March 2006 Defense Horizons  

Defense

United States an exceptionally cost-effective instrument of military 

action and national strategy. Although the USSOCOM annual budget 

($6.5 billion) is only 1.5 percent of the U.S. defense budget, SOF 

are used in nearly every combat operation and are spearheading the 

fight against a transnational Salafist-terrorist insurgency—namely 

al Qaeda—around the globe in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, Africa, and elsewhere.

While the nature of SOF is such that their missions evolve 

with the environment, table 1 describes those missions for which 

U.S. SOF now organize, train, and equip. The recent Department of 

Defense Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report reveals a growing recognition in U.S. defense circles of the heightened importance 

of SOF for combating the global jihad and other irregular threats.

Most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies of the 

United States appreciate the value of SOF capabilities for such missions and possess them in one form or another and under one name 

or another.1 Table 2 summarizes these forces.

In addition, some allies have high-performance commando 

and elite paramilitary forces that are not assigned to their defense 

ministries. Within Spain’s Guardia Civil, for example, are some of 

the world’s finest counterterrorism forces (reflecting Spain’s long 

struggle with Basque separatists, who use terror tactics). While most 

allies have small forces to perform missions for which the United 

States has SOF, several larger allies, such as the United Kingdom, 

France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Poland, have SOF-type forces 

in significant numbers capable of a wide range of missions. Quantitatively, the combined SOF-type capabilities of NATO allies are 

roughly half those of U.S. SOF. This represents significant capacity 

for global efforts, provided the forces can be organized to work and 

fight together against common threats such as al Qaeda.

However, the SOF of NATO members, including the United 

States, are not organized to collaborate for the purpose of improving capabilities, increasing preparedness, or operating jointly. NATO 

has on occasion requested U.S. and allied national SOF for specific 

Alliance contingencies, such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo. Moreover, some useful but minor U.S.-allied bilateral SOF cooperation 

Overview

In the post-9/11 security environment, special operations 

forces (SOF) have proven indispensable. SOF units are light, 

lethal, mobile, and easily networked with other forces. While the 

United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

allies have extensive SOF capabilities, these forces are not formally organized to collaborate with one another. There would 

be much to gain if U.S. and allied SOF trained to work together: 

national SOF assets would be improved, obstacles to effective 

combined operations would be removed, and a coherent Alliance 

capability would be readily available for NATO. 

The Alliance can focus and grow its SOF capabilities by providing a selective and small combined “inner core” of NATO special 

operations forces for operations, while using an outer network to 

expand and improve SOF cooperation with interested allies.

Special operations forces (SOF) have proven invaluable over 

past decades and have become indispensable in the post-9/11 security environment. They can be used to prevent terrorist attacks, 

rescue hostages, train foreign forces for unconventional operations, 

seize critical facilities, scout in hostile territory and forbidding terrain, and pave the way for intervention by regular forces. Such versatility is possible because SOF combine physical fighting prowess 

with technological dexterity. They can use lasers, unmanned aerial 

vehicles (UAVs), and global positioning system devices to spot enemy 

targets and then transmit the data to precision-strike air forces. SOF 

units are light, lethal, small, mobile, and easily networked with other 

forces. In addition, SOF are uncommonly enterprising and adaptable—important qualities in these fluid and unpredictable times.

While SOF operate in small units, there are proven advantages 

to organizing them to function across structural boundaries. In 

1987, the United States created a joint U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), made up of SOF from the Army, Navy, and Air 

Force, with a unified headquarters and separate program budget to 

fund equipment and training requirements. This step has given the 

Creating a NATO Special 

Operations Force

by David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith

A publication of the

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

M a r c h 2 0 0 6

Number 52

Horizons
 Defense Horizons March 2006

in Europe is currently sponsored by the U.S. European Command 

(USEUCOM). But, other than allied SOF embedded in the NATO 

Response Force (NRF), NATO has no SOF capability, nor has the 

Alliance made it a top priority to expand, improve, and fit together 

member SOF capabilities.

Thus, what NATO does best—enhancing and melding multilateral capabilities for combined action—it has not done with regard to 

SOF. These scarce, high-value forces are increasingly essential to the 

shared security interests of members on both sides of the Atlantic, 

and SOF of all allied countries could benefit from working together. 

NATO can improve in this area and should.

Much could be gained through sharing of know-how and best 

practices, and interoperability could be forged through SOF exchanges, 

training, and exercises under NATO. National SOF could be improved, 

and obstacles to effective combined special operations could be 

removed. Beyond this, a strong case can be made for creating a NATO 

SOF force. If history since the end of the Cold War is a guide, most 

future contingencies in which NATO may elect to act with force as 

an alliance will require SOF. This argues for making U.S. and allied 

SOF assets readily available, not as disparate and disjointed ad hoc 

national contributions, but as a coherent, combined force. Because 

many allies have SOF, because SOF can be effective in small numbers, 

and because U.S. SOF have a tradition of working well with friends, 

creating a NATO SOF capability is a practical and affordable option.

In sum, the United States and its allies have an opportunity to 

enhance and use SOF collaboratively to the benefit of each and all. 

While NATO members are not the only countries with real or potential 

capabilities of this sort, the Alliance is the best mechanism to organize 

SOF cooperation and mount combined special operations. A way could 

be found for “partners” and other countries to join.

The goals of expanding, improving, and employing combined SOF 

capabilities in NATO are, however, up against a serious constraint. For 

the United States and others, these forces are treated as scarce (in 

Pentagon jargon, low-density), high-value, national assets with sensitive methods and means, unique abilities, and critical missions. This 

raises concerns about any initiative that could place SOF under other 

than strictly national control, reduce SOF availability for unilateral 

use, and share SOF know-how with any but the closest allies—concerns that a design for NATO SOF must address.

Against this background, the pages that follow aim to answer 

several questions:

■ Why is this the moment to consider a SOF capability for NATO?

■ What can be gained by creating NATO SOF?

■ Given the aims and constraints, what form should NATO SOF take?

■ What steps should the United States, allies, and NATO take to 

make it happen?

Why Now? The Fight against Terrorists 

The urgency of the idea of NATO SOF lies in the particular 

relevance of SOF in the fight against transnational terrorism and the 

benefits of conducting this fight multilaterally, a declared goal of the 

David C. Gompert is a senior fellow at RAND and former distinguished research 

professor at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the 

National Defense University. Mr. Gompert was the former senior advisor for 

national security, Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq. Rear Admiral Raymond 

C. Smith, USN (Ret.), is former deputy commander, U.S. Special Operations 

Command, and former commander, Naval Special Warfare Command.

Counterterrorism	 Disrupt, defeat, and destroy terrorists and their infrastructure

Direct Action	 Raid, ambush, or assault critical targets in hostile or denied territory

Special Reconnaissance	 Complement national and theater intelligence by obtaining specific and time-	 	

sensitive “ground truth”

Unconventional Warfare	 With local forces, respond to guerrilla warfare, insurgency, subversion, and sabotage

Foreign Internal Defense	 Train, advise, and assist host-nation military, paramilitary, and civil forces to help 	 	

protect free and fragile societies

Civil Affairs	 Coordinate U.S. military activities with foreign officials, U.S. civilian agencies, 	 	

international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations

Psychological Operations	 Influence foreign views and behavior

Humanitarian Assistance	 Deliver critical relief where and when others cannot

Search and Rescue	 Extract personnel from enemy territory or denied areas when conventional combat 	 	

search and rescue capabilities are insufficient

Information Operations	 Interfere with adversary information and information systems while protecting 	 	

U.S. systems

Collateral Mission Areas	 Perform operations that include security assistance, counterdrug operations, 	 	

and peacekeeping

Table 1: U.S. Special Operations Forces Missions
March 2006 Defense Horizons  

United States and its allies. Generally speaking, SOF are more useful 

than regular military forces for finding and eliminating terrorists. 

They were successful against al Qaeda in Afghanistan immediately 

after 9/11 and continue to play an important role in Iraq, the Philippines, and other areas.

The terrorist threat from Salafist extremism has mutated since 

the collapse of the Taliban, becoming less centralized, hierarchical, 

coherent, and concentrated. While al Qaeda has been partly decapitated, disorganized, and scattered, its new form—unstructured, flattened, distributed, and ever-changing—is harder to locate, isolate, 

and destroy. The operational challenge associated with defeating 

terrorists is, as the Department of Defense (DOD) sees it, to find, 

track, and engage them, whether in remote and rugged terrain or in 

crowded cities.2 This is often best done by sophisticated nonmilitary 

means such as intelligence collection and operations, proactive 

investigation, and high-performance police-commando units. But 

there are cases and places in which the capabilities, concentrations, and methods of terrorists exceed the firepower and reach 

of nonmilitary services. In these situations, SOF provide a unique 

set of counterterrorism capabilities. Indeed, because terrorists are 

unlikely to congregate as they did under the Taliban in Afghanistan, 

conventional forces may not be as effective against them, making 

SOF the most important military counterterrorism capability. Counterterrorism is, in fact, now the number one SOCOM mission.3

Why are SOF so valuable for this task? Given the changing 

threat and operational problems it poses, counterterrorism action 

demands a particular package of qualities: readiness, deployment 

range and speed, inconspicuousness, stealth, daring, sensor-shooter 

integration, sure but discriminating lethality, initiative, ingenuity, 

opportunism, cognitive speed, comfort with local forces, flexibility 

(antidoctrinaire), and adaptability. Among military forces, SOF 

match up especially well with these demands.

The United States is not alone in regarding the al Qaeda threat 

as serious enough to justify special capabilities and operations 

beyond ordinary law enforcement. While our European allies have 

tended to stress police over military forces, the magnitude of the 

Country SOF Capabilities

Belgium	 1 para-commando brigade (2 paratroop/parachute, 1 commando, 2 mechanized 	 	

infantry, 1 reconnaissance squadron, 1 artillery)

Bulgaria	 1 special forces (SF) command

Canada	 1 commando unit

Czech Republic 1 SF group

Denmark	 1 SF unit

France	 2,700 SOF: 1 command headquarters, 1 paratroop/parachute regiment, 1 helicopter

unit, 3 training centers (48); 500 marine commandos in 5 groups: 2 assault, 1 recon-	 	

naissance, 1 attack swimmer, 1 raiding

Germany	 1 SOF division with 2 airborne (1 crisis response force), 1 SF command (1 commando/	 	

SF brigade)

Greece	 1 special operations command (including 1 amphibious commando squadron), 1 	 	

commando brigade (3 commando, 1 paratroop/parachute squadron)

Italy	 naval special forces command with 4 groups: 1 diving operation, 1 navy SF

operation, 1 school, 1 research

Latvia	 1 SF team

Lithuania 1 SF team

Netherlands	 1 SF battalion

Norway	 1 Ranger battalion

Poland	 1 special operations regiment

Portugal	 1 special operations unit; 1 commando battalion

Spain	 special operations command with 3 special operations battalions

Turkey	 SF command headquarters; 5 commando brigades

United Kingdom 1 Special Air Services regiment, 1 marine commando brigade, 1 commando artillery 		

regiment, 1 commando air defense battery, 2 commando engineer units, 1 landing 	 	

craft squadron

Source: All figures from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2004–2005 (London: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Table 2: Allied Special Operations Forces Capabilities
 Defense Horizons March 2006

Because some allies already have significant numbers of SOF, the 

main benefit would come from orienting them more (but not exclusively) toward counterterrorism and upgrading their capabilities for 

that mission. Given global demands on U.S. SOF, enhancing allied 

capacity would be helpful, whether or not U.S. and allied SOF combine for operations.

Improved U.S. Capabilities 

Though excellent, U.S. SOF are not superior in every mission or 

skill-set. They would be the first to admit how impressed they are when 

exposed to their allied counterparts, from British tropical commandos 

to Norwegian arctic rangers to French undersea divers. Collaboration 

with NATO forces would better enable U.S. SOF to examine alternative 

approaches, innovations, and niche capabilities. It also might permit 

specialization, in that U.S. SOF would know where certain allied capabilities exist that they need not duplicate. In particular, allied SOF can 

expand the available linguistic skills inventory.

NATO SOF also would enhance the ability of U.S. SOF to operate in cultural settings known better to allies. Deep cultural awareness and access can be essential for SOF effectiveness in operations 

and in developing indigenous antiterror forces. This would apply 

anywhere in Europe, but also in parts of Africa and the Middle East, 

thus covering the three regions of main concern to NATO. Because 

Europe, Africa, and the Middle East are principal theaters of 

Islamist terrorist activity, U.S. SOF must make every effort to operate effectively in these regions.

An Alliance Capability 

One of the tenets of NATO is that shared security interests 

endangered by common threats are best defended with effective unified action. A multinational response can bring more capabilities to 

bear as well as signal solidarity and collective will against enemies. 

Driving a wedge between the United States and its allies is a known 

priority for al Qaeda, as attacks in London and Madrid show. Unified 

action can also ensure the sharing of risk and responsibility—the 

political keystone of the Alliance. These principles are as crucial in 

the fight against al Qaeda as they were in the days of East-West confrontation. From NATO’s least powerful member to its most powerful, 

all countries are better served operating within an alliance compared 

to operating alone or with just one or two other powers, provided 

effectiveness is maintained. Done right, NATO SOF could advance 

both unity and effectiveness.

The ultimate goal of NATO SOF should be to expand the capacity, 

improve the capability, and multiply the options for combined action, 

ranging from surveillance, to working with local forces, to direct 

assault. Although the United States has significant national SOF capabilities that can be used worldwide, operating with allied SOF could be 

advantageous. Certainly in Europe, and arguably in much of Africa and 

the Middle East, combined U.S.-allied SOF action is politically more 

acceptable and supportable than U.S.-only action.

If U.S. and allied SOF are called on for combined operations, 

their effectiveness and impact would obviously be greater if they 

2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings, compounded by smoldering extremism in segments of Europe’s Islamic population, has made 

allies aware that both police and military forces may be needed. 

Moreover, Europeans are acutely aware of the potential for North 

Africa to become a platform for terrorism. Under these circumstances, it should not be difficult to reach a consensus in NATO on 

the importance of having more specialized military capabilities for 

counterterrorist action.

Although counterterrorism is the most compelling reason for a 

SOF capability in NATO, such a capability would serve the Alliance in 

many other ways as it increasingly faces irregular, elusive, nonstate 

threats, as well as some state threats. The list of current U.S. SOF 

missions highlighted in table 1 suggests the broad and enduring 

value these forces could add to the Alliance in an uncertain future.

What Is To Be Gained? 

The United States and its allies can gain in three ways from 

creating a SOF capability in NATO: by enhancing allied (specifically, 

non-U.S.) SOF capabilities available for use against common threats; 

by expanding and regularizing the access of U.S. SOF to valuable and 

complementary experiences, techniques, and perspectives of allied 

SOF; and by creating the option of decisive NATO action using SOF. 

The following examples provide specifics.

Improved Allied Capabilities

It is certainly in the interest of the United States to increase 

the availability and quality of allied SOF for counterterrorism missions. While some allied SOF may compare well with U.S. SOF in 

specific skills and tasks, the following core U.S. capabilities may be 

viewed together as a “gold standard,” especially when it comes to 

finding, tracking, and eliminating terrorists:

■ surveillance in dangerous and inaccessible areas

■ urgent insertion and assault (by land, sea, or air)

■ high but highly discriminating lethality

■ rapid world-wide deployment and employment

■ improvisation during operations

■ self-sufficiency

■ all-terrain capability (from mountainous to tropical to 

arctic to urban)

■ information networked.

NATO SOF could both enlarge and improve allied SOF capabilities against this standard, thus increasing overall military capacity 

to fight al Qaeda, as well as to meet other national security goals. 
March 2006 Defense Horizons  

units; and support capabilities, such as lift and logistics. The number 

of actual assault troops could be between 150 and 200—a small 

number but with huge utility. The core force should focus initially on 

one or at most two vital missions: counterterrorism, as stressed here, 

and perhaps the related mission or submission of hostage rescue.

Counterterrorism missions go far beyond SOF dropping from 

helicopters by ropes at night into terrorist camps or storming 

occupied buildings. SOF must be able to function clandestinely for 

extended periods in areas where terrorists might lurk, collecting 

intelligence, strengthening local forces, and apprehending killers. 

Thus, NATO SOF could be very 

active rather than standing by 

for rare use. Nations deciding 

whether to contribute units 

should fully expect that they 

will be used.

The nature of the terrorism threat is such that the 

inner core of NATO SOF should 

be able to conduct protracted 

clandestine operations as well 

as to deploy urgently in the event of sudden dangers to Alliance 

members and interests. Except for a permanent command and control (C2

) cell, the core force would be composed of rotating national 

SOF units, thus permitting high readiness, a manageable burden on 

individual allies, and wide learning. National units could rotate into 

the inner core every 3 months, possibly staggered to increase continuity and exposure to different allied SOF. Three months may seem 

short, but a longer period might burden unit and personnel planning, 

while a shorter period might harm effectiveness. SOF are highly 

trained and motivated troops who get to work quickly and produce 

results efficiently. Participating forces would be intensively trained 

to common high standards and chosen tactics. The need to train 

together and to be ready to operate together means that national 

forces comprising the core would need to be co-located in Europe 

or North America.

Organizationally, this inner core could be akin to the way the 

United States prepares and uses SOF for critical continuing missions. NATO could form a standing joint task force (SJTF) within 

Allied Command Operations to which assault teams, or units of 

action, and support resources are assigned rotationally and kept at a 

high level of readiness.4 This SJTF–SOF–C/T (for counterterrorism) 

would provide a focal point for planning, be responsible for results 

during rotational assignments, and serve as a deployable command 

and control to minimize reaction time.

For strategic, political, and operational reasons, the United 

States should participate substantially but not overbearingly. If the 

NATO SOF consisted of three assault teams at any moment, the United 

States might provide one and allies the other two. The two allied 

teams would rotate from members that possess requisite numbers of 

high-quality SOF, for example, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 

Italy, Spain, and Poland.5 A U.S. officer should have permanent (nonrotating) command of SJTF–SOF–C/T, with an allied deputy (rotating 

or nonrotating). Command of each assault team would lie with the 

country providing that team in rotation. While each team would come 

from one nation, interteam collaboration in training and operations is 

were interoperable and trained to common standards of excellence. 

In addition, having high-quality allied SOF readily available to NATO 

would provide options to act against al Qaeda or other enemies if 

U.S. SOF are otherwise engaged or, for some reason, not ideal for the 

need at hand. While the United States may not wish to count absolutely on the availability of NATO SOF, it is an option well worth having. By the same token, it would be advantageous for allies to have 

SOF capability of enough quality and quantity to join counterterrorism operations with the United States or to conduct such operations 

of their own when U.S. assets are unavailable.

It is crucial for governments to have public support 

in the fight against terrorism. 

NATO SOF would permit the 

Alliance to take swift, precise, 

proportional, and collective 

military action against terrorists, as well as other unconventional threats. Depending on 

circumstances, use of SOF in 

surgical operations may enjoy 

greater public support and international acceptance than largescale intervention by regular ground and air forces.

To act decisively with SOF, NATO would need forces that are 

ready and able to work well together. This means that contributing 

allies, including the United States, would have to assign some SOF to 

NATO for training and employment. In other words, for NATO to be 

able to achieve both unity and effectiveness in combating transnational terrorism militarily, its members’ SOF must prepare together 

and be organized to act together. Occasional contacts will not suffice. Herein lies the biggest challenge, given the national value and 

sensitivity of SOF.

Creating and Using NATO SOF

For the United States, as well as other prospective SOF contributors, the question is whether assigning such valued assets and 

sharing sensitive know-how via NATO would compromise national 

capabilities and limit national options. Therefore, the approach to 

creating SOF capability in NATO must maximize national and common benefits while minimizing national costs and risks. The key 

to this is a formula that provides a selective and small combined 

capability for critical operations while also expanding and improving 

SOF through cooperation among all interested allies—that is, both 

to focus and to grow SOF capabilities. To this end, NATO SOF should 

consist of a small inner core and a larger outer network.

Inner Core 

The inner core could be a force of 500, with associated systems (for example, vehicles, weapons, information technology, and 

unmanned aerial vehicles). The force could consist of deployable 

command, control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4

ISR) personnel and gear; assault 

for NATO to be able to achieve 

both unity and effectiveness in 

combating transnational terrorism 

militarily, its members’ SOF must 

prepare together and be organized 

to act together
 Defense Horizons March 2006

crucial. SOF assault teams must be able to rely on one another, especially in larger and more demanding contingencies.

With this formula, the total number of U.S. personnel assigned 

to NATO SOF at any given time would be about 100, including assault 

and support personnel. Army, Navy, and Air Force units should all 

participate. There are at least three ways the United States could 

meet its obligation while not detracting from—indeed, while enhancing—national SOF:

■ In the first, the U.S. team in rotation to NATO SOF would come 

from those teams in the queue for high-readiness status for U.S. counterterrorism operations. This would mean that no increase in U.S. SOF would be 

needed for the counterterrorism mission. At the same time, it could increase 

the strain on U.S. SOF, which would have to be weighed against the advantages of having NATO SOF.

■ Alternatively, if DOD deemed it useful to increase SOF specialized 

for counterterrorism based on its latest threat assessment, the additional U.S. 

capacity could satisfy the needs of U.S. participation. Even then, however, 

it would be ideal to rotate all or most U.S. counterterrorism teams through 

NATO SOF to expose them to allied capabilities and alliance operations.

■ A third option would be to utilize the U.S. SOF that are already 

assigned to USEUCOM under Special Operations Command Europe to participate in NATO SOF (in effect, wearing a second helmet). While this would be 

the most practical option for the United States, it would forfeit the benefits of 

widespread exposure of U.S. SOF to NATO. Moreover, USEUCOM SOF are not 

dedicated to the counterterrorism mission, which would be a disadvantage 

insofar as NATO SOF should concentrate on counterterrorism.

Perhaps NATO and national planners, including USSOCOM, will 

devise other alternatives. If so, key principles to maintain include:

■ substantial, as opposed to token, U.S. participation

■ ready availability for operations under NATO

■ capability for combined action based on common best tactics and 

co-training

■ rotational assignments

■ a standing command cell, headed by an American officer

■ counterterrorism focus

■ selectivity with the aim of effectiveness.

Each non-U.S. member 

contributing to the inner core 

would provide no more than 50 

personnel—roughly an assaultteam equivalent—during its 

rotation. Because standards 

for participation would be very 

high, and most allies do not have action units of sufficient size and 

capability for counterterrorism, only a few allies would likely participate.6

 Very limited participation might ease concerns about the 

sharing of sensitive knowledge. Other allies could support the NATO 

SOF effort by participating in the wider network of cooperation and 

perhaps by joining the core force as their SOF become qualified for 

counterterrorism missions.

Even though the inner core would consist of a minority of NATO 

members, the combined force could act for the Alliance as a whole, 

in response to a request from the North Atlantic Council (NAC).7

There is ample precedent for this (for example, the few nuclearcapable members and the few in which intermediate-range missiles 

were deployed in the 1980s). By the same token, any member that 

does not wish to join NATO SOF at all should be satisfied not to 

participate in the establishment or use of the force, rather than to 

oppose what other allies wish to do.

Training would be multilateral and directed by the SJTF command. In addition, although SOF are not big consumers of airlift, 

adequate NATO airlift assets would need to be earmarked and 

readied for sudden and urgent missions. The whole system would be 

geared toward excellence, as defined above, and readiness for fast 

action, which is especially crucial in counterterrorism operations. 

The inner core would need to be ready to go within 24 hours of initial warning, upon the decision of the NAC. Once employed, NATO 

SOF—like national SOF—must have a high degree of operational 

decisionmaking authority. Micromanagement of an operation, after 

NAC has issued general mission guidance, would be self-defeating 

if not dangerous to SOF engaged in close quarters with terrorists. 

Rules of engagement would have to be as permissive as those under 

which national SOF operate.

Because of the tempo and danger involved in special operations, sharing tactical intelligence among units is integral and crucial. In combined operations with allies, tactical commanders will 

want to share such intelligence across national boundaries. Barriers 

will at best hamper and at worst endanger SOF and their missions. 

It is inherent in networking that whenever information is shared—

whether to allies or among U.S. forces—the risks of compromise 

increase. However, this consideration should not interfere with the 

creation or use of NATO SOF capabilities. Any ally that is trusted 

enough to participate in a critical and sensitive special mission is 

surely to be trusted with information that bears on mission success. 

Allied SOF are hardly likely to imperil themselves by mishandling 

intelligence. Moreover, tactical information in fast-moving special 

operations is fleeting, thus it is not easily exploited by the enemy. In 

any case, tactical SOF commanders are in the best position to decide 

whether the operational risks of sharing information outweigh the 

benefits. Any constraints imposed on them only limit their options.

Sharing intelligence information may involve some risk that 

sources and methods will be 

compromised, but SOF typically generate their own intelligence and are able to judge 

whether the risk of compromise 

outweighs the consequences 

of not providing and receiving 

tactically critical information. 

Apart from the matter of sharing tactical intelligence information, 

the objective of NATO SOF interoperability will require some commonality of C4

ISR systems and protocols, at least for communications connectivity. Like any other technology sharing, the allies will 

once employed, NATO SOF—

like national SOF—must have 

a high degree of operational 

decisionmaking authority
March 2006 Defense Horizons  

need to decide whether the advantages of being able to combine SOF 

for critical counterterrorism operations justify such sharing.

The fundamental argument for having an available core force 

lies in the specific nature and broad value of SOF. Such forces are 

almost always needed—no matter what the contingency—and 

needed early, often with little warning and a premium on moving 

and acting with great speed. Unlike the NRF and NATO high-readiness forces, SOF may well be needed in far less than the time it takes 

to cobble together earmarked national forces. While the United 

States could, technically speaking, meet the need with its own SOF, 

to be able to do so with allies, and as an ally, is much more advantageous, especially if overall counterterrorism capacity is increased by 

developing U.S. and allied SOF to common standards and making 

them interoperable.

Notwithstanding the virtues, the idea of committing even a modest number of SOF to NATO, which implies nonavailability for purely 

national action, may not appeal to members. Conceptually, there is 

another approach: a de facto NATO SOF capability. It begins by setting 

as a goal the ability of NATO to deploy within 24 hours of first warning a U.S.-allied SOF counterterrorism force of high quality, common 

methods, and integrated C2. Even if participants decline to commit 

to release their units of the force—something that is in any case not

called for by the Washington Treaty—all participating allies could 

agree to work assiduously to remove technical and procedural obstacles to that goal. They would 

agree to rotational co-location 

to permit common training and 

high readiness, form a SJTF 

with a permanent command, 

set and work toward high standards, and assign logistic and 

transport resources for deployment.

Dogged implementation 

of this alternative concept 

would lead to virtually the 

same practical efforts to form an inner core force as if NATO actually “owned” the force. It matters less whether members’ SOF are 

legally bound to the Alliance than whether every step is taken to 

provide for effective combined operations when NATO and members 

individually decide to act. At the same time, commitment has merit, 

namely, confidence, credibility, and speed. From a U.S. standpoint, it 

is unlikely that a consensus of allies would want to commit SOF to a 

counterterrorism operation that the United States, as leader in the 

war with al Qaeda, would wish to avoid. By formally assigning NATO 

SOF to missions that U.S. SOF would most likely support or perhaps 

carry out, the United States and NATO both can increase available 

SOF capacity as well as their access to it. On balance, the concept 

of formal commitment is better than that of practical commitment, 

though the latter is well worth gaining.

Whichever of these two concepts is chosen for inner-core 

SOF, one of the most important contributions of NATO, based on 

its proven strengths, is to provide the organizational and logistic 

infrastructure needed to prepare for and mount effective combined 

operations. While the United States has substantial infrastructure for its own SOF, many allies do not, at least not for large or 

simultaneous demands. Of course, allies could make use of U.S. 

infrastructure, whether or not NATO has a SOF capability. But it 

is better for both the United States and allies if NATO can furnish 

and coordinate common support from a number of allies, including 

the United States. While each participating country could cover the 

expense of its rotating team, NATO should use common funds to pay 

for support, the cost of which would be modest because SOF require 

comparatively little infrastructure and service.

Wider Network 

Surrounding this inner core would be a wider but much looser 

cooperative network of SOF from all allies committed to developing 

NATO SOF. In addition to counterterrorism and hostage rescue, this 

wider group could be enhanced through such cooperation to perform 

a fuller range of missions, including internal defense, counterinsurgency, intelligence gathering, peacetime advising of new partners, 

civil affairs, and information operations. The SOF assets of this outer 

network need not be co-located, but they would interact episodically 

and train to the same standards as the inner core.

Because this larger group would train with similar tactics and 

methods, it could be requested and assigned for employment by NATO 

in the same manner as other national forces. This would allow for 

augmentation of NATO’s core 

SOF, in the event of large-scale 

or simultaneous demands. A 

successful program of cooperation would also give the 

Alliance the option to grow the 

inner core over time.

NATO members with 

more advanced SOF would 

have a responsibility to provide personnel in small numbers to help develop SOF in 

the wider program. Thus, even in the outer network, it would be 

necessary for U.S. and other advanced SOF to share some knowledge 

on tactics, methods, and threats, though the need for security would 

be much greater in the core than in the network. While each member, including the United States, would have to decide for itself what 

and what not to share, the advantages of elevating SOF capabilities 

among committed and trustworthy allies cannot be ignored. After 

all, if these allies are prepared to have their SOF fight shoulder to 

Defense Horizons is published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. CTNSP 

publications are available online at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other 

department or agency of the Federal Government.

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

 Hans Binnendijk

Director

such forces are almost always

needed—no matter what the 

contingency—and needed early, 

often with little warning and 

a premium on moving and 

acting with great speed
 Defense Horizons March 2006

shoulder with U.S. SOF, the benefits of sharing could outweigh any 

risks, up to a point.

Such a two-part SOF offers the promise to add significantly—

even dramatically, for such a small enterprise—to NATO’s inventory of usable capabilities. The 

benefits lie in pooling, sharing, and expanding the circle 

of high-performance SOF. The 

cost of a headquarters, training facilities, and other infrastructure would be much less 

than the NRF. Very quickly, 

NATO could have high-quality SOF that could operate 

independently or work with 

NRF and other Alliance forces, 

and the number would grow. 

NATO’s ability to handle critical situations and threats, including al 

Qaeda, would be greatly enhanced.

In addition to giving NATO an important new capability, the 

proposal offered here would give members improved options for 

combined coalition-of-the-willing SOF action. SOF of any of the 

inner core members, and perhaps of some of the outer network 

participants, would be able to operate with U.S. SOF or on their 

own, but with greater effectiveness in the fight against terrorism. 

In sum, NATO SOF would increase the special operations capabilities of both the Alliance and allies.

Conclusion 

As soon as it is prepared, the United States should initiate discussions with the NATO Secretary General, Supreme Headquarters 

Allied Powers Europe, and allies with significant SOF regarding the 

proposed objectives and two-tier architecture of NATO SOF. Even 

two or three nations (for example, the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany) could begin by developing plans for the innercore force, with others joining in time. The United States and others 

might be more comfortable with a very tight inner core at first.

One of the first steps following a political decision to create a 

NATO SOF capability would be to create the standing joint task force 

and assign a commander and multilateral staff. Once that is done, 

this new cell can be expected to come up with specific plans and 

proposals for Alliance and members’ consideration. The creation of 

the SJTF would signal NATO’s determination both to focus and build 

a capability that is indispensable in defending the Alliance against 

terrorism.

A good test of the value of such an initiative is whether it would 

worry al Qaeda. It should. Terrorists in Afghanistan have witnessed 

first-hand what U.S. and allied SOF can do. To them, the prospect of 

a high-performance NATO counterterrorism force, able to operate 

anywhere with speed, agility, and lethality, displaying Western-democratic resolve and unity, would be highly unwelcome.

Notes

1 By NATO SOF we mean allied special military and paramilitary forces, commandos, rangers, and the like that have at least some missions and capabilities like 

those of U.S. SOF. 2 The Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, National Military 

Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today; A Vision 

for Tomorrow, 2004, available at 

<www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/

d20050318nms.pdf>. 3 U.S. Special Operations 

Command Mission, available at 

< h t t p : / / w w w. s o c o m . m i l / D o c s /

Command_Mission-060214.pdf>. See 

“Vision Statement” in the U.S. Special Operations Command Vision 2004, 

available at <http://www.socom.mil/

Docs/Command_Vision-060214.pdf>. 4 An important detail is where 

in NATO such a SJTF would be situated. One possibility is the standing joint headquarters in Lisbon, from which a sea-based JTF can be built and deployed. 5 Whether allies provide companies or platoons to form such assault teams is 

a detail to be worked out. The key principles are that the numbers are not excessive 

and that units of action should be national. 6 Participation in high-performance paramilitary (non-DOD) counterterrorism 

forces should not be excluded. 7 Per the Washington Treaty, NAC consensus is required for NATO action, and 

any country may decline to provide troops, even if assigned to NATO.

the United States should initiate 

discussions with the NATO Secretary 

General, Supreme Headquarters 

Allied Powers Europe, and allies 

with significant SOF regarding the 

proposed NATO SOF