FILED

April 29, 1999

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

APRIL SESSION, 1999

COREY ADAMS KENNERLY, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9806-CC-00252

)

Appellant, )

)

) FRANKLIN COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. J. CURTIS SMITH,

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE

)

Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)

ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE

CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

FLOYD DON DAVIS JOHN KNOX WALKUP

201 First Avenue, N.W. Attorney General and Reporter

Winchester, TN 37398

KIM R. HELPER

Assistant Attorney General

425 Fifth Avenue North

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

J. MICHAEL TAYLOR

District Attorney General

STEVEN M. BLOUNT

Assistant District Attorney General

1002 East Main Street

Decherd, TN 37324

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
1

 Although the court had appointed counsel at that time, Defendant filed this amended

petition pro se.

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OPINION

The Defendant, Corey Adams Kennerly, appeals the trial court’s denial of

his petition for post-conviction relief. On October 28, 1996, Defendant pleaded

guilty to first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. Pursuant

to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment

with the possibility of parole for felony murder and twenty years for especially

aggravated robbery, to be served concurrent to his life sentence. 

On January 13, 1997, Defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction

relief, which he later amended.1 Following a post-conviction evidentiary hearing,

the trial court denied relief, and Defendant appealed. In this appeal, Defendant

raises three assignm ents of error for review: (1) the trial court failed to comply

with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d), and as a result, his plea was

not entered voluntarily; (2) the trial court erred by overruling his motion to dismiss

his attorneys of record; and (3) he suffered the ineffective assistance of counsel

because counsel failed to request a change of venue. 

I.

In his half-page argument to this Court, Defendant alleges that the trial

court “failed to advise him of certain of his constitutional rights and statutory

rights,” citing to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and State v. Mackey,

553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1977). A thorough review of the plea hearing transcript

reveals that Defendant’s hearing could perhaps serve as a model for trial judges
-3-

to follow when accepting guilty pleas. The trial judge in this case placed the

utmost importance on Defendant’s understanding of the proceedings, including

the protections afforded by the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. 

In his brief, Defendant specifies only one right which he contends was not

but should have been given. He states, “The Court failed to advise him that he

had a specific right to a change of venue . . . .” Defendant has not cited, nor can

this Court locate, any authority tending to show that the trial court has a duty to

inform criminal defendants of a right to change venue. Therefore, this issue is

both waived and without merit. We conclude that the trial court properly ensured

the knowing and voluntary nature of Defendant’s plea.

II.

In his second issue, Defendant alleges that the trial court erred by denying

his motion to dismiss his attorneys of record. However, as the State points out,

Defendant has waived this issue by failing to provide any argument in his brief on

appeal to this Court. 

III.

Finally, Defendant argues that he suffered the ineffective assistance of

counsel prior to his guilty plea. Gleaning his argument from the statement of

facts contained in his brief, it appears that this issue has two prongs: (1) his

counsel failed to advise him of his constitutional rights, including the right to plead
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not guilty and proceed to trial; and (2) his counsel failed to inform him that his

case could have been moved to a location other than Franklin or Grundy County.

It is more than apparent from the transcript of the guilty plea that Defendant

was aware of his constitutional rights, including the right to plead not guilty and

proceed to trial. Therefore, even if his counsel had been deficient in this respect,

Defendant could not fulfill his burden to show he was prejudiced by the

deficiency. Furthermore, his pretrial counsel testified at the post-conviction

hearing that the decision not to request a change of venue was made after the

issue was fully discussed with Defendant prior to the plea. Defendant testified

at his plea hearing that he had no dissatisfaction with his pretrial counsel. 

The trial judge entered a thorough memorandum opinion denying postconviction relief. The evidence clearly supports the trial judge’s findings. Based

upon a thorough reading of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the law

governing the issues presented for review, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

____________________________________

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
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CONCUR:

___________________________________

JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE

__________________________________

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR.