Defense

twice that of our consumption of either coal or natural gas and four

times greater than use of nuclear or renewable energy sources.1

The bulk of our petroleum use goes to meet energy demands,

with approximately 90 percent of a barrel of crude oil going to gasoline, diesel, and other fuels. Since 1949, however, the industrial consumption of petroleum for nonfuel use has increased nearly sevenfold.2 The chemical industry, for example, relies on petroleum for

more than 90 percent of its raw materials to manufacture its myriad

of products, ranging from plastics, refrigerants, and fertilizers to

detergents, explosives, and medicines. Virtually everything requires

petroleum or petroleum derivatives for its manufacture.

We are beginning to see a shift from petroleum, however. As the

20th century was ending, Michael Bowlin, then-president of the American Petroleum Institute, who was also chairman and chief executive

officer of ARCO, told industry executives that the world was entering

“the last days of the Age of Oil.”3 Estimates of the remaining life of

the reserves vary widely, but many experts agree that worldwide oil

production will peak between 2010 and 2020. Even if we agree with

those who hold that the petroleum supply may be renewable, environmental pressures and economic incentives will remain that will

move us to newer technologies.4 Far from repeating the apocalyptic

warnings of the 1960s and 1970s about the end of oil, Bowlin pointed

to new technologies that will replace petroleum.

The Age of Biology

Prominent among the replacements for petroleum will be products developed from biological sources. Using biological materials,

that is, plants and animals, as raw materials for industrial and consumer products is not a new idea. Before the rise of cheap oil, agriculture was the dominant source of our raw materials. Indeed, when

the U.S. Department of Agriculture was established in 1862, its motto

proclaimed, “Agriculture is the foundation of manufacture and commerce.” Even today, agriculture supplies raw materials for industry;

for example, about 8 percent of the U.S. corn crop goes to industrial

Overview

Winston Churchill is said to have stopped predicting future events

because the future was just “one damned thing after another.”

Nonetheless, we need to keep an eye on the future and speculate

as to what the next damned thing might be. One candidate is the

changing raw material base for the economy.

Today, the hydrocarbon molecule is the basic unit of commerce. In a biobased economy, genes will replace petroleum. So,

just as we currently demand assured access to sources of hydrocarbon molecules (oil), in the near future we will demand

assured access to a broad-based, diverse supply of genes (plants

and animals). This shift has security implications. Relations with

oil-rich countries will be of less importance, and relations with

gene-rich states—mostly the biodiverse regions along the equator—will assume greater significance. Conflicts may arise

between gene-rich, technology-poor countries that control the

basic raw materials of a biobased economy and gene-poor, technology-rich nations that control the production methods. 

American instruments of power will be challenged to meet

the demands of a biobased economy. We already see diplomatic

challenges with the United Nations Framework Convention on

Biological Diversity and controversy with Europe over genetically

modified crops. Informational and economic challenges and

opportunities will likewise appear. It may be challenging for U.S.

land forces, especially the Army, to meet the demands of securing

access to large supplies of new genetic material.

Agriculture will become increasingly important as a part of

the Nation’s industrial base, as it offers the most economical way

to produce large quantities of biological materials. Homeland

defense will have to consider heartland defense, as agricultural

fields will assume the same significance as oil fields.

The Age of Geology

For much of the last century, and particularly since the end of

World War II, petroleum has been the primary raw material for U.S.

industrial and consumer needs. As a nation, our petroleum use is

From Petro to Agro: Seeds of a

New Economy

by Robert E. Armstrong

A publication of the

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

OCTOBER 2002

Number 20

Horizons

October 2002 Defense Horizons 1
Robert E. Armstrong is a senior research fellow in the Center for Technology

and National Security Policy at the National Defense University.

Dr. Armstrong may be contacted via e-mail at armstrongre@ndu.edu or 

by phone at (202) 685–2529.

uses rather than directly meeting food or feed requirements.5 Moreover, the agricultural industry offers the most cost-effective way to

manufacture large volumes of biological materials.

In its vision statement for the 21st century, the National Agricultural Biotechnology Council forecasts agriculture to be the source

of not only our food, feed, and fiber, but also our energy, materials,

and chemicals.6 In a 1999 report on biobased industrial products, the

National Research Council noted that U.S. farmers already generate

annually about 280 million tons of waste biomass—leaves, stalks,

and partially used plant portions. That is more than sufficient material to serve as feedstock for all of the domestic industrial chemicals

that can be readily manufactured from agricultural sources.7

Domestically, resources needed for food and feed production

will not compete with resources required to grow our industrial raw

materials. Our natural resource base of land and water is more than

adequate to meet the demand. The United States has the largest

amount of arable land per capita of any country in the world (1.73

acres for the United States versus 0.99 for other developed countries;

the developing world average is only 0.49

acres).8 Additionally, through the U.S.

Department of Agriculture Conservation

Reserve Program, 35 million acres are left

fallow each year, some of which could be

used to grow crops specifically for biomass.

While water does present some local

and regional challenges, groundwater

depletion rates in the United States have

slowed overall during the last 20 years. As

the need for affordable water increases, improvements in irrigation

technology and the development of new water resources are likely to

follow. One estimate suggests that improvements in irrigation technology alone can reduce the anticipated worldwide demand for additional water resources by one-half during the next 25 years.9 Thus,

while a concern, water availability is not likely to present a barrier to

expanded agricultural production.

Technological innovations in agricultural production probably

will continue to increase yields. Corn yields, for example, gained an

average of 1.0 bushel per acre per year during the last century. In the

last half of the century, the average increase was l.8 bushels per acre

per year. Depending on soil characteristics and water availability,

even something as simple as the spacing between cornrows can be

used to maximize yields. In the late 1990s, corn yields in the United

States averaged 134 bushels per acre. Some researchers believe that

within the next 20 years, technology and cultural practices can

increase yield averages to nearly 260 bushels per acre.10

The United States clearly has the production capacity to produce and process the raw materials for a biobased economy. Still, in

most current industrial practices, the cost of the conversion

process—turning biomass into energy, materials, and chemicals—is

not competitive with petroleum. Consider five common industrial

products: adhesives, acetic acid, pigments, inks, and plastics. A comparison of their cost when derived from petroleum with their cost

when derived from plant materials generally shows not only a greater

cost for plant-derived materials but also great disparity in the

spread, based on which product is being considered.11

A key problem with making cost comparisons is that the production costs are based on using existing facilities designed for petroleum feedstocks. When using biomass, some of the end products can

be made through direct physical or chemical processing; others can

be produced indirectly through fermentation (using microbial

agents) or by enzymatic processing. What is needed are “biorefineries.”12 Like an oil refinery, a biorefinery would take carbon and hydrogen and produce desired products. The biorefinery’s economic advantage will emerge from its dual capability. Along with the desired end

products, foods, feeds, and biochemicals could be produced.

Prototypes of the biorefinery already exist in our industrial base

in the form of corn wet mills, soybean processing facilities, and pulp

and paper mills. While the prototypes of full-scale biorefineries are

only in the planning stage, two facilities

designed for specific biobased end products are presently coming online. Earlier

this year, Cargill Dow opened a $300-million facility in Nebraska to manufacture a

bioplastic made from sugars found in corn

kernels.13 As the technology improves, the

company plans to extract the sugars from

less costly agricultural waste, such as corn

stalks, wheat straw, and rice hulls.

Similarly, DuPont announced last year that it had successfully

manufactured a key ingredient for one of its new polymers, using

corn sugars instead of petrochemicals.14 The conversion was done in

a pilot plant using a fermentation technology. Anticipating the eventual cost competitiveness of biological materials, the company has

built a full-scale production plant for the polymer and designed it to

use either petrochemical feedstocks or biobased feedstocks.

Is this biobased economy just a vision with a few immediate

examples, or is there a long-term probability for its success? In its

1999 report on biobased industrial products, the National Research

Council argued that a competitively priced, biobased products industry eventually would replace much of the petrochemical industry. As

an intermediate goal, the report suggested that by 2020, a biobased

economy could provide 25 percent of the 1994 levels of the Nation’s

organic carbon-based industrial feedstock chemicals and 10 percent

of liquid fuels. The report suggested that, ultimately, 90 percent of

the U.S. organic chemical consumption and 50 percent of our liquid

fuel needs could be met by a domestic biobased economy.

In this new economy, plants and animals will be specifically

bred and farmed to produce desired raw materials. For example, if

an industrial process requires a chemical to have certain tolerances

to heat, a protein may be available to provide that tolerance. The

protein, which would be the product of a gene, could be derived from

plants. If the protein occurs naturally in animals or in plant species

that are not easily farmed, genetic engineering offers the ability to

transfer the gene to a plant species more suited to agricultural production. (The product of moving genes from one species to another

2 Defense Horizons October 2002

the United States clearly

has the production

capacity to process the

raw materials for 

a biobased economy
is called a transgenic.) Once introduced into an agriculturally desirable plant, the protein can then be produced more cost-effectively

and made available on a commercial scale.

Fueling the Biobased Economy

As the biobased economy matures and issues of production and

processing are improved, the demand for new products will grow.

New products will require new raw materials. In a biobased economy,

the basic raw material will be genes, and novel genes will be the

source of novel products. Thus, as we shift from an economy based

on geology to one based on biology, the basic unit of commerce will

shift from the hydrocarbon molecule to the gene. The Quadrennial

Defense Review 2001 cites access to key

markets and strategic resources as part

of our enduring national interests.15 Just

as we currently demand assured access

to sources of hydrocarbons, in the near

future we will demand assured access to

a broad-based, diverse supply of genes.

As with any resource vital to our

economy, the location of large supplies

of genes will become important to our

national security concerns. In our petroleum-based world, the resource is concentrated in various pockets distributed

worldwide in nearly all climate regions. Obviously, genes are distributed worldwide, as there is life in every nook and cranny of this

planet. However, the overwhelming majority of genes are concentrated in the equatorial regions.

Biologists refer to a region’s biodiversity when commenting on

the range of life forms present. The more life forms present (that is,

the more genes present), the greater the biodiversity. The general

biological principle of latitudinal diversity gradient contends the

closer to the equator, the greater the biodiversity. The amount of

solar energy present, the lack of seasonal climate fluctuations, and

the expanse of land explain the gradient’s existence. By way of illustration, consider the results of a study that used comparable sized

plots of land at different latitudes to compare the number of different bird species found at each latitude: Greenland, 56 species; New

York state, 195 species; Colombia, 1,525 species. Plants show a similar degree of biodiversity. For example, in all of Canada and the

United States, there are only 700 native tree species. In one census

involving about 25 acres in Borneo, more than 1,000 different tree

species were cataloged.16

International Implications

In a biobased world, our relations with Ecuador (to use a representative country that takes its very name from the equator) will

be more important than those with Saudi Arabia. The United States

must consider what controversies could arise over another nation’s

genetic treasure and how best to secure access and provide compensation to the regional owners. These are not new issues.

A classic example that illustrates the potential issues is the

rosy periwinkle plant of Madagascar. In the early 1950s, a plant biologist working for the U.S. drug firm Eli Lilly extracted two cancerfighting compounds from the flower. During the course of the patents

on the two compounds, Lilly earned hundreds of millions of dollars

from the sale of the drugs. Madagascar received no compensation

whatsoever.17

By the early 1990s, two documents were ready for international

agreement that sought to address cases like that of the periwinkle,

among other things. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement—part of the Final Act of the

Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations—sought to

strengthen international intellectual property protection in order to

promote world trade. The United

Nations Framework Convention on Biological Diversity, known commonly as

the Biodiversity Treaty, sought to preserve agrarian societies and promote

sustainable development.

Throughout the Uruguay Round,

the United States strongly supported the

TRIPS notion of protecting international

intellectual property. Emblematic of the

problems associated with that position

were the 1993 riots in India directed

against W.R. Grace, a U.S. chemical firm.

Indian farmers were protesting that Grace had a patent on an insecticide derived from the neem tree, even though the farmers had a

traditional method to extract the compound from the leaves.

Although Grace’s process gave the compound a shelf life and allowed

it to be transported to areas where neem trees were not available,

the farmers accused Grace of “gene piracy.”

The Biodiversity Treaty was seen by many to be in conflict with

the U.S. position on TRIPS. The Biodiversity Treaty sought to address

the issue of the biodiverse-rich underdeveloped countries seeking

compensation for the resources taken and used by the technologyrich developed countries. Provisions of the treaty require biodiverserich countries to provide access to genetic material in return for the

developing countries providing a fair and equitable share of the benefits. U.S. pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms initially opposed

the treaty. Eventually, however, they dropped their opposition, out of

fear that it might ultimately preclude their exploration for genetic

resources in underdeveloped countries. The treaty was signed by

President William Clinton in 1993 but was never ratified.18

October 2002 Defense Horizons 3

as we shift from an

economy based on

geology to one based on

biology, the basic unit of

commerce will shift from

the hydrocarbon molecule

to the gene

Production Costs (dollars per pound)

Petroleum- PlantProduct derived derived

Adhesives 1.65 1.40

Acetic acid 0.33 0.35

Pigments 2.00 5.80

Inks 2.00 2.50

Plastics 0.50 2.00
Although the treaty was not ratified, the business sector moved

forward with an agreement that serves as a model for such arrangements. In 1991, Merck and Company signed an agreement with the

Costa Rican Institutio Nacional de Biodiversidad (INBio) for a 

2-year renewable contract, in which INBio supplied Merck with

extracts from plants, insects, and micro-organisms for its drugscreening program. In exchange, Merck paid INBio $1,135,000 and

royalties on any resulting commercial products.

Thus, even a decade ago, the business sector was quite aware of

the potential for genes as raw materials. This is especially true in the

pharmaceutical industry at the moment, as about one-fourth of all

prescription drugs contain an active ingredient derived from plants.

In a biobased economy, with many players seeking access to the

biodiversity treasures of developing countries, the possible international scenarios that might arise are limitless: conflicts between

developed countries over who had access to what gene at what time;

conflicts between developing and developed countries over access to

genes and compensation; conflicts between

developing countries over territory, and thus

ownership, of particular stores of genes.

In this context, a serious dilemma

could surface if a state set out to destroy

large amounts of diverse genetic material.

This is not a hypothetical situation. It is

estimated that some 31 million hectares of

rainforest are destroyed annually.19 Article 3

of the Biodiversity Treaty states that countries have the “sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies.”20 If genes were the basic

unit of commerce, would we tolerate another state’s environmental

policies that allowed for the continued destruction of the rainforest?

Another likely point of international friction will be the use of

transgenics. Moving genes from one species to another provides for

tremendous diversity and the opportunity to create new products. It

also raises safety and ethical concerns about introducing such

genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into the environment. (A

distinction is drawn between GMOs that are nonliving end products

that would have no effect on the environment—for example, the

heat tolerance protein theorized above—and living modified organisms [LMOs], such as seeds, that may have some environmental

consequences.)

Current Department of Agriculture figures cite a continuing

increase in acreage planted with genetically modified crops in the

United States. In 2002, nearly one-third of all corn acreage will use

genetically modified (GM) seed, while GM cotton will account for

just over 70 percent of acreage and GM soybeans will be planted in

approximately three-fourths of soybean fields.21 The use of GMOs

only will increase as the biobased economy matures, and, likewise,

the potential for disputes will increase.

These are not hypothetical issues for the distant future but are

present day concerns. The European Union (EU), for example, has

had a moratorium on approving the importation of GM crops for the

past 4 years. While it appears that the EU may be moving toward

approval by summer 2003, the moratorium has been a cause of controversy between the EU and the United States. As recently as February 2002, the Secretary of Agriculture noted that the United

States had not ruled out the possibility of filing a formal complaint

with the World Trade Organization (WTO).22 At the same time, however, environmental activists in Europe are encouraging EU governments to ban GM crops of beet and oilseed rape. In Australia, the

Insurance Council of Australia has stated its reluctance to insure

farmers, biotechnology companies, or food companies in cases

involving GMOs.23

Significant multilateral international efforts have been made to

address specific concerns surrounding LMOs. In January 2000, the

Biosafety Protocol to the Biodiversity Treaty was signed. Known as

the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, it is the first protocol to the Biodiversity Treaty. Its intent is to provide countries the chance to

obtain information about LMOs before they are imported. Moreover,

it acknowledges each country’s right to regulate bioengineered

organisms and provides a framework to help the developing world to

protect its biodiversity further. Although the United States is not a

party to the Biodiversity Treaty and thus cannot be a party to the Protocol, it participated in the negotiations as a

member of the so-called Miami Group, a

coalition of leading agricultural exporters

that included Argentina, Australia, Canada,

Chile, and Uruguay.24

While the various treaties and scenarios described above depict potential conflicts, not all international implications of a

biobased economy will be filled with peril.

For example, consider the implications for

job creation. As a raw material, petroleum has considerably more

energy per unit volume than biological materials. Thus, it is economical to transport petroleum from its source to distant refineries

for processing and then further to ship the refinery products for use

as end products or industrial intermediates. With biological materials, however, the economics will not support shipping the raw materials much farther than 250 to 300 miles from their point of origin.

Biorefineries will have to be built close to the source of their raw

materials. A regionalized agriculture will likely develop, with certain

areas growing specific crops to supply regional biorefineries. Additional processing and manufacturing of value-added biologically

based products can economically take place farther from a biorefinery, but there will be limits to the distances involved. The significance is the likely creation of nonfarming jobs in rural areas.

Urbanization in the developing world is often noted as a major

issue of strategic concern for the 21st century. Currently, there are

approximately 40 cities in the world with populations of 5 million or

more. By 2015, it is anticipated that nearly 25 more will join the ranks.

Only 11 of these 65 will be in the developed world.25 Moreover, the

demographic structure of societies in developing countries is heavily

weighted toward people 25 years of age and younger. Unemployment

among large numbers of young urban males in developing countries

is frequently cited as a root cause of the terrorism that we are fighting today. A biobased economy ultimately could help stem the flow of

urbanization and provide rural employment opportunities.

Domestic Implications

Just as new international issues will surface as a result of our

transition to a biobased economy, new domestic considerations will

4 Defense Horizons October 2002

a serious dilemma

could surface if a state

set out to destroy large

amounts of diverse

genetic material
likewise arise. For example, most homeland defense planning currently focuses on the protection of urban populations and infrastructure, while the safeguarding of agricultural areas does not

receive much consideration.26 Agriculture simply does not enter into

the thinking of most people. Throughout most of the last century

(from about 1930 to 1999), agriculture as a percent of U.S. employment declined nearly 90 percent—from 23 percent to 2.6 percent.

The number of farms declined from 6.3 million to 2.2 million. Agriculture was not even included among the eight critical national

infrastructures in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63, “Critical Infrastructure Protection.” Interestingly, however, agriculture is

included as a subgroup of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness Group resulting from PDD 62, “Combating Terrorism.”

In fairness, it has not seemed particularly necessary to include

agriculture as critical infrastructure, since croplands have not surfaced as likely terrorist targets. Terrorists usually aim to score immediate to near-term effects by striking high-profile targets. While a

present-day attack on our field crops

could have a large economic price tag, it

certainly would not affect our ability to

feed ourselves. Food is plentiful worldwide, and the marketplace easily could

meet any immediate or near-term

demands. (Even with the growing world

population, per capita food production has

actually increased during the last 30 years

from 2,360 calories per day to 2,740 calories per day.27)

In addition to field crops, farm animals, food in the processing or distribution chain, food at wholesale

or retail establishments, and agricultural facilities are all potential

targets.28 Presently, an attack on any link in the chain would result in

large economic losses, as well as likely loss of human and animal life.

It is estimated that a natural outbreak of foot and mouth disease on

just 10 farms would result in a $2 billion loss.29 Losses from last year’s

outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the United Kingdom were estimated at $30 billion.30 However, if we relied upon agriculture to provide the raw materials for our economy, the potential disruption

could be orders of magnitude greater.

Consider this hypothetical scenario. What if, as the National

Research Council report suggests, we did derive 50 percent of our

liquid fuels from agriculture? At present, agriculture provides only

1.2 percent of our “gasoline” supply in the form of ethanol, much of

which is blended with gasoline as an oxygenate to reduce seasonal

pollution effects. As new biotechnologies improve the processing of

biomass, ethanol will become an economically viable option, and it

will become a larger source of our liquid fuel supply. At that point,

destruction of a large portion of U.S. farmlands would be tantamount

to an invasion of Kuwait.

The whole issue of agricultural bioterrorism is complex, but

for the purpose of this argument, let us focus solely on croplands.

How vulnerable are our croplands? In 1970, without planning or

assistance from any organized terrorist group, a naturally occurring

epiphytotic, an epidemic in the plant world, destroyed 15 percent of

the U.S. corn crop with an estimated value of $1 billion.31 Although

we have diversified the genetic base of corn in an effort to avoid

another such disaster, crops are still vulnerable to disease. Any

number of organisms, including various molds, fungi, viruses, and

bacteria, can cause epiphytotics. These organisms are easily grown

in laboratories, at no threat to humans, and can be transported

worldwide without detection.

At present, our crops present a relatively simple target set for

anyone wishing to do them harm. The U.S. crop base is fairly uniform, with 8 of every 10 acres planted to just 3 crops: corn, wheat, or

soybeans. There is genetic diversity within each crop, offering some

disease resistance. Predicting the actual loss for any given attack

would be based on several assumptions, as epiphytotics are dependent on multiple variables. Moisture and temperature are the most

complex variables involved and are extremely difficult to predict in

any long-term fashion.32 Nonetheless, well-coordinated simultaneous

attacks in many areas, using multiple pathogens, would no doubt

result in significant losses. (Significant in this case could be analogous to the 1970 corn epiphytotic. This would have the net effect of

reducing our annual supply of raw materials by 15 percent.)

The U.S. Department of Agriculture

is responsible for the Animal and Plant

Health Inspection Service (APHIS).

Under APHIS, the Plant Protection and

Quarantine (PPQ) Division is charged

with protecting our crops from the

national and international spread of diseases and pests. Since 1982, PPQ has conducted a nationwide survey on crop health

and is responsible for dispatching rapid

response teams to control any disease outbreak. In the face of a concerted attack, however, one could envision PPQ requiring the assistance of large numbers of people to help man the response teams. It

is not inconceivable that military troops could be requested, in much

the same manner as they are today to aid with firefighting.

From a plant protection perspective, the shift to a biobased

economy will have some positive aspects. To provide new materials

for industry, there will be a demand for new genes and their products.

If novel genes are found in plants that can be easily grown in this

country, then their direct cultivation would be the preferred method

rather than creating a transgenic with corn, wheat, or soybeans. With

direct cultivation, the overall U.S. crop base would be broadened and

thus provide a more challenging target set for terrorists. Also, the

construction of regional biorefineries would complicate targeting

more than the current groupings of petroleum refineries.

While a biobased economy will no doubt bring the United States

the same benefits of slowing urbanization and rural revitalization as

anticipated for the developing world, the net effect most likely would

be marginal. We will remain a predominantly urban society. As we

reconsider the terrorist threat in the wake of September 11, however,

it is important to note that agriculture will assume a greater significance as a potential target.

Challenges to U.S. Instruments of Power

Converting to a biobased economy will present new but not

totally unfamiliar challenges on all fronts. This is not the first time

October 2002 Defense Horizons 5

agriculture was not

even included among

the eight critical

national infrastructures

in Presidential Decision

Directive 63
we have developed and used new resources. Nor will it be the first

time we have sought to obtain resources from other nations or

wanted to trade finished products. None of these changes will happen quickly or without warning. Nonetheless, it is worth considering

some possible effects on our diplomatic, informational, economic,

and military instruments of power.

Diplomatic and Informational

Already, diplomatic challenges are being presaged by topics

such as the Biodiversity Treaty and possible WTO action for our

GMOs. Such issues may well become the norm, requiring a diplomatic corps well trained in scientific and technical skills. Water warrants some extended discussion, as it will be at the heart of diplomatic concerns in the 21st century, regardless of the world’s resource

base. A biobased economy, though, may well intensify the issue.

Globally, the renewable fresh water supply has fallen by nearly

two-thirds in the last 50 years. During that same period, the human

population has increased nearly 250 percent. Two-thirds of the

world’s water demands are for agricultural use, and while irrigated

agriculture accounts for only 20 percent

of farmland, 45 percent of the world’s

food supply is grown on irrigated land. By

2025, it is estimated that nearly 3 billion

people—40 percent of the projected

world’s population—will find it difficult

or impossible to satisfy basic water needs.

The potential international points of conflict over water are

also significant. Two or more countries share 261 of the world’s

rivers. Some 51 countries, within 17 international river basins, are at

risk of water disputes during the next decade. An analysis of 1,831

international water-related disputes over the last 50 years revealed

that about one-fourth resulted in violence.33

Although water will be a problem, it will not be an insurmountable one. In a 1999 National Academy of Science report on the future

of water in the Middle East, it was noted that additional supplies

could be obtained by using a variety of techniques. Some involve

improved management of watersheds and collection of water that

now is lost as runoff. Other techniques use current technologies and

include wastewater reclamation and desalination. Some of these can

be made even more productive and economical with further

improvement. Conservation still remains a significant factor in

extending water supplies. Between 1985 and 1993, for example,

Israel reduced its water consumption by more than 200 million cubic

meters per year, almost entirely through improvements in irrigation

and water delivery restrictions.34

Former U.S. Senator Paul Simon is a strong advocate of desalination. In his 1998 book on the world’s coming water crisis, he noted

the progress being made in desalination technologies and use. About

11,000 plants are in operation in more than 125 countries. Desalination is most widely used in the Middle East, which accounts for about

60 percent of the world’s plants. In fact, Saudi Arabia built the first

modern desalination plant in the late 1930s. To be certain, the economics of desalination are still not competitive, especially for agriculture, but continued development will ultimately drive down the

price. That will be especially true as the price of water from other

sources rises.35

The informational element of the biobased economy is of particular interest and is worthy of a separate study. It is probably

unprecedented that both government and business sources are being

required by the general population to provide such large amounts of

detailed technical information on procedures and products. This

issue will only become more complicated, as nontechnical societies

will demand data, and bioethics considerations will have to consider

differing cultural views.

Economic

The economic forces of globalization at work today will not be

affected by the biobased economy (with the possible exception of

urbanization, as previously discussed). Thomas Friedman points out

that the driving force of globalization is free market capitalism.36

While a discussion of agricultural trade may well question how much

it follows the rules of a truly free market, it is instructive to note our

position in that arena. According to the Department of Agriculture

Economic Research Service, the United States accounted for 19.2

percent of the world’s agricultural exports in 2000. In that same year,

we accounted for 13.7 percent of worldwide agricultural imports.37

Friedman also notes that globalization has its own set of defining technologies, which includes computerization,

miniaturization, digitization, satellite

communications, fiber optics, and the

Internet. Those are the same technologies American farmers use in

a technique called precision agriculture, which enables them to

integrate all available data and to make the most efficient and economical decisions concerning a crop. For example, using data collected from field sensors, a farmer may detect a developing pest

problem. Rather than treating an entire field, as would have been the

solution in the past, very targeted treatments can be applied, saving

time and money.

In an economy dominated by products derived from agriculture, it is unlikely that we would lose our position of trade or production capability. In fact, our position only will be strengthened, as

the defining technologies used in agriculture are the very ones also

used in biotechnology. Thus, we would likely achieve an economic

advantage through our combined biotechnology skills—which will

allow us to identify and use novel genes more quickly—and our agricultural production capacity.

The National Corn Growers Association, an industry trade

group, has coined the phrase that the United States is the “Saudi

Arabia of Corn.” In a globalized, biobased economy, we will be the

new Persian Gulf.

Military

Of all the instruments of national power, the military is the one

most likely to be affected by a shift in our resource base. The instruments of diplomacy, information, and economics do not require long

lead times to research, develop, and acquire their tools of the trade.

Nor are the consequences potentially as serious if an initial misstep

is made in exercising one of those instruments of power. The inter6 Defense Horizons October 2002

water will be at the heart

of diplomatic concerns

in the 21st century
national consequences of launching military operations, however,

can be long lasting and potentially fatal to those directly involved.

It can be argued that there is less likelihood of exercising the

military instrument of power in a biobased economy than in our current petroleum-based economy. That may be true, especially in terms

of needing to ensure a daily supply of new raw material—genes

rather than oil. Nonetheless, demand for new raw material will

remain considerable. Novel genes will be the source of novel products

in the biobased economy. While the other instruments of power may

play a greater role in securing access to novel genes, the military

must still be prepared to operate in areas of enduring U.S. interest.

To be certain, the U.S. military is not ignoring biology and is

particularly aware of the potential benefits of new biological technologies. In

a 2001 National Research Council

report on future biotechnology opportunities for the Army, the five areas of

sensors, electronics and computing,

materials, logistics, and therapeutics

were identified as significant.38 Additional work done by the Office of Net

Assessment (Office of the Secretary of

Defense) has further identified a number of specific areas that could

enhance soldier performance and provide greater protection on the battlefield. One particularly intriguing notion is the idea to use biological

evolutionary processes to create more effective battlefield systems.39

Advances in any or all of these areas will benefit the Nation’s

21st-century military, regardless of how it is organized or which wars

it is prepared to fight. However, the likely missions and the force

structure required for those missions need to be considered.

Special Challenges for the Land Force

The Army’s current transformation process and its efforts to

find the proper mix of heavy and light forces should be considered in

the context of the country’s transformation to a biobased economy.

Gas and oil undeniably will remain important resources through the

first part of this century. Given the geography of a scenario envisioning armor and infantry battling over petroleum and gas resources—

a possible replay of Operation Desert Storm or an even larger future

conflict over Eurasia’s untapped gas and oil—multi-ton vehicles,

whether part of a legacy force or new acquisitions, are no doubt

indispensable. Thirty years from now, however, biology may well have

simultaneously reduced the need for fossil fuels and increased the

need for access to highly diverse genetic resources.

The Army’s transformation to its new Objective Force also

should be completed by then. Of its many attributes, the new force is

to be agile and deployable. Legacy vehicles such as the multi-ton

Abrams tank and Bradley infantry fighting vehicle will still be supplementing the force until about 2030. The Interim Force will be

fielded as a bridge between our current force and the final Objective

Force that will also have multi-ton armored vehicles. An important

question to ask is whether such an army will have the necessary

equipment to conduct a forcible entry into an equatorial region to

secure the genetic resources contained in a given 5,000-square-mile

patch of rainforest. The significance of the question lies in the long

lead time needed for research, development, and acquisition of

weapons systems.

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, recently

made the following comment:

We [the Army] must be able to project power anywhere in the

world, not just in the easily accessible areas with multiple air and

seaports of debarkation, but in the most remote, desolate, landlocked

and infrastructure-poor areas as well... The one map in the Chief’s

office is a map of the Caspian Basin. The reason the map is

there...[is that]... it’s the one part of the world we didn’t know

how to get to, and nobody else could,

either. For the last two years, the Army

War College has conducted its war

game in the Caspian Basin.40

General Shinseki certainly has the

right idea. He simply needs to add a

map of the Amazon Basin to his wall.

Despite all the possible considerations surrounding the shift from geology to biology, it is important to recognize that “war’s ultimate stakes,” as

retired U.S. Army War College Commandant Major General Robert Scales

calls them, will not change for the warfighter, whether organized as

heavy, light, or something in between. Land, people, and resources

will remain the primary focus of warfare.41 Moreover, it is important

to note that biological technologies will not provide the next and

final wave for the revolution in military affairs and deliver some sort

of ultimate weapon to ensure our future victories. Again, to quote

General Scales: “2,500 years of history confirm that ambiguity, miscalculation, incompetence, and above all chance will continue to

dominate the conduct of war. In the end, the incalculables of determination, morale, fighting skill, and leadership, far more than technology, will determine who wins and loses.”42

Despite the war on terrorism, we are at one of those periods in

history in which we are not burdened by pressures of such imminent

danger that our very existence is threatened. We have time to ponder the distant future. We have an opportunity to shape our relationships with those countries that will be strategically important to

us. We have an opportunity to invest in those technologies that will

be important to our economic advantage in a biobased economy.

We also have the chance to prepare now for the type of warfare

that we may encounter in a world run on biological resources. Sir

Michael Howard, the noted historian and military theorist, commented, “You can rest assured, whatever doctrine you are working on

in peace time, you probably have it wrong. What counts is making

sure that you’re not so wrong that you can’t get it right when the time

comes.”43 Before progressing much further in our current thinking,

pausing to take stock of the next damned thing may prove to be a

damned smart thing.

October 2002 Defense Horizons 7

while the other instruments

of power may play a greater

role in securing access 

to novel genes, the military

must still be prepared to

operate in areas of

enduring U.S. interest
Notes1 Petroleum Industry Analysis Brief, accessed at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/

emeu/mecs/iab/petroleum/index.html>. 2 Energy Information Administration/Annual Energy Review 2000, “Table 5.12b

Petroleum Consumption by the Industrial Sector, 1949–2000,” accessed at <http://

www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec5_29.pdf>. 3 DIGEST, compiled from reports by the Associated Press, Bloomberg News, Dow

Jones Service, Reuters, and Washington Post staff writers, accessed at <http://

search.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/wplate/1999-02/10/1741-021099-idx.html>. 4 Commentary, “Potential Oil Supply Refill?” The Washington Times, Wednesday,

May 29, 2002, A12. 5 Sam Willet, National Corn Growers Association, personal communication.

6 National Agricultural Biotechnology Council, Vision for Agricultural Research

and Development in the 21st Century, December 14, 1998. 7 National Research Council, Biobased Industrial Products: Priorities for

Research and Commercialization (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999). 8 Margot Anderson and Richard Magleby, Agricultural Resources and Environmental Indicators, 1996–1997, Agricultural Handbook no. 712, July 1997, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, chapter 7.1, 7. 9 Ibid.,7.

10 W.E. Larson and V.B. Cardwell, “Corn Production: A Guide to Profitable and

Environmentally Sound Management. Future Expectations,” accessed at <http://citv.

unl.edu/cornpro/html/future/future.html>. 11 Department of Energy, Plant/Crop-Based Renewable Resources 2020: A Vision

to Enhance U.S. Economic Security through Renewable Plant/Crop-Based Resource

Use, January 1998. 12 Section 9003, Biorefinery Development Grants of the Farm Security and Rural

Investment Act of 2002, authorizes development grants to build biorefineries to

“develop transportation and other fuels, chemicals, and energy from renewable

sources.” 13 Terence Chea, “From Fields to Factories: Plant-Based Materials Replace OilBased Plastics, Polyesters,” The Washington Post, May 3, 2002, E1, accessed at

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24747-2002May2.html>. 14 “DuPont Makes Key Polymer Ingredient from Corn Instead of Petroleum,”

DuPont news release, May 1, 2001, accessed at <http://www.dupont.com/corp/news/

releases/2001/nr05_01_01.html>. 15 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington,

DC: Department of Defense, September 30, 2001), accessed at <http://www.

defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf>. 16 Edward O. Wilson, The Diversity of Life (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press,

1992), 195–197. 17 Richard Stone, “The Biodiversity Treaty: Pandora’s Box or Fair Deal?” Science,

June 19, 1992. 18 Charles R. McManis, “The Interface between International Intellectual Property and Environmental Protection: Biodiversity and Biotechnology,” Washington University Law Quarterly 76, no. 1 (Spring 1998), 255–280. 19 “Rates of Rainforest Loss,” Rainforest Fact Sheets, Rainforest Action Network,

May 8, 2002, accessed at <http://www.ran.org/info_center/factsheets/04b.html>. 20 McManis, 258.

21 “U.S. Department of Agriculture Figures Show Rise in GM Crop Plantings,”

Chemical Week 164, no. 15, 36. 22 “EU Says it Will Approve GMO Imports as Early as October,” Food and Drink

Weekly 8, no. 10, 1.

23 “Pressure on EU to Ban GM Crops,” A Northern Light Special Collection Document, Document ID FE20020404310000906, accessed at <www.AllAfrica.com>. 24 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Fact Sheet: The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, February 16,

2000), accessed at <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/biotech/00021601.htm>. 25 “Millennium in Maps, Population” (map supplement), National Geographic

no. 4 (October 1998). 26 Henry S. Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the

Threat, McNair Paper 65 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2002), 12.

27 “Can the Planet Produce Enough Food to Feed the Billions Who Will Be Born

in the Future?” National Geographic no. 4 (October 1998), 59. 28 Parker, 12.

29 Floyd P. Horn and Roger G. Breeze, “Agriculture and Food Safety,” in Food and

Agricultural Security: Guarding against Natural Threats and Terrorist Attacks

Affecting Health, National Food Supplies, and Agricultural Economics, ed. Thomas

W. Frazier and Drew C. Richardson, Annals of the New York Academy of Natural 

Sciences 894 (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1999), 9–17. 30 Lawrence Alderson, “Foot-and-Mouth Disease in the United Kingdom 2001: Its

Cause, Course, Control and Consequences,” accessed at <http://www.warmwell.

com/aldersonsept3.html>. 31 Paul Rogers, Simon Whitby, and Malcolm Dando, “Biological Warfare Against

Crops,” Scientific American 280, no. 6 (June 1999), 72. 32 “Concepts of Epiphyt,” accessed at <http://www.pa.ipw.agrl.ethz.ch/~w3pa/

models/epiphyt/concepts.html>. 33 Robert Toguchi, seminar remarks at The Role of American Military Power,

held by the Association of the U.S. Army, April 2002. 34 U.S. National Academy of Sciences, et al., Water for the Future: The West Bank

and Gaza Strip, Israel and Jordan (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999). 35 Paul Simon, Tapped Out: The Coming World Water Crisis and What We Can Do

About It (New York: Welcome Rain Publishers, 1998). 36 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus

and Giroux, 2000). 37 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Briefing Room,

“U.S. Agricultural Trade: Global Agricultural Trade,” accessed at <http://www.ers.

usda.gov/briefing/agtrade/commoditytrade.htm>. 38 Board on Army Science and Technology, National Research Council, Opportunities in Biotechnology for Future Army Applications (Washington, DC: National

Academy Press, 2001). 39 Jerry Warner, et al., Exploring Biotechnology, Opportunities for the Department of Defense, Critical Review and Technology Assessment Report, January 31, 2002. 40 General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, seminar remarks at The

Role of American Military Power, held by the Association of the U.S. Army, November 2001. 41 Robert Scales, Future Warfare (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College,

1999), 26. 42 Ibid., 25.

43 Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” Journal of the Royal

United Services Institute for Defence Studies no. 119 (March 1974), 3–9.

8 Defense Horizons October 2002

Defense Horizons is published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy through the

Publication Directorate of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

Defense Horizons and other National Defense University publications are available online at

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/nduphp.html.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other

department or agency of the Federal Government.

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Hans Binnendijk

Director