MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 2 2 ME 48 Docket: BCD

- 21

- 416 Argued : May	10,	2022 Decided: August	30,	2022 Panel: STANFILL ,	C.J., JABAR	and	HORTON,	JJ.,	CLIFFOR D ,	A.R.J., and HUMPHREY,	A

. R

. J

. *

NECEC	TRANSMISSION	LLC	et	al.

v. BUREAU	OF	PARKS	AND	LANDS	et al.

STANFILL , C. J. [¶1] The	 New	 England	 Clean	 Energy	 Connect	 project	 (the	 Project)	 is designed	 to	 transmit	 power	 generated	 in	 Québec	 through	 Maine	 and	 into Massachusetts.	 	 The	 Project	 includes	 a new 145.3

- mile,	 high

- voltage	 direct current	 (HVDC)	 transmission	 line,	 proposed	 to	 run from	 the	 Maine

- Québec border	in	Beattie	Township	to	a	new	converter	station	in	Lewiston	and	 from there	 to	 an	 existing	 substation	 by	 a	 new	 1.2

- mile,	 high

- voltage	 alternating current	 transmission	 line.	 	 Of	 the	 Project’s	 five	 segments, s egment	 1

— a 53.1 mile

- long HVDC	 transmission	 line running	 along a	 corridor	 from
Beattie Township	to	the	Forks	Plantation

— is	the	most	controversial	because	it

* Justice	Humphrey	sat	at	oral	argument	and	participated	in	the	initial	conference	while	he	was an	Associate	 Justice	and,	as	directed	and	assigned	by	the	Chief	 Justice,	is	now	participating	in	this appeal	as	an	Active	Retired	Justice.2
must be cut	 through	 commercial	 timberland	 and	 will	 cross	 hundreds	 of wetlands ,	waterways,	and	other	wildlife	habita ts , as	well	as	public	land. [¶ 2 ] On	November	2,	2021, fifty

- nine percent	of	Maine	voters	approved the	following ballot question through	a	public	referendum : Do	 you	 want	 to	 ban	 the	 construction	 of	 high

- impact	 electric transmission	lines	in	 the	Upper	Kenn ebec	Region and	 to	 require the	 Legislature	 to	 approve	 all	 other	 such	 projects	 anywhere	 in Maine,	both	retroactively	to	2020,	and	to	require	the	Legislature, retroactively	to	2014,	to	approve	by	a	two

- thirds	vote	such	projects using	public	land? [ 1 ] Though	the question d id not	mention	the	Project,	the legislation	enacted by	the voters	(the Initiative ) effectively preclude s the Project

. 2 [¶ 3 ] On	 November	 3,	 2021, NECEC	 Transmission	 LLC	 and	 Avangrid Networks,	 Inc.	 (collectively,	 NECEC) , 3 filed	 a	 com plaint	 for	 declaratory

1 Section	4	of	the I nitiative requires	legislative	approval	of	the	construction	of	any	high

- impact transmission	line	in	addition	to	a	CPCN	from	the	PUC. I.B.	2021,	ch.	1,	§ 4 (effective	Dec.	19,	2021). Section	 5	 of	 the	 Initiative bans	 the	 construction	 of	 any	 high

- impact	 tra nsmission	 line in the “Upper Kennebec	Region , ” defined as	“the	approximately	43,300	acres	of	land	located	between	the Town	of	Bingham	and	Wyman	Lake,	north	along	the	Old	Canada	Road,	Route	201,	to	the	Canadian border,	 and	 eastward	 from	 the	 Town	 of	 Jackman to	 encompass	 Long	 Pond	 and	 westward	 to	 the Canadian	border,	in	Somerset	County	and	Franklin	County.”	I.B.	2021,	ch.	1,	§	5	(effective	Dec.	19, 2021). Section	6	requires	sections	4	and	5	to	be	applied	retroactively to	September	16,	2020

. I.B. 2021,	ch.	1,	§ 6 (effective	Dec.	19,	2021).

2 Consistent	with	the	terminology	used	by	the trial	court	and	the parties,	we	use	“the	Initiative” throughout	this	opinion	to	refer	to	the	legislation	enacted by	the	passage	of the	citizens’	initiative question	in	November	2021. See I.B.	2021,	ch.	1 , §§	1

- 6	(effective	Dec.	19,	2021).		The	Initiative	was the	second	attempt	at	a	citizens’	initiative	to	curtail	the	Project;	we	held	the	first	proposed	initiative unconstitutional	in Avangrid	Networks,	Inc. v .	Sec’y	of	State ,	2020	ME	109, ¶¶ 35

- 38, 237	A.3d	882

.

3 NECEC Transmission	LLC owns	the	Project;	Avangrid	owns	NECEC	Transmission	LLC	and	is	the indirect	parent	company	of	Central	Maine	Power	Company	(CMP).		CMP,	together	with	H.Q.	Energy3 judgment in	the	Superior	Court alleging ,	among	other	things,	that retroactive application	 of	 the	 Initiative	 to	 the	 Project ,	 as	 required	 by	 section 6, is unconstitutional	on	a	variety	of	grounds. The complaint	named the	Bureau	of Parks	and	Lands,	the	Public	Utilities	Commission	(PUC),	the	Maine	Senate,	and the	 Maine	 House	 of	 Representatives as	 defendants (collectively,	 the	 State parties ).	 	 Thirteen	 orga nizations	 and	 individuals	 were	 granted	 intervenor

status in	the	trial	court

. 4 [¶ 4 ] NECEC	moved to	preliminarily	enjoin	the	Initiative	from	becoming law. After	 transfer	 to	 the Business	and	Consumer	Docket ,	and	 f ollowing	 the denial	of	NECEC’s	request for a	preliminary	injunction,	the	trial	court ( Duddy, J. ) reported	t h e case	to	us	pursuant	to	M.R.	App.	P.	24(c)

. We	accept	the	report	and frame	the	question	of	law	raised	by	the	court’s	reported	interlocutory	ruling	as follows:

Services	 (U.S. )	 Inc.,	 originally	 entered	 into	 transmission	 services	 agreements	 with	 several Massachusetts	electricity	distribution	companies	 to	 transmit	electricity	 through	 the	Project.		CMP ultimately	transferred	all of its	rights	and	responsibilities	in	the	Project	to NECEC Transmission	LLC

.

4 The	 following	 parties	 intervened	 on	 the	 side	 of	 NECEC:	 H.Q.	 Energy	 Services	 (U.S.)	 Inc. , Cianbro Corporation , International	Brotherhood	of	Electrical	Workers	Local	104 , Industrial	Energy Consumer	Group , and	the	Maine	State	Ch amber	of	Commerce.		The	following	parties	intervened	on the	 side	 of	 the	 State	 appellees:	NextEra	 Energy	 Resources,	 LLC	 (NextEra);	 the	Natural	 Resources Council	of	Maine	(NRCM);	and	individuals	Thomas	B.	Saviello,	Christine	M.	Geisser,	Wendy A.	Huish, Jonat han	T.	Hall,	Theresa	E.	York,	and	Robert	C.	Yorks	(the	West	Forks	residents).4 Would	 retroactively	 applying	 sections	 4	 and	 5	 of	 the Initiative	 to	 the	 certificate	 of	 public	 convenience	 and necessity	 (CPCN)	 issued	 for	 the	 Project,	 as	 required	 by section	6,	violate	due	process	under	the	Maine	Constitution, Me.	 Const.	 art.	 I,	 §	 6

- A, if	 N ECEC	 undertook	 substantial construction	 consistent	 with	 and	 in	 good

- faith	 reliance	 on the	CPCN	before	the	Initiative	was	enacted? Answering	 that	 question,	 we	 hold	 that	 section 6 of	 the	 Initiative is unconstitutional to	 the	 extent	 it	 requires s ections	 4	 and 5	 to	 be	 applied retroactively to	 the CPCN	 if	 the	 appellants	 have	 acquired	 vested	 rights	 to proceed	with	Project	construction. We	therefore	remand to	the	Business	and Consumer	Docket for	further	proceedings	consistent	with	this	opinion.
I. BACKGROUND [¶ 5 ] T he	interlocutory	ruling	underlying	this	case	is	before	us	pursuant to	M.R.	App.	P.	24(c),	on	report	from	the	Business	and	Consumer	Docket.		Given that	procedural	posture,	the	following	facts	are	taken	from	the	reported	ruling and our	opi nion	affirming	the	PU C ’s	order	granting	the	CPCN for	the	Project , NextEra	Energy	Res.,	LLC	v.	Me

. PU C , 2020	ME	34,	227	A.3d	1117 , and	are	limited to	 those	 facts	 relevant	 to	 the	 question	 of	 law	 that	 we	 now	 answer.
See Littlebrook	Airpark	Condo .	Ass’n	v. Sweet	Peas,	LLC , 2013	ME	89,	¶ 9,	81	A.3d
348 (outlining	the	limited	scope	of	review	for	reported	interlocutory	rulings )

.5 A. Project	Permitting	and	Other	Governmental	Approvals [¶ 6 ]		On	September	27,	2017,	CMP	filed	a	petition	with	the	PUC to	obtain

a CPC N	 for	 the	Project. NextEra	Energy	Res.,	LLC ,	2020	ME	34,	¶ 3 ,	227	A.3d
1117

. The	 PUC	 held many	 days	 of public and	 evidentiary hearings and conferences	and received well over	one	thousand	public	comments	regarding CMP’s	petition. Id. ¶ 6.		On	May	3,	2019,	 the	PUC	concluded	 that	 the	Project meets	the	statutory	public

- need	standard	and	unanimously	voted	to	grant	CMP
a	CPCN to construct	and	operat e the	Project , all	at	no	cos t	to	Maine	electricity

customers. Id. ¶¶ 6

- 10. [¶ 7 ]		Appellee

- Intervenor	NextEra	intervened	in	the	PUC proceeding	and appealed to	us	from the	order granting	the	CPCN. Id. ¶ ¶ 5, 11.		We	affirmed	the PUC’s	 decision	 on	March	 17,	 2020 ,	 concluding	 that the	 PUC’s	 determination, findings	of	fact,	and	application	of	the	law	were	supported	by	the	voluminous record

. Id

. ¶ 43. [¶ 8 ] In addition	 to	 the	 CPCN,	 NECEC	 and	 CMP	 obtained	 multiple authorizations	 from	 various	 government	 entities	 before	 beginning
construction on	the Project

. NECEC	applied	for	permits	from	the	Department of	Environmental	Protection	 (DEP) as required	under	 the	Natu ral	Resources Protection	Act, 38	M.R.S.	 §§ 48 0

- A to 48 0

- JJ (2017) ,	and	 the	Site	 Location	 of6 Development	 Act,	 38	 M.R.S.	 §§ 483

- A , 484 , 487

- A (2017) , as	 well	 as	 for	 a
Site Law	 Certification	 from	 the	 Land	 Use	 Planning	 Commission	 (LUPC), see 12 M.R.S.	§ 685

- B	(2017)

. On	May	11,	2020,	the	DEP	approved	NECEC’s	permit application	 in	 an	 order	 that	 also	 incorporated	 the	 LUPC’s	 certification

. Appellees

- Intervenors	NextEra,	NRCM,	a nd	the	West	Forks	residents	appealed the	 DEP’s	 order	 to	 the	 Superior	 Court	 and	 the	 Board	 of	 Environmental Protection	(BEP) and	moved	to	stay	the	order

. The	Superior	Court	denied	their motion	to	stay the DEP’s	order. NextEra	Energy	Res.,	LLC	v.	Dep’t	of	E nv’t	Prot. , 2021	 Me.	 Super.	 LEXIS	 14	 (Jan.	 8,	 2021)

. On	 November	 23,	 2021,	 the	 DEP suspended	 the	 permit	 it	 had	 issued	 pending	 the	 outcome	 of	 this	 case.	 	 The appeal	 to	 the	 BEP	 remained	 pending when	 this	 case	 was	 filed in	 the Superior Court

. 5 [¶ 9 ]		NECEC	and	CMP	also	secured a	permit	from	the	United	States	Army Corps	of	Engineers	under	 the	Clean	Water	Act	and	 the	Rivers	&	Harbors	Act (the	ACE	permit). See 33	U.S.C. S. § 1344 (LEXIS	through	Pub.	L.	No.	117

- 66);
33 U .S.C.S.	§ 403	(LEXIS through	Pub.	L.	No.	117

- 116)

. The	Sierra	Club,	NRCM,

5 The	status	of	some	of	these	proceedings has changed	during	the	time	that	this	case	has	been pending,	but	that	information	is	not	part	of	the	formal	record	before	us. See,	e.g. ,	Edward	D.	Murphy, State Environmental	Board	Denies	Appeal	of	Transmission	Line	Project ,	Portland	Press	Herald	(July	21, 2 022), https://www.pressherald.com/2022/07/21/state

- environmental

- board

- denies

- appeal

- of

transmission

- line

- project/.7 and	the Appalachian Mountain	Club	(AM C )	sued	the	Army	Corps	of	Engineers to	 enjoin	 the	 ACE	 permit,	 alleging	 that	 the	 environmental	 assessment underlying	the	permit	was	insufficient	and	that	the	Corps	sh ould	have	instead completed	 a	 full environmental	 impact	 statement .	 	 Following	 an	 emergency appeal	 of	 the	 denial	 of	 a	 preliminary	 injunction,	 on	 January	 15,	 2021,	 the United States	 Court	 of	Appeals	 for	 the	 First	 Circuit	 enjoined	 construction	 on

s egment 1	of the	Project	pending	appeal.		The	First Circuit	vacated	the	partial injunction	on	May	13,	2021, Sierra	Club	v.	U.S.	Army	Corps	of	Eng’rs ,	997	F.3d 395	(1st	Cir.	2021), but	the	case	remains	pending. [¶1 0 ] Separately,	 CMP	 received	 a presidential	 permit	 from	 the United States Department	 of	 Energy	 (DOE)	 on	 January	 14,	 2021.
NECEC Transmission	 LLC ,	 DOE	 Docket	 No.	 PP

- 438,	 Presidential	 Permit	 (DOE Jan.	 14,	 2021); s ee Exec.	 Order	No.	 10,485,	 3	 C.F.R. 106 (1953), amended	 by
Exec. Order	No. 12,038,	3 C.F.R.	136	(1978).		Thereafter,	the	Sierra	Club,	NRCM, and	 AM C amended	 their	 pending	 complaint	 regarding	 the	 ACE	 permit	 to include	claims	relating	to	the	presidential	permit. [¶1 1 ]	 	 Finally,	 NECEC	 obtained	 municipal	 permits	 and	 approvals requiring	compliance	with	local rules in	most	municipalities	through	which	the8 Project	will	pass.		At	the	time	this case was	 filed,	NECEC	had	not	yet	secured permits and	approvals	from	four	municip alities. [¶1 2 ]		In	addition	to	the	aforementioned	permits	and	approvals,	NECEC (through	 CMP)	 needed	 a	 lease	 from	 the	 Bureau	 of	 Parks	 and	 Lands	 for	 the
0.9

- mile	 stretch	 of	 the	 Project	 that	 crosses	 public reserved	 lands	 in Johnson Mountain	 Township	 and	We st	 Forks	 Plantation. In	 2014, CMP	 had obtained	a	lease	 from	the	Bureau	to	construct	electric	transmission	 facilities, and	in	2020 CMP entered into an	amended	lease ( the	BPL	lease ) superseding the	2014	lease	for	the	public reserved	lands	through	which	the Project	would
pass . 6 [¶1 3 ]	 	 In	 June	 2020,	 Senator	 Russell	 Black	 filed	 a	 complaint	 in	 the Superior	 Court	against	 the	Bureau,	alleging the BPL	lease	 violated article	 IX,
section	 23 of	 the	 Maine	 Constitution.	 	 The	 Business	 and	 Consumer	 Docket ( Murphy,	 J. )	 vacated	 the	 BPL	 lease, Black	 v.	 Cutko , No. BCD WB

- CV

- 2020

- 29, 2021	WL	3700685 (Me.	B.C.D.	Aug.	10,	2021),	and	that	decision was appealed

to	us , Black	et	al

. v.	Bureau	of	Parks	and	L ands	et	al .,	No. BCD

- 21

- 257.		After Senator	Black	moved	to	lift	the	automatic	stay	on	the	judgment, we	issued	an agreed

- upon	 order	 prohibiting	 NECEC	 from	 building	 on	 the	 leased

6 CMP	assigned its	interest	in the	2020	BPL	lease	to	NECEC Transmission	LLC on	January	4,	2021.9 public reserved	lands	 until	 the	legal	 questions	 regarding	 the	 BPL	lease	 have been	resolved. See M.R.	Civ.	P.	62(e),	(g). [¶1 4 ]		 In	summary,	at	 the	 time	 this case was	 filed , (1)	 the	DEP	permit (incorporating	the	LUPC	Site	Law	certificate)	was	still	pending	on	ap peal	before the	BEP , (2)	the	ACE	permit	and	the	presidential	permit	from	the	DOE	were	the subjects	 of	 a lawsuit	in federal	 court , (3)	 the	 BPL	lease	was	 the	 subject	 of	 a direct	 appeal	 to	 us	 in	 another	 case , and	 (4)	 not	 all	 necessary	 municipal approvals	h a d been	obtained. T he	only P roject

- wide	permit	or approval that was	final	when	this case was	filed	was	the	CPCN	from	the	PUC

— an	order	that we	affirmed	and that is	not	subject	to	any	further	review.
B. Project	Construction [¶1 5 ]	 	 The	 Project	 is	 divided	 into	 five	 segments.	 	 Segment	 1 includes 53.1 miles	of	HVDC	line	along	a	new	corridor	running	from	Beattie	Township at	 the	 Canadian	 border	 to	 the	 Forks	 Plantation.	 	 Segments	 2	 and	 3	 cover approximately	92	miles	of	transmission	line along	an	existing	corridor	that	will be	 widened.	 	 Segments	 4	 and	 5	 focus	 on	 network	 upgrades,	 including	 a 26.5

- mile	transmission	line	from	Lewiston	to	Wiscasset. [¶1 6 ]	 	NECEC	 received	 the	 final P roject

- wide	 permit

— the	 presidential permit	 from	 the	 DOE

— o n	 January	 14,	 2021.	 	 On	 January	 18,	 2021,	 NECEC10 started clearing	 and	 construction	 activities	 in s egments	 2 through 5	 of	 the Project.		On	Ma y 15,	2021,	NECEC	commenced	construction o n s egment 1	of	the Project,	the	53.1	miles	from	the	Canadian	border	to	the	Forks P lantation. [¶1 7 ] According	to	the	preliminary	injunction	record, NECEC	had	spent nearly	 $450	million	 on	 the	 Project,	approximately forty

- three percent	 of	 the projected	 total	cost , as	of	November	3,	2021,	when	 this	case	was	 filed	in	 the Business	and	Consumer	Docket

. B etween	January	18,	2021,	and	the	time	the
P roject	 was	 halted	 following the referendum in	November	 2021, NECEC	 cut approximately	 124	miles	 of	 right

- of

- way f or	 direct	 cur rent	lines , cleared the
entire corridor for	the alternating	current	line , erect ed transmission	structures along	the	corridor , and	prepar ed the	converter	station	site.
C. The	2021	Citizens’	Initiative [¶1 8 ]	 	 As	 we	 recently	 reiterated	in connection	 with	 a	 related	 citizens’
initiative : The	broad	purpose	of	the	direct	initiative	is	the	encouragement	of participatory	democracy. By	[ a rticle	IV,	part	third , ]	section	18	[of the	 Maine	 Constitution,]	 the	 people,	 as	 sovereign,	 have	 retaken unto	 th emselves	 legislative	 power,	 and	 that	 constitutional provision	must	be	liberally	construed	 to	 facilitate,	rather	 than	 to handicap,	 the	 people’s	 exercise	 of	 their	 sovereign power to legislate

. . . . [S]ection	18	cannot	be	said	merely	to permit the	direct ini tiative	of	legislation	upon	certain	conditions. Rather,	it	reserves to	 the	 people	 the right to	 legislate	 by	 direct	 initiative	 if	 the constitutional	conditions	are	satisfied.11 Avangrid	Networks,	 Inc. ,	2020	ME	109 ,	¶ 15,	237	A.3d	882 ( quoting McGee	v. Sec’y of	State ,	2006	ME	50,	¶ 25,	896	A.2d	933 )

. [¶1 9 ]		 In	accordance	with	the	Maine	Constitution’s	provision	 for	direct initiative	of	legislation, Me.	Const.	art.	IV,	pt.	3,	§ 18 ,	voters	circulated	a	petition for	a	citizens’	initiative	affecting	the	Project beginning on	October	30,	2020.		On February 22,	 2021,	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	 determined	 that	 the	 petition	 had garnered	enough	valid	signatures	to present the i nitiat ed	bill to the	Legislature.
See id .	§ 18(2); 21

- A	M.R.S.	§ 905(1)	(2022) .		Th ough	presented	with	the bill , L.D.	1295	(130 th Legis.	2021) , the	Legislature did	not	act	on	the	measure	before adjourning sine	die on	March	30,	2021. See Me.	Const.	art.	IV,	pt.	3,	§ 18(2).		As a	result, a ballot question	summarizing the	initiated	bill	was	submitted	to	the public	for	a vote in November	2021. See	id .	§ 18 (2)

- (3); see generally Caiazzo	v. Sec’y	of	State ,	2021	ME	42,	¶¶ 2

- 5,	256	A.3d	260

. [¶ 20 ]		On	November	2,	2021, fifty

- nine percent	of	Maine	voters	approved the initiated	bill ,	which took	effect	on	December	19,	2021 , and effectively	halted the	 Project.	 	 The	 legislation enacted through	 the	 Initiative	 consists	 of	 six sections,	 four	 of	 which e ffect	 statutory	 changes	 with	 implications	 for	 the Project. 7 I.B.	2021,	ch.	1,	§§ 1

- 6	(effective	Dec.	19,	2021). We	do	not	address

7 NECEC	 argues	 that	 the	 sections	 of	 the Initiative	 are	 not	 severable and	 therefore the	 entire Initiative	must	fall	if	we	conclude	that	any	section	is	unconstitutional.		However,	we	need	not	consider12

s ections	 2	 and	 3	 of	 the	 Initiative	 because	 no	 one	 challenge s	 their constitutionality. [¶ 2 1]		Section	1	of	the	Initiative	amends 12	M.R.S.	§ 1852	(2021 ),	which
govern s the	 Bureau ’s authority to	 lease	 public reserved	 lands,	 by	 requiring legislative	 approval	 for	 leases	 for	 transmission	 lines retroactively	 to September 16,	2014. I.B.	2021,	ch.	1,	§ 1	(effective	Dec.	19,	2021) .		The	effect	of section	1	upon	the	portion	of	the	Project	involving	public reserved	land	is	the subject	of	the	separate	appeal	in Black	et	al.	v.	Bureau	of	Parks	and	Land s	et	al ., No. BCD

- 21

- 257,	and	is	more	appropriately	addressed	in	 that	 context	 rather than	on	report	under	M.R. App .	P.	24(c). See	Littlebrook	Airpark	Condo.	Ass’n , 2013	ME	89,	¶ 9,	81	A.3d	348

. [¶ 22 ]	 	 Sections	 4,	 5,	 and	 6	 of	 the	 Initiative	 amend 35

- A M.R.S.	 § 3132 (2021 ), the	statute	requiring project	developers	to	obtain	a	CPCN	from	the	PUC before	constructing	certain	transmission	lines. I.B.	2021,	ch.	1,	§§ 4

- 6	(effective

the	issue	 of	 severability	 because	 the	 parties	 failed	 to	 preserve	it	in	 the	 trial	 court. MP	 Asso cs.	 v. Liberty ,	2001	ME	22,	¶ 18,	771	A.2d	1040

. Even	if	the	issue	were	preserved,	the	separate	sections	of the	Initiative	would	be	severable. See 1	M.R.S.	§ 71(8)	(2022)	(codifying	the	general	rule	of	statutory construction	that	“ [ t ] he	provisions	of	the statutes	are	severable”); Lambert	v.	Wentworth ,	423	A.2d 527,	535	(Me. 1980)	(establishing	the	presumption	of	severability	in	statutes	whose	unconstitutional provisions	 are	 separate	 and	 independent	 from	 the	 valid	 provisions); see	 also 16A	 Am

. Jur.	 2d Cons titutional	 Law § 211	 (“[I]f	 a	 statute	is	 unconstitutional	 as	 applied,	 the	 state	may	 continue	 to enforce	that	statute	in	different	circumstances	where	it	is	not	unconstitutional,	and	if	a	statute	has unconstitutional	applications,	 they	are	 severable	 from	 th e	 constitutional	applications.” (footnotes omitted) ).13 Dec.	 19,	 2021)

. Th o se	 s ections do	 not	 affect	 the	 authority	 of	 any	 executive

a gency	 other	 than	 the	 PUC,	 nor	 do they affect	 any	 of	 the	 many	 permits	 or approvals	obtained	by	the	Project	except	the	CPCN. [¶ 23 ]		Section	4	of	the	Initiative	enacts 35

- A	M.R.S.	§ 3132(6

- C)	(2022) 8 and provides	 that	“[i]n	addition	 to	obtaining	a	[CPCN],	a high

- impact	electric transmission	line	may	not	be	constructed	anywhere	in	the	State	without	first obtaining	the	approval	of	the	Legislature.” I.B.	2021,	ch.	1,	§ 4	(effective	Dec

. 19, 2021)

. Section	5	of	the	Initiative	enacts	35

- A	M.R.S.	§ 3132(6

- D) (2022) , 9 which

8 Section	4	states	in	full	as	follows: Sec.	4.		35
- A	MRSA	§3132,	sub
- §6
- C is	enacted	to	read:
6
- C.		High
- impact	electric	transmission	line;	legislative	approval. In	addition to	obtaining	a	certificate	of	public	convenience	and	necessity,	a	high

- impact	electric transmission	 line	 may	 not	 be	 constructed	 anywhere	 in	 the	 State	 without	 first obtaining	 the	 approval	 of	 the	 Legislature,	 except	 that	 any	 high

- impact	 electri c transmission	 line	 crossing	 or	 utilizing	 public	 lands	 designated	 by	 the	 Legislature pursuant	to	Title	12,	section	598

- A	is	deemed	to	substantially	alter	the	land	and	must be	 approved	 by	 the	 vote	 of	 2/3	 of	 all	 the	 members	 elected	 to	 each	 House	 of	 the Legis lature. I.B.	2021,	ch.	1,	§ 4 (effective	Dec

. 19,	2021)

.

9 Section	5	states	in	full	as	follows: Sec.	5. 35
- A	MRSA	§3132,	sub
- §6
- D is	enacted	to	read:
6
- D.	 	 High
- impact	 electric	 transmission	 line;	 geographic	 prohibition. Notwithstanding	subsection	6

- C,	a	high

- impact	electric	transmission	line	may	not	be constructed	 in	 the	 Upper	 Kennebec	 Region.	 	 For the purpose	 of	 this	 subsection, “Upper	 Kennebec	 Region”	 means	 the	 approximately	 43,300 acres	 of	 land	 located between	the	Town of	Bingham	and	Wyman	Lake,	north	along	the	Old	Canada	Road, Route	 201,	 to	 the	 Canadian	 border,	 and	 eastward	 from	 the	 Town	 of	 Jackman	 to encompass	Long	Pond	and	westward	to	the	Canadian	border,	in	Somerset County and Franklin	County.14 bans	 all	 high

- impact	 electric	 transmission	 lines	 from	 the	 “Upper Kennebec Region,”	 an	 area	 spanning	 portions	 of	 Franklin	 and	 Somerset	 Counties. I.B. 2021,	 ch.	 1,	 § 5	 (effective	 D ec.	 19,	 2021)

. Finally,	 section	 6	 of	 the	 Initiative enacts	 35

- A	 M.R.S.	 § 3132	 (6

- E) (2022) , 10 which	 applies	 sections	 4	 and	 5 retroactively	 to	 high

- impact	 electric	 transmission	 line	 projects on	 which
construction had	 not	 started	 by	 September	 16,	 2020. I.B.	 2021,	 ch.	 1,	 § 6 (effective	Dec

. 19,	2021)

. Though	the	Initiative	does	not	expressly	mentio n	the Project,	 sections	 4	 and	 5	 apply	 to	 the	 Project	 through	 section	 6	 because construction	did	not	begin	on	it	until	January	2021.
D. Procedural	History [¶ 24 ]		On	November	3,	2021,	the	day	after	the public	referendum on	the initiated	 bill ,	 NECEC (i.e.,	 NECEC Transmission	 LLC and	 Avangrid ) filed	 a three

- count	 verified	 complaint	 against	 the	 State parties seeking	 declaratory

I.B.	2021,	ch.	1,	§ 5 (effective	Dec.	19,	2021).

10 Section	6	states	in	full	as	follows:
Sec.	6
. 35
- A	MRSA	§3132,	sub
- §6
- E is	enacted	to	read:
6
- E.	Retroactivity .		Notwithstanding	Title	1,	section	302	or	any	other	provision	of law	 to	 the	 contrary,	 subsections	 6

- C	and	 6

- D	apply	 retroactively	 to	September	 16, 2020	 and	 apply	 to	 any	 high

- impact	 electric	 transmission	 line	 the	 construction	 of which	had	not	commenced	as of	that	date. I.B.	2021,	ch.	1,	§ 6	(effective	Dec.	19,	2021).15 and	 injunctive	 relief	 to	 permanently	 block	 retroactive	 application	 of	 the Initiative	 to	 the	 Project.	 	 That	 same	 day,	 NECEC	 move d	 for	 a	 preliminary injunction	to	stay	the initiated	legislation during the	pendency	of	th e litigation. Several	 organizations	 and	 individuals	 moved	 to	 intervene ; five	 support ed NECEC, and eight	 support ed the	 State parties .	 	 After expedited	 briefing	 and

ar gument,	 the	 Business	 and	 Consumer	 Docket	 denied	 NECEC’s	 motion	 for	 a preliminary	 injunction	 on	 December	 16,	 2021.	 	 In	 a	 comprehensive	 and thoughtful	opinion , the	court	rejected	the	various	constitutional	challenges	to the initiated legislation	and	found	“n o	basis	to	block	the	Initiative	from	going into	effect	as	scheduled.”		However,	the	court	also	suggested	that	NECEC	and the	supporting	intervenors	move	to	have	the	questions	of	law	reported	to	us pursuant	to	M.R.	App.	P.	24(c). [¶ 25 ]		On	December	22,	2021 ,	NECEC	moved	for	the	court	to	report	the interlocutory	ruling	denying	its	request	for	a	preliminary	injunction.		M.R.	App. P.	24(c)

. Less	than	a	week	later,	the	court	reported	the	case	“in	its	entirety	for the	Law	Court	to	determine	the	questions	of	law presented.”16 II.		DISCUSSION
A. Scope	of	Appellate	Review	under	Rule	24(c) [¶ 26 ]	 	 Rule	 24(c)	 of	 the	 Maine	 Rules	 of	 Appellate	 Procedure	 governs reported	interlocutory	rulings	and	is	an	exception	to	the	 final	judgment	rule. As	such,	it	should	be	used	sparingly, Bank	of	Am.,	N.A.	v.	Cloutier ,	2013	ME	17, ¶ 8,	 61	 A.3d	 1242,	 especially	 t o	 report	 constitutional	 questions, Sirois	 v. Winslow ,	585	A.2d	183,	185	(Me.	1991). 11 Rule	24(c)	provides: If	the	trial	court	is	of	the	opinion	that	a	question	of	law	involved	in an	interlocutory	order	or	ruling	made	by	it	ought	to	be	determined by	the	La w	Court	before	any	further	proceedings	are	taken,	it	may on	motion	of	the	aggrieved	party	report	the	case	to	the	Law	Court for	that	purpose	and	stay	all	further	proceedings	except	such	as	are necessary	to	preserve	the	rights	of	the	parties	without	making	a ny decision	therein. M.R.	App.	P.	24(c).		Upon	receipt	of	a	Rule	24(c)	report,	our	broad	 task	is	 to determine	whether	accepting	 the	report	and	answering	 the	questions	of	law therein “ ‘ is	consistent	with	our	basic	function	as	an	appellate	court,	or	would
im properly	 place	 us	 in	 the	 role	 of	 an	 advisory	 board. ’ ” Littlebrook	 Airpark Condo.	Ass’n ,	2013	ME	89,	¶ 9,	81	A.3d	348	(quoting Cloutier ,	2013	ME	17,	¶ 8,

11 Former	Rule	72	of	the	Maine	Rules	of	Civil	Procedure	governed	the	process	for	reporting	cases to	the	Law	Court	before	the	Maine	Rules	of	Appellate	Procedure	were	adopted	in	2001.		M.R.	Civ. P. 72	( West 2001); see M.R.	App.	P.	1 A dvisory N ot e ,	Jan.	1,	2001.		Because	Rule	24	is	“derived	nearly verbatim	 from	 former” Rule	 72, 3A	 Harvey	 &	 Merritt, Maine	 Civil	 P ractice § A24:1	 at 224 (3d, 2021

- 2022 ed.	20 21 ),	we	consider	cases	that	examined	former	Rule	72	when	interpreting	Rule	24. Liberty	 Ins.	 Underwriters,	 Inc.	 v.	 Est.	 of	 Faulkner ,	 2008	 ME	 149,	 ¶ 5	 n.4,	 957	 A.2d	 94; see,	 e.g. , Littlebrook	Airpark	Condo

. Ass’n	v.	Sweet	Peas,	LLC , 2013	ME	89,	¶ 13,	81	A.3d 348.17 61	 A.3d	 1242).	 	 We	 weigh	 three	 factors	 to	 make	 that	 determination: “(1) whether	 ‘the	 question	 reported	is	 of	 sufficient	importance	and	 doubt	 to outweigh	 the	 policy	 against	 piecemeal	 litigation’;	 (2)	 whether ‘the	 question might	 not	 have	 to	 be	 decided	 because	 of	 other	 possible	 dispositions’;	 and (3) whether	‘a	decision	on	the	is sue	would,	in	at	least	one	alternative,	dispose of	the	action.’” Id. (quoting Cloutier ,	2013	ME	17,	¶ 8,	61	A.3d	1242). [¶ 27 ]	 	 Here,	 the	 court	 reported	 its	 order	 denying	 NECEC’s	 motion	 to preliminarily	enjoin	the	Initiative “ in its	entirety ” and	did	not submit	specific questions.		The	court’s	open

- ended	report	does	not	prevent	us	from acting	on
it. See , e.g. , Luhr	v.	Bickford ,	661	A.2d	1141,	1141

- 42 ( Me. 1995)	(considering whether	 to	 accept	 a	 report	 that	 presented	 “unspecified	 questions	 of	 law” involved	 in	 the	 trial	 court’s	 interlocutory	 order,	 identifying	 the	 operative question	of	law	at	issue,	and	discharging	the	report	after	concluding	that	the question was not doubt ful (quotation	marks	omitted) ) ; Churchill	v.	S.A.D.	No.	49 Tchrs

. Ass’n ,	 380	 A.2d	 186,	 189	 (Me. 1977)	 (“So	 long	 as	 the	 record	 clearly identifies	the	issue	raised	and	contains	the	necessary	information	to	permit	a determination	of	 the	question ,	no	 further	particularization	is	required.”) ; b ut

see Swanson	 v.	 Roman	 Cath

. Bishop ,	 1997	 ME	 63,	 1 6 &	 n.11,	 692	 A.2d	 441 (Lipez, J.,	 dissenting) (urging	 caution	 when	 deciding	 whether	 to	 accept	 a18 reported	case	involving	constitutional	questions	and	noting	that Luhr did	not involve	constitutional	claims)

. It	does,	however,	require	us	to	define	the	scope of	our	review	before	we	reach	the	merits. [¶ 28 ] NECEC	urges	us	to	accept	three	questions on report : 12 1) Whether	the	Initiative	unlawfully	deprives	NECEC	of a vested right	to	complete	Project	construction; 2) Whether	 the	 In itiative	 violates	 the	 separation	 of	 powers under	the	Maine	Constitution;	and 3) Whether	 the	 Initiative	 unlawfully impairs	 NECEC’s	 rights under	 the	 contracts	 clauses	 of	 the	U nited	 States and	Maine constitutions. [¶ 29 ] We	 limit	 our	 analysis	 to	 sections	 4	 through	 6	 of	 the	 Initiative. Section	 1	 of	 the	 Initiative	 affects	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 Bureau	 to	 lease public reser ved	 lands	 by	 retroactively	 requiring	 legislative	 approval	 for transmission	line	leases. I.B.	 2021,	 ch.	 1,	 § 1	 (effective	 Dec.	 19,	 2021)

. The Business	and	Consumer	Docket	( Murphy,	J. )	vacated	the	BPL	lease	based	on	a determination	 that	 it	 was	 not	 validly	 issued, Black	 v.	 Cutko ,

12 NECEC	argues	 further	 that	we	should	address	all	issues	involved	in	 the	interlocutory	ruling including	 whether	 NECEC	 will	 suffer	 irreparable	 harm , whether	 the	 balance	 of	 harms	 favors	 an injunction , and	whether	the	public	interest	favors	an	injunctio n.		We	disagree.		Those	questions	are fact

- bound	and	would	require	this	Court	to	apply	the	abuse

- of

- discretion	and	clear

- error	standards, see All.	for	Retired	Ams.	v.	Sec’y	of	State ,	2020	ME	123,	¶ 12,	240	A.3d	45,	which	would	be	inconsistent with	the	de	n ovo	review	of	legal	questions to	which a	Rule	24(c)	report is	limited .		Moreover,	the	legal standards	 governing	 the	 grant	 or	 denial	 of	 a	 preliminary	injunction	 can	 be	 resolved	 by	 applying well

- established	 principles	 of	 law	 and,	 therefore,	 are	 not	 sufficien tly	 doubtful	 to	 require	 our attention. Despres	v.	Moyer ,	2003	ME	41,	¶ 14,	827	A.2d	61.19 No. BCDWB

- CV

- 2020

- 29,	 2021	WL	 3700685	 (Me.	 B.C.D.	 Aug.	 10,	 2021),	 and that	decision	has	been	appealed	to	us, Black	et	al	v.	Bureau	of	Parks	and	Lands et	 al. , No.	 BCD

- 21

- 257.	 	 The	 constitutionality	 of	 the	 retroactive	 clause	 of
section 1	 of	 the	 Initiative,	 which	 amends	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 Bureau	 under Title 12,	 may	 never	 have	 to	 be	 decided	 depending	 on	 the	 outcome	 of	 that appeal.	 	 Under	 those	 circumstances,	 furt her	 consideration	 of	 the constitutionality	of	section	1	of	the	Initiative	would	not	be	consistent	with	our basic	appellate	function. See Littlebrook	Airpark	Condo.	Ass’n ,	2013	ME	89,	¶ 9, 81	A.3d	348. [¶ 30 ] T he	separation	of	powers	claim requires	only	a brief	explanation. We	 have	 recognized	 the	 power	 of	 a	 legislative	 body	 to	 enact	 retroactive legislation	that	affects	the	validity	of	a	permit	issued	by	an	executive	authority.
See ,	e.g. , City	of Portland v.	Fisherman’s	Wharf	Assoc s. II ,	541	A.2d	160 , 162

- 64 (Me.	1988). Neither	 the	CPCN	nor	any	other	permit	 that	has	been	upheld	in court	 as	 validly	 issued	 is	 necessarily	 categorically	 exempt	 from	 retroactive legislation. However,	 the	 effect	 of	 retroactive	 legislation	 upon existing proceedings	 and	 rights is	 ultimately	 for	 the	 courts,	 not	 the	 Legislature,	 to decide. For	example,	in Avangrid , we	declared	the	citizens’	ini tiative	at	issue there to	be	invalid	because	it	purported	to	adjudicate	the	validity	of	the	CPCN20 directly , and	 thereby	 exercise	 judicial power	 rather	 than	 legislative	 power. 2020	 ME	 109,	 ¶ 35,	 237	 A.3d	 882.	 	 The	 Initiative	 now	 before	 us	 is distinguishable	because	it	is	an	exercise	of	legislative	power	that	may	affect	the validity	of	the	CPCN	but	leaves judicial	review

— and	the	separation	of powers — intact. [¶ 3 1 ] With	respect	to	the	contracts	clause	claim,	we decline	to	address that	 question	 because	 it	 is	 governed	 by	 established	 principles	 of	 law. See Kittery Retail	Ventures,	LLC	v.	Town	of	Kittery , 2004	ME	65,	¶ 38,	856	A.2d	1183 (reciting	 the	well

- settled	 test	 for	resolving	contracts	clause	claims)

. In	other words,	 the	 question that	 the contracts	 clause	 claim	 raises	 is	 not	 sufficiently doubtful	 “to	 outweigh	 the	 policy	 against	 piecemeal	 litigation.” Littlebrook Airpark	 Condo

. , Ass’n ,	 2013	 ME	 89,	 ¶ 9,	 81	 A.3d	 348	 ( quotation marks	omitted ). [¶ 32 ] Thus ,	 we	 accept	 and	 answer	 only	 the	 question whether retroactively	applying	sections	4	and	5 of	the	Initiative to	the CPCN	issued	for the Project , as	 required by section	 6,	 violate s the due	 process	 clause	 of the
Maine	Constitution

.21 B. The v ested rights	doctrine	arises	from	the	Maine	Constitution	and limit s the	Legislature’s	authority	to	apply	laws	retroactively. [¶ 33 ] Whether	retroactive	application	of	the	Initiative	to	the	CPCN	that the PUC	issued	for the	Project	unconstitutionally impairs	NECEC’s	vested	rights depends	 on whether	 Maine’s	 vested	 rights	 doctrine	 is	 a	 constitutional limitation	on	legislative	authority ,	in cluding	citizen	initiatives .		We	hold	that	it
is. [¶ 34 ]	 	 By	 its	 terms,	 the	 Initiative	 applies	 retroactively	 to the	 PUC’s authority	 over projects	 involving high

- impact	 electric	 transmission	 line s on which	 construction had	 not	 started	 by	 September	 16, 2020 , 35

- A	 M.R.S. § 3132(6

- E)	(2022) , and	thus it applies to the	Project

. [¶ 35 ]		The	same	constitutional	limitations	on	legislative	authority	apply
to	 citizen

- initiated	 legislation	 as apply to	 the	 enactments	 of	 the	 Legislature. Op inion of	the	Justices , 2017	ME	100,	¶	59,	162	A.3d	188. We	are	mindful	that
citizen

- initiated	legislation	enjoys	a “ heavy	presumption	of	constitutionality ” and	should	be	construed	liberally. Id. (quotation	marks	omitted). At	the	same time,	“[s]ince	by	the	initiative	process	the	people	of	Maine	are	exercising	their legislative	power,	the	constitutional	validity	of	a	citizen	initiative	is	evaluated under	the	ordinary	rules	of	statutory	construction.” League	of	Women	Voters	v

. Sec’y	of	State ,	68 3 A.2d	769,	771	(Me.	1996).22 [¶ 36 ] “If	 the	 Legislature	intends	 a	 retroactive	 application,	 the	 statute must	be	so	applied	unless	the	Legislature	is	prohibited	from	regulating	conduct in	the	intended	manner, and	such	a	limitation	upon	th e	Legislature ’s	power can only	 arise	 from	 the	 United	 States	 Constitution	 or	 the	 Maine	 Constitution .”
Norton v.	C.P.	Blouin,	Inc. ,	511	A.2d	1056,	1060	n.5 (1985) (emphasis	added) ;

s ee State	v.	L.V.I.	Group ,	1997	ME	25,	¶ 9,	690	A.2d	960	(characterizing	the	cited excerpt from Norton as	 “clarif [ ying]	 the	 proper	 analysis	 concerning	 the retroactive	application	of	statutes”); cf

. Op inion of the Justices ,	103	Me.	506,	508, 69	A.	627	(1907)	(“ [ L ] aws	and	regulations	are	to	be	held valid	unless	there	can be	pointed	out	some	provision	in	the	State	or	United	States	Constitution	which clearly	prohibits	them.”). [¶ 37 ]		The	principal	parties	accept Norton ’s	directive	but	disagree	about the	 provenance	 of	 Maine’s	 vested rights	 doctrine.	 	 NECEC	 argues	 that	 the doctrine	 is	 grounded	 in	 the	 due process	 clause	 of	 the	 Maine	 Constitution,
Me. Const.	art.	I,	§	6

- A ,	and that	it therefore	limits	the	Legislature	from	applying the	Initiative	retroactively.		The	State	appellees conten d instead	that	the	vested rights	 doctrine	 is	 a	 creature	 of	 common	 law	 that	 citizens,	 acting	 as	 the Legislature,	may

— and	did

— abrogate	by	clear	enactment.23 1. The	vested	rights	doctrine	and	the	due	process	clause	of	the Maine	Constitution. [¶ 38 ]	 	 Contrary	 to the State	 appellees’ arguments,	 the	 protection	 of vested	rights	has	been	rooted	in	the	Maine	Constitution	since	Maine	beca me a
state. See David	M.	Gold, The	Tradition	of	Substantive	Judicial	Review:	A	Case Study	of	Continuity	in Constitutional	Jurisprudence ,	52	Me.	L.	Rev.	355,	364

- 70 (2000) (chronicling	 the	 history	 of	Maine’s	 vested	 rights	jurisprudence)

. We first	considered	the	legal	significance	of	vested	rights	just	three	years	after	the Maine	Constitution	took	effect,	in Pro prietors	of	Kennebec	Purchase	v.	Laboree , 2	 Me.	 275,	 288

- 9 3 (1823).	 	 There,	 we	 considered	 the	 constitutionality	 of retroactively	applying	a	statute	changing	the	doctrine	of	disseisin	that	would have	resulted	in a deeded	owner	losing	his	land. Id. at	286

- 93. In	describing the	 effect	 of	 the	 statute,	 we	 discussed	 article	 1,	 section	 1	 of	 the	 Maine
Constitution: By	 the	 spirit	 and	 true intent	 and meaning	 of	 this	 section,	 every citizen	 has	 the	 right	 of “possessing	 and	 protecting	 property” according	to	t he	standing	laws	of	the	state	in	force	at	the	time	of	his “acquiring[”]	it,	and	during	the	time	of	his	continuing	to	possess	it. Unless	this	be	the	true	construction,	the	section	seems	to	secure	no other	right	to	the	citizen	than	that	of	being	governed	an d	protected in	 his	 person	 and	 property	 by	 the	laws	 of	 the	land,	 for	 the	 time being

. . . . The	 design	 of	 the	 framers	 of	 our	 constitution,	it	 would seem , was . . . to	guard	against	 the	retroactive	effect	of	legislation upon	the	property	of	the	citizens.24 Id

. at 290	 (quoting Me.	 Const.	 art.	 1,	 § 1 ) .	 	 We	 proceeded	 to	 hold	 that retroactively	applying	the	challenged	statute was	unconstitutional	to	the	extent that	 it	 altered	 the	 common	 law	 “because	 such	 operation	 would	 impair	 and destroy	 vested	 rights,	 and	 deprive the	 owners	 of	 real	 estate	 of	 their	 titles thereto,	by	changing	the	principles	and the nature	of	those	facts,	by	means	of which	 those	 titles	 had	existed	and	 been	 preserved	 to	 them	in	 safety.” Id. at 29 4

- 95

. [¶ 39 ]	 	 Since Laboree ,	 we	 have	 continued	 to	 frame	 vested	 rights	 in constitutional	terms,	albeit	broadly	and	often	without	reference	to any	specific provision	 of	 the	 Maine	 Constitution.	 	 In Coffin	 v.	 Rich ,	 45	 Me.	 507,	 514

- 1 6 (1858),	 we	 relied	 on Laboree to	 hold	 that	 a	 statu t e	 making	 individual stockholders	 personally	 liable	 for	 corporate	 debts	 was	 unconstitutional	 as applied	 retroactively because	 it	 created	 a	 new	 liability	 where	 none	 had previously	existed.		We	explained: There	 can	 be	 no	 doubt	 that	 Legislatures	 have	 the	 power	 to	 pass retrospective	statutes,	if	they	affect	remedies	only.		Such	is	the	well settled	law	of	this	State.		But	they have	no	constitutional	power	to enact	 retrospective	 laws	 which	 impair	 vested	 rights,	 or	 create personal	liabilities. Id. at	514

- 15 ; s ee Thut	v.	Grant ,	281	A.2d	1,	6	(Me.	1971)	(“[T]he	Legislature	has full	power	and	authority	to	regulate	and	change	the	form	of	remedies	in	actions25 if	 no	 vested	 rights	 are	 impaired	 or	 personal	 liabilities	 created. There	 is	 no constitutional	inhibition	against	the	enactmen t	of	retroactive	legislation	which affects	remedies	only.”	( e mphasis	and	quotation	marks	omitted) ) .		We	relied	on Coffin in Sabasteanski	v.	Pagurko ,	232	A.2d	524,	525

- 26	(Me.	1967),	where	we held	 that	 a	 statu t e	 validating	 deeds	 with	 certain	 administrative defects	 was unconstitutional	 as	 applied	 retroactively	 because	 it	 effectively	 ousted subsequent	innocent	purchasers	of	their	right	to	property. [¶ 40 ]		In Adams	v.	Palmer ,	51	Me.	480	(1863),	we	identified	a	provision of	the	Maine	Constitution	as	protecting vested	rig hts different	from	the	one	we identified in Laboree

. In Adams , a	 widow	 had,	 while	 she	 was	 still	 a	 minor, released	her	right	of	dower	 to	a	parcel	of	land	by	joining	in	a	deed	with	her husband. Id. at	487. Because	she	was	a	minor	when	she	signed	the	deed,	the deed	was	voidable	by	her. Id. at	489. After	she	became	an adult,	the	Legislature enacted	a	statute	providing	that	a	minor’s	release	of	a	right	of	dower	was	valid. Id .	at	490. W e	held	th e statute was	unconstitutional	as	applied	retroactively. Id .		We	reasoned	that	the	adult	widow’s	right	to	recover	a	freehold estate	upon her	 husband’s	 death	 was	 a	 vested	 property	 right. Id. We	 implied	 that	 the widow’s	vested	right	was	protected	by	the	guarantee	in a rticle	I,	section	6 of the	 Maine	 Constitution	 “that	 no	 one	 shall ‘ be	 deprived	 of	 his	 life,	 liberty,26 property , or	privileges,	but	by	the	judgment	of	his	peers	or	the	laws	of	the	land.’” Id

. (quoting Me. C onst.	art.	1,	§	6 ( emphasis	omitted)). 13 [¶ 4 1]		Against	this	historical	backdrop,	NECEC	argues	that	vested	rights are	 properly	 viewed	 as	 arising	 from	 the	 Maine	 Constitution’s	 due	 process clause, a rticle	I,	section	6

- A.		We	agree.		Though	our	decisions	in Laboree and Adams predate	 the	 adoption	 of	 sec tion	 6

- A, see 1965	 Me.	 Laws	 1163 (Proclamation	 of	 the	 Governor	 of	Maine) ,	 their	logic	 recognizes	implied	 due process	protections	in a rticle	I,	sections	1	and	6	that	guard	against	retroactivity.
In Laboree we	interpreted	section	1	as	protecting	a	person’s inherent	right	to possess	and	protect	property	 “according	 to	 the	 standing	laws	 of	 the S tate	in force	at	 the	 time	of	his	acquiring	it,	and	during	 the	 time	of	his	continuing	 to possess	it.” Laboree ,	2 Me. at 275,	290	( quotation	marks omitted).		The	essence of	 that	 right	is	 due	 process. Cf

. Hammond	 v.	 Temp.	 Comp.	 Rev.	 Bd. , 473	A.2d 1267,	1272	(Me.	1984)	(observing	that	a	party	alleging	a	due	process	violation

13 See	also Austin	v.	Stevens , 24	Me.	520,	529	(1845) (“ While	the	exercise	of	the	legislative	power is	admitted	to	be	both	constitutional	and expedient,	to	determine	what	shall	be	the	respective	rights and	 duties	 of	 tenants	 for	 life,	 and	 of	 reversioners	 in	 relation	 to	 improvements	 made	 during	 the continuance	of	 the	estate	 for	life,	it	will	not	 follow,	 that	 their	rights	 to	such	improvements	can	b e altered	or	changed,	after	they	have	been	fixed	and	established	by	the	laws	existing	at	the	time,	when the	life	estate	falls. The	right	of	the	legislative	department	to	authorize	a	person	holding	lands	by possession	 and	 improvement,	 to	 claim	 and	 obtain	 c ompensation	 for	 his	 improvements	 has	 been admitted. But	if	he	should	voluntarily	abandon	his	improvements	with	the	land,	and	they	should	by the	existing	laws,	as	they	would	now	do, become the	property	of	the	owner	of	the	estate,	would	any intelligent	 pers on	 claim	 for	 the	 legislature	 the	 constitutional	 power	 to	 deprive	 the	 owner	 of	 any portion	of	his	estate	except	for	public	use? ”)

.27 “must	 be	 able	 to	 point	 to	 existing	 law	 or	 rules,	 or	 mutual	 understandings, wherein	 his	 claims	 of entitlement	 are	 secured	 and	 may	 be	 supported”); Thomas M.	 Cooley,	 A	 Treatise	 on	 the	 Constitutional	 Limitations Which	 Rest Upon	 the	 Legislative	 Power	 of	 the	States	 of	 the	American	Union	 356	 (1868) ( “Due	 process	 of	law	in	 each	 particular	 case	means,	 such	 an exertion	 of	 the powers	 of	 government	 as	 the	 settled	 maxims	 of	 law	 sanction

. . . . ”); cf. Tinkle, The	 Maine	 State	 Constitution 29	 (2d	 ed.	 2013)	 (observing	 that
section 1	“has	been	perceived	as	a	catchall	for	fundamental	rights	not	otherwise enumerated	in	A rticle	 I”).		 In Adams ,	we	analogized	section	6’s	protection	of vested	property	rights	to	the	due	process	clause	in	the	New	York	constitution that	 that	 state’s high court relied on	 to	 reject	 a	 retroactive	 law	 as unconstitutional. See	 Adams ,	 51	 Me.	 at	 492

- 93	 (citing Westervelt	 v.	 Gregg , 1 2 N.Y.	202 (1854)). 14 Moreover,	this	court	has	long	equated	sections	6’s	“law of	the	land”	clause	with	“due	process	of	law.” See,	e.g. , State v.	Knight ,	43	Me.	11, 122	(1857)	(defining	“law	of	the	land”	as	“the	due	course	and	process	of	law” (quotation	marks	omitted) ); State	v.	Doher t y ,	60	Me.	504,	509	(1872)	(“‘[D]ue process	of	law’	and	‘law	of	the	land’	have	the	same	meaning.”); J ordan	v.	Gain es ,

14 Further, Adams characterized	our	decision	in Laboree as	approving	the	due	process	principles upon	which	other	courts	had	re jected	retroactive	legislation	as	“denying	the	power	of	the	Legislature to	take	away	vested	rights.” Adams	v.	Palmer ,	51	Me.	480,	493	(Me.	1863).28 136	Me.	291,	294,	8	A.2d	585	(1939)	(“‘[D]ue	process	of	law’	and	‘the	law	of	the land’	 are	 identical	 in	 meaning.	 	 They	 are	 of	 equivalent	 import	 and interchangeable.”	(citations	omitted)). [¶ 42 ]		Thus, s ections	1	and	6	of	the	Maine	Constitution’s	Declaration	of Rights	were	proxies	for	due	process	protections	of	vested	rights	until	section
6

- A	 was	 adopted	 in	 1963. Cf

. L.D.	 33	 (101st	 Legis.	 1963) (“A	 due	 process clause

. . . should	be	added	to	the	Maine	Co nstitution

. . . . It	may	well	be	said	that in	various	places	within	the	Declaration	of	Rights,	as	the	same	is	now	written, much	of	the	protection	given	by	the	proposed	new	due

- process	clause	appears. However,	the	right s with	which	we	are	here	concerned	ar e	so	fundamental	and so	important	that	if	there	is	a	second	or	repeat	guarantee,	such	underwriting	of protection	is,	we	believe,	all	to	the	good.”)

. Constitutional	protection	of	vested rights	 proper l y	 resides	in	Maine’s	 due	 process	 clause. Cf.	 Tinkle,	 Th e	 Maine
State	 Constitution 45	 (2d	 ed.	 2013)	 (“With	 the	 incorporation	 into	 the	 state constitution	of	section	6

- A,	which	expressly	contains	a	due	process	clause,	the law	of	the	land	clause [in	section	6] has	become	doubly	redundant	and	fallen into	desuetude. ”)		We	conclude	that	the	vested rights	doctrine	“arises	from”	the Maine	 Constitution	 such	 that	 it constrains	 the	 power	 to enact retroactive legislation

.29 2. NECEC ’s vested right s claim to	develop	the	Project	under the	terms	of	the	CPCN [¶ 43 ] S ections 4 through 6 of	 the	 Initiative relate	 to 35

- A	 M.R.S. § 3132(6), which direct s the	 PUC	 to	 determine	 whether	 a	 proposed transmission	line	project	serves	an	identified	 “public	need.” I.B.	2021,	ch.	1, §§ 4

- 6	(effective	Dec.	19,	2021). Section	4	adds	a	requirement	to	the	statute	for legislative	 approval	 “ [ i ] n	 addition	 to	 obtaining	 a [CPCN].” Id. § 4. Section	 5 categorically	bans	construction	of	high

- impact	electric	transmission	projects	in the “ Upper	Kennebec R egion. ” Id. § 5. Section	6	makes s ections	4	and	5	of	the Initiative	 applicable	 to	 all	 high

- impact	 electric	 transmission	 li ne s	 on	 which
construction had	not	started by	September	16,	2020. Id. § 6. Because	NECEC started	 construction	 on	 the	 Project	 some	 four	 months after	 September	 16, 2020,	the	retroactivity	provision	in s ection	6 directly impairs NECEC’s	ability to	proceed	with	Project	construction	pursuant	to	the	terms	of	the	CPCN	issued under	then

- existing	law. [¶ 44 ]		The	issue	before	us involves the intersection of	NECEC’s	private interest	 to	 proceed	 and	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 electorate	 to	 determine public legislative policy.		The	applicability	of the	vested	rights	doctrine	here	turns	on whether	 NECEC	 acquired	 a	 cognizable	 property	 right	 that	 the	 Maine
Constitution protects	 from	 being impaired	 by	 retroactive	 legislation.30 See J. Spencer	 Hall, State	 v.	 Vested	 Rights	 Statutes:	 Developing	 Certainty	 and Equity	 and	 Protecting	 the	 Public	 Interest ,	 40	 Urb.	 Law.	 451 ,	 455

- 56 (2008) ( “‘ Vested	rights	are	rights	vested	in	specific	individuals	in	accordance	with	the law	in	what	the	law	recognizes	as property .’		Critical	to	the	application	of	the doctrine	 of	 vested	 rights,	 then,	 is	 a	 definition	 of	 what	 constitutes property

. . . . James	 Madis on	 viewed	 property	 as embracing ‘ everything	 to which	a	man	may	attach	a	value	and	have	a	right.’”	(quoting	Edward	S.	Corwin, The	Basic	Doctrine	 of	American	Constitutional	Law ,	12	Mich.	L.	Rev.	247,	271 (1914) (footnotes	omitted) ). [¶ 45 ]		NECEC	urge s us to	look	at	the	Project	as	a	whole,	arguing	that it has	 a	 vested	 right	 to	 complete	 constructio n of	 the	 entire	 Project .	 	 But	 the question	presented	in	this	case	and	which	we	proceed	to	answer	is	narrower. We	limit	our	vested rights	analysis	to	the	specific	approval	that	the	retroactivity provision	 in s ection	 6	 of	 the	 Initiative	 affected. T he	 Initiative	 retroactively imposes	a	requirement	of	legislative	approval	for	a	CPCN	previously	granted	by the	PUC.		It	does	nothing	to	aff ect	the	other	permits	or	approvals that NECEC needs before	it	may complete	the	Project,	many	of	which	are	still	the	subject	of31 pending	proceedings. 15 In	 other	words,	 the	 focus	 of	a	 vested	 rights	analysis must	 be	 upon	 the	 specific	 entitlement	 that	 is	 affec ted	 by	 the	 retroactively applied	legislation.	 	 Thus,	 the	 fact	 that	NECEC	 had	 not	 obtained	all	 required municipal	 permits	 at	 the	 time	 this	 case	 was	 filed	 does	 not	 bear	 on	 whether NECEC	has	acquired	a	constitutionally	protected	property	right	to	continue	the work	authorized	by	the	CPCN.		Nevertheless,	NECEC’s	ability	to	complete	the entire	 Project	 is	 contingent	 on	 obtaining	 any	 remaining	 permits	 needed, assuming	 that	 NECEC	 has,	 in	 fact,	 acquired	 a	 vested	 right	 to	 proceed	 as authorized	by	the	CPCN’s	terms	and conditions. [¶ 46 ]		In	Maine	and	other	states,	the	right	to	proceed	with	construction in	 the	 municipal

- law context	 vests	 once	 a	 developer	 undertakes	 significant, visible construction	 in	 good	 faith and with	 the	 intent	 to	 carry	 construction through	to completion	as	authorized	by	a	validly issued	building	permit. Sahl v. Town	of	York ,	2000	ME	180,	¶ 12,	760	A.2d	266; see J.	Spencer	Hall, State	Vested Rights	 Statutes:	 Developing	 Certainty	 and	 Equity	 and	 Protecting	 the	 Public
Interest , 40 Urb.	 Law.	451 ,	4 59

- 94 (2008) (surveying	 state	 statu t es	codifying the	vested	rights	doctrine). That	permit	must	be	final	and	not	subject	to	direct

15 Section	1	of	the Initiative enacts	retroactive	standards	for	the	grant	of	the	BPL	lease,	but	we	do not	add ress	that	issue	because	there	is	a separate appeal before	us from	the	order vacating	the	grant of	the	lease. Black	et	al.	v.	Bureau	of	Parks	and	Lands	et	al .,	No. BCD

- 21

- 257.32 or	further	appeal. Powell	v.	Calvert	C ounty ,	795	A.2d	96,	101	(Md.	2002)	(“[A] special	exception	approval,	whose	validity	is being	litigated,	is	not	finally	valid until	all	litigation	concerning	the	special	exception	is	final.		Persons	proceeding under	it	prior	to	finality	are	not	‘vesting’	rights;	they	are	commencing	at	‘their own	 risk’	 so	 that	 they	will	 be	 required	 to	 undo	wh at	 they	 have	 done	if	 they ultimately	fail	in	the	litigation	process.”)		We	have	applied	the	test	announced
in Sahl only to	resolve a vested	right s challenge	to	retroactive	changes	in	local zoning	ordinances	affecting	a	project	of	limited	scale;	we	have	never	applied	it to	changes	in	state	law	affecting large

- scale	infrastructure	projects	overseen	by a	matrix	of	local , state , and	federal	authorities. Still, Sahl ’s underlying	rationale for	protecting	a	developer’s	good

- faith expenditures	in reliance	on	government approval	of	proposed	investments	against	retroactive	changes	is	not	limited	to zoning	law	and	informs	our	analysis	of	whether	NECEC	ha s a	ve sted	right	 to proceed	with	Project	construction	under	the	terms	of	CPCN. [¶ 47 ] Thus,	in	the	context	of	large

- scale	infrastructure	development,	we conclude	 that	 a	 claim of unconstitutional	impairment	 of	 vested	 rights	 arises under	the	following	conditions.		First,	the	claimant	holds	a validly issued	and final	permit,	license,	or	other	grant	of	authority	from	a	governmental	entity	that is	not	subject	to	any	further	judicial	r eview.		Second,	the	law	under	which	the33 permit,	license,	or	other	grant	of	authority	was	issued changed thereafter	and would ,	 if	 applied	 retroactively,	 eliminate	 or	 substantially	 limit	 the	 right	 to proceed	 with	 the	 activity	 authorized	 by	 the	 permit.	 	 Third ,	 the	 claimant

un dertook substantial	good

- faith	expenditure s on	the	activity	within	the	scope of	 the	 affected	 permit	 prior	 to	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 retroactive	 legislation, meaning	that	the	expenditure	was	made	(1)	in	reliance	on	the	affected	permit
or	 gran t	 of	 authority ,	 (2) before	 the	 law	 changed , and	 ( 3 )	 according	 to	 a schedule	 that	 was	 not	 created	 or	 expedited	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 generating	 a vested	rights	claim. 16 [¶ 48 ] Here,	 the PUC determined	 that	 there	was	 a	 public	 need	 for	 the Project and issued	th e	CPCN	on	May	3,	2019.		We	affirmed	the issuance	of	the CPCN	on	March	17,	2020,	holding	that	the	PUC	followed	the	proper	procedure and	made	the	public

- need	determination	base d on	sufficient	record	evidence.
See	Nex t Era	Energy	Res. , LLC , 2020	ME	34,	¶ 43,	227	A.3d	1117.

16 The	State parties argue	that	so	long	as	there	is	a	rational	basis	 for the Initiative,	the	vested rights	claim	fails.		We	disagree.		If the	effect	of	the	retroactive	legislation	is	to	abrogate	vested	rights, the	rationale	and	basis	for	the	legislation	become	irrelevant. See Muskin	v.	State	Dep’t	of	Assessments &	 Tax’n ,	 30	 A.3d	 962 ,	 969 ( Md. 2011)	 (U nder	 the	 Maryland	 Constitution,	 “[i]f	 a retrospectively

- applied	 statute	 is	 found	 to	 abrogate	 vested	 rights	 or	 takes	 property	 without	 just compensation,	it	is	irrelevant	whether	th e	reason	for	enacting	the	statute,	its	goals,	or	its	regulatory scheme	is	‘rational.’”).34 [¶ 49 ]		The	 facts	before	us	were	generated	in	connection	with	NECEC’s request	for	preliminary	injunctive	relief;	they	have	not	been	finally	adjudicated. Nonetheless,	 the	 record	 indicates	 at	 least	 preliminarily	 that NECEC	 began
construc tion	on	January	18,	2021,	after	having	secured	the	CPCN	and	all	other
necessary, P roject

- wide	approvals	 from	various	state	and	 federal	authorities.
T he	CPCN	was	the	only	approval that	was affirmed	after	appellate	review	and not	subject	to	any	 further	appe als

. There	is substantial	evidence	that	NECEC proceeded	 with	 construction	 thereafter	 in	 good

- faith	 reliance	 on	 those approvals and intended	 to	 develop	 the	 Project	 to	 completion. NECEC’s construction	efforts	were consistent	with	the	baseline	schedule that was first set	in	the	transmission	service	agreements	governing	Project	construction	and that was later	amended	to	reflect	permitting	delays. As	of	November 2,	2021, the	day	Maine	 voters	approved	 the initiated	bil l, NECEC	had	cut	around	124 miles	 of	 the	 Project	 corridor	 and	 erected	 multiple	 transmission	 structures, spending	 nearly	 $450	million	 or forty

- three percent	 of	 the	 total	 project	 cost
estimate at	 that	 time

. NECEC	 spent	 that	 significant	 sum	 with	 the	 PUC’s

as surance	in	issuing	the	CPCN	that	the	Project	served	the	public	need. [¶ 50 ]	 	 Our	 decision	 affirming	 the	 PUC’s	 public

- need	 determination enshrined	it	in	a final judgment

— in	effect	providing	NECEC	added	assurance35 not	only	 that	 the	CPCN	complied	with	 then

- existing	law	but	also	 that NECEC could	 proceed	with	 Project	 construction	 according	 to	its	 terms.	 	 To	 be	 sure, those	terms	anticipated	additional	oversight	by	other	government	entities ; i n its order	granting	the	CPCN , the	PUC state d that it “expects	that	th e	scenic	and recreational	 impacts	 of	 the	 [Project] will	 be	 reviewed	 and,	 to	 the	 extent appropriate	 and	 feasible,	 mitigated	 through	 the	 processes	 at	 the	 Maine Department	 of	 Environmental	 Protection	 (DEP)	 and	 the	 Land	 Use	 Planning Commission	(LUPC).” Cent ra l M ain e	Power	Co

. , Request	for	Approval	of	CPCN for	the	New	England	Clean	Energy C onnect ,	No.	2017

- 00232,	Order	(Me.	P.U.C. May	 3,	 2019); s ee 35

- A	 M.R.S.	 § 3132(6),	 (7)	 ( acknowledging the	 DEP’s authority	to	modify	the	location,	size,	character,	and	design	of	transmission	line projects	that	the	PUC	has	already	determined serve	an	identified public	need). Obtaining the	CPCN	alone was necessary	but	not	sufficient	to confer	the	right

to c omplete construction. However, we hold that NECEC	could	reasonably	rely on	the CPCN , and	our	judgment	affirming the	CPCN , as	valid authorization to begin construction	such	that its right	to	proceed according	to the	CPCN ’s	terms could	vest	upon	evidence	that	it	undertook significant,	visible	construction in good	 faith, according	 to	a	schedule	 that	was	not	created	or	expedited	 for	 the purpose	of	generating	a	vested	rights	claim.36 [¶ 5 1] To	 be	 clear, we	 do	 not	 decide	 whether NECEC	 performed substantial	construction	in	good	 faith 17 according	 to	a	schedule	 that	was	not created	 or	 expedited	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 generating	 a	 vested	 rights	 claim

. Although	it	appears	from	the limited	record	developed	in	connection	with	the request	for	preliminary	injunctive	relief that	NECEC did	so, it	is	up	to	the	trial court	to	make	t hose factual	determination s on	remand

. III.		C ONCLUSION [¶ 52 ] We conclude	that	section	6	of	the	Initiative,	as	applied retroactively to	 the	 CPCN,	 would	 infringe	 on	 NECEC’s	 constitutionally

- protected	 vested rights	if	NECEC	 can	 demonstrate	 by	a	 preponderance	 of the evidence	 that	it engaged	in	substantial	construction	of the	Project	in	good

- faith	reliance	on	the authority	granted	by	the	CPCN	before	Maine	voters	approved	the	initiated	bill

17 The	State	appellees	argue	 that	because	NECEC	was	aware	of	widespread	opposition	 to	 the Project	and	knew	that	the	Secretary	of	State	had	issued	a	petition	allowing	t he	Initiative’s	proponents to	collect	signatures	in	October	2020,	it	could	not	have	proceeded	with	construction	on	January	18, 2021,	in	good	faith.		We	do	not	accept	the	argument’s	implicit	premise	that,	to	be	acting	in	good	faith, a	developer	must	wait	to commence	construction	pursuant	to	a	valid	permit	if	there	is	a	possibility that	a	retroactive	change	in	the	law	could	affect	the	right	to	complete	a	project.		As	of	January	2021, all	that	existed	was	a	petition	in	circulation.		There	was	no	indication	whe ther	sufficient	signatures had	 been	 gathered	 for	 the	 ballot	measure	 to	 be	 presented	 to	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State,	whether	 the Secretary	 of	 State	 would	 certify	 that	 the	 petition	 had	 garnered	 enough	 valid	 signatures	 to	 be presented	to	the	Legislature,	or	whethe r	the	Legislature	(or	Maine	voters	acting	in	its	stead)	would approve	the	then

- hypothetical	initiative.		In	contrast,	in Kittery	Retail	Ventures,	LLC	v.	Town	of	Kittery , the	 developer	 submitted	its	 revised	 plan	 to	 the	 Planning	Board	after	a	 citizen amendment	 to	 the zoning	ordinance	was	passed	and	enacted	but	before	its	effective	date.		2004	ME	65,	¶ 5,	856	A.2d 1183.		The	potential	that	a	prospective	citizens’	initiative	might	be	voted	into	law	after	the	CPCN	was final	is	far	too	attenuated	to	defeat good	faith.37 by	 public	 referendum.	 	 Even	 then,	NECEC’s	 vested	 right	 to	 proceed	with	 the Project	 would	 not	 be	 absolute;	 what	 would	 be	 protected would be NECEC’s right	to	move	forward	under	the	terms	of	the	validly issued	CPCN	as	granted under	then

- existing	law. [¶ 53 ] We	emphasize	that	our	analysis	and	conclusions	are	not	based	on the	wisdom	of either	the Project	or	the	Initiative. See	Avangrid	Networks,	Inc. , 2020	ME	 109,	 ¶ 10,	 237	A.3d	 882.	 	On	 this	 report	 of	an	interlocutory	 ruling pursuant	to M.R.	App.	P.	24(c) ,	th e	limited	question	that	we	answer	is	this: Would	retroactively	applying s ections	4	and	5	of	the	Initiative , to the	 CPCN	 issued	 for	 the	 Project,	 as required	 by s ection	 6 of	 the Initiative, violate the due	process clause	of the	Maine	Constitution, if NECEC	u ndertook	substantial	construction consistent	with	and in	 good

- faith	 reliance on	 the	 CPCN	 before	 the	 Initiative	 was enacted ? Our	answer	is	yes. The	entry	is: Report	 accepted	 as	 to one	 question ,	 which	 is answered	in	 the	affirmative	as	indicated	in	 the opinion .	 	 Remanded	 for	 further	 proceedings consistent	with	this	opinion.38 Timothy	 C.	 Woodcock,	 Esq.	 (orally),	 P.	 Andrew	 Hamilton,	 Esq.,	 Jonathan	 A. Pottle,	Esq.,	and	Casey	M.	Olesen,	Esq.,	Eaton	Peabody,	Bangor,	 for	appellant H.Q.	Energy	Services (U.S.)	Inc. John	J.	Aromando,	Esq.	(orally),	Jared	S.	des	Rosiers ,	Esq.,	Joshua	D.	Dunlap,	Esq., and	Sara	A.	Murphy,	Esq.,	Pierce	Atwood	LLP,	Portland,	for	appellants	NECEC Transmission	LLC	and	Avangrid	Networks,	Inc. Gerald	 F.	 Petruccelli,	 Esq.,	 and	 Scott	 D.	 Dolan,	 Esq.,	 Petruccelli,	 Martin	 & Haddow,	LLP,	Portland,	f or	appellant	Maine	State	Chamber	of	Commerce Sigmund	D.	Schutz,	Esq.,	Anthony	W.	Buxton,	Esq.,	Robert	B.	Borowski,	Esq.,	and Jonathan	 Mermin,	 Esq.,	 Preti	 Flaherty	 Beliveau	 &	 Pachios	 LLP,	 Portland , for appellant	Industrial	Energy	Consumer	Group Philip	 M.	 C offin	 III,	 Esq.,	 Jeffrey	 D.	 Russell,	 Esq.,	 and	 Cyrus	 E.	 Cheslak,	 Esq., Lambert	Coffin,	Portland,	for	appellant	Cianbro	Corporation Benjamin	K.	Grant,	Esq.,	McTeague	Higbee,	Topsham,	and	Robert	M.	Cheverie, Esq.,	Robert	M.	Cheverie	&	Associates,	P.C., Hartfo rd , Conn ecticut,	for	appellant International	Brotherhood	of	Electrical	Workers	Local	104 Aaron	 M.	 Frey,	 Attorney	 General,	 and	 Jonathan	 R.	 Bolton,	 Asst.	 Atty.	 Gen. (orally),	Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellees	Bureau	of	Parks and	Lands,	Maine	Pu blic	Utilities	Commission,	Maine	House	of	Representatives, and	Maine	Senate Christopher	T.	Roach,	Esq.	 (orally),	Roach	Ruprecht	Sanchez	&	Bischoff,	P.C., Portland,	for	appellee	Next E ra	Energy	Resources,	LLC James	T.	Kilbreth,	Esq.	(orally),	David	M.	Kall in,	Esq.,	Jeana	M.	McCormick,	Esq., Sara	 P.	 Cressey,	 Esq.,	 and	 Oliver	 Mac	 Walton,	 Esq.,	 Drummond	 Woodsum, Portland,	 for	 appellees	 Thomas	 B.	 Saviello,	 Christine	 M.	 Geisser,	 Wendy	 A.39 Huisch,	 Jonathan	 T.	 Hull,	 Theresa	 E.	 York,	 Robert	 C.	 Yorks,	 and	 the	 Natural Resources	Council	of	Maine Orlando	E.	Delogu,	amicus	curiae	pro	se Dmitry	Bam,	amicus	curiae	pro	se James	L.	Costello,	Esq.,	and	Jason	J.	Theobald,	Esq.,	Curtis	Thaxter	LLC,	Portland, for	 amici	 curiae	 former	 commissioners	 of	 the	 Maine	 Public	 Utilities Commission Timothy	Norton,	Esq.,	and	Shea	H.	Watson,	Esq.,	Kelly,	Remmel	&	Zimmerman, Portland,	 and	 David	 S.	 Rosenzweig,	 Esq.,	 Keegan	 Werlin	 LLP,	 Boston, Massachusetts,	for	amici	curiae	NStar	Electric	Company,	Massachusetts	Electric Company	 and	 Nantucket Electric	 Company,	 and	 Fitchburg	 Gas	 and	 Electric Light	Company Elizabeth	A.	Boepple,	Esq.,	and	Sean	R.	Turley,	Esq.,	Murray	Plumb	&	Murray, Portland, and Paul	 W.	 Hughes,	 Esq.,	 and	 Andrew	 A.	 Lyons

- Berg,	 Esq., McDermott	 Will	 &	 Emery	 LLP,	 Washington,	 D.C.,	 for amici	 curiae	 Calpine Corporation,	Vistra	Corporation,	Holly	Bragdon,	and	Brian	Ahern. Stacy	O.	Stitham,	Esq.,	and	Eamonn	R.C.	Hart,	Esq.,	Brann	&	Isaacson,	Lewiston, for	amicus	curiae	City	of	Lewiston Timothy	A.	Pease,	Esq.,	and	Jonathan	P. Hunter,	Esq.,	Rudman	Winchell,	Bangor, for	amici	curiae	Susan	Austin,	Susan	Bernard,	Jon C onnor,	Steve	Foster,	Peter Lyford,	Beth	O’Connor,	Nathan	Wadsworth,	Dustin	White,	Harold	Stewart	 III, and	Andre	Cushing Brett	D.	Baber,	Esq.,	Lanham	Blackwell	&	Babe r,	PA,	Bangor,	for	amicus	curiae Robert	J.	Weiner Richard	 Anderson,	 Walter	 Anderson,	 Richard	 Barringer,	 Lloyd	 Irland,	 Ellen Pope,	Tom	Rumpf,	and	Sam	Zaitlin,	amici	curiae	pro	se
Business	and	Consumer Docket	docket	number	BCD

- CIV

- 2021

- 00058 For	Cler k	Reference	Only