louisville, the pattern of organization had been set. At both St. Louis and Louisville. one officer administered each depot (or quartermaster stores, and separate assistant quartermasters were assigned responsibility for river and railroad transportation, 

quarters and fuel, clothing and equipment, forage, animals and corrals, 

and repair shop operations. III 

Chief Quartermaster All en was a man of tremendous organizational 

ability and administrative skill, capable of directing both the purchase 

and shipment of immense quantities of supplies to advance depots and 

the return to the base depot of vast amounts of unserviceable material for 

repair and large numbers of broken·down anima ls for recuperation. At 

the same time, he not only supervised the transportation to the front of 

recruits and reinforcements but also the return of the sick and wounded 

to the hospitals in the rear. 

Operating from St. Louis, he began his career as one of the great 

quartermasters of the Civil War by re-equipping the destitute force under 

General Fremont in the fa ll of 1861. He then furnished supplies and 

transported troops on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers in movements that resulted in the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, and he 

supported General Halleck in his Corinth campa ign. At the same time, 

he was supplying Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis in his arduous campaign 

through Missouri and Arkansas against the Confederate Generals Price 

and Van Dorn. Allen continued to provide supplies for the armies of 

Grant and Sherman in their operations along the Mississippi River which 

culminated in the fall of Vicksburg in the summer of 1863. Following 

a brief lull, he soon was transporting the command of Sherman to 

Memphis and was foresighted enough to have steamers in readiness at 

Eastport on the Tennessee to permit Sherman's troops to cross without 

delay and reach Chattanooga in time to take part in the battle of Missionary Ridge. 

In the fall of 1863, on Meigs' orders, Allen moved his headquarters 

to Louisville without relinquishing his responsibilities at St. Louis. H is 

'" (I) Auuual ~1$ of Ihe Qllarlamasler Geuu al, 1861- 1865, p. 508 (Allen's Rpt, 

I Jul 1865, appended to QMC's Rpt or 1865). (2) See aoo reports Dr his subordinate officers 

- Col. William Myers, Col. Lewis 8 . Parsons, CaplS. Gco. W. Ford. J. L. Woods. R. S. Hart, 

Charles Parsons-in RG 92, l'crsona1 Nurative Rpls, F.Y. 1863. 1864. 1865. Passim. 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN T H E CIVIL WAR 429 

task was first to suppl y Chattanooga and later to equip and supply the 

consolidated forces under Sherman in his proposed campa ign against 

Atlanta. Drawing upon the resources of the entire northwest, the officers 

serving under All en procured the principal stores that were deposited 

at the advance depot established at Nashville. 

It was a hercu lean task 10 coliect, tra nsfer and concelllrale at onc poi nt 

horses and mules by the hu nd reds of thousands. corn and oats by the millions 

or bushels, hay by the lens of thousands of tons, wagons and ambu lances by 

the tens of thousamfs. fined out with harness. subsistence stores by the hundreds 

of thousa nds of tons, and miscellaneous articles, in the aggregate. proportionably large. lIZ 

In addition, immense tra ins of railroad stock, engines, and cars were 

brought {Tom the East, ferried over the Ohio at Lo uisvill e, and sent 

forward to transfer stores from the Nashvill e Depot to the [Tont. The 

shipment of clothing, equipment, ordnance, and med ical supplies, and 

the transportation of troops added to the burden this campaign imposed. 

So essential were All en's services as Chief Quartermaster of the Valley 

of the Mississippi that the Secretary of War denied Sherman's request to 

have him assigned as chief q uartermaster to his command!1I 

As though his responsibilities were not burdensome enough, Allen, 

as part of his d uties, also furn ished transportation and supplies to the 

troops in New Mexico and on the plains. He fitted om several Indian 

expeditions, and although the troops engaged were not numerous, the 

lines of supply were extended and hazardous. 

Even partial statistics make more graphic the scope of his acti vities. 

In the period from I October 186 1 to 30 June 1865, General Allen 

received and expended $106,694,657.24. At the same time, his depot 

quartermaster at St. Louis, Colonel Myers, ex pended $90,799,435.88. 

making an aggregate expenditure of $197.494,093. 12. When his accounts 

were settl ed. the Treasury Department disallowed not one penny of 

Allen's huge disbursements. By comparison, the lOlal disbursements of 

the Q uartermaster's Department for 1860 were only about $6,000.000. 

T he tota l amount of suppl ies All en purchased in those years cannot be 

enumerated, but a sampling full y illustrates the vast amounts involved. 

Under All en's d irection, his offi cers purchased 8,864,173 bushels of corn, 

26,234,423 bushels of oats, 377,518 tOns of hay, 6,638 wagons, 1,269 

ambulances, 60,854 sets of harness, 100,364 horses, and 75,329 mules.t1f 

"" Allnull/ Reports Q/ Ihe QUartt:rIllIUUr Ce.rera/. 1861- 1865, p. 506 (Allen'. Rpt, I Jul 

1865, appended 10 QMC's Rpl, 1865). 

'''(I) OR, ser. I, vol. XXXII, PI. III, 270 (Sherman 10 Meig5. 6 Apr 1864). (2) RC 92, 

OQMG Letter Book, vol. 76. pp. 275-74 (Meigs 10 Allen. 29 Apr 18&1). 

III (I> Amrual Reports of Ihe QUlJrlermaSler Ge.rera/. 1861- 1865, pp. 505-08 (Allen's Rpl, 

1 J ul 1865, appendfil to QMG's Rpt, 1865). (2) J ames F. Rusling, Men and Tllings I Saw in 

Civil War Days (New York, 1899), pp. 174-89. 
430 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

In the East, the Washington Depot became the great depot through 

which a large part of the suppl ies passed for the armies before Richmond 

and on the Atlantic Coast. Unlike the St. Louis Depot. it never was 

placed u nder the authority of a chief q uartermaster of a military department. Instead, a chief quartermaster of the depot, who reported directly 

to Meigs, d irected its operation. T hroughout the war, Maj. (later 

Bvt. Maj . Gen.) Daniel H . Rucker filled th is post. H is efforts to supply 

the troops were hampered in 186 1 not only by the necessity of b uilding 

a depot where none existed before, but also by u ncertainty as to where 

it should be located. When Rucker arrived in Washi ngton in April 

186 1, there not only was no depot organization but neither was there a 

wagon, animal, or article of camp or garrison eq uipage on hand for 

issue to the 3-mon tbs' militia pouring into the city. Moreover, wholly 

ignorant of every deta il of military life, they not on ly bad to be equi pped 

by Rucker but also instructed " upon almost every conceivable subject 

connected with their new position." II~ Nevertheless, with the aid of 

four assistant q uartermasters, Rucker eq uipped the troops who fought 

the first Battl e of Bull Run. 

The disastrous result of that battle and the necessity of refitting that 

army as well as supplying the additional forces assembling at Washington 

brought a crysta lliza tion of depot policy. Depot operations had not been 

systematized because, un til 21 J uly l 8G l, no one had expected to establish 

a main depot for the Army at Washington. It had been anticipated that 

the advance of the Union forces would result in the capture of Richmond 

and the location of a permanen t depot at that city to sustain operations 

further south. After Bull Run, the Q uartermaster's Department leased 

buildings, erected storehouses, and built stabl es for the protection of 

animals and stores, and perfected the organization of the Washington 

Depot. 

As Meigs assigned additional assistant q uartermasters to Rucker, the 

latter d ivided depot functions among them in much the same pattern 

as occurred at the St. Louis Depot and for that matter at all other general 

and base depots. Functions vari ed slightly from time to time as changes 

were made in the depot's responsibilities. For example, after the establishment of the Cava lry Depot at Giesboro in the District of Col umbia, 

R ucker no longer had to assign an assistant quartermaster at the Wash ington Depot to receive and issue horses and mules. An assistant q uartermaster continued to be responsible for all transportation by wagon and 

ambulance and all repairs to such equipment. In contrast to St. Louis, 

Rucker assigned no over-all d irector of rail and water transportation. 

Instead, he subd ivided tha t function among four assistan t q uartermasters. 

". RG 92, OQMG Consolidated Correspondence File, Box 9H (Rucker Rpt, 22 Jul 18(5). 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 431 

One furnished railroad transportation to officers, troops in movement, 

furloughed soldiers, government officials, and employees; a second receipted and paid the freights on supplies shipped by river and ocean; 

a third chartered and paid for chartered vessels; and a fourth contracted 

for the victualling of government-owned or operated vessels. In addition, 

separate assistant quartermasters had charge of forage, of clothing and 

equipment, of the receipt and forwarding of ordnance stores, and of the 

construction and hiring of hospitals, quarters, offices. and wharves. The 

duties of the officer responsible for the purchase of Quartermaster stores 

and the operation of repair shops at the Washington Depot were considerably broadened by the assignment of new responsibilities to the Quartermaster's Department early in the war. ]n the fall of 1861, the Secretary 

of War ordered the Quartermaster General to provide forms for preserving burial records at Army hospitals and materials for manufacturing 

headboards for soldiers' graves. The following summer, Congress inaugurated the policy of establishing national cemeteries as burial sites for 

soldiers who died in the service of their country.''' Thereafter, the 

assistant quartermaster at the Washington Depot responsible for purchases and repair shop operations was also charged with the manufacture 

of coffins and headboards, the interment of deceased soldiers, and the 

care of the cemeteries at Soldiers' Home, Arlington, and Ft. Stevens.I1T 

Quartermasters also established advance and temporary or movable 

depots to sustain armies in the fi eld. When the line of communication 

between an army and its base depot became too long and it was desirable 

to ease the transportation of supplies, quartermasters established an 

advance depot. Such a depot contained a sufficient stock of stores and 

provided a variety of services that permitted an army to continue operations even if enemy action temporarily cut its line of communication to 

the base depot. Advance depots were located at poinu readily accessible 

by means of rail or water transportation. Supplies accumulated at such 

a depot were brought fon va rd from a base depot and supplemented, when 

possible, by local procurement. 

Advance depots frequently took on the proportions of secondary 

base depots. The Nashville Depot, for example, served as the advance 

depot for supplying Sherman's troops in the campaign that terminated 

with the capture of Atlanta. Lt. Col. James L. Donaldson, who was 

assigned as Chief Quartermaster of the Department of the Cumberland 

''' 12 SIal. 596 Oul 17, 1862). 

II. (I) A.mlllli Reporls of IIII!! Quarler"'ll.Iltr Gen/!!rlll, 1861- 186J, p. 542 (Rucker'. Rpt. 

31 Aug 1865. appended to QMG', Rpc, 1865). (2) For duties of individual officers assigned 

to Washington Ikpot. see reporu of Capu. J ames M. Moore, Edward S. Allen , Ben Burton, 

Chas. H . Tompkins, E. E. Camp, and E. L. Haru in RG 92, Personal Narrative Rpu, F.Y. 

1865', 1864, 1865, passim. 
432 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

and senior and supervisi ng q uartermaster in October 1863. reorganized 

that depot. His assignment occurred at a time when the Union forces, 

barefooted, ragged, and on short rations, were hemmed in at Chattanooga 

by the Confederates. Donaldson's immediate duty was th erefore to 

supply Chananooga, a laborious assignment until the battles of Look· 

out Mountain and Missionary Ridge secured that stronghold late in 

November. 

During lhe wimer, he hurried along preparations for the proposed 

campaign against Atlanta. Donaldson then found the Armies of the 

Tennessee and the Ohio, as well as the Army of the Cumberland. looking 

to the Nashville Depot for supplies. Yet he could gel no estimates [TOm 

those two armies and in fact had no authority to call for them. In 

anticipation of the demands to be made upon Nashvill e, however, Donaldson sent large estimates for the spring campaign to Chief Quartermaster 

Allc:n at Louisville, estimating on the basis of supplies needed for 60,000 

anima ls and 150,000 men lO last as a 6-months' supply from and after 

I May 1864. He termed th e response from Allen "magnificent." T he 

Louisville and Nashville Railroad brought enormous quantities of supplies to Nashville. and Colonel Parsons. directing river transportation 

from St. Louis, crowded the Cumberl and with steamers and barges. T he 

Nashville Depot. Dona ldson reported, was taxed to the utmost to handle 

the stores sent. 

For weeks together, my Levee thronged with transports of all sorts, and a 

(orce at least three thousand (3,000) men, and from four (4) to five hundred 

(500) teams were kept constantly at work, day and night, Sundays. and week 

days, in transferring the supplies to my various depots, and Store houses. My 

estimate is that. for three (3) months. or more together. I received, and 

handled daily, an average of from two (2) to three (3) thousand tons of 

Freight. exclusive of the amount arriving here by Railroad."B 

When Donaldson took charge of the Depot, there were on ly two 

levees at which river freight could be landed. O ne accommodated 20 

boats by crowding and the oth er, 12. T he tota l accommodation was 

inadequate lO care for th e number arriving at Nashville and Capt. C. H . 

Irvin, an assistant quartermaster at the Depot, built a third levee. H e 

also conce ived of a p lan for handling th e vast inAux of stores at Nashville. 

All available warehouses were in usc at Nashville but it was obvious that 

they wou ld be insufficient to store a ll supplies. With Donaldson's ap' 

proval. Capta in Irvin constructed three additional large warehouses, 

locating them on the railroad lines. He built one call ed the Forage 

House on the line of the Northwestern Ra ilroad.' '' Two others, the 

' .. RG 92. Persona l Narrative: RpIS. F.Y. 1864. I. 99 1 (Dona ldson's Rpt, 15 Sc:p 1864) . 

.. OilS size: was 1.109 (C:C:I long by 140 fC:C:1 wide:. 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 

Bread Shed or Eaton Depot and the Taylor Depot, lrvin built on the 

line of the Tennessee and Alabama Railroad, and Donaldson assigned 

them to the Subsistence Department to be used for the storage of beef, 

pork, vinegar. and whiskey,m Even with these additional warehouses, 

a considerable amount of forage had to be stored outdoors on raised 

platforms and covered with paul ins. This is scarcely susprising in view 

of the fact that Donaldson, in estimating for forage for 60,000 animals for 

6 months, called for 108,000,000 pounds of forage, the bulk of which 

Allen forwarded to him by I May. 

T hat amount of forage by no means oversupplied Sherman's armies; 

in fact a shortage developed. When Sherman moved in May, the Nash· 

ville Depot began forwarding to Chattanooga an average of from 40 to 

60 cars of grain da ily, keeping this supply Howing until early in August 

when grain began to run short because the forage was being used to feed 

about 75,000 animals rather than the 60,000 for which Donaldson had 

estimated. The supply at Nashville had to be replenished, and fortunately Allen was able to procure sufficient stocks from the new crop of 

oats then being harvested. An alarming crisis, however, developed in 

transporting it to Nashville. T he railroads could not carry sufficient 

amounts and the Cumberland River had fallen to 10 or 12 inches of water 

on Harpeth Shoals, halting navigation to Nashvill e. The quartermaster 

overcame this problem by introducing a novel feature in river navigation. 

Donaldson organized a Heet of light-draught steamers to come up the 

Cumberland to the shoals where he stationed 100 yoke of oxen to meet 

and tOw tbem over the shallows into deep water from where they could 

make their way under their own power to Nashville. This method provided 500 additional tons of freight every day, and was used for 2 weeks 

until heavy rains again made the Cumberland navigable at that point. 

When Sherman was ready to begin his campaign, all the necessary 

supplies were on hand at the Nashville Depot except a suffi cient number 

of horses for the Cavalry. To provide this essential supply. Chief 

Quartermaster Donaldson was, in the end. compelled to procure an order 

for a general impressment of all horses at Nashville and within a radius 

of 20 miles. By this means he mounted 1.000 men more than he would 

otherwise have been able to do. Sherman was well into his campaign 

before horses in any large numbers were received at the Depot.

1tI 

Donaldson estimated that from the time Sherman began his movement, he never had less than 60,000 animals and 125,000 men to provide 

'-The Eaton Depol w;u 600 feel long by 11 2 feel wide and Ihe Taylor Depol 517 reel 

long by 190 feel wide. Bolh were one·slory buHdings. RC 92, Personal Narnlive Rplll, 

F.Y. 1864, I, 1010-1 011 (Rpl. Dona ldson to Maj. Gen. Ceo. H. T homas, 12 Oel 18&1). 

111 Ibid., 1, 997 (Dona ldson Rpt . 15 Sep 1864). 
434 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

for south of the Tennessee River and at least 15,000 animals and 40,000 

men, including Quartermaster employees, north of it. When Sherman 

began his march, he had told Donaldson that he had no orders to give 

him; "only supply my Army," he warned him, "or I will eat your 

mules," 122 With pride, Dona ldson informed Meigs that the Nashville 

Depot had not failed; Sherman's army never suffered for lack of any 

supplies. Sherman himself reported that, fTom I May to 15 September 

1864, stores had been brought forward "in wonderful abundance. with 

a surplus that has enabled me to [eed the army well during the whole 

period of time," 123 

To achieve this, Donaldson had converted Nashville into one vast 

storehouse and corral, "with warehouses covering whole blocks, one of 

them over a quarter of a mil e long," and with corrals and stables "by the 

ten and twenty acres each." ~ His quartermasters maintained boatyards 

and vast repair shops to facilitate the repair of river steamers on the one 

hand and wagons and ambulances on the other. In addition, extensive 

machine and car shops were established at Nashville to keep in repair 

and operation the engines and railroad cars upon which Sherman's army 

depended. These were under the direction of Col. Daniel C. McCallum 

in charge of military railroads, but an assistant quartermaster under 

Donaldson handled all disbursements. To care for the sick and wounded 

soldiers and to maintain the health of his Quartermaster employees, 

Donaldson erected hospitals. He provided fuel so that the city water 

works could supply the large quantities of water needed by the hospitals. 

barracks. offices. and shops. He organized a fire department for the 

protection of the public stores. Having taken possession of the Methodist 

Printing House, he operated it to provide the stationery, forms, ledger 

books, and similar supplies needed by the army in the fie ld and the 

Department of the Cumberland. 

His disbursements amounted to over $5 million per month. He 

employed over 12,000 laborers. mechanics, and clerks. More than a 

dozen assistant quartermasters were on duty at Nashvi lle, among whom 

were divided the duties of the Depanment. 125 This distribution of 

duties at an advance depot was much the same as that described at a 

general or base depot. Assistant quartermasters, assigned to that duty by 

Chief Quartermaster Donaldson, each handled responsibilities for river 

transportation, railroad disbursements, clothing and equipment, forage, 

and repairs and construction . 

.... (I) Rllsling, Men lind Tlrings I SlIW in Civil Wlir Days, p. Ill. (2) Sherman, MUlloirs. 

II,272. 

101 OR, ser. t, vol. XXXVIII, Pt. I, p. 62 (Sherman to Hallo::k. 15 Sep 18&1). 

U4 Rusling, Men and Tilings 1 Saw in Civil War Days, p. 185. 

U1 1bid., p. -'22. 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 435 

Few advance depots were as large as the Nashville Depol but the one 

erected at City Point Va., the headquarters of Lieutenant General Grant. 

directing the operations against Richmond, was its equivalent in the 

East. T he principal depot at City Point was located on the J ames River, 

at the mouth of the Appomauox after the armies had crossed the James 

and begun the siege of Petersburg. Until 7 November 1864, Col. 

P. P. Pitkin was chief quartermaster of the depot and was succeeded by 

Col. George W. Bradley. T he chief quartermaster of the depot retained 

direct charge of water transportation on the James River. but all other 

duties-forage, clothing, railroad transportation. and the like-were in 

charge of assistant quartermasters, subject to his supervision. He reported to General Ingalls, the Chief Quartermaster of the armies operating before Richmond. 

An average of 40 steamboats, 73 sa il vessels. and 100 barges daily in 

the James River engaged in the transportation of supplies fTom northern 

ports. A daily line of boats also ran' between City Point and Washington 

to provide mail and passenger service.!!' Wharves had to be constructed 

and storehouses erected to accommodate the daily supplies required by 

the armies as well as to hold in depot 20 days' supply of forage and at 

least 30 days' of subsistence. besides large quantities of clothing, ordnance. 

and hospital stores. The daily consumption of supplies was enormous. 

In the maller o[ forage alone, the Army's animals required 600 tons of 

grai n and hay daily.121 Although carpenters employed in the repair 

depot at City Point, under the direction of Bvt. Ll. Col. E. J. Strang, 

built some storehouses, stables, barracks for Quartermaster and Subsistence employees, and hospitals. the U.s. Military Railroad Construction 

Corps erected most of such buildings and constructed the wharves for 

ordnance stores, railroad supplies. forage, mail. coal. commissary supplies. 

clothing. and quartermaster stores at the direction of the depot quartermaster. 11I The hospital buildings alone numbered 110 at City Point, 

and in addition there were also offices (or the provost marshal. the harbormaster, depot quartermaster, commissary. and the assistant quartermasters 

in charge of specific supplies; repair shops. bakeries. kitchens; and stables 

and corrals. lit Colone l Strang employed a force of about 1,600 wheelwrights, carpenters. blacksmiths, saddlers. teamsters, laborers. and clerks. 

,. AnnulIl ~porl$ 0/ tll~ QUllrtumnJ/u G~nulIl, 1861-1865, p. 509 (Ingalls' Rpt, 28 Sep 

U165. appended 10 QMG'I Rpt. 18(5) . 

... RG 92.- 0QMG ColUQlidated· Correspondence File. Box 159 (Ingalls' RI)I to Meigs. 

2. Jun 18(5) . 

.. (I) Ibid. (2) AJillulIl R~porlS 0/ t"~ QlIlIrtumrulu G~."rrlll, 1861-186,. p. 7.\. 

(Slnng', Rpt. 22 Scp 1865, appended to QMG'I Rpt, 18(5) . 

.. See sketch of City Point. 
Rou;h Skotch 

of City Point 

\ 

Showln; Locotlon of Bulldln;, . 

Nam •• 

Scol. 100 It. _ Onl InclI 

- L865 

co 

0; 

.. ~ 

• .. 

o 

= 

c::J c •• ,, == __ , ... .~, 

= DO DO 

.. 

-

• • • Go 

S KETCH O F CITY POINT, VA . 
-, 

• 

.' •• 

SKETCH Of' CITY POINT, VA. 
4~8 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

and the number of men employed monthly in the Construction Corps 

averaged from 2,000 LO 3,000. 

The depots at City Point and Nashville were extremely large advance 

depots. In the course of the Civil War, many small er advance depots 

were established, as for example, at Belle Plain in Virginia on the Potomac 

River, and at Memphis, Tenn. Regard less of size, however, they can· 

formed to the pattern described. All duties were divided among a 

number of assistant quartermasters, each being selected for his peculiar 

fitness for the assignment. All such depots included repair shops and a 

varying force of mechanics and laborers. 

Immediately in the rear of the troops, assistant quartermasters estab· 

lished small depots, onl y large enough to provide for the da ily wants of 

the troops. These temporary depots usually existed at any location only 

for a few days, the depot quartermasters making a forward or retrograde 

movement with their supplies in accordance with the movement of the 

army and upon the orders of its chief quartermaster. T he workings of 

this depot system, brought to perfection as the war progressed, were 

nevertheless evident from the beginning. 

In the Peninsular campaign undertaken by Maj. Gen. George B. 

McClellan in the spring of 1862, the base depots o[ the Army of the 

Potomac were located at Washington and Alexandri a. An immense 

depot of clothing and equipment had been established in Washington, 

and transports for moving the Army of the Potomac from Washington 

to its new base at Fort Monroe, rendezvoused at Alexandria in mid-March. 

A depot of land transportation had been established in the previous 

summer at Perryville. at the mouth of the Susquehanna River, where 

assistant quartermasters accumulated wagons, horses, and mules because 

of the difficulty of subsisting the animals in the Washington area, limited 

as it was to transportation via the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Perryville, on the other hand, could be reached by both rail and water. As the 

Army moved into Virginia. the Quartermaster's Department broke up 

the Perryville Depot and sent its means of transportation to Fort Monroe. 

It fonvarded and kept aAoat at Fort Monroe huge stocks of forage purchased and stored earlier in New York on the orders of Chief Quartermaster Stephen Van Vliet. T he depot established there became the main 

or advance depot for the Peninsular campaign. 

By 6 April. assistant quartermasters established temporary depots 

at Cheeseman's Creek. primarily for forage, and at nearby Ship's Point, 

at the mouth of the Poquosin River below Yorktown, for subsistence. 

When the Enemy evacuated Yorktown, they broke up those depots and 

tra nsferred the supplies to Yorktown. T hereafter, as the Army advanced. 

up the Peninsula, quartermasters successively changed depots from one 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 439 

location to another until on 20 May the temporary depot was at While 

House on lhe Pamunkey River, where the railroad from West Point to 

Richmond crossed. As soon as that railroad was put into working order, 

supplies werc moved over it to the fronl. When it became necessary late 

in June for the Army to fa ll back to the James River, the depot at White 

House was broken up. and the suppli es were moved to Harrison's Landing 

on the James River. Thus, in accordance with the movement of the 

Army of the Potomac, assistant quanermasters moved supplies at the 

Temporary depots from place lO place by transports, always keeping these 

depots within each reach of the wagon supply trains of the Army/Ill 

In other campaigns. railroads formed a line of supply for depots. 

When the Army of the Potomac entered upon the Gettysburg campaign 

in the summer of 1863, its base of supply was at Baltimore. Chief 

Quartermaster Ingalls set up depots for the issue of supplies at Westminster and Frederick in western Maryland, the clothing, forage, and 

food. being brought forward to Frederick on the Baltimore and Ohio 

Railroad and to Westminster on the "Branch road." Following the 

baltle, the Confederate Army moved into northern Virginia and the Army 

of the Potomac concentrated near Harper's Ferry. At Ingalls' direction, 

temporary depots were established at Berlin, Harper's Ferry, and nearby 

Sandy Hook, and on 16 July the Army was ordered to replenish its supplies at these depots. The lines of supply then were the Chesapeake and 

Ohio Canal and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Depot quartermasters supplied clothing, fTesh horses, and mules. The troops were to 

be prepared to march with 3 days' cooked rations in their haver.sacks, 

3 days' hard bread and small rations in their regimental wagons, and. in 

addition, 2 days' salt meat and 7 days' hard bread and small rations in the 

wagons of the supply train. 

As the Army of the Potomac followed Lee into Virginia, these rations 

were expected to supply the Army until it reached Gainesville on the 

Manassas Gap Railroad and Warrenton on the Warrenton Branch. 

While the Army took up its march, the depot quartermasters moved their 

supplies via Alexandria, and Chief Quartermaster Ingalls went to Washington to arrange for the forwarding of supplies via the Orange and 

Alexandria Railroad. The campaign ended a little more than a week 

later with the Army taking up a line across that railroad near the Rappa. 

hannock River. Assistant quartermasters established depots for supplying the troops at Warrenton Junction, Warrenton, and Bealton.'" 

" RG 92, I'Cf$Onal Narralivc RplS, F.Y. 1865, V, 541--555 (Van Vliel's Rpt. 2 Aug 1862) . 

... <I) Annual Rf!/X>rts olliltl Q"ar'umruter Genual, 1861- 186J, pp. 28-30 (Rpt of Ingalls, 

28 Aug 1864, appended to QMG'I Rpt, 1864). (2) RG 92, I'ersonal Narrative Rpts, F.Y. 1864, 

Ill, 1019-1021 (Rpt, Capt. P. P. "itkin, 20 Scp 1864). 
440 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Quartermasters of temporary depots ordinarily made use of whatever buildings they found available for the protection of their stores, 

but frequently there were nonc. Such was the situation when Assistant 

Quartermaster Pitkin set lip a temporary depot for the supply of the Army 

of the Potomac at Berlin, Md., in mid-July 1863, and later at Warrenton 

Junction, Va. He used canvas to protect his stores and issues were made 

in the open field .n. Assistant quartermasters establishing temporary 

depots at various river poin ts in the course of McClellan's Peninsular 

campaign occasiona ll y found old wharves, as at Harrison's Landing, that 

they could use to accommodate commissary. ordnance. quartermaster, and 

hospital stores. Usua lly, however, they constructed temporary wharves 

by throwi ng ashore at high tide barges and canal boats and bridging 

them over.1I1 

Operating through a depot system, quartermasters distributed suppli es to the troops in the fie ld with increasing efficiency during the war. 

There were few complaints of shortages after the first few months. U t 

Requisitioning through the depot cha in, supply officers obtained and 

issued rations to the men, forage for the anima ls, replaced worn-out or 

lost items of equipment, clothing, and shoes, built hospitals for the sick 

and wounded, erected faci lities for the protection of animals and stores, 

and occasionally furnished shelter for troops and civilian employees. 

Construction of Ban'acks and Other Facilities 

All barracks and other buildings erected duri.ng the Civil War were 

considered temporary structures and consequently were built by the 

Quartermaster's Department.m The rush to arms in April 186 1 allowed 

no time (or the erection of barracks. T he regiments pouring into WashJ. RC 92, Penonal Narrative Rpts, F.Y. 18&1, III, 1021 (Pitkin Rpt, 20 Sep 18&1) . 

... (I) Annual R~porlj 0/ fll~ Q"lIrlerm4$l~r Ge:m;ral, 1861- /86', p , 39 (ingallll' Rpt, 28 Scp 

1863, appended to QMC's Rpt, 18&1). (2) R.G 92. I'cnonal Narnllive Rpl$, F.Y. 1863, V, 549 

(Van Vliet's Rpt, 2 Aug 18(2). 

, .. An exception may be found in the (harges made by McClellan in the fa ll of 1862. 

Ordered to pursue ami attack the enemy following the battle of Antietam, McClellan elaimed 

that he was unable to do so bcc:ause h is Cava lry lacked hones and hi' troops were in want 

of blankets, shoes, and clothing. His claims oould not be susta ined in Halleck's opinion. 

Meigs refuted any charge of failure in his Oepartme11l , while the Ch id Quartermaster of the 

Anny of the Potomac denied any suffering had oa:urroo bc:c:ausc: of lack of clothing, though 

lupplies had been delayed in lromsit. OR, ser. I. vol. XIX. 1'1. I, pp. 12- 13: 16-17 (McClellan 

10 Halleck, II , 12, 18 O<:t 1862); pp.7-9 (Halleck to Stanton . 280<:1 1862): Pt. 11 , pp. 491- 93 

(Ingalls to Meigs, 26 Oct 1862). 

,. Under regu lations, all quarters for offICers and soldiers at permanent forlific:ations were 

built by)he Engineer Department, bill no h permanent struclUrc:s were built during the 

war. (I) Way De/Jilrlmtml Curer,,1 Ordus, GO 41, I Mar 1860. (2) Ue:vised Regulations for 

lilt Arm] of Ihe Unil ed Siales, /86/, p. 569. 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 441 

ington for its defense were temporarily sheltered in public buildingsthe Capitol and the Patent Office-and in the halls of Georgetown 

College. State authorities also resorted to the use of empty stores, halls, 

and courthouses. The 1st Massachusetts Infantry Regiment was quar· 

tered for a week in Faneuil Hall in Boston, then moved to its first camp 

in an old icehouse that the State had partially fitted up for barracks.m 

Some troops were fortunate enough to be quartered in nearby forts, but 

most volunteers were quartered at small camps that sprang up throughout 

the northern states. 

T he first troops to arrive at such a camp built the barracks they 

occupied. This was standard procedure; the Regu lar Army had always 

been called upon to erect its temporary quarters in the field. The 

quartermaster furnished the tools, lumber, and other material required, 

and the men did the work. U1 Under these circumstances, the design had 

to be simple, and generally such a barracks was a long, one-storied, gabled 

building, having an entrance at one end, a broad aisle running through 

the center, and a double row of hunks, one above the other on either 

side. Such a barracks was intended to hold one company of 100 men.''' 

By the spring of 1864, plans had been standardized for barracks and 

were provided for the guidance of quartermasters directed to construct 

them. In these plans, the barracks, 24 feet by 128 feet in length, was a 

two-storied structure, with provision for better ventilation in summer and 

heating in winter. The first floor provided quarters for officers, kitchens, 

and storerooms; the second Hoar offered a dormitory for troops, the hunks 

being arranged in three tiers down the length of the two side walls. 138 

Hospitals were built to the specifications and plans of the Surgeon 

General's Office, but essentially they were much the same as a barracks, 

except that only one row of bunks was provided at either side of the 

aisle, and attendants' rooms, dispensary, and kitchen were included. 

When the troops left the training camps for active service in the 

theater, they depended for protection in summer on the shelter tent, 

issued to them by the Quartermaster's Department, after the first few 

months of the war, in lieu of the large Sibley and wall tents that had been 

in use, and in winter, on the huts they built when the army went into 

quarters. Hutting had afforded winter protecton ever since the Revolutionary War. The troops usually took up quarters in a well·timbered 

1M Billings, Hardtack arId CoUu, p. 45 . 

.... i~ practice Wa3 not confined to the beginning of the war. Wlle'l more draftees 

arrived in the fall of 186!! than could be a~eommodated in the barracks at Rock Island. III., 

they were called upon 10 build additional barracks for their use. RC 92, OQMC Leiter Book, 

vol. 72. p. 527 (Ac tg QMC Thomas to C. A. Reynolds. 18 Nov 18(11) . 

.. Billings, Ha rdtacit and CoUee, pp. 45-46. 

"Orders, QIIQ.rtenllasler Gelleral, 1862-1865 CO 17,28 Apr 1864. 
442 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

CAMP OF 8TH N.J. VOLU NTEERS, M ARCH, 1862 

area, and it was the work of a few days only before a city of log cabins 

was built. T he o nl y difference in the Civil War was that the hut was 

usually covered with the shelter tent. ItO In winter quarters, quartermasters, using troop labor when necessary. bUl usuall y employing the 

large number of mechanics and laborers attached to the repair shops thal 

accompan ied all armies in the fi eld, bui lt sheds and platforms for the 

protection of supplies, stabl es fOT the an imals, guardhouses, quarters [or 

officers, and any other faci lities required.'41 

Construction at depots was under the direction of quartermasters 

who furnished the required materials and supervised the work of hired 

civilians. Most general depots had an assistant quartermaster in charge 

of both construction and rentals, who hired mechanics and laborers to 

construct and keep in repair the warehouses, guardhouses, shops, stabl es, 

'" RG 92. I'Cl"1OnaJ Nam uivc RplS. F.Y. ]864. IV. 248 (Lt. Col. G. A. Shallc" berger's Rpt . 

- Nov 1864) . 

• n I bid., p. 249; ibid., F.Y. 1865. II. 431-55 (Ch id QM J. C. Farnsworth, 5] Aug 1865); 

ibid., F.Y. 18&1. III, 1025 (QM 1'. P. Pitki" . 3 Dec; 1865). 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 443 

WINTER HUTS AND CORDUROY ROADS 

barracks, hospitals, and other buildings under the depot's control. In 

addition to an unknown number of artisans and laborers, Capt. E. E. 

Camp. attached to the Washington Depot, also employed the services of 

an architect, a draftsman, and a foreman. Some eight hospitals were 

under his charge, including Lincoln Hospital, consisting of 36 buildings 

with accommodalions for 1,200 patients, and Harewood Hospital, with 

26 buildings and space for 900 pat nts. l<~ At advance depots, quartermasters used the services of the numerous skilled craftsmen brought from 

urban centers to work in the repair shops. A large proportion of 

laborers at all types of depots were so-ca ll ed "contrabands," that is negroes 

who were employed not only in construction work, but also as teamsters, 

cooks, and stevedores to unload cargoes at depot wharves, and as handlers 

of forage at forage depots. Ita 

''' Ibid., F.Y. 1863, I, 641 - 52. 

, .. (I) Congress, in an aCI approved J uly 17, 1862, fixed their compensation al "len dollan 

per month and one ralion, three dollan of which monlhly may be in clothing:' Orders, 

QllarteTIIlllster General, 1862, Circular. 23 Sep 1862. (2) Ammol Report.! oj Ih e QIl<lrtermasler 

General, 1861- 1865, pp. 19-20 (QMG's Rpl. 18(3); p. 44 (Ingalls' Rpt, 1863, appended). 
444 QUARTERMASTER SU PPORT OF T H E ARM Y 

-

GOVERNMENT H ORSF.,SHO):I NC S HOP 

Clothing the Trool)S 

Although the t TOOp S were usuall y required to build their barracks 

and huts. officers of the Quartermaster's and Subsistence Departments, 

respecti vely, suppli ed them th eir clothing and rations. Volunteers received th eir initial issue of dothing and equipment from their respective 

states, for many companies and regiments were raised and equipped under 

state authority. Quartermasters at camps of rendezvous established in 

the d ifferent northern states issued their initia l supply to oth er recruits. 

Such camps were supplied by United States quartermasters who were 

genera lly in charge of the genera l depot in th e rear area, or were chief 

quartermasters of th e milita ry department in which the camps were 

located. For exampl e, Capt. H. Dickerson, assistant quartermaster in 

charge of the Cincinnati depot, supplied all th e camps in Ohio in 1862.1U 

Replacements of clothing in the fi eld were made by company supply 

officers on requisitions of the regimenta l quartermasters. 

By law, the Volunteer Army received the same clothing allowance 

as the Regu lar Army. Under regul ations, an infantryman received two 

caps and one hat, one overcoat, twO d ress coats, th ree pairs of trousers, 

, .. OR, ser. lII, '101. 11 . PI'. 482- 84 (GO 121, 29 Aug 1862). 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 445 

three flannel shins, three pairs of flannel drawers, four pairs of stockings, 

four pairs of bootees, and one blanket. An artilleryman or cavalryman 

received the same allowance except that a jacket was issued in lieu of the 

dress coat and boots were given instead of bootees.''' This constituted 

a year's issue of clothing, except that the overcoat was expected to give 

service for 5 years and the blanket for 3 years. In active operations, this 

clothing allowance did not last the time for which it was intended. Wear 

and tear and losses necessitated frequent replacements. For items lost 

in battle. new articles were provided, the quartermaster being required 

to certify to that effect before new issues could be made. Any replacement for other losses were charged against the soldier's clothing accountit amounted to $42 a year-and were deducted from his pay at the end 

of the year, the system of accountability being the same as that originally 

introduced by Quartermaster General Jesup. The soldier's knapsack, 

haversack, canteen, and shelter tent were government property that were 

issued for his use but turned in at the end of his term of service. The big 

knapsack, well·stuffed by the soldier at the beginning of his service, was 

soon a casualty of war. Always dropped in battle, knapsacks were also 

discarded by weary soldiers on marches. In the Chancellorsville cam· 

paign, Ingalls reported, the loss of knapsacks of those actually engaged 

was at least 25 percent. 148 In time, the knapsack was seldom used by 

veterans. The blanket roll, slung over the shoulder, took its place. 

Lack of discipline by commanding officers and carelessness on the 

part of the troops combined to produce heavy losses of clothing and 

equipment both on the march and in battle. Loaded down with musket 

and 40 to 60 rounds of ammunition, shelter tent, blanket or overcoat, 

and extra clothing in his knapsack as well as 3 days' cooked rations in his 

haversack, a soldier on the march lightened his burden by throwing away 

all but the most essential items.1tT In battle, the soldiers piled their 

knapsacks and threw away their blankets, overcoats, and other articles of 

clothing. Whether victorious or defeated, Meigs reported, the regiments 

seemed seldom to recover the property thus laid aside ... • In the Chancellorsville campaign, the weather suddenly turned hot and the soldiers 

threw away overcoats and blankets "enough to carpet the roads they 

""The clothing allowance was set up on a 5·year basis of issue. Revis~d R~gulatjon.l for 

Ihe Arm)' of Ih ~ U"iled SillieS, 1861, p. 170. 

'''(I) Billings, HlIrdtllck lind CoOee, p. 319. (2) A"''''111 R~/fflrll of ''' ~ QUllrl mllul er 

Ceneral, 1861- 1865, p. 35 (Ingalls' Rpt, 28 Aug 1864 , appended to QMC's Rpt, 1864). 

,,' (I) Billings, HlIrdlllck and CoDu, p. 317. (2) Ingalls n:ported the soldier's load in the 

Chancellorsville campaign was 45 pounds, though the reports of different oorps quartenna5lers 

varied. Annllill Report.l of lIu Qllarlermlljler Ce'leral, /861- /865, p. 47 (Ingalls' Rpt, 29 May 

1863, appended 10 QMC's Rpt. 1864). (3) Sec also RG 92. Personal Narrat ive Rpts, F.Y. 1863, 

V. 468 (Lt. Col. C. W. Tolles. I Scp 1863) . 

... IIn"lIal R e/fflrls of the QUllrUrmllsler Ceneral, 1861- 186$, p. 18 (QMC's Rpt, 1862), 
446 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

FALL IN FOR SOUP 

travelled over," Quartermaster Le Due informed Meigs. In the woods 

where the 5th Corps had bivouacked, the troops left wagj:mloads of 

blankets, coats, and pants. Some had been torn in strips but many were 

good and "the negroes and women of the country were busy in securing 

the plunder." ~ Quartermasters repeatedly commented on the fact that 

the troops were generally overloaded.uo 

T he effect of such wastefulness was to increase the problem of supply 

by quartermasters in the field and procurement by the Department. The 

consumption rate for clothing and equipment was greater- than necessary, 

and appropriations made upon estimates based on the regulation allowance provided for soldiers in the Regular Army proved insufficient to 

clothe and equip the soldier of the Volunteer Army. In consequence, 

large deficiency appropriations were necessary.UI 

... RG 92, Personal Narrative Rpts, F,Y, 1863, III, 743 (Rpl , Lt. Col. Wm. G. Lc Due, 

25 Sep 1864), 

... (I) Anmw/ Reports of the QuarlermllSler Genua/ J86J - 18M, p. 36 (I ngalls' Rpt, 

28 Aug 1864. appended to QMG's Rpl, 1864), (2) See a lso RG 92, Personal Narralivc Rpts, 

F.Y. 1863. Ill, 769 (Capt. J. G. C. Lee's Rpl , 20 Aug 1863) . 

.. , OR, ser. III, vol. II, p, 733 (Meigs 10 Stanton, 3 Nov 18(2). 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 447 

THANKSGIVING IN CAMP, 1861 

Subsisting the Troops 

The armies of the Civil War were as improvident of rations as of 

clothing and equipment. The ration allowed the troops had changed 

but little over the years. For the most part, it still provided a meat and 

bread diet as it had in the past.,n On 3 August 186 1. Congress generously increased the bread ration so that the soldier received 22 instead of 

18 ounces of soft bread or flour, or 16 instead of 12 ounces of hard bread. 

1t directed that fresh beef in place of salt meat was to be issued when 

practicable as often as the commanding officer of any detachment or regiment required it. Twenty ounces of fresh mutton might be issued in lieu 

of salt beef, and issues of dried, pickled, or fresh fish might be made. 

W At the beginning of the war. the cOinponents of the ration con$istetl of the following: 

12 ounces of pork or bacon. or 20 ounces of fresh or ~alt beef; 18 ounces of bread or flour. 

or 12 ounces of hard bread, or 20 ounces of cornmeal; and to e~ery 100 rations there wa~ also 

included for issue 8 quarts of beahs, or 10 pounds of rice, or twice a week 1!'t0 ounces of desiccated potatoes and 100 ounces of desiccated mixed ~egcta bles; 10 pounds of coffee, or 

1Jh; pounds of tea; l!'t pounds of sugar; 4 quarts of negar; I pound of sperm candles, or 

IYt pounds of adamantine candles, or 1l,4 pounds of tallow candles: 4 pounds of soap: and 

2 quarlS of salt. Rnlised. R~gulatjOlu lor the AmI)' 0/ th~ U"ited. Stales, 1861, p. 24~. 
448 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

CooKS AT WORK 

If practicable. one pound of potatoes per man was to be issued at least 

three times a week, and hominy. peas, onions. or canned tomatoes were 

added to the vegetable list. Molasses and syrup were also included.tn 

In I 86!!, pepper in the proportion of 4 ounces to every lOO rations was 

added to the ration. Whiskey formed no part of the regular ration but 

one gill was allowed daily in case of excessive fatigue and exposure,Ut 

The original ration o[ 186 1 had been ample in qua ntity. however 

lacking in variety and un palatable it seemed to the volunteers. A year's 

experience showed that the additiona l allowance of flo ur led only to 

waste and increased procurement and transportation costs. T he Com· 

missary General of Subsistence therefore recommended a reduction in 

'·( 1) Ibid., p. 245. (2) 12 Stili. 287. 

IN(I) Revued Regll/olio>ls lor ti,e Arm, ollile U"ilea SloleJ, 1861, p. 2'14. (2) 1251111. 

745 (Mar 5, 1865). (5) Henry Symonds. Report 01 /I CommiJ.lllry 01 S'lb.listenu, 1861- 6' 

(Sing Sing, N. Y., 1888), pp. 142, 148 gives d3 !3 on amount of wh iskey procured for Sherm3n'l 

cam(l3ign. 
FIELD OPERAT IONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 449 

DRESSED B EEF AT REG I MENT A L CoMMISSARY 

the amount of the ra lio n, but it was not until 1864 that Congress 

eliminated the flour increase.U6 

The above-mentioned components of the ration were issued in camp. 

On the march, the soldier received one pound of hard bread; three-fourths 

of a pound of salt pork, or one and one-fourth pounds of fresh meat; 

sugar, coffee, and sa lt. Fresh meat was obtained from the herds of beef 

caule driven along with the army by special drivers under the orders 

of the chief commissary of the army. Bmchers connected with the 

brigade organization slaughtered the animals at night and the meat was 

then cooked. On the march, Fresh meat was issued to the troops either 

at night or early in the morning so that it could be carried in the 

haversack.'" To prevent scu rvy. potatoes, onions. dried apples or 

peaches, pickles, and kraut were occasionall y issued in small quantities. 

"' (1) 1.5 SIIII. 144 Qun 20, (864). (2) RG 192, eGS, l..cuen to SlY. 1854- 1866, p. 242 

(Taylor to Stanton, 28 No," 1862). (3) lI"iIr fHJr"IIf '" G~ tflll Ord rs, / 861, GO 226. 8 Jul 

, .... 1M (I> Sharpe. T ile Arl 0/ Supplyillg An niel ill Ihe Field, p. 83. (2) Billings, Hardlad 

and CoUu, p. 321. 
450 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

. \ . ;:> 

I 

CoMMISSARY Dr.PARTMENT AT HEADQUARTF.RS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC 

Condensed milk had been developed by Gail Borden, but the Subsistence Department did not include it in the regular ration. Sherman 

recorded that during the Atlanta campa ign his Army was supplied with 

all sorts of patent compounds, including the derisively named "desecrated 

vegetables and consecrated milk," but in the Army of the Potomac condensed milk could be bought only from the sutler. liT Canned foods 

were available but they were little used in the Civil War. The Subsistence Department purchased canned foods for sale to officers and for 

hospital use. Maj. Henry Symonds, commissary at Louisville, for example. provided canned fruits and canned tomatoes for officers serving 

with Sherman on the Atlanta campa ign.1II 

Purchasing commissaries of the Subsistence Department procured 

in the markets of the North the components of the ration issued to the 

troops, the subsistence items provided for sale to officers, and the special 

foods required at hospita ls. Such purchasing and depot commissaries 

were the key field officers in the supporting area of the rear. Maj. Amos 

Beckwith, who was chief commissary of the Washington Depot from 

1861 to 1864, and Maj. Henry Symonds, who served at the Louisville 

Depot throughout the Civil War, were among the more important pur· 

chasing commissaries. Such depot commissaries also built and operated 

bakeries that produced fresh bread and hardtack, pork·packing plants 

that turned out salt pork, hams, lard, and grease, and pickle plants that 

yielded barrels of kraut and pickles. They also built large corra ls at 

which cattle were received and inspected. The corral at Louisville, for 

example. could accommodate 40,000 head of cattl e.tli 

WI <I> Joe B. Franll:, Gllil norde", ~irymllll fo II Nllfioll (Norman, 1951 ), p. 258. (2) 

Sherman, Memoirs, II, S91. (S) Billings, Hllrdflld, IIl1d CoDu, p . 12!i. 

"'Symollds. Report oj a Comlllissary oj SllbJisltllCt, p. 1&6 . 

.. Ibid., pp. 105-06. 150-51, 155, 198-99, 20~-()7. 
FIELD OPERATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR 451 

Subsistence Department 

Unlike the Quartermaster's Department, which assigned a chief 

quartermaster to each military department, the Subsistence Department 

had only a few officers designated as chief commissaries of military departments. One was Capt. Thomas J. Haines, appointed chief commissary 

of the Department of the Missouri in 1861. His authority later was 

extended to include the Departments of the Tennessee and the Northwest. 

Such appointments appeared to be without legal foundation, for it was 

almost the end of the war before Congress authorized the Secretary of 

War to appoint, when necessary, chief commissaries to each geographical 

military division and military department.'60 While so assigned, the 

officer had the temporary rank, pay, and emoluments of a colonel of the 

Subsistence Department. Similar temporary rank was bestowed on the 

chief commissaries of the principal depots. 

Like the Quartermaster's Department, the Subsistence Department 

also had a field orgalJlzation that supported the tactical units of the Army. 

It consisted of both regularly appointed officers and a host of acting 

commissaries. At the beginning of the war, legislation provided for the 

appointment of regimental commissaries and commissary sergeants. 

Frequently, no commissary was appointed and the quartermaster sergeant 

executed commissary as well as quartermaster duties. Legislation also 

provided for the appointment by the President of brigade commissaries 

and commissaries for army corps who were given the rank of lieutenant 

colonel.le' 

Chief commissaries of armies were as essential as chief quartermasters 

and they were appointed from the beginning of the war. Thus, Col. 

Henry F. Clarke was appointed Chief Commissary of the Army of the 

Potomac and served until 1864. Maj. Robert Madeely served as Chief 

Commissary of the Army of the Tennessee during the Vicksburg cam· 

paign, and Col. Amos Beckwith accompanied Sherman as his Chief 

Commissary in the campaign against Atl anta. Such appointments were 

not legally recognized until Congress enacted legislation. in March 1865. 

providing for the appointment of a chief commissary o[ an army with the 

rank of colonel. At the same time. it also recognized the need for still 

another group of commissari es who had been serving during the war, 

namely. division commissaries who were granted the rank, pay, and emoluments of a major of the Subsistence Department. All such rank was 

temporary, lasting only while the officer was assigned to the designated 

post. Ie! 

'·15 SIal. 513 (Mar 3, 1865). 

"' 12 SIal. 268 Uu1 22. 18(1); p. 597 Uul II. 18(2) . 

.. 15 SIal. 513 (Mar 3,1865). 
452 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

It was the regimental, brigade, division, and corps commissaries and 

the chief commissaries of the armies who were responsibl e for requisitioning and issuing rations to the troops. T hey ca ll ed for supplies from the 

purchasing depots, established the advance and temporary depots that 

moved with the a rmies, supervised the herds of beef cattle that accompanied the armies, and, when necessary, directed the building and operating of bakeries to provide fresh bread for the troops in the 6eld.U ! 

SummaJ'Y 

T he Civil War wrought great changes in the supply departments. 

The Quartermaster's Department expanded, as Meigs later recalled, till 

"leavened by the knowledge and spirit and integrity of the small body of 

officers who composed it early in 1861, it showed itse lf competent to take 

care of the supplies and transportation of a great army du ring four years 

of most active warfare." ,eo It coll ected a large fleet of vessels on the rivers 

and along the coast. It constructed and equipped a squadron of river 

ironcl ads that played an important part in the operations of the Army 

in the West. It supplied the Army both during its initial stages of 

organization and duri ng active campaigns over long routes of communication by wagon, rail, river, and sea. It organized and operated an effective 

depot system, and, at the war's end, it returned to their homes over a 

million men. 

In the course of the war, th ere were only two occasions when the 

Union Army suffered for want of supplies. T he first occurred in 1863 

when General Rosecra n's army, checked at Chickama uga, fell back to, 

and was besieged at, Chattanooga. Havi ng lost control of its long line 

of communication , the troops lived for a time on scant rations, and many 

horses and mules of the Cavalry, the Artill ery, and the wagon trains 

perished. T he second occurred wben General Sherman captured Savannah in December 1864 but found it impossible to open the river to 

navigation at once. In consequence, some animals perished from lack of 

forage and the troops were shan of supplies despite the presence of a 

heavily laden Quartermaster fl eet wa iting at the mouth of the river. 

It was detained a few days until the channel could be cleared by vessels 

and machines provided by the Department. Genera l Meigs took quiet 

satisfaction in the fact that on both these occasions of want, he was with 

the troops, shared their hardships, and personally took action to relieve 

their distress. 

, .. See Billings. Hardlack a>!d CoUcc, pp. 120-2 1. 

to< Henry L. Abbot, "Memoir of Montgomery C. Meigs, 1816-92'" (Addre$S before National 

ACidemy. April 1893) in Civil War Pamp/lleU (n.p., n.d.) quoting Meigs' farewell address 

upon his retirement as Quartermaster General. 
CHAPTER XI 

Post-Civil War Developments 

Demobilization Operations 

"Reduce! Rerlucell ReduceJlI" So Quartermaster General Meigs 

communicated his orders in April 1865 to Brevet Maj. Gen. James L. 

Dona ldson, Ch ief Quartermaster of the Military Division of the Tennessee. Similar orders went out to other departmental and depot quartermasters,' Four years of bitler fighting had ended in Virginia at 

Appomattox. but the cessation or combat operation brought no immediate 

diminution of Quartermaster activities. Over a million volunteers were 

impatient to be mustered out of service. The rapid demobilization of 

the Civil War armies and the disposal of surplus su pplies imposed upon 

Quartermaster officers tasks that were as burdensome as any encountered 

in the transportation of troops and supplies during the war. 

The cost of the Civil War in men and resources had been enormous. 

During the war years, Congress had appropriated, in regular bills for 

fiscal-year expenditures and in deficiency bills, over one billion dollars for 

disbursements by the Quartermaster's Department alone.! Expenditures 

for clothing and equipment in fiscal year 1863 were over 40 times as much 

as they had been in 186 1. The cost of transporting troops and supplies 

in the former yea r was almost $39 million as compared to a little over 

$3 million in fiscal year 1861 , and by 1864 and 1865 it had risen to over 

$87 million and $80 million, respectively.8 Expenditures in the other 

supply departments had increased at a similar rate. In consequence, 

when the war ended, Congress and the people of the country were keenly 

interested in a reduction of War Department expenditures. For the next 

30 years, retrenchment was to be the dominating and controlling factor 

in Army life. 

A rapid deduction of the Army to a peacetime basis was preliminary 

to any economy move, and the decision to discharge the Volunteer Army 

'RG 92. OQMG Consolidated Correspondence Filc. Box 947 (Donaldson to Maj . Gen. 

Geo. H. Thomas. 15 Mar 1866). National Archives. 

AmlUlIl Reports of tile Qllllrtumils/u Genemf, 1861-/86j, p. 45 (QMG's Rpt. 1865). 

"These amounts were ascerta ined from only such accounlJ as had paucd · the uquined 

administrative examination of the QuartennaJter General's oftke. and they are by no means 

delin it ive. See ibid~ /J<2nim. 
454 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

promptly was the first step in that direction. The prospect of eady 

demobilization was most agreeable to the volunteer, whose onc wish was 

to return to his civilian pursuits as quickly as possible after Lee's surrender. Execution of troop demobilb:ation, however, brought no immediate reduction in transportation costs to the Quartermaster's Depart· 

ment. On the contrary, its transportation expenditures were exceedingly 

heavy until fiscal year 1868.4 

Actually, the developments in Mexico. the Fenian invasion of 

Canada, the turbulent conditions in the West. and the necessity of 

maiiHaining troops in the southern sta tes until the newly reconstituted 

governments could be re-admitted to the Union compelled the United 

States to retain some volun teers in the Army until their terms of service 

expired. Demobilization of the Volunteer Army that could have been 

accomplished in 3 months was spread over 18. The War Department 

carried out troop demobilization so quietly that tbe passage of the soldiers 

from the Army to civil life was scarcely known, "save by the welcome to 

their homes received by them." 5 Immediately following the review of 

the troops in Washington, the Armies of the Potomac and of the Tennessee were demobilized and, by 15 November, over 800,000 men had 

been mustered out of service. The ordinary process was to muster out 

the regiments in the field, or wherever they might be, transport them as 

organizations to the states from which they came, and there pay them off 

and discharge them from service.s The Quartermaster's Department 

furnished all transportation for troops returning home, whether by land 

or water.7 

The Department's transportation activities were by no means limited 

to the movement of troops being demobilized. It transported volunteers 

reta ined in service to the Gulf and south Atlantic coast to take the place 

of those being discharged. The Department moved a large force of 

Cavalry to the western plains. It provided transportation for 60,000 war 

prisoners. released and sent to their homes in the southern states.

S By 

the end of 1866, the Regular Army had been reorganized and the Department transported the troops to their posts. Once again, a large part of 

' In fiscal year 1866. the 1)eparlnu:nt examined and passed accounts for the transporlalion 

of troops and supplies amouflling to a lin le over 585.500,000: in fi5C3. i year 1867 these expenditures which included much of the COSt of returning the volunteers to their homes. totaled 

almost $129 million. House 6. D{J(;. No. 1. 1I9th and <10th CcIng .. 2d scss .. pp. 69, 528 

(QMG's Rpl, 1866, 1867) . 

• OR, ser. III, vol. V, 126 (Grant 10 Stanton, 20 Oct 18(5). 

"(I) Ibid., ser. 1II. vol. V. 20--211 (GO 94, 15 M~y 1865). (2) House Ex. Doc. No.1, 

~9th Cong., 2d 5eSS .• p. I (S\\" 5 Rpt, H Nov 1866) . 

• Amlllal Reports of the QuartemWSler General, 1861- 186J, pp. 155-58 (QMG's Rpt, 1865, 

gives instructions and routes used in returning the troops 10 their homes). 

- Ibid., p. 8 (QMG's RJlt, 1865). 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 455 

the Regular Army was stationed on the frontier to renore order, the 

troops being distributed in sma ll units at widely scattered posts. ]n 

addition to troop movements, the Department also transported, for 

purposes of concentration and storage. large quantities of war materiel. 

There was as much transportation activity at the close of hostilities as 

at any lime during the war. 

The concentration of serviceable Quartermaster items at a few main 

depots and the disposal of unserviceable and surplus stocks offered further 

means o[ reducing expenditures. As soon as Lee's forces surrendered in 

April, Meigs issued orders halting all procurement of horses, mules, 

wagons, harness, clothing and equipment.' Supplying large armies during 4 years of war had necessarily led to an accumulation of stores of all 

sorts. Large stocks were on deposit at the depots. In addition, vast 

quantities of equipment in the hands of the troops were turned in at the 

depots when the men were mustered out of service. The troops that 

served under Grant and Sherman in the Armies of the POtomac and the 

Tennessee were transported to their several states under arrangements 

made by the Washington Depot. Their horses. mules. ambulances. 

wagons. Quartermaster stores. surplus clothing, and camp and garrison 

equipage were turned in at that depot. In consequence. all available 

storage space in Washington. Georgetown. and Alexandria was crammed 

to capacity.IO This situation was duplicated at most of the general and 

major base depots. 

Procedures for the disposal of unserviceable property had long si nce 

been set forth in Army Regu lations. 1I To dispose of unserviceable 

animals and other property. Meigs authorized the chief quartermasters 

of the military departments to sell at public auction to the highest bidder 

after due advertisement of the sale.11 Such disposition was also to be 

made of articles that the government would find more economical to sell 

than to ship to other points. On the other hand. if Ihe supplies were 

serviceable or could be made so--if wagons, harness. or equipment. for 

example. could be repaired and made useful for issue to the troops during 

• (I) RG 92. OQMG Leiter Book. ~ol. 84. pp. 84- 85 (Meigs to Thomas. 12 Apr 1865); p. 230 

(Meigs to Col. C. W. Moulton, 29 Apr 1865). (2) RG 92, OQMG Clothing U:lIcr Book, vol. 25. 

p. 576 (I'erry to Col. McKim, 12 Apr 1865) . 

.. RG 92, I'enonal Narralive Reporu of Officers, QMD, for Fiscal Year Ending W June 

1866, pp, 736-77 (Rucker's Rpt, !! Sep 1866). Hereafter briefly died as Penonal Narralive 

Rpu. F.Y. 1866. 

"Sec Revisfld US. Arm)' R flgulatio,/S 0/1861, pp. 152-55 . 

.. (I) RG 92. OQMG Leiter Book, "01. 84, p. 507 (GO 28, 8 May 1865). (2) This order was 

. ubsequcnlly changed so Ihal sales could be made only afler invoiees of Ihe property was senl 

to Ihe Quartennasler General for approval and submiued 10 Ihe Seerelary of War for his 

orden. Wllr Departmflnt Gflllua/ Ordus, 186J. GO II!!, 15 Jun 1865. 
456 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

the next 10 years-they were retained and concentrated at designated 

storage points. 

Quartermasters disposed of the surplus Civil War stores of the Department at public auctions. Although the prices received were, for the 

most part, below the cost of the items being sold, the Department nevertheless realized large sums of money from the sales. These amounted to 

over $30 million. of which half was rea lized from the sale of surplus 

horses, mules, and oxen during the first year after the war. At the close 

of hostilities, the Department was heavily in debt, and on Meigs' representation that it would be for the advantage of the service, funds derived 

from the sale of surplus Quartermaster property were used to payoff 

vouchers for supplies and services held by creditors against the Department. By June 1866, the use of such funds for this purpose was no 

longer necessary, and thereafter the money was deposited in the Treasury 

to the credit of the Department, to be drawn out again upon requisition. " 

In the course of concentrating supplies at the main depots, smaller 

depots and posts in the military departments were broken up. Thus, 

supplies in the depots at Knoxville and Chattanooga were shipped to the 

Nashville Depot for disposal. In the Virginia area, though the depot at 

City Point was retained for a short time, supplies were soon concentrated 

at Fort'Monroe and the Washington Depot. Disposal activities, together 

with the filling of requisitions from supplies on hand at these concentration points, eventua ll y contracted operations to such an extent that they 

too could be closed out. The Nashville Depot, for example, was liquidated after the last of its surpl us serviceable stores were sent to the 

Jeffersonville Depot in the fa ll of 1866.16 In preparation for curtailing 

its operations, the Washington Depot in November 1867 sent to the 

Jeffersonville Depot over 840 tons of Quartermaster stores, 500 army 

wagons, 100 ambulances, and 13 traveli ng forges. At the same time, the 

Washington Depot shipped over 946 tons of Quartermaster stores, 970 

army wagons, and 40 traveling forges to Fort Leavenworth.a 

About all that was left at the Washington Depot was a considerable 

stock of clothing and equipage. For some years, a clothing depot continued to be maintained at Washington, largely because there was no 

room to store any more of such items at the Schuylkill Arsenal. the principal depository in the East for clothing and equipage. Most of the 

clothing depots of the Civil War were liquidated promptly. In 1866, 

the Quartermaster's Department transferred the textiles, clothing and 

U{I) RG 107. OSW. Military Book. vol. 56 C. p. 1~ 5 (Stanton to Meigs. 19 Jill 1865). 

(2) HOllse Ex. Doc. No, I, 39th Cong., 2d leSS .. pp. 4'. 83 (QMG's Rpt. -Oct 1866). 

"RG 92, Personal Narrative Rpts. F.Y. 1866. p. 261 (Donaldson Rpt. 8 Oct 1856). 

"[bid., F.Y. ]868. n.p. (McFerran Rpt,] Jill 1868). 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 457 

equipage maintained at the Cincinnati Depot to the Jeffersonvill e Depot. 

During the following year, such supplies as the Department did not sell 

at the New York clothing depot. it shipped to the Schuylkill Arsenal. 

It also discontinued the St. Louis clothing depot, its stocks being sent to 

Fort Leavenworth for storage and issue at that depot. T he Department 

also d iscontinued all of the minor clothing depots,U Shortly after the 

Civil War. the great arsenals of supply in the East and West were located 

at Philadelphia and at J effersonville. 

By 1869. only four depots were designated as general depots, reporting directly to the Quartermaster General. T hese four were New York, 

Philadelphia, Washington. and J effersonville. New York was a general 

depot only in the sense that the city being a great port and storehouse, 

the depot quartermaster could readily purchase and ship supplies to all 

parts of the United States. He kept no large stock of supplies on hand. 

From these depots, quartermasters drew supplies for the Army generally 

on orders of the War Department, though the depot quartermasters also 

operated under instructions to supply such stores as might be ca lled for 

by the local commanders of the military divisions and departments within 

which the depots were located. All other depots were local and under 

the command of the commanding general of the divisions and departments, or districts in which they were situatedY Subsequently, general 

depots were also designated at San Francisco and St. Louis. 

The sale of unserviceable property immediately after the war and 

the concentration of serviceable items at depots where the government 

owned storage facilities made possible the release of considerable numbers of rented warehouses, sheds. and other storerooms that the Department had been using. During the war. the Department had also constructed many temporary structures-barracks. officers' quarters. sheds, 

stables. and warehouses. Some of these. for example. the government 

buildings at City Point Depot. were turned over to the Freedmen's Bureau 

at the close of the war. but most of these surplus buildings were sold on 

orders of the Quartermaster General, approved by the Secretary of War. 

Except upon special request, all construction of buildings was halted 

when the war ended. 

To reduce expenditures further, large numbers of civilian laborers, 

mechanics. clerks. and agents. employed at depots and posts in the military 

department. were discharged from the Quartermaster payroll. The 

suspension of all repair work and construction and the contraction of 

"(I) RG 92, PerSOlla] NaTl'3tive Rpts. F.Y. ]867, p. -'3] If. (Rpl, MSK Capt. G. A. Hull. 

S<! JUIl 1867): FY 1868, p. 203 ff. (Rpt, MSK Capl. Wm. H . CiII, 31 Aug 1868). (2) R~port of 

fh~ Quartum4$tu Genual to the .~eCf"dary of War, 1868, p. 69. 

"(I) Annual Report of til e Quar/u master General, 1868, pp. 18-19. (2) War Departmeu/ 

General OrdeT$, 1869, GO 32, 8 Apr 1869. 
458 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

depot operations made possible sharp reductions in civilian employment. 

The use of troop labor at depots furthered this objective. As a consequence, Chief Quartermaster Rucker could repon that civil ian employment at the Washington Depot had dropped from 9,251 on 30 June 1865 

to 1,380 a year later, and that number included the working parties 

engaged in cemeterial operations in Virginia." 

Believing that the sooner the United States retired from the communications and transportation business the better it would be for the 

government, Meigs was determined to dispose promptly of all governmentowned and operated facilities in those fields and thereby reduce expenditures in his Department. During the Civil War, the U.S. Military Telegraphs, under the direction of Bvt. Brig. Gen, Anson Stager, had constructed over 15,000 miles of military telegraph lines, expending over 

$2,500,000 for their construction, maintenance, and operation.'G Application of the principle of retrenchment to the Office of Military Telegraphs had to he delayed because at the close of the war its control was 

expanded by taking possession of some 5,000 miles of commercial tele· 

graph lines in the southern states, The southern telegraph companies 

were required to repair their lines and furnish all labor and material. 

Stager's office kept an account of all government business passing over 

the lines in the months following the end of the war for possible future 

settlement,tO On 1 December 1865, by order of the Secretary of War, 

the southern commercial te legraph lines were restored to the companies 

claiming ownership, though the government still considered it expedient 

to retain in certain localities expert telegraphers as cipherers in order to 

maintain at all times a reliable and rapid means of communication with 

its officers. 

Two months later, by order of the Quartermaster General, all the 

U.S. military telegraph lines in the states south of the Ohio were turned 

over to the te legraph companies owning the "telegraph patent right" in 

the territory through which the lines passed. In return, the companies 

relinquished all claims against the United States for the use of their lines 

before they were restored to them and for all losses that they sustained 

by the exclusion of commercial business during the lime the lines were 

in the possession of the United States. 21 At the same time, the Quarter. 

master General ordered the sale of all military telegraph lines in opera· 

IO RG 92, Personal Narrative Rpts, F.Y, 1866. pp. 746-47 (Rucker Rpt, g Scp 1866) . 

.. House Ex. Doc. No. I, g9th Cong .. 2d 5eSS" pp. 300-g01 (Stager's Rpl, appended to QMG's 

Rpt, 1866). 

tl> R~porls l'h ~ QUllrl r",as/ ~r u~HlI, 1861- 186J, p. 419 (Slager's Rpl, appended to 

QMG's Rpl. 18(5) . 

.. House Ex. Doc, No. I, 39th Cong .. 3d scss., p. 299 (Slager's Rpl. appended 10 QMC's 

Rpl, 1866), 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 459 

tion north of the Ohio River to commercial companies owning lines in 

the states in which such lines had been constructed. Disposal of the 

military telegraph lines was therea fter quickly accomplished. By the 

close of fiscal year 1866, the personnel employed in the U.S. Military 

Telegraphs had been reduced to 3 18 from 1,437 at the close of the 

previo us yeaT. n By that date. a ll but two officers of th e agency---Stager, 

who continued to be stationed at Cleveland as chief. and Bvt. Brig. Gen. 

Thomas T. Eckert, on duty in the War Department at Washingtonhad been mustered out of service. Eckert was out of the agency in July 

though he continued to serve in the War Department until 28 February 

1867. General Stager was mustered out on I September 1866, and the 

operation of the U.S. Military Telegraphs came to a close. 

The Quartermaster's Department reduced transportation expenditures as rapidly as demobilization of troops and materiel permitted. 

Meigs began by ordering the d ischarge of all chartered ocean transports 

and river steamboats not required to bring home troops. He d irected 

that troops were to be transported, as much as possible. in governmentowned steamers. Munitions. supplies, and stores no longer required for 

operations in the southern states he ordered returned to the depots of 

New York and Washington in sailing vessels. or in such steamers as might 

be returning without troops.11 

Discharge of chartered vessels was followed by sale of the governmentowned fl eet. All steamboats and barges owned on the western rivers 

were sold during the first year after the war. Some delay occurred in 

the program for disposing of governmen t-owned ocean vessels. since it 

was necessary to retain some in the Department of the Gulf to support 

the armed force sent to Texas and to transport home later large numbers 

of Volunteer troops mustered om in the southwest. This involved heavy 

expenditures. but by the summer of 1866 the necessary sea service 

req uired by the Quartermaster's Department was being done. with some 

few exceptions, by commercial lines." 

Meigs was as much interested in getting the government out of railroad operations as he was in removing it from the steamboat business. 

Such a course would relieve the government of the heavy expenditures 

incurred in the maintenance and operation of the military railroads, and, 

it was hoped, would promote the resumption of trade. In the course of 

the war. the government had operated 50 railroads as military lines, 

having an aggregate length of 2,603lh miles. Repairs, equipment, and 

• I bid., p. 58 . 

• (1) Orders 0/ the QUllrlermllSler Gellerll/, 1862- 186' (GO 24, 29 Apr 1865). ('2) RG 92. 

OQMG Leller Book, vol. 84. pp. 250-!l1 (Meigs 10 Van Viiel, 29 Apr 1865). 

"HOUle Ex . Doc. No. I, !19th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 54--55 (QMC'I Rpl, 1866). 
460 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

operation had resulted in an expenditure during the war of over $45 

million. 2 • As of April 1865. the number of civilians employed in the 

military railroad department totaled 23,538.~ 6 Among the first orders 

Meigs issued at the close of the war was one directing the suspension of 

all military railroad construction and repairs, except such as were needed 

on lines by which troops were still being supplied. With this action 

went the discharge of all unnecessary laborers, the intention being to 

reduce and disband the Railroad Construction Corps as soon as possibleY 

In May, Meigs formulated certain principles to govern the Department and the military authorities in disposing of the military railroads. 

He proposed that the roads be turned over to the parties asking to receive 

them who had the best claims to the railroads and were able to operate 

them. If a state had a board of public works willing to take charge. the 

railroads were to be given to this board, leaving settlement of all questions 

of property rights between rival groups to the state authorities and 

judicial tribunals. Meigs proposed to assess no charge for any improvements made while the railroad was in the hands of the military authorities. 

Moreover, he would have permitted all materials for permanent way, used 

in the repair and construction of the road, and all damaged material left 

along the route, to be considered as part of the railroad and given up 

with it. On the other hand, he would allow no payment or credit to 

a road for its occupation or use by the United States. He proposed to sell 

at auction to the highest bidder all movable property, including rolling 

stock, owned by the United States States, but all such property owned by 

the railroads and captured by the Army he would place at the disposal of 

~he roads originally owning it. 

Meigs proposed that southern railroads not taken over by the military 

authorities be left in the hands of their owners, who were to continue or 

resume operations, subject onl y to the removal of any individual who had 

not taken the oath of allegiance to the United States. If anyone refused 

to take such an oath, the Treasury Department was to appoint a receiver 

who would administer the railroad. ~8 

In the opinion of Assistant Secretary of War C. A. Dana, to whom 

Stanton referred these proposals, Meigs erred on the side of generosity, 

but with some slight amendment the principles formulated by him were 

applied in the disposal of the military railroads. 2D At Dana's suggestion, 

iron and other materials deposited along the road for repair purposes 

• [bid., p. 56. 

-A,mllal Report.! of Ihe QWlTlermfl.llu Gel/u at, 1861- 186J. p. ~O (QMC's Rpl. 1865) . 

.. (I) OTder.! of th e Qllarlermfl.ller Ge"ual, 1862- /86J (CO 24. 29 Apr 1865). (2) RG 92. 

OQMC Letler Book. vol. 84, pp. 418-19; 420-21 (Meigs to HaJ1 ~k. 17 and IB May 1865). 

- OR, ser. III. vol. v. 2&-28 (Meigs to Stanton. 19 May 1865). 

- Ibid., pp. 40-42 (Dana to Stanton. 29 May 1865). 
POST·CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 461 

but not used, as we ll as all such material in depots, were to be sold to the 

railroad companies at a fair valuation. At Dana's insistence, too, the 

government was protected by clarifying one of Meigs' proposals to include 

the fact that not only would the United States allow no payment or credit 

for the usc of any military ra ilroad, but it would pay no damages done to 

any road in the prosecution of active hostilities. 

By the end of June 1865. some of lhe railroads in Virginia and 

North Carolina had already been returned to their owners or to boards 

of public works. Most of the rolling stock and movable machinery 

coll ected in the states along the Atlantic Coast had also been disposed of 

at public auction, either for cash or in payment of debts for transportation 

due the railroads by the Quartermaster's Departmem.tO 

Before the end of fisca l year 1866, all military railroads had been 

returned to their owners, but in the southwest the roads were too impoverished to purchase for cash the rolling stock and machinery that had 

cost the Quartermaster's Department millions of dollars. Since the 

reconstruction and operation of these railroads was of great importance 

to the pacification and prosperity of the coumry, the President prescribed 

in executive orders a method by which the southwestern railroad compa· 

nies could obtain the rolling Slock and other property, in proportion to 

their needs, either for cash or on a credit basis." By 30 June 1866, all but 

a small amount of military railroad property had also been disposed of. 

Disposal was accomplished promptly, but collection of the debts 

incurred by the southern railway companies continued to plague the 

Department {or more than 20 years. In January 1868, collection of this 

indebtedness was centralized in the Quartermaster Genera l's office.n By 

1870, all of the southern railway companies on the Atlamic Coast had met 

their obligations, much of the debt having been pai.d (or in services, that 

is, the transportation of troops, military stores, and mails, the cost of which 

was credited to the companies when their accounts were rendered. In 

that yea r, however, 28 southern roads stilI owed over $4,500,000 to the 

United States and, though the government had been most lenient. it now 

instituted suits.

1I 

T he defaulting roads appealed to Congress for relief and rhe following year Congress enacted legislation authorizing the Secretary of War 

to compromise, adj ust. and settl e the suits pending against the roads." 

to A'muM Reports of the Quartermaster Celleral, 1861- 186j, p. 24 (QMG', Rpt, 8 Nov 

1865) . 

.. For executive orders, 8 August and ' 4 October 1865. see ibid., pp. 405-07 (QMC's Rpl, 

1865). 

oo An"ua/ Report 01 'lie Quartermaster Ce"erlJi, 1868, p. 21 (Dana', Rpl, 100<:1 1868, 

appended) . 

• Ibid., 1870, pp. 9-10 . 

.. 16 Stat. 475 (Mar 5, 1871). 
462 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

A number of settlemCIllS were made under the law, but some roads still 

continued to contest payment. By 1883. 46 of the 50 roads originally 

indebted to the United States had settled their debts. Since the Department had neither the means nor the facilities (or collecting disputed 

debts, the Quartermaster General recommended that his Department be 

relieved of the business, but 4 years passed before Congress authorized 

the Secretary of War and the Attorney General to settle the remaining 

cases, thereby relievi ng the Department of further responsibility.u 

When the United States released its control of the military railroads 

in the South, the Quartermaster's Department once again relied [or its 

transportation of troops and supplies on the privately-owned railroad 

lines of the country, and it was at once confronted with a new rate 

problem. Throughout the war, the government had enjoyed, as a resu lt 

of an agreement made with the roads in March 1862, the bene fi t of much 

lower freight and passenger rates than the railroads granted the public. 

Shortly after the war was over, some of the railroads Objected to continuing this rate agreement, and the President's proclamation of 20 August 

1866, terminating the Civil War, made enforcement of it impracticable, 

The War Department thereupon determined to relinquish the uniform 

rate agreement, and, after I March 1867, the Quartermaster's Department 

paid the railroad companies the rates of their respective tariffs, unless 

lower ones were agreed upon.1f 

Care of the Dead 

While most quartermasters were bending aU their efforts towards 

contracting operations and reducing expenditures, the execution of one 

responsibility, legally vested in the Department during the war, required 

increasing appropriations in the postwar years. That responsibility was 

the care of deceased military personnel and the maintenance and supervision of national cemeteries, The delegation of those functions to the 

Department during the Civil War was natura l. Ever since 1775 the 

Department had assumed certain duties in caring for the dead, ]n line 

with its responsibility for construction, repair, and maintenance at Army 

posts, quartermasters had long administered post burial grounds. They 

had always furnished the material for coffins and headboards and paid 

the expenses of burial. If the soldier died at a garrison and interment 

was made in a post cemetery, no expense was incurred for the grave. If 

• Amlllill ~port of Ih~ Qllllrtumllsier Genua/, 188), p. 1<4; ibid" 1881, pp. 11- 12. 

-(I) House Ex. ~. No. I, 40lh Cong., 2d S($$., p. 5" (QMG's Rpl. 1867). (2) G~n~ml 

Orders lind Circulars 01 th~ QllllrterllllUtu Gellerill's Office, 186J-67, GO 9, 22 Feb 1867. 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 463 

the post had no burial gro unds and interment was made in a nearby ChUTCh 

plot or private cemetery, the Department paid the charges for the grave." 

Congress had always made a small appropriation every year for the 

funeral expenses of noncommissioned offi cers and soldiers, but before the 

Civil War it had not provided a cent toward the burial expenses of 

officers.u When an officer died, his burial expenses were paid from his 

estate, but if it proved insuffi cient for that purpose the Secretary of War 

customaril y allowed a small sum from the fund for Army contingencies. 

If this fund was exhausted-and that occurred upon occasion- his fe llow 

officers were expected to defray the costs of his burial." 

By the time of the Seminole war, cenain precedents were being 

established that, many years later, helped support adoption of a policy 

providing for the return of the remains of deceased military personnel 

to their native soil. During the campaign against the Indians in Florida, 

relatives often made application to the Quartermaster's Department for 

aid in recovering the body of an officer killed in action. It became 

customary for the Department to advise the applicant that if he provided 

a leaden coffin and had it delivered to a designated quartermaster at a 

port, the Department would have it forwarded free of charge to a quartermaster operating in the field closest to the area of burial. T he latter 

would cause the body to be disinterred and shipped to the applicant, 

utilizing whatever public shipping space he might have avaiiable. tO This 

policy of affording every assistance that the Department could give in 

returning the remains of an officer for family burial continued to be 

applied in the Mexican War and later in the Indian campaigns on the 

western frontier." In no case, however, could the Department incur any 

expense in giving this aid to bereaved families, since the laws sanctioned 

no payments for that purpose, though Quartermaster General Jesup 

sought, without success, to obtain congressional action amending the 

Jaw.n The return of the remains of deceased officers was an exception 

Of RG 92. OQMG Letter Book. vol. 6. p. ~ Uaul' 10 SW. 15 Dec 82~); vol. I!I. p. 274 

Ga up 10 ACling AQM John D. ScOIl. 10 Scp 1829); vol. 40. p. 58 1 Ue:sup 10 Capt. J. A. Ogden. 

8 Jul 1848). 

- RG 92. RepOrl! of QMG 10 SW and Heads of Depls .• vol. 2. pp. ~iO 1 Ua up to SW. 

16 Mar 1855). 

- RG 92. OQMG Leller Book. vol. 20. p. 121 Oaup 10 Brig. Gen. H. Atkinson. 17 Mar 

l8~4). 

"'40 Ibid., vol. ~I . pp. 210-11 Oesup to Maj. E. Mackay. 27 Jan IMI); vol. 32. p. 99 Uaup 

to Capt. E. A. Ogden, 12 Jul 1841). 

"See for example, ibid., vol. ~7, p. 456 Oesu p 10 Capl. G. F. Kane. 8 Jun 1846); vol. 38. 

p. 270 (AQMG Stanton 10 Col. H . Whiling. 12 Nov IM6); pp. 548-49 Oaup to Miss M. Eall· 

man, 2 Apr IM7); vol. 42, pp. 478-79 Oesup 10 Maj. S. B. Dusenbery. 15 Jan 1850); vol: 54, 

p. 162 Oesup to Lt. Col. G. Crosman, 17 Mar 1860). 

'" RG 107, SW. Reports 10 Congr<=, vol. 6. p. 70 (SW to Chairman, House Committee 

on Military Affain, 7 Mar 1848). 
464 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

to the general practice followed in campaigns. Most officers and all 

enlisted personnel who died in battle were buried where they fe ll. For 

the most part, too, burial sites went unmarked and no records were kept 

other than the report of those killed in action. 

The Civil War forced changes in the traditional policies governing 

burial and records. Recognizing that the War Department would be 

called upon to answer an increasing number of inquiries concerning the 

fate of individual volunteers, the Secretary of War took steps to preserve 

records. His first action, taken in September 1861, was aimed at the 

maintenance of records at Army hospitals.u To preserve accurate and 

permanent records of soldiers who died at Army hospitals, he directed 

the Quartermaster General to place blank books and forms for such 

record purposes at every genera l and post hospital of the Army. He also 

ordered him to furnish headboards for soldiers' graves. Proper execution 

of the forms provided became the duty of the commanding officer of the 

military corps or department in which the individual died. Each adjutam, acting adjutant, or commander of a military post or company, 

receiving a copy of any mortuary records from a military company, was 

ordered to transmit it to the Adjutant General at Washington. 

Even before the Secretary's order reached him, Capt. E. L. Hartz, 

chief assistant to the quartermaster at the Washington Depot, had already 

begun to collect all the information possible on the military personnel 

who died in the Washington area. He later claimed that he had 

originated at the depot the system of burial and mortuary records adopted 

by the Quartermaster General for the Depar~ment generally.H When 

he was transferred to the Army of the Cumberland at the end of 1863, 

Capt. James M. Moore, who later supervised the establishment of the 

national cemetery at Arlington, carried on the burial and record program 

begun by Captain Hartz in the Washington area. 

In April 1862, the burial and record program was extended to the 

theater. Under War Department order, commanding generals were 

required to give decent interment to those who had fallen in battle, "so 

far as possible," by laying off lots of ground in some suitable spot near 

every battlefield "so soon as it may be in their power." They were to 

cause the remains of those killed to be interred, with headboards to the 

graves bearing numbers, and "when practicable," the names of the persons 

buried in them. A register of each burial ground was to be preserved, 

in which all the data inscribed on the headboards would be recorded.'5 

The language of this order deprived it of the force of a command . 

•• Gell eral Orders of Ih e War Deparhltu,I, 1861-1862, I, 158 (GO 75. II Sep 1861) . 

• , RG 92, Personal Narralivc Rpu, F.Y. 1863, llJ, 11.3- 15; 128 If.; F.Y. 1864, II, 570. 

-General Order$ o/Ill e War Deparlmt:l1/, 1861- 1862, T, 248 (GO 33. 11 Apr 1862). 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 465 

Since burials had to be made by fatigue parties detailed from the line. 

few battlefield interments were recorded in accordance with this directive. 

the deaths being reported by the commanding generals in the lists of 

those killed in battle. Most of the records kept during the war were of 

those who died in hospitals, camps, and barracks, and for whose burial 

there was time to make orderly provision ... e Such burials were handled by a local undertaker, whose services were contracted for by the 

quartermaster. 

The tremendous increase in the military force in 1861 and the higher 

mortality rate made inadequate most burial grounds at established posts 

serving as troop concentration centers. More burial sites were required 

but the law prohibited their purchase. Meigs suggested overcoming the 

difficulty by taking up long leases of 50 or 99 years, and paying for lease 

and right to bury." In Washington, the Board of Governors of th"e Old 

Soldiers' Home agreed to permit a portion of their land to be used as a 

cemetery. Elsewhere, cemeterial associations patriotically offered small 

plots of ground for burial of the soldier dead. Some of these plots were 

maintained by the cemetery associations; others were deeded outright to 

the government. 

Such measures offered a partial solution until Congress could take 

action. By 1862, the need was growing urgent, particularly in Washington. The capita l was becoming the hospita l center for the neighboring battlefields and military encampments in the area. On 17 July 

1862, Congress authorized the President to establish national cemeteries 

"for the soldiers who shall die in the service of the country."·' 

No War Department policy was formulated during the war to implement this congressional action. Generally, such national cemeteries as 

were established were laid out to meet emergency needs. Most of them, 

created by the Quartermaster's Department, were located at troop concentration points, where mortalities in Army general hospitals accented 

the need for them. A few were laid out on battlefields as memorials to 

those who gave their lives in battle, the responsibility for such action 

being vested in the commanding general. But since the establishment 

of battlefield cemeteries depended upon a lull in active operations and 

the availability of troops who could be detailed for burial duties, only five 

were laid out during the war, and two of these-Antietam and Gettysburg- were created by the joint action of states whose troops had 

participated in the battles. t O 

.. Allllual Reports of lilt: Quarlern-Ulster Gl!fler(ll, 1861- 1865, p. 50 (QMG's Rpt, 1865). 

"RG 92, OQMG Letter Book. vol. 57, p. 107 (Meigs to Maj. James Belger, 18 Oct 1861). 

" 12 Stat. 596. 

"The other battlefield cemeteries were Chattanooga, Stones River, and Knoxville, the fif$t 

two established under the direclion of Maj . Gen. George H. Thomas. and the third by order 
466 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Shortly after the guns were still ed at Appomattox, Meigs called for 

rcports from his officers on the number of interments registered during 

the war.'(l From the returns made- lOl,736 out of a total fa tality list 6£ 

more than three times that number- it was evident that before interment 

in national cemeteries could be completed, a search, recovery. and reinterment program would have to be in itiated for about lwo-thirds of the 

war dead.u 

With analysis of reports and all correspondence relative to cemeterial 

work centra lized in a Cemcterial Branch establ ished in the office of the 

Quartermaster General in ''''ashington, the task of concentra ting remains 

and maintaining records was conducted under the direction of the chief 

quartermasters of the military departments and divisions. By 1870, the 

coll ection and reinterment program was virtually completed when the 

remains of 299,696 Union soldiers were buried in 73 national cemeteries.

u 

In the meantime, other phases of the work under quartermaster direction- maintenance and improvement of the national cemeteries, validation of land titles, and marking of graves-were also executed with vigor. 

In the course oE concentrating the war dead in na tional cemeteries, a 

considerable number of battlefield cemeteries were established in the 

postwar years, most of them in the fanner Confederate State;> on lands 

appropriated for the purpose. The acquisition of valid titles to the land 

was essential, and, in 1867, Congress authorized the Secretary of War to 

acquire titl e in fee simple to land wanted for cemeterial purposes at a 

price mutua ll y agreed to by the owner and the Secretary, or, if agreement 

was impossible, by a process of appra isement.

u Three years later, the 

Quartermaster's Department had obtained va lid titles to the land occupied 

for national cemeteries.u 

In the same law of 1867, Congress also made provision for a conti nuing program of care and maintenance of national cemeteries. The 

Secretary of War was d irected to deta il an officer to inspect all cemeteries 

annuall y. On the basis of his report and the Secretary's estimate, Congress appropriated fu nds enabling the Quartermaster's Department to 

0/ Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside. The worlc. was not uecessarily dire<:led by a quartermaster 

in the field. On the orders 0/ General Thomas, Chaplains T. B. Horn and William Earnshaw 

supervised the establishment of the Chattanooga and Ihe Stones River Nalional CemC{eries, 

respectively . 

.. GeJlerll/ Orders lIud Circulars of tlte QUllrter"'ust cr COICrlll'S OffiCI!, 186J- 1867 (GO 40. 

S Jul 1865) . 

.. Amwal Report!> of lIu QIMr/e'nIJllster Geuem/, 1861- 186J, pp. 17&-77 (QMG's Rpt, 1865) . 

.. A,wual Report of Ihe QUllrtermasl er Gencril/. 1870 (Washington, 1870), pp. 68, 84. 

M 14 SIII/. 399 (Feb 22, 1867). 

" For a tabula r re<:ord of titles sec. Anllull/lleport ollhe Quartermll$ttr General, 1870, 

1'1'.86-87. 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 467 

make repairs and improvements. In thal same legislation, Congress 

directed the Secretary of War to mark each grave with a small headstone. 

The necessity of replacing the rapidly decaying wooden headboards of 

the war period with mOTe durable markers had led Meigs to suggest, with 

economy in mind, the ereCtion of a small cast-iron monument, coated 

with zinc to prevent rust. Bvt. Brig. Gen. James J. Dana, in charge of 

ccmcterial operations in the Washington office, morc cOlTcclly interpreted 

the sentiment of the nation when he thought that it would "sustain the 

expense of marble or other permanent memorials." U The Secretary of 

War made no final decision lIntil 1873, when Congress having appropriated $ 1 million for headstones. he decided in favor of marble 01 

durable stone and selected the design, slightly modified later but still in 

use today. ·~ Before the end of the year, the Quartermaster's Department 

had let contracts and the work of placing the headstones in the national 

cemeteries was begun. Six years later, as a resu lt of agitation, Congress 

authorized the Secretary of War to furnish the same type of headstone. 

for the graves of Civil War veterans buried in private cemeteries. Of 

As the postwar years passed, Quartermaster cemeterial operations 

showed no signs of diminishing; on the contrary they expanded. Before 

the last Union soldier had been reinterred in national cemeteries, inquiries 

had already been made concerning the burial rights in those cemeteries 

of ex-soldiers of the war. The Secretary of War supported Meigs' strict 

interpretation of the law, and for the time being veterans were denied 

buria l in them.n Under pressure of interested groups, however, Congress in 1873 granted buria l rights in nationa l cemeteries to all honorably 

discharged veterans of the Civil War. U 

The extension of burial rights in 1873 necessarily brought about a 

further expansion of the national cemeterial system. Ten years later, 

the need to acquire additional land, either contiguous to established 

national cemeteries or nearby, was becoming acute at those cemeteries 

located near large cities, among whose population were many veterans, 

a certain percentage of whom would eventually exercise their burial 

• (I) RC 92, OQMG Letter nook, vol. 92, pp. 107-09 (Meigs to Edward Clark, 5 Jun 1866). 

(2) House Ex. Doc. No. I, !19th Cong .• 2d sess .• p. 61 (QMG', Rpl. 1866); p. !l25 (Dana's RPL 

appended). 

00(1) RC 107. OSW, Letten Sent. vol. 75, pp. 694-97 (Belknap 10 MeiV, 25 JUIi 1873). 

(2) 17 Slot. 545 (Jun 8, 1872); p.545 (Mar 5, 1873) . 

.. 20 Slot. 281 (Feb 3, 1879). 

00(1) Am,uo/ Report 0/ III ~ Quort ermoJt~' G~lIual, 1869, pp. 177- 180. (2) RG 92, 

OQMG Lctu:r Book, vol. 102, p. 519 (Meigs to Ingall5, I JUIi 1869). 

·(1) 17 Stal. 605 (Mar 5, 1875). (2) In the previous year Congress had all~mpted 10 

restrict the right to destitute vetera/U only, but the furor this legislation raised had compelled 

Congress to grant the right of burial to all honorably discharged vtterallI. 17 SIal. 202 

Oun I, 1872). 
468 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

rights in national cemeteries. In consequence, the Quartermaster's Department urged and obtained action to correct this situation at New York, 

Philadelphia, and Baltimore,GO 

Even before expansion in the East began, the Department established additional national cemeteries in the West, necessitated by the 

abandonment of military posts on the old emigrant routes as settlement 

progressed westward. Such abandonment entailed the removal of remains from the post cemeteries and reinterment in national cemeteries, 

for this course was less expensive than providing for the continued care 

and maintenance of the post cemeteries. Thus. in 1873, when Forts 

Kearny, Nebr., and Sedgwick, Colo., were abandoned, the Quartermaster's 

Department established a national cemetery at Fort McPherson, Nebr., 

to which the quartermaster removed the remains of those who had been 

buried in the cemeteries of the two abandoned posts.

e, It later established national cemeteries at Santa Fe and San Francisco. to serve the same 

purpose in other frontier areas. The e~tab li shment of the national 

cemeterial system, begun in the Civil War by the Quartermaster's Department, was to find even further expansion in consequence of subsequent 

wars. 

Review of Supply at Westem Posts 

Demobilization and cemeterial operations were not the only problems to which Quartermaster General Meigs gave his attention in the 

spring of 1865. When field armies no longer needed to be supplied, 

Me igs, for the first time, could turn to an examination of Quartermaster 

operations in an area that, perforce, he had neglected during the war. 

T hat area was the region west of the Mississippi. Texas, Louisiana, and 

Arkansas had joined the Confederate States, but the rest of the transMississippi region had remained in Union hands. Though there had 

been some local operations against Confederate forces in the area during 

the war, the major defense problem had been posed by the Indians, who, 

taking advantage of the withdrawal of the regular troops from the western 

posts, had ravaged the western settlements. Volunteer forces had engaged 

in some successful operations against the Indians, but the task of reestablish ing control and making the West safe for the emigrant awaited 

the end of the Civil War and the return of the Regulars.e2 

Following the attack on Fort Sumter, most of the regular quartermasters of the Department, who had been stationed at western posts, had 

.. A.mulIl R" poTl uf Jilt QuaT/ennas/tr Ge"eTal Itltlt, p. 194; ibid., 188}, p. 171. 

"' Ibid., 187}, pp. 22- 211 . 

.. No analysis is made of Quartermaster support of the various Indian campaigns in Ihe 

post·Civil War yea rs. The methods u~d showed no variation from those of the pan. 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 469 

also been called East, though Meigs assigned some experienced quartermasters as replacements at a few key positions. Thus, he appointed 

Capt. J. C. McFerran, who had seen a decade of service in the Department 

of New Mexico, as its chief quartermaster when he called Maj. James L. 

Donaldson East. and he designated Deputy Quartermaster General 

Edwin B. Babbitt. serving as chief quartermaster of the Department of 

Oregon in 1861, to relieve Maj. Robert Allen as chief quartermaster of 

the Department of the Pacific. Generally. the subordinates of these twO 

officers and, in fact, most of the assistant quartermasters appointed to 

western posts during the war were drawn from the Volunteer Army. 

Many of [hem proved sound businessmen and able quartermasters, 

but some were as venal as any quartermasters to be found with the armies 

in the field east of the Mississippi. The latter group, under the increasingly close supervision exercised, were soon dismissed, but, unfortunately, 

adequate supervision of Volunteer quartermasters stationed at western 

posts was not achieved during the war. On the Pacific Coast, for example. 

where Colonel Babbitt supervised some 45 posts, "widely extended over 

an area of 1,500 by ?OO miles," he found it impossible to visit any of the 

outposts of the department.u Nor could any of the chief quartermasters 

of the western military departments depend upon the local commanding 

officer to exercise supervision, because he too was a Volunteer officer, 

usually as inexperienced as his quartermaster, and sometimes as willing 

to share in any profits to be made. 

Charges of widespread fraud in forage and wood contracts, of speculation in government vouchers, and of misuse of government materials 

and labor in post repair shops were being made to such an extent in 

1865 that Meigs cautioned his chief quartermaster at St. Louis not to 

pay forage contractors until he received instructions.so Earlier unfavorable reports on the activities of the assistant quartermaster at Fort Scott, 

Kansas, had led Meigs to refuse to allow funds to be remitted to him, but 

the officer had continued to be employed because he had the confidence 

and favor of the military commanders in Missouri and Kansas.u 

Postwar investigations revealed that fraudulent practices of contractors and Army personnel had been even more prevalent than the War 

Department had suspected. Meigs sent Bvt. Brig. Gen. James F. Rusling 

on an extended inspection tour from Fort Leavenworth to the Pacific 

• A.mual Reports of tlt e Quartermaster Celltral, 1861- ]86J, p. 622 (Rpt. Babbitt to Meigs. 

16 Aug 1865, appended to QMG's Rpt. 1865) . 

.. RG 92, OQMG Leiter Book. vol. 88. pp. 84; 147--48 (Meigs to Easlon. 17 May, 2Q Nov 

1865). 

-Ibid., vol. 86. pp. 241--42 (Meigs 10 Sherman. 28 Aug 1865). 
470 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Coast in 1866.ee He reported a "general looseness of ideas" as to government property on th e Plains; nobody hesitated to swindle the United 

States, He learned that the cava lrymen who had served in the West 

during the war had swapped horses with the settlers. "for a consideration" 

before being mustered out of service. and in consequence had turned 

in only refuse stock. Rusling found that large numbers of government 

animals, picked up when astray, stolen, or bought of those who had 

stolen them, were being used openly in private learns and trains. and he 

recommended seizure unless lawful title could be shown.·' 

Convinced that there had been reck less or ignorant management on 

the part of many officers, Rusling informed Meigs that the contracts 

made in fiscal year 1865, in the main, "smell to heaven ." 18 At Fort 

Sedgwick, Colorado Territory, wood, fo r example, had been supplied 

at $ 105 per cord in contrast to the $46 being paid in 1866. White 

acknowledging that fa Jling postwar prices were having an effect on costs, 

Rusling affirmed th at the drastic reductions being made in contracts 

resulted from assigning an experienced quartermaster to the post. Moreover. the latter's changes were being made despite the opposition of 

commanding officers who viewed him as an interloper having no business 

to interfere with existing arrangements." 

The distant posts of the Pacific Coast and Arizona provided as 

fruitful opportunities for mismanagement as any on the Plains. Perhaps 

no part of his investigation so aroused Rusling's ire as his inspection of 

Drum Barracks, a post tha t by the "genius and audacity" of Phineas 

Banning, general government COnlractor for sOllthern California and 

Arizona, had become "a huge opprobrium & scandal" to the Quartermaster's Department. TIl Drum Barracks, located in the town of Wilmington, on the southern California coast some 18 miles south of Los Angeles, 

was established in January 1862. To encourage construction of this post 

and depot that would bring government business to Wilmington where 

the interests of Banning & Co. were located, Banning and a partner deeded 

two parcels of land to the United States. A post. originally maintained 

at San Diego, had been abandoned, Rusling was informed, because of its 

proximity to the border and the presence of Maxmilian in Mexico. But 

that explanation fa iled to satisfy Rusling's astonishment at the lavish 

• (I) Ibid., vol. 92. pp. '62-63 (Meigs to Rusling. 10 Jul 1866). (2) Rusling traveled more 

than 15,000 miles, sent back innumerable lellen, anti ' 0 lengthy reportS that covered evc:ry 

upect of Quartermaster operations. These pointetl ou t shortcomings and offend recommendations. See RG 92, Rusting. Reports or Inspections in QMD . 

.. RG 92, RUlling. Rc:pom or Inspeclion in QMD, I. 1- 2 (Denver Rpt, 12 ~p 1866). 

· ,bid., pp. 7-8. 

-'bi ~ 1. , (Ft. Sedgwick Rpl, 50 Aug 1866). 

- Ibid., I. 1- 2 (San Francisco Rpl, (j May 18(7). 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 471 

waste of publ ic funds at Wilmington where there was no harbor. where 

troops and supplies had to be taken from the roadstead at San Pedro 

to Wilmington by Banning's steam tugs at rates favorable to him, and 

where the distance to Fort Yuma, Ariz., destination point for troops and 

supplies for that territory, was almost twice that from San Diego and half 

of it across desert. 

Despite these disadvantages, a complete depot and post for five com· 

panics had neverthe less been erected at Drum Barracks. and Banning 

had been successful in obtaining the contract for supplying the troops 

stationed there. He had also secured contracts for supplying other camps 

in southern California that an alert quartermaster, Rusling charged, 

could have provided for at a much lower rate by way of the Colorado 

River. Popular opinion held that Bann ing profited largely not only from 

these contracts but also in other ways. When it was alleged that the post 

had an insufficient supply of water. a ditch and Aume. 12 miles long, that 

ran through the lands of Banning and others, had been erected in 1864 to 

bring water from the San Gabriel River to Drum Barracks. Built by 

troop labor with materials largely furnished by the government, th is 

ditch. it was locally believed, was only ostensibly intended to benefit Drum 

Barracks. but in reality was to supply the town of Wilmington with water. 

It had brought an abundance of water to the post for a few months and 

the surplus supply, Rusling was informed. had been used to irrigate 

Banning's barley fields. When most of the troops were withdrawn in 

1865-66, the ditch was no longer used or maintained in good repair. 

Rusling estimated that over one million dollars had gone into the 

permanent improvements made at Drum Barracks and Wilmington 

Depot, [or wh ich there was no longer any use, except as temporary 

accommodations for troops moving to Arizona. He recommended disposal of the ditch and sale of the depot and post buildings. 71 

Undoubtedly, part of the irregularities uncovered in the course of 

inspection tours could be attributed to the Volunteer officers' ignorance 

of the rules. On the other hand. inspection officers investigated many 

cases of malfeasance on the part of quartermasters and commissaries as 

well as commanding officers, who had entered into collusion with them 

to ensure profits to themselves. Yet the War Department initiated no 

prosecutions; the guilty parties had been mustered out of service before 

adequate evidence could be accumulated. 

Long before the last of Rusling's reports had been sent to \t\'ashington. Meigs had concluded· that it would be necessary to change all the 

., (1) Ibid. , I, 1- 511 (Sail Francisco Rpt, 6 May 1867). (2) For the sub~eqtJenl pTOblenu 

involved in d isposal. see RG 92, OQMG Coosolidated Correspondence File, 1794-1915, Box 

'68. 
472 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

post quartermasters on the Plains.'! The War Department. in fact, 

instituted changes in both the staff and the line as soon as possible after 

the war ended. With the existing field armies broken up. it placed the 

troops once again under the control of commanding officers of military 

departments as they had been before the war. In the fall of 1865, there 

were 19 military departments grouped under 5 military divisions. of 

which two, the Military Division of the Pacific. under Maj. Gen. H. W. 

Halleck, and the Military Division of the Mississippi, under Maj. Gen. 

W. T. Sherman. embraced all of the stales and territories west of the 

Mississippi. except Texas and Louisiana." 

When Sherman went to St. Louis to assume command in 1865, 

Meigs assigned Deputy Quartermaster General L. C. Easton. who had 

served as his chief quartermaster in the campaign against Atlanta and 

on the march to the sea. as senior and supervising quartermaster of the 

Military Division and chief quartermaster of the Military Department of 

the Missouri. Subsequently, in the fall of 1866, when demobilization 

of materiel was well in hand, Assistant Quartermaster General J. L. 

Donaldson. who had supervised Sherman's support at Nashville, relieved 

Easton as chief quartermaster at St. Louis. The latter continued as chief 

quartermaster of the Department of the Missouri, taking up his headquarters at Fort Leavenworth. the chief supply depot for the posts on 

the Plains. At about the same time. Meigs sent Assistant Quartermaster 

General Robert Allen. who had so brilliantly su pplied the armies of the 

Mississippi Va lley during the war, to the Pac ific Coast as Halleck's chief 

quartermaster. With experienced commanding officers taking charge. 

asSisted by able, experienced chief quartermasters. Meigs hoped that 

abuses would be corrected and expenses reduced. T4 

Sherman. making a tour of the posts in his command in the summer 

of 1866. was not surprised that the Quartermaster General was shocked 

"at the terrible bills and contracts that turn up for this quarter." But 

he wrote Grant's chief of staff, "we have no business to put men out 

here unless we give them food and shelter and all things but sand and 

water must be hauled from one to four hundred miles. " n Meigs. certain 

.. RG 92, OQMG Lener Book, vol. 88, p. 147 (Meijp to Easton, 20 Nov 1865). 

'"The Military Division of the Pacific included the Department of the Columbia (Oregon 

and the territories of Washington and Idaho) and the Department of California (California , 

Nevada, and the territories of New Mexico and Arilona). The Military Division of the 

Mississippi included the Department of the Ohio (embracing all the states of the Old North. 

west), the Depart.men! of Arkansu (including that lIate and Indian Territory), and the 

Department of the Missouri (embracing the lIata of Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri. and Kan'-U 

and the territoriel of Colorado. Utah. Nebraska, Dakou, New Mexico, and Montana) . 

.. RG 92, OQr.{G Letter Book, vol. 9., p. 105 (Meijp to Halleck, 17 Dec 1866) . 

• HOUle Ex. Doc. No. 25. 59th Cong., 2d sess .. p. 7 (Ltr. Shennan to Gen. J. A. Rawlins, 

2. Aug 18(6). 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 473 

to be confronted with reduced appropriations and dedicated to a program 

of retrenchment, could not be so philosophical. Estimates in 1866, he 

informed his chief subordinates in the West, were at the rate of $5 million 

a year for the Departments of the Platte and of the Dakota; those from 

the Military Division of the Pacific were running over $8 million per 

year.18 He called attention to the fact that expenditures for a French 

soldier were no more than $200 a year. Before the Civil War, it had cost 

about $1,000 per man per year for all expenses in the United States Army, 

but on the Pacific Coast he estimated that the costs had doubled in 1866. 

"Surely," he pleaded, "it will be possibl e by stationing troops in favorable 

localities-by not moving them much from place to place and by enforc· 

ing rigid economy and responsibility upon disbursing officers and local 

commanders to bring down the rate of expenditures." 11 

Allen gently reminded Meigs that quartermasters had no control 

over troop movements or selection of stations. but he reported that he 

had reviewed expenditures with General Halleck as soon as he had arrived 

at San Francisco in December 1866. His first estimate showed a reduc· 

tion of expenditures, and he promised further reductions if the Depart· 

ment made funds available to pay for articles as they were purchased, 

thereby putting an end to "the mischievous and wasteful system of discounting vouchers." of which his predecessor. General Babbit. had also 

complained.os 

True economy. Allen pointed out, could be effectively promoted only 

by reducing transportation costs. It was transportation, not the original 

purchase price, that determined the cost of the item supplied. Barley, 

for example, was worth an average of I cent per pound where it was 

bought. but delivered at Camp Lyon, Idaho. it cost over 10 cents. In the 

Military Division of the Pacific, transportation. no matter how judiciously 

managed. would appear excessive in comparison with other military 

departments, he warned, for the posts supplied were widely scattered, 

and most of them were not only remote from the source of supply, but 

.. RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, vol. 94, p. ! (Mei~ to Allen, 10 Oct 1866): p. 2!! (Meigs to 

Donaldson, 9 Nov 1866). 

n Ibid., vol. 94, p. 4 (Mei~ to Allen, 10 Oct 1866) . 

.. (I) RG 92, Penonal Narrative Rpts. F.Y. 1867, p. 13 (Allen's Rpt, 17 Jan 1867). See also 

ibid~ F.Y. 1866, p. 37 (Babbil's Rpt, 25 JUI 1866). (2) On a western inspeetion tour, General 

Ingalls also called attention to this problem and its effect. At Fort Yuma, for example, he 

found the prices of articles purchased and labor hired were based on the value of "certified 

vouchers." If an employee was paid $100 in currency, he was obliged to exchange it for $65 

in coin at the sutler', store or other broker's establishment. If he was paid by a "certified 

voucher" of $100, which might not be cashcd in currency for a year to come, he was compelled 

to sell it for $45 in coin. The inevitable result was to cause suffering to the employee, increase 

prices to the government, and depredate public credit. House Ex. Doc. No. Ill. 39th Cong., 

2d $C$$., pp. 15--16 (Lt.r, Ingalls to McDowell, 7 Nov 1866). 
474 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

, 

THE OLD FERRY ON THE COLORADO RIVER AT FORT YUMA 

the roads leading to them were hard to travel. The most expensive 

posts of his Division, he advised, were in Arizona where most of the 

troops were stationed. Only a limited amount of forage could be obtained there. so that forage and Quartermaster stores were shipped by 

water from San Francisco, via the Gulf of California to the Colorado 

River, and from there by river steamer to Fort Yuma, a distance of 2,210 

miles. Including overl and transportation of 308 miles from Yuma to 

Tucson. it cost by contract almost 21 cents per pound to send stores from 

San Francisco to Tucson.n• 

Meigs was well aware that reduction of transportation costs was the 

key to economy in his Department. To ascertain what changes should 

be made in routes and modes of supply at western posts. he sent Bvt. Maj, 

Gen, Rufus Ingalls on a tour of inspection in 1866 from Fort Leavenworth through Colorado, Utah, Montana. Idaho. and Oregon, and back 

by way of the Gulf of Ca liforn ia. the Colorado River, and Denver.'11 

.. RG 92, I'ersonal Narrative Rpts, F.Y. 1867, pp. 6, 9 (Allen's Rpl . 17 Jan 1867), 

.. House Ex. Doc. No. 111.l9th Cong .. 2d scss., p. 2 (AAG to Ingalls, 4 May 1866). 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 

• '. • , .... ~ .. e ' _ ___ .-.J ~ __ L .. ~ 

- STAGECOACH STATION, FT. KEARNY, NE8R. 

475 

Inga lls, whose pre.Civil War service had made him thoroughly familiar 

with the western fromier, proposed no change in the How of supplies 

from cast to west for posts in New Mexico and Colorado Territory, and 

for those on the North and South Platte, the Laramie. and upper Missouri 

Rivers. Changes had already been made on the Pacific Coast, he 

reported, and with General Allen taking over as chief quartermaster he 

would effect others. Ingalls' principal suggestions were to supply the 

posu in Utah from the west instead of the east, and to utilize to a greater 

extent the Colorado and Columbia Rivers as supply Iines.A' Though the 

Department, impressed with his findings, decided to determine which 

su pply routes were preferable by comparing rates offered in bids from 

freighters of both the Pacific Coast and Missouri. improvement of trans· 

portation in the Military Division of the Pacific was left to Chief 

Quartermaster Allen.u 

"Ibid., pp. 2- 25 (Ingalls' Rpt, 14 Ike 1866). 

" RC 92, OQMC Leiter 8ook, vol. 95, pp. 25- 27 (Actg QMC Rucker to Allen, 18 J an 

1867). 
476 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

F1'eighting Supplies 

In 1866, western posts were as dependent on wagon transportation 

for the deli very of their supplies as they had been before the war. T here 

were some very costl y routes on the Pacific Coast and in Arizona, and 

military stores were carried over these routes, and to a cenain extent 

ovcr supply lines in Texas, in government wagon lrains.BI Most western 

posts on the Plains. however, received their supplies in wagons that were 

privately owned by freighting companies. When necessary. quartermasters rouled military personnel on the overland romes across the 

Plains by stagecoach at so much per man per mile. But so h igh were 

the rates demanded by the companies that held a monopoly of this 

business that the chief of the transportation branch in the office of the 

Quartermaster General at Washington recommended such transportation 

be used as sparingly as possible." 

Long before the Civil War, the Quartermaster's Department had 

determined that the cheapest and most satisfactory means of transporting 

military stores to the pOSts on the Plains was by contract. Freighting 

supplies to those posts in 1866 was performed almost entirely by contractors. Under contracts awarded annuall y to the lowest bidders, they 

transported military stores at rates fixed at so much per 100 pounds per 

100 miles, the rates being adjusted to the season of the year, that is, 

lower for the summer than for the winter months. Since the Department 

was firmly committed to the use of private transportation as an economy 

measure, it was not long before mi litary su pplies destined for pOSts in 

the Military Division of the Pacific and in Texas were also being sent 

under contract. Distance and difficult routes caused rates to be much 

higher in the Military Division of the Pacific than on the supply lines 

of the Plains 01' in Texas." 

This trend toward contracting for the transportation of suppli es 

by no means eliminated the need for government-owned wagons. It was 

possibl e to reduce the number of such wagons and teams at posts and 

depots and thereby redllce expenditu res ror maintenance. but a certain 

amoun t of government transportation had to be retained to meet emergencies, such as might be created by the failure of a contractor to fu lfill 

his obliga tions, or by an unexpected movement oE troops, or by the loss 

of supplies at a post through fire. In addition,'the posts had to maintain 

- (l) House Ex. Doc. No. I. !91h Cong .. 2tl leSS .. p. 58 (QMG's Rpl . 1866). Annual Report 

oJ tllt~ Q"Qrtt'rmasler Geflt'ml, 1868. pp. S~'1 (Rl't or By(. U . Col. J. C, C. Lee, IS Aug 1868), 

.. House £1(. DO(. No. 1. !91h Cong .. 2d SCS5., p. 158 (Rpl . Col. Aleunder Bliss, I Ocl 

1866. appended to QMC'I Rpl , 1866). 

- See, A",wal Rt'port 0/ the Qllflrlermastt'r Ge"eral. 11MB, pp. 12- 15. for examp , of 

conlracu made and ra ~ allowed. 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 477 

BULL TRAIN BRINGING WOOD TO FT. RENO, OKLA. 

a designated amount of wagon transportation organic to the military 

units assigned to the post. Such transportation accompanied the troOps 

on military expeditions. In Arizona, New Mexico, and the Rocky 

Mountains. much of this transportation was done by pack mules, but 

because the troops were not sk illful in the management of pack trains. 

such transportation was very c05tly.86 

Tmnsporlation by Transcontinental Railroads 

The freighters were soon to be toppled from their dominant position 

by the advance of the transcontinenta l railroad lines. During fiscal year 

1866, their wagon trains carried almost 81,500.000 pounds. or 40,750 tons 

of military stores at a cost of morc than $3.250,000." Before the close 

of the next fiscal year, the Quartermaster's Department. for the first time, 

was able to make use of the Union Pacific Railroad to forward its supplies. 

It shipped military stores as far as Fort Sedgwick, Colorado Territory, 

on the Omaha branch of the line, and to Fort Harker, Kansas. on the 

branch from Kansas City, at a saving of 389 and 215 miles of wagon 

transportation, respectively." During fiscal year 1868, the freighters' 

share of military transportation was reduced to some 22,645 tons while 

the Union Pacific Railroad carried 18,605 tons." 

The completion of the Union Pacific Railroad in 1868, the construction of other transcontinental lines in later years, and the extension of 

the system of railroads in Texas, forced a reduction in rates for wagon 

transportation, but the railroads did not entirely supersede the wagon 

• AnnUIII Report of the Quartermaster CenuIII, J870, p. 12. 

,. HOUfe E.1f:. Doc. No. I, !19th Cong .. 2d scss .. p. Hi8 (Rp' of Col. Alexander Bliss. I Oct 

1866. appended to QMC', Rpl. 1866). 

• Hou$C ex. DOl:. No. I. 40th Cong .. 2d SCS5 .. p. ~!I!I (QMG's Rpl. 1867). 

• Annual Heparl of file QuarUrm4Ster General, J868, pp. 26, 28. 
478 QUARTERMASTER SU PPORT OF THE ARMY 

trains." Wagons and stagecoaches were niH needed "to be the pioneer 

in advance of lhe rai lroad" as new regions were developed and new posts 

established, and wagon transportation continued to be required for the 

supply of posts loca ted on lines lateral to the l'ai roa s.~1 Transportation 

of military supplies in the West remai ned a costly business, with transportation after 1867 continuing LO be divided between the wagon trains 

and the railroad lines. On the eve of lhe Spanish-American War, the 

wagon tra ins carried some 32,647 tons of freight and the railroads ovcr 

48,745 lons. T he stagecoach lines also were still participating in Quartermaster transportation to the extent of carrying 967 passengers and a 

little over a quarter of a ton of stores during the fiscal year ending 

30 June 1897.12 

Although, in general, western transporta tion expend itures remained 

high, the extension and use of the Union Pacific Railroad did diminisrl 

COSt S along its line and to most of the older posts in the Missouri country. 

If this was gratifying to the Quartermaster's Department, the Quartermaster officer in charge of transportation in lhe Washington office must 

have rued the day he got involved in the settlement of accounts of the 

federally subsidized transcontinental lines. Until 1873, the Department 

paid in cash to the Pacific roads one-half of what they earned in transporting troops and supplies. The other half, charged against the Department's appropriation for the transportation of the Army, the Treasury 

retained to be used in payment of the interest on the bonds issued by 

the United States in the railroads' favor as req uired by the acts of 1862 

and 1864 which subsid ized construction of the l'Oads.u 

Influenced by reaction against government libera lity to the roads, 

rumors of corruption, and the reve lations of the notorious Credit Mobilier 

affa ir, Congress enacted legislation in 1873 which directed the Secretary 

of the Treasury to withhold the whole of the roads' earnings for such 

government service.·' Despite litigation and further congressional debate, this application of earnings continued to be enforced until 1878 in 

the Pacific railroad accounts adjusted in the Quartermaster General's 

office and the Treasury Department. Fearful that the government might 

never rea lize the principa l of the subsid y bonds, Congress at that time 

provided for the estab lishment of a sinki ng fu nd to liquidate the debts 

of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific Railroads to the United Sta tes, 

.. ,lor Ihe impa(:t of the: Union I'ad'i<: Rai lroad on wagon rales see. ibid., 18]9, p. 12 . 

.. House Ex, Doc. No. I, 39th Cong .. 2d $('3.$ •• p. 158 (Uliss Rpl , I 0" 1866, appended to 

QMC's Rpl , 1866). 

- A"'III/If Reporl 0/ Ihe QUllrlernllls/tIf Celie",', 11/9], p. 38. 

-(I) I bid., 1868, 1'. 6; ibid., In}, p. 74. (2) 12 S/nl. 489-98 Uu l I, 1862); J5 Slili. 556-65 

Uul 2, 18&1). 

"18 StilI. 508 (Mar 3,1873). 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 479 

one-half of the compensation they earned for military transportation 

being carried to the credit of the sinking fund and the other half applied 

to the interest on the bonds issued in their behalf by the United States.·~ 

More work was involved in the adjustment of these railroad accounts 

than could be accomplished by the limited clerica l force of the Quartermaster General's offi ce, and large numbers of unsettled accoums accumulated in the office. Their number was further increased as the Pacific 

railroad Jines were extended and consolidated, bringing thousands of 

miles of new railroad under the operation of the Pacific railroad Jaws. 

Much of this new mileage was constructed without government aid and 

the railroad companies sought compensation for transportation carried 

over the unsubsidized portions of their roads. The Supreme Court 

having found in favor of the Central Pacific Railroad in irs suit against 

the government in 1866, the Quartermaster's Department thereafter had 

to settle accounts for transportation over the unsubsidized portions of the 

road, drawing upon its appropriation for Army transportation. That 

fund was exhausted even before the order embodying the Court's findings 

reached the office. and it could not make settlement until Congress passed 

a deficiency appropriation bill." 

Congressional legislation, court rulings, and directives from the 

offi ces of the Secretary of War and Secretary of lhe T reasury were so 

numerous that settlement of transportation accounts became increasingly 

complicated in the postwar years. Legislation dealing with the landgrant railroads added to the difficulties of the Quartermaster's Department, Early in the war, Meigs had ruled that the Department would pay 

to land·grant railroads 66¥') percent of the military tariff rates being paid 

to other railroads. The 331,1 percent deducted was for the value to the 

United States of the conditions auached to the land grants which provided 

that the railroads should remain public highways for the use of the 

government, free from toll or other charges upon the transportation of 

any property or troops of the United States. This re bate continued to 

be applied to all military transportation on the land-grant railroads until 

1874, when Congress ordered all payments to such roads discontinued. 

They were directed to the courts for a decision as to whether they were 

legall y entitled to payment and for recovery by suit of the amounts that 

might be legally due them." 

Of the 49 land.grant railroads to which the prohibitory payment law 

applied, only 9 were dearl y bound to transport troops and supplies free 

of COSt to the government. Two of the roads brought suit and the courts 

- 20 Slot. 58 (Pofay 7,1878). 

- A,UlIInI Report 0/ the Quortermaster GePlerol, 1887, pp. 156-57. 

" 18 SIIII. 74 Uun 16, 1874); p. 153 Uun 22, 1874); p. 453 (Mar 3, 1875). 
480 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

sustained the position Meigs had taken during the war.1I Although the 

Supreme Court found in favor of the roads, the law forbidding payment 

remained on the statute books. Despite the fact that failure to change 

the law or make payments created dissatisfaction, all but one of the landgrant railroads continued to serve the Department. 

Meigs repeatedly urged Congress to repeal the prOhibitory payment 

laws, to fix a certain rate of compensation for the services of the landgrant railroads to the government, and to authorize his Department to 

make payments from the regular Army transportation appropriation as 

had been done before 1874. Yet 6 years after the passage of the first 

prohibitory Jaw. only one appropriation had been made to seule the 

accounts due the roads." During that time, the indebtedness of the 

Quartermaster's Department to the roads had steadily increased, and the 

$300.000 appropriated by Congress to settle the arrears, on the basis of 

50 percent of the tariff rates for like transportation performed for the 

public at large, was insufficient. Congress had fixed the rates of compensation, but it was the mid-1880's before settlement was put on a 

regular basis through the passage of annual special appropriations for 

the purpose. 

Burdened with the problems of transportation expenditures and 

settlement of accounts, one Quartermaster officer, charged with these 

responsibilities in the office of the Quartermaster General, had enough 

imagination and foresight to suggest the desirability of training a "transport corps." Reporting to the Quartermaster General in 1884, Lt. Col. 

C. G. Sawtelle wrote: 

The history of all wars, modern and ancient, proves that army is the 

weakest whose transportation facilities are the most inefficient. A well 

equipped and organized transportation service is a necessary adjunct to every 

army in the Ileld, and its absence, or even its presence with ignorant or 

inexperienced offi cers in charge, has resulted in more disasters and defeats 

and unsuccessful marches and campa igns than perhaps any other cause. IOCI 

He suggested that it might be expedient and proper to institute measures 

for instructing offi cers in the organization and direction of the "transport" 

of the army, including the equipment, construction, and operation of 

railroads in time of war. For this purpose, he argued, the curriculum 

might be expanded at the Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Va., and at 

the school of application at Fort Leavenworth, Kans. He conceded that 

the scattered condition and the exceedingly small size of the Army probably did not permit the organization of such a corps, an essential part of 

-Anllulil Report o/the QUllrtermllJter Gellerli/. 1877. pp. 11. Ill- IS. 

-Ibid., 1880, p. 105 . 

.. Allllulil Report of tile QllllrtermllSter Ce"erll~, 1884, p. 10. 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 481 

European armies, but in case of war, he believed, "our country would be 

found sadly deficient in this most important requisite to successful mili· 

tary operations." 101 The Spanish-American War proved him a tTue 

prophet. 

Distribution Difficulties 

Although in the long run, the shift from wagon routes to transcontinental railroad lines resulted in more rapid and certain delivery 

of supplies to the small companies of tTOOpS scattered at posts throughout 

the West, that obviously was not the situation in 1886. Quartermaster 

distribution of supplies then was greatly hampered by the constant forays 

of the lndiam and embarrassed, in consequence. by the nonfulfillment of 

contracts by freighters. The Army was in no position to control the 

Indians. All the posts on the Plains were undergarrisoned because, in 

the dosing months of 1866, the volunteers had to be mustered out of 

service before they could be replaced by regular troops enlisted under 

legislation passed by Congress but enacted too late to permit the men to 

be sent to remote frontier posts.u~~ Since frequent troop movements 

occurred and district commanders often changed the destination for supplies ordered, quartermasters also experienced considerable confusion in 

forwarding them. The result was that several posts were left short of 

supplies and additional requisitions had to be sent forward late in the 

season when winter storms delayed and sometimes prevented delivery.lu 

The sufferings endured at remote, inaccessible posts were as intense 

as any experienced at Valley Forge. Take the situation that developed 

at Fort Phil Kearny in the unprecedently severe winter of 1866-67. 

Located in the mountainous regions of Wyoming. on a fork of the Powder 

River, 233 miles from Fort Laramie. Fort Phil Kearny was in process of 

construction as a post on the wagon road that was being opened from 

Fort Laramie to Virginia City, Mont. Garrisoned by five companies of 

the 18th Infantry. it was harassed by the Sioux and Cheyenne, who were 

determined to resist construction of the wagon road through their only 

remaining hunting grounds. On 31 December 1866, the post lost by 

massacre a party of 76 men, 3 officers, and 2 civilians, going to the relief 

of a wagon train sent out to obtain timber. 

"'Ibid., pp. 142- 143. 

"' House Ex . Doc. No. I. 40th Cong., 2d seu., p. 51 (Rpt, Lt. Gen. W. T. Shennan, 

I Oct 1867, appended to SW Rpt, 1867). 

' .. RG 92, Personal Narrative Rpu, F.Y. 1867, pp. 137-50 (Rpt, Chief QM j . L. Donaldson, 

Mil. Djv, of Missouri. I jul 1867): pp. 151--59 (Rpt, Chief QM L. C. Easton. Dept. of Missouri, 

51 jul 1867); pp. 587- 95 (Rpt, Chief QM William Myers. Dept. of the Platte, 23 Aug 1867). 
482 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

GUAROING THE SUPPLY TRAIN 

At that time, Bvt. Brig. Gen. George B. Dandy had been relieved as 

post quartermaster as Fort Laramie and was en route to assume the same 

duties at Fort Phil Kearny. He arrived at the fort on 27 December to 

find the garrison shut up in the stockade in a demoralized condition from 

fear and half frozen from lack of fuel. There were only a few tons of 

hay and very little corn on hand to feed the mules of the wagon trains 

and the horses of the 2d Cavalry company that had recently arrived. To 

prevent them from starving to death, Dandy sent most of them to Fort 

Laramie, but many of them died on the road from starvation and cold. 

He retained only enough animals to haul timber for fuel from a distance 

of 6V2 miles. By mid-January the supply of hay was exhausted, and he 

was trying to keep the animals alive on three to four pounds per day of 

cornmeal and hominy that he obtained from the commissary. The 

animals were reduced to such extremity that they ate their harness and 

the tongues and bodies of the wagons. Too thin and weak to work, the 

animals finally had to be turned loose to care for themselves. 

Then, in order to obtain the necessary daily supply of timber for 

fuel, the men had to pack it on their backs through the snowdrifts. 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 483 

.... , /' -.-;. .. :-' .~ ' .. 

FORT PHI L KEARNY, 1867 

In consequence, the hospital was soon filled with frostbitten patients. 

Supplies, estimated for a garrison o( five companies that had swelled to 

eleven, were exhausted long before fresh shipments could be expected. 

One-third of the whole force was in the hospita l with scurvy. reduced as 

it was to a daily fare of bacon and hard bread, the only rations available. 

The soldiers' quarters were badly ventilated and so insufficient that some 

of the companies Jived in tents during that severe winter. Having been 

sent to Fort Phil Kearny in the dead of wimer, it was impossible for 

Quartermaster Dandy to do anything except share the general hardships 

and await the arrival of succor.'~' 

The degree of suffering endured at Fort Phil Kearny was not duplicated elsewhere, but other pOSts also ran short of commissary supplies. 

For months during that wimer, it was impossible to keep communications 

open with such remote fons as C. F. Smith, on the Big Horn River in 

southern Montana, Buford at the junction of the Bruneau and Snake 

Rivers in southwestern Idaho, and Berthhold on the Missouri River in 

North Dakota. All were located in the country of the unfriendly Sioux. 

Even after the coming of the transcontinental railroads improved trans-

'''Ibid., F.Y. 1867. pp. 11 7- 1" (Dandy's Rpt.:W Jun 18(7). 
484 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

portation, life at the fronticr posts remained rugged. T hough few in 

numbers, the troops were ca lled upon not only to fight the Indians, but 

also to get in their supply of fuel and forage and to constr uct their 

quarters from whatever material was nearest at hand·-timber, stone, 

adobe, or sod. 

Quarters at Western Posts 

Inspection of post quarters in 1866 brought forth some well·merited 

critiCism. Bvt. Brig. Gen. J. F. Rusling wrOte Meigs that sod should be 

used as a "dernier resort, and sod or d irt were vile," so bad and disagreeable in fact that no troops should be required to shelter under them. 

"Dirt, dampness, disease, vermin, a ll infest such structures," he reported, 

"and the United States Government, I take it. means better than that by 

the faithful troops th at serve it." In Sod had been used at Fort Sedg· 

wick, Colo., and when General Sherman, commanding the Military Divi· 

sion of the Mississippi, visited there in Ihe summer of 1866 the quarters 

looked like hovels. "Surely," he wrote, "had the southern planters put 

their negroes in such hovels, a sample would, ere this, have been carried 

to Boston and ex hi bited as illustrative of the cruelty and inhuman ity 

of the man -masters. " IIIe At Fort Yuma, Ariz., the buildings were of 

adobe, roofed with zinc, " the worst roofing th at could have been used in 

that infernal clima te," Rusling informed Meigs.'oT Quarters provided 

for the troops in Arizona were generally condemned by the assistant 

inspector general of the Military Division of th e Pacific, who thought the 

troops were suffering unnecessari ly, for they were exposed to weather 

"as the negro of the south or the peasant of Ire land has never been," II., 

To this criticism, the commanding genera l of the Department of California, Genera l McDowell, rejoined: " I know nothing of the huts in 

Ireland; but I have seen plenty of negro cabins that were very comfortable 

as compared with a tent, and th is is the comparison to make." , Ot He 

thought the inspector's opinion should be received with some a llowance. 

Believing that it was true economy to make the soldier comfortable 

since that improved his health, effi ciency, and mora le and prevented 

desertion, Me igs wished to offer better barrack accommodations than in 

'- RC 92. RUlling. Reports of Inspectionl in QMD, I, 3 (Denver Rpt, 12 Sep 1866) . 

... House Ex. Doc. No. 23, 39th Cong .. 2d sea .. p. 7 (Shennan to Gen . J. A. Rawlinl. 24 Aug 

1866). 

"'RG 92. RUl ling, Reports of InspectiOIlJ in QMD. II, 5 .... 56 (San Francisco Rpt , 16 May 

1867). 

- House Ex. Doc. No. I, 40th Cong .. 2d 5esS .. p. 85 (Inclosure to Cenel1ll Halleck'. Rpt , 

18 Sep 1867. appended to SW'. Rpt . 1867). 

- Ibid., pp. 94- 95. 
POST·CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 485 

---

---- FORT LARAMIE 

WYOMING.TERRITORY ------

--~-. O£N: ...... PLAN or 'POIT --

I 

:mo._ 

; •. _. 

I __ ..... =-1.. ........ 

GENERAL PLAN OF FORT LARAMII::, WYOMING TERRITORY, 1874 

the past, to make quarters, reading rooms, and mess rooms "more attractive than the sutler's shop and the groggery." no When he suggeSted. 

however. that Sherman reconsider the advisability of erecting a permanent 

garrison at Fort Sedgwick, Colo .• that most expensive post on the Plains, 

he became involved in an exchange of views over staff and line responsi. 

bilities. a clash of viewpoinu that arose with increasing frequency in the 

postwar years. 1II Genera l Sherman, convinced that Fort Sedgwick would 

have to be retained as a military post, was equally certain that, in all 

malters relating to the shelter of troops on the Plains, a large degree of 

discretion should be left with the commanding general.lI2 

Meigs agreed with Sherman's interpretation of his authority, and 

supposed that he intended to, and in fact did, exercise supervision and 

control over Quartermaster operations in his command. He reminded 

•• RG 92. OQMG Letter Book, vol. 92, pp. 370---71 (Meigs 10 Sherman. 9 Ju1 186fi). 

,tt Ibid., pp. 302-OJ (Meigs 10 Sherman, 28 J un 1866). 

'''Sec RG 92. QMD, RegiJI("r of Lellen Re(eivM , 3 Jul 1866. 
486 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Sherman that in the course of the war there had been few complaints 

that Quartermaster officers fai led to obey orders of military commanders 

or failed to cooperate zealously and successfully with them and under their 

instructions, and he assured him that no such case would be permitted 

to arise in the future. On the other hand, the Secretary of War and the 

bureau chiefs under him were responsible for Army expenditures and 

Meigs added, "we do not meet this responsibility by saying to each 

General commanding a Division we have such appropriations spend 

them as you will." A general supervision and regulation had to be 

retained at Washington, Meigs insisted, to enable these officers to know 

what is done, to regulate expenditures, and to answer the questions of 

Congress and the Executive. 1l3 

Reasonableness got Meigs nowhere, By order of the Secretary of 

War, acting on a recommendation of Lieutenant General Grant, General 

in Chief, Meigs was directed to place $1 million in the hands of Sherman's 

chief quartermaster, to be spent, in sHch amounts in sheltering the troops 

on the Plains and within the Military Division Sherman commanded, 

as he might direct.'H Thereafter, Meigs did not "feel at liberty to give 

orders" on sheltering the troops in the Military Division of the Mississippi, though he sent information along to Chief Quartermaster Easton, 

and later advised Assistant Quartermaster General Donaldson, when he 

was sent to relieve Easton, that he was "to exercise nearer control of the 

operations and expenditures" of the Quartermaster's Department in that 

division.m The grant of the so·called sheltering fund proved an exception to the system of keeping application of appropriations for barracks 

and quarters under the direct personal control of the Secretary of War, 

though other unsuccessful efforts were made by commanding officers to 

obtain approval of a system under which there would be assigned to each 

departmental commander the amount of money that could be spared for 

construction purposes.' U 

Except [or hospitals, for wh ich after 1870 the Surgeon General made 

separate estimates and obtained appropriations, the Quartermaster's 

Department built most barracks, quarters, storehouses, and other military 

buildings from funds annua lly appropriated by Congress for "construction of temporary hlJls and stables," and for repairing buildings at estab· 

'''RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, vol. 92, pp.1I6&--70 (Meigs 10 Shenn3n, 9 Jul 1866). 

u·lbid .. pp. 1188-89 (Meigs to Easton, 12 Jul 1866). 

\B lbid., pp. 469-98 (Meigs to Easton, 25 Jul 1866): vol. 94. p. 11117 (QMG 10 Donaldson, 

I Dec 1866). 

"oSee, for el<ample, RG 92. OQMG Letter Book, 18711- A. General and Misc., pp. 496-98 

(Indorsement, Meigs to AG, 24 Jul 18711). 
POST·CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 487 

lishcd posts. 111 This legislation was in accord Wilh War Department 

views on construction. Since most western military posts were themselves 

temporary, the War Department considered it advisable to keep the troops 

in cantonments, occupying quarters they themselves constructed from 

local materials. III Only by spec ial alilhorization of the War Department 

could COntracts be made LO purchase material for the erection of tern· 

porary posts in the West. No permanent buildings could be constructed, 

except by order of the Secretary of War, and such authority was also 

necessary to make any alterations. To construct permanent buildings. 

the Quartermaster's Department had to submit detailed estimates to 

Congress. which enacted special appropriations for the project. Such 

had been the law since 1859, until Congress put a limit of $20,000 on the 

cost of a permanent building in 1872. Congress later also provided that 

no expenditures exceeding $500 could be made on any building without 

the approval of the Secretary of War and only upon detailed estimates 

prepared by the Quartermaster's Department. 1IG 

While the Quartermaster's Department, utilizing funds provided for 

the incidental expenses of the Army, could and did hire and pay skilled 

artisans and laborers to a limited extent to construct and repair buildings, 

principally in the East. most construction work. at western posts had to 

be done by the troops. Since the Department's staff was too small to 

permit assigni ng an experienced quartermaster to each western post where 

construction was under way. much of it was under the direction of inexperienced officers. Inexp.erience proved costly. Some of the first sites 

selected for the construction of new military posts on the Texas frontier, 

for example, had to be abandoned for lack of water or timber after considerable expenditures had been made by the Quartermaster's Department to forward workmen and materials.u o 

Obviously, the buildings provided under these conditions were of the 

rudest construction, providing unwholesome and uncomfortable quarters 

for officers and men. Assistant Surgeon John S. Billings, reporting on 

barracks and health, charged that the statement made that "we have the 

best-fed and worst-housed Army in the world" seemed more nearly correct 

than such generalizations usually were.Ut Dark, cheerless, noisome, and 

'" (I) RG 92, OQMG Leiter nook. vol. 106. pr. 592-93 (~feigs 10 SUTgWn General. 17 Oct 

1870). (2) RG 92. OQMG Leiter 8 ook. I 878-A. General and Mise .. p. 746 (Meigs 10 SW, 29 Jun 

1878). 

"'(1) RG 92. OQMG Letter Rook. vol. 90. p. ~ (AetK QMG Rucker 10 Donaldson, 16 Apr 

1867). (2) IVllr Dtlpnrt"lIwt GtllltlrlJi Ordtlrl, 1867, GO 76. 15 AUK 1867. 

". (I> lVar Dtlpnrtl1ltlflt Gtlntlrlfl Ordtlt'S, 186JJ, GO 95, 2' Nov 1868. (2) II Stat. 452 

(Mar 5. 1859): 17 Stnt. 128 (May 28. 1872): 24 Still. 97- 98 Uun 30, 1886) . 

.. Amllllll Rtlf10rt of thtl QUllrttlrmllJltlr Gtllltlrlll, 1868, pp. 10.5 ..... .56: 58-6'. 

, .. J ohn S. Billings. A Rtlport 0" Bllrrlfch lIud HospitlllJ u:ith lkJCriptiolls oj Militllry Po.stJ 

(Washington. 1870). p. XXXIII. Htlreafler brieny d ied as Billings. Rtlport 0" Barraclu. 
488 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

overcrowded, Army barracks produced a mortality rate from disease in 

the period 1867- 70 that was 50 percent greater than it should have been, 

Billings reponed. Army regulations established some rather flexible 

standards for air space for each man. In 1863. they called for 225 

square feet of room north of 38° north, and 256 square feet south of that 

latitude. Setting the average height of rooms at 10 feet, that gave each 

soldier 375 and 426 cubic feet, respectively. But this provision was 

qualified by the authorization that when the number of officers and men 

made it necessary, the commanding officer could reduce the amount of 

quarters pro rata. Practically speaking, there were no regu lations. At 

Fort Griffin, a frontier pOSt in Texas, the barracks consisted of 4 rows 

of small frame huts, 10 to a row, each hut measuring 13 by 8Y2 by 6 feet, 

giving 660 cubic feet of air space to each hut. Each row of huts was 

supposed to accommodate one company, but even if the company strength 

was only 60, each shanty would be occupied by 6 men, giving each man 

only 110 cubic feet of air space. 122 Other posts offered accommodations 

that were no better than those at Fort Griffin. 

One-half o[ the Army posts in 1870 had barracks that were built with 

a central aisle, each side of which was lined with a row of double bunks, 

usually placed in two tiers, though those at Fort Buford in Dakota 

Territory had three tiers. Their use had long since been discontinued 

in European armies, and Billings thought it was imperative to put an end 

to this evil in the American Army. When Meigs inspected the frontier 

posts of Texas in the winter of 1869- 70 and saw the rough board, vermininfested bunks in which the men slept, he was horrified and determined 

to have iron beds manufactured and sent as soon as possible. 12O There 

had been agitation for the introduction of iron bedsteads more than a 

decade before 1861, but lack of funds and then war had deferred action. 

Meigs attacked the problem with renewed vigor, and 25 years after the 

subject had first been broached, he could report that nearly all military 

posts had been supplied with single iron bedsteads.1u 

A majority of the posts lacked proper bathing faci lities. At Fort 

Buford, a basin of water out of doors was the only faci lity. Even the 

Missouri River at that point was too rapid and dangerous to permit the 

men to make use of it in the summer.1U In the existing state of appropriations. construction of bathhouses could not be permitted. The 

Secretary of War regularly rejected all plans and estimates for them, 

·- Ibid., p. 194. 

U I RG 92, OQMG Leucr Book, vol. 105, pr. 2Q ~-OO (Meigs to ACting QMG McFerran, 

\I Jan 1810). 

, .. Ammal Report 01 tlte QllartermllSt er General, JB]}, p. 25. 

I . Billings, R eport Oil Barrachs, p. 402. 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 489 

holding that the troops could provide for their own needs without expense 

to the government.1U 

When dusk fell, the barracks became a gloomy place, lit by the 

Bickering light from an occasional candle, as they had been since the days 

of the Revolution. Under regulations, the Subsistence Department in 

the post-Civil War period furnished 1 pound and 4 ounces of candles to 

every 100 rations. 127 On order of the Secretary of War, a board of officers 

convened in the summer of 1878 to report upon lighting barracks with 

lamps fed with mineral oil, or as it was later call ed, kerosene. As a 

result of that report, the Secretary authorized a trial of such lamps at 

certain military posts. Supply responsibility (or lamps and mineral oil 

was transferred from the Subsistence to the Quartermaster's Department 

in the spring of 1881.'28 The Department estimated that the new method 

of lighting would cost the government abou t $2,500 per year more than 

the old, but since the lamp would give the light of 16 candles, the morale 

of the troops would be much improved.m 

As improvements began to be made for the comfort of the soldier, 

the War Department also tried to furnish a better means for the use of 

his leisure hours than was offered by the grog shop. Immediately after 

the Civil War, Congress had provided for the establishment of schools at 

posts, garrisons, or permanent camps to instruct the enlisted men in "the 

common English branches of education , and especially in the history of 

the United States." 110 When no suitable room or buildings could be 

set apart for educational and religious purposes, the Secretary of War 

directed the Quartermaster's Department to construct such buildings, 

the plans and detailed estimates of cost being forwarded by the commanding officer. th rough the Quartermaster General, for the approval of the 

Secretary'>s' As General Grant interpreted the law, however, all posts 

west of the Mississippi were considered temporary and not entitled to 

the benefit of the act.lU 

For the next dozen years, little was accomplished under this law. hut 

eady in 1878. by order of the Secretary of War, a board of officers. including the Quartermaster General, met to consider steps for carrying out 

the law. The board recommended that post funds be used for this 

purpose and that a more liberal application also be made of Quarter-

.. RG 92, OQMG Leiter Book., 1875-A, General and Mise .. p. 363 (Meigs 10 SW, 30 Mar 

1875); ibid., 1877- A, pp. 473"-74 (Meigs to SW. 17 Jul 1877). 

'Of Revi.!ed u.s. Army Regulation.! 0/1861, p. 244. 

,. Headquarters of Ihe Army General Order.!, 1881, GO 50. 24 May 1881. 

uo Anllual Report 0/ the Quartermastu General, 1881, pp. 12- 13. 

"'14 SIal. 356 (lui 22. 1886). 

'Ot War Deparlmellt General Orders, 1886, GO BO, 24 Sep 1866 . 

.. RG 92, OQMG Letter Book. vol. 99. p. 293 (Acting QMG Rucker to AG, 10 Apr 1868). 
490 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

master appropriations. 1n consequence, the Quartermaster's Department 

furnished an increasing number of posts with buildings to be used for 

schools, chapels, read ing rooms, and lib raries. u~ Approval of another 

recommendation of the hoard resulted in the Quartermaster's Department 

procuring and forwarding to the post libraries such periodicals and newspapers as the Department's appropriation for incidental expenses permitted it to purchase. 

Fully convinced that it was "cheaper to amuse soldiers than punish 

them (or faults resulting from ennui and want of interesting employment 

for leisure hours," Meigs, as a member of the board, had approved of 

bowling alleys for the troops. Quartermaster funds were not available 

for such purposes, but the troops might build their own bowling alleys, 

and Meigs was so much interested in their welfare that he prepared 

drawings of a billiard table that he requested the editor of Builder and 

Woodworker to publish. T his was a journal known to the Army, and 

publication of his drawings in it would provide "do-it-yourself" plans for 

the soldiers, enabling them also to build their own billiard tables.m 

This effort to ameliorate the life of the soldier came at a time when 

officers of the Army were urging a change in policy that would lead to 

the abandonment of temporary pOSts in the West in favor of large 

permanent garrisons where troops might be concentrated. By the 1880's, 

transcontinental railroads crossed the continent, settlement had spread 

across the country, and the Indians were under greater control. The 

transition period following the Civil War, when troops lived in holes in 

the ground, in houses made of green cottonwood logs infested by vermin, 

and in temporary shanties, was coming to an end. Sherman, then serving 

as Commanding General of the Army, appealed to Congress for generous 

treatment, for decent quarters, and for repeal of the law permitting construction of only temporary shelters on the frontier. To overcome local 

pride which might obstruct any movement to abandon specific posts, 

Sherman recommended the appointment of boards of officers to review 

the problems of coastal defense and inland posts and determine which 

should be maintained and which posts might be disposed of by sale. 

H the money thus obtained could be used to build durable barracks on 

permanent sites, economy, he argued, would be promoted. Such construction would bring Army barracks in line with what was happening 

111(1) War Del}a r/ me'!/ Ge'!era/ Orders, 1878, GO 24, 18 May 1878. (2) RG 92, OQMG 

Letter Book, 1880-A. General and Misc .. p. 11119 (Meigs to Officer in Charge of Education of 

the Army, 6 Apr 1880); ibid., 1881 -E, pp. 2508-10 (Same to I13me, 2 Nov 1881) . 

... RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, 1881 - B, pp. 7011-04 (Meigs to F. T. Hodgdon, 18 Feb 1881); 

ibid., 1881-C, 1266-67 (Meigs to Capt. Arthnr McArthur, 14 Mar 1881). 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 491 

all over the United States, "where old log cabins are giving pl ace to the 

morc lasting brick hOllses of the farmer and mechanic." m 

The law on building temporary huts was not allered, and Congress 

continued parsimonious in dealing with the general appropriations for 

Army expenses. 'While the Quartermaster General found that he could 

not persuade the Committee on AppropriaLions to increase the annual 

funds for barracks and quarters, still by playi ng on local interests and 

enlisting the influence of senators and members of the House of Representatives, the Army obtained a number of special appropriations, generall y for $100,000, for the constl"llction of specific new posts beginning 

in the late IS70's.m The trend toward concentration in permanent 

garrisons began, and Congress aUlhorized the President to designate and 

place under the control of the Secretary of the Interior the lands of any 

military reservation that became use less for military purposes. 

General appropriaLions for barracks and quarters, however, continued to be inadequate, usually ranging from $650,000 to $750,000. 

Since the buildings at many posts were the outgrowth of temporary 

quarters, poorly constructed to begin with and unsatisfactory even after 

they were enlarged and al tered, they required constant repairs to keep 

them inhabitable. The ann ual drain for their maintenance left only a 

small part of the appropriation availabl e for the erection of new buildings 

that the Quartermaster's Department sought to construct of Stone, brick, 

or other durable material, according to plans carefully drawn and 

incl uding the most approved sanitary requirements. Until the end of 

this period, Quartermasters General continued to appeal for adequate 

appropriations.UT 

Neither transportation probl ems nor construction proj ects whoUy 

absorbed the attention of the Quartermaster's Department in the postCivil War years. The broad field of procurement and its problems also 

demanded consideration. When the Civil War ended, the large wartime 

procurement of Quartermaster supplies ground to a halt as quickly as 

Me igs could send out orders. Obviously, with the Volunteer army 

promptly demobilized and the maximum strength of the Regular Army 

fixed f01" many years at about 25,000 men, the surpluses of Quartermaster 

supplies on hand at the depots obviated the necessity for procuring many 

UO A"fIIM/ Report of /lt e Secretar)' of War, 1881, I. ~5 3(j (Sherman'S Rpl, 3 Nov 188 1, 

appended): sec ~Iso ibid., 1877, I. G3 (I'ope's Rpl. 15 ScI' !f177. appended). 

''' RG 92. OQMG LeBer Book. 1879--D. General and Misc.. p. 2315 (Meigs to General of 

the Arrny, 21 OCI 1879). 

"' Sce Amlllal Rt port of tilt Quarlenlluster ", r(l/ , 1890, p. 4; 189), p. 10; 189-1 , p. 6. 
492 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

items for some years to cornc. This was not true for such perishables 

as forage and fuel, bUl economy dictated that. at every post where it was 

possible, these supplies were to be provided by troop labor. On the 

other hand, the Quartermaster's Department did not have to procure 

clothing and equipage. Clothing stocks requ ired no replenishment for 

5 years, and the textile supply was so large that the first cloth was not 

procured until 1877.111 With the restoration of peace, many supplies 

were obtained by requisiLion on the general depots. 

Return to COlllmel Procedtn°e 

War had necessitated many open-market purchases, but peace led 

Meigs to emphasize anew that supplies unobtainable at depots were to 

be procured by contracts awarded to the lowest bidders. It was Quartermaster policy to purchase supplies loca ll y at the places where they were 

needed, provided they could be obtained at as reasonable rates as elsewhere, taking into account the cost of transportation. This policy particularly applied to forage. lumber. and other products of the country 

in which the posts and depots were located. As seulement moved westward. the Subsistence Department followed the same policy. Increasingly, commissaries directed their efforts toward obtaining supplies. such 

as fresh beef. flour, and other commodities, from producers near the 

points of consumption. In Although the Subsistence Department encouraged such local procurement. the main purchasing depotS for subsistence continued to be at New York, Baltimore, Boston, Louisville. 

S1. Louis, Chicago, and New Orl eans. to which San Francisco and Portland. Ore., were added in the 1870's as production on the Pacific Coast 

made subsistence supplies available there. As far as such Quartermaster 

stores as hardware and other manufactured articles were concerned. they 

still could be obtained cheaper at S1. Louis or Chicago than at any 

western POSt or depot. ItO 

To promote a more economical administration of the procurement 

of supplies, the War Department changed its contract procedure in the 

fall of 1867, largely through Meigs' efforts. to give greater uniformity and 

system. In the past, the subordinate officers of the Quartermaster's 

Department, on duty at the various posts and depots where stores were 

consumed, made the contracts for Quartermaster supplies. Under the 

"Anllual Report of IIle Quartermaster Geller/II, 1871, p. 10; ibid ~ J87], p. 25. 

-RG 192, CGS, Lellen 10 SW, 1866-72, pp. 99: 252 (Annual Rpts. CG or Subsistence, 19 Ocl 1868: 20 (Xt 1869). 

' .. RG 92, OQMC leiter Book.. vol. 96, pp. 69-70 (Acting QMG Rucker 10 Donaldson, 

12 Apr 1867): ibid., vol. 99, p. 205 (Same 10 Ea5lon, 25 Mar 1868). 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 493 

new regulation, all contracts for Subsistence and Quartermaster supplies 

and services for the troops within any geographical command. except 

those for clothing and equipage, were made on the basis of advertisements 

and proposa ls received by the chief quartermasters and chief commissaries 

of the military departments or districts and submitted by them to the 

commanding generals, upon whom rested the responsibility of making 

the awards as well as causing the advertisements to be made.1U Thus, 

Quartermaster and Commissary officers executed lhe details of contracting 

for supplies, but commanders made the final decisions. on the information 

collected by the staff officers. When larger quantities of supplies were 

needed to stock general depots, or transportation contracts were made 

over routt:! affecting more than one general command, chief quartermasters and chief commissaries transmitted all related contrac t papers to 

the chief of the bureau concerned for his decision under the general 

supervision of the Secretary of War. 

Although Meigs believed that, under (he law, the Secretary of War 

ultimately had to be responsible for all administration in regard ( 0 contracts and expenditures of the appropriations of the Army, he nevertheless 

had always endeavored to give control over the awarding of contracts, 

on which their operation might absolutely depend for success, to the 

generals commanding troops or military divisions and departments. 

Meigs maintained that he found this praCtice conducive to efficiency, 

economy, and harmony of administration. H3 

Conflict Over Contract ContTOi 

Harmony was not noticeably promoted, however, in the persistent 

conRict between staff and line that was as apparent in the fields of contracts and expenditures as it was in construction. Ignoring the control 

he exercised over contracts and staff officers in his department, Brig. Gen. 

John Pope, commanding the Department of the Missouri, made a sweeping denunciation of the over-concentration of every detail of Army ad· 

ministration in Washington and of the suppl y staffs that "absolutely 

control the supplies of the Army to the smallest aniclc, and regulate the 

manner of its transportation and delivery to the Army." He charged that 

many of the staff officers, although holding commissions in the Army, had 

never served a day with troops, "and are as ignorant practically of the 

condition, the circumstances, and the surroundings of the Army, and of 

the country in which the largest part of it is serving, as they are of such 

... War D~parlllunl General Orders, 1867, GO 97, 12 Noy 1867. 

, .. RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, 1879-(:, General and Mise .. p . 1597 (Meigs to Col. 

Ru rul Saxton, 50 Apr 1879); ibid., 1879·B, pp. 1024-28 (Meigs to AG, 21 May 1879). 
494 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

military service in the Chinese Empire." Pope did not hesitate to 

declare that concentration of Army administration in Washington had 

reached a point "where every sort of fraud is made possible." HI 

For his part. the Commissary General of Subsistence found that parts 

of the general order on contract procedure had been so construed by 

some division and department commanders as to relieve him of a portion 

of the duties assigned to him by law,lH The order remained in effect, 

however, until 1879 when a board of officers made changes in the control 

of contracts that relieved commanding generals of all responsibility, 

thereby fanning anew the staff-line controversy and causing General 

Schofield to "attack the Staff as encroachers upon Military Command." I .. 

Meigs considered the changes injudicious and informed the Genera l of 

the Army that haste had resulted in publishing the new order before it 

had been submitted to the heads of bureaus and the General of the Army 

for criticism and revision. T hrough Meigs' efforts, control and responsibility in making contracts for supplies within their proper commands 

were restored to the commanding generals. Great care was taken, however, to restate the responsibilities of the Secretary of War as well as 

the relations of staff officers to their commanders. Meigs hoped that this 

revision would tend to end the "constant and annoying disagreement 

between li ne and staff." ue 

To the commanding officer, the problem of expenditures was simple. 

T he Secretary of War made his recommendations for the War Department appropriations. When made, the appropriations ought to be 

turned over to the proper bonded officers of the Army to be expended 

[or the purposes for which they were made, under the direct orders of 

the General of the Army and his subordinates in command. T hus, every 

dollar would be spent prec ise ly for the purpose for which it was asked, 

and, according to General Pope, estimates would decrease surprisingly.'H 

To the supply chief, the problem was complicated by several factors. 

The annual estimates of the Quartermaster's Department were based 

," Pope'. letler, addressed to J udge M. F. Force, 13 March 1876, at the time Alphonso 

Taf, was appointed Secreta ry of War, is reproduced ill the Burn, ide Report. Stnate Report 

No . .555, 15th Collg., 3d scs.s" pp. 11 6-19. (2) His letter, also publi'hed in the NOTtll Amui. 

ellll lleuietu and the Arllly and Navy Jourrwl, brought prompt reaction from both Meigs 

and Commi"ary General R. Macfeely. RG 92, OQMG Lette r Book. 1878·6, Gene ral and 

Misc., pp. 1276-81 (Meigs 10 SW, 8 May 1878). RG 192, CCS, Lellers 10 SW, 1873- 79, pp. 

350-55 (Macfed y 10 SW, 28 May 1878). 

, .. RC 192, CCS, LeiteR to SW, 1875-79, pp. 202-1 1 (Macfetly 10 SW, 8 Nov 1876). 

"'(1) War De/X'rtme'JJ Geue rll/ OrduJ, 1879, GO 10. 3 Mar 1879. (2) RG 92, OQMG 

Letter Book, 1879·C, Ceneral and Misc., pp. IGCM-OO (Meigs 10 Sherman, I J un 1879) . 

... (I) War Depnrtmenl Ce'leTal Orders, 1878; f8HO, GO 72, 14 Jul 1879: GO 40, 22 

May 1880. (2) RG 92. OQMC Letter Book, 1880·A, General and Mi$C., pp. 506-{)8 (Meigs to 

McDowell , 23 Apr 1880). 

'n Senate Report No. 555, 45th Cong., 3d 1tU .. p . 119. 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 495 

upon experience of the actual requirements of the service during past 

years. They were made out in the fall of the year and attempted to 

declare, in anticipation. the wants of the military service for the whole 

of the year, which did not begin until JO months after they were presented 

and that ended nearly 2 years after their presentation. Submitted to the 

Secretary of War, these estimates were sometimes reduced by him before 

transmittal to Congress, whose members, in the interests of enforcing 

economy, might still further red uce them in the appropriation bill they 

passed. 

Restrictive Legislation Governing Expenditures 

Not only were supply operations restricted by inadequate appropriations but they were also hampered by the rigidity of the legislation 

governing expenditures. Since the Quartermaster's Department had first 

been established as a bureau in WaShington in 1818, it had been possible 

to transfer moneys appropriated for one branch of expenditures to another 

with in the same department. IU In 1868, however, Congress repealed 

that law and provided that funds could be used onl y for the purpose for 

which they had been appropriated.'tt T his restriction orten caused great 

embarrassment to quartermasters. T heir funds came to them from the 

Secretary of War upon the basis of monthly estimates, transmitted through 

department and division headquarters where they were revised by commanding officers with the advice of their chief quartermasters, then 

forwarded to Washington for examination in the office of the Quartermaster General, and finally su bmitted for the Secretary's approval, atten· 

tion being ca ll ed to any apparently excessive expenditures.

no Since the 

exigencies of the service were constantly changing, a quartermaster might 

find, for example, that, having requested and received funds to erect 

temporary shelter for troops, he really needed transportation money 

because the troops were on the move and not going into quarters. Yet, 

under the law, he could not use shellering funds for transportation pur· 

poses, nor could he resort to the use of credit because the law forbade 

any expenditure beyond the appropriation. 

As the fiscal year drew to a close, some officers of the Department 

would have expended all the funds in their hands belonging to specific 

appropriations. while others would still have a surplus. T his necessitated 

transfers of funds from one class of officers to another, who often were 

"'The law had been on the statute boo .... since 1809. 2 SIIIt. 555-56 (Mar 5, 1809). 

' '' 15 Slat. 56 (Feb 12. 1868). 

'IORG 92. OQMG Letter Book, 1872- A, General and Misc., pp. 87- 90 (Meigs to SW, 

25 J ail 1875). 
496 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

stationed fa r apart. Such transfers would be made until all accounts 

were paid 0 1" the appropriation was exhausted. Unfortunately, delays 

in the paymc lll of aCCQUIHS occurred under th is system that tended to 

increase the expenses of the Department. 

Other restrictions that Congress placed on the use of appropriations 

that were in tended to promote economy resu lted only in inconvenience 

and increased supply COSts. In 1870, Congress enacted legislation thal 

made appropriations applicable onl y to the service of the fisca l year for 

which they were appropriated, ul To end tra nsponation contracts on 

30 June, [or example. in the midst of lhe season of active troop movements, of river navigation. and o[ transportation on the Plains, was both 

inconvenient and costl y. If, as sometimes happened, appropriations were 

not made until the fisca l year began, new contracts could not be made 

and put into operation until the greater part of the transportation season 

had ended. In consequence, the Department often had to resort to 

temporary and irregular arrangements that entail ed higher costs. The 

Subsistence Departmelll, confronted with the necessity of supplying distant posts that req uired early preparations, unsuccessfully sought to have 

a clause inserted in Army appropriations bills providing that $300.000 

of the money appropriated for that Department might be applied by the 

Commissary Genera l of Subsistence before 1 Jul y to the purchase of 

supplies required for advance shipments to pOSts on the upper Missouri 

and to the d istant POStS in Texas and Arizona.' u 

Previously, money appropriated for any fiscal yea r had been available until expended and the work of suppl yi ng the Army had gone on 

without interruption. Under the act of 1870, all appropriations ceased 

to be available except for payment of services already rendered, or for 

settlement of COntracts previously made, and the work of the Quartermaster's Departmelll was liable to be seriously delayed and embarrassed 

during the interval needed to advertise. execute, and put in operation 

contracts for the new fisca l year. 

The act of 1870 had other effects that complica ted operations because under the law. officers were required to keep separate accoun ts (or 

each appropriation. In the past, quartermaStcrs had estimated for the 

amount of funds they would need, the moncy being sent to them in a 

lump sum and used to pay all proper expenses until exhausted. When 

they submitted their accounts to the Quartermaster General and the 

Treasury Department, the latter analyzed them and entered on the 

Treasury books the amOUlHS chargeable agai nst the severa l appropriations 

noted on the vouchers. In 1836, there had been only four appropriations 

.... 165/"1 . 251 Uul 12, 1870) . 

... RG 192, CGS, Leuen wSW, 187!--79. p. 103 (10 OC! 1874). 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 497 

for the Department but by 1870 there were ni ne. with some quartermasters drawing from a ll of them and therefore required to keep nine 

separate accounts. lSI Meigs complained that 

the necessity of keeping, whenever p?ssible. in the hands of each disbursingofficer, or subject to his draft, a considerable balance of each and every approp riation which he is likely to use, instead of a genera l balance applicable to all, 

Increases the amount of money lying idle, locked up in the depositories. and 

subject to draft by disbursing officers, and thus increases the remittances to 

them and lowers the bala nces in the Treasury ava ilable for remittance to the 

posts where actually needed.lS. 

A bill to simplify the accounts of disbursing officers was urgently needed. 

A committee prepared such a bill but no legislation resu lted, and, year 

after year, the Quartermaster General urged the need for relief, not onl y 

for the disbursing officers but also for those in the Washington office who 

examined accounts and returns.Ut 

One more illustration will suffice to show the difficulties under which 

the supply bureaus operated. In 1872, Congress provided that the proceeds of sales of old material, condemned stores, or other public property 

of any kind had to be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts 

and could be made available for use of the Department only under a new 

appropriation,ue Even the proceeds of property sold to other Departments and bureaus were not exempt from this provision. The loss of the 

proceeds from such sales had the effect of reducing the appropriation, 

since supplies disposed of by sale could not be replaced by purchases made 

with funds derived from snch sales as had been the practice in the past. 

Thus, in one fisca l year, the Quartermaster's Department lost about $ 1 

million from the sale of old property. 

The Subsistence Department was at a particular disadvantage under 

this law, for it handl ed extremely perishable supplies, yet the sale of 

any damaged subsistence to prevent loss to the government resulted in 

Joss to the Department's appropriation. Subsistence stores might be 

placed at a post to meet the needs of a garrison for 6 months, but, at the 

end of half that time, the garrison might move to a distant point, leaving 

a 3 months' subsistence supply. Because the su pplies were not needed 

""The nine appropriations disbursed by the Department were regular supplies, 

ineidental expenKS. Cilvalry and artillery h Orse5: barracks and quarters: transportation of 

the anny, clothing and equipage, stores, e~ion and repairs of hO$pitab, and national 

cemeteries. 

>NRC 92, OQMC Letter Book, I 87!--A, General and Misc .. pr. 87-90 ei~ to sw, 

25 I an 1873). 

"(I) House Report No. 87, 42nd Cong., ~ SC$S., pp. 16-18. (2) AIIIIIIII/ Reports 0/ 

the Q utlrtermllJtu GwulIl, 1814, pp. 6-7. (3) RG 92, OQMG Letter Book. 18BO·E. General 

and Misc., pr. 2702-03 (QMG to SW, 14 Dee 1880) 

- 17 Stili. 83 (May 8, 1872). 
498 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

at the post and it would cost more to transport them than to buy fresh 

stores, the supplies would be sold, the proceeds going into the Treasury 

and being diverted from the appropriation. Called upon to succor starving Indians and replace supplies lost by emigrants or needed by railroad 

and land-s urveying panies, the Subsistence Department sold supplies, or, 

in the case of the Indians. charged the value of those issues to the Indian 

Department. In t.hese cases, too, the proceeds of sales were lost to the 

Department. Both the Quartermaster General and the Commissary 

General urged the Secretary of War lO seek repeal of the law. In 1875, 

it was amended, but only to the extent of excepting subsistence sales from 

the provision requiring that the proceeds of all sa les of public property 

be covered into the Treasury.UT 

Despite administrative difficulties created by legislation and assertions by some line officers that they could provide [or the troops more efficiently and cheaper, the Quartermaster's Department did not fail in its 

supply responsibilities, not even when fiscal year 1877 closed on 30 June 

without congressional action on an appropriation bill for the next year. II. 

Most supplies required for the Army were purchased under contract, the 

amount increasing as the surplus stocks of the Civil War were used up 

or deteriorated with the years to the point where they were condemned 

and sold. 

Resort to Government Manufacture 

Surplus stocks and the economy motive led to efforts to supply at 

least some of the items needed by the troops through government manufa cture . In May 1873, the Chief of Ordnance suggested that his Department, having on hand a large stock of good and valuable material unused 

in its shops, could supply such wagons as the Quartermaster's Department 

needed. With the approva l of the Secretary of War, a board, consisting 

of officers from the two departments, took under consideration the problem of revision of specifications as well as the transfer of responsibility 

for supplying Army wagons, ambulances, and their equipment from the 

Quartermaster's Department to the Ordnance Department. UI Meigs saw 

some need ror improvement of Army wagons, particularly the introduc-

'''(I) RG 192. CGS. Leuen 10 SW, 1875- 79, p. 102 (10 Oct 1874). (2) 18 Slat. 410 

Mar 3, 1875). 

"(I) The appropriation aet for fiscal }'ear 18;8 was not passed until November 1877. 

20 Sial. I If. I'rov;s;on for the previous yea r had been delayed until 24 July 1876. 19 Slat. 

97. (2) RG 92. OQMG Letter Uook, 1876· 11 . General and Misc., pp. 1268-70 (Meigs to SW, 

50 Jun 1876). 

, .. <I> RG 92. OQMG Leiter Ilook. 1875-A. General ant! Misc., pp. 28!)....90 (Meigs to 

SW. 26 May 1873). (2) RG 107, SW, Lelten Sent, vol. 93, p. 677 (Sp«ial Order, 2 Jun 1873). 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 499 

tion of metal hubs. but he rejected as administrati vely unsound the 

proposed transfer of responsibility and was unalterably opposed to government manufacture of articl es readily provided by the facilities of 

private enterprise at reasonable ratcs.ao The Secretary made no transfer, 

and, since supplies of wagons on hand were ample for Army needs, no 

purchases were required so that the possibility of manufacture by the Ordnance Department was dropped. 

In the summer of 1875, the stock of wagons had faBcn so low that 

the Secretary of War authori zed a supply of 200 to meet current demands 

and any sudden requirements. At that time, Meigs was in Europe on 

a special assignment to study the organization of the military staffs of 

the European armies. Bvt. Maj. Gen. Rufus Ingalls was serving as 

Acting QuartermaSler GeneraL He obviously did not share Meigs' 

opposition to government manufacture because he proposed to have the 

Department produce the wagons.1U T he Department erected shops for 

the manufacture of Army wagons on land leased near the J effersonville 

Depot. purchased material, and produced 109 wagons, at an average cost 

of .$ 129.50 each. When Meigs returned, he promptly closed the wagon 

factory. stored the material, and made a contract for the delivery of 

50 wagons at $92.50 each. 1U 

If Meigs' prudence had scotched government production of wagons 

at a Quartermaster depot, government manufacture of Quartermaster 

items soon was being advocated elsewhere, despite his fea rs that such a 

course would arouse the hostility of workers and private factory owner's. 

In 1874, Congress had authorized the establishment of a military prison 

at Fort Leavenworth. 'M It specifica lly provided for the production of 

Army shoes by prison labor. In 1877, the Secretary of War directed that 

if the Quartermaster's Department found it praclk.able to manufacture 

at the prison not only shoes and boots but also other articles that it 

furnished to the Army, it was to provide all the necessary materials and 

tools, employ and pay civilian instructors and inspectors, and be responsible for the shipment of the manufactured items.104 The rapid develop· 

- RG 92. OQMG Letter Book, IS73-A, General and Mise" pp. 432- 39 (Meigs to 

Recorder of Board. II Jul 187~): ibid., 1873- B. General and Mise .. pp. 991 - 96 (Meigs to S\\l. 

22 Aug 1873). 

'·' /bid. , 1875-A. General and Mise .. pp. 446-47 (Ingalls to DQMG Saxton. 13 Jill 

1875). 

'·(1) I bid., 1876--8, pp. 1050-51 (Meigs to Lt. Col. J. A. Ekin, 23 May 1876); ibid., 

1876·A, pr. 482-84 (Meigs to SW. 9 Aug 1876). (2) Amwal Reporl of the QuartermaSler 

Getltml, J876, p. 19. 

, .. Originally allthorited to he est ablished at Rock hland, 111., in 1873, the prisOIl 

Wall transferred to FOri Leavenworth in 1874. 17 SIal. 582 (Mar 3, 1873); IS SIal. 48 (May 

21, 1874). 

1M War Depar/m cul Gwcml Ordcrs, 1877, GO 12, 19 Feb 1877. 
500 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

ment o[ shoe manufacturing at the prison, followed shortly by a proposal 

to produce barrack chairs there upon their being authorized for issue to 

posts, aga in aroused Meigs' apprehensions.,n The latter were not shared 

by Congress. In 1879, it enacted legislation authorizing the Secretary 

of War to ca lise such Army supplies as could be economica lly and properly manufactured at Leavenworth to be produced at the prison.'ee 

Meigs did not change his views on government manufacture and remai ned 

unconvinced of its economy, but, under this sanction, manufactures at 

Fort Leavenworth were expanded to include not only shoes, boots, and 

cba irs, but also harness, kettles, pans, and other articles described as 

"stove furniture." ,e1 

Introduction and Production of New Clothing 

The large surplus stocks of cloth ing on hand at Quartermaster depots 

precluded the possibility of introd ucing any changes in the uniforms of 

the soldier in the immediate postwar years, though a demand for a new 

uniform began to be made by 1869. Moreover, older soldiers were con· 

vinced that the clothing issued to them before the war had been better 

made than the garments they rece ived in the postwar years. Meigs, 

however, thought their complaint was "a good deal like our grandfathers' 

lament over the want o[ the fi ne peaches they had in their remote 

youth." 'e$ By 1872, depletion as well as deterioration of cloth ing stocks 

permitted a change in the uniform to be ordered and, by the fall of the 

following year, nearly all the troops had been supplied with the new 

uniform.no 

By that time, the old knapsacks, made of pa inted cloth, had also 

become unfit for use by chemical decomposition, which turned black 

paint soft and sticky. Since new equipment would have to be procured, 

Meigs recommended that it be improved. The Ordnance Department 

was already making a large part of the leather equipment of the soldier, 

'· RC 92. OQMC Letter Book, 1878·A. Ceneral and Mise .. pp. 14 1-42 (Meigs 10 SW, 

18 Jan 1878): ibid., 1878·B. pp. 871 - 74 (Same !O same, II Mar 1878). 

'· 20 SIal. 389 (Mar 3. 1879). 

'or Amuml Re/Wrt of Ih e Qllarlermasler Ce'l erlll, 1880, p. III; ibid., 1885, p. Hi8. 

, .. (I) RG 92, OQMG Letter \klok, vol. 102, pp. 171 - 75 (Meigs 10 BVI. Brig. Gen. J ohn 

H. I'alme r, 24 Apr 1869). (2) Not only the quality but the suitability or Army clothing 

was questioned. The hat was criticized as affording no warmth in winter and giving no 

protection from the sun in sum mer. and the unirorm coau were held to be so wadded and 

tight· fitting as to render e~eessi"e muscular action almost impracticable. RC 92. OQMC 

Consolidated Correspondence file, no" 117 1 (Lt. Col. Alfred A. Woodhull, "A Medical Re· 

port upon the Uniform and Clothing or the Soldiers of the United Stales Army." t5 April 

1868). Hereafter briefly ciled as Woodhull Rpt. 

'-(I) A",,,,al Report of the QuartermaSler General, 1872, p. ]2. ibid., 1873, p. 55. 

(2) See War Departmellt Ge'leral Orders, GO 92. 26 Oct 1872, for a description. 
7TH U.S. CAVALRY, 1867 
502 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

and Meigs suggested that knapsacks, haversacks. and canteens also be 

furnished by that Department. T his transfer was accomplished at the 

close of 1871.110 

The production of the new clothing followed procedures that had 

been practiced for morc than halE a century.'ll Manufac turing operations at th e Philadelphi a DepOl had been suspended at the close of the 

war and resumed only to a limited ex tent until the new uniform was 

adopted . The depot's production was supplemented by manufacturing 

operations at the J effersonvill e Depot and at San Francisco,lT2 According 

to the Q uartermaster General, the clothing was now so well cut and made 

that there was no need fo r company tailors to remake garments as they 

had been accustomed to do in th e past. Nevertheless, requisitions for 

larger sizes than were needed by the soldiers contin ued to be made in 

order to permit th e remaking of garments to their measurements. The 

effect was to exhaust the su pply of larger garments, leaving an improper 

distribution of sizes on hand at th e depots.m 

During the Civil War, garments had been made in four sizes. This 

number was increased to fi ve in the postwar period, but the distribution 

of sizes still fell far short of that prov ided by commercial houses. Determined to provide th e sold ier with better fitting garments, the Department 

attacked the problem in two ways. On the one hand, it permitted the 

issue of unmade garments---overcoats, dress coats, blouses, and trouserscharging them at actual cost to the soldier, and, on the recommendation 

of the Q uartermaster General, an additional $5 was credited to each 

recruit's clothing money to pay for the expense of altering or fitting his 

clothing. On the other hand, the Department restudied the problem 

of sizes and, as a result. increased the number of sizes from five to twelve 

for trousers and to six for blouses. IH The increased distribution of sizes 

made possible a better fitt ing of garments. but unmade cloth ing could 

still be requisitioned throughout this period. In 1893, the Quartermaster General condemned this practice; it produced unmilitary effects. 

In one company, he charged, "both close-fitting and loose blouses and 

coats" might be seen , wh ile individual taStes in trousers ran "the gamu t 

' .. (I) Amilia/ Report of the Quartuml1$/er Genual, 1872, pp. 10-1 1. (2) Wa r Department General Ordas, 1871, GO '15. 26 Dec 187!. 

'" See supra. pp. 25.!1 • .!I48 . .!I50. 

"'Clothing production at San Francisco developed after 18'1'1. That development 

was in ac(Ordance with the 13w requiring preference to be given 10 the products of the 

I'acific Coast in purchasing supplies 10 be used by the trOOps on the Coast. (I) Atlnual 

Report of Ih e QllIIrtermaster General, 1877, pp. 25--24; ibid., 1878, pp. 17. '19. (2) H Sta!. 

92 Gil l 13. 1866). 

''"Amillal Report of !lIe Quartermaster Genual, 1877, p. 24. 

m (I) (bid. , 188), p. 5'1; ilJid., 188." p . .!I18. (2) lVar Departmenl General Orders, 

188), GO 62. 4 Aug 186.!1; GO 66. 25 Sep 188.!1. 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 503 

from the skin-tight variety, with swelling " hoodlum' or 'bowery' bottoms, 

to those of exaggerated, sailor-like proportions." '15 

In the postwar years, the troops made demands for seasonal clothing. 

Lt. Col. Alfred A. Woodhull, an assistant surgeon of the Medical Department, pointed out in 1868 that "the system of proportioning the clothing 

to th e actual temperature is practised by every community except the 

military." As a practical solution to the problem, he recommended 

adoption of a loose-fi tting outer u niform and use of th e layering principle, 

practiced by both the Chinese and Maine lumbermen, to permit an 

increase or decrease of undergarments accord ing to the season.m The 

layeri ng principle in Army clothing found no application until World 

War II. 

Special win ter clothing to protect men standing guard at posts on 

the wind-swept western plains was a necessity. Without an appropriation 

for cloth ing, however, Meigs could onl y suggest that th e troops should 

equip themselves with suitable protective garments, such as buffalo overcoats and overshoes and wool-lined, buckskin mittens by purchasing them 

out of company funds. Such had been th e practice in prewar years, the 

garments bei ng retained as company property and used as a common 

stock when the men wen t on guard duty.117 As soon as funds became 

available, the Department proposed to provide cold-weather garments. 

Overshoes and mittens were issued and charged to the soldiers at cost 

price. Buffalo overcoats were provided only when their need was certifi ed by the commander of the military department, and usually througho ut this period they remained the property of th e government. When 

the scarcity of buffa loes made such overcoats prohibitive in price, the 

Department substituted blanket·lined canvas coa ts.l1 S 

The Department approached the issue of summer clothing with 

more reluctance. Summer cotton uniforms had been issued to the troops 

until 1850 when, largely on the basis of experiments conducted by medical 

officers of the French army in Africa, a board of American officers had 

recommended and won approval for the use of a woolen uniform exclusively. T he postwar request for a summer uniform found no support 

among Quartermaster officers or from the Surgeon Genera l of the Army, 

who insisted that the use of light woolen fabrics was most conducive to 

the preservation of health in warm climates. ITV 

" ' Amnurl R~porf 0/ fir/' Qllarf rmastu Gwual, 189J, p. 5. 

"' RG 92. OQMG Consolidaled Correspondence File, Box 11 71 (Woodhull Rpl.). 

'" RG 92. OQMG Leiter Book. vol. 106, p. 474 (Meigs 10 Shem13n , 23 Sep 1870). 

"'(I) WUT ~/Mrtm '!t General Orders, 1871, GO 9. 8 Feb 1871. (2) Annual Report 

of II! ~ QllartumaS/er Gt ntral, /88-1, p. 2 1. 

If. (I) RG 92. OQMG Letter Book. vol. 89, pp. 106-07 (Meigs to Perry, II Jan 1866). 

vol. 91. pp. 227-29 (Perry 10 Meigs. 18 Apr 1866). (2) Amnllll port of tl! ~ QuaTtumad er 

G~ntrol, 1886, p . 192. 
504 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Requests for a summer uniform continued to be made and. in 1879, 

a board of officers approved adoption of stich a uniform. Meigs disapproved of the recommendation on the basis of the increased COSts that 

would result. and the General of the Army also disapproved. Me igs 

preferred that in hot weather the command ing officers of posts be authorized to allow their officers and men to use the un iform blue Aannc l sack 

coat with white pants and straw hats that they could buy from local 

traders. This was a practice that had prevailed for many years. l ao After 

20 years of requests. a few garments, made of COlton duck, were sent for 

experimental issue to troops in T exas in May 1886. They gave so much 

satisfaction that the Quartermaster Genera l recommended and the Secretary of War approved their issue to all troops in T exas. Authority was 

subsequently granted to supply such clothing to troops in the Departments 

of Arizona and Missouri. 'B I Issue of a summer uniform to all the troops 

was not accomplished before the Span ish·American War. 

When Samuel B. Holabird became Q uartermaster General in the 

summer of 1883, one of the fi rst acts of his adm inistration was to devise 

a suit of canvas cloth ing, simi lar to the work ing clothes worn by miners 

in the western states, to be worn by soldiers on fatigue duty. Such duty 

was very hard on uniform clothing, and while the clothing allowance of 

-(I) w .. ~ cpo~lmcl1l CC"C~fJl OTdc~s, 1879, CO 76, 25 Jul 18i9. (2) Even in 18(l8, 

the practice of wearing light straw hats in warm wealher Willi so C0l11111011 Ihal a medical 

report on Army clothing rccomlllelldctl that rorlilal authority be granted for the use of 

such hats. RG 92. OQMG Consolida ted Correspondence File. Ilox 117 1 (Woodhull Rpt .). 

"' Annual Report 01 Ihe Quarlermaster CtmerfJl, 11188, PI'. 17; 2~6 fr. 
POST·CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 505 

some posts was ample, at others it was inadequate because of the nature 

of th e extra work requ ired. Using shelter te nts in storage, Holabird 

had the material dyed a dark brown and fash ioned into fatigue coats and 

trousers. T he adoption of th ese garments, issued without cost to all 

enlisted men on fatigue and extra duty, met a long fel t want in the 

Army,ln However slowly changes were made, the Department grad ually 

moved in the direction of providing more comfortable clothi ng, adapted 

to particular needs. 

Ration Changes 

Improvements in the provision and preparation of rations added to 

the soldier's well-being b ut were effected only after persistent demands 

and much delay. Construction of th e transcontinental railroads made it 

unnecessary to place and keep at western posts such large quantities of 

rations as had been required when suppl y had depended on the arrival 

of wagon trai ns, dispatched only at specia l seasons of the year. More 

frequent deliveries by railroads provided fresher supplies th at were more 

pa latable to the troops.1U During the first few years after th e war, this 

was about the only observable improvement. No changes were made in 

the ration issued to the troops, though the Commissary Genera l suggested 

that it could probably be improved by the introduction of a greater 

variety of components. He later proposed that the problem be brought 

before a board of officers then preparing a system of regulations for the 

Army.'u 

The provision of bread for th e Army often provoked criticism, 

usually from officers of the Medica l Department who maintained that 

the ration was insufficient in amount. It was not the size of the ration 

that was at fault so much as the way in which the Raul' was converted 

into bread. The Subsistence Department issued onl y flour- 18 ounces 

daily to the soldier as a component of his ration: it was made into soft 

bread by the post bakery over which the Department exercised no control. 

For his flour, the soldier received 18 ounces of bread, but his Aour would 

have yielded more bread and a considerable saving could thus be made 

on the ROllT ration . It was estima ted that each soldier lost about I percent per day in AOllT.m Under regulations, any food saved from the 

ration could be sold, the proceeds to be used fo r the purchase of other 

subsistence items at original COSt from loca l producers or from the Subsistence Department. Thus, in effect, the savings could be used to intro-

'''Ibid., 1884, pp. 21, 309- 10. 

''' RG 192, eGS, Leiters to SW, 18G6- 1872, p. 99 (Annual Rpt, 19 Oct 1867): pp. 517- 20 (Ltr. 5 Jun 1871). 

"' Jbid., pp. 369-80 (Annual RpL 20 Oct 18(9); pp. 533- 34 (Ltr, 8 Aug 1871). 

" Ibid., 1882-84. p. 4 (Ltr, 19 Dec 1882). 
506 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

duce greater variety into the established ration through the purchase of 

dairy products, seasonings, and fresh fruits and vegetables. 

The Commissary Genera l of Subsistence was convinced that no better 

system could be devised for feeding the troops, " none that would be more 

elastic, more economical, or better suited to our service and the necessities 

of our soldiers," 186 What was needed, he urged, was a modification of 

regulations to prevent the post bakery from being converted into a moneymaking machine to support bands, librari es. schools. gymnasiums, and 

chapels at posts. Funds obta ined from ration savings were being diverted 

to the support of such projects instead of being used to introduce greater 

variety in the soldier's diet. In effect, the soldier was not getting the 

whole of the ration allowed him.111 As long as such desirable post 

projects had to be obtained without funds from Congress, funds from 

ration savings would continue to be diverted to such purposes. 

During most of the years between the Civil War and the SpanishAmerican War, the Subsistence Depanment considered the ration allow· 

ance ample and made few changes. l Si Greater variety was introduced 

by a growing list of substitute items that could be furnished in lieu of 

the standard issue. T hus, mutton or dried. pickled. or fresh fish could 

be issued instead of fresh beef in 1879. Canned fTesh or corned beef. 

first used as part of the travel ration in 1878, was added to the regular 

ration as a substitute item IO years later.

lI

• 

The ration did not provide for the issue of potatoes, onions, or fresh 

vegetables because of their extremely perishabl e nature and the imprac· 

ticability of furnishing them at all seasons. In any case, they could be 

cultivated in post gardens or purchased from local producers with the 

funds obtained under the ration savings system. By 1890, however. the 

- I bid., 8~1. pp. 6 14- 15 (Llr, I Jun 188 1) . 

... (1) Ibid. Sec a lso ibid., UI66-72. p. 570 (Annual Rpl, 20 Oct 1869); p. ~55 (Lir. 

8 Aug 1871); ibid., 1882-42. pp . .5-5 (Ltr, 19 Dec 1882). (2) The extent to which the soldier 

was affecled is well illustrated in the returns of $ubsillenee stora h om David's Island, N.Y .. 

where the savings were extremcJy large in 1883. .'or the fint 5 months of that year. the 

money value of the Javings purchased by the Subsistence Department amounted 10 

$1,932.48, or more than 44 percent of the money va lue of the Jame articlC:$ issued ill Ihal 

period at the rccmit ing depot on Dayid's bland by the Department. In olher words. 

nearly one·half of the subsistence issued. excluding beef, Wll$ sold a5 53yings imtead of 

being con5umed by the men . Ibid., 1882- 84. pp. 15f>-57 (Ltr, 19 Apr 1883). 

" The impression that the soldier was liberally $upplicd was generally accepted, but 

Maj. T. A. Mcl'arlin, assistant surgeon at FOTt l.eavenworth , was of another opinion . Mak· 

ing a comparison of the American and British ra tion in 1875. he concluded thai the 

American ration was lower in energy value and C:$pecially deficient in frah vegetablct and 

milk. His tabulation of the nutritive value of various diets caused him 10 place the Army 

ration only slightly ahead of the famine diel of the Lancashire laboren in 1M2. Samuel 

C. l'rCKolI. "A Stuvey of Rationing and Subsistence in the United Stales Anny, 1775 10 

I!HO," chap. I V, pp. 19-24. This is a manuscript prepared for the National Odensc Re· 

search Committee, OSRD. in 1944. On file in QM Historian's Office. 

,. (I) War Dcpa r/r'tel/I Gel/ernI Orders, 1879, CO 6, 7 Feb 1879; GO 16, 10 Mar 1879. 

(2) RG 192, CGS, l.etten to SW. 1886-88, pp. 599-600 (Macfeely 10 SW. 19 Jan 1888). 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 507 

genera l demand for their inclusion in the ration induced the Commissary 

General of Subsistence to recommend that they be added. By law, one 

pound of vegetables was added to the ration, the proportion of fresh 

potatoes, onions, cabbage, beels, turnips, carrots, and squash, or of canned 

tomatoes being determined by the Secretary of War.toO With increased 

knowledge o[ nutrition, greater attention was at last beginning to be paid 

to a well balanced diet for the troops. 

The finest rat ions in the world could be spoilt by poor cooks. To 

improve the quality of the food served, the Subsistence Department 

published and distributed to the Army pamphlets on bread-making and 

on Army cooking.m Any long-range improvement. however. depended 

on getting better cooks. To encourage this objective. an Army board 

on cooking proposed that extra compensation be allowed to company 

cooks. Neither this proposal nor the repeated r ecommendations of the 

Commissary General for the enlistment of cooks and bakers for the Army 

produced any result.' Dl 

On the other hand, the Quartermaster's Department was successful 

in introducing a system of common mess halls for enlisted men in place 

of the former method of messing by compani es. Tried first at the 

recruiting depot at David's Island in 1888. the experiment proved so 

successful that common mess halls were adopted at a number of the larger 

posts by 1893. Their use had the advantage of providing better cooking 

than in the company mess, pleasanter service of the food. and withal 

greater economy in preparation. T hen the Quartermaster General 

joined the Commissary General in recommending that Congress provide 

for the employment of trained cooks so that better and more scientific 

cooking might be introduced in the consolidated mess in order to promote 

the hea lth and well being of the so ldier.'~' Training for cooks was not 

provided, however. until schools for cooks and bakers were established 

in 1905. 

Administml.ive Developments 

Administration of the responsibi li ties for transportation. construction. and the procurement of forage. horses and mules, clothing and 

equipment, and genera l supplies had to be carried out by a dwindling 

'''(I) RG 192. CGS, Leiters To SW, 1889-90, pp. 2Gr.-fM.l (Ltr, 24 Jan 1890). (2) 26 

51111. 158 (Act of June ]6. ]890). (S) Wl1r Dt:p"rl mt:nl Glm",,"1 Orders, J8')O, GO 78, 2-" 

Jul 1890. 

'0' (I) RG 92. OQMG Consolidated Correspondence File. Box 773 (Macfeely to Sur· 

geon Geueral of the Army, II Dec 1877); (Rpt of &ard on Army Cooking. !I Feb 1879). 

(2) RG 192. eGS, Lettcrs to SW, ]880-81, p. 470 (Macfeely to WD Ch ief Clerk, 19 J an ]88 1). 

I. (I) RG 92. OQMG Consolidated Correspondence File, Box 773 (Board Rpt. !I' Feb 

]879). (2) RG 192, CGS. Leiters to SW, ]889-90, p. 289 (Macfeely to SW. 5 Feb 1890). 

'" AmlUal R eporl o/Ihe Quar/ermtl.ffer Central, 1888, pp. 5-6: 1889, p. 23: 189J, pp. 10-1 I. 
508 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

staff of Quartermaster office s.' D~ Reduction of the Army to a peacetime 

basis (allowing the Civi l War necessarily led to a consideration of the 

proper organ ization of all the supporting supply bureaus.us The War 

Departmclll originally began planning for a permanent Army of 100,000 

men, and Meigs solicited the advice of his officers on how to reorgani ze 

his Departmcnt to adapt its personnel to the needs of such an Army. 

The War Departlllent reduced its proposed strength figures in the next 

few months, and when Meigs submitted his recommendations in Decem. 

ber 1865, his proposed organization was to serve a minimum force of 

50,000 men capable, by filling up compani es to lhe maximum, of an 

increase to 82,600 men. Since the services of Volunteer officers would 

be lost, Meigs recommended an increase in the number of regular officers 

in the Department from 67, as then provided by law, to 89. Even with 

that numbcr, he poin ted OLlt that the Depanmcnt would still require the 

services of officers detai led from the line to se rve as acting assista nt 

quartennaslers at the many posts that would have to be established on 

the (romiel". Meigs proposed that stich officers be allowed an additional 

compensation of $10 a month. Under thc war-tested provisions of the 

reorganization act of 1864, the Depanment had been able to meet every 

demand made upon it, and Meigs therefore also recommended that the 

act be continued in force, except so far as certain provisions became 

obsolete by the disbandment of the Volunteer army .'~G 

The legislation enacted by Congress in the Sllllllllcr of 1866 differed 

considerably from the proposals made by Meigs. Congress cominucd 

the provisions of the act of 1864 in force only until I January 1867 . 

... Among other d uties. not en larged upon , were the 5Clllement of Civil War claims, 

a tedious, time.consuming responsibil ity thaI lastcd for many yean. and Ihe carrying out 

of an increasing number of relief projects Ihat ca lled for the issue and distribution of 

surplu, food . clothing, bedding, and temage to \·ktims of lire, flood, earthquake, tornadoes. 

yellow fe"er epidemics. amI the ra\·ages of grasshor rcn. Most of thac retief measures 

were the rcsu lt of congressional action. For ClCamplc. in 1866. Congress authorized the: 

issue of condemned clothing and surplus (:'."'p and g:l rrison C<.[uipagc, bedding. and hospita l 

(urnilu .·e to fami lies made homeless by lire in I'ortland, Maine. In 1874 il provided for 

the s.~ e of Ar",y clothing to persons on the wClIt ern fron tier made destitute by the Ta"ages 

of grasshoppers during the previous summer. (I) I~ SIIlI. 364 Uuly 14. 18(6): 18 .~I(lt. 314 

Web 10. 87~). (2) $(.'C also AnnU1l1 R eport nf t/,r QIUlrlenlllUler GelleTIII, 1876, p. 20: 

1880, p. 20: 188-1, p. 22: 1887, pp. 17-18. 

'IOAl lhough in July 1866. Congress had provid(. ... J for a ",ini"''''l1 Strength of 54.30'1 

rank and lile. susceptible of increase to 75.382 men. the reportcd St rength of the Army on 

30 Septembe r 1866 wu onl )' 37.5~5 . Three years later. Congress ordercd a sharp decrease 

and by 1876 the authorized strength had been brought down to 27.500 men. Fo r the ne"t 

2'1 years. the actual 'lumbe r of en listed men in the Am,y was around 25,000. (I) 1<1 SIIII . 

332-33 Uul 28. 1866): 15 SIIII. 31 8 (Mar 3. 18(9): 19 S/tII. 97 Uul 2~. 1876). (2) 1·lo use Ex. 

Dot:. No. I. 391h Cong .• 2d scss., p. 2 (AG Rpl. 20 Oc;t 1866). (3) A nnU1l1 Report of the 

Gellllrilf of 'lit: A r",)', 1876, p. 20. 

'10(1) RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, \·01. 87, pp. 122- 25 (Meigs to AQMG Thomas 

<!I Ill., 9 Oct IIl(5). (2) 1·lo uSt: Reporl No. 35, ~Oth Cong .. 3d scss .. pp. 29-50 (Ln, Meigs 

to Grant, 18 Dec 186!». 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 509 

It not only authorized fewer officers for the Department than Meigs had 

req uested but a lso provided for a further gradual diminution of the 

existi ng staff by directing that vaca ncies in th e grades of captain and major 

were not to be fi lled until th e strength of the Department was reduced 

to 59 offi cers and 16 military storekecpers.m 

About 10 years later, Congress further red uced the Depanmcm's 

staff to 57 officers. At that time, it also provided that no more appointments were to be made in the grade of military storekeeper. t hat grade 

ceasing to exist as soon as it became vacant by reason of lhe resignation 

or death of the incumbents.'u The number of military storekeepers 

steadil y decreased after 1875 un til by 1890 there was only one left. His 

retirement was not due until 1905, when the grade of military storekeeper would cease to exist. 

In the post-Civil War years, most of the Quartermaster officers were 

once again assigned as q uartermasters in cbarge of depots or as chief 

quartermasters of military departments. Few in number, these quartermasters could not discharge all assigned fu nctions, and their efforts had 

to be suppl emellled by those of line officers detailed for duty as acting 

assistant quartermasters at posts. An economy-minded Congress that 

authorized the lise o( troop labor to provide shelter, fue l, and forage for 

the Army was unli ke ly to see the need for compensating such line oA'icers 

for the heavy responsibilities they were called upon to discharge. T hough 

not bonded, they disbursed large sums of money; they erected barracks 

and storehouses; they provided transportation for supplies and troops; 

and they had charge of stables and public an imals. Repea tedly, the 

Q uartermaster General renewed the recommendation for compensation 

that he first made in December 1865, but Congress contin ued to ignore 

his plea. l~g 

Since troop movements were freq uent. line officers doing duty as 

acting assistant quartermasters were changed often. In fisca l year 1870, 

for example. the average number of them serving in that capacity was 

150, but the total number for the year was 433 ~oO Such turnover among 

'"'In add ilion to thc brigadicr gcnc ral hcading thc OepartmCnl, Meigs had calk'<i for 

a staff of 8 coloncls, 16 lieutenant coloncls. and 64 majors. or a total of 89 officers and 16 

military storekeepers. Instead. Congress had provided 6 colonels, 10 lieutenant colonels. 

15 majors, and 44 captains. or a total of 76 officers. including the Quartermaster General. 

and 16 military storekeepers. By allowing vacancies w go unfilled until thc number of 

majors was reduced to 12 and tile captains to 30, the final authorized strength of tile Department was fil(e<.\ at 59 officers. 14 Still. 334 Oul 28, 1866). 

''' In addition to the Quartermaster General, thc authorized staff of the Depanmcllt 

after 1875 oonsisted of 4 colonels. 8 lieutenant colonels. 14 majors, anti 1\"0 captains, holding 

the positioll5, respectively, of assistant Iluartennaster general. deputy {luartermaster general, 

quartemlaster, and assistant quartcrmaster. 18 SIal . 338-39 (\\hr 3. 1875). 

'''Sce ,f.wual Reparl al Ill e QuartermflSler Ge'l'fral, 1869, p. 5; 1870, p. 4; 1873, 

p. 9; 1879, p. 4. 

reo I bid., 1870, p. 4. 
510 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

acting assistant quartermasters was characteristic for the whole of this 

period. Greater economy in the maintenance of Quartermaster property 

would undoubtedly result, Meigs felt, if the employment of acting 

assistant quartermasters could be placed on a more permanent basis. but 

that decision rested with commanders of military departments and districts. and no change in the policy governing assignment was made,to. 

To aid the burdened acting assistant quartermasters, Meigs began, in 

1873, to recommend the enlistment of post quartermaster sergeants. 

Such noncommissioned offi cers, by remaining at posts in charge of prop· 

erty when the garrison changed, he argued, would preserve knowledge 

and responsibility so often lost through the frequent change of acting 

assistant quartermasters. It was the summer of 1884, however, before 

Congress authorized the appointment of post q uartermaster sergeants, 

limiting the number of 80.202 

The legislation reorganizing the Quartermaster's Department in 

1866 had an immedi ate effect upon the organi zation of the Quartermaster 

General's office in Washington. Failure to prolong the life of the reorganization act of 1864 beyond January 1867 terminated the devisional 

organization of the office of the Quartermaster General that had been 

established under the act. The workload of the former nine divisions 

had decreased with the close of the war and consolitlation of duties had 

begun to take place in the fall of 1866, but the final dissolution of the 

divisional organization was not ordered until 19 August 1867.H' ]n lieu 

of divisions, branches were designated. In 1868, (or example, there were 

fi ve branches. each under an officer. T hese included branches for transportation, clothing and equipage, inspection, national cemeteries, and 

regular supplies, the last a catchall that included not only regular supplies 

but also all business relating to barracks and quarters, purchase o( animals. and investigation of war claims. Changes were made in the office 

organization from time to time, and the number of branches tended to 

increase. Since only four officers were usua lly assigned to assist the 

Quartermaster Ge neral, it became customary to place a number of 

branches under lhe supervision of one offi cer. Thus, in 1890, Deputy 

Quartermaster General M. I. Ludington had under his supervision the 

following branches: inspection, fiscal, money and property accounts, 

clothing and equipage returns, barracks and quarters, and care and 

maintenance of national cemeteries.

Ut Not until 1895 did a divisional 

organization of the office again emerge. T hen, four divisions, each with 

- RG 92, OQMG Letttr Book. 187!-B. Gentnl and Misc., pp. IOOJ..&l (Meigs 10 LI. 

r.f. L . Courlney. 25 Aug 1873). 

-23 SIal. 109 Qui 5, 1884). 

- Annual Report of tile Quarlermasler GePleral, 1868, p. 20. 

" Ibid., 1890, pp. 6-7. 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 511 

subordinate branches were eSlablished-Supply and Transportation, Construction and Repair; Correspondence and Examining. which included 

all matters relating to finance, returns, money and property accounts, and 

inspection; and Mail and Records, which also included separate branches 

for claims and national cemeteries. 

Organizational developments in the Subsistence Department followed much the same pattern as that in the Quartermaster's Department. 

Following the Civil War, Congress reduced its authorized staff. In 1866. 

it had a total of 28 officers in addition to the Commissary General of 

Subsistence. Congress decreased that number to 25 in 1874 and to 21 

in 1895.101 Except for three officers assigned to the Washington office, 

the others were designated as purchasing commissaries at depoLS or chief 

commissaries of military departmenLS. The efforLS of this small staff 

had been supplemented during the war by the appoi ntmen t of numerous 

assistant commissaries of subsistence, but the expiration of the law authorizing such officers, coupled with the necessity for their services, led to the 

continued detailing of line officers to serve in the anomalous position of 

acting assistant commissaries.108 The Commissary General of Subsistence 

tried, without success, to have the position of assistant commissary restored 

and also worked to have commissary sergeants appointed.10T Congress 

authorized the appointment of commissary sergeants who were to be 

responsible for receiving and preserving subsistence supplies at posts in 

1873, the Secretary o( War being directed to appoint one commissary 

sergeant at each military post or place of deposit for subsistence stores.~o, 

T his then remained the organization of the Subsistence Department until 

the Spanish.American War. 

Staff and Line Controversy 

Throughout much of this period, Congress devoted attention to the 

problem of Army and War Department organization. In the course of 

committee investigations, much information was elicited and many views 

were expressed on the controversy between staff and line that involved 

the General of the Army, the Secretary of War, commanding generals of 

military departments, and the chiefs of the staff bureaus. Stemming from 

- <I) 14 SIIIl. 554 lJul 28, 18(6); 18 SIal. 244 Oun 25, 1874); 28 SIIIl. 656 (Feb 12. 1895). 

(2) The dislribution of officen in 1895 included, besides the Commisury General, 2 colonels 

and 5 lieutenant colonels, each assigned as an assistant commisury general; and 8 nlajon 

and 8 captains, assigned as commissaria. 

- HOU5C Ex . D<x:. No. I, 40th Cong., 2d 1C5S., p. 581 (CGS's Rpl, 1867). 

-(I) Ibid ~ p. 582. (2) RG 192, CGS, Lenen to SW, 1866-72, p. 257 (Annual Rpt, 

1868); p. 570 (Annual Rpt. 1869). 

-17 SIal. 4M (Mar 5, 1875). 
512 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

lack of clearly defined lines of command, the conflict assumed large proportions after the Civil War, though evidence of disagreement is apparent 

as early as 1821. Insofar as the supply bureaus were concerned, the basic 

point at issue was control. Staff officers recognized only the orders of 

the Secretary of War, and it was charged tha t "should he be a civilian, 

unaccustomed to military routine, they are more likely to control his 

action than to be controll ed by it." 20D The viewpoint of the commanding general was we ll sta ted by Maj. Gen. George G. Meade. "The 

staff corps, being constituent parts of the Army, should in all purely 

military matters, be under the orders of the genera l commanding the 

Army, til is officer being himself under the orders of the Secretary of War, 

as representing the President." 210 The problem of control, however, was 

not resolved in the period 1865 to 1898. 

Proposed Consolidation of Supply BUTeaus 

Still pursuing economy, congressional committees were convinced 

that objective could be promoted by consolidating some of the supply 

bureaus, in particular, by merging the Subsistence, Pay, and Quartermaster's Department into one supply agency. The practicability of such 

consolidation was generally conceded in 1869, but whether it would 

promote effi ciency or economy was questioned. When the proposa l was 

first examined, there were some supply officers who favored consolidation, 

among others, Dvt. Maj. Gen. Rufus Ingalls. 211 As Congress investigated 

and studied the problem of War Department organization agai n and 

again, the viewpoint of those who had favored consolidation changed to 

opposition. 21Z The view of the Army was well summarized by General 

Meade, who had had a fair opportunity, as he noted, to observe the workings of the existing system, both in lime of war and peace. 

It has always wm'ked well. I doubt if any army is better su pplied or 

has its wants more promptly attended to than ours; and, when consideration 

is given to this fact, it would seem to me the part of prudence is to let well 

enough alone, and not hazard experiments, which, even if successfu l, could 

attain no better result .. ha n all admit is now attained. 211 

Content to look to the past rather than the future, veteran officers of the 

Civil War saw no need for change and the consolidation proposal was 

- House Report :-'0. 33', <10th Cong., 3d 5e$S" p. 2 . 

... House Report No. 74. 42d Cong., 3d $($S., p. 16. 

''' House Report No. 33, 40lh Cong., 3d 5e$S., pp. 117- 120 . 

.,. House i\1i5C. Doc. No. 56, 45th Cong .• 2d SCSlI .. pp. 55-56 (Ingalb testifying, 12 

Jan 1878) . 

... Sena te Report No. 555. 451h Cong., 3d scss .. p. 468. 
POST-CIVIL WAR DEVELOPMENTS 513 

dropped, not to be revived until the Spanish-American War emphasized 

anew the inadeq uacies of organization. 

Retirement of Meigs 

Throughout the prolonged period of investigation, Meigs continued 

to fill the position of Quartermaster Genera l, but in view of the proposals 

to change the retirement system and the eagerness of his su bord inates 

for promotion, he might well have felt uneasy about his tenure. Efforts 

to make compulsory the system of retirement adopted in 1862, authorizing 

the President, in his discretion, to place on the retired list officers of 

62 years of age or who may have served 45 years, aroused his ire. In 186 1, 

the 45-year old Meigs adv ised Seward that he would find the Army and 

Navy "clogged at the head with men, exce ll ent patriotic men, men who 

were soldiers and sailors forty years ago, but who now merely keep active 

men out of the places in which they r;:o uld serve the country." Sixteen 

years later he could see no justification for revising the retirement system 

to permit the promotion of younger men. A bill to make retiremen t 

compulsory at 62 was under consideration in the Senate in 1877 and 

Meigs, then himself approaching that age, cried out: "Is it to the interest 

of the country to put competent men out of position to put able-bodied 

men on the retired, the pension list and forbid them to serve, forbid the 

country to make any use of knowledge and experience they have 

gained." 214 

When Meigs became 62 in 1878 and it was generall y believed that 

the War Department intended to retire from active service those officers 

who were eligible for retirement, the efforts of those seeking to become 

his successor were intensified. In 1866, Congress had provided that the 

Quartermaster General was to be appointed by sel ection from the officers 

of the Department, thus putting a premium on se iority.~u The three 

senior offi cers of the Department, ranked in order of their seniority, were 

Robert Allen, Daniel H . Rucker, and Rufus Ingalls. Both Allen and 

Rucker were older than Meigs, and Ingalls, with the support of Grant and 

other generals of the Army of the Potomac that he had so ably served as 

Chief Quartermaster, campaigned actively for the post.218 

Meigs did not retire but rumors of his impending retirement con-

." (I) RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, 1877·B, General and Misc., p. 1514 (To Senator 

J. D. Cameron, I Nov 1877). (2) OR, ser. I, vol. t , 368 (Meigs to Seward . 6 Apr 1861). 

'''" 14 SIal. 336 aul 28, 1866) . 

... (I) See RG 94, AGO. Appointment, Commission and I' ersonnel (ACI') lile on 

Ingalls (Grant to Presidem. 27 April 1877): aohn B. Gray to President, 31 J uly 1879); 

Hancock to President, 13 March 1879). (2) Allen never sought the position . He died 4 

years after Meigs retired. 
514 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

tinued to circulate, and Lt. Gen. P. H. Sheridan backed the appointment 

of his father-in-law, Bvt. Maj. Gen. D. H . Rucker. "It would be a 

gracious act on the part of the President," he suggested, to give such 

recognition to Rucker. who would then retire. Rucker, whose real rank 

was that of coloncl. appreciated Sheridan's efforts. but naturally he preferred to retire after his appointment as Quartermaster General had been 

confirmed. particularly since his sole means of support would be his 

retirement pay, III 

On 6 Februray 1882. aged 65 and after 46 years in the service of his 

country, 21 of them as Quartermaster General, Meigs was retired from 

active duty. Appreciating the motives that led Rucker to seek the office, 

Meigs recommended that he be appointed. On 13 February, Rucker 

was appointed Quartermaster General, assuming the duties of the office a 

week later. At the same time, he applied for retirement, his request 

being granted on 23 February. Ingalls who had been seeking the office 

for severa l years was appointed Rucker's successor and accepted the posi· 

tion even before official confirmation of his appointment had been 

received by the War Department from the Senate and before his commission was issued. "Shall his commission be antedated to the 10th and his 

acceptance be regarded as or that date," the Adjutant General queried. 

His commission was so dated, with rank from 23 February 1882. Ingalls 

served as Quartermaster General until I July 1883, when he requested 

retirement under the law of 30 June 1882. It amended earlier legislation 

by providing for retirement of an officer at his request after 40 years' 

service and automaticall y placed him on the retired list when he became 

64 years old.u, 

This law insured a far more rapid succession of Quartermasters 

General than had been possible in the years when there had been 1)0 

retirement lists or even later when retirement had been at the discretion 

of the President. During the next 15 years, four men, all veterans of 

the Civil War, served successively as Quartermaster General--Samuel B. 

Holabird, I July 1883 to 16 June 1890; Richard N. Batchelder, 26 June 

1890 to 27 July 1896; Charles G. Sawtell e, 19 August 1896 to 16 February 

1897; and George H. Weeks, 16 February 1897 to 3 February 1898. 

"" RG 92, AGO, ACI' file on Rucker (Ln, Slu:ridali to President, !i J ul IS8O); (Tele· 

gTam, Sheridan to Sherman , 18 Jun 1880); (SW 10 I'residenl, 22 Jun 1880); (Rucker 10 

Sheridan , 23 Jun IS80). 

-(I) RG 94, AGO, ACP lile on Inp l1 l. (2) 22 SIIII. li S Oun 3lJ, 1882). 
CHAPTER XII 

The Spanish-American War 

Background 0/ Unpreparedness 

When the United States went to war with Spain in 1898, the country 

was wholly unprepared; the lessons of 1861 had been completely obscured 

by the subsequent victories of the Union Army. That Army was the 

most powerful military force in the world in the spring of 1865, but 

whatever bright expectations it then entertai ned for the future WCfC 

quickly dissipated by the rapid demobilization of irs strength and the 

indifference of the public and its representatives in Congress to the needs 

of the Army in the post-Civil War years. The Army resigned itself to 

the minor glories of Indian fighting and routine garrison life. 

On the eve of the Spanish-American War, the Regular Army numbered 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men, stationed at some 80 posts, 

most of which were located in the West.' This fragmentation of the 

troop strength made it difficult to keep even two companies of infantry 

together long enough to give them systematic instruction. In consequence, although all of the general offi cers and most of the field offi cers 

were veterans of the Civi l War, junior officers in the lower gy-ades ga ined 

no experience in handling large bodies of men. Supply officers were 

equally handicapped because they had no opportunity to solve the complex problems involved in the logistical support of large units. Their 

duties were confined to the routine supply of minuscule garrisons that 

were stationed either at frontier postS or at coasta l fortifications guarding 

the major harbors.' 

Although the Regular Army was small, the War Department en-

'This was t.he llrength as or I April 1898. Senate Doc. No. 22 1, 56th Cong., h t !leSS., 

"Report of Ihe CommiMion Appointed by the President to Invettigate the Conduct of the 

War Department in lhe War with Spain." (8 voll., Washington, 1900), I, 11'. This commis· 

sion was headed by Maj. Gen. Crenville M. Dodge, and in repon will hereafter be briefly 

cited as Dodge Commission Reporl . 

• Whatever skills and tcchniquel had been developed by the Civil War quartennasters 

in lupplying large bodies or trOGp5 were 105t to the Department upon their retirement or 

death. Of the 57 oAken in the Department on I April 1898, only 5 had seen service as 

quartennasters during the Civil \Var, and 4 of them had filled poslS of minor importance 

during the last year of the war. 
5 16 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

countered no problem in the procurement of manpower in 1898. Public 

feeling, already aroused by reports of the situation in Cuba, was brought 

to a high pitch by the sinking of the battleship Maine. In consequence, 

when McKinley yielded to pressure and Congress, on 25 April, formally 

declared that a sta te of war had existed since 21 April, there was no lack 

of men willing to take up arms.' On 22 April, Congress had authorized 

the President to call for volunteers, and his proc lamation the following 

day brought response from 125,000.- In a littl e more than a month, 

they were mustered into service. By that time, an additional force of 

75,000 volunteers were being called for on 25 May. In the meantime, 

on 26 April, Congress authorized an increase of the Regular Army to 

about 61,000, and, on I I May, provided for 16 regiments consisting of 

engineers, cavalry, and vol unteer infantry, especially accustomed to 

tropical climates and ca ll ed immunes.a By August, the Regular Army 

numbered 58,688 offi cers and men and the Volunteer Army, 216,029, 

making a total strength of 274,717.° 

As in the past, two supply bureaus, the Subsistence and Quartermaster's Departments, continued 10 be responsible for subsisting. clothing. 

and equipping this force that mushroomed in the short time of 3Y2 

months. In the course of the post-Ciyil War years, these bureaus, too, 

had suffered a diminution of strength, so much so that they had relied 

heavily upon offi cers detailed from the line to carry out their work. On 

the eve of the Spanish-American War, the Subsistence Department had an 

authorized strength of onl y 22 officers, including the Commissary General 

of Subsistence.? There was a total of 57 officers in the Quartermaster's 

Department. In addition to officers detailed to assist in performing 

supply duties, each Department also made use of the services of post 

sergeants. There were 96 commissary sergeants and 80 quartermaster 

sergeants. 

Both Departments were under the directiol? of newly designated 

chiefs, competent men with long years of experience in their respective 

departmehts who, nevertheless, would still need time to familiarize themselves with the heavy responsibilities they were assuming. On 3 February 1898, 12 days before the battleship Maine was blown up in the harbor 

of Havana, Brig. Gen. Marshall I. Ludington, the last of the Civil War 

quartermasters to become Quartermaster General, was appointed to the 

':ro Stat. 364. 

'Ibid., pp. !l61-{j!l. 

" Ibid., pp. 364-66; 405. 

· War po.rtm l1t Atmuill port , 1898. I. 257. 260. 

'Ibid., T, 549 (Rpl of Commissary General. 17 OCt 1898). 
THE SPANISH·AMERICAN WAR 517 

post.~ A week after the formal declaration of war, Commissary General 

William H . Nash retired, to be succeeded , on 3 May, by Brig. Gen. 

Charles P. Eagan,e Promotion on a basis of seniority from within the 

Departments to the top position had res ulted in a rapid turnover of 

chiefs in the past decade and obviously could not be conducive to the 

formulation, let alone the development, of any program of improvement. 

To weakened leadership was added restricted strength authorizations in 

the Departments, which made experienced quartermasters and commissaries unavailable in the numbers required for war. Both the Subsistence 

and the Quartermaster's Departments were physically unprepared to 

satisfy such demands from the fi eld and, as in past wars, had to make 

extensive use of inexperienced personnel. 

When it increased the military establishment in April , Congress 

also provided for an expanded supply organization for the support of 

tactical units in the fi eld. As in the Civil War, the Army was organized 

by corps, divisions, and brigades. Congress authorized a chief quarter· 

master and a chief commissary of subsistence, with the rank of lieutenant 

colonel, for each army corps; a chief quartermaster and a chief commissary 

of subsistence, with the rank of major, for each division; and an assistant 

quartermaster and a commissary of subsistence, with the rank of captain, 

for each brigade.1o Under this law, 7 corps quartermasters, 22 division 

quartermasters, and 65 brigade quartermasters were appointed, along 

with 28 chief commissaries o[ subsistence, 7 with the rank of lieutenant 

colonel and 21 with that of major, and 69 commissaries with the rank 

of captain! ' 

Legislation was also necessary to increase the efficiency of the support· 

ing depot and military departmental organization as well as o[ the office 

arrangements in Washington. In 1898, the country was divided for 

administrative purposes into eight military departments, each of which 

required a chief quartermaster and a chief commissary of subsistence on 

• Ludington had been seeking th is honor since the summer of 1896 whell Quarter· 

maner Ceneral Richard N. Batchelder retired, but his aspirations had been denied by the 

appointmelll fll'Sl of Charles C. Sawtelle, who scrved on ly 6 months, and then by l hal 

of Ceorge H . Weeks, who retired within a ycar. 

· Ceneral Nash had servcd as Commissary Genera l only 12 days, an honor accorded 

him as senior officcr of the Department. This honor had rotaloo with amating rapidity 

sincc Ccncral Robert Macfeely resigned in 1898. Including Nash, 7 mcn scrved as Commis· 

sary General between 1890 and thc beginning of Ihe Spanish·Amcrcan War, of whom! 

retired in 1898. William H. Bell , having been appoillied in November 1897, retired 2 

months laler, to be succeeded by Samuel Cushing who served 3 montld. He, in IlIrn, was 

followed by Na5h, whose scrvice ended ill 12 days. 

'·30 Stilt. 361 (Apr 22,1898) . 

.. (I) A.nnual Ueport 01 the Qtwrtumaster Cem:ral, 1898, p. 155. (2) War Department 

Annual Rel,ortf, 1898, I, 555--60 (Rpt of Commisnry Ceneral). 
518 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

the staff of the commanding general. In addition, officers were needed 

for the increased number of supply depots and to carry the rapidly 

expanding workload of the offices of the Quartermaster General and of 

the Commissary Genera l of Subsistence. At the end of May, Ludington, 

recalling Meigs' efforts in the Civil War, drafted a bill similar to that 

enacted by Congress in 1864. He requested the authorization of additional temporary personnel and proposed to expand his existing office 

organization from four to eight di visions.a To compensate officers for 

the immense volume of work that would be imposed on those appointed 

to take charge of the office divisions as well as of th e great supply depots, 

Ludington recommended that Congress grant them a temporary increase 

in rank.1! 

In July, Congress enacted legislation along the lines suggested by 

Ludington, making it applicable to both the Subsistence and Quartermaster's Departments. To the Subsistence Department, Congress temporarily added 8 majors and 12 captains; in the Quartermaster's Department, the additional officers included 2 colonels, 2 lieutenant colonels, 

3 majors, and 20 captains. In both Departments, Congress granted additional temporary rank, next above that then held but not above colonel, 

to officers assigned to the important supply depots as well as to those 

assigned as assistants to the chiefs of the respective departments. In the 

Quartermaster's Department, such temporary rank was also to be given 

to the quartermaster acting on the staff of the Commanding General of 

the Army and to no more than four special inspectors." The latter, like 

those of the Civil War, were to be under the control of the Quartermaster 

General to be used by him to make inquiries and secure information on 

the state of the Department. Unlike the Civil War measure, the act of 

July 7, 1898, did not enumerate and describe the div isional organization 

of the office of the Quartermaster Genera l but simply authorized the 

Secretary of War to make such distribution of duties as he deemed in the 

best interests of the service. Ludington's proposed reorganiza tion was 

immediately put into effect .. " Profiting from past experience, the Quar-

'" The proposed division of duties in the office of the Quar erll1 a~ r General was a5 

follows: the first division was to handle all matters relating to funds, estimates, returns, and 

money accounts; the second was to deal with water and rail transportation: the third was 

10 have charge of clothing and equipage; the fourth was to supervise wagon (ramportation, 

animals, and forage: the fifth division was to handle construction; the sixth was to take 

charge of sewerage. lighting. heating. alld ground rentals; the seventh was to be responsible 

for all personnel matters: and the eighth division was to handle all claims and supen'ise 

the operation of the national cemeteries. 

'" RG 92. OQMG Document File. 1800-1914. Case 117402 (Ludington to SW, 30 May 

1898). 

"30 Sial. 714--15 aul 7. 1898). 

"RG 92. OQMG Document File. 1800-1914, Case 117402 (Ludington to SW, 8 Jul 

1898; Ludington to AG. 7 Aug 1898). 
THE SPAN ISH-AMERICAN WAR 519 

termaster Genera l effected a more prompt reorganization than had 

occurred during the Civil War. 

The n umber of additiona l officers authorized by Congress was not 

actually as large as appeared on the surface. Under the legislation 

enacted in April 22 and J uly 7, 121 positions were added to the Quartermaster's Department. Of these, 78 were filled by appointmen ts from 

civil life and 2 1 by appointment of officers from the line. Inasmuch as 

22 regular offi cers of the Departmen t were commissioned in the Volunteer 

service and one accepted a Volunteer commission in the J udge Advocate 

Genera l's Department, the actua l n umber of Volunteer and Regular 

officers available for service in the Departmen t during the war was 155." 

T he total n umber of officers in the Subsistence Department in the war 

period was 129. 11 Congress also added one military storekeeper to the 

Quartermaster's Departmen t and increased the number of post q uartermaster sergean ts by an additional 25.18 

The lack of an adeq uately tra ined Army that could be supported in 

the fie ld by a sufficient number of experienced supply officers was only 

one facet of the general un preparedness of the country in April 1898. 

In characteristic fashion, the McKinl ey admin istration had fa iled to coordinate its fore ign and military poli cies; it decl ared war and (hen got 

ready to wage war. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War, thereupon found 

that the government machinery was altogether inadequate to meet the 

emergency. "Jt had, d uring th irty years, been called upon only to plan 

for and meet the req uirements of the regular army in time of peace, and 

natura ll y enough had become quite fi xed in the narrow grooves o[ 

peace."" Obviously, even the most effective staff organization would 

have been hard pressed under wartime demands, but while the admittedly weak organiza tion was res ponsible for much of the Clisordel' 

that ensued, Congress, th rough its ind ifference to the problem of national 

defense, shared in that responsibility. 

I. Dodge Commission Report, I. 437 (QMC'I Rpt to ('./)mmiuion. 14 OCt 1898). T he 

number of officers in the Department in any given month of the war varied for appoint· 

l11 ent5 we re made throughout the war. ThUi. of the 121 Volunteer offieen. 60 were appointed in May. 28 in June. 26 in J uly. and 7 in August. Of the appointees. 23 qualified 

in May. 49 in J une. 31 in J u ly, 14 in August. and 4 in Septenlber . 

.. General Eagon reported that 20 otr.cers were added under the act of Ju ly 7 and 

101 under the ael of April 22. of whom 9 never qualified under their commissions. Since 

.5 regular Subsistence offieers were commissioned in the Volunteer senice. the t0l3 1 added 

to the Department was 129. I/Jid., I. 545-46 (Eag;l11's Rpt to Commission , 6 Oct 1898}. 

" 50 SIa l. 571; 728 Ou l I and 8, 1898) . 

.. Russell A. Alger. The SJllwish-Amtricll u Wllr (New York. 1901). p. 1. 
520 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Clothing and Equippillg the TJ'oops 

The supply bureaus were as ill prepared LO respond to any sudden 

demand for large quantities of suppli es as they were to provide guidance 

by experienced personne l. The Quartermaster's Depanmem had little 

or no reserve stock on hand at its general depots; appropriations had 

neither encouraged nor permillcd the accumulation of reserves, and, in 

fa ct, it was only with the strictest economy that Ihe Department had been 

able to procure clothing and eq uipage to which the Regular Army was 

entitl ed. When th e war began . such factors were ignored whil e enterprising journal ists denounced the ludicrous supply operations of a Department that sent American soldiers, clothed in woolen uniforms, to 

fight in a tropica l climate. But no time was allowed for preparations, 

and haste and inexperience accounted for most of the shortcomings. 

Supply operations in 1898, however, were singularly free of the corruption 

and fraud that had maked those of 1861. Indefinite charges of fraud and 

collusion in awarding war contracts were made in the press, but the commission, later appointed by the President to investigate the conduct of 

the War Department and popularly known as the Dodge Commission, 

found no evidence to substantiate the charges. Those who made them 

invariably failed to appear before the Commission, though invited 

to do SO.20 

When Quartermaster General Ludington became aware in March 

of the probabil ity of trouble with Spain, he conferred with the Secretary 

of War on the need for making preparations. Lack of funds and restricti ve legislation controiling expenditures seriously hampered his efforts 

to take action. Since the crisis developed in the last quarter of the fiscal 

year, his appropriated fun'ds were running low. As of I April, he had a 

balance of slightly more than $2,500,000 that he could use for preparatory 

measures and to that amount he was limited. Under laws enacted by 

Congress in the post-Civil War years and still in effect, the Department's 

expenditures could not exceed its appropriation for the fiscal year, and it 

could enter into no contracts ca lling for the future payments of money 

in excess of that appropriation. Generally, no contract could be made 

unless it was authorized by law or was under an appropriation that was 

adequate to its fulfillment. Contracts for clothing, subsistence, forage, 

fuel, quarters, and tra nsportation were exceptions to this last restriction, 

but none could be made that exceeded "the necessities of the current 

year."~' As in the past, the Quartermaster's Department generally had 

to make contracts by advertising for bids and awarding the contracts to 

- Dodge Commission Rtport, I. 138-40 (Rpt to I'resident. 9 Feh 1899). 

"See 'I!Itr, pp. 49:>-96. 
THE SPANISH·AMERICAN WAR 52 1 

the lowest bidders. though emergencies did permit open-market purchases. 

However, when Congress appropriated funds for the next fiscal year in 

March 1898, 5 weeks before the war began, it limited such open-market 

purchases to no more than $200 and required that each stich purchase be 

immediately reported to the Secretary of War. 21 

On 9 March, Congress appropriated $50 million for national defense, 

but, under the narrow interpretation given to the law by an Administration determined to prevent any disturbance to its peace efforts, not a 

dollar was made available for any other purpose.

1I Of this fund, the 

Quartermaster's Department was allotted $500,000 for the specific purpose 

of transporting ordnance to the seacoast for the fortifications there.u 

None of this money could be used for the accumulation of Quartermaster 

supplies for offensive war. Not until about 20 April was another allotment of $1 million made from that fund to the Department. Even 

though Ludington anticipated trouble, there was little that he could do 

legally to prepare for it. Given the limitations imposed by Congress and 

the attitude of the McKinl ey administration on preparations, it is 

doubtful whether a more aggressive officer would have undertaken to 

stretch the law to the extent necessary to put the Quartermaster's Department in readiness to clothe, equip, and transport the thousands of 

volunteers soon to be under arms. The Commission Investigating the 

Conduct of the War nevertheless later suggested that "possibly someone 

else would have gone into the market earlier, anticipating approval of 

his acts in case war was declared and the Army increased tenfold." 2. 

As soon as war was inevitable and Congress made funds available, the 

Department worked energetically to meet the demands made upon it. 

In the meantime, LudingtOn did initiate certain actions to improve 

the supply situation. When he became Quartermaster General in 

February, he found that clothing stocks were low, and his first efforts 

were directed toward building them up. As in the past. Army clothing 

and tentage were still being manufac tured at the depots, principally at 

Philadelphia, but clothing was also produced at J effersonville and San 

Francisco. In March, Ludington instructed the depot quartermasters 

• ~o Stat. 322 (Mar 15, 1898). 

-(I) ~O Sial. 274. (2) Alger later anrihuted this rcstrictive interp et~ ti n of rhe 

law to McKinley, but there is no evidence that the Secretary of War eKerted himself to 

alter this view or to urge the necessity of placing the Anny in readiness for any demanW. 

that might be made upon it. Alger, TIle Spa'lish.Artlericafl lVar, pp. 8-9 . 

• About SIO million weill to the Ordnance Department and 15.500,000 to the Engi. 

nee .... for rortification purposes. The Medica l Department received $20,000 and the Signal 

CoI"Jl' $225.400. 

-Dodge (:.(lmmission Iffport, I, 127 {(:.(lmmission 10 President, 9 Feb 1899). There 

is no evidence that any other supply bureau chief openHed along Ihe lines suggested by 

the Commission. 
522 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

to push prod uction. Clearly. government manufacture alone would not 

suffice for wartime needs, and, on 26 March, he directed the depot officers 

at New York, Philadelphia. St. Louis, and Chicago to explore market 

conditions and gather information on what tentage and clothing items 

were ava il abl e for immediate purchase and how rapidly additional suppli es could be produced. Within his limited means, he authorized the 

purchase of some material for clothing and tentage earl y in April.l. 

Preliminary procurement activity was confined to the Phil adelphia 

Depot. On 20 April. Ludington directed the depot quartermaster to 

advertise and invite proposals [or such Army textiles as kersey and Rannel 

and for blankets, forage caps, leggings, ponchos, summer underwear, and 

shoes. He was also to invite proposals for the manufacture of a large 

number of blouses, fl annel shirts, and trousers to be made from material 

that the depot had on hand. By 25 April, the Quartermaster General 

further authorized him to invite proposals for more than $3 million of 

clothing and tentage. t ' When war was formall y declared, the Department also initiated purchases at New York, Chicago, St. Louis, Boston, 

and Baltimore that aggregated over $3 million. 

Quartermaster attention was at first concentrated on clothing and 

equipping the troops to be sent on exped itions aga inst Cuba and Puerto 

Rico. When news arrived of Commodore Dewey's victory over the 

Spanish fleet at Manila, it became necessary to send troops to the Philippine Islands. The first expedition sa iled on 25 May. In the course of 

dispatching other troops to Manila, the United States annexed the 

Hawaiian Islands on 7 July and placed them for military purposes under 

the Department of California. The depot Quartermaster at San Francisco 

clothed the troops for these expeditions, drawing upon the markets of 

San Francisco and Portland for his supplies as well as expanding the 

manufacturing operations of the depot itself." 

Supply of clothing and tentage generally was hampered by the fact 

that the required fabrics for their production, made according to Army 

specifications, were not available. The Quartermaster's Department 

could find , for exampl e, only a few thousand yards of kersey, specified 

for use in Army trousers, and there was practically no standard tent duck 

on the market. To meet the immediate tentage requirements of the 

troops first mustered into service, the Department purchased all canvas 

of fair quality that it could obta in throughout the country. Naturally, 

the life of such tentage was short and, in the ra iny season, the troops 

- I bid., T. 07- '8 (QMC's Rpt to Commission, 14 Oct 1898). 

" I bid., I, 08. 

- RG 92. OQMG Document File, 1800-19104, Case 11 55!! (Rpt of Maj. O. F, Long, 

depot quartermaster, 25 Aug 1898). 
THE SPAN ISH-AMERICAN WAR 528 

suffered. Similarly. the Department had to substitute a lighter weight. 

dark blue fabric for the sky blue kersey used in the manufacture of 

trousers. It could get blue Aannel for blouses. but the fabric was not 

dyed according to Army specifications which required the usc of indigo. 

The result was that the blouses faded into various shades of blue, grecn, 

and purple. Deliveries of specification fabric did nm begin to come in 

until a month after the Department made contraclS,n 

On I April 1898, the Quartermaster's Department was prepared to 

clothe and equ ip for 3 months the Army as then organ ized and an add'jtional 8,000 to 10,000 rnen.*O The regulation allowance of tentage for 

troops of the Regular Army was with the troops at the garrisons where 

they were stationed and they carried it with them into the fie ld. T hus, 

there were abou t 28,000 shelter tents in the hands of the troops and 

anoth er 10,000 at the de pots, with an additional 6,500 due on contract as 

of 1 April." A fair supply of camp kettl es, entrenching tools, and other 

Quartermaster supplies were on hand; in fact, "a pretty good stock" of 

mess pans had been in storage since the Civil War.1I 

The Department was not prepared, however, to clothe and equip an 

Army that with in a few months increased to more than 10 times the size 

of the peacetime force. The difficulties the Department encountered in 

shortages and prod ucti on were matched by its inability to obtain finn 

requirement figures from the War Department. Before the war began, 

Ludington was told to make his arrangements for about 30,000 men. 

Then the number was changed to 80,000, but no one seemed to know 

what the strength of the Army to be call ed out might be. "There were 

so many changes," Ludington testified, and he rece ived no official informa· 

tion until the President issued his proc lamation, on 23 April, calling for 

125,000 volunteers.u In littl e more than a month, they were at camps 

clamoring to be outfitted. More volunteers were raised , the size of the 

Regular Army was increased, and, by August, the Quartermaster's Department had to satisfy the demands of approximately 275,000 men. 

-Dodge Commiu ion Report, VII. 51-40 (Ludington). Unless otherwise indicated. 

nallles cited in connect ion with the Dodge Commission Report will indicate the individual 

testifying. 

- The Depnlment had on hand at it! depo ts and due on contract about 69.000 

blankeu. 28.000 blouses. 5.5.000 forage caps. 98.000 COllon flannel drawers, 28.000 campaign 

hall, 23.000 ov ~tJ. 12.000 ponchos, 47.000 dark blue flannel shiru. 62,000 pain of shoes. 

305,000 pain of cotton and 167.000 pain of woolen !OCu, 35.000 pairs of trousers and 23.000 

pain for moumcd $Oldiers. and 170.000 COIIO" a"d 84.000 woolen ulldershirlS. See ibid., I 

453. for a lable of Ihe principal arlicles of clothing and equipage on hand and due in on 

contract. 

"Ibid., I. 437 (QMC'I Rpt to Commiuion. 14 Oct 1898). 

-Ibid., VII. 3140 (LUdington). 

- I bid., VII. 3147. 
524 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

When the Regulars took the field, they were clothed in the regulation 

blue wool uniform. For years, troops serving on campaigns in Texas, 

Arizona, and the hot, arid plains of the Southwest had been unsuccessful 

in their efforts to obta in a summer uniform,S< The clothing on hand 

at the depots rcady for issue to the tTOOpS on I April consisted of the 

same heavy wool items. unsuitabl e for the tropica l climate in which the 

Army was soon to be operating. Even if consideration had been given 

to the procurement of lightweight clothing, the time element did not 

permit its production. To meet objections, the Department first reduced 

the weig!lt of the kersey for trousers from 22 to 16 ounces, then removed 

the lining from the blouse in May, and also furn ished summer underwear.'" Later, as an emergency makeshift, since no khaki cloth was 

produced in the United States, canvas suits, made of twilled or plain duck 

in khaki color, were manufactured. Quartermasters issued more than 

5,000 suits of canvas clothing to the Fifth Army Corps at Tampa before 

it sailed, and canvas suits clothed the Rough Riders before they went 

to Tampa. T he Department furnished canvas su its to all troops going 

to Puerto R ico, and it later shipped sufficient quantities of this uniform 

to Cuba to equip all the troops there but various factors delayed issue. 30 

The Quartermaster General doubted that this clothing afforded as much 

protection as the woolen uniform, and apparently it proved as hot. At 

Manila, Chief Quartermaster James W. Pope met the need for lightweight clothing by purchasing khaki and wh ite summer uniforms locally, 

but sufficient time had been allowed before the ex pedition left San Francisco to equip each man with a supply of Na nkeen underclothing, light 

cotton socks, gingham shirts, and a white drill suit in addition to the 

regular wool uniform.37 

T he Department was much criticized for its failure to furnish sufficient clothing at the camps where the troops were assembl ing. The 

Chief Quartermaster at Chickamauga testifi ed that clothing could not be 

furn ished as fast as it was wanted in May. Most regiments were inadequately supplied with underwear and shoes. Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, 

Commanding General of the Army, reported that several of the volunteer 

regiments came to Tampa without uniforms or blankets. Much of this 

clothing deficiency arose out of the fact that many of the states, in filling 

the quotas for the first ca ll for volunteers, held their men in camp for 

.. See anl~, pp. 503--M . 

.. Dodge Commission R~port , VI. 2648 (Col. William S. I'allen. chief of Clothing and 

Equipage Division). 

"(I) Ibid .• I. 442-43 (QMG's Rpl to Commission . 14 OCt 1898). (2) See infra.. p. 527. 

Of (I> Dodge Commission POTt, I. 445. (2) RG 92. OQMG Documelll File, 18(1()-

1914. Case 11 5533 (Pope Rpt. 16 Nov 1898). 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 525 

several weeks before they were mustered into the federa l service. Cloth· 

ing wore out during that time and, when the volunteers were turned 

over to the War Department. they were reponed, in many cases, to be 

without proper clothing, barefoot. and with only the shin worn when 

leaving home. When the War "Department made a second call for 

volunteers, a better cooperation existed between it and the state officers. 

The Quartermaster's Department delivered supplies in advance to muster 

points and encountered no great difficulties in equipping troops enlisted 

under that call." The Quartermaster General asserted that he made 

every effort to relieve deficiencies by telegraphing authority to purchase 

at point of muster such articles as shoes, drawers, stockings, shirts, and 

even tents, if procurable." 

When Col. W illiam S. Patten took charge of the Clothing and 

Equipage Division in the office of the Quartermaster General on 15 May, 

he found a situation in reference to clothing requisitions that he could 

only describe as "a mess." Troops were being mustered in and concentrated at camps in Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, and, on orders of the 

War Department, "they piled their requisitions" into the Washington 

office. The only solution was to ship supplies in bulk to the various 

points of concentration as faSt as they became available without waiting 

for requisitions to arrive or be examined. He simply judged what kind 

and quantity of supplies were likely to be needed, and the Quartermaster 

General urged depot quartermasters to inform the office when the supply 

of any particular articles ran low. T here was no " red tape," the Colonel 

testified, so far as the office of the Q uartermaster General was concerned.io 

The Department made a good procurement record, much better, in 

fact, than in a similar period of unpreparedness at the opening of the 

Civil War. As in 186 1, it had to purchase whatever was available on the 

market to meet immediate needs, and though much of the clothing fell 

below Army standards, still there was no use of shoddy. Industrialization 

had progressed enormously in the past 30 years and production was now 

more rapid than in 1861. Col. Amos S. Kimball, depot quartermaster 

at New York, proudly reported that "100,000 uniforms, consisting of 

blouses and trousers, were manufactured and ready for delivery in less 

• (I) ,4"'111111 Report 0/ the QuarUrmllster Cenerll/, 1898, p. 77. (2) RC 92. OQMG 

Document File, 1800-191-4, Case II!">!">!! (I'allell to QMC, 16 Aug 1898) . 

• (I) Dodge Commission Relwrl, I. 435-56 (QMG'$ Rpt (O Commis.siOIl, 14 Oct 1898). 

(2) The acting Chief Quartennaster o f the 7th Corps. fOT example, ~ported (hat he purchased underclothing, shoes, and $Orne blankeu at Jacksonville, Fla., for the regimenu that 

arrived short of clothing, but unifonns could nOi be supplied in that manner, and it wa$ 

10 days 10 2 weeks before they were received. Ibid., III. 3!8 (Capt. C. 8 . Ilakcr). 

-Ibid., VI, 2647; I. 09 (QMG's Rpt to Commis.sion, 1-4 Oct 1898). 
526 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

EQUII'M ENT OF SOLDIER IN 1898 

than 2 weeks,"" Within a period of 3\12 months, the Department full y 

equipped an Army of 275,000 and was in a position to maintain its stock 

of supplies. The short duration of the war, however, left the Department 

with a considerable surplus on hand. 

Quartermasters purchased and contracted for clothing and equipage 

at the principal depots of Philadelphia, Jeffersonvill e, New York, St. Louis, 

San Francisco, Chicago, and Boston, and at purchasing offices in Cin· 

cinnati, Detroit, Baltimore, New Orl eans, St. Paul, and Washington. 

Though the Department purchased most of the clothing, it manufactured 

considerable quantities at the Philadelphia, Jeffe rsonville, and San Francisco depots. The St. Louis depot also prod uced a small quantity of 

trousers. The same system, introduced a hundred years earlier, was still 

being followed at the Ph iladelphia Depot. Cut garments, prepared in a 

cutting depanment that was expanded so that its outpu t was more than 

3,000 garments a day, were given out to seamstresses li ving in the area. 

" RG 92, OQMC Doculllent File, 1800-1914, Case 11 5533 (Kimball to QMG, 1 Sep 

1898). 
THE SPAN ISH-AMERICAN WAR 527 

Their number increased from 1, 100 before the war to between 4.000 and 

5,000 in the war months.u 

T he demand for tentage was so large because so many troops in both 

active campaign and camps were sick that issues far exceeded regulation 

allowances and much tentage was required for ordinary hospital purposes. 

The peacetime practice of manufacturing all Army tents at the Philade lphia Depot had to be suppl emented by procurement under contract. 

Tents were manufactured wherever material could be obtained and 

skilled workmen were available. For example, under special arrangements with the Post Office Department, its Mail Bag Repair Shop manu-

£actured some 10,000 common and conical tents from fabric supplied by 

the Philadelphia Depot.

u Government production of tent5--(:onical. 

common, hospital, wall tents and shelter halves- was pushed at the Philadelphia Depot, where the introduction of electric sewing machines, operated by women, greatly ex pedited their manufacture." Of the tents 

obtained during the months of the war, the principal purchasing depots 

procured over 172,000 and the Ph il adelphia Depot manufactured over 

199,000." 

Despite the rapidity with which the Department procured clothing 

and eq uipage, there were delays in clothing the troops at the camps. 

Some of the delay was attributable to the inexperience of vol unteer 

quartermasters who did not know the sizes of the men they were to clothe, 

the method of requisitioning suppli es, nor the proper issue procedures. 

Most of the delay, however, resulted from the breakdown in transportation. Colonel Patten was shipping clothing as fast as it became ava ilable, 

and he assumed that the troops at Tampa, for example, were being well 

outfitted. Much to his surprise, he later learned that this was not true. 

When Major General Miles arrived at Tampa, he informed the Secretary 

of War that 15 cars, loaded with uniforms, had been sidetracked 25 miles 

away and remained there for weeks while the troops suffered for lack of 

clothing." Similarly. though canvas suits were sent to General Shafter's 

troops in Cuba on 6 Jul y and were on transports in the harbor, the 

difficulty of unloading supplies at Siboney and the lack of transportation 

from the coast prevented distribution until after the surrender of Santiago 

when issue was begun on 25 July.tT 

.. 'bid ~ 11 55!! (Col. John Furey 10 QMG. , Sep 1898). 

" / bid., Case 1!!!96 (Maj. T. E. True 10 QMG, 25 Aug 1898). 

"'bid., Case, 13!396 (Maj. C. S. Bingham 10 I'hiladelphia Ikpol Q M, J<I Aug 1898) . 

.. A,,"ua/ Report 01 the QuartermtIJter Ceneral, 1898, pp. 75, 76. 

"Dodge Commission Report, VI, 2tH7 (Patten); II, 888-89 (Llr. Milo 10 SW, .. J un 

1898). 

"/bid" 11, 949, 970 (Telegrams, Alger 10 Shart eT, " J u1 1898: AG to Shdler, 7 Jul 1898); 

I, 129 (Commission 10 Prnidem , 9 Feb 1899). 
528 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Subsistence Problems 

As the Quartermaster's Department made haste to clothe the troops 

as soon as war was declared, so the Subsistence Department quickly turned 

its attention to feeding them. Although it was known that American 

soldiers would be fighting in a tropica l climate, investigators later uncovered no evidence to show that the Department gave serious study or 

consideration to modifying the components of the ration. There were 

no conferences between personnel of the Subsistence Department and 

the Commanding General of the Army or Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter, 

commanding the expedition to Cuba. Nor did the Department consult 

with the Surgeon General of the Army as to the proper foods to be used. 

Except for the inclusion after 1890 of a pound of vegetables, the garrison 

ration had changed little in the past hundred years, but by the use of a 

growing list of substitutive components, the ration, as fixed by law, was 

capable of giving greater variety and was also liberal in amount. The 

field ration still call ed for bacon, hard bread, coffee and sugar, beans, rice, 

or hominy, and when possible, potatoes, onions, and canned tomatoes. 

A travel ration, first introduced in 1878 and somewhat modified in subse· 

quent years, gave the troops hard bread, canned fresh or corned beef. 

canned baked beans, and coffee and sugar. Commissaries issued this 

ration to soldiers traveling on cars, stages, transports, or otherwise than 

by marching, or when, for short periods, they were separated from 

cooking facilities.'s 

Subsistence officers gave some thought to the problem of supplying 

an army in Cuba with fresh bread and meat. Lt. CoL James F. Weston, 

who was to serve as Chief Commissary on the Shafter expedition and 

became Commissary General of Subsistence in 1900, gave consideration 

to the difficulties involved even before the Regulars were ordered to camps 

in the South.n Exploring the possibility of furnishing the troops with 

fresh bread in the fi eld, he learned that a New York baking company 

could be induced , at a reasonable cost, to dismantl e its ovens and machinery and set them up in Florida or Cuba, as the Army required, to 

turn out 100,000 loaves daily. The Acting Commissary General thought, 

however, that any army put into the fi eld would have to use hard and 

not soft bread. ~o 

.. (I) Wllr Deptlrlmen/ Ammal Reports, 1898, I. r;.~0-52 (Rpt or Commissary General. 

17 Oct 1898). (2) Wllr Department Gell emi Ord rs, 1878, GO 59 (1 Aug 1878). See also 

GO 75 (28 Sep 1881): GO 104 (28 Aug 1882); GO 3 (16 Jan 1883) . 

•• Senate Doc. 270, 56th Cong., ht $C$S .. ""Food Furnished by Subsistence Department 

10 Troops in the Field," 3 vob., Washington. 1900). til. 2384- 85 (Weston to Gen, S. T . 

Cushing, 24 Mar 1898). Hereafter briefly referred to as Court of Inquiry Record. See also 

Weston'S testimony. ibid., I, 151- 52. 

"' Ibid., III, 2386 (Osgood to Weston. 8 Apr 1898). 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 529 

As early as December 1897, when the Subsistence Department sent 

a commissary to the Klondike. Commissary Weston had called attention 

to the possibilities of supplying fresh beef in cans. Canned fresh beef, 

or roast beef as it was designated commerciall y, was already a part of the 

travel ration and, with the threat of war, Weston centered his efforts on 

its use. He discussed the problem with the Armour Packing Company, 

tried cooking a hash or stew using canned beef, and later at Tampa, as 

Chief Commissary of the expedition to Cuba, he had similar experiments 

conducted by Capt. H. L. Riley, commanding Troop E, 3d Cavalry. 

Adding potatoes, onions, Hour, and condimen ts-"j ust what a soldier 

has"- Colonel Weston informed the Commissary General that he could 

make the canned beef into a palatable stew. The canned meat was in 

fact stringy and tasteless, and, under exposure to tropical sun, became 

increasingly disagreeable in appearance. Yet it was the best product of 

its kind available under existing standards in the meat packing and 

canning industries. Weston therefore argued that canned beef could be 

furnished without loss; it would be healthful; and it offered a solution to 

a difficult problem that had to be met. Ne ither he nor any other commissary contemplated that the troops would be subsisted on canned beef 

for any extended period of time or that they would, through lack of 

cooking facilities, be compell ed to eat it cold as it came from the can, 

without vegetables and condiments.

5 1 Yet that was the situation that 

developed on the transports and during the campaign in Cuba. 

If the Subsistence Department engaged in no foresighted pl anning 

for subsisting troops in the tropics, it was not negligent in its procurement 

of rations. In anticipation of war, the Acting Commissary Genera l of 

Subsistence, early in April, advised all chief commissaries of military 

departments and all purchasing commissaries to have at all posts travel 

rations sufficient for the wants of the full garrison if they were ordered 

to move. He also directed them to list the firms from whom components 

of the field and travel rations could be obtained at once, if wanted in 

large quantities. The posts had large supplies of rations on hand in the 

spring of 1898, and when the War Department moved the Regulars to 

Chickamauga Park, New Orleans, Mobile, and Tampa in mid-April, 

they took along 30 days' rations to prevent deterioration of subsistence 

stocks at the depleted garrisons. In addition, the Subsistence Department 

ordered all rations and stores for sale, over and above what were needed 

by the reduced garrisons left at the posts, shipped to the southern camps, 

if that course was economical. The effect was to place in the hands of 

regiments larger amounts of rations than they could properly care for, 

n Ibid., III. 2384- 85 (Weston to Cushing. 24 Mar 1898); II. 1859-00 (Rpr. Court of 

Inquiry, 29 Apr 1899). 
530 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

and General Shafter subsequently requested suspension of the order 

requiring troops to bring with them a 30-day supply of rations.n 

]0 the meantime, early plans for operations against Cuba called for 

the dispatch of an exped ition of 70,000 men, and the Secretary of War 

ordered the Subsistence Department to concentrate 90 days' supply of 

rations for that number of men at Tampa. Although neither this 

proposed expedition nor several others materialized, subsistence orders 

in preparation for them resulted in huge quantities of rations-from 

6 million to 7 million rations- being sent to Tampa, adding materially 

to the storage problem that developed there. 

Among the components purchased and sent to Tampa were 1 million 

pounds of canned roast beef. The purchasing commissary at Chicago 

made this first purchase on 11 Mayan orders from Colonel Weston, then 

serving in the Washington offi ce. On the same day, he ordered an additional 2, 100,000 pounds, of which 620,000 pounds were shipped to San 

Francisco for the Manil a expedition. When General Eagan assumed the 

duties of Commissary General of Subsistence that month, he directed 

additional purchases to be made to the end of June in New York and 

Chicago, until 6,847, 174 pounds of canned roast beef were acquired, 

includ ing 350,000 pounds delivered by Armour and Company from stock 

shipped to Liverpool and brought back.

oa T he Court of Inquiry later 

concluded that the amount of canned fresh beef procured by the Commissary General was "excessive, unnecessary, and not demanded by the 

emergencies of the existing situation." 04 

The Department was equally generous in its procurement of other 

components of the ration. T he expeditionary force to Cuba, for example, carried with it 1,198,055 rations of potatoes, onions, and canned 

tomatoes. Subsequent shipments to the depot commissary in June and 

July added almost 2 million more. U The rate of spoilage was high, but 

even if it had run to 75 percent, the Court of Inquiry concluded that 

nearly 1 million rations of vegetables should have found their way to 

the troops. This was a quantity sufficient to allow issue of the full 

vegetable component of the ration to 16,000 men for 62 days.n 

Investigation fully revealed that if the Department erred in procurement, it erred on the side of over-supply. Troops made no complain ts 

of ration shortages at the camps in the southern states. Troops arriving 

at a camp with travel or fie ld rations turned in their baked beans, hard 

.. Dodge Commission Report, II. 88 1 (Shafter to AG. 27 May 1898). 

"Court of Inqu iry Record, Ill. 1948-67 (Purchase orders). 

" I bid., II. 1875 (Rpt, Cou rt of Inquiry) . 

.. War Department AmlU/I/ Reports, 1898, I. f>52 ff. (Rpt. CGS. 17 Oct 1898). 

" Court of Inquiry Record, II. 1865-66 (Rpt. Court of Inquiry). 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 531 

[SSUING BEEF AT TAMPA 

bread, and bacon at the commissary depot in exchange fo r fresh meat and 

flour.61 Regiments had the flour baked into bread either by loca l 

bakers-an arrangement that did not always prove satisfaclory---or, if 

their baking ovens had been carried a long. the regiments baked their 

own bread. Such a field bakery might turn out 800 loaves in 10 hours. 

Regiments that baked their own bread were usually able to save money 

for their company fuods,n 

The fresh meat issued to the troops in camp was refrigerated beef, 

supplied under contract and delivered by the packing companies in 

refrigerated cars. Regimental commissaries drew directly from the cars 

on orders of th e depot commissaries deposited with the representatives of 

the packing companies. ~~ This was the first war in which the Army was 

not supplied with beef on the hoof as the source of its fresh meat. 

"' Dodge Commission Il~porl , IV. 1242-43 (Lt. Col. James N. Allison. Chid Commissary. 

Camp Alger). 

" Ibid., III. 166-67 (Brigade Commissary J. C. Bald ridge): III. 333 (Lt. Col. O. E. 

Wood. Chief Commissary. Seventh Corps). 

-Ibid., I. 548 (CGS Reply. 6 Oct 1898); Ill . 167 (Capt. J. C. Baldridge). 
532 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

SERVING DINNER. AT TAMPA 

When the tTOOpS embarked for Cuba, they were directed to supply 

themselves with 10 days' travel rations. Because canned corned beef was 

not available in any large quantity at Tampa. commissaries provided 

most of the tTOOpS with canned fresh beef. It had been a component of 

the travel ration for 20 years but was still generally unfamiliar to the 

troops because canned corned beef, popularly known as "salt horse," had 

been most widely used in the past. Delayed in sailing and lacking cook· 

ing facilities on board the transports, the soldiers subsisted on cold 

canned beef, baked beans, and coffee from 8 to 241une, when the landing 

at Daiquiri was completed. 

Under the stress of circumstances, canned roast beef then became a 

part of the field ration. though Army regulations did not authorize it. 

When the expedition landed. a commissary depot was established at 

Siboney. and, to facilitate issues. Colonel Weston testified. no formal 

requisitions were required for rations. Regimental commissaries had 

only to give the number of men for whom they were drawing and select 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 533 

what they wanted from the stock on hand.

M The latter included an 

abundance of bacon, some canned corned beef, and ample quantities of 

potatoes, a,nioos, and canned tomatoes. With complete freedom of 

choice and ample supplies on hand at the depot. many of the troops still 

received canned roast beef, despite the fact that on the prolonged voyage 

to Cuba tinned beef had become unpalatable and even distasteful to 

them. No testimony taken later clarified the reason for this choice of 

rations, though it is possible that the inexperience of regimental commissaries may have had something to do with it. ]0 any case, the testimony 

was conclusive that the Army in Cuba was insufficiently subsisted from the 

landing to the surrender of Santiago, the insufficiency being directly 

traceable to the deficiency in transportation that permitted no more than 

the accumulation of I day's supplies in advance of Army needs at the 

front.81 

Refrigerated fresh beef was not sent to Cuba until 21 July, the day 

after the port of Santiago was opened for navigation. The expeditions to 

Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands included refrigerated beef in the 

rations carried with them. Transports, equipped with refrigerating 

apparatus, were furnished either by the government or by the packing 

company making the delivery. Where such transports were not supplied, 

as was the case with some troops going to the Hawaiian and Philippine 

lslands, the Quartermaster's Department shipped beef cattle in pens on 

the transports for slaughter and use on the way. On arrival at Manila, 

the troops temporarily obtained refrigerated beef from the Navy until the 

Chief Commissary could make a contract with Australian packers for 

furnishing a regular supply. 

In Cuba, the soldiers at first received the refrigerated beef with great 

satisfaction. Arrangements for issuing and transporting the beef to the 

camps, however, were inadequate and inefficient. Carelessly handled 

and exposed to sun and rain en route to the regimental camps, a consider· 

able portion of the refrigerated beef became tainted before it reached 

the troops and was either rejected or trimmed down before cooking. 

The prolonged use of canned beef by the troops in the field met with no 

favor anYWhere, but the Court of Inquiry later found that their com· 

plaints were not sufficiently strong to reach corps and division com· 

manders and their commissaries. 

On 21 December 1898, the Commanding General of the Army, 

Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, testifying before the Dodge Commission, 

created a sensation. He charged that canned fresh beef was furnished 

the troops "under pretense of experiment" and was really beef pulp from 

"Court of Inquiry Record, I. 156. 

·'Ibid., II, 1863 (Rpt, Court of Inquiry, 29 Apr 1899). 
534 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

which the beef extract of commerce had been boiled out. He claimed 

that its use caused sickness. He went on to charge that the refrigerated 

beef furnished the troops in Cuba and Puerto Rico, as well as at the 

camps at Tampa, Chickamauga, and Jacksonville was "embalmed," or 

treated with chemicals to preserve it. In his judgment, he testified, the 

use of such beef was one of the serious causes of so much sickness and 

distress among the troopS.8l 

These spectacular charges brought immediate demands from the 

packing companies that they be given an opportunity to appear before 

the Dodge Commission,M T he latter had been sitting nearly 3 months 

before such charges were aired for the first time, and "stranger and more 

inexcusable and more unsoldierly still," according to Secretary Alger, 

during all those months, "with this pretended knowledge of facts which, 

if they existed, should have been made known to the Secretary of War, 

for the protection of the army, General Miles had never mentioned the 

subject." U 

Miles' insinuations of negligence, dishonesty, and even criminal 

incompetency on the part of the Subsistence Department reflected the 

lack of harmony between the Commanding General of the Army and 

the supply bureaus and fully revealed the frayed relations existing with 

the Secretary of War. His charges goaded the Commissary General into 

denying them in language that was vituperative and highly improper in 

an officer.n Intemperate though his reply was, General Eagan's statement and the testimony of many other witnesses convinced the Dodge 

Commission that there was no foundation in fact for the charges and 

insinuations made by General Miles. The G;mrt of Inquiry, convened 

under War Department orders early in 1899 to investigate these allegations, came to the same conc1usion.s8 Careful and prolonged investigation by two commissions proved General Miles' charges unwarranted and 

untrue, but the legend that embalmed beef was furnished to the troops 

in the Spanish·American War persists to this day. 

- Dodge Commission ~port, VII, 3255-3261. 

-See for example, ibid., VIII, <108-09 (Swift & Co. to Commission . 2<1 Dec [898) . 

.. Alger. Sponisll.Am~rical1 Wa r, p. 377. 

- As a result. General Eagan was tried by court martial. found guilty, and rcoommended 

to be dismissed from the service. President McKinley. however. commuted the sentence 

to suspension from rank and duty for 6 years. General Eagan was reinstated in the service 

late in 1900 and. at his own request. was immediately thereafter placed on the retired list. 

AGO, General Orders and Circulars, 1899, GO 2<1, 7 Feb 1899. 

- (I) Dodge Commission R~port, T, 153 ff. (Rpt to President. 9 Feb 1899). (2) Court 

of Inqu iry Record, II. 1855 If. (Rpt of Court of Inquiry. 29 Apr 1899). 
THE SPANISH·AMERICAN WAR 555 

Procuremenl of Wagons, Ambulances~ and Animals 

The procurement of horses. mules. wagons, and ambulances to provide mobility for the Army in lhe field continued to be a function of the 

Quartermaster's Department. On I April 1898, the Department had 

no reserve of wagons or ambulances and, in fact, had bought none in the 

9 months before the war started. Such wagons and ambulances as the 

Army did possess were in the hands of the Regular troops and were carried 

with them into the field when mobilization began-a total of 500 fourmule escort wagons, 592 six-mule Army wagons. and 96 Red Cross 

ambulances. On I April, the Army had 6,701 horses, of which 6,120 

were cavalry horses, 500 artillery horses. and 81 draft and siege battery 

horses, and it also had 2,021 mules, 81 of which were pack animals." 

T he startingly small anlount of field transportation on hand on the 

eve of the war was the direct result of the policy of retrenchment that had 

been pursued in the post-Civil War years. By 1895, it was believed that 

the Army would never again need wagon trains. since the Indian troubles 

were over, and if it did, wagons could be hired from contractors. On 

War Department orders. the Army's fine trains were broken up. Quartermaster Thomas Cruse recalled their loss with regret. 

Wagons that cost two hundred dollars were sold to fanners for fifteen- and 

their stock were unable to pull them I Harness went for two dollars which had 

cost forty. It was nothing less than a crimel Lack of those trains caused the 

Army endless trouble- and lives-when we got into camps, but the reformers 

and amateur economists had their way." 

To save money, the wagon transportation of even the small Regular Army 

had been sold off and it had no more than five pack trains. 

In the interests of economy, Congress had also limited the purchase 

of draft animals to 5,000 in the appropriation act for 1889-a limitation 

that was reenacted in succeeding appropriation acts. As late as 15 March 

1898, on the eve of the Spanish-American War. Congress provided that the 

number of horses purchased, added to those on hand, was not to exceed 

the number of enlisted men and Indian Scouts in the mounted service." 

This restriction was nOt suspended until 7 June 1898.TO 

When the war began. Col. Crosby P. Miller, in charge of procurement of wagons and animals in the office of the Q uartermaster General, 

.. (I) Dodge Commission Report, I. 466 (QMG's Rpl 10 Commission, 14 Ocl 1898), (2) 

Annullf Report IIf file Quartermaster Genernl. 1898. p. 10. 

-Thomas Cruse. AfXlelle D(JYs lI"d Allflr (Caldwell, Idaho, 1941). pp. 255--56. 

-25 Stal. 486 (Sep 22. 1888): .50 StilI. S2S (Mar 15 1898). 

".!JO Slat. 4.!JS. 
536 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

estimated that the Army needed about 5,000 wagons. His estimate was 

based on an allowance of 25 wagons to a regiment of infantry. 45 to the 

cavalry. and 5 to a light battery. making about 275 wagons for a division 

and about 750 to a corps.ll The manufacturers of wagons were completely unable to meet such a demand. Captain Cruse attended a 

meeting on wagon transportation in the Secretary's office, on 3 April. 

at which General Alger asked that the Studebaker Company furnish 

200 six-mule Army wagons and 1,000 escort wagons as soon as possible, 

"say- within two months." To this request Clem Studebaker replied: 

I couldn't agree to turn out two hundred six-mulers in a year. When you 

people sold off all your big wagons, some two years ago, we used up all our 

stocK. Now we have neither material nor machinery to make them. TO 

In anticipation of the needs that war would create, Ludington early 

in April called for information from all prominent wagon and harness 

manufacturers of the country on how rapidly and at what prices they 

could supply the Army in an emergency. T3 To get wagons made according to Army specifications would have taken 9 months. The best that 

the manufacturers could do was to produce from materials that they had 

on hand about 50 wagons a week.u When the war began, these replies 

became the basis for purchase action. By telegram, the Department 

obtained bids and promptly awarded contracts for the first wagons. In 

order to limit the various kinds of wagons obtained so that the problem 

of furnishing parts in the field might be controlled, the Department made 

no awards to companies that could supply only a small number of 

wagons.15 

To Supply the transportation needed, the Department began by 

furnishing the regiments what they would actually require in camp--

four wagons to each regiment and enough wagons for the depot quartermaster-an objective that it did not accomplish until well into July. 

It supplied troops ordered to Cuba first, while those left at the camps had 

to operate with reduced transportation. By far the larger number of 

wagons furnished were so-called farm wagons, drawn by four mules. 

The Department procured and issued 3,605 of this type by the end of 

August. It also purchased a few spring wagons, a small number of Army 

six-mule wagons, and some escort wagons. In all, the Department procured during the war 4,620 wagons, but not all were delivered before the 

"Dodge Commissioll Report, VI, 2625 . 

.. Cruse, AfX'cht Do:,J !md Afltr, p. 264. 

"DOOge Commission Report, I, 439 (QMC'$ Rpt (0 Commission, 14 Oa 1898) . 

.. Ibid., VI, 2625 (Miller). 

" Ibid., I, 439 (QMC', Rpt (0 Commissioll, 14 Oct 1898); VI, 2626 (Miller). 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 537 

war ended and the Department rejected some because they failed to meet 

the standards set. TI 

Relatively few of the thousands of wagons procured saw service in 

the fie ld overseas. The failure of the Quartermaster's Department to 

provide a sufficient number of transports with adequate carrying capacity 

for the Cuban expedition had the effect of limiting the land transportation 

available for the Santiago campaign. Colonel Humphrey testified that 

he shipped from Port Tampa 114 wagons. 1,336 pack and draft mules, 

578 government horses. and 381 privately owned horses.H In addition, 

Shafter's Army also had 84 wagons that were sent from Mobile. He took 

no more land transportation because the vessels were fully loaded. 

Under the most favorable circumstances. this land transportation 

would have been barely enough for the Army; in the conditions existing 

in Cuba it proved painfull y deficient. The road upon which the Army 

operated rapidly became impassable for wagon transportation. Wagons 

stalled in the mud or broke down, delaying the trips to the supply depots 

at Siboney and Daiquiri. So bad were the roads that the ability of a 

pack mule to carry a load was reduced 50 percent. Mules that ordinarily 

could carry 250 pounds became heavily loaded. Maj. Gen. A. R. Chaffee 

testified. when they had two boxes of crackers. weighing 100 pounds, on 

their backs." Teamsters and packers as well as soldiers were disabled 

by fevers to such an extent that the efficiency of transportation was much 

impaired. Soldiers who could handle six-mule teams replaced the 

civilian teamsters; experienced packers, however, were not as easily found 

and, on occasion, pack trains were laid up for lack of packers.a To the 

effects of rain, impassable roads, and the decimated ranks of labor must 

be added the wholly unanticipated demands for rations, for Shafter was 

feeding about as many refugees as he had soldiers in his Army.eo As a 

result. land transportation in Cuba was taxed to its utmost. 

The Quartermaster's Department sent new Army wagons or animals 

with the first expeditions to the Philippine Islands. As more troops and 

supplies were landed and the siege of Manila began. the question of 

providing land transportation became increasingly important. To meet 

this need, Chief Quartermaster Pope resorted to hiring pony carts and 

even employed bull carts drawn by carabaos, a slow means of transportation but still the best. he found, for moving supplies. Scarcity of carts 

made hiring expensive and he bought ponies and (earns, though the price 

"Ibjd~ J. 439, 466; VI. 2626. 

"Ibid., VlI, 2642-43; 3677-78. 

" Ibid ., IV. 9 10 . 

.. John D. Miley. In Cuba with ShaltfiT (New York. 1911 ). pp. 87-88 . 

• Dodge Commission Report, VJJ, 3"199 (Shafter). 
538 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

A PACK TRAIN MOVING AMMUNITION TO THE FRONT 

of a pony soared from $15 and $20 to $ 100 and $ 150 per animal. To eke 

out the lack of animals and vehicles, he employed Chinese and natives 

to pack in stores. Lieutenant Colonel Pope early advocated the use of 

coolie labor for military purposes and though his suggestion of bringing 

500 to 1.000 Chinese from Arnoy and Hongkong was not approved. they 

were increasingly employed in the fi eld as the Filipino insurrection 

began." 

Production of ambulances was more difficult than of wagons. As an 

Army item, none could be immediately purchased on the market and only 

twO companies-the Studebaker Company and the Milburn Wagon Company at Toledo-manufactured Army ambulances. The regulation 

allowance of ambulances was 3 to a regiment, making 27 to a division. 

The Quartermaster's Department ordered production of 500 Rucker and 

50 Red Cross ambulances, the contracts being divided between the two 

companies. They came in so slowly that the Department had great 

difficulty in meeting the requirements of the Surgeon General who 

directed {he distribution of ambulances to {he Army.l • 

.. RG 92. OQMG DOCliment File. 1800-191 4. Case 115555 (Pope Rpt, 16 Nov 1898); 

Case 155596 (Pope Rpt. II Allg 1899) . 

• Dodge Commission Report, VI. 2627- 28 (M iller). 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 539 

T he Department was at all times able to supply mules and harness 

more rapidly than wagons. Experienced, qualified Quartermaster officers 

purchased mul es. They also procured mules for pack trains, fitted out 

the trains at J efferson Barracks. and shipped them with packers to Tampa 

and MobiJe.BI Horses for the Cava lry and Artillery of the Regular Army 

had for some time been purchased by boards of regular offi cers appointed 

for the purpose. Capt. James B. Aleshire, later to become Quartermaster 

General, had been furnish ing nearly all the horses required by the Army 

and he continued making purchases. To supply the Volunteer Cavalry. 

boards, usua lly consisting of one Volunteer officer and two Regulars, generally purchased horses in the states from which the regiment came, so far 

as practicable and economical. These boards kept alert to the formation 

of any combinations to force prices upward and by moving to other 

localities if they detected such efforts, they protected the interests of the 

government. The Department bought a total of 36,800 animals during 

the war, of which 16,618 were horses and 20, 182 were mules. By the 

end of August 1898, it had issued 36,033 animals, of which 16,483 were 

horses and 19,550 were mules." 

Distribution P1'oblem 

The meagre transportation with the Regulars when they were 

mobilized at Tampa, Mobile, New Orleans, and Chickamauga Park, and 

the difficulty of providing volunteer regiments and depot quartermasters 

at the camps with wagons promptly had much to do with the transporta· 

tion and distribution snarls that developed. CoL James C. G. Lee, 

chief quartermaster at Chickamauga Park, found the incoming regiments 

so poorly supplied with transportation that it was wholl y inadequate for 

camping purposes. To haul baggage and supplies, he had to supplement 

such transportation with teams hired from citize s.8~ His experience 

was not unique. When Capt. James B. Bellinger arrived at Tampa in 

mid·May to take charge o[ the depot, he was confronted with an appalling 

situation. T here were 1,000 cars of suppli es on sidetracks in and about 

Tampa, and the depot had 5 government wagons and 12 hired civilian 

wagons to unload them. Freight was arriving at the rate of 50 cars a 

day and could be unloaded at the rate of only two or three.u Adequate 

wagon transportation was essential to relieve the railroad block by empty· 

ing freight cars, to make available for issue the quartermaster and com· 

• Cruse, Apaclu~ Days and Affer, pp. 264-67 . 

.. Dodge CommiSliion Report, I, 466 (QMG's Rpt to Commission , 14 Oct 1898) . 

• RG 92, OQMG Document File, 1800- 1914, Case 115555 (Lee 10 QMG, I] Sep 1898). 

Ibid ~ Case 1155511" (Bellinger Rpt, 18 May-5 1 Aug 1898). 
540 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

missary stores necessary for equipping and feeding the troops, and to 

furnish the regiments with transportation necessary for hauling supplies 

to their camps. The task was further complicated by the faa that all 

wagons procured by the Department were sent "knocked down" and had 

first to be assembled. and all harness had to be fitted to mules that were 

"green." 81 The arrival of a superintendent of wagon transportation 

about the end of May and the erection of shops to repair wagons and 

harness did much to relieve the inadequacies of wagon transportation at 

Tampa. 

Vast quantities of freight were shipped to Camp George H. Thomas 

at Chickamauga Park, Ga., to Camp Alger at Dunn-Loring, Va., to Camp 

Meade in Pennsylvania, and to other camps at Anniston, Huntsville, 

Knoxville, Lexington, and other localities through the South. At Tampa, 

the amount shipped in proved overwhelming because the depot could 

not be expanded as rapidly as troops and supplies arrived. Not only 

were large numbers of Regulars concentrated immediately at Tampa, but 

early in May. in preparation for a movement on Cuba that failed to 

materialize, an army of 70,000 men was ordered there with 90 days' 

supplies for them and 30 days' rations for their animals. 88 

The distribution of supplies was not as easily accomplished as their 

procurement in 1898. As in earlier years, the emphasis in distribution 

was not on storage but on transportation. The major Quartermaster 

depots were primarily purchasing offices or manufacturing plants. They 

afforded only a minimum amount of storage space, but that was ample 

to care for the needs of an Army whose size was well below 30,000 in the 

years following the Civil War. The Quartermaster's Department needed 

no large facilities for storing reserve stocks during those years, since 

retrenchment policies and meagre appropriations had prevented the 

accumulation of reserve stocks sufficient for even the small Army of that 

day. When the war began, the Department procured supplies and sent 

them as rapidly as possible to the camps where the troops were concentrating and to the embarkation points for the expeditions to Cuba, Puerto 

Rico. and the Philippine Islands. Quartermasters rented local Storerooms and sheds and erected temporary storehouses. 

Developing C1'isis in Railroad Tmnsl)Q1'lalion 

Under the supervision of the office of the Quartermaster General, 

chief quartermasters of the military departments and of general depots 

" 'bid . 

.. (I) Amlllal R l!fwrl of Major GUll!ral Commolldiug Ih l! A rmy, J898, p. 9. (2) Dodge 

Commission R" fwrl, VII. 3241 (Miles). 
THE SPANISH.AMERICAN WAR 541 

made contracts with the l'ailroad companies for the shipment of supplies. 

T hese contracts called for general freight rates set by the carload preferably, or by the 100 pounds, if the shipment involved was small, or by 

class.8i For the most pan, the chief quartermasters secured advantageous 

rates, but there was no co-ordination of shipments made by individual 

quartermasters nor any advance notice of freight shipments to the depot 

quartermasters at the camps. With each quartermaster advised to send 

supplies forward as fast as they became available, congestion was inevitable at the destination points where freight cars could not be unloaded 

as quickly as they arrived, despite the Quartermaster General's instructions to pay no demurrage charges. Confusion was furth er heightened 

at reception points, where certain supplies might be urgently needed, by 

the fact that materials of different classes, belonging to different departments, were frequently packed in the same car so that to obtain smaller 

packages of medicines and medical suppli es, for example, large packages 

of quartermaster or commissary stores had first to be removed. 

The congestion became so bad at Tampa that it was impossible to 

get ordinary freight shipments through. The Department thereupon 

shipped carloads of fa st freight, but these too being sidetracked, it made 

carload shipments by express and by special trains of fast freight. Even 

such shipments were delayed. Captain Bellinger found a special fast 

freight trainload of clothing, lost for 10 days, on a siding some 18 miles 

from Tampa.

io No small part of the difficulties of the Medical Department, it was charged, was occasioned by the slowness with which the 

Department transported medical supplies. Like clothing, receipt of 

medica l supplies was also delayed, even when shipped by fast freight. 

Supplies, for example, sent from the St. Louis depot to Chickamauga on 

17 May were not received by the end of the month.i' 

Depot Quartermaster Kimball at New York reported that in the 

haste to get subsistence stores placed at Tampa to accompany the expedition, the depot instructed concerns from whom the stores were bought to 

deliver direct to the shipping lines and turn in their shipping receipts 

immediately to the depot office, but dealers failed to do so.u Large 

numbers of freight cars were shipped on railroad waybills that the quartermaster did not receive until days and weeks after the cars arrived. He 

could not determine the contents of freight cars because bills of lading 

were not sent in advance of stores, and shipping invoices were missing or 

• Dodge Commi$Sion Re/)Qrt, VI. 2609 (Col. Charles Bird. deputy chief of Transporta· 

tion Division). 

" RG 92, OQMG Document File. 1800-1914, Case 115533 (Bellinger Report). 

" Dodge Commission Report, I. 174 (Rpt to Preside,lt, 9 Feb 1899); III, 732 (Maj . C. 

M. Gandy. brigade su rgeon); V. 2~19 (Deputy Su rgeon General J. Morris Brown). 

" Ibid. ., I, 523 (Llf. Kimball to QMG, 3 Jun 1898). 
542 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

delayed. This situation was not corrected until 2 June, when Ludington 

directed all depot and chief quartermasters to forward bills of lading 

promptly,n 

A board of officers originall y selected Tampa as a satisfactory site 

from which to dispatch a small force to Cuba. Tampa, however, served 

by only two lines of single-track railroad, onc of which controlled communication with the port, 9 mil es distant, was not suited for handling an 

army of 25,000 men and the large amount of supplies required for its 

effective operation. Much of the tra nsportation congestion at Tampa 

stemmed from the lack of any plan for organizing a base depot. Tampa, 

for example, just grew until it outstripped its facilities and confusion 

became ever greater. Troops arrived before supply officers had camp 

sites ready or supplies on hand. When the Hood of supplies came, the 

quartermaster had only a small number of wagons to transport thein, few 

fac ilities in which to store them, and no means to tell what the supplies 

were or for whom they were intended. At Tampa, Captain Bellinger 

took steps to bring the situation under control. To reduce confusion 

in the fmure, he advised the Quartermaster General of the need to send 

car numbers on bills of lading. To reduce existing congestion, the depot 

quartermaster obtained more wagons and hired men to open, inspect, 

and determine the contents of cars backed up on sidings in all directions 

in the Tampa area. Since it was impractical in the existing congestion 

for the railroads to place cars, Captain Bellinger had wagons driven 

alongside the tracks wherever possible, and the cars unloaded. Where 

the class of stores permitted, they were unloaded on the ground, covered 

with paul ins, and placed under uard .~· By mid-June, Quartermaster 

Bellinger could report that freight cars were being unloaded at the rate 

of about 70 a day; that only 100 cars of the Florida Central and Peninsular 

line and III of the Plant system remained unloaded at Tampa. T here 

were also 50 at Port Tampa and several hund red cars on sidings north of 

Tampa still to be unloaded, but he expected to have the tracks completely 

cleared in another week.n 

Not all of the congestion at Tampa could be attributed to the shortcomings of the Quartermaster's Department. Captain Bellinger found 

himself in the midst of what he described as a "cold, calculated railroad 

fight" between the two rai lroads- the Florida Central and Peninsular 

line and the Plant line- serving Tampa. The Plant line also controlled 

the 9 miles of communication between T ampa and POrt Tampa. The 

" I bid., I, 523 (Tdeg, Ludinglon 10 Dcpol QM al S1. Loui$ el III., 2 Jun 1898). 

" RG 92, OQMG DocumcnI Filc. 1800-1914. Case 115533 (Bellinger Rpt. 18 May- 31 

Aug J898). 

" Dodge Commission Report, I, 524-25 (To QMG, 15 Jun 1898). 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 543 

railroads had ample sidings, but congestion had filled them as far north 

as Columbia, S.C., or half the distance from Tampa to Washington.we 

Instead of supporting Quartermaster Bellinger's efforts to eliminate congestion, the two roads became locked in a fi erce competitive struggle. the 

Plant line refusi ng to transfer cars for unloading to the Florida CentraL 

Only through Bellinger's determined efforts was an interchange track 

built so that 25 to 30 cars could be transferred daily instead of the 3 to 4 

previously permitted by the Plant System's control of the connecting switch 

for the two railroads.n The Plant line also continuall y ran passenger 

trains between Tampa and the port. carrying crowds of sightseers and 

tourists, and the line's regular freight, passenger. and express business 

between Tampa and Key West went on without interruption. P8 Such 

freight was insignificant in comparison with what the line carried for the 

Army but the railroads' attitude was nevertheless revealing. 

Between 18 May and 31 August. the depot at Tampa handled 13.239 

carloads of freight or 158.862 tons. In an even shorter space of time, it 

also handled an enormous number of cars used in transporting 66,000 

troops with their baggage and over 15.000 animals.~11 

Although it was late June before freight car congestion at Tampa 

was relieved. there was little complaint of the way in which the Quartermaster's Department handled the transportation of troops by railroad. 

As was customary, post quartermasters made the arrangements with the 

railroads under War Department contract for transporting rhe Regulars 

in April. On 8 May, in anticipation of the movement of volunteer 

forces, the Quartermaster General prepared lists of those to be transported 

from each locality and sent them to the chief quartermasters of the military departments concemed. The latter consulted with the railroads 

and settled in advance as many of the preliminaries as possible. loo As a 

result. the bids were all in before the movement of volunteer troops 

began, and the Department obtained adva ntageous rates, averaging llh 

cents per mile. lOt It provided beuer accommodations for the soldier 

than in the Civil War. It furnished tourist sleeper cars or Pullmans to 

troops traveling over 24 hours, three men occupying a section. When 

" The Florida Central had a sidetrack capacity at Tampa, its terminus, of about 350 

ClIO that il e~pandcd 10 530. The I'lant System had a sidetrack capacity at Tampa of 

about 680 ClI O and at Port Tampa of 850 Ihal it increased to 848 and 1,003, respcctively. 

"RG 92. OQMG Document File, 1800-1914. Case 115533 (BellinRer Rpl, 18 May-31 Aug 1898) . 

.. (I) Ibid., (Llr. Bellinger 10 H. B. 1>lanl, 3 .Tlln 1898; Plan I 10 Bellinger. 4 Jun 1898. 

appended to Bellinger's Rpt). (2) Dodge Commiu ion Re/lflrl, vn. 3639--40 (Col. C. F. 

Humphrey. Chief Quartermaster of Shafter's Army) . 

.. Miley. 111 Cuba wilh Sila/lt:r. IIp. 24-25. 

IO RG 92, OQMG Document File. 1800-1914. Case 115533 (Bellinger Rpt). 

"" Dodge Commission Reporl, I , 440 (QMG'! Rpl to Commission. 14 0(11898). 

'''' Ibid., VI , 2r>0R--Q9 (Bird). 
544 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

day coaches had to be used. Ludington expressly stipulated that each 

soldier was to have a double seat for himself.' u On the whole, there was 

little criticism of the railroad transportation provided for the tfOOpS, 

although there were some complaints voiced about the delays that occurred, particularly in transporting the sick to their homes from Montauk 

Point.tO' 

Delays frequently occurred as a result of factors over which the 

quartermaster had no control. The wild scramble for railroad transpOflation that ensued at Tampa, For example, when Shafter received 

orders to sail, took place despite the careful preparations made by Captain 

Bellinger and the traffic manager of the Plant Iinc. Orders to move to 

Port Tampa for embarkation came on 5 June. Bellinger and the traffic 

manager worked out a schedule calling for the arrival of trains at Port 

Tampa at half-hour intervals. The trains were to be ready at a given 

hour and the troops were notified to break camp. They were to haul 

their baggage to the designated siding, ready to be placed on the train. 

Bellinger allowed an average of 7 to 8 boxcars per regiment for company 

and regimental baggage. Some delay occurred because the railroad was 

unable to switch out the accumulation of freight cars and clear the track 

in time. Far more delay was occasioned by the excessive amount of 

baggage in the hands of the troops and the time it took them to transfer 

it from camp to cars and unload it. Bell inger recall ed that one regiment 

of less than 700 men used 15 boxcars for its baggage. 

In the midst of this operation, General Shafter issued orders on the 

evening of 7 June to rush the movement; he intended to sail at daybreak 

with such troops as were on board the transports. To expedite the movement, Bellinger then arranged to have a train for each of the remaining 

regiments placed at designated points along the track and moved out as 

soon as loaded during the night. This placed a heavy strain on railroad 

equipment, and it was agreed that, if necessary, boxcars would be used by 

the troops. In the meantime, Bellinger sent a letter to each division, 

brigade, and regimental commander, advising of the arrangements and 

notifying him that a wagon train of 25 wagons would be sent to each 

regiment to assist in hauling their baggage to the railroad. His careful 

arrangements neverthdess went awry. A corps commander notified the 

different organizations that they would be loaded as soon as possible. 

This was construed as an order to break camp at once and, with some 

7 or 8 regiments up all night, confusion reigned supreme. When a 

wagon train appeared, it was at once seized by the nearest regiment. 

In the wild haste to reach the railroad and not be left, troops so overloaded 

'''Ibid., r. 440. 

''' Ibid., V. 2198-Z200 (Kimball). 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 545 

wagons that fresh teams gave out before they had gone half a mile through 

the heavy sand. Regiments ordered to move early in the evening arrived 

at the railroad only by daybreak for lack of wagons that never reached 

them. Despite this disregard for plans, all the troops reached Port Tampa 

by II A.M. Some 17,000 troops were moved from Tampa to the port in 

about 40 hour5. 104 

The Department was criticized much morc severely [or the kind of 

transport vessels it furnished for the troop movement to Cuba. In the 

years since the Civil War, Quartermaster supply operations had involved 

little or no shipment of troops or supplies by water. For motc than haH 

a century it had not been necessary to send any large body of troops by 

sea to invade a foreign country. Whatever knowledge the Department's 

officers had acquit:ed in the Mexican War and in the course of the Civil 

War was completely lost to the quartermasters of 1898. So much was 

this true that the deputy chief of the Transportation Division of the office 

of the Quartermaster General could testify "that the Army had never 

done anything of this kind; we had never transported troops by sea; it 

was something new to the Army of the United States."'as 

Ocean Transportation 

In anticipation of the demands that might be made upon the Department, Ludington, on 24 March, directed his depot quartermaster at 

New York to ascertain and report on the number and carrying capacity of 

vessels that could be chartered on short notice from shipping companies 

in the coast-line trade. In forwarding the desired information, Colonel 

Kimball advised the Quartermaster General that the Navy had an absolute option on all ships of the most prominent steamship companies.1DS 

Scouting and other ships could be purchased for "national defense" by 

the Navy Department without violating the spirit of the act appropriating 

$50 mill ion, but the Quartermaster's Department operated under limitations. It lacked funds and, in any case, did not fee l warranted in demanding vessels before they were absolutely neded nor, conditioned by the 

many years of retrenchment, did it feel justified in chartering and maintaining them at large expense in advance of their need. As soon as troop 

movements were determined, the Quartermaster's Department called 

upon owners of vessels to supply as many ships as they could spare without 

... RG 92, OQMG Document File:, 1800-1914, Case 11 5553 (Bellinger Rpl). 

"" Dodge Commi!;Sion Rel/ort, VI. 2612 (Bird). 

, .. (I> Ibid., I, 467 (Ltr. Ludington 10 Kimball, 24 Mar 1898 and reply 29 Mar 1898). 

(2) See also ibid., V, 2191- 92 (Kimball). 
546 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

however crippling too severely their commercial interests. lOT The Dodge 

Commission was of the opinion that a sufficient number of ships should 

have been furnished promptly, even if such action compelled the seizure 

of every steamer on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts sailing under the 

American flag. lOS 

Until June 1898, the Supplies and Transportation Division of the 

office of the Quartermaster General supplied all means of transportation. 

Increasing demands for transportation led the Quartermaster General 

to place all wagon and animal procurement in a separate division. Rail 

and water transportation continued to be under the direction of Col. 

Charles Bird until 18 July when, by order of the Secretary of War. the 

Quartermaster General established two branches in the Transportation 

Division, one to direct all railroad transponation and the other to have 

exclusive charge of the ocean transpon service. At the Secretary's suggestion, Col. Frank j. Hecker became chief of the Transportation Division, Colonel Bird remaining as deputy chief. Hecker was a Detroit 

banker and railroad executive whose services were enlisted by Secretary 

Alger to expedite the procurement of transports and to whom, on 20 june, 

he granted full authority to chaner or purchase ships. Under this 

authority, Hecker began his operations at once as a civilian agent, but 

by 8 july he was commissioned a colonel in the Volunteer service.'Oi 

Before 1 July, Colonel Bird had chartered for the Cuban operation 

43 transports, having an aggregate tonnage of 104,201 tons, with a 

carrying capacity of 23,622 men, including their arms, ammunition, equip. 

ment, and supplies. He had also obtained 4 water boats, 3 steam lighters, 

2 ocean tugs, and 3 deck barges for the same expedition. In addition, 

he had chartered 14 transports on the Pacific Co'asl, having an aggregate 

tonnage of 41,152 tons, with a carrying capacity of 13,688 men, includ ing 

their complete equipment and supplies. l1O Under Colonel Hecker's 

direction, quartermasters chartered additional ttansports to carry troops 

and supplies to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands. Suitable 

vessels still could not be chartered and, by order of the Secretary of War, 

Colonel Hecker purchased 14 large steamships and had them hastily 

fitted up to carry troops and supplies to Cuba and Puerto RicoY' 

Although the Transportation Division had difficulty in procuring ships, 

it did not repeat the errors of the Civil War. It did not employ middlemen to charter or purchase ships; the Dodge Commission uncovered no 

, .. Ibid., I, 445 (QMG's Rpl 10 Commission. 14 OCI 1898). 

",. Ibid., I, 135 (Rpt to I'resident , 9 Feb 1899). 

, .. (I) RG 92, OQMG Document File, 1800-1914, Gase 156557 (Alger to Hecker, 20 

Jun 1898). (2) Almual ~/,o rl of Ih~ Quarurmastu G~"~ral, 1898, pp. 54, 61. 

uo Amlllal ~porl of Ih~ Quarlumaslu "eral, 1898, pp. 58, 59. 

'" For an account of Hecker's activities. se Dodge Commission Rtport, VI, 2767 If. 
I 

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 547 

scandals; and quartermasters paid reasonable prices for the charter and 

purchase of vesse ls. 

In obtaining ships. the Department was handicapped not only by 

its self-imposed limitation of the demands made on shipowners but also 

by congressional opposition to granting American registry to foreign 

ships. Consequently, the only vessels it could charter for the Shafter 

expedition were the American merchant vessels engaged in the coasta l 

trade on the Atlantic and the GulL These, for the most part, were sma ll 

ships constructed for carrying freight and not designed for the transportalion of large bodies of men. The Department chartered them at 

prices based on so much per gross ton , the companies providing the 

officers and crew and also victualing the ship." " The Department 

provided only coal and watcr. It also experienced some difficulty in 

chartering transports on the Pacific Coast. Bccause most of the steamship companies there werc engagcd in trade with the Far East and South 

America, the services of their vessels could be obtained only upon their 

arrival at their home ports. Except for one vessel secured through the 

Navy Department, the Washington office chartered all transports used on 

the Pacific Coast. They were all ocean vessels that were in themselves 

superior to any obtained for the Cuban operation. 

As soon as each vessel was chartered, it was fillcd up, under the 

supervision of Quartermaster officers at New York and San Francisco, 

respectively, for the transportation of troops to Cuba and the Philippine 

Islands. The time allowcd for this work was so short, particularly for the 

first transports sent to Port Tampa in May, that, in somc instances, 

quancrmasters put matcrial on board and sent along ship carpenters to 

make alterations whi le the vessels were en route.'11 They built wooden 

bunks, added washing faci lities and wa ter-closets, but made no arrangements for cooking, except stich as would permit the men to prepare hot 

coffee, since the troops were to carry travel rations. They added wind 

scoops and sails to furnish air between decks, and, as long as the hatchways 

could be kept open and there was no storm, plenty of ventilation could 

be provided to keep the men comfortabl e. The ships for the Cuban 

operation were not equipped for any extended voyage but were simply 

intended to carry men on a 36-hour Hm to Havana. When the (ar more 

distant Santiago became the destination of Shafter's army, complaints 

about unsatisfactory transports reached the department. Quarters, it 

, .. Maj. John W. Summerhaycs. who had charge of outlilling the chartered ships at 

New York. tcstified that on the Iil"5t trallllKlru sent to Tampa the ownel"5 furnished the provisions. boarding the officen for SI.50 a day, and if the men wanted anything more than 

their travel rationJ. they had 10 pay 50 cents per day. Ibid., VI , 2~1S. 

'''Ibid .. T. 470 (Ltr. Ludington 10 Kimball, 9 May 1898). 
548 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

was reported, were crowded, poorly ventilated, and unsanitary. The 

ships were obviously ill suited for service as tfOOP transports. To alleviate the discomfort and suffering experienced by the troops, the Department substituted hammocks for bunks and procured electric plants to 

provide light and f un ventila ting fans, but lack of time prevented the 

installation of some of them. It provided galleys for cooking and more 

comfortable accommodations generally on the vessels chartered for the 

7,OOO-mile voyage of the troops to Manila. ni 

Limited in its choice of vesse ls and lacking time to make adequate 

changes to accommodate the troops com[ortabl y. the Department undoubtedly selected the best transports availabl e. It is utterly incomprehensible, however, that it should have failed to ascertain the correct 

carrying capacity of the ships sent to Port Tampa. Secretary Alger wrote 

that the British standard for estimating carrying capacity of ships was 

adopted by officers of the Quartermaster's Department who were assisted 

by an officer of the Navy, detailed -[or the purpose by Secretary Long. 

That method of assigning one man to each ton -and-a-half carrying capacity 

proved to be a too-generous estimate, since the ships chartered were not 

troop ships_ m Colonel Kimball, in his report on ships in March, had 

also furnished gross tonnage figures as submitted by the shipowners. 

The Department apparently had doubts about the reported carrying capacity of the vessels sent to Port Tampa because, early in May, it 

requested Maj. James W. Pope, then depot quartermaster at Tampa, and 

Col. Charles F. Humphrey, soon to become Chief Quartermaster of the 

Shafter expedition, to ascertain "the extreme carrying ca pacity of each 

of the ships" in order that the Department might determine whether 

sufficient ships had been sent to carry troops and supplies. Colonel 

Humphrey reported that a board o[ officers had examined the vessels and 

found that they could not be " loaded to carry the number certified by 

the agents at time of charter." lIe By the time Shafter's army was to 

sa il, the original fl eet assembled at POrt Tampa had been increased to 

38 vessels, including 2 water boats, 3 steam lighters, 1 collier, 1 tug, and 

2 decked barges. Estimated to have a carrying capacity of 20,000 to 

25,000 men, the fleet was actually able to transport less than 17,000 men, 

and most of the vessels were uncomfortably crowded, stuffy, and badly 

". Ibid., I. 446-47 (QMG's Rpl to Commission, 14 On 1898); I, 477 (Telegr.llll. Luding· 

ton to Summerhaycs and Kimball, 14 Jun 1898); VI, 2410 If. (Su mmerhayes); VI, 2614 

(Bird). 

,,. Alger, The S!XltIislt-America'1l 11''''', p. 75. 

, .. Dodge Commi$Sion Report, I, 468 (Ltr, QMG to Humphrey, 2 May 1898; Ltr, Maj. 

Bird to Maj. Pope, 4 May 1898); I. 469 (Telegram and hr, Humphrey to Ludington, 9 May 

1898). 
THE SPAN ISH-AMERICAN WAR 549 

equipped. 1IT Instead of the troops being on board for no more than 

48 hours, the point of destination for the fl eet involved a 6-day journey. 

The confusion at Tampa when the troops broke camp lO move to 

Port Tampa was duplicated at the embarkation on 7 June. It was 

heightened by the frant ic efforts of the troops who, on hearing that the 

capacity of the ships had been overestimated, were determined not to be 

left behind. "Everybody was in feverish haste to go on board the transports," Lt. Col. John D. Miley, aide-de<amp to General Shafter, recalled; 

"often, before onc regiment was comple tely embarked the next would 

arrive, impatient and chafing at any delay in giving them the assignment 

of a vessel. " 11S At Port Tampa, there was only one long pier from which 

supplies and men could be placed on board the transports. It extended 

for about half a mil e along a canal into which the ships had to be brought. 

There was no dock and the limited wharf facilities made loading a 

difficult operation. The railroad track was about 50 feet from and 

parallel to the canal. All boxes and packages had to be carried from the 

cars and across the sand on the backs of stevedores or trucked over 

improvised platforms. Nine vessels could lie for loading in the canal 

with two more at the slip and two at the pier built at the end of the 

narrow strip of land. lI~ As soon as th e ships were loaded, they were 

warped to th e other side and out of the canal. stern first, by tugs, and 

anchored in the bay until the loading of all ships was completed.no 

Chief Quartermaster Humphrey was in charge of the ocean transportation. He had never loaded ships before but he was assisted by a 

civilian shipmaster, Capt. James M. McKay, who for some 20 years had 

been engaged in trade between Florida and Cuba.Ul The loading of 

supplies had already been accomplished before the troops arrived. Statements made that property was loaded in a helter-skelter way, with 

ammunition separated from artillery guns and commissary, medical, and 

quartermaster stores intermingled, led the Dodge Commission to inquire 

into the me thod of loading. General Shafter had ordered rations and 

ammunition put on board each ship so that in the event it became 

detached, the ship could act separately.122 That order was executed, but 

both Colonel Humphrey and Captain McKay stoutly maintained that 

stores were loaded in order and by themselves. Men on the wharf had 

'" (I) Ammal ReJwrl 0/ Ihe Quarlemlluttr General, 1/1.98, p. G3. (2) Dodge Commis· 

sian Report, IV, 987 (Maj. Gen. A. R. Chaffee). 

''' In Cllba will! Shafter, p. 27. 110 Dodge Commission Report, VIt, 26G8 (Capt. James M. McKay, sh ip captain and 

assistant to Colonel Humphrey) . 

.. Ibid" VII, 2G4HI (Humphrey). 

-Ibid., VI. 2655 (McKay): VII. 3209 (Shaftcr). 

'- I bid y VII. 3208 (Shafter). 
550 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

checked them as they were put on board. and both the Commissary and 

Ordnance Departments had officers present looking after their own stores. 

1t is to be noted that the Medical Depa rtment did not follow this practice, 

and regimental stores were not reported. Colonel Humphrey kept a 

tabulated report of everything which he submitted to Genera l Shafter 

on 19 June, though ca ptains of ships received no such lists. 123 

T hough Captain McKay insisted that loading was orderly, sufficient 

testimony was given to indica te that medicines, stores, and hospital 

furniture were often put in the holds of transports under all sorts of 

(reight. and that. because o( lack oE proper landing facilities and the 

difficulty of getting at the contents of ships, perhaps a third of the medical 

supplies taken aboard at Port Tampa were not put ashore until after the 

surrender of. Santiago. Since the Quartermaster's Department was responsible for loading, shipping, and unl oading medica l stores, the Dodge 

Commission concluded that, to the extent that slow transportation and 

delivery fa ilures accounted for lack of such supplies, th e Department had 

to share the blame for the shortages of. medical supplies that harassed the 

Army in Cuba.'H 

Loading the transports was complicated by the limited wharf faci lities 

at Port Tampa and by the fact that full cargoes were not on hand. It 

freq uently was necessary to bring transports into the canal to be loaded 

and, before loading was fi nished, send them into the harbor to be brought 

back later to complete th e cargo. To obtain complete rations to be 

loaded on anyone vesse l, suppl y offi cers often had to go not only from car 

to car but also from one train to another in order to complete rations.'u 

Colonel Humphrey averred that he loaded all supplies that came to him, 

but the number of transports was inadequate to carry everything. Because shipping space was unavailable, General Shafter ordered a fully 

equipped train of 40 ambulances to be left at Tampa; wagons, he decided, 

would have to serve the dual purposes of supply carriers and ambulances.ue 

Limited railroad facilities and inadequate harbor accommodations 

did not harass the quartermasters at San Francisco. Transportation 

facilities were in no way taxed by th e mobiliza tion and embarkation of 

troops for the Philippines. Nor was it necessary for the quartermasters 

to supervise the embarkation at once of any large body of men. Owing 

to the difficulty of obtaining transports, the Eighth Army Corps, comprising the forces of the Philippine expedition, was dispatched in seven 

Ull/)id., VI, 2660-6 1 (McKay); VII, 3642 (Humphrey); I'p. 3673-85 (Tabulated report). 

ao l/)id., I, 174-75 (Rpt to President, 9 Feb 1899). 

""' Ibid., VII, 3667 (Humphrey). 

"'" Ibid., VI, 3037 (Maj. n . F. Pope, chief surgeon); VII, 3194 (Shafter). 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 55 1 

separate movements, beginning on 25 May and ending in October.127 

Only the troops of three of these expeditions reached Manila in time to 

take part in the assault and capture of that city. 

Quartermaster Humphrey completed the loading of supplies for 

Shafter's expedition to Cuba on the morning of 6 June, when he reported 

to the genera l th at he was ready to receive troops by noon. Loading of 

the troops did not begin lIntil the following day because of the delay 

occasioned by the congestion on the railroad. When the troops did 

arrive, no schedule had been prepared in advance for assigning transports 

to troops and for informing regimental commanders of the assignment 

before they reached the port. Lt. Col. Joshua W. Jacobs, assistant to 

Colonel Humphrey and afterwards Chief Quartermaster of the Fifth 

Corps, testified that he never saw any spec ific program for troop embarkation, but Captain McKay was as certa in that such a program had existed. us 

Colonel Humphrey pointed out, however, that if such a schedule had 

been made in advance it would have gone by the board, since troops did 

not arrive at their designated times. In general, Humphrey knew tHe 

ships that would be used by brigades and divisions. He was notified by 

telephone or telegraph when specific regiments or batteries broke camp 

and started to the port, and he was informed of the number of men in 

each organization. When a regiment arrived, Colonel Humphrey, for 

the first time, assigned the troops to a ship, filting strength of regiments 

to capacity of ships.12I1 

With some 10,000 men hastily embarking from a narrow pier with 

limited facilities for handling them, congestion and some confusion were 

inevitable. To Captain McKay, it seemed orderly enough but to Colonel 

Theodore Roosevelt of the Rough Riders, it was a " higglety-pigglety 

business." The intense excitement of that June morning came through 

as he testified how he and Colonel Wood, determined to get their men 

to Cuba, had hun ted for Colonel Humphrey who allotted them the 

Yucalan. 

The Yucalml was coming in at the dock., and by that time we found there 

was a great scramb le for the transports, and Colonel Wood jumped in a boat 

and went out in midstream. I happened to find out by accident that the 

transport Yucatan had also been allotted to the Second Infantry and the 

Seven ty-first New York.. and I ran down to my men and left a guard on the 

Yucatan, holding the gangplank. against the Second Infa ntry and the Seventyfirst New York., and then letting aboard only the Second Infantry, as there was 

no room even for all of them.lIO 

,rr War Department Amwa/ Reports, 1898, I. pt. 2. pp. 268-69 . 

... Dodge Commission Ueport, V. 1842- 43 Gacobs); VI. 2657-59 (McKay). 

U/IIlbid., VII. 36~O. 3651 (Humphrey). 

U/II Ibid ., V, 2258. 
552 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

EMBARKING THE TROOPS AT PORT TAMPA 

This seizure and holding of a ship not only never occurred according to 

Captain McKay and Colonel Humphrey, but General Shafter insisted it 

would never have been permitted. "He would not have allowed such 

an act of insubordination as taking any of the boats; had they gotten ontO 

the wrong ship. they would have gotten off very shortly." III 

Despite all difficulties. supplies and tTOOpS-aS many as General 

Shafter could risk taking- were on shipboard within a week and started 

out of the harbor on 8 June only to be reca lled as a result of a false Tumor 

that the Spanish Heel had been sighted. T he expedition did not sail 

until 14 June, arriving 6 days later at Daiquiri, selected as the point of 

debarkation. If anything, quartermasters experienced more difficulty 

in landing the expeditionary force than in embarking it in the first place. 

The Department was not remiss in its efforts to provide lighters; 

in anticipation of the need and without req uisition, it had searched for 

suitable steam lighters as soon as the war began. Colonel Bird went from 

Boston to Galveston without locating more than four. General Ludington urged his quartermasters at Port Tampa, Mobile, Pensacola, and at 

other ports on the Gulf to help solve this problem.1II The Department 

.... Ibid., VII, '209. Sec Maj. Gen. Leonard Woods' testimony supporting Shafter, VII, 

~. Sec also VI, 2659 (McKay): VII. 5651-52 (Humphrey). 

-Ibid., VI, 2615 (Bird): 1,502--0-4 (Ltn, Ludington 10 Maj. Pope. ' ·0 Apr ... May; to 

Maj. Pullman, 50 Apr: to Col. Humphrey, 7, 25 May 1898). 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 553 

LANDING THE TROOPS AT DAIQUIRI 

managed to furnish the expedition two light.draughl steamers, the 

Cumberland~ and the Manteo that carried stevedores to Cuba and could 

be run to the small wharf at Daiquiri and unloaded. It also provided 

two steam lighters. the Laura and the Bessie, a sea-going tug, the Captain 

Sam, and two decked barges. General Shafter counted on using the 153 

lifeboats of the transports that had a carrying capacity of over 3,000 men, 

and he expected to have help from the Navy,US What appeared to be 

ample preparations fOT debarkation turned out to be sadly inadequate. 

En route to Cuba one of the decked barges was lost, the Bessie had to turn 

back for repairs, the steam-tug Captain Sam deserted, and only one steam 

lighter, the Laura reached Cuba. The Navy could not continue to spare 

boats for the landing of supplies. 

Disembarking the troops- men with their blanket rolls, 3 days' 

rations, ammunition, and riftes-<aused no particular trouble. Some 

were landed by the Navy, but many came ashore in the small boats of 

the expedition that, [or the most part, the troops themselves manned. 

Landing supplies, however, posed difficulties. The harbor of Daiquiri 

was actually an open roadstead. onl y slightly sheltered. There was only 

'-Ibid., VIl , 3195 (Shafter); 3642. 2674 (Humphrey). 
554 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

A SMALL BOAT LANDI NG TROOPS AT DAIQU IRI 

one place that a tra nspon could anchor with safety and that was at the 

pier of the iron company. but, since it was 80 feet from the water to the 

top of the pier, it was useless. There remained onc small dock at which 

all supplies bad to be landed from vessels baving a draught of less than 

8 to 10 feet. The expedition's lighterage had been sharply decreased 

by losses. but the demands made upon what remained were decidedJy 

increased by the grealer distance the supplies had to be lightered because 

of the unwillingness of the transport captains to nm the risk of bringing 

their vessels close in to the rocky. precipitous shore."· 

General ShafLer ca ll ed for more lighters and, in response, tugs with 

barges in tow were dispatched by the Quartermaster's Department from 

Mobile, New Orleans, and Key West, but all were lost in storms at sea. 

The unsuccessful efforts of the Department to relieve the acute situation 

at Daiquiri led it to enter into a contract with the New York firm of 

D. Van Aken &: Co. The latter was to send an expedition o[ skilled 

artisans and laborers with the necessary equipment [or constructing 

''' / bid., VI, 2662-ti3 (McKay); II , 971, 974 ( I'elegra m, Shafter !O AC and reply, 7 Ju l 

ISUB). 
THE SPANISH·AMERICAN WAR 555 

lighters. barges, docks, and wharves. and Eor repairing ra ilroads and 

engi nes. By the time the expedition arrived on 23 July, Santiago had 

surrendered. and it was ordered to Puerto Rico where it was employed in 

unloading transports and performing other services needed by the troops 

serving under Maj. Cen. Nelson A. Miles.1U 

Unloading supplies at Manila was also beset with difficulties. Chief 

Quartermaster Pope. arriving on board the Newport on 25 July. found a 

situation that he described as one of the most remarkable ever to confront 

a transportation officer. The first expedition, consisting of three transports. had arrived, unloaded at Cavite, and departed. The four transports of the second expedition had arrived on 16 Jul y but were still 

unloading in the harbor when the third expedition anchored in the bay. 

The troops, investing the city of Manila, had established their camp, 

ca lled Dewey, several miles north of the city and were also holding the 

town of Cavite. T hese twO places were separated by the bay and land 

communication was impossible, since the 12-mile long road around the 

bay was impassabl e. The troops at Cavite and Camp Dewey had to be 

fed and clothed and communications had to be kept open, but the only 

means of transportalion, the Chief Quartermaster reponed, was one small 

rented launch be longing to the Department and two small steamers. The 

latter were under the cO.ntrol of the Navy but allowed to tow cascos, 

loaded with rations and other suppli es, across the bay at stated times. 

The casco was the native lighter, a heavy flat-bottomed boat, capable of 

holding from 50 to 100 tons of freight. covered with matting to protect 

the stores. Since the water was so shallow that neither the steamers nor 

the launch could approach Camp Dewey, getting the cascos LO shore 

without destroying the stores was a problem. Lieutenant Colonel Pope 

emphatically recommended that in d ispatching future expeditions every 

transport should be provided with a good high-powen.xi launch, of light 

draft, for landing troops and supplies and For LOwing ships' boats in case 

of necessity.al 

C,"iticism mId 11Ivestigatio1l 

The shortcomings of the supply bureaus in cloth ing. equipping, 

subsisting, and transporting the Army might all have been promptly 

forgonen after the collapse of Spanish resistance if there had been no 

publication of the famous "Round Robin," a paper signed by Col. 

Theodore Roosevelt and the genera l officers of the Fifth Army Corps, 

,. For the report of the quartermaster of t his expedition. sec RG 92. OQMG Consoli· 

dated Correspondence File. Box 1065 (Rpt . Capt. W. 1'. Williams !O n rig. Gen. J. C. Gilmore. 

28 Scp 1898). 

' .. RG 92. OQMG Document File. 1800-1914. Case 1155SlI (Rpt . 16 Nov 1898). 
556 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

demanding that lhe troops, disabled by malarial fever, be sent home from 

Cuba. Further revelations concerning lhe dirty, overcrowded transports 

that brought the sick LO the camp at Momauk Point, the lack of fresh 

watcr, insufficient medicines, and want of medica l care on shipboard, as 

well as the inadequaLC housing. transportation facilities, and supplies at 

the hastily erected Camp Wickoff itself aroused such a stann of critic ism 

against the War Department and the supply bureaus that Secretary Alger 

call ed for a full investigation. President McKinley appointed a commission. headed by Grenvi lle M. Dodge, an army officer of Civil War fame 

and chief Engineer in the building of the Union Pacific Railroad, to 

examine into the conduct of the war.lIT 

The Commission, after months of taking testimony in various cities 

throughout the country, submitted a report to the President on 9 February 

1899Y8 In reference to the Quartermaster's Department, it praised the 

zeal and industry of its offi cers in accomplishing "the herculean task" of 

obtaining and issuing within so short a period the immense quantity of 

materials required by the Army and, in particular, commended the effort 

that had been made to protect the interests of the government. It was 

critical, however, of the lack of system exhibited in supplying the camps, 

the lack of administrative or executive ability shown in the failure to 

prevent congestion at Tampa, and the lack of foresight in preparing a 

Aeet of transports. In general, it attributed most of the shortcomings of 

supply to the scarcity of trained offi cers and the genera l unpreparedness. 

So intense, however, were the excited feel ings of the country at the time 

the Commission sent its findings to President McKinley that the repol't 

was condemned as a "whitewash." After a lapse of more than half a 

century, a cooler judgment must suppOrt the concl usions of the Dodge 

Commission. It avoided making a scapegoat of Quartermaster General 

Ludington, Surgeon Genera l M. Sternberg, Commissary General Eagan, 

and Secretary of War Alger for the unpreparedness that had handicapped 

operations. Though the Commission threw out for consideration the 

suggestion that the Quartermaster's, Subsistence, and Pay Departments 

might be consolidated and a separate Transportation Division crea ted, 

its findings produced no immediate reforms, but the lessons drawn from 

the war ultimate ly did resu lt in far-reaching changes, not onl y in the 

Quartermaster's Department but also in the War Department as a whole . 

... Dodge CommiloSion Report, I, 237 (LIf, Alger to I'rnident, 8 Sep 1898; McKinley 

to Commission, undated). 

"For the report see ibid., I, 107 If. 
CHAPTER XIII 

Conversion of a Department into 

a Corps 

Root's Re/01-m Measures 

The years between the close of the Spanish-American War and the 

declaration of war against Germany in 191 7 were marked by significant 

developments ,in Quartermaster operations stemming from the shortcom· 

ings revealed in 1898 and the recommendations made for their improvement. T hese deve lopments were effected against a background of long 

ovcr.<fue reforms in Army and War Department organization. For the 

Quartermaster's Department, the administrative reforms meant the conversion of the Department. as it had existed since 1818, into the Quartermaster Corps of today. 

Despite the pressure for rcform built up by the barrage of criticism 

that struck the War Department in 1898 and the findings of the Commission Investigating the Conduct or the War, reforms were introduced only 

grad ually. Elih u Root, who became Secretary of War on I August 1899, 

was the guid ing force behind the reform measures, but President McKinley's appoi ntment of him was dictated not by a desire to bring about 

reorgan ization of the War Department but by the need to obta in the 

services of a lawyer who could handle problems of colonial administration 

resulti ng from the acquisition of overseas possessions.' Much of the new 

Secretary's attention was devoted to these problems, hut he also began a 

close study of the War Department wh ich resulted in the initiation of a 

series of reforms designed to eliminate the confusion and inefficiency that 

had characterized War Department administration in the past. 

Two of Root's proposals-the establishment of the General Staff 

and the short detail system- were fundamentally important to the supply 

departments in the changes they brought about. According to Newton D. 

Baker, who was Secretary of War during World War I, Root's creation 

of the General Staff was his outstanding contribution to national defense, 

for without it the country's participa tion in that war "would necessarily 

'I'hilip C. Jes5UP, Elihu Rool (2 vob., New York, 1858), I, 215. 
558 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

bave bee n a confused , ineffective, and discreditable episode." ~ Persistem 

in his advocacy of th is reform, Root slowly bUl steadil y built support for 

the measure.l 

The past record of friction between the Commanding General of 

the Army and the Secretary of War and the supply bureau cbiefs was 

deal' enough. In theory, th e Commanding Genera l was the seniol' military ad viser to the President and the Secretary of War, but in practice 

he. bad functioned chiefly as the fi eld commander of th e combat forces. 

H e was responsible for the effic iency and discipline of the troops and for 

other pure ly line matters, but he had no d irect supervision of the supply 

agencies that provided support for the fi eld forces. The Secretary of 

\-Va r held the purse strings and, to that extent, exercised control over 

the chi efs of the supply burea us, bUl, for th e most part, the ir actions were 

unco-ordinated, and no one in th e \·Var Department was responsible for 

long-range planning. 

Under the zealous gu idance and influence of Secretary ROOl, Congress 

enacted legislation in 1903 creating the position of Chief of Staff and 

the General Staff Corps.' It abolished the separate office of Commanding 

General of the Army. 1t gave alllhority to th e Chi ef of Staff, under the 

direction of the President or of the Secretary of War, to supervise all 

troops of the line and the spec ial staff and suppl y departments. To assist 

the Chief of Staff, Congress esta blished a General Staff Corps and made 

it responsible fo r mob il ization and defense planning. 

Legislation crea ted th e General Staff; interpretation and appl icati on 

of th e law was another matter. Obviously, the supply departments were 

not going to welcome General Staff supervision, and bringi ng them under 

the control of the new agency was not easily accomplished. Difficulties 

in de fi n ing General Staff responsibilities and particularly in fi xi ng relationsh ips between th e Genera l Staff and the supply and administrative 

bureaus developed at once. Opposition grew to such an extent that 

Congress included a limiting provision in the National Defense Act of 

19 16 to the effect that the Ge neral Staff was not to be " permitted to 

assume or engage in work of an adm inistrative nature that pertained to 

established bureaus or offi ces of the War Department." · Only th e stand 

taken by Secretary of War Newton D. Bakel' in rejecting th e opinion 

of the Judge Advocate General as to the meaning of the law saved th e 

essential principles of th e General Staff, but it did not restore in lime 

' Ibid .. I. 240 . 

• Five Years of Ihe JVtlF Delm.lmelll Followi"g I/u lVar will, Spai", 1899-190), As Show ., 

ill tir e A""ual n ef,orls (If Ihe SecrelMY (If IVtlF (n.d" n.p.). p. Hi!; (Rpt. 27 Nov 1901); pp. 

2<J2 Ir. (Rpl. 1 Dec 1902). Hereaft er bricny cited as Fille Year.s of Ihe lVar De/raTlmelll . 

• 32 SII/I. 830-31 (Feb 14. 1903). 

·39 Slol. 168 (.JU Il 3. 1916). 
CON VERSION OF A DEI'ARTMENT INTO A CO RPS 559 

its power " to make it a vigorous director of wa r prepa rations before the 

outbreak of hostilities with Germany." G The objective of co-ordinating 

War Department acti vi ty was not ga ined in the years before World War 1. 

Impact of lh e Detail S)'sl em 

Even before he had achieved his purpose of establishing a Genera l 

Staff Corps, Root had struck a blow against entrenched bureaucracy. 

]n the course of his intensive study of organizational probl ems, the 

Secretary became impressed by the separation of line and staff that had 

resulted from detailing officers of the line to permanent staff posit.ions 

in the Quartermaster's Department and in the other suppl y bureaus. 

Critics argued that such officers, appointed for life to staff positions after 

only a shan period of service with troops during the ea rly pan of their 

ca reers, lost touch with the troops ill the fi eld and became ignorant of 

their needs. They attributed much of the maladministration of the 

supply services during the Spanish-America n War to this policy.T 

The pendulum was now allowed to swing to the other extreme. 

To correct the evils Aowing from permanent tenure, ROOl proposed and 

Congress enacted legislaLion provid ing for a short deta il system, under 

which offi cers of the line were to be detailed to serve in a staff position 

for a period of 4 years, after which they would aga in return to service 

with the troops.s This provision, however, applied immediately to 

future staff appointments. As long as there remained any offi cers holding permanent appointments in the Quartermaster's Department and in 

the other suppl y bureaus, they were to be promoted according to seniority. 

By the end of June 190 1, three officers had been detailed from the line 

for duty in the Quartermaster's Department. The number increased 

to nine by the end of the next fisca l year.' 

T he new system rece ived favorabl e endorsement from no bureau 

chief. It ran coumer to the whole basic philosophy of the Quartermaster's Department. Since the days of Jesup, continuous training of 

quartermasters in time of peace to provide efficient staff offi cers in the 

event of war had been an objecti ve. The Department was in full accord 

• John D. r.fillclt, "The Direclor of Su pply Activities in the War Dc:partmC:nI; An 

AdminUlralive Survey, I." The America" Polilicnl Scie"ce Rwiew, XXXVIII (April 1944), 

No.2, p. 254. 

• See, for cump1c, Dodge: Com mission Rcporl, VJlI, 56IHl7 (Llr, e has. F. Benjamin 

to Capt. Evan P. Howcll. 16 Jan 1899). 

'(I) Fil/t: f enT! of lilt! War lk/Jdrlmt!III, p. 64 (Rpl, 29 Nov 1899). (2) 31 Sla/. 755 

(Feb 2, 190 1). 

• A,,,1U1I1 Rt!Jlorl ollht! Qllllrlermllsler Ct!ucral, 1901, p. 26; 1902, p. 25. 
560 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

with the convictions expressed by a contributor to the Army and Navy 

Journal. 

An Ingalls or a Rucker cannot be picked by chance or made to order; long 

years of training and superior business capacity are requ ired for their making, 

while their fu nctions in a great war are not less essential lhan those of lhe 

commanding ge neral. 1o 

Brig. Gen. Charles F. Humphrey, who became Quartermaster General 

when General Ludington retired in 1903, repeatedly criticized the effects 

of the new system on the efficiency of the Depanment. In his opinion, 

Quartermaster duties constituted a profession that could be learned 

only by close application and long experience. T his, he contended, was 

an age of specia lization in the commercial world and should be no less 

so as far as Quartermaster business was concerned." 

Humphrey's successor, Brig. Gen. James B. Aleshire, reported that 

in 1907 most of the important work of the department- major construction projects, operation of general depots, and supervision of the Army 

Transportation Service- were all being carried on under the direction of 

officers of the old force of the Department who held permanent assignments. Selection of fi eld officers would ultimately be necessary, he conceded, but they would not have the technical knowledge necessary for 

efficient service. Bad as the situation was in peace, Aleshire predicted 

that it would be worse in war, when the Department would require 

officers of zea l, experience, and efficiency but would find it difficult to 

obtain them since the type required would seek duty with troops in 

the line.1Z 

The short detail system had its defects and brought new problems. 

Line officers were reluctant to volunteer for detail to staff positions 

because considerable study was necessary to pass the examination for 

appoi ntment, which, in any case, brought no increase in payor rank. 

Moreover, many of their superior officers were not in sympathy with 

such appointments. They held that any duty that took a line officer from 

his branch of service was time wasted and was likely to decrease his 

efficiency. 

When the Chief of Staff requested Quartermaster General Humphrey 

to submit suggestions for the reorganization of his Department in the 

spring of 1904, he promptly seized the opportunity to recommend adop· 

tion of a system of permanent appointment of commissioned officers in 

'" Arm)' Iwd Nav)' jourflal, vol. 41, p. 886 (Ltr to editor, 2S Apr 1904). A lively debate 

on th is topic was conducted in letters to the editor. 

"(I) AmlUal Reporl of Ih e Quarlerma$ler Ge fl eral, 1905, pp. 59-60. (2) See also views 

of Quartermaster officers on the detail system, RG 92, OQMG Document File, 1800-1914. 

Ca.se 201640 (Rd. of officers' minutes, 25 Mar, 22 Apr 1904). National Archives . 

.. ,fmtllal Reporl of Ille QUllrle rmllJ"ler General, 1908, pp. 54-55. 
CONVERSION OF A DEPARTMENT INTO A CORPS 561 

the Department for all grades, including 30 of the 60 captains authorized 

for the Department.u Other supply chiefs made similar proposals. 

Critics decried the suggested restriction of the detail system to the junior 

grades in each staff department as the "edge of a wedge which later may 

be driven into the head destroying the whole structure" that Root had 

erected.H Humphrey enlarged on his proposed modification again the 

following year, but it was 1906 before any action was taken. Then, 

Congress provided for a partial abandonment of the short detail system 

but made it applicable only to the Ordnance Department.' ~ This concession, however, encouraged the Quartermaster General and the other 

supply bureau chiefs to renew their attacks, and only the slowness of 

Congress to act prevented complete abandonment of the system before 

World War I. 

Renewed Interest in a Service Corps 

If the Quartermaster's Department showed only a tepid interest in 

the measures thus far sponsored by the Secretary of War, there was one 

reform that it had been advocating ever since the days of the Mexican 

War, when the idea of an enlisted service corps was first suggested by 

Deputy Quartermaster Thomas Cross and endorsed by Quartermaster 

General Jesup.a The Spanish-American War had served once again to 

emphasize the need for such a corps of reliable, experienced men. It 

would relieve the Quartermaster's Department from its dependence upon 

civilians who had no knowledge of army regulations, orders, or business 

methods. 

Humphrey, who, as Chief Quartermaster with Shafter's Army, had 

painfully experienced the inadequacies of civilian help in Cuba, sub· 

mitted a draft of a bill for creating a service corps to the Secretary of 

War soon after he became Quartermaster GeneraL He reiterated his 

arguments in its behalf year after year during his service as chief of the 

Department.>? By that time, the Commissary General of Subsistence, 

the Adjutant Genera l's Office, and departmenta l commanders were all 

recommending the establishment of a service corps. The latter were 

particularly impressed with the need of such a corps as a means of 

.. RG 92, OQMG Document File. 1800--1914. Case 201640 (Humphrey to Chief of 5d 

Div. General Staff, !H Aug 19(4) . 

.. Arm)' and NaV)' Journal, vol. 41, pp. 1276-77 (6 Aug 1904) . 

.. 54 Stat. 455 (fun 25, 19(6). 

'·Scc ante, pp. 243; 286-87. 

"(1) RG 92. OQMG Document File. 1800-1914. Case 201&10 (Humphrey to SW, 16 

Feb 19(4). (2) Annual R eport of the Quartermaster Cwual, 190", p. 52; 1905, pp. 62-65; 

1906, p. 49. 
562 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

elim inating the detail of men from the line for extra duty, wh ich weak· 

ened organizations and decreased the efficiency of the Army.ls In 1906, 

the General Staff drafted another bill for creating a service corps. The 

Secretary of War sent it fO Congress but no action was taken. I Q Like his 

predecessor, Quartermaster General Aleshire year after year recommended 

establishment of such a corps, but War Department efforts failed to 

secure the necessary legislation. 2Q 

Establishment of the Qum·te1·mastel· Corps 

In the meantime, the 'War Department sponsored another reform 

that had been recommended by the Dodge Commission and one that had 

been given much attention even earlier in the reorganization efforts of 

post.Civil War days.21 Secretary Root satisfied himself that separate 

supply departments, acting independently of each other and responsible 

only to a civilian Secretary of War, constituted a bad arrangement that 

was productive of confusion, conflict, unnecessary expenditure of money, 

and increased paper work, and that they also made for difficulty in fixing 

responsibility. He therefore recommended the consolidation of the Com· 

missary, Pay, and Quartermaster's Departments into one supply agency 

in the fa ll of 190 1. 22 

T his initial effort to secure legislation was unsuccessful but interest 

in the reform remained high. Consol idation of the supply bureaus 

offered many problems and various proposals were much debated in the 

next 10 years. 21 Late in 1911, a renewed legislative effort appeared to 

have a good chance of success. Congress proposed to incorporate for 

consideration in the coming Army appropriation bill various reform 

measures, including consolidation of the three supply bureaus and th'e 

establishment of a service corps. 

Economy of operation had been stressed as one of the most important 

advantages to be derived from adoption of these reforms, but Secretary 

.. RG 92, OQMG Document File, 1800-1914, Case 30~JoI60 (Chief of Staff to SW, 16 

Nov 1905). 

10 Ibid., Case 309460 (Taft to Chairman , Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 27 

Jan 19(6). 

"(f) A"''''1I1 ReporlS oj Ihe QUllrlamllsler Geueral, 1907, pp. 51- 53; 1908, p. 59; 

1909, p. 92: 1910, pp. 60-61. (2) Wllr De/){lrllll t: ut Amwal Reporls, 1907, I, 17; 1910, 1,26. 

"(I) Dodge Commission Report, I . 148. (2) See alllt!, pp. 512-13 . 

.. Five Years of IIle lVar De/X'rtnumt, p. 163 (Rpt. 27 Nov 19(1) . 

• (I) The first drafted ltilf was circulated to the Commissary General of Subsistence 

and the Quuterrnaster Gcneral for thei r comments. kG 92, OQMG Document File, 1800-

1911. Case 307782 (fAG to CGS. 15 J an 1902); RG 91, AGO Document File, Case 411861 

(Memo, TAG for Ludingtoll. 25 Jan 19(2). (2) t·or later propO$als see, ibid., Case 15&4410 

(Sharpe to SW. 26 Sep 19(7); RG 92. OQ~fG Docllmcnt File, 1800- 1911, Case 307782 (Sharpe 

to SW. 31 Dec 1907: Aleshire memo for file, 4 Jan 1909). 
CONVERSION OF A DEPARTMENT INTO A CORPS 563 

of War Henry Stimson did not take a favorable view of congressional 

efforts in 1912 to use consolidation (or the purpose of cutting down the 

number of officers in the Army.24 He had good reason for his attitude. 

Among other agencies, the Quartermaster's Department had been handicapped by personnel shortages ever since 189B. As soon as the SpanishAmerican War ended, legislation had reduced the Department to its 

prewar Regular establishment of 57 officers. Congress discontinued the 

increased rank that had been conferred on certain Quartermaster officers 

during the war. It retained in existence the office of military storekeeper, 

created in 1898. only until its incumbent vacated it through retirement 

or death. The appointments of all volunteer quartermasters also came 

to an end, except that Congress did permit the President to continue in 

service or to appoint 30 volunteer quartermasters, with the rank of major, 

and 40 volunteer assistant quartermasters, with the rank of captain. z5 

This legislation temporarily gave the Department a staff of 128 officers 

until early in 1901, when Congress authorized a tota l of 96 officers for the 

Department.2S 

With this staff, the Department had been expected to supply Quartermaster officers for executing the duties of the Department in the Philip~ 

pines, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and later in the Canal Zone; to staff and 

administer the Army Transport Service; and to direct the activities df 

clothing, equipping, and sheltering an Army that was greatly expanded 

in size. Whereas for fiscal year 1898, omitting appropriations made for 

the conduct of the war, Congress provided almost $8 million for the 

regular service of the Quartermaster's Department, by fiscal year 1908 

that amount had grown to nearly $36 million. Although the volume of 

the Department's work increased in proportion to the increase of appro· 

priations, the number of its officers had not kept pace. 

The legislation of 190 I very clearly had made inadequate provision 

for the Department. The result had been that officers of the line had 

to be detailed for duty in the Department as acting quartermasters. In 

1905, 21 had been so detailed; by 1908, the number had grown to 79, 

of whom 45 were lieutenants, performing duties that by reason of the ir 

importance required "a ripe experience and mature judgment." ZT On 

.. RG 92, OQMG Document File, 1800-1914 . Case 519005 Addt!' (Lt T. Stimson to 

Chaimlan , House Committee on Military Affairs, 1 Jan 1912) . 

.. (I) 50 Sillt. 977 (Mar 2, 1899). (2) The milita ry storekeeper retired on 12 J anuary 

1901, thereby discontinuing Ihal position . 

.. 51 Sllll. 751 (Feb 2, 1901). The Department consisted of 6 assistant quartermasters 

general, with the r.wk of colonel; 9 deputy quartermaners general. with the rank of lieu· 

tenant colonel; 20 quartemlasters, wilh the rank of major; and 60 quarterm3sten, with Ihe 

nwk of captain, under a Quartermaster Ceneral, wilh the ranI.: of brigadier general . 

.. Anfllllli Report of til e Q!wrlermosler Geuunl, 1905, p. 59; 1908, p. 41. 
564 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

the one hand. such detail evoked complaints from the line that its effi· 

ciency was being impaired, and, on the other, Quartermasters General 

maintained that the lack of a sufficient number of qualified officers hampered Quartermaster operations. Repeated requests for additional per· 

sonnel finally led Congress to authorize 30 more officers for the Department in 19 11. but since Quartermaster Genera l Aleshire 3 years earlier had 

shown a need for 2 16 officers, the authorized strength of 126 was still inadequate. 28 With much justice, Stimson opposed efforts to reduce officer 

strength in effecting consolidation of the three supply departments 

because the Quartermaster's Department in 19 12 was still drawing upon 

the line for officers to serve as acting quartermasters in addition to those 

regularly detailed to that staff. The 'War Department once more reo 

viewed the whole matter of the proposed reforms.2~ 

On 24 August 1912, Congress enacted legislation that created the 

Quartermaster Corps by merging into one supply agency the former 

Subsistence, Pay, and Quartermaster's Department.M The Head of the 

new organization was named Chief of the Quartermaster Corps of the 

Army, but brevity and familiarity with the former designation both 

suggested a reversion to the title of Quartermaster General of the Army, 

a change that Congress made in 1914.11 Major General Aleshire became 

the first chief of the Quartermaster Corps. and was succeeded on his 

retirement, in September 1916, by the former Commissary General of 

Subsistence, Maj. Gen. Henry G. Sharpe. Under a plan worked out by 

Aleshire, the consolidation was put into effect in the United States by 

I November 1912 without delaying or interfering with the supply, service, 

and pay of the Army. Consolidation was made effective in the Philippine 

Department on I January 191 3. 

The commissioned strength of the Corps, as fixed by the 191 2 legis· 

lation, was set at 183 officers. The three former suppl y bureaus had a 

total strength of 223 officers when the law was approved. A reduction 

of 40 officers was thus required. The au thorized strength was to be 

gradually achieved by not filling vacancies in certain designated grades. 

By 1915, the commissioned strength of the Corps stood at 185. The 

National Defense Act of 1916 reversed this downward trend by setting 

the commissioned strength at 369 officers.u 

- 36 SIal. 1045, (Mar 3, 1911). Under this act. Ihe dist.ribulion of officers was as follows: 

I brigadier general, 8 colonels, ]2 ]ieulenant colonels, 27 majors. and 78 caplains. 

- RG 92, OQMG Document File, 1800-19]4, Case 319603 Addtl. (Slatement, Chief of 

Stall' to SW, 6 Jan 1912) . 

.. ~7 SIal. 591-93 . 

.. (I) RG 92. OQMG Documelll File, 1800-1914, Case 487541 (SW 10 Chairman, House 

Commillee on Mililary Affairs. 5 D~ 19]3). (2) 38 Stal. 356 (Apr 27. 1914. 

" 39 Stat. 170 Gun 3, 1916). Under this law. Ihe Corps consisted of Ihe following 

officers: I Quartermaster General, wilh Ihe rank of major general; 2 assistants with the 
CONVERSION OF A DEPARTMENT INTO A CORPS 565 

C1'eatiol1 of a Semice C01'PS 

T he act of August 24. 19 12, not on ly created the Quartermaster 

Corps by consolidating three supply bureaus but it also militarized the 

Corps by establishing a service corps of enlisted men to do for the Army 

the work. of clerks, engineers, firemen, carpenters, blacksmiths. packers, 

teamsters, and laborers, work wh ich civilians and soldiers detailed on 

extra d uty had previously performed. T he total enlisted strength was 

not to exceed 6,000 men. T he Q uartermaster Corps buil t up this 

service corps grad ually through a system of examinations, the successful 

candidates replacing civilian employees and relieving enlisted men of 

the line of extra d uty. By 30 J une 1916, the se rvice corps had a total 

of 5,379 enlisted men.U 

T he years 1898-19 17 were marked by more fu ndamenta l administrative changes than had affected the Department since its establishment as 

a bureau in 1818. Of significance, LOa, is the (act that adjustments to 

these changes were in many cases still being made on the eve of the 

country's entrance into the war with Germany. 

Development of the Army Tmnsport Service 

During these same years, many modifications and developments were 

also made in Q uartermaster operations or in the way in which the functions assigned to the Department were carried out. Clearl y some of these 

developments were a direct result of recommendations made by the Dodge 

Commission and of efforts on the part of the Q uartermaster's Department 

to remedy shortcomi ngs exposed by the Spansh-American War. In other 

cases, they represented new departures intended to produce grea ter efficiency in the Army. As in so many instances in the past, economy, tOO, 

was a motivating factor that freq uently made itself felt. 

The annexation of Hawaii and the acquisition o( Cuba, Puerto Rico, 

Guam, and the Ph ilippine Islands, as a result o( the Spanish-American 

War, established the United States as a colonial power and brought new 

problems of occupation and colonial administration to the Army.a. For 

rank of brigad ier genera l; 21 colonels; 24 lieutenant colonels; 68 majors, 180 captains; 

and 73 pay clerks then in active service who were appointed and commissioned recond 

lielltenants in the Corps . 

.. Amlllai Rt!JOrl of 111 (: Quarl(:rmtl$/ er Gelleral, 1916, p. 4, 

.. Unde r the Teller resolution, the United States disclaimed any intent to exercise 

sovereignty or conlTol over Cuba. The troops were withdrawn in 1902 but not before 

the PIau amendment had made provision for American intervention w preserve Cuban 

independence and to maintain a go"ernment capable of prolccling life, property, and 

individual liberty. 
566 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

the Quartermaster's Depanmelll, whose historic mission was the transportation of troops and supplies, the postwar Army responsibilities necessitated the developmenl of an effic ielll transport service. 

When the Spanish-American War ended. the Department had in 

service a sizable fleet of bOlh government-owned and chartered vessels. 

As rapid ly as the services of the chartered vessels could be relinquished, 

the Department sent such ships to their home ports for termination of 

their charters. By the end of fiscal year 1899, the Quartermaster's Department had no chanered vessels in service on the Atlantic Coast. It still 

used 15 chanered vessels on Ihe Paci fi c Coast, which were engaged in 

transporting men and suppli es re<luired in the operations against the 

Filipino insurrectionists led by Aguinaldo.u 

During the war, such vessels as the Department had purchased had 

been hastily fined to lranspon troops to Cuba and Puerto Rico. Criticism had caused the Department to try to improve accommodations on 

these ships, but the demand for their services limited the alterations that 

could be made. As soon as the need for these ships decreased, the 

Department entered into contracts to refi t the transports in order that 

more comfortabl e accommodations could be provided for officers and 

en listed men. In 1899, the Department transferred most of these refitted 

ships to the Pacific where the need was greatest, though it also intended 

to provide a fleet of such transports for service on the Atlantic.u 

Regulation o( the transport service was as essential to its success as 

improvement of equipment. Even before the remodeled transports were 

ready for service, the Quartermaster General pointed Ollt the necessity 

for formulating regulations to govern the organization and maintenance 

of the Army Transpon Service. A board of officers, convened for this 

purpose after the war, confc lTed with Quartermaster officers and consulted 

the ru les and t'egul aLions governing lhe conduct of service of well-estab· 

lished steamship lines, and particularly those used in the British transport 

service. From the lauer, the board adopted a basic policy. In the 

maintenance of distant garrisons, it would be as advantageous to the 

American service, as it was to the British. [Q make provision for sending 

out fami lies with troOps. The drafted regulations. approved by the 

Secrctary of 'Val', wcre published on 16 November 1898.u Under these 

regulations, the Department established two home ports, one at New 

York City and the other at San Francisco. It placed each under the 

direction of a General Superintendent of the Army Transport Service. 

- Amrual Rellorl of Ihe Quarlermrulrr Gfllrtral, 1899, pp. 10, 15. 

"//lid., pp. 84--85 (Col. Cha3. [liTO to QMG. III Scp 1899) . 

.. RG 94 . AGO Document File, 1800- 191~ . Case 122525 (Maj. Cen. Will iam Lud low, 

l'rCI. of lloard. 10 TAG , 26 OCI 1898). 
CONVERSION OF A DEPARTMENT INTO A CORPS 567 

who was aided by an assistant and olher subordinate office)'s. In add i. 

tion, the War Department assigned a transport quartermaster. commIssary, and surgeon to each vessel. 

So improved were th e accommodations offered by the Quartermaster's Department on Army lranspons and so smooth ly did they 

operate und er the regulations that the return of volunteer troops to 

San Francisco and the transportation of new levies LO Manila in 1899 

was accomplished "practically without loss of life, disease. or injury to 

health." " This was in marked contrast to the difficulties that had beset 

the Quartermaster's Dcpanmclll in 1898. ' ·Vith quiet satisfaction, exSecretary Alger wrote: 

The same Quartermaster-General who was severel y criticized and abused in 

1898 had since then transported half way round the globe a force over three 

times the size of the regular army in 1898, and is now transporting supplies 

of a ll kinds that d istance for a force of 70,000, without accident, withou t 

comp laint, and without, I veJ\lure to say, one-half of the anxiety, annoyance 

and labor it caused to send Shafter's army of 17,000 one-tweUth of that 

distance.1t 

The Department took in stride the dispatch of troops to China in 1900 

at the time of the Boxcr Rebellion when the United States and the 

European powers sent an intcl"llationa l expedition to re li eve the foreign 

legations besieged in Peking. A Quartermaster officer reca ll ed that 

Amcrican troops were landed in Ch ina in bener condi tion, with more 

complcte equipment of every class, and larger and bettcr stores of a ll 

supplies than those of any other country .. o With equal case, the Department handl ed the transportation demands made upon it for sending 

troops LO Cuba in 1906 and to Vera Cruz in 19 14. 

Under Quartermaster direction, th e Army Transport Service operated an ocean transport service. a harbor boat service, and an inter-island 

service in the Philippines during the years berore World War 1. Begi nning on 31 August 1898, the Quanennaster's Department cstablished a 

regular line of Army transports that provided weekly service between 

New York and the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. A similar bimonthly service was provided on the I'acilic Coast between San Francisco 

and Mani la. Even before th e Spanish-America n War, the Department 

had owned 10 steam tugs, launches, and propellers, most of which were 

used for harbor service at New York. H Under the Army Transport 

Scrvice, the number of govern ment·owned tugs, lighters, launches, and 

- Fillfl YO!IIrS oj 1I,t: lVar Dt:pttrlmt:III, p. 26 (Rpl, 29 Nov 1899). 

- Alger, Tilt: S/Hlllisll·Americall lI'ar, pp. 464--65 . "(I) Cruse. Apacht: D/.)'s alld Aflt:r, 1'. 288. (2) RG 92, AGO Document File, 1800-1914. Case 1327399 (Aleshirt: 10 TAG, tl Apr 19(8). 

"Amlllal lit:"",' of IhO! Quartt:rmaster Ct:llt:ral, 1897, p. 41. 
568 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

miscellaneous sma ll craft performing Quartermaster, Signal, and Artillery 

Corps work at harbors on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts increased 

umil, on the eve of World War I, they numbered well over 200.42 T he 

necessity of lightering military supplies hom ship to depot at Manila 

had caused the Department, in 1898, to authorize the Chief Quartermaster 

to purchase a sufficient number of launches, tugs, and lighters for his 

requirements. Ten years later, the Department was maintaining and 

operating at Manila and other ports in the Philippine Islands 56 launches 

and 160 lighters, cascoes, and other small boats.u In addition, the Army 

Transport Service operated an inter-island boat service in the Philippines 

for the transportation of passengers and supplies between the various 

ports.u 

Attack on A1'my Transport Service 

The Army Transport Service had scarcely been established before it 

had to weather an attack on its continued existence. In the spring of 

190 1, such interested organizations as the U.S. Export Association raised 

the question of whether the government should employ its own transports 

or patronize established lines of steamers.40 For reasons of economy, 

Secretary Root was inclined to agree with the arguments advanced by 

commercial lines. They were particularly applicable in the case of the 

Army tra nsport line carrying passengers and supplies to Cuba and Puerto 

Rico. Reduction of the number of troops in these islands had decreased 

transportation needs to such an extent that Secretary Root was certain 

commercial lines could handl e the limited amount of Army business more 

economically than government-owned transports. He therefore discon· 

tinued the Army Transport Service to Cuba and Puerto Rico on 30 June 

190 1 after the Quartermaster's Department had made contracts with 

commercial lines.<6 He also favored discontinuance of the transport 

service on the Pacific but deferred action until October of the following 

year when the Quartermaster's Department solicited bids from commercia l linesY 

Neither Quartermaster General Ludington nor his successor, Brig_ 

Gen. Charles F. Humphrey, agreed with the Secretary. Ludington wrote 

fee lingly of the futile efforts to secure suitable commercial ships for the 

.. I bid., 1916, p. 42; 1917, p. 62_ 

.. Ibid., 1908, p. 32 . 

.. See Ibid., 1905, p. 55; 19JJ, p. H; 1916, p. 43 . 

.. RG 92. OQMG Document File, 1800-1914, Case 164216 (Pres. of Assoc. 10 Rool, 8 

Apr 1901) . 

.. War Depo.rlmtmt A,uw"l Re//QI'/S, 1901, I. 16 . 

.. Ibid., 1902, I, 49-50. 
CONVERSION OF A DEPARTMENT I 'TO A CORPS 569 

transporta ti on of the armies during the war with Spain. He deemed it 

a wise policy to retain a suffi cient number of transports as part of the 

equipment of the Army so that the Departmclll might be able to meet 

promptly any emergency demand for transportation .. s Humphrey, who 

had been serving as Cbief Quartermaster at Manila before his appointment as Quartermaster General early in 1903, was as firmly convinced 

that the abandonmcl1l of the Army Transport Service would be a mistake. 

He argued that not only did the service afford comfortable, health y 

accommodations for the troops, but it also allowed the Army to send the 

family of an enlisted man to the Philippines, thereby diminishing the 

hardships of foreign service. In addition, it provided other services 

essentia l to the government, such as carriage of mail free of expense to 

the POst Office Department 'lnd sa fe transferra l of large sums of currency 

and coin. To clinch his drgument in favor of retention of the Army 

Transport Service, he had prepared a detailed compilation of expendi. 

tures showing that this service cost less than similar service on commercial 

lines." 

The Secretary of War did not abolish the Army Transport Service. 

He did not restore transport service on the Atlantic but sailings between 

San Francisco and Manila were continued until 1917, though Secretary 

Root reduced the number from bimonthly to monthly departures in 

1902. The Department had to d ispose of some vessels when the Secretary 

terminated service on the Atlantic, but on the eve of Worl d War I the 

Army Transport Service still had 16 transports in operation. 

E/fm'ts to lmpmve Van'01IS Aspects of Railmad Tmllsportation 

Railroad congestion at Tampa in 1898 had led the Dodge Commission to conclude that a lack of executive or administrative ability, either 

on the part of the Quartermaster's Department or the railroad officials, 

had been responsibile for that condition,SO Obviously, it behooved the 

Department to scrutinize its methods of operation more closely with a 

view to the ir improvement. The greater demands for water transportation following the Spanish-American War, however, caused the Department to defer consideration of the problems involved in the transportation 

of troops and supplies by rail until a later time. 

Review and revision of the Depanment's method of settling accounts 

for railroad transportation was of immediate urgency. The clerical work 

of preparing, verifying, and settling such aCCOlints, inVOlving free, land-

.. ,4""1111/ ReptJrl 01 /I'e Q"ortermoJler Gr.llero/, 1902, p, 16, 

" I bid" I90J, pp, 1&-17, 

- Dodge: Commission ReptJrl, I, 147. 
570 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARM Y 

gram , or bond-aided railroads, was difficult and voluminous. The Quartermaster's Department handled not only Army transportation, but 

legislation a lso required it to provide transportation for the property 

and supplies of a ll other Executive Departments, a nd the Departmen t 

prepared the accounts for such service in duplicate. 51 

For many years, railroad companies had been presenting their 

accounts to the quartermasters with whom they did business and who 

were located in the areas in which the railroads rece iving payment operated, as for example, at New York, Chicago, Omaha, San Francisco, 

Seattle. and other cities. In the summer of 1900, a board of Quartermaster officers, working with representatives of the railroad compani es, 

the War Department Auditor, and the Comptroll er of the Treasury, 

made a report after spending considerable time seeking ways to improve 

the method of settlement. Among other things, the board recommended 

the establishment of a central office in Wash ington where a ll railroad 

accounts in the future would be paid. ~2 

A lack of personnel to man such an offi ce led the Department to 

defer action, but, in 1905, Quartermaster General Humphrey agai n raised 

the issue. He en larged at length on the greater economy and efficiency 

that could be promoted by bringing into a cen tral office the cl erks then 

handling the seltlement of accounts a t a ll the different Quartermaster 

offices. Since all settlement was subject to revision by the Auditor fo r 

the War Department in ""Vashington, much vexatious correspondence 

wou ld be reduced and centralized operations, he declared, would eliminate much duplication of activity. G' Humphrey's recommenda tion to 

the Secretary of War met with considerabl e opposition from western 

railroad companies, wh o feared that a \Vashington office would not lead 

to prompt settlement of th eir accounts.Si Their opposition was seemingly strong enough to cause anion again to be deferred . 

Greater centra li zation was inevitable but th e Depanment attacked 

the problem piecemea l a few years later. With the approval of the 

Secretary of War, it discontinued seven disbursing offi ces fo r the se ttl ement of transportation accounts on I Jul y 19 10. This first reduction 

havi ng demonstrated that funh er consolidation was in the best interests 

of the service, the Department closed th ree more offices the fa ll owing 

year. By I July 19 12, only four of th e 15 d isbursing ofTtces that had 

., 23 Slat. 111 Gu l 5, 1884) . 

.. RG 92, OQMG Document File, 1800-1914. Case H0765 (Ludington \0 SW, 28 J Ull 

19(0) . 

.. Allllual Rl!j1art lIf IIIl! Q!llJl·/l!m,"sll!r Gl!" l!Tal, 1905, PI'. 42--44 . 

.. Sec RG 92, OQMG Document File, 1800-191 4, Case 140765 ror a number or such 

protests. 
CONVERSION OF A DEPARTMENT I N TO A CORPS 57 1 

sc ul ed accounts in the past continued in operation- a t Washington, 

Chi cago, St. Louis, and Sa n Francisco."" 

Even as it simplified these tra nsactions, the Quartermaster's Department gave attention (0 the problem of possible congestion in the handling 

o [ supplies and troops at future mobilization periods. Late in 1907, 

it solicited the views of d epot quartermasters and railroad officials on the 

desirability of allach ing distinctive cards to all fre ight cars carrying 

carl oad lots of Quartermaster supplies, th e cards to indicate in large 

letters the desLi na tion of th e contents, the consignor, the consignee, and, 

so far as practicable, the contents o[ the car. It proposed to use such 

cards in both peace and war. Depot quartermasters saw some va lue in 

th e plan in time of war, but most railroads rejected the proposal beca use 

it violated a basic ru le that they had adopted prohibiting the placing 

of any signs or cards on freight cars by a nyone.

M 

The Office of the Quartermaster General made a renewed attack 

upon th e probl em in 191 2 when it took up the question with th e American Railway MaSLCr Car Builders' Assodation. It then limited th e use 

of placards to stich times as th e country was threatened with war or was 

at war. It adopted a seri es o[ placards, each placard to give in [ormation 

on point of origin, consignee and destination , date shipped, consignor, 

and by color of a broad band in the center of the placard to give infonnation on type of supplies. (Green , for example, indicated subsistence.) 

All railroads agreed th at fre ight cars so placarded wou ld be given right 

of way from point of origin to destination and that such cars would be 

placed in the fastest moving freight trains. They also agreed tha t sllch 

freight cars would be kept constantly moving to desti nation point, and, 

once there, would be discharged and released without the necessity of 

waiting fo r formal bills of lading and official papers, the pl acards themselves serving to identify all shipmentsY 

Beginni ng in 1911 , the Omce of t.he Quartermaster General gave 

increasing attention to the preparation of data useful in the transportation 

of troops and supplies in the evem of a general mob ili zation. Thus, 

it prepared card indices showing th e routing [rom all mobile army posts 

to th e principal ports on the Atlamic, Pacific, and Gulf Coasts. It 

secured information on term inal fac ilities at points where troops might 

be concentrated. It gath ered data on railroad equipment- number and 

" Allllua/ ~porf of Ih ~ QUllrf r.rmlls ~r ll ral, 1911, pp. 48-49; 1912, pp. 46-47 . 

.. RG 92 OQMG Document File. 18()()'-'1914, Case 232872 (Ltr, OQMG to officer in 

cha rge, General Depot, 12 Dt-c 1907; lIr, Lr. Col. F. C. Hodgson to QMG. 14 Dec 1907; hr, 

Commissioner, Truck Line Assoc .. 10 Maj. J. S. Littell, 15 J an 1908). 

OT (I) RG 165. War College Div. Docu ment File. Case 9392- 1 (Memo. Actg QMG for 

Chief of Staff. 26 Jan 1916). (2) A"",wl ~po f 01 flt~ Qllllrlerl1lllster G/"'eml, 1916, pp. 

47---48. 
572 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

types of locomotives, passenger cars, and freight cars. It held conferences 

on rates and fa res. At the time of the Vera Cruz ex pedition in April 

1914, the American Railway Assoc iation sent a representa tive to \>Vashington to offer ilS assistance. Subsequently, the Quartermaster Corps 

made ten tative arrangemen ts with a comm iltee of that Association, 

whereby, if it became necessary to mobilize all the forces of the United 

States, the Assoc iation wou ld establish a branch office in Washi ngton 

with a corps of expert railroadmen to work u nder the instruction of the 

'>Var Department and assist in the expeditiolls operation of troop and 

suppl y trains.u The Quartermaster General was convinced that the 

government could cou nt upon the wholehearted cooperation of the ra ilroad offic ials in carrying out the provisions of the legislation enacted in 

1906. This legislation had provided that in time of war, or th reatened 

war, the railroads, at the request of the President, would give preference 

and precedence over all other traffic LO the transportation of troops and 

materials of war.6t 

When the outbreak of war in Europe induced various individuals 

to propose the establishment o[ a national board of transportation and 

to offer suggestions on the relation of rai lroads to national defense. the 

Quartermaster General countered thaI all practical preliminary arrangements had already been made. He rejected. as undesirab le, a suggestion 

that a transportation div ision be created in the General Staff in view of 

the fact that a d ivision of the War Department charged with the duties 

of transportation was already in existence,eo 

A proposed congressional reso lution of 7 December 19 15 which 

looked toward government acq uisition and called for action to coordinate 

lines of communication and transportation with national defense caused 

tbe Quartermaster General to comment that in his opi nion the existing 

law of June 29, 1906, pro"ided ample legislation. All that was required 

to put that law into proper effect was the adoption of certain details. 

He proposed the enactment of a law thal would give the Secretary of 

War authority to call offic ials of transportation lines to meet officers of 

the War Department in conference and that would permit him 10 grant 

a per diem allowance to the railroad offi cials. 81 

.. RG 165. War College Div. Document File, Case 9201- 2 (LIT, Waller E. Emery 10 

I'res. Wilson, 31 Jill 191 5. and 2d ind., Actg QMC 10 TAG, II Aug 1915; Case 9201 - 8 (fAG 

to QMG, 20 Sep 1915, and lsi ind., AClg QMC 10 TAG , 25 Sep 191 5): CaSt: 9201- 11 (Aleshire 

to TAG, 4 Feb 1916). 

" 34 Stilt. 587 Oun 29, 19(6) . 

.. RG 165. War College Div. Documellt File, Case 920 1- 11 (Aleshire to TAG, 4 Feb 1916). 

"Ibid., Case 920 1- 14 (QMG to Chief of Staff, 19 j an 1916). The proposed action of 

the resolution was rejected by the War Department. Ibid., (Llr, SW to Chairman, Senate 

Military Alb in Committee, :; jan 1916). 
CONVERSION OF A DEPARTMENT INTO A CORPS 573 

The General Staff was by no means so certain that the existing 

legislation would suffice. The law prescribed no penalty for fail ure to 

give prdcrence and precedence to, or to exped ite, military traffic. and 

the War Coll ege Division, in making its report, was doubtful that the 

existing law would have relieved the congestion at Tampa in 1898. Its 

report went on to point Oll t that it was a matter of common knowledge 

that. early in 1916, a large panian 'of the freight cars of the country were 

on side tracks and in railroad yards from the Atlantic seaboard back for 

hundreds of miles towards the interior, loaded with goods destined for 

Europe. because there we re insufficient shi ps available to forward them. 

One rai lroad had ordered its agents to refuse transportation for export, 

since 8,000 loaded cars were on its side tracks as far from New York as 

Scranton, Pa. The War College Division found th e measures taken lSy 

the Quartermaster Corps va luable in case of mobilization, but, again, it 

thought that they would be effectual only if the railroad officials at the 

lime of mobi lization were willing to comply with the Act o( June 29, 1906. 

Revelatory of the failure to resolve differences between the General 

Staff and th e supply bureau, th e repon added that, in any case, the 

plans prepared by the Quartermaster Genera l were part of the duty 

o utlined for a transportation section of the General Staff. "Execution," 

the War College Division pronounced, "rather than preparation of such 

plans is a proper fun ction of the Quanermaster Corps." While it 

approved the suggestion of conferring with railroad officials. the Division 

maintained that th e War Department should be represented at such 

conferences by members of the General Staff. nOt by Quartermaster 

officers.u 

For all its aspirations. the General Staff apparently evolved no plan 

for co-ordinating railroad service in the event of national necessity. For 

its pan. the Quartermaster Corps believed that the "careful plan of 

cooperation" with the railroads, which it had adopted, and their assistance 

in the past and imereSL in this plan "demonstrated that the problem of 

rail congestion , which was the bugaboo of the mobilization of troops in 

1898. has been cmirely eliminated." II Both the Staff and th e QuartermaSter Corps overlooked the need for co-ordination among the various 

supply services. and no one gave a thought to the basic problem of adequate storage facil ities to the rear to prevent congestion at port docks 

and progressive ly into the interior along railroad sidings. despite the fact 

that the nature of that problem had already been pointed up by shipment 

of goods to Europe in the winter of 1915-16. 

- Ibid ., Cue 9201- 14 (Memo, Cilief. War College Di\', for Chief of Staff, 4 Feb 1916). 

- Amlllal Report 0/ lilt: QIMrlerlml.ller General, 1916, p. 49. 
574 QUARTERrlllASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Clothillg ProiJIems 

The provision of suitablc clOlhing for military personnel in the 

Tropics had first become a problcm when Shaftcr's Army was selll to 

Cuba, but the continued prcsence of troops in the Philippines and Cuba 

after the war made thc dcvelopmcnt and issue of such clothing of continuing urgency. Dewlopment of an appl'Opriatc servicc uniform for 

troops scrving in the Tropics caused Ihe greatcst anxiety to the Dcpartment and engaged its allention throughout the years before the United 

States weill lO war with Germany. 

After a yea r's experimcntation by Ame rican manufact urers, thc 

Quartermaster Gencral concluded, in the fall of 1899, that they could 

produce khaki of quality, strength, and color eq ual to the English fabric 

and in sufliciet11 qllamilics to mcct Army needs. i\'leanwhilc, to supply 

the 22 additional regiments being organized and equ ipped for service in 

the Philippines, the Depanmcllt had to go inLO the English market and 

purchase sufficient cloth for the purpose. ft • The Quartermaster Genera l 

provcd LO be t OO sanguine in his exp<.'Ctat ions; 2 years later the problem oE 

a fast color was still being worked lIpon , and the demand for khaki 

clothing in the Philippincs and Cuba was so great that the Dcpartment 

could make none available to sta tc mi litia, and on ly in a few cases could it 

furnish such clothing to Regu lar troops at extreme southcrn posts in the 

United States.u Experimcntation continued , and the Regulars in the 

Un ited States wore the abundant supply of white bl eached duck cloth ing 

left on hand in Quartermaster depots after the Spanish-American War. 

The probl em of developing a fa st color for tropica l clothing was 

compli cated by the necessity of making all military clothing less conspicuous in the field in vicw of the improved range of the rifle. The 

Army conducted extensive tests from 1900 to 1902 LO determine the 

visibility of different colors. Aftcr many disappointments, the Department finally succeeded in producing an ol ive-drab color that it believed 

mCl Army requirements for invisibility, fastness, and serviceability." 

When the War Department appointed a board of officers to consider the 

uniforms and equipment of the Army, the Quartermaster's Department 

was able to submit perfectcd samples that led to the adoption of the 

olive-drab shade for overcoa ts and service winter uniforms at the same 

timc that changes in the dcsign of thc uniform were also adopted." 

"Ibid., 1899. p. 95 (Rpl , Col. Wm. S. I'alloll 10 QMG. 1 Sep 1899). 

-Ibid., 1901, p. 66 (Rpl . Chief of CIOl hing and Equ ipage IJr to QMG, 15 Aug 19(1). 

-Ibid., 1902, p. 6 . 

.. AGO, Gtmt:rtJl Ordus Mid CirrultJrJ, 1902, GO 81 (17 Jill 1902); GO 152 (31 Dec 

1!J02). 
CONVERSION OF A DEPARTM ENT I NTO A CORPS 575 

T he tradiLional hlue uniform was reta ined onl y for dress pu rposes. 

Quartcrmaster General Humphrey relucta ntl y abandoned it as a serv icc 

uniform. He acknowledged the advamages of th e olive-drab uniform 

for active field servi<.:e, but he undoubtedly voiced th e sem iments of man y 

veterans when he declared th at for a uni form in time of peace th e blue 

was in every respect preferabl e. l3Iue-clad men o n parade presented a 

"far nea ter, more imposing, and more soldierly appearance lhan the ir 

companions in olive drab." 8" 'Vilh some mi nor modifications adopted 

later, the new olive-drab service un iform consiSled of the familiar breeches 

and sack coat worn by th e tl"OOpS in World War ]. 

Large stocks of clothi ng had been left on hand after the SpanishAmeritan ' Val" and economy req uired that they should be absorbed by 

issue before the new uni form was made available to the troops. Nevertheless, adoption of the new uniform, earl y in 1902, led to a hasty 

prom ulgat ion of an order requiring offi cers to equip themselves wilh it 

by I January 1903, despite the fau that issue to enlisted men was to begin 

on ly after the a\'ai lable supply of old-style clothing became exhausted, 

and obviously if. would take years to deplete that stoc k. oD Inevitably, 

pressures built lip to begin issue of the new un iform immediately. A too 

early efforL was made to introduce th e new uniform by equipping troops 

retu rn ing from the Ph ilippines with it beca use they wo uld have no woolen 

clothing. Since ad herence to that policy would have equipped the Army 

long bdore all the blue clothing had bee n issued , th e 'War Department 

discontinued th e policy within a year.;~ ]n the meanti me, efforts were 

made to induce the enlisted llIen to d raw th e old-style cloth ing by offering 

it at reduced prices, and subseq uen tl y such clothi ng could be drawn for 

wear whe n nOt on duty. By sitch mea ns, the Qual"lcn nastcr's Department 

gradually red uced stocks. Issue of the new uniform to all organizations 

bega n in the summel" of 1906. 

To the distress of the Department, khaki was retained for summer 

clothing when the new uniform was adopted in 1902. Quartermaster 

interest in securi ng adoptio n of the ol ive-d rab shade for cotton cloth ing 

was heightened by th e fact that the entire domestic ompUl of khaki was 

controll ed by o ne corpora ti on which alone possessed th e secret of dyeing 

gray cotton, th e basis of the khaki, the necessary fast color. To relieve 

the situati on, the Department recommended that th e use of colton khaki 

uniforms in th e United States be discon tinued, and tha t olive·drab, 

- Au,wIII Uel/Orl of Ille Quartermllster Ge'!eml, 1905, p. 16. 

- AGO, Ge"eml Order$ lind Ci ... ;ultm, 1902, GO 81 (17 Ju1 19(2). The: time by which 

officers we re LO supply Lhemselves WiLh Ihe new uniform was later e);tended to 1 Ju ly 1903. 

Ihid., GO 132 (31 Dec 19(2). 

"' (1) Ibid., 1902, GO 122 (13 J u t (904). (2) A",u.III1 !le/",,.t of /I!P. QUllrtullwJler 

Ccneml, 190), p. U. 
576 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

unli ned wimer service uniforms be used for summer wcar. It also 

suggested that since successful experiments had been made to produce a 

cotton fabric in an olive-green shade- a color thatlllost nearly approached 

the olive-drab and was suitable for service wear in summer and in the 

Tropics- standards and specifications for that shade could be adopted and 

thereby also relieve the conditions surrounding the supply of khaki." 

The Secretary of \Var took these proposa ls under consideration. In the 

meantime, the dema nds for khaki clothing outran the ability of the contractors to supply it. To satisfy tlie demands from the Philippine Division, the Q uartermaster's Department authorized its chief quartermaster 

to purchase materia l and manufacture at Manil a the khaki clothing 

req uired for use of the Philippine $caUls and Regu lar troops. 7! 

Dissatisfaction with the existing situation led the Department to 

continue its experimentation to perfect a more suitab le color and cloth 

for summer service uniforms. By 1909, it had developed an olive-drab 

cotton cloth which it claimed was softer, more pliable, cooler, and more 

comfortabl e to wear than the old khaki. It also claimed that the fabric 

had permanency of coloLIa An Army board subsequently disagreed with 

these findings, but the olive-d rab summer uniform was adopted, though 

its issue did not begin until the summer of 1912, after the existing stocks 

of khaki clothing had, for the most part, been exhausted. 

Compla ints continued to be almost as numerous as in previous years, 

however, for permanency of color proved no more satisfactory in olivedrab than in khak i materia l. Because cotton service uniforms were considered unfit for use in campaigns, the War Department did not accumulate any in its reserve supply. T he general dissatisfaction led the Quartermaster Corps to continue experimenting in the hopc of deve loping a marc 

suitabl e fabric made of a mix tu re of- cotton and wool. Early in 1914, it 

again offered a proposal made 8 years earl ier. It suggested that a uniform 

of mixed colton and wool, or of wool might provide a more satisfactory 

field service outfit during all seasons of the year. The Corps solicited 

comments from the field. In consequence, although the ol ive-drab cotton 

service uniform was retained for use in the Tropics, its issue to troops in 

the United States, Alaska, and China was abolished. The War Department suspended the date of that action pending the outcome of Quartermaster experiments with the mixed cotton and wool fabric." 

These experiments were still in progress on the eve of World War I, 

"Annual llIlPQT/ 01 jhe Quartermaster Ge1leral, 1906, pp. 37-38. 

"Ibid., 1907, p. <44. 

" Ibid., 1909. p. 31. 

"RG 165. War College Div. Document File. Case 6894- 19. remrd card (OCS Memo for 

TAC. :1 Jan 1914; 3d 'nd .. OCQMC 10 CofS. 25 Mar 1914; 4lh 'nd .. OCS. 10 Chief. QMC, 

26 Mar 1914). Ibid .. Case 689 ..... 32. record card CrAG 10 QMG. 24 Jnl 1914). 
CONVERSION OF A DEPARTMENT INTO A CORPS 577 

but other problems also required attention. American manufacturers 

were dependent on imported dyestuffs and the outbreak of war in 1914 

immediately closed their source of supply. The olive-drab shade. so 

carefull y adopted by the Department for the service uniform, could not 

be obtained for use in 1917. Domestic dye production was initiated, but 

the Quartermaster Corps also took steps to develop a satisfactory subsritute fabric made of brown and gray mixed meltons that could be readily 

procured from various woolen mills. TO 

One of the lessons drawn from the Spanish·American War was the 

wisdom of having an adequate reserve of supplies on hand to meet 

emergency demands. In submitting its report to the President, the 

Dodge Commission had recommended that the Quartermaster's Department should ma intain at all limes a 4-months' supply of all articles of 

clothing and equipment needed by an army of 100,000 men.TO The 

experiences of the war remained so vivid for Quartermaster officers that 

they constantly worked to build and maintain a reserve stock in the 

years before World War].11 Interest in this problem was not restricted 

to the Quartermaster's Department. In response to a question raised 

by the War College Board, then functioning in lieu of a General Staff 

not yet established, the Secretary of War directed the Board, in June 

1903, to take under consideration a study covering the establishment of 

permanent general depots for reserve supplies of all classes of war materiel 

and to recommend regulations for the administration and inspection of 

such depots.a The War College Board leisurely pursued its study during 

the next few years. 

In 1905, Congress Cut the appropriation for clothing and equipment 

by $750,000. Quartermaster General Humphrey quickly pointed out 

that the number of troops to be supplied was practically the same as in 

1904 and that the cost of supplies and materials was increasing. Despite 

his comments, Congress did not recognize the need for more funds and, 

in the following year, it again appropriated only $4 mill ion for clothing 

and equipment as it had in the previous year. Humphrey warned the 

Secretary of War that a deficiency had been avoided only by curtailing 

much-needed purchases and by carrying a stock that was totall y inadequate 

to meet emergencies. TiO 

"AlltlUal Report af '''e Quarlerma51er Gmeral, 191$, p. 22: ibid., 1916, p. 21. 

"' Dodge Commission RepOrl, I, 148, 

n Lt. Col. Thomas Cruse obserlled that, while he was stationed at Philadelphia as 

depot quartermaster from 191 1 to 191.~ . building a reserve stock "became almost an ol»ession with me," Apache Da)'J alld Aftu, p. 309, 

.. RG 165, War College Dill. Document Fi le, Case 6271 (Memo Rpl of Suocommltee 

of Third Dill, undated) . 

.. Annual Report of til e QlIartu master General, 1905, p. 15: 1906, p. 35. 
578 QUARTERMASTER SU PPORT OF THE ARMY 

Not only did Congress fai l to heed the warning of the Quartermaster 

General, who was soon to retire, but it also funher red uced the funds for 

clothing and equipment. appropriating onl y $3 million for fiscal year 

1907. Since, by care ful computation, over $5,500,000 would be needed, 

this appropriation, Quartermaster Genera l Aleshire reponed, was not 

only inadequate to meet the needs of the Army and supply the militia 

but also left no margin (or preparing for an emergency. Decreasing 

appropriations and increasing COSts meant that the limited working stock, 

accumulated in the years since the Spanish-American ,"Var, had become 

so reduced that practica lly no dependence could be placed upon it. The 

"hand-to-mouth" policy being pursued, Alesh ire pointed out, was dis· 

advantageous, uneconomical, and ull5afe. He added that unless a reserve 

supply was bui lt up, the Department, as in 1898, would be "severely and 

unjustl y criticised for failing to accomplish the impossibl e" in any 

emergency.·o 

Aleshire's efforts won a modest increase in the appropriation fot' 

fiscal year 1908, and Congress made far larger sums available for reserve 

stocks in the next 2 years. With the backing of Maj. Gen. Leonard 

Wood as Chief of Staff, Aleshire took steps to put into effect a plan to 

build a reserve supply of clothing sufficiem to uniform 85,000 men." 

In the fall of 191 0, the War College Division of the Genera l Staff 

submitted recommendations for the establishment of depots of supplies 

in the areas within which troops would be mobi lized in the event of 

war.'" With the Secretary of War's approval, the Chief of Staff implemented these recommendations to the extent of establishing onl y one of 

lhe proposed chain of genera l suppl y depots until the practicability of the 

scheme could be tesled. Fie ld Supply Depol No. I was ordered set up 

at Philadelphia, where military storehouses already in existence could be 

released £01' the purpose.

1S On the basis of lists prepared by the various 

supply bureaus, the Genera l Staff drew up a standard list of field supplies 

to be kept on hand at this depot. The clothing reserve stocks already 

accumulated by the Quartermaster General formed a part of the stock 

directed to be placed in Field Supply Depot No. I." At a later date, 

other fi eld supply depots were to be establ ished at Atlanta, St. Louis, 

Omaha, San Francisco, and at, or in the vicinity of, Springfield, Mass. 

By 30 June 1913, a considerable amount of the designated quantities 

- I bid., 1907, 1" 37- 38. 

Oi I bid., 1910, p. 46. 

- RG 165. War College Div. Document File. Case 627 1- 9 (Memo. Chief. War College 

Div, for Secretary. Ceneral Staff Corps. 9 Nov 1910). 

- Ibid., Case 6271- 35 (Memo. Chief of Staff fo r TAG. 9 Feb 1911). 

"(I) Ibid., Cue 6271-52 (Memo. Brig. Gen . W. W. Wotherspoon for Secretary. General 

Stafr Corps). (2) A""ual R~port 01 th ~ Quart ~rmtJ.Iter G~,,~ral, 1911, PI'. 20-22; 27. 
CONVERSION OF A D EI'ARTMENT INTO A CORPS 579 

of clothing and equipage was on hand at Fie ld Suppl y Depol No. I, but 

a year later large deficiencies existed in the reserve stocks. With the 

approva l of the Secretary of War, the Quartermaster Corps used these 

reserve supplies to cloth e and equi p th e troops sent to Vera Cruz and 

concentrated on the Mexican border.u The Quartermaster Corps was 

unable to rebuild its reserve stocks because not only did th e War Department fa il to include the estimates deemed necessary by the Quartermaster 

Genera l, but, except for I year, Congress also furth er ( lit the amount or 

fa iled entirely to appropria te funds fo r the purpose." It necessaril y 

Followed . too, that the proposed chain of field supply depots was never 

esta bl ished. 

Following the outbreak of rcvollilion in Mexico in 19 10, border 

troublcs becamc steadily worse. When Mexica ns, under the leadership 

o( Francisco Villa, in vaded America n territory in March 1916, the 

President sent an expeditionary force under Brig. Gen . J ohn J. Pershing 

in pursuit. In May and June, most of the orga ni zed mi litia of the states 

were call ed into active service and concentrated on th e border. T o 

clothe and eq uip these troops, th e Qua rtermaster Corps u tilized all 

supplies on hand. The reserve proved inadequate to meet the demands, 

and, under authority of the Secretary of War, the Corps made purchases 

at the general depots, either in open mar ket or after inviting proposals 

upon short notice.!T 

O n the eve of World Wa r I, reserve stocks of clothing and equipage 

had becn wipcd out. Despitc Aleshire's warnings, Congress made no 

.. Amllln/ R~porl oj I" ~ Q!lnrl n/ln I~r G~!lern/, 19f.1, I'p. 11, 21. 

"In the B·year period before World Wu I. the amou nts estimated u nccessary for 

rC5erve l upplies by Ihe cloth ing branch of the Qua te nna er GenCl"31'I office, included in 

thc estimate by the War Departmcnt , ant! actua lly appropriated by Co ~ were u follows: 

Amount enirnatcd by Amount included Amount appro· 

Fi.so l t'ear cloth ing mpply ;" estimate priau:d by 

branch Congress 

1909 ... ....... $2:100,000.00 $2,500,000.00 $ 1.274.873.sr. 

1910 .. .. ...... 1.549,61(;.61 1.549.615.6 1 1.549,6 15.61 

191 [ .... . .. ... 1,194,653.&1 49-1,653.64 494,6.'i!l.64 

1912 ....... ... 332.04 1.76 332.04 1.76 332.04 1.76 

1915 .. ........ 2,05 1,889.34 131.700.00 .. ... . . ..... 

1914 . ......... 1.596.893.79 596,893.79 244.958.79 

]915 .......... 2.906.064.45 225.389.95 225.389.95 

1916 ..... . .... 225,000.00 2O(l,QOO.OO ......... 

Total. .... . 12.656,158.59 6.03"0.294.75 4,12 [.533.6 1 

lI"d., 1916, p. 20. 

or Ibid., 1916, p. 20. 
580 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

appropriations for their replacement in fisca l year 1916. Quartermaster 

Cruse later wrote: 

But we had been assured that the United States was not going into the 

war; therefore, we were told, the Army needed no unusual alJowances. When 

we did go into the struggle there was not in stock sufficiency of ordinary articles 

to outfit our two regular divisions.sa 

Consl1'uction Demands 

Other functions of the Quartermaster's Department were affected by 

the aftermath of the Spanish·American War. Colonial empire necessi· 

tated the maintenance of a larger Army than had existed before 1898. 

The continuing warfare in the Philippines emphasized the need for 

immediate action, but, initially, Congress enacted legislation early in 1899 

that only temporarily increased the size of the Regular Army to no more 

than 65,000 enlisted men and authorized a force of volunteers not to 

exceed 35,000.n Since the volunteer force had to be discharged not 

later than I July 1901 and the Regular Army then reverted to its prewar 

strength, Secretary Root urged reorganization of the Army in the fa ll of 

1900. In response to his recommendations, Congress made provision 

for an Army whose strength might be varied by the President, accord ing 

to the exigencies of the time, from a minimum o[ approximate ly 60,000 

to a maximum of 100,000. 8{J During the next decade, however, the 

strength of the Army never approached the maximum, averaging only 

about 65,500. 

This increase of the Army [rom its prewar strength of about 25,000 

made immediate demands upon the Quartermaster's Depanment, for it 

required an increase in barracks, hospitals, and post accommodations. 

In order to secure a definite pl an for the location and distribution of 

military posts needed for the proper accommodation, instruction, and 

training of the Army as reorganized by Congress, Secretary Root appointed a board of genera l officers in November 1901. He transmitted 

its report and recommendations to Congress the following May. ~l 

The policy of the War Department, according to Secretary Root, 

was to increase the size of the posts in which the Army was quartered 

rather than to increase their number. This policy was dictated by a 

desire to promote "economy of administration" and, even more impor. 

· Cruse, Apache Days and Afler, p. 309. 

·30 Sial. 979-80 (Mu 2. [899). 

"'(I) ~I Sial. H8 fl. (t'cb 2. 1901). (2) Five Yum 0/ Ihe War Departm enl, pp. 136-37 

(Rpl. 2Q Nov 19(0) . 

.. See House Doc. 6 [8. 57th Cong., hi SC$5 .. "Resu lu of Preliminary Examinations and 

Surveys of Sites for Milituy I'osts." 
CONVERSION OF A DEPARTMENT INTO A CORPS 581 

lam, to promote "efficiency of officers and mcn." Large posts made 

possible systematic stud y and practi ce in schools und er lhe direction and 

influence of offi cers of high ra nk that would be impossibl e if troops and 

officers were scattered among small po S.D ~ Accustomed as Army offi cers 

were, however, to the system of 5ca tlered posts that had been erected as 

protection against the Indians. the recommendations of the board advanced no definite plan for concentrating troops in a few posts. O[ the 

65 existing posts at which troops were stationed. the board recommended 

thal 52 be permanently and 13 temporarily occupied. The board also 

recommended the erection of 7 new regimental posts in contrast to earlier 

compan y poSlS.u A decade later, Secre tary of ,.var I-I enry Stimson was 

LO poim out that Army Regulations then made no memion of the 

importance of combined maneuvers; that the " beautiful park" idea of 

post construction had been firml y fixed; and that "as a whole, the Army 

was not aware of its own shortcomings." W' 

Gu ided by the board 's approved plan for a system of permanent posts, 

the Quartermaster's Department constructed and repaired, both in the 

United States and in the Philippine Islands, barracks, quarters, hospitals, 

storehouses, and misce ll aneous bui ldings under the liberal appropriations 

made by Congress. " It is sa fe to say," the Quartermaster Genera l 

reponed, "that a vastly grea ter amoun t of construction \I/ork was planned, 

undertaken. and contracted for during the fisca l year 1902- 03 than during 

an y previous year in the history of the Army."~" 

The Quartermaster General augmellled the regular corps o( archi· 

tects and draftsmen employed in the Construction and Repa ir Division 

of his office by hiring a number of temporary employees. So extensive 

did the construction work become that the Dcpartmcnt also obtained the 

service of an ex perienced architect.. Placed in charge of the Departmelll's 

force of architects and draftsmen, he was direct.ed to revise drawings and 

specifi ca tions to improve the general appearance of bu ildings and, in the 

interest o f economy, to eliminate undul y elaborate details of design and 

construction so that better buildings might be constructed at no increase 

in cost." 

The cost [actor became increasingly important because as the work 

progressed the cost of all materia l and labor rose steadily. Contracts 

awarded for construction from fu nds for fiscal year 1906, for example, 

showed a 12 percent increase over those for the previous year. Between 

1902 and 1905, construction costS advanced umil they were 36 percent 

-Five Yea~J 01 til e lI'a~ fl/Hl~lm "I , pp. 266-67 (Rpl. 1 Dec 1902). 

- 1·louse Doc. No. 6 18. 571h Clng .. lsI Sos .. 1'1>. 7- 8 . 

.. lI' a~ Depnrtmenl Annual ll /l ~ls. 1!)f2. I, 164. 

- AII/IIlal Report 01 Ille Quarfermaster Gellflral, 190), p . 21. 

M l bid., 19OJ, p. 9. 
582 QUARTERMASTER SU PPORT OF THE ARMY 

higher at the end of tha t pe riod tban a t th e beginning.Dr The increased 

COSt S of heavy timber, du rable lu mber. and high-grade Aooring led to the 

adoption of concrete a nd iron construction , The in trod uClion of exten· 

sive heat.ing, wa ter, and sewerage systems and the substitution of el ectric 

or bT(lS lighti ng for the forme r kerosene lamps added to construction costs 

but provided modern, comfortabl e accommoda tions. By 19 10, th e Quartenllaster's Department had mo\'cd towa rd the <.:onccmralion of all public 

utilities at a p OSt as a further means o( introducing economy,,8 

The recommendations made in the report o f the board o[ general 

offi cers in May 1902 were applica bl e onl y to inl and posts that accommodated the mobile Army. Coastal fortifications were not included in 

their review inasmuch as a general plan for the distribution and sheller 

of the Coast Artillery Corps had been adopted by the Endicott Board iil 

1886 with the approva l of the President and Congress. The building oE 

coastal fortifications was not a responsibility of the Q uartermaster's Dcpartment, but it paid for the constmction o f barracks, quaners, shops, 

storehollses, and other miscellaneolls buildings (or the troops assigned to 

these fortifications from Quartermaster appropriations and constructing 

quartennasters directed the work .n 

One effect of the Spanish-American \'Va r was to stimulate a more 

rapid compleLion of the coastal fortification work that had been initiated 

in a most leisurely manner in 1888. The acquisition of colonial possessions as a result o f the war also made necessary an extension of the work 

of the Endicott Boa rd. The Secretary of War appointed a new board 

to give consideration not onl y to building coastal defenses in Hawa ii and 

the Philippines but also to reviewing cO<1.stal fonifications of the United 

States in the light of the effect upon them caused by changes in ordnance 

and ship construction. Subsequentl y. it also became necessary to prolect 

the Panama Canal. The necessity for sheltering troops at all of these 

places added to the burden of constructi on that the Quartermaster's 

Depanmelll cal'l'i ed in the years before 19 17. 

]n addition 10 the construction and repair of barracks, quan ers, 

hospitals, Slorehollses, and other buildings at interior posts and coastal 

fonificati ons, the Quartermaster's Department also directed other construction for which Congress made provision. Beginning in June 1902, 

Congress appropriated funds for the constl"l1cti on, equipment, and maintenance of sui tabl e bui ldings at mi li tary posts and stations to be used 

as post exchanges: schools; libraries: read ing, lunch, and amusement 

rooms: and g'ymnasiullls. By 1905, the Department had expended 

.. I bid., p. 6. 

" I bid., 1910, p. ~7 . 

- See. ror example. Ila lislical SlalemCnlS. i bid., 1911 , pp. 75 IT; 1916. pp. 91 IT. 
CON VERSION OF A DEPA RTMENT INTO A CORPS 583 

$ 1,500,000 for these p urposes.' " It furnished gymnastic apparatus to 

nearl y everyone of th e compl eted post exchanges and to many of the 

minor posts, and it built bowli ng alleys a t the most important posts. 

Secretary of War Willi am H. Taft rega rded athletic exercise as a necessity 

fo r th e troops and hoped appropriations would continue lO be made until 

every pcnnanCnl mil itary pOSt had a fully equipped gymnasium, incl uding 

a swimming pool. , 0 1 Congress must have been in agreement because 

appropriations fo r these purposes continued to be made during these 

years. 

T he permanent military posts constr ucted in that period were a 

fa r cry from the primitive frOllli eT posts erecled largely by troop labor 

in th e years o[ lndian wa rfa re. Oddly enough, their location had remained unchanged, though the reasons for th eir erection at particular 

siles had long since ceased to have any meaning. From the viewpoint 

of economy, Quartermasters General recommended abandonment of such 

postS as were no longer needed. Secretaries of War were equa ll y costminded but they were also concerned with increasing the effic iency of the 

Army by stationing troops at fewer POStS in order to provide better opporllInities for tra ining.'ol Proposals to abandon any military post, however, 

aroused local opposition which tended to prevent such action. 

The necessity for reorgani zing the Army upon a basis o f larger tactical 

units and for rearranging garrisons with this in view grew increasingly 

important. In the fall of 1911, Secretary of War H enry Stimson again 

attacked this fundamental problem. He was high ly critical of the 

scattered distribution of the Army. Troops were stationed in 24 states 

and tCl'I'iLOl'ies and at 49 POStS, 31 of which had a capacity for less than 

a regiment each. He emphasized the ex pense of garrison ing troops at 

obsolete posts that had " universall y been constructed upon a plan which 

involves a maximum initial cost of construction and a maximum COSt 

of maintenance in money and men ." lOS 

Cost argumellls generall y provoke congressional illlerest, and the 

House ca lled lIpon Stimson to furn ish add itiona l information.'1It The 

War Coll ege made a careful stud y which formed part of a broader report 

prepared by th e General Staff on "The Organization of th e Land Forces 

,00 {bid., I90J, p. 6. 

,oo !l'llr Dt:/lnrlmtml A,munl 1lt:I,orlS, 19OJ, I. 39 . 

.. (I) See. for example, A,Hlunl 1l~/JOrl of lilt: QUtlrltrmnsltr Gtntral, 19OJ, p. 7. (2) 

War Dt:/HITlmt"'f Am,unl Rt:/JOrll, 1906, I. 8; 19()9, I. 32-3~. 

"(I) WilT Dt:jmrlmt:"t AmlUll/ Rt //OrIJ, 1911, I. 13-14. (2) RG 165. War College Diy. 

Doeumem ,lilt'. Case 6270-13 (Memo. Chief of Sta lf for QMG. 27 Ike 191 1); Case 52io-I6 

(Aleshire to Ch ief of Stalf. 12 J an 1912) . 

... House Resolution M3. 62d Cong .. 2d 501 .. n:printed in Wllr Dt:pnrlmt:"t Ammll/ 

R t:/JO rIJ, 1912. I. 156. 
584 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

of the Un ited States," ,0. One immediate consequence was that Congress 

provided that no part of the funds appropriated for the Army was to be 

expended for permanent improvements at any Army post which had been 

or migh t in future be ordered abandoned by the President.'o8 A much 

needed reform appeared to be in the making, but the Wilson administration shelved the Stimson plan when it came into office, A thorough 

rearrangement of POStS did not result. On the eve of World War I, 

troops were still garrisoned at the same widely distributed posts, where 

existing ba rrack accommodations had been built by constructing quartermasters to provide (01' a minimum strength of 65 for infantry companies, 

Since the National Defense Act of 1916 raised the minimum strength to 

100 and also provided additional units to regiments, the quartermasters 

were confronted with the necessity of immed iately extending barrack 

accommodations for which funds had first to be acquired, loT 

Impl'ovcmcnt in Rations 

Stung by the criticism leveled against the Subsistence Department in 

the Spanish-American War, the Acting Commissary General of Subsistence, Brig. Gen. John F. Weston, set out, as soon as opportunity permitted, to review and improve the rations furnished the Army. Upon his 

recommendation, the Secretary of War appointed a board of officers, on 

20 December 1899, to consider and report upon the composition of the 

ration for the use of troops in tropica l climates. ,oe 

The high rate of sickness among the men serving in Cuba, Puerto 

Rico, and the Philippines had focused attention on the problem of 

properly feeding troops operating in tropical countries. Many offi cers 

had decided convictions as to what components constituted a suitable 

tropical ra tion. Some were highly critical of the large amount of meat 

included and the high energy va lue of the ration genera ll y. Others 

rejected the theory that ea ting large quantities of fresh meats had a 

deleterious effect upon the health of the troops and insisted that the 

natives of Cuba and Puerto Rico we_re also large meat eaters, when they 

were able to procure t.'O~ 

1<11 (1) I bjd., I, 71-153; 157- 76. (2) RG 6~, War College Diy, DOCLlmem File, Case 

6270-25 (Memo, Chief of Staff for QMG, 9 Feb 1912). 

'''' 37 SIIII. 582 (Aug 24, 1912). 

,<If filM Depa rllUull Anlllllli R e/wrls, 1916, I, 199, 

.'" AGO, Hq of Army. Special Order No, 295 (20 Dec 1899). 

'''' T he cont rove rsy was productive of many papers published on the subject by medical 

oUicel'S. See, for example. JouTft1l1 01 tilt Milit ary Service IlIslit ulion of the United S/lIles, 

vol. 24, PI'. 375- 97, an article by Maj . LOllis L. Seamen , entitled "The U.S. Amly Rat ion, 

and its Adaptability {or Use in Tropical Climata," vol. 26, pp. 309-46, "The Ideal Ration 

for Ihe American Army in the Tropics," by Capt. Edward L, Munson; vol. 28, pp. 83-95, 
CONVERSION OF A DEPARTMENT INTO A CORPS 585 

A wealth of letters, papers, and reports, including reports from three 

boards of officers convened, res pectively. in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the 

Philippines, were submitted to the board, wh ich proposed changes in the 

ration to make it morc suitable for use in the tTopics.tl n Careful study 

of all of the views expressed led the board to conclude that the components 

of the ration wou ld have to be about the same in all climates- that is. a 

meal, bread, vegetable, fruit, seasoning. and a coffee and sugar component. 

The real problem was to find a ration that, by substitution among its 

various ingredients, would be suitable for all climates. 

The Board prepared such a list of the kinds and quantities of substitutive articles composing the ration. It did not reduce the meat ration, 

holding that the necessity for such reduction could beSt be determined 

in each case by the immediate commander on the ground. Submitted to 

the Acting Commissary General for comment, he approved the list with 

some minor changes. HI The Surgeon Genera l also endorsed its adoption. 

To put the findings o[ the board into effect, the War Department obtained 

legislative authority from Congress since the components of the ration 

had previously been fixed by Jaw. Early in 1901 , Congress authorized 

the President to 

prescribe the kinds and quantities of the component articles of the Army 

ration, and to direct the issue of substitutive equivalent articles in place of any 

such components whenever, in his opinion, economy and a due regard for the 

health and comfort of the troops may so require.lU 

This change permitted greater fl exibility and allowed for more variety 

in the diet of the soldier. The kinds and quantities o[ the standard 

components of the garrison ration and their substitutive eq uivalents were 

announced to the Army some 2 months later. At the same time, tli e 

components and substitutive articles of the field ration and the travel 

ration were also set forth."1 

In the meantime. the Acting Commissary General of Subsistence was 

also concerned with the problem of providing troops with a satisfactory 

emergency ration for use on active campaigns. At his request. the 

Secretary of War appointed a board of officers in January 1899 to examine, 

test. and report on various emergency rations, including that which was 

"The Sold ier', Ration in the Tropia-lis Usc and In Abu~." by Maj. Loui, L. Sea1l1 an; 

voJ. 29, pp. 2~28. "Meat Ration in the Tropia," by Maj. P. R. Egan. 

' .. For the gUt of their recommendation,. see board report, 13 March 1900, included in 

A'/ptllcd Reporl of /hfll Acliflg Commissary CfII"fllra/ of Subsislfll"u, 19()(), pp. 35- 36. 

1.11 (I) The Acting Commissary Cfllneral JaW no ~uon, for example, for increasing the 

am<lunt of Cllnnw $;lImon from 16 to 18 ounces. and he recommendw retention of cornmeal 

as a substitutive component since 10 many men camfll from the southern states where it was 

cU$lomari ly used. (2) For the board's list see ibid., p. 37. 

"·31 Sillt. 758 (Feb 2. 1901). 

'It IVllr DfII/Wrtmfllflt Gfllfltra / Orders, 1901, CO 56. 23 April 1901. 
586 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

then III existence.'" The board recommended no cba nge. but in the 

opmion of Acting Commissary Ge neral \"'esLOn, the cxisLing emergency 

ration was one in name only because it failed to meel lhe essential military 

requirements (or such a ration-that it be small in volume, so packaged 

as to be easily transported in th e pockets or haversacks o[ the troops, and 

composed of components that CQuid be eate n, if necessary, withalll be ing 

cooked. H e recommended tha t the whole problem of eme rgency rations 

be placed before the board of officers then considering the tropica l 

ratio n. lI~ 

The board examined and tCSled samples of emergency rations but 

since none proved satisfactory, it determi ned to develop its own . Drawing upon their knowledge of the "pi nol e" used by the Indians of the 

Southwest and the Mexicans, the officers of th e board formula ted a meat 

and bread component made from parched and ground grai n and powdered 

beef, compressed into cakes we igh ing 4 ounces each, that could be eaten 

dry or used to make a soup or porridge, salt and pepper be ing included 

in the package for extra season ing. The ration also included a chocola te 

component that consisted of equal pans of pure chocolate and pure sugar, 

molded in to cakes weighing I V3 ounces each. Each can of emergency 

ration was to contain 3 cakes of the meat and bread component, 3 cakes 

of the chocolate componenl, M of an ounce of fi ne salt, and I gram of 

red pepper. The board req uested authority to have 2,000 of these rations 

prod uced and tesled in the field." s The tests proving satisfactory, the 

board recommended adoption and issue of this ration as th e Army's 

emergency ration. 

T he ration was not adopted, though it was widely used in the Philippines. Its use was not wholly sllccessful, however, and th e Subsistence 

Deparunent continued experimelHation. After tha t Departlllent was 

merged with the Quartermaster's DepanmelH in 1912, food experts 

of the Department of Agriculture were ca ll ed upon to work with officers 

of the Medical Department and the Qual'lermaster Corps to perfect a 

satis[actory emergency ration. Theil' efforts were not sLiccessful , and the 

emergency ration Llsed in ' ·Vorld War I, somewha t refined a nd reduced 

in we ight from 16 to 12 ounces, was essentially the same as that formulated 

by the board of of11cers in 1900.'17 

"'(I) ACO. Hq of Army. S(X'cial Order No. 17.21 J an 1899. (2) The existing emer· 

gency ration had been adopted on 5 Dcrember 1896. (Sec WaT Department GO No. 49). 

It called for 10 ounccs of bacon. 16 ounces of ha rd bread. 4 ounces of pea meal or an 

cquivalent component for making soup. 2 ouures of roa~ted and ground collee or Y2 ounce 

of tea. 4 grains of saccharin. 0.64 ounces salt. 0.04 ouuces of pepper. and 1h Ollnce of lobacco. 

, .. W.-.r J!arlm nl Annual J!orls, 1901, l. 487 (Lt r. Weston to TAG. :. Jan 1900). 

"" I bid., 1,497 (l'res. of IJ.oard to Commissary Gelleral. 3 Aug 1900). 

'''Compare the fonnula and spcrif,cations of 1900 and 1918. See Alllllwi porl of 
CONVERSION OF A DEPARTMENT INTO A CORPS 587 

Improving the variety, quality. 01' (Iuamily of th e l',uions issued to 

the troops made li ule difference if the food was nOt properly prepared. 

Brig. Gell. Charles P. Eagan had altributed much of the sick ness prevalent 

during the Spanish-American War to the lack of trained cooks.u ~ As 

early as 1876, CoTlllllissary General Robert Madccly had suggested thal 

th e efficiency of th e Army would be increased a nd desert ions decreased 

if cooks and bakers were en listed and rewa rded wi lh extra pay. For the 

next 22 years, he and his successors had called attention to this deficiency 

and had also urged the need for a school to train such personnel.lIP As 

soon as Eagan was appointed Commissary Genera l on 3 May 1898. he 

had drafted a bill to enlist cooks. Congress had authorized their enlist· 

ment on 7 July 1898, but too late to procure them for active operations 

in the war. UO 

In the fall of 1900, Acting Commissary Genera l Weston renewed 

the recommendation, ohen made in th e past, for the establishment of one 

or more schools for the training of cooks and bakers.1Il The Secretary 

of War did not approve his proposal. The General Staff, to whom a 

similar suggestion was later submitted, believed it would be best to rely, 

as in the past. upon recruiting officers securing suitable cooks from among 

men who professed to have some culinary skill.m 

The persistent cfforts of Genera l ''''eston, who became Commissary 

Genera l in Deccmber 1900, finally bore fru it in 1905. T he War Depan· 

melll established a training school for cooks and bakers at Fan Ri ley, 

Kansas. under the direction of the commandant of th~ School of Appli ca. 

tion [or Cavalry and Field Artil1ery.'u It later established other schools 

at WashingtOn Barracks, D.C., at th e Presidio, San Francisco, and at Fort 

Sam Houston, Texas. The Subsistence Department issued a manual for 

Army bakers in 19 10 and a lso made ava ilable a new revised ed ition of Ihe 

manual for Army cooks, published in 1896. 

Trained cooks and bakers required improved equ ipment to enable 

them to prepare better food for the Army. Before the Subsistence De· 

partment could initiate any program of experimcntation to improve 

utcnsils and equ ipment, the issue of control of such equipment as garrison 

and field bake ovens, kitchen and mess ha ll furniture , and indi vidual mess 

till': Commissllr)' Generlll, 1901, p. 70. and Amll/lIl Reporl IIf Ihe Qllllrferlll/ufer Ceneraf. 

1919, pp. 70-71. 

,uDodgl' CommiuiOI1 Reporf, I. 550-51 (F.agan Reply 10 Corn1l1iuion's il1lluirin. 6 

Oct 1898). 

"·,bid., I. 558-61 (Eagan memo ror Investigtaing Committee. 6 Oct 1898). 

"30 Sial. 721. 

, .. ,fnn"a/ R II!/Qr/ 01 II,e Cooumiuar)' Cenernl of Subsisleuce, 1900, p. 49. 

".see Arm)' a.ltl Nuv)' l ou rual, vol. 41. p. 153 (2 Jan 1904). 

" lVar Depa."lme'll Gellerll/ Orders. 19Qj, GO 2 (4 Jan 1905); GO 63 (24 Apr 19(5). 
588 QUARTERMASTER SU PPORT OF THE ARMY 

equipmen t had to be se ttled. Tcstimony before the Dodge Commission 

had elicited the fa ct that llnee suppl y departlllents had to cooperate in 

getting food to the troops in the fi eld. T he Subsistence Department 

bought rations, the Quartermaster's Depa rment transportcd and distributed them, and the Ordnance Departlllelll provided the kni ves, forks, 

spoons, canteens, tin cups, and haversacks that comprised the fi eld mess 

kits. The Quartermaster's Department was also responsible for building, 

altering, and repairing bake ovens construCled in bake houses at ga rrisoned posts and in the fi eld, and furnished the utensils used in them.'u 

That Department also authorized the Subsistence DepartmeOl to purchase 

portable bake ovens for use in the fi eld. 

The ACling Comm issary General was of the opinion tha t his Department ought nOt onl y to be charged with responsibility for providing food 

but should also be given the authority to provide eq ui pmcOl used in the 

preparation of food in order that responsibil ity for any fa ilure to furn ish 

proper rations could be de fini tely fixed. He hoped that the Secretary 

of War, under authority granted him, would transfer responsibility [or 

sllch equipment from the Quartermaster's Department to the Subsistence 

Department. T his. he urged. was in line with the views of the Dodge 

Commission that held "there should be a division of the labor now 

devolving upon the Quartermaster's Depanment." I U 

The transfer of responsibility was not made immediately. T o 

bring it about, the Secretary of War had to recommcnd changes in the 

wordi ng of the Army appropriation bill, since the designation of lIle 

supply agency procuring equipmen t was determined by the specific appropriations made in that bil\. The Commissary General persisted in his 

efforts to recover the responsibility he had once had and, by 1906, when 

the Subsistence Department had a training school for bakers in operation 

at Fort Riley, he won the backing of the Chi ef of Staff. Though Congress 

failed to act in that year, it transferred respo nsibil ity for bake ovens and 

equipment to the Department on 10 June 1907.'%0 

Under the direction of Brig. Gen. Henry C. Sha rpe, who succecded 

\-Veston as Commissary General, the Subsistcnce Department in itiated a 

program of experimemation to perfect a kn ock-down field oven and a 

field range suited to the needs o f the Army.'27 By 1910, the Army 

H. At the I"CI!Ucst of the Commissary Genera l. respo nsibilit y for the con5ITuction of 

bake 01'en5 had been tralu ferred 10 Ihe QU;trlerrn;Uter GenelOll in 1894 10 eliminate the 

necessily o f haying IWO COn traclors. one 10 erec;1 Ihe building and Ihe olher 10 bu ild tho 

brick oyen and ch imney. and to eliminale Ihe delays Ihal arrangement caused. War Deparlme,,1 Ge" eral Orders, 189-1. GO 40. 29 Aug 1894 . 

.. (I> AmIlIal Rt /JOrl of lite Acli"8 Commi.l.5llry Gellual of Subsisleflce , 19QO, pp. 47-

48. (2) Dodge Commission Rt/JOrl , I. 148 (Rrl 10 President.!) Feb 1899) . 

.. \I'm' De/Jllrlmtml Ge flu al Ordtrs, 1907, GO 66 (27 Mar 19(7); GO 128 <10 J un 1907). 

U"T Aflm/lll ileporl of lilt Commissary Ge fl ual of S" bsi51tlllce, 1908, p. 10. 
CONVERSION OF A DEPARTMENT INTO A CORPS 589 

adopted two new types of field ovens and fi eld ranges. Other developIllemal work weill forward after the Subsistence Deparement was merged 

with the Quartermaster's DepartlllelH in 1912, bUl, under the impact of 

wa r in Europe, interest was centered primari ly upon the perfection of a 

satisfactory rolling field kitchell. ,n Until 1917, the effects of the SpanishAmerican 'War cominued to make themselves fel t in the changes intro· 

duced in rations and eq uipment, and in the tra in ing of cooks and bakers. 

Ecollomy /\11 easU'res 

Efforts to improve the operations of the supply bureaus on the basis 

of the recommendations made by the Dodge Comm ission represented one 

line of deve lopment d uring the years 1898 to 1917. Not all the changes 

and introd uction of new procedures in Quartermaster operations resulted 

from the impact of the Span ish.American ''''ar. All, however, were 

intended to promote the efficiency of the Army and, as so often occurred 

in the past, all were much affected by the need to economize. Colonial 

possessions and their defense proved expensive. 

The fi rst steps taken to promote economy came as soon as conditions 

in the Philippines permitted a redu ction of ex pense. To dete rmine 

wha t retrenchment measures might be undertaken, the Secretary of \'Var 

sen t the Quartermaster General, the COlllmissary Gencral o( Subsistencc, 

and the chiefs of other suppl y and adm inistrative burea us on a tour of the 

Philippines in the SLimmer of 190 1. Actions taken as a result of recommendations made by General Ludington and General "Veston incl uded 

the re lease of rented storage space, the construction and consol idation of 

warehouses at l'vlan ila , the abandonment of outlying subsistence depots, 

the reduction ill the number of sa les stores, and the greate r use of native 

rodder as forage. The ' Val' Depa rtment policy of concentrating troops 

at fewe r posts also greatly decreased transportation COSts. 12~ 

The economy drive made itself felt in most Quartermast er activities. 

Its effects on construction and transportation have been Iloted. In the 

latter fi eld, economy accou nted in pan for the t.ransfer of some of tile 

Army's transport business to commerc ial lines. In the construction pro· 

gram, economy dictated the usc of lumber that conformed to commercial 

sizes and the procurement of commercial·type plumbing fix tu res. Il also 

brought about a revision of plans for barracks, q uarters, and other build· 

ItO RG 165, War College Div. Doc\lment File, Ca~e 8330-3 (Memo. Ch id of War College 

Oil'. for Chief of Staff, II Fell 1914 lld 1st ind., Aleshire to Chid of Staff, 19 Feb 1914). 

See also Case 83~(}..IO (I'olelno. Chief. War College Oil'. for Chief of Staff, 9 De<: 1915): Case 

833(}.. 17 (Same for same. 18 Aug (910). 

,to (I) AnlllUlI Repor, 01 tI' e CmllmisslI"Y Clmernf 01 S,d)sis/ellC/!! , 1902, 1' . 16. (2) ;1"''''111 

l1 e/lo'" 01 Iile QUlIJ'lenlllUler General, 1902, pp. 24-25. 
590 QUARTERMAST ER SU PPORT OF THE A RMY 

lIlgs that red uced costs. In general, during th ese years, th e Quarter. 

master's Department pursued a policy of adapti ng its specificat ions fo r 

suppli es a nd materials thal were not distin ctively military to simil ar commercial articl es of hi gh sta ndards. The effect was to wid en competition 

under ordinary conditions and to decrease costs. To reduce clothing 

manufact uri ng costs, the Department substituted a straight standing collar 

for the st.and ing falling coll ar of the service coat., replaced bellows pockets 

with patch pockets, and eliminated cuffs from sleeves. It also used 

wool en fabrics in lieu of the more expensive worsteds previously demanded in specifica tions. By 1910, Quartermaster General Aleshire 

reported with sa tisfactio n th at much progress had bee n made in th e 

elimination from cIOLhing specificatio ns of the distincti ve fea tures that 

had ex isted between government and ordi nary commercial practice. 

Only the special colors and forms of the cut of articles of outer uniforms, 

as prescribed by regulations, remai ned to distinguished garments worn by 

th e soldier (rom si milar wel l-made articles found in the commercia l 

trade. 13O \"'hile such measures promoted economy, th ey d id not necessaril y produce th e most satisfactory uniform for field service. 

Decelltmlizatioll of Pmcw·emclll. 

T he economi es effected in the purchase of supplies by the Quartermaster's Departmen t were brought about at the same time that it made 

marked progress in dece l1lrali zing procuremelll to the rleld in order to 

promote efficiency in operations. Althoug h Q uartermaster General 

Humphrey had made some suggestions in 1903 for decentralizing the 

business methods of the Department, it was his successor, Brig. Gen. 

James B. Aleshire, who put into effect a thoro ughly decentrali zed system 

th at radicall y changed Quartermaster methods of operation. 

Aleshire had long given tho ught to the system of su ppl y and, about 

a month after he became Quartermaster General in 1907, he placed before 

the Secretary of Wa r his plan for decentralizing o pcrations.'3' Briefly, 

his pla n provided that designated depots of th e Depa rtment (urn ish 

su ppli es upo n requisitions approved by military departmem commanders 

within the limit of funds allotted to th eir ch ief q uartermasters from the 

appropria tions and subject to such instructio ns regu lating this method 

of suppl y as were recommended by th e Quartermaster General. The 

system was based on the principle that Congress had pl aced to the credit 

of the Quartermaster's Department in th e United States Treasury certain 

''' A,m.lI.' Uel"'.' fJI lI. e Qum·le"''''l$ler Coe"",.,.!. 1910, Pl'. ]7- ]8. 

10' RG 94, AGO Document Fi]e, ]80(1·]9 ]4 . c;;,se ]273468 (Aksh i,·c to Taft. 10 Aug 1907). 
CONVERSION OF A DEPARTMENT INTO A CO RPS 59 1 

sums or money that it appropriated for designated purposes. As the 

agent or Congress, and under the direction of the Secretary of War, the 

QuartcnnaSlcr's Depanment ex pended these funds in accordance with 

law and regula tions. For this purpose, it apponioned to each chief 

quartermaster, or quartermaster in charge of an independent station, 

public work, or other project, a sum sufficient for th e ordinary administrative needs of his territoria l department or work. Tn turn, the chief 

quartermaster allotted to post quartermasters suffi cient credits to meet 

their needs. 

Aleshire thought of th e Quartermaster genera l su pply depots as 

wholesale houses from which supplies might be ordered within a limit of 

cost established by th e apportionment and allotment of funds made. 

When it was to the advantage of th e Government, supplies might also be 

purchased at department headquarters or in the vicinity of posts. 

Under this system, Aleshire placed the whole business of procuring 

suppli es on a moncy-\'a lue basis and operated it in accordance with the 

principle of banking methods. A post quartermaster ordered through 

his ch ief quartermaster supplies from a depot which were not to exceed 

the credit he had for his post. The depot fill ed the order, sent an invoice 

showi ng COSt, and received a draft on the Quartermaster General or a 

credit transfer from him for th e value. ' ·Vhen th e depot quartermaster 

had LO replen ish his stock, the Quartermaster General cashed the drafts 

by placing money to his credit. 

Aleshire a rgued that the system had man y advantages. It placed 

on departmental commanders and their chief quartermasters the responsibility fo r the proper and economical suppl y of their commands and thus 

insured a proper equipment of troops for field service at all times. 

It gave chief quartermasters and other quartermasters a limited degree 

of independ ence of action and ex perience in meeti ng supply responsibilities in peace that they wou ld be required to meet in time of war. 

It relieved the office of the Quartermaster General of many details and 

gave elasticity to th e \I'hole Department. Since a llotments of funds 

could not be exceeded, th e system would have th e effect of enforcing 

greater economy in issslIes, better ca re and protection of supplies obta ined, 

and wou ld also tend to prevent deficiencies in appropriations. Moreover, 

Aleshire beli eved th e system would obviate the accumulation of surplus 

stores at posts in th e military departments and wo uld lessen losses through 

deterioration of stocks remaining too long in storage. 

The arguments in behalf of th e system struck Secretary Taft as 

sound and he approved Aleshire's plan on 15 August 1907. There was 

delay in inaugurating the system, for no data had been kept in th e 

Washington office or at th e depots, on the basis of which Aleshire could 
592 QUARTERMASTER SU PPORT OF THE ARMY 

allot funds to the ch ief quart ermasters.u ~ T he compiling of this information was a time-consuming task and the new system did not go into 

effect until I Jul y 1908.133 

Aleshire by no means intended to limit his system solely to the 

procllremelll of supplies but also propo.~ed to usc the same principl es and 

methods in the procurement of necessary Quartermaster services. The 

system as it applied to services also went into effect on I July 1908.'3-1 

Aleshire pursued his policy of decentral ization furthe r by ridding his 

office of some of the details and correspondence perta ining to certain 

classes o[ employees. This he did by placing their selection from lists 

of eligibles furnished by local Civil Service Commissioners in the hands 

of chief q uartermasters, depot quartermasters, and quartermasters of 

independent stations. , 33 In the course of preparing instructions for 

placing the system of decelllraliza tion in operation for the procurement 

of supplies and of services, Aleshire came to the conclusion that it could 

also be extended to the Army Transport Service. He turned the problem 

of working out the details of its application over to Col. J. B. Be ll inger, 

then General Superintendel1l of the Army Transport Service at San 

Francisco. u8 

The introd uction of these rad ica l changes was not effected withou t 

difficulties. On the one hand, misinformation about the system caused 

local communities to [ear the loss of depot busi ness, and Aleshire had to 

reassure Congressmen and their consliLUems that such would not be the 

effect o[ decentra lization. 13T On the other hand, the instructions for 

pUlling the system into effect that seemed crystal clear to Aleshire struck 

his chief quartermasters and their clerks as murky. There were complaints of the additional work imposed on chief q uartermasters and post 

quartermasters by the system and demands [or more clerical help. There 

was, in fact, more or less confusion in putting the system into operation. 

T he Quartermaster General sent out his chief cl erk to expla in the system. 

He observed that old cl erks, "do not take hold of lhe matter, have no 

,. RG 92. Letter Books of General J. n . Aleshi re. 1, 265 (A 1C!l hire to Col. J. G. Harbord. 

10 Sel' 1907) . 

.. WM DeptJrlmefl/ Gefl eral Orders and Circulars, 1908, GO 18 (24 Jan 1908). 

''' Ibid., GO 7S (8 May 1908). 

"'This M:heme was promulgated in Circular No. 26, Q.M.G.O .. 1907. 

,.. (I) RG 92, Letter Books of General J. B. Aleshire. IV, 421- 211 (Aleshire to Bellinger, 

2\1 Jun 1908). (2) Instructions gove rning Ihe procurcmelll of su pplies arc found in Circular 

No. I. Q.M.G.O .. 1908 and for the procurement of services in Circular No. II . Q.M.G.O .. 

1908. 

,., RG 92. OQMG Document File, 1800-1914. Case 239012 (Aleshire 10 Hon. S. Sherley. 

[3 Mar 1908). (2) RC 92. leiter Books of Ceneral J. B. Aleshire. Ill. 440-41 (To Charles 

A. L. Reed. 20 Mar 19(8). IV. 17S--79 (To Han. C. W. Fulton). TV. 180-82 (To Han. Jon· 

athan Bourne. 2 May 19(8). 
CONVERSION OF A DEPARTMENT INTO A CORPS 593 

interest in it, and will not study the circulars and understand the require· 

menu." T he office of the chief quartermaster and depot quartermaster 

at Omaha lagged behind all others in putting the system into satisfactory 

operation. Aleshire attributed their difficulties to the preponderance 

of elderly clerks employed there. Of seven clerks employed in the chief 

quartermaster's office, two were 70 and the other five were 59, 64, 74, 

and 75, respectively. Under Civil Service rules, the Department could 

only rid itself of the aged or the inefficient cl erks by demoting them and 

thus making vacancies in the higher positions for efficient younger derks. 

It is undentandable why the Quartermaster's Department and the War 

Department were warm supporters of Civil Service retirement plans. III 

A revision in 1909 of the origi nal circulars setting forth instructions 

governing procurement of supplies and services greatly simplified pro· 

cedures and produced satisfactory results. lU The Chief of Staff com· 

mended the Quartermaster General for so successfully working out the 

complicated details of this decentralization scheme.l<o When, 3 years 

later, the Quartermaster's, Subsistence, and Pay Departments were con· 

solidated to form the Quartermaster Corps, Aleshire requested that the 

policy of decentralization, which had been so successful in the Quartermaster's Department since 1908, be approved as the policy of the newly 

created Corps. The Secretary of War agreed to this request.Ht This 

was the system of decentralization under which the Quartermaster Corps 

was operating when the United States went to war with Germany in 191 7. 

Establishment of the Remount Service 

In the midst of decentralizing Quartermaster operations to the field, 

General Aleshire persuasively advocated another reform that he had long 

cherished to increase the effi ciency of the Army. This was the establishment of a remount service for the Army. For many years, horses and 

mules for the use of the Army had been purchased by the Quartermaster's 

Department under contract after advertising for bids. Procurement 

under the contract system had many d isadvantages. It resulted in delays, 

necessitated deliveries at large horse markets where the animals easily 

became infected with diseases, and provided no opportunity for judging 

the character and disposition of animals accepted and shipped to the 

troops. 

- RG 92, Letter Books of General ) . B. Aleshire. VI I, 338-42 (To Col. George Ruhlen , 

Y )ul 1909), V, 478-79 and VI. 136-37 (To Maj. O. E. McCaTihy. 26 Dec 1908 and I Feb 

19(9) . 

.. Circulan No.6 and No.7, 1909. 

'''War Depart'lIImt Annual llejJorts, 1909, I, 205 (Rpt, Chief of Starr, I Dec 19(9). 

'" RG 92, OQMG Document File, 1800-191 4, Ca5c: 381685 (Aleshire to SW, 4 Scp 191 2). 
594 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Prompted by a desire to give local horse raisers in the vicinity of 

Army posts an opportunity to sell directly to the Government, Congress, 

in 1905, also provided for open.market purchase of animals at military 

posts, when needed, at prices not to exceed a maximum fixed by the 

Secretary of WarY! Unfortunately, local horse raisers and farmers were 

not appreciably encouraged by this provision. 

Aleshire's views on the methods to be pursued in purchasing animals 

for the Army had first been offered in February 1907 when, as a major 

on duty in the office of the Quartermaster General, he presented a paper 

before (he General Staff and Army War College on his proposed reform.lta 

Five months later he was appointed Quartermaster General and, in submitting an annual report covering the operations of his predecessor during 

the previous fiscal yeal, he took the opportunity to reitera te his views.'H 

Aleshire proposed that three or more remount depots be organized, 

located, and equipped. To each depot, he suggested assigning a remount 

district, each depot and d istrict to be under the charge of an officer of the 

Quartermaster's Department, preferably one detailed from the Cavalry 

or Field Artillery and especially suited for this duty. These depot officers 

would be responsible for all animals, supplies, property, and funds. 

They would supervise the care and handling of the horses, and, when 

d irected by proper authority, would purchase young horses, conforming 

to specifications, within the remount distriCt assigned to their depots. 

The depots and their commanding officers would be under the general 

supervision of a Remount Division that Aleshire proposed to establish 

in the office of the Quartermaster General. Aleshire was certain that a 

remount service would prove more economica l tha n the contract system, 

and that the Army would be supplied with young, sound, well-broken 

animals. 

To demonstrate the superiori ty of this method and to justify its 

extension to the procurement of all remounts and draft and pack animals, 

Aleshire called for a practical test. He hoped to obtain the use of the 

abandoned Fort Reno mili tary reservation in Oklahoma in order to put 

the plan on trial, and he worked diligently to enlist the support of 

Cavalry officers for the remount service.H ~ 

Congress authorized the establishment of a remount service in May 

1908, and the War Department turned over to the Quartermaster's 

"' 33 Slat 836 (Mar 2. 19(5). 

n l This paper was subsequently published in the Journal of the Unil ell Slat e.! Caualry 

AJ.locialioll, XVIII, No. 66 (Octolx:r 1907). pp. 279~326}. 

'" Annual Report of til e Q"'trtermast ~ General, 1907, pp. 33"·36 . 

.. ORe 92, Leiter Books or General J. B. Aleshire, II and Ill. IlImi",. 
CONVERSION OF A DEPARTMENT INTO A CO RPS 595 

Department the Fort Reno reservation for use as a remount depot.HI 

Within 3 years, the Department established additional remount depots 

at Fort Keogh, Mont., and at Front Royal, Va. It added two auxiliary 

remount depots in March 1916 at El Paso and Fort Sam Houston, Tex., 

to maintain in good condition the animals belonging to the forces operating along the Mexican border.U1 A Remount Branch, first set up in 

the Supplies Division of the office of the Quartermaster General late in 

April 1912, and subsequently transferred to the Transportation Division, 

supervised the remount depots ... • 

The Remount Service promptly proved its superiority over the old 

method of procuring remounts that had resulted in the purchase of 

older horses either under contract or in open market. The new system 

encountered difficulty, however, in purchasing young horses for Cavalry 

purposes because such an imals were no longer being bred as extensively 

as in former years. Draft horses and mules were proving more profitable 

to the farmer. Conferences between representatives of the War Department and the Department of Agriculture resulted in the formulation of a 

plan for encouraging the breeding of horses suitabl e for the Cava lry, the 

plan to be executed by the Department of Agriculture.'" Put into 

operation by 191 2, the plan had the effect of steadily improving the type, 

breeding. and appearance of young horses purchased by the Quartermaster 

Corps. 

Development of Moto?' Transportation 

The Quartermaster's Department initiated reform in the method 

of procuring animals at a time when development of motor vehicles was 

already raising the question. in European if not in American armies. 

of whether the day of animal-drawn transports was not over. Foreign 

armies had already given much allention to testing various types of motor 

cars, but Quartermaster Genera l Ludington rejected a proposal to build 

a car for the United States Army in 1900. He considered that the 

condition of the average roads traversed in military operations. unpaved 

and often deep with mud. made them entirely unsuitable for automobile 

use. The necessity for sudden, hurried movement under all conditions 

of weather and in every description of country. with varyi ng amounts and 

'''(1) 35 Stdt. 11 9 ~fay II , 1908). (2) Wllr Department Genernl Orders, 19()8, GO 59 

(18 Apr 19(8). 

'''(1) Wllr DeptJrtment Gt!nudl OrduJ, GO SO, 29 Apr 1909; GO 11 7,50 Aug 1911. 

(2) Annual RtI/Wrl 01 the QUllrtumllJter Gelleral, 1916, p. 62 . 

... RG 92. OQMG Document File, 1800-1914, Case 365930 . 

... RG 92, OQMG Document File, 1800-1914, Case 293506 (Capt. Kirby Walker to the: 

Q~iG, 18 Jan 1910). 
596 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

weights of cargo "enjoins the Army from using any method of transportation which is in any degree experimental, or untried and unproven." u o 

The views expressed in 1900 were still entertained by his successor 

in 1907.u' Even as a means of Army passenger transportation in cities, 

it was the policy of the Quartermaster's Department to reject req uests 

for automobiles.'" Lack of funds to purchase both animal·drawn trans· 

portation and automobiles made experimentation impossible even if the 

Department had been enthusiastic about lhe possibilities of motor transport. Quartermasters and other officers, however, continued to exhibit 

an interest in the subject, and, by 1910, the General Staff. while regretting 

that lack of funds made inadvisabl e the trial of motor vehicles for the 

transportation of troops, had nevertheless come to the conclusion that 

the adoption of some form of traction ve hi cle for transporting supplies 

in the field was a pressing necessity,l6I 

Officers of the Quartermaster's Department were equally convinced 

of the need at that time, and they carefully went into the question of the 

efficiency and economy of motor trucks as compared with animal-drawn 

transportation. They found the ordinary commercial truck to be far 

more economical and efficient than the anima l·drawn wagon when used 

in cities and on macadam roads. and the Department purchased commercial trucks for that purpose. But the same truck was not suitable as a 

means of transportation for the Army in the field. In 1911, the Department began a developmental and testing program designed to produce 

a truck to meet Army requirements}U 

This first test did not prove conclusive. Lack of funds again 

hampered the pursuit of any special test program. but the Quartermaster 

Corps purchased motor trucks for use at various quartermaster installations. and quartermasters made careful reports of the efficiency, stability. 

and economy of their operation. Although the commanding general of 

the Southern Department thought it was a mistake to wait until a satisfactory type of mOlar transportation for fi eld service was developed. the 

lOG RG 92, OQMG Document File, 1800-191'1, Case 109744 A (Ltr, John Brisben Walker 

to Elihu Root, 1900 and ht ind .. Ludington. 31 May 19(0). 

,., Amillal Report at tire QrlnrlermrlSler Gem:ml, 1907. p. 32. 

I .. (I) RG 92, OQMG Document " ile, 1800-191'1, Case 221689 (Ltr, Purchasing Com mis· 

sary, N.Y. to TAG, 6 OCI 1908. and 2d ind .. Aleshire, 12 OCt 1908). (2) Ibid., Ca~ 2285&1. 

Quartermaster General Humphrey had bought automobiles for lise in Havalla. at San 

Francisco, and for the constructing quartermasters at Walter Reed Hospital in Washington in 1906 only to h~ ... e the Treasury ru le that he had no authority for such purchues 

under the Appropriation Act. ~nd they were Charged against his account. 

"" ' bid., Case: 2285&1 (Memo. Lt. Col. D. A. Frederick. for Acting Chief of Staff, 7 JUII 

1910). 

"'Ibid., Case 520076 (Aleshire to Chief of Staff, 2 Nov 1911): (Memo, Capl. A. E. 

Williams for QMC, 3 Nov 1911). 
CONVERSION OF A DEPARTMENT INTO A CORPS 597 

Quan crmaster Corps pursued its deve lopmental program, limited by the 

funds it was able to save from the appropria tion for Army tra nsportation 

fo r the purpose. lOr. The first specifica tions of the Quanermaster Corps 

for tr ucks were written in 19 13 afLer extensive correspondence with 

man ufactu rers and with the SOCiClY of Automo bile Engineers. As the 

developmental program continued, th e Cor ps rev ised these specifi cations 

a nd brought them u p to date annua ll y. 

In 19 16, Pershing's expedition into Mexico afforded an opportun ity 

for testing the work done so far by the Corps and for determining the 

val ue of mOLOr transportation. Any lingering dou bts as to its superiority 

over animal-d rawn transportation were forever settled. T he first call 

for two motor-truck compa n ies came from the So uthern Department on 

II March 19 1G. Each compa ny was to consist of 27 motor trucks of 

112 tons capacity, eq uipped with the necessary personnel for th eir 

operatio n. W ith the approva l of the Secretary of War, the Q uartermaster Corps purchased the tr ucks, hired the necessary personnel at the 

factories manufacturi ng the trucks, and d ispatched trucks an d o perators 

by spec ial-tra in service to Columbus, New Mex., with in 5 days. By 

30 June 19 16, the Corps had purchased, for use on the Mex ican border, 

588 motor trucks, 57 motor tan k trucks, 10 motor machine-shop trucks, 

6 motor wrecking trucks, 75 a utomobiles, 61 motorcycles, and 8 tractors 

for repairi ng roads, as we ll as o th er miscellaneous road machinery, repair 

parts, and eq uipment. ,~~ 

T he operation and ma intenance, under emergency cond itions, of 

this vari ed motor equipment-there were 13 different types of trucks 

a lone made by 8 11la llufacturers--crea ted a host of new problems that 

ra nged from the establishment of repair shops to the su ppl y of spare 

parts and the procuremelll of compctem pe rsonnel. The practica l 

experience gai ned, though acq ui red by only a few officers, was of much 

val ue, for with in a few momhs after the fina l withdrawal of the Army 

from Mexico the United States ente red World War I. 

Summm)' 

T he Q uartermaster's De partment had been given no o pportunity to 

redeem and consig n to oblivion, by o ll tstand ing su ppl y achievements 

later in the conflict, the poor showing th at it had made when the SpanishAmerican War bega n. Un li ke the Civil War, that war was of too short 

dura tion to permit the Department to overcome the drag of unprepared-

' .. RG 92. OQMG 1'l!l"5Qnal Filc-Gl!n. J. B. Alesh irl!. Box 2 (Llf, Brig. Gl!" Tasker Bli$s 

to Inspector General E. A. Garlington, 10 Dec 1913); (Ltr. Aleshire to Bliss, 26 Jan 1911). 

'''' A""ual Rtf/lort of the Quarlermaller Celler"I. 1916, p. 56. 
598 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

ness and inexperience before it ended. But if, in consequence, supply 

shortcomings were not (orgotlcn, that fact was conducive to creating a 

favorab le atmosphere for reform and it ena bl ed Secretary of War Elihu 

Root to effect some fundamenta l administrative changes before the crest 

of the rdorm wave spent itself in 1904. Consolidation of three of the 

supply burea us into onc Quartermaster Corps and its militarization were 

made possible only after persistent effons and because Root's initial 

reforms had eliminated the [car of even greater bureaucracy. Though 

it took the crisis of 1898 to stimulate action, most of the administrative 

reforms and some of the operational changes made in th e Subsistence 

and Quartermaster's Departments, as, fo r example, the creation of the 

remount service and the establishment of Army schools for cooks and 

bakers, had been advocated for many years. 

T he initial drive for increasi ng the efficiency of the Army and the 

War Department soon gave way to the more familiar leisurely pace that 

had characteri zed prewar reform efforts. As was customary in other 

postwar periods, developments in th e years 1898- 1917 were hampered 

by the need to economize. No sense of urgency drove the Quartermaster 

Corps after war broke out in Europe in 1914. It was persuaded, as was 

the War Department and the public generally, that the country was not 

going to become involved in World War 1. A newly consolidated Corps, 

under the leadersh ip of a Quartermaster Genera l- Maj. Gen. Henry G. 

Sharpe- who had been appointed on 16 September 1916 and whose career 

had been predominately that of a Subsistence officer, was ca ll ed upon to 

support a war, the su ppl y demands for which were far greater than those 

oE the Spanish-American War and fo r which th e Corps was as unprepared 

in 1917 as it had been in 1898. 
CHAPTER XIV 

Supply m the Zone of Interior 

1917-1918 

The effectiveness of the reforms initiated after the Spanish-American 

War. designed to promote a morc efficient War Department organization 

and to co-ord ina te its activities through the crea tion of a General Staff. 

was tested in 19 17 and found wanting. "The whol e General Staff and 

War Department organization, genera ll y, fe ll li ke a house of cards," Maj. 

Gen. Johnson Hagood later wrote, "and a new organization had to be 

created d uring the process o[ the war." 1 

WaT Depa1·tment Organizalioll m April 1917 

On 6 April 1917, Newton D. Baker was Secretary of War. Congress 

had provided for an Assistan t Secretary of War in 1890, but not until 

Benedict Crowell look over that office in November 1917 did it acquire 

much significance. The Secretary's chief military advisor was the Chief 

of Staff. In the 14 years since Congress had created the office of Chief 

of Staff and established a Genera l Staff Corps to assist the Chief. littl e had 

been accomplished to develop an effective instrument for co·ordinating 

the suppl y activiti es of the War Department. The act of 1903 had pl aced 

the supply bureaus under the supervisory control of the Chief of Staff. 

but in 191 7 these burea us were still operaling as semi-independent, 

decentralized, and unco-ordi nated agencies. T hough the channel of 

communication between supply chiefs and the Secretary of War was 

through the Office of the Chief oE Staff, for all practica l purposes, the 

chiefs of the five suppl y bureaus, as well as the heads of six other administrative bureaus, reported directly to the Secretary of War. Even in 

peacetime, th is outmoded organ ization was burdensome to the Secretary 

of War, but in war it made it impossible (or him to keep abreast of the 

ex panding operations of each bureau." 

Lack of co·ordination was the basis (or most of the supply difficulties 

I The ServiCt!s of Suf,/,/), k>~lo . 1927), p. 27. General Hagood served for 7 years in 

the War Oeparunent before the war and JCteo ~ Chief of Sta ff. Services of Supply, Ameri . 

can Expeditionary ForcClS, during World War l. 

'/uut!SJ iglllio" of Iht! lIi(J r Deparllllclll: Hearings before Ihe Cornmillee on Military 

Affair:<, Senate, 6!>th Cong., 20 SC$$ •• Pt. 3. p. 1741 (Baker). Hereafter brien,. cited as W.D. 

/"vt!s/igMi"" H t!lIriltgs. 
600 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T H E ARMY 

encolllllcred at the begin ning of the war, but the failu re of th e Chic[ of 

Staff to promote co-ordination resulted in large measure from the lack 

of support given to the Genera l Siaff Corps. Not only were the burea us 

unenthusiastic about Staff supervision, but. according to a critic o[ 

Ge nera l Staff organization earl y in 1916, the Army at large was "no morc 

than lukewarm in itS support." Moreover, he detected a distinct spirit 

of hostili ty developing in Congress. " Only 4 years carli er, Congress had 

reduced the number of General Staff ofliccrs [rom 45 to 36. When Congress passed the Na ti onal Defense Act in 19 16, it authorized a gradua l 

increase in their number to 55, to be accomplished through fi ve annua l 

increments, but it defeated any rea l benefi t to be derived from the increase 

by providing that no more than half o[ the officers of the Genera l Staff 

were to be located in Washington at one time. In April 1917, there 

were onl y 19 in that city, the rest being stationed at various departmental 

he dqu rters.~ 

T he sma ll number of Genera l Staff officers doomed to failure Staff 

efforts to plan for war and to co·ordinate War Department supply activities. Not only were there no war plans, but, as soon as the war began, 

the avail ability of General Staff officers for such work was further decreased because ma ny of them were promoted, placed in command of 

divisions, and ordered out of Washington.o Even the Chief of Staff was 

in no position to influence deve lopments. So lightl y was the post regarded that the President sent Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott, Chief of Staff, 

to Russia in Mayas a member of the Un ited States Mission, and detached 

his successor, Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, for other work abroad in October 

1917. An Acting Chief of Staff functioned duri ng the absence of the 

Chief o[ Staff. Between G April and 31 December 1917, the office was 

rotated among three offi cers no less than six times, only one incumbent 

serving as long as 2 successive months.' Under these circumstances, it 

I RG 120, War Department H istorical Files. Box 152 (Historical Rpt , "Summary History 

or the Ceneral Staff:' 'Juoting Maj. R. H. Van Deman). 

~ (I) 39 S/n/. 167. (2) Ceneral l'eylon C. ~l;Ir , Tire Nnlioll nl IYnr (New York, 1932), 

PII. 45-46. 

o Wnr Expwdilllrt:s: l1earings berore Ihe Sc:lc:<:t Commillcc on EXllCnditures in the 

War Department. House. OO, h Cong .. 2d sess., Scr. 4, I't. 57. p. 307 1 (Samuel T. Ansell. ESII ')' 

Hereafter briefly refere<.1 to u II'nr Expt: udilllrt:s H t:nriugs. 

' The services of these oAken were as fo llow$: 

Da te Ch id or Slarr Acting Ch ier of Starr 

Ap' 6- May 15, 1917 ~hj . Gen. Hugh H. Scot! 

May 15- Aug 8, 1911 Absent wit II U.s. Commission to Gen. Tasker H. Ol iss 

Russia 

Aug 8- s.,p 22, 1917 Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott • 

s.,p ,,- 0" 29, 191' Cen. Tasker 11 . B1 i~s 

0" 29- I)tt 16. 1911 Absent in France Ia . Cen. John Biddle 

Dtt 16- J'" 9, 1918 Gen. T asker H . Bliu ·· 

J'" 9- Mar 3, 19 18 Absent in France Maj. Gen . J ohn Biddle 

Mar 4- Mav 19, 1918 Absent in France Cen. I'eyton C. March 
SUPPLY IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR, 1917- 191 8 601 

is not surprising that there was no co-ordination of suppl y bureau operations. T he lack of co-ordination, in fact, permitted developments that 

broke down such single-agency control of some functions as had existed 

before 1917. 

OQMG Organization in April 1917 

In April 191 7, the Quartermaster Corps was one of five supply 

bureaus under the general direction of the Chief of Staff. At that 

time, Maj. Gen. Henry G. Sharpe had been Quartermaster General for 

7 months. Sharpe, a most competent commissary. had served for 29 

years in the Subsistence Department, becoming Commissary General 

of Subsistence in 1905. a post he held until Congress merged the Sub· 

sistence Department with the Pay and Quartermaster's Departments in 

1912. A student of supply, Sharpe had for many years worked to achieve 

the establishment of a supply corps. He was a ded icated offi cer, whose 

devotion and loyalty to the service Secretary of War Baker fully appre· 

ciated. General Sharpe was not, however, a man of £orceful character. 

He lacked the aggressi veness required in the crisis of 1917 to combat the 

inroads upon his aUlhority that were made both from within and outside 

the War Department. 

The expanded organization of the Office of the Quartermaster General, created to meet the demands of the Spanish-American War, had 

gradually contraCted after 1898 until by 1911 only five divisions remained. 

Except for changes at the Branch level, necessitated by the absorption of 

the Subsistence and Pay Departments in 191 2, those five divisionsAdministrative. Finance and Accounting. Supplies, Construction and 

Repair, and Transportation- were still in existence on 6 April 191 7 when 

the United States d eclared war aga inst Germany.' Simil ar divisional 

organi zations were maintained at the general depots of the Corps and 

in the offices of the chi ef quartermasters of the four military departments 

into wh ich the United Stales was d ivided for adm inistrative purposes.-

• Maj . Gen. H ugh L. Sc:ou retired on 22 Seplember 19 17 . 

•• Gen. T asker H . iJlig relired on !I I December 1917. but. by direction of the I'resident . 

he was continued on active dut y iU Ch ief of Staff umi l ]9 May 19 18. 

Table prepared from inrom. ation . ubmitted by the Adjutant General to the Hon. Royal C. 

Johnson, 1!1 Dc:ccmbcr 19 19. See IVnr £.'.:~ "dif ll rtJ H earill!.!. 66lh Cong .. 2d 5CU .. SeT. 4. 

I't. 25. p. I!lOS. 

'(I) A"" lIn/ Reporl oIl/Ie: Q unrfumnJIe:r (;C:llunl.1911, pp. 4-6; 1919, p. 10. (2) General 

Sharpe disclosl'd that, art er oonsullalion wilh a firm or New York efficiency experts. Ihe 

OffICe had been organizm to handle efflCienrly the work that del'Olved upon il by law. 

RG 92. AGO 201 file on Sha rpe (Llr. Sharpe to Senator Frclinghuyscn . 26 Feb 1919) . 

• These departmenls "'ere. under War Departmelll order, in process nl being reorganized 

into six departmenll by I May 1917. War Dcpartmcnt CO !l8, 2 Apr 19]7. 
602 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

The names of the five divisions of the Office of the Quartermaster 

General were indicative of the broad duties imposed on the Corps. As in 

the past. it was still charged with providing the means of transportation 

needed in the movement of troops and supplies. It had also. since 1885. 

become responsible for handling the freight shipped by all executive 

departments of the government. The Corps continued to furnish all 

animals used by the Army as well as forage and wagons. It provided 

subsistence. cloth ing, camp and garrison equipage. and anicles authorized to be kept for sa le to the troops. It constructed barracks, quarters, 

storehouses, and other buildings needed by the Army; it repaired roads 

and bridges and built docks, and wharves for military purposes. It supplied, distributed, and accounted for fu nds for the payment of military 

personnel. The Corps had charge of all national cemeteries in the 

country. In addition to these spec ific funct ions, the Corps was also 

responsibl e generall y for attending to all matters connected with military 

operations that were not ex pressly assigned to some other burea u of the 

War Department. 

To execute these diverse functions, the Quartermaster Corps, on 

6 April 1917, had 205 officers. In the National Defense Act of 1916. 

Congress had provided for an increase of 183 officers to the existing 

Quartermaster staff of 11 3, the add itional offi cers to be added in annual 

increments over the next 5 years. In the existing emergency. the Presi· 

dent, by Executive Order. authorized the immediate addition of all 

increments. but. on the outbreak of war, the Corps was still 91 offi cers 

short of its authorized strength.' Of the 205 officers the Corps did have, 

55 were on permanent assignment and 150 were detailed from the line. 

As soon as the war began, the Corps was badly crippled, for the War 

Department reassigned 66 of the detailcd officers and sent them back 

to the linc.'t) 

Anticipating thal developmelll. Quartermaster Genera l Sharpe had 

expected in any emergency to draw trained personnel from the Officers' 

Reserve Corps. The National Defense Act of 1916 had authorized the 

establishment of such a Corps, and many of the most effic ient and val uabl e 

clerks in the Office of the Quartermastcr General had ta ken the examinations and qualified for commissions in lhe Quartermaster section oE the 

Officers' Reserve Corps. In May 191 7, Sharpe requested The Adjutant 

Genera l to ca ll such Reserve officers to active duty in the Washington 

office. where their experience cou ld be put to work to expedite the 

increasing business of the Corps. The Acting Chief of Staff disapproved 

i (I) 39 SIIII. 170. (2) I .. cury G. Sharp<:. Th ~ Q!llIrl rlllllJl r Cor/IS (New York, 1921), 

I). 26 . 

• t) Wllr Expeudilllrl!l H.-tll·it,S" , 66th Cong .• 2.1 SI..'SS ., Ser. 4. 1'1 . <13 , p. 2268 (Sharpe). 
SUPPLY IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR. 1917- 191 8 603 

his application on the basis of a recomme ndation made by The Adjutant 

General who fea red its effects upon h is own office. It was then decided 

that any Civil Service employee or enlisted man, given a commission as 

a Reserve officer and called to active dULY, would ha ve to be scm to some 

other station than the one at which he was located when called into 

service. The effect was to deprive the Office of the Quartermaster General at a critical time of much needed, va luable, experi enced assistance. 

These men, through long years of training and thorough knowledge of 

the workings of the Office, were most famil iar with the laws, decisions. 

and precedents regulating the Corps and, as a result, were best qua lified 

to prepare tables of requ irements and draw up estimates for Congress. 

T he very men whose services were denied to Sharpe were later ordered 

back to Was hington and assigned to d uty in the Office after he had been 

relieved as Quartermaster General." 

Establishment of the Council of National Defense 

Realizing that th e Quartermaster Corps lacked sufficien t trained 

personnel to handle its rapidly ex panding wartime business, Quartermaster General Sharpe eagerl y sought the a id of experts availabl e within 

the organiza tion of the Council of National Defense. 12 T his Council, 

composed of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Agriculture , Interior, Commerce, and Labor, had been created as a res ult of a rider to the Army 

Appropriation Bill passed by Congress on August 29, 19 16. This legislation gave recognition to the problems of ind ustrial mobilization and 

economic comrol. It charged the Council with the "co-ordi na tion of 

industries and resources for the national security a nd welfare" and with 

the "creation of relations which will render possibl e in time of need the 

immediate concentration and utilization of the resources of the Nation." 

T hough created in the summer of 19 16, the Council was not fu ll y 

organized lI ntil 3 March 19 17." 

The Council itse lf dealt only with top policy questions. The actual 

work of planning was done by th e Advisory Commission created II October 19 16. The Commission consisted of seven men, a ppointed by the 

Council of National Defense, with the approval of the President. Each 

man represen ted a certain line of industry or activity, and each headed 

II (I) Sharpe. T he Q"arlerma.iter Cor/IS, pp. 19, 36-39. (2) Army ReorgalliUllioll: Hear· 

ings berare House Commiucc on Military Affail1l, 66th Cong .. 1st sess .. Pc 14. pp. 650--!">I. 

Herearter briefly referred to 3 S ,4rmy Reorganilillion Hea,.jng£. (3) IVllr E.~p nditIlTC£ 

Hellrings, 66th Cong., Ser. I. PI. 6. pp. 519-20 (Gocthals). 

\~ Wa r expenditures H Cllri"gs, 66th Cong .. 2d SCS!i •• SeT. 4, Pc 411 . p. 2259. 

13 (I) 39 Stili. 649. (2) Fi'·sl ,4" " 1'111 Report, Council Of ,va/io'ml De/elise, 1917 (Washington. 1917), p. 6. 
604 QUARTERMASTER SU PI'ORT OF THE ARMY 

a commiuec in his special field that would permit bringing together 

experts who could adv ise the governmcnt. u Of these, the Committee 

on Supplies, dea ting with cotton goods, woolen goods, leather and shoes, 

played a major role in Quartermaster operations in 1917." h soon 

became apparCIH to th e Council and lhe Advisory Commission that war· 

lime requ irements would necessitate a program of co-ordination, and, by 

resolution of the Council on 3 1 March 19 17, a Genera l Muni tions Board 

was created to co-ordinate purchases made by the War and Navy Departmen ts, to assist in the acquisition of raw materi als. a nd to establish precedence of orders between the \OVal' and Navy Departments and between 

the military and ind ustrial needs of the country." Because the authority 

and scope of action of the General Munitions Boa rd were only vaguely 

defined and the centra lization of authority sought by the Advisory Commission was not achi eved, the Council of Nationa l Defense soon took 

furthe r action. In Jul y, it transformed the General Munitions Boa rd 

into the War Ind ustri es Board. Presidential action in March o( the 

following year brought about a compl ete reorga n izati on of the War 

Industries Board and a grea ter extension of iLS powers. H The relations 

between the Quartermaster Corps and the Council of National Defense 

and its committees and boards will become more apparent as some of 

the Corps' major wartime suppl y operations are ana lyzed . 

.. Following are the namC5 of the seven men. their positions. and the commiuee each 

headed : 

Daniel Willard (I'resident . Balt imore" Ohio Rail road). Commiuec on !1 an ~p()I'!~tiou 

and communication 

Howard E. Comn (Vice·president. Iludson Motor Co.). Comm ittee on rn unidnns :md 

manufacturing (including . ta ndardiUltion) and industria l relations 

J u lius Rosenwald (I'resident . Sears. Roebuck !II Co.). COl1lmiucc on Supplia 

Bernard Born/ch (Banker). Col1lmittC'C on raw materia ll. minerals. and ." ctals 

Dr. Hollis Cod frey (I'resident. Drexel Institute). CouuniuC(' on engineering anll 

education 

Samuel Compel'S (l'l'aillelll. America n Federation of I.abor). Coml1l iu cc on labor. 

including conservation of health and ",elfare of ",orken 

Dr_ Franklin Martin (Sec retary. General American College of Surgeons. Chicago). Cummince on medicine and surgery. including genera] Jani t~ti on. 

L. T he CommittL'C on SuppliC$ was created by resolution of the Advisory Commission 

of the Counci] of Na tioual Defense on ] 2 February 19]7 to cooperate in an advisory cap3city 

with the pu rchasing officers of the War and Navy I)epartments in secu ring their requirements 

of clothing. equipment. and subsistence. and in co-ordinating the bU)'ing by these depa rt . 

ments of these supplia. Fisl Alwl/lll Rt!/Jorl. COLwcil Of NII/imlfll Dt!/UISt! , 1917, 1" 65. 

If Representatives of the supply bureaus of the War and Navy Departments were 

appoimed to the Ceneral Munitions Board aloug with appointCf:$ fmn, the committees 

on raw materiall. manufacture, IUpplies. and medicine of the Advisory Comm ission. Ihid .. 

pp. 20-21 . 

11 Grosvenor B_ Clarluon . IndUSlriol Amt!ricn hi III" W orld lfIar (New York. 1923). 

pp- 3S-56; 48-50. 
SUPPLY I N THE ZONE OF INTERIOR, 19 17- 191 8 605 

ShelteJ';lIg the Troops 

In April 1917, as in 1898, the Quartermaster Corps was unprepared 

to cope wit h the demands made lI pon it. Although other suppl y burea us 

were equall y unprepared, the Corps' position was more critica l si nce it 

immediate ly had to tra nsport, clothe, feed, and shelter an ex panding 

Army. Woefully understaffed and lacking funds, the Corps entered upon 

a 9-month period of fTamic endeavor, made more difficult by the fa ilure of 

the Chi ef of Staff's Office to susta in the authority and [unCtions of the 

Quartermaster General. Reli eving General Sharpe of some of his duties 

was imended to speed achi evement of some of the intended objectives 

and incidentally ease his burden, bill since such transfers always involved 

the loss of experienced personnel, the effect upon his Office was demorall1.lIlg. It led him to protest tha t divided authority and parceling out his 

vital fu nctions were likely to res ul t in serious conseq uences for which he 

woul d neve rth eless be held responsibl e." 

Providing shelter for the troops call ed into service was one such 

function removed from his control. Ever since the period of the Mexican 

border trouble, the Office of the Quartermaster General had been studying 

the problem of housing troops in the field. Its Construction and Repair 

Division had designed and prepared plans for a series of temporary 

buildings and had also prepared sched ul es of the necessary materials to 

be used in their erection. In response to an inquiry from the Secretary 

of War in March, the Quartermaster General reported that his Office had 

avail ab le working drawings and blueprints for the construction of temporary cantonment buildings to shelter troops at regimenta l, brigade, 

or division training points. Blueprints, he reported, had been forwarded 

and more would be sent immed iately to the various department commanders. He also indica ted that his Office had under way some tentati ve 

negotiation with a number of large concerns that ma nu factu red readymade structu res in the expectation thallili lization of such resources would 

make possible the erection of temporary shelters for practically any number of troops on very short notice.'D 

Rece iving no furt her instructions even after war had been declared, 

Quartermaster General Sharpe pressed for a policy dec ision in April. 

Numerous requisitions for funds to provide shelter for National Guard 

troops were pouring into his Office. Would such troops remain in 

tentage with temporary kitchens and mess shelter of frame construction • 

.. RG 120. War Depa lln ~ll HUlorical Fila. Box 1·015 (Memo. Sharpe for Ch icf of Staff. 

17 Sell 1917). 

" 'bid., Box 143 (LIT. TAG 10 QMG. 21 Mar 191 7 anti ht ind .. Sharpe: 10 TAG. 

21 MaT 191 7). 
606 Q UARTERMASTER SU PPORT OF THE ARMY 

similar 1.0 those t hal had been constructed o n the Mexic.1 1l border, or, 

he queried, would they be housed in temporary buildings such as were 

provided for ma ne uver camps? To ex pedite all y construction program, 

he pointed out, the Corps would also have to be advised immediatel y 

concerning th e location of, a nd the numbe r of troops to be cared for at, 

the vario us mo bilization camps fo r the Nationa l Guard, the Regula r 

Army, and any o ther troops that miglll be ra ised. tO It was 7 May 19 17, 

however. before th e \·Var Departme nt directed the commanding generals 

of the several military de pa rtments to select sites for th e construction 

of ca nLo nmelllS for the training of th e mobilized Na tio nal Gua rd and th e 

National Army.2' 

Earl y in April, it became appa rent to th e General Munitions Board 

of the Council of NaLi onal Defense that th e construction of nt nm ts , 

additions to Governmem arsenals, and expansion of mher manufacturi ng 

concerns engaged in th e production of war mate rials a nd supplies was a 

vital part of th e prepa ra tion for carrying on the war. A group of civi lian 

ex perts, formed into th e Committee on Emcrgency Construction, bega n 

a study of th e probl ems in vo ve .~ 2 Beca use of th e magnitude of the 

work and th e limitcd time availabl e, the Committee recommend ed that 

an ex peri enced a nd ca p.:1.ble officer be charged sole ly with the constructi on 

of cantonments. The General Munitions Board proposed to make ofilce 

room available for him and his staff and to furnish him with adequate 

civilian assistance. 2' 

The Secretary of 'War approved of th ese recommendations and 

ordered Col. L W , Litte ll, Chief of th e Construction and Repair Division 

in the Quan crmasler C eneral's Officc, placed in charge of call1Ollmem 

construction, A separa te division, to be kn own as the Cantonmem 

Di vision, was establ ished in the Office, absorbing most of the limited 

personnel of th e Construction and Repa ir Di vision . The lau er di vision 

continued in cha rge of construction and repair work at permanent posts 

.w RG 9'l. AGO I)ocumcnl File. CaS(' 2!ii0158 (Sharpe 10 TAG. 9 Ap r 1917): CaS(' 2599 172 

(Memo, Sha rpe ror Ch id or Sla rr, 13 Apr 1917), 

u (Il War DejHlr/ ,mml A"" ual RepOl"/s, /917, I. 25. (2) Thc Nal ional Army I'lan , 

dCl'clopcti by Ihe Wa r Collegc Di vision of thc Genc r:1I Staff and Ihe Anlly Wal' Collcge, 

was a rong.rangc I'rogram h,~1 W:IS e~enlual1 y ad:.ptcd :md madc to $Cr~ e as Ihe basil ror 

Ihe Setective $cr" ice Act of May 18, 191 7. Thc di li li n drawn belween Itcgula r Army, 

Nalional Gua rd , and drafrt't.'S undcr Ihe Act Wal laler abolished b y designating all three 

as Ihe "Unilcd Slates Army." War ~parl",e"l Ce"em/ Orderl, 1918, GO . 7 Aug 191 8, 

(3) For de:velopmcnt of Ihe: I'lan, see Ma rvin A, Krcidbcl'g and Me:rton G. Henry. fli$lory of 

flf ili la.., flf obil iUllioli if! Ihe U"ited Statu A rm}" I nJ- 19H (DeJXIrlment of the Army 

Pamphlel No. 20-2 12, Washington , 1955). 

:. First A,,,,unl ~por . Coullcil of Naliaunl efu/J~. 1917. pp. 2~2 . 

23 (1) RG 120, Hillory or Construcl ion , Book I (Exhibits). 1'1'. 11- 12 (Comm iu ce on 

Emergency Construct ion 10 W. A. an~ , 10 May t917). (2) RG 92. AGO Documenl File. 

Case 259i942 (Memo. Maj. I', t:. Piel"(:e ror ACl ing Chicf of Staff, 16 ~fay 1917), 
SUPPLY IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR, 1917- 19 18 607 

and stations. ileca use tb e Cantonment Division operated directly under 

the Secretary of 'Var, th e Quartermaster Corps was relieved of allresponsibility for cantonment conslruclion, except the preparation of estimates 

required by that Division.

z

< 

T he task con fronting th e CantonmClll Division was enormous. In 

April 1917, th ere were suflici cnt barracks onl y fo r sheltering the Regular 

Army. Additional housing had to be provided for the increments to 

th e Regular Army, for the expanded National G uard, and for the men 

drafted imo the Na tional Army. Early in May, War Department plans 

ca lled for the constl"llction of 32 cantonments, but insufficient fu nds and 

shortages of suppli es, labor, and transporta tion compell ed a revision of 

these plans. Late in May, the General Staff decided that cantonments 

wou ld be constructed only fo r 16 divisions of th e National Army by 

I September. The Na tional Guard would be mobilized in camps that, 

fo r th e most pan, would be under canvas, with only certain divisional 

storehouses and quarters [or special uses constructed of wood. For 

climatic reasons, it located th ese Nalional Guard camps in the southern 

states. Z~ 

The Comm ittee on Emerge ncy Construction, acting in an advisory 

ca pacity, assisted Colonel Line ll in bu ilding up an organization adequate 

for the task, in obtain ing th e services of qua lifi ed men to d irect the work 

of the Division, and in selecting responsible contractors to carry out the 

construction. On the adv ice of the Committee, and in th e interest of 

economy, the Cantonment Division abandoned the one·story bar 'ack 

used in Quartermaster plans in favor of a two·story barrack. Working 

through th e various subcmnmittees of the Council of Nationa l Defense, 

Ihe Cantonment Division obta ined construction materials and equipment. 

If the camps were to be ready by I September, speed was essential. 

Some sites were not selected , however, until June. Beca use work had 

to begin even before completed plans and speci fi cations could be made 

available [or use in submitting competiti ve estimates, th e ordinary method 

of advertising for b ids and awarding contracts to the lowest bidders could 

not be followed. Since no form of government coillract met this situa· 

tion, the Council of Na tional Defense developed a new one. This con· 

tract provided th at work should be done on a cost.pl us basis with a graded 

. (I) RG 120. History of Conslruction, Book I (Exhibits). p. 32 (Ltr. Sharpe to Chief of 

Scaff. 17 May (91 7): " . 3~ (Mcmo. Littell for Chief of Staff. 18 May 191 7). (2) RG 92. 

OQMG General Correspondence .'ile. 19t7 1922. nox 7997 (fAG to Col. I. W. Littell. 

19 May 1917). 

2. RG 92. OQMG General Correspondence File, 1917-1922, nox 7997 (Memo. Chief, War 

College Oi\, .. for Chief of Staff. - May 1917; o. Acting Chief of Staff. Gen. T. H. BliM. 

(o r TAG. 29 May 1917; LIT. Commillce on Emergency Construction to Col. I. W. Littell, 

25 Ma y 1917). 
608 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

scale of percentages decreasing from 10 percent to G percellt on the cost 

of the work as the total cost of work increased.n T he use of this lype 

of COlllraCl was much criticized and condemned later. but General Littell 

testified that no contractor received as high as 6 percent, the actual amount 

varying between 2 and 3 percent. A minority report of the Committee 

o n War Expenditures held the cost-pl us system justifiable, inevitable, and 

unavoidable.n 

By October 191 7, the Cantonment Division had. I'or the most part. 

completed the initial construction of cantonments. Auention was then 

turned to other types of construction- the building of munitions plants. 

provi ng grounds, aviation fields. pon terminals, and interior depots. 

Before the war, the Quartermaster Corps had been responsible (or all sllch 

construction, but in the absence of any co-ordinating influence in 191 7, 

various supply bureaus had been permitt ed to obta in funds for construction purposes in appropriation and deficiency bills.28 Competition for 

materials had inevitably resulted. To restore centralized control. the 

Secretary of War on 5 October 191 7, directed the Cantonment Division to 

assume responsibility for all construction made necessary in the United 

States by the emergency. whether provided for by existing or pending 

appropriations. n 

The Ordnance Department and the Corps of Engineers agreed to 

the transfer of work. blll it required a considerabl e number of conferences 

to resolve difficulties with the Signal Corps.so So far as the Quartermaster 

Corps was concerned. the Secretary's order resulted in the transfer of 

what remained of the .prewar Construction and Repair Division to the 

Cantonment Division as a branch of that organization, along with its 

personnel and records. 3 ' To this time, the Quartermaster General had 

regarded the Cantonment Division as an organil..ational unit of his Office. 

but that division had shown an increasing degree of independence. Its 

chief did not even consult the Quartermaster General on the reorganization required by the new responsibilities resulting from the Secretary's 

order of 5 October. The Quartermaster General was critical of these 

20 IV D. InvcJ!igfll ioll HCflri"i,s. 6:'lh Cong., 2d seu., I't. 2, p. 2323 (Littell). 

21 lVar Ex~"ditllrtJ H.mri"g$, 66th Cong., Scr. I, vol. 3, p . 41 4. 

liThe Signal Corps. for example, had heell grallIed funds 10 conltrUl;t, maintain, and 

Tepair barracks, quaTten, lIables. storehouses, magazines, administrative buildings, hangan, 

sheds, shops, garages, and OtheT permancllI buildings neceuary fOT the shelter of aviation 

troops, public animals, stores and equ ipment . 40 SIIlI. 43 (May 12, 1917). 

t. RG 92, OQMG General Correspondence File, 1917-1922, Bo" 7997 (Ltr, TAG 10 QMG, 

5 Oct 1917). 

IO /bid., Box 7997 (Llr, Maj. W. A. Sta rrell to Maj. W. W. Taylor. 8 Dec 1917). 

II OQMC Office Ordcr No. 106, 10 Oet 1917. 
I 

SUPPLY IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR, 1917-1918 609 

developments and considered unnecessary the additional authority requested by the Cantonment Division to execute its expanded duties. 12 

The Secretary made additional changes after he reassigned Sharpe 

to other duties. He placed the Cantonment Division under the Chief 

of Staff to function as part of the Operations Division on 9 February 

1918. In the following month the Cantonment Division was renamed the 

Construction Division,n Although the Construction Division was entirely separated from the Office of the Quartermaster General by this 

directive, there still were many matters that, by reason of existing conditions, continued to be handled through that Office. Thus, the Office 

of the Quartermaster General hired most of the civilians employed by 

the Construction Division; officers commissioned In the Quartermaster 

Corps were assigned to the Construction Division; and the Quartermaster 

Corps accounted for all funds expended by the Construction Division 

and all property it used in connection with its construction work. As a 

result of these ties, the impression was created that there was no separation 

and, in consequence, confusion and an unwillingness to cooperate full y 

were fostered. To clarify this situation, the chief of the Construction 

Division proposed that an Executive Order be issued converting the 

Division into a separate bureau of the War Department to handle all 

construction." T hat objective, however, was not attained in 1918. 

Loss of TmnspoJ·tation Function 

For all practical purposes, the Quartermaster General had lost his 

responsibility for construction in May 1917. Before the summer was 

over, a War Department order relieved him of still another function, 

namely, the responsibility for transporting troops and supplies overseas. 

To carry out this duty, the Corps had, since the Spanish-American War, 

maintained an Army Transport Service. A General Superintendent 

and his assistants directed the whole of the Army Transport Service at the 

home ports of the vessels, and the Water Transportation Branch in the 

Transportation Division of the Office of the Quartermaster General provided general supervision. 

In April 1917, the Army Transport Service had only 16 vessels. 

All but four of the troop transports were in service in the Pacific, and 

the four that comprised the Atlantic Heet were primarily engaged in the 

It RG 92, OQMG General Correspondence File, 1917- 1922, Box 7m (2d ind., QMG to 

TAG. 2Q Dec 1917). 

n War Department GO 14 • 

•• RG 120. Hi$tory of Construction, Ilook II (Exhibits), pp. 185--38 (Memo, Brig. Gen. 

R. C. Manhall.Jr., for ASW, 2 Aug 19 18). 
610 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Canal Zone,ss Although the Service did not own many ships, it could, 

under the direction of the QuartermaSter General, charter commercial 

vessels and refit them for service. In preparation for demands for additional ships, the Water Transportation Branch maintained a record on 

various commercial vessels of American registry, giving their tonnage, 

capacity. and general suitability for transport use. Major General Sharpe 

later insisted that even if the Army Transport Service owned only a few 

ships, it had "the nucleus of an organization" that needed only the 

necessary orders and financial support to permit it LO expand readily to 

any extent demanded. II 

Before the declaration of war, the Quartermaster General instructed 

the Chief of the Transportation Division to communicate with the chairman of the Shipping Board and impress upon him the necessity for 

making ships available as transports. Col. J. M. Carson, Depot Quartermaster at New York City and, after 8 May 1917, also General Superintendent, Army Transport Service, recommended more specific action. As 

early as December 1916, he urged that plans be prepared, if they did not 

already exist, to enable the Army to lake possession of the German and 

Austrian ships interned at New York harbor since August 1914 and to 

seize the docks at Hoboken where they were berthed. Many of these 

vessels were passenger ships, admirably adapted for use as troop transports. 

The Quartermaster General replied that he would take steps to do this 

as soon as it became necessary, but representatives of the Treasury Department immediately seized the vessels when war was declared. The Shipping Board subsequently took over their operation, and weeks of valuable 

time were lost before the question of their use by the Army was 

favorably settled.

JT 

The docks at Hoboken were not included in the seillire of the German ships. Colonel Carson again urged the importance of obtaining 

them, but not until he personally presented the matter to the Quartermaster General and the Secretary of War on 15 April did he receive 

instructions the following day to take possession of the docks. Despite 

the colonel's energetic measures to clear the docks of property belonging 

to the steamship companies that owned them, it was mid-May before they 

were ready for transports. Approximately a week later on 21 May, he 

received orders to prepare to send the first convoy of American troops 

to France. With the cooperation of the steamship companies whose 

vessels were to be used, and with the assiSlance of the sh ipyards and of 

n Annual RefXJrl al Ihe QuarlemUlsler Gellert/I. 1917, pp. 55-58. 

Ie Sharpe. Til t QunrttrmaSltr CQrPS, p. S52. 

IT (I) Ibid., pp. S5G-58. (2) RG 92. OQMG Historical Files. Box 50 (LtT. Lt. Col. F. 1'. 

Jackson to Brig. Gen. J. M. Carson, S May 1919, and appended report from Canon). 
SUPPLY IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR, 1917- 1918 61 1 

the Nava l officers of the New York Navy Yard in fitt ing out the ships, he 

dispatched the expedition on 14 June 1917. 

Since there was no embarkation camp at which the troops could be 

held until they could board transports, Colonel Carson had to communicate with the posts from which they were being drawn and regulate the 

arrival of the troops so that they could march directly from the train to 

the designated ship. Without adequate co-ordination, the possibilities 

for things to go wrong were innumerable. and the need for such control 

was clearly evident to one observer. 

Slowly and confusedly the troopships wcre here being prepared for sea. 

Slowly and more confusedly su pplies and troops were being brought. 

Evidently the first convoy of this expedition has been hurried ly ordered. 

Lack of system, lack of direction, cohesion, and organization were evident upon 

all hands and in everything. Supplies and troops were loaded in confusion 

and disorder. Men were sem to ships unprelJared to receive them. Supplies 

were piled in pell-mell. Many had to be un oaded. Some ships received too 

many troops, some too few, and had to be changed. Men came ex pecting to 

go aboard to live and had to stay ashore or on a lighter and live as best they 

could. Troops intended to be put aboard ships to live had to be held for 

a couple of days in railroad freight yards, blocked in by freight trains, and most 

dirty and uncomfortable.u 

Because the docks offered inadequate storage space for all the freight 

that was to accompany the expedition , Colonel Carson a lso had to attempt 

lO regulate the arrival of supplies and equipmen t. Although the tonnage for the expedition was limited, the War Department had established 

no priority lists for shipments nor did it exercise any co-ordination. Each 

supply bureau shipped the supplies that would be required by its represcmatives in France, one bureau alone shipping about 12,000 lOns of 

freigh t to New York to be forwarded with the expedition. 39 T hough 

the Quartermaster Corps was supposedly responsible for the transponation of supplies and troops, its control, in the existing state of uncoordinated action, had been undermined by the action of the various 

supply bUTeaus in securing appropriations for mak ing shipment of their 

own materials. They had created traffic sections that handl ed the shipment of their supplies by railroad, sending the finished products to the 

ports as rapid ly as they were procured. At the ports, where available 

tonnage was scant and where port officers had to consider the immediate 

needs of the American Expeditionary Forces as we ll as th e necessity fgr 

a balanced Jading of th e vesse ls, much of this material could not be 

38 Robert L. Bullard. Pusrntalilit:s (/lid Rt miuisc:t:uct:S oj Ih t: Wor (New York, 1925). 

pr·26--27. 

39 (1) Sharpe. Th t: Quartt:rmastt:r Cor/!s, pr. 360--61. (2) RG 92. OQMG Historiu l Files. 

Box 50 (Ca rson Report). 
612 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

forwarded. Within a shon time, Army freight cluttered the docks at 

the ports and, with no storage space available there, remained in freight 

cars that clogged the rails so far inland that by December freight traosportation almost came to a halt. 

Colonel Carson's experience in preparing for the first convoy convinced him that as Depot Quartermaster and General Superintendent 

he did not have suffic ient authority to handle satisfactorily the military 

details of embarkation. A port commander was obviously necessary. and 

pending the appointment of such an officer, he suggested that he be so 

designated. Quartermaster General Sharpe approved, but the Chief of 

Staff did not assign th is duty to Colonel Carson. Instead, he instructed 

the Commanding General of the Eastern Department to exercise the 

functions of a commander of the port of embarkation until a line officer 

could be designated for such duty. He directed General Superintendent 

Carson to report to the commanding general for instructions. 40 

Shortly after the first convoy sailed, Colonel Carson received orders to 

send a second division abroad as soon as possible. To insure proper 

supervision and co-ordination. Quartermaster General Sharpe recommended, on 20 June 1917. that ports of embarkation be established at 

New York, Newport News. and such other portS as might be necessary. 

He proposed that the New York port be designated for the transportation 

of troops and genera l supplies and the Newport News port for the shipment of animals, forage, and heavy ordnance. He recommended that a 

commanding officer be assigned to each port of embarkation who would 

be under the orders of the Secretary of War and would have authority to 

communicate directly with the chiefs of the supply bureaus. He further 

recommended the establishment of a concentration camp at the New York 

port and a depot to accommodate 10,000 anima ls at the Newport News 

port. He proposed that bureau chiefs furnish timely information of 

contemplated shipments to the port commander who would decide on 

the priority of all shipmentS." 

The Secretary of War approved of the proposals. Approximately 

5 weeks later, on the recommendation of the General Staff, co-ordination 

was carried much further than Sharpe had envisaged. A section to take 

charge of the embarkation of troops and supplies for transatlal1lic transportation and to exercise direct control under the Secretary of War was 

.0 (I) RG 94, AGO Documen t ile , Case 2612095 (Memo, Chid, War College Div. for 

Chid of Stall, 5 Jun 1917), (2) RG 92, OQMG Historica] t'iles, nox 56 (Memo, ACting Chid 

of Stall for TAG . G Jun 191 7, exhibit in Appendix Ill, p. 5 for " History of Purchase Stonge &: 

Tnflk Division' '). 

iI RG 120, War ])epartlllelll Hilitorical .'i]es, Box 162,A (Memo. Chief of War College 

Div. for Chid of Stall. 5 Jul 19] 7, ropy in " History of I'urchase, Stonge &: Traffic Division ," 

Appelldix IV. pp. 15- ]6). 
I 

SUPPLY IN T H E ZONE OF INTERIOR, 1917- 1918 613 

established in the Office of the Chief of Staff. This section, co-ordinating 

and supervising all troop movements to Europe and all shipments oE 

supplies from points of origin lO POftS of embarkation and controlling 

the employment of all Army transports used in the transa tlantic service 

as well as all supplementary commercial shipping, was placed under the 

direction of Brig. Gen. F. J. Kernan, temporarily detailed as Chief of 

the Embarkation Service. Col. Chau ncey B. Baker, who had been serving as chief of the Transportation Division in the Quarlcrmaster General's 

Office, was detailed as his principal assista nt,n T he effect of th is order 

was to relieve the Quartermaster Corps of all responsibility for overseas 

transportation of troops and supplies. The Transportation Division still 

retained its prewar responsibility for railroad and motor transportation. 

Centmlized Con l1"Ol 0/ Subsistence Procurement 

War had brought the loss of two of the basic functions of the Corps 

for the duration of the conflict. Its impact was to be felt in other 

changes, particularly in the shift from a system of decemralized procurement to one of centralized control. Quartermaster purchase of food for 

the Army was an entirely decentralized function before the war. Depot 

quartermasters bought all subsistence, basing their purchases on requirements figured by departmemal quartermasters and procuring from dealers 

in the immediate vicinity of the poStS to be supplied. The system had 

been efficient in providing the sma ll prewar Army with high quality food 

at relatively low prices. 

Sharpe did not anticipate any need for change in this system, and, 

at the outbreak of war, he instructed the officers of the 13 Quartermaster 

depoLS to provide subsistence supplies for the various organi zations assigned to the different camps and canLOnments under their jurisdiction. 

Shortly thereafter, the War Department issued instructions to the camps 

and cantonments which required them to lay in a 3 months' suppl y of 

food-I month's suppl y at camp, I month's suppl y en route, and I momh's 

suppl y on requisition. Quartermasters at the camps bought all perishable 

stores, and depot quartermasters procured all other subsistence .. l The 

large purchases required for the rapidly expand ing Army and procured 

by quartermasters competing agai nst each other materially affected prices. 

Moreover, the prices they paid varied greatl y and the subsistence stores 

they purchased were not uniform in quality. At times, there was a 

. : (I) War Department GO 102, 4 Aug 1917. (2) Sharpe, The QuarlermllJler Corps, 

pp. 564-67 (Memo, TAG for QMG, 27 Jul 1917) . 

• 1 RG 120. War Deparunem Ilistorical Files. Box 5~ (Memorandu m, Lt. Col. Wm. R. 

Grove. 24 Dec 1917, sub: Method of Band ling Subsistence During 19]7). 
614 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T H E ARMY 

congestion of purchase orders in certain areas, particularly in the New 

York area where the quartermaster of the New York Depot was Hlling 

practicall y all overseas shipments of subsistence. Competition between 

the armed services further disturbed market conditions, while purchases 

by Allied governments added to the abnormal demand. 

By the summer of 1917, it was apparent that certain food commodities 

would be scarce. The Council of Na ti onal Defense undertook to provide 

the req uirements of the Army and Navy without unduly influencing the 

price paid by civili ans. Working through the Na tional Canners' Association, it made arrangements to secure military requirements of such 

articles as canned peas, corn, beans. tomatoes, and fru its by allotment to 

all the canners of the country." 

When the U.S. Food Administration was organized in August, it 

continued to make such allotments. On 8 October 191 7. by proclamation 

of the President, 20 of the princi pal items of food suppl y were placed 

under the control of the Food Administration. They were in such great 

demand that it was believed that supply would not be sufficient and that 

control of their sale and distribu tion wo uld be necessary. Depending 

upon act ual or prospective shortages, the Food Administration later 

brought other food items under its COntrol. In order to co-ordinate all 

purchases of food products intended for military purposes, a Food Purchase Board was orga ni zed in December at the suggestion of the Food 

Administrator. The Board was composed of members representing the 

Quartermasler General. the Paymaster General of the Navy, the Food 

Administration, and the Federal Trade Commission. Thereafter, when 

an actual or prospective shortage existed for foods that were to be purchased. the Food Purchase Board took cha rge, recommending the method 

of procurement and the prices to be paid. the latter being determined 

after an investiga tion of costs by the Federal Trade Commission. 

Under the pl an of control finally developed, the Office of the Quartermaster General obtained articles on the allocated purchase list by 

requesting the Food Administration to allocate the quantity required. 

The Food Admi nistration allotted the amount to the producers of the 

commodity in question. div iding the business among them in proportion 

to their capacity. When informed that the allotment had been made, the 

Office of the Quartermaster General directed procurement through the 

proper genera l supply depot in whose area the designated industry was 

located. under terms and at prices decided upon by the Food Purchase 

Board. The Office procured under this control plan Rour, sugar, all 

canned vegetables, canned and eva porated fruits, sa lmon, sardines, canned 

.. "-irst AU/HI!!! /l e/Jorl, COimci! 0/ Naliall!!! De/elise, 1917, p. 67 . 
SUPPLY IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR, 1917-1918 615 

milk. and fresh beeL The products so handled totaled about 40 percent 

of all food requirements (or the Army!' 

Before the end oE 1917, the Office of the Quartermaster General 

developed a plan for the control of practically all the remaining items of 

subsistence it procured. During the Ilrst 9 months of the war, subsistence 

procurement remained in the hands of the depot quartermasters. There 

was no shortage of rations and the absence of criticism is evidence that 

they performed satisfactorily despite all obstacles. Centralized control 

was a necessity. however, and Jed La the establishment of a Subsistence 

Division in the Office of the Quartermaster Genera l on 2 January 191 8. 

On the previous day. the Office put into effect a control plan that covered 

33 principal subsistence items. Under that plan, depot quartermasters, 

and later zone supply officers, solicited bids and reported them to the 

Subsistence Division. Quartermaster officers in the Division compared 

the bids wilh current market prices and accepted the most advantageous 

bid, the purchase being completed by the local suppl y officer. In effect, 

the plan provided centralized comrol with decentralized purchase. The 

Division gradually extended the list of controlled items until, by the time 

the armistice was signed, it included almost all subsistence items not 

allotted through the Food Administration.'11 

Dellelopme11ls in PmCttremel1t of Textiles and Clothing 

In April 1917, Sharpe also rel ied upon the existing decentralized 

Quartermaster procurement system to obta in the textiles. cloth ing, and 

equipment needed by the troops of t he Regular Army and the National 

Guard, both ra ised to their authorized maximum war strength, and by 

the forces o[ the National Army to be called to the colors, a total of 

approximate ly 1,500,000 men by SeptemberY Although it is doubtful 

that the Quartermaster General, or most Army officers. then appreciated 

the problems of ind ustrial mobilization confronting a democracy at war, 

Sharpe knew that the Corps would need the cooperation or the business 

community in maki ng large purchases. In February 1917, he proposed 

that boards of award be establ ished at Quartermaster purchasing depots, 

to be composed of depot officers and one or more competent businessmen, 

H(I) Amuica'$ /lflHliriOlu, 1917- 18: Ueporl of Befledict Crowell (Washington. 19(9). 

pp. 440-41. ('2) RG 120. War Dcparuncm lIi5toricai Files. no" 147 (Rpt . " ' lislOry of the 

SUbsistence Division." pp. 10-15 . 

.. (I) Sharpe, T he Q"llrtermll$ltr Corps, pp. 9:S-96. (2) RG 120. War Dcpart ment 

Historical Files. no" 147 (Rpl. " History or the ub:si Slcnc~ Division ." pp. I:S-IS). 

U (I) lVII' ~parlmenl AmwlII RtporlJ, /917, I. 12. (2) RG 120. War Dcparlment 

Hiltorkal Files, Box 143 (lsI ind .. TAG 10 QMG, 23 May 19 17, to llr. TAG to CG. Eastern 

Departmcnt .22 May 191 7). 
616 QUARTERMASTER SUI'PORT OF THE ARMY 

lhe latter to be designated by the Counci l of National Defense. These 

businessmen were 110t to be connected with any firm that would be likely 

to submit proposals on Quartermaster items of supply, but, by reason 

of the ir qualifications and expert knowledge, they could serve in an 

advisory capac ity to the depot purchasing officer on the board of award, 

which wou ld examine bids, make awards, and enter into contracu,,$ 

The Council of National Defense adopted a resolution along some· 

what different lines that Secretary of War Baker communicated to lhe 

president of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. It reo 

quested that the latter appoint a small committee in each of the cities 

in which the Quartermaster Corps had a purchasing depot. to the end 

that advice and assista nce could be furnished the local quartermaster in 

case it became necessary when unusuall y large purchases had LO be made 

on short notice. 4 $ 

The president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce hurri edly organ· 

ized such advisory committees at six major purchasing depots at BostOn. 

New York, Philadelphia, Chicago. St. Louis. and San Francisco, where 

bids were to be ope ned earl y in March.'o Later. he provided advisory 

committees at other depots. The service of these committees varied. 

At some depots, quartermasters never ca ll ed upon them; at others, notably 

at New York and San Francisco. the depot quartermasters relied heavily 

on th eir assistance. The advisory committees so ught to e liminate middl e· 

men. to put the quartermasters in LOuch with reputable manufacturers. 

and to resolve difficulties ca used by government specifications. Their 

primary importa nce was in bringing about contact between government 

and industry and in selling government business to manufacturers who 

generall y lacked confidence in the government's business me thods which 

they viewed as bad. As purchase of Quartermaster supplies grad ually 

became centralized in Washington through the efforts of the Council of 

National Defense, th e depot quartermasters' power in th e placement of 

contracts decreased and the necessity for advisory committees also 

declined. 

The Quartermaster Corps was grea tly handiql.pped in meeting any 

emergency demands for clothing and equ ipment because it lacked sufficient trained personnel; it had no funds; and it had no stock of reserve 

clothing on hand- that had been exhausted when the National Guard 

was called into service on the Mexican border in June 1916. When, 

on.3 March 1917, the Secretary of War directed the Quartermaster Gen-

.. RG 120, War Department Historical Fila. 1\01( I," (Memo. Sharpe ror SW. 4 Feb 1917). 

4' RG 92. OQMG Historical Files. 1\0 .. 3 (Hi5torical Rpl. " l'robJem in Industrial 

MobiliutioTl ," prepared by H. I'helps I'utnam). 

60 JIIon Experrdilllre$ HetJrings, 66lh Cong .. 2<1 ICSS .. Ser. 4. 1'1. 43. p. 2259 (Sharpe). 
SUPPLY IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR, 19 17-191 8 617 

eral to procure, withollt delay and to the extent o[ existing appropriations, 

the clothing and equipment needed to eq uip at war strength all existing 

National Guard organizations. Quartermaster Genera l Sharpe could onl y 

reply that there was no exiSting appropriation for the procuremclll of 

clothing and other Quartermaster supplies.'1 During the fall of 1916, 

the clothing appropriation had become exhausted and deficiencies had 

been created in order to support the National Guard and Regular Army 

of 250,000 men, stationed principally on the Mexican border. 

Sharpe expected a new appropriation bill to pass on 4 March 1917. 

and, in anticipation, he directed his quartermasters to advertise for bids 

on sufficient quantities of texti les, clothing, and equipment to provide 

during fiscal year 1918 for the Regular Army which was estimated at 

160,000 men. Congress, however, adjourned without enacting such legislation; it did not pass the Army Appropriation Act until 15 June 1917. 

With the Secretary of War's sanction, the Corps therefore had to make 

arrangements for entering into Contracts with the successful bidders before 

Congress appropriated funds in order that the manufacturers cou ld produce the articles of clothing and have them ready for delivery promptly 

by I July, or the beginning of the next fisca l year.&! 

The contracts provided clothing only for the then existing Regular 

Army strength of approximately 160,000 men, but later in March, as the 

likelihood of war became more evident, Sharpe obtained authority from 

the Secretary of ,"Val' to increase the amounts of these COlllracLS to cover 

500,000 men. Early in April, before Congress assembled in special 

session, the Secretary authorized Sharpe to make purchases for an additiona l 500,000 men .

n Late in May, the Secretary extended th is authority 

to include still another 500,000 men. Though such action helped alleviate the existing situation, the effect, in general, of Congress' delay in 

passing the appropriation bill was to retard materially the procurement 

of supplies. 

The extent to which the Quartermaster Corps could make preparation to clothe and equip troops was based on what it estimated to be the 

capacity of the country's mills to produce cloth. On 13 March 1917, 

Sharpe informed the Chief of Staff that, assuming funds were available, 

clothing and equipment for 1,000,000 men could, under existing conditions, be procured within 10 months, or by December 1917, although 

AI RG 94, AGO Document File, Case 2545<H8 (TAG to QMG tt id., 5 ~far 1917, alld 

ht ind .. Sharpe !O TAG. 5 Mar 191 7). 

n w.n. Illuestiga/ioll HeIJritrgs, 651h Cong .. 2d 5eS:I .. PI. 2. pp. 469- 70; 870-73 (Sharpe). 

61(1) RG 94, AGO Document File, Case 2555459 (TAG 10 QMG, 21 Mar 1917, and 

III ind., Sharpe 10 TAG, 21 Mar 1917). (2) RG 120, War Departmenl Historical FilQ, 

Box U!I (Memo. Sharpe for Chief of Slaff, 5 and -4 Apr 1917). (5) Frederick Palmer, 

Newloll n. BIJ!ur (2 vols .. New York, 1911 ). I. 11 S-19; 247. 
618 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

the Corps might have to purchase some blanketS tha l did not conform to 

specifications.1t Shortly thereafter, the Chief of Staff called into Federal 

service a number of Na tional Guard organizations, having an estimated 

strength oE 68,000 men. Actually. the men numbered 89,000. but Sharpe 

was prepared to clothe and equip them immediately. Referring more 

specifically 1.0 his previous time estimate, he noted that it would take 

4 months, or until the end of July, to complete the equipment of the 

Regular Army and the Na tional Guard, both raised to war strength and 

totalling approximately 500,000 men. To equip another 500,000 men 

would take an additional 5 months." Thus. Sharpe again emphasized 

that it would be the end of December before the Corps could clothe and 

equip 1,000,000 men- a fan that he endeavored to impress anew on the 

Chief of Staff in the course of a personal conf ren ce.~e Inasmuch as the 

Committee on Supplies later took aClion to increase production by encouraging nonessential industries, such as carpet factories, to convert their 

plants to the manufacture of Army fabrics-in this instance to the production of mehon for Army overcoats--the Quartermaster Corps actually 

provided clothing for 1,640,502 men by the end of December 1917." 

By II November 19 18, it had clothed more than 3,500,000 men. 

Supply was not accomplished without crisis. By mid-July 19 17, 

the Chief of the Supplies Division reponed that between unanticipated 

demands and delinquencies, the clothing supply situation was such that 

if the entire National Guard was called out on 1 September, according to 

War Department plans, a part of that force would have to train in citizens' 

clothes. He therefore recommended that the assembling of the Na tional 

Army be deferred a month. T he bulk of the supplies for equipping these 

troops was being wrned out in factori es in the East during August and 

could not be shipped to reach distant points by I September.u 

By using colton clothing at all cantonments in the South, the Quartermaster General had hoped to provide the first increment of the National 

Army with sufficient woolen clothing to prevent suffering. BUl War 

Department orders to furnish woolen clothing to certain other troops 

caused him to doubt that the first troops of the National Army could be 

provided with more than one cotton coat and pair of breeches, two suits 

of cotton underwear, one pair of shoes and colton stockings, a hat, and 

u RG 120, War Department Historical Fila. Sox 145 (Sharpe to Chief of Stalf, 

15 Mar 1917). 

n I bid., Sox 10 (Sharpe Memo. 2 Apr 1917). 

" H is estimate of the time required to clothe and t<lu ip 1.000.000 men was reiterated 

on 19 April 1917. I bid .• Box 145 (Sharpe to TAG). 

61 IVD. 111Ve$ligation H earings, 65lh Cong .• 2d $tU .• PI. 2. p. 599 (Sharpe). 

U Ibid., pp. 493-97 (Memo. Sharpe for Brig. Gen. A. L. Smith. 15 Jul 1917: em~. 

Smith for QMG. 18 and 24 Jul 1917). 
SUPPLY IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR, 19 17- 191 8 619 

twO blankets pCI' man. Sharpe made it clear that the impossibility of 

equipping the entire United States Army with woolen clothing by 

5 September was "a fact and not a theory." "~ 

Much of the difficulty ex perienced by the Corps in supplying sufficient clothing during the first phase of su ppl y, extending from 6 April 

to 31 December, stemmed from the fai lure of the Genera l Staff in preparing troop schedules to consult with the Q uartermaster Genera l as to 

whether supplies were on hand to meet those schedules. This fIrSt supply 

period covered a time when "there was no policy and yet many policies." 

Although providing clothing and equipment for the Army is predicated 

upon Army strength, yet in those months the ' Var Department failed to 

approve and furn ish to the Quartermaster Corps and the other supply 

bureaus any reliable strength program on wh ich to base supply requirements. Even when projects were approved, the , Va r Dcpanment failed, 

in many instances, to inform tbe Quartermastcr Ceneral's Office of them 

in time to be of any use. 8G 

Calculation of requirements was further upset by a sh ift in operational plans. When the original plan for raising the Army was under 

discllssion, the President had no intention of sending any troops abroad 

until 1918. The Corps based its program of cloth ing procurement on th is 

premise. Early in May, however, the President, in response to All ied 

pleas, decided to ship troops abroad at once. Such troops not onl y had 

to be provided with woolen uniforms and underclothing but also with a 

6 months' reserve of woolen clothing. Within a few months, Maj. Gen. 

John J. Pershing, commanding the American Expeditionary Forces, 

ca ll ed for enormous qualllities of woolen clothing. Usi ng Quartermaster 

allowance tables, based on actual issues on the Mexican border in 1916 

which had provided a 4 months' allowance for 25,000 men, Pershing 

requisitioned the same quantity for that number of men per month. 

In addition to the suppl y demands created by initial issue and maintenance of reserve stocks for the Expeditionary Forces, the War Department also organized and sent to Europe large numbers of technical troops, 

none of whom had been included in the original estimate made by the 

Quartermaster General. In fact, there was scarcely a day, Sharpe commented, that a requ isition did not come to his Office for outfitting some 

technical troops for overseas duty, the dispa tch of whom had not previously been contemplated. Furthermore, large numbers of men in trai ning camps had also to be clothed though they, too, had not been included 

in the original plan. The cumulative effect was to decrease the supplies 

intended for the troops ca ll ed into the camps, which were also opened 

n fbid ., pp. 500-502 (Memo for Chief of Siaff. 2S Aug 1917). 

10 Army Reorgaorizn/ioor Hearings, 66lh Cong., 1st sess., I, 1091 (Colonel Dal)·). 
620 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

earlier than the Quartermaster General had recommended. The War 

Department, Sharpe complained, could never appreciate the impact upon 

su pply of calling out troops earlier than planned. 61 

In making its initial clothing contracts in March, the Quartermaster 

Corps followed the established procedure of advertising for proposals 

and awarding contracts to the lowcst bidders. On the day following the 

declaration of war, Sharpe requested authority to purchase by negotiation 

as was provided by law whenever an emergency existed.62 On 8 April 

1917, a meeting was held in the Secretary of War's office, attended by all 

the bureau chiefs and by members of the Council of Na tional Defense 

and the Advisory Commission. Those attending thoroughly explored 

the problem of how purchases were to be made. They emphasized the 

dangers of competition between the various procurement agencies of the 

government, and Commission members advised that advertising for the 

tremendous quantities of supplies required would greatly disturb industry 

and would inevitably stimulate the market, causing inflation of prices. s3 

As a result, Secretary Baker published an order which changed the 

method of purchase.so The order directed that for the duration of the 

emergency, contracts for all supply and equipment of the Army and for 

fortification and other works of defense could be made without advertising 

for bids. It further d irected that, when possible, supply bureaus were to 

inform the General Mun itions Board of contemplated orders for supplies 

so that the Board might assist in placing the orders and co·ordinating 

purchases for the 'War Department with those for the Navy and other 

government departments. When time did not permit a supply bureau to 

consult the Board, the order directed the bureau to contract for supplies 

without reference to the Board. 

In consequence of this d irective, the Quartermaster Corps, to all 

intents and purposes, temporarily lost control of its purchasing power. 

The Committee on Supplies, an adv isory agency, "practically preempted 

the Quartermaster General's functions of purchase by lodgi ng comrol in 

the hands of a civilian ." S~ The Secretary of War approved a certain 

list of articles, prepared by the Counc il of National Defense, which were 

61(1) IY.D. hl v~digl1/iou ~ari1lg5, 65th Cong., 2d SCSS., Pc 2, pp. 494-95 (Memo, Acting 

Secretary. General Staff, for QMG, 20 J ul 1917; Memo, Sharpe for Chid of Sta ff. 21 Jul 

1917); p. 505 (Memo, Sharpe for Chief of Staff. II Scp 1917). (2) RG 120. War Department 

Historical Files. Box 143 (Memo, Sharpe for Chid of Staff, 8 SC'p 19 17; Memo. Sharpe for 

Secretary of War. 17 Sep 1917). 

82 IY.D. II1 V~sliga/iO'1 H eariugs, 65th Cong .. 2d $e5S .. 1'1. 2, p. 477 (Sharpe to SW, 

7 Apr 1917). Approval was granted by 1st indorsement on 9 April 191 7. 

Sl (I) Wa r "'ll "dilur~$ ari"g5, 66th Cong .• 2d $t-'$S., Ser. 4. 1'1. 43. p. 2250 (Sharpe). 

(2) FirSI Amwal Report, COlmcit 01 I\'al;ol)a/ De/enu, 1917, pp. 6!>-66. 

60 W .O. fllvesligalioll H eari1lgs, 65t h Cong .. 2d scss .. PI. 2, p. 5 17 (Order. 12 Apr 1917). 

M J. Franklin Crowell, Gooemme1l1 War C01llrocls (New York, 1920), p. 58. 
SUPPLY IN THE ZONE Of INTERIOR. 19 17- 191 8 621 

to be purchased exclusively through the Council. The list included 

woolens, COllons, knit goods, leather, and shoes.

GU In placi ng COlllracts 

for these supplies, the Office of th e Quartermaster Genera l, under th e 

Secretary's directive, foJlowcd a procedure wbereby it estimated yardage 

required for th e items of clothing watHed and then applied to the COIllmittee on Suppl ies fo r information which wou ld indicate where, with 

whom, and at what price th e Corps should make the necessary contracts."T 

At first. Col. H. J. Hirsch, the purchasing quartermaster at the Philadelphia Depot, execlIled such contracts, bUl this arrangement soon proved 

too cumbersome and he and his assistants were moved in November into 

the office of the Committee on Suppl ies in Washington , where, according 

to the vice-chairman of that Committee, "he was attached to us to sign 

and validate the contracts" and "generally O.K'd everything that we 

O.K'd." u 

In Sharpe's opin ion, there never was a loss of Quanermaster responsibility. Technically. as long as a Q uartermaster offi cer met with th e 

Committee and signed th e contract, th e Committee on Supplies did not 

purchase cloth. In any case, Sharpe fully approved o[ th e Secretary's 

order of 12 April. Calling upon the Council of Nationa l Defense to 

assist in the procurement program, he maintained, was "one of the most 

prudent steps" taken by th e War Department. The Council had to 

induce manufacturers to und ertake government business because they 

were not eager to elUer into contracts, and the Quartermaster Corps, 

Sharpe testified, had insufficient personnel [or th e task.09 

Rejecting the charge that Genera l Sharpe became "a rubber stamp, " 

Th e New YOl·k T imes summed up public reaction La th e hearings being 

conducted on War Department operations by the Senate Committee on 

Military Affairs when it editorialized: 

Evidently he relied too much upon the Comm ittee detailed to help h im. 

It knew more about business than he did, but the fact did not release General 

Sharpe from the obligation to su pervise its transactions, in fact to regu late 

them.T9 

T he job, the editor concluded, was ~oo big for him. For his part, Secretary Baker doubted whether anyone man , given the unprecedented situation th at faced the country in 1917, could ha ve taken the Quartermaster 

Corps and expanded it to meet all th e supply needs of th e Army.l1 This 

68 A"'!Ual Rt!port 01 the Quartermaster Gefleral, 191 7, p. 2'. 

8T I bid. 

s War E.~pt! "dilllrt!s Hrarillgs, 66th Cong .. 2d ses5 .• SeT. I, PI. 4, p. 4 15. Compare 

Sha rpe'S views of this function. Ibid., ScT. 4. Pt. 43, pp. 2242-43. 

6G II' D. I""e.fligation H f,orillgs, 65th Cong .. 2d scss., PI. 2. pp. 595- 96; 631. 

10 December 23,1 91 7. 

nRC 94, AGO 201 file on Sha rpe (Ltr, Baker to Maj. Gen. James Harbord. 11 Sep 1922). 
622 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

was a war unlike any in which the colllllry had ever been engaged. It 

was a war of materiel which called for vast amounts of supplies and for 

orga nization of th e nation's resources for military purposes. 

Although the hearings proved disadvantageous to the Quartermaster 

General, the intent of Congress was to investigate the operations of the 

Counc il of Nationa l Defense. In contrast to the policy of separation of 

government and business which Sharpe had advocated in his proposal 

ca lling for the establishment of boards of businessmen to assist depot 

purchasing officers, the Council of Na tional Defense pursued an opposite 

policy for guiding industrial mobilization, under which its commiuces, 

such as the Committee on Supplies, apparently acted as government 

agents or advisors and, at the same time, as representatives of industry.n 

This blending of government agent and business representati ve gave 

rise to a considerable amount of criticism. Among the more serious 

charges made were that the. Council "absorbed constiwtional functions 

be longing to regular departments of th e government;" that it lodged the 

power to negotiate comracts a nd fix prices in advisory commodity or 

trade committees and consequently only a nominal responsibility reo 

mained with the lega lly liable comracting officers of the government; and 

that it evolved a plan of operation under which " representatives of interested industries acted on committees which both sold and bought from 

the governmem in the same act." 73 The lack of co·ordination in the 

prewar suppl y burea u system, however, had afforded the Council both the 

occasion and the opportunity "to assume the role of a coordinating agency 

under executive authority."" 

The contract proced ures followed by the Committee on Supplies 

particularly aroused congressional ire. In placing contracts, that Com· 

mittee made lise of two types. For woolens, cottons, and kni t goods, it 

allocated awards among the mills according to capacity. The allocation 

method had to be lIsed, the Committee argued, wherever demand exceeded capacity, and profits in the civil ian market, in consequence of 

scarc ity, were more lucrati"e than in government work. T~ In effect. the 

a ll ocated award was a cost·plus contract. The Committee took into con· 

sideration all labor and materia l COSts, overhead expenses, and plant 

investment in arriving at actual cost, and allowed a 10 percent profit, 

which it considered reasonable when manufacturers were "working for 

:z w.o. flmesligaliou H eariugs, 65th Cong .. 2d seu .. I'I.~ . pp. 18!i1 - .I}4 (Walter S. Gifford, 

Director. Councilor Na tional Defense). 

13 Crowell, COl/emmenl War COrllrllcls, p. 61. 

H Ibid., p. 60. 

1' 11'111" ExperldiJure$ I-Icari" gl, 66th Cong" 2d :leSS .. St'r. I, 1'1. 1, pp. 41 5- 16 (Charles 

Eisenman). 
SUPPLY IN T H E ZO NE OF INTERIOR, 1917- 19 18 623 

t he Governmen t on one thing." 1Q The other (orm of contract used by 

th e Committee on Suppli es was based on competitive bidding. Because 

there were enough shoe manufacturers to fill Army requirements and onl y 

the number of lasts had to be increased to meet Army demands for shoes, 

th e Committee on Suppli es used competiti ve bidding in awa rding con· 

tracts for shoes and leather. " 

Defenders oE the Co uncil admiued that the form of orga nization 

was never idea l but pleaded , in justifi cati on, tha t there had been no time 

" to quibbl e over technicaliti es of precedents." The administra tive rna· 

chinery was effective, they maintained, and th ere was no abuse of the 

trust th e Council imposed in th e men it chose to operate ie'S The Commillee on Supplies handled contracts aggrega ting approxima tely $800 

million in th e 9 momhs of its existence.

TO lls work ended when the 

War Department reorganization in 19 18 provided for co·ordination of 

th e suppl y burea us. T he Clothing and Equipment Division, first established in th e Office of th e Quartermaster Genera l on 18 January 1918 and 

later transferred to the Office of the Director of Pu rchase in the Genera l 

Staff, abandoned the alloca ti on method and contracted on a competitive 

basis fo r textil es, clothing, and equipment. 

Wool Supply 

In the course of proc uring tex tiles in 1917, the Committee on Supplies soon decided th at it would be desirable to control th e supply o[ wool. 

There was no ac tual shortage o[ wool even tho ugh the limited domestic 

supply was inadequate to meet domestic requirements and though war 

had deprived the United States or its prewar sources o[ suppl y in Austral ia 

and New Zea land . The wool market of South America was still availabl e 

LO it, but it was the submarine threat to sh ipping that posed the danger 

of a wool shortage and made conserva tion desirable. 

T he possibility of shortage and the certa inty of rising prices led the 

Boston \ "'001 Trade Associa tion, even before war was declared, to offer 

the govcrnmcnt its entire stock of wools, wool tops, and noils a t prices 

preva iling on 2 April 19 17. The Assoc iation te legraph ed its patriotic 

resolution to th e President on 5 April and the Assistant Secretary o[ 'War 

acknowledged receipt of the message.

8G Information of the resolution 

," Ibid., p. 418. 

11 bid ~ p. 422. 

T8 (I> Ibid., ScT. I. Pc 4. p. 373 (Grosvcnor U. Cla rkson). (2) II'fl. Illvestigation Hearings, 

65th Cong .. 2d sess .. 1'1. 3. pp. 18:;]- 54 (Waltcr S. Gifford). 

u War £"'I)cllditnres Hearings, 66th Cong .. 211 SI!SS .. Ser. ], Pc 4. p. 4] 2 (Ch3Ties 

Eisenman). 

so II'./). illTlcsliglllioll Hearings, 651h Cong .. 2d SCSS .• 1'1. 2. pp. lOO8-O'J (OQMG Memo, 

27 Dl,{: 1917). 
624 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

was passed a long to the Quartermaster Genera l, but Sharpe took no action 

because the Secre tary of War had indi cated that the matter had been 

referred to the Ceneral Munitions Board. In any case, it was Sharpe's 

understanding thal, under th e law apPl'Opl'ialing funds for the purcbase 

of clothing, th e Corps co uld not usc any pan of the funds to buy wool 

or any other raw materia ls as such action wou ld practi cally be a speculative 

transaction. It was the duty of the Corps to purchase only th e manufactured article and in the past it had never purchased wool.s' The Advisory Commission's Committee on Raw Materials took the offer of th e 

Boston Trade Association under consideratio n bm did not act, beca use 

lhe Committee learned that it, too, had no authority to purchase. The 

Secretary and Treasurer of the National Association of Wool ManufacHirers later charged that th e government lost millions of dollars by its 

failure to accept that offer.S2 

Wool prices began to rise sharply in the ensuing wee ks and the vicechairman of th e Comm ittee on Suppli es "was very keen" on buying wool 

in order to assure a supply. to stabilize the marke t, and to save the 

governmelll money.u When, in June. the Council of National Defense 

indicated that it would be necessary to control the wool supply of the 

country, Sharpe consulted with the accounting offi cials of the Treasury 

Department who now construed the language of the act appropriating 

funds fo r th e Army for fisca l year 1918 to permit the purchase of all 

materia ls necessary in the manufacture of Army clothing and equipage. 

a reversal of the interpretation formerly en tertained. 8 f 

Although Sharpe received authority to purchase wool in June, further delays OCCUlTed in work ing out procedures. The Navy Deparemcnt, 

the Council of Nationa l Defense, and th e Department of Commerce 

were all concerned with th e problem of wool supply. By I August, 

Sharpe established a wool purchasing offi ce at Boston in compliance with 

the advice of the Council of Nati ona l Defense. The quartermaster in 

charge of this office acted as the disbursing offi cer and assumed accountability for the wool purchased by the Committee on Wool Supply of the 

Council of Na tional Defense-.n The committee bought only a little over 

600 million pounds of wool before the end of the year, and none was sold 

or allotted to dealers or manufacturers until February 191 8.8~ In 1918, 

81 I bid., 1009: 1013 (Sharpe): Ibid., PI. 11, p. 14611 (Col. John P. Wood). 

8z lbid., 1'1. 3, pp. 1411 - 12 (\Vinlhrop L. Martin). 

U I bid., Pt. S, PI'. 1277- 78. 

Sf Ibid., Pt. 2. p . 1013 (Memo, Maj. H. M. Lord for QMC, 6 Jun 1917). 

U Ibid., PII. 1014- 15 (Memo, Lt. Cot. H. M. Lord for QMG, I Aug 191 7: QMC 10 Depot 

Quartennaster, I Aug 1917): pp. 10 18-24 (MenlO, Sharpe ror SW. II Sql 1917. inciO!ling 

rcgu lation$ gm'erning "'001 purchase). 

SI RG 92. OQMG Historical iles, Bolt 43 (1lislOrical R«ord or the Office of the Wool 

Pu rchasing Quartermaster, 1 Aug 191 7 to 30 Apr 1919). 
SUPPLY IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR. 1917- 191 8 625 

the Office of the Quartermaster General took over complete control of 

the waol market. 

Production of Clothing 

Once the Committee on Supplies had obtained the required amount 

of cotton and woolen fabrics, the Quartermaster Corps handled their 

conversion into coats, trousers, shirts, and overcoats. It either contracted 

with clothing manufacturers to whom it allocated the cloth, deducting 

the cost of the fabric from the contract price, or the Corps produced these 

garments in its own depot factory facilities. Unlike earlier war periods, 

the Corps did not immediately expand its depot factory facilities. 

Undoubtedly, this resulted from a basic policy adopted by a board of 

officers late in 191 5. The board, which included the Quartermaster 

General, was of the opinion that "the Government ought not to establish 

a monopoly in the production of any of its war material, and ought not 

to manufacture its own war material to the exclusion of patronage of 

private manufacturers capable of aiding it." Government-owned fa ctories were to be operated only "for the purpose of establishing standards, 

of understanding costs of production, of insuri ng that attention shall be 

given to improvement, and of qualifying its officers in all respects as 

experts with respect to the material needed. " 8T 

]n time, the limited fa ctory operation, that had been continuously 

maintained at the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot since the days of 

Callender Irvine, expanded until in 191 8 that factory was rapidly becoming the largest clothing manufacturing plant in the United States. 1t 

employed 3,000 workers in its shop to make trousers and woolen coats, 

and in addition, as in earlier war periods, it had on its payrolls 2,000 

outside seamstresses who produced in their homes denim jumpers and 

trousers, white clothing, and olive-drab shirts. A shirt factory at the 

J effersonville Depot expanded its operations until it employed a sewing 

force of 20,000 women. Shirts had been made in the depot area since 

1872, bundles of cut-out garments being issued to women who sewed the 

shirts in their homes. The Corps also established a uniform factory at 

the Jeffersonville Depot in February 191 8. It reached a productive 

capacity of 750 woolen coats and 1,500 pairs of woolen trousers per day.sa 

Despite all efforts, seriOlls shortages of clothing developed in the 

fall of 191 7. The situation became especially acute at camps located in 

the southern part of the country where troops, clothed in cotton uniforms, 

IT RG 165. War College Di .... Document File, Case 9432- 7 (Chid of Sial{ 10 SW, 

10 Dec 1915). 

88 America'S Mllnitions, /9 J7- /9/8: R eporl 0/ Bem:dicl Crou'ell, pp. 486-87. 
626 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

u.s. ARMY UNIFORMS, 191 8 

Shortages and !lI vestigalio1J 

were exposed to the onslaught of an earl y and particul arly severe wi nter. 

To the lack of overcoats, blouses, and other essentia l items of woolen clothing. critics attributed an epidemic of pneumonia that swept through the 

camps. Rumors began to spread of a fai lu re in the suppl y program 

generall y. and apprehensions for the success of the war effort mounted, 
SUPPLY IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR, 1917-19 18 627 

particularly in view of the congestion developing at the ports and in the 

country's railway system. The whole situation led to an extensive investigation of the war effort by the Senate Military Affairs Committee, beginning 12 December 1917. 

That investigation lasted until 29 March 1918. Testimony was 

taken from the Secretary of War, the bureau chiefs whose supply preparations were in question, members of the Advisory Commission, the Committee on Supplies, and from others whose evidence might help clarify 

the problem. So far as the Quartermaster Corps was conce rned, the 

investigating committee centered much of its attention on the shortage 

of clothing while other supply activities during the first 9 momhs of the 

war went unnoticed in the absence of criticism. 

Sharpe and other Quartermaster officers, then and later, vigorousl y 

rejected charges made by Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals and others that 

the Quartermaster Corps was inefficient and that conditions within it 

were chaotic.BII The amount of supplies procured by Quartermaster 

officers contradicted the sweeping generalization of inefficiency leveled 

against them and the Corps generally. Mistakes had been made, but 

even in the procurement of clothing Quartermaster officers by the close 

of 1917 were beginning to surmount the difficulties that had been encountered. By the time Genera l Goethals became Acting Quartermaster 

General in December 1917, the Corps was meeting the demands of in itial 

supply. More troops had been clothed than Sharpe had though t possible 

in April, and contracts for additional supplies o( clothing had been made. 

Under Quartermaster officers, the bulk of sLlch procurement was also 

accomplished before the Clothing and Equipage Division was absorbed 

in the General Staff on the eve of the Armistice and, in fact, a large proportion of all the articles procured was obtained before that Division was 

established in January 191 8. QO 

Though overlooked in the furor over clothing shortages, the Corps 

procured ample stocks of subsistence· during the opening momhs of the 

war and also made provisions for the better preparation of rations served 

the troops. It established 16 additional schools for bakers and cooks, one 

at each of the National Army cantonments, to provide trained bakers, 

mess sergeants, and cooks for the new organizations created in the National Army, a developmem for which Sharpe was responsible and that 

was in marked contrast to the Jack of attention given to the preparation 

of food in past wars. The Corps also immediatel y procured automobiles 

80 (I) War E"f,efldilurCJ Hemifl81, 66th Cong., 2d scss .. Ser. 4, Pt. 43, pp. 2273- 74; 

228~ 1. (2) RG 94, AGO 20 1 file on Sharpe (Ltr, Sharpe 10 Senator Frclinghuyscn, 

26 .'eb 1919). 

90 See data on manufactuu!s, Annual Reporl vI II' e Qlwrlermll1ler GCfl r.rai, 1919, p. 57. 
628 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

and motor trucks, animals, harness, forage, and wagons, although a force 

of men had to cut down trees and season the wood in especially built 

kilns before the wagons could be manufactured.&! 

Quartermaster operations were not restricted solely to procurement 

activities in 1917. T he Corps established and operated a Remount Service and provided for the construction of a number of remount depots. 

It made plans £01', and by January 191 8, had opened a Quartermaster 

Training School at Jackson ville, Fla., that functioned as a reception, 

replacement. activation, and unit training center to provide the personnel sent abroad. The Corps also took steps to renovate and repair 

clothing. shoes, and equipage, and laid the foundation for later salvage 

and reclamation operations. Within the limitations imposed upon it, 

the Corps under Sharpe met in 191 7, as effectively as it could, the needs of 

the expanding Army and was accomplishing fa r more than the public was 

made aware of in the course of the congressional investigation. 

War Department Refo1'm Measures 

That investigation, however, convinced the committee that a more 

effectual supply organization was needed in the War Department. As a 

solution, Congress proposed to create a Ministry of Munitions, a bill for 

that purpose being debated while the hearings were in progress. The 

Administration was adamantly opposed to this solution, preferring to 

bring about reorganization by giving the President blanket authority to 

make such readjustments as he deemed necessary in the existing agencies. 

This view finally won favorable support and led to the passage of the 

Overman Act of May 20, 1918, under which Congress gave the President 

power to cooordinate and consolidate the executive bureaus, agencies, 

and offices as the emergency demanded for purposes of economy and 

greater efficiency of operation. V2 

Even before the hearings of the investiga ting committee began, the 

War Department had been trying to improve its supervision of supply. 

Shortly after testimony began to be taken, the Department inaugurated 

measures to improve supply operations and forestall the establishment of 

a Ministry of Munitions. On 20 December 1917, Secretary Baker established a War Council to oversee and co-ordinate all matters of supply in 

the fi eld armies.iS The Council was "a temporary expedient to bridge 

over the time required for the reorganization of the General Staff" by 

making available the services of a group of experienced officers. In 

9. A'Hlllal l!O~t 0/ Ihe Qllllrierma.fler General, 1917, pp. 75- 76. 

u 40 Slat. 556-57. 

va War Department GO No. 160. 
SUPPLY IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR, 19 17- 191 8 629 

addition to the Secretary of War, th e Assistant Secretary, and the Chief 

of Staff, the Council included th e Judge Advocate Genera l, the Ch ief of 

Coast Arti ll ery, the Chief of Ord nan ce, and the Quartermaster General. 

Crea tion of the War Council afforded the Secretary of War an opportunity 

to replace. without humiliation, some of the bureau chiefs because, under 

his order, the administrative duties of a bureau chief serving on the 

Council were delegated to an acting chief. As soon as Sharpe was 

detailed to the W ar Council. the War Department reca ll ed to active duty 

th e famed engi neer who buill th e Panama Ca na l, Maj. Gen . George 'V. 

Goethals, U.S. Army, retired, and assigned him as Acting Quartermaster 

Genera l on 19 December 1917. Goethals assumed charge of the office 

on 26 December.B4 

The War Co uncil was of short duration. When Gen. Peyton C. 

March arrived in Washington to serve first as Acting and then as Chief 

of Staff, he objected vigorously to its continuation. On his recommenda· 

tion, the Secretary abolished the War Council earl y in June 8.~~ At 

that point, the War Department relieved Genera l Sharpe from duty with 

the Council and assigned him to th e command of th e Southeastern Departent.9~ He did not resume his duties as Quartermaster General and, 

for th e rest of th e war period, the post was filled by an Acting Quartermaster General. 

OQMG EXjJansion Uncle?' SharjJe 

During the first 9 months of the war, there had been relatively li ttle 

reorganization in lhe Offi ce of the Quartermaster General. 91 Such 

changes as Sharpe had introduced in the fall of 191 7 were limited to 

creating new branches and divisions to handl e expanding Quartermaster 

business. Thus, he set up a Fuels and Forage Bra nch and a Conservation 

Branch in the Supplies Division a nd established a Motor Branch, responsi. 

9<lIenedict Crowell and Robert F. Wilson, TI, .,. Arm;",s of '"dustr" (2 vols .. New Haven . 

1921). I, 12. (2) War Department GO No. 159. 

O' Ma rch. T il", Nalio" ill \I'M, pp. 48-49. 

88(1) War Department GO 54. 3 June 1918. (2) Sha rpe's new assign ment ended i~ 

career as a suppl y officer. Viewing events from the perspective of the postwar years. Baker 

wrote Sharpe in 1921 that ") wish 1 could have had a d earer and more helpful view of some 

of the tremendous diffi cu ltiC$ with which you were besct:· He felt the Anlly owed Sharpe 

an immeasurable debt. and by way of setting the record straight he rec:ommended that 

Sharpe be given the Disliuguishcd Service Meda l fo r his oumandiog success in subsisting 

the troop1l in the wa r. The award was made but on the basis of Sharpe's ser~icc in Ihe 

Southeastern Department. and he declined to acccpt it. RG 94. AGO 20 1 fi le (Ur. Baker 

to Sharpe, 29 Aug 1921; Itr, Baker to Harbord. II Sep 1922: Itr. Sharpe to l'el1hiog. 

23' Feb 1923). By Ihat time Sha rpe was au! of the service; he relired in February 1920. 

~T See Chart No. I. Organizat ion of the Office of the Quarte rmaster Gencral As of 

April 6, 1917. 
630 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

hie for purchase of- mowr-propelled vehicl es, in the Transportation Division . Ex pa nding remount acthriLies led him to crea te a separate Remount 

Division on 3 October and the mounting sLOrage problem resulted in the 

establishmclH of a 'Warehollsing Division on 16 October 19 17. 

Th is last development represcillcd a belated apprec iation of the 

need for storage planning. Ne ither the Quan ermaster Corps nor the 

War Department generally had understood the need fo r storage facilities. 

Beyond providing for the building of such facilities at the Army cantonments, little had been done. The Corps used existing commercial 

facilities exclusively for handling overseas shipments. In part, Quartermaster failure to plan (or storage construction was explai ned by the lack 

of funds ava ila ble fo r such projects. On I November 1917, the Corps' 

slOrage space totaled less than 3 million sq uare feet, and by th at time 

fre ight cars were bei ng used as warehouses through lack of storage space 

in which to unload th em, either at the depots 0 1' at th e ports of embarkation. More than five times that amount became ava ilable by th e end 

of the war.n 

A lecture on modern commerc ial warehousing techniques, given at 

the Army War Coll ege in August 1917 by O. D. Street. General Manager 

of Distribution [or the Western Electric Co., stimul ated Q uartermaster 

Genera l Sharpe to action. When he established the Warehousing Division in October, he borrowed the services of Street and some members of 

his staff to organ ize that division. In two detailed repons to the Quartermaster General, Street laid th e foundation fo r a sllccessful storage and 

distribution program for handling supplies sh ipped with in the cou ntry 

and abroad. 99 Much of what he recomme nded, Sharpe's successor, Acting 

Quartermaster General Goethals, carried imo effect. In his dua l ca pacity 

as chi ef of th e Corps and as Director of Storage and Traffic and later as 

Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic in th e Genera l Staff, Goethals 

supervised and co·ord inated the storage system of all the suppl y bureaus 

and a lso form ul ated plans and directed the construction of additional 

storage facilities.'oo 

Reorgallization Unde1' Goethals 

In the wimer of 19 17- 18, th e War Department initiated a series of 

orga ni zational changes in both the General Staff and the Office of the 

Quartermaster Genera l in an effort to perfect a workable supply system 

98 RG 120, War Depal'lmcnt Historical Filcs. Box 165·1 (Historical Rpt . "Administrative 

History of the Office of Director of Storage." pp. 46. 130). 

9~ lbid., Ik>x IH (Street to Sharpe. 16 Nov 1917 and 21 Dec 1917). 

l OO AIIIUW{ R"/Iorl 0f'lie Chi"f of SlaD, /9/9, pp. 170 If. 
Ch.rt I 

ORGANIZATION Of THE Off iCE OF THE OUARTERMASTER GENERAL 

AS OF APRil 6, 1917 

Off iCE OF THE 

QUaRTERMASTER GENERAL 

AOHI~ISTRATI¥ E SUPPLI ES nUSPORUTION 

DIVISIOII DI¥lS IO~ DIVISIO~ 

FI .... IlCE COllST~UCT OII 

AKD ACCoun I NG no REPAIR 

DIVISION IIIVISION 
G3Z QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

and provide the necessary co-ordination between the Staff and supply 

bmcaus. In re lieving the Quartermaster Corps of responsibility for 

water transportation and construction, the "Val' Department had been 

moving in the direction of making the Corps primarily a procuring and 

distributing agency. That trend was accelera ted when General Goethals 

took charge because he viewed the Corps as a large purchasing organization which he proceeded to sta ff with civilians who he thought would 

be better able to handle the job than military men.' O' In so do ing, he 

satisfied some of the obj ections that had been ra ised. 

To sil ence criticism of procurement proced ures, Goethals promptl y 

took from the Council of National Defense the purchases it had been 

mak ing fo r the Quartermaster Corps.' o~ He had the Philadelphia contracting office, wh ich had been moved to \Vashington in th e fa ll of 1917 

and established in the office of the Commi uee on Supplies, transferred to 

the Office of the Quartermaster General. He incorporated it in th e 

Supplies and Equ ipment D ivision wh ich was shortly redesignated the 

Clothing and Equipage Di vision. 

No less than three reorgani zations of th e Office of the Quartermaster 

General occurred during the first 6 months of 19 18, and changes were 

almost constantl y being made between reorganizations. Needless to say, 

the seri es o[ rapid reorganizations produced considerable confusion. 

Despite the Auid ity o[ organi zation in 1918, the Corps supplied the tTOOPS, 

at least in the zone of interior, fo r the shortage of shipping did not permit 

shipment overseas of any large amounts of supplies umil the last 5 months 

of the war. Whether personnel and orga n izational un its were reshuffled 

in the Office of the Quartermaster Genera l or transferred later to the 

Office of th e Director of Purchases and Storage in the General Staff, they 

maintained continuity of opera Li ons. 

Goethals initiated the first tentati ve reorgan ization of the Office on 

26 january 19 18, dividing the organization into operating divisions and 

service bureaus, the latter including General Adminislration, Personnel 

and Planning, and Quartermaster Suppl y Control. The operating divisions were Supply and Eq uipment, Remount, and such (ormer branches 

as Fuel and Forage, Motors, Subsistence, and Conservation (later Reclamation), were raised to the sta tus of divisions. A supplememary order in 

February restored the Warehousing Division, which had been inadvertently omitted. t03 

Even before this reorga niza tion took place, Goethals had brought to 

' G' Wa r Ex/lmrlilul"l!"l H'!!IIrj" , 66th Cong .. Ser. I. I'!. 6. p. 520 . 

• 02 /l>irl., PI'. 5 18-t9 . 

• n (I) A"'IIIal Helw lt flf th e Quartermast er Gel/ ernl, /9J9 , pp. 14- t!"i . (2) See Chart 

No.2. Organization. J anuary 26. [9]8. 
SUPPLY IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR. 19 17-1918 633 

the attention of the Chief of Staff the supply difficulties that were being 

experienced as a result of the failure to control traffic and to co-ordinate 

inland traffic service. lnland traffic was supposedly under Quartermaster 

control but actually was being directed by each supply bureau while 

responsibility for the transport service was then vested in the Embarkation 

Service, l Ot In consequence, the Secretary of War established in the 

Office of the Chief of Staff a Storage and Traffic Service, transferring to 

it the Embarkation Service. At the same time and only 9 days after his 

appointment as Acting Quartermaster General, the Secretary also designated Goethals as Director of the Storage and Traffic Service, with authority to supervise and comrol the tra nsportation of troops and supplies, 

both by land and sea, and to make provision for the necessary storage 

facilities on the seaboard and at imerior points. loa About 2 weeks later, 

the Secretary of War established a Purchase and Supply Service in the 

Office of the Chief of Staff to supervise and co-ordinate the purchase 

programs of the supply bureaus.'ot 

In the first importam wartime reorganization of the General Staff 

that occurred on 9 February 191 8, these two services became twO of the 

five divisions into which the General Staff was divided. lOT Within little 

more than a momh, the operations of these two divisions, having given 

rise to a great deal of duplication and complication, the divisions were consolidated to form the Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division of the General 

Staff. The Secretary appoimed Acting Quartermaster General Goethals 

as Director of that division.'" General March had decided to put him 

in charge of all the suppl y of the Army, relieving him of his Quartermaster 

dUlies as soon as the Chief of Staff could bring back from France 

Brig. Gen. Robert E. Wood, whom the Secretary appoimed Acting 

Quartermaster General on 9 May 1918.'0' 

When the Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division was formed in 

April, a second reorganization of the Office of the Quartermaster General 

occurred.'" Primarily. it was concerned with developing executive control and decreasing the number of division chiefs reporting to Acting 

Quartermaster General Goethals. thereby easing the heavy burden he 

was carrying in the imerim before General Wood relieved him of Quartermaster responsibilities. One of the civilians whom Goethals had brought 

O~ War ExpenditureJ H earingJ, 66th Cong., Scr. I. 1'1. 6. p. 518 (Gec;nhall). 

,oa War Deparlment GO 167, 27 Dec 1917. 

'" War Deparlment GO 5. 11 J an 1918. 

lOT War Department GO 14. The other three divisions were War I' lans. ExecUlive. and 

Operalkms. 

101 War Deparlment GO 36. 16 Apr 1918. 

10'(1) War Department GO 46. (2) Mareh , T he Na/ioll at lI'ar, PI" 187--88. 

110 See chart , A""uol Report of /lit: Qunrltrmns/er Ge"erfll, 1919, racing p. 16. 
Chart 2 

ORGANIZATION , JANUARY 26, 1918 

Showing Relation of Control ano O~.r at lon ~no, r the Olrll(:tor of 

Storage all" Tr,fflc and the Actin, QIIarh ..... t. r Bener.1 

DIR OF STORAGE AND TRAFFIC 

ACTING QUARTERMASTER GENERA L 

AUT DIll; Of UST 

STORAGE" TRAff iC qUAflTERMASTU GENERAL 

r- PEII;$ I PLIIG 

'" 

STORAGE' TRAffiC CONTROL 8UREAU Off iCE Of THE 

'" ACTI NG qUARTERMASTER GENERAL 

I I I 

actJ,IUTl OIL nOUK ttll UM 11M su~~u 

eonlOl su~ t [~IP I[',-,"ATIOII ~. ." ." ." ." ." '" '" 

I I IIlAII~ TlAil FUEl TUFFlt , FOUI£ UIIOilIT MOTORS CAllo .. £lIT ." ." ." ." ." '" 
SUPPLY IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR, 1917-1918 635 

to Washington was Robert J. Thorne, former president of Montgomery, 

Ward & Co. On 8 March 1918, Goethals had assigned Thorne as Assistant to the Acting Quartermaster General, with comrol of such matters 

as might, from time to time, be delegated to him.'" Under the new 

reorganization in April, lines of authority for all divisions went to the 

Acting Quartermaster General through Thorne's office and his influence 

was felt throughom the organization. In addition to Thorne, Goethals 

appointed a second Assistant to the Acting Quartermaster Genera l and 

gave him authority over the Remount and Reclamation Divisions. In 

the weeks following the announcement of this reorganization, the Acting 

Quartermaster General appointed two more Assistants. 

By June 1918 still a th ird rearrangement of the Office organization 

was made necessary by the establishment of new commodity units within 

the Office and by the appointment of these additional Assistants, one of 

whom became responsible for all financial activities of the Corps. Ex· 

panding business had split the Supplies and Equipment Division into 

three commodity divisions-Clothing and Equipage. Hardware and 

Metals, and Vehicles and Harness. Changes were also made in the 

Subsistence Division, which in line with its past experience had tended 

to become a complete unit in itself, handling all subsistence problems 

from requisitions through purchase, inspection, storage. and distribution. 

Beginning in May with the removal from the Subsistence Division of the 

purchase responsibility for bakery equipment, that division became 

increasingly a commodity purChasing division like others in the Office.lU 

The divisions were still grouped under assistants. with Thorne acting both 

as general Assistant to Acting Quartermaster Ceneral Wood and assistant 

in charge of specific divisions.1U This was the final reorganization of 

the Office of the Quartermaster General before its absorption into the 

Purchase and Storage Division of the Ceneral Staff. 

The reason this absorption could take place without disrupting the 

Army supply program was that one man directed the development of 

the Office of the Quartermaster General along such lines as to make it the 

basis for consolidation of supply functions. Goethals, as Acting Quarter· 

master General and as Director. first, of Storage and Traffic and. then, of 

III War Department GO 24. 

111 Set RG 12(}, War Departmen! Historical Files. Box 147 (Rpl, "History of the Sub· 

listence Divilion''). 

III <I) The divisions under Thorne were Supply Control. Clothing and Equiplgt', Hard· 

ware and Metals, Vehicles and Harneu, Subsistence, and Depot. A second auiSlan! had 

charge of the COIl$ervation and Reclamation, Fuel and Forage. and Remount Division,; 

a third, Motor Transport Service; and a fourth, Finance and Accounl5; while an Executive 

Office had charge of the Admini$lrative. Personnel. and Methods Control Divisions. (2) Set 

Chart No.3, Third Reorganization of the Office of the Quartermaster General, June 1918. 
636 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Purchase. Storage and Traffic in the General Staff, pursued the same 

policy line at both the Quartermaster and the Staff level. 

Goethals had long advocated c.:onsoiidaling Army purchases of stand· 

ard items in one supply bureau, leaving purchase of special technical 

supplies to the respective bureaus using them. When he first took charge 

of the Quartermaster Corps, he found so much competition for supplies 

among the supply bureaus and between the services that he was convinced 

that the appointment of a minister of munitions would be most advisable. 

Since the Administration was opposed to that course of action, he coneluded that the only alternative was for the 'Val' Department to bring 

about such co-ordination and consolidation of purchases as would eliminate competition.''' This view found liul e support among supply bureau 

chiefs who feared that any sweeping reorga nization of existi ng procurement machinery would disorganize th e bureaus to such an extent as to 

interfere with th e effective suppon that they cla imed they were giving to 

the American Expeditiona ry Forces_ Among the bureau chi efs, Goethals, 

found only one-the Chid of Ordnance- willing to agree to a consolidation of purchases." & 

The new Chief of Staff, however, warmly supported Goethals_ 

General March later wrote: 

Experience had shown that the interior organ ization of the various bureaus 

was such as to render an effective supervision of their activ ities by the 

Genera l Staff, as contemplated by Genera l Orders, No. 14, impossible. As 

the result of a careful consideration of the matter I became convinced that a 

consolida tion of procurement. except of certain specialized equipment. of 

storage, of finance, and of transponation, together with a positive and direct 

central control of these activities by the Genera l Staff, was essential to the 

elimination of the unsatisfactory conditions existing and to the rapid. efficient, and economical utilization of the resources of the country to the development 

of the Army program as a whole. '11 

Until the passage of the Overman Act, in May 19 18, made transfer of 

functions possible, Goethals was hampered by the existing inHexibility. 

The first 5 months of 191 8 were a period of "supervisory charge of purchases with a view to consolidation" that did not work very satisfactorily."T 

Chauges in Field O"grmization 

In the meantime, reorganization in the Office of the Quanermaster 

General during these months was being paralleled by changes in the 

U4IYar Expt'IIdifllrel HearillgJ, 66th Cong .. Ser. I, "I. 6. p. 522 (Goethals). 

lIS Ibid ., p . 523. 

tll AIllII.af Rt:porf 01 tile Chit:1 01 StIlR. U .ll. Army. 1919, p. 20. 

111 WilT E.'(/JeudifIlUJ H eariugs, 66th Cong .. SeT. I. 1'(' 6. pp. 523-24. 
I 

SUPPlY 

COillOl 

l"ISlOli 

I 

'n, 

I ' .. E$I 

1""1011 

ChHt 3 

THIRO REORGANIZATION Of THE OFFICE OF THE OUARTERMASTER GENERAL 

JUNE HI18 

OFF ICE OF THE 

ACTING OUARTERMASTER GENERAL 

OFfiCE Of THE 

ASST ACTING OUARTERHASTER GENERAL 

I UECUTIH 

OFfiCE 

I ~~.IJTUTU( 'lIlIOIIlll IIUMlD1 

'''I SIOI Oll"IOIL COIIMll 

DI1"IU 

FIRST SECOND TlII~D FOURTlI 

USISTAMT ASSIST.l.MT ASSISTA NT ASSISTANT 

I I I 

" , MUDWAIE IECI.JIIATIOli fUElS 11010. FIUICt 

. nl IIOil ' MUllS ""'"111 ' fOUi€ , , IC~TI.I 

"'''lOll '''UIOI 'K 1""1011 

I I 

SUIIIU(llt( tEPOT ,-, 0" 111l1li 11"11011 l"ISiO. 
638 QUARTERMASTER SU PPO RT OF THE ARivlY 

Quartermaster field organization. It will be recalled that at the ombrcak 

of the war, depa rtmental qua rtermasters were assigned to the SlafTs of th e 

commandi ng officers of th e m ilitary depanmcms, who co nsolidated estimales and forwarded requisilions [Q depot q uartermasters. The latter 

procured and sLOred supplies, issui ng th em on req uisition. Since particular depots handled lhe procurement of designated supplies- for 

example, clothing and equipage a t Philade lphia and wagons and harness 

at J effersonville-a ki nd of "centralized decentral iza tion" characterized 

the existing syslem. 11 8 Post and camp quartermasters supplied troop 

units in the field, usuall y by requisition ing through departmental qual" 

ten nasters on the depots, or, in case of emergency, by making direct 

purchase. 

By exempting suppl y of divisional camps from departmental control 

in the fall of 19 17, the importance of the depa rtmen tal q uartermaster 

had been dimin ished in favor of the depot quartermaster, and th e supply 

channel not only fo r the camps but also for remount depOls and animals 

embarka tion depOls ran d irectly from the Quartennastcr General to thc 

point of issuc.!l9 As control of purchases and distribution became ce ntralized in "Vashi ngton, th e authority of the depot quarten nastcrs, in 

turn, was diminished. Their mai n function became that of storing 

supplies, which were procured in \·Vashington , and issui ng them to the 

Na tional Army cantonmCIHS and to the National Guard camps that were 

attached to the ir particular suppl y depots {or Quartermaster supplies. 

The managers o f supply soon learned, however, th at centra lizing 

th e control of purchases in \.yashington was likely to leave undeveloped 

many areas of resources and prod uction in the country. They resolved 

that problem by developi ng th e lOne system because it was apparent that 

under th e direction of the variOILS d ivisions of- th e Office of the Quanermaster General, th e quartermast.ers of th e existing 13 general supply 

depots could procure, prod uce, inspect, manufacture, store, and distribute 

Quartermaste r su ppl ies. Control continued to be exercised by the various 

centra l divisions or the Office of th e Quartermaster General located either 

at ' '''ashington or at some other poim suitabl e fo r lI'ansacting th e business. The Acti ng Q uartermaster General assigned to each general supply 

depot a certain "zone or jurisdi ction" in which it carried Ollt its activities 

of procurement, production , inspection, manufacture, and storage. 

Withi n his zone, each depot quartermaster ascertai ned production facil ities, recommended to the proper division of the Quartermaster General's 

Office the employment of qual ified producers, kept informed of- market 

conditions, and was prepared to make recommendations for purchase 

IlS AlltIllllllle/IQJ'/ uf Ihe Qll" r/enll,,$I/"" Ce llero/, 1919, p. 9. 

1I~ I bid., p. 13. 
SUPPLY IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR, 1917- 191 8 639 

when shortage of any article existed and supply was obtainable in his 

zone. On the basis of this information. the division in the Washington 

office placed purchase orders and allocated them properly throughout the 

industries of the coumry.'"o 

Early in June 1918, Acting Quartermaster General Wood amended 

these instructions to excl ude From the zone system the Remollnt purchasing zones and sllch zones of operation as the Motor Transport Service 

established. He also excluded from the zone system the procurement 

or inspection of wool, cotton, and other "commoditi es in th eir unfabri· 

cated state." m These instructions with their amendment formed the 

basis for the new zone system, the concept of which rema ined essentially 

the same, although man y changes and revisions were later made in the 

system. 

II COllsolidated Se11Jice 01 SlljJJ)/y 

In Wash ington, a Staff study of the su pply problem looked not only 

toward consolidating the procurement activities of the supply bureaus 

and standardizing their methods, blll also toward ass uming, on the basis 

of the Overman Act, direct control or, and responsi bility for, the suppl y 

program. The Outcome was the formulation of a tentative plan for a 

consolidated service of supply that Goethals presented to the Chief of 

Staff for approva l in the Slimmer of 19l 8Y~ Even this plan did not 

contemplate merging all procurement activities. Briefl y, Goethals proposed a central agency for the procurement of all standard articles of 

Army su ppl y, leaving in the bureaus the purchase, production, ana 

inspection of highly technical mat erial. · He also called for the centra lized 

administration of rail and water transportation, embarkation, and all 

d istribution, including storage. The Chief of Staff approved the plan in 

prindple on 26 August and gave authority to outline the successive 

organizational changes that woulc:J be involved.I ~3 

The basic considera tion in instituting changes was the maintenance 

of an uninterrupted flow of supplies, and the sh ift to Staff control was 

brought about only on the basis o( preparation and gradual change. 

A first step toward consolidation had been taken even before this plan 

I~O RG 92. OQMG eon espondence File. 1917-22. no" 238 (Acting QMG Wood to all 

Divisions and General Supply Depots, 13 May 1918). 

121 I bid., Box 5073 (Acling QMG Wood to all Divisions and General Supply Depots, 

4 JUIl 191 8). 

112 RG 120, War Department Historical Files. fiox 144 (Memo. Goethals for Chid of 

Staff. 18 Jul 1918). 

IU For copy of the March memorandulll , 26 August 1918. see RG 120, H istory of Con· 

struction, Book I (Ex hibits). p. 121. 
640 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

was formulated or approved. As soon as the Overman bill became law 

on 20 May 1918, the War Department instituted a system of interbureau 

procurement. In anticipation of the law's passage. Goethals. as Director 

of the Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division, issued a circular early in 

May setting forth a uniform procedure lO be [oll owed by all supply 

bureaus under the interbureau procurement system. 

Briefly, each supply bureau was to continue to be responsible for 

the determination of requirements, design, and specifi cations and for the 

issue of the articles it had heretofore handled, but for those of its supplies, 

the procurement of which under this system was assigned to another 

bureau, th e issuing bureau had to requ isition on the procuring bureau. 

Although Goethals established the procedures for this system in May, the 

supply bureaus put through only a few orders under it before the end 

of July 1918.12< The Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division effected 

consolidation of procurement by groups of articles, making these assignments in supply circulars that it issued. The Division pursued a general 

policy of consolidating purchase of particular items of supply in the suppl y 

bureau that was already purchasing the major part of those items. Under 

the workings of the inter bureau procurement system, the Quartermaster 

Corps became the most important War Department purchasing agency. 

The procurement divisions within the Office of the Quartermaster General, which expanded to handle the consolidated purchases assigned to 

them, became the nucleus around which were developed the procurement 

divisions of the PurclJase and Storage Division of the General Staff. 

Along with the increase of procurement responsibility, through 

consolidating within the Quartermaster Corps the purchase of a large 

number of articles, went the removal of such functions as were extraneous 

to making it primarily a purchase and distribution service. This development, it will be recalled, had begun early in the war, when the War 

Department transferred responsibility for camp construction from the 

Corps in May, and for all repair work in October 191 7. This initial 

removal was followed by the loss of control over the transportation of 

troops and supplies OVerseas, when the War Department established the 

Embarkation Service in August 1917. T he War Department did not, 

however, transfer the Water Transportation Branch of the Quartermaster 

General's Office, formerly responsible for administering the Army Transport Service, to the Staff until 22 April 1918, when the Purchase, Storage 

and Traffic Division absorbed itYs Quartermaster control over rail 

transportation was lost on to January 191 8 at the time the War Depart12' A ... ,u<l/ Report 01 til t Quartu mlulu Genual, 1919, p. 19. 

12 Jbid., 1918, p. 7. 
SUPPLY IN THE ZONE OF INTERIOR, 1917- 1918 641 

ment placed the Inland Transportation Service under the charge of 

Goethals as Director of Storage and Traffic. 

In this piecemeal loss of the transportation function. the Corps 

retained responsibility for motor transportation. This function was of 

recent growth but, except for a few motor vehicles used for special purposes, the Corps had compl ete responsibility for motor transportation 

before the war. With the outbreak of war and the grant of special 

appropriations. each supply bureau began to purchase its own motor 

vehicles without regard to the advantages that would accrue from limiting 

procurement to a few models. The usual difficulties of competition for 

supplies and complications from lack of standardization ensued. In order 

to bring supply of motor transportation under a singl e control, the War 

Department organized a Motor Transport Service as part of the Office 

of the Quartermaster General on 18 April 191 8. Its purpose was to 

consolidate the purchase, procurement, maintenance, and repair of all 

motor-propelled vehicles for the Army, except tanks, caterpillars, and 

artillery tractors. 12e The Acting Quartermaster General placed the Service under the direction of a third Assistant. 

About 4 months later, the War Department reorganized the Service 

as a separate agency and redesignated it the Motor Transport Corps, 

thereby removing all responsibility for motor vehicles from the Quartermaster Corps.Ul Insofar as purchase responsibility was concerned, however, this proved a temporary arrangement. Within 3 weeks, the War 

Department returned responsibility for the procurement of motor-propeJled vehicles and spare parts to the Corps and the Acting Quartermaster 

General established a Motor and Vehicles Division in his Office. The 

War Department's action was in line with the general principle of consolidating purchase responsibility in one agency. 128 

Placing responsibility for all financial activities of the Corps, including pay of the Army, under the direction of a fourth Assistant to the 

Acting Quartermaster General in the June 191 8 reorganization of the 

Office, paved the way for the removal of this function. The necessity 

for standardizing and co-ordinating fiscal and accounting methods of the 

several supply bureaus led to the appointment of a Director of Finance 

as assistant to the Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic. He was 

made responsible for and had authority over the preparation of estimates, 

disbursements, money accounts, property accounts, finance reports, and 

126 War Department GO !l8. 18 Apr 1918. 

121 War Department GO 75, 15 Aug 1918. 

U8 (I) War Expomr/iluru H earings, 66lh Cong .. 2d 1iC$S • • Ser. 4. vol. !I. pp. 3157--58 

(Man;h). (2) RG 120, War Departmem Historical Files. Box 165- F. I'S&:T Supply CiT. No. 87 

(5 Scp 1919). 
642 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

pay and mileage of the Army. The War Department thereupon removed 

all such activities from the Quartermaster Corps in October 1918 and 

from the other supply bureaus during the next 2 months. The former 

Assistant in charge of Quartermaster financial activities became the 

Director of Finance.m 

By that time, an almost complete removal of functions from the 

Office of the Quartermaster General had occurred. On 12 September 

191 8, the War Department also appointed Acting Quartermaster General 

Wood Director of Purchase and Storage in the Purchase, Storage and 

Traffic Division.lIO About 2 weeks earlier. the Acting Quartermastcl 

General had been directed to report to the Director of Purchase, Storage 

and Traffic, and the Corps had been given responsibility for and authority 

over storage, distribution, and issue of all Army supplies within the 

United States.'41 In the September directive, that authority was revoked 

and given to General Wood as Director of Purchase and Storage and not 

as Acting Quartermaster General. On 18 September, the War Department removed all divisions responsible for storage and distribution of 

Quartermaster supplies from the control of the Quartermaster General 

and ordered them to report to the Director of Storage in the office of the 

Director of Purchase and Storage. This marked the beginning of the 

consolidation of storage. Since the 13 general supply depots of the 

Quartermaster Corps contained about 70 to 80 percent of the storage space 

occupied by all the supply bureaus, it was feasible and convenient, in 

effecting consolidation of storage, to attach to the Quartermaster system 

the storage methods and functions Qf the other supply bureaus. By the 

time the armistice was signed, the storage units of three of the other 

supply bureaus had also been transferred to the Director of Storage.1n 

The War Department also placed under Director Wood's control 

the former Conservation and Reclamation Division of the Office of the 

Quartermaster General, renamed the Salvage Division. Conservation 

and reclamation activities in 1917-18 marked the first organized effort to 

lessen the waste entailed in war. Profiting from the experience of Great 

Britain and France, Sharpe had established a Conservation Branch in 

his Office on 5 OctOber 1917. It became a separate division less than a 

month later. B~ginning with the conservation of food and kitchen waste, 

12D (I) RG 92, OQMG Historica l Files. Box 7 (Digest of PS&:T Supply Circu1ars-No. 98. 

11 Oct 1918). (2) War Expenditures Heari,rgs, 66th Cong .. h i sess .. .xr. I, PI. I. p. 184 

(Ltr, ACofS, Dir~ctor of PS&:T, to Committ~~ on Military Affairs. 12 Jun 1919). 

130 (I) RG 92, OQMG Historical Files, Box 7 (Dige!it of PS&:T Supply Circulars-No. 91. 

12 Sep 1918; No. 109, 4 No ... 1918). (2) Se~ Chart No.4, Organization of Office Director 

Purchase and Storage, No ... ember 1918. 

1n PS&:T OJ .... Supply Cir. No. SO, 27 Aug 1918. 

13~ Armua/ R eport oflhe Chiel of Sian, 1919, p. 179. 
I 

•• 

-." 

Chart 11 

ORGANIZ~TION OF OFfiCE DIRECTOR PURCH ASE AND STORAGE 

AS OF NOVEMBER 191 8 

DIRECTOR OF PURCHASE AND STORAGE 

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR 

EXECYTIVE CHI EF DIRECTOR OF PURCHASE DIRECTOR Of STORAGE " OFFICER R • ., ~SST DIRECTOR ASST DIRECTOR 

I I I SUT U~lUS .~, '"" '" ... nOI ~ ". ." nocrs ... •• '" '" •• Dlln OP II ." ." ." '" ." ." 

I I I ""TOU "' ... ... " ." uu EUIlAT ., DI IU MU ... ." ." ." ." ." 

I 1 MED I •• R£MOun PIIII P SlIP '" ." '" ." 
644 QUARTERMASTER SU PPORT OF T HE ARMY 

the division's auivities had expanded to include the repair of shoes, 

cloth ing, and equipment, and the operation of laundries and dry-cleaning 

facilities. 11I 

On 18 September, the War Department removed all Quartermaster 

procurement divisions from the control of the Quartermaster Genera l 

and ordered them to report to the Director of Purchase of the office of 

the Director of Purchase and Storage, though the actual absorpLion did 

not take place until October. During that month, the War Department 

also transferred the procurement unils of the other supply bureaus. 

The Purchase. Storage and Traffic Division formally confirmed the transfer of Q uartermaster procurement, storage, and distribution functions on 

6 November, only 5 days before the armistice brought an end to hos· 

tilities,'" At Goethals' insistence, the reorganization of the Army suppl y 

system was carried through to compl etion after the armistice. Although 

the Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division d id not make consolidated 

purchases before the war ended, its absorption of the supply bureaus' 

procurement fu nction set a precedent for centralization.'" 

In November 1918, the only functions remai ning in the Office of the 

Quartermaster General were the control of personnel, the operation of the 

Remount Service, and the maintenance of national cemeteries. After 

the signing of the armistice altered the situation, the Director of Purchases and Storage took into his office both the remount and cemeterial 

services, and comrol of Quartermaster personnel became a pan of the 

Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division. Except for the name and the 

classification of personnel, no vestige rema ined of the Quartermaster 

Corps in Washington or in the fi eld in (he zone of interior, where the 

Director of the Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division used the Quarter· 

master system of suppl y zones as the basis for consolidating the storage and 

distribution activities of the other supply bureaus. T he Corps' organization was not destroyed, but it was used as the basis for a new Staff organization, the Purchase and Storage Division, (hat absorbed the suppl y operations of all the suppl y bureaus. 1I1 

1" RG 120. War Depuunen t Historical Files, I\ox [45 (Rpl , " Fullctions and Operation, 

of the Salvage Service"). 

114 WilT Exptndilurt1 fl ellriug1, 66th Cong .. Ser. I, Pt, l. p. [46 (PSS:T Supply Cir. 

No. 11 0). 

110 Ibid., Ser. I, ['I. 6. IIp. 52!: 52S-29 (Goethals). 

,H RG 92, OQMG H islOrica l files (fl . Phdps Putnam, "Short Sketch of the Organiution 

History of the Ql,lanermaster Corps and the I'urchase and Srorage Divi$ion ," p. 56). 
CHAPTER XV 

Quartermaster Theater Operations, 

1917-1918 

Among the staff officers accompanying Maj. Gen. (later Genera l of 

the Armies) John J. Pershing when he sa iled from New York 011 28 May 

1917 was Col. Daniel E. McCarthy, Chief Quartermaster of lhe American 

Expeditionary Forces (A.E.F.). His forma l designation to the post had 

been an nounced only 2 days earlier.' In the initial organ ization of the 

Headquarters of the A.E.F., the Chief Quartermaster was onc of 15 chiefs 

constituting Pershing's administrative and techn ical staff. 

Administrative Developments 

Development of a satisfactory general staff system to meet the needs 

of modern war was one of several pressing problems that demanded 

General Pershing's immediate ancmion. "It required no geni us," he 

later wrOle, "to see that coordination and direction of the combat branches 

and the numerous services of large forces could be secured only through 

the medium of a well-constituted genera l staff, and T determined to 

construct it on the sound basis of actual experience in war of our own 

and other armies." ! 

General PeTShing or!ginally established his Headquaners at Paris, 

removi ng it to Chaumont early in September 1917. 3 Based on comprehensive study of the sta ff organizations of the French and British armies, 

Pershing divided the organization of Headquarters, A.E.F., into the 

Genera l Staff and the Administrative and Technical Staff. The General 

Staff included a Chief of Staff and his assistants, a secretary to the General 

Staff, and five sections- Administrative Policy, Intelligence, Operations, 

Training POlicy, and Co-ordination. The Administrative and Technical 

Staff was composed of the Adjutant General, Inspector General, Judge 

Advocate, Chief Quartermaster, Chief Surgeon, Chief Engineer Officer, 

I u .s. Army in Ih t World !Yar,1917-19 (1 7 vol5 .. Washingwn. 19~8 . XVI. 1 (Iiq AEF 

GO I. 26 May 1917). 

! J ohn J. I'cnhing. AI., ,<" ~"uJ j " Ille I\'orld IY", (2 vols .• New Yor ... . 1931). I. 103. 

3 I bid., I . 128. 129. 163. 
646 QUARTERMASTER SU PPORT OF T H E ARMY 

General Purchasing Agclll, Chi ef of Gas Service, Director General of 

Transporta tion, Commanding Ge ne ral o[ the Line of Communications, 

Chief of Red Cross, and Provost Marshal General.' In the absence of 

any directive to the contrary, each chief of the Administrative and 

Technical Staff fe lL free to communicate directly with the Commanding 

General of the A.E.F. or his Chief of Staff.· Adding the fi ve chiefs o[ the 

General Staff sections, 20 heads of departments and sta ff bureaus had 

access to General Pershing. Li ke Secretary Baker, he was in danger of 

being overwhelmed in administrative detail. 

The arrival of the first American contingent in France also required 

the establishment of an organiza tion to provide logistical suppOrt for it 

and the divisions that would soon be following. According to Field 

Service Regulations publ ished before the war, the commanding genera l of 

the fi eld forces comroll ed the theater of operations, and Genera l Pershing 

decided that these regulations, at least initially. would furnish the best 

basis on wh ich to erect his suppl y organi za ti on for the A.E.F. In conformity with these regulations, he divided the theater of operations into 

a forward or combat zone and a rear zone. ca ll ed in 1917 the Zone of the 

Line of Communica tions. For administrative purposes, this Line o( 

Communica tions was sub·d ivided into several sections--one advance 

section, one intermediate secti on, and eventuall y eight base sections, with 

a ninth added after the armistice. These base sections were grouped 

around the major pon areas of France and England. Each base included 

at least one imponam port for rece iving and forward ing munitions. equip. 

ment, and other supplies shipped from the United Stales.

8 Beyond these 

sections lay the intermediate section in which the great storage depots 

came to be located. T he adva nce section took in the area between the 

intermediate section and the forward zone or zone of opcrations. In th is 

section, Genera l Pershing established the billeting and trai ning areas 

for the first divisions of the A.E.F.' 

A commanding officer was in charge of cach of these sections, and 

all of these offi cers were under the jurisd iction o( the Commanding 

General. Line of Communica tions. The latter was responsible for the 

care and storage of all supplies, materia l, and equipment, as well as for 

the construction, maintenance, and repair of all agencies necessary to 

accomplish this purpose. T he Commanding General. Line of Com· 

munications, was flll"ther responsible for the distribution of supplies 

among the several depots in accordance with approved plans for mili.tary 

• u.s. Arm)' in lilt: lI',.dd W" r, 1917- 19, XVI. I! IT. (liq AEF GO 8,5 Jul 1917). 

I See James G. Harhord , Till! A"'e"le"" Army ill Fmllre (Boston . 19!'6), p. 212. 

~ Genel'a l Johnson Hagood, Til l! St:.viU$ of Suppl), (New York, 1927). 1'. 41 . 

T See Map of France Showing QMC AEF Activities. 
QUARTERMASTER THEATER OPERATIONS, 1917-1918 647 

operations. Separate and apart from the control over supply exercised 

by the Commanding General, Line of Communications, were two other 

phases of supply. One of these was the procurement of supplies, material, 

equipment, and plants necessary for the support of the American troops 

in France, responsibility for which rested with the Chiefs of the Supply 

Departments, A.E.F., and the olher was the transportation of supplies, 

responsibility for which Pershing vested in a Director General of Transportation in September 1917.8 The General Staff exercised general 

supervision over the whole supply organization at Headquarters, usuall y 

through th e Co-ordination Section. 

A chief quartermaster as well as a representati ve from each of the 

other supply departments served on the staff of the Commanding General, 

Line of Communications. Similarly, the staff of the commanding officer 

in each geographical section included a section quartermaster and other 

representatives of the supply depanmeOls. The Chief Quartermaster 

at General Headquarters did not deal directly with his subordinates in the 

sections but operated through the ch ief quartermaster, Line of Communications, whose office duplicated that of the Chief Quartermaster, 

A.E.F. A troublesome deficiency in the existing arrangements, however, 

was the failure to differentiate between the responsibilities of the bureau 

chiefs, A.E.F., and the bureau chiefs, Line of Communications. Possibly 

conducive to even more difficulty was the independence of the Director 

General of Transportation who was responsible solely to the Commander· 

in-Chief.-

This initial organization proved increasingly unworkable, and, early 

in February 1918, the Chief of Staff, at General Pershing's direction, 

convened a board of officers, with Col. J ohnson Hagood designated as 

senior member, to consider the problem and to reorganize the entire 

A.E.F. Staff.'o Ana lysis of the existing organ ization indicated the immediate necessity for providing a single and direct line of responsibility 

for all matters of suppl y in order that the demands of any emergency 

might be met without hesitation or uncertainty. The board's recom· 

mendations were embodied in a directive on 16 February, the detailed 

interpretative construction of it being communi cated in another directive 

approximately 5 weeks later." 

The Line o[ Communications was redesignated the Services of 

Supply, and all the technica l and supply staff, which previously had 

8 U.S. AWl)' in tlu iVorld iVar, 1917-19, XVI. 1116 (Hq AEJ' GO 7!1, 12 Dec 1917). 

9 Hagood. Th e rvius 0/ Supply, pp. 78-82. 

, 0 Ibid .. pp. IH-!lri. 

"US. Artily iu ''' ~ lVodd iVar, 1917- 19, XVI, 216-26 (Hq AEF GO !II. 16 Feb 1918); 

pp. 249-57 (Hq AEF GO 44, 23 Mar 1918). 
_ ' 0 

BASE SEC T ION NO 3 

d. 

".C'."'" .n """:';.'"::':..":::' .... ' ~ 0 

.. _-" ~ ... 

_.,-,- ~ . . ~, a 

....... ..... ' . ...... 

;: ~:::-" ".",~ 

.~~, . 

.. 

_ ~ ... ......... -. . ... -" .. ~ 

.. -~ ..... ...... -, ..... ,~ 

... , ..... . .. ,_ .............. , ... 

• 

• 

• 

--0 

,. .... .. ~­

...... 

MIP OF FAIHCE SHOWIHG OMC lEI ICTlYITIES 

Pro ard jl OUilt t~iel nIIl. AU. 1111 21. un 

MAP 7 
QUARTERMASTER THEATER OPERATIONS, 1917- 1918 649 

formed part of General Pershing's Staff at Chaumont. were removed to 

Tours to rcport to the Commanding General, Services of Supply, for 

co-ordination of their functions of procurement, distribution, transportation, and construction, and to act as his staff. Thereafter, the Chief 

Quartermaster served in a dual capacity as Chief Quartermaster, A.E.F., 

and as Chief Quartermaster on the staff of the Commanding General, 

Services of Supply. 

In the course of this reorganization, the chiefs of the General Staff 

sections became designated as Assistant Chief of Staff, G- l, G- 2, G-3, 

G-4, and G- S. The G-4 section had supervision of all supply departments, and, little by little as the war went on, G-4 at General Headquarters "took over the function of direct and complete responsibility 

to General Pershing for supply," proposing on the eve of the armistice 

to relegate the Commanding General. Services of Supply, to the role of 

subordinate of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. The cessation of hostilities halted this development without settling the principles involvedY 

When Colonel McCarthy arrived in Paris in June 191 7, he opened 

his office in three small rooms. The rapid increase of business and the 

arrival of additional Quartermaster officers and clerks soon made removal 

to larger quarters necessary, and he leased hotels and other large buildings 

for the purpose. Colonel McCarthy organized his office along the lines 

of a departmental q uartermaster's office.lJ Becoming incapacitated by 

illness, he had to relinquish his post early in August and return to the 

United States. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Harry L. Rogers succeeded him 

as Chief Quartermaster on 13 August 1917, serving for the duration of 

the war.1t 

Shortly after Colonel Rogers took charge, the Office of the Chief 

Quartermaster consisted of four divisions- Administrative, Finance and 

Accounting, Supplies, and Transportation.u This was much the same 

organization as existed in the Office of the Quartermaster General at 

Washington. An organizational unit to handle construction was unnecessary. At the suggestion of Quartermaster General Sharpe, the War Department made the Engineer Corps responsible for constructing barracks 

.2 Hagood. The Sen/ius of Su.pply, pp. 321- 29 . 

• 3 RG 120. AEF 50S Historical Files. Box 129 (Rpt, Col. D. E. McCarthy to TAG. 

6 Mar 1920). 

It (I) u.s. Army in the World War, 1917- 19, XVI. 53 (Hq AEF GO 21)_ (2) Colonel 

'Rogen had been relieved from du.ty late in June 1917 as Departmental Quarlerma5ter. 

Southern Department, with headquarten at Fort Sam Houston. Texas. Reporting 10 

General Penhing on 23 July. he was a$S igned to inspection work. He Wa5 on duty in 

connection with the re-Iocation of Headquarters at Chaumont when Pershing appointed 

him Chief Quartennaster. 

u RG 92. OQMG. Gen . H . L. Rogen Private Fi le, Box 24 (CQM Office Memo. 17 Aug 

1917). 
650 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

lO house personnel of the Expeditionary Forces. Under existing regula. 

tions, it already had responsibility for all other types of construction in 

the theater of operations. This action eliminated the need [or two 

similar organizations abroad,le 

Under the original organization of Genera l Headquarters, A.E.F., 

the Quartermaster Corps was responsible for transporting personne l and 

supplies, providing Quartermaster transportation. and repairing all vehicles of all services and organizations, except military vehicles. It was 

also responsible for clothing. Quartermaster equipment, subsistence, fuel, 

forage, lights, water, camp sites, quarters and offices and their equipment, 

pay of personnel and general disbursements, laundries and baths, remounts, claims, salvage, Quartermaster workshops and stOrehouses, cold 

storage and refrigerating plants, labor, Quartermaster personnel, and 

cemeteries and burials. U 

By 14 September, the Chief Quartermaster had lost responsibility 

for railroad transportation, a separate Transportation Department under 

a Director General of Transportation having been established as one o( 

the technical services of the Headquarters, A.E.F. " Three months later, 

the Chief Quartermaster also lost control of the Army Transport Service 

in Europe, supervision of it being placed under the DirectOr General 

of Transportation on 18 December 191 7." The Quartermaster Corps 

nil! retained responsibility for motOr transportation and " its efficient 

operation," although it was organized as the Motor Transport Service 

on 8 December. Abolll 2 months later, Headquarters, A.E.F., also 

removed that responsibility from the Quartermaster Corps, transferring 

it to the Service of Utilities when the Line of Communications was 

reorganized as the Services of Supply in February 191 8. 20 The actual 

transfer did not take place. however. until Headquarters, Services of 

Supply, was established at Tours the following month. 

As in the lone of interior. so in the theater of operations it was found 

advisable, General Pershing wrote, to give relief to the Quartermaster 

Corps by eliminating from its responsibilities such traditional functions 

as construction and transportation. leaving the Corps free to develop its 

operations as a supply service.tl To supply proper was added the func18(1) Sharpe. Th~ Quar/ ~rllltfSltr Corps, pp. 297-500 (QMG 10 TAG, 26 May 1917: 

III ind .• TAG to QMG. 16 J u n 1917). (2) RG 165. War College Div. Doc. File. CaK OO8~2 

(Po{emo, Chid of War College Div for Chid of Staff, S Jun 1917). 

IT U.s. Arm)' in the World War, 1917- 19. XVI. :zo...2 1 (Hq AEF GO 8. 5 J ul 1917). 

It I bid., XVI. 7+-75 (Hq AEF GO 57). 

lb id~ XVI. U6 (Hq AEF GO 78). 

IOlbid " XVI, ISO (Hq AEF GO 70. 8 Dec 1917): 216 (Hq AEF GO 51, 16 Feb 1918). 

til Ibid., XVI. 150 (Hq AEF GO 70, 8 Dec 1917): 216 (Hq AEF GO 51, 16 Feb 1918). 

Ii Final R~por/ 0/ G~n. }olHl }. Pershing (Wa$hinglon, 1920). p. 75. 
QUARTERMASTER THEATER OPERATIONS, 1917- 191 8 65 1 

tion of salvage, a responsibility that had been left largely undeveloped 

in the Army to that time but which, in 1917. was early recognized as vital 

in conserving overseas resOllrces. Although th e mai n emphasis in the 

theater as in the zone of interior was on developing a supply service, 

the Corps also retained certa in other responsibilities, such as pay of the 

Army and graves registration, which were not supply functions. 

In the Staff reorganization of February 1918. the Chief Quartermaster 

was charged with responsibili ty for the pay of personnel and general 

disburseme nts; for Quartermaster material, includ ing clothing, subsistence, fucl , and (Ol"age; for the transportation of water beyond water 

poillls; remoulll service; laundries, baths, and d isinfection of clothing; 

salvage service; cold storage and refrigeralion; Quartermaster shops, 

depots, and storehouses; graves registration service: and inspection of 

Quartermaster activities. 2~ Any decrease in duties occasioned by removal 

of functions from the Corps caused no reduction in its workload because 

assignment of new duties more than balanced transfers. In February 

1918, Headquarters, A.E.F. made the Corps responsible for operation of 

a garden service. The follow ing month, it assigned the Corps the duty 

of establ ishing sales stores in each sector occupied by the A.E.F. and 

directed the Chief Quartermaster to provide rolling sales stores for 

accommodating the troops at the t.~ 3 The Corps became responsible 

for administering a depot that handled the effects of the deceased members of the A.E.F. It also orga ni zed railroad supply un its, paid the 

Octroi dues to French towns, and operated a baggage service'" 

'When the Office of the Chief Quartermaster was transferred from 

Chaumont to Tours in March 1918, its work expanded rapidly. For 

administrative purposes, the Chief Quartermaster reorganized the office 

to include a Deputy Chief Quartermaster, who acted in his place during 

his frequent absences on inspection and other duties. Besides this 

officer, th ~ new organization usually included twO principal assistants to 

the Chief Quartermaster, who were assigned important duties as occasion 

required. The Chief Quartermaster also established an Inspection Service u nder one officer who had a varying number of trave ling inspectors 

reporting to him on supply problems, finance, and the condition of the 

remount and other services_ In addition to the Inspection Service, the 

n u.s. Army in Ih~ World IVllr, /9Ji- 19, XVI. 223 (Hq A£F GO 31. 16 Feb 1918). 

23 1bid., XVI. 233', 238, 2>1 1-42 (Hq AEF GO 34, 25 Feb 1918: GO 37. 7 Mar 1918). 

1. Octroi was a form of municipal tax or duty. which. under a law dating back to the 

beginning of municipal government in ,lrance. the communes were authorized to levy on 

cerlain articles destined for local consu111ption. Among these were Foods. fuds. gasoline. 

lubrieation oils. fodde r. building mate rials. and engineering supplies. Through Quarter· 

master negotiation. these Ic\';es werc at first reduced to a nat ralc and laler most towns 

removed the tax entirely. 
652 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

work of the office was organized into six divisions and three other services, 

each under a chief. The divisions included Administrative, Supplies, 

Personnel, Finance, Accounting. and Construction and Repa ir, u The 

other services werc Remount. Salvage, and Graves Regislratio l. ~u 

It will be recalled that in each section of the Line of Communications 

an officer of the Quartermaster Corps, designated a section quartermaster, 

was responsible originally to the Chier Quartermaster, Line of Com. 

munications, and, after the February 191 8 reorganization, to the Chief 

Quartermaster, Services of Supply, for supervising the depots and other 

activities of the Corps that were located in his geographical section. 

Similarly, in each of the armies, corps, and divisions in which the troops 

were organized, a Quartermaster officer served as a member of the technical staff of the commanding officer of each of these military organi zations. 

T hese quartermasters functioned under G-4 of the General Staff in the 

case of armies and corps, and under G-I in the case of div isions. Regiments had regimental supply officers on the staffs of their regimenta l 

commanders. 

The connecting link between the armies and the services in the rea r 

was the regulating station under the control of a regulating officer. The 

regulating station was a large railyard where cars from the supply depots 

and from the rear were received and made up into trains for the divisionsY Upon the regulating officer, who was originall y a member of the 

Co-ordination Section of the General Staff, and, after reorganization, a 

member of the Staff's G-4 section, fell the responsibil ity for maintaining a steady flow of supply. While all the supply services clamored 10 

have their shipments rushed through, the regu lating officer, acting under 

special or secre t instructions, declared priorities in the supply of things 

the Army needed most. He exercised the necessary control "to get to 

the armies at the proper time those things most urgently needed to defeat 

the enemy and to place embargoes on things which can be dispensed with 

U In the absence of responsibility for construction , the inclusion of a Con~truction and 

Repair Division raises questions. The Corps did engage in a limited amount of such work. 

II was responsible, for example, for designing the cold.storage: plant at Gievres and for 

furnishing the malerial and equipment for ii, though Ihe actual construction of the plant 

was carried out by Quartermaster personnel under Engineer supervision. The Construction 

and Repair Division appears to have befon somelhing of a "catch·a ll," for among ils dulies 

were drafting and illustrating for the Corps; designing equipment. chevrons. and other 

insignia; map.making; and drawing up organization chartl. RG 92, OQMG Hislorical Files, 

Box 75 (Historical Report or Chid Quanermaster, A.t:.F .. 1917- 19, p. 35). Hercaher briefly 

cited as CQM Report. 

:1 Ibid., pp. 35-35. 

:> US. Arm>, ;>1 I/lll World Wa r, /917- 19, XV I, 157 (Uq AEF GO 73, 12 Dec 1917); 

p. 252 (Hq A.EF GO 44. 23 Mar 1918). 
QUA RTER I\,IASTER T HEATER OPERATIONS, 19 17- 191 8 653 

(or the time being." " T he Chid Q uartermaster and the chiefs of th e 

other supply services ful fill ed (heir responsibi li ties when th ey delivered 

to the regu laLi ng oHicer (he supplies called for by him, and Q ua rtermaster 

control o[ its supplies ceased at the regu lati ng sta tion. 

QlIllrl.ermasler Ullils alld Persollnel Sl'rclIglit 

To exec ute the ,'aried functions assigned to it, the Quanermastel' 

Corps needed a large force of offi cers and enlisted men. \Vhen General 

I'ershing sailed for Fra nce, Q ua rtermaster personnel accompanyi ng him 

consisted of 16 officers, 10 enlisted men, and 12 field clerks. The n umber 

of officers an d enl isted men increased slowly, and, d uring most of the war, 

lack of tra ined personnel serioLisly ha nd icapped the Cor s.~ o A month 

after Colonel Rogers became Chi ef Quartermaster, tWO commissioned 

officers and one clerk d id the work of the Suppli es Division in his office. 

T here were on ly 143 Qua rtermasler ofTicers in the A.£.F. on 21 Septem ber 

1917, of whom on ly 32 were officers o[ the Regula r Army. The entire 

Qua rtermaster person nel- commissio ned, en listed, and civil ia n- in 

France on 6 October 19 17 had increased to less tba n 2,500. On n :commenda tion of his Ch id Q uartermaster, General Pers hing cabl ed \Vashingwn that this n umber was entirely inadequate properl y to handle 

suppl ies fo r th e troops a lready in ra ce. ~o 

Obviollsly, Quartermaster enlisted personnel d id not keep pace wi dl 

demands any more than th e Corps' ollicer personnel did. Congress had 

authorized the establ ishment of Q uan ermaster units in 19 12, but, when 

the United States entered th e wa r, provision had been made for on ly 

fotlr types- truck, wagon, pac k, and bakery compani es. The \Var Department subseq uen tly tra nsferred the trU Ck companies to th e Motor 

Transport Corps when it separa ted tha t orga ni zation from the Quartermaster Corps. By the end of the war, the Quartermaster Corps in th e 

A.E_F. employed 26 distinct ty pes of uni ts. In add ition to the authorized 

un its, th e A.E.F. used six other types of Q uartermaster organ iza tions, fo r 

which ta bl es of organization had been pre pa red blll not submi tted fo r 

approval .

u 

Nearly as man y Q uartermaster Cor ps organiza tions arrived in France 

'8 RG 120. AEF Gen Hq I'roceed ings of Uoa rd of Offi(ers. (9 17- 19, 60,,; 2206 (Memo. 

Brig. Gen. Geo. Van Hom Mosely. ACS. G·". for TAG. 3 JUII 191 9). 

2D RG 92. OQMG. Gen. H. L. Rogers Private File. 60,,; 3 {Memo, Col. W . R. Grove for 

Acting Q~ G. n.d. bill circa May (9 18). 

so RG 92. OQMG H istorical Files. 60,,; 75 (CQM Report. p. 23). 

31 RG 92, OQMG. Gell. H . L. Rogers Pri"ate "·ile. Bo,,; II (Memo. Col. J ohn S. Chambers 

for Chid Quar erma~ter, 2 J an 1919). 
654 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

during the period from Jul y to September 1918 as had arrived during all 

the other months of the war. The Personnel Division of the Chief 

Quartermaster's Office was constantly plagued by its inability to obtain 

authorized personnel from the United States according to approved 

schedule. In consequence, units had to be hastily organized in France 

from inexperienced personnel at the Corps' disposal. Of the 706 units 

in France on 15 December 1918, 262 or 37 percent were organized in 

the A.E.F, " By II November 191 8. Quartermaster Corps personnel in 

the A.E.F. numbered 4,665 officers and 90,066 enlisted men.n 

Initial Supply Prepamtions 

Despite personnel shortages. the Quartermaster Corps fulfilled its 

responsibilities so satisfactorily that, at the end of the war, Pershing 

reported that "no army was ever better provided for" than the A.E.F.H 

Preparations began before any troops reached France. Two days after 

Pershing sent for Colonel McCarthy, the latter was at the Office of the 

Quartermaster General and, in the II days before the Baltic sa iled, he 

and his four assist.ants raced against time to prepare requisitions for 

clothing, subsistence, harness, tools, tarpaulins, gasoline, ranges, tents, 

stationery, and all the other multifarious necessities required to support 

the first convoy being sent to France. Requisitions called [or a 6-months' 

supply for these troops and also provided such additional supplies as 

would be needed by Headquarters and the depots, remount stations, 

veterinary hospitals, and other facilties that Quartermaster officers would 

be establishing soon after their arrival. Colonel McCarthy assumed that 

some articles could be obtained abroad, but only actual investigation by 

Quartermaster officers after arrival could determine what supplies would 

be available and in what quantities. 

Preliminary preparations included consultations with Quartermaster 

General Sharpe and his assistants. The Chief Quartermaster and his 

staff also held conferences with British officers on duty in the Office in 

order to supplement information obtained from military observers' reports as to what troops would need in the way of rations and clothing 

when operating under the new methods of warfare, such as trench fighting. 

Before departing, Colonel McCarthy requested Quartermaster General 

Sharpe to send as soon as possible the nucl eus of an organization for 

$I Ibid. 

u RG 92. OQMG HislOrica l Files. Box 75 (CQM Report. p. 3). 

U Final Report of Ge'l. John J. Pershi,tg, p. 7S. 
QUARTERMASTER T H EATER OPERATIONS, 1917- 1918 655 

handling the transport service, as well as clerks, warehousemen, wheelwrights. blacksmiths. tailors, shoemakers, and mechan ics." 

On board the steamship Ballic, he wasted no lime. His staff held 

classes for the benefit of the reserve quartermasters to instruct them in 

their duties and responsibilities. While en route, General Pershing 

appointed Colonel McCarthy on 31 May to serve as senior member of a 

board of officers detailed to consider the advantages and d isadvam ages of 

such pons as the French might ind icate for use as possible bases for the 

A.E.F., and to examine the rail fac ilities leading to th e Western Front." 

The board made a study of the various harbors in the southweSlern part 

of France that would likely be assigned for American use. T he Ballic 

docked at Liverpool on S lune, and 2 days later Colonel McCarthy and 

the other officers of the board arrived at Boulogne, the first of the A.E.F. 

to reach France. Ten days later, the board submitted its report, recommending that the ports of St. Nazaire, La Pall ice, and Bassens be turned 

over to the American forces for permanem use. T hese were the only 

available ports on the west coast of France capable of accommodating 

vessels of more than moderate draft. T he board further proposed that 

three other ports-Nam es, Bordeaux, and Pauillac- be designated [or 

emergency use since they were capable of handli ng light-draft shipping. 

It recommended acceptance of the French plan of establishing instruction 

camps and bases of supplies in the interior and of using the ports as 

reshipping points. T he board also recommended that steps be taken 

immediately for the construction of wharves, storehouses, and camps; 

that personnel and material be sent to France without delay to be used 

in building and operating refrigerating plants, slaughter houses, and 

artesian we lls; that laborers be brought to France as enlisted personnel; 

and that a general officer of the line, with sufficient staff, be deta iled as 

commander for the service of the rear.IT 

Selection of the ports was determi ned not only by availability but 

also by the fact that "the main railroad routes from these ports toward 

northeastern France were not incl uded in the service of the rear" for 

either the French or British armies as were the railroad lines fa rther 

north.1S In consequence, they were available for the transportation of 

suppl ies for the American Army. Double-track railway lines from 

St. Nazaire and Bordeaux joined at Bourges and continued on through 

II RG 120. AEF 50S Historical Files. Box 129 (Rpt. Col. D. E. McCarthy to TAG. 

6 Mar 1920). 

''' Orgll1liLotio1l o/lhl! Sl!nJius 01 Supply (Monograph No.1. prepared in Hutorical 8 r. 

War I'lans Diy. General Stall. J une 1921 . WaShington. 1921). p. 116 (fAG to Col. D. E. 

McCarthy. 31 May 1917). 

n Ibid., pp. 117- 21 (Board's Rpt. 20 Jun 1917). 

U Penhing. My £:>:peric"us i" lire World Wllr, I. 83. 
656 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T H E AR1 ... IY 

Nevers a nd Dijon to Nellrch<i.teau where ot her radiating lines exte nded 

toward the LolTai ne sector. In th e event that another port and rail line 

became necessary to supplement th e suppOrt a fforded via these POrtS and 

railroads, the A. E.F. co uld also make lISC of th e port of Marse ill es and the 

rail road leading nonl! from it. 

These considerations were of th e IIlmost importance because they 

he lped determine the sector of th e front where the A.E.F. would be most 

effective in fight ing as a unil-.. nd General Persh ing was de termined to 

maintai n the idelllity of the America n troops as a se parate fighting uni t 

rather than pe rmit the ir incorporation in French and British uni ts. With 

th e British committed to ope rations coveri ng the channel ports and the 

French concerned about the safety of Paris, the baulcfrolll from the 

Argonne Forest to th e Vosges MOllllla ins, Pershi ng later wrote. afforded 

a c1 ear·cut opportunity for th e "decisive use of our army." 3U Ava ilability 

of the western ports and the railroads leadi ng to northeaste rn France led 

to a n early ten tative un derstanding between Persh ing a nd Gen . Philippe 

Petain. Commander-in·Ch ief of the French Armies, as to the gencral area 

of A.E.F. activities and the loca lion of the Line of Communications. 

Dej)ol System 

In accorda nce with the recom mendatiom made by the board of 

officers on pons, Pershing sent Quartermaster offi cers to 51. Nazaire to 

establish it base and make provision for th e first convoy arri vi ng there on 

26 June 19 17. "W it hin a few weeks, 5t. Nazllire \ ... as throbbing with 

Quartermaster activiLies. From th e first medium·sized storeroom on the 

docks, taken over from the French on 26 .June. storage space grew until. 

on II November 19 18, the Quarte rmaster Corps occupi ed seven buildi ngs 

with a total covered storage space of 162,3 17 square feeL AboUl a year 

after the first convoy arri ved at SI. Nazaire. ships were unl oading an 

average of 2 12,585 t argo tons a month a t the port, 63.5 pe rcent of which 

consisted of Quartermastcr uppli es,~o 

Sl. Na7.airc was thc beginn ing of the gigantic suppl y struCture built 

on the Line of Communications for th e sto.rage and d istribution of the 

materiel and suppli es needed to suppOrt the A,E.F. The Qua rtermastcr 

Corps established gene ral depots in the base. intermedia te, and ad vance 

areas of the Line of Communications. 

Base depots, such as the depot established at Montoir, 4 mi les from 

5L Nazaire, or th e depot built at St. 5ulpice, nea r Bordeaux on the main 

30 ! bid., I. 83. 

40 RG 9'!, 0Qi\lG, Cen. H. L. RogeTll I'rivllle File, no.: Z7 (Historicat Rill. LI. Col. E. K. 

Coutt(,T, The QUllrlCTm:lSler Corps, AEt', PI>. 10,95-96). 
QUARTERMASTER THEATER OPERATIONS, 1917- 1918 657 

line of the Paris-Orleans railroad, served the dual purpose of temporary 

storage and reserve storage depots. Primaril y, base depots provided 

temporary storage for supplies that had to be unloaded quickly from the 

ships arriving in the port to prevent congestion and to reduce turnabout 

time for them, thereby making their tonnage available for more extended 

use in the transportation crisis of 1917. Since railroad facilities from 

the ports were also inadequate, quartermasters could not in any case 

send supplies direcliy to the interior from cars loaded at shipside. Base 

depot facilities not only provided temporary storage but also afforded an 

opportunity for sorting and classifying supplies that become disorganized 

in the hasty unloading of sh ips, thereby making possible regular balanced 

shipments to the intermediate and advance storage depots. One of the 

regular daily shipments out of the Quartermaster depot at St. Sui pice, 

for example, was 250,000 rations, forwarded to the great regulating 

station at ls·sur·Tille. By II November 1918, the S1. Sui pice depot 

consisted of 57 buildings, represeming 1,439,300 square feet of covered 

storage space. In addition, the Corps also had 900,000 square feet of 

open storage space." As supply activities expanded, the Corps established 

other Quartermaster depots in the various base sections, while the Engi· 

neers constructed warehouses, additional docking facili ties to increase 

capability of unloading steamships at the ports, and rail trackage and 

yards. 42 

Based on the assumption that the A.E.F. would operate on the northeastern frontier of France and in Alsace·Lorraine, the development of an 

adequate supply system called for the establishment of centrally located 

depots in the intermediate section of the Line of Communications, where 

accumulated reserves could be held in readiness and from which stock 

levels at the advance depots could be fi ll ed. The initial thrust forward 

of the Line of Communications was marked by the opening of oiTtces at 

.. RG 92, OQMG liistorical files. Box 75 (eQM Report, p. 205). 

n As of II Novembe r 1918. Quarte rmaster depots in the base sections were as follows: 

Base Sc<:tion I- Headquarters and Depot No. I, SI. Nauaire; Depot No.2. Names; Depot 

No. 11, ThouaT5; Depot No. 4. Monloir: Depot No. [ •. La Sables d·Olonne. 

Base Section 2-Headquarters and Depot No. I. Bordeaux; Depot No.2, La Pallice 

(subse(juently Innsferred to Base SC<:tion 7): Depot No. 11, S\. Sulpice: Depot No.4, CoutTlis. 

Base Section !l-Heatlquarters and Depot No.1. London; Depot No.2. Liverpool; Depot 

No. 11, Southampton. 

Base Section 4- Heat.lquart('1"S ant.l D('pot No. I, Le Harve; Depot No, 2, Rouen : Depot 

No. 11. Calais. 

Base Sect ion r.-Head'luarters and Depot No. I. Bres\. 

Base Section 6-Headqu3,·t eT5 and Depol No. I. Marseille: Depot No.2, Miramas. 

Base Section 7-Heatl,[lIarters and Depot No. I, La Rochelle: Depot No.2, La l'allice; 

Depot No. 11 , Rochefort. 

Base Section 8-l-Ieadquarters. Padua: D('pol No. I, Villa Franca <Ii Verona (,,,bseqllenlly 

rel1'ov('d to Alessandria). 
658 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Nevers in July 1917. Quartermaster operations began when 51 enlisted 

men of the Quartermaster Corps arrived at Nevers from St. Nazaire on 

8 July to establish a depot tha t for a time operated both as an advance 

and intermediate depot. When Headquarters, A.E.F. authorized the 

Imermediate Section on 13 August. Nevers became Headquarters and 

Depot No. I for the Intermediate Section. Nevers was selected as a depot 

point because it was centrally located whichever way the front might 

move. Its location and the fact that it was also a division point on the 

French railway system were important considerations in the work of 

transferring supplies from the base ports. It was planned to make 

Nevers the main intermediate supply base, but the needs of the expanding 

A.E.F. outgrew the possibilities of the Nevers Depot, the necessary expansion of which was precluded by the lack of available space for adding new 

warehouses and railroad sidings. In consequence, General Headquarters 

later established the main intermediate depot at Gievres early in 1918. 

Until that time, the depot at Nevers received and handled all supplies sent fonvard from the bases. It was the principal distributing point 

in France. The shift to the use of the Gievres depot was gradual. Even 

in July and August 1918, the depot at Nevers received no less than 6,000 

carloads of supplies each month and distributed an average of 200 carloads daily. As the depot at G ievres grew, the amount of materiel 

handled at Nevers diminished, and it was designated as the depot for 

supplyi ng office equipment and sta tionery for the entire A.E.F. In the 

early months of its existence, the Quartermaster depot at Nevers had the 

distinction of being used as a training center for inexperienced Quartermaster personnel. Newly arrived Quartermaster officers and enlisted 

men alike were put through a short course of training and then dispatched 

to other projects. T hus, the Chief Q uartermaster took detachments 

of officers and enlisted men from the depot personnel at Nevers to aid 

in establishing the Quartermaster depots at Dijon and Bordeaux .. ' 

The intermediate depot established at Gievres was a r eserve storage 

depot for all the ~ppl y services, each of wh ich had its own section. The 

Quartermaster section became the largest Quartermaster depot of the 

A.E.F. The commanding officer of the Gievres depot, as a member of 

G-4, co-ordinated the construction, warehousing labor, and the apportionment of freight cars at the depot. Built near the town of Gievres 

on a tract of land that stretched between the Paris-Orleans Railroad 

and the Selles-Villefranche highway in the Tours district. th e depot was 

centrally located and had unlimited possibilities for growing to serve the 

U <i) RG 92, OQMG, Gen. H . L. Rogen i'rivalc .'ile, Box 28 (Historical Rpl, Quarter· 

master Depot No.1, intermediate Section). (2) See al~. RG 92. OQMG Historical Files, 

Box 75 (CQM Report. p. 157 ff.). 
QUARTERMASTER THEATER OPERATIONS, 1917- 1918 659 

purposes of the A.E.F. The Quartermaster section expanded rapidl y. 

On 20 March 191 8, Quartermaster personne l included a depot quarter~ 

master, a fi e ld clerk, about 40 enlisted men of the Corps, and a labor 

battalion. The depot quartermaster operated only eight Quartermaster 

warehouses. Eight months later, when the war ended, the number of 

warehouses had ex panded to 107, and Quartermaster personnel on duty 

had increased to 147 commissioned officers, one field clerk, and 7,412 

enlisted men. 

T he storage of subsistence occupied about half the total space of the 

depol. The Corps used 17 warehouses for storing clothing and about 

as many for the storage of miscellaneous property. It stored in the open, 

under tarpaulins, supplies, such as escort wagons, water carts, and rolling 

kitchens, which were shipped directly from the base ports and assembled 

at the depot by a large staff of exports. The refrigerating plant erected 

at Gievres was one of the largest of its kind in the world. Designed by 

Quartermaster officers, the refrigerating plant was built by Quartermaster 

personnel under the su pervision of the Engineers Corps from material 

furnished by the Quartermaster Corps. The ice box was large enough 

to hold at one time 18 million pounds of fresh beef. In addition to the 

large amounts of clothing, rations, and other supplies that the Corps 

handled at Gievres, it stored huge quantities of coal and wood there. 

It operated four gasoline storage tanks, each with a capacity of 500,000 

gallons, and also stored a large stock of lubricating oils at the Gievres 

depot. 

Operation of the Quartermaster depot, with its numerous warehouses, hundreds of cars, and miles of railroad tracks, required efficient 

checking devices and controls. Quartermasters handled as many as 667 

cars in one day, loading 410 and unloading 257. One single order had 

call ed fOI" the shipment of as much as 4,596 LOns of foodstuffs and tobacco. 

To fill this largest order received at the depot, the depot quartennaster 

had 457 cars loaded, sealed, and ready for shipment 19V2 working hours 

after he received the order. Gievres supplied as many as 800,000 men at 

one time. It supplied all the divisions of the American Army fighting 

beside the French at Chateau-Thierry, the American divisions in the 

St. Mihiel drive, and, until the armistice was signed, the American troops 

fighting in the Argonne and north of Verdun. 44 The Corps established 

other Quartermaster depots in the intermediate section at Montierchaume 

and Issoudun, but they were not on as large a scale as the depot at GieVTes. 

The last supply link on the Line of Communications was the depot 

+4 (I) RG 92, OQMG, Gen. H. L. Rogers I'rivate File. Box 28 (Historical Rpt. Gievres, 

Intermediate Quartennaster Depot No.2). (2) RG 92, OQMG Historical Files. Box 75 

(CQM Report. p. 147 IT.). 
660 QUARTERMASTER SU PPORT OF T H E ARMY 

established in the Advance Section. By October 1917, the organization 

of the Line of Communications had developed to such an extent that it 

became necessary to take steps to organize the Advance Section. The 

establishmem at Neufchateau of Headquarters, Advance Section, Line of 

Communications, was officiall y announced on 14 December 1917. u 

The largest and only permanent adva nce depot was built at Is-surTille for the use of all the suppl y services. T he Quartermaster Depot 

at Is-sur-Tille was opened on 7 December. One week later supplies 

began arri ving. although the warehouses were not yet completed and 

stocks had to he stored in the open under tarpaulins. Slarting with 

2 warehouses, the Quartermaster Depot expanded until it had in operation, at the time of the armistice, 9 clothing warehouses; 8 subsistence 

warehouses; 8 miscellaneous property warehouses; 12 steel hangars, used 

to cover forage and rations; and 6 combination warehouses and shops. 

Shipments from the Ad vance Quartermaster Depot to the combat 

units passed through the Regulating Station located at Is-sur-Tille. 

Peak operations for the Quartermaster Depot were reached in September 

191 8 when it forwarded 464 carl oads of supplies to troops on the firing 

line and supplied 1,036.785 men, including certain French trOOps.·' 

The Corps established a number of other Quartermaster advance 

depots, all but one of which were of minor importance.n The depot 

established at Dijon, on 23 Jul y 191 7, was known as {he Bread and Mea t 

Depot because, at least until the spring of 191 8, it supplied practicall y 

all troops beyond that point with fresh bread and was the distribution 

point for fresh beef issued to troops in the Advance Section. Such bed 

distribution eventually proved unsatisfactory because Dijon was located 

too far behind the regulating station at Is-sur-Tille to permit shipments 

of beef to arrive regularly for inclusion in the balanced rations that were 

loaded there and sent to the from. In consequence, fresh beef began 

to be shipped directl y to Is-sur·Till e from the depot at Gievres. After 

the Corps placed a mechanical bakery in operation at Is-sur-Tille, practically all bread [or the Advance Section was furnished from that point.·' 

Supply of Pelmieum Pmducts 

The storage and distribution of the bulk of Quartermaster suppli es 

were handled through the depot system established on the Line of Com· 

.0 u.s. Arm:! ill lite W orld WPT, /9Ii- /9, XVI, 142 (Hq AEF GO 7!». 

4e RG 92. OQMG Historical Fill'S, Box 75 (CQM Report, p. 113). 

U Other depou we~ established at Gondrecourt. La "aldahon, Jonch('ry, Neu fcMteau. 

and Bou rmont. 

u RG 92. OQMG Historical Fill'S, Box 75 (CQM Report , pp. 129-51). 
QUARTERMASTER THEATER OPERATIONS. 1917- 1918 661 

LOADI NG CAR Wrm SACKED BREAD, DljON 

municalions, but the ha nd ling of gasoline, for which the Chief QuaT.teTmaster, A.E.!"., was made solely responsibl e, posed specia l problems. The 

French supplied their armies by lIsi ng 50-Jiter bidons, or cans, that were 

fill ed at bases and shipped forward by rail and truck. Such a system 

afforded high mobility but required innumerable cans and tended to 

congest transportation facilities. Th is tendency alone made it advisable 

for the A.E.F. to reduce the lise of cans to a minimum and to adopt the 

American system of bulk distribution, that is, the use of tank storage, 

ra ilway tank cars between storage poinls, and motor tank truck distribution (or local use. 

Obtaining the necessary equipment was d ifficult. The Office of the 

Ch ief Quartermaster se lected Bordeaux and Pallice as the main practical 

pons for receipt of gasol ine piped into storage tanks from tank steamers. 

It used existing illSlallations of the French refiners and erected additional 

storage facilities. The Gasoline and Oil Branch in the Office of the Chief 

Quartermaster, A.E.F., d irected operations. The Branch chief hired 

six French ra ilway tan k cars and ordered 2,950 tank cars from the United 

States. None of the latter had arrived by April 191 8, and the British 
662 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Government came to the assistance of the A.E.F. by agreeing to rent 50 

rai lway tank cars to the Branch for the duration of the war. By the time 

the armistice was signed, 549 tan k cars had been delivered from the 

United States. Pendi ng the arriva l of storage tanks from the United 

States, the Gasoline and Oi l Branch had a considerable number of small 

capacity storage tanks constructed in France and put into immediate use. 

Wherever consumption justified it. the Branch installed storage tanks and 

pumps in the base and intermediate areas. 

Un til late in June 191 8. however. General Headquarters refused to 

allow deli very of bulk gasoline in the Advance Section and would not 

permit it to be forwarded even in tank cars. At the time of the Chalea uThierry push. the shortage of packaged gasoline prevented the French 

from adequately supplying the American divisions that had been thrown 

into combat. Headquarters, A.E.F., ordered the Chief Quartermaster 

to arrange for immediate de livery of 650,000 gallons per month to the 

Paris Group. With cans unobtainable, the Gasoline and Oil Branch 

could guarantee delivery only if it was permitted to forward bulk gasoline. 

General Headquarters acquiesced and the Branch at once erected gasoline 

depots. It successfull y filled requirements from these depots in bulk, 

with motor tank wagon delivery to units. Thereafter, General Headquarters allowed the Branch to place portab le bulk storage at any designated locations in the Advance area. 

Deliveries of motor gasoline showed a tremendous increase after 

June 1918. Over 48!,.i million gallons were delivered between January 

and December 1918, and more than three-fourths of that amount was 

de li vered in the last 6 months of the year. Deliveries in 191 8 also 

included approximately 5 mill ion ga llons of aviation gasoline and about 

l!,.i million gallons of kerosene as well as 4 million ga llons of lubricating 

oil, and almost 2!,.i million pounds of grease.n 

Other QuartennaJler Activities On the Line of Communications 

In addition to its depot operations on the Li ne of Communications, 

the Quartermaster Corps was engaged in numerous other activities that 

were scattered throughout the geograph ica l areas of that Line. In Base 

Section 1, for example, of which St. Naza ire was the Headquarters, the 

Corps operated six field bakeries, a gasoline and oil distribution station, 

and two coal storage yards. It had under cultivation twO gardens, th ree 

bulk production farms, and a seedling nu rsey. It also maintained in 

•• (I) RG 92. OQMG. Gen. H. L. Rogen riv~te File. Box 5 (Rpt . Gasoline and OH 

lir.U1eh or the Supplies vi~io . undated). (2) I bid" llox 8 (I\rier 1·Ii, tory or the O~ralions 

or the Gasoline and Oil I\ranch. 16 Jan 1919). 
QUARTERMASTER THEATER OPERATIONS, 1917- 1918 663 

that Section a remount depot, a salvage depot, and an Effects Depot that 

received and arranged for the disposition of all personal property, effects, 

and records of American soldiers at the time of their death, capture, or 

disappearance while serving with the A.E.F.80 

The scope and variety of Quartermaster activities in the Intermediate 

SeCtion were greater than in any other section. Not only did they include 

all activities, except the operation of an Effects Depot, to be found in 

Base Section I, but within the Intermediate Section the Quartermaster 

Corps also opened and operated factories that produced candy. hard bread, 

and macaroni for the A.E.F.ol A large assortment of metal products was 

likewise man ufactured under Quartermaster supervision. Within its 

boundaries was located the major salvage depot at St. Pierre-des-Corps.n 

The Corps also conducted numerous Quartermaster activities in the 

Advance Section. At Is-sur-Tille, the Quartermaster Corps maintained 

three salvage sheds, a degreasing plant, a fuel and forage yard, two coal 

docks, an electric light plant, a carpenter shop, a tin shop, a paint shop, 

a box mill, a saw mill, and a sa les commissary that did a business of 

approximately $100,000 a month. At Is-sur-Tille, the Corps established 

a mechanical bakery. This development marked an almost revolutionary 

change in the method of providing bread for the Army. In lieu of 

assigning bakery companies to operate field bakeries with the div isions of 

the Army, the Corps erected a large mechanical bakery in the rear of 

the regu lating station, from which bread was supplied to the troops at 

the front. Adoption of this plan was based on Allied experience, and, by 

obtaining the necessary machinery on a replacement basis from the 

British, the Corps facilitated the early operation of the mechanical bakery. 

This plant, when in full opera tion, had the advantage of using less fuel 

and less personnel- 7 bakery compani es of 101 men each- to produce the 

same amount of bread that 27 companies turned out in field bakeries. 

The Corps did not complete the mechanical bakery until I December 

191 8, but from August, 11 bakery companies, using snch parts of the 

bakery eq uipment as were available and improvising others, provided 

580,000 pounds of field bread per day." 

Storage /01' Combat Units 

Storage on the Line of Communica tions was but one part of A.E.F. 

requirements. Provision had also to be made for storage in the combat 

iD For a detailed descriplion of the$e activities, see RG 92. OQMG, Gen. H . L. Rogel'$ 

Private File, Box 28 (Hislorical Rpl , BaSt' Seclion One). 

AI 1,,/ro, p. 670. 

6t 111/ro, p. 676. 

AS RG 92, OQMG. Gell, H . L. Rogel'$ I' rillale File, Box 7 (MenlO. Col. L. L. Deitrick., 

Bakery Br, 10 Supplies Diy, H Dec 1918). 
664 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

units.5o Placing suppli es in th e hands of combat troops involved certa in 

basic considerations. Among these were regularity and promptness in 

the receipt of suppli es as a necessary mea ns of ma intaining trOOp moral e 

and effi ciency. But it was essential that the paperwork needed to obta in 

suppli es be held to a minimum and th at the delivery of supplies to 

organ izations be placed, as much as possible, on an automatic basis. Only 

th e authorized standard reserve of supplies could be placed in the hands 

of the troops if" their mob ili ty was to be preserved. Moreover, undue 

acc umulations of suppli es at the front had to be avoided to minimize the 

danger of th eir destruction or capture .. -'" 

Storage in combat units developed into twO kinds- railhead stockages 

and stockages known as an army park or depot. The railhead was the 

poim on the railroad at which supplies were discharged. The place at 

which the trains o[ a division received its supplies was called th e refilling 

point, but it was possi bl e for ra ilhead and refilling poim to be one and 

the same place. Rai lhead storage was not a responsibility o( the Quartermaster Corps but was placed under the autho rity of th e regulating officer. 

In the ea rl y months of A.E.F. panicipation in th e war, it was genera ll y believed th at all suppli es could be delivered to divisions at their 

ra ilheads. Experience soon demonstrated till! impossibili ty of utilizing 

for all supplies this method of del ivery for an army of nearly a million 

men, operating in a limited area with its railroad transportation under 

French control. Railh eads were full y occu pied in handling on ly rations 

and forage. Since freight cars were limited in number and had to be 

quickly released, th e o nl y altermllive to prevent the development of 

congestion was the est ablishment of parks a nd dumps. As soon as commandet·s determined the military objective and sta bilized operations to 

the point where it was possible to eSlablish a supp ly park, such a fac ility 

was provided to supply the Army. Quartermasters drew su ppli es for a 

Quartermaster army par k principally from the Quartermaster in termedia te depot at ~iev es and the Quartermaster advance depot at Is-sur-Till e. 

The first such army park was established near Melun during the operations of the Paris Group about Chateau-Thierry. It ,vas a sma ll park 

that was set up essentiall y for emergency reserve purposes o nl y and all 

the supply services utilized it. 

Of far more importa nce was the Quartermaster Army Park at Fleury, 

est.ablished o n 3 October 1918 to insure the proper suppl y of all Class 2 

~· I The volumc of l"<.'Conls and lhc diflicuhy of usiug them prc,·cms any detailed analysis 

of front ·linc storage operations within the scope of this brief treatment. 

5s !'iun/ 1/ ' /101"1 0/ Cell . in/,,! }. Pel· .• iliug, p. 64. 
QUARTERMASTER THEATER OPERATIONS, 1917-1918 665 

and g supplies, that is cloth ing and eq ui pment, to the First Army, 

numbering about a million men, when it began irs Argonne-Meuse 

operations. W ith the troops engaged in active fighting, suffe ri ng heavy 

casualties. ex posed to gas altack, and requ iring large renewa ls of cloth ing 

and equipment, the Quartermaster Park at Fleury became a depot of 

genera l issue. T he Chief Q uartermaster of the First Army had d irect 

control or the park. Divisions, corps, and all elements of the First Army 

submitted their req uisitions by messenger. telephone. or te legraph to tbe 

Chief Quartermaster of that Army, whose office checked them immedi· 

ately. He ordered issues made at once fl"Om the park to the using 

organizations with a minimum of forma lities. 58 

Parks or dumps at division or corps levels were indefi nite in form 

and rather haphazard affairs. In evaluati ng Quartermaster storage operations in the combat units, Maj. C. W. Halsey. of C-4. General Headquarters. A.E.F., observed that "combat operations or the American 

armies, as army organizations. were not of long enough d uration to 

develop any very comple te experience in army stockage practice." n 

Introduction of Automatic SUjJjJly 

Storage operations constituted onl y one part of the overall Q uartermaster responsibility for providi ng logistical support to the A.E.F. T he 

Corps was also responsibl e for furnishing the troops with clothing, personal and organizational equipment, rations. forage, fuel, and an imals. 

Its efforts to procure supplies duri ng the months of the war carried it 

into the field of production. 

Quartermaster supply operations began as soon as the fi rst Headquarters of the A.E.F. was opened in Paris. " T he ma in dependence of 

the A.E.F. for supplies was necessaril y on the resources of the United 

States since there was a shortage of almost all supplies in Europe. Inasmuch as tonnage was the crux of the whole supply problem, however. it 

18 (I) RG 92, OQMG Historic.al files, Box 75 (CQM Report. PI'. 498-99). (2) U.s. Ami)' 

i'l Ihe World WilY, /917-19, XIV. 172 (Undated Rpt, Cen Hq A.E ..... 4th Section). (5) I bid., 

XVI. 249-56 (HI) AEF GO ·44, 25 Ma r 1918) provides de tails on requisitions and methods 

uf supply. (4) "Operations of the Quartermaster Corps, U.s. Army During the World War: 

Notes on AmIY, Corps and Diyision Qua rtermaster Activities in the A.E.F," (MOnograph 

flio. 9, Quarlerma5ler Corps School. Philadelph ia, I'a.). p. 9 If. (Extra", Ch id QM, Fin t 

Amly to CG, First Army, iO Dec 1918). 

II U.s. A",I)' i" Ihe World WDr, 1917- 19, XIV. 175. 

iI As a mailer of fact, the fi n t Quartermaster purchase abroad was made as 5()()n as 

the Commander·in·Chief's party arrived in London. Considering the yolume of A.E.F. 

rttordJ, no one should be surprised that the fint Quartennaster purchase was a few boxes 

of carbon paper to carry on the necessary derical work at Headquarters. the shortage having 

developed while General r enhing's party was en mute on the Baltic. 
666 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T HE ARMY 

was vital to suppl ement the resources of the United States with whatever 

supplies could be obtained in Europe. 

As fa r as possible, procurement of supplies from the United States 

was placed on an aULOmalic basis. Adoption o[ a system of automatic 

supply had been proposed by Chief Quartermaster McCarthy in May 

1917. Quartermaster General Sharpe, who had not approved of this 

proposal, recommended the lise of requisitions submitted monthly or 

oftener, if necessary, direct to the Depot Quartermaster at New York as a 

means of avoiding unnecessary accumulation of supplies in France,n 

Subsequently, General Pershing recommended adoption of the system of 

automatic supply of standard items and the gradual accumulation of a 

gO-day reserve_ Despite Sharpe's dissent, the Secretary of War approved.eo 

T he gO-day reserve was distributed so as to provide 45, 30, and 15 days of 

supply, respectively. in the base, intermediate, and advance sections. 

When the danger to shipping from submarine attack decreased, the 90-day 

reserve was reduced to 45 days of supply.Ol 

There were exceptions to the general rule of automatic supply. 

Requisitions for material that was a regular item of troop supply and 

emergency requisitions for quantities of regular items above the standing 

calls constituted spec ial requests for supplies and were designated "exceptional supply." Forage. for example. always had to be carried as exceptional supply because the Corps purchased a large proportion of the 

animals used by the A.E.F. in France and Spain. Without knowing the 

number of animals on hand in the A.E.F. and the quantity of hay that 

the French government provided, the Office of the Quanermaster Genera l 

in Washington was unable to compute forage requirements on an automatic basis. n 

Local Pmcttrement 

Adoption of the policy of purchasing supplies in Europe was dictated 

by the acute shortage of shipping in 1917. That shortage was such that 

during the first 7 months of its existence, the A.E.F. was almost entirely 

dependent on France for its logistical support. Less than 500,000 of the 

approximately 5 million tons of suppl ies needed during those months 

n RG 120, AEF SOS Historical Files, Box 129 (Rpl, Col. D. E. McCarthy to TAG, 

6 Mar 1920. Appendix F). 

" (I) U.S. Arm)' iPl Ill e World iV.u, 1917- 19, XV, 10-1 1 (Persh ing ,able, 7 Sep 1917). 

(2) RG 165, War College Div. Doc. File, Cue 7702- 15 (Memo, Sharpe for Chief, War College 

Div. 4 OCI 191 7; Memo, Chief of Staff for TAG. 18 OCt 1917). 

$ ' Fillol Reporl of Ge". Joll" J. Persh i,rg, p. II. 

$2 RG 92, OQMG, Gen . H. L. Rol{Crs I'rivale Fite, Box 6 (Memo, LI. A. 8 . Rosenkrans 

for Col. Crusan, 6 Dec 1918). 
QUARTERMASTER THEATER OPERATIONS, 1917- 191 8 667 

were shipped from the United States." Only such supplies as could not 

be procu red abroad were sent in order that the space thus saved could 

be used for the transportation of troops. From the beginning of the war 

until 31 December 191 8. the A.E.F. requ ired approximately 18 million 

ship tons of material. Of lhis amount, 10 million tons were obtained in 

Europe and about 8 million tons were shipped from the United States. 

Over half of the amount purchased in Europe represented Quartermaster 

supplies." 

When purchase of supplies in Europe was initiated in June to supply 

the limited wants of the fi rst Expeditionary Forces, each supply service 

handled procurement independently. with the same competitive results 

as occurred in the United States. By August. General Pershing established a General Purchasing Board to co·ordinate the purchase operations 

of the supply departments. the Red Cross. and the YMCA. He appointed 

Charl es G. Dawes as General Purchasing Agent.u General Headquarters 

supervised the Board until it was placed under the control of the Commanding General. Services of Supply. The Board had no authority to 

make purchases. but it exercised the power of control and veto of purchases. Before purchase orders could be placed by the Quartermaster 

Corps or any other supply service, they had to be submitted to the 

General Purchasing Agent for approval. The latter was also responsible 

for locating supplies in Europe, 

Dawes continued, in 1918, to maintain that military necessity required purchases in Europe and to urge that the insufficient tonnage 

available be used for transporting articles of "first necessity unobtainable 

here." The Chief Quartermaster, A.E.F .. fully agreed with him. By 

the summer of 1918, however. manufacturers in the United States questioned that policy, and the War Industries Board sent a mission overseas 

to look into the question of foreign purchases in general and shoe procurement in England in particular-a development indicative of a trend 

toward buying American goods that, had the war continued for many 

more months, would have become more pronounced, particularly so as the 

shipping crisis passed." 

u RG 92, OQMG Historical Files, Boll 75 (CQM Report, p. 42). 

Of Charles G. Dawes, A jOIl.r.tal of the Creal War (2 vols .. New York, 1921), 11 , 53, 54. 

u (1) Penhing, My Experiellce$ in Ih e World War. t , 148-49. (2) Dawes. A j OIl.r.taI of 

Ihe Cn:ll/ Wilr. t, 19-21. (3) U.s. Army in the World Wa r, 1917- /9, XVI, 57 <Hq AEF GO 25, 

20 Aug 191 7); p. 6of <Hq AU GO 28, 50 Aug 1917). 

"(I) RG 92, OQMG Recordt, Report of Maj. Roy A. Shaw, 24 Sep 1918. (2) The 

purchase of Ihoes in England brought protMU from the American Ihoe manufacturen who 

maintained there were ample facilities for the production in the United States of Ihoes of 

luperior wea ring quality. Moreover, it was claimed that it required five times the Ipace 

to tran5port the ume quantity of hidn as leather as was ncceuary for the finilhed product, 

.boa. 
668 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Chief Quartermaster McCarthy delegated responsibil ity for the procurement of Quartermaster supplies to Lt. Col. Harry E. Wilkins, one of 

the four assistants who accompanied him to Paris. The latter was 

designated Chief Purchasing Officer of the Quartermaster Corps. His 

office, origi nall y organized in Paris. continued to be maintained in that 

city and remained under tile jurisdiction of the Chief Quartermaster, 

A.E.F .• when Gencral Headquartf!rs moved to Chaumolll and later when 

the supply services were transfclTcd to the Headquarters, Services of 

Supply, at TOUTS. When Pershing established the General Purchasing 

Board, the Chief Purchasing Officer of the Corps became the representative of the Chief Quartermaster, A.E.F., on that board. Its membership 

also included representatives from the other suppl y services. 

The small office of the Chief Purchasing Officer of the Corps ex· 

panded until it became a great business organ ization, with agents not 

only in France but also in the principal cities of Great Britain, Italy, 

Switzerland, and Spain. These purchasing agents reported to, and 

worked through, the representatives of the General Purchasing Board 

also stationed in these cities. The Chief Purchasing Officer organized 

his Paris office into divisions. The principal one was the Purchasing 

Division composed of five commodity branches, one manufacturing 

branch, and one branch that handled the de livery and transportation of 

supplies purchased. In addition, the organization included a Subsistence 

Manufacturing Division, an Accounting and Auditing Divisionj a Personnel Division, and a Ch ief Clerk in charge of all records and files. Of 

In the beginning, each supply service bought its own items of supply 

although under the co-ordinating control of the Genera l Purchasing 

Agent. In time, under the leaderShip of a Quartermaster officer, Lt. Col. 

N. D. Jay, who served as Assistant Genera l Purchasing Agent, the Gen· 

eral Purchasing Board developed a system of purchase by ca tegory in 

order to bring aboUl a more effective control of purchases, prevent 

competition between the supply services, and withal secure the ad· 

vantages to be obtained from large transactions. A directive of the 

Commanding General, Services of Supply, established categories of supplies used by more than one suppl y service, and it authorized the General 

Purchasing Agent to designate the particu lar service that would purchase 

such supplies for all the suppl y departmems. e8 Under these categories, 

the Quartermaster Corps purchased all textiles and clothing except special 

aviator'S and gas-protective clothing, all insignia, blankets, mattresses and 

bedding, tentage, tarpaulins, jute and burlap, kitchen utensils, lamps, 

II RG 92. OQMG, Gen, H. L. Roge!", Private File, BQx 28 (Historical Rpt. Chier Pur· 

chasing Officer, Q.M.C., A.E .• • .. p. 12). 

U Dawes, A 1011",111 oJIItt: Grelll Wa r, II. 17. !;9. 
QUA RTERMASTER T HEATER OI'ERATIONS. 19 17- 191 8 669 

refrigera ting machinery. tanks, horseshoes, agricuilurai implements, office 

fix lU res and supplies, coa l, oil, gasoline. paints, priming plant supplies, 

and hides and lea ther. In addition, the Corps bought its own supplies 

wh ich were not handl ed by other services, as, for example, salvage 

machinery.G' 

Clothing. texlil es, and subsistence were the principal supplies purchased by the Chid P\II"chasing Officer. Most purchases of clothing and 

texLi les were con lraClcd for in th e usual ma nner. The shortage of 

blankets caused th e Chief Purchasing omccr to buy commercia l bl ankets 

or a ll kinds in the fa ll of 1917. On 14 October 19 17. th e War Department 

approved lhe Chief Quartermaster's request for authority to purchase 

200,000 blankets in Spain. Three da ys later, it also amhorized him to 

comract with the British Government for 200,000 uniforms. Early in 

December, Pershing complained to the War Departmelll by cable that 

the failure of the Quartermaster Corps to land suppl ies of wimer clothing 

long requested had prod uced a serious ituation .'~ The Corps had 

shipped considera bl e quantities of clothing, but, obviously, the rate at 

whi ch clothing wore out surpassed any past experience on which it based 

a replacement factor. In December 19 17, the 'War Department advised 

the Chief Quartermaster LO limit his purchases of Spanish textiles to 

quamities required on ly for emergency needs because large contracts 

were being fill ed in the United States. A month later, however, it 

requested him to report what additional amounts of clothing could be 

purchased in Europe,n Among the articles of clothing purchased in 

England during the war were 1,000,000 overseas caps, 278,000 wool coalS, 

over 2,000,000 pairs of wool drawers, 1,150,000 pairs of gloves, 237,000 

Oannel shirts, almost 2,000,000 pairs of fi eld shoes, and nearly 4,500,000 

pairs of wool stock ings. The Chief Purchasi ng Officer also bought 

small er quanti d es of these and other articles of clothing in Spain and 

France, while he purchased th ousa nds of yards of textiles in all three 

countries.a 

Clothing and textil es could be procured by regular purchase, but 

certain other supplies had to be purchased only on terms tha t ca ll ed for 

replacement either of the suppli es themselves or of the raw materials used 

in their production. Such arrangements were particularly likely to be 

necessary in purchasing su bsistence, Thus, the shortage of shipping in 

the winter and spring of 191 8 resulted in the delivery of insufficient stocks 

.11 RG 92, OQMG H istorical t'lJ ~, Box 75 (CQM Report, p. 50), 

1~ RG 92. OQMG, Gen. tl , L. Rogers I'rll'ate File, Box 7 (Gable No. '60·S, II DC(: 19 17), 

11 (I) I bid, (Gallic No, 6~2, 12 J an 19 18). (2) RG \2(). War Depanmem Historical Fila, 

Box 14~ {Ln, Acting Chief of Staff (0 CG. AEF, I~ Dec 1917), 

n For a I~(eI1lCIll showing the delil'eries of clothing, textites, and insignia purchued 

in .:lIrope during the war, sec RG 92, OQMG, Gen, H , L. Rogers Private File, Box 7. 
670 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

of fresh beef [or the Army. When various organizations of th e A.E.F. 

purchased hesh beef locally. the French government notified the A.E.F. 

that it expected the return of an equal amount of beef for a ll that had 

been purchased. Similarly, in the summer of 191 8, the Purchasing 

Division, Office of the Ch ief Purchasing Officer, obtained 20,000 pounds 

of rice from the French Intendence on a replacement basis, a The purchase of metal products genera ll y entailed the rep lacement of an equivalent tonnage of bulk metals because, by the end of 1917, Germany controlled the area of France that produced more tha n 80 percent of its iron 

and steel, and French war industries were themselves dependent on outside sources for their raw material. 

P1'oduction Activities 

The purchases of supplies carried the Chief Purchasing Officer of 

the Corps into the fi eld of production. As the A.E.F. expanded, it 

became evident that the resources of France wou ld have to be deve loped 

to the utmost to provide adequately for the America n troops. Because 

of their bulk and the consequent saving in ship's tonnage, the Chief Purchasing Officer selected for procurement in France three items of subsistence suppl y- macaroni, hard bread, and candy. None of these items 

was available on the market because of the shortage of raw ma teria ls, and 

most factories equipped for their production were already operating under 

military control by the French government. Through the efforts of the 

Purchasing Division, the French government turned over to the Quartermaster Corps a number of factories, complete with opCTating personnel. 

In the case of macaroni production, the Corps furnished the flour and 

provided the necessary person nel to supervise manufacture, inspection, 

and shipment of the product. Most of th ese developments occurred 

between July and November 1918. In that period, 20 French factories 

turned out hard bread for the American forces and 13 candy factories 

operated to supply the wants of the Expeditionary Forces. T he Corps 

furnished sugar and cocoa beans for the manufacture of candy, supplied 

coke and coal for operating the factories, and, in many instances, provided 

wooden boxes, paper, nails, and cartons for packing purposes. By such 

means supply caught up with demand.14 

The Quartermaster Corps a lso carried on production that utilized its 

own personnel and materials in plants that it either erected or leased. 

The sheet metal and hollow ware shops near Bourges were one example. 

In February 1918, the Quartermaster Corps faced an acute shortage of 

13 RG 92, OQMG Historical Files. Box 75 (CQM Reporl. PI'. 53, 68). 

H Ibid., pp. 5H7. 
QUARTERMASTER THEATER OPERATIONS, 1917- 191 8 671 

pans, coffee boil ers, and galvanized iron cans, which formed a n important 

part of the equipment of field kitchens. T he coffee boilers and pans 

had to be made in graduated sizes in order tha t th ey might be nested 

and stored in the field ranges. Since articles of the correct dimensions 

could not be procured in France, the Chief Purchasing Officer made 

arrangements whereby the Corps virtually took over the operation of a 

French factory, suppl ying fuel and raw material and applying American 

methods of factory management. The Corps retained French management and employees, but it d irected the supervision, inspection, and warehousing of mater ials, and, in r ush periods, it detailed American soldiers 

to work in the factory. The Corps contracted for the entire output of 

metal articl es, which were made according to Army specifications. When 

the Quartermaster Corps terminated contracts in January 1919, total 

production had aggTegated 204,601 finished articles, and it was estimated 

that these products had saved ocean tonnage space amounting to 123, 136 

cubic fee t.u 

The Coffee Roasting Plant, established at Corbeil-Essenes near Paris 

and operated under the direction of the Chief Purchasing Officer, furnishes another example of Quartermaster manufac turing operations. 

To save space on transports, the Chief Purchasing Officer bought practicall y the entire European supply of green coffee in 191 7-some 16 

million pounds. Not un til the European stock of green coffee had been 

exhausted in the fa ll of 191 8 did it become necessary to make regular 

shipments fTom the United States, and by that time the height of the 

tonnage crisis was over. To roast and grind the coffee, the Corps installed the latest equipment in the plant. That plant became the largest 

in Europe, with an initial capac ity of 500,000 rations a day wh ich increased to 1,500,000 rations a day by the time the armistice was signed. 

When operations ceased , the Corps employed 300 French civilians in 

addition to 3 officers and 215 en listed men of the Corps.'s 

Estahlishment of the Gm'den SenJice 

The exploitation of French resources took other forms that were 

directed by the Supplies Division, Office of the Chief Quartermaster, 

A.E.F., rather than by the Chief Purchasing Officer. In December 1917, 

the Chief Quartermaster learned that both the French and British armies 

had been cultivating vegetable gardens ncar the front lines and at camps 

located in trai ning areas. He deemed it expedient to take over French 

u RG 92. OQMG, Gen. H . L. Roger.; Private File, Box. 28 (Historical Rpt, Chief I'ur· 

chasing Officer, PIl. 28-30). 

16 RG 92, OQMG Historical Files, Box. 75 (CQM Report , pp. 58--67). 
672 QUARTERMASTER SU PPORT OF THE ARMY 

military ga rd ens established in those SCClOrs in which American troops 

replaced French soldiers so that the work already begun would not be 

lost. The French had built up a remarkable system of kitchen gardens, 

pursuing a method whereby ready-grown vegetable seed lings were furnished to the troops culLivati ng gardens. Such local production had the 

advantage of inslll'ing prompt de li very of fresh vegetables and at the same 

time saving ocean, ra il, and motor transportation. 

On the basis of an investigation and report on the French system, 

the Chief Quartermaster establ ished a Garden Service Branch in the 

Supplies Division of his Office. It furnished techn ica l direction, land, 

tools. seeds. and seedlings. The Uranch sc t up its tech nical headquarters 

at Versailles where the French were operating their seedling nursery. 

I\y directive, General Headquarters ordered each division commander (0 

appoint a garden offi cer and establ ish a garden in each divisional train ing 

area and at. each permanent post and camp." The Garden Service Branch 

acquired about 3,000 acres of land, of which it placed about half under 

cultivation by lhe time the war ended. SOllle 157 officers were in charge 

of the d ifferelll brardens. Although the armistice intervened before the 

Garden Service reached large proportions, it had drawn up extensive 

plans for 19 19, and its actual accomplishments were considerable. The 

final repons received from all garden officers about 15 November 1918 

indicated that the Service had produced approximately 10 million pounds 

of vegetablcs in these gardens at a COSt (not includ ing the labor of 

enlisted men) of about one-third the prevailing market prices. 1I 

Wood and Coal Proem'erne'llt 

The Fuel Branch of thc Supplies Division in the Office of the Chief 

QuartermaSlcr directed thc procurement of coa l and wood, the supply 

of which invo lved different problems. Obtaining sufficient wood for 

fuel purposes was compli ca ted by the fear or the Frcnch authorities that 

A.E.F. needs would encroach on thosc of its civilian population and, evcn 

more important, (hal satisfying thesc nceds might deplete a nat ural 

resource of France difficult lo replace. Procurement required tact[ul 

handling. 

]n October 1917, the Chief Quartermaster procured a large number 

of "coupes" or wood lots ncar the regu lati ng station atls-sur-Tille through 

which the troops would have to be supplied. He employed a large force 

iT u.s. A,."" ill thll lVorld lVar, 19Ii- 19, XVI. 233 (Hq AEF GO 34, 25 Feb 1918). 

11(1) RG 165, War College i)iv. I)oc. t·ile. Cue 101 84-16 (Chief Quarterma5ler, AEF, 10 

QMG, 6 Aug )918). (2) RC 92. OQMC. Cell. H . L. Rogers Private File, Box " (Rpl on 

Guden Service). 
I 

QUARTERMASTER THEATER OPERATIONS, 1917- 1918 673 

of expert Spanish woodcutters under contract on a piecework basis. 

They cut abo ut 75,000 cords. This deve lopment so alarmed the French 

that a conference was arranged and an agreemc lll worked Out whereby 

10 percent of the wood cut by lhe A.E. F. in lhe coupes was to be sold to 

the civilian population. The Chief Qua rtermaster deve loped a dose 

co.operation between his offi ce and the French Forestry Service with the 

result that the Corps accumulated a fa irl y large supply of ready-cut wood. 

In the winter of 1918- 19, the Corps estimated that no less than 

400,000 cords of wood would be needed for the combat troops alone. 

To meel this requirement, the Chief Quartermaster organized a battalion 

of labor troops that grew from 9,500 to 11,000 men. Working under the 

direction of a competent forestry offi cer and following closely in the 

wake of the advancing armi es, this organization, known as the Fuel 

Wood Project Advance Section, produced in 3 months one·third of the 

supply required (or the wimer maintenance of a troop program that 

called for 4,500,000 men.''' 

On the basis of a repon on coal submitted La Chief Quartermaster 

McCarthy in June, he made arrangements whereby france provided 

100 tons a day for 90 days. This agreement called for a ton-for-ton 

return of the coal at the earliest possible moment. In "iew of the 

existing shortage of shipping and French objections to receipt of anthracite coa l from the United States, the Fuel Branch in the Office of the 

Chief Quartermaster began negoti ations for a regular coal suppl y from 

England and for ships with which to transport it to France. The Purchasing Agent for Greal Britain, represcming the Chief Purchasing 

Officer, entered into the negotiations and became convinced that procedures followed by the British Admiralty in obtaining its supply would 

have to be applied to fill A.E.F. coa l requirements in Great Britain. 

The outcome was that, d uring the war, coa l was purchased entirely in 

England on estimates prepared by the Fuel Branch. These were forwa rded via the Paris office to the Purchasi ng Agent for Great Britai n in 

London. He tra nsmitted them to Harris &: Dixon, Ltd., wh ich acted as 

sole agent of the A.E. F. for the procurement of coa l in Creat Britain, 

obtaining the allotment of tonnage from the British coa l controll er. 

Harris 8c Dixon, Ltd., prescntcd a permit to the British Coal Exporta tion 

Committee and shipmcnts followcd. 30 T he importation of British coal 

began in October 191 7. The shipments du ring that month reached 

1' RG 92. OQMC. Gen. H. L. Rogers I' ri" ilte f ile. Box 5 (Memo. LI. Col. t·. T . H ill for 

Maj. E. K. Cou lter. 26 !\'ov 1918). 5« also ibid., (Rpt . Maj. W. E. Mannear to Milj. Gen . 

H . L. Rogers. 29 ~1ar 1919). 

lo /bid., Box 5 (Memo. Lt. Col. D. n . \Venll for Chief QM. 29 No,' 1918; memo. Lt. Col. 

F. T . H ill for Maj. E. K. Coulter. 26 No,' 1918). 
674 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

28,336 tons. By October 1918, the total amount of coal sbipped from 

Great Britain for the A.E.F. during the intervening 12 months was over 

one million tons." 

Growth of Salvage Opemlions 

T he shipping crisis of: 1917 and the need to save tonnage had other 

r esults than the purchase and production abroad of supplies. It stimulated the growth of sa lvage operations, a novel and striking development 

of the war. Though repairs, particularl y of wagons and harness, had 

been undertaken in earlier wars, never before had the Quartermaster 

Corps made a systematic auempt to salvage the enormous waste of war. 

Contributing to this development was a War Department order. effective 

15 1u1y 1917, that abolished the fixed clothing allowance for the soldier. 

That order set his allowance for the duration of the war as the quantity 

of clothing necessary and adequate for the service upon which he was 

engaged. T he directive ordered clothing that was worn or damaged 

through fair wear and tear to be turned in to the Quartermaster Corps 

for replacement. In addition. all articles of clothing, equipage. and 

other supplies abandoned on the march, in camp. or picked up on the 

field of battle were eventually to be turned in to the salvage depots for 

renovation. repair, and, if practicable, for re-issue.

82 

At the direction of Colonel McCa rthy. Quartermaster offi cers had 

investigated British and French methods of salvage savings as soon as 

headquarters had been established in Paris." It is doubtful that, in 

the summer of 1917, the Corps had envisaged the extent to which salvage 

operations would grow. Initiall y, the Corps directed its efforts to mak· 

ing repairs. The wear and tear on clothing and shoes in the training 

areas led to the development of a repair program as a means of extending 

the life of these articles and thereby reducing the amount of tonnage 

required for Class I supplies. General Headquarters directed the Corps 

to organize shops for the repair of clothing and to provide each suppl y 

company with half.soling machines for the repair of shoes. 8~ This 

method of shoe repair by small shops operated by supply companies 

prove ineffective, and, within less than a month. General Headquarters 

directed the Chief Quartermaster to establish shoe repair shops on a 

scale su itable for handling all the repa ir work necessary in the Army.n 

" RG 92. OQMG Historical Fila. Box 75 (CQM Report, p . 88). 

n (I) Wllr Department GePlerll1 Order!, 1917. GO 89, II Jul 1917. (2) u.s. Army il! tile 

World Wllr. 1911-/9. XVI, .. 9 (Hq A.EF GO 16, 19 Jul 1917) . 

.. RG 120, AEF 50S Historical Files, G· ... Box 129 (Rpt, Col. D. E. McCarthy to TAG. 

6 J',far 1920). 

" U.S. Army in tlie World Wllr, 1911- 19, XVI. 56 (Hq AEF GO 2~. 20 Aug 1917). 

n Ibid., XVI. 77 (Hq AEF CO ~8, 17 Sep 1917). 
QUARTERMASTER THEATER OPERATIONS, 1917- 191 8 675 

T he rapid accumulation of clothing and equipment requiring repairs in the fall of 1917 caused Chief Quartermaster Rogers to initiate 

a further study of the problem. In consequence, Headquarters. A.E.F., 

established a Salvage Service, attaChing it to the Quartermaster Corps,u 

It had become obvious that salvage operations would have to be developed 

as a centralized, well-controlled activity. As set up, the Salvage Service 

collected and repaired all Quartermaster articles as well as those that 

were common to several departments and therefore required similar 

equipment and labor for their repair. This partial centralization of 

salvage operations prevented unnecessary duplication of repair facilities. 

Salvage operations for those articles pertaining only to one department 

were handled by the supply department having responsibility for the 

article. 

General Headquarters designated an officer as Chief of Salvage 

Service, Line of Communications, and assigned him as assistant to the 

Chief Quartermaster, Line of Communications. It also detailed one 

officer for each army to serve as Chief of the Army Salvage Service and 

assistan t to the Chief Quartermaster of the army. He had direct control 

of all Salvage Service personnel in the army area. 

Salvage operations extended from base depots to front-line trenches. 

Salvage squads collected abandoned material from battlefields. Pioneer 

Infantry and Labor Battalions of the Corps assisted them in this work, 

and, following heavy offensives, commanders also detailed line troops to 

help recover abandoned material. Salvage squads deposited such material at dumps and salvage officers then had it transported to railheads 

where the material was sorted into classes. Salvage officers had serviceable 

articles delivered at once to supply offi cers for immediate re-issue to 

troops. They shipped unserviceabl e articles to the rear. Those of a 

highl y technica l nature, they sent to the depot of the appropriate suppl y 

service for repair. Those articles in general use throughout the Army 

and all unserviceable Quartermaster items, they shipped to Quartermaster salvage depots. 

Both shops and depots repaired unserviceable material. Shops 

served loca l troops and were loca ted at certain base pons and troop 

centers. In most instances, articles of clothing repaired at shops were 

returned to their original wearers. Depots handled the unserviceabl e 

material recovered at the front, as we ll as large amounts of clothing and 

other material sent from training areas. At the salvage depots, clothing 

was disinfected, laundered, repaired, and then sent to general supply 

depots for re-issue. 

88 (I) Ibid" XVI. 168-71 (Hq AU CO 10, 16 Jan 191 8). (2) RG 92. OQMC Historical 

Files, Box 75 (CQM Report. pp. 26-27). 
676 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

SACK AND TENT DEPARTMENT, SALVACE DEPOT, ST. PIERR£-DES-CoRPS 

The first Salvage Service depot established was opened. on 13 January 

1918, at St. Pierre-des-Corps, a suburb of Tours. Salvage operations 

expanded so rapidly that 11 months later the Salvage Service was operating 

4 depots, 20 shops, 66 laundries. and 77 d isin(cctors.8' It employed a 

large number of refugees at the sa lvage depolS. By the time the armistice 

was signed, salvage work at St. Pierre.des.Corps was being done by 730 

men and 5,300 women under the dircClion of 26 officers and 45 enlisted 

men ," 

Sa lvage savings were impressive. During the month of September 

1918, the Salvage Service depots and shops recl aimed for fe-issue morc 

than 2,600,000 anicles of clothing and equipment valued at over 

$7,250.000. This was in addition to the large amount of servicable 

material coll ected on fh e battlefi eld during that month, valued at $8 

million and turned over to supply officers for immediate re·issue." The 

a' RG 92. OQMG Historical Files. Box 75 (CQM Rcporl. p. 297). 

as /bid., p. 311. 

SII / /J;d., p. 310. 
QUARTERMASTER THEATER OPERATIONS, 1917- 19 18 677 

HARNt:ss DEI'ARTMl;NT, SALVAC~: D EI'OT, ST. PI ERRE-DKS-CORPS 

Salvage Service made additional savings by using the waste products of 

the kitchens. It sold or converted these waste products into soap for 

laundries and hospitals, into dubbin [or waterproofing shoes, and into 

fertilizer, glycerine, and other products of commercial va lue. The disposal by sa le of articles that could not be repaired and of waste products 

thal could not be converted to Army use added other savings. 

Lll1.t11d1'Y Operations 

The development of salvage service fa cilities included such extensive 

laundry operations for sterilizing garments thaL all laundry functions 

eventuall y came under the control of the Salvage Service. Under authorization of General Headquarters, the Quartermaster Corps provided 

and operated laundries to do such laundry work without charge as was 

essential for troops in the zone of the advance and for patients and 
678 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

operating personnel in hospitals." No laundry work. however. was 

performed for troops not serving in the zone of the advance. 

At no time during the war were adequate laundry facilities available 

for combat troops. By cable in November 191 7, Pershing had requested 

that one mobi le laundry be furnished each division embarking for France. 

Only four mobile laundry units arrived at Bordeaux between 5 July and 

22 August 191 8; ten more arrived at Marseill e in November after the 

armistice was signed. The Chief of the Salvage Service criticized the 

inadequate facilities provided for washing the clothes of men who were 

actually in the front lines when, at the same time, newspaper accoun15 

were extolling the amoul of work turned out by mobile laundries that 

had been erected in the various training camps in the United States." 

Insufficient facilities for laundering clothes resulted in an extensive 

amount of lice infestation among the troops. Inspection reports showed 

that until the armistice was signed. 90 percent of the troops at the front 

were in verminous condition." 

Baths and Disinfesting Plants 

Hot baths for the men. disinfestation of their uniforms. and issue 

of clean underclothing were the basic essentials in controlling this problem. By directive, in the spring of 1918, the Quartermaster Corps 

assumed responsibility [or establishing bathing and disinfecting plants 

for troops operating in the zone of the advance.'· Except during 2 months 

after the close of the war, when this responsibility was vested in a separate 

division of the Office of the Chief Quartermaster, A.E.F., it was a branch 

function of the Salvage Service. 

Quartermaster Corps personnel in the fi eld operated portable bathing 

units and mobil e delousers, both horse-drawn and steam-driven. After 

the armistice, the Corps systematica ll y built stationary bathing and disinfecting plants at base ports and in embarkation areas. All disinfecting 

activities were carried on through the Quartermaster Corps. A large part 

of the personnel performing the work, however, belonged to the Medical 

Department but was attached to the Corps. Some 2 weeks after the 

armistice. General Headquarters detailed Col. H. L. Gilchrist of the 

Medical Department for duty under the direction of the Chief QuartermaSler and placed him in charge of all delousing activities in the Army. 

'0 us. Army iu flit World War, 1917- 19, XVI, 175 (Hq AEF GO 13,21 J an 1918) . 

• • RG 92, OQMG, Gen . H . L. Rogcn I'riva te Hie, !\.ox 24 (Mcmo, Col. T , 8 . Hacker for 

Col. A, M. Davis, .. Dec 1918), 

II RG 92, OQMG Historical Files, Box 75 (CQM Report , p. 383) . 

• 3 Hq SOS Bulletin 12,20 May 191 8. 
QUARTERMASTER THEATER OPERATIONS, 191 7-1918 679 

At the same time. it also attached to the Quartermaster Corps the equipment and personnel of the degassing service of the Chemical Warfare 

Service. Used to provide hot baths for men who had been subj ected to 

mustard gas, this service was no longer needed after II November 1918. 

Since the demustardization process was similar to that of bathing and 

delousing, the equipment and personne l of the degassing service could be 

usefully employed in the Quartermaster program.

u So effectively had 

the process of bathing and delousing been carried out that, 6 weeks after 

Colonel Gilchrist's assignment. the lice-infestation dropped from 90 percent to less than 3 ercent g~ 

Wagons and H amess 

T he developments anal yzed in reference to procurement, storage, 

and distribution emphasize the reshaping of the Corps in the theater into 

a supply agency. These developments were in harmony with those that 

had also made the Corps in the zone of the interior primarily a supply 

agency. World War] marked the last exercise of that broad responsibility for the transportation of men and supplies that had been the basic 

function of the Quartermaster General since 1775. In the complexities 

of modern war, Army transportation became too large an enterprise to 

remain a sub-service of a supply agency. Both rail and water transportation for the A.E.F. in France were placed under the control of a Director 

General of Transportation before the end of 1917. Responsibility for 

the motor transport service was also removed from the Corps early in 

191 8. 98 Such responsibility for transportation as remained with the Chief 

Quartermaster, A.E.F., during the war was limited to the provision of 

vehicles and animal transportation used by the combat units. The 

Animal Drawn Transportation Branch in the Chief Quartermaster's office 

provided all vehicles and harness; the Remount Service purchased all 

public animals used in the A.E.F. 

At the beginning of the war, vehicles and harness were supposed to 

arrive with organizations as troop property. But since some organizations 

came unequipped and other combat organizations were, in some cases, 

detailed for duty in the Services of Suppl y, a policy was soon established 

of pooling all vehicles and harness on arriva l at the base ports. These 

h u.s. Arm)' ill tlUf World War, 1917- 19, XVI, 547 (Hq AEF GO 216, 26 Nov 1918). 

n RG 92, OQMG HislOrical }'iICll, Box 75 (CQM Report, p. 388). 

~ Sec supra, p. 650. 
680 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T H E ARMY 

MOV ING SU 'I' Ll E.~ TO THE FRONT, 1 OCTOIlER 1918 

pooled supplies were held at the d isposition of lhe Anima l Drawn Transportation Branch to insure distribution on the priority basis desired.' T 

Requisitioned qualllities of ve hicles and harness fa il ed to arrive on 

time. and the Branch had to purchase a considerable amount of such 

supplies from the French and British,VA Deliveri es from these sources 

were slow, undoubtedl y made more so by lhe inadequacies of railroad 

transportation. Even morc difficulty was experienced in obtaining a 

stock of spare parts for the repair of vehicles. II was usually necessary. 

in the earl y months of the war, to obtai n parts by taki ng them [rom cornpleted vehicles. In consequence, depots were top heavy with the less 

expendable items, a condition that was being rapidly improved by the 

8. RG 92, OQMG, Gen. tl . L. Rogers I'riva te t'ile, Sox 5 (l-l i5l0ry o( the A'liOia l Drawn 

Transportation Bl1I.nch. (j Dec (9 18). 

U From the French, the Branc.h p urchased 2,000 chariots de pare, 4.0S9 ration or tool 

carlll, 4SO water carIS. 190 medical wagons. S.S99 (ourgon wagons, and 164,1 19 single $Cts of 

haTllC5S. I'u r, hascs from the Britbh consisted of 2,090 general service wagons. I,S20 wa ter caru, 

and 826 single llets of hamr!SS. I bid. 
QUARTERMASTER THEATER OI'ERATIONS, 191 7- 191 8 681 

time the Quanermaster Corps was successful in meeting the demands 

made upon it for vehicles. 

Remount SC1"Vice 

Far more difficult was the task of the Remount Service in providing 

horses and mules for the A.E.F. Pershing called supply of animals during 

the height of operations "one of the biggest, if not the biggest probl em" 

in the A.E.F." The shortage of animals was a serious problem throughout the war. 

Of the 243,360 animals received by the Army during the war. only 

67.725 were sent from the United Stalcs. 1DO The supply of animals in the 

United States was ample but shipping space was not. The first animals 

to reach France, in July 1917, arrived in the same convoy with the troops 

to which they were to be assigned, but the shipment of animals with 

troops was later discontinued. The shortage of shipping and a French 

supply offer led Pershing to recommend that no more animals be shipped 

from the United States. The inability of the French government to 

carry out its offer of 7,000 animals a month. however. resulted in a resumption of shipment from the United States in November 191 7. 

Animals continued to be sent until April 191 8 when priority of shipping 

had to be given to troops. food, supplies, and munitions. Shipment of 

animals from the United States was not resumed until September 1918 

and then the number fell far short of what was required. 

In the meantime. the shortage of animals grew increasingly critical. 

By the end of August 191 8, it amounted to 72,000 animals. In an effort 

to bring some measure of relief, it was proposed to motorize a number of 

units, especially artillery brigades, and to reduce the anima l allowance 

to each combat division from 6,719 to 3,803. Even when put into effect, 

this proposal would by no means have eliminated the shortage. On three 

separate occasions during 1918. the French army came to the aid of the 

A.E.F. by turning over animals directly to American combat troops so 

that the full effect of American arms might be felt. One such occasion 

occurred in the fall of 191 8 when, after the St. Mihiel salient had been 

wiped out, Marshal Foch ordered 13,000 animals turned over to the 

It RG 92, OQMG. Gen. H. L. Rogers Private File, Box 76 (Pershing to Chief, Remount 

Service, 29 Mar 1919). 

lot Of these 67,725 animals, 5,958 were cavalry horsa, 52.855 we re dr.tfl horsa, 28,599 were 

draft mules, and 555 were pack mules. "Operations of the Quartermaster Corps, U.S, Army 

During the World War: Report of Remount Service, A.E.F." (Monogr.tph No.5, undated, 

prepared by Quartermaster Corps School, Philadelphia. Pa.), pp. 1,94. 
682 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

U.S. Army to enable it to swing around and immediately begin the 

Argonne offensive.un 

T he British government also furn ished animals for the A.E.F. It 

offered to equip the divisions that were to train in the British area and 

by agreement supplied lcn divisions. To reduce the animal shortage, 

the Quartermaster Corps also developed a plan to procure horses and 

mules in Spain. It made purchases despite the German influence brought 

to bear to prevent sales and the difficulties encountered in obtaining trans· 

pOflation for the animals to France. Of the 243,360 animals received 

by the A.E.F. in France, the Corps purchased 135.9 14 from the French, 

21,259 from the British, and 18,462 from the Spanish.

lOt 

Though the Remount Service in the A.E.F. was not offi ciall y established until September 1917, remount work began from the time Chief 

Quartermaster McCarthy opened his office in Paris. 1OI In June, one 

offi cer and clerk. had charge of remount work., but, by 31 December 1918, 

personnel of the Remount Service had increased until it numbered 493 

officers and 14,596 enlisted men. T heir duties included not only the 

purchase of animals and the administration of Remount depots, but also 

the care, conditioning, training, and maintenance of animals. For this 

purpose, the Service had Remount squadrons on duty with the three 

Armies as well as Army, corps, and division Remount officers. Despite 

th e handicaps under which the Remount Service operated-lack. of proper 

installations, insufficient personnel, inadequate transportation facilities, 

and other hampering restrictions-its operations were effective enough to 

win Pershing's commendation.'u 

Clothing Changes 

Supply opera tions constituted a major part of Q uartermaster activities in the theater, but no account of such activities would be complete 

without illustrating the effects that the impact of war-that is, the changed 

methods of warfare and the employment of new instruments of defense 

and attack- had upon the most important Quartermaster items of supply 

furnished the soldier. T hese were his clothing and his rations. 

T he uniform that clothed the American soldier in 1917 had been 

developed to meet the needs of a peacetime Army, but it was found to 

be unsatisfactory in many respects for wartime operations. No one 

anide of that uniform was more completely unsuited to the needs of the 

101 <I) Ibid" p. 23. (2) RG 92. OQMG H istorical Files. Box 75 (CQM Report. pp. 34s--46). 

(3) Final Reporl of C .... n. John J. P .... nhing, pp. 70-71. 

1112 RG 92. OQMG H istorical Files. Box 75 (CQM Report. p. 354). 

loa U.s. Ann, in the World War, 1917-19, XVI. 78 (Hq AEF GO 39. 18 Sep 191 7). 

,04 RG 92. OQMG. Gen. H. L. R.n Printe File. Box 76 (Penhing to Col. Frank S. 

Annstmng, 29 Mar 1919). 
QUARTERMASTER THEATER OPERATIONS, 1917- 1918 683 

troops engaged in trench warfare than the campaign hat that had been 

designed to afforq protection against the sun on western plains. As early 

as June 1917, the Chief Quartermaster recommended the adoption of a 

soft cap. He contracted for and French firms produced large quantities 

of overseas caps, the material being furnished by the Quartermaster 

Corps.10~ 

Earl y in the war, General Headquarters appointed a board of Quartermaster officers to make recommendations, based on British and French 

experience, on the type of winter clothing that the troops would need. l Oll 

In consequence, Headquarters authorized rubber boots and arctic overshoes for issue to th e troops and sale to officers. It added to the authorized 

list of clothing lined leather gloves and one-fingered mittens.'ol The 

peacetime shoe that had been recommended by the Munson Board in 

1912 gave way to a sturdier fi eld shoe, but it was 12 April 191 8 before the 

War Department adopted a specification for the production of the socall ed "Pershing" hobnail boot, a heavier shoe with flesh-out upper 

leather and a more waterproof construction designed to suit the demands 

of trench warfare. General Headquarters also eliminated canvas leggings 

in favor of woolen spiral puttees in an effort to combat the problem of 

mud and cleanliness. 

W hen it was found that the weight of the fabric used in the uniform 

that clothed the troops in the winter of 1917- 18 afforded inadequate 

protection, the War Department approved the recommendations of Chief 

Quartermaster Rogers to substitute 20 oz. for 16 oz. melton used in the 

uniform and 32 oz. for 30 oz. mellon used in the overcoats. It also 

authorized an increase in the weight of flanne l shirting and of woolen 

underclothing. l OS 

Rations 

Trench warfare and the extensive use of toxic gases soon developed 

the necessity for providing Food that was protected against spoilage by 

gas and dampness. The reserve ration, established in prewar days and 

still carried by the soldier in combat operations in 19 17, called for 12 oz. 

bacon, 16 oz. hard bread, 1.12 oz. coffee. 3.2 oz. sugar, and 0.16 oz. salt.'o~ 

For troops operating in front-line trenches, this ration was unsatisfactory, 

since cooking was impracticable. 

IO~ RG 120, AEF Cen Hq. AG I-ile, Folder 414 (Is! indo Col. D. E. McCar!hy. 30 Jun 1917 

on Rp!, L!. Col. C. E. Siamon 10 Col. McCarlhy. 29 JUll 1917). 

lOB Hq AEF Special Orders No. 23, [ Jul 1917. 

10' U.S. Army ill tl,~ World Wa r, 1917-19, XVI, 76 (Hq AEF CO 38, 17 Scp 19[7). 

108 (I) RG 120, AI-:F Gen Hq. AC File. Folder 414-A (Memo. Rogers for Chief of Siaff. 

12 Jan 1918). (2) RC 165, War College Diy. Doc. File. Case 6773-172 (Memo, ACling Chief of 

Siaff for TAG, 6 Feb 1918). 

109 U.s. Army in the World War, 1917- 19, XVI, 60 (Hq AEF GO 18,28 Ju1 1917). 
684 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T HE ARMY 

The Subsistence Branch of th e Ch ief Quartermaster's Office proposed 

changes that the War Department subseq ucl1ll y approved. The revised 

reserve ration ca lled for food to be packed in ra tion-sized amounts. In 

lieu of bacon, the reserve ration prov ided for 16 oz. of canned meat 

(corned beef, fresh roast beef, or corned beef hash) put up in a I-pound 

can, or an equival ent amount o[ canned salmon or sardines, and 16 oz. 

of hard bread to be packed in two half-pound ca ns. The ration included 

th e same amount of suga r, salt, and coffee as previollsly allowed but 

substituted soluble coffee for th e roasted a nd grou nd coffee issued in the 

past. Utili zing solidified alcohol, th e soldier in an advanced position, 

where the use of fire was prohibited co uld prepare a cup of coffeeYo 

The troops at a ll times carried a suppl y of 2 days' reserve rations, Whenever they had consumed these rations, the suppl y offi cer replaced them, 

send ing a requisition to th e division quartermaster through G- I. 

The smaller tins of th e individual reserve ration were also assembled 

and shipped in 25·ration un its that were hermeticall y sealed in galvanized 

iron conta iners. T hese were known as specia l reserve rations and were 

suppli ed in addition to the reserve rations ca rried by the men. The 

iron containers were kept in th e trenches and used only when other food 

could not be supplied. The specia l reserve ration was considered part 

of th e sector equipment and was left in the trenches when a division was 

relieved. By ca bl e in October 19 17, General Pershing ordered the ship. 

ment of 2 million reserve rations paCked in iron containers. Shipment 

was to be made at the rate of 100,000 per month . Other orders followed, 

but not until the earl y fall of 1918 did the supply of special reserve rations 

eq ua l the demand. The supply of soluble coffee was never sufficient.H ! 

The garrison rati on, issued to alllroops of th e A.E.F. wherever transportation permitted, was not ma teriall y changed in its basic components. 

Working with personnel from the Chief Surgeon 's Office, the Chief 

Quartermaster made some modifications to gel th e best ration possible 

for the troops. He introduced a considerable number of substitutive 

articles, and, in an effort to economize on transportation, the Quartermaster Corps included boneless beef and dehydrated vegetables. Dehydrated vegetables were no more popular with th e soldi ers of World War I 

than they had been with those of the Civil War despite the improvements 

that had been made in their production. General Rogers added tobacco 

no (I) RC 92. OQM G. Gen. H. L. Rogers Private File, Box 6 (Memorandum StatemelU 

oovering the Organiza tion and Operation of the Subsistence Hr, 14 De<: 1918). (2) RC 165, 

War College Div. Doc. File, Case 9164--12 (Memo. Acting Chief. War College Div. fo r Chief 

of Staff, 9 Nov 1917). 

III RG 92, OQMG. Gen. H. L. Rogers Private File, Box 5 (~ orandum Slatement 

Covering the Organ izat ion and Operation of the Su bsistence Hr. H De<: 191 8). 
I 

QUARTERMASTER THEATER OPERATIONS, 1917 - 191 8 685 

UNl.OADING TOIt~:s OF "CANNEn W1LLlt:" ANI) " H ARDTACK" 

to the radon in the SUIlllucr of 1918 and also provided for the issue of 

a half pound of ca ndy every JO days. T he iss ue of both tobacco and 

candy was much appreciated by the troops in France."! 

When American troops gained their first experience in trench war-

(are in October 1917, a need immediately arose for conta iners in wh ich 

hot food as we ll as drinking water cou ld be carried to the men in th~ 

trenches from rolling kitchens that had to be kept several miles to the 

rear. This immediate need was met by using ordinary milk callS of 

214- and 5-gallan capadty. When fill ed, the can was carried on a pole 

by two men, or by one man using either a Yukon pack or a Canadian 

tumpline. Both of these itcms, used by the British forces, had originated 

with thc Indians and trappers of Alaska and Canada. The Yukon pack 

112 (I) For the components of the .. ario1l3 rat ions issued to the A.E.F.---garri$On, field, 

TCKrve. Ip«ial reM:rve, and travel ration-KC: U.s. Arm,. j" tlu: World War, 1917- 19, XVI, 

479-82. (2) Arm,. Rllorglmj~atiou: Hearings before: the Committee on Military Affain, 

66th Cong., hI seu" I. 108\- 82 (ROg<:11' testimony). 
686 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

was a nrapped bag that permitted a man to carry provisions on his back. 

The lumpline was a single strap worn across rhe forehead or breast to 

assist in carrying a pack upon the back. The Chief Quartermaster, 

A.E.F., purchased a sufficient suppl y of Yukon packs and tllmplines from 

the British Expeditionary Forces. 1II 

Experience demonstrated that a Thermos-type container was needed 

to carry hot food to men under fire. The French were using such a 

5-gallon container called the "Marmilc Norvegienne." The Chief Quartermaster took steps to manufacture the mannitcs in France for the 

American Army, but demand exceeded the ability to suppl y in Europe, 

and production had to be started in the United States. Each division of 

lIS (I) RC 92. OQM G. Gen. H. L. Rogers I' ril'ate File, Box 76 (Memo', Chief of Starr 

for CQM, 2 Nov 1917 and 14 J an 191 8). (2) For description and usc of the Yukon pack and 

tlllnpline. 5eC RG 165. War College Div. l)oc. File, Casc 7776-5 (Memo, Acting Chief of Staff 

for TAG, 7 J an 1918). 
QUARTERMASTER THEATER OPERATIONS, 191 7-1918 687 

the A.E.F. had to be supplied with 1,070 marmitcs, 200 Yukon packs, 

and 100 tumpli nes .. u 

This equipment met the need but did not prove satisfactory, and, 

ea rl y in March 191 8, Maj. Gen. R. L. Bullard, commanding the First 

Division, submitted recommendations to the Commander-in-Chief that 

called for the development of a 5-gal1on marmile can, shaped and fitted 

with proper shou lder straps to permit it to be carried on a man's back. 

Adoption of such a can, he argued, would reduce the size of carrying 

parties, make it easier to get through trenches, and wou ld permit free 

use of hands to assist the carrier in fmding his way through trenches at 

night. The Corps deve loped and tested sample Bullard marmites and 

placed extensive orders for their manufac tu re, but the armistice stopped 

operations before any considerable number were turned out.m Develop. 

mental work had to be carried on in reference to other equipment but this 

one example suffices to illustrate the problem confronting the Quartermaster Corps. 

Sttmmmy 

In .summary, the impact of war made itself felt in modifications of 

supplies and equipment, in changed Quartermaster functions and opera· 

tions, and, in consequence, in changes in organization itself. T he temporary loss of the functions of transportation and construction in 1917 

foreshadowed their permanent loss in 194 1. On the other hand, the 

demands of war led to the evolution of a new fun ction, salvage. From 

something of "a novelty in military activities," the Salvage Service became 

"an economic necessity in the repa ir and avoidable prevention of the 

waste of war. " 118 For the first time in war, the Corps took the field as a 

militarized organ ization, bringing to life a concept that had been urged 

by Quartermaster officers as early as the Mexican War. The number 

and types of units multiplied rapidly and contributed much to promoting 

the greater effectiveness of the Corps in war. In consequence, General 

Hagood could report thal "in the matter of supply the operation of the 

Quartermaster Department in the Great War was not only far superior 

to anything that we had in any previous war, but, as a rule, throughout 

the A.E.F. the service was more efficient and more satisfactory to the individual than it had been at home in time of peace."'" 

11. RG 92. OQMG. Gen. H. L. Rogers I' rivale File, 80x 76 (Memo, CQ~f for Capt. Weed, 

5 Apr 1920). 

11~ Ibi d. 

11 $ Harbord, T he American Army ill FraJlce, p. 500. 

liT Hagood. The Sen/ices Of Supply, p. !H2. 

CHAPTER XVI 

An Interlude of Peace 

The armistice signed on 11 November 1918 halted combat operations, but, while Quartermaster operations both in the zone of the 

interior and in the A.E.F. were diverted from wartime supply to 

demobilization. peace did not diminish the Corps' activities. One of 

these activities, the program for the care of the dead, assumed larger 

proportions after the armistice than during the months of combat and 

continued to be of major importance for more than a decade after the 

waT had ended. 

Graves Registration Service 

Graves registration actiVIties were not new in 191 7. They had 

originated in the Civil War when for the first time the government had 

assumed the obligation of identifying. when possible, and burying in 

registered graves the remains of all who died in that war and had created 

a national cemeterial system for the realization of that purpose.1 A 

fundamental principle-the return of remains to their native soilemerged out of that war. When troops were sent overseas during later 

wars, that principle was extended to include areas outside the continental 

limits of the United States. First used in the Spanish·American War, 

the precedent continued to be applicable to those who died in overseas 

garrisons in the years preceding World War I and had a far broader 

application in that war. 2 

If the activities were not new, the organization of the Graves Registration Service into units according to definite Tables of Organization 

was accomplished for the first time in the history of the Army in 1917. 

Such organization was made possible only because the Corps itself had 

been militarized in 1912. The first recommendation made by Quarter. 

master General Sharpe to the Secretary of War on 31 May 1917, however, 

1 See anle pp. 464-66. 

21n 1898, CongreM by special appropriation had provided fund s enabling the Secretary 

of War, in hb discretion, to cause the remains of those killed in action or who died at 

military camps or at places outside the United States to be brought home. At the request of 

next to kin, the remains of servicemen could be buried in na tional cemeteries or returned to 

their homes for private burial. (I) SO Slat. 750, Act of Jul 8, 1898. (2) An lIIal Repart o/Ihe 

Quartermast er General, 1898, pp. 2~24 . 
690 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

had called for the organization of a burial corps of civilians. Approxi. 

mately a month later, at the direction of the Chief of Staff, a board of 

Quartermaster officers was convened to formulate plans for a militarized 

formation. It was 7 August 191 7 before the Chief of Staff and the 

Secretary of War approved these plans for the organization of graves 

registration units. Each unit was to consist of two commissioned officers 

and 50 enlisted men, suitably graded.~ 

At the request of General Sharpe, Chaplain Charles C. Pierce, U.S.A., 

retired, who had organized and conducted graves registration work in the 

Philippine Islands after the Spanish-American War, undertook similar 

activities in 1917. He was recalled to active duty on 31 May 1917 and 

commissioned a major (later colonel) in the Quartermaster Corps.' 

Major Pierce participated in the planning for the Graves Registration 

Service, recruited men for the four authorized units, and made arrangements for their preparatory training. When, on 2 August, General 

Pershing cabled for a general superintendent for all American cemeteries 

to be established in Europe, the War Department appointed Major Pierce 

to that post and also named him chief of the Graves Registration Service 

on 27 September 1917. He and the First Graves Registration unit, 

hQwever, did not reach France until 31 October.a 

The delay in planning for and dispatching units of the Graves 

Registration Service had permitted a separate line of development to be 

followed in the A.E.F. In France, the Chief Quartermaster had promptly 

gathered information on Allied experience in caring for their dead, and, 

on 29 August, Headquarters, A.E.F., had established its organization, 

known as the Burial Department, under the direction of the Chief Quartermaster.G After Major Pierce arrived in France, he prepared regulations for merging the Graves Registration Service and the A.E.F. Burial 

Department. 

Some difficulties had to be resolved, since the original plan had made 

provision for the Graves Registration Service to bury the dead. General 

Pershing maintained that the "dead at the front must necessarily be 

"(I) War Deparlmef/ I Gef/ua/ Ordus, /917, GO 104, 7 Aug 1917. (2) RG 94, AGO 

General Correspondence File. Box 672. File 1I22.0!)2 GRS (Memo. Capt. H. R. Lemly for 

QMG, 20 Jul 1917) . 

• (I) RG 94, AGO, 1242 ACI' 80 (Special Orden 12!), 111 May 1917). (2) Chaplain Pierce 

had established and directed the U.S. Amly Morgue and Office of Identification at Manila. 

I'or more details on this activity. see, Edward Steere, The Graves R egislratiof/ Seroice hi 

World War 11, QMC HISTORICAL STUDIES No, 21 (GPO, 19!)1). pp. 10-11. 

& (I) RG 92. OQMG General Correspondence Filc. 1917-~2. Box 4909, File 320 GRS 

(Capt. H. R. Lemly to Administration Div. 9 Aug 191 7). (2) Ibid., (Cable. Pershing to TAG, 

2 Aug 1917). (3) Ibid., (Pierce to Capt. Lemley. 21 Nov 1917). (4) RG 92, OQMG Historical 

Records. Box 75 (Historical Report. Chief QM. 1917- 19, p. 415). 

e US. Army in fhe Wo rld War, 1917- 19, XVI. 62 (Hq AEF GO 27, 29 Aug 1917). 
AN INTERLUDE Of PEACE 69 1 

buried by units themselves." T In any case, the personnel strength of the 

Graves Registration Service was barely sufficient to locate and register 

the graves after the burials had been made. Regulations therefore continued to place responsibility for burials on burial officers and on details 

of enlisted men selected by commanding officers of the divisions and 

corps. Regulations required the burial offi cers to report all burials and 

grave locations to the chief of the Graves Registration Service for the 

purpose of recording and taking charge of burial places. 

The Commanding General also objected to the proposed shipment 

of caskets and buria l equipment as "impracticable." Quartermaster 

General Sharpe, on 31 May 191 7. had taken a simil ar view, recommending 

that "the bodies of our soldiers who die in Europe be interred there and 

no attempt made to bring them back until after the close of hostilities." 8 

Any program for the return of the dead was therefore deferred. In 

uniting the Graves Registration Service and the A.E.F. Burial Department, Major Pierce also combined the methods of operation evolv.ed by 

the British and French governments earlier in the war with those that 

the Army had used in the Philippines. Headquarters published governing regulations for the Service on 15 February 1918. 8 

These regulations made the Graves Registration Service responsible 

for deploying units and groups along the line of battle. When hostilities 

began in any given sector, such units and groups could immediately start 

their work of identifying bodies and marking graves. Under battlefield 

conditions, burial details frequently had to make hurried interments in 

undesirable locations. Nor was there any surety that, in the midst of 

an advance or heavy fighting, instructions would be so perfectly executed 

that identities would be preserved. Graves Registration units, following 

closely after the combat troops, registered and verified the temporary 

markings of graves, searched for bodies that had been inadequately interred, as well as those that had been overlooked, and re·interred and 

concentrated them in properly located cemeteries. In addition to this 

basic function, the Graves Registration Service also kept accurate and 

complete records on the location and identification of graves of all officers 

and soldiers of the A.E.F. and all civilians attached to it; located and 

acquired all necessary cemeteries for American use; maintained and controlled the cemeteries; and compiled a registry of all burials. 

T he Graves Registration units began their work in March 1918. 

'(I) RG 92, OQMG eelleral Correspondence File, 1917- 22, Bo:w: 4909, File S20 GRS (Cable. 

Pershing to Chief of Staff, 31 Dec 1917). (2) I bid., (Pierce to Lemly, 21 Noy 1917). 

8 RG 94, AGO General Correspondence File, Box 672, File 322.0:'2 GRS (Memo, Capt. 

H. R. Lemly for QMG, 20 J ul 1917). 

D US. Army in th~ Wo rld War, 1917-19, XVI, 211- 13 <Hq AEF GO 30, 15 Feb 1918). 
692 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

At that time, the Service consisted of 4 units, a total of 8 officers and 200 

men. When the armistice was signed. there were 18 units, of which 5 

were provisional units that had been organized in France, comprising a 

maximum strength of 49 offi cers and 872 men.'Q The Graves Registration Service also employed large numbers of labor troops and clerical 

personnel. 

After the armistice. the work of concentration and maintenance 

became of primary importance. There were more than 2,300 military 

cemeteries under the control of the Graves Registration Service. 1I They 

were scattered all over France, from the historic battlefields of ChateauThierry and the Argonne to the base ports on the Atlantic Coast. In 

addition. there were buria l grounds in England, Italy, and Belgium, some 

in Germany, and even a few in the M urmansk region on the shores of 

the Arctic Ocean in northern Russia. 

Of the 70,000 burials in France, approximately 15,000 were in isolated graves. In compliance with the wishes of the French Government 

to assemble in large cemeteries as many isolated burials as possible, and 

until the ultimate policy of the United States was announced, General 

Headquarters, A.E.F., instructed the Graves Registration Service on 

13 November 1918 to begin a recheck of all graves in France. The 

Graves Registration Service accordingly made concentrations in central 

cemeteries that were established in the forward areas where American 

troops had fought, though it undertook no concentrations in the rear 

areas and base sections. a The first and largest of these was the Argonne 

Cemetery at Romagne. In all, the Graves Registration established 15 

such concentration cemeteries in the battie areas. 

The Service had by no means completed the work of recovery and 

concentration of remains by the summer of 1919, but, with the intent of 

putting' this phase of the operation on a maintenance basis, the Commanding General, SOS, directed the Graves Registration Service to complete 

its activities in the Advance Section by I July. The work of the graves 

registration companies thus came to an end. Colonel Pierce and his staff 

returned to Washington, where the office of the Chief of the Graves 

Registration Service was established as a branch of the General Administrative Division and subsequently, by consolidation with the Cemeterial 

Branch in 1920, it emerged as a separate Cemeterial Division in the Office 

of the Quartermaster General. U 

10 RG 92, OQMG Historical Records, Box 75 (Historical Rpt. CQ~f, 1917- 19. p. 416). 

1l 1bid., p. 418. 

n "The Work of the American Graves Registration Service," Documentary Supplement. 

Doc. 3 (Memo. Office of Chief, GRS, for CG, 50S, AEF. 24 Jul 1919). Typescript study on 

file, Office. QM Historian. 

13 RG 92. OQMG General Correspondence File, 1917-22. Box 233 (Memo. Col. W. C. Jones 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 693 

Profr7'am /01' the Return of the Dead 

Based on past precedent, the War Department was committed to the 

policy of bringing borne its soldier dead from EUTope, though not before 

the end of the war. It was 6 October 1919 before the War Department 

formall y annou nced its policy in a letter to the Quartermaster General. 

By that directive. all remains of America n soldiers in Great Britain. 

Belgium, and haly were to be returned to the United States unless the 

nearest relatives made a request for their permanent burial in the military 

cemeteries located in those countries. On the other hand. no remains 

of American soldiers were to be left in Germany, Luxemburg, and north 

Russia. regardless of requests made. All remains in France- and most 

were located there-were to be returned, but only on specific request of 

the nearest relatives.u 

T he possibility that such a policy would be pursued had resulted in 

a considerable amount of public discussion and even controversy after 

the armistice. The War Depanment resolved this problem by permitting 

the nearest next of kin of each dead soldier to decide. on the basis of a 

questionnaire sent out by The Adjutant General's office. whether the 

body should remain in one of the overseas military cemeteries or be 

returned to the United States for burial.u The Quanermaster General 

recognized that a special organization would be needed to handle the 

specific problems of exhumation. shipment, and concentration of remaining bodies. On 24 October 1919. he submitted a tentative plan oE 

organil.ation that, with some slight modifications, met with approval by 

the Secretary of War. " In short, it reconstituted the Graves Registration 

Service, Q.M.C., in Europe, and charged it with responsibility for the 

disinterment abroad and the repatriation of the dead. T he plan also 

provided for the establishment by the Corps of an office at Hoboken, 

responsible for the shipment and transportation of the dead. The entire 

operation remained under the direct supervision of the Cemeterial 

Division of the Office of the Quartermaster General. 

Despite the announcement of policy and the establishment of the 

necessary administrative organ ization in 1919, the repatriation program 

did not begin until the following year. Lengthy d iscussions were entailed 

in making arrangements Wilh the governments of the countries in which 

ror QMG, Direclor of PIt<S. 7 Feb 1920; lub: Reporl on Graves Regi51ral ion Service); (P&:S 

NOlice O. 2G Feb 1920. sub: Organizalion of Cemeterial Division). 

,. AnnulIl Report 0/ ti,e Quartermaster General, 1920, p. 59. 

II RG 92. AGO Records. File !l 19.12 (Annnal Report or the Quarlennasle r General, 1921, 

p. -4 5). 

" "Hillory of the American Gravet Registralion Service. Q.M.C .. in Europe," I, 56-!>7. 

(!I.volume, Iypescripl siudy on file in OfflCC. QM Hislorian). 
694 QUARTERMASTER SU PPORT OF THE ARMY 

the dead were temporaril y buried. France did not authorize remova ls 

from the Zone of the Armies. where most of the remains were loca ted, 

until 15 September 1920,11 After October, the work moved forward 

without interruption. 

By the end of fisca l year 1922. most of the dead, whose return had 

been authorized by next of kin, had been brought to the United States. 

The repatriation program was offi cia ll y ended with th e arriva l at New 

York of the transport Camb1'ia on 30 March 1922.18 For many years 

after that date, however, bodies continued to be shipped to the United 

States as search located them and the process of identification reduced the 

number of un knowns. In all, more than 46,000 remains were returned 

for burial in the United States,l' 

To honor a ll American soldiers who gave their lives in the war and 

in recognition of the unidentified dead, the body of one unknown soldier 

was selected with fitting ceremony from among those in France, returned 

lO the United States, and buried with extraordinary honors in the Arlington National Cemetery on II November 1921.2° A decade later, after 

much careful pl anning, th e Tomb of the Unknown Soldier was completed. 

Establishment of Overseas MilitaJ)I Cemeteries 

The work of concentration after th e armistice had reduced the 

number of burial places from 2,300 to approximately 700. The cost of 

maintaining even that number would have been excessive, so th e War 

Department decided that, after shipment of the bodies authorized for 

return to the United States had been accomplished, those that remained 

wou ld be interred in a few permanent military cemeteries, designed as 

memorials to those who gave their lives for their country.u A considerable amount of preliminary planning eventually led to a decision to 

esta blish eight permanent cemeteries, of which six were to be in France, 

one in England, and one in Belgi um.

u More than 30,000 American 

11 RG 94, ACO Records, File 1119.12 (Annual Re(l'OrI of the Quartermaster General, 192 1. 

p .• 5). 

l8 RG 92, OQMG Gencr.ll Correspondence "'ile, 191 7-22, "'ile 29!.1 (Europe, I) (Memo, 

QMG for S\\', 9 ~hr 1922). 

I. RC 94, AGO Recordl. "'ile ! 19.12 (Annual RepOl·t of the Quutermaster Gener-li, 192., 

p. 27: 1925, p. 31). 

10 (I) Ibid., 1922, p. 22. (2) 42 SIal. 211 ("ublic Resolution, Nov., 1921). (2) "Arlington 

National Cemetery," 'fhl! QllIlrll!rmtl.llt!r R roil!IV, (May-June 1937), pp. 33: 66. 

U "The Work of the American Graves Registration Service," Documentary Supplement , 

Doc. 15 (Rpt. Chief. American Craves Registration Service, QMC, in Europe, to TQMG, 

• Feb 1926). 

U The cemeteries are Brookwood in England, Flanden Field in Belgium, and Aisne· 

Ma rne, Mcusc·Argonlie. Oise·Aisoe. Somme. St. Mihicl, and Suresne:s in France. 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 695 

soldiers. representing about 40 percent of those who lost their lives in the 

war. were buried in these cemeteries. 

Under congressional authorization, lhe American Graves Registration Service, Q.M.C .• in Europe. purchased the necessary real estate for 

establishing the cemeteries or acquired rights of burial in perpetuity." 

Construction quartermasters. under the supervision of the Graves Registration Service. carried Ollt all construction work and improvements. 

Placing grave markers in the cemeteries was handled as a separate project. 

The proposed use of marble slab.type markers for graves in the national 

cemeteries aroused opposition from those who were impressed by the 

simple white wooden crosses and the Star of David that had been erected 

as temporary markers in the overseas cemeteries. The Secretary of War 

bowed to the sellliment that favored their retention and, on 17 December 

1924, approved adoption of these two types of headstones for the military 

cemeteries. By the end of fiscal year 1929, the Service had erected 

headstones at all graves. 2

" 

]n 1923, Congress established the American Battle Monuments Commission, an organization entirely independent of the War Department. 

It made the Commission responsible for the erection of war memorials 

and for the beautification of the military cemeteries in Europe.1I T he 

more economy-minded Graves Registration Service disapproved of the 

Commission's elaborate plans. Under the terms of the law, the entire 

ca re and responsibility of the grounds, as well as of the monuments and 

memorials erected, were to revert to the Quartermaster Corps when the 

duties of the Commission terminated. As the work of the Commission 

neared completion in 1932, and the Corps prepared to assume this 

responsibility, the President, by Executive Order, directed that, effective 

21 May 1932, the maintenance of memorials and the administration of 

the overseas military cemeteries were to be transferred to the American 

Battle Monuments Commission.z8 Though the question of re-transfer 

of responsibility to the Corps was raised later, no action was taken and 

Quartermaster responsibility for the miiitary cemeteries in Europe terminated in 1934-. 

Pilgrimage of the Gold Stm· Moth en 

The Craves Registration Service managed one other important project, namely, the pilgrimages of the Cold Star Mothers to the overseas 

u 42 $/(.11. 490 (Ac t of Apr 1, 1922): 42 SIal. 1162 (Act of Jan 22. 1925). 

u RG 94. AGO Records, File 519.12 (Annua] Rcport of The Quartermaner Genera], 1929, 

p. 60). 

~ 42 Stilt. 1509 (Act of Mar 4, 1925). 

. xecUli ~e Order 6614 (Feb 26, ]934) as 3mended by Executive Order 0090 (Apr 25, 1954). 
696 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

military cemeteries. Though such a project had been advocated in the 

midst of the controversy over permanent burial abroad or repatria tion, 

it was 1929 before Congress enacted legislation authorizing the Secretary 

of War to arrange for pilgrimages to the European cemeteries "by mothers 

and widows of members of the military and naval fo rces of the United 

States who died in the service at any time between April 5, 19 17 and 

July I, 192 1, and whose remains are now interred in such cemeteries."!7 

T hese pilgrimages, paid for by th e United States, were to be made a t 

such times as the Secretary of War designated between May I, 1930. and 

October 31, 1933. By subseq uent amendment, Congress extended e ligibility for pilgrimages to mothers and widows of men who had died and 

were buried at sea, or who died at sea or overseas and whose places of 

buria l were unknown. 2I 

The Secretary of War de legated all responsibility for planning and 

ma nagi ng the pilgrimages to The Quartermaster Genera l.u T he cemeteria l Division in the Office of The Quartermaster General reta ined 

responsibility for supervising and co-ordina ting all activities connected 

with the pilgrimages. It determined the number of mothers and widows 

entitled to make the pilgrimage and th e costs of the undertaking. It 

submitted estimates for funds to Congress. T he Quartermaster General 

decentralized operation of the plan to offices esta blished in New York 

and Paris. Q uartermasters at a New York port of emba rkation were 

charged with a ll details relative to meeting the mothers and widows on 

arrival in New York, and with providing suitable accommodations during 

their sojourn in New York and en route to and from Europe. T he Chief, 

American Graves Registra tion Service in Europe, hand led all matters 

connected with the pilgrimage, from the arrival of the mothers and 

widows a t the port of debarkation in Europe until th eir departure [or the 

United States.BO 

T he Office of T he Quartermaster General determined that 17,389 

women were entitled to the benefits of the legislation enacted by Congress. 

Of this number, 3,653 made pilgrimages d uring the ca lendar year 1930, 

the largest number fo r any year of the project- 31 T he following year, 

only 1,784 indicated their intention of going. Before the project ended 

with the arriva l in New York, on 24 August 1933, of the steamship 

2T 45 Sial. 1508 (Act. Mar 2, 1929). 

2B 46 Sial. 3H (Act, May 15, 1930). 

2e By general order, the tit le of the chid of the Quartermaster Corps was changed to 

read The Quartennaster General aft er 31 January 1924. War Dt!po.rtlllt!" / Gt!" c.lIl Ordcrs, 

GO 2. 

ao RG 94, AGO Records. file !U9.1 (Annual Report of The Quartermaster General, Fi$C3.1 

Year 9~0, pp. 15-17). 

n I bid., Fiscal Year 9~ . p. 36. 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 697 

Washington, carrying the last of the Gold Star Mothers, a total of 6,693 

had visited the European cemeteries. With the closing of the New York 

and Paris offices on 31 October 1933, Quartermaster Corps responsibility 

for the pilgrimages came to an end. 

Quartermaster Re-embarkation Duties 

Long before the Corps relinquished its responsibility for maintaining 

military cemeteries overseas, Quartermaster activities in demobilizing 

men and supplies in the A.E.F. came to an end. The joyous celebration 

that marked the signing of the armistice brought only a temporary interruption in the wartime pace of Quartermaster operations in the A.E.F. 

The thoughts of the soldiers quickly turned to home, and whereas since 

June 1917 the stream of men and supplies had moved from base ports to 

the front, the current after November had to be reversed. The War 

Department assigned most of the duties in connection with the reembarkation of the troops to the Quartermaster Corps. These included 

reclothing and re-equipping the troops, providing them with bathing 

and delousing facilities at embarkation centers, caring for and feeding 

them at the great embarkation camps, looking after their baggage, paying 

them, and, just before they marched aboard the transports, exchanging 

their francs for dollars. 

Brest, Bordeaux, and St. Nazaire were converted from ports of 

debarkation to ports of embarkation, and nearly all American troops 

returning to the United States passed through one of these three ports. 

Embarkation camps were built near these three bases to take care of Army 

units smaller than a division. The outfitting, equipping, and inspecting 

of divisions took place at Le Mans. Designated as an embarkation center 

on 14 December 1918, Le Mans functioned as such until late in the spring 

of 1919. By that time, the majority of the 2 million soldiers in the A.E.F. 

had started home, and the remainder, mostly in the Army of Occupation, 

could be cared for in the embarkation camps at the base ports. Embarkation operations ceased at Bordeaux on 30 June, and at St. Nazaire on 

26 July 1919. Brest continued operations until the last American departed for home. Between 11 November 1918 and the first week of 

October 1919, 1,063,936 American soldiers sailed from Brest. At the 

end of August, General Pershing had embarked with the First Division, 

and, by October 1919, the A.E.F. had ceased to exist. The few remaining troops were designated simply as the American Forces in France.n 

3% For details 011 how Quarterma5ler duties in reference to embarkation were carried 

OU!. we RG 120. W.D. Historical Files, Box 165-1 ("Brief History of QM and Purchase and 

Storage Demobiliution Activities''). 
698 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Disposal of War Materiel 

The cessation of hostilities also posed other problems. On II November 1918, the Quartermaster Corps, as well as the other supply 

services of the A.E.F., had on hand many months' supply of reserve stocks 

of all kinds of war materiel. In addition, the Corps had innumerable 

contracts outstanding for all types of supplies, deliveries of which were 

to be made months ahead to suppOrt the campaigns of the spring and 

summer of 1919 that had been projected before the armistice. Shipments 

from the United States of supplies that were surplus were stopped at 

once. Three days after the armistice, Headquarters, 50S, issued an 

order authorizing the cancellation of contracts, the termination of the 

purchase of supplies, and the cessation of construction work.1S 

Since practically all Quartermaster material obtained in Europe had 

been bought by the Chief Purchasing Office, Q.M.C., A.E.F., its disposal 

was, logically also made his responsibility. In addition to his other 

duties, he was designated as Chief Sales Officer, Q.M.C., A.E.F. When, 

on 17 December 1918, Headquarters, SOS, appointed a General Sales 

Agent to have charge of all sales of surplus Army stocks in Europe, the 

Chief Sales Officer, Q.M.C., became the Corps' representative on the 

General Sales Board. Brig. Gen. C. R. Krautholf of the Quartermaster 

Corps was appointed General Sales Agent.u 

Supplementing the work of the General Sales Board, but in no way 

superseding or interfering with the regular Army organization, was the 

U.s. Liquidation Commission, created by the War Department on 

I1February 1919. Established as the central agency to facilitate disposition of all claims against the United States and to dispose of all property 

belonging to the United States that was. acquired in conn~ction with the 

war and outside the territorial limits of the United States, the Liquidation 

Commission began work in Europe early in March 1919.as Both the 

General Sales Agent and the Liquidation Commission acted in advisory 

capacities, co.ordinating the work of disposing of surplus stocks and 

liquidating accounts. 

Long before the General Sa les Board was organized, the Quartermaster Corps began disposing of surplus articles. Quartermasters at 

once inventoried warehouse stocks after II November, and, except for a 

small amount of new blankets and clothing which were returned to the 

sa (I) Hq 50S GO 54, 14 Nov 1918. (2) RG 92, OQMG Historical Records, So,,- 75 

(Hislori(al Rpt. CQM, AU, 1917- 19, p. 529). 

u RC 92, OQMG HiSlorical Records, Box 75 (Historical Rpt. CQM, AEF, 1917-19, p. 535). 

U (I) WO GO 24. II F~b 1919. (2) March. The N(I/ion (It Waf, p. 178. 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 699 

United States, the Corps disposed of practicall y all surplus Quartermaster 

supplies in Europe. Since the popu lations of the waTtorn countries of 

Europe were in dire need of re lief, disposal of food stocks, clothing, and 

other materials presented no problem. The Corps made many of its 

early sa les to relief commissions, among them the American Relief Commission for nelgium and Northern France, headed by Herbert Hoover. 

1t made such sales from list prices plus the COSt of transportation. Of 

the $1,500 mi llion estimated as the value of all supplies in the A.E.F. 

available for sale, over one-third, or $600 million, of this amount represented the val ue of Quartermaster stores,S8 

T hroughout the spring and early summer of 1919, the Corps continued to make piecemeal sales to European governments, although at 

the same time the U.S. Liquidation Commission was negotiating with the 

French government to dispose of, by bulk sale, all remaining Army 

supplies and installations in France. The latter included Quartermaster 

refrigerating plants, coffee-roasting. plants, and the mechanical bakery 

at ls-sur·Tille, as we ll as numerous warehouses and shops. Bulk sale to 

the French government on reasonabl e credit was desirable because of the 

existing world shortage of cash and credit. the impossibility of selling 

surplus material in France without the payment of duty to and supervision by the French government, the certainty of deterioration, and the 

opposition that would be aroused by retention of troops in France to 

guard and handle surplus material. Under the agreement worked out. 

the French government also assumed all liability for property requisitioned for the A.E.F. and for restoring such property to its original 

condition.' 1 By this agreement, the greater part of the surplus property 

in France. which was estimated to have COSt about $1, 125 million, was 

sold to the French government [or $400 million. Sale of surplus property 

to various other purchasers accounted (or almost another $100 million." 

In consequence of the agreement. all the great depots and installations of the A.E.F. in France were turned over to the French government 

in the late summer and fall of 191 9. Except for the activities of the 

Graves Registration Service. Q.M.C .• in Europe, and support of the Army 

of Occupation in Germany. Quartermaster operations overseas came to 

an end. The last of the Corps. as an organization of the A.E.F. and of 

the American Forces in France. left that country on 10 January 1920." 

30 RG 92. OQMG HiSlorical R«ord3. Box 75 (BislOrical Rpl . CQM. AEF. 1917- 19. p. 5-'9). 

n I bid .• pp. 550-54. 

II Rt!POTI 0/ tilt! Chitl of Stag, 1919 (Washington. 1919). p. 236. 

n RG 120. W.O. Hi510rical Filet. Box 165·1 ("Brief History of QM and Purchuc and 

Slorage Demobiliuu ion AClivil its." pp. 5!-54). 
700 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Industrial Demobilization 

In the United States, similar probl ems of noop demobilization, contract termination, and disposal of surplus war materiel confronted the 

Secretary of War. The War Department was still in the process of 

reorganization, and, at the time the armistice was signed, the complete 

absorption of the divisions of the Office of the Quanermaster General 

in the Purchase and Storage Division of the Purchase, Storage and Traffic 

Division was being accomplished.

40 Preoccupied with problems of reorganization and the acceleration of production necessary for winning the 

war, the Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division had drafted no long-range 

plans and had made no preparations for casing the impact of demobiliza· 

tion on the economy of the country. The United States was as unprepared for industrial demobilization in November 1918 as it had been for 

mobilization in April 1917. T he need for such planning was a lesson 

subsequently drawn from the economic dislocation that followed World 

War I. 

When the war ended, the Office of the Director of Purchase and 

Storage had an immense quantity of supplies on hand. and a still greater 

amount either in production or obligated for by contract. These supplies 

included raw materials. machinery. precision instruments. and medical 

and hospital supplies. since the Purchase and StOrage Division had absorbed most of the supply operations of all the supply bureaus. Its 

director also served as the Acting Quartermaster General. 

The sudden capitulation of the enemy and at a time when the United 

States was preparing for a major military effort in 1919 resulted in 

enormous quantities of supplies being on hand or due in about the time 

of the armistice. Industrial production was then reaching it.s peak." 

In anticipation of campaigns projected. the supply agencies had to execute 

cOntracts far enough ahead to allow sufficient lead time for the manufacture of the war materiel that would be needed by the troops. As the 

Chief of Staff later explained to the House War Expenditures Committee: 

Eight months ahead of the armistice. on November II . 1918. we were work- ing on a program which contemplated laying down in March 19 19. an army 

of 80 diVisions in France and 18 at home which was abou t a million more 

than we had on November II. when we cut off and stopped it. But the 

buying going on in September. October. and November was not all for these 

mon ths but for the months ahead. for the spring campaign ; 50 on the day 

when the armistice was signed. and when I shut down everything in the 

United States. the storehouses all along the seacoast were filled with supplies of 

foodstuffs maki ng for the seacoast to go across the water. and food products in 

40 See '1II1t. p. 644 . 

.. Bernard Baruch. Americ,m ["duslry j" 'he "'<lr (Wa5hinglOn. 1921). pp. 6-7. 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 70 1 

the course of delivery all the way a long back. When the armistice was signed 

we stopped trains and held trains filled with food products a long lime, until 

we could get storage for them, and we encouraged contractors to store stuff 

and hold it for us until we could dispose of it. We had a three months' su p/,Iy 

on November 11, which was based not on the strength of the army at (lat 

dale. but based on the spring drive of the next year. We were buying su pplies 

and laying in supplies, not for an army of morc than 3,000,000 men, but for 

an anny of morc than 5.000,000 men,·1 

When hostilities ceased, the War Depanment immediately suspcnded 

existing contracts for the procurement of supplies and took all possible 

steps to reduce war expenditures. The personnel of the commodity 

divisions of the Office o( the Director of Purchase and Storage. who had 

been pushing procurement at top speed, now turned to the termination 

of contracts and the making of settlements and adjustments. At the end 

of World War I, undelivered ba lances on contracts that involved some 

30,000 contracts and that totaled about $4 billion were canceled.tI 

Policies gu iding termination established that all articles completed 

under a contract were to be paid for on the terms provided in the contract; 

and for all uncompleted products. the contractor was to be reimbursed 

for his expenditures and paid for the use of his capita l and services." 

The War Department set up the machinery for handling contract termination after the armistice. Zone supply officers in the 14 procurcment 

zones into which the country was divided became responsible for tenni· 

nating contracts and negotiating settlements. Local boards of review 

were established, on 16 November 1918. in each zone to examine and 

tentatively approve the settlements made by the zone supply officers. 

These boards had final authority to approve all settlements of contracts 

that were terminated without COsl to the government. T hey had to 

refer all other settlements to the Claims Board in the Office of the Director 

of Purchase and to the War Department Claims Board for final approval.u 

The War Department established tlte Claims Board. on 20 January 1919, 

to supervise and co-ordinate the work of the various War Department 

agencies engaged in the settlement of claims resulting from contract 

termination and to authorize and approve such settlements. Subsequently, when Congress passed thc Dent Act, which conferred fu ll authority on the Secreta ry of War to adjust all contracts, the War Department 

Claims Board was made the agency for carrying Out the law." 

u eo"g~~$Siomz/ Ruo~d. July 29. 1919. p. 55-46. 

tI Ema Risch. D~",obiljullion Plllnning ,md 0pulllioll ill II/~ QUQ~I ~n"'l.Ilu Co~ps, 

QMC HISTORICAL STUDIES No. 19 (Washington. 19-48), p. 27. 

u (I) ~porl of Iht ellief of SlaD. 1919, pp. 97~98. (2) March , T"~ Nalioll III II'tI'~. 

p . ISO. 

U ,f,wual Ueflorl (If Iht Quar/ermasler C~.,~rlll, 1919, pp. 150-51. 

u (I) lVa~ Dept/rlme,,1 Circula~s, 1919, Cir 26. 20 j an 1919. (2) IVtI'r porl"'cnl Ceneral 

Orde~s and BuildillS, 1919, CO 55. ! Mar 1919. (5) 40 SIIlI. 1272- 75 (Mar 2. 191 9). 
702 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Surplus Disposal in the Zone 0/ Interim' 

The end of hostilities posed an immediate storage problem because 

cancell ation of overseas requirements and the accumulation of stocks 

from incomplete contracts greatly in excess of requirements resulted in 

serious congestion at storage points. Pending d isposition of surplus 

stocks, stores not only were accumulated in genera l supply depots, but 

supplies that had been ordered shipped or were in transit to pons of 

embarkation for the supply of troops overseas were also diverted to the 

th ree Army rescrve depots of Schenectady. New Cumberland, and Columbus. Construction of these depots was nearing completion at the time 

the armistice was signed,H It was eSlimated that, on II November 191 8, 

there were approximately 600,000 tons of such supplies on the docks and 

about 400,000 tons were moving toward the seaboard, all routed to the 

overseas forces." 

T he accumu lation of huge quantities of supplies on hand, resulting 

from large amoun ts that were turned in as camps were abandoned in 

the United States, shipped from overseas, and accepted before contracts 

could be terminated necessitated a sharp increase in storage space for the 

protection of the supplies until they could be disposed of as surplus. 

In December 191 8, the total warehousing space under control of the 

Storage Service was approximately 64,617,1 10 square feet. One year 

later, the space still being used for supplies in the possession of the government had increased to approximately 76,278,446 square feet, owned by 

the government, and to 300,262,472 square feet of leased space, 290,776,828 

square feet of which were open storage!e 

The necessity to dispose of accumulated surplus supplies was recognized before the war ended, and Congress authorized disposal, on July 9, 

1918, but the problem did not become urgent until after the armistice." 

Then, a Surplus Property Division was set up. on 30 November 19 18. in 

the Office of the Director of Purchase and Storage and given jurisdiction 

over all surplus property except sa lvage-that is, waste material valuable 

only for scrap or junk. Originally. all sales of surplus property involving 

a cost price in excess of $5,000 for such supplies had to be approved by the 

Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic. T hat amount was later raised 

to $ 100,000 and, with the appointment of a Director of Sales early in 

January 1919, his approval had to be obtained for sales in excess of that 

figure. The surplus property was then sold at auction or to the highest 

U A,,,,,,"1 R fIIfXJfl (1/ tllfII QUllrlfllrmrulfllT GfllllfII'lI/, 1919, pp. 161-62 . 

•• RG 120. W.O. Historial Files. Box 165·1 ("Brief Hiltory of QM and Purchase and 

Stonge Demobiliu tion Act ivities," p. 2'6) . 

• , lbid ~ p. 241. 

50 40 SIll'. 850. 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 703 

bidder on sea led proposa ls. Sales to government departments or Allied 

governments were an exception to this general method. In such sales. 

the price was not to be less than the invoice price, including the cost of 

inspection and transportation.&! 

In view of the large quantities of supplies held by the War Department, the existing shortages, and the restrictions that had been imposed 

during the war. the public eagerly sought the release of surplus material, 

particularly foodstuffs. Before any large-scale disposa l program CQuid be 

initiated, however, supply officers had to determine what stocks were on 

hand. An inventory of all supplies in the zone supply depots. Army 

reserve depots, port terminals. and posts was begun on 31 December 191 8 

and completed 4 months later. In addition, before supplies could be 

declared surplus to Army needs, the Chief of Staff had to take into account 

certain determining factors. In November 1918, he had to consider 

the possibility that the armistice might be short-lived and that military 

operations might be resumed. The Chief of Staff therefore instructed 

the supply departments to provide for a margin of safety, and he called 

upon them to retain supplies necessary for the troops still in the A.E.F. 

and for initiall y equipping a complete army of 1,500,000 men. He 

viewed this order only as a temporary measure to enable the supply departments to cancel contracts and dispose of surplus stores. At the same 

time, he also wanted to retain an adequate reserve of nonperishable 

supplies for the Army, the National Guard, and the Reserve Officers' 

Training Corps to avoid a repetition of the serious lack of material that 

had existed at the outbreak of World War I. 

Varying troop strength figures in the months after the armistice 

further complicated the disposal program. The total number of men 

to be rationed and supplied was materially reduced, on the one hand, 

by the unanticipated rapidity of demobilization and, on the other, by 

the decrease in the authorized size of the permanent peacetime Army. 

In the absence of action by Congress, General March, in January 1919, 

ca lled upon the suppl y departments to provide the full amount of supplies 

required to support a peacetime Army of 500,000 men. By June, however, Congress had reduced the number to 300,000.51 The effect was to 

compel a downward revision of requirements and to release additional 

supplies as surplus to Army needs. 

The de lay in releasing surplus material evoked considerable criticism 

of the War Department. In answer, the Secretary of War offered a 

~1 (I) AtHwal R eport of Ihe Quarterma.ller Cefleraf, J919, pp. 122- 23. (2) Re/lort of the 

Chie f of Stag, 1919, pp. 201-{)2. 

n <I) Report of Ih e Chief 0/ SIGD. 1919, p . 2M. (2) Report No. 171, W dr Expellditure$ 

HCGring.s. 66th Cong., Ser. I, vol. 3. pp. (10), (II). 
704 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

plausible explanation based on the aforementioned considerations that 

had to be taken into account, and this slowed the declaration of materials 

as surp us.~' His explanation was less satisfying to others later who 

thought he leaned "too far toward the side of lhe producers and the 

commercial distributors" and overlooked the interests of the consumers.~· 

T he Graham Committee investigating war expenditures was particularly 

disturbed by an agreement made by the Acting Quartermaster Genera l 

with the canners' association which called for withholding from the 

market, during the 19 19 season, 200 million cans of vegetables that werc 

surplus to Army needs. Under pressure. the agreement had later to be 

abandoned, though it was not abrogated until 23 May 1919.5& 

Congress later directed the Secretary Qf War to provide for direct 

purchase of surplus supplies by the public. In consequence, a plan for 

sale and distribution of surplus supplies through the parcel poSt system 

was developed, under which orders were received, consolidated, and 

fonvarded by the local postmaster to the general supply depot in the area 

of which the post office was located along with the funds to pay for the 

supplies. The latter were shipped to the postmaster who made the 

distribution. 

The Post Office Department, however, was not equipped to handle 

the tremendous volume of business involved, and about 6 weeks after 

the plan began to operate. distribution through a system of Army retail 

stores replaced the parcel post system. Between 3 August and 24 Septem. 

ber 191 9, when the War Department abandoned use of the parce l pOSt 

system, it sold approximately $ 12 million worth of surplus supplies, 

three-fourths of the amount being subsistence. Zone supply offi cers 

supervised the operation of 26 retail stores, established in principal cities 

throughout the country on 25 September 1919. By I November, the 

number of stores had increased to 77. They remained in operation until 

late in February 1920. T hereafter, the Quartermaster General closed 

them, one by one, whenever overhead operating expenses exceeded 

10 percent of receipts or when he lacked supplies to replenish stocks. 

The Quartermaster General reported that over $35 million worth of 

surplus supplies had been disposed of through the retail stores by 

30 June 1920.u 

" LtT, SW to Hon. H. D. Flood, Appendix to Minority Report. Report No. 17 1. War 

EX~fldillJ.rtS H t l1rings, 66th Cong., Ser. I, vol. 3. 

uCrowell, Governmefll War Conlrl1cts, p. 295. 

58 (I) See majority and minority reports of the Select Committee on Expenditures in the 

War Department, Report No. 171, War Expelldilures Hearillgs, 66th Cong .. Ser. I, vol. 3. 

(2) See also ibid., Ser. 5, vol. I, pp. 43-58, 81. 

51( 1) A.mual Reporl of Ihe QUl1rterfTulJler General, 1920, p. 50. (2) RG 120, W.O. 

Historica l Files. Box 165·1 ("Brief H istory of QM and Purchase and Storage Demobilization 

Activities," pp. 248-50). 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 705 

In terms of general sale of surpl us material, the Surplus Property 

Division, from the time of its establishment on 30 November 1918 to 

30 June 1920. sold surplus property amounting to $382,247,08 1. This 

property had originally cost the government $488,485.476, the percentage 

of recovery being 83.23 percent. As of 30 June 1920, the Division still 

had about $200 million worth of surplus property on hand, and the disposal program continued to be active for a long time after the war.n 

Zone of Interior Salvage Opemlions 

The Director of Purchase and Storage delegated responsibility for 

the sale and disposal of all unserviceable government material, accumulated in the process of demobilizing the wartime Army and dismantling 

camps established during the war, to the Salvage Division in his Office. 

Between I December 191 8 and 31 December 1919, the sale, by public 

auction or under sealed proposals, of unserviceable property amounted to 

moire than $11 million. The Division did not sell all waste; in the process 

of classification, it reclaimed large quantities of unserviceable property 

and returned such supplies to organizations for further use. In th is same 

period, unserviceable property to the value of almost $3 million was so 

recovered and' used. 58 In 1920, surplus disposal and salvage operations 

again became re~ponsibHities of the Quartermaster General, and sale of 

waste materials, disposal of surplus property, and the settlement of claims 

arising out of cancellation of contracts absorbed a considerable share of 

the Corps' efforts for years to come. 

Salvage operations in the zone of the interior during the war, as in 

the A.E.F. overseas, had also included the operation of laundry facilities 

and repair shops for clothing, shoes, and canvas items. The War Department had adopted a general policy of establishing repair shops and 

laundries of suffic ient capacity to meet requirements at each camp, cantonment, or permanent POSt where a considerable number of troops were 

in training. When the war began, the government had owned 14 small 

steam laundries, located at postS throughout the country and servicing a 

few hundred men. The war had brought increased demands for laundry 

work that could not be satisfied through the use of commercial laundries. 

On 8 August 191 8, the Secretary of War had authorized the expenditure 

of more than $5 million for the construction of laundries to service from 

30,000 to 40,000 men in each of 20 camps and posts. Five days later, he 

had also authorized the construction of repair shops, warehouses, and 

or Anllual Report of the Quartermaster General, 1920, p. 49. 

at RG 120. w.n. Historical Files. Box 165·1 ("Srief History of QM and Purchase and 

Storage Demol;liliution Aclivities," p. 270). 
706 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

other necessary facilities for salvage purposes at each of the National Army 

cantonments and Nationa l Guard camps. He had further authorized 

the establishment of dry cleaning plants at Atlanta, Fort Sam Houston, 

El Paso, and Alcatraz. ~e This construction work had been well under way 

at all points and, in some instances, the fac ilities had been completed 

and were in full operation by the time the armistice was signed. 

With the end of the war, the Salvage Division curtailed repair 

activities at the camps and centered such work at base salvage plants to 

promote co-ordination, reduce expenses, and permit the personnel at 

camps to concentrate on getting unserviceable and surplus property ready 

for disposal. The [unction of disposal overshadowed all other activities 

of the Salvage Division at that time. Although the Division sharply 

reduced the amount of repair work, it did introduce improved methods 

of operation in the winter of 1918- 19. It also proposed, and the Secretary 

of War approved, the provision of free laundry service to the troops beginning with fiscal year 1920. Such free service was to replace the flat 

$1 per month rate charged each soldier during the war.eo 

Such activity, however, was of limited duration. As the troops were 

demobilized and camps were dismantled and abandoned, the War Department, on 1 October 1921 . ordered the repair of shoes, clothing, and hats, 

and the dry cleaning of clothing at government expense for the enlisted 

man discontinued.sl The Quartermaster General transferred various 

repair shops to post exchanges. which employed civilian shoemakers, 

tailors, and hatters. The enlisted man thereafter paid for such repair 

work at regular rates established by the post exchanges.8z Free laundry 

service also came to an end on 1 October 1921. After that date. the 

enlisted man paid $2 per month for laundry service, with no limitation 

on the number or kind of pieces he sent to the laundry. In the years 

of peace that followed, the equipment of Army laundries, first procured 

during World War I, became old and obsolescent, and, by 1935. The 

Quartermaster General was making efforts to obtain funds to provide 

up.to.date equipment.sa Adequate maintenance and even expansion of 

the laundries was greatly handicapped by the meager funds granted by 

Congress for this purpose during the postwar years. On the eve of 

GO (I) RG 120. W.D. Historical Files. BOil 145, file 7-46. 1 ("Functions and Operations of 

the Salvage Service," pp. 10-13). (2) Report o/the QUlIrtermastcr Gellual, 1919, p. 117. 

8(1 RG 120, W.D. Historical Files, Box 145, file 7-46.1 ('"Functions and Operations of the 

Sahage Service;' p. 92). 

8 1 Wlir Department Circuitlrs, /921, Cir. 245, 16 Sep 1921. 

n RG 94, AGO Records, file 319.12 (Annual Report of the Quartermaster General, 1922, 

p. 11). 

8.1 Ibid., (Annual Report of The Quartenna$ler General, 1935, p. 6). 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 707 

World War II. there were only 33 Quartermaster fixed laundries. 29 of 

which were in the United States and 4 in its overseas possessions. 

POJlwm' ReQ1'ganization 

Demobilization in 191 8 generated many problems, the most important of which undoubtedly were those relating to the strength of the 

peace time Army to be maintained and the organization to be provided 

for the Army and the War Department. Both had been reorganized 

during the war as a result of emergency legislation and under the pressure 

of war conditions. When hostilities ended and th e wartime Army began 

to disintegrate. a decision had to be made on the size of the force to be 

maintained. The War Department. too, needed to be put on a permanent peacetime basis. its organization taking cognizance of the lessons 

learned during the war. 

Immediately following the armistice, the General Staff began a study 

of the problem that culminated in a number of recommendations. 

Based on this study. the Secretary of War submitted to Congress a bill 

for reorganizing and increasing the efficiency of the Army." Hearings 

on the proposed reorganization were held by both the Senate and House 

Committees on Military Affairs from August 1919 through January 1920. 

Of interest to the suppl y services were those provisions of the bill 

which vested authority in the President to make such distribution of the 

duties. powers. functions. records. and personnel of previously existing 

departments. bureaus. and offices as he might deem necessary for the 

efficiency of the service. and those provisions that strengthened the Genera l StatE in its control of the entire Military Establishment. including 

the supply bureaus. Of additional and specific interest to the Quartermaster Corps were the proposals to retain separate agencies to handle the 

functions of finance and motor, rail, and water transportation- functions 

that before the war had been the responsibility of the Corps. 

Maj. Gen. Harry L. Rogers presented the views of the Quartermaster 

Corps in reference to reorganization. While serving as Chief Quartermaster of the A.E.F., he had been appointed Quartermaster General in 

the summer of 1918. with the rank of major genera l dating from 22 July, 

but he had remained on d uty overseas. Subsequently, demobilization 

activities in the A.E.F. had kept him in France until February 1919, at 

which time he assumed his duties as Quartermaster General and also 

•• (I> For the bill. S. 2715. s« Heorgfmiulliofl of the Army: H eoriflgs before the Subcomminee of the Committee 00 Military Affai .... U.s. Seoate. 66th Coog .. 1st SCM .• p . 16 ff. 

HereaFter briefly clled as ReorglUliUltioll of the Army. (2) For the formulalion of Ihe bill. 

s« the tnlimony of Geoeral March. ibid., p. 84. 
708 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

became Director of Purchase and Storage. Testifying before the Senate 

Committee on Military Affairs in the fall of that year, he argued vigorously against perpetuating those separate agencies that had been created 

from the Quartermaster Corps. They were only productive of unnecessary expense and overhead. and he further charged that separation had 

materially impaired efficiency of operations. He favored a single large 

supply organization that would handle supplies common to all branches 

of the service. He also objected to General Staff operation, believing its 

function should be only supervisory in character. $~ It would be difficult 

to assess the influence of the general's argument, but when Congress passed 

the National Defense Act, on June 4, 1920, it restored the functions of 

transportation and construction to the Corps. The prewar responsibility 

of the Corps for paying military personnel, however, continued to be 

vested in a separate Finance Department. 

It fell to General Rogers to re·establish the Quartermaster Corps 

under the new legislation. By War Department directive, the transfers 

of the records and of the enlisted and civilian personnel of the Transportation Service, Motor Transport Corps, Construction Division, and Real 

Estate Service were made effective on 15 July 1920.08 On the same date, 

all commissioned personnel of these activities were detailed temporarily 

for duty with the Corps. All field duties of the transferred agencies were 

assumed by quartermasters, that title being once more restored to use. 

Under the National Defense Act of 1920, Congress abolished the 

Purchase and Storage Service and substituted for it the title of Quartermaster Corps. As reorganized under the law, the Office of the Quartermaster General consisted of three divisions and five services. The latter 

included Control, Supply, Construction, Transportation, and Remount; 

the divisions were General Administrative, Personnel, and Cemetei-ial.01 

As the scope of activities decreased in the postwar years, organizational 

changes took place that reduced. the number of divisions and services in 

the Office. Within a decade, the Office had returned to its prewar 

organization which consisted of four division5-'-Administrative, Supply, 

Transportation, and Construction-each having subordinate branches and 

sections.

e8 This organization continued to exist until World War II 

brought a proliferation of divisions to take charge of the rapidly expanding business of the Corps. ev 

U Ibid., pp. 5~4-50. 

U (I) War Depnrtlnlm t Gelleral Orders, 1920, GO 42. 14 Jul 1920. (2) RG 92. OQMG 

General Correspondence. 1917- 22. Box 237 (Telegram. QMG 10 depot officers. 14 Jul 1920). 

aT OQMG Cir 11.28 Jul 1920. 

880QMG 00 22. 2 JUII 1930. 

8~ Erna Risch. The Quartermaster Corps: OrgalliwfiOlI, Supply, mId Services in U.S. 

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington. 1953). 1.11 ff. 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 709 

Congress, in the National Defense Act of 1920, fixed (he size of the 

peacetime Army at not more than 280,000 men. This number was considerably less than the War Department had originally proposed but was 

more than double the size of the Army in 1917. ]0 1920, when the 

country generally seemed satisfied to return to "its traditional diplomacy 

of isolation ITom Europe," and men were inclined to accept as accomplished fa ct that war had been ended for all time, many leaders considered 

a large army unnecessary. The need for economy further enhanced their 

desire to relieve the people of the burdens of war in peacetime by pursuing what Senator John S. Williams of Mississippi called "our traditional 

policy of conserving the financial resou rces of the people during times 

of peace" and only when war came requiring them to submit to the 

immense strains then necessary.TO 

Such considerations operated against establishing and maintaining 

the force authorized by Congress in 1920. During the next 20 years an 

Army of 280,000 men was never achieved.· In fact. 7 months after 

Congress passed the Nationa l Defense Act. it reduced the size of the Army 

to 175,000 men. n In 1922, it cut the maximum authorized strength of 

the Regular Army still further to 12.000 officers and 125,000 enlisted 

men.n Even this strength could not be attained because Congress failed 

to appropriate sufficient funds for support. The Secretary of War, there· 

fore. directed that the enlisted strength of the Regular Army be main· 

tained at an average of 11 8.500 men for fiseal year 1923.11 Budgetary 

economies kept the Army at about this size until 1936 when Congress 

passed the War Department Appropriation Act for that year making 

sufficient funds available to permit an increase of enlisted strength to 

165,000 men. It was 1938 before it made any increase in the number 

of officers.14 

As the size of the Army decreased, the proportion of officers and 

enlisted men allotted to the Quartermaster Corps also declined. In the 

National Defense Act of 1920. Congress authorized a commissioned 

strength. including the Quartermaster General, of 1,054 officers for the 

Corps and a maximum enlisted strength of 8,000 men. Until 1936. the 

average enlisted strength of the Corps never exceeded 7,600, and the 

shortage of personnel was such that men had to be detailed from the line 

to perform Quartermaster Corps duties. Not only was there a decrease 

in the number of enlisted men required, but. by 1928, there was also a 

T6 Fred Greene, "T he Military View of American National Policy, 1904-40," America'l 

Historical Rroiew. LXVI, No.2, p. !lS8. 

n4 1 Stat. 1098 (Feb. 7, 1921 ). 

12 42 Stat. 721-24 (Act, }un 30, 1922). 

u Au"ual R eport 01 the Stcrelary 01 War, 1923, p. 125 . 

.. 49 Stat: 1282 (ACI, May 15, 19!16); 52 Stal. 21fi-1 7 (Au, Apr 13, 1938). 
710 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

materia l decrease in the higher enlisted grades and a corresponding 

increase in the lowest grade. It became so difficult to secure and keep 

men qualified to perform the specialized duties or the Corps that civilians 

had to be hired to do the work .. " During this 20·year period, the Corps 

never attained its allotted commissioned strength. Its actual commissioned strength hovered around 700 officers. Since quite a few of these 

officers were detached for other than Quartermaster Corps duties, die 

shortage of officer personnel was acute. Repeatedly, The Quartermaster 

Genera l warned that the procurement of sufficient commissioned personnel to bring the Corps to its authorized strength was a primary 

requ irement.

a When the German Army invaded Poland in 1939, the 

Quartermaster Corps consisted or 718 officers and 10,545 enlisted menY 

If lack of funds kept both Army and the Quartermaster Corps understrength, the status of Quartermaster officers was improved, for the National Defense Act provided that officers above the grade of captain, who 

since 1903 had been detailed from other branches of the Army, were 

thereafter to be permanently commissioned in the Quartermaster Corps. 

When the reorganization of the Army and the War Department was under 

consideration in 1919, the question of permanent appointments as opposed to the detail system was once more reviewed. ]n the course of his 

testimony, Quartermaster General Rogers insisted that experience during 

the war and even earlier, in operations on the Mexican border, had 

amply demonstrated the need for permanentl y assigned specialists.T8 

Congress incorporated his views in the Act, and the concept of career 

supply officers won acceptance. 

Congress also made provision for a 4-year tour of duty for appointees 

to the post of Quartermaster General. Genera l Rogers' opposition to the 

General Staff prevented his reassignment for a second tour of duty as 

Quartermaster General. Genera l Pershing, then Chief of Staff, opposed 

his reappointment, and in 1922 Maj. Gen. William H. Hart succeeded 

him. He, in turn, was followed, in the intervening years before World 

War II, by Maj. Gen. B. Franklin Cheatham, Maj. Gen. John L. DeWitt, 

Maj. Gen. Louis H. Bash, and Maj. Gen. Henry Gibbi ns.a Except for 

General DeWitt, all of these offi cers had long years of trai ning and experin RG 94. AGO Records, file 319.12 (Annual Report of The Quartermaster General, 1928. 

p. 2). 

;81bid., (See Annual Reports of The Quarteml3ster General, 1931 , p. I; 1937, p. I). 

11 A'lImal Repor/ of/he Sure/"ry of IVnr, 19-10, App. 8 , Table D. 

78 (I) Reorg{miwlim' of II' lI Army, pp. 546--47. (2) Comp:n e General Persh ing's views, 

ibid., pp. 1439--10. 

n General Ha rt served from 28 AugllSl 1922 to 2 J anuary 1926; General Cheatham, frolll 

3 Janllary 1926 to 11 January 1930; General DeWitt, from .3 February 1930 to 2 February 1934; 

General Bash. from 3 February 1934 to 3"1 March 1936; and General Gibbins, from I April 

1936 to 31 March 1940. 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 711 

coce in the work of the Corps. It was well-established practice to select 

The Quartermaster Genera l from among the senior officers of the Corps.80 

Impact of Retrenchment 

T hese Quartermasters General guided the operations of the Corps 

during the 20 years tha t followed its reorganization in 1920. For at least 

a decade and a half, lack of funds, shortage of personnel, and public 

indifference to Army needs hampered operations. Considerations of 

economy that influenced the size of Army appropriations immediately 

after the war were reinforced by the prolonged economic depression that 

followed the stock market crash in 1929. T he latter brought further cuts 

in War Department budgets. In the midst of the ensuing retrenchment, 

the Secretary of War noted that successive reductions in military appropriations had been absorbed by "continuing in service obsolete and inefficient equipment, and where absolutely necessary, by suspending technical 

research and development work. " U 

Pursuit of such a policy, which permitted the War Department "to 

maintain the structural framework of trained personnel indispensable to 

orderly mobilization in emergency," was inevitable in view of the huge 

surpluses of clothing and equipment in existence at the end of World 

War I. Much of this equipment was already obsolescent at the end of the 

war, but its existence precluded requests for funds to purchase new items. 

T he War Department was aware of the risks involved, but. even as it 

inaugurated a policy of modernization and development of new types of 

equipment for future procurement, it announced in ·1922 its policy of 

requiring the use of equipment on hand until the wartime supply became 

exhausted.S! 

Maintenance of wartime equipment grew increasingly expensive and 

efforts to improve the appearance of wartime clothing proved ineffective. 

By 1930, the Corps was attempting to replace obsolete equipment and 

to develop clothing suited to Army requirements. Lack of funds continued to hamper such efforts. It was not until New Deal measures 

were inaugurated in the 1930's to combat depression and unemployment 

that relief and emergency funds became available to arrest "the deterioration of the Army's materiel condition. " U 

80 The exception to this p .... ctice. General DeWitt. was an Infantry officer who before 

World War 1 had been detailed to the Corps for two brief periods. His supply experience. 

however. was broadened by the services he perfonned during the war and by h is staff 

assignments aller the war. 

~lAI!IIUQI Rt!porl of lilt! Surt!lary 01 War, 19JJ, pp. 18-19. 

82 Risch, Tht! QUllrlt!rmll.ller Corps: OrgauiUllioll, SupPly, aud St!rvices, I , 52. 

n R. Elbertson Smith. Th t! Army lIud Economic Mobiliwlion in U.S. ARMY I N 

WORLD WAR II (WaShington, 1959.) p, 125 . 
16TH U.S. INFANTRY, 1930 

(Note that the first sergeant's insignia should carry only two arcs.) 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 713 

Postwar Construction Program 

This general trend of development followed in the two decades after 

1920 is fully reflected in Quartermaster activities. When Congress returned responsibility for construction, including repairs, operation of 

utilities. and handling of real estate, to the Quartermaster Corps in 1920, 

retrenchment was the order of the day. A 42-percent reduction in appropriations for construction in 1922, as compared to 1921, reveals the extent 

of the retrenchment that the Corps had to make. Congress also cut the 

costs of maintenance and repairs by morc than $5 million in 1922, as 

compared with the preceding year.8~ This period of retrenchment lasted 

through 1925. The War Department had given considerable thought 

to the problem of sheltering the troops, but not until March 1926 could 

it initiate an Army housing program to replace with proper permanent 

buildings the temporary structures erected during the war, many of which 

were still in use. At that time. Congress enacted legislation that authorized the Secretary of War to dispose of 43 military reservations or portions 

of them. The act further provided that the net proceeds derived from 

the sale of such properties. including proceeds from the sale of surplus 

buildings. were to be credited to a Military Post Construction Fund. to 

remain available until expended for permanent construction at military 

posts as directed by Congress. 8S This legislation marked a distinct departure from the policy established in 1884, which had required the 

transfer to the Department of the Interior of military reservations no 

longer needed by the War Department.ee Their subsequent disposal 

had in no way redounded to the benefit of the Army. 

The Army housing program as projected was to cover a lO-year period 

and involve a total expenditure of approximately $148 million. A 

modest beginning was made in the program during fiscal year 1927. a 

little more than $7 million being appropriated that yeaT for the construction of hospitals. barracks. and quarters. 8T The Corps gave careful attention to post lay-out plans. applying modern methods of city planning for 

grouping buildings to produce a harmonious arrangement and to insure 

economy in the building of roads, sewer and water systems, and other 

utilities.sa 

"RC 94, AGO Records, file 319.12 (Annual Report of the Quartermaster General. 

1922. pp. 14-15). 

u 44 Sillt. 203-07 (Act, Mar 12, 1926). 

Ie 2~ Stllt. 103 (Act, Jul 5, 1884). 

IT For a listing of the projects, see RG 94, AGO Records, filc 319.12 (Annual Report 

of The Quartennaster General, 1927. pp. 67-(8). 

"See an article by the City I'lanning Adviser to the War Department, George B. 

Ford. "New Anny Posts for Old." Tile QlIlIrfermllJler Review, IX (Nov- Dec 1929), pp. 19-22. 
714 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

In addition to providing funds for housing, Congress made money 

available. by fiscal year 1929, for 49 miscellaneous construction projects, 

the costs of which amounted to more than $ 16 million. These projects 

ranged from construction of magazines, shops, warehouses, and similar 

faci lities to restoration of the Lee Mansion and construction of the Tomb 

of the Unknown Soldier. These appropriated funds also covered the 

purchase of furniture for officers', warrant officers', and noncommissioned 

officers' quarters and for officers' messes.S8 

So far as the Army housing program was concerned, the depression 

years of the Thirties served to expedite the work, since the program fitted 

in admirably with the efforts to relieve distress and unemployment by 

constructing public works. When, in November 1929, the President 

issued instructions to expedite public work construction, the Corps had 

more than $22,500,000 still available from existing appropriations for its 

construction program. Ordinarily, the preparation of plans and specifications, the soliciting of bids, and the execution of contracts inVOlving such 

a large sum would have taken from 12 to 15 months. By concentrating 

all efforts on the job, the Construction Service, in 7 months, placed under 

contract construction work totaling more than $ 19,500,000. The War 

Department afforded further relief to the economy of the country by 

instructing all field commanders to begin repair and maintenance work 

immediately in the various corps areas, for 1vhich the Quartermaster 

Corps released and allotted to them more than $2,500,000." 

During these years, a large amount of non·military construction was 

assigned to the Corps and directed by its Construction Service. This 

work included marking battlefields and other places of national fame. 

erecting tombs and monuments, and restoring colonial forts and historic 

buildings. el 

By the time the first decade of the housing program was nearing an 

end. approximately $150 million had been allotted for construction 

purposes. Considerable improvement had been made, but the maintenance costs for World War I housing still in use were running excessively high, and the Secretary of War was urging further appropriations." 

Sf A sp«ific listing of these projecu is to be found in, Brig. Gen. William E. Horton, 

"The Work of the Construction Service, Quartermaster Corps." The QuarlermlUler Review, 

VIII (Sep-Ocl 1928), pp. 6--8. . 

.0 RG 94, AGO Records, file 319.12 (Annual Report of T he Quartermaner General, 

1930, pp. 54--55). 

fI The renoration of Old Fort Niagara and Fort McHenry and the ertttion of an 

ornamental gateway to indicate an approach to the old fort on Roanoke Island were the 

first white child, Virginia Dare, was born in 1589 arc three examples of this kind of work. 

11 (I) RC 94, AGO Records, file 319.12 (Annual Report of The Quartermaster General, 

1935. p. 12). (2) Amlual ReportJ of the Secretary of W4r, 19)6, p. 39: 19J7, pp. 35-36. 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 715 

From 1985 to 1940, the funds provided by Congress were supplemented 

by allotments from the Public Works Administration. At the close of 

fiscal year 1939, the Secretary of War referred to the "marked betterment 

in housing facilties," but the Chief of Staff considered that the crowded 

housing conditions had been only partially all eviated, since the increase 

in the size of the Army more than offset the construction provided. 

General Malin Craig. Chief of Staff. was of the opinion that full use 

was not being made of the technical skill and experience of the Corps of 

Engineers. He believed that responsibility for any new construction 

ought to be vested in that Corps in order to distribute the construction 

workload and to free the Quartermaster Corps for' its task of supplying 

and maintaining troops in the fi eld and in garrison. With this purpose 

in view. he had a study prepared for submission to the Secretary of War 

in 19 ~9 that presaged the ultimate transfer of construction to the Corps 

of Engineers in World War 11." 

Army Transp01·t Service 

Quartermaster transportation of men and supplies and the develop· 

ment and procurement of suitable equipment showed the effects of 

budgetary economies common to the War Department generally. The 

transportation of men and supplies had been a primary Quartermaster 

function since 1775, but the restoration of that responsibility to the Corps 

in 1920 proved to be only temporary; it was permanently separated from 

the Corps early in World War IU~ When the Corps reassumed responsibility for transportation in the summer of 1920. the separate agencies 

had initiated arrangements to settle claims and dispose of surplus equipment that the Corps carried to completion. So far as the Army Transport 

Service was concerned. it became the policy of the Quartermaster General 

to restore it to its prewar basis. The Corps tried to dispose of all surplus 

floating equipment. including Army transports as well as barbor boats 

and Coast Artillery vessels, by sale or transfer to other Departments. 

A prompt release of chartered vessels had been started as soon as the 

return of the A.E.F. made this feasible. and, by 30 June 1921, all such 

vessels had been returned to their owners.u 

Tbe Army's wartime transport requirements had led tbe U.S. Ship· 

ping Board to submit a plan to Congress as a basis for obtaining the 

II <I) AmUlIII ReportJ II/ the Surdary III Wllr, 19)9, pp. I. SI- S2. (2) A volume of 

the U.s. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series in preparation by l..conore Fine and Jeue 

A. Remington, "The Corps of Enginttn: Military Construction in the United Stales," pro· 

vides greateT detail of these wartime developmenu. 

I t Risch, The Quar/umasler Corps: Organiullion, SupP'y, lind ServiceJ, I , 16-22. 

It RG 91, AGO Records, file S19.12 (Annual Repon of the Quartennauer General, 1921, 

p. 18\). 
716 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

necessary appropriations for construction purposes. Actually. the war 

ended before {he intended troop transports were ever completed. At 

that point. the War Department requeued that only 6 of the originally 

proposed 70 B class transpons be completed at the Hog Island yards for 

its use. These were vessels suitable for combined troop and cargo purposes. 1t also wanted 5 of the vessels being built at Camden shipyards, 

the speed and design of which made them especially suitable for permanent transports on the long Pacific Ocean runs." In the early 1920's, the 

Corps substituted the Hog Island B type transports for the old transports 

that it had purchased in the Spanish-American War. It also replaced old 

harbor boats by recently constructed vessels. The Corps anticipated that 

completion of this replacement program would furnish the Army Transport Service with practically a new fleet_ 

At the time the Corps resumed responsibility for the Army Transport 

Service, 16 of the Army-owned transports were assigned to active operations, the rest being out of commission, awaiting sale or other disposition. 

In the course of the following years, the ever-present need to economize 

reduced the number of transports in active operation. A decade after 

the armistice, the Army Transport Service was operating 7 passenger 

transports and 2 freight transports on regular schedules to the insular 

possessions of the United States. It also had in operation one cable 

ship.D7 These vessels were then in satisfactory condition, but their upkeep was becoming of much concern to the Corps. The limitation on 

funds prevented the accomplishment of even essential repair work and 

the need to economize became a decisive factor in still further reducing 

transport service. The Corps undertook to improve the condition of 

the ships by introducing newer safety devices and improving ventilation 

and other facilities but progress was slow. By 1932, only 6 transports 

were in operation, 2 of which were freight transports. This remained 

the size of the Army Transport Service until the emergency period and 

the outbreak of World War 11 brought sudden expansion in equipment, 

personnel, and funds." 

Rail and Motor Transpol·tation 

The postwar years brought no new developments in Army use of 

railroad transportation but the War Department did profit from the 

" For details. $« AII,lIml Report of Ihe Chief of Tr(ltuporlalioll Service, 1919 (Wu hington. 1919). pp. U+-39 . 

., RG 94. AGO Records. file 319.12 (Annual Report or The Quartennu ter General. 

1928. p. !of). 

18 Chesler Wardlow. Tir e Trall$porlolioPl Corps: Rt:spo.uibr'lilit:$, OrglllliUl tion, Iwd 

Operations in U.s. ARMY IN WORLD WAR" (Washington. 195 1). pp. 28-12. 
I 

AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 717 

experience gained in World War I. That war had clearly demonstrated 

the need for centralized control of inland transportation and traffic 

operation. and the War Department retained such control in the years of 

peace that followed the armistice. T he designation of the Quartermaster 

General as Traffic Manager for the War Department and his authorization 

to exercise jurisdiction over all transportation activities of the Army, 

including rates. routings, and methods of shipment. underscored the 

change. The War Department also specifically directed all bureaus and 

branches to use no funds or personnel for the maintenance of traffic sections, a development in the early months of World War I that had been 

productive of confusion and congestion in traffic." The Corps' attention 

was primarily centered on the development of closer relations with the 

railroad carriers, and the maintenance of a troop movement bureau in 

the Office of The Quartermaster General by the American Railway Association, which represented practically all the carriers of the United States, 

contributed much to this objective. 1Go 

When Congress returned responsibility for motor transport to the 

Quartermaster Corps in the summer of 1920, reduction of personnel and 

disposal equipment had already been largely accomplished in the 20 

months since the armistice. Vehicles that would be needed by the Army 

had been designated for retention before the disposal program was initiated. Although the Corps was responsible for procuring all Army 

vehicles, except those used in combat, its procurement of new vehicles 

during the 1920's was inconsequential by reason of the large amount of 

wartime equipment on hand. As of 30 June 1929, the Corps had purchased only 763 new vehicles, of which 709 were passenger cars and 

54 were trucks and other miscellaneous vehicles acquired for experimental 

purposes. Of the 17,305 vehicles of various types and makes that the 

Corps had on hand, 16,542 had been purchased during the war.1OI 

Not all of them were in operation. On 30 June 1930, Tables of 

Allowances called for 13,514 motor vehicles. but lack of funds for operation, maintenance, and replacements made possible the authorized operation of only 8,366 during that fiscal year. Lack of funds for the procurement of gasoline further reduced the number to 7,496. U12 With limited 

funds available for purchase, the Quartermaster Corps could make little 

progress in determining the extent to which animal transport might, 

with safety. be replaced by modern motor vehicles . 

.. War D~/HIrlm~nl G~n~rQI Ord rJ. 1921, GO 21. 5 Jun 1923. 

100 (I) RG 904. AGO Rtoords. file 319.12 (Annual Reports of The Quartermaster General. 

1922- 37, pa,uim). See ,Ulle, p. 572 for early proposals for a troop movement bureau. 

101 RG 904, AGO Recorcis, file 319.12 Annual Report o( The QuartermUler General, 

1929. p. 38). l Ot Ibid., (Annual Report of The Quarlerm;Uler General, 19W, p. 65). 
718 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

The Corps also possessed an extensive stock of spare parts for the 

wartime vehicles. Accordingly, during the Twenties, it developed and 

operated a system of spare parts distribution to service such vehicles. 

It did not expand the system to include servicing any of the new motor 

vehicles acquired later. Since the Corps was procuring re latively few 

of them, it decided not to stock parts for this equipment. IOS As the years 

passed, maintenance of war-purchased vehicles became increasingly costly. 

More and more, the using services complained of unsatisfactory equipment, and The Quartermaster General reported to the Secretary of War 

that such a result was to be expected. Maximum motor transportation 

efficiency [or the Army, he explained, could not be accomplished with 

models and types of vehicles purchased during 1917- 18 for war purposes. IOf 

Not until Congress passed the War Department Appropriation Act for 

fiscal year 1935, forbidding the use after I January 1935 of funds to 

repair vehicles purchased before I January 1920, could the Corps begin to 

eliminate such vehicles from further operation. 1M 

During the postwar years, the Quartermaster Corps worked closely 

with the automotive industry to develop vehicles suitable for military 

purposes. Quartermaster officers attended most of the important transporlation conferences, at which they offered suggestions and recommenda· 

tions of value to the commercial transport interests. At Holabird 

Quartermaster Depot, the Corps experimented and developed designs and 

inventions that were adopted by the automotive industry. Within the 

limits of available funds, (he Corps conducted a program for the development of motor vehicles suited to military purposes, but. obviously shortages of funds (during fiscal years 1933 and 1934 no funds were appropriated for the purpose) made impossible any adequate program of 

development and testing. los 

Wartime experience had emphasized one fact that the Corps never 

lost sight of in the postwar years. Wartime procurement of nearly 

275,000 motor vehicles, of over 200 different makes, had driven home the 

necessity for centra lized control o( motor-vehicle procurement in order 

to keep with in reasonab le limits the number of different types of such 

vehicles. Only by standardization could the Corps hope to supply spare 

parts efficiently for the maintenance and repair of the motor fleet. The 

problem of standardization had long been under study by Quartermaster 

officers. When, in the spring of 193 1, Congress appropriated funds for 

1030QMG Cir 1-10. 12 Dec 1928. par. 16; ibid., 18 May 1933. par. 19. 

IOf RG 94, AGO Records, liIe 319.12 (Annual Report of The Quartemlaster General. 

1932. p. 80). 

IO~ 48 Stal. 623 (Act. Apr 26. 19H). 

lOS RG 94. AGO Records, iiiI' 319.12 (Annual Reporl of The Quartermaster General. 

193'4. p. 15). 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 719 

the purchase of badly needed m OlOr transport in the Army, the funds to 

be made ava ilable for immediate expenditure as an unemployment relief 

measure, The Quartermaster Genera l unveiled a procurement plan that 

would promote standardization. T his was to be accomplished by "writiog into specifications performance requirements, quality and sturdiness of 

materials and design plus outside dimensions that will make units interchangeable in various types of vehicles." 1111 

Under this plan, the Corps purchased the first substantial number of 

trucks procured since the war. They represented six lypes, ranging from 

I Y2- to 6-lon capacity. Since the sizes and types could not be procured 

within the price stipulated in the appropriation act, the Corps, with War 

Department approval, purchased units and assemblies for chassis of all 

the authorized types and assembled the vehicles at the Holabird Depot. 

This action provoked vigorous criticism from some representatives of the 

au tomotive industry. Coupl ed with departmental competition and genu. 

ine disagreement on how best to atta in standardization, it led to an 

extended discussion of the procurement and standardization policy 

recommended by The Quartermaster General. The War Department 

settled one phase of the disagreement in September 1933 when it directed 

that, as a general rule, motor vehicles would be supplied as complete 

vehicles by the automotive industry.'o, 

Attack upon the policy of standardization and interchangeability 

then came from the Comptroll er General, who questioned the legality 

under procurement law of the policy of writing specifications in such 

detail that stipulations practically eliminated competition anq made 

award certain for a particular product.

lOt As long as the Corps could 

not write specifications to obtain uniformity of design, materials, or 

external dimensions, and had to accept the lowest bid from a responsible 

bidder, standardization could not be achieved. Only legislative action 

could resolve the conflict between procurement law and standardization 

efforts. The viewpoint of the Comptroller General found its way into 

Army Regulations.llo 

lOT (I) {bid., (Annual Report of T he Quartermaster Gener.al, 19-' 1. pp. 57-58). (2) See 

also Col. Edgar S. Stayer, "'The Yea r's Ad"ancement in Mil itary Motor Tran~po rl: ' The 

Quartermaster Rroiew, XII Gu l- Aug 1952), pp. -'3-57 . 

108 IVllr De/Jllrtme,,/ General Orders, 19JJ, GO 9, II Sep 1953. 

10. Decisiolls of Ih e Complroller CellulIl of Ihe Ulli/ed StilUs, "01. I!, Gul. I, 1933, 

to J un. 30, 1934). pp. 184-9 1; 477. 

110 AR 850- 15, Sec. I. par. 3d (1939) Itales: "The procuremem of motor "chicles other 

than combal "chicles will be limited to moddJl produced commercia lly by IWO or more 

competing companies and available at reuonable prices, and with the minimum de"iation 

frolll Ilandani commercial chassill necessary 10 conform to appro"ed mililary characteristiCi 

SCI up for Ihe using ann or sc",ice 10 which the "ehicle ill allocaled. The parts and unit 

assemblies 110 used will be standard production in the automotive indunry." 
720 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T HE ARMY 

The Quartermaster Corps undertook no large-sca le replacement of 

obsolete motor equipment in the postwar years. Instead, limited funds 

compelled the Corps to follow a piecemeal procurement of motor vehicles 

of manufacturers' standard commercia l production which resulted in the 

acquisition of a motor fleet of different makes and models (over 300). 

It also led to the virtual abandonment of Quartermaster distribution of 

parts and units. Available funds did not permit the purchase of stocks 

of units and parts for so many makes and models of motor vehicles as were 

purchased after the war. It therefore became necessary to decentralize 

such procurement and to buy locally the units and parts needed for 

repair purposes.1I1 

The Quartermaster General continued to stress the need for standardization in order to make maintenance in a wartime theater feasible. 

In the summer of 1939, the War Department, acting on recommendations 

of the Quartermaster Technical Committee, modihed its position to the 

extent of directing that all military requirements for general-purpose 

tactical motor transportation be met by five chassis types. In order to 

insure maximum standardization, it directed that procurement of the 

largest possible number of vehicles be accomplished on a once-a-year basis. 

T he War Department further directed that maximum interChangeability 

of major parts and unit assemblies be obtained within the industry 

applicable to standard chassis and capable of meeting essential performance requirements of the arms and services.

lU 

This action made possible further progress toward standardization. 

The only remaining obstacle was adherence to the practice of procuring 

on a competitive basis. Legislation permitting the abandonment of the 

formal advertising method was passed on 2 July 1940. It authorized 

the Secretary of War to enter into contracts "with or without advertising." IU Though passage of the law did not bring to an end the long 

struggle over standardiza tion, it did remove one o( the principal obstacles 

to acquiring uniform vehicles. By that time, however, the country was 

well into the emergency period and would soon be at war. 

Indusl1'ial Mobilization and Procu1'emenl Planning 

Other than the purchase of food, forage, and fuel, which accounted 

for the larger part of Quartermaster expenditures during most of these 

III RG 94, AGO Records, file 1U9.12 (Annual Report of T he Quartermaster General, 

1935, p. 8: 1937, pp. 11-12). 

111 Vernon Cantr:n.sen, "Molor Transport Under The QuarlermUler General, 1903-

1942," pp. 70-7 1 (Historical MSS on file in Office, QM H istorian). This slUdy provides a 

far more detailed ana lysis of the standarditation problem than is presented in this chapter. 

l U 54 Slat. 712. 
\ 

AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 721 

years, Quartermaster procurement of supplies was minimal in amount. 

This was a natural consequence of having on hand huge surpluses of 

clothing and equipment that obviated the need for procurement. The 

development of policies governing procurement was, to some extent, 

shaped by the need to economize. No account of this development 

would be complete, however. without some brief reference to industrial 

mobilization and procurement planning during these years. Such plan· 

ning was an innovation in Quartermaster activities, a direct legacy of the 

war tbat Congres.s incorporated into the defense system. 

Under the National Defense Act of 1920, the Assistant Secretary of 

War was charged with making "adequate provision for mobilization of 

mat~riel and industrial organizations essential to war·time needs." Since 

the law also made the General Staff responsible for "the mobilization of 

the manhood of the Nation and its material resources in an emergency," 

a conflict of authority was raised that had to be resolved by evolving a 

workable division of responsibility.lu 

About a year later, an Army board, headed by Maj. Gen. James G. 

Harbord, Deputy Chief of Staff, was appointed to resolve the conflict. 

Its recommendations. later embodied in a general order, provided for 

General Staff determination of the supply requirements of the Army and 

vested responsibility for fulfilling these requirements in the Assistant 

Secretary of War. III In carrying out their respective functions. the 

General Staff and the Assistant Secretary of War had to rely on the 

Quartermaster General and the chiefs of the other supply bureaus. who 

were responsible for most of the essential elements of military supply as 

analyzed by the Harbord board. Preparation of specifications and detailed drawings of the mat~riel to be obtained; inspection, test, and 

acceptance for adoption of types; and storage and issue were elements 

that involved only the military relationship of the supply branches with 

the General Staff. Purchase. production. and inspection of facilities were 

elements of military supply that placed the supply bureaus under the 

control and supervision of the Assistant Secretary of War.lIt 

In the broader planning field. the development of strategic war plans 

and plans for the mobilization of manpower remained a duty of the 

General Staff. General Staff divisions did much preliminary work before 

Ito 41 Stat. 765-64 Uun 4, 1920). 

110 (I) Hearings before the Committee on Military Affain, HR, 69th Cong., 2d sess .. 

"Hinoria! Documenu Relating to the Reorganization Plans of the War Department and 

to the Present National Defense Act," (Wuhington. 1928). pp. 580-8~. (2) War Department 

Genertlf Orden, 1921, GO 41 , 16 Aug 1921. 

l uThe so·called Harbord decision provided only a temporary arrangement; procure· 

ment malleT$ later required further clarification which wu finally obtained in an Army 

Regulation 5-5. iu ued on 16 July 1932. 
722 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

a basic War Department Mobilization Plan was published in 1923. Its 

publication resulted in the preparation of annexes and unit plans by all 

lower command and staff echelons. among which was the Quartermaster 

annex to the General Mobilization Plan. In the course of the next 

decade, during which the plan was repeatedly revised. Quartermaster 

planning efforts were directed toward the preparation of studies of war 

reserves; tables of organization and of basic allowances; regulations governing transportation, shelter, and supply of troops during mobilization; 

and Quartermaster unit plans and requirements for specialists and their 

training. War Department manpower planning culminated in the 

Protective Mobilization Plan of 1937. When actual mobilization began 

in the summer of 1940, the revised Protective Mobilization Plans proved 

useful as a guide, though the planners had failed to provide an adequate 

force for meeting the demands made by World War II. They had also 

assumed that mobilization would be sudden on the outbreak of war 

rather than relatively slow during many months of nominal peaceyT 

While the General Staff projected plans for the mobilization of manpower, the Assistant Secretary of War was responsible for two closely 

interrelated functions-procurement planning and industrial mobilization planning. The latter was the broader function that could be carried 

forward only on the basis of well-developed procurement plans. Concerned with formulating policies iOlended to facilitate the transition of 

the couOlry's economy from a peacetime to a wartime footing. the Office 

of the AssistaOl Secretary of War performed industrial mobilization 

planning. 111 

On the other hand, the Assistant Secretary's direction of procurement 

planning was largely supervisory in character. Within the framework 

of policies enunciated by his office, he relied on the Quartermaster Corps 

and the other supply services to develop detailed procurement plans. 

Much of the early planning of the Corps was concerned with working 

out plans for the conversion of each Quartermaster article of supply into 

terms of raw or finished material required, and with investigating the 

resources of the country in materials and manufacturing facilities. 11I In 

accordance with the requiremen ts established in the Industrial Mobilizali T <i) 'or a ruller dbcussion or mobilization pianning, sec MaTVin A. Kreidberg and 

Merton G, Henry, History of Milita ry Mobiliurl;on ;" the U" ited Stat es Army. 171J-1941 

(DA Pamphlet No. 20-2 12, GPO, 1955), pp. 377--492. (2) Rderenas to Quartermaster 

pa rticipation in this planning are to be round in RG 94, AGO Record$, file 319.12 (Annual 

Repom or The Quartermaste r General, 192<1- 37, passim). 

li S .'or exhaustive analysls or such planning, sec Ha rold W. Thatcher, Plamli!!g for 

I'ldjlslriu/ Mobili%l1lio'l. 1920---/0, QMC H ISTORICAL STUDIES NO.4 (n .p .. August 1945). 

II' RG 94, AGO R~Tdl, file 319.12 (Annual Reports of The Quartermaster Geoel'lll, 

1921-37, ptmim). 
I 

AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 723 

tion Plan, the Quartermaster planners drafted plans for an integrated 

program of wartime procurement that would avoid the difficulties experienced during World War I. These plans, calling for decentralization 

of procurement operations, soon centered the latter in procurement districts that were more or less coterminous with the nine corps areas into 

which the country was divided for military purposes. Procurement 

planners in the districts surveyed the production facilities within their 

districts that were capable of furnishing the clothing, equipment. and 

other supplies needed by the troops to be mobilized in their corps areas. 

On the basis of their findings. the Quartermaster planners specifically 

allocated to these industrial facilities the needs of the Corps. executing 

production schedules with the plants that were earmarked for the use 

of the Corps. On the day of mobilization (M Day) and during the 

following war period. contracts were to be negotiated with the allocated 

facilities in accordance with the war procurement plans that were kept up 

to date by periodic revisions. The peacetime method of formal advertising for bids in contracting for supplies was to be abandoned, and, on 

M Day, planning activities were to be absorbed by current procurement 

operations.1ti1 The transition from a state of limited emergency, proclaimed by the President in 1939, to war in 1941 was so gradual that no 

M Day was recognized and, in consequence, the provisions of the procure· 

ment plans and Industrial Mobilization Plan were not implemented 

according to schedule. Nonetheless, such planning provided a greater 

degree of industrial and military preparedness in 1941 than had existed 

in 1917. 

Procurement Policy 

In the course of these years. procurement policy governing daily 

operations followed a line of development that was not identical with that 

taken by the procurement planners for future emergencies. Unlike the 

decentralized procurement shaped by the planners, the concept of centralized control guided daily operations. It will be recalled that when 

General Aleshire became Quartermaster General in 1907, he had introduced a decentralized system of procurement, but that designated classes 

of supplies had been handled by certain depots, as, for example. the 

Philadelphia Depot, which, since its establishment, had been a center for 

the procurement of clothing and equipage and which also manufactured 

such supplies at its factory. Under the impact of war, this system, 

• til )o'or a comprehensive account of the development of Quartennalter procurement 

planl, Itt Thoma.. M. Pitkin and Herbert R. Rifkind. Procure/mml PllIlI>ling in the QUllrtu· 

mtJJier Corps. 192Q-fO, QMC HISTORICAL STUDl.ES No. 1 (n.p., March 19-45). 
724 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

described as "a sort of decentralized centralization," had given way to 

greater and more effective cemralization of control and operations. 

Progress in that direction had been furthered by the passage of the Overman Act on May 20, 191 8. That law permitted greater consolidation 

of Army purchasing through the establishment of an interbureau procurement system, whereby all articles bought mainly by one supply bureau 

were centralized for purchase in that agency,m Centralizing contracting 

first in the commodity divisions of the Office of the Quartermaster General and later in the Purchase and Storage Division in Washington, as 

well as in a few field procurement offices, had not proved conducive to 

an effective use of the country's resources in 1918. To remedy that situation by a wider distribution of contracts and by building on the existing 

Quartermaster depot system. the War Department had established a zone 

system, under which it divided the country into procurement and distribution zones and designated the depot quartermasters as zone supply 

officers responsible for supply activities in their zones.lIZ 

The value of centralized control of procurement had been fully 

demonstrated during the war, and Quartermaster General Rogers and his 

successors retained it as the policy of the Office. The War Department 

inactivated a number of wartime depots following the armistice and abandoned the zone system in favor of the former depot system. Once again. 

the Quartermaster Corps resumed, in 1920, the practice of centralizing 

purchase of specific articles in designiated depots and, during the next 

two decades, extended and refined it. In addition, the Corps introduced 

decentralized procurement for such supplies as could be more economically obtained at depots. POStS, camps, and stations. 12! 

Not all of the advantages growing out of the Overman Act were 

lost. The National Defense Act of 1920 provided that the Quartermaster 

General was to be responsible for the purchase and procurement for the 

Army of all supplies of standard manufacture and of all supplies common 

to two or more branches. Special or technical articles used or issued 

exclusively by a supply department were to be procured by that department. The War Department implemented this provision of the law on 

25 September 1920.124 Interbranch procurement, however, made little 

or no progress in the next 10 years. In 1931, the Assistant Secretary of 

War appointed a board of officers to study supply tables of the War Department branches in order to eliminate dual procurement of articles 

,2> Sec alrle, pp. 628, 639. 

122 Anuual R eporl 0/ the Quartermaster Gwerlll, 1919, p. 31. 

lU RG 94, AGO Records, file 519.12 (Annual Report of The Quartermaster General, 

1931, p. 57). 

124 Welr Depelrtme>lt Ge>l e ral Orders, 1920, GO 61. 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 725 

of common use in the Army.IU Other boards continued the work but 

the goal had by no means been achieved by 1940. 

The need for economy in Quartermaster supply operations led to 

efforts to improve procurement methods by eliminating wasteful practices 

and duplication of work. This development was further stimulated by 

the impact of th e depression that began in 1929, and was reHected in 

Q uartermaster partici pation in consolidated contracts and the system of 

interdepartmental procurement. Having participated on an experimental basis in some lubricating oil contracts annually entered into by 

the Navy Department, the Corps, in 1930, extended this practice to cover 

Quartermaster requirements for lubricating oils for almost every purpose. 

Such consolidated contracts had the ad vantage of giving the Corps uniform and satisfactory grades of oil at less cost, reducing paper work 

required in advertising for bids, and eliminating the need for Quartermaster testing, since the Navy Department prov ided exhaustive tests of 

the products.

12G 

The Corps soon also obtained the gasoline it required through contracts negotia ted by the Navy Department. In the 1930's, additional 

legislation and executive direction broadened the application of the 

system of interdepartmental procurement. As a result, the Corps also 

made purchases under the General Schedule of Supplies of the Treasury 

Department and purchased from the Federal Prison Industries, Inc., such 

articles as brooms, brushes, automobile tags, steel furniture, and other 

items it procured for the Army.m 

In summary, it became Quartermaster Corps policy th roughout the 

years between World War I and II to fill the larger part of Army requirements for Quartermaster.suppli es by direct procurement from manufacturers and producers, letting contracts by formal advertising until 2 July 

1940 when that method was abandoned. It obtained some supplies by 

participation in consolidated contracts made by other governmenta l 

agencies and by purchase from other such agencies. The Corps also 

manufactured some 'articles in factori es that it operated at its depots as 

it had been doing since the days of the Mexican War. 

Quartermaster procurement of supplies and services, however. was 

not accompliShed without criticism, particularly during the depression 

years. Then, the sale to the Corps and other government agencies of 

prison products, produced in competition with private enterprise, aroused 

,25 RG 94. ACO Records. me 319.12 (Annual Report of The Quartermaster General, 

1932. p. 82; 1933, p. 23). 

12ft/bid., (Annual Report of The Quarlermaster General, 193'0, pp. 32-38). 

12T (I) 47 SIIlI. 1517 (Mar 3. 1933); 46 SIIlI. 392 (May 27, 1930). (2) Gcncral Orders 

Ilnd Dul/dins, 1928-)), Bulletin 15 (Ex. Order 6166. 10 JUIl 1933). 
726 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF T H E ARMY 

opposition among various manufacturing interests who protested the practice. Similarl y, the operation of Quartermaster repair shops and laundries, and the manufacture of products at government-owned factories, 

particularly the production of clothing by the factory at the Philade lphia 

Depot, brought so many complaints that a congressional committee investigated such opera tions and services. The net effect was to curtail though not to eliminate. governmen t competition with private 

enterprise. us 

ReSeal"ch 

The Corps has always been interested in and responsible, in cooperation with the using arms, for the development of Quartermaster items 

of supply. The development and completion of the best types of equipment and armament in time of peace was an announced basic policy of 

the War Department following World War I, even if actual procurement 

had to be deferred to a future time.' t~ To impl ement ~his policy, the 

War Department directed the chiefs of the branches of the Army to make 

annual surveys of adopted types of equipment and armament with which 

their troops were provided in order to determine if such types were 

abreast of current developments and satisfactory for an emergency. 

These annua l surveys and the reports of deficiencies based on them were 

a primary stimulant to improvement of design. Those portions of the 

surveys that pointed out inadequac ies in Quartermaster items of issue 

were forwarded to The Quartermaster General [or action. The Corps 

thereupon took steps to improve the existing design of the articl es or to 

develop new ones. It sought their adoption as standardized items of 

issue, and it prepared and held in readiness specifications governing their 

procurement." 11 

While this policy and its implementation had the virtue of introducing an clement of systemization into developmental work, the Corps 

evolved no integrated program of research. Only as the annual surveys 

reported deficiencies in clothing and equipment did the Corps take steps 

to improve items individ ually. It d id not stress the relationship of items 

of equipment to each other, except in the fi eld of motor transport items. 

T he Office of The Quartermaster General made efforts to co-ordinate 

Quartermaster research within the Corps and with other supply services. 

121 For a fuller treatment of this development and of procurement in general, set: 

Harry B. Yoshpe and Marion V. Massen, PrQCurtmumt Poiicit:s and Proct:d!lrt:S in I/!t: 

Quartt:rmastt:r Corfu During World War 11, QMC HISTORICAL STUDIES No. 17 (Wash.· 

ington, 1947), pp. 12- 18. 

,n Risch., Quartt:rmastt:r Corps: OrganiUllioll, Supply, lind Stroius, I, 52. 

"IlSee AR 85()..25, 15 Dec 1924. 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 727 

The establishment of a Quartermaster Corps Technical Committee early 

in 1922 on instructions of the Secretary of War furthered co-ordination. 

This Committee served as an advisory board on equipment problems and 

was responsible for effecting complete co-ordination among all interested 

branches of the Army during development of types of equipment for 

which the Corps had responsibility.UI 

Obviously, the huge stocks of surplus supplies on hand after the war 

hindered the development of new items, despite expressed War Department policy to the contrary. An even morc restrictive faClOr during these 

20 years was the inadequacy of funds for research purposes. III World 

War II critics of this prewar research program dismissed its accomplishments as negligible. They charged that the Army started World War II 

using the same kind of equipment with which it had ended the previous 

war. Others added that the situation was much worse, since items developed as a resu lt of field experience in 1917 and 1918 were modified 

in peacetime to make them more suitable for garrison life. This was 

undoubtedly true of the evolution o( the Army uni(orm.u~ On the 

other hand, the Quartermaster Corps developed in these years the basic 

uniform fabrics used throughout World War II. II. 

As interest in preparation (or national defense revived in the decade 

of the Thirties, the Corps did accomplish much that was o( value. In 

1936, for example, the Corps eStablished a Subsistence Research Laboratory at Ch icago. It was responsible for the development of the D ration, 

an emergency ration of the survival type, and of the C ration, a combattype ration designed to provide a soldier with three nutritionally balanced, 

satisfying,meals a day, independent of centra l messing facilities. UI 

The modernization of standard equipment for which the Corps was 

responsible progressed steadily, though slowly. The Corps developed a 

few new pieces of equipment, the most notable of which were the jeep 

and other multiple-wheel-drive vehicles. Though at this late date it is 

impossible to determine whether more could have been accomplished 

and at a faster pace, within the limits imposed by Stringent budgets, a 

1I1 0QMG 00 10, 24 Jan 1922. Thi. order officially established the Commitlee. but 

itl minute. actually date from 10 October 192 1. 

I U See Mark S. Wal$On. Chie/ 0/ SlaO: Prewar Pfans aftd Prelx'raliO>l1 in U.S. ARMY 

IN WORLD WAR II (Wash ington, 1950). pp. 112.42.47-49. 

,uSee Ema Risch and Thomas M. Pitkin . CIOlhi>lg Ille Soldier 0/ World War 11, 

QMC HISTORICAL STUDIES No. 16. (Washington. 1!H6). pp. 50 ff. 

IU These included IB-ounce serge for enlbted mens' uniform •• 52·ounce melton for 

oveTCO<lh. elastique for officers' unifonns. and herringbone twill for work clothes . 

... (I) See Harold W. Thatcher. Tile DttMlopme"t 0/ Special Ratio"s lor the Arm)" 

QMC HISTORICAL STUDIES No.6 (Washington. 1944). passi",. for more details on prewar 

developmenh in Wi, field. (2) See also Walter P0rge5. ''The Subsistence Research Labo· 

ratory" (CQMD Historical Studies No. I. I May I!HII). On file in Office. QM Hinorian. 
728 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

certain amount of essentia l preparatory grou ndwor k was laid in the 

decade of the Thirties that permitted the developmem of a morc scientific 

research program later. 

Qum"te1"masleJ" Suppm't of Non-Mililm, Pmjecls 

In 1933, the Quartermaster Corps was afforded an opportunity to 

test the effectiveness to meet emergenc ies of the organization that it had 

developed after World War 1. In this test, the Corps functioned not in 

support of a military mobilization but of a non-military project. This 

was by no means an unusua l assignment. Participation in relief measures 

had long ago become an accepted though littl e publicized facet of Quartermaster Corps activities. As early as 1838, a Q uartermaster officer had 

been directed lO relieve the distress of Charleston, S.C., citizens, whose 

homes had been destroyed by fire, by furnishing them with accommodations in the barracks and quarters of the forts in the harborY' In the 

ensuing 95 years, the Corps supplied sufferers in tornadoes, cyclones, 

hurricanes, yellow fever epidemics, earthquakes, fires, and floods with 

tents, cots, blankets, bed sacks, and clothing. Floods were almost a 

yearly event in the Mississippi Va lley.U7 Most of such supplies the 

Corps furnished on a loan basis, since this was government property for 

which it was accountable. Frequently, the articl es supplied were not 

returned and their value became a total loss to the Army's clothing 

appropriation. Upon occasion, Congress provided funds and authorized 

purchase of tentage for re lief purposes.us 

Some of these d isasters reached major proportions. Such were the 

Mississippi VaHey floods of 1913 and 1927. In the 1927 flood, the Corps 

expended supplies valued at almost $3 million, and T he Quartermaster 

General warned that the loss of tentage in particular would be seriously 

felt in event of a similar disaster in the next year or in an emergency 

requiring mobilization. no Still another major disaster in which the 

Corps furnished a large measure of relief was the earthquake and fire that 

swept through San Francisco in 1906. To meet the continuing needs in 

that city, Congress appropriated fu nds and made provision for reimbursing the Corps for the supplies it had issued, the value of which was almost 

188 RG 92, OQMG Letter Book, No. 26, p. 247 (Ltr, Actg QMG to rust. QM Engle, 

9 May 1838). 

117 See, for example, RG 94, AGO Record" file 319.12 (Annual Report' of the Quarter. 

master Genen!, 1881, p. 20: 1882, p. 7; 1884, p. 22). 

118 See, for example, 26 SIal. 33 (Act, Mar 31, 1890); 30 Slat. 216 Goint Re50lution, 

Mar 24, (897). 

1111 RG 94, AGO Records, file 319.12 (Annual Report of The Quartermaster General, 

1927, pp. 48-50; 54). 
I 

I 

AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 729 

$700,000"00 The relief policy was so well established by the 1930's that 

when the needs of the unemployed in the depression years surpassed the 

ability of charitable organizations to meet them, the Corps loaned cots 

and bedding to accredited charitable organizations for the use of the 

unemployed.w 

When Franklin D. Roosevelt became President, he made a major 

effort to relieve unemployment. In response to his suggestion, Congress. 

in March 1933. enacted legislation establishing the Civilian Conservation 

Corps.ltt That Corps enrolled young men to work on forestry, flood 

control, prevention of soil erosion, and similar projects. tbe work to be 

under the technical supervision of the Departments of Agriculture and 

Interior. The War Department was charged with many important functions in support of the Civilian Conservation Corps, in the execution of 

which the Secretary of War assigned to the Quartermaster Corps the 

task of supplying the men with food. clothing, equipment, and shelter, 

and of transporting them to and from their work camps. 

Enrollment began on 6 April without causing any supply difficulties, 

hut. on 12 May, the President directed that the entire quota of menabout 300,OOO-were to be at work by 1 July. Since this force was 

almost three times the strength of the Regular Army within the continentallimits of the United States, this acceleration of enrollment required 

a supply effort closely paralleling that needed in a major military 

mobilization. In consequence, it provided a fair test of the effectiveness 

of the Quartermaster Corps' supply machinery.u, 

The Quartermaster Corps clothed and equipped the men without 

any delay, since it sti1l had on hand from World War I large stocks of 

Army clothing, tentage. and other equipage. Their availability greatly 

reduced the requirements that had to be filled by purchase. Distinctive 

articles of the uniform, however, had LO be altered before issue in order 

to make them suitable for civilian wear. The Quartermaster Corps 

accomplished most of the alterations, as well as the production of large 

quantities of denim clothing and tentage at the Philadelphia Depot's 

UO (I) Ibid., (Annual Report of the Quartermaster Genenl, 1906. pp. 40-42). (2) For 

Quartennaster activity in this d isaster sce reports in RG 92. OQMG Document File, ISOO--

1915. BoxCi 55"!l8. 5!1!19. 

IU RC 94, AGO Records, file !l19.12 (Annual Reports of The Quartermaster General, 

19!12, pp. 47-48; 19!1!1, p. !l0). 

m4S Stat. 22- 23 (Act, Mar !I I, 19!1!1). 

H' (I) A full report on Quartennaster l upport of the Civilian Conservation Corps is 

to be found in RG 94. AGO Records, file !l 19.12 (Annual Report of The Quartennaster 

General, 19!1!1. pp. 69-76). Additional data il in sections of Illbsequent Annual Reporu 

for 19!14 through 1937. (2) See also Capt. Francis V. Fill Gerald , "The President PrescribesThe Organiz.ation and Supply or the C.C.C .. " Th", Quartumllsl"" R"",iew, XII I Qu i- Aug 

19!15). pp. 7- 18. 
no QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

clothing factory, the laboring force of which was more than doubled to 

do the work. The Quartermaster General decentralized purchases of all 

classes of supplies to the depots, directing depot quartermasters to circu· 

late purchase information as widely as possible among prospective bidders, 

including those at facilities listed in procurement plans. Once the 

Civilian Conservation Corps completed initial mobilization, the Philadelphia Depot purchased all clothing and equipage to avoid competition 

among the depots. but it continued to make awards of contracts in all 

parts of the country. 

To subsist the men of the Civilian Conservation Corps, The Quartermaster General provided the same ration furnished Regular Anny personnel. The camps procured perishables locally, except that in some 

cases Quartermaster supply depots purchased meats on monthly contracts. 

Subsistence supply functioned smoothly, but difficulties had to be solved 

in transporting rations to work camps remote from markets. 

The Quartermaster Corps provided tentage for shelter both at conditioning camps and at work projects. Corps area commanders were 

responsible for the construction of temporary buildings and the installation of utilities at work projects, with Quartermaster personnel providing 

technical advice and assistance. 

Transportation was a serious problem. Since most of the men came 

from congested centers in the East and a large number of work projects 

were located in the Far West, The Quartermaster General reported that 

"a transcontinental movement of almost unparalleled proportions in 

peace time" had to be undertaken. The corps area commander handled 

movements within his corps area unless they involved the use of sleeping 

car equipment. In such cases, the Office of The Quartermaster General 

made the arrangements. 1t also handled all movements from one corps 

area to another. The American Railway Association and the Pullman 

Company assigned some of their personnel to the Office to assist in transportation. The carriers also placed some of their personnel on duty at 

each corps area headquarters. In consequence of these arrangements and 

the cooperation of the railroads, the Quartermaster Corps accomplished 

the movement of Civilian Conservation Corps personnel without incident. 

By the time the first work camps-some 1,470-were completed, the 

task of the Quartermaster Corps in supporting the Civilian Conservation 

Corps had become routine and subsequent expansions of the program 

posed no probl ems. The demands made on the Quartermaster Corps 

necessitated no changes in organization, and, so smoothly did supply 

operations function, that Quartermaster officers were convinced the Corps 

was not only properly organized but sufficiently flexible to meet every 

emergency in the future. 
AN INTERLUDE OF PEACE 731 

Impact of the Eme1'gency 

Six years later, war began in Europe. The small but potentiall y 

expandable Quartermaster Corps at once felt its impact. To house the 

growing Army, and to clothe, equip, and subsist it, the Corps' organization 

in the fie ld and at Washington was expanded. That expansion could be 

orderly because of the extended period of the emergency which lasted 

from the presidential proclamation of limited emergency in September 

1939 to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. During these 

months, Quartermaster preparations were accelerated and when war came 

not only was the Army better prepared but the Quartermaster Corps also 

was in better position to support it than it had been in any previous war. 

CHAPTER XVII 

In Retrospect 

The Quartermaster suppl y function undoubtedly is as old as th e 

first army that look the fi eld, but the term "Quartermaster" appears not 

to have come into general usage in Europe until the rise of standing 

armies in the 16th century. The derivation of the term is traced to the 

German "Quartier-Me ister" or the Dutch "Kwaniermeester. " It was 

late in the 17th century, however, before the title "Quarter-MasterGeneral" was introduced in the British Army. Beginning in 1686, one 

or morc British Quarter-Masters-General were appointed. Service in 

the colonial wars familiarized American colonists with British army 

organization and led the Continental Congress to establish the post of 

Quartermaster General in Washington's Army in 1775. 

For 43 years after the Continental Congress authorized the appointment of the first Quartermaster General, that offi cer functioned as the 

principa l staff officer of the commanding general or the forces that took 

the field, but his existence was wholl y dependent on a state of war. When 

the country was at peace. his office ceased to exist. No matter how small 

an Army was maintained in peacetime. the troops still had to be transported to their desti nations, provided with quarters, and furn ished with 

rations, clothing, equipment. and ammuniLion. ]n the absence of a 

Quartermaster General, such suppl y duties devolved upon the Secretary 

of War. Even more compelling than the need to relieve the Secretary of 

such responsibilities was the necessity to provide the military establishment in time of peace with an organization that would make it efficient 

in time of war. That fact was forcibly demonstrated during the 'War 

of 18 12. 

]n the years following that war, persistent efforts eventually resulted 

in a reorganization of the staff departments in 181S. A fundamental 

change was then introduced in the concept of the Quartermaster General 

of the Army. Secretary of War Joh n C. Ca lhoun sought and obtained 

legislation creating staff bureaus in Wash ington, and the Quartermaster 

General became a bureau chief residing at the capital. His ten ure was 

no longer limited to a wa r period and, in the absence of pension and 

retirement systems, his assignment was for life. It was not until IS82 

that provision was made for mandatory retirement. After Maj. Gen. 
734 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Montgomery C. Meigs retired in that year, the Secretaries of War generally followed the principle of sen iority in selecting the Quartermasters 

General who succeeded him. 

The term "bureau chie£" is apt to evoke an image of an offi cer who 

headed a subdi vision o[ the War Department and executed th e various 

responsibilities assigned to him through a large number of subordinates. 

both military and civilian, functioning in assigned areas of a compart· 

mentalized agency. Nothing could be fanher from the actuality in 1818 

and for many years thereafter. When Quartermaster General Thomas S. 

Jesup set up his office in onc or two rooms of the War Department building in 18 18, he viewed it as "properly a Military One" and insisted on 

being permitted to select officers from the Army who were sufficiently 

qualified as clerks to handle all clerica l duties and who. at the same time, 

were sufficiently versed in the details of military service to make them 

useful and efficient. His ulterior motive was to make his offi ce a school 

of instruction, in which you ng officers w·ould have an opportunity to 

educate themselves for the various duties of the staff. As originally 

established. therfore, Maj. Trueman Cross, who acted as assistant to the 

Quartermaster Genera l, headed the office staff. It also included two other 

officers and a sergeant but no professional clerks because Jesup opposed 

employing them on the grounds that they would be of little assistance to 

him beyond casting accounts and copying letters. 

As Quartermaster duties increased and the number of offi cers available to assist him in Washington dwindled to two officers and sometimes 

to one, J esup's views on clerical he lp necessarily changed. By 1824, he 

employed two civilian clerks. To keep the office records current, the 

War Department also detailed three sergeants for duty as extra clerks. In 

emergencies, Congress authorized the temporary hire of extra civilian 

clerks. but, in the pre-Civil War years, the permanent clerical staff did 

not exceed six men. Perched on three-legged stools before high desks. 

reminiscent of Scrooge's mercantile establishment so vividly described 

by Charles Dickens, these clerks kept the large letter books of the office 

in longhand, recorded contracts and claims, and carefully maintained 

the ledgers of property and monetary accountability, each clerk bei ng 

assigned certain res ponsibil ities. T he same chief clerk and most of his 

assistants served throughout the years before the Civil War. As in the 

case of the military personnel, the civilian clerk, in the absence of a retirement system, served at his post until death removed him. 

Not until the Civil ' Var increased the work of the office tremendously 

did the Quartermaster General establish a divisional organization of 

duties, large ly along commodity lines. A Quartermaster officer and his 

assistants who were served by an increasingly large clerica l staff directed 
l 

IN RETROSPECT 735 

the work of each division. After the Civil War, the office force expanded 

during subsequent war years and contracted in periods of retrenchment 

hut, although the number of divisions dwindled to as few as four by 

1898, the divisional organization was thereah er retained. 

The Civil War marked the first time tha t female clerks were hired 

in the office of the Quartermaster General. Retrenchment after the war 

did n ot eliminate them; in [aCl, there was considerable pressure to continue employing those most in need. General Meigs had viewed the 

advent of the female clerk with alarm. His sympathies, however, were 

touched by their appeals, and he was instrumenta l in getting Congress to 

enact a special law during the war to allow a certain number of female 

copyists to be employed in the office. But when the Secretary of War 

referred more and more needy female applicants to him in the postwar 

years, he tartly informed the latter that the limit of employment in his 

office had been reached. He was glad, he wrote the Secretary in 1877, 

that the office "has been abl e to offer a refuge to so many widows and 

relations of deceased officers," but he quickly added that under the revised 

sta tutes a woman had the right to aspire to any clerkship for which she 

was competent in any bureau. If the law was therefore enforced in all 

War Department offices, he pointed out, the Secretary would be able to 

extend employment to more female applicants and thus spare himse lf the 

pain of refusing them. The female clerk and copyist remained. The 

general use of the typewriter before the close of the 19th century assured 

her continuing employment, for, when Meigs first ex perimented with the 

use of the Sholes and Glidden typewriter in 1874, he found that women 

were better and more rapid copyists than men with " this instrument." 

The shih from chief staff officer of the commandi ng general to 

bureau chief, heading an office in Washington, had an impact that was 

not immediately apparent. Concerned with problems of property accountabil ity, funds control. and the preparation and defense of estimates 

for appropriations, the Quartermaster General, as well as other bureau 

ch iefs, reported directl y to the Secretary of ' Val' rather than to the Com· 

manding General of the Army. In time, they developed a close and 

influential relationship with Congress. T hat influence aroused suspicions tha t the interests of the staff were being promoted at the expense 

of. those of the line. A genera l feeling developed, too, that the needs 

of the line were not even known to the staff officer. T hat attitude 

furthered the resentment against staff removal from line control and laid 

the basis for the staff and li ne controversy, involvi ng the Commandi ng 

General of the Army, the Secretary of War, and the staff bureaus, that 

grew to large proportions afte r the Civil War. The fundamental problem of control was not tack led until Elihu Root as Secretary of War 
736 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

pushed through legislation in 1903 that abolished the separate office of 

Commanding General of the Army, established the position of Ch ief 

of Staff, and brought the suppl y departments under the latter's superVISion. T he long-range objective of th is reform, however, was not 

achieved before World War I. 

In addition to this shift in basic control, two other developments, 

attributable to the reform spirit engendered by the Spanish-American 

War, brought changes affecting Q uartermaster personnel. One of these 

was the introd uction of the detail system. For 85 years the Department 

had adhered to the J esup concept of developing a body of officers trained 

and experienced in the conduct of the Department's busi ness. Pursuit 

of that policy had been eminently successful ; it had produced Q uartermasters of the ca liber of Ingalls, Allen, and Rucker. At Root's insistence, 

Congress had discarded that conce pt in favor of the idea that line officers 

could be detail ed for 4·year tours of duty in the Quartermaster's Department to execute its functi ons. This rotation, proponents of the detail 

system argu"ed, would permit the line officer to acq uire an insight into 

supply operations, would provide the staff bureaus with a better knowledge of the needs of the Army, a nd, it was anticipated, wou ld resolve the 

line and staff comroversy. The change was to be effected gradually, but 

ultimately it wou ld end the se paration of line and staff, to wh ich critics 

attributed much of the maladministration of the suppl y services during 

th e Spanish.American \·Var. At a time when the commercia l world was 

increasingly emphasizing specialization, it was abandoned in the Quartermaster's DepartmeOl, though not without protest from succeedi ng Quartermasters General. This sweeping change proved temporary in character. Congress mod ified it in 1920 to the extent of permanently 

commissioning in the Corps officers above the grade of captain, who, since 

1903, had been detailed from other branches of the Army. It thereby 

re·established a career for supply officers. 

Militarization of the Corps had been a reform advocated by Quartermaster officers since th e time of the Mexica n War. It was finally achieved 

in 1912. Before that time, the Department had employed ma ny civilians 

to do the work of clerks, blacksmiths, packers, teamsters, engineers, fire· 

men, carpenters, and laborers. Quartermasters frequently experienced 

difficulty in controlling such civilian workers. Failure of such workers 

to carry out instructions could conceivab ly hamper operations. When 

civilians were not availab le for the tasks to be performed or funds did 

not permit th eir hire, commanders detailed soldiers on extra duty for the 

purpose. Opposed by commanding officers, this practice was a solution 

that worked a hardship on the Army, particularly during active operations, when Army strength might be diminished at a time of greatest 
IN RETROSPECT 737 

need. FOT the first time, Congress authorized the establishment of a 

service corps of enlisted men in 19 12 which demonstrated itS usefulness 

a few years later in World War I. T hough only truck, wagon, pack, and 

bakery companies existed in 1917, before the war ended the War Department had authorized, and the Quartermaster Corps in the A.E.F. had 

used, 26 different types of units. 

Along with these trends came modifications in the responsibilities 

assigned to the QuartermaSter General. These changes transformed the 

organization from a transportation agency to a supply department responsible for the procurement, distribution, maintenance. and salvage of 

supplies. Allhough the Quartermaster General in 1775 had a basic 

responsibility for quartering the troops. his primary function was the 

transportation of men and supplies. Procurement was limited to the 

purchase of tentage and the means to enable the troops to erect huts for 

winter quarters. The Quartermaster General also procured the boats, 

when necessary, and the wagons, animals, and forage needed to keep 

supply lines moving and to permit the Army to take the fi eld. 

Transportation and construction continued to be the major functions 

of the Quartermaster's Department throughout the 19th century. In 

1862, when railroads began to play an increasingly important role in wartime operations, Thomas A. Scott, an experienced railroadman then 

serving as Assistant Secretary of War, suggested the establishment of a 

separate transportation agency. Neither that proposal nor a similar 

recommendation made by the Dodge Commission in 1899 received consideration. T he increasing compl exities of modern war ultimately 

brought a reassignment of Quartermaster responsibilities and the establishment not only of separate Transportation and Motor Transport Services but also a separate construction agency during World War I. 

Though these arrangements proved temporary. the precedent set was to be 

followed in World War II and responsibility for transportation and 

construction were to be permanently removed from the Corps. 

In the meantime, the Department had been acquiring other responsibilities over the years that permitted it to emerge as the chief supply 

agency of the Army in the decades before World War II. T he first 

changes were gradual, but World War I brought a drastic reorientation 

of the Corps' responsibilities. Despite the Secretary of War's opposition, 

the Department had become compl etely responsible for the procurement, 

distribution. and issue of clothing in 1842. The Civil War resu lted in 

additional responsibilities in the care of the dead and the maintenance 

of national cemeteries. When Congress merged the Subsistence and Pay 

Departments with the Quartermaster's Department in 1912, it transferred 

the responsibilities of those twO agencies to the newly created Quarter-
738 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

master Corps. By that date, the Corps had broad responsibilities in 

several fields of Army supply. 

In 191 8, the Corps' headquarters and field organization provided 

the basis on which to build the staff structure called the Purchase and 

Storage Division, which absorbed the supply operations of all the supply 

bureaus. Although this proved to be only a temporary arrangement that 

Congress abolished in the Nationa l Defense Act of 1920, the provisions 

of that law reserved to the Corps a major role in interbranch procurement 

by providing that the Quartermaster General was to be charged with the 

purchase and procurement for the Army of "all supplies of standard 

manufacture and of all supplies common to tWO or more branches." 

Congress exempted from the centralized procurement responsibility 

vested in the Quartermaster General only those technical or special articl es 

used or issued specifically by one supply department. Despite the temporary return to the Corps of the responsibility for transportation and 

construction. the emphasis was predominantly on its function as a supply 

agency. 

Most of the major changes that altered the organization, functions, 

and personnel of the Corps occurred in the first decades of the 20th 

century. These, the later history of the Corps would disclose, were but 

a prelude to even more fundamental modifications which were to come 

in the \\lake of revolutionary military developments that in 1939 were 

still hidden in the future. 

The history of the Corps reveals that its operations followed a cyclical 

pattern that was common to all supply services. Wartime expansion was 

inevitably succeeded by peacetime retrenchment. In the yeaTS of peace, 

the Quartermaster General was unable to prepare ahead of time for future 

emergencies. Only too often the funds at his disposal were barely sufficient to cover current operating expenses. Stringent economies had 

frequently to be practiced to enable the Department to stay within 

appropriated funds. 

Not an unpreparedness, however, can be attributed to lack of funds. 

Quartermaster officers tended to become imbued with the same apathy 

toward military preparedness that infected the civilian population and 

which influenced Congress and the Executive branch of government alike 

throughout the 19th century. For approximately 9 of the 100 years of 

that century, the country was engaged in war. The brief years of war in 

contrast to the long years of tranquility could not dim the bright image 

of peace that the people of the United States charished. Protected by a 

broad expanse of water and sheltered by the British navy that patrolled 

it, they felt no menace to their way of life. Turning their attention to 

the conquest of a continent, they enjoyed the advantages of low defense 
IN RETROSPECT 739 

costs and could afford the luxury of a small Army, only large enough to 

provide police action against the Indians who obstructed the westward 

movement. 

The opening decades of the 20th century saw no change in the 

civilian attitude. Quartermaster officers, shaken by their experience in 

the Spanish-American War, did make a concerted effort to build up 

reserve stocks of supplies. These supplies were depleted, however. when 

the Quartermaster General had to equip the organized militia of the 

states, called into active service and concentrated on the Mexican border 

when the President sent Pershing and the punitive expedition in pursuit 

of Villa. The Quartermaster Corps was left as unprepared to meet the 

demands made upon it in 1917 as it had been in earlier wars. The 

attractiveness of the slogan "the war to end wars" and a willingness to 

believe that victory in World War I meant its achievement, only added 

to the prevailing public indifference to the state of the Army after 1918. 

When any war broke out, (he Quartermaster General was at once 

called upon to transport, shelter, clothe, equip, and subsist immediately 

a rapidly mushrooming force. Congress then loosened the purse strings 

and placed ample funds at the disposal of the supply bureau, but haste 

made for waste. Money could not buy the time required to manufacture 

and produce the supplies so urgently needed and therefore substitute 

articles, usually inferior to the standard items obtained in the past, had 

to be accepted. Quartermasters promptly became the targets for criti· 

cism, much of which they did not merit, and congressional investigating 

committees sought the reason for supply failures. As the war progressed, 

the initial confusion and shortages were always overcome. Galvanized 

into action, the quartermasters often achieved amazing results, supported 

by the tremendous production efforts of the country. The costs, however, 

were high. 

With the end of a war, Congress and the War Department gave first 

consideration to reducing costs. This meant demobilizing the Army, 

getting the volunteers and draftees back to their normal civilian pursuits, 

and reducing die size of the Regular Army that had been expanded in 

wartime. The country's lavish support of war measures and its tremendous production effort resulted in the receipt of large quantities of 

supplies, contracted for months earlier but which could not be used by 

the reduced number of peacetime troops. Demobilization also meant 

the prompt rele<J,se of rented storage facilities and the disposal of surplus 

supplies, usually at a fraction of their original cost. Military appropriations became smaller; retrenchment was again the controlling objective. 

To ease the rigorous economies imposed on the Army, reserves of wartime 

supplies being held at depots were used until exhaustion of such stocks 
740 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

compelled the Quartermaster General to seek larger appropriations for 

the support of the Army. By that time, the supply bureau had slipped 

into the state of unpreparedness that preceded every war. The compe· 

tent supply organization developed for the support of war was replaced 

by the small staff needed for peacetime operations, and supply lessons 

learned painfully under pressure sometimes appeared to be completely 

lost to quartermasters removed by decades of peace from the demands 

of war. 

In the Revolutionary War. Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene, forced to 

assume the duties of Quartermaster General against his inclinations, 

complained that no one ever heard of a quartermaster. Certainly the 

annals of military history support his assertion. Glory is deservedly the 

combat soldier's reward, but the historical record does not reveal him as 

overly generous in sharing credit for victory with the supply officer 

without whose work that goal could not be reached. Only rarely is the 

effort of the Quartermaster officer praised. An abundant and steady 

flow of supplies is taken for granted by the troops, usually without any 

awareness of the problems involved in its maintenance. Let supplies or 

transportation be delayed, however, and denunciations of the quarter· 

master at once fill the mail pouches. If encomiums were few for Quarter· 

master officers, they may take quiet satisfaction in the fact that in the 

history of the Corps no military operation of the U.S. Army failed for 

want of supplies. Despite difficulties and occasional failures, they gave 

unstinted support to the line in the doldrums of peace as well as in the 

spirited stimulation of war. 
BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS S. JESUP 

FATHER OF THE CORPS 

8 MAY 1818- 10 JUNE 1860 
QUARTERMASTERS GENERAL , 1775--1939 

Col. (Maj. Gen.) Thomas Mimin 

14 Aug 1775-16 May 1776 

28 Sep 1776-7 Nov 1777 

Maj. Gen. Natha nael Greene 

2 Mar 1778-26 Jul 1780 

Col. Stephen Moylan 

5 J un- 27 Sep 1776 

Col. Timothy Pickering 

5 Aug 1780-25 Jul 1785 
Quanennasters General, 1775-1939 

Samuel Hodgdon 

4 rv(ar 1791- 19 Apr 1792 

John Wilkins. Jr. 

Ju n 1796-16 Mar 1802 

.lames O'Hara 

19 Apr 1792- 30 May 1796 

Brig Gen. MorKan Lewis 

4 Apr 1812- 2 Mar 1813 
Quartermasters Genera l, 1775- 1939· 

Brig. Gen. Robert Swartwout 

21 Mar 1813-29 Apr 1816 

Brig. Gen. Joseph E. J ohnston 

28 Jun 1860-22 Apr 186 1 

Col. George Gibson 

29 Apr 1816-14 Apr 1818 

Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs 

15 May IS61-6 Feb 1882 

• No picture of Col. J ames Mullaney (29 Apr IS1&-14 Apr ISIS) has been 

found. 
Quartermasters General, 1775-1939 

Brig. Gen. Daniel H. Rucker 

1S-23 Feb 1882 

Brig. Gen. Samuel B. Holabird 

1 Jul 1883- 16 Jun 1890 

Brig. Gen. Rufus Ingalls 

23 Feb 1882- 1 Jul 1888 

Brig. Gen. Richard N. Batchelder 

26 Jun 1890-27 Jul 1896 
Quartermasters General, 1775-1939 

Brig. Gen. Charles G. Sawtelle 

19 Aug 1896-16 Feb 1897 

Brig. Gen. Marshall I. Ludington 

3 Feb 1898--13 Apr 1903 

Brig. Gen. George H. Weeu 

16 Feb 1897-3 Feb 1898 

Brig. Gen. Charles F. Humphrey 

12 Apr 1903-1 Jul 1907 
Quanermasters General, 1775-1939 

Maj. Gen. James B. Aleshire 

I Jul 1907- 12 Sep 1916 

Maj. Gen. Harry L. Rogers 

22 Jul 191 8-27 Aug 1922 

Maj. Gen. Henry G. Sharpe 

13 Sep 1916-12 Jul 1918 

Maj. Gen. William H. Han 

28 Aug 1922-2 J an 1926 
Quartermasters General, 1775-1989 

Maj. Gen. B. Franklin Cheatham 

8 Jan 1926-17 J an 1980 

Maj. Gen. Lou is H. Bash 

8 Feb 1984-31 Mar 1936 

Maj. Gen. John L. DeWitt 

3 Feb 19!0-2 Feb 1934 

Maj. Gen. Henry Gibbins 

1 Apr 1936-3 1 Mar 1940 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 

National Archives 

Record Group No. II. Papers of the Continental Congress. 

T his is a voluminous collection of many items, much of them relating 

to supply in the Revolutionary War. Of these, the following are particularl y useful: 

Reports of the Board of War. 

Letters of the Board of War. 

6 vols. 

2 vols. 

Item No. 147. 

Item No. 148. 

Letters and Reports of the Secretary at War. 7 vals. Items No. 

149- 151. 

Letters of Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene. 7 vols. Items No. 155. 173. 

Letters of Thomas Mifflin and others. 1 vol. Item No. 161. 

Letters of Ephraim Blaine and others. I vol. Item No. 165. 

Reports of Committees. 12 vols. Items No. 21- 22, 27. 29, 31, 34. 

Record Group No. 92. Records of the Office of the Quartermaster 

General. 

The basic archival material used in this volume is found in this 

record group. T he number is applied to all Quartermaster documents 

as well as to those of some, other agencies that were later absorbed by the 

Quartennaster's Department. It is a voluminous collection of hundreds 

of bound volumes and boxes of documents from which the history of 

Quartermaster supply operations must be laboriously dredged, for there 

is no inventory of these records. The following major collections oE 

correspondence are of primary importance: 

Letter Books. In the first period of record keeping, 1820- 1889, 

outgoing correspondence was copied in letter books-some 107 volumes 

to 1870. After that date the letters were copied in books of the respective 

responsible divisions in the Office and a set called Letter Book, General 

and Miscell aneous, was also maintained. 

Clothing Book, Letters Sent. 33 vols. The outgoing correspond· 

ence relative to clothing was copied in these books for the period 1827-

1870, when the Clothing and Equipage Division began to maintain its 

books of outgoing correspondence. 

Letters Received. The incoming correspondence for the period 

1820- 1889 is fi led in 208 boxes and indexed in registers. 

Register of Letters Received. 142 vols. For the period 1820- 1889, 

all incoming correspondence was entered in Registers of Letters Received, 

each letter being given a symbol to permit location. The letters fTe· 
750 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

quently are not round in the designated location and, in consequence. 

the Registers themselves remain val uable, for they give the date, sender's 

name, and the purport of the letters received. 

OQMG Consolidated Correspondence File, 1794-19 15. 1,275 boxes. 

In time, letters received pertaining to a common subject were consolidated 

for convenience o[ use and filed under subject heads. In later years both 

incoming and outgoing correspondence were filed together on some 

subjects. 

OQMG Document File. 1890- 1914. 8,607 boxes. In 1890 the 

"book period" of record keeping gave way to the "record card period." 

Information formerly entered in the Register of Letters Received and 

briefs of Letters Scnt were copied on record cards, the incoming and 

outgoing correspondence being filed together to [arm the Document File. 

OQMG General Correspondence File, 1917- 1922. 4,042 ft. This 

is the third period of record keeping in which incoming papers and copies 

of outgoing correspondence were placed in one file and classified by 

subject according to the War Department decimal classification scheme. 

There are other volumes in this record group that are informative 

for wartime supply operations, especially in the field. For the Mexican 

War the following are useful : 

Official Letters ITom Col. Henry Whiting, AQMG, with Gen. 

Taylor's Army in Mexico, 1846-47. 2 vols. 

Official Letters to Col Henry Whiting, 1846-47. 5 vols. 

Official Letters to Maj. D. D. Tompkins, QM at New Orleans. 

9 vols. 

Official Letters from Maj. D. D. Tompkins. 6 vols. 

Letter Books of Maj. Geo. H. Crosman, QM at Philadelphia, 1845-

46. 4 vols. 

For the Civil War period, the following should not be overlooked: 

Letters of Brig. Gen. Stewart Van Vliet to QMG, 26 May 1846-

7 Aug 1865. 1 vol. 

Letters Issued, AQMG Office, Louisville, 18 Feb-16 June 1862. 

I vol. 

Rusling, Reports of Inspections in QMD. 2 vots. These are important not only for the Civil War but for the post-Civil War period, and 

particularly for conditions in the West. 

Annual Reports from QM Officers, 1863. 5 vots. 

Personal Narrative Reports of Officers, QMD, for Fiscal Years 1864-

1868. 12 vols. Filed alphabetically by name of the officer and copied 

in volumes, these reporu are extremely important for they spell out the 

operations in which the officers were engaged in the field and at depots. 

Though the reports were not instituted before the last year of the war, 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 751 

the officers generally give a background of their activities that frequently 

carry the narrative back to 186 1. 

For the World War I period, the following coll ections are of major 

importance in this record group: 

OQMG Historica l File. 63 boxes. During World War I a Historical Branch was set up in the OQMG. It collected documents relating 

to suppl y operations in the lOne of interior under the OQMG and under 

the Purchase and Storage Division of the General Staff. Along with the 

documents there are filed drafts of historical reports prepared in the 

Branch. 

General H. L. Rogers' Private File. 77 boxes. This is a valuable 

collection of documents and historical reports recording the activities of 

the QMC in the A.E.F. It includes the Report of the Chief Quartermaster, A.E.F., as well as material pertaining to the Purchase and Storage 

Division when Rogers served as chief. 

Report of Maj. Roy A. Shaw to Acting QMG. 10 Sections. This is 

a report of an inspection visit made to England and France in the summer 

of 1918 and covers such subjects as requirements for QM supplies in the 

AEF, overseas Shipments, Slocks, paCkaging, QM salvage, foreign purchases 

of QM supplies. 

The following miscellaneous volumes and boxes of material provide 

useful information for supply operations: 

OQMG Estimates and Reports, 1835- 1848. 3 vols. 

OQMG Register of Contracts. 1818-60. 12 vols. 

OQMG Decision Book, 1842- 1870. 10 vols. 

Annual Reports from QM Officers to QMG. 1863-1878. 37 boxes. 

Letter Book, Western River Transportation. I vol. 

Charter Parties and Names of Crews of Vessels, 1847. These are 

copies entered in bound volumes. 

Vessels Engaged in Mexican War and on Western Rivers During the 

Civil War. 

Letters Received from Heads of Departments and Bureaus, 1863-

1870. 12 boxes and 24 volumes. 

Reports of QMG to SW and Heads of Departments. 8 vols. 

Letter Books of General J. B. Aleshire. These are valuable for the 

pre-World War I years when General Aleshire served as QMG. 

Letters from Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Jesup, 1828-1846. 1 box. 

Included in this record group are the records of the Schuylkill 

Arsenal, a large collection of documents consisting of letter books, orders 

on the military storekeeper, inspection books, reports on employees, 

seamstress books, and other miscellaneous records that cover the period 

1846 to 1916. They are particularly valuable for tracing developments 
752 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

at the Clothing Establishment and the Philadelphia Depot. Among the 

more important volumes are the following: 

Letter Books, 1842- 1846. 8 vols. Letters sent to the QMG and 

others from t.he Purchasing Office of the Office of Clothing and Equipage. 

Philadelphia. 

T he Quartermaster General Letter Books. 1856- 1860. 15 vals. 

Letters Scm, 186 1, by AQMG Ghas. Thomas. 2 vols. 

Crosman Letter Books. 1862-1865. 5 vah. 

Record Group No. 92. Records of the Office of the Commissary General 

of Purchases. 

Entered under the record group number for Quartermaster records 

is a vast collection loosely referred to as the records of the Office of the 

Commissary General of Purchases. They are, in fact, a grand melange 

of records of some seven supply agencies that operated in Philadelphia, 

which, in the course of transfer of records between W·ashington and 

Philadelphia before their final deposit at the National Archives, became 

interspersed in addition with records from quartermasters and commissaries stationed in the field and at departmental headquarters. The seven 

supply agencies at Philadelphia were the Office of the Purveyor of Public 

Supplies. the Office of the Superintendent of Military Stores, the Office of 

the Commissary General of Purchases. the Office of the Military Storekeeper, the Office of the Military Agent which later became the Office of 

the Quartermaster Office, the Clothing Establishment, and the Office of 

Army Clothing and Equipage that was established after the Quartermaster's Department absorbed the remaining functions of the Commissary 

General of Purchases in 1842. The volumes are so intermingled that all 

distinction between the records of the different offices is lost and there is 

no arrangement by office, At some time in the past, 561 of the 600 bound 

volumes were given numbered tags in the order in which they were 

shelved so that a volume can be located by tagged number. Unfortunately. the unnumbered volumes are not so readily located. A partial 

inventory, restricted to bound volumes originating in the Philadelphia 

offices, was prepared by James R. Masterson and provides a useful guide. 

Among the volumes of correspondence particularly useful for this study 

are the following: 

Letters Sent, Commissary General of Purchases, 1812- 1850. 18 vols. 

Letters Sent, Purveyor of Public Supplies, 1800-1812. 8 vols. 

Letters Sent, Office of the Military Storekeeper, 180 1- 1857. IO vols. 

Letters Sent, William Linnard, 1802- 1847. II vols. Linnard served 

first as military agent and then as Quartermaster Officer at Philadelphia. 

The so-called miscellaneous coll ection, not inventoried by Masterson. 

includes a vast array of ledger books, abSlracts of orders, issues, receipts 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 753 

and other supply documents. Among the more important volumes are 

the following: 

Letter Book of Capt. A. R. Hetzel, 1835-37. I vol. Tag No. 074. 

Letters Sent by R. F. Loper, Transport Agen t, 1847. Tag No. 076. 

Letter Book, Capt. 1, R. Irwin, at Port La Vaca, 22 1un 1846-

31 Mar 1847. Tag No. 078. 

Letter Book, 18 Apr- 27 June 1847, Capt. A. R. Hetzel, Vera Cruz 

Depot. Tag No. 085. 

Letter Book of Capt. James M. Hill, Brazos Santiago, 1 Oct- 31 Dec 

1846. Tag No. 088; I Jao-3 1 Mu 1847. Tag No. 089; I OCt 1845-

30 Sep 1846. Tag No. 090. 

Letter Book, Capt. W. M. D. McKissack, Santa Fe, I JUIl 1846-

16 Oct 1848. Tag No. 091. 

Letters Scnt, Bvt. Maj. Chas. McClure, Chief Commissary. New 

Mexico. 1868-1870. Tag. No. 145, 147. 

Contracts. List giving names of contractors, quantities, prices, 

1812- 1837. Tag No. 256. 

Letter Book, William Linnard, 1823- 25. Un tagged. 

Included in this record are many loose papers that provide detailed 

information on early supply operations. T hey are referred to as: 

Coxe and Irvine Papers. T hey are boxed in 118 cardboard containers and 27 meta l trays. T hey are papers of the offices of Tench Coxe. 

Purveyor of Public Supplies. and Call endar Irvine. Commissary General 

of Purchases. 

Record Group No. 93'. Revolutionary War Records. 

In th is record group the most important volumes for Quartermaster 

history are the following: 

Letter Books of Col. Timothy Pickering. Voh. 82-88; 123- 126. 

Letter Book of Samuel Hodgdon. 30 Dec 1782-10 Dec 1783. Vol. 93. 

Record Group No. 94. Records of the Adjutant General's Office. 

A guide to the use of these records is provided in a " Preliminary 

Inventory." No. 17. compiled by Lucille H . Pendell and Elizabeth Bethel. 

Since the AGO handled records. orders. and correspondence of the Army. 

documents that could not be located in QM fil es frequently were found 

in this record group, which was therefore used for suppl ementary purposes. As in the case of QM correspondence. that of the AGO also follows 

the "book period." the " record card period," and the "decimal classification period." Records used from this collection include the following: 

Letters Sent, 1800- 1889. 95 vols. 

Letters Received, 1805- 1889. 620 ft. 

Registers of Letters Received, 1814-1889. 188 vols. 

AGO Document File. 1890- 1917. 2.967 ft. 
754 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Decimal Correspondence File, 1917- 1925. 790 ft. 

Records of the Appointment. Commission, and Personal Branch. In 

this ACP file is to be found information on the military service of QM 

officers-for the period 1863- 1894. Before that date such information 

is found in Letters Received, and after that date in 201 files. 

Orders and Circulars, 1797- 1910. 2,082 vols. This is one of the 

most complete collections of orders and circulars for these years. The 

first volume contains the orders of General James Wilkinson, 1787- 1809. 

In its capacity as custodian of Army records. the AGO also maintained other groups of records in addition to those emanating from its 

Office and divisions. Of these, the most important for Quartermaster 

operations are the very fragmentary Post-Revolutionary War Manuscripts 

and Post-Revolutionary War Papers for the period 1784- 1815. These 

appear to be arbitrarily divided into two record group numbers: 94 and 

98. Included in RG No. 94 are: 

QM Accounts and Returns, 1792- 1811. 

Letter Book of Samuel Hodgdon, 26 Aug 1799- 22 Oct 1800. 

Orderly and Company Book, 1795- 1813. 

St. Clair Papers. 

Record Group No. 98. Post-Revolutionary War Records. 

Journal of Quartermaster General James O'Hara. This is the most 

important volume for QM history in this record group. 

Record Group No. 107. Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. 

A preliminary checklist has been compiled by Lucille H. Pendall 

for this large collection of records. To develop the relationship between 

the Quartermaster's Department and the Office of the Secretary of War 

and to analyze the role of the Secretary of War in supply operations, the 

following records are useful: 

Letters Sent, 1800- 1889. 151 vols. A general chronological arrangement is followed. For the years 1800- 1870, the volumes are designated Military Books; for the period 1871- 1889, Letters Sent. 

Letters Received, 1800- 1889. 212 ft. 

Registers of Letters Received. 227 vols. Keyed by symbol to the 

Letters Received, these registers are valuable, for the abstracts provide the 

correspondent's name, date, and purpose of the letter- the only information sometimes available for missing letters received. 

Letters Sent to the QMG and the Purchasing Department, 18 Nov 

1814-23 May 1815. I vol. 

Registers of Letters Received from the QMG and Purchasing Department, Oct 1814-June 1815. 1 vol. 

Reports to Congress, 3 Feb 1803-31 Dec 1870. 11 vols. Copies of 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 755 

letters. submitting reports to Congress in reply to resolutions of Congress. 

T hese often include copies of the reports. 

Contracts, 1 May 1799-7 Nov 1810. 2 vats. T hese are copies of 

articles of agreement and contracts between the Secretary and cOntractors 

and other persons for rations, quarters, and other supplies. 

Record Group No. 120. Records of the American Expeditionary Forces. 

T his is a vol uminous record collection that includes not only the 

documents of the A.E.F. but also those of the War Department for the 

war period. The following collections were used: 

AEF SOS Historical Files. 79 ft. 

These files are a general historical file for the period 1917- 1923, 

and include reports, statistics, lists, orders, bulletins, memoranda, re la ted 

correspondence. and similar materials assembled for the preparation of 

histories of SOS operations. Drafts of historical monographs and reports 

are also filed in this collection. Among the records are those of the QMC 

in the AEF. which was made a part of the SOS in 1918. T hese records 

include the general correspondence of the chief quartermaster as well 

as the correspondence of the Supplies. Remount. and Salvage Divisions 

of his office. 

War Department Historical Files. 1917- 1923. 50 ft. These are the 

records of the wartime organization and operation of the War Department. T he files were created and assembled by the Historical Section. 

established by the Secretary of War in January 191 8. in the War College 

Division of the General Staff. They include documents as w.elJ as 

prepared drafts of historical monographs and reports. T hey are particularly valuable for development of relationships between the Purchase. 

Storage and Traffic Division and the QMC. 

History of the Construction Division. 1919. 18 vols. T his is a 

narrative history of construction during the war that was prepared by 

Gen. R. C. Marshall. supported with appendices. exhibits. reports. memoranda. blueprints. 

Records of the Motor Transport Corps. 

Record Group No. 165. Records of the War College Division. General 

Staff. 

Document File. 1903-191 9. 211 ft. T he records of this file are 

kept in accordance with the " record card period." the cards being used 

to locate pertinent documents under subject heads. T he file is valuable 

for tracing relationships between the Staff and QMC in the pre-World 

War I period and for such planning developments as occurred in reference 

to clothing. reserve depots. and QM supply operations generally. 

Record Group No. 192. Records of the Commissary General of Subsistence. 
756 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

There is a wealth of material on Army subsistence in these records. 

The followil'l:g proved valuable: 

Letters Sent to the Secretary of War, 1840- 1889. 10 vals. 

Letters Sent to the Secretary of War, 1884-1893. 12 vols. These 

are letter press copy books of letters sent to the Secretary. 

Letters Scm, 1818- 1889. 132 vats. 

Letters Received, 1818-1889. 

Registers of Letters Received, 1818-1889. 80 vols. Letters received 

during the first years of the bureau are missing. but abstracts are found 

in the Registers. 

Correspondence Record Cards. For the years 1890- 94, only bound 

volumes of record cards providing abstracts of incoming and outgoing 

correspondence are available. 

Correspondence File, 1894-1912. Copies of letters sent and letters 

received are filed together. 

Lists of Proposals for Subsistence Contracts, 1819- 1841. 5 vols. 

Registers of Contracts, 1819- 1907. 31 vols. These give such data 

as names of contracting parties, dates and places of contracts, period 

covered, costs. Copies of the contracts so listed before 189 1 and all 

related correspondence were destroyed in that year by authority of 

Congress. 

Manuscript Collections 

Abee!, James. Letter Book of Col. James Abetl, Deputy Quartenuaster General, 10 May 

1778-10 Sep 1778. Manuscript Div., Library of Congress. 

Account Book of Purveyor's Office, 1802. Manuscript Collection, New York Public Library. 

Blaine, Ephraim. Papers of Ephraim Blaine. 5 vols. Manuscript Div.. Library of 

Congress. 

Brown, Maj. Gen. J acob. Official Leuer Book No. I, 12 April 1814 to 2! December 1815; 

No.2, I Jan 1816 10 .0; Feb 1828. Manuscript Div .. Library of Congress. 

Dearborn, Gen. Henry. Letters and Orders of General Dearborn, 1812- 1!. 2 vols. New 

York H;"torical Society. 

Duer, William. Papers on Revolutionary affairs, anny supplin, and land operations. New 

York Historical Society. Two bound volumes of papers and many boxes of letters 

arranged chronologically. 

Greene, Maj. Gen. Nathanael. Leuers to and from Major General Nathanael Greene, 

1778-1780. 12 vols. American Philosophical Society Library. 

Hay. Udny. Papers and Correspondence of Undy Hay, Deputy Quartennaster General, 

Revolutionary War, 1776-1792. New York Historical Society. 

Hodgdon, Samuel. Instructions and Correspondence of Samuel Hodgdon, 1794-1800. 

Manuscript Div., Library of Congress. 

Hughes, Hugh. Letter books of correspondence with deputies and other officers, 1776-1782, 

of Hugh Hughes, Quartennaner General of New York, Revolutionary War. 19 vols. 

New York Historical Society. 

IrviQe, Brig. Gen. William. William Irvine Papers. Pennsylvania Historical Society. 

Jesup, Maj . Gen. Thom:u S. Jesup Papers. Manuscript Div., Library of Congress. 

Meigs, Maj. Gen. Momgomery C. Meigs Papers. Manuscript Djv., Library of Congrea. 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 757 

Morris, Rober!. Robert Morris Papers, 768-ISO~. Manuscript Collection _ New York 

pubHc L ibrary. 

Morris. Robert. Papers of Robert Morris. including the fina ncier', Official Diary . .!I vols .. 

and his Official Leller Booh, volumo A through E; his personal correspondence, 

1777- 1781. Manuscript Diy., Library of Congre5$, 

Piatt. John H . John H. Piatt LeU!':r Book, 9 J u l 1812-7 Jan 1814. Manuscript Div., 

Library of Congress. 

Stanton, Edwin M. SlarllOn Papcn, ManuKripl Div., Library of Congress. 

Stewart, Charles. Correspondence of Charles Stewart, 1777- 1782. Manuocript Div .. Library 

of Congress. 

Swartwout. Robert. Swartwout Papers, Manuscript Collection, New Yo rk. Public Library. 

U.s. Anny. Miscellaneous r«or<l$, principally quartennaster general and supply accounts 

and returns, 1795- 1848. 26 vols., and loose papers. Manuscript Div., Library of 

CongTes$. 

U.S. Army. Reports on the Reduction of the Anny, 1821. Manuscript Div" Library of 

CongTes$. 

Washington, George. Washington Papers. Manuscript Div., Library of CongTes$. 

Wayne, Anthony. Wayne Papers. Pennsylvania Historical Society. 

Wilkinson, James. Wilkinson Papers. Chicago Historical Society. 

PTinled Primm) Sow'ces 

Alge r, Russell A. Th c Spllnis/h>4mcriclm War. New York, 1901. 

Amcrica" Slal e Papers. Washington, 18:'12-61. 38 vols. 

Class II J"diatl ADair$. 2 voh. 

Cia$!! III Finance. 5 vols. 

Class V Military ADairs. 7 vols. 

CIa$!! X Miscellaneous. 2 vok 

Aylel!, William. "Correspondence of Col. William Aylett, Commissary General of Virginia," 

Tyler's Quarterly Historical aud Genealogical Magazitl c, J (1919-20), 87-110; 145-161. 

BaUagh, J ama C. (ed.). The Leiters 0/ Richard Hell,.., Lee. New York, 191 1. 2 vols. 

Bandel. Eugene. Frollticr Lile in th c Army, 1855-61. Ralph P. Bieber (ed.). Glendale, 

Calif., 1932. 

Baruch, Bernard. American b,duslry in Ihe War. Washington. 1921. 

Basler, Roy P. (ed.). The Collultd Works 01 Abraham Lincoltl. Rutgers University Press, 

1953. 8 vols. 

Bassett, John S. (ed.). Corrnpondence 0/ A"dr= Ja cksoll. Washington, 1926. 2 vol!. 

Billings, John D. Hardtack. aud CoDee. Boston, 1888. 

Birkbcck. Morris. Notes Oil a journey i" America. London, 1818. 

Buhoup, Jonathan W. Narrative 0/ Ih e Cc,,/ral Divisioll. PitlJihurgh , 1847. 

Bullard. Robert L. Personalities and R eminiscc"us 0/ the War. New York. 1925. 

Burnett, Edmund C. (ed.). Letters of M embers 0/ lit e COlllinental Congress. Wash ington, 

1921- 36. 7 vois. 

BUllerfield. Consul W. (ed.). journal 0/ Capt. jOllalhall Hearl. Albany, 18M. 

WasJiingto".lroin e Correspondellce. Madison, Wis., 1882. 

Calendar 01 Virgil!ia Stale Papers. Ri~hmo d, 1875-93. II vols. 

Carte r, Clarence E. (ed.). Th e Territorial Papers 01 tI,e Unit ed Statts. Washington, 

1934-. 24 voh. 

Clarkson, Grosvenor B. IIIduJtrial America in th e World Wa r. New York. 1923. 

Commager, Henry S. (ed.). Til e Blue a .. d ti,e Gray. New York, 1950. 2 vols. 

Cooke, Lt. Col. Philip St. George. jaurnal 0/ tlt e Marcil of /lle Mormon Blillalioll 0/ 

Infantry Volunteers in Senate Executive Docunullt No.2, 31st Cong .• Special Scss. 

Crowell, Benedict. America's MUIIWml$, 1917- 18: Report 0/ Benedict Crowell. Washing. 

ton, 1919. 
758 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Cruikshank, Maj. E. (ed.). Documeutary History 01 Ih e Campaign 011 Ih e Niagara Fran· 

tier ill 1812. Weiland, Om., 1896-1907. 8 voh. in 4. 

Cruse, Thomas. Apache Days and A/ler. Caldwell, Idaho, 1941. 

Dana, Charles A. Recollectia.,s 01 Ihe Civil War. New York, 1902. 

Darlington, Mary C. For/ Pill (md Leiters 'mm tilt Frolltiu. Pittsburgh, 1892. 

Darnell, Elias. A Journal COfl/llifli"g fI" Accurlllll mId III/ ere.!t"'g /l.cco,"'/ of ... Th ou 

Heroic K,mllicky J'o/r.mteus mId Regulars, Commanded by General Wi",il esler. 

Philadelphia, 1854. 

Davis, Capt. John. "The Yorktown Campaign: Journal of Captain John Davis, of the 

Pennsylvania Line," Pe'l>u),/Vllllia fI1l1gll%i'lt: of Hislory arId Biography, V (188]). 

290-310. 

Dawes, Charles C. A Jou rnal 0/ the Creal lVar. New York, 1921. 2 vols. 

Denny, Maj. Ebenezer. "Military Journal of Major Ebenezer Denny:' Pub/icaticnu of tht 

Historical Socitty oj Pt m/sylvania, VII, 207-409. 

Dodge. Nathaniel S. Hints on Army Tra"spar/alion. Albany, 1863. 

Drake. Francis S. LiJtI l!IId Corrtlspondence of Majar.GtI"ual Henry Knox. Boston, 1873. 

Essarey, Logan (cd.). "Messages and Leiters of \ViIliam H enry Harrison." /IIdia'la Historical 

CoUte/ialls, IX, Indianapolis, 1922. 

First Allnua/ Report, Council of Naliolla/ Dele/uti, 1917. Washington, [917. 

Fitzpatrick, J ohn C. (00.). Thtl Diaritls 0/ Gtorge WllJ'hi>!glon , 1748-99. New York. 1925. 

4 vois. 

---. Th e Writings of Washingto". Washington, 193 1-39. 30 vols. 

Force, Peter (cd.). America.! Archives. Washington, 1837·53. 4th and 5th serio. 9 vols. 

Ford, WorthinglOll C. (cd). Correspo"dell ce alld jo!<r"als of Samutl B/achley Webb. 

New York. [893-94. 3 vols. 

--- and Others (cds.). journals of the Continental Co"grtss, 1774-1789. Washington, 

1904--37. 34 vols. 

Furber, George C. Thtl Twtlve Mo"ths JlO/Wlleer. Cincinnati, 1850. 

Gibson , George RutlOOge. journal of a Soldier Under Kearuy Il>!d Do"ipha", 1846--47. 

Ralph P. Bieber (ed.). Glendale, Calif .. 1935. 

Gralll, Ulysses S. PeTlonal Memoirs 0/ U. S. Graut. New York, 1885-86. 2 vols. 

Graydon, Alexander. Memoirs 0/ a Life. Harrisburgh , 1811. 

Hagood. Maj. Cen. J ohnson. The Services 0/ Supply. Boston, ]927. 

Hammond, Isaac "\-V. (cd.). Diary a1!d Orderly Book 0/ Sergeau/ jo"athan Burtoll. Con· 

cord, N.H., 1885. 

Hammond, Oli$ C. (ed.). Leiters and Papus 0/ Maior·Gell eTliI Jolm Sullivan. New 

Hampshire Historical Society Col/ections, X I II- XI". Concord. N.H., 19.!1l. 2 vols. 

Harbord, J ames G. The Amuicall Army in Fra"ce. Boston, 193"6. 

Haupt, Gen. Hennan. RemilljsCtlIlCtis 0/ Ge"eral Hermall Haupl. Milwaukee. Wis .. 1901. 

Heath , Maj. Gen. 'Villiam. "Heath Papers." Massachusetts Historical 'Society Colltclia"s, 

ser. v, vol. IV; ser. 7. vols. IV- V. 

Henf)'. Capt. William Seaton. CamjHIign Sk tches 0/ th ~ War Wilh Mexico. New York, 

1848. 

Hiltzheimer, J a,ob. "Extracts from the Diary of J acob Hi ltzheimer, 1768-1798:' P~nnsyl· 

vania Magazin e 0/ History (wd Biograph)', XVI (1892), 93- 102, 160-177, 412-22. 

Hitchcock, Maj. Gen. Ethan Allen. Fi/ly Years in Camp and Fitld. W. A. Croffut (ed.). 

New York, 1909. 

Hitchcock, Henf)'. Marcilj/lg with Siurman. New Haven, 1927. 

H ughes, John T . Doniphan'S Expedition . Cincinnati. 1850. 

Joh nson, Robert U .. and Clarence C. Buel (cds.). B(Jtt/es and Leadtrs of the Civil War. 

New York. 1884-88. 4 vols. 

Kenly, John R. Memoirs of a Marylafld " ollmtur. Philadelph ia, 1873. 

Lee, Ri, hard H. Ahmoir of the Life 0/ Richard H~nry Lee. Philadelphia, 1825. 2 vol$. 

Leib, Charles. Ni,,~ Months ill ti, e Quart ermllJ'l~r's epartm~/lt: Th ~ ChanCtis lor M(Jki/lg 

a lIfil/ioll. Cincinnat i, 1862. 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 

Lodge, Henry C. (cd.). Work.! 0/ Alexafldu Hamil/on . New York, 1904. 12 vols. 

Lowe, Percival. Five Years a DragmJfl, 1848-H. Kansas City. 1926. 

759 

McAfee, Robe rt B. H is/ory of Ihe Lille War in IIle Wnlem Cemnlry. Lexington, 1816, 

McCallum, Bvt. Brig. Gen. D. C. Reports 01 0,,1. Brig. G,m. D. C. McCallmn and tilt: 

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1776-78," PUinsy/vo'lia Maga~ine 01 His/ary and BiograpllY, XVI (1892). 129-59. 

Majon, Alexander. S~tI"ly Years on Ihe Frontier. Col. Prentiss Ingraham (cd.). Chicago. 

189-'. 

March, General Peyton C. Th e Nation <It War. New York, 1932. 

Matthews, William and Dixon Wecler. Our Soldiers Speak, 1775-19/8. Boston, 1943. 

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1913. 2 vols. 

Mearns, David C. (ed.). Linwlll Papers. New York, 1948. 2 vol.$. 

Meigs. Gen. M. C. "Documents. General J. C. Meigs on the Conduct of the Civil War," 

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ed .. revised. 2 vols. 

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Temple, William Grenville, U.s.N. Memoir of the Landing of the Ullit ed States T roops 

at Vera Cnu ill IM7. Philadelphia, 1896. 

Thacher, James. A Mililary Journal Durillg the Americall Revolutionary War. Boston. 

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760 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Thian, Ralph P. L !:gislalivf: Hislary 0/ Ih t: Gt:lItTtJI Stag of Iht: Arm)' of the United 

Slotes. Washington, 1901. 

Trobriand, Regis de. Four YeaTS with tht: Army of the Potomac. Boston. 1889. 

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Waldo, Albigcnce. "Valley Forge. 1777-78: Diary of Surgeon Albigence Waldo, of the 

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P1'inted Military Sources 

Annual Reports. Annual Reports of the Secretary of War, the Commissary General of Purchases, the Commissary General of Subsistence, 

and the Quartermaster General were a valuable source of information. 

particularly those which carried appended reports of subordinate officers 

and other documentary material. These reports are located as follows: 

American State Papers, Class V Military Affairs. The annual reports the period 1822 to 1838 are printed in these volumes. 

Senate Executive Documents, and House Executive Documents. 

25th-36th Congress. The annual rcports arc printed in either the Senate 

or House Executive Documents for the years 1839-1860. 

Annual Reports. For the years 1861 through 1920, the annual reports of the Secretary of War. including subordinate offic.es, were printed 

and published in Washington each year. The annual reports of the 

Quartermaster General were also printed and published separately in 

Washington. A bound compilation of the Civil War reports of die 

Quartermaster General 1861-65, is particularly informative and useful. 

Record Group No. 94. AGO file 319.12. National Archives. 

Though annual reports were prepared by the Quartermaster General for 

the years 192 1 through 1938. they were not printed for reasons of economy. T hey are available at the National Archives and are noted here 

to complete the record of location. 

General Orders, Circu lars. Bulletins. Generally, the instructions 

primarily of the War Department, Adjutant General's Office, and 

Quartermaster General's Office are used in th is volume, Those printed 

and compiled and bound, normally on a yearly basis. after about 1860 
I 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 761 

are readily available. Orders were printed for many years before that 

date. but few collections of them exist outside of the National Archives. 

Laws. The following collections of military laws are useful: 

Callahan, John F. The Military UJws oj the United Sla/u. Baltimore, 1858. 

Cross, Col. Trueman. Military Laws 0/ the United Siaies. Washington, 183"8. 

Hetzel, Capt. Abner R. Military Laws 01 IIle United Slatu. Washington , la-.6. Sd 

edition. 

Registers, The following provide the military service record of 

officers: 

Cullum, Bvt. Maj. Gen. George W. Biographical Regi.lter 0/ O/fu:t!rs lwd Graduates 0/ the 

Militory Academy at Wed POi'll, N,Y., From Its Establishment, in 1802 to 1890. New 

York, 1891. 11 'IOU. Sd ed., revised. Supplemental volumes 4 through 9 coveT the 

period 1890-1950. 

Hame rsly, ThomaJII H. D. Complete Regular Army Register of the United States for One 

H undred Year,S, 1779- 1879. Washington, 1880. 

H eitman, Francis B. Historical Register of Officers of th Continental Army Duri>lg the 

War of the Reuo/ution, April, 177', to December, 178J. Washington, 1914. Revised 

and enlarged edition. 

---. Hi'storical Regi'ster a>ld Dictionary of the United Siaies Army, 1789-190J. Wash· 

ington, 1903. 2 vol5. 

Regulations. T he following early regulations for the Army, published periodicaliy were useful : 

GUleral Regulatiolls for the Army. Washington, 1821, 1825, 1835, 1841. 

Reui:;ed Regulatioru lor the Army of file United States, /86/. 

Legislative Sources 

Alluals 0/ Co.rgress, 1789-1824. Washington. 1825-37. 42 vols. 

Jourual of tlu Exuuliw. Proceedings of th e Se>lote of tlte United Slates, 1789-1901 . 

Wll5hington, 1828-19()9. 32 vols. 

Hearing:;: 

Army Reorga"iUltion. Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of 

Representa tives, 66th Cong., 1st and 2d sessions. Washington, 1920. 

Histo rical Documents Relating to the Reorgani%Otion Plans 0/ the War De/J<lrtmell/ 

a.rd to the Prese.rl Natio>lal Defellu Act. Hearings before the Committee on Military 

Affain, House of Representatives, 69th Cong" 2d session. Washington, 1927. 

brvesligation of the War De/J<lrtmurl, Hearings before the Committee on Military 

Affairs, Senate. 65th Cong .. 2d session. Washington, 1918. 8 parIS. 

Reorganiwtiofl 0/ tilt Army. Hearings before the Subcommiuee of the Committee on 

Military Affairs, Senate, 66th Cong., ht and 2d sessions. Washington. 1919. 

StaU Service 0/ the Army, General Seroice Corps, Conso/idatioll of Certa;'1 Brallches. 

Hearings held before the Committee on Mililary Affairs, House of Representatives, 62d 

Cong., Washington, 191 1. 

War E;o:pe'lditures. Hearings held before the Select Committee on Expenditure$ in 

the War Department, House of Representatives, 66th Cong .• 2d session. 

House E;o:uutive Doc"ments: 

No. 119. 29th Cong .. 2d seu. "Correspondence with General Taylor." 

No. 60, ~Oth Cong.. 1st sess. "Messages of the President of the United States, with 

the Correspondence Therewith Communicated between the Secretary of War and Other 

Officers of the Government. on the Subject of the Mexican War." Wll5hington. 1848. 

No. 91, 33d Cong .. 2d scss. "Report upon the Cost of Transporting Troops and 
762 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Supplies to Californi a, Oregon, New Mexico, Etc. by Maj. Gen. Thomas S. J esup. QMG." 

No. 17. 54th Cong., ht sess., s.n. 851. "Army Contracts, 1855," 

No. 33, 35th Cong .• 1st sess., s.n. 955 "Estimate for Utah Expedition." 

No. 50, 35th Cong .. 2d .$OS" S.n. 1006 "Army Contracts, 1858." 

No. 58, 35th Cong" 1st sess., S.n. 955 "Army Conlracl.$, 1857." 

No. 58, 35th Cong., 2d se5S .. S.n. 1006 "Army ContraclJ, 1857." 

No. 71, 35th Cong., 1st $CU., S.n. 956. "Utah Expedition ." 

No. 99, 35th Cong .• ht 505 .• s.n. 958. "Contracts, Utah Expedition." 

No. 23. 39th Cong .. 2d sess., s.n. 1288. "Inspection Reports, 1866." 

No. 111 , 39th Cong .. 2d sess., 5.n. 1293. "Ingalls Inspection Report, 1866." 

No. 377, 40th Cong., 2d 5e$S., S.II. 1346. "Vessels Boughl . Sold, and Chartered by the 

U.S. since April 1861." 

No. 618, 57th Cong., 1st sess. "Resu lts of Preliminary Examinat ions and Su rveys of 

Sites for Military Posts." 

House Miscdlaneolls Document 

No. 56, 45th Cong., 2d scss. "Reorg;inizat ion of the Army," Report of a Subcomm ittee 

of the Committee on Military Affain. Washington, 1878. 

House Repor/s; 

No. 78, 36tH' Cong .. 2d scss., a.n. 11 05 "Abstracted Illdian Trust Bonds." 

No.2, 37th Cong., 2d $t'SS., S.n. 1142 and 1143. "Government Contracts:' 

No. 33, 40th Cong., 3d scss., I.n. 1388. "Army Organization, 1869:' 

No. 74, 42d Cong., 3d scss .. I.n. 1576. " Army Staff Organization." 

No. 87, 42d Cong., 3d scss., s.n. 1576. "Ellpend itures in the War Departmenl." 

House Report of Committee 

No. 108, 37th Cong., 3"d scss., Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the 

War. Washington, 1863. 3 parts. 

Sena te Execulivtl Documents: 

No. 62, 34th Cong .. 3d SCSS., I.n. 881. ·'Purchase. Importation, and Use of Camels and 

Dromedaries to be Employed for Military Purposes, 1857." 

No. 37, 37th Cong., 2d sess., I.n. 11 22. "Vc-ssell Purchased or Charte red Since April 

1861." 

No. 221, 56th Cong., I5t InS. "Report of the Commission Appointed by the President 

to Investigate the Conduct of the War With Spain." Washington, 1900. 8 vols. 

No. 270, 56th Cong., 1st scss. "Food Furnished by Subsistence Department 10 Troops 

in the Field." Washington, 1900. 3 vols. 

Senate Reports of Committees 

No. 71, 37th Cong., 3d seS5., I.n. tl5!. Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct 

of the War. 

No. 75, 37th Cong., 3d sess., S.n. 1151. Report in I'art. The select committee of the 

Senate appointed to inquire into the chartering of transport vc-sse ls for the Ban~ expedition. 

No. 84, 37th Cong., 3d IC$S., I.n. 1151. Report of select committee on transportation 

for the Ban~ expedition. 

No. 555, 45th Cong., 3d SCM "Reorg;inization of the Army, 1878." 

US. Staili/es at lA.rge. 

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Phinerer, Frederick. Statisticlli Record of the Annies 01 the United SIllies. New York, 1901. 

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Pitkin, Thomas M., and Herbert R. Rifkind. PrOCUremfl"' Pip"","! in the QUllrtermaster 

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Curtis, Edward E. "The Provisioning of the British Army in the Revolution," Thll Magdline 01 Hidory, with NoteJ and QuerieJ, XVIII. 252- 2<41. 

Elf<ln, Maj. P. R. "Mat Ration in the Tropia," Journal 01 the Military Service Ins/itution 

of the U"ited StaleJ, vol. 29, pp. 24- 28. 

Fitzpatrick, John C. "Bread and the Superinlendenl of Rakers of the Cominental Army," 

DAR Mogaline, LVI. No.9 (Sep 1922), 515-20. 

Fin Gerald, Capl. Fnmcis V. "The President Prescribes-The Organization and Supply 

of the C.C.C.,'· T he Quarterm/lSler Review, XIII Uul- Aug 1955), 1-18. 

Ford, George B. "New Anny POSit for Old : ' The Quarlerm/lJter Review, IX (Nov- Dec 

1929), 9-22. 

Greene. Fred. '"The Military View of American Na!ional Policy, 1904--40," American HiJ10ricIII Review, LXVI, No.2 aan 196 1), 354--71. 

Hart, Charles H. "Colonel Robert Leuis Hooper, ~puty Quartenn:uter General in the 

Conlinenlal Anny and Vice President of New Jeney," PennJ),IVIlnia MIIgllzine 01 HiJlory 

and DiogTaphy, XXXVI (1912), 60-91. 

Horton. Brig. Gen. William E. "The Work of the Construction Service, Quartermaster 

Corpa:' The Quartermaster Review, VIII (Sep-<kl 1928). 6-9. 

Jameson, J. Franklin. "CorrespondJnce of John C. Calhoun," American Historical AMOCia -

tion, A,wual Report lor 1899. II, 95- 1204. 

-. " Papen of Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene." Rhode Island Historical Society Publica· 

tionl, vol. 5, No.5, pp. 1!i9-61. 

King, john. "John Plumbe, Originator of the Pacific Railroad," Annals 0/ Iowa, vol. VI, 

3d ser. Oan 19(4), 289-96. 

Knopf, Richard C. "Wayne', Western Campaign: The Wayne· Knox Correspondence, 1195-

94:' Penru),loonill Magazine 01 H iJIO? lind BiOgTaphy. vol, 78, No.5 Uu] 1954),298-341. 

Ludwig, Christopher. "Christopher Ludwig, Baker·General in the Army of the United 

Statet During lhe Revolutionary War," PermsylVllnill MllglIJ;ne 01 Hislory lind BiogTll' 

ph),. XVI (Apri] 1892), 343-48. 

McKee, Marguerite M. "Service of Supply in the War of 1812." The Quarlermruler Review, 

VI Uan- Feb ]927), 6-19; (Mar-Apr 1927). 4[>-5!i. 

Millett, Lt. Col. John D. "The Direction of Supply Activities in the War Department: 

An Administrative Survey:' TIle Americlln PolWell1 Science Review, XXXVIII (April 

1944), 249-65; aune 1944), 47s-98. 

Munson, Capt. Edward L. "The Ideal Ration for the American Army in the Tropics:' 

Joumal Of Ihe Mililary Service lrutilulion 0/ the United Stales, vol. 2ti. pp. 309--46. 

Nebon, Harold L. "Military Roads for War and Peace. 181- 8~:' Mililllry ADairs. XIX, 

No. I (Spring. 1955), 1-14. 

Parker. Theodore R. "William J. Kountz, Superintendent of River Tnlnsportation Under 

McClellan. 1861-62," The Wuten! Penns),IVllnill HiJloriclIl Magazine, XXI, 231 .... 54. 

Robinson, C. W. ''The Life of Judge AUgustus Porter," Publications of the Buffalo Historical Society, VII (1904), 229-75. 
766 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Seaman , Maj. Louis L. "The Soldier's Ration in the: Tropia--lts Use and t u Abuse," 

Jounrtll of lilt' Military Service Ins/illl/ion 0/ 1111: U'lilcd SillIes, vol. 28, pp. 8,""95. 

---, 'The U.s. Army Ration and 115 Adaptability for Usc in Tropical Climates," jourtllJl 

of !lu: Milililry Service "IS/ilu/io" of tilt Unil..;d StaleS, vol. 24, pp. 375-97. 

Stayer, Col. Edgar S. "The Year's Advancement in Military Motor Transport," Tilt: Quar-

/trma$l!!r Rroiew, XII Qui-Aug 1932). 3,.."7. 

Tomes, Robert. "The Fortune. of War," Harper's Nc:w Monthly Maga~im . XXIX Uune 

1864). 227- 31. 

Trumbull, J. Hammond. "A Business Firm of the Revolution, BamabM Deane &: Co., 

Magll1ine of American Hist ory with NOles Imd Queries. XII (1884), 17-28. 

Williams, Samuel. "T",o Western Campaigns in the War of 1812," Ohio Valley Historical 

Series MiJcell(ll1its, VII (1871), No, 2, 9-53. 

Wright, Col. John W. "Some Notes on the Conlinelllal Anny," Willi(lrl1 (ll1d M(lry College 

QU(lrlerl), H iJloricQI M(lg(l~ine,. Xl. 5I!OOnd $eries. No.2 (Apr 1931), pp. 81- 105 Ind No. 

3 au ly 1931). pp. 185-209: XII, second series. No.2 (April 1932), pp, 79-103, 

Wymans, Walker D. ...·n:ighling: A Big Business on the Santa Fe Trail," Tile K("/.I(ll 

R i$lorical QUQrltrl}', vol. 1. (Nov 19111 ), No. I. pp. 17-27. 

---. "The Military Phase of Santa Fe Freighting. 1846-1865." The J(,(IIlSaJ HiJloricti/ 

Quarlerl}', vol. 1 (Nov 1932). No.5, pp. 415--428. 
Index 

Ab ... hams, Abraham D., 15'1. 132 

Accountabi lity. system of 

adoption of, for clothing. 198-200 

introduction of, for money and property, 

' 85-86 

Accounlll 

disbursing offICers, 496-97 

Adams, John 

on appointment of QMG, !I 

Advisory CQmmiSilion, 603, 6O-ln 

Alesh ire, Maj. Cen. James B. 

appointment of, as QMC, 560; a5 first chief 

of Q MC, 564 

im portance of reserve cloth ing supply 

st ressed by. 578 

introduction of dc:<:clllralized procurement 

by, 590-95 

opposition of, 10 sharI detail system, 560 

procu rement of horJeS by, in 1898, 559 

proposal for remount scrvi<;c by, 59!-94 

recommendation for a service corps by, 562 

retirement Of. 564 

AI~andria , Loudon and Hampshire Rail. 

road, 596 

Alger, Russell A., 519, 534, 567 

Allen, Byt. Maj. Gen. Robert 

assignment of, 10 51. Louis, 544 

Civil War activities of, 427- 29 

dc.llh of, 513n 

postwar .service of, -472, 475 

sen ior and supervising Qr.(, !92 

service of, in California, !08, 3!!; in 

Mexican War, 278, 295 

Ambulances 

difficu lties in proctm:menl of, 1898, 5!8 

number of, April 1898, 535 

American Bail ie Monument! Commis.sion, 

,go 

America 'l Expeditionary Forces 

establishment of headquarters of, 645 

initial 8taff organiution of, 645-<16 

reorganiUltion of staff of, 647 .... 9 

selection of ports for, 655-56 

supply organiUltion of, 646-'19 

American Graves Registration Service, QMC, 

in Europe, 693. 695 

American Railway Awxillion , 572, 717 

Anderson, J. D., 404 

Animal Drawn Transportation Branch, OC. 

QM. A.E.F. 

dilllribUlion on priority ba$b by, 680 

fo~ign purcha5e of, 680, 680n 

Animals. See (llso Horses, Muh: •. 

Civil War abuses in procurement of, 375 

Civil War improvement in proc:urement of. 

378, 379 

disadvantages of cont ract procuremem of, 

,,, 

disposa l of surplus, afler Civil War, 456; 

after Mexican Wa r, 298 

increased front ier usc of, !l 15, 316 

limitation on purchase of, 1889, 1898. 535 

number of, on hand in April 1898. 555: 

p rocu red abroad for A.E.F .• 682; p ro· 

cured in ZI ror A.E.F., 68 1, 68 1n 

open·market purchase of, in 1905, 594 

procu rement of, through ~mount Jervice, 

594 

shortage of, in A.E.F., 681, 682 

Annapolis and E]k Ridge Railroad. 395 

Appropriations 

for clothing, 1799-1808, 121 n : 1909--16. 579n 

delay in providing, 1917, 617 

lack of QM control of ilS, in 1819, 194 

Mexian War p~paralions hampered by 

lack of, 245 

paJ$age of first, in Mexican War, 238 

pOiH·Seminole War reduction of, 237. 238, 

238n 

restrictive legislation governing, in 1898, 

520-21 

Arlington National Cemetery, 4tH 

Armour Packing Company, 529, 530 

Armstrong, John, 152, 171 

A~y 

aggregate stfength in 1850, 301; in 1860, 

d is'" tribu tion of, in 1850.30]; in 1860,301; 

in 1898, 515 

frC(luent movement of, in 1850's, 306 

increa$(' of, in 1898. 516; in Mexican War, 

246, 247 

reduction of size of, 1842, 237 

strength of, in 1784, 75; in 1821. 195; in 

1898. 5 15; in post·Civii War. 491; in 

post·World War I. 703. 709; in pre· 

World War I, 580 
768 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Army Transport Service 

attack on, 568-69 

discontinuance of, to Cuba and Puerto 

Rico, 568 

cffectiven~ of operations of, in 1899, 567 

need for, 565-66 

number of transports in, April 1917. 569, 

609 

regulation of, 566 

restora tion of, (0 QMC, 715-16 

work of, 567-68 

Artificers. corps of 

attached to QMD, in 1812. U7 

in Seminole War, 230 

A rlium 

company of, authorized in 1782.73 

employment of, in RevolUl.ion, 6, 16. 68 

hiring of, for conslruction work, 197,211; 

10 repair anns at Ft. Washington, 96-97; 

10 repair wagons in Mexican War, 242 

O'Hara's employment of, 104, 106 

on 'Vaync's expedition, 106-07 

Automatic supply 

exceptions to, 666 

McCarthy's recommendation for adoption 

of,666 

Sharpe's opposition to, 666 

Avery. Elisha, 28 

Aylett, William, 28, 43 

Babbitt, Col. Edwin B., 469 

Baker, Col. Chauncey n., 613 

Baker, Newton D. 

action of, in behalf of General Staff, 558 

change in purchase method by, 620 

on Root's creation of General Staff, 557-58 

Secretary of War, 599 

on Sharpe, 621 

Baker's, proposal for enlistment of, 507 

Ballimore and Ohio Railroad, 327, 328, 362, 

395, 396, 439 

Bandel, Eugene, 503 

Banning. Phineas, 470, 471 

Barradul. Su al.lO Shelter. 

bathing facilities at, 488-89 

candlelight in, 211 

construction of, in 1830's, 211 : in Civil 

War, 441. in Revolution, 16: in World 

War I, 607 

crilicism of, at western posts, 4M 

description of Civil War, 441 

furniture for, 211 

inadequacy of post·Civil War general appropriations for, 491 

introduction of gas lights in, 582; iron 

bedsteads in, 488: kerosene lamps in, 489 

Barracks-Continued 

standards for air space in, 488 

lise of heanh fires in, 211: Franklin stoves 

in , 2 12 

Ilart.len, John C., 164, 171 

Bash, Maj. Gen. Louis H ., 710, 710n 

Batchelder, Brig. Gen. Richard N., 514 

Bathing and disinfecting plants, A.E.F. 

effectiveness of, 679 

establishment of, 678 

Medical Department cooperation in, 678-79 

Salvage Service direction of, 678 

Beckwith, Col. Amos, 451 

Ikd 

delivery on hoof, in Civil War, 3M, 385. 

449, 452 

field ra tion inclusion of canned, in 1898, 

trOOp '" unfamiliarity with canned, in 1898, 

use '" of refri gerated, in Spanish·Amerkan 

War. 5.!1 1, 533 

Bt'CT, spruce, 10 

Belli. John, 100, 102 

Bellinger, Col. James D. 

application of decentralization w Army 

T ransport Service by, 592 

depot QM at Tampa, 5.!19, 54 1, 542. 544 

Belmont, August, 295 

Diddle. Clement. 24, 41, 45 

Dillings, John S., 487, 488 

Bird, Col. Charles, 546, 552 

Blaine, Ephraim 

appointment of, as Commissary Genera l of 

Purchases, 59 

resignation of. 68 

services of, as Commissary General, 68: as 

deputy commissary general of purchases, 

.!I I, .!I2. 4.!1, 46; in Whiskey Rebellion, 1\0 

BlankeLS 

description of standard, .!I57 

introduction of waterproof, in 1861, SS9 

procurement of, by A.E.F .. 669; in Civil 

War, 357-59 

shortages of, .!I57, .!I58 

supply of. in Revolution, I.!I, 15 

use of shoddy in production of, 358 

Blatchford; Richard M., 342 

Board of War 

appointment of Mifflin and Trumbull to, 

,. 

duties of, 4 

establ ishment of, 4 

orders to Clothier General by. 49 

procu rement of cloth ing by. 4.!1 
INDEX 

Board of War-Continued 

proposal of, for commissaries of hides for 

siales, 51 

n::placcmclll of, by Wa r Office, 9 

supervision exercised by. 5, 24, 48 

BoalS 

const ruction of, in Civil Wa r, 414; in 

Revolution. 17; in Wa r of 1812. 172 

UooIC('·making fa.:;tory 

establishment of, 256 

production iIt, 256 800.= 

QM manufacture of, 256 

supply of, by contract, to 1847.256 

Boston Wool T rade Associalion, 62.5. 624 

Brant, Maj. J. B .. 216 

Brent , Capl. Thomas L., 323, 324 

Brown , Maj . Gen. Jacob, 176, 177 

Brown , Col. Samuel L .. 3'81. 382 

Buchanan, William 

appointment of, as Commissary Gene ral of 

Purchases, 29; as deputy commissary. 28 

resignat ion of. 42 

Buford , Thomas, 158, 160 

Bullard, Maj. Gen. R. L., 687 

Buntin, Robert, 94 

Burial Department, A.E.F. 

cstablishment of, 690 

merger of, with Graves Registration Serv· 

ke, 690 

Butler, Brig. Gen. Benjamin F., 395 

Butler, Maj . Gen. Richard, 92, 97, 98 

flyers, j ames, 166 

Calhoun, john C. 

frontier policy of, 188 

on internal improvements, 215 

introduction of commissariat system by. 

143. 182 

relations with johnson brothers, 191- 92 

Se<::retary of 'Var, 181 

views on peacetime milita ry establishment. 

194-95 

Camels 

fail ure of experiment with, .520 

proposal for use of, 319 

Cameron, Simon 

appointment of john Tuck.er by, 368; 

T homas A. Scott, .562 

criticism of, 34 1, 3-63 

opposition to Me igs' appointment by, S36 

and patronage, .5!4. 340, 841 

Cantonment Division 

barrack construction by, 607-(l8 

establishment of, 606 

redesignation of, 609 

responsibility of, for a ll construction , 608 

Canvas. See Tents. 

Card, Capt. Benjamin C., 338 

Carleton, j oseph, 76 

Carrington, Edward, 129 

Carson. Col. J. M., 610, 611 , 6 12 

Carswell , Samuel, 140 

Cass, Lewis, 216 

Castle, Edward H., 363 

Cavalry Bureau 

creat ion of, 377 

dUlies of chief of, 377 

establishment of depots by, 377 

QM officers on duty in, 377, 378 

Ceme terial Division , OQMC 

establishment of, 692 

769 

supervision of return of the dead program 

by, 693 

Cemeteries, national. See also Cemeteries, 

overseas military; Headstones. 

expansion of, 467-68 

extension of burial rights in , 467 

legislation establishing, 43 1. 465 

maintenance program for, 466-67 

validation of land titles for, 466 

Cemeteries, overseas military 

location of, 694n 

loss of QM responsibility for, 695 

decision to e rect permanent, 694-95 

Cemeteries, post 

abandonment of, 468 

Chambers, Col. Talbot, 189 

Champion , Henry, 43 

Champlain. Lt. Samue l, 139 

Chauncey, Commodore Isaac, 172 

Cheatham , Maj . Cen. B. Frank.lin, 710, 7IOn 

Chemical Warfare Service, 679 

Chief Purchasing Officer, QMC. A.E.F. Su 

Office of the Chief 

Purchasing Officer, QMC, A.E.F. 

Chief o f Staff 

absorption of transportation function by 

office of. 612- 13 

creation of position of, 558 

failure of. to co·ordinate supply bureaus, 

,,. 

rota tion of office of, in 1917. 600, 600n 

Ch id Q ua rtennaSle r, A.E.F. 

divisional organitation of office of, 649 

dua l service of. 649 

functions of, under original organization 

of Ceneral Headquarters, 650; after Staff 

reorganization, 65 1 

IO$S of transportation responsibilities by, 

reorga '" nization of office of, in March 191 8, 

651-52 
770 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Chief Quarlcnnaster, A.E.F.-Conlinued 

responsibility of, for petroleum products 

supply, 661 

wagon transportation responsibility of, 679 

Chief Sales Oflker, QMC, A.E.F., 698 

Chrystie, Lt. Col. John, 145 

City Point Depot, 4~5-38. 456, 457 

Civil War. Set: al.lo Clothing; Forage; Sub· 

~is{ence: Transportation, ocean: Trans. 

portation. rivcT. 

d isbursements of Quartermaster's Department in, 453 

lack of supplies in, 452 

supply crisis at Chauanooga in, 403-04 

supply support of Sherman in, 419 

Civilian Conservation Corps. 729-30 

Claims Board, 70 ' 

Clarke, Col. Henry F., 451 

Clary, Capt. Robert E., 278, !l37 

Clothier General 

3ppoin tment of, in 1779, 5 1 

creation of office of, 23 

limitation on purchase by. 43' 

Clothing allowance 

abolition of fi:<ed, 1917. 674 

in Ciyil War, -H4-45: in 1190. 120 

deductiom from pay for, in Revolution, 15 

monetary, for Volunteers in Mexican War, 

m 

Clothing. Su alsQ Uniform . 

accoumability system for, 198-200 

changes in. to reduce cost of, 590 

criticism of, 124, 149 

distribution of, 120, 200 

estim3ting requirements for, 200-201, 52!, 

619-20 

impact of fromier on, 302; of changed 

methods of warfare on , 682-M 

insp«tion of. by boarili of officers, 105. 

200: by m ilitary storekeeper, 94, 104, 105: 

by Purveyor of Public Supplies, 12!, 

]24,127, 146; by Superintendent of Mili. 

tary Stores, 123, 124, 125. 126, 127 

introduction of new items of, !02, !03, 68! 

issue of, in Civil War, !50, !51, 444: of 

unmade, 502, 50! 

khaki, 574, 575 

p3cking of, 321-22 

replacement of, in Civil War, 445 

Jale of, to troops, 15 

shortages of, in 1861, 351; in 1898, 524: 

in World War I, 626, 669 

siZe!! of, in Revolutionary 'War, 23, 31; in 

Civil War, 502; post·Civii War increase 

in, 502 

Clothing-Continued 

Spanish·American War use of canvas, 524; 

of wool, 524 

supply of, in Revolution3ry Wu, 15, 23, 

3'0-31, 4!, 62, 71; in Mexican Wa r, 251, 

253, 254, 255, 256; to Northwestern 

Army, 161-62; in Spanish·American War, 

525, 526; in World Wu I , 618-19 

use of surplus stocks of, afte r Civil War, 

492; after Mexican War, 302; after 

Sp3nish·Ame rican War, 575 

waste of, in Civil War, 445, -146 

Clot hing, procurement of 

by Comm issary General of J'urchases in 

Seminole War, 226n 

by contract in post· Revolutiona ry period, 

79-80, 94-95: in Civil War, 351--54 

initial use of telegraph in, 250 

local procurement of, by A,E.F" 669: in 

1898, 525 

by Purveyor of Public Supplies, 119-127, 

1'14--16 

in Revolutionary War, 15, 30, 49-50: in 

Seminole War, 226; in World Wa r I, 

616-18, 62()-2!, 625 

role of ad'visory committees in , 616 

by War Depu unenl agenl$ in 1861, 342 

Clothing, production of 

method of, in 1799, 123 

modification of method of, in 1812, 146-47 

expansion of, in Civil War, !48, 350; in 

Mexic3n Wu , 253: in World War I , 625 

limited Civil War use of sewing machine 

in, 348n 

local, 3t Mexico City, 255 

post-Civil War depot, 502 

~se of government-furniShed materials in, 

123, 146 

in Sp3n ish·American War, 521, 526 

Clothing. reserve stocks of 

3mounu 3ppropriated for, 579n 

build up of, in Civil War, 356, 357; in pre· 

World Wu 1 period, 577-78 

exhaustioll of, in 19 ]6, 579 

13ck of, in 1898, 520 

need for, 577 

IUtus of, in April 1917,579-80 

Clothing, se3sonal and 'p«i31 

cold·weathe r, gOg 

demands {or, 503-05 

btigue, 504-05 

summer, 30!', 503-04 

winter, 503 

Clothing Bureau 

abolishment of, 251 
INDEX 

Clothing Bureau-Coruinued 

e$lablishmclII of. 20 1 

preparation of clothing estimates by, 201 

Clothing Department 

absorption of, by QMD, 2 

delay in refonn of, 43 

establishment of. 25 

reorganization of. 49-52 

Clothing and t:qu ipmcnt Division, 623. 632 

Clymer, JO$eph, 309 

Coffee Roasting Plant 

establishment of. 671 

nec:euity for, 671 

operations of, 67 ' 

Colt, Peter, 43 

Columbus Depot, 702 

Commissary Department. See also Subsistence Department. 

criticism of, 12, 23, 26. 31, 48, 54 

establishment of. I 

eXpill15ion of. 7 

field organiution of, 1775. 6-7 

organiution of, in 1780, 59 

reorganization of, in 1777,26-29 

revision of ..egulatory system for, 42 

supervisory controls over, 4-5 

Comm issary General of Forage. 25 

Commissary General of Issues 

elimination of office of, 71 

establbhment of office of, 27 

Commissary General of Purchases 

abolishment of office of, 251 

absorption of duties of, by Superintendent 

of Finance. 67, 68 

elimination of, 71 

establishment of office of, in 1777, 27; in 

1812, 1!I9 

overlapping functions of, 141 

redesignation of, as Commissary of Pur· 

chases, 195 

reduction in strength of office of, 195 

Commissary General of Stores and Pur· 

chases, I , 3 

Commissary General of Su1»istence, Su also 

Subsistence Department, 

creation of office of, 182 

rapid turnover in appoimees for, 1890-98, 

517n 

Commissary of Military Stores, 77, 83, 87, 93, 

94, 101 

Commiuee on Emergency Construction 

advisory assistance of, 607 

fonnation of, 606 

recommendations of, 606 

Commiuee on Raw Materials, 624 

Commiuee on Supplies 

creation of, 604n 

criticism of, 622 

771 

fC'commendation of, for control of wool 

supply, 623 

role of, in procurement of textiles, 620-21 

termination of work of, 623 

value of contracts ,under, 623 

Committee on Wool Supply, 624 

Conservation Branch, 629 

Construction 

costs of, on frontier in 1850's, 304; in 1902-

10, 581- 82 

of Delaware Breakwater, 217-18 

employment of civilians in, 211 

establishment of fund for, in 1926, 713' 

improvcments in, 582 

increased need for, after Span ish.American 

War, 580 

reduction in post·World War I appropria· 

tions for. 713 

responsibility of Engineers for, 210; of 

QM for, 210, 714, 714n 

restrictions on, in post·Civil War yean, 

of schools, libraries, gymnasiums, 582-83; 

of post·World War I housing, 713, 71 4 

temporary, on frontie r, 304, 486-87 

troop labor used in, 16, 211, 212, 215, 441, 

487 

use of special appropriations for, 491 

Construction Corps 

activities of, at City I'oint, 435 

disbanding of, 460 

origin of, 398 

sile of, 398 

use of, on western military railroads, 404 

Construction Division 

Cantonment Division renamed as, 609 

relation of, with QMC, 609 

proposal to establiSh, as separate bureau, 

6Q9 

Construct ion and Repair Division 

absorption of, in Cantonment Division, 608 

dutiC10 of. in 1917, 6Q6...{)7 

employment of experienced architeet in, 

'" plans of, in 1917 ,605 

Constructions, roads. See Roads, military, 

Continental Anny 

origin of. 3 

Contraband!, 443 

during Civil War, 345-47 

revision of, in 1867, 492-93 
772 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Contract s)'lIt em 

advantages of government manufacture of 

clothing over, !JS2 

agitation for return 10. for d othing supply, 

202 

application of. to supply of clOIhing, 79-80 

breakdown of, in War of 1812, 158 

continuation of, by Treasury Board, 78 

criticism of, in 1782. 72 

imroduClion of, by Robert Morris, 67, 71, 

72 

supply of equipment under, 80-31 

Contract termination 

overseas, in 1918, 698 

policies guiding, 701 

in ZI, 701 

Com ractors 

Anny criticism of, 72 

counter charges of. 72 

obligations of subsistence, 117-18 

QM supplies handled through. 80 

Contracts 

centralized control of, in 1864, 347 

cost-plus. 607--08, 622 

criticism of cost-plus. 608 

exposu re of abuses in, 546 

limitations in making, in 1861. 339 

remed ial legislation on , 345-46 

u~e of allocation method in placement of. 

622 

violation of procedures governing, in 1861. 

542, 34!1" 

Cooke, Lt. 0.>1. Philip St. George, 281, 325 

Coo'" 

Congress authorizl:$ en listment of. 587 

proposal for enlistment of. 507 

Cooks' and Bakers' Schools 

I:$tablishment of, 507 

increase in number of, 19 17, 627 

Corps of Topographical Engineers, 214 

0.>undl of Nationa l Defense 

congressional invl:$tigation of, 622 

~nd construction, 606, 607 

criticism of, 622 

defense of, 623 

development of COlIt-plus COlllract by, 607-

Q8 

I:$tablishment of, 603 

proposa l of, for depot advisory committees, 

51' recommendation of, fo r abandonment of 

competitive bidding, 620 

responsibilitil:$ of. 603 

Sharpe's use of. 603 

and subsistence requirements. 6 14 

Cox. j ohn. 40 

Coxe, Tench 

appointment of, as Purveyor of Public 

Supplies. 121. 121 n 

criticism of clothing inspection by. 124 

elimination of office of, U9 

feud with Irvine. 125 

procurement of supplil:$ hy, as Commissioner of Revenue. 82 

responsibilities of. 127 

supply of clothing by. in 1812, 144-45 

Court of Inquiry 

criticism by, of canned beef procurement, 

1898, 530 

discrediting of Miles' chargl:$ by. 534 

Craig, Issac. 94. 100, 102. 112. 11 3 

Craig. Gen. Malin. 715 

Crawford. William H., 178, 181 

Crosman. Byt. Maj . Gen. George H. 

assignment of. to Taylor's Headquarters. 

241 

preparat ions of, for Mormon expedition. 

'24 

proposal of. for use of camels, 319 

service of. in Mexican War, 242, 245, 246. 

270 

Cross, ~t. Brig. Gen. Osborn 

QM with Regiment of Mounted Riftl:$, 

306, 314 

services of, in Mexican War, 24 1. 274, 277. 

297, 298 

Cross, 0.>1. Trueman 

as Acting QMG. 196. 197,218,227,228,240 

appointment of. as Assistant QMG. 182 

on control of funds, 194 

on connruction of great military road, 217 

dea th of, 246 

dutil:$ of. in Washington office. 182, 197 

proposa l for corps of enlisted wagon 

drivers, 245 

QM in field, in 1845. 241. 242. 243, 244 

servicl:$ of, in Seminole War, 221, 229, 235' 

Crowell, Benedict, 599 

Cruse, Lt. Col. T homas, 535, 536, 577n, 580 

Cumming, William, 183 

Cumm ings, Alexander, 54 1, 542 

Cutts, Richard, 151 

Cuyler, jacob, 28, 43 

Dana, C. A .• 460, 461 

Dana, 8vt. Brig. Gen. James j .. 394, 467 

Dandy, Brig. Gen. George B., 482, 483 

Darnell , Elias, 162 

Dawes, Charles G., 667 
INDEX 

Dead, care of. Su also Cemeteries, llillional; 

Cemeteries, overseas military; Head· 

1I0nes. 

burial and r«ord program for, in Civil 

War, 46+-65 

preservation of reconb in, 464 

provision of burial expenses in, 463 

QM respOluibililY for, 462 

search and recovery program for, after 

Civil War, -465, 166 

by units in the fie ld. in 1917,691 

Dead, return of. See alJo Craves RegUtra. 

lion Service. 

establishment of precedent in, during 

Selninole War, 46~ 

origin of principle, 689 

organization established for, in 1919, 693 

termination of progt'llm for, 694 

War Department policy on, in 1917.693 

Dearborn, Maj. Gen. Henry 

Northern Department commander, 157. 

168, 169 

on qualifications of a QMG, 170, 171 

Secretary of War, 116 

Delaware Breakwater, 217-18 

Demobilization 

of troops, after Civil War, 45~5: artcr 

Mexican War, 297: after World War I, 

697 

Denny, Ebeneter, 159, 160 

Den! Act, 701 

Department of Apiculture 

and development of emergency ntion , 586 

and hone-breeding plan, 595 

Depot clothing factory, I'hiladelphia, See 

/liso Cloth ing, production of. 

employment aI, 625 

expansion of, in World War t , 625 

policy toward, in 19 15, 625 

Depoll 

advance, in Civil War, 451-$!); in World 

War I, 659-60 

bait, in Civil War, 427, 4!O, 458, 459; in 

World War I, 656, 657 

break up of Civil War, 456 

clothing, in Civi l War" 427 

concentration of supplies at main, after 

Civil War, 45(i 

colUlruction at, in Civil War, 442 

designation of post-Civil War general, 457 

expansion of general, in Civil War, 427 , 

'450 

development of A.E,", system of, 656-60 

function of base, 657; of inlennediue, 657 

in intermediate section , 657-59 

liqu ida tion of Civil War cloth ing, <1 56, 457 

773 

Dt'pots-Continucd 

minimum storage space at, 1898, 5<10 

post-World War I inactivation of, 724 

remount, 595 

lubsistence, in Civil War, 5&t, 455, 450; 

in Seminole War, 226 

temporary, in Civil War, 438-40 

use of, in Seminole War, 222, 228, 2! 1 

Depots, field supply 

deposit of reserve clol hing slocks in, 578 

establishment of No, I, 578 

General Staff plan for, 578 

study of, 577 

use of raerve clothing stocks in, in 1916,579 

Deputy quartermasters general 

appointment of, by Continental Congress, 4 

rank of, 4 

Delail system 

attimde of line officers 10, 560 

creation of four,year, 559 

Inodification of, in 1920, 710 

opposition of Quartennaster's Department 

to, 559-60 

partial abandonment of, 561 

DeWitt, Maj. Gen, J ohn L" 710, 710n, 711n 

Dickerson, Capt. John J " CQM with Monnon 

expedition, 524, !25, !!I 

DLjon Advance QM Depot 

establishment of, 660 

meat and bread depot, 660 

Director General of Transportation, A.E," . 

d uties of, 647 

supervision of A.E.F. Anny Transport 

Service by, 650, 679 

transfer of n.;1 transportation to, 650, 679 

Distribution 

d ifficulties of, at western posts. 481-&t 

Dix, John A., !42 

Dodge Commission 

conclusions of, 556 

on con$Olidation of supply bureaus, 556 

criticism by, of QMD'I handling of tranl' 

portation, 550; of preliminary procurement activity. 521; of provision of ocean 

t.-an$portatiOIl, 546 

dbmissal of Miles' subsistence charges by. 

,,. 

recommendation of, for clothing reserve, 

577 

uncovery of no frauds by, 520 

Dodge. Maj. Gen. Crenville M., <101 , 556 

Donaldson, Bvt. Maj. Cen, James L. 

activities of, al Na$hville Depot, 45·1-!4 

assignment of, al CQM Military DivisiQn 

of the Missi$!l ippi. 472 

on grain fraud, !79-80 
774 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Donaldson, BVI. Maj Gen. James 1--

Continued 

senior and liupervbing QM, 395 

transfer 0(, (0 Nuhvi ile, 403 

Doniphan, Col. Alexander W .. 248, 271. 282 

DQughcrty. John, 216 

Drum Barrlu;:k$, 470-71 

Drum, Capt. S. tI., 275 

Dry cleaning plants. COIlstrucl ion 0(, in 7..1, 

706 

Duer, William, 90. 91. 92 

Duna.n. William, 140, 15 1 

DUllon . Capt. C., 403 

Dusenbery. Maj . Samuel 8 ., 332 

I)yer, f:liphalcl, 28 

Eads. J ames B., 412 

Eagan, Brig. Cell. Charles I', 

bill by. enlisting (oob. 587 

oourt ma rtial of, 5.H. 53411 

on need for trained cooks, 587 

pl'QCurement of canned beef by. 550 

Easton, Bv!. Maj. Cen. Langdon C. 

assignment of. as CQM, Anny of Cumber· 

land, 403; CQM with Sherman, 392: 

CQM. Department of Mi5$Ou ri, 472 

AQM at Ft. Leavenworth, 1MB, 309 

senior and supervising QM, Military Jk. 

partmcnt of the Missi$5ippi. 472 

Mississippi, 472 

wagon train management under, 426 

EalOn, Urig. Cell. Amos 8 .. 582 

Eckert, Brig. Gen. Thomas T ., 459 

Eddy, Capt. Asher R., 562 

Edwards, Capt. Arthur. 414. 415 

E!fects Depol in Bue Section No. 1,663 

Ekin. BVI. Brig. Gen. James A., 578 

Elliot &: Williams 

award of subsistence contract to. 79, 85, 107 

failure in execution of lubsinence conll'lllct 

by, 107, 108 

EI Paso Remount Dcpot, 595 

Embarkation Service. 61S, 65'S 

Emel'$On, Rev. William. 15 

EndiCOIl Board, 582 

Engineer Department 

construction responsibility of, 210 

1m" of cmergency construction in ZI by, 608 

and overseas construction by, 649-50 

road construct ion by, 215. 214 

transfer of Delaware Breakwater to, 2 18 

Ernest, M'auhew, 112 

Espcnshield, 512 

Eustis, Jacob, 138, 166, 168 

EU$lis, William, ISS, 175 

Ewing, Grorge 

appointment of, as Commissary of Hides, 

resigna " t ion of, 5 1 

Expenditurcs 

post·Civil War restrictive legislation gov· 

erning, 495- 98 

Fallen Timbers. Batlle of,-IOS 

Farms. post. Set Gardens, post. 

.·edenl "rison i ndu$lries, Inc., 72S 

Feiton, Samuel M., 562 

Fenwick, Col. John R., 144 

Ferguson, Capt. C. B., 379, 380 

Florida Centl'llli and Peninsular Railroad, 542, 

,., .'loyd. John n. appointment of QMG by, 333 

l'dations with William H . Russell. 312, 31S 

s«retary of War, 512 

Food Purchase Board, 6 14 

Foote, Capt. Andrew H., 409, 4 15 

Fonge 

ccntralited oontrol of, S"81. 582 

cultivation of gnin for, by hired civilians, 

515; by troops, 204 

decenll'lllli~ed procurement of. 1861. 379 

establishment of chain of magalines for, in 

Revolution , 46 

failure of, on SI. Clair eXpedition, 99 

increased costs of, on frontier. 514 

and 1m" of animab in Civil War, 579 

mi~ed grain fraud in, 379-80 

O'Hara's use or boou for supply of, 105 

ration, 316, 579 

reform in procurement of, in 1865,380, !81 

requiremenlS of Anny of Potomac, 1861-62, 

shipmcnl '" of, for Seminole War, 221 

shortage of, in 1863,381 

supply of. in World War I, 666 

tr.IIISporlation of. 10 frontier posll, in 

1850's, 506 

Forage department 

e!lablishmcnt of, 25 

elimination of, 61 

introduction of systematized procedure! in, 

45-46 

Forbes, F. H ., 405 

Fort Berthhold, 483 

Fort Bridger. 325, 3'26 

Fort Buford, 483, 488 

FOri Defiance, 108, 160 

Fori Dearborn, 129 

Fort Cibson. 274 

Fort Greenville, 105, 107, 108, 109, III 
INDEX 

Fori Griffin, 488 

Fort Hail, !09 

ForlcHamilton,99, 106, 108 

Fort HannaT, 78. 84 

Fori Harker, 477 

Fon J efferson. 95, 99, 106, 107 

Fort J esup. 2118. 239, 241, 241\ 

Fori Kearny. !l08, 309, 327. 468 

Fori Leavenworth, 2M, 277. 278, !{)6, 308, S09, 

!l 10. !Il l , !lIS, 11211, 324, 11'25, !l26. 328, 329, 

456, 457. 472 

Fori Leavenworth Military Prison 

p roduction of QM supplies at, 499-500 

Fori Phil Kearny, 481, 482, 485 

Fori Laram ie, !l08, 309, 1\10, 1127 

Fori Mcintosh, 78, 78n 

Fort McPherson, 468 

ForI Pierre, 30!l 

Forl'Pin, 78,96,97. 98, 101, 102. 103 

Fort Recovery. 108 

ForI Riley. 310 

Fort Sooll , 309, 469 

Fort Sedgwick. 470, 477, 485 

Fort Smith, 274 

Fort C. F. Smith , 483 

Fori St. Clair. 107 

Fori Union, 308. 3"10 

Fori Wash ington, 87, 89, 91. 94.96,97,98,99, 

100, 102, 103, 105, 106, 112 

Fort Wayne, 129 

FOri Yuma. 484 

Fowler, Theodosius, 91 

FranciJ, T ench 

appointment of, as Purveyor of Public 

Supplies, 83 

death of, 121 

UM: of government·furnished materials in 

production by, 123 

Fraler, John G., 6 

Freighting companies 

amount of tonnage transported by, in F.Y. 

1866, 477; in F.Y. 1868, 477; in April 

1898, 478 

contracts with. 309. 310, 31 1 

extension of contracts with, to Pacific Coast, 

476 

names of, 309 

post·Civil War empl0l"ment of, 476 

Freighting of supplies 

advantages of, 313 

bl" contract, 308-16 

costs of, 310, 31 1 

mcn employed in, 309 

for Mormon expedition, 323, 324 

number of animals used in, 3'09; of wagons 

in, 309 

French, Capt. S. G., !I II 

Fuels and Forage Branch, 629 

Fromier 

775 

impact of, on transportation costs, 304, 306, 

473,474 

implementing Calhoun's policy for, 188-93 

lengthening supply lines of, 304-08 

westward expansion of, 1817, 188 

Gaines, Maj. Gen. EdJllund, 144,224,264 

GanM:voort, Peter, 1!lI, 132 

Garden Service, A.£.F. 

development of, 671-72 

extent of operations of, 672 

responsibility of CQM for, 65 1 

under Supplies Division, OCQM, 67 1 

Gardens, post 

criticism 0(, 204 

cultivation at, 20.5-04 

extent of production at, at Ft. Leavenworth , 

m 

forage production at, 204 

opposition 10, !lIS 

subuitution of civilian for troop labor at, 

m 

Ga rland, Maj. John, 201 

Gasoline and Oil Branch, OCQM, A.E.F. 

construction of storage tanks by, 662 

delivery of bulk gaSOline by, 662 

direction of petroleum supply operations 

by. 661 

General Munitions Board 

and construction. in 1917,606 

establishment of, 604 

notice to, of supply orden, 620 

~ferral of wool offer to. 624 

General Purchasing Agent, 667 

General Sales Agem . 50S, 698 

Gcneral )'urchasing Board, A.E.F. 

development of supply categories by, 668 

establishment of. 667 

function of, 667 

General Salcs Board, 698 

General SChedule of Supplies, 725 

General Staff 

cstablishment of, 557. 558 

impact of war on, 600 

lack of support for, 600 

opposition of supply bureaus to, 558 

reduction in personnel of, 600 

rejects proposal for cooks' and baken' 

school, 587 

reorganization of, 633 

General Staff. A.E.F. 

designations of sections of, 649 
776 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

General Staff, A.E.F.--Conlinued 

growing conflict between C--4 of, and Serv· 

ices of Supply, &19 

Gibbins, Maj. Gen. Henry. 710, 710n 

Gibson, Col. George 

appl ication for post of QMG by. in 1818, 

182 

appoimmenl of, as CommiUilT)' General of 

Subsistence, 185; as QMC, 179 

death of, 382 

proposal by, for open-markel purchues. 247 

provision of subsistence for Mormon expedition by. 327 

subsistence ~POrl by. in 1846,248 

support of JaCkson', c;ampaign in West 

Florida by, 179 

termination of QM service of. ISO 

Giesooro, 380, 430 

Gicvres QM Imermediate Depot 

e!ltablishmcnI of. 658 

location of, 658-59 

operations ai, 659 

Gi lchrist. Col. H. L., 678. 679 

Glen, Henry. 112 

Glidden, George R .. 319 

Goddard, John, 6 

Goethals, !'obj. Gen. George W. 

appointment of, as Director. Purcha5C, 

SlOrage and Traffic Division. 633; as 

DircclOr of SlOrage and T raffic Service, 

a$Signment '" of, as Acting QMG, 629 

completion of reorganization after armistice 

by, 644 

eoncept of Corps as purchasing organization, 632. 

c6-<lroination of storage Iystem by, 630 

criticism of QMC by, 627 

proposal for cOIIKllidauxl Krvice of supply 

by, 639 

resumption of purchaK funct ion by, 632 

views on consolidating Army purchases, 636 

Gold Star Mothen, pilgrimage of 

congressional authoriution for, 696 

eligibility for, 696 

number of participants in, 696-97 

Governmem-fu rnished materials 

innoduction of UK of, by Tench .'rancis, 

IIrict '" comrol of, 146 

usc: of, in clothing contracts, in Civil War. 

!52 

Govemmem halls. 350 

Graham Committee. 7IM 

Graves Registrat ion Service. Su II/SO Ameri· 

can Gravell Registration Servke in Eu· 

rope; Graves reginration units; Dead, 

return of. 

concentration in cemeteries by. 692 

establishmcnt of. 690 

functions of, 691 

manage.nent of Gold Star Mother.' Pilgrimages, 695 

number of concentration cemeteries established by, 692 

number of unilS in, 692 

origin of, 689 

tem.illation of activities by, in Advance 

Section, 692 

transfer of. to OQMG. 692 

Graves registration units 

lint establishment of, 689. 690 

number of. In A.E,F" 692 

termination of work of, 692 

Gray. Samuel. -'2 

Greeley. Aaron, 172 

Greene, Maj. Gen. Nathanael 

appointment of, as QMG, 40 

husiness ventures of. while QMG. "On 

improvement of transportation under, 44-

.. resignation of, 55. 59 

Gunboats 

naval command of. 413 

QM coll5truction of, 412 

QM support of. flotilla. 415' 

tr.lll$fer of. to Navy, 413-14 

usc: of. on Cumberland Rive r. 406 

Hagood. Maj_ Gen. Johnsoll. 647. 687 

Haines. Capt. Thomas J .. 45 1 

Halleck, Maj. Gen. H . W. 

on chaos at St. Louis. 545 

criticism of shoes by, !60 

postwar assignment of. 472 

Hamilton . Alexander. 81. 82 

Hampton . Maj. Gen. Wade, 174 

Hancock, Capt. W. S., 324 

Hanford and Browning, 353 

Harbord. Ma j. Gen. J ames G., 721 

Bargous. Louis 5 .. 294. 295 

Ham.ar, Col. Josiah. 78, SO. 87 

Hannar expedition 

failure of, 88 

strength of, 87 

supply 1e55(llis of, 88 

supplying the. 84-8'1 

Harney. Brig. Gen. William 5.,-'43 

Harris It Dixon, Ltd., 67-' 
INDEX 

Ha rrison, Brig. Gen. William Henry. 159 

Hart, Maj. Gen. William R., 710, 710n 

Ham, Capl. E. L., 464 

Hatch, Capt. R. B., 408 

Hatfield, MGSe$,51 

Haupt, Hennan 

appointment of. 397-98 

civilian operation of military railroads 

under, 398 

regulations imposed by . .!I98-99 

Headstones 

design of, 467 

legislation authorizing use of, in national 

cemeteries, 467 

types adopted fot oveneas cemeteries, 695 

use of, for veterans buried in private cemeteries, 467 

Heath. Maj. Cen. William, 66 

Hecker, Col.. Frank j..546 

Henry, William, 5 1 

Henel, Capt. A. R. 

chief procurement officer for animals, 274 

procu rement of wagons in Mexican War 

by, 269 

senior QM at the Brazos, 291 

views on sold ien detailed as teamsters, 293 

Hide Department 

establishment of, 24 

respunsibility of, for shoes and accoutrements, 24 

reorganization of, 5 1-52 

Hirsch, Col. H. J., 621 

Hodgdon, Samuel 

as agent fo r O'Hara. 102: fo r Wilkins, 115 

as Commissary of Military Stores, 77, 87, 

100, 194 

as QMG for St. Clair expedition, 93, 94, 95, 

97, 98, 99, 100 

as Superintendem of Military Stores, 85, 

110, 124n 

on Wayne's criticism of dothing, 105 

Holabird QM Depot, 718, 719 

Holabird, Brig. Gen. Samuel B. 

devises fatigue dothing, 504-05 

tenure of senoice as QMG, 514 

Ho~ 

fraudul ent Civi l War practices in procurement of, 575 

impressment of. in Revolution, 21, 64, 69 

lack of, for Yorktown Campaign, 68 

Pickering's met.hod of obtain ing, 68-69 

procurement of. in Mexican War, 274, 275. 

279; in ZI for A.E.F., 68 1n 

purchase of, by boards of officen, 5J9 

use of, in Seminole War, 222, 255 

777 

Horses, pack 

contractor supply of, 85-86, 92 

10M of, on Hannar expedition, 88 

O'Hara's regulation of, 10.5-04 

procuremem of, in War of 1812, 158, 165 

use of, on \Vayne expedition, 106 

Hospitals 

construction of, in Civil War, 441 

estimates and approprialions for, .486 

Washington Depot responsibility for, 431, .. , 

Hodges, Capt. Henry C., 416 

Howard, George T., 512 

Howe, Eliu, 548 

Hughes, Hugh 

appointment of, as Assistant QMG, 8 

proposal of, for enlisting teamsters, 22 

refusal of, to selVe under Greene, 41 

support of boat construction by, 17 

tramporta tion method devised by, 65 

Hughes, John T" 279 

Hull, Gen. W i11iam, 155, 157, 159 

Humphrey, Brig. Gen. Charles F. 

on abandonmem of blue senoice uniform, 

575 

bills Cor scnoice corps drafted by, 561 

de termination of capacity of transports by, 

548 

opposition to discontinuance of Army 

Transport SelVice. 568, 569 

proposal for central office for settling railroad accounts, 570 

recommendation for permanent appoint_ 

mems in Department, 560-61 

responsibility of, for loading transports of 

Shaher expedition, 549 

testimony on shipment of wagom and 

animals, 557 

views on short detail system, 560 

warning of, on inadequate clothing ap' 

propriatiom, 577 

Hunt , Col. T homas F. 

AQM at New Orleans, 187 

criticism of, 299 

death of. 532 

at New Orleans, in Mexican War, 240-4 1, 

243,274 

procurement of water transportation by. 

244, 258, 267, 268 

selVices of, as Acting QMG, 197, 206, 221, 

240 

Huts, troop construction of, 16 

India rubber, use of. 258 

Indian expeditions. Su Harmar expedition; 

SI. Clair expedition; Wayne expedition. 
778 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Indu5Iriai demobilization. Set a/so Contract 

termination; Surplus property. disposal 

of. 

lack of plans for, 700 

Industrial Mobilization Pian, 722-25 

Innal;on 

during Revolution. 48. 52, 56 

Ingalls, Bv!. Maj. Gen. Rufus 

appointment of, as CQM of Army of 1'0-

tomac. 42~; as QMG, 514 

criticism of, on animals furnished Army 

of Potomac, 1176 

establish ment of wagon factory at J efl"cl'$Onville Depot by, 499 

improvement of wagon train management 

by, 425-26 

marking of Army wagons by, 424 

QM with Steptoe expedition, U I 

reduction of wagon trains by, 42~24 

retirement of, 514 

submission of Army of Potomac estimates 

10 QMC by, !l93 

survey of supply rou tes at western posts by. 

474-75 

views on consolidat ion of supply bureaus, 

512 

Inspection. Su also Clothing, inspect ion of. 

abuses in hot'$e, 575 

improvement in animal, 378 

of shoes, in Civil War, 361 

Interbureau procurement, 724 

Internal improvements, 2 12-18; 317- 18 

Irvin, Capt. C. H .. 432 

Irvine, Callender 

appointment of, as Commissary General of 

l'urchases. l 25n, 140: u Superintendent 

of Military Stores. 125 

criticism of Quartermaster's Department 

by, 149-50 

dea th of. 25 1 

feud with Co1<e, 125 

modification of clothing production by. 

146-47 

preference of, for fi1<ed salaries in lieu of 

commi!\Sion$, 147 

proposal to me rge office of. 140 

recommendation of, on use of i!\S uing com· 

missa ries, 150; on system of accountability, 199 

relinquishment of inspection by, 127 

support of Seminole War by, 222-23, 224 

Irvine, Brig. Gen. William, 97,124, 124n. 125 

Irwin, Capt. James R. 

CQM with Scott's Vera Cruz expedition, 292 

death of. 297 

Irwin. Capt. J ames R.-COntinued 

establishment of depot in Mexico City by, 

295 

funds for QM operations at Vera Cruz obtained by, 294, 295 

Irwin, Matthew, 28 

Js·sur-Til1e 

erection of mechanical bakery at, 660, 663 

establishmem of QM depot at, 660 

peak operations of QM depot ai, 660 

regulating stalion at, 657 

Jackson, Maj. Gen. Andrew 

commander of Southern Division, 177 

failure of, to obtain QM supplies, 175 

troop construction of roads under, 212, 

212n, 213 

Jacob!!, Ll. Col. JOlIhua W., 55 1 

Jay, Ll. Col. N. D., 668 

jay Treaty, 109 

jeffenonville Depot 

clothing production at, in [870'5, 502; in 

1898, 521, 526 

a post-Civil War general depot, 456, 457 

shirt bctory at, 625 

uniform factory at. 625 

wagon factory established at, 499 

j effenonville Railroad. 402 

J enkins, Col. Elisha, 173. 176 

jesup, Brig. Gen. Thomas S. 

on aceountabiHty, 185-86 

death of, 332, 333 

detailed deputy QMG. 172 

direction of QM field operations in Vera 

Cruz expedition by. 284, 287. 288, 289, 

291. 292 

evaluation of QM support during Mexican 

War by. 237; of regulations by, 187 

as field commander during Seminole War, 

221.228,229.230,232.233 

fonnulation of system of clothing account· 

ability by, 199-200 

inspection tour of. in 1845, 239 

invention of ponton wagon by,229n 

landing of, at Vera Cruz, 287 

p re·Quarte rmaster Anny career of, 183n 

proposal for vete rina ry corps and training 

by. ~16 , 317 

regulations for Department drafted by, 184, 

185 

railroad construction recommended by, 

7-18 

road construction advocated by. 216 

support of Missouri expedition by. 1819, 

188 
INDEX 

J esup, Brig. Gen. Thomas S.-Gontinued 

views on Quartermaster'S Department, 183-

84; on Seminole policy. 234 

Johnson, J ames 

advances on contracts to, 191-92 

award of transportation contract 10, 189, 

190 

failure in execution of subsistence contract, 

190, 192; of transportation coDtract. 191 

settlement of claims of, 193 

subsistence contractor, 189 

use of steamboaUl on expedition proposed 

by, 190 

J ohnson. Richard M., 189 

Johnston, Brig. Gen. Albert S., 302, 525 

Johnston, Gen. J O$Cph E. 

appointment of, as QMG, .!I33 

direction of first Union procurement orden 

by, "39 resignation of, !311, 334 

Jones, William, 139 

Kearny. Brig. Gen. Stephen W., 248, 277, 279, 

280,281 

Kernan, Brig. Gen. F. J.. 613 

Keyes. Lt. Col. Erasmus D .. 336 

Kimball, Col. Amos S., 525, 54 1, 545, 548 

Knox, William, 93. 9311 , 94, 98, 101 

Knox, Henry 

appointment of, :u Secretary at War, 76-77 

duties as Secretary at War, 81 

and Hannar expedition, 87 

preparation of supply estimates by, 78 

retrenchment under, 75 

and 51. Clair expedition, 88, 89. 90. 91. 92, 

94.96,98 

Kountz. Capt. William J.. 408 

Krautholf, Brig. Gen. C. R .. 698 

Laborers. civilian 

employed in RR re.:onstruction in Western 

theater, 405 

Lamb, Anthony, 158 

Lamb. Robert. 5 1 

Land grant ra ilroads. Stt: Railroads. land 

grant. 

Laundries, fixed 

construction of, in 1918,705 

deterioration of. 706 

number of, in 1917.705: in 1959.707 

opposition to government·operated. 726 

Laundry service in A.E.F. 

criticism of. 678 

inadequate facilities for. 678 

Laundry service in ZI 

di$COntinuance of free. 706 

provision of free. 706 

Lawrence and Morris. 79, 80 

Lawton, R. B., 262 

Leavenworth . Col. Henry, 195 

Lee, Maj. Gen. Charles, 6, 21 

Lee. Col. James C. G., 539 

Lewis. Brig. Gen. Morgan 

appointment of. :u QMG, 136 

779 

criticism of Commissary Department opera· 

tiom by, HI 

fu nctions of, 142 

as member of N.Y. legislature, 170 

objections of, 10 law establishment Depart· 

ment, 137 

organization of Department by. HIS-59, 168 

restrictions on authority of, 159 

services terminated as QMG. 171 

supply activities of, 167 

Lexington and Frankfort Railroad, 402 

Lincoln. Maj. Gen. Benjamin 

appointment of. as Secretary at War, 5 

forwarding of men and supplies by, for 

Yorktown campaign. 69 

temlination of service as Secretary al War. 

76 

Line of Communications. Stt: a/so Services 

of Supply. 

depot operations on , 656-60 

division of, into sub·sections, 546 

QM facilities operated in advance sect ion 

of, 663, in base section. 662: in intermediate section, 662-63 

redesignation of. as Services of Supply. 647 

responsibilities of Commanding General. 

64H7 

Linnard, Bvt. Lt. Col. William 

appointment of, as deputy quartennasler, 

13' 

difficu lty experienced by. in delivering Slipplies in 181 2, 150 

duties of. 131 

handling of transportation by. al Philadelphia, 2{)5 

key figure in War of 1812. 168 

as military agent, !!II 

rele,uion of. in Deparlment, 182 

as transportation agent. 150 

Littell, Col. I. W. 

cantomnenL construction linder, 606 

Chief. Construction and Repair Division. 

606 

Loper, Capt. Richard F. 

transportation agent in Civil War. 369. 370, 

371; in Mexican War, 287 

Lou isville and Nashville Railroad, 396. ~02 
780 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

LUdington. Brig. Gen. Marshall 1. 

appointment of, as QMG. 516 

duties as DQMG, 510 

ex.pansion of OQMG under, 518, 518n 

government.owned vessels for emergency 

use advocated by. 568 

preparations 0[, for war, 520, 521, 522 

proposal by. for increased strength in Department, 518 

reje<:don of proJ>0$31 for Anny automobile 

by. 595 

Ludlow, Israel, 92 

Lutterloh, Col. Henry Emanual. 25- 26, 37 

Lynch, Capt. Samuel G .. 368 

McCallum, BYI. Maj. Gen. Daniel C .. 396, 

!l96n, 404 . 

McCarthy, Col. Daniel E. 

automatic supply proposed by. 666 

CQM, A.£.F., 645 

delegation of procurement responJibility 

by, 668 

initial supply prepantions of, 654-55 

investigation of Allied u lvage methods 

by, 674 

relinquishment of CQM post by. 649 

remnu", service unde r, 682 

McClellan, Maj. Gen. George B. 

c;:ri ticbm of Civil War shoes by, 5'60; of 

Volumcer clothing in Mexican War by, 

Macfeely, '" Brig. Gen. Robert 

Chief Comm issary, Army of Tennes.s«:, 451 

proposal of, for enlistment of cooks and 

bakers, 587 

resignat ion of, as Commissary General of 

Subsistence, 517n 

McFerran, Capt. J. C., 469 

McHenry, James, II I, 129 

Mackay, Bvt. Col. Aeneas 

death of, 532 

as QM at St. Louis supports Kearny, 278 

McKay, Gordon , 561 

McKay, Capl. James M., 549, 550, 551, 552 

McKinstry, Maj. Justus 

in charge of cloth ing depot at Mexico City, 

295 

congressional investigation of, 594 

dismissal of, from lenice, 544 

emergency procurement by, in 1861,50 

McKu.sack, Capt. William M. B. 

disposal of surplus property at Santa Fe, 

29' 

QM at Santa Fe, 278, 282,285 

supply of troop5 under Lt. Col. P. St. 

George Cooke by, 281 

Maintenance 

of boal$ in Revolution , 17; of tentage, 16 

Manasas Gap Railroad, 459 

Manutacture, government 

resort to, in post·Civil War period, 498--500 

March, Gen. Peyton C. 

opposition of, to War Council, 629 

support of Goethals by, 656 

Marcy, Capt. R. B., 525. 529 

Marm ite, 686-87 

Martin. Capt. J ames G., 552 

Masten. Capt. Frederick H., 552 

Meade, Maj. Gen. George C. 

on consolidation of supply bureaus, 512 

on staff-line controveny, 512 

Mea$;lm, George, 23 

Mease, James 

appointment of. as Clothier General. 25 

continuat ion of, in office, 0 

responsibility of, for shoe procurement, 24 

resignation of, 51 

Meats, canned, introduction of·, 506 

Medical Department. 586 

Mehelm, John, 51 

Meigs, Bvt. Maj. Gen. Montgomery C, 

appointment of, as QMG, 356, 556n 

at Chattanooga, 405, 404, 452 

on compulsory retirement, 5 13 

control of rail transportation dghtened by, 

365-<6 

formu lation of principles for disposal of 

military railroads by, 460 

and Ft. Pickens expedition, 536 

opposition of, 10 government manufacture, 

498-99; to loss of fund control, 344; to 

restrictive contract legislation, 546 

p lan for bowling alley drafted by, 490 

policy of, on rates to land gnnt railroads, 

... q ualifications of, 556, 557 

recogn ition for QM field officen obtained 

by, 394 

reform of ocean transportation procurement by, 572 

relations with McCallum, 396n 

retirement of, 513, 514 

western inspection tour of, 488 

Meigs, Return Jonathan, 155, 158 

Mess halls, introduction of system of common , 

507 

Mexican War. Su Il /Sil Clothing; ' Subsistence; Tr.uuponation, ocean; Transporta tion, i~ er; Wagons. 

clothing the volunteer in, 251, 255, 254, 255 

clothing depot at Point Isabel in, 256 

criticism of tenU in, 257 
INDEX 

Mexican War--COntinued 

demurrage COSLS in, 262 

depots, at Corpus Christi, 244; at Point 

lsahel. 245 

issue of clothing to Regulars in, 256 

ponton equipment requisitioned for, 229, 

245 

preliminary QM preparations for, 239-46 

supply of Kearny, 277-83: of Taylor, 263-73 

support v{ Scott's campaign. 283- 96; of 

General Wool. 27!-77 

Mifflin, Benjamin, 139 

Mifflin, Maj. Gen. Thomas 

appointment of. 10 D.oard of War, 37: as 

QMG. in 1775,3; in [776,8 

evaluation of serviO;e5 of, 36-37 

procuremcn! of cloth ing by. l!\ 

promotion of, to brigadier gclleral, 8; 10 

major general. 24 

reorgan ization plan of. 39 

rr$ignalion of, in 1776,8; in 1777,8,36 

Milburn Wagon Co., 558 

Miles, Maj. Gen. Nelson A. 

on breakdown in transportation, 527 

criticism of canned beef, 533 

on lack of unifann, and blankets for volun. 

teer regiments, 524 

usc of embalmed beef charged by, 534 

Miley, Lt. Col. john D .. 549 

Military agents 

ineffec:tiveness of system of, U5 

introduction of sy$lem of, 130-33 

reappointment of, as deputy quartermasten;, U8 

Military departments 

assignment of CQM to , 389 

Changes in, during Civil War, 389, 390 

duties of CQM in, 389 

Military Post Construction Fund, 715 

Military railroads, See Railroads, military. 

Milk, unavailability of in Revolution , 10 

Miller, Col. Crosby P., 555 

Miller, james. I I ~ 

Ministry of Munitions, 628 

Mississippi Centra l Railroad, 403 

Missouri and Yellowstone expedition 

congressional investigation of. 193 

to St. Peter's River, 188, 189 

trooIM for, 190 

troubles with contractor on, 190-95 

use of steamboats on, 190 

to Yellowstone River, 188 

Mobile and Ohio Railroad, 401, 403 

Monroe, james, 144 

Montoir QM base depot, 656 

Moore, Capt. james M., 464 

Morley, Capt. R. F .• 395 

Mormon expedition 

QM support of, 322-29 

wltliers incapacitated on, 302 

!roops on, 323, 326, 527 

Morris, Robert 

plan of. for subSisting Army, 64-65 

resignation of, 78 

use of connact system by, 67, 70, 71- 72 

Morrison, j ames 

78 1 

as deputy QMG to Northwestern Anny, 

154, 161, 162, 163, 164 

as subsistence contractor, 119 

Morristown 

hardships at, 56-58 

mutiny at, 65 

Motor Branch, 629 

Motor Transport Service. Su aim Trans· 

portation, motor. 

cstablishmem of, 641 

redesignation of. as Corps, 641 

Mounted Rilles, Regiment of. 306-()7, 314 

Moylan, John 

assistant in Clothing Department, 51 

as Clothier General, 70, 71 

Moylan, Col. Stephen 

appointment of, 8 

resignation of, 8 

Mules 

Civil War reliance on, for drah purposes. 

374, 420 

procurement of, during Mexican War, 271. 

275,274, 275, 279; in 1898, 539; in Zl for 

A.E."" 681n 

usc of, in Seminole War, 222, 233 

Mules, pack 

need for repackaging ~fex can Wa r supplies 

carried on, 272 

objection to use of, in Mexican War, 272 

reduction in carrying capacity of, in Cuba, 

537 

use of. in Mexican War, 270, 27 1, 272, 280, 

292 

Mullany, Brig. Gen, James R. 

appointment of, all QMG, 179 

wlicitation of appointment in 1818, 182 

lenninalion of aenices of, as QMG, 180 

Mumford, William, 28 

Murphy, 312 

Myen;, Col. Abraham C. 

resignation of, from Department, 354 

$Crvicc of. as QMG of Confederate Anny. 

Myen;, '" Col. Wi lliam, 428 
782 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Na~h. Brig. Gen. William H. 

retirement of, 517 

Jervice of, as Commissary General of Subsistence. 517n 

Nashville Depot 

in Civil War .• 31-," 

liquidalion of, 456 

Nationa l AssociatiOIl of Wool Manufacturen, 

,,. 

National Cannen' Association, 614, 704 

National Defense Act of 1916. 558, 585, 600, 

602 

National Defense Act of 1920, 708, 709, 710, 

721, 724 

Navy Department 

assistance of, in transportation of camels, 

cooperatio '" n of. at Vera Crul, 290 

effect of prepa rat ions of, in 1898,545 

funds for. on I'acilic Coast, 280 

Purveyor executes contracts [or, M 

QM usc of pclroleum products oonnllCI.$ of, 

725 

Neve rs QM Depot 

centralization of office equipment and Itationery at, 658 

e$lablishment of. 658 

as training center [or QM personnel,658 

New Cumberland Depot, 702 

New York Defense Comminu, 342, 563, 369 

New York Depol, 457 

Northem Central Railroad, !63 

Octori. 651, 65l n 

Office of the Ch ief Purchasing Officer. QMC, 

.... . E.F. 

clothing articlell purchued by, 669 

direc tion of production activities by, 67G71 

organiution of. 668 

partidpation of, in 10011 coal procurement. 

procurement '" by, on a replacement I»sis, 

669-70 

supply categoriell assigned 10. 668-69 

Office of the Chief Quartermaster, ..... E.F. 

Su Chief Quartennaster, ..... E.F. 

Office of T he Quarte rmaster General 

absorption of, in General Stair, 635 

branch organiution of. 510 

centrali za tion of cemete ri al work in, 465 

dissolution o f divisional organiution of. 

in 1867, 510 

divisional organiution of, in 1864, 557-3"8, 

538n; in 1895.510-11 : in 1898,518, 518n, 

546: in 1920, 708: in 1930. 708 

Office of the Quarte rmaster Genera1-

Continued 

employment of civilian c1erQ in, 197; of 

women oopyisu in, 357 

expansion of, under Sharpe, 629-50 

increase in Civil War ,Ierical staff of. 357 

organizat ion of, in 1849. MO: in .... p ril 

1917, 601 

preparation of clothing estimates by, 200-

20' 

reorganization of, in 1898, 5 18n, 519; in 

Janual')' 1918, 652: in .... pril 1918, 655-

35; in June 1918. 655 

te rmina t ion of divuional organiution of, 

in 1867. 510 

Offi,en ' Reserve Corps 

elrcci of adverse ruling on , on QMC. 605 

QMC proJ>O$Cd use of. in 1917,602 

O'Hara. J ames 

appointment of, as QMG. 100, 101 

fie ld organization of, 102-04 

preparations of. for Wayne's expedition, 

. 101-C2. 106-07, l OS 

resignation of, 110, J 12 

u subsistence contrattor, 78 

Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, 327, 528 

Opdyke, George, 342 

Orange and Alexandria Line. 596, 459 

Ordnance Dcpartment. 77. 141, 189. 265. 498, 

499, 608 

Orr, Benjamin. 172 

Overman .... tt 

ba5is of plan fo r consolidated service of 

supply, 659 

pauage of. 628 

promotion of centralbed control under, 724 

pl'Ovilioni of, 628 

O.m 

use of. in Mexican War. 242, 245. 270, 27 1. 

274,276.279, 285: in Revolu tion, 2 1; in 

War of 1812. 162 

'>adfic Railroad Company, 328 

Pa,k animals. Su: Hones. p<lck; Mu lell, pad;. 

Pack trains 

limited ule of. in Civil War, 574 

use of. in mountainous front ie r, 471 

Parke. John , 6 

PanoOl, Col. Lewis B. 

adoption of m nlract system in steamboat 

proc:urement by, 409, 410 

assignment of, to Western Department. 395, 

'28 

responsibility of. for all welltem river 

transportation, 404, 410 

Sloc:kpiling railroad equipment .advocated 

by, 40 1-C2 
INDEX 

l'auenon, Maj. Gen. Robert, 350 

I'anen, Col. William S" 525. 527 

I>ennsylvania Railroad, 327. 328, 3"62, 363, 369 

" I>cnhing" hobnail boot, 683 

]'crshing. Gen. j ohn J. 

call of, for woolen clothing. 619 

endorsement of ;WlOll1lltic supply syuem 

by, 666 

on need for A.£.F. gelleral staff. 645 

j'c\"$Onnel, dvilian 

denundation of. paid commissions, 54 

employment of, in Comm issary Dcpulmenl 

in 1775,6; in QMD in 17.75,6; in 1780, 

60-6[: ill Seminole War, 230-31 

lirst women copyists. 337 

inadequate number of, in OQMG in 1861, 

increase '" in number of. employed at posts, 

197 

introduction of, in OQMG, 197 

Jesup's opposition to use of clerical, 183 

lack of fu nds to hire, in 1845, 238 

majority of Revolutionary. on fixed salary 

basis, 54 

need for retirement plans for. 593 

number of fema le, in 1864, 337; of male, 

in 1864, 337 

post·Civil Wn release of. 457. 458 

a, purchasing agents on a commission 

basis. 7 

reduction of. in 1782.72 

substitution of troop labor for at depots. 

458 

Personnel. QM military 

actual comm issioned strength of. in 1861. 

334; in 1917.602; in 1939. 710; enlisted 

strength of. in 1916. 565; in 1939, 710 

age and health of. in 1850'5.331,332 

authorized commissioned strength of. in 

1920. 709; enlisted strength of. in 1920. 

709 

Civil War inc~ase of. 3-35 

efforts to obtain gradation in rank for 

field. 394 

introduction of regular gradation of Tank 

for. 198 

permanent commissions 3ulhorited for. 710 

post·Civil Wn assignment of. 509 

number of. in A.E.F., 653. 654 

Sharpe's proposed use of Reserve officen. 

602-{l3 

station of, in 1850'5.331 

Perry. Capt. Alexande r J .. 337 

Perry. Commodore. M. C., 292 

I'etroleum products 

bulk distribution of, in A,E.F" 662 

CQM, A.E.F. responsibi lity for. 66 1 

783 

Pen it, Chark'S, 40, 52, 53. 60 

Philadelphia clothing establishment. Su also 

CIOIhing, production of. 

origin of. 146---47 

production at. in 1812, 147; in Civil War, 

348. 350; in Mexican War, 253; in Span· 

ish·American War, 521, 526; in World 

War I, 625 

I'hiladelphia Depot, 253, 348, 350, 457, 521, 

526, 625, 723 

J'hiladelphia. Wilmington &: Baltimore Rail· 

road, 362 

I'iall. John H., 158, 160 

I'iatt, CapL William, 163, 175 

Pickering, Col. Timothy 

abolition of office of, 73' 

appointment of, as QMC, 60 

preparations of, for Yorktown campaign, 68 

QMD absorption of Commissary Gene ral 

of Purchases p roposed by, 1-2 

retrenchment under, 72-73 

as Secretary of War, I I I 

Pierce. Col. Charles C., 690, 692 

Pinckney. Maj. Gell. Thomas, 139 

Pitkin , Col. P. 1'" 435, 440 

Plant Railroad, 542, 543 

l'lumbe, John. 318 

Poinsett. Joel R., 217 

Ponton equipmem 

call for. in Mexican Wn, 245 

use of, in Seminole War. 228-29 

Pope, Lt. Col. James W., 521, 548, 555 

Pope. Brig. Gen. John. 493, 494 

Port Tampa 

confusion at. on embarkation. 549 

inadequacies of, 549 

limited wharf facilities at. 550 

loading of troops at, 551 

Porter, Augustus, 157, 166 

Porter, David D .. 319. 336 

Porter, Peter 8., 214 

Ports of Embarkat ion. proposal for, in 1917, 

612 

POOlS 

concentration of publie utilities at, 582 

establishment of schools. chapels. libraries 

at, 489-90 

garrisoning troops in fewer. 580-81 

proposal for reduction in number of permanent, 583 

,helving of Stimson plan for, 584 

Posts, western 

costs of supporting, in 1866, 473 

fraudulent practices at, during Civil ,Var, 

469-71 

neglect of, during Civil War, 468 
784 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

P05I1, wcslem -COm inued 

post-Civil Wa r redislribution of mili tary 

personnel at, 472 

proposal !O subst itute permanent garrison 

fo r temporary, 496-91 

qua rteTS at. in post·Civil Wa r years, 484-91 

rClnignment of pcnonnel at, in Civil 

War, 46$-69 

transportation COSls at, 475-74 

Potter. Reu ben M., 348 

Price. Col. Sterling. 271 

Procurement. S~e also Cloth ing. procurement of; SUbsistence. procuremcnl or. 

centraliled control of, in post-World WiIr 

I, 724; in World War I, 615 

change in post·Civii Wa r OOninel procedures in, 492-93 

development of dece tra il( d, 590-93 

encour.lgemenl of local, al weste rn postS 

and depots, 492 

lag in intcrbranch , 724-25 

post-Civil War return to award of oon· 

tracts in, 492 

QM partic:ipation in imerdepanmenlal, 

725 shift to centralized oontrol of, in 1917, 613 

sy5tem of inte rbureau. 6'10 

Procuremen t, lcoal 

of coal by A.E.F., 67$-74 

establishment of A. E. "'. co·ordina ting 

agency for control of, 667 

need for, by A.E.F., 666 

opposition of American manufaclUren to 

A.E.F., 667, 667n 

quamity of supplies obtained by A.E.F. 

ullder, 666-67 

on a rep13cement basis by A,E,F .. 669-70 

lupply categories for, 668 

of wood by A.E.F., 672- 75 

Procurement planning 

congressional authoriz.ation for. 721 

development of decent.ralilrd concept under. 725 

responsibility of Aaistant s«retary of 

War fOf. 721. 722 

unde rtaken by QMC. 722, 725 

Production 

opposition to government, 725-26 

overICu by QMC for A.E.F .. 670-71 

Purch:ue, Storage and Traffic Division 

absorption of QM organiz.atioll by, 642 ...... 3 

oon50lidation of procurement in , 64{) 

establb hment of, 6SS 

failure to plan for indullrial demobiliza· 

tion, 700 

transfer of QM financial activities to, 641-

.. 

l' ureh3se and Storagc Service 

abolishmclH of. 708 

establishmcnt of. 633 

Purchasing Depa rtment. See fJfso Commill· 

Ja ry General of I'urchascs. 

abolilhment of, 25 1 

lou of cloth ing rcs(Klnsibilities by, 196, 200 

l'urveyor of Public Supplies 

aboli~hment of, 139 

disagrct:l1lent of, wit h Superintcndent of 

Military Stores, 123-27 

establishment of, 82 

funct ion of, 82, 120 

introduction of use of government .fu r. 

lIishrd mate ria ls by, 123 

preparation of clothing l upply by. 121, 122 

Putnam, Maj. Gell. Israel. 6 

Qua rt e rmaster Corps. See afJO Qua rtermaster's Department. 

creation of. 564 

establishment of service corps in. 565 

extension of decentraliz.atiotl policy to, 595 

functions of. in April 1917,602 

lou of construction function by. in 1917. 

607. 608; of fi nancial activities, 64 1-42: 

of purchasing power, 620; of transportation fu nction, 609. 618 

origin of, 1 

I'ersh ing praise of, 654 

rQtoration of construction function to. in 

1920,708; of t.ransportation fu nction, 708 

strength of. in 1912. 564, 564n; in April 

1917. 602: in 1920.709: in 1989.710 

supply perfonnance of, in 1917. 627- 28 

trallsfer of construction responSibility pro· 

po$Cd, in 1939, 715 

World War I changes in ZI field organiz.a. 

tion of. 6116-39 

Quarte rmaner Corr- Technical Committee. 

720, 72:1, 72711 

Quartermaster', Department. Su fJfjo Qua r· 

termaster Corps. 

abol ition of, in ISI5. 177 

absorption of Purchasing Department by, 

25 1 

administratioll of, by twO co·equal heads, 

178, 179 

administrative organlution of. in m ilitary 

departments. in 186 1, 589-90; in I89S, 

517- IS 

criticilm of, 48, 54. 169, 170, 44011 

decentra\iution of procurement operation, 

in, 590-92 

effect of frontier expansion on expenditures of, 3()4, 306. ~07, 808, 814, 815. 316, 

' 2<>-22 
INDEX 

Quartermaster's Depa rtmem--COn lillue(! 

lield organization of. in 1775, 6; in 1861, 

590-92; in 1898, 517 

lunuions of, 2 

impact of oongrctSional economy drive on, 

in 1820, 194: of c:x panding fromieT on, 

502, 504, 520, 521 

increased duties of, dIeT Spalli5h.Amcrican 

War. 563 

need for increase in personnel in, 196, 197, 

240, 5&f 

propmal to merge, with Pay antI Subsistence Departments. in 1901, 562 

proposed poat-Civil War organiution of, 

508 

provisional staff arrangcmenlS in, in 1815, 

177. 178 

fe-establishment of, in 1812. IS6 

rCglJlalOry code for, 184, 185 

reorganir.uiolll of, during Revolutionary 

War, 24-25, 39-'11, 55, 59- 62: in ISU, 

152-53 

Secretary of War Cnwford', proposed sta ff 

arrangement for, 178 

strength of, in 1818, 182; in 1821. 195; in 

1826, 196; in 1858, 198; in 1845, 239-40, 

in 1857.350: in 1860, 530; in 1861. 5n. 

555; in 1866. 509; in 1875. 509: in 1898. 

516.518,519; in 1901,563, 563n; in 1911 , 

564, 564n 

supervisory conlTo l of. in Rcvohuion. 4. 5 

Taylor'S criticism of. 265, 268. 272. 273 

title of, 5n 

tramfer of clothing responsibi lities to, 196, 

200,251 

unprepar~nClS in 1861,338-39, 340 

lise of line oiflccrs detailed to, 509-10, 563-

64; of SubsiJlencc Commissaries in, 195, 

QuartermastCT '" General 

abolition of position of, in 1785, 75; in 

1802. 150 

absorption of duties of. by Secretary of 

War in 1785. 76 

appointment of c!villalls as, 76. 95. 101 

change of title to The Quartermaster General, 696n 

changed concept of, I II 

creation of position of. I 

designation of, at War Department Traffic 

Manager. 717 

functions of. in 1775, 2 

origin of term , 753 

provision for four·year tour of duty for, 

710 

rank of, in 1775, 4 

785 

Quartermaster General-Continued 

re·establi1;hment of grade of, 111 

raponsibility of. for Gold Star Mothers' 

Pilgrimages, 696 

restoralion of title of, in 1914, S64 

Quartermaster Training School, 628 

Quitman, Brig. Gen. J. A" 292 

Railroads 

congestion at Tampa, 539, 542 

first large.sale QM use of, 395 

J esup's propmal for construction of, In 

southwest, 517-18 

method of senling accounts with. 570 

opposition of, to centraliled settlement of 

accounts, 570 

problems of indebtedness of lIOuthern, 461-

QM " support of survey parties for, 318 

reduction in number of disbursing offiCe! 

, for. 570-71 

usc of height cars of, for storage, 612 

Railroads, land·grant 

policy governing compensation to, 566, 

.,....., 

usc of rebate on, 479-80 

Ralroads, military 

au thority of dircctor of, 396 

Civil War costJ of, 459-60 

civi lian operation of eastern, 398; of west· 

ern, 404 

civilians employed on, in 1865, 460 

disposition of, after Civil War, 459-62 

exteruion of credit in disposal of, 461 

extent of, in Civil War. 459 

Haupt's regulation for, 59S-99 

investigation of western, 403 

legal balis for, 596 

Meigs' instructions on usc of, 400 

military control of western, 400-401 

principles governing disposal of, 460-61 

role of QMD in relation to. 395. 396n. 397, 

401 , 402 

Railroads, transcontinental 

amount of tonnage carried by, in 1897.478 

settlement of transportation accounts of 

fede rally l ubsidiled, 478-80 

usc of, in transportation of supplie., 477 

Ration, components of 

in 1775. 9; in 1788. 78; in 1794, 109; in 

1798. 118; in Mexican War, 248 

addition of coffee to, 205; of desiccated 

vegetables, 526, 447n; of l ugar, 205 

comparison with British, 9n 

elimination of whiskey from, 118, 203 

increase in vegetable, in 1821, 203 
786 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Ration, components of-Cominued 

"residential authority to change, 202 

proposal to add d ri ed apple 10, 2-48, "extract of beef" 10, 248, quality of, 118-19 

Ration, eme rgency 

appointment of board on, 585 

componenU of, 58611 

development of. 586 

Ralkm, field 

componcnU of, in 1898, 528 

extended lue of canned meal in, 529 

Ration, ga rrison 

addition of boneless beef 10, 684; candy. 

685; dehydrated vege tables, 684; fresh 

vegetables, 506-07. pepper, 448; tobacco, 68. 

A.E .• ·. modilic;nion or, 684--85 

componenU of, in Civil War, 44711 

increased lin of substitutive items in, 500 

introduction of greatcr Hexibility in. 585 

modification of, in Augu$( 1861. 447-48 

rtduction of Hour component of, in 18&4, 

use '" of canned beef as substitutive item in , 

5Q6 

Ration, on marches. See (Aiso Radon . travel. 

in Civil Wa r. 449; in Seminole War, 223' 

Ration, ff1erve 

A.KF, revised, 684 

pre· World War I componenlS of, 685 

supply of .pecial. 684 

Ration , lraveL Set! (1/50 Ration, on marches, 

addition of canned beef 10, 506 

usc of, in 1898, 528 

Ration savings 

diversion of, 505-06, 506n 

Rations, special 

development of C, 727; of D , 727 

sltldy of su itable l.ropicaL 584n, 584-85 

Regulating station 

function of, 652 

QM control of supplies ended at, 655 

Relief p rojects. Su fJ/JO Civilian Conserva· 

tion Corps. 

QM support in ntaural disasten, 508n. 

728-29 

for unemployment, 729 

Remount Branch , establishment of. 595 

Remount dcpolS, establi$hment of, ill Fort 

Keogh. 595; at Fort Reno, 595; at Front 

Roya l. 595; at Fori Sam Houston, 595 

Remoum Division. 630 

Remount Service 

Aleshires' plan for, 594 

elablishmenl of, 594 

hone.brttding plan proposed by, 595 

Remount Service, A.E,F, 

establishment of, 682 

funclions of, 682 

Repair shops 

central iution of, at base salvage depots, 706 

in Civll War, 454, 435, 44S 

cstablbh melll of, at T ampa, S40; in ZI, 

705 

opposition 10 governmem, 726 

te rmination of free services ai, 706 

Irall5fer of. to J>Xs, 706 

Research p'ogr.lm 

criticism of post·World War I , 727 

detrimelllal effect of surplus supplies on, 

727 

development of jeep by. 727 

lack of integrated post·World War I, 726 

usc of annual surveys in, 726 

Retirement system, military 

adoption of. 1862,513 

change in, 1882, 514 

proposal for a compulsory, 1877, 515 

Retrenchment 

postwar, after Seminole War, 2S4-55; after 

Spanbh·American War, 589, 590; after 

World War I, 711 

promotion of, in 1851, 521, 322 

Richardson, William H., 248 

Road . military 

construct ion of great 1856, 215-17 

employment of civilians in conJtru" ion of, 

21. 

Engineer responsibility for construction of, 

213, 214 

QM responsibility for construction of, 212. 

213, 214 

use of troops in construction of, 212- 13, 

212n, 214, 215 

Robinson, Capt. H. R " 597 

Roosevelt. Theodore, 551 

Rogers, Brig. Gen. Harry L , 

appointment of. as CQM, A.E.F., 6'19, 6'l9n; 

as QMG, 707 

argumenu of, on post-World ' Yar 1 reor, 

ganization, 708 

as Director or I'urchasc and Storage, 708 

opposition to reappointment of, 710 

e~ of. on need for permanent commis· 

sions in QMC, 710 

Root , Elihu 

appointment of board by, to study post 

location , 580 

Army reorgani za tion urged by, 580 

con50lidat ion of supply bureaus recommended by, 562 

creation of General Staff by, 558 
I 

INDEX 

Root, Elihu-COntinued 

propolal for short detail system by. S!l7. 

559 

Se<:retary of Wa r, 557 

usc of commercial tl'ansport$ bvorcd by. 568 

Rucker. IIv!. Maj. Cen. Daniel H . 

ac tivities of, at Wash ington Depot. 43'0-3 1 

appointment of, as QMG , 51<1 

QM in New Mexico, 351 

reduction of personnel by. at Washington 

Depol, 458 

rdonn ill animal procurement proposed 

by, 376-77 

ret irement of, 514 

lu pe rintendent of forage procurement, !ISO 

Ruiling. 1),,1. Brig. Gen. J ames F. 

illspcclion of western postS by, 469-71 

on quarters al western po,tJ, 484 

Russell & Waddell 

change in name of, 310 

congressiona l investigation of, 3U 

freighting of Anny supplies by. 510, 510n 

profi tJ earned by. 312 

wn favors gr.lnled 10, 315 

Rutherford , Capl. George V .. .!I!l8 

St. Clair, Gen. Arthur 

apprelumlions of, on transportation . 98, 99 

commander of Ind ian expedition , 89 

exolleration of, 100 

Hannar expedition planned by, 85, 87 

pea,e efforu of, 84 

51. C13ir expedition 

appointment of QM for, 93 

breakdown in transportation on. 92- 93 

congressional investigation of, 100 

failu re of, 99 

ineffecth'e plann ing for, 88--89 

poor quality of military SlOres on , 96-97 

supply arrangements for. 90--95 

51. Louil Depot, 427, 428. 429, 457, 526 

51. Nua ire DepO! 

establishment of, 656 

extent of QM facilities at, 656, 662 

51. 5ulpice Q1\f base depot, 656, 657 

Salvage 

initiation of operations, in 1.1 in 1917 ,628 

opcratiOIl5 in ZI, 705-<l7 

Sa lvage Division, 705 

Salvage Service, A,E.F. 

rn.sis for esla blishment of, 674, 675 

control 01 laundry fun"ions by. 677 

at depots, 675--76 

organiution of operations by, 675 

u.vin~ effected by, 67&-77 

al shops, 675 

San Antonio Depol. 508, "I 

Sanders. Capt. John, 267 

787 

San Fran.;:isco Depol, 457, 50?, 502n, 52 1. 526 

Sawtelle, Brig. Gen. Charles C. on Ilecd for transpol·tation corps, 480-81 

tenure of ~e rvice u QMG , 5 14 

5aKton, Capt. Rufus, 416 

Schen('(:tady Dt:pot. 702 

Schofield, LI. Gen. J . A., 49-4 

Schools, establishment of coo"" and baken", 

587: of POSt, 489, 490 

Schuyler, Maj. Cen . I'hilip, !f9 

Schuylkill Arsenal 

bootcc establishment at, in 1861, 560 

bootcc production at, 256 

.;:hief depository for clothing and equipage, 

SS8, 456 

clothing product ion at, 253, 348 

manufacture of ten u at , 256 

produ"ion of shoes at, in Mexican War, 

256: in Civil War, 360 

return of surplus Clothing 10. 255 

surplus clothing aI, 1850, 302 

text iles in storage al. 356 

5oon , Thomas A. 

appointment of. to head rail and telegraph 

lines, 186 1. !62. 366, S95 

crilicism of. SGS 

establishment of transportation bureau pro· 

posed by. 3(;6 

schedu le of ratcs es abli d by, S63. 364 

western inspec::lion Irip of, 396. 409 

Scott. Maj. Gen. Winrleld 

appointment of. as commander of Vera 

Cr ~ expedition, 284 

denunciation of conlraet system by. 144 

development of Army regUlatory code by. 18. 

discliMion of supply probleml with J esu p 

at BraW5, 287 

estimate of animals needed on march to 

Mexico Cily by, 291 : tranl portation re· 

quired for Vera Cruz ex pedition . 288. 289 

Navy's transportation offer accepted by. 290 

plan of, for Vera Crul expedition. 28-4 

on QMC appointment. in 1S60, 5"33n: in 

1861. 355, 536 

as Seminole Wa r commander, 22 1, 222, 223, ". su pply difficulties of. in Seminole War, 222, 

223. 224 

Seam$tresses 

employment of, in 1830'1.224,226: in Civil 

War, .$48: in Mexican War, 253: by Pur· 

veyor, 123; in Seminole War. 224, 226: 

in War of 1812, 147 
?SS QUARTERMASTER SUPI'ORT OF THE ARMY 

Seam~lrcssct-Cont inued 

cngagcmclIl of, ill homes, 123, 147 

number of, employed in Spanish ·American 

War, 527 

Second Conlinental Congress 

creollion of Army by. 5 

cstablishment of su pply dcparunems by, 

exerciK of lupcrvi5()ry control by. 4-5 

promotion of confusion in Commisury De· 

partment by. 7 

Secreta ry at War 

lIb$orplion of QM IYs dutiCi by. 76 

cont rol ovcr l upply by, 84, 117 

creation of, 5 

oUlla of, 77 

Secretary of Treasu ry. 81 

Secretary of War 

creation of, 81 

direction of distribuciol\ of supplies by. 83 

duties of, 77. 81, 117 

10SlI of procurement a u thority by. 82 

\Jmpti on of procu rement authority by, 84 

Seminole War. Set: I,bo Clothing. Forage, 

"Iones, Mu les, Subsistence, Wagons. 

U$ignmcnt of qll3r1CnnaSlers in, 221 

ballea ux cons. meted for use in , 232-33 

civilian relid in, 227 

supply supporl in, 218-34 

Irial of ponton equipmenl in, 228-29 

lroopl serving in, 220 

use of corps of arlificers in, 230 

Senace Comminec on Mitiury Affairs, investigation of war d rorl in 1917 by, 621 , 627 

Service corps 

Ciyil War ~mmen at ion for, 420 

Cross' propo5al for, 243" 

Cltablishment of, 565 

Uumphrey drafu bill for, 561 

J esup's dforlS 10 oblain a militarized. 286 

87 

J esup's proposal for. in 1850.31 4 

renewed inlerest in, 561-62 

Service of Utilities, A.E.F., lransfer of MOlOr 

Transpo rt Service to, 650 

Services of SU pply, creal ion of, 647 

Sewi ng machines 

introductiOll of elcclric, at "hiladelphia 

Depol, 527 

limited use of, in Civil War QJI,{ produClion 

of clothing, .Han 

Shannon, Capt. Samuel, 22 1 

Sha rpe, Maj. Cen. Henry G. 

appointment of. as Commiuary General of 

Subsistence, 588; as QMG. 564 

assignment of, to Southern Depanment. 629 

caret'r 0(, 601 

Sharpe, Maj. Cen . Henry C.-Continued 

cd I icism of, 62 1 

detail of, to War Council, 629 

on expendability of Army Transporl Serv. 

icc, 6 10 

opposition of, to aU lomalic supply system, 

666; to 1055 of runel ions, 005, 608-09 

on program for rew rn of dead, 691 

proposal of, fur ports of em barkation. 6 12 

recommemlation for civilian burial corps 

by, in 1917.689-90 

rejcction of Dist ingubhed Service Meda l, 

62911 

views on Commitlet' of Supplies, 62 1 

Shaumburgh. lIartholemew, 138 

Shelter. Sce IIlso Ua rracb . 

de lay in providing policy decisivn vn , in 

1917, 605-06 

in the fi eld , 186[-65,411-42 

gran! vf fund to Sherman for, 486 

p re· World Wu I plann ing for, 605 

in Reyo[ution, 15- 17 in 1917- 18, 6O.'Hl9 

$Iaff·l inc controversy over, 48.5-86 

troop col15t ruction 00(, 210 

of HOOpS at weste rn posts aft er Civil War, 

484-85, 487-9 1 

Sherman, Maj. Gen. William T . 

on exce$Sive lransportation . 422, 424 

post war aSSignment of, 472 

on QM supply of his Anny, 04 on quarters at western posts, 485- 86 

on supply of western poslJ, 472 

Shipping Hoa rd, 6 10 

Shoddy, 358 

~ 

abandonment vf COntl"'CI system for pro· 

turcmenl of. 256 

tritidsm of, in Civil War, 360; in Revolution, 24 

exchange of hides for, 29-30 

fraudul cnt practices in prvduction vf, 360 

inadequate Revolutionary War lu pply of, 

24 

introduction of m~ hin 5Cw , 361 

procurement of. by H ide Department, 24; 

by C101hing Depart ment, 24; under con· 

tract, in Ciyil War, ~GO, 56 1 

production of. at Ft. Le3vcnworth military prison. 499; at Schuylkill Arsenal in 

Civil War, 360: in Mexican War. 256 

re liance on competitive bidding in procure· 

ment of, in 1917 , 62~ 

Sibley. Col. Ebenezer S. 

assistam to J esup in office, 332 

on clothing militia, 35 1 
INDEX 

Sibley, Col. Ebenezer S.-Continued 

expansion of QM clothing manufacture by, 

34' 

functions of, under Meigs. 33'1 

service of, as Acting QMG in 1861. 333, 

362, 1169 

Signal Corps, and construction in 1917. 608 

Singer, Isaac Merri!, 348 

Smith, Brig. Gen. Thomas A., 188 

Smyth, Brig. Gen. Alexander, ]69 

Soldien' load, in Civil War, <1<15, 44511 

Spanish-American War. Su also Clothing, 

subsistence; Transportation. Wagons. 

legislation restricting supply operations in, 

520, 521 

unpreparedn~ for. 515-19 

Specific supplies, system of 

abandonment of, 67 

adoption or. 58 

failure of, &4-66 

Staff-line oontroveny 

expression of. berOTe investigating comminces, 511-12 

in fiel ds of contracts and expenditures, 493-

95 

fi n t dlarges in. against staIT bureaus, 187-

88 

over shelte r, 48!>-86 

Root's survey of, 558 

Stagecoaches 

extent of transportation by, in F.Y. 1897, 

usc '" of. for transporting Il1ilhary pcrsonnel, 

476 

Stager. B~t . Brig. Gen. Anson 

appointment of. to manage telegraph linC!i 

in Ohio. 67; as superintendent by Mc· 

Clel1an, 367; as head of U.S. Military 

Telegraphs, 458 

commissioned colonel, 1862, 367 

mustering out of, 459 

Stanton, Edwin M .. 365, 396 

Stanton, Col. Henry 

death of, 3112 

distribution of quartermasters by, in Mexi· 

can Wa r, , 241 

p rocurement of clothing and equipment 

for Mexican War by, 250 

QM at I'hiladelphia in Mexican War, 25 1, 

253, 254 

service of, as ACting QMG , 1845, 239, 240, 

287, 298 

warning by, on lack of funds, 245 

Starr, George, 51 

789 

Steamboats. river. Su also Transportation, 

ri~e . 

carrying capacity of, 406 

d ischarge of chartered, in 1865, 459 

employment of, on Missouri expedition, 

190, 191, 19~ 

number of, acqu ired in Civil War, 415 

proposed usc of, in 1815, 154, 155 

QM construction of. 4 12, 4 14 

sa le of goverlllnent·owned, in 1865, 459 

transportation of suppliC!i by commercial. 

ill 1820's, 207 

usc of, ill Seminole War, 23'2, 233 

Stevenson, Col. J, D., 281 

Stewart, Charles, 28, 71 

Stimson, Hen ry, 563, 564, 583 

Stinson . Daniel, 253 

Stoddard, Maj . Amos, 160 

Stoddard, Capt. William, 379. 380 

Storage 

beginning of Wodd War I progr.un for, 630 

failure 10 p lan for, 630 

improper. of clOlh ing, 105, 124 

inadequacy of dock space for, 611 

lack of facilities for, 1917, 573 

types of, in A.E.F. comb3L un ilS, 664, 665 

Storage space 

amount of, 1918- 19, 702 

impact of World War 1 demobi lization on , 

702 

lack of, in Spanish·American War, 540 

release of. afte r Civil War, 457 

Strang, Bvt. Lt. Col. E. j., 435 

Strcct. O. D., 630 

Studebaker. 312 

Studebaker Co., 538 

Studebaker, Clem, 536 

Subsistence. Set also Rat ion. 

abolition of contract system, 182 

adoption of commis.sariat system, 182; of 

contract system , 67; of system of specific 

supplies, 58 

breakdown or system of specific supplies. 

64 

con rusion in supply of, in Apri l 1861 ,385-

'6 crilicism of, in Mexican War, 248-49 

deli~ ery of. under commissaTiat system. 

202; under contract system, 202; in 

trenches of World War I, 685-87 

distribution of, by QMD, 202 

failure in contract system, 78 

issue of, by assistant commissaries, 202 

spoilage of, in Seminole War, 226; in 

Spanish·American War, 53.!! 
790 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Subsutcnce-Continued 

supply of, in Revolution, 9-12, ~1-~3'. 41, 

46-48, 56-59, 64-(i7; in Seminole War, 

226-27, in War of 1812. 157-58, 159-00, 

162, 166 

use of condensed milk, 450 

Subsistence, proc;urement of 

abuses in, S84 

by allotment, 614 

canned foods, in Civil War, 450 

ccntraliled control for, in World War I, 

.15 

through wmmiUilrial f}'5letn, 202 

by contract 10 lowesl bidder in Civil War, 

383, 384 

under contract l)'Item, 18-79, 117-19, 142-

.. criticism of, by contrae! system, 78, 108, IH 

items undcr allocation, 6 14-15 

by open-market purchases in Civil War, 

3811: in Mcxican War, 247-48 

pre-World War I method of, 6 1S 

in Spanish-American War, 529--30 

Subsistence: Department. See (llso Commis· 

sary Department. 

absorption by QrofC. 5M 

appointment or commissary sergeams ;IT, 

51 1 

commissaries in. perform QM duties, 195 

contracts for lubsillence for frontier posts, ". 

depots of, 226, 584, 455, 450, 492 

designation of, as permanent supply bureau , 182 

effect of restrictive legislation governing 

n le of surplus supplies on, 497-98 

establishment of, 182 

failure of, to adopt ntion to climate, in 

1898,528 

field organiution af, in Civil War, 451--52; 

in Mexican War, 247, in Spanish·American War, 517 

improvement of utensib by, 587 

lack of, during War of 1812, 142-44 

manual for cooks and bakers issued by, 587 

production of food pnxlucu by, in Civi l 

War. 450 

provision of candlts by. 489 

npid rOlation of chiefs of, 517, 517n 

re·establishment of. 182 

responsibility of. for equipment. 588, 5SSn 

sn englh of, in 1845, 247; in Civil War, ~8!, 

383'n; in post·Civii War years, 511; in 

Spanish.American War, .516. 518, 519 

use of local procurement by, 492 

Subsistence Division, establishment of, 615 

Subsistence Research Laboratory, establishment of, 727 

Sullivan , Maj . Gen. John, 88 

Supe rintendent of Finance 

assumption of clothing procurement by, 70 

direct ion of subsistence procurement by, 

71-72 

replacement of, by Board of Treasury, 78 

Superimendent of Military Stores 

abolition of office of, 151 

Commisury Gener.lll achieves com",1 of, 

149 

creation of office of, 8~ 

diugrecmcnt of, with Purveyor, 125-27 

inspection of clothing by, 123, 124 

Slonge and issue of supplies by, 120, 122; 

of textiles, 2~ 

Superintendent General of Military Supplies 

cstablishmem of, 151 

funct ions of, 151 

Supplies, shipment of 

abulCS in, 206 

confusion in, to Washington, in 186 1, 565 

by contract freighter, 508-16 

COSt and means of, in War of 1812, 154-55 

failure to co·ordinate, in 1898, 541 

freight charges for, to Pacific (;c)all, in 

1850'1, 508 

lack of billa of lading and illvoices for, in 

1898, 541 

by land, to frontier, !O8 

by wagon , in War of ]S]2, 205; in 1820's, 

205-06 

by water, to Pacific Coast, 507; in 1820's, 

207-<lB 

Supplies and Transportation Division, 

OQMG,54.6 

Supply 

civi lian control af. 76-84 

civilian domination of, 17] 8-18 12, 117 

Supply bureaus 

Dodge Commission investigation of, 555-.56 

CSlablishmem of, 181-84 

pOllt·Civil War legislation hampering operations of, 495-98 

proposal fo r consolidation of, in 1869,512-

]5; in 1899. 556; in 1901,562 

Supply linn 

C5tablishment of allernate, to Wash ington , 

186 ],562 

to frontier postS, in 1798-1812, 128-29 

impact of frontier on, in 1850'., !04-08 

use of water, to Pacific, 307 

Su rplus property, disposal of 

through Anny retail stores, 704 
INDEX 

Su rplus properly. disposal -Con~i ued 

after Civil War, 455-56; after Mexican War, 

298-99; ahcr World War I, 698-99, 702-

05 

congressional authorization for. 702 

criticbm of, afler Mc:xican War, 299; dIeT 

World WaT I. 70~ 

facton considered in declaring materials as, 

70' methods of. after Civil War, 45!Hi6; after 

World War I, 702-03 

by parcel poll system. 704 

program for, complicated by troop strength, 

70' UM: of funds from, 456 

Surplus Property Division 

amount sold, 705 

authority of, 702 

establishment of, 702 

SUllen, 10, 19. 143, 249, 250, 422 

Swan. William, 158, 173 

Swartout, Brig. Gen. Robert 

appointmen t of, as QMG, 153, 171 

arrival at Headquaners of. 173 

pl1)vUiionai retentiOn in service of, 177 

report of, on insullkic:nl funds, 1'1'4 

resignation SUbmitted by. 154 

Swords, BYI. Maj. Gen. Thomas 

assignment of, al QM on Kearny expedition, 278, 280 

senior and supervising QM, 392 

su pe rilllenderu of embarkation at Vera 

Crut, 297 

Symonds, Maj, Henry, 450 

Tailors 

employment or. in e10thing production at 

Phitadelphia, 123, 146, 147; of master, 

by l'urve1Or, 123 

Tampa 

concelllration of men and l upplies at, 540 

freight handled by depot at, 54' 

inadequacy of nl ilroads at, 542 

overstockage of rations at. 530 

Taylor, jarn('l, 155, 157 

Taylor, RTig, Gen, J oseph p" 382 

Taylor, Ilrig. Gen. Zachary 

advance of, to Rio Crande, 239 

commander of Army of Occupation, 2'8 

commencernCIII of ho.ni litics reported by, 

criti '" cism of Quarternra5ler's Department 

by. 265, 268, 272, 273 

Teams, See (I/so HOT5CS, MuLes, Oxen, 

imprasment of, 34, 63 

neglect of, 22, 45 

791 

Picke ring's device for obtaining, 68-69 

supply of, for Harrison's army, 162: for 

Hull'l army, 157 

T eamsters, civilian 

c riticism of, in MClCican War, 273 

difficulty of obtaining, on frontier, 3B, ' 14 

exemption of, from militia fines, 44 

impact of militia service on. 36 

loss of, through ye llow fever, in 1898, 557 

Ill'oposal to enlist, in Civil Wa r, 420: by 

JClUP, in 1850, 314: in Mexican War, 243. 

273; in RC"'olut ion, 22, 45 

on suppl y linCl in 1790's, 98 

u nreliability of in I 850's, 314: in Civil 

War, 402: ill Mexicall War, 243, 273; in 

RevoLutioll, 19-20, 35, 45 

TelegnphJ, U.s. Military 

appointment of Stager as general manager 

of, 367 

Civil War construction of lincs by, 458 

delay in postwar disposal of, 458 

lack of centnlliled control of, 367 

n:latioll of Quartermaster's Department to, ",-<8 restorat ion of, to commercilll companies, 

458, 459 

te rmi na tion of opeJOltions of, 459 

Telcgnphy, initial usc of by Quartermaste r'S 

Departrllent , 250 

Tellt. SibJcy 

de"elopn,ent of, 323 

fidd tcst of, 323 

TenlS 

canvas shortage for, in Civil War, 359; in 

Me"ican War, 244: in Revolution, 15 

gove rnment production of, du ring Mexican 

War, 256: in 1898,521 

inferior quality of, in Me"ican War, 244, 

257; in Seminole Wa r, 223 

introduction of shelter·half, 3'59-60 

manufacture of, in Revolution, 17 

nurnbe,' of. in hands of troopl, in 1898, 523 

origin of term " pup tent." 360n 

procurement of. in Sem inole War. 223, 224: 

in Spall ish.Amerinn War, 527 

product ion of, by !'ost OffICe Oepllrtment , 

1898, 527 

repair of, in Revolution, IG 

shortage of, in 1861 . 359; in Revolution, 

15. 16 

types of, in 1861, 359 

UK of shelter·halr, in Civil War, 441 
792 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Textiles 

finl post·Civii Wu procu rement of. 492 

inferior IIU311 '1 of. in Civil War, 554 

p rocu remf'lIt of foreign man\lfacIlJr~ , in 

1861, S55, 556 

scarcity of. in Rc:,·olulion. 13, IS, ~ 

shortages of, in 1861. !lSI, 554; of Anny 

specificat ion, in 1898, 522 

use of ,ubstitute:, 522, 523 

T hacher, James, 57 

Tholllas, Col. Charles 

AQMG and 5enior ofli(er, passed over in 

186 1, 533, 535 

ch ief of ' >h iladelph ia Depot, 340 

Civil War cloth ing and equipment purchucd by. 339, 341, 553 

contraeu and properly accounts handled 

by. 557 

prepara tions for Mormon expedition 51.1 -

pcrviSt!d by. 524 

service: of, in Mexican War. 245. 246, 267. 

270. 275. 276 

Thoma,. Capl. James, 169 

Thompson. J ama, 41 , 45 

Thomson, J. Edgar, 562, !69 

Thome, Robert J .. 655. 635n 

T hornsbury: Joseph, 25, 41 

Tomb of lIu: Unknown Soldirof, 694, 714 

Tom pkins, Col. D. D. 

charter of transports for return of troops 

from Me"ico by, 297 

on dcmurrage charges. 416, 417 

d isposa l of steamcrs by, dter Mexican War, 

298 

e"pert on transportation, .H I 

proJl'O'U I of, for appointment of one forage 

agent, in 1862, 579 

tra nsportation at New York under, in 

1861. !68, 569, 570 

Topograph ical Department, 285. 298 

TOllen. LI. George M., 287 

Tnmsportation 

of 2!1d Army Corps, 411- 12 

activities in post·Civil War years, 454 

breakdown of, in 1777, !I"!I-36: in 1780,65-

04 

fint Iimilation o f Q~f respoll$ibility for, ,95 

im provement of, unde r Greene, 44-45 

inadeq uacies of, in Revolution, 19: at 

camps in Spanish,American War. 527, 

increased '" requ irements for, in 1820's, 209 

lack of co·nrdinalion in , of troop' and 

su pplies, in 1917, 611 

Transporta I ion---COntinued 

lall exerci~ of broad rnponsibility for, 

679 

loss of funclion of, lIy QMC, 609-U 

provision of, in Reyolution, 19, 20-22, 44- ., 

use of Chinese for purchaJe! of su pply, 538 

Tra nsportation COSII 

in Ciyil War, 45!1 

increase of, in 1850'1, w.. !06, !l 17 

major part of expenditures, ~ 

10 I'acific Coast. 307 

reduction of, through ganlen cult ivation. "'. hy wale r, in 1820's. 207 

al weslern posts, 47!!-74 

T ransportal ion Diyision. 610 

Transporta tion. land. Su . T ransportation, 

ra il: Transpo rtation , wagon. 

Transportation, mOlOr. Su a/IO Motor 

Transporl Seryice, 1'rucQ, mOlor. 

competition in procurement of, 641 

fi nt truck spccificatiOlU for. 597 

initial use of, in field operations, 597 

initiation of truck.testing program, in 

1911 , 596 

lack of funds for, hampers devdopmental 

program for, 596, 717 

lilllited post ·World War I procurement of, 

717 

number of vehicles in operation in 19!1O, 

717 

problem of standardi~a ion, 718-19, 720 

relurn of QM procurcmellt responsibil ity 

for, &II 

spare parts system for. 718. 720 

Transportation, ocean, Su 11/$0 Tr.msporla· 

tion, river; Transports, 

abuses in procurement of, in Civil War, 

!l7o-72, 4 16 

activities of John Tucker in providing, 

~8, :%9 

amount of, acqu ired by QuartennaSle r's 

Department during Civil War. 4 15; pro· 

~idctl for Shafter's army, 548 

efforts 10 secure interned ships {or, 610 

employmellt of. in Seminole War. 2g l- 32. 

inadeq '" uadn of, for Shaft er's C!tpcdition. 

547-48 

lack of knowledge of, in 1898.545 

mismanagement in loading of, 549-50 

Naval cooperation in providing, on Vera 

Cruz campaign. 290 
INDEX 

Transportation . ocean-COminuctl 

operational procedures in use of, in Mexi· 

can War, 262-63 

procu rement of, for rccurn of tfoopS from 

Mexico, 297 

provision of, for J'eninsular campaigll. 416. 

417n, 417-18; for Vera Cruz campaig'}, 

288, 289 

remedial measures in obtaining, in Civil 

War, 372-73' 

shortage of lighterage in, in 1898, 552-5S 

use of, in movement of troops and supplies 

in Civil War. 417- 19 

Transportation , rail. Su also Railroads, 

land grant; Railroads, military. 

adjustment of a(oou nl5 of federally sub· 

sidized lines, 478-79 

adoption of revised rate schedu le, in 1862, 

S65 

classification of supplies for, 328 

conflict Uclween two lines al T ampa for, 

542-43 

oonfusion in use of. al lime of embarkation al Tampa, 544 

continued post-World War I co-ordination 

of, 717 

developing crisis in . 1898. 5-40-45 

failure to plan for co-ordination in use of, 

m 

first QM usc of. 206-Q7 

initial use of. in supply of western posts, 

m 

Meigs tightens control of. 365-66 

plans for use of. in future: mobilizations, 

571-12, 573 

post·Civii Wa r use of, -462 

ralC controversy in. 1861. 363--65 

of supplies for Monnon expedition, 327, 

'" tariff for milita ry personnel by. 365; for 

supplies by. 365 

termination of Civil War rate schedule. 

46' 

of troops, in 1898. 5-43-44 

Transport ation . river. See olso Steamboats. 

river: Transportation. ocean; Transports. 

advantagn of, over railroads. -405 

amoum of. acquired in Civil War. 4 15 

eentralil.cd supervision of. in Civil War, 

408 

d«entntlized control of. in 1861 , 406. 407 

disadva11lages of, 406 

employment of. in Seminole War. 232- 33 

fraudulent practices in. in Civil War, 407, 

408 

793 

Transportation. river- Continued 

importance of. in Civil War. 405 

introduction of contraa system in Civil 

War procurement of, 409, 410 

maintenance of. 41 5 

fo r Taylor'~ operations, on the Rio Grande, 

265, 267, 268 

use of. in Civil War troop movemenlJl, 4 10-

12 

Transportation, wagon. Set! also ' Vagons, 

Wagon trains_ 

dependence of western POSIJI on , in 1866, 

476 

difficulties of providing. for supply of 

frontier posts, 205-{)6 

effect of railroad competition on, -411 

inadequacy of. in Cuba. 531 

lack of, in Phil ippines. 537: at camps in 

Tampa , 539 

need for regu la tion to fix field allowance 

of. 422-23 

reduction of fi eld allowance for, in Anny 

of Potomac. 423-24 

requ irement for government·owned. on 

frontie r, '416-11 

usc of. in Mexican War, 2-4 1--43. 210, 27 1. 

272-73, 276, 278, 291. 292; in Revolu· 

tionary War. 19,20,21,22,34-36,44-45. 

63. 68--69; in Seminole War. 221. 222. 

228; in War of 1812. 151, 162--63.205 

Transports. See' also Army Transport Serv· 

ice; Transportation . ocean. 

accomlllodations on board. in Mexican 

War. 262--63; in Spanish·American War. 

547-48 

cha rier of, in 1898, 545-46, 547 

fa ilu re I<) determine carrying capacity of, 

in 1898. 548 

operation of, 262 

purchase of. in 1898. 546 

Tran~po rt s. chartered. 

abandonment of bid procedures for. in 

1861.312 

detention of. in Civi l War, 416, 419 

discharge of. in 1865, 4S9; after Spanish· 

Alllerican War. 566 

excessive costs of, in Civil War, 370, 37 1 

use of, in 1820'5, 208: in 1899.566; in Civil 

Wa r. 415. 416: in r.f ex ican Wa r. 258, 

259, 262; in Seminole Wa r. 23 1, 232 

Transports. government.owned 

disposal of, after Civil War, 459; after 

Mexican War, 298-99 

improvement of accommodations on. 566 

J esup's policy on. 308 

list of. in Mexican War. 260-61 
794 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

Transporu. Gove rn rnent ·owned-----COnt inued 

IISC of. in 1820's, 208; in Civil War, 415. 

41 5n ; on Pacific Coast. in 1850's, 307; 

in Mexican War. 258, 259, 260-61; in 

Seminole War, 232. 2113 

Treasury. Board of 

award of contracts by. 79 

creation of, 78 

duties of, 78 

T reasury Department 

establishment of, 81 

, upply responsibility of, 82 

usc of General Schedules of Supplies of, 

725 

Treaty of Greenville, 109 

Troop movements 

frequency of, in frontie r. 306 

increased use of land Iransponalion fo r, 

Trucks, '" mOlOr 

post· World War I types of. 719 

procurement of, after 1920, 717. 720 

propc"al to use, in A.E.F. unils, 681 

T rumbull, Joseph 

appointment of, to Board of War, 29; as 

Commi$Sary General, 3, 28 

3U1hority of, 7 

OpJKI$ilion of, to fixed salaries. 26 

organization of CommiSS3fY Department 

by. 6-7 

resignation of. 29 

success of. as Commissary Gcneral. 10 

Tucker. John 

as general agent of tunsponation. 368 

lack of transportation experience of. 1169 

praise for. 371 

provision of transportation for Peninsular 

campaign hy. 416 

resignation of. 372 

Tumpline. 685. 686. 687 

Turn bull. Mannie & Co .. 79. 80. 96 

Turnley. Cap!. Parmcnas. 358 

Twiggs. Brig. Gen. E. D .. 291 

Tyson . J. Washington. 25 1 

Uniform. See also Clothing. 

ahandonment of blue service. 575 

adoption of blUe. 13; of new, in 1850,302; 

in 1902. 574. 575; of olive·d rab service 

winter. 574; of olive·drab summer. 576 

compla ints of sum mer, 576 

development of service. for wear in tTOpics. 

57' 

introduction of new. in 1872.500 

of Revolutionary troops. 13 

Union Defense Committees, 340. 343 

Union Pacific Railroad. 477 

U.s. f'ood Administration, 614, 615 

U.S. Liqu idation Commission. 698, 699 

U.S. Military Railroad ConstTllction Corps. 

See Construction Corps. 

U,S. Shipping Board. 715 

UnilS, QM 

lh~t organization of graves registration. 

689. 690 

number of gravcs regist ration, 692 

organization of. in France, 654 

types of. authorized in 1917. 653'; used by 

end of World War I . 653 

Valley Forge, 31~37 

Van De Venter. Maj. Christophe r. 181 

Van Rensselaer, Maj. Gen. Stephen, 169 

Van Vliet. Bv!. Maj. Gen. Stewart 

CQM, Army of the Potomac. 423 

introduct ion of mixed feed by. in 1862, 

379 

prcparation of clothing by, for Shennan's 

troops, 419 

QM wilh Mormon expedition, 324 

Vcgetablcs. dehydrated, use of, in A.E.F., 

648; in Civil War, 447n; on Monnon 

expedition, 326 

Veterinary corps. proposal for esta blishment 

of, in 1853. 316, 317 

Vinton, Bv!. l\hj. Gen. David H. 

Civil War procurement of clothing by, 353, 

'54 

di rection of New York clothing depot by. 

351 

di s~1 of surplus property at Monterey 

by. 298 

Vouchers. discounting of, 473. 473n 

Wadsworth. Col. Dedu$, 141 

Wadsworth, Jeremiah 

appointment of. as Commissary General or 

PurchaSC$, 39. 42; as deputy commissary. 

28 

imp,'o"emenl of Comlnissary Department 

by. 46-48 

resignation of, 55. 59 

\\' agon department 

establishment of. in RevolUlion. 25 

need fo r militari~ed units in, 45 

personnel reductions in, 61-62 

\\'agons 

carrying capacity in Civil War of Anny, 

420-21 

dependence on hired. in Revolutionary 

War. 19. 21. 34. 44; for shipment of sup ' 

plies in War of 1812. 154, 162, 205 
INDEX 

\\' a801\s-Conl iliUM 

difficulty of procuring. in Rcvolucion , 6" 

faClOrs h:lI11pcring production of, in Me"i. 

C:.tll War, 269-70; in Span ish·American 

War, 5% 

frauuu1cm pract ices in Civil War produc. 

tion of. 374 

impressment of, in Revolution . 19,21. !l4-

35, 44; in War of 1812. 162 

identification of Arm y, in Civil War, 424 

interchangeable pans proJ>O$Cd for, 241 ; 

in use for, by 1857.323 

lack of rescn'c Siock of, in 1898. 535 

IO$S of, at Long Island. 21 

method of shipping supplies by hired, in 

1820's, 204-06 

number of. avai lable in April 1898. !i35 

ponlon, in Seminole War. 229 

pooling of. by SOS, A.E.F.. 679 

procun:mcm of, in Civil War, 373, 374; 

in ~lcKican War. 24 1, 242, 269, 270. 291-

92, in Seminole War, 221 - 22. 227. 228 

production of, by government manufacture. .,. 

repair of. in Mexican War. 2-42: in Semi. 

nole War, 229 

Washington's p roposa l for regimental, 22 

weight carried on, in 1812, 206: in 1820's, 

206: in 1850, 309, 311, 312: in Seminole 

War, 228 

Wagon trains. Su a/so, Freighting companiC'S: ,,'reighting of su pplies. 

basis of organi7.ation of, in Seminole War, 

2" 

heginning of, for supply with Arm y, -424 

elements of Civil War Army. -421 

management of, in Civil War, -424-26 

organiution of, for Taylor's Army, 2-1!), 

268,27 1 

reduction of Civil War regimental. -423. -424 

size of headqulTten and ~gimental, in 

Civil War, -42 1, -422. -422n, -423 

usc of. in tra nsportation of supplies from 

the La Vaca Depot, 27-4, 276 

Wagon t'':Iins, KOvernment-o"'ned 

amount of mi litary supplies carried on, 309 

breakup of, in IS9!), 535 

CO$t of transporting military supplin on, 

in Texas. 3'11 

uisad,-antagn of usin~, 308-09 

post·Civil War use of, -476 

Ust of for transportation of Army supplies, 

Wagonma "". "" sttT General 

appointment of Goddard as, 6: of Thorns· 

bury ;1$, 25 

\\'agonmaster General---COntinued 

allthoriution for, in War of 1812. 137 

usc of, by O'Bara, 103 

Waluo, David, 309 

War Council 

abolishment of. 629 

establishment of, 628 

War Industries Iloa rd, 601 

War Office, 5 

795 

War of 1812. See (llso Clot hing, Subsistence, 

Transportation , Wagons. 

campaign of 1813 in, 170-7-4 

neglcct of Sout he rn Ocp.1Ttrnen! in, 175~76 

preparations for Bull'. campaign, 155-59 

support of campaigns on Niagara and 

nonhe.n frontien in, 164-70: of North. 

weste rn Anny, 159-6-4 

Ward. Maj. Gen, Artemus, 6 

War plans 

de"elopmenl of, by Genera l Sta ff, 72 ~22 

QM annex to, 722 

War Industries I\o.ud. 667 

Warehousing Division, 630 

Wash ington Depot 

activities at. in Civil War. -430--31 

concentration of surplus supplin aI, 456 

designation of, as general depot , -457 

development at, of a record program for 

the dead, 4&4 

reduction of civilian l~rsonnel at , in 1866, 

458 

troop transportation handled by, 455 

Washington, George 

assumption of command by, ~ 

aut horilation for appointment of QMG by, 

, 

c riticism hy, of clothing sizC'S, 31; of inade· 

Ijuate su pply nrangements, 12-1; of lack 

of shoes for troops, 24; of Quartermaster's 

Department , 8 

reorganiution of Army by, 5 

Wa ter Transportation Branch 

absorptioll of, by I'S&;" Division, 6'10 

supervision of Army Transport Service by, 

609 

\Vaton, I'eler 1-1 ., 380 

WaYlle, Maj. Gen. Anthony 

ani"al of. at I'i!lsburgh , 101 

commander of Indian expedition , 100 

criticism of clothing by, 104-05: of contract system by, 108: of tTall5porlation 

by, 102 

W3yne, Maj . Benry. 319. 33-4 

Wayne's expedition 

breakdown in subsistence supply on, 107...()9 

QM field organilalion for, 1Q2...{14 
796 QUARTERMASTER SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 

\Vaj'ne's c~ped ili Il -Co linued 

QM preparation, for. 101-02 

transpo rtation for. 103. 105-06 

Wee!.:s, Brig. Gen. George Ii., 5 14 

Weston , Brig. Gen. J ohn F. 

appoinlrnCll1 of, as chid commissary of 

Shafter's a r", y, 528: a5 COm missary Gen· 

crol l of Subsistence. 587 

efforts of, 10 impro,·c ralion. S84 

on emergency ralioll. 585-86 

cxperimcm of. with canned beef, 529 

procurement of n nned ()ccf by. in 1898, 53. on providing troops with fresh bread. 1898, 

528 

recommendation of, for establishing COOl:.5' 

and bakers' schools, 587 

011 requisitioning rations. 1898. 532 

Wha rton, Carpenter. II. 12.26 

Wheaton, Capl. J oseph . 165 

\vhelen, Israel. 121 , 121n , 124 

Whiskey Rebellion, 11 0-11 

While. James. 159 

Whiling, 8,'1. Brig. Gen. Henry 

appoinlmelll of. ,II CQM in Taylor's Anny. 

246, 262, 274 

arrival of, at Taylor's headquarters, 268 

assignmem of QM to Wool's command by, ". buildup of wagon t1<lin hy, 270 

death of. 552 

procurement of mules in Mexico by, 27 1, 

272,275; of water transportation at New 

York by, 258 

proposal by, for enlistment of teamsters, 

'73 

Whitney, " !iii, !J] 8 

Wilkins, Lt. Col. Harry E., 668 

Wilkins, j r" j ohn 

appoin tment of, as QMG. 112 

as COlllr~ctor's ~geli C 92, 97 

field orgHni~a'ion cstablished by, 112 

QM functions of, 112. 129 

receipt of pHy of major genera l ' by, 129 

termination of sen'ices as QMG, 1:W 

lise of agem at I'hiladelphia by, 115 

Wilkinsou, Maj, Gen, james 

IIppointment of, as Clothier General, 5 1 

criticiSIll of military agelilS by, 1'5 

dut in of, in Hide Department, 52 

relationship of, to contracwr, 119 

Winchester, IIrig. Gen. James. 16 1 

Winthrop. Col. JOIIII , 267 

Wise. Cap!. George D., 415. 414 

Wood. I\rig. Gen. Robert E. 

ap]l{)imment of. as Acting QMG, 6"; as 

Director, I'urchasc and Storage. 642 

mo<lilicat ion of lone system by. 659 

Woodhull. Lt , Col. Alfred A" 502. S05 

Wool. Maj. Gen. John W .. 249. 274. 369 

Wool I'urchasing Offic:e, 624 

Wool Supply. in World Wa r I , 625-25 

Worth . n vt. Maj . Gen. W. J .. 254. 275 

Yo rktown campaign. 66--70 

Yukon pack . 685. 686, 687 

Zone of the Line nf Communications, Su 

Line of Communications. 

i'.one system 

abandonment of. 724 

development of, 63'8-59 

~ U.S, GOVERHMENT PfIlNTlNG OFFICE: 1_ 203-0.a/80011 

PIN ; 064967- 000