alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of the Claim of George R. Batal, Respondent-Appellant, against Louis Mayersohn et al., Appellants-Respondents. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

Appeal by the employer and its carrier and cross appeal by the claimant from a decision and award of the Workmen’s Compensation Board. The claimant was a school teacher who during his vacation and the hours when he was not teaching performed such jobs as selling books, painting, umpiring baseball games, planting and mowing lawns and counseling at a summer camp. During his summer vacation in 1954 he went to work for a construction company and the second day sustained a serious injury resulting in his becoming a paraplegic. He returned to teaching on a part-time basis in April, 1955 and on a full-time basis on September 1, 1955. The board held the claimant’s employments as a teacher and a laborer were “ dual and dissimilar ”, it established his average weekly wage under subdivision 3 of section 14 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law and made an award of $34.87 per week up to September 1, 1955 and $31.39 per week thereafter based on a 10% earning capacity. The facts in this record present ample support for the determination that the employments were “dual and dissimilar” *(Matter of Brannigan*v. *Tern aids,*285 App. Div. 980 affd. 309 N. Y. 892). The award was made without regard to the claimant’s earnings as a teacher and was not restricted to only the Summer months. Since it could be found that subdivisions 1 and 2 of section 14 could not reasonably and fairly be applied the board could properly utilize the procedure of subdivision 3 and while the resulting award may seem excessive it is the result mandated by the statute *(Matter of Terry*v. *City of Glens Falls,*2 A D 2d 625, motion for leave to appeal denied 1 N Y 2d 644; *Matter of Chromey*v. *Argentieri,*10 A D 2d 749). Since no proof was offered on the point we would be inclined to return the case to the board for proof of actual earnings by the claimant in addition to his salary as a teacher were it not quite clear from this record that there were no such earnings. The claimant indicated that he was ill during the Summer of 1957 and the board has made the continuation of the award after July 15,1958 contingent upon no change in “ condition or earnings ”. In the absence of actual earnings the board has the power to determine wage earning capacity and its finding of a 10% earning capacity after September 1, 1955 should not be disturbed. Decision and award unanimously affirmed, with one bill of costs to be divided between the Workmen’s Compensation Board and the claimant, with printing disbursements to each. Present — -Bergan, P. J., Coon, Gibson, Herlihy and Reynolds, JJ.
#### § 2001.47 Destruction.

Classified information identified for destruction shall be destroyed completely to preclude recognition or reconstruction of the classified information in accordance with procedures and methods prescribed by agency heads. The methods and equipment used to routinely destroy classified information include burning, cross-cut shredding, wet-pulping, melting, mutilation, chemical decomposition or pulverizing. Agencies shall comply with the destruction equipment standard stated in § 2001.42(b) of this Directive.
### §8715. Jurisdiction of courts

The district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims, of a civil action or claim against the United States founded on this chapter.

(Pub. L. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 599; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, §160(a)(2), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 48; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, §902(b)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516.)

| Derivation | U.S. Code | Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 5 U.S.C. 2103 (less applicability to 5 U.S.C. 2099). | Aug. 17, 1954, ch. 752, §14 (less applicability to §10), 68 Stat. 743. |

Statutes at Large

Standard changes are made to conform with the definitions applicable and the style of this title as outlined in the preface to the report.

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1992—Pub. L. 102–572 substituted "United States Court of Federal Claims" for "United States Claims Court".

1982—Pub. L. 97–164 substituted "United States Claims Court" for "Court of Claims".

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1992 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 102–572 effective Oct. 29, 1992, see section 911 of Pub. L. 102–572, set out as a note under section 171 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.

#### Effective Date of 1982 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–164 effective Oct. 1, 1982, see section 402 of Pub. L. 97–164, set out as a note under section 171 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
#### Comfort-Craft Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc., Respondent, v. Frank P. Salamone, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court which denied a motion to dismiss the complaint in an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff furnished materials and labor in connection with the construction of a building owned at the time by one Vincent R. Trieozzi, and that thereafter said Trieozzi conveyed the property to one Salamone -by a deed which contained a clause in compliance with section 13 of the Lien Law; that thereafter plaintiff filed its lien; that the grantee knew at the time of the eonvo3'anee to him of the materials and labor furnished by the plaintiff. There is no allegation of fraud and no allegation that the conveyance was made with intent to avoid the Lien Law. The mere allegation that grantee knew of the furnishing of the materials and labor b3r plaintiff is not enough. The grantee stands in the position of an innocent purchaser unless fraud or intent to avoid the Lien Law are alleged. (Lien Law, § 7; *Servido'ne*v. Hirsehmann, 268 App. Div. 347.) Order reversed, with $10 costs, and motion granted, with leave to plaintiff to replead within 20 da3rs after the entry and service of the order herein, if so advised. Bergan, P. J., Coon, Gibson, Reynolds and Taylor, JJ., concur.
§ 635.19 Protection Orders. ( a ) A DD Form 2873, Military Protective Order (MPO) is a written lawful order issued by a commander that orders a Soldier to avoid contact with those persons identified in the order. MPOs may be used to facilitate a “cooling-off” period following domestic violence and sexual assault incidents, to include incidents involving children. The commander should provide a written copy of the order within 24 hours of its issuance to the person with whom the member is ordered not to have contact and to the installation LE activity.
( b ) *Initial notification.* In the event a MPO is issued against a Soldier and any individual involved in the order does not reside on a Army installation at any time during the duration of the MPO, the installation PMO/DES will notify the appropriate civilian authorities (local magistrate courts, family courts, and local police) of: ( 1 ) The issuance of the protective order;
( 2 ) The individuals involved in the order;
( 3 ) Any change made in a protective order;
( 4 ) The termination of the protective order.
( c ) A Civilian Protective Order (CPO) is an order issued by a judge, magistrate or other authorized civilian official, ordering an individual to avoid contact with his or her spouse or children. Pursuant to the Armed Forces Domestic Security Act, 10 U.S.C. 1561a, a CPO has the same force and effect on a military installation as such order has within the jurisdiction of the court that issued the order.
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 251 (Thursday, December 31, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Page 86974]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-28939]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION


Surrender of License of Small Business Investment Company

    Pursuant to the authority granted to the United States Small 
Business Administration under the Small Business Investment Act of 
1958, as amended, under Section 309 of the Act and Section 107.1900 of 
the Small Business Administration Rules and Regulations (13 CFR 
107.1900) to function as a small business investment company under the 
Small Business Investment Company License No. 03/03-0260 issued to 
F.N.B. Capital Partners, L.P., said license is hereby declared null and 
void.

United States Small Business Administration.
Thomas G. Morris,
Acting Associate Administrator for Investment and Innovation.
[FR Doc. 2020-28939 Filed 12-30-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
## United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________
No. 19

- 2235

___________________________
United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.
Christopher Williams

Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

____________
Submitted: May 6 , 2022 Filed: May 13, 2022

[Unpublished]

____________ Before SMITH, Chief J udge, BENTON and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

____________
PER CURIAM.

Christopher R. Williams pled guilty, without a plea agreement, to possessing
a firearm as a felon

, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The
district court sentenced him to 190 months in prison pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)

. He appeal ed

, among other things, the ACCA sentence, arguing he did not have at least three prior convictions for a serious drug offense,
which were committed on different occasions . This court affirmed the ACCA-2- sentence. See United States v. Williams , 976 F.3d 781, 787 (8th Cir. 2020). Williams sought cert iorari in the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of this court and remanded “for further consideration in light
of Wooden v. United States .” Williams v. United States , 142 S. Ct. 1439 , 1439 (2022), citing Wooden v. United States , 142 S. Ct. 1 063 (2022) (holding that the defendant’s prior convictions for burglary were not offenses committed on different occasions within the meaning of the ACCA). Considering Wooden v. United State s , t his court remands to the district court for a new factual det ermination o n the issue
of whether Williams had three prior convictions committed on different occasions

.

* * * * * * * *

The judgment of the district court is vacated

, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

______________________________
Order entered July 14, 2016

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 15

- 01333

- CR

EILEEN FRANCES NORTH , Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Crimin al District Court No. 5

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F14

- 35144

- L



### O RDER

T he Court DENIES appellant’s motion to reconsider the briefing order

.

We ORDER the Clerk of the Court to file the amended brief tendered as of the date of

this order.

We ORDER the State to file its brief within THIRTY DAYS from the date of this order.

/s/ ADA BROWN JUSTICE
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 43974

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MITCHELL J. McROBERTS,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 639

Filed: August 17, 2016

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 

Falls County. Hon. Randy J. Stoker, District Judge. 

Order denying Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, 

affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, Interim State Appellate Public Defender; Maya P. Waldron, 

Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GUTIERREZ, Judge; GRATTON, Judge;

and HUSKEY, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM

Mitchell J. McRoberts was found guilty of felony injury to a child, Idaho Code § 18-

1501(1). The district court sentenced McRoberts to a unified term of ten years, with a minimum 

period of confinement of three years, suspended the sentence, and placed McRoberts on 

supervised probation for five years. McRoberts subsequently violated his probation but was 

continued on probation. Following a second probation violation, the district court revoked 

McRoberts’ probation, ordered execution of the underlying sentence, and retained jurisdiction. 

Upon McRoberts’ completion of the retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended 

McRoberts’ sentence and placed him on supervised probation. McRoberts again violated the 
2

terms of his probation, and the district court revoked probation and ordered execution of a 

reduced sentence of ten years, with a minimum period of confinement of one year. McRoberts

filed an untimely Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the district 

court denied. McRoberts appeals.

Idaho Criminal Rule 35 provides that a district court has discretion to consider and act 

upon a motion filed within fourteen days of the order revoking probation. The filing limitations 

provided by Rule 35 are a jurisdictional limit on the authority of the court to consider the motion 

and, unless filed within the period, a district court lacks jurisdiction to grant any relief. State v. 

Sutton, 113 Idaho 832, 833, 748 P.2d 416, 417 (Ct. App. 1987). In this case, McRoberts 

acknowledges that his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence was untimely. Because 

McRoberts’ Rule 35 motion was not filed within the fourteen-day limitation provided by the 

rule, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. Accordingly, we do not address the 

merits of McRoberts’ Rule 35 motion. Therefore, the district court’s order denying McRoberts’

Rule 35 motion is affirmed.
#### In the Matter of Francis Realy et al., Respondents, v. Alfred B. Caine, as Acting District Principal of Central High School District No. 2, Sewanhaka, Town of Hempstead, et al., Respondents, and James A. De Sonne, as Building Principal of the H. Frank Carey High School, Franklin Square, Town of Hempstead, et al., Appellants.

In a proceeding under article 78 of the Civil Practice Act to review the determination of the public school officials and the local Board of Education directing that petitioners’ daughter should be sent to the Special Services School established under the authority of section 4406 of the Education Law, rather than to continue in the Junior Arts Program established under subdivision 4 of section 4404 of the Education Law and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, the Board of Education and one of the school officials appeal, by permission, from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated November 21, 1961, denying their cross motion, made pursuant to section 1293 of the Civil Practice Act, to dismiss the petition for insufficiency and for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter of the proceeding. Order reversed, on the law, without costs, and motion to dismiss petition granted. The facts are affirmed. It appears, both from the face of the petition and from the affidavits in support of the motion, that the determination under review was made on the basis of tests by the board’s psychologists rather than -on the basis of tests by petitioners’ psychologist. Such a determination necessarily involved an administrative determination—-one which could be adequately reviewed by the Commissioner of Education (Education Law, § 310). Therefore, this proceeding under • article 78 of the Civil Practice Act does not lie (Civ. Prac. Act, 1285, subd. 4). Beldock, P. J., Brennan, Hill, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur. [31 Misc 2d 471.]
Exhibit 13.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  ending 30 June 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),the undersigned hereby certify that to the best of our knowledge:
  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934; and
  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial conditionand results of operations of the Company.
   Lawrence Patrick Adrian DaviesChief executive
   Kandimathie Christine RamonChief Financial officer
    1934, or otherwise subject to the liability of that section. This certification will not be deemed to be incorporatedby reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, even if thedocument with which it is submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission is so incorporated byreference.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Victor Garcia, Appellant.

Judgment of conviction reversed, upon the law and the facts, the verdict vacated and a new trial ordered in the interests of justice. Clearly, on the record here, it was error to allow the Assistant District .Attorney to interrogate the defendant on cross-examination as to whether or not he *602had theretofore appeared in a New York courtroom in connection with another matter and, upon the defendant’s response that he did not remember, then, to allow the introduction by the prosecutor of the testimony by two witnesses, connected with the court and the Bureau of Criminal Identification, to show that the defendant had appeared in a Court of Special Sessions on an earlier occasion in connection with the arraignment on an independent criminal charge. The People concede that the prosecutor should not have called these witnesses for the purpose of eliciting testimony upon an entirely collateral matter. In any event, the allowance of the cross-examination and the receipt of the particular testimony constituted error in having the effect of bringing before the jury the fact of a previous criminal charge and arrest which, of course, was not to be permitted (see *People*v. *Jones,*191 N. Y. 291; *People*v. *Jusino,*10 A D 2d 618) and also was in distinct violation of the rule generally precluding collateral evidence having no relevancy except on the issue of credibility. (See *People*v, *J)e Garmo,*179 N. Y, 130; Richardson, Evidence [8th ed.], §§ 503, 511, 512 and cases cited.) Here, the verdict of guilty insofar as this defendant is concerned depends upon the validity and context of his alleged confession. There was no independent evidence of bis participation in the alleged crime. He took the stand and gave testimony raising issues as to the nature and extent of his statements to the officers and as to the voluntariness of his alleged confession. Inasmuch as the defendant’s defense depended entirely upon a resolving of the issue of credibility, it may not reasonably be said that the errors did not affect the result. (See *People*v, *De Garmo, supra,*p. 135; *People*v. *Jones, supra,*p. 292; *People*v. *Jusino, supra.)*Consequently, we cannot overlook such errors as not affecting the rights of the accused within the meaning of section 542 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *(People*v. *Mleczho,*298 N. Y. 153, 162; *People*v. *Hetenyi,*304 N. Y. 80, 88.) Concur — McNally, Stevens and Eager, JJ.; Rabin, J. P,, and Steuer, J., dissent and vote to affirm under section 542 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
### **CHAPTER 3091—COMMEMORATION OF FORMER PRESIDENTS**

Sec.
309101.
Sites and structures that commemorate former Presidents.
FORM 6-K



SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION



Washington, D.C. 20549



Report of Foreign Issuer



Pursuant to Rule 13a-16 or 15d-16 of



Securities Exchange Act of 1934



For the month of September 2006



ABBEY NATIONAL PLC

(Translation of registrant's name into English)



Abbey National House, 2 Triton Square, Regents

Place, London NW1 3AN, England

(Address of principal executive offices)





Indicate by check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual reports under cover Form 20-F or Form 40-F.



Form 20-F . . . .X. . . . Form 40-F . . . . . . . .



Indicate by check mark whether the registrant by furnishing the information contained in this Form is also thereby furnishing the information to the Commission pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.



Yes . . . . . . . No . . .X. . . .











---











ABBEY NATIONAL PLC

CUSIP # 002920AA4





Confirmation of Redemption to Holders of

$500,000,000 7.35% Perpetual Subordinated Reset Capital Securities



Abbey National plc hereby confirms that it has given notice in accordance with the terms of its $500,000,000 7.35% Perpetual Subordinated Reset Capital Securities that on October 16, 2006 it will redeem all of its outstanding $500,000,000 7.35% Perpetual Subordinated Reset Capital Securities at a redemption price equal to 100% of the principal amount thereof, together with accrued interest thereon to, but excluding, October 15, 2006.



Dated: September 12, 2006



Contacts



|Jo Wainwright (AFM Legal)
|-------------------------

001 44 20 7756 4723



Jon Burgess (Head of Investor Relations)

001 44 20 7756 4182













---













SIGNATURES



Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized.



| | ABBEY NATIONAL PLC        
| | --------------------------
| |                           
| | Dated: 12 September 2006  
| | Katy BondAbbey Secretariat