FILED 


FEB. 3, 2015 


In the Office of the Clerk of Court 


WA State Court of Appeals, Division III 


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 


DIVISION THREE 


STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 31595-9-111 

) 

Respondent, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

ENRIQUE HERNANDEZ, ) PUBLISHED OPINION 

) 

Appellant. ) 

BROWN, J. - Enrique Hernandez pled guilty to felony driving while under the 

influence of alcohol (felony DUI) and third degree assault. He appeals his offender 

score computation and two sentencing conditions. Mr. Hernandez contends the trial 

court (1) impermissibly considered offenses other than those listed in RCW 

9.94A.525(2)(e) when calculating his offender score, (2) erred when it imposed a term 

of confinement and community custody greater than the statutory maximum for third 

degree assault, and (3) erred when it imposed a term of confinement coupled with a 10­

year ignition interlock requirement in excess of the statutory maximum for felony DUI. 

We disagree with Mr. Hernandez' first contention but agree with his second and third 

contentions and remand for resentencing in a manner consistent with this opinion. 
No. 31595-9-111 

State v. Hernandez 

FACTS 

The State charged Mr. Hernandez with felony DUI and third degree assault. 

Before trial, Mr. Hernandez moved the court to declare his offender score. He argued 

his felony DUI offender score should be 5 while the State believed his offender score 

was 9. Mr. Hernandez pled guilty to the felony DUI and assault charges. The court 

calculated his offender score for the felony DUI at 9+ and his offender score for third 

degree assault at 8. In calculating the offender score, the court considered the following 

criminal history: a 1994 juvenile conviction for second degree robbery, a 1998 forgery 

conviction, a 2001 DUI, physical control convictions in 2003 and 2006, a 2007 DUI, a 

2003 second degree malicious mischief conviction, a 2003 conviction for attempt to 

elude, a 2006 second degree possession of stolen property conviction, and a 2009 

felony DUI. The court sentenced Mr. Hernandez to 60 months for the felony DUI and 57 

months for third degree assault, with the sentences running concurrently. The court 

ordered community custody for 12 months after his release and required use of an 

ignition interlock device for 10 years. Mr. Hernandez appealed. 

ANALYSIS 

A. Felony DUI Offender Score 

The issue is whether the trial court incorrectly calculated Mr. Hernandez' offender 

score for his felony DUI conviction by including all of his prior offenses in that 

calculation. Mr. Hernandez contends RCW 9.94A.525(2)(e) limits the prior offenses that 

can be used in his offender score calculation to felony DUI convictions, misdemeanor 

2 

No. 31595-9-111 

State v. Hernandez 

QUI convictions, and felony physical control convictions. Thus, he argues, the court 

should not have included any of his other prior convictions in his offender score 

calculation, making his maximum offender score 6 instead of 9+. 

Our fundamental objective in statutory interpretation "is to ascertain and carry out 

the legislature's intent." State v. Morales, 168 Wn. App. 489, 492, 278 P.3d 668 (2012). 

A court must give effect to a statute's plain meaning if the meaning is plain on the 

statute's face. Id. "Such meaning is derived from all that the legislature has said in the 

statute and related statutes that disclose legislative intent about the provision in 

question." Id. Interpretations rendering any portion of a statute meaningless should not 

be adopted. Id. "[S]trained meanings and absurd results should be avoided." Id. 

We review offender score calculations de novo. State v. Wilson, 113 Wn. App. 

122, 136,52 P.3d 545 (2002). Offender scores are calculated in three steps: U(1) 

identify all prior convictions; (2) eliminate those that wash out; (3) 'count' the prior 

convictions that remain in order to arrive at the offender score." State v. Moeurn, 170 

Wn.2d 169, 175,240 P.3d 1158 (2010). 

Former RCW 9.94A.525 (2011) applies here. Subsection (2)(e) states: 

If the present conviction is felony driving while under the influence of 

intoxicating liquor or any drug (RCW 46.61.502(6)) or felony physical 

control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any 

drug (RCW 46.61.504(6)), prior convictions of felony driving while under 

the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, felony physical control of a 

vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, and 

serious traffic offenses shall be included in the offender score if: (i) The 

prior convictions were committed within five years since the last date of 

release from confinement (including full-time residential treatment) or entry 

3 

No. 31595-9-111 

State v. Hernandez 

of judgment and sentence; or (ii) the prior convictions would be considered 

"prior convictions within ten years" as defined in RCW 46.55.5055. 

According to the Morales court, "the '[t]he prior convictions' that shall be included 

in the calculation of the offender score are limited to these: 'felony driving under the 

influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, felony physical control of a vehicle while 

under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, and serious traffic offenses.'" 

Morales, 168 Wn. App. at 493 (quoting RCW 9.94A.525(2)(e) (2011)). Mr. Morales had 

seven prior serious traffic offense convictions and a fourth degree assault conviction. 

Id. at 493-94,497. The court stated RCW 9.94A.525(2)(e) was applicable and RCW 

9.94A.525(2)(d), discussing when serious traffic offenses wash out, had no bearing on 

the offender score calculation. Id. at 500-01. The court determined four of the serious 

traffic convictions washed out and the fourth degree assault conviction should not have 

been counted because "it [was] not among th[e] limited classes of prior offenses." Id. at 

497,501. Including the current attempting to elude conviction, the defendant's offender 

score was 4 instead of 8 as calculated by the trial court. Id. at 491, 501. 

Division Two of this court recently adopted part of Division One's Morales holding 

in State v. Jacob, 176 Wn. App. 351, 360, 308 P.3d 800 (2013). The court decided 

"under subsection (i) only RCW 9.94A.525-specified prior convictions count as offender 

score points for purposes of sentencing a defendant convicted of former RCW 

46.61.502(6) (2008) felony DUI." Id. The court reasoned the sentencing court erred by 

including the defendant's drug convictions in his offender score "because drug 

4 

No. 31595-9-111 

State v. Hernandez 

convictions are not among the statutorily specified prior convictions for offender score 

inclusion under subsection (i) of RCW 9.94A.525(2)[(e)]." Id. 

When calculating Enrique Hernandez' offender score, the sentencing court 

identified 10 prior convictions. Our focus is the second step: determining whether any 

of these prior convictions wash out. RCW 9.94A.525(2) contains several provisions 

detailing when certain types of prior convictions wash out. For example, subsection 

(2)(a) provides class A and sex felonies never wash out, subsection (2)(b) provides 

class B felonies other than sex offenses wash out after the offender spends 10 crimefree years in the community, and subsections (2)(c) and (d) provide class C felonies and 

serious traffic offenses wash out after the offender spends five crime-free years in the 

community except as provided in subsection (2}(e). 

The holdings in Morales Jacob do not bind us. While Divisions One and Two 

were persuaded the plain meaning of subsection (2}(e) means solely those crimes 

specifically enumerated in the subsection could count in an offender score calculation 

for a felony DUI, we reason the plain meaning is that subsection (2}(e) acts as an 

exception to the wash out provisions seen in subsections (2}(c) and (d). Subsection 

(2)(e) revives certain offenses that would wash out under (2}(c) and (d), but solely in 

cases where the current conviction is for felony DUI or felony physical control. 

Reading subsection (2)(e) differently leads to strained and absurd results. 

Subsection (2)(a) provides class A and sex felonies never wash out. Under Mr. 

Hernandez' interpretation of subsection (2)(e), class A and sex felonies cannot be 

5 

No. 31595-9-111 

State v. Hernandez 

included in calculating the offender score for a felony OUI. And, RCW 9.94A.525(11) 

states how to score offenses when the present conviction is for a felony traffic offense: 

"for each felony offense count one point for each adult and % point for each juvenile 

conviction."1 Nothing in subsection (11) limits calculating an offender score for a felony 

traffic offense to solely those crimes enumerated in subsection (2)(e). Considering the 

statute as a whole supports the argument that subsection (2)(e) does not limit prior 

convictions to only those laid out in that subsection. See State v. Wright, 84 Wn.2d 645, 

650,529 P.2d 453 (1974). 

Nothing in the legislative history indicates the legislature intended to limit 

sUbsection (2)(e) as decided in Morales and Jacob. Mr. Hernandez argues the 

legislature was unconcerned with unrelated class C felony offenses when writing 

subsection (2)(e). He relies on sections of the bill reports stating "prior offenses" are 

those under OUllaws. See, e.g., House Bill Report on H.B. 3317, at 1-2, 59th Leg., 

Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006). But, that discussion was in relation to misdemeanor OUls, 

not felony OUls. The bill reports then discuss felony sentencing, including how offender 

scores are calculated under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA). chapter 9.94A 

1 RCW 9.94A.525(11) provides: 

(11) If the present conviction is for a felony traffic offense count two points 

for each adult or juvenile prior conviction for Vehicular Homicide or 

Vehicular Assault; for each felony offense count one point for each adult 

and % point for each juvenile prior conviction; for each serious traffic 

offense, other than those used for an enhancement pursuant to RCW 

46.61.520(2). count one point for each adult and % point for each juvenile 

prior conviction; count one point for each adult and % point for each 

6 

No. 31595-9-111 

State v. Hernandez 

RCW, specifically noting the provisions of RCW 9.94A525(11) and when certain nonfelony crimes, such as serious traffic offenses, count in an offender score. See, e.g., 

Final Bill Report on H.B. 3317, at 1-2, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006). This 

discussion does not evince an intention to treat differently felony DUls from other felony 

crimes. We note the legislature amended subsection (2)(e) in 2013: 

If the present conviction is felony driving while under the influence of 

intoxicating liquor or any drug (RCW 46.61.502(6» or felony physical 

control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any 

drug (RCW 46.61.504(6», all predicate crimes for the offense as defined 

by RCW 46.61.5055(14) shall be included in the offender score, and prior 

convictions for felony driving while under the influence of intoxicating 

liquor or any drug (RCW 46.61.502(6» or felony physical control of a 

vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug (RCW 

46.61.504(6» shall always be included in the offender score. All other 

convictions of the defendant shall be scored according to this section. 

RCW 9.94A525(2)(e) (emphasis added). 

Given our analysis, we conclude the trial court did not err by including all of Mr. 

Hernandez' prior convictions. 

B. Community Custody Exceeding Statutory Maximum 

The State correctly concedes the trial court erred when it imposed a term of 

confinement plus a term of community custody exceeding the statutory maximum for 

assault in the third degree. Thus, we remand to the trial court to resentence Mr. 

Hernandez on the third degree assault consistent with RCW 9.94A701(9). 

juvenile prior conviction for operation of a vessel while Linder the influence 

7 
No. 31595-9-111 

State v. Hernandez 

C. Ignition Interlock Requirement 

The issue is whether the trial court erred when it imposed a 1 O-year ignition 

interlock requirement on Mr. Hernandez. He contends the court exceeded its authority 

because imposing the 10-year ignition interlock requirement exceeded the statutory 

maximum: his 60-month sentence was the statutory maximum. 

We review erroneous sentence claims de novo. In re Pers. Restraint ofBrooks, 

166 Wn.2d 664,667,211 P.3d 1023 (2009). When someone is convicted of a felony, a 

court must impose a sentence as provided in the SRA RCW 9.94A505(2)(a). The 

SRA applies to those convicted of felony OUI. RCW 9.94A505(2)(a)(xii); RCW 

9.94A603. As it relates to community custody, a court cannot impose an aggregate 

term of confinement and community custody beyond the statutory maximum. State v. 

Boyd, 174 Wn.2d 470, 472-73,275 P.3d 321 (2012) (interpreting RCW 9.94A701(9». 

A felony OUI is a class C felony and carries with it a maximum five-year sentence. 

RCW 46.61.502(6); RCW 9A20.021(1)(c). 

Under RCW 46.61.5055(5)(a), a court must "require any person convicted of a 

violation of RCW 46.61.502 ... to comply with the rules and requirements of the 

department [of licensing] regarding the installation and use of a functioning ignition 

interlock device." RCW 46.20.720(1) provides a 

court may order that after a period of suspension, revocation, or denial of 

driving privileges, and for up to as long as the court has jurisdiction, any 

person convicted of any offense involving the use, consumption, or 

possession of alcohol while operating a motor vehicle may drive only a 

motor vehicle equipped with a functioning ignition interlock. 

of intoxicating liquor or any drug. 

8 
No. 31595~9~111 

State v. Hernandez 

The court must state how long the ignition interlock is required. RCW 46.20.720(1). 

The sentencing court gave Mr. Hernandez the statutory maximum of 60~month' 

confinement and ordered him to use an ignition interlock device for 10 years after his 

driver's license was restored. The court was required to order Mr. Hernandez to comply 

with the requirements of the department of licensing regarding the use of an ignition 

interlock device, however, the court exceeded its authority in ordering him to use such a 

device for 10 years after his release from confinement. The court had the discretion to 

order the use of an ignition interlock device under RCW 46.20.720(1). But that 

discretion is limited to the length of time the court retains jurisdiction; here five years 

was the limit. The legislature knows how to create an exception to the jurisdictional 

requirement; it did not do so here. See RCW 9.94A.750; RCW 9.94A.753. The 

Department may require the use of an ignition interlock device for ten years, but the 

court erred in imposing the 1 O-year requirement because its sentencing discretion was 

limited to the 5~year maximum. 

Remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 

Brown, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

Lawrence-Berrey, J. 

9