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There is a general perception that Africa is 

trapped in a never-ending cycle of ethnic conflict. 

The Rwandan genocide, Darfur, northern Nigeria, 

CÔte d’Ivoire, and the violent aftermath of the 

controversial Kenyan elections, among other cases, 

seemingly substantiate this perception. As grievances 

accumulate and are defined at the group rather than 

individual level, the motivation for reprisals is never 

ending. The centuries-old inertia behind these animosities, moreover, defies resolution. The seeming 

implication is that Africa’s complicated ethnic diversity leaves the continent perpetually vulnerable 

to devastating internecine conflict. This, in turn, 

cripples prospects for sustained economic progress 

and democratization.

Africa Security Brief

Misinterpreting Ethnic Conflicts in Africa

By Clement Mweyang Aapengnuo

A P u b l i c at i o n o f t h e A f r i c a C e n t e r f o r S t r at e g i c S t u d i e s

◆ Ethnicity is typically not the driving force of African conflicts but a lever used by political leaders to 

mobilize supporters in pursuit of power, wealth, and resources.

◆ Recognizing that ethnicity is a tool and not the driver of intergroup conflict should refocus our conflict 

mitigation efforts to the political triggers of conflict.

◆ Ethnic thinking and mobilization generally emerge from inequitable access to power and resources 

and not from an intrinsic hatred.

◆ Over the medium to long term, defusing the potency of ethnicity for political ends requires a systematic 

civic education strategy that helps build a common national identity, which so many African countries 

still lack.

H i g h l i g h t s

No . 4 / A p r i l 2 0 1 0

Et h n i c i t y, Et h n i c M o b i l i zat i o n , 

an d Co n f l i c t

In fact, ethnicity is typically not the driving 

force of African conflicts but a lever used by politicians to mobilize supporters in pursuit of power, 

wealth, and resources. While the ethnic group is the 

predominant means of social identity formation in 

Africa, most ethnic groups in Africa coexist peacefully with high degrees of mixing through interethnic 

marriage, economic partnerships, and shared values. 

Indeed, if they did not, nearly every village and province in Africa would be a cauldron of conflict.

Ethnicity became an issue in Kenya’s recent elections because of a political power struggle that found 

it useful to fan passions to mobilize support. It was 
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not an autonomous driver of this post-electoral violence, however. While Daniel arap Moi’s 25 years in 

power governing through an ethnic minority–based 

patronage network did imprint group identity on 

Kenyan politics, there are many instances of crossgroup cooperation. Most prominent of these were 

the formation of the Kenya African National Union 

by the Kikuyus and Luos in the 1960s to fight for 

independence and the creation of the National Rainbow Coalition to break the one-party stranglehold 

on power in 2002. Intergroup cooperation, in fact, is 

the norm rather than the exception. Intermarriage 

is common, and many of Kenya’s youth, especially 

in urban areas, grew up identifying as Kenyans first, 

followed by ethnic affiliation. This is not to suggest 

that ethnically based tensions do not persist—rather, 

that the post-election bloodshed in 2007–2008 was 

not an inevitable outburst of sectarian hatred.

In Rwanda, Hutus and Tutsis have intermarried 

to such an extent that they are often not easily distinguished physically. They speak the same language 

and share the same faith. Indeed, ethnic identity was 

closely associated with occupation (farmer or herder) 

and one’s identification could change over time if one 

shifted occupation. Violence in Rwanda has usually 

been over resources and power. Political manipulation of these resource conflicts led to the well-orchestrated 1994 genocide. Politicians, demagogues, and 

the media used ethnicity as a play for popular support 

and as a means of eliminating political opponents 

(both Tutsis and moderate Hutus).

In Ghana, the military government of General 

I.K. Acheampong decided in 1979 to vest all lands in 

the northern region in 4 of the 17 indigenous ethnic 

groups that lived in this area. At the time, the military 

was seeking an endorsement of one-party government. 

Since the proposal was subject to a national referendum, the government needed a “Yes” vote from the 

north to counter a “No” vote from the south. The land 

arrangement was the deal some northern politicians 

cut with the government for their support. The issue 

became a defining moment in the mobilization of ethnic groups such as the Konkomba and Vagla in the 

name of developing their area. The first intercommunal violence began shortly thereafter—and continued 

for the next 15 years, culminating in the Guinea Fowl 

War of 1994–1995 in which some 2,000 people were 

killed. During that time, more than 26 intercommunal 

conflicts over land (resources) and chieftaincy (power) 

occurred in northern Ghana—all characterized as ethnic conflicts.

Such a classification—in Ghana as in many 

other African conflicts—is an oversimplification. 

Indeed, many conflict scholars find the ethnic distinction baseless.1

 Often it is the politicization of 

ethnicity and not ethnicity per se that stokes the 

attitudes of perceived injustice, lack of recognition, 

and exclusion that are the source of conflict. The 

misdiagnosis of African conflicts as ethnic ignores the 

political nature of the issues of contention. People do 

not kill each other because of ethnic differences; they 

kill each other when these differences are promoted 

as the barrier to advancement and opportunity. The 

susceptibility of some African societies to this manipulation by opportunistic politicians, it should be 

noted, underscores the fragility of the nationbuilding 

enterprise on the continent.

In many cases, the political choices made by 

states lay the foundation for ethnic mobilization. In 

other words, “ethnic conflicts” often emerge in multiethnic, underdeveloped societies when the behavior 

of the state is perceived as dominated by a particular group or community within it, when communities feel threatened with marginalization, or when 

no recourse for redressing grievances exists.2 Ethnic 

thinking and mobilization generally emerge from the 

resulting inequitable access to power and resources 

and not from an intrinsic hatred.

Periodic eruptions of violence involving 

Christians and Muslims in Nigeria’s highly diverse 

Father Clement Mweyang Aapengnuo is a Doctoral Student 

in the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at 

George Mason University. He is the former Director of 

the Center for Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies 

in Damongo, Ghana.

“misdiagnosis of African conflicts 

as ethnic ignores the political 

nature of the issues 

of contention”
“middle-belt” Plateau State capital, Jos, are a case 

in point. This violence is usually reported as “communal conflict.” This characterization, however, 

overlooks some of the institutional arrangements 

of Nigeria’s federal system that foster this violence. 

State and local governments have enormous influence in this system, controlling roughly 80 percent 

of the country’s gross domestic product.3 In addition to the implications for resource allocation, local governments are responsible for classifying citizens as “indigenes” or “settlers.” Settlers are banned 

from holding some positions in state government, 

are not eligible for state education subsidies, and 

are restricted from owning land. In Plateau State, 

this translates into Hausa-speaking Muslims being 

classified as settlers even if their families have lived 

in the region for generations. The ongoing and at 

times violent tensions resulting from such an arrangement are predictable.

Inst i t u t i o nal Co nst rai n ts to 

Et h n i c M o b i l i zat i o n

Recognizing that ethnicity is a tool and not 

the driver of intergroup conflict should refocus our 

attention to the political triggers of conflict. That 

there is a mobilization stage in the lead-up to conflict, 

moreover, highlights the value of early interventions 

before ethnic passions are inflamed.

State institutions and structures that reflect ethnic 

diversity and respect for minority rights, power-sharing, and checks and balances reduce the perception of 

injustice and insecurity that facilitates ethnic mobilization. The justice system is key. In societies where 

justice cannot be obtained through public institutions, 

groups are more likely to resort to violence for resolving their grievances. A just society is more than the 

legal system, however. A genuine separation of powers 

and the rule of law are needed to prevent abuses of 

state power. Such measures prevent state functionaries 

from using their powers to benefit their ethnic groups 

to the detriment of other groups. In much of Africa, 

the executive rather than the legislative branch determines most land policies. Invariably, the ethnic 

group of the president benefits from these policies. In 

Kenya, Kikuyus used the political and economic leverage available to them during Kenyatta’s regime to form 

land-buying companies that facilitated the settlement 

of hundreds of thousands of Kikuyus in the Rift Valley 

during the 1960s and 1970s.4

An even-handed legal system also creates space 

for civil society organizations to coalesce around issues of common concern, such as development, accountability, and human rights transcending ethnic 

affiliations. This, in turn, facilitates exchanges between groups. Business associations, trade and professional associations, sports clubs, and artist groups, 

among others, are all civil society organizations that 

can cut across ethnic lines and engage government 

in productive ways.

Electoral systems and elections constitute another 

area of policy focus. Elections on their own do not necessarily lay the foundation for stability. On the contrary, 

they can be a source of ethnic tensions and violence. 

The practice of winner-takes-all electoral outcomes 

in a multiethnic and underdeveloped state where the 

government controls the bulk of resources in a society makes winning an election a life-and-death issue. 

Accordingly, it is important that electoral systems are 

independent of political control. One of the differences 

between Kenya’s and Ghana’s recent elections was the 

independence and resilience of the Ghanaian electoral 

commission. Furthermore, once the Electoral Commission in Ghana has validated electoral results, private 

groups then have the right to challenge irregularities in 

the courts. These multiple levels of accountability gave 

Ghanaians confidence in their electoral system despite 

a very close 2008 election.

Ghana’s Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) provides another useful 

institutional mechanism for mitigating ethnic conflict. 

Backed by a constitutional act (Act 456), CHRAJ 

was mandated in 1993 to “investigate complaints of 

violations of fundamental rights and freedoms in both 

public and private sectors, investigate complaints of 

administrative injustice, abuse of power and unfair 

treatment of any person by a public officer in the 

exercise of official duties.” The commission was also 

mandated to “educate the public on their fundamental 

rights and freedoms and their responsibilities towards 

each other.” For the first time, Ghanaians could take 

government to task and have their grievances addressed immediately at the local level. Coming out 

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of 12 years of military rule and entering a new democratic dispensation, the formation of the commission 

was timely. Apart from the constitutional mandate, 

funding was committed to support CHRAJ offices at 

the national, regional, and district levels. The fact that 

the commissioner was independent of executive influence gave the commission enormous credibility. It is 

also what distinguishes the CHRAJ from similar commissions in other countries. Since its inception, the 

commission has handled high-profile cases involving 

government ministers, unlawful dismissals involving 

the Inspector General of Police, and the confiscation 

of people’s assets. In each of these high-profile cases, 

the court ruled in favor of the commission.

Religious bodies and local nongovernmental 

organizations have disseminated CHRAJ messages 

to the grassroots through workshops, seminars, and 

support for communities with grievances to present 

their case to the commission. With this infrastructure, education, and resources in place, Ghanaians 

have come to appreciate the value of the rule of law 

and the timely response to their grievances at the 

community, district, and regional levels.

P r i o r i t i es f o r M i t i gat i n g Et h n i c 

Co n f l i c t i n A f r i ca

Reframing ethnic conflicts as political competitions for power and resources should shift how we 

think about mitigation strategies. Rather than accepting identity conflict as an inevitable feature of 

Africa’s highly diverse ethnic landscape, a number 

of preventative policy interventions can be pursued.

Build Unifying Institutional Structures. At the 

core of ethnic conflicts is the relationship between 

ethnic groups and the state in the search for security, 

identity, and recognition. How the state negotiates 

these interests and needs will determine the level of 

identity conflicts. A comprehensive legal system that 

respects minority rights, protects minorities from the 

abuse of state power, and ensures that their grievances 

are taken seriously will reduce opportunities for ethnic mobilization. Among other things, this requires 

equitable access to civil service jobs and the various 

services the state provides. Key among these state 

functions is minority participation within the leadership and ranks of the security sector. The military 

can be a unifying institution, creating bonds between 

ethnic groups, helping to forge a national identity 

for all ethnicities, providing youth an opportunity 

to travel and live throughout the nation, and allowing minorities to advance to positions of leadership 

through merit. Diversity in the security sector also 

has tangible benefits as ethnically representative police forces are linked with lower levels of conflict in 

diverse societies.5

Elections are another flashpoint of ethnic grievances—and therefore a priority for mitigating violence. Elections present clear opportunities for politicians to play on ethnic differences. Establishing an 

independent, representative electoral commission led 

by individuals with impeccable integrity can circumscribe these ploys. As seen in Ghana and elsewhere, 

the effectiveness of a competent electoral commission 

can make an enormous difference in averting ethnic 

violence. Independent electoral commissions can also 

establish electoral rules that reward candidates for 

building cross-regional and intergroup coalitions—

and indeed require them to do so. Ensuring electoral 

jurisdictions do not coincide with ethnic boundaries 

is one component of such a strategy.

Ghana’s experience with the CHRAJ provides 

further lessons for institutional responses to mitigate 

ethnic tension. The CHRAJ provided an accessible 

government entity responsible for documenting and 

reconciling ethnic grievances. Creating variants of 

the CHRAJ in other African countries would thus 

be a point of first contact for minority groups who 

believe that they have been aggrieved. Such a human rights commission would then be empowered 

to serve as something of an ombudsman for investigating and remedying intergroup conflicts at the local level. It would be granted access and convening 

authority to draw on the assets of all other government entities that may have a role in resolving the 

grievance. In this way, the human rights ombudsman 

“diversity in the security sector 

also has tangible benefits as 

ethnically representative police 

forces are linked with lower levels 

of conflict”

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would be an official mechanism to which individuals and communities could proactively go to resolve 

intergroup differences. Given the nature of its work 

and the requirement to gain the trust and support of 

local populations, representatives of the human rights 

ombudsman would need to be accessible at the local 

level in all potentially volatile regions of a country.

Reinforcing Positive Social Norms. Over the 

medium to long term, defusing the potency of ethnicity for political ends requires reorienting cultural 

norms. Social marketing campaigns that promote national unity, intergroup cooperation, and “strength 

through diversity” themes can help frame the ethnic 

narrative in a positive light, thereby making it more 

difficult for divisive politicians to play on differences 

to mobilize support. Such a communications strategy 

would be complemented by a country-wide, community-level outreach campaign implemented by civil 

society organizations that targets youth reinforcing 

messages of “one country, one people,” tolerance for 

other groups, and nonviolent conflict resolution.

Targeting youth is particularly important for 

breaking intergenerational attitudes regarding ethnicity. Youth is the population group most easily mobilized to violence. A comprehensive and deliberate 

educational system designed to promote integration 

and coexistence with emphasis on civic lessons on 

citizenship and what it means to be a nation will foster this concept of a common people with a common 

destiny. A social marketing campaign also brings this 

unifying message directly to the people rather than 

relying on ethnic or political leaders (who may be 

benefiting from the perceived divisions). This campaign, paralleling the successful efforts of legendary 

Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere, would simultaneously help build a common national identity (which 

so many African countries still lack) while taking the 

ethnicity card off the table for political actors.

Complementing efforts to shift cultural and political norms surrounding identity, sanctions need to 

be created and applied to those actors who continue 

to attempt to exploit ethnic differences toward divisive ends. Two groups are critical here: the media and 

politicians. Penalties would take the form of a national law criminalizing the incitement of ethnic differences by political actors and public officials. These 

laws then need to be enforced. An independent body, 

whether the electoral commission or a human rights 

council along the lines of Ghana’s CHRAJ, would be 

given responsibility for investigating charges of ethnic incitement—and the authority to assess penalties 

including fines and bans from holding public office. 

The symbolism generated from a few highly publicized cases would go far toward shifting these norms.

The media also play a unique role in communicating information and impressions in society. As 

such, they have an indispensible function in a democracy to foster dialogue and debate. Unfortunately, 

in practice, it is common in Africa for certain media 

outlets to be controlled by politically influential individuals who are willing to whip up identity divisions 

to support their interests—greatly elevating the potential for ethnic conflict. Media also have the potential to escalate a local conflict to the national level—

raising the stakes for violence as well as complicating 

the task of resolution. Given the unique potential 

that media have for shaping social attitudes and 

mass mobilization, most societies accept that media 

must meet certain standards for responsible behavior. 

These standards should include prohibitions against 

programming that incites ethnically based animosity. 

Again, independent monitoring bodies, possibly in 

collaboration with national media consortia, should 

be given the authority to quickly investigate and enact tough sanctions against outlets deemed to have 

violated these standards against hate mongering.

Early Response. A key lesson learned from experience in preventing and quelling ethnic tensions 

in Africa is the value of addressing these issues sooner 

rather than later. Tamping down these tensions is 

more feasible—and less costly in social and financial 

terms—if it occurs before intergroup divisions have 

been mobilized and violence ensues (which, in turn, 

sets off a new and more polarized cycle of grievance, 

fear, distrust, and retaliation). It also underscores 

the importance of government officials taking every 

“targeting youth is particularly 

important for breaking 

intergenerational attitudes 

regarding ethnicity”
expressed struggle by groups seriously (for example, 

claims of discrimination, denigration, or denial of 

rights) and responding immediately. This, of course, 

presupposes that the government is competent and 

willing to deal with these conflicts and is not a party 

to the grievance in the first place. The creation of a 

human rights ombudsman that is seen as an impartial 

actor that will document and investigate ethnically 

based claims provides the dual benefit of a mechanism 

that addresses these claims fairly and can help defuse 

tensions before they boil over. Belief that there is a 

systematic means by which one’s grievances can be 

fairly addressed reduces the likelihood that individuals will feel the need to take corrective measures into 

their own hands.

Finally, preventing ethnic tensions from escalating out of control requires a rapid response capacity within the security sector to respond when 

intergroup clashes occur. These police and military 

forces must be trained to respond in an even-handed yet assertive manner that builds confidence in 

the state’s capacity to intervene constructively. As 

most ethnic violence occurs at a local level—along 

a faultline bordering neighboring communities—

the value of a rapid response before other triggers 

are tripped is vital. The local nature of these ethnic triggers also points to the need for broad-based 

training of the security forces. Every local police 

jurisdiction needs to have the awareness and capacity to respond in such ethnically charged contexts 

as they will likely be the first responders. They, in 

turn, can be backed up by military forces (most 

likely from a provincial level) that will, in most 

cases, have better transport, communications, and 

firepower to bring a situation under control. However, the initial response by the police is critical in 

shaping the trajectory of that confrontation.

There is a human tendency to reinforce intergroup differences. Civilized societies learn ways to 

prevent these impulses from becoming polarized and 

turning violent. Understanding the political roots 

of many of Africa’s ethnic clashes can help us focus 

and redirect our conflict prevention efforts—and in 

the process enhance the effectiveness of our growing 

toolkit of corrective measures.

No t es

1 Bruce Gilley, “Against the Concept of Ethnic Conflict,” 

Third World Quarterly 25, no. 6 (2004).

2

 Edward E. Azar and Robert F. Haddad, “Lebanon: An 

Anomalous Conflict?” Third World Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1986).

3 Philip Ostien, “Jonah Jang and the Jasawa: Ethno-Religious 

Conflict in Jos, Nigeria,” Muslim-Christian Relations in Africa, 

Sharia in Africa Research Project, August 2009, available at 

<www.sharia-in-africa.net/media/publications/ethno-religiousconflict-in-Jos-Nigeria/Ostien_Jos.pdf>.

4 Walter Oyugi, “Politicized Ethnic Conflict in Kenya: A Periodic Phenomenon,” Government of Kenya, 2002.

5

 Nicholas Sambanis, “Preventing violent civil conflict: The 

scope and limits of government action,” 2002, background paper 

for the World Development Report 2003: Dynamic Development in 

a Sustainable World (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2003).

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