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• Winner of the 1991 Edgar S. Furniss Book Award given 

the Mershon Center at Ohio State University, as an outstand

contribution to national security studies 

• Lead volume on the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff

professional military reading list (JCS Pub. l) 

"A definitive work from both a historical and practical viewpoi

'must read'." 

--Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., U

former Chairman, Joint C

"An exceptionally rich exploration of the historical as well as cu

dimensions of the [interservice] problem." 

--Russell F. Weigley, author of The American 

in the Journal of Ame

"Those with responsibility for the organization and direction of U

States defense.., ignore this book at their cost." 

--Martin Edmonds, American Political Sc

"[Allard] provides an unparalleled basis for assessing where we 

where we must go if we are to solve the joint and combined 

and control challenges facing the U.S. military as it [makes 

transition] to the twenty-first century." 

----General Edward C. Meyer, U.S. Army Ret., fo

Staff, U.S. Army, Armed F

"Anyone who wants to be more than a dilettante in command an

must understand what Lt. Col. Allard describes and documen

marvelous volume." 

--Admiral W.J. Holland, Jr., U.S. Navy Ret., Sig

"A roman h clef in a usually dry, technocratic field... Allard ha

powerful tool for effective use by modern military forces in 

information age." 

--Robert Hunter, Center for Strategic and Interna

Defense 

Kenneth Allard 

Revised Edition 

"[HE CENTER FOR ADVANCEO 

Directorate of Advanced Concepts, 

Technologies, and Information Strategies 

Institute for National Strategic Studies 

National Defense University 

Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 
DIRECTORATE OF ADVANCED CONCEPTS, TECHNOL

AND INFORMATION STRATEGIES (ACTIS) 

• Director: Dr. David S. Alberts 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed o

within are solely those of the author. They do not ne

represent the views of the National Defense Univer

Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government 

Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. 

Copyright © 1996 by C. Kenneth Allard, except for chapter 

273 through 303), which is copyright © 1995 by Westview P

is reprinted by permission of Westview Press. 

Reproduction in whole or part requires written permissio

author, except for official use by the U.S. Government. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Allard, C. Kenneth (Carl Kenneth), 1947- 

Command, control, and the common defense / Kenneth Allard. -- 

p. cm. 

Includes bibliographical references and index. 

1. United States--Armed Forces--Organization. 2. Command an

control systems--United States. 3. United States--Armed Forces-- 

Equipment. 4. Information technology--United States. I. Title. 

UA23.A593 1996 

355.3'3041--dc20 96-44766 

First printing, June 1990 (Yale University Press) 

Revised Edition, October 1996 

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP 

Washington, DC 20402-9328 Phone: (202) 512-1800 

ISBN 0-16-053377-1 
This book is respectfully dedicated to the memory of Congress

Bill Nichols of Alabama--Soldier, statesman, patriot 

The Romans said, "If you would have peace, you must be 

war." And while we pray for peace, we can never forget that 

no less than a bayonet or an aircrait carrier, is a weapon of wa

to our soldiers, our sailors, our airmen, and our marines to en

weapon is lean enough, flexible enough, and tough enough t

win if, God forbid, that ever becomes necessary. 

From the opening statement by Congressman Nichols 

House Armed Services Committee 

Hearings on the Reorganization of the 

Department of Defense 

February 19, 1986 
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

Acknowledgments xi 

Abbreviations xv 

Paradigms and Perspectives 1 

The Roots of Service Autonomy, 1776-1850 

Paradigms on Land and Sea, 1861-1921 47 

The Quest for Unity of Command 89 

Setting the Scene: Formative Influences on M

Command and Control 125 

Tactical Command and Control of American A

Forces: Problems of Modernization 151 

Building Joint Approaches: Of JINTACCS 

and JTIDS 193 

Historical Linkages and Future Implications 

Epilogue: Desert Storm and 

Information Age Warfare 273 

Notes 305 

Bibliography 335 

Index 347 

About the Author 361 
actually have been of some use to the reader. This is espe

these people are students in either our military or civilia

institutions. The study of information age conflict has capt

attention in the media and academe over the last several y

deeply grateful that this book is being made available to stu

this rapidly changing field. 

One of the challenges facing the writer is keeping u

developments. While Command, Control, and the Comm

provides a historical perspective on a contemporary problem, 

in the late 1980s; since then, the end of the Cold War and 

experience in the Gulf War have provided some funda

perspectives of their own. Re-written history has its own pit

solution was to leave the original content intact and to add as 

chapter which originally appeared in a 1995 anthology on t

Both works have, of course, been edited for consistency. 

Thanks are due to the editors of both Yale University P

publishers of Command, Control, and the Common Defense, 

Press, publishers of Turning Point: The Gulf War and 

Strategy, for their kindness in granting permission for this r

to be published; in particular, John Covell of Yale Press 

Mazarr of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

Turning Point. Dr. David S. Alberts, Director of Advanc

Technologies, and Information Strategies at National Defen

provided not only the support that made this publication pos

much encouragement and many helpful suggestions. Advice a

assistance by the following people are gratefully acknowled

Storey-Gross, Rosemaria B. Bell, Richard L. Layton, and 

(ret.) Gary F. Wheatley. My appreciation for the people reco

acknowledgments to the original volume remains undiminishe

Finally, there is reason to ponder in the light of more 

developments one of the major points in that original work: 

integration demanded by emerging command and control 

otten runs afoul of existing command structures and theories o

I completed the revisions to this edition while servin
1st Armored Division, 

June 1996 
be mentioned here. This book would not be complete

I failed to thank those people whose contributions w

Professors Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., of the Fletche

Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and Professor 

Oettinger of the Harvard University Program on 

Resources Policy supervised the dissertation tha

resulted in this book: both merit my heartfelt than

professionalism, their sound guidance, and, most 

patience over a very long haul. Both the Harvard 

Information Resources Policy and the Security Studie

Fletcher, then headed by Professor Uri Ra'ana

generous financial support, which is gratefully acknow

The privilege of completing a combined degree pro

such distinguished institutions as the Kennedy Schoo

ment at Harvard and the Fletcher School at Tuits wo

been possible for a serving Army officer without the 

of a third distinguished institution: the United Sta

Academy at West Point. It was a great honor to se

years as an assistant professor in the USMA Departm

Sciences under Col. Lee D. OIvey: my debt to him a

colleagues in "The Department" is profound. T

support of the Military Education Foundation is al

edged with appreciation. Brig. Gen. Roy K. Flint, 

Academic Board, deserves special thanks for his en

and the support provided by the USMA Scien

Laboratory during a 1985 fellowship at the National W

Washington, D.C. Col. Roy Stafford, dean of the f

National War College, extended every personal and 

courtesy during that fellowship; his generosity and en

helped to make the dissertation a reality. Gen. Robe

United States Air Force, vice chairman of the Joint Ch

and Lt. Gen. C. E. McKnight, Jr., United States Arm

two officers who served with great distinction 

respective tours of duty as the director, Command, 

Communications Systems Directorate, Office of the 
y g

the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Frank Snyder of the Na

College, and Lt. Gen. John H. Cushman, United States Army (Re

kind enough to review the entire dissertation and to provid

comments and suggestions that made the task of editing and 

immeasurably easier. Two former assistant secretaries of defe

served with great distinction in the field of command and contro

P. Dirmeen and Donald C. Latham, reviewed the manuscript, a

similarly generous with their comments and encouragement. A spe

of thanks is due all six of these men for service "above and beyond 

of duty." The following military colleagues also reviewed the ma

either in whole or in part, and provided many helpful comments: 

Raoul H. Alcala and Rodger L. McElroy; Lieutenant Colonels 

Collins, William Culley, and William Beletsky; and Major Shelly 

Alan Sabrosky (formerly of the Army War College) also r

manuscript and provided some notably timely assistance on 

occasions. Bert Hopkins, of the JTIDS Joint Program Office, has 

invaluable source of assistance and insight into the often arcane pr

interoperability, in both its electronic and bureaucratic manifestatio

I was fortunate enough in 1985 to be awarded a Cong

Fellowship by the American Political Science Association. Ser

Capitol Hill and participating in the events that ultimately led 

passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was an experience that wo

been heady enough under any circumstances; but because it cam

same time that many of the ideas in this book were being form

fellowship provided a firsthand look at the problem of 

reorganization in a way that nothing else could have. Grateful th

due Congressmen Les Aspin (chairman of the House Armed 

Committee), Nicholas Mavroules, and John Kasich, as well 

Wincup, the committee's staff director. Dr. Arch Barrett, professio

member of the House Armed Services Committee, deserves 

mention for playing the interlocking roles of taskmaster, teach

friend. Mentors on the other side of the Hill include Senator John 

Les Brownlee, and James R. Locher II1 of the staff of the Senate 

Services Committee. All these men will certainly recognize my de
acquainted with three distinguished soldiers who are known 

their lifelong records of outstanding service to their co

General Otto L. Nelson, Jr. (1902-85), General J. D. Hittle

Dr. Lawrence H. Legere. Early in their careers, however, e

gentlemen made contributions to the study of Ameri

organization that have had an enduring influence on eac

generation of students of the subject. While their works are l

in the pages which follow, their advice and encouragemen

equally important. It is my hope that this book will in som

repay their kindness and confidence. 

No matter how helpful the assistance offered by everyon

errors of fact or interpretation are of course my sole respo

reader is also urged to remember that the views expressed th

work are the personal opinions of the author and do not nece

the official positions of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Department o

the government of the United States. 

Finally, a special note of appreciation is due to the three 

life: my wife, our daughter, and my mother. All three have he

ways, most of all by putting up with the countless inconv

personal shortcomings of someone who has seemed wedded 

books and word processors but also to his uniform. 
C2 

C2W 

C3 

C3I 

C4 

CINC 

CSIS 

DA 

DMRD 

DOD 

GPS 

HASC 

IW 

JCS 

JINTACCS 

JSTARS 

JTIDS 

MSE 

NATO 

NAVSTAR 

NDU 

NTDS 

OCMH 

OJCS 

OSD 

Command and Control 

Command and Control Warfare 

Command, Control, and Communications 

Command, Control, Communications, and In

Command, Control, Communications, and C

Commander in Chief (usually of a unified o

command) 

Center for Strategic and International Studie

Department of the Army 

Defense Management Review Decision 

Department of Defense 

Global Positioning System 

House Armed Services Committee 

Information Warfare 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Joint Interoperability of Tactical C2 System

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Syst

Joint Tactical Information Distribution Syst

Mobile Subscriber Equipment 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Navigation Satellite Timing and Ranging 

National Defense University 

Naval Tactical Data System 

U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Military H

Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 
USA 

USAF 

USMC 

USN 

WWMCCS 

U.S. Army 

U.S. Air Force 

U.S. Marine Corps 

U.S. Navy 

Worldwide Military Command and Control System 
Committee at a hearing called to examine the organ

department. At issue was a broadly crafted piece 

introduced by Senators Barry Goldwater and S

correct Pentagon organizational and command pro

believed to have been at the heart of operational fa

the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue attempt and the 1

of the Marine barracks in Beirut. Even the success

invasion of Grenada two years before was incl

criticism, especially when allegations were made th

Navy, Air Force, and Marine contingents deployed 

had experienced difficulty communicating with one 

coordinating their movements. The most wid

incident in that conflict was the apocryphal tale t

element, pinned down by enemy fire and unable to 

with supporting ships and aircratt from the other 

used the island's telephone system and one sol

credit card to place a long-distance call to Fort Bra

send a message. 1 

That this story was never subsequently confirmed 

soldier in question was never produced did not pre

dent from taking its place in popular mythology (a 

even appeared in a 1986 movie, Heartbreak Ridg

loosely modeled on the Grenada operation). It was n

surprising that the senators' questioning of Secretar

would eventually turn to this issue. The Was

recorded the following exchange between Weinberge

The defense secretary also clashed repeatedly 

Sam Nunn . . . on whether inadequate radios 

U.S. military forces during the invasion of Grenad

"They were not hampered significantly," W

testified. 

"That is directly contradictory to your own D

of Defense report," Nunn said, holding up a th

secret aRer-action report on the Grenada opera

are making unclassified statements that are 
lawyer, but as a secretary of defense I dont think that

appropriate method by which to proceed in solving problems. '~ 

The asperity of this exchange turned out to be an unhappy harbi

things to come. For the next eleven months, both the Senate and the 

struggled with the issue of Pentagon reorganization, engaged at ev

by representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense a

uniformed services who, despite their public protestations of supp

the effort, feared that congressionally mandated reforms would 

relationships and procedures that had endured for more than a gener

Their reservations are not hard to understand. For one thing, the 

Administration had come into office pledged to build up the 

defenses. During the preceding five years, modernization of nucl

conventional forces, rather than structural modification of the 

establishment, had been one of the Administration's main pr

Altering that course threatened goals that were about to be realized, 

as raising difficult issues of stewardship sure to be exploited by the 

Ninety-ninth Congress. At a more profound level, the services sen

the effort to reform the Pentagon had serious implications for the s

of Command, that is, the system by which authority is dis

throughout a military organization. Each of the services has 

structure: it is a well-defined, hierarchical, top-to-bottom arrangem

precisely defines every layer of the organization, its relationship t

other activity, and--to a very large degree--the roles and function

people who make it up. The formal chain of command, the arrange

"line-and-block charts," the perquisites of rank, and even the trai

future leaders are all constituent parts of this system. Although co

structures differ from service to service, they are at the heart of 

life, exerting a common regulatory effect on the soldier, the sai

airman, and the marine. 

The downside to this common heritage of service authority is t

largely an internal mechanism and so, in a sense, stops at the water

Precisely because service command structures exert first claim 

loyalties of their members, command relationships between the 

have been a persistent problem. In fact, it was largely because 
g jp

• The commanders in chief (CINCs) of the unified a

commands (who control American forces in the field) 

additional authority over their service components and 

larger role in defense resource planning. 

• The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was giv

authority over the services, including directive authority o

Staff, a full-time four-star deputy empowered to act in h

formal designation as the president's principal military advi

• Joint service experience was to be a legal prerequisite f

advancing to flag or general officer rank; also, a new joint 

created to groom future CINCs and chairmen of 

performance in the joint arena. 

• Service headquarters staffs were to be reorganized, the ob

functional decentralization and personnel reductions of up to 

• For the first time, the president was ordered to transmi

an annual report detailing the "national security strategy 

States," including not only an assessment of the nati

capabilities but an analysis of how its political and econ

might be brought to bear in support of American foreign po

The phrase "landmark legislation" occurs commonly enoug

Hill to encourage caution in applying it. Yet Goldwater-Nic

deserved this title and more: it was the most important s

enactment since the National Security Act of 1947 created 

postwar military establishment. 

Anomalies 

It is interesting that the initial attention to the 

command and control on Grenada did not result in m

commentary in the ensuing hearings before the Armed Service

of the House and the Senate. Admittedly, there were other iss

more easily understood and discussed in the open sessions 

characterized these proceedings. But if the congressional pu
problems existed on Grenada was because "each Service contin

purchase its own communications equipment which all too frequent

compatible with the equipment of the other Services." It then 

approvingly the following assessment by Gen. Wallace H. Nuttin

former commander in chief of the U.S. Readiness Command: "It is a f

of the way we prepare for war and that is the fact that the law charg

military department to organize, train, and equip forces to opera

particular environment for which it is responsible. That is too sim

answer, but that is where it begins: with the way we prepare for war. 

General Nutting's comment is intriguing. If each of the m

departments is charged with the responsibility of organizing, ta'ainin

equipping forces for a particular operational environment, then it 

that service, rather than joint, command structures exercise the do

influence over those forces. The communications media linking the 

command structures simply reflect this basic organizational fact 

Because they are directed toward the particular Army, Navy, Marin

Air Force units taking part in an operation, an electronic confu

tongues can result when these forces attempt to communicate wit

other. It can easily be argued, as Secretary Weinberger did, that G

was a hastily conceived and executed operation, that such comma

control difficulties as existed are understandable when placed in c

and that, in any case, none of those problems interfered with the suc

the invasion. 

The counter to such arguments, however, is that Grenada was h

fair test of the American military command and control system. N

Soviet forces nor their surrogates were present in the numbers or w

capabilities that would be expected closer to the Eurasian land 

Almost as important was the fact that electronic warfare was not a 

on Grenada as it certainly would be in any engagement with the S

their major clients, or even the military regimes of many third 

countries. Here the full measure of stress would be applied to Am

command and control links, including intelligence eavesdropping, 

interference with radio transmissions, various forms of electronic "

ing," and the use of the electromagnetic spectrum to identify and d
yqy 

battlefield, breaking down artificial organizational barriers a

those commanders who are swift and innovative enough 

opportunities thus offered. Other analysts have gone so far 

the existence of an entirely new plane of combat, known as c

control warfare, in which the active use of one's own electroni

systems, together with protective command and control coun

makes its possible to seize the tactical initiative, cripple 

command and control system, and thereby defeat his forces. 5 

Whatever the facts contained in the classified reports b

Secretary Weinberger and Senator Nunn, American forces on 

not, at the very least, displayed a conspicuous virtuosity in a

new precepts to the invasion. Although it was little noticed 

further evidence on this point had surfaced just three week

Senate hearings, when Navy Secretary John Lehman annou

was terminating his service's separate role in a joint comman

project called JTIDS--for Joint Tactical Information Distribu

Although the news that the Navy was now committing itself t

Army-Air Force version of JTIDS might have been welcome 

circumstances, the sad fact was that the Navy was taking thi

after having invested nine years of effort and at least $I00 

stubborn effort to maintain a separate identity in what was 

joint project. And even then, Secretary Lehman had cancele

only after a restive House Armed Services Committee had q

wisdom of further investments in the increasingly high-risk ap

by the Navy's JTIDS contractors. 6 

Again there were the predictable, plausible explanations: J

experimental program in which the Navy had taken on

approach while the other services explored another; develop

nology was inherently risky and diverse; JTIDS was not re

system but a family of systems; and so on. 7 Whatever the m

arguments, a larger pattern was emerging, which itself was 

some underlying problems: 

• The JTIDS program, which continued through 1986 d

billed in at least one newspaper article as a "Six Hun
y jppgpp

appeared all-embracing, and the expenditure of considerable amo

the taxpayers' money--however much the exact figures may have v

• The JTIDS experience seemed to confirm the earlier manife

of interoperability problems seen in the service communications s

on Grenada. If the engineering of future command and control s

in the calmly deliberative atmosphere of the laboratory produc

same kinds of interservice difficulties seen in the heat and confu

combat, then perhaps General Nutting had been correct 

assessment: maybe the root of the problem lay in the way the s

were organized to prepare for war. 

• Finally, the most presumptive evidence of a larger pattern lay 

year-long effort devoted by the Congress to passing the 

comprehensive defense organization measure in a generation. 

this massive effort was driven by congressional perceptions tha

phrase often used during those debates, "the system was broke 

needed fixing." The system in question was nothing less th

structure of command, and in adjusting the relationship betwe

service and joint military institutions, Congress made every ef

ensure it had corrected the problems that had seemingly contrib

flawed operations in the field and ineffective functioning in the 

organization of the nation's defenses. 

To put the point plainly, it had become clear that there was a 

pattern affecting the development of individual weapons system

equipment (especially visible in command and control programs s

JTIDS), military organization (the way the services equip their forc

prepare them for war), and general command structure (the distribu

power within a military organization). The common thread linki

three is that the services, in preparing their forces for war, can hav

different perspectives on war itself~if not on the nature of such co

then certainly on the fundamental questions of service roles, mission

capabilities that would be brought to bear. Historically, these 

viewpoints feature the respective applications of land power, sea pow

air power as a first priority, generally stopping well short of a 
rules and operations of the computer that forces the user t

about what might otherwise remain implicit. 9 Certainly 

something about putting JTIDS in the hands of the soldier, t

pilot, and the marine that forced their parent services to co

fundamental differences that might otherwise have remained 

differences were summed up in a classic statement by G

Kelley, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, who, in 

interservice rivalry and his own well-publicized opposition to 

reorganization effort, observed that "asking a man to be as 

other services as he is to his own is like asking him to be a

girlfriends as he is to his wife. ''10 

The subject of this book is precisely that tension between 

of service loyalty and the need to seek the often elusive syn

combat power. The general question it addresses is this: W

characteristics of the American military structure--its tradit

and organization--that affect the evolution of command and c

information age? More specifically, what are the elements co

separate service identities, and how have those identi

interservice relationships? How has the evolution of interser

ships affected the structure of command and the operational em

combatant forces? In what ways does the contemporary 

command affect and influence the technological choic

modernizing the command and control systems used by the arm

the United States? 

The answers to these questions are subsumed in the thesis 

which is that the American military establishment embodies 

service separatism, one that has been renewed and reinforce

and paradigms of thought that stress the decisive effect of mil

the land, at sea, or in the air. Although these traditions, the na

historical circumstance and political choice, have on the who

nation well, they inevitably complicate the problem of c

control in an age of global missions and technological 

Increasingly, those missions and the forces required to carry t

involved all the services. The need to seek unity of comman
primary emphasis on the joint integration of American combat power

Approaches 

The question of service loyalties is not an unfamiliar one, 

surfacing as "interservice rivalry," the pejorative of choice whe

writer wishes to characterize some aspect of military malfeasa

inefficiency with the comforting outlines of stereotype. Althou

appellation is certainly appropriate in some instances--including 

discussed in this book--it is probably more accurate to use th

autonomy to describe the preferred or actual conditions govern

organizational life of the services. That word is variously defi

Webster's New World Dictionary as "self-governing," "independe

"functioning independently without control by others. 'q2 But none 

definitions quite captures the essence of military organizations st

constant balance between the requirements of top-down control (in

political control) and the need to delegate authority effectively en

perform mission requirements, especially in remote operational e

ments. It is equally important in applying this term to appreciate 

suggests both a basic division of labor (separate land, sea, and air 

and a profound historical legacy. Each of the services is respons

producing the forces that ultimately defend American interests 

particular operational environment, but each is also the reposi

powerful traditions and heritages embedded in the deepest r

American history. The Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the M

therefore need to be understood not only as organizations engaged 

constant effort to balance the pressures of centralization and decen

tion but also as large, well-established, and uniquely American instit

The strong self-concepts that characterize the services imply 

degrees of organizational difference that are sometimes overlook

the idea that there are distinct service "personalities" or "styl

received increasing attention in recent years with the renewal of int

defense reform. A 1986 best-seller, The Straw Giant by journalist 

T. Hadley, is a wide-ranging critique not only of specific P
no movement without coordination. He cannot go right, left, 

forward without informing units on his right and left, art

supply trains, his superiors--all in detail. He is, for all h

authority, a rather restricted part of a whole. His unit's succe

survival, rests on efforts not just of himself, but of outsiders. ''1

This picture is in stark contrast to the self-contained indep

naval officer commanding a ship at sea: "The commander o

the wheel to the right, or commands a starboard turn, and, s

within the ship, all the paraphernalia of battlemammunition

fuel--turn right also. There is no coordination necessary, n

permission, no letting people know. While the ship must retu

conform to formation if maneuvering with a task force, it re

independent in ways no Army unit attains. ''14 

Air Force officers, members of a service built around futur

and high technology, have equally different psychological pr

are more apt to have a more passionate attachment to machine

different sense of time. After all, an Air Force pilot can be in 

lunch. An Army officer measures an hour's progress in ya

officer in miles, an Air Force officer in continents. ''t5 

In a related article commenting on Goldwater-Nichols jus

enactment, Hadley made another important point: "These dif

of course, inherently difficult to define or quantify. But th

apparent to the most casual observer, and even seemingly sim

of operations or tactics can elicit vastly different responses 

who come from different service backgrounds. Taken to

intellectual and psychological differences represent a key sour

and competition within our armed services. And until steps 

overcome them, it seems unlikely that any bureaucratic reorg

greatly improve our defenses. ''16 

Although Hadley's contention might seem self-evident 

negative view of service autonomy is not shared by all ob

articles in the July 1985 edition of the U.S. Naval Institute Pr

cases in point. In "A Separatist Case," Army Col. Willia

argued that the Navy's historical tradition of technical com
good thing. "Specifically, the [Joint Chiefs of Staff, or JCS system] 

the Navy's ideas of decentralization and unit autonomy, and its de

operational focus. ''18 His argument was that the JCS system preser

essential elements of service autonomy while promoting effecti

action and that it achieved this by encouraging a full airing of view

the nation's political leadership was free to accept or reject. Theref

JCS "symbolizes affiliation with a system designed to protect 

loyalty, autonomy and competition while improving and rationalizi

dialogue and planning. ''19 Indeed, the system not only "resonates n

with this maritime perspective" but also coincides with the dem

pluralistic traditions of the American political cuitta'e. 2° 

Interestingly enough, both sets of arguments implicitly accept t

that autonomy is an important determinant of both the national co

structure and service organization. Equally important is their accept

the idea that autonomy springs from underlying cultural diff

--which are themselves grounded in the operational variances of 

on land, at sea, or in the air. Commander Fedyszyn also echoed a 

point from American civil-military relations theory by his assertion 

nation's political values and beliefs exercise an important influ

determining the overall shape and characteristics of its military co

structure. On the one hand, this observation may be sufficien

understood as to be conventional wisdom. On the other, the e

these varied influences in determining distinctive service personal

as Hadley pointed out, an exceedingly difficult thing to de

quantify. 

Samuel P. Huntington's major works on civil-military relatio

Soldier and the State and The Common Defense, are the de

chronicles of the rise of American military professionalism 

nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For the present inquiry, Hunt

contributions are particularly relevant not only for their historical 

but also for the light they shed on the development of the fund

traditions and strategic principles associated with each of the serv

his view, "technicism, popularism, and professionalism are th

strands of the American military tradition. '~t 
effects on the development of the Army and Navy, Huntingt

calls attention to the doctrines that played important formul

the growth of service professionalism and, eventually, in th

cultures. For the Army, the writings of Baron Henri Jomini 

Clausewitz were instrumental in the development of land po

the theories of sea power espoused by Alfred Thayer Maha

similar function for the Navy. 22 

Huntington's use of these strategic thinkers suggests the 

separate service ideologies, which may help in understanding 

service autonomy on both interservice relationships and mod

and control. Looking for that common thread in the field of s

ideologies calls to mind a classic work of contemporary strate

1966 by Rear Adm. J. C. Wylie. In Mil#ary Strategy: A Gene

Power Control, Admiral Wylie succinctly summarized the 

schools of strategic thought that have exercised a great influ

American military establishment. They are: 

• Continental or land power theory: Derived principally 

Clausewitz, and the record of American military practice ov

two centuries, its major tenets call for the destruction of the 

and effective control over the means required to bring this obj

• Maritime strategy: Heavily influenced by the writin

Thayer Mahan, classic maritime strategy aims for effecti

the sea by decisive defeat of the enemy's fleet. Once 

control of the sea also permits power to be projected onto t

• Air theory: Closely associated with the writings of Giuli

Billy Mitchell, the theory asserts the primacy of air power ov

form of combat because the inherently offensive nature of ai

it a decisive edge over lesser, defensive weapons. Classic

meant the heavy bomber; in contemporary parlance, it is 

associated with intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear 

Wylie's treatment of these strategic theories provides 

reference point for the present investigation, because these th

correlate to the preferred theories of the Army, Navy, and Ai

appears to contradict the others in a number of important resp
paradigms," to borrow a phrase most closely associated with Th

Kuhn. (Kuhn uses the term paradigm to designate a fund

organizing concept, or "disciplinary matrix," that, once discovere

a profound influence on its adherents.) 25 

Some more recent scholarship has also suggested the potential im

of the strategic paradigm as a heuristic device for assessing the i

service perspectives on command and control problems, as well as a 

of related concerns. Arnold Kanter's 1979 study Defense Po

Budgetary Perspective stressed "the importance of the military ser

the predominant source of sanctions and the focus of organizational 

despite the impact of unified combatant commands, defensewide 

and joint institutions such as the JCS." Given an irreducible interdep

among the military services," Kanter wrote, "each service's e

stabilize its own organizational environment contain the seeds of u

able jurisdictional claims and insatiable demands for additional reso

the absence of countervailing pressures, the interaction of these eff

produce interservice rivalries over roles and missions as well a

shares. ''26 Consequently, defense policy outcomes do not so much r

conscious strategic choices as they reflect the results of bur

bargains arrived at by quasi-independent service actors. 

Rand Corporation analyst Carl Builder, in a 1987 report prep

the Army, argued that the recognizable service differences obse

Huntington and Kanter are important in understanding that "the 

services have acquired personalities of their own that are shaped 

experiences and which, in turn, shape their behavior." Builder s

seven points of comparison to account for these differences, t

fundamental of which he described as "altars of worship"--basic 

principles or cherished ideals. For the Navy, this altar is "inde

command at sea," for the Air Force, the "inexhaustible foun

aerospace technology, and for the Army, its status as the nation's 

servant: "If the Army worships at an altar, the object worshippe

country; and the means of worship are service. ''27 Builder merely 

Wylie's original formulation in holding that service strategies res

these predispositions, especially with regard to the theories of ai
would prefer to fight--the Airland Battle doctrine--but not 

the selection of the means and ends of war, as do the Air 

Navy. ''29 This would be a bold assertion under any circu

more so in a report intended primarily for Army readers. 

Builder cited Wylie as his authority for stating that "the A

have a strategic theory like the Air Force and Navy 

circumstances--its lack of control over terrain, engagement, a

resources---deny it the freedom to define war on its own 

Army therefore is handicapped by a lack of coherence in 

planning process not only because its ideology lacks the 

outlines of sea power and air power theories but also bec

commitments to use force do not always drive defense budg

in matters relating to land power (such as airlift, sealift, fire 

so on). Builder concluded that this very deficiency, however, 

Army some future leverage in the renewed national comm

expressed and implied by the Goldwater-Nichols Act) to 

planning and more disciplined strategic choices. 31 

Whatever the merits of that conclusion (and there were 

internal Army audiences that found it persuasive), it is wor

Builder simply ignored classical land power theory: the stan

Clausewitz and Jomini, for example, do not appear in his so

mentioned only briefly, if at all, in the text. This is in mark

the approach taken by one of the more celebrated works 

Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, by Edward N. Lutt

course of elaborating the paradoxical nature of strategy in w

inspired by the Clausewitzian notion of friction), Luttwak d

levels of strategy (technical, tactical, operational, and theate

underpinnings for the fifth and broadest level, or grand strate

great emphasis, however, on the theater level of strategy, w

the relationship between military strength and territory." In 

to a major restatement of continental theory, he analyzed th

almost entirely in terms of the relative strengths of comp

forces that, together with their fire support, can be brought 

the confines of the theater itself, s3 
mobility limitations, they are a kind of least common denomin

evaluating force structures: "There is no basis for the conceptualiz

distinct naval and air counterparts to theater strategy because 

phenomena of ground warlbre that are most important within that 

Second, claims of autonomy for a single form of military power u

rest on the grounds "that it is decisive in itself." Yet Luttwak arg

both classical sea power and air power theories contain basic co

flaws (the relevance of maritime power against continental nations 

the Soviet Union, for example), and that their supposedly decisiv

have been exaggerated (such as the failure of conventional 

bombing to overcome "the political and industrial resilience of its 

during World War II). 35 The advent of nuclear weapons ex

diminishing effect on traditional autonomy, even as it seemed to co

unexpected ways the tenets of the early prophets of air pow

catastrophic nature of nuclear weapons, however, as well as the 

logic of strategy, seriously limited their use in war, even as i

extended military competition beneath the level of actual nuclear co

Therefore, the need to link these instruments of actual or surrogate 

drives grand strategy and largely turns the notion of traditional au

into either irrelevance or anachronism. 

Although they differ in their appreciation of the relative m

traditional service paradigms, it can be argued that both Buil

Luttwak are correct: Builder in his realistic assessment of the bure

utility of hard-edged service perspectives in making the inc

choices that are the daily bread of Pentagon life and Luttwak 

prescriptive call for greater attention to the demanding disciplines 

strategy. On the one hand, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force 

only the basic building blocks from which the combatant force

United States are formed; they are the institutional repositories 

military art as it relates to their particular missions. Applying this e

to tough decisions on budget choices and weapons procurement 

they are expected to do, and it would be inconceivable for b

expertise and the applications not to have been shaped by fund

notions of what is and is not important. Inevitably, these perspectiv
College has noted, for example, that there is scant indica

Navy today holds to the Mahanian view of strategy that exal

over all other forms of military action, claims for navies an 

domain in the realm of warfare, and equates command of 

victory .... Mars, not Neptune, is again the god of war. ''37 

Directions 

The common ground between these perspectives may 

by an eminent student of military strategy, Peter Paret, who

about Napoleon, noted that "each age has its own strategy

autonomy is clearly an important part of the American mil

having been the primary organizational tool with which 

strategic needs were met for the better part of two centu

clearly, the search for more effective teamwork among the arm

likely to remain a dominant influence in the foreseeable fu

nation's military and political establishment comes to grips wi

of strategic challenges as we approach the twenty-first centu

also much in the careful balance that must be struck between 

and future challenges that suggests various other constants: 

struggle between the tactical and the strategic, the operatio

bureaucratic, the decentralized and the 

rendering unto Caesar the things that 

these distinctions is to understand, first, 

of organizational perspective between 

with the nation's security and, second, 

more important than others. 39 

centralized, or, for tha

are Caesar's. The tric

that there are importan

those elements prima

that some of these di

Nowhere else are those differences less apparent but more 

the field of command and control. To return for a moment t

hearings that introduced this chapter, at least part of the re

particularly sharp questioning of Secretary Weinberger on th

ability problems encountered during Grenada may have been 

incredulity (on Capitol Hill as well as among the public) 

problem could even exist. ARer all, how could it be that fo
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marines who severally 

procure, and field command and control systems (defending them 

step of the way before the civilian leadership of the Defense De

the executive branch, and the Congress); so it is not particularly 

that service perspectives should dominate this process. In contras

function of the joint military institutions (primarily the Joint Chief

and the unified and specified commands) to weld these 

service-procured systems into a coherent instrument of comm

effectively controls all assigned combatant forces. The crux of th

the extent to which the JCS and the unified commanders are han

in achieving the level of cross-service integration required by the 

of combat. 

But far more is involved here than matters of bureaucratic jur

however important their consequences. Consider, for exam

following definitions of three terms, command, command and con

command and control system, as they are used in U.S. military 

and throughout this book: 

Command: "The authority vested in an individual of th

forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military fo

Command and control: "The exercise of authority and direc

properly designated commander over assigned forces in the acc

ment of the mission. Command and control functions are p

through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, commu

facilities, and procedures which are employed by a comm

planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and o

in the accomplishment of the mission." 

Command and control system: "The facilities, equipment, c

cations, procedures, and personnel essential to the comma

planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigne

pursuant to the missions assigned. ''4o 

One of the most striking characteristics of these definitions is t

to which they evoke the personal nature of command itself, espe

fact that it is vested in an individual who, being responsible for the "

coordination, and control of military forces," is then legally and prof
command as an important but still secondary priority. 42 

Given the fact that these service components are the na

fighting forces (and that assignments to infantry battalions, des

fighter squadrons are more exciting and rewarding than any 

position), these priorities are understandable. They neverthe

problems whenever command crosses service lines. In a Harva

prepared for use in command and control courses throughout t

Defense University system, Prof. Frank Snyder points out that 

tional decisions establish command and reporting relationship

minimum, create requirements for communications . . . [not o

physical links themselves, but for staffs that share vocabular

dedicated to performing communications functions in the large

Organizational decisions shape the C3 [command-control-comm

system and commit C3 resources. ''43 Modern communications 

however, presents some important impediments: "As ideas mo

mind of one commander to the mind of another, the activit

undertaken on the sending (transmitting) side have to be matc

receiving side .... Everything that is done must be und

analog-to-digital conversion needs to be matched by a corres

conversion at the other end, every encryption by a decryption

modulation by a demodulation .... [Therefore] the domina

establishing a telecommunications path is not its optimizati

standardization of the process. More important than doing thin

way is doing them the same way." (emphasis added) 44 

This perspective frames the major issue examined in this bo

the pluralistic traditions of service autonomy which are a major 

American military experience affect the way in which c

exercised over our combatant forces, now and in the future? 

important question if one assumes that future military develo

increasingly demand a global view of American responsibi

coherent strategic choices (political and budgetary), and greate

between the armed forces. It follows that command and contr

linchpin in any such effort, not only because of its technologic

but also because of its potential to transcend vastly different 
ogy on which all command and control systems must ultimately d

This dual emphasis on organization and technology represents 

view of command which assumes that its problems cannot be u

apart from the human institutions--governmental and mil

actually do the commanding and controlling. This viewpoint 

some isolation from the usual discussions of command and con

that appear in trade journals such as Signal magazine or 

Electronics and are largely meant to inform a technically sop

audience of the latest projects, systems, or other developm

fast-moving industry. The publishers of Signal have also produc

volumes on conventional command and control issues, including 

ground force applications. 45 Lt. Gen. John Cushman's book 

and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy is a comprehensive a

the institutional, structural, and procedural problems confronting 

commander. 46 The field of strategic command and control (whi

means nuclear command and control) is unusually complex and, b

its subject matter, presents major barriers to unclassified resear

has been illuminated by the work of two men: Paul Bracke

Command and Control of Nuclear Forces, and Bruce G. Blair, in 

Command and Control. 47 Both volumes are remarkable for thei

ability to look beyond specific weapons, warning systems, and 

structures in examining the larger question of how American nucl

are commanded and controlled--and how well. Not only do th

demonstrate the merits of well-conceived organic approache

subject, but they also serve the further purpose of permitting thi

concentrate on the command and control of American con

forces--those whose primary missions do not involve strategi

retaliation. 

Probably the most important contemporary work to treat the p

command as a central focus is Martin Van Creveld's Command 

Viewing command as an "eternal function" of military organizati

of surpassing importance, Van Creveld gives a brief summary of 

of command and its functions in the "stone age" (that is, prior to 

long-distance communications) before examining at some l
isolation. The available data processing technology, and th

armaments in use; tactics and strategy; organizational s

manpower systems; training, discipline, and what one might c

of war; the political construction of states and the social make

--all these things and many more impinge on command in w

turn affected by it. ''49 

In Command in War, as well as his later work, Technolo

Van Creveld demonstrates the continuing importance of c

themes in military history: the competing demands of autonomy 

tion, the similarly contradictory impulses of "rationalized" hier

the operational flexibility, and, above all, the ceaseless quest 

advantage through technology. This quest has led to greate

efficiency through the use of automation, but with often pe

effects. Although there may be a cyclical quality to such appa

advances, Van Creveld observed a fundamental difference 

operational environments in which warfare is waged: "At sea a

technology is required not merely in order to fight but for shee

only for this reason, and everything else being equal, the 

environment, the greater the military benefit technological sup

confer. By contrast, the terrestrial environment is much mo

including as it does terrain, lines of communication, obstacle

artificial, and every kind of clutter" (emphasis added). 50 Giv

scope of his subject, as well as his primarily European focus, 

does not pursue the implications of this assertion in more d

understanding that there is such a fundamental dichotomy in th

environments of land, sea, and air warfare is the beginning of 

any study of the unique requirements of the American milita

ment. As such, that observation forms a point of departure for 

It is worth noting at this point that there is a downside in 

follow a broad-gauged approach to the study of comman

because command and control issues affect so much that is c

nation's military establishment, there is a significant leve

problem in any work such as this. 51 One could elevate the 

study to examine the issues of NATO command and control, 
pjg g

ners, aviators, and surface warfare officers, as the captains o

combatant ships are known, and even these classifications can 

broken down still further. The justification for rejecting these a

levels in order to focus on the services rests primarily on gr

historical continuity: it is the Army, the Navy, and, more recentl

Force, rather than supranational alliances or shifting subordinate g

that have fought our wars. They also provide the most 

continuous links to American societal values and therefore merit t

attention. 

A final limitation is suggested by the need to keep the search for 

continuity within manageable proportions even while depicting 

upon the evolution of modern command and control systems. 

reason, it is necessary to exclude detailed consideration of th

reform debate that culminated in the passage of the 1986 G

Nichols Reorganization Act. Although that effort provides a bac

much of what follows, the scope of the legislative enactmen

extraordinary outpouring of literature that accompanied the deba

that it should be a boundary and not a focal point of this study

that story and the impact the changes will have on the future ev

command and control are topics richly deserving separate conside
of 1812, and the Mexican War, as well as a ho

historians call lesser engagements. During each 

conflicts, the services confronted some profoundly 

circumstances. Their response took on the hard 

precedence, especially when it came to their 

command structures and the basic norms those 

embodied. Gradually, the weight of precedence it

basic organizational and even political directions for 

This chapter explores those realities in terms of co

perspectives, the evolution of different command s

each of the services, and the problems faced in tactica

and control during this period. The results of this e

development will be seen in a brief review of the Mex

Constitutional Imperatives 

If the Revolutionary experience provided stro

of the latent American ability for self-defense, then the 

of the Continentai Army and Navy under the 

Confederation provided an equally compelling coun

those security arrangements proved inadequate to 

British diplomatic intransigence and Indian proble

frontier. The Constitutional Convention was thus forc

a series of fundamentally important choices. In his c

on American civil-military relations, The Soldier an

Samuel P. Huntington provided an eloquent summa

mechanism set in place by the United States Con

ensure civilian control of the new military establishm

The Framers' concept of civilian control was t

the uses to which civilians might put military for

than to control the military themselves. They we

afraid of military power in the hands of political 

than of political power in the hands of military 

Unable to visualize a distinct military class, they c
of warfare in the nineteenth century. The Framers turned to 

experiences as citizen-soldiers in the Revolutionary War in se

appropriate model for the future. The citizen-soldier was t

Republic's unique substitute for a large standing army, the ver

which was anathema. Control of the minimal defense establishme

be divided between Congress and the president, as well as be

states and the federal government. In this division of power, Con

given three principal responsibilities: "To declare War . . . To 

support Armies . . . To provide and maintain a Navy." The pres

made commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United S

the states were to exercise control over their militias until such tim

were called to federal service. 2 

This separation of powers implied from the outset that civilia

would always be compromised in part because the military 

forced to serve two masters. In delineating this view, Huntington 

two models of civilian control: subjective and objective. Objectiv

isolates the military from society and sets limits on what it may 

not do. It assumes "the maximizing of military professionalism 

achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the mir

state. ''3 The Framers of the Constitution, however, adhered to the 

of subjective control, which presupposes the complete interpene

civil and military groups. Rather than standing apart from th

realm, the military is an integral part of it, fully participatin

give-and-take of a pluralistic, democratic society, civilian cont

assured in large measure by the intimacy of this social embrace. 4 

Subjective control was incorporated into those constitutional p

that formed the nexus of American civil-military relations. 

military would function as an organic part of society, they would 

to compete in the political arena along with other national e

interest groups, forwarding their own agendas, seeking allian

advancing their claims for public support. The dual controls pos

Congress and the presidency would reinforce the pluralistic natu

system, ensuring that future generations of military leaders woul

not just what to do but, to a significant degree, how to do it. 5 
state militias and the citizen-soldiers who composed them w

decisive weapons used to repel any future invader, very 

tradition of the Minutemen. Navies, by contrast, could hardly b

existence with the same rapidity, so that it was necessary 

"maintained" as a first line of defense for a country that 

looked to its maritime interests. Whatever permanent establis

required for these two autonomous organizations--and opi

considerably in both the Constitutional Convention and 

ratification conventions as to what those requirements shoul

clear that questions of resources, missions, organization

personnel would be debated in an atmosphere characterized 

able political scrutiny. 

It was precisely the vitality of those controls that Alexand

James Madison, and John Jay used as an argument in favo

Constitution. Hamilton, in particular, addressed himself to s

legislatures (that of New York under Governor George C

especially doubtful) by arguing that a small but permanent m

was essential not only to forestall pressures from neighborin

Spanish colonies but also to perform the everyday task 

garrisons on the western frontiers: 

These garrisons must either be furnished by occasional de

from the militia, or by permanent corps in the pay of the go

The first is impracticable; and if practicable, would be pern

The latter resource of permanent corps in the pay of the g

amounts to a standing army in time of peace; a small one, i

not the less real for being small. Here is a simple view of t

that shows us at once the impropriety of a constitutional i

of such establishments, and the necessity of leaving the ma

discretion and prudence of the legislature. 7 

Hamilton argued as well that the new Constitution containe

sufficient to enable Congress to be both discreet and prudent 

whatever forces would be required in peace or war. Those pr

assured legislative control of the purse strings would act to 

tendency to turn the Army into an agency of executive dom

threat to American liberties. 8 
almost the first century of its existence. Madison developed th

point that a navy would become an essential adjunct of 

diplomacy, thereby laying the ideological groundwork for a m

Navy would acquire during the second century of its existence: 

of power. I° Probably the most ingenious rationale for a navy, 

was written by Hamilton in Number 11 of The Federalist when he 

the notion of maritime commerce to embrace the role each of th

of the new Union could play in building and provisioning 

happens, indeed, that different portions of confederated Americ

each some peculiar advantage for this essential establishment." 

wood could be a prime source of naval stores, the Middle Sta

produce iron for fixtures and weapons, and the sailors themsel

"chiefly be drawn from the Northern hive. ''11 Although this vie

Navy as an agency of national integration can be taken at face v

does not have to embrace Charles A. Beard's economic interpr

the Constitution to read between Hamilton's well-crafted lines. 12 I

navy was justifiable as a fundamental source of national secu

there was no reason a relatively permanent naval establishment s

also be an important source of economic strength throughout t

Not only could a navy protect American commercial interests ab

its very existence would help promote them at home. 

To summarize the effect of these constitutional perspective

question of service autonomy: 

1. The language of the Constitution provided a basic division 

that was fundamentally important for the subsequent organizati

armed forces of the United States. The Army and Navy were to b

from the outset, separate organizations set up to fulfill different 

Although they were not well articulated at the time, both functio

on a common set of strategic assumptions that emphasized A

insularity and its geographic isolation from powerful adversaries. 

factors of insularity and isolation, it was expected by the Framer

Navy would function as a kind of maritime police force in peace a

line of defense in war. That first line was expected to capitaliz

factors of geography in order to allow sufficient time for t
power, the Army was to be the essential instrument for 

continental security and facilitating expansion. 

2. The difference of functions between the Army and the N

different assessment of the threat each posed to the fabric 

civil liberties. Precisely because the Navy was to have the bulk 

abroad, it does not seem to have been perceived as pos

comparable to that which was implicit in standing armie

defended the necessity of a navy and some questioned 

involved, but the only ideological cast to the debate seems t

from spokesmen such as Patrick Henry, who considered all 

"instruments of imperial ambition. ''is In contrast, the Army's 

to exert territorial control at home, a capability that, if not f

against, could easily become perverted by executive do

personal ambition. These different functions led advoca

Hamilton, Madison, and Jay to defend the military and nav

ments on different constitutional grounds. The unifying fa

course, that both services were to be completely subordin

authority. 14 

3. Service functions were drawn with different views of 

self-interest. The Navy's mission of protecting maritime co

status in a seafaring nation where the line between commerci

establishments was oRen blurred, and the relative perman

shipyards and shore installations combined to give it a role th

the constitutional purposes both of the "Common Defense" 

"General Welfare." The Army's functions were much narrow

the time it was not to exist in any great numbers nor was it to 

with weapons requiring great public expenditures (harbor 

being the exception). It would usually comprise a series of iso

garrison forces, which differed from the rest of pioneer soc

degree. Although the pork barrel would not be unknown in e

the intimate relationship between commercial and naval in

placed nautical questions high on the political agenda. 
of the Army and the Navy. It was during this formative period as 

the services made a series of fundamental organizational choices 

only confirmed and advanced their separate identities but also 

underlying differences in the way they viewed the essential 

functions of command and staff. Those subtle but profound differe

an important effect on the way each service confronted the 

brought about by the increasing complexity of warfare. These res

turn affected both the nature of their individual command struc

their overall relationship with each other. 

It is ironic that many of these decisions seem to fit an evo

pattern as the services charted courses that were separate but 

parallel. Indeed, they had begun that evolution in the same organ

cocoon, since Congress had created the War Department in 

charged it with responsibility for both Army and Navy functions. 

due less to a perceived need for unified strategy than to the simple 

the ships of the Revolutionary Navy had all been sunk, auctione

otherwise disposed of. It was not until 1798, when the country stoo

brink of an undeclared naval war with France, that Congress c

separate Department of the Navy. By inaugurating these two 

Congress completed the first evolutionary step originally envis

Federalists such as Hamilton: executive authority concentrated in 

cabinet officer heading each department and being directly respo

the president as commander in chief. By this legislative enactm

constitutional precept of civilian control had now been welded int

chains of command that linked the nation's military and nav

directly to civil authority. 15 

This was an organizational move of some significance, especi

affected the formation of corporate norms by which the Army a

would translate the overall value of autonomy. As a modern naval 

put it, the legislation ensured that "control of naval operations [w

directly under the nation's Cormnander-in-Chief rather than thr

War Department--thus providing some insurance against the 

effects suffered by other nations when naval operations h

subordinated to land warfare and sea power objectives were ignore
ments of "providing and maintaining" naval forces. The Army d

to have taken as strong an ideological position on the same is

because its status had already been secured not only through c

but also by the constant necessity of providing forces on the 

contrast, the Navy would look back on the period of subordinat

of extreme weakness in the face of increasing provocation from 

maritime foes, especially the British. The separate status ach

Navy by 1798 would indeed allow insufficient time for a 

maritime strength before the War of 1812 brought about a 

blockade even more devastating than that of the Revolutio

should be noted, however, that the creation of separate dep

War and Navy placed the president in his role as commande

the position of being the sole officer of the government re

reconciling whatever different approaches these organizations 

grappling with the problems of national security. 

If the establishment of separate departments for the Arm

represented a victory for Hamiltonian concepts of adminis

these ideas stood in some contrast to another intellectual 

American life that had an equal or greater impact on milita

organizations throughout much of the nineteenth century

summarized the key distinctions between Hamiltonian rationa

more democratic impulses of the Jeffersonian tradition: 

liberals, Jefferson had little interest in or use for regular m

and he had no recognition of the emerging character of 

military officership." Instead, military service was seen to be 

obligation of a democratic society. When called to arms, the c

would be led by a small cadre of officers who were essenti

specialists in areas such as seamanship or engineering that 

tied to the comparable civilian occupations of a develo

society--and not at all to a higher military science or con

Although both the Jeffersonian and the Hamiltonian tradition

idealized conceptions that were never entirely achieved, the 

this "military technicism" would be a pervasive counterpoint 

of"military professionalism" throughout much of the nineteen
nature, and it is a common characteristic for both to have a 

established system of rank and organization designed to establish the 

of authority from highest to lowest. There is, however, a disce

difference between the Army and the Navy in the way that militar

naval staffs evolved, although commanders in both services 

organization as a basic tool to gain control over the increasing num

activities that were becoming adjuncts of modern warfare. 

Whereas the naval staff remained rudimentarY well into the nine

centurY, the growth and sophistication of the military staff is a story 

deeply intertwined with the history of the U.S. Army. The Army share

characteristic with the professional military establishments of most m

countries, a brotherhood that traces a common lineage back to the 

beginnings of the profession of arms. In the opening to his history

Military Staff." Its History and Development, Gen. J. D. Hittle s

"When some unknown warrior chief asked for help or advice from o

his co-belligerents, militarY history saw the first functioning of the m

staff. ''18 This thought captures the essence of the military staf

extension of the leader's span of control through officers who assist h

carrying out the functions of command. The translation of his inte

into actions, orders, and operations is a basic function of the military 

so basic that it is known in most armies as the "staff action cycle." 

cycle operates as a continuum, in which staff members gather the 

information on which the commander's decisions are based, write the 

that will carry out his orders, and supervise their eventual executio

short, the military staff is one of the most basic methods for comman

control, both as an organization embodying the personality o

commander and as an extension of the means by which his forces are 

control led.I 9 

Historically, three conditions, ot~en related, have made it necessary 

commander's reach to be extended: the size of the force, its opera

characteristics, and its functional complexity. The first is relat

numbers: armies are essentially mass organizations of armed men 

triumph in battle over other mass organizations of armed men. Alth

victory is not always a function of size, there is a strong presumptio

more is better---or as Napoleon put it, "God is on the side of the b
assured, he found it necessary to set up "captains over tho

captains over hundreds" in order to prevail. 2° Such systems we

throughout the history of warfare, and it often happened tha

commanders as a group would become the sovereign's cou

thereby arranging themselves into an informal kind of staff. 21 

The second condition has concemed the different operationa

istics of subordinate echelons. In the nineteenth and twentieth c

principle of combined arms was elevated into one of the h

modern warfare, but ancient armies incorporated the same ide

heavy and light infantry formations, often in conjunction with 

cavalry. These varied capabilities, however, created increased d

the extension of personal control by the commander, and so h

retinue sometimes shouldered these burdens in an elementary 

labor. The military system Alexander the Great inherited fro

Macedon was the most advanced of its day, with a staff that 

hospital, commissary, and engineer functions. As various 

activities became important to warfare--Alexander, for exampl

early form of ballistae, or missile-throwing catapults, to cov

crossings--it was natural for staff form to follow function as t

were given supervisory responsibility for them. Similarl

subordinate echelon had capabilities or a mission requiring i

independently---cavalry is an obvious example--it was accep

for the commander's most trusted subordinate to be placed in ch

The need to extend command authority brought about by fo

operational characteristics often contributed to the third factor

complexity. The larger the force and the more varied its 

operating characteristics, the more complex were the tasks 

support and operational employment. A fundamental tension aro

need to achieve greater efficiency by delegating functions and t

to retain overall operational control. Since a division of labor 

lead to a division of authority, the usual answer was for com

keep the reins of control in their own hands insofar as ci

allowed. Like the ideas of concentration of forces and combine

principle of unity of command was followed as an instinctive 
mechanisms for such support, the development of modem warfare 

the most profound pressures for the growth of the military staff. 23 

By the end of the seventeenth century, the rise of the nation-s

resulted in the creation of armies numbering in the hundreds of th

whose sheer size created logistical difficulties that simple plun

pillage would not resolve. 24 The staff system pioneered by the 

king Gustavus Adolphus was one response to these unpre

demands, but it was the genius of Frederick the Great that bro

military staff to an equally unprecedented level of efficiency. On

most notable achievements, and an important step toward 

organization, was the development of the quartermaster-general's 

logistic post he expanded to embrace the functions of reconn

intelligence, and operations. Although the post's evolution would 

completed under Frederick, the gathering of the three functions in 

staff officer eventually led to that position becoming institutiona

"chief of staff," both in fact and in name. During the French Re

that nation became the first to create the office, and in the afterma

Napoleonic Wars, most European armies followed France's exa

this and other refinements of the staff system, Frederick the Gre

pioneer, striking a new balance between the continuing need for 

command and the requirement to extend that authority throu

military machine grown more complex than ever before. 25 

In a curious way, Frederick's innovations also imparted a s

foundation to the revolutionary army that was about to be born on 

continent. This cross-cultural influence occurred primarily thro

efforts of one man, Baron Friedrieh yon Steuben, who 

Washington's inspector general and drilhnaster to the Continent

during the winter of 1777-78. Von Steuben was a product 

Frederickian system, having served in the Prussian army for m

twenty years in both field and staff assignments. His influence 

American military experience was to have a lasting impact; as Vi

pointed out, he "established the disciplinary pattern for the U.S

which survives today. ''26 He also organized Washington's head

including the establishment of operations and intelligence section
remarkable letter to Secretary of War James McHenry whic

the importance he had come to attach to the smooth func

military staff and his concern that lessons learned in the Revo

forgotten by subsequent administrations. He went into so

discussing the duties of "the Inspector General, Quarterma

Adjutant General and officers commanding the corps of ar

engineers," who are important because of "the nature of the

offices and from their being always about the Commander in 

obliged to intrust many things to them confidentially [so that] 

movement can take place without their knowledge." His clos

would become something of a legacy: "The appointment of ge

is important, but those of the general staff all important. ''28 

Although the general staff concept that Washington had in 

less ambitious than that which later prevailed in European 

advice was not without consequence. By 1798, the War Depa

was organized along the functional lines suggested by 

eventually including departments of Quartermaster, Inspec

Adjutant General, Paymaster General, and Surgeon General. 

organization of the Army also reveals the extent to which it ha

other instinctive principles of land warfare as well. Gen. An

was named to lead the field army that had been called into se

to deal with the Indians of the northwestern frontier. His 

marked the second time Congress vested such authority in a s

leader, thus showing that the precedent by which Was

exercised unity of command over the Continental Army ha

model for the future. Eventually the service's senior general a

title of commanding general of the army, an office that persi

twentieth century. Wayne's tenure was also remarkable for 

convert the entire organization of the field army into a "legion

of regiments of the three combat branches of infantry, cavalry, 

Although the legion structure, which provided for the tactical 

the three branches, would not long survive once the immediat

Northwest had been resolved, its establishment was sign

importance of combined arms in land warfare had becom
against the Barbary pirates, only three were built, and the Navy suff

more neglect under the administration of Thomas Jefferson. The 

1812 was fought under the same approximate conditions of naval i

that had prevailed during the Revolution. Not even some sp

victories in isolated ship-to-ship actions could mask the fact that th

naval blockade "annihilated our maritime commerce, all but paral

economic life of the country, and laid the seaboard open to invasion. 

This is not to suggest that there were no parallels between the in

behavior of land and sea forces in terms of the three principle

above which placed a premium on the extension of the comm

control; but such parallels as existed were less important th

fundamental differences. At the most basic level, concentration o

could not have much meaning when the entire American Navy con

fifteen seaworthy frigates, as it did at the start of the War of 18

British Navy was long accustomed to operating in flotillas and fl

American ships typically sailed alone or in a squadron of two 

vessels. There was consequently little need for an extensiv

command structure. 31 

The structure that did exist resided primarily in the person of th

captain, whose authority over his vessel and crew was absolu

should not, however, casually equate this concept with the idea of 

command as it existed on land. Whereas land warfare by now fe

military hierarchy in which the authority of the command

disseminated through the staff and subordinate echelons, th

centralized authority at a much lower level: the ship's qua

Although shipboard organization commonly featured different dep

for navigation, gunnery, and sailing, each of these functions too

under the firm control of the vessel's captain. There was 

counterpart to the concept of combined arms, although the exis

different ship types would later provide a sort of rough equi

Without the demands raised by large numbers and varied capabilit

not surprising that the naval command structure was uncomplicated

The unitary command at ship level was mirrored in the rud

organization of the Navy ashore. Following the creation of th
technical and military, from experts of both classes; but func

yet differentiated into organization, and he not only was resp

but had to give personal attention to various and trivial ma

diverse character, which overburdened him by their mass, a

concentration of attention upon the really great matters of his o

The War of 1812 brought about changes in the organizatio

Navy and the War departments as the nation tried to cope with 

of fighting what amounted to a second revolutionary war. The 

also the first real test of the military system set up by the Con

the results were far from encouraging. Naval weakness was m

Regular Army which could not be quickly expanded from 

strength of 6,700 men to the 35,000 authorized by Congress s

the outbreak of hostilities. The militia system would p

troublesome, with the governors of Connecticut and Massachu

refusing to provide their states' quotas of militia to augmen

force. 33 No single event of that war, however, provided better 

military and naval weakness of the United States than the sa

nation's capital in 1814 by British forces who had landed with 

opposition and routed a hastily assembled force of American 

the Battle of Bladensburg. The battle was remarkable in that Pr

Monroe, Secretary of War John Armstrong, and other cabi

directly involved themselves throughout the course of a thoroug

operation, utterly subverting whatever control could have been 

the local commander--a hapless brigadier named William Win

been chosen because he was a relative of the governor of Mary

therefore useful "in mitigating the opposition to the war. ''34 

In response to these and other deficiencies, Congress took 

during and shortly after the war to improve the organizational 

the Army and the Navy. In 1813, Congress passed a law that 

the General Staff by setting up a Topographical Departm

departments of the Adjutant General, Inspector General, Surg

and Apothecary General. Equally significant was the refin

secretary's power over these officers, including the autho

regulations to guide their functions and powers. 35 Congress 
with his responsibilities as secretary. Eventually, this centraliza

authority took on the structural form that became known as the 

bureau system. Although it was an important milestone in the devel

of a professional army, the bureau system contained an inherent we

it "meant dividing the management of the Army into specialized se

with the General Staff not so much a coherent entity as a collec

varied experts. It also left unclear the relationship between th

headquarters in Washin~on and the line officers in the military d

into which the country was divided. ''36 

Other important changes brought about by Calhoun's admini

included legislative recognition of the post of conunanding general 

Army in 1821 and the retention of a force structure that enab

Regular Army to maintain its peacetime stren~h at the unprecedente

of six to twelve thousand officers and men. The net effect of Ca

efforts was thus to give the Army a structural framework with w

would operate for the balance of the century, these refinements 

further indicator of the Army's instinctive preference for hiera

organizational patterns. 37 

The Navy's organizational structure also underwent a significant 

in the aftermath of the War of 1812 when a Board of Navy Commis

was established by Congress in 1815. The board, consisting of thr

captains--senior captains or those exercising major command

appointed by the president and attached to the secretary's offic

legislative objective was to "devolve technical detail with a mea

administrative responsibility on [these] selected officers, without 

same time relinquishing civilian control over policy. ''38 It is a trui

civilian control has meant different things at different times to d

people, for shortly after the board's creation, a dispute broke out b

the secretary and the commissioners over the right to contro

movements and naval personnel. The president eventually had to int

and thereatter the secretary's functions included the oversight 

operations and discipline of the Navy, while the commissioners c

themselves to providing technical advice regarding its civil fun

docks, shipyards, and the like. Although this seems an odd reversal 
impossible for him to manage the former. ''39 

This organizational initiative on the part of the Navy pro

contrast to the Army General Staff, which in the same 

progressed much further in bringing different functions into it

of command, an integration that also permitted its top staff o

degree of latitude in running their bureaus. The Navy 

altogether more austere: its three commissioners had no suc

tion in their responsibilities and their functions remained pure

nature. A further contrast can be seen in the fact that, b

Calhoun's incumbency in 1825, the General Staff had achieve

nearly definitive that no essential changes were needed, even 

the shock of the Civil War... and it long served as the mod

other departments were patterned. '~4° By 1829, the Navy c

were confronting the tasks of protecting the rapid expansion 

maritime commerce and experimenting with steam-powered 

numbers and complexity these new tasks were so demanding t

soon found itself in danger of being--to use the approp

metaphor--swamped. The solution would have pleased von 

board was kept as before, but now its members subdivided th

that each member, giving particular attention to the branch 

him, perform[ed] his own part in the most satisfactory manner

Although it is not clear that the Navy was consciously 

trail blazed by Army organizational growth--as Calhoun

seemingly implied--by 1842 the maritime service had its 

system. Although differentiation of function had permitt

commissioners to work somewhat more efficiently than befo

of the Navy Abel P. Upshur entered upon his office in 1841 

reported to Congress: 

I have had but a short experience in this department, b

experience is enough to display its defects, even to 

superficial observation. It is, in truth, not organized at all. 

to be performed must, under any circumstances, be 

onerous, but it is rendered doubly so by the want of 

arrangement and distribution of duties. At present a m
p, y p

recommending legislation to set up a bureau system within the N

Congress eventually approved five bureaus: Navy-Yards and Do

Construction, Equipment, and Repair; Provisions and Clothing; Ordn

and Hydrography; and Medicine and Surgery. 43 Congress did 

however, approve Upshur's recommendation that the bureau chiefs als

collectively constituted as a kind of corporate board of directors to 

secretary. The lawmakers' reasoning on this point is not well covere

the standard naval histories, but the reorganization was part of a W

naval program that had proposed the appropriation of the unheard-of 

of $8.5 million for the construction of new ships in the wake of 

Anglo-American naval scare of 1840. The Whig program provoked a 

of sectional clashes, and the result, inevitably, was a compromise tha

somewhat short of the original proposal. Upshur's plan for the bu

chiefs to function as a rough kind of General Staff may have been 

aspect of that compromise, possibly because Congress preferred to 

with the several bureau chiefs rather than with one collective w

especially when any expansion of the Navy meant a burst of constru

funds to be distributed through the nation's yards, docks, and constit

cies. Commenting on the aftermath of this legislative fight, the Spr

history of naval policy states: 

A wide geographical distribution of naval patronage and oth

spoils was to become the established and accepted method o

securing the majorities necessary to pass naval bills. Selecting nav

personnel on a geographical basis, pouring public funds in

superfluous or poorly located navy yards and other equipment, ofte

paying exorbitant prices for inferior labor and materials, all for th

purpose of promoting the political fortunes of Senators an

Representatives, were to become distinguishing characteristics o

naval legislation---characteristics which have persisted down to th

present day. 44 

The Navy was left with an organizational structure that rou

paralleled its sister service, but stopped short of achieving the l

potential of such a system for functional integration. The Army's Gen

Staff at this time also fell far short of that potential, but the failur
bureaucracy, the political leadership of the civilian executiv

representative function and legislative power of Congress." 

problem also existed in the Army: service autonomy had now 

pair of separate but congruent Iron Triangles. 45 

Command and Control Perspectives 

to the Mid.Nineteenth Century 

The middle part of the nineteenth century was in man

classic age of command and control because the technology us

movements of forces on land and at sea had not materially ch

ancient times. 46 By the 1850s, the steamboat, the railroad, an

the telegraph were ushering in a dimension of strategic control 

have profound effects on both service autonomy and th

autonomy of commanders in the field. It is useful, therefore, to 

baseline against which to compare the changes that will be 

later. 

Classical command and control can also be thought of as 

command and control" because it typically represented the 

single commander to extend his ability to control events on a ba

ability that was subject to the physical limits of terrain, comm

and weaponry: "Napoleon's control of the course of battle at 

Waterloo [1815] was scarcely greater, or less, than that of Mar

Blenheim, a century before, or that of Alexander at Arbela, 

centuries earlier. Each commander, on each occasion, could 

the battlefield. ''47 If the commander's line of sight repre

prevailing reality of tactical command, then attempts to extend 

sight have represented a large part of tactical control 

throughout the history of warfare. Visual distance and the 

extend it were the common concerns of both military 

commanders. Alexander's need to see the battlefield at Arbel

was basic to the commitment of his reserves, and naval history 

even earlier example of the practice at the Battle of Salamis 

when Timon of Athens threw his cloak over the side of his fl

signaling the Greek fleet to turn and ram the enemy. 48 
scene at about the same time that black powder was cloudi

battlefield more than ever.) Therefore, visual signals were 

augmented by audible signals, such as drums, trumpets, march ca

and, later, signal cannons. Although these devices could exte

commander's ability to direct movements, they usually did not m

basic communication requirement for an effective two-way f

information. That task was most often the function of the cou

messenger, who could be used for effective tactical communication 

the combat force and could bridge the gap to whatever strategi

existed. History's best-known example of the strategic use of a cour

the anonymous runner sent by Miltiades to Athens to inform the cou

the Greek victory at Marathon. 49 

Visual signals were the prime medium used for the control o

movements from antiquity through the nineteenth century. Bonfir

example, served as beacons along the English coast to warn 

approach of the Spanish Armada, and Queen Elizabeth's naval com

ers used the placement of the Cross of St. George on different ma

signaling device at sea. s° The flag signal system, incorporating 

range of pendants and codes, eventually became the primary comm

tions system during the age of sail. Flags and pennants were repe

each ship in the battle line, both to acknowledge receipt of a messa

to pass it on to other ships farther away. This system was adequate 

generally slow pace of daily sailing, but far more problematic at n

bad weather, or in the heat of battle when flags were obscured by 

smoke. Naval commanders, then, shared the line-of-sight limitation 

land army counterparts, even though the line of sight on the oce

likely to be greater than on land, owing to the absence of inte

terrain features. 51 

In the matter of strategic connectivity, naval forces presented an int

contrast to armies. Although transportation by sea was faster than 

and it was often possible to use sailing ships as courier vessels, the

no reliable means of communication with a ship once it was out of 

the shore. Oceans being vast and uninhabited, the only alternative 

rely on the ship's captain to carry out whatever sailing instructio
g

If the essential test of any command structure is how 

carries out the operational missions of the force that is to be 

then this quaintly decentralized system worked rather well. A

of 1812, the Navy embarked upon a long period of gradual 

growth as it assisted in the opening of new markets 

commerce, patrolled the seas in search of pirates, slavers, an

and in general began to fulfill the role that Hamilton and oth

had foreseen. These recurring missions in turn led to the 

permanent squadrons, not only in American home waters, bu

Mediterranean (1815), the Pacific (1821), one each in the Gu

and the Caribbean Sea (1822), and one in the South Atlanti

always, there was a downside. These widely scattered responsi

not be easily met by a Navy that was still small by European 

most naval deployments consisted of either a single ship or a 

two to three vessels operating under the nominal command 

captain. The dispersion of ships was matched by the simpli

administration ashore, which still lacked any semblance 

organization, a deficiency that "unquestionably retarded the 

of the Navy into a synchronized fighting machine .... In 

there was little opportunity for the larger group operations 

weld the individual ships into squadrons in fact as well as nam

There is little to distinguish the command and control meas

the American Army in both the Revolution and the War of 181

commonly used by other armies of the period, the major differ

the difficulties of communication imposed upon land forces oper

was still largely a wilderness with few well-maintained roads. 

limitations upon commanders' lines of sight tended to make 

battlefield control problematic, so that engagements were mos

relatively restricted frontages; at Germantown, for example, 

fought the entire battle in an area less than five miles wide. 

conditions, the use of couriers was the only realistic pos

long-distance communications being sent by water whenever pos

The basic unit of control in the American Army was the 

five hundred to seven hundred men, which in both the Revol
dictated by the maximum effective range of the smoothbore 

Volleys would be exchanged between the opposing lines until one g

the other broke and ran, most often as the result of the reserves 

cavalry being committed at some critical juncture. The leveled bayo

the victorious infantry formation would then add to the incentive 

losing side to flee the battlefield, turning defeat into rout. The pro

control, however, was no less a problem for the victorious side, sinc

lines and communication with subordinate commanders would 

disappear once the forces closed with each other. Under those con

it is not hard to see why it was often difficult or impossible to achi

sort of follow-up to exploit a tactical victory. 54 

Strategic control of the American Army was not an apparent p

during the Revolution, with a chain of command extending fr

Continental Congress through its Board of War to the person of 

Washington as commanding general. The physical proximity 

nation's political leadership to the theater of operations was a pe

problem for the survival of the new republic, but it greatly simpli

process by which Congress would direct the war, George Washi

correspondence being ample proof that he did not feel deprived of 

control. 

The War of 1812 provided extremes of strategic control, one 

which could be seen in the presidential supervision of combat op

previously mentioned at the Battle of Bladensburg. Monroe's ab

intervene in this fashion was again a function, however unhappily

physical proximity to the scene of the action. At more extended 

strategic control over land forces was as disjointed as it was at s

prior to the outbreak of war in 1812, Brig. Gen. William Hull wa

command in the Northwest because he had been a dashing soldier 

the Revolution, but, as the U.S. Army's official history notes, "by th

age and its infirmities had made him cautious and timid. ''55 Not k

that war had been declared, he sent his military equipment to the W

ship, only to have it captured by the British who had known for two 

that hostilities had commenced. The cause of the fiasco was that 

dispatched to Hull by the War Department had been sent in care 
action and recalled them: "They returned just in time to su

Hull's entire force. ''56 

As severe as Hull's difficulties were, they are overshadowe

known example of the problem of strategic control at extended 

Battle of New Orleans. Gen. Andrew Jackson won a brilliant 

on January 8, 1815, some two weeks following the signing of 

Ghent which ended the war. 57 

The Army that presided over the next thirty years of peace 

fought major engagements against the Seminoles in Florida a

Sac and Fox Indians under Chief Black Hawk. Indian fig

frontier, like other forms of irregular warfare, called for 

autonomy on the part of battlefield commanders like Jackson

tactical autonomy of the field commander was such a we

norm that Jackson complained bitterly to the president w

occasion, the headquarters secretariat bypassed the usu

command and reassigned one of his officers without prior n

Apart from dealing with major Indian uprisings, the Army 

occupied with policing the frontier. Its strength in the years 

Treaty of Ghent and the outbreak of the Mexican War varied 

of 5,702 in 1828 to a high of 12,330 during the Anglo-Amer

1840. In 1821, its structure had been cut to a total of seven 

infantry and four regiments of artillery, with the result that i

with the integrated movement of mass formations (such as i

fall into disuse. As was the case with its sister service, peaceti

would not contribute to wartime effectiveness. 59 

The following points summarize the similarities and 

affecting the command and control of the Army and Navy: 

1. Tactical command and control measures generally were 

to the size and capabilities of armies fighting on battlefield

small by today's standards. The great limiting factor, both in 

elsewhere, was the commander's line of sight. Within that ra

means of control were reasonably effective; they were less 

proportion to the range at which visual control diminished. 

limits, however, commanders had a wide range of options for 
The complexity of naval command and control lies in the fa

the naval commander has neither opportunity nor capabili

interject his personality upon some specific segment of his com

in combat. It is not uncommon for a ground-force commander t

one of his subordinate units during a moment of crisis. The 

commander, until a few years ago, carried his flag in one 

combat units of his battle line .... Once combat was joined, ther

the naval commander was confined to that particular unit and 

its fortunes~is ability to control the action limited to 

communications. 60 (Emphasis added) 

2. Strategic control during this period was a function of dista

Army, having been constrained to fight some of its most 

engagements on its own soil in relative proximity to the 

government, generally operated with a higher degree of effective 

control (sometimes bordering on outright interference) than was 

with the Navy. Both because of its small size during this pe

because there were no effective methods to extend strategic con

the horizon, the Navy developed an extremely decentralized p

command and control that can be characterized as tactical a

tempered by strategic review. A parallel can be seen, however, w

elements fighting on the frontier; because they were operatin

obstacles and at great distances, they were at least as remote as a

force. They tended, therefore, to be equally autonomous in tactical 

making, yet quite as subject to subsequent strategic review of their 

3. The investiture of a significant degree of authority in the p

the on-scene commander was an essential feature of the classi

command and control, extending across both naval and land force

the factors of distance and the relative inability of prevailing com

tions to span that distance in a timely fashion, there was simply 

alternative except to work through the officers placed in tactical c

It was possible to relieve and censure the incompetent, and 

possible to second-guess the competent; but there was little opport

personal intervention upon command authority, and where the op

did exist and was taken, the results were not encouraging. Writi

years later about such a historical incident during the classic 
tactical autonomy bequeathed by the classic era of command an

Meeting the Test: Command Structure in the 

Mexican War 

Although the Mexican War of 1846-48 did not produc

changes in the command structures the Army and Navy had s

in the nineteenth century, it is a good example of how tho

functioned under the stress of combat. The outcome was a m

of American arms, enlarging the country's sovereignty by over 

square miles and thereby bringing about a continental dimension 

tasks of national security. The war was the first not to be foug

American soil, the first to feature an amphibious operation 

bined forces of the Army and the Navy, and the first to feature 

invasion--which compelled the surrender of the enemy's nat

and led to the attainment of the war's original political objecti

also showed that service autonomy had resulted in the growt

mature military establishment than the country had had befo

was capable of putting into the field a force of over twenty th

and transporting it more than five hundred miles into enem

while supplying it and providing strategic direction over its mo

In this last regard, President James K. Polk played an 

proving "that a President could run a war." If service au

created strong but separate military and naval organizations, P

that his constitutional and legal role as chief executive was c

unify their efforts: "It had been demonstrated that a civilian co

chief could and did function effectively as the single center f

authorization, coordination and in lesser degree for control 

military and naval effort. All lines concentrated in the White 

Thus was achieved a genuine unity of command . . . that s

keeping in coordination the various movements in the field. ''62 

Polk achieved this unity of command by using his ca

executive sounding board for all the important decisions 

"strategic plans, instructions to diplomats, blockade rules
invasion. The President remarked that he had supposed the Secre

War and Navy to be continuously in conference to coordi

movements of their respective forces, and Secretary Mason

mortified, left the room to hasten the movement of his ships. ''64 

It is not at all clear just how the secretary proposed to bring a

haste, given the general difficulty of controlling naval movements 

specific problem of getting messages from the capital to the 

operations--two to three weeks away by steamer. It is clear, howe

coordination at the top was inadequate. The Navy's bureaus wer

not chartered to act as a corporate body. The Army bureaus pe

their assigned administrative functions well enough, but were 

unable to come together to assist in the planning of strategy or op

those responsibilities fell almost solely to Winfield Scott, then co

ing general of the army. Although Scott was equal to the task, ther

institutional body below the level of the cabinet to translate 

objectives into strategic plans or to coordinate the movements 

expeditionary forces. And when General Scott left Washin

command the invasion of Mexico in 1847, "a one-man general st

way to none at all" as the president, the secretary of war, and th

chiefs became the Army's "headquarters. '~5 

Coordination in the field was much better: relations between t

and ground force commanders were generally excellent although m

some incidents that shed light on both the past and the future. Th

having concentrated one of the largest flotillas in its history, com

the sea, cutting Mexico off from foreign suppliers and suppor

Army's movements ashore. The largest of these movements com

with the amphibious landing at Vera Cruz referred to above. That o

which took place under the watchful eyes of nearby British, Fren

Spanish naval vessels, was unopposed by the Mexicans but still a 

success by any standard. Ten thousand troops were landed in fou

debarked from the transporting ships by sixty-five heavy surf boat

were then towed to shore by steamers. Once ashore, Scott found 

artillery was not adequate to reduce the walls of the town's fort

requested that the flotilla commander, Commodore Matthew C
y, , 

flotilla operating under conditions quite as remote and decentr

in the service's history. Shortly atter the war began, S

instructed to seize control of the California coastline and as 

interior of the territory as was practicable. At this moment, ho

John C. Fr6mont entered Monterey at the head of an irregular 

as the California Battalion and became embroiled in a 

Stockton as to which of them would exercise overall co

agreement was eventually reached that allowed Fr6mon

operational control over the Army contingent while Stockt

overall authority. 67 

This agreement was successful in that the two small forces 

subdue most of the California territory (although the achie

mitigated by the fact that resistance was light). It was less suc

Gen. Stephen W. Kearny arrived with his Army of the West to 

of the occupation under the terms of a presidential directive, 

that Stockton refused to recognize his authority. The situat

resolved until the arrival of Stockton's replacement in 1847. 68 

Neither of these incidents, of course, affected the outcome 

and it is possible to ascribe both of them to personality 

perhaps aggravated by the uncertainties of new situations. A 

however, suggests that whatever impact personalities may h

almost certainly secondary to the accumulated effects of a ha

more of service autonomy. Separate service organizations, f

and then de jure, had developed around a basic division of 

service faced severe challenges in coping with its unique 

environment, and each developed a certain body of instinctive 

those challenges. Not the least of the differences that natural

was a disparity in perspective regarding command relationship

approach was built around the principles of mass, subord

concentration of force. It stressed a strictly hierarchical orga

distributed the commander's authority through the ranks and e

pyramiding control structure that enabled him to intervene pe

directly as the tactical situation required. The Navy approach w

outset, far more federal in character, not only because of t
certain norms regarding command and expectations of w

appropriate and what was not in exercising the attendant means o

The Navy under Perry was operating under conditions of strateg

much like what the Army had been accustomed to from the beginn

several weeks separated the dispatch of messages from the seat o

ment from their arrival at the theater of operations. That fact, a

the strong coordination requirements imposed by President Po

observation by foreign rivals, and, above all, the presence of th

worked to ensure that cooperation between Scott and Perry w

consistently strong--and that the only matter of contention would 

and quickly put behind them. 

The ground forces under Fremont and Kearny were, in 

operating under conditions of strategic control that had almo

characterized naval operations: Kearny at San Diego was making 

that were every bit as remote from White House supervision as th

by Preble, Bainbridge, and Decatur at Tripoli a generation earlier. 

two services thus operating under conditions of the most relaxed 

control, it is not surprising that a conflict over command sho

developed. It is interesting, not to say ironic, that the method c

resolving what was essentially a competition over the norms of s

tion and control was a formula roughly corresponding to the arr

characterizing today's unified and component commands. G

Navy's ideas about subordination in general, it is also not surpr

even this agreement would come to an end when it appeared t

forces would be subjected to the "unified command" of Genera

Without the pressure of a military threat, acrimony was pr

Stockton and Kearny were, after all, the local representative

similar but autonomous organizations; those institutions shared a 

purpose with respect to the nation's defense, but they were matur

different political and operational conditions. Those differenc

become more rather than less profound as the nation, follo

triumphs in Mexico and California, drifted uneasily toward the Civ
quarters of a century of the nation's existence, b

markedly during the three major wars fought betwe

1921. The Civil War, the Spanish-American War

War I eventually resulted in the adoption of the 

mutual cooperation--a descriptive and prescriptive 

proper exercise of operations whenever both se

involved. Equally significant during this period was 

of command and control in both the tactical and str

as the telegraph and the wireless ushered in the age 

munications. The integration of these systems into 

apparatus of both services was one aspect of the att

control of the enormous complexities that technolo

brought to warfare during the nineteenth century. 

the growth of staffs which brought about during th

Army General Staff and a comparable structure in t

the Chief of Naval Operations. 

These developments took place against a backdro

to understand the principles of warfare, in both thei

and their application, on land and sea. Strategic th

nineteenth century arose from the teachings of A

Jomini but would, in the development of its Americ

embrace two competing paradigms--that offered b

Clausewitz with its prescriptions for land warfare 

Alfred Thayer Mahan with his classic analysis of th

of seapower. The final result of these develo

extension of battlefield control, the development of 

staff arrangements, and the existence of two related 

strategic paradigms---constituted the next stage in th

service autonomy, which would be increasingly c

the nature of warfare changed in the twentieth centur
attached himself to Napoleons staff, lived to the age 

(1779-1869) and exercised a pervasive influence as the chro

interpreter of the emperor's campaigns. His Precis de I'art de 

was published in a complete edition in 1838, and was both a 

those Continental wars and an attempt to deduce from the

immutable principles of strategy. His was the first modem 

attempted such a systematic approach. In it he set forth four bas

of strategic planning: 

1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, suc

upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also 

communications of the enemy as much as possible without com

one's own. 

2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with t

one's forces. 

3. On the battlefield, to throw the mass of the forces upon th

point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is o

importance to overthrow. 

4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown 

decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and wit

If the objective of warfare was the concentration of mass at 

critical point, then what determined where that point existed

argued that strategic points might be geographical, such as a mou

or the confluence of two rivers; they might be political centers; t

be established incidentally as armies maneuvered in relation to 

of communication; or they might be sites that held a political si

for countries allied in a war. Capturing these critical points, or p

the enemy from doing so, ought to be the objective of strategy. T

than the aimless maneuvers of eighteenth-century armies, was 

Jomini's view, constituted the core of Napoleon's genius in makin

the master of Europe. 2 

Equally important to Jomini's formulation was the idea that th

of these objectives should follow according to definite lines of o

that would optimize the direction of an advance while p
for the first time provided a methodology that was the

practical. "In his theory the campaign occupies the central 

position. The purpose of warfare is to occupy all or part of 

territory. Such occupation is accomplished by the progressive 

of zones of occupation; and this domination is possible 

campaign is planned carefully before the outbreak of hostiliti

task of strategy is to make those preliminary plans. ''3 

It is difficult to overstate the impact of Jomini's t

nineteenth-century military thought. Because Napoleon had em

early years of that century as one of the great captains of hi

natural that the articulator of his campaigns and methods 

enjoyed some measure of reflected glory. Jomini's influence i

States was to be profound, accomplished chiefly through the 

men: Dennis Hart Mahan and Henry Wager Halleck. Maha

from the United States Military Academy first in his class i

after studying in France, returned to West Point as a facult

position he held from 1832 to 1871. Thoroughly conversant w

teachings, he was the professor who taught the principles of w

generation of cadets who later became the leaders on both 

Civil War. One of his most prominent students was Henry W

of the Class of 1839, who became a translator of Jomini's 

author of The Elements of Military Art and Science in 1846, 

staff to Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War. His book is 

Jominian precepts, stressing the offensive as the key to v

principle led in turn to his declaration that "the first and fore

the offensive is, to keep your forces concentrated as much as p

will not only prevent misfortune, but secure victory since.., 

the power of throwing your whole force upon any exposed p

enemy's position. '~4 Concentration of force had thus achieved 

a major precept of American military thought, a Jominian le

many ways continues to the present day. 

This legacy did not, however, extend to the America

structure or contribute very much to the development of the m

as the agency for successfully combining arms on the battl
staff sections made up the major field commands and corps he

It is possible, however, that though Jomini's American reader

service to his strictures concerning the importance of staff pr

they were far more intrigued by the operational side of the N

staff. While Berthier supervised the administrative functions of 

operational matters were largely handled through the Mais

reported directly to Napoleon. Small cells existed within the M

would roughly correspond to the operations and intelligence se

modem headquarters; but the most important components of 

were the aides-de-camp, trusted senior officers who were disp

special missions by the emperor as the situation demanded, s 

These officers, usually brigadiers or major generals, were the 

which Napoleon injected his personal genius into diverse 

situations--much as a football coach sends in a play from the 

The problem, of course, was that the system did not work as wel

Napoleon. The American staff system--if it can be called tha

feature a well-organized arrangement of staffs within its tactica

until the twentieth century. Instead, Civil War commanders

fascinated by Napoleon, tended to focus more on his tactics th

prosaic but equally essential staff and administrative sy

accompanied his operational genius. Their oversight is under

Napoleon's actions were conducted in a language of com

operations that was instinctively understood by, say, a captain o

chasing Indians on the frontier. To the same officer, serving in 

whose entire complement averaged between ten and fifteen thou

in the years separating the Mexican and Civil wars, Berthier's 

staff system and the grande armde it administered must hav

almost unimaginable. 

Ironically, this inattention to staff development took place a

tile time the technology of the Industrial Revolution had spaw

major advances whose application to land warfare would crea

edented capabilities and challenges for the extension of com

control: the telegraph, the railroad, the steamship, and the rifled 

The most revolutionary of these capabilities was the electric 
Although the military applications of the new technology were 

constant experimentation throughout the conflict, its utility had 

demonstrated by the British in the Crimean War in 1854 and b

five years later in the Franco-Austrian War--the latter case 

field telegraph lines could extend even to an army's front and f

The companion technology to the telegraph was the 

advances in strategic mobility were as far-reaching as those 

signaling in strategic communications. The potential fo

movement of troops by rail fit well with Jomini's teachings co

concentration of force via interior lines, even as rail cars 

resolve the immemorial problem of slow and ponderous logis

As Ernest Fisher pointed out, a horse-drawn "wagon could tra

2 tons a distance of about 20 miles a day, while a train car co

10 tons perhaps 350 miles per day, an improvement factor on 

about 100. ''7 Army officers played a prominent role in 

defending railroad routes across the frontier, and many leR t

become railroad executives in their own right. The Union and 

armies would put this wealth of experience to good use i

military capabilities of the new technology under the stress of 

The same principles by which steam was hamessed 

locomotives were applied to develop the steamship for us

Under the leadership of Commodore Matthew C. Perry, the U

quick to realize the benefits of steam propulsion, althoug

program for the new vessels was hampered by naval conserv

constraints, and design flaws. For one thing, early steamships 

Fulton II mounted paddle wheels on either side, a feature t

vessel extremely vulnerable to gunfire and cut down on th

cannon that could be mounted. Capt. John Ericsson's in

perfection of the underwater screw propeller corrected both p

in 1842 the Navy launched two steam cruisers, the Misso

Mississippi. By 1861, the service had a complement of over n

a dozen of which were steam cruisers--"first-class vessels arm

unsurpassed in any navy. '`) The chief implication of steam p

command and control was that it made the movement of nav
naval support of land operations, suggesting, however, a rang

problems for the command and control of joint forces. I° 

The fourth technology to have an impact on command and co

the rifled projectile, so called because of the rifling, or internal g

the interior of a firearm's barrel that imparted a spin to the proje

left the muzzle, greatly increasing its accuracy. Some artillery o

War was rifled, notably the Parrott gun, but most was not

twelve-pound Napoleon muzzle-loaded smoothbore became 

common ficldpiece. Naval artillery would undergo the same cha

later years of the century, an evolution foreseen by the Navy's 

gunnery expert, Adm. John A. Dahlgren, in 1859. Union and C

ships, however, fought the war using eleven- and fifteen-inch sm

cannon as the weapons of choice. 11 The rifled projectile had i

effect on the Civil War infantry. Smoothbore muskets had not bee

much beyond one hundred to two hundred yards, but the Sprin

Enfield rifles manufactured after 1855 were capable of effective 

four hundred to six hundred yards, with maximum ranges of 

thousand yards. Although rifling was a technique long known to g

much of the new effectiveness of weapons was due to the adopt

mini6 ball, a conical projectile that expanded to meet the rifle

when the gun was fired. The tremendous striking power now pla

hands of infantrymen would eventually spell the end of eighteen

linear warfare tactics, since concentrated battle lines invited co

slaughter. As battle lines spread out in response, the problem of 

and control would become steadily more acute, for the ad

weaponry were not accompanied by corresponding changes in or

or technique. Tactical control would thus become the most intr

the many problems on the extended battlefields of the Civil War. 

Each of these technological changes represented a vast pot

change, yet, as the Civil War was soon to show, change was not 

the American military command structure was prepared for-

much its talent for improvisation might help overcome the effect

ineptitude and lack of foresight. If the Army was largely unaw

great strides in military organization made by the French under B
defeat, however, that led to the reforms in the Prussian Arm

Gerhard yon Scharnhorst and August von Gneisenau, improv

resulted in Prussian victories over the Austrians in 1866 and th

1871. Those victories gave the Prussian system a credibility 

their systematic approach to warfare all the more appealing in 

demonstrated failures of the American Army during the Civil 

the Prussian system became the model for many reformers in th

Army after the war, it is appropriate to review it here briefly. 

In his book on the Prussian-German General Staff, Trevor 

characterizes that system as an attempt to "institutionalize g

least try to perfect a system that could perpetuate military 

through the vagaries of change. ''13 Scharnhorst and the 

recognized that the extension of the commander's control on th

and the growing demands of military administration had res

growth of staffs from regimental to corps and army levels. Th

was to organize those staffs so they would serve as the cent

influence to prepare the army in peacetime for its wartime fu

when war came, to assist in meeting its operational obje

proponent agency for both tasks would be the General Staff, 

chief, whose function was to provide the king with military adv

combining military excellence with the dynamics of political co

Equally important were the educational establishments set 

the officer corps in general and to select and groom prospect

Staff candidates. At the head of the system stood the Kriegsak

central repository for theoretical investigations into the art of 

principal agency for the final grooming of those selected for G

service. The system was especially well suited for the explora

ideas, primarily because of the lateral linkages established 

educational and operational sides of the General Staff. Becau

linkages, the Prussian Army was quick to seize upon the pote

telegraph after Morse's demonstration in 1844 and to in

military applications in a systematic way. Similarly impres

response to Germany's first railway, which opened in 1835; b

General Staff was studying its use in speeding the nation's mob
existed in both the U.S. Army and the Navy, there was not

approaching the careful organization of successive staff ech

characterized the Prussian system. There is probably no better d

tion of the vast gulf between the systems than a mission on w

Army officers embarked in 1855. Led by Maj. Richard Delafield

were sent to Europe on an observation tour by Secretary of Wa

Davis, who was concerned that the Army be kept abreast of 

military developments on the Continent. The officers returned 

later and, in 1861, published their findings in a volume entitled 

War in Europe. The book provided elaborate commentary and il

of weaponry, fortifications, even the organization of regiment

--but it failed even to mention that there was such a thing as th

General Staff. Even more interesting is the fact that one of th

officers was Capt. George B. McClellan, who in due course was 

command of the Union Army. His occasional difficulties in tha

coupled with his tour of the Continent gave an ironic twist to this 

in his memoirs: "One of the greatest defects of our military sys

lack of a thoroughly instructed STAFF CORPS .... Perhaps th

difficulty that I encountered in creating the Army of the Poto

from the scarcity of thoroughly instructed staff officers, and I m

state that every day I myself felt the disadvantages under 

personally labored from the want of that thorough theoretical an

education received by the officers of the German General Staff. ''1

The Prussian General Staff, then, was the model of operation

the more perceptive thinkers in the Army turned to in the afterm

Civil War. If Jominian precepts, or more exactly the 

interpretations of Jominian precepts, had not provided the answ

riddle of Civil War strategy, they had at least created the beg

disciplined military thought and had provided an overall concep

land warfare was all about. The paradigm would become sharp

more generalized as American military thought turned in the last 

the nineteenth century to the work of Karl von Clausewitz. Not 

into English until 1873, his book Vom Kriege (On War) becam

of military thought and the dominant paradigm on the conduc
appropriate context ("war is not a mere act of policy 

continuation of political activity by other means .... The po

is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means c

considered in isolation from their purpose"). 18 Far more than 

emphasized the importance of the battle as the decisive factor 

the conquering of the enemy's forces rather than the mere o

his territory as the primary means for achieving victory. He 

direct in his prescription for its accomplishment: "The bes

always to be very strong; first in general and then at the decis

• there is no higher and simpler law in strategy than that of k

forces concentrated. 'q9 The composition of those forces idea

a mix of artillery and cavalry with strong infantry as th

centerpiece so that "a combination of the three arms leads 

complete use of all of them. ''20 He was also concerne

proliferation of subordinate echelons made necessary by the

tions not be allowed to interfere with unity of command. That 

reflected the limitations of the classical age of command and 

is not without contemporary significance as well: 

There is no denying that the supreme command of an ar

markedly simpler if orders only need to be given to thre

other men; yet a general has to pay dearly for that conve

two ways. First, an order progressively loses speed, v

precision the longer the chain of command it has to travel

the case where there are corps commanders placed bet

divisional commanders and the general. Second, a general's 

power and effectiveness diminishes in proportion to the in

the sphere of action of his closest subordinates. A general 

his authority over 100,000 men felt more strongly if he com

means of eight divisions than by means of three divisions. 21 

Clausewitz did not live to see the Prussian General Staff b

institution that would help overcome the natural tendencies for 

echelons to subvert the control of the commander. Although 

therefore, deliver the same sort of definitive advice on 

composition that he did on other aspects of the Army, h

suggested the General Staff's true function when discussing the 
pf y gy 

just therein consists military genius, that it is not one single 

bearing upon War... but that it is an harmonious associat

powers, in which one or the other may predominate, but none 

be in opposition. ~ 

The General Staff was to be the agency for bringing a

harmonious association of the powers, reconciling the competing 

of administration and operations, optimizing the mix and employm

combat branches, and, most important, amplifying rather than at

the commander's control through subordinate echelons. 

This approach was complementary to the unity of view that C

maintained for all facets of the problem of land warfare, an

teachings became the dominant theoretical model for armie

nineteenth century drew to a close, the Prussian General Staff be

dominant practical model. Together they formed a paradigm 

warfare that was above all a prescription for the totality of war o

the ultimate form of national expression. Jominian ideals wou

entirely pass from the scene, but they were somewhat eclipse

hindsight of the American Civil War and the image it conveyed o

mobilization of the nation's resources united in the attrition and d

of the enemy force. For the U.S. Army, its organization, struc

functions would eventually come to be measured against this p

The precepts of concentration of force, employment of the combi

and the maintenance of unity of command bad been elevated fro

instinct to prescriptive strategy, with all those factors displayed 

backdrop of technological development that, as the century d

close, the Army was anxious to exploit. 

The American Civil War on Land and Sea 

Despite the many developments in combat on land and se

about by the Civil War, its impact on the American command 

was minimal--at least in terms of forcing immediate and fun

structural change. In many ways, the war even tended to support 

that the mechanisms for strategic control of the Army an
"1,696 regiments of infantry, 272 of cavalry and 78 of artille

that meant moving six hundred tons of supplies each day for 

army from depots to encampments? 3 

Although it was necessary to create three assistant secretaries o

the conflict, probably the most impressive achievement of all 

that "the organization of the existing staff departments or mili

was not materially altered during the period of the war, al

official and clerical force was augmented from time to time to 

increased amount of work imposed upon them. ''24 Somewhat m

cation had to be made in the organization of the Navy Depart

the scope of its activities: "From 1861 to 1865 the numb

increased from 90 to 670; of officers from 1300 to 6700; and 

from 7500 to 51,500. The annual naval expenditures rose from 

to $123,000,000. ''25 Three bureaus were added in 1862: Navig

eventually and mysteriously became associated with person

Engineering, and Equipment and Recruiting 26 Coordinating t

the eight bureaus and directing their activities toward wartim

required that Gustavus V. Fox, a former naval officer, be appo

post of assistant secretary of the navy, a newly authorize

half-century later, Mahan gave this assessment of Fox's efforts

power and individual responsibility are the fundamental m

bureau system. Its defect is lack of coordination. Happily

country . . . in 1861 unwittingly introduced into naval adm

singularly fit man . . . [to] impart unity and direction to the e

impulses under which naval expansion was advancing .... The 

the establishment, of the Navy Department on its civil side

harmonized with the requirements of the military situation. '~7 

Although the creation of Fox's post was essentiall

modification of an existing structure, it bore out the pattern of 

control and consolidation noted elsewhere in this book: naval 

tion followed much the same path as military administration, 

later and always with a greater reluctance to create intervenin

Assessing the impact of the Civil War on the norms of civili

somewhat more difficult. On the one hand, the structure of civ
through a succession of field commanders who were tried a

wanting--although the painful process went on for almost th

before Ulysses S. Grant was brought from the West and placed 

command of the Union Army. The ultimate triumph of both sy

process, however, should not be allowed to overshadow the exist

major problem in American civil-military relations. 

Historian T. Harry Williams has pointed out that Lincoln bec

better strategist than most of his generals, but that he was 

overcome their persistent tendency to see every Civil War tac

strategic problem in Jominian terms--that is, to emphasize c

territory rather than the destruction of enemy forces. Probably the 

worst--example was provided by General George G. Me

congratulated his troops for having "expelled the enemy from ou

Gettysburg but failed to pursue the beaten Lee or to comer him a

flood-swollen Potomac River: "Weeks later the general 

Washington for conferences and during a conversation Lincoln sa

suddenly, "Do you know, general, what your attitude toward L

week after the battle reminded me of?.' "No, Mr. President, wh

asked Meade. "1'11 be hanged if I could think of anything e

Lincoln, "than an old woman trying to shoo her geese across a cre

With Grant, Lincoln finally got a commanding general of the A

actually deserved his title, but any assessment of the eventual tr

the command system must be counterbalanced by the enormo

sustained as the system was made equal to the tasks of w

particularly hard to understand why a distinguished historian 

Williams would conclude that, by war's end, "the American sy

superior to most command organizations then existing in Europe 

at least as good as the Prussian staff machine. ''29 Such an as

might, with qualifications, describe the working relationships tha

among the president, the secretary of war, the general-in-chief, 

field commanders, but it ignores the fact that there was no institut

body available to provide the president with well-informed milita

on a regular basis. Nor was there a well-defined staff system th

have helped the Army deploy a field force fully ten times larger 
marshal, and several assistants. 30 Regimental commanders, w

control ten companies and a total complement of five hundred to 

men, had a staff of seven officers and six noncommissioned offic

Staffs at all levels were organized primarily around ad

functions, which often overlapped with operational functions; s

creatures of the units they served, were usually incapable of ta

slack. McClellan was so poorly served by his own staff officer

Peninsular Campaign that he blundered around for weeks trying 

base of operations from the York to the James River using a 

Other parallel roads were there, but his staff knew nothi

existence, despite the fdct that elements of both his Third and 

Corps had come across them by chance. 32 When the task a

purely operational, there were many instances in which th

simply incapable of extending either the control or the 

commander. To return to the example of Meade at Gettysbu

little question that his recent assumption of command and the 

three days of intense combat handicapped his ability to exploit 

by pursuing the retreating Confederates. But "had Meade p

properly trained staff, orders for the pursuit would have been p

waiting only his word to put them into effect as soon as the 

withdrawal began. Largely because Meade lacked such a staff 

was permitted to accomplish his southward movement and 

Virginia without interference from the Northern forces. ''33 

This last point is somewhat speculative; nevertheless, the di

combat command undoubtedly were magnified not only 

inadequacies but also by the lethal relationship that had sprung 

nineteenth-century technology and eighteenth-century tactics. 

maneuvering unit of the Civil War was the regiment, wh

beginning of the war attacked in two lines, its compan

shoulder-to-shoulder as they advanced. Here they faced the w

worlds: not only was rifle fire more accurate at extended ran

rifle itself was loaded from the muzzle in a standing position

practical way for attacking infantry to maintain a volume of 

reload on the move, which meant advancing by ranks in t
the corps area could range up to ten miles, and, depending on th

of corps attached to it, the field army's span of control could c

encompass twenty to thirty miles. 34 Complicating the problem 

"enthusiasm and skill" with which average infantrymen used any 

cover on the battlefield and their tendency to spread out when a

"Attacks started in close order, but troops often scattered for c

concealment when they came under fre, and thereafter advanced 

rushes supported by fire from neighboring units. The generals atte

combine frontal assaults with envelopments and flanking movem

the difficulty of timing and coordinating the movements of su

bodies of men in broken terrain made intricate maneuvers very dif

Although control remained a problem throughout the 

improvements in tactical signaling and the adaptation of the teleg

military use had far-reaching consequences. Both owed much 

initiative of Albert James Myer, who invented the "wig-wag" s

semaphore flags, spearheaded the drive to create a Signal Corps 

such branch in any army), and became the chief signal officer of t

in 1860. His system of semaphore flags and brevity codes repres

attempt to extend the range of visual control through a network 

and observation posts. Aided by telescope and binoculars, 

manning these posts could provide a nearly instantaneous 

information across a ten-mile distance, either from observation po

on commanding terrain or from signal detachments stationed w

committed in actual combat. The Confederate Army was not 

recognize the potential of the system, largely because Capt. E

Alexander, formerly Myer's assistant, became its chief of 

Alexander is credited with personally sending the message that al

Confederate force that its flank was being turned during the First 

Bull Run, a warning that led to the reinforcement by Jackson's 

(when it won for itself and its commander the appellation "Stonew

ultimate victory. 36 

Similar instances took place during the battles of Antietam, wh

signals gave a timely warning of the approach of Jackson's cav

Gettysburg, when the Union observation post at Little Round To
grew more sophisticated as time went on, and since ciphers 

simple or nonexistent, they learned to intercept and read 

messages. One of the more famous instances of interception oc

Grant's signalman wig-wagged the message to Admiral 

Vicksburg had fallen after a long siege. Southern observers s

signal and passed the news via their own relay system to the 

garrison commander at Port HudsonIwhO upon hearing th

promptly surrendered his entire force. "Northern newspapers ha

message as 'the most momentous signal in American history.'"3

The presence of signal centers at the corps and army le

natural linkage points for the field telegraph, another 

innovations. Like semaphore signaling, it was soon an integra

both the Union and Confederate armies. Armies on the m

horse-drawn "telegraph train" which could not only receive me

in transit but run out ten miles of wire in four hours. 38 The tac

could thus be linked effectively with the much more extensive 

networks, so that it was possible tbr messages from Washing

the most distant commands in a matter of hours. On the Union 

more than 6.5 million messages were sent during the war, 39 a 

tion that the Army would be either the beneficiary or the v

strategic control that now tied it directly to the seat of gove

action by Stanton that underscored the point was his ordering 

of the Army's telegraph wire moved from the headquarters of 

the Potomac into the War Department, where it was Preside

custom to come from time to time to read dispatches---espec

major engagement was brewing. Although this kind of long-ran

was not an easy cross to bear for generals accustomed to a gre

personal autonomy in their commands, the benefits of the 

extending their control--in a situation where every other fa

constrain it--must have seemed worth the price. There is no 

comprehend the praise that Grant, as hard-bitten a commander 

armies have ever had, paid in his memoirs to the military teleg

operators. He went so far as to say that the first thing the 

Potomac did with every change of position was to dig entren
had turned down a proposal from Myer before the war for a sem

system of its own, claiming that its existing system of flag hoi

adequate for the needs of the service. During the war, however, th

was required not only to blockade southern ports but to suppor

operations on land. The usual practice, therefore, was for Army sig

to be put aboard naval vessels whenever such ship-to-shore coor

was required. Such was indeed the case during the Battle of Mobile 

1864, when Adm. David Farragut's flotilla attacked in cooperati

ground forces commanded by Gen. Edward Canby. Army Lt. J. C. 

handled signal liaison duties from Farragut's quarterdeck, narrowly 

being hit by an explosive shell and accidentally striking the admira

head with a flagstaff at one point, but successfully passing messag

and forth throughout the engagement. 41 

The Civil War tended to bear out the belief that the doctrine of 

cooperation was a reasonable basis for Army-Navy relationships. T

a noticeable lack in the historical record of any but petty disagr

between commanders engaged in joint operations (although Gen. B

"Beast" Butler, who became the military governor of New Orlea

the city capitulated to his and Farragut's forces, seems to have m

point to offend not only naval colleagues but everyone else a

Several factors appear to have minimized potential command pr

For one, the decentralized structure of the Navy placed a great 

authority on squadron and flotilla commanders: there was no 

equivalent to the commanding general of the Army, nor was th

course, a general staff of any description. Army forces operating 

West enjoyed, in the early years of the war at least, much the same 

decentralized authority, primarily because of strategic confu

Washington and the attendant problem with the Army of N

Virginia. Commanders of both services, thrown on their own resour

at some distance from the national capital, found that common 

solutions to mutual problems were attainable---especially when i

nient questions of subordination were not involved. As Grant noted 

naval colleague at Vicksburg, Adm. David Porter, "I had no more a

to command Porter than he had to command me. ''42 
without such assistance. The most perfect harmony reigned 

two arms of the service. There never was a request made, that 

of, either of the flag officer or any of his subordinates, th

promptly complied with. '~3 

This fulsome praise should not obscure the fact that a

operations of the Army and Navy during the Civil War were 

"ad hockery writ large," in which success often was due not 

good will and common sense as to chance. Nevertheless, b

clearly had learned a great deal about the art of what were 

combined (joint) operations, operations that became progres

difficult as they were thrown against tougher Confederate defe

the war. If so much was accomplished from scratch, however

more might have been achieved had the services been better 

prepared to work with one another--as indeed they might have 

the example of the Vera Cruz landing during the Mexican War? 

The question is not an idle one, especially given the strategi

of the Civil War which might well have called for the Un

exploited its numerical superiority on land and sea in joint op

confined to the periphery of the Confederacy. McClellan off

strategy late in 1861, just after taking over command of the 

General Scott, whose Anaconda Plan aimed at doing little 

sealing the existing borders of the Confederacy. McClellan 

combined force of 273,000 men operating as a kind of 

invasion force, attacking port cities such as Charleston and S

using rivers to capture strategic points located farther inla

Richmond. Lincoln rejected the plan, and historians ever 

derided it. Williams called it "as fantastic a proposal as Linc

from a military man, and he was to be the recipient of man

noted that the Union lacked the logistical resources, sea tr

"staff organization to administer such a host," and concluded 

fatally flawed in conception because "it made places rather tha

objectives. ''44 

That conventional wisdom was challenged by a 1978 book 

Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War, which, while i
were indeed potential avenues of approach for an army and a navy 

exploit them; but this presumes both the availability of the physica

and the existence of the theoretical and practical knowledge neces

bring them to bear. Neither the means nor the knowledge existed 

American command structure at that time. Although the vast in

machine of the North might over time have provided the men an

necessary to fulfill such a strategic conception, neither service po

the command and staff capabilities necessary to have turned strate

applied operational art. As it was, there were elements of truth in 

Anaconda Plan, McClellan's concept of waterborne mobility, and 

strategy of dogged attrition. Each might well have had its place in 

strategic design that exploited northern strengths and southern weak

but without a trained cadre of staff and operational experts, the Un

as capable of carrying out such combined strategic operations as it 

conducting space flight. 

It is an exercise in historical hindsight to suggest that the Pr

might have done better, not only in applying a disciplined method 

study of likely strategic problems, but in designing the military m

deal with them. The American political experience, however, attach

importance to the constitutional principles of separation of pow

civilian control of the military, values that resulted in the creati

maintenance of two largely autonomous service organizations unit

by an informal and decentralized command structure. It was 

therefore, that their early conceptual models should have favo

personalized improvisation of a Napoleon rather than the highly str

order of the Prussian General Staff. 

The Civil War ended only at~er having created the conditi

profound changes in the internal conceptions of both services. The 

had deployed forces on a scale that could not previously hav

imagined across a theater of operations of continental dimensio

campaigns involved a level of destruction that had far more in c

with modem warfare than with anything that had gone before. Th

had experienced the same kind of quantum leap in size, while ac

invaluable lessons with the new technologies of steam and a
use their boilers unless under emergency conditions. The Arm

never developed a high-level planning body like that of the F

Prussians, would with unconscious irony some years later desc

demobilization of the Grand Army of the Republic as t

achievement of the wartime "General Staff. ''46 The nation, exh

the most terrible war in its history, was content to leave thi

they had been alter Appomattox, perhaps even viewing the 

outmoded military and naval establishments with a certa

afterglow. Change, however, was to become a constant, 

nineteenth century drew to a close, a naval paradigm was abou

Toward a Paradigm of Ocean Warfare 

The writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan gave the U

strategic vision of itself and its role in the nation's defense 

that it deserves to be called a paradigm. As had been the c

Army and its reactions to the early theorists of nineteenth-cen

the Navy used Mahan's doctrines as both descriptive and 

instruments around which to accomplish a major change in 

The Navy's customary functions had always included p

American maritime interests in peacetime and defense of 

harbors and coasts during war; a third mission would now be 

operated in both peace and war--projection of American pow

accident that Mahan's doctrines seized the temper of the tim

way. The last Indians had been rounded up, the frontier was c

burgeoning American industrial base was looking for ne

markets. The traditional reliance of the Republic on a foreig

stressed isolation from all but hemispheric problems was grad

way to an acquired taste for foreign adventure. 

There was also a matter of strategic choice that was bein

even as Mahan's first great work, The Influence of Sea 

History, was being written. The old Civil War Navy, a polygl

of monitors, ironclads, and steam-and-sail cruisers, had to be r

the next generation of armored warships, a task the nation's ne
determination to remain the dominant sea power in the world, gave 

to German naval development, and affected the character of naval 

and practice in France, Italy, Russia, Japan and among many of th

powers. ''47 The theory itself, however, was not especially elaborate 

original: "His contribution lay rather in organizing into a coherent 

or philosophy, the strategic principles which the British Admira

been following more or less blindly for over two hundred years. ''48 

That contribution began with a statement about the nature 

maritime environment: "The first and most obvious light in which 

presents itself from the political and social point of view is that of 

highway; or better, perhaps, of a wide common over which men m

in all directions, but on which some well-worn paths show that con

reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather than 

These lines of travel are called trade routes. ''49 

This was an interesting conceptual reversal that was esp

significant for a public long accustomed to thinking of oceans as 

rather than as lines of communication. The factors influencing a co

ability to profit from those lines included geographical position, p

conformation, territorial size, population, national character, and 

government. Depending on the relative weight of those variables

processes tended to occur. First, the dynamics of production nec

involved a search for overseas trade in order to expand available m

Second, trade led to the development of a national merchant marine

is the wish of every nation that this shipping business should be don

own vessels." Third, the necessity to secure lucrative trade led 

armed merchantmen (which eventually gave rise to naval fleets) 

overseas naval stations and outposts (which became colonies). I

three related activities--production, shipping, and colonial expansi

to be found the key to much of the history, as well as of the po

nations bordering upon the sea. ''50 

The implications of Mahan's formulation for American naval pol

not obtain so much from these activities, however (since the United 

possessed at that point neither colonies nor an especially large m

marine), as much as from the necessity to protect the nation's pro
commerce, neither were they now a barrier against a determ

opponent. Such an opponent, according to Mahan, could b

American coastline merely by staying out of sight of the 

menacing the principal routes in and out of American ports. It i

that Mahan linked that idea to a basic change that had tak

command and control technology: "It seems possible that, in th

submarine telegraphs, that the blockading forces in-shore an

and from one port to another, might be in telegraphic commun

one another along the whole coast of the United States, re

mutual support; and if, by some fortunate military combi

detachment were attacked in force, it could warn the others 

upon them. ''51 

Although this argument presumes the rather far-fetched i

opposing force should have somehow been able to secure a 

American soil, Marconi's wireless became a reality just five yea

Power was published, allowing precisely this kind of over

control to be exercised for the first time with naval forces. 

It is true, as James L. Abrahamson has pointed out, that M

widely read book failed "to point unambiguously toward the 

American naval resurgence or the creation of a battle

nevertheless it provided the intellectual force behind the mo

resulted in both the resurgence and the fleet. 52 Even before Sea 

published, its ideas were credited with having spurred the secr

navy in his annual report of 1889 to call for twenty armored b

act as a blockade-breaking force. That report led the House N

Committee to approve construction the following year of three 

that were to displace more than ten thousand tons and mount m

of eight-inch guns. These were formidable weapons, and with t

Congress committed itself and the Navy to a process of nava

that future events would help sustain. The Spanish-American W

seemed to vindicate Mahan's precepts and served as well to 

support the Navy enjoyed in public opinion. The admin

Theodore Roosevelt and the building of the Panama Canal 

affairs at the tbrefront of the country's attention, with the "
his father, Dennis Hart Mahan, who was famous in his own righ

great interpreter of Jomini to the previous generation of American 

leaders. It is a commonplace to say that Jomini's influence was 

strong upon the son, a fact the son often confirmed himself. The p

comparison are many, but none more important than the 

concentration of force. This fundamental Jominian concept is expr

one of the most frequently quoted passages from Sea Power: "It is 

taking of individual ships or convoys, be they few or many, tha

down the money power of a nation; it is the possession of that ove

power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it, or allo

appear only as a fugitive; and which, by controlling the great c

closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the 

shores. This overbearing power can only be exercised by great navi

One could note other Jominian influences as well: the Napoleo

for the climactic battle and Mahan's teachings concerning the 

climactic central naval engagement; the Jominian formulation of 

and exterior lines and Mahan's equation of that principle to trad

and strategic choke points; and both men's preferences for movem

offensive action. 55 

As important as those points are, however, they do not sum up M

whole notion of command of the sea as well as does the idea of conce

of force. To a Navy long accustomed to single-ship engagements 

and peacetime patrolling in squadrons of two or three vessels, Mah

now offering the revolutionary perspective that command of the se

destroying or neutralizing the enemy fleet en masse; this require

turn meant concentrating unprecedented numbers of ships and 

them as parts of a coherent whole. Although the concept is akin 

Jomini had in mind for land battles, naval scholar Herbert R

detected a difference; he contrasted the "indivisibility of the sea,

could not be fenced off, with the static nature of the land, which c

so divided between armies concentrated for the purpose: 

At sea.., all the conditions that on land tend to strengthen 

defense vis-a-vis the attack are absent. No common frontier en

the defender to establish and maintain contact; no accident

ground help to canalise his opponent's advance into predictable 
This essay, written shortly before Pearl Harbor, captures 

essence of naval command in the era ushered in by Mahan: fl

concentrated, opponents must be crushed, and oceans must be 

The operational implications of this doctrine affecte

command structure in ways that were reminiscent of the Army

grips with the principles of extended battlefield control and co

integration a century before. Naval technology had now prog

point that armor was lighter and more extensive, gunfire m

and more accurate, steam propulsion both faster and more eff

changes in turn gave naval architects far more flexibility than 

before and allowed the construction of different classes of shi

fulfilling a variety of roles in fleet formations. That developm

just as the wireless gave ships a communications range 

seventy-five miles from shore stations or other elements of th

its aid, cruisers could now operate beyond the visual range 

the fleet, thereby extending the naval commander's effect

control. The experimentation with different ship types cont

with fast-running torpedo boats being added and then coun

advent of a new class, the torpedo boat destroyer, or as it 

widely known, the destroyer. The fast-moving destroyer

extended the fleet's defensive perimeter still farther. 58 

Sitting at the center of this perimeter, as ships were deli

construction program begun in 1907, were the first Ame

noughts, twenty-thousand-ton battleships which featured a c

for integrated fire control of their eight twelve-inch guns, as 

lesser batteries. Fire control officers, observers, range-finde

were linked for the first time with a common set of cal

electrical communications. This integrated fire control system 

the dreadnought to have an effective radius of action of betw

eight miles, whereas naval engagements between wooden-hull

usually taken place at ranges of less than a thousand yards. 59 

For American naval officers in the quarter-century betwee

and the outbreak of World War I, these new weapons system

fleet command had at last been achieved in fact as well as na
commander. Whereas a squadron commander before had had little 

to project his influence beyond the limits of his own quarterde

authority of the fleet commander now was consolidated and dist

throughout the tactical echelons assigned to him. He not only coul

at greater ranges; he could effectively command there as well. 

Mahan's unique exposition of philosophy and ideology represent

of those instances in history where an idea can be seen to have 

affected technological choices. His ideas shaped a political and s

consensus that led to the revival of American sea power during an 

which sea power became synonymous with the revolution in shipb

that produced the dreadnought as the capital ship of an integrate

The requirements of integration, in both the planning and the const

of these vessels, as well as in their utilization at sea, in turn led to a 

level of centralized control. The modification of the Navy's co

structure to accommodate the results of these technological choices w

accomplished without the pain that attends most modernization cycl

is especially difficult for military or naval organizations. Y

modernization of the administrative side of the Navy command st

proved to be an intractable problem: the admirals could experience 

of operational gratification as the payoff for their efforts; the bure

could only lose power and position. 

It will be recalled that the Navy bureau system had been cre

1842 to replace the Board of Commissioners and that it had fun

without major changes ever since. It will also be recalled that 

delivered the classic comment on its character: "Individual pow

individual responsibility are the fundamental merits of the bureau 

Its defect is lack of coordination. ''60 Much the same thought was exp

by Paullin in his authoritative work on naval administration: "The b

are semi-independent principalities, whose obligations to their suzera

secretariat, are rather slight. ''61 More recent scholarship has ten

support those assessments. 62 The bureau systems in both services pr

hierarchies that carried out certain routine and well-understood fun

but this same division of labor made them inadequate mechanis

comprehending activities that were not routine or that demanded 
college's first president, Adm. Stephen B. Lute) were beginni

the formation of a naval general staff. During the Spanish-Am

the Naval War Board was formed to advise the Navy secr

conduct of operations, an initiative that led to the formation of 

General Board in 1900, an advisory body of senior officers 

1917 by Admiral of the Navy George Dewey. Pressure to 

general staff was still being exerted by naval reformers, suc

William Sims and Adm. Bradley Fiske, and was just as steadf

by a coalition of bureau chiefs and congressmen. After sever

initiatives were killed on Capitol Hill, President Taft's sec

navy G.V.L. Meyer ordered, on November 18, 1909, a reor

the Navy Department as far-reaching as was possible wi

statutory enhancement. 63 

This plan, which became known as the aide system, 

principal divisions within the department for Operations

Material, and Inspections, each headed by a senior 

Collectively, they would constitute an informal advisory 

secretary, but, like the General Board, they would have 

authority outside their respective jurisdictions. Under the l

Admiral Fiske, the aide for operations became a kind ofprimu

until, on March 3, 1915, legislation was passed making the c

operations (CNO) responsible for the deployment of the f

preparation of war plans. Because of opposition by Secretary 

Josephus Daniels--who denounced the plan as an attempt to 

the American Navy"--the CNO was denied authority to 

except through the secretary. This plan, of course, left the b

virtually intact, a condition that persisted until the eve of Worl

This marked the first time the pattern of Navy administratio

a direction different from that taken by the Army; to that poi

had established many of the same kinds of structures set up t

War Department, although usually after a delay of some yea

new tack? Part of the reason may have been the well-ingra

personal responsibility in the bureau structures noted by Maha

ashore and the Navy afloat stressed precisely this kind of uni
that had acquired its fundamental organizational values when it wa

decentralized, unitary, and highly personal• 

Those attributes made the bureau chiefs the natural enemies 

system of coordinative authority, the degree of hostility being i

proportion to the potential for loss of bureaucratic prerogatives. 

their political backing, however, that made their authority so for

and that ultimately compelled the Navy to accept a compromise mu

ambitious than what the reformers had hoped for. The previous 

noted that the Navy from the outset was seen as an agency embody

twin purposes of national defense and the promotion of commerce

of the critical battles over its maintenance and expansion had tende

fought out in political terms. This is not surprising, since its large

were in such harbor cities as Norfolk, New York, and Boston, all 

well represented in Congress• These installations were commonly u

political patronage, an example of which occurred during the pres

election of 1888 when one thousand men were temporarily employe

New York yard. The increasing technical sophistication of the Nav

inroads into the more flagrant applications of the spoils system, b

when a merit system was introduced at the New York yard in 18

superintendent found it expedient to keep a rough parity b

Democrats and Republicans among the members of the workforce. 65 

Given the additional monies spent on naval construction in the 

the dreadnoughts, the stakes for contracts, jobs, and effective p

control had clearly escalated--and there was good reason to fea

general staff-type organization might upset the cozy relationsh

existed among the principal players. Paullin summed up their identi

roles: 

The two naval committees of Congress practically decide 

amount of the annual appropriations for the navy, the uses to w

this money shall be applied, and the numbers and types of new s

•.. It is scarcely too much to say that the Secretary of the Navy

chiefs of naval bureaus, the members of the General Board

President of the United States, the Speaker of the House and 

leading members of the two naval committees constitute a g

committee on naval legislation, whose members, by conferenc
other players regarded this most recent addition to th

ill-disguised suspicion, a fact that became evident when C

asked to give legislative sanction to the General Board i

testimony of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Charles H. 

instructive, although he was compelled to mute his criticism o

deference to Admiral Dewey, the great naval hero who was 

Atter noting its accomplishments, Darling said that the boa

should nevertheless be restricted because of involvement wit

did not properly concern it, especially the administration o

His muffled indictment was clearly meant as a warning 

membership of the inner circle: "These questions are en

military significance. It [the General Board] has undertaken 

department what legislation was needed. It has devoted m

attention to the reorganization of the Navy Department, as we

as the military side. It has prepared and circulated m

advocating a general staff. In short, it has already invaded th

civil administration and planted there the standard of conques

The hint was taken: the Navy would never have a general 

the steady growth of the CNO's power. A basic differen

responses to the dynamics of command and staff had now 

precedent that would come to play a large role in futur

relations. The final point to be made here is that if Profess

was correct in his assertion that both services were made subo

norm of subjective civilian control, then the voluptuous inti

and political elites surely suggests that some services were m

than others. 

The Spanish-American War and Its Aftermath 

For a "splendid little war," the Spanish-American W

rather large consequences, especially in its impact on 

structure of the Army. It also served as a demonstration of w

wrong when two autonomous services were required to pe

coordinated operations in wartime despite a lack of strat
the war with much satisfaction. The renascence that had begun w

reconstruction in the 1880s and attained ideological convict

Mahan's writings in the early 1890s had, when the war broke out 

produced spectacular if overrated victories, such as that by Admira

at Manila Bay. 

Although the Army could take some comfort in victories such 

San Juan Hill in Cuba, it was a recollection tarred by debacle

mobilization, equipment, transportation, and direction of the expe

force. The War Department had not enjoyed the benefits of the 

awakening that had paced naval developments. Following the C

and the disbanding of the great blue-clad forces, the Regular A

settled back into the familiar routine of patrolling the frontier and 

the remaining Indians. Administratively, Army line officers com

seven territorially based departments under the supervision 

commanding general of the Army, while the secretary of the A

nominally responsible for the twelve bureaus and boards that fun

controlled much of Army life. This great functional authority bro

bureaus into frequent conflict with line officers, compelling the 

either to arbitrate or to remain aloof. The bureaus also maintained 

liaison with the relevant committees of Congress, spurred o

promotion system that depended directly on the enlargement 

functional authority. The bureaus were, as a result, quasi-aut

agencies in their own right and as naturally resistant to coo

authority as were their naval counterparts. 6s 

A few bright spots had existed in Army life since the Civil W

notably in the person of Emory Upton, who had been one of the 

major generals in the Union Army and had then gone on to 

commandant of cadets and instructor of tactics at West Point. H

had been instrumental in the Army's coming to grips with the dem

extended control of battlefield tbrmations, largely through the 

squads of four men which could maneuver on their own and as 

platoons and companies. He was to be best known, however, fo

published posthumously, The Military Policy of the United Stat

1775, which was an indictment both of the militia system and of 
century. 69 A significant effort had been made as well 

Tecumseh Sherman, who, as commanding general from 1869 

been instrumental in establishing "schools of application" i

branches, enabling officers to receive organized higher instr

profession. 

There was thus good reason to believe that the tradit

qualities of the officer corps had not atrophied over the y

outbreak of hostilities with Spain after the sinking of the bat

soon proved that valor needed to be accompanied by efficiency

would later be described as "a hydra-headed monster" by Arm

metaphor that captured well their uncoordinated actions in res

One of those reformers, William Harding Carter, later wrote: 

At the outbreak of the war with Spain, the conditions 

Department indicated to every officer who had given any s

subject the absolute necessity for a General Staff. From t

that it became apparent that a volunteer army was to be rai

offices of the Secretary of War . . . and the corridors o

Department were uncomfortably crowded with applicants f

ments or with Members of Congress presenting the 

constituents for appointment to office. The Secretary of W

Adjutant General could only attend to the proper functio

offices in guiding organization, equipment and mobiliza

great volunteer Army by secreting themselves for a few mo

time, or during the night, when most of the real work of 

ment had to be conducted, to avoid the pressure from office 

Predictably, those efforts did not go well. The port of em

the expeditionary force was Tampa, Florida, which ha

facilities for such a movement; this was fortunate, in a way, 

there were not enough troop transports. Even after that emba

sorted out, the entire force sat in port for over a week bec

rumors of Spanish cruisers. The force that finally arrived 

outfitted in wool uniforms and compelled to subsist on ration

known in the subsequent public outcry as "embalmed beef. ''71 

The operational command of the expeditionary force w

Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter was given a movement order 
Harbor. 72 Gen. Nelson Miles, then commanding general of th

compounded the confusion by leaving for the field, surrendering 

control over the mobilization and Army-Navy coordination to the 

of war and the bureau chiefs. 

It was perhaps inevitable, given this lack of any effective 

mechanism for interservice cooperation in Washington below th

tarial level, that confusion at the operational level should have 

between the naval and expeditionary forces. Shafter's force a

William Sampson's fleet wrangled bitterly over how they were j

overcome Cervera's fleet at Santiago and reduce the garrison ho

town. Communications were exchanged not only between the gen

the admiral but also between their respective headquarters in Wa

The matter eventually reached the president, and Shafter was to

President directs that you confer with Admiral Sampson at 

cooperation in taking Santiago. After the fullest exchange of vi

will agree upon the time and manner of attack. "73 This h

injunction was not enough to overcome service prerogative

representatives were excluded from the Spanish garrison's 

ceremony, and further acrimony over the disposition of Spanish 

taken as prizes in the harbor was avoided only through th

intervention of the secretary of war. 

Interservice conflict during this brief war, as petty as it may a

the surface, was the understandable outward manifestation 

organizations in the full flower of their own autonomy. The task 

however--a large-scale amphibious invasion--implied a coo

between ground and naval forces that was the first hint 

time-honored division of labor between land and sea might be 

down and that interservice support based on occasional improvisa

a doctrine that was no longer appropriate. Although that realizatio

in the future, sober reflection in the aftermath of the war sugge

something ought to be done to improve mutual cooperation bet

service sovereignties. It was in that spirit that a Joint Board was c

1903 by the respective service secretaries, to be composed of fo

officers from the Army and Navy who would meet as often as nec
tion for the advances made in the Prussian staff system, already 

some Army circles well before this, received another boo

publication in 1895 of a book entitled The Brain of an Army

Wilkinson, a prominent British analyst of military affairs. Th

the first detailed exposition of the Prussian system to appea

and it had a powerful impact on both sides of the Atlantic. 

United States and Britain, whose own organizational deficienc

sharply highlighted by the Boer War, the book's clearly w

understandable prose helped focus public discussion on the mo

by Scharnhorst and now brought to fruition under Helmuth yon 

Otto yon Bismarck. The English parliamentary system, with 

of party discipline and collective cabinet responsibility, was a

the Prussian prescription without undue difficulty, and the Imp

Staff became a reality. In the United States, however, its eq

political tradition, which viewed with intense suspicion any c

of uniformed authority, promised a far more difficult stru

anything so "alien" as a system modeled on that possessed 

whose government appeared synonymous with military autocra

The outcome of that struggle might well have been differe

been for the leadership of Elihu Root, who from 1899 to 190

the strongest and most able secretaries of war in the Arm

Originally appointed by President William McKinley to direc

following in the wake of the airing of the logistical debac

Root's political standing was enhanced not only by his own r

competence and probity but also by the enthusiastic support 

from Theodore Roosevelt following his accession to the presid

As secretary, Root had the further benefit of an outstanding a

William Harding Carter, who had won the Medal of Hono

Indian wars and provided much of the professional advice 

critical in winning congressional support for reform. The cau

was aided as well by the political climate, which recognized 

deficiencies had made clear the need for improvement, especia

the widening demands of policing the territories now acquired 

In the Philippines, for example, a native insurrection was alre
educational system and to serve as an interim General Staff. T

wise move, relying as it did on the precedents already estab

Sherman's schools of application as well as the Naval War Coll

seventeen years earlier. The second and third elements were mor

Root proposed in 1902 a formal legislative package that did awa

post of commanding general of the army, substituting a chief of s

army, with authority over both the line and staff departme

authority he was to exercise on behalf of the secretary of wa

agency by which he would exercise it was the General Staff of 

Rather than being permanent, General Staff officers (forty o

number) were to be chosen from among the best of the regular li

and detailed to the staff for up to four years. 

In his letter of transmittal to the Senate, Root spoke directly t

point at issue: "The General Staff scheme is not a new pr

because officers of the Army have always been utilized to a cer

in this business . . . but they have had no legal status. Neithe

custom places the preparation of plans for national defense in th

any particular officer or body of officers, and what is everybody

is nobody's business .... It has usually been because American 

rises superior to system, or rather absence of system, that di

been avoided" (emphasis is added). 76 

The main point many Congressmen were likely to see at issue

was the effect that such a reorganization might have upon 

constituencies or on long-established working relationships. An

staff scheme necessarily involved the redistribution of power a

the bureau chiefs with their direct linkages to Congress. Equal

was the business of placing overall supervisory authority in the 

the chief of staff, a move intended to resolve the ambiguous d

line and staff that had existed for over seventy-five years be

secretary and the commanding general of the army. The bure

stood to lose a great deal and, from his highly personal perspecti

Gen. Nelson A. Miles, commanding general of the army and 

Honor recipient, whose confused campaign against the Spanish c

had not measured up to his previous gallantry against the Apache
adapted to the monarchies of the Old World .... Unlike our P

the sovereigns of Spain, Italy, Austria, Turkey, Germany a

are trained from their earliest boyhood with a view to co

armies when they arrive at the head of government; and a Ge

Corps such as suggested might be better adapted for those 

than for our Republic. The scheme is revolutionary, casts to 

the lessons of experience, and abandons methods which su

carried us through the most memorable epochs of our history

Although General Miles's testimony certainly assumed in 

an uneven knowledge of comparative military systems at leas

own, opposition to the proposal was sufficiently strong that 

did not press for the issue to be brought to a vote during tha

acted instead upon a suggestion by Major Carter and arr

number of distinguished retired officers, such as Lt. Ge

Schofield (himself a former commanding general of the arm

Gen. Wesley M. Merritt, to testify in favor of the bill later in t

Equally important in Root's campaign to educate the sena

written statements by senior field commanders, such as Brig. 

W. Davis, which strongly advocated the bill's adoption. One le

Army War College president, Maj. Gen. S. B. M. Young, wen

state that it was "a matter of conviction among all the older 

the position of commanding general was anomalous; similarl

opinion "quite unanimous among the general officers of tod

bureau system was unsatisfactory. 78 From the steadily accumu

of this evidence, as Carter said, "it will be seen that the me

Senate Military Committee were being rapidly disabused of 

the Commanding General of the Army represented the advan

the Army on the subject of our military administration and 

Although the final act did not include all the consolidation

bureaus that had been requested, the bill creating the Genera

Army was passed by Congress on February 14, 1903. The 

officially came into existence on the fifteenth of August the sa

one week after the retirement of General Miles. 

Aside from his own retirement, the general's worst fe

realized: the system created was far from being close to 
would be preserved, however much incremental gains and los

affect individual interests. With the aid of hindsight, one can se

volume of the debate on this point was significantly lower than m

been expected, especially when contrasted with the dire misgiv

had colored much of the constitutional ratification process. A c

experience had apparently given some confidence that the norm o

control was well established and a military dictatorship unlikely 

system proposed by Elihu Root. But how, then, to explain the con

misgivings that occurred at about the same time when naval gen

advocates were accused of wanting to "Prussianize the Navy"----

when the Army was traditionally the agency that in the popular im

posed the greatest threat to civilian control? The difference may 

been a function of constituency interests: regular appropriations 

construction concentrated in the large port cities during the Mahan

age of a "Navy second to none" represented a return on invest

ought not to be threatened by the uncertainty of a new and p

powerful agency--therefore a naval general staff was rejected. T

by contrast, had only a marginal impact on a few constituencies 

throughout the country: the General Staff could conceivably threa

of those interests, but both the stakes and their potential cons

were much less significant than those represented at the time by 

Seen in this light, "civilian control" was simply a code word 

interests of the affected constituencies, their elected representat

their bureaucratic allies. 

The General Staff was not, however, to be a panacea for all th

problems. Instead, as Richard Leopold pointed out, it was "burde

unanticipated administrative duties and the old duplication of func

A constant flow of officers from the staff to the line and back 

always attained. A long period of building and experimentation lay 

It would not be until 1912, for example, that a showdown bet

adjutant general, Maj. Gen. Fred C. Ainsworth, and Secretary 

Henry L. Stimson would show that bureau autonomy had ended d

well as de jure. Congress, having created the General Staff, was d

to surrender its function of constitutional watchdog, and its scruti
reinforced and shaped later organizational changes. What 

more profound was that the Army had taken a fundamental 

step in its own organizational philosophy---one that directly 

outlook toward command. In previous evolutionary stages, 

grown in complexity to the point that unity of command requ

agencies merely to cope with added functions. This functio

had increased in scope and complexity to the point tha

seemingly demanded tight control from the top. These were mu

organizational ideas that characterized American managerial th

time. Yet in the military context, centralization led para

inefficiency and even a loss of unity of command unless acco

steps to coordinate hierarchical authority at several levels--in e

of decentralization as the commander's authority was red

nonhierarchical ways. 

R is interesting, for example, that the writings of Carter

other reformers from both services are filled with reference

their clear understanding that centralized authority in the bu

form of industrial rationalism that had reached the effective 

military application unless accompanied by a corresponding 

coordinative authority. They also appear to have understo

coordinative authority, if it was to be effective in a military co

exist at several levels beginning at the top. Had the general s

services been formed at about the same time and in the same 

reformers assumed they would be--coordinative authority mig

cross-service linkages from the beginning. That was not to be

took the lead in forming staffs all the way down to brigade a

levels in ways that allowed its officers to be trained around a 

they were extensions of a commander's authority and not a sub

The test of efficiency for the staff would be twofold: first, the k

of labor (personnel, logistics, operations, and so on) must be 

handled and, second, there must be effective coordination b

elements in areas of overlapping responsibility. The same prin

also be applied in coordination and liaison between staffs of su

adjacent units. As a consequence, the staff became the prefe
purpose of counteracting an uncoordinated process of bur

centralization. The motivation for this effort, however, was the 

that which had generated the reforms of Gneisenau and Scharnhor

balance was struck between centralization and decentraliza

between the need to manage more effectively the complexities o

while preserving and extending the unity of command. 

World War I and Perspectives on Service Autonomy 

World War I produced the first direct American involvem

large-scale war on a foreign continent. Its significance for the Arm

Navy lay in the fact that the demands of raising, equipping, tran

and supplying the combat forces in their most severe test to date 

for once, result in an initial collapse of the command structure. In

reforms in both departments that had taken place earlier in th

--the creation of the Army General Staff and the consolidation 

responsibility in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations--resu

highly creditable performance during the eighteen months that U.

forces were in combat. Naturally enough, the test of war would su

need for some changes in these arrangements, but the changes 

made were essentially refinements of the earlier initiatives and 

represent fundamental realignments of the command structure 

service. Of more significance for the present analysis were th

learned, or at least suggested, during World War 1 concerning the 

twentieth-century warfare. The advent of new weapons systems, 

which came into embryonic existence during this war, would 

complicate the problem of command and control. The most n

these weapons was certainly the airplane, and its further dev

would eventually call into question the principles of service auton

had been developed over the previous century. A brief revie

effects of World War I is therefore in order. 

For the Navy, the mission was twofold: reinforce a British n

was in crisis owing to the depredations of submarine warfare and e

transports carrying some two million American troops across the 
importance of command of the sea, but not his prescriptions 

achieve that dominance. The battleships that were forming the b

the new American Navy would become less important than 

which were originally intended as screening vessels for the bat

whose speed and flexibility now gave them a critical importanc

escort and antisubmarine warfare. 

The naval command structure was forced to adapt to these 

changes before having fully absorbed the impact of its own l

reforms. The legislation creating the billet authorized for the ch

operations (CNO) had just been passed in 1915, and then over t

objections of President Woodrow Wilson's secretary of the nav

Daniels. To both Wilson and Daniels, any form of strategic 

strong central authority smacked of warmongering: "Daniel

when he first became Secretary was to convert the naval ser

military organization into a vast educational institution special

inculcation of civic values and moral principles, not unlike a 

organization for adults. ''82 

Nevertheless, under Adm. William S. Benson, the slow star

come as the rush of wartime operations propelled a steady cons

functions under the CNO. By the end of 1917, for example, tha

ten sections dealing with everything from general policy to ship 

and armed guards on merchant vessels. Logistics were the respo

a Division of Material, while coastal areas and ports were a

through a system of naval districts. 83 

The war at sea demanded both a concentration of for

application of long-range strategic control unprecedented in na

The wireless radio, first developed for limited naval use only a 

than fifteen years before, now assumed a critical combat role. 

naval communications stations on shore quickly grew into glob

as messages went to and from every class of naval vessel. So 

the system become to ongoing operations that radio-directi

decoding of signals, and intelligence analysis became vital 

naval shore stations: the results of their analysis would then be 

back to the forces at sea for operational exploitation. This was 
technological changes involved a far greater degree of lo

control than had ever been tried before, the payoff was the 

success that characterized the use of destroyer screens a

all-important troop transports. 84 

For the Army, it soon became apparent that the developm

General Staff, beyond its basic organizational structure, 

embryonic. The Wilson administration, anxious to avoid any app

warlike provocation, had gone so far as to prohibit any detaile

planning for possible American involvement in the conflic

disturbing was the situation in the five major service bureaus (Q

ter, Medical, Engineer, Ordnance, and Signal) which, despite the

subordination to the General Staff, were still accustomed to ope

a pronounced degree of autonomy. Under the pressures of 

wartime procurement and logistical requirements, these bureau

to adjust, but they soon found themselves competing with each 

scarce resources: "When the Army went into the Nation's mark

the vast body of supplies needed for the war, it went not a

agency, seeing the problem of supply as a whole, but as fiv

bureaus competing with each other, as well as with the other gre

of the Government and the Allies, for manufacturing art

materials, industrial facilities, labor, fuel, power and transportatio

Under fire, the War Department was forced to take immediate 

early February 1918, the War Department General Staff was r

into five divisions: an Executive Office, War Plans, Operations

and Supply, and Storage and Traffic. Other measures consolidat

Staff control over logistical matters and centralized procurement 

headquarters of all but specialized items. The chief of staff, Gen. 

March a hard-driving officer whose reputed "ruthlessness" wa

as necessary as that of Gen. George C. Marshall a generation 

given additional authority "to carry out the Army program." 

mandate, he proceeded to eliminate weak performers in all ar

staff and to create new agencies to deal with emergent technolog

aviation and chemical warfare. Distinguished officers, such as G

W. Goethals, were recalled from retirement to join the Genera
of a wartime situation made more difficult by a lack of 

planning, the very purpose for which the General Staff ha

been created. It was also evident, however, that the req

operating an expeditionary force on another continent deman

of similarly wide-ranging authority to Gen. John J. Pershing, 

selected commander of the American Expeditionary Force 

selection called to mind the old controversy between the 

general of the army and the senior field commander• Since 

been clear that the chief of staff would not "command" per 

was the grant of functional autonomy to the senior field com

reconciled with the increasingly centralized authority now pos

chief of staff?. The answer continued to be elusive, and a pa

characterized the relationship between March and Pershing t

war. Pershing, for example, was not at all reluctant to que

instructions or to support his own staff in demanding mo

weapons and equipment already in the production pipeline. 

high-handedness, fi'om the chief of statVs perspective, even 

back-channel communications to the secretary of war. 

In defending Pershing's claim to virtually independent c

overseas activity, Gen. James G. Harbord, formerly the AEF 

wrote some years a~erward: "General Pershing commanded the 

under the President and Secretary of War, as the President's 

military power or person was interposed between them .... 

war has ever been fought commanded by a staff officer in a d

• . . The organization effected in our War Department . . 

preserves the historic principle that the line of authority runs 

the highest in the land to the highest in the field" (emphasis a

That principle was not as clear to some people as it appa

General Harbord, but his comment nevertheless represents 

lesson that emerged from the war. The matter of command w

to be a source of controversy whenever American forces 

deployed overseas, and troubling questions had to be faced 

extent of operational authority granted to the commander. A 

descent in the command philosophy articulated by Harbord 
Otto L. Nelson pointed out that Harbord's statement was evo

deeper principle not only of command but of military organi

general: "In this controversy over jurisdiction, there arose a prin

as important as that of control--pride of position. Span of contro

increase functional specialization and in so doing sets up of a 

many rungs in the ladder of command and authority. Pride o

works to step over these subordinate rungs and insists that no co

or controlling restrictions emanate from any authority except th

heads, and only then from the chief in person. ''88 

That distinction--between pride of position and span of contr

be at the heart of a number of seemingly larger issues, and 

transcend both time and differing service positions. 

However unsettling the problem of high command may have b

was good reason for the Army to take pride in its accomplis

World War I, especially in the refinement of battle staffs. Shortl

AEF's arrival in France, Pershing organized his staff along 

suggested by a close study of the staff systems prevailing in the B

French field armies. Under that organizational line-up the staff w

down into four major functional groups, each headed by a prin

officer known as an assistant chief of staff. Thus, the assistan

staff, G-l, handled personnel, G-2 had intelligence responsibil

was the operations officer, and G-4 was the command Iogisti

arrangement was replicated down through the division level; bri

battalions had similar but smaller "S-level" staffs, arranged a

same numerical groupings. In slightly modified form, this syste

in the Army down to the present. Harbord summarized its ope

follows: "General Headquarters... concerned itself only with th

phases of control. Under the supervision of the commander in 

pursuant to clearly determined policies, the assistant chiefs of 

coordinated by the chief of staff, issued instructions and gav

direction to the great combat units and to services of supply

always in touch with the manner and promptness of their fulfillm

system of direct responsibility contemplated secrecy in preparation

decision in emergency and coordinated action in execution" 
communications requirements caused by large frontages, inc

bers of troops, and the need for more precise tactical co

remarkably lethal battlefields created by artillery and the mac

the Meuse-Argonne offensive alone, for example, the two ar

corps, and thirty-three divisions of the AEF required communi

twenty-five hundred miles of field wire per week. Some 

ubiquity of the telephone and telegraph can be seen in the figu

by the Signal Corps at war's end. Nine thousand telep

connected to permanent lines, 134 permanent telegraph o

maintained, and 273 telephone exchanges established. The sys

approximately 12 million telegraph messages, 1.6 million l

calls, and the staggering total of 47 million local telephone c

of this in little more than six months of actual combat. 90 

Yet even this was not enough to meet the unprecedented 

tactical flexibility caused by the primacy of the defense, aris

machine gun's extension of the dominance of rifled musketry 

the Civil War. Although the field telephone was a great impro

the telegraph, it could not begin to solve the control problem

the need for infantry to fight by dispersion and movemen

because the telephone was a fixed instrument. As convenient 

commanders to converse by telephone with superiors and subo

onset of an engagement was accompanied by a loss of contro

had been the situation in land combat through the ages. Wirele

far more useful at sea than on land at this stage, although 

principal headquarters of the AEF were also connected by this m

as by telegraph and telephone. The fast-growing dependence of 

on both these means of communication, however, led to the fir

efforts to derive intelligence from the use of the electromagne

Consequently, World War I is usually thought of as the starting 

history of modem electronic warfare, as both sides sought to 

own communications while exploiting those of the enemy. 9t 

But the principal artifact of the First World War that wou

future of service autonomy and the existence of separat

structures was not radio-telecommunications, but the airplane. 
was the need for air power and an air service to run it. Both the 

the Navy would be forced to come to grips with that issue in fu

ways. For the Navy, the airplane completed the picture that ha

emerge with the maturation of the submarine as a weapo

Henceforth, the Navy would fight in three mediums of ocea

subsurface, surface, and above the surface. The Army faced 

difficult problem integrating air power onto a battlefield alread

by the tank and the substitution of machine power for muscle p

notion of the strategic use of air power in an Army accustomed 

in terms of divisional frontages had not yet arisen. 

But air power and the problems of total war in the twentie

were only distant thunder as World War I ended. The forces c

by the Army and the Navy were at that moment the strong

nation's history, and the services themselves were enjoying th

completion that had been brought about by more than a 

autonomy. Autonomy had nurtured these organizations, had giv

character of their own, had established a tradition of victorious 

outcomes on land and sea, and had finally provided paradigm

exercise of power in those operational environments. These wer

achievements, and they would continue to exercise a formative 

Army and the Navy turned increasingly toward the challenges of 
pgpg

taken millions of lives and unalterably changed the 

political order of Europe. Military strategy was not 

central focus of the immediate postwar period, but it e

a kind of awakening as the proponents of the doct

power--almost always capitalized as Air Power--p

new gospel promising that aircraft technology would c

stalemate of warfare fought to the point of exh

surface-bound armies and navies. Like the airplane itse

doctrine had important institutional and organization

tions. Its more extreme advocates openly suggested tha

the air made surface forces vulnerable whether on land 

though traditionalists in both the Army and the Navy c

dispute those claims in every way, there was a growing 

that the potency of air power was quickly coming to 

capacity of either parent service to deal with it. 

That realization generated pressures at two levels. 

service sought to exploit the fast-developing capa

aviation to achieve new applications of the old p

combined arms. For the Navy, this meant a greatly 

command and control problem as it sought to adapt 

and aircraft to the new imperatives of three-mediu

beneath and above the ocean, as well as on its surfa

Army, the obvious ability of the airplane to support a

the ground made it an attractive adjunct of tradition

bombardment; more troubling was the apparent p

land-based aircraft for long-range strategic bombardme

bility that, if fully exploited, threatened to alter long-

Army roles and missions beyond the point of recog

strong as these intraservice tensions were, the airplane 

generate fundamental conflict at the inter-service le

tional service autonomy was based on a clear divisio

between land and sea forces: the airplane fit neither 
Navy, advocacy of American air power was most closely iden

the public career of Brig. Gen. William ("Billy") Mitchell. Wo

would force the services to come to terms with air power, as w

other realities of true global combat--such as national mobili

amphibious operations--which also transcended usual service d

The process by which that adaptation took place changed accept

of service autonomy; henceforth, the doctrine of "mutual coope

the sine qua non of interservice relationships was replaced by 

command" in the prosecution of the war. After the war, this ne

became the basis for a redefinition of service autonomy, a pr

culminated in the passage of the National Security Act of 194

establishment of a centralized Department of Defense. 

The Interwar Period: 

Toward a Paradigm of Air Warfare 

One of the most frequently quoted passages of Brig. G

Mitchell's memoirs concerns his reflections as commander of 

Army Air Service in the St. Mihiel salient in World War I: "

over the lines gave me a much clearer impression of how the ar

laid out than any amount of travelling around on the ground

significant thing to me was that we should cross the lines 

contending armies in a few minutes in our airplane, whereas the a

been locked in the struggle, immovable, powerless to advance 

years .... It was as though they kept knocking their heads again

wall, until their brains were dashed out. They got nowhere, as far 

the war was concerned. ''1 

Mitchell, who had clashed repeatedly during the war with 

Pershing, was to become the apostle of air power thereafter, ar

air power was the solution to the strategic stalemate cause

enormous increase in the defensive power of conventional we

both speeches and magazine articles, as well as in two books

Force: The Keystone of National Defense and Winged Defe

Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power, Econ
capital ships were vulnerable to destruction from the air. As 

that demonstration was to the Navy hierarchy, Mitchell's h

calls for autonomy of the air arm were equally disturbing 

service. When, in the aftermath of several air crashes in Sept

he openly declared the leadership of the War and Navy depar

guilty of negligence in the administration of their respectiv

Mitchell was court-martialed, convicted, and allowed to resi

service. Air power thus acquired a central place in public c

and a martyr of heroic proportions as well. 2 

To the public and political debate on air power, there was a

1930s the most comprehensive statement on air power yet 

Giulio Douhet, through his book The Command of the Air, 

dominant influence on the development of air power, althou

had far more meaning for the fraternity of airmen in both the U

and Europe than for the public. Intrinsic to his writings was 

vision of airmen that a way had been found to break the stalem

from the land paradigms of Jomini and Clausewitz, as well 

power prescriptions of Mahan: land warfare had become symbo

trenches of Flanders, while the meeting of the great navies at 

proven not only that such engagements could be tactically inco

also that Continental powers could withstand the effects 

blockade. For Douhet, the land and the sea were environme

that lent themselves to the creation of "fortified lines of defe

had reached a state of virtual impregnability prior to the a

power. Now these lines could be bypassed: "The airplane h

freedom of action and direction; it can fly to and from any 

compass in the shortest time--in a straight line--by any ro

expedient. Nothing man can do on the surface of the earth 

with a plane in flight, moving freely in the third dimensi

influences which have conditioned and characterized warfa

beginning are powerless to affect aerial action. ''3 

If there was no effective defense against aerial bomb

followed that the enemy's war-making potential was the p

against which air forces should be directed. Once command o
inherently offensive and decisive nature of air power. 

1. An adequate national defense 

air. 

2. Air power having obliterated 

noncombatants, population and 

installations, should be the focal 

meant having effective comma

the distinction between comba

industrial centers, rather than 

points for aerial bombardment. 

3. Enemy air forces should be destroyed on the ground by 

their airfields, support facilities, and aircraft production centers. 

4. Surface forces should maintain a defensive stance along expos

to stabilize the situation until the air forces had achieved decisive 

5. The primary air force plane should be the biggest bomber 

longest range; only secondary attention need be given to sp

aircraft or one's own air defense. 5 

Applying these principles could give a country the means to 

command of the air: 

To have command of the air means to be in a position to 

offensive power so great it defies human imagination. It means 

able to cut an enemy's army and navy off from their bas

operation and nullify their chances of winning a war. It m

complete protection of one's own country, the efficient operati

one's army and navy, and peace of mind to live and work in s

In short it means to be in a position to win. To be defeated in th

on the other hand, is finally to be defeated and to be at the me

the enemy, with no chance at all of defending oneself, compel

accept whatever terms he sees fit to dictate. This is the meani

the "command of the air." (Emphasis added) 6 

As revolutionary as Douhet and his proponents thought this do

be, it of course owed important intellectual debts to earlier 

paradigms. In a provocative book tracing the doctrinal impact of 

on Army Air Force planners after World War II, Perry M. Smith 

that Douhet's doctrines served the same purposes for the Air F

Mahan's prescriptions had for the Navy a generation earlier: just

of service autonomy, funding for service-dominant "decisive" 
Army Air Force "leaders and planners were reluctant to divert 

the close support of [ground] troops or to the defensi

interception. ''7 This adaptation of doctrines suggests that, unlik

in other sciences, strategic paradigms did not wholly replace 

or render the preceding ideas obsolete. Instead, these 

perspectives of land, sea, and air combat tended to represent 

old doctrines geared to new circumstances. 

Nevertheless, the air paradigm continued to have important 

for service command structures during the interwar period. Arm

enthusiasts were at the forefront of efforts to create a separate 

hoping to achieve "autonomy for air" under a unitary command 

have coordinate status with the War and Navy departments. Th

this idea is not hard to discover. The Royal Air Force, 

American partnership was closest, had been formed during the 

Hugh Trenchard's leadership during this period, it continued t

model of development for American airmen. Douhet's thou

matter were equally explicit, and he had the satisfaction of 

Italian government follow his advice in the 1920s, when it set 

departments for the army, navy, and air force under a sin

ministry. In the United States, however, the Army's historical 

with complex command structures led in two directions with r

power. Traditionalists tended to view the air arm in much th

they viewed other arms of combat power: its development 

include separate status as a combat branch, but its integration 

place within the outlines of the existing command structure. Th

Army acceded to the establishment of a separate Army Air Co

and eventually included in its hierarchy a deputy chief of staf

an assistant secretary of war for air; it would, however, oppose 

War II the creation of a separate air force department. 

Army aviators thus inherited both the Army staff tradit

revolutionary perspectives of air power. In the delineati

structures that accompanied the growth of the Army Air Corp

principles of specialization, subordination, and coordinativ

guided the formation of the Air Staff in ways that were scarcely 
dimension than ever before. Appearing before the Morrow Board 

Army aviator Maj. Horace M. Hickam provided a remarkably clear 

that perspective: 

Nothing short of a department of defense . . . with a new ra

commanders, officers skilled in the operations of armies, navies

air forces as our generals now operate infantry, cavalry and arti

with the necessary staff nothing short of that will mee

situation; . . . I believe we must develop a general staff wh

skilled in the handling of armies, navies and air forces, and wh

capable of laying out a campaign, and of using all these forces, 

separately or with one another. ~ 

The strategic concept of the Army's aviators was thus reinfo

both ideology and organizational vision. To these two factors sh

added a third, which fit in neatly with the Army's traditional acco

tion to the norm of strategic control. As aircraft technology wa

pushed in the 1930s toward ever larger and more powerful airfra

consonance with Douhet's doctrine of the big bomber--air-to

radios underwent a parallel growth in range and effectiveness

bomber fleets could thus be effectively controlled from the grou

the beginning of their existence. Strategic doctrine, an envisioned 

of strategic organization and strategic control, provided mutually su

influences in the formative period of the American Air Force. 

The air arm of the Navy developed in a much more contained 

that it was kept firmly attached to the body of its parent servi

obvious potential of the airplane for naval reconnaissance and an

fine warfare, fully demonstrated during World War I, led to the cre

the Bureau of Aeronautics in 1921 under Rear Adm. William A. 

Admiral Moffett was to head the bureau until his death in 1933, pr

be, as Robin Higham put it, a kind of Hyman Rickover of 

skillfully using the inherent powers of a bureau chief, assiduously 

Congress and public opinion regarding the appeal of aviati

constantly building aviation as a function of naval power rather 

substitute for it. 9 Moffett's political acumen enabled naval avia

only to develop its own equipment and personnel but also to exp

new potential of the aircraft carrier, three of which had been adde
While Army aviators continued their obsession with long-r

bombing during the interwar years--to the neglect of the clo

of ground troops that was being enthusiastically explored b

Luflwaffe--the Navy developed carrier-based airplanes as an 

the battle fleet's traditional role in securing command of t

Pearl Harbor, the guns of the battleship were considered 

naval weapon, but their 16-mile range was gradually augment

planes which had an effective range of 150 miles from th

fleet. Carriers attached to the fleet provided the launching 

these planes, as well as for the fighters providing air cove

over the battle line itself. Consequently, the carrier force oft

screening element to seek out and engage enemy forc

battleships closed in for the knockout blow. Improvement

planes and the ordnance they carried would after 1942 turn th

its head. Equally significant, however, were the electronic 

allowed the locus of control of the task force to be shi

battleship to the carrier. By the late 1930s, the marriage of sh

and long-distance aviation radio had permitted an unpreceden

precision to be exercised in the control of aircraft, and it was 

the aftermath of its Midway victory, that would be the fir

resulting impact upon warfare at the tactical level. 

Air power and its implications were the major elemen

interservice relationships during the postwar period, evid

deliberations of the Joint Board of the Army and the Navy, w

reconstituted after World War I. Its members included the ch

the Army and the chief of naval operations, their principal 

the directors of their respective war planning divisions. The 

activities prior to World War I had been confined to litt

ceremonial matters, but the Treaty of Versailles had left Jap

strengthened territorial position which, with the advent o

threatened American possessions in the Pacific. The Pacific h

considered by the Navy to be its own preserve, but the p

Army garrison in the Philippines demanded joint planning by 

Throughout the interwar period Army and Navy planners 
primarily to protect home territory and vital possessions within e

supporting distance of home territory." Even less was accomplis

planning a strategy that took into account the forces and logistical 

likely to be available) I 

The problems of protecting the Western Pacific or the Panama 

were made even more difficult by the absence of any effective plan 

command of combatant forces if more than one service was involve

with the advent of air arms in each service, those overlaps becam

more likely. The traditional doctrine was, of course, mutual coop

which in theory meant little more than the traditional separat

functions at the water's edge and the invocation of good fellowsh

common sense in practice. The doctrine could not, however, 

serious conflicts when separate service functions became intertwi

had indeed been the case at Santiago de Cuba during the war with S

possible solution was to select a leader such as General Pershin

would be placed in supreme command of all forces that might be a

to an expeditionary force, but would exercise that authority t

subordinate-level commanders. This was the principle of "un

command," a concept so threatening to traditional service autonomy 

operational sphere that it acquired an almost pejorative meaning as 

thrashed out in Joint Board and Joint Chiefs of Staff proceedings 

next generation. At the first opportunity, for example, a p

committee of the Joint Board recommended against unity of comm

favor of a new wrinkle on the old doctrine: "The committee is 

opinion that in joint Army and Navy operations the paramount inte

one or the other branch of the National forces will be evident, and 

cases intelligent and hearty cooperation.., will give as effective re

would be obtained by the assignment of a commander for th

operation, which assignment might cause jealousy and dissatisfaction

Nevertheless, by 1927, some progress had been made in inter

planning, as evidenced by the publication of a new edition of th

Board's guidelines, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, and a 

ORANGE war plan. Now recognized were three principles f

coordination of armies and navies in pursuit of common objectives: 
other were temporarily placed under the operational con

service commander exercising paramount interest. 

3. Unity of command: when the objective required the h

subordination of all component forces under a single com

those instances where such command was specifically author

president. 

Although an important doctrinal barrier had been breached

decade gave ample evidence of service reluctance to come to 

the new theory. By 1938, a series of further changes to Jo

recognized unity of command and mutual cooperation as eq

principles of joint operations to be used as the situation dictat

course, meant that mutual cooperation was both rule and reali

from being an effective tool for interservice planning, this philo

little more than a nonaggression pact concluded between the 

Navy of the United StatesJ 3 

The ability of the Army and Navy to plan joint oper

movement for economy in government, and, most of all, the p

air arm attracted consistent congressional attention throu

mid-1920s--and virtually none at all thereafter, especially with 

of the Great Depression. A high-water mark of a sort was reach

when Congress considered the bill that eventually resulted in 

recognition of an Army Air Corps that was kept firmly 

traditional structure. While studying the bill, the House Milit

Committee published a report drawn up by the G-3 Division (

of the War Department General Staff in what one can only assu

of its fiat contradictions of official statements, was a sudde

candor: 

It is believed that there are outstanding questions at issu

between the Army and Navy on which no agreement h

reached, or the agreement arrived at is in the nature of an in

compromise. Some of the most important are: 

• The question of unity of command in combined op

maneuvers, or war plans. 
In light of subsequent events, this testimony ranks as a rem

accurate assessment of the prevailing state of service autonomy a

often confused and confusing effects of the air power paradigm 

point in history. 

These relationships would not change materially through the end 

1930s, although controversies persisted at the intraservice and inter

levels as growing air power threatened existing hierarchies. For the 

officers who later came to play key roles in the wartime and p

services--including such men as H. H. Arnold, Jimmy Doolittle

Mitscher, and Arthur Radford--these conflicts were a formative 

sional experience: 

These and many other officers, when they were later generals 

admirals, never forgot the old animosities and the personal bittern

These memories contributed to the intense nature of the struggle 

unification] when it erupted again in its full fury during and a

World War II .... Never after the 1920's were the Navy men abl

view any proposal for the re-organization of the armed force

much more than a shrewd plot designed to enhance the size 

prominence of some other military service at the Navy's expe

This suspicion was not infrequently justified, but it was present e

when wholly unjustified) 5 

It was not therefore surprising that "unity of command" was 

achieved in the interwar period or that "mutual cooperation" shoul

been the limited creature of service autonomy that it was. 

The one place where the doctrine came together in combinatio

major installations of both services---complete with their respect

arms--was at Pearl Harbor. The writings of Roberta Wohlstetter 

Harbor: Warning and Decision) and Gordon W. Prange (At Daw

Slept) have explored in a wealth of detail the intelligence and oper

failures that led to that disaster; both authors, however, place a p

emphasis on a more fundamental failure of command. Both Gen. Wa

Short and Adm. H. E. Kimmel were all that might have been hoped 

commanders operating under "mutual cooperation." Conscientiou

courteous with each other, they maintained a working relationship th
united only in a common failure to employ their air assets 

Kimmei left uncovered by long-range reconnaissance aircraf

quadrant used by Nagumo's carriers for their approach, 

grouped all his aircraft together on the ground to avoid a chim

from saboteurs, thereby exposing them to utter devastation from 

That such mistakes could be made in the face of increasin

diplomatic news and specific warnings from Washington is 

evidence of individual failings by the on-scene commanders as 

of the end product of limited service perspectives. To para

Root, who was also concerned with limited perspectives, coo

everybody's business and what was everybody's business w

business. Cloaked in the mantle of organizational autonom

representatives of the service sovereignties thus received an un

vivid object lesson in the deficiencies of the doctrine 

cooperation. Equally apparent was the vulnerability of surfa

aerial attack: if Douhet would not be entirely vindicated by 

World War II, Billy Mitchell certainly had been in the fi

American involvement in the conflict. By demonstrating that t

of air power had progressed from theory to reality, and by sho

doctrine of mutual cooperation had foundered somewhere in th

Battleship Row, the attack on Pearl Harbor taught the servic

were no longer in business for themselves. 

World War II and the Search for Unity of C

More than fifty years after its end, World War 

undiminished stature as a watershed event in human history. A

other consequences, the demands of total war were to have a la

upon the command structure of the armed forces. A complete 

those changes is well beyond the scope of this study, but the

was to bring about a radical transformation in the norms o

service autonomy. The services would evolve quickly from 

decentralized and utterly separate entities into well-develope

that deployed vast land, sea, and air forces in operatio
of some magnitude in an age that did not yet know the comput

impressive as these logistical feats were, the political objective of t

demanded the complete defeat in battle of geographically disperse

fanatically determined enemies, an objective that presupposed the n

invade and occupy their territory. 

The scope of these requirements led to contradictory demands. 

one hand, the need to conserve and allocate scarce resources 

different theaters of operations, as well as the need to maintain 

policy and strategic control, argued for a greater centralization of au

in Washington than ever before. On the other hand, not even the rema

advances in electronic communications would allow remote contro

global war that, in addition to its other precedent-shattering aspects, 

feature an almost unimaginable increase in mobility. Therefore, a pr

need for operational flexibility required authority to be decent

efficiently to commanders in the field. In striking the balance b

centralization and decentralization, the services also had to come to 

with a new perspective of warfare itself, in which everything seemed 

related to everything else. In many ways, the operational art dev

during the war appeared to justify the prophecies of early air 

advocates such as Maj. Horace Hickam, in that land, sea, and air 

became a combined arms team at the level of grand strategy. 

The predominant effect of the war on service command structur

thus the operation of the dynamic of functional integration at three 

the high command, the unified and component commands that were 

in the theaters of operations, and, most of all, the operational 

themselves. Running through these levels was the common thre

wire--of communications electronics, which came into its own 

technological tool that could tie diverse command echelons tog

providing an extension of command authority that was, for once, eq

its assigned battlefield task. Although the age of telecommunication

begun with the Civil War telegraph and had developed still further w

addition of the telephone and wireless radio during World War I, 

War II was the first conflict in which command and control assum

modem electronic outlines. The marriage of organization and telecom
to coordinate those activities with each other and with the A

again, a contrast in approaches was evident. For the Army, alw

embrace hierarchical organizational principles, the General Sta

1903 had proven not to be a panacea. The General Staff had 

able to overcome the institutional resistance of the long-establish

or the entrenched powers of the chiefs of the traditional Arm

(infantry, artillery, cavalry, and so on). Worse yet, the steady ac

of functional areas coming under headquarters supervision had 

the interwar period to an excessive centralization that was now 

unmanageable. The process recalled J. F. C. Fuller's classic war

subject: "The staff becomes an all-consuming bureaucracy, a pa

squirting ink into every corner. Unless pruned with an axe, it wi

a fakir's mango tree, and the more it grows, the more it overs

general. It creates work, it creates officers, and above all it crea

spirit. No sooner is a war declared than the general-in-chi

himself a Gulliver in Lilliput, tied down to his office st

innumerable threads woven out of the brains of his staff. ''17 

Shortly after being sworn in as Army chief of staff on Se

1939--the same day World War II began--Gen. George C

found that some sixty-one of his subordinate officers enjoyed 

direct access to him; they included, for example, the chief of ch

chief of the morale branch, the chiefs of the six combat arms br

the five assistant chiefs of staff from the General Staff director

yet, even the most minor decisions had to be routed to Marsha

his principal deputies: 8 

Although not hesitant in making other reforms, Marshall w

tackle the problem of War Department reorganization. Yet a

nearer for the United States, his patience was running out. Du

meeting in early November 1941, he found evidence that a 

bombs destined for the British garrison at Singapore had be

because of poor coordination. "We can have no more of thi

"This is the worst command post in the Army, and we must do 

about it, although I do not yet know what we will do about i

heart of the problem as well was the fact that the General Staf
Solving that problem became a priority after American entry in

war, and here two important influences converged that would aff

evolution of command structures not just in the Army but in al

services. A reorganization panel was appointed by Marshall and hea

Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, an aviator of broad experience. McN

was assisted by Maj. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., a member of the Histo

Government Department at West Point, who had written his disserta

Harvard in 1940 on the subject "The War Department General S

Study in Organization and Administration." The dissertation 

description of General Staff evolution as well as an attempt to rela

history to both modern organizational theory and contemporary pro

As such, the manuscript was much in demand during the plannin

implementation stages ofthe reorganization. 21 

While Nelson's manuscript provided an intellectual foundation 

project, a memorandum fi'om Gen. Henry H. Arnold, deputy chief o

for air, had far-reaching practical effects. Arnold's memorandum 

that "unity of command" should be the basis for both the reorganiza

the War Department and the establishment of theater commands. 

stating that "unity of command" was a fundamental concept "through

the strata of military organization" when "two or more integral forc

joined together for collaboration," Arnold continued, "This Un

Command can be expressed only by a superior Commander, w

capable of viewing impartially the needs and capabilities of the g

forces and of the air forces. Only a superior commander can sele

employment which will result in the maximum contribution of each 

toward the National Objective. This kind of Unity of Command re

the establishment of a separate command agency; not the subordinat

one member of the team to the other. ''22 

This was to be the primary concept around which the reorganiza

the War Department took place in March 1942. Three major com

were set up: Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army S

Forces. These commands took over much of the burden of day-

operations, while the General Staff was refocused on strategi

long-range operational planning. The War Plans Division of the G
fundamental change which the War Department had experien

establishment of the General Staff. ''24 In essence, it took the 

another step forward toward more effective control. The Ar

history of this period says that this "rationalization of the 

structure... [substituted] the vertical pattern of military com

traditional horizontal patterns of coordination [which] paral

developments among leading industrial organizations. '~5 Wha

nization actually did, of course, was to provide for both 

horizontal linkages: this was the original purpose of the Gene

the 1942 reforms helped restore those functions. 

The second point relates to the Air Force and was well su

Ray Cline: "The Army Air Forces . . . had [achieved] virtu

control of the development of its [sic] own special weapon, th

It organized and supported the combat forces to be employed 

operations. Finally, by advising the General Staff and pa

interservice deliberations, General Arnold's headquarters was 

ally to influence, though it could not control, both strategic an

planning. ''26 

The de facto autonomy thus achieved by the Army Air For

the final point to emerge from the reorganization. From t

command" that had now created the Air Force as a virtu

branch with the ground forces, it was but a short logical step 

command" that embraced under a common command the force

the Army and its high-flying stepchild but of the Navy as w

precisely the formula that was followed in some of the operat

of the war--and a considerable cause of interservice difficulty

The Navy's adjustment to wartime demands was not as 

that of the Army, if for no other reason than that the Navy di

absorb a thirtyfold increase in manpower (as the Army did i

269,023 officers and men in 1940 to 8,267,958 in 1945). 

there were several adjustments in the Navy's command stru

worth mentioning. On March 12, 1942, at the same time that t

beginning its reorganization, the president signed Executive 

which combined in the Office of the Chief of Naval Opera
the three admirals who commanded the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic 

"Provision was made whereby one of these three officers act

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, and in case two or more fleets op

together would exercise overall command and would coordinate 

activities. On 7 December 1941, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Comma

in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was also Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet. ''27 

As the Navy's official historian notes, the executive order creatin

position of COMINCH (which was held throughout the war by 

Ernest J. King) contained a paragraph that largely went unnoticed bu

great practical and historic consequences: 

Paragraph 4 of the Executive Order read that "as Chief of Na

Operations the officer holding the combined offices as her

provided shall be charged under the direction of the Secretary of 

Navy with the preparation, readiness, and logistic support of 

operating forces comprising the several fleets . . . and with 

coordination and direction of effort to this end of the bureaus a

offices of the Navy Department, except such offices (other th

bureaus) as the Secretary of the Navy may exempt... " Thus, 

CNO was given the legal authority for which the office had be

striving since its establishment twenty-seven years before. 28 

Much of the Navy's strategic planning for the war was 

concentrated in the CNO office, while the bulk of operational matter

concentrated in the "dual-hatted" COMINCH headquarters. Together, 

staffs were to experience a growth in function and numbers tha

smaller than the Army's but still roughly comparable; the CNO's 

alone, for example, employed over four hundred officers at one 

during the war. The grant of authority to the CNO was not, howe

blank check. Several times during the war, Admiral King subm

reorganization plans that would have centralized his authority still f

with the creation of a number of deputy CNO's, each supervising o

the office's major functional areas (aviation, personnel, material

plans), but the scheme was rejected by President Franklin D. Roosev

grounds of civilian control. Roosevelt, a former assistant secretary 

navy, had a strong sense of its traditions and the limits they imposed 

reorganization, even in wartime. 29 
that which Halleck had occupied during the Civil War. The m

structure to emerge from World War II, however, was the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which replaced the old Join

provided the focal point for interservice planning and operati

was never formally sanctioned by Roosevelt, but grew out o

Conference (December 1941) when a Combined Chiefs of 

secretariat was organized to coordinate British and Amer

planning. The JCS quickly became the agency for American 

in Allied councils of war, as well as the embodiment for 

command of all American forces. In addition to Admiral 

membership was to consist of Gen. George C. Marshall, A

King, and, interestingly, Gen. Henry H. Arnold, chief of t

Force. 

Each of the service chiefs played a critical role in the unifi

that were set up in cooperation with the Allies. The JCS acte

as the chief planning body for decisions on resources and gra

they pertained to the unified commands. The work was carr

through what had become by the end of the war an elaborat

more or less permanent committees staffed by representativ

service. 3° Transmission of orders, however, continued as b

the service hierarchies. The service with preponderant respon

given theater of operations would be designated by the JCS a

agent. The headquarters staffs of the Army, Navy, and (e

Army Air Force then generated the orders to the theate

carrying out the JCS directives. For example, the Navy De

would be used to generate orders to Admiral Nimitz for the 

Areas command, and the War Department General Staff w

the same function for General MacArthur's Southwest 

command. 31 The concept of each service acting as executive 

JCS, a sensible approach to the new division of labor, 

outgrowth of the old idea of "paramount interest." Of equ

were the "component commands" set up under the unifie

Component commands were the building blocks of the unif

structure, each component comprising those elements of lan
command structure, a system, it must be emphasized, that allo

services to function under effective political control while defeati

enemies on every front. The first tension is directly traceable to th

of service autonomy. Roles and missions were clearly not a m

indifference to services that had only recently embraced the con

joint operations, especially when there was every reason to suspect 

inevitable postwar reorganization might lead to permanent s

changes. The war against Japan was divided, as noted above, 

Army and Navy commanders in chief (CINCs) rather than being 

under a single unified command; the European theater of operat

contrast, was placed under Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower with th

playing a secondary role. Paul Y. Hammond has argued that inte

bargaining was the inevitable accompaniment of the resource decis

JCS were called upon to make. In particular, the allocation of reso

the Pacific (and therefore the Navy) was surprisingly high in view 

absolute priority placed on the European theater, in which the Ar

the dominant force. 32 

Hammond also noted that once the necessity for this coalitio

away after the defeat of Germany, the interservice coalition fe

Separate Army-, Air Force-, and Navy-dominated commands now p

for the final struggle in the Pacific, so that it almost "seemed that 

services were to fight their own individual war with Japan. ''33 

precisely the correct point to be made when one recognizes that th

of World War II combat was so vast that it allowed a relatively f

not only for service interests but also for the paradigms of warfar

were the heart and soul of those interests. The disciples of 

Clausewitz, Mahan, and Douhet would thereafter justify their 

organizational claims on the basis that land, sea, or air power h

responsible for victory. 

The second basic source of tension was not unrelated to the first: 

of air power as a component command. Not only did air pow

important implications for both intra- and interservice relations; it w

a new implement of warfare, and much experimentation was req

see what did and did not work under combat conditions. The 
command of experienced Army airmen, the memo charged, bu

battle itself the planes were committed in an uncoordinated

fashion. The moral of the story was that Army planes "wh

powers either offensively or defensively are the stronge

available" should be commanded by Army Air Force officers. 3

Whatever the merits of this specific instance, the more gen

that many Army-Navy problems at the operational level revo

differences in the use of the air arm. General Arnold, the Arm

chief throughout the war, revealed in his memoirs just 

Army-Navy rivalry was really Air Force-Navy rivalry: 

There were numerous things throughout the Pacific the 

not like. One was the apparent fact that the Navy would do 

to keep control. They used higher-ranking officers than we 

so normally retained command. While Naval officers could 

an Army outfit, it was very seldom an Army officer ever co

a Navy unit. A general impression existed that the Nav

understand the technique of ground operations, nor the tec

our air operations .... Their plan of putting air units into o

and the way they had them distributed in depth, instead of 

mass of air units to destroy the Japanese Air Force, seeme

me--a waste of planes and trained airmen when we were s

them. Our own doctrine was to use the mass of planes av

break the back of the enemy's Air Force as soon as possible

Doctrinal, organizational, and ideological differences would 

divide Navy and Army aviators. For its part, the Navy was bu

ing the capabilities of carrier-based aircrali and was rapidly 

fleet around them. As wrenching a transition as this was--es

battleship officers who now saw their beloved dreadnoughts re

status of mobile antiaircraft and coastal bombardment platform

nevertheless considered its organic air arm to be the key to su

surface fleet. It consequently greeted any attempt to share co

air arm with another service with roughly the same enthusiasm 

it greeted the kamikaze. 

The Navy was not alone in its difficulties with the Army A

Army itself shared many of these feelings. When American g
words, was adapted to the demands of the ground force co

fighting the battle. ''36 The difficulty was that ground commanders 

trained to think of air power either as a kind of long-range artille

levitational form of organic air defense. Far from being an el

combat power in its own right, the airplane was thought to b

supporting arm; given the usual pattern of the Army command 

air assets were accordingly parceled out among the principal grou

commanders. German air forces, which operated under grou

control, but at a much higher level of centralization, were con

more effectively and were able to use the weight of numbers ag

more dispersed Allied tactical air squadrons. 

British Air Marshal Arthur Coningham and Air Chief Ma

Arthur Tedder led the fight to reorganize while under fire. Tedd

"Given centralized control of air forces, this flexibility brings w

immense power of concentration which is unequalled in any othe

warfare. ''37 Further setbacks in the campaign against Gen. Erwin 

such as the Battle of the Kasserine Pass, helped to force change

component was created within the structure of the Allied Expe

Force in North Africa, and under it were centralized the strategic

and transport aircraft assigned to the theater. This centralizatio

allowed the flexibility the airmen had been seeking, as bombers 

enemy supply lines while fighters pursued their primary task of ga

superiority. Once that superiority had been gained, close air su

troops on the ground could begin. This represented a radical sh

Army's thinking, but under the pressure of war it was soon codifi

Field Service Regulation 100-20, issued on July 21, 1943, was a w

in air power doctrine. It began with the statement that "land powe

power are co-equal and interdependent forces; neither is an auxilia

other." It then set forth the approved doctrine for the command of a

The inherent flexibility of air power is its greatest asset. Thi

ibility makes it possible to employ the whole weight of the ava

air power against selected areas in turn .... control of availab

power must be centralized and command must be exercised th

the air force commander if this inherent flexibility and abil

deliver a decisive blow are to be fully exploited. Therefor
Further organizational refinements stemming from what so

be an effective operational concept included a well-develope

which the two chains of command were linked by air-ground 

that provided both the close air support the ground troops ne

centralized control the airmen considered a prerequisite to all e

The system reached its highest stage of development 

Normandy invasion and the subsequent campaign for the 

Europe. The Ninth Tactical Air Command, under Maj. G

Quesada, placed Air Support Parties in each of the armored 

were spearheading the breakout from the Normandy beach

1944, equipping them as well with radios that enabled effec

communications to be maintained between the fighter-bomber

commanders. This enabled both centralized control and 

execution of the operation. Intercepted German communicatio

the effectiveness of the tactical air control system, as when F

Hans yon Kluge, the German commander in France, was 

having said during the battle: "Whether the enemy can be st

• point is still questionable. The enemy air activity is terrific, 

almost every one of our movements. Every movement of 

however, is prepared and protected by its air force. Losses in m

ment are extraordinary. The morale of the troops has suffered h

The Normandy invasion thus represented a kind of high-w

service integration during World War II, not only in terms of 

and air forces welded together in the largest joint operation i

also in terms of results. As Caraley pointed out, that level o

was only temporary, as the interservice coalitions shifted towa

It is important to note, however, that these temporary alignm

as they lasted, provided a consistency of purpose that p

building of the most complex command structure that ha

devised by American forces. Once mission and organizati

joined, complexity proved not to be an obstacle to operatio

ness. Compare, for example, the wildly ambiguous instructio

Army Expeditionary Force in Cuba, mentioned in chapter 3, w
If command and control during World War II was domi

organizational integration of land, sea, and air forces, integratio

those forces in turn was driven by communications electronics. T

the electromagnetic spectrum for voice communication, high-speed 

radar, and sonar allowed divergent forces to operate either 

proximity or at great ranges; it permitted commanders to receive 

warning of enemy dispositions while monitoring the location of 

forces; and it effectively combined previously separate systems fo

and engaging targets. Above all, electronic communications pro

essential accompaniment to the revolution in mobility. As Walter M

it, "It was the teaming of the internal combustion engine in the a

the surface, in order to take the traditional objectives of surface 

which, together with the remarkable development of electronic com

tions, really determined the history of the Second World War. ''41 

For the Army ground forces, mechanization was the answe

enormous increase in the defensive power of firearms that had f

seen in the Civil War. Infantry, transported to battle in ships, pl

armored vehicles, relied on individual firepower--the M-I Gar

and the Browning automatic rifle--and dispersion to reach their o

With the basic building block of the twelve-man rifle squad, divisi

built around the concept of the task force so that infantry, ar

supporting arms could be task-organized for specific tactical requ

Mobility, complex command structures, and flexible employment 

each created demands upon tactical control: here telecommu

provided the answer. According to the Army's Lineage Book, "F

radios were included in a company's equipment. These and teleph

companies tighter together than had been the case since the Civil 

The key to this structure was, of course, the tank, with its inheren

for firepower and maneuver--capabilities that indeed made it the 

decision." Pioneered by the German general Heinz Guderian, 

radio became the standard device for commanders to orchestrate 

sweeps in conjunction with infantry movements and supporting a

artillery fires. Because of the radio and the telephone, the means o

kept pace with the tactical complexity of the battlefield. 43 
coded transponders for automatic identification of friendly air

effective ship-to-shore, surface-to-surface, and air-to-surface 

sonar systems for detection of submarines. 45 The marriage of 

electronics allowed surface fleets to operate at unprecedented 

Battle of the Coral Sea in 1942 being the first naval engageme

during which the surface combatants never saw one another. T

these engagements and the greatly expanded flow of data creat

problems, as naval commanders sought ways in which to t

information into combat decisions, as well as to coordinate 

antiaircraft defenses. These requirements led to the deve

shipboard Combat Information Centers (CICs) that quickly 

bridge as sources of decisions at sea. The CICs were, in effect

versions of the Operations Room pioneered by the RAF. Manu

automated display plots integrated data from the ship's own rad

from internal and external voice links. ''46 Similarly, it became 

turn whole ships into floating command posts to deal with th

amphibious landings, which, with their concentration of land, 

assets, posed the greatest demands on timing and coordina

twenty-three amphibious command ships (AGC class) were 

Navy during the war for service in all major theaters. 47 

The proliferation of electronic devices for improved co

control of highly mobile and dispersed weapons systems was 

feature of technical innovation within the services throughout 

Adm. Sir Arthur Hezlet pointed out in his study, Electroni

Power, not all the transformations that took place were cau

electron's adaptation to modern combat, but most of them sure

have taken place without it. 48 This is a proper way to view t

first major exposure to the integrative potential of electronic co

control, because those services were organizations of human 

could and did make choices that either exploited or limited th

The general point is that the services appear to have been mos

in pursuing electronic integration of the combat arms over 

exercised supervision, and less aggressive in fielding systems 

primary purpose of integrating joint combat activities. Given t
ASV Mark III transceiver fitted on four-engine, land-based 

represented a significant advance in the technique of dete

attacking submarines. The difficulty was that land-based bom

under the control of the Army Air Force; the suggestion, there

antisubmarine warfare could best be conducted by the joint op

these bombers in conjunction with carrier-based airplanes immed

afoul of established service roles and missions. Worse yet, such 

new approach conflicted with the Navy's preferred method of de

the submarine threat, which was by convoys under the escort 

surface vessels---even though this method had not stopped t

number of sinkings of Allied merchant ships by the U-boat. 

Although the convoy system was retained and ultimately prev

the U-boat--with the help of such purely naval electronics as 

sonobuoys--this incident illustrates that technology took second 

service prerogatives. Samuel Eliot Morison, the Navy's official 

noted that the Navy's first thought on the problem was to acquir

long-range bombers rather than utilize the Army Air Force asse

in existence. The problem was complicated by the existence of 

service communications systems, as well as by a "deficient 

organization"--although its deficiencies go unrecorded. The mo

reason is stated with admirable frankness: "Admiral King . . 

intention of permanently sharing with the Army what he conceive

naval responsibility, the protection of shipping. '~9 

Service autonomy, then, was far from extinguished, by e

integrative potential of electronics or the pressures of wartime co

Technical modernization, with increasingly sophisticated comm

control mechanisms, would continue after the war, its principal 

the same as before: intraservice rather than interservice. Alth

shared experience of the services in responding to the pre

mobilization and the consolidation of hierarchical control--to sa

of the sanctification of unity of command as the principle tha

operational success--would seem to have ameliorated man

organizational stumbling blocks in the creation of a postwa

establishment, this commonality was more apparent than real. In
The National Security Act of 1947: 

Forging the New Confederacy 

The National Security Act of 1947 was the most sign

of defense legislation in the nation's history; only the Cons

more fundamental source of authority on the structure by 

government seeks to ensure the nation's security The Natio

Act's major provisions included: 

• The establishment of a cabinet=level Department of Natio

which two years later became, simply, the Department of Def

• The creation of the United States Air Force 

• With the 1949 amendments to the act, the elimination of 

Navy departments as cabinet=level agencies, their subord

common secretary, and their reduction to a coordinate status 

with the Air Force 

• The delineation of the principal functions of each of the arm

• The legislative recognition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

coordinate, but not command, the armed forces 

• The establishment of the Central Intelligence Agen

National Security Council 50 

One might think that with the creation of the unif

establishment that had been envisioned by reformers since the 

the nineteenth century, the troubling issues of service autonom

resolved and the entire issue reduced to one of purely histor

But consider Harry Howe Ransom's comment: "Since Wo

interservice rivalry has been the prime characteristic of 

establishment .... With all of the reorganizations since World 

the defense structure continues to resemble an alliance 

independent, sovereign units, often engaged in bitter j

warfare. ''51 The answer to this seeming anomaly is that the 

"characteristic" interservice rivalry was merely the outward m
would also, paradoxically, create centers of institutional resistanc

around service paradigms. 

Those paradigms were much in evidence throughout the 

struggle, which began as early as November 3, 1943, whe

Marshall proposed that the JCS endorse a scheme for postwar 

as a basis for future legislation. His plan, the features of w

embraced by the War Department throughout the controversy, 

the establishment of a single department heading the ground, nav

forces; a unified logistical service; civilian under secretaries and 

staff heading each of these four departments; and a chief of s

president heading a U.S. General Staff, composed of himself an

service chiefs. 52 

The Marshall proposal was opposed by Admiral King, with 

that the concept of a single military organization was mere

throughout much of 1944, first by the Joint Strategic Survey Com

the JCS and then by a special JCS committee headed by ret

James O. Richardson. 

More significant for the public debate were the hearings held 

through May 1944 by a select committee of the House of Repr

headed by Clifton A. Woodrum. The Woodrum committee 

produced the first comprehensive airing of service views on unifi

were important for two reasons. First, the Army presented its 

scheme for postwar organization during the testimony of Lt. G

T. McNarney, the deputy chief of staff who had presided 

reorganization of the War Department General Staff in 1

McNarney Plan was virtually identical to Marshall's earlier propo

deliberately vague, however, the key points on which the 

struggle would ultimately turn: consolidation of service air assets 

Air Force, the future status of the Marine Corps, and the nature o

control over the defense budget. The second reason the 

committee hearings were significant was that they not only p

well-defined Army position but also alerted the civilian leaders

Navy and its congressional allies to the fact that this position 

critical interests of the naval service. Partly because of the deat
impending end of the war refocused attention on the unificati

Before those alternatives are examined, however, it will b

summarize the objectives of the services as they approached the 

The objectives of the War Department "coalition" (whic

included the Army, the Air Force, various congressional 

President Truman) in the reorganization proposals included th

a unitary defense department headed by a single secretary adm

common budget; a JCS headed by a single chief of staff havin

the department budget and direct access to the president; a s

Force with control over all land-based aircraft, including t

Navy; and the limitation of congressional authorization 

organizational guidelines, with details being delegated to th

branch, s4 Caraley has noted that these objectives were held b

against a backdrop of resentment carried forward from the inte

when appropriations favored the Navy and thereby contrib

Army's chronic lack of preparedness. His evidence on this p

from a quote by Mark S. Watson, compiler of the Army's offi

Chief of Staff." Prewar Plans and Preparations, which con

resentment at budgetary deprivations. Caraley's citation, how

the following passage which gives an important ideological co

Army was less favored, presumably because there was a contin

confidence, shared by the White House and Congress, of o

bulwark and a belief that the Navy could safely be thought of 

as the traditional 'first line of defense' but as the only really ne

of defense for the time being. Even the growing reach of the a

was not exploited in military form to any such degree as it wa

and Japan. ''55 

The position of the Navy as the first line of defense was mos

challenged by the airmen in the War Department coalition

Douhet's predictions regarding the efficacy of strategic bomb

been entirely borne out by the massive but conventional camp

Army Air Force over Europe and Japan, the use of atomic 

Hiroshima and Nagasaki suggested that the original air paradig

deficient only in its estimate of the bomb sizes required to achi
sea, and air forces were interdependent. Secretary of War R

Patterson's testimony before the Senate in 1945 stated the matte

"The elementary lesson which we have learned from the hard exp

World War II is that there must be single direction of the Nation's 

and air forces. While the foundation of our organization is three c

arms--air, land and sea--these arms must operate as a single te

single direction, which has responsibility and final power of deci

all. ''56 This was not only a reasonable inference to draw from t

conduct of the war but also an acknowledgment of the Arm

dependence on the Navy and the Air Force for strategic and tactical 

In his free-ranging critique of the general staff system, John C

pointed out that the War Department proposals were entirely 

with hierarchical organizational principles regarding unity of c

span of control, staff coordination, and integration of sp

activities. 57 As shown in chapters 2 and 3, these organizational p

were the touchstones of the Army's rise to institutional profession

well as its habitual response to the problems of modernizatio

testimony of its leaders--Patterson, Marshall, and McNarney

others--there is the consistently expressed need for a single 

decision maker, a chief of staff, presumably supported by an a

general staff with directive authority, although there is an 

consistent and perhaps deliberate vagueness on this point. Caral

this organizational pattern to the Army's "general theory of 

making" which assumed the existence of an optimum solu

maximized military effectiveness and was therefore in the "real i

all the services." By advocating what was in effect a national gen

system, the Army was seeking to transfer the results of its own 

experience to the problem of the postwar defense establishment, ss 

The Navy approach to that problem similarly reflected the res

own historical experience. The tradition of decentralized con

characterized both the operations of the Navy at sea and its organ

philosophy ashore had provided a formative experience not 

overcome by the catharsis of World War II. Hammond pointed ou

Navy command structure still rested on a philosophy that empha
direction could be achieved by an organization without a unifi

structure at the center. ''s9 Navy spokesmen throughout the 

controversy persisted in arguments that reflected their inheren

the subordination characteristic of the development of Army s

so doing, they adopted a phraseology that seemed at time

constitutional arguments concerning the concentration and s

powers. In arguing against the Army's single chief of staff 

example, Admiral King testified that it was "potentially, t

horseback.' It is allegedly based on the premise that unity 

command in Washington is necessary to insure unity of effort 

.. Although unity of command is well suited to the latter, there 

dangers in a single command at the highest military level. I 

fact the most potent argument against the concept o

department.'~0 

Nor had the experience of the war reduced the Navy's 

ideological underpinnings: "Navy leaders still considered a

Mahan thesis that a strong navy and command of the sea 

pensable elements in maintaining overall combat effectiveness 

security. '~sj Having gone through the painful experience of 

surface fleet to the demands of three-medium combat, the N

about to surrender control over the elements it deemed organ

combat power. A familiar jibe has it that "the Navy is alrea

service. It has its own Navy, of course; but it also has its ow

the naval air arm, as well as its own Army, otherwise kn

Marines." This was the essence of the naval self-image as 

during and after World War II: a complete sea-air-land team t

rapidly concentrated "in support of" military operations and ju

moved elsewhere to strike whatever blows might be required b

command structure that was "coordinated," but not necessarily 

In comparison with War Department objectives, the Navy 

for the status quo, while the Army and its allies were, in 

speaking, revisionists. Two Navy goals were especially critical

JCS decision-making process, in which unanimity was a pre

action, was an important legacy of service autonomy. Fleet A
Forces pass on the question of whether or not the Navy should 

for building and maintaining a balanced fleet. One might just as 

committee composed of a Protestant, a Catholic, and a Jew to 

national souls by recommending a national church or creed. ''63 

The second critical Navy objective was civilian control, 

important aspect of which was the direct access to Congress tha

a hallmark of naval support since 1798. Admiral King's testim

reminded his listeners that control over naval appropriations w

casualty of the Army reorganization scheme: "Under the Constit

the duty of the Congress to "provide and maintain a Navy.' 

Congress is entitled to full and public examination of all con

which have a bearing on the question. The needs of the Navy sho

subject to review by individuals who do not have informed res

in these premises. ''64 

The objectives of the War and Navy departments clashed mo

during the Senate hearings on unification held from Octob

December 17, 1945. The Army had resubmitted its proposal in 

modified form that incorporated the findings of the Richardson 

report of the previous spring; the new plan was presented at the 

hearings by Gen. J. Lawton Collins. This time, however, the A

was countered by a comprehensive alternative developed for th

Ferdinand Eberstadt, a close friend of Navy Secretary James For

recommendations of the Eberstadt Plan incorporated traditio

preferences for the coordinative approach: 

• "Organization of the military forces into three coordina

ments," all of them with cabinet-level secretaries. 

• Creation of the National Security Council and Central I

Agency as coordinative agencies for policy and intelligence, res

• Continuation of the JCS as the agency responsible fo

direction of the armed forces, but with statutory limits im

ensure that it would be coordinative in nature. 

• Creation of an elaborate set of coordinating committees for 

tion, research and development, military training, and so on. 65 
command; decorum then having been satisfied, unrestrained 

ensued. Lt. Gen. James Doolittle, hero of the Tokyo raid a

Honor recipient, stated that "no single service won the wa

almost in the same breath, added, "The Navy had the transpor

invasion of Japan possible; the Ground Forces the power 

successful; and the B-29 made it unnecessary." The senator

good copy when they heard it, then goaded the general into ex

theory of aircraft carriers: "The carrier has two attributes. On

that it can move about; the other attribute is that it can be sunk

airplanes are developed with sufficient range.., there will 

use for aircraft carriers. '~s6 

Predictably, the Navy also waxed lyrical in describing it

especially in the Pacific. Admiral Halsey, never one for un

declared: "The tide of war changed with the ebb and flow of 

Almost every landing, every amphibious operation, every cam

all-out offensive was spearheaded by carrier aviation backed b

power of the big guns of the United States Fleet .... Yes, 

Navy, and its carrier aviation, we could not have won the war

of warfare that the vast expanses of the Pacific impose, a s

indispensable. ''67 Not to be outdone, the Army sent Gen. 

Eisenhower, who began his testimony by declaring, "At one ti

infantryman but I have long since forgotten that fac

responsibility of commanding combined arms." He then adde

and airmen had come to regard him as "one of their own se

than of an opposing one." In summarizing his argument f

executive department to preside over three coequal and 

fighting teams," the future president said, "There is no suc

separate land, sea or air war; therefore we must now recogniz

establishing a single department of the armed forces to govern 

Just after the Senate hearings ended in December 1945, Pr

Truman addressed a message to Congress that endorsed the 

unified defense department built along the lines suggested b

Plan. By this point, however, the Navy and its allies were comm

they increasingly saw as a fight for survival. The incautious r
couple of carriers which are ineffective anyway, and the

probably be sunk in the first battle. Now as for the Marin

know what the Marines are, a small, bitched-up army talkin

lingo. We are going to put those Marines in the Regular Ar

make efficient soldiers out of them .... We know this is 

town, and a Navy hang-out, but Army Air is still going to st

we are going to take over, too. 69 

Remarks like these could hardly have been more upsettin

speaker also chosen to cast aspersions on the virtue of Navy w

with powerful congressional allies such as Representative Carl V

Senator David Walsh, the Navy was able to use the Eberstadt P

alternative to Army consolidation. With a quick resolutio

unification question thus denied, the conflict dragged on through

but moved inevitably in the direction of a compromise betwee

service positions. 

Even as the services were grappling publicly with the sha

postwar defense establishment, privately they were still at odds 

other over the peacetime structure of unified commands. Caraley 

"unified command in the field.., in 1945 was not opposed by any

reflected not only the public stance of service leaders but their acc

unity of command in principle. 7° Applying that principle, how

something else. Throughout most of 1946, the JCS sought to find 

for the problem of divided Army and Navy commands in the Pacif

difficult was the determination of which service would exerci

command over the other theaters in which the rapidly de

American forces were still deployed. In the midst of this cont

declassified memorandum by the Army General Staff highlighted 

differences in the service positions on the meaning of unified comm

a. The Army and the Navy do not have a meeting of the m

unified command .... the Navy is unwilling in fact to place 

called "a fleet" under other than a naval commander. Thi

means that there cannot be true unified command of th

services unless the joint commander is a naval officer. The N

[sic] willing to assign certain naval forces to other than a 

commander, but fleet units operate in support, that is by coop

Furthermore, there does not appear to be a clear meeting 
These differences led General Eisenhower, by then the A

staff, to propose what eventually became the Unified Com

Under this document, theater commanders would be appointe

responsible to the JCS, which in turn would have the respo

strategic direction of the armed forces assigned to the unifie

This responsibility would be exercised through the unified 

assisted by a joint staff composed of representatives from 

component commands. The component commands, as had bee

World War II, would deal directly with their respec

headquarters in Washington on all matters not directly lin

operations, especially logistics, training, and administratio

Truman approved the plan on December 14, 1946, and 

establishment of the following commands: Far East, Pacif

Northeast (Newfoundland, Greenland, and Labrador), the A

(subsequently changed to Atlantic Command), Caribbean, an

Finally, the plan also included the establishment of the S

Command under the direct supervision of the JCS. 72 

Even while these matters were being hammered out, anoth

battle in the unification struggle ended without resolution. S

2044 was introduced in April; it followed closely the lines 

Truman's message of the previous December (which had gene

the Collins Plan) but incorporated as well several of Eberstadt

for policy coordination. The bill generated hearings that aga

forum for Army proponents to argue the case for the e

efficiency of unification. The Navy, however, was shrewd en

its case on the grounds that unification would hurt the Navy 

eliminate the Marine Corps. Given the residual good will the n

enJoyed in the allermath of the war and the congressiona

structure that allowed its allies virtually unlimited opportuniti

obstruction, or modification once their critical interests were t

was not surprising that the Senate adjourned without taking 

2044. This outcome represented a legislative stalemate: the 

merit coalition was strong enough to raise the unification issue 
adjournment, Truman pressured Forrestal and Patterson to come 

a proposal that was jointly acceptable and would form the 

legislation. One of the first concessions the president made 

abandonment of the principle of a military chief of staff and ac

of the JCS as an advisory body with statutorily limited respon

Throughout the summer and fall of 1946, the differences wer

overcome and the outlines of a compromise emerged: 

cabinet-level department, three coordinate services, and policy c

tion much along the lines suggested by the Eberstadt Plan. The 

naval aviation and the Marine Corps remained problematical. T

no doubt at all, however, that congressional prerogatives for 

and budgetary control would be a feature of any organ

proposal. TM 

The countdown to the final agreement came when, on January 

Patterson and Forrestal reported to the president that they had 

agreement on all outstanding issues between their departments 

unification. The bulk of the concessions had clearly been mad

Army. The defense establishment would rest upon coordinative 

only were the three services to be coequal, but the authority of the 

the "Secretary of National Defense" would be carefully limited. A

the essential autonomy of the services, as well as their roles and 

would continue much as they had emerged during World War II, 

the retention of naval aviation and the Marine Corps. Final approv

National Security Act came at last on July 26, 1947, when 

Truman signed it into law. As passed, the act contained language t

explicit congressional intent regarding unification of the services: 

"provide for their authoritative coordination and unified directi

civilian control but not to merge them." As the official histor

Office of Secretary of Defense points out, "Because the 

departments.., retained the status of 'individual executive depa

they were still largely autonomous organizations, with nearly ful

over their internal affairs. In fact, all powers and duties not sp

conferred upon the Secretary of Defense became part of the aut

each respective departmental secretary. Furthermore, any service s
national security (which was itself an interesting qualification!

act as the principal military advisers to the president and the 

defense. 76 The Joint Staff, however, was limited by the sam

more than one hundred officers, drawn from all the services. Th

the establishment of the JCS as an officially collaborative, 

body, and the preservation of its pattern of unanimous decisio

represented a return to the status quo ante. However far-reach

lative charter, the JCS would remain a collective entity, its a

ability to carry out the mission entrusted to it a subject for ne

debate and controversy. 

The picture that thus emerged from the unification struggle 

which service autonomy was only slightly altered. Congres

presented with three paradigms of warfare loosely grouped 

competing coalitions and, in the at~ermath of the nation's grea

triumph, was asked to choose between them. It was unabl

particularly when that choice involved the possibility of offen

constituencies and disrupting long-established political and a

relationships. Undoubtedly, the Air Force side of the War 

coalition represented a kind of messianic zeal and a strategi

was attractive to some--and deeply troubling to others. 

represented a countervailing conservatism in the unification s

had on other occasions as well. Henry L. Stimson, secretary 

two presidents, included in his memoirs, written with McGeor

classic reminiscence: 

But some of the Army-Navy troubles, in Stimson's v

from the peculiar psychology of the Navy Departmen

frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic in

religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his pro

the United States Navy the only true Church. The high prie

group were a group of men to whom Stimson always referr

Admirals." These gentlemen were to him both anonym

continuous .... in 1940 and afterwards he found them still 

still uncontrolled by either their Secretary or the President. 

not Knox's fault, or the President's, as Stimson saw it. It w

that the Navy Department had never had an Elihu R

Admirals" had never been given their comeuppance. 77 
merger or a hostile takeover, Congress simply shrugged and 

blessing to a limited-liability partnership. 
and a half that preceded the birth of the modern era 

and control, it is important to begin at the micro 

look in particular at the differences in the sociolog

command. One of the most basic distinctions involv

"style"--the manner in which command was 

exercised. As Rear Adm. Julius Furer noted, the 

naval command has always been the undivided and 

authority of the ship's captain. Command in th

indeed an indivisible entity during much of this per

because of the relatively small numbers of ships in t

fleet throughout most of the nineteenth century but 

those limited numbers dictated a deployment 

emphasized single ships or, at most, a squadron of 

vessels. The indivisibility of naval command in su

was reinforced by the absence of any physical mea

commanders to extend their influence beyond 

quarterdecks or, until the invention of the wireless, 

sort of control over ships that were not literally wit

of sight.L 

Those norms stood in stark contrast to those of 

which from the founding of the Republic emphasized 

practice of achieving battlefield success through th

of mass at the decisive point. The necessity to achie

centrations and to promote the contributions of the 

of land combat power made the division of authori

Unity of command, under these circumstances, 

essential balance of land warfare: controlling la

through the use of subordinate echelons and comm

preserving tactical flexibility and the power of ove

Although battlefields prior to World War 1 were la

to the same line-of-sight limitations that charact

engagements, land warfare offered more reliable 
prerogatives or operational effectiveness; indeed, victory on the b

positively demanded this practice. 

These micro differences are also discemible at the macro 

service organizational development. It is a short step from 

authority patterns to a reliance upon staffs, and much of the 

history, particularly as seen in chapters 2 and 3, is linked to its a

extend control by the expanded use of staffs. Initially fo

repositories of functional and administrative responsibility at 

headquarters, the Army staff gradually became an adjunct of b

control that was indispensable in overcoming the complexities o

in an industrial age. The Navy also used a headquarters staff to d

labor of "providing and maintaining a Navy"; but its experience w

staffs was limited until well into the twentieth century. It is thus po

conceive of the Army as having embraced a tradition of cent

brought about by the sheer force of numbers, while the Navy 

committed to a decentralized model of organization in which ad

tion on shore reflected its command preference at sea. In asse

outcomes of the defense unification struggle, Paul Y. Hammond 

Samuel P. Huntington's delineation of the "Hamiltonian" and "J

ian" traditions referred to in chapter 2. He saw the Army's organ

philosophy as the embodiment of Hamiitonian principles of admin

structure based on function and a clear line of authority from 

bottom. The apex of this development, which Hammond 

"neo-Hamiltonianism," took place in the Root reforms and em

centralization of authority, accountability, and policy contro

hierarchical lines. In his formulation, the Navy represents 

decentralized model, one that is Jeffersonian in its inherent di

concentrated authority, subordination, and structures built along o

federal lines. Both philosophies, anchored in the bedrock of the A

political-military tradition, have shown a remarkable resilience 

course of two centuries. 2 

Whatever the conceptual tools used to define the respective 

organizational philosophies, there is no question that they s

common commitment to individual autonomy. It is difficult from a 
y y y y 

proposed some tentative arrangements that would prevent d

and promote economy to my good friend Judge Garrison, 

of War, and suggested further study by Navy and Army o

effect the reforms and closer cooperation I envisione

Garrison, barely looking at the plan outlined, said, "Joe, I d

a damn about the Navy and you don't care a damn about t

You run your machine and I will run mine. I am glad if any

convince me I am wrong, but I am damn sure nobody lives 

do it. I am an individualist and am not cut out for cooperat

I will let you go your way, and I will go my way} 

This powerful tradition remained long atter the burdens of m

global combat, and a permanent postwar military establi

transformed the services into huge bureaucratic complexes wh

and scope, resembled each other more than their respective or

antecedents. 

All the standard histories of the postwar period documen

centralization in the three services whose autonomy had been c

the National Security Act of 1947. Ray Cline, writing the offic

the Operations Division of the Army General Staff, showe

quickly the principal staff directorates moved to reestablish t

they had been forced to delegate during the war. Although 

language stressing the need for the "principle of decentral

1946 reorganization resulted in a more centralized and comp

than had been in place at the start of the war (when Marsha

recalled, termed his own staff headquarters "the worst comman

Army") and included twenty-nine individual elements with 

direct access to the chief of staff. 4 

The pattern of consolidation was the same in the Navy as 

the process of demobilization was halted and reversed by the 

Cold War, the services found that this consolidation was 

continued control over their own budgets. Since their respecti

the defense budget were a function of approved roles and mi

became the subject of a bitter controversy that did not end with 

of the National Security Act. Instead, the "corollary functio

service (in reality, a polite code word for the always troubleso
and missions that were eventually codified by executive orderJ Trou

arose from the fact that the services each had de facto proponen

portion of the unified commands while maintaining direct ties wit

components in other unified commands. Part of the postwar cons

was the gradual extension and formalization of these ties, the result o

it can be argued, was to enhance the power of the components at the 

of the unified commander. Eventually these service guidelines were p

by the JCS under the title Unified Action Armed Forces, a documen

with all the precision of a well-crat~ed union contract. 6 

Controversies such as these were ample proof that service a

was alive and well in the postwar world. That it should have be

plain enough not only from the language of the National Security 

from the events that surrounded its passage. The temperamen

Seventy-ninth and Eightieth Congresses, which wrestled with this 

tion, was entirely consistent with that of the Continental Congress 

Constitutional Convention: in all cases, concentration of power 

official or in any agency was viewed with deep suspicion. Not only 

putative chief of staff of the armed forces proposed by the Army 

as a "man on horseback," but there was also a surprising am

discussion asserting that the secretary of national defense and w

assistants he hired might turn out to be the dreaded Prussian Gene

in murk Accordingly, the secretary's powers were limited to 

direction, authority, and control" over the services, and he was au

to hire a maximum of three special assistants, each to 

compensation at the rate of $I0,000 a year" (Sect. 202, Title II, P.L

The quaintness of that language is itself testimony to subsequen

that took place over almost four decades. From three underpaid a

in 1947, the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) has gr

encompass a deputy secretary, two under secretaries, a comptro

inspector general, a general counsel, and eleven assistant secret

well as almost 100,000 civilian and military personnel coun

employees of the OSD-supervised defense agencies and field a

such as the Defense Communications and Defense Mapping agen

full recitation of the steps leading to a staff of that size is beyond th
the military departments were not. The role of the 

preparation and review of the defense budget was broade

IV of the act. These amendments also created the position 

of the Jcs and increased the Joint Staff to 210. 

• Reorganization Plan 6 of 1953: President Eisenhower s

plan for reorganization of the Defense Department for 

approval; the plan, not being overturned by either the H

Senate, became law on June 30, 1953. Its provisions furt

the size of the OSD by transferring to it several of the Eber

coordinating committees and adding six assistant secre

general counsel. 

• Amendments of 1958: These further solidified the secre

over the military departments, which were to be "separate

with each department functioning under the direction of 

The chain of command was redefined with the president and 

of defense exercising direct command of the unified a

commands, the JCS empowered, as before, to act as th

advisers, and the individual service chiefs removed from 

command. The Joint Staff was increased to four hundred off

limited in scope by personnel assignment restrictions an

prohibition against its functioning as an armed forces general 

In the passage of the 1947 National Security Act as wel

incremental changes, Congress consistently stipulated that p

Defense Department be consolidated in civilian rather than m

This preference was the product of the most deeply rooted na

Suspicious of any concentration of power, Americans ar

whenever that concentration involves military power. But it 

the nation's political leadership to apply those values to speci

and here one can observe an uncritical interpretation of 

civilian control. Huntington's model of subjective civilian c

assumes the greatest level of political-military interaction, 

political direction may involve some spillover into what otherw

purely military functions. Seen in this light, civilian control 

the Defense Department was not limited to the careful p
transformation. Like the National Security Council, which grew in 

and influence because it was an essential coordinator of div

governmental policies, OSD performed the vital function of integrat

work of three otherwise autonomous military services. 

This was a task that the services were unable or unwilling to 

themselves. By design, the consensual, collaborative nature of the JC

not the kind of military staff structure that could have unified 

efforts and acted as a counterweight to the dominance that OSD eve

imposed. It is of course questionable whether Congress would eve

allowed an armed forces general staff even if the services had adv

one and even if it had been convinced that such a body would 

tightly controlled by the civilian leadership of the Defense Depa

--although such an outcome had at times appeared likely at the ou

the unification struggle. Having made its decision, however, Co

found it easier to acquiesce in the creation of additional burea

development within OSD. But in a particularly perverse way, this p

tended to generate its own multiplier effect as the services tried t

pace with the inroads that were being made into their own organiz

The phenomenon was nowhere better illustrated than when 

McNamara seized upon the powers that had been gradually built in

secretary's office and used cost analysis as a tool to evaluate 

acquisition and development programs. The creation of the Pr

Analysis and Evaluation Office within the OSD structure soon sp

similar offices within the service staffs. Thus, a good-faith ef

enhance precision in defense budgeting had the unintended conseque

contributing to bureaucratic proliferation: the creation of one 

generated three others. 

This is not to suggest that the integration of service planning was 

proper goal of the civilian leadership of the Defense Departmen

merely to point out that the mechanism chosen to bring abou

integration had costs as well as benefits. With the passage of the 

amendments, for example, the secretary of defense became the imm

superior of the generals and admirals heading the unified and sp

commands, while the service chiefs--the Joint Chiefs themselves w
attempts to subordinate the service chiefs to the dictates of a s

Now, however, the JCS would give advice (when asked) whi

and specified commanders, who were by definition in the fie

the seat of government, were responsible for executing what

decision was reached. If policy formation and policy executi

separate, an even wider gulf separated the unified command

procurement process, which would remain, as before, within th

the services. In theory, the needs of the unified comman

solicited by both the services and OSD. In practice, howeve

commands and OSD would find that there were limits on th

civilian staff to achieve control over the budgets that were sti

McNamara's initiatives, largely administered by the services. 9 

The command structure that emerged, therefore, by the beg

modem age of command and control featured a decidedly m

integration and autonomy. One of the most important aspec

autonomy continued to be the effective control the Army, th

the Air Force exercised over their budgets and programs. H

secretaries of defense such as Robert McNamara scrutinized 

budget or forced critical cuts on selected programs, the bottom 

was that it was the generals and admirals who not only drew 

document but defended and justified it throughout each p

congressional appropriations process. This fact of life wa

especially important in the development of command and co

because each one of them would be developed by one se

other--not the Joint Staff, which had no procurement funds w

the unified and specified commanders, despite their respon

commanding and controlling the combatant forces of the Unite

The second implication of service autonomy for command 

development is related to the first: the development of those s

primarily take place along service-directed lines. The extraor

the electromagnetic spectrum to enhance combat integration 

War II continued apace thereafter as the services pursued the

search for more and better ways to control such new weapo

fighter, the intercontinental bomber, the helicopter, and 
their command and control systems were considered in isolation fro

most likely employment in a joint operational setting. Because 

nature of service autonomy, it was not uncommon for comma

control systems that would operate in a joint environment to take 

place in the procurement process to systems that controlled the 

weapons wielded by the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force. 

Thus the maintenance of service control over budgets and an e

on service-related command and control systems over joint system

two of the primary ways in which autonomy would affect the futu

there was another influence emanating from the historical experi

military staffs and their effect upon military organizations, it is 

easiest to summarize this point in terms of a paradox: centralizat

essential to decentralization. Although staffs and organizations g

they did because of the increasing complexity of warfare, size al

not adequately address the problems. This is another way of sayin

balance always had to be struck between elements that were so criti

had to be managed centrally and those so diverse they had to be 

commanders at progressively lower echelons. The trick, of course, 

know the difference, and it was here that the military staff pla

important role in sorting matters out. The best example in Am

military history is that of Pershing organizing his command with a 

Staff centralized along functional lines, while effective decentralizat

achieved through similar staff structures set up through subo

echelons. Precisely because there was a unanimity achieved 

centralization of some matters, others could be decentralized--and t

was the agency that spanned the gap. In more contemporary parlan

staff was an interface not only between echelons but occasionally b

divergent systems as well. 

Centralization versus Autonomy in the Defense Departm

The 1958 amendments to the National Security Act beca

legislative backdrop to the building of centralized civilian power wi
brought with him from the business world and in the aggres

style he used to consolidate his power over the Pentagon bur

weapon of choice in gaining control over defense policy was 

programming, and budgeting system (PPBS), a method 

developed at the Rand Corporation by Charles Hitch 

Enthoven--both of whom were brought to Washington by M

establish a Systems Analysis Office under the defense com

PPBS approach allowed McNamara to evaluate the prog

military services through the use of systems analysis----compa

and support systems with the objectives and missions they we

fulfill. The results of this evaluation were then used to determ

these systems and projects would be supported by the secre

requests--and which would be eliminated. In a bureaucra

which "dollars equal policy," there was no more effective to

central control than the budgetary whip wielded by McN

defense centralization had been achieved without creating 

General Staff long feared in congressional lore: what had em

was a kind of civilian general staff, the key members of whic

from administration to administration, but whose institution

would come to dominate Pentagon councils? ° 

This is not to say that this control was absolute under 

McNamara or his successors. Defense Department manag

always be something of a contest involving OSD, the servic

often than not) Congress, with winners and losers varying 

issue. The rationalization of competing nuclear strategies, for 

an issue that demanded McNamara's attention from the firs

incumbency. Given his strong backing within the new a

(Kennedy had campaigned against the "massive retaliation" s

Eisenhower-Nixon years in 1960) together with his dominee

trative style, McNamara was able to inaugurate "flexible res

centerpiece of American nuclear strategy. The services, each 

its preferred plans for nuclear war-fighting that compleme

missions and functions, now had to accept the role delineate

the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP), which for t
case had its origins in the late 1950s, when both the Air Force 

Navy were experimenting with new designs for the next genera

fighter-bombers. The introduction of the swing-wing, pioneered by 

made it appear to the new administration that a single airframe cou

the varied needs of both services. Although the services had 

experience with limited adaptation of common airframes (the F-4 Ph

for example), neither the Air Force nor the Navy welcomed the 

their premier future aircraft being a single plane designed and bui

contractor in thrall to OSD. Yet this was exactly what appeared to h

when McNamara arrogated the contract decision to himself and 

against the recommendations of both services, awarded it to the t

General Dynamics-Grumman. The criteria for the award were 

McNamara: the General Dynamics bid was higher than that 

competitor, Boeing, but cost-analysis was used to justify it as bein

realistic. Further, General Dynamics offered a commonality factor b

the Air Force and Navy models that was 20 percent higher than B

and thus brought it closer to McNamara's guidance. Consequent

TFX emerged as the showpiece for commonality and cost-effect

under the new regime at OSD. The Air Force, however reluct

approached the project, was gratified to find that General Dynam

favored Air Force contractor, had been chosen. This factor, plus the 

number of planes planned for the total Air Force "buy," placed that 

in the driver's seat in administering the contract. Development of th

went well: a prototype flew in 1964, and by 1968, the first pro

models of the Air Force version of the TFX, now christened the F

entered combat service in Vietnam? 3 

The Navy, however, had no intention of being forced to accept 

that was the product of its "shotgun marriage" to the Air 

Consequently, it dragged out development of its "B" version of the 

by a combination of tactics that altered the airframe, degraded its h

performance, and also added weight to the point that the plane wo

be suitable for carrier use. By 1967, the Navy had played for t

effectively that it was able to use the appearance of a new genera

Soviet fighters to argue that the program should be scrapped. In a s
procurement decision about to be made by the Senate Arm

Committee, Navy officials delayed carrier trials of the F-11 

because of "small difficulties with the aircratt and bad we

McNamara gone and the public distracted by such tumultuo

President Johnson's renunciation of his reelection candidacy 

days later, the assassination of Martin Luther King, the N

Senate allies were able to cancel the F-I 11B with a minimum o

place, the Senate added the funds for development of th

alternative, which eventually became better known as the F-14 

The TFX episode is an instructive lesson in the interact

central direction by civilian officials in OSD and the residu

service autonomy. Neither held absolute sway: OSD had 

legal authority but the services had considerable discretion o

and extent of policy implementation. Moreover, both relied u

alliances that extended throughout the government. Robert 

analysis of the TFX decision noted also that the Navy feared c

because civilian officials might not appreciate the unique req

sea power, but he added that, even beyond this, "commonality 

sufficient threat to arouse Navy antipathy." The reasons? Not 

definition of requirements and the development of combat sys

functions of the services, but the decisions throughout this 

made on the basis of military combat experience and serv

Therefore, these are operational decisions intimately linked to 

roles and missions, so much so that even the common pro

minor items becomes a controversial de facto challenge to 

expertise of the services, their respective jurisdictions, and 

relationship to their civilian masters. The TFX case is a succi

of the limits to commonality in weapons procurement and an 

well worth remembering in appreciating the problem of joint c

control.l 5 

While the OSD under Robert McNamara came to play an 

dominant if not unchallenged role in the defense bureaucracy, 

of events and the accumulation of technological choices 

extend the influence of the new civilian elites into areas in whi
conduct of crisis operations across great distances. During the 1962 

missile crisis, for example, President Kennedy's personal direction 

naval task force sent to intercept Soviet freighters was considered 

unprecedented, but understandable in light of the stakes involved a

relative ease of communicating with a fleet that was operating in 

proximity to home waters. Consequently, "government leaders had b

capability and the incentive to reach out beyond the traditional lim

their control."J 6 

This extension of political control over operational autonomy w

accomplished, however, without overriding some deeply held feeli

professional military officers concerning the extent and propri

civilian intervention. According to Adm. Thomas Moorer's recollec

the Pentagon command post during the missile crisis: 

Mr. McNamara came into the Navy Flag Plot, took a hurried loo

the situation and demanded that a picket ship be moved to a diffe

area. The Chief of Naval Operations objected, telling him the 

was in the correct area and, furthermore, that it could not get to 

point where the Secretary wanted it in time to be effective. There 

a heated argument--an uninformed, inexperienced civilian telling 

Chief of Naval Operations how a picket ship should be deploy

[Later, Secretary McNamara] came into the Navy Operations Ce

and began to give commands at the level of a single destroyer. 

insisted on talking to the captain of the destroyer by teleph

because he was interested in the expression on the face of the So

merchant ship commander when the destroyer pulled along-side. ''~

But given the facts that the Cuban missile crisis was resolved on 

so distinctly favorable to the United States and that the chief of 

operations, Adm. George W. Anderson, who had clashed so bitterl

McNamara, was shortly thereafter retired and shipped off to b

ambassador to Portugal, it was not surprising that military comm

would eventually come to accept these interventions as a new 

obligations to which they, as professionals, would have to adjust a

they could. 

The pace of those adjustments increased during the 1960s, as ad

in communications technology made instantaneous global comman
qpgy

centers, and reliable communications that would ensure tha

States would never be subject to a "nuclear Pearl Harbor."ls T

of real-time control over the nation's strategic nuclear forces w

in the conventional forces as well. Long-distance radio an

communications were enhanced by the addition of sin

wavelengths and microwave relays in the 1950s. By the 19

communications were making use of the first satellite 

development that permitted the use of ultra-high frequency 

that carried greater quantities of message traffic more cheaply 

than ever before. Of equal significance was the wide e

computer applications for military purposes. This innovati

computer-to-computer networks joined by data links that were 

carried by satellites: Anthony G. Oettinger termed the process 

tions."19 

These improvements, together with the increasingly demand

merits for what has since become known as the "strategic con

the nation's nuclear and conventional forces, led to several ini

was the establishment in 1960 of the Defense Communicati

which was placed under JCS control and given responsibili

distance military communications, especially those from 

government to the combatant commands around the world. 

the issuance of DoD Directive S=5100.30 in October 1962

titled "Concept of Operations of the Worldwide Military Co

Control Systems" (WWMCCS, pronounced "wim-ex"). This 

overall policies for the integration of the various command 

elements that were rapidly coming into being, stressing f

system characteristics: survivability, flexibility, compatibility, 

tion, and economy3 ° The general guidance of the di

supplemented over the next two years with three others that 

translate overall objectives into specific criteria to be follo

services in designing their command and control system

WWMCCS evolution was not influenced as strongly by a

directives as it was by the episodic availability of both tec

resources to meet individual requirements of the unified a
the 1960s. During the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and 

June 1967, the USS Liberty, a naval reconnaissance ship operat

control of the European Command, was ordered by the JCS 

farther away from the coastlines of the belligerents. Five hig

messages to that effect were sent to the Liberty by the various hea

involved, but none arrived for more than thirteen hours--at which 

ship was the victim of an apparently mistaken attack by Israeli ai

patrol boats that killed thirty-four officers and men, wounded se

more, and damaged the vessel so severely it was subsequently sc

the words of the resulting congressional investigation, "The circ

surrounding the misrouting, loss and delays of those messages 

one of the most incredible failures of communications in the hist

Department of Defense. ''22 Similar problems were blamed 

communications and procedural breakdowns that attended two s

incidents involving hostile actions by the North Koreans: the seiz

USS Pueblo in January 1968 and the downing of a Navy 

reconnaissance aircratl in April 1969. The congressional report s

the heart of the problem was a DoD communications managemen

that was "confused, overlapping and fragmented. '~3 

The result, predictably, was a growth in the centralized, 

management of WWMCCS. Under the direction of Deputy Se

Defense David Packard, twenty-seven command centers were 

with standard Honeywell 6000 computers and common program

not only represented an economy of procurement but also all

rapid exchange of information among the command centers. An 

secretary of defense for telecommunications was established wit

and, with the 1971 revision of DoD Directive S-5100.30, he w

primary staff responsibility for all WWMCCS-related syste

directive also designated the JCS chairman as the official respo

the operation of the WWMCCS, including the power to coord

WWMCCS requirements of the unified and specified command

changes accompanied another jump in the technical sophisti

long-range command and control: plexiglas boards and grease pen

replaced by computer consoles, electronic displays, and other 
relay of orders from the seat of government to on-scene 

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is said to have even 

crisis communications link to speak directly with a nav

operating an amphibious landing craft during the 1976 e

American nationals from Lebanon. The practice became so c

it soon was enshrined in the regular military lexico

echeloning."24 

As efficient as the system undoubtedly became as 

skip-echeloning crisis managers, more questions arose towar

the 1970s when an acrimonious dispute over WWMC

management broke out between DoD and the General Accou

The controversy centered around congressional criticism 

management of the WWMCCS was still divided among 

agencies. 25 More troubling were persistent press reports abou

"breakdowns," the most notorious of which was a power outa

Jonestown, Guyana, evacuation in November 1978, whic

interrupted communications between Pentagon officials an

control team for more than an hour. Other stories asserted tha

of computer nonavailability was chronic. In a 1977 exercise, 

it was reported that several of the major commands experi

rates of 70 to 80 percent. The Pentagon repeatedly denied the

maintained they were exaggerated, Gerald P. Dinneen (Carte

tion assistant secretary of defense for what was then called 

tions, command, control, and intelligence) calling the criti

occasion "a bum rap. ''26 

While some writers have expressed concern over what h

the computer fails to work, other have pointed out the conseq

much information inundating the high command. John Fialka 

during a mobilization exercise in late 1980, one participan

"WWMCCS just fell flat on its ass." Although a computer 

locked Army planners out of the network for twelve hou

problem was information overload. Rather than focusing on b

problems that required decisions, the command structure found 

capsized by waves of computerized trivia. According to the A
The problem, of course, was that the organizational preference

to centralization had also created a highly efficient electronic sy

not only mirrored those preferences but magnified them. Onl

aftermath of the Iranian hostage disaster in t980 (which had 

real-time communications with the White House) was there any re

the trend toward electronically enhanced centralization. The 

administration, as a deliberate act of policy, stressed a greater nee

upon the judgment of the professional military and especially on th

on-scene commander. There was a resulting increase in the degree 

tactical control noted during small-scale operations, such as tho

Gulf of Sidra in 1981 (when a Libyan jet fighter was shot down 

F-14s), as well as those involving considerably more military force

the 1983 invasion of Grenada. Lest it be thought, however, that 

autonomy had displaced bad new centralization or that strategic c

ity had been superseded, direct White House control over the 

1985 interception of the Achille Lauro hijackers provided drama

to the contrary. 28 Defense centralization as well as its electronic e

into the domain of service and operational autonomy is likely 

constant, differing only in degree from one set of political decisio

to the next. This basic fact of contemporary military life was per

summed up in the anonymous comment of one much-decor

high-ranking officer: "There may be some times when o

management communications system breaks down, but there aren

Most of the time, the damned thing works too well." 

New Battlefield Technologies 

While the pressures of autonomy and centralization prov

familiar historical counterpoints, an appreciation of the pivota

technology is critical in understanding the significance of cont

command and control developments. Three battlefield tech

summarized here emerged in the 1970s and continue to play an 

role in the strategic and tactical calculations of the services: e
of the fundamental ingredients of warfare; however, it t

additional importance when an American intelligence e

developed virtually from scratch during the war and a

institutional status with the creation of the Central Intelligenc

1947. In its modem usage, the term PGM refers to the ability o

to be guided in its flight to the target by a human or robot

thereby achieving great accuracy and pinpoint target destructio

World War II combat produced at least one example of the 

form of the kamikaze suicide bomber, most Americans go

exposure to these weapons in April 1986, when camera 

released that showed "smart bombs" dropped from Air F

destroying Libyan transport aircraft during U.S. retaliatory st

the Quaddafi regime. 

These technologies have been closely related throughout th

ment--to the point that, like triplets, it is not easy to disc

without bringing up the other two. The key to their closenes

destructive capacity of the PGM, which was demonstra

appearance of unpowered but laser-guided bombs during the 

of the air campaign over North Vietnam in 1972. Laser "des

an attacking aircraft simply pointed out and "illuminated" 

Receptors on the bomb homed in on this reflected energy an

steerable front fins so that the projectile followed a devastat

trajectory. Because there are very few battlefield targets that c

the impact of a five-hundred- or two-thousand-pound bom

within twenty feet, it was not long before PGMs could be foun

the inventories of all three services. The Navy, for example, w

not only with the Phoenix air-to-air missile but also with 

antiship missile, which had a range in excess of fifty miles

added the TOW antitank missile, which could destroy the lar

vehicles with a single hit at three thousand meters. 29 

The key to applying PGMs was to "acquire" targets at ext

and then guide the missiles toward their final destination. This 

led directly to the need to field intelligence and electronic war

that could identify and pinpoint those targets while denying e
With the advent of effective guided ordnance systems, nava

entered an em in which the radius of surface action of the carrier

task force now approached five hundred miles. Carriers routinely 

with aircraft that had specific EW missions, the two stalwarts 

A-6 Intruder/Prowler, developed for electronic countermeasures 

and the E-2C Hawkeye, which carries a radar system for b

warning and air control. Carrier aircraft and surface ships carrie

suites that helped maintain this umbrella of coverage, the force b

together by the Naval Tactical Data System NTDS, an electron

data link that allowed information to be shared by all compon

NTDS-equipped ships or aircraR thus became part of an i

information network, each member drawing upon the data reporte

of the electronic, acoustic, or optical sensors possessed by th

individually or collectively. Because of the need to orga

information, both to track incoming threats and to assign weapon

with them, "automated data processing has become a basic el

naval combat. "3° 

The carrier task force had now become the focal point for wha

known in the Navy as composite warfare doctrine, which stre

"layered threat" to the battle group from coordinated attacks by e

surface, and subsurface forces firing a variety of PGMs. It was ar

concept that the Aegis cruisers were developed during the 1970s

of the class, the USS Ticonderoga, being commissioned in ear

Aegis cruisers are equipped with advanced sonar, the AN

omnidirectional radar, and an extremely sophisticated comp

automatically and simultaneously tracks subsurface, surface, and 

threats and assigns appropriate weapons systems to deal with them

the Aegis is so important to the composite warfare concept an

Navy's vision of future ocean combat that it is discussed in some 

the following chapter.) It is sufficient to note here that, ope

conjunction with the carrier, its planes, and escorting vessels, Aegi

the Navy to counter the "layered threat" with a "layered defense. '~n 

The use by the Air Force of PGMs has already been mentioned

important to note that its use of EW and electronic intelligence i
into combat--the "bending" of German radar beams, for exam

accepted as commonplace when American airmen joined 

counterparts from mid-1942 onward. 32 This "war in the ethe

integral part of Air Force history, but many of these same less

relearned during the air war over North Vietnam from 1965 to 

American policymakers dawdled during the escalation of U.S. 

the North Vietnamese received Russian help in constructing 

system that produced the heaviest concentrations of antiair

(AAA) fire ever seen in warfare. Augmenting the AAA c

were belts of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), which grew in 

complexity until "during the cicven-day offensive in 1972 . 

1,000 SAMs were fired with the resulting loss of 15 B-52s an

aircraft. ''33 Under these circumstances, every technique of E

jamming, confusing enemy radars with chaff, or false 

employing specially equipped "Wild Weasel" aircra~ that 

enemy radars and fired missiles that tracked the beam back 

Measure and countermeasure followed one another until 

American involvement in the war. The Air Force maintained 

throughout and retained the ability to strike at any target 

Washington-based decision makers. 

The Air Force emerged from the war impressed by th

Soviet-directed air defenses and the losses they could inflict u

aircraft. By the end of the 1970s, the Air Force was tak

deliveries of the aircraft that would be the linchpin in its e

airborne intelligence and electronic warfare into a decisive 

combat power against the Soviets or their proxies. This sy

Boeing E-3A Sentry, better known by its acronym AWACS 

Warning and Control System), consisting of a Boeing 707 fo

aircraft mounting, among other things, a Westinghouse APY-I 

radius of coverage of over two hundred nautical miles. 

computer consoles on board the aircraft provide real-t

(including air, sea, and surface targets) for the crew, as wel

ground controllers. The fact that the AWACS is an aerial syst

it a true "look-down" capability, countering the ability of atta
airfields, and other high-value point targets. 34 

The reaction of the U.S. Army to these battlefield technolo

interesting study in the mechanics of organizational mode

especially in relation to the development of military intelligence, 

discipline and later as a combat support branch of the Regula

The creation of a G-2, or intelligence, section for Pershing's staff 

War I was an insufficient precedent to ensure that the integ

intelligence and operations would be effective during either tr

wartime service. For one thing, the G-3, or operations officer, 

dominate the rest of the staff, and the G-3 office continued to 

most capable and ambitious officers, who regarded themselves as 

and soul of the command staff and earmarked for greater thi

tendency eventually caused problems the next time America

themselves at war. Gen. Omar Bradley's memoirs contain a 

recalling the situation at the start of World War II: "The America

long neglect of intelligence training was soon reflected by the in

our initial undertakings .... In some stations the G-2 became the 

ground for officers ill-suited for command. I recall how scrup

avoided the branding that came with an intelligence assignment in 

career. Had it not been for the uniquely qualified reservists who s

filled many of our intelligence jobs throughout the war, the Arm

have been pressed. ''36 

The record of just how crucial intelligence was to Allied vict

war was not revealed until the publication in 1974 of a remark

book, The Ultra Secret. Its author, F. W. Winterbotham, disclose

first time that British cryptographers had broken the German high 

code early in the war, so that virtually all radio communications fr

to his generals, and from them to their subordinate commands, ha

British intelligence almost at the same time the messages arrive

intended destinations. That revelation, as well as those that fo

historians and other scholars took up the trail, showed that ma

victories of celebrated Allied tactical commanders had depended d

this precise intelligence. This hitherto unsuspected factor was to a

of what had been previously written of the history of the war. 37 
the discipline as a whole until the creation of the Militar

branch in 1964. Traditionally, one of the best ways f

commander to gain intelligence--assuming that he wanted it

engage in active operations in the best Jominian tradition 

enemy reactions and dispositions. Yet the generals picked 

combat units in Vietnam found that, although their training 

them well for the efficient employment of overwhelming 

backed by elaborate support mechanisms, their chief 

consisted of locating a highly elusive enemy. Worse yet, th

virtually indistinguishable from his surroundings and emerged 

when he enjoyed a decisive advantage. One general officer c

these perplexities: "I knew that finding the enemy would b

toughest jobs. It occurred to me that perhaps we would be a

the guerrilla, a farmer by day and a fighter by night, by th

under his eyes. As it turned out, our surveillance was ju

sophisticated. ''38 

The response to these difficulties was primarily technolo

so many other features of the American experience in Vie

traditional fields of signals intelligence (SIGINT), count

human intelligence (HUMINT), and imagery intelligence 

entirely new array of sensors was added. Battlefield radars, 

reconnaissance aircrat~, unattended ground sensors, and infr

phy all provided an increasingly technical base to the de

intelligence. Other airborne sensors sought out enemy radi

flashed the location of the sending unit back to artillery 

ground. The HUMINT teams sought out the enemy infrastr

computer-assisted pattern analysis and, in some cases, dir

units to the targets thus developed. Almost overnight, milita

had become an important part of the target acquisition p

increasingly visible part of operational planning. Military inte

however, were not as a regular thing particularly well i

tactical line units; rather, they tended to be held as strate

detached to lower echelons for specific purposes. Although 

worked well enough in the highly irregular arrangements 
possible by the conflict was the fact that, more than in previou

East wars, there was a direct face-off between protagonists 

top-of-the-line U.S. and Soviet equipment. This was also 

mid-intensity conflict in which electronic warfare had such dem

results on ground combat, as Soviet-supplied air defense radars 

with deadly effect against Israeli planes, limiting the ability of tha

redress the traditional numerical superiority of Arab armies. 

impressive were the results of a variety of PGMs that were able 

either improved optical tracking or terminal guidance systems to 

much higher "probability-of-hit" ratio than had ever been seen in 

combat. Largely for that reason, there was an unprecedented at

forces on both sides that for a time threatened the ability 

superpowers to effect timely resupply of their client states. 40 

The parallels with a putative war between the Warsaw Pact an

armies in Central Europe were obvious and, given the close-run 

the Israeli victory, more than a little disturbing. The numerous deb

special studies, and analyses in the aftermath of the 1973 war resu

sweeping revision of the Army's tactical doctrine and the publica

new field manual on operations, FM 100-5. This document, "the 

of the Army's system of field manuals," was intended to ope

chapter in the way the Army went about the business of preparing 

and to put commanders at all echelons on notice that a new era had 

The war in the Middle East in 1973 might well portend the 

of modem battle. Arabs and Israelis were armed with the 

weapons, and the conflict approached a destructiveness 

attributed only to nuclear weapons .... In clashes of massed 

such as the world has not witnessed for 30 years, both 

sustained devastating combat losses, approaching 50 per cent i

than two weeks of combat. These statistics are of serious impo

U.S. Army commanders (emphasis in the original) 41 

The manual went on to analyze the changes in land combat, 

significant of which was the tank. Because of improvements i

firepower, and maneuverability, "the capabilities of modem tan

been extended to as far as the tanker can see. What he can see, he 
armored targets at extended ranges. Artillery rounds using lase

similarly made point destruction of individual targets possibl

fire. This acquisition of targets at such extended ranges wa

without precise intelligence, so commanders were now told u

of their new responsibilities for the effective management (

G-2 officers) of the three major intelligence disciplines: h

gence, signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence. Maki

work together would allow the commander to "see" his adv

battlefield, to pinpoint the location of his main forces, and to 

at long ranges, thereby reducing the numbers that would surv

American front-line units. This concept became known as 

application of the old doctrine of attrition: electronic warfar

intelligence, and PGMs were the new technological realities 

sought to exploit. 43 

This would not be the first time, however, that doctrine and 

failed to mesh. An Intelligence Organization and Stati

completed in 1974, at the direction of Army Chief of Staff G

W. Abrams, was a virtual indictment of the system that pre

time. It found that military intelligence units were not prope

to support the tactical mission and, indeed, were in most case

control of tactical commanders because of their strategic re

Given the fact that many military intelligence units e

functionally separate chains of command and reported 

national-level agencies, the study concluded that, at least i

commands, "the integration of intelligence from all sources 

product was largely a myth. ''44 

These findings were the genesis of a new tactical structure 

CEWI battalion (for Combat Electronic Warfare and 

pronounced "see-we"), first developed at Fort Hood, Texas

Despite its uninspiring name---which, like the "Boy Named 

impossible to change later on--the CEWI battalion was a 

innovation that originally incorporated sections for ground 

(battlefield radars and ground sensors), electronic warfar

security, imagery intelligence, and interrogation. At its h
pointed out, "Automation must be the savior, for only through a 

designed automation architecture can one hope to search, sense, 

and select the right set of equipment or targets from the mass of 

The human mind is a wonderful mechanism, but 35,000 is more th

manage. ''45 Statements like this seemed visionary at the time 

CEWI battalions were formed: after all, how did this new branch e

join a field Army while carrying fragile, bulky, and trou

computers? The answer became clearer now with the advent of brie

lap-top computers with fold-down LED displays and built-in print

it or not, the computer's place was every place. The CEWI b

therefore, became an accepted part of the tactical structure of th

even though the process of experimentation with its different sect

missions would provide continuing challenges for the new breed o

intelligence officers. 

The battlefield technologies of electronic warfare, intelligen

battlefield automation as well as precision-guided munitions thus g

responses in each of the services: Aegis for the Navy, AWACS fo

Force, and CEWI for the Army. In some cases this meant far-

changes that went to the heart of service organizations, doctrin

procedures. What, for example, were the implications for the trad

independent command at sea of the Navy's growing reliance on e

command and control? How would the AWACS--the quint

airborne system--affect the cardinal principle of air control exerci

the ground? How would the Air Force and the Army handle the 

but critical matter of sharing intelligence at the theater level or, 

matter, at the tactical level? These questions were important, but th

possibly less significant than the fact that all of them stemmed 

from the efforts of each service to come to terms with fundamental 

affecting its particular warfare environment. They were part of the 

change and renewal that has been a constant of American military h

Now, however, something else was about to change, and it invo

traditional role of the services as the primary repositories of op

expertise and arbiters of technological choice in the develop

weapons systems. The choices customarily made in this arena, to th
technological edge on an increasingly capable Soviet adv

raising larger problems. How would these systems work to

environment involving more than one service? What hig

would be in charge of referring and resolving likely conflict

event of tough decisions, who would make them, and who w

bill? 

The discussion of the legacy of service autonomy that in

chapter allows a quick summation of its potential impact on c

control. The American political system, the norms of civilian 

the reluctance of the Republic to centralize power in eith

military hands produced services that over time represented 

balance between those traditions and the requirements 

efficiency. Pluralism and the norms of autonomy were somew

the events of World War II and the defense unification stru

services were le~ as the embodiments of their respective 

wisdom, with primary responsibilities for the development 

ment of the tanks, warships, and airplanes that were the 

sinews of the combatant forces. This tradition of separatism, 

less effective when it came to the problem of putting toget

and control systems--the nervous system of those fo

composition transcended service lines. In a nutshell, the issue 

services had institutional expertise and procurement responsi

programs and money) for command and control systems

secondary interest in systems that crossed service lines; 

primary interest in joint command and control, but neither th

ity nor the money for procurement of such systems; the 

specified commands had all the responsibility for the nation

forces (and arguably much of the expertise as well), but no m

procure new items or to fine-tune what was in place; final

none of the operational expertise and only incomplete 

procurement, but complete responsibility for anything that a

failed to do anywhere in the system. The search for sound 

these conditions is the focus of the remainder of this book. 
thought of as the dawning of the modem era in c

control. The major influences in this process high

previous chapter--the advent of battleworthy pre

munitions, the higher plateaus reached by electron

close association with new methods for tactical 

surveillance, and target acquisition, and the deve

global system for controlling U.S. strategic and t

--all implied great changes for the combatant f

command structure itself. All too often, the pace 

tion appeared to outrun the capacity to understa

taking place. The writings by experts in the new 

command and control often seemed to consist of 

technical details unrelated to any larger context. W

prose could be an impenetrable thicket of buzzw

and obscure usages. Pondering this problem, Geral

appointed by the Carter administration as the 

secretary of defense for communications, command

intelligence, said in a 1979 speech: "We go to Con

them that our WWMCCS has got to have a BME

and our fuzzy sevens have to be replaced by PAV

want to keep PARCS and DEW in operation, we h

the NEACP, and we have to improve our MEEC

TACAMO and begin planning to replace AFSA

Triple-S. And then we wonder why no one understa

If command and control defied easy expla

assistant secretary of defense, still less did it carry 

implications for the military organizations that wer

front of the rush to modernization. For example

Army brought smaller and more powerful comp

tactical units, one of its leading professional journ

unnamed NCO who damned the new machines a

that could destroy us all." 2 
places for complex and delicate equipment of any kind. And if the

reasonable presumption that computers might fail at the very mome

they were needed most, was it sensible to make the vast investm

time and money that would be required to achieve even a minimal 

tactical automation? 3 

These were not easy questions to answer, particularly when the

few intellectual reference points that could serve to guide the 

about a discipline that was as old as warfare itself and as new 

information revolution of which it was a pan. Inevitably, a fe

souls offered conceptual models of the command and control proc

were useful jumping-off points; the following section briefly 

several of them. But this chapter is primarily about the ef

high-technology command and control systems on the services

which faced problems in coming to terms with the changes dema

these new technologies. The Navy is presented here as an exam

technically sophisticated but essentially autonomous comma

control structure. The Army and the Air Force, though separate 

since 1947, have never been closer than in their recent ef

determine how their respective forces can best achieve the 

required in modern theater warfare. But even with the best of in

the problem of ground and air integration is difficult, especial

relation to the Army's new doctrine of the "Airland Battle." Ine

the different organizational structures of these two services prese

interesting conflicts in their approach to modernization, as well as 

understanding of what it is that command and control s

accomplish, especially when ground and air component comm

work together. If there is a single point to be made here, it 

organizational realities exert an influence on command and 

development that is both pervasive and, in some cases, decisive. O

it another way, electrons cross service boundaries with far grea

than is apparently the case with humans. 
boards or in some stage of the defense procurement proce

these articles address the issue of how such systems 

organizations they are meant to serve, the larger question of c

control as a process is more elusive. An elegantly simple bas

discussion is provided by I. B. Holley, Jr., who conceives of c

process by which the commander perceives and decides both 

objectives to be sought," as well as the "means to achieve the

basically everything else: "the communication of the comman

to his subordinate echelons, followed by continuous monitor

command is to control what a pilot is to an autopilot. 4 

A number of other thoughtful analysts have also wres

conceptual outlines of the command and control process. Thre

presented here: John Boyd, a former Air Force colonel act

civilian consultant and as a staff analyst in the Office of the 

Defense, and Dr. Joel S. Lawson, who retired from the Nav

Systems Command, where he was known as "the guru of Nav

Paul Gorman, now retired after a distinguished Army car

command and control "modeler" in the same sense as Boyd 

but his writings have shed important light on key service dif

respect to command and control. These three perspec

something of the universal aspects of command in the inf

balanced as always by fundamental organizational differences

John Boyd's model of command and control is the 

probably the best known theoretical treatment of this proble

depicts what is essentially a four-step process of observation

decision, and action which he views as basic to the comman

process--so much so that he abbreviates it simply as the O

Each of these steps is part of the tactical decision loop, the id

success in battle often depends on which commander can 

loop faster. By "turning inside" his opponent's decision c

thinking more quickly and coherently--a commander not o

rapidly to events but can control them. He can then 

complicate his opponent's decision cycle, so that eventually th

command and control system collapses and his forces are d
7Y 

FIGURE 6. !. The Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action (O-O-D-A) Cyclc 

Source: Author (al~er John Boyd) 

the fighter pilot he once was, Boyd clearly envisions combat as a do

in which victory depends upon lightning speed, instinctive reflexe

most of all, positional advantage. Or, as Chuck Yeager might have 

"Get on the other guy's tail and hammer him!" 

The O-O-D-A link is intrinsic to the "maneuver warfare" school of t

espoused by Boyd, Pierre Sprey, Steven Canby, and William S. 

Their critique of the traditional American style of attrition warfare w

outlined later in this chapter, but it is enough to observe here th

essence of maneuver is the Jominian concentration of superior 

against an opponent's vulnerable points so as to bring about his 

Boyd's decision loop provides a coherent conceptual underpinni

modem maneuver warfare theory because it focuses primarily o

enemy command structure and, more specifically, on the mind 

opposing commander: that, rather than the enemy force, should 

object of maneuver. Rather than engaging the main body of the op

force, for example, an operation should bring pressure against vuln

points in its control mechanisms (headquarters, command posts, com

cations nodes, and so on) in order to sow confusion, create pani

bring about defeat} 

It follows that Boyd's approach to command and control is 

ideological and conceptual, primarily resulting from a common m

between leaders and subordinates. This shared view, which is dev

and reinforced by years of training, personal relationships, and co

experiences, colors both perceptions of and reactions to combat situ

Rather than relying on a wealth of electronic communications, l
high-technology electronics. Therefore, command and contr

rather suspect concept, which ought largely to be replaced b

and monitoring: '6 

Boyd's model was criticized in a 1983 Air Force study by 

E. Orr, Combat Operations C31: Fundamentals and Interaction

contention is that Boyd's function blocks require a "substan

and clarification" in order to provide an acceptable "comb

process" model. Far more satisfactory from his point of 

conceptual model offered by Joel S. Lawson, shown in figu

noting the "clear relationship" between the Boyd and Lawso

final two steps, DECIDE and ACT, are identical in both), O

Lawson's five functional steps yield a clearer understanding 

intelligence in command decisions. 7 Lawson can be defende

grounds that his basic model fits in well with his large

command and control. This view treats command and contr

"command control," as a process in which different com

different roles while operating as parts of a larger system. L

that "to talk about a completely integrated C3I system is r

various parts must be pretty much self-contained and perfo

and separable functions so that we can change one 'mo

affecting all the others." It then follows that ''the purpose of 

control process is to either maintain or change the equilibriu

environment, as determined by a higher authority. "s 

The four-step SENSE-COMPARE-DECIDE-ACT basic 

becomes a component in the more detailed model of the 

shown in figure 6.2), in which external data are processed, co

desired state, and acted upon with the help of decision aids

own forces are added to the environment, they are the

influencing that environment: the results of those interac

become part of the data chain. Lawson calls this his thermod

of the command control process in order to connote its int

and effect upon, the surrounding environment. Both that fo

the basic model provide a convenient way of thinking about 

and control process. Thus, the final box of figure 6.2 show
7 

WE~ 

01RECI'lON 

COkiSAT 

OIRECTI(~ 

COMMAND 

OOUT~O4. 

UNiT 

TAgK 

GflO~JP 

TASK 

FOaOE 

FIGURE 6.2. Lawson's Models of Command and Control 

Source: AFCEA Press 
inherent implications that go far beyond its immediate pres

command and control. Lawson's model is slightly more c

provides a more precise sense of how environment affects var

the command and control process. One could as well select 

and expand the four or five discrete steps highlighted by Boyd 

to a very large number, depending on the task being highli

same way that a military commander chooses large-, medium

scale maps on the basis of mission and geographical area

important thing about these models may be their essential 

viewing command as a process, one that is, moreover, repea

over in recognizable ways. In addition to the congruence of t

analytical elements observed earlier, both models sugge

unanimity of both form and function that transcends service lin

This tendency is particularly noteworthy in Lawson's wo

easy to see why his basic process and nested models have made 

contribution to the study of command and control. The mode

are analytically crisp and, without being unduly busy, tend 

essential processes that characterize many systems. At least 

attractive simplicity may stem from the fact that most 

professional experience comes from his work as a naval c

control analyst. As he freely admits, naval command and cont

the most technically sophisticated yet least demanding prob

any of the services. Defining a total of seventy-seven thousa

merchantmen, and military or civilian aircraft as the entire 

items of potential naval interest, he notes that this is the 

world." In contrast, "the Army or the Marines face a v

problem because their targets are different. They have to deal 

larger number of objects on a not-very-large battlefield b

"objects' turn out to be individual radios or tanks or field p

Navy, these things are aggregated into one hull so that we h

number of discrete objects with which to deal. Therefore, u

and solving the Navy's command-control problem may be 

than solving the other Services'. "1o 
services. The Navy vice admiral would logically expect to comman

100 ships, planes, and submarines in a typical carrier battle group 

given time. His Air Force counterpart, a three-star wing comm

however, would have a command and control problem at the next o

magnitude, typically I00 to 1,000 aircraft of all types, in add

ground reporting and controlling stations. But the Marine and Arm

commanders would have the most complex problem of all: their 

platoons, companies, battalions, and higher formations typically 

1,000 to 100,000 or more movable subordinate entities: 

These numbers are tyrannical, but probably less so than 

communications systems and command mechanisms that woul

available to each. The navy commander would have the most ass

communications, the army commander the least. The navy c

mander would be dealing on the average with relatively high-ran

officers, and the average rank of subordinate leaders.., would de

as one proceeded from navy to air force to marines to army. 

navy commander's information regarding his sub.ordinates woul

quite precise and real-time, that of the army leader vague and s

arriving. The navy commander would have . . . the greatest tac

flexibility, the army commander the least. The navy comm

principle would be centralization, while that of the army comma

would perforce be decentralization. The air force would be much c

to the navy in all these respects, the marines closer to the army. j I 

Figure 6.3 highlights these points by Gorman. Although it i

conceptual model per se, it can be argued that his observation is of 

importance in understanding the interservice differences that fo

settings in which command and control systems exist. 

The initial chapters of this book examined the respective s

paradigms underlying service approaches to the problem of comm

war. Gorman's view is a powerful reminder that those verities 

operational realities giving rise to them continue to be important. T

valuable perspective since it suggests something of the context in wh

universal and the particular meet and define one another. Another 

of that context not mentioned by Gorman is that of the different 

operating environments. In exactly the same sense that the land a

presented dissimilar challenges to both strategic connectivity and 
¢1 

Z 

o 
Compare those environments with that of the earth and add the add

limitations on long-range surveillance imposed by surface terrain fe

jungles, forests, mountain ranges, buildings, and cities, among other 

It becomes apparent not only that land warfare encompasses far 

"moveable subordinate entities" than either air or sea combat but t

laws of physics make this operational environment far more diffi

monitor than the others. 

The heart of modem command and control is therefore somethin

paradox: no matter what far-reaching changes have been brought ab

science and technology, differing service approaches persist and 

flourish in the modem era. Although the strong arms of traditio

history that reinforce the norms of service autonomy can nev

dismissed, it is interesting that many of these differences are al

product of basic environmental dissimilarities. As will be shown in th

the following chapter, differences in the number and character of for

well as their respective operational environments, help account f

persistence of interservice command and control problems in the f

some extraordinarily integrative technologies. 

Global Reach: An Overview of Navy Command and Cont

In a 1979 article, Rear Adm. Frederick C. Johnson summariz

approach of his service to command and control as follows: "The 

commander through the ages has sought to attain target detection 

maximum practicable range in order to provide sufficient distance an

for decision-making and preliminary actions, and . . . to provide w

systems with the quality and quantity of data needed to acquire the 

for timely engagement and kill. The compression of time, the vastn

the aerospace atmosphere above and expanding operational volume 

the surface of the sea necessitates that this range now be exten

dimensions which are beyond the wildest dreams of even the 

farsighted of our predecessors. ''12 

The time compression and range extension of which the admiral 

are themselves functions of the marriage of the precision-guided mu
and tactical survival; ships and aircraft, for example, 

controlled through digital data flows after the Naval Tactical 

(NTDS) became operational in the early 1960s. It is thus 

realize that, almost unnoticed, the Navy has acquired a g

experience in the technological modernization of its command 

systems. 

The results of that experience are helpful in gaining the per

more "mature" view of a process the Army and Air Force ar

with as well. And, as has so often occurred in the past, the m

strategies of the services offer a useful contrast for study. T

concentrated its efforts on the development of a tactical arch

the ground up, while the Navy experience stresses the imp

top-down approach. The Army has a discernible tendency 

creation of theater-specific command and control networks, 

Navy remains firmly wedded to the concept of global syst

reach the fleet upon whatever seas it is deployed at the mome

this reflects basic differences in the operational character of th

well as in their specific missions. 

Since World War II, the Navy has again laid claim to 

mission it occupied throughout the nineteenth and early 

twentieth centuries. Despite its fears that its traditional ro

largely taken over by the Air Force in the postwar reorga

nuclear era dealt the Navy a surprisingly strong hand. Fo

nuclear weapons were gradually introduced into the fleet 

munitions to be delivered by carrier jets but as warhead

submarine warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and air defense. T

carrier strike force into a "nuclear strike force" with a 

deterrence mission, as well as a "mobile air force for regional 

wars" and a diplomatic signaling device providing a "visible d

of national interests. ''13 The deployment of ballistic missile s

the 1960s meant the gradual eclipse of a primary carrier rol

nuclear bombardment, even as it guaranteed a permanent Navy 

nuclear triad. The diplomacy of the nuclear era, however, 

forces into a favored instrument both of power projection 
administration in 1987 to reflag Kuwaiti oil tankers and place a lar

task force on escort duty in the Persian Gulf was consistent with th

sea power. 14 As events there and in the Mediterranean have demo

throughout the 1980s, these front-line forces are also capable of 

out or supporting actual combat missions in response to fast-

changes in the international situation. 

All these missions necessitated the development of a global app

naval command and control, despite the clear preference of that se

decentralized operations. The Navy has attempted to bridge 

between the requirements of an efficient global command network 

demands of tactical autonomy by embracing the concept of mo

outlined above. The idea is very close to the federalist m

organization the Navy embraced on so many occasions in its hist

concept thus represents a basic naval philosophy, as well as a pr

for a command and control system that, insofar as possible, will 

things to all men," spanning the complete range of activities and op

that naval units worldwide might be engaged in. This ideal 

attenuated by reality, however, for reasons that are partly technica

financial, and partly organizational. The modular units that compo

command and control perform functions that vary greatly dependin

tactical environment, although all of them will, as Lawson puts it

PROCESS, COMPARE, DECIDE, and ACT. A global system 

account of this diversity by permitting component systems 

interdependent, but not necessarily congruent? 5 

This point is perhaps more easily understood in its organ

context. The Navy is deployed in four fleets that traverse the worl

oceans--itself a powerful factor encouraging diversity--and is co

of surface forces (ships), subsurface forces (submarines), and ai

(carrier as well as land-based aircraft). The marriage of precision o

and electronic fire control has affected all these platforms: guided 

now constitute both their principal offensive weapons and the p

tactical threats they are meant to counter. These systems come in 

of forms: antiship missiles, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), air-to

missiles, and even antisubmarine rockets or missiles. Submarine
Complicating the matter is the fact that most task forces are 

aircraft carriers that must not only coordinate ship movemen

air operations as well. No single system of communications 

accommodate such a melange of different frequencies a

characteristics, especially when different task force elements m

or detached to meet changing mission requirements--hence 

interactive communications modules. 

One of the other characteristics of the naval command and c

is its increasing ability to expand the range of tactical engage

As noted in chapter 5, the organic assets of the carrier batt

E2C Hawkeye advanced early warning aircraft and the Aegis 

among others) give it an effective surveillance umbrella of a

five hundred miles. Shore-based command and control links 

extend that range in some geographical areas, and even thos

are being improved to the point that it will be possible for ba

conduct tactical reconnaissance over entire oceans, t7 The m

logical factors speeding the development of ocean area tactic

are advanced satellite systems, including NAVSTAR (glob

positioning), FLTSATCOM (high-speed data links), and re

platforms using high-resolution radar and infrared scanning. 

satellites for sensing and data relay has been accompa

development of more capable earth-based sensors: SURTA

towed-array sonar system), improved and rapidly deployabl

as well as the Air Force AWACS, with its great utility fo

maritime missions. With the data from these sensors, the 

relay of information from high-speed communications links, 

signal processing of the next generation of supercomputers

tactical integration is a near-term possibility. And what will 

for gathering and analyzing all this data? "A cruise missile 

type of ocean area targeting grid can have an effective ran

three thousand miles without any basic changes in engine 

technology. ''19 

Meanwhile, the expansion of tactical operating ranges is 

problem in today's Navy. To understand this, one must appreci
operated in World War II carrier task forces. 20 Because there are 

these ships, and because each represents a heavy investment of dol

capabilities, they are naturally high-priority targets for any opposing 

Because of the increased lethality of precision-guided munitions

as the ever-present threat of nuclear weapons, the ships of the ta

typically operate as far apart as possible. Escort vessels for the car

have primary antiair warfare (AAW) or antisubmarine warfare (ASW

tions, but will also act as command and control relay points to main

300-to-500-mile umbrella surrounding the carrier. A two-carrier tas

such as that which operated against the Libyans in the Gulf of 

April 1986, would typically cover some 56,000 square miles. If 

area were superimposed upon a map of the eastern United States, 

show a task force centered around Washington with carriers dep

Richmond, Virginia, and Baltimore, Maryland, AAW ships spre

Norfolk, Virginia, to Trenton, New Jersey, and airborne inte

operating from Boston, Massachusetts, to Charleston, South Car

would be capable of mounting air strikes as far away as Chicago, 

Indianapolis, Indiana, St. Louis, Missouri, and Atlanta, Georgia. 2t 

These ranges obviously present a challenge for command and 

systems within the fleet. Moreover, the threats they must contend w

increased with the expansion of the Soviet navy from a coastal 

force into a deep-water fleet whose surface and subsurface combat

capable of interdicting American sea lines of communication. T

(14,000 tons) OSCAR submarine, for example, carries twe

nuclear-capable SS-N-I 9 antiship cruise missiles, each with a range 

three hundred miles. Even more widely known are the three Ki

aircraft carriers added to the fleet since 1975 (a fourth aircraft car

new design is under construction). The sea-going combatants are su

by long-range naval aviation, whose capabilities are being augme

the continuing production run of the TU-22 Backfire bomber. Its e

speed and range (Mach 2.3 and 3,500-mile combat radius) make it 

threat to U.S. surface ships almost anywhere in the world. 22 

A naval confrontation, therefore, between the United States 

Soviet Union or some of its better-equipped client states woul
the survivors are detected by shipboard radars of the escort 

then engage them with antiaircraft missiles. Final point defens

remaining "leakers" (that is, penetrating aircraft) is prov

defensive systems aboard each ship-chaff, decoys, and fast-fi

guns, meant either to deceive the missile or to shoot it down. 24 

Because of the speed at which these missiles close with 

naval command and control is directed at buying time for t

tactical command to identify specific threats and take appropri

does this in several ways. First, it extends the range of the 

available to tactical commanders at sea. Since there are limits 

of sensors organic to the fleet, extending them has increa

having real-time access to national-level systems and 

command and information centers. This linkage takes place lar

Fleet Command Centers which represent the land-based si

command and control and are also the focal points for the tra

up-to-date intelligence to the fleet, gleaned from both national 

Navy sensors. The system is an extension of the Navy's ex

World War II, in which (as recent scholarship has demons

stations were the key elements in the production of the naval 

that produced victories such as that at Midway. 25 

The second major function of the naval command and cont

to improve the ranges and data-handling capabilities of t

systems used by commanders at sea to make operationa

Highlighting the potential deadliness of naval combat hav

Navy's recent experiences in the Persian Gulf--the accidental 

USS Stark (struck by an Iraqi-fired Exocet missile in May 1

tragic downing of the Iranian airbus by the USS Vincennes i

The heavy investment in the Aegis-class cruisers, of which th

is one, is itself an excellent demonstration of how serious

regards the threat from highly accurate, fast-moving m

experience with digital data and its global mission have mad

the improvement of its principal fleet command and control sy

counter Soviet-style missile barrages and to deal with the pro

similar weapons in the third world. Antiair warfare (AAW) wa
which demonstrated that even a relatively unsophisticated oppon

produce devastating results with far fewer missiles than the Sovie

be expected to launch. 26 Worse yet, the Naval Tactical Data 

(NTDS), largely the offspring of first-generation data-processin

ment, now faced a problem for which its original design had few 

How, for example, would separate NTDS modules and thei

controllers handle the multi-media threat that resulted when a s

target fired an airborne missile against a surface ship? There clea

be no time for manually assisted methods by NTDS operators in 

that known Soviet capabilities materialized in a wartime sce

coordinated missile and torpedo barrages. 2~ 

Although it will not solve all the Navy's data-handling prob

Aegis concept is usually described as a quantum leap from any

went before. Billed as a cruiser, the ship nevertheless has a hull 

largely along the lines of the Spruance-class destroyer. Its princip

is the large, AN/SPY-1A phased-array radar that can search a

hundreds of air and surface targets. Also equipped with a state-

sonar suite, the Aegis is for the Navy what the AWACS is fo

Force: an all-seeing eye. But while the sole function of the AWA

acquire and transmit data to ground control stations, Aeg

independent weapons platform as well. Computers link the rad

ship's weapons systems, automatically identifying and tracking 

targets. The system has another feature whose significance shou

overlooked: if set in the automatic special mode, the computer c

and fire the appropriate weapon from the ship's arsenal--SM-2 an

missiles, antisubmarine rockets and torpedoes, Harpoon antiship 

five-inch guns, or the Phalanx point defense gun. 2g 

In the aftermath of the Iranian airliner shoot-down in July 19

Vincennes mistook an A-300 airbus for a much smaller F-14

inevitable that questions about Aegis would be raised: Were its ca

all that had been promised in light of the billion dollars investe

ship? If they were, had too much control been taken away fro

beings and given to the computer? There were allegation

immediately following the incident that operational tests of t
outer defense zone, where they can shoot approaching bombers 

reach missile launch range, cannot be overstated .... with Ae

win the air battle against all comers. Without Aegis, we canno

the at~ermath of the airbus tragedy, the chief of naval opera

Carlisle H. Trost, argued that operational testing of the A

amounted to a "moral imperative" that the Navy had lived up to 

"exhaustive tests" involving some thirty thousand hours of 

evaluation and the expenditure of more than $900 million. He 

"Seldom has a system received this level of confirmation 

introduction to the fleet. TM 

The public report that followed the formal military investig

Vincennes incident provided additional evidence of both the ca

the Aegis system and its limitations. On the one hand, "the AEG

System's performance was excellont--it functioned as design

other, even such a sophisticated system could not offset the ef

crew of time compression (three minutes and forty seconds fr

of first sighting until the instant the captain had to make the 

launch missiles), confusion, fear (the ship had just repelled a

Iranian gunboats), and even the ghost of the USS Stark trage

before. "The fog of war and those human elements which 

individual differently . . are factors which must be co

Although the investigation revealed the need for some refinem

"human engineering" of the Aegis battle display system, Ad

Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, summed up 

learned from the system's first exposure to combat: "AE

advantages are the extended range of its sensors, its fast reacti

capacity to track many targets at once, its ability to send this 

automatically to other units, and its data display .... Operating 

a land-based airfield, however, these advantages can bo seve

That problem is not the fault of the system but geography. "33 

Because of their metaphysical character, questions about 

exercised by the computer versus "the man in the loop" co

resolved by the easy reply that the system had worked as des

aspect of the Iranian airbus tragedy highlights the third basic 
Command Center (TFCC), these centers are compact versions (fou

square feet or less) of their counterparts ashore, providing task 

battle group commanders at sea with an organic capability t

process, analyze, display, and disseminate tactical data. Current 

for TFCCs to be placed aboard the Navy's principal surface co

the latest versions featuring state-of-the-art color monitors, la

video displays, and automatic status boards. All of this equipment i

to give the commander at sea a "God's-eye view" of the tactical 

which would have seemed unimaginable only a decade ago. 34 

The TFCC concept originally grew out of the same dissatisfa

the NTDS that gave rise to Aegis. The great digital data incr

resulted from the introduction of new modular information sy

airborne early warning and antisubmarine warfare in the late 

early 1970s imposed additional burdens on control centers. Har

to keep up with the torrential data flows, fleet commanders reacte

needs as best they could, usually by introducing program changes 

subsystems. As one Navy study noted, this practice "inevitab

differences in performance capabilities of identical ship classes 

incompatibilities between . . . programs that adversely affected 

ability when units from one fleet joined another. "35 

The TFCC was thus seen as an approach that would help st

consolidate, and decentralize naval command and control at sea. T

together of various modules of otherwise autonomous data sys

represented a recognition by the Navy that, though responsib

command at sea may not have changed, certain of its methods 

transformed. 36 Even more significant is the fact that the TFCC rep

technological response to the realization that the Navy's C

Warfare Concept stresses the unity of combat at sea, regardle

specific medium from which threats may be generated. This is a 

idea in a service whose three major constituent communitie

warfare officers, aviators, and submariners--have tended to have 

sense of their individual identities. 

In each of the three aspects discussed here--the exte

shore-based information systems, the deployment of advanced 
development of systems geared to the dynamics of controll

classes of naval platforms. Because most of these platforms a

around carrier-centered battle groups and task forces, and 

Navy seems to have confined itself to a realistic appraisal 

capabilities, the job of designing interoperable command 

systems has been easier. The Navy also appears to have benefi

determination to make these modernization efforts fit into 

structure of command. That the Navy has dealt resolutely 

quantities, from the microprocessor gateway to required shipbo

suggests a capability for organizational and engineering discipl

led to a successful modernization strategy. 

This is not to say there are not problems, the most importa

may be the questions of doctrine and leadership posed by mo

and therefore more intrusive, systems of command and control

lecture to the students of the Naval Postgraduate School and 

War College, Dr. Eberhardt Rechtin neatly summarized this dile

The difficulty of designing a naval communications archi

compounded by the Navy's own traditions of command, an i

element of which is the meaning of "special trust and con

Every naval officer's commission includes those words, 

have come to mean to him that he is trusted to carry out 

with the minimum possible instruction, i.e., the less comm

from above, the better. The tradition is reinforced by th

absolute authority vested in ships' captains at sea, an 

originally granted in a time of communications delays of 

months. Conunanders at every level, however, insist on 

what is going on within their commands, i.e., the more com

tions to and from below, the better. 37 

Increased connectivity to shore-based command and cont

improved local processing capabilities represented by the TFCC 

refinements of the use of naval forces in potential crisis m

scenarios. There is a similar benefit in wartime scenarios wh

could operate in a "receive only" mode of radio silence wi

sight of the tactical situation. But as Rechtin's words imply, it 

clear whether these improved capabilities will be used to g
questions are prepared to argue that the system is so destructive 

virtue as to require its abandonment. But critics are probably 

pointing out that in the event of general hostilities, commu

terminals and relay points would be among the first targets h

aggressive adversary. Should electronic warfare or physical attack 

a complete or partial disruption of the system--a tactic f

discussed in the literature as "Command-Control-Communications 

measures"--the burden on the shoulders of naval commanders 

heavy. A retired Navy captain expressed the dilemma well in po

that under such conditions, "the commander at sea will be much 

his own than he is now. Although the present close linkage be

shore and sea commanders may have certain advantages, it doe

anything to develop the exercise of independent judgment in 

commanders--a quality they will have to use in wartime. "3s 

Although there is no simple answer to this problem, trai

technology suggest two possible pathways. The classic Navy re

the problem of attenuated control in the age of sail was to select 

sea captains who had the ability to reach sound independent de

quality that does not appear to have vanished from the mod

officer corps. Developing and testing personal qualities, however, 

the main reasons training under simulated combat conditions is su

part of peacetime readiness: there simply is no other way to prepa

eventuality of the officer's having to decide, "What do you 

communications are knocked out?" Partial technological solutio

problem, however, are of acute concern to planners. Indeed, tw

naval command and control system's future objectives are to gua

survivability "through redundancy, hardness, dispersion, or reco

of the system," and to provide "an assured flow of minimum 

command, operational, intelligence, surveillance, environmen

logistics data to the tactical commander." Details of how that 

accomplished are not within the scope of this book nor are th

public domain: but the stakes are so high that there appears to 

doubt that survivability is the next evolutionary step in the develo

naval command and control. 39 
maritime operations. Rechtin even elevates this concept to t

plane of naval thought: 

What might Mahan say today? I believe he would be on

first to recognize that the new technologies of comman

possible coordinated operations over vast distances. He 

recognize his concentration of force now means coordinat

integration of force, not necessarily close proximity, especial

age of nuclear weapons. He would, as before, discount 

isolated independent forces as a foundation of strategy. He wo

recognize as in the tradition of his great fleet . . . the conc

battle group tied together by an integrated information networ

On the other hand, this level of integration, so powerful when 

the Navy's internal organization, can become almost a close

when other services are concerned. Navy planners, for unde

reasons, must look primarily to the needs of their own service w

with fiscal constraints. Command and control dollars, which 

harder to come by than some others, have to be carefully husban

meet the emerging requirements. Small wonder, then, that the int

ity of command and control systems for joint or interservice use 

as a secondary set of priorities. As a frustrated Pentagon action 

it, "When the Navy is talking about joint command and co

usually mean interoperability between themselves and the Marine 

Command, Control, and the Airland Battle 

In turning from an examination of Navy command and 

that of the Army and the Air Force, the relevance of General 

observations concerning their underlying differences is particular

From a coherent global system with a comparatively small 

movable subordinate entities, one enters a realm in which tens of 

of such entities must be controlled, manipulated, and tied togeth

the matter more difficult is the fact that the physical environm

warfare, including its adjacent airspace, presents its own cha

command and control. The physical problems of an environm
Those are the questions that have emerged since the incep

Army's new doctrine for fighting and winning mid-to-high-inte

into the twenty-first century. Successively known as Airland Batt

Battle 2000, and Army 21 (reflecting longer-range planning)

doctrine has been the centerpiece of Army operational thinkin

became official in 1982. The implications of Airland Battle creat

to which service would control the "extended battlefield" envisio

precepts. This question reflects one of the themes of this boo

tight integration offered by emerging command and control te

--seemingly demanded by modern warfare--oRen runs afoul 

command structures and the theories of warfare those structures e

A corollary to this point is that technology, by itself, does no

problem and may in fact exacerbate it. As noted in the previous 

the 1970s the Army and the Air Force groped for solutions t

technological challenges of electronic warfare, precision-guided 

battlefield automation, and intelligence. Like the Navy, the Arm

Air Force returned to the fundamental military task of exte

commander's range of vision, both to create additional operati

and to buy time for tactical decision making. To this end, as no

the Army fielded the CEWI organization and the Air Force 

AWACS. The quest for depth, however, was bound to br

organizational conflict. By seeking to cover areas far beyond the 

range of its organic weapons and sensor systems, the Army wa

on Air Force turf, which traditionally had included the responsib

territory from the front lines back to the enemy's homeland. C

delicate balance of service autonomy was once again in some 

being upset. 

As was described in chapters 4 and 5, that balance had been 

since World War II through the coordinative structure of the Jo

of Staff and the placement of service components within the s

the unified and specified commands. The National Security A

(and its subsequent amendments), the Key West and Newport a

and JCS procedures (most notably, JCS Pub. 2, Unified Acti

Forces) were all carefully crafted compromises between service 
service components. Until the passage of the Goldwater-Nicho

1986, the CINC had broad control over operations, but little s

intemal organization of the component commands or their appli

service doctrine to theater requirements. 

For the Air Force, that doctrine continued to rest on the 

paradigms of Douhet and Mitchell, as well as on the lessons lear

World War II aerial combat, a heritage that was somewhat cont

Bernard Brodie provided a classic summation of this paradox: 

Airpower had a mighty vindication in World War II. But 

Mitchell's conception of it . . . rather than Douhet's tha

vindicated. It was in tactical employment that success was 

spectacular and that the air forces won the unqualified respe

admiration of the older services. By contrast, the purely st

successes, however far-reaching in particular instances, were 

entirely convincing to uncommitted observers .... If airmen 

like laboratory animals running a maze, they would seek to 

successes and to recoil from frustrations. They would now be 

favor of tactical as against strategic uses of air power. But 

instead very human, and knowing also the power of nuclear we

they have remained intensely loyal to their original strategic ide

The tactical success of which Brodie wrote was gained at som

the North African desert during the early days of American e

combat, the experiences there and elsewhere suggesting tha

success rested on the concentration of scarce air assets in orde

superiority over the opposing air force. These successive concent

force ultimately resulted in air superiority and unhindered close ai

of ground operations. Nowhere better highlighted than in the N

invasion and the ensuing campaign for northern Europe, these fe

principles of tactical air operations provided the doctrinal backdro

air-ground teamwork that was so devastatingly effective throughou

of the war. 43 

The Korean and Vietnam conflicts taught additional lessons th

contributed to the evolution of the air-ground operations syst

system allowed for the use of both preplanned and immediate req

air support to be routed back through the parallel chains of comm

now existed for air and ground units. An important feature 
Marines, U.S., and South Vietnamese Air Force planes, as well as 

helicopters; however, it was flexible enough to work well in an atmo

in which air superiority was assured. 44 

The system underwent more substantial challenges during the 

over North Vietnam, where American pilots acquired a great resp

the capabilities of Soviet-supplied air defenses. All too often, pilo

their commanders on the way to attack targets were denied p

information on incoming flights of MIGs or the imminent lau

Russian SAMs. The primary reason for these failures was not the a

of information but the inability of covering ground control and surve

stations to transmit the data using the strike force's overloaded UHF 

frequencies. As one Air Force general later recalled, 

The communications systems could t~ot handle the traffic. If v

transmissions arrived, they were o~en ambiguous or misundersto

• . Enemy interception of unencrypted voice transmissions o

permitted these countermeasures to evade or defeat planned act

These troubles happened in an environment that was essentially 

from enemy jamming, whereas in Europe, we would expect mas

jamming. 45 

In the post-Vietnam era, the problems of the NATO Central Fron

been the focus of much attention from Air Force commanders 

echelons who have been concerned about the viability and integrity 

tactical air control system should war with the Warsaw Pact ever 

about. They worry that such a sophisticated, determined adversary 

target command and control centers for massive electronic jammin

for physical destruction--and this at the very time that NATO 

commanders would be counting most heavily on air force support 

counter the numerical preponderance of Warsaw Pact armies. Tw

improvements in the system have been the AWACS and the Ai

Battlefield Command and Control Center, a C-130 Hercules 

equipped for surveillance and control operations. 

The linchpin of that system is the Tactical Air Control Center (T

which is responsible for centralized command and control of the num

air force assigned to its area of operations. The TACC is at the hea
ground force elements for immediate processing of close ai

requests. Each of these elements of the tactical air control system 

critical link in what is essentially a theater-level view of the 

Moreover, the system is remarkable for being controlled from th

and not the air--this despite the extensive use within the syst

AWACS and other surveillance aircraft. Critical data obtained f

and other sensors are down-linked to ground stations where dec

made on aircraft utilization. This is an important doctrinal po

explains why the AWACS is not primarily configured for c

fighter-to-fighter engagements. Similarly, the tactical air liaiso

with the Army ground forces are not independent control ce

primarily information conduits. Decisions on aircraft allocation, i

with Air Force paradigms, history, experience, and doctrine, are 

the central ground-based nodes of the tactical air control system. 4

The Army-Air Force partnership might have remained 

undisturbed had it not been for the challenge posed by the g

Soviet military might, a challenge that continues to the present, d

very real potential of the recent Gorbachev initiatives and the rhe

has often accompanied them. Beginning in the aftermath of the 1

Kippur War, the modernization of the Soviet forces arrayed again

represented a steady expansion of Russian capabilities that 

rigorous self-examination by American military leaders. The Air 

convinced that the trends evident in Vietnam and the Yore Ki

would continue apace as Soviet air defenses grew ever more num

sophisticated. The 1986 edition of Soviet Milita~ Power, for 

noted that more than "4,600 tactical SAM launchers and 12,

[antiaircraft artillery] pieces are deployed with Air Defense 

regimental through front level," together with 25,000 shoulder-fir

at battalion and company levels. The varied ranges, deploym

guidance mechanisms employed in these systems combined to ma

tactical air defenses a hedgehog designed to blunt the effect of 

air operations. 47 

The same publication also documented the growth of Sovi

aviation, which has since the mid-1970s almost quadrupled the 

capabilities of its front-line tactical aircraft. Some 5,440 
as the SU27/29 and MIG29, which, with lookdown, shootdown 

long-range air-to-air missiles, improved avionics, and greater oper

ranges, were comparable to the newest aircraft in Western inventorie

The Soviet ground forces, traditionally large and well equipped, a

benefited greatly from more than a decade of modernization. A

there is no easy way to summarize the results of that process, 

supplied by the U.S. Defense Department show that in 1988 th

million-man Soviet ground forces deployed some 53,000 main battl

(a third of which were the newest models with production runs conti

60,000 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicle

48,000 artillery pieces. The 213 divisions of the Soviet Army, org

around tank and motorized rifle regiments with organic combat 

units, thus constitute a force of unprecedented mobility. Probably th

dramatic development of recent years, however, has been the addi

the Soviet inventory of a family of tactical helicopters used for m

and fire support. Two of its latest models, the MI-24 HIND and the 

HAVOC, are at least the equal of their U.S. counterparts, and th

Soviet attack helicopter, code-named HOKUM, is of an advanced 

that presently has no Western counterpart. 49 And finally, as i

improvements were not enough, the Pentagon stated, "An ambitiou

development program is underway involving expansion, equ

modernization, training improvements, innovative tactics and oper

concepts, and enhancement of command and control capabilities. ~50 

The pace, the extent, and the meaning of the Soviet buildup are 

that have attracted wide attention and debate by the defense an

community in the wake of perestroika and the announced intent

Soviet leaders to reduce military expenditures and trim force stru

This brief retrospective look at Soviet military developments, howev

the stage for the emergence of the doctrine of Airland Battle, a proce

began in the mid-1970s as many of these developments were being 

by Western analysts for the first time. The evolution of Airland 

doctrine has undergone three phases, the first of which began in 197

the publication of FM 100-5, Operations. Under the leadership o

William E. DePuy, commander of the Army's Training and D

Command (TRADOC), use of the new manual was the first step in 
do so while fighting outnumbered. The manual explicitly called 

imbalances to be redressed by the skillful concentration and app

firepower: "Whether on the offense or the defense, U.S. Army f

exploit to the maximum the mobility of our weapons system

massed field artillery, totally mobile tank and mechanized 

battalions, airmobile antiarmor weapons, attack helicopters, 

support aircraft, and, in some circumstances, tactical emplo

nuclear weapons offer us the means to concentrate overwhelmi

power and to decisively alter force ratios when and where we cho

The new doctrine was equally explicit in stating that a defend

by employing these weapons systems with full terrain advantage, 

able to defeat an attacking force three times its size; therefore any 

force should seek a superiority at the point of concentration of 6

U.S. Army forces were unlikely to enjoy such a numerical advant

conflict with the Warsaw Pact countries, a commander "should a

if he expects the eventual outcome to result in decisively greater 

his own, or result in the capture of objectives crucial to the outc

larger battle "'s3 Both offensive and defensive operations depend

commander's ability to "see the battlefield," both to take 

advantage of his own weapons systems and to provide time to c

his forces against the weight of the enemy's main thrust. 54 

It was not surprising that a doctrine for "winning the la

through the use of the "active defense" was criticized for its 

orientation, and FM 100-5 became a highly controversial man

subsequent critique put it: "There is nothing subtle about the d

advocates meeting the strength of the Soviet attack head-on and 

it through massed firepower. The combat techniques describ

manual stress almost mechanical methods for fighting or app

power. Systems analysis terms . . . are used to describe the dy

combat .... Follow-on interpretations of FM 100-5 use ex

couched in terms such as "the calculus of battle" and in ma

notions expressed by Lanchester Laws and gaming theory to d

modern battlefield. "~5 

This second stage in the evolution of Airland Battle doc

characterized by the critiques of those who fell roughly into th
alternative to this style of warfare in a widely read book, National De

which gave the reformers their first real public exposure. 56 The in

debate over FM 100-5 continued to be featured in the pages 

military's leading professional journals, and gradually the outlines 

maneuver critique became clearer. Rejecting the firepower attrition m

in favor of movement to gain tactical leverage, maneuver theorists a

that enemy forces should not be met head-on, but should be allow

penetrate and engage infantry defenses. At the same time, fr

armor-heavy forces would circle into the enemy's rear to attac

vulnerable supply trains, lines of communications, and comman

control centers. Thus, while the enemy's main-force units were 

encouraged to extend themselves deep into the defended zone, his s

and decision-making lifelines were being cut, and the O-O-D-A cy

his command structure was being smashed. This use of territory 

consequently be seen as one of the main points of departure betwe

two schools: attrition strategists viewing it as something to be hel

organized into progressively more lethal "kill zones," and man

advocates offering a more dynamic view--as something to be gain

traded for tactical advantage. 57 

The maneuver critique paced the continuing refinement of 

doctrine, by then the responsibility of Gen. Donn A. Starry. The 

TRADOC commander presided over the third stage of the evolut

pattern, which would ultimately lead to the publication of a revise

100-5 in 1982 and the enshrinement of Airland Battle as its center

By late 1978, Army doctrinal thinking had coalesced into a batt

development plan which broke combat down into two main functi

central battle fought largely along the lines of the attrition model, 

force generation effort, which involved the higher-level preparation f

organization and commitment of reserves and other formations need

turn the tide of battle. 58 Equally noteworthy was the increased focus 

widening range of options now available to Soviet commanders a

country's modernization efforts came to fruition. British defense a

Christopher Donnelly was the most influential voice calling attention 

fact that the unprecedented speed and mobility of Soviet motorized 

and tank divisions were allowing the Russians to experiment 
American forces would have to defeat both the committed ele

Soviet first-echelon armies on the NATO central front and the 

echelon Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies which could now be ex

arrive from the East quickly enough to play a critical reinforcing r

Airland Battle was to provide the conceptual basis for U.S. 

engage both the Soviet front-line and the follow-on focus. The ne

of FM 100-5 released in August 1982 called for the aggressiv

maneuver and counterattack in order to gain the offensive as r

possible: "The offense is the decisive form of war, the command

means of attaining a positive goal or of completely destroying 

force .... The attacker concentrates quickly and strikes ha

unexpected place or time to throw the defender off balance. 

attack is underway, the attacker must move fast, press every 

aggressively, and capitalize on each opportunity to destroy e

enemy's forces or the overall coherence of his defense. ''6o The ne

stressed that the operational concepts of Airland Battle depen

initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization of all arms at the 

operational, and strategic levels of warfare. It was also clear, how

the doctrine was a synthesis of old and new, emphasizing both 

and maneuver as vital ingredients of combat power. 61 As o

summarized what had happened, "What had emerged from 

manual and subsequent discussions was the idea of a battle

included precision-guided missiles, anti-tank weapons, laser-gui

lery shells, and cruise missiles to attack the follow-on echelons 

forces and to allow for a counterattack with a favorable U.S. force 

The new doctrine received high marks from many observe

reemphasis of the offensive, but no single aspect of Airland B

attracted more attention than its concept of the Deep Strike (al

Deep Attack and, more recently, Follow-On Forces Attack

envisions attacks against Soviet second-echelon forces at strategi

This precept flowed logically enough from the perceived threat 

those forces, but the idea that corps commanders were now respo

seeing and influencing a deep battlefield that might extend mo

hundred miles behind enemy lines was startling. This extended b

was described by General Starry in a 1981 Military Review article
apparently attractive targets whose destruction actually has little pa

the close-in battle. ''63 Deep attack tools--primarily interdiction by a

long-range artillery, and missiles, but also including electronic warf

deception--would be used to deny follow-on Soviet forces a "fre

into the battle area. Similarly, deep strikes would help create 

opportunities which in turn would help U.S. forces gain and ke

initiative: "Interdiction is the key to battlefield success .... lit] 

method whereby we achieve the leverage to slow him down and ult

stop him from achieving his objectives. ''64 It can be argued, therefo

the Deep Strike concept represented the relegation of the attrition m

the follow-on Soviet forces, even as the maneuver model was 

employed to fight the central battle. 65 (See figure 6.4.) 

The Airland Battle concept has continued to provide the Army 

doctrinal structure that has not only led to a synthesis between ma

and attrition but also paced a renascence of strategic thinking. Th

version of FM 100-5, for example, stressed four cardinal tenets 

doctrine: initiative ("an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operat

agility ("the ability of friendly forces to act faster than the enemy")

("the extension of operations in space, time, and resources"

synchronization ("the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, 

and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the d

point"). The concepts of initiative and agility signaled a return 

aggressive warrior spirit, as well as the need to capitalize on the s

fighting qualities of the new generation of Army weaponry: for ex

the M-I Abrams tank, the Bradley Fighting Vchicle, and the 

Apache attack helicopter. But by stressing the need for its comman

consider combat operations in relation to the need for dept

synchronization, the Army was reemphasizing the importance 

"operational art of war--the employment of [joint] military forces to 

strategic goals in a theater of war [or] operations." Those concepts 

implied two things that are important for this analysis: a relian

high-technology command and control systems, and a new or

integration in the combat operations of the Army and the Air Force. 6

Whatever the respective merits of the attrition and the maneuver 

of warfare, there was little question at the start of the debate th
~o ii' 

:~ I,U u. 

F-. 

< 

._ 

Oo6 

o 
mobile message centers in the principal tactical commands. The admi

tive overhead of this system was huge. In a typical corps, whose a

responsibility could encompass a territory almost twice the size of th

of New Jersey, more than five thousand personnel were required j

man the corps signal brigade. 67 Signal installations were prim

equipped with switching devices that were bulky, cumbersome, and h

move. These features made them unsuitable for the dynamic pa

combat envisioned by FM 100-5; signal centers would have to di

rapidly to keep pace with maneuver units and to ensure their own su

in the face of Soviet attacks. 

Because the existing message center equipment used antiquated a

switching devices, the communications network was also unable to h

the rivers of data that were about to be generated by battlefield autom

By 1980, there were some seventy battlefield systems and subsyste

various stages of conversion to automation 6s But with the revise

100-5 intended as a guide for modernization, the Army was eventuall

to conceptualize a tactical command and control architecture with 

major functions: maneuver control, for supporting battlefield decisio

commanders and staffs; fire support control, for automating the u

indirect fire by artillery, missiles, and aircra~; intelligence and elec

warfare, for the automation of all-source tactical intelligence an

control of electronic warfare; air defense control, for automated ma

ment of the Army component of air defense; and combat service su

control system, for computer control of logistical data. 69 

Linking these diverse subsystems and components together wou

three major new communications systems: 

• SINCGARS." The Single-Channel Ground/Airborne Radio Syst

the Army's new family of tactical VHF radios. With emb

electronic countermeasures, SINCGARS radios transmit either vo

data in a frequency-hopping mode that defeats jamming. Later ve

incorporate secure voice and data transmission capabilities. 7o 

• MSE.. Mobile Subscriber Equipment allows field commande

corps and division areas to communicate by voice very much 

commercial radiotelephone network. Also secure and with emb
Tactical Information Distribution System, It is an interim sys

for high-density data transfer in the tactical environment, prim

maneuver control and air defense, (This system and its evolut

subject of the following chapter.) 72 

All these systems represent a heavy investment of time, perso

money, and each represents an aspect of the Army's respons

challenge of Airland Battle as it appeared from 1982 onward. 

And yet, the marshaling of these forces of technology, impo

extensive though it was, was only one aspect of the Army's resp

least as significant was the challenge that Airland Battle posed, in 

to the norms of the Air Force, a conflict that continues to the pre

Army investment in its command and control infrastructure was 

purchase the means to achieve the synchronization called fo

doctrine. This term had a deeper meaning, however. It implied the 

much greater unity between ground and air forces committed to 

and that notion raised again the troublesome issue of subordin

interservice relationships. The resulting debate on the Army-Air F

in Airland Battle has been only marginally less acrimonious 

which attended the publication of the original FM 100-5. And

Force proponents are quick to point out, to date it is only 

doctrine, not a joint doctrine. 

Air Force objections to Airland Battle fall into three major c

that are distinct but closely related: command structure, doct

resources. Interestingly, most of the questions center around the 

paradigm of the inherently flexible and offensive use of air po

theories of Douhet and Mitchell as well as the practical lesso

North African and Normandy campaigns continue to exert a 

influence on the present debate, with Air Force proponents stre

these lessons show that air power should not be parceled out lik

to ground force commanders. Rather, it should be concentr

successively applied to targets that will allow it to establish s

over the defending air force; air superiority, once achieved, is the 

other uses of air power, including close support of the groun

Above all, paradigms and history show that it is still necessary to 
perspective would be replaced by several narrow, possibly comp

corps perspectives .... In at least some ways, such a situation constit

return to practices that proved unworkable during the North A

campaign. The result? TACAIR's ability to mass forces to meet and d

the enemy at the critical time and place would be eroded. ''73 

Not only would such a concept be a throwback, according to 

argument, it would also disrupt the present air-ground operations syste

carefully crafted in the light of lessons learned from Korea and Vie

That system depended for its effectiveness on parallel structures withi

unified commands that placed air and ground component commande

an equal footing in both rank and authority. And yet, since 1973, the 

had not recognized any echelon above that of the corps, doing away 

the "theater army" that had always doubled as the ground comp

command in favor of a less top-heavy system in order to conserve s

manpower spaces. Among other things, this restructuring implied tha

Tactical Air Control Center, normally colocated with the Army and 

Force components, would have to deal instead with the representativ

one or more corps, rather than a single counterpart. With the comi

Airland Battle, therefore, the previous breach was widened still further

Linked to the imbalance of command structure was a fundamental 

of modem aerospace doctrine: centralized command and decentra

execution. As the capstone Air Force manual set forth this concept: 

Centralized control is essential to positive control of aerospa

power. Centralized control is established under a single 

commander who directs the employment of forces at a level 

command from which the overall air situation can best be judge

This level of authority and responsibility rests with the commander 

chief in specified commands and with the air component command

in unified or combined commands. Under this concept, aerospa

operations are exercised at the most effective level. This 

decentralized execution. 75 

Airland Battle, with its corps emphasis, clearly threatened both 

command structure and the doctrine it exemplified. Acknowledging 

fact, one Air Force commentator pointed out with admirable candor 

"the extended battlefield requires the Army to look deep and control a
issues between the services has always been the trade-off in the n

missions devoted to close air support of the ground forces ver

considered essential by the Air Force in achieving air superio

1984 article, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Tidal McCoy 

this issue, emphasizing the continuing commitment to close air su

pointing out that "air superiority has mission priority becau

believes that without control of the air, neither it nor the ground 

succeed." Further, the principle of centralized command and dec

execution is the mechanism that "best applies force to the battlefi

parcel out that force and dedicate it to ground commanders 

provide the strongest defense. "77 In a similar vein, the Air 

awarded a prize to a 1985 essay whose author wrote that Airla

doctrine was misconceived: Deep Strike would siphon o

surveillance and intelligence collection capabilities from the 

because of range limitations of organic Army sensors. Equally 

were the additional intratheater lif~ requirements that would 

follow from the increased mobility envisioned by the doctrine. 7s 

In the midst of this free-swinging doctrinal debate, Gen. 

Wickham, Jr., chief of staff of the Army, and Gen. Charles A

chief of staff of the Air Force, found themselves united by a lon

personal friendship and remarkably similar viewpoints on the 

closer cooperation between the services they led. Beginning in 

(months before the invasion of Grenada would thrust the 

interservice relationships back into the headlines) both generals q

their staffs to work on a cooperative project to rationalize the pla

development of joint combat forces centered around the Airla

model. On May 22, 1984, the two service chiefs appeared at a 

press conference to announce that this effort had yielded Army-

agreement on thirty-one separate initiatives, including some 

fundamental to Airland Battle operations--for example, air 

suppression of enemy air defenses, and fusion of combat informa

was clearly a major step forward, and over the next several 

progress made in these areas would result in closer coordinatio

the services, the cancellation of several duplicative programs

reprogramming of over $1 billion in associated savings. 79 
advocates. ''8° Another explanation, however, is that the process of 

doctrine development has now been institutionalized within the Joint 

with the reforms mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Conseque

it can be argued that this process is no longer dependent on ad 

working groups and good intentions. It is also fair to note, however, 

the cooperative process has essentially solved most of the easy prob

and that far tougher issues lie ahead in the 1990s. Among them ar

following: 

• How adaptable is the Air-Ground Operations Systems--with 

parallel chains of command and hierarchical structures--to the cha

decentralized melee characteristic of Airland Battle combat? 

• How will the close air support mission and the selection o

next-generation close air support aircraft play out? 

• To this point, the Army and the Air Force have cooperated on 

for the next generation of long-range reconnaissance and surveil

aircraft: the TR-l/Precision Location Strike System and the E-8/

Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). With fia

declining defense budgets, there is an inherent potential for dev

mental problems, procurement stretch-outs, and, inevitably, mi

trade-otis. Therefore, can the joint air-ground surveillance orientatio

these systems be maintained through the process of development 

procurement? 8~ 

This discussion of Airland Battle would be incomplete, however, we

not to include a final caveat by Steven L. Canby. In a free-ranging cri

of the doctrine presented at the Wilson Center in 1984, Canby, one o

more prominent military reformers, argued that 

the new technologies for implementing the Deep Attack conce

have been undercosted by an order of magnitude, the conce

proceeds from a false syllogism, and the concept itself is n

feasible .... The vulnerabilities Deep Attack presumes in th

opposing force array do not exist; its automated command an

control leads to deception and inflexibility; and its submunitions ca

be easily countered, s2 
control technologies of the Airland battlefield. Essentially, his po

there are two dangers to the modernized command and contro

now being fielded: the first is that these systems won't work

second is that they will. The technology needed to acquire 

Intelligent Surveillance and Target Acquisition (VISTA) Technol

their associated automation systems is, according to the firs

reasoning, easily offset by standard Soviet countermeasures, 

direct attack, deception, and electronic warfare. Both the sens

processor can be easily deceived or removed entirely by such s

without them, Deep Strike simply will not work. 

Second, if the systems are allowed to continue working, especi

intelligence and electronic warfare systems that acquire large a

data and fuse them according to predetermined algorithms, there 

greater threat from strategic deception, or spoofing. A c

dependence upon automation not only invites such enemy a

encourages him to engage in countermeasures that will cause 

decision mechanisms to break down from information overlo

point is simply stated: Automaticity implies extreme inflexibility 

the enemy can di.~'cover--and operate outside of--the boun

predictabl~' (emphasis added). ~3 

There are no easy answers to such objections. There 

technologies in the history of warfare that have not been either n

or nullified by creative countermeasures applied in the manner t

describes. One suspects, however, that "predetermined algorit

"inflexible automaticity" are terms that may have more to 

theoretical perspectives of these systems rather than with their l

in the field. To the extent that they reflect real-world preferences

they are more accurate descriptions of Soviet, rather than West

about troop control. For good or ill, American armed forces 

likely than most others to use any hi-tech system with a great 

ingenuity and individuality whenever possible----or to simply pul

whenever it is not. Although the soldier, the sailor, the airman

marine provide this built-in "sanity check," it is important to reme

they are also the ultimate consumers of the advanced systems n

contemplated. They are consequently the ones with the most 
This chapter has shown the interplay between the highly integra

technology of the information age and the service command structures 

seek to exploit it in meeting a variety of challenges, some of which 

related to technology and some of which are not. The conceptual model

the command and control process presented by Boyd and Lawson 

illustrative of the holistic nature of that process, while the differing ser

perspectives suggested by Gorman are an important counterpoint, s

they highlight the effects of differing operational environments. Th

differences are accompanied by great variations in the structure, leader

styles, and organizational strategies among Army, Navy, and Air Force u

only some of which are fully appreciated in the usual bureaucratic calcu

These characteristics, grounded as they are in the everyday practical

of military life, account for subtle but important differences in the way 

services approach command and control. One can compare, for exam

the Navy's modular approach with the centralized cotruuand-decentral

execution formula that is the centerpiece of Air Force doctrine. Altho

there are differences between these two philosophies, both are locate

one end of the spectrum of "movable subordinate entities," while the A

is at the other. Nowhere is that difference more apparent than in a re

doctrinal publication by the Army Command and General Staff College 

the command and control process. Conceptualizing command as a "direc

process" for infusing the "will and intent of the commander" among 

subordinates, the manual notes that the premise of command rests upon 

assumption of "reliable subordinate behavior." Control, however, is 

entirely different matter: 

Control is a process by which subordinate behavior inconsisten

with the will and intent of the commander is identified and corrected

This process is regulatory: its premise is unreliable subordinat

behavior. Unreliable behavior in this context . . . will normally b

inadvertent, resulting from different perspectives of the battlefield

inattention, a lack of understanding of the mission or th

commander's intent--or the fog of battle, s4 

Both the Navy and the Air Force might find themselves in so

agreement with parts of that approach, but it clearly defines the uni
very junior members of its command hierarchy (corporals or se

charge of rifle squads, for example) will therefore exercise great 

within certain well-defined limits. Those limits are inherent to a 

and control regime in which the premise of unreliable subordinate 

compels decentralization to be tempered by measures th

on-the-spot intervention by any member of the chain of command

in concept, both the Army and the Air Force would appear to ag

philosophy of centralized command and decentralized execution

much they might differ on the operational meaning of that prin

contrast, the Navy centralizes command at a much lower level--

individual ship or the task force. Although subordination of nava

no less assured than their land or air counterparts, the idea of l

centralization necessitates the more modular, or federal, 

characteristic of naval command and control. It is also consisten

idea of a global system whose parts are interchangeable, 

innumerable combinations of its modular components. 

Although it is tempting to think otherwise, a holistic 

command and control has to be tempered by these o

differences in the service environments. As the Army-Air Forc

over Airland Battle demonstrates, it is equally important to co

fact that the services are very human institutions. Organiz

people tend to reflect certain norms, values, and beliefs; not sur

these characteristics combine to provide common perceptio

many matters, technological adaptation being one of the mo

ones in any military organization, ss Command and control syst

central feature of the modernization process, but, as th

experience with Aegis has demonstrated, they are expensive an

accompanied by some degree of technological risk. These har

about dollars and uncertainty become even more diffic

command and control systems are considered in the contex

relationship to the larger picture of interservice and mu

operations. As the following chapter demonstrates, these decis

involve significant cost escalations in order to achieve inter

ty----or even a head-on, life-or-death competition with 

developed by another service. 
forces and the commanders in chief of the unified and specif

commands as the "users" of those forces. 86 More than most ot

weapons, modern command and control systems fall somewhere 

between those distinctions, if for no other reasons than the personal sty

of the local commander and the unique requirements of the thea

mission. This was a point made most strongly in 1978 by a special t

force of the Department of Defense Science Board. Among other thin

the panel concluded that the major military commands lacked 

manpower, expertise, and financial resources to adapt service-develop

command and control systems for theater requirements; moreover, 

commands lacked the resources to exercise and evaluate their system

Consequently, the CINCs lacked the most rudimentary means to influe

the development of one of the key instruments used in carrying out th

wartime missions, g7 

The issue of this structural inadequacy would require lengthier treatm

here were it not for retired Lt. Gen. John H. Cushman, who in 19

explored that topic in Command and Control of Theater Forc

Adequacy. Writing fi'om the perspective of a former corps command

General Cushman viewed the theater commander as the focal point o

"vibrant, living web" of interlocking command and control systems wh

he uses "for perceiving and understanding challenge and for fashioning a

producing response. ''88 Although commanders at every echelon share o

a part of the larger system, which extends all the way through the Natio

Command Authorities in Washington, the theater commander is at 

particular disadvantage in understanding, using, ~uld developing his orga

command and control systems, for precisely the reasons noted by 

Defense Science Board task force. But General Cushman goes further 

assessing the impact of a number of technical and institutional factors t

contribute to this problem. For present purposes, his four ma

bureaucratic causes of failure in theater command and control are m

important. They include "service failures to view CINC requireme

holistically; structural failure in the procurement and acquisition process 

give sufficient weight to the CINC's command and control requiremen

institutional failure by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enforce a jo

perspective in the development of command and control systems; a
adverse impact of service autonomy on command and control. 

acceptance of his view is not required to appreciate the point m

chapter: namely, that the services impose organizational struc

operational barriers that would not seem obvious, given the 

properties of modern and emerging command and control tec

As has been seen, these barriers are partly the result of o

necessity, partly the product of differing organizational values, 

the result of fundamentally different ideas about the nature o

Although the Goldwater-Nichols Act greatly strengthened the h

unified and specified commanders in correcting some of the fail

by Cushman, these more fundamental service differences are unl

eliminated by the stroke of a pen. For that reason, the followi

focuses on how the services approach the problem of joint com

control, especially when hi-tech systems and high-dollar values 

line. 
The previous chapter demonstrated the 

pressures faced by the services as they moder

command and control structures in response to re

developments in weapons accuracy, electronic w

battlefield automation. Two major cross-currents were 

the integrative potential of the new command a

systems--whose capabilities for sensing, processing, 

data dwarfed anything that had gone before---and 

tional resistance observable whenever this integrativ

threatened existing relationships among the services. 

paradoxical, since the services were acting as th

agencies of change even as they imposed barriers 

implications of those changes. The answer to th

contradiction is surely that the services are human 

made up of individuals who have strongly identifie

norms, values, and beliefs composing the respective 

the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Equally important t

ciation of these opposing influences, as has been sho

very real differences between the land, sea, and 

environments, differences that are reflected as w

services' organizational structures. Perhaps the be

summing up the paradox is by a simple conceptual m

services are conduits of change even as an electrica

conduit of power--both, however, offer varying 

resistance. These characteristics of change and res

equally present in the case study that is the focus of t

the Joint Tactical Information Distribution Syste

pronounced "jay-tids"). 

There is no question that every step taken by the 

the road to modernization led to greater and greater p

integration. A 1977 study noted the progress being m

of the services' command and control arenas but also 

a glaring deficiency: "Efforts are underway within e
within and across major tactical mission areas. l Since those words 

written, the development of common or joint approaches to comman

control has become one of the most important but least understood a

of American defense policy. 

Three basic factors have been responsible: 

I. Shifting geopolitical requirements: In the early 1980s, the 

expansion of Soviet military capabilities and rising third world te

led to the direct involvement of the USSR in Angola, Eth

Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Grenada, to cite some of the more cele

examples. The Iranian Revolution, the seizure of the U.S. emba

Tehran, the failure of the joint mission mounted to rescue the Am

hostages seized during that takeover, and the potential for instabilit

accompanied the Iran-lraq War through much of the 1980s were 

more troubling. In American military circles, the talk was 

"requirements-capabilities mismatch" whenever existing resources 

compared to possible engagement scenarios in these or other re

conflicts. More worrying still was the prospect of having to fi

several of these far-flung theaters simultaneously. These pressures 

new life to Eisenhower's dictum of a generation before that joint w

had replaced service separatism; now, however, it seemed that 

developing command and control technologies might assist this in

tion, acting as a "force multiplier" that could link hard-pressed Am

land, sea, and air forces. For example, the U.S. Central Com

(CENTCOM)---formed as a unified command in 1983--had as its 

mission the control of American forces moving to any emergency 

Persian Gulf or Southwest Asia, a distance of over seven thousand 

from their home bases. According to its commander at that time, Lt

Robert Kingston, the success of the CENTCOM mission depended 

"our capability to quickly deploy a sizable force; to promptly re

process and use intelligence from national, strategic, and tactical so

[and] to exercise effective command and control over forces dep

across a large geographical area." The effectiveness of comman

control in turn depended upon the ability of service command and c

systems to be interoperable--that is, to communicate effectively wit

another. 2 
purposes lies in the fact that money was at long last becoming a

the modernization of American command and control systems

was nowhere more in evidence than in the attention given 

command and control by the incoming Reagan administra

quickly earmarked more than $18 billion for improvem

"connectivity and survivability" of the information systems su

U.S. nuclear triad. 3 Inevitably, the visibility accorded nuclea

and control helped focus attention on conventional command 

problems as well. With major weapons systems purchases n

with maturing technologies now ready to be applied to press

problems, and, most important, with enough money avail

investment decisions on both tactical and strategic command 

systems were about to be made. In consequence, these form

issues began to receive some public attention. 

3. Public perception of the problem: At least part of this a

attributable to the aftermaths of a series of military failures. 

staff report prepared by James R. Locher III, Defense Organ

Need for Change, which served as the backdrop for the Se

Services Committee's deliberations on Pentagon reform i

singled out examples of such operations as evidence of p

defense organization. Two of these failures were the capture 

Pueblo in 1968 and the aborted Iranian hostage rescue missi

both of which involved confusion in the chain of command se

those operations. The confrontation between Defense Secretary 

and Senator Nunn noted in chapter 1 may have been predes

Locher Report's characterization of the 1983 invasion of Gr

example of an operation whose success obscured lessons that 

important for the future: 

Probably the largest single problem was the inability 

units to communicate .... For example, the Army element

on the ground were unable to speak to the Navy ships of

request and coordinate naval gunfire .... The root caus

inability to communicate is that each Service continues to 

its own communications equipment, which all too freque

compatible with the equipment of the other Services. 4 
fundamental structural reform, and the revelation of problems i

Grenada operation was merely the latest stroke in the continuing effo

ensure a high level of interservice teamwork in combat operations. R

Army Col. Harry Summers, an advocate of defense reform, found so

the criticism of Grenada overblown, especially the question of Army-

radio compatibility. His major premise was that "if all military radios 

on the same channel, the result would not be better communicatio

would be a total lack of communications"--the channel would be ra

clogged by overuse. Instead, the sine qua non of military communica

is the rational allocation of the available electromagnetic spectrum, 

different radios using different frequencies for different purpos

support of different missions. Commonality, when required, is achiev

setting up functional networks for higher commanders, for fire suppo

in the case of Grenada, for interservice coordination. Although 

procedure may have gone awry during the invasion, he said, "the s

itself is sound. And it is a system that most definitely does not depen

every radio being able to communicate with every other radio. ''5 

Colonel Summers made an important point here, since he was vo

the orthodox view of how interservice command and control has 

achieved ever since World War II on the basis of the lessons le

during that conflict. Many of those procedures are simple, common 

measures, such as the establishment of the Air Naval Gunfire Liaison 

nets which are common features of joint operations. When more compli

exchanges are necessary, it is not unusual to see service components s

exchange liaison officers equipped with the necessary communications 

For example, Air Force liaison officers, who operate with front-line 

units, typically carry two sets of radios, one for communication wit

ground unit with which they are working and one for controlling th

strikes that unit has been allocated. A routine but important part of the 

planning process, therefore, is the allocation of frequencies and netw

that will allow each of the force components to operate without m

interference; second only to that priority is the establishment o

common channels that will link the components together as required. 

This is the system Colonel Summers correctly described as h

guided the command and control of joint operations for the last forty y
performance of tactical tasks increased greatly. Today the 

actively pursuing automation across the tactical equipme

consequently, joint and combined operations no longer 

manual procedures to provide interoperabilitfl' (emphasis add

If the appearance of the computer on the battlefield did no

highlighted differing service norms on command and cont

always been present but had lain largely dormant since th

Agreement. The residual powers that gave the services 

organize, train, and equip their forces virtually guaranteed that 

would procure a different computer hardware and softw

oriented primarily toward the requirements of its operational 

and its preferred weapons systems. If there was nothing inhe

with this evolutionary pattern--which, atter all, had endured in 

another since the founding of the Republic--it made joint p

more challenging than before. Although the free mark

handsome rewards to inventive entrepreneurs who could dev

or software adaptations that allowed the electronic matin

computer species, the defense establishment itself provided no 

of natural incentives. 

Before turning to a brief review of the measures that ult

birth to JTIDS, it is essential to review the official defini

critical terms: 

InteroperabiliOz. The condition achieved among com

electronics systems or... equipment when information or 

be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them 

users. The degree of interoperability should be defined w

to specific cases. (JCS Pub. i) 

Commonalit)z. Tactical command and control systems 

when the systems have the quality of one entity possess

interchangeable characteristics with another. Tactical com

equipments and systems are common when: they are com

can be operated and maintained by personnel trained o

without additional specialized training; repair parts are inte
Players and Programs 

Since the mid-1970s, a command and control "communi

taken on discernible outlines at the highest levels of the governm

membership is not limited to the Defense Department (DOD) but 

to other executive agencies and even to Capitol Hill. The emergence 

community can be traced at least as far back as the early years 

Carter administration, which came into office in 1977 with somethi

perceived mandate to accomplish basic organizational changes at t

of government. One of the first of those changes, made partly in re

to congressional pressures, was the naming of Dr. Gerald P. Dinnee

dual positions of deputy under secretary of defense for resear

engineering and assistant secretary of defense for communi

command, control, and intelligence. The twin titles reflected the g

prominence of conunand and control issues and foreshadowed 

involvement by the top civilian management of the Defense Depart

coordinating those responsibilities, in particular, Dr. Dinneen's 

would be notable for the beginnings of a "general systems appro

command and control management (a phrase he used repeate

speeches and articles on the subject) and for the influence he wiel

the promulgation of DOD Directive 5000.2, which recognized the 

evolutionary nature of command and control systems. 7 

Another evolutionary step in the DOD command and control m

ment structure was taken in 1978, when the Defense Science 

completed a study requested by Dinneen's boss, Dr. William J. Pe

under secretary of defense for research and engineering. Among 

questions were the following: "To what extent should procurement 

systems require multi-service cooperation as contrasted with the 

procedure of separate procurement in each service? .... To what exte

existing procedures and organizations proven their effectiveness 

procurement of joint systems? "s The board's answers to these qu

were blunt: "The nation is failing to deploy command and control s

commensurate with the nature of likely future warfare, with m

weapons systems, or with our available technological and industria
panel also called for stronger, more centralized management 

and control within the DOD, either by creating a new defen

and control systems support agency or by amending the ch

Defense Communications Agency (DCA), which had han

strategic communications since the 1960s. II 

This recommendation was by far the most controversial pr

report that otherwise received general acceptance. It was, 

consistent with the predominant postwar pattern of defense 

that sought to solve almost every emerging problem by carvin

office or agency within the civilian management levels of 

Department. Almost immediately, it was realized that 

alternatives the only practical one was the amendment of the D

and Dr. Dinneen asked the director of that agency, Vice Adm

Gravely, to draft the document. Gravely did so, and by Febru

had proposed a charter that gave the DCA effective c

communications integration efforts associated with the S

Command, as well as "general program guidance" over m

command and control programs. When they were asked for th

the proposed charter, the Joint Chiefs for once displayed 

agreement. According to Dinneen's account, they 

were unanimous in their recommendation that such an 

agency not be created .... The primary objection of the ser

the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . was that service prioriti

command and control systems among other programs 

Planning, Programming and Budgeting System would b

statutory control of them was given to an agency. What wa

was stronger operational influence on the planning and prog

of inter-service command and control systems. 12 

As an alternative, the Joint Chiefs set up in May 1979 the 

Control, and Communications Systems Directorate within the 

structure, and gave it the following missions: "to develop po

and programs for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure adequate 

the commanders of unified and specified commands and t

Command Authorities for joint and combined military op
developed by the services. It was, however, well placed to bec

leading military spokesman for joint command and control matter

assume an increasingly influential role as an "honest broker" in rec

divergent service interests. 14 

By the time the Reagan administration took office in 19

evolution of the command and control community had progresse

point that more agencies than ever were involved in some aspec

process, so that the chief characteristic of high-level command and 

management appeared to be the very fractionation and dispersion o

criticized by the Defense Science Board. For that reason, the f

overview is limited to a brief discussion of the principal actors w

an impact on the problem of joint command and control. 

Executive Agencies. The lines of command and control merg

White House, where the president, with his constitutionally m

powers as commander in chief of the armed forces, sits as the 

command authority (NCA). He and the secretary of defense 

ultimate "users" of the system, with direct lines of authority extend

them to the CINCs of the unified and specified commands, in w

vested the combatant forces of the United States. The president 

secretary of defense can therefore have an important role 

development of command and control systems. As was shown in ch

the establishment of the WWMCCS system was in part spu

President Kennedy's unhappiness over what he saw as commun

shortfalls during the Cuban missile crisis; subsequent crises h

generated lessons learned that have led to renewed efforts for ev

precise presidential control. 15 Of more day-to-day concern, howeve

role played by the Office of Management and Budget; its im

significant simply because of the expense of high-technology equip

factor that inevitably leads to hard decisions in the preparation 

defense budget. Finally, the intelligence community plays a vital 

command and control, both as producers of intelligence and as de

of the systems that collect, process, and disseminate data. 
major programs annually to determine if the results justif

spending. With this leverage, the Armed Services committees 

Senate and the House have exercised close supervision over co

control issues, especially the House committee which ha

particularly influential part in advocating joint approaches to th

Congress has also found it necessary to have an independ

information in order to compete effectively with the resources 

the executive branch. Three agencies directly responsible to Co

ot~en been used in recent years to provide the lawmakers with 

analyses of defense programs: the Congressional Budget Office

Accounting Office, and the Congressional Research Service of th

Congress. Each of these agencies has acquired a staff of defen

and, with them, an increasing ability to perform in-depth pol

Armed with the power of the purse and these informatio

Congress can be a formidable player on command and control is

DOD: Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). As has 

throughout the previous two chapters, the growth of OSD f

been one of the constants of postwar defense organization. Th

agencies within the OSD as presently constituted that have 

impact upon the command and control process. The Office of 

Secretary for Program Analysis and Evaluation is the lineal d

the Enthoven-Hitch systems analysis office brought to the 

Robert McNamara. Like other budgetary elements thro

government, this agency can and does have a major impact 

programs, since it is responsible for advising the secret

cost-effectiveness and financial impact of future expenditures. 

the most important OSD agency on command and control matt

that of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and 

Originally created in 1958, its powers were significantly incr

result of DOD Directive 5000.1, promulgated in 1971 by Da

then deputy secretary of defense. Its terms left the basic respo

systems development in the hands of the services, while OSD

included initial acquisition approval and program revie
took office as part of a Reagan administration determined to dec

much of defense management. In line with the spirit of a memo

written by Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci in 1981, th

a conscious effort to shil~ the responsibility for command and 

developments back to the services. 19 This trend, however, not o

counter to the recommendations of the Defense Science Board 

difficult to square with the burden of managing the increased fund

program proliferation of this rapidly growing mission area. B

Latham's responsibilities had grown far beyond those of his pred

with the addition of intelligence oversight responsibilities (long he

the missing "I" in "C3I"); by 1985, these additional duties had le

redesignation as an assistant secretary of defense for C3I directly u

secretary of defense. The primacy of this new status was further ma

the republication of DOD Directive 4230.5, which stated the follow

"It is DOD policy to develop, acquire and deploy tactical 

systems and equipment that effectively meet the essential operat

needs of the U.S. tactical forces, and that are compatible 

interoperable where required with other U.S. tactical C3I sy

and equipment .... The Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, as 

principal assistant to the Secretary of Defense for all C3I ma

shall ensure that all DOD components comply with this policy. '~

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The creation of the C3 

Directorate of the Joint Staff has been mentioned, but there are thr

aspects of JCS involvement with joint command and control that sh

noted here. The first is that the Carlucci memorandum also gran

chairman of the Joint Chiefs permanent membership on the 

Resources Board, the top management body established in 1979 to 

service programs. Set up in 1979 under the chairmanship of the 

secretary of defense, the board is composed of the service secreta

under secretaries of defense, and seven of the principal assistant se

of defense. As the only military member of the board, the chairman 

well positioned to play a strong role in the promotion of joint 

especially those pertaining to interoperability? 1 
interests of interoperability; it also brings together in a single 

the technical resources necessary to work out the practic

required when different command and control systems are broug

Finally, perhaps the most telling indicator of JCS involve

problem of joint command and control came with publicatio

"memorandum of procedure" which set forth the policies to be 

the services in implementing the revised DOD directive on inte

In this document, the Chiefs went further than ever before in 

was required: 

All requirements for tactical C3I systems are of intere

Joint Chiefs of Staff regardless of whether those requiremen

meet joint, combined, single-Service or defense agency ne

Joint Chiefs of Staff require that compatibility and interop

once established during the requirements validation pro

maintained during acquisition, deployment, and employm

system throughout its operational life. 23 

The Services and Military Departments. The Joint C

approved this memorandum, of course, are the same ones who 

respective services; each of these officers consequently plays a 

in the developmcnt of the command and control systems which 

feels are required to carry out its particular mission. That being 

might be hard to understand why interoperability has been a pro

or, if it has now been identified as such, why it cannot be solve

the strength of the memorandum cited above. The answer to th

is suggested by Gen. John Cushman, whose book Command a

of Theater Forces: Adequacy illustrates that there are a m

service agencies that develop command and control systems. A

are there a great many of these agencies, but most of the

important internal service constituencies, none of them in

questions of bureaucratic self-interest. Because each is a quasi-

power center with its own set of agendas and issues, it is diffi

for a service to maintain coherence and discipline within its 

Imposing external pressures from the alien world of joint o
the JTIDS case study. These approaches are represented by the T

and JINTACCS programs----or, respectively, the Joint Tactical C

cations Project and the program for Joint lnteroperability of 

Command and Control Systems. Both programs are still in existen

organizations and personnel now having been absorbed by the n

Tactical C3 Agency. Both programs have made a clear contrib

interoperability, despite the fact that they have represented l

optimal solutions. One major difference between them was their le

structures. The TRI-TAC program was set up in May 1971 under 

office that eventually was reorganized and headed by Dinneen 

assistant secretary of defense for communications, command, con

intelligence, whereas JINTACCS grew out of a JCS-sponsored 

during the Vietnam War and in 1977 was accorded full program st

JCS activity. The chief difference between JINTACCS and T

however, lay in their basic approach: TRI-TAC was an effort to 

interoperability from the ground up, that is, by incorporating int

perspectives at the design and engineering stages. In contrast, JIN

attempted to reconcile the differences in the operating character

existing command and control systems in order to achieve at 

minimal level of interoperability. To put it in terms of the de

advanced earlier in this chapter, TRI-TAC was an effort to 

complete interoperability through commonality, while JINTACCS 

to achieve a lesser degree of interoperability. 25 

This contrast becomes even clearer with a closer look at TRI-

accordance with its charter, original TRI-TAC objectives were to 

interoperability among tactical command and control systems, dev

deploy in a timely manner interoperable telecommunications equip

the combatant commands, and eliminate duplication of effor

development and procurement of telecommunications equipmen

uniformed services. 26 The management system set up to achie

purposes involved TRI-TAC acting as the executive agent for 

refining service communications requirements, validating them, 

assigning a single service to act as project manager for the develo

specific systems. It was hoped that by coordinating the taskin
thing, the project managers were handicapped by having to b

systems that not only spanned differing service requirement

incorporated aspects of previous-generation analog communi

gether with next-generation digital data equipment. Not s

research and development became a seemingly endless process. 

switch of the tactical communications system, the AN-TTC-3

enced prolonged delays in development, seriously lengthenin

required to deploy it and several of its major subsystems. Th

suggested deeper problems. Reviewing the program's progress i

House Armed Services Committee said, 

The Panel has a very uneasy feeling about the entire T

program .... There is some suggestion that this so-calle

service effort is joint in name alone. Without the full supp

cooperation of all the military services, it appears that the pro

doomed to continue to stumble along as it has to date. 

fundamental law of physics that a multicomponent system

itself, will continually move to an increasing state of chao

not suggesting that the TRI-TAC program is in a chaotic 

certainly does not appear to be in an orderly state at present. 2

It was against this backdrop of criticism that Dinneen came 

and redoubled the emphasis on interoperability within the OSD. 

Progress was made, but the pace continued to be slow. "T

late and expensive," said one DOD official during the Carter 

tion, "but there are no good alternatives .... There will b

Congressional scrutiny, but eliminating TRI-TAC at this point w

absolute disaster. ''28 This point of view seemed to represent a 

since the program continued with all deliberate speed and Congr

allow its earlier criticism to interfere with research and d

expenditures year al~er year. By 1983, the first of the major TR

items had reached the procurement stage, the AN/TTC-39 cir

proving to have been at least worth the wait. 29 But as TRI

subsumed in that same year into the new Joint Tactical C3 A

legacy seemed to suggest that the undeniable progress brou

program had been purchased at what was perhaps a disproport
produced was too big, too bulky, too heavy, and too costly 

TRI-TAC was "all things to all men. ''30 

The JINTACCS program was much less ambitious in scope

was set up as a method to link command and control systems th

existed. Its problems, however, have been no less difficult than 

TRI-TAC, because interoperability cuts across service and doctr

at least as much with current equipment as it does with future 

Adding to this dilemma is the inherent difficulty of integratin

designed for separate service use. Consequently, any effort t

interoperability has to take account of four basic characteristics: 

• computer hardware, which places physical limits on the ad

of major systems; 

• computer software, which often involves different prog

computer languages; 

• military standards, which affect the meanings and formats 

messages; and 

• system interfaces, which are the electronic means of 

between physically remote systems. 

When JINTACCS was set up, therefore, it was hoped that 

would lead in two directions: the reconcilation of diverse existin

and the refinement of an architecture of design standards that wo

interoperability to be built into future systems--all without distu

traditional functions of the service acquisition process. The miss

JINTACCS program--approved by the secretary of defense on 

1977--reflected this: it was to 

insure that inter-service and joint plans are developed to a

technical compatibility, and that tests and demonstration

conducted to exhibit the compatibility, interoperability and 

tional effectiveness of those tactical command and control s

used in support of ground and amphibious military operations. 3

The JINTACCS program has tackled computer hardware and 

problems, but it has been directed primarily at establishin

acceptable protocols and message formats between different di
meanings in different services. As one JINTACCS action offic

the problem, "You send out a message to all units of a joint for

their operations. An Army outfit will double the guard force 

barbed wire, the Air Force will energize their crypto systems, an

will simply pack up and go home!" A similar problem croppe

the design of a standard message format, when only three char

available to abbreviate the Navy's Supporting Arms Coordina

Naturally, the Navy suggested calling it "SAC," but the Air For

that "SAC" already was the official acronym for the St

Command. The Navy retorted that its SACC had been in ex

before the Strategic Air Command, and that if anyone had to 

should be the Air Force. A lengthy argument then ensued ov

acronym until a compromise was reached that satisfied the 

both automation and service honor: "1 think they decided 

damned thing the SCC! ''32 

It is through such disputes, however ridiculous they may app

infrastructure of interoperability is painstakingly hammered 

serious problems occur when embedded terms, procedure

doctrinal issues arise that cannot be easily compromised. In 

cited above, for example, the Navy's opposition might easily 

due to the existence of the term SACC in the software of a 

different systems; going into a computer program and chan

instance in which such a term appears can be an expensive a

proposition. Small wonder, then, that these disputes do occur. 

noted, however, that JINTACCS, like the JCS itself, is an inters

that is not capable of imposing unilateral decisions to resolv

Indeed, as one service's briefing guide to the work of 

JINTACCS committees notes, "Decisions are by majority vote

of the permanent members objects, in which case unan

prevail"---exactly the voting procedure followed in the Security 

the United Nations. 33 In the event of a serious dispute, the m

have to be referred in succession from the JINTACCS program 

the Joint Standards Group for Tactical C3 Systems to the Joint 

Systems Council and ultimately to the Joint Chiefs themselves. 
in producing interservice agreements on character-oriented messag

that different components will be able to share computer d

information in joint operations. Finally, JINTACCS is the lead d

in the TADIL which will by 1989 provide the common lin

operations of the JTIDS system to be described below. 34 

If there is a criticism to be made of JINTACCS, it would co

lack of scope; its limited purposes have, of course, lim

achievements. One example is a JINTACCS program that brought 

the data requirements of the Army's TACFIRE artillery system 

Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support System, or MIFASS, a n

more ambitious fire-control system which (perhaps in the nature o

the Marines ultimately canceled. Despite similarities in the functio

two systems, there were basic design differences in the transmissi

used (netted FM voice radios for TACFIRE versus a switche

network for MIFASS) as well as the data rate and the choice of 

formats. Eventually JINTACCS succeeded in designing common 

protocols, and modems between the two systems which--had 

been procured--would have allowed them to communicate, althou

much slower data rate associated with the Army system. 35 

The basic question, however, is why two such systems--thre

common modems and multiplexers are counted--had to be deve

the first place to perform a single function: indirect fire support fo

units. Considering that Marine and Army units have historical

themselves fighting side by side on numerous occasions, why woul

been necessary to make technical sacrifices just so they could c

cate? The answer depends on outlook. The JINTACCS approach 

that building a series of least common denominators between fun

similar but organizationally discrete systems reflects an accep

reality. The TRI-TAC approach would suggest a basic en

solution, trading off requirements in order to allow the construc

single system that would satisfy both the Army and the Marines. 

might add that the TR1-TAC system would take filieen yea

developed or even that it would add a statistically significant perc

the gross national debt. Some middle ground between the TRI-T
JTIDS: Concepts, Applications, and Developments t

All the progress on interoperability charted thus far was 

in the future when the JTIDS program had its inception in 

mid-1970s. Like TRI-TAC and JINTACCS, this program re

fundamental development strategy midway between the al

commonality of the TRI-TAC approach and the more limited in

ity envisioned under JINTACCS. As shown, these strat

responses to the new technological advances represented by th

precision-guided munitions and the need for increased mobil

sea, and air forces--all of which demanded increased e

command and control. Consequently, a new set of requir

generated for a communications infrastructure capable of sup

weight of the data to be passed between remote sensor platfo

dispersed weapons systems, and the intelligence-operations fu

needed to keep track of it all. 

In constructing such an infrastructure, the services were mo

from a common baseline, even though their current communi

varied so much in design and operating characteristics as to 

unsuitable for interservice use. Despite the Navy's experience 

data, the bulk of service tactical communications rested on a 

high-frequency radio nets, in which soldiers, sailors, airmen, 

simply pushed a button or iii~ed a receiver in order to talk to o

Convenient and familiar as these practices were, they simply w

in an environment in which such signals could be jammed, int

intelligence analysis, or tracked with sufficient speed and acc

permit the sending station to be targeted and destroyed by enem

The problem was that voice radio systems were carried 

communications relays--that is, the voice of the sender was b

into electronic pulses that were transmitted to a receiver which 

process for the listener. The process was roughly five thou

slower than the speeds achievable by digital information sys

used computers to send thousands of bits of information per s

electronic pathways from machine to machine. Digital data 
For communications engineers, the possibilities seemed endless 

of two principal developments. First, one of the major problems 

wrestled with had been the "man-in-the-loop problem": the humans 

ends of the communications links that had characterized the earlie

era and had been one of its least efficient aspects. Now, the sm

more powerful mini- and micro-computers suggested that it w

possible to design whole systems that would use digital data pat

"interrogate" sensors continuously, the information then being re

nanoseconds back to a command post or fire control center where 

be displayed on a cathode ray tube, or CRT. Human interventio

thus be limited to the decision process itself. This was a powerful 

and led to several service programs, the Air Force AWACS and t

Aegis being two of the better-known examples. The second deve

was the application of the computer to data transmission and dis

techniques. The speed of computer processing allowed a sign

broken down, packed with data, and transmitted simultaneously 

entire frequency band. This technique--called "frequency hopping

defeat enemy jamming and voice interception, permitting the r

computers to reconstitute the signal, extract the information from 

bus," and automatically dispatch it to a number of different ad

Frequency hopping and distributed data techniques represented t

sort of improvement over existing tactical communications as the 

gun had over the bolt-action rifle. 

In the early 1970s, the Navy and Air Force separately began 

several programs that addressed their most critical needs 

post-Vietnam era. The Navy's programs were the Integrated Tac

Control Program and the Integrated Tactical Navigation Syste

concepts that sought to harness digital data techniques to the pro

coordinating the movements of ships and carrier-based aircraft. 

Force had similar efforts underway in two programs of its own: 

Location Reporting and Control of Tactical Aircratt and In

Communications, Navigation, and Identification. The test results 

four programs were sufficiently encouraging that by 1973 both 

were ready to request formal OSD project funding and approval. 
ppp

The development of the classic JTIDS concept is most close

with Gordon Welchman, a transplanted Englishman whose 

career included World War II service with the team at Bletchl

cracked the German high command code. His early exposure 

Secret led to a lifelong fascination with military communica

number of important contributions during his many year

Whatever tile deficiencies of German codes, Welchman's s

North African campaign convinced him that one of the keys t

victories had been the flexible system of tactical communi

allowed the Desert Fox to command from any point on the 

Similarly, the presence of radios in all German tanks--consider

when introduced in the 1930s--not only allowed Romm

subordinate commanders to have great connectivity but also 

officers the wide latitude for independent action chara

decentralized operations. But in Welchman's view these less

been well applied: 

After World War Two, the planning of battlefield commu

gradually deteriorated into little more than methods of 

telephone system thinking and switchboard technology to p

rigid structure of point-to-point linkages. . The 

inter-element connectivity that the Germans provided 

blitzkrieg by using interlocking common-user radio nets co

served as a model for our own future planning, bu

forgotten .36 

To Welchman, and to other Mitre engineers whom he p

JTIDS represented nothing less than a revolutionary attempt t

those forgotten lessons; with the help of modern technology, th

applied to future battlefields which would demand greater 

between different combat elements in order to coordinat

decentralized operations. It is interesting that these ideas 

developed in parallel with much of the thinking that chara

maneuver school of thought associated with the military reform 

Yet, while the reformers were deeply suspicious of technologi

to command and control problems, Welchman and his fo
of top-down linkages shown in Model II. The essence of this system 

it depends on sender-oriented communications--information flows 

down hierarchical lines as a result of single actions taken by the se

that information. In Model III, a distributed data network is 

characterized as much by lateral linkages as hierarchical ones a

common pool of information each member draws upon---and contri

---depending on its own requirements and abilities. Like borrowers 

library, each member of a distributed data network decides for hims

information he requires and, in the best scholarly tradition, enri

system with his own contributions to the common store of informati

this wide pattern of lateral and hierarchical connectivity geared 

individual data decisions that characterizes receiver-oriented commun

Ideally, JTIDS would be a mobile, decentralized, receiver-orient

munications system characterized by wide-ranging connectivity 

combat elements with different functions, command lines, parent 

and even native languages---the latter necessary because of the 

applications of the system to the NATO environment. 38 In more p

terms, Mitre engineers saw that it might be possible to construct 

system using decentralized computer-to-computer communication

cially given the rapidly growing power of microprocessors. Adva

silicon chip technology promised that these terminals would be 

smarter, and cheaper than ever before. They could thus be program

use in a wide variety of service applications, beginning with the need

Air Force and the Navy for secure, jam-proof digital commun

utilizing both voice and data. Consequently, Secretary of Defense J

Schlesinger directed in September 1974 that the program go forw

way that would exploit its benefits for all three services. This directiv

the establishment of the JTIDS Joint Program Office under a formal 

by the Deputy Secretary of Defbnse for Research and Engineeri

Army, Navy, and Air Force were all to be represented, but, in a m

would have lasting significance, the Air Force was chosen to be the e

agent for the program--probably because of the Mitre connect

because it would buy the greatest number of aircraft terminals. 39 

In at least some respects, the choice of the Air Force as lead se

a billion-dollar joint project where important interests were a
POINT - TO - POINT 

SUPREME COMMAND 

MAJOR COMMAND 

COMBAT I~~-1 .'..~. I I ,~..,,, ~ .~-I I -~.-~ 

HIERARCHY 

FIGURE 7.1. Models of Communications Networks 

Source: Author 
ppy g

services may have had about another commonality-induced s

marriage were far from apparent, however, as the program got und

By the mid-1970s, it had begun to take on the outlines that 

characterize its fundamental technological approach. 

The primary concept was that JTIDS terminals would allow aircra

ultimately other users as well, to communicate with one another w

the involvement of their pilots or crews. A flight of F-15 jet f

equipped with JTIDS, for example, would exchange information s

times per second concerning their heading, altitude, speed, and so o

data would be sent automatically to every other aircraft, appearing 

CRT on the pilot's console with an alphanumeric display that some l

to the video game "Space Invaders. TM Any other member of the JTID

--a ground control station, an orbiling AWACS aircraft, or other me

of the same flight--would both receive these reports and contribu

results of their own sensor suites. The result would be a compreh

situation display, so comprehensive that the pilot might well be sw

with all the data held by the system. For that reason, JTIDS woul

allow the pilot or any other user to select only those categories o

relevant to his assigned mission. The pilot of an F-15 approachi

enemy air defense zone, for example, could select only those data sh

his own position relative to enemy interceptors and air defense sy

picked up by his own sensors or by those of any other member 

JTIDS network. Another pilot on an air superiority mission could j

easily suppress the data on low-level air defenses and call up inste

system's holdings on opposing enemy fighters and high-altitude SAM

Thus, JTIDS technology embodied the classic concepts of 

receiver-oriented communications and selective retrieval of infor

from a larger data pool. 43 Both facets of the system were made possi

the physics embodied in JTIDS, which featured a kind of computer-s

technique known as "time-division multiple access," or TDMA. Like 

computer time-sharing techniques, TDMA allows many users to 

access to a shared network; unlike them, however, JTIDS was to b

not around a central processing unit of a single computer but aro

number of small computers constantly communicating with one an
first illustration, the internal timing device divides slots fo

transmission into "epochs" of 12.8 minutes, consisting of 64 

12-second time frames. Each time frame is further subdivided 

time slots of 7.8125 milliseconds each--meaning that 98,304 tim

available in each JTIDS epoch. Each one of these 7.8 

messages contains synchronization periods on either end th

maintain system alignment. The fantastic speeds and informatio

possible with digital data flows are shown graphically in 

illustration, which depicts the information content possible in j

these bursts. In routine position and status reports by a single 

the JTIDS net, data on all the categories shown would be 

automatically. And, as shown in the illustration, potential users 

include the aircraft, ships, and ground stations of different servic

The technological choices that flamed the initial developmen

thus had the following characteristics: 

• The JTIDS system would be self-regulating, without th

necessity for central communication centers or nodes which 

easy to target and destroy in combat. 

• The nodeless character of the system was also a function 

that each JTIDS terminal would act as an inherent repeat

allowing the typical network to be spread across an are

hundred to five hundred miles. Similarly, the destruction 

terminal would not affect the integrity of the network as a wh

• The JTIDS architecture lent itself particularly well to 

multiple nets accommodating the needs of a wide variety of 

digital data flow, for example, could also handle voice tra

although it was true that "a little bit of voice would eat up a lo

• Each JTIDS terminal would provide embedded positive id

of every other terminal in the system, as well as their precis

from one another; it thus automatically provided for relative 

as well as the distinguishing of enemy and friendly units. 46 

• The terminals would feature an encryption device allow

communications to be transmitted automatically. The tec
The basic idea of JTIDS technolo~' is to use small, synchronized computers to place 

unprecedented amounts of information on a radio signal. The signal is broken into tim

slots of 7.8 milliseconds (top), with slots assigned to each member of the net. The bo

illustration shows the large amounts of data that can be packed into each of these tim

and displayed graphically on the JTIDS terminal. 

FIGURE 7.2. JTIDS Message Technology 

Source: JTIDS Joint Program Office 
mass of data being passed over the net each microsecond. 47 

these improvements would mean a quantum jump in all 

communications security. 

The capabilities of the JTIDS technology thus offered the 

common baseline from which to derive solutions to some of 

pressing problems. What follows is a summary of service ob

they approached the first phase of the program. 

Air Force. The potential represented by JTIDS appea

especially rich for the Air Force, and not only because it wa

service in developing the program. By 1978 the AWACS a

coming into initial operational use, and JTIDS could be an ef

for distributing its data to ground control stations. The 

surveillance capabilities of the AWACS promised a new era in 

control of high-performance aircraft such as the F-15, which, n

land forces, would have to fight outnumbered and win in any co

with the air forces of the Warsaw Pact. A better system 

information distribution among surveillance planes, fighter ai

ground control stations would help provide the needed edge. A

report summarized it in 1977, with JTIDS 

command and control support to fighters is going to be 

deal better. Controllers won't be saturated. Pilots will h

information they need soon enough to fly their own maneuver

will plot MIG locations relative to the pilot .... If part 

command and control system is lost, full connectivity w

remainder provides survivability .... Fighter mutual suppor

coordinated much more easily when information comes in 

and does not come as a surprise. 48 

Above all, JTIDS would provide secure, jam-resistant comm

without which the tactical air control system would not be able 

known Soviet capabilities. 

If there were any reasons for reservations about the Air Force 

they lay in the fact that JTIDS appeared to affect three import
complexity, if they were actually deployed in fighters. The reasons f

problem are many, but most come down to the fact that the Air 

remains firmly wedded to the idea of single-seat fighters. Whatev

benefits, the .ITIDS terminal would be yet another system competi

the attention of an already overworked pilot. Finally, if JTIDS ter

were installed in individual strike aircraft, the resulting information 

would give new life to the traditional doctrine of decentralized exec

Indeed, it could even be argued that receiver-oriented communicati

fighter cockpits might call into question the whole notion of com

centralized and exercised from the ground. 

Navy. The Navy, as mentioned earlier, had been using digital da

naval air operations for more than a decade at the start of the 

program, so it did not need to be convinced of the potential value 

system. Nor did adding a terminal in the cockpit of the fighter pre

problem. Navy fighters had flown with Naval Tactical Data S

terminals for years, the problem of cockpit complexity having been l

solved by the "guy in back"---the standard two-seat configuration of 

fighters. Consequently, the Navy looked upon the surveillance, navig

and control potential of JTIDS much the same as the Air Force di

with fewer reservations. The Navy's version of AWACS was the 

Hawkeye; with JTIDS it would be even more capable of extendin

umbrella of air defense coverage around the carrier battle group beca

the embedded relay characteristics of the system's terminals. And, t

always suspicious of Air Force involvement in maritime operation

Navy coveted the potential of AWACS for extending that umbrell

farther if a way could be found to provide its data to surface 

Another advantage in the Navy's eyes was JTIDS potential for bec

the single system that could tie together the diverse Navy net

responsible for air, surface, and submarine warfare. Amphibious oper

would similarly be enhanced if the Marines and the Army were part 

JTIDS network. 

Tactical applications of JTIDS seemed equally promising, among 

dropping JTIDS equipped sonar buoys in an area of suspected subm
Meanwhile, another F-14 in the vicinity would fire one of 

without having a radar lock on the intruder. The JTIDS link w

the unarmed F-14 to acquire the missile and guide it to the tar

Navy, therefore, JTIDS represented the next generation of the 

revolution of which the service was already an active proponent

Army and Marine Corps. At the inception of the JTID

Army interest was largely theoretical, although it also wanted 

the data the AWACS could provide to ground stations respons

defense. But another near-term gain suggested itself by the 

because of the embedded identification and navigation capabil

system. Both the Army and the Marines have had to grapp

difficult problems of land navigation in the tactical environment

of the standard challenges has always been to know where 

troops are located. The standard tools for accomplishing tha

always been the map, the compass, and the second li

combination with an unusual capacity for illustrating the w

Murphy's Law. But even when things were going well, it w

military practice to send most unit position reports to higher h

by unencrypted radio voice transmissions. The Vietnam War 

that even a technologically unsophisticated adversary could be 

adept at intercepting and exploiting such messages. Thus, the g

contingent was eager for a method of securely tracking and re

location of maneuver units on the battlefield. 

Giving that requirement additional urgency was the prol

highly accurate air defense weapons among Army and Marine 

most sophisticated of these weapons, such as the Hawk and 

missiles and the Vulcan air defense gun, had always been ti

Force nets, but the Redeye and Stinger air defense sys

shoulder-fired, heat-seeking missiles, designed to be used by 

soldiers with the forward maneuver units. Knowing the deadly 

missiles could have on low-flying aircratt and fearing the in

historic indifference to the finer points of distinguishing h

friendly aircraft ("Shoot 'era all down and sort 'era out on the 
gpg

aircraft were also small enough to be transportable in tactical vehicl

connectivity of these terminals meant that a few of them could c

wide area and link both JTIDS and non-JTIDS units. This w

principal idea behind what unfortunately became known as the 

JTIDS Hybrid, a jaw-crunching acronym, the first part of 

(pronounced "plarz") stood for the Position Location Reporting S

Under this concept, Net Control Units (NCU) were to be set up, con

of a JTIDS terminal and a display console deployed in a shelter 

back of a standard Army/Marine two-and-a-half-ton truck. The 

terminal would be linked to aircraft, ground control centers, and any 

member of the network with a JTIDS terminal. Its principal linkag

forward troops, air defense teams, and fire support coordinators wo

through the "enhanced PLRS user units" deployed with those forces. 

user units were little more than manpack radios tied to a data entry 

that closely resembled a hand-held calculator. Not only would the N

linked to both aircraft and air defenders; it would also d

automatically the position of all user units on the map grid of the co

A division commander could then know from a single glance at the 

display the actual positions of his maneuver units. Those units coul

use the system to determine their own position by interrogating the 

and could exchange limited "free text" messages with other user uni

both the Army and the Marines, these were revolutionary capabilities

worth the effort of participation in the JTIDS Joint Project Office. 50 

The identification of these service applications was one of the 

features of the JTIDS program during the formative years of 1975-80

same period, however, was marked by a mixed pattern of confli

cooperation that ended with a series of important decisions in the fina

of the Carter administration. But to summarize, the initial agreeme

the direction of the JTIDS program focused on the developmen

production of three classes of terminals: 

• Class I Terminals: The Class I terminals were to be the answer 

most immediate concern of the Air Force, which was the nea

deployment of a data distribution system on the AWACS aircraf
control nets. The Air Force planned to buy eighty-six devel

full production models of the terminals, with initial depl

1983. 

• Class H Terminals: In concept, the Class II terminals repr

full flowering of JTIDS technology. As many as five thousa

terminals might be purchased, as the Navy and Air Force dep

on aircraft and ships and the Army and Marines made them 

of the PLRS/JTIDS Hybrid. Possessing the same capabili

Class I terminals, but far smaller and lighter (1.6 cubic fe

pounds), the Class II terminals were to be developed and 

beginning in the mid-1980s. 

• Class III Terminals: Although they would never ultimately 

existence, Class III terminals were something of a gleam in 

early JTIDS planners as they anticipated the 1990s bring

advances in miniaturization, increased computer power, and 

costs. In particular, it was thought that JTIDS might well 

"candidate capability" for the application of a DoD-sponsor

called Very High Speed Integrated Circuitry (VHSIC), w

help usher in the fourth generation of computer technology. 51 

Although the services were able to agree on an overall plan 

they disagreed about some aspects of the program. The most 

these disagreements involved the message standards to b

implementing JTIDS and, even more profound, the technologic

ture of the system itself. Little more than a year into the program

and the Air Force got into serious difficulty over the configur

tactical data link (TADIL) to be used in the Class 1 term

argument centered on whether it was necessary to create an Int

Message Standard for these terminals until an entirely new 

--TADIL J--was developed around the operations of th

terminals by the mid-1980s. The Navy argued that the existing 

joint operations could serve as an interim standard and question

and difficulties of developing new software that was seem

grammed for early obsolescence. The Air Force countered t
The main point made by the Navy was that the new mess

specification did not meet its requirements. The Navy wanted 

system that would interface with its existing TADILs and hence k

its expense down to the absolute minimum .... The root reason w

again economics. 53 

The dispute simmered along until late 1976, when the issue was 

all the way to the Air Staff. A compromise of sorts was reache

interim standard would be put in place for AWACS, but the TA

standards would be designed under the auspices of a joint working 

formed under the new JINTACCS charter. The Navy had clearly 

battle. Consequently, the compromise did not entirely settle the is

message standards and the relative costs of having to adapt to new sy

The disagreement over message forms cropped up again in 197

now in a more serious context because it was linked to a schism--no 

word is appropriate here--that had developed between the Navy an

Air Force over the technological architecture. The original T

architecture envisioned multiple nets, but all as part of a single system

Navy's concept was an alternative to TDMA, known as Distributed 

Division Multiple Access, or DTDMA. The technical differences be

the "T" and the "D" architectures are varied, complex, and not espe

relevant to this analysis: suffice it to say that the message forms 

fundamentally different and it was not at all clear they could even be 

compatible. The conceptual divergence came principally fi'om 

differences in the way the Air Force and the Navy envisioned JTIDS 

first place, a divergence that only grew wider as the project wor

Figure 7.3 illustrates the difference. As shown in the top drawing, T

envisioned the use of multiple nets, but all as part of a single sy

Below is DTDMA, which was far more easily adapted to the N

long-standing preference for federal, quasi-autonomous organiza

structures and their corresponding electronic networks. Another reaso

the Navy's preference may have been the fact that the prototype DT

message structure and characteristics closely paralleled the TADIL A 

TADIL C links the Navy had used extensively for years. For wh

!ii I !i 

~'~ 

~.~ 

~ ~ 0 ~ ' e.~ ~, 

,-~ ~ 

..., ~e~ ~ 
y g 

and was not mollified when the Air Force proposed in 

"advanced" form of TDMA, which, after the linguistic fashion 

matters, was termed Advanced TDMA, or ATDMA. The sy

identical to TDMA except that it claimed to double the data r

system--an issue that had been a Navy concern. Navy suspicio

Force intentions were further heightened when the Air Force beg

funds for an "interim" anti-jam radio voice system called "SEEK 

The Navy was, of course, looking to JTIDS as the integrated 

data distribution system of the future; it now appeared that the 

saw JTIDS only in terms of data distribution and that it might be 

to go off on its own to acquire the anti-jam radio capability th

consistent with its practices and known preferences. 5s 

It was against this backdrop that Gerald P. Dinneen took a 

actions that sealed his personal commitment to the JTIDS pro

symbol of interoperability and joint development of command a

systems. On September 5, 1978, he issued a memorandum dire

the effort toward Class II terminals be pursued "based upon the 

TDMA technical approach. To insure maximum interoperabilit

Navy is to join and support [that] effort." Now DTDMA w

relegated to a "technical contingency" only. 56 In November, 

prevailed on the secretary of defense to sign a directive declarin

major acquisition system subject to OSD management scrutiny (

Dinneen) under the provisions of DOD Directives 5000.1 and 

And in March 1979, he chided the services again on their slow p

designing JTIDS message standards. Not only did he urge th

better, but he announced the formation of a JTIDS Executive C

under his chairmanship. 58 This was top-management interventi

vengeance. 

The Navy saw the situation as one in which its critical inte

threatened not only by the Air Force but also by an OSD staff in

prone to sacrifice operational interests for conformity with the 

the lead service. Throughout 1979 and 1980, therefore, the Nav

skillful rear-guard action designed to preserve its options withou
recollection of the first meeting of Dinneen's JTIDS Executive Comm

I set the record straight on pressing and unrelieved Navy conce

over the course OSD has directed the JTIDS program to fol

despite Navy objections. Specifically, I indicated that I could 

comprehend the justification for Dinneen's directive [of Septembe

1978] instructing the Navy to abandon its approach in favor of 

Air Force proposal, the plan to send forth in the very near future 

RFP [contract proposal on Class II terminals] framcd in terms wh

may result in a design that precludes the Navy from satisfying 

future requirements and ignores already developed, more flex

Navy technology, and finally, that I intended to pursue the ma

further and to higher levels, if possible. 59 

There is no record that Mann's candid luncheon meeting wi

deputy secretary of defense resulted in specific directives to Dinn

back off. Nevertheless, the OSD position was softened somewhat 

August 1979 memo which reestablished TDMA as the JTIDS baselin

directed the Navy to continue (!) its DTDMA evaluation activ

Pressures continued to build when, in late January 1980, the G

Accounting Office (GAO) issued a formal report to Congress entitled 

Joint Tactical Information Distribution System--How Important I

Although the GAO had made a low-key inquiry about JTIDS manag

the year before, this was an attack from an unexpected quarter, 

Congress had largely been supportive of JTIDS; indeed, the 1977 

Armed Services Committee Report that had criticized TRI-TAC 

singled out .ITIDS for praise. 6j Now, however, the investigating a

Congress had formally reached out to question DOD management 

program and its ability to resolve interservicc conflicts in the develo

process. 62 In preparing its rebuttal, OSD followed the usual pract

soliciting service reactions to and comments on the GAO report. T

Force response amounted to a stirring defense of its stewardship 

lead service. The Navy response said flatly, "The Department of the 

concurs in general with the findings and recommendations stated 

report" in a memo signed by none other than D. E. Mann. There 

evidence whatever that Mann had thus made good on his threat to 
py

we share most of the same concerns for JTIDS as the GAO. W

Services are all agreed that the operational requirement is urgent

the determination of optimal solutions is an interactive process. 

have 'turned the comer' as far as management issues are concern

planning will put the JTIDS program firmly onto the normal mil

accountability tracks of any other major program. By this time 

the results should speak for themselves ?'64 

It could hardly have come as a surprise, then, that on July 

Dinneen signed a memorandum reversing his 1978 decision. 

TDMA would be the baseline architecture for Class I and 

terminals--the latter now approaching a contract decision poin

he had decided that the development of higher capacity termin

proceed based on DTDMA. In practical terms, this meant that 

Air Force, and (presumably) Marine terminals would be Class 

systems. The Navy would not be required to purchase them, sinc

be developing its own Class II terminals using the DTDMA t

Dinneen further specified that the architecture of the overall syst

be maintained "so that all JTIDS equipment will be interoperabl

and combined operations. "6s 

This decision clearly represented a major fork in the road

arguably affected all subsequent action on the program. In 

Dinneen had been converted----or pressured--to the view espou

Navy for the preceding five years; he had also accepted the argum

by the Navy at least since 1978, which was that DTDMA an

could be made "backwards compatible"--some slots in both ar

could be reserved for joint use. Nevertheless, a major step had 

away from the common direction that had been the hallmark of 

program since its inception. More fallout was not long in comi

Air Force continued to express both reservations about JTIDS te

fighter cockpits and enthusiasm concerning ever-newer and more 

"interim systems" for anti-jam radio systems: in the bizarre term

commonly encountered in these matters, SEEK TALK had giv

HAVE QUICK. In the final days of the Carter administr

dissatisfaction surfaced in the press with an article in Def
whose personal integrity and intentions were universally considered 

above reproach. It is nevertheless a fact that on January 16, 1981, 

Force, as the executive service for JTIDS, was given approval to p

with full-scale development of the Class II TDMA terminals. Lat

team of Singer Kearfott/Rockwell Collins was chosen to provide 

forty of these "development" terminals which would provide the bas

full production decision to be made by 1986 on further proliferation 

system. As Gerald P. Dinneen left office, therefore, what legacy 

leave behind? Clearly, he had much more to show for his efforts th

"million-dollar radio" deplored by the anonymous subordinate

floated that story. In his close personal involvement with JTIDS, like 

Robert McNamara with the TFX a decade before, Dinneen had ex

the full range of central management powers inherent in his offic

McNamara as well, Dinneen had ultimately been forced to comp

with Service norms, none more important than the definition o

unique mission requirements. But while the TFX did not long surviv

McNamara's incumbency, JTIDS remained a contentious issue with

Defense Department for years after Dinneen's departure. 

JTIDS Developments 1981-1985: Divergence and Denou

It was somewhat ironic that the Reagan administration, 

determined to avoid what it saw as the overcentralized management 

Carter Defense Department, appointed to the job of supervisi

command and control programs a man whose qualifications, talen

personality would make him every bit as formidable as Gerald Di

Donald C. Latham would emerge from the shadows of the Office 

Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to beco

assistant secretary of defense for command, control, communication

intelligence, developing the powers of that position to an unprece

extent. Yet neither Latham nor Dinneen could have predicted the 

outcome of the JTIDS program during the half-decade between 19

1985: 
spurned for so many years. 

• The Army, the service that had watched most of 

controversy from the sidelines, was the only one to gain from 

program a result that approximated its original objective. 

• The Marines, because of the above developments, were 

embarrassment of being the only service to have two sets 

--TDMA for use in conjunction with the Army's PLRS/JT

and DTDMA for all other operations with the Navy. 

By any reckoning, this was a remarkable turn of events, 

DTDMA failure in particular giving an entirely new mean

concept of "backwards compatibility." And yet, the root

unintended consequences can be found in the Carlucci mem

March 27, 1981, which set the tone for the decentralized manag

of the Defense Department and sent a strong signal that serv

were in the ascendant. This directive followed by less than 

"Great Schism" between the DTDMA and TDMA techno

effects of both decisions were already evident by May of 1981

C. Cittadino (OSD director for Theater and Tactical C2 Syst

important source of institutional memory) stated in a cover brie

Latham's acting deputy that "despite Congressional direction 

efforts, the JTIDS program is proceeding more as a confedera

programs than (ideally) as a single fully integrated one." Not o

the Navy had moved out of the JTIDS Joint Program Office 

Air Force Base, Massachusetts, its representative now ensconc

rest of the Naval Electronic Systems Command in Crystal City, 

By now, GAO inquiries on JTIDS, if not exactly routine, 

become an accepted part of the cost of doing business in t

Department. So no one was startled when, on April 2, 1982, 

GAO letterhead appeared at the top of a four-page documen

again raised questions about DOD management of the JTIDS pr

primary thrust of the GAO inquiry was directed at what i

detectable softening of the respective service commitments 

fewer terminals were planned for acquisition; funding lev
the associated increased development costs and interopera

problems may not be appropriate. We understand that the N

Distributed Time Division Multiple Access has greater gr

potential [than TDMA] which would appear to be desirable fo

Air Force as well. 68 

The DOD reply came on May 24, 1982. As expected, it rebutt

of the GAO's concerns but was candid in asserting that any develo

program such as JTIDS was subject to uncertainty. It also pointed 

the Air Force anti-jam voice requirements meant that this service 

"a demonstration of JTIDS Class 2's operational utility in a 

tactical environment before making its major resource commitme

new concept for fighter operations. ''69 One of the most interesting 

of the DOD reply, however, was the revelation of its basic man

philosophy about JTIDS: 

Although it is treated programmatically as a major system, JT

is really a sub-system program. Different terminal types and anc

equipment must be tailored to Service platform and mission nee

For the near term, the urgency of Service mission needs determ

whether a terminal will be retrofitted into one platform rather 

incorporated into a lesser-priority user during production .... I

meantime . . . the dual-technology approach of the several Se

programs will both give us a healthy production base and ass

long-term competitive situation. 70 

This approach was, of course, consistent with admin

philosophy, which stressed the regulative mechanisms of the free 

and the importance of rebuilding American defenses rather than re

ing the defense establishment. Yet the decentralized manageme

foreshadowed by the Caducei memorandum would often be at logg

with the need to maintain coherence in a command and control bud

was at last experiencing real growth. 71 

In turning to the various service interests as they appeared in t

1980s, it is appropriate to begin with the Army, simply because it

applications presented the fewest conflicts with the interests of th

services and, perhaps for that reason, its program was proceedi
g y g

development having been approved in 1980. No significan

appear to have been encountered in that contract during this 

deliveries began in 1983, and the process of field testing and 

commenced. 72 Each Army division was eventually expected to 

eight hundred users of the system, the great majority being 

through the austere PLRS user unit described above. The dir

this equipment were estimated by the Army at just over $33 

each of the nineteen divisions (or their equivalents) in its forc

for a total procurement outlay of some $627 million. 73 This fig

hardly insignificant, was not an unreasonable investment in 

great improvement the system represented for a wide rang

tactical operations. Assuming that the program remained rea

time and within budget, there were considerable grounds for 

the procurement cycle continued. 74 

Aside from the fact that its requirements did not conflict w

the Navy and Air Force, what other reasons lay behind 

comparatively successful experience with JTIDS? One factor 

its requirements were well understood by the service's top 

----both the problem and its solution--prior to any commitm

project. The Army realized that it was in a relative Stone Age i

ability to move perishable data around the battlefield was con

JTIDS system represented a way to solve that problem and to c

the larger, joint world that was essential to Airland Battle an

lesser initiatives. 75 Another reason was that the Army's c

employment of JTIDS modified the classic "many-to-many" 

JTIDS connectivity to fit its own circumstances. Each of the 

units was required to go through the Net Control Stations to 

other user, although the system for all practical purposes 

"transparent" to these subscribers. These control stations the

nodes, whereas the original JTIDS concept had stresse

connectivity. This concession to traditional hierarchy reflect

sense of reality: mainly the fact that the great number o

subordinate entities" in the Army environment would quickly 

capacity of the fastest computer that could be fielded. The solu
Navy, was far more complex. Five major areas of divergence--all 

but inextricably linked---can be extracted from the record 

interaction. 

• Different operational environments: As simplistic as it ma

the different operational environments of the Navy and Air For

the heart of their dispute over JTIDS, especially in relatio

anti-jamming capabilities they sought. 

• Data versus voice: The preference of the Navy for data 

equally strong Air Force belief in voice control were products 

their operational environments and their histories. That differe

JTIDS persisted throughout the program. 

• Differing commitment levels: As the lead service, the Air F

seen by the Navy to be in a clear position of dominance; yet it

enthusiasm for JTIDS led to further bad feelings, especially in 

of efforts to make two increasingly diverse architectures compat

• DTDMA Versus TDMA: The two fundamentally different arch

approaches were never resolved until cancelation of the Navy's 

in 1985. Here again, the divergence reflected underlying f

differences. 

• Technological risk: The Navy DTDMA architecture ca

inherent degree of technological risk as it pushed the state of t

electronics. The Air Force TDMA was high technology, but 

ably more doable. 

Probably the best indicator of where the services stood on th

issues can be gleaned from their annual appearances before the 

and Development Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Co

(HASC). Their testimony during the authorization process for t

1982 through 1985 shows their preferences on these issues as we

evolution of the program as a whole. It is important to realize 

record was far from being one of unalleviated failure. The Air Forc

TDMA terminals became operational on the AWACS in 1983, 

services made important progress in pioneering ways to share that 
between 1982, when the HASC was persuaded of the ne

compatibility of the parallel systems, and 1985, when its patien

arguments over that question came to an end. To demonstrate t

the five issues outlined above on this outcome, each is examined 

Different Operational Environments. The respective 

environments of the Navy and Air Force represent differences 

as to seem obvious to the most casual observer. And yet, the 

of those differences were not at all obvious during the HAS

which generated a series of exchanges among witnesses, congre

professional committee staff members, notably Anthony R. Batt

the Hill's most expert observers of defense technology and 

inquisitor. The environmental differences centered around t

capabilities of JTIDS versus other systems that the Air Force w

as either complementary to JTIDS or, ultimately, as a substitute 

Air Force premise was that the JTIDS anti-jam margin was in

break through known Soviet capabilities on the European battl

point led to questioning by Battista and others to the effect 

threat was so great for the Air Force, why was it any diffe

Navy? Was the threat indeed different or were these purported 

just examples of interservice rivalry? Their skepticism reached 

during the 1984 hearings when the Air Force, after having p

named its preferred anti-jam voice system SEEK TALK 

CLEAR, went all-out for funding by rechristening it Enhanced 

EJS. It was doubtful that this system had anything in comm

"real" JTIDS, and sharp questioning was the order of the day 

the hearings. 

Near the end of these sessions the commander of the T

Command, Gen. Wilbur L. Creech, appeared before the subco

argue for EJS. He explained the Navy and Air Force differences 

First of all, we operate in different ways against 

missions. Let's take a central European war, for example .... 

Now the threat that we [USAF] face are jammers 

distributed along the FEBA [Forward Edge of the Battl
the shore. In a carrier battle group, there are 24 to 30, sometim

many as 36 .... That is a little over one squadron of Air Force 

surface aircraft. 

In contrast, we the Air Force... are going to take 89 squa

to Europe. And with our Allies we are going to be operating 

squadrons in that area which is the size of Oregon. Clearly, the 

the need, the missions are different. 76 

General Creech went on to explain another critical difference. 

Force base was a fixed point, whereas a carrier was constantly 

therefore the relative navigation characteristic of JTIDS was more 

the Navy than to the Air Force. This was well-crafted and p

testimony, and, though the Air Force eventually lost on EJS, 

Creech's delineation of the differences in service perspectiv

unmatched by any other witness. 

Data versus Voice. The issue of whether it was better to 

tactical aircratl by voice or data was familiar to everyone even r

associated with the JTIDS program, for it had been a bone of co

between the Air Force and the Navy from the beginning. As the 

evolved after 1980, however, the stakes rose as the Air Force becam

concerned about jammers and their disruptive effects on air operatio

relationship of jamming to the data-voice controversy was technol

driven: there was a trade-off between the computer power investe

content of a message (either data or voice) and its protective 

margin (or "sheath"). Although questioners such as Anthony Battis

the point again and again, the Air Force repeatedly claimed that it m

more sense to make that investment in ways that considered the 

mental differences between a pure voice system, which was what 

Force wanted, and JTIDS Class II, which was at the most a da

hybrid. 77 

Apart from the technological questions, there were equally im

doctrinal issues at stake, the term doctrine being used here to con

services' historical reactions to their roles and missions in their re

operational environments. The Navy, with its longer experience i

data, came to a different set of conclusions from that of the Ai

even when those services were describing their reactions to a c
GENERAL EAGLET: In the Air Force, it is clear to us that, 

we can use a lot of data link communications, there are a nu

missions, particularly those in a high-threat environment, f

voice communications are absolutely imperative, such as 

penetrating well into enemy territory and one member needin

a wingman's attention to the fact that a SAM has been launch

his right wing and is approaching him. We don't believe th

get that data to him is to format it and communicate it to a 

display. We think the way to do it is for the wingman to b

push a button and say: "Joe, break left. There's a SAM."... 

MR. DICKINSON: I don't mean to be argumentative. I

recollection that the Navy flew missions in Vietnam over l

that they were subject to SAMs .... How is your threat diffe

ADMIRAL KIRKSEY: . . . One of the problems that exis

strictly voice system and during the large strikes in Vietna

you have 45 to 60 aircraft involved in a relatively small 

area was that everyone would be on the voice circuits at 

time. On one occasion we had 35 surface-to-air missiles t

launched around the city of Hanoi, and of course directio

being called: "Hey, there is a missile coming at 030," and so 

lot of them were relative [position] calls and people's hea

going around on a swivel trying to find out, "Is that missile 

after me?" So there are a lot of problems involved . . . 

combat operating only with voice circuits. 78 

Interestingly, in this discussion no one ever brought up the 

difference between the single-seat fighters of the Air Force 

two-seat configuration of Navy planes. In any case, the mat

likely to be resolved in a congressional hearing. The

data-versus-voice controversy, as both an important doctrinal p

an obstacle to joint interoperability, simmered throughout 

program and persists to this day. 

Differing Commitment Levels. The anti-jam and voice

issues were almost reverse sides of the same coin, and there w

linkage between the differing levels of commitment to the JTID

and the whole question of system architecture. This was du

perceptions concerning the choice of the Air Force as the execu

for JTIDS, a choice ostensibly driven by expectations that th
in remaining compatible with an architecture for which it had no u

Adm. Gordon R. Nagler, the director of naval command and 

summed up the Navy outlook: 

On JTIDS... l0 years ago the decision was made by the Sec

of Defense to go with a basic system .... That was to be the 

Air Force system. The Navy, after several years of discussion ..

told to go to the systems with D that gave you more capability

the Navy was told you must be backward compatible with T

said, "Roger," because at that time, the Air Force was buying 5,

sets. Now they're going to buy 5,000 EJS. But at that time they 

going to buy 5,000 T's. They've [now] got 144 programmed. 

still backward compatible. We have in our budget approved b

Secretary of the Navy... [funds so] that by 1988 D's [will a

built to be backward compatible with T's so we can interoperat

the Air Force. 79 

Apart from the trouble and expense involved, it was the Navy 

that it had received the worst of both worlds: project dominance by 

service which sacrificed Navy requirements and the proliferatio

another system with which it was required to maintain compatibilit

grievances help explain the pained attitudes that often lay just u

surface of JTIDS issues. 

DTDMA versus TDMA. The DTDMA/TDMA controversy c

to simmer, even though it had seemingly been resolved with t

agreement to explore the two architectures. In 1982, it was evi

Congress largely agreed with that decision--or at least found no 

grounds on which to question it. Indeed, part of their acceptance m

have been due to the distraction of having to keep track 

architectures and the arcane reasons they existed. As difficult as 

the nomenclature was at least consistent compared to the bewilder

of Air Force anti-jam radio designations that seemed to chang

Witness the following exchange during the 1982 hearings 
Talk, JTIDS with DTDMA and JTIDS with TDMA, given t

Quick is here? That is a good thing to do . . . but do we 

three? 

MR. LATHAM: In my personal opinion we do not, but if I 

opt for something, I will opt for the JTIDS program if I 

forced into a personal view on it. Within the JTIDS pr

would be willing to live, and I think we can live adequately 

D and the T .... So, I would keep the two JTIDS programs. 8

The more serious question always was the interoperability 

systems as they grew increasingly more distinct. By 1983, for e

Navy had a plan that aped that of the TDMA terminals: la

DTDMA terminals were to be outfitted in carriers and cruis

Class IA DTDMA terminals in E2C surveillance aircrat~, a

DTDMA terminals in fighter-bombers. 81 Admiral Nagler pointed 

1983 hearings that the costs of maintaining interoperability 

insignificant, but that they would be less were the DTDMA arc

be adopted as the interoperable standard: 

ADMIRAL NAGLER: If we adopted DTDMA in AWA

throughout the Navy, we would be interoperable through A

We could save $250 million in our program in JTIDS. We w

have to add the T version and be backwards compatible if w

work through the AWACS and the aircraft carriers, crui

AAW destroyers .... [The Air Force has its] own problem

have a joint program that's interoperable, I want us 

interoperable at the AWACS level and at the U.S. carrier an

level. Not every airplane that flies over central Europe has t

every airplane flying over the ocean, if they talk through A

That's my version. I'm sure the Air Force has a different ver

MR. DICKINSON: General Eaglet, do you want to respond? 

GENERAL EAGLET: . . . We believe.., that we should lo

alternative solution--that is the one which is currently direc

1980 to continue TDMA as the common interservice inter

mode. We suggest that [each] one should be studied at t

time. This would enable us to make a wiser selection betw

two approaches and converge on the one which is most cost 

for the taxpayer. Now that's our view on that issue. $2 

This disagreement would persist until technical diffic

DTDMA provided a "convergence" that few would have imagin
the packaging of printed microcircuitry and silicon chips in a 

would fit into the ships and aircratt it would serve: weight, si

cooling, and power requirements were all potential problem a

same challenge faced the TDMA terminals as well; but this ar

was one whose design had been crafted in the mid-1970s, stabili

contract award in 1980, and further refined as deliveries bega

place in 1983. The DTDMA approach was far more ambitious a

the state of the art. One indication of problems was that de

milestones and initial operational capability dates slid gradually t

end of the decade. Then, in November 1984, Secretary of the N

Lehman abruptly canceled the DTDMA contract with TADCOM

venture subsidiary of ITT and Hughes Aircraft. s3 Although the 

was renegotiated to minimize the risk to the government, th

problems with DTDMA were now out in the open. 

As the 1985 hearings began, committee staffer Anthony R

made this point clear to the members in his overview of the 

Department's research and development efforts: 

DTDMA is a very attractive feature for the Navy to have 

the program again has been in trouble. It was terminated by th

last year. They reinstated the contractor and put a cap 

program, and 1 can tell you right now that the Navy will sign 

9-month delay in the program. I will tell you it is closer 

months, and I believe that right now, even though it costs you 

capability, the Navy could go with TDMA .... accordingly, I 

recommend that you consider terminating that program becaus

is an alternative to it. s4 

With that sort of introduction, it was inevitable that tough q

would follow. Congressman Dennis Hertel, normally soft-spoke

asked Donald Latham why both architectures were necessary: "W

we pay the price for them to do their own thing? We are on 

side." Latham responded politely that the duality was based on 

he added that the services "could show you in spades why that is 

following exchange then ensued: 

MR. HERTEL: No, they cannot show us that. We have had t

here and they cannot show us that at all. And they cannot sh
program that uses two different signal wave forms that 

interoperable. 

MR. HERTEL: It costs more. That is what it does. 

MR. BATT1STA: That is like saying, I have got an AM r

you have got an FM radio, and we are interoperable bec

welded the receivers together. That is all they have done her

Equally severe questions greeted Navy representatives l

hearings. 86 What this reception made clear was that Congres

long-suffering in its willingness to go along with different a

despite its occasional misgivings that these systems might 

toward less, rather than greater, interoperability in the long run

Navy program ran into trouble, then, it was ripe for cancellatio

after all, a Congress whose willingness to fund the Reagan defe

was fast running out of steam. The stage was thus set for the fin

It came when, as expected, the House of Representatives re

termination of the DTDMA program in favor of the TDMA 

The Senate, however, recommended continuation of DTDMA

reflecting the traditional support the Navy had enjoyed in th

well as the fact that the Republican Senate tended to favor 

administration position. The best account of what happened ne

in a 1986 article by John Englund: 

With their patience wearing thin, the members of th

committee decided to hold back money for both program

OSD an ultimatum: Choose one JTIDS program for all the 

or forget about JTIDS altogether .... The House-Senate co

eventually reached a delicate compromise. Rather than reso

issue, the legislators asked for several outside studies of th

issue. In the meantime, the conferees accepted the House 

that the money should not be released. 87 

Different stories are told to explain the ultimate effects of 

and the personalities involved. Englund's version is that Anth

exerted further pressure against DTDMA, aided by his knowl

TADCOM contract difficulties. Donald Latham states tha

sponsored study of the Navy program in the summer of 1985 p

basis for final action. 8~ In any case, on October 22, 1985, Sec
of course, was how the Navy proposed to reconcile its future requ

with an architecture whose inadequacy it had so steadfastly critici

decade or more. 

Perhaps the best summation of the case came from Donald Lath

objected, among other things, to Englund's characterization of th

program as a "$600 Million Pentagon Fiasco": 

In summary, the choice is not always clear as to whether or 

is more cost-effective to compromise requirements to hav

system for all services or more than one, optimized to se

peculiar requirements. We learned from the TFX program 

mid-1960s that it is counterproductive to state a firm policy t

services must always buy and use the same equipment. W

continue to work hard to make the right decisions without abdi

our responsibility to ensure that our services have hig, hly ca

cost-effective interoperable equipment. In the meantime, JT

vitally needed capability, is on the right track, and we intend to 

it there. 90 

JTIDS: Epilogue and Implications 

Latham's comments on this occasion were exactly the 

spirited defense one would expect from a man who had fought har

JTIDS program, effectively using the force of his office and perso

promote the goal of interoperability despite the pressures of c

interests. After leaving government late in the Reagan administr

could occasionally be coaxed into more candid reminiscences a

difficulties of maintaining that focus in the face of "end runs to 

by the services." He even went so far in one interview with the aut

describe JTIDS as "a joint program that has become progressiv

disjointed." Although understandable, that judgment is probably t

Certainly the costs in time, money, and levels of effort were fa

than JTIDS advocates anticipated at the program's inception, but 

thing can be said for many ambitious undertakings, especia

involving high-technology defense programs. There is little 

however, that the basic JTIDS concept has provided a relatively 

benchmark for almost fifteen years. The continuity of this prog
deployed on the E-3 AWACS and they now provide 

air-ground linkage for the NATO air defense community. 

• The marriage of the Army's PLRS-JTIDS Hybrid eventua

divorce--or at least annulment; PLRS emerged from the 

with an even more unlikely name, EPLRS (the "E" s

"enhanced"). Although the new acronym was every bit as u

as the old, expectations for the "enhanced" system were 

similar to what the Army had been hoping for since the early 

• The other half of this marriage was eventually rechristen

(Army Data Distribution System). Although it was primaril

for air defense functions, its uses were eventually to be ext

areas of the Army command and control system. A vari

Class I1 terminal--an "M"-series adapted for use in the fi

the high data rates characteristic of the basic JTIDS system

developed for this task. 92 

• Two versions of the basic Class I1 airborne terminal w

The one in full-scale development was intended for surveill

(such as the AWACS) and larger fighters (F-14 and F-15

their "downlinks" on ships or ground stations. The other te

in "concept definition," a term synonymous with "gleam in 

a smaller version called MIDS, which is intended for sma

such as the U.S. F-16 and F/A-18 and possibly the Europe

and Rafale as well. 93 

• Its suspicion of digital data in the fighter cockpit int

Force, the lead service in the development of JTIDS, stil

buy the fewest number (200) Class II terminals--all but 

were destined for its tactical air control and surveillanc

However, planned procurement by Army, Navy, Marine, 

users would bring the total purchase of Class II terminals t

1,800 at a total cost of $4.3 billion. As such, JTIDS would 

backbone of joint and combined interoperability by the 1990

What then, are the appropriate lessons to be learned from 

experience'?. The first is surely that this is a cautionary tale fo
inclined to leave the field. Given the number of actors involve

procurement system seemingly designed around the motto "Ne

anything small," it is no wonder that JTIDS could be conceive

1960s, developed in the seventies, developed some more in the 

and (maybe) procured in the nineties. The parallels with the TFX 

equally striking, most of them suggesting that here, as in so ma

issues, defense decisions are almost an incidental by-produc

political process. Another rcminder is that there are clear limi

ability of OSD to intervene and impose rationality on the system. A

the legal and constitutional role of OSD is vital, there are practic

faced by any political appointee who attempts to compel 

institutions to do things they find fundamentally obnoxious. Beca

any significant length of time, the pluralistic nature of the A

civil-military system is more likely to favor the institution 

individual. 

A second implication that can be drawn from the record of JT

healthy skepticism about commonality--which is not to s

commonality is necessarily a bad thing. Rather, like the attain

perfect grace, it is a worthwhile end that is seldom achieved on ea

the TFX, JTIDS was an experiment in commonality that achiev

worthwhile ends, most of which were not clearly envisioned 

program's inception. It has been suggested from time to time that 

case might have turned out better had Robert McNamara been w

accept a lesser degree of commonality between the Navy and A

versions of the plane. The JTIDS program began as an attempt to 

100 percent commonality, aided by an all-embracing technology 

was thought, would be universally applicable to all service envir

Service requirements--some real and others less so--quickly 

otherwise. Had DTDMA actually been built and performed to expe

the commonality level between it and TDMA would have been 

than the 10 percent required to maintain the minimum 

interoperability. It is difficult for a layman to judge, but so

between the 10 percent of bare-bones connectivity and the 100 pe

complete commonality might have been a better objective for OS

management. Had that middle ground been diligently sought in th
qgg

command and control systems architecture is being attended to

problem with JTIDS was that it started years before this aspec

management was being adequately addressed. The TRI-TA

JINTACCS, the Joint Tactical C3 Agency, and even J

represented important steps along the learning curve in bring

separate organizations and procedures in pursuit of a larger g

the great benefits of this kind of architectural developmen

reduces the pain associated with sudden and disruptive chan

that are oRen critical to service missions, requirements, doctrin

careers. The JTIDS case showed how very real that pain co

even when the time line in question involved programs that 

ten years from realization. Indeed, the pain was so great that p

DTDMA and TADIL J occasionally seemed to stay five to ten 

realization--the point here being that the essence of strategic 

that it must be done so as to permit effective choices, not to po

indefinitely. 

A fourth observation that can be drawn from the JTIDS e

consistent with the general theme of this study. It is that 

paradigms and the human institutions that carry them out a

focused on their respective operational environments and th

weapons systems that enable them to carry out their mission

seen particularly clearly in the quarrels over the anti-jam m

system--a technical characteristic that was a surrogate for di

and Air Force roles, missions, and operational environments

implication of this finding for command and control is that t

military establishment does not naturally create the institution

to evolve the "system of systems" demanded by warfare in the 

age. When it has done so--as with JINTACCS and the oth

cited in this chapter--it has usually been at the express or imp

of its civilian masters and always with some reluctance. The

nothing inherently wrong in this aspect of the civil-military 

The only drawback, in fact, is that the military all too ot~

abdicating responsibility for matters on which its collective 

judgment ought to be solicited, considered, and respected by 
Department of Defense. "95 In that assessment, he was undoubtedly 

Finally, it would be inappropriate to close this discussion 

offering at least some speculative thoughts on the future o

technology, if not the system itself. A future historian of comm

control at the dawn of the information age may well observe tha

was an attempt by the American armed forces to lilt themselves up 

bootstraps using a primitive, immature technology. That, at leas

impression an observer gets from reading the testimony by 

officials who complained that the system was too big, too expens

too disruptive of contemporary practices. The technology is al

sight that will satisfy two of these objections. A Defense De

project for the creation of Very High Speed Integrated Circuitry (

involves the production of microcircuits capable of performing 

million operations per second, all of it on a wafer-thin ceram

slightly smaller than a telephone push button. The military applic

this technology were illustrated some years ago in an Aviatio

magazine article that showed several generations of aircra

equipment. With the application of VHSIC, the twenty-one-inch 

TV-sized radar set of the 1960s is reduced to a device of about t

dimensions as a pack of chewing gum. 96 Interestingly, the twenty-

TV set approximates the size of the JTIDS Class II terminal. The 

technology of the 1990s may well answer many of the physical p

experienced in the mounting of the current generation of JTIDS eq

although one naturally hesitates to make any similarly o

predictions regarding cost. 

The conceptual aspect of what these systems may portend is no

to predict, for many of the reasons shown in this study. Distribu

systems like JTIDS offer potential solutions to a wide variety of b

problems, many of which are linked to a hierarchical pa

communication. For that reason, their continued development is 

certainty. The concepts of receiver-oriented communication and 

retrieval of data are essential parts of that evolution, with the pote

fostering greater situational awareness at progressively lower leve

military hierarchy. Nor is the perspective of these systems like
paedia Britannica in about one second. 97 

There is no reason, therefore, to expect that distributed da

such as JTIDS will be limited in their potential contribution to 

forces that are bold enough in their science and creative enou

organizational structures to make the most effective use 

technologies. A hypothetical example is portrayed in figure 7

how distributed data networks could be used for both strategic 

connectivity, given relay techniques like LASERSATCOM. S

and advanced relays could provide situation awareness indepen

limitations of standard hierarchical information flows. Ulti

proliferation of these distributed data systems could even involv

able organizational stresses should command and information 

firmly welded together, begin to diverge. All this is, of cou

speculative, despite the reality of the wide range of technolog

confronting the American military establishment. If JTIDS 

establishment some ideas on how to make those choices, the 

ultimately provide an intellectual legacy as important as th

operational efficiency it promises to bring to the armed fo

United States. 
DISTRIBUTED 

STRATEGIC 

DATA NETWORKS 

COMBAT 

COMMAND 

~,~ 

UNIFIED/ 

SPECIFIED 

COMMAND 

~,,~.~ 

I 

NATIONAL 

COMMAND 

The strategic use of distributed data networks may be one of the ways in which decisi

makers at higher echelons of command may eventually be able to use a modem equiv

of "Napoleon's Telescope." The potential advantages of such a receiver.oriented system 

include real-time sharing of crisis or combat data and common situation awareness, as 

as the elimination of both information filters and information overload. 

FIGURE 7.4. Linkages For The Future? 

Source: Author 
problems of modem command and control did 

full-grown from the minds of technocrats and that the

properly understood in isolation from the human in

governmental and military--that actually do the c

and controlling. Command and control can thus be 

apex of a pyramid (see figure 8.1) whose conne

include in ascending order national identity, operation

ments, strategic paradigms, service organizational nor

logical choices, patterns of interservice organizatio

command, and finally, the command and control e

itself. In essence, this represents an organic view o

and control, one that seeks causes by examining the 

record of the historical-political, conceptual, and org

choices that shape the circumstances in which spec

logical decisions are made. Similarly, this approach 

idea that technology somehow has a mind of its own, 

frequent statements in discussions of command a

issues to the effect, "Well, the technology is drivin

direction." Of course, the technology is doing not

sort: it is inherently neutral, a kind of level playi

which human beings (either on their own or as me

team) make choices that produce certain outcome

course, is one of the classic assumptions of the soci

that men and women shape their institutions and 

shaped by them. It assumes as well that technology 

well understood if one insists upon looking at it a

deus ex IBM machina. 

This approach also permits an interdisciplinary 

seeking root causes. At the heart of the argument is t

history can teach something about modem conditio

laying bare the record of previous choices and mak

the assumptions and rationales on which those ch
NATIONAL 

COMMAND 

• EFFECT OF NCA 

DECISIONS 

FTTERN OF INTER=RVlCE 

ORGANIZATION 

~JGS-COOROINATIVE 

DECISION MAKING 

TECHNOLOGICAL CHOtCES 

• PREFERRED SERVICE WEAPONS 

& PROGRAMS 

• I::)ROGP, I/d~ AOV~ACY IN 

ADMINISTRATION ANOCONGRESS 

BAnG SERVICE ORGANIZATIONAL NORMS 

• ARMY 

• NAVY 

• AIR FORCE 

STRATEGIC PARAOIGMS 

•LANO POWER (JOM~VCLAUSEV~I"Z) 

• SEA POWER {MAHAN) 

• AIR POWER (OOUHET) 

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 

.LAND 

• SEA 

• AIR/AEROSPACE 

NATIONAL IDENTITY 

• NATIONAL VALUES 

• POLITICAIJMIUTARY TRADITION 

• GEO-STRATEGIC REALITIES 

• HISTORY 

FIGURE 8. I. Key Determinants of Command and Control 

Source." Author 

based. Figure 8.1 thus shows the concept of a basic building block la

national values: this broad category consists of those historically signi

factors that have helped determine the character of the American appr

to command and control. For that reason, the lines of this category 

be drawn widely enough to embrace a wide range of other disciplines

example, a sociologist might suggest the importance of including 

characteristics as population, character, and national will. An econ

could make an equally strong case for considering such elements as 

national product, industrial base, and state of technological sophistica

The present analysis has concentrated instead on the strategic cond

and assumptions that framed the American approach to its mi
fundamental division of labor was matched by pragmatic co

Navy would contribute to the commercial expansion and 

integration of the new nation, while the very small Regular A

occupy itself in peacetime with constabular duties on the fr

American civil-military tradition was founded on the separation 

and an absolute requirement for the subordination of the mil

civil authority. These norms, as well as the Hamiitonian 

administrative rationalism, led by the start of the nineteenth cen

cabinet-level services linked to each other primarily through th

as their common commander in chief. The "subjective" cont

services was further assured by their common subordination to 

determined to use its power of the purse to ensure that decis

structure and employment of these forces took place in an atm

considerable political intimacy---especially when naval constr

procurement were at issue. These differing constitutional, 

practical differences gave rise to the tradition of service auton

became the dominant factor in defense organization for at lea

century and a half. 

This autonomy is further reflected by the second level of th

which symbolizes the differing operational environments confro

Army and Navy from the nineteenth century onward--then bein

the Air Force in the mid-twentieth century. The physical 

between land, sea, and air operations are far more obviou

ideological, organizational, and practical consequences that 

them. The water's edge, for example, served not only as t

embodiment of the division of labor between the Army and th

also as the standard for interservice relations until the airplane 

that long-standing benchmark. Similar discrepancies, rooted in f

environmental differences but carrying equally important philos

ideological overtones, can be seen as well in the wartime dispu

the Army and its then-organic Air Force. Should scarce ai

concentrated at the theater level, as the airmen argued, or sh

aircraft be dispersed to the control of individual division 

commanders, according to the more traditional notions of 
y 

comparative command and control. 

The conditions required to bring about victory in each of the 

operational environments lead to the next level: that of strategic parad

The ideas of Jomini and Clausewitz on land warfare, Mahan on cont

the sea, and Douhet on command of the air are not just prescriptive th

about the measures and primary weapons required to meet and defeat 

enemies in these particular environments; they are also arguments f

decisive impact of those respective operational environments o

nation's destiny. Jomini, Clausewitz, Mahan, Douhet, and Mitchell w

persuaded that the conditions of victory they prescribed were also th

to national survival, and current arguments for the decisive eff

Landpower, the Maritime Strategy, or the B-I and B-2 bombers are al

sense, their modem descendants. The inherent competitiveness of 

paradigms cannot therefore be overstated: indeed, in their purest form

represents the negative of the other two. Each one also represen

embodiment of the most profound truths that experience and insig

reveal to the practitioners of these individual forms of warfare, somew

the exclusion of all others. As such, the strategic paradigms represe

ideological component of service autonomy. As many analysts have p

out, it is a small step from these internal belief systems to the 

rationales expressed in the competition for budget resources necess

provide armies, warships, and bombers) 

The strategic paradigms exercise a powerful internal influence in 

of the services, because, as prescriptions for victory, they carry with 

formulas for the organization of the forces required to execute them

most obvious differences in these organizational norms (the next le

figure 8.1) can be seen in the contrasting levels of centralization emp

by the Army and the Navy. Two of the fundamental requirements o

warfare involve the concentration of forces and the combination of 

The numbers and diversity of these forces necessitated decentr

operations at the lowest levels; staff development from the eigh

century onward was an effort to balance this decentralizatio

concentrating power at the top and extending the commander's sp

control throughout an increasingly complex hierarchical structure. 
bureaus (described as "watertight compartments") and a rel

adopt the cross-cutting general staff model favored by both 

Navy reformers in the early twentieth century. 

The influence of strategic paradigms upon service organization 

reflected in the internal distribution of power within the individua

because the emergence of those paradigms went hand-in-hand w

of service professionalism in the Army and Navy of the late nine

early twentieth centuries. In the Air Force, the paradigm of 

predated the existence of that service by more than twenty 

nevertheless, cleared the pathway to power for the "bomber gen

won de facto autonomy during World War II and exercised a 

influence within its ranks after 1947. The paradigms of lan

warfare provide a longer evolutionary history, with a much rich

of shifting professional elites over time. The mechanization 

warfare, however, and the supplanting of the battleship by t

carrier---though they have been linked to the emergence of domin

groups within each service--have largely consisted of tec

reinterpretations of the respective paradigms. For that reason, it 

to separate service organizational norms from the next level depi

diagram, that of technological choice. Precisely because w

doctrines must be constantly reevaluated, one of the key functi

service organization is its control over the development of futur

and equipment. Not only is this a matter of choosing the weapon

produce the necessary combat power to win on land, at sea, or 

(important as that task is for the nation's security); it is 

embodiment of the professionalism and expertise of the milita

The National Security Act of 1947 preserved the ability of 

Navy, and Air Force to make fundamental technological choices

those relating to command and control systems. What is subsum

well is the fact that, having made these technological choices, th

also play the predominant role in advocating them in terms 

programs not only within the Defense Department and elsewh

executive branch but before Congress as well. This fact also he

why, in the JTIDS case, two services, having different p
8.1: the pattern of interservice organization and national command. 

two concepts are linked in important ways, inasmuch as they constitu

levels meant to yoke together the respective service organizations 

common defense, lnterservice organization has been shown througho

book to be a consideration secondary to the primary service structu

the nineteenth century, there was no interservice organization p

Army-Navy relations resting on the simple and familiar doctrine of "m

cooperation." The demands of twentieth-century warfare brought abo

quest for unity of command, most notably by the development 

World War I1 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the system of unifie

specified commands. 

Codified by the National Security Act of 1947, this structure w

provide the basic framework for interservice relations: as su

represented a balance between the requirements for centralized direct

the national defense and the legacy of service autonomy. The services 

to continue to perform their traditional roles of training, equipping

providing forces and the JCS was to be a collaborative body whose 

function was allocating forces to the commanders in chief of the u

and specified commands, who were themselves expected to exercise 

combatant authority through the service components assigned to them

level of national command depicted here represents the constant of m

subordination to civilian control, adjusted by the National Security A

the present outline of a single Department of Defense that replace

separate cabinet-level departments of War and Navy. In the cont

command and control, this level represents not only the dramatic e

that presidential directives and other decisions can have (the creat

WWMCCS in the at~ermath of the Cuban missile crisis, for exampl

also the day-to-day interactions by the OSD staff that impl

administration policies and, as shown in the JTIDS case, can be

strong influences in their own right. 

How do these varied and dynamic influences affect the comman

control environment, with its complex pressures for centralizatio

decentralization, regional versus global priorities, and interacting "sy

of systems"? The record of TRI-TAC, JINTACCS, and most of all, J
that were chartered with the specific objective of providing an in

focus for joint command and control. The conflicts that were so 

the JTIDS study provide the counterpoint to cooperation. It is im

note that these difficulties do not arise out of service knave

failings of individuals, but rather as the inescapable result of the 

service autonomy, especially when the services, in their institutio

military experts, make the key technological choices. The result

choices can have a determinative effect on joint command an

because they usually take place in a setting or a preexisting time 

emphasizes unique service perspectives, not joint priorities. 

choices the Air Force made for voice control resulted i

configurations, organizational structures, and communications do

preceded JTIDS by many years and ultimately contributed to th

of that case. The ability of the Air Force to take those action

exerting a direct impact upon the command and control envir

itself an example of the legacy of service autonomy. 

This is not to suggest that this legacy is without some co

merits. It is difficult, for example, to imagine how the America

establishment would look without the distinctive coloration of th

inasmuch as they continue to embody certain fundamental 

missions. And in a society that enshrines progress so aggres

Civil War battlefields must constantly be protected from h

commercial development, there is much to be said for org

encompassing traditions that, in the case of the Army, predate the 

of the Republic. If nothing else, these traditions embody a war

that serves not only as a repository for the hard-won lessons of c

also as a generational link between past and present. Conti

military expertise are therefore two of the better reasons wh

services exist and why they will continue to do so. A third reaso

well: a deeply and profoundly pluralistic democracy has little e

for monoliths, especially military monoliths. The American e

consequently seems well suited to its heritage of diverse service c

Naturally, there is a downside: having separate services simpl

more difficult to weld their diverse capabilities into a sin

integrated fighting machine. This problem is the same wheth
finish the job, the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 

now diminished service separatism to an irreducible minimum

Keynesian economists, this line runs, we are all joint warriors 

Further, since this law strengthens the role of the chairman of the JC

the unified commanders in the defense acquisition process, joint con

(including interoperable command and control) are certain to re

greater attention. Finally, the heightened emphasis on national strateg

evidenced by provisions of Goldwater-Nichols as well as the cont

refinement of the defense planning process---ensures that there w

countervailing pressures to whatever narrower, service concerns 

occasionally have the temerity to show themselves. 

The answer to the first objection is easier to deal with than the se

Certainly the evidence presented in these chapters indicates that s

influences--whether or not one is comfortable with the designati

autonomy used here--were pervasive long aRer the National Securit

of 1947 and its 1958 amendments. Indeed, had the problems of 

planning versus service interests been truly resolved at this point, 

would have been no need for further legislative enactments. On the s

point, there is no question that Goldwater-Nichols represents a signi

evolutionary step away from parochial interests and toward more eff

teamwork. It is unlikely, however, to solve every problem where join

service interests may not coincide. Consider only the fact that the 

military institutions (and especially the staff of the JCS) are not peopl

the representatives of some unknown "fifth service." They are, in

serving members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines w

selection for and standing within the joint community is a function o

primary combat specialties. It is naive to think that these officers wi

continue to be strongly influenced by the basic ideas their parent se

bring to the problem of war fighting--however much they are en

during these assignments in the business of joint combat power. 

It is equally unrealistic to assume that the unified and spe

commanders and their staffs will somehow be isolated from se

influences in the future. In fact, part of the intent of Goldwater-Nicho

the larger body of reform it represented was to tie the services an

............................................................. ..........
Pacific Command headed by a Navy admiral, the European 

headed by an Army general. None of these arrangements su

eclipse of basic service values, however much they may be ba

joint perspectives. 

As before, the services remain the key sources of operationa

in the making of technological choices, whatever marginal bu

adjustments Goldwater-Nichols may have made to the Defense D

procurement structure. Edward Luttwak, therefore, may be pre

dismissing as "nonstrategies" the ideas of the "naval, air, and 

proponents if those services still have leeway in developing thei

weapons. 2 Similarly, if the chiefs of those services, wearing their 

as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, must recommend balancing regional 

requirements against finite budget resources, it is a fair assum

command and control systems-----even joint or interoperable ones

be immune to service priorities. What, then, are some 

conclusions that can be drawn from our historical experience? 

Implications for the Future 

There is no question that the management of command a

systems is part of the much larger problem of the management 

technology. In this realm, technological choice involves taking 

risks not only in terms of the familiar relationship between 

benefits but also in terms of larger effects: if we invest a given 

dollars in a piece of equipment, will it work, and will it be a go

it does? Nowhere are these questions more difficult to answer t

field of command and control, largely because the applicati

computer to this age-old problem of war carries so many 

uncertainties. For all its wonders and promises, the computer 

susceptible to Murphy's Law than any other human invention

ability to understand its military potential is handicapped by its 

short track record. Only the current generation of computer equi

been small and durable enough to make it usable in the 

environments of ship spaces, aircraft compartments, and tactical 
when joint operations are required by mission and circumstances. 

It is somewhat cold comfort to note Brig. Gen. Richard Sim

observation of a thirty-to-fitly-year cycle in technological innovati

that "full acceptance of and integration of computers will have to wa

the computer-literate school children of today become the 

generation of the day after tomorrow. "3 If the computer is still a ma

technology in which the best is yet to come, then what complicates 

the present generation of defense decision makers are the 

opportunities for pitfalls in the transition of military communic

systems from analog to digital formats, from fixed sites to 

platforms, from single-service to joint systems, and from infor

hierarchies to distributed data networks. Naturally, some of these c

inevitably affect established roles, missions, procedures, and careers

Maj. Gen. Otto Nelson called "pride of place" in his pioneering st

the Army's organizational history. 4 But as difficult as these basic que

of command and control are, there should be no doubt as to the u

stakes. Maj. Gen. Clay Buckingham summarized them well: 

As we approach the turn of the century, our ability to pro

power and our ability to fight is going to be increasingly influen

by the command and control factor, that is, by our ability 

command and control our own forces, both strategically 

tactically in a high-intensity environment; by our ability to deny [

enemy access to our command and control information; and by 

ability to attack and disrupt the enemy's command and con

system. 5 

Given these complexities, are there any useful benchmarks to 

defense decision makers maintain a consistent focus? One possibility 

be to think of command and control as a kind of electronic equiva

the "directed telescope," the practice of Napoleon and other comm

in which trusted aides or observers were sent to gather critical batt

information to supplement the regular channels of information abou

friendly and enemy forces. The use of these emissaries as the "eyes 

commander" would then permit a situation assessment that di

exclusively depend upon information that had been transmitted up th
One some morning, that his department is hip-deep in disaster. ''7 

With remote decentralized operations, there is a pronounce

relatively unfiltered information channels that can tie decision 

every level to operational realities. Naturally, every command a

system that is developed and procured cannot function prim

"directed telescope": but at the very least they should not int

this function. The interoperability of otherwise diverse command a

systems ought to be the sine qua non in any development and 

decisions made by top leaders in the Department of Def

uniformed and civilian. Effective two-way information flows are 

concern of leaders in either crisis management or actual combat

to Murphy's Law for a moment, it should be a foregone conclusi

forces needed to deal with an incipient crisis or a particul

mission will probably NOT be the ones that are on the scen

closest to it. If by good luck they are, it is a virtual certainty tha

have to be supported and reinforced by units hastily commit

situation develops. And beyond any question, these forces will 

from more than one service. 

Interoperability must be the key if the unexpected is to be tre

everyday occurrence, but the record to date does not demo

practicality or even the wisdom of a universal family of com

linkages in which everything is compatible with everything else. R

that reality, a more realistic goal for commanders and defense po

may be what I call the baseline of interoperability. This conce

from two related propositions. The first is that, though every 

system does not necessarily have to be compatible with every oth

it is important for commanders to ensure that compatible li

maintained between those elements that must be in communicatio

another. The second is that, in establishing such a baseline of inte

ity, it is important to distinguish carefully between the req

capabilities, and limitations of both organizations and technica

Common to both propositions is the assumption that there 

substitute for the direct involvement of the commander in establ

the requirements for interoperability and the organizational o
cate with one another in order to perform a unit's primary and 

missions? What kinds of information are needed from them, and 

kinds of information do they need in return? How fast and how 

does this information need to be exchanged? 

• What are the means required to achieve interoperability with th

that must be in communication? Are these means primarily tec

(hardware, software, data bases, protocols, networks) or can the 

ends be accomplished by specific organizational strategies (lead

followership, management, teamwork, cohesion, procedures, trai

Finally, how can these technical and organizational choice

reinforce one another? 

There is nothing especially startling about these questions, exce

the fact that they often tend to be overlooked by the leade

organizations pressured by deadlines and bottom lines. The result 

what is thought to be a command and control problem can actually 

organizational or leadership problem, a basic misperception that can 

perverse effects in two ways. First, the investment of time, mone

effort to set up a command and control system will probably not so

underlying organizational problem and may even make it worse--wi

for example, the Navy-Air Force rivalry over the architecture of J

Second, it is equally unlikely for any command and control system 

effective if it does not enjoy the confidence of both the leaders 

primarily intended to serve and the operators who must make that s

work--the clear example here being tile institutional reluctance of t

Force to embrace any system of digital control in the cockpits of its fi

Consequently, one of the fundamental tasks for organizational lead

the information age is to set the terms of reference by which those o

zations manage their internal and external communications. Implicit 

responsibility as well is the need to use the baseline of interoperabi

the essential balance between the diverse operational environments 

services and the requirements for effective joint teamwork. 

The declaratory policy of the Defense Department, as we have s

firmly on the side of interoperability, but the actual spending of 
qpyy 

future developments in this matter will be the newly strengthened 

the unified and specified commanders in defense resource 

Equally significant will be the ability over time of the JCS ch

represent joint concerns before the Defense Resources Boa

rechristened as the Defense Planning and Resources Board 

Pentagon management initiatives put forward by Secretary o

Richard Cheney in July 1989) when service programs are being 

Both will give added weight to the infrastructure for interoperabi

already established within OSD and the Joint Staff. The mo

contribution of bodies such as the Joint Tactical C3 Agency and 

Staff J-6 (which succeeded the C3 Systems Directorate) is lik

made within the incremental process that eventually will all

systems to be engineered in consonance with joint requirements. 

A far more difficult question to address is the proliferation 

command and control systems that in some cases have parallel 

such as the Army's TACFIRE and the ill-fated MIFASS system 

eventually canceled by the Marines. This was precisely the issue 

Armed Services Committee was concerned with during the delibe

JTIDS, when the members became impatient with the twin archi

that program juxtaposed against the steady progression of dif

Force programs for anti-jam voice communications. The JT

shows, however paradoxically, that interoperability can be an el

and that Congress, OSD, and the services are often loath 

between competing systems--especially when sunk costs are inv

no one wishes to be blamed for having "wasted" those do

answer, originally proposed by the 1978 Defense Science Board 

called for the creation of a defense command and control ag

would have the primary task of developing common or modul

for use by the services. Such systems would then be availab

services to order for their own use--a kind of Sears, Roebu

approach to command and control. 

To say that the creation of such a superagency is an idea tha

attract universal enthusiasm within the uniformed ranks is to ri

understatement. The usual arguments against it are numerous: it 
agencies as an unmixed blessing, especially in the era of G

Rudman-Hoilings deficit reduction, s Consequently, the creation of 

such agency, for command and control supervision or any other pur

an idea seriously out of step with the times. 

Another potential solution to the problem of choosing among co

command and control systems may involve greater use of the Join

particularly the J-6, which has specific responsibility for joint comm

tions matters. As with any other activity of the Joint Staff, this dir

is limited in the scope of what it can accomplish because it has 

indirect role in the systems acquisition process. To date, that r

largely consisted of good-faith efforts to build bridges with the co

and control system developers in each of the services in an att

promote interoperability concerns when future systems are still 

drawing boards. Winning friends and influencing programs in th

undoubtedly represent the maximum use of the tools now in the h

the JCS. But what more might be done? One strategy would be to g

J-6 more authority over the development of command and control 

that have the greatest potential for use in the joint environment. Thi

be accomplished either by using "fenced money"--specifically ear

funds---or by ensuring an authoritative voice for the directorate in 

management reviews of key command and control systems 

development. 

The JCS chairman, for example, sits in as a regular member at m

of the Defense Resources Board which makes those critical mana

decisions. Both the former chairman, Gen. John Vessey, and his suc

Adm. William Crowe, have reportedly made extensive use of J-6 

of command and control systems in their recommendations to the 

The continuance of that practice, perhaps accompanied by greater 

the directorate to monitor board decisions, would be a positive step 

future. It is important to note as well that the gradual acquisition o

power in the hands of the JCS chairman----one of the measures cons

advocated in JCS reform studies and a central feature of Gol

Nichols--implies the grant of additional authority to the Joint Sta

effective use of that authority to affect key management decisi
g, j

But though it is easy to say that military professionals 

primarily responsible for ensuring better interoperability and sol

of other problems in the joint world, there is still another basic 

be confronted. In the modem era of command and control, wh

does "joint" or, even worse, "jointness" really consist of?. Th

definition for more than a century has simply been "more 

service." The movement toward JCS reform was accompanied in 

by assertions that better teamwork was needed, as well as an 

integration of combat power from all available forces. In this 

even possible to distinguish a "minimalist" approach, which 

matters as a kind of limited liability partnership, and a "m

viewpoint, which suggests a synergy of joint forces wherein th

more than the sum of its parts. The reason these and other f

concepts of this larger strategic realm remain vague and conte

be that no prophet of the joint operational art of war has y

forward to tie its theories or suppositions together in a syst

comprehensive way. In this book l have taken a somewh

approach toward the problems of command and control by exa

strategic paradigms that constitute the ideological and doctrina

the services in coping with the challenges of the land, se

environments, and ultimately shaping differing service app

command and control. But though Clausewitz, Mahan, and 

contain valuable insights into the problems of single-service co

is no single overarching strategic paradigm that similarly encom

modem relationship between land, sea, and air combat at th

levels of conflict short of general thermonuclear war. 

This observation echoes those made some twenty years ago 

C. Wylie, whose book Military Strategy: A General Theory 

Control remains as timely today as when it was written. Wylie's 

eloquent statement of the need for both scholars and military pr

to understand the underlying strategic theorems that shape th

realities of force design and overall response to the challen

international environment. He is explicit in defining the limi

theorems, however: 
the existing specific concepts of war strategy, the continent

maritime, and the air theories. 9 

Wylie also points out that a further difficulty is that any suc

theory would have to be sufficiently elastic to embrace these cri

specific enough to yield practical guidance. By any standard, the 

of such a "general theory of strategy" or (as it has been referred t

joint strategic paradigm is a future intellectual task of the first mag

For the present, however, the obvious question is: does the ab

either prophet or paradigm matter at all? Equally obvious is the fa

final answer to that question is possible and none is attempted h

must nevertheless be impressed at the extraordinary staying pow

paradigms considered in this book, especially in their ability to 

relatively constant reference points for the services during p

pronounced technological changes over the course of many ge

Those reference points have lent stability to the institutions of the 

as they redefined their paradigms in light of new developments in 

a process largely accomplished through the cyclical refining of op

doctrine. Mahan's prescriptions, for example, originally supp

rationale for fleets of battleships. Yet his theories were equally re

the carrier task force when that weapon superseded the dreadnoug

World War II, and it can be argued that they provided the unde

for the Navy's maritime strategy of the 1980s. Perhaps the key 

these paradigms provide is an objective that defines the contex

continuing choices (technological and organizational) that are 

secure each operational environment. 

As useful as such precepts have been for the services, the abs

more general strategic paradigm also helps explain why int

organization has been such a persistent problem in the postwar w

depicted in figure 8.2, the lack of a higher-level paradigm m

problem of interservice organization more difficult. As we ha

service organizational norms represent the institutional embodime

beliefs surrounding each set of unique paradigms. The overarch

paradigm or "general theory" is, in an important sense, a kind o

link. Its absence means that interservice organizational norms are 
NA~AL 

COMMAND 

• EFFECT OF NCA 

ORa~UtUZAIION l 

DEC~ION MAKING ,," ...... ~.-ra~.-~'~.-~- ..... ,,, 

,... : J q~.T.ST~T.EGCp.A.Pap~O,..., 

TRC~NOI.OGICAL C~OICES 

• PREFERRED SERVICE WEAPONS 

& PROORAk~ 

• PROGRAM ADVOCACY IN 

ADMINISTRATI~ ~I~CONGI~;~ 

eAsJc ~a~ct one~oN~ ,o,..s 

.ARMY 

• NAVY 

• AIR FOI~ 

STRATEGIC pARAD(GMS 

• LANO POWER (JOMINI/CLAUSEWITZ) 

• SF.A POWER (MAHAN] 

• ^~ POWER IOO~RET} 

OPERA'nONAL E NVlRONMEt~ffS 

• I.,/dCD 

.sEA 

• AIRtA~ RO~;PACI~ 

NATIONAL IOENllTY 

• NATI(~b~ VALUES 

• POLfflCALJMU~^RY TRAD mG',l 

• QEO-STRATEGIC REALITIES 

• HISTORY 

FIGURE 8.2. The Missing Link: A Joint Strategic Paradigm 

Source: Author 

in terms of a higher plane of strategy but rather in terms of 

upon service autonomy and everything it represents. Seen 

perspective, the pattern of interservice organization as it cur

makes perfect sense. How better to account for the ponderous, 

style and committee-laden approach that characterizes the Join

than to say that it is an organization in search of a paradigm? 

Wylie is certainly correct in his estimation of the difficulties 

coming to grips with this theoretical impasse. Indeed, a skepti

argue that the whole is no more than the sum of the parts 

search for any higher reality is not only futile but a case 

wagging the dog." But the main reason for seeking to improv

body of joint force theory is to sharpen the mechanism of c
g

military tradition from its earliest days, capable enough in deali

specific military skills, but reluctant to organize and subordinate th

a "distinctive military science . . . directed to the exclusively 

purpose of war. ''I° Although certainly modified by the rise of 

professionalism in the nineteenth century, the technicist influence 

entirely disappear. What paradigms and professionalism ma

produced is a kind of "service technicism," which is similarly relu

accept subordination to a higher plane of theory beyond the s

specific service instruments. 

From a less theoretical standpoint, the absence of a joint paradi

also be attributed to the fact that the "joint age" represents little m

a single generation's experience, with budget levels and respo

specific security problems shaping real-world choices between 

programs. Each year, those choices are defended before Congress in 

reports of the secretary of defense and posture statements by the 

chiefs, all of which are couched in terms emphasizing their contrib

the overall American strategy of deterrence. In reality, howeve

pragmatic responses to problems represent the tentative linkages b

service capabilities and emerging joint perspectives; they also repre

raw material from which a true overarching strategic paradig

ultimately be refined. 

The precise nature of such a paradigm clearly awaits 

investigation, yet it may not be unduly speculative to suggest what 

look like. Once again, it is appropriate to use Wylie as a baseli

objective of such a paradigm must be "to provide a common an

frame of reference for the special talents of the soldier, the sai

airman, the politician, the economist, and the philosopher in their c

efforts toward a common aim. ''11 His assumptions are that war, w

inevitable, at least cannot be precluded; "that the aim of war 

measure of control; that the pattern of war is not predictable; and 

ultimate tool of control in war is the man on the scene with a gun. 

application of this strategy is set forth by Wylie in terms that vivid

Jomini: 
Finally, this control is achieved by the varied capabili

services; by the airman, who delivers destruction from the sk

sailor, who uses control of the seas to facilitate control of the l

the soldier, whose unchallenged physical presence is the ultim

control in warfare. 14 

Wylie's view is thus consistent with the findings of this book

strategic paradigm must clearly be capable of unifying the 

perspectives of the operational environments. That theoretical f

more than passing interest to American military audiences bec

than any other country, the military power of the United State

depends upon a combination of land power, sea power, air p

increasingly, space power. As the record of service autonom

here has amply demonstrated, each of their respective paradigm

an argument for the decisive effect of that particular 

environment on the nation's security and, implicitly, a rationale 

Navy, or Air Force programs. A truly useful set of principles

has to be broad enough to accept the merits of the service parad

extent that they are effective prescriptions for victory in their 

operational environments. But it must also be narrow enough t

ideological overtones of those paradigms in favor of a presc

produces the most synergistic combination of these forces--

norms that allows the contribution of each arm of the serv

maximized for the common good. The philosophical underp

recalls that passage in which Clausewitz describes military gen

one single quality bearing upon War" but rather a "harmonious 

of powers, in which one or the other may predominate, but none 

opposition."15 The conduct of American defense policy over th

years has been an attempt to achieve that end with respect to 

land, sea, and air forces; yet practice has not thus far yielded pa

Implicit in this philosophical underpinning is the assumptio

of the services is competent to organize, train, and equip forces 

in its respective operational environment, however much the 

specific roles and missions may be subject to continuing debate
purpose of their individual forces and a need to look long and hard 

they fit together at the margins. These are difficult decisions to ma

abstract, but they are even more painful when service doctrinal pr

(which are linked to their paradigms) come into conflict with certa

requirements of the unified commanders: close air support over 

beach, for example. Precisely for this reason, Title II of Goldwate

enhanced the power of the unified and specified commanders o

service components, especially in the streamlining of internal c

lines. ]6 That important evolutionary step is certain to produce the 

adjustments by trial and error that will answer the all-important q

what is "service," what is "joint," and how do we tell the differe

record of those marginal, incremental, but vital developme

eventually yield valuable clues about the outline of a new paradigm. 

If one looks to the margins of interservice relationships for 

paradigm, then one of its dimensions is almost certain to inc

qualitatively new factor of modern command and control. Any 

largely untested capability ought to be approached with a fair am

skepticism, but there is little doubt of the great potential that exis

application of information-age technologies to the fundamental pr

combat command. Nowhere is this potential greater than in the a

command and control systems to link remote and physically d

things, such as armies, airplanes, and ships. When one recalls 

assumption that the pattern of warfare cannot be predicted, the im

of using command and control to link these dissimilar elements 

obvious. Precisely because the next crisis--or an even more fun

military challenge--will almost certainly require a combination o

forces that no one had anticipated, it ought to be axiomatic 

interoperability of diverse command and control systems is the one 

that cannot be let~ to chance. There are a number of methods t

interoperability, some more painful and expensive than oth

whatever method is followed, command and control can provide 

ingredient of an effective linkage to the margins of the services. A

can be a fundamentally unifying influence, both in operatio

possibly, in paradigm as well. 
The development, however, of joint doctrine---as distinct from 

was one of the significant additions to the responsibilities of t

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff mandated by Goldwater-Nichols. 17 

those duties is now entrusted to the new J-7 Directorate of the 

which in 1987 developed a "joint doctrine master plan" in or

the herculean task of comparing service doctrines across a w

subject areaswfor example, command and control coun

airspace control, fire support, special operations, suppression 

defenses, sea-air rescue, and so on. The Joint Staff, the servi

unified commands share the responsibility for generating cons

joint principles to be followed in each of these subject are

hoped that eventually those specific functional agreements can 

the more general categories of joint operations: intelligenc

logistics, communications, combat support, and, most criti

operations. Out of this hierarchy, a body of theory or "jo

capstone" is finally to emerge, ts 

The experience with JINTACCS and JTIDS strongly sugg

launching of new bureaucratic entities and the imposition of ne

do not necessarily represent final victories in and of themselv

system is above all a consensual one, and the real merits 

doctrinal refinement process will be seen when that quest c

hurdles of established procedures and institutional inte

inevitably must. It is equally important to ensure that the evolu

doctrine occurs as the result of a conscious effort to distill th

field experience. Figure 8.3 is a schematic representation 

process might work. At the left-hand scale is the joint system 

now, with joint operations the result of an infinitely varied s

circumstances, each one of which requires an equally unique, 

kind of response. The trick is in moving away from what som

officers refer to as the "perpetual All-Star game." This is don

toward the right side of the schematic: an organized effort is s

to plan joint exercises, training, readiness tests, and actua

around the notion of testing prospective concepts about what 

the field. The lessons learned from those experiences drive 
FIGURE 8.3. The Evolution of Joint Doctrine and Strategy 

Source: Author 

refinement and formation process--which itself can generate 

hypotheses that can be plugged back into the field evaluation proc

Whether this process ever yields a joint paradigm may be cons

less significant than the fact that it incorporates a disciplined m

generating, testing, and evaluating those operational concepts t

eventually form the body of joint doctrine. Thus far, the formatio

doctrine has largely been confined to the gathering of service 

specific war-fighting functions--for example, air defense, landi

operations, and low-intensity conflict. As this process goes furthe

be increasingly important that these areas of tentative inte

agreement are validated by exposure to the rigors of field testing. 

ample historical precedent for such efforts by a national-level milit

because, as I. B. Holley points out, this is just the sort of prob

challenged the elder Von Moltke as he drove the Prussian General 

perfect its mobilization planning: 

Just promulgating appropriate doctrine was not enough. M

understood that staffs have to be exercised by repeated trial

conducted test mobilizations which revealed imperfections i

plans and less than gratifying performances by inexperi

officers .... Moltke's genius lay in applying Scharnhorst's emp

on a careful recording of experience, which he then analyzed 

utter objectivity to produce viable doctrine. 19 
military educational establishment, including the service war 

well as the National Defense University system. Their placem

process is important for three reasons. First, they are the only 

capable of providing the shared academic and operational persp

can help produce the intellectual underpinnings of the larger bo

doctrine. Second, their twin missions of research and training m

colleges ideal places to study the larger strategic implicatio

doctrine and to inculcate those perspectives into a student popu

which our future generals and admirals are ultimately sel

incorporation of such a common ideal was something strongly 

by those who enacted Goldwater-Nichols; however, it does not 

there was always a full understanding of the fact that the ab

effective body of joint doctrine has made far more difficult 

training officers for joint service---in the war colleges or anyw

was similarly unclear how joint education, rather than simply jo

was to take place without the benefit of a higher plane of theo

it. All the more reason, then, to set the creation of doctrine and 

basic goal, to put an ordered process in motion to achieve it, an

military educational establishment as the main engine of 

development. 20 

The schematic depicted in figure 8.3 ultimately arrives at t

applied operational strategy suggested by the synergy of the join

This, of course, is speculative for the reasons outlined above. Bu

of whether such a unity of thought can ever be discerned and 

the words of a latter-day Clausewitz or some modern apostle 

art, there is much to be said for any systematic effort to codify th

the American military experiment with its unique balance o

forces. In particular, those who study strategy need to better und

these forces are developed, procured, and employed in ways th

no small measure the peculiar geopolitical circumstances that c

United States. It is the beginning of wisdom to understan

capabilities and the limitations those strategic choices entail. 

The problem of coherent strategic choice is a matter 

demanding than the difficulties of reconciling the many issues o
society makes it difficult for any military strategy to be follow

Machiavellian precision. 21 Added to this is the fact that the A

military institution itself is a peculiarly pluralistic one, a basic 

trait that makes it extraordinarily difficult to achieve the tight sta

tion seemingly demanded by warfare in the information age. And 

kind of warfare is precisely the type at which the "techno

supremely sophisticated society" must excel if it is to prevail and 

should its essential interests be threatened. These are depressing 

which foster still another: is it all worth it? 

The answer is: probably yes. Although the promise of 

command and control stops well short of completely dissipating t

war, it has the potential to turn night into day, to achieve spans o

that can be measured in global terms, and to mass collective 

power without massing forces. One needs only to cons

demonstrated effects of the present generation of battlefield re

sance systems fielded by the services to understand the veracit

lesson the Army learned from the 1973 Yore Kippur War: wha

seen can be hit; what can be hit can be killed. The function of 

now entails a wide range of electronic, optical, and acoustic sen

are increasingly linked in real-time to computer-controlled firing 

such as the Aegis-class cruisers. The ranges and discrimination 

missiles, laser-guided artillery, and other "smart" munitions 

suggest the possibility for coordinated attacks from diverse and d

platforms and weapons systems. All this suggests a level of 

comparable to some of the great technological advances in 

history: the archers at Agincourt, the rifled musketry of the A

Civil War, and the machine gun in World War I. 22 

This is not to suggest that the action-reaction cycle of mea

countermeasure is likely to be repealed--in fact it is more inte

ever. What is suggested, however, is that the ultimate winner in thi

will not necessarily be the side with the latest piece of electronic 

Rather, the armed forces that can gather and exploit the mos

information are likely to have the decisive advantage. In writing a

comparative differences between the British and German develop
They not only deployed radar as a weapons system but also 

sound tactical doctrine to guide its use and provided the op

training to insure that the system actually functioned in practi

Command, control, organization, and joint doctrine ultim

together at this point, because no technology could possibly ov

corrosive effects of a top-heavy, inefficient bureaucracy. If, fo

the computer is used to reinforce hierarchical information flow

continues the now-familiar pattern of information overloads 

necks--this is the fault of humans, not technology, because t

simply does not care. 

The great potential of distributed data systems like JTIDS 

can bring a democratic influence to the flow of battlefield i

Data can be shared and selected, for example, by comm

operators who may not even be members of the same tactical or

but who are transient members of the same computer network. 

gunner and the F-15 pilot linked by JTIDS may have no closer 

to each other than two researchers browsing through the same 

university library; both pairs, however, are effectively using no

cal information regimes that reconcile their individual needs 

overall cooperative framework. The drawback, of course, i

information sharing can be utterly subversive of the notion 

hierarchy, which, for all practical purposes, considers com

information lines to be identical. In the end, it may well 

command and information lines may diverge, especially if the re

Army's Airland Battle ever matches the decentralized combat m

for in its doctrine. In the interim, compromises and intelligen

will be required to exploit JTIDS-style technologies in ways 

decentralized operations but do not sacrifice overall coherence. 

planning may ultimately produce is an ability to move info

quickly it will extend the commander's span of control in way

revolutionize military organization itself. The answer lies neithe

overreliance on high technology nor in a Luddite rejection of n

but in the making of wise technological choices and tough org

military history for many reasons: as a triumph o

weaponry, as a vindication of the American military 

as a long overdue setting-to-rest of the Vietnam syn

as the harbinger of a new and uncertain era in the a

the Cold War. This triumph of arms certainly repres

those things, but Desert Storm may be better rememb

first war to demonstrate the means, the method

awesome lethality of combat in the information age. 

uncertainties of defense reductions, budget austerit

organizational structure that seems singularly ill-su

new demands of large-scale technological integration

major legacies of Desert Storm will be a continuing e

U.S. defense establishment to exploit the potential o

technology and precision weaponry in an emerging p

information age warfare. 

The ultimate significance of this paradigm is re

statement by Paul Nitze, one of the architects of Am

War strategy, who argued that the United States may 

shift its reliance upon nuclear weapons to a "mo

deterrence" emphasizing the new generation of hig

conventional weaponry. As he explained his rationale

The Gulf War offered a spectacular demonst

the potential effectiveness of smart weapons u

strategic role. Against Iraq, such weapons rapidly 

useless the military forces of a powerful dic

particular by neutralizing his command, cont

communications facilities. I 

If such a dramatic shift in the role of nuclear we

not by itself a startling development, consider this bol

by two RAND analysts: 

Warfare is no longer . . . a function of who 

most capital, labor, and technology on the battlef
an opponent can be attacked--psychologically as well as physica

basic concept is well illustrated in an anecdote told by Sena

Bradley. Recounting his experiences as a member of the 1964 U.S. O

basketball team, the senator recalled how he had committed a single 

phrase to memory in anticipation of the ultimate game in this long-

rivalry. Early in the game, a collision with an opposing player cau

future senator to blurt out the only Russian phrase he knew. "Hey, b

watch out!" But at that point, wrote Bradley, "[a] funny thing happe

until that moment, the Soviets had called all their plays verbally; b

that moment, since they thought I understood Russian, they stopped 

to each other. And so we went on to win the gold medal. ''3 

Desert Storm was not the conflict with the Soviet adversary t

been the sine qua non of defense planning throughout the Cold Wa

did involve a former Soviet client state that had adopted th

centralized command structure characteristic of Warsaw Pact armi

forces had long studied how to attack such structures, devising m

somewhat similar to the one improvised by Senator Bradley. When 

Storm began, the televised images of this new style of warfare were 

into public consciousness with an immediacy that was itself one 

primary distinctions between the Gulf War and all those that ha

before it. No other war in history had begun with live coverage of 

shots instantly transmitted to worldwide audiences. Television subse

brought home equally dramatic images of Tomahawk cruise 

striking their targets with pinpoint accuracy after flights lasting 

hundreds of miles. Some of the most sobering depictions of technol

assisted carnage came at the very end of the war, after JSTARS el

reconnaissance aircrati detected Iraqi columns retreating from Kuw

vectored coalition aircraft to attack what later became known 

Highway of Death. 

For America's armed forces, this victory in the desert was the c

tion of more than two decades of post-Vietnam renewal, but it was 

payoff for an investment strategy that had consciously sought to 

enemy strengths with technological expertise. The hi-tech weapons 

to counter the now-defunct armies of the Warsaw Pact proved their 
advice arrived in a river of digital data that flowed incessant

continental United States to the theater of operations--much 

time. These fielded technologies effectively provided U.S. force

has since become known as information dominance--the use 

tion systems to provide tactical, operational, and strategic adv

come together in a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. 

If these linkages conveyed superior agility and initiative to 

had information dominance, an especially cruel fate awaited th

Coalition airpower was systematically used to blind the Iraqi co

control system in the opening hours of the war, an initial ad

inexorably led to a succession of others: 

• Overall air superiority that was maintained throughout the 

• The flanking movement of coalition ground forces to the 

concealment from Iraqi observation. 

• The systematic destruction of the linkages between Baghd

ground forces in Kuwait, effectively depriving those forces 

orders and information needed for coherent defense. 

Ultimately, this progression culminated in the invasion of I

a combined-arms force that, during a furious 100-hour assaul

the vaunted Republican Guard, liberated Kuwait, and effective

war. The real significance of information dominance was well 

in a personal observation to the author by the commander of a 

squadron that had penetrated deep into the Euphrates Valley

inkling the Iraqis had that we were there came when their t

exploding." 

Guided by this recent combat experience, it is not particular

that information warfare has emerged from the shadows to 

hottest of Pentagon hot topics. Centers for information warfare 

up in each of the service bureaucracies as well as in the O

Secretary of Defense, all of them marked by more than the usua

frenetic activity. Throughout the American military education

ment, courses of instruction in the new cyberwar discipline
systems and computer-based networks while defending one's 

information, information-based processes, information systems 

computer-based networks. 4 

This characteristic wordiness cannot entirely conceal the Pe

growing enthusiasm for information war--or to a potential that som

to such revolutionary military developments as the battle tank, the a

and the aircraft carrier. Others suggest that even this view 

conservative, arguing that the information revolution will in

transform the very nature of warfare. 

First-Order Expectations 

It is consequently important to place such expectations in 

by emphasizing that information has always been one of the c

components of warfare; indeed, it could be argued that there was 

new under the sun, no matter how much the technological imp

might have changed. "All warfare is based on deception," wrote S

in the third century B.C. "Therefore, when capable, feign incapacit

active, inactivity .... Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign d

and strike him .... Therefore I say: Know the enemy and know y

in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. ''s 

Information is also central to the thought of Clausewitz, who arg

the absence of accurate and timely information on the battlefield 

intrinsic part of the "friction" that contributed to the "fog of war." 

one of On War, he wrote that because "many intelligence reports 

are contradictory, even more are false, and most are uncertain," the s

judgment of the commander was all-important in correctly a

battlefield situations. "This difficulty of accurate recognition con

one of the most serious sources of friction in war, by making things 

entirely different from what one had expected. ''6 There is a direct 

continuity between these classical pronouncements and more contem

reflections. In 1985, for example, Martin van Creveid suggested tha

Plato to NATO, the history of command in war consists essentiall

endless quest for certainty"--a search that he largely regarded a
sixteen-year-old who returned home at twenty-one only to b

how much his parents had learned in five years; either va

assessment was unduly pessimistic or the U.S. military ha

greatly between 1985 and its deployment to the Persian Gulf 

reality, however, this "array of gadgetry" merely represente

evolutionary steps in the long and convoluted history recount

this book: the electron used in ever more ingenious ways to 

span of battlefield control. Beginning with the telegraph in th

century and continuing with radio and radar in the twentieth, t

of war" gradually accompanied the development of air, nav

forces of unprecedented destructive power--forces that wer

deployed on a global scale. During the Cold War, the military 

both blocs were linked to their respective command au

electronic networks that allowed a high degree of peacetime m

ment and--at least in theory---positive control over each escala

the way to the initiation of nuclear war. s 

Paced by the need to exert positive control over the forces o

Armageddon, the marriage of computers, satellites, and com

pathways gradually changed the nature of battlefield comman

more data, flowing faster and faster, was becoming available 

lower levels. In his excellent book The First Information W

Campen argued, "Information technology unveiled in the Persi

gave combat forces a tantalizing glimpse of what comm

hungered for since the dawn of human conflict: a 'bird's eye' 

battlefield. '~ This "tantalizing glimpse" of something better i

Desert Storm unique, both as a military victory in its own ri

harbinger of things to come. 

Those developments were summarized in a Foreign Affairs a

1991 that took on additional importance when its author, Dr. W

subsequently became secretary of defense in the Clinton ad

Perry argued that U.S. forces in the Gulf War had exacted 

to-one combat advantage over their Iraqi adversaries d

employment of a class of weapons originally developed aroun

strategy" intended to blunt the numerical advantage of W
that they had a more precise idea of their own dispositions as 

those of the enemy. Much of this advantage resulted from the explo

of space satellites that provided the information used to "genera

for maps, locate military units, identify military systems, and pinp

[Iraqi] air defense and command and control installations. ''lj 

positioning satellites also provided pinpoint navigation informa

the tactical level, while reconnaissance aircraft such as JSTAR

AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) played critical r

locating such diverse targets as tanks, Scuds, and fleeing Iraqi aircr

• Air Defense Suppression. Stealth bombers, Tomahawk cruis

siles, and antiradiation missiles were used to blind the Iraqi air d

system through a combination of innovative tactics that destro

main sensors systems (principally radars) as well as the comma

control centers that were supposed to tie them together. Iraqi g

were thus forced to fire blindly at aircraft that generally remaine

out of effective range, with the result that "coalition air forces we

to fly 2,000 to 3,000 sorties per day with losses averaging less th

aircraft per day. ''12 

• Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs). The combination of 

bombers and PGMs meant that effective bombing could take pla

only with far fewer collateral civilian casualties than ever befo

also with a quantum jump in overall effectiveness. Of the 2,100 

delivered by the Stealth aircraft, some 1,700 were believed t

fallen within 10 feet of their targets--an effectiveness rate of o

percent. 13 Perry emphasized as well the interdependence o

component: 

The effectiveness of the coalition's defense suppression tac

depended upon the precision-guided weapons; the effectivenes

the precision-guided weapons in turn depended on the intellige

data that identified and located targets; and the very survivabilit

the intelligence systems depended on the effectiveness of 

coalition's defense suppression systems. 14 

The critical linkages between all these elements were of course pr

by communications systems. Although interdependence was one w
According to Lieutenant General James S. Cassity, the Join

communications officer during the war, "The services put mor

communications connectivity into the Gulf in 90 days tha

Europe in 40 years. ''Is Another official likened the hastily 

communications system to "a mini-AT&T. ''16 Because milita

cations specialists were forced to link diverse generations o

this hybrid system became a model of high-pressure improvis

as high-tech components; but it ultimately proved capable 

more than 700,000 telephone calls and 152,000 messages 

addition to managing over 35,000 tactical radio frequencies. 17 

This communications infrastructure was essential to the fu

the advanced weaponry that had been placed in the hands of t

military during the 1980s. The army's M-I Abrams tank, for 

capable of cross-country speeds of over 30 miles per hour. T

thermal sights and laser range-finders, it is also capable of sho

move, often achieving first-round hits at ranges between 1 and 2 

speed and range capabilities, however, complicated the task 

and control, especially when considering that a single U.S. 

ground attack deployed over 1,400 M-is in an arc covering 

square miles across a largely trackless desert. Tactical compu

the Maneuver Control System, helped to track these fast-m

while a new generation of tactical radios (known as SINCGAR

speed both voice and data communications around the 

Commanders in the field were also equipped with the new M

subscriber equipment) system--the military version of the cell

as well as tactical satellite terminals that brought unprecedent

clarity to radio communications that had previously been n

failures on both counts. 18 

More effective communications--especially involving sat

not only crucial in controlling fast-moving, far-flung forces 

operating the improved sensor systems needed for all classes 

munitions. Coalition air operations were controlled by AW

that featured not only long-range, "look-down, shoot-down" ra

secure radio systems that transmitted both data and voice com
ggp

into enemy territory, JSTARS was linked with AWACS and other 

to provide a battlefield portrait of unparalleled clarity. The downlin

these images to tactical ground stations allowed for real-time decisio

directly affected battlefield outcomes. In addition to its most visible 

detecting the Iraqi retreat that became the Highway of Death, JSTAR

credited with detecting and neutralizing a Republican Guard counte

during the liberation of Kuwait, locating mobile Scud launchers, an

venting fratricide between adjacent U.S. Marine and U.K. armored u

However, there is probably no better example of the importance 

relationship between sensors and communications than the NAV

Global Positioning System, or GPS. NAVSTAR is a system of sa

that transmits navigation data to any point on the earth; by simply 

on a receiver that compares the signal from several of these satellit

user's position can be pinpointed to within less than 300 feet

capability underlies much of the tactical and technical mastery dis

by the United States in the Gulf War. The Pentagon's final report 

war singled out these receivers as "lifesavers" for troops operatin

featureless desert, but it also noted that the equipment was similarly 

among other things, for improving aircraft navigation on many di

platforms, pinpointing the location of Iraqi radio transmitters, reduc

emplacement times of Patriot missile batteries, and providing the pr

data needed by the navy's Tomahawk cruise missile. 20 

There are numerous examples of technical wizardry that played im

roles in Desert Storm, many of which have a direct tie-in to infor

warfare: the proliferation of night vision devices, software modifi

that turned the Firefinder radar and the Patriot missile into Scud h

multispectral imagery in aerial reconnaissance, digital terrain mappin

much else. However, none of these implements nor the ones men

previously would have had the same effect had it not been for the 

who made them work, an admittedly common sense observation tha

on additional significance when placed in the context of 

organization, and doctrine. 

A succession of public policy choices, for example, meant that th

Army recovered from Vietnam by evolving from a draft-induced for
g y g 

when thousands of off-the-shelf personal computers appeared in all 

of the battlefield. Regardless of whether or not they were f

authorized, these computers were brought along by soldiers, 

airmen, and marines determined to use in war the tools with wh

had trained in peace. 21 The widespread innovations in the 

applications of spreadsheeting, word processing, and data trans

contributed so much to the war effort would have been unthinka

military system that lacked the improvisational and even entrepr

talents of this youthful cadre of uniformed professionals. 

Another act of public policy had adjusted the always troublesome 

zational balances of centralization and decentralization. The Go

Nichols Act of 1986 realigned the chain of command, reaffirm

direct line of authority from the president and secretary of defens

theater commander (the CINC) and giving him virtually complete a

to adjust his organization (including its command and control sy

mission requirements. The same act also clarified the role of the C

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, making him the principal military ad

the president and granting him additional authority to direct the 

the Joint Staff. The CINC's combatant authority as well as the m

strategic direction were thus clarified as they had not been si

Defense Department was created by the National Security Act o

Because the Gulf War brought the first wartime test of the new 

ments, General Norman Schwarzkopfs assessment is relevant: 

Goldwater-Nichols established very, very clear lines of com

authority and responsibilities over subordinate commanders, and 

meant a much more effective fighting force in the Gulf. The lin

authority were clear, the lines of responsibility were clear, an

just did not have any problem in that area--none whatsoever. 22 

The advantages of effective policy and organization were 

complemented by the development of a body of thought in both t

and the air force that was especially well suited to the prosecution 

mation warfare. As noted in Chapter Six, the Army began the 1980

midst of a wrenching doctrinal debate that pitted its traditional emp
stressed the need for initiative, agility, depth, and synchroniz

Implicit in all of these things was the importance of thinking fas

more effectively than the enemy, of "turning inside his decision loo

of indirectly attacking his ability to command. 

But a more direct attack on the enemy command structure wa

pendently developed by Air Force Colonel John Warden using a 

different set of assumptions. Warden is a latter-day exponent 

classical airpower theories originally developed by Giulio Douhet an

Mitchell. In a major restatement of the offensive primacy of airpow

book The Air Campaign provides a theoretical and historical temp

applying airpower as a decisive force against key enemy strong p

centers of gravity. Although it is not the only such strong point, 

command, with its necessarily associated communications 

intelligence gathering functions is an obvious center of gravity, 

has been from the earliest times: As the death of the king on the 

of battle meant defeat for his forces, so the effective isolation o

command structure in modern war has led to the rapid defea

dependent forces. 25 

Warden also broke command down into three basic functions---i

tion, decision, and communications--and argued that each co

attacked either directly or indirectly as part of an overall air sup

campaign. 26 But what makes this formulation of more than ac

interest was the application of these theories to the planning and ex

of the air war against lraq, both through Warden's own role as the 

of an elite planning cell on the Air Staff in Washington and thro

contributions of his disciples who helped carry out those plans in th

Forces Air Component Command in Riyadh. 

Inevitable tensions arose during Desert Storm over the use of a

to carry out the strategic air campaign envisioned by Warden ver

ground attack missions supported by classic Airland Battle theory. T

a good deal of evidence that these were highly emotional argume

those involved in making hard choices when lives hung in the bal

However, the larger point is that both the army and air force app
yy

Baghdad to frontline Iraqi observation posts. Although Iraq's 

and decision functions were clearly singled out for attack, the th

in Warden's trilogy of command functions was equally well rep

the concerted air campaign against a laundry list of Iraqi com

facilities: microwave relays, telephone switching centers, and e

carrying coaxial communications cables. 28 The importance o

been achieved, as well its implications for the future, was sum

General Schwarzkopf: "Desert Storm confirmed that sta

equipment is required to counter threats in many regions of the 

superiority in stealth, mobility, and command, control, comm

and computers proved to be a decisive force multiplier. ''29 

Second-Order Implications: 

The Revolution in Military Affairs 

It is in the nature of the U.S. way of life that the 

victory quickly gave way to more critical assessments of wh

achieved in the Persian Gulf. Many of these assessments h

news, bad news" quality about them. Improvisation, for ex

worked wonders in the quick adaptation of high-technology we

harsh demands of desert warfare. The bad news was that the Ir

us do it, erroneously believing that time was on their side a

U.S. forces to attack only after the extended period required fo

fine-tuning of our advanced but fragile equipment. As a resu

critique, "The Gulf war provided little conclusive evidence re

effectiveness of high-technology weapons in combat. ''3o Suc

ments reflected a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature 

well summarized in an adage from the sports world: You tak

opponent gives you. The Iraqis had given the coalition the pric

time, and credit rather than criticism was merited when this ad

used with such devastating effect. 

But if that much was clear, what vulnerabilities required 

before the inevitable "next time," especially because no futu

was likely to repeat Iraqi strategic blunders? In the years sinc
The preceding chapters of this book have invited the r

attention to the historical, strategic and organizational roots of that cont

tendency for the command and control systems of the American 

forces to be different. Despite the reforms of the Goldwater-Nichol

Operation Desert Storm provided additional evidence that di

command and control systems continued to plague joint operation

example, the Air Tasking Order--a thousand-page document cont

the daily attack requirements for all coalition aircraft---could be trans

only through air force communications channels. Because the elec

linkages with the navy were more limited, it became necessary to pr

Air Tasking Order every day and fly it to each aircraft carrier in th

Sea and the Persian Gulf. Different service requirements for secure 

(a radio system that prevents enemy eavesdropping) in air

communications made it more difficult for the air force AWACS to c

navy fighters. 31 These and similar examples show why improvisation

the time to patch such work-arounds together--was so important in m

the Desert Storm communications system operate at all. In the afterm

Goldwater-Nichols, improvements in communications standards and 

cols had helped to ease interoperability problems, but a new dim

arose when the scope of Desert Shield became apparent. The only w

manage its vast communications demands was with the help of comm

companies, both for basic satellite capacity and for mobile ground st

In most cases, these interoperability problems were exacerbated by th

that commercial technologies had far outpaced those of the military. 32 

Communications Infrastructure 

The U.S. communications gear that provided the infrastructu

Desert Storm command and control was heavy, bulky, and hard to tran

Much of it had never been intended for such a large-scale contin

operation; just the air force portion of the communications pa

eventually required over 200 sorties of C-141 aircraft. 33 But if tim

once again on the side of coalition in overcoming the lift proble

equally important element in the functioning of the Desert 

communications infrastructure was the utter absence of determined 
growth. 34 A postwar congressional report, for example, poin

that the reliance on commercial telecommunications "m

communications vulnerable to jamming, saturation, and sabot

regardless of the means of attack, the sprawling and e

conspicuous centers of the Desert Storm communications lash-u

obvious and highly lucrative targets for any future enemy. 

Finally, some of the most vexing problems of the com

infrastructure involved the technical limitations of many ta

systems. In addition to the interoperability problems noted pre

modernization of communications equipment has always proce

and starts, leading not only to differences between the service

them as well. Some army units, for example, had the new SrNC

while many others did not. Older, FM-voice radios--in additi

vulnerable to jamming and interception--were so limited in ran

were ill suited to the fast-moving armored warfare that chara

ground assault. 

Intelligence 

Much of the publicity surrounding the use of intellig

Gulf War has focused on the controversy between analysts in 

Washington over the issue of bomb-damage assessment a

suggested about the efficacy of the air campaign on Iraqi gro

Other issues, however, may have more lasting significance. Al

intelligence systems collected reams of information that pro

manders with a remarkably accurate view of enemy 

dispositions, the Gulf War experience also underlined the 

importance of an old lesson: Problems in communications ine

to problems in disseminating intelligence. The reason is tim

intelligence delayed by communications hang-ups quickly beco

--useful for writers and analysts but not terribly helpful to h

commanders. Calling access to tactical intelligence a "seriou

congressional analysis of the war noted that "the failure of the 

system to keep warfighters properly supplied with information 
host of other purposes. It is an article of faith among signal officers 

little bit of photo eats up a whole lot of data." However, the root 

problem was the lack of effective alignment between the sensors de

by each of the services and the communications pathways nee

deliver this information to those who needed it. Alan Campen sug

that the emphasis in sensor technology has been on developing 

powerful capabilities for "detection and discrimination" rather th

considering how the resulting data could be made comprehensible an

to the user in time to make a difference. 37 As a result, it was diff

link these individual reconnaissance "systems" into interlocking 

much less to weave them seamlessly into a larger whole. 

Underlying both the capabilities and limitations of the new s

warfare was the computer--~r more properly, the microchip---whi

now found its place at every level of combat, from individual weap

the theaterwide databases that kept track of everything from ele

order of battle to the time-phased deployment of the troops

equipment, and the supplies that sustained them. In the aftermath of 

Storm, however, there has been a growing realization that the see

awesome technology deployed in the war actually represented 

through the rearview mirror. Given the vagaries of government p

ment, many of the systems deployed in the 1980s were conceived 

1970s technologies. One example is the Patriot missile. Althou

Scud-busting properties have come in for postwar revisionist critiqu

worth remembering that the Patriot was actually conceived and dev

as an anti-aircrat~ weapon during the Carter administration. Modifi

in its sotlware allowed the Patriot to be used to intercept missiles, al

a bug in this same software also allowed the last Scud fired in the 

slip through undetected and kill 28 U.S. soldiers in a cantonmen

outside Dhahran. 3g 

Newer technologies of the information age offer seemingly li

possibilities to correct such problems and to usher in a whole ra

unprecedented military capabilities. The pace of development for p

ing, disseminating, and storing electronic data is such that entire

generations are being produced by the commercial marketplace 
g gy 

interactive databases. 39 Dr. Alan B. Salisbury has sug

improvements in artificial intelligence, image systems, machine 

fiat-panel displays, and holographic storage are helping to 

global network by fueling the integration and fusion 

technologies into new products and services. 4° The impro

computers parallel those in communications. Although 64,

information per second are commonly transmitted via th

system, the advent of fiber-optics networks will raise this num

megabits per second. And by the year 2000 even this stand

eclipsed by one measured in gigabits. As Michael L. Dertou

summarized these developments: "Independent of each other

and communicating tools have been improving at the annua

percent for at least the last two decades. This relentless com

capabilities has transformed a faint promise of synergy into 

and real potential. ''41 

This potential has attracted a great deal of attention 

international security community in discussions of what has 

the "revolution in military affairs," or RMA. Surprisingly, s

most attentive observers have been members of the armed f

former Soviet Union, suggesting that the Russian appro

disciplined study of military science that preceded the October 

may have survived it as well. Hudson Institute analyst Mary C

has argued that the Russian military views the U.S. performanc

Gulf War as a qualitatively new stage in the history of warfare

to that which ushered in mechanized combat earlier this cen

Russian formulation, this first "space-age war" was decided by 

satellite reconnaissance and other forms of surveillance 

acquisition, which led to a 300- to 400-percent increase 

effectiveness; and "intelligent" command and control systems 

delivery of precision-guided and Stealth munitions. Accordingl

future warfare will be determined by the side exercising su

these systems to gain--in the following order--superiority 

airwaves (electronic warfare), in the air itself, and only 

operations of ground forces. 42 
and airmobile warfare, respectively. The true potential of the RMA 

similarly hard to judge until the information-based technologies prof

Desert Storm are effectively united with new force structures. 43 In a 

vein, the merging of the tactical, operational, and strategic lev

warfare is said to have been one of the characteristic features of 

Storm, signifying a form of warfare that "integrates and synch

multiservice warfighting systems in simultaneous attacks on the 

throughout his entire depth and in the space above him as well. ''44 

If the importance of effective integration across different system

levels of warfare is one of the central tenets of the RMA, then ano

the concept of"information dominance"--a term first used in a 1993 

by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Placed 

context of future regional contingency operations by U.S. forces, th

study argued that an integrated system of powerful and pervasive s

linked to an integrated network of tough, lightweight computers is es

both to providing American forces with information as a combat mu

and to denying this advantage to the enemy. The aspect of denial, w

object lesson of the blinding of Iraqi intelligence, is important as a 

for the future: 

Information denial can be done passively, through tile use 

stealth, concealment, and hard-to-detect electronic signals, or it 

be done more thoroughly through active means: the use of electro

warfare to jam enemy radars or radios, concentrated early attacks 

enemy command and control nodes . . . and, more radically, u

such advanced techniques as electromagnetic pulse weapons to wr

the enemy's electronic systems and computer viruses to incapaci

its software. 45 

The calm tone used in delivering this invocation of the me

electronic mass destruction should not mask its significance as a 

harbinger of the future. 

The CSIS study, like so many others that have examine

relationship between warfare and information, draws upon some 

classical formulations of Dr. Thomas P. Rona. A career engineer at B

Rona's writings in this field--though mostly unpublished--are never
! 

FIGURE 9.1. The extended weapon system. Note the capabilitie

extended command and control--through the complex linkages betw

--and enemy interference with these same links. 

Source: Dr. Thomas Rona 

to would-be information warriors what John Boyd's were to 

warriors. He links information warfare to all forms of military 

operations as well as the larger issues of national strategy, a fact 

must be understood in the context of increasing information 

technological sophistication. He has also warned constantly of 

of hubris, since technological proliferation means that comp

gain some of the same capabilities the United States now cons

uniquely its own: "The enemy also has the capacity to learn le

concept of "the extended weapon system" (see Figure 9.1) rep

interdependent linkages between the PGM and its environment 

the supporting structure of weapons platforms (aircraft, for 

sensors, and communications pathways needed to guide the P

target. It is precisely in the spiderweb of linkages required by th

weapon system that information warfare takes place. As show

9.2, information warfare exists as an elaborate interplay of 

countermoves in which each side tries to interfere with, man

exploit the extended weapon system of the adversary while at

prevent such actions against its own systems. The side that most 

balances the offensive actions needed to exploit the linka

enemy's extended weapon system with the defensive actions 

protect its own can be said to enjoy the competitive advantage 

the prerequisite to victory in future warfare. The quest for this "
SIDE A ~~ 

~ ~ ,~ PREVENI" 

EXPLOITATION; 

S OIq SEC'I.IRI'I Y 

PRECI.IJI)[i 

INTERI"ERENCE 

l MAN I PUI'A rlON ~" 

SIDE 

FIGURE 9.2. The information war concept. The essence of the informa

concept is the balance between offensive actions designed to exploit enemy 

and the defensive measures needed to preclude such actions against on

forces. 

Source: Dr. Thomas Rona 

differential" is fundamental, as is the corollary principle that Ro

constantly cited: The basic purpose of command and information 

is to destroy other command and information systems. 46 

A more visionary approach to the RMA has been offered 

colleague, Martin Libicki, who argued that advances in co

manufacturing will lead to "free silicon" (in other words, pervas

ubiquitous computing) in the twenty-first century, leading in turn t

applications of robotics, including the evolution of PGMs int

numbers of "smart ants." The principal implications are that "seeke

become more dominant than "hiders" as information grids make m

more difficult; that the larger the weapon, the easier it is to detect a

so smaller is better; and that large numbers of smart ants will 

equivalent of intelligent and deadly minefields--meaning that defen

dominate the offense. 47 So profound are these changes that the tra

balance between information and force is being altered, with fir

becoming a mere appendage to information. There is consequently 

in Libicki's opinion, for the American defense establishment to ente

era of joint warfare and contemplate the need for profound organiz

changes, including the formation of a new "Information Corps. "48 
designing new uniforms or composing the appropriate fight so

have been, however, a number of institutional responses by th

suggest some important directions for the future. 

One of the most important of these occurred as a feature of 

Management Review put in motion by Secretary of Defense Di

One of those initiatives, known as Defense Management Revie

(DMRD) 918, was a frank acknowledgment that despite aver

expenditures of more than $20 billion, DoD business informat

were simply not up to the challenges of radical increases in 

flows, primarily because they had not been designed to work tog

the discontinuities in operational command and control system

tion exchanges between these disparate business systems--f

administration, logistics, and training--were difficult and requir

sary expenditures of time, labor, and money. The DMRD initiative 

gave rise to the DoD program on Corporate Information Man

CIM, a concept most closely identified with Paul Strassmann, ap

Cheney as the first director of defense information. Strassman

briefings on CIM reflected not only the emphasis on saving m

DoD was downsized but also the need to tailor the d

information systems to provide end-to-end support from the P

joint task forces in the field. This was a radical departure, 

appeared to wipe away the traditional dividing line between t

managed business information systems largely run by Do

command and control systems procured by the services. 49 

Two DoD directives issued at the end of the Bush ad

codified the new directions. The most sweeping change cam

Directive 8000.1, which stressed that "data and informatio

corporate assets structured to enable full integration and inte

across DoD activities. '~0 The Assistant Secretary of Defense f

named as the official responsible for the department's 

management program while the Defense Information Systems 

DISA, formerly the Defense Communications Agency) was g

authority to enforce "integrated information technology standar

DoD Directive 4630.5 further strengthened the existing em
y gg gy g 

information infrastructure--including more than 400 financial system

matSriel management systems, and (at least) 10,000 command and 

systems. 53 Implicit in this authority was not only the approval 

systems but also the identification and forcible retirement of redund

ones--all of which are critical development functions hist

performed by the military services. 

The Joint Staff, its stature already enhanced by Goldwater-Nicho

benefited from the lessons of Desert Storm and the increased emph

interoperability. It has revised its policy on "command and 

warfare" to reflect the need to decapitate the enemy command st

while protecting one's own ability to communicate, plan, and ac

quickly than the adversary. Intelligence contributes to these object

compiling databases that identify the critical "C2 nodes, links, and 

of potentially hostile nations. ''54 Equally important is the emphasis t

new operational doctrine places on the conscious exploitation 

improvements in command and control technology, which off

potential for an exponential increase in the efficient application of m

power . . . in a focused joint strategy. ''55 Joint commanders in 

operations will therefore be expected to focus the technologi

practices of operations security, deception, electronic warfare, an

psychological operations through tightly integrated campaign p

Although all these activities have previously had their place i

military operations, those places have generally been secondary

combination into a whole larger than the sum of its parts sugges

importance for the future. 

If the emphasis on command and control warfare can be seen 

effort to exploit existing capabilities in new ways, one of the most 

approaches to information age warfare has come with an initiative 

as "C4I For The Warrior." In briefings, brochures, and several 

publications, this concept has been advanced as a vision of tech

focused around a joint, completely interoperable, global infor

grid--"the infosphere." Warriors of the future, it is said, will be 

take advantage of flexible C4I modules and common operating e

ments and receive "over-the-air updating" of mission orders and 
y py

that reality changes, glitzy visions of the future and simple 

ship---however worthy the purpose--amount to much the same th

remains to be seen, of course, is the extent to which the enhanced 

of the JCS Chairman can affect program and budget decision

translate this vision into incremental realities. 

Of the three services, the air force approaches the future of i

warfare with the best track record. Its demonstration of tec

prowess in the Gulf War and vision of itself as the custodian o

battle management" provide powerful incentives to pursue simil

tions in the future. In such places as the Electronic Systems Co

Bedford, Massachusetts, and the Air Intelligence Agency at Kelly 

Base in Texas, highly automated approaches to command an

warfare are being brought to bear against an array of that serv

challenges: theater missile defense, advanced mission plan

battlespace management among a number of others. The common 

of these diverse efforts is better situational awareness leadi

application of decisive force at the decisive point--a concept 

passable working definition of information dominance. 57 Accord

commander of the Air Intelligence Agency, "For those who 

importance of information dominance, the consequences will be th

for those who.., ignored the need to achieve air superiority. '~

the occasional tendency of airpower advocates to equate both thes

the exclusion of all other arms, the focus of these efforts app

resolutely joint. One point in evidence: the combining of 

Intelligence Agency and the Joint Electronic Warfare Center int

multiservice Joint Command and Control Warfare Center. 

The Navy's thirty years of experience with high-technolo

systems has recently resulted in a vision of the future that is of 

passing interest. Under the leadership of retired Vice Admira

Tuttle, the navy articulated a concept of "Space and Electronic 

(SEW) that is remarkable in its clarity and elegance. The nav

SEW a "major warfare mission area" in 1989, centered around t

familiar objective of targeting the enemy leadership, separating 

their forces and even their people. The navy SEW concept al
pp

best seen as a continuum. 59 

As illustrated in Figures 9.3 and 9.4, the navy approach enco

many of the concepts embodied in emerging command and control 

doctrine, the basic functions of deception, operations security (p

here as countersurveillance), and electronic warfare generating the 

means to defeat the opposing command structure. The comma

control structure necessary to carry out this style of warfare 

however, the one in place today, the present system being so

notorious for its reliance on top-down, paper-driven message 

"Tactically, the commander at sea, in effect, is forced to r

equivalent of all editions of the New York Times---every day, eve

every column--in order to glean the information he needs. ''6° 

The theoretical sophistication of this policy is matched 

practicality of the "Copernicus Architecture," a name deliberately 

to imply that the center of the universe is changing as the ne

command and control system is put in place. Planned as a deca

"investment strategy," the objectives of Copernicus include 

direction of standardized technological components, the jettiso

outdated programs, and the installation of systems and networks t

connect fleet operations to command centers at the joint, alli

national levels. The guts of the system will be tactical nerve ce

operational units linked to CINC command complexes via flexible 

networks" at the tactical and global levels. 6j In order to implem

strategic objectives of SEW and to guide increasingly scarce proc

dollars, the fundamental organizing principle of Copernicus is t

naval commanders at all levels to choose the kind of information t

need in carrying out their missions. Although the advent of a new 

receiver-oriented communications (for the first time since the wirel

sent to sea early in this century) would undoubtedly be a w

development throughout the fleet, it is important to appreciate the 

cratic and technical obstacles that will have to be overcome. Lik

other service, the navy is faced with hard programmatic choices of 

versus muscle" as command and control systems are forced to c

with weapons systems for funding priority. And even when those 
reactions over a short 

period, and apply 

pressure to act 

 To apply pressure to act 

i • 

operations) 

Technical deceptio

(stratagem continu

reinforcement thro

communications, 

navigation, recogn

acoustical, and ele

systems) 

Counter-Surveillance 

• Targets enemy 

surveillance 

Counter-C41 

• Targets enemy C41 

Electronic Combat 

• Targets enemy 

weapons and 

weapons systems 

, • To deceive, degrade, : • 

evade, attack sensors and )I 

sensor platforms ! • 

i 

!. 

i ! 

I" 

To deceive, delay, 

degrade, or destroy 

elements of hostile C41 

from sensor platforms to 

weapons carriers 

To deceive, delay, 

degrade, or destroy enemy 

command and control 

links and nodes 

The coordination of all 

offensive and defensive 

measures across the force 

to provide counterweapon protection to the 

force 

FIGURE 9.3. This chart illustrates the continuum 

operations in the space and electronic warfare arena. 

Evasion and conc

(denial of detectio

Diversion and sim

(divert detection) 

Jamming and satu

(overcome detecto

Destruction 

• Deception (manip

deception of own 

cations) 

! • Deception (imitati

tion of hostile com

• Saturation (overw

systems) 

• Jamming 

• Destruction 

• Counter-targeting 

deception, IR dec

signals manageme

• Counter-platform 

request to ASUWC

ASWC) 

• Counter-weapon/t

phase (platform d

decoys, jamming, 

request to other c

• Jamming 

• Destruction 

of warfare and 

Source: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (0P-094), Space an

Warfare: A Navy Policy Paper on a New Warfare Arena (Washin

Government Printing Office, 1992) 
FIGURE 9.4. This chart illustrates the tactical continuum of space and e

warfare. 

Source: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Space and Electronic W

have been made, the pace of modernization can present its own pr

A recent navy publication candidly noted that just after the carr

George Washington was commissioned, the ship's commun

processor was removed because it had become obsolete upon inst

"Similarly, the Trident submarine USS Kentucky recently slipped f

ways with KW-7 cryptographic machines installed, more than a y

active ships in the Fleet removed them from their radio rooms. "62 

The Army has traditionally occupied third place in the annual th

race for defense dollars, a fact of life that has made modernization 

hard to come by, especially those earmarked for command and 

The service has gamely made do with existing resources, but its 

operations have often been conducted either as if the airplane 

reconnaissance satellite had never been invented or as if these p

were of no conceivable use to the soldier. Fortunately, this has b

change. General Gordon R. Sullivan used his position as Army C

Staff to stress the importance of information-based warfare and to p

number of key initiatives: establishment of a broad effort a

"digitizing the battlefield," preparation of a new field man

information operations, and the orchestration of a series of 

maneuvers aimed at testing out the operational implications 

information technologies. 63 

Although these larger initiatives are meant to suggest a 

institutional commitment, some of the most important practical d
suggested that this measurement---originally derived from th

Soviet-style combined arms force typically facing a U.S. A

commander--was still valid for many regional conflict scenarios

The answer to this continuing problem has come with the m

number of closely related technologies: the increasing processin

486 Pentium computer microprocessors, advances in software 

to accommodate greater complexity, and the extension by s

computer of digital data pathways from the strategic to the ta

The first two technological advances have moved the army's l

All-Source Analysis System from dream to reality, wherea

represents the Information Age equivalent of rural electrificat

quently, ground commanders will soon have the ability to co

instantaneously information derived from their own sensors 

digitized frontline reports as well as the downlinks from lo

remotely piloted aircraft) with those of theater systems (such a

and to compare those results with databases and other intelligen

at the highest national levels. 64 The foreseeable effects incl

tactical intelligence from a craft to something approaching 

however, the potential also exists for this new form of "electron

to supplant the more traditional one. 

The institutional responses summarized here suggest that the 

exhibited during Desert Storm have created a revolution of risi

tions within the defense establishment. Far from preparing for t

would-be information warriors in every department and defense 

preparing for the inevitable "next time," whether it results fro

North Korean invasion or an as-yet-unnamed "major regional c

elsewhere in the world, it should be recognized that these effor

only from recent wartime experience but also from a strong 

information technology represents a way--possibly the on

enhance future American combat effectiveness in the mids

defense cutbacks. The new fiscal austerity raises a troubling 

the very moment when technological possibilities gleam br

likelihood of getting them has seldom been dimmer. These cu

have the potential to turn troublesome budget rivalries into tu
There are several reasons to avoid falling back into the pit

inter-service rivalry, beginning with the fact that there simply is not 

money to go around. The following is a brief summary of some of the 

Operational Factors 

As shown by the Gulf War, the services are operating i

tighter operational "box," with traditional dividing lines between la

and air forces increasingly blurred. Not only do weapons strike from 

ranges, but their extended lines of control also involve progressively 

levels of coordination and rapid exchange of information. Unde

circumstances, interoperability becomes the sine qua non of al

combat. 

Cultural and Generational Factors 

The significance of Goldwater-Nichols becomes ever more ap

representing a change in direction that becomes more notice

retrospect. It has prompted the development of a truly joint 

particularly among younger officers for whom joint teamwork repre

well-understood constant of contemporary military life. Equally im

has been the creation of joint military institutions that have become 

zational counterweights to the traditional autonomy of military s

The Joint Staff and such high-level bodies as the Joint Requirement

sight Council have become increasingly influential players in dete

defense policy, and they are likely to become even more so in the fu

Commercial and Industrial Factors 

The defense procurement system is an unwieldy structure 

manifold inefficiencies have been the subjects of at least seven 

studies, the latest of which documented the astounding fact that mo

six hundred laws and untold numbers of regulations govern 
save money and to take advantage of the latest commercial tech

Although much remains to be done to rationalize or simply 

unnecessary defense procurement regulations and military speci

is clear that commercial products, practices, and standards w

determine the means by which the department develops its p

information warfare. This means in turn that the services must b

to enter the commercial marketplace of future command and con

with the firm understanding that they are no longer in b

themselves. 

Reflections 

In addition to these institutional responses, the technolog

in the Gulf War highlights some new perspectives on the ancie

of command. What was perhaps most notable was the demons

the command and information functions--once virtually iden

begun to separate as more and more information has been 

lower and lower levels. John Keegan has written that the 

functions of command are to see and to know. 67 To this must be 

other functions: to decide and to enforce those decisions. Th

significant because deciding and enforcing are hierarchical 

seeing and knowing are not. Both were clearly essential in De

however, much of the information on which the comman

depended came in distinctly nonhierarchical ways. The free-flo

mation pathways in the Gulf War suggest ad-hocracies as unit

to communicate by faxes and PC modems in ways that simply b

traditional top-down architecture of the military communications 

Perhaps there is something about the electron and its pathw

inherently subversive of hierarchies, much as the printing pres

altered the established order during the first information revoluti

and Ronfeldt made much this same point in their essay on 

noting that the information revolution "diffuses and redistributes 

crosses borders . . [and] redraws the boundaries of 

responsibilities," expanding "the spatial and temporal hor
relationships, but there are equally good ones validating the more 

"one-interface-stands" of free-form electronic networking. Alth

rapidly evolving differences in the command and information 

pull in opposite directions, both are essential to the modern 

organization. A rule of the road for the short term appears to 

command structures should be kept as flat as possible (something 

against the grain of any hierarchy), while the organized 

information-gathering should be encouraged to seek its own leve

it will do anyway). 

Closely linked to the principle of command is the question o

control. Some observers see information warfare as a great mech

central control because they believe that the lethality of ind

(through remotely directed standoff weapons) will allow them to r

significantly supplement direct fire. If this is true, there would 

grounds in military history on which to base strong concerns. J.F.

for example, wrote scathingly of World War I commanders who a

to control the battlefield from the rear with the latest impl

contemporary information warfare, the field telephone, by 

talking, talking in place of leading, leading, leadingP 69 The fa

both direct and indirect fire (with their respective differences in 

and operating principles) will be reverse sides of the same coin 

time to come because each of these classes of weapons bring

capabilities to the extended battlefields of the future. Information 

is best thought of as the binding agent for an integrated campaig

than a mere succession of target lists) in which both direct and 

fires are selectively employed. The same information differen

allows a missile to be guided by a global positioning satellite to 

also permits the Abrams tank commander to site and destroy his 

extended ranges. It will be recalled from Chapter Six that this 

was articulated by the army in the aftermath of the 1973 Middle E

the first conflict to feature the large-scale use of PGMs: What can 

can be hit, what can be hit can be killed. 70 

One of the many great unknowns in information warfare is the 

of future organization: How will military force structures accomm
We can never forget that organization, no less than a b

an aircratt carrier, is a weapon of war. We owe it to our sol

sailors, our airmen, and our marines to ensure that this w

lean enough, flexible enough, and tough enough to help the

God forbid, that ever becomes necessary. 71 

The command structure is the one part of a military organ

more than any other, must function as a weapon of war. It mus

lethal, predatory weapon, capable of preying upon and k

command structures---or else it runs the risk of becoming 

expensive techno-gaggle more likely to generate friction than 

The American military will be another decade or more in com

with the techniques of organizing, equipping, and training suc

structures, but a rough consensus seems to be emerging on 

(1) Information systems are helpful only to the extent that they 

fog of war, and (2) The command structure must be capable 

even after the computer dies. 

The issue of computer vulnerability is only one of the m

surrounding the possible outcomes of the focus on information 

It is far from clear what the utility of information warfare 

low-intensity conflict. In Somalia, for example, Mohammed Aid

followers communicated using a combination of couriers, 

cellular phones, and drums. At the opposite end of the spectrum

democracy in the former Soviet Union has lessened the urge

not the necessity) of doomsday planning. Nevertheless, the 

nuclear proliferation has increased concern that electronicall

U.S. forces might be vulnerable to the circuit-frying electroma

(EMP) of even a low-yield nuclear weapon. Information 

underlie all forms of warfare, but it seems that the United Sta

clear information differential only in the realm of mid-intensity 

Another caveat comes in the area of information denial put 

the CSIS study on the RMA: How easily can denial be accomp

information-intensive world? If the United States conside

potential threat, how much sense does it make to blithely sug
gpy

which the attack was being staged. However, what happens when 

shifts from land to space, as will surely happen when the ne

acquire their own satellite reconnaissance capability? Wou

information warfare doctrine suggest that the satellite be inter

----or destroyed? How far would a democratic country have to g

active information denial measures--and at what ethical and mor

Despite these questions, information warfare appears to r

uniquely U.S. approach to combat--a mixture of technical 

improvisation, offensive spirit, and a preference for direct res

moreover, a course on which the defense establishment ha

embarked. The uncertain and awkward language used by ma

practitioners to describe the new direction---"infosphere," "cy

and "coherent battlefield"--suggests not only the novelty of the s

also the absence of a paradigm. Thus, there are any number of go

"to make haste slowly," recognizing that this is a field w

significance and dimensions are as much a challenge to con

observers as the elephant was to the six blind men of Hindusta

wise to avoid the pitfalls of technological hubris, it is equally im

ensure that leadership in exploring the field of information war

surrendered to technocrats, who tend to view these matters as e

problems in which the actions of any future enemy are somehow 

This is an area of endeavor that cries out for continuing exper

and dialogue between the military technologist and the war

effective operational employment as the ultimate standard. 

Finally, if information technology is truly to become a weapon 

must be a joint weapon: but most of our weapons and all of our 

reflect specific service roots. Earlier in this book, the reader's 

was invited to the fact that the U.S. defense establishment h

history of strategic concepts that fall short of capturing the essen

it means to be a superpower with land, sea, and aerospace forces 

global interests. 72 The information war paradigm--inchoate, unce

indistinct though it may be--represents a possible alternative, 

because it embraces each of these operational environments as w

Staff Report to the Committoe on Armed Services, S. Rpt. 99-86, 

(Washington: GPO, 1985), p. 365; hereafter, Lather Report. 

2 George C. Wilson, "Weinberger Questioned on Grenada Reform Plan

Post. Nov. 15, 1985, p. All. The complete transcript of Weinberger

printed in U.S. Congress, Senate, Reorganization of the Departme

Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services. United States S

99-1083, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 1985 (Washington: GPO, 1987), pp. 67-1

3 U.S. Congress, House, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reo

of 1986, Conf. Rpt. 99-824 to accompany HR 3622, 99th Cong., 2nd S

88, 91-98. The most recent account of the passage of the Goldwater-Ni

Mark Perry, Four Stars (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), pp. 328-340. 

Barry Goldwater recounted in characteristically vivid language his reco

same event in his memoirs, Goldwater, with Jack Casserly (New Yo

1988), pp. 334-361. 

4 Locher Report, p. 365. 

5 John H. Cushman, Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequac

AFCEA Press, 1986), and Verl R. Stanley and Phillip L. Noggle, "

Control Warfare: Seizing the Initiative," Signal 38:8 (Apr. 1984), pp. 23-

6 "Navy Scraps Communications System," Washington Post, Oct. 23, 1985

7 For example, see John Englund, "JTIDS: Diary of a $600 Million Pe

Washington Post, May I 1, 1986, p. DI, and letter to the editor from Ass

of Defense Donald C. Latham, "Navy and Air Force Pilots Can Talk!" W

May 26, 1986, p. A20. 

8 Englund, op. cit. 

9 See Joseph Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason (San Fr

Freeman, 1976), esp. pp. 8-16, 23-38. 

10 "What Loyalty Can Mean to the Top Marine," Washington Post, July 3

For a more thoughtful if no less contrarian approach to the problem 

combat power, see former secretary of the navy John Lehman's account 

of Grenada in Command of the Seas (New York: Scribner's, 1988), pp

chapter titled "'What Price Jointness?" Lehman goes so far as to argue t

defense ideology of "jointness' hobbles our military effectiveness terri

event of a major war with the Soviet Union could well lead to defeat" (p. 

I I For a succinct discussion of the span-of-control problem in military his

B. Halley, Jr., "Command, Control, and Technology," Defense Analysis (

command and control) 4:3 (November 1988), p. 268. 

12 Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, 2nd coll. 

World, 1974), p. 95. 

13 Arthur T. Hadley, The Straw Giant (New York: Random House, 1986), p
111/7/989 (July 1985), p. 82. 

19 Ibid., p. 89. 

20 Ibid., p. 82. 

21 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard U

1981), p. 193. 

22 Ibid., chaps. 8-10, pp. 193-283, et passim. Huntington, The Common Def

York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1961). 

23 Rear Adm. J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: ,4 General Theory of Power Co

Brunswick, N J: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 37-56. Wylie actually asserts 

theories. The final one, guerrilla warfare, is not relevant here, because it has 

dominating an influence in the evolution of service command structures as t

of land, sea, and air power. 

24 Ibid., pp. 65-76. 

25 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2rid ed. (Chicago

Chicago Press, 1970), esp. pp. 35-65. See also Kuhn, The Fundamenta

(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1977), esp. pp. 293-319 and n. 4, p. 295. 

26 Arnold Kanter, Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective (Chicago: Univ. 

Press, 1979), pp. 17, 28-29. 

27 Carl H. Builder, The Army m the Strategic Planning Process: Who Shall Be

(Santa Moniea, Calif.: Rand Corp., 1987), pp. 22-27. 

28 Ibid., pp. 50-71. 

29 Ibid., p. 71. 

30 Ibid., p. 73. 

31 Ibid., pp. 78-86, 90-91. It is a measure of the superficiality with which thes

often considered that Builder's failure to address the classical roots of Arm

went unremarked in a report primarily intended for Army audiences. Regre

same flaw persists in the slightly expanded version of this report, 

commercially as The Masks of War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1

32 Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge: Har

Press, Belknap Press, 1987). 

33 Ibid., p. 113. See also chaps. 8-10. 

34 Ibid., pp. 158-159. 

35 Ibid., pp. 161-168. 

36 Ibid., pp. 171-174. 

37 Philip A. Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," in Peter 

Makers of Modern Strategy frora Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton

Univ. Press, 1986), p. 477. The same thought was more recently echoed 

Newport colleague: "Our students read more Man Zedong than Alfred Thay
40 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub. i: Department of Defense Diction

and Associated Terms (Washington, OJCS, Jan. 1986), p. 74. 

41 I am indebted to Prof. Frank Snyder of the Naval War College, who ha

importance of command style to a generation of students, for emphasizin

me. His more general comments have been equally helpful throughout thi

42 This is not to suggest, however, that the requirements for effect

communications linking the chain of command from top to bottom are 

than absolute. See the brief discussion that follows in this chapter on stra

and control, as well as the more comprehensive description in chapter 5. 

43 Frank M. Snyder, Command and Control: Readings and Commentary, 

the Harvard Univ. Program on Information Resources Policy, Cambridge, 

39. 

44 Ibid., p. 62. 

45 James M. Rockwell, ed., Tactical C3 for the Ground Forces (Washin

Press, 1986), and Gordon R. Nagler, ed., Naval Tactical Com

(Washington: AFCEA Press, 1985). 

46 Cushman, op. cir. 

47 Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Ha

Univ. Press, 1983), and Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Contro

Brookings Institution, 1985). 

48 Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 

49 Ibid., p. 261. 

50 Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War (New York: Free Press, 1989

hereafter Technology; see also pp. 217-232, 235-257, 267-282, et pa

former Senator Goldwater's account of the legislation that now bear

Goldwater, pp. 334-361. Mark Perry also writes of the passage of 

Nichols bill in Four Stars, pp. 312-340. 

51 The classic treatment of the levels-of-analysis problem is contained 

Allison, The Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 245-2

52 A sampling of the topical literature on DOD structural reform would 

Report; Archie D. Barrett, Re-Appraising Defense Organization (Washin

Defense Univ. Press, 1983); Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel 

eds., Reorganizing America's Defense (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 

Clark et al., eds., The Defense Reform Debate (Baltimore: Johns Hopkin

1984); John M. Collins, U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique (Boulder, 

Press, 1982); and Barry M. Blechman and William J. Lynn, eds., T

Effective Defense (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1985). (Se¢ also n. 3 above.) 
5 Ibid., pp. 163-169. 

6 One military scholar recently argued that Huntington "does little more than 

Uptonian premise in an ideological context"--that is, that American society i

and the military institution is "conservative." See Major Andrew J. Bacevich, J

Upton: A Centennial Assessment," Military Review 61:12 (December 1981 ), pp

7 Alexander Hamilton ("Publius"), No. 24. The Federalist Papers, Mentor ed. (

New American Library, 1961), pp. 161-162. 

8 Ibid., Nos. 25 and 26, pp. 162-174. 

9 Ibid., p. 162. 

10 Ibid., Nos. 41 and 42, pp. 255-271. 

1 ! Ibid. 

12 See Charles A. Beard, The Economic Basis of Politics (New York: Vintage Book

13 Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power (Princeton: 

Univ. Press, 1967), p. 23. 

14 For some recent constitutional perspectives on defense, see the special issu

Forces & Society 14:1 (Fall 1987), which contains a compendium of articles on 

15 Lloyd M. Short, The Development of National Administration m the Un

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1923), pp. 78-118. 

16 Vice Adm. Edwin B. Hoopcr, The Navy Department: Evolution and Frag

(Washington: Naval Historical Foundation, 1978), p. 2. 

17 Huntington, op. cit., pp. 193-199. 

18 J.D. Hittle, The Military Staff." Its History and Development, 3rd ed. (Harri

Stackpole Press, 1961), p. 1. 

19 Ibid., p. 3. 

20 Numbers 31:1-54. Interestingly, his officers did not carry out Moses' order

the taking of prisoners (capturing not only the virgins called for by their instr

the rest of the women as well) and were required to do penance. 

21 For a succinct example, see the discussion of the command structure of anci

set forth by Virgil Ney, The Evolution of Military Unit Control, Combat 

Research Group Memorandum M-217 (Washington: U.S. Army Combat De

Command, Sept. 10, 1965), pp. 8-15. 

22 Ibid., pp. 13-16. Hittle, op. tit., pp. 22-26. See also Van Creveld, Technology, p

23 Hittle, op. cir., pp. 13-22. 

24 See Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstetn 

(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 5-39. 

25 Hittle, op. tit., pp. 39-47, 52-60; Ney, op. eit., pp. 32-36. 

26 Ney, op. cit., p. 33. 

27 Hittle, op. tit., pp. 178, 180. 
the idea for a legion concept came directly from yon Steuben, who propose

the postwar organization of the Continental Army. See also Russell F. W

of the United States Army, rev. ed. (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Pre

92-94. 

30 Sprout and Sprout, op. cit~, p. 86. 

31 Charles O. Paullin, History of Naval Administration, 1775-1911 (Annapol

Institute Press, 1968), p. 452. Probably the most authoritative source o

organizational history during this period, Paullin points out that the U.S. 

"flotillas," but that they were deployed as harbor defenses and usually 

barges, useless Jefferson-vintage gunboats, and whatever else would float. 

discussion of naval developments that led up to this historical period, see 

Technology, pp. 125-136. 

32 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Administration and Warfare (Boston: 

1908), p. 32. 

33 Emery Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (Washington: GP

95-96. 

34 Ibid., pp. 126-133: see also T. Harry Williams, Americans at War (Bato

Louisiana State University Press, 1960), pp. 25-27, and John K. Mahon

1812 (Gainesville: Univ. of Florida Press, 1972), pp. 295-300. 

35 Short, op. tit., pp. 127-128. 

36 Weigley, op. cir., p. 135. 

37 Williams, op. tit., pp. 31-32. 

38 Sprout and Sprout, op. cit., p. 92. 

39 Huntington, op. cir., p. 201. See also Henry P. Beers, "The Development 

of the Chief of Naval Operations: Part I," Military Affairs 10 (Spring 1946

40 Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun, Nationalist, 1782-1828, p. 297; cited 

op. tit., p. 34. 

41 Capt. John H. Rodgers to Secretary of the Navy John Branch, U.S. Co

Doe. no. 2 (Ser. no. 195), November 23, 1829. Cited by Hooper, op. tit., p

42 Abel P. Upshur, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy (Washington

Navy, 1841), p. 378. Cited by Paullin, op. cit., 209. 

43 Paullin, op. eit., p. 210. See also Short, op. eit., p. 167. 

44 Sprout and Sprout, op. cit., p. 123. 

45 Ibid., p. 93. 

46 This is also what Martin Van Creveld refers to as the "Stone Age" of 

control. See his Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1985

47 Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, A Preliminary, Interpr

the History of Command and Control (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia Corp., 

hereat~er, HERO. 

48 David L. Woods, A History of Tactical Communications Techniques 
51 D. A. Paolucci, Norman Polmar, and John Patrick, A Guide to U.S. Naval C

and Control, NOSC Technical Document no. 247 (San Diego, CA: U.S. Nav

Systems Center, July 1, 1979), p. 9. 

52 Rear Adm. Julius A. Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in Worl

(Washington: U.S. Naval Historical Division, 1959), p. 4. 

53 Ibid. 

54 Fisher, op. cit., p. 13. 

55 Mauriee Matloff, ed., American Military History (Washington: U.S. Army, Offi

ChiefofMilitary History, 1973), p. 127. 

56 Woods, op. cit., p. 52. 

57 Matloff, op. tit., pp. 144-147. 

58 Upton, op. cit., pp. 145-147. 

59 Cited figures are from Weigley, op. tit., pp. 566-567, and Matloff, op. tit., p. 15

60 HERO, p. 32. 

61 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History (Boston: Lit'tie

1918), p. 108. 

62 Leonard D. White, The Jacksonians, p. 65; cited by Williams, op. tit., p. 41. 

63 Williams, op. tit., p. 39. See also Allen R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, 

Common Defense (New York: Free Press, 1984), pp. 137-150. 

64 Alfred H. Bill, Rehearsal for Conflict: The War with Mexico, 1846-1848, p. 1

by Lawrence H. Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," manuscript (Was

U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, n.d.), p. 23. 

65 Weigley, op. cit.. p. 175. 

66 T. Harry Williams, The History of American Wars (New York: Alfred A. Knopf

p. 180; Matloff, op. cit., pp. 174-175; Legere, op. cit., pp. 23-24. 

67 Williams, The History of American Wars (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), p

68 Lcgere, op. cit., p. 25. See also Edward L. Beach, The United States Navy (Ne

Holt, 1986), pp. 159-160. 

Chapter 3 Paradigms on Land and Sea 

I Antoine Henri Jomini, Precis de/'art de la guerre, I:158. Originally published 

Art of War, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippinc

1862. Reprint. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), p. 70. See also Crane 

Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, "Jomini," in Edward Mead Earle, ed., M

Modern Strategy, rev. ed. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 77-

sequel to Earle's classic work appeared in 1986 with the publication of M

Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Pr

Princeton Univ. Press, 1986). See in particular John Shy's excellent chapter, "

pp. 143-185. 
Mahan and Halleck, pp. 7791. On Jominis influence on the U.S. Army

Williams, The History of American Wars (New York: Knopf, 1981), pp. 1

5 Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Pre

65-66. See also J. D. Hittie, The Military Staff." Its History and 

(Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Press, 1961), pp. 86-128. 

6 Daniel L. Woods, A History of Tactical Communications Techniques (

Martin-Marietta Corp., 1965), pp. 105-108. See also Van Crcveld, Te

i 54-158. 

7 Dr. Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., "Weapons and Equipment Evolution and Its I

Organization and Tactics in the American Army from 1775-1963

(Washington: U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, n.d.)

generally, see Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from W

Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980). 

8 See Thomas Weber, The Northern Railroads in the Civil War (New York: C

Press, 1962), esp. pp. 220-232. See also Van Creveld, Technology, pp. 158-16

9 Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power (Prince

Univ. Press, 1967), p. 152. 

10 Packet vessels had not, of course, b~n unknown during the Age of Sail. S

Robinson, A History of Naval Tactics (Annapolis" U.S. Naval Institute Pr

542-557. 

11 Ibid., pp. 591-597. 

12 Fisher, op. tit., pp. 30-34. See also Maurie¢ Matloff, ed., American Mi

Army Historical Series (Washington: U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of M

1973), pp. 181-183, and Van Creveld, Technology, pp. 170-172. 

13 Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 

14 Ibid. Naturally, Dupuy's admiration for the Prussian General Staff is n

with either his scholarly writings or his long experience as an officer in th

15 Cited by Hittle, op. cit., p. 189. 

16 Colmar van der Golz, The Nation in Arms (London, 1913), p. I. Cite

Howard, "The Influence of Clausewitz," in Karl yon Clausewitz, On War, 

Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), 

17 Clausewitz, op. cit., Book I, p. 87. 

I g Ibid., p. 87. 

19 Ibid., Book II1, p. 204. 

20 Ibid., Book V, p. 285. 

21 Ibid., Book V, p. 294. 

22 Roger A. Leonard, ed., A Short Guide to Clausewit: on War (New York: Ca

1967), p. 71. Cited version is an extract of the standard 1874 translation b

Maude which in this quotation reads better than more current translations. 

uses the same quote in this version for obvious reasons in his Genius far War
26 Ibid., p. 260. 

27 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Administration and Warfare (Boston: Little, 

1908), pp. 73-74. 

28 T. Harry Williams, Americans at War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ

1960), p. 76; hereafter Americans. See also Williams, Lincoln and His Genera

York: Knopf, 1952). 

29 Ibid., p. 81. 

30 Hittle, op. tit., p. 190. 

31 Virgil Ney, The Evolution of Military Unit Control, Combat Operations Researc

Memorandum M-217 (Washington: U.S. Army Combat Developments Co

1965), p. 55. 

32 Weigley, History, p. 241. 

33 Hittle, op. eit., pp. 191-192. 

34 Fisher, op. cit., pp. 30-34. See also Weigley, History, pp. 234-237. The definit

on unit command problems in the Civil War at the tactical level is Kenneth P. W

Lincoln Finds a General. A Military Study of the Civil War, 5 vols. (Ne

Macmillan, 1949-59). 

35 Fisher, op. tit., p. 33. See also Van Creveld, Technology, pp. 169-178. 

36 Woods, op. cit., pp. 80-85. See also J. W. Brown, The Signal Corps in the Wa

Rebellion (Boston: Wilkins Press, 1896), pp. 115-139. 

37 Ibid., p. 86. 

38 Brown, op. tit., pp. 170-181. 

39 Woods. op. cit., p. 114. 

40 U.S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, vol. 2 (New York: Webster, 18

205-207. 

41 Woods, op. tit., p. 87. 

42 Grant, op. tit., 1:461. 

43 ibid., p. 574. 

44 Williams, Americans, p. 67. See also Allen R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, 

Common Defense (New York: Free Press, 1984), pp. 160-164. 

45 Rowena Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War (Annapolis: U.S. Naval 

Press, 1978), p. xxiii. Her theory is developed in pp. 34-40, 384-387, et passim. 

46 Legislative History of the General Staff of the United States, 1775-1901, Sen

no. 229, 56th Cong., 2rid Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1904), p. 5. 

47 Alger, op. cit., p. 88. 

48 Sprout and Sprout, op. tit., p. 205. 

49 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, 

(Boston: Little, Brown, 1918), p. 25. 

50 Ibid., pp. 26-29. 
54 Mahan, Sea Power, p. 138. 

55 See Philip A. Crowl, "'Alfred Thayer Mahan: Naval Historian," in Peter 

cit., pp. 456-460. 

56 Herbert Rosinski, The Development of Naval Thought (Newport, RI: Nav

Press, 1977), pp. 23-24. This book is a collection of essays published bet

1947. 

57 Rosinski's work naturally draws from that of another eminent naval sch

Corbett. See in particular Corbett's treatment of "Inherent Differences in 

of Warfare on Land and on Sea," in Some Principles of Maritime Str

(Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1972), pp. 157-164. 

58 Karl Lautcnschlager, "Technology and the Evolution of Naval Warfare,

Security 8:2 (Fall 1983), pp. 16-19. See also Van Creveld, Technology, pp

59 Lautensehlager, op. tit., p. 19. 

60 Mahan, Naval Administration and Warfare, p. 73. 

61 Paullin, op eit., p. 440. 

62 See, for example, Abrahamson, op. cit., p. 47. 

63 See Edward L. Beach, The United States Navy: 200 Years (New York: H

407-417. 

64 Henry P. Beers, "The Development of the Office of the Chief of Nav

Military Affairs, part I, 10 (Spring 1946), pp. 40-68; part 2, 10 (Fall 194

65 Paullin, op. tit., pp. 407-408. 

66 Ibid., pp. 439-440. 

67 Ibid., p. 437. 

68 Otto L. Nelson, Jr., National Security and the General Staff (Washi

Journal Press, 1946), pp. 18-21. 

69 See Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (Washingto

Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe (New York: Appleton, 1878)

biography of Upton is Stephen A. Ambrose, Upton and the Army 

Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1964). See also Millett and Maslowski, op. tit

70 Maj. Gen. William Harding Carter, Creation of the American General Sta

Doc. No. 119, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1924), p. 17. 

71 A good account of these difficulties is covered by Weigley, History, pp. 2

72 Cited by Legere, op. cir., p. 49. 

73 Ibid., pp. 52-53. 

74 Ibid. 

75 See Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army: A Popular Account 

General Staff (London: Constable, 1895). Less influential was a sho

essay by Wilkinson which was also published at the same time: The Bra

(London: Constable, 1895). For a current appraisal, s¢¢ Col. Michael D. 

of The Brain of an Army in Defense Analysis 4:3 (September 1988), pp. 
80 Leopold, op. tit., p. 43. 

81 Sprout and Sprout, op. cit., p. 353. 

82 Vincent Davis, The Admiral's Lobby (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolin

]967), p. 30. 

83 Beers, op. cit., pp. 22-25. 

84 D. A. Paolucci, Norman Polmar, and John Patrick, .4 Guide to U.S. Navy Co

Control and Communications (San Diego, CA: U.S. Naval Ocean Systems Cen

1979), p. 17. 

85 Nelson, op. cir., p. 299. 

86 Ibid., pp. 230-236. 

87 James G. Harbord, The American Army in France(Boston: Little, Brown, 1936)

Cited by Nelson, op. tit., p. 258. 

88 Nelson, op. cit., p. 258. 

89 James G. Harbord, The American Expeditionary Force: /ts Organizati

Accomplishments (Evanston, IL: Evanston Publishing Co., 1929), p. 64. 

90 Historical Sketch of the Signal Corps, 1860-1928 (Ft. Monmouth, NJ: U.S

Signal School, 1929), pp. 89-90. 

91 See Mario de Areangelis, Electronic Warfare (New York: Sterling Press, 1985), 

11-26. Properly speaking, as de Arcangelis points out, both the Russians 

Japanese tried to exploit each other's naval signals during their war of 1904-0

notably at the Battle of Tsushima Straits. 

Chapter 4 The Quest for Unity of Command 

1 William Mitchell, Memoirs of World War I: From Start to Finish of Our Great

(New York: Random House, 1960), pp. 630-632; cited by Russell F. Weigl

American Way of War (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 224. 

2 William Mitchell, Our Air Force: The Keystone of National Defense (New 

Dutton, 1921), and Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Mod

Power, Economic and Military (New York: Putnam, 1925). See also Weigley, 

pp. 223-241. 

3 Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (Reprint, Office 

Force History; Washington: GPO, 1983), p. 9. See also Van Creveld, Technol

183-197. 

4 See Edward Warner, "Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare," in 

Mead Earle, ¢d., Makers of Modern Strategy, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton Univ

1973), pp. 485-503. A current appraisal of Warner's contribution appears in the 

to this book. See David Maclsaac, "Voices from the Central Blue: The Air 

Theorists," in Peter Paint, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavell

Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 624-647. 

5 Warner, op. tit., p. 490. These five points are paraphrased from Wamcr's summa
the Chief of Military History, n.d.), pp. 125-126. 

9 Robin Higham, Air Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), p. 62. 

10 Ibid. See also Van Creveld, Technology, pp. 199-216. 

11 Legere, op. tit., p. 153. See also Louis Morton, "War Plan ORANGE: E

Strategy," World Politics 11 (Jan. 1959), pp. 221-250. For a more recent 

Michael K. Doyle, "The United States Navy and War Plan ORANGE: Mak

a Virtue," Naval War College Review 32:3 (May-June 1980), pp. 49-63. 

12 Joint Board Serial no. 19, "Joint Operations of the Army, Navy and Marine 

22, 1919. Cited by Legere, op. cir., p. 76. 

13 Ibid., pp. 155-156. See also Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For 

Defense (New York: Free Press, 1984), pp. 374-377. 

14 Council of National Defense, Hearings before the Committee on Military 

Cong., 1st Sess., on H.R. 10248, H.R. 10982 and H.R. 10985 (Wash

1926), pp. 35-36. Cited by Legere, op. cit., p. 133. 

15 Vincent Davis, The Admirals' Lobby (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North C

1967), p. 100. 

16 See Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, 

Univ. Press, 1962), and Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept (New Y

1982). These works have recently been joined by a controversial volume 

retired rear admiral, Edwin T. Layton, "And I Was There" (New York: Wil

1985). Layton, who was Admiral Kimmel's intelligence officer at the tim

Harbor attack, argues that bureaucratic in-fighting and personal jealousie

Department prevented critical information from being sent to Hawaii in ti

difference. 

17 J. F. C. Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure (Harrisburg, 

Services Publishing Co., 1936), pp. 66-67. 

lg Otto L. Nelson, Jr., National Security and the General Staff (Washin

Journal Press, 1947), pp. 325-328. 

19 Cited by Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Div

History of the U.S. Army in World War II (Washington: U.S. Army, Offic

of Military History, 1951), p. 73. 

20 Nelson, op. tit., p. 333. 

21 Details of the reorganization effort are covered in Nelson, op. cit., pp. 3

more recent treatment, see James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McN

Organization and Administration, 1900-1963 (Washington: U.S. Army, 

Chief of Military History, 1975), pp. 66-76. See also Cline, op. cit

Information on Nelson's contribution to the reorganization effort was obtai

telephone interviews with him from January to June 1982. 

22 Memo from Gen. !1. H. Arnold to the chief of staff, Nov. 14, 1

Organization of the armed forces for war. Cited by Nelson, op. cir., pp. 337
28 Ibid., pp. 113-I 14. 

29 Ibid., pp. 163-167. 

30 The most comprehensive account of the JCS committee structure is by Vernon E

Development of the JCS Committee Structure, vol. 2 of The History of the Join

in Worm War II (Washington: Historical Office, OJCS, 1972). 

31 Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification (New York: Columbi

Press, 1966), p. 18. 

32 Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1

163. 

33 Ibid., p. 164. 

34 U.S. National Archives, Records of the War Department General and Special 

ABC 370.62, "Unity of Command File" (See. l-B, RG 165), memo, "General H

Command Responsibilities in the South Pacific under 'Unity of Command,'" n.d

35 Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper Bros., 1949), p. 349. 

36 Gen. William M. Momyer, Airpower in Three Wars (Washington: GPO, 1978), p

37 Ibid., p. 41. See also Sherry, op. tit., pp. 147-176. 

38 U.S. Army FM 100-20, Field Service Regulations, Command and Employment 

Power (Washington: War Dept., July 21, 1943); reprinted as appendix to Air Sup

in World War 11 and Korea, U.S.A.F. Warrior Studies (Washington: U.S.A.F. O

Air Force History, 1983). 

39 Cited in The Effectiveness of Third Phase Tactical Air Operations in the Eu

Theater, Report of the Army Air Forces Evaluation Board in the European Th

Operations (Orlando, FL: Orlando Army Air Force Base. August 20, 1945), p. 

also R. H. Kohn and J. P. Hanrahan, eds., Condensed Analysis of the Ninth Air F

the European Theater of Operations, U.S.A.F. Warrior Studies, Rev. ed. (Wash

U.S.A.F. Office of Air Force History, 1984). 

40 Cited by Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, O ffTcial History of the U.S. A

World War H (Washington: U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Military History

p. 53. 

41 Walter Millis, Arms and Men, Paperback ed. (New York: Capricorn Books, 1

283. 

42 The Army Lineage Book, vol. 2 (Washington: U.S. Army, 1953), p. 57. Cited b

Ney, Evolution of Military Unit Control, Combat Operations Research 

Memorandum M-217 (Washington: U.S. Army Combat Developments Com

1965), p. 283. 

43 Ney, op. cit., p. 117. See also pp. 97-117. 

44 Karl Lautenschlager, "Technology and the Evolution of Naval Warfare," Intern

Security 8:2 (Fall 1983), p. 31. 

45 Ibid. 

46 D. A. Paolucei, Norman Polmar, and John Patrick, A Guide to U.S. Navy Com

Control and Communications, NOSC Technical Doe. 247 (San Diego, CA: U.S

Ocean Systems Center, July 1979), p. 26. 

47 Ibid. 
50 The act was promulgated by the Eightieth Congress as P.L. 253. It is 

original and amended versions in Rudolph A. Winnacker ¢t al., eds., The 

Defense Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978 (Wa

Historical Office, 1978), pp. 35-50. 

51 Harry Howe Ransom, "Department of Defense: Unity or Confederation?

Defense Policy, eds., The Associates in Political Science, U.S. Air F

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1965), p. 180. 

52 Legere, op. tit., pp. 276-277; Caraley, op. cit., pp. 23-24. 

53 Caraley, op. cit., pp. 23-34; Winnacker, op. cir., pp. 3-4; Hammond

192-196. 

54 Caraley, op. tit., p. 58. 

55 Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff'. Prewar Plans and Policies, Official Hist

Army in World War I! (Washington: U.S. Army Historical Division, 1950

56 Testimony of the Hon. Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War, Hearin

Committee on Military Affairs, U.S. Senate, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 8

(Washington: GPO, 1945). Testimony taken before these hearings herea

as Senate, 1945. 

57 John C. Ries, The Management of Defense (Baltimore: Johns Hopkin

1964), pp. 10-15. 

58 Caraley, op. cir., p. 63. 

59 Hammond, op. cir., pp. 228-229. 

60 Testimony of Adm. Ernest I. King, Senate, 1945, p. 121. 

61 Caraley, op. tit., p. 87. 

62 Ibid., pp. 87-109. 

63 Testimony of Fleet Adm. William F. Halsey, Senate. 1945, p. 543. 

64 Report to the Hon. James Forrestal. Secretary of the Navy, on Unificat

and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Secu

Report), Senate Comm. Print, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1

65 See also Hammond, op. cit., pp. 205-213. 

66 Testimony of Lt. Gen. James Doolittl¢, Senate, 1945, pp. 290 and 308. 

67 Testimony of Fleet Adm. William F. Halsey, Senate, 1945, pp. 537-538. 

68 Testimony of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Senate, 1945, 

69 Cited by Caraley, op. tit., p. 151. See also Perry, FourStars, pp. 3-11. 

70 Ibid., p. 238. 

71 U.S. National Archives, Records of the War Department General and 

ABC File 370.26, "Unity of Command" (S¢c. I-b), "Memorandum 

Norstad," October 17, 1946. 

72 James F. Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945-

The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(Wilmington, DE: Glazier, 1979), 

73 Caraley, op. cit., pp. 251-256; see also Hammond, op. cit., pp. 220-221, a

op. cit., pp. 17-21. 

74 Steven L. Rearden, The Formative Years, 1947-1950, vol. I of The Histor

of the Secretary of Defense (Washington: OSD Historical Office, 1984), 
Chapter 5 Setting the Scene 

! Julius A. Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War 11 (Was

GPO, 1959), pp. 26-28. 

2 Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press

pp. 23-24, 59-62. See also Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and th

(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 193-203. 

3 Testimony of former secretary of the navy Josephus Daniels, Hearings bef

Committee on Military ,4flairs, U.S. Senate. 79th Cong.. 1st Sess., on S. 84 and 

(Washington: GPO, 1945), p. 205. 

4 Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, Official H

the U.S. Army in World War II (Washington: GPO, 1951), pp. 352-361. 

5 For a discussion of the Key West and Newport conferences, see Steven L. Reard

Formative Years, 1947-1930, Vol. 1 of The History of the Office of the Secr

Defense (Washington: OSD Historical Office, 1984), pp. 385-401. See also Perr

Stars, pp. 12-16. 

6 Unified Action Armed Forces is published as JCS Pub. 2 (Washington

December, 1986). The current version was written in the at~ermath 

Goldwater-Nichols Act. While it still makes careful distinctions among the ro

missions of the services, the unified and specified commands, and their 

components, it nevertheless goes further than any of its predecessors in addres

need for "maximum integration," "full utilization of forces," and "interoperab

key elements of joint action. 

7 The statutory basis for the current organization of OSD is contained 

Goldwater-Nichols Act. See Conference Report, Goldwater-Nichols Departm

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 2n

Report No. 99-824, September 12, 1986. One of the directives of this act requ

services to study the size and configuration of OSD and the defense agencies, a 

of some controversy and uncertainty throughout the defense reform effort. The 

report listed some 96,578 military and civilian personnel employed by the te

defense agencies and eight "field activities" supervised by OSD. Over half o

however, were assigned to a single organization, the Defense Logistics Agen

Army Study of Defense Agencies and DOD Field Activities: Report to the Secr

Defense, vol. 1 (Washington: Department of the Army, August 31, 1987), pp. 18

8 1949 Amendments: P.L. 81-36, 63 Stat. 30 (April 2, 1949); 1953 Amendmen

83-15, 67 star. 19 (April 4, 1953); 1958 Amendments: P.L. 85-599, 72 S

(August 6, 1958). 

9 See Perry, Four Stars, especially chapters 4-6. Perry's account of the stormy rela

between the service chiefs and OSD during the McNamara years is one of the hi

of this excellent history of the JCS. 

10 The standard work on the budgetary innovations of the McNarama era is M

Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much ls Enough? Shaping the Defense P

1961-1969 (New York: Harper & Row, 1969). See also Charles J. 

Decision-Making for Defense (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1965). A mor
12 Ibid., p. 319. 

13 Kennedy School of Government, TFX: The Commonality Decision, 

9-375-035 (Cambridge: Intercollegiate Case Clearing House, 1978), pp. 1

TFX Case, and Richard A. Smith, 'ff~he Seven Billion Dollar Contract Tha

Rules," Fortune 67:2 (April 1963), pp. 110-111, 191-192, 199-200. 

14 TFX Case, pp. 14-20, and Robert J. Art, The TFX Decision: McNam

Military (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), pp. 157-166. 

15 Robert F. Coulam, The Illusions of Choice: The F-Ill and the Problem 

Acquisition (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1977), p. 31. 

16 Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brow

127-128. 

17 Letter, Adm. Thomas J. Moorer to Lt. Gen. Victor H. Krulak, Aug. 16, 

Krulak in Organization for National Security (Washington: U.S. Stra

1983), pp. 86-87. 

18 The most comprehensive treatments of the development of strategic 

control are by Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear 

Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1983), and, in a somewhat more controversi

Blair, Strategic Command and Control (Washington: Brookings Institution

19 Anthony G. Oettinger, "Information Resources: Knowledge and Powe

Century," Science 209 (July 4, 1980), pp. 191-198. 

20 Blair, op. eit., pp. 51-65. 

21 WWMCCS History, TRW Defense and Space Systems Support Group, 

WWMCCS System Spec. WSS-78, Annex J (UNCLAS), September 30, 19

22 U.S. Congress, House, Review of DOD Worldwide Communications. Pha

the Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on A

(Mollohan Report), 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1971), p. 6. 

23 Ibid., p. 18. 

24 This incident was variously described by a number of sources interv

project, but the only documented account appears in James Ray and Ted S

Revolution in Command and Control Technology and the Civilian-Milit

Command (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Univ. Press, 1977), p. 

Schrceder's version is that Rumsfeld spoke with a lieutenant commander 

"while the JCS watched on the sidelines." 

25 U.S. General Accounting Office, The Worlahvide Military Command 

System--Major Changes Needed in Its Automated Data Processing Ma

Direction (Washington: GPO, 1979), pp. 5-6. 

26 The Jonestown incident was documented by the GAO's follow-up report o

which also contained an analysis of the DOD rebuttal. See World

Command and Control System--Evaluation of Vendor and Departmen

Comments (Washington: GPO, 1980). The Jonestown incident, the exe

and the Dinneen comment were reported by William J. Broad, "Computer

Military Don't Mix," Science 207 (Mar. 14, 1980), p. 1184. Furthe

WWMCCS appeared in two articles reprinted by the U.S. Army War C
28 Interestingly, the requirements of strategic connectivity in this instance a

extended to the use of unsecured radio-telephone links between Defense 

Weinberger and President Reagan, who were flying in separate military aircr

they discussed the proposed operation. See Bill Keller, "U.S. Plans Were Made 

Line," New York Times, Oct. 15, 1985, p. 15. 

29 James Digby, Precision Guided Weapons, Adelphi Paper no. 118 (London: IlS

p. 2. See also Richard K. Betts, Cruise Missiles: Technology. Strategy, 

(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1981). For a discussion of the Tomahaw

missile, see John Lehman, Command of the Seas (New York: Scribner's, 1

164-170. 

30 Karl Lautenschlager, "Naval Warfare Technology," International Security 

1982), p. 44. 

31 Lehman, op. cit., p. 170. 

32 For a comprehensive treatment of electronic warfare in World War II, see R. 

The Wizard War (New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1978), an

Price, Instruments of Darkness: The History of Electronic Warfare (Ne

Scribner's, 1978). 

33 Gen. William M. Momyer, AirPower in Three Wars(Washington: GPO, 1978)

34 Ray Bonds, ed., The U.S. War Machine (New York: Crown Press, 1978), p. 15

general topic of modem air combat, see Lon O. Nordeen, Jr., Air Warfare in th

Age (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1985). 

35 Parts of the following section have been adapted from C. Kenneth Allard, "Re

American Military Intelligence: Decisions for the 1980s," published as an i

paper in Seminar on Command, Control. Communications and Intelligence, 

Univ. Program on Information Resources Policy, Cambridge: Harvard Univ., 

159-205. 

36 Omar Bradley, A Soldier's Story(New York: Holt, 1951), p. 33. 

37 F.W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 197

recent information on Ultra has emerged with the official publication of the de

British archives from World War 11. See F. H. Hinsley et al., eds., British Intelli

the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations (London: 

1979). 

38 Lt. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard, "Narrowing the Combat Intelligence Gap," Ar

(August 1969), p. 23; cited by M. B. Powe and E. E. Wilson, The Evol

American Military Intelligence (Ft. Huachuca, AZ: U.S. Army Intelligence 

1973), p. 120. 

39 Ibid., pp. 107-123. 

40 See Chaim Het-zog, The War of Atonement (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), 

Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, The Yore Kippur War (Ne

Doubleday, 1974). 

41 U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington: Dept. of the Army, 

2-2; hereafter, FM 100-5. 

42 Ibid., p. 2-6. 
Chapter 6 Tactical Command and Control of American Arme

1 Gerald P. Dinneen, "A Systems Approach to Communications, Command

Intelligence," Signal 34:5 (Feb. 1980), p. 8. 

2 Cited by Lt. Col. Frederick W. Timmerman, "Yes, Sir! General Machin

32:1 (Jan. 1982), p. 30. 

3 One of the most comprehensive discussions of this issue is by Co

DeBastiani, Computers on the Battlefield; Can They Survive? (Washing

Defense Univ. Press, 1983). 

4 Irving B. Holley, Jr., "'Command, Control, and Technology," Defense An

issue on command and control) 4:3 (November 1988), pp. 268-269. 

5 For an overview of the maneuver school of thought by one of its most ard

see William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, CO: We

1985). 

6 John R. Boyd, "'Organic Design for Command and Control," b

(mimeograph), March 1984, pp. 5, 32-35. Col. Boyd's contribution t

reform movement rests largely on the strength of his personal briefings and 

rather than on published writings. Many of these themes are also containe

briefing, "Patterns of Conflict" (May 1981), which is also unpublished. I 

both, as well as on a series of interviews and other discussions with Co

1982 to the present. 

7 Maj. George E. Orr, Combat Operations C31: Fundamentals and Interact

Air Force Base, AL: Air Univ. Press, 1983), pp. 23-27. 

8 Dr. Joel S. Lawson, Jr., "Naval Tactical C3 Architecture, 1985-1995," 

(Aug. 1979), pp. 71-72. 

9 Ibid. For a more comprehensive treatment of this subject by the sam

Lawson, "State Variables of a C2 System," in John Hwang et al., 

Analytical Concepts in Command and Control (New York: Gordon and B

Publishers, 1982), pp. 61-84. 

10 Ibid., p. 63. See Gregory D. Foster's discussion of several command and c

including those of Boyd and Lawson, in "Contemporary C2 Theory and 

Failed Quest for a Philosophy of Command," Defense Analysis 4:3 (Sep

pp. 201-228. In the same issue, see also Philip S. Kronenberg, "Comman

as a Theory of Interorganizational Design," pp. 229-252. The most c

treatment of command and control models and organizational designs to d

Stuart E. Johnson and Alexander H. Levis, Science of Command and Co

(Washington: AFCEA Press, 1988, 1989). 

11 Gen. Paul F. Gorman, "'Toward a Stronger Defense -Establishment," in As

et al., eds., The Defense Reform Debate (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ

p. 291. Now retired from the Army, General Gorman formerly served as a

chairman of the JCS and as commander in chief, U.S. Southern Comm

recently served as a member of the Packard Commission. Interestingly, Va

also noted recently the differing obstacles to control presented by th
Political Instrument (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978). More rece

former secretary of the navy John Lehman's comments concerning U.S. oper

the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf, 1986-1988, in Command o'the 

363-401. 

15 Raymond T. Tate, "The U.S. Navy in Transition," Signal 34:7 (April 1980), p. 3

16 See Seymour J. Deitchman, Military Power and the Advance of Technology, 

(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 91-104. 

17 Lautenschlager, op. cit., p. 44. 

18 Ibid. See also Louise Hodgden, "Satellites at Sea: Space and Naval Warfare

War College Review 32:4 (July-Aug. 1984), pp. 31-45, and Franklin W. D

"Architectural Considerations for the C3 Aspects of a Space-Based Nava

Surveillance System," in Gordon R. Nagler, ed., Naval Tactical Command and 

(Washington: AFCEA Press, 1985), pp. 192-203. 

19 Lautenschlager, op. cit., p. 48. 

20 Deitchman, op. cit., pp. 97-98. 

21 Scott C. Truver, "To Get the Drop on Soviet Archers, U.S. Navy Needs Bows

and Bucks," Armed Forces Journal International 123:10 (Apr. 1986), p. 5 I. 

22 U.S. Dept. of Defense, Soviet Military Power (Washington: GPO, 1986), pp

hereafter, SMP86. On the growth of the Soviet navy, the literature has expande

as dramatically as the subject. See, in particular, Bradford Dismukes and Ja

McConnell, eds., Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979); 

McGwire and John McDonnell, eds., Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and 

Dimensions (New York: Praeger, 1977); George Hudson, The Soviet Navy En

Nuclear Age: The Development of Soviet Naval Doctrine, 1953-1973 (Ann Ar

University Microfilms, 1980); Steve F. King, Soviet Naval Strategy for the 

(Washington: NDU Press, 1978); and Bruce W. Watson and Susan M. Wats

The Soviet Navy: Its Strengths and Liabilities (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 19

23 Rear Adm. Frederick C. Johnson, "Command and Control Overview," Sign

(Aug. 1980), p. 62. 

24 William D. O'Neill, "Naval Anti-Air Warfare," National Defense 65:365 (Feb. 

27. 

25 U.S. Navy, "Navy Command and Control Systems Ashore," study, U.S. Navy E

Systems Command, Washington, D.C., n.d.; hereafter, NCCS paper. See als

Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1979), an

recently, the book that, although controversial, is the best eyewitness account to 

naval intelligence in the Pacific, Rear Adm. Edwin T. Layton with Capt. Roge

and John Costello, "Andl Was There" (New York: William Morrow, 1985). 

26 Truver, op. cit., p. 51. On the lessons for naval warfare suggested by the 

Islands War, see Charles W. Koburger, Sea Power in the Falklands (New York: 

1984), and David Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War (London: L. 

1987). 

27 Paolucei, op. cit., p. 87. Probably the most graphic demonstration of such a 

occurs in popular fiction. See Tom Claney, Red Storm Rising (New York: G. P. 
gy gpp

30 Cited by Truver, op. cit., p. 50. 

31 Adm. Carlisle H. Trost, "The Navy is Living Up to Its Moral Imperative,

Post, August 20, 1988, p. A21. 

32 U.S. Dept. of Defense, Investigation Report: Formal Investigation into 

stances Surrounding the Downing of Iranian Air Flight 655 on 3 

Washington, D.C., July 28, 1988, p. 43. 

33 Ibid., Letter, 2nd endorsement. From the chairman of the Joint Chiefs o

secretary of defense, August 18, 1988, pp. 7-8. 

34 See Lt. Lowell F. Eggert, "Navy Command Control System-Tactical Flee

Signal 34:10 (Aug. 1980), pp. 64-65, and Lt. Comdr. John G. Robinson, 

Command Center," Surface Warfare, Headquarters, Dept. of the Navy

(January 1981), pp. 8-9; OP-094 briefing, "TFCC Restructured Program

1989. 

35 U.S. Navy, "U.S. Navy Tactical Command and Control Plan tbr Allied Int

study (Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OP-094, Sep

pp. 2-3. See also, Lt. Christopher W. Maillefert, Command and 

Contemporary Perspective (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, July 19

36 Vice Adm Robert E. Kirksey, "Tactical Command and Control: The 

Commander's Perspective," in Nagler, op. elL, pp. 110-114. 

37 Dr. Eberhardt Rechtin, The Technology of Command (Washington: Natio

Press, 1983), pp. 23-24. 

38 William Outerson, "Peacetime Admirals-Wartime Admirals," Proceedin

Naval Institute 107:4 (Apr. 1981), p. 35. 

39 NCCS Paper, p. 1. 

40 Reehtin, op. tit., p. 30. 

41 See discussion in chap. 4 of this book. See also U.S. Joint Chiefs of 

Action Armed Forces, JCS Pub. 2 (Washington: Office of the Joint Chiefs 

1986). 

42 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Pr

107. 

43 See discussion in chap. 4 of this book. 

44 Riley Sunderland, Evolution of Command and Control for Close 

(Washington: Office of U.S.A.F. History, March 1973), pp. 42-60. For a

more recent scholarship on Air Force operations over North Vietnam

Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power (New York: Free Press, 1989). 

45 Lt. Gen. Robert T. March, "Tactical C3: The Modern Challenge," Signa

1978), p. 16. 

46 See Dr. Fred A. Diamond, "A Structure for Tactical C3," Signal 33:!0 (A

77-81, from which this discussion of the Air Force tactical command 

drawn. See also U.S. Army Field Manual, FM 100-25, The Air-Groun

System (Washington: HQDA, March 30, 1973). Although the basic o

Air-Ground Operations System has remained unchanged for more than tw

more recent reference is a pamphlet, "General Operating Procedures for J
1989), pp. 40-102. 

49 SMP gg, pp. 64-75; see also SMP 86, pp. 64-72. 

50 SMP 86, p. 64. The literature on the development of Soviet conventional theat

is extensive. In addition to the six editions of the SMP series, see Joseph D. D

Soviet Military Strategy in Europe (New York: Pergamon Press. 1980); W

Lewis, The Warsaw Pact: Arms. Doctrine and Strategy (New York: McG

1982); Harriet F. Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (

CO: Westview Press, 1979); and Christopher N. Donnelly, Red Banner: Th

Military System in Peace and War (Alexandria, VA: Jane's, 1988). 

51 U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington: Headquarters, Dep

Army, July I, 1976), pp. 3-4. 

52 Ibid. 

53 Ibid., p. 4-3. 

54 See also the TRADOC official history by John L. Romjue, From Active De

Airland Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982 (Ft. Monr

Headquarters, TRADOC, June 1984), pp. 3-12. For the earlier period in the evo

the Army's new doctrine, see Maj. Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to B

General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Leavenworth P

16 (Washington: GPO, 1988). 

55 Col. Wayne A. Downing, "U.S. Army Operations Doctrine: A Challenge for th

and Beyond," Military Review 61:1 (January 19gl), p. 66. 

56 James Fallows, National Defense ('New York: Random House, 1981), pp. 26-31. 

57 See Downing, op. tit., and David P. Porreca, "New Tactics and Beyond," 

Review 59:5 (May 1979), pp. 21-29. See also Lind, op. cit. 

58 Romjue, op. cit.,.pp. 23-26. 

59 See Christopher N. Donnelly, "Soviet Operational Concepts in the 198

Strengthening Conventional Defense in Europe. Report of the European Securi

(London: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 105-136. 

60 U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington: Headquarters, Dep

Army, August 20, 1982), p. 8-1. 

61 Ibid., pp. 2-1, 2-4. 

62 Herbert 1. London, Military Doctrine and the American Character (New Brunsw

Transaction Books, 1984), p. 24. 

63 Gen. Donn A. Starry, "Extending the Battlefield," Military Review 61:3 (Mar

pp. 32-33. 

64 Ibid., p. 45. For a good journalistic account contrasting the attrition and Airlan

approaches, see Deborah Shapley, "The Army's New Fighting Doctrine," N

Times Magazine, November 28, 1982, pp. 36-42, 47-52, 56. 

65 Although not specifically related to Airland Battle, Richard E. Simpkin m

sensible point that maneuver and attrition are mirror images of each other 

complementary in combat. See his Race to the Swift (New York: Pergamon-B

1985), pp. 19-23. 

66 U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington: Headquarters, Dep
69 Headquarters, Dept. of the Army (DAMO-FDQ), briefing memorandum, "

C2 Systems," July 16, 1994. See also Lt. Gcn. James W. Rockwell, cd., T

the Ground Forces (Washington: AFCEA Press, 1985), especially the 

William R. Richardson, "The Army Command and Control Master Plan

and Loren D. Diedrichson, "Evolution and Integration of Army Tactical 

pp. 205-215. 

70 SINCGARS briefing by Lt. Col. Walter Olcson, SINCGARS Project Man

U.S. Military Academy, March 21, 1985; Magnavox Electronic Systems C

Summary on SINCGARS Combat Net Radios," Ft. Wayne, IN, Nov. 2

Army, 1989 Weapons Systems (Washington: Headquarters, Dept. of the A

1989), p. 133, hereafter Weapons '89. 

71 S¢c Don Schaum ct al., "MSE, the Operational Concept," in Rockwell

157-170; GTE Tactical Systems Division, "MSE: The U.S. Army's Choi

Heights, Mass., n.d.; Weapons '89, p. 129. On the question of SINCGAR

interference, see Nell Munro, "$10 Billion Radio Systems Can't Coo

Times, July 31, 1989, p. 24. 

72 Norman E. Wells, "A View from the Joint Program Office: .FI'IDS," in 

cit., pp. 225-230; Weapons '89, p. 123. 

73 Maj. James A. Machos, "TACAIR Support for the Airland Battle," A

Review 35:4 (May-June 1984), p. 21. See also Col. Thomas A. Cardw

Battle Revisited," Military Review 65:9 (Sept. 1985), p. I1, for a disc

structural imbalance with respect to "synchronization." 

74 U.S. Air Force (XOX1D), "The Air Force Role in the Airland Battle, 1

Information Publication no. 13 (mimeograph) (Washington: Headquart

n.d.), pp. 2-5. 

75 U.S. Air Force, Air Force Manual I-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the 

Air Force (Washington: Headquarters, U.S.A.F., Mar. 16, 1984), pp. 4-2 a

76 Col. Thomas A. Cardwell, "One Step Beyond: Airland Battle, Doctrine, 

Military Review 64:4 (Apr. 1984), p. 48. By the same author, see Comm

for Theater Warfare: The Quest for Unity of Command (Maxwell Air Fo

Air Univ. Press, 1984). This study is a detailed analysis of service doctrin

as they affect control of component forces and command arrangements i

warfare, especially control over organic air assets. 

77 Tidal W. McCoy, '"Full Strike': The Myths and Realities of Airland B

Forces Journal International 212:11 (June 1984), p. 83. 

78 Maj. Jon S. Powell, "Airland Battle: The Wrong Doctrine for the Wrong 

University Review 35:4 (May-June 1985), pp. 15-22. 

79 Richard G. Davis, The 31 Initiatives (Washington: Office of Air Force H

pp. 35-47. 

g0 Ibid., p. 86. 

81 S¢~ U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, New Technolo

Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack, OTA-ISC-309 (Washington: GP

143-167. 

82 Steven L. Canby, "The Conventional Defense of Europe: The Operatio
CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1977), esp. chaps. I I, 12, 16, and 17. 

86 See chap. 4, this book. 

87 U.S. Dept. of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on 

and Control Systems Management (Washington: Office of the Secretary of D

Research and Engineering, July 1978), pp. 2-3. 

88 Lt. Gen. John H. Cushman, Command and Control of Theater Forces: 

(Washington: AFCEA Press, 1985), p. 25. 

89 Ibid., p. 198. 

Chapter 7 Building Joint Approaches 

1 David T. Signori and Harold A. Cheilek, "An Overview of Joint Tactical Com

Control," in John Hwang et al., eds., Selected Analytical Concepts in Com

Control (New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1982), p. 145. 

2 Lt. Gen. Robert A. Kingston, "C31 and the U.S. Central Command," Signal 

1983), p. 23. See also Maj. Gen. Vaughn O. Long, "Interoperability: The 

Systems in Support of USPACOM," Signal, 38:6 (Feb. 1984), pp. 25-28. 

3 See Bruce Blair, Strategic Command and Control (Washington: Brookings 

1985), esp. pp. 182-280. 

4 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Defense Organization

for Change, by James R. Locher Ill, Comm. Print 99-86 (Washington: GPO, 

365. 

5 Harry G. Summers, Jr., "Military Radio Foul-Up Wasn't Like That at All," L

Times, Dec. 11, 1985, p. 7. 

6 Maj. Gen. Clay T. Buckingham, "JINTACCS," Signal 34:8 (May-June 1980), 

7 Dr. Gerald P. Dinneen, "A Systems Approach to Communications, Command

and Intelligence," Signal 24:5 (Feb. 1980), pp. 8-12. 

8 William J. Perry, "Memorandum for the Chairman, Defense Science Board Ta

September 20, 1977. Reprinted as Appendix A in U.S. Defense Dept., Rep

Defense Science Board Task Force on Command and Control Systems M

(Washington: Dept. of Defense, USDRE, July 1978), p. 19; hereafter, DSB. 

9 Ibid., p. I. 

10 See chap. 6, this book. 

11 DSB, p. I. 

12 Dinnecn, op. cit, p. 18. See also Bruce Blair, Strategic Command an

(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 50-65. 

13 U.S. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, C3 Systems Division, "C3 Systems 

Projects," briefing paper, Mar. 15, 1981, p. I-l. 

14 See Lt. Gen. John H. Cushman, Command and Control of Theater Forces: 

(Washington: AFCEA Press, 1985), pp. 164-165. 

15 See chap. 5, this book. 

16 U.S. Congress, llous¢, Committee on Armed Services, Review of the Dep
18 Ibid., p. 353. 

19 Frank J. Carlucci, "Management of the DOD Planning, Programming a

System," U.S. Defense Dept. memorandum, March 27, 1981; herea

memorandum. 

20 U.S. Defense Dept., DOD Directive 4230.5, Compatibility and lnter

Tactical Command, Control Communications, and Intelligence Systems 

Dept. of Defense, ASDC31, July 5, 1984), p. 1. 

21 Carlueei memorandum, p. 6. In 1989 the Bush administration was no 

predecessors at resisting the temptation to reform defense management. S

Defense Richard Cheney, Defense Management Report to the Presiden

OSD, July 1989). 

22 U.S. Defense Dept. DOD Directive 5154.28, Joint Tactical Command

Communications Agency (Washington: Dept. of Defense, ASD-C, July 5, 

23 U.S. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Memorandum of Policy No. 160

and lnteroperability of Tactical Command, Control, Communications an

Systems," January 7, 1986, pp. 7-8. 

24 Cushman, op. tit., pp. 114-141. 

25 Buckingham, op. cir., pp. 53-61. 

26 U.S. Defense Dept., TRI-TAC, briefing pamphlet (Washington: OSD-

Communications Office, September 1979), p. 4. 

27 HASC C31 Panel, pp. 27-28. 

28 Dr. J. Neil Butch, program director under Dinneen, cited by James Fawc

Challenges Face Military Planners," Defense Electronics (June 1978), p. 5

29 See Thomas C. Bennett, "What Now, Colonel," Defense Systems Rev

1983), pp. 61-64. According to this article, the AN-'FI'C-39 represents a 

in the handling of record copy transmissions (teletype, fax, photo, etc.) 

field army levels. 

30 Interview with Col. Donn M. Knisely, commander, TRI-TAC Test 

Huachuea, Ariz., January 5, 1984. 

31 Buckingham, op. cir., p. 57. Note that the mission order did not specif

operations per se. However, it would be difficult to conceive of "ground 

military operations" that did not involve air or naval forces--which m

wording. 

32 Both "war stories" recounted in this section emerged during discussions I h

officers at the Joint Interface Test Force, JTC3A, Ft. Monmouth, N J, Februa

33 U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "U.S. Navy Tactical 

Control Plan for Allied Interoperability," September 1980, pp. 3-1 I. 

34 U.S. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JINTACCS: Command Briefing (F

NJ: JTC3A, Apr. 30, 1984), p. 13. 

35 Information on the problems of TACFIRE-MIFASS interface was extr

untitled briefing by the JINTACCS systems engineer, dated September 19

36 Gordon Welchman, The Hut Six Story (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), p
39 U.S. Army, "Plan for U.S. Army Participation in the JTIDS Joint Service 

Army Deputy Program Director, JTIDS Joint Program Office, Hanscom Air F

MA, July 15, 1981, pp. 3-4; hereaRer, Army JTIDS Plan, 1981. 

40 See chap. 5, this book. 

41 U.S. Air Force, TDM,4 JTIDS Overview Description, ESD-TR-84-183 (Han

Force Base, MA: USAF-ESD, July 1984), pp. 104-105; hereafter, TDM,4 Over

42 Ibid. See also Billy Joe Workman, "An Overview of the JTIDS," Mitre Corp. R

MTR-322g, Bedford, MA, Apr. 1976, pp. 47-62. 

43 Ibid., p. 11. 

44 Billy Joe Workman, "A User's Guide to JTIDS," Mitre Corp. Report no. 3140

MA, Oct. 24, 1975, pp. 15-18. 

45 Ibid. 

46 N. E. Bolen, "An Introduction to TDMA. ATDMA, and DTDMA," Mitre Cor

no. MTR-3864, Bedford, MA, Nov. 1979, p. 18, et passim. 

47 Workman, "Overview," pp. 29-46. 

48 D. W. Cullivan, "Combat Applications of the JTIDS,'" Mitre Corp. R

MTR-3513, Bedford, MA, Dec. 1979, p. 113. 

49 Workman, "Overview," pp. 63-g2. 

50 Army JTIDS Plan, pp. 12-15. Also, Hughes Aircraft Company, "Position 

Reporting System," Ground Systems Group, Fullerton, CA, July 1980 (

briefing). 

51 Army JTIDS Plan, p. 5. Also, TDMA Overview, pp. 43-63. 

52 Brock L. Robertson, "JTIDS--The Early Years," Tactical Air Forces lntero

Group Report, Langley Air Force Base, VA, 1983, pp. 22-33. 

53 lbid., p. 27. 

54 See Bolen, op. cit., pp. 2-8. 

55 Ibid. See also Robertson, op. cit. pp. 39-42. 

56 U.S. Defense Dept., Memorandum by Under Secretary of Defense for Res

Engineering Gerald P. Dinneen; Subject: JTIDS; Sept. 5, 1978; p. 1. S

Dinnccn JTIDS memoranda under this heading are cited as Dinneen JTIDS M

the corresponding date. 

57 Robertson, op. cir., p. 44. 

58 Dinneen JTIDS Memo, March 15, 1979. 

59 U.S. Navy, Memorandum for the secretary of the navy by the assistant secret

navy for research, engineering, and systems; Subject: JTIDS; Apt. 27, 1979; p. 

60 Dinncen JTIDS Memo, Aug. 2, 1979. 

61 HASC C31 Panel, pp. 24-26. 

62 U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Congress by the Comptroller G

the United States: The Joint Tactical Information Distribution System--How 

Is It? PSAD-80-22 (Washington: GPO, Jan. 30, 1980), pp. ill-v, et passim. 

63 U.S. Navy, Memorandum for the under secretary of defense for rese
12, 1981, p. 3. 

67 U.S. Defense Dept., Memorandum from the director, Theater and Tacti

acting deputy under secretary of defense (C31); Subject: JTIDS Program 

May 21, 1981; p. 3. 

68 U.S. General Accounting Office, Letter from director, GAO Mission 

Systems Acquisition Div., to the secretary of defense; Subject: Need 

JTIDS Requirements and Architecture; Apr. 2, 1982. 

69 U.S. Defense Dept., Letter from the under secretary of defense for 

engineering to director, GAO Mission Analysis and Systems Acquisition 

1982. Cited portion is from p. 3 of enclosure to basic correspondence. 

70 Ibid., pp. 2-3 (basic correspondence). 

71 John C. Cittadino, "Advancing C3: A View from OSD," Signal 3g:9 (M

123-129. 

72 Col. William S. Jones, "Army Firms Up JTIDS Planning," Battlefield Ele

1982), pp. 81-87. 

73 Army JTIDS Plan, p. 46. Cited figures are in 1981 dollars. 

74 See also U.S. Army, "Revised PLRS/JTIDS Hybrid Operational and 

Plan," Combined Arms Center (AZTL-CAC-CC), Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 

pp. 2-1 to 2-5. 

75 lbid., p. 1-2. 

76 U.S. Congress, House, Department of Defense Authorization of Appropr

1985 and Previously Authorized Programs, Committee on Armed Service

2nd Sess., 1984 (HASC 98-34), pp. 1300-1301: hereafter HASC 1984. 

77 Ibid., pp. 1296-1298. 

78 U.S. Congress, House, Hearings on HR. 2287, Department of Defense A

,4ppropriations for FY 1984 and Oversight of Previously Authoriz

Committee on Armed Services, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 1983 (HAS

1233-1234; hereafter, HASC 1983. 

79 HASC 1984, pp. 456-457. 

80 U.S. Congress, House, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 5968, 

Defense Authorization of Appropriations for FY 1983, Committee on A

97th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1982 (HASC 97-33), pp. llS0-1151; hereafter, HA

81 HASC 1983, pp. 1226-1227. 

82 Ibid., pp. 1231-1232. 

83 Benjamin F. Schemmer, "OSDAJK Agree on Common JTIDS as U.S. N

Its Program," Armed Forces Journal International 121:6 (Jan. 1984), p. 1

84 U.S. Congress, House, Hearings on H.R. 1872, Department of Defense A

Appropriations for FY 1986 and Oversight of Previously ,4uthori

Committee on Armed Services, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 1985 (HASC 99-2), 

85 ibid., p. 233. 

86 Ibid., p. 760. 

87 John Englund, "'JTIDS: Diary of a $600 Million Dollar Fiasco," Washin
92 Weapons 1989. p. 123. 

93 OSD, "C3I System Review Committee of JTIDS," Briefing packet, Nov. g, 198

94 Ibid. 

95 HASC 1984, p. 1306. 

96 Philip J. Klass and Benjamin M. Elson, "'Broad Technology Gains Made," 

Week andSpace Technology 114:7 (Feb. 16, 1981), pp. 47-82. 

97 Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Satellite Arena Twenty Years atter Sputnik," Arme

Journal International (Feb. 1978), p. 29. 

Chapter 8 Historical Linkages and Future Implications 

1 The strategic paradigms noted here are discussed at length in chapter 3 

Clausewitz, and Mahan), and chapter 4 (Douhet). The relationship betwee

ideologies and competition for defense resources is addressed in chapter I. 

Arnold Kanter, Defense Politics (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1979). Of 

is also possible to argue that black is a delicate shade of white, and that these 

are the subtle underpinnings of a delicately balanced military, policy supporting 

strategic objectives. See, for example, William T. Pendley, "The U.S. Nav~, 

Defenses, and the Airland Battle," in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff et al., eds., E

Doctrines and Technologies (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1988), pp. 189-199. 

2 Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge: Harv

Press, 1987), pp. 156-174. 

3 Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), 

4 Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., National Security and the General Staff (Wa

Infantry Journal Press, 1946), pp. 578-580. 

5 Maj. Gen. Clay T. Buckingham, "The Requirements of Environmental Threat," 

M. Rockwell, ed., Tactical C3 for the Ground Forces (Washington: AFCE

1985), p. 325. 

6 A paper prepared at the Army's Combat Studies Institute presents a succinct 

of this practice. See Maj. Gary B. Griffin, "The Directed Telescope: A T

Element of Effective Command," U.S. Army Command and General Staff Co

Leavenworth, KS, May 20, 1985. On the personal intervention of ground com

as a function of command and control in land warfare, see chaps 2 and 3 in thi

7 Charles Peters, "From Ouagadougou to Cape Canaveral: Why the Bad News 

Travel Up," Washington Monthly (April 1986), p. 27. 

8 During the second session of the Ninety-ninth Congress, Rep. Jim Courter (R

member of the House Armed Services Committee, went so far as to introduce l

that would have abolished the defense agencies and transferred their function

the services. 

9 Rear Adm. J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: ,4 General Theory of Power Cont

Brunswick, N J: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1966), p. 67. 

10 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard Un

1981), p. 195. 
12, 1986, pp. 14-29, 104-120. 

17 Ibid. (Title II, Sec. 153, [a]5), p. 18. 

18 U.S., Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-7), "Joint Doctrine 

briefing, 1987; see also JCS Pub. 1-01, Joint Publication System, dotn

domt Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program (Was

April 15, 1988). 

19 Irving B. Holley, Jr., "Doctrine and Technology of Warfare," in Pfaltzgr

18. 

Throughout much of 1988, the military educational establishment was th

inquiry by a special panel of the House Armed Services Commit

Representative Ike Skelton of Missouri. The panel's final report addressed 

to the strengthening of the joint educational curriculum but also view

education system as a whole, recommending a number of steps to advan

strategy within that system. See U.S. Congress, House, Report of the Pa

Education of the One Hundredth Congress of the Committee On Armed S

of Representatives, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., Comm. Print No. 4, A

(Washington: GPO, 1989). 

Samuel P. Huntington, American Military Strategy, Policy Papers i

Affairs No. 28 (Berkeley: University of California Institute for Interna

1986), p. 13. 

One of the foremost exponents of this view of C3I is Army Captain Ralp

novel Red Army (New York: Pocket Books, 1989) is a gripping portr

theaterwide battlefield that develops from a post-INF Soviet invasi

Europe. His nonfictional works have also stressed the linkage of in

lethality-for example, "The Age of Fatal Visibility," Military Review 

1988), pp. 49-59. 

Holley, op. cit., p. 30. 

Chapter 9 Epilogue: Desert Storm and Information Age Wa

20 

21 

22 

23 

1 Paul H. Nitze, "Is It Time "I'o Junk Our Nukes?" Washington Post, Jan

p. CI. 

2 John Arquilla and David Ronfelt, "Cyberwar Is Coming!" Comparative S

2 (1993): 141. 

3 Senator Bill Bradley, "For the Record," Washington Post. April 21, 1992

4 DoD Directive S-3600.1, Feb. 1996. 

5 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Ox

Press, 1982), pp. 66, 84. 

6. Carl yon Clauscwitz, On War, trans, and ed. Michael Howard an

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), i17 (original empha

summed up the problem this way: "The general unreliability of all infor

a special problem in war: all action takes place, so to speak, in a kind of 
(g, g, 9)

9 Alan D. Campen, "Communications Support to Intelligence," in Alan D. Ca

The First Information War (Faiffax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1992), p

10 William J. Perry, "Desert Storm and Deterrence," Foreign Affairs 70, no. 4 (

66-82. 

li Ibid., p. 69. 

12 Ibid., p. 75. 

13 Ibid., p. 76. Subsequent scholarship has inevitably caused these figures to be r

as more details of"friction" become available. See Rick Atkinson, Crusade: 

Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), espe

216-236. See also Thomas A. Ke, aney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Airpow

Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993). 

14 Perry, "Desert Storm and Deterrence," p. 76. 

15 Quoted in Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Fi

to the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 55

16 Dick G. Howe, quoted by Peter Grief in "'The Data Weapon," Government Ex

no. 6 (1992): 21. 

17 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, 559~n-\560. 

18 ibid., 563\-568. Satellite communications were so important in Desert Storm 

ultimately provided 75 percent of all SHF connectivity to the forces in the the

K-32). 

19 Thomas S. Swalm, "Joint STARS in Desert Storm," in Campen, The First In

War, pp. 167-170. See also two related articles in Signal 45, no. 12 (1991

Electronic Marvels Set for Multiple Upgrades," pp. 53-55, and "Soldiers 

Battle Data for Tactical Control," pp. 46-48. 

20 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, pp. 569-570. 

21 See Joseph S. Toma, "Desert Storm Communications," in Campen, 

Information War, p. 105. 

22 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, p. 546. 

23 See, supra., pp. 168-188. 

24 U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5. Operations (Washington, D.C.: Hea

Department of the Army, 1986), 12-18. For a fuller discussion of the evolu

doctrine, see John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The De

of Army Doctrine 1973-1982 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and 

Command, 1984). 

25 John A. Warden, The Air Campaign (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1988), p

26 Ibid., pp. 53-54. 

27 Army-air force tensions during the air campaign are reported extensively in 

Crusade, pp. 216-240 et passim. 

.28 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, p. 98. 

29 General H. Norman Schwar'zkopf, "Why Desert Storm Was a Success," 
121-126. 

33 Campen, The First Information War, p. 25. 

34 Ibid., pp. 171-177. 

35 House Armed Services Committee, Defense for a New Era, p. 23. 

36 Ibid., p. 37. 

37 Campen, The First ]nformation War, p. 56. 

38 See Atkinson, Crusade, pp. 416-421. 

39 Lawrence G. Tesler, "Networked Computing in the 1990s," Scientifc Am

3 (1991): 54-61. 

40 Dr. Alan B. Salisbury, presentation to the annual convention of the 

Communications Electronics Association, Washington, D.C., June 25, 19

41 Michael L. Dertouzos, "Communications, Computers and Networ

American 265, no. 3 (1991): 31. 

42 See Mary C. Fitzgerald, "The Impact of the MTR On Russian Military A

and 2 (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 1993); "Russia's New Mil

RUSlJournal (October 1992): 40-48; and "The Soviet Military and the N

the Persian Gulf," Airpower Journal 5, no. 4 (1991): 64-77. 

43 See Frank Kendall, "Exploiting the MTR," Strategic Review 20, no. 2 

and Major Michael R. Macedonia, "Information Technology in Desert S

Review 72, no. 10 (1992): 34-41. 

44 Lieutenant Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor, "Future Battle: The Merging 

Parameters 22, no.4 (1992): 42. 

45 Michael J. Mazarr ct. al., The Military Technical Revolution: A Structu

(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), 

46 Dr. Thomas P. Rona, presentation to the Information Resources Manag

National Defense University, Washington, D.C., December 3, 1992. 

47 Martin C. Libicki, "Silicon and Security in the Twenty-First Century," S

20, no.3 (1992): 62-65. 

48 Martin C. Libicki and James A. Hazlett, "Do We Need an Information 

Forces Quarterly 1, no.2 (1993): 88-97. 

49 See the following articles on CIM and Strassmann's tenure in the 

McCashin, "Pentagon Peruses Mastery of Corporate Data Systems," Sig

(1991): 81-84; Lisa Corbin, "DOD Inc.," Government Executive 24, 

36-39; and Diane Hamblen, "Paul Strassmann: Turning Our Upside Dow

Side Up," Chips I0, no. 4 (1992): 4-8. 

50 U.S. DoD Directive 8000.1, October 27, 1992. 

51 Ibid., paragraph E.5(a). 

52 U.S. DoD Directive 4630.5, November 12, 1992. 

53 Assistant Secretary of Defense (C31) Emmett Paige, Jr., "Re-engi

Operations: Information Management Impact," address to the Federal 

executive breakfast, Vienna, VA, September 14, 1993. 

54 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 30, "
Navy Policy Paper on a New Warfare Area (Washington, D.C.: Governm

Office, 1992). 

60 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Command and Control Warfare Oper

61 Director of Space and Electronic Warfare, Office of the Chief of Nava

(OP-094), The Copernicus Architecture, Phase 1: Requirements Defini

1991), chapter 3. 

62 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-094), Sonata, Washington, D.C

63 See, for example, General Gordon R. Sullivan and Colonel James M. Dubik, 

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Manual 100-6, Information Operations (Drain), Headquarters, Department o

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64 These advances in the army's intelligence community are well covered 

articles by Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Commanders Pull Intelligence in 

War Strategy" and "Digital Intelligence Extends Army Force Projection Po

48, no. 12 (1994): 29-35. 

65 See U.S. Department of Defense, "Streamlining Defense Acquisition La'w

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Government Printing Office, 1993). 

66 U.S. Congress, House, Conf. Report, Federal Acquisition Streamlining A

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no. 15, (1994): 899-904. 

67 John Keegan, The Mask of Command(New York: Viking, 1987). 

68 Arquilla and Ronfelt, "Cyberwar Is Coming!" pp. 143-144. 

69 Major General J.F.C. Puller, Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure, (Har

Military Service Publishing Company, 1936), p. 61. 

70 Paraphrased from Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, 

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 2-6. 

71 U.S. Congress, Reorganization of the Department of Defense, Hearing

Investigative Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 99th Con

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 8. 

72 Supra., Command, Control and the Common Defense, chapter 8. 

..................................................................................... 
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. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on H.R. 1872, Departme

Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1986 and Oversight 

Authorized Programs. Before the Committee on Armed Services, House 

tives, 99th Cong., Ist sess. HASC 99-2. Washington: GPO, 1985. 

. Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth C

Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. 101st Cong., 1

Print No. 4, April 21, 1989. Washington: GPO, 1989. 

. Committee on Armed Services. Review of DOD Worlchvide Communica

(Mollohan Report). Report of the Armed Services Investigations Subco

Committee on Armed Services, 92nd Cong., 1st sess. Washington: GPO, 1

. Review of the Department of Defense Command, Control, and C

Systems and Facilities. Report by the Command, Control, and Commun

Sub-Committee on Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services, 9

Sess. HASC 94-72. Feb. 18, 1977. Washington: GPO, 1977. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Creation of the American General Staff, by Major G

Harding Carter. Document No. 119. 65th Cong., Ist sess. Washington: GP

. Committee on Armed Services. Defense Organization: The Need for Ch

R. Locher III. Staff Report No. 99-86 to the Committee on Armed Service

1985. Washington: GPO, 1985. 

. Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs on S. 84 and S. 14

1st sess. Washington: GPO, 1945. 

. Legislative History of the Army of the United States. 1775-1901. Docu

56th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1904. 

. Reorganization of the Department of Defense: Hearings before the 

Armed Services, United States Senate. S. Hrg. 99-1083, 99th Cong., 

Washington: GPO, 1987. 

. Report to the Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, on Unificat

and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Secu

Report). Comm. Print. 79th Cong., Ist sess. Wash!ngton: GPO, 1945. 

U.S. Department of Defense. DOD Directive 4230.5. Compatibility and Inte

Tactical Command, Control. Communications and Intelligence System

Washington, July 5, 1984. 

. DOD Directive 5154.28. Joint Tactical Command, Control and C

Agency (ASD-C). Washington, July 5, 1984. 

. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Command and C

Management. Washington: OSD, July 1978. 

. Soviet Military Power. 5th and 6th eds. Washington: GPO, 1986, 1988. 

U.S. General Accounting Office. Report to the Congress by the Comptroller-

United States." The Joint Tactical Information Distribution System--How 

It? PSAD 80-22. Washington: GPO, Jan. 30, 1980. 
1974. 

U.S. National Archives. Records of the War Department General and Special Staf

370.62. "Unity of Command." 
AcMlle Lauro incident, 140 

AEF. See American Expeditionary Force 

Aegis cruiser, 142, 165-67, 210 

Aide system, 71-72 

Airborne Battlefield Command and Control 

Center, 174 

Airborne Warning and Control System 

(AWACS), 143-144, 210; JTIDS and, 

214, 217-20, 222, 236-37, 241 

Airerait carrier, 95, 107, 119, 142, 161-62 

Air defense: capability of Soviet Union, 

143-44, 146, 174-76; proliferation of 

Army weapons for, 219 

Air-ground operations system, 173-74, 184 

Aidand Battle doctrine, 13-14, 171-88; 

Army-Air Force conflict over, 183-86, 

189; Army C2 and, 179-81; Canby's 

objections and, 186-88; Deep Strike 

concept in, 179-80, 185, 186-87; 

ground and air integration problem and, 

152; information lines and, 271; Soviet 

countermeasures and, 187; stages in 

evolution of, 177-79; tenets of, 179-82; 

unresolved issues for, 186 

Air Naval Gunfire Liaison radio nets, 196 

Air power. Army Field Service Regulation 

101-21 and, 108; as component 

command, 106-09; controversies over, 

98; Douhet's influence on, 91-94; early 

advocacy of, 89-91; flexibility of, 

108-09; in interwar period, 90-91; 

service autonomy and, 88; summary of 

theory of, 11; in World War I, 88; in 

World War If, 106-09 

Alexander, Edward P., 60 

Alexander the Great, 29, 37 

Alger, John, 66 

Allied Expeditionary Force, 108 

American Expeditionary Force (AEF), 

85-86, 87 

Amphibious command ships, 111 

Anti-jam radio system, 227-2

234 

Arab-Israeli War (1973), 146

270 

Army Data Distribution Syst

183, 241 

Army 21. See Airland Battle 

Army War College, 78 

Arnold, Henry H., 102, 103, 

ATDMA (Advanced TDMA)

Attrition warfare vs. maneuv

154, 178, 179-80. See als

Battle doctrine 

Aufragstaktik, 154-55 

Automation: battlefield intell

147-48; danger of concep

dependence on, 187; join

operations and, 196-97 

AWACS. See Airborne Warn

Control System 

Backwards compatibility, 22

Baruch, Bernard, 85 

Baseline of interoperability, 

Battista, Anthony R., 234, 23

Battle, as key in war, 55 

Battlefield reconnaissance sy

270 

Battle of Bladensburg, 33, 40 

Battle of Mobile Bay, 62 

Battle of New Orleans, 40 

Beard, Charles A., 24 

Benson, William S., 83 

Berthier, Louis-Al¢xandre, 5

Blair, Bruce G., 18 

Blechman, Barry M., 162 

Boeing E-3A Sentry. See Air

and Control System 

Boyd, John, 153-57, 178 
Bureau of Aeronautics, 94 

Bureau system: Army and, 75, 79; Navy 

and, 70-71, 95 

Butler, Benjamin "'Beast," 62 

Calhoun, John C., 34-36 

Canby, Steven L., 186-87 

Caraley, Demetrios, ! 15, 116, 120 

Caducei, Frank, 202 

Carter, Jimmy, 198-99 

Carter, William Harding, 75, 77, 78, 79, 81 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 113, 

141 

CenUalization: advances in telecommunications and, 137; ofaircraR control, 

108-09; amendment of DCA charter 

and, 198-99; electronically enhanced, 

136-40; postwar rise in, 127-28. See 

also General Staff; Unity of command 

Centralization-decentralization balance: Air 

Force doctrine and, 188, 189; Aidaad 

Battle doctrine and, 184-85; in World 

War If, 100, 109 

CEWI (Combat Electronic Warfare and 

Intelligence) battalion, 147 

Cheney, Richard, 259 

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 71, 73, 

82, 103-04 

Chief of staff, Army, 30. See also General 

Stafl~ Military staff 

CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 113, 

141 

CIC (Combat Information Center), 111 

CINCs. See Commanders-in-chief 

Citizan-soldier. 22-23. See also Militia 

system 

Cittadino, John C., 229 

Civilian control: Army General Staff and, 

79-80; of Army vs. Navy, 41-42; in 

Civil War, 47, 5052, 5660, 62 

Clansewitz, Karl yon, 11, 47. 54-5

261,265 

Cline, Ray, 103, 127 

CNO. See Chief of Naval Operatio

CNO-COMINCH, 104 

Collins, J. Lawton, 118-20 

Combat Electronic Warfare and Int

(CEWI) battalion, 147 

Combat Information Center (C/C), 

Combined arms concept, 31, 32, 89

115 

COMINCH (Commander-in-Chief, 

States Fleet), 104 

Command: controversy over line of

defined, 16; evolution of, in mo

warfare, 18-19; need to extend 

of, 28-30, 32; persona! interven

and, 42, as process, 153, 188; s

of, as internal to services, 2-3; s

in land vs. sea warfare, 125-26. 

also General command structure

National command structure; U

and specified commanders, Uni

commands 

Command, Control, Communication

Intelligence (C31), 198, 202 

Command and control" approaches 

problem of, 8-15; bureaucratic c

of failure in, 190; classical, 37-4

defined, 16; development of join

approaches to, 193-246, dual em

on organization and technology 

17-20; environment of, 252-53; 

in 1960s of, 138; formative influ

on, 125-49; future directions for

historical linkages of, 247-55; in 

Mexican War, 43-46; in ninetee

century, 41-43; structural anoma

3-8 

Command and control community, 

Command and control system: Airla
tasks in choice of, 258; management of 

defense technology and, 255-56; 

modularity in, 155, 162, 168; 

service-related emphasis and, 131-32; 

superagency proposal and, 259 

Command and control warfare, 5, 256-57 

Command centers: on-board systems and, 

165-67; shore-based systems and, 165, 

166, 169 

Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet 

(COMINCH), 104 

Commanders-in-chief (CINCs): Airland 

Battle doctrine and, 173; GoldwaterNichols provisions and, 3; influence on 

weapons development, 190 

Command structure. See General command 

structure; National command sm~cture 

Commerce, role of Navy in, 24, 65-66, 112 

Commonality: defined, 197-98; functional 

networks and, 196; skepticism about, 

242; as threat, 135; weapons 

procurement and, 134-35. See also 

TRI-TAC program 

Communications system: intersetvice 

compatibility and, 4; naval command 

structure and, 38; sender- vs. 

receiver-orientation of, 212; technologicarl advances in, and power of OSD, 

134-36; in Vietnam air war, 174; in 

World War I, 82-83. See also 

Telecommunications 

Component command: air power as, 

106-07; in unified command structure, 

106, 120.21 

Composite warfare doctrine, 142-43. See 

also Aegis cruiser 

"Compunications," 137 

Computer technology: battlefield 

automation and, 148; in command 

centers, 138; interservice rivalry and, 7; 

limitations of, 139-40, 167, 255-56; in 

modern naval C2 systems, 160-61,167; 

security issues and, 210, 211,215-17; 

establishment, 22, 23-24; Se

hearings on defense organiz

(1985), 1-2, 15; TRI-TAC p

204-205; Woodrum commit

hearings, 114-15 

Coningham, Arthur, 10g 

Constituency interests, 80 

Continental theory, i 1, 13-14 

Control: pride of position and, 

of, in nineteenth century, 39

process, 153, 188. See also 

and control 

Cooper, Thomas, 237 

Coordinative authority, 81-82 

Cost-analysis: McNamara's use 

134; prioritization of C2 sy

199-200 

Coulam, Robert F., 135 

Counterintelligence/human inte

0-1UMINT), 145 

Creech, Wilbur L., 233-34 

Crisis management: politico-m

coordination and, 135-36; 

nications and, 138, 140-41

naval forces in, 169; vs. w

scenarios, and naval C2 sy

! 69-70 

Crowe, William, 167 

C31 (Command, Control, Com

and Intelligence), 198, 202 

C2. See Command and Contro

Cuban missile crisis, 135-36 

Cushman, John H., 5, 190-91

Dahlgren, John A., 52 

Daniels, Josephus, 83, 127 

Darling, Charles H., 73 

Data-handling issues: Aegis c

166-67; NTDS and, 165-

168-69 
limited to, 210; in JINTACCS, 206-08; 

by Joint Chiefs of Staff, 117-18 

Defense agencies: creation of, 26-28; 

reorganization in 1800s of, 33-36 

Defense Authorization Act (1972), 201 

Defense budget: bureaucratic proliferation 

and, 130; Congressional control and, 

201; development of joint approaches 

and, 114, 115, 195; JTIDS program 

and, 239-40; services' influence on, 

130-32; services' roles and missions 

and, 127-28; unification debate of 

1940sand, 114, 115 

Defense Communications Agency (DCA), 

137, 199-200 

Defense Electronics (journal), 153 

Defense Resources Board, 202, 259 

Defense Science Board: C2 management 

study and, 198; superagency proposal 

and, 259 

Delalield, Richard, 54 

Department of Defense (DOD): centralization vs. autonomy and, 132-40; 

civil-military partnership and, 243-44; 

decentralized management in, 228-29, 

230; Directive S-5100.30 (WWMCCS), 

137-40; establishment of, 113; 

integration of planning and, 130-31; 

under McNamara, 132-37; powers of 

OSD and, 128-29; summary of Soviet 

capabilities by, 175-76; technological 

choices and, 258-59. See also Office of 

the Secretary of Defense 

Department of the Navy, 26-27, 32 

DePuy, William E., 176-77 

Dickinson, William L., 235, 237-44 

Digital data flows, speed of, 210, 212 

Dinnecn, Gerald P., 139, 151, 198-99, 

225-26 

"Directed telescope" function, 256 

Donnelly, Christopher, 178 

Doolittle, James, 119 

Douhet, Giulio, 11, 91-93, 94, 9

250, 261 

DTDMA (Distributed Time Divi

Multiple Access), 222-28, 22

236-38 

DTDMA/TDMA controversy, 22

229-32, 236-38 

Dupuy, Trevor, 53 

Eaglet, Robert D., 235 

Eberstadt, Ferdinand, 118, 131 

Eberstadt Plan, 118, 119, 120-21 

ECM (Electronic countermeasures

Educational establishmenL 53, 26

20 

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Defense 

Department reorganization and

unity of command and, 106, 1

Electronic command and control. 

SeeTelecommunications 

Electronic countermeasures (ECIV

Electronic warfare (EGO, 142-43; 

Arab-lsraeli War, 146; beginni

World War I, 87; Grenada inva

4-5; modem naval C2 systems 

170', precision-guided munition

141 

Encryption, in JTIDS, 215-17 

Englund, John, 239, 240 

Enhanced JTIDS (EJS), 233, 234 

Ericsson, John, 51 

EW. See Electronic warfare 

Executive agencies, 200 

• Executive Order 9096, 103-04 

Fallows, James, 178 
Kaplan), 162 

Forre~tal, James, 117, 120, 126 

Fox, Gustavus V., 57 

Frederick the Great, 30 

Fremont, John C., 44, 45 

Frequency hopping, 205, 21 i-12 

Fuller, J. F. C., 101 

Furer, Julius, 125 

Gabriel, Charles A., 185-86 

General Accounting Office (GAO): JTIDS 

program and, 221,224; WWMCCS 

controversy and, 137 

General Board of the Navy, 70, 72, 73 

General command structure: air paradigm 

and, 93-95; Civil war and, 56-57; at 

component command level, 106; 

evolution of, 26-36; functional 

integration of, 100-109; at high 

command level, 100-103; int~rscrvic¢ 

differences in, 71-73; Mahan's 

influence on, in Navy, 68-73, 

operational forces and, 106-09; 

Spanish-American War and, 73-82; at 

unified command level, 105-06; World 

War Ii and, 99-109. See also specific 

services 

General Dynamics Corporation, 134 

General Staff: of the Army, 70, 77-82, 

84-85, 101-02; naval command 

structure and, 70-73, 79-g0; postwar 

defense establishment and, 115-16; 

Prussian, 52-56 

General sa'ategic paradigm. See Joint 

paradigm 

Geopolitical requirements, and joint 

approaches, 194 

German U-boat, 83, 112 

Global reach, 160-71 

Gneiscnau, August von, 53 

Grumman Corp., 134 

Guderian, Heinz, 110 

Guerrilla warfare, 145, 306 n

Gustavus Adolphus (Swedish 

lladlcy, Arthur T., g-9 

Halleck, Henry Wager, 49 

Halsey, William F., 117, lie, 

Hamilton, Alexander, 23-24, 

Hammond, Paul Y., 106, 116

Hann¢, William G., 9 

Harbord, James G., 85-87 

HAVE CLEAR, 233 

HAVE QUICK, 227 

Hertel, Dennis, 238-39 

Hczlet, Arthur, 111 

Hickam, Horace M., 94 

Higham, Robin, 94 

Hittle, J. D., 28, 3 i 

Holley, I. B., Jr., 153, 268, 2

Hull, William, 40 

HUMINT (Counterintelligenc

intelligence), 14546 

Huntington, Samuel P., 10-1

35, 126, 264, 270 

Ideology, 11. See also Strateg

Indian fighting, 41, 65 

inforraation. See Intelligence 

Information age, warfare in, 

Information flows, 210, 215, 

Integration: pressures for, 19

autonomy and, 171-72; o

planning by DOD, 130-3

War 1I forces, 99-109 

Intelligence: Army developm

144-48; developments in 

144--48; guerrilla warfare 
197; ~directed telescope function and, 

257-58; DTDMA-TDMA controversy 

and, 237-38; infrastructure of, 205-06, 

259-60; JINTACCS vs. TRI-TAC 

approach toward, 203-04; Joint Chiefs 

of Staff "memorandum of procedure" 

on, 202-03; JTIDS as backbone of, 241; 

key leadership tasks for, 257; Navy 

planning and, 171-72; problems of, in 

Grenada invasion, I-2, 3-5, 6, 15, 

195-96; rapid technological change and, 

168-69 

lnterservice cooperation: interservice 

agencies and, 252; in Mexican War, 

43-45 

Interservice organization: lack of joint 

paradigm and, 262-64; national 

command structure and, 251-52. See 

also Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Interservice relationships: Airland Battle 

doctrine and, 181-83; in Civil War, 

61-63; in interwar years, 95-98; joint 

paradigm and, 265-66; in SpanishAmerican War, 75-76 

lntraservice loyalties, 19 

Iranian airbus tragedy, 165, 166-67 

Iranian hostage rescue mission, 195 

Jackson, Andrew, 41 

Jargon, I 51 

JCS. See Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Jefferson, Thomas, 27 

JINTACCS program, 204-09 

Johnson, Frederick C., 160 

Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 

(Joint Boards), 96-97 

Joint Board of the Army and Navy, 74, 76, 

95-96 

Joint Chiefs of Staff: C3 Systems 

Directorate and, 199-200; decisionmaking process in, 117-18; develop

y , , , 

proliferation of C2 systems and, 

259-60; service autonomy and, 1

service membership of personnel 

254; technological choice and, 16

259-60. See also Joint Staff J-6 

Joint doctrine, development of, 267-6

Joint operation: during Civil War, 62

communication and, 196; Joint A

and, 97; in World War 11, 109, 1

Joint paradigm: absence of, 260-65; 

operational strategy and, 269-70; 

doctrinal refinement process and, 

267-69; nature of, 265-67 

Joint Staff J-6, 259, 260 

Joint Staff J-7 Directorate, and joint 

doctrine, 267 

Joint Tactical Command, Control, an

Communications Agency, 203. 25

Joint Tactical Information Distributio

System (JTIDS): agreements on p

for, 220-21; Air Force and Navy 

divergence on, 232-40; Air Force 

applications for, 217-18; architect

of, 221,222-27, 228-29; Army 

applications for, 219-20, 229, 231

battlefield information flow and, 2

capabilities of, 216-17; classes of 

terminals in, 220-21; concept of, 

211-17, 214-16; C2 environment 

251-53; developments from 1981 

1985, 228-40; developments to 19

209-28; DTDMA/TDMA controve

and, 222-27,236-38; goal of 

interoperability and, 258, 259; 

implications of experience of, 242

interservice disagreements on, 221

Marine Corps applications for, 219

Navy applications for, 218-19; Na

Airforce commitment levels, 235-3

tactical applications and, 218-19; 

technological offspring of, 240-41

See also Army Data Distribution 

System 
Kanter, Arnold, 12 

Kaplan, Steven, 162 

Kearfott, Singer, 231 

Kearny, Stephen W., 45-46 

Kelley, Paul X., 7 

Kennedy, John F., 136 

Kimmel, H. E., 98-99, 103-04 

King, Ernest.L, 104, 105, 114, 117, 118 

Kingston, Robert, 194 

Kinney, J. C., 62 

Kirksey, Robert E., 235 

Kluge, Hans yon, 109 

Knox, Frank, 114-15 

Kriegsakademie, 53 

Kuhn, Thomas S., ! 1-12 

Land navigation, problems of, 219-20 

Land power theory, i !, 13-14 

Land warfare: command style and, 125-26; 

developments leading to paradigm for, 

48-56; evolution of military staff for, 

28-31; nineteenth-century technology 

and, 50-53; unity of command and, 29; 

visual signals in, 37-38, 41-42 

LASERSATCOM, 245 

Latham, Donald C., 197, 228-40 

Lawson, Joel S., C2 model of, 155-57, 162 

Layton, Edwin T., 275 hi6 

Leahy, William D., 105 

Legere, Lawrence J., Jr., 95-96 

Lehman, John, 5, 238, 240 

Leopold, Richard, 80 

Levels-of-analysis problem, 19-20 

Lincoln, Abraham, 57, 58, 59 

/.,ocher, James R., Ill, 4, 195 

Luttwak, Edward N., 13-14, 255 

MacArthur, Douglas, 86 

McNarney Plan, 114 

Madison, James, 23, 24 

Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 11, 32

47, 57, 250, 261,262; Do

doctrines and, 92-93; Influ

Power upon History, 65-7

strategy and, 64-70 

Mahan, Dennis Hart, 49, 67 

"Maneuver warfare school," 1

"Man-in-the-loop" problem, 2

Mann, D. E., 226 

March, Peyton C., 84-85 

Marconi, Marchese, 67 

Maritime strategy, 11, 12, 14-

Marshall, George C., 101-02, 

Mason, John, 44 

Meade, George G., 58, 59, 60 

Message standards, and JTIDS

225, 233 

Mexican War (1846-48), 43-4

Meyer, E. C., 139-40 

Meyer, G. V. L., 71 

Miles, Nelson A., 76, 79-80 

Military education, 74, 77, 16

n20 

Military failures, and joint app

Military force: components of

Navy, 162-64; concentrati

functional complexity of, 2

operational characteristics 

of, 28-29 

Military history, themes in, 19 

Military organization: absence 

paradigm and, 262-63; in 

Navy, 250-51; autonomy a

evolution of, 2%36; gener

structure and, 251; pride o

86; Prussian system of, 52

differences in, 125-26; str

paradigms and, 250-5 i 
Military tradition, 10, 257 

Militia system, 33, 74-75 

Millis, Walter, i 10 

Mitchell, William ("Billy"), 1 I, 90-91, 99, 

173, 250 

Mitre Corporation, 211,212 

Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE), 

! 82-83 

Modernization: pace in 1970s of, 151; 

problems of, 151-91 ; service differences 

in strategies for, 161; of Soviet forces, 

176-77, 178-79 

Modularity, in C2 system, 155, 162. 

168-69 

Moffett, William A., 94-95 

Moltke, Helmuth yon, 268 

Momyer, William, 108 

Moorer, Thomas, 136 

Morison, Samuel Eliot, 112 

Morse, Samuel F. B., 51 

Moses, 29, 308 n20 

MSE (Mobile Subscriber Equipment), 

182-83 

Mustin, H. C., 167 

Myer, Albert James, 60, 61 

Nagler, Gordon R., 236, 23%38 

Napoleon, 48-50 

National command authority (NCA), 200 

National command structure: autonomy 

and, 10; in Civil War, 57-61; 

emergence of Joint Chiefs of Staff and, 

105-06; interservice organization and, 

251-53; in Mexican War, 43-44; in 

modem age. 131; National Security Act 

and, 252; in World War I, 85-86; in 

World War II, 105-10 

National Defense Act (1916), 81 

National Defense University (NDU), 17 

National security strategy report, 3 

National strategy, and service autono

14, 254 

National values, and character of C2

247-49 

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization 

Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS)

161,166-68 

Naval War Board, 71 

Navy EC-121 reconnaissance airera

incident, 138 

NDU (National Defense University), 

Nelson, Otto L., Jr., 86, 102, 256 

Net Control Units (NCU), 220, 23 I 

Ney, Virgil, 30 

Normandy invasion, and service 

integration, 109 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO): interoperability issues, 

JTIDS concept and, 212; Soviet f

and, 175, 177-79; tactical air con

system and, ! 75 

NTDS..gee Naval Tactical Data Syst

Nuclear weapons: air power paradigm 

115-16; Defense Department 

management and, 133; integrated 

and, 136-37; service strategies an

strategic C2 and, 18 

Nutting, Wallace H., 4 

Ocean area tactical integration, 163 

Offensive, as key to victory, 49 

Office of Management and Budget (O

200 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operatio

(CNO), 7 I, 73, 82, 103-04 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (O

amendments of 1958 to National 
autonomy and, 135. See also 

Department of Defense 

OMB. See Office of Management and 

Budget 

O-O-D-A (Observation, orientation, 

decision, and action) model, 153-54, 

178 

Operational environment: command style 

and, 125-26; C2 problems of land 

warfare and, 171-72; electronic 

surveillance and, 142; general strategic 

paradigm and, 264-65; JTIDS and, 232, 

233-34; military organization and, 8-9; 

modern C2 and, 158, 160; service 

autonomy and, 45, 248, 249; service 

differences in, 8-9, 19, 188-89; 

technological superiority and, 19 

Orr, George E., 155 

OSCAR submarine (U.S.S.R.), 164 

OSD. See Office of the Secretary of 

Defense 

Packard, David, 138, 201 

Panama canal, and naval policy, 66, 67 

Paradigms. See Strategic paradigms 

Parallel systems, and JINTACCS vs. 

TRI-TAC approaches, 208-09 

Parer, Peter, 15 

Patterson, Robert P., 116, 122 

Paullin, Charles O., 70, 72-73 

Pearl Harbor, 98-99, 315 hi6 

Perry, Matthew C., 44-45, 51 

Pershing, John J., 85-86, 132 

Personal intervention by commanders, 

41-42 

Peters, Charles, 256-57 

Peters, Ralph, 331 n22 

Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 

System. See Cost-analysis 

PLRS-JTIDS Itybrid, 220, 221,230-32, 

Prange, Gordon W., 98-99 

Precision-guided munitions (P

140-42; demands for C2 ef

209; modem naval C2 and

as threat to naval force, 16

President: Army-Navy differen

role in defense establishme

also Executive agencies; an

presidents 

Procurement process: army ser

and, 84; cost-analysis and, 

JTIDS experience and, 242

autonomy and, 148-49; ser

in, 15-16; systems for join

menl, 132; unified comma

Professionalism: citizen-soldie

interoperability and, 261; i

tradition, 10; "service teeh

264; strategic paradigms a

yon Steuben, 30 

Prussian military organization, 

74-75 

Public perception, and joint ap

195 

Quartermaster-general's office

Quesada, Elwood, 109 

Railroad, 51, 53 

Range extension: modem nava

and, 163-65; Soviet threat 

165-66. See also Global re

Ransom, Harry Howe, 113 

Reagan, Ronald: C2 managem

defense buildup under, 2, 

centralization and, 140; us

by, 16 i-62 

Receiver-oriented communica

213, 218, 244,328 n37 

Rechtin, Eberhardt, 169, 170 
, , 

Richardson, James O., 114 

Richardson committee report, ! 18-19 

Ries, John C., 116 

Rifled projectile, 52 

Robertson, Brock, 222 

Rockwell Collins, 228 

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 104-05 

Roosevelt, Theodore, 67 

Root, Elihu, 77-80, 99 

Rosinski, Herbert, 68 

Rumsf¢ld, Donald, 139 

Sampson, William, 76 

Scharnhorst, Gerhard yon, 52-53 

Schlesinger, James R., 212 

Scott, Winfield, 44 

Sea power strategy, 1 I, 12, 14-15 

Sea warfare: paradigm for, 65-73; visual 

signals in, 38 

Security of telecommunications system, 

210,211,215-]6 

SEEK TALK, 225, 227, 233 

Senate Bill 2044, 121 

Sender- vs. receiver-oriented communications, 212. See also Joint Tactical 

Information Distribution System 

Service agencies, joint C2 systems and, 

202-09 

Service autonomy: air power and, 89-90; 

electronic C2 and, I l 1-12; ideology 

and, 250; intellectual underpinnings of, 

10-12; intcroperability and, 17; legacy 

of, and C2 conflict, 252-53; merits of, 

253; Mexican War C2 and, 45-46; 

national concerns and, 253-55; under 

National Security Act, 122-23; need for 

unity of command and, 7-8; objective 

and subjective civilian control and, 23; 

operational environment and, 248-49; 

Service command structure. See G

command structure 

Service organization. See Military 

organization 

Service paradigms. See Strategic p

ShaRer, William R., 76 

Sherman, William Tecumseh, 75, 

Short, Walter C., 98-99 

Signal (journal), 18, 153 

Signal communications, 38-39, 60

Simpkin, Richard, 256 

SINCGARS. See Single.Channel 

Ground/Airborne Radio System 

Singer Kearfott, 228 

Single-Channel Ground/Airborne R

System (SINCGARS), 182 

Single Integrated Operations Plan (

133-34 

SIOP. See Single Integrated Opera

Plan 

Skelton, Ik¢, 331 n20 

"Skip-echeloning," 139 

Smith, Perry M., 92-93 

Snyder, Frank, 17 

Soviet Military Power (Department 

Defense), 175 

Soviet Union: air defense capability 

142.-43, 145, 174; military buil

175-77; modem naval threats fr

163-64, 165-66 

Spanish-American War, 67, 73-82 

Sprout, H., 36 

Sprout, M., 36 

Staffaction cycle, 28 

Stanton, Edwin M., 57, 61 

Starry, Donn A., 178, 180 

States, Constitutional role of, 22 

Steam propulsion, 64-65 
and, 173; Air Force views on Airland 

Battle doctrine and, 183-84; air power 

doctrine and, 92-93; competitiveness of, 

250; data-voice controversy and, 

234-35; joint paradigm and, 260-70; 

Jominian legacy and, 48-49; modem C2 

and, 158; Naval paradigm and, 116-17; 

postwar unification debate and, 113-24; 

service autonomy and, 250; service 

differences and, 11; service organizations and, 250-51; stability provided by, 

261-62; in World War II combat, 106 

Strategic planning, and defense leadership, 

243 

Subordination: cooperation and, 62; Naval 

separation and, 26-27; operational 

characteristics of forces and, 29; 

organizational strategies of services 

and, 2%36 

Summers, Harry, 196 

Superagency for C2 systems, 259-60 

Surface-to-air missiles (SAM), 143 

Survivability of computer technology, 

151-52, 171 

Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), 

174-75 

Tactical control: in Civil War, 52; Indian 

fighting and, 41; maps and clocks and, 

310 n4g; in Navy, 42; telecommunications and, 110-13; World War I Army 

communications and, g7. See also 

Automation 

Tactical digital information link (TADIL), 

208, 221-22 

Tactical fighter, experimental (TFX), 

134-35 

Tactical Flag Command Center (TFCC), 

168-69 

TADIL (Tactical digital information link), 

20g, 221-22 

services in, with develo

1970s, 148; service org

251; uncertainties of co

equipment and, 255-56 

Technological risk, 232, 23

Technology: advances in, a

advantage, 270-71; Airl

doctrine and, 179-80; o

Revolution, 50-52; from 

244-45; modern naval w

scenarios, 170; need for 

in, 17; neutrality of, 24

century military operati

59-60, 68-69; role of, in 

ments, 140.49; service 

171-72. See also Comp

Telecommunications; W

technology 

"redder, Arthur, 108 

Telecommunications: centr

136-37, 138; security is

211,215-16; systems fo

target, 169-70; World W

100, 110-13 

Telegraph: Civil War use o

of, 50-5 I, 53; naval thr

World War II, 87 

Telephone, 87 

Telephone-system thinking, 

Territory, emphasis on cont

58 

Theater perspective, i 88-91 

Time Division Multiple Ac

214-15, 222-28, 236-38 

Training, for modem naval 

scenarios, 170 

TRI-TAC program, 204-06, 

also Commonality 

Trost, Carlisle H., 166-67 

Truman, Harry, 119, 121-2
p, ; , y

development, 196 

Unified Command Plan, 121 

Unified commands: peacetime structure of, 

121-22; in World War 1I, 105 

U.S. Air Force: Airland Battle doctrine and, 

183-85; Army-Navy rivalry and, 107; 

creation of, 92, 113; combat 

technologies of 1970s and, 140, 141, 

142-43; JTIDS applications for, 218-19; 

JTIDS architecture and, 223-28; JTIDS 

Class 1 terminals and, 221; JTIDS Class 

II terminals and, 229, 241; as lead 

service for YrlDS program, 214-15, 

227, 229, 236; modern C2 systems and, 

173-74; operational environment for, 9; 

TFX episode and, 133; unification 

debate of 1940s and, 114-16; War 

Department reforms of 1942 and, 103 

U.S. Army: Air Corps, 92-93, 96, 103; air 

power and, 87; battlefield technologies 

of 1970s and, 142.-49; in Civil War, 

56-57, 64; command structure in, 

73-81; Constitutional perspectives on, 

24-26; evolution of organization in, 

28-31, 33-34; Field Service Regulation 

100-20, 108; FM 100-5, 145-46, 

176-77; FM 100-5, revised, 178, 

181-82; ground force control of aircrat~ 

and, 107; JTIDS and, 228, 227-28; 

nineteenth-century C2 in, 39-41; 

operational environment for, 9; 

premoderu communications in, 180-81; 

service bureaus in, 73-74, 83; Spanish 

American War and, 73-81; strategic 

paradigm of, 12-13; World War I battle 

staff in, 85-86; World War 11 

telecommunications in, 110; unification 

debate of 1940s and, 114-16. See also 

War Department 

U.S. Army Signal Corps, 60, 87 

U.S. Constitution, service autonomy and, 

21-26 

; pp

24-26; C2 systems in, 160-71

evolution of organization in, 2

34-36; intraservice loyalties in

JTIDS and, 5-7, 218-19, 222-

Mahan's influence on, 64-73; 

combat technology and, 163; 

C2 systems in, 157, 160-71; N

Department and, 26-27; opera

environment for, 9; strategic p

of, 12, 67-68, 161-62; TFX ep

and, 133-35; unification deba

1940s and, 114, 115; in Worl

g2-83; in World War II, 103-0

Unity of command: advent of air 

and, 93, 96-97; Army General 

and, 80; Clausewitz and, 55; F

the Great and, 30; Joint Board 

Army and the Navy and, 94-9

warfare and, 29; in Navy, 32; 

Polk, 43, 45; precedent set by 

Washington, 3 i; pressure for, 

modem warfare, 29-30; quest 

War Department reorganizatio

102-03; World War I1 and, 89, 

See also National command st

Upshar, Abel P., 35-36 

Upton, Emory, 74 

USS Liberty, 138 

USS Pueblo, 138, 195 

USSR. See Soviet Union 

Van Crev¢ld, Marlin, 18-19 

Very High Speed Integrated Circui

(VHSIC), 221,244 

Vietnam conflict, 139, 140, 142-4

Vincennes incident, 162, 163-64 

Visual signals, 38-39, 41-42 

Voice: drawbacks of radio systems 

209-10, 219; in JTIDS architec

215-17, 234-35. See also Data-

controversy 
War of 1812, 32-36, 39-41 

War Plan ORANGE, 95-96 

Washington, George, 30-3 i 

Watson, Mark S., 115 

Wayne, Anthony, 31 

Weapons technology: developments of 

1970s in, 140-49; in late-nineteenthcentury Navy. 69; modem naval C2 

and, 160-61; in World War I, 82 

Weinbcrger, Caspar W., I-2 

Weizenbaum, Joseph, 7 

Welchman, Gordon, 211 

Wickham, John A., Jr., ! 85-86 

"Wig-wag" system, 60 

Wilkinson, Spenser, 77 

Williams, T. Harry, 58, 63 

Wilson, Woodrow, 83 

Winterbotham, F. W., 144 

Wireless radio, 47, 67, 83-84, 87. See also 

Electronic warfare 

Wohlstettcr, Roberta, 98-99 

Woodrum, Clifton A., 114 

Woodrum committee, 114-15 

World War I, 82-88 

World War 11, 99-113 

Worldwide Military Command and Control 

System (WWMCCS), 137-39 

Wylie, J. C., 11,261-62, 263-64, 266 

Yom Kippur War, 146, 175, 176, 270 

Young, S. B. M., 79 
y g, 

intelligence assignments in the United States and overs

served on the faculty of the United States Military A

Special Assistant to the Army Chief of Staff, and 

Students at the National War College. He was directly 

two significant Pentagon reforms: as a Congression

helping to draft the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986; an

director of the DoD Section 800 Panel, playing a 

crafting the recommendations which served as the un

for the Vice President's "reinventing government" in

well as the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 199

A widely published analyst on national security 

latest book is Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (N

1995), which has become a standard reference 

institutions in the U.S. and overseas. Because of his 

fields of command and control and international pe

operations, Colonel Allard served in 1996 on special 

with U.S. forces in Bosnia. 

Colonel Allard is also an Adjunct Professor in th

Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. 

Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law & Diplom

MPA from Harvard University. 

*U.S.G.P.O.:199@405-201:40012