ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 305 1 

I

n March 2018, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi responded to a question 

about the Donald Trump administration’s new “free and open Indo-Pacific” 

strategy by comparing it to “sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean” that 

might get some attention, “but soon will dissipate.”1 Wang’s remarks raise an 

important question for U.S. policymakers: Is Beijing so confident in its own 

influence, and doubtful of U.S. commitments in the region, that it perceives a 

green light to continue or expand the kinds of behavior Washington is trying to 

discourage, such as coercion of China’s territorial rivals and “predatory” lending?

The question takes on added significance in the context of Chinese perceptions of a United States in relative decline following the 2008 global financial 

crisis. The view that Washington was no longer able or willing to stand up to 

China may have contributed to more assertive Chinese policies over the last 

decade. For instance, Beijing’s discounting of some U.S. commitments under the 

Barack Obama administration’s “rebalance to Asia” strategy may have contributed to China’s controversial land reclamation program in the South China Sea.2

Some regional observers are now concerned that Beijing will exploit Washington’s lackluster response to the 2019–20 novel coronavirus to further expand its 

influence across Asia.3

Nevertheless, a review of Chinese assessments of the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy over the last 3 years reveals that Beijing is not as dismissive of U.S. prospects in the region as Wang’s comments suggest. After a brief 

review of the origins and contents of the strategy, this paper discusses Chinese 

perspectives on two levels. At the official level, Beijing has already developed 

a counternarrative that raises doubts about U.S. motives and portrays China 

as more in tune with the region’s interests and sensibilities. At the unofficial 

level, influential Chinese civilian and military analysts have focused greatly on 

Just Another Paper Tiger? 

Chinese Perspectives on the 

U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy

By Joel Wuthnow

STRATEGIC FORUM

National Defense University

About the Author

Dr. Joel Wuthnow is a Senior Research 

Fellow in the Center for the Study of 

Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, at National 

Defense University.

Key Points

◆ Chinese officials have responded 

to the U.S. “free and open IndoPacific” strategy through a regional counternarrative that raises 

doubts about the motives and 

sustainability of U.S. leadership in 

Asia while presenting China as a 

partner of choice.

◆ Chinese analysts perceive the 

Indo-Pacific strategy as a form of 

containment based on stronger 

U.S. relations with Japan, India, 

and Australia. They assess that, 

if left unchecked, the strategy 

will reduce China’s influence and 

increase regional tensions.

◆ Chinese observers identify weak 

regional support as the primary 

constraint on U.S. strategy in 

Asia and advocate responding by 

improving China’s own relations 

throughout the neighborhood.

◆ U.S. messaging needs to offer 

assurances of U.S. commitments 

and evidence of regional contributions. These messages should be 

regularly reinforced in regional 

gatherings, even those hosted by 

China.

◆ Washington needs to maintain 

key relationships in the region but 

need not respond in kind to every 

Chinese overture. The strategy 

may also create new opportunities 

to negotiate with China on certain 

issues from a position of strength.

June 2020

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CHINESE MILITARY AFFAIRS
2 SF No. 305 ndupress.ndu.edu

the quadrilateral dialogue and U.S. relations with India, 

Japan, and Australia, confirming prior Chinese concerns 

about strategic encirclement; expressed deep concerns 

about the motives and ramifications of the strategy for 

Chinese interests; and identified regional ambivalence 

toward U.S. objectives as the main constraint that may be 

exploited to minimize risks. Their conclusion is that China should take advantage of that weakness by redoubling 

its own regional economic and diplomatic initiatives.

The final section of this paper argues that U.S. policymakers will have to contend with all aspects of China’s 

response: regional countermessaging, additional investments in programs such as Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road 

Initiative (BRI), and China’s changing relations with 

other pivotal countries, including India, Japan, and Australia. It is also possible—though far from a foregone 

conclusion—that Beijing’s refocusing on neighborhood diplomacy as a way to prevent the emergence of 

an anti-China balancing coalition could imply a modest, 

if temporary, reduction in overt Chinese saber-rattling 

and predatory lending. Such moves, if they occur, would 

be evidence that the U.S. strategy is achieving some of 

its near-term objectives. Nevertheless, Washington will 

have to consider the implications of China’s responses to 

U.S. influence in the region and be clear-eyed about the 

limits of Chinese restraint.

An Evolving U.S. Strategy in the 

Indo-Pacific Region

A renewal of U.S. strategic focus on Asia dates to 

the mid-2000s, with the George W. Bush administration’s pursuit of bilateral free trade agreements, initial negotiations on a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a shift 

of military assets to the region, and attempts to encourage stronger collaboration between U.S. allies (departing from the “hub-and-spokes” alliance model inherited 

from the Cold War). These policies were designed to 

strengthen the pillars of regional order, prevent China 

from “making a bid for hegemony,”4

 and address other 

challenges, such as terrorism and North Korea’s nuclear 

development. Driven by similar goals, the Obama administration continued this approach, which it relabeled 

as the Asian “rebalance” or “pivot.”5 Some of the unique 

achievements of the rebalance included signing an enhanced defense cooperation agreement with the Philippines, dispatching a U.S. Ambassador to the Association 

of Southeast Asian Nations for the first time, and increasing U.S. aid to Southeast Asia through the Lower 

Mekong Initiative.6

The Trump administration’s approach is largely consistent with this reweighting of the region’s importance 

for U.S. interests. At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation CEO summit in Da Nang, Vietnam, in November 2017, President Trump identified the United States 

as a Pacific power and discussed the need to uphold the 

principles of a “free and open” regional order, such as 

the rule of law, individual rights, and freedom of navigation, which have supported economic growth, while 

also renegotiating free trade agreements to reflect the 

principles of “fairness and reciprocity.”7 U.S. officials, including Trump and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, also 

highlighted India’s role in promoting regional growth 

and advancing democratic norms.8 This contributed to 

the adoption of the term Indo-Pacific (which originated 

among Australian scholars earlier in the century) rather 

than the narrower Asia-Pacific, but reflected consistency 

in U.S. policy: both Bush and Obama courted India as a 

valued partner.9

Trump coupled his positive vision for regional order 

with a diagnosis of the problem that emphasized Chinese policies and actions, including intellectual property 

theft, massive industrial subsidies, and corporate espionage, which reduced U.S. competitiveness. His administration’s National Security Strategy, released in December 2017, followed by the Department of Defense’s 

2018 National Defense Strategy, put more weight on 

strategic competition with China, in contrast with the 

previous two administrations that had emphasized a 

mix of balancing and cooperation to steer Beijing in a 

more positive direction.10 In various speeches throughout 2018 and 2019, U.S. officials expanded their critique 

of China’s behavior, focusing on region-wide problems 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 305 3 

associated with Xi’s BRI, such as “debt trap diplomacy,” 

the use of Chinese labor in building overseas infrastructure projects, and perceived exporting of authoritarian 

ideology.11

The primary tools associated with the strategy reflect both continuity with and change from the IndoPacific strategy of previous administrations. Concluding 

free trade agreements with countries such as Japan and 

South Korea continued a long-term pattern, but abandoning the TPP was a major deviation. U.S. officials 

reaffirmed the importance of treaty alliances and partnerships with Southeast Asian countries, while placing 

more attention on states such as Sri Lanka, Mongolia, 

and the Federated States of Micronesia.12 Trump also revived the U.S.-Japan-Australia-India quadrilateral dialogue, which was originally held in 2007, expanding its 

focus and upgrading it to ministerial status.13 In addition, 

his administration continued U.S. Navy–led freedom of 

navigation operations in the South China Sea that previous administrations had used to challenge China’s excessive territorial claims, but reportedly granted the military 

more authority to determine how, when, and where those 

operations would be conducted.14

Given concerns about the BRI, a hallmark of the 

new U.S. strategy was identifying alternative forms of 

infrastructure assistance. In July 2018, Secretary of State 

Michael Pompeo announced a $113 million “down payment” on U.S. investments in the digital economy, energy, and infrastructure sectors.15 In October 2018, Trump 

signed the BUILD Act, which raised the ceiling on U.S. 

development financing from $29 billion to $60 billion. 

The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation was established at the end of 2019 to manage these 

funds, a large (but unstated) share of which would be devoted to Indo-Pacific projects.16 Moreover, in November 

2018, the U.S. Government signed a memorandum with 

its Japanese and Australian counterparts to create a new 

partnership designed to provide financing for projects 

that “adhere to international standards and principles for 

development,” an implicit critique of Chinese projects 

viewed as falling short of those standards.17

A more complete view of the Indo-Pacific strategy 

appeared in 2019 when both the Defense and State departments detailed their approaches to the region (see 

table). The Defense Department’s Indo-Pacific Strategy 

Report, which was released in June to coincide with the 

annual Shangri-La Dialogue, illuminated how the acquisition and deployment of advanced capabilities, new 

operational concepts, and initiatives to strengthen security partnerships (highlighting Taiwan, New Zealand, 

and Mongolia) would contribute to the preservation of 

a “free and open” region and dissuade Chinese adventurism.18 In November, the State Department issued A 

Free and Open Indo-Pacific, which documented a wide 

range of diplomatic, economic, and security programs.19

In short, U.S. speeches and official documents gradually articulated an interagency strategy to strengthen the 

regional order and respond to challenges from China, 

largely continuing goals from previous administrations 

while adding in some unique elements.

U.S. scholars have paid close attention to the diplomatic and resource limitations that may constrain the 

Indo-Pacific strategy, including the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the TPP, contentious cost-sharing 

negotiations with allies, inadequate reallocation of U.S. 

financial resources to the region, proposed cuts to State 

Department and U.S. Agency for International Development funding, and a force structure that has remained 

static in some ways despite a gradual shifting of air and 

naval assets to the region.20 Nevertheless, U.S. observers 

have paid less attention to China’s perspectives.21 This is 

a notable gap because Chinese concerns may influence 

responses that demand further U.S. resource commitments or reduce the strategy’s effectiveness. The following discussions probe Chinese views at both the official 

and unofficial levels.

China’s Regional Counternarrative

Since the end of 2017, Chinese Foreign Ministry 

and Ministry of National Defense spokespersons, along 

with senior Chinese officials, have addressed the IndoPacific strategy on several occasions.22 The tone of these 
4 SF No. 305 ndupress.ndu.edu

Table. Indo-Pacific Strategy Lines of Effort: State Department vs. Defense Department

responses has been low key, except for contentious rebuttals to direct U.S. criticisms of Chinese policies, such 

as those contained in the National Defense Strategy or 

comments by senior U.S. military officials.23 The lack of 

more provocative statements in most cases suggests that 

Chinese officials are seeking to avoid a rhetorical confrontation with the United States that would not be well 

received in the region, where appetite for an escalating 

U.S.-China rivalry is low.24 Instead, Chinese messaging 

has attempted to create fissures between Washington 

and its allies and partners by raising doubts about U.S. 

motives and commitments while positioning China as a 

partner of choice.25

Four themes in Chinese messaging support this 

larger regional counternarrative. First are accusations of 

U.S. ulterior motives. In September 2018, Vice Foreign 

Minister Le Yucheng stated that China is “firmly against 

[U.S.] attempts to use the Indo-Pacific strategy as a tool 

to counter the BRI or even contain China.”26 In June 2019, 

the Chinese ambassador to India similarly argued that the 

Indo-Pacific Strategy Report’s labeling of China as a “revisionist power . . . can hardly stop people from concluding 

that the real agenda of the [United States] is to contain 

the rise of China.”27 In August 2019, a Foreign Ministry 

spokesman accused the United States of promoting the 

strategy to “drive a wedge” between China and its neighState Department, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific Defense Department, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

Line of Effort Examples Line of Effort Examples

Engaging Partners and 

Regional Institutions

Pacific Pledge ($100M), 

Lower Mekong Initiative 

($3.8B), Taiwan Arms Sales 

($10B), India Defense 

Sales ($16B)

Preparedness Purchases of fifthgeneration aircraft, 

long-range anti-ship 

missiles, offensive 

cyber capabilities, new 

operating concepts

Enhancing Economic 

Prosperity

International 

Development Finance 

Corporation ($60B), 

Millennium Challenge 

Corporation ($2.3B), 

U.S.-Japan Free Trade 

Agreement, Blue Dot 

Network

Partnerships Strengthen five treaty 

alliances, expand 

partnerships with Taiwan, 

New Zealand, Mongolia; 

emerging partnerships 

with South Asia/Pacific 

Island nations

Championing Good 

Governance

Transparency Initiative 

($600M), Myanmar 

Humanitarian Assistance 

($669M)

Promoting a Networked 

Region 

Quad, trilateral 

partnerships, ASEAN 

engagement, support for 

intra-Asian partnerships

Ensuring Peace and 

Stability

Southeast Asia Maritime 

Security Initiative 

($356M), Bay of Bengal 

Initiative, U.S. Coast Guard 

Engagement, Explosives 

removal in Vietnam 

($340M)

Investing in Human 

Capital

Fulbright Fellowships, 

Young Southeast Asian 

Leaders Initiative, Food 

for Peace Program 

($500M)
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 305 5 

bors through a “selfish beggar-thy-neighbor approach in 

economic affairs while making military deployments and 

strengthening military allies in the region.”28

Second is discounting regional support for U.S. 

goals and policies. This is evident in Wang Yi’s March 

2018 comparison of the purported attempts by the 

United States and its Quad partners to “contain” China 

to “sea foam in the Pacific or Indian oceans” that would 

soon dissipate because “stoking a new Cold War is out 

of sync with the times and inciting bloc confrontation 

will find no market.”29 In June 2019, a Foreign Ministry spokesman responded to Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan’s Shangri-La Dialogue speech 

by stating that “development and win-win cooperation 

is an unstoppable trend of the times and the shared aspiration of people all over the world. . . . [B]y hyping 

up military undertones and confrontation, a country 

will only end up hurting itself.”30 The Defense Ministry 

spokesman’s response to the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report 

likewise stated that “any strategy that only satisfies the 

interests of one party will have little support and will 

hurt the interests of all in the end.”31

Supporting this theme, Chinese officials have construed the policies of other states as out of step with the 

competitive nature of the U.S. strategy. In September 

2018, Le Yucheng stated that “there are various versions 

of [an] Indo-Pacific strategy,” and China is open to any 

that “will help regional development and cooperation.”32

The next month, China’s ambassador to India characterized Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Shangri-La 

Dialogue speech as constituting a separate “Indo-Pacific 

policy” that is “not aimed at any country,” but rather 

“advocates open, inclusive, and rule-based cooperation, 

with which the Chinese side also agrees.”33 In September 

2019, Wang Yi met with the co-chair of Nepal’s Communist Party, who—likely at China’s behest—stated that 

Nepal “firmly disagrees with the so-called Indo-Pacific 

Strategy, and opposes any attempt to contain or thwart 

China’s development.”34 This appears to have been the 

first attempt by China to enlist proxies to validate its 

own arguments against the U.S. strategy.

Third are allusions to the inability of the U.S. Government to fully resource its strategy. In August 2018, Wang 

Yi responded to a question about Pompeo’s announcement of a $113 million down payment on Indo-Pacific 

development by stating that “when I first heard this figure of $113 million I thought I heard wrong. At least it 

should be 10 times higher, for a superpower with a $16 

trillion [gross domestic product].”35 A Foreign Ministry 

spokesman also raised implicit doubts about the strength 

of U.S. commitments to the region’s future by commenting, “We hope that they can make substantial financial 

contributions and take more concrete steps to truly contribute to the welfare of the people in the region.”36

Fourth is portraying China as a magnanimous power 

willing to support policies that advance regional development. Commenting on the quadrilateral dialogue, a Foreign Ministry spokesman stated in November 2017 that 

China is “glad to see relevant countries develop friendly 

and cooperative relations,” as long as they do not target “a third country.”37 In August 2018, Wang Yi stated, 

“If the [United States] wants to help regional countries 

with faster development and enhanced security, I think 

these moves should be welcomed.”38 On another occasion, a Foreign Ministry spokesman likewise stated that 

if the United States and its partners are able to increase 

spending on regional infrastructure, “we welcome that 

with an open and inclusive attitude.”39 Part of the Defense Ministry spokesman’s response to the Indo-Pacific 

Strategy Report was to note that “China upholds that all 

countries, while seeking their own interests, should also 

pursue common benefits and jointly build a community 

of shared future.”40

In sum, Chinese statements on the Indo-Pacific 

strategy do not support an interpretation of Beijing as 

“nonchalant” about the direction of U.S. strategy, as one 

Australian-Chinese scholar argued in a Survival article.41

Rather, Wang Yi’s “sea foam” remarks and other official 

statements can be seen as part of a larger counternarrative raising questions about the motives, sustainability, 

and implications of the U.S. strategy, while positioning 

China as more in tune with the region’s sensibilities. 
6 SF No. 305 ndupress.ndu.edu

Communicating this message to a regional audience in 

different venues over 2 years constitutes an active attempt to weaken support for U.S. policy and justify China’s own initiatives. This could signal a concern that, if 

successful, the Indo-Pacific strategy will undermine Chinese interests, in particular by strengthening the resolve 

of states to join with the United States to oppose China 

on the BRI, reject China’s territorial claims, or advance 

other unwanted policies.

China’s Strategic Discourse on 

U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy

At the unofficial level, Chinese scholars have assessed the Indo-Pacific strategy from many angles and 

have deliberated on how China should respond. The 

following review of 30 Chinese assessments published 

between 2018 and 2019 demonstrates a common narrative among influential government think tank analysts 

and university scholars, who focus much of their attention on the Quad countries, with some attention to U.S. 

partnerships with Southeast Asia and Taiwan and U.S. 

infrastructure assistance; assert that the main purposes 

of the Indo-Pacific strategy are to contain China and oppose the BRI; and identify weaknesses affecting the U.S. 

ability to execute the strategy, most notably lukewarm 

support among regional countries. This narrative leads to 

prescriptions that focus on enhancing China’s attractiveness as a partner of choice via BRI investments and other 

regional outreach.42

A Heavy “Quad” Focus. Compared with the broad 

scope of the Indo-Pacific strategy outlined in U.S. Government sources, Chinese analysts myopically focus on 

the quadrilateral dialogue and various tri- and bilateral 

interactions involving the United States, Japan, Australia, and India (see figure 1). The dialogue itself was the 

most common attribute associated with the strategy, appearing in 26 sources (87 percent). Ye Hailin, director 

of South Asian studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, describes a November 2017 quadrilateral 

meeting in Manila as a “significant event” in the IndoPacific strategy and “pre-production work” in developing strategic cooperation between those states.43 Most 

Chinese sources contend that Washington is driving the 

dialogue, but a minority hold that Japan and Australia 

are using it to keep the United States actively involved 

in Asia.44 At the trilateral level, Ye notes that coordination among U.S., Japanese, and Australian development 

finance institutions represents a nascent attempt to counter the BRI.45 He also assesses the annual U.S.-JapanIndia Malabar military exercise as increasingly combatfocused, with participating forces standard for “a low 

intensity war.”46

Chinese sources also highlight bilateral developments between the United States and its Quad partners. 

References to the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Australia alliances and the U.S.-India partnership appear more frequently 

than references to the other three U.S. alliances (with the 

Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand). Of 

these, the greatest attention has been on U.S.-India relations, appearing in 19 sources (63 percent). Chinese 

analysts are especially focused on developments in military cooperation between Washington and New Delhi, 

including the U.S. sale to India of 22 Sky Guardian unmanned aerial vehicles in June 2017, the first to a nonally;47 pledges to increase defense cooperation during 

Modi’s July 2017 U.S. visit;48 and frequent exchanges 

between the two countries’ defense ministers.49 People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) interlocutors were also interested in the September 2018 U.S.-India Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement, which will 

provide New Delhi with greater access to U.S. defense 

items and could permit greater interoperability between 

U.S. and Indian forces.50

Some analysts expand their view of the Indo-Pacific strategy to include other issues. U.S. Navy freedom of 

navigation operations in the South China Sea are among 

the most commonly cited military features of the strategy, appearing in almost half of the articles.51 Scholars 

argue that their increasing frequency, occurrence near 

Chinese-occupied features, and greater authority granted to military officials under Trump reflect a bolder use 

of this tool.52 U.S. partnerships in Southeast Asia are 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 305 7 

discussed in nine sources (30 percent). An article by two 

PLA scholars, for instance, argues that the weakening 

of the U.S.-Philippine alliance under President Rodrigo 

Duterte has led the Trump administration to cultivate 

Hanoi as a new “regional thug” (地区打手) to confront 

Beijing in the South China Sea.53 Taiwan also appears in 

a few sources (5, 17 percent) that associate recent congressional legislation such as the Taiwan Travel Act and 

the Taiwan-related language in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act with the strategy.54

While Chinese assessments typically focus on the 

political and military features of the Indo-Pacific strategy, analysts have also paid increasing attention to its economic contours. Aspects of the strategy related to infrastructure development appear in 17 articles (57 percent), 

while other economic tools such as free trade agreements 

appear in 12 (40 percent). Some discussions, as noted, 

reference economic coordination within the quadrilateral 

dialogue or between the United States and its Quad partners. More recent assessments discuss the restructuring 

of the U.S. development finance bureaucracy and the allocation of $60 billion in infrastructure financing under 

the BUILD Act.55 Interviews with Chinese civilian analysts at the end of 2018 suggested that these initiatives—

more so than the $113 million “down payment” earlier 

announced by Pompeo—were regarded as key parts of 

the U.S. strategy; one interlocutor stated this signaled 

that Washington was “serious in developing a whole-ofgovernment strategy.”56

Causes for Concern. Despite protestations of U.S. 

officials to the contrary, containment is the motive that 

Chinese strategists most frequently ascribe to the IndoPacific strategy.57 Of the 26 articles that provide a view 

on this topic, 22 (85 percent) use some version of the 

argument that the United States is harnessing its military deployments and relations with countries around 

China’s periphery to limit China’s economic growth 

and military options, thereby preserving its own hegemonic status in the regional order.58 There is often little elaboration of this perspective, suggesting that the 

argument is so widely accepted that none is required. 

Closely associated is the perception that U.S. strategy 

under Trump has been redesigned to constrain the BRI 

by circulating an “anti-BRI” message and identifying 

Figure 1. Perceived Geographic Focus of Strategy (n=30)

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Quadrilateral Mechanism

U.S.-Japan Alliance

U.S.-Australia Alliance

U.S.-Philippines Alliance

U.S.-ROK Alliance

U.S.-Thai Alliance

U.S.-India Partnership

U.S.-Southeast Asia Partnerships

U.S.-Taiwan Relations

% of Articles
8 SF No. 305 ndupress.ndu.edu

alternative sources of infrastructure financing. This argument appears in some form in 16 articles (62 percent). 

By contrast, only a small group of scholars (23 percent) 

acknowledge that there are also significant domestic 

economic goals motivating U.S. strategy.59

The quadrilateral dialogue and U.S. relations with 

Japan, Australia, and India figure prominently in Chinese characterizations of U.S. strategy as a containment 

plot.60 Geographically, it is not lost on Chinese observers that the Quad countries occupy important positions 

across China’s eastern, southern, and western flanks or 

that these countries tend to align with the United States 

on matters such as opposing China’s expansive territorial 

claims, confirming prior narratives about U.S. attempts to 

orchestrate an Asian North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

One article even suggests that the United States is building a “strategic linkage” (战略联动) between the Quad 

and U.S. allies in the North Atlantic region to jointly contain both China and Russia.61

Slightly deviating from the conventional wisdom, 

several authors argue that instead of trying to retain a 

dominant position in the regional order, Washington 

is pursuing a narrower “offshore balancing” strategy.62

Drawing from U.S. scholar John Mearsheimer, Zhang 

Jiadong, a professor at Fudan University, contends that a 

decline in U.S. national power relative to China and the 

other major powers has led the United States to shift from 

its postwar hegemonic strategy to an approach based on 

its maritime power, reminiscent of Britain’s strategy in 

the 18th and 19th centuries.63 The Quad countries are also 

highlighted in this perspective. Zhang writes that, confronted with China’s rise, Washington cannot rely completely on its alliances with Japan and Australia to balance China, and has thus sought to pull New Delhi into 

its strategic orbit.64

For Chinese scholars, the implication is that, if left 

unchecked, the strategy could damage China’s interests 

in various ways. In a rare rebuke, two scholars from the 

PLA Strategic Support Force explicitly reject Wang Yi’s 

dismissal of U.S. strategy as “sea foam,” arguing that 

Washington’s attitude is “very serious and its investment 

is very obvious. . . . [O]bjectively, China’s external environment has undergone important changes.”65 A majority 

of the 12 authors who evaluate the strategy’s impact (9, 

75 percent) argue that it could increase regional tensions, 

thus threatening China’s economic development. Specific 

predictions include a looming arms race in the region,66

bolder Japanese and Indian foreign policies,67 and instability in the South China Sea.68 Some authors (5, 42 percent) also argue that the strategy could weaken Chinese 

influence by reducing support for China’s BRI investments.69 One PLA scholar contends that greater interoperability between U.S. and allied forces will “weaken our 

influence and capabilities in the region and counter our 

antiaccess/area-denial capabilities.”70

Seams and Weaknesses. Concerns about these kinds 

of outcomes are tempered by a careful examination of a 

range of obstacles that could weaken the U.S. strategy 

(see figure 2). Fifteen of the 17 articles (88 percent) that 

discuss U.S. weaknesses focus on weak regional support 

for a hawkish U.S. strategy. Much of this analysis is focused on the three Quad partners. For example, Ye Hailin 

argues that Japan has a “different concept” of the IndoPacific at odds with Washington; Australia has no territorial disputes with China and has only a limited ability 

to project power near China’s territory; and India has to 

consider its competing obligations as a new Shanghai Cooperation Organization member.71 Indeed, several scholars portray India as the weakest link in the Quad, arguing 

that New Delhi’s aversion to alliances and policy differences with the United States on matters such as India’s 

arms relations with Russia, energy ties to Iran, and U.S. 

visa restrictions would prevent India from siding with the 

United States.72

Closely associated with this viewpoint is the argument that the Quad states are unlikely to lean too closely 

to the United States due to their dependence on China as 

a top export market.73 In the Indian case, Ye Hailin argues 

that a key intervening variable will be Modi’s domestic 

political strength: a stronger Modi will be more likely 

to look after India’s long-term interests in developing 

economic links with China, but a weaker prime minister 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 305 9 

would prioritize relations with Washington for domestic 

political gain.74 Some Chinese scholars also cite China’s 

attractiveness as a reason for lukewarm support for U.S. 

goals from Southeast Asian states75 and Pacific Island 

countries,76 many of which are recipients of BRI financing and other Chinese assistance. A handful of scholars 

also note that the United States itself could be self-constrained due to the need for China’s assistance on North 

Korea and other issues.77

At a domestic level, six articles (35 percent) reference financial challenges, such as Budget Control Act 

requirements that will limit the growth of the U.S. defense budget after 2020,78 a U.S. national debt of more 

than $21 trillion that could also constrain future U.S. 

military spending,79 and U.S. global commitments that 

intrinsically limit the amount of spending on Indo-Pacific 

priorities.80 Moreover, seven articles (41 percent) mention bureaucratic challenges such as interbureaucratic 

disputes, frequent policy reversals, and a lack of permanent appointees in relevant posts.81 Bridging the domestic 

and external constraints is the view that the Indo-Pacific 

strategy is fundamentally at odds with Trump’s “America 

First” philosophy. Specific irritants discussed under this 

heading include U.S. withdrawal from the TPP, the unpopular U.S. trade war with China, the threat or imposition of tariffs, and contentious burden-sharing negotiations with states such as South Korea.82 As two scholars 

from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences suggest, 

the “stick of trade” and other measures have left “many 

allies and partners feeling at a loss.”83

China’s Response: A Stronger Neighborhood Diplomacy. Depictions of lackluster regional support for 

U.S. policies lead Chinese scholars to consider what 

tools Beijing can use to exacerbate those weaknesses. 

Among the 16 articles that discuss responses, 15 (94 percent) contend that China should strengthen its regional 

diplomatic and economic outreach. Expanding BRI financing to neighboring countries is the most commonly 

cited tool for preserving China’s regional influence.84

While this argument might be dismissed as simply parroting the current party line, advancing the BRI is still 

meaningful in the context of skepticism in some Chinse 

quarters about spending massive sums on foreign development, indicating that foreign policy elites might be 

Figure 2. Perceived Constraints on U.S. Strategy

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60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Lack of U.S.

Ally/Partner

Support

% of Articles

China Factor America First

Philosophy

U.S.

Debt/Financial

Constraints

U.S. Stang

Challenges
10 SF No. 305 ndupress.ndu.edu

relatively supportive of continuing this policy if it can 

be framed as a tool of strategic competition. Other tools 

referenced in the literature include building stronger 

party-party relations with Vietnam,85 building trade deficits as leverage with the Association of Southeast Asian 

Nations,86 strengthening cooperation with Myanmar,87

and supporting ASEAN’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.88

Several Chinese analyses focus specifically on how 

Beijing can drive wedges between the United States and 

its Quad partners.89 India, often seen as the weakest link, 

has received perhaps the most attention. Hu Shisheng, director of South Asia studies at the Chinese Institutes of 

Contemporary International Relations, argues that China 

should strengthen ties by supporting Modi’s “Act East” 

policy and undertaking joint projects in places such as 

Myanmar, while recognizing India’s aversion to the BRI 

label.90 Ye Hailin argues instead that a solicitous approach 

would be interpreted in Indian circles as a form of “blackmail.” His solution is for China to build relations with 

smaller South Asian nations such as Sri Lanka or Bangladesh in order to “force India to acknowledge the reality of 

China’s entrance into the Indian Ocean region.”91 Ye has 

also supported targeting Chinese investments in parts of 

India predisposed to welcoming them, which could help 

in shaping Modi’s domestic calculations.92

Implicit in these discussions is the perspective that 

Beijing should avoid actions that undermine China’s 

regional reputation, such as a resumption of land reclamation in the South China Sea or economic penalties 

against states that run afoul of China on various issues 

(one example being China’s heavy-handed response to 

South Korea’s deployment of a Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense missile battery in 2017, which led to a major decrease in China’s favorability ratings among South 

Koreans).93 Moreover, few Chinese sources, including 

PLA officers, argue that a military buildup or the use of 

military (or paramilitary) tools should be at the forefront 

of China’s response.94 This gap could have several explanations: hesitance to discuss coercive tools in open 

sources, acceptance that much higher military budgets 

are unlikely due to Chinese budget constraints, or a tacit 

recognition that assertive Chinese policies are creating 

demand for U.S. military presence and assistance in the 

region. However, there are no signs that Chinese scholars 

favor a fundamental reevaluation of China’s territorial or 

resource ambitions.

Implications for the United States

There was little evidence in this review of two of the 

most concerning potential misperceptions. First, there 

was little overconfidence or “triumphalism” about China’s 

own capabilities that would lead to a conclusion that Beijing may simply ignore the U.S. strategy and proceed with 

the kinds of activities it is designed to discourage. Second, 

there was no alarmism that would support a dramatic 

response, such as a major increase in military spending, 

alliances with other countries, or the use of force. Rather, 

evidence at both the official and unofficial levels suggest 

that Beijing is concerned about the motives and implications of the strategy and will respond by targeting the 

links between Washington and its regional supporters 

through countermessaging, expanded economic and diplomatic outreach, and perhaps scaling back some of its 

more controversial policies.

It is unclear that perceptions of a failure in U.S. leadership on the coronavirus will fundamentally alter Chinese judgments about U.S. strategy in the region. Beijing 

has already tried to deflect blame by focusing on the 

theme of U.S. mismanagement of the crisis at home and 

abroad and highlighting China’s provision of aid to many 

countries.95 This fits into a larger narrative aiming to exploit divisions between the United States and its regional 

partners to China’s benefit. However, as Michael Green 

and Evan Medeiros point out, predictions in the middle 

of crises are often perilous.96 It is entirely possible that 

Chinese analysts will conclude that the crisis has actually 

done little to fundamentally shake U.S. advantages—or to 

reduce regional concerns about Chinese leadership.

One implication for U.S. policymakers concerns strategic messaging to China and the region. There is clearly a 

gap between Chinese and U.S. perceptions on the intent 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 305 11 

and focus of the Indo-Pacific strategy. Chinese officials 

and scholars have both discussed the strategy as a way 

to contain China and frustrate the BRI, diverging from 

U.S. perceptions that the strategy is designed, in part, to 

dissuade China from conducting policies that undermine 

the regional order, but not to stunt China’s growth or 

overturn its political system. Chinese observers are also 

intensely focused on the quadrilateral dialogue and relations among the Quad countries, which support the larger 

containment narrative, while U.S. sources portray a much 

wider, whole-of government strategy, with key initiatives 

in all of Asia’s subregions.

There is probably nothing that U.S. officials can do 

to influence these perceptions. Chinese interpretations 

of U.S. strategy in Asia as a containment plot are deeply rooted and have persisted across recent U.S. strategic 

adjustments, including the rebalance to Asia.97 Specific 

concerns about U.S. trilateral initiatives and the Quad 

reflect growing anxieties that Washington is trying to 

orchestrate an “Asian NATO” around China’s borders.98

These views continue to circulate widely among Chinese 

analysts, even if some are beginning to doubt whether the 

United States has the resources needed to execute a containment strategy.99 U.S. assurances to Chinese interlocutors will not change those attitudes, but should continue 

to the extent that others in the region—few of whom 

support an escalating competition between the two states 

in which they would have to choose sides—pay attention 

to such messaging.

U.S. officials will also have to contend with China’s 

regional counternarrative, which focuses on raising doubts 

about U.S. motives and commitments while presenting 

China as the more attractive partner. While avoiding 

over-the-top rhetoric that would alienate its supporters, 

Washington should continue to point out areas where 

Chinese policies are harming regional interests and showcase examples where the United States is actively contributing to regional development. A comparative U.S. 

disadvantage is that while China has subsumed much 

of its regional diplomacy under the BRI label, U.S. programs are carried out under many different labels, which 

undermine their collective impact. U.S. officials should 

thus consider a common branding for U.S. initiatives in 

security assistance, educational initiatives, infrastructure 

financing, overseas development assistance, and other 

programs. This messaging should be reinforced by consistent, high-level U.S. participation in regional conclaves 

such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summits. 

U.S. policymakers should also find ways to advance an 

attractive message in China-led meetings, such as the 

Xiangshan Forum, or else risk losing this opportunity.100

Another set of implications concerns the possibility 

that China will strengthen its neighborhood diplomacy 

to avoid a U.S.-led balancing coalition. Greater Chinese 

financial commitments to smaller countries in Southeast Asia, Central and South Asia, or the Pacific Islands 

could increase Beijing’s ability to influence those states’ 

decisionmaking on issues of concern to U.S. policymakers, such as access for U.S. firms or reliable basing for future U.S. military operations. However, U.S. decisions on 

whether, and in what cases, to respond to Chinese economic inducements should take into account that most 

states do not appear to be at serious risk of falling into a 

Chinese “debt trap”;101 many are, instead, carefully hedging their bets with strong ties to the United States, Japan, 

South Korea, and other partners.102 Rather than seeking 

to respond in kind to every Chinese overture, U.S. financial assistance should focus on states that are most critical 

to U.S. interests and most at risk of exploitation.

Given its concerns about a nascent “Asian NATO,” 

China will likely seek to weaken the alignment between 

the United States and its Quad partners. One element is 

high-level diplomacy, demonstrated by Xi Jinping’s October 2019 visit to New Delhi and planned visit to Tokyo 

in 2020.103 China might also solidify its influence in these 

countries by granting preferential access to BRI projects, 

media engagements focused on shifting popular opinion, 

or through influence operations targeting the elite. In this 

competitive environment, Washington should continue to 

expand robust high-level engagement with Asia’s pivotal 

states at all levels (bilateral, trilateral, and quadrilateral) 

in areas such as high-tech development, infrastructure 
12 SF No. 305 ndupress.ndu.edu

investment, maritime domain awareness, and support for 

democratic institutions, and support stronger interactions 

among these states even if the United States is not directly 

involved.

While predictions of a decline in Chinese “assertiveness” remain tentative, Washington should welcome 

any evidence of Chinese restraint with its rivals. While 

Chinese analysts do not explicitly advocate such an 

adjustment—which would require them to admit that 

Beijing had been “assertive” in the first place, leading 

to a deterioration of China’s reputation in many countries—China could still exercise restraint in some areas 

in order to prevent states such as Vietnam, India, and Indonesia from seeking a closer alignment with the United 

States. Evidence that Beijing has shifted toward a more 

restrained regional posture, which might include a reluctance to conduct aggressive enforcement actions in the 

South China Sea or avoidance of a future Doklam-like 

incident with New Delhi, would be a sign that the U.S. 

strategy has paid dividends. Beijing should be similarly 

encouraged if it recalibrates BRI policies to accord with 

international norms, responding to widespread concerns 

about predatory lending.104

Nevertheless, U.S. policymakers should understand 

the limits of China’s forbearance in regional disputes. 

First, Chinese leaders remain committed to the goal of 

defending “every inch” of Chinese territory and must not 

appear overly weak in front of a nationalistic domestic 

audience. There is no reason to suspect that Beijing would 

not react strongly if confronted by a perceived provocation 

by another territorial or resource claimant; as in the past, 

China would justify its responses as defensive.105 Second, 

Chinese restraint on sensitive issues may not apply equally to all parties, and recent military and economic coercion targeted at Taiwan suggests a different approach.106

Third, over the long run, Beijing’s perception that it has 

successfully consolidated its regional influence—and thus 

defused the main threat posed by the Indo-Pacific strategy—could usher in a new round of aggressive policies. 

This means that constant pressure is required to ensure 

that the shaping goals of the strategy are achieved.

Finally, there may be some implications for U.S.-

China relations. While the focus of Chinese analysts has 

been on strengthening relations with neighboring states, 

some also worry about a deterioration of relations with 

Washington.107 These authors encourage steps to maintain stability between the two dominant countries in the 

region, such as joint infrastructure projects,108 pursuing 

competition in a “friendly” manner,109 and strengthening 

military-to-military communications to avoid a direct 

clash.110 This reflects similar Chinese prescriptions during the U.S. rebalance to Asia.111 Although Beijing will 

still oppose aspects of the U.S. approach that it disagrees 

with, such as freedom of navigation operations and U.S. 

arms sales to Taiwan, Beijing might be willing to reach a 

consensus on other issues, one example being in military 

crisis communications. If the United States has achieved 

this effect through the Indo-Pacific strategy, the time 

might be right to negotiate on these or other issues from 

a position of strength.

Notes

1 “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press,” People’s Republic 

of China (PRC) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 9, 2018, available 

at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1540928.shtml>.

2 Ely Ratner, who served as a key Asia advisor to Vice President Joe Biden, has suggested that President Barack Obama’s “desire 

to avoid conflict” with China allowed Beijing to make “incremental 

gains” in the South China Sea. See Ely Ratner, “Course Correction: 

How to Stop China’s Maritime Advance,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 

2017, 64–72. Admiral Jonathan Greenert, who served as chief of naval 

operations during this period, reported that his counterpart, Admiral 

Wu Shengli, “made clear that he thought the United States would have 

a more forceful reaction when China began its island-building.” See 

Jonathan W. Greenert, Tenets of a Regional Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2018), 19n100. Thanks to 

Lyle Morris for this observation.

3 William Choong, “U.S. Regional Leadership: A Shot Across the 

Bow,” The Interpreter, April 7, 2020, available at <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/us-regional-leadership-shot-across-bow>.

4 Nina Silove, “The Pivot Before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to 

Preserve the Power Balance in Asia,” International Security 40, no. 4 

(Spring 2016), 46.

5 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Affairs, 

October 11, 2011, available at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/

americas-pacific-century/>; Kurt Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of 

American Statecraft in Asia (New York: Twelve, 2016).

6 “Fact Sheet: Advancing the Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific,” 

The White House, November 16, 2015, available at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheetadvancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific>.

7 “Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO Summit, Da 

Nang, Vietnam,” The White House, November 10, 2017, available at 
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 305 13 

<www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trumpapec-ceo-summit-da-nang-vietnam/>.

8 Ibid.; “Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next 

Century: An Address by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson,” Center 

for Strategic and International Studies, October 18, 2017, available at 

<www.csis.org/analysis/defining-our-relationship-india-next-centuryaddress-us-secretary-state-rex-tillerson>.

9 On the broader “Indo-Pacific” concept, see Rory Medcalf, 

“Indo-Pacific Visions: Giving Solidarity a Chance,” Asia Policy 14, no. 

3 ( July 2019), 79–95.

10 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017); Summary of the 2018 

National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the 

American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department 

of Defense, January 2018). 

11 See, for example, “Vice President Mike Pence’s Remarks on the 

Administration’s Policy Towards China,” The Hudson Institute, video, 

43:09, October 4, 2018, available at <www.hudson.org/events/1610-

vice-president-mike-pence-s-remarks-on-the-administration-s-policytowards-china102018>; Phil Davidson, “Halifax International Security 

Forum 2018: Introduction to Indo-Pacific Security Challenges,” U.S. 

Indo-Pacific Command, November 17, 2018, available at <www.

pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1693325/halifax-international-security-forum-2018-introduction-to-indo-pacific-security/>; 

Michael R. Pompeo, “The Lessons of 1989: Freedom and Our Future,” 

Department of State, video, 16:27, November 8, 2019, available at 

<www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-at-koerberstiftung-axica-the-lessons-of-1989-freedom-and-our-future/>.

12 “Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Plenary Session of the 2018 

Shangri-La Dialogue,” Department of Defense,” June 2, 2018, available at <https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/

Article/1538599/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-plenary-session-ofthe-2018-shangri-la-dialogue/>; “Millennium Challenge Corporation 

Official Visits Sri Lanka to Continue Progress on Compact,” Millennium Challenge Corporation, September 20, 2018, available at <www.

mcc.gov/news-and-events/release/release-092018-mcc-official-visitssri-lanka>; “Secretary of State Michael Pompeo Makes First Historic 

Visit to the FSM,” U.S. Embassy in the Federated States of Micronesia, August 27, 2019, available at <https://fm.usembassy.gov/17874/>; 

Lara Seligman, “In Rare Mongolia Stop, U.S. Defense Secretary Gets 

an Unusual Gift,” Foreign Policy, August 8, 2019, available at <https://

foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/08/in-rare-mongolia-stop-u-s-defensesecretary-gets-an-unusual-gift-military-pentagon-russia-china-asia/>. 

Moreover, in December 2018, Donald Trump signed the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, which contained $1.5 billion in annual appropriations for regional security assistance programs and funded other efforts, 

such as democracy promotion and cyber defense initiatives. For an 

overview, see “The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) of 2018,” 

IF11148, Congressional Research Service, updated April 4, 2019.

13 Tanvi Madan, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ‘Quad,’” War 

on the Rocks, November 16, 2017, available at <https://warontherocks.

com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/>; “Secretary Pompeo’s Meeting with Quad Foreign Ministers of Australia, India, and Japan,” 

Department of State, September 27, 2019, available at <www.state.gov/

secretary-pompeos-meeting-with-quad-foreign-ministers-of-australiaindia-and-japan/>.

14 Laura Zhou, “Trump Signs Off on Plan to Allow U.S. Navy 

More Freedom to Patrol in South China Sea, Report Says,” South 

China Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 22, 2017, available at <www.

scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2103718/trumpsigns-plan-allow-us-navy-more-freedom-patrol>.

15 Michael R. Pompeo, “America’s Indo-Pacific Economic 

Vision,” speech, Indo-Pacific Business Forum, U.S. Chamber of 

Commerce, video, 20:50, July 30, 2018, available at <www.state.gov/

remarks-on-americas-indo-pacific-economic-vision/>.

16 Ben O. de Vera, “DFC Eyes Big Investments in Indo-Pacific 

Countries,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 9, 2020, available at 

<https://business.inquirer.net/286798/dfc-eyes-big-investments-inindo-pacific-countries>.

17 “Joint Statement of the Governments of the United States 

of America, Australia, and Japan,” The White House, November 17, 

2018, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/jointstatement-governments-united-states-america-australia-japan/>.

18 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (Washington, DC: Department of 

Defense, 2019).

19 A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2019).

20 A number of these critiques have appeared in the pages of 

War on the Rocks. See, for example, Eric Sayers, “Assessing America’s 

Indo-Pacific Budget Shortfall,” War on the Rocks, November 15, 

2018, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2018/11/assessingamericas-indo-pacific-budget-shortfall/>; Mark Montgomery and Eric 

Sayers, “Addressing America’s Operational Shortfall in the Pacific,” 

War on the Rocks, June 18, 2019, available at <https://warontherocks.

com/2019/06/addressing-americas-operational-shortfall-in-thepacific/>; Gregory B. Poling, “For Lack of a Strategy: The Free and 

Open Indo-Pacific,” War on the Rocks, November 13, 2019, available at 

<https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/for-lack-of-a-strategy-the-freeand-open-indo-pacific/>; Randy Schriver and Eric Sayers, “The Case 

for a Pacific Deterrence Initiative,” War on the Rocks, March 10, 2020, 

available at <https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/the-case-for-a-pacific-deterrence-initiative/>. For an Indian view, see Brahma Chellaney, 

“America’s Feeble Indo-Pacific Strategy,” Japan Times, November 14, 

2019, available at <www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/11/14/commentary/world-commentary/americas-feeble-indo-pacific-strategy/>.

21 Two recent articles by foreign scholars do cover Chinese 

perceptions, but with only limited reference to the significant volume 

of Chinese sources available. See Feng Zhang, “China’s Curious Nonchalance Towards the Indo-Pacific,” Survival 61, no. 3 (May 2019), 

187–212; and Feng Liu, “The Recalibration of Chinese Assertiveness: 

China’s Responses to the Indo-Pacific Challenge,” International Affairs

96, no. 1 ( January 2020), 9–27.

22 This review assesses only responses that specifically characterized the “Indo-Pacific strategy” and not specific elements associated 

with it, such as arms sales to Taiwan. For a Japanese scholar’s assessment of Chinese public statements on the Indo-Pacific strategy, see 

Yamazaki Amane, “The PRC’s Cautious Stance on the U.S. IndoPacific Strategy,” China Brief 20, no. 4 (February 28, 2020), available at 

<https://jamestown.org/program/the-prcs-cautious-stance-on-the-us-indo-pacific-strategy/>.

23 This includes China’s more assertive responses to the 

China-related language in the National Security Strategy, National 

Defense Strategy, and 2019 National Defense Authorization Act. 

See, respectively, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s 

Regular Press Conference on December 19, 2017,” PRC Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs, December 19, 2017, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/

mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1520766.shtml>; “Foreign 

Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference 

on January 22, 2018,” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 

22, 2018, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/

s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1527756.shtml>; “Chinese Defense 

Ministry Opposes China-Related Contents in U.S. Defense Act,” Xinhua, August 14, 2018, available at <www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-

08/14/c_137390012.htm>.

24 See, for example, Jonathan Stromseth, “Don’t Make Us 

Choose: Southeast Asia in the Throes of U.S.-China Rivalry,” Brookings Institution, October 2019.

25 This is consistent with one of China’s main global narratives. 

See Hedi Holz, China’s Playbook for Shaping the Global Media Environment (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2020), 7.
14 SF No. 305 ndupress.ndu.edu

26 “Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng: Parties Should Work 

Together in Concert Instead of in Contest,” PRC Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, September 26, 2018, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/

wjbxw/t1599075.shtml>.

27 “Ambassador Hong Xiaoyong Has a Signed Article ‘What 

U.S.-China Trade War Is Really About: A Chinese Perspective” 

Published in The Straits Time,” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 

7, 2019, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng//wjb_663304/

zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1670460.shtml>.

28 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Remarks 

on August 5, 2019,” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 5, 

2018, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/

s2510_665401/t1686226.shtml>.

29 “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press.”

30 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press 

Conference on June 3, 2019,” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 

3, 2019, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/

s2510_665401/t1669120.shtml>.

31 “Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference on June 27,” 

China Military Online, June 27, 2019, available at <http://eng.mod.

gov.cn/news/2019-06/27/content_4844628.htm>.

32 “Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng.”

33 “Ambassador Luo Zhaohui Interviewed by The Tribune,” PRC 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 2, 2018, available at <www.fmprc.

gov.cn/ce/cein/eng/embassy_news/t1601467.htm>.

34 “Wang Yi Meets with Co-Chairman of the Nepal Communist 

Party Puspa Kamal Dahal September 10, 2019,” PRC Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs, September 12, 2019, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/

mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1697106.shtml>.

35 Charissa Yong, “U.S. Announces US$300 Million to Fund 

Security Cooperation in Indo-Pacific Region,” Straits Times (Singapore), August 4, 2018, available at <www.straitstimes.com/politics/uspledges-nearly-us300-million-security-funding-for-south-east-asia>.

36 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press 

Conference on July 31, 2018,” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 

31, 2018, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/

s2510_665401/t1581940.shtml>.

37 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular 

Press Conference on November 13, 2017,” PRC Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, November 14, 2017, available at <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/

xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1510216.shtml>.

38 Yong, “U.S. Announces US$300 Million to Fund Security 

Cooperation in Indo-Pacific Region.”

39 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press 

Conference on July 31, 2018.”

40 “Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference on June 27.”

41 Feng, “China’s Curious Nonchalance Towards the IndoPacific.”

42 Government think tank analysts and prominent university 

scholars were prioritized over the larger academic community because 

they are more likely to be familiar with internal government thinking, 

and in some cases might even be contributing to official views and 

responses. For overviews of the links between China’s analytic communities and policymaking, see, for example, Pascal Abb, “China’s Foreign 

Policy Think Tanks: Institutional Evolution and Changing Roles,” 

Journal of Contemporary China 24, no. 3 (October 2015), 531–553; Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, New Foreign Policy Actors in China, SIPRI 

Policy Paper 26 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research 

Institute, September 2010), 34–40; Xuanli Liao, Chinese Foreign Policy 

Think Tanks and China’s Policy Towards Japan (Hong Kong: Chinese 

University Press, 2006); Bonnie S. Glaser and Phillip C. Saunders, 

“Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles 

and Increasing Influence,” China Quarterly, vol. 171 (September 2002), 

597–616. The review also incorporates both civilian and military scholars to probe whether there are any differences across bureaucratic lines. 

These sources are supplemented with the author’s interviews with more 

than a dozen Chinese civilian and military analysts.

43 Ye Hailin, “Prospects for the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept and 

China’s Countermeasures” [“印太” 概念的前景与中国的应对策

略], Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review [印度洋经济体研究], 

no. 2 (2018), 9.

44 Liu Fugui and Li Qianqian, “Analysis of the Implementation 

of the Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy” [试论特朗普政

府印太战略的实施], Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review [印

度洋经济体研究], no. 5 (2019), 70.

45 Ye, “Prospects for the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept and China’s 

Countermeasures,” 6.

46 He notes, in particular, that all three countries dispatched 

aircraft carriers to the 2017 version of the event, held in the Indian 

Ocean. Ye Hailin, “Strategic Thoughts on China’s Response to the U.S. 

‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept” [中国应对美国再版“印太”概念的策略

性思考], Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review [印度洋经济体

研究], no. 5 (2019), 132. Ye also describes the exercise “Northern-19,” 

including U.S., Japanese, and Australian forces operating off Guam, as 

a key event. Ibid.

47 Chen Jimin, “The Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’: Policy and Limitations” [特朗普政府 “印太战略”: 政策与

限度], Peace and Development [和平与发展], no. 1 (2018), 31–32.

48 Wu Shengqi and Tao Wenzhao, “The Prospects of the Trump 

Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy” [特朗普政府 ‘印太战略’ 

前瞻], International Forum [国际论坛], 20, no. 5 (2018), 34.

49 Ibid., 33; Ye, “Prospects for the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept and 

China’s Countermeasures,” 5.

50 Interviews, 2018. For background, see Manu Pubby, “India, 

U.S. Ink Comcasa Deal at 2+2 Dialogue,” Economic Times (Mumbai), 

September 7, 2018, available at <https://economictimes.indiatimes.

com/news/defence/comcasa-india-to-get-access-to-real-time-encrypted-information-from-us/articleshow/65710975.cms>.

51 Many articles also note the name change from U.S. Pacific 

Command to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Notably, there is almost 

no discussion of specific U.S. military systems allocated to the theater, 

even though acquisition of advanced technology and concepts represents one plank in the Defense Department’s Indo-Pacific Strategy 

Report.

52 See, for example, Li Daguang, “Clues to Trump’s ‘Indo-Pacific 

Strategy’ from the National Defense Strategy Report” [从国防战略报

告看特朗普“印太战略”端倪], China Economic and Trade Guide [中

国经贸导刊], March 2018, 75; Wu Xinbo, “A New Era of the Trump 

Administration and U.S. China Policy” [特朗普执政与美国对华政策

的新阶段], China International Studies [国际问题研究], no. 3 (2018), 

85–86; Zhu Feng, “Great Power Contest in the South China Sea Under the Backdrop of the ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ [“印太战略”阴影下

的南海大国较量], World Affairs [世界知识], no. 1 (2018), 20.

53 Cheng Hanping and Qu Junfeng, “Intentions of Strengthening 

U.S.-Vietnam Strategic Cooperation Under the Background of the 

Indo-Pacific Strategy” [印太战略背景下越美两国深化战略合作意

在何方], Wei Shi [唯实], no. 7 (2018), 91. Another scholar writes that 

Secretary of Defense James Mattis traveled to Indonesia and Vietnam 

early in his tenure to push those countries to serve as “pivotal players” 

in the region. See Zhang Ling, “An Analysis of the Initial Practice of 

the U.S. National Security Strategy,” International Strategic Studies, vol. 

2 (2018), 46.

54 Wu, “A New Era of the Trump Administration and U.S. China 

Policy,” 86; Chen, “The Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 13. Fewer articles still reference U.S. relations with small South 

Asian or Pacific Island nations, or Mongolia, as central to the strategy.

55 See, for example, Ye Hailin, “Strategic Thoughts on China’s 

Response to the U.S. ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept,” 6; Gu Guoli, “The Trump 

Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ and Its Progress” [特朗普政府
ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 305 15 

的“印太战略”及其进展], International Studies Reference [国际研究

参考], no. 9 (2019), 6. 

56 Interviews, November 2018. 

57 Lee Jeong-ho, “U.S. Has No Desire to Contain China, U.S. 

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo Tells Chinese Foreign Ministry 

Wang Yi in Bangkok,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 

August 2, 2019, available at <www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/

article/3021012/us-has-no-desire-contain-china-us-secretary-statemike-pompeo>.

58 Several terms are often used interchangeably in these assessments, including 遏制, 牵制, and 包围.

59 See, for example, Xia Liping and Zhong Qi, “Analysis of the 

Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy Concept’” [特朗普政

府“印太战略构想”评析], Contemporary International Relations [

现代国际关系], no. 1 (2018), 25; Chen, “Preliminary Analysis of the 

Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 37–38; Chen, “The 

Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 40–41. One might expect this view to prevail among civilians, but in fact half of those who 

acknowledge this motive are People’s Liberation Army scholars.

60 See, for example, Chen Jimin, “The Trump Administration’s 

‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’: Policy and Limitations” [特朗普政府“印太

战略”:政策与限度], Peace and Development [和平与发展], no. 1 

(2018), 31–32; Hu Shisheng, “Trump’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ Concept 

and Prospects for China-India Interactions” [特朗普的“因太战略”

构想与中印互动前景], World Affairs [世界知识], no. 5 (2018), 28. 

61 Chen Fangming, “Preliminary Analysis of the Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” [特朗普政府“印太战略”初析], 

Asia-Pacific Security and Maritime Studies [亚太安全与海洋研究], no. 

4 (2018), 39.

62 See, for example, Xia and Zhong, “Analysis of the Trump 

Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy Concept,’” 25; Ge Cheng and 

Shen Minghui, “‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ from U.S. and Indian Perspectives: Policy Limitations and China’s Responses” [美印视角下的“印

太战略”:政策限度及中国的应对], Yunnan Social Sciences [云南社会

科学], no. 5 (2018), 49.

63 Zhang Jiadong, “The U.S. ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept and Its 

Influence on China” [美国 “印太” 倡议及其对中国的影响], 

Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review [印度洋经济体研究], no. 

3 (2018), 14. “Offshore balancing” has been discussed by many U.S. 

strategists over the past 25 years, but Chinese authors appear most 

influenced by John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

(New York: W.W. Norton, 2011).

64 Ibid.

65 Cai Zebin and Li Demu, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ Strategy: Retrospect and Prospect” [“印太”战略的缘起,本质及前景], Strategy and 

Policy Studies [战略决策研究], no. 5 (2019), 73.

66 Chen, “Preliminary Analysis of the Trump Administration’s 

‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 43.

67 Xia and Zhong, “Analysis of the Trump Administration’s ‘IndoPacific Strategy Concept,’” 28.

68 Wei Zongyou, “The Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific 

Strategic Concept and Its Impact on Regional Order” [特朗普政府的

印太战略构想及其对地区秩序的影响], Contemporary World [当代世

界], no. 12 (2018), 22.

69 See, for example, Zhang, “The U.S. ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept 

and Its Influence on China,” 22; Chen, “The Trump Administration’s 

‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 14.

70 Li, “Clues to Trump’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ from the National 

Defense Strategy Report,” 73.

71 Ye, “Prospects for the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept and China’s 

Countermeasures,” 7–13.

72 See, for example, Wu and Tao, “The Prospects of the Trump 

Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy,” 33; Xia and Zhong, “Analysis 

of the Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 26. See also 

Zhang Jiadong, “Trump Cranks Up Pressure on India by Rejecting Invitation,” Global Times (Beijing), November 4, 2018, available at <www.

globaltimes.cn/content/1125760.shtml>.

73 See, for example, Chen, “Preliminary Analysis of the Trump 

Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 42.

74 Ye, “Strategic Thoughts on China’s Response to the U.S. ‘IndoPacific Concept,” 13–14.

75 Chen, “The Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 

39–40.

76 Qin Sheng, “Policy Implements of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Strategy 

in the South Pacific; Status, Dynamics, and Prospects” [“印太”战略

的南太平洋攻势:现状,动力与前景], Asia-Pacific Security and Ocean 

Studies [亚太安全与海洋研究], no. 6 (2019), 94.

77 Chen, “The Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 

42; Xi and Zhong, “Analysis of the Trump Administration’s ‘IndoPacific Strategy Concept,’” 26.

78 Xu Nanfeng, “Trump’s ‘America First’ Overdrafts American 

National Power and Credit,” International Strategic Studies, vol. 3 

(2018), 16.

79 Zhang, “An Analysis of the Initial Phase of the U.S. National 

Security Strategy,” 47.

80 Xia and Zhong, “Analysis of the Trump Administration’s ‘IndoPacific Strategy Concept,’” 26.

81 Wu and Tao, “The Prospects of the Trump Administration’s 

Indo-Pacific Strategy,” 34; Hu Bo, “Trends and Prospects of the U.S. 

‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’” [美国“印太战略”趋势与前景], Pacific 

Journal [太平洋学报], no. 10 (2019), 29.

82 See, for example, Xu, “Trump’s ‘America First’ Overdrafts 

American National Power and Credit,” 12; Ge and Shen, “‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ from U.S. and Indian Perspectives,” 49; Chen, “Preliminary 

Analysis of the Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 40.

83 Lu Hong and Sun Xihui, “‘Structural Dilemma’ and ‘Trumpism’: Dual Motives of the Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific 

Strategy’” [“结构性矛盾”与“特朗普主义”:特朗普政府“印太

战略”的双重动因], Forum of World Economics & Politics [世界经济与

政治论坛], no. 6 (2018), 25.

84 See, for example, Chen, “The Trump Administration’s 

‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 45; Xia and Zhong, “Analysis of the Trump 

Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy Concept,’” 28; Wu Zhaoli, 

“The Indo-Pacific Strategy’s Development, Limitations, and China’s 

Response” [印太战略的发展,局限及中国应对], Journal of Xinjiang 

Normal University [新疆师范大学学报], no. 5 (2018), 88–89. One 

scholar even argues that China should study the U.S. Overseas Private 

Investment Corporation model in order to make the BRI more effective. Gu, “The Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ and Its 

Progress,” 8.

85 Cheng and Qu, “Intentions of Strengthening U.S.-Vietnam 

Strategic Cooperation Under the Background of the Indo-Pacific 

Strategy,” 94. 

86 Ibid. 

87 Hu Zhiyong, “Direction and Geographical Impact of the 

Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ Security System” [特朗普政府

‘印太’安全体系走向及其地缘影响], Journal of Guizhou Provincial 

Party School [贵州省党校学报], no. 4 (2019), 110. 

88 Gu, “The Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ and 

Its Progress,” 7. 

89 See, for example, Ge and Shen, “‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ from 

U.S. and Indian Perspectives,’” 49–50; Chen, “Preliminary Analysis 

of the Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’” 45; and Wang 

Peng, “‘Hedging’ and ‘Wedging’: Internal Logic of the U.S. ‘IndoPacific’ Strategy” [“对冲”与“楔子”:美国“印太”战略的内生

逻辑], Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies [当代亚太], vol. 3 

(2018), 51. 
16 SF No. 305 ndupress.ndu.edu

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for multidisciplinary research and analytic exchanges on 

the national goals and strategic posture of the People’s 

Republic of China. The center focuses on China’s ability to 

develop, eld, and deploy an effective military instrument 

in support of its national strategic objectives.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by 

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abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 

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INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

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and Strategic Support

90 Hu, “Trump’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ Concept and Prospects for 

China-India Interactions,” 30. 

91 Ye, “Prospects for the ‘Indo-Pacific’ Concept and China’s 

Countermeasures,” 14. 

92 For instance, Ye writes that officials in Assam have expressed 

an interest in pursuing the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 

economic corridor. Ye, “Strategic Thoughts on China’s Response to the 

U.S. ‘Indo-Pacific Concept,’” 14. 

93 For a discussion, see Peter Harrell, Elizabeth Rosenberg, and 

Edoardo Saravalle, China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures (Washington, DC: CNAS, 2018). 

94 An exception is advocacy in one article, written by two People’s 

Liberation Army analysts, that China should rely on maritime law enforcement to draw “red lines” around Vietnamese developments in the 

South China Sea. However, the same authors focus more on building 

strong party-party relations with Vietnam. Cheng and Qu, “Intentions of Strengthening U.S.-Vietnam Strategic Cooperation under the 

Background of the Indo-Pacific Strategy,” 94. 

95 Kurt M. Campbell and Rushi Doshi, “The Coronavirus Could 

Reshape Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2020, available 

at <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-03-18/coronaviruscould-reshape-global-order>.

96 Michael Green and Evan S. Medeiros, “The Pandemic Won’t 

Make China the World’s Leader,” Foreign Affairs, April 15, 2020, available at <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-15/

pandemic-wont-make-china-worlds-leader>.

97 Adam P. Liff, “China and the U.S. Alliance System,” China 

Quarterly, vol. 223 (2018), 137–165; John Garver and Fei-Ling Wang, 

“China’s Anti-Encirclement Struggle,” Asian Security 6, no. 3 (2010), 

238–261; Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and 

the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security 23, no. 4 

(1999), 49–80. 

98 For a discussion, see Joel Wuthnow, “U.S. ‘Minilateralism’ in 

Asia and China’s Responses: A New Security Dilemma?” Journal of 

Contemporary China, vol. 115 (2019), 133–150. 

99 A limited measure of success, however, is the acknowledgment 

of some Chinese scholars that the United States is pursuing domestic 

economic motives. 

100 The Department of Defense made a positive step in dispatching Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China Chad Sbragia to 

the 2019 Xiangshan Forum. Sending a higher level official to a future 

iteration, however, could guarantee a more central speaking role in 

front of a broad regional audience. 

101 According to one analysis, the Indo-Pacific countries at serious risk of debt distress include Laos, Maldives, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, and Pakistan. John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance, 

Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a 

Policy Perspective (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 

2018), 12.

102 See, for example, Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: 

The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies (Washington, 

DC: East-West Center, 2005); Evelyn Goh, “Southeast Asian Strategies toward the Great Powers: Still Hedging after All These Years?” 

The Asan Forum, February 22, 2016, available at <www.theasanforum.

org/southeast-asian-strategies-toward-the-great-powers-still-hedgingafter-all-these-years/>; G. John Ikenberry, “Between the Eagle and the 

Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia,” 

Political Science Quarterly 20, no. 20 (2017). 

103 Feng, “The Recalibration of Chinese Assertiveness,” 23–24.

104 There is some evidence that China has already begun to recalibrate its Belt and Road Initiative lending to focus more on quality. 

See, for example, Prashanth Parameswaran, “What’s in China’s New 

Belt and Road Recalibration?” The Diplomat, May 7, 2019, available 

at <https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/whats-in-chinas-new-beltand-road-recalibration/>; BRI Update 2019—Recalibration and New 

Opportunities (Beijing: Deloitte, 2019).

105 Some of China’s “assertive” behavior in the South and East 

China seas has been explained as responses to provocations by others. 

See Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Assertive Behavior Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,” China Leadership Monitor, 

no. 35 (Summer 2011), available at <www.hoover.org/research/chinasassertive-behavior-part-two-maritime-periphery>.

106 See, for example, Richard C. Bush, “From Persuasion to Coercion: Beijing’s Approach to Taiwan and Taiwan’s Response,” Brookings 

Institution, November 2019.

107 Wu, “A New Era of the Trump Administration and U.S. 

China Policy,” 86–87; Xia and Zhong, “Analysis of the Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy Concept,’” 27.

108 Gu, “The Trump Administration’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ and 

Its Progress,” 8.

109 Xi and Zhong, “Analysis of the Trump Administration’s ‘IndoPacific Strategy Concept,’” 28.

110 Li Bin, “‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ and the South China Sea: 

Focus of the Focus” [“印太战略” 与南海: 焦点中的焦点], World 

Affairs [世界知识], no. 13 (2018), 21.

111 Phillip C. Saunders, The Rebalance to Asia: U.S.-China Relations and Regional Security, INSS Strategic Forum 281 (Washington, 

DC: NDU Press, August 2013), 10, available at <https://ndupress.ndu.

edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-281.pdf>.

For helpful comments on earlier drafts, the author 

thanks Phillip C. Saunders and Jonah LanganMarmur. Ian Burns McCaslin and Melodie Ha 

provided valuable research assistance.