AIRPOWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Expeditionary Diplomacy:

POL-MIL Facilitation of AEFDeployments

William L. Dowdy, PhD

Military Defense Analyst

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Title of Paper: Expeditionary Diplomacy: POL-MIL Facilitation ofAEF

Deployments

Author: William L. Dowdy, PhD

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Executive Summary

During the Cold War, U.S. Air Force units typically operated either from bases on

American territory or from main operating bases (MOBs) in allied countries where access

was assured under long-accepted arrangements. In the decade following the end of the

Cold War, the number of MOBs abroad has been drastically reduced, and most remaining

USAF assets have been pulled back to bases in U.S. territory.

Meanwhile, given changes in the international security environment and consequent

adjustments in U.S. national security strategy, Air Force units have increasingly been

required to deploy to, and operate from, forward locations in many countries outside of

the Cold War alliance structure. Under the nascent Expeditionary Aerospace Force

(EAF) concept, gaining access to and maintaining positive relations with host countries

are prerequisites to successful expeditionary operations.

This study was inspired by the view stated at Air University in 1999 by then-Maj

Gen Donald G. Cook, first EAF Implementation Director, that "diplomatic preparation of

the battlefield" is a neglected concept and enterprise that should receive more attention

from EAF architects. As the first and only systematic study of "diplomatic preparation,"

this Research Paper selectively surveys existing and prospective USAF initiatives that

attempt to come to grips with political-military ("pol-mil") challenges associated with

expeditionary operations.

The author introduces the notion of "expeditionary diplomacy" as the process that

both prepares the way for Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) deployments and

facilitates effective operations after deployment by promoting positive host nation

relations - the process that both gets us into forward operating locations (FOLs) and

keeps us there as long as the mission requires.

The study then examines current Air Force-wide, major command, regional

component, and school house initiatives to meet the diplomatic challenges of operating

into and from numerous far-flung locations. Additional measures are recommended

throughout the study to better prepare aerospace expeditionary task forces specifically,

and USAF personnel in general, for the newly-salient requirement to be accomplished

diplomats as well as accomplished warriors.

Finally, the author concludes with some general recommendations concerning the

way ahead.

Preceding Page'f Blank
Table ofContents

Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i

TABLE OF CONTENTS iii

TABLE iv

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 1

Expeditionary Diplomacy 2

Objects and Levels ofExpeditionary Diplomacy 2

Study Assumptions and Objectives 4

SECTION 2: CURRENT APPROACHES TO EXPEDITIONARY DIPLOMACY 5

Diplomatic Clearances 5

Steady-State versus Crisis-Response Operations 6

Analysis and Recommendations 7

Aerospace Expeditionary Force Center (AEFC) 8

EAF Online 9

AEFC Lessons Learned 9

Prospective Developments 10

Analysis and Recommendations 10

Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program 12

Background 12

FAO Roles and Qualifications 13

Education and Training 13

Analysis and Recommendations 14

USAF Special Operations School (USAFSOS) 18

Analysis and Recommendations 18

Air Mobility Warfare Center (AMWC) 20

Analysis and Recommendations 20

U.S. Air Forces Central Command (CENTAF) 22

Traveling Briefings 22

Electronic Briefings 22

Orientation Notebook 23

Analysis and Recommendations 23

SECTION 3: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 29

THE AUTHOR AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 33

in
Table

Page

Table 1. Facilitating Expeditionary Diplomacy 27

IV
Section 1

Introduction and Overview

The Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) concept of a primarily United States-based force

with rotating Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) deployments is premised on the

assumption that deploying forces will routinely be granted access to, and authorization to

operate from, forward operating locations (FOLs) in host countries. To be denied that

privilege in an important location or throughout a theater of operations would

fundamentally undermine the strategy implicit in the EAF concept. In short, it would be

a "show-stopper." Put another way, access—to include en route overflight and landing

rights and diplomatic clearance to operate from FOLs—is a prerequisite for AEF

operations. Indeed, denial of access may well prove to be a more critical limiting factor

than technical or logistical constraints.

Once achieved, access must be sustained. Access alone is not enough. Optimized,

or even adequate, operability of a FOL means the absence of crippling restrictions. Both

access and operability of AEFs are enabled by diplomacy. • Both are perpetuated or

enhanced by diplomacy - an ongoing process of many dimensions. This study examines

diplomacy as the enabling process that both prepares the way for AEF deployments and

facilitates sustainment of effective operations - that both gets us in and keeps us in (and

gets us out when the mission is completed). Successful diplomacy alone cannot assure

successful expeditionary aerospace operations. But without it, such operations cannot

succeed because they will not occur. Successful access and sustainment diplomacy is not

sufficient, but it is necessary; it is a prerequisite, a threshold requirement, an enabler and

facilitator.

1

"Host nation access is the most constraining requisite for any AEF deployment," writes Lt Col Michael J.

Nowak, USAF. (The Air Expeditionary Force: A Strategy for an Uncertain Future? Maxwell AFB: Air

University Press, The Maxwell Papers, No. 19, September 1999, p. 11.)

2

In Operation Desert Fox, December 1998, more than half ofthe American strike aircraft at ground bases

in the Persian Gulf region were kept out of the attack on Iraq because of objections of Saudi Arabia.

(Douglas Jehl, New York Times, "U.S. Fighters in Saudi Arabia Grounded," 19 December 1998, p. 9.)

See also William L. Dowdy, Testing the Aerospace Expeditionary Force Concept: An Analysis ofAEFs

I-IV (1995-97) and the Way Ahead, Airpower Research Institute Research Paper 2000-01, Maxwell AFB,

AL: College ofAerospace Doctrine, Research and Education, 2000, pp. 22-23.

1
Expeditionary Diplomacy

"Expeditionary diplomacy," as the term is used in this study, is meant to denote

much more than just the narrow, stylized, formal practice of diplomats. Expeditionary

diplomacy is meant to encompass the full range of engagement measures undertaken and

continued by U.S. civilian and military officials - from the national command authority

(NCA) level, through forward-deployed commanders, down to individual airmen - with

the objective of facilitating positive and productive relations with other nations for the

purpose of achieving success in expeditionary operations.

Objects and Levels of Expeditionary Diplomacy

The objects of U.S. Air Force diplomacy, thus broadly construed, are first and

foremost the nation or nations hosting deployed forces, but they may also include

neighbors of host nations, coalition partners, potential coalition partners, staging or transit

area governments, international organizations and their agencies and officials, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Of all these objects of diplomacy, host nations are

most central and essential to execution of the AEF concept of operations. Without

forward basing, the USAF must resort to reliance on long-range operations with severe

sortie-rate disadvantages.

U.S. diplomacy directed toward host nations must be both continuous and multileveled to enable and sustain AEF operations. It must be continuous in the sense that it

is enmeshed in the broader, ongoing bilateral relationship that is cultivated over time in

pursuit of common interests, and multi-leveled because it involves, from the USAF

perspective: (i) military-to-military ("mil-to-mil") relations; (ii) relations with civil

authorities; and (iii) daily person-to-person relations affecting public perceptions. These

respective levels of diplomatic engagement will be more or less important in a given

context, but each will affect the ability of an AEF to accomplish its mission.

Traditionally, mil-to-mil relations have been a strong suit. Affinities between

individuals in the profession of arms often transcend the cultural differences that tend to

encumber other levels of diplomacy. Relations with local civil authorities may prove to

be critical for deployed USAF commanders in matters like force protection, contracted

services, and implementation of status of forces agreements (SOFA). Good public

relations - fostering a favorable attitude toward deployed USAF personnel and their

mission - is a key objective of American diplomacy that even the individual airman is

3

"We must.. .nourish our friendships, build trust and instill confidence through formal and informal

agreements with other nations to ensure continued access." (General Ralph E. Eberhart, then USAF Vice

Chief of Staff, quoted by Christopher Haug, "Access Key to AEF Success," Pacific Air Forces News

Service, released 6 May 1998.)

2
sometimes in a position to facilitate or to frustrate. As in the practice of medicine, a

fundamental objective for host-nation diplomacy is "to do no harm."

Transit/staging area governments and militaries, and their civil officials and publics,

are typically approached on the same multi-level basis as FOL host nations. However, on

the whole, the challenge of engendering supportive actions from en route countries is

likely to prove less daunting than with FOL hosts. Such countries often have had a

longer experience as alliance or coalition partners. Previous relationships facilitate

mutual understanding. For example, "through NATO, experienced commanders may be

well versed on European cultural and political issues, but they are usually not as

knowledgeable in Middle Eastern customs or on the history of developing African

nations."

Alliance ties offer no guarantees, however. In the punitive strike against Libya in

April 1986, Operation EL DORADO CANYON, U.S. Air Force F-llls from RAF

Lakenheath, England were required to fly around French and Spanish airspace because

France and Spain (as well as Italy and Greece) refused overflight rights for the mission.

Similarly, in the American resupply of Israel during the 1973 Middle East War, Western

European nations denied access to bases and overflight rights.

The diplomatic objective of doing no harm also applies to dealings with regional

host-country neighbors. As American friends in the Persian Gulf have been known to

remind us, they must live with their neighbors long after we have gone. Therefore, they

should not be expected to automatically approve and support U.S. initiatives in the

region, especially initiatives that may reasonably be predicted to rankle neighboring

states. A coincidence of interests may not necessarily result in agreement on measures to

be taken. Thus, the sensitivities of host-nation neighbors (of both FOL countries and en

route countries) should be taken into account when undertaking AEF diplomatic

initiatives. Both sets of neighbors are potential coalition partners. If badly treated, they

may instead become anti-coalition antagonists.

As the proportion of USAF expeditionary operations continues to tilt toward

peacetime roles (military operations other than war - MOOTW), Air Force diplomacy

will increasingly have to accommodate the participation of non-state actors, principally

international organizations like the United Nations, along with its many agencies, as well

as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of numerous types and political persuasions.

Though less directly involved in actual warfare situations, such actors have the potential

to be both part ofthe problem and part ofthe solution in MOOTW.

Widely reported capital crimes by U.S. servicemen in Okinawa, Korea, and Kosovo are examples ofrare,

isolated incidents that can nevertheless do great damage to host-country public opinion.

5 Moreover, they are typically more distant from the scene of action than the FOL states, thus less

vulnerable to intimidation or retaliation from U.S. opponents.

6 Nowak, The Air Expeditionary Force, p. 20.

Charles M. Perry, et al., Airpower Synergies in the New Strategic Era, Herndon, VA: Brassey's Inc.,

1997, p. 23, 65.

3
Study Assumptions and Objectives

To summarize, this study proceeds from the premise that failures of diplomacy can

lead very directly to failures in AEF mission accomplishment. It proceeds from the

reality ofincreasing complexity in diplomatic interactions with different types of actors at

various levels of contact. Finally, it proceeds from the recognition by senior USAF

leadership that diplomatic preparation for, and diplomatic sustainment of, AEF

deployments and operations—i.e., expeditionary diplomacy—are urgent imperatives of

mission success and, as such, they should be assigned a high priority throughout the

Expeditionary Aerospace Force. As one senior leader has stated, "we have been burned

in the past in several places around the world by taking for granted that we would receive

diplomatic clearance. Taking for granted that we could bed down the initial deployment

of airplanes. Taking for granted that we could fly past certain hours. My approach... is

to remind people that we are guests in someone else's home. And we need to think and

behave that way."

The objective of this study is to stimulate thinking about a diplomatic

preparation/sustainment strategy that can serve AEF planners and commanders. In the

process of contemplating development of such a strategy, examples of extant diplomatic

preparation/sustainment approaches will be evaluated with a view toward determining

what ideas and measures are worthy of consideration for general and sustained

implementation by the United States Air Force.

Lt Gen Michael Short, quoted in "Over Here, Over There," Airman, October 1998.
Section 2

Current Approaches to Expeditionary Diplomacy

For purposes of discussing examples of ongoing diplomatic preparation and

diplomatic sustainment measures, it is useful to consider Air Force-wide, MAJCOM,

regional-component, and school-house initiatives that are aimed at coming to terms with

the diplomatic and political challenges of operating into and from numerous far-flung

locations outside the sovereignty ofthe United States.

Diplomatic Clearances

Arguably the most critical and portentous diplomatic enterprise affecting AEF

deployments is the pursuit and maintenance of diplomatic access, overflight, and landing

clearances. Critical, because without clearances there will be no forward-based

expeditionary operations. Portentous, because the clearance process both affects and is

affected by the state ofrelations with current and prospective host governments. Handled

unsuccessfully, clearance requests are show stoppers; handled badly, they can delay or

restrict operations and lead to damaged bilateral relations.

Under current procedures, aircraft clearances are requested by the aircraft-owning

MAJCOMS, principally Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command, although the

MAJCOM Commander's authority may be delegated to satisfy mission requirements.

Aircraft clearance requests are directed to appropriate national authorities by in-country

American Embassy representatives, typically the U.S. Defense Attache.

There are three types of personnel clearances: (i) theater clearances, granted by the

regional CINC (Unified Commander) for official travel within the area of responsibility

(AOR); (ii) special area clearances, granted by the U.S. Department of State (DoS) and

the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for official travel to countries designated as

"special areas" by DoS; and (iii) country clearances, granted by foreign authorities

(requested through American Embassies) for official travel to respective countries. Of

9 Foreign Clearance Guide, chapter 6, "Aircraft Clearances," http://www.fcg.pentagon.mil.

10 Ibid., chapter 3, "Definitions," section A17; chapter 8, "Personnel Clearances," section F. Aircrews

performing aircrew duties exclusively do not require personnel clearances. (Chapter 6, section Al)

5
the three types, it is the country clearances that are the object of deployment diplomacy,

and over which host countries hold a veto.

Once access to a host country is achieved, operations in/from that country are

governed by a separate set of agreements regarding foreign operating rights, foreign

military rights, and foreign surveys. All are within the general purview of

Headquarters USAF/XONP as executive agent.

Steady-State versus Crisis-Response Operations

If handled properly, clearances for AEF deployments in support of steady-state

operations ("ongoing contingencies" such as SOUTHERN WATCH) are less challenging

to obtain than those for deployments in support of crisis-response operations ("pop-up

contingencies"). Steady-state operations, involve predictable scheduling, continuity in

host-country destinations, and level force requirements. As a consequence, they are

much easier to deal with in the clearance process. Indeed, "blanket" clearances - issued

for specified categories of flights or personnel travel, usually granted on a periodic

12 basis ~ are often used for steady-state deployments.

Crisis-response clearances, on the other hand, are much more problematic, as crises

by their very nature are short-notice and time-critical, and involve contentious issues.

The aforementioned U.S. operations to resupply Israel in the 1973 Middle East war and

13 to strike Libya in 1986 are cases in point. Short-notice aircraft clearance procedures are

coordinated by HQ USAF/XONP.14

One key to success in achieving access during crises is to cultivate friendly, positive

relations in normal times. It is too late to build relationships once a crisis occurs. "Our

job ... is to posture ourselves so that our presence is valuable to those who are going to

need our help," according to General John P. Jumper, USAF. "I'm not sure we have

always taken that sort oflook at it before, but this is the way in the new expeditionary air

force that we have to think about it. We have to think about [the] cultural and diplomatic

end ofthis ahead ofthe game . . . ." 15 General Ralph E. Eberhart, USAF, has said that

building friendly relations is key to successful deployment of AEFs. "As we continue to

exercise and train with other nations, we set the stagefor when we might need access.''''

11 Ibid., chapter 9, "Requests for USAF Foreign Operation Rights, Foreign Military Rights, and Foreign

Surveys."

12 Foreign Clearance Guide, chapter 3, section A4.

13 The 1958 U.S. intervention in Lebanon offers another example of crisis action impediments. In this case

overflight problems with Austria, Switzerland, and Greece adversely affected USAF deployments into

Turkey. (Maj Patrick J. Smith, USAF, "Building the Eagle's Nest: Challenges in Basing the Air

Expeditionary Force," Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies Thesis, June 1997, pp.

23-31, passim.)

14 Foreign Clearance Guide, Chapter 6, section F5.

15 General Jumper is quoted in "Operating Abroad," Air Force Magazine, December 1998, p. 28.

16 "Access Key to AEF Success."

6
While access rights and operating rights cannot be guaranteed in advance, even

among friends (as we have seen), and while much of the enabling strategic-level

diplomacy required is beyond the purview of the Air Force alone, there are additional

measures that can be undertaken by the USAF to maximize the prospects of diplomatic

clearances in both steady-state and crisis situations.

Analysis and Recommendations

There are really two pieces to the discussion of diplomatic clearances: (i) ideas on

how to facilitate the clearance process itself; and (ii) thoughts on how to cultivate

relationships with current and potential host countries so that they will be more likely to

say yes to future access requests.

With regard to the first, the current decentralized system for requesting diplomatic

clearances to overfly, transit, and operate from other countries seems to be working

reasonably well on a routine basis, though aircrew stories abound regarding missed

departures, delays en route, diversions, and work-arounds.17Such problems are probably

inevitable, given the politics and national pride involved in these matters ofsovereignty.

There is also a sense of frustration among some mid-level action officers that the

level of interest in the U.S. Government regarding diplomatic clearances is too low and

that situations are sometimes allowed to drift unnecessarily into crisis due to inattention

or due to insufficient horsepower brought to bear. Whether a more centralized,18 more

authoritative system for requesting, monitoring, and following through on clearance

requests would reduce the incidence of problems or merely create different ones is an

open question and one beyond the scope ofthis study.

How best to cultivate relationships between the USAF and current/prospective

recipients of access requests is a question different from the one about process. Its

answers lie in a combination of the current and proposed initiatives of the Air

Expeditionary Force Center, Foreign Area Officer Program, USAF Special Operations

and Air Mobility Warfare school houses, and U.S. Central Command Air Forces.

One persistent story regards an occasion when a CINC and his entire entourage, airborne en route to his

AOR, had to abort his mission, turn around, and return home because of lack of landing clearance at his

proposed destination. It is not yet clear whether this incident says more about the clearance process or

more about the arbitrariness of certain would-be host governments.

18 During the 1996 AEF III test deployment, Grand Forks AFB coordinated 905th Air Refueling Squadron

diplomatic clearances for aircraft going into Moron AB, Spain, and Langley AFB coordinated diplomatic

clearances for the same aircraft going into Doha, Qatar. "The process worked, but the potential is there for

clearances to be missed when more than one agency is working clearances for a given aircraft." (Joint

Uniform Lessons Learned report #32831-07299 dated 10/23/96)
Aerospace Expeditionary Force Center (AEFC)

The AEF Center (briefly known as the "AEF Management Staff or AMS) was stood

up at Langley Air Force Base in the summer of 1999 to help manage transformation of

19 the USAF into its new Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) organization, and subsequently

to manage rotating AEF deployments.

According to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-400 of 01 October 1999,

"Expeditionary Aerospace Force Planning," the AEFC is the centralized management

team that prepares AEF force packages for: (i) steady-state rotations (like Operation

SOUTHERN WATCH and Operation NORTHERN WATCH); for (ii) on-call (crisis

response) Aerospace Expeditionary Wing (AEW) operational requirements; and for (iii)

escalation to surge or full-scale major theater war (MTW) operations with subsequent

return to steady-state operational levels.

The AEFC facilitates AEF/AEW management and administrative tasks to

include: AEF/AEW preparation for a given tasking and location;

providing AEF/AEW continuity; assisting the sourcing of forces

(UTCs/individuals) for USAF component requirements using MAJCOMapproved schedules; developing unit preparation and training templates;

guiding all aspects of AEF/AEW planning, to include TPFDD refinement

20 and DRMD preparation; and monitoring AEF/AEW readiness.

For purposes of this study, we can infer that AEFC's role in diplomatic preparation

and diplomatic sustainment of AEF deployments follows implicitly from the functions

italicized above. "Preparation for a given . . . location" may be seen to include

facilitating diplomatic access and host-nation cooperation/assistance. These objectives

are in turn abetted by "unit preparation and training templates."

It is correct to say that the Aerospace Expeditionary Force Center is a work in

progress in the sense that its stipulated roles and functions - and the most efficient and

effective ways to fulfill them - were being refined as the first complete cycle of paired

21 AEF rotations proceeded through the calendar year 2000. Diplomatic preparation and

sustainment of AEF deployments are similarly being refined as part ofthe larger process

of inventing the AEFC. Responsibilities for expeditionary diplomacy are also being

19 In this transformation role, AEFC briefly shared responsibilities with Air Staff Directorate XOPE, which

went out of existence in the Spring of2000.

20 Italics added. AFI 10-400, p. 13. Acronyms not explained in the quotation are: UTCs (unit type codes);

MAJCOM (major command); TPFDD (time-phased force and deployment data); and DRMD (Deployment

Requirements Manning Document).

21 For example, AEFs 9 and 10 were scheduled to be on call during the period 01 September - 30

November 2000. Two ofthe ten AEFs are successively on call for three-month periods (along with one of

the two designated AEWs and one ofthe five Lead Mobility Wings). AEFs are "buckets of capabilities"

from which elements can be drawn to fit the requirements of particular operations. After their three-month

periods of being on call or deployed, AEFs continue through the balance of their now standard 15-month

cycles which include periods of maintenance, training, and preparations for their next on-call/deployment

period.

8
shared with other commands - both administrative and operational. That said, an

inventory of expeditionary diplomacy focal points within the AEFC can be identified at

this stage ofthat organization's evolution.

EAF Online

"Preparation and training" for different locations - or, more to the point, destinations

- is assisted by the availability on a multi-purpose web site of information that includes

coverage of geopolitical issues and host country characteristics, as well as links to lessons

learned from previous rotations and links to related information sources. This web site,

"EAF Online" can be accessed through "dot mil" and "dot gov" locations at

22 " https://aefcenter.acc.af.mil/eafonline. Other web sites on NIPRNET (non-classified but

sensitive internet protocol router network) and SIPRNET (secret internet protocol router

network) are referenced in deployment guides and special instructions (SPINS) originated

by the AEFC.

Comprehensive evaluation ofthese expanding sites is beyond the scope ofthis study,

but they give the impression of heavy emphasis on operational and logistical matters,

rather than geopolitical and diplomatic issues. In principle, however, such sites are also

potentially very useful in displaying the sort of information that can help to sensitize

deploying airmen to host-country cultural environments, as well as to diplomatic hazards

and opportunities.

AEFC Lessons Learned

The AEF Center has three sequential responsibilities: to prepare AEFs for

deployments; to monitor them while deployed, and to follow up deployments with a view

toward providing continuity between AEFs. The third responsibility is abetted by an

AEFC Lessons Learned archive accessed through the Center's web site. Lessons from

the test AEF deployments of the mid-to-late 1990s are available, as well as those since

implementation of the 10-AEF rotational system on 01 October 1999.23 The Air Force

Center for Knowledge Sharing and Lessons Learned (AFCKSLL) and the Joint Center

for Lessons Learned (JCLL) can also be mined for USAF-relevant information.24

Expeditionary diplomacy issues are not addressed as a separate, identifiable

category, but they can be teased out using categories such as diplomatic clearances, force

protection, host-nation relations, local contracting, etc. Measures are in prospect to

optimize the lessons learned function, including adaptation of a universal reporting

system (different formats now are used for different databases) and development of a

23

A new EAF Portal was scheduled to have been launched in March 2001 that would consolidate functions

of the AEFC Web page, EAF Online, and Lessons Learned in one location. ("EAF On-Line" briefing

prepared for the AEF 5/6 Conference, 7 February 2001, POC Capt Kimberly A. Kadryna, USAF, AEFC.)

For a comparative analysis of four test AEFs between 1995 and 1997 and an overview of the 10-AEF

construct, see Dowdy, Testing the Aerospace Expeditionary Force Concept.

ev.i

9

24 These sites, respectively: http://afknowledge.langlev.af.mil/AEFLL and http://icll.iwfc.ifcom.smil.mil.
capability to "push out" lessons learned (as opposed to the current reliance on "pull out'

inquiries).

Prospective Developments

A third initiative under way at AEFC - in addition to the aforementioned EAF

Online web site and the lessons learned system - is the development of a "Commanders'

Playbook" by the continuity cell of the Center. This is a useful vehicle for providing

commanders with the tools they need to carry out their AEF duties and to prepare their

airmen for deployment. While now primarily operational/logistical in content, it has the

potential to address considerations of expeditionary diplomacy. This tool was under

development in 2000. Version one was posted on the web on 01 December 2000, along

with a companion quick reference "Commanders' Checklist."

Finally, possible future initiatives by the AEFC that could facilitate diplomatic

preparation and sustainment of AEFs are the following: prospective partnering with the

USAF's regional orientation program at Hurlburt Field (see below); production of online

cultural instruction: innovative uses of video teleconferencing (VTC); and periodic,

27 scheduled broadcasts of area orientation briefings targeted to deploying personnel.

These and other desirable measures can increasingly be addressed as the more immediate

28 imperatives of EAF implementation find solutions and thus decline in urgency.

Analysis and Recommendations

In its first year of operation, the new AEF Center initiated steps that, taken together,

should prove to be quite useful in preparing Air Force units for the diplomatic challenges

of deployment. In implementing its charter, the AEFC has set up web sites and databases

intended to help fulfill its broader functions. Selectively accessed and utilized, these

repositories of information can yield up information relevant to diplomatic concerns. But

they could be even more useful.

For example, improvements could be made to the "lessons learned" database that

make it more responsive to diplomacy-related key word inquiries. From sampling the

lessons from previous deployments, one suspects, however, that neither the reporting

format nor the typical reporting officer is sensitive to diplomatic-cultural-political factors.

One foreseeable remedy to this particular issue may be increasing the numbers ofForeign

Area Officers in the field as the USAF FAO Program is fully developed. (See below for

additional comments on this topic.)

25 Conversation with Lt Col William Price, USAF, Chief AEFC Analysis Branch, in a visit to AEFC at

Langley AFB by the author on 16 May 2000.

26 Conversation with Capt Kadryna, USAF, at AEFC 16 May 2000 and e-mail communication from Maj

Julie A. Wyzywany, USAF, AEFC, dated 25 January 2001.

Interview ofBrig Gen Edward LaFontaine, USAF, Director, AEF Center Blue Team, 16 May 2000.

10

28 Ibid.
With regard to the EAF Online web site, the political-military content appears to be

primarily descriptive rather than analytical in nature. While knowledge is the beginning

of understanding, "facts" alone are of limited utility in dealing with foreign cultures.

Through consultations with and contributions from recognized area specialists in the Air

Force, DoD generally, other government departments, and/or the world of academe, the

analytical content could be enriched. EAF Online is off to a good start, and it has the

potential for considerable development in pol-mil content.

11
Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program

One of the more promising Air Force-wide initiatives to facilitate overseas

operations has been inauguration of it Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program. Air Force

Instruction (AFI) 16-109 ("Foreign Area Officer Program") of 01 June 1998 provides

guidance for establishing and sustaining the Air Force FAO Program.29 The Deputy

Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) has the policy lead

and directs the FAO Proponent Office (originally established in June 1997), that in turn

manages the FAO Program.

Background

One of the major steps leading to establishment of the Air Force FAO program was

taken at CORONA South 96 when senior USAF leaders directed the Air Force to develop

culturally-aware and foreign-language-proficient officers, stipulating that 10 percent of

the Air Force officer corps should be proficient in a foreign language by 2005.30 By

February 2001, there were 3,104 USAF officers proficient in a foreign language - about

52 percent ofthe 6,000 or so required to constitute ten percent.31

"When Air Force senior officers tasked SAF/IA to establish a service FAO Program,

they were reacting to clear evidence (e.g., DoD and AF Inspector General reports, AF

Process Action Teams recommendations, etc.) that the Air Force needed to do a betterjob

of recruiting, developing, managing, and employing officers with foreign language

proficiency and international affairs expertise. Furthermore, they were responding to the

new, complex global security environment in a post-Cold War world."32 That

environment has been a major factor in influencing the initiative to transform the USAF

into an Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) able to respond to a broad spectrum of

traditional and non-traditional military missions, often as a coalition partner in joint and

combined operations.

29 This program supercedes the USAF Foreign Area Specialist Program (FASP). AFI 16-109 implements

Department of Defense Directive 1315.17 of 22 February 1997 which mandated that each of the services

formalize a FAO program.

30 "History ofthe FAO Program," http://www.hq.af.mil/af/saf/ia/afaao/fao/historv.htm. This so-called "ten

by five" goal has been interpreted by SAF/IA to mean 10 percent of regular officers, and "proficient" has

been defined as 2/2 (or better) on the Defense Language Proficiency Test according to Capt Joseph Pilkus,

USAF, Chief, Global Skills Development, International Airmen Division (SAF/IAA), telephone interview,

23 February 2001.

31 Figures were provided by Capt Pilkus, 20 March 2001 e-mail. "Senior leaders have been briefed that we

have two choices regarding the 10X5 goal," Capt Pilkus writes. "First, we need to plus-up funding to meet

the 10X5 goal OR, without funding, we WILL NOT meet the goal until 2010."

32 USAF FAO Notes, http://www.faoa.org/service/af-faol.html.

12
FAO Roles and Qualifications

Air Force FAOs are expected to play a key role in combined operations by

facilitating communications and understanding among coalition partners. In the words of

the AFI16-109,

the Air Force FAO Program contributes to key aspects of the Air Force

mission by developing a cadre of qualified and experienced line officers

who possess foreign language competency and regional expertise essential

for effective interaction with foreign militaries and organizations. FAOs

ensure productive engagement with partners and allies across the range of

operations, including support of Air Force participation in contingency

operations.33

Selection for award of the "qualified FAO" 16F3X Air Force Specialty Code

(AFSC) by an FAO selection board is based on three principal criteria, (i) The

cornerstone of the FAO Program is foreign language proficiency. A minimum of 2/2

must be scored on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT).34 Further, scores

must be current as ofthe most recent test cycle, (ii) Qualifying officers must also possess

a graduate degree in foreign area studies or international relations, (iii) Finally, and

possibly in lieu of a graduate-level area studies degree, significant overseas professional

experience is a qualifying factor, depending on the nature and scope of that experience.

Requirements for an "entry-level FAO" (16F1X AFSC) are not as stringent as those for

16F3X.35 Applicants must be line officers already qualified in their primary AFSC

before seeking an FAO AFSC, which, when awarded, cannot be an officer's primary

AFSC.36 It is, instead, a "career broadening code."

Education and Training

In contrast to the Army FAO program, there is no formal USAF training pipeline.

FAO candidates are drawn from the pool of officers who are already capable in a foreign

language at a 2/2 level, with a Masters Degree in an area studies-type academic program

and/or significant overseas experience. However, once awarded an FAO AFSC, officers

are then eligible for qualifications enhancement opportunities. Language and Area

Studies Immersion (LASI) provides officers who have at least a 1/1 on the DLPT in

select critical languages an opportunity to spend one month in country studying that

language.37

33 AFI 16-109, paragraph 1.2.

34 The DLPT consists ofthree categories on a scale of zero to 3, with plusses. A "2/2" means proficiency

in listening and reading, respectively. The third category is speaking, as determined by OPI (oral

proficiency indicator) standards. A "3/3/3" would indicate true fluency. Note that the 16F3X AFSC

requires listening and reading proficiency, but not speaking proficiency. (Information provided by Capt

Pilkus, SAF/IAA.)

35 A 1+/1+ on the DLPT is required. (Capt Pilkus, SAF/IAA)

36 Contents ofthis paragraph are from "Criteria," http://www.hq.af.mil/af/saf/ia/afaao/fao/criteria.htm.

37 "Frequently Asked Questions," http://www.hq.af.mil/af/saf/ia/afaao/fao/faq.htm.

13
A new Area Studies Advanced Program (ASAP) affords FAOs an opportunity to

conduct academic research in their regions of expertise. Applications must be approved

by a selection board and, at the completion of overseas field work, the officer must

submit a research paper of high quality. Program costs are expected to average $6,000

for 30 days oftravel. 8

Maintenance offoreign language proficiency is an individual responsibility. Officers

who have at least a 2/2 on the DLPT may qualify for Foreign Language Proficiency Pay

(FLPP). In addition to maintaining language skills, FAOs must stay up to date on

pertinent U.S. political, economic, and military objectives, as well as the current politicalmilitary situation within their region of speciality.39 Pol-mil currency may be facilitated

by attending regional seminars at the State Department's Foreign Service Institute

(FSI),40 or by attending the USAF Special Operations School (USAFSOS) at Hurlburt

Field, Florida. (See discussion below.)

Analysis and Recommendations

Of all the initiatives currently under way, the USAF FAO Program arguably has the

most promising long-term potential to serve the needs of expeditionary diplomacy. It is

offto a good start, with several hundred officers having qualified for the FAO Specialty

Code.41 Whether the Program achieves its potential, however, is an open question. There

is evidence to suggest that the Air Force has not yet invested a sufficient degree of

commitment to assure success of the FAO Program. One indicator of increased

commitment will be mandated change in the Air Force personnel system. Tracking FAO

qualifications and assigning FAOs to appropriate billets are ongoing challenges. As of

this writing, the operative Air Force Instruction, AFI 16-109 of 01 June 1998, was under

revision. It remains to be seen whether the revisions, when published, will represent a

greater or lesser degree of commitment to the Program, or whether they will incorporate

any ofthe changes ofthe sort recommended in this study.

The Program, as described above and elaborated in AFI 16-109, suffers from at least

two serious weaknesses in the opinion of this analyst: (i) it stipulates that the FAO

AFSCs cannot be an Air Force officer's primary specialty code; and (ii) it provides no

formal USAF training for officer development into qualified FAOs.

The fact that officers must still compete for promotions within their primary AFSCs

seems to ratify and re-institutionalize the disincentives for career-minded officers to seek

a succession of FAO assignments or to devote themselves whole-heartedly to a career as

38 Information on ASAP is from http://www.hq.af.mil/af/saf/ia/afaao/fao/asap.htm.

39 AFI 16-109, paragraph 2.3.1.

40 "Professional Continuing Education (PCE) at the Foreign Service Institute," http://www.hq.af.mil/af/

saf/ia/afaao/fao/pcefsi.htm. The FAO Proponent Office will fund all cost associated with attendance.

41 According to SAF/IAA figures, between 750 and 800 officers have applied for FAO AFSCs and 448 had

been accepted by March 2001. Most are captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels. Thirty-nine percent

were intelligence officers; 13 percent were pilots. (Information is from Col Anthony A. Aldwell, USAF,

Chief, SAF/IAA, briefing to EUCOM J-l, 06 March 2001.)

14
true area specialists. Only those officers placing a low priority on achieving maximum

promotion potential are likely to commit enthusiastically to a FAO career - or even to

apply in the first place for a FAO AFSC.

And, by providing no direct instruction or assistance to officers seeking to qualify as

FAOs, the Air Force is left to choose from the pool of officers who have achieved

qualifications on their own and have chosen to apply. Put another way, the Air Force is

not "growing" FAOs; it is only "anointing" already-qualified officers who happen to

apply. Obviously, this is not the optimal way to develop a corps of regionalists attuned

from the beginning oftheir specialist development to the needs ofthe Expeditionary Air

Force.

The outlines of remedies to the two programmatic weaknesses described above

are easy to trace, (i) Create a separate primary FAO AFSC, thus a FAO career path with

its own built-in promotion incentives and opportunities. If necessary, due to the small

size ofthe AFSC pool, promote a high percentage oflong-serving (and deserving) FAOs,

based on much the same rationale that higher percentages of physicians (in comparison to

line officers) are promoted - namely, that the billets are available (e.g., attache billets)

and that retention of these specialists is an important consideration, (ii) The Air Force

should grow its own FAOs. Identify captains 2 who have the aptitude and interest and

send them to graduate school full time for a master's degree in international relations or

area studies, and for language study in a high-priority language (e.g., Chinese, Farsi,

Arabic, etc.). Once they have qualified for the FAO AFSC, then round out their

development with the programs now offered to "walk-on" FAOs. This sports analogy is

suggestive: the USAF should emphasize recruitment and development of "scholarship"

FAO candidates, while still accepting a certain percentage ofwell-qualified walk-ons. As

now constituted, the Air Force FAO Program is wholly dependent on "walk-on"

candidates.

Once a sizeable corps of well-qualified FAOs is established - and, indeed, during its

establishment - desirable billets can be identified, created, and filled.43 One can envision

that this would make a dramatically positive contribution to the needs ofthe Air Force in

the area of expeditionary diplomacy. The following initiatives may then be worthy of

consideration, (i) Start with placement ofmore and better-qualified attaches and assistant

attaches at all important American Embassy locations, (ii) Create billets for, and appoint

FAOs as, political-military affairs advisors at multiple command levels within the EAF

construct, including MAJCOMs, Component Commands, Lead Wing Commands, etc.

(iii) Assign FAOs in such a way as to insure that an appropriate regionally-qualified,

language-qualified FAO deploys with all AEF Aerospace Expeditionary Task Forces

42 Recruiting officers with four or more years in an alternative Air Force career field, officers with

predominately line AFSCs, will insure that FAOs are well "blued" before becoming regionalists, thus

capable ofworking knowledgeably and effectively with line officers in their subsequent assignments.

43 As of early 2001 there were 153 billets coded for FAOs, of which 108 were attache billets. A billet

conversion is underway in early 2001 to convert 16Ps (political-military advisors) to 16Fs (FAOs). If full

conversion of 16Ps is achieved, FAO billets would then number 250-300. (Capt Pilkus, SAF/IAA)

15
(ASETFs).44 (iv) Assign FAOs to school-house tours on the faculties of Air Command

and StaffCollege (ACSC), Air War College (AWC), etc.45

Other ideas for possible incorporation into the USAF FAO Program:

• Assign FAOs to one-to-two year tours in appropriate bureaus of the Department of

State (DoS). This would not only enhance regionalist credentials, but also provide

professional contacts in DoS and insights into the interagency process and DoS

institutional culture.

•

•

Recruit naturalized native speakers of designated high-priority languages into the

USAF and into the FAO Program. Air Force ROTC, Officer Training School (OTS),

and the USAF Academy could all be instrumental in this regard. True fluency in

some strategically critical languages is virtually impossible to achieve by non-native

speakers - certainly not without years offormal study that would not be cost effective

for the Air Force.4

Develop a separate but complementary enlisted linguists program with training,

proficiency pay ("pro-pay"), and assignment incentives. Most enlisted linguists are

now utilized almost exclusively in cryptology. Enlisted linguists in a variety of other

specialty codes could be particularly valuable in foreign cultural contexts where

officers would not be as fully accepted.47 Such enlisted linguists would have the

language abilities and the overseas experience, but not necessarily the post-graduate

degree qualifications, of FAOs. They might instead offer a variety of operational

skills that are rare among officers.

Offer enhanced language pro-pay rewards for both officers and enlisted for

designated high priority languages and designated levels of fluency.4This would be

a hedge against losses to the outside economy. For retention purposes, these highly

qualified and high-value individuals should be offered as high a level of financial

incentives as now enjoyed by rated officers.

44 The rotation of FAOs periodically through operational assignments should keep them attuned to the

needs of USAF operators as well as enhance their ability to "talk the talk" with foreign contemporaries.

(This latter point was made by Capt Michael A. Oren, Chief, Mobility Forces and Programs, Headquarters,

Pacific Air Forces, in comments on an earlier draft ofthis study.)

45 ACSC, AWC, and other Air Education and Training Command (AETC) schools have not been

heretofore discussed in this study, but, in any reckoning of Air Force assets contributing to preparation for

responsibilities of expeditionary diplomacy, these and other Professional Military Education (PME)

institutions must be included. Regional studies are incorporated into the various curricula, and the Air War

College continues to include regional field trips as a major feature of its academic year. In this context,

continued funding of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program is essential.

IMET underwrites participation of many of the International Officers (IOs) attending ACSC and AWC

each year.

46 Spanish, German, French, and Russian language skills predominate among Air Force FAOs. (SAF/IAA)

47 Maj S. J. Moree, USAF, recommends the use of non-commissioned officer linguists in all deploying

Security Forces units. ("USAF Security Forces and Foreign Language Skills in the Global Environment:

Are We Prepared?" Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and StaffCollege Research Report, April 1999.)

48 Strategically critical/high priority languages such as Arabic, Farsi, and Chinese are not well represented

among USAF FAOs. (SAF/IAA)

16
• Open up Air Force tuition assistance (now limited to degree-granting institutions) to

non-degree-granting, but nevertheless highly effective, language schools. And plusup language training funding in order to meet the "ten by five" goal.49

• Mandate more rigorous foreign language requirements in Air Force officer accession

programs, principally the Air Force Academy and Air Force ROTC.50

A greater level of commitment by the U.S. Air Force to its FAO Program,

incorporating some of the above, or similar, recommendations, would be an indication

that Air Force leadership recognizes how vital regional (including linguistic) expertise is

to the success ofthe EAF concept and culture - and how challenging it is to develop and

retain such expertise. Without effective expeditionary diplomacy, AEF operations will

not be fully successful - indeed, may not occur at all. And without a strong FAO

program, expeditionary diplomacy will almost certainly be less effective.51

49 This need was indentified by Capt Pilkus, SAF/IAA. See also note 32.

50CaptPilkus.

51 As one commentator on an earlier version of this study observed, the U.S. armed forces might be well

advised to take a joint approach to FAO development and assignment. "The U.S. military ought to have a

pool of qualified FAO pol-mil officers from across the services that can . . . interface and work together as

a team. Training and qualification standards should be identical and a good dose ofjoint doctrine along

with country/region specific knowledge is a must.... cross-service tours could be implemented." (Maj

David H. Dahl, USAF, East Asia Desk Officer, PACAF, 29 March 2001 e-mail to study author)

17
USAF Special Operations School (USAFSOS)

The curriculum taught at Hurlburt Air Force Base deserves prominent mention in

this study, both as an example of what the Air Force is now doing to prepare AEF

personnel for deployment diplomacy, and because it is suggestive of how pol-mil

currency and cultural awareness can be enhanced, not only for FAOs but also for AEF

personnel generally.

The USAF Special Operations School became a reporting unit of the newlyestablished Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) on 22 May 1990.52 The

USAFSOS teaches about 80 classes a year representing approximately two dozen formal

courses. It also offers about 25 off-station tutorials. The curriculum includes both

thematic courses - e.g., Dynamics ofInternational Terrorism, Intro to Special Operations,

Revolutionary Warfare, and Cross Cultural Communications - and regional orientation

courses on Asia-Pacific; Latin America; Russia, Central Europe, and Central Asia; SubSaharan Africa; and the Middle East. "The goal of each orientation course is to provide

students with a basic and introductory level of understanding of the historical, political,

military, economic, religious, and cultural dynamics of the region as a foundation for

application in current or future planning or operations."

While in theory it would be desirable to send all deploying AEF personnel through

USAFSOS, it is, of course, impossible for numerous reasons. The School may thus be

seen as one of the solutions to the need to prepare AEF personnel for the practice of

deployment diplomacy.

Analysis and Recommendations

The most compelling recommendation regarding Hurlburt is that the Special

Operations School should keep on doing what it is doing in the way of regional

orientation courses and related thematic offerings. American citizens in general are

likely to remain largely uninterested in and uninformed regarding peoples and events

beyond our shores. However, it is increasingly incumbent on USAF personnel, as they

move to engagement operations and away from the main operating bases characteristic of

the Cold War, to strive for a genuine understanding of foreign peoples and cultures in

forward locations where they deploy and operate. By most accounts, the USAF Special

Operations School has been performing a valuable service in promoting such

understanding - a service that could be made more valuable by offering more ofit.

52 The institutional roots of USAFSOS extend back to April 1967 and activation ofthe USAF Special Air

Warfare School. As of this writing, plans were in the works for transformation of USAFSOS into the

"Joint Special Operations University."

53 This quotation is from the following web site: http://www.hq.af.mil/af/saf/ia/afaao/fao/afsos.htm.

Other information on USAFSOS is from http://www.hurlburt.af.mil/usafsos/.

18
That said, three related recommendations may also be worthy of consideration: (i)

fill future school quotas with the objective uppermost of maximizing the cultural

awareness and political sensitivity of personnel most likely to deploy within the AEF

rotation; (ii) consider customizing a larger portion ofthe curriculum to the region-specific

practical needs of personnel who will actually deal with host-nation counterparts on a

day-to-day basis; and (iii) consider offering regional advanced courses to FAOs and

prospective deploying commanders that go beyond the "orientation" level ofinstruction.

19
Air Mobility Warfare Center (AMWC)

One ofthe more promising recent initiatives aimed at preparing the USAF in general

and Air Mobility Command (AMC) in particular for challenges requiring expeditionary

diplomacy is the 12-day Deployed Commander and Staff Course (DCSC) offered at Ft.

Dix, New Jersey.

Taught seven times a year under auspices ofthe Phoenix Readiness Program ofthe

Air Mobility Warfare Center, the DCSC includes blocks of instruction on the

roles/capabilities of American Embassies abroad, on dealing with non-governmental

organizations (NGOs), and on the United Nations. Geared to the role of Lead Mobility

Wings in Humanitarian Relief Operations (HUMROs), the course is divided about 50-50

between classroom and field exercises. The latter include role-playing interactions with

host-country officials that incorporate diplomatic challenges arising from cultural

differences.

The Phoenix Readiness Program as of June 2000 included 15 courses in addition to

the Deployed Commander and Staff Course, all intended to prepare support and security

personnel for various aspects of expeditionary force deployments. Typically, over half of

the Phoenix Readiness students have been from AMC, but Air Combat Command (ACC)

and sister services - even the U.S. Coast Guard - have sent students.55 The Phoenix

Readiness Program brings in "mentors" who have experienced "real world" deployments,

and it circulates survey forms to deployed forces for feedback on the relevance of the

Program curriculum.56

Analysis and Recommendations

While the DCSC offers only three blocks of instruction on topics directly related to

deployment diplomacy, it is unique in recognizing the need for such course content and

innovative in the field exercise portion ofthe course, which includes foreign culture roleplaying. The Deployed Commander and Staff Course has a current maximum throughput of around 245 students annually.57 The obvious need is for more instruction in this or

other Air Mobility Warfare Center courses on the cultural/political challenges of

expeditionary operations.

54 The Phoenix Readiness Program was established at Ft. Dix in November 1999 under auspices ofthe 421st

Ground Control Combat Readiness Squadron, according to Lt Col William Paliwoda, the 421st Deputy

Commander. DCSC content information was provided by Lt Col Paliwoda (telephone interview, 28 June

2000). Additional information on Phoenix Readiness and the Deployed Commander and Staff Course can

be accessed through the following web site: http://www.amwc.af.mil.

55 Lt Col Paliwoda discerns "a fairly strong undercurrent . . . leaning toward making PR [Phoenix

Readiness] an AF-wide course rather than just an AMC course." (e-mail correspondence with author, 19

January 2001)

56 Information in this paragraph was provided by Lt Col Paliwoda.

57 Lt Col Paliwoda, e-mail correspondence, 19 January 2001.

20
While Air Force MAJCOMs, just exemplified by AMC, play important roles in

expeditionary diplomacy as we have seen, it is the USAF component commands under

geographic Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) that have special knowledge and special

responsibilities relating to their respective regions. U.S. Air Forces Central Command

(CENTAF) is a case in point.

21
U.S. Air Forces Central Command (CENTAF)

CENTAF has in place and under development several initiatives that together

facilitate preparation of designated Air Force units for deployment diplomacy in the

Central Command area of responsibility (AOR). Political-military information is being

made available through four mediums: traveling "road-show" briefings; a CENTAF

SIPRNET site; compact disks (CDs); and hardcopy packages prepared by the CENTAF

political-military affairs advisor.

Traveling Briefings

Quarterly "road-show" briefings by CENTAF intelligence personnel at AEF Lead

Wing home bases began in April 2000 and, by early January 2001, had been presented to

AEF 7 at Barksdale Air Force Base, AEF 9 at Cannon, AEF 2 at Dyess, and AEF 4 at

Lakenheath. As ofthis writing, AEF 6 was scheduled for an April 2001 briefing at Shaw.

Advance invitations to the briefings are sent out to appropriate subordinate unit

representatives. On average, about 25 intelligence personnel are trained at each location.

While the Lead Wing hosts the conference, there are usually five to seven bases

represented at each conference. Notifications for the Lead Wing briefings are optimally

issued six months ahead ofthe commencement of on-call status, and the actual briefings

are scheduled about three months ahead of scheduled on-call/deployment periods. While

the content of these pre-deployment briefings has been predominately of an operational

nature, they have typically included a pol-mil update of major issues in the deployment

area concerned.58

Follow-up visits to deployed units in the field are undertaken to evaluate the

usefulness ofthe predeployment Lead Wing briefings described above. AEF 7 elements

were visited in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and AEF 2 in Saudi Arabia in July and

December 2000, respectively. Follow-up debriefs have focused on the relevance of

predeployment briefings, on what information ought to be added or subtracted, and on

what important information should be passed to follow-on deploying units.

Electronic Briefings

Complementing the road-show briefings is display on the CENTAF SIPRNET site of

operational area information of considerable variety and quantity and amenable to

continuous updating. Road-show briefing slides are also posted at that site.

58 The modus operandi of the CENTAF briefing teams was described by Capt Timothy West, USAF,

during an interview by the author at Shaw AFB on 18 May 2000 and in an e-mail to the author dated 06

Feb2001.

22
To make comprehensive and timely information available through another medium,

the CENTAF A2 (intelligence) shop prepares and distributes compact disks to designated

AEF units for each on-call rotation. By February 2001, up to 650 megabites of

information were being passed on in this fashion, including some pol-mil content. Each

succeeding disk contains about three months' worth of updates. One to two hundred

megabites of information is typically gleaned on visits to deployed units.59 Thus, the

concept shows considerable promise, allowing relatively inexpensive and wide

distribution of briefing and background materials to include pol-mil information.

Orientation Notebook

A fourth CENTAF initiative has emerged from the office of the political-military

affairs advisor to the CENTAF Commander in the form of a briefing notebook. This

"AOR Orientation" notebook has been made available in the past mainly to deploying

Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA) personnel, but it has the potential for wider

distribution to appropriate AEF personnel.60 In its January 2000 version, this unclassified

reference book contained: maps; country profiles (including political histories); othernation military rank charts; cultural guidelines; and sections on Islam, Arabic phrases,

and additional information sources including web sites.61 In contrast to the traveling

briefings, SIPRNET information site, and CD distribution, this pol-mil notebook is

almost exclusively concerned with information that facilitates what this study has

described as "deployment diplomacy."

Analysis and Recommendations

CENTAF, in part because it has always been "expeditionary" in orientation, has been

forward-leaning in the provision of information and guidance in matters relating directly

or indirectly to deployment diplomacy. As intimated above, this component command

59 Capt West, e-mail dated 06 February 2001.

60 This area orientation notebook can be considered a lineal descendant of the "Indian Ocean Factbook,"

compiled during the 1960s and 1970s for use by U.S. Navy units attached to the Middle East Force and

other naval units operating in the Indian Ocean. The "Qatar Playbook" resulting from deployments of

AEFs III and IV of 1996-97 is a more narrowly-focused attempt to compile information useful to deploying

units, though with less pol-mil content. (See Dowdy, Testing the Aerospace Expeditionary Force Concept,

pp. 9-14 passim; p. 12.)

62 This notebook, dated 10 January 2000, was compiled by Capt Ricky D. Cox, USAF, then CENTAF

Political-Military Affairs Advisor.

23
may be seen as a useful prototype for initiatives across the Air Force. The traveling road

show, SIPRNET site, updated CD distribution, and feedback collection visits to deployed

units in the Gulf are all worthy of continuation and emulation.

The AOR Orientation notebook produced and distributed by the CENTAF PoliticalMilitary Affairs Advisor is a product that deserves replication in other USAF component

commands. The Pol-Mil Advisor roles at CENTAF involving education, protocol, liaison

with regional officials, etc. exemplify the sorts of contributions that can be made by wellqualified FAOs strategically positioned throughout the Air Force.

24
Section 3

Conclusion and Recommendations

There is considerable evidence, both in rhetoric and in action, that U.S. Air Force

leadership is alert to the diplomatic imperatives associated with expeditionary

operations.62 Taken together, the Air Force-wide, MAJCOM, regional-component, and

school-house initiatives described in this study represent a solid start in coming to terms

with the diplomatic and political challenges of operating into and from numerous farflung locations. However, while many constructive measures are being undertaken, it is

apparent from this study of expeditionary diplomacy that more can be done and should be

done in the area ofpolitical-military preparations.

The shortcoming most apparent to this writer is the absence of any single USAF

organization that has the institutional "big picture" in the area of expeditionary

diplomacy.63 It was not unusual in this writer's experience for one command staff to be

unaware ofthe measures being undertaken by other commands. It follows that no single

authority has developed and implemented an optimized, integrated approach toward

meeting the newly-salient requirement for American airmen to be effective expeditionary

diplomats as well as expeditionary warriors.

The decentralized, ad hoc approaches discussed in these pages have together

contributed to achievement of considerable progress in the preparation of expeditionary

diplomats. Proposals have been offered throughout to make these worthwhile initiatives

even more productive. But the combination ofthese and other approaches is nevertheless

inadequate to the total need because of lack of uniform (and uniformly high) standards,

unavoidable gaps in the coverage and content of educational initiatives, and inefficient

redundancies.

The survey of initiatives described in Section 2 is certainly not comprehensive of all

that is under way in the U.S. Air Force. For example, other component commands, such

as USAFE and PACAF, are beginning to address the requirements of expeditionary

62 This attentiveness starts at the top. Gen Michael E. Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff, has had since August

2000 a State Department Minister-Counselor as his Policy Adviser (POLAD). For details, see Jennifer

Palmer, "Adviser helps Air Force navigate foreign policy maze," Air Force Times, 25 September 2000, p.4.

63 This study has been sponsored by, and written for, the U.S. Air Force in the context of its ongoing EAF

cultural transformation. Obviously, there are crucial inter-service and interagency factors at work that will

abet or frustrate USAF initiatives within the general domain of expeditionary diplomacy. Such factors are

beyond the purview ofthis study.

25
diplomacy.64 CENTAF, arguably the component pacesetter in this field, has been taken

as representative, for reasons having to do as much with the nature of the Central

Command AOR and the fact of ongoing operations in SOUTHERN WATCH, as with the

noteworthy initiatives ofthe CENTAF A2 shop and pol-mil advisor.

Though not comprehensive of all expeditionary diplomacy preparations, the

foregoing survey of initiatives is suggestive of what remains to be done. The general

conclusion flowing from this survey is that "diplomatic preparation" is no longer a

neglected concept as General Cook feared in 1999, but that it can indeed benefit from a

more comprehensive, coherent, and systematic approach.

In a concluding attempt to conceptualize such an approach a notional matrix is

offered below. Along its vertical axis in ascending order of the degree of pol-mil

expertise required are the three constituencies of the USAF that participate in

expeditionary diplomacy: (i) the largest constituency, composed of rank and file airmen

who will deploy abroad during their careers; (ii) the expeditionary commanders at all

command levels and for all unit types; and (iii) the area/regional specialists composing

the Foreign Area Officer "corps." The horizontal axis is the time line, divided into shortterm, medium term, and long-term futures.

64 The two component commands have used similar organizations for establishing an initial forward

presence for a task force: the "Contingency Response Group" (CRG) in the case of USAFE, and the

"Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell" (DJTFAC) in the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).

For a discussion ofthe origins and operation ofthe first CRG, see Gen John P. Jumper, "Rapidly Deploying

Aerospace Power: Lessons from Allied Force," Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 1999, pp. 4-10.

It is not so much the detail as the concept ofthese two early-arriving teams that is instructive to this study.

While stressing operations and logistics, these organizations also have political-diplomatic functions that

may prove to be just as crucial to early success of a deployment. Lt Col Albert "Bull" Mitchum, then

Political-Military Advisor to the USAFE Commander, was aboard the first helicopter ofthe 86th CRG in its

initial deployment to Tirana, Albania in April 1999 during Operation ALLIED FORCE. The 86th on that

occasion also included legal, protocol, psychological operations, and civil-military affairs personnel - in

short, an expeditionary diplomacy package - along with its operational, logistical, and force protection

elements. (Gen Jumper, "Rapidly Deploying Aerospace Power," p. 6, and telephone interview of Lt Col

Mitchum, USAF-ret, 16 March 2001.)

26
Table 1. Facilitating Expeditionary Diplomacy

(Current andProspective Initiatives)

(Hi)

FAOs

(ii)

Expeditionary

Commanders

(all levels,

all unit types)

(i)

Rank and

File Airmen

-LASI(p.l3) ~ Convert to 16Fs to — Establish sufficient

primary AFSCs (p. 15") numbers

-ASAP (p. 14) — Fill needed

~ Recruit specialities

-- Convert 16Ps to 16Fs "Scholarship — Establish billets in

(footnote 44) Candidates" (p. 15) key locations

— Fix personnel

~ Attract more applicants ~ Language School system

— Establish career

patterns

--USAFSOS(p.l8) --"Push-out" lessons ~ FAOs on staff

- DCSC (p.20) learned system (p. 10) — Multiple

-- EAF Online (p.9) — PME Continuum deployments

-CC Playbook (p. 10) ofEducation — PME Continuum

— Component Cmd briefs ~ Developing Aero- ofEducation

space Leaders (DAL) ~ DAL (footnote 69)

-- USAFSOS ~ In-country — Multiple

experience deployments

~ EAF Online - Self-study

- CCAF — Mentoring

~ Component Cmd and — Undergraduate

Lead Wing briefings degree programs 1

Short Term

Time,

Medium Term Long Term

->

Hierarchical

Constituencies

(by degree of

knowledge required)

27
The matrix is meant to be reflective of current initiatives as well as suggestive, not

comprehensive, of what needs to be done - and in what context and sequence. The

fundamental question remains of who should be in charge. Since building "expeditionary

diplomats" is in its essence an education and training function - education at the FAO

and commander levels, training at the rank and file level65- it would arguably make

sense to put Commander, Air Education and Training Command (AETC) in charge.

Four-star horsepower would be indicative of the high priority attached to the

enterprise. Existing AETC assets - schools and instructors and distance learning

programs - could be leveraged to build both knowledgeable warriors and knowledgeable

regionalists. Commander, Air University, has already designated among his current

priorities the integration of AEF and regional studies into the "Continuum of

Education"66 that begins with the new Aerospace Basic Course and proceeds through

Squadron Officer College, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College levels.

Putting AETC/CC - or an alternative four-star commander - in charge would not

foreclose continued reliance on centers of current initiative such as the AEF Center and

component commands like CENTAF.

SAF/IA would continue to manage and promote the FAO Program - hopefully with

increased resources and a more productive partnership with the Air Force Personnel

Center in matching qualified FAOs to appropriate billets. A plussed-up FAO cadre

might, for example, usefully send regional specialists to two- or three-year school-house

faculty tours to share their expertise with prospective commanders67 and to "re-blue" the

FAOs themselves by proximity to operators and other Air Force specialties.

A robust Foreign Area Officer Program with increased numbers, carefully recruited

language and area specialties, strategically located billets, and attractive career incentives

to keep FAOs on board for full careers is, in the view ofthis writer, the linchpin to longterm success in addressing the diplomatic imperatives of USAF expeditionary operations.

65 Senior non-commissioned officers, as with most enterprises, will serve as crucial facilitators of both

educational and training objectives.

66 Lt Gen Lance W. Lord, Commander Air University, "Air University Shortbursts" command briefing

dated 21 February 2001, AU/CC Priorities slide.

FAOs in PME instructor billets could prove to be key players in the nascent "Developing Aerospace

Leaders" (DAL) initiative of the Air Force Chief of Staff. For more on the DAL project and how it

potentially relates to the challenge of producing more geostrategically astute expeditionary leaders, see

James M. Smith, "Expeditionary Leaders, CESfCs, and Chairmen: Shaping Air Force Officers for

Leadership Roles in the Twenty-First Century," Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 2000.

28
SelectedBibliography

Articles, Papers, and Briefings

AEFC Deployment Guide for AEFs 7 and 8 Planning Conference, CY 2000.

AEFC Special Instructions (SPINS) for AEFs 9 and 10, CY 2000.

Air Force Instruction 10-400. "Expeditionary Aerospace Force Planning." 01 October

1999.

Air Force Instruction 16-109. "Foreign Area Officer Program." 01 June 1998.

Aldwell, Col Anthony A., USAF. Chief SAF/IAA Briefing to EUCOM J-l, 06 March

2001.

Department of Defense Directive 1315.17. "Service Foreign Area Officer Programs."

22 February 1997.

Dowdy, William L. Testing the Aerospace Expeditionary Force Concept: An Analysis of

AEFs I-TV (1995-97) and the Way Ahead. Airpower Research Institute, Research

Paper 2000-01. Maxwell AFB: College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and

Education, CY 2000.

"EAF On-Line." Briefing prepared for the AEF 5/6 Conference 07 February 2000 by

Capt Kimberly A. Kadryna, USAF, AEFC.

Foreign Clearance Guide, http:www.fcg.pentagon.mil.

Haug, Christopher J. "Access Key to AEF Success." Pacific Air Forces News Service,

06 May 1998.

Jehl, Douglas. "U.S. Fighters in Saudi Arabia Grounded." New York Times,

19 December 1998.

Joint Uniform Lessons Learned Report #32831-07299 dated 10/23/96.

Jumper, Gen John P. "Rapidly Deploying Aerospace Power: Lessons from Allied

Force." Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 1999.

Moree, Maj S.J., USAF. "USAF Security Forces and Foreign Language Skills in

theGlobal Environment: Are We Prepared?" Maxwell AFB: Air Command and Staff

College Research Report, April 1999.

Nowak, Lt Col Michael J., USAF. The Air Expeditionary Force: A Strategy for an

Uncertain Future?" The Maxwell Papers No. 19. Maxwell AFB: Air University

Press, September 1999.

"Operating Abroad." Air Force Magazine, December 1998.

"Over Here, Over There." Airman, October 1998.

Palmer, Jennifer. "Adviser helps Air Force navigate foreign policy maze." Air Force

Times, 25 September 2000.

Perry, Charles M., et al. Airpower Synergies in the New Strategic Era. Herndon, VA:

Brassey's Inc., 1997.

29
Smith, James M. "Expeditionary Leaders, CINCs, and Chairmen: Shaping Air Force

Officers for Leadership Roles in the Twenty-First Century." Aerospace Power

Journal, Winter 2000.

Smith, Maj Patrick J., USAF. "Building the Eagle's Nest: Challenges in Basing the Air

Expeditionary Force." Maxwell AFB: School of Advanced Airpower Studies

Thesis, June 1997.

E-Mail Correspondence

Dahl, Maj David H., USAF, East Asia Desk Officer, PACAF, 29 March 2001.

Joy, Lt Col Michael, USAF, Deputy POLAD, PACOM, 19 March 2001.

Oren, Capt Michael A., USAF, Chief, Mobility Forces and Programs, PACAF, 29-30

March 2001.

Paliwoda, Lt Col William, USAF, Deputy Commander, 421st Ground Control Combat

Readiness Squadron, 19 January 2001.

Pilkus, Capt Joseph, USAF, SAF/IAA, Chief, Global Skills Development, International

Airmen Division, 20 March 2001.

Urie, Lt Col Jeffery A., USAF, ACC/XO-AEF, 17 May 2000, with attached briefing.

West, Capt Timothy, USAF, CENTAF A2 Staff, 06 February 2001.

Interviews

Cox, Capt Ricky D., USAF, CENTAF Pol-Mil Affairs Advisor, Shaw AFB, SC,

18May2000.

Frazee, Lt Col David, USAF, ACC/CC Pol-Mil Advisor, by telephone, January 2001.

Kadryna, Capt Kimberly A., USAF, AEFC, Langley AFB, VA, 16 May 2000.

LaFontaine, Brig Gen Edward, USAF, Director, AEFC Blue Team, Langley AFB, VA,

16 May 2000.

Mitchum, Lt Col Albert, USAF-ret, former USAFE Pol-Mil Advisor, by telephone,

16 March 2001.

Paliwoda, Lt Col William, USAF, Deputy Commander, 421st Ground Control Combat

Readiness Squadron, by telephone, 28 June 2000.

Pilkus, Capt Joseph, USAF, SAF/IAA, Chief, Global Skills Development, International

Airmen Division, by telephone, 23 February 2001.

Price, Lt Col William, USAF, AEFC, Chief, Analysis Branch, Langley AFB, VA,

16 May 2000.

Redanz, Maj Robert D., USAF, AEFC, Strategic Airlift, Langley AFB, VA,

16 May 2000.

West, Capt Timothy, USAF, CENTAF A2 Staff, Shaw AFB, SC, 18 May 2000.

Williamson, Col (sei) Carl, USAF, Deputy POLAD, CENTCOM, by telephone,

23 January and 13 February 2001; synopsis by facsimile 14 February 2001.

Web Sites

http://afknowledge.langlev.af.mil/aefll

http://icll.iwfc.ifcom.smil.mil

30
https://aefcenter.acc.af.mil/eafonline

http://www.amwc.af.mil

http://www.faoa.org/service/af-fao 1 .html

http://www.hq.af.mil/af/saf/ia/afaao/fao/afsos.htm

http://www.hq.af.mil/af/saf/ia/afaao/fao/asap.htm

http://www.hq.af.mil/af/saf/ia/afaao/fao/criteria.htm

http://www.hq.af.mi./af/saf/ia/afaao/fao/faq.htm

http://www.hq.af.mil/af/saf/ia/afaao/fao/history.htm

http://www.hq.af.mil/af/saf/ia/afaao/fao/pcefsi.htm

http://www.hurlburt.af.mil/usafsos/

31
The Author

Before joining the Airpower Research Institute in 1998, Dr. William L. (Lee) Dowdy

served four years on the Air War College faculty, three years at the Army War College

(Strategic Studies Institute), and four years active duty as a Regular U.S. Navy Officer

after commissioning at Duke University. He was also a Naval Reserve Intelligence

Officer for over twelve years. Dr. Dowdy has served on the faculties of several

universities, including Dalhousie University (Canada), Lancaster University (England),

and Boston University. He is co-editor of two books: Pulling Back from the Nuclear

Brink: Reducing and CounteringNuclear Threats (with Barry R. Schneider, published by

Frank Cass, London); and The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena (with

Russell B. Trood, Duke University Press and Himalayan Books of India). Dr. Dowdy, a

Masters and Ph.D. graduate of Tulane University, has also published over two dozen

journal articles and book chapters on international security issues.

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful advice of his professional colleagues

in the Airpower Research Institute - Dan Mortensen, Ken Werrell, and Tom Searle. Dr.

Jim Titus, Air University Dean of Research, also read the draft manuscript and provided

valuable suggestions. Col Al Howey, Director of the Airpower Research Institute,

provided a work environment congenial to research and writing.

Special thanks go to Lt Col Gary Lambert, Ops Chief at the AEF Center, for

arranging a briefing session, interviews, and follow-up feedback on early drafts of this

study. Capt Joe Pilkus of SAF/IA also merits special thanks for sharing his

comprehensive knowledge ofthe USAF FAO Program. Capt Tim West at CENTAF was

especially helpful at critical stages of the project. The author wishes to thank for their

systematic review of the manuscript Lt Col Dave Frazee, Pol-Mil Advisor to ACC/CC,

Maj Rob Redanz of AEFC, and Capt Mike Oren of PACAF. Col (sei) Carl Williamson,

Deputy POLAD at CENTCOM, Lt Col Mike Joy, Deputy POLAD at PACOM, Lt Col

"Bull" Mitchum, USAFE Pol-Mil Advisor, Lt Col Bill Paliwoda of the Air Mobility

Warfare Center, Maj David Dahl of PACOM, and Capt Ricky Cox, Pol-Mil Advisor at

CENTAF, were all generous with their assistance and encouragement. Finally, the

technical assistance of Ms. Cathy Parker was greatly appreciated in preparing the

manuscript for publication.

As always, any remaining errors are those ofthe author alone.

33