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NIST Technical Note 1840 

A Review of Risk Perception in 

Building Fire Evacuation 

Max T. Kinateder 

Erica D. Kuligowski 

Paul A. Reneke 

Richard D. Peacock 

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.TN.1840 
               

 

 

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NIST Technical Note 1840 

A Review of Risk Perception in 

Building Fire Evacuation 

Max T. Kinateder 

Erica D. Kuligowski 

Paul A. Reneke 

Richard D. Peacock 

Fire Research Division 

Engineering Laboratory 

This publication is available free of charge from: 

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.TN.1840 

September 2014 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Penny Pritzker, Secretary 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Willie May, Acting Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Acting Director 
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Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this 

 document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. 

Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by the 

National Institute of Standards and Technology, nor is it intended to imply that the 

entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology Technical Note 1840 

Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Tech. Note 1840, 48 pages (September 2014) 

This publication is available free of charge from: 

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.TN.1840 

CODEN: NTNOEF 
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Abstract 

Risk perception (RP) is studied in many research disciplines (e.g., safety engineering, 

psychology, and sociology), and the context in which RP is studied varies greatly. Definitions of 

RP can be broadly divided into expectancy-value and risk-as-feeling approaches. RP is seen as 

the personalization of the risk related to a current event, such as an ongoing fire emergency, and 

is influenced by emotions and prone to cognitive biases. The present article is a literature review 

that differentiates RP from other related concepts (e.g., situation awareness) and introduces 

theoretical frameworks (e.g., Protective Action Decision Model and Heuristic-Systematic 

approaches) relevant to RP in fire evacuation as distinct from other related fields of research 

Furthermore, this paper reviews studies on RP during evacuation, especially on the World Trade 

Center evacuation on September 11, 2001. It discusses factors modulating RP, as well as the 

relation between RP and protective actions. This paper concludes with a summary of the factors 

that influence risk perception and the direction of these relationships (i.e., positive or negative 

influence, or inconsequential), the limitations of this review, and an outlook on future research. 

Keywords: egress, evacuation, evacuation modeling, fire safety, human behavior, human 

factors, risk perception 

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Table of Contents 

Abstract.......................................................................................................................................... iii
 

Table of Contents............................................................................................................................ v
 

Tables and Figures ......................................................................................................................... vi
 

1 Introduction............................................................................................................................. 1
 

2 Methods................................................................................................................................... 3
 

3 What is RP? Defining RP during fire evacuation ................................................................... 4
 

3.1 Scope of RP...................................................................................................................... 5
 

3.2 Related concepts and expressions .................................................................................... 6
 

3.3 Theoretical frameworks on RP and evacuation ................................................................ 8
 

3.3.1.1 Heuristic-Systematic Models ............................................................................. 8
 

3.3.1.2 Transactional Stress Model ............................................................................. 10
 

3.3.1.3 Protective Action Decision Model .................................................................. 11
 

3.3.1.4 Reasoned actions models ................................................................................. 12
 

3.3.1.5 Hazard to action chain model .......................................................................... 13
 

3.3.1.6 Security Motivation System ............................................................................ 14
 

4 What role does perceived risk play in building fire evacuation? .......................................... 15
 

4.1 RP during the World Trade Center evacuation on September 11, 2001 ........................ 15
 

4.2 The mediator hypothesis ................................................................................................ 17
 

4.3 Further evidence and open questions ............................................................................. 17
 

4.4	 Factors potentially modulating RP ................................................................................. 18
 

 Situational factors ................................................................................................... 19
 

4.4.2 Individual factors .................................................................................................... 21
 

4.4.3 Social factors........................................................................................................... 24
 

4.4.4 Organizational factors............................................................................................. 25
 

4.4.5 Summary of factors ................................................................................................. 26
 

5 Overview of studies .............................................................................................................. 26
 

6 Limitations ............................................................................................................................ 32
 

7 Conclusions and Outlook...................................................................................................... 33
 

References..................................................................................................................................... 34
 

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Tables and Figures 

Table 1. Current knowledge on factors affecting perceived risk and evacuation behavior. 

References for the findings are given in the text in Section 4.4.1 to 4.4.4. .................................. 19
 

Table 2. Overview of studies on RP and evacuation. The studies are sorted according to their 

relevance for RP and evacuation................................................................................................... 27
 

Figure 1 Timeline of building fire evacuation ............................................................................... 2
 

Figure 2 The Theory of planned behavior (TPB); Redrawn from [89]. ...................................... 13
 

Figure 3 The hazard to action chain; Redrawn from [11]. ........................................................... 14
 

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A Review of Risk Perception in Building Fire Evacuation 

Max T. Kinateder, Erica D. Kuligowski, Paul A. Reneke, and Richard D. Peacock
 

National Institute of Standards and Technology
 

1 Introduction 

During building fire emergencies, occupants need to reach a place of safety. Evacuation behavior 

enables building occupants to do so [1]. Figure 1 gives an overview of the evacuation process. 

Occupant evacuation from buildings comprises two distinct periods: pre-evacuation and 

evacuation periods [2]. The pre-evacuation period can be further split into a pre-alarm phase, a 

risk perception phase, which ends when an evacuation decision is made, and a protective action 

phase [3]. One crucial point in the pre-evacuation period is the decision of occupants to evacuate 

after they have received initial fire cues1

, which marks the transition from pre-evacuation to 

evacuation behavior. This decision is potentially dependent on occupants’ risk perception (RP) 

and other human factors (For a recent review, see [4]). 

Engineering tools such as evacuation computer models, aim to establish the Available/Required 

Safe Egress Time (ASET/RSET) of a building. RSET is defined as the time necessary for a 

building population to evacuate. ASET refers to the time which is actually available for 

evacuation [3]. Most evacuation models implement oversimplified assumptions about the preevacuation period. For example, psychological processes and social interactions are often not 

considered (for an overview, see [2, 5]). This is problematic, as studies have shown that the preevacuation period can be as long as or longer than the actual evacuation time period (or 

movement time) [6-8], and this can consequently add to the uncertainty in evacuation models. 

1 In the present article, the term fire cue refers to all cues provided in a scenario initiated by a fire. These 

are not restricted to fire effluent cues and include indirect indicators of a fire emergency (e.g., seeing other 

occupants evacuating or receiving information via a public address system). 

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Pre-alarm Pre-evacuation Movement 

period period period 

Evacuation Movement 

Ignition Alarm Decision begins... 

Protective 

Actions 

Time 

Informationseeking 

Actions 

Evacuation 

Actions 

Figure 1 Timeline of building fire evacuation 

It is important to understand RP during building fire evacuations for many reasons. Since RP 

marks the point of transition from pre-evacuation to evacuation (or protective) behavior, it is 

questionable whether an accurate description of the evacuation process is possible in the absence 

of an accurate description of the RP. In the worst case, faulty assumptions about RP may find 

their way into evacuation models or affect building design. In turn, understanding RP and its 

relevance for evacuation decision-making may contribute to the development of more accurate 

evacuation models, via more precise predictions of delay times, and ultimately improve building 

safety. A significant part in this endeavor is the eventual development of a comprehensive 

behavioral theory on human behavior in fire [9]. A comprehensive theory of human behavior in 

fire would describe and explain aspects of evacuation behavior in logical terms that are 

consistent with systematic observations of the real world. 

A review of the literature on the topic of RP has highlighted a variety of ways that RP has been 

discussed. First, research studies on the topic often attempt to identify the factors that influence 

perceived risk. These factors can be individual-based, physical (i.e., from the environment) or 

social in nature. Second, research studies have questioned whether RP influences aspects of the 

evacuation process such as the evacuation decision or evacuation delay time. In either case, 

literature on RP and evacuation often does not propose a definition of RP or the way in which the 

research has defined the term (See Table 2 for an overview of different ways of 

operationalization of perceived risk in research studies). 

Therefore, the first goal of this literature review is to clarify the concept of RP in the context of 

building fire evacuation, and to provide a definition of RP specifically for the field of fire 

protection engineering. Furthermore, the distinction from similar relevant concepts (e.g., 

situation awareness) and the scope (e.g., the spatial and temporal proximity of a threat) of RP is 

presented. 

When studies on RP are presented, researchers have often identified some theoretical 

underpinning of risk perception that provides the foundation for the methods in the study. Thus, 

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the second goal of this review is to identify and describe relevant theoretical frameworks of RP 

from evacuation research and other disciplines. 

Finally, a systematic overview, summary and discussion of the factors affecting RP during 

evacuation are presented. Specifically, the current knowledge on the role of RP during preevacuation and evacuation period and factors modulating the relation between RP and protective 

actions are discussed. This way, the present overview may contribute to theory development in 

the field of evacuation research; specifically the eventual development of a theory of human 

behavior and decision-making in fire. 

2 Methods 

For the purpose of the present literature review, we followed the steps for a systematic literature 

review suggested by Khan et al. [10]: 

Step 1 - Framing questions for a review: The following main research questions were 

formulated: What is RP? And what role does RP play during building fire 

evacuation? These questions comprise the headings for the main chapters of this 

review. Each of these two very broad questions was subdivided into several steps 

which represent the sub headings in the each chapter. 

Step 2 - Identifying relevant work: Relevant literature on RP was primarily identified by 

searching literature data-bases (Web of Science, Google Scholar, Science Direct, 

Social Science Research Network, EvacMod.net). The keywords used to identify 

relevant literature included the following terms: risk perception, evacuation, fire 

emergencies, human factors, human behavior in fire, hazard perception, egress, 

disaster, situation awareness, threat awareness, risk assessment, perceived 

vulnerability, arousal, risk communication, safety climate, safety culture, 

hurricane evacuation, heuristics, systematic information processing, and 

decision-making. The sources were accessed through the libraries of the National 

Institute of Standards and Technology and the University of Würzburg, Germany. 

For literature without full text access from either of these two libraries or through 

interlibrary loan, abstracts were considered, or the source was ignored. The 

literature identified included but was not limited to reports and journal articles 

from fire research, psychology, sociology, and biology. The search results were 

integrated with relevant literature from colleagues and other publications. 

Step 3 - Assessing the quality of studies: Literature was included if it was relevant to the 

topic and met the following quality standards: Only publications in peer reviewed 

journal articles, conference proceedings, or books from established scientific 

publishers were considered. The literature research was not restricted to a certain 

time period, journal, field, or geographical location. An important criterion was 

the precision of the description of study protocol, sample, data collection and 

analysis methods. Since studies from a variety of fields were included at this 

point, studies were ranked according to their relevance to RP and fire evacuation 

(Table 2). 

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Step 4 - Summarizing the evidence: The main findings of the first question (What is RP?) 

are summarized in text in Section 3. The results for the second question (What is 

the role of RP during fire evacuation?) are summarized in text and tables. The 

summaries address differences regarding the theoretical foundation, methods of 

data collection and analysis, as well as the interpretation of results of individual 

studies. 

Step 5 - Interpreting the findings: The methods, results, and their implications are 

discussed, followed by a discussion of the limitations of the present literature 

review. Finally, future research questions for the topic of RP in the field of fire 

safety engineering are identified. 

3 What is RP? Defining RP during fire evacuation 

As RP is studied in many research disciplines (e.g., fire protection engineering, psychology, and 

sociology) [11, 12], the contexts to which concepts of RP are applied vary greatly. 

As the term suggests, RP comprises a risk and a perception component. ‘Risk’ has various 

meanings in everyday usage, such as hazard (e.g., What are the most important risks for 

occupants during a building fire?), consequence (What is the risk of delayed evacuation during 

building fires?), probability (e.g., What is the risk of being in a building fire?), or potential 

adversity or threat (e.g., What is the risk of being exposed to a building fire?) [13]. This 

highlights a critical aspect in many questionnaire studies on evacuation and RP in which 

participants were simply asked, ‘how much risk’ they felt [e.g., 14, 15-19]. It is possible that 

participants had different concepts about the term ‘risk’ when they rated their perceived risk. 

Note that these lay concepts of risk vary significantly from the scientific definition in fire safety, 

where risk is “the potential for realization of unwanted, adverse consequences to human life, 

health, property, or the environment. [20, p. 3]” 

‘Perception’ is defined as the organization, identification, and interpretation of sensory 

information in order to represent and understand the environment [21]. RP bridges all perceptive 

modalities and comprises various cognitive processes (e.g., sense-making, decision-making, or 

appraisal). In this context, RP can be understood as a signal-detection process. Occupants 

continuously scan their environment with their senses. This sensory signal detection system has 

to filter threat-relevant fire cues from the noise of irrelevant input. This process results either in a 

hit (correct detection), miss (cue not detected/ incorrect rejection), false alarm, or ignore (correct 

rejection). The criterion as well as the signal-to-noise ratio affects the signal detection (See [22] 

for an introduction to signal detection theory). Several factors, such as previous experience with 

fire, may lower the threshold criterion of detection/ increased sensitivity to fire cues (leading to 

more hits and false alarms; See Table 1 for an overview of factors affecting perceived risk). The 

more complex an environment becomes, the more the amount of sense-based “noise” increases, 

which makes it more difficult for an individual to differentiate fire cues from irrelevant stimuli 

(more misses). In other words, the fire cues become less salient for the occupants. 

Scientific definitions of RP refer to the subjective assessment of the probability of an undesired 

event, the magnitude of its consequences, and one’s own coping capabilities [11, 23, 24]. In this 

context, coping capabilities refer to general and situation specific competencies of an individual 

(e.g., the ability to stay calm in stressful situations or expertise in firefighting). Interestingly, 

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there seem to be two approaches to this process. The first can be summarized as an expectancyvalue approach [25, 26] and the second can be referred to as the risk-as-feelings approach [27]. 

Expectancy-value approach to RP. According to this approach, RP consists of two components: 

an individual’s assessment of a natural hazard and his/her perceived vulnerability [25]. It 

comprises the belief (whether rational or irrational) held by an individual, group, or society about 

the chance of occurrence of a threat and about its extent, magnitude, and timing and refers to 

subjective assessments of probabilities of a specified type of accident happening, and how 

concerned one is with the consequences [26]. Here, RP is seen as a conscious cognitive process 

which is prone to biases. In the case of building fires, this would reflect an evaluation to the selfposed question “Am I at risk?” after having received fire cues (e.g., a fire alarm or smoke). 

Risk-as-feelings approach to RP. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis criticizes the assumption that 

RP is an (entirely) conscious cognitive process [27-29]. It stresses the role emotions play the 

moment decisions are made and it assumes that information needs to convey emotions in order to 

become meaningful for an individual. Here, RP refers to how much risk/danger a person feels 

he/she is in as a result of the event [30]. For building fires, this would reflect an occupant’s “gut 

feeling” after perceiving fire cues. 

Note that RP is seen as a subjective process of an individual. That is, RP is not necessarily 

related to objective risk and is prone to various biases. One may hypothesize that both 

approaches are relevant and even connected for fire evacuation and simply refer to different 

aspects of how a building fire is experienced. Consequently, a holistic approach to RP in fire 

evacuation should include the expectancy-value as well as the risk-as-feelings approach. 

The main difference between risk-as-feelings and the expectancy-value approach lies in the 

psychological processes, which may even be operating simultaneously (e.g., while walking 

through a dark empty street, one may feel at risk although one knows that one is in a safe area). 

This differentiation is important for fire evacuation, since the results of the risk estimates of these 

processes can be different and consequently, behavior may vary depending on which approach is 

predominant. 

3.1 Scope of RP

The scope of RP research varies across disciplines and it is questionable if and how results can 

be transferred from one field to the other. In fact, RP studies on technological threats and natural 

hazards vary significantly in their outcome [11]. The following list gives an overview of the 

variety of research approaches to RP and decision-making. 

‐ Threat certainty: Threats vary in how certain they are and can be categorized into 

imminent or latent threats. Imminent threats are certain to occur, very near, or impending 

and require immediate responses. A latent threat refers to threats from potential disasters, 

such as living in a high-risk hurricane or earthquake region. Here, the incidence of the 

actual event is not predictable (for an individual) in the foreseeable future. Most of the 

literature on RP during disasters covers latent threats in which consequences are 

uncertain, rare, and/or delayed. For emergency evacuation during fire, imminent threats 

are relevant. 

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‐ Time frame: The time frame of risks can be differentiated into short term and long term 

risks. Long term risks refer to risks that lie relatively far in the future (e.g., hurricanes that 

are near the coast for days in advance); for the present paper, short term risks lie in the 

immediate future (within hours, minutes or even less time). The long term perspective 

could be seen as the general tendency of a person to expect a threat. In the case of 

building fire evacuation, the time frame of risks is most likely short term. 

‐ Target of RP: This addresses the question of what is at risk for an individual. RP can be 

directed at various aspects of life; including one’s life and well-being, status, property, 

goals, or others. For fire evacuation, the RP of one’s own life and health seems most 

relevant. This is also sometimes referred to as personal risk [31]. However, it is possible 

that other aspects of RP may compete with one’s own safety [32]. For example, family 

members or significant others in a residential evacuation may act as a modulating factor 

for one’s own personal risk. 

RP defined for building fire evacuation 

In the present literature review, RP refers to the perception of an imminent, short term threat to 

one’s own life and health. Here, RP is defined as a psychological process that describes the 

subjective (conscious and unconscious) evaluation of the probability to be affected by an 

imminent undesirable event in a specific situation and an assessment of one’s own perceived 

vulnerability/ coping resources. RP is seen as the personalization of the risk related to the current 

event, such as an ongoing fire emergency. It is influenced by emotions and prone to cognitive 

biases. The result of the RP process is the perceived risk in a specific given situation. 

3.2 Related concepts and expressions

The following section describes several concepts that either overlap with the present definition of 

RP or are sometimes used synonymously. Of these, situation awareness is the most relevant in 

the context of fire evacuation and will be discussed in more detail. Given the conceptual overlap, 

for example, in the importance of appraisal processes in RP and situation awareness, these 

related terms were also considered during literature research. 

1.	 Situation Awareness (or sometimes known as situational awareness) is a key concept 

introduced by Endsley in the decision-making literature [33]. Situation awareness is 

defined as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time 

and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the 

near future” [34, p.97]. It is conceptualized as an internalized temporal and spatial 

representation or mental model of a person operating in a complex environment [33-35]. 

The quality and precision of such mental models affect decision-making and depend 

among others on the complexity of the environment. Poor situation awareness has been 

identified as a major cause in accidents related to human errors [36]. Apart from the 

definition reported here, several other definitions can be found in the literature. A 

discussion of these definitions is beyond the scope of this paper (See [35] for a detailed 

summary of situation awareness concepts). Situation awareness and RP are very closely 

related concepts. Situation awareness is a more holistic concept than RP as it applies to 

the environment as a whole and not only to hazards. Furthermore, situation awareness 

can be seen as a conscious process, whereas RP consists of conscious (expectancy-value 

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assessments) and unconscious components (the feeling of risk). Some authors argue that 

RP can be understood as situation awareness for dangerous situations [37]. Although RP 

and situation awareness overlap, however, they are independent concepts. Individuals 

may feel at risk with both high and low situation awareness. 

2.	 Perceived vulnerability is the subjective appraisal of one’s own capacity to anticipate, 

cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard [38]. Some authors use 

RP and perceived vulnerability synonymously [39]. 

3.	 Hazard perception is the skill to detect developing threats [40]. This concept is mainly 

used in traffic research. Some authors argue that hazard perception reflects situation 

awareness for dangerous situations in the traffic environment and improves with training 

[37]. 

4.	 Threat awareness (related death awareness) can be understood as the general mental 

model an individual has about life threatening events [41]. It is part of terror management 

theory, which addresses how humans cope with the idea of their own mortality [42]. 

5.	 Risk assessment is the “identification, evaluation, and estimation of the levels of risks 

involved in a situation, their comparison against benchmarks or standards, and 

determination of an acceptable level of risk” [43]. It is similar to RP, however, most of 

the literature using this term refer to objective risk assessment as compared to RP which 

is subjective. Objective risks can be statistically estimated (e.g., the calculation of 

probability and estimated damages of environmental disasters). Similar to RP, the time 

frame, scope, and certainty of a threat can vary in risk assessment. Here, risk is 

conceptualized as the product of probability and consequences of an undesired event 

[44]. 

6.	 Risk communication is the field of research that deals with the exchange of information 

and education about risk-related content. Risk communication is relevant to a wide range 

of disciplines (e.g., avoiding industrial accidents, illnesses, traffic, disasters) [45, 46]. Its 

importance lies in the fact that successful risk communication can lead to improved 

safety behavior without having to learn from experience. For the case of fire evacuation, 

risk communication may contribute to an increased awareness and preparedness of 

occupants as well as to more effective evacuation behavior. Risk communication affects 

RP. 

7.	 Safety climate refers to a (work or living) community’s shared perception of their 

organization’s policies, procedures, and practices as they relate to the value and 

importance of safety within the organization [47]. Safety climate may affect RP as well 

as other factors such as situation awareness. 

8.	 Safety culture summarizes the shared values and beliefs in an organization that interact 

with its structures and control systems to produce safety related behavioral norms [48]. 

Similar to safety climate, safety culture influences RP. 

9.	 Arousal refers to the general activation of the sympathetic nervous system. Although not 

directly related to RP, arousal may be strongly correlated with the underlying 

physiological and psychological processes of RP. For example, arousal affects decision7 
               

	 	 	 	

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making, in the sense that higher arousal is related to more impulsive decision-making 

[49]. 

10. Fear is an emotional response to a perceived threat and a common reaction to emergency 

situations [50]. Animal studies sometimes use fear reactions as an indicator of RP [51]. 

3.3 Theoretical frameworks on RP and evacuation

Since RP is relevant to multiple disciplines, several theoretical frameworks addressing RP have 

been developed. As mentioned earlier, the scope of RP research varies across fields. Despite the 

existence of several theoretical frameworks, many research studies on RP during evacuation do 

not mention being founded in a specific theory or theoretical framework (Table 2). 

The following sections introduce theoretical models related to RP and human behavior in 

emergency situations. Most of the theories follow the psychometric approach to RP, which is the 

basis of the risk-as-feeling approach [12]. This approach aims to develop objective, reliable and 

valid measures of psychological phenomena through suitable assessment tools (e.g., rating scales 

or standardized questionnaires) [52]. 

3.3.1.1 Heuristic‐Systematic	Models	

Heuristic-Systematic Models refer to two-process models of information processing and can be 

applied to RP. Such models are widespread in the psychology literature [e.g., 49, 53-56]. The 

basic assumption is that information can be processed systematically, heuristically, or in a 

combination of the two. In systematic information processing, all available information is 

assessed according to its meaning and relevance. Prospect theory [57] first introduced the 

concept of heuristics, which can be understood as mental shortcuts or simple rules of thumb that 

allow for the making of fast decisions at the cost of less systematic information processing. 

Heuristics are useful tools for decision-making if sufficient information about probabilities or 

other resources are not available. In fact, research on natural disasters has shown that the actual 

probability of an event is rarely regarded in risk appraisals [58]. However, the use of heuristics 

can lead to systematic biases in RP and consequently may affect occupants’ evacuation decisions 

(see below). Several types of heuristics are relevant for evacuation and RP: 

‐ The affect heuristic refers to the fact that current emotional states influence decisionmaking. This concept is an important part of the risk-as-feeling approach. Emotional 

states modulate the understanding of numbers and probabilities. Studies have shown, for 

example, that large numbers are underweighted in decisions and lack meaning for people 

unless they convey a feeling [59]. Similarly, judgments of risk and utility are often 

influenced by whether or not one likes something (e.g., utility is overestimated and risk 

underestimated for activities associated with positive emotions) [29, 60, 61]. 

‐ Anchor Heuristics describe the tendency to overly rely on a few initial or salient pieces of 

information (anchors) during decision-making. Other later or less salient cues may be 

ignored. Anchoring itself can be affected by mood, expertise, or other heuristics [62]. 

This may lead to over or underestimation of risk during fire evacuation. For example, an 

occupant might interpret the sound of a fire alarm as a cue for a drill and subsequently 

ignore more subtle cues of a real incident. 

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‐ Availability heuristics describe how likelihood estimates of an event are affected by how 

easy it is to recall or imagine it [57]. The more “available” an event is in memory, the 

higher its estimated likelihood [63]. For example, occupants may assess the risk of a fire 

emergency by the ease of recalling similar occurrences. 

‐ Representativeness heuristic notes that likelihood estimates of an event are often judged 

by their similarity to the parent population [57]. The more a cue seems to fit into a certain 

category of events, the more likely it will be estimated as indicative of it. For example, 

occupants may perceive an alarm sound as less indicative for a fire alarm if it sounds 

similar to other alarm sounds (e.g., an error sound from an electronic device). 

‐ Similarly, proximity heuristics describe the “tendency to judge probabilities by 

monitoring the spatial, temporal, or conceptual distance to a target” [64, p. 424] and has 

been studied to understand estimates of accident probabilities. Some occupants may 

overestimate the probability or severity of a fire emergency if they perceive fire cues 

matching their expectations about a fire emergency scenario. 

The use of heuristics may explain another type of bias known as normalcy bias, which refers to 

the tendency to interpret cues as indicative for everyday events and underestimating the 

likelihood and consequences of disasters [65]. During building fires, when occupants are faced 

with ambiguous information, the normalcy bias is likely to last longer while occupants remain 

inside the building [9]. Additionally, the anchor, availability and representativeness heuristics 

may lead to low perceived risks, since many fire cues (such as a fire alarm) are not specific to an 

emergency. For most cases, the assumption that a fire alarm is just another drill and not a real 

emergency is true. During the evacuation of the World Trade Center (WTC) on September 11, 

2001, occupants, especially those from the lower floors, reported relatively low RP which may 

be attributed to the assumption that nothing extraordinary was going on in the building [18]. 

When processing information systematically, individuals aim to understand the available 

information and its relevance for RP and decision-making. This process is relatively slow and 

requires significant resources. In heuristic information processing, RP is based on relatively 

automatic processes in which little effort is spent on processing the information [66]. Whether 

information is processed systematically or heuristically depends on an individual’s level of 

arousal (i.e., activation of the sympathetic nervous system), available cognitive resources, and 

other factors, such as experience, emotional states, or personality traits [49]. 

Then the question arises: when is information processed systematically and when is information 

processed heuristically during evacuation? RP, as defined above, may determine whether or not 

information is processed heuristically or systematically. One study on building evacuation 

suggested a curvilinear relationship between perceived risk and information seeking behavior, an 

indicator of systematic processing [30]. If participants reported either low or high perceived risk, 

they were less likely to seek more information. 

Both systematic and heuristic processes can lead to an evacuation decision, but they may be 

affected by different factors. Both systematic and heuristic decision-making are prone to biases 

and limited within each individual. The concept of bounded rationality describes that decisionmaking is limited by the available information, the cognitive resources, and the finite amount of 

time to make a decision. Satisficing, describes the process in which occupants do not base their 

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decisions on all available information but on the amount of information they deem sufficient for 

their decision [67, 68]. Drabek developed the stress-strain perspective based on the concept of 

bounded rationality [69]. Similar to the heuristic-systematic approach, constraints (e.g., the 

availability of information) in the social and physical environment bias RP and behavior during 

emergencies. 

3.3.1.2 Transactional	Stress	Model	

The Transactional Stress Model is not a RP model per se but provides insights on coping 

mechanisms when people are faced with risk [70]. It is a classic cognitive theory on emotion 

regulation (in this case closely linked to RP) and postulates several appraisal processes. 

‐ Primary appraisal: “How relevant is this situation to my needs?” Is there the risk of harm 

or loss, threat, challenge? In the case of evacuation, this is the assumed reaction to the 

alarm signal. If the alarm is deemed relevant, the next appraisal process follows. 

‐ Secondary appraisal: “Do I have the necessary resources available to cope with the 

situation?” If yes, then problem-focused attempts to cope with the situation are used. If 

no, then emotion-focused coping is used (i.e., If I cannot change the situation, I have to 

adapt my emotional reaction to it). 

‐ Re-appraisal after coping attempts: “How is the situation now?” 

Problem-focused coping does not automatically imply that occupants would choose adequate 

reactions. Classic cognitive stress models, such as the transactional stress model, focus on the 

subjectively perceived threat of a situation [70], which can be interpreted as RP. Specifically, 

psychological stress occurs if one does not possess the necessary resources to cope with a 

situation which is perceived as dangerous. 

Appraisal processes, similar to the ones discussed in the Transactional Stress Model, have been 

incorporated into theories developed specifically for human behavior in fire. Proulx’s cognitive 

stress model of people facing fire, for example, takes into account different factors, such as 

information processing, decision-making, problem-solving, and stress [71]. Similar to the 

Transactional Stress Model, Proulx sees iterative appraisals of the situation and one’s own 

coping resources at the core of experienced stress and behavior. According to this model, several 

stress loops are triggered when occupants are confronted with a fire outbreak, in which the 

appraisal of ambiguous information and increased danger can lead to fear, worry, and confusion 

[71]. 

The importance of appraisal processes during catastrophic events has been shown in empirical 

studies. For example, in a questionnaire study with hurricane survivors, Riad, Norris, and 

Ruback found that 58 % of the respondents chose not to evacuate from a severe hurricane threat. 

The most important reasons for not evacuating during a hurricane were that the hurricane had not 

been perceived as a serious threat, participants had been confident that the current place is as safe 

as any other, and participants avoided thinking about the situation [39]. The misinterpretation of 

cues indicating a possible threat may therefore be a key problem in the process of evacuation. 

Evidence from a hypothetical scenario study showed that participants appraised different types of 

disasters (crime, natural disaster, terrorist attack) as similar in risk, but they differed in the 

intentions to take protective actions. For example, in a natural disaster scenario participants were 

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more likely to state they would change their daily activities than in a crime scenario [72]. The 

cognitive appraisal of a given situation as dangerous may influence evacuation motivation. For 

example, a recent meta-analysis showed that the motivation to participate in safety trainings rises 

if the consequences of a potential event are perceived as threatening [73]. 

3.3.1.3 Protective	Action	Decision	Model

The Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) was developed to provide a holistic approach to 

human behavior in emergency situations. It sets up a descriptive framework of the information 

flow and decision-making that affects protective actions taken in response to disasters [74-79]. 

The model describes the path from the initial perception of hazard cues to the initiation of 

protective action. It takes a variety of predispositions, such as environmental or social context, 

into account. Furthermore, it stresses the importance of appraisal processes, and thus links 

cognitive psychological approaches, such as the aforementioned transactional stress model, with 

classic safety engineering models. 

A brief overview of the processes in the PADM follows with a discussion of the role of RP in the 

model. For a more comprehensive description of the model, see [79, 80]. PADM differentiates 

between pre-decisional and decisional processes. The former are the basis on which an individual 

makes his/her evacuation decision. The pre-decisional processes comprise (1) perceiving, (2) 

directing attention to, and (3) comprehending relevant fire cues. After the three pre-decisional 

processes have identified potentially relevant fire cues, occupants are hypothesized to engage in 

a five step decision-making process which may result in protective actions [81, 82]: 

1.	 Risk identification: Is there a real threat that I need to pay attention to? [If yes, then the 

occupant believes the threat] 

2.	 Risk assessment: Do I need to take protective action? [If yes, then the occupant decides 

that he/she needs to take protective action] 

3.	 Protective action search: What can be done to achieve protection? [The occupant begins 

searching for possible protective action strategies] 

4.	 Protective action assessment: What is the best method of protection? [The occupant 

chooses one of the action strategies developed in the previous stage and develops a 

protective action strategy or plan] 

5.	 Protective action implementation: Does protective action need to be taken now? [If yes, 

the occupant follows the plan developed in the previous stage] 

As stated earlier, RP is defined in this review as the subjective evaluation of the probability to be 

affected by an imminent undesirable event and the assessment of one’s own perceived 

vulnerability. This corresponds to the two first decisional processes in PADM. Lindell and Perry 

incorporate threat perception into PADM, which they treat as an equivalent primary appraisal in 

the transactional stress model (see above) [70, 81]. Their approach to RP corresponds to the 

expectancy-value approaches discussed earlier and also includes emotional and motivational 

aspects (labeled dread and unknown risks) [81]. The first stage of the decision model involves 

hazard identification in which the properties of a potential threat have to be evaluated. In the 

second step, risk assessment, ones’ own vulnerability toward the threat is judged. This clearly 

represents the cognitive side of RP (systematic assessment of expectancy and values). One may 

speculate that the risk-as-feeling side is at least implicitly part of the pre-decisional as well as the 

risk identification and assessment processes. 

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It is also possible to integrate heuristic processing into PADM. Heuristics could play two 

different roles in the PADM. First, heuristics and systematic processing may be competing at 

each decisional step. Depending on the arousal, cognitive resources, previous experience, or the 

result of one of the decisional processes, an occupant may process each of the five decisional 

questions heuristically or systematically. For example, an occupant who identified a potential 

risk and sees him or herself as extremely vulnerable may rely on heuristics to identify protective 

actions. Second, heuristics may lead to skipping some of the decisional processes and thus speed 

up the decision-making at the cost of less thorough reasoning. Consider, for example, the anchor 

heuristic. An occupant might interpret the sound of a fire alarm as a cue for a fire emergency and 

immediately start evacuating without going through the steps of protective action search and 

assessment. 

It is important to understand how RP affects evacuation activities. As theorized by the PADM, 

RP can be understood as a threshold mechanism for evacuation decision-making [16, 83]. 

Therefore, it is possible to hypothesize that there is a threshold of acceptable risk for an occupant 

before he/she decides to evacuate. Evacuation decision-making is “triggered” if the perceived 

risk becomes unacceptable. 

The PADM is a descriptive model of decision-making during emergency situations. As such, it 

does not make predictions about future behavior. However, it is possible to integrate the 

processes described in the PADM into predictive models, such as the Evacuation decision model 

(EDM). EDM aims to predict the point in time when the decision to take protective action is 

made and assumes that RP is the key factor in this process [84]. 

3.3.1.4 Reasoned	actions	models	

Reasoned actions models, such as the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB, Figure 2) or the Theory 

of Reasoned Action (TRA), are general theories describing how intentions are transferred into 

actions [85, 86]. They fall into the systematic branch of the heuristic-systematic approach. These 

models assume that “intentions are the immediate antecedents of behavior and intentions 

themselves are a function of attitude toward the behavior, subjective norm, and perceived 

behavioral control” [85]. RP plays a role in an individual’s assessment of his/her perceived 

behavioral control (i.e., Do I have the resources to change the odds for an undesired event?). 

Most applications of these models have been used to predict long term behavior (e.g., changes in 

health behavior). However, it seems possible to apply the TPB to planned evacuation behavior. 

The main limitation of this approach is that it is purely cognitive and leaves out affective 

situational variables (e.g. fear and anxiety). One study applied the TRA to hurricane evacuation 

behavior [76]. TRA assumes that occupants’ conscious intentions to engage in a behavior are the 

principal determinants of actual behavior. However, unanticipated barriers can arise between the 

intention and the opportunity to act, thus making the actual behavior different from the 

behavioral intention [87]. 

A meta-analysis of protection motivation models showed that increases in threat severity, threat 

vulnerability, response efficacy, and self-efficacy facilitated adaptive intentions or behaviors. 

Decreases in maladaptive response rewards and adaptive response costs also increased adaptive 

intentions or behaviors [88]. 

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Figure 2 The Theory of planned behavior (TPB); Redrawn from [89]. 

The Protection Motivation Theory [89] is a model developed to understand and predict long-term 

health behavior. It tries to explain the effects of threatening (health) information on attitude and 

behavior change (e.g., planning to quit smoking after learning about the smoking related 

diseases). Protection motivation theory can also be applied to (planned) evacuation behavior. It 

hypothesizes that perception of the severity, susceptibility, or probability of occurrence, 

perceived self-efficacy, and perceived response efficacy modulate protective actions [90]. 

Although the reasoned action models were not developed to understand building fire evacuation, 

they have important similarities with other models (e.g., PADM) and may help to better 

understand RP and evacuation behavior. Unlike the more disaster specific models, the reasoned 

action models have been studied and found applicable to a wide range of behaviors. Thus we 

speculate that at least for planned evacuation, similar processes like the ones described in TRA 

or TPB can be assumed. However, these models do not apply to spontaneous and unplanned 

behavior. The important question is whether building fire evacuation is planned behavior or not. 

The answer to this question has consequences on how RP has to be conceptualized. If evacuation 

was a predominantly planned behavior, RP would most likely have to be understood from an 

expectancy-value perspective. If evacuation behavior does not involve long term planning, the 

risk-as-feeling approach may be more relevant. For most occupants, evacuation is clearly not a 

long term planned behavior in the sense that occupants plan the following: “When the fire alarm 

goes off, I will (not) evacuate”. However, the time from the initial cue to the evacuation decision 

can be seen as a planning phase (as it is in the PADM) in which occupants appraise their 

situation, vulnerability, resources and options. Future studies should investigate to what degree 

evacuation from an imminent threat is planned behavior. 

3.3.1.5 Hazard	to	action	chain	model	

Wachinger et al. [11] developed a model (Figure 3) based on a literature review that describes 

the effect of RP on protective actions during natural disasters. The authors assume that, similar to 

reasoned action models, intentions (labeled as “willingness to act”) and preparedness are the 

precursors of (protective) actions. According to this model, RP influences preparedness as well 

as intentions: The higher the perceived risk, the higher the preparedness and intentions. The 

authors found that the most robust predictors of RP were trust in authorities (lower trust leading 

to higher perceived risk) and previous personal experience of a natural disaster. 

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Unlike the models discussed before, this model makes few assumptions about the actual 

decision-making process. However, the authors hypothesize that high trust in authorities could be 

seen as a form of heuristic processing. Individuals may trust authorities when they are confronted 

with complex and unknown hazards which require swift decision-making. Further research is 

required to show whether this model is also applicable to fire emergencies. 

Figure 3 The hazard to action chain; Redrawn from [11]. 

3.3.1.6 Security	Motivation	System	

RP is also studied from an evolutionary perspective. Understanding the biological side of RP can 

help to develop theories on human behavior and decision-making. Life threatening events, such 

as fires, are experienced only rarely. Furthermore, indicators of a potential threat are often not 

easily detectible or may be ambiguous. The question is, how organisms adapt to threats that may 

not occur in every generation. Woody and Szechtman suggest a security motivation system 

(SMS) as part of the central nervous system, designed to adapt the organism to extremely rare 

life threatening events [91]. The SMS detects “subtle indicators of potential threat, to probe the 

environment for further information about these possible dangers, and to motivate engagement in 

precautionary behaviors, which also serves to terminate security motivation” [92]. The authors 

postulate that the SMS is represented in hardwired neural circuits and its activation motivates 

protective actions through increased arousal and vigilance, enhanced detection of threatening 

cues, and the facilitation of future behavioral responses to such cues [93]. Applied to the 

situation of fires, cues such as the smell of smoke or other people moving to an emergency exit 

may activate the SMS. 

The SMS can be integrated into other theoretical concepts. The SMS has two major functions: 

(1) to detect and process threat relevant cues and (2) to trigger protective action when a threat is 

detected [94, 95]. These functions correspond closely to the assumption about the pre-decisional 

processes in PADM or the risk-as-feeling approach. The highly automated functions of the SMS 

can be seen as precursors of the decisional processes in PADM. Woody and Szechtman applied 

the SMS to policy making (mainly dealing with information about terrorist threats) [95]. The 

authors argue that the SMS is triggered by information about life-threatening events and not by 

abstract threats, regardless of the actual probability of the event. This offers a potential 

explanation for cognitive biases or the use of heuristics in emergency situations. 

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4 What role does perceived risk play in building fire evacuation? 

In this section literature is presented on how RP affects evacuation behavior and on factors 

influencing RP itself. In relation to the influence of RP on evacuation behavior, although several 

studies found correlations between perceived risk and several relevant outcome variables (e.g., 

evacuation decision [yes/no/uncertain], evacuation delay [time], and pre-evacuation behaviors 

[number of actions]), the role of RP during building fire evacuation is still inconclusive. Models, 

such as the PADM discussed in the previous section, state that occupants need to appraise 

whether a situation provides a threat before they decide to take protective action. However, one 

may speculate that RP is not necessarily a precursor of evacuation and that there may be cases in 

which occupants begin egress without necessarily feeling at risk. During fire drills, for example, 

occupants may comply with evacuation procedures and evacuate but not feel at risk. 

With that said, there are several possible links between RP and a protective action decision: 

1.	 RP directly causes protective action decision-making and behavior. 

2.	 RP may affect evacuation decision-making and behavior but other factors do so as well. 

3.	 RP is a mediator and it accounts for the relationship between a predictor variable (e.g., 

other human factors) and protective action decision-making. 

4.	 RP is a moderator and it affects the direction and/or strength of the relationship between a 

predictor variable and protective action. 

5.	 RP is a correlate of protective action decision-making and behavior but not a causal 

factor. 

6.	 RP may be independent of protective action (i.e., occupants may feel not at risk and 

evacuate or feel at risk and not evacuate). 

Although some of these potential links are mutually exclusive, it is possible that different links 

are operating in parallel or at different stages of the evacuation process (e.g., in the preevacuation and the evacuation period). Future research is necessary to identify which of the 

potential links are the most important interrelations of RP and protective actions. 

4.1 RP during the World Trade Center evacuation on September 11, 2001

A significant amount of research on RP and evacuation has been published on the attacks on the 

World Trade Center (WTC) on September 11, 2001. Several independent studies found that 

perceived risk was positively correlated with evacuation decisions and faster response times, and 

low perceived risk was associated with delayed evacuation [14, 30, 79, 96]. That is, low 

perceived risk is a risk factor, whereas high perceived risk could be seen as a protective factor. 

Kuligowski developed a predictive model of evacuation decision-making based on qualitative 

interviews with evacuees from the WTC on September 11, 2001 [79]. Based on the PADM, RP, 

in the form of risk identification and assessment, was found to play an important role in 

predicting protective action identification, assessment and implementation (i.e., the decision to 

evacuate). Gershon et al. [97] reported that 70 % of the interviewed WTC occupants stated that 

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feeling at risk triggered their evacuation decision. That is, RP may be one important but not the 

only factor influencing the decision to evacuate. 

A closer look reveals an even more complex situation. Studies on the 2001 WTC disaster found 

different results. Sherman et al. [30] studied evacuation delays during the attack on the WTC on 

September 11, 2001. The authors operationalized perceived risk in a single item rating as the 

perceived “seriousness” of the situation. Here, higher perceived risk was found to be connected 

to shorter evacuation delays and fewer pre-evacuation behaviors (which again shortened 

evacuation delays). Sherman et al. [30] also found that higher perceived risk may also lead to 

more information seeking behavior which in turn prolonged evacuation delays. In another study 

on the evacuation from WTC on September 11, 2001 by Kuligowski and Mileti [98], RP was 

operationalized as a yes/no question on whether or not occupants believed that somebody else 

had been killed in the event. Here, higher perceived risk was correlated with more information 

seeking, more pre-evacuation actions, and longer evacuation delays. However, the path-analysis 

performed in that study revealed that RP was not directly connected to evacuation delays after 

controlling for the number of cues, the floor level, information seeking, and the number of preevacuation actions. In that model, RP predicted information seeking behavior and, in WTC 2, in 

the number of pre-evacuation actions [98]. Sherman et al. [30] suggest a curvilinear relation of 

RP and information seeking behavior, i.e., if the perceived risk is either extremely high or low, 

occupants are less likely to seek more information (see also heuristic-systematic approach). 

Differences in the operationalization of RP and the samples may explain the differences between 

the studies (e.g., the sub-sample reporting the highest perceived risk in Sherman et al. [30] was 

not included in the Kuligowski and Mileti [98]). However, it is not easy to disentangle these 

seemingly contradictory results. With regard to the definition of RP given earlier, it is not clear 

to what extent the items used in both studies measured perceived risk. Whereas the item in 

Sherman et al. [30] could be understood as an evaluation of one’s own vulnerability, Kuligowski 

and Mileti’s rating could have been understood as an implicit measure of perceived probability. 

These differences underline the importance of a clear definition of RP and standardized, reliable, 

and valid (construct validity [99]) measures of RP. 

Another indicator of the complexity of the problem was demonstrated in a study by Day et al. 

[14] on RP during evacuation from WTC on September 11, 2001. In this study, participants were 

asked to rate their perceived risk on a seven point Likert scale during different stages of the 

evacuation process. The authors found a significant negative correlation between perceived risk 

and response time. However, they also reported that several participants did not give ratings of 

perceived risks, as they reported not remembering to have evaluated their risk [14]. Note that 

simply not remembering having assessed the risk of a situation does not imply that these 

occupants did not feel at risk. It is possible, for example, that memory effects biased the 

participants’ responses. Nonetheless, these findings indicate that at least two of the possible links 

between RP and protective actions mentioned earlier – correlation (5) or independent (6) – are 

possible. 

In summary, the studies discussed here draw a complex picture of the role RP during evacuation 

from the WTC on September 11, 2001. Note, however, that some of the differences in the results 

of the studies may be attributed to the fact that the studies by Sherman et al. [30], Kuligowski 

and Mileti [98], and Day et al. [14] used different data sets and operationalized RP differently. 

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4.2 The mediator hypothesis

One noteworthy point is that all the theoretical frameworks reviewed here assume that RP is in 

some way causally related to evacuation decisions. However, it is questionable whether 

evacuation decision-making could be possible without feeling at risk. According to the 

aforementioned mediator hypothesis, RP mediates between individual factors and actual risk 

reduction behavior. The idea of this hypothesis is that an evacuation decision is not solely 

dependent on the outcome of an RP process. In fact, it assumes that evacuation is also possible 

without perceiving risk. Some occupants may evacuate simply because they received instructions 

to do so. For example, occupants who experienced several fire drills previously may follow 

instructions to evacuate assuming that these are part of yet another drill and not perceive fire 

related risk. 

Studies were found that supported the assumptions of direct and indirect pathways between 

individual factors and evacuation decisions. In a study on wildfire risk behavior (note that this is 

not immediate evacuation behavior), Martin et al. [15] found, in a study on wildfire 

preparedness, that risk reducing behavior was associated with individual factors such as 

subjective knowledge and locus of responsibility mediated by perceived risk. In the same study, 

self-efficacy, defined by Bandura[100] as the extent or strength of one's belief in one's own 

ability to complete tasks and reach goals, had a direct (non-mediated) effect on risk reduction 

behavior. In addition, perceived risk was clearly associated with risk reduction behavior [15]. 

Another study found that perceived risk mediated the effect of gender on evacuation from flood 

but not wind events [101]. Future studies should aim to disentangle the causal relationships 

between perceived risk and evacuation decision-making. 

4.3 Further evidence and open questions

Although the role of RP during evacuation is still inconclusive, one may speculate how RP 

affects evacuation decision-making. McGee and Russell found that the personalization of risk is 

an important link between awareness of a hazard and mitigation actions [102]. This finding is in 

line with the theoretical framework models discussed above (e.g., PADM). According to the 

heuristic-systematic modeling approach, the level of perceived personal risk affects the level of 

information processing. Systematic processing can be most likely expected at moderate levels of 

perceived risk; whereas heuristic processing is expected at either low or high levels. As already 

mentioned, this may then determine how occupants move through the decisional processes 

suggested in the PADM. 

The question still remains as to how significant RP is to evacuation behavior. Or more 

specifically, how much variance in evacuation behavior can be explained by RP? For example, 

Riad et al. [39] found a number of highly significant correlative associations between RP and 

evacuation, but the reported effect sizes were relatively small. All in all, perceived risk improved 

the prediction whether or not someone would evacuate by 8 % compared to chance [39]. 

Unfortunately, not many studies on RP and evacuation report effect sizes (See Table 2). 

Wachinger et al. [11] propose three hypotheses to explain why some studies on natural disasters 

did not find a connection between RP and protective action. All three hypotheses introduce 

moderator variables which also seem potentially applicable to building evacuation. Although the 

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meaning assigned to RP during evacuation from latent threats, such as disasters, may be 

different, it is possible to develop similar hypotheses for building fire evacuation: 

1.	 Occupants perceive high risks but do not decide to engage in protective action because 

they think that staying in place outweighs the estimated subjective costs of protective 

action (e.g., having to stop one’s work, not wanting to make a fool of one self, or 

expecting difficulties while evacuating). This could be of particular importance if there 

are competing motives (e.g., one’s own safety vs. property attachment). 

2.	 Occupants perceive high risks but trust that authorities, for example, will help them. This 

hypothesis may be less relevant for building evacuation from an acute threat. However, 

this underlines the importance of highly credible evacuation communication by 

authorities. 

3.	 Occupants perceive high risks but do not think they have sufficient resources to engage 

into protective actions (e.g., mobility impaired occupants may not be able to use stairs for 

evacuation). Again this underlines the importance of credible evacuation communication 

and/or instructions. Occupants need to know their options in order to engage in protective 

action. 

Future studies are clearly necessary to understand the role of RP in building fire evacuation. 

These studies should investigate (1) the causal relationship between RP and evacuation decisionmaking and behavior, as well as (2) underlying reasons why some occupants do not evacuate 

although they may feel at risk. 

4.4 Factors potentially modulating RP

Several factors potentially modulate RP which can be broadly differentiated into situational, 

individual, social, and organizational factors (Table 1). Some of these factors are dynamic, in 

that they may change during an emergency situation, (e.g., available fire cues or emotional 

states) and some are static (e.g., context or previous experience). Furthermore, these factors 

interact with each other and can be affected by the RP process itself. For some of the static 

factors, distributions can be either assumed or derived from the literature. For example, the factor 

prior experience could be operationalized as the percentage of occupants in a building who have 

previously experienced an event or evacuation. 

As the role of RP during fire evacuation is complex (see above), the factors potentially 

influencing RP also interact with each other and affect other important variables in the 

evacuation process. For example, the number and intensity of cues and the floor level affected 

not only RP, but also had a direct impact on pre-evacuation delays in two studies on the WTC 

evacuation on September 11, 2001 [30, 98]. The exact interaction among RP, evacuation 

decision-making and evacuation delay is still not entirely clear (e.g., what is a mediating or a 

moderating variable? Which factors are mainly correlates but have effects on evacuation 

behavior independent of RP?). Findings on several of the factors identified as being connected to 

RP and evacuation are described below. 

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Table 1. Current knowledge on factors affecting perceived risk and evacuation behavior. 

References for the findings are given in the text in Section 4.4.1 to 4.4.4. 

Factor Category Static/ 

dynamic1 

Effect on perceived risk 

Fire Cues Situational Dynamic More, closer, unexpected and more intense fire cues lead to 

higher perceived risk 

Hazard proximity Situational Dynamic Inconclusive 

Floor level Situational Dynamic The higher the floor, the higher the perceived risk 

Context Situational Static Inconclusive 

Credibility of Situational Static Credibility of information moderates information processing and 

information perceived risk with potential interaction effects of the source of 

information (another person vs. system) 

Complexity of Situational Dynamic Inconclusive 

information 

Gender Individual Static Tendency toward lower perceived risk in men, but effects are 

potentially modulated by age and context 

Age Individual Static Inconclusive 

Previous experience Individual Static Direct effects of previous experience on perceived risk are 

inconclusive. 

Behavioral training Individual Static Inconclusive 

Hazard knowledge Individual Static Knowledge about hazards increases perceived risk 

Property attachment Individual Static Inconclusive 

Personality traits Individual Static Inconclusive 

Emotional states Individual Dynamic High arousal and state anxiety increase perceived risk 

Medical factors Individual Dynamic Inconclusive 

Cognitive abilities Individual Static Inconclusive 

Information Individual Dynamic Information that is processed easily may be associated with lower 

Processing perceived risk 

Trust in authorities Individual Static High trust reduces perceived risk; low trust increases perceived 

risk 

Cognitive bias Individual Dynamic Inconclusive 

Behavior of others Social Dynamic Behavior of others moderates the link between perceived risk and 

protective action 

Social roles Social Dynamic Inconclusive 

Groups Social Dynamic Higher perceived risk in groups 

Organizational Organizational Dynamic Inconclusive 

context 

Note: 1 Dynamic factors can change in the course of a fire emergency, e.g., the number of fire cues may increase or decrease with 

time; 

4.4.1 Situational factors

Situational factors refer to all aspects of the combination of circumstances at a given moment 

that influence RP and/or evacuation. These cues originate mainly from the physical environment 

of an occupant. 

‐ Fire cues refer to all cues initiated by a fire. Fire cues that are greater (in number), closer 

in proximity, and more intense have been linked to higher perceived risk [30, 79, 98]. In 

addition, sudden and unexpected cues may increase perceived risk in the sense that 

unusual, surprising events produce cues which occupants cannot identify immediately 

[30]. Furthermore, the accuracy of information conveyed by cues is relevant, especially 

since information that clearly and unambiguously indicates threat can increase perceived 

risk. Similarly, studies have shown that poorly designed alarm systems may not induce 

high enough perceived risk in occupants [79, 103]. 

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‐ Hazard proximity refers to the spatial proximity of the occupant or occupants to a threat, 

and its role on RP is still inconclusive. According to the literature, this factor may 

modulate perceived risk. Some studies found that the higher the perceived risk, the closer 

the hazard was to occupants [98], while other studies did not find this effect [104]. It is 

possible that other factors, such as the relative location of occupants to the hazard and 

known exit routes modulate the effect. Other factors, such as visibility or vertical vs. 

horizontal distance, may be important confounding factors. In addition, it is not clear if 

the relation between hazard proximity and perceived risk is, for example, linear or nonlinear. 

‐ Floor level refers to the absolute floor level of an occupant in a building, irrespective of 

his/her distance to the fire (which would be measured by the hazard proximity factor 

mentioned above). The current state of research concludes that perceived risk increases 

with floor level in high-rise buildings. In the case of a full building evacuation, the floor 

level in a high-rise building was a significant predictor of perceived risk during the 

evacuation from the WTC on September 11, 2001 (the higher the floor, the more 

perceived risk) in one study but not in another [30, 98]. Although future studies should 

investigate whether the absolute floor level or the position relative to the fire origin 

(hazard proximity) is more relevant. 

‐ Context, broadly defined as the general circumstances of an event, affects human 

behavior in fire in several ways and its effect on RP is still not fully understood. 

Preparedness, vigilance, and the interpretation of fire cues may vary over different 

contexts (e.g., public events, workplace, or home setting). A questionnaire study 

demonstrated that participants’ self-reported perceived risk varied over different settings 

(e.g., financial vs. safety related decision-making) [105]. The underlying mechanism may 

be that environmental cues are interpreted differently over different contexts. In a 

residential home, for example, occupants may perceive cues about a fire from the fire 

itself or from smoke detectors. In public buildings most occupants may only receive 

information from the fire alarm system (e.g. through public announcements). Another 

explanation may be that cognitive biases (e.g., normalcy bias), social roles and perceived 

responsibility, availability of emergency procedures (e.g. evacuation plans), and the 

interpretation of cues may vary across contexts. 

‐ Credibility of information2 refers to the perceived level of credibility that a person assigns 

to a piece of information or source of information. Overall, this factor moderates 

information processing and RP with potential interaction effects of the source of 

information. Credibility of risk-related messages affects information processing (see, 

heuristic systematic approach) as well as RP and has been extensively studied in the 

context of disaster preparedness [107]. One study on long term RP showed that risk 

2

 Here, the authors are describing the effect of information credibility on risk perception. Whereas this is 

inconclusive, other research, as well as NIST guidance, suggests that credibility of information has an important 

influence on evacuation decision-making, response, and protective action behavior [106]. 

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assessment after receiving risk-related information was in part mediated by heuristic and 

systematic information processing. Here, highly credible sources were associated with 

more heuristic information processing and lower perceived risk. In turn, low credibility of 

an information source is associated with more systematic information processing and 

higher perceived risk. If the source of information was an industry or government 

organization, higher credibility was correlated with lower perceived risk scores in this 

study. If the source of information was another person, however, this correlation was 

inverted [108]. Another study on hurricane evacuation showed that a) people use 

different sources of information and b) their trust in the credibility of these sources varies 

[74]. 

‐ The complexity of a situation, including the information provided to building occupants 

in a fire situation, may affect whether information is processed systematically or 

heuristically. In one basic research study, participants rated ostensible food additives as 

more harmful when their names were more difficult to pronounce than when their names 

were easier to pronounce. The study indicates that information which is more demanding 

to process increases perceived risk [109]. Transferring that to evacuation scenarios, 

Drabek hypothesizes that inconsistency, ambiguity and overload of information increase 

emergent perceived risk [69]. However, given the small number of studies on the effect 

of the complexity of a situation on RP, further research is clearly necessary. 

4.4.2 Individual factors

Individual factors refer to factors within or about a person that may affect RP and evacuation 

behavior. These can be either state (i.e., dynamic, for example, emotional states or arousal) or 

trait (i.e., stable, for example, gender, age, cognitive abilities) variables. 

‐ Gender: Lower perceived risk [27] and less risk-averse attitudes [105] of men compared 

to women might explain gender differences in evacuation behavior. However, no 

influence of gender on risk identification and assessment was found in Kuligowski’s 

analysis of evacuation decision-making during the WTC disaster on September 11, 2001 

(p. 148) [79]. In Sherman et al.’s WTC evacuation study, being female was associated 

with increased perceived risk [30]. A meta-analysis found that men were more likely to 

engage in risk taking behavior, but that this effect was modulated by context (i.e., the 

kind of threat) and age (i.e., with growing age, the differences seemed to get smaller) 

[110]. In another study, gender differences in RP could be explained by differences in 

self-reported fear and anger [111]. In summary, men seem to perceive less risk than 

women. 

‐ Age is correlated with several evacuation-relevant variables (e.g., experience, cognitive 

and physical abilities, education, social role, etc.); however, its role with regard to RP is 

still inconclusive. Some authors argue that older adults are better in risk evaluation than 

younger adults since they have to practice risk-related decisions more frequently in their 

daily life (e.g., medication labeling, adaption to changes in physical fitness) [112, 113]. 

This is in line with research on driving behavior, which states that deficits due to reduced 

physical abilities or reaction times can be compensated on a strategic and tactical level 

(higher vigilance). Further research is needed since some studies found that older 

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occupants are less likely to evacuate [39] but others found no relation between age, 

perceived risk, and evacuation delay [30, 79, 98]. 

‐ Previous experience with fire emergencies or similar situations may significantly affect 

RP, vigilance, and preparedness and has been identified as one of the strongest predictors 

of increased perceived risk during natural disasters [11]. However, experiencing a 

disaster without experiencing personal harm may decrease perceived risk. [For an 

overview of studies on RP, experience, and natural disasters, see 11] Research from 

volcano disasters showed that having experience in a disaster diminished differences in 

RP between volcano experts and untrained participants [114]. Similarly, survivors of the 

1993 WTC bombing had shorter evacuation delays than occupants who had no such 

experience during the evacuation of the WTC on September 11, 2001 [14]. Therefore, the 

effects of previous experience on RP are still under debate, although it seems possible 

that increased perceived risk moderates the connection between evacuation decisionmaking and previous experience. 

‐ Behavioral training is a factor that aims to convey the receipt of behavioral or theoretical 

knowledge through practice. Although the effects of behavioral training on RP is still 

unclear, it is known to improve evacuation behavior [115]. In one study, the ability of 

novice drivers to detect hazards was improved through training. In this study, trained 

participants scanned the environment for potential threats more frequently and efficiently 

than the control group [116]. That is, training may increase preparedness and vigilance 

for fire cues, and the effectiveness of training depends on the severity of perceived risks 

[117]. 

‐ Hazard knowledge refers to the knowledge that any person has related to specific types of 

hazards associated with an incident, including the consequences of the hazard and 

appropriate responses. This factor has been shown to increase perceived risk, although 

these effects are complex and still not fully understood. In line with studies showing that 

knowledge is correlated with the adoption of risk reduction behaviors [74, 118], 

Kuligowski and Mileti found that obtaining additional information after receiving initial 

fire cues was weakly correlated, but with statistical significance, with perceived risk 

during the evacuation from WTC on September 11, 2001 [98]. However, unknown or 

ambiguous events are also associated with increased perceived risk [109]. In turn, 

familiarity with an event reduces perceived risk [119], although familiarity does not 

necessarily imply knowledge. An overuse of warnings and false alarms may consequently 

lead to a desensitization of occupants and may reduce their perceived risk during a real 

emergency [120]. Further research is necessary to disentangle the effects of hazard 

knowledge and familiarity on RP. 

‐ Property attachment or territorial functioning may not directly affect RP, but may 

mitigate the connection between perceived risk and evacuation (see also Context). In 

studies on hurricane evacuation, homeowners reported that a reason for not evacuating 

was the fear of looting (i.e., perception of risk to personal property) [39, 76, 77]. In some 

cases, occupants returned to their desk to pick up personal items during evacuation of 

WTC on September 11, 2001 [79]. Further research is necessary to clarify the effects of 

property attachment on RP. 

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‐ Personality traits refer to relatively stable “patterns of thoughts, feelings, and actions in a 

diverse array of psychological phenomena, including motives, wishes, apperceptions3 , 

and attitudes, as well as behaviors in which a person processes information [121].” 

Although future studies need to clarify the exact role of personality traits and RP during 

fire emergencies, some personality traits, such as impulsivity or sensation seeking, are 

related to risk taking behavior and may be important for RP [122, 123]. Based on 

personality traits, individuals may vary in their RP. Highly impulsive occupants, for 

example, may require a lower number of fire cues to perceive a high enough risk before 

they decide to take protective actions. One study found that the relation between 

personality traits and risky driving behavior was mediated by risk-related attitudes [124]. 

‐ Emotional states, such as state anxiety, are correlated with arousal (the activation of the 

sympathetic nervous system), and can increase perceived risk. Higher arousal is 

associated with more impulsive information-processing [49] and may bias RP. High state 

anxiety affects the way that hazard cues are processed and reduces cognitive resources 

[125, 126]. Emotional states may also affect the readiness with which cues are interpreted 

as threatening and an attentional bias on threatening stimuli [127]. One questionnaire 

study on terrorism-related hazards found that risk appraisals were modulated by fear and 

anger. Highly fearful participants reported higher perceived risk, and participants scoring 

high on the anger scale also reported lower perceived risk [111]. 

‐ Medical factors (including intoxication) affect how fire cues are perceived and 

information is processed, but the effects on RP are still inconclusive. For example, 

alcohol intake distorts RP in the sense that that it modulates arousal and may lead to more 

risky behavior [128]. However, the range of medical factors potentially modulating 

perceived risk is vast and future studies are necessary. 

‐ Cognitive abilities refer to the ability to understand fire related cues. Although still 

inconclusive, some cognitive impairments (e.g. age related impairments, such as mild 

cognitive impairment or dementia [129, 130]) may reduce the ability to perceive and 

understand fire related cues, and therefore, reduce the ability to perceive risk, as well as 

comply with evacuation procedures. So far, there are no studies that directly address RP 

and cognitive abilities in the context of evacuation and future studies are necessary to 

understand their role during evacuation. 

‐ Information processing and RP potentially interact; however, the exact relation is still 

inconclusive. Basic research shows that low processing fluency (i.e., the ease with which 

information can be processed) fosters the impression that a stimulus is unfamiliar, which 

in turn results in perceptions of higher risk [109]. That is, higher cognitive load when 

processing unfamiliar information is associated with higher perceived risk. More studies 

3

 Apperception in the psychology literature refers to consistent patterns on how people perceive their environment in 

relation to their past experience. 

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on information processing and RP during fire evacuation are necessary to verify whether 

these results can be transferred to emergency situations. 

‐ Trust in authorities reduces perceived risk, whereas low trust (or distrust) increases 

perceived risk. Trust in authorities has been found to predict perceived risk during natural 

disasters, with high trust reducing perceived risk and low trust increasing perceived risk 

(and may even lead occupants to underestimate a hazard in unprotected areas) [11]. 

Wachinger et al. [11] further note that trust in authorities can be understood as a heuristic 

that helps in decision-making in complex situations and when facing unknown or 

ambiguous threats. Trust in authorities, similar to credibility of information (see above), 

may also mediate the path between perceived risk and protective actions. Furthermore the 

authors hypothesize that damaging trust may increase perceived risk [11]. One 

hypothetical scenario study found a correlation between the degree of trust in authorities 

and hazard appraisals for certain technological risks [131]. As most of the research on 

trust in authorities and RP focusses on evacuation from natural disasters, further research 

with regard to fire evacuation is necessary. 

‐ Cognitive biases refer to systematic distortions in human information processing and 

decision-making. The use of heuristics may lead to such biases. 

o	 General RP bias: In general, perceived risk of events is correlated with the actual 

risk. However, there are some biases in the sense that small risks are 

overestimated and high risks are underestimated [132-135]. 

o	 Positivity bias (comparative optimism) refers to the fact that occupants 

consistently rate their own personal risk as lower than the risk to others. This 

phenomenon is well documented in the literature, and was found in one study on 

tunnel fire emergencies [19, 132, 135]. 

o	 Locus of control/perceived control: risks perceived to be under one’s own control 

are more acceptable than risks perceived to be controlled by others. Illusion of 

control was found to be correlated with perceived invulnerability (positivity bias) 

and negatively with perceived risk in a study on accidents in chemical and nuclear 

facilities [135]. 

o	 Normalcy bias reduces perceived risk and refers to a tendency to attribute cues to 

‘normal’ events during disasters and not to catastrophic events. During the 

evacuation of the WTC on September 11, 2001 occupants, especially from the 

lower floors, reported relatively low perceived risk which may be attributed to the 

assumption that nothing extraordinary was going on in the building [18]. 

4.4.3 Social factors

Social factors mainly refer to the effect of others on one’s own RP and behavior. This can be 

broadly labeled as social influence. Social influence is defined as changes in attitudes, beliefs, 

opinions or behavior as a result of the fact that one is confronted with the attitudes, beliefs, 

opinions, or behavior of others [136]. 

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‐ Behavior of others: The behavior of others potentially moderates the link between RP and 

protective action. Seeing other occupants evacuate provides a cue for an emergency and 

may increase personal perceived risk. In turn, passive behavior of others may trigger the 

normalcy bias (i.e., that nothing is wrong) and reduce perceived risk. Studies from the 

evacuation of a cinema theater showed that the non-evacuation behavior of others could 

thwart evacuation [137]. Social influence on RP may be a function of knowledge, as one 

study showed that experts, in comparison with the untrained, rely less on information 

derived from others [131]. Further studies testing the specific relationship of social 

influence, perceived risk and protective action are necessary. 

‐ The effect of social roles on RP is still inconclusive. However, it is possible to assume 

that social roles affect RP as a function of perceived responsibility and knowledge. For 

example, trained fire wardens may improve their hazard detection skills and be more 

vigilant. In turn, the behaviors of fire wardens, or occupants with assigned authority, may 

influence the perceived risk of other occupants. Survivors of the WTC attacks reported 

that being told by others (especially people in fire safety roles or roles of authority) to 

evacuate triggered their evacuation decision (See also Social trust) [79, 97]. Further 

studies are also necessary to investigate the impact social roles have on the scope of an 

occupants’ perceived risk (See 3.1 Scope of RP). For example, one may speculate that 

occupants whose social role includes high perceived responsibility for others (e.g., a fire 

fighter or a parent) extend the scope of their RP to others. 

‐ Occupants in groups may experience higher perceived risk than occupants who are alone 

during a fire emergency. During the evacuation from WTC 1 on September 11, 2001, 

occupants who grouped together during the event reported higher perceived risk [108]. 

However, only one study was found to provide evidence of this linkage. Therefore, future 

studies are necessary to test if occupants with higher perceived risk are more likely to 

form groups, or whether forming groups increases perceived risk. 

4.4.4 Organizational factors

Organizational factors refer to the effects of the organizational structure on RP during 

evacuation. In a study on the September 11, 2001 WTC evacuation, participants working for the 

New York/New Jersey Port Authority reported higher perceived risk during the incident [30]. 

One may speculate that an organization’s safety climate and culture affects RP, which in turn 

influences protective action of the organization’s member. A qualitative study of the WTC 

disaster on September 11, 2001 showed that evacuation was affected by worksite preparedness 

planning, including the training and education of building occupants, and risk communication 

[96]. 

Organizational context: Depending on where an emergency occurs (e.g., work, home, public 

places; see also context), RP and evacuation behavior may be different. In one questionnaire 

study using a hypothetical bombing scenario, participants reported higher compliance rates to 

evacuation orders if they were at work than at home [138]. One reason might be that occupants 

felt safer or perceived less risk in their home environment. Depending on the organizational 

context, the perceived risk necessary before an evacuation decision is made might be different. 

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4.4.5 Summary of factors

Table 1 summarizes the findings regarding the individual factors potentially affecting RP during 

emergencies. A literature review on RP during natural hazards (e.g., evacuation from hurricanes 

or floods) concluded that the previous experience and lack of trust in authorities had the 

strongest direct effects on RP [11]. Future studies are necessary to test whether this holds true for 

building fire evacuations as well. Similarly, further research is clearly necessary regarding all the 

factors identified in the present review, since so many of the relationships were inconclusive 

(See Table 1). 

5 Overview of studies 

Table 2 gives an overview of studies used in this review. The studies are sorted according to their 

relevance to RP during building fire evacuation. A comparison of the studies reveals that there 

are very few studies on RP in the context of a building fire evacuation. 

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Table 2. Overview of studies on RP and evacuation. The studies are sorted according to their relevance for RP and evacuation. Ref. Rel.3 Scenario N Study Transfer to Qual./ Control data Method Measure of Theory Factors RP related

population building Quan. group RP affecting RP to 

fires evacuation3 

possible? 2 

27 

[98] 3 Building 803 WTC yes Quan. no Retroevacuation occupants1 spective 

under a terrorist attack 

[14] 3 240 WTC yes Quan. no Retro- Interview 

occupants5 

Buildingevacuation under a terrorist 

spective 

attack 

1 item PADM Environmental No direct(yes/no): cues, floor level, effect on 

obtained evacuation 

“During the information, delay (beta ≈time when 0 for both you first towers);became weak effect aware that on something information had seekinghappened behavior ( and when beta ≈ 0.15) 

you first entered the In one stairwell or tower, preelevator to evacuation leave did you actions werebelieve that associatedother people with higher were in perceived danger of risk (beta ≈being 0.23 vs. betakilled?’’ ≈ 0.08). 

7 point Likertscale (“How much at risk did you 

- Number of cues, 

quality of cues, distance toimpact 

feel”) 

Highperceived riskpredicted earlyresponders(Beta = .36; OR = 1.44) Low perceived risk was not a predictor of delayed evacuation 

[79] 3 Building 252 WTC yes Qual. no Retro- Interview 7 point Likert PADM Previous Perceived 

evacuation occupants5 spective scale experience, risk 

under a hyper vigilance, predicted 

terrorist cue intensity, evacuation 

attack cue decision 

identification 
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Ref. Rel.3 Scenario N Study Transfer to Qual./ Control data Method Measure of Theory Factors RP related

population building Quan. group RP affecting RP to 

fires evacuation3 

possible? 2 

[30] 3 Building

evacuation under a terrorist attack 

1139 WTC

occupants 

yes Quan. no Retrospective Question­ naire 1 item asking “How serious

did you thinkthe situationwas at first?” on a 4 pointLikert scale 

- female, member

of port authorityNY/NJ, personalbackground variables;evacuatingfromWTC1(vsWTC2),more Environmental Cues, more unusual Events (contextvariables),lower education,longer tenure inthe towers,moreknowledge,moreemergencypreparedness 

lower perceived risk:- lessinformation seeking- more preevacuation actions- longer preevacuation delays (beta = -.25) 

28 

[96] 3 Building 50 WTC yes Qual. no Retro- In-depth Coding of - - Yes,

evacuation occupants spective Interviews qualitative emergent

under a (n=30) or interviews terrorist focus groups perception attack (n=20) of risk

formed bysensory cues facilitated evacuation decisions (but not the process of evacuation) 

[97] 3 Building

evacuation under a terrorist attack 

1444 WTC

occupants 

yes Qual. Comparison 

to WTC occupantswho were not in the building at 

Retrospective Questionnaire Several items (number not

specified),including seriousness of the 

situation, and 

Behavioral Diagnostic Model 

- Yes, 70 % 

stated thattheyevacuated because theyappraised the situation 
29 

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Ref. Rel.3 Scenario N Study Transfer to Qual./ Control data Method Measure of Theory Factors RP related

population building Quan. group RP affecting RP to 

fires evacuation3 

possible? 2 

the incident concerns that 

the buildingwouldcollapse 

asdangerous.Occupantswho thoughtthe situationwas serious evacuated with less delay (OR = 3.78) and faster (OR =1.80). 

[103] 3 Tunnel 11 tunnel Tunnel users With Qual. no Retro- Review of Not reported Danger Visibility of Yes 

accident and fires limitations spective reports, video control cues fire footage, model 

media reports 

Buildingevacuation under a terrorist 

400 WTC Yes no Retro- Interviews Seek info, 

occupants1 

[139, 140] 2 

spective environmental 

cues 

attack 

[18] 2 Building 126 WTC yes Quan. no Retro- Questionnaire 7 point Likert - Floor level in -

evacuation occupants5 spective scale tower, WTC1, 

under a time (before or terrorist during attack evacuation) 

Elevatorevacuation during anunspecified 

573 High-rise Yes, with Quan. no Cross- Hypothetical - Rating of 

perceived safety of evacuation routes (two 7 point Likert

yes 

building limitations 

[141] 2 

sectional scenario 

occupants questionnaire 

emergency 

Building floor, evacuation method(elevator vs.staircase) 

scale items) 

[135] 1 Accident in 302 Employees With Quan. no Cross- Questionnaire - locus of control, -

chemical/ in chemical limitations sectional 

nuclear & nuclear positivity bias, facility facility availability

heuristic 

[39] 1 Hurricane 777 Residents in With Quan. no Retro- Interview - - yes 

evacuation hurricane limitations spective 
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Ref. Rel.3 Scenario N Study Transfer to Qual./ Control data Method Measure of Theory Factors RP related

population building Quan. group RP affecting RP to 

fires evacuation3 

possible? 2 

risk regions 

[142] 1 Wildfire 747 Wildland- Yes, with Quan. No Prospective Questionnaire 2 questions Social Lot size, -

evacuation urban limitations on perceived amplification 

interface probability of risk Previous(WUI) scaled to framework experience, homeowners range from 0 social context in Boulder to 100 and 

and Larimer Likert scale Counties in for 4 Colorado, variables onUSA perceived 

consequences 

[143] 1 Hurricane 206-407 General With Quan. no Retro- Questionnaire - - - -

evacuation population limitations spective 

in hurricanearea 

[17] 1 Hurricane 448 Tourists With Quan. no Cross- Questionnaire 5 point Likert - - Yes

evacuation limitations sectional scale (correlated 

with stated preference) 

[19] 1 Hurricane 570 General With Quan. no Retro- Interview 3 point scale PADM Actual risk, no 

evacuation public limitations spective homeownership, (low-middlehigh) 

[15] 1 Wildfire 251 Fulltime & With Quan. no Retro- Questionnaire 5 point Likert PADM Fire experience, Yes,

evacuation seasonal limitations spective scale subjective mediated;

residents knowledge,

perceived 38 % ofresponsibility variance in 

perceived riskexplained 

[16] 1 Flood 196 General With Quan. no Retro- Questionnaire 5 point Likert Threshold Not reported 

evacuation population limitations spective scale model of RP 

in flood area 

Distance to threat, Timecourse of events, amount of propertydamage 

[69] 1 Natural 406 Business With Qual. no Retro- Questionnaire 4 items Stress-strain Higher Perceived 

disaster employees limitations spective measuring perspective perceived risk risk 

risk-related was associated predicted behavior and with lower evacuation perceived amount of delay (beta = 

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Ref. Rel.3 Scenario N Study Transfer to Qual./ Control data Method Measure of Theory Factors RP related

population building Quan. group RP affecting RP to 

fires evacuation3 

possible? 2 

31 

safety community .145) 

disaster multiple planning, evacuation warning (beta = .158) messages implying thatevacuation was mandatory,residing in a mobile home or apartment, working in a more formalizedcompany,working in a younger company, and long-term event or consequences 

[144] 0 Terror 3062 General With Quan. no Cross- Interview 4 items with 

a 5 pointLikert scale on perceived risk of a terrorist 

Protection 

preparedness public limitations sectional Motivation

Theory 

race (noncaucasian), gender (female; not a good predictor), previous the factors 

attack 

12 % ofvariance in perceived riskexplained by

experience, preparedness,information seeking4 

Note: The content of this table is solely based on the information available in the individual studies and the amount and accuracy of the reported information varies. Ref. = Reference number; Rel. = Relevance; N = sample size; 1 NIST WTC evacuation data base; 2 yes, with limitations, no, unclear; 3 If yes, describe the 

relation (e.g. mediated, correlated); 3 0 = RP mentioned but in another context than evacuation, 1 = planned evacuation from a latent threat, 2 = acute evacuation

from an acute threat than building fire, 3 = Fire evacuation from buildings; 4 labeled as milling in this study; Quan. = Quantitative study; Qual. = Qualitative 

study; WTC = World Trade Center; 5 HEED data base; 6 no specification of actual number of participants was given in this paper 
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6 Limitations 

There are some limitations to the present review. The literature reviewed for this report varies 

significantly in nature and scope. The question of scope, or what to include and what not to 

include in this review, was therefore an important one [146, 147]. The theoretical models 

selected and discussed here focus on RP as the process of an individual occupant. There are 

additional theories that address risk and RP in other contexts, e.g. in strategic decision-making 

(Game theory [e.g., 148, 149]) or as a social or organizational phenomenon (e.g., the social 

amplification of risk framework [150]). However, these theories are beyond the scope of the 

present article. 

Another issue is publication bias. Generally speaking, very few studies on RP report results 

where no correlations were found between RP and evacuation. This indicates that there might be 

a publication bias towards positive relations between RP and evacuation. The Cochrane 

collaboration and other researchers have repeatedly shown that studies with significant and 

positive results are easier to find than those with non-significant or 'negative' or null results 

[151]. This may have caused an over-representation of studies finding correlations between RP 

and evacuation. 

As already mentioned previously, the bulk of the literature on evacuation and RP relies on selfreported rating scales. Many authors operationalized RP with 1 item questions such as “How ‘at 

risk’ did you feel at particular moments during the evacuation process?” [e.g., 14, 15-19, 79]. 

Single items are an easy to use and economical approach to measure RP. However, the 

question(s) may not grasp RP in its full complexity and it is possible that participants had 

different concepts about what they meant when they rated their perceived risk. Using different 

methods of measurements may lead to significantly different outcomes (as demonstrated by the 

comparison of two studies on evacuation from the WTC on September 11, 2001 [30, 98]). It is 

crucial that the measurement tool actually reflect the construct of interest (construct validity). 

Furthermore, it is questionable if a single item can validly measure a construct that consists of 

two independent dimensions (perceived probability and vulnerability). However, single item 

measures can have sufficient predictive validity [152-154]. It is necessary to develop and test 

measuring tools (e.g., questionnaires) for RP during building fire evacuations that meet common 

quality criteria (objectivity, reliability, validity [52]) of psychometric testing. 

Most of the data about RP and evacuation reported here relies on self-report data. As previously 

noted, the understanding of the term risk perception may vary greatly within the population. Selfreport studies are extremely useful to get an understanding of occupants’ experiences and 

behaviors during evacuation. However, self-report data are prone to bias due to social 

desirability and other sources of bias (e.g., memory effects). That is, self-reported behavior or 

behavioral intentions may differ greatly from actual behavior. Slovic [27] reports the case of a 

study in which participants were asked whether or not the construction of a nuclear power plant 

would stop them from using an adjacent beach. Most participants stated that they would stop 

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using the beach if the plant was built. The power plant was built, and no decline in the attendance 

of the beach was observed. 

In the present review, the authors discussed the effect of several factors on RP. In each case, an 

attempt was made to identify correlations or causal effects between each factor and RP, 

individually. However, RP in complex situations, like a fire emergency, is most likely 

determined by multiple variables, which may interact with each other. That is, the conclusions of 

the present review may oversimplify how various factors increase or decrease perceived risk and 

may neglect potential interaction effects between the factors. 

The present review on the role of RP during fire evacuation is heavily based on studies of one 

single event (i.e., the attacks on WTC on September 11, 2001). Although these studies revealed 

comparable results using independent databases, and knowledge on RP has significantly 

advanced based upon these research efforts, it stands to reason that the events of September 11, 

2001 may not allow for generalization to all other building fires. Future studies are necessary to 

build a broader database. Such studies should take into account different contexts (e.g., with 

regard to occupancy or location). Only a limited number of studies were found using data from 

laboratory settings or drills. Additionally, prospective studies are extremely scarce in this field 

(Table 2). The development of ecologically valid and ethical laboratory paradigms for the study 

of evacuation and RP may prove especially useful. 

Finally, this literature review depended on the accessibility of sources. This review is limited to 

the libraries of the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the University of 

Würzburg, Germany. For literature without full text access from either of these two libraries or 

through interlibrary loan, abstracts were considered, or the source was ignored. 

7 Conclusions and Outlook 

The first goal of this overview was to clarify the concept of RP in the context of building fire 

evacuation and to provide a definition of RP specifically for this field. RP was defined and 

differentiated from other similar concepts, such as situation awareness. In this paper, RP is seen 

as a psychological process comprising the subjective evaluation of the probability to be affected 

by an imminent threat and an assessment of one’s own perceived vulnerability and coping 

resources. It is modulated by affects and prone to cognitive biases. In a second step, the 

following relevant theoretical frameworks on RP from evacuation research were identified and 

described: Heuristic-systematic approach, PADM, Transactional stress model, reasoned action 

models, and SMS. We hypothesize that this synopsis may contribute to theory development in 

the field of evacuation research. 

In a next step, factors potentially influencing RP during building fire evacuation were identified 

and discussed. The results of this discussion, summarized in Table 1, revealed that the number of 

fire cues, floor level in high-rise buildings, credibility of information, gender, previous 

experience, hazard knowledge, certain emotional states, information processing, certain 

cognitive biases, the behavior of others, and groups can affect RP. 

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Future research will have to clarify the relationship of the factors identified in the present review. 

Specifically, three future research steps are necessary: (1) develop a self-report questionnaire of 

RP for fire evacuation. The variety in which perceived risk was measured in the studies reviewed 

in the present article indicates that a common standard to study RP during fire evacuation is 

necessary. An objective, reliable, and valid questionnaire is necessary to understand RP during 

fire evacuation. (2) Identify specific effects of perceived risk during the pre-alarm and the 

protective action phase of a fire emergency. Controlled laboratory studies which systematically 

manipulate RP could shed light on how perceived risk influences RSET. (3) Develop a holistic 

predictive model on the interaction of the factors potentially modulating RP. Although the 

present review identified a set of factors that most likely influence perceived risk during fire 

evacuation, it is unclear how strong the effects of individual factors are and how these factors 

interact with each other. 

The present review demonstrates that RP is relevant to evacuation outcome variables such as 

evacuation decision-making and evacuation delays. Furthermore, the present review introduces a 

definition of RP during fire evacuation, allowing a more precise operationalization of the 

concept. A precise operationalization of RP potentially allows researchers to explain additional 

variance in occupants’ evacuation decision-making and behavior, and, consequently, may 

improve the prediction of ASET/RSET in engineering tools. 

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