SAND 2003-0753 

March 2003 

Maritime Confidence Building Measures 

Across the Taiwan Strait: Technical 

Collaboration for Human Security at Sea 

Chyungly Lee, Ph.D. 

Taipei, Taiwan 

Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/26 

Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated 

by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin 

Company, for the United States Department of 

Energy under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. 
Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea

The Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) at Sandia National Laboratories assists political and technical 

experts from around the world to acquire the technology-based tools they need to assess, design, analyze, 

and implement nonproliferation, arms control, and other cooperative security measures. As part of its 

mission, the CMC sponsors research on cooperative security and the role of technology. Reports of that 

work are provided through the Occasional Papers series. Research is conducted by Sandia staff, 

international technical experts, and visiting scholars. (The CMC’s Visiting Scholars Program is 

administered by the Institute for Public Policy at the University of New Mexico.) For additional 

information on the CMC’s programs, visit the CMC home page on the World Wide Web at 

<http://www.cmc.sandia.gov> or write to: 

Cooperative Monitoring Center 

Sandia National Laboratories 

Mail Stop 1373 

Albuquerque, NM 87185-1373 

For specific information on this report contact: 

John Olsen at the above address. 

This report was prepared by Sandia National Laboratories 

Albuquerque, NM 87185 and Livermore, CA 94550 

4
Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea 

Maritime Confidence Building Measures 

Across the Taiwan Strait: Technical Collaboration for 

Human Security at Sea 

Abstract 

The concept of confidence building measures (CBMs) has been developed for decades to 

reduce military tensions and political uncertainties in the flash points of regional security 

concerns. Nevertheless, the perceptions of state-centered and military-based requirements for 

CBMs have hampered both Beijing and Taipei from taking proactive initiatives across the 

Taiwan Strait in the past. Increasing economic interdependence and social interactions since the 

1990s have led both sides to establish joint efforts for ensuring peace for the prosperity and 

welfare of people across the Taiwan Strait. This study revisits the concept of CBMs in the 

context of cross-Strait tensions and suggests technical collaborations for human security at sea to 

tackle the fundamental difficulties in the initial stage of developing CBMs. A pragmatic 

framework for cross-Strait maritime CBMs, centered on a technical collaboration laboratory 

(TCL) model, is presented as a building block for security. Technologies could support 

cooperative measures, including cooperative detection of and collaborative response to human 

security threats at sea. 

5 
Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea

Acronyms 

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

ARATS Association of Relations Across the Taiwan Strait 

ARF ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

CBM confidence building measure 

CIB Criminal Investigation Bureau 

CFE Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 

CGA Coast Guard Administration 

CIMA China Institute for Marine Affairs 

CIPA Criminal Investigation and Prevention Association 

CSBM confidence and security building measure 

CSCAP Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 

CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

DPP Democratic Progressive Party 

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 

EPIRB Emergency Position Indication Radio Beacon 

FTP file transfer protocol 

GMDSS Global Maritime Distress and Safety Systems 

GPS Global Positioning System

IIR Taiwan Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University 

ITMS International Tracking and Monitoring System

MBFR Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction 

NPA National Police Administration 

PRC People’s Republic of China 

RCC Rescue Coordination Centers 

SAR Search and Rescue 

SEF Strait Exchange Foundation 

SNL Sandia National Laboratories 

SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea 

TCL technical collaboration laboratory 

VPN virtual private network 

VTS Vessel Traffic Systems 

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Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea 

Contents 

1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 11

2. THE CONCEPT OF CBMS IN THE CONTEXT OF CROSS-STRAIT TENSIONS............ 11

2.1. BACKGROUND........................................................................................................................ 11 

2.2. REVISITING THE CONCEPT OF CBMS .................................................................................... 13 

3. DEVELOPING CROSS-STRAIT MARITIME CBMS............................................................. 15

3.1. DEMAND FOR CROSS-STRAIT MARITIME CBMS................................................................... 15 

3.2. OPPORTUNITIES TO INITIATE CROSS-STRAIT MARITIME CBMS........................................... 18 

4. THE MECHANISM OF CROSS-STRAIT MARITIME CBMS.............................................. 20

4.1. TECHNICAL COLLABORATIONS FOR HUMAN SECURITY AT SEA........................................... 20 

4.2. THE CROSS-STRAIT MARITIME COOPERATION SYSTEM ....................................................... 25 

4.2.1. Cooperative Detection Subsystem.............................................................................. 27

4.2.2. Collaborative Response Subsystem............................................................................ 27

5. FINAL PERSPECTIVE: FROM CBMS TO CONFLICT PREVENTION............................ 29

Figures 

FIGURE 1. THE CROSS-STRAIT MARITIME COOPERATION SYSTEM........................................................... 26

Tables 

TABLE 1. MAJOR INCIDENTS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT (1996-2002.8) ....................................................... 16

TABLE 2. EXAMPLES OF COOPERATION..................................................................................................... 20

TABLE 3. TECHNICAL COLLABORATIONS FOR HUMAN SECURITY AT SEA ............................................... 21

TABLE 4. TECHNICAL AIDS FOR DETECTING HUMAN SECURITY THREATS AT SEA.................................. 22

TABLE 5. TECHNICAL AIDS FOR COLLABORATIVE RESPONSE TO HUMAN SECURITY AT SEA .................. 24

TABLE 6. POSSIBLE NON-GOVERNMENTAL PROXIES ................................................................................ 28

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Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea

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Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

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Maritime Confidence Building Measures 

Across the Taiwan Strait: Technical 

Collaboration for Human Security at Sea 

Executive Summary

Despite political hostility and diplomatic contention between the governments of Beijing 

and Taipei, people across the Taiwan Strait have maintained extensive economic and social 

exchanges since the early 1990s. The Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association of 

Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), two semi-official organizations, have represented 

Taiwan and mainland China, respectively, in negotiating arrangements for cross-Strait 

exchanges. 

Due to the unique geographical and political background of the Taiwan Strait, there have 

always been both military security threats and human security problems in the Strait’s maritime 

space. Combating human security threats at sea caused by either crimes at sea or natural 

disasters involves functional cooperation and operational coordination between jurisdictions. 

Although both sides implicitly agree that a “middle line” in the Taiwan Strait is the jurisdictional 

boundary, the cross-boundary movements and activities between people of both sides have been 

often beyond control. Criminal elements that commit acts of illegal trafficking, drug and gun 

smuggling, and armed robbery at sea often take advantage of such loopholes. The large amount 

of crime at sea not only endangers travelers passing through the Strait but also results in serious 

negative social and economic impacts on both sides and causes concerns of deteriorating security 

environments. In addition to crimes at sea, the high frequency of incidents at sea in the Taiwan 

Strait have delivered an alerting signal that any inappropriate handling of incidents could 

potentially escalate to armed fire. 

However, there are potential areas for cooperation that could encourage human security 

at sea. Technical collaborations for human security at sea are suggested in this study to provide 

the basis of confidence building in the Taiwan Strait. Technical collaboration in security 

cooperation in general (and confidence building measures (CBMs) in particular) has both 

technical and strategic roles: it provides an objective source and the means of collecting, 

organizing, and analyzing information for jointly defined security goals. It also provides an 

important channel for improving the relationship and paves the way for future cooperation. 

Research and development of mutually acceptable technologies could become a cooperative 

effort in and of itself. Technical collaboration is particularly appropriate for cross-Strait CBMs 

because of its objectivity and low political sensitivity. Commitments to technical collaboration 

would reduce concerns of political risks, and thus become more likely at the initial stages of

developing CBMs in tense relations. A cross-Strait maritime cooperation system could be 

composed of two subsystems: 

• a limited cooperative detection system in which information exchanges and analyses in a specially established technical collaboration laboratory (TCL) provide 

credible and objective sources of data 

9 
Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea

• a collaborative response system in which communication of immediate responses 

through informal channels could alleviate political distrust between Beijing and 

Taipei 

The role of a TCL would be to reduce information biases due to either political distrust or 

technical failure, and facilitate efficient responses for promoting human security at sea. The 

concept of collaborative response stresses coordination of actions in response to incidents, rather 

than agreements on a joint operational procedure. The operational procedure need not be 

specified or designated in advance so that both sides would not be anxious about losing 

respective political capital before making commitments to collaborate. 

The goal of this study was to suggest maritime CBMs that could be used as building 

blocks for maintaining peace and achieving security in the Taiwan Strait. It is an incremental 

approach to conflict prevention, rather than an institutional approach for crisis management. As 

long as the “one-China” issue remains the obstacle for normalizing cross-Strait relations, 

developing a cross-Strait maritime cooperation system could expand the scope and the content of 

cross-Strait constructive engagement. Such engagement on the one hand responds to the new 

security environments in which concerns of human security at sea have been highlighted, and, on 

the other hand, could transform the overall security policy environment from a tensionpreoccupied agenda to a coordination-driven one. 

10
Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea 

Maritime Confidence Building Measures 

Across the Taiwan Strait: Technical 

Collaboration for Human Security at Sea 

1. Introduction 

The concept of confidence building measures (CBMs) has been in use for decades to 

reduce military tensions and political uncertainties among political adversaries or competing 

powers, particularly for tension reduction at regional flash points. Potential military 

confrontation across the Taiwan Strait has prompted attention from both academic scholars and 

policy researchers of Asia-Pacific security. Exploring new ways to reduce military tension and 

maintain peace across the Taiwan Strait has become an important security topic. Currently and 

in the future, increasing economic interdependence and social interactions may prompt both 

sides to establish joint efforts to ensure peace in the Taiwan Strait for the prosperity of both 

sides. Nevertheless, perceptions of state-centered and military-based requirements for CBMs 

have hampered both Beijing and Taipei from taking initiatives in the past. Progress may be 

made by considering an incremental approach to conflict prevention, rather than an institutional 

approach for crisis management. Moreover, informal modalities may be more feasible than 

state-centered concepts. 

The objectives of this study are to revisit the concept of CBMs in the context of crossStrait tensions and explore the options for technical collaborations for human security at sea as 

the foundation of confidence building in the Taiwan Strait. In the first section, CBMs will be 

reconceptualized to tackle the increasing transnational/transboundary maritime security threats in 

the context of complex cross-Strait interdependence. In the second section, demands and 

opportunities of developing cross-Strait maritime CBMs will be assessed. In the third section, a 

pragmatic framework of maritime CBMs across the Taiwan Strait will be specified, including 

issues, mechanisms, and technical feasibilities. In the last section, the prospects of developing 

CBMs to achieve conflict prevention will be discussed. 

2. The Concept of CBMs in the Context of Cross-Strait Tensions 

2.1. Background 

Despite political hostility and diplomatic contention between the governments of Beijing 

and Taipei, people across the Taiwan Strait have maintained extensive economic and social 

exchanges since the early 1990s. The Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association of 

Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), two semi-official establishments, represented 

Taiwan and mainland China to negotiate institutional arrangements of cross-Strait exchanges. 

However, the communication has been suspended since the former President Lee Teng-hui’s 

visit to the United States in 1995.1

 The cross-Strait missile crisis in March 1996,2 the alleged 

 1 Lee Teng-hui, who received his Ph.D. from Cornell University in 1968, delivered a speech at the Olin Lecture 

on June 9, 1995, as part of the university’s alumni reunion weekend. In the speech, “Republic of China on 

11 
Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea

state-to-state theory in July 1999,3 the shift of the Taiwan’s Presidency to the Democratic 

Progressive Party (DPP) in 2000,4 and the incident of the 2001 Asia-Pacific Economic 

Cooperation (APEC) summit

5

 have gradually eroded the trust built by SEF and ARATS in the 

past. 

In addition to the potential military confrontation and diplomatic suppression that have 

affected security for decades, transboundary non-traditional security issues (such as drug trafficking, illegal trade, smuggling, gun running, etc.) have emerged from the increasing economic 

and social interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and caused tremendous human security

concerns for both sides. The suspension of cross-Strait functional communication due to 

political or diplomatic hostility has gradually transformed the security environment in the 

Taiwan Strait. The current phase of cross-Strait relations can be characterized as “cold peace.” 

A strategic alliance with a third country or tactical responses to each other could make war less 

likely, in spite of the suspension of cross-Strait communication. However, the lack of strategic 

attention to human security concerns risks the long-term economic welfare and prosperity of 

people across the Taiwan Strait. 

Human security is a newly developed international security agenda. The inquiry focuses 

on a broad range of threats (economic, food, health, environmental, community, and political) to 

individuals,6

 rather than on a narrow range of external (military) threats to the territorial and 

political integrity of states, as do more traditional security concepts. Although the definitions of 

the concept vary due to different intellectual and professional backgrounds, the goal of human 

security is to secure the freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety, or lives.7

 The

 

Taiwan” was mentioned 16 times. Beijing thus condemned Lee’s political intent of Taiwan’s independence. 

Later, in July 1995, the Chinese fired six DF-15s from Fujian province to an East China Sea impact site 90 miles 

north of Taipei. 2

 On the eve of Taiwan’s first democratic presidential election, China launched four DF-15s into two ocean impact 

zones that would bracket the island. One zone was 47 miles west of the southern port of Kaohsiung and the 

other was just 30 miles east of the northern port of Keelung. The United States reacted by deploying a large 

force consisting of two carrier battle groups to the waters off Taiwan. Tensions of military confrontation 

escalated. 

3 During a July 8, 1999, interview with Deutsche Welle radio, President Teng-hui Lee stated that relations 

between Taiwan and China were “special state-to-state” in nature. Beijing then cancelled the pre-scheduled trip

of Wang Daohan, chairman of ARATS, to Taipei in October 1999. 

4 In Taiwan’s second democratic presidential election on March 18, 2000, Shui-bian Chen (an opposition candidate) was elected. Beijing hesitates to establish contacts with the pro-independence DPP government. 5 The 2001 APEC Shanghai Summit was once considered an opportunity to reduce the cross-Strait tension. 

However, Beijing failed to issue a visa to President Chen’s proxy, Yuan-Chu Lee, because of his earlier governmental capacity as Vice President. 

6 The term “human security” first came to prominence with the publication of the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report. It indicates seven elements of human security: economic security, food security, health security, 

environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. The threats of each 

elements are poverty, hunger and famine, injury and disease, pollution and environmental degradation, violence 

and crime, integrity of cultures, and political repression. 7 Three major schools of thought on human security are (1) a rights-based approach in which normative legal

frameworks at national, regional, and international levels are the solutions; (2) a humanitarian concept that 

highlights concerns about the safety of people and “freedom from fears”; and (3) a sustainable human 

development view that stresses issues of “freedom from wants.” (For conceptual reviews of human security, see 

12
Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea 

issue of human security at sea in this study particularly refers to crimes at sea and maritime 

search and rescue in the Taiwan Strait and the surrounding areas. Incidents of crimes at sea 

include illegal trafficking and smuggling conducted by fishing boats or vessels from both sides 

of the Taiwan Strait, and pirate activities in the Taiwan Strait. Maritime search and rescue issues 

are particularly focused on disaster relief and emergency rescue. 

The concept of CBMs implemented in Europe8

 and recently in the Asia Pacific9 could 

have provided more room for cooperation between Beijing and Taipei to cope with human 

security issues across the Taiwan Strait. Nevertheless, the myth of a state-centered and militaryoriented CBMs agenda has hampered both Beijing and Taipei in taking initiatives in the past. 

On the one side, Beijing has reiterated that creating CBMs is a concept applicable only among 

states. The controversies of the “one-China” issue10 have frozen the ability to conceptualize 

CBMs in cross-Strait relations. On the other side, considering the sensitivities and dilemma of

military transparency for the physically weak party in the asymmetrical relations, Taipei has 

been very cautious about a CBM approach. 

2.2. Revisiting the Concept of CBMs 

The experience of applying the concept of CBMs in the Asia-Pacific security agenda has 

been widely discussed.11 Obviously, importing any specific security concept without 

 

Fen Hampson (2002), “The Many Meanings of Human Security,” in his Madness in the Multitude: Human 

Security and World Disorder (Oxford University Press), pp. 1-37; and Sabina Alkire (2001), Conceptual

Framework for the Commission on Human Security (http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/doc/index.html). 

8 The term CBMs was first used in the mid-1950s in connection with United States and Soviet open skies and 

ground post control proposals at the United Nations. It was later adopted to refer to the modest, politically 

binding, largely voluntary provisions on exercise notification and observation in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of 

the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The term “confidence and security building 

measures” (CSBMs) was introduced at the 1981-1983 CSCE Review Conference in Madrid by neutral and 

nonaligned European nations to denote measures that were more “militarily significant, politically binding and 

verifiable” than earlier measures. Western delegations to the 1975-1986 Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction 

(MBFR) negotiations had proposed CSBM type initiatives as “associated measures” to promote verification of 

conventional force limitations. The 1989-1992 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) talks resurrected 

these measures as “stabilizing measures” designed to enhance verification. (See M. Susan Pederson and Stanley 

Weeks (1995), “A Survey of Confidence and Security Building Measures” in Ralph Cossa (ed.), Asia Pacific 

Confidence and Security Building Measures (Washington DC: CSIS, 1995), pp. 99. 

9 In Asia Pacific, the term “CBMs” has been used since the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Bangkok in July

1994. 

10 Debates on “one China” issues have been the major obstacle for resuming talks between both sides of the 

Taiwan Strait. Beijing’s interpretation of the “one China’’ principle is that Taiwan is an inalienable part of

China. In his early days in the presidential office, President Chen was willing to discuss the “one China” issue 

with Beijing as long as Beijing did not confine the talks under the “one China” principle. In August 2002, 

President Chen addressed the status of Taiwan and China as “one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait.” It 

exacerbated cross-Strait political distrust. 

11 For examples, see Ralph Cossa, ed. (1995), Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1995); Ralph Cossa (1998), “Asia-Pacific Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security” 

in Michael Krepon et. al (eds.), A Handbook of Confidence Building Measures for Regional Security (3rd edition)

(Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center), pp. 15-39; and Desmond Ball, “The Most Promising CSBMs 

for the Asia Pacific Region,” paper prepared for an international conference on “The Asia-Pacific Region: Links 

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Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea

considering the local environments will not lead to immediate success. Thus, the concept of 

CBMs should not be universally applied without contextual specifications. In the context of 

cross-Strait tensions, three elements of CBMs should be highlighted to tackle the fundamental 

difficulties in the initial stage of developing CBMs. 

First, developing CBMs is a pragmatic approach to a security objective. Idealists take 

ultimate goals as a point of departure and aim at winning every move, while pragmatists care 

more about relative significance and choose the lesser of two losses. Although a unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral pragmatic desire for cooperation is essential to develop successful CBMs, 

the motivations behind the negotiation of initial steps need not be in concert as long as they are 

not implacably hostile. All that is required is for each party to see value in the particular steps 

chosen and for those steps not to intensify existing levels of hostility. It is not necessarily driven 

by political willingness, ideological accommodation, or other liberalist thoughts of functionalism.

Second, developing CBMs involves an incremental building-block process. The process 

is often more important than the product. Thus, the format is not necessarily tied to institutional 

settings, but stresses the ongoing efforts of interactions. Conflict and cooperation often co-exist 

despite political tensions. The transformation of security environments from a conflict-devastated situation to a cooperation-dominated relationship is an evolving process, not revolutionary 

magic. An initial negotiating strategy may need to put more emphasis on “agreement and implementation,” rather than on the “importance of the content” of the measures. Even when the contents of agreements are trivial and basic, the cumulative effects can be significant. 

Third, the design of mechanisms for CBMs stresses the achievable implementation 

agenda. The principle of cooperative security encourages dialogue and engagement among 

political adversaries. However, dialogue and engagement without defined purposes can be 

difficult to sustain. The continuing utility of CBMs actually stems from the achievable implementation agenda and the adaptability to a transformed security environment. Therefore, an 

issue-oriented and sector-specific agenda with clearly defined objectives and measurable progress will be more appropriate at the start. 

In the context of cross-Strait tensions, the pragmatic desire of cooperation is rooted in the 

prevention of military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait by both military and non-military 

means. The pragmatic objective is to make the choice of using armed forces from either side 

less likely through CBMs. Cutting the net of any established cross-Strait CBMs will incur 

security costs. Thus, both sides will be tied to CBMs to be better off. The incremental buildingblock approach of CBMs accumulates trust piece by piece and is particularly important to the 

context of cross-Strait tensions because any ambiguity or misunderstanding can easily increase 

tension and reverse the trend of cooperation. The most critical part of developing cross-Strait 

CBMs is to design an achievable implementation agenda. The implementation must first include 

the consideration of a format that is politically acceptable to both Beijing and Taipei. Measures 

that overreach the political willingness of both sides can become sources of contention rather 

than accommodation. 

 

Between Economic and Security Relations,” organized by the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 

University of San Diego, May 13-15, 1993. 

14
Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea 

It would not be in the interest of either side if the self-restraint of state-centered and 

military-based CBMs is imposed at the initial stage of cross-Strait confidence building. In fact, 

both sides share tremendous contextual advantages in developing CBMs. These include sharing 

cultural and religious affinities; strong and stable political infrastructures of both Beijing and 

Taipei to legitimize CBMs; and Beijing’s economic catch-up for technical feasibility of CBMs. 

Such contextual advantages provide important potential for accommodation in negotiation, 

despite the ideological gap and other differences dividing the two sides. 

In sum, a more constructive and pragmatic definition of CBMs in the context of crossStrait tensions will include both formal and informal measures, whether unilateral or bilateral, 

that address, present, or resolve uncertainties between Beijing and Taipei for the purpose of 

conflict avoidance as well as tension reduction. The scope of implementation can cover 

humanitarian, economic, cultural, or military matters. 

3. Developing Cross-Strait Maritime CBMs 

3.1. Demand for Cross-Strait Maritime CBMs 

Due to the unique geographical and political background of the Taiwan Strait, there have 

always been both military security threats and human security loopholes in the Strait’s maritime 

space. Combating human security threats at sea caused by either crimes at sea or natural 

disasters involves functional cooperation and operational coordination between jurisdictions. 

Although both sides implicitly agree a “middle line” in the Taiwan Strait to be the jurisdictional 

boundary, the cross-boundary movements and activities between people of both sides have often 

been beyond control. Criminal elements that commit acts of illegal trafficking, drug and gun 

smuggling, and armed robbery at sea often take advantage of such loopholes. The large amount 

of crime at sea not only endangers travelers passing through the Strait but also results in serious 

negative social and economic impacts on both sides and causes concerns of deteriorating security 

environments. 

In addition to crime at sea, the high frequency of incidents at sea in the Taiwan Strait 

have delivered an alerting signal that any inappropriate handling of incidents would potentially 

raise mistrust and trigger armed fire across the Strait. From January 1990 to May 2000 there 

were 237 fishing disputes, including 127 related to collisions, labor disputes, and entangled nets 

between Taiwan and mainland China’s fishing boats. Another 55 cases involved Taiwanese 

fishing boats allegedly robbed by pirates from mainland China. In the remaining 55 cases, 

Taiwanese fishing boats allegedly were inspected and harassed by the Mainland Coast Guard. 

From January 1995 to May 2000, the Coast Guard operating in Taiwan forced trespassing fishing 

vessels from its waters 18,241 times.

12 Table 1 lists major incidents in the Taiwan Strait. 

 12 Statistics quoted from “Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Relationship” by John C.C. Deng (Vice Chairman, 

Mainland Affairs Council), http://www.rocinfo.org/govt_position/891226.htm.

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Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

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Table 1. Major Incidents in the Taiwan Strait (1996 to August, 2002) 

Date 

(M/D/Y) 

Description Highlights

02/19/1996 Chinese cargo vessel Gu Cheng sank in 

the Taiwan Strait; 30 crewmen were 

missing.

Taiwanese officials sent army helicopters and 

a marine police vessel to search. 

11/16/1998 Cheung Son, a Hong Kong bulk carrier, 

was attacked in the Taiwan Strait. The 

crew of 23 was beaten to death and the 

bodies were tied to weights and thrown 

overboard. 

An intriguing aspect of the case was that the 

boat used for the attack had previously been 

used for legitimate border defense purposes 

and the pirates were in the uniforms of border 

police. In December 1999, China sentenced 

the 12 pirates of that attack to death. 

07/31/1999 Taiwanese cargo freighter Shin Hwan and 

its 10 crew members were detained by 

Chinese Coast Guard for alleged 

smuggling in waters near Matsu. 

Shin Hwan was a private freighter hired by the 

Ministry of National Defense to ship provisions 

to military servicemen in Matsu. 

The crew were returned on December 2, 1999. 

The case was not solved for 5 months due to 

lack of a communication channel. 

11/10/1999 Taiwanese fishing boat Hechen 11 was 

attacked by three mainland fishing boats in 

Taiwan’s territorial waters. Crews were 

abducted. 

Taiwan’s Coast Guard attempted a rescue but 

did not find the boat. 

02/28/2000 The bulk carrier Hualien No.1 with a cargo 

of 5300 tonnes of gravel vanished during 

the trip from Hualien to Tamsui; 21 crew 

members have vanished. 

The case was not resolved due to lack of 

coordination among governmental agencies 

(Ministry of Transportation and 

Communication, Coast Guard Administration). 

The disappearance of the military vehicle 

Hualien No. 1 has led to speculation that it was 

held by the Chinese. 

12/26/2000 Coast Guard stations in Matsu and Kinmen 

found unusual large-scale gatherings of 

Chinese fishing boats. Matsu spotted a 

Chinese fishing boat lurking just 2 km from 

Kaoteng Island, part of the Taiwancontrolled archipelago. The Coast Guard 

fired 16 rounds of ammunition into the air 

as a warning. Six crew members aboard 

were arrested on the spot and the ship 

sank into the sea. 

The incident happened right before the 

opening of three mini-links. 

04/28/2001 The cargo ship Guangyuan Lun, registered 

in Belize, with 23 Chinese crewmen, was 

caught in Typhoon Chebi. 

The rescue effort was organized mainly from 

the Taiwan-based rescue organization. The 

Red Cross Society and the Rescue and 

Salvage Centre of the Chinese mainland have 

extended their thanks. 

16
Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea 

Date 

(M/D/Y) 

Description Highlights

05/16/2001 The Kaohsiug-registered Tsaifu No. 1 was 

intercepted by a Chinese Customs cutter 

60 km northeast of Pengchia Islet on 

suspicion of having illegally sold diesel oil 

to Chinese fishing boats. 

It was released after on-the-spot 

negotiation between the two sides. 

People’s Republic of China (PRC) armed navy 

(PRC anti-smuggling law enforcement officials) 

boarded the vessel for inspection. Two Taiwan 

Coast Guard ships and a Knox-class frigate 

negotiated with PRC. 

The spot is within Taiwan’s 200-nautical-mile 

(370-km) economic zone. 

Highlighted the need for a mechanism to 

enable a joint crackdown on crime at sea. 

06/23/2001 The Chinese sand carrier Guangyuan sank 

during Typhoon Chebi near Tainan’s 

Anping. Taiwan authorities found 13 

bodies from the incident. 

Through SEF and ARATS communication, a 

case of cross-Strait humanitarian rescue was 

accomplished. 

09/14/2001 Two maritime officers of the Pehghu Coast 

Guard Squadron were attacked by a 

Chinese fishing boat that had sneaked into 

Taiwan territory and conducted illegal trade 

with the locals. Coast Guard personnel 

were beaten and thrown into the sea. 

Penghu police came to the rescue. 

05/02/2002 A tanker (the Front Tabago) carrying 

249,000 tonnes of crude oil was originally 

headed for Wakayama, Japan, but lost 

power near Japan. Japan denied the ship 

permission to enter its waters. It tried to 

seek permission to enter Kaohsiung Port to 

unload its oil and launch repairs but was 

denied by the Ministry of Transportation 

and Communications in Taiwan. On 

May 7, the tanker was towed to the Taiwan 

Bank in the Taiwan Strait, 260 km from 

Kaohsiung and 148 km from the coast of 

China. 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged China 

and neighboring countries to cooperate and 

fend off potential environmental disasters. The 

Taiwan Bank is in the overlapping Exclusive 

Economic Zone (EEZ) of Taiwan and China. 

The Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan, notified 

China about the situation. 

05/03/2002 A Taiwanese skipper and a member of his 

crew have been detained by Chinese 

authorities in Pingtan, Fujian Province after 

three Chinese illegal immigrants were 

found dead on their fishing boat. The 

fishing boat tried to smuggle 11 illegal 

Chinese immigrants into Taiwan. 

The SEF contacted the ARATS. 

05/06/2002 A Keelung-registered boat, Fusheng No. 3,

was discovered ablaze 55.5 km off 

Pengchia Islet. The bodies of two 

crewmen were found in the ocean by a 

Chinese fishing vessel. 

The Keelung district Prosecutors’ Office 

arrested 8 suspects in connection with the 

murders on June 17, 2002. The murders were 

triggered by a disagreement between drug 

dealers on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. 

08/07/2002 A mainland Chinese gravel ship Haida,

registered under the flag of Belize, carrying 

2,700 tons of river sand and other 

commodities from Zhangzhou of Fujian, 

lost power due to tropical storm Kammuri. 

Rescuers from Taiwan battled high waves to 

evacuate 14 men from the ship. 

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Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

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The most recent incident that called for developing cross-Strait maritime safety and 

security cooperation is the incident of Tsaifu No.1. On May 16, 2001, the Kaohsiung-registered 

Tsaifu No. 1 was intercepted and held by a Chinese anti-smuggling vessel about 60 km northeast 

of Pengchia Islet in the overlapping claimed EEZ of both Taiwan and China. The Tsaifu was 

suspected of illegally selling diesel oil to two Chinese fishing boats. The Chinese patrol 

allegedly crossed a hypothetical median line in the Taiwan Strait to arrest the vessel. China’s 

armed anti-smuggling law enforcement officials boarded the vessel for inspection. Later, two 

Taiwan Coast Guard ships and a Knox-class frigate arrived to negotiate with China’s officials. 

Although the vessel was released after on-the-spot negotiation, the boarding of China’s officials 

caused considerable concern over whether China intends to reinforce its authority in the Taiwan 

Strait unilaterally. The incident could have led to fire exchanges or political recriminations if

negotiation failed. 

3.2. Opportunities to Initiate Cross-Strait Maritime CBMs 

The idea of a cooperative approach to the management of safety and security in the 

Taiwan Strait has been much discussed over the years by SEF and ARATS. In the Kimen 

Agreement signed by the respective Red Cross societies on September 12, 1990, both sides 

agreed on crime fighting issues and repatriation of illegal immigrants. The SEF–ARATS joint 

agreement, effective in 1993, also identified issues related to joint combat of maritime crime and 

robbery and mutual assistance on judicial branches. It is hoped that through consultation on these 

issues, a formal channel for joint crime control can be established. However, the institutionalized solutions to crime at sea have been suspended since the former President Lee Teng-hui’s 

visit to Cornell in mid-1995. In October 1998, the Koo-Wang Talk13 reached the agreement to 

provide more assistance on individual cases of cross-Strait civil distress, but the further implementation has not been realized due to the political stalemate. 

Since then, apart from everyday verification of notarized documents, there has been no 

response with respect to the exchange of other intelligence of transboundary crimes, which has 

meant that effective crime fighting has been impossible. Recently, efforts were resumed at the 

non-governmental Track II level. Academic and research communities from both sides of the 

Taiwan Strait organized seminars and dialogues in which public security officers were able to 

attend without provoking political controversies. A seminar on “Cross-Strait Cooperation for 

Combating Crime” was held in May 1998 in Taipei. Two Shanghai public security officers and 

several scholars and experts from mainland China attended the seminar. On June 20, 2001, 

another cross-Strait academic exchange was held in Taipei. The Central Police University in 

Taiwan and the Chinese Police Society in mainland China co-organized the conference. The 

format of engagements moved from individual invitation toward more institutional coordination. 

Recently, engagements have upgraded to the official level but with private capacities. In 

July 2001, 15 mainland Chinese incumbent and retired senior public security officers made a 

 13 Chen-fu Koo is the chairperson of the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF). Daohan Wang is the chairperson of 

the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). The first Koo-Wang Talk was held in

Singapore in April 1993 to lay a framework for regular SEF–ARATS dialogue. During October 14 to 16, 1998, 

the second Koo-Wang Talk was held. 

18
Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea 

low-profile visit to Taiwan. In December 2001, the Criminal Investigation and Prevention Association (CIPA) organized a trip to China. The delegations included Yu-jun Lu, the Chairman of 

CIPA, and Ching-sung Cheng, Director of the Criminal Investigation Bureau under the National 

Police Administration. This was the first time that senior Taiwan police officers visited the 

People’s Republic of China (PRC) to promote bilateral cooperation in cracking down on crime.14 

Although fighting crime involves the exercise of public authority and government policy, the 

law-enforcement agencies on both sides agreed that crime is a common enemy and keeping order 

is a common duty of all law-enforcement officers. A viable communication mechanism to 

exchange information about criminal activities under the principles of reciprocity, safety, and 

dignity would be of common interest to both sides. In January 2002, criminal-investigation 

authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait agreed tentatively to install a hot line to exchange 

information on crime. 

In terms of search and rescue operations, recent developments have indicated mutual 

understanding and chances for future cooperation. The first joint sea rescue mission occurred in 

March 2001, when a Cambodian-registered cargo ship sank in the Taiwan Strait while carrying 

logs from Malaysia to South Korea. In this case, Taiwan authorities requested assistance from

mainland China. A rescue ship was sent in response. One month later, the Guangyuan Lun, 

registered in Belize, with 23 Chinese crewmen, sank during Typhoon Chebi near Tainan’s 

Anping in April 2001. Through SEF and ARATS communication, a cross-Strait humanitarian 

rescue mainly organized from the Taiwan-based rescue organization was accomplished. In May 

2002, immediately after the China Airlines crash in the Taiwan Strait, ARATS and SEF arranged 

passage to the island for family members of nine mainland victims of the crash. The Maritime 

Search and Salvage Center in China sent two tugboats from the southeast port city of Xiamen to 

help with rescue efforts. Table 2 summarizes cooperative efforts between Taiwan and China. 

 14 The Central News Agency (“Taiwanese, Chinese Police to Discuss Human Smuggling, Drug Trafficking,” 

Taipei, 12/10/01). In addition to exchanging views on halting cross-Strait human and firearm smuggling as well

as drug trafficking, the two sides discussed cooperation in fighting economic crimes following their accession to 

the World Trade Organization. During its 12-day visit, the delegation met public security authorities in Shanghai 

and Guangdong and Fujian provinces as well as the PRC Police Society. The delegation visited the PRC’s 

Ministry of Public Security and the Public Security Bureau under the Beijing City Government. 

19 
Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

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Table 2. Examples of Cooperation 

Date 

(M/D/Y) 

Description Highlights

3/10/2001 The Cambodian-registered cargo ship Pamela 

Dream sank in the Taiwan Strait (between Fuzhou 

and Matsu) on March 8 while carrying logs from 

Malaysia to South Korea. Taiwan’s National 

Search and Rescue Center asked for help from 

China. China sent a rescue ship in response. 

It was the first joint sea rescue between 

Taiwan and China. 

12/10/2001 The Criminal Investigation and Prevention 

Association (CIPA) organized a trip to China. The 

delegates included Lu Yu-jun, the Chairman of 

CIPA, and Cheng Ching-sung, Director of the 

Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) under the 

National Police Administration (NPA). 

It was first time that senior Taiwan police 

officers visited China to promote bilateral 

cooperation in cracking down on crime. 

Counterparts in China will be public security 

authorities in Shanghai, Guangdong, Fujian, 

and the Chinese Police Society. 

4. The Mechanism of Cross-Strait Maritime CBMs 

The objectives at this stage are to establish new patterns of interaction that would become

perceived as beneficial to both sides, and to make these patterns harder to reverse when 

perturbations occur. In this section, concrete ideas for designing cross-Strait maritime CBMs are 

suggested. Three particular concerns are critical in this regard. First, the format must be politically acceptable to both Beijing and Taipei. Due to the sensitivity of the issues, the near-term

goal is to consume the least political capital in each side, but at the same time to generate the 

most added value from cooperation. Second, the substance must have a desirable security value. 

If either side of the Taiwan Strait loses security value while committing to cooperation, the 

content of cooperation will not be pursued. Third, the implementation must be technically 

feasible. The idea can be novel but the feasibility must be perceivable. However, the intent here 

is not to provide a comprehensive list for resolving the core cross-Strait issue at one time, but to 

tackle the very fundamental difficulties in the initiating stage by opening possible technical 

collaborations between Beijing and Taipei. 

4.1. Technical Collaborations for Human Security at Sea 

Technical collaborations for human security at sea are suggested in this study to build the 

basis of confidence building in the Taiwan Strait. Technical collaboration in security cooperation in general (and CBMs in particular) has both technical and strategic roles. On the one hand, 

it provides an objective source and the means of collecting, organizing, and analyzing information for jointly defined security targets. On the other hand, it provides an important channel for 

improving the relationship and paves the way for future cooperation. The research and development of mutually acceptable forms of technologies could become a cooperative effort in and of 

itself. Technical collaboration is particularly encouraged in the cross-Strait CBMs because of its 

objectivity and low political sensitivity. Commitments to technical collaboration would hardly 

cause concerns of political risks, and thus become more likely at the initial stage of developing 

CBMs in hostile relations. 

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Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea 

In terms of substance of cooperation, human security at sea focusing on crimes at sea and 

maritime search and rescue in the Taiwan Strait and the surrounding areas would generate great 

security value for both sides. The people-centered security objectives pursue long-term economic welfare and prosperity of people across the Taiwan Strait. 

In terms of technical feasibility, technical collaboration for human security at sea should 

be composed of two parts: cooperative monitoring for threat detection (including both crimes at 

sea and emergency detection) and collaborative response to resolve the incidents and prevent 

incidents from escalating to conflicts. The technology of the cooperative monitoring has been 

applied to the implementation of regional security agreements as well as global non-proliferation 

treaties.15 It provides a method of information sharing, and facilitates transparency through 

verification effectiveness. The concept could be applied to the detection of human security 

threats at sea. In relation to a collaborative response, the technological infrastructures used for 

crisis management and crisis prevention in other cases16 could be modified to facilitate communications and promptly resolve issues of human security at sea. 

Table 3 highlights domains of technical collaborations for human security at sea. Technical points of departure for crimes detection as well as emergency search and rescue could 

include readily available and globally accepted technologies that supply information regarding 

vessel identity, location, navigational course, and high-value cargo integrity. It does not require 

any immediate collaborative detection regime, but rather enables independent information 

exchange for the detection of maritime problems. Following the technical detection, communication to coordinate the response proves vital. 

Table 3. Technical Collaborations for Human Security at Sea 

Issues and Scope Domains for Technical Collaborations 

Cooperative Detection Collaborative Response 

Crimes at Sea Vessel Tracking and Sensor 

Monitoring 

Maritime Search and Rescue Emergency Location and 

Sensor Monitoring 

Communication Establishment 

and Response Coordination 

Among other technologies, satellite communications have revolutionized the shipping 

industry, increasing ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship interaction significantly. Global Positioning 

System (GPS) data, in conjunction with other systems, currently provide a wealth of location 

knowledge with near-real-time accuracy. Integrated systems involving the use of GPS location, 

 15 See Kent L. Biringer (1997), Cooperative Monitoring: a Framework for Issues Analysis and the Role of

Technology, Sandia National Laboratories, USA; Moodie, Michael (2000), Cooperative Security: Implications 

for National Security and International Relations, Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper No. 14 

(Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories); and John Olson and Charles D. Harmon (2001), 

“Technology Development for Nuclear Transparency Application,” paper prepared for the Third Annual JNC

International Forum on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Tokyo, Japan, February 21-22, 2001. 

16 For the role of technology in conflict prevention, see Arian Pregenzer (1995), Crisis Prevention Centers as 

Confidence Building Measures: Suggestions for Northeast Asia, Sandia National Laboratories, USA. 

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Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea

as well as satellite communication and tracking capabilities, are especially useful for possible 

maritime CBMs in general and detection of human security threat at sea in particular. Table 4 

lists options for relaying vessel position and status to an outside source. A full analysis of 

available technologies must ultimately rely upon the specific cooperative activity explored. For 

illustration, this section will outline one technical system for both crimes at sea and emergency 

detection, as well as suggest a possible opportunity for cross-Strait information exchange. 

Table 4. Technical Aids for Detecting Human Security Threats at Sea 

Cooperative

Activity

Applicable Technology Features 

Traditional Radio/VHF 

communication, Distress 

Channel 16 

VHF distress transmission dependent upon receiver 

tuned to appropriate channel and within radio range. 

Emergency PositionIndicating Radio Beacon 

(EPIRB) 121.5 MHz 

Homing beacon deploys under 3 to 15 feet of water. 

Signal is transmitted to COSPAS/SARSAT polar orbiting 

earth satellite and relayed to land user terminal in 

satellite view. Delay times from 15 minutes to 4 hours. 

Approximate 9-mile margin of error. 

EPIRB 406 MHz Advanced EPIRB. Approximately 2.5-mile margin of 

error. Additional 121.5-MHz frequency for local SAR. 

Maritime 

Search and 

Rescue (SAR)

INMARSAT-E GBIRP 1.6-GHz beacon with internal GPS locator is able to 

transmit location to INMARSAT geostationary satellite. 

Provides 2- to 5-minute data relay time and location 

accuracy within 200 meters. 

Vessel Traffic Systems 

(VTS) 

Port equipment provides near-real-time vessel location 

data and navigational message capacity for Port 

Authorities. 

ShipLOC Polar orbit satellites transmit delayed (20 min. to 2 hours) 

location data to ship owners, with access to confidential 

tracking website. If vessel is steered off course (or if 

vessel indicates an alarm), owners notify the International 

Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre, which can 

then notify proper law enforcement authorities throughout 

Asia and respond to possible attack. 

Vessel Tracking 

and Sensor 

Monitoring 

International Tracking and 

Monitoring System (ITMS) 

On-board sensors relay real-time, authenticated, 

encrypted data regarding the status and integrity of ship 

containers or alarms to main data station on board. This 

information, coupled with GPS location, is transmitted via 

INMARSAT geostationary satellites to an outside terminal 

and superimposed upon navigational software in order to 

provide transparency of vessel course, as well as 

shipment integrity. 

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Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

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The International Tracking and Monitoring System (ITMS), developed and prototyped by 

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), is one type of integrated system that illustrates the degree 

of vessel monitoring possible.17 ITMS integrates two fundamental aspects: a remote monitoring 

and data gathering system with a ground analysis system. The remote system is on board the 

vessel and employs intrusion detection devices, containment seals, environmental sensors, and a 

GPS device. Sensors gather information regarding the integrity and character of specific materials or containers en route. The sensor information is periodically collected, authenticated, 

encrypted, and then transmitted via satellite (such as INMARSAT or ORBCOMM) to a ground 

receiving station. This station then validates and interprets information for the user through 

graphical interfacing software. The ground station may also poll the remote system for updated 

information outside of normal transmission timeframes.

18 

This proposed system addresses recoverability by providing timely location and cargo 

status information so that an accurate incident description would be provided regarding if, 

where, when, and how a diversion or other incident took place. The ITMS could be applicable 

when transporting high value or hazardous cargo that could cause safety concerns or is under 

threat of theft or diversion. Systems using similar technologies could monitor cross-Strait cargo 

integrity and thus discourage illegal trafficking and smuggling, or hazardous material diversion. 

Basic vessel tracking could additionally encourage compatible vessel traffic schemes in port and 

deter crimes at sea. 

In terms of maritime emergency detection, the United Nation’s Safety of Life at Sea 

(SOLAS) Convention currently outlines mandatory levels for coastal and open sea Global 

Maritime Distress and Safety Systems (GMDSS). Distress signals currently range from mere 

radio transmissions on international emergency channel 16 to complex GPS transmitting 

beacons. Under the GMDSS, Emergency Position Indication Radio Beacons (EPIRBs) have 

become globally adopted. Several categories of EPIRBs currently exist. Mandated vessel 

requirements for EPIRBs depend upon vessel size, crew size, and navigational routes. In 

general, EPIRBs are mandated by government regulations to be carried on commercial fishing 

vessels, vessels over 300 gross tons, and vessels for hire that operate more than three nautical 

miles from shore and carry six or more passengers. 

An EPIRB is essentially a homing device that can be manually or automatically 

deployed. A periodic signal is transmitted to a low-orbiting polar satellite. The cooperative 

COSPAS/ SARSAT emergency satellite systems developed by the United States, Russia, 

Canada, and France are tuned to receive distress signals worldwide. Once a satellite detects an 

EPIRB signal, it stores the registered user information and time-tags the signal to relay directly 

when passing over regional land Rescue Coordination Centers (RCC). Once an RCC receives 

signal information, it directly contacts the appropriate rescue authorities. The system is an 

international, humanitarian, satellite-based search and rescue system which operates all the time, 

 17 Although an updated version of ITMS is currently under development, elements of this system are commercially

available at present. 

18 The prototype for ITMS displayed this concept through a cooperative experiment transporting uranium ore from

South Australia to Europe. Through this system, vessel location and cargo sensor information provided 

international, near-real-time vessel tracking, as well as authenticated, encrypted sensor data. 

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Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea

automatically detects and locates emergency radio beacons globally by satellites, and alerts 

appropriate rescue authorities. 

Nevertheless, most EPIRB emergency detection can often be delayed for hours. 

Additionally, the satellite transmissions often do not allow accurate positioning for local search 

and rescue officials who may face inclement weather or are far from the actual accident site. A 

rescue crew may be responsible for an area in which another authority may be closer or better 

equipped to respond, depending on the nature of the emergency. Collaborative search and rescue 

communication can alleviate current inadequacies. Sharing information regarding coastal 

response equipment and search and rescue operational responsibilities may prove a valuable and 

practical CBM for the Taiwan Strait. 

Table 5 summarizes the technology available for improving human security at sea. 

Table 5. Technical Aids for Collaborative Response to Human Security at Sea 

Infrastructure Technical Options Equipment

Transmission link for simple data 

streams 

Voice links by telephone (hot line) 

Computer modem to telephone line 

Commercial satellite on dial-up basis 

Dedicated satellite links – Highbandwidth, dedicated link with support 

transmission of video images in 

addition to voice 

Typically $3000/month for the satellite use 

Communications 

Internet – Virtual Private Network 

(VPN) 

*Inexpensive Internet infrastructure with full 

encryption from end to end 

*Privacy for $5000 at each end, then a minor 

charge per month for local service provider 

Transmission of documentation Facsimile machines 

Encrypted email 

Access-controlled File Transfer Protocol (FTP) 

Web server for large data files 

Discussion of issue by video 

conference 

Voice-activated, auto-zooming cameras 

Large display screen 

Document viewer 

Trained operators 

Compatible systems at both ends 

Supporting 

Negotiations and 

Consensus 

Building 

Classrooms for education and training

After security issues are properly detected, response elements become paramount. A 

trusted foundation for collaborative response requires frequently employed communication lines. 

Although the political hot line is a popular concept for high-level emergency or crisis management discussions, it seems to do little to instill long-term trust in communication systems 

between regions of tension. It is often argued that these emergency lines of communication are 

the first to break down in a crisis if not well established and used regularly. Alternatively, 

technical tools for facilitating communications in collaborative responses for human security at 

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Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea 

sea could consist of patrol hot lines, video conferencing technology, and virtual private network 

(VPN), as explained below. 

Most cases of crimes at sea in the Taiwan Strait involve smuggling between fishing 

boats. Frequent patrols become critical to deter illegal trafficking or smuggling at sea. 

Nevertheless, without communication between patrol agents of both sides, any unilateral action 

could be misinterpreted as an intrusion of jurisdiction and escalated into a political incident. 

Thus, the establishment of patrol hot lines would enable prompt communications and prevent 

incidents at sea from becoming sources of political tensions. 

Video conferencing technology has been widely used in business, schools, and other 

professional activities. It allows two or more people at different locations to conduct real-time 

visual connection and interaction. A videoconference system includes audio-visual equipment 

(such as voice-activated, auto-zooming cameras, and large display screen) as well as a means of 

transmitting information between sites.19 Both ends should be equipped with compatible 

systems. Video conferencing technology used in confidence building measures would be 

particularly useful for supporting collaboration between parties that are traditionally isolated 

from each other and unlikely to normalize their relations in the near future. In the context of 

cross-Strait CBMs, interactions via videoconferencing could be used as a means to avoid face-toface confrontation and provide both sides with more flexibility. 

In terms of coordinating response to threats of human security at sea among parties with 

insufficient political trust, releasing any information or communication of joint efforts at an early 

stage could possibly cause public anxieties and lead to unwanted speculation. VPN establishes a 

secured channel within the Internet to provide privacy and integrity in sensitive exchanges. VPN 

patrons install compatible hardware or software to encrypt20 and authenticate21 their exchanges 

and protect them from “hackers.” VPN is an inexpensive Internet infrastructure with full 

encryption from end to end. VPN can provide secure data links over high-bandwidth Internet 

links, while improving access and potentially reducing communication costs. 

4.2. The Cross-Strait Maritime Cooperation System 

Some technologies discussed in the last section are already in place and heavily used by 

vessels and ports worldwide; others are under extensive research and developments. However, 

regions of tension often fail to share either technological capacities or research information. 

More region-specific or issue-specific designs should be encouraged to tackle particular political 

difficulties between two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Due to the lack of official communication 

 19 A broadband satellite connection with studio-quality equipment produces an excellent full-motion video connection, but the equipment and transmission expense is huge. Recent advances in computer and 

telecommunications technologies have sparked an interest in compressed video systems, which transmit

information via the Internet or telephone network, greatly reducing the cost of video conferencing. 

20 Encryption converts data from a readable format to cipher text that only the intended recipient can decipher. 

Most VPNs include encryption algorithms such as 3DES, DES, RC5, Blowfish, CAST, or IDEA. 

21 Authentication verifies that the data have not been altered, substituted, or removed. It does this by creating a 

unique signature based on the data. If the data were altered, re-authentication by the recipient would show mismatched signatures. VPN data authentication can use a number of algorithms including MD5 and SHA-1. 

25 
Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea

between Beijing and Taipei, an immediate buildup of an extensive maritime cooperative regime

or joint operations would be highly unlikely; yet any misunderstandings in their individual 

operations for combating crimes at sea or emergency rescue and search could possibly trigger 

political debates and escalate tensions. Therefore, a pragmatic objective of cross-Strait maritime 

cooperation would be to prevent any incident at sea from turning into a potential conflict. 

Two critical elements include (1) assurance of information transparency between both 

partners and (2) communication of immediate responses to issues of human security at sea. 

Technical collaborations suggested in the last section will play important roles in both 

elements. A cross-Strait maritime cooperation system with technological applications is 

suggested in this section. It is composed of two subsystems: a limited cooperative detection 

system in which information exchanges and analyses in an established technical collaboration 

laboratory (TCL) provide credible and objective sources of data to avoid factual debates due to 

political distrust, and a collaborative response system in which communication of immediate 

responses through established channels could alleviate political distrust between Beijing and 

Taipei. (See illustration in Figure 1.) 

Figure 1. The Cross-Strait Maritime Cooperation System

26
Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea 

4.2.1. Cooperative Detection Subsystem 

The major component of cross-Strait cooperative detection subsystem for human security 

at sea would be the establishment of a technical collaboration laboratory (TCL) in which 

scientists and technicians from both sides of the Taiwan Strait could be invited to work together 

under a framework of agreements. Cooperation among scientists and technicians would cost 

hardly any political capital; thus, it is the least politically sensitive and most feasible. The tasks 

of TCL would include four major dimensions. 

First, TCL could be used to synchronize raw information collected from local agents. 

That is, instead of extensively sharing the equipment or hardware of information collection (i.e., 

a satellite system), data from Taipei (YT) and data from Beijing (YB) would be collected 

respectively by each side using their own means but further organized by the TCL. 

Second, TCL would transmit agreed data and information to both the non-governmental 

proxy of Taipei (XT) and the non-governmental proxy of Beijing (XB) for their consideration of 

collaborative responses to incidents at sea. 

Third, TCL could support technical requirements for the collaborative response subsystem, mainly communication technical support between XT and XB, as needed. 

Fourth, TCL would further explore options for an extensive cooperative monitoring 

system for human security at sea. In other words, TCL would be a research and development 

mechanism for a deeper and broader cross-Strait maritime cooperation system. 

In sum, when an incident happens, technicians in TCL would immediately organize data 

and transmit the information to the collaborative response subsystem. The role of TCL would be 

to reduce information biases due to either political distrust or technical failure, and facilitate 

efficient responses for promoting human security at sea. 

4.2.2. Collaborative Response Subsystem 

The second subsystem in the cross-Strait maritime cooperation system is the collaborative response subsystem. The concept of collaborative response stresses coordination of actions 

in response to incidents, rather than agreements on a joint operational procedure. In other words, 

the operational procedure need not be specified or designated in advance so that both sides 

would not be anxious about losing respective political capital before making commitments to 

collaborate. A declaratory measure of confidence building, which states the good will of both 

sides to collaborate for human security at sea, would be a good start. 

Communication technologies described in the previous section could be used in developing the cross-Strait maritime CBMs. However, the selection of agents to perform the communication is essential. Maritime issues have been managed by various agents on each side of the 

Taiwan Strait. Inter-agent integration could be a challenge to both Beijing and Taipei. Since 

cross-Strait governmental cooperation at this moment is highly unlikely, selecting non-governmental proxies to deliver the jurisdictional messages across the Taiwan Strait would be critical. 

27 
Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea

The optimal candidates ought to have two attributes: internal networking capacity and external 

representation. 

First, the agents must have strong internal networking capacity. It could be non-governmental organizations or institutions with sufficient knowledge of maritime issues in general and 

frequent contacts to officials of crimes at sea and SAR in particular. The proxies should have the 

channels to network among governmental agents and consult with various agents when 

responses to incidents at sea require inter-agent cooperation. 

Second, the agents must have sufficient external representation. The proxies should 

have effective accesses to higher political authority in government. In addition to functional 

operation, the proxies should be able to represent political willingness and strategic concerns of 

the higher authorities in Beijing or Taipei. Thus, a certain degree of implicit or explicit consent 

on cooperation between the two sides has to be reached. 

In addition to collaborations of responses through technological cooperation, constant 

dialogue between XT and XB should be encouraged to explore other common concerns and 

creative ideas of cross-Strait maritime security cooperation. 

Agents of both sides suggested in Table 6 have ongoing contacts and communications. 

In Taiwan, CIPA was founded in 1992 by retired and current high-ranking police officers and 

legislators. The main purpose of CIPA is to combat crime committed by Taiwan’s citizens 

abroad. The group also functions as a semi-official channel for Taiwan to establish links with 

external police authorities. On the mainland, the China Police Society is considered to be a front 

organization of the Department of Public Security and acts as an informal contact point with 

foreign counterparts of police studies associations, especially that of Taiwan and its police force. 

Both organizations have some contact through the exchange of visits and Track II activities. 

Nevertheless, the scope of their discussions has been broader crime issues, not necessarily with 

the focus of crime at sea. Thus, the function of preventing crime at sea from turning to political 

or military incidents might be limited. 

Table 6. Possible Non-Governmental Proxies 

Area of Interest China Taiwan 

Crime at Sea China Police Society Criminal Investigation and 

Prevention Association 

Maritime SAR ARATS, Red Cross Society of 

China 

SEF, Red Cross Society of Taiwan 

Overall Maritime Security CSCAP China CSCAP Taiwan 

In terms of SAR, the Maritime Safety Administration of PRC is responsible for maritime 

safety of navigation. The Maritime Rescue and Salvage Center of PRC is responsible for 

guiding and coordinating rescue and salvage operations in the coastal areas. Both have made 

combating and co-investigating cases of piracy and armed robbery an important component of 

their functions and duties to ensure the safety of navigation. In Taiwan, the National Search and 

28
Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea 

Rescue Center under the Ministry of National Defense is responsible for coordinating overall 

SAR, while local Search and Rescue Associations are also essential in SAR. The Coast Guard 

Administration (CGA) has handled mainly coastal patrol and anti-smuggling efforts. In April 

2002, the Executive Yuan announced plans to establish a Maritime Affairs Ministry in two years, 

in which CGA will take the leading role in the formation of the country’s maritime policy. 

Currently, there is no formal arrangement between both sides of the Taiwan Strait regarding 

SAR. However, when it is needed, both sides offer assistance on ad hoc bases through Red 

Cross Societies or SEF and ARATS. 

For overall maritime human security issues, the Council for Security Cooperation in the 

Asia Pacific (CSCAP), a regional Track II mechanism for multilateral security dialogue, has 

provided Taipei and Beijing with opportunities to exchange views of regional security concerns 

since 1996. 22 Although “cross-Strait issues” are currently not on the agenda of CSCAP working 

groups,

23 previous engagements in the working groups have built a constructive foundation for 

Taipei and Beijing to initiate possible cooperation for human security at sea. In Taipei, the 

Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University (IIR Taiwan) coordinates 

Taiwan’s participation in CSCAP activities. It has strong internal and external channels of 

networking policy and research communities with regard to regional security issues and crossStrait relations. In Beijing, the Secretariat of CSCAP China is located in the China Institute of 

International Studies under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The China Institute for Marine 

Affairs (CIMA) under the State Oceanic Administration has been coordinating China’s 

participation in the CSCAP Maritime Cooperation Working Group. IIR Taiwan and CIMA 

China launched a bilateral cooperation forum in November 200124 and have indicated good will 

and intentions of further engagements. 

5. Final Perspective: From CBMs to Conflict Prevention 

The goal of this study was to develop maritime CBMs as building blocks for maintaining 

peace and achieving security in the Taiwan Strait. It is an incremental approach to conflict 

prevention, rather than an institutional approach for crisis management. As long as the “oneChina” issue remains the obstacle for normalizing cross-Strait relations, developing a crossStrait maritime cooperation system would extensively expand the scope and the content of crossStrait constructive engagements. Such engagements on the one hand respond to the new security 

environments in which concerns of human security at sea have been highlighted, and, on the 

other hand, would transform the overall security policy environment from a tension-preoccupied

security agenda to a coordination-driven one. Through transformation of policy environments, 

the security perceptions of policy-makers could be shifted from a tension-oriented to a 

cooperation-dominated mindset. 

 22 CSCAP was established in July 1993. China became a formal committee member in 1996. Scholars and security 

specialists from Taiwan are invited to participate in CSCAP working group meetings in their private capacities. 

The arrangements make CSCAP one of the rare venues where delegations from Taiwan and mainland China 

discuss security issues together. 

23 Due to objections from China, cross-Strait security and political issues have not been formally on CSCAP 

agenda. However, international delegations often exchange views on cross-Strait issues informally. 24 The forum was held in November 2001 in Taipei. The discussion was mainly on South China Sea issues. 

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Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea

The potential role of Technical Collaboration Laboratories (TCL) is to facilitate 

obtaining and sharing information relative to various maritime CBM agreements. In each 

domain of cross-Strait cooperation, including maritime, environmental, economic, military, etc., 

there might be both a cooperative monitoring subsystem to detect common human security 

threats and a collaborative response subsystem to prevent incidents from being potential 

conflicts. The technical collaboration for each domain needs to be developed to improve the 

security environment of a particular human security concern. Nevertheless, the functions and the 

operational principles would be similar to what we have elaborated in maritime CBMs. That is, 

in order to respond effectively to human security threats that both sides of the Taiwan Strait 

commonly face, joint efforts of problem monitoring and solving become inevitable. 

The information flow from non-governmental proxies in each security domain to the 

central governments in Beijing and Taipei would constantly indicate the importance of cooperation for human security. The cross-Strait security environments and policy agenda would be 

shifted from tension-preoccupied to coordination-driven in nature. The transformation of 

security environments is an evolving process in which any single cooperation provides an 

incremental improvement. Thus, the value of developing CBMs through technical collaboration 

should not be underestimated as a low security priority. Instead, the strategic goal of cross-Strait 

conflict prevention should be clearly in mind while initiating multi-dimensional confidence 

building measures. 

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Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea 

Selective Bibliography

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(http://www.humansecurity.chs.org/doc/index/html). 

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Cheon, Seongwhun (1999), Cooperatively Enhancing Military Transparency on the Korean 

Peninsula: A Comprehensive Approach, Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper 

No. 10, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA. 

Cossa, Ralph, ed. (1995), Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures (Washington 

DC: CSIS, 1995). 

Cossa, Ralph A. (1998), “Asia-Pacific Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security,” in 

Michael Krepon, et al. (eds.), A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for Regional 

Security 3rd Edition (The Henry L. Stimson Center Handbook No. 1). 

Deng, John C.C. “Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Relationships,” http://www/rocinfo.org/ 

govt_position/891226.htm. 

Durrani, Mahmud Ali (2001), Enhancing Security Through a Cooperative Border Monitoring 

Experiment: A Proposal for India and Pakistan, Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional 

Paper No. 21, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA. 

Griffiths, David N. (2000), Maritime Aspects of Arms Control and Security Improvement in the 

Middle East, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Policy Paper No. 56 (San Diego, 

CA: IGCC, University of California). 

Hampson, Fen (2002), “The Many Meanings of Human Security,” in his Madness in the 

Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder (Oxford University Press), pp. 1-37. 

Kao, Cheng-sheng (2002), “Discussion of Cross-Strait Cooperation in Crime Fighting,” 

Exchange No. 63, June 2002, pp. 30-32. 

Krepon, Michael, Jenny S. Drezin, and Michael Newbill (eds.) (1999), Declaratory Diplomacy: 

Rhetorical Initiatives and Confidence Building, The Henry L. Stimson Center Report No. 27. 

Moodie, Michael (2000), Cooperative Security: Implications for National Security and 

International Relations, Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper No. 14, Sandia 

National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA. 

Nam, Man-Kwon, and Shin, Sung-Tack (1999), ENTNEA: A Concept for Enhancing Nuclear 

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Occasional Paper No. 12, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA. 

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Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea

Olsen, John N., and Charles D. Harmon (2001), “Technology Development for Nuclear 

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Pederson, M. Susan, and Stanley Weeks (1995), “A Survey of Confidence and Security Building 

Measures,” in Ralph Cossa (ed.), Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures

(Washington, DC: CSIS, 1995), pp. 81-100. 

Pregenzer, Arian L. (1995), Crisis Prevention Centers as Confidence Building Measures: 

Suggestions for Northeast Asia, SAND 94-1527 (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National 

Laboratories). 

Siddiqa-Agha, Ayesha (2000), Maritime Cooperation Between India and Pakistan: Building 

Confidence at Sea, Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper No. 18, Sandia 

National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA. 

Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh, and Yuan, Jing-Dong (1999), Cooperative Monitoring for Confidence Building: A Case Study of the Sino-Indian Border Areas, Cooperative Monitoring 

Center Occasional Paper No. 13, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA. 

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Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea 

About the Author 

Chyungly Lee is an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, 

National Chengchi University in Taiwan. She received her Ph.D. from the University of 

Maryland, Department of Government and Politics, in 1995. Her international experiences 

include Visiting Scholarships through the Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National 

Laboratories, USA, in spring 2002 and through the Center for International Relations, Liu 

Institute for Studies of Global Issues, University of British Columbia, in autumn 2002. She is an 

active participant in the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and has been 

coordinating Taiwan’s participation in CSCAP-related activities since May 2000. Her recent 

publications and current research have focused on non-traditional security issues in the Asia 

Pacific, particularly on the perspectives of economic security and human security. 

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Maritime Confidence Building Measures Across the Taiwan Strait: 

Technical Collaboration for Human Security at Sea

Distribution 

350 MS 1373 CMC Library, 5341 

1 MS 9018 Central Tech Files, 8945-1 

2 MS 0899 Technical Library, 9616 

1 MS 0619 Review & Approval Desk, 9612 

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