This report was prepared by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center with 

significant contributions from the Defense Intelligence Agency Missile and Space 

Intelligence Center and the Office of Naval Intelligence.

BALLISTIC &CRUISE 

MISSILE THREAT 
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Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat

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Key Findings

Threat History

Warheads and Targets

Ballistic Missiles

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles

Medium-Range and

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

Land-Attack Cruise Missiles

Summary

3

4

6

8

10

14

18

22

26

30

table of contents

2

Page1. (Cover) Full page: AP

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 Bottom right: Chinese Internet

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 Bottom right: Defense.pk;

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 Bottom: FARS; 

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32. (Back cover): Jamejam 

This report contains material copyrighted by others. No claim of copyright is made for 

any included works of the US Government.
Many countries view ballistic and cruise missile systems as cost-effective weapons and symbols of 

national power. In addition, they present an asymmetric threat to US airpower. Many ballistic and 

cruise missiles are armed with weapons of mass destruction.

North Korea has unveiled the new road-mobile Hwasong-13 intercontinental ballistic missile 

(ICBM) while continuing to develop the Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2), which placed a satellite in orbit for 

the first time in December 2012. An intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and a new solidpropellant short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) are also being developed. 

Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015. Since 2008, 

Iran has conducted multiple successful launches of the two-stage Safir space launch vehicle 

(SLV) and has also revealed the larger two-stage Simorgh SLV, which could serve as a test bed 

for developing ICBM technologies. Since 2010, Iran has revealed the Qiam-1 SRBM, the fourthgeneration Fateh-110 SRBM, and claims to be mass-producing antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). 

Iran has modified its Shahab 3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) to extend its range and 

effectiveness and also claims to have deployed the two-stage, solid-propellant Sejjil MRBM. 

China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world. It is 

developing and testing offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, qualitatively upgrading 

missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses. The Chinese ballistic 

missile force is expanding in both size and types of missiles. China continues to field conventionally 

armed SRBMs opposite Taiwan, and is developing a number of new mobile, conventionally armed 

MRBMs. Missiles such as the CSS-5 ASBM are key components of the Chinese military modernization 

program, specifically designed to prevent adversary military forces’ access to regional conflicts. 

China is adding the CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A) to the ICBM force and future ICBMs could utilize 

multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The number of Chinese ICBM nuclear 

warheads capable of reaching the United States could expand to well over 100 within the next 15 

years. The new JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is also under development.

India and Pakistan continue to develop new SRBMs and long-range ballistic missiles. The Indian 

Agni IV IRBM has been flight tested twice since 2010, and India conducted the first flight test of 

the Agni V ICBM in April 2012. An even longer ranged Agni VI is reportedly in the design phase.

Russia still has over 1,400 nuclear warheads deployed on ballistic missiles capable of reaching the 

United States. Although the size of the Russian strategic missile force is shrinking due to arms control 

limitations and resource constraints, development of new ICBM and SLBM systems is proceeding, 

and Russia is expected to retain the largest force of strategic ballistic missiles outside the United 

States. Russia tested a new type of ICBM in 2012 and is nearing deployment of the new Bulava 

SLBM. Russian officials have stated a new liquid-propellant ICBM is also under development.

Land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) are highly effective weapon systems that can present a major 

threat to military operations. At least nine foreign countries will be involved in LACM production 

during the next decade, and many missiles will be available for export.

key findings
Ballistic and cruise missiles present a significant threat to US and Allied forces overseas, and to 

the United States and its territories. Missiles are attractive to many nations because they can be 

used effectively against an adversary with a formidable air defense system, where an attack with 

manned aircraft would be impractical or too costly. In addition, missiles can be used as a deterrent 

or an instrument of coercion. Missiles also have the advantage of fewer maintenance, training, and 

logistic requirements than manned aircraft. Even limited use of these weapons could have devastating 

consequences because missiles can be armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads.

The ballistic and cruise missile threat continues to increase with the proliferation of missile 

technology. Over 20 countries have ballistic missile systems, and missiles likely will be a threat 

in future conflicts involving US forces. Ballistic missiles have been used in several conflicts over 

the last 30 years, including the Iran-Iraq war, the Afghan civil war, the war in Yemen, the 1991 

and 2003 Persian Gulf conflicts, the Russian military actions in Chechnya and Georgia, and most 

recently in the conflict within Syria. Although LACMs have not yet been widely proliferated, as 

many as 20 countries could possess cruise missiles in the next decade.

Guided cruise and ballistic 

missiles were first used 

when Germany attacked 

targets in England and 

Northern Europe with 

V-1 cruise missiles and 

V-2 ballistic missiles 

during World War II. 

Although these missiles 

were inaccurate, their 

use resulted in tens 

of thousands of Allied 

casualties.

threat history

V-1 Prior to Impact in London

4
The US Air Force, in cooperation with the other services, is responsible for countering the ballistic and 

cruise missile threat through deterrence and, if necessary, active suppression. Threat suppression 

may include attacks on missile systems, both before launch and in flight, and attacks on their 

supporting infrastructure. This document includes information on some of the major current and 

projected foreign ballistic and cruise missile systems.

Guided cruise and ballistic missiles were first used when Germany attacked targets in England and 

Northern Europe with V-1 cruise missiles and V-2 ballistic missiles during World War II. Although 

these missiles were inaccurate, their use resulted in tens of thousands of Allied casualties.

V-2 damage; 160 People were Killed in this Attack V-2 Ballistic Missile
Ballistic and cruise missiles can be armed with conventional or nonconventional warheads. 

Conventional warheads are filled with a chemical explosive, such as TNT, and rely on the detonation 

of the explosive and the resulting metal casing fragmentation as kill mechanisms. Nonconventional 

warheads include weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons) and 

nonlethal warheads, a relatively new class of warhead designed to disable equipment rather than 

harm personnel. Conventional, biological, and chemical weapons can be packaged in unitary 

(single) warheads and in submunitions (multiple small bomblets that are released at altitude to 

disperse over a wide area).

Conventional warheads can be optimized for specific types of targets. For example, submunitions 

can be used to create craters in an airfield runway or destroy armored vehicles. A penetrator 

warhead, which uses a relatively small amount of explosive surrounded by a heavy metal casing, 

can pass through a hardened structure, such as a bunker, to destroy its contents.

warheads & targets

Chemical and biological weapons can be 

packaged in submunitions to be dispersed 

over a wide area.

6

Russian SS-25 ICBM
Many long-range ballistic missiles and several types of LACMs carry nuclear warheads. Most of 

these warheads have an explosive force that is tens to hundreds of times more powerful than the 

atomic bombs used in World War II.

Chemical and biological weapons are attractive to many Third World countries because they are 

much easier to produce than nuclear weapons, and many countries with chemical and biological 

warfare programs also are equipped with ballistic and/or cruise missiles. Accuracy is not very 

important for these weapons when used against urban areas or large concentrations of military 

forces. Chemical and biological weapons can be packaged in submunitions to be dispersed over a 

wide area. They are capable of producing massive casualties, inducing panic and chaos in civilian 

populations, and severely degrading military operations.

Chinese DF-15 SRBM

MIRV of the Decommissioned Soviet SS-20 IRBM Iranian Qiam-1 SRBM
Operational ballistic missiles are deployed in silos, on submarines, and on land-mobile launchers. 

Mobile missiles are favored by many nations because they can be hidden, greatly increasing their 

survivability.

Many SRBMs remain intact until the warhead detonates. In longer range ballistic missiles, warheads 

are contained in separating reentry vehicles (RVs). Some long-range ballistic missiles carry MIRVs, 

with up to 10 RVs per missile. RVs reenter the Earth’s atmosphere at very high velocities, on the 

order of 4-5 miles per second at ICBM ranges.

Ballistic missiles can use solid- or liquid-propellant rocket propulsion systems. The trend in modern 

missile systems has been toward the use of solid propellants because of their reduced logistical 

requirements and simplicity of operation. However, some less developed nations have greater 

access to liquid-propellant technology and, therefore, continue to develop new liquid-propellant 

missiles. Russia is also developing a new liquid-propellant missile.

Multiple-stage missiles, with each stage having its own independent propulsion system, are more 

efficient for longer range missions. ICBMs typically have two or three stages, with powerful liquidpropellant engines or solid-propellant motors to propel the payload toward its target, and a 

postboost vehicle (PBV) with a much smaller propulsion system. A PBV can be used to improve the 

RV deployment accuracy for a single-RV missile. For a missile with a MIRV payload, the PBV is used 

to release RVs so that they follow different trajectories, allowing them to hit separate targets. Some 

MIRV missiles can hit targets separated by over 1,500 kilometers with a single missile.

A ballistic missile with a high-quality inertial guidance system is capable of delivering an RV within 

a few hundred feet of the target after a flight of over 9,500 kilometers. For many missiles, accuracy 

The trend in modern missile 

systems has been toward the use of 

solid propellants because of their 

reduced logistical requirements and 

simplicity of operation. However, 

some less developed nations have 

greater access to liquid-propellant 

technology and, therefore, continue 

to develop new liquid-propellant 

missiles.

ballistic missiles

8
can be greatly improved by utilizing satellite-aided navigation. Missiles also can use maneuvering 

RVs with terminal sensors to attain very high accuracy. The use of terminal sensors and a maneuver 

capability can allow ballistic missiles to attack moving targets such as ships at sea, but an antiship 

mission requires a sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance system to support 

missile targeting. 

As more modern guidance technology is proliferated, countries will be able to improve the accuracy 

and lethality of their missile forces. However, even a missile with a guidance system only accurate 

enough to hit a large city is capable of inflicting massive casualties when armed with a weapon of 

mass destruction.

Many ballistic missiles carry penetration aids to improve the chances of an RV penetrating a ballistic 

missile defense system. Penetration aids are devices intended to deceive or jam sensors used to 

detect and track missiles and RVs. They are of increasing importance to countries developing and 

operating ballistic missiles.

Multiple Chinese SRBMs on Parade

Short-range ballistic missile

<1,000 km (621 mi)

Medium-range ballistic missile

1,000-3,000 km (621-1,864 mi)

Intermediate-range ballistic missile

3,000-5,500 km (1,864-3,418 mi)

Intercontinental ballistic missile

>5,500 km (3,418 mi)

Submarine-launched ballistic missile

Any ballistic missile launched from

a submarine, regardless of 

maximum range

North Korean TD-2 ICBM/SLV
10 Some SRBM developers 

have already begun to 

develop countermeasures 

such as maneuvering 

RVs, and are expected to 

continue countermeasure 

development.

short-range

ballistic missiles

Several countries are now producing and/or developing SRBM systems, while many other countries 

have purchased missiles or missile technologies from one or more of the missile producers. 

The Russian SS-1c Mod 1, also called the SCUD B, has been exported to more countries than any 

other type of guided ballistic missile, and has proven to be a versatile and adaptable weapon. 

For example, the Iraqi SCUD missiles used during the 1991 Persian Gulf War had been modified 

to double their range. North Korea has produced its own version of the SCUD B and the SCUD C, 

which is an extended-range version of the SCUD B. 

Although the SCUD was originally designed as a tactical battlefield support weapon, many 

countries view it and other SRBM systems as strategic weapons to be used against urban areas. 

Iraq used extended-range SCUD missiles as strategic weapons during both the Iran-Iraq war and 

the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Other countries could modify SCUD missiles to significantly improve 

their accuracy and use them against high-value military targets and cities.

New SRBM systems are in development in several countries. China has deployed a very large 

force of modern solid-propellant SRBMs in the vicinity of Taiwan, and according to Taiwanese 

government officials, China has recently started to deploy a new SRBM known as the Dong Feng 

16 (DF-16/CSS-11 Mod 1). In August 2010, Iranian officials hailed the successful test firing of 

the liquid-fuel Qiam-1 surface-to-surface missile. Around the same time, the Iranian Minister of 

Defense told reporters that the third-generation of the Fateh-110 missile had been successfully test 

fired and that the system was officially delivered to the missile force in September 2010. In 2012, 

10
SS-21 Iskander-E SS-1c

Mod 1

SS-1c

Mod 2

Prithvi Agni I Hatf-I Shaheen I CSS-6 CSS-7 CSS-8

Pakistani Hatf-9 SRBM Launch Indian Dhanush SRBM Launch

srbm

Iran claimed to have also successfully flight tested a fourth-generation Fateh-110. Iran has also 

flight tested an ASBM variant of its Fateh-110 missile. A seeker has likely been added to the missile 

to improve the system’s accuracy against sea-based targets.

Recent conflicts have highlighted missile defense capabilities and provided the incentive for 

continued missile defense development, in turn, motivating ballistic missile developers to pursue 

missile defense countermeasures. Some SRBM developers have already begun to develop 

countermeasures such as maneuvering RVs, and are expected to continue countermeasure 

development.
Iranian Fateh-110 SRBM

Chinese CSS-6 SRBM

Pakistani Ghaznzvi SRBM Launch Developmental Pakistani Abdali (Hatf-2) SRBM
RUSSIA Fewer than 200

SCUD B (SS-1c Mod 1) Liquid Road-mobile 300

SS-1c Mod 2 Liquid Road-mobile 240+

SS-21 Mod 2 Solid Road-mobile 70

SS-21 Mod 3 Solid Road-mobile 120

SS-26 Solid Road-mobile 300

Iskander-E Solid Road-mobile 280

CHINA More than 200

CSS-11 Mod 1 Solid Road-mobile 800+

CSS-6 Mod 1 Solid Road-mobile 600

CSS-6 Mod 2 Solid Road-mobile 850+

CSS-6 Mod 3 Solid Road-mobile 725+

CSS-7 Mod 1 Solid Road-mobile 300

CSS-7 Mod 2 Solid Road-mobile 600

CSS-8 Solid/Liquid Road-mobile 150

CSS-9 Mod 1 Solid Road-mobile 150

CSS-9 Mod-X-2 Solid Road-mobile 260

CSS-14 Mod-X-1 Solid Road-mobile 150

CSS-14 Mod-X-2 Solid Road-mobile 280

CSS-X-16 Solid Road-mobile 200

CSS-X-15 Solid Road-mobile 280

NORTH KOREA Fewer than100

SCUD B Liquid Road-mobile 300

SCUD C Liquid Road-mobile 500

Toksa Solid Road-mobile 120

ER SCUD Liquid Road-mobile 700-995

INDIA Fewer than 75

Prithvi I Liquid Road-mobile 150

Prithvi II Liquid Road-mobile 250

Dhanush Liquid Ship-based 400

Agni I Solid Road-mobile 700

PAKISTAN Fewer than 50

Hatf-9 Solid Road-mobile 60

Hatf-1 Solid Road-mobile 50

Shaheen I Solid Road-mobile 750

Ghaznavi Solid Road-mobile 250

IRAN Fewer than100

Fateh-110 Solid Road-mobile 200-300

Shahab 1 Liquid Road-mobile 300

Shahab 2 Liquid Road-mobile 500

CSS-8 (M-7) Solid/Liquid Road-mobile 150

Qiam -1 Liquid Road-mobile unknown

SYRIA Fewer than100

SCUD D Liquid Road-mobile 700

Note: All ranges are approximate.

* The missile inventory may be larger than the number of launchers; launchers can be reused to fire additional missiles

DEPLOYMENT MAXIMUM Number of

MISSILE PROPELLANT MODE RANGE (km) Launchers (By Country)*

CHARACTERISTICS srbm
New MRBM and/or IRBM systems are in development in China, North Korea, Iran, India, and 

Pakistan. These are strategic systems, and many will be armed with nonconventional warheads. All 

of these countries except Iran have tested nuclear weapons. Neither Russia nor the United States 

produce or retain any MRBM or IRBM systems because they are banned by the Intermediate-Range 

Nuclear Forces Treaty, which entered into force in 1988. 

China continues to maintain regional nuclear deterrence, and its long-term, comprehensive military 

modernization is improving the capability of its ballistic missile force to conduct high-intensity, 

regional military operations, including “anti-access and area denial” (A2/AD) operations. The 

term A2/AD refers to capabilities designed to deter or counter adversary forces from deploying to 

or operating within a defined space. Currently, China deploys the nuclear armed CSS-2, CSS-5 Mod 

1, and CSS-5 Mod 2 for regional nuclear deterrence. China is also acquiring new conventionally 

armed CSS-5 MRBMs to conduct precision strikes. These systems are likely intended to hold at-risk 

or strike logistics nodes, regional military bases including airfields and ports, and naval assets. 

Notably, China has likely started to deploy the DF-21D, an ASBM based on a variant of the CSS-5.

North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile development program and has exported missiles 

and missile technology to other countries, including Iran and Pakistan. North Korea has also 

admitted its possession of nuclear weapons. It has displayed new IRBMs and older No Dong MRBMs 

in recent military parades. 

medium-range &

intermediate-range

ballistic missiles

Iran’s Shahab 3 

and Sejjil can reach 

targets at a distance 

of about 2,000 km.

14
Iran has an extensive missile development program, and has received support from entities in 

Russia, China, and North Korea. The Iranian Shahab 3 MRBM is based on the North Korean 

No Dong missile. Iran has modified the Shahab 3 to extend its range and effectiveness, with 

the longest range variant reportedly being able to reach targets at a distance of about 2,000 

km. Iran also claims to have mass-produced Shahab 3 missiles. Iranian solid-propellant rocket 

and missile programs are also progressing. Iran has conducted multiple launches of the Sejjil, 

a solid-propellant MRBM with a claimed range of 2,000 km. In addition, Iran has conducted 

multiple launches of the Safir, a multi-stage SLV that can serve as a test bed for long-range 

ballistic missile technologies.

India continues to develop and improve its ballistic missiles. All of India’s long-range missiles 

use solid propellants. Indian officials have stated that the Agni II MRBM is deployed. The 

Agni III IRBM has been flight tested four times since 2006, and has been pronounced ready for 

deployment. The Agni IV IRBM has been flight tested twice since 2010, with the 2011 launch 

successful. 

Pakistan continues to improve the readiness and capabilities of its Army Strategic Force Command 

and individual strategic missile groups through training exercises that include live missile firings. 

Pakistan has tested its solid-propellant Shaheen 2 MRBM six times since 2004, and this missile 

system probably will soon be deployed.

CSS-2 CSS-5 Shahab 3 Agni II Agni III No Dong Ghauri Shaheen 2

Indian Agni IV IRBM Launch

mr/irbm
North Korean No Dong MRBM

Chinese CSS-5 MRBM Road-Mobile Launcher

Iranian Sejjil MRBM

Indian Agni III IRBM
Iranian Sejjil MRBM Launch Iranian Shahab 3 MRBM in a Silo

China 

CSS-2 1 Liquid Transportable 3,000 5 to 10

(Limited Mobility)

CSS-5 Mod 1 2 Solid Road-mobile 1,750+ Fewer than 50

CSS-5 Mod 2 2 Solid Road-mobile 1,750+ Fewer than 50

CSS-5 Conventional 2 Solid Mobile 1,750+ Fewer than 30

CSS-5 ASBM 2 Solid Mobile 1,500+ Unknown

Saudi Arabia (Chinese-produced)

CSS-2 (conventional) 1 Liquid Transportable 3,000 Fewer than 50 

(Limited Mobility)

North Korea

No Dong 1 Liquid Road-mobile 1,250 Fewer than 50

IRBM 1 Liquid Road-mobile 3,000+ Fewer than 50

India

Agni II 2 Solid Rail-mobile 2,000+ Fewer than 10

Agni III 2 Solid Rail-mobile 3,200+ Not yet deployed

Agni IV 2 Solid Rail-mobile 3,500+ Not yet deployed

Pakistan

Ghauri 1 Liquid Road-mobile 1,250 Fewer than 50

Shaheen 2 2 Solid Road-mobile 2,000 Unknown

Iran

Shahab 3 1 Liquid Silo & road-mobile 2,000 Fewer than 50

Sejjil 2 Solid Road-mobile 2,000 Unknown

IRBM/ICBM Undetermined Undetermined Undetermined Undetermined Undetermined

 

Note: All ranges are approximate.

* The missile inventory may be larger than the number of launchers; launchers can be reused to fire additonal missiles

NUMBER DEPLOYMENT MAXIMUM NUMBER

mr/irbm

MISSILE OF STAGES PROPELLANT MODE RANGE (km) OF LAUNCHERS*

CHARACTERISTICS
Russia retains about 1,200 nuclear warheads on ICBMs. Most of these missiles are maintained on 

alert, capable of being launched within minutes of receiving a launch order. Although the size 

of the Russian ICBM force will continue to decrease because of arms control agreements, aging 

missiles, and resource constraints, Russia probably will retain the largest ICBM force outside the 

United States. Efforts to maintain and modernize the force are underway. Russia successfully 

tested a new type of mobile ICBM in 2012 according to Russian press reports. The Russian SS-27 

Mod 1 ICBM, a missile designed with countermeasures to ballistic missile defense systems, is now 

deployed in silos in six regiments. Russia began deployment of the road-mobile version of the SS27 Mod 1 in 2006. A MIRV version of the SS-27, the SS-27 Mod-2 (RS-24), was deployed in 2010. 

In addition, Russian officials claim a new class of hypersonic vehicle is being developed to allow 

Russian strategic missiles to penetrate missile defense systems, and the Russian press has indicated 

deployment of a new rail-mobile ICBM is being considered. Furthermore, Russia has stated that a 

new heavy liquid-propellant ICBM is under development to replace the aging SS-18. Russia’s goal 

is to begin its deployment in the 2018-2020 timeframe.

In 2011, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which limits the United States and Russia to no 

more than 1,550 warheads each (including those on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers), entered 

into force.

China is strengthening its strategic nuclear deterrent force with the development and deployment 

of new ICBMs. China retains a relatively small number of nuclear armed, liquid-propellant CSS-3 

limited range ICBMs and CSS-4 ICBMs capable of reaching the United States. It is also modernizing 

its nuclear forces by adding more survivable, road-mobile delivery systems. Both the road-mobile, 

intercontinental 

ballistic missiles

In 2011, the New Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty, which limits 

the United States and Russia to 

no more than 1,550 warheads 

each (including those on ICBMs, 

SLBMs, and heavy bombers), 

entered into force.

18
solid-propellant CSS-10 Mod 1 and the longer range CSS-10 Mod 2 ICBMs have been deployed to 

units within the Second Artillery Corps. The CSS-10 Mod 1 is capable of reaching targets throughout 

Europe, Asia, and parts of Canada and the northwestern United States. The longer range CSS-10 

Mod 2 will allow targeting of most of the continental United States. China may also be developing 

a new road-mobile ICBM capable of carrying a MIRV payload, and the number of warheads on 

Chinese ICBMs capable of threatening the United States is expected to grow to well over 100 in the 

next 15 years.

North Korea continues development of the TD-2 ICBM/SLV, which could reach the United States if 

developed as an ICBM. Launches in July 2006, April 2009, and April 2012 ended in failure, but a 

December 2012 launch successfully placed a satellite in orbit. In an April 2012 military parade, 

North Korea unveiled the new Hwasong-13 road-mobile ICBM. This missile has not yet been flight 

tested. Either of these systems could be exported to other countries in the future. Continued efforts 

to develop the TD-2 and the newly unveiled ICBM show the determination of North Korea to 

achieve long-range ballistic missile and space launch capabilities.

Since 2008, Iran has conducted multiple successful launches of the two-stage Safir SLV. In early 

2010, Iran unveiled the larger Simorgh SLV. Iran will likely continue to pursue longer range 

ballistic missiles and more capable SLVs, which could lead to the development of an ICBM system. 

Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015. 

India conducted the first flight test of the Agni V ICBM in April 2012. An even longer range Agni VI 

is reportedly in the design phase. Russian SS-25 ICBM launch

SS-18

Mod 5

SS-19

Mod 3

SS-25 SS-27

Mod 1

SS-27

Mod-2 (RS-24)

CSS-3 CSS-4 CSS-10 Taepo

Dong-2

icbm
North Korean Hwasong-13 ICBM

Russian SS-18 ICBM Launch Russian SS-27 ICBM Road-Mobile Launcher

Chinese CSS-10 ICBM Road-Mobile Launchers
Russia

SS-18 Mod 5 2 + PBV 10 Liquid Silo 10,000+ About 50

SS-19 Mod 3 2 + PBV 6 Liquid Silo 9,000+ About 50

SS-25 3 + PBV 1 Solid Road-mobile 11,000 More than 150

SS-27 Mod 1 3 + PBV 1 Solid Silo & road-mobile 11,000 About 80

SS-27 Mod-2 3 + PBV Multiple Solid Silo & road-mobile 11,000 About 20

New ICBM At least 2 Undetermined Solid Road-mobile 5,500+ Not yet deployed

China

CSS-3 2 1 Liquid Transportable 5,5000+ 10 to 15

CSS-4 Mod 1 2 1 Liquid Silo 12,000+ About 20

CSS-10 Mod 1 3 1 Solid Road-mobile 7,000+ 5 to 10

CSS-10 Mod 2 3 1 Solid Road-mobile 11,000+ More than 15

North Korea

Taepo Dong-2 2 or 3 1 Liquid Fixed 5,500+ Unknown**

Hwasong-13 UndeterminedUndetermined Undetermined Road-mobile 5,500+ Unknown

India

Agni V 3 1 Solid Undetermined 5,000+ Not yet deployed

 

Note: All ranges are approximate.

* The missile inventory may be much larger than the number of launchers; launchers can be reused to fire additional missiles.

** Launches of the TD-2 space vehicle have been observed from both east and west coast facilities.

NUMBER WARHEADS DEPLOYMENT MAXIMUM NUMBER

MISSILE OF STAGES PER MISSILE PROPELLANT MODE RANGE (km) OF LAUNCHERS*

Russian SS-25 ICBM Road-Mobile Launcher Indian Agni V ICBM Launch

CHARACTERISTICS icbm
Russia maintains a substantial force of nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) with 

intercontinental-range missiles. Russia is developing new and improved SLBM weapon systems 

to replace its current inventory of Cold War vintage systems. Upgraded SS-N-23s are intended to 

replace older SS-N-23s on DELTA IV Class SSBNs. The SS-NX-32/Bulava is a new solid-propellant 

SLBM that is primarily intended for deployment on new DOLGORUKIY class SSBNs. Russian SLBMs 

are capable of launch from surfaced and submerged SSBNs from a variety of launch locations.

China currently has a single XIA Class SSBN that is intended to carry 12 CSS-NX-3/JL-1 missiles. In 

addition, China will deploy the new CSS-NX-14/JL-2 SLBM on new 12-tube JIN Class SSBNs. This 

Chinese JIN-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine

submarine-launched 

ballistic missiles

22 Russia maintains 

a substantial force 

of nuclear powered 

ballistic missile 

submarines (SSBNs) 

with intercontinentalrange missiles. Russia 

is developing new 

and improved SLBM 

weapon systems to 

replace its current 

inventory of Cold War 

vintage systems.
missile will, for the first time, allow Chinese SSBNs to target portions of the United States from 

operating areas located near the Chinese coast.

India is developing a new ballistic missile-capable submarine, the INS Arihant. The K-15 is 

reportedly ready for induction when the Arihant is deemed ready.

Each Russian TYPHOON SSBN Carried 20 SS-N-20 SLBMs Chinese CSS-NX-3 SLBM Launch

slbm

SS-N-18 SS-N-23 CSS-NX-3 CSS-NX-14 SS-NX-32
Chinese CSS-NX-3 SLBM Launch Chinese CSS-NX-3 SLBM Launch Sequence

Russian SS-N-18 SLBM The Chinese XIA SSBN can Carry 12 CSS-NX-3 SLBMs

Russian Bulava SLBM Launch
Russian SS-N-20 SLBM Launch

CHARACTERISTICS slbm

RUSSIA

SS-N-18 2 + PBV 3 Liquid DELTA III 5,500+ 96

SS-N-23 3 + PBV 4 Liquid DELTA IV 8,000+ 96

SS-NX-32 Bulava 3 + PBV 6 Solid DOLGORUKIY (BOREY) 8,000+ 16; Not yet deployed

TYPHOON 20; Not yet deployed

CHINA

CSS-NX-3/JL-1 2 1 Solid XIA 1,700+ 12; Not yet deployed

CSS-NX-14/JL-2 3 1 Solid JIN 7,000+ 12; Not yet deployed

INDIA

K-15 2 1 Solid ARIHART 700 12; Not yet deployed

Note: All ranges are approximate.

NUMBER WARHEADS SUBMARINE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF

MISSILE OF STAGES PER MISSILE PROPELLANT CLASS RANGE (km) LAUNCHERS

Each Russian Delta IV SSBN can Carry 16 SS-N-23 SLBMs

Russian DOLGORUKIY Class SSBN at Sea
Unlike ballistic missiles, cruise missiles are usually categorized by intended mission and launch 

mode (instead of maximum range). The two broadest categories are LACMs and antiship cruise 

missiles. Each type can be launched from an aircraft, ship, submarine, or ground-based launcher. 

A LACM is an unmanned, armed aerial vehicle designed to attack a fixed or mobile ground-based 

target. It spends the majority of its mission in level flight, as it follows a preprogrammed path to a 

predetermined target. Propulsion is usually provided by a small jet engine.

Because of highly accurate guidance systems that can place the missile within a few feet of the 

intended target, the most advanced LACMs can be used effectively against very small targets, 

even when armed with conventional warheads. LACM guidance usually occurs in three phases: 

launch, midcourse, and terminal. During the launch phase, a missile is guided using only the 

inertial navigation system. In the midcourse phase, a missile is guided by the inertial navigation 

system updated by one or more of the following systems: a radar-based terrain contour matching 

system, a radar or optical scene matching system, and/or a satellite navigation system such as the 

US Global Positioning System or the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System. The terminal 

guidance phase begins when a missile enters the target area and uses either more accurate scene 

matching or a terminal seeker (usually an optical or radar-based sensor).

Defending against LACMs will stress air defense systems. Cruise missiles can fly at low altitudes 

to stay below enemy radar and, in some cases, hide behind terrain features. Newer missiles are 

incorporating stealth features to make them even less visible to radars and infrared detectors. 

Modern cruise missiles also can be programmed to approach and attack a target in the most 

land-attack

cruise missiles

The cruise missile threat to US forces will continute 

to increase. At least nine foreign countries will 

be involved in LACM production during the next 

decade, and several of the LACM producers will 

make their missiles available for export.

26
efficient manner. For example, multiple missiles can attack a target simultaneously from 

different directions, overwhelming air defenses at their weakest points. Furthermore, LACMs may 

fly circuitous routes to get to the target, thereby avoiding radar and air defense installations. 

Some developmental systems may incorporate chaff or decoys as an added layer of protection, 

though concealment will remain a cruise missile’s main defense. The cruise missile threat to 

US forces will increase over the next decade. At least nine foreign countries will be involved in 

LACM production during the next decade, and several LACM producers will make their missiles 

available for export.

The success of US Tomahawk cruise missiles has heightened interest in cruise missile acquisition 

in many countries. Many cruise missiles available for purchase will have the potential to perform 

precision-strike missions. Many of these missiles will have similar features: a modular design, 

allowing them to be manufactured with a choice of navigational suites and conventional warhead 

options; the incorporation of stealth technology; the ability to be launched from fighter-size 

aircraft; and the capability to fly high-subsonic, low-altitude, terrain-following flight profiles.

The cruise missile threat to US forces will continue to increase. At least nine foreign countries will 

be involved in LACM production during the next decade, and several of the LACM producers will 

make their missiles available for export.

The CJ-10 (DH-10) is the first of the Chinese Changjian series of long-range missiles and LACMs. It 

made its public debut during a military parade in 2009 and is currently deployed with the Second 

Artillery Corps. 

lacm

Torgos MUPSOW SS-N-21 AS-4 AS-15 APACHE Popeye

Turbo

Storm

Shadow

KEPD-350 SCALP-EG Ra’ad Babur

Russian/Indian Brahmos LACM Launch
Russian Kh-101/Kh-102 LACMs on Test BEAR H Bomber

German Taurus LACM (KEPD-350) CLUB-K Container Missile System

Pakistani Babur LACM Launch

Iran recently announced the development of the 2,000-km range Meshkat cruise missile, with 

plans to deploy the system on air-, land-, and sea-based platforms.

The Club-K cruise missile “container launcher” weapons system, produced and marketed by a 

Russian firm, looks like a standard shipping container. The company claims the system can launch 

cruise missiles from cargo ships, trains, or commercial trucks. 

The first flight test of the Brahmos, jointly developed by India and Russia, took place in June 

2001. India plans to install Brahmos on a number of platforms, including destroyers, frigates, 

submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and fighters. Russia and India are also working on a followup missile, the Brahmos 2, which was flight-tested in 2012. 

Pakistan continues to develop the Babur (Hatf-VII) and the air-launched Ra’ad (Hatf-VIII). Each 

missile was flight tested in 2012. 
CHARACTERISTICS lacm

CHINA

YJ-63 Air Conventional Undetermined Undetermined

DH-10 Undetermined Conventional or nuclear Undetermined Undetermined

 

FRANCE

APACHE-AP Air Submunitions 100+ 2002

SCALP-EG Air and ship Penetrator 250+ 2003

Naval SCALP Sub and surface ship Penetrator 250+ 2013+

 

UAE

BLACK Air Penetrator 250+ 2006

SHAHEEN* 

GERMANY, SWEDEN, SPAIN

KEPD-350 Air Penetrator 350+ 2004

 

INDIA, RUSSIA

Brahmos 1 Air, ground, ship, and sub Conventional less than 300 2010+

Brahmos 2 Air, ground, ship, and sub Conventional less than 300 2013+ 

 

ISRAEL

Popeye Turbo Air Conventional 300+ 2002

 

PAKISTAN

RA’AD Air Conventional or nuclear 350 Undetermined

Babur Ground Conventional or nuclear 350 Undetermined

 

RUSSIA

AS-4 Air Conventional or nuclear 300+ Operational

AS-15 Air Nuclear 2,800+ Operational

SS-N-21 Nuclear 12,800+ Operational

Kh-555 Air Conventional Undetermined Undetermined

Kh-101 Air Conventional Undetermined 2013

3M-14E Ground, ship, and sub Conventional 275 Undetermined

 

SOUTH AFRICA

MUPSOW Air and ground Conventional 150 2002

Torgos Air and ground Conventional 300 Undetermined

 

TAIWAN

Wan Chien Air Conventional 250+ 2006

HF-2E Ground Conventional Undetermined Undetermined

 

UNITED KINGDOM

Storm Shadow Air Penetrator 250+ 2003

IRAN

Meshkat Air, ground, and ship Conventional Undetermined Undetermined

Note: All ranges are approximate and represent the range of the missile only. The effective system range may be greatly increased by the range 

of the launch platform.

*The BLACK SHAHEEN is an export version of the SCALP-EG.

MISSILE LAUNCH MODE WARHEAD TYPE RANGE (km) IOC
Overall, the threats posed by ballistic missile delivery systems are likely to continue to increase 

and grow more complex over the next decade. Current trends indicate adversary ballistic missile 

systems are becoming more mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate while also achieving longer 

ranges. Prelaunch survivability is also likely to increase as potential adversaries strengthen their 

denial and deception measures and increasingly base missiles on mobile sea- and land-based 

platforms. Adversarial nations are adopting technical and operational countermeasures to defeat 

missile defenses. Ballistic missiles are already in widespread use and will continue to increase in 

number and variety. The availability of weapons of mass destruction for use on ballistic missiles 

vastly increases the significance of this threat. 

Despite an ongoing reduction in the size of the Russian strategic missile force, Russia probably will 

retain the largest force of strategic ballistic missiles outside the United States. The development 

of new ballistic missile systems is a high priority for Russia. Russian officials have claimed that a 

new class of hypersonic vehicle is being developed to allow Russian strategic missiles to penetrate 

missile defense systems. Russia tested a new type of ICBM in 2012 and has stated it is developing a 

new heavy liquid-propellant ICBM to replace the aging SS-18. Russia is also offering the advanced 

new Iskander-E SRBM for export.

China is producing technologically advanced ballistic missiles and has sold ballistic missile 

technology to other countries. China has an extensive theater missile program and has deployed a 

large force of ballistic missiles in the vicinity of Taiwan. China is expanding the reach of this force 

summary

Ballistic and cruise missiles, with their relatively 

low operating costs, their potential to penetrate 

defense systems, and their value as a symbol of 

national power, will continue to be the offensive 

weapons of choice for many nations. As such, they 

are threats that must be carefully considered in 

future military planning and operations.

30
to attempt to prevent foreign powers from becoming involved in any future regional conflict. China 

can already target the United States with a relatively small force of ICBMs. Its ICBM force will grow 

quantitatively and qualitatively. 

North Korea is continuing development of the TD-2 ICBM/SLV, has unveiled a new road-mobile 

ICBM, has an IRBM in development, and maintains a large SRBM inventory. North Korea has 

exported ballistic missile systems and will probably continue to do so.

Iran has ambitious ballistic missile and space launch development programs and continues to 

attempt to increase the range, lethality, and accuracy of its ballistic missile force. Iranian ballistic 

missile forces continue to train extensively in highly publicized exercises. These exercises enable 

Iranian ballistic missile forces to hone wartime operational skills and evolve new tactics. Iran is 

fielding increased numbers of theater ballistic missiles, improving its existing inventory, and is 

developing the technical capability to produce an ICBM.

The proliferation of LACMs will expand in the next decade. At least nine countries will be involved 

in producing these weapons. The majority of new LACMs will be very accurate, conventionally 

armed, and available for export. The high accuracy of many LACMs will allow them to inflict serious 

damage, even when the missiles are armed only with conventional warheads. US defense systems 

could be severely stressed by low-flying stealthy cruise missiles that can simultaneously attack a 

target from several directions.

Chinese CSS-5 MRBM Road-Mobile Launchers Russian SS-25 ICBM Launch
NASIC-1031-0985-13

2013

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