Panel 5 

pay to convince Russia, China, and North Korea

not to continue aiding Iran. For example, is a

closer relationship with NATO or reassurances

regarding American development of missile

defenses more important for Russia than selling

nuclear technology and expertise to Iran?

Would China respond to expanded access to

markets or technology? Can North Korea afford

to forego profits from missile sales to Iran and

other Middle Eastern countries that are looking

to upgrade weapons capabilities? There is no

evidence to suggest that leveraging suppliers

halts proliferators. There is, however, the distinct danger that we will pay in influence or

treasure and that the suppliers will continue to

provide the proscribed goods and services.

Recommendation: Maintain strong

counterproliferation policy. Make clear to our

partners in the war against global terrorism

that support for the war does not excuse weapon

proliferation or assistance to Iran in building

NBC or long-range missile capabilities.

Option 4: Provide additional military

aid or other security guarantees to the Gulf

Arab governments to deter capricious behavior by Iran. A U.S. military presence in the Gulf

will be required for some time. The desire to

reduce force vulnerability needs to be balanced

against the political and deterrent value of a

visible American military presence in the Gulf.

Pulling back U.S. forces as Iran becomes a

much stronger regional power would add to the

incentives for proliferation by suggesting that

the United States will reduce its presence in

response to governments acquiring nuclear

weapons capability; maintaining a determined

presence would demonstrate to Iran that the

United States takes its security commitments

seriously and signal to the Gulf States that their

security is not the price of a U.S.-Iran rapprochement. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and its

partners in the GCC are consumers of security,

vulnerable to attack from larger, more powerful

neighbors. The memory of Iraq’s invasion of

Kuwait should be sufficient reminder that

threatening neighbors cannot be ignored.

Memories fade fast in this region, however, and

most Arabs have an overwhelming desire to

return to the policies of a simpler, distant

era—before Baghdad’s invasion of Kuwait and

before an Islamic Iran sought to remake the

Gulf in its image. This complacency probably

will not change if and when Iran crosses the

nuclear threshold. Furthermore, the Arab Gulf

governments are aware that their security ties

to the United States allow them greater flexibility in their own budding relations with Iran. To

be sure, they are not likely to support a policy

of preemptive strikes to lessen their problem

with Iran. On the other hand, even as their ties

to Iran expand, they will not join Iran in a

security arrangement that would preclude a

U.S presence in the Gulf.

Recommendation: Be prepared to offer

expanded security guarantees and, if necessary, a smaller presence. How we identify the

regional security threat—an NBC-rearmed

Iraq, a resurgent and nuclear Iran, regionally

based international terrorists—will determine

the size and shape of our presence through the

next decade. An international agreement to

assure international access to the Strait of

Hormuz might ease American concerns about

Iranian plans to close the strait to international

shipping, though the negotiability and impact

of a measure would need close study.

Option 5: Promote limited dialogue. As

an adjunct to a reshaped containment posture,

U.S. policy could also aim at renewing dialogue with Iran while at the same time seeking

to minimize the value of Iran’s acquiring

unconventional weapons. U.S. sanctions policy

has inhibited some countries and companies

from doing business in and providing loans to

Iran, but our ability to dictate the terms of

engagement of other governments with Iran is

diminishing rapidly. A new course of seeking

greater, albeit limited, contact with Iran would

seem more productive than trying unilaterally

to sustain the current containment.

Recommendation: Tone down rhetorical references to Iran as a rogue state. Acknowledging Iran’s strategic weight and threat

perceptions and giving it a voice in a new

regional forum (not the GCC) would allow

Iran the political, economic, and strategic

interaction that it seeks, while also serving to

underscore Iraq’s continued isolation. It also

would set the agenda and terms of engagement

on the basis of Iran’s behavior before it tries to

make demands based on a nuclear status. The

United States might also work on limited topics

of shared concern, support Iran for membership in the World Trade Organization, and

expand Track II-type measures to include

contacts with lower-level Iranian civil servants,

intellectuals, students, and academicians.

Afghanistan’s future after the Taliban is clearly

another such issue. Baghdad will perceive that

it is the target of a new Iranian-U.S. rapprochement. This could work to Iranian and American advantage. America cannot choose which

Iranians with whom it will deal. We cannot

identify the good versus the bad or the democratically elected versus the undemocratically

selected leaders of Iran. That is Iran’s business,

not ours. What is important is that the contacts

be clear and unambiguous and not brokered by

mysterious middlemen with their own agendas.

Conclusions

Iran has always raised hard choices for

the United States, and more so than ever since

September 11. Clearly, the attacks have created

an opportunity to engage some governments

with whom the United States has long been at

odds. By the same token, they raise the risk to

U.S. policy of Faustian bargains with newfound

friends that could be inconsistent with other,

longer-term U.S. policy interests and objectives.

Should cooperation in the war on global terrorism override objections to a regime’s lack of

democratic standards, suppression of dissent

and human rights, or repression of minority

groups? Granted, Iran is not in the same category as Russia, Uzbekistan, or China (that is, a

putative U.S. partner that does not support

international terrorism but is burdened by a

history of questionable human rights practices

and suppression of religious and political

minorities). Iran is different: once a friend, it is

now an adversary, stained by a history of supporting international terrorism. Moreover,

indicators of popular unrest—including student demonstrations comparing the mullahs to

the Taliban—suggest that the regime is stifling

popular yearnings for political change so

strong that they are not being suppressed by

arrests, trials, public floggings, or warnings

from the Supreme Leader and the president.

Would an American policy that publicly encouraged or offered moral support to the government in Tehran gain the United States any

leverage in dealing with a regime still capable

of significant internal repression? Should the

war on global terrorism supercede U.S. policies

No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 5 

U.S. policy could also aim

at renewing dialogue

with Iran while at the

same time seeking to

minimize the value of

Iran’s acquiring unconventional weapons
Panel 2 

European Union ambassadors to Tehran.

Meanwhile, Iran continued its quest for new

and unconventional weapon systems and the

long-range missiles needed to deliver them.

Until Khatami’s election as president in 1997,

Iran made no discernible progress in extending relations with Europe or its neighbors, and

the United States remained anathema. When

Khatami won his first landslide electoral

presidential victory in 1997, America was still

locked into a containment mindset: Iran was a

rogue state whose behavior had to be modified

before it could be accepted back into the international community.

Since September 11:

Missed Opportunity . . .

The attacks on the World Trade Center

and the Pentagon evoked contrary and confusing reactions in Iran. President Khatami offered his condolences to the families of the

victims, and the mayor of Tehran sent his

expression of sympathy to the mayor of New

York shortly after the attacks. Iranian officials

signed the book of condolences opened at the

Swiss Embassy, which oversees U.S. interests in

Iran. Students held apparently spontaneous

demonstrations and chanted pro-American

slogans, in contrast to the standard, orchestrated “Down with the U.S.” Several Iranian

parliamentarians, including the head of the

reformist Second of Khordad Party, Behzad

Nabavi, called for normal relations with all

countries except Israel. He previously had

expressed strong anti-American sentiments.

Probably most striking was the Iranian

response to an American letter of October 7,

which assured Tehran that the United States

would respect Iranian airspace and territorial

integrity and asked for assistance for any U.S.

military personnel forced to land on Iranian

territory or who escaped to Iranian soil. Iran

agreed to assist American pilots downed on

Iranian soil and to allow transshipment of

food and humanitarian supplies for Afghan

refugees in northwestern Afghanistan. (Humanitarian cooperation had actually begun

in late summer 2001 under United Nations

[UN] aegis.) During his visit to New York for

the opening of the UN General Assembly in

October, Khatami condemned Osama bin

Laden and his supporters as extremists and

terrorists, a “cult of fanatics who...could only

communicate with perceived opponents

through carnage and destruction.” He said

that there were no barriers to cultural or

economic ties with the United States and, in

an interview with The New York Times,

hinted that Iran could accept whatever settlement Yasser Arafat and the Palestinians

agreed upon. If all Palestinians accept Israel’s

right to exist, he told the interviewer, then “we

will respect the wishes of the Palestinian

nation.” Khatami and former president

Hashemi-Rafsanjani had made this type of

comment before, and the formulation is

similar to one made in the 1980s by Iraqi

leader Saddam Hussein and deemed acceptable in Western eyes.

Three final events have drawn attention to

potential Iran-U.S. connections. Iran’s representative to the United Nations, Mohammed

Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian, met in October with

several senators and representatives, including

staunch supporters of Israel, raising speculation that Tehran may be ready to extend U.S.

officials an invitation to visit Iran. Iran’s Foreign Minister Kemal Kharazi made a special

point of shaking Secretary of State Colin Powell’s hand before a meeting of the UN 6+2

Committee on Afghanistan. Most recently,

Mohsen Rezai—a leading conservative, former

head of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, adviser

to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and currently

secretary general of the Expediency Council—

acknowledged that the two countries shared a

common interest in Afghanistan. According to

The New York Times, Rezai further suggested

that better relations might be possible if the

United States were to take the first step.1

. . . Or Deliberate

Ambiguity?

How much should we read into these

signals, if that is what they are? Clearly, Iranians in the public and private sectors are debating whether there should be an opening to

America. Some scholars and analysts believe

that the reformists and conservatives are deeply

divided over this issue, while others, including

Iranian experts, claim that even the conservatives favor normalizing relations with the

United States. They just do not want Khatami

and the reformists to get the credit. Indeed,

Khamenei’s strategy might be to slow down

what even he may acknowledge to be an inevitable process—the normalization of relations with Washington.

Nevertheless, Iranian politics—and therefore decisions on foreign policy gestures or

moves—are in virtual gridlock. For every effort

Khatami has made to loosen the restrictions on

social and cultural life and personal freedoms,

or advance a more progressive foreign policy

since his first election in 1997, his conservative

critics—those labeled hard-liners outside

Iran—have countered by closing reformist

newspapers; arresting Khatami supporters,

including the mayor of Tehran and a parliamentarian who denounced the conservativedominated judiciary as undemocratic; and

calling for opposing U.S. initiatives in

Afghanistan and Central Asia. While Khatami

and reformist politicians were talking of condolences and the celebration of the “dialogue of

civilizations” at the United Nations this year,

Supreme Leader Khamenei continued to reject

firmly and clearly the idea of dialogue with the

United States. On October 12, for instance, he

accused America of “dragging the planet into

global war” and hinted that those who even

suggest dialogue should be removed from their

posts. He warned that “any negotiation with

America is against the nation’s interest.” The

judiciary even set up a body to ensure that no

Iranian official pursues relations with the

United States.

In contrast, Khatami’s remarks while in

New York in October were more nuanced and

balanced, at least in style. In his UN speech, he

called for an end to the bombing campaign in

Afghanistan as soon as possible and urged that

the United Nations—and not the United

States—determine the post-Taliban government. Yet, lest anyone think that Khatami was

suggesting a softer policy on the Middle East

Judith S. Yaphe is a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National

Defense University. Please direct any questions or comments to Dr. Yaphe at (202) 685–2224 or forward them

via e-mail to yaphej@ndu.edu.

No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 2 

clearly, Iranians in the

public and private sectors

are debating whether

there should be an

opening to America 
Panel 2 

European Union ambassadors to Tehran.

Meanwhile, Iran continued its quest for new

and unconventional weapon systems and the

long-range missiles needed to deliver them.

Until Khatami’s election as president in 1997,

Iran made no discernible progress in extending relations with Europe or its neighbors, and

the United States remained anathema. When

Khatami won his first landslide electoral

presidential victory in 1997, America was still

locked into a containment mindset: Iran was a

rogue state whose behavior had to be modified

before it could be accepted back into the international community.

Since September 11:

Missed Opportunity . . .

The attacks on the World Trade Center

and the Pentagon evoked contrary and confusing reactions in Iran. President Khatami offered his condolences to the families of the

victims, and the mayor of Tehran sent his

expression of sympathy to the mayor of New

York shortly after the attacks. Iranian officials

signed the book of condolences opened at the

Swiss Embassy, which oversees U.S. interests in

Iran. Students held apparently spontaneous

demonstrations and chanted pro-American

slogans, in contrast to the standard, orchestrated “Down with the U.S.” Several Iranian

parliamentarians, including the head of the

reformist Second of Khordad Party, Behzad

Nabavi, called for normal relations with all

countries except Israel. He previously had

expressed strong anti-American sentiments.

Probably most striking was the Iranian

response to an American letter of October 7,

which assured Tehran that the United States

would respect Iranian airspace and territorial

integrity and asked for assistance for any U.S.

military personnel forced to land on Iranian

territory or who escaped to Iranian soil. Iran

agreed to assist American pilots downed on

Iranian soil and to allow transshipment of

food and humanitarian supplies for Afghan

refugees in northwestern Afghanistan. (Humanitarian cooperation had actually begun

in late summer 2001 under United Nations

[UN] aegis.) During his visit to New York for

the opening of the UN General Assembly in

October, Khatami condemned Osama bin

Laden and his supporters as extremists and

terrorists, a “cult of fanatics who...could only

communicate with perceived opponents

through carnage and destruction.” He said

that there were no barriers to cultural or

economic ties with the United States and, in

an interview with The New York Times,

hinted that Iran could accept whatever settlement Yasser Arafat and the Palestinians

agreed upon. If all Palestinians accept Israel’s

right to exist, he told the interviewer, then “we

will respect the wishes of the Palestinian

nation.” Khatami and former president

Hashemi-Rafsanjani had made this type of

comment before, and the formulation is

similar to one made in the 1980s by Iraqi

leader Saddam Hussein and deemed acceptable in Western eyes.

Three final events have drawn attention to

potential Iran-U.S. connections. Iran’s representative to the United Nations, Mohammed

Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian, met in October with

several senators and representatives, including

staunch supporters of Israel, raising speculation that Tehran may be ready to extend U.S.

officials an invitation to visit Iran. Iran’s Foreign Minister Kemal Kharazi made a special

point of shaking Secretary of State Colin Powell’s hand before a meeting of the UN 6+2

Committee on Afghanistan. Most recently,

Mohsen Rezai—a leading conservative, former

head of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, adviser

to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and currently

secretary general of the Expediency Council—

acknowledged that the two countries shared a

common interest in Afghanistan. According to

The New York Times, Rezai further suggested

that better relations might be possible if the

United States were to take the first step.1

. . . Or Deliberate

Ambiguity?

How much should we read into these

signals, if that is what they are? Clearly, Iranians in the public and private sectors are debating whether there should be an opening to

America. Some scholars and analysts believe

that the reformists and conservatives are deeply

divided over this issue, while others, including

Iranian experts, claim that even the conservatives favor normalizing relations with the

United States. They just do not want Khatami

and the reformists to get the credit. Indeed,

Khamenei’s strategy might be to slow down

what even he may acknowledge to be an inevitable process—the normalization of relations with Washington.

Nevertheless, Iranian politics—and therefore decisions on foreign policy gestures or

moves—are in virtual gridlock. For every effort

Khatami has made to loosen the restrictions on

social and cultural life and personal freedoms,

or advance a more progressive foreign policy

since his first election in 1997, his conservative

critics—those labeled hard-liners outside

Iran—have countered by closing reformist

newspapers; arresting Khatami supporters,

including the mayor of Tehran and a parliamentarian who denounced the conservativedominated judiciary as undemocratic; and

calling for opposing U.S. initiatives in

Afghanistan and Central Asia. While Khatami

and reformist politicians were talking of condolences and the celebration of the “dialogue of

civilizations” at the United Nations this year,

Supreme Leader Khamenei continued to reject

firmly and clearly the idea of dialogue with the

United States. On October 12, for instance, he

accused America of “dragging the planet into

global war” and hinted that those who even

suggest dialogue should be removed from their

posts. He warned that “any negotiation with

America is against the nation’s interest.” The

judiciary even set up a body to ensure that no

Iranian official pursues relations with the

United States.

In contrast, Khatami’s remarks while in

New York in October were more nuanced and

balanced, at least in style. In his UN speech, he

called for an end to the bombing campaign in

Afghanistan as soon as possible and urged that

the United Nations—and not the United

States—determine the post-Taliban government. Yet, lest anyone think that Khatami was

suggesting a softer policy on the Middle East

Judith S. Yaphe is a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National

Defense University. Please direct any questions or comments to Dr. Yaphe at (202) 685–2224 or forward them

via e-mail to yaphej@ndu.edu.

No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 2 

clearly, Iranians in the

public and private sectors

are debating whether

there should be an

opening to America 
Panel 2 

European Union ambassadors to Tehran.

Meanwhile, Iran continued its quest for new

and unconventional weapon systems and the

long-range missiles needed to deliver them.

Until Khatami’s election as president in 1997,

Iran made no discernible progress in extending relations with Europe or its neighbors, and

the United States remained anathema. When

Khatami won his first landslide electoral

presidential victory in 1997, America was still

locked into a containment mindset: Iran was a

rogue state whose behavior had to be modified

before it could be accepted back into the international community.

Since September 11:

Missed Opportunity . . .

The attacks on the World Trade Center

and the Pentagon evoked contrary and confusing reactions in Iran. President Khatami offered his condolences to the families of the

victims, and the mayor of Tehran sent his

expression of sympathy to the mayor of New

York shortly after the attacks. Iranian officials

signed the book of condolences opened at the

Swiss Embassy, which oversees U.S. interests in

Iran. Students held apparently spontaneous

demonstrations and chanted pro-American

slogans, in contrast to the standard, orchestrated “Down with the U.S.” Several Iranian

parliamentarians, including the head of the

reformist Second of Khordad Party, Behzad

Nabavi, called for normal relations with all

countries except Israel. He previously had

expressed strong anti-American sentiments.

Probably most striking was the Iranian

response to an American letter of October 7,

which assured Tehran that the United States

would respect Iranian airspace and territorial

integrity and asked for assistance for any U.S.

military personnel forced to land on Iranian

territory or who escaped to Iranian soil. Iran

agreed to assist American pilots downed on

Iranian soil and to allow transshipment of

food and humanitarian supplies for Afghan

refugees in northwestern Afghanistan. (Humanitarian cooperation had actually begun

in late summer 2001 under United Nations

[UN] aegis.) During his visit to New York for

the opening of the UN General Assembly in

October, Khatami condemned Osama bin

Laden and his supporters as extremists and

terrorists, a “cult of fanatics who...could only

communicate with perceived opponents

through carnage and destruction.” He said

that there were no barriers to cultural or

economic ties with the United States and, in

an interview with The New York Times,

hinted that Iran could accept whatever settlement Yasser Arafat and the Palestinians

agreed upon. If all Palestinians accept Israel’s

right to exist, he told the interviewer, then “we

will respect the wishes of the Palestinian

nation.” Khatami and former president

Hashemi-Rafsanjani had made this type of

comment before, and the formulation is

similar to one made in the 1980s by Iraqi

leader Saddam Hussein and deemed acceptable in Western eyes.

Three final events have drawn attention to

potential Iran-U.S. connections. Iran’s representative to the United Nations, Mohammed

Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian, met in October with

several senators and representatives, including

staunch supporters of Israel, raising speculation that Tehran may be ready to extend U.S.

officials an invitation to visit Iran. Iran’s Foreign Minister Kemal Kharazi made a special

point of shaking Secretary of State Colin Powell’s hand before a meeting of the UN 6+2

Committee on Afghanistan. Most recently,

Mohsen Rezai—a leading conservative, former

head of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, adviser

to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and currently

secretary general of the Expediency Council—

acknowledged that the two countries shared a

common interest in Afghanistan. According to

The New York Times, Rezai further suggested

that better relations might be possible if the

United States were to take the first step.1

. . . Or Deliberate

Ambiguity?

How much should we read into these

signals, if that is what they are? Clearly, Iranians in the public and private sectors are debating whether there should be an opening to

America. Some scholars and analysts believe

that the reformists and conservatives are deeply

divided over this issue, while others, including

Iranian experts, claim that even the conservatives favor normalizing relations with the

United States. They just do not want Khatami

and the reformists to get the credit. Indeed,

Khamenei’s strategy might be to slow down

what even he may acknowledge to be an inevitable process—the normalization of relations with Washington.

Nevertheless, Iranian politics—and therefore decisions on foreign policy gestures or

moves—are in virtual gridlock. For every effort

Khatami has made to loosen the restrictions on

social and cultural life and personal freedoms,

or advance a more progressive foreign policy

since his first election in 1997, his conservative

critics—those labeled hard-liners outside

Iran—have countered by closing reformist

newspapers; arresting Khatami supporters,

including the mayor of Tehran and a parliamentarian who denounced the conservativedominated judiciary as undemocratic; and

calling for opposing U.S. initiatives in

Afghanistan and Central Asia. While Khatami

and reformist politicians were talking of condolences and the celebration of the “dialogue of

civilizations” at the United Nations this year,

Supreme Leader Khamenei continued to reject

firmly and clearly the idea of dialogue with the

United States. On October 12, for instance, he

accused America of “dragging the planet into

global war” and hinted that those who even

suggest dialogue should be removed from their

posts. He warned that “any negotiation with

America is against the nation’s interest.” The

judiciary even set up a body to ensure that no

Iranian official pursues relations with the

United States.

In contrast, Khatami’s remarks while in

New York in October were more nuanced and

balanced, at least in style. In his UN speech, he

called for an end to the bombing campaign in

Afghanistan as soon as possible and urged that

the United Nations—and not the United

States—determine the post-Taliban government. Yet, lest anyone think that Khatami was

suggesting a softer policy on the Middle East

Judith S. Yaphe is a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National

Defense University. Please direct any questions or comments to Dr. Yaphe at (202) 685–2224 or forward them

via e-mail to yaphej@ndu.edu.

No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 2 

clearly, Iranians in the

public and private sectors

are debating whether

there should be an

opening to America 
Panel 5 

pay to convince Russia, China, and North Korea

not to continue aiding Iran. For example, is a

closer relationship with NATO or reassurances

regarding American development of missile

defenses more important for Russia than selling

nuclear technology and expertise to Iran?

Would China respond to expanded access to

markets or technology? Can North Korea afford

to forego profits from missile sales to Iran and

other Middle Eastern countries that are looking

to upgrade weapons capabilities? There is no

evidence to suggest that leveraging suppliers

halts proliferators. There is, however, the distinct danger that we will pay in influence or

treasure and that the suppliers will continue to

provide the proscribed goods and services.

Recommendation: Maintain strong

counterproliferation policy. Make clear to our

partners in the war against global terrorism

that support for the war does not excuse weapon

proliferation or assistance to Iran in building

NBC or long-range missile capabilities.

Option 4: Provide additional military

aid or other security guarantees to the Gulf

Arab governments to deter capricious behavior by Iran. A U.S. military presence in the Gulf

will be required for some time. The desire to

reduce force vulnerability needs to be balanced

against the political and deterrent value of a

visible American military presence in the Gulf.

Pulling back U.S. forces as Iran becomes a

much stronger regional power would add to the

incentives for proliferation by suggesting that

the United States will reduce its presence in

response to governments acquiring nuclear

weapons capability; maintaining a determined

presence would demonstrate to Iran that the

United States takes its security commitments

seriously and signal to the Gulf States that their

security is not the price of a U.S.-Iran rapprochement. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and its

partners in the GCC are consumers of security,

vulnerable to attack from larger, more powerful

neighbors. The memory of Iraq’s invasion of

Kuwait should be sufficient reminder that

threatening neighbors cannot be ignored.

Memories fade fast in this region, however, and

most Arabs have an overwhelming desire to

return to the policies of a simpler, distant

era—before Baghdad’s invasion of Kuwait and

before an Islamic Iran sought to remake the

Gulf in its image. This complacency probably

will not change if and when Iran crosses the

nuclear threshold. Furthermore, the Arab Gulf

governments are aware that their security ties

to the United States allow them greater flexibility in their own budding relations with Iran. To

be sure, they are not likely to support a policy

of preemptive strikes to lessen their problem

with Iran. On the other hand, even as their ties

to Iran expand, they will not join Iran in a

security arrangement that would preclude a

U.S presence in the Gulf.

Recommendation: Be prepared to offer

expanded security guarantees and, if necessary, a smaller presence. How we identify the

regional security threat—an NBC-rearmed

Iraq, a resurgent and nuclear Iran, regionally

based international terrorists—will determine

the size and shape of our presence through the

next decade. An international agreement to

assure international access to the Strait of

Hormuz might ease American concerns about

Iranian plans to close the strait to international

shipping, though the negotiability and impact

of a measure would need close study.

Option 5: Promote limited dialogue. As

an adjunct to a reshaped containment posture,

U.S. policy could also aim at renewing dialogue with Iran while at the same time seeking

to minimize the value of Iran’s acquiring

unconventional weapons. U.S. sanctions policy

has inhibited some countries and companies

from doing business in and providing loans to

Iran, but our ability to dictate the terms of

engagement of other governments with Iran is

diminishing rapidly. A new course of seeking

greater, albeit limited, contact with Iran would

seem more productive than trying unilaterally

to sustain the current containment.

Recommendation: Tone down rhetorical references to Iran as a rogue state. Acknowledging Iran’s strategic weight and threat

perceptions and giving it a voice in a new

regional forum (not the GCC) would allow

Iran the political, economic, and strategic

interaction that it seeks, while also serving to

underscore Iraq’s continued isolation. It also

would set the agenda and terms of engagement

on the basis of Iran’s behavior before it tries to

make demands based on a nuclear status. The

United States might also work on limited topics

of shared concern, support Iran for membership in the World Trade Organization, and

expand Track II-type measures to include

contacts with lower-level Iranian civil servants,

intellectuals, students, and academicians.

Afghanistan’s future after the Taliban is clearly

another such issue. Baghdad will perceive that

it is the target of a new Iranian-U.S. rapprochement. This could work to Iranian and American advantage. America cannot choose which

Iranians with whom it will deal. We cannot

identify the good versus the bad or the democratically elected versus the undemocratically

selected leaders of Iran. That is Iran’s business,

not ours. What is important is that the contacts

be clear and unambiguous and not brokered by

mysterious middlemen with their own agendas.

Conclusions

Iran has always raised hard choices for

the United States, and more so than ever since

September 11. Clearly, the attacks have created

an opportunity to engage some governments

with whom the United States has long been at

odds. By the same token, they raise the risk to

U.S. policy of Faustian bargains with newfound

friends that could be inconsistent with other,

longer-term U.S. policy interests and objectives.

Should cooperation in the war on global terrorism override objections to a regime’s lack of

democratic standards, suppression of dissent

and human rights, or repression of minority

groups? Granted, Iran is not in the same category as Russia, Uzbekistan, or China (that is, a

putative U.S. partner that does not support

international terrorism but is burdened by a

history of questionable human rights practices

and suppression of religious and political

minorities). Iran is different: once a friend, it is

now an adversary, stained by a history of supporting international terrorism. Moreover,

indicators of popular unrest—including student demonstrations comparing the mullahs to

the Taliban—suggest that the regime is stifling

popular yearnings for political change so

strong that they are not being suppressed by

arrests, trials, public floggings, or warnings

from the Supreme Leader and the president.

Would an American policy that publicly encouraged or offered moral support to the government in Tehran gain the United States any

leverage in dealing with a regime still capable

of significant internal repression? Should the

war on global terrorism supercede U.S. policies

No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 5 

U.S. policy could also aim

at renewing dialogue

with Iran while at the

same time seeking to

minimize the value of

Iran’s acquiring unconventional weapons
Panel 5 

pay to convince Russia, China, and North Korea

not to continue aiding Iran. For example, is a

closer relationship with NATO or reassurances

regarding American development of missile

defenses more important for Russia than selling

nuclear technology and expertise to Iran?

Would China respond to expanded access to

markets or technology? Can North Korea afford

to forego profits from missile sales to Iran and

other Middle Eastern countries that are looking

to upgrade weapons capabilities? There is no

evidence to suggest that leveraging suppliers

halts proliferators. There is, however, the distinct danger that we will pay in influence or

treasure and that the suppliers will continue to

provide the proscribed goods and services.

Recommendation: Maintain strong

counterproliferation policy. Make clear to our

partners in the war against global terrorism

that support for the war does not excuse weapon

proliferation or assistance to Iran in building

NBC or long-range missile capabilities.

Option 4: Provide additional military

aid or other security guarantees to the Gulf

Arab governments to deter capricious behavior by Iran. A U.S. military presence in the Gulf

will be required for some time. The desire to

reduce force vulnerability needs to be balanced

against the political and deterrent value of a

visible American military presence in the Gulf.

Pulling back U.S. forces as Iran becomes a

much stronger regional power would add to the

incentives for proliferation by suggesting that

the United States will reduce its presence in

response to governments acquiring nuclear

weapons capability; maintaining a determined

presence would demonstrate to Iran that the

United States takes its security commitments

seriously and signal to the Gulf States that their

security is not the price of a U.S.-Iran rapprochement. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and its

partners in the GCC are consumers of security,

vulnerable to attack from larger, more powerful

neighbors. The memory of Iraq’s invasion of

Kuwait should be sufficient reminder that

threatening neighbors cannot be ignored.

Memories fade fast in this region, however, and

most Arabs have an overwhelming desire to

return to the policies of a simpler, distant

era—before Baghdad’s invasion of Kuwait and

before an Islamic Iran sought to remake the

Gulf in its image. This complacency probably

will not change if and when Iran crosses the

nuclear threshold. Furthermore, the Arab Gulf

governments are aware that their security ties

to the United States allow them greater flexibility in their own budding relations with Iran. To

be sure, they are not likely to support a policy

of preemptive strikes to lessen their problem

with Iran. On the other hand, even as their ties

to Iran expand, they will not join Iran in a

security arrangement that would preclude a

U.S presence in the Gulf.

Recommendation: Be prepared to offer

expanded security guarantees and, if necessary, a smaller presence. How we identify the

regional security threat—an NBC-rearmed

Iraq, a resurgent and nuclear Iran, regionally

based international terrorists—will determine

the size and shape of our presence through the

next decade. An international agreement to

assure international access to the Strait of

Hormuz might ease American concerns about

Iranian plans to close the strait to international

shipping, though the negotiability and impact

of a measure would need close study.

Option 5: Promote limited dialogue. As

an adjunct to a reshaped containment posture,

U.S. policy could also aim at renewing dialogue with Iran while at the same time seeking

to minimize the value of Iran’s acquiring

unconventional weapons. U.S. sanctions policy

has inhibited some countries and companies

from doing business in and providing loans to

Iran, but our ability to dictate the terms of

engagement of other governments with Iran is

diminishing rapidly. A new course of seeking

greater, albeit limited, contact with Iran would

seem more productive than trying unilaterally

to sustain the current containment.

Recommendation: Tone down rhetorical references to Iran as a rogue state. Acknowledging Iran’s strategic weight and threat

perceptions and giving it a voice in a new

regional forum (not the GCC) would allow

Iran the political, economic, and strategic

interaction that it seeks, while also serving to

underscore Iraq’s continued isolation. It also

would set the agenda and terms of engagement

on the basis of Iran’s behavior before it tries to

make demands based on a nuclear status. The

United States might also work on limited topics

of shared concern, support Iran for membership in the World Trade Organization, and

expand Track II-type measures to include

contacts with lower-level Iranian civil servants,

intellectuals, students, and academicians.

Afghanistan’s future after the Taliban is clearly

another such issue. Baghdad will perceive that

it is the target of a new Iranian-U.S. rapprochement. This could work to Iranian and American advantage. America cannot choose which

Iranians with whom it will deal. We cannot

identify the good versus the bad or the democratically elected versus the undemocratically

selected leaders of Iran. That is Iran’s business,

not ours. What is important is that the contacts

be clear and unambiguous and not brokered by

mysterious middlemen with their own agendas.

Conclusions

Iran has always raised hard choices for

the United States, and more so than ever since

September 11. Clearly, the attacks have created

an opportunity to engage some governments

with whom the United States has long been at

odds. By the same token, they raise the risk to

U.S. policy of Faustian bargains with newfound

friends that could be inconsistent with other,

longer-term U.S. policy interests and objectives.

Should cooperation in the war on global terrorism override objections to a regime’s lack of

democratic standards, suppression of dissent

and human rights, or repression of minority

groups? Granted, Iran is not in the same category as Russia, Uzbekistan, or China (that is, a

putative U.S. partner that does not support

international terrorism but is burdened by a

history of questionable human rights practices

and suppression of religious and political

minorities). Iran is different: once a friend, it is

now an adversary, stained by a history of supporting international terrorism. Moreover,

indicators of popular unrest—including student demonstrations comparing the mullahs to

the Taliban—suggest that the regime is stifling

popular yearnings for political change so

strong that they are not being suppressed by

arrests, trials, public floggings, or warnings

from the Supreme Leader and the president.

Would an American policy that publicly encouraged or offered moral support to the government in Tehran gain the United States any

leverage in dealing with a regime still capable

of significant internal repression? Should the

war on global terrorism supercede U.S. policies

No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 5 

U.S. policy could also aim

at renewing dialogue

with Iran while at the

same time seeking to

minimize the value of

Iran’s acquiring unconventional weapons