No. 177, February 2001 Strategic Forum 1

Strategic Forum

I

n the past, U.S. decisionmakers have

addressed strategic nuclear force and

national missile defense issues in an

incremental and uncoordinated manner. Too

often, force structure decisions have been

driven by near-term programmatic, budgetary,

arms control, and political pressures rather

than by long-term strategy and objectives.

The forthcoming Strategic Posture Review

(SPR) needs to fundamentally reassess the

purposes of nuclear weapons, missile defenses, and the requirements of deterrence

and stability in the new security environment.

The Bush administration should develop

a comprehensive conceptual framework to

decide on the size, composition, and posture

of strategic offensive and defensive forces.

Such a framework should integrate new

assessments of deterrence and stability over

the next 10–20 years, in light of the much

more diverse threats facing the United States.

It will not be easy to come up with

solutions that balance competing and often

contradictory objectives. Improving U.S.

capabilities to deal with one set of strategic

concerns may complicate efforts to address

others. SPR should include a reassessment of

U.S. strategic force levels and targeting

requirements; consideration of different

hedges and reconstitution options against

greater-than-expected threats, such as maintaining production capabilities or making

unilateral strategic force reductions outside

a formal treaty framework; and development

of a broad calculus to assess the impact of

national missile defense and other strategic

developments on deterrence and stability. 

Before the next administration decides on

a strategic force posture, national missile

defense (NMD) architecture, and arms control

objectives for both offensive and defensive

forces, it needs to grapple with questions of

strategy and doctrine. Any consideration of

alternative defense strategies and their implications for nuclear forces and missile defenses

should start with a basic set of questions: For

what purposes will we need nuclear weapons

and missile defenses in the future and under

what conditions would these missions be carried out? What countries will pose strategic

threats to vital U.S. national interests over the

next 10–20 years? What hostile actions are we

trying to deter, and what are the proper character, size, and mix of nuclear weapons and

defenses in deterring these threats?

The United States could face three types

of strategic threats in the security environment

of the next 20 years: the reemergence of a

potential challenge from Russia, challenges

from a hostile China, and aggression by states

of concern (e.g., North Korea, Iraq, and Iran.).

Any of these countries may use or threaten to

use force against the United States, its forces,

or its allies and friends. Such aggression would

be particularly troublesome if it involved use

of weapons of mass destruction and longrange ballistic missiles to deter U.S. and Western military intervention in regional crises. A

related question is how the United States

should deter these threats. The fundamental

goal of deterrence is to prevent aggression by

ensuring that, in the mind of a potential

aggressor, the risks of aggression far outweigh

the gains. Offensive deterrence and defensive

deterrence affect different sides of this deterrence equation: offensive forces increase risks

to aggressors by threatening unacceptable

costs; defensive forces decrease potential gains

by denying an aggressor’s ability to achieve 

its objectives.

These two variables—the threats we seek

to deter and the most effective means of achieving this goal—have significant implications for

the role of nuclear forces and missile defenses

in overall U.S. defense strategy and for the

appropriate mix of these forces for meeting U.S.

deterrence requirements. Broadly speaking: 

A strategy that puts higher priority on

meeting future challenges from an adversarial

Russia or a hostile China, and that maintains

faith in traditional deterrence, is likely to

continue relying most heavily on the threat of

nuclear retaliation. Force mixes for this world

are likely to emphasize robust offensive capabilities and no or minimal NMD (although

some have suggested that the United States

should not rule out the possibility of defending

against China in the future).

A strategy that is much more concerned

with rogue states than large nuclear-armed

powers, and is pessimistic about the efficacy of

offensive deterrence, is far more likely to feature a force mix that is heavy on missile defenses and overwhelming conventional power,

and lighter on strategic offensive forces.

A strategy that is more concerned with

building partnerships with Russia and China

and relying on preventive defense, traditional

deterrence, and conventional capabilities to

defend U.S. interests against rogue state actions

would be characterized by lower levels of 

offense and no or low defenses. 

A strategy that is concerned with the

emergence of both a nuclear competitor and

The U.S. Strategic Posture Review:

Issues for the New Administration

by M. Elaine Bunn and Richard D. Sokolsky

No. 177

February 2001

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points
rogue states might have a mix heavy in both

offensive and defensive forces.

Force Mixes and 

Offense-Defense

Before developing alternative force mixes,

one must address the relationship between

strategic nuclear forces and national missile

defenses as they relate to assumptions about

who and what the United States is trying to

deter. There are essentially four different ways of

thinking about the offense-defense relationship: 

The first possibility is a direct relationship—that is, the more NMD one has, the

more nuclear weapons the other side will have;

conversely, the lower the level of NMD, the

lower the level of strategic offensive forces.

Such a relationship is the basis for the 1972

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Strategic Arms

Limitation (SALT) I Treaties, as well as the

current Russian proposal for a reduction in

strategic nuclear forces to 1,500 and a ban on

NMD deployment beyond what is allowed in the

ABM Treaty. 

The second possibility is an inverse relationship—that is, a tradeoff between strategic

nuclear forces and NMD. For example, some

have suggested a future agreement between the

United States and Russia on both offensive and

defensive forces that would set an aggregate

ceiling for strategic ballistic missiles and allow

freedom to mix between offensive and defensive

interceptors. This trade-off relationship is also

often implicit in budget discussions.

The third possibility is that there are no

inherent or direct relationships between offense

and defense levels, because they are driven by

different factors: NMD is sized by threats from

states of concern, while strategic nuclear forces

are sized to deal with a potentially hostile

Russia (or perhaps a China that might be

viewed as a strategic threat in the future).

Because there are different drivers, both nuclear forces and missile defenses should be

sized independently of each other, and therefore many combinations are possible.

A fourth possibility is that there is a relationship, but it is nonlinear and unpredictable

because of the complex interaction of U.S.

decisions on offenses and defenses and their

impact on the security calculations of different

sets of countries: states of concern, Russia,

China, or allies. This relationship is analogous

to interconnected gears, but with an unknown

differential. It is clear there are connections,

but it is not clear in which direction and how

far the gears will turn, or what the

consequences would be. 

Thus, with a number of ways to view the

relationship between nuclear and missile

defense forces, no single logic defines the

appropriate mix of U.S. offenses and defenses.

The matrix on the next page presents illustrative mixes for the 2020 timeframe. While levels

of offensive and defensive forces in these mixes

are not the only ones possible, they cover a

range of possibilities that have been put forward by government officials and academic

specialists both here and abroad. These force

mixes should be seen primarily as a device to

identify and frame key issues that should be

addressed in the SPR; each will need to be

evaluated in terms of its implications for deterrence, stability, the behavior of states of concern, relations with Russia, China, and allies,

and U.S. arms control and nonproliferation

objectives.

The relative emphasis on either strategic

nuclear forces (SNF) or NMD in future strategies is driven by assumptions related to the

major threats confronting the United States

and the relative level of confidence in offenseversus defense-dominant deterrence. For example, the no NMD/ minimal deterrent SNF posture of 300–500 warheads reflects a view that

Russia and China are unlikely to emerge as

hostile nuclear competitors, that very low

numbers of nuclear weapons are the best

guarantee of security, and that rogue state

threats can be handled with offensive retaliatory capabilities (nuclear or conventional) or

preemption. On the other hand, a medium

NMD/very light SNF posture of 600–800 interceptors and 1,000 warheads, respectively, would

establish NMD levels comparable to those

envisioned under U.S. proposals from the early

1990s for protection against accidental/unauthorized launches and states of concern (global

protection against limited strikes, or GPALS),

and nuclear forces at the levels to which some

predict Russia will fall. 

Future Force Posture

In considering future mixes of strategic

nuclear forces and national missile defenses

and the future of the U.S. strategic force posture, the SPR will need to address several interrelated issues.

Force Levels and Targeting Policy. The

possibility of a future hostile, aggressive Russia

with substantial nuclear forces continues to

place the most stressful demands on the

prospective U.S. strategic nuclear posture.

Current U.S. policy on deterring this kind of

Russia (a strong Russia gone bad) means

being able to hold at risk those targets that the

United States believes a potentially hostile

Russian leadership would value. Historically,

implementing the hold-at-risk doctrine has

meant meeting a high standard of target destruction in four categories: (1) nuclear forces,

(2) other military forces, (3) economic and

industrial targets, and (4) leadership and

command, control, communications, and

intelligence (C3

I) assets. Because being able to

hold at risk Russia’s strategic forces is only one

part of the strategy, further reductions in Russian nuclear forces would probably not yield

further significant reductions in U.S. nuclear

requirements regarding Russia. Reductions in

U.S. strategic nuclear forces below the levels

agreed to in principle in 1997 (2,000–2,500

accountable warheads) would require a fundamental change in the targeting policy that

underlies the strategy for nuclear deterrence of

Russia. Such a change in guidance by the

civilian leadership might mean dropping one

or more categories of targets, relaxing the

exacting damage criteria that affect strategic

force levels (for example, by reducing the

number of targets within each category that

must be held at risk with strategic warheads),

or adopting a strategy that targets populations

(a difficult choice, given American values).

2 Strategic Forum No. 177, February 2001

This Strategic Forum was prepared by M. Elaine Bunn, a distinguished research professor in the Institute 

for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University, and Richard D. Sokolsky, a visiting

fellow in INSS. Please address any questions or comments to Ms. Bunn at (202) 685–2366, or via e-mail 

at bunne@ndu.edu

with a number of ways 

to view the relationship

between nuclear and

defense forces, no 

single logic defines the

appropriate mix
There is, in fact, nothing sacrosanct

about current targeting requirements. The

Cold War calculus of setting a requirement to

hold at risk a certain set of targets comes down

to a judgment call about what level of damage

would deter a Soviet/Russian leader from

launching nuclear weapons against the United

States. Over the years, this political judgment

has varied. Moreover, the process of translating

general policy guidance into the selection of

specific targets often involves subjective judgments. The real issue is what kind of strategic

deterrent we realistically need to maintain to

deter a potentially hostile Russia in the future.

In thinking through this issue, four key questions should be taken into account. First, how

would a hostile Russia, assuming that it could

mount a strategic resurgence, choose to challenge the United States, and what role would

strategic nuclear weapons play in this strategy?

Second, how much strategic warning time

would the United States have of the revival of a

hostile Russia, and would these signs of hostile

intent allow for timely and effective measures

in response? Third, what kind of target list

would a resurgent Russia present, and what

would its implications be for U.S. strategic

force levels and targeting policy? Finally, if

Russia were destined to become an anti-status

quo peer competitor, would U.S. interests best

be served by having Russia launch its bid for

hegemony from a higher or lower nuclear

baseline? In other words, how should the

balance be struck between maintaining nearterm strategic force readiness and the capabilities for managing an uncertain long-term

nuclear risk? 

The “Lead-and-Hedge” Policy. The 1994

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) called on the

United States to reduce the role of nuclear

weapons while preserving the option for reconstituting a much larger nuclear force above the

warhead ceilings in arms control agreements

in the face of an uncertain future for Russia.

Such a force would consist of nondeployed

warheads and strategic delivery vehicles with

sufficient space to upload these warheads if

circumstances warranted. The NPR hedge was

conservative, based in part on the assumption

that Russia might emerge as a major power

within a relatively short period, and in part on

the assumption that whatever level to which

the United States reduced would become a de

facto ceiling. These assumptions may have

been valid then, but are not necessarily true

today. In the NPR, the hedge was the difference

between a START II force of 3,000–3,500 warheads and a START I force of close to 6,000. In

the future, if a political decision were made to

retain a hedge, it might mean the difference

between future levels of strategic forces

(whether treaty-mandated or not) and START

II levels. Alternatively, a future hedge might

mean putting less emphasis on maintaining a

large number of warheads on the shelf that are

rapidly available in favor of maintaining stored

components and/or the industrial and nuclear

weapons infrastructure to increase nuclear

capabilities within the timelines that a threat

might arise. Making further reductions in the

number of deployed strategic weapons outside

a formal treaty framework (i.e., unilaterally,

with deployed defined as immediately available

for use), which would give the United States

even greater flexibility both to reconstitute

strategic forces and to agree to substantially

lower strategic force levels, might also be part

of a redefined lead-and-hedge policy. In sum,

the way the hedge was first conceived may have

served our interests over the past decade, but

may need to be conceptualized differently if it

is to serve our interests in the future. In other

words, can the United States safely afford to do

more leading and less—or a different kind—

of hedging?

Nondeployed and Tactical Nuclear

Weapons. In looking at substantially lower

numbers of strategic weapons, the issue of

nondeployed (or stockpiled) and tactical 

nuclear weapons (TNW), which are unconstrained by arms control treaties, assumes more

importance. To compensate for declining

conventional capabilities, Russian military

doctrine has increased reliance on tactical

nuclear weapons. Moreover, the characteristics

of TNW, especially their small size and mobility, are a proliferation worry. At the same time,

trying to negotiate legally binding limits on

nondeployed and TNW warheads, especially if it

required verified warhead dismantlement,

would be contentious and time-consuming and

could cause serious military and political

problems. Intrusive verification procedures pose

potential problems for protecting sensitive

military and operational information—an

especially important concern, as some experts

have noted, because of the ascendancy of the

Russian security services in Russian national

security policymaking. In addition, stockpiled

weapons for both sides, but especially for the

United States, are important to maintaining

effective stockpile stewardship programs under

nuclear testing moratoria. Moreover, the military significance of stockpiled Russian tactical

nuclear warheads is probably marginal, since

many of these weapons and their associated

launchers are obsolescing rapidly. Because of

No. 177, February 2001 Strategic Forum 3

Illustrative U.S. Force Mixes for 2020

Heavy

3,000–3,500+

Medium

2,000–2,500

Light

1,500

Very Light

1,000

Minimal

300–500

0

None

National Missile Defense

Strategic Nuclear Forces

100

Very Light

250

Light

600–800

Medium

1,000+

Heavy
4 Strategic Forum No. 177, February 2001

the age of many TNW systems, as well as resource constraints, Russian TNW capabilities

are expected to drop significantly in the coming years (see Proliferation: Threat and 

Response, Office of the Secretary of Defense,

January 2001, p. 54; available at http://www.

defenselink.mil). Finally, negotiating limits on

tactical nuclear weapons is perhaps even more

problematic. Reaching an agreed definition on

these systems would present thorny issues, and

verifying limits on them, many of which are

dual-use, with any degree of confidence presents a daunting technical challenge. Verification would also require a level of intrusiveness

that is probably unacceptable to both countries.

Because of its huge numerical advantage,

Russia would probably have little incentive to

negotiate lower limits; the United States, moreover, would have little bargaining leverage

unless U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe were

put on the bargaining table—a decision that

would cause serious problems with NATO allies.

Nonetheless, Russia’s nondeployed and

tactical nuclear weapons pose a potential

proliferation problem and international pressure will continue to grow for both countries to

reduce and dismantle their large number of

stockpiled weapons as a test of their commitment to genuine nuclear disarmament. To

deflect this pressure, and in view of the formidable problems inherent in controlling these

weapons, the United States should continue to

push for transparency and confidence-building

measures that could reduce uncertainties about

the size of weapons stockpiles and provide

reassurance about U.S. and Russian intentions. 

The Stability Calculus. Finally, the Strategic Posture Review will need to come to terms

with the concept of stability. Stability is a factor

that is often thrown around in discussions of

the strategic balance and missile defenses but

has different meanings—arms race stability,

crisis stability (a subset of which is first strike

stability), and regional/political stability—

whose relevance in the new security environment should be reexamined. The SPR will need

to carefully consider the implications of alternative offense-defense force mixes for all three

types of stability. To cite but one example, much

of the discussion to date about NMD and strategic offensive forces has revolved around arms

race stability—that is, whether nations feel

pressure to increase the size or capabilities of

their forces in response to possible U.S. ballistic

missile defenses. However, numbers should not

be the only or even primary consideration. More

important is the posture of forces—in particular, how they are deployed and whether they are

survivable in all types of situations, from normal peacetime (day-to-day) to periods of

heightened tension when a nation may put

more of its forces on alert (generated). Such

factors, along with early warning and command and control capabilities, have a far

greater impact than force levels on crisis or first

strike stability, particularly whether they encourage escalation in a crisis situation.

In short, lower numbers are not intrinsically better and should not be the measure of

merit in evaluating alternative offense-defense

mixes or options for lower strategic force levels.

Proposals for reducing the alert status of U.S.

and Russian strategic forces, while potentially

lowering the risks of accidental or unauthorized launch or providing a symbol of U.S.

leadership and the end of U.S.-Russian enmity,

should also be judged in terms of their impact

on crisis stability. It is by no means clear, for

example, that a unilateral U.S. decision to

reduce the alert levels of its strategic forces

would enhance stability, especially in a crisis,

when re-alerting of forces could prove to be

highly destabilizing, increasing rather than

dampening incentives for escalation. It is

equally problematic that Russia would be

receptive to U.S. proposals for full reciprocity in

de-alerting, given its greater reliance on nuclear

forces for deterrence, or that the U.S. and Russian approaches to reducing alert levels would be

compatible. Finally, to the degree that the threat

of an accidental or unauthorized launch of

nuclear weapons is based on faulty information, the problem lies with Russia’s deteriorating early warning and command and control

capabilities. Unilateral changes in the U.S.

strategic force posture would not address this

problem; on the other hand, continuing and

expanding efforts on shared early warning—

such as the recently agreed Joint Data Exchange

and pre-launch notification system—would be

an effective response to this problem.

The Bush administration will need to

make decisions on NMD and the U.S. strategic

force posture in light of its overall global

strategy, the range of scenarios for which we

can envision a mission for both strategic

offensive and defensive forces, and judgments

about the efficacy of offensive and defensive

deterrence. Moreover, in considering alternative deterrence futures and preferred outcomes,

the Strategic Posture Review will need to

integrate a much broader range of factors into

its analysis—not just strategic nuclear

weapons, but also theater and national missile

defenses, tactical and nondeployed nuclear

weapons, alert levels, conventional strategic

and information operations capabilities—and

develop a strategic calculus that is relevant to

the security environment.

This is an inherently messy process and

confronts U.S. planners and decisionmakers

with a serious intellectual challenge that will

require a coherent long-term vision, innovative

thinking, and a willingness to challenge Cold

War logic and orthodoxy. The discussion here

only scratches the surface. But it will have

served its purpose if it illuminates some key

choices and tradeoffs the United States faces

and stimulates more informed debate and

understanding about how all the pieces of this

complex puzzle fit together.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by

members of the National Defense University as well as

other scholars and specialists in national security affairs

from this country and abroad. The opinions expressed or

implied in this publication are solely those of the authors

and do not necessarily represent the views of the

National Defense University, the Department of Defense,

or any other governmental agency.

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considering alternative

deterrence futures and

preferred outcomes, the

Strategic Posture Review

will need to integrate 

a much broader range of

factors into its analysis