03 February 2010

Joint Security Operations

in Theater

Joint Publication 3-10
PREFACE 

i 

1. Scope 

 This publication provides doctrine for planning and executing operations to protect a 

joint security area in operational areas outside the homeland. It outlines the joint force 

commander’s (JFC’s) responsibilities and discusses organizational options, and command 

and control considerations across the range of military operations. It focuses on joint 

security operations that are designed to protect bases and lines of communications that 

support joint operations. 

2. Purpose 

 This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other 

JFCs and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides 

military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not 

the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and 

executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort 

in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of 

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of 

these commands, and the Services. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate 

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of 

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of 

a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational 

doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not 
Preface 

ii JP 3-10 

ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational 

command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, 

regulations, and doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

 LLOYD J. AUSTIN III 

 Lieutenant General, USA 

 Director, Joint Staff 
SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-10 

DATED 01 AUGUST 2006 

iii 

• The role of land forces in joint security operations was expanded to include the 

utilization of the US Army’s maneuver enhancement brigades. 

• The discussion of the joint force maritime component commander’s role in joint 

security operations was expanded. 

• Naval expeditionary support force and naval expeditionary support force 

commander terms were changed to maritime expeditionary security force and 

maritime expeditionary security force commander respectively. 

• The language on the naval expeditionary logistics support group was expanded. 

• Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive language was 

replaced to reflect extant chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear language. 

• The term battlespace was replaced with operational environment where 

applicable. 

• Language on the utility of nonlethal weapons for joint security operations was 

added. 

• Mobility corridor was changed to movement corridor consistent with current 

usage. 

• The following terms and definitions were recommended for deletion from Joint 

Publication 1-02: Army base; axial route; base defense zone; combat support 

elements; combat support troops; high-water mark; joint line of communications 

security board; naval coastal warfare; naval coastal warfare commander; 

perimeter defense; and rear area; and rear guard. 

• Publication references were updated. 

• Redundancies were removed and proper references provided. 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-10 

Intentionally Blank 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

v 

 PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................... vii 

CHAPTER I 

 OVERVIEW 

• Introduction ...................................................................................................................... I-1 

• Joint Security Environment ............................................................................................. I-1 

• Joint Security Framework ............................................................................................... I-4 

• Base Functions and Nodes .............................................................................................. I-6 

CHAPTER II 

 COMMAND AND CONTROL 

• Introduction .................................................................................................................... II-1 

• Joint Security Operations Command and Control ....................................................... II-1 

• Roles and Responsibilities ............................................................................................ II-3 

• Establishment of Base and Base Cluster Command Relationships ........................... II-11 

• Operations Centers ...................................................................................................... II-12 

CHAPTER III 

 PLANNING 

• Introduction ................................................................................................................... III-1 

• The Fundamentals of Planning Joint Security Operations .......................................... III-1 

• Joint Security Operations Planning Overview ............................................................ III-3 

• Common Planning Considerations .............................................................................. III-8 

• Other Major Planning Considerations ....................................................................... III-21 

CHAPTER IV 

 SECURITY OF BASES AND BASE CLUSTERS 

• Introduction ................................................................................................................... IV-1 

• Tenets for Joint Security Operations ........................................................................... IV-1

• Base and Base Cluster Operations Overview .............................................................. IV-1 

• Security in Level I and Level II Threat Environments ............................................... IV-3 

• Countering a Level III Threat .................................................................................... IV-12 

• Air Base Defense Considerations .............................................................................. IV-16 

• Seaport Facility Defense Considerations ................................................................... IV-19 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-10 

CHAPTER V 

 LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY 

• Introduction .................................................................................................................... V-1 

• Fundamentals of Lines of Communications Security .................................................. V-1 

• Joint Movement Control ............................................................................................... V-1 

• Security of Lines of Communications .......................................................................... V-3 

• Other Considerations ..................................................................................................... V-7 

APPENDIX 

 A Joint Security Operations Centers .......................................................................... A-1 

 B Sample Base Defense Plan ..................................................................................... B-1 

 C References ............................................................................................................... C-1 

 D Administrative Instructions .................................................................................... D-1 

GLOSSARY 

 Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ........................................................................ GL-1 

 Part II Terms and Definitions .................................................................................... GL-5 

FIGURE 

 I-1 Levels of Threat ................................................................................................... I-2

 I-2 Notional Organizational Structure for Joint Security Operations ...................... I-5 

 I-3 Key Joint Security Area Related Functions/Nodes ............................................ I-6 

 II-1 Joint Security Coordinator Relationships ......................................................... II-5 

 II-2 Army Component Designated as the Joint Security Coordinator .................... II-6 

 II-3 Tenant Unit Commanders’ Responsibilities ................................................... II-11 

 III-1 Fundamentals of Joint Security Operations Planning ...................................... III-1 

 III-2 Levels of Threat Troop Capability Requirements ........................................... III-7 

 III-3 Positioning Considerations ............................................................................. III-19 

 III-4 Types of Host-Nation Security Support ......................................................... III-23 

 III-5 Objectives of Civil-Military Operations in Joint Security Operations ......... III-26 

 III-6 Base Security Considerations: Use of Non-US Contractor Personnel ......... III-29 

 IV-1 Tenets for Successful Joint Security Operations ............................................. IV-2 

 IV-2 Base Boundary Considerations ........................................................................ IV-4 

 IV-3 Base Security Work Priorities .......................................................................... IV-5 

 V-1 Fundamentals of Lines of Communications Security ....................................... V-2 

 V-2 Joint Lines of Communications Security Board ............................................... V-3 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

vii 

• Provides an Overview of Joint Security Environment 

• Describes Command and Control of Joint Security Forces 

• Discusses Joint Security Operations Planning 

• Covers Base and Base Cluster Security Operations 

• Describes Lines of Communications Security 

Overview 

Our National Security 

Strategy, National Defense 

Strategy, and National 

Military Strategy call for 

deployed military units, 

forward-based activities, 

and forward operating 

bases. 

The security environment requires that deployed military 

units, forward-based activities, and forward operating bases 

protect themselves against threats designed to interrupt, 

interfere, or impair the effectiveness of joint operations. 

Base and lines of communications (LOCs) security must 

be properly planned, prepared, executed, and assessed to 

prevent or mitigate hostile actions against US personnel, 

resources, facilities, equipment, and information. 

Joint security areas (JSAs) are increasingly vulnerable to 

enemy forces with sophisticated surveillance devices, 

accurate weapon systems, and transport assets capable of 

inserting forces behind friendly combat formations. 

Levels of Threat Threat activities can be generally described and categorized 

in three levels. Each level or any combination of levels may 

exist in the operational area, independently or 

simultaneously. 

Typical Level I threats include enemy agents and terrorists 

whose primary missions include espionage, sabotage, and 

subversion. Enemy activity and individual terrorist attacks 

may include random or directed killing of military and 

civilian personnel, kidnapping, and/or guiding specialpurpose individuals or teams to targets. 

Level II threats include small-scale, irregular forces 

conducting unconventional warfare that can pose serious 

threats to military forces and civilians. These attacks can 
Executive Summary 

cause significant disruptions to military operations as well as 

the orderly conduct of local government and services. 

Level III threats may be encountered when a threat force 

has the capability of projecting combat power by air, land, 

or sea, anywhere into the operational area. Level III threats 

necessitate a decision to commit a tactical combat force 

(TCF) or other significant available forces to counter the 

threat. This threat level is beyond the capability of base and 

base cluster defense and response forces. 

A JSA is a specific surface area designated to facilitate 

protection of bases. The size of a JSA may vary 

considerably and is highly dependent on the size of the 

operational area, mission essential assets, logistic support 

requirements, threat, or scope of the joint operation. 

Base functions include force projection, movement control, 

sustainment, command and control. Base nodes are air 

bases, airfields, seaports, and sea bases. 

Command and Control 

Unity of command is 

fundamental to effective 

security within the joint 

security area. 

To provide security and unity of command the joint force 

commander (JFC) designates operational areas, selects 

appropriate command structures, and establishes a command 

and control network through multinational, subordinate, and 

adjacent commanders to direct and coordinate the actions of 

components and supporting organizations or agencies. 

The chief of mission (COM) is responsible for the 

direction, coordination, and supervision of all US 

Government executive branch employees in that country 

(except those under the command of a US area military 

commander). Geographic combatant commander (GCC) 

and COM security memorandums of agreement (MOAs) do 

not alter established command relationships, nor relieve 

commanders of responsibility for unit security. The GCC 

has responsibility for all Department of Defense (DOD) 

elements and personnel within that geographic area of 

responsibility (AOR), except those for whom security 

responsibility has been transferred to the COM via the MOA 

process. 

viii JP 3-10 
Executive Summary 

A GCC is ultimately responsible for all military joint 

security operations (JSO) conducted in the AOR. GCCs 

establish AOR-wide force protection measures, procedures, 

and policies for joint forces, family members, DOD civilian 

workforce, and designated government contractor 

employees that are assigned, attached, in-transit, or 

otherwise physically located within their AORs. The 

functional combatant commander coordinates with the 

applicable GCC and/or subordinate JFC to ensure that these 

facilities or bases are adequately secured. Subordinate JFCs 

have the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the 

assigned mission based on their concept of operations and 

provide security of all military bases and LOCs within their 

joint operations area. The JFC dedicates assets for JSO in 

proportion to the severity of the threat in order to conserve 

resources and prevent degradation of support. 

The JFC, normally through a designated joint security 

coordinator, ensures that appropriate command relationships 

among subordinate areas, base, and base cluster 

commanders are established and understood by all affected 

commands. Tactical control is the typical command 

relationship established between the base or base cluster 

commander and the dedicated security force, when the 

attached force is from a different component command. 

Commanders may plan, coordinate, monitor, advise, and 

direct JSOs through joint security coordination centers, rear 

area operations centers, rear tactical operations centers, base 

cluster operations centers, and base defense operations 

centers. 

Joint Security Operation Planning 

Understanding the basic 

fundamentals of joint 

security operations is key to 

the proper execution of this 

challenging mission. 

The fundamentals of JSO planning are as follows:

• Establish clear joint security related command and 

control relationships and responsibilities. 

• Understand the enemy. 

• See the operational environment. 

• Use the defenders’ advantages. 

ix 
Executive Summary 

• Mitigate defenders’ disadvantages. 

• Balance security actions with civil and political 

considerations. 

Base and LOC security should be governed by the factors of 

mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support 

available — time available (METT-T). 

Mission The primary mission of the base is to support joint force 

objectives. Inherent in this mission is the subsidiary 

mission of securing these bases and LOCs from enemy 

action. 

Enemy Every intelligence and counterintelligence resource available 

to the base commander should be used to determine enemy 

capabilities and intentions. 

Terrain and Weather The base commander must make the best use of the terrain 

within the operational area. Commanders analyzing terrain 

must consider all its military aspects, from the standpoints of 

base and LOC function as well as security considerations 

from both a defender’s and enemy’s perspective. 

Weather and visibility conditions can have a significant 

impact on land, air, and maritime operations. Commanders 

should minimize their own vulnerabilities to adverse 

weather conditions and exploit any advantages over enemy 

vulnerabilities. 

Troops and Support 

Available 

There may be some units on a base whose primary missions 

are defense and security. In some cases, the JFC or 

subordinate commander may determine that land combat 

forces, usually platoon to battalion task force level, may also 

be assigned as dedicated base, surface LOC and/or area 

defense forces. In other cases, particularly bases where 

there are limited combat forces, security forces may be 

formed from logistic, transiting units, or other support units. 

Time Available Commanders assess the time available for planning, 

preparing, and executing the mission. They consider how 

friendly or adversary forces will use the time and the 

possible results. Proper use of the time available can 

fundamentally alter the situation. Time available is 

normally defined in terms of the missions and tasks assigned 

and bounded by adversary capabilities. 

x JP 3-10 
Executive Summary 

Planning Considerations In planning for JSO, the following are common 

considerations.

• Force protection. 

• Intelligence. 

• Communications. 

• Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense. 

• Air and missile defense. 

• Threat early warning and alert notification system. 

• Land forces and joint security. 

• Maritime-land interface. 

• Terrain management and infrastructure development. 

• Area damage control. 

• Integration of joint security and logistic operations. 

• Detainee operations. 

Other major planning considerations are host-nation support; 

multinational operations; civil-military operations; 

interagency, intergovernmental organization, and 

nongovernmental organization coordination; DOD civilian 

work force and DOD contractor employees; and laws, 

agreements, and other legal constraints. 

Base and Base Cluster Security Operations 

The joint force commander 

assigns and controls forces 

that are responsible to 

execute base and base 

cluster security operations. 

Key to establishing successful base security is to ensure 

there is a proactive base security posture. Security forces 

must be trained, organized, and equipped to properly 

execute base and base cluster security against Level I and II 

threats, and if required, be prepared to engage Level III 

threats. 

xi 
Executive Summary 

In Level I and II environments, actions against enemy 

threats and other potential emergencies to include natural 

disasters and accidents must be planned for and adjustments 

to base or base cluster security plans made. Base security 

forces should have a high degree of direct-fire lethality to 

cope with potential threats. The mobile security force 

(MSF) should also have access to supporting indirect fires, a 

high degree of tactical mobility and a reasonable span of 

command and control. The MSF commander must have the 

most up-to-date copy of the base defense plan, and, when 

applicable, base cluster defense plan in order to effectively 

coordinate between the base and MSF operations. Control 

measures in base and base cluster security operations are the 

same as those used in defensive operations. The area 

commanders/base cluster commanders coordinate base 

boundaries, establish phase lines, contact points, objectives, 

and checkpoints as necessary to control the base clusters. 

The base boundary is not necessarily the base perimeter, 

rather it should be established based upon the factors of 

METT-T, specifically balancing the need of the base 

defense forces to control key terrain with their ability to 

accomplish the mission. These measures decrease the 

likelihood of fratricide, prevent noncombatant casualties, 

and minimize damage to the property of friendly civilians. 

Perimeter primary positions must be prepared to prevent 

hostile forces from penetrating the base and interfering with 

its primary mission. If not capable of defeating enemy 

threats, the security forces must delay the enemy until 

the MSF can respond. Other base security considerations 

are: direct fire weapon systems; antiarmor weapons; 

indirect fire systems; close air and other aviation support; 

coastal and harbor security support; vulnerability to release 

of toxic industrial materials; barriers, obstacles and mines; 

physical facilities; as well as operations security and 

deception in support of operations security. 

In some operations, there may be a Level III threat. In 

these situations, the JFC must consider and plan for combat 

operations in the JSA. Area commanders assigned a JSA as 

part of their area of operations must develop and organize 

TCFs and/or port security units that are trained, led, and 

equipped to concentrate the necessary combat power at the 

decisive time and place. Defeating Level III threats within 

the JSA will ensure support bases can continue vital 

sustainment operations. 

xii JP 3-10 
Executive Summary 

Level III threats can result from enemy forces infiltrating or 

penetrating friendly positions and moving into the friendly 

operational area, or conducting airborne, air assault, or 

amphibious operations. The designated land force 

commander has several options to deal with the threat. The 

commander may establish a TCF to deal with such a threat; 

designate another force as the on-order TCF; or, accept the 

risk of not having a designated TCF. If required, the 

commander may establish a number of TCFs, in accordance 

with the Level III threat and the JFC’s guidance. 

Lines of Communications Security 

Secure lines of 

communications (LOCs) 

are vital to successful joint 

operations. 

In some operational environments, the greatest risk to joint 

force operations may be the threat to the main supply 

routes from the ports of debarkation forward to the main 

battle area or forward operating bases. 

Fundamentals of LOC 

security. 

Fundamentally, three tenets are noteworthy with regard 

to LOC security. First, LOC security is an operation, not a 

logistic function; secondly, LOC security against Level II 

and Level III threats will require dedicated security force 

capabilities; and third, LOC actions and operations must be 

closely synchronized with joint movement control 

operations. 

The primary threats to movement along ground LOCs in 

Level I and II threat environments are mines, ambushes, 

improvised explosive devices and vehicle-borne improvised 

explosive devices. Improvised explosive devices and 

vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices may incorporate 

chemical or radiological material to create exposure and 

contamination hazards. Level III threats may include risk 

from air and ground conventional force interdiction. Land 

LOCs, rail lines and pipelines may also be vulnerable to 

demolitions, sniper fire, and indirect fire. Both active and 

passive security measures, to include reconnaissance and 

surveillance, should be employed. 

Active measures include cordon security operations that 

support a specific route for a designated period during which 

multiple movements take place. Passive measures include 

capitalizing on security offered by other activities not 

directly related to LOC security. 

xiii 
Executive Summary 

xiv JP 3-10 

Reconnaissance and surveillance should include the terrain 

along the LOCs that the enemy could use to influence the 

joint force’s movement and should take place at irregular 

intervals to avoid developing a regular pattern that an enemy 

force could exploit. 

CONCLUSION 

This publication provides doctrine for planning and 

executing operations to protect a JSA outside the homeland. 

It outlines the JFC’s responsibilities and discusses 

organizational options, and command and control 

considerations across the range of military operations. It 

focuses on JSO that are designed to protect bases and LOCs 

that support joint operations. 
CHAPTER I 

OVERVIEW 

I-1 

“The protection function encompasses a number of tasks, including . . . securing 

and protecting JSAs [joint security areas].” 

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

1. Introduction 

a. Our National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military 

Strategy call for deployed military units, forward-based activities, and forward operating 

bases. The security environment requires that these units, activities, and bases protect 

themselves against threats designed to interrupt, interfere, or impair the effectiveness of 

joint operations. Base and lines of communications (LOCs) security must be properly 

planned, prepared, executed, and assessed to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against US 

personnel, resources, facilities, equipment, and information. 

b. This publication provides guidelines for planning, preparing for, executing and 

assessing operations to protect a joint security area (JSA) outside the homeland. 

Within this publication, these operations will be referred to as joint security operations 

(JSO). JSO provide for the defense of and facilitate force protection (FP) actions for 

designated bases, base clusters, LOCs, and other designated areas. They provide for unity 

of effort and efficient use of constrained resources to maintain a relatively secure 

environment allowing the joint force commander (JFC) and component commanders to 

focus on their primary mission. JSO may entail the participation of host nation (HN) forces, 

to include various police or security forces (SF). The JFC should establish the operational 

framework that best addresses the operational environment while providing for maximum 

flexibility. The designation of a JSA is normally based on the nature of the threat, 

type and scope of the mission, and the size of the operational area.

c. This publication also outlines joint security coordinator (JSC) responsibilities and 

discusses joint security organizational options and command and control (C2) 

considerations. 

2. Joint Security Environment 

a. A geographic combatant commander (GCC) or a subordinate JFC must be prepared 

to protect bases, base clusters, airfields, seaports, sustainment activities and LOCs within 

the operational area. JSAs are increasingly vulnerable to enemy forces with sophisticated 

surveillance devices, accurate weapon systems, and transport assets capable of inserting 

forces behind friendly combat formations. In noncontiguous situations, these forces may 

operate within the operational areas of friendly forces. Standoff weapon threats in the 

form of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mortars, rockets, theater missiles, and 

surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are of particular concern.
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-10 

b. JSAs may be small or may span national boundaries, each with a distinct security 

environment and different policies and resources to address threats. They will normally 

contain units, surface LOCs, and facilities from all elements of the joint force, supporting 

commands, organizations, intergovernmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs), as well as important HN infrastructure. It will often contain the units and facilities 

of one or more multinational partners. Most of these units and facilities are organized into 

bases and base clusters to enhance their effectiveness and security. Vital sea and air LOCs, 

through which the bulk of logistic support flows, have their greatest vulnerability where 

they converge, often times at the aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) or seaports of 

debarkation (SPODs). 

c. Levels of Threat. There are three levels of threat as depicted in Figure I-1. 

These different levels provide a general description and categorization of threat activities, 

identify recommended security responses to counter them, and establish a common 

reference for planning. Each level or any combination of levels may exist in the operational 

area independently or simultaneously. Emphasis on specific base or LOC security 

measures may depend on the anticipated level of threat. This does not imply that threat 

activities will occur in a specific sequence or that there is a necessary interrelationship 

between each level. 

d. Commanders and JSCs must be aware that chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear (CBRN) materials may be used at any level of threat. CBRN materials may be used 

by terrorists or unconventional forces in order to accomplish their political or military 

objectives, or in conjunction with air, missile or other conventional force attacks. 

For additional information on CBRN defensive considerations see Joint Publication (JP) 

3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Environments. 

LEVELS OF THREAT

LEVEL I

THREAT

LEVEL EXAMPLES

Agents, saboteurs, sympathizers, terrorist, civil disturbances

LEVEL II

LEVEL III

Small tactical units, unconventional warfare forces,

guerrillas, may include significant stand-off weapons threats

Large tactical force operations, including airborne, heliborne,

amphibious, infiltration, and major air operations

Figure I-1. Levels of Threat 
Overview 

I-3 

e. While the doctrinal principles and guidelines provided herein are applicable to all 

threats, their primary focus is on Level I and II threats.

(1) Level I Threats. Typical Level I threats include enemy agents and terrorists 

whose primary missions include espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Enemy activity and 

individual terrorist attacks may include random or directed killing of military and civilian 

personnel, kidnapping, and/or guiding special-purpose individuals or teams to targets. 

Level I threat tactics may also include hijacking air, land, and sea vehicles for use in direct 

attacks; the use of IEDs, random sniping, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices 

(VBIEDs), SAMs, and/or individual grenade and rocket propelled grenade attacks. 

Civilians sympathetic to the enemy may become significant threats to US and multinational 

operations. They may be the most difficult to counter because they are normally not part of 

an established enemy agent network and their actions may be random and unpredictable. 

Countering criminal activities and civil disturbance requires doctrine and guidelines that 

differ from those used to counter conventional forces and normally require detailed 

coordination with HN military, security, and police forces. More significantly, based on 

political, cultural, or other perspectives, activities that disrupt friendly operations may be 

perceived as legitimate by a large number of the local populace. Countering Level I 

threats is considered to be part of the day-to-day FP measures implemented by all 

commanders. Key to countering these threats is the active support of some portion of the 

civilian population, normally those sympathetic to US or multinational goals. 

(2) Level II Threats. Level II threats include small scale (described as less 

than company-sized equivalents) irregular forces conducting unconventional warfare 

that can pose serious threats to military forces and civilians. These attacks can cause 

significant disruptions to military operations as well as the orderly conduct of local 

government and services. These forces are capable of conducting well coordinated, but 

small scale, hit and run attacks, IED and VBIED attacks, and ambushes and may include 

significant standoff weapons threats such as mortars, rockets, rocket propelled grenades, 

and SAMs. Level II threats may include special operations forces that are highly trained in 

unconventional warfare. These activities may also include operations typically associated 

with terrorist attacks outlined in the previous paragraph including air, land, and sea vehicle 

hijacking. These forces establish and activate espionage networks, collect intelligence, 

carry out specific sabotage missions, develop target lists, and conduct damage assessments 

of targets struck. They are capable of conducting raids and ambushes. If the JFC assigns a 

base boundary to an installation, sufficient organic forces must exist on that installation to 

deter and defeat Level II forces as defined. 

(3) Level III threats may be encountered when a threat force has the capability 

of projecting combat power by air, land, or sea, anywhere into the operational area. 

Specific examples include airborne, heliborne, and amphibious operations; large combined 

arms ground force operations; and infiltration operations involving large numbers of 

individuals or small groups infiltrated into the operational area, regrouped at predetermined 

times and locations, and committed against priority targets. Air and missile threats to 

bases/base clusters and LOCs may also pose risks to joint forces, presenting themselves 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-10 

with little warning time. Level III threats necessitate a decision to commit a tactical 

combat force (TCF) or other significant available forces to counter the threat. This 

threat level is beyond the capability of base and base cluster defense and response forces. 

3. Joint Security Framework 

a. A JSA is a specific surface area designated to facilitate protection of bases. 

Regional political considerations and sensitivities will influence whether a JSA is 

established. The JSA may be used in both linear and nonlinear operations. Figure I-2 

depicts a notional organizational structure for JSO in which all bases are located in a land 

component commander’s area of operations (AO). 

b. The size of a JSA may vary considerably and is highly dependent on the size of the 

operational area, mission essential assets, logistic support requirements, threat, or scope of 

the joint operation. In linear operations the JSA may be included in, be separate from or 

adjoin the rear areas of the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) or joint force 

maritime component commander (JFMCC) or Service component commanders. 

c. JSAs may be designated where joint forces are engaged in combat operations 

or where stability operations are the primary focus. Providing security of units, 

activities, bases/base clusters, and LOCs located in noncontiguous areas presents unique 

challenges based on the location, distance between supporting bases, and the security 

environment. 

Providing security of units, activities, bases and/or base clusters, and lines of 

communications located in noncontiguous areas presents unique challenges.
Overview 

I-5 

d. JSAs may be established in different countries in the GCC’s area of responsibility 

(AOR). The airspace above the JSA is normally not included in the JSA. This airspace is 

normally governed by procedures promulgated in JP 3-52, Airspace Control. The JSA will 

typically evolve as the operational area changes in accordance with (IAW) requirements to 

support and defend the joint force. A maritime amphibious objective area may precede a 

JSA when establishing a lodgment. A lodgment would normally be expanded to an area 

including existing ports and airfields from which bare base operations could be conducted, 

and then eventually evolve to areas including multiple countries and sea boundaries. 

NOTIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

FOR JOINT SECURITY OPERATIONS

BASE

BASE

BASE

JSA

JSA

JTF

JSA

BASE

II

X

X

X

XXX

X XX

X

BASE

JSA JTF SUST joint security area joint task force Sustainment Brigade

BASE

AIRBASE

XXX

XX

XX

SUST

Figure I-2. Notional Organizational Structure for Joint Security Operations 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-10 

4. Base Functions and Nodes 

 Base functions and nodes include, but are not limited to the items shown in Figure 

I-3 and described below. 

a. Force Projection. Force projection is the ability to project the military instruments 

of national power from the United States or another theater, in response to requirements for 

military operations. It allows the JFC to strategically concentrate forces and materiel to set 

the conditions for mission success. The process of force projection involves the 

mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of the joint 

force. A secure area is vital for the reception of personnel, materiel, and equipment; 

assembling them into units at designated staging sites; moving those units to a destination 

within the operational area; and integrating these units into a mission ready joint force. 

For further information on force projection see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment 

Operations. 

b. Movement Control. Movement control is the planning, routing, scheduling, 

controlling and coordinating of responsibilities for personnel and cargo movement over 

LOCs throughout the operational area. Freedom of movement is critical to the support of 

the joint force and joint movement control must be closely coordinated with JSO. The 

JFC or subordinate JFC normally centralizes transportation movement by designating a 

joint movement center (JMC). The JMC controls intratheater force movement, coordinates 

strategic movements with US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and oversees 

the execution of transportation priorities. Rail terminals, SPODs, APODs and other key 

transportation nodes may be located in a JSA. 

For further information on movement control see JP 4-09, Distribution Operations. 

KEY JOINT SECURITY AREA

RELATED FUNCTIONS/NODES

Force Projection

Movement Control

Sustainment

Command and Control

Airbases/Airfields/Forward

Arming and Refueling Points

Seaports

Sea Bases

FUNCTIONS NODES

Figure I-3. Key Joint Security Area Related Functions/Nodes 
Overview 

I-7 

c. Sustainment. The primary mission of many of the forces in a JSA is to sustain joint 

force operations and forces throughout the operational area. These forces may include any 

number and type of logistic units and include key supply, medical treatment facilities, and 

logistic capabilities provided by contractors. Where possible, medical treatment facilities 

should be situated away from all legitimate military targets to avoid endangerment. The 

Geneva Conventions prescribe the protections applicable to medical treatment facilities and 

their personnel. 

For further information on sustainment see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, as well as other 

applicable 4-series joint publications. 

d. Command and Control. Bases containing C2 capabilities such as major 

headquarters and signal centers are critical installations in a JSA. The loss of this capability 

may have a significant impact on the entire operation. 

e. Air Bases, Airfields, Forward Arming and Refueling Points. Airfields are 

critical nodes and are therefore lucrative targets for attack. Aircraft approach and 

departure corridors and the immediate areas contiguous to the base from which 

threats to aircraft may originate are critically important and a challenging joint force 

security consideration.

f. Seaports. SPODs, seaports of embarkation, and joint logistics over-the-shore sites 

are key nodes often located on a vulnerable seam between the land and naval force 

commander AOs. Therefore, component or subordinate joint force commanders must 

ensure advance coordination for security operations planning that entails C2, 

communications, rules of engagement (ROE), coordination points and responsibility for 

security along LOCs and employment of forces. The JFC and subordinate JFCs ensure that 

port security plans and responsibilities are clearly delineated and assigned. 

g. Sea Bases. The JFMCC normally uses the composite warfare commander construct 

for defense of seabasing operations with principal warfare commanders establishing 

preplanned responses to defend the sea base, as well as sealift, airlift, and connector craft 

within the assigned geographical area. Proximity to the littorals, especially ports and 

harbors and the requirement to respond to threats along boundaries will be of interest to the 

JSC and may require close coordination between the two. The relationship between 

supported and supporting commanders, while similar to those described in Chapter II, 

“Command and Control,” and Chapter IV, “Security of Bases and Base Clusters,” are 

complicated by the multiple tasks that may be assigned to the individual ships. 

Environmental factors and the possibility that the shipping will not remain static may 

complicate defensive planning. 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-10 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER II 

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

II-1 

“Even in friendly territory a fortified camp should be set up; a general should never 

have to say: ‘I did not expect it.” 

The Emperor Maurice 

The Strategikon 

c. 600 AD 

1. Introduction 

Unity of command is fundamental to effective security within the JSA. The JFC 

works toward this end by designating operational areas, selecting appropriate command 

structures, and establishing a C2 network through multinational, subordinate, and adjacent 

commanders to direct and coordinate the actions of components and supporting 

organizations or agencies. C2 authority and responsibilities must be established for the 

units and activities throughout the operational area for the security of the bases and 

base clusters and their supporting LOCs. Operations within the JSA will almost always 

involve interaction with a combination of HN forces, multinational forces (MNFs), 

contractor employees, noncombatants, US country teams, intergovernmental organizations 

(IGOs), and NGOs. This chapter discusses the roles and responsibilities, command 

relationships, operations centers, and requirements for JSO throughout an operational area.

2. Joint Security Operations Command and Control 

a. The JFC will normally designate JSAs to ensure the security of base/base 

clusters and LOCs. The JFC establishes C2 relationships within the operational area, but 

may delegate certain authority to subordinate commanders in order to ensure effective C2 

and to facilitate decentralized execution of security operations. 

b. The JFC may retain control of JSO and may coordinate them through the operations 

directorate of a joint staff (J-3), or he may designate a functional or Service component 

commander with joint security responsibilities. To facilitate JSO, commanders should 

establish a joint security element to coordinate JSO. The individual who normally leads 

a joint security element is referred to as the JSC. 

c. The JSC (or staff element) may establish a joint security coordination center 

(JSCC) using elements from the JSC’s staff and representatives from all components 

operating in the operational area to assist in meeting joint security requirements. 

Component and staff representation will vary IAW mission, forces, and security 

requirements. 

d. Bases/base clusters will normally be established to support joint operations and 

placed under the control of a base commander or base cluster commander. The base 

commander is responsible for security within the base boundary and has a direct interest in 
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-10 

the security of the area surrounding the base. The area commander will establish base 

boundaries in coordination with (ICW) the base or base cluster commander. Base defense 

is accomplished in a coordinated effort by base defense forces providing security within the 

base boundary and other ground or surface forces executing security tasks outside that 

boundary. The base boundary is not necessarily the base perimeter, rather it should be 

established based upon the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and 

support available — time available (METT-T), specifically balancing the need of the 

base defense forces to control key terrain with their ability to accomplish the mission. 

Base boundaries may be dynamic, requiring ongoing coordination due to changing 

METT-T factors over time and host nation limitations. 

e. The JFC may task the land, air, or maritime component commander to provide 

TCFs to counter Level III threats. The JFC also assesses the availability and effectiveness 

of HN contributions to base security. Based on this assessment, the JFC may be required to 

adjust the concept of operations, sequencing, and unit missions. Transportation (ports, 

highway networks, waterways, airfields, and railroads) nodes; C2, intelligence capabilities, 

and existing host-nation support (HNS) and civil considerations all impact how the JSA will 

be organized and operations conducted. 

JOINT SECURITY AREA- 32D ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE 

COMMAND OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM EXPERIENCE 

During the initial phases of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, General Tommy 

Franks, Commander of US Central Command and coalition forces 

designated the land component commander (CFLCC), as the joint 

security coordinator for Kuwait and Northeast Saudi Arabia. He in turn 

designated the Commander, 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command 

(32 AAMDC), as the CFLCC Deputy C3 to coordinate operational 

protection. 32 AAMDC reorganized and augmented it’s staff with military 

police, chemical, engineer, and other key expertise, and served as the 

single point of contact integrating theater level operational protection 

efforts. Commander, 32 AAMDC recommended operational force 

protection priorities to the CJFLCC, led the joint security area (JSA) 

operational force protection board, oversaw high-value asset 

vulnerability assessments of JSA priorities, recommended protection 

measures needed to optimize the joint, interagency, and multinational 

force’s protection stance, and monitored execution and risk mitigation of 

these measures. A coalition operational protection coordination center 

was also established under the 32d to further integrate Kuwaiti and 

coalition efforts. This operation highlighted the need for a single 

commander to standardize force protection conditions and to participate 

in joint protection working groups. The benefits of this structure 

included preventing a single dimensional approaches and ensuring that 

there were no seams in protection. 

Various Sources 
Command and Control 

II-3 

f. The base commander is responsible for security operations and will exercise 

tactical control (TACON) over all forces performing base defense missions within the base 

boundary. This includes both isolated bases and bases with a contiguous joint force area 

commander. The base/base cluster commander will coordinate such operations with the 

joint security element, HN SF, or other agencies as appropriate. 

3. Roles and Responsibilities 

a. US Embassy Representatives

(1) Chief of Mission (COM). The COM is responsible for the direction, 

coordination, and supervision of all US Government (USG) executive branch employees in 

that country (except those under the command of a US area military commander). GCC 

and COM security memorandums of agreement (MOAs) do not alter established command 

relationships, nor relieve commanders of responsibility for unit security. The GCC has 

responsibility for all Department of Defense (DOD) elements and personnel within that 

geographic AOR, except those for whom security responsibility has been transferred to the 

COM via the MOA process. 

(2) Regional Security Officer (RSO). The RSO is the COM’s senior security 

officer and manages programs to assure the security functions of all US embassies and 

consulates in a given country or group of adjacent countries. The RSO works closely with 

the senior defense official/defense attaché (SDO/DATT) to ensure the safety and security of 

DOD elements and personnel for whom the COM has security responsibility. 

(3) Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché. The SDO/DATT is the senior US 

military officer in a foreign country representing the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the GCC. Specific SDO/DATT responsibilities 

for JSO include, but are not limited to the following: 

(a) Function as the single point of contact for JSO for all DOD noncombatant 

command elements that are the security responsibility of the COM. 

(b) In designated countries, and IAW GCC/COM security MOAs, has FP 

responsibility for the in-country combatant command forces. 

(c) Coordinate with JSC on JSO issues. 

(d) Has authority over in-country noncombatant command forces in cases of 

emergency wherein US national/or DOD interests are involved and the urgency of the 

situation precludes referral up the chain of command to the GCC. 

(e) ICW the COM and RSO, initiate combined JSO planning with the HN 

and coordinate execution of these operations with the COM, GCC, through the JSC and 

ICW the JFC. 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-10 

(f) Perform additional joint security responsibilities and duties as assigned by 

the GCC. 

b. Department of Defense

(1) Geographic Combatant Commander. A GCC is ultimately responsible for 

all military JSO conducted in the AOR. The GCC, through the JSCC or similar 

organization, coordinates JSO through the SDO/DATT with the COM as appropriate. 

GCCs establish AOR-wide FP measures, procedures, and policies for joint forces, 

family members, DOD civilian workforce, and designated government contractor 

employees that are assigned, attached, in-transit, or otherwise physically located 

within their AORs. In addition, the GCCs provide support for interagency, IGO, NGO, 

and HN activities to enhance security for US forces, US citizens, and HN citizens. These 

responsibilities include maintaining the security of the command and protecting bases, 

LOCs, and critical HN infrastructure upon which the GCC depends against attack during 

on-going military operations. GCCs must ensure that subordinate staffs and/or commands 

are formally designated with the authority to conduct JSO. 

(2) Functional Combatant Commanders (CCDRs). Elements of functional 

combatant commands providing support to the operational area, such as USTRANSCOM 

and US Special Operations Command, may establish facilities or occupy bases within the 

operational area. The functional CCDR coordinates with the applicable GCC and/or 

subordinate JFC to ensure that these facilities or bases are adequately secured. 

Command and coordination relationships between those elements and the area or base 

commanders subordinate to the JFC will be defined by orders or MOA. Coordination must 

include sharing of intelligence information, because supporting operations of functional 

CCDRs are often planned outside the operational area. 

(3) Subordinate Joint Force Commander. Subordinate JFCs include the 

commanders of subordinate unified commands and joint task forces (JTFs). Subordinate 

JFCs have the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on 

their concept of operations. Subordinate JFCs provide security of all military bases and 

LOCs within their joint operations area (JOA). The subordinate JFC conducts joint security 

planning, risk assessment, and force allocation; assigns AOs; and designates LOCs. They 

do this by either ensuring that the joint security coordination authority duties are clearly 

assigned to a formally designated JSC or embedding the authority in the J-3 staff. 

(4) Joint Security Coordinator. Establishing and maintaining JSO throughout 

the operational area, although vital to the survivability and success of the joint force, is an 

economy of force mission. The JFC dedicates assets for JSO in proportion to the severity 

of the threat in order to conserve resources and prevent degradation of support. This 

function is normally vested in the JFC’s staff or with a component commander with the 

capability to perform the function. In a low-threat environment, the JFC will normally 

designate JSC responsibilities within the joint staff (e.g., J-3). In this environment, the 

inherent defensive capabilities of bases, units, or HN forces are generally adequate to deter 

the threat. In high-threat environments, the JFC normally designates a JSC to provide 
Command and Control 

II-5 

a dedicated focus on JSO within the JSA(s). Under these circumstances, the JFC 

normally designates a component commander with the appropriate capabilities and force 

structure to perform this function. The JFC considers mission requirements, force 

capabilities, the nature of the operating environment, and the threat in making the 

designation. Figures II-1 and II-2 depict notional operational area C2 networks, with 

options for the selection of the JSC. 

(a) The JSC coordinates the overall security of the JSA(s) IAW JFC 

directives and priorities. The JSC coordinates with appropriate commanders on security 

issues to facilitate sustainment, HNS, infrastructure development and protection, in addition 

to movements of the joint force. The JSC’s overall coordination responsibility for security 

of the JSA(s) does not lessen the responsibility that component elements residing or 

operating in the operational area have for their own security. The JSC also assist 

commanders establish reliable intelligence support and practice terrain management within 

their operational area with due consideration of security requirements. The JSC establishes 

secure and survivable communications with all forces and commands operating in or 

transiting the JSA(s). The JSC normally coordinates security requirements and priorities 

JOINT SECURITY COORDINATOR RELATIONSHIPS

JOINT FORCE COMMANDER

AREA

COMMAND

COMPONENT

COMMAND

JOINT

SECURITY

COORDINATOR OPCON

TACON

Coordination Authority

OPCON

TACON

- operational control

- tactical control

ISOLATED

BASE

BASE

BASE

CLUSTER

Figure II-1. Joint Security Coordinator Relationships
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-10 

with the joint force air component commander (JFACC)/area air defense commander 

(AADC). 

(b) In cases of Level III threat or other emergencies, the JFC may designate a 

subordinate commander with the authority to counter the threat and restore JSA security. 

The JSC will support requests by the assigned commanders. 

(c) Specific joint security coordination across the range of military operations 

includes coordinating with appropriate commanders and staff to ensure that the following 

applies: 

1. The base and LOC construction and security posture in JSA supports 

the JFC’s concept of operations and is adaptable to support future operations. 

2. The overall base and LOC security plan is developed and coordinated 

with appropriate US forces, multinational forces, other US agencies, noncombatant 

command forces under the COM and SDO/DATT, and HN commands. 

ARMY COMPONENT DESIGNATED AS THE

JOINT SECURITY COORDINATOR

JOINT FORCE COMMANDER

ARMY

FORCES

AIR FORCE

FORCES

MARINE

CORPS

FORCES

NAVY

FORCES

JOINT

SPECIAL

OPERATIONS

TASK

FORCES

TACON

Coordination Authority

TACON - tactical control

BASE

JOINT

SECURITY

COORDINATOR

AREA

COMMAND

BASE

CLUSTER

Figure II-2. Army Component Designated as the Joint Security Coordinator
Command and Control 

II-7 

3. The chain of command established by the JFC and the degree of 

authority granted to the JSC are adequate for the mutual protection and security of all US 

personnel and assets in the operational area. 

4. The intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), and law enforcement 

networks are responsive to the needs of base commanders and LOC security forces 

operating in the JSA. 

5. Objective criteria are developed and shared for assessing the 

criticality and vulnerability of bases, base clusters, LOCs, and key infrastructure, both 

internal and external to the operational area, to prioritize security improvements and 

position mobile security forces (MSFs) and TCFs (as required). 

6. Coordination with the JFACC/AADC has been completed to ensure 

that air and missile defense requirements for the JSA(s) are integrated into US, 

multinational, and/or HN air defense plans IAW JFC priorities and concept of operations. 

7. Base and LOC defense plans incorporate adequate provisions and 

procedures for CBRN warning and reporting procedures. 

8. Appropriate liaison is established with multinational and HN 

commands for coordination of JSO. 

9. All relevant international and domestic (US and HN) legal guidelines 

impacting on security within the JSA (such as HNS agreements, law of armed conflict 

guidance, status-of-forces agreements [SOFAs], and ROE) are disseminated and shared to 

appropriate command levels. 

(5) Component Commanders. The JFC normally exercises command through 

Service or functional component commanders and designates command responsibilities 

based on the operational mission. 

(a) Security Responsibilities 

1. Component commanders with area responsibilities provide for the 

defense of their AOs, the overall defense of bases located in their AOs, and for LOCs 

within their AOs. 

2. Within established AOs, other component commanders must ensure 

and provide for the defense of their assets and/or bases critical to their component 

responsibilities. A component commander with unique security requirements (for example, 

those related to the shoulder-launched SAM footprint around a joint operating base) should 

expect to provide the majority of forces for the defense of those assets/bases. 

3. When an area of operation is not established, commanders must 

provide for the defense of those bases critical to their component responsibilities. 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-10 

Accordingly, that component should expect to provide the majority of forces to conduct 

these security operations. 

(b) Joint security responsibilities are usually modified by HN agreements 

when operating in the sovereign territory of multinational partners who normally retain 

responsibility for the overall security of an operational area. In these circumstances, the 

component commanders would continue to execute their security authority as directed by 

the JFC through other appropriate commanders and ICW the JSC, to include the 

following: 

1. Organizing appropriate component bases into base clusters and 

designating base and base cluster commanders. Organizing the defense of bases within 

their operational area. 

2. Coordinating the local security of bases and base clusters, LOCs, and 

key infrastructure to include establishing priorities for security and area damage control 

(ADC) IAW JFC directives. 

3. Establishing a C2 network linking bases and base clusters, and 

ensuring that adequate coordination is established with MNFs and HN activities within or 

bordering their security zones. 

4. Ensuring that base and base cluster defense plans are adequate, 

coordinated, and complementary to applicable HN security plans. 

5. Serving as the single point of contact for coordinating JSO within 

their AO with the HN (if so designated by the JFC). 

6. Ensuring that base or LOC MSFs as well as other area security units 

are identified, trained, and positioned IAW JFC directives and priorities. 

7. Performing other security responsibilities as directed by the JFC 

through the JSC. 

(c) Service and functional component commanders may also establish bases 

IAW JFC guidance to meet the JFC’s objectives. In this case, component commanders 

delegate authority to provide security and defense of those bases to the base commander 

and coordinate security and defense issues with Service or functional components with area 

responsibilities, as appropriate. 

(6) Area Commanders. Service component commanders with area 

responsibilities establish base and base clusters within their AOs and delegate the authority 

to provide security to those subordinate commanders. 

(a) Component commanders, most typically the Army or Marine Corps 

commanders with a JSA in their AO may be designated as the JSC and be delegated 
Command and Control 

II-9 

with the authority to conduct security operations. In lower-level threat environments, 

the commander, Army forces may delegate joint security coordination responsibilities to a 

major Army logistic unit, normally a theater support command (TSC). The TSC would 

subdivide and assign specific security areas to its subordinate sustainment brigades. Army 

TSCs and sustainment brigades would be responsible to plan, coordinate, control, and 

execute JSO within the JSA. 

(b) The JSA or a designated part of the operational area may be the 

responsibility of the commander, Marine Corps forces (COMMARFOR). The 

COMMARFOR may designate to the commander of the Marine air-ground task force 

(MAGTF) the JSO mission, including the defense of logistic and air bases within the JSA. 

The MAGTF commander may, in turn, choose to designate the MAGTF logistics combat 

element commander for this mission. Tasks may include joint security responsibilities (e.g., 

area damage control, convoy security, movement control) that will be conducted by Marine 

Corps forces in the JSA. 

(7) Base Cluster Commander. When necessary, the JFC may designate a senior 

base commander as a base cluster commander. A base cluster is a collection of bases, 

geographically grouped for mutual protection and ease of C2. The base cluster commander 

is responsible for coordinating the defense of bases within the base cluster and for 

integrating defense plans of bases into a base cluster defense plan. The base cluster 

commander normally has TACON of forces assigned to the base primarily for the 

purpose of local base defense. The authority the base cluster commander will exercise 

over other forces residing on the base for primary purposes other than local base 

For base defense purposes, the base commander typically exercises tactical control 

over forces assigned or attached to the base.
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-10 

defense must be established by the JFC and be explicitly detailed in order that 

appropriate JSO may occur as part of the overall base defense plan. 

(8) Base Commander. The JFC normally designates the commander of the 

primary occupant of a base as the base commander. The base commander is responsible for 

all base security operations within the base boundary and will closely coordinate operations 

with all occupants. A base commander provides and exercises base defense C2 through a 

base defense operations center (BDOC). The base commander establishes a BDOC to 

serve as the focal point for force protection, security and defense within the base boundary. 

Through the BDOC, the base commander plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and 

controls all base defense efforts, and coordinates and integrates security operations with the 

base cluster operations center (BCOC) as appropriate. This normally involves TACON 

over forces assigned or attached to the base primarily for the purpose of local base 

defense. The base commander may also exercise TACON over other forces residing on 

the base for primary purposes other than local base defense when these forces are 

called on to perform functions related to base defense or local security missions as part of 

the overall base defense plan. Commanders of units residing on the base that are not 

explicitly detailed by the JFC for base defense should coordinate with the base commander 

for participation in the base defense plan. The base commander provides for base terrain 

management and the location of all critical assets. The base commander is determined 

by the JFC based on the classification of the base and by the functions and unique 

security requirements of the individual Services. The Service designated with base 

command responsibilities provides the C2 structure for FP, security, and defense 

operations within the base boundary.

(9) Tenant Unit Commanders. Tenant unit commanders are commanders of 

units that reside and operate on, but do not fall under the direct command of the base 

commander. Tenant unit commanders must actively participate in the preparation of 

base security and defense plans. They will normally be required to provide security of 

their own forces and high-value assets, provide individuals to perform perimeter/gate 

security, and will often be assigned battle positions IAW base security plans. These forces, 

when provided, will generally be under the TACON of the base commander for the purpose 

of base defense. Most importantly, they are required to ensure that all personnel are 

properly trained to support and participate in base security in the event of attack. 

Tenant joint special operations task forces, because of low personnel densities, must 

coordinate the above requirements with the base commander (see Figure II-3). 

(10) Tactical Combat Force Commanders. In operations where there is the 

possibility of a Level III threat, the JFC may elect to establish a dedicated joint security 

combat force called a TCF. The command relationships between the TCF and 

subordinate commanders will be determined by the JFC. The TCF is normally 

commanded by a designated land component commander or subordinate commander. The 

TCF is a combat unit, with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets, 

which is assigned the mission of defeating Level III threats. The threat requiring the 

commitment of a TCF is usually of such magnitude that several bases or base clusters are 

threatened. Once committed, the TCF is given an operational area by the appropriate 
Command and Control 

II-11 

commander in which to accomplish its assigned mission. With this operational area, the 

TCF commander is the supported commander for the integration and synchronization of 

maneuver, fires, and interdiction. This may require the rearrangement of boundaries within 

an operational area. Plans for the employment of the TCF should be coordinated and 

rehearsed with area commanders, base cluster commanders, base commanders and with the 

HN. 

4. Establishment of Base and Base Cluster Command Relationships 

a. Command Relationships in Joint Security Operations. The JFC, normally 

through a designated JSC, ensures that appropriate command relationships among 

subordinate area, base and base cluster commanders are established and understood by all 

affected commands. Command relationships determine the interrelated responsibilities 

between commanders as well as the authority of commanders in the chain of command. 

The typical command relationships established in support of JSO should be TACON 

between the base or base cluster commander and the dedicated security force, when 

the attached force is from a different component command. 

TENANT UNIT

COMMANDERS

TENANT UNIT COMMANDERS' RESPONSIBILITIES

Providing organic

communications to

support their own

commands'

requirements

Participating in the

preparation of base

defense plans

Providing, staffing,

and operating base

defense facilities in

accordance with

base defense plans

Conducting

individual and unit

training to ensure

readiness for

assigned defense

tasks

Providing their

share of facilities,

equipment, and

personnel for the

BDOC and, when

appropriate, for the

BCOC

Providing for their

own internal

security

Advising the base

commander on

defense matters

peculiar to their units

Sustaining and

administering their

own forces

Providing their

requirements for

common-user

communications

systems to the

base commander's

communications

element

BDOC base defense operations center BCOC base cluster operations center

Figure II-3. Tenant Unit Commanders’ Responsibilities
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 3-10 

b. Base Classification. Unless determined by higher authority, the JFC will determine 

the classification of bases IAW established policies. A base may be either a single Service 

base or a joint base. 

(1) Single Service Base. A base that contains forces primarily from one Service 

and where the base’s primary mission is under the control of that same Service. Base 

commanders of these bases are normally designated by the Service component commander. 

(2) Joint Base. A base that has two or more Service units where no Service has a 

majority of forces or primacy of mission responsibility. The JFC assigns command 

authority of this base to a Service component and that component will then designate the 

base commander. When a joint base is designated, it is critically important that the JFC, 

normally through the JSC, delegates the authority to conduct JSO within the base 

boundary to a single commander. However, other Services have SF that contribute to or 

can accept command of base or base cluster security (elements of the Navy’s Navy 

Expeditionary Combat Command and US Coast Guard port security units [PSUs] for 

example). 

5. Operations Centers 

a. Joint Security Coordination Center. A JFC may elect to establish a JSCC using 

the designated JSC staff elements and representatives from the components operating 

within the operational area. Component and staff representation will vary IAW mission, 

forces, and security zone requirements, and should support the planning, coordination, and 

execution of all joint security related operations. The JSC will ensure that component 

representation and representation from the JSC staff is sufficient to support assigned 

mission responsibilities. The JSCC serves as the JSC’s full time centralized planning, 

coordinating, monitoring, advising, and directing agency for operational area JSO. It 

coordinates with other elements on the JSC staff, with higher, lower, and adjacent command 

staffs, and with HN and allied command staffs. The JSCC is manned with full time staff for 

key personnel and additional “as needed” personnel with subject matter expertise as 

available. 

See Appendix A, “Joint Security Operations Centers,” for more information on the 

functions and organization of the JSCC. 

b. Rear Area Operations and Rear Tactical Operations Centers. Army and 

Marine Corps area and subarea commanders usually have rear area operations centers 

(RAOCs) and rear tactical operations centers (RTOCs) to assist in accomplishing their area 

security and defense mission. These C2 facilities serve as the area and subarea 

commander’s planning, coordinating, monitoring, advising and directing agencies for JSO. 

RAOCs may be designated as a JSCC and either RAOCs or RTOCs can serve as BDOCs 

and/or BCOCs. 

c. Base Cluster Operations Center. A BCOC is a C2 facility established by the base 

cluster commander to serve as the focal point for the security of the bases within the base 
Command and Control 

II-13 

cluster. It plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base cluster security 

efforts. The BCOC personnel keep the base cluster commander informed of the situation 

and resources available to cope with security related requirements. They coordinate all 

BDOC efforts, and integrates JSO with other designated higher-level staff as designated by 

the JFC. The nature of the BCOC depends on the combination of forces involved and may 

include other sister Services, multinational HN and/or other US agencies personnel. The 

BCOC is similar in many respects to the land force unit’s tactical operations center 

and, in some cases, may be one and the same. Representatives from intelligence, maneuver, 

and fire support staff the BCOC. The base cluster commander provides other functional 

staff representatives to augment his base commanders as necessary. Multi-Service, other 

agency, HN and/or multinational representation should be part of the BCOC when elements 

of their armed forces, police, or paramilitary forces are directly involved in the overall base 

defense effort or they are a major tenant organization to the base. 

See Appendix A, “Joint Security Operations Centers” for more information on the functions 

and organization of the BCOC. 

d. Base Defense Operations Center. A BDOC is a C2 facility established by the 

base commander as the focal point for FP, security, and defense within the base boundary. 

Through the BDOC, the base commander plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and 

controls all base security efforts, and coordinates and integrates area security operations 

with the base cluster operations center (if established) or other designated higher-level staff 

as designated by the JSC. The nature of the BDOC depends on the combination of forces 

involved and may include sister Services, multinational HN and/or other US agencies 

personnel, depending on the combination of forces located at each particular base. MultiService, other agency, HN and/or multinational representation should be part of the BDOC 

when elements of their armed forces, police, or paramilitary forces are directly involved in 

the overall base defense effort or they are a major tenant organization to the base. The 

center normally consists of three primary sections —command, intelligence, and operations 

— with additional sections as deemed necessary. These additional sections could include a 

logistic section to plan the provision of services and support to the base, and an ADC 

section that provides inspection, planning, and control of the base’s emergency 

response/ADC resources. The BDOC is manned full time with key personnel and 

augmented with subject matter expertise as required. 

See Appendix A, “Joint Security Operations Centers,” for more information on the 

functions and organization of the BDOC. 
Chapter II 

II-14 JP 3-10 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER III 

PLANNING 

III-1 

“Never break the neutrality of any port or place, but never consider as neutral any 

place from whence an attack is allowed to be made.” 

Horatio Nelson 

Letter of Instruction 

1804 

1. Introduction 

The JSC, through the joint force subordinate commanders, base cluster 

commanders and base commanders, monitors and coordinates the overall 

organization and control of forces responsible for base and LOC security and advises 

the JFC on all issues associated with JSO. These forces must be trained, organized and 

equipped to properly execute JSO. This chapter sets forth joint force security planning 

considerations along with the discussion on special considerations relevant to JSO. 

2. The Fundamentals of Planning Joint Security Operations 

 Understanding the basic planning fundamentals of JSO is key to the proper execution 

of this challenging mission. Commanders in the field should ensure security operations are 

being planned and executed as part of “normal” operations. The fundamentals of JSO 

planning are listed in Figure III-1. 

FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT SECURITY

OPERATIONS PLANNING

Establish Clear Joint Security Related Command and Control

Relationships and Responsibilities

Understand the Enemy

See the Operational Environment

Use Defenders' Advantages

Mitigate Defenders' Disadvantages

Balance Security Actions With Civil and Political Considerations

Figure III-1. Fundamentals of Joint Security Operations Planning
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-10 

a. Establish Clear Joint Security Related Command and Control Relationships 

and Responsibilities. Key to proper joint security planning, coordination and execution is 

the establishment by the JFC or his designated representative of clear and well-understood 

C2 responsibilities. The JFC, normally assisted by a designated JSC, must ensure that base, 

base cluster, and LOC security C2 responsibilities are established early on in the decisionmaking process. 

b. Understand the Enemy. Joint forces must be familiar with the capabilities of 

enemy forces; weapons; equipment; tactics; and political, ideological, cultural, 

economic, and/or other motivational factors. The status of the civilian populace as 

related to previous enemy activity may also play a significant role. Everyone from the base 

commander through the JFC must have access to the latest intelligence concerning probable 

enemy intent. 

c. See the Operational Environment. Joint intelligence preparation of the 

operational environment (JIPOE) provides the commander a continuous, integrated, and 

comprehensive analysis of enemy capabilities, the anticipated impact on friendly operations 

and civilian populace, terrain, weather, and any other characteristics of the battlespace that 

may influence the JSC’s decision. It helps the commander anticipate battlespace events, 

develop priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and information requirements tied to those 

events, and develop effective counters to those events. 

d. Use the Defenders’ Advantages. There is strength in the defense and commanders 

and planners should take these advantages into account as they prepare and execute JSO. 

Key advantages to the defense include: 

(1) The ability to fight from cover and concealment. 

(2) Detailed knowledge of local waterways, terrain, and environment. 

(3) The ability to prepare positions, routes between them, obstacles, and fields of 

fire in advance. 

(4) The ability to plan communications, control measures, indirect fires, close air 

and logistic support to fit any predictable situation. 

(5) The ability to conduct rehearsals of contingency response plans on the terrain 

they will be executed on. 

e. Mitigate Defenders’ Disadvantages. Military bases and surface LOCs are 

fixed, often lucrative targets with limited depth for maneuver. Mitigating the 

disadvantages of securing fixed facilities and LOCs is critical to the success of JSO. Key 

methods and techniques to mitigate these disadvantages include: 

(1) Establish strongly defended boundaries with well-controlled access points. 
Planning 

III-3 

(2) Integrate MSFs into base and LOC security plans. 

(3) Apply aggressive countermeasures to include patrolling, observation posts 

(OPs), listening posts, etc., throughout the operational environment. 

(4) Harden facilities and critical resources. 

(5) Synchronize fires with base defense and LOC security actions. 

(6) Conduct execution rehearsals. 

(7) Develop, maintain, and execute CBRN emergency response measures. 

(8) Integrate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and other 

early detection assets to see beyond the base perimeter. 

f. Balance Security Actions with Civil and Political Considerations. Base and 

LOC security will have to be planned and executed IAW the standing ROE/standing rules 

for the use of force (RUF) and other higher headquarters orders, which may include 

numerous constraints and restraints. All commanders and staff officers responsible for 

planning, coordinating, and executing JSO must take these factors into account. Failure to 

do so may have significant, possibly negative, strategic-level impact. Base commanders 

and their subordinates must comply with established ROE and should ensure that 

inconsistencies among Service components, multinational partners, and possibly even 

contractor personnel ROE are reconciled. Discrepancies need to be resolved at the JFC’s 

level to ensure all bases and Services are operating with the same guidance. In areas with 

US country teams, commanders must liaise closely with COM through the SDO during 

planning efforts to account for all political considerations. 

3. Joint Security Operations Planning Overview 

Base and LOC security should be governed by the METT-T factors. Additionally, 

careful consideration should be given to the support available and to civil and political 

considerations. 

a. Mission. The primary mission of the base is to support joint force objectives. 

Inherent in this mission is the subsidiary mission of securing these bases and LOCs from 

enemy action. The stated security plan should specify the following essential elements: 

(1) Who will secure the base? 

(2) Where each unit is positioned? 

(3) When and for how long the unit must be prepared to provide security? 

(4) What are the control and coordinating measures? 
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 3-10 

(5) What specifically the unit will secure – careful consideration should be given 

to the protection of any key assets within a given base or LOC related assets? 

For more detailed guidance on planning see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

b. Enemy. Every intelligence and CI resource available to the base commander 

should be used to determine enemy capabilities and intentions. 

The intelligence process and intelligence support to joint operations are discussed in JP 

2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 

(1) The JFC should provide commander’s critical information requirements 

(CCIRs) to the staff and components. CCIRs comprise a comprehensive list of 

information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely 

information management and the decision-making process that affect successful mission 

accomplishment. In the course of mission analysis, the intelligence planner identifies the 

intelligence required to answer the CCIRs. Mission analysis leads to the development of 

intelligence requirements (general or specific subjects upon which there is a need for the 

collection of information or the production of intelligence). Those intelligence 

requirements deemed most important to mission accomplishment are identified by the 

commander as PIRs. Based on the command’s intelligence requirements, the intelligence 

staff develops more specific questions known as information requirements (those items of 

information that must be collected and processed to develop the intelligence required by the 

commander). Those information requirements that are most critical or that would 

answer a PIR are known as essential elements of information. Specific joint security 

related PIRs may include: 

(a) The enemy’s tactical, operational, and strategic objectives and intentions 

as they relate to attacks on bases and LOCs. 

(b) Organization, size, and composition of forces, and locations of 

strongholds that threaten bases and LOCs. 

(c) Movement of enemy personnel and equipment. 

(d) Enemy intelligence capabilities to include use of local hire base workers, 

infiltrators. 

(e) Enemy capabilities and tactics (special consideration should be given to 

standoff weapon capabilities such as mortars, theater missiles, SAMs, and CBRN 

materials). 

(f) Local support for enemy cause. 
Planning 

III-5 

(2) Information requirements deal with necessary information about the enemy, 

environment, and other factors that needs to be collected and processed in order to meet the 

intelligence and other requirements of the commanders responsible for JSO. The 

intelligence effort should be directed toward planning and direction, collection, processing 

and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination and integration of intelligence 

that will permit the development of friendly capabilities to: 

(a) Prevent and disrupt enemy attacks on bases and LOCs. 

(b) Counter enemy fires, mobility, electronic warfare, imagery, and human 

intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. 

(c) Identify and defend against enemy intelligence collection efforts. 

c. Terrain and Weather. Bases and surface LOCs are usually selected in order to 

accomplish missions related to their use. Although defensive considerations are 

frequently secondary, they must not be ignored. The nature of air bases, for example, 

precludes establishment of tight boundaries with extensive cover and concealment for 

defenders. However, the defense of an air base can be enhanced if the location does not 

allow the enemy to approach unobserved. Likewise, ports are located in or adjacent to 

urban areas. Nonetheless, the base commander must make the best use of the terrain 

within the operational area. Commanders analyzing terrain must consider all its military 

aspects, from the standpoints of base and LOC function as well as security considerations 

In analyzing base security, commanders must consider observation and fields of fire, 

cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach. 
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-10 

from both a defender’s and enemy’s perspective. Security considerations include 

observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of 

approach. Additionally, commanders must analyze how the weather affects both defender 

and enemy weapons systems and tactics. Weather and visibility conditions can have a 

significant impact on land, air, and maritime operations. Additionally, prevailing winds 

can determine the effectiveness of enemy employment of CBRN weapons and/or the 

release of toxic industrial materials from nearby industrial facilities. Commanders should 

minimize their own vulnerabilities to adverse weather conditions and exploit any 

advantages over enemy vulnerabilities. 

d. Troops and Support Available for Joint Security Operations. There may be 

some units on a base whose primary missions are defense and security, such as military 

police (MP) at a large headquarters, SF on an air base, and air and missile defense forces. 

In some cases, the JFC or subordinate commander may determine that land combat forces, 

usually platoon to battalion task force level, may also be assigned as dedicated base, surface 

LOC and/or area defense forces. In other cases, particularly bases where there are 

limited combat forces, security forces may be formed from logistic, transiting units, or 

other support units. In these situations, support in the form of special training and 

equipment will be required. This support is essential in ensuring that such forces are 

capable of performing the required security missions and tasks. Most on-call personnel 

made available for joint security related missions will be obtained from the units 

whose primary mission is not security-related. In many cases, these personnel will not 

have the same degree of combat skills as dedicated security forces and therefore must 

receive additional training in marksmanship, tactics, and basic ground combat skills. 

Integration of these forces into successful JSO requires close supervision and leadership. 

Dedicated resources, normally from within the base, will be required to provide the needed 

support to ensure forces are at the requisite level to respond effectively. Figure III-2 shows 

troop capability requirements for each threat level. 

(1) Level I Threat Troop Requirements. Level I threats involve day-to-day 

security measures that must be maintained by all military forces. At this level, available 

assets should be able to detect and defeat enemy activities. Level I security activities 

are conducted primarily by the forces assigned to the mission, usually as tasks in 

addition to their primary duties. Early in the process of planning for any joint security 

operation the JSC and unit commanders must determine which units and/or individuals will 

be exempt from security duties and ensure that those assigned security duties have the 

requisite ground combat skills to accomplish the mission. The JSC normally establishes a 

dedicated security force and determines its size and composition by striking a balance 

between economy of force requirements weighed against the enemy threat and the size and 

importance of the base or LOC. 

(2) Level II Threat Troop Requirements. Level II threats include threats that 

will often require, in addition to the standard base and LOC self-security forces, a dedicated 

MSF or area command combat force specifically focused on JSO. The MSF would 

normally be, at a minimum, an MP platoon or SF flight, but may be a land force combat 

arms unit. Key capabilities of this force normally would include: 
Planning 

III-7 

(a) Armored mobility (armored wheeled or combat tracked vehicles). 

(b) Larger caliber direct fire weapons (heavy machine guns, automatic 

grenade launcher, and/or direct fire cannons). 

(c) Organic or on-call indirect fire capability (medium mortars at a 

minimum). 

(3) Level III Threat Troop Requirements. Level III threats require the same 

forces as level II threats and normally include a TCF. A TCF is an on-call mobile response 

force capable of responding to larger-scale conventional or counterinsurgency threats in the 

JSA. A TCF normally consists of a combined arms task force with organic combat and 

combat support elements and ability to call for fires (indirect and air delivered). 

e. Time Available. Commanders assess the time available for planning, preparing, 

and executing the mission. They consider how friendly or adversary forces will use the 

time and the possible results. Proper use of the time available can fundamentally alter the 

situation. Time available is normally defined in terms of the missions and tasks assigned 

and bounded by adversary capabilities. Commanders must use the time available 

effectively and provide subordinates with time to plan and prepare their own operations. 

f. Civil and Political Considerations. JFC and subordinate planners must give 

significant consideration to the civil and political impact of joint security measures and 

actions. For example, closing key surface LOCs (military use highways, pipelines, rail 

LEVELS OF THREAT

TROOP CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

LEVEL I

THREAT

LEVEL

LEVEL II

LEVEL III

LOC line of communications

CAPABILITY REQUIREMENT

Base or LOC force internal defense capability.

May require limited military police presence.

Same as Level II, but may require the employment of

a tactical combat force.

Same as Level I, but will require base mobile security force

or area security force with specified base or LOC security

related mission requirements.

Figure III-2. Levels of Threat Troop Capability Requirements
Chapter III 

III-8 JP 3-10 

ways, waterways) to civilian use may be desirable from a security perspective, but the 

potential impact on the local population and on relief and reconstruction programs could 

greatly outweigh the advantages of such measures. 

4. Common Planning Considerations 

a. Force Protection. Countering level I threats is considered to be a part of the dayto-day FP measures for bases. Antiterrorism (AT) measures will be a large part of the 

base security plan. 

For more specific guidance on AT planning and operations requirements see JP 3-07.2, 

Antiterrorism, as well as the applicable GCC’s FP and AT directives or operation orders. 

b. Intelligence. Effective intelligence support, merged with CI and law enforcement 

agency information, is essential to conducting successful JSO. Current intelligence and CI 

estimates should be focused on joint security challenges and must incorporate intelligence 

from all US, multinational, and HN sources. JSO must be completely and deliberately 

linked to the overall JFC JIPOE and component intelligence preparation of the 

battlespace processes.

(1) Responsibilities. The JSC is responsible for coordinating the intelligence and 

CI requirements of organizations with JSO responsibilities with the intelligence directorate 

of a joint staff (J-2). The J-2, through the joint intelligence operations center (JIOC) and/or 

the joint intelligence support element (JISE), is responsible for ensuring that the appropriate 

resources and operations are allocated to support these requirements. 

(2) Intelligence Considerations. The JSC requires timely and accurate allsource intelligence in order to coordinate appropriate joint security related actions; 

however, intelligence will typically come from supporting CI elements operating 

throughout the operational area and the supporting JIOC and/or JISE which may be able to 

provide surveillance video, imagery, and signals intelligence as required. Logistic units are 

also a lucrative source of information regarding potential unconventional, subversive, IEDs, 

CBRN, guerrilla, and terrorist threats. This information is usually reported through CI and 

operational channels simultaneously. The JSC, in conjunction with the combatant 

command counterintelligence support officer (CISO) or JTF CI coordination authority, will 

coordinate with appropriate commanders and staff to ensure: 

(a) Reporting means and procedures are established and used for the timely 

reporting of suspicious activities or incidents to the JSC. 

(b) Adequate liaison is established with HN military commands and 

government agencies in the operational area to collect valuable information from those 

sources. 

(c) Chains of command are used to convey essential information and 

intelligence to support all forces engaged in JSO. 
Planning 

III-9 

(d) Separate or transient forces that may have been diverted from other tasks, 

and which may not otherwise have access to critical information, receive effective 

intelligence support. 

(3) Counterintelligence. An effective CI process is one of the most important 

ways that commanders and the JSC can contribute to maintaining adequate joint security. 

The CI process includes the complementary functions of investigations; operations; 

collection, reporting, and analysis; production, and dissemination. The J-2, through the 

CISO and in conjunction with the Service supporting CI organizations, should develop a CI 

plan for collection requirements, liaison operations with HN intelligence and security 

services, incident investigations, and analytical support, particularly to the JSC staff and the 

JSC force protection working group (FPWG) (if established). The CI plan should include 

an assessment of all foreign intelligence services. CI is particularly effective in assisting 

commanders, the JSC, and staffs in identifying the espionage, sabotage, subversion, and 

terrorist threats to bases and LOCs. CI can provide commands and staff with identification 

and analysis of threats from unconventional forces, terrorist, partisans, and civilian groups 

sympathetic to the adversary. The CISO is responsible for providing the commander with 

current CI estimates that include analysis of adversary or other foreign intelligence 

capabilities and other threats as appropriate. The CISO must ensure that effective 

communications networks and liaison with HNs, allies, joint forces, and law enforcement 

agencies are established and that this information is reported in a timely and consolidated 

manner to the impacted components responsible for planning and executing JSO. 

More information on intelligence operations can be found in JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

c. Communications

(1) General. The JSC must have an interoperable, secure, reliable, flexible, and 

survivable communications network in order to accomplish the mission. Existing military 

or commercial communications systems should be used based on security and reliability to 

the maximum extent possible. However, additional communications systems (e.g., Joint 

World-Wide Intelligence Communications Systems) may be required to reconfigure or 

expand the network. 

(2) Communications System Support Responsibilities. The joint force 

communications system directorate (J-6), ICW the JSC, provides overall management of 

organic communication system (e.g., single channel radios and internal switching or 

terminal equipment supporting the JSC staff) and coordinates with the appropriate system 

manager for nonorganic communications system support. The JSC will designate units to 

establish HN connectivity as required. (NOTE: The JSC will establish necessary liaison 

with the J-6 to ensure that all communications requirements for the JSA are met.) 

(3) Individual Component Responsibilities. Each component command will 

establish communications with the JSC and lateral organizations. Deficiencies in 

communications assets should be identified and resolved through the JFC. 
Chapter III 

III-10 JP 3-10 

(4) Joint Movement Control Communications. Communication to support 

LOC security operations must be coordinated with, and will often use, the joint movement 

control communications structure. This is especially true when LOC security operations are 

limited to internal convoy defense capabilities. See Chapter V, “Lines of Communications 

Security,” for more information. 

(5) Inter-Service and Multinational and Contractor Communications System 

Challenges. Often, tenant units, the program managers for contractors deploying with the 

force, or even MSF organizations will be operating with noncompatible communications 

equipment. The JSC and subordinate commanders responsible for planning and executing 

JSO must ensure that specific base, base cluster and LOC security communications 

measures are planned for and tested to ensure compatibility. If communications 

compatibility is identified as an issue, then proper “work-around” actions must be taken by 

the appropriate commander. 

Further discussion of communications systems can be found in JP 6-0, Joint 

Communications System. 

d. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense. CBRN defensive 

operations are of primary importance to JSO and must be incorporated into all appropriate 

plans and procedures. Many potential threat forces have the capability to employ CBRN 

weapons to attack critical facilities and LOCs. All US forces in the operational area must 

be prepared to actively participate in the planning and execution of CBRN defensive 

operations. 

(1) Responsibilities of the JSC. The JSC coordinates with component 

commanders and other appropriate commanders and staffs, ensuring that they incorporate 

appropriate CBRN defense planning, exercises, equipment, personnel decontamination 

measures, and preventive measures into overall security planning and operations. This 

responsibility includes due consideration for positioning of friendly CBRN defense assets to 

support current mission requirements and anticipated follow-on actions. 

(2) Responsibilities of Component Commanders. Component commanders 

incorporate CBRN defense planning, exercises, equipment, personnel decontamination 

measures, and preventive measures into area and base or base cluster security plans. They 

also position friendly CBRN defense personnel and assets to support current mission 

requirements and facilitate future operations, IAW JFC directives and priorities. 

(3) Base and Base Cluster Commander. Every base and base cluster 

commander integrates operational elements of CBRN defense designed to sense, shape, 

shield, and sustain against CBRN threats. 

For further information on CBRN defensive operations see JP 3-11, Operations in 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments, and Field Manual 

(FM) 3-11.34/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3.37.5/Navy Tactics, 
Planning 

III-11 

Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-11.23/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP[I]) 3-2.33, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures for Installation CBRN Defense. 

e. Air and Missile Defense. Since most units operating on base and surface LOCs in 

the operational area have limited capability to engage and destroy incoming enemy air and 

missile threats; commanders must be aware of the capabilities and limitations of joint force 

defense counterair operations for their areas. The JSC’s focus is protection for the JSAs. 

Dependent upon the size and scope of the JFC’s mission, the joint force may establish an 

integrated air defense system (IADS) to conduct defensive counterair operations. The 

IADS is not a formal system in itself but the aggregate of component air defense systems 

operating in the operational area. The focal point of the IADS normally is the joint air 

operations center (JAOC). The JSC should establish effective liaison with the JFACC and 

AADC at the JAOC during development of the critical and defended lists to ensure that 

defensive counterair coverage is coordinated and maintained throughout the operational 

area to reduce or mitigate the effectiveness of the air and missile threat. That JSC liaison 

serves as the JSCs’ eyes and ears as well as their representative on matters of Service 

capabilities and limitations. This integrated and coordinated air and missile defense 

planning must include detailed plans to disseminate timely air and missile warning and 

cueing information to components, forces, multinational partners, and civil authorities. Air 

and missile warning and cueing information for JSAs must be planned for and executed at 

the JSCC and down to each BDOC/BCOC. Special consideration must be given to the 

critical asset list and the defended asset list. 

For more information on joint air and missile defense in general, see JP 3-01, Countering 

Air and Missile Threats, Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-01.01, Fleet Air Defense, 

MCWP 3-22, Antiair Warfare, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.1, Counterair 

Operations, and FM 44-100, US Army Air and Missile Defense Operations. 

f. Threat Early Warning and Alert Notification System. Threat early warning is 

essential to the protection of joint forces operating throughout the operational area and 

should be linked through the JSC and JSCC (if established) down through designated 

BCOCs and BDOCs. Alert notification systems are divided into two general categories. 

(1) Air Warning. The air and missile defense warning system is a critical link in 

the operational area air early warning system. Early warning and identification of enemy 

air threats, enemy air- and surface-to-surface missiles, and airborne and air assault 

operations are provided by several types of forward collection methods, including forwarddeployed reconnaissance units, air defense systems and the theater air ground system. A 

JFC’s tactical warning requirements are supported by national and theater intelligence 

systems. 

(2) Surface, Subsurface, and Land Warning. Information about potential 

surface, subsurface, and land threats are provided by various air, land, sea, and space 

intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition systems. The CI element at the JIOC/JISE 
Chapter III 

III-12 JP 3-10 

will provide fused intelligence early warning of surface, subsurface or land threats to the 

bases and LOCs. 

(3) The JSC coordinates with appropriate commanders and staffs to ensure that a 

reliable, responsive, and redundant air, land, and sea early warning system is established 

from the joint force level down to the base level throughout the operational area. The JSC 

will ensure that a standardized alert system is implemented throughout the JSA to ensure 

warning and uniform response to threats. Training should be conducted to ensure that all 

joint forces understand the correct responses to the various and sometimes confusing early 

warning alert notification systems. 

(4) Land and maritime component commanders are responsible for ensuring that 

adequate early warning systems are established in their AO IAW JFC directives. 

g. Land Forces and Joint Security. Joint security on the land includes bases, critical 

assets, lines of communications, and convoy security. Challenges include logistic facilities 

that may be located in heavily populated areas which are often linked by long and 

vulnerable surface lines of communications. 

(1) In a JSA, multiple Service components may be using the same facilities within 

a base complex such as: 

(a) Army intermediate staging bases, tactical assembly areas, or forward 

operating bases (FOBs). 

(b) Army common-user water terminals. 

(c) MAGTF support bases. 

(d) Air Force air bases and airfields for APODs and close air support. 

(e) Naval bases supporting and sustaining fleet operations. 

(2) Joint Security and Protection 

(a) Joint security operations requires fixing responsibility for protecting the 

joint force. A senior land commander will normally be designated with responsibility for 

joint security operations. 

 

(b) When the Army is designated as the JFLCC, this responsibility is 

exercised through the designated protection cell. When designated as the JSC and 

responsible for the JSA, the Army headquarters protection cell (with augmented joint, 

interagency, and multinational personnel) provides the nucleus of the JSCC. The protection 

cell: 
Planning 

III-13 

1. Integrates and synchronizes protection tasks and systems in the 

operations process. 

2. Advises commanders on the priorities for protection and coordinates 

the implementation and sustainment of protective measures to protect assets according to 

the commander’s priorities. 

3. Provides input to the commander’s plan by integrating the threat and 

hazard assessment to minimize vulnerability and provides vulnerability mitigation measures 

to help reduce risks. 

(3) In support of the JFC’s concept of operations, the JFLCC plans and conducts 

security operations to ensure protection of US and multinational critical assets and the 

support areas required for sustainment of land operations. The JFLCC will normally assign 

an Army maneuver enhancement brigade for security of defined geographic areas and to 

serve as its operational protection headquarters. 

(a) Area security may be the predominant method of protecting support areas 

that are necessary to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources 

required to sustain, enable, and control tactical forces. Area security operations are often 

emphasized in noncontiguous AOs to compensate for the lack of protection integrity that 

large or distant, unoccupied areas often create. Area security operations are often an 

effective method of providing civil security and control during some stability operations. 

Forces engaged in area security operations can saturate an area or position on key terrain to 

provide protection through early warning, reconnaissance, or surveillance and guard against 

unexpected enemy attack with an active response. 

(b) Base and base cluster defense are essential to joint land operations. Land 

forces may contribute to the protection of multiple FOBs within their respective support 

areas. 

(c) The security and protection of lines of communications and supply routes 

are critical to joint land operations since most support traffic moves along these routes. The 

security of supply routes and LOCs (rail, pipeline, highway, and waterway) presents one of 

the greatest security problems in an operational area. Route security operations are 

defensive in nature and are terrain-oriented. A route security force may prevent an enemy 

force from impeding, harassing, or destroying traffic along a route or portions of a route by 

establishing a movement corridor. Units conduct synchronized operations (reconnaissance, 

security, mobility) within the movement corridor. A movement corridor may be established 

in a high-risk area to facilitate the movement of a single element, or it may be an enduring 

operation. 

(4) US Army theater security organizations. The US Army has several 

organizations specifically designed and equipped to conduct security functions. 
Chapter III 

III-14 JP 3-10 

(a) Among the Army’s modular support brigades, the maneuver enhancement 

brigade performs joint security and protection tasks. Maneuver enhancement brigades are 

designed to provide protection capabilities and other support to the joint force to include: 

1. Engineer. 

2. Military police. 

3. CBRN. 

4. Civil affairs 

5. Air defense artillery. 

6. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). 

7. Tactical combat forces. 

(b) Regional Support Groups. Army units specifically designed to serve as 

base headquarters and provide command and control, to include oversight of security for 

temporary bases. 

(c) Rear operations centers (area) may provide augmentation for base 

command and control and security management for critical bases and facilities. 

For more information, see FM 3-37, Protection. 

h. Maritime-Land Interface. Bases established on a shoreline can present special 

advantages and challenges to those responsible for the functions inherent in the base’s 

mission and for its defense. The advantages include the availability of the assets of more 

than one Service component for use by commanders in fulfilling their responsibilities. The 

special challenges may include the fact that facilities like ports and harbors are usually 

located in heavily populated areas. 

(1) Command arrangements may be complicated by diverse purposes when 

multiple Service components use the same facilities. For example, the following 

installations may be in close geographical proximity. 

(a) Army common-user water terminal. 

(b) Support base for a MAGTF. 

(c) Air Force base operating an APOD. 
Planning 

III-15 

(d) Naval base supporting and sustaining fleet operations and/or maritime 

expeditionary security forces operations, naval advanced logistic support site, and naval 

forward logistic site. 

(2) Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF)

(a) In support of the JFC’s concept of operations in time of war or 

contingency, MESFs plan and conduct operations to ensure strategic mobility and provide a 

safe haven for US and MNFs in coastal areas and for sustainment of land operations. 

(b) The JFC is responsible for maritime security. This responsibility is 

exercised through the JFMCC, who will normally assign a commander to be in charge of 

maritime security forces for a defined geographic area. Maritime expeditionary security 

encompasses coastal sea control, harbor defense, and port security. 

(c) The MESF commander may assign subarea operational commanders as 

needed for coastal sea control and harbor defense in order to conduct maritime 

expeditionary security operations such as intelligence gathering, reconnaissance and 

surveillance, interdiction, security and safety, and supporting operations. 

(3) Defense Planning. Friendly naval forces are the primary defense against 

waterborne threats and should achieve maritime superiority in the waters adjacent to the 

base. However, even if overall superiority is achieved, small enemy units may seek to 

interfere with base operations from seaward approaches. 

(a) Amphibious Raids. The enemy may attempt amphibious raids using 

watercraft and/or aircraft. Likely beaches, landing zones, and insertion areas should be 

guarded, obstacles should be placed, and the mobile reserve employed to counter such raids. 

(b) Sea Mining. Enemy mining of the seaward approaches to the base can 

be conducted from surface vessels, by air, or clandestinely by submarines. Detection of 

such activity should be a priority effort for surveillance systems, patrol boats, and aircraft 

guarding the seaward approaches to the base. 

(c) Maritime Special Operations Forces. Determined, specially trained, 

organized, and equipped individuals or units can infiltrate ports, harbors, and bases near 

shore by swimming, scuba diving, high-speed surface craft, indigenous small boats, or 

miniature submersibles. They can damage vessels, port facilities, and base resources. 

Security forces, both seaward and ashore, and their supporting surveillance systems must be 

prepared to locate and counter such threats. 

(4) Approaches to the Base. Appropriate security and surveillance forces, 

backed up by capable MSFs, must be designated to cover every possible avenue of 

approach. These approaches include: 
Chapter III 

III-16 JP 3-10 

(a) Beaches. 

(b) Concealed water approaches (fjords, bayous). 

(c) Rivers. 

(d) Drop zones and landing zones. 

(e) Land approaches. 

(f) Urban terrain and infrastructure (including underground water and sewage 

systems). 

(g) Piers, docks, and waterfront facilities. 

(5) Navy and US Coast Guard (USCG) Organizations. The MESF 

commander may assign a maritime expeditionary security squadron (MSRON) commander 

as the harbor defense commander (HDC). In concert with the MESF/MSRON commander, 

the HDC sets the boundaries for harbor defense. Defense of the harbor is the responsibility 

of the HDC, and inland defense is the responsibility of the appropriate area or component 

commander designated by the JFC. Close coordination on mission priorities must be 

accomplished for MESF units between the MESF commander and seaport/marine terminal 

commander to avoid conflicts. On a larger scale, under the direction of the MESF 

commander, the MSRON commander may have TACON of forces providing port security 

and harbor defense in more than one port and/or harbor. This may be particularly true along 

a coastline that has multiple ports in geographic proximity to each other. In this situation, 

the multiple ports may be designated a base cluster. The MSRON will, through the MESF 

commander, coordinate security operations with the appropriate area or functional 

commander. The MESF may possess some or all of the following capabilities. 

(a) Command and Control Division. The C2 division is a mobile 

surveillance and detection unit that possesses surface search radar, thermal imaging and 

visual imaging cameras, and the mobile ashore support terminal to facilitate 

communications. 

(b) Boat Division. A small craft unit consisting of eight 34-foot boats armed 

with crew served and personal weapons with the capability to detect and engage surface 

targets, conduct high-value asset escort, and provide harbor patrol. 

(c) Security Division. Approximately 150 personnel armed with crew 

served and personal weapons designed for ashore protection of MESF. Capabilities include 

port security, entry control point protection, military aircraft protection, and garrison 

security. 

(d) Port Security Unit. A USCG small craft unit consisting of six 25-foot 

boats armed with crew served and personal weapons; with the capability to detect and 
Planning 

III-17 

engage surface targets. This unit is integrated into the maritime component in wartime or as 

allowed by law. The unit also includes a waterfront security force to protect piers/wharves 

used in onload and offload operations. The mission of a PSU is to conduct port security 

and/or harbor JSO. PSU duties include patrolling harbors and anchorages, maritime 

interdiction, surveillance, and the enforcement of exclusionary zones. 

(e) Naval EOD Detachment. This detachment provides ordnance handling 

and evaluation, special weapons and/or ammunition support, and mine detection and 

neutralization capabilities. This detachment also identifies mine and/or ordnance beaching 

areas for the port or harbor. 

(f) Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Elements. These elements detect and 

destroy enemy mines in harbors, approaches, and sea-lanes, using MCM aircraft and 

vessels. Because of the small number of MCM forces, control of these assets is normally 

determined by the JFMCC. 

(g) Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit (MDSU). The MDSU has the 

missions of underwater hull search and repair, channel clearance, vessel salvage, and pier 

and piling inspection and repair. The MSRON commander can request this unit’s support 

of base defense efforts from the MESF commander when required. 

(h) Riverine Squadron (RIVRON). The RIVRON consists of 12 heavily 

armed patrol craft capable of fire support, insertion of forces, or riverine control and/or 

denial. 

(i) Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG). 

NAVELSG, via the use of their Navy expeditionary logistics regiments, provides the 

capability and command and control of its Navy cargo handling battalions to conduct 

loading and discharging of military sealift shipping, either in-stream or pier side. 

(6) Factors which should be considered when planning the defense of a base on a 

shoreline include the type and nature of the threat as well as protection for sea approach 

chokepoints, tides and currents, water clarity and depth, pier clearance, lighting, use of 

patrol boats, communications, rail and highway entrances security, air and missile defense 

measures, security for individual vessels, and ADC. 

i. Terrain Management and Infrastructure Development. Effective terrain 

management and infrastructure development is critical to the success of JSO. The joint 

force must take advantage of security enhancement capabilities by using and enhancing 

available fixed and permanent installations, facilities, and fabrications. Infrastructure 

development focuses on facility security modification and damage repair in order to reduce 

the efforts that joint forces must make to heighten their base and LOC security posture. 

Additionally, use of HN manpower, medical support, equipment and materiel should be 

maximized. 
Chapter III 

III-18 JP 3-10 

(1) Terrain Management Responsibilities

(a) The JFC has overall responsibility for terrain management in the 

operational area and assigns specific terrain management responsibilities to subordinate 

commanders as appropriate. 

(b) The JSC coordinates terrain management within component 

capabilities. The JSC’s primary terrain management responsibility is to advise the 

commanders on the stationing of units and facilities in the JSA. 

(c) Component Commanders. The JFLCC and JFMCC are responsible for 

terrain management within their AOs. They ensure that positioning of bases and stationing 

of units and facilities are made with due consideration for security. 

(2) Positioning Considerations

(a) Unit Positioning. Factors affecting base and unit positioning include the 

implications of the current threat assessment, the suitability and survivability of available 

facilities, and the subordinate unit mission requirements. Component commanders and 

their staffs should use these factors and their own risk assessments to determine whether 

units should be dispersed or grouped together for mutual support. 

(b) Facility and Supply Positioning. Factors affecting the positioning of 

facilities and supplies include the current threat assessment, the security implications, and 

the requirements of the units operating or using the facility and/or supplies, the impact of 

the facility or supplies on the joint force mission and/or concept of operation, LOCs, and 

accessibility. Considerations include those described in Figure III-3. 

(3) Infrastructure Development Responsibilities. Joint forces deployed to 

developed areas should be able to capitalize on established infrastructure and the use of 

existing facilities. Joint forces deployed to less developed areas must rely more on 

construction of new but austere, initial, or temporary facilities IAW established base 

development criteria. HNS should be sought but will normally be less available than in 

developed areas. 

(a) GCC. The GCC, in coordination with multinational partners as well as 

relevant USG/NGO entities and HN organizations, is responsible for identifying the 

wartime facility and construction requirements for US forces. During hostilities, the GCC 

specifies theater construction policy through the engineering support plan for each 

operation plan. 

(b) JSC. The JSC coordinates to ensure that the JFC’s construction policy in 

the JSA is implemented with due consideration to security concerns and requirements. 
Planning 

III-19 

(c) Commanders. Commanders are responsible for implementing 

construction policy IAW JFC directives and guidelines. They plan and implement 

construction projects with due consideration to security concerns and requirements. 

More information on base construction can be found in JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. 

j. Area Damage Control. ADC includes the measures taken before, during, and after 

hostile action or natural or man-made disasters to reduce the probability of damage and 

minimize its effects. Engineers perform most of these tasks. Other forces and assets 

contributing to ADC include combat support units, logistic units, tenant/transient units and 

HN units. When an attack or natural disaster occurs, the objective is to continue 

regular operations by quickly restoring control, evacuating casualties, isolating 

danger areas, and replacing personnel and materiel losses. 

(1) General. Effective planning, establishment of specific responsibilities, and 

use of all available assets are necessary to conduct ADC and to ensure prevention, 

containment, and rapid restoration of operations. 

(2) Responsibilities

(a) JSC. The JSC may advise appropriate commanders and staffs on ADC 

operations. 

POSITIONING CONSIDERATIONS

Clustering of support activities reduces vulnerability to ground attack but

can increase vulnerability to air, missile, and/or chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear attack.

Locating key facilities away from high-speed routes minimizes vulnerability

to enemy ground penetrations but may also reduce accessibility to units

requiring support.

Dispersal of critical supplies such as fuel, ammunition, and spare parts

reduces the risk of loss but also reduces the ease and speed of distribution.

CLUSTERING

LOCATION

DISPERSAL

Figure III-3. Positioning Considerations
Chapter III 

III-20 JP 3-10 

(b) Area and Base Commanders. Commanders are responsible for 

ensuring that ADC plans are developed, prioritized, coordinated, and executed. 

(c) Host Nation 

1. Authority. The HN, depending on applicable agreements, may have 

overall responsibility for ADC within its territorial boundaries. In these circumstances, US 

forces will retain responsibility for ADC within US base boundaries and be prepared to 

assist the HN within its unit capabilities with ADC operations outside US base boundaries. 

2. Assistance. HNS agreements frequently address HN assistance for 

ADC operations. Commanders usually serve as single points of contact for coordinating 

ADC operations and, in that capacity, should ensure that HNS for ADC is planned, 

coordinated, prioritized, and executed IAW the JFC’s priorities and concept of operation. 

(3) ADC Planning Requirements

(a) General. ADC is executed at the lowest level. Base and base cluster 

security plans may have ADC annexes identifying responsibilities, priorities, requirements, 

and procedures for conducting ADC operations. These plans will be coordinated and 

integrated at the component and subordinate command levels to ensure rapid response and 

efficient use of limited ADC assets. 

(b) Specific Planning Responsibilities. Base and base cluster ADC annexes 

should identify responsibilities and procedures required before, during, and after an 

incident. Plans should also include responsibilities for all units occupying the base or 

located in the base cluster that can make contributions to ADC. Examples include, but are 

not limited to, SF, engineers, ordnance, EOD, CBRN contamination avoidance and 

decontamination or reconnaissance, civil affairs, maintenance, medical support, 

communications systems, supply, and transportation. 

k. Integration of Joint Security and Logistic Operations. Joint logistics integrates 

strategic, operational, and tactical level logistic operations. Maintaining movement control, 

keeping LOCs open, protecting key reception and transshipment points, protecting key 

logistic bases, and obtaining HNS are critically important JSO. 

(1) Responsibilities. The JSC coordinates the overall security in the JSA and 

seeks joint security support of the joint force logistic concept of operations. The JSC must 

coordinate with the JMC (if established) or other movement control agency on 

employment and joint security of all movements within the JSA.

(2) Other Considerations

(a) Medical Operations. Enemy operations that interdict LOCs and disrupt 

sustainment activities could seriously impact the ability of medical support personnel to 
Planning 

III-21 

retrieve and evacuate wounded, sick, and injured personnel and provide timely medical 

care. 

(b) The JFC should employ a joint movement control agency, center, or cell 

to conduct joint movement control planning, coordinate actions and resolve issues, 

especially with the HN, and act as the lead for joint movement control functions. The JSC 

should establish liaison with the JMC through the JSCC to monitor movements in the 

operational area. 

For more information on joint movements and movement control see JP 4-09, Distribution 

Operations. 

l. Detainee Operations. Planning for detainee operations is critical to the success of 

JSO. The JSC should establish planning mechanisms that ensure effective consideration of 

potential detainee-related issues and the development of plans and procedures to respond to 

these issues. Conducting appropriate planning will assist the JSC in mitigating possible 

detainee issues. 

For additional information see JP 3-63, Detainee Operations. 

5. Other Major Planning Considerations 

 The integration of all US military capabilities, often in conjunction with forces from 

other nations, other US agencies, NGOs, HN civil authorities, and HN security forces and 

authorized civilians accompanying the joint force, requires effective and efficient JSO 

planning. The JSC coordinates the overall security of bases and LOCs through the 

integration and synchronization of HNS, multinational operations, civil-military 

operations (CMO), and interagency coordination. The goal is to maximize the 

effectiveness of the base and LOC security forces through the proper employment of all 

security assets. 

a. Host-Nation Support 

(1) The effective use of HNS enhances the capability of US forces to achieve 

success during any military operation. Many HNs can provide valuable support for 

conducting security operations. The JSC and appropriate subordinate commanders 

must consider HN capabilities when planning and conducting security operations. HN 

personnel and organizations can frequently perform many functions as well as, or better 

than, US personnel or units because of their familiarity with language, local customs, 

terrain, transportation and communications networks, facilities, and equipment. The scope 

of HNS is limited by the availability of resources, equipment interoperability, the capability 

of the HN, and the ability of the United States and the HN to reach agreements concerning 

their use. 
Chapter III 

III-22 JP 3-10 

CONVOY OPERATIONS TRAINING 

Due to the high-threat nature of the lines of communications in Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM, the Army established a major in-theater tactical convoy 

operations training program for all deploying Army units. In addition to 

Army units, selected other Service units and contractor personnel went 

through this major live-fire training as part of their in-theater preemployment preparation. This convoy training included both classroom 

and hands-on training that included close-quarters marksmanship, 

shooting from moving vehicles, recovery of damaged vehicles while 

under fire, and other convoy tactic-related actions. 

SOURCE: Stars and Stripes, March 2004 

(2) Responsibilities

(a) JSC. The JSC, coordinating with appropriate commanders and the HN 

lead staff (if designated), ensures that HN security assets are used to enhance the overall 

security of the military forces and support the JFC’s current and future concept of 

operations. 

(b) Component Commanders. Component commanders are responsible for 

the use and employment of HNS IAW JFC directions and guidelines. When HNS security 

assets are available, component commanders’ responsibilities include ensuring that the 

following applies. 

1. HN security assets dedicated to US forces are used and positioned to 

help defend bases, LOCs and facilities and can support the JFC’s current and future concept 

of operations. 

2. US base and base cluster defense plans are coordinated with and 

complement HN overall security plans. 

3. Appropriate HN commands are advised of US forces’ priorities for 

security. 

(3) Considerations. HNS is normally based on agreements that commit the 

HN to provide specific support in prescribed conditions. Agreements are made at 

various levels, including national, theater, subordinate joint force command, functional 

component command (e.g., JFLCC), Service component command, and the local unit. In 

general, HNS is highly situational and heavily dependent on both the operational 

capabilities of the HN and its support for US policies. 

(a) Command and Control. US and HN commanders command their 

respective units and normally work ICW each other. In some instances, forces from one 

command may be placed under TACON of the other. The degree of coordination between 
Planning 

III-23 

US forces and HNS activities depends on the type of HNS involved, the location, tactical 

situation, the political environment, and existing agreements. The USG coordinates its 

control of HN resources through local officials or HN territorial commands and defines 

control with treaties or HNS agreements. When an established US military structure is 

absent, the SDO assigned to the US embassy country team will normally be the point of 

contact for US forces’ coordination of HNS requirements. 

(b) Training. US personnel at all levels should receive training in dealing 

with HN personnel, both on and off duty. Orientation should include HN government 

regulations, business practices, social customs, military procedures, religious customs, and 

language familiarity. Frequent training in security awareness, base security plans, LOC 

security, and safety should be provided to those HN units charged with support of the 

defense effort. 

(c) HN Security Support. Many HNs can and do provide extensive support 

for security-related activities. Specific types of HN security support are depicted in Figure 

III-4 and are described below. 

1. Civilian Guard and Labor Service Units. These units are usually in 

place during peacetime or developed after the commencement of hostilities. The use of 

civilian guards after hostilities commence will be on a case-by-case basis based on 

circumstances in the operational area and as directed by the GCC. 

2. Special Military Units. These units are designed during peacetime to 

perform specific wartime missions, such as guarding enemy prisoners of war and detainees 

and securing valuable facilities, materiel, or ammunition. Included in this group are HN 

TYPES OF HOST NATION SECURITY SUPPORT

Civilian Guard and Labor Service Units

Special Military Units

Individual Military Personnel Units

Paramilitary Units

Light Infantry and Security Units

Civilian Police

Intelligence Units and Agencies

Figure III-4. Types of Host-Nation Security Support
Chapter III 

III-24 JP 3-10 

MP units, which provide support but are not necessarily assigned or totally dedicated to US 

forces. 

3. Individual Military Personnel Units. These personnel may be used 

as fillers for selected HN units, which provide individual HN personnel in order to support 

US forces, such as the Korean augmentation to the US Army in Korea. 

4. Paramilitary Units. Some nations’ police are paramilitary in nature, 

such as Belgium’s Gendarmerie, and function in both civilian and military roles. They have 

significantly more utility for HNS in a hostile environment than normal civilian police. 

5. Light Infantry and Security Units. Most HN countries use these 

types of units as their primary security forces. They are frequently given both area and 

point security missions. 

6. Civilian Police. These organizations frequently assist US MP and SF 

forces during peacetime, but have significantly less capability during wartime. 

7. Intelligence Units and Agencies. HNS intelligence organizations 

may be employed to assist in providing essential elements of information to the JFC’s base 

and LOC security plan. Base commanders must ensure that HN intelligence elements link 

with the JFC and other joint force intelligence staffs. HN agencies are normally excellent 

HUMINT and CI sources. HN organizations can provide tactical intelligence on enemy 

ground, naval, and air forces, CI on foreign intelligence and security service threat, terrorist 

intentions and collection capabilities, and interrogation and debriefing reports from enemy 

prisoners of war (EPWs), other detainees, refugees, returnees, and enemy sympathizers. 

HN intelligence personnel would add valuable local and national cultural insight to 

currently held intelligence assessments and data. 

For more information on HNS see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

(d) HNS in CBRN Environment. When required, HN military, 

paramilitary, and selected civilians providing support are equipped and trained to operate in 

a CBRN environment. Training and equipping are normally national responsibilities. In 

the event of a CBRN attack or CBRN environment, many types of HNS may be needed. 

The need of HNS may be due to limited CBRN defense supplies and/or units. Some of the 

types of HNS that can be requested are decontaminates, water, water transportation assets, 

CBRN detection devices, engineer digging equipment or units, and decontamination 

equipment or units. 

For further information on CBRN defensive measures see JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments. 

b. Multinational Operations
Planning 

III-25 

(1) Integrating Multinational Forces into JSO. The JFC establishes 

coordination with MNF and HN commands IAW existing agreements at all appropriate 

levels within the joint force. In some instances or contingencies, the JFC will have access 

to the US ambassador and his country team for help in the coordination process. 

Intelligence and operations liaison within and between bases, base clusters and higher 

headquarters is essential in developing security plans and executing defensive operations. 

Early and continuous liaison with MNF and HN and allied organizations, and with 

established MSFs, must be conducted to ensure effective and coordinated actions when 

required. 

(2) Command and Control of US Forces in Multinational Operations. The 

President of the United States always retains direct command authority over US forces. 

This includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and 

for planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and protecting military forces 

for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It is sometimes prudent or advantageous, 

however, to place appropriate US forces under the operational control (OPCON) or 

TACON of a foreign commander to achieve specified joint security related military 

objectives. In making the determination to place US forces under the OPCON or TACON 

of non-US commanders, the US President must carefully consider such factors as the 

mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and ROE. 

(3) Host Nation and MNF. Host nation and MNF governments, represented by 

their military forces and law enforcement agencies, generally will have responsibility for 

many base and LOC security functions. The JFC will coordinate US MNF and HNS 

requirements with MNF and HN commands. 

See JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, for more information on multinational operations. 

c. Civil-Military Operations. CMO assist the JSC in establishing and maintaining 

positive relationships between assigned forces, civil authorities, and the population. CMO 

are critically important to ensure civil authority and popular understanding of, as well 

as compliance with, military security measures. They enhance support for US forces and 

alleviate conditions that may result in local interference with military operations. Likewise, 

CMO are key in ensuring that JSO impacts on local civilian populace are also considered 

and lessened if feasible. Consideration of the impact JSO can have on the civil populace can 

be very important, especially in long-term stability operations. The JSC coordinates with 

the component commanders to ensure that they incorporate CMO procedures into all JSO. 

The proper employment of CMO assets can greatly enhance the JSC’s ability to integrate 

US, multinational, and HN security forces, as well as HN government agencies and NGOs. 

Component commanders are responsible for CMO within their AO IAW the JFC’s 

directives. CMO personnel and forces can assist in conducting joint and multinational 

security operations by providing assessments on local civilian capabilities and 

vulnerabilities in such areas as public facilities, transportation, and supplies. They can 

provide interface and coordination directly with designated civil agencies and authorities to 

facilitate or develop the objectives shown in Figure III-5. 
Chapter III 

III-26 JP 3-10 

Additional information on CMO can be found in JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

d. Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental 

Organization Coordination 

“Joint force commanders frequently state that interagency coordination is one of 

their biggest challenges. To that end, commanders must understand the 

principles of interagency coordination and bring them to bear during joint and 

multinational operations.” 

General John M. Shalikashvili, US Army 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

October 1996 

(1) Interagency coordination is the coordination that occurs between agencies of 

the USG, including the DOD, for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. Similarly, in 

the context of DOD involvement, IGO and NGO coordination refer to coordination 

between elements of DOD and IGOs or NGOs to achieve an objective. The integration of 

US political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into 

demonstrable action have always been essential to success at all levels of joint operation. 

(2) The JSC, with the assistance of joint force CMO assets and reach back to the 

geographic combatant command joint interagency coordination group, integrates JSO with 

the activities of other agencies of the USG, NGOs, IGOs, regional organizations, and the 

operations of HN forces and activities of various HN agencies conducting security 

operations in the GCC’s AOR and/or the JOA. By understanding the interagency 

coordination process, the JSC will be better able to appreciate how the skills and resources 

Enhance base and lines of communications security measures

Reduce civil interference with joint security operations

Reduce impact of joint security operations on the civilian population

Assist in the integration of civil security and defense assets

Assist in the coordination of relief efforts by governmental and

intergovernmental agencies

Enhance civil information activities, in conjunction with psychological

operations programs, to dispel rumor and disinformation generated by

hostile elements

OBJECTIVES OF CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

IN JOINT SECURITY OPERATIONS

Figure III-5. Objectives of Civil-Military Operations in Joint Security Operations
Planning 

III-27 

of the various USG agencies interact with NGOs, IGOs, and regional organizations to assist 

in the overall security posture of the joint force. 

(3) NGOs. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are 

frequently on scene before the US military and are often willing to operate in high-risk 

areas. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed. Because of 

their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civilmilitary resources that a JFC would otherwise have to devote to a joint operation. NGOs 

may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades 

of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small 

organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. The US President, through 

the GCC, may determine that it is in the national interest to task US military forces to 

provide security for NGOs, which in most instances is mutually beneficial since military 

assistance to NGOs has often proven to be the critical difference that enabled the success of 

joint operations. 

For further information on interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination see JP 3-08, 

Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 

e. DOD Civilian Work Force and DOD Contractor Employees

(1) General. US forces seldom deploy for contingency operations without a 

significant number of supporting DOD civilians and contractor personnel. Civilians 

accompanying the force provide support to military forces across the range of military 

operations. Their contributions to the force are critical to the success of today’s joint 

operations. The management, control, and security of the DOD civilian work force 

and contingency contractor personnel are a unique and significant challenge for the 

JFC, subordinate JFC and Service component commands. 

(2) DOD Civilian Workforce. The DOD civilian work force is defined as US 

citizens or foreign nationals hired directly or indirectly to work for the DOD, paid from 

appropriated or nonappropriated funds under permanent or temporary appointment. This 

includes employees filling full-time, part-time, intermittent, or on-call positions. The DOD 

civilian work force should be prepared to respond rapidly, efficiently, and effectively to 

meet mission requirements for all contingencies and emergencies. 

(a) Plans, programs, contingency and emergency manpower requirements, 

and an appropriate state of readiness, including organization infrastructure, should be 

developed as an integral part of the continuing activities of each DOD component. 

(b) As an integral part of the total force, the deployed DOD civilian work 

force will follow the JFC’s force protection and other joint security policies and 

operational direction when employed in or deployed in support of military operations. 

They should be processed and supported in the same manner as military personnel of their 

employing component, as permissible by law and/or existing SOFAs with foreign nations. 
Chapter III 

III-28 JP 3-10 

(c) Responsibilities

1. The JFC and DOD components should develop, maintain, and 

exercise civilian contingency and emergency plans and procedures to implement DOD 

planning guidance and policy to prepare the civilian work force for employment and 

deployment to support all contingencies and emergencies rapidly, efficiently, and 

effectively. The GCC will establish civilian work force accountability procedures to 

include names, numbers, locations, and status of deployed individuals. The GCC should 

also issue theater specific admission requirements for civilians and includes summaries of 

civilian work force status to their situational reports and comply with all requirements of 

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 1400.31, DOD Civilian Work Force 

Contingency and Emergency Planning and Execution, with regard to the civilian work 

force. 

2. The JSC should monitor DOD component and GCC compliance with 

all civilian work force contingency and emergency plans and procedures to ensure the 

proper level of security is accorded to all of the civilian work force. 

(3) Contingency contractor personnel will provide support to US military forces 

across the full range of military operations. They include all DOD contract personnel and 

their subcontractor personnel, including US citizens, third country nationals (TCNs) and 

local national personnel who are hired by and provide support to US military forces in 

contingency operations under such contracts. DOD contingency contractor personnel 

are separate and distinct from contractor employees working for the Department of 

State or other government agencies (OGAs), even when their contracts are 

administered by a US military contracting agency. The JFC may have limited 

responsibility for the security of OGA personnel to include OGA contractors. 

(a) DOD contingency contractor personnel include system support, external 

support, and theater support personnel. System support contractors and many external 

support contractor personnel deploy with the force and are referred to as contractors 

authorized to accompany the force (CAAF). CAAF personnel often have a habitual relation 

with, reside with, and provide direct support to US military units. CAAF personnel for the 

most part are treated similar to DOD civilians in relation to joint security, AT, and FP 

programs. They are, in accordance with their contract, required to abide by JFC and 

component AT and FP as well as other joint security related directives and policies. 

(b) Non-CAAF personnel include theater support and some external support 

contractors, local nationals, and TCNs. These locally hired personnel often reside off base 

and will, in general, be provided incidental security support when they are working on a 

military base or in close proximity to US forces. Use of local national or TCN or theater 

support contractor employees must be carefully considered from the base security 

perspective. In some operational situations, the use of local national and some TCN 

personnel can carry significant security, and even medical, risks. Figure III-6 provides 

basic points of consideration related to the use of local national and TCN contract 

employees to support base operations.
Planning 

III-29 

(c) Responsibilities. CCDRs, subordinate JFCs, Service components and 

DOD agencies shall: 

1. Ensure operational specific contractor policies and requirements are 

identified in appropriate plans and orders. This integrated planning includes the Service 

components and DOD agencies coordinating any proposed contractor support arrangements 

that may impact the operation plan or operation order (OPORD). 

2. Ensure the contract clearly and accurately specifies the terms and 

conditions under which the contractor is to perform, describes the specific support 

relationship between the contractor and the DOD, and contains standardized clauses to 

ensure efficient deployment/redeployment, management, protection, authorized levels of 

health service and other support, and sustainment. 

3. Develop a security plan for protection of contingency contractor 

personnel in locations where there is not sufficient protection. In appropriate cases, the 

GCC may provide security through military means, commensurate with the level of security 

provided DOD civilians. 

4. Monitor component compliance with contractor personnel 

contingency and emergency plans and procedures to ensure the proper level of security is 

accorded. 

(d) Security Related Considerations for Contractors

BASE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS:

USE OF NON-US CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL

Will these contractor personnel reside on base or live off base?

If they live off base, what base access control measures are required?

How will access be controlled to specific areas within the base?

Is there a vetting and badging process in place? If so, who will enforce

it and how?

Will these contractor personnel be physically screened and/or searched

in order to enter the base?

Will armed escorts be required? If so, who will do this? How will this

requirement be resourced?

Figure III-6. Base Security Considerations: Use of Non-US Contractor Personnel
Chapter III 

III-30 JP 3-10 

1. Area commanders, base commanders and supported unit commanders 

are responsible for providing individual AT and FP support, and may be responsible for 

providing security to contractor personnel. To properly accomplish this task, area 

commanders must have oversight of all supporting contingency contractor personnel in 

their AO. 

2. Contractors must ensure that their employees follow all security and 

individual FP requirements and oversight organization policies stated in the contract. 

Contractors are expected to take passive FP measures for the safety and security. Also, 

contractors should mandate measures for self-defense such as conducting driving classes, 

issuing cell phones, and establishing procedures for reporting suspicious incidents. 

3. Contingency contractor personnel may be armed for self-defense 

pursuant to DOD policy and subject to US HN law and international law, and relevant 

SOFAs and international agreements. All requests for permission to arm contingency 

contractor personnel must be reviewed by the appropriate GCC’s staff judge advocate 

(SJA). 

For more information, see Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3020.41, Contractor 

Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces. 

4. Security contractors should not be used to protect US or coalition 

military forces, facilities and supply routes in areas where major combat operations are ongoing or imminent, except as specifically authorized by the GCC. Security contractors 

may be employed to protect selected military assets in areas where major combat in not 

imminent or ongoing if consistent with applicable US, HN, and international law, and 

relevant SOFAs or other international agreements. 

5. The use of force by contingency contractor personnel is strictly 

limited by laws and not protected by SOFA provisions. The combatant command SJA must 

ensure that any use of contracted security forces to protect US military forces, facilities and 

supplies is done IAW applicable internal, US and local law. 

For more information, see DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany 

the US Armed Forces. 

6. CAAF and selected other contingency contractor personnel should, as 

a minimum, receive information on local and security procedures, be issued CBRN and 

other protection equipment (along with the requisite training), and travel/movement security 

support. Such training and equipment should be designated in the contract and be given 

before deployment at the designated deployment center. Operational specific FP and 

general security training required by non-CAAF will be determined and executed by the 

JFC and applicable component commanders and/or DOD agency. 

7. The issue of contractor security forces C2, ROE/RUF, and their role 

should be addressed by the GCC in each individual theater, the terms of the contract, and 
Planning 

III-31 

the appropriate service regulations. Additional, overarching guidance and information can 

be found in JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support. 

f. Laws, Agreements, and Other Legal Constraints

(1) Commanders at all levels are to have access to professional legal advice with 

regard to the legal aspects of the use of force in security operations. International law, US 

law and HN law are all relevant. Together, they regulate the status and activities of US 

forces across the range of military operations. This section provides a very basic summary 

of principal legal instruments that may impact on joint security. 

(2) Responsibilities

(a) The GCC coordinates with appropriate commanders and staffs to ensure 

the law of armed conflict, established ROE, US law, international agreements, HN laws and 

other legal issues are considered and adhered to in conducting JSO. 

(b) Component and Base Commanders. Component and base 

commanders ensure that JFC ROE is disseminated and shared to all members of the joint 

force operating in or passing through their AO or base. They ensure that laws, regulations, 

and procedures regarding treatment of detainees are disseminated and shared to all 

appropriate US forces and that adequate liaison is established with HN authorities in order 

to coordinate these actions when required. They ensure that legal representatives are 

available to assist US forces and to coordinate with friendly HN authorities on such matters 

as HN supply for US forces, acquisition of HN and enemy materiel, responsibility for the 

handling of EPWs or other detainees, division of police authority between HN and US 

forces, and responsibility for ADC. 

(c) In certain contingency operations, the JFC may have no HNS or operate 

in a noncooperative HN and will have full responsibility for all joint security functions. 

Therefore, the JFC must plan for and be prepared to execute all JSA functions with or 

without HNS. 

(3) Rules of Engagement. ROE are directives issued by competent military 

authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will 

initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. The GCC 

establishes ROE for the AOR IAW guidance from the President and SecDef. Requests to 

modify ROE can be made by a subordinate JFC or local commander. All ROE, to include 

security operations related ROE, must conform to the law of war, but the formulation 

process also takes into account operational, political, and diplomatic factors such as HN 

laws concerning defense of others, self defense, and protection of military facilities. As a 

result, ROE may restrict or prohibit some uses of force that the law of armed conflict would 

allow. (NOTE: ROE may change at national boundaries.) 

(4) US Law. US forces, regardless of location, follow US law as expressed in 

statutes, executive orders, DOD directives and instructions, Service regulations, and 
Chapter III 

III-32 JP 3-10 

geographic combatant and component command directives, OPORDs and regulations 

promulgated under the law as well as international agreements concluded pursuant to US 

law. Civilian employees and contractors overseas accompanying the Armed Forces of the 

United States may be prosecuted for violations of US law under either Article 2 of the 

Uniform Code of Military Justice (during time of declared war or contingency operation), 

or under the Military Extra-territorial Jurisdiction Act if certain requirements are met. Joint 

force security directives issued by the GCC and by the component commanders are subject 

to applicable SOFAs or similar agreements. For specific publications containing applicable 

US laws and SOFAs contact the US embassy SDO or GCC’s legal adviser. Some SOFAs 

and similar agreements are classified. 

(5) International Agreements. The Armed Forces of the United States are 

committed to conducting joint operations according to the applicable provisions of the law 

of armed conflict, including those of The Hague and Geneva Conventions. International 

agreements are the primary source of rules of international law applicable to US, 

multinational, and HN forces. The most comprehensive are SOFAs; however, these may be 

modified or become inapplicable in time of armed conflict. They prescribe most of the 

reciprocal rights, powers, duties, privileges, and immunities of the US forces to include 

DOD civilians and contractor personnel stationed abroad and of the governments of the host 

and allied/coalition nations and their respective armed forces. Other important types of 

international agreements concern security assistance and HN support agreements. For 

specific information on HN support agreements (e.g., acquisition and cross-servicing 

agreements) and international agreements (e.g., defense cooperation agreements) contact 

the US embassy military SDO or GCC’s legal advisor. 

(6) HN Laws. HN laws apply to individual members of the US forces in the HN, 

unless specifically modified or made not applicable to US forces by the terms of an 

international agreement. HN laws have broad as well as finite implications on the conduct 

of all functions related to JSO. Obligations that the law of war imposes on the US can take 

precedence over HN laws. US advisers, commanders, staff officers, DOD civilians, and 

Service members must understand critical HN laws and the provisions of DOD and Service 

policies concerning HNS. 

(7) Detainee Operations. Commanders at all levels must plan for and anticipate 

the capture of detainees. Commanders must take the appropriate measures to ensure fair 

and equitable treatment is afforded to all detainees. 

See JP 3-63, Detainee Operations, for additional information. 
CHAPTER IV 

SECURITY OF BASES AND BASE CLUSTERS 

IV-1 

“Rear guards are the safety of armies and often they carry victory with them.” 

Frederick the Great 

Instructions to his Generals 

1747 

1. Introduction 

The JFC, with or without a formally designated JSC, assigns and controls forces that 

are responsible to execute base and base cluster security operations. Key to establishing 

successful base security is to ensure there is a proactive base security posture. Security 

forces must be trained, organized and equipped to properly execute base and base cluster 

security against Level I and II threats, and if required, be prepared to engage Level III 

threats. This chapter sets forth the considerations, as well as guidance for base and base 

cluster security operations. This chapter also provides discussion on defensive 

considerations against Level III threats. 

2. Tenets for Joint Security Operations 

 In order to be successful, certain fundamental tenets are essential for successful joint 

security operations. These include knowledge of the enemy, unity of command, economy 

of force and responsiveness. While of equal importance, paramount in the conduct of joint 

security operations is the availability of well trained forces to provide a timely and often 

immediate response to threats. These tenets are discussed below in Figure IV-1. 

3. Base and Base Cluster Operations Overview 

 The JSC, ICW the base and base cluster commanders, coordinates the forces of the 

various Service or functional components to best capitalize on their combined capabilities 

while minimizing the vulnerabilities of each. 

a. Base. A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported. At the 

base level, the component in command of the base has overall responsibility for the 

security of everything within the base boundary. Tenant units normally secure their own 

facilities within the base, but selected forces will be made available by tenant units and the 

base commander will exercise TACON over those forces for the purpose of base defense. 

This will be commensurate with their capabilities and the local threat. 

b. Base Cluster. A base cluster is a collection of bases, geographically grouped for 

mutual protection and ease of C2. The base cluster commander will be appointed by the 

JFC or his designated representative and may be the next higher tactical C2 headquarters of 

the base, the senior base commander, or another designated base commander, depending on 

the situation. There is no fixed number of bases in a base cluster, but typically a base 
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-10 

cluster contains two to seven bases. The JFC, normally through the JSC, designates 

each base cluster. 

c. Base Security Forces. A base security force is a security element established to 

provide local security to a base. It normally consists of the combined dedicated and oncall forces assigned or attached and those forces from tenant units attached with 

specification of TACON for base defense or security operations. It may also include a MSF 

consisting of MP, SF, or combat arms units. The mission of the base security force is to 

counter Level I and II threats. The base commander normally appoints a base security 

force commander to execute FP, security, and defense functions within the base 

TENETS FOR SUCCESSFUL

JOINT SECURITY OPERATIONS

Knowledge of the Enemy

Unity of Command

Economy of Force

Responsiveness

Knowledge of the enemy’s capabilities, vulnerabilities, and likely intentions is

essential to prepare for combat operations, prevent surprise, and protect the

joint security area.

Unity of command is the cornerstone for uninterrupted support of the main

effort and the protection of the joint security area. It requires coordination

and cooperation toward the common goals with the joint security area. It

may be achieved by the joint force commander through the joint security

coordinator, area commanders, base cluster commanders, and base

commanders.

A tactical combat force, if required, is normally employed by a component

commander or another commander as directed by higher authority. The

will normally operate in a specified area of operations

within the joint security area.

tactical combat force

Defense of the joint security area should not significantly detract from the

overall joint force mission.

Consequently, only the minimum means necessary to accomplish the

defense should be committed.

joint

security area

Responsiveness requires immediate reaction and rapid deployment of

sufficient combat power to destroy the enemy and area damage control

resources to minimize damage.

Responsiveness is enhanced by timely intelligence and reliable

communications.

Figure IV-1. Tenets for Successful Joint Security Operations
Security of Bases and Base Clusters 

IV-3 

boundary. This individual will plan and execute all base security IAW the base 

commander’s guidance. The base commander tasks units located within the base to provide 

personnel, equipment, and materiel to form or augment the base security force. 

d. Command and Control Considerations. The area commander, normally a 

combat arms land force commander, is responsible to provide security support to all 

bases and base clusters (if designated) within the command’s AO. This responsibility 

will often include bases that are commanded by organizations not part of the area 

commander’s forces. The base cluster commander has direct responsibility for area 

security within the assigned cluster. In cases where the isolated base commander has no 

dedicated land combat arms forces, the base commander, ICW the JSC, should normally 

form a MSF capable of conducting area security operations needed to protect the base. This 

may entail operations outside the base boundary. In all cases, command arrangements and 

joint security operation directives, orders and policies must be clearly established for all 

anticipated situations. The following diagrams in Figure IV-2 illustrate a number of 

considerations for establishing the base boundary. When HN, urban terrain, and other 

factors constrain the size of the base boundary, the base commander must 

coordinate/integrate proactive security operations with the area commander or HN to 

counter the threat of standoff attacks or assume the risk. 

e. Work Priorities. Base and base cluster commanders must set priorities for tasks 

involved in base security. Work may occur on several concurrent tasks. Figure IV-3 

reflects some key base security work priorities. 

4. Security in Level I and Level II Threat Environments 

a. General. Base and base cluster commanders develop security plans in order to 

organize base security operations. Successful security depends on an integrated and 

aggressive plan consisting of on-call base security, dedicated SF, base or base cluster 

MSFs, and ADC response services (medical, fire fighting, and engineer). Actions against 

enemy threats and other potential emergencies to include natural disasters and accidents 

must be planned for and adjustments to base or base cluster security plans made. Drawing 

from the units available, commanders organize SF within their bases and base clusters. The 

base commander integrates the base security plans with those of its base cluster. 

(1) Base SF should have a high degree of direct-fire lethality to cope with 

potential threats. This may include a mixture of small arms, automatic weapons, and 

antitank systems. The MSF should also have access to supporting indirect fires, a high 

degree of tactical mobility and a reasonable span of C2. A base security force should be 

capable of: 

(a) Conducting reconnaissance patrols for detecting and reporting the 

location, strength, and capabilities of enemy forces located near the base and both landward 

and seaward if base is at a SPOD or seaport. 
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-10 

(b) Developing fighting positions within the base from which enemy 

advances can be stopped or destroyed. 

(c) Developing and conducting a patrol plan to deny the enemy key terrain 

from which to conduct standoff attacks. 

(d) Fusing tactical intelligence sources to execute/coordinate proactive 

combat operations. 

BASE BOUNDARY CONSIDERATIONS

Airfield

Airfield

Airfield

Airfield

Base boundary closely follows installation

perimeter: Host nation, urban terrain, and

other factors may constrain size.

Notional base cluster that includes three

bases: One commander responsible for

entire cluster.

Boundary negotiated between base and area

commanders: Base commander owns key

terrain inside boundary for base defense

purposes.

Notional base boundary taking shoulderlaunched SAM footprint into account: Base

boundary is beyond perimeter of facilities.

Boundary

Boundary

Boundary

Boundary

Perimeter

Perimeter

Perimeter

Perimeter

shoulder-launched surface-to-air

missile (SAM) launch footprint

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

Figure IV-2. Base Boundary Considerations
Security of Bases and Base Clusters 

IV-5 

(e) Using the MSF to attack small enemy units threatening the base from 

within the base boundary. 

(f) Providing internal security for critical capabilities and high value assets 

located on the base. 

(g) Understanding established fire control measures to prevent fratricide 

within the base and between the bases and base clusters; as well as with other forces 

operating outside the base perimeter, to include the TCF, MSF, and HN security forces. In 

addition, the likelihood of civilians and infrastructure in the area around the base should be 

properly considered when deciding upon courses of action. 

(2) The MSF commander must have the most up-to-date copy of the base defense 

plan, and, when applicable, base cluster defense plan in order to effectively coordinate 

between the base and MSF operations. This coordination occurs through the BDOC and 

BASE SECURITY WORK PRIORITIES

Preparation of a base security plan

Establishment of appropriate perimeter standoff based on threat and host nation

situation

Establishment of vehicle and personnel entry points and search areas

Establishment of access control processes, badges, and local national labor and

visitor control procedures

Construction of personnel survivability shelters in vicinity of work centers, living

areas, and recreation facilities

Establishment of attack warning systems (including alarms, codes, actions and

means of population education)

Integration of host nation or coalition forces as required

Establishment of mass casualty procedures and capabilities

Development of joint coordinated fire plan

Conduct rehearsals

Establishment/coordination of active patrols and tactical counterintelligence

operations within the base boundary to deny the enemy freedom of action

When defending airbases; establishment of shoulder-launched surface-to-airmissiles suppression patrols and response capabilities to deny the enemy terrain

from which to engage aircraft landing/taking off. This will be done within the base

boundary or in coordination with the area commander.

Figure IV-3. Base Security Work Priorities
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-10 

BCOC (if established). The MSF commander coordinates with the base to ensure that he 

understands the base defense plan, to include methods of contacting the BDOC or BCOC, 

including call signs and frequencies. Base defense plans and layouts should include the 

following: 

(a) Positions of critical internal assets, external coordination points, and nofire areas. 

(b) Locations of any obstacles or mines near the base. 

(c) Locations and direction of fire of crew-served weapons. 

(d) Locations of target reference points and preplanned fires. 

(e) Locations of OPs employed by the base. 

(f) Signal for final protective fires. 

(g) How to obtain fire support and to clear fires. 

(h) Sensor and patrol plans. 

(i) Closest medical treatment facility. 

Security forces should have a high degree of direct-fire lethality to cope with potential threats.
Security of Bases and Base Clusters 

IV-7 

(j) Location of CBRN collective protection facilities and decontamination 

sites. 

(k) Location of ammunition supply point. 

(l) How to obtain aviation units tasked to respond to incidents. 

(m) Communications plan. 

(3) The composition and size of an MSF will vary. The nature and size of the 

threatening enemy force influences the size and number of MP, SF or land force combat 

arms elements that make up the MSFs. Base and base cluster commanders, in coordination 

with the JSC, consider the following: 

(a) The priority of ongoing operations. 

(b) The criticality of the base under attack. 

(c) The amount of time needed for friendly elements to consolidate. 

(4) The base commander, ICW the area commander, continuously assesses the 

situation and, if appropriate, requests commitment of more MSF assets to handle the threat. 

b. Control Measures. Control measures in base and base cluster security operations 

are the same as those used in defensive operations. The JFC designates bases and base 

clusters. The area commanders/base cluster commanders coordinate base boundaries, 

establish phase lines, contact points, objectives, and checkpoints as necessary to 

control the base clusters. These control measures include fire support coordination 

measures (FSCMs) to permit or restrict fires in and around the base and base clusters. Nofire areas may be required to protect civilians, prevent disruption of sustaining operations, 

or protect combat outposts, OPs, and patrols. All control graphics are coordinated with HN 

agencies to minimize interference, misunderstandings, and unnecessary collateral damage. 

The base commander designates target reference points and sectors of fire for organizations 

located within the base boundary. All fires within the operational area will be coordinated 

among all affected organizations. These measures decrease the likelihood of fratricide, 

prevent noncombatant casualties, and minimize damage to the property of friendly civilians. 

The area commander normally designates reconnaissance and patrol areas to provide area 

security outside the base boundaries as necessary. MSFs must conduct aggressive patrols, 

and develop and occupy defensive positions in these areas in order to counter enemy 

attacks. The objective is to provide the base additional early warning, deter enemy actions 

and, if possible, defeat enemy elements operating in the base cluster. Areas should be 

assigned to cover all likely avenues of approach, areas likely to be used to launch stand-off 

weapons, and other key terrain. 
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-10 

c. Base Security Tactics 

(1) Defense Against Penetrating Attacks. Perimeter primary positions must be 

prepared to prevent hostile forces from penetrating the base and interfering with its primary 

mission. If not capable of defeating enemy threats, the SF must delay the enemy until the 

MSF can respond. The base’s MSF may be used to reinforce threatened areas, to block 

enemy penetrations of primary security positions, or to counterattack in order to regain lost 

security positions or destroy the attacking force. The MSF should be mounted in vehicles 

that provide as much personal protection as possible. SF should be equipped with reliable 

communications and should have sensors and devices to compensate for capability loss 

during periods of limited visibility. Aviation and naval support may be requested to 

augment the capabilities of base SF and enhance reconnaissance and surveillance 

operations. Sensors and defensive positions are employed on the base boundaries to 

provide indications and warning or detect and defeat the enemy. Joint fires are planned in 

detail to ensure the synchronization and integration of joint fire support capabilities, in 

support of the base defense and MSF. Forces (augmentation and selectively armed 

personnel) may be directed to secure facilities within the base vital to performance of the 

base’s mission. Examples are the BDOC, ammunition storage areas, and aircraft 

revetments. SF require careful fire control to prevent fratricide. 

(2) Defense Against Standoff Attacks. Standoff attackers are a fleeting target. 

Level I and II threats depend on blending in with the legitimate populace and only reveal 

themselves as combatants when they engage in a hostile act. It is not feasible to catch every 

terrorist or guerilla before they act, so the best practice is to shape the base security 

environment with robust defense operations within the base boundary. 

(a) These proactive combat operations deny the enemy key terrain; disrupt 

enemy planning, reconnaissance, and organization; detect the enemy as they move into 

position; and posture forces to quickly neutralize detected forces. 

(b) Robust tactical real-time ISR assets, to include HUMINT, within the base 

boundary can also act as a force multiplier to cue joint fires and forces. Some of these 

tactical ISR assets may also need to be located outside of the base boundary to provide early 

warning of threats and request area commander combat power to counter threats. 

(c) For imminent threats originating outside the base boundary when the area 

commander is not able to assist due to competing priorities, the base commander must 

either use base security combat power to counter the threat with the permission of the area 

commander or assume the risk from enemy standoff attacks. 

(d) The HN may also limit the base commander’s ability to counter standoff 

attacks. In these cases, the use of joint patrols and/or liaisons officers may allow the base 

commander to affect their battlespace. Inability to adequately defend the base as a result of 

the host nation’s limitations on the base boundary must be communicated up the chain of 

command to revise existing agreements or accept the risk 
Security of Bases and Base Clusters 

IV-9 

d. Other Base Security Considerations

(1) Direct Fire Weapons Systems. The base and/or port security force 

commanders should try to maximize the effectiveness of all available organic direct fire 

weapon system capabilities. Heavy direct fire weapons (often limited to heavy machine 

guns and automatic grenade launchers) must cover the most likely avenues of approach and 

have sufficient fields of fire to employ the weapons effectively and efficiently. 

Improvements to these positions should be continuous and range cards should be 

developed. If possible, in-place live fire training should be conducted. Often, civil 

considerations may limit the commander’s authority to clear fields of fire and to conduct 

live fire training, especially if the base is adjacent to a major urban area. 

(2) Antiarmor Weapons. Forces performing base security actions generally 

have few organic antiarmor weapons. Antiarmor weapons, including tanks, will be 

positioned to cover the most likely high-speed avenues of approach in mutually supporting 

positions. The base defense plan will assign positions for augmentation forces possessing 

antiarmor weapons. 

(3) Indirect Fire Systems. Mortars, field artillery, and even naval surface fire 

can support the base security effort. In Level I and II threat environments, mortars are often 

the most readily available and most responsive indirect fire weapons systems. 

(a) Fire Support Planning. The BDOC fire support officer is the focal point 

for the planning of indirect fires for base security. The BDOC fire support officer 

coordinates with the supporting fires cell (FC) or fire support coordination center (FSCC). 

Designated or planned targets should include areas likely to be used as locations for 

standoff weapons and likely enemy avenues of approach. These targets should be 

planned to minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties. Copies of fire support 

plans and target lists must be provided to the headquarters controlling the fire support 

assets. Targets may be planned outside the base boundary after coordination with the 

headquarters responsible for the area concerned. The BDOC and FSCC will ensure that all 

fire missions are properly coordinated to prevent the possibility of fratricide. 

(b) Fire Support Coordination Measures. FSCMs permit or restrict fires 

in and around bases. Careful coordination must take place in planning these measures, 

especially with the HN. No-fire areas may be required to protect civilians or to prevent 

disruption of missions by friendly fire. 

(c) Observers. Fire support units normally will not furnish observers to 

bases. Observers with appropriate training should be identified on each base to control 

supporting fires. 

JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, and applicable Service publications provide additional 

information on fire support planning and FSCMs. 
Chapter IV 

IV-10 JP 3-10 

(4) Close Air Support (CAS). The supporting FC or FSCC will maintain contact 

with the appropriate air control system to request CAS for base security efforts. When 

available, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) may be 

used to extend the range of observation and provide immediate combat response to threats. 

See JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, for more information on CAS. 

(5) Other Aviation Support. The BDOC and BCOC, with other C2 centers, 

coordinate other aspects of aviation support. Examples include air reconnaissance of the 

base or base cluster area and air movement of base security. They may also coordinate to 

manage air support priorities and diversions for emergency resupply, personnel 

augmentation, and evacuation. 

(6) Coastal and Harbor Security Support. The supporting MESF commander 

will maintain contact with the maritime component commander to provide waterborne and 

shore security for seaports and bases that are adjacent to navigable waters, excluding air and 

missile security. When available, USCG and Navy coastal security resources may be used 

to extend the range of observation and provide immediate combat response to waterborne 

threats. 

(7) Vulnerability to Release of Toxic Industrial Materials (TIMs). Base 

security planners must consider the threat of personnel TIM exposure due to TIM attack or 

accidental TIM release from adjacent industrial facilities such as chemical plants, nuclear 

power facilities, etc. Establish communications with industrial security forces for these 

facilities and a process for immediate notification of TIM release. 

(8) Barriers, Obstacles, and Mines. The commander directs the construction 

and improvement of perimeter barriers. This includes establishing clear fields of fire and 

implementing physical security measures such as checkpoints on vehicle and pedestrian 

routes leading into the base, and port security units boarding suspect vessels. Concrete 

barriers, natural obstacles, and aggressive offensive actions can deny enemy access to the 

area immediately surrounding the base. Keeping the enemy at a distance degrades his 

ability to launch damaging attacks on the base. The commander should continue to direct 

improvement in the base defense, as time and other resources permit, to ensure a stable 

security system. Obstacles must be kept under observation and covered by direct and 

indirect fires. Some obstacles may be useful only for certain threat levels. For example, 

chain-link fencing may constitute a useful obstacle against Level I threats if well patrolled, 

but will be ineffective against higher-level threats. The use of mines will be very limited, if 

authorized at all. 

See JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations, and numerous 

Service publications for more information on barriers, obstacles, and mines. 

(9) Physical Facilities. Commanders must stress continuous upgrading for base 

physical security. Activities occupying fixed bases will have opportunities for installing 

sophisticated security equipment not available to units in mobile bases. Hardening of high 
Security of Bases and Base Clusters 

IV-11 

value areas within the base must be planned for, resources must be obtained, and actions 

carried out. Plans for base construction must consider ADC, fortification, survivability, and 

barrier/obstacles. 

For more information on building standards, see Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 

4-010-01, DOD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, and the numerous Corps 

of Engineers Guidance Sheets. 

(a) Intrusion Detection. Defenders can place sensors on likely avenues of 

approach, locating them at the limits of the defense or outside the defense if coordinated 

with adjacent commands. Directed ground and sea surveillance radar and airborne forwardlooking infrared systems, if available, can improve the chances of detecting intrusions early. 

Remotely monitored sensors, trip flares, binoculars, night vision devices, unmanned aircraft 

systems, and other nonlethal warning devices can also be useful. Dummy sensors at OPs 

and concealed surveillance resources also should be considered. 

(b) Observation. To improve observation, defenders should clear the 

ground to the front of positions and from near perimeter fences by cutting foliage or 

applying defoliant. See JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear (CBRN) Environments, for more discussion. Perimeter roads on either side of the 

fence improve observation. A combination of concertina wire, lighting, surveillance 

cameras, and intrusion sensors enhances base security. Observation sites in guard towers or 

atop buildings can increase the surveillance capabilities of perimeter guards. In urban areas, 

leveling of adjacent buildings may be required, but these types of measures must be 

carefully weighed against the potential negative impact that they may have on the local 

civilian population. 

(c) Entrances. The base should have as few entrances as possible. These 

entrances should meet existing CCDR and other published FP requirements. Control of the 

entrances must be balanced against threat and base mission requirements. 

(d) Working and Living Areas. Buildings housing personnel and sensitive 

equipment should have adequate standoff from the perimeter as required by combatant 

command’s standards and the UFC. Shelters with reinforced and sandbagged roofs should 

be near all working and living areas, to serve both as shelters and fighting positions. 

For more information on building standards, see UFC 4-010-01, DOD Minimum 

Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, and the numerous Corps of Engineers Guidance 

Sheets. 

(e) Medical Treatment Facilities. Medical treatment facilities should be 

located and marked IAW the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Medical units must 

not be used in an attempt to shield military objectives from attack and where possible 

should be so sited that attacks against military objectives do not imperil their safety. Base 

or base cluster commanders may direct otherwise only in circumstances dictated by 

operational imperatives. These commanders will seek authorization through the chain of 
Chapter IV 

IV-12 JP 3-10 

command. Medical treatment facilities may be guarded by a picket or by sentries or by an 

escort. However, the guards are primarily to protect patients and medical personnel from 

marauders and bandits. Medical personnel are noncombatants and therefore shall not be 

employed in any combatant related duties. 

(f) Base physical security plans must ensure adequate protection for mission 

essential vulnerable areas and task critical assets. 

(10) Operations Security (OPSEC) and Deception in Support of Operations 

Security. OPSEC and deception operations must be integral to all planning and execution 

of any JSO. OPSEC and deception measures encompass several areas, some of which are; 

visual, sonic, electronic and olfactory (smell). Effective OPSEC and deceptive measures 

multiply the combat power of security operations by keeping the enemy ignorant of security 

activities and can cause him to act out of that ignorance, forcing him to make tactical, 

operational, or even strategic errors. Exploitation of those errors causes enemy plans and 

actions to fail, improving the overall security posture of the base or base cluster. OPSEC 

measures must be constant and effectively guarded to avoid compromise. Execution of 

good OPSEC demands that friendly security forces do not establish observable patterns, 

unless those patterns are part of a well-constructed deception plan. Deception measures 

must support the mission and be credible for the intended audience. Since deception does 

not occur without enemy observation, the commander must ensure that the enemy will 

interpret deceptive actions in a manner that is advantageous to the security plan. 

For more information on OPSEC, see JP 3-13.3, Operations Security; for more information 

on deception, see JP 3-13.4, Military Deception. 

(11) Riverine Operations. Rivers and other inland waterways provide 

significant transportation routes in much of the world. As such, security forces throughout 

the JSA may be called upon to either secure a river or inland waterway or utilize the 

waterway to secure the JSA itself. Additionally, riverine forces may be required to provide 

LOC security. 

(12) Nonlethal Weapons Systems. Nonlethal weapons provide commanders 

with additional escalation-of-force options before having to resort to lethal force. These 

weapons should be fully considered in any base security plan to help minimize civilian 

casualties and property damage. A variety of nonlethal weapons exist to assist in discerning 

intent, delaying and deterring individuals, and discriminating targets in a variety of 

situations that occur in Level 1 threat environments. 

5. Countering a Level III Threat 

 In some operations, there may be a conventional force Level III threat. In these 

situations, the JFC must consider and plan for combat operations in the JSA. Area 

commanders assigned a JSA as part of their AO must develop and organize TCFs and/or 

PSUs that are properly trained, led, and equipped to concentrate the necessary combat 

power at the decisive time and place. Defeating Level III threats within the JSA will ensure 
Security of Bases and Base Clusters 

IV-13 

support bases can continue vital sustainment operations. Area commanders must also 

ensure that appropriate active and passive measures are taken in the JSA to protect US 

forces and equipment. 

REAR AREA SECURITY — VIETNAM 

Even though a “rear area” in Vietnam could not be defined by 

established linear boundaries, there were isolated pockets (de facto rear 

areas) that were considered to be relatively secure and yet found to be 

vulnerable to a determined enemy attack. The city of Saigon before the 

1968 TET Offensive is an example. Saigon was an insulated city. Aside 

from occasional incidents of small-scale terrorism during more than 20 

years of civil strife, the Communists had done little to disturb the sense 

of security enjoyed by most Saigonese. Defended by 10 Army of the 

Republic of Vietnam battalions and a division-sized national police force, 

and encircled by a series of major US command centers and bases, the 

capital seemed invulnerable to serious attack. TET would change that. 

Despite initial success, North Vietnamese attacks into the “rear area” 

eventually failed, but not before changing the course of the war. 

SOURCE: Multiple Sources 

a. General. Level III threats can result from enemy forces infiltrating or penetrating 

friendly positions and moving into the friendly operational area, or conducting airborne, air 

assault, or amphibious operations. The designated land force commander has several 

options to deal with the threat. The commander may establish a TCF to deal with such a 

threat; designate another force as the on-order TCF; or, accept the risk of not having a 

designated TCF. If required, the commander may establish a number of TCFs IAW the 

Level III threat and the JFC’s guidance. Designating more than one TCF provides flexibility 

of response to competing needs. The primary advantage of having a dedicated, rather than 

an on-order, TCF is the assurance that the TCF can focus the force’s planning and prepares 

activities for one mission. This includes establishing liaison and communications with 

supported bases and base cluster BDOCs and BCOCs. It also allows the dedicated TCF to 

rehearse its plans. When the designated commander assigns a subordinate unit an on-order 

TCF mission, there must be established criteria on when to commit that unit as the TCF. 

The tenets for successful combat operations in the JSA are knowledge of the enemy, unity 

of command, economy of force, and responsiveness. 

b. Tactical Combat Force. Actual and potential Level III threats to the JSA may 

require the area commander to designate a TCF that can respond to the threat and protect 

the forces in the JSA. The area commander decides the composition of the TCF after 

weighing the risk of allocating forces to the TCF and thus decreasing the combat power 

available elsewhere. The size of a TCF will be based on METT-T. The TCF must be 

extremely mobile and capable of moving by air and ground because of limited reaction time 

and extended distances between units common to the JSA. It should be capable of 

defeating armored vehicles and dismounted infantry. Consequently, a TCF typically 

consists of infantry, Army or Marine Corps aviation (attack and utility helicopters), and air 
Chapter IV 

IV-14 JP 3-10 

cavalry elements augmented with combat engineer and field artillery support. The 

commander may also organize a TCF with armored cavalry, armor, mechanized infantry 

units and naval attack aircraft and boats and vessels providing naval air and surface fire 

support if the situation so dictates. A TCF should have a full array of combat and combat 

support assets allocated to it to accomplish the mission. A TCF may have available support 

from the following types of assets: 

(1) Military intelligence (includes CI). 

(2) Field artillery. 

(3) Engineers. 

(4) Army or Marine Corps aviation (attack, air cavalry, air assault, C2, and 

possibly special electronic mission aircraft). 

(5) MP/security police. 

(6) CAS. 

(7) Air defense artillery. 

(8) Area signal nodes. 

(9) Navy and USCG vessels and aircraft. 

 Any or all of these types of assets may not be immediately available to the TCF on its 

commitment. They are limited assets and may be engaged in other missions. The force 

conducting the JSA security mission may also receive support from other US and allied 

Services, including the HN. 

c. Responsibilities of the JFC. The JFC’s plans for combat actions in the JSA must 

be designed to optimize the use of all available US, multinational and/or HN forces. If 

determined that a TCF is warranted, the JFC (or designated representative) provides 

mission guidance to the responsible component or area commander owning the TCF. 

d. Responsibilities of the commander assigned the JSA within an AO. The 

commander responsible for the security of the JSA will normally exercise TACON over the 

TCF. He ensures the TCF is properly established, trained, and supported. This commander 

normally will be responsible to coordinate TCF actions ICW the subordinate base cluster 

and commanders within the JSA. 

e. Responsibilities of the TCF commander. The TCF will normally be under the C2 

of the commander assigned the AO in which it is operating. MSFs designated by the JFC in 

the designated operational area may be placed under the TACON of the TCF commander. 

The TCF commander may also receive TACON of transient forces in an emergency, as 
Security of Bases and Base Clusters 

IV-15 

directed by appropriate higher headquarters and IAW conditions established in JP 1, 

Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. In addition, the TCF commander may 

receive joint fire support as directed by appropriate higher command. Finally, the TCF 

commander receives necessary liaison from component or other joint force commands 

(normally, liaison from component commands with area responsibilities comes from 

RAOCs or RTOCs). 

f. Base Security in Level III Threat Environments. Bases are often very difficult to 

defend against Level III threats. When there is the possibility of a Level III threat against a 

base, extraordinary action may be required. These actions could include, but are not limited 

to: 

(1) Significant additions to MSF capabilities. 

(2) Employment of additional barriers and mines outside and around the base 

boundary. 

(3) Developing extended, in depth individual defensive positions. 

(4) Increased training and rehearsal of base defense actions to include rehearsal of 

MSF and TCF coordination. 

(5) Enhanced fire support. 

(6) Increased port security patrols. 

(7) Improve integrated air and missile defense. 

g. Coordinating Base Defense and TCF Actions. During Level III operations, the 

area commander retains overall C2 for security within the JSA. However, ICW the 

base/base cluster commander, the area commander may decide to delegate TACON over 

selected SF located in the TCF’s operational area to the TCF commander, excluding air 

defense forces, which remain under the JFACC/AADC. These forces are used to delay and 

disrupt Level III threats, protect the flank of a TCF, or allow a base time to establish 

security in greater depth. Some base SF necessary for the protection of critical base assets 

may remain under the control of the base commander. MSF units within the perimeter 

work closely with the BDOC/BCOC to ensure a synchronized security plan is in place. 

BDOCs and/or BCOCs will establish and maintain contact with the tactical operations 

center of the area commander or the TCF as ordered. Upon notification by a base or base 

cluster commander through the BDOC or BCOC that a threat exceeds a base’s security 

capabilities, the area commander may commit the TCF. The situation will dictate the C2 

relationship between the security forces or TCF and the base security force as well as 

whether planned arrangements should be modified. 
Chapter IV 

IV-16 JP 3-10 

6. Air Base Defense Considerations 

Air Base Approach and Departure Corridor Security. Aircraft are especially 

vulnerable when operating in the “low and slow” take-off and landing flight regimes. Air 

base approach and departure corridor security operations provide for the safety of aircraft 

from the shoulder-launched surface-to-air threat as they take off and land at air bases. Base 

commanders of any Service, who command installations with active airfields, must identify 

considerations for planning and securing air operations at airfields subject to threat systems. 

This should include approach and departure corridors used by the aircraft. They must also 

determine the best tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter and/or neutralize the 

surface-to-air threat, and identify seams within the joint force as they relate to securing 

aircraft arrivals and departures against surface-to-air threats. Threats to aircraft may be 

launched from a considerable distance from the air base. In the ideal case the base 

commander has sufficient forces attached and an appropriately sized base boundary to 

counter these threats. Base, base cluster, and area commanders must all be aware of the 

nature of these threats and share the responsibility to counter them. 

a. Planning. Planning airfield approach and departure air corridor security requires 

the integration of air operations into the theater air plan, plotting shoulder-launched SAM 

footprints and defining approach and departure corridor security procedures. Air base 

commanders typically coordinate base boundaries with the area commander to ensure such 

boundaries provide appropriate protection for aircraft using approach and departure 

corridors. Depending on the air base capabilities, these areas may be within the base 

boundaries and the security provided by the base commander. 

b. Threats to Air Bases. Airfield security and local area assessments should be 

conducted to identify the area of vulnerability to direct fire, indirect fire and shoulderlaunched SAM threats (in terms of possible launch sites) to include the airfield arrival and 

departure corridors. A thorough assessment should include the capabilities of SF, 

intelligence, CI, and operational personnel as well as local/HN authorities. 

(1) Criteria to identify possible direct fire, indirect fire and shoulder-launched 

SAM launch sites include but are not limited to: 

(a) Cover and concealment — the ability of an object to conceal and prevent 

detection by friendly forces, and to provide protection for the adversary from return fire. 

(b) Line of sight providing unobstructed view of the target. 

(c) Exposure time — the amount of time the intended target is vulnerable 

from an operational attack. 

(d) Distance to target and the range of the adversary’s weapons systems as 

well as target recognition for the adversary to positively identify the intended target. Set up 

time required for an adversary’s fire team to assemble into an attack position. 
Security of Bases and Base Clusters 

IV-17 

(e) The amount of time it takes to detect an adversary’s fire team once their 

weapons are exposed. 

(2) Because potential launch sites may be located some distance outside the 

existing base or installation fence-line, base commanders and area commanders must 

coordinate actions to protect airfields from attack. Actions include establishment of an 

appropriately delineated base boundary, defensive efforts and the allocation of resources to 

detect, deter, and destroy this threat to airfield operations and personnel. 

(3) The preferred method is to deny an attacker access to potential launch sites, 

however that may not always be possible. Base, base cluster, and area commanders, 

depending on the situation, should develop and exercise contingency plans for responding 

to an incident of direct fire, indirect fire or shoulder-launched surface to air attack. Rapid 

reaction plans will facilitate the immediate engagement of an adversary attack or postattack, to deter/prevent future attacks and ease concern for air travel safety by the public at 

large. 

c. Direct and Indirect Fire Threats

(1) Vulnerability assessments should be conducted to identify the areas from 

which direct and indirect fire threats can attack lucrative ground targets such as mass 

gathering areas or parked aircraft. 

(2) Consider dispersal of parked aircraft to reduce damage from direct or indirect 

fire attacks, such as rocket propelled grenades. 

d. Shoulder-Launched SAM System Threats

(1) The Defense Intelligence Agency-Missile and Space Intelligence Center has 

flight path threat analysis simulation (FPTAS) software that allows the local commander to 

quantify the areas of greatest shoulder-launched SAM threat. FPTAS uses aircraft 

performance, flight path data, missile characteristics, and digital terrain elevation data to 

generate maps depicting areas from which shoulder-launched SAMs could engage US and 

allied aircraft. Commanders use these maps to identify flight paths with minimum exposure 

to the shoulder-launched SAM threat and to adjust take off/landing patterns to limit their 

exposure and use areas readily secured by ground troops. This software can be downloaded 

at the Defense Intelligence Agency-Missile and Space Intelligence Center website. 

(2) Most CCDRs have designated their Air Force component as the office of 

primary responsibility for maintaining a database with current intelligence and operations 

information on select countries and airfields, to include a shoulder-launched SAM target 

acquisition. For example, Air Mobility Command (AMC), maintains the Virtual Threat 

Assessor. This database is used to determine the requirement for aircraft defensive systems 

to counter the shoulder-launched SAM threat; and on a more basic level, to determine 

whether nondefensive system equipped AMC military and commercial aircraft will be 
Chapter IV 

IV-18 JP 3-10 

permitted to operate into those countries or airfields. This information can assist the 

JFACC making their own policy decisions for aircraft operations at those same locations. 

(3) There are two areas where commanders should employ mitigation measures to 

counter the shoulder-launched SAM threat: airfield/installation defense and reducing 

aircraft in-flight susceptibility. 

(a) The following are points to consider in developing base defense plans in 

regard to airfield/installation defense and the shoulder-launched SAM threat. 

1. Once an analysis of possible launch sites is accomplished, prime 

shoulder-launched SAM launch sites and vulnerable areas can be isolated by expanding the 

base boundary or airfield area of control and reducing areas of vulnerability. The following 

mitigation measures may require coordination with local/HN authorities: 

a. Increased physical presence at prime launch sites. Visual 

observation of security teams is a strong deterrent. 

b. Focused and random patrols of potential launch sites. 

Incorporate random patrols into the base defense plan. 

c. Employment of technical equipment to detect and respond to the 

various threats. 

2. Ensuring personnel are educated on the shoulder-launched SAM 

threat (to include component recognition), areas of vulnerability, and reaction plans. 

Develop and provide shoulder-launched SAM awareness training for security force 

personnel and local/HN authorities. Develop a shoulder-launched SAM awareness program 

for neighborhood watch groups and local business/installation facilities in close proximity 

to airfields or along flight paths. The Defense Intelligence Agency Missile and Space 

Intelligence Center has a web site in their Operation ENDURING FREEDOM section with 

a shoulder-launched SAM link that is a good source of information on shoulder-launched 

SAM systems. 

(b) To reduce aircraft in flight susceptibility due to the shoulder-launched 

SAM threat, consider the following when developing base defense plans: 

1. Establishing airfield specific procedures for the use of aircrew tactical 

countermeasures and/or tactics. Development and dissemination may require coordination 

with local/HN authorities. Ensure aircrew awareness of launch identification and the 

possible effect of shoulder-launched SAM on their aircraft. Ensure aircrews and flight 

operations are tied into the AMC intelligence combined risk assessment database to obtain 

current information on airfield security assessments. 
Security of Bases and Base Clusters 

IV-19 

2. Varying arrival and departure times of aircraft. Stagger the arrival 

times of normal scheduled missions to make arrival, departure, and ground times harder to 

predict for the adversary. 

3. Randomly change approach and departure routes as a deterrent (IAW 

current Federal Aviation Administration guidelines). 

4. Limit or discontinue use of landing lights within identified threat 

zones to reduce heat producing/targeting options. 

5. In high threat areas or when intelligence has indicated a high alert 

status, coordinate, develop, and practice plans for engine-running offloads to minimize 

ground time. 

e. MSF Actions. Command relationships; and tactics, techniques, and procedures 

must be identified to ensure MSF efforts are fully synchronized with air base operations in 

general. 

7. Seaport Facility Defense Considerations 

 When a seaport or marine terminal is part of a formally designated base cluster, the 

base commander will normally be responsible for security within the base boundaries with 

HN, Army, or Marine Corps forces responsible for shore boundary defense and Navy and 

USCG forces providing waterside harbor approach security. However, if the seaport or 

marine terminal is isolated or located outside of a land combat area commander’s AO, the 

designated HDC will normally be given responsibility to secure the seaport or marine 

terminal, as well as the harbor approaches. In these situations, the HDC may be required to 

use organic shore SF to serve as the MSF while other naval personnel provide boundary 

security. In other more high risk situations, the area commander, ICW the JSC and the 

HDC, may decide to provide a MSF from another Service for base security, especially if the 

seaport or marine terminal is isolated. In these situations, the MSF would be placed 

TACON to the HDC. The HDC should be aware that some arriving cargo ships may be 

carrying US Navy embarked security teams. These forces remain on the ship during 

loading/offloading operations and therefore are considered in the overall protection of the 

ship while in port. 
Chapter IV 

IV-20 JP 3-10 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER V 

LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY 

V-1 

“Co-equal with the security of flanks, the maintenance and full use of the lines of 

communications to the rear are of major concern to the commander. It is his 

responsibility that the incoming supply is equal to the needs of his deployments 

and that the supporting arms and fires which have been promised him keep their 

engagements. Or if they do not, he must raise hell about it.” 

Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall 

Men Against Fire 

1. Introduction 

 Successful onward movement of personnel, equipment, and materiel arriving in 

country (during joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration) is vital to the 

success of joint force operations. In some operational environments, the greatest risk to 

joint force operations may be the threat to the main supply routes (MSRs) from the 

ports of debarkation forward to the main battle area (in linear operations) or forward 

operating bases (in nonlinear, noncontiguous operations). This chapter provides 

guidelines for planning and executing surface LOC security operations in support of joint 

operations. This chapter also provides links between JSC LOC security actions with joint 

movement control operations. 

2. Fundamentals of Lines of Communications Security 

 For the purposes of this publication, LOC security operations include the protection 

of ground supply routes, inland waterways, rail lines and pipelines that are used to 

support joint force operations in contingency operations (see Figure V-1). LOC security is 

especially challenging in major combat operations and in sustained, high risk combat and 

follow-on stability operations as seen in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. 

a. Security of LOCs that transit these nonassigned areas will require special 

consideration, especially in Level II and III threat environments. Even when the JFC 

designates a JSA, units may not have sufficient combat capabilities to adequately secure 

them. 

b. The key to successful LOC security is establishing and maintaining proper 

linkages throughout an operational area. The commander designated with responsibility 

for the operational area is responsible for security. The JSC remains responsible to the JFC 

for coordination and staff oversight. 

3. Joint Movement Control 

a. The GCC has a wide range of options for performing successful joint movement 

control. Subordinate JFCs and Service components may be directed to carry out their own 

movement, or the GCC may establish a theater level joint transportation board. In some 
Chapter V 

V-2 JP 3-10 

instances a combination of both may exist. The organization charged with movement 

control plans, allocates, coordinates, and deconflicts transportation, as well as establishes 

and operates an in-transit visibility system to assist in tracking theater movements. It also 

establishes the location, identity, and communications facilities of nodes in the 

transportation system and promulgates tasking procedures, cycles, and deadlines. The joint 

movement control plan integrates the transportation capabilities of the component 

commands and provides for centralized planning and decentralized execution and is key to 

an effective movement control system. Only through a disciplined joint movement 

control system can LOC security actions be properly planned for and executed. The 

JSC must work closely with the designated joint movement control organization to ensure 

the movement control plan provides for movements to be conducted in a secure 

environment throughout the operational area. 

b. The planning, routing, scheduling, control and security of personnel and cargo 

movement over LOCs throughout the operational area are vital to the support of the joint 

force. Normally, a JMC coordinates strategic movements with USTRANSCOM and in 

coordination with the JSC, oversees the execution of joint transportation priorities and 

controls movement actions. In major operations, the JMC executes movement control to 

include coordination of convoys passing through higher-level organizational, cross Service, 

and MNF boundaries. 

(1) JSC links to the JMC ensures LOC security is maintained throughout the 

operational area. One viable technique to link the JSC and JMC planning functions is to 

establish a joint LOC security board (JLSB). Basic functions and characteristics of a JLSB 

can be found in Figure V-2. 

(2) The JSC works closely with the JMC to monitor the security of joint 

movements throughout the operational area. The JSC may use assessment teams and 

recommend adjustment of security forces based on threats to movement security. 

FUNDAMENTALS OF

LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

LOC security is an operation, not a logistic function

LOC security in Level II and III threat conditions will require

dedicated security force capabilities

LOC security actions must be closely synchronized with

joint movement control operations

LOC line of communications

Figure V-1. Fundamentals of Lines of Communications Security
Lines of Communications Security 

V-3 

(3) A joint deployment and distribution operations center (JDDOC) is a joint 

capability solution designed to synchronize and optimize intertheater and theater 

deployment, distribution, and sustainment operations within a GCC’s AOR. The JDDOC is 

an integrated operations and fusion center (movement control organization), acting in 

consonance with the GCC’s overall requirements and priorities, and on behalf of the GCC, 

may direct common user and intratheater distribution operations. The JMC will work 

closely with the JDDOC. 

For further information on movement control see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and JP 4-09, 

Distribution Operations. 

4. Security of Lines of Communications 

 The primary threats to movement along ground LOCs in Level I and II threat 

environments are mines, ambushes, IEDs and VBIEDs. IEDs and VBIEDs may 

incorporate chemical or radiological material to create exposure and contamination hazards. 

Level III threats may include risk from air and ground conventional force interdiction. 

JOINT LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY BOARD

FUNCTIONS

MAKE UP

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff J-3 operations directorate of a joint staffLOC line of communications

JSC Joint Security Coordinator

BATTLE RHYTHM

Assesses and reports current LOC security status

Assesses and reports LOC security capability shortfalls

JSC Lead (or J-3 if there is no JSC)

Joint movement center/joint transportation representative

J-2 representative

Provost marshal representative

Others as required (weather, civil affairs, legal)

Normally meets on a daily basis or operates full time based on

joint force commander guidance.

Figure V-2. Joint Lines of Communications Security Board
Chapter V 

V-4 JP 3-10 

Land LOCs, rail lines and pipelines may also be vulnerable to demolitions, sniper fire, and 

indirect fire. Commanders and their staff develop LOC security requirements and identify 

appropriate risk mitigation measures to ensure LOCs remain open. Logistic personnel 

should synchronize these measures with joint security operations. Certain units, such as 

NAVELSG, rely on the supported commander to provide force protection. 

a. Active Security. The active LOC security techniques include measures initiated to 

achieve positive control of the LOCs and reduce the threat. Active security includes: 

(1) Patrols. 

(2) Snipers. 

(3) Fighting positions along LOCs. 

(4) Check points. 

(5) Route sweeps. 

b. Cordon Security Operations. Cordon security operations are area defense 

missions that support a specific route for a designated period during which multiple 

movements take place. They are used to establish a security cordon in order to allow safe 

Land forces provide cordon security along a main supply route 

during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
Lines of Communications Security 

V-5 

passage for personnel, accompanying materiel and/or units transiting high-risk portions of 

the operational area. Cordon security requires appropriate land combat arms capabilities 

and other resources to properly observe and secure the designated route. Cordon operations 

may be used to establish a reserved route that is used exclusively by military or designated 

USG and NGO support actions. The JFC must consider the resources and possible negative 

civil impact of this particular LOC security operation. 

(1) Movement Corridors. Commanders typically use a variety of tactics, 

techniques, and procedures to complement LOC security operations. One such procedure is 

the establishment of movement corridors. A movement corridor is established to a secure 

ground LOC that connects two or more support areas within the operational area that 

complements cordon security operations and is part of a layered and integrated security 

approach to LOCs. A layered security typically normally consists of a number concentric 

rings that provide increased survivability and response measures. The width and depth of 

the movement corridor will be dependant on METT-T and the GCCs’ guidance. 

(2) Security cordons protect the LOCs by keeping enemy forces more focused on 

the security force than on engaging vulnerable forces moving along the LOCs. Cordon 

security is provided by two or more combat outposts positioned to provide mutual support. 

The JSC, via the JFC’s J-3, normally assigns a specific area commander with responsibility 

for this mission. The area commander uses selected air assault, mechanized, or motorized 

combat units to man combat outposts at critical locations along the assigned route. 

Notionally, a combat outpost would be composed of a mechanized or motorized platoonsize element equipped with automatic weapons, communications, and sensors and would be 

supported by dedicated fire support assets. Outpost and patrol duties are performed on a 

rotational basis. On waterway LOCs, motorized land forces may not be available or may 

not be sufficient to provide the cordon. In this case, patrol boats armed in similar fashion 

would provide or reinforce security. 

(3) One of the primary responsibilities of the cordon commander is to collect and 

disseminate route combat information. This information is provided to higher headquarters, 

the JSC and all units moving or scheduled to move along the designated route. In some 

cordon operations, the cordon outposts may also serve as communications relay sites. 

(4) Combat outposts are located within supporting distance of each other 

whenever possible. Units assigned to these combat outposts provide MSFs in the event of 

enemy activity along the route within their assigned cordon. Forces based at these combat 

outposts conduct random or directed reconnaissance patrols, UAS sorties, and/or offensive 

operations to counter enemy activities between these two points on a frequent but irregular 

schedule. If available, rotary- or even fixed-wing aircraft may be used to assist in cordon 

security operations. The presence of rotary- or fixed-wing assets can provide significant 

enhancements to LOC security. 

c. Passive Security. Passive LOC security techniques include measures initiated to 

achieve security without a significant expenditure of manpower or resources. Passive LOC 

security techniques include the following. 
Chapter V 

V-6 JP 3-10 

(1) Formation and march control of convoys with convoy security so they present 

the least lucrative target possible under prevailing conditions. 

(2) Security related driving techniques (speed of march, actions on contact, 

overwatch positions). 

(3) Proper selection of routes. 

(4) Variations of convoy departure times. 

(5) OPSEC measures. 

(6) Capitalizing on security offered by other activities not related to the LOC’s 

security requirements enhance security along LOCs. These activities include aircraft 

traversing the LOC, maintenance activities taking place along the LOC, training exercises 

or troop movements adjacent to or along the LOC, HN military and police traffic control 

activities, and the activities of the civilian population. The commander uses passive 

security for all conditions or situations and as an adjunct to any other technique of LOC 

security employed. They are the products of a long-term and continually improved program 

for an integrated security system. 

For more information on convoy operations, see FM 4-01.45/Marine Corps Reference 

Publication (MCRP) 4-11.3H/NTTP 4-01.3/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

(AFTTP) 3-2.58, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy 

Operations. 

d. Reconnaissance and Surveillance. LOC reconnaissance and surveillance 

addresses not only MSRs, pipelines and waterways, but may include the terrain along the 

LOCs that the enemy could use to influence the joint force’s movement. LOC 

reconnaissance and surveillance takes place at irregular intervals to avoid developing a 

regular pattern that an enemy force could exploit. Route reconnaissance and surveillance 

techniques can include the following: 

(1) Use of manned aircraft or UASs.

(2) HN military or police physical reconnaissance/traffic control actions.

LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS — IRAQ 

In the spring of 2004, insurgents destroyed seven vital bridges along the 

main supply routes in Iraq. The unexpected loss of these bridges led to 

serious supply shortages until bypasses were found and repairs were 

made. 

SOURCE: Various Open Sources 
Lines of Communications Security 

V-7 

(3) Coordinating combat arms land force patrols and other actions, along selected 

LOCs. 

(4) Waterway patrols. 

5. Other Considerations

a. Risk Management. The JFC, normally through a JSC, uses the risk management 

process and the JLSB (if established) as well as directs staff coordination process to assess 

risk to LOC security. The JSC works closely with the JFC’s J-2, J-3, and logistics 

directorate of a joint staff/JMC and other key special staff elements and component 

representatives, HN, other US agencies, and MNFs to determine risk to LOC security and 

measures to defeat or mitigate these risks. The JSC must ensure there is a dedicated process 

to assist commanders and staffs at all levels to reduce, mitigate, or defeat risks to forces 

transiting surface LOCs. LOC security planning must be linked directly to the JFC JIPOE 

process and updates must be disseminated and shared as they are identified. The JSC 

identifies risk, develops potential courses of action, assesses and addresses resource 

requirements, implements the actions (through subordinate commanders) and then monitors 

the LOC security actions. The specific steps in the risk management process are: identify 

threats, assess threats to determine risk, develop control or security measures, make risk 

assessment decisions, implement control and security measures, and review these measures 

for continued use. 

SUPPLY ROUTE TAMPA 

In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, US Army military police forces were used 

to provide limited route security along main supply route TAMPA from 

the border of Kuwait north to the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. A key part 

of this mission was to provide tactical communication relay capability. 

This nontraditional mission was required due to the length and criticality 

of the main supply routes as well as the lack of other communications 

options. 

SOURCE: Army Transportation Battalion Commander’s 

End-of-Tour Report 

b. Civil Considerations. The JFC, normally through the JSC, must be careful to take 

civil considerations into account when planning LOC security related actions. LOC 

security actions can and will have an effect on the civilian population as well on other USG 

and NGO support actions in the operational area. In some instances, the JFC may 

determine it is necessary to temporarily designate a route for military use only. This 

decision has the potential to have a negative impact on the local population as well as USG 

and NGO support actions. Even if the JFC does not fully restrict a route from civilian 

traffic, LOC security actions can have a negative impact. It is imperative that all LOC 

security related decisions be coordinated with the JFC CMO staff. 
Chapter V 

V-8 JP 3-10 

For further information on CMO, see Chapter III, “Planning,” and JP 3-57, Civil-Military 

Operations. 

c. Communications and Reporting Requirements. In a joint environment, 

regulation of transportation and LOC security will prevent congestion and enforce the LOC 

security plan. Robust and well-planned communications and reporting requirements must 

be planned for and resourced. Often, resources to support LOC are unreliable and/or 

unavailable and may require reallocation of available communications resources by the JFC 

communications system directorate of a joint staff. Joint transportation planners must 

determine which LOC requires joint control and which ones will be regulated via area 

commanders. The traffic regulation reporting plan must be coordinated with and support 

LOC security requirements. To accomplish successful movement, the transportation 

system must be linked to an information and communications system, to include the JSC 

and his staff on behalf of the JFC. These systems provide data in time to adjust the 

responses of the terminals and nodes along LOCs. In some cases, a dedicated LOC security 

frequency may be designated. In extreme cases, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar 

System may be used to assist in the LOC security mission. 
APPENDIX A 

JOINT SECURITY OPERATIONS CENTERS 

A-1 

1. Joint Security Coordination Center 

a. JSCC Basic Functions. The JSCC conducts 24-hour operations and its primary 

responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following. 

(1) Coordinate and oversee overall current and future security operations within 

the AOR and/or the JOA. Monitor emergency service, FP, AT, physical security, base and 

base cluster defense plans, and FPWG policies, plans, and operations to ensure applicability 

with operation plans, orders, directives, policies, and regulations. 

(2) Ensure the JFC’s operational vulnerability assessment and assistance program 

(VAAP) provides assistance and advice on risk mitigation measures to all bases, base 

clusters, LOCs, APODs, SPODs, and other organizations or facilities located in the AOR 

and/or the JOA. 

(3) Prepare policy, plans and guidance on JSO for implementation by 

subordinates assigned within an AOR and/or the JOA. 

(4) Assist the J-3 in the preparation of joint security plans and orders relating to 

current operations. When necessary, coordinate with the J-3 in order to deconflict specific 

JSO with on-going, planned operations. 

(5) Keep the JSC informed of the current situation within the AOR and/or the 

JOA and apprised of all joint security operations, including enemy, friendly, and civilian 

activities. 

(6) Monitor the current status of assigned or attached security forces and other 

resources and provide information to aid, allocate, and move forces and material as 

necessary. 

(7) Ensure the participation of units within the AOR and/or the JOA in 

conducting active and passive security measures to include integration of the IADS. 

(8) Identify and prioritize allocation of resources to defeat or mitigate 

vulnerabilities. 

(9) Provide for centralized collection and processing of information from various 

intelligence and operational sources and disseminating and sharing resultant intelligence 

products to include all joint security related base and LOC threat conditions, weather, 

hazards, etc. 

(10) As required, provide members to JLSB (if JLSB is stood up). 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-10 

(11) Prepare operational reports as required; also maintain a staff journal, display 

and file necessary items to record operational activities of the joint command. 

b. Unique Positions and Responsibilities Within the JSCC 

(1) Joint Security Coordinator. Principal staff officer responsible for the 

planning and preparation of JSO throughout the operational area.

(2) Chief of Staff / Deputy, Joint Security Coordinator. Assistant to the JSC 

for the planning and preparation of JSO throughout the operational area. Responsible for 

coordinating actions and directing the JSCC staff for the JSC. 

2. Base Defense Operations Center 

 Basic BDOC Functions. The BDOC conducts 24-hour operations and its primary 

functions include, but are not limited to the following. 

a. Provide the C2 organization necessary to conduct coordinated base security 

operations. 

b. Prepare plans to implement the base commander’s overall base defense guidance. 

c. Plan and execute FP, AT, and physical security operations IAW published guidance. 

d. Conduct FPWG and threat working group. 

e. Monitor the current status of assigned, attached, and tenant unit forces and resources 

and provide information to aid, allocate, and move forces and material to meet base defense 

requirements. 

f. Identify and communicate any base defense shortfalls to the base cluster commander 

or JSC, as well as Service or applicable functional component command. 

g. Keep the base commander informed of the current base security situation. 

h. Ensure the participation of all units within the base perimeter in conducting active 

and passive security measures. Monitor and direct guard forces as necessary. 

i. Assess potential conflicting interests and operational demands of base forces 

inherent when operating in multi-Service or multinational environment. 

j. Develop and execute a reconnaissance and surveillance plan to ensure proper 

security from standoff threats within base boundaries and coordinate with area 

commander/base cluster commander to for the area outside the base boundary. 
Joint Security Operations Centers 

A-3 

k. Establish and maintain connectivity with higher-level staff (BCOC or JSCC). 

l. Prepare security related operational reports as required; also maintain a staff journal, 

display and file necessary items to record operational activities of the command. 

m. When necessary, coordinate with the appropriate area commander or tenant 

commander to ensure that base security actions are deconflicted with ongoing or planned 

combat or stability operations. 

n. Plan and coordinate the base fire support plan. 

o. Identify and share base emergency response/ADC capabilities to include medical 

support, combat engineering, EOD, fire fighting, etc. 

p. Evaluate actions to identify operational deficiencies and develop methods to 

improve combined operational effectiveness to include coordinating training and exercising 

base security measures. 

3. Base Cluster Operations Center 

 Basic BCOC Functions. The BCOC acts as both a BDOC and BCOC, so it would 

perform all basic functions and specific BDOC tasks described above. Additional BCOC 

functions would include, but are not limited to the following. 

a. Keeping the base cluster commander informed of the current situation within his 

base cluster, including enemy, friendly, and civilian activities. 

b. Preparing comprehensive plans to implement the base commander’s overall base 

cluster defense and security guidance. 

c. Communicating any base defense shortfalls identified to the JSC, as well as Service 

component and/or applicable functional component command. 

d. Assessing potential conflicting interests and operational demands of base cluster 

forces inherent when operating in multi-Service or multinational environment. 

e. Providing centralized collection and processing of information from various 

intelligence and operational sources and sharing resultant base cluster intelligence products 

as appropriate. Information would include weather, civil considerations, LOC conditions, 

CBRN threats, IEDs, or other know hazards. 

f. Providing the essential C2 organization to conduct integrated base defense. 

g. Developing and executing a reconnaissance and surveillance plan to ensure that 

bases are properly protected from stand-off threats outside their base boundary. 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-10 

h. Establishing and maintaining connectivity with higher level staff (JSCC or JSC). 

i. When necessary, coordinating and deconflicting base security, base cluster security, 

and local combat operations. 

j. Planning and coordinating the base cluster fire support plan. 

k. Identifying and sharing base and base cluster emergency response and ADC 

capabilities to include medical support, combat engineering, EOD, fire fighting, etc. 

l. Evaluating actions to identify operational deficiencies and develop methods to 

improve combined operational effectiveness to include coordinating training and exercising 

base defense measures. 

4. Common Positions and Key Responsibilities for all Operations Centers 

 The following positions, when created, normally require personnel to be dual hatted:

a. Operations Officer. The operations officer serves as the principal advisor to the 

JSC or base commander on all operational matters. Other responsibilities include the 

following. 

(1) Direct the operations within the center. 

(2) Develop a training, exercise, and certification plan for the JSCC staff, or units 

and individuals who have been designated as part of the base defense plan. 

(3) Monitor current operations and intelligence in order to help synchronize the 

efforts and make operational decisions in line with the JSC/base commander’s intent. 

Enforce full participation and support to the FPWG and VAAP. 

(4) Seek guidance from the principal staff on situations that are beyond the 

operations officer’s decision-making authority. 

(5) Notify staff sections on significant operational events and include appropriate 

staff sections in critical decisionmaking. 

(6) Prepare and submit operational and situational reports as required to the 

JSC/base commander. 

(7) Monitor outgoing communications and correspondence for completeness, 

accuracy, and staff coordination. 

(8) Maintain a log of significant events and distribute the guidance from the 

JSC/base commander or staff officers. 
Joint Security Operations Centers 

A-5 

(9) Coordinate planning with higher headquarters. 

(10) Monitor security status of base(s) and deconflict security operations. 

(11) Assist in developing priority intelligence requirements and coordinating with 

appropriate staffs for collection on intelligence requirements. 

b. Intelligence Officer. The intelligence officer’s duties are listed below. 

(1) Supervise intelligence section personnel. 

(2) Ensure frequent communications with higher-level intelligence organization 

as directed by the JSC. 

(3) Provide intelligence input on the situation report (SITREP). 

(4) Ensure subordinate commands receive intelligence updates and other 

information in a timely manner through the most appropriate means. 

(5) Ensure maps are ordered and distributed. 

(6) Provide daily intelligence update to the operations center and FPWG. 

(7) Coordinate and maintain liaison with HN intelligence agencies. 

(8) Keep the Operations Officer informed of all significant intelligence and 

intelligence action and events. 

c. Force Protection Officer. This officer serves as the principle advisor to the JSC or 

base commander on all AT, FP, physical security, and emergency services matters. Duties 

include the following: 

(1) Develop, publish, and provide guidance on all FP, AT, physical security, 

vulnerability assessment, and working group policies and procedures. 

(2) Chair the JSC/base commander’s FPWG and threat working group. 

(3) Assist the operations officer to prepare and submit operational and situational 

reports as required to the base commander. 

(4) Brief the operations officer on FP matters. 

(5) Set the standard for the base commander’s FPWG, to include ensuring unity 

of effort on base defense; sharing of information and intelligence; establishing the FPWG’s 

agenda, priorities, and VAAP input; conduct and monitor the JSC/base commander’s risk 

assessment program; and identify base defense resources. 
Appendix A 

A-6 JP 3-10 

d. Battle Captain. The battle captain will: 

(1) Be responsible for tracking day-to-day operations. 

(2) View all incoming messages and distribute appropriate guidance for each. 

(3) Act as the operational focal point in coordinating the efforts of the staff. 

(4) Ensure the accuracy of map information, mission statement, task organization 

charts, battle board information, the significant events display and daily journal. 

(5) Provide daily operational update to the FPWG. 

(6) Determine which events appear on the significant event display. 

(7) Inform other staff sections of significant events. 

(8) Monitor the communications network ICW the communications 

noncommissioned officer (NCO). 

(9) Direct or commence the drafting of required operational action messages such 

as fragmentary orders 

(10) Coordinate the shift change briefings. 

(11) Monitor the progress of the base commander’s daily SITREP to ensure all 

required inputs are received in a timely manner to allow the message to be transmitted on 

time. 

e. Operations NCO. The operations NCO’s primary duties include the following. 

(1) Assist the operations officer in the conduct of operations. 

(2) Assist with the accuracy of map information, mission statement display, task 

organization chart, chart data board information, maintain the journal, and ensure the 

situation map is up to date. 

(3) Maintain master files for all incoming and outgoing messages by date time 

group. 

(4) Maintain the significant events log. 

(5) Ensure files, logs and reports (both computer and hard copy) are maintained, 

current, and submitted as required. 
Joint Security Operations Centers 

A-7 

(6) Supervise information flow procedures. 

(7) Supervise the maintenance of incoming and outgoing message files and ensure 

message read files are available for the base commander and staff. 

(8) Provide direct supervision of the daily journal. 

(9) Establish personnel and equipment listings for administrative support. 

(10) Be responsible for the routine upkeep and maintenance of the operation 

center. 

(11) Assist in the daily preparation of the SITREP. 

(12) Obtain material required by the staff. 

(13) Prepare map overlays as required. 

f. Fire Support Officer. The fire support officer’s duties include the following. 

(1) Assist the operations officer to develop base fire support plans. 

(2) Coordinate fire support related plans, measures, and communications 

requirements with the appropriate BDOC, BCOC, JSCC staff, or area command staff as 

required. 

(3) Conduct assessments of existing fire support plans and coordinate 

exercise/rehearsals of same.

g. Communications Officer. When there is no full-time communications officer, 

then the operations NCO would serve in this position. Key duties include: 

(1) Provide advice on communications matters. 

(2) Ensure adequate secure voice and communications connectivity is maintained 

with appropriate headquarters. 

(3) Coordinate required communications for the JSCC/BDOC/BCOC. 

(4) Maintain a log of significant communications activities. 

(5) Monitor action on all communications operations. 

(6) Prepare briefings on communications status for the JSC/base commander and 

provide communications input to the SITREP. 
Appendix A 

A-8 JP 3-10 

(7) Maintain the secure telephone system between higher and subordinate 

command headquarters. 

(8) Maintain current status of all joint communications in support of the operation 

and available for contingency operations. 

(9) Identify trends that may develop to degrade communications. 

(10) React to requests for additional communications support, or restoration of 

degraded communications. 

(11) Publish telephone number listing. 

(12) Actively participate in and support the FPWG and VAAP. 

h. Logistics Officer. The logistics officer’s duties include the following. 

(1) Maintain a thorough knowledge and understanding of all logistic plans and 

actions applicable to base defense requirements. 

(2) Monitor and coordinate the logistic functions and requirements, including 

general engineering, in support of base defense. 

(3) Prepare logistic input to the SITREP. 

(4) Actively participate and support the FPWG and VAAP. 

i. Engineer. The engineer officer’s duties include: 

(1) Advise and establish JSC/base commander’s general engineering policy and 

guidance. 

(2) Provide general engineering and when applicable, combat engineering and 

input to JSC/base defense plans. 

(3) Coordinate and supervise base defense construction and environmental 

support actions. 

(4) Develop infrastructure criteria IAW the JFC engineer guidance. 

(5) Coordinate for the contract procurement of real property FP equipment (i.e., 

barriers, guard shacks, lighting). 

(6) Actively participate and support the FPWG and VAAP. 
Joint Security Operations Centers 

A-9 

j. CBRN Officer. The CBRN officer will: 

(1) Act as lead subject matter expert for CBRN defense, response to CBRN 

incidents, and sensitive site exploitation. 

(2) Actively participate and support FPWG. 

(3) Conduct vulnerability analysis based on the latest intelligence/threat 

assessments. 

(4) Assist operations officer in devising CBRN defense plans and review CBRN 

annexes to higher headquarters operation plan and concept plan. 

(5) Support the operations center for theater-level CBRN warning and reporting. 

(6) Coordinate with medical representative on health support requirements. 

(7) Coordinate with logistics officer pertaining to chemical defense equipment, 

supplies, maintenance, and transportation of CBRN defense assets. 

k. Medical Representative. The medical representative’s duties include: 

(1) Advise JSC/base commander and staff on health service support matters 

related to base defense. 

(2) Plan for and assist in exercising mass casualty treatment. 

(3) Plan for and assist in exercising base casualty evacuation procedures. 

(4) Actively participate and support the FPWG and VAAP. 

l. Liaison Officers. Represent respective tenant units, component, and/or activity. 

Actively participate in all planning and actively participate in the FPWG and VAAP as 

required. 
Appendix A 

A-10 JP 3-10 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX B 

SAMPLE BASE DEFENSE PLAN 

B-1 

1. Overview 

a. The format outlined below is offered as one method of developing a sample base 

defense plan. It is optimized for a base or installation, to include deployed units and can be 

adapted for use at other facilities. It is meant to help the JSC, as the principal staff officer 

responsible for planning and preparation of JSO throughout the operational area, structure 

the base defense plan in a comprehensive and organized manner. The format is patterned 

after the standard five-paragraph military operation order (Situation-Mission-ExecutionAdministration and Logistics-Command and Signal). 

b. This format enables the integration of existing programs such as law enforcement, 

physical security, AT, OPSEC, information security, high-risk personnel protection, and 

other installation efforts. Base defense plans should be integrated into all plans and separate 

annexes. Remember that staff interaction is a crucial element of developing a realistic, 

executable plan. 

c. Although this sample is patterned after the military operation order, it can be used 

by other DOD agencies and facilities to protect personnel, activities, and material under 

their control. 

d. This sample uses supporting annexes, appendices, tabs, and enclosures to provide 

amplifying instructions as required. This method shortens the length of the basic plan 

(which should be read by all personnel outlined in the plan), and provides organization, 

structure, and scalability. 

e. The primary reference for plan formats is Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, 

Planning Formats. Should a conflict exist between this Appendix and the format found in 

CJCSM 3122.03C, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manual format 

takes precedence. 

2. Sample Format 

 (In Joint Operation Order Format) 

 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 

 Copy No. ______ 

 Issuing Headquarters 

 Place of Issue 

 Message Reference Number 

Type and Serial Number of Operation Order. 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-10 

References: 

 a. Maps or Charts 

 b. Time Zone. (Insert the time zone used throughout the order) 

Task Organization. (List this information here, in paragraph 3, or in an annex if 

voluminous. The organization for defense should clearly specify the base units providing 

the forces for each defense element. Attached or transient units and the names of 

commanders should be included. The defense requirements of US, HN, and other civilian 

organizations quartered on the base also should be identified. Their capabilities to assist in 

the defense must be determined and integrated into the base defense plan.) 

1. Situation. (Under the following headings, describe the environment in which defense 

of the base will be conducted, in sufficient detail for subordinate commanders to grasp the 

way in which their tasks support the larger mission.) 

 a. Enemy Forces. (Describe the threat to the base, to include the composition, 

disposition, location, movements, estimated strengths, and identification and capabilities of 

hostile forces, including terrorist organizations.) 

 b. Friendly Forces. (List information on friendly forces not covered by this operation 

order, to include the mission of the next higher headquarters and adjacent bases as well as 

units not under base command whose actions will affect or assist the defense of the base. 

These units may include MP or Air Force SF response forces, fire support, naval coastal 

warfare forces, special operations forces, engineers, decontamination or smoke units, EOD, 

HN military or police organizations, and public and private civilian organizations of both 

the United States and HN.) 

 c. Attachments or Detachments. (When not listed in the Task Organization, list 

elements attached to or detached from base units and the effective times.) 

2. Mission. (Give a clear, concise statement of the commander’s defense mission.) 

3. Concept of the Operation. (Under the following headings, describe the commander’s 

envisioned concept of the operation.) 

 a. Commander’s Intent. (The commander discusses how the development of the 

defense is envisioned and establishes overall command priorities. This subparagraph 

should provide subordinates sufficient guidance to act upon if contact is lost or disrupted.) 

 b. Concept of Operation. (Briefly describe how the commander believes the overall 

operation should progress. Define the areas, buildings, and other facilities considered 

critical, and establish priorities for their protection.) 
Sample Base Defense Plan 

B-3 

 (1) Phasing. (Set forth, if necessary, the phases of the operation as they are 

anticipated by the commander.) 

 (2) Maneuver. (Describe the organization of the ground defense forces, the 

assignment of elements to counter standoff and penetrating attacks to include the base 

boundary patrol concept of operation and establishment of a defense with primary, 

alternate, and supplementary defensive positions, as well as reaction force responsibilities. 

Describe the purpose of counterattacks and set work priorities.) 

 (3) Fires. (State plans for employing air and missile defense and supporting fires, 

such as mortars and other indirect fire assets, smoke, and aviation support.) 

 c. Tasks for Subordinate Elements. (If not previously described, this and succeeding 

subparagraphs should set forth the specific tasks for each subordinate defense element listed 

in the Task Organization.) 

 d. Reserve. (The next-to-last subparagraph of paragraph 3 contains instructions to the 

base’s mobile reserve.) 

 e. Coordinating Instructions. (Always the last subparagraph of paragraph 3. Contains 

those instructions applicable to two or more elements or to the command as a whole.) 

 (1) Control Measures. (Define and establish restrictions on access to and 

movement into critical areas. These restrictions can be categorized as personnel, materiel, 

and vehicles. Security measures also may be outlined here.) 

 (a) Base Boundary. (Define and establish the base boundary as coordinated 

with the area commander. Include a description of plans to cope with enemy standoff 

attacks.) 

 (b) Personnel Access. (Establish control pertinent to each area or structure.) 

 1. Authority. (Give authority for access.) 

 2. Criteria. (Give access criteria for unit contractor personnel and local 

police and armed forces.) 

 3. Identification and Control 

 a. (Describe the system to be used in each area. If a badge system is 

used, give a complete description to disseminate requirements for identification and control 

of personnel who conduct business on the base.) 

 b. (Describe how the system applies to unit personnel, visitors to 

restricted or administrative areas, vendors, contractor personnel, and maintenance and 

support personnel.) 
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 3-10 

 (c) Materiel Control Procedures 

 1. Incoming 

 a. (List requirements for admission of materiel and supplies.) 

 b. (List special controls on delivery of supplies to restricted areas.) 

 2. Outgoing 

 a. (List required documentation.) 

 b. (List special controls on delivery of supplies from restricted 

areas.) 

 c. (List classified shipments.) 

 (d) Vehicle Control 

 1. (State policy on registration of vehicles.) 

 2. (State policy on search of vehicles.) 

 3. (State policy on parking.) 

 4. (State policy on abandoned vehicles.) 

 5. (List controls for entering restricted areas.) 

 (e) Train Control 

 1. (State policy on search of railcars.) 

 2. (State policy on securing railcars.) 

 3. (State policy on entry and exit of trains.) 

 (2) Security Aids. (Indicate the manner in which the following security aids will 

be implemented on the base.) 

 (a) Protective Barriers 

 1. Definition. 

 2. Clear zones. 
Sample Base Defense Plan 

B-5 

 a. Criteria. 

 b. Maintenance. 

 3. Signs. 

 a. Types. 

 b. Posting. 

 4. Gates. 

 a. Hours of operation. 

 b. Security requirements. 

 c. Lock security. 

 d. Protective lighting system. (Use and control, inspection, 

direction, actions during power failures, emergency lighting.) 

 (b) Intrusion Detection System 

 1. Types and locations. 

 2. Security classifications. 

 3. Maintenance. 

 4. Operation. 

 5. Probability of Detection. 

 a. Limitations. 

 b. Compensating measures. 

 c. Redundant capabilities. 

 (3) Interior Guard Procedures. (Include general instructions that apply to all 

interior guard personnel, fixed and mobile. Attach detailed instructions such as special 

orders and standing operating procedures as annexes. Ensure that procedures include 

randomness.) 
Appendix B 

B-6 JP 3-10 

 (a) Composition and organization. (NOTE: In security and support 

operations environment, the interior guard may be a contracted civilian security force.) 

 (b) Tour of duty. 

 (c) Essential posts and routes. 

 (d) Weapons and equipment. 

 (e) Training. 

 (f) Military working dogs. 

 (g) Method of challenge. 

 (h) Alert force. 

 1. Composition. 

 2. Mission. 

 3. Weapons and equipment. 

 4. Location. 

 5. Deployment concept. 

 (4) Rules of Engagement. (Delineate the circumstances and limitations under 

which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces 

encountered.) 

 (5) Contingency Plans. (Indicate actions in response to various emergency 

situations. List as annexes any detailed plans, such as combating terrorism, responding to 

bomb threats and hostage situations, dealing with disasters, and firefighting.) 

 (a) Individual actions. 

 (b) Alert force actions. 

 (6) Security Alert Status. 

 (7) Air Surveillance. 

 (8) Noncombatant Evacuation Operation Plans. 

 (9) Coordination with HN or Adjacent Base Plans. 
Sample Base Defense Plan 

B-7 

 (10) Measures for Coordination with Response Force and Tactical Combat 

Forces. 

 (11) Procedures for Update of This OPORD. (If the OPORD is not effective 

upon receipt, indicate when it will become effective.) 

4. Administration and Logistics. (This paragraph sets forth the manner of logistic support 

for base defense. State the administrative and logistic arrangements applicable to the 

operation. If the arrangements are lengthy, include them in an annex or a separate 

administrative and logistics order. Include enough information in the body of the order to 

describe the support concept.) 

 a. Concept of Combat Service Support. (Include a brief summary of the base defense 

concept from the combat service support point of view.) 

 b. Materiel and Services. (List supply, maintenance, transportation, construction, and 

allocation of labor.) 

 c. Medical Services. (List plans and policies for treatment, hospitalization, and 

evacuation of both military and civilian personnel.) 

 d. Damage Control. (List plans for firefighting, clearing debris, and emergency 

construction.) 

 e. Personnel. (List procedures for strength reporting, replacements, casualty reporting, 

and other procedures pertinent to base defense.) 

 f. Civil Affairs. (Describe control of civil populations, refugees, and related matters.) 

5. Command and Signal 

 a. Communications. (Give information about pertinent communications nets, 

operating frequencies, codes and code words, recognition and identification procedures, and 

electronic emission constraints. Reference may be made to an annex or to a signal 

operating instruction.) 

 (1) Types 

 (a) Primary. 

 (b) Alternate. 

 (2) Operation. 

 (3) Maintenance. 
Appendix B 

B-8 JP 3-10 

 (4) Authentication. 

 b. Command 

 (1) Joint and multinational relationships. (Command relationships must be 

spelled out clearly, to include command succession. Shifts in relationships as the defense 

progresses, as when a response force is committed, must be specified. These relationships 

may be presented in chart form as an annex.) 

 (2) Command posts and alternate command posts. (List locations of the BDOC, 

BCOC, and their alternate sites, along with the times of their activation and deactivation.) 

6. Acknowledgment Instructions 

Annexes: 

A. Task Organization 

B. Intelligence 

C. Operations 

D. Logistics 

E. Personnel 

F. Public Affairs 

G. Civil Affairs 

H. Engineer Support 

J. Command Relationships 

K. Communications 

L. Force Protection 

M. Host-Nation Support 

N. CBRN 

Distribution: 

Authentication: 
APPENDIX C 

REFERENCES 

C-1 

The development of Joint Pub 3-10 is based upon the following primary references. 

1. Department of Defense Publications 

a. DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program. 

b. DODD O-2000.12-H, DOD Antiterrorism Handbook. 

c. DODD 3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP). 

d. DODD 4500.54, Official Temporary Duty Travel Abroad. 

e. DODD 5105.75, Department of Defense Operations at US Embassies. 

f. DODI 1400.32, DOD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency Planning 

Guidelines and Procedures. 

g. DODI 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism Standards. 

h. DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed 

Forces. 

i. DODI 5210.84, Security of DOD Personnel at US Missions Abroad. 

2. Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Publications 

a. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B, Standing Rules 

of Engagement. 

b. CJCSI 5120.02A, Joint Doctrine Development System. 

c. CJCSI 5261.01A, Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund. 

d. CJCSM 3113.01B, Theater Security Cooperation. 

e. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) 

Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures). 

f. CJCSM 3122.02C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) 

Volume III (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and 

Deployment Execution). 
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-10 

g. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, 

Planning Formats. 

h. CJCSM 3141.01A, Procedures for the Review of Operation Plans. 

i. CJSCM 3500.05A, Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide. 

3. Joint Publications 

a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

b. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

c. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

d. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats. 

e JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations. 

f. JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations. 

g. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism. 

h. JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations. 

i. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 

j. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. 

k. JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support. 

l. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Environments. 

m. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security. 

n. JP 3-13.4, Military Deception. 

o. JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations. 

p. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 

q. JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations. 

r. JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Forces. 
References 

C-3 

s. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. 

t. JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 

u. JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

v. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence 

Management. 

w. JP 3-63, Detainee Operations. 

x. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 

y. JP 4-02, Health Service Support. 

z. JP 4-09, Distribution Operations. 

aa. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support. 

bb. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 

4. Multi-Service Publications 

a. FM 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.40, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations. 

b. FM 3-09.32/MCRP 3-16.6A/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP(I) 3-2.6, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower. 

c. FM 3-11.34/MCWP 3-37.5/NTTP 3-11.23/AFTTP(I) 3-2.33, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Defense. 

d. FM 3-11.5/MCWP 3-37.3/NTTP 3-11.26/AFTTP (I) 3-2.60, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Defense Decontamination. 

e. FM 3-55.6/MCRP 2-24A/NTTP 3-55.13/AFTTP(I) 3-2.2, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System. 

f. FM 3-100.12/MCRP 5-12.1C/NTTP 5-03.5/AFTTP(I) 3-2.34, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Risk Management. 

g. FM 3-100.38/MCRP 3-17.2B/NTTP 3-02.41/AFTTP(I) 3-2.12, Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Operations. 
Appendix C 

C-4 JP 3-10 

h. FM 4-01.45/MCRP 4-11.3H/NTTP 4-01.3/AFTTP 3-2.58, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Defense. 

5. Army Publications 

a. Army Regulation 525-13, Antiterrorism. 

b. FM 3-0, Operations. 

c. FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations. 

d. Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 3-11.3, Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear Contamination Avoidance. 

e. ATTP 3-11.5, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Decontamination. 

f. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations. 

g. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations. 

h. ATTP 3-34.210, Explosive Hazards Operations. 

i. ATTP 3-34.400, General Engineering. 

j. FM 3-37, Protection. 

k. FM 3-90, Tactics. 

l. FM 3-90.31, Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations. 

m. FM 3-100.21, Contractors on the Battlefield. 

n. FM 4-01.30, Army Movement Control. 

o. FM 4-93.4, Theater Support Sustainment Command. 

p. TC 5-34, Engineer Field Data. 

q. ATTP 22-6, Guard Duty. 

r. ATTP 3-05.137, Army Special Operating Forces Foreign Internal Defense, Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces. 

s. FM 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. 

t. FM 3-93, Theater Army Headquarters. 
References 

C-5 

6. Air Force Publications 

a. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine. 

b. AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power.

c. AFDD 2-4, Combat Support. 

d. AFDD 2-4.1, Force Protection. 

e. AFDD 2-4.4, Bases, Infrastructure and Facilities. 

f. AFDD 2-9, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations. 

g. Air Force Policy Directive 31-3, Air Base Defense. 

h. Air Force Handbook (AFH) 10-222, Guide on Bare Base Facility Erection. 

i. AFH 31-302, Air Base Defense Collective Skills. 

j. AFH 31-305, Security Forces Deployment Planning Handbook. 

k. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-301, Air Base Defense. 

l. AFI 31-304(I), Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and 

Other Detainees. 

m. AFTTP 3-10.1, Integrated Base Defense. 

n. AFTTP 3-10.2, Integrated Base Defense Command and Control Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures.

7. Marine Corps Publications 

a. Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1-0, Marine Corps Operations. 

b. MCDP 4, Logistics. 

c. MCRP 3-15.2, Mortars. 

d. MCRP 3-41.1A, MAGTF Rear Area Security. 

e. MCRP 5-12D, Organization of Marine Corps Forces. 

f. MCWP 3-11.3, Scouting and Patrolling. 
Appendix C 

C-6 JP 3-10 

g. MCWP 3-16.6, Supporting Arms Observer, Spotting, and Controller. 

h. MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency Operations. 

i. MCWP 3-21.1, Aviation Ground Support. 

j. MCWP 3-41.1, Rear Area Operations. 

8. Navy Publications 

a. NWP 3-10, Naval Coastal Warfare. 

b. NWP 3-10.1, Naval Coastal Warfare Operations. 
APPENDIX D 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

D-1 

1. User Comments 

 Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: 

Doctrine and Education Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These 

comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), 

writing, and appearance. 

2. Authorship 

 The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for 

this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3). 

3. Supersession 

 This publication supersedes JP 3-10, 01 August 2006, Joint Security Operations in 

Theater. 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: CSA WASHINGTON DC//G-3/5//DAMO-SSP// 

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// 

 CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JT10// 

 Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting 

Center, Doctrine and Education Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for 

Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. 

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that 

directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. 

The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when 

changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 3-10 

c. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

___________________________________________________________________ 

___________________________________________________________________ 

___________________________________________________________________ 

5. Distribution of Publications 

 Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. 

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be 

in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET) and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the 

combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication 

to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy 

(Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 

Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400. 

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and 

deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications. 
GLOSSARY 

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

GL-1 

AADC area air defense commander 

ADC area damage control 

AFDD Air Force doctrine document 

AFH Air Force handbook 

AFI Air Force instruction 

AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures 

AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction) 

AMC Air Mobility Command 

AO area of operations 

AOR area of responsibility 

APOD aerial port of debarkation 

AT antiterrorism 

ATTP Army tactics, techniques, and procedures 

BCOC base cluster operations center 

BDOC base defense operations center 

C2 command and control 

CAAF contractors authorized to accompany the force 

CAS close air support 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CCDR combatant commander 

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement 

CI counterintelligence 

CISO counterintelligence support officer 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

CMO civil-military operations 

COM chief of mission 

COMMARFOR commander, Marine Corps forces 

DATT defense attaché 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DODI Department of Defense instruction 

EOD explosive ordnance disposal 

EPW enemy prisoner of war 

FC fires cell (Army) 

FM field manual (Army) 

FOB forward operating base 

FP force protection 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-10 

FPTAS flight path threat analysis simulation 

FPWG force protection working group 

FSCC fire support coordination center 

FSCM fire support coordination measure 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

HDC harbor defense commander 

HN host nation 

HNS host-nation support 

HUMINT human intelligence 

IADS integrated air defense system 

IAW in accordance with 

ICW in coordination with 

IED improvised explosive device 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff 

J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff 

JAOC joint air operations center 

JDDOC joint deployment and distribution operations center 

JFACC joint force air component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFLCC joint force land component commander 

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander 

JIOC joint intelligence operations center 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment

JISE joint intelligence support element 

JLSB joint line of communications security board 

JMC joint movement center 

JOA joint operations area 

JP joint publication 

JSA joint security area 

JSC joint security coordinator 

JSCC joint security coordination center 

JSO joint security operations 

JTF joint task force 

LOC line of communications 

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force 

MCDP Marine Corps doctrine publication 

MCM mine countermeasures 
Glossary 

GL-3 

MCRP Marine Corps reference publication 

MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication 

MDSU mobile diving and salvage unit 

MESF maritime expeditionary security force 

METT-T mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support 

 available — time available 

MNF multinational force 

MOA memorandum of agreement 

MP military police (Army and Marine) 

MSF mobile security force

MSR main supply route 

MSRON maritime expeditionary security squadron 

NAVELSG Navy expeditionary logistics support group 

NCO noncommissioned officer 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures 

NWP Navy warfare publication 

OGA other government agency 

OP observation post 

OPCON operational control 

OPORD operation order 

OPSEC operations security 

PIR priority intelligence requirement 

PSU port security unit 

RAOC rear area operations center 

RIVRON riverine squadron 

ROE rules of engagement 

RSO regional security officer 

RTOC rear tactical operations center 

RUF rules for the use of force 

SAM surface-to-air missile 

SDO senior defense official 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SF security forces (Air Force or Navy) 

SITREP situation report 

SJA staff judge advocate 

SOFA status-of-forces agreement 

SPOD seaport of debarkation 

TACON tactical control 

TCF tactical combat force 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-10 

TCN third country national 

TIM toxic industrial material 

TSC theater support command 

UAS unmanned aircraft system 

UFC Unified Facilities Criteria 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USG United States Government 

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

VAAP vulnerability assessment and assistance program 

VBIED vehicle-borne improvised explosive device 
Glossary 

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions 

found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, will reflect this publication as the source document for 

these terms and definitions. 

alert force. Specified forces maintained in a special degree of readiness. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-10) 

area command. A command which is composed of those organized elements of one or 

more of the Armed Services, designated to operate in a specific geographical area, 

which are placed under a single commander. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-10) 

area damage control. Measures taken before, during, or after hostile action or natural or 

manmade disasters, to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effects. Also 

called ADC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-10) 

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and 

maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational 

area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component 

commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

Army base. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

axial route. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

base. 1. A locality from which operations are projected or supported. 2. An area or 

locality containing installations which provide logistic or other support. 3. Home 

airfield or home carrier. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-0) 

base boundary. A line that delineates the surface area of a base for the purpose of 

facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, 

formations, or areas. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 3-10) 

base cluster. In base defense operations, a collection of bases, geographically grouped for 

mutual protection and ease of command and control. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-10) 

base cluster commander. In base defense operations, a senior base commander designated 

by the joint force commander responsible for coordinating the defense of bases within 

the base cluster and for integrating defense plans of bases into a base cluster defense 

plan. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-10) 

GL-5 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 3-10 

base cluster operations center. A command and control facility that serves as the base 

cluster commander’s focal point for defense and security of the base cluster. Also 

called BCOC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-10)

base commander. In base defense operations, the officer assigned to command a base. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-10) 

base defense. The local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify 

or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base, to ensure that 

the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to US forces. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-10)

base defense forces. Troops assigned or attached to a base for the primary purpose of base 

defense and security as well as augmentees and selectively armed personnel available 

to the base commander for base defense from units performing primary missions other 

than base defense. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-10) 

base defense operations center. A command and control facility, with responsibilities 

similar to a base cluster operations center, established by the base commander to serve 

as the focal point for base security and defense. It plans, directs, integrates, 

coordinates, and controls all base defense efforts. Also called BDOC. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-10) 

base defense zone. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

chief of mission. The principal officer (the ambassador) in charge of a diplomatic facility 

of the United States, including any individual assigned to be temporarily in charge of 

such a facility. The chief of mission is the personal representative of the President to 

the country of accreditation. The chief of mission is responsible for the direction, 

coordination, and supervision of all US Government executive branch employees in 

that country (except those under the command of a US area military commander). The 

security of the diplomatic post is the chief of mission’s direct responsibility. Also 

called COM. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08) 

coastal sea control. The employment of forces to ensure the unimpeded use of an offshore 

coastal area by friendly forces and, as appropriate, to deny the use of the area to enemy 

forces. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-10) 

combat support elements. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

combat support troops. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

force protection. Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department 

of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical 

information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect 

against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 
Glossary 

GL-7 

force protection working group. Cross-functional working group whose purpose is to 

conduct risk assessment and risk management and to recommend mitigating measures 

to the commander. Also called FPWG. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-10) 

harbor defense. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

high-water mark. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

joint base. For purposes of base defense operations, a joint base is a locality from which 

operations of two or more of the Military Departments are projected or supported and 

which is manned by significant elements of two or more Military Departments or in 

which significant elements of two or more Military Departments are located. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-10) 

joint line of communications security board. None. (Approved for removal from 

JP 1-02.) 

joint security area. A specific surface area, designated by the joint force commander to 

facilitate protection of joint bases and their connecting lines of communications that 

support joint operations. Also called JSA. (This term and its definition modify the 

existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

joint security coordination center. A joint operations center tailored to assist the joint 

security coordinator in meeting the security requirements in the joint operational area. 

Also called JSCC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-10)

joint security coordinator. The officer with responsibility for coordinating the overall 

security of the operational area in accordance with joint force commander directives 

and priorities. Also called JSC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-10) 

mobile security force. A dedicated security force designed to defeat Level I and II threats 

on a base and/or base cluster. Also called MSF. ( JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-10)

movement control. 1. The planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and 

cargo movements over lines of communications. 2. An organization responsible for 

the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over 

lines of communications. Also called movement control center or MCC. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-10) 

naval coastal warfare. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

naval coastal warfare commander. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

perimeter defense. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-10 

port security. The safeguarding of vessels, harbors, ports, waterfront facilities, and cargo 

from internal threats such as destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or other 

subversive acts; accidents; thefts; or other causes of similar nature. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-10) 

rear area. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

rear area operations center/rear tactical operations center. A command and control 

facility that serves as an area and/or subarea commander’s planning, coordinating, 

monitoring, advising, and directing agency for area security operations. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-10) 

rear guard. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

regional security officer. A security officer responsible to the chief of mission 

(ambassador), for security functions of all US embassies and consulates in a given 

country or group of adjacent countries. Also called RSO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-10) 

response force. A mobile force with appropriate fire support designated, usually by the 

area commander to deal with Level II threats in the operational area. Also called RF. 

(This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are 

approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

security. 1. Measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself 

against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. (JP 3-10) 2. A 

condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures 

that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. (JP 3-10) 3. With 

respect to classified matter, the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from 

having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national 

security. (JP 2-0) (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its 

definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

sonic. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

tactical combat force. A combat unit, with appropriate combat support and combat service 

support assets, that is assigned the mission of defeating Level III threats. Also called 

TCF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-10) 

vehicle-borne improvised explosive device. A device placed or fabricated in an 

improvised manner on a vehicle incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, 

or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. 

Otherwise known as a car bomb. Also called VBIED. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-10) 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATIONS

PLANS SYSTEM

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the

development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-10 Operations