National Military Strategic Plan

for the War on Terrorism

1 FEBRUARY 2006

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, DC 20318

“This is a pivotal moment in our nation’s history and 

in world history. We must stay committed if we are 

to win the Global War on Terrorism and defend the 

U.S. and our national interests.”

 

 
Global War on Terrorism 

Military Strategic Objectives:

• Deny terrorists the resources they 

need to operate and survive

• Enable partner nations to counter 

terrorism. 

• Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover 

and eliminate uncontrolled 

materials, and increase capacity for 

consequenc management. 

• Defeat terrorists and their 

organizations. 

• Counter state and nonstate support for terrorism in 

coordination with other U.S. 

Government agencies and partner 

nations 

• Contribute to the establishment of 

conditions that counter ideological 

support for terrorism

Secretary Of Defense Foreword...................................... 1

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum........... 2

Executive Summary...................................................... 3

I. Purpose.................................................................... 9

II. Strategic Environment............................................. 10

III. National Guidance.................................................. 19

IV. Strategic Assumptions............................................ 21

V. Considerations....................................................... 22

VI. Mission for the Global War on Terrorism.................... 22

VII. Military Strategic Approach.................................... 22

VIII. Conclusion.......................................................... 27

IX. Annexes................................................................ 28

X. Glossary................................................................. 33

Contents

“Our nation -- this generation -- will lift a dark threat of violence 

from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this 

cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not 

falter, and we will not fail.”

 

-- President George W. Bush

This document available 

online @ www.jcs.mil
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2
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The NMSP-WOT constitutes 

the comprehensive military 

plan to prosecute the Global 

War on Terrorism (GWOT) 

for the Armed Forces of 

the United States. This 

document reflects the lessons 

of the first four years of the 

Global War on Terrorism, 

including the findings and 

recommendations of the 

9-11 Commission and a 

rigorous examination within 

the Department of Defense 

(DoD), personally led by the 

Secretary of Defense and the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. 

 The NMSP-WOT outlines the 

Department’s strategic planning 

and provides strategic guidance for 

military activities and operations 

in the GWOT. The document 

guides the planning and actions 

of the Combatant Commands, 

the Military Departments, Combat 

Support Agencies and Field Support 

Activities of the United States to 

protect and defend the homeland, 

attack terrorists and their capacity 

to operate effectively at home and 

abroad, and support mainstream 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

efforts to reject violent extremism. 

 Strategic Environment

 In the GWOT, violent extremism -- in 

its various forms -- is the primary threat to 

the United States, its allies, and interests. 

Groups and individuals who advocate 

extremist ideologies often see the United 

States and the West as obstacles to their 

ability to achieve their aims. 

 The terms “extremist” and “moderate” 

are used in this document as follows: 

“Extremists” are those who (1) oppose -- in 

principle and practice -- the right of people 

to choose how to live and how to organize 

their societies and (2) support the murder 

of ordinary people to advance extremist 

ideological purposes. “Moderates” or 

“mainstream,” refer to those individuals 

who do not support the extremists. The 

term “moderate” does not necessarily mean 

unobservant, secular or Westernizing. It 

applies to people who may differ from each 

other and from the average American in any 

number of ways except that they oppose 

the killing of ordinary people. The term 

“terrorist” refers to those who conduct 

terrorist acts. 

 Nature of the War 

 The United States is at war against 

extremists who advocate and use violence 

to gain control over others, and in doing 

so, threaten our way of life. The GWOT 

is a war to preserve ordinary peoples’ 

ability to live as they choose, and to protect 

the tolerance and moderation of free 
4

and open societies. It is not a religious 

or cultural clash between Islam and the 

West, although our extremist enemies find 

it useful to characterize the war that way. 

These violent extremists see the U.S. and 

the West as primary obstacles to achieving 

their political ends. In fighting this global 

conflict, the United States must ally itself 

with partners around the world, especially 

those in the Muslim world who oppose 

domination by extremists.

 The nature of free and open societies 

enables terrorist networks to take 

advantage of freedom of movement, 

communications, financial systems, and 

logistical support. Extremist networks 

are able to operate in and exploit seams 

between states, between military and police 

forces, and between international and local 

laws. Consequently, the United States and 

partner nations remain highly vulnerable 

to terrorist violence designed to undermine 

the international antiterrorist coalition and 

to cause some members to seek to “opt 

out” of the struggle.

The conditions that extremist networks 

exploit to operate and survive have 

developed over long periods. The effort 

to alter those conditions will require a 

long-term, sustained approach whose 

success is key to promoting an international 

environment inhospitable to terrorists and 

their supporters. 

 Nature of the Enemy 

 The enemy is a transnational movement

of extremist organizations, networks, and 

individuals -- and their state and non-state 

supporters -- which have in common that 

they exploit Islam and use terrorism for 

ideological ends. The Al Qa’ida Associated 

Movement (AQAM), comprised of al Qa’ida 

and affiliated extremists, is the most 

dangerous present manifestation of such 

extremism. Certain other violent extremist 

groups also pose a serious and continuing 

threat.

 There is a direct relationship between 

the enemies’ motivations and the 

willingness to use terror tactics. The 

enemies of the United States and its 

partners are motivated by extremist 

ideologies antagonistic to freedom, 

tolerance, and moderation. These 

ideologies have given rise to an enemy 

network of extremist organizations and their 

state sponsors and non-state supporters. 

Extremists use terrorism -- the purposeful 

targeting of ordinary people -- to produce 

fear to coerce or intimidate governments or 

societies in the pursuit of political, religious, 

or ideological goals. Extremists use 

terrorism to impede and undermine political 

progress, economic prosperity, the security 

and stability of the international state 

system, and the future of civil society. 

 All enemy networks rely on certain key 

functions, processes, and resources to 

be able to operate and survive. These 

three elements are an important basis for 
5

counter-network strategies and can be 

defined as follows: 

• Function (Critical Capability): A 

specific occupation, role, or purpose.

• Process: A series of actions or 

operations (i.e., the interaction of 

resources) over time that bring about 

an end or results (i.e., a function).

• Resource (Critical Requirement): A 

person, organization, place, or thing 

(physical and non-physical) and its 

attributes. In network vernacular, 

a resource may also be referred 

to as a “node” and the interaction 

or relationship between nodes 

described as “linkage.”

 Specific functions, processes, and 

resources vary from group to group, 

network to network, and even from time to 

time. This demands an agile and adaptive 

approach to deny terrorists those critical 

elements that allow operation and survival 

of the network. A common lexicon and 

analytic framework is therefore essential to 

identify and describe these elements within 

the enemy’s complex and ever-shifting 

network of networks. Such an approach 

facilitates ease, simplicity, and broad 

applicability at the strategic level within DoD 

and among the interagency and partner 

nations. As a strategic start-point, the 

terrorist network of networks is organized 

by NMSP-WOT into nine basic components 

for the further detailed study of its critical 

elements of operation and survival: 

• Leadership

• Safe Havens

• Finance

• Communications

• Movement

• Intelligence

• Weapons

• Personnel

• Ideology

This categorization serves as a common 

lexicon for orienting and coordinating efforts 

against enemy networks. 

 National Strategy 

 Ends. The national strategic aims are to 

defeat violent extremism as a threat to our 

way of life as a free and open society; and 

create a global environment inhospitable to 

violent extremists and all who support them. 

 Ways. The U.S. Government strategy 

for GWOT is to continue to lead an 

international effort to deny violent extremist 

networks the components they need to 

operate and survive. Once we deny them 

what they need to survive, we will have 

won. In the mean time, we must deny them 

what they need to operate. This strategy 

has three elements and relies on three 

critical crosscutting enablers.

 The key elements of the U.S. 

government GWOT strategy are: protect 

and defend the homeland; attack terrorists 

and their capacity to operate effectively at 

home and abroad; and support mainstream 

Muslim efforts to reject violent extremism. 

The three crosscutting enablers are: 

expanding foreign partnerships and 

partnership capacity; strengthening capacity 

to prevent terrorist acquisition and use of 

WMD; and institutionalizing domestically 
6

and internationally the strategy against 

violent extremists.

 Means. Success in this war will rely 

heavily on the close cooperation among 

U.S. Government agencies and partner 

nations to integrate all instruments of U.S. 

and partner national power -- diplomatic, 

information, military, economic, financial, 

intelligence, and law enforcement 

(DIMEFIL). The clandestine nature of 

terrorist organizations, their support by 

some populations and governments, and 

the trend toward decentralized control 

and integration into diverse communities 

worldwide complicate the employment of 

military power. 

 Mission for the Global War on 

Terrorism

 The Department of Defense, as 

authorized under its chain of command 

and in coordination with other government 

agencies and coalition partners, will 

develop plans and, when directed:

• Thwart or defeat terrorist attacks against 

the United States, its allies, 

 and interests;

• Attack and disrupt terrorist networks 

abroad so as to cause the enemies to be 

incapable or unwilling to attack the U.S. 

homeland, allies, or interests;

• Deny terrorist networks the

 possession or use of Weapons of

 Mass Destruction/Effects (WMD/E);

• Establish conditions that allow partner 

nations to govern their territory effectively 

and defeat terrorists; and

• Contribute to the establishment and 

maintenance of a global environment 

inhospitable to violent extremists and all 

who support them.

 Military Strategic Approach 

 The Armed Forces of the United States 

will support national and international 

activities to counter the enemy’s ideology, 

support moderate alternatives, build 

capacities of partners, and attack the 

enemy to deny its key resources and 

functions. This strategy is expressed in 

terms of ends, ways, and means.

 Ends. The Contingency Planning 

Guidance establishes four termination 

objectives as the military contribution to 

achieving these national strategic aims 

in the GWOT. These objectives and the 

mission expressed in this strategy account 

for the comprehensive military contribution 

to the GWOT. The CPG termination 

objectives can be found in the classified 

version of this document.

 Ways. The U.S. government strategic 

elements and crosscutting enablers call for 

both direct and indirect military approaches. 

Direct approaches primarily focus on 

protecting our interests while attacking the 

enemy. Indirect approaches primarily focus 

on establishing conditions for others to 

achieve success.

 The military contribution to this strategy 

focuses on the accomplishment of six 

strategic objectives:

 Deny terrorists what they need to 

operate and survive. At the national 

military level, the armed forces focus efforts 

to deny the enemy the nine terrorist network 

components discussed earlier. This effort 

will identify global linkages among terrorist 

networks, and then arrange regional actions 

to achieve network-wide effects. The base 

plan proposes a five-step process to defeat 

violent extremism (comprised of mapping

nodes and connections, identifying the 

network, developing an action plan, tying 
7

the plan to metrics, and tracking progress 

to determine effects). Doing this for all 

network components for all countries maps 

the network, identifies linkages, facilitates 

sharing “best practices,” and informs 

capacity building efforts.

 Enable partner nations to counter 

terrorism. While nations around the world 

must fight terrorist extremism within their 

own borders, many lack the capacity to do 

this. The armed forces will work with other 

agencies to enable our partners’ success. 

This effort is key to creating a global 

environment inhospitable to terrorists. 

 Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover 

and eliminate uncontrolled materials, 

and increase capacity for consequence 

management. Military activities 

include efforts to: detect and monitor 

acquisition and development; conduct 

counterproliferation operations, security 

cooperation activities, WMD active and 

passive defense, and coordination of 

consequence management operations 

(logistics, health service support, and 

decontamination activities). 

 Defeat terrorists and their 

organizations. This military strategic 

objective directly addresses the enemy’s 

ability to continue global terrorist 

operations. This requires continuous 

military operations to develop the situation 

and generate the intelligence that allows us 

to attack global terrorist organizations. 

 Counter state and non-state support 

for terrorism in coordination with other 

U.S. Government agencies and partner 

nations. The military contributes by setting 

conditions for the success of other U.S. 

Government agencies and coalition efforts. 

 Contribute to the establishment of 

conditions that counter ideological 

support for terrorism. Countering 

Ideological Support for Terrorism attacks 

the enemy’s strategic center of gravity -- 

extremist ideology. To ensure unity of effort, 

the Department of Defense will coordinate 

closely with the Federal agencies assigned 

primary responsibility for this effort in the 

U.S. Government. The military’s role 

in contributing to the establishment of 

conditions that counter enemy ideologies 

is critical. Among the ways that the military 

contributes are:

• Security. A secure environment 

allows moderates to express 

themselves without fear of 

intimidation. 

• Humanitarian Assistance. 

These efforts are often key to 

demonstrating benevolence and 

goodwill abroad, reinforcing support 

for local governments and mitigating 

problems that extremists exploit to 

gain support for their cause. 

• Military-to-Military contacts. The 

military’s extensive footprint and 

access to foreign military leaders 

influence the way they think about 

the GWOT and the actions they take 

to counter violent extremists and 

promote moderates. 

• Conduct of Operations. The way 

we conduct operations -- choosing 

whether, when, where, and how -

- can affect ideological support for 

terrorism. Knowledge of indigenous 

population’s cultural and religious 

sensitivities and understanding 

of how the enemy uses the U.S. 

military’s actions against us, 

are considerations for military 

planning. The conduct of military 

operations should avoid undercutting 

the credibility and legitimacy of 

moderate authorities opposed to 
8

the extremists, while limiting the 

extremists’ ability to spread their 

ideology.

• Military Information Operations 

(IO). DoD has significant capabilities 

that can assist in amplifying the 

voices of moderates, while helping to 

counter extremists. 

 Means. The combination of the 

Combatant Commands, the Military 

Departments, the Combat Support 

Agencies, and the programs and resources 

of the Department of Defense constitute the 

military means for fighting the GWOT. 

 

Conclusion

 This National Military Strategic Plan is 

the result of close cooperation between the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint 

Staff, and the Combatant Commands and 

Services. Building on the lessons learned 

over the past four years, it maps DoD’s way 

ahead for the next few decades of this long 

struggle. 

 It is of supreme importance that the 

United States Military understand the 

nature of the threat and the nature of this 

war. This understanding is critical to the 

implementation of this strategy. Integral 

to the National Military Strategic Plan for 

the GWOT is the concept of “supporting 

mainstream efforts to reject violent 

extremism.” All military members need 

an understanding of this critical element 

of the strategy. We must be aware of the 

culture, customs, language and philosophy 

of affected populations and the enemy, 

to more effectively counter extremism, 

and encourage democracy, freedom, and 

economic prosperity abroad. 

 It remains vital that the United States, 

our allies and partners face this enemy with 

a force of intelligent and culturally attuned 

professionals. Now is the time to invest in 

the human capital needed to combat this 

enemy for the coming decades. 
9

Strategic Plan 

I. PURPOSE

 This National Military Strategic Plan 

for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT) 

constitutes the comprehensive military plan 

to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism 

(GWOT) for the Armed Forces of the 

United States. It is the plan that guides the 

contributions of the Combatant Commands, 

the Military Departments, Combat Support 

Agencies and Field Support Activities of 

the United States to protect and defend 

the homeland, attack terrorists and their 

capacity to operate effectively at home and 

abroad, and support mainstream efforts to 

reject violent extremism. 

 The NMSP-WOT fulfills the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s responsibilities 

for strategic planning and provides 

strategic guidance for military activities 

and operations in the GWOT. The strategy 

articulates the military contribution to 

achieving the national GWOT objectives as 

identified in the: National Security Strategy 

(NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), 

National Military Strategy (NMS). 

 The plan serves to: 

• Implement the Contingency Planning 

Guidance (CPG) by identifying the 

military strategic framework for 

achieving the CPG-directed GWOT 

Termination Objectives, 

• Identify capabilities the Military 

Departments should seek to provide,

• Guide ongoing activities, 

• Identify priorities, 

• Establish a mechanism to measure 

progress, and 

• Inform planning for future DoD actions 

in the GWOT. 

 As the basis for the family of GWOTrelated plans and the relationships among 

them, this plan will guide the preparation 

of:

• Commander, USSOCOM’s Global 

Campaign Plan, 

• Geographic Combatant 

Commanders’ GWOT Theater 

Campaign Plans,

• Functional Combatant Commanders’ 

GWOT supporting plans, 

• Combatant Commanders’ strategic 

communication activities pertaining 

to GWOT, and

• Coordination within DoD, with other 

U.S. Government agencies, and with 

coalition partners in support of the 

GWOT.

Figure 1 depicts key documents that 

provide strategic guidance in the GWOT 

Additional documents are listed in the 

classified version. 

 Authority to conduct military operations, 

resulting from this plan, will be contained in 

specific execute orders or other directives 

as approved by the Secretary of Defense 

and the President.

��������� ��������

President

Secretary of Defense/

Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff

Combatant

Commands

National Strategy for

Combating Terrorism

Geographic

Combatant

Commands

Special

Operations

Command

EUCOM WOT Theater

Campaign Plan PACOM WOT Theater

Campaign Plan SOUTHCOM WOT Theater

Campaign Plan NORTHCOM WOT Theater

Campaign Plan CENTCOM WOT Theater Campaign Plan

National Military

Strategy

National Defense Strategy

National Security Strategy

SOCOM Global Campaign Plan for WOT

National Military

Strategic Plan for the

War on Terrorism

Figure 1
10

 The base plan is divided into eight 

sections:

• Purpose, 

• Strategic Environment, 

• National Guidance, 

• Strategic Assumptions, 

• Key Considerations,

• DoD Mission for the GWOT, 

• Strategic Approach, and 

• GWOT Priorities. 

 The annexes identify responsibilities, 

provide direction to coordinate efforts 

within DoD, guide coordination within the 

U.S. Government, and provide procedural 

information. The following annexes are 

summarized in section IX of this document. 

• Annex B, Intelligence

• Annex C, Operations

• Annex D, Logistics

• Annex E, Legal Considerations

• Annex F, Public Affairs

• Annex G, Coalition Management

• Annex H, Strategic Communication

• Annex J, Command Relationships

• Annex L, Homeland Defense, 

Homeland Security and Civil Support

• Annex T, WMD/E

• Annex V, Interagency Coordination

Due to the unique nature of this 

document, the annexes do not strictly follow 

the military’s Joint Operation Planning and 

Execution System (JOPES) format.

II. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

 Prior to 9/11, the United States 

countered terrorism primarily through 

diplomacy and law enforcement. President 

Bush, however, declared the 9/11 attacks 

as “acts of war” by an “evil that is intent 

on threatening and destroying our basic 

freedoms and our way of life.” Since that 

time, DoD’s understanding of the nature 

of this war and the nature of the enemy 

continues to mature and evolve.

 There is a direct relationship between 

the enemies’ motivations and the 

willingness to use terror tactics. The 

enemies of the United States and its 

partners are motivated by extremist 

ideologies antagonistic to freedom, 

tolerance, and moderation. These 

ideologies have supported the development 

of a transnational movement comprised 

of extremist organizations, networks, and 

individuals, their state sponsors, and non-
11

state supporters. These extremists use 

terrorism -- the purposeful targeting of 

ordinary people -- to produce fear to coerce 

or intimidate governments or societies 

in the pursuit of political, religious, or 

ideological goals. Extremists use terrorism 

to impede and undermine political progress, 

economic prosperity, the security and 

stability of the international state system, 

and the future of civil society.

 There have been other struggles in 

history between ideologically incompatible 

views. Modern democracy was challenged 

during WWII by fascist totalitarianism and 

then during the Cold War by communism. 

Both struggles required the use of U.S. 

and partner instruments of national power 

to ensure that respect for individual rights 

and tolerance prevailed over extremism and 

intolerance. 

 The terms “extremist” and “moderate” 

are used in this document as follows: 

“Extremists” are those who (1) oppose -- in 

principle and practice -- the right of people 

to choose how to live and how to organize 

their societies and (2) support the murder 

of ordinary people to advance extremist 

ideological purposes. “Moderates” or 

“mainstream,” refer to those individuals 

who do not support the extremists. The 

term “moderate” does not necessarily mean 

unobservant, secular or Westernizing. It 

applies to people who may differ from each 

other and from the average American in any 

number of ways except that they oppose 

the killing of ordinary people. The term 

“terrorist” refers to those who conduct 

terrorist acts. 

 In terms of the threat categories 

described in the current National Defense 

Strategy, terrorist networks, like al Qa’ida, 

may employ irregular, catastrophic, or

disruptive methods to challenge U.S. 

security interests. Irregular threats employ 

“unconventional” methods to counter 

the traditional advantages of stronger 

opponents. Catastrophic threats involve 

the acquisition, possession, and use of 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

or methods producing WMD like effects 

(WMD/E). 2 Disruptive threats may come 

from terrorist organizations that develop 

and use breakthrough technologies to 

negate current U.S. advantages in key 

operational domains. 

 Some extremists’ goals, objectives, and 

methodologies take on the characteristics 

of insurgencies. At the furthest end of the 

spectrum, some extremists espouse a 

global insurgency aimed at subverting the 

existing political and social order of both 

the world of Islam and the broader world. 

They aim to undermine Western influence, 

redefine the global balance of power, and 

establish a global pan-Islamist caliphate. 

Rather than simply seeking to overthrow 

a particular government in the traditional 

sense of the term insurgency, these 

extremists aim to fundamentally change the 

nature of the world order. 

 Aspects of the current strategic 

environment contribute to and enable 

the spread of terrorist extremism, such 

as globalization and the existence of 

“opportunists.” Globalization complicates 

warfare exponentially owing to the 

dense intertwining of the systems that 

make countries and organizations 

strong or weak -- financial, economic, 

political, social, military, and information 

among many others. Dense patterns of 

telecommunications allow the worldwide 

dissemination of data, information, and 

knowledge in real time. It is through the 

combination of television, radio, telephony, 

Internet, computers, and an oral society 

that people are able rapidly to learn or to 

seize upon bits of data as truth with no 

facts or critical analysis or explanation of 
12

context. Technology and globalization 

has made it easier for extremist leaders to 

attract well educated recruits to serve as 

leaders and foot soldiers, fuel the frustration 

of disaffected and unemployed youth, 

increase global sympathy, move operatives 

to points of destination throughout the world 

very quickly, provide financial support, and 

exchange data to synchronize attacks. 

 “Opportunists,” such as criminal 

organizations, weapon proliferators, 

and rogue states, undercut the rule 

of international law and governmental 

legitimacy, contributing to an environment 

of corruption. Additionally, inadequate 

government capacity and presence 

allow the existence of safe havens and 

sanctuaries in various regions of the world. 

These conditions foster a “convergence 

of convenience” between extremists and 

opportunists who support each other to 

satisfy their own interests. They may 

share a common enemy or other broad 

goals. Our efforts in the GWOT address 

the convergence of opportunists’ and 

extremists’ interests. The United States is 

only beginning to understand the collusive 

nature of this criminal-extremist nexus. 

 Opportunists could contribute to the 

proliferation of dangerous technologies. 

A key danger in this war is that terrorist 

extremists will obtain and use WMD/E. The 

enemy can exploit the fear and disruptive 

impact these weapons instill and not just 

their destructive kinetic effects. 

 Even as the United States and partners 

engage against extremism, other terrorist 

threats exist. The President has stated 

that “no group or nation should mistake 

America’s intentions: We will not rest until 

terrorist groups of global reach have been 

found, have been stopped, and have been 

defeated.” Attacks by global and regional 

terrorist extremist organizations other 

than the al Qa’ida and those extremists 

associated with them, could become 

a feature of the strategic landscape. 

Consequently, the United States and its 

partners should continue to be vigilant, 

collaboratively plan, and be prepared to 

identify and eliminate the various terrorist 

threats against the American people and 

other civilized societies. 

 Nature of the War

 The United States is at war against 

extremists who advocate and use violence 

to gain control over others, and in doing 

so, threaten our way of life. The GWOT 

is a war to preserve ordinary peoples’ 

ability to live as they choose, and to protect 

the tolerance and moderation of free 

and open societies. It is not a religious 

or cultural clash between Islam and the 

West, although our extremist enemies find 

it useful to characterize the war that way. 

These violent extremists see the U.S. and 

the West as primary obstacles to achieving 

their political ends In fighting this global 

conflict, the United States must ally itself 

with partners around the world, especially 

those in the Muslim world who oppose 

domination by extremists.

 The clandestine nature of terrorist 

organizations, their support by some 

populations and governments, and the 
13

trend toward decentralized control and 

integration into diverse communities 

worldwide complicate the employment of 

military power. Success in this war relies 

heavily on the close cooperation among 

U.S. Government agencies and partner 

nations to integrate all instruments of U.S. 

and partner national power -- diplomatic, 

information, military, economic, financial, 

intelligence, and law enforcement 

(DIMEFIL).

 The nature of free and open societies 

enables terrorist networks to take 

advantage of freedom of movement, 

communications, financial systems, and 

logistical support. Extremist networks 

are able to operate in and exploit seams 

between states, between military and police 

forces, and between international and local 

laws. Consequently, the United States and 

partner nations remain highly vulnerable 

to terrorist violence designed to undermine 

the international antiterrorist coalition and to 

cause some members to seek to “opt out” 

of the struggle.

 

 The conditions that extremist networks 

exploit to operate and survive have 

developed over long periods. The effort 

to alter those conditions will require a 

long-term, sustained approach whose 

success is key to promoting an international 

environment inhospitable to terrorists and 

their supporters. 

 Nature of the Enemy 

 There is no monolithic enemy 

network with a single set of goals and 

objectives. The nature of the threat is more 

complicated. In the GWOT, the primary 

enemy is a transnational movement of 

extremist organizations, networks, and 

individuals -- and their state and non-state 

supporters -- which have in common that 

they exploit Islam and use terrorism for 

ideological ends. The Al Qa’ida Associated 

Movement (AQAM), comprised of al Qa’ida 

and affiliated extremists, is the most 

dangerous present manifestation of such 

extremism. Certain other violent extremist 

groups also pose a serious and continuing 

threat.

 Networks provide survivability via a 

combination of redundant systems, secrecy, 

and a cellular structure. They can be highly 

adaptable, and the al Qa’ida Network 

(AQN) is an example of such adaptation. 

Following the elimination of the AQN base 

of operations in Afghanistan, the remaining 

leadership and key operational elements 

dispersed around the globe, effectively 

franchising Islamist extremism and 

terrorist methodology to regional extremist 

organizations. The AQN’s adaptation 

or evolution resulted in the creation of 

an extremist “movement,” referred to by 

intelligence analysts as AQAM, extending 

extremism and terrorist tactics well beyond 

the original organization. This adaptation 

has resulted in decentralizing control in the 

network and franchising its extremist efforts 

within the movement. Other extremist 

networks have proven to be equally 

adaptive. 

 Enemy Critical Vulnerabilities 

 The networked and cellular structure of 

global extremist threats calls for careful and 

continuous analysis of their organizations 
14

and operating systems to identify enemy 

vulnerabilities. Center of gravity and 

critical vulnerability analysis enables the 

U.S. Government to focus efforts more 

effectively on the enemy. 

 Centers of Gravity 

 Centers of gravity exist at the strategic, 

operational and tactical levels, and differ 

for each extremist network or organization. 

At the strategic level, the AQAM’s center 

of gravity is its extremist ideology. This 

ideology motivates anger and resentment 

and justifies, in the extremists’ eyes, the use 

of violence to achieve strategic goals and 

objectives. A principal focus of this strategic 

plan is to support other U.S. Government 

agency efforts to counter the extremist 

ideologies that fuel terrorist networks. 

 At the operational and tactical level, 

various centers of gravity exist, including 

key leaders, popular support, organizational 

support (state and non-state supporters) 

and key operational elements of the 

organization. Center of gravity analysis 

must be tailored to a specific network for 

each campaign of the GWOT. 

 Key Network Components 

 All enemy networks rely on certain key 

functions, processes, and resources to 

be able to operate and survive. These 

three elements are an important basis for 

counter-network strategies and can be 

defined as follows: 

• Function (Critical Capability): A 

specific occupation, role, or purpose.

• Process: A series of actions or 

operations (i.e., the interaction of 

resources) over time that bring about 

an end or results (i.e., a function).

• Resource (Critical Requirement): A 

person, organization, place, or thing 

(physical and non-physical) and its 

attributes. In network vernacular, 

a resource may also be referred 

to as a “node” and the interaction 

or relationship between nodes 

described as “linkage.”

 Specific functions, processes, and 

resources vary from group to group, 

network to network, and even from time to 

time. This demands an agile and adaptive 

approach to deny terrorists those critical 

elements that allow operation and survival 

of the network. If denied to the enemy, 

they can become critical vulnerabilities. 

Attacked individually or in combination, 

the loss of key functions, processes, and 

resources serves to disrupt the enemy’s 

ability to operate. Attacked systematically 

over time, the enemy center of gravity can 

be undermined and the network rendered 

unable to survive. A common lexicon and 

analytic framework is therefore essential to 

identify and describe these elements within 

the enemy’s complex and ever-shifting 

network of networks. Such an approach 

facilitates ease, simplicity, and broad 

applicability at the strategic level within DoD 

and among the interagency and partner 

nations. As a strategic start-point, the 

terrorist network of networks is organized 

by NMSP-WOT into nine basic components 

for the further detailed study of its critical 

elements of operation and survival: 

Leadership; Safe Havens; Finance; 

Communications; Movement; Intelligence; 

Weapons; Personnel; and Ideology. This 

categorization serves as a common lexicon 

for orienting and coordinating efforts against 

enemy networks.

 Leadership. Leadership provides 

the motivation and energy necessary 

to maintain coherent progress toward 

a goal. Most terrorist extremist groups 
15

have a central figure who embodies the 

cause and several operational leaders/

coordinators who provide leadership 

on a functional, regional or local basis. 

Adaptive organizations have a “bench” 

of leaders prepared to assume greater 

responsibilities, if required. For example, 

although the AQ network retains a 

level of centralized control over its 

own operations, control of the broader 

movement is decentralized. Usama Bin 

Laden acts as the inspirational leader of 

many in the extremist movements, not as 

an operational director. This resource is 

vulnerable to the military, intelligence, law 

enforcement, and informational instruments 

of national power. Military, intelligence, 

and law enforcement instruments focus 

on capturing or killing key terrorist leaders, 

while informational instruments focus on 

degrading their standing with their followers 

and potential recruits. Leadership provides 

the following focus for targeting: strategic 

vision/motivation; operational guidance/

direction; and tactical direction. 

 Safe Havens. One of the most 

important resources to extremists is safe 

haven. Safe havens provide the enemy 

with relative freedom to plan, organize, 

train, rest, and conduct operations. Safe 

havens can be physical or non-physical. 

Terrorists benefit from physical safe haven 

when states grant them access to territory, 

or when they gain access to ungoverned, 

ill-governed, or under-governed space 

within states that lack effective control over 

their own territory. Terrorists sometimes 

conceal themselves in remote hideouts, 

with minimal contact with authorities 

and limited access to transportation and 

communication lines. Other illicit groups, 

such as insurgents, drug lords, and 

smugglers, have already identified territory 

with these characteristics, and some 

groups may “rent” attractively prepared 

sites to enemy groups for financial gain 

or out of ethnic, religious, or ideological 

sympathies. Urban areas are also used 

by terrorists for meeting, planning, and 

hiding in smaller numbers. Suitable urban 

environments for such activity share few 

characteristics with remote sites except, 

in some cases, poor government control. 

Non-physical safe havens for terrorists 

can exist within cyber, financial, and legal 

systems. These “virtual” safe havens allow 

enemy networks to enjoy relative freedom 

from disruption, as in physical sanctuaries, 

since states often make them available or 

are unable to deny their use. These areas 

may create opportunities for cooperation 

by criminal elements and extremists. All 

instruments of national and international 

power can play a role in disrupting or 

denying terrorists access to such safe 
16

havens. State-sponsored safe havens 

may be vulnerable to diplomatic, military, 

economic, and informational instruments. 

Ungoverned space may be vulnerable to 

military and intelligence instruments. Virtual 

safe havens may be vulnerable to financial, 

economic, informational, and intelligence 

instruments. Safe havens provide the 

following foci for targeting: specific physical 

safe havens; specific virtual safe havens; 

facilities; and safe haven/sanctuary 

providers. 

 Finance. Extremists fund operations by 

using unofficial banking systems, legitimate 

businesses, front companies, wealthy 

backers, state sponsors, non-governmental 

organizations, and criminal activities. Drug 

trafficking is a growing source of criminal 

funding for many enemy organizations. 

Though other U.S. Government and 

international entities have the lead role in 

attacking this key resource, the military can 

assist in many ways. Finance provides 

the following focus for U.S. government 

targeting: illicit trade/criminal activity; 

embezzlement; donors; money exchange; 

safekeeping; couriers; front companies; 

personal wealth; and legitimate businesses. 

 Communications. The ability 

to receive, store, manipulate, and 

communicate and/or disseminate 

information. All instruments of power 

play a part in attacking the vulnerabilities 

associated with communications. The 

military instrument can assist by collecting 

intelligence on communications, attacking 

computer systems, and denying intelligence 

to the enemy through operational security 

(OPSEC) and force protection measures. 

Communications includes: foreign electronic 

media; commercial telecommunications; 

trade/field craft; Internet/chat/email; OPSEC 

and signal security. 

 Movement. Extremists must move 

and have supporting documentation to 

elude detection, maintain flexibility and 

access targets. Terrorist access to targets 

includes the ability to move weapons to 

desired target locations. Principal means 

are to use existing methods for smuggling 

contraband to deliver weapons and 

operatives to desired target locations. Law 

enforcement and diplomatic instruments 

lead the effort to deny enemy transit across 

borders and to protect likely targets in the 

United States. The military contributes 

to this effort by deterring, detecting, and 

interdicting terrorists before they can 
17

reach the United States and protecting 

potential military targets in the homeland. 

Movement includes: couriers; movement 

corridors/transit points; relative anonymity; 

organic and commercial transportation; 

popular support; and illicit/criminal trade 

mechanisms. 

 Intelligence. Extremist networks 

require specific and detailed information 

to achieve their ends. They gather this 

information from open sources, human 

contacts (both witting and unwitting), 

reconnaissance and surveillance, and 

technical activities. Terrorists use the 

resulting intelligence to plan and execute 

operations, and secure what they need 

to operate and survive. The intelligence 

component of extremist networks includes 

counter-measures to protect against 

infiltration or attack. Terrorist entities 

perform counterintelligence, apply 

operational security measures, use denial 

and deception, and exercise great care 

in determining the loyalty and reliability of 

members, associates, active supporters 

and other affiliates. The intelligence 

capabilities of terrorist entities must be 

systematically, broadly and consistently 

countered and attacked by unremitting 

attention to and steady efforts at force 

protection, counterintelligence, counterdenial and counter-deception, among 

other measures. U.S. and partner nation 

counterterrorist efforts must take full 

account of and constantly seek to counter 

the abilities of terrorist entities to acquire 

and use the intelligence required for their 

activities. Overseas, the military uses force 

protection, counterintelligence, and OPSEC 

to combat terrorist access to targets. 

Access to intelligence can be disrupted 

or eliminated by actions derived from: 

passive/active human intelligence; open 

source collection; technical intercept; and 

counterintelligence. 

 Weapons. Extremists employ existing 

technology (explosives, small arms, antitank missiles, and other weapons/devices) 

in conventional and unconventional 

methods to terrorize and achieve mass 

effects. In addition, terrorists may use 

non-weapon technologies as weapons. 

The best examples of asymmetric uses 

of technologies would be the use of 

commercial aircraft as missiles during 

the 9/11 attacks and the use of industrial 

chemicals to induce casualties and panic 

among the public. Components for WMD/

E and the scientific expertise that enable 

them are available on the world market, 

often from states that support terrorist 

extremist groups. Stockpiles in the former 

Soviet Union and “WMD for profit” activities 

such as the AQ Khan network could 

be the source of WMD/E for terrorists. 

Diplomatic efforts seek greater control over 

weapons by responsible parties, especially 

weapons with significant potential to create 
18

multiple casualties such as man portable 

air defense missiles (MANPADs) and 

WMD. Financial efforts seek to stop the 

flow of funds that fuel procurement. The 

military in concert with other instruments 

of national power will conduct interdiction 

operations in all mediums (air, land, sea, 

and cyber) to prevent the proliferation of 

WMD, associated components, knowledge, 

or technology. The Proliferation Security 

Initiative (PSI) is a global initiative aimed 

at stopping shipments of WMD, their 

delivery systems and related materials 

worldwide. PSI is best understood as a set 

of partnerships that establishes the basis 

for cooperation on interdiction activities 

when the need arises. Access to weapons 

can be disrupted or eliminated by targeting: 

conventional weapons procurement/

manufacture; movement of conventional 

weapons; WMD/E finance, technology, 

technical experts, material and equipment 

procurement; material and equipment 

movement; processing and production 

facilities; training; and delivery platforms. 

 Personnel. This critical capability 

incorporates terrorist recruitment, 

indoctrination, and training of enemy 

operatives. Extremists use religious 

facilities, schools, refugee camps, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and 

the media as vehicles for recruitment, 

reinforced by the educational and 

indoctrination efforts. Recruitment can 

be disrupted by countering the appeal 

of extremist ideology. The military plays 

a critical role in that effort, as well as in 

operations to capture or kill individual 

terrorist foot soldiers. Personnel targets 

include: operatives; technical experts; 

personnel recruiters; personnel movement; 

and ideological legitimacy.

 Ideology. Extremist ideology motivates 

violent action and inspires individuals to 

provide material resources. Ideology is 

the component most critical to extremist 

networks and movements and sustains all 

other capabilities. This critical resource 

is the enemy’s strategic center of gravity, 

and removing it is key to creating a global 

antiterrorist environment. 

 It is ideological belief, reinforced by 

propaganda operations, that convinces 

recruits and supporters that their actions 

are morally justifiable. All instruments of 

national power play a role in undermining 

ideological support and propaganda 

operations that defends and promotes 

the use of terrorism. The principal 

responsibility for this important mission 

lies outside the Department of Defense. 

Countering ideological support and the 

enemy’s propaganda operations involves 

action as well as words. There can be 

value in actions demonstrating that the 

United States possesses, and is willing to 

use, overwhelming force against terrorists 

and other extremists. At the same time, the 

United States must be aware and should 

Ideology

• A systematic body of concepts 

especially about human life or 

culture. It can be thought of as a 

comprehensive vision, as a way of 

looking at things

• There are many different kinds of 

ideology: political, social, spiritual, 

epistemological, ethical, and so on.
19

show respect for all religions, cultures, 

customs, language, and philosophies of 

affected populations. Targeting ideology 

includes: amplifying the voices of those who 

promote alternative ideas that emphasize 

tolerance and moderation; promoting 

freedom and democracy; de-legitimizing 

extremist ideological leaders; and providing 

alternatives to extremist education systems 

(e.g., some madrassas), among others.

III. NATIONAL GUIDANCE

 Guidance in the Global War on Terrorism 

is derived from appropriate National 

Security Presidential Directives, the 

National Defense Strategy, Contingency 

Planning Guidance, and the National 

Military Strategy. The NMSP-WOT is the 

military component of the greater U.S. 

Government efforts in the GWOT. The 

following summarizes the national strategic 

aims, strategy, and the end-state for the 

GWOT.

 National Strategic Aims

• Defeat violent extremism as a threat 

to our way of life as a free and open 

society, and

• Create a global environment 

inhospitable to violent extremists and 

all who support them. 

National Strategy 

 The U.S. Government strategy 

for GWOT is to continue to lead an 

international effort to deny violent extremist 

networks the resources and functions 

they need to operate and survive. The 

strategy animating this broad international 

effort has three key elements: protect and 

defend the homeland; attack terrorists 

and their capacity to operate effectively at 

home and abroad; and support mainstream 

efforts to reject violent extremism. The 

latter element is the decisive element 

of the strategy and is focused on the 

enemy’s strategic center of gravity -- 

extremist ideology. Systematically denying 

the enemy ideological support while 

supporting mainstream efforts could lead 

to the enemy’s defeat. In the meantime, 

protecting and defending the homeland, 

and attacking terrorist networks are 

essential to protect the center of gravity of 

the United States and disrupt enemies of 

the United States. Each partner country 

has a special interest in protecting and 

defending its own homeland, attacking 

terrorists and their capacity at home and 

abroad, and in supporting mainstream 

efforts to reject violent extremism. 

 Protect and defend the homeland. 

These efforts protect and defend 

economies, society, and systems of 

government from the effects of terrorist 

attacks. This element includes efforts 

internal and external to the homeland; in 

other words, protecting and defending the 

homeland requires efforts abroad. 

 Attack terrorists and their capacity 

to operate effectively at home and 

abroad. These offensive efforts of the 

strategy are designed to disrupt terrorists’ 

operations, affecting terrorists’ ability to 

execute their attacks effectively or sustain 

�������� �������� ��� ��� ����

National Strategic Aims:

- Defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society, and

- Create a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them.

Ends

Means

Continue to lead a broad international effort to

deny terrorist networks the resources they need to

operate and survive.

Support

Mainstream

Muslims

Protect the

Homeland

Attack

Terrorists

Ways

Instruments of National Power

Expand foreign partnerships and partnership capacity.

Prevent terrorist use of WMD.

Institutionalize the GWOT domestically and internationally.

Expand foreign partnerships and partnership capacity.

Prevent terrorist use of WMD.

Institutionalize the GWOT domestically and internationally.

Figure 2
20

their ideology. These efforts include killing 

and capturing key enemy leaders and 

foot soldiers, destroying training centers, 

and denying the enemy access to each 

of the eight categories of resources and 

functions critical to the enemies’ operations. 

Ultimately, continuous and successive 

network-wide attacks against the enemy 

can cause enemy networks to fail. 

 Support mainstream Muslim efforts 

to reject violent extremism. These 

efforts are achieved through countering 

extremist ideology and encouraging 

democracy, freedom, and economic 

prosperity in societies. For instance, take 

the primary threat, represented by the 

AQAM. A decisive point in countering 

ideological support for terrorism occurs 

when moderate Muslims lead the fight

against the extremists. Key to this is 

Muslim populations’ belief that terrorism is 

not a legitimate means to pursue political 

goals. The strategy is to encourage and 

enable moderates to promote the view 

that violent extremist efforts undermine the 

wellbeing of the Muslim community on a 

local, regional, and global level. The belief 

that violent extremist efforts are harmful to 

the Islamic community, and contrary to the 

teachings of Islam, must come from within 

Islam itself. As the Muslim community 

progressively recognizes violent extremist 

actions as a threat to itself through 

introspection, mainstream moderates may 

become more active in stopping the violent 

extremists. The U.S. role in this effort is to 

support, where appropriate, and encourage 

and amplify the voices of moderates 

who oppose extremists and continue to 

encourage democracy, freedom, and 

economic prosperity in societies. 

 The three strategic elements of the U.S. 

government strategy for the GWOT are 

enabled by three crosscutting elements 

that represent critical efforts for achieving 

success in the war. These enablers 

include: expanding foreign partnerships and 

partnership capacity; enhancing capacity 

to prevent terrorist acquisition and use of 

WMD; and institutionalizing domestically 

and internationally the strategy against 

violent extremists.

 End-State 

 Violent extremist ideology and terrorist 

attacks eliminated as a threat to the way 

of life of free and open societies. A global 

environment that is inhospitable to violent 

extremism, wherein countries have the 
21

capacity to govern their own territories, 

including both the physical and virtual 

domains of their jurisdictions. Partner 

countries have in place laws, information 

sharing, and other arrangements, that allow 

them to defeat terrorists as they emerge, at 

the local and regional levels. 

IV. STRATEGIC ASSUMPTIONS

 Long-term war of varying intensity. 

Defeating extremism can be expected to 

require decades of effort.

 Violent extremists will use any means 

of attack. The United States and other 

free and open societies will remain principal 

targets of the extremists. They may seek to 

use all means of attack, including WMD/E, 

against targets at home and abroad.

 Internal struggle within societies. 

Extremists are waging a global war to 

gain control over their communities and 

freedom is seen as a primary obstacle to 

their success. Violent extremists are hostile 

to the United States and the West for 

philosophical, political, and other reasons. 

The world, in general, has a large stake 

in the defeat of violent extremists. The 

AQAM is the immediate strategic threat to 

mainstream Muslims, the United States and 

our partners.

 Ideology matters. Violent extremist 

movements can make new terrorists faster 

than the anti-terror coalition can capture 

or kill them. Ideological support and 

propaganda operations are a foundation for 

extremist success and a key to recruitment 

and indoctrination.

 Enemies within friends. The networks 

of terrorist groups and others who support 

their violent extremist ideologies will 

influence, and in some cases penetrate, 

the governments and civil and religious 

institutions of partner nations 

 Together and alone. The United States 

leads a coalition of more than 80 countries 

to combat violent extremism, but will act 

alone, as necessary. 

 All instruments of power. The United 

States is at war, and success in the war 

will require the coordinated efforts of all 

instruments of U.S. and partner national 

power. In fact, the principal thrust, must 

come from instruments of national power 

and influence outside the Department 

of Defense. The United States will 

also promote freedom, democracy, and 

economic prosperity around the world to 

mitigate those conditions that terrorists seek 

to exploit. 

 Divided responsibilities. Responsibility 

for protecting the United States is 

divided among Federal, state, and local 

governments and the private sector will 

remain divided. The DOD will need to 

coordinate closely with other government 

agencies to achieve integrated plans and 

operations. A detailed understanding 

of this division of responsibility may be 

necessary for developing campaign plans. 

This division of responsibility is subject to 

change as the U.S. Government addresses 

the 9/11 Commission recommendations, 

the Quadrennial Defense Review, and other 

reviews of GWOT strategy.

V. CONSIDERATONS

 Close neighbors. To protect the U.S. 

homeland, cooperation with neighbors in 

this hemisphere is especially important.

 Enemies are trans-national. The 

enemies do not respect national 

boundaries. The U.S. Government will 

need to use its country teams abroad in 
22

new ways to execute a global strategy. 

Violent extremists cooperate with 

opportunists -- other extremists, criminal 

elements, proliferators, and drug cartels -- 

based on self-interest.

 Common assessment of threat. U.S. 

Government agencies will not automatically 

adopt a common assessment of the 

threat or a common understanding of the 

nature of the war; nor will U.S. coalition 

partners. Greater commonality of view, 

however, can be achieved through effort.

 A “networked enemy” has certain 

vulnerabilities that can be exploited. 

Although some nodes of the network are 

difficult to see, others may be identified and 

acted upon. Perturbations of nodes in the 

network may present intelligence collection 

and attack opportunities. Networked 

enemies have different vulnerabilities 

than hierarchical enemies. There may be 

vulnerabilities especially in network links 

with opportunists whose motivations are not 

ideological. 

VI. MISSION FOR THE GLOBAL 

WAR ON TERRORISM

 The Department of Defense, as 

authorized under its chain of command 

and in coordination with other government 

agencies and coalition partners, will 

develop plans and, when directed:

• Thwart or defeat terrorist attacks 

against the United States, its allies, 

and interests;

• Attack and disrupt terrorist networks 

abroad so as to cause the enemies 

to be incapable or unwilling to 

attack the U.S. homeland, allies, or 

interests;

• Deny terrorist networks the 

possession or use of WMD/E;

• Establish conditions that allow 

partner nations to govern their 

territory effectively and defeat 

terrorists; and

• Contribute to the establishment

 and maintenance of a global 

environment inhospitable to violent 

extremists and all who support them.

VII. MILITARY STRATEGIC 

APPROACH 

 The military strategic approach is to 

focus military operations in such a way as 

to assist other elements of national power 

to undermine the enemy center of gravity 

– violent extremist ideology. The Armed 

Forces of the United States will pursue 

direct and indirect methods to support 

activities to counter the enemy’s ideology, 

support moderate alternatives, build 

capacities of partners, and attack the 

enemy to deny its key components. This 

strategy is expressed in terms of ends, 

ways, and means. (Figure 3 depicts this 

military strategic approach.) 

�������� ��������� ��������� ��� ��� ����

National Strategic Aims:

- Defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society, and

- Create a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them.

Ends

Means Combatant Commands, Services, and Combat Support Agencies

Military Strategic Objectives

Support

Mainstream Muslims

Protect the

Homeland

Attack

Terrorists

Enable partner nations to counter terrorism.

Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled

materials, and maintain capacity for consequence mgmt. Ways

Deny terrorists the resources they need to operate and survive.

Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological

support for terrorism.

Defeat terrorists and their organizations.

Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with

other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations.

Enemy Foot soldiers

Ideological support Leadership

Safe havens

Funds Weapons

Comms & Movement Access to Targets Personnel

Leadership Intelligence

Communication

Finance Weapons

Safe Havens Movement Personnel Ideology

Leadership Intelligence

Communication

Finance Weapons

Safe Havens Movement Ideology

Enemy

Figure 3
23

 Ends

 The Contingency Planning Guidance 

establishes four termination objectives as 

the military contribution to achieving the 

national strategic aims and end-state in the 

GWOT. These objectives and the mission 

expressed in this strategy account for the 

comprehensive military contribution to the 

GWOT. The CPG termination objectives 

can be found in the classified version of this 

document. 

 Ways

 DoD achieves these termination 

objectives and complements other U.S. 

Government activities by accomplishing 

six military strategic objectives that focus 

on the strategic elements of the national 

GWOT strategy. These military strategic 

objectives call for both direct and indirect 

military approaches to the end-state. 

Direct approaches focus on protecting 

our interests while attacking the enemy. 

Indirect approaches focus on establishing 

conditions for others to achieve success.

The military strategic objectives are:

 Deny terrorists what they need 

to operate and survive. Key to this 

is understanding the critical nodes and 

linkages of the terrorists’ networks. At the 

national military level, efforts are focused 

to identify global linkages among terrorist 

networks, and then to arrange regional 

actions that will achieve network-wide 

effects. Because the enemies are located 

in countries around the world with whom 

the United States is not at war, much 

of the effort against the terrorists will 

have to be made by those countries with 

the encouragement and assistance as 

necessary of the United States. 

 Enable partner nations to counter 

terrorism. As 9/11 demonstrated, a 

terrorist group based in a remote, relatively 

inaccessible country can still pose a major 

threat to the United States and its interests. 

Thus, victory requires a worldwide, 

continuous, and comprehensive effort to 

create a global environment inhospitable 

to violent extremists and all who support 

them. The United States must also continue 

to encourage and assist bilateral and 

multilateral regional partnerships among 

states that can work together in combating 

terrorism. 

 Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover 

and eliminate uncontrolled materials, 

and increase capacity for consequence 

management. Important for the enemy’s 

success is its ability to maintain itself 

as a credible opponent. The enemy 

gains credibility in supporters’ eyes if 

it is able to obtain and use weapons of 

mass destruction or successfully employ 

technology to achieve mass effects as 

occurred in New York and against the 

Pentagon. Joint Publication 3-40 describes 

the military contributions to combating 

WMD, including nonproliferation (NP), 

counterproliferation (CP), and consequence 

management (CM). Military activities 

include efforts to: detect and monitor 

acquisition and development; and conduct 

counterproliferation operations, security 

cooperation activities, WMD active and 

passive defense, and coordination of 

consequence management operations 

(CM logistics, health service support, and 
24

decontamination activities). All of these 

efforts serve to protect the homeland. 

 Defeat terrorists and their 

organizations. This military strategic 

objective directly addresses the enemy’s 

ability to continue global terrorist 

operations. This requires continuous 

military operations to develop the situation 

and generate the intelligence that allows 

us to attack global terrorist organizations. 

This becomes the first object of military 

operations against the terrorists -- find the 

enemy. Once the situation is effectively 

developed, military operations may 

be authorized to: capture or kill senior 

leadership and senior operatives; eliminate 

safe havens; destroy training camps and 

resources; capture or kill cell members 

(“foot soldiers”); and disrupt recruiting 

and indoctrination efforts. As always, 

emphasis is on operating with and training 

partner nations to achieve this objective, 

while always being prepared to operate 

independently, if necessary.

Counter state and non-state support 

for terrorism in coordination with other

U.S. Government agencies and partner 

nations. State sponsorship provides 

extremists access to key resources, 

including fronts for illegal activities. Nonstate entities may also provide some 

of these same benefits to the enemy. 

Non-state supporters may be financial 

supporters, such as charities and criminal 

organizations that directly or indirectly 

support terrorist organizations. The 

military contributes by setting conditions 

for the success of other U.S. Government 

agencies and coalition efforts. The range 

of military activities includes: intelligence 

operations to identify state sponsors 

and non-state supporters of terrorism; 

capturing/killing terrorists and their direct 

supporters; interdiction operations to 

intercept terrorist resources (including 

WMD/E and components); coordinated 

counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and 

counter-narcotics efforts; and exercises and 

capability demonstrations to dissuade and 

coerce states and non-state entities. In 

extreme circumstances, the military leads 

efforts toward cessation of state and nonstate support of terrorism, as exemplified 

by operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, to 

oust regimes that supported terrorists and 

stabilize the countries afterward. 

 Contribute to the establishment of 

conditions that counter ideological 

support for terrorism. Countering 

Ideological Support for Terrorism attacks 

the enemy’s strategic center of gravity 

-- extremist ideology. Although the 

Department of Defense is not the lead 

Federal agency for this effort, the U.S. 

military can contribute significantly. DoD 

can take actions to help build up, for 

example, the security, confidence, and 

other institutional capabilities of those 

who oppose violent extremists’. DoD can 

also take actions to shake the confidence 

of violent extremists, expose their false 

statements and corruption and otherwise 

affect the extremists’ ability to convey 

effectively their messages of antagonism, 

violence, and intimidation. 

 To ensure unity of effort, DoD will 

coordinate closely with the Federal 

agencies assigned primary responsibility 
25

for this effort in the U.S. Government. 

Actions to counter ideological support 

should be designed to de-legitimize the 

enemy’s ideology (center of gravity) and 

create conditions that isolate nodes and 

connections of the network. Once isolated, 

these nodes or connections may be treated 

as regional or local threats, vulnerable 

to local partner nation efforts. The most 

effective efforts in the ideological struggle 

are likely to be partner efforts.

 The military’s role in contributing to the 

establishment of conditions that counter 

enemy ideologies and propaganda 

operations is critical. The U.S. Military’s 

extensive professional military education 

programs are key to fostering leadership 

at every level that exercises judgment 

informed by these considerations. Success 

in the GWOT, both in the near-term and 

future, will largely depend on the cultural 

education and understanding of senior 

leaders and military professionals. Among 

the ways that the military contributes are:

• Security. The Armed Forces of 

the United States and indigenous 

forces provide security as a 

critical condition for countering 

enemy ideologies and propaganda 

operations. The U.S. armed forces 

often contribute best by helping train 

the forces of other countries for the 

skills needed to combat terrorism. 

A secure environment allows 

moderates to express themselves 

without fear of intimidation. Security 

is also an important condition for 

the success of many of the counter 

ideology efforts of other government 

agencies, international organizations, 

non-governmental organizations, and 

the private sector. 

• Humanitarian Assistance. The 

considerable capabilities of the 

Armed Forces of the United States 

to alleviate suffering in times of 

hardship provide opportunities to 

influence the way people perceive 

their situation and their environment. 

These efforts are often key to 

demonstrating benevolence and 

goodwill abroad, reinforcing support 

for local governments and mitigating 

problems that extremists exploit to 

gain support for their cause. 

• Military-to-Military contacts. The 

military’s extensive footprint and 

access to foreign military leaders 
26

influence the way they think about 

the GWOT and the actions they take 

to counter violent extremists and 

promote moderates. These contacts 

include: International Military 

Education and Training (IMET), 

Offices of Military Cooperation 

and other train-and-equip efforts, 

foreign participation in Regional 

Centers, combined training activities 

and exercises, and senior military 

contacts. 

• Conduct of Operations. The way 

we conduct operations -- choosing 

whether, when, where, and how -

- can affect ideological support for 

terrorism. Knowledge of indigenous 

population’s cultural and religious 

sensitivities and understanding 

of how the enemy uses the U.S. 

military’s actions against us should 

inform the way the U.S. military 

operates. The U.S. military prefers 

to work in a supporting role where 

indigenous forces are capable of 

leading operations. Where effects 

can be achieved by means other 

than direct U.S. military actions, the 

U.S. Government may seek to do so. 

Where U.S. military involvement is 

necessary, military planners should 

build efforts into the operation to 

reduce potential negative effects. 

At the same time, we must, by 

our military actions, convey the 

sense that our power cannot be 

defeated and that, under the right 

circumstances, we are willing to 

use it. This will require careful 

balancing. The conduct of military 

operations should avoid undercutting 

the credibility and legitimacy of 

moderate authorities opposed to 

the extremists, while defeating 

extremists’ ability to spread their 

ideology.

• Military Information Operations 

(IO). Amplifying the voices of 

moderates and countering the 
27

extremists can be supported by DoD. 

These operations are coordinated 

with other Department and agencies, 

principally the State Department, as 

a component of DoD’s contribution to 

public diplomacy and public affairs. 

 Means

 The combination of the Combatant 

Commands, the Military Departments, 

the Combat Support Agencies, and the 

programs and resources of the Department 

of Defense constitute the military means for 

fighting the GWOT. 

VIII. MILITARY PRIORITIES IN 

THE GLOBAL WAR ON 

TERRORISM

 Military priorities can be characterized 

as being of the “first” or “second” order, 

or as “enablers.” First order priorities 

orient Combatant Commands, Military 

Departments, and Combat Support 

Agencies toward achieving current critical 

objectives of the GWOT. Although these 

priorities are temporal in nature, these 

tasks are expected to consume a majority 

of resources that are dedicated to the 

GWOT for the near future. Second order 

priorities provide direction for important but 

not critical aspects of the war, and guide 

the application of capacities not dedicated 

to first order priorities. The ability to commit 

resources to these second order priorities 

will differ from combatant command 

to combatant command and by each 

Military Department and agency. Enabling 

priorities identify parallel efforts that affect 

accomplishment of GWOT near-term and 

future objectives, but are not unique to the 

GWOT effort. Enabling priorities identify the 

application of resources in GWOT that are 

more directly tied to the national military 

strategy as a whole. The priorities serve to 

translate the military strategic framework, 

described in the preceding section, into 

focused efforts against the enemy.

CONCLUSION

 This National Military Strategic Plan is 

the result of close cooperation between the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint 

Staff, and the Combatant Commands and 

Services. Building on the lessons learned 

over the past four years, it maps DoD’s way 

ahead for the next few decades of this long 

struggle. 

 It is of supreme importance that the 

United States Military understand the 

nature of the threat and the nature of this 

war. This understanding is critical to the 

implementation of this strategy. Integral 

to the National Military Strategic Plan for 

the GWOT is the concept of “supporting 

mainstream efforts to reject violent 

extremism.” All military members need 

an understanding of this critical element 

of the strategy. We must be aware of the 

culture, customs, language and philosophy 

of affected populations and the enemy, 

to more effectively counter extremism, 

and encourage democracy, freedom, and 

economic prosperity abroad. 
28

 It remains vital that the United States, 

our allies and partners face this enemy with 

a force of intelligent and culturally attuned 

professionals. Now is the time to invest in 

the human capitol needed to combat this 

enemy for the coming decades. 

 The classified version of this strategy 

can be found on the Joint Staff classified 

website (http://j5.js.smil.mil/ under National 

Military Strategic Plan for the War on 

Terrorism). Alternatively, contact The Joint 

Staff, Deputy Directorate for the War on 

Terrorism at (703) 693-2023. 

 The classified version of this document 

supersedes the NMSP-WOT dated 19 

October 2002. The document will be 

updated biennially, or as required.

 The following annexes exist in full form 

in the classified version of the NMSPWOT. This unclassified version includes 

excerpts from those annexes. Additionally, 

expanded excerpts of Annexes C, H, R, and 

V are included to help illustrate issues and 

concepts of particular interest in the GWOT 

for those who may not have access to the 

full annexes in the classified NMSP-WOT.

• Annex B, Intelligence: Describes the 

threat, concept of intelligence operations, 

and intelligence activities.

• Annex C, Operations: Provides 

tasks, coordinating instructions for 

implementing the base plan, and assigns 

DoD-wide responsibilities. It establishes 

Commander of the United States Special 

Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM)

as the supported command for the 

GWOT.

• Annex D, Logistics: Provides tasks, 

coordinating instructions for supporting 

the base plan, and assigns DoD-wide 

responsibilities.

• Annex E, Legal Considerations:

Provides guidance and DoD-wide 

responsibilities.

• Annex F, Public Affairs: Coupled 

with the Strategic Communications 

guidance in Annex H, offers guidance for 

implementing Public Affairs campaigns in 

support of GWOT.

• Annex G, Coalition Management:

Provides tasks, coordinating instructions 

for the international efforts of the GWOT.

• Annex H, Strategic Communication:

Coupled with the Public Affairs 

guidance in Annex F, offers guidance for 

implementing strategic communication 

campaigns in support of GWOT.

• Annex J, Command Relationships:

Describes the supported/supporting 

commander relationship for the GWOT.

• Annex L, Homeland Defense, 

Homeland Security, and Civil Support:

Describes the military’s role in each 

mission area as it relates to the GWOT.

• Annex R, Implementation: Describes 

how DoD will implement, assess, and 

measure progress in the GWOT.

• Annex T, WMD/E: Describes WMD/

E terrorism and the principles for 

combating WMD/E.

NMSP-WOT ANNEXES
29

• Annex V, Interagency Coordination: 

Addresses interagency coordination 

process at the strategic and operational 

levels.

ANNEX C: OPERATIONS

 In addition to articulating classified 

tasks and coordinating instructions for the 

Defense Department, Annex C implements 

the Secretary’s designation of the 

Commander of the United States Special 

Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM) as 

the supported combatant commander for 

planning, synchronizing, and as directed, 

executing global operations against terrorist 

networks. 

 CDRUSSOCOM leads a global 

collaborative planning process leveraging 

other combatant command capabilities 

and expertise that results in decentralized 

execution by both USSOCOM and other 

combatant commands against terrorist 

networks. In this role, USSOCOM’s specific 

responsibilities include:

• Integrating DoD strategy into GWOT 

plans and establishing intelligence 

priorities against terrorist networks;

Leading the development and 

synchronization of plans against 

terrorist networks;

• Prioritizing and synchronizing 

those parts of security cooperation 

activities, deployments, and 

capabilities that support campaigns 

against terrorist networks in 

coordination with geographic 

combatant commanders;

• Exercising command and control of 

CT operations, as directed;

• Providing representation, in addition 

to other military commands, to U.S. 

national and international agencies 

for matters related to United States 

and multinational campaigns against 

terrorist networks;

• Creating, implementing and directing 

global operational preparation of 

the environment (OPE) to integrate 

operations to find, fix, and capture 

terrorists and other High Pay Off 

Targets (HPTs);

• Supporting other combatant 

commanders for operational planning 

as required against terrorist network 

targets;

• Developing and leading a time 

sensitive planning (TSP) process 

to rapidly propose courses of 

action and to provide operational 

recommendations to the Secretary of 

Defense considering the full spectrum 

of military options;

• Interface with national, Military 

Department, and commercial 

laboratories to maintain awareness 

of promising state-of-the-art GWOT 

technology for the warfighter; and

Lead the development of a GWOT 

Intelligence Campaign Plan (ICP) for 

DoD. 

 

ANNEX H: STRATEGIC 

COMMUNICATION

 Violent extremists are using the 

Internet and some mass media as a 

safe haven for organizational support, 

intelligence gathering and offensive 

operations. The organizational uses of 

the Internet include command and control, 

training, dissemination of information 

and ideology, perception management 

and propaganda as well as intelligence 

gathering. Mass media and other 

influence networks are used to deliver 
30

disinformation and propaganda to further 

extremist objectives. Extremists have 

been resourceful and adaptive in using 

information operations in support of their 

own strategic communication strategy to 

gain and maintain ideological support and 

influence key audiences. Because they are 

not constrained to be truthful or accurate, 

they can exploit the information domain 

with considerable effect. At the operational 

and tactical level of extremist networks, 

various centers of gravity exist, including 

key leaders, popular support, organizational 

support (state sponsors and non-state 

supporters) and key operational elements 

of the organization. 

 The U.S. military, in coordination with 

interagency and Coalition partners, will 

support a U.S. Government strategic 

communication strategy for the Global 

War on Terrorism. This strategy will guide 

Public Affairs (PA), Information Operations 

(IO), military support to public diplomacy 

(MSPD), and military diplomacy (MD)

toward GWOT strategic goals. 

 The Defense Department’s strategic 

communication objectives in the GWOT 

are to align Coalition and partner nations 

against violent extremism, provide support 

for moderate voices, dissuade enablers and 

supporters of extremists, deter and disrupt 

terrorist acts, and counter ideological 

support for terrorism. Achieving these 

objectives requires a sustained, proactive 

strategic communication effort. Combatant 

Commanders should harness all strategic 

communication capabilities, including 

public affairs, public diplomacy (military 

support to public diplomacy and military 

diplomacy) and information operations, and 

work with the interagency to implement a 

synergistic strategic communication effort. 

A successful strategic communication 

strategy will insure maximum beneficial 

impact on the perceptions of target 

audiences, capitalize on truthful information, 

and exploit enemy exorbitance.

 The Chairman and Combatant 

Commanders will implement aggressive 

PA, IO, MSPD, and MD plans to support a 

comprehensive strategic communication 

process for the war on terrorism. The U.S. 

military will consider how actions can affect 

the debate between extremists and their 

opponents. The intent is to ensure all areas 

of communication are fully coordinated and 

synchronized, while not subordinating one 

area to another. The lead for coordination 

will depend on the individual commander’s 

mission. Effective planning and execution 

of strategic communication is critical to 

accomplishing the commander’s mission. 

The success depends on sound leadership, 

guidance and organizational rigor. The 

U.S. military will participate, as appropriate, 

at the strategic level (within DoD, with the 

Interagency, and among coalition partners) 

to provide coordinated support for U.S. 

Government efforts to achieve strategic 

communication objectives for the GWOT. 

The DoD elements of strategic 

communication are PA, PD, and IO, as 

shown in figure H-1. The U.S. military 

specific disciplines are also shown; 

military PA, MSPD, MD, and military IO. 

The chart shows the need for integration 

and informed interaction among the four 

disciplines. While some actions occur in 

isolation of the others, it remains key that 

coordination and synchronization take 

Strategic Communication defined as “the 

transmission of integrated and coordinated 

U.S. Government themes and messages that 

advance U.S. interests and policies through 

a synchronized interagency effort supported 

by public diplomacy, public affairs, and 

military information operations, in concert 

with other political, economic, information 

and military actions.”
31

place within and among the four military 

strategic communication disciplines. It 

is important for commanders to consider 

that maximum effectiveness for all aspects 

of strategic communication may rest 

upon a successful public affairs program. 

Roles and responsibilities in the strategic 

communication discipline should be 

assigned with this in mind.

 DoD components will coordinate 

closely with the Department of State and 

other Federal agencies assigned primary 

responsibility for strategic communication, 

to ensure unity of effort. Success relies 

heavily on the close cooperation among 

U.S. Government agencies, Coalition, and 

partner nations to integrate all instruments 

of U.S. and partner national power -- 

diplomatic, information, military, economic, 

financial, intelligence, and law enforcement 

(DIMEFIL)

ANNEX R: IMPLEMENTATION AND 

ASSESSMENT

 The GWOT requires innovative, 

flexible tools and processes for tracking 

the war, assessing the progress of the 

United States and its partner-nations, and 

developing ways to overcome challenges. 

Appendix 1 provides guidance on the 

GWOT Assessment process and Appendix 

2 outlines the metrics used to make the 

assessment. The metrics serve a two-fold 

purpose, first, to measure progress in the 

GWOT via the effectiveness of NMSPWOT strategic framework, and, second, 

to use criteria in the GWOT Assessment 

process to identify issues/shortfalls that 

DoD Strategic Communication Elements

Lead PA PA J5 J3

Leaflets

Commando

Solo

Web

Initiatives

Media

Affairs

Example

Adversaries

&

Associated

Foreign

Audiences

Foreign

Defense

Officials

Foreign

Audiences

US & Foreign

Audiences

Audience

Military

Diplomacy

Military PA

Function

Figure H.1. Notional Guide for Seamless Strategic Communication Elements

MSPD Military IO

PA Diplomacy IO

Coalition

Building

������������ ������ ��� �����������
32

will be subsequently integrated into DoD’s 

Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 

Execution process for resource resolution.

 On a semi-annual basis, Combatant 

Commands, Services, and selected Combat 

Support Agencies (CC/S/SAs) are required 

to assess their progress in the global war 

on terrorism against the system of metrics. 

This semi-annual process measures the 

Department of Defense’s progress in the 

global war on terrorism and identifies issues 

that inhibit progress.

 The metrics for the GWOT provide 

a snapshot of progress in the war and 

feedback on the efficacy of the U.S. 

strategy. When implemented through the 

Assessment process, these metrics will 

be used to revise the U.S. strategy in light 

of lessons from prosecuting the war and 

in response to changes in the enemy’s 

strategy. 

 As outlined in the base plan, the 

metrics reflect an “ends, ways and means” 

approach. The Termination Objective is 

the military end-state, or ‘ends,’ and the 

Military Strategic Objectives in conjunction 

with the three elements of the national 

strategy comprise the ‘ways’ to achieve the 

ends. When the metrics are implemented 

as part of the GWOT Assessment 

process, as described in Appendix 1 of 

this annex, the metrics provide feedback 

to the agencies responsible for supplying 

the ‘means,’ namely the Combatant 

Commands, Services and Combat Support 

Agencies. These metrics are directly 

linked to other DoD processes such as the 

Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 

Execution System (PPB&E), Joint Quarterly 

Figure R-1. GWOT Assessment Process
33

Readiness Review, the CJCS Assessment 

of Risk, the Quadrennial Defense Review 

and the Secretary of Defense’s Balanced 

Scorecard (currently under development). 

ANNEX V: INTERAGENCY 

COORDINATION

 As described elsewhere in this plan, the 

GWOT requires a joint, interagency effort 

in support of a sustained global war plan. 

DoD needs to achieve unprecedented 

levels of coordination (at both the strategic 

and operational levels) to effectively 

deal with this complex requirement and 

accompanying interdependence. This effort 

also requires an end to unilateral “stove 

piping” of actions within departments, 

agencies, and staff directorates. 

 DoD will monitor and guide the 

implementation of this plan through a set of 

processes that include, but are not limited 

to the following: The Joint Staff GWOT 

Federation, CJCS’s GWOT Senior Leader 

Review Board, GWOT Strategic Review, 

and Periodic Secure Video teleconferences 

(SVTCs).

X. GLOSSARY

Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement 

(ACSA). Assigns for controlling the negotiation 

and the conclusion of agreements with foreign 

governments and international organizations by 

personnel of the DoD, its components or other 

organizational elements.

Alliance. An alliance is the result of formal 

agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more 

nations for broad, long-term objectives that 

further the common interests of the members.

Antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce 

the vulnerability of individuals and property to 

terrorist acts, including limited response and 

containment by local military forces.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN). The association is made up of 10 

member states and 12 “dialogue” partners in 

Southeast Asia.

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Consists of 20 

Asian countries and one regional organization 

(European Union), institutionalized as a regional 

security organization with multilateral discussions.

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 

Forum to discuss Asia-Pacific regional economic 

issues.

Assure. A range of actions taken both at home 

and abroad to solidify resolve and demonstrate 

commitment. 

Australia Group (AG). The Australia Group 

(AG) was founded in 1984 in the aftermath of 

the massive use of chemical weapons during 

the Iran-Iraq war. During the 1980s, evidence 

surfaced that several countries, including Iraq, 

were producing chemical weapons using supplies 

from the international trade in chemicals and 

related equipment. Thirty countries participate 

in the AG: Australia, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, 

Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 

Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 

Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the 

Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 

Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, 

Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the United 

States. The AG has no charter or constitution 

and operates by consensus. The group meets 

annually in Paris.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, 

and High Yield Explosives-Consequence 

Management (CBRNE-CM). Essential services 

and activities required for managing or mitigating 

damages or other consequences or problems 

resulting from the employment of CBRNE.

Civil Support (CS). DoD support to U.S. civil 

authorities for domestic emergencies and for 

designated law enforcement and other activities. 
34

Also see Homeland Security and Homeland 

Defense definitions.

Coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or 

more nations for common action.

Combating Terrorism. Actions, including 

antiterrorism (defensive measures taken 

to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and 

counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to 

prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken 

to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat 

spectrum. 

Command, Control, Communication, 

Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance (C4ISR). Term is being 

redefined. Intent is to treat “C4” as “battlespace 

communications” or simply “communications” and 

address “ISR” as “battlespace awareness.” 

Compel. A range of actions taken to achieve a 

change in behavior or activity through the use of 

all instruments of national power.

Computer Network Attack (CNA). Intrusion or 

disruption of computer network.

Computer Network Defense (CND). Defensive 

measures to protect and defend information, 

computers, and networks from disruption, denial, 

degradation, or destruction.

Consequence Management (CM). Actions taken 

to maintain or restore essential services and 

manage and mitigate problems resulting from 

disasters and catastrophes, including natural, 

manmade, or terrorist incidents. 

Contain. Efforts taken to limit freedom of action, 

minimize the effects of terrorist activities, 

preclude the regeneration of lost capabilities, 

and/or limit terrorist influence.

Counterintelligence (CI). Information gathered 

and activities conducted to protect against 

espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, 

or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of 

foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign 

organizations or foreign persons, or international 

terrorist activities.

Counterterrorism (CT). Offensive measure taken 

to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism.

Critical Infrastructures. Designated capabilities, 

facilities and systems considered essential to the 

maintenance of the stability and good order of a 

nation. 

Defeat. Decisive actions taken to render ineffective, 

destroy, or eliminate the capabilities of terrorist 

organizations or their state and non-state 

sponsors.

Defend. Actions taken to deter, preempt, or prevent 

attacks against the homeland. Can include 

conducting preemptive attacks to protect U.S. 

interests.

Destroy. To physically render an entity ineffective 

or incapable of conducting activity unless it is 

reconstituted or regenerated. 

Deter. Actions taken to disrupt, prevent, or preclude 

acts of aggression. Includes preemptive actions 

to unhinge the ability to conduct operations.

Direct Action (DA). Short-duration strikes and 

other small-scale offensive actions by special 

operations forces or special operations capable 

units to seize, destroy, capture, recover or inflict 

damage on designated personnel or materiel.

Disrupt. Actions taken to interrupt, temporarily 

prevent, or desynchronize a terrorist network’s 

capability to conduct operations.

Dissuade. The focused application of all elements 

of national power to convince or persuade an 

organization, state, or non-state entity.

DIMEFIL: Diplomatic, Information, Military, 

Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law 
35

Enforcement instruments of national power 

articulated in the National Strategy for Combating 

Terrorism (February 2003). 

Extremist. Those who (1) oppose -- in principle and 

practice -- the right of people to choose how to 

live and how to organize their societies and (2) 

support the murder of ordinary people to advance 

extremist political purposes. 

Foreign Military Financing (FMF). Congressionally

appropriated funds granted to foreign 

governments to finance the purchase of 

American-made weapons, services and training.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS). That portion of 

U.S. security assistance authorized by the 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 

and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as 

amended. This assistance differs from the 

Military Assistance Program and the International 

Military Education and Training Program in that 

the recipient provides reimbursement for defense 

articles and service transferred.

Fundamentalism. A movement or point of view 

characterized by adherence to fundamental or 

basic principles. Radical Islamic movements 

are frequently referred to in the West as 

fundamentalist, but in fact the use of this term 

is an intellectual error. In a purely scriptural 

sense all Muslims are fundamentalists, since all 

believing Muslims, whether Sunni or Shi’a, hold 

that the Qur’an is the literally revealed word of 

God. Therefore, the word fundamentalist does 

not represent a useful distinction in discussing 

Islam. 

Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT). A broad 

range of products including imagery, imagery 

intelligence, geospatial information, imageryderived MASINT, and imagery-derived products.

Global Information Grid (GIG). A globally 

interconnected, end-to-end set of information 

capabilities, associated processes and personnel 

for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, 

and managing information on demand to 

warfighters, policy makers, and support 

personnel. 

High Pay-Off Target (HPT). A target whose loss 

to the enemy will significantly contribute to the 

success of the friendly course of action. Highpayoff targets are those high-value targets that 

must be acquired and successfully attacked for 

the success of the friendly commander’s mission. 

(JP 3-60)

Homeland Defense (HD). The protection of U.S. 

territory, sovereignty, domestic population and 

critical infrastructure against external threats and 

aggression. Also see Homeland Security and 

Civil Support.

Homeland Security (HS). IAW National Strategy 

for Homeland Security, “Homeland Security is 

a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist 

attacks within the United States, reduce 

America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize 

the damage and recover from attacks that do 

occur.” 

International Military Education and Training 

(IMET). Formal or informal instruction provided 

to foreign military students, units and forces 

on a non-reimbursable (grant) basis by offices 

or employees of the United States, contract 

technicians and contractors.

Isolate. To separate from a larger whole and set 

apart, denying freedom of movement and access 

to external support.

Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET).

Program to train Special Operations Forces.

Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC). 

Provide full-spectrum information to combatant 

commanders.

Madrassa. A building or group of buildings used 

for teaching Islamic theology and religious law, 

typically including a mosque. 
36

Maritime Interception Operation (MIO). The 

capability to conduct vessel boarding/seizure on 

an uncooperative, underway ship suspected of 

carrying contraband.

Military Assistance for Civil Authorities (MACA). 

The broad mission of civil support consisting of 

the three mission subsets of military support to 

civil authorities, military support to civilian law 

enforcement agencies, and military assistance for 

civil disturbances.

Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances 

(MACDIS). A mission set of civil support involving 

Department of Defense support, normally based 

on the direction of the President, to suppress 

insurrections, rebellions, and domestic violence, 

and provide Federal supplemental assistance to 

the states to maintain law and order. 

Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). A 

mission of civil support consisting of support for 

natural or manmade disasters and chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, or high yield 

explosive consequence management, and other 

support as required. 

Moderate. The terms “moderates” or “mainstream,” 

refer to those individuals who do not support 

the extremists. The term “moderate” does 

not necessarily mean unobservant, secular or 

Westernizing. It applies to people who may differ 

from each other and from the average American 

in any number of ways except that they oppose 

the killing of ordinary people.

Multinational. Between two or more forces or 

agencies of two or more nations or coalition 

partners.

Preparation of the Environment (PE). Definition 

for this term can be found in USSOCOM 

Directive 525-5 dated 4 Oct 04 (S/NF).

Partner nation. Countries associated with 

another in some activity or common interest.

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). A 

Presidential initiative focused on the air, ground, 

and maritime interdiction of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD/E), ballistic missiles, and 

related materials/equipment moving to or from 

countries and non-state actors of proliferation 

concern.

Salafism. A movement comprised of Sunni 

extremists who believe they are the only 

correct interpreters of the Qur’an and consider 

moderate or mainstream Muslims to be infidels. 

Salafists seek to convert all Muslims and to 

insure their own fundamentalist version of Islam 

will dominate the world. “Salafi” comes from 

the word “Salaf” which means ancestors in 

Arabic. This worldview holds that the Righteous 

Ancestors were the Prophet, his companions, 

and the Four Caliphs who succeeded him: AbuBakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali (the nephew of the 

Prophet). This movement has influenced the 

rise of Wahhabism.

Security Cooperation (SC). Integrate 

various agencies, U.S. Governmental, 

nongovernmental agencies and allies to create 

a secure environment.

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). An 

agreement, which defines the legal position of a 

visiting military force deployed in the territory of 

a friendly state.

Strategic Communication. The transmission of 

integrated and coordinated U.S. Government 

themes and messages that advance U.S. 

interests and policies through a synchronized 

interagency effort supported by public 

diplomacy, public affairs, and military 

information operations (IO), in concert with 

other political, economic, information and 

military actions.

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 

(SCADA). Over arching system used to control 

and manage functions in various environments.
37

Terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful 

violence or threat of unlawful violence to 

inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to 

intimidate governments or societies in the 

pursuit of goals that are generally political, 

religious, or ideological. The term “terrorist” 

refers to those who conduct terrorist acts.

Terrorist Extremist. An extremist that uses 

terrorism -- the purposeful targeting of 

ordinary people -- to produce fear to coerce 

or intimidate governments or societies in the 

pursuit of political, religious, or ideological 

goals. Extremists use terrorism to impede 

and undermine political progress, economic 

prosperity, the security and stability of the 

international state system, and the future of civil 

society.

Terrorists with global reach - transnational 

terrorists. Terrorist organizations with an 

operational and support network in multiple 

countries that possess the capability to recruit, 

plan, resource, and execute terrorist acts 

worldwide.

Terrorist Treat Integration Center (TTIC). 

Elements of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, 

the DCI’s Counterterrorist Center and the 

Department of Defense will form a Terrorist 

Threat Integration Center to fuse and analyze 

all-source information related to terrorism.

Ungoverned Space. Territory lacking effective, 

organized, and/or responsible governance, 

affording secure sanctuary for illicit criminal 

organizations, terrorist network(s), and/or 

antigovernment paramilitaries. Includes 

under-governed areas within a country with a 

functioning government. Government may be 

witting or unwitting.

Wassenaar Arrangement. The Wassenaar 

Arrangement on Export Controls for 

Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 

Technologies was established in July 1996 

by 33 Participating States. Meetings are held 

in Vienna, Austria, where the Arrangement 

is based. The Participating States of the 

Wassenaar Arrangement are: Argentina, 

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, 

Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 

Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 

Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 

Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of 

Korea, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, 

Slovak 

Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 

Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United 

States.

Weapons of Mass Destruction or Effect 

(WMD/E). WMD/E relates to a broad range 

of adversary capabilities that pose potentially 

devastating impacts. WMD/E includes 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 

and enhanced high explosive weapons as 

well as other, more asymmetrical “weapons.” 

They may rely more on disruptive impact 

than destructive kinetic effects. For example, 

cyber attacks on U.S. commercial information 

systems or attacks against transportation 

networks may have a greater economic or 

psychological effect than a relatively small 

release of a lethal agent. 

(Footnotes)

1

 A key danger in this war is that terrorist extremists 

will obtain and use WMD/E. The 2004 National 

Military Strategy introduces the concept of weapons 

of mass effect (WME) to emphasize the mass 

“effects” of an attack to produce strategic outcomes, 

using other than the standard WMD weapons 

(Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and in 

some cases High Yield Explosives). The term WMD/

E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities 

that pose potentially devastating impacts. The 

enemy can exploit the fear and disruptive impact 

these weapons instill and not just their destructive 

kinetic effects. 

2

 The NMS introduces the concept of weapons of 

mass effect (WME) to emphasize the mass “effects” 

of an attack to produce strategic outcomes, using 
38

other than the standard WMD weapons (Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and in some cases 

High Yield Explosives). The term WMD/E relates 

to a broad range of adversary capabilities that pose 

potentially devastating impacts.