No. 216, August 2005 Strategic Forum 5 

under the leadership of Kim Beazley, there will 

be no wavering on central alliance issues. But it 

must be understood that a U.S. war with China 

over Taiwan would face any Australian government, of whatever political persuasion, with 

choices that it would rather not face.

Australia and the United States have close 

commonality of views when it comes to fighting the war on terror and dealing with the 

spread of weapons of mass destruction. Our 

common support for the success of democracy, 

in such places as Indonesia and Iraq, and for 

preventing the emergence of failed states, in 

such places as the Solomon Islands and Papua 

New Guinea, establishes the basis for a strong 

alliance partnership for the 21st century.

There are two areas where drift could set 

in, however. The first is that the alliance is now 

heavily underpinned by the close relationship 

between Prime Minister Howard and President 

Bush, both of whom will eventually depart the 

political scene. Maintaining support for the 

alliance is contingent upon Washington’s 

success in convincing the Australian public of 

both the necessity and legitimacy of its policies.19 The promotion of conservative Christian 

values, as an inherent part of an American 

national identity, is a cultural current few 

Australians relate to. This seems little understood in America. Another point is that Australia should not be seen, or described, in the 

region as “a deputy sheriff” of the United 

States. That is damaging. A more apposite 

label—if one must be used—is that of Kurt 

Campbell: “Australia has become our Britain 

in Asia.”20

The second area of potential difficulty in 

the alliance is over China. Prime Minister 

Howard states that Asia is poised in coming 

decades to assume a weight in the world economy it last held more than five centuries ago.21

Central to this is the growing economic mass of 

China, which is set to outstrip Japan—and 

perhaps, eventually, America—in economic 

size. As a regional power, Canberra needs influence in Washington and Beijing. Howard proclaims: “Australia does not believe that there is 

anything inevitable about escalating strategic 

competition between China and the U.S.”22

True, but it looms as an ever-present risk so 

long as there is serious tension over Taiwan.

Even absent the Taiwan problem, history 

tells us much about the likelihood of tension 

and conflict between a rising major power and 

an established power. I have argued that we 

must not allow our realist stance toward the 

inevitable emergence of China to undermine our 

upholding of democratic values and freedom. 

The strongly positive views of China that currently are held in Australia may shift in the 

future if Beijing’s growing economic and military influence is felt less benignly across the 

region.23 But at present the greatest potential 

threat to the alliance may be the absence of a 

common approach to Beijing. Dan Blumenthal 

rightly argues that Canberra must realize that its 

role is not to mediate between Beijing and Washington, but rather to help ensure that China’s 

rise is indeed peaceful and that the United States 

maintains its preeminence in Asia.24

A deeper appreciation is required in Washington that Australia has a significant role to 

play in securing American interests, as well as 

its own, in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia has 

become a more assertive power in supporting 

alliance interests in Japan. And Canberra now 

has greater geopolitical clout in Southeast Asia 

and the South Pacific, both of which are important areas with regard to the fight against 

terror and failed states. U.S. policy in both 

regions has been essentially one-dimensional, 

emphasizing the counterterrorism agenda 

almost to the exclusion of anything else.25 This 

preoccupation has promoted an impression 

that America does not really care about other 

important regional interests and is giving 

China an opportunity, especially in Southeast 

Asia, to gain influence at America’s expense.

In the final analysis, the most critical 

issue for the security of the entire Asia-Pacific 

region is the nature of the relationships among 

the major powers: China, Japan, India, Russia, 

and the United States.26 Australia relies on a 

balance of power in Asia in which America 

continues to play the predominant role. Asia 

without America would be a dangerous place 

for Australia.

Notes1

 Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” 

Survival 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997), 156–179.

2

 Paul Dibb et al., “Understanding Goliath: on the sources 

of American conduct,” The Australian Financial Review, 

July 16, 2004. 3

 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 45. 4

 John Baker and Douglas H. Paal, “The US-Australia 

Alliance,” in America’s Asian Alliances, ed. Robert D. Blackwill 

and Paul Dibb (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 108. General 

John Baker is a former chief of the Australian Defence Force. 5 Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign 

and Trade Policy White Paper (Canberra: Department of Foreign 

Affairs and Trade, 2003), xvi. 6

 Owen Harries, Understanding America (Sydney: 

The Centre for Independent Studies, 2002), 30. Harries was the 

editor of The National Interest in Washington, DC, in the 1980s 

and 1990s. 7

 The Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and 

the United States of America (ANZUS) was signed in 1951 and 

entered into force in 1952. Following the reestablishment of peace 

between Japan and the United States in 1951, Australia and New 

Zealand sought a treaty commitment from the United States that 

an armed attack on any of the three countries would be considered 

an attack upon all. The treaty obligates parties to respond to such 

an attack in accordance with their constitutional processes. When 

New Zealand refused in 1985 to allow U.S. nuclear-powered or 

nuclear-armed ships to enter its ports, the United States abrogated 

its ANZUS responsibilities toward New Zealand in 1986; however, 

New Zealand has not formally withdrawn from the alliance. The 

full text of the treaty can be found at <www.australianpolitics.

com/foreign/anzus/anzus-treaty.shtml>. 8

 But the United Kingdom, with 3 times Australia’s 

population, provided 20 times as many troops to the war in Iraq. 9

 It is highly unlikely that Japan, South Korea, or any 

country of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations would 

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal 

can be accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming 

events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of 

international security affairs and defense studies. Through an 

active outreach program, including conferences and publications, 

INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

I N S T I T U T E F O R N A T I O N A L S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

Stephen J. Flanagan

James A. Schear Director COL Debra Taylor, USA

Director of Research Managing Editor, NDU Press

maintaining support for 

the alliance is contingent 

upon Washington’s 

success in convincing 

the Australian public of 

both the necessity and 

legitimacy of its policies
Australia experienced neither a war of 

independence nor a civil war. Nationbuilding in 

a harsh country imposed a strict sense of limits. 

To this day, a sense of vulnerability of a sparsely 

populated, resource-rich continent prevails in 

the popular Australian consciousness and informs Australian defense policy. The legacy of 

convicts, drought, and the arid interior created a 

mindset that was skeptical, cynical, hard-bitten, 

self-deprecatory, and suspicious of authority. 

Religion does not play a significant role in 

Australian politics. And Australia’s sense of 

nationalism is not as fervent as that of America.

Sheer differences in size should also not be 

underestimated. America is approaching 300 

million people, whereas Australia has only 20 

million in a country of about the same area. 

The United States spends more than $400 

billion (USD) on defense, Australia less than 

$13 billion (USD). America is the world’s only 

superpower, and its neighbors are not unstable 

or threatening. Australia’s immediate neighborhood is potentially unstable, and the broader 

East Asia region carries the risk of major power 

war, unlike Europe.

Nature of the Alliance

Smaller powers, such as Australia, have 

always relied on external aid for the accomplishment of the basic goal of all states: survival. Neutrality and nonalignment have appealed to some other smaller powers. But these 

alternatives have never appealed to Australians. 

The policy of a protective alliance “has always 

been the most obvious weapon for the small 

power, and the one most employed.”3 But borrowing someone else’s strength can have disadvantages as well as advantages.

For instance, Australia—as the junior 

partner—is not accustomed to being a frank 

ally. Although there are extensive bilateral 

mechanisms for consultation and deliberation 

on a wide range of policy issues, Australia does 

not have the record of speaking up in the way 

that the United Kingdom does. It has been 

suggested that Australia should speak up and 

the United States should listen more.4

As Prime Minister Tony Blair has said, the 

price of British influence is not, as some would 

have it, that the United Kingdom obediently has 

to do whatever the United States asks. The 

Australian Foreign Policy White Paper of 

2003 echoes this theme when it states: “Even 

when U.S. actions do not suit our interests, our 

strong ties mean that we are better placed to 

put our views to Washington and that the 

United States will listen to them.”5 In other 

words, some argue that the alliance should 

offer Australia ways to dampen current U.S. 

tendencies toward unilateralism.

One of Australia’s leading experts on 

America, Owen Harries, has argued that the 

great sympathy felt for America immediately 

after September 11 quickly evaporated and was 

replaced by suspicion and hostility. He states 

that after the outrage of September 11, he does 

not believe the United States could have reacted 

in any way other than it did. But doing so 

carried a cost. It forced America decisively 

along a course of action that:

by emphasizing her military dominance, by 

requiring her to use her vast power conspicuously, by making restraint and moderation 

virtually impossible, and by making unilateralism an increasing feature of American 

behavior . . . [this was] bound to generate 

widespread and increased criticism and 

hostility towards her.6

Harries fears this may turn out to be the real 

tragedy of September 11.

Of course, the second Bush administration 

has drawn back from unilateralist tendencies, 

as the recent development of its relations in the 

Asia-Pacific region—and not least with Japan 

and Australia—clearly demonstrates. The 

nature of Australia’s alliance with America is 

that it is resilient enough to survive perturbations that exist from time to time (as in the 

Vietnam War), as long as Australian politicians 

do not wage a public campaign of virulence 

against the United States—and as long as 

Washington does not take Canberra too much 

for granted.

Alliance Obstacles

So are there any serious obstacles to good 

alliance relations between Australia and the 

United States? That will depend on the nature 

and scale of U.S. expectations of Australia. 

Three points are relevant. First, the Australian 

government has already demonstrated firm 

resolve in the war on terror. Only a matter of 

days after September 11, Prime Minister John 

Howard invoked the Australia–New Zealand–

United States (ANZUS) treaty for the first time 

in its history to come to the assistance of America.7

 Since then, Australia not only has provided 

combat troops in Afghanistan and Iraq but also 

has spent large sums of money on domestic 

counterterrorism capabilities and developed 

close antiterrorist cooperation agreements with 

countries in the region, especially in Southeast 

Asia. Serious obstacles would arise only if 

America made politically difficult demands on 

Australia to combat terrorism—for example, 

under some circumstances in Indonesia.

Second, the United States and others need 

to recognize that the Australian Defence Force 

is quite small. The total size of the regular force 

is scarcely 52,000, plus some 20,000 reserves. 

The army, which is being used most intensively 

in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, fields 

only five battalions as well as a special forces/

commando regiment. The realistic military 

contributions that Australia can make to alliance operations are what the Defence Minister 

terms niche contributions. These include capabilities that are in short supply in the U.S. 

military inventory, such as air refuelling tankers, special forces, certain types of electronic 

surveillance and intelligence, conventional 

submarines, and, in the future, highly capable 

early warning aircraft.

Australia’s leading journalist, Paul Kelly, 

has described Australia’s contributions to alliance operations as “calculated and ruthlessly 

cynical.” So, for example, in the Iraq war, 

Australia sent 2,200 troops, including special 

forces and commandos, fighter and electronic 

surveillance aircraft, surface warships, and 

clearance divers. But they were withdrawn as 

soon as the combat phase ended. The prime 

minister then announced that 1,500 troops had 

to be sent to the Solomon Islands in the South 

Pacific, which had become a failed state. Failed 

No. 216, August 2005 Strategic Forum 2 

Paul Dibb is professor emeritus at The Australian National University and a former Deputy Secretary 

of Defence and Director of the Defence Intelligence Organisation in Australia. This paper is based on 

a presentation he gave in Honolulu, Hawaii, at the June 2005 INSS symposium, Asia-Pacific Democracies: 

Advancing Security and Prosperity, cosponsored by U.S. Pacific Command and the Asia-Pacific Center for 

Security Studies. Questions and comments may be addressed to the Institute at ndu-inss-research@ndu.edu.

the nature of Australia’s 

alliance with America is 

that it is resilient enough 

to survive perturbations 

from time to time
Australia experienced neither a war of 

independence nor a civil war. Nationbuilding in 

a harsh country imposed a strict sense of limits. 

To this day, a sense of vulnerability of a sparsely 

populated, resource-rich continent prevails in 

the popular Australian consciousness and informs Australian defense policy. The legacy of 

convicts, drought, and the arid interior created a 

mindset that was skeptical, cynical, hard-bitten, 

self-deprecatory, and suspicious of authority. 

Religion does not play a significant role in 

Australian politics. And Australia’s sense of 

nationalism is not as fervent as that of America.

Sheer differences in size should also not be 

underestimated. America is approaching 300 

million people, whereas Australia has only 20 

million in a country of about the same area. 

The United States spends more than $400 

billion (USD) on defense, Australia less than 

$13 billion (USD). America is the world’s only 

superpower, and its neighbors are not unstable 

or threatening. Australia’s immediate neighborhood is potentially unstable, and the broader 

East Asia region carries the risk of major power 

war, unlike Europe.

Nature of the Alliance

Smaller powers, such as Australia, have 

always relied on external aid for the accomplishment of the basic goal of all states: survival. Neutrality and nonalignment have appealed to some other smaller powers. But these 

alternatives have never appealed to Australians. 

The policy of a protective alliance “has always 

been the most obvious weapon for the small 

power, and the one most employed.”3 But borrowing someone else’s strength can have disadvantages as well as advantages.

For instance, Australia—as the junior 

partner—is not accustomed to being a frank 

ally. Although there are extensive bilateral 

mechanisms for consultation and deliberation 

on a wide range of policy issues, Australia does 

not have the record of speaking up in the way 

that the United Kingdom does. It has been 

suggested that Australia should speak up and 

the United States should listen more.4

As Prime Minister Tony Blair has said, the 

price of British influence is not, as some would 

have it, that the United Kingdom obediently has 

to do whatever the United States asks. The 

Australian Foreign Policy White Paper of 

2003 echoes this theme when it states: “Even 

when U.S. actions do not suit our interests, our 

strong ties mean that we are better placed to 

put our views to Washington and that the 

United States will listen to them.”5 In other 

words, some argue that the alliance should 

offer Australia ways to dampen current U.S. 

tendencies toward unilateralism.

One of Australia’s leading experts on 

America, Owen Harries, has argued that the 

great sympathy felt for America immediately 

after September 11 quickly evaporated and was 

replaced by suspicion and hostility. He states 

that after the outrage of September 11, he does 

not believe the United States could have reacted 

in any way other than it did. But doing so 

carried a cost. It forced America decisively 

along a course of action that:

by emphasizing her military dominance, by 

requiring her to use her vast power conspicuously, by making restraint and moderation 

virtually impossible, and by making unilateralism an increasing feature of American 

behavior . . . [this was] bound to generate 

widespread and increased criticism and 

hostility towards her.6

Harries fears this may turn out to be the real 

tragedy of September 11.

Of course, the second Bush administration 

has drawn back from unilateralist tendencies, 

as the recent development of its relations in the 

Asia-Pacific region—and not least with Japan 

and Australia—clearly demonstrates. The 

nature of Australia’s alliance with America is 

that it is resilient enough to survive perturbations that exist from time to time (as in the 

Vietnam War), as long as Australian politicians 

do not wage a public campaign of virulence 

against the United States—and as long as 

Washington does not take Canberra too much 

for granted.

Alliance Obstacles

So are there any serious obstacles to good 

alliance relations between Australia and the 

United States? That will depend on the nature 

and scale of U.S. expectations of Australia. 

Three points are relevant. First, the Australian 

government has already demonstrated firm 

resolve in the war on terror. Only a matter of 

days after September 11, Prime Minister John 

Howard invoked the Australia–New Zealand–

United States (ANZUS) treaty for the first time 

in its history to come to the assistance of America.7

 Since then, Australia not only has provided 

combat troops in Afghanistan and Iraq but also 

has spent large sums of money on domestic 

counterterrorism capabilities and developed 

close antiterrorist cooperation agreements with 

countries in the region, especially in Southeast 

Asia. Serious obstacles would arise only if 

America made politically difficult demands on 

Australia to combat terrorism—for example, 

under some circumstances in Indonesia.

Second, the United States and others need 

to recognize that the Australian Defence Force 

is quite small. The total size of the regular force 

is scarcely 52,000, plus some 20,000 reserves. 

The army, which is being used most intensively 

in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, fields 

only five battalions as well as a special forces/

commando regiment. The realistic military 

contributions that Australia can make to alliance operations are what the Defence Minister 

terms niche contributions. These include capabilities that are in short supply in the U.S. 

military inventory, such as air refuelling tankers, special forces, certain types of electronic 

surveillance and intelligence, conventional 

submarines, and, in the future, highly capable 

early warning aircraft.

Australia’s leading journalist, Paul Kelly, 

has described Australia’s contributions to alliance operations as “calculated and ruthlessly 

cynical.” So, for example, in the Iraq war, 

Australia sent 2,200 troops, including special 

forces and commandos, fighter and electronic 

surveillance aircraft, surface warships, and 

clearance divers. But they were withdrawn as 

soon as the combat phase ended. The prime 

minister then announced that 1,500 troops had 

to be sent to the Solomon Islands in the South 

Pacific, which had become a failed state. Failed 

No. 216, August 2005 Strategic Forum 2 

Paul Dibb is professor emeritus at The Australian National University and a former Deputy Secretary 

of Defence and Director of the Defence Intelligence Organisation in Australia. This paper is based on 

a presentation he gave in Honolulu, Hawaii, at the June 2005 INSS symposium, Asia-Pacific Democracies: 

Advancing Security and Prosperity, cosponsored by U.S. Pacific Command and the Asia-Pacific Center for 

Security Studies. Questions and comments may be addressed to the Institute at ndu-inss-research@ndu.edu.

the nature of Australia’s 

alliance with America is 

that it is resilient enough 

to survive perturbations 

from time to time
Australia experienced neither a war of 

independence nor a civil war. Nationbuilding in 

a harsh country imposed a strict sense of limits. 

To this day, a sense of vulnerability of a sparsely 

populated, resource-rich continent prevails in 

the popular Australian consciousness and informs Australian defense policy. The legacy of 

convicts, drought, and the arid interior created a 

mindset that was skeptical, cynical, hard-bitten, 

self-deprecatory, and suspicious of authority. 

Religion does not play a significant role in 

Australian politics. And Australia’s sense of 

nationalism is not as fervent as that of America.

Sheer differences in size should also not be 

underestimated. America is approaching 300 

million people, whereas Australia has only 20 

million in a country of about the same area. 

The United States spends more than $400 

billion (USD) on defense, Australia less than 

$13 billion (USD). America is the world’s only 

superpower, and its neighbors are not unstable 

or threatening. Australia’s immediate neighborhood is potentially unstable, and the broader 

East Asia region carries the risk of major power 

war, unlike Europe.

Nature of the Alliance

Smaller powers, such as Australia, have 

always relied on external aid for the accomplishment of the basic goal of all states: survival. Neutrality and nonalignment have appealed to some other smaller powers. But these 

alternatives have never appealed to Australians. 

The policy of a protective alliance “has always 

been the most obvious weapon for the small 

power, and the one most employed.”3 But borrowing someone else’s strength can have disadvantages as well as advantages.

For instance, Australia—as the junior 

partner—is not accustomed to being a frank 

ally. Although there are extensive bilateral 

mechanisms for consultation and deliberation 

on a wide range of policy issues, Australia does 

not have the record of speaking up in the way 

that the United Kingdom does. It has been 

suggested that Australia should speak up and 

the United States should listen more.4

As Prime Minister Tony Blair has said, the 

price of British influence is not, as some would 

have it, that the United Kingdom obediently has 

to do whatever the United States asks. The 

Australian Foreign Policy White Paper of 

2003 echoes this theme when it states: “Even 

when U.S. actions do not suit our interests, our 

strong ties mean that we are better placed to 

put our views to Washington and that the 

United States will listen to them.”5 In other 

words, some argue that the alliance should 

offer Australia ways to dampen current U.S. 

tendencies toward unilateralism.

One of Australia’s leading experts on 

America, Owen Harries, has argued that the 

great sympathy felt for America immediately 

after September 11 quickly evaporated and was 

replaced by suspicion and hostility. He states 

that after the outrage of September 11, he does 

not believe the United States could have reacted 

in any way other than it did. But doing so 

carried a cost. It forced America decisively 

along a course of action that:

by emphasizing her military dominance, by 

requiring her to use her vast power conspicuously, by making restraint and moderation 

virtually impossible, and by making unilateralism an increasing feature of American 

behavior . . . [this was] bound to generate 

widespread and increased criticism and 

hostility towards her.6

Harries fears this may turn out to be the real 

tragedy of September 11.

Of course, the second Bush administration 

has drawn back from unilateralist tendencies, 

as the recent development of its relations in the 

Asia-Pacific region—and not least with Japan 

and Australia—clearly demonstrates. The 

nature of Australia’s alliance with America is 

that it is resilient enough to survive perturbations that exist from time to time (as in the 

Vietnam War), as long as Australian politicians 

do not wage a public campaign of virulence 

against the United States—and as long as 

Washington does not take Canberra too much 

for granted.

Alliance Obstacles

So are there any serious obstacles to good 

alliance relations between Australia and the 

United States? That will depend on the nature 

and scale of U.S. expectations of Australia. 

Three points are relevant. First, the Australian 

government has already demonstrated firm 

resolve in the war on terror. Only a matter of 

days after September 11, Prime Minister John 

Howard invoked the Australia–New Zealand–

United States (ANZUS) treaty for the first time 

in its history to come to the assistance of America.7

 Since then, Australia not only has provided 

combat troops in Afghanistan and Iraq but also 

has spent large sums of money on domestic 

counterterrorism capabilities and developed 

close antiterrorist cooperation agreements with 

countries in the region, especially in Southeast 

Asia. Serious obstacles would arise only if 

America made politically difficult demands on 

Australia to combat terrorism—for example, 

under some circumstances in Indonesia.

Second, the United States and others need 

to recognize that the Australian Defence Force 

is quite small. The total size of the regular force 

is scarcely 52,000, plus some 20,000 reserves. 

The army, which is being used most intensively 

in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, fields 

only five battalions as well as a special forces/

commando regiment. The realistic military 

contributions that Australia can make to alliance operations are what the Defence Minister 

terms niche contributions. These include capabilities that are in short supply in the U.S. 

military inventory, such as air refuelling tankers, special forces, certain types of electronic 

surveillance and intelligence, conventional 

submarines, and, in the future, highly capable 

early warning aircraft.

Australia’s leading journalist, Paul Kelly, 

has described Australia’s contributions to alliance operations as “calculated and ruthlessly 

cynical.” So, for example, in the Iraq war, 

Australia sent 2,200 troops, including special 

forces and commandos, fighter and electronic 

surveillance aircraft, surface warships, and 

clearance divers. But they were withdrawn as 

soon as the combat phase ended. The prime 

minister then announced that 1,500 troops had 

to be sent to the Solomon Islands in the South 

Pacific, which had become a failed state. Failed 

No. 216, August 2005 Strategic Forum 2 

Paul Dibb is professor emeritus at The Australian National University and a former Deputy Secretary 

of Defence and Director of the Defence Intelligence Organisation in Australia. This paper is based on 

a presentation he gave in Honolulu, Hawaii, at the June 2005 INSS symposium, Asia-Pacific Democracies: 

Advancing Security and Prosperity, cosponsored by U.S. Pacific Command and the Asia-Pacific Center for 

Security Studies. Questions and comments may be addressed to the Institute at ndu-inss-research@ndu.edu.

the nature of Australia’s 

alliance with America is 

that it is resilient enough 

to survive perturbations 

from time to time
No. 216, August 2005 Strategic Forum 5 

under the leadership of Kim Beazley, there will 

be no wavering on central alliance issues. But it 

must be understood that a U.S. war with China 

over Taiwan would face any Australian government, of whatever political persuasion, with 

choices that it would rather not face.

Australia and the United States have close 

commonality of views when it comes to fighting the war on terror and dealing with the 

spread of weapons of mass destruction. Our 

common support for the success of democracy, 

in such places as Indonesia and Iraq, and for 

preventing the emergence of failed states, in 

such places as the Solomon Islands and Papua 

New Guinea, establishes the basis for a strong 

alliance partnership for the 21st century.

There are two areas where drift could set 

in, however. The first is that the alliance is now 

heavily underpinned by the close relationship 

between Prime Minister Howard and President 

Bush, both of whom will eventually depart the 

political scene. Maintaining support for the 

alliance is contingent upon Washington’s 

success in convincing the Australian public of 

both the necessity and legitimacy of its policies.19 The promotion of conservative Christian 

values, as an inherent part of an American 

national identity, is a cultural current few 

Australians relate to. This seems little understood in America. Another point is that Australia should not be seen, or described, in the 

region as “a deputy sheriff” of the United 

States. That is damaging. A more apposite 

label—if one must be used—is that of Kurt 

Campbell: “Australia has become our Britain 

in Asia.”20

The second area of potential difficulty in 

the alliance is over China. Prime Minister 

Howard states that Asia is poised in coming 

decades to assume a weight in the world economy it last held more than five centuries ago.21

Central to this is the growing economic mass of 

China, which is set to outstrip Japan—and 

perhaps, eventually, America—in economic 

size. As a regional power, Canberra needs influence in Washington and Beijing. Howard proclaims: “Australia does not believe that there is 

anything inevitable about escalating strategic 

competition between China and the U.S.”22

True, but it looms as an ever-present risk so 

long as there is serious tension over Taiwan.

Even absent the Taiwan problem, history 

tells us much about the likelihood of tension 

and conflict between a rising major power and 

an established power. I have argued that we 

must not allow our realist stance toward the 

inevitable emergence of China to undermine our 

upholding of democratic values and freedom. 

The strongly positive views of China that currently are held in Australia may shift in the 

future if Beijing’s growing economic and military influence is felt less benignly across the 

region.23 But at present the greatest potential 

threat to the alliance may be the absence of a 

common approach to Beijing. Dan Blumenthal 

rightly argues that Canberra must realize that its 

role is not to mediate between Beijing and Washington, but rather to help ensure that China’s 

rise is indeed peaceful and that the United States 

maintains its preeminence in Asia.24

A deeper appreciation is required in Washington that Australia has a significant role to 

play in securing American interests, as well as 

its own, in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia has 

become a more assertive power in supporting 

alliance interests in Japan. And Canberra now 

has greater geopolitical clout in Southeast Asia 

and the South Pacific, both of which are important areas with regard to the fight against 

terror and failed states. U.S. policy in both 

regions has been essentially one-dimensional, 

emphasizing the counterterrorism agenda 

almost to the exclusion of anything else.25 This 

preoccupation has promoted an impression 

that America does not really care about other 

important regional interests and is giving 

China an opportunity, especially in Southeast 

Asia, to gain influence at America’s expense.

In the final analysis, the most critical 

issue for the security of the entire Asia-Pacific 

region is the nature of the relationships among 

the major powers: China, Japan, India, Russia, 

and the United States.26 Australia relies on a 

balance of power in Asia in which America 

continues to play the predominant role. Asia 

without America would be a dangerous place 

for Australia.

Notes1

 Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” 

Survival 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997), 156–179.

2

 Paul Dibb et al., “Understanding Goliath: on the sources 

of American conduct,” The Australian Financial Review, 

July 16, 2004. 3

 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 45. 4

 John Baker and Douglas H. Paal, “The US-Australia 

Alliance,” in America’s Asian Alliances, ed. Robert D. Blackwill 

and Paul Dibb (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 108. General 

John Baker is a former chief of the Australian Defence Force. 5 Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign 

and Trade Policy White Paper (Canberra: Department of Foreign 

Affairs and Trade, 2003), xvi. 6

 Owen Harries, Understanding America (Sydney: 

The Centre for Independent Studies, 2002), 30. Harries was the 

editor of The National Interest in Washington, DC, in the 1980s 

and 1990s. 7

 The Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and 

the United States of America (ANZUS) was signed in 1951 and 

entered into force in 1952. Following the reestablishment of peace 

between Japan and the United States in 1951, Australia and New 

Zealand sought a treaty commitment from the United States that 

an armed attack on any of the three countries would be considered 

an attack upon all. The treaty obligates parties to respond to such 

an attack in accordance with their constitutional processes. When 

New Zealand refused in 1985 to allow U.S. nuclear-powered or 

nuclear-armed ships to enter its ports, the United States abrogated 

its ANZUS responsibilities toward New Zealand in 1986; however, 

New Zealand has not formally withdrawn from the alliance. The 

full text of the treaty can be found at <www.australianpolitics.

com/foreign/anzus/anzus-treaty.shtml>. 8

 But the United Kingdom, with 3 times Australia’s 

population, provided 20 times as many troops to the war in Iraq. 9

 It is highly unlikely that Japan, South Korea, or any 

country of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations would 

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal 

can be accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming 

events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of 

international security affairs and defense studies. Through an 

active outreach program, including conferences and publications, 

INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

I N S T I T U T E F O R N A T I O N A L S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

Stephen J. Flanagan

James A. Schear Director COL Debra Taylor, USA

Director of Research Managing Editor, NDU Press

maintaining support for 

the alliance is contingent 

upon Washington’s 

success in convincing 

the Australian public of 

both the necessity and 

legitimacy of its policies
No. 216, August 2005 Strategic Forum 5 

under the leadership of Kim Beazley, there will 

be no wavering on central alliance issues. But it 

must be understood that a U.S. war with China 

over Taiwan would face any Australian government, of whatever political persuasion, with 

choices that it would rather not face.

Australia and the United States have close 

commonality of views when it comes to fighting the war on terror and dealing with the 

spread of weapons of mass destruction. Our 

common support for the success of democracy, 

in such places as Indonesia and Iraq, and for 

preventing the emergence of failed states, in 

such places as the Solomon Islands and Papua 

New Guinea, establishes the basis for a strong 

alliance partnership for the 21st century.

There are two areas where drift could set 

in, however. The first is that the alliance is now 

heavily underpinned by the close relationship 

between Prime Minister Howard and President 

Bush, both of whom will eventually depart the 

political scene. Maintaining support for the 

alliance is contingent upon Washington’s 

success in convincing the Australian public of 

both the necessity and legitimacy of its policies.19 The promotion of conservative Christian 

values, as an inherent part of an American 

national identity, is a cultural current few 

Australians relate to. This seems little understood in America. Another point is that Australia should not be seen, or described, in the 

region as “a deputy sheriff” of the United 

States. That is damaging. A more apposite 

label—if one must be used—is that of Kurt 

Campbell: “Australia has become our Britain 

in Asia.”20

The second area of potential difficulty in 

the alliance is over China. Prime Minister 

Howard states that Asia is poised in coming 

decades to assume a weight in the world economy it last held more than five centuries ago.21

Central to this is the growing economic mass of 

China, which is set to outstrip Japan—and 

perhaps, eventually, America—in economic 

size. As a regional power, Canberra needs influence in Washington and Beijing. Howard proclaims: “Australia does not believe that there is 

anything inevitable about escalating strategic 

competition between China and the U.S.”22

True, but it looms as an ever-present risk so 

long as there is serious tension over Taiwan.

Even absent the Taiwan problem, history 

tells us much about the likelihood of tension 

and conflict between a rising major power and 

an established power. I have argued that we 

must not allow our realist stance toward the 

inevitable emergence of China to undermine our 

upholding of democratic values and freedom. 

The strongly positive views of China that currently are held in Australia may shift in the 

future if Beijing’s growing economic and military influence is felt less benignly across the 

region.23 But at present the greatest potential 

threat to the alliance may be the absence of a 

common approach to Beijing. Dan Blumenthal 

rightly argues that Canberra must realize that its 

role is not to mediate between Beijing and Washington, but rather to help ensure that China’s 

rise is indeed peaceful and that the United States 

maintains its preeminence in Asia.24

A deeper appreciation is required in Washington that Australia has a significant role to 

play in securing American interests, as well as 

its own, in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia has 

become a more assertive power in supporting 

alliance interests in Japan. And Canberra now 

has greater geopolitical clout in Southeast Asia 

and the South Pacific, both of which are important areas with regard to the fight against 

terror and failed states. U.S. policy in both 

regions has been essentially one-dimensional, 

emphasizing the counterterrorism agenda 

almost to the exclusion of anything else.25 This 

preoccupation has promoted an impression 

that America does not really care about other 

important regional interests and is giving 

China an opportunity, especially in Southeast 

Asia, to gain influence at America’s expense.

In the final analysis, the most critical 

issue for the security of the entire Asia-Pacific 

region is the nature of the relationships among 

the major powers: China, Japan, India, Russia, 

and the United States.26 Australia relies on a 

balance of power in Asia in which America 

continues to play the predominant role. Asia 

without America would be a dangerous place 

for Australia.

Notes1

 Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” 

Survival 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997), 156–179.

2

 Paul Dibb et al., “Understanding Goliath: on the sources 

of American conduct,” The Australian Financial Review, 

July 16, 2004. 3

 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 45. 4

 John Baker and Douglas H. Paal, “The US-Australia 

Alliance,” in America’s Asian Alliances, ed. Robert D. Blackwill 

and Paul Dibb (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 108. General 

John Baker is a former chief of the Australian Defence Force. 5 Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign 

and Trade Policy White Paper (Canberra: Department of Foreign 

Affairs and Trade, 2003), xvi. 6

 Owen Harries, Understanding America (Sydney: 

The Centre for Independent Studies, 2002), 30. Harries was the 

editor of The National Interest in Washington, DC, in the 1980s 

and 1990s. 7

 The Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and 

the United States of America (ANZUS) was signed in 1951 and 

entered into force in 1952. Following the reestablishment of peace 

between Japan and the United States in 1951, Australia and New 

Zealand sought a treaty commitment from the United States that 

an armed attack on any of the three countries would be considered 

an attack upon all. The treaty obligates parties to respond to such 

an attack in accordance with their constitutional processes. When 

New Zealand refused in 1985 to allow U.S. nuclear-powered or 

nuclear-armed ships to enter its ports, the United States abrogated 

its ANZUS responsibilities toward New Zealand in 1986; however, 

New Zealand has not formally withdrawn from the alliance. The 

full text of the treaty can be found at <www.australianpolitics.

com/foreign/anzus/anzus-treaty.shtml>. 8

 But the United Kingdom, with 3 times Australia’s 

population, provided 20 times as many troops to the war in Iraq. 9

 It is highly unlikely that Japan, South Korea, or any 

country of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations would 

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal 

can be accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming 

events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of 

international security affairs and defense studies. Through an 

active outreach program, including conferences and publications, 

INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

I N S T I T U T E F O R N A T I O N A L S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

Stephen J. Flanagan

James A. Schear Director COL Debra Taylor, USA

Director of Research Managing Editor, NDU Press

maintaining support for 

the alliance is contingent 

upon Washington’s 

success in convincing 

the Australian public of 

both the necessity and 

legitimacy of its policies