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Khobar Towers

Tragedy and Response
Khobar Towers

Tragedy and Response

Perrv D. Jamieson

Air Force History and Museums Program

United States Air Force

Washington, D.C. 2008
Library of Congress Cataloging-in Publication Data

Jamieson, Perry D.

KhobarTowers : hagedy and response lPerry D. Jamieson.

p.cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Dhahran Military Housing Facility Bombing, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,

199 6. 2. Terrorism-Saudi Arabia. 3. Bombing investigation-Saudi Arabia.

[. Dhahran Military Housing Facility Bombing, Dhahran, SaudiArabia,1996.

2. Terrorism-Saudi Arabia. 3. Saudi Arabia-Relations-United States. 4.

united States-Relations-Saudi Arabia.l I. Air Force History and Museums

Program (U.S.) II. Title.

HV6433.533J36 2008

363.32509538-dc22

2008010703

lv
Thq came from Pineville, West Virginia, from

Cambridge, Minnesota, andfrom other small towns.

In many ways, they were ordinary young Americans:

they liked moric, cars, and a laugh with their friends.

But in one wey, thqt were extraordinary young

Americans: they gave their lives for their country.

This book is for them.
Foreword

America's mind's eye carries all too many painful pictures of terrorist

actions against her: the collapsed Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, a gaping

hole at the waterline of USS Cole, and shocked, bleeding casualties sitting in

the streets of the U.S. embassy in Kenya, as well as fire blossoming from New

York City's Twin Towers. Another enduring image is the shredded walls of

Khobar Towers where nineteen airmen gave their final full measure on June

25,1996.

This account of the KhobarTowers bombing, so eloquently narrated by Dr.

Perry Jamieson, tells the story of the horrific attack and the magnificent

response of airmen doing their duty under nearly impossible circumstances.

None of them view their actions as heroic, yet the reader will marvel at their

calm professionalism. All of them say it was just their job, but the reader will

wonder how they could be so well trained to act almost instinstively to do the

right thing at the right time. None of them would see their actions as selfless,

yet countless numbers refused medical attention until the more seriously

injured got treatment.

Throughout this book, the themes of duty, commitment, and devotion to

comrades resoundingly underscore the notion thatAmerica's brightest, bravest,

and best wear her uniforms in service to the nation.

This book is more than heroic actions, though, for there is also controversy.

Were commanders responsible for not adequately protecting their people?

What should one make of the several conflicting investigations following the

altack? Dr. Jamieson has not shied away from these difficult questions, and

others, but has discussed them and other controversialjudgments in a straightforward and dispassionate way that will bring them into focus for everyone. It

is clear from this book that there is alarger issue than just the response to the

bombing. It is the issue of the example set by America's airmen. Future airmen

who read this book will be stronger and will stand on the shoulders of those

who suffered and those who made the ultimate sacrifice.

No matter what conclusions the reader might reach, one continues to

return to the magnificent actions of young Americans far from home working

in grueling conditions, who just do their duty. A duty they do without equivocation and for the love of their country and their service. Ultimately, then, this

is a story of victory, because the Air Force learned from Khobar Towers. It

vll
learned about a ruthless enemy, and all airmen will learn, too, that even under

the most devastating conditions, they can fight back and win, a lesson that the

world's terrorists have yet to learn. But learn they will.

C. R. Anderegg, Director

Air Force History and Museums Program

vltl
Preface

For some Americans, the catastrophic events of September ll,200l may

have overshadowed the Khobar Towers bombing of June 25, l996.Yet as horrific

as the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center were, the bombing in

Dhahran-terrible in its own right-should still command our attention. There is

no distinguishing of the importance among these, or any other terrorist events, to

those who lost their loved ones in them. That the Khobar Towers tragedy was followed by ones even larger in scale does not diminish its importance: it furthers it.

The "Bleeding Kansas" of the 1850s prefigured a far bloodier Civil War in the

I 860s, and the blasted facade of Building I 3 I anticipated the yet more deadly terrorism of the twenty-first century.

This history is based largely on tape-recorded oral history interviews conducted by the author and held by the Air Force Historical Studies Office, on

Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. Other historians contributed a few

more of these sessions and those sources are identified in the endnotes and backmatter. Where I conducted the interview, the endnotes describe it as an interview

"with" the participant; where another historian asked all or most of the questions,

the notes call it an interview "of" the participant. In the endnotes which have

shortened citations, the use ofone ofthese prepositions or the other tells the reader whether the interview cited was conducted by the author or another historian. In

every case, the AFHSO holds copies of these taped interviews.

Many of the interviewees offered painfully vivid accounts of the Khobar

Towers bombing and its aftermath. Their stark honesty made it difficult to quote

some parts of their interviews. I tried to describe accurately the horrors of a terrorist attack and at the same time to respect the feelings of those who survived the

bombing that night and of the families of those who did not.

Another difficulty raised by these oral history interviews was that they sometimes contradicted one another. When two or more witnesses disagreed about a

small point, I did not, except in a very few cases, ty to reconcile the competing

versions. It is not surprising that under the stressful circumstances of a terrorist

attack, some people recalled certain details differently than others; the remarkable

fact is that, in the great majority of cases, these oral accounts verified one another.

In addition to the oral history interviews, many documents were quoted or

otherwise used to prepare this work. Wherever possible, I have cited in full these

ix
sources. The text never quotes classified or "for official use only" documents, but

in two or three instances, it makes indirect use of open portions of them. In these

few cases, the notes describe the source, but do not give a formal citation. This

methodology protects the identification of closed documents, w{rile offering some

help in retrieving them in the future, if they are declassified and released. The

AFHSO retains the documents, classified and unclassified, that are cited or

described in the endnotes.

The KhobarTowers story cannot be told without encountering controversies,

and most of the people best informed about these were on active duty with the

United States Air Force when this manuscript was written. In the instances where

these airmen were quoted by the press, they are identified by name and the relevant source is cited in the endnotes. In some cases, where an oral history interview

provided sensitive information, the speaker is not identified. All of these interview tapes, held by the AFHSO, have been assigned a number. In the instances

where the witness is not identified by name, the endnotes cite one of these numbers. This reserves the identity of the speaker, while ensuring that future

researchers eventually will be able to confirm the quotations and to read or hear

them in their fulI context.

Unit designations can be confusing. It would have been more accurate to

identify the Air Force units deployed to Southwest Asia by their provisional designations, but these four-digit numbers would have cluttered the narrative. Where

reasonable in both the text and notes, I used the more familiar, stateside designation of these units. In a few cases, the text does not make it clear that the speaker

in an interview or the author of a document had served in Saudi Arabia and that

the value oftheir evidence should be credited accordingly. In these instances, their

unit's provisional designation is given, to alert the reader that the speaker or author

had been in Saudi Arabia.

Stating the ranks of officers and airmen proved less confusing than identi$zing units. The largest issue here was that many Khobar Towers veterans received

promotions after the attack, and before they were interviewed or before this manuscript went to press. I have identified them with the rank they held on June 25,

1996. The notes acknowledge the cases where colonels at the time of the bombing

later were promoted to generals.

I followed the convention of telling when an event took place by citing the

local time. Military documents often use "zuhr" time, equivalent to Greenwich

Mean time. I converted these to the local a.m. and p.m. modifiers, which are

familiar to general readers.

The nomenclature of local geography raised a few problems. The name

"Khobar Towers" itself can be misleading. To avoid cluttering the narrative with

repeated qualifiers, I followed the Air Force practice of using this name when only

the USAF area of the larger compound is meant, a refinement which is detailed in

chapter two. A similar case involved the Ministry of Defense and Aviation

(MODA) complex on the King Abdul Aziz Air Royal Saudi Base, which included

x
the King Abdul Aziz Air Base Hospital. Air Force personnel generally used the

term "MODA Hospital" to mean specifically the King Abdul Aziz Hospital.

Again to simplify the text, and to follow the useage familiar to Air Force readers,

I refer to the King Abdul Aziz AkBase Hospital as the "MODA Hospital." "King

Abdul Aziz Air Base" itself introduces another issue: the text usually refers to it,

as Americans di4 as DhahranAir Base.

Beyond this particular case, it sometimes proved difficult to identifu and

locate the Dhahran hospitals that treated the wounded Americans. Air Force documents, prepared quickly in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, and airmen who

suddenly found themselves patients in a foreign city in the dead of the night,

weren't able to answer every question a historian could ask. Doctors in the medical section of the Royal Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C., and at King Abdul

Aziz Air Base, Saudi Arabia, identified in the baclcnatter, gave me valuable information about the Dhahran hospitals. Saudi Embassy personnel also clarified other

points of local geography and history.

Finally, a word about the personal stories included in the narrative. It is fair to

ask why they, and not others, were used. Some veterans judge a work of military

history by narrow criteria: Does it tell the story of their particular unit? How

closely does its narrative match their own memory of events? The KhobarTowers

bombing affected thousands ofAmericans, Saudis, and others. No single volume

can do justice to the experiences of all the Air Force personnel, let alone the many

others, who were touched by this terrible event of June 25,1996. British Field

Marshal WJ. Slim wrote in the preface to his memoirs of World War II's Burma

campaign: "I am very conscious that for every [individual, unit, and formation] I

mention there were a hundred others whose doings were just as worthy of record."

And so it is with the Khobar Towers episodes told here; many others were just as

worthy of record.

This narrative tells the story based on their own accounts, of only a few ofthe

hundreds of airmen who were at the Khobar Towers that night. It recounts what

they were doing just before the bombing and what happened to them immediately afterward. The sample is intended to give an idea of the activities of airmen on

a surnmer night during Operation Southern Watch. Moreover, it was chosen to

convey the experiences ofpeople across the area affected by the attack, from the

mechanics on the flightline at KingAbdulAzizArBase to the securitypolicemen

on the roof of Building 131 at the Khobar Towers.

This sample necessarily had to be kept small enough that a reader could keep

hack of individuals and events. In addition to the few airmen mentioned in the

narrative, the stories ofhundreds ofothers couldjust as well have been told. There

was no intention to slight the experiences of any of the many veterans of the

KhobarTowers attack.

While this selection process posed a dilemma, it also underscored one of the

strongest themes of the KhobarTowers story. The bombing did not produce three,

or six, or ten heroes or heroines. whose stories stood out from all the others.

xl
Instead the blast left in its wake, as one officer later said, a thousand stories of

people helprng people. No account can do justice to them all. If this one begins to

give its readers an appreciation of how American military men and women

responded to the Khobar Towers tragedy, it has done its job.

Perry D. Jamieson

xll
Acknowledgements

So many people helped me tell the Khobar Towers story that it's difficult to

account for all of them. I've made my best effort here, and apologize to those I've

failed to remember.

The most fundamental contributors were the many officers, airmen, and

civilians who gave me and other historians oral history interviews about their

experiences with the Dhahran bombing. A list of them appea$ in the Sources.

A number of chiefs of the Air Force History Program and heads of the Air

Force Historical Studies Office (under its various names over the years) supported this project. They include Dr. Richard P Hallion, Mr. William Heimdahl, Col.

(ret.) C.R. (Dick) Anderegg, Col. George Williams, Col. Christine Jaremko

(Hallion), Col. Leonard Maggio, Col. George (Bamey) Ballinger, and Col. Carol

Sikes.

Three senior officers read drafts of this work, and their suggestions greatly

improved it: Maj. Gen. (ret.) Daniel M. (Dan) Dick, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Terryl J.

(Terry) Schwalier, and Col. (Dr.) Douglas J. Robb.

Every book like this one depends on the valuable work done by the airmen

and civilians of the Air Force History field program. In this case, three historians

deserve particular credit. SrA. Ronald J. Biggs, Jr. greatly helped my research at

NellisAir Force Base and also gave me a fine oral history interview about his own

experiences as the historian of the 4404th Composite Wing (Provisional) at the

time ofthe bombing. SSgt. Eric O. Grzebinski wrote a valuable history ofthe unit,

covering the crucial period May l-July 31, 1996. SSgt. Yancy Mailes made a

tremendous contribution to my research at Eglin Air Force Base. As this book's

Sources shows, he also conducted a number of significant oral history interviews.

The names of several other conscientious field historians who helped me appear

in the next paragraph.

Many other people contributed to this book, in a wide variety of ways. Some

of them are listed here, with their ranks as they were at the time they assisted me:

Ms. SharonAdamoyurka, Dr. Feher S. Alsharif, U.S. Army Brig. Gen. (ret.) David

A. Armstrong, SSgt. Ronald (Beetle) Bailey, CMSgt. Robert Beggs, Mr.

Lawrence (Larry) Benson, Mr. Dennis Case, Mr. Joseph Caver, Mr. Mark Cleary,

Ms. Diana G. Comelisse, Dr. Richard G. Davis, Brig. Gen. Daniel M. (Dan) Dick,

Col. Gary R. Dylewski, Col. Thomas R. Friers, Maj. Phillip G. (Slick) Gibbons,

SSgt. Ken Goss, Dr. Rebecca Grant, Mr. Grant Hales, Dr. Daniel Harrington,

xiii
SSgt. Gregory Herureman, Mr. Bruce Hess, Maj. Roy Houchin, Capt.Robert L.

(Bob) Jones, Lt. Col. Donald Jozayt, Ms. Yvonne Kinkaid, Col. (ret.) Thomas A.

McCarthy, Maj. (Dr.) Pat Merrill, Ms. Debra Moss, Ms. Toni L. Petito, U.S. Army

Capt. Erik R. Pohlmann, Dr. Diane Putney, TSgt. Tracy Reed, Lt. Col. (Dr.)

Douglas J. Robb, Dr. Frank N. (Mickey) Schubert, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Terryl J.

(Terry,) Schwalier, Maj. John (Irish) Setter, Lt. Col. Thomas H. Shafer, Dr. Kamal

Shahab, Dr. Fred Shaw, Ms. Marie Shaw, SSgt. C. Michael Sibley, MSgt. William

Sine, Maj. Beverly Sloan, CMSgt. William (Ed) Stevens, Dr. Wayne Thompson,

Dr. Jeffery Underwood, Mr. John D. (Jack) Weber, Mr. Herman S. Wolk, and Mr.

William T. (Tom) Y'Blood.

xiv
The Author

Perry D. Jamieson earned a B.A. from Michigan State University and an

M.A. and a Ph.D. from Wayne State University. Dr. Jamieson taught American

military history at the university of rexas at El Paso and has worked for the Air

Force History Program since 1980. He has contributed to the arurual histories of

the Strategic Air Command, Air Force Systems Command, Air Force Space

Command, and Headquarters United States Air Force, as well as to many special

projects. Dr. Jamieson is the author of Lucrative Targets: the u.s. Air Force in the

Kuwaiti Theater of Operations, a volume in The USAF in the Persian Gulf War

series. He has also written four books on the U.S. Army during and after the civil

War.
Contents

Foreword ......vii

Preface ........ix

Acknowledgements. ........xiii

TheAuthor ....xv

Tragedy

I Approachingl0P.M. .......5

2OperationSouthernWatch. ......15

3 StayAlert,BeObservant .........23

4 TheAttack ........43

SlntheWake.. ......53

6 GordenHour.. L:tt-': .. -....7r

7 Accounting..... .........89

8 Wednesday:AtKhobarTowers..... .....109

9 Wednesday:Elsewhere ....129

l0 ThreeDeparturesfromDhahran ........151

ll HonoringandRemembering.. ...161

12 After theAttack ........177

Epilogue .:.... .....199

Appendix: Biographical Sketches. ...203

Notes. .......213

sources ......259

Index. .. - -...263

Illustrations

Maps and Diagrams

MiddleEast.. .......xix

T-BuildingTypicalFloorPlan .........8

U.S. SectionKhobarTowers.... .....11

DhahranArea.... ...100

xvll
Photographs

Building 131dirtparkinglot.... .... 36

Maingate .....36

ViewsouthwestfromKhobarcomplex ......36

Saudiresidentialtowers ......31

Saudiresidentialtowersafterinstallationofbarriers .... ... 37

Mosqueeastofbuilding 131 ........37

Parking lot north of building 13 I ; location of tanker truck with explosives . . 37

"Jersey"barriersandconcertinawire . ...... 38

Sepentineentrancetomaingate.. ...38

Barriersatatmaingate.. ....38

Roof-topsecuritypolicepost ........38

Truckinspection.. ...39

Insideentrancebunker .......39

Bunkeratentrancatocomplex ......39

Truck for emergency blocking at entrance . . . 39

"Jersey"barrierinstallation ... 39

Northendofcomplexafterexplosion..... ........ 40

Security policemen SSgt. Alfred R. Guerrero, SrA. Corey P. Grice, and

AlC. Christopher T. Wagar receive Airman's medal from Air Force

Chief of StaffGen. RonaldR. Fogelman . . . 40

Bucklednortheastcornerofbuildingl3lafterexplosion ... 40

Explosioncrater. .....41

Close-up ofnorth face ofbuilding 131 afterexplosion. . . . . . . . . . . . 4l

Humveeremainsafterexplosion..... ......41

Roominteriorsafterexplosion ......42

Chaplain Aleson speaks at departure ceremony. . . . . 140

CasketloadedintoC-5aircraft ......140

C-5baywithallcasketsladed. .....140

Dr. Robb with patients aboard medical evacuation aircraft . . l4l

General Ryan with patients aboard medical evacuation aircraft . . . . l4l

LandstuhlRegionalMedicalCenter .......l4l

C-l4landC-9onEglinrunway ......142

Ambulances waiting for patients at Eglin . . . 142

General Cranston and Dr. Treadway visit patients aboard medevac aircraft . 142

Patientsassistedfrommedevacaircraft ..... 143

Patientscarriedoffmedevac aircraft. ....... 143

Khobar returnees speak with the media at Eglin . . . . 144

Colonel Dylewski, General Cranston, and President Clinton . . . . . . 144

F-15 missing man formation . . 144

Eglinhangarceremony ......145

xviii
Colonel Dylewski andPresident Clinton speak atEglin ceremony. . . . . . . . 145

Dedication ceremony for Khobar memorial at Patrick . . . . . .146

Khobar memorial at Patrick . . 146

HC-130 flyover during Patrick dedication ceremony . . . . . . . . . 146

Khobar memorial at Eglin . . . 147

Memorials at Gunther's Enlisted Heritage Hall . . . . . 147

KhobarmemorialatGunther .......147

Khobarmemorial atPrince SultanAirBase . ...... 147

GeneralsSchwalierandAnderson ...148

Maj. (Dr.) Steven P. Goffreceives Airman's medal from Air Force

Chief of Staff Gen. Ronald R. Fogelman . . 148

SecretaryofDefensePerry. ....... 148

Secretary of the Air Force Widnall and Colonel Cochran . . . 149

Dr. Treadway with patient . . . 149

Col.ThomasR.Friers ......149

Acting Secretary of the Air Force Peters . . . . 150

Secretary of Defense Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

GeneralShalikashvili .....150

Mai. Gen. Daniel M. Dick . . . 150

xlx
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There qre q thousand little stories out there,

about people taking care of people.

Colonel GaryR. Dylewski

Commander, 33rd Fighter Wing
Khobar Towers

Tragedy and Response
Tragedy

Tfeir best efforts were simplv overcome bv

the speed with which the iient develoned aid the sheer magnitude of the blait.

MajorBrian G. Fillmore

Air Force Office of Special Investigations
Chapter One

Approaching 10 P.M.

The HC-130P came home early. This combat Shadow tanker, tail number

0986, had launched at about 3 p.m. on Tuesday, June 25, 1996. The aircraft had

flown from King Abdul AzizRoyal Saudi Air Base, Saudi Arabia, a facility that

Americans usually called DhahranAir Base. The HC-130 was scheduled to return

about eight hours later, but sometime before 6:30 its crew saw a fuel-correction light

begin flickering on and ofl alerting them to a discrepancy in their number one

engine. They rehrrned to base and briefed the problem to the team of eight maintenance airmen who worked during the dayshift.l

The aircrew started back to their living quarters, which were a few miles east of

DhahmnAir Base's military flightline. If their HC-130 hadn,t encoqntered its difficulty, at l0 p.m. that night they would have remained airborne. Instead. bv that hour

the crew were in their dormitories, in the American sector of the rhobar Towers

housing complex.

The tankerb early rehrrn also meant that the nightshift engine mechanics wogld

relieve the dayshift sooner than usual. At7 p.m.,the seven Nbos ofTSgt. Donald

Herlacher's maintenance team came on duty and began troubleshooting the problem. AlC. Ken Smith of the dayshift, wanting to impiove his skills, stayied to work

withthem.2

The HC-l30's engine problem, as one officer commented later, had created..a

trade-off. The aircrew that was back in the dorms shouldn't have been there, [and]

the maintenance guys that would have been back in the dorms werent at the dorms.

because they were at the airplane."3

The maintenance airmen continued their efforts into the night, beyond 9 p.^.,

beyond 9:30 p.m. MSgt. Joel schaeffer drove over from the Khobar Towers compound and picked up Airman Smith. They headed east, back to their dorm. By then

it was nearing l0 p.m.a

At that hour, the unrelenting heat from a June day in SaudiArabia had left the

KhobarTowers compound. Late night offered the best time to exercise before going

to bed. "You can't run in the day," as one officer put it, .,unless you're just really

obsessed or have a death wish, really." After dark, many of the airmen who had been

on duty during the hours of brutal heat came out of their dorms to wallg jog, or head

for the gm. This facility, more formally called the recreation and fitneis center.
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

occupied a converted parking gurage near the middle of the compound's western

edge.5

On that day, June 25, workcrews had just finished refurbishing the gym' The

main improvement was the addition of a room for aerobic workouts. It featured

about trventy televisions that circled the exercise equipment, so an airman could

watch TV while using a rowing machine, stationary bicycle, or stair-stepper. The

sparkling new mirrors that circled the walls contributed another highlight to the

remodeling. Latethatmoming, Brig. Gen. Terryl (Terry) J. Schwalier, commander

of the 440Zth Composite Wing (Provisional), had cut the ribbon on this renovation

and the airmen celebrated with a small party.6 That evening, a bench-pressing contest was held in the facility.T

Among the many regulars at the gym was MSgt. Dwalme R' Berry, an administrator and deployed first sergeant of the 71st Rescue Squadron, from Patrick Air

Force Base, Florida. Sergeant Berry arrived at the recreation center later than usual,

that night of the twenty-fifth. In two days his tour in Saudi Arabia would en4 and he

had promised his wife he would get in a final round of shopping for her in Dhahran

before he retumed home. ordinarily, he andTSgt. Arthur Bisby, his workout parher'

would get to the gyrn about 6 p.m. That evening, they shopped dovrntorm and didn't reach the rec center until 9 p.rn.u

Dressed to exercise, the two NCOs went through the healy door that led fiom

the brand-new aerobic area into the weight room. Sergeants Berry and Bisby started

into their dumbbell routines. Nine thirty went past, nine forty-five. Berry looked at

the mirrors and realized that something was wrong: they were cracking''

While these two NCOs pitted themselves against the equipment in the Khobar

gym, several hqndred yards to the northeast, the senior officers of the 58th Fighter

Squadron, deployed from Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, were contending with

another kind of challenge. They lived on the seventh floor of Building l2l , 

ttrhich

faced Eighth Street, the eastem perimeter of the Khobar compound. It was an eight

story structure, consisting of Jground level with seven numbered ones stacked

above it. About half of the squadron's pilots had rooms on the sixth floor, about half

on the seventh, or top, one.10 Like the other Tshaped dormitories in the complex,

each floor had three suites-- cach suite contributing one arm of a building's T' All of

the eight-story dormitories accordingly had twenty-four suites. One of these on the

severrth floor of Building 127 was the "command module," the residence of the

deployed 58th Fighter Squadron's commander, Lt. Col. Douglas R. Cochran; the

op"*tion, officei Lt. C;1. Thomas A. McCarthy; and the project officer for the

deployment, Lt. Col. William Miller.rl

The officers of the 58th were busy that night. The squadron had all but finished

its tour in Saudi Arabia. The fighten would fly just four more sorties, and then their

tour would end. In two days, the squadron would be going home, and its officers

were dealing with, as one of them later summarized: "all the turmoil that comes

with [getting] diplomatic clearances, with making sure our people [will be] getting

home, making sure their equipment [will be] getting home, making sure the trans6
Approaching 10 P. M.

ports, the fuel, the airborne fuelers-everything-the jets are ready to go, and the

pilots are ready to go."12

The biggest issue bubbling during the night of the twenty-fifth was the need to

secure a diplomatic clearance for one of the transports that would carry some of the

squadron's weapons and cargo back to the united States. There was mundane housekeeping to be done, too: preparing for the departure, Lt. col. cochran had cleaned his

bathroom that night. Then he gave his attention to the items on his deslg the paperwork necessary for the return home. Beyond the door to colonel cochran's roorn Lt.

cols. Thomas Mccarthy and william Miller had taken up stations in the day roonl

the common area of the suite. They were helping him get the clearance issue resolved

and, expecting a call, they had the telephone bracketed between them.r3

The two lieutenant colonels watched a movie on the television, paramount's

1976 Marathon Man. As l0 p.m. approached, the film reached one of the most harrowing scenes in cinema history. christian Szell, a former Nazi portrayed by

Laurence olivier, used a dental drill to torture Thomas Babbington (Babe) Levy,-a

Columbia graduate student played by Dustin Hoffinan.ra

Not far from cochran's suite stood Building l3l, at the northeast comer of the

Khobar Towers complex. It was configure d,rrke r27 and all the other T dormitories:

it had eight floors; three suites per floor, twenty-four suites per building. That night

the residents of Building l3l were busy packing up and cleaning theiirooms. The

next day's inspection, just before they departed, would be a demanding one. The

first sergeants would check the rooms closely, making sure the airmen tJft tnem n

good order for the next occupants.ls

on the first floor of Building 13I, a minor mob scene developed in ttre kitchenette ofrSgt. George Burgessb suite. Sergeant Burgess, who was an assistant flight

chief, and his suitemates had cleaned their rooms thoroughly. But one problem area

remained: the refrigerator. A senior airman had cleaned il but his effoJ hadn't satisfied his yitemates. They all crowded into the small kitchen, working on the refrigerator, and indulging in some good natured criticism of the E-4. eurgess pitched in

with the others, crammed together in the limited space. While he jostleO wittr nis suitemates, a stray thought crossed his mind: it was the only time during their ninety-day

tour that all four of them had been in the kitchenette at the same time.16

Dovwr the hall from Sergeant Burgess and his suitemates, SSgt. Eric D. ziegler

and his roomates also were making their apartment "spick and span, for the next

day's inspection. For his part, Sergeant Ziegler offered toclean the bathroom. He finished the task and decided to visitAlc. Brent E. Marthaler. while Airman Marthaler

was sprucing up his room, Ziegler entsrtaned.him with some conversation.tT

Leaving Airman Marthaler to his worlg Sergeant Ziegler joined the rest of his

suitemates, rzvrho were in the day room. Their conversation was good spirited that

night. Like the other members of the 58th Fighter Squadron, ttrese alrmen rrad been

in Dhahran since April and were glad to be going home.18

Sergeant Ziegler handed TSgt. patrick p Fennig, his roomate, two Southwest

Asia service medals. To raise their souvenir varue ,"2" wanted,themflown on one of
!xdo oE: i

Ji ,E E

d 6'.: E mA\lan

tl

-c\civ
Approaching 10 P. M.

the operation Southern watch F-l5 missions. Sergeant Fennig, a flightline expeditor, assured his roomate he would get them out on a sortie the next morning.leThe group watched some television and at about five minutes before l0 p.m.,

Sergeant ziegler headed for bed. The staffsergeant checked his digital alarm clock

and realized that at some point during all the cleaning, it had gJtten unplugged.

zieglerhadto monkey with it a bit to get it reset. Two nights before, he had broken

the clock and, this late in his tour, he didn't want to spend the money on a new one.

with a little tinkering, the NCo set the current time and the wakelup one that he

wanted. Then he tested his "snooze,'button.20

six floors above Sergeant ziegler, SSgt. Alfredo R. Guerrero, a ten-year veteran and an instructor in antiterrorist training, checked the security polic" post orr,op

of Building 131. Two "SPs," SrA. corey p Grice and Alc. christophei T wagar,

were assigned to the roof of this dormitory. These young men were among the 169

personnel assigned to the security police squadron then stationed near Dhahran.2r

_ 

The watch was passing quietly at the rooftop sec'rity post and the weather at

the time was normal. on most Saudi nights in lateJune, at about g p.m. the air began

to give up some of the daytime's broiling heat. Around 9 p.m. the temperature usually would fall agarn but even after this drop the thermometer typically remained in

the nineties and the humidity stayed high. on the night of June is, tige,there was

nothing remarkable about the weatheq the visibility, or the level of activity aroturd

the Khobar Towers complex.22 "The nights over there were all pretty quie! pretty

much," Sergeant Guerrero commented later, 'because that was evervbodvt .dolvn,

time. You'd have joggers in the area, and people .recreating, around.,b3

Sergeant Guerrero had come on duty at6p.m.In the normal co'rse of things,

the twenty-nine year old airman on temporary duty from Edwards Air Force Base,

california, would have been on a patrol in the area himself, rather than making a

supervisor's check of the posts of other security policemen. As it happened two

supervisors had ended their tours on Sunday, Jvne 23, and for the firil week to follow, he-and another staffsergeant were to pick up the supervisory responsibility. on

the night ofTuesday the twenty-fifth, the assignment fell to Guerrero.2a

ordinarily, too, the NCo would have begun his post checks sooner and arrived

on-the roof of Building 13 I earlier in the night. That evening an agent ofthe Air Force

office of Special Investigations had found a Saudi national engaged in suspicious

activity and detained him. The AFosI officer brought this man io 

-Guenero's 

police

desk, while the sergeant was making out the duty schedule for the next day. ..so 

we

were doing the report on that," Guerrero recalled, "and we had to call in a Saudi lieutenant, to come [and] take him. That put me a couple hours behind schedule, because

normally I did the roster [for the next day] and I still had to go over the rosteq before

I started checking the posts."And so it was after 9:30 p.m. when Guerrero set our, on

foot to check the security police posts. "I wonder what would have happene{'he

mused later, "if I'd gone up [on the roof of Building l3l] even five minuGs earlier.,z5

Sergeant Guerrero began his rounds by going directly to the roof of this dormitory, at the far northeastern corner of the Khobar Towers compound and checking
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

on SeniorAirman Grice. Then he walked across the top of the building to its northern edge, where he stopped to talk withAirman First Class Wagar. Grrerrero had not

spent ive minutes on ih" roof; the time was approaching 9:50 p'm'26

Sergeant Guerrero and Airman Wagar had a good view of the area around

them. The weather had been normal lhat day, and continued so that night. Eight

floors below the two security policemen, Thirty-frst Sfeet ran east to west across

the front of Building 131 and marked the northem end of the Khobar Towers complex. The north side of this avenue-the northern perimetel of the compound-was

protected by a staggered double row of concrete 'New Jersey'' barriers and a ten-

-foot 

chain-iink r.C*ity fence, topped with concertinawtre.z1 Beyond this border of

the Khobar Towers stood the large parking lot of al Khobar Park, a public area. This

carparkwas coveredby three inches of asphalt and shadedby omamental trees. Just

north of it, Guerrero andWagar could see the buildings of al Khobar, a well-settled

community of Dhahran. For about seven miles to the west and northwest, the taller

structures ofthis urban area stood out over the flat landscape'28

The distance, as a bird would fly it, from where Sergeant Guerrero stood on the

roof of Building 131 down to the southem end of this open parking lot, was only

about thirty-five yards. While the staff sergeant stood talking with Airman Wagar, a

white four-door Chelrolet Caprice drove south along the western edge of the parking lot, toward the northwest end of the Khobar Towers compound. Then it made a

teft nand turn and headed east.2e At about 9:50 p.m. Sergeant Guerrero spotted this

sedan and, slowly following it, a second vehicle: a Mercedes-Benz fuel or sewage

tanker, with a capacity of 3,500 to 4,000 gallons.30

The car and the truck drove east along the southem edge ofthe large parking

lot, just beyond the northern perimeter of the compound. when the caprice reached

u poitrt opporite Building 13 i , 

it made another left hand tum and headed away from

the perimiter fence and pulled a very short distance into the carpark. The overhead

tights in this part of the parking lot were out; the area was dark'3l

Standing next to Airman Wagar on the roof of the dormitory, Sergeant

Guerrero paid less attention to the Caprice than to the much larger vehicle that followed it. The tanker continued a bit firther east than the car. Then it, too, turned left

and rolled a short distance away from the fence and into the parking lot. Both vehicles came to a stop in the darkness.32

The security policemen riveted their attention on the large truck. With its headlights off, it began backing up toward the hedges that grew along the north side of the

se-curity fence. Both airmen immediately knew that something was very wrong. It

was not unusual to see big trucks in the area around the compound; what was unusual, Sergeant Guerrero explained later, was 'fthe type of vehicle, the position it was in."

,,It was quite clear," he udd"4 "tnut th"y wanted to leave it in a cerlain spoti'33

Two men got out of the tanker truck and ran to the white Caprice. Months later,

Sergeant Guerrero recalled exactly what went through his mind during those seconds on the roof of Building l 3 l : "When they jumped out, we just couldn't believe

it happened.You could see it happen, but it seemed' 'This isn't happening'"'34

10
Parking Lot

Entrance

Parking Lot

mate location oftanker truck

Fence/Jersey

Barrier Protective

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35th Street

U.S. Sector

Khobar Towers

Housing Complex

l1
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

The Caprice sped off into the night and instantly the two security policemen

were certain that the tanker truck was a bomb. Both men stepped back from the

three-foot lip at the edge of the building. The racing departure of the white sedan,

Sergeant Guerrero later stated, "was the clicker. They were in a hurry. I felt something was going to happen very soon."35 He did not know it then, but "very soon"

hlned out to be less than four minules.l6

The security policemen might have put their own lives ahead of others and fled.

They did not do that. Instead, Guerrero got on his "brick" radio and alerted the SPs

at the compound's main gate and all others w4to were on patrol that night He then

called Mr. Marwan Darwish, who was the 4404th Wing's liaison officer, serwing as

an interpreter ofArabic for the Americans and advising them on Arabian affairs. In

performing these jobs, Mr. Darwish worked closely with the base security police

and was well acquainted with their operations and procedures. Lt. Col. James J.

Traister, commander of the 4404th Wing's security police squadron, said of this liaison officer: "Without him we would be hard pressed in working with our counterpar1s. He is the hardest worting individual I have ever worked with."37

That night Mr. Darwish, who routinely carried apager and a cellular phone,

had gone into Dhahran to eat dinner and do some shopping with Maj. Kevin C.

Greenfield, the 4404th Wing's judge advocate general; Capt. Lisa A. Winnecke,

Major Greenfield's deputy; and Lt. Col. Christomer Dooley, the United States

Military Training Mission's JAG, who worked out of its offices in Riyadh and

Dhahran.38 Within the first minute after Sergeant Guerrero spotted the truck, he

paged Darwish at a downto'w'n mall. The interpreter used his cell phone and quickly

reached the security policeman on the roof of Building 13 L Guerrero told him

about the threatening vehicle and his intention to evacuate the dormitory.3e Darwish

rang offon the SP and immediately called the Saudi military police, the "Red Hats."

The line was busy. The interpreter tried several calls, making his way up the Saudi

military police chain of command. Every line was busy; something was very

wrong. Darwish told his companions, We need to get back to the Khobar Towers.ao

While Mr. Darwish tried to reach the Saudi MPs, the securi[z police on the roof

of Building 13 t had taken action. Airman Wagar ran for the access to the top floor

of the building, where he would begin spreading the alarm. Sergeant Guerrero

sprinted across the roof and called to SeniorAirman Grice, "Letb go!'ar

Not far from Building 131, SrA. Craig J. Dick was patroling in a "humvee," a

military vehicle that blended the features of a jeep and a three-quafier ton truck.

Senior Airman Dick had heard a securi6, alert on his radio and sped to the scene,

waming some joggers out ofthe area along his way. He pulled up near Building 131,

jumped out from behind the wheel, and headed for the rear, or southem, entrance of

the dormitory at a dead run.42

Eight floors above SeniorAirman Dick, Sergeant Guerrero and SeniorAirman

Grice got off the roof and found that Airman Wagar, who had left ahead of them,

already was carrying the word along the top, or seventh, floor. Guerrero ran on

dornrn the stairwell to the sixth floor. and Grice to the fifth. An officer assisned to the

t2
Approaching 10 P. M.

Khobar Towers that night later praised the three security policemen for their

"remarkable" job of starting an evacuation of the building. "It was amazingl' he

said, "what they were able to accomplish in three minutes fbefore the explosion]."a3

The three security policemen raised the alarm the same way that Roman sentries would have: yelling and pounding on doors. They found most people still

awake, sitting in the day rooms of their suites, watching television or engaging in

conversations. The SPs moved rapidly from one aparhnent to the next, spreading the

word. Wagar recalled: "I was yelling, 'Get the hell out of the building."'"'When we

would knocld' Guerrero said, "we would ask, 'Is there arytody else in here?"'4

The urgency in the speech and actions of the securif policemen immediately

convinced the dorm residents that this was not an exercise. Like many others that

night, two pilots of the deployed 71st Rescue Squadron, Capts. Michael D.

Morelock and Matthew Winkler, were watching television. Captain Morelock sat in

a chair and Captain Winkler on a couch across from the set, which was wedged in a

comer in front of the sliding glass doors of their day room. Their suite, numbered 7-

I 

, was on the top floor of Building l3 I 

, and their rooms directly faced the park and

the truck bomb. Morelock had gotten up and headed for bed when an SP knocked

loudly and burst through their unlocked door. Months lateq he quoted the policeman: "We have a situation with a fuel truck. You need to set out of the buildins

no\ i. -'

Captain Winkler also remembered vMdly the intense seconds that followed the

SP's appearance. In Winkler's experience, security policemen always had their

M l6s in "the right place at all times." The pilot recalled a telling detail: the SP had

his weapon "slinged over his shoulder and it was kind of getting in his way because

he was tryrng to hurry so much."a6

Captains Winkler and Morelock, like many others on the top floors of Building

131 that night, did not ask any questions or make silly remarks. The dormitory residents responded like military professionals. Sergeant Guerrero said ofthe people he

alerted: "They immediately jumped up and started running, they didn't hesitate."47

Although Captains Winkler and Morelock left their suite promptly, neither felt

any sense of immediate danger. Winkler said later that he had no fear for his life and

Morelock had the passing thought that perhaps someone simply had parked in the

wrong place and riggered a false alarm. Winkler went into his bedroom and picked

up his brick radio and beeper fiom the nightstand, and put his shoes on. Morelock

got his radio, too, and shuffled through his flightsuit to find his identification card.

The security policeman asked them if there was anyone else with them. Their third

resident, Capt. Thomas E Edman, a navigatoq was in the bathroom at the front of

the suite. The pilots called to Captain Edman and the SP also knocked on the latrine

door and told him that he would have to leave the building immediately.a8

Captain Winkler gained a small lead on Captain Morelock, who checked at the

neighboring suite to make sure that Lt. Col. Thomas H. Shafer, commander of their

deployed squadron, and Captain Christopher J. Adams, a pilot and the deployment

operations officer, had gotten the word to evacuate.ae Morelock learned that these

13
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

two officers had heard the warning. Captain Adams had roused Lieutenant Colonel

Shafer, already asleep for the night, with the news. They had started to run out of

their suite whenAdams noticedthat the squadron commanderwas not wearing any

shoes and suggested he go back for a pair.50

Having checked on Lieutenant Colonel Shafer and Captain Adams, Captain

Morelock followed Captain Winkler doun the stairs. The two made it as far as the

first landing, half way between the seventh and sixth floors. Winkler turned to his

right, toward the next flight dovr,n. Each of the stairwell landings had a large glass

window, and unforhrnately for the two officers, they were novr' near one. A11 of the

compoundb dormitories had been built on the same pattem. So the large windows

featured on every stairwell landing proved dangerous that night, not only to

Morelock and WinkJeq bul lo others as well.sl

Lieutenant Colonel Shafer later praised the security police for their rapid waming of the residents on the top floors of Building 131. He noted that Captains

Winkler and Morelock and others who were evacuated from their suites by the SPs

doubtless were safer in the interior ofthe dormitory in the elevator lobbies and stairwells, than they would have been in their rooms, which direct$ faced the bomb. But

Colonel Shafer also pointed to two other aspects ofthe nightb tragic events. First,

not one person got out of Building l3l before the detonation. Second, it may well

have been for the better that they did not: large numbers of people might have run

out of the dormitory and directly into the explosion. Captain Winkler agreed: "If I d

got to the ground flooq I migtrt have been killed. You can't 'what if it." Lt. Col.

Thomas A. McCarthy, operations officer of the 58th Fighter Squadron, and no

doubt others, thought the same thing.52 These two considerations raised by Colonel

Shafer do not diminish the alert work done by the security police that night, but they

underscore the fact that terrorist attacks, like other acts ofviolence, have a capricious quality.

Captains Winkleq Morelock, and many others responded promptly to the wamings from the security policemen. Sergeant Guerrero and the SPs with him had done

as well as possible, within the few minutes they had to raise the alarm. Now only a

matter of seconds remained. Guerrero had almost finished spreading the word along

the sixth floor. He ran to the door of the one remaining suite. People moved past him

rapidly, leaving the building as they had been told. It was 9:53 p.m.sl

T4
)

)

Chapter Two

Operation Southern Watch

The terrorist bombing of the Khobar Towers killed nineteen United States Air

Force personnel and injured hundreds of others. With the loss ofthese casualties, the

American press and much of the public began asking questions about the nation's

military presence in Dhahran. How manyAir Force officers and airmen served there

and elsewhere in Saudi Arabia? Why were they there? How long had they been

there? What were the "KhobarTowers"?

Uniformed Americans had been on duty in southwest Asia since World War II,

but for decades their numbers remained small. When the United States sent its fint

military training mission to Saudi Arabia, tn 1944, it consisted ofjust twelve members. During the next year and into l946,Americans had helped the Saudis build

King Abdul Aziz Air Base, in Dhahran. In 1951, the two nations began negotiating

formal agreements that resulted two years later in the establishment of a United

States Military Training Mission. Working in cooperation with the Saudi Ministry of

Defense and Aviation, the USMTM assisted the kingdom3 regular military forces.

Beginning in the 1950s, the United States helped build several air bases in Saudi

Arabia. The Office of Program Management-Saudi Arabian National Guard, a

United States Army program managerb office that helped modemize the kingdom's

National Guard units, was established in Riyadh :lr'1965. Throughout the ColdWar,

the number of uniformed Americans stationed in the oil-rich Saudi nation, ruled by a

royal family that was wary of non-Islamic foreigners, stayed well under 1,000.1

This remained the case until 1990. OnAugust 2 of thatyear,haqr units rlnder

the orders of dictator Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, SaudiArabia's small neighbor to the north. Faced with more than 200,000 soldiers and over 2,000 tanks

beyond the northem border of his kingdom, King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz then took the

unprecedented step of inviting thousands of military personnel from the United

States and other non-Islamic nations to help defend his country.2

Saddam Hussein did not invade Saudi Arabia, but he remained in Kuwait,

which he claimed to have annexed as an eleventh province of kaq. The Air Force

and the other military services carried out Operation Desert Shield, an enornous

defensive deployment that protected the large Saudi kingdom. President George

Bush mobilized an international coalition against Saddam Hussein, but the Iraqi

dictator stubbornly refused to leave Kuwait. The United Nations set a deadline,

)
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

January 15, 1991, for Iraq to end its occupation of its southem neighbor. When

Saddam ignored this final warning, a coalition of nearly forty nations contributed to

the military effor1 designated Operation Desert Storm, commonly called the Gulf

War. A stunningly successful forty-three day air campaign and a four-day ground

offensive rapidly ended the Iraqi dictator's occupation of Kuwait. Aerospace operations provided the centerpiece of this dramatic military victory. By the end of the

GulfWaq Saudi Arabia hosted a vastly larger foreign presence than ever before in its

history. More than 54,000 Air Force personnel were assigned to southwest Asia, and

most of them served in that Islamic kingdom.3

The Gulf War ended initially with a temporary, and later a permanent, ceasefire. On March 3,7991, Lt. Gen. Sultan HashimAhmad of the Iraqi army agreed to

the terms of a temporary cease-fire dictated to him by Gen. H. Norman

Schwarzkopf, the commander in chief of the United States Central Command

(USCENTCOM), at Safivan airfield in southern lraq. A month later, onApril 3, the

United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687, rvhich stated its conditions for a permanent cease-fire. The UN called on Iraq to destroy its nucleaq biological, and chemical weapons and established inspections to see that it did so.

Resolution 687 also directed the Baghdad dictatorship to scrap all but its shortrange missiles and to renounce international terrorism.a Saddam characterized the

Security Council's terms as "one-sided and unfair," but on April 6 he accepted them

and a permanent cease-fire went into effect.5

The American-led coalition had expelled Saddam from Kuwait, but he then

lashed out in other directions. In the wake of the 1991 GulfWar, the Kurdish people

of northem lraq, an ethnic minorif within their nation, rebelled against the dictator

in Baghdad. Saddam dispatched several divisions to crush their uprising. By midApril 1991, hundreds ofthousands ofKurdish refugees had fled their country

through the mountain passes into Tirrkey and Iran.6

Another tragedy developed in southern Iraq, where the Shi'ite sect of Muslims

rebelled against Saddam's government and army, dominated by Sunni Muslims.

Here, too, the Iraqi autocrat moved quickly and brutally against the insurrection. His

Hip and Hind helicopter gunships and his ground troops killed hundreds, perhaps

thousands, of Shi'ite men, womeq and children.T

Although the international community denounced Saddam's supression of

these rebellions, it took no fin1her military action against him. On the night ofApril

5, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 688, which contended

that the wave of Kurdish refugees into Turkey and Iran threatened "international

peace and security," and rejected Saddam's claim that this was an internal issue.

TINSCR 688 called on the Iraqi government to end its repression of the Kurds and

"to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected."

Having made this declaration, the United Nations took no steps to enforce it. Nor

did the United States supporl either the Shi'ite or Kurdish rebellions. In "a feckless

abdication of a victor's power and responsibiliry" one historian contended, "the

fGeorge Bush] administration tumed a blind eye."s

I

(

I

I

!
I

Operation Southern Watch

President Bush did take action to get humanitarian aid to the Kurds. OnApril 5,

before the UN adopted Resolution 688 that night, he ordered Operation Provide

Comfort, an airlift of food and supplies to the Kurdish refugees in northem Iraq.

Three days later, Air Force MC l30s began air dropping food, tents, and other supplies into the mountainous region near the Turkish border. Operating from Incirlik

Air Base, Turtey, the 1440th Composite Wing (Provisional) provided a variety of

aircraft-fightem, special operations helicopters, and transports-in support of the

air portion of Provide Comfofi.q OnApril 10. President Bush established a' no-fly"

zone above 36" north latitude. The United States. other nations. and intemational

organizations would begin delivering aid to the Kurdish refugees, and the American

president served Saddam notice that the USAF would shoot down any Iraqi aircraft

attempting to interfer with the relief effort. The Air Force continued the Provide

Comfort mission, and by early May, most of the Kurds had left their refugee camps

and retumed to their homes.lo

In the case of the Shi'ites, President Bush on March 14 took the position that

Saddam should not use his helicopters against his ornm people within Iraq. The chief

executive said he was "warning" the Iraqi government: "Do not do this." The president did not, however, direct any military measures against Saddam's gunships. His

fundamental premise, expressed in early April, was that the coalition that had won

the GulfWar "did not go there to settle all the internal affairs of Iraq."ll

President Bush stood by this assumption, but as months passed and as Saddam

persisted in his brutalities, the chief executive decided that the United States must

protect the Shi'ites and ensure that Baghdad did not fui1her its military position in

southem Iraq. In late July 1992, reports multiplied that the Iraqi air force was sending military aircraft from Talil Air Base against hapless villages in that region. The

United Kingdom and France expressed support for an American proposal to patrol

southern Iraq and shoot down any fighters or helicopters that Saddam sent against

the Shi'ites.12

On August 26, 1992, President Bush announced that the United States, the

United Kingdom, and France would enforce a no-fly zone over southem Iraq, similar to the one previously established to protect the Kurds. It would cover the airspace

over Iraq south of 32 " north latitude 

, an area roughly the size of Iowa. The chief

executive cited Saddam Hussein's "harsh repression" of the Shi'ites and the need to

enforce the UN'sApril 1991 Resolution 688.13 Later, in October l994,the Security

Council also would adopt Resolutiong4g,which limited the Baghdad government's

right to deploy military forces in southem Iraq.la

The three Westem allies gave various names to their military enforcement of

the no-fly zone. The British called their effort "Operation Jural," and the French

"Operation Alysse." The Americans designated theirs "Operation Southem Watch,"

and assigned it to the Joint Thsk Force Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA), a component of

USCENTCOM. This unified command had southwestAsia as its area of responsibility andMacDillAirForce Base, Florida, as its headquarters. U.S. Army Gen. J. H.

Binford Peay III had been the USCENTCOM commander since August 1994. The
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Air Force component of General Peay's unified command was U.S. Central

Command Air Forces (CENTAF), provided by the Ninth Air Force, headquartered

at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina. CENTAF was commanded by Lt. Gen.

John P Jumper fromAugust 1994 until June 1996, when he was succeeded by Lt.

Gen. Carl E. Franklin. The unified command's JTF-SWA operated from a headquarters inRiyadh, SaudiArabia, andwas commandedbyAirForce Maj. Gen. Kurt

B. Anderson. From January to July 1993, Major General Anderson had commanded Operation Provide Comfort's Combined Task Force and was thoroughly

acquainted with the southwest Asian theater. ls

The 4404th Composite Wing (Provisional) was the only Air Force unit in the

southwest Asian area of responsibility and contributed the air component of JTFSWA, which flew Operation Southern Watch. It had been activated as an Air

Conrbat Command unit on June l, 1992, and its Tactical Air Command predecessors dated back a bit earlier, to March 1991. During the Gulf War, the 4th Tactical

Fighter Wing had been assigned to al Kharj Air Base, and after the waq the 4404th

Composite Wing succeeded it at that facility.l6 In July 1991, the wing headquarters

moved to King Abdul Aziz, or Dhahran, Air Base, in Ash Sharqiyah, or the Eastern

Province, of Saudi Arabia. The 4404th Wing had been stationed near Dhahran four

years when, in July 1995, Brig. Gen. Terryl J. (Terry) Schwalier became its thirteenth commander. General Schwalier, who had entered the Air Force in 1969, was

a pilot with combat experience in RF 4Cs and F-16Cs. The 4404th represented his

second assignment as a wing commander. I'

A provisional wing, the 4404thwas made up of a command element and five

provisional groups. The command element consisted of (with its personnel as of

hne25,1996) the wing commander, Brig. Gen. Terry Schwalier; vice commandeq

Col. Wayne L. Schultz of the Colorado Air National Guard; senior enlisted advisor,

CMSgt. Paul K. Ayers; the commander's executive officer, Capt. Bradley K. Burhite

(three other executive officers served General Schwalier during his thirteen months

as wing commander); and an administrative staffthat supported the wing commander. There were eight staffagencies: comptroller, Maj. Andre Burgess (Maj. David

V Raths succeeded him on June 26); chaplain, Lt. Col. Dennis E. Aleson (Lt Col.

Wayland M. Hartsfield, June 26); historian, SrA. Ronald J. Biggs, Jr.; staffjudge

advocate, Maj. Kevin C. Greenfield; manpower, Capt. Andrew Baker; public affairs,

2d.Lt.Laura Koury; safety, Col. Kufi B. Dittmer (Lt. Col. Allan L. Mink II, June

26); and a wlng operations center.

The five provisional groups, and their commanders as of June 25, 1996, wete

the 44}4thOperations Group, Col. Jonathan S. (Scott) Gration; 44091h Operations

Group (stationed at Riyadh), Col. Dale F. Bible; 4404th Logistics Group, Col. Peter

R. Mooy; 44}4thSupport Group, Col. Gary S. Boyle; 4404th Medical Group, interim commander, Lt. Col. (Dr.) Douglas J. Robb.r8

A composite unit, the 4404th Wing employed a variety of aircraft to enforce the

no-fly zone over southern lraq. While it was heavy in fighters, it flew airframes as

diverse as the EF-l 1lA, F-4G, and C 130. The wing's large number-and variety

18

t

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!

I
I

Operation Southern Watch

of types----of aircraft offered "wonderful" opportunities to a commander, as General

Schwalier observed. "You got to deal with every aspect of air power. You had fifteen,

sixteen types of aircraft over there, at any one time."le Most of the 4404th's assets

were based at Dhahran Air Base, and from there, the unit launched 100 or more

Southem Watch flights each day. "We would fly seven days a week," General

Schwalier recounted. "It was intense, is the best way to describe it." Working at this

high tempo of operations,by 1996 the wing had flo'*,n more than 100,000 sorties

over kaq. On the day of the terrorist bombing, the unit flew all 118 of its scheduled

sorties, and 81 of them were Southem Watch operations.2o

The 4404th Wing had more than 5,000 personnel assigned, at eleven locations

in four countries.2l The largest concentration of them were the 2,300 airmen stationed in theAmerican sector ofthe KhobarTowers compound, just east of Dhahran

Air Base. (Second to this Dhahran group were the 1,500 personnel deployed to

Riyadh, where the 4404thWing's 4409fh Operations Group flew its tankers and

reconnaissance aircraft.22) No relatives of these active-duty members of the US$

or any other service, accompanied them to Dhahran.23

The Air Force manned the 4404th Provisional Wing largely by rotating officers

and airmen through southwest Asia on temporary-duty assignments. Although

entke units of some aircraft-including HC-130s, C-130s, A-10s, and tankersserved in the theater 365 days ayea;24 nearly all of the more than2,300 individuals

in Dhahran served there on 90-day rotation tours. Only nineteen of the 4404th

Wingb billets were pernanent ones.25 The rotation manningpolicy meant that about

l0 percent of the unit's personnel, 200 or more airmen and officers, turned over

every week.26 Like the Air Force, the Army rotated its personnel through Dhahan.

Its PatriotTbsk Force crews served six-month tours.27

There were few exceptions to the Air Force's standard 90-day assignments. In

June 1996, some security policemen, who belonged to a relatively small career field

whose members were critically needed on deployments overseas, were serving in

Dhahran on 45- and 65-day rotation tours, as well as the typical 90-day one.28

Members of the Tlst Rescue Squadron generally served 60-day rotations.2e When

Brig. Gen. Terry Schwalier took command in July 1995, he began a one-year assignment. He then became the first wing commander to serve a fuIl-year tour. Nine

other senior positions of the 4404th also represented one-year assignments.3O

Beyond these few cases, exceptions to the standard 90-day tour were exffemely rare.

An assignment of more than 179 days in the theater required a waiver signed by the

Secretary of the Air Force.3l

As for unit deployrents, the one made during the spring of 1996 by the 58th

Fighter Squadron, whose F-15s provided the wing's primary air-to-air uni!32 represented a typical case. A component of the 33d Fighter Wing, it consisted of 18 aircraft, about 40 officers, and roughly 300 airmen, and it deployed approximately 260

personnel to Dhahran. Each squadron of the wing usually went to Saudi Arabia

about every eighteen to twenty-four months, and its officers knew a year or so in

advance about their next Southern Watch tour, and would spend about a month

I
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

preparing for a deployment.33 The 58th left the United States on April14,1996,

served the usual rotation of about ninety days, and was scheduled to retum to Eglin

Air Force Base, Florida on June 28. This return date, as events developed, fell just

two days after the KhobarTowers bombing.3a

Both Saudi Arabia and the United States favored the ninety-day temporary duty

tours. The Saudi government, driven by Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, had accepted foreign troops, but the Islamic kingdom remained sensitive about military forces

from other countries taking permanent station within its borders. In consideration

forthis sensivity, the vastmajority ofuniformedAmericans in SaudiArabia afterthe

GulfWar served in briefrotation tours like those of the 4404thWing. The short-term

deployments also were consistent with the foreign and military policies of the

United States in southwest Asia. When President Bush had directed the Desert

Shield deployment in defense of Saudi Arabia in 1990, he had stated that the

American forces would leave whentheirmissionwas completed. The United States

sought no bases or continuing presence on the Arabian peninsula, and it did not consider Southern Watch a permanent operation.3s And yet by the time of the Khobar

Towers bombing, American airmen had been patrolling the skies over Iraq for half a

decade. After the terrorist attack suddenly drew attention to Operation Southem

Watch, as Brigadier General Schwalier commented, "The fact that we had been

there for five years came as a surprise to many people."36

Those airmen who deployed to Dhahran for Southern Watch lived in the

American sector of the KhobarTowers compound, a complex named for al Khobaq

the community of eastem Dhahmn wtrere it was located. (Arab translators usually

rendered the name "al Khubar"; English ones nearly always made it "al Khobar.")

The Arabic words that transliterate to "Khu-bar" or "Kho-ba1' translate in English

to "small settlement." This phrase suggests the origin of the community's name,

because as late as the 1940s Khobar was no more than a small fishing village on the

Arabian Gulf.37

The economic rise of Khobar dated to 1936, when the Arabian American Oil

Company had dug the Dammam No. 7 well and confirmed that Saudi Arabia held a

vast supply ofthe hydrocarbons that were so valuable throughout the world. The history of Dhahran, the area around it, and the entire kingdom, changed fundamentally. During the late 1940s and into the next decade, ARAMCO discovered new oil

fields south, west, and north of Dammam. As the company expanded and its exports

and revenues increased, al Khobar began developing from a small fishing village

into an urbanized communiff. During the 1950s and 1960s the mudbrick huts ofthe

fishermen gave way to modern residences, multi-lane highways, and handsomely

landscaped streets.38

In 1979 contractors working for the Saudi govemment finished building the

Khobar Towers. The kingdom's leaders intended the facility, as they had Eskan

Village outside Riyadh, to house Bedouin tribesmen. These nomadic people, however, preferred their ovm tents and traditions to the government's aparffnents and a

new lifestyle, and both compounds went unused for years. The buildings of Khobar

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Towers stood empty until Americans began quartering there during the Desert

Shield deployment of 1990 and the Gulf War that followed.3e

The complex originally intended for the Bedouins was large, taking in about

fourteen residential blocks. The Air Force and U.S. Army occupied only about two

of them. When USAF airmen in the 1990s spoke about "Khobar Towers," they usually were referring to just the American sector, secured within its oum perimeter, as

opposed to the larger, fourteen-block Khobar area, which featured both Saudi military and civilian housing.ao

Most of the U.S. Army personnel who lived within the American perimeter

worked on Lucky Base, a small facility about five miles south of the Khobar

Towers. These "green suiters" belonged to the 6th Battalion, 52d Air Defense

Artillery, a Patriot missile unit from Fort Bliss, Texas, and to the 54th Signal

Battalion, from Fort Huachuc a, Aizona. South of the Army and Air Force facilities,

yet still within the secured compound, French and British personnel occupied four

buildings.ar

The American sector of the compound was bounded on the north by Thir[zfirst Street, on the east by Eighth Street, on the south by Thirty-fifth Street, and on

the west by Twelfth Street. Press accounts stated that the complex was a mile in circumference; resident joggers, who took an interest in such things, put it at the same

distance or a little less, perhaps nine-tenths of a mile.a2

Within this perimeter stood forty-one buildings. Twenty of them were tall, T:

shaped structures that served either as dormitories or as a combination of housing

and offices. These high-rise buildings gave the "KhobarTowers" complex part of its

name. The "Khobar" came from the local community, and "Towers" was a useage

similar to "tower" aparhnents in the United States.a3 In addition to these twenty tall

buildings, the compound also featured seven partially underground parking garages

that had been converted to storage or services facilities, including a shopette, post

office, and a furnishings management office. The buildings of the Air Force complex ranged from four to eight stories, each floor divided into two or three suites.

Within the dormitories, each floor had three suites, each housing as many as ten

people, or thirty per floor.a

By 1996, the appearance of the KhobarTowers suffered from the sustained use

of the facilities. A number of airmen-from general officers down through the

ranks-rxpressed honest opinions about this. General Schwalier said that when he

arrived at the Khobar Towers, the conditions reminded him of something out of *M*A*S*H*" "I remember thinking," he stated n 1999, "I would not let my son

live in some of these barracks, they were in such disrepair." His successor, Brig.

Gen. Daniel M. Dick, commented that by 1996 Khobar Towers had gained the

appea.rance of "aTDY [temporary duty] hang out." One airman contrastedthe quality of the Air Force facilities with those enjoyed by the Arabian American Oil

Company, less than five and a half miles to the wes! which he openly envied.as

The 4404th Wingb May 1996 Five-Year Facilities Improvement Plan included

$500,000 for repairing and upgrading 432 dormtory rooms. "If this renovation is

2l
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

not accomplished," the report stated, "KhobarTowers quarters will continue to deteriorate, eventually to the point of condemning the only living quarters available to

the GIs in Dhahmn. In addition, repair calls will increase, tasking our civil engineers

beyond their resources.'ao

The area around the Air Force's Khobar Towers compound was well populated.

South of it was the Saudi military housing complex, whose tall buildings mirrored

the USAF dormitories. These structures continued beyond the eastem border of the

Air Force compound and then gave way to civilian housing, open fields, and a

mosque. Not much further east lay the Arabian Gulfi airmen could smell the sea air

and could see the Gulf water from their dormitory balconies. The northern perimeter of the Air Force compound was Thirty-first Street and just beyond it stood al

Khobar Park. Across from the northern part ofthe compound's western bordeq there

were private residences and south ofthem, open areas.47

Less than a mile west of the KhobarTowers was the easternportion of Dhahran

Air Base, which featured an air defense reservation and the civilian runways of

Dhahan Intemational Airport. The westem part of the base, with its military runway, was about another five miles from the KhobarTowers. The King Fahd expressway, a limited access highway that connected the city of Dhahran with a causeway

to Bahrain, ran nor*r-and-south between KingAbdulAziz and Khobar.a8

This Saudi Arabian base was one location among many where, in June 1996,

about 12,000 Air Force people were serving in deployments around the world.ae

FewAmericans knew anything w{ratever about DhahranAir Base and the housing

complex at the Khobar Towers. A sudden tragedy dispelled this ignorance.

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Chapter Three

Stay Alert, Be Observant

There had been yiolence in the Dhahran community of al Khobar before June

1996, and there would be afterward. During the Gulf War, on February 2 5, 1991, an

Iraqi Scud missile killed twenty-eight Americans and wounded ninety-eight others

when it hit an Army barracks. This facility, a converted warehouse near Souk's

Supermarket, stood a little less than six miles from the Khobar Towers.r After the

June 1996 bombing, the community retumed to the news in 200 I . Not long after the

September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, on the night of

October 6, abomb exploded on a crowded al Khobar street. OneAmerican and several other foreign nationals were killed.2

After the Gulf War had ended, tensions remained in Saudi Arabia. Iraqi dictator

Saddam Husseinb persisting belligerence had prompted President George Bush to

direct "Operation Southern Watch." Another source of tension was created by militant Islamics within SaudiArabia. During the 1991 GulfWar, these religious fundamentalists began to build a popular following by denouncing the presence in their

country ofAmericans and other foreign "infidels." The militants also criticized the

Saudi royal family, alleging that its extravagant living and comrption befiayed a lack

of fidelityto Islam.3

During the ear$ 1990s, very few violent acts were aimed at Westerners.

Americans, civilian and military generally believed themselves safe in Saudi

Arabia, particular$ so in the quiet Eastern Province. Doubtless most of them felt

more secure in Riyadh, and certainly in Dhahran, than in the large cities of the

United States.a

Then on November 13, 1995, a deadly event changed this pattern. Terrorists

exploded a car-bomb in Riyadh, at the Office of Program Management-Saudi

Arabian National Guar4 the training facility for the Saudi National Guard the U.S.

Army had operated since 1965.5 An Islamic fundamentalist group claimed responsibility for this explosion of the equivalent of 200 pounds of TNII which killed seven

people, five Americans and two Indians, and wounded sixty others. Immediately

after this bombing, the U.S. State Deparhnent alerted the embassies, consulates, and

military units in the region that "threats have been made againstAmerican citizens in

SaudiArabia. TheAmerican Embassy in Riyadh is informing the local communityto

exercise cautiorl keep a low profile and limit travel wi*rin Saudi Arabia.'6
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Despite the Riyadh bombing, the Saudi government minimized the numbers

and strength of the dissidents who opposed the rule of the royal family and the presence ofAmericans. [n aMay 1996 interview, a senior Saudi official estimated that

his country harbored no more than 300 hard-core militants, whom he compared to

the American extremists wtro had held law officers at bay in Montana earlier that

spnng. "Basically, these are our Freemen," he stated. "They say the same thingthat they do not recognize the govemment." About the same time as this interview,

the Saudi defense minister played down the threats against American installations,

calling them "boyish acts," stressing that "the Kingdom is not influenced by

threats."T The Saudi arnbassador to the United States told American reporters:

"Islamic radicals are very, very small, and looked upon in this country as outcasts. . . . Islamic extremists are not a threat to the stabilifz of the country." Saudi

authorities seemed to regard the Riyadh bombing as an aberration.8

Americans responded much differently to the November 1995 attack.

Immediately following the bombing, the State Deparhnent began a study of its facilities in Riyadh. At the same time Gen. Joseph W Ralston, Air Combat Command

commander, and Lt. Gen. John P Jumper, commander ofthe NinthAir Force, which

provided the air component of the United States Central Command, toured the

southwest Asian theater and reviewed the measures taken to protect the forces

there.e

These general officers were in no way alone in their concems aboul the security of Americans in the region. After the Riyadh bombing, airmen of all ranks in

Saudi Arabia believed they were in dangerous surroundings. Many shared the view

of Maj. Bennie L. Umstead II, the JTF-SWA commander's executive officeE who

often drove past the Saudi Arabian National Guard building during the weeks after

the attack. "'We saw the bombing site there," Major Umstead said later. "We knew

there was, of course, always the potential forviolence. There was a carefulness in the

air."lo

Airmen in Dhahran, more than 200 miles from Riyadh, were equally concerned. After the KhobarTowers bombing, SSgt. Anthony Overbay, who had lived

in Building 131 on the compound, told the press: "This building we were in, we constantly joked that we were a fine target, out in this comer, right next to the park."

Another NCO direct$ acknowledged: "I didn't feel comfortable about this tour."lr

Still another airman commented, referring to a series of five suspected reconnaissance incidents reported by the security police between April I and25,1996: "We

knew that people were watching us. We had people stopping and looking atthe area

and leaving."l2

None of these airmen were any more concemed than their om senior officer,

the commander of the 4404th Composite Wing (Provisional). Brig. Gen. Terry

Schwalier himself stated: "We realized there were people out there who were serious about hurting Western interests."l3

After the Riyadh attack, General Schwalier immediately issued a Battle Staff

Directive that raised the alert status of the Khobar Towers Iiom "Threatcon Alpha"

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Stay Alert, Be Observant

to "Threatcon Bravo."ra At the time General Schwalier made this decision, the official USAF guidance on "threatcons," or threatening conditions, was stated in Air

Force lnstruction 3l-210, which had been in effect since July l, 1995. Like its predecessors, this AFI used the phonetic alphabet to designate four levels ofthreatcons,

which might develop against any installation. Each of these letters represented a

warning against a range ofpotential threats from terrorists or others, and each

required a base to take certain security measures. As the threatcon advanced through

the alphabet, it reflected an increased threat to the installation and it usually meant

that the intelligence about that threat became more specific. At each level of warning, an installation took all of the security measures required at the earlier, lower

ones, and additional ones as well.15

Air Force Instruction 3 I -2 10 defined rhreatcon Alpha as a general alert of possible terrorist activiry whose exact nature or full extent could not be predicted.

Security measures taken at this level included increasing overall vigilance, reviewing bomb threat procedures, checking deliveries ofpackages, and reducing the number ofentrance points to a base. Threatcon Bravo represented an increased and more

predictable threat of terrorist actMty, without any specific target being identified. A

commander declared this level of warning when he or she had information that terrorists were actively preparing for an operation in the general area oftheir installation. At Threatcon Bravo, personnel took all the measures of rhreatcon Alpha and

additional ones such as moving vehicles, hash dumpsters, crates, and other large

objects at least twenty-five meters (about eighty-fwo feet) from buildings; routinely

locking vehicles and checking them for tampering when unlocking them; reviewing

security plans; and maintaining a low profile.r6

The Khobar Towers remained at Threatcon Bravo on June 25,1996. After

determining a threat condition, commanders sometimes modified the security measures taken at its level. In the case of Khobar Towers, by June 25, 1996, Brigadier

General Schwalier had implemented so many of the measures associated with

Threatcon charlie that some of its residents believed that the compound stood at

that higher level, rather than at Bravo.lT

When the Khobar Towers moved to Threatcon Bravo after the Riyadh bombtng, the security police responded accordingly. Three days after this change in alert

status, General Schwalier noted in a private letter: "our cops are on l2-hour shiftshaving doubled up on the gates and increased their patrols." The security police

tightened their checking of identification cards at the compound's main gate. At

Threatcon Bravo, as one security policeman put i! the Sps became "more vigilant in

[their] normal duties."r8

In addition to raising the threatcon level, General Schwalier directed a number

of measures to improve the protection of the Khobar Towers perimeter. Thousands

of sandbags were used to build two M-50 machine gun bunkers that covered the

main gate and seven similar defensive positions on DhahranAir Base. A formidable

line of concrete 'T.,lew Jersey''barriers in double rows fortified the western, northem, and eastern perimeters of the complex. After the Novernber 13 bombing, work

25
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

crews reinforced these large obstacles with others like them that had been left scattered along the road to the installation. "We immediately started to check and reinforce our barrier," General Schwalier stated. "We worked shaight for three or four

days bringing in barriers that were strewn along the highway. We got very serious

about completely surrounding our area with these Jersey barriers." Eventually, eight

hundred of these obstacles protected the Khobar perimeter.re

The 44}4thComposite Wing took other steps as a result of the Riyadh bombing. General Schwalier directed that a "serpentine," or staggered, pattern of barriers

be installed in front of the compound's entry points, which forced all vehicles to

slow down before they reached a security checkpoint. The wing commander also

restricted oflbase travel, and he directed that trash dumpsters and parked vehicles

be moved at least twenty-five meters away from buildings. Non-essential commercial deliveries into the complex were suspended. "I wouldn't let vendors come on

base" right after the Riyadh attack, General Schwalier stated. "We tried to make sure

we really got a grip on everything that was going on within the compound." He summaizedthe wing's view of force-protection issues, before and after November 13:

"We were aware of security before, but we got hyper about it as a result of the

Riyadhbombing."2o

During the next month, December 1995, the 4404thWing began a vigorous

training program for its Disaster Control Group. Headed by the wing's support

group commander and made up of representatives from key functional areas' the

DCG would restore the unit's communications and manage its recovery in the event

of an attack, an afucraft accident, or other contingency.2l It was also during

December that General Schwalier initiated an ongoing series of weekly security

review meetings, which were attended by the Air Force Office of Special

Investigations (AFOSI) detachment commander, the wing's support group commander, its civil engineering squadron commander, security police squadron commander, intelligence officer, and othen when required. During the same month, too,

General Schwalier directed the 4404thto conduct a tabletop terrorist bombing exercise.2z

on January 8, 1996, the AFOSI presented General Schwalier with a Vulnerabilif Assessment.23 Twice a year OSI officers, as a routine part of their responsibilities, submitted a document like this one to the senior officer in Dhahran. They

gave the commander of the KhobarTowers, and of other such facilities worldwide,

their observations of possible lulnerabilities of their installation to terrorists and a

list of recommendations on how to strengthen these potential weaknesses. No one

could state definitely which, if any, of the points identified in any AFOSI assessment would ever be exploited by attackers, but these semiannual reports helped

senior leaders focus their efforts against the greatest threats.2a

When Brigadier General Schwalier had taken command of the 4404IhWing in

July 1995, the AFOSI had a vulnerability survey underway. It provided this report to

the commander in September and he directed the 44041h to begin work on its recommendations. Before the wing could implement the suggestions of this AFOSI

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wlnerability survey, the Riyadh car bombing took place. The OSI began a new

report, which would take into account the concems raised by this November 1995

terrorist attack. It was this lulnerability assessment that General Schwalier received

on January 8, 1996.2s

TheAFOSI team identified a number ofpotential vulnerabilities at the Khobar

Towers, and their January 1996 assessment listed thirty-nine "action items." These

included recommendations about cutting vegetation fiom the compound's perimeter

fences, protecting radio fansmissions, monitoring the activities of the third country

nationals who worked at the Khobar Towers, improvrng parking arrangements,

strengthening the security of the senior members of the wing's staff, and other

issues.26 By the time of the June 25, 1996, anack the 4404th Wing had implemented thirty-six of the OSI's thirty-nine recommendations.zT

The AFOSI's January 1996 vulnerability assessment listed five terrorist scenarios: driving into the Khobar Towers to make a suicidal car-bombing, parking and

abandoning a vehicle with a bomb in it, carrying a human-portable explosive device

into the compound and leaving it there, entering the base wearing a body charge to

make a suicidal man-pack bombing, or posting a package or letter bomb to the facility. Given the experience of the Riyadh attack, preventing a car-bornb from penetrating the KhobarTowers became the top priority.28

After the January 1996 assessment, the wing took fi..rther steps. To prevent a

speeding vehicle from penetrating the compound, Brigadier General Schwalier

directed that dumpsters be positioned at key locations. After the Riyadh attack, each

Khobar gate had serpentine barriers that forced all incoming traffic to approach at

slow speeds, and after the January assessment, the security at these entry points was

further improved. Although the staggered obstacles slowed vehicles and reduced the

chances of a suicide car bombing, they also could delay the traffic legimately entering the compound. Vehicles carrying Air Force passengers might back up and

become a target for terrorists. After the January assessment, the security police

accordingly set up two checkpoints at each gate, and directed military vehicles into

the second, more guarded one while they completed their identification checks.2e

In addition to vehicle security, General Schwalier also remained concerned

about off-base travel. The limitations he put in place after the Riyahd bombing continued in various forms throughout the winter and spring of 1996. For airmen with a

few hours leave, Bahrain beckoned as a popular destination. It was a forty-minute

drive from the Khobar Towers, across the fourteen-mile King Fahd causeway and

through its six security checkpoints, to the U.S. Naly, Central Command facility,

which featured a post exchange and a beach club. Here, in contrast to the Saudi

kingdom where Islamic law prevailed the Khobar airmen could buy alcoholic beverages.3o

During December 1995 and early 1996, a series of terrorist bombings took

place in Bahrain. Although their pattem suggested they represented local criminal

activity, rather than attacks aimed at Americans, General Schwalier saw no reason to

take risks. On February 21 he stopped all unofficial travel to Bahrain. "My con-

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

cern," he stated later, "was that [the terrorists] were starting to choose places

Americans might flequent." One Air Force officer later praised the travel restriction,

in candid terms: "I think the commanders there [at KhobarTowers] did a pretf, darn

goodjob ofkeeping the security as tight as it was, when all us 'Joes'overthere were

going, 'Hey, I d like to go to Bahrain and have a whiskey."'3l

In an irony of dates, the Bahrain restriction wouldhave ended onJvne26,1996.

The new travel policy took effect on the twenty-fifth, the day of the bornbing, and on

that Thesday airmen began signing up for passes that would have allowed them to

rehrrn in civilian clothes to the popular NAVCENT facility. The terrorists struck that

night, and all such trips were canceled.32

The Bahrain travel restrictions represented only one example of the tense situation around the KhobarTowers during the spring of 1996. Saudi securif forces took

an action that no doubt prevented a terrorist athack when, on March 29,they tntercepted a late-model Chewolet Caprice being smuggled into their country from

Jordan. Border guards searched the car and found eighty-five pounds ofplastic

explosives. As ominous as the large quantity of deadly material was the fact that it

had been expertly concealed within the Caprice's engine compartment. Saudi press

reports connected this smuggling attempt with the November 1995 Riyadh bombing.33 Before this episode and after it, continuing into earlyApril, some Saudi newspapers ran a series of anti-American articles that increased the mood of tension.3a

On March 14 a new commander of the 4404thWingb securiq' police squadron,

Lt. Col. James J. Traister, reported to the Khobar Towers.3s Lieutenant Colonel

Traister had a strong background in antiterrorism, and one Air Force report said of

him: "He was considered to be a superb squadron commander."36 He met with

General Schwalier and discussed the issues related to his new assignment. While the

two officers talked about a range of possible threats to the installation, the wing

remained focused on preventing the penetration of the compound, particularly by a

car-bomb. Colonel Traister later summarizedlhe strategy: "The defense of Khobar

Towers is to stop and eliminate any threat (human bomber or car bomber) fiom getting [past] 12th Street [the westernperimeter] into the main compound. This is with

the assumption that all personnel perform theirjobs and everything falls into place

with lots of luck." He also stated: "This plan is not designed to stop stand [off] type

weapons, RPG [rocket propelled grenade], mortar attack, or sniper fire. Our intent

is to make the base as hard atargetto hit as possible to force the enemy to go elsewhere."37

In April Brigadier General Schwalier, Lieutenant Colonel Traister, and Col.

Gary S. Boyle, the wing's support group commander, implemented additional counterterrorist measures. Airmen trimmed back vegetation growing on the interior of

the perimeter fence and put seven miles of concertina wire along the top of the double Jersey barriers. The security police increased their patrols and worked twelvehour to fourteen-hour shifts, six days a week.38

In another of these April 1996 measures, General Schwalier and Colonel

Traister established sentry observation posts on the dormitory roofs at each ofthe

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four corners of the Khobar Towers. From the top of Building 201, between Thirtyseventh and Thirty-fifth Streets, the security police had an excellent view of the

main gate and the west side of the compound. It was manned around the clock.3e

Another dormitory Building 101, stood just east of Twelfth Street and south of

Khobar's softball field, and complemented Building 20I as an observation post for

the westem perimeter. The roof of Dormitory 101 also overlooked the northwestern

part of the compound, an area that included the offices of the 4404th Wing. The

security police manned this post during the midnight shift. Building l3l, located at

the northeast corner and manned by the midnight shift, was destined to gain the

greatest notoriety of these four observation posts. SPs were stationed there, like

Building 101 

, on the midnight shift. The fourth, Building 1 I 7, stood in the southeast

comer of the compound and complemented 13l's view of the eastem perimeter. It

would be manned when threat conditions increased.4 General Schwalier had taken

an extraordinary step: neither the British, nor the French, nor the U.S. Army Forces,

Central Command (ARCENT) buildings had any rooftop sentries.ar

On April 22, Ihere was a dramatic development in the Riyadh bornbing case.

The Saudi government announced it had arrested four of its oli,n nationals for this

crime and televised these suspects making confessions. During this broadcast the

prisoners stated that they had been influenced by Islamic groups outside their country and admitted that they had planned more attiacks. On May 15, with these men

under a death sentence, the American Embassy issued another advisory: there were

threats of "retaliation against Americans in Saudi Arabia" if the condemned were

executed.a2

In late April and into May, the Defense Department, Federal Bureau of

Investigation, and Central Intelligence Agency sought permission to question the

forn prisoners. The American agencies wanted among several things, to investigate

whether the Riyadh bombing and other attacks were the work of Saudi militants acting alone; of terrorists from Iran and other countries; or, what one Saudi official

called'the most dangerous possibility," a combination of the two. The Saudi govemment denied the American requests and the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh renewed the

question on behalf of the FBI. After this approach was refused, the State

Department raised the issue with the Saudi Embassy. As the end of May

approached, the Americans had received received no reply.a3

While fhe State Department waited for a response, an odd incident took place at

the Khobar Towers: a car rammed one of the Jersey barriers that stood along the

compound's eastern perimeter, toward its northern end. The vehicle approached

very slowly, ran into the solid concrete at a low speed, four to six miles per hour, and

moved it two or three feet. The driver then backed up and drove away.a Airmen living in Building 127, a dormitory in the northeastern part of the complex, promptly

reported the episode to the security police. "The dorm residents," General Schwalier

noted, "did as we asked. They reported it:'After this episode, the wingb civil engineering squadron staked doum all of the Jersey barriers around the perimeter. The

incident was reported up the chain of command and an officialAir Force report of

29
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

April 1997 stated: "The incident was fully investigated. . . . The investigation was

inconclusive, with explanations ranging from the possibility of an accident to the

more serious concem that it may have been a test of the perimeter.'4s

Between May 26 and 3 l, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John M.

Shalikashvili toured the Arabian Gulf and on the morning of the twenty-ninth he

visited Dhahran. General Schwalier escorted the Chairman around the military side

of Dhahran Air Base. "I put in front of him as many of my people as I could,"

General Schwalier later related. "I had groups waiting for him at the operations area,

the logistics areas, [and elsewhere], probably a couple hundred, three hundred people each place.'46

Addressing the Dhahran airmen, General Shalikashvili emphasized the importance of their Southern Watch mission. "And the work that you do," he said "each

and every day, here on the flightline tuming wrenches, or performing admin functions, or myriad other tasks that make the 4404fh so outstanding, and make your

mission run so smoothly --every task is vital, and every one of you is indispensable." At the end of his remarks, the Chairman twice exhorted the airmen to "be

safe." "So let me tell you that I am proud of you," General Shalikashvili declared,

'lzour families are proud of you, and the Nation is proud of you. And I ask a few

things of you: keep up the magnificent job you're doing over here, and do what only

you all can do, which is to take good care of your equipment and of each other, and

be safe." Then he closed: "Good luck to you all, be safe, and God bless you."a7

General Shalikashvili's emphasis on safety was already firmly in the minds of

his audience, as an attihrde ofcaution had prevailed that spring. The travel restrictions remained in force. Wing persormel were not to go into downto'wn Dhahran,

unless the AFOSI had advised them it was safe, and then, under a long-standing

rule, they were to move in groups of at least two but no more than four. An article in

the Gulf Vievv, the wing newspaper, alerted readers in mid-April: "So next time you

go downtown, remember [terrorists] look for targets of opportunity like Westemers

in groups larger than four, or one person alone (that's the reasoning behind the two

to four flrle)."+s Air Force members also were advised to check their cars for

bombs.ae

In addition to the travel restrictions, General Schwalier sftessed security awareness to his subordinates during his weekly "stand ups" of the 4404th's stafl at force

protection meetings, and on other occasions. At the wing's staffmeetings, his officers discussed at length what the appropriate threat condition should be for the week

ahead.5o General Schwalier coordinated this setting of the threatcon level with the

JTF-SWA and ARCENT and with the British and French.The 4404thWing and the

JTF-SWA convened alarge number of meetings of military officers representing

Saudi Arabia, the United States, and other nations participating in Southern Watch

and its counterpart operations, to discuss security issues.5l There was, an AFOSI

representative later commented, "excellent cooperation from all parties involved."s2

The security efforts of the 4404thWing also extended to the 200 to 300 new

arrivals it received each week. Like all such deployed units, it conducted a series of

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Stay Alert, Be Observant

"Right Start" orientation briefings for its newcomers. The 4404th held its sessions

for incoming personnel in one of the Khobar compound's seven converted garages.

The northern side of this building featured an auditoriurr! used for the Right Start

briefings, USO-type shows, and other sizeable gatherings. (The southem portion of

the structwe was the home of the "Khobar Konnection," where dances, attended by

Air Force and Arabian American Oil Company personnel, were held.) Brigadier

General Schwalier directed that the Right Start briefings be held every Friday,

roughly tripling their frequency. The commander personally gave a forty to fortyfive minute presentation at the opening of each session, reviewing the wing's standards and rules. He urged each group of arrivals to view their temporary duty at

KhobarTowers as an opportunity to improve the combat capability of their unit, to

represent America well by being good guests in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and

to better themselves and their installation during their tour. General Schwalier

stressed to each week's audience the importance ofprotecting the forces in the theater.s3 "I would talk about the threati the wing commander recalled, three years

later, "about things we had seen [happen], particularly the Riyadh bornbing. . . . I

said, You'll probably be mad at me because of the force protection measures that I

have instituted." At the Right Start program on June 21, fle days before the bombing, he emphasized to the newcomers that the wing was operating under a heightened threatcon and that itwas not conducting an exercise-it was responding to an

acitalthreat.sa

During a wing "stand up" meeting, on May 31, the dramatic news arrived at

Khobar Towers that the Saudis had executed the four Riyadh bombers. General

Schwalier later commented that his unit learned about this development very

promptly, 'fthrough the Saudi community," because of the positive relationships he

and his officers had established with their hosts. "I think [we received the news]

before anybody else knew about it. The Saudis dont generally say anything about

these executions." This news indeed represented an abrupt turn of events: when the

executions took place, the State Department was still waiting for a reply to the FBI3

request to question the prisoners. The AFOSI believed that the death sentences

would not be carried out until June 17.55

When General Schwalier received this sudden news, he immediately deployed

additional security police patrols and took filrther measrnes to protect the complex.

Two vehicles drove a surveillance route around the perimeter roads of the compoun4 which were, beginning on the northern side and moving clockwise: Thirtyfirst, Eighth, Thirty-fifth, and Twelfth Streets. The security police also walked two

foot-patrols, one covering the half of Khobar Towers that lay north of Thirty-third

Street, and the other covering the area south of it.5o

After the executions, Brigadier General Schwalier issued a Battle Staff

Directive that "locked doum" the Khobar Towers: all residents were to remain within the compound, except for traveling to their duties at nearby Dhahran Air Base.

(From gate to gate, the distance from the Khobar Towers to the air base was six

tenths of a mile, or about a three-minute drive. The trip to the base's military flight31
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

line, which took a cuwing route, was about five miles.) Under the lock dovm, personnel were required to sign in and out oflog books when they entered certain

buildings on the Khobar compound, and telephone security was tightened.sT

With the Khobar Towers locked down, all traffic in and out of the compound

moved through the main gate, and this single entry point received concentrated

attention. Lieutenant Colonel Traister implemented a number of security improvements. Since the Riyadh bornbing, two bunkers with M-60 machine grrns had covered the traffic entering and leaving the main gate. After the executions, Colonel

Traister directed that a pair oftwo-and-a-halfton dump trucks be positioned to close

the gap between these two bunkers, and the security police kept two more of these

vehicles on stand-by. In the event ofan atback, the SPs could use these trucks to

close the roadway, and fire from behind them. Emergency vehicle lights, so bright

they could be seen day or night, were mounted behind the main gate. These beacons,

a back up to the radios of the security police, could be used to alert other security

posts if any trouble developed at the main entry point.58

The security police manning the main gate, always vigilant, were particularly

so during the lock down. Six SPs served there, making identification checks on

every vehicle entering the compound and conducting extensive searches. A seventh

professional, a French military policeman, joined them between 8 p.m. and midnight, the nighttime hours when the volume of traffic at the main gate ran high. Two

teams ofsecurity police dogs trained to detect explosives also served at this entry

point during the day, and at least one team at night.5e

The Khobar Towers remained locked do'urn for five days, until June 5, and military facilities in Riyadh for even longer. In the case of the latter, Brigadier General

Schwalier praised Col. Dale Bible, the commander of the 4409th Operations Group

in Riyadh, for acting in "lock step" with the actions that he himself had taken in

Dhahran. The wing commander characleized Colonel Bible as "one of my real

good ops grcup commanders."@

It was evident to every resident ofKhobarTowers, and every visitor to the compoun4 that security had tightened during the late spring of 1996. An assistant crew

chief pointed out that, in addition to the machine gun bunkers at the main gate,

"There was a bunker on the British building. You could tell security was getting

tighter. There were a lot more checks; you had to show your ID." A civil engineering

officer, who had served a Dhahran tour during June-Septernber 1995, was surprised

at the high level of security she found when she retumed a year later: "There were

vehicle searches in place. . . . There were no trips to Bahrain, and very limited trips

to downtown [Dhahran]." An NCO who made many rotations to Dhahran had a

similar experience. He retumed in February 1996 to find that "security was stepped

up a lof'and that "tovr'ards May. . . the base got super tight."6r

Khobar Towers airmen commended the security measures that had been taken

before June 25,1996. "They had machine gun nests at the front gate," a pilot of the

Tlst Rescue Squadron recalled months after the bombing. "They had put up a double set of barriers. They were doing a lot heavier checking [of vehicles at the gate]."

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"I watched those security guys at Dhahran," Capt. Jeff Prichard asserted, "and I

know how good they are. There is no question in my mind that security was as tight

as it could be."62

Mr. David Winn, the United States consul general in Dhahran and a veteran of

twenty-five years service in the Middle East, found out first hand how tight it was,

when he drove on the compound one day that spring, intending to make a quick

shopping foray at the commissary. The diplomat went in to buy some razor blades

and retumed to find the securig police were preparing to tow his vehicle. Mr. Winn

had parked too close to the commissary and had violated the minimum safe distance, had his consul-general's car turned out to be a mobile bomb. He paid the SPs

a compliment when he told General Schwalier: "My God, Terry, you know they

really gave me a shakedown." On another occasion, Winn stated that General

Schwalier's force protection measures "were so stringent, so draconian, so professional that I thought he almost had overreacted."63

This emphasis on security and readiness remained strong throughout the days

just before the attack. About two weeks before the KhobarTowers bombing, Lt. Col.

(Dr.) Douglas Robb arrived in Dhahran to serve a one-month interim assignment as

the commander of the 4404thWing's medical group. At Dr. Robb's first meeting

with his stafl he asked about the unit's preparations to deal with a disaster involving

mass casualties. The medical group's readiness officer already was updating the

unit's contingency plans and the new commander accelerated that review, so that it

was completed before the bombing. During the week before the attaclg Robb conducted what he later called a "'mass cal' logistical supply exercise." His medical

professionals checked first hand-not on paper-the availability and quantities of

the supplies they would need in the event of a disaster. If for example, their paperwork said a closet held fifty cots, they located the key to that storage area, opened iq

and counted the cots. [n the few cases w{rere they discovered shortages, MSgt. Luis

Madrigal, the unitb supply sergeant, filled them. On Jtne 20, about the same time

that the medical group was making these firsthand checks, members of the 4404th

Wingb transportation squadron conducted an emergency-response exercise.@

General Schwalier commissioned a series of articles on security awareness and

antiterrorism inthe GulfWew. On June 20, the same day the transporlation squadron

ran its exercise, one ofthese feature stories appeared in the wing newspaper. It occupied nearly a half page and carried the headline: "Terrorism: Real threat

exists... stay alert, be observant." At about the same time, Gen. J. H. Binford Peay

III, U.S. Central Command commander, told a general officer who visited his

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida headquarters that he was concerned terrorists

would attempt to make a "catastrophic hit" somewhere in southwestAsia.65

In *re hindsight available after the attack, the security of one particular part of

the KhobarTowers compound, the northem perimeter, became an issue. The fence

here, running along the north side ofThirty-first Street, stood less than 100 feet

from the Building I 3 I dormitory and other structures at this end of the complex. [n

November 1995 and again in March 1996, Colonel Boyle asked his counterparts in
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

the Saudi security forces for permission to extend this perimeter. During interviews

a few days following the bombing, Brigadier General Schwalier told journalists

about these two occasions when the Americans had approached the Saudis about

moving the border from 100 to 400 feet. "We asked them," he stated, "to move it

outside of the parking lot." The wing commander explained to the press that "the

pace [of decision making] is different in Saudi Arabia" than.the United States. "We

did as much as we could," he said" "given the environment."66

The Saudi security forces had replied that moving the compound's perimeter

farther north would interfere with access to the parking lot next to al Khobar Park

and to a mosque that stood to the east. They stated that they had no authority to

approve the American request, without the approval of the government ministries

that owned the property. The Saudi security officers contended that the existing

perimeter was sufficient against a car-bomb attack on the scale of the Riyadh one.

The host government offered to increase its ov,'n security patrols inside and outside

Khobar Towers and" in response to American concerns about suspicious vehicles, to

run checks on license plates.67

The Saudi government never denied the American requests to extend the northern perimeter; it refused to act on them. As Secretary of Defense William J. Perry

characterized it, "the answer was not now, not yet." General Schwalier told

reporters: "The answer was, 'Not at this time."' U.S. Navy Capt. Michael

Doubleday, the Defense Departmentb press briefeq stated that "it was not a matter

of refusal, it was a matter of ongoing discussions."68 "It's an ongoing process of

negotiation with the Saudis," one senior American military officer explained.

"Requests are not made and satisfied in adey. .. . It was reasonable for the Saudis to

take time [with the request to expand the perimeter] because it would affect their

road network." During a June 27,1996, press conference, Maj. Gen. Kurt B.

Anderson, the JTF-SWA commander, pointed out: "We are on Saudi Arabian soil.

We will coordinate our security measures with them. They will help us. But we do

not own this country." Major GeneralAnderson reminded the joumalists of the llmdamentals of the relationship: "We are here lMng on the facilities they have provided us. That sets up certain constraints that our securif measures must operate within:'6e

After the magnitude of the Khobar Towers bomb became knovrn, many knowledgeable observers concluded that the location of the northem fence was a moot

point. "Wete dealing with a huge bomb," General Anderson emphasized, one that

caused so much destruction over so wide an area that some Saudis thought there had

been more than one explosion. General Peay stressed the same point to reporters,

soon after the attack "Frankly, you could have moved that blast a number of yards

farther out and you probably would have had similar results. So this was an act of

exorbitant degree of capability. . . that you don't normally see [in terrorist cases]."7o

Some relevant findings came from a survey of the KhobarTowers bomb damage that experts from the Defense Special Weapons Agency and the Army Corps of

Engineers conducted soon after the explosion. This team projected what the explo34

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StayAlert Be Observant

sive effects might have been had the terrorist truck been parked 400 feet north of

Building 131, the perimeter the Americans had requested. They concluded that in

this case "the blast would likely have produced damage comparable to that which

actually occurred at Building 133," rvhich stood west of dormitory l3l andwqs

about 400 feet from where the bomb actually had been located. The damage survey

team prdected there would have been "significant structural damage and shattering

of most or all glass windows and doors. While deaths from blurt trauma might be

reduced in this scenario, severe injuries and death from glass fragmentation would

likely occur."

Underscoring the obvious importance of keeping terrorist bombs at a distance

from facilities, the teamb report then pointed to some hard realities, which applied

directly to the case of the Khobar perimeter. "For large threats," it stated "represented by truck bombs. . . these standoffdistances quickly become exkemely large, and

often extremely difficult to implement. For example, for a blast equivalent to 20,000

lbs of TNI concrete structures would still suffer damage at a standoff of over 400

feet and there would be significant glass shattering at over 1,000 feet."7l

The suruey echoed Lieutenant Colonel Traisterb realistic observation that were

limitations on what could be done to protect Khobar Towers against standoff

weapons. Securing the compound's perimeter was another matter and in that regard"

many believed that General Schwalier, Colonel Traister, Colonel Boyle, and others

had succeeded. One junior officer asserted in February 1997 that,were it not for the

force-protection improvements made during General Schwalierb tenure, "half ofus

wouldn't be here today." The general's successor later offered this assessment: "If

[the tenorists] could have gotten that truck into the middle ofKhobarTowers and set

it offbeside the dining hall. . . then the death toll would have been tremendously

worse. It was the great work ofTerry Schwalier that the tragedy was as contained as

it was."72

Immediately afterthe KhobarTowers attack, anAFOSI officer stated: 'As tragic as this event is, it should be recognized that personnel responded in a professional manner, as trained, to attempt to counter the threat that was immediately perceived when the explosives laden vehicle parked outside the perimeter fence. Their

best efforls were simply overcome by the speed with which the event developed and

the sheer masnitude of the blast."73
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Dirt parking lot southwest of Building I 3 I where some of the wounded were initially

taken; Building 130 is at centerleft,72l at top right (rop). Looking across an underground garage at the main gate (center). View southwest from Khobar complex,

Dhahran Air Base is just beyond the highway at the top right of the pichre (bottom).

Opposite page, top to bottom: Saudi residences similar to KhobarTowers'buildings,

looking southeast across 8th Street from Building 131. Same intersection as above, but

with additional 'Tersey''barriers installed. Mosque east of Building l3l, the Arabian

Gulf is visible in the distance. Parking lot north of Building 131 before the bombing,

the tanker fuck would park just offthe picture at bottom right. (See map on page 11.)
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"Jersey" barriers and concertina wire at

the corner of 12th Street and 3lst Sfreet

(top l{t). The serpentine entrance to the

main gate (1op right). Barrier at the main

gate (cente). Aroof-top security police

post (leJt).

Opposite page: Truck inspe ction (top

left).Mackme gun inside bunker (/op

right). Bwku on road into complex

(center top). Dump truck behind bunker

for blocking entrance in emergency (center bottom). Installation of additional

"Jersey" barri ers (b o tt om).

38
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Khobar Towers complex, with Building

I 3 1 at left, after the attack (top). Securif

policemen SSgl. Alfredo R. Guerrero,

SrA. Corey P Grice, andAlC.

ChristopherT. Wagar each receive the

Airman's Medal fromAir Force Chief of

StaffGen. Ronald R. Fogleman (cente4

leJi to right).The panels on the northeast

corner of Building 131 buckled from

explosion (/ey').

Opposite page, top to bottom: The

force ofthe explosion can be inferred

flom the size ofthe crater, the interior

walls of the rooms in Buildine l3l, and

the remains of ahumvee.

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Most of the deaths and injuries were caused by fllng glass and blunt trauma. These

pictures show room interiors, with glass (rop) and debris (center and bottom).

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Chapter Four

The Attack

On June 25,1996, Maj. Gen. Kurt B. Anderson, the commander of the Joint

Task Force SouthwestAsia (JTF-S'WA), and Maj. Bennie L. Umstead II, his executive officeq took a C-21 transport from Riyadh to Dhahran Air Base. Arriving at the

KhobarTowers that aftemoon, they billeted for the night in a distinguished-visitors

suite of Building 101, the visiting officers quarters. Theirrooms were across the hall

fiom the temporary lodgings of Brig. Gen. Terry Schwalier, the commander of the

4404th Composite Wing (Provisional). Building 101 stood southwest of Building

131, a short distance across a dirt and gravel parking lot. The next morning General

Anderson was to officiate at the change of command ceremony in which Brig. Gen.

Dan Dick, then the Air Combat Command inspector general, would succeed

General Schwalier.r

The plans for this ceremony were, of course, canceled by that nightb violent

explosion. Wifiresses later gave varying descriptions of how the Khobar Towers

attack sounded, looked, and felt, depending upon exact$ where they had been at

9:53 p.m. that Tiresday. Many agreed with Maj. Bennie Umstead that the explosion

was not only loud, but prolonged. "It wasn't a blast like a 'boom,"' he said. "The

blast lasted, it seems, like forty-five seconds. . . . It was a long noise, the loudest I

ever heard. You tried to put your hands over your ears." Capt. (Dr.) R. Morris

Treadway, a flight surgeon who lived in Building 127, recalled: "The shaking

seemed to go on for ever." Maj. Cynthia Coles, a resident of Building 133, also

emphasized the length of the explosion: "It felt like an etemity. First of all the lights

went out; it went dark. I felt the wave of the blast pressure. [I felt] just sunounded by

the pressure and then, instantly, the loud noise and the pressure from it, exploding

again, just totally surrounding me."2

People heard the bomb, and felt its horrendous force, across great distances. At

the time of the attack, Lt. Col. (Dr.) Douglas J. Robb, dental surgeon Lt. Col. (Dr.)

Alfred B. @ruce) Lauder, and Capt. CintkriaY (Cindy) Pollert were entering a carpet

shop in downtovrn Dhahran, about three-quarters of a mile from the blast. The explosion broke the glass in the merchant's windows and brought dorvn dust from the ceiling. "It shook androckedlhe downtovm," Dr. Robb remembered, so forcefully that he

and the others at first believed the bomb was somer,vhere in the city itself, near them.l

The force of the blast carried vast distances across water and desert. Its tremor was
I

Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

felt in Bahrain, twenty miles away, and Headquarters Joint Thsk Force Southwest

Asia received phone calls indicating that distant reverberations were heard in the

UnitedArab Emirates, more than one hundred and twenty miles away.a

The blast was readily visible fiom the military flightline at DhahranAir Base,

about five miles west ofthe truck-bornb. Here the maintenance team was at work on

the HC-130 that had been forced to return early. SSgt. Jacques P. Bruffy, one of the

engine mechanics, was facing the opposite direction from the Khobar Towers.

Another airman looked over his shoulder, saw the flash in the nighttime sky to the

east, and asked him: "Did you see tltat?" The ground hemor from the blast shook

the maintenance shack. Within two minutes of the attack, the airmen on the flightline got the news over their radio: there had been an explosion at the Khobar Towers.

The blast occurred while MSgt. Joel Schaeffer and AlC. Ken Smith were

effoute from the flightline to the compound. The other maintainers considered

returning to the Khobar Towers, too-like many others that night, they wanted to

help those rnjured in the explosion. They were instructed, howeveq to stay where

they were and finish repairing the HC-130, and they stuck to their task.s

Their commandeq Lt. Col. Thomas H. Shafer, praised the way the maintenance

team responded to the unprecedented circumstances they faced. He pointed out that,

at the time, it had to be assumed the HC-130 would be needed to carry the wounded

back home. It was possible, too, that there would be more terrorist attacks: that night,

no one could be certain there would be only one bombing. The maintainers, as

Colonel Shafer later said worked under combat conditions to get the 130 fixed.6

About four miles east of the flightline, the blast effects were vividly apparent to

the airmen who were working out at the Khobar Towers gym. MSgt. Dwayne R.

Berry and his exercise partner TSgt. Arthur Bisby stared at the new mirrors around

the walls. Then they realized what was wrong with them: one after anotheq they

were cracking and shattering. "They started to explode outward," Sergeant Berry

said, "toward us. . . . The mirrors were going, one by one, boom-boom-boom." Two

or three seconds passed and the lights throughout the gym flashed. Berry looked

through the door into the gym's new aerobics room and saw the twenty-odd televisions all flare ou! each screen flickering at the same time. The blast rocked the allconcrete building and, as he recalled, it "shook like aleaf ."7

Capt. Russell D. Barile also was working out in the gym that T[esday night and

had reached his next-to-last set ofexercises when the bomb exploded. Later he

recalled feeling "the air pressure change. There was an audible hissing sound. Then

the blast hit. It shook everything. Dust came dorvn from the ceiling." Captain Barile,

Sergeants Bisby, Berry, and many others ran out of the gym.8 They found that the

entire Khobar Towers complex was dark, "unbelievably dark," as Berry put it.

Despite the darkness, they could see a huge, bluish cloud moving across the compound. "Then we knewi' Berry said "that it was a bomb."e

Several hundred yards northeast ofthe gym, on the sixth floor of Building 127,

Lt. Cols. Thomas A. McCarthy and William Miller were waiting for a telephone call

and watchins Marathon Man tn their dav room. and Lt. Col. Douglas R. Cochran

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was doing paperwork in his bedroom when the blast struck. Like so many others,

Colonel McCarthy later could recall exactly what he thought at the time of the

attack. "What ran through my min{'he remembered, '\vas 'heat lightning,'because

it [had been] a fairly clear day)'Then Colonel McCarthy heard the explosion and

still sitting in his chair near the suite's picture window, immediately "saw what

looked like a brown cloud, coming straight at the window And at that point

I...turned my head, and that's when the whole window blew in. Of course it happened a lot faster than that, but it seemed to happen [slowly]. The window blew

in. . . . The glass went right by me."

The blast knocked Colonel McCarthy out of his chair toward Colonel Miller,

whose leg was sliced open by a flying shard, while Colonels Cochran and McCarthy

had minor cuts. None of the pilots in Building 127 suffered anything like the injuries

of the airmen in Building 131, but of those n 127, Colonel Miller's wound proved

the worst.lo

Colonel Cochran crawled out of his bedroom and Colonel McCarthy heard him

curse the perpetrators of the bombing. The circumstances merited the squadron

commander's choice of words-and he was not the only person who used strong

language that night. An airman in Building 131 who was severely injured in the

attack described the fint few minutes after the blast: "That was my worst nightmare.

I never heard cries like that, cussing like that." And while many cursed, manyColonel Cochran among them-also called out to their neighbors, to see if they

needed help.rr

Colonel Cochran and the officers with him began to aid one another, a phenomena that by then was taking place all across the compound. He and Colonel

McCarthy put a compress on Colonel Miller3 leg and got him out of their suite and

into the elevator lobby at the center ofthe floor. Then they began checking on the

other rooms. Capt. Craig E. Dye had been talking on the telephone to his wife at the

moment of the blast, and the explosion immediately cut offthe phones. Lori Dye,

like many military wives, had had a number of overseas calls with her husband end

abruptly, and she was not alarmed wften the line went dead in mid-conversation.

McCarthy found Captain Dye in a dazed condition and helped him into the lobby,

with Miller. Dr. Mo Treadway treated Miller, and then McCarthy and another officer shouldered him down the stairwell from the sixth floor.l2 Capt. Mark E.

Ladtkow had suffered some cuts that later required stiches, and his roomates took

him out of the building as well.r3

Up Eighth Street from Building 127 stood Building 131, the dormitory nearest

the blast center, and by far the hardest hit. On its first floor, TSgt. George Burgess

and his three suitemates were crammed together cleaning their refrigerator, when

the bomb went off. The lights went out and the next thing Sergeant Burgess remembered was being on the floor. Months later, he recalled those first minutes after the

atfack "It felt like I was being sand blasted . . . . It was like I was just in the stream [of

a sand blaster]. Then it stopped and it was like, dead silence. Then you could hear

water startins to run."

I
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Sergeant Burgess heard SrA. Michael J. Dolinar, Jr., nearby, saying that he

could not see. "It was totally darki Burgess emphasized. "There was no emergency

lighting, or nothing. ltwas dark.It was dark and dusty. If you inhaled, it was like

dirt!' Gropng in the pitch black, Burgess found SrA. Mike Dolinar's arm and could

feel blood on it. Dolinar had suffered lacerations on his face and elsewhere and

would be irmong the many airmen taken that night to the Minist'ry of Defense and

Aviation (MODA) Hospital, on the civilian side of Dhahran Air Base, near the

Dhahran International Airport. ra When Burgess discovered his suitemate's injury in

the darkness, he said to him and the others: "OI! just grab somebody's hand, we're

getting out of here."i5

The airmen found that leaving Building 131 in the immediate wake of the blast

was a disorienting experience. Helping one another, they climbed over the rubble.

The explosion had destroyed some of the walls, which made their trip particularly

confusing. "It was weird"" Sergeant Burgess said later, "because some of the walls

weren'tthere....Theyweregone....Withthewallsnotbeingthere, Ihadnobearings. . . . There was nothing I could go with."

Once Sergeant Burgess found the flight of steps running down to the ground

floor, he regained his orientation. His rurit was nearly at the end of its tour, which

meant he had been going up and do"ln those stairs for three months. "Once I found

those steps," he said later, "I knew how to get out." He also admitted later: "I didn't

even think of the steps not being there."16

As the group left their dormitory, Sergeant Burgess spotted SSgt. Eric D.

Ziegler, sitting on the ledge of one of the windows of his first-floor room. With the

ground floor under his perch, Sergeant Ziegler sat a story and a half, or well over ten

feet, above the dirt and rubble below. He and Burgess were weight lifting partners,

lived down the hall from one another, and knew each other well. Burgess heard

Ziegler yell dorvn to him: "George, I'm hurt." Burgess called back up: "Okay,'Zl

just stay there. I'll be right back."r7

Once Sergeant Burgess and his suitemates were outside the dorm where it was

lighter, they could see more of the bomb's damage. "There was glass, debris, and

everything," Burgess recalled, "all over the place." In the better lighting, he also

decided on their next course ofaction: "I could see people were starting to gather

out in the parking lot, behind the building [131] that the 58th [Fighter Squadron]

was staying in. . . . I could see people starting to gather, over there, so I took [my

suitemates] out. . . and, hand in hand" we went out there."l8

Sergeant Ziegleq who had called do'nm to Sergeant Burgess, remained perched

in his window. Like hundreds of others, later he could describe exactly what he had

been doing and thinking at the second the bomb exploded. He experienced one of

the strangest coincidences of that tragic nght. Ziegler had reset his alarm clock and

he was testing its "snooze" setting at precisely the moment of the explosion. In his

mind, the two events fused together in abuarre cause and effect: "I hit my snooze

button and when I hit my snooze button, that's when everything blew up. It was like

I'd pushed a button, and everything blew up."1e

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The two simultaneous events disoriented Sergeant ziegrer, and so did the

blast-it threw him across his bedroom. "I really didnt know what was going on,"

he recalled later, "except [that] I was no longer by my alarm clock, I was on the other

side of the room. And I'm a big guy to move.,2O

Sergeant ziegler worked through his disorientation and an awareness dawned:

"I could see that the walls were gone and everything was gone. And rrealued,thatit

was something more than just my alarm clock going off. . . . Then I [thought], I dont

know what's happened now, but I've got to get out of here."2l

As Sergeant ziegler regained awareness, he realized he couldn't see well

because he had been, as he put it later, "smacked in the face" by flying debris. His

right eyelid, left cheek, and left side ofhis nose were cut open and he had a deep

punchrre wound in his right palm, as well as multiple lacerations in his scalp, left

arm, and right knee. Despite these injuries, ziegler managed to crawl across his

room to a window.22

"I thought that [window] was a doorway," Sergeant ziegler related. "I saw a

light, it was a window, and I sat up in this window." perched more than ten feet

lbove the ground ziegler could see below him groups ofpeople who had escaped

Building 1 3 l. Some of them yelled up at him, ..Don,t jump ! Don't jump !'23

sergeantziegler had no intention ofjumping; he stayed put. The damage to the

right side of his face and the dust in his eyes still prevented him from seeing muctl

but he heard a voice he recognized, belonging to Sergeant Burgess. "I could see

lights. . . that was itl' ziegler recounted. "But I heard his voice. He called me ,2.,,'

ziegler yelled douzn for assistance, and Burgess called back the assurance he would

rehrn to help.2a

Sergeant Burgess led his companions to the parking lot and helped Senior

Airman Dolinar get seated on a curb. SrA. Steve Jerwoski, one of Burgeis's suitemates, had left the grcup and escaped on his own. when Burgess reached the the parking lot, he realized that there were only two, not three, airmen with him. He ran back

to his first-floor suite to look for SeniorAirman Jerwoski, and then he went to help

Sergeant Ziegler.25

'T went back across the hall," Sergeant Burgess related, ,,into Z\apartrnent . . . .

There he was, sitting on his window sill there." Burgess helped Sergeant Ziegler out

ofthe window and from the room. It was an emotional trip for the two airmen. Three

of Ziegler's suitemates had been killed in the explosion, and Burgess later said:

"This is where it kind of got a little tough on me. I actually had to climb over some

people to get to him.u26

Sergeant Burgess helped Sergeant ziegler into his bedroom, where he could

put on a pair of shoes. The attack had come at a nighttime hour when many dorm

residents were in slippers, socks, or barefoot. The explosion had blown windows

inward, and strewn glass became the most dangerous hazard,left in the wake of the

blast. Ziegler was one of many people who, injured or no! put shoes on as soon after

the attack as they could. In Buil dng 127 ,Dr. Mo Treadway and others used the contents of the large bottles that commonly sat on the tops of ofiice water coolers to

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

wash the glass offthe feet of some of the residents of that dormitory making it safer

for them to put on their boots or shoes.27

Sergeant Ziegler had no water cooler at hand, but he got his shoes on, wrapped

himself in a blanket, and Sergeant Burgess helped him out of the suite. They soon

met SSgt. Andre L. Stanton of the 412th Operations Support Squadron, a resident of

the fifth floor who had suffered a deep cut on the right side of his face and others to

his nose and upper arm.2s Capt. Russ Barile, who saw Sergeant Stanton that night,

said he "looked like somebody had hit him in the head with a hammer." capt.

Michael D. Morelock, a pilot who lived on the seventh floor, helped Stanton out of

the building and later the-airman was taken to the MODA Hospital.2e

By the time Sergeant Stanton met Sergeants Ziegler and Burgess, he already

had received assistance from Captain Morelock and he would receive more help,

too, during the hours to come. By the same token, Stanton was one of many people

that night who, although badly injured themselves, helped others w4ro needed it. He

hooked Ziegler by the arm and they went out of Building 131 together. Burgess

stayed in the dorm and began searching for others who had been wounded'3O

Spending any time at all in Building 13 I after the blast was dangerous, because

there was no certainty that the structure would remain sound, or that there would be

no more explosions. Yet Sergeant Burgess and many others returned to their dorms

that night, time and again,to help their injured comrades. When, several months

lateq Burgess was asked how often he had gone back into Building 131, he

answered: "I remember at least four times, and I know there was more.""

The security police rendered much good work, too, in the immediate wake of

the blast. SSgt. Alfredo R. Guerrero, the first person to spot the deadly truck, had

been spreading the warning along Building 13 I 's sixth floor and was making his last

stop on that level of the dorm w;[en the bomb denotated. "I just remember hearing a

large bang," he recounted soon afterward. "It went dark and I was spun around." The

blast ripped Sergeant Guerrerob brick radio out ofhis grip and rendered his hand

numb for the next two days, but the SP was able to stay on his feet'32

A resident who was walking near Sergeant Guerrero was knocked to the floor

and some rubble landed on him. The sectyity policeman pulled the semiconscious

man to his feet and stayed with him until he began to regain his faculties. The dazed

airman could stand on his own, but could not walk well. Guerrero got an arm around

his waist and helped him dornm the stairs. By the time they reached the third or second floor, the injured man had exhausted his energy. "You can make it," Guerrero

convinced him, and the two eventually made their way into the dirt and gravel parking lot southwest of the dorm where, by then, a number of people had gathered. The

security policeman saw to it that the resident got into a vehicle that took him to a

Dhahran hospital.33

AlC. ChristopherWagarhad leftthe roof ahead of Sergeant Guerrero and SrA.

Corey Grice, and had alerted the residents of the seventh, or top, floor. He later candidlyacknowledged that his fint thought that night had been the very human one of

self preservation. "I saw my life flash before my eyes," Airman Wagar said, "and I

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The Attack

just wanted to get out of there."Yet like so many others that nighq he did his duty.

wagar raised the alarm along the seventh floor, while Guerrero worked the sixth and

Senior Airman Grice the fifth. wagar's next objective was the fourth level and he

headed for the stairs. "It happened so fast," he later recalled. "Before I even got [to]

the stairwell, the bomb exploded and threw me against the wall."3a

Among the many Wagar had wamed were Capts. Michael D. Morelock and

Matthew winkler, pilots of the deployed 71st Rescue Squadron. These two officers

had started dorvn the stairwell, captain winkler ahead of Morelock. They walked at

a normal pace, as Winkler later described it, "in no rush, in no fear ofmy life." They

had reached the landing between the seventh and sixth floors and were facing a window on that plateau when the bomb went off.35

"Because I was near a window," Captain Winkler recounted, "I felt the heat and

I had seen the bright, orangish flash." He described the shock of the blast "It was

just massive. You become a rag doll. lt just hits you." The window glass exploded

into the two pilots and captain Morelock said months later: "I remember feeling

that. And that's really all I remember, until picking myself up offthe floor. To this

day, I donl know if I was unconscious or not."36

The blast hurled the two officers offof the stairwell wall behind them and threw

them into a heap on the steps back up toward the seventh floor.37 CaptanWinkler,

who had been nearer the landing windoW had his left arm cut to the bone and suffered other severe wounds. He would be among the many patients later taken to the

MODA Hospital.38 Like a large number of the Khobar veterans, Morelock minimized his or,vn injuries as "superficial," but he had, in fac! suffered cuts on his face,

head, and neck from the flying glass. His lacerations were serious enough that later

that night a pararescue jumper put him on an intravenous line and he was briefly

hospitalized. Col. Thomas R. Friers, commander of the lst Rescue Group, who saw

Morelock when he returned to Florida around midnight of June 2i/28, said,the

young pilot was "terribly beat-up looking. His face looked like he'd been in a fight

with apitbull."3e

As Captain Morelock regained his senses, he-like Sergeant Burgess and

many others that night-was impressed by the extent of the darkness. "The dust and

debris was still hanging in the air," he recalled, "so you couldn't see anything. No

outside light was getting in; it was very dark." Captain Winkler was injured more

severely than Morelock and was less conscious than his roomate, but he, too,

remembered the total darkness around them. As he put it: "You cannot believe how

dark it was in that building. . . . You could barely see a foot or two in front of you,

right after the bombing.'ao

Groping in the blackness, Captain Morelock managed to stand up. He was

fi.rnctioning, but still dazed, and had no sense of how little time had passed since the

explosion. Morelock yelled down the stain for help: it was only later that he realized

that it was far too soon after the atlack for any medical personnel to be responding.al

Captain Morelock then tried shouting up to the seventh floor. This time he got

an answer: a call for help from Capt. Thomas E Edman, the third resident of his

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

suite. Morelock believed he shouldn't try to move Captain Winkleq because it was

still too dark to see the extent of his injuries. He decided it would be better to retum

to the seventh floor and help Captain Edman and the others there. Winkler was conscious enough that he too heard Edman's calls, and he understood-and didnl feel

abandoned-when Morelock told him he was going to check on their suitemate.42

So much debris had fallen into the stairwell that Captain Morelock could not

walk up the half flight of steps. He crawled on his hands and knees and groped in

front of himself, wary of encountering a sudden dropoff. Morelock and Captain

Edman called back and forth to one anotheq while the pilot made his way slowly

toward the navigator. They met near the door to their suite and Morelock led Edman

back dovm to where Captain Winkler lay on the stairs.a3

On the way down, Captain Edman told his suitemate he had injured his hip.

Later he would be taken to King Fahd University Hospital in Dhahran, where the

staffconfirmed that the blast indeed had fractured his femur and damaged one of his

kidneys. Among the hundreds injured by the bomb, he was one of seven who were

listed as severely injured.a While Captain Morelock was helping Edman down the

stairwell, his ornrn head injuries were bleeding heavily. He took his shirt off and his

suitemate helped him get it tied around some of his cuts.as

By the time the two officers made their way to where Captain Winkler was

lying on the stairs, Captain Morelock's vision had improved enough that he could

see how badly his suitemate was injured. He decided it would be best to leave

Captain Edman with Winkler, while he retumed again to look for others on the seventh floor. Morelock found that he now could see well enough to make this second

trip by walking rather than crawling. Enough time had passed for some of the dust

to settle, and his eyes had begun to adjust to the reduced lightittg.ou

Captain Morelock went into the suite of Lieutenant Colonel Shafer, the commander of the deployed 71st Rescue Squadron, and Capt. Christopher J. Adams, a

pilot and the deployment operations officer. The visibility was far better here than in

the stairwell, because the explosion had tom offthe northem face of building and

lights from Dhahran reached into what remained of the rooms in this part of the

structure. Morelock found CaptainAdams mortally wounded. The blast had struck

as Lieutenant Colonel Shafer had been returning to his bedroom for a pair of shoes.

When Morelock reached Shafer, the lieutenant colonel was dazed by the explosion,

he was still shoeless, and his feet had been cut by glass. He later was treated at the

ArabianAmerican Oil Company Hospital. Morelock knew that any route out of the

building would be covered with glass shards and other debris. The two men agreed

that it would be best if the captain went alone to get medical help.aT

Morelock took the stairs back down, stopping to reassure Edman that he would

get assistance for him, Winkler, and the others still in the building. Once he was

back in the interior of the dormitory the lighting was still poor. The captain realized

that if he searched every floor by himself in the darkness, this would delay getting

medical help. So he stopped at each level and called in, thinking that if he heard a

response, he would offer aid and if not, he would continue down the stairwell.a8

50
The Attack

The captain got no replies on the sixth or fiffi floors. On the fourth he encountered Sergeant Stanton. Although badly injured Stanton by then had made his way

down one flight of stairs, from his fifth-floor suite to the fourth level. Morelock

made no more stops, but instead took Stanton direct$ out of Building 13l and got

him seated at a picnic table. Although dazed and hurt, Stanton later came around

enough that he was able to help Ziegler out of the dormitory.ae

Leaving Sergeant Stanton resting at the picnic table, Captain Morelock kept his

commitment to Captain Edman and the others that he would find medical help for

them. The captain soon spotted MSgt. William F Sine, a pararescue jumper of the

deployed 71st Rescue Squadron. A resident ofBuilding 131, Sergeant Sine hadjust

walked out ofhis room and headed for the elevator lobby when the bornb exploded.

Knocked to the floor, he suffered a severe contusion ofhis right calf The blast also

wrenched the sergeant's back and left his right arm greatly swollen and hanging

nearly useless. Despite these injuries, Sine was helping others soon after the

attack.5o

Captain Morelock, Sergeant Sine, and SSgt. Matthew A. Wells, another PJ,

went to Captain Winkler's aid. By the time they reached the landing, Captain Edman

had Winkler up on his feet and had an arm around him. Sine took offhis shirt and

tied it into a tourniquet on the captainb dangerously cut left arm.5r To free the PJs to

help others, Morelock offered to take Winkler out of the building. Sine and Sergeant

Wells agreed and headed up to see what they could do for those still on the seventh

floor. Morelock, Edman, and Winkler left Building 131 together, slowly working

their way dorvn the stairwell.s2

These three officers, like many others that night, had been alerted to the

impending attack by the security police. While Airman Wug*, Sergeant Guerrero,

and Senior Airman Grice had warned them and the other residents of the upper

floors to evacuate Building 131, SrA. Craig J. Dick had sped to the scene in his

humvee. He had parked the vehicle and was running hard toward the dormitory's

rear entrance when the bomb exploded. The explosion threw him about fifty feet

and knocked him unconscious.53 The shock wave bruised one of Senior Airman

Dick's eardrums and ripped away his uniform. One of his fellow SPs offered a short,

honest description: it "blew his pants off."5a

A security police patrol soon found SeniorAirman Dick, and a crowd gathered

around the stricken SP The group was willing to help him, but was hesitating, uncertain how to move him safely, when Capt. Lawrence Branch, a resident of Building

l3l who had escaped the atlack with minor injuries, arrived on the scene. During

the first minutes after the attack, Captain Branch had realized that first aid supplies

would be badly needed and had gathered a large bag of sheets, pillow ffrses, and

other pieces of cloth. He used a fitted sheet to create amake-shift litter and helped

the group get Dick on to it. Volunteers then carried the SP to an ambulance that took

himto the MODA Hospital.55

Senior Airman Dick's bruised eardrum prevented him from being put on a

medical evacuation flight right away, and instead he retumed to duty. Brigadier
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

General Schwalier was impressed at seeing the SP at work soon after the attack and

commended him on this, and on his heroics at Building 131. Airman Dick, like

many, many others, modestly replied that he was only doing his job. He eventually

boarded one of the medical evacuation flights to the Landstuhl Regional Medical

Center, in Landstuhl, Germany, where the staffexamined his bruised eardrum.56

Senior Airman Dick's charred vehicle continued to attract attention, for some

time after the bombing. "When I saw the humvee the next day," SrA. Ronald J.

Biggs, Jr., said "it was completely burnt on the inside. The seats were fblorvn into]

the back of it . . . . It was one of those things you hear about, but never see." Many

who walked by the hummer mistakenly assumed Dick had been in it at the time of

the blast. Looking at the blackened chassis and interior, they concluded that his survival had been a miracle.5T
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Chapter Five

In the Wake

The terrorist bombing of the Khobar Towers killed nineteen United States Air

Force personnel. Eight of them were members of the 58th Fighter Squadron, stationed at Eglin Air Force, Florida: TSgt. Daniel B. Cafourek of Watertowrl South

Dakota; Sgt. Millard D. Campbell, Angelton, Texas; SrA. Earl F. Cartrette, Jr.,

Sellersburg, Indiana; MSgt. Kendall K. Kitson, Jr., Yukon, Oklahoma; AlC. Brent

E. Marthaler, Cambridge, Minnesota; AlC. Brian W McVeigh, Debary, Florida;

AlC. Joseph E. Rimkus, Edwardsville, Illinois; and AlC. Joshua E. Woody,

Corning, California.l Four more belonged to other units from Eglin Air Force Base:

TSgt. Patrick P Fennig, Greendale, Wisconsin, 60th Fighter Squadron; AlC. Peter J.

Morgera, Stratham, New Hampshire, 33d Operations Support Squadron; TSgt.

Thanh V (Gus) Nguyen, Panama City, Florida, 33d Logistics Group; and SrA.

Jeremy A. Taylor, Rosehill, Kansas, 33d Maintenance Squadron.2

Five of the deceased served in the Tlst Rescue Squadron, stationed at Patrick

Air Force Base, Florida. They were: Capt. Christopher J. Adams of Massapequa

Park, NewYor$ Capt. L. Timothy Haun, Clovis, Califomia; MSgt. Michael G.

Heiser, Palm Coast, Florida; SSgt. Kevin J. Johnson, Shreveport, Louisiana; and

AlC. Justin R. Wood, Modesto, Califomia.3

In addition to Eglin and Patrick, two other bases suffered a fatality. Staff Sgt.

Ronald L. King liom Battle Creek, Michigan, was assigned to the 55th Contracting

Squadron at Offirtt Air Force Base, Nebraska; and AlC. Christopher B. Lester of

Pineville, WestVirginia, was a member of the 88th Civil Engineering Squadron at

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.a

Eighteen of the nineteen fatalities occurred in Building 13 I and the other on the

fourth floor of Building 133, to the west of it. The Jersey barriers on the north side

ofThirty-first Street mitigated the effects ofthe blast against the ground level of dormrtory 131 . One airman was killed on this floor, but most of the fatalities took place

on the three levels above it eight on the first floor; three on the second; and three on

the third. Two deaths occurred on the sixth level and one on the seventh.s

Lt. Col. (Dr.) Douglas J. Robb, the senior medical officer at the KhobarTowers

that night, pronounced the nineteen airmen dead on the scene. He stated that the

autopsies later revealed that the leading causes ofdeath were flying glass and blunt

trauma. "The severity of their injuries," Dr. Robb said, "indicated that none would
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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

have survived even with the best of immediate emergency medical care. The one

fatality in Building 133, removed from the strongest area of the blast wave, had a

large shard of glass sever his aorta-an immediately fatal injury."o

The bomb that killed these nineteen people also wounded hundreds of others.

On July 22, the Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO) office of

the 4404rh Mission Support Squadron reported to Headquarters Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, fhal327 airmen had been

idured in the bombing.lt categoized them as 2 very severely injured, 7 severely

injured. and 3 I 8 not severely injured.T

In addition to the 327 reported by the PERSCO office, many others suffered

less serious injuries. Dr. Robb, who was best placed to know, put the total number of

patients treated at 519, ofwhom 317 were cared for at the KhobarTowers clinic. The

olher 202 were taken to hospitals in Dhahran, where 71 were admitted and 13 I were

keated and released.8

The total number of injured probably will remain unknovrn. In addition to the

519 patients accounted for by Dr. Robb, many other airmen refused to seek treatment and their injuries went unreported. A large number of people who were hurt

that night looked around and saw scores of others who were injured much more seriously than themselves, and they refused to seek aid. Capt. @r.) R. Morris Treadway,

Jr., a flight surgeon of the 58th Fighter Squadron, stated in this regard: "We really

had to go out and look for people that were injured as a result of the bombing."e

As time passed, some of those who were less severely injured came forward.

Dr. Robb said this process began the day after the bombing, when people came in

'lvith glass in their feet, their hands, their knees, who didn't bother to come in that

night" because they had been helping others who had been more seriously hurt. He

saw "a pretty steady'' flow of these less severely injured patients for about two days.

After yet more time passed, a larger number presented themselves. Six months after

the bombing, a few Dhahran veterans still were coming forward for the first time

and seeking care at the base hospital at EglinAir Force Base, Florida. By November

1991 , 525 officers and airmen had received the Purple Heart for the Khobar Towers,

andAFPC continued to process nominations for this medal.lO

None of the United States Army personnel stationed at Dhahran were wounded

by the bomb. The number of civilian casualties, on the other hand, was high.

Nicholas Burns, a State Departrnent spokesman who visited Dhahmn soon after the

attack, reportedthat 147 Saudis and 150 Bangladeshis were wounded. These early

figures probably were too low. Air Force medical officers reported an estimated

350-400 injrned civilians. "We'll never know [the number]," Dr. Robb stated,

"because [the Saudis] don't talk about it like we do, but there were several hundred

[Saudi and other] civilian casualties."rr

When American medical personnel visited the Dhahran hospitals to attend to

Air Force patients after the bombing, they saw a nurnber of wounded, and some

deceased, Arabs in the emergency rooms. The Ministry of Defense and Aviation

Hospital alone treated 150 Saudi casualties. Secretary of State Warren Christopher

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In the Wake

visited this facility on the day after the bombing and called on two injured Saudi

children who had been playing near the compound when the bomb exploded.l2

While these human losses were of paramount importance, the bomb also

caused extensive physical damage all across the Khobar Towers compound. Teams

formed by the wing's civil engineering squadron assessed Building l3 1, nearest the

blast, as "destroyed." They determined that the three structures closest to this dormitory, Buildings 129,130, and 133, were uninhabitable. In addition to these four

facilities, the CE teams initially found that five others on the northern end of the

compound-l 0 l, I 04, 127, 128, and. 132-also could not be used. 13

Otherbuildings as well, all across the complex, suffered damage. Capt.Russell

D. Barile, a pilot with the Tlst Rescue Squadron, described a typical room in

Building 103, a dormitory nearly way half across the compound from the truck

bomb: "It looked like someone had taken a. . . hand grenade and set if offright outside the window. The glass was all shattered. There were some mattresses turned

over, things laying all over the room." It appeared, Captain Barile thought, as if

someone had set of a satchel charge outside of Building 103. The destruction was

so extensive that at first he believed that this dormitory far southwest of the bomb,

had been the focal point of the attack.ra

The structwe that 

, n fact, hadbeen nearest the bomb, Building I 3 1, suffered the

greatest damage. The explosion ripped away this dormitory's entire northern face.

Capt. Michael D. Morelock got a close look that night at this damage, from the interior of the building. Not long after the explosion, Captain Morelock entered the suite

of Lt. Col. Thomas H. Shafer and Capt. Christopher J. Adams, w4rich was on the seventh floor and faced north. Entering their quarters, he became aware for the first time

of the extent of the dormitoryS destruction. 'T went into their suite," Morelock said

later, "and it was when I walked into the main living room area of their suite that I

realized the damage to the building . . . . An entire wall was gone and other walls were

buckled." The northern facade of the dormitory had fallen staight dorvn, creating a

large pile of rubble. In addition to tearing offthe north wall, the blast had ripped

pieces ofconcrete from the Jersey barriers across the street and throvm them into the

rooms on the dormitoryS ground floor and two or three levels above it.l5

The bomb created an enornous crater, with its center about 80 feet from the

front of Building 13l. TSgt. George Burgess later recalled how that night he had

crawled across to the shorn edge of this dormitory and looked sfraight down from a

height of four or five floors. He found that the crarcr was so large that he couldn't

see all of it without moving his head. Sergeant Burgess remembered thinking at the

time: "'somebody fired a rocket at us, or a missile.' . . . It was a 619 hole."16 The

crater in fact proved to be about 55 feet in diameter, as a study team from the

Defense Special Weapons Agency and the Army Corps of Engineers later determined. It was 16 feet deep, relative to the original ground surface, and it displaced

an estimated 28,000 cubic feet of dirt.rT

The explosion also inflicted major structural damage to Building 133, a dormitory to the west of 13 1 . The blast wave hit the eastern face of this structure, which
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

stood about 400 feet from the truck, and rebounded. Across the whole complex, the

explosion wrecked door frames and blasted window panes into dangerous spears of

glass. In almost every case, these shards blew back into the rooms, not out, and

thereby caused most of the injuries.l8

The bomb responsible for this physical destruction and human suffering was an

enonnous weapon. Soon after the attiack, the DSWA-ACE team estimated its yield to

be the equivalent of 23,000 pounds of TNT.1e Compared with other bombs familiar

to Americans in the mid-1990s, the explosive tonnage of the Dhahran weapon was

greater than either the one detonated in February 1993 at the World Trade Center in

New York City or in April 1995 at the Alfred P Murrah Building in Oklahoma City.20

This massive bomb left chaos in its immediate wake. MSgt. Dwayne Berry

described the mayhem that he and Capt. Russ Barile found when they reached

Building 131 soon after the detonation. "By the time we got there," he recounted

"there were people coming out, I mean, severely injured people; people were

yelling, people were screaming, people were crying. Smoke was everywhere. Bits

of clutter and debris were everywhere." Maj. Bennie L. Umstead II, who had

checked into Building 101 for the night, recalled: 'A lot of people were just sitting

on the curbs, crying." Halfway across the compound from the bomb stood the converted garage that housed both an auditorium (the home of the fught Start briefings) and the "Khobar Konnection." In this recreation center, the explosion threw people across the room, flipped over tables, and filled the air with a smoky dust from the

concrete walls. "Get out of the building," someone called out, "before the next one!"

The roomful of a hundred or so people headed for the exits. On the northem end of

the compound in the wake of the explosion, Lt. Col. Thomas A. McCarthy recalled,

"Rumors were rururing amuck."2l

The security police moved promptly to get control of the situation. SSgt.

Alfredo R. Guerrero had radioed in his sighting of the fruck at about 9:50 p.m.

Within four minutes of his report, Lt. Col. James J. Traister, the commander of the

wingb security police squadron, had initiated a 100 percent recall of the SPs on the

compound that night. All securify policemen at their posts called in on their brick

radios and accounted for themselves. The SPs also immediately deployed a cordon

around Building 120, Iheir headquarters and armory which was in the southeast

quadrant of the compound.22

At 9:55 p.m., no more than two minutes after the explosion, Lieutenant Colonel

Traister arrived at Building 131. He reported that there were many injured people,

not only in that dormitory but in all ofthe facilities on the northern half of the compound. Traister dispatched twenty-five security policemen to search and clear all of

the buildings north of Thirty-third Street, the east-west avenue that bisected the

complex. He also instructed these SPs to begin administering self-aid and buddy

care, the Air Force's term for its first aid program.23

Acting on guidance that Brig. Gen. Terry Schwalier, the commander of the

4404th Composite Wing (Provisional), gave over his brick radio, the security police

also quickly activated a temporary Disaster Control Group near the scene of the

56

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bombing. This was an improvised unit of security policemen who would use their

ovm radios to manage communications in the immediate wake of the a|tack.Later,

when time permitted choosing a site and getting hardware in place, communication

specialists and other airmen would establish a Site Recovery Center, from which the

wingb formal Disaster Control Group would manage the unitb return to normalcy.2a

Even before the security police had activated their temporary DCG, they

responded to a report of another attack against the compound. Shortly after the detonation,25 airmen began seeing Saudis climbing over and under the compoundb

perimeter fence. These proved to be well-meaning locals, who were coming to the

aid of the Americans. At the time and urder the circumstances, the security police

and others assumed that these would-be helpers surging toward the fence represented a wave of follow-on attackers.

At9:57 p.m. Sergeant Guerrero got on his radio again and reported that groups

of Saudis had been seen trying to enter the compound. Just four minutes had passed

since the explosion that had killed nineteen people and injured hundreds ofothers. In

the darkness and confusion, the security police quite properly assumed that terrorists

were launching a follow-on attack. Twenty SPs secured the compound's perimeter,

some ofthem coming voluntarily, and all ofthem moving quickly. Guerrero recounted: "You know, every SP there, as soon as they heard what was going or1 immediately grabbed guns and helped out. There were people in shorts and stuff; they didn't

bother to get in uniform." A survivor later recalled: "One thing that really sticks with

me from that night is the sight of an airman in aT:shirt, shorts, [and] flip-flops standing guard with an M-16 at the door to the chapel.'26 The security police detained at

least two of the intruders, handcuffing them to the perimeter fence.27 Within minutes,

the SPs had established a secure cordon, running along Thirty-third Street and the

western, northem, and eastem boundaries ofthe compound.2s

Sergeant Guerrero later described the bogus alarm: "It was chaos, because we

had the local nationals climbing the fence, wanting to help, but we didn't know that,

at the time . . . . So you could hear over the [security police] radio, 'So-and-so coming over the fence line, on this perimeter."' Maj. Cynthia D. Coles, a nurse who was

outside Building 133, recalled that there were confirsing rumors of another bombing

or some other attack. Dr. Mo Treadway was with a group of about fifty people near

Building l2l when "someone came over. . . yelling and screaming that there were

individuals in fatigues, with guns, climbing over the fence. Potentially, we thought

we were under a ground atlack, with guys crawling under the fence with guns. It was

kind of a sfange situation."2e

The false alarm died dowrU and order began to emerge slowly in its wake. Soon

after Lieutenant Colonel Traister reached Building 131, the first medical personnel

began arriving on the scene. They told him that the designated casualty collection

point was the Desert Rose kur, the dining facility-the "chow hall"-that stood in

the middle of the southern half of the complex. Its location carried two advantages:

it was in the interior of the compound and it was just east of Building I I 1, the medical clinic. Significantly, these two facilities-the dining hall and the clinic-had

57
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

medical supplies, water, tables, and other feahrres that would prove extremely valuable during an emergency.3o

Within minutes after the attack, officers of the Air Force Office of Special

Investigations and the security police began directing people to move from the

stricken northern end of the compound to the Desert Rose Inn and to help the

injured reach the medical clinic. The security police quickly deployed teams, Major

Umstead recalled, "on the perimeter, ushering people fto the Desert Rose Inn and

the clinicl. They had guards, ushering people in-and to keep people away from the

perimeter."31

Very shortly after 10 p.m. fire chief MSgt. Walme Mello began using the bullhom on his crash rescue vehicle, instructing people to go to the Desert Rose Inn and

directing the firefighters of the wing's civil engineering squadron to establish a

triage and patient care area there.32 SSgt. Matthew A. Wells, a pararescue jumper

who was in the gym at the time of the explosion, was among the many who responded promptly. After the casualty collection point was set up in flont of the Desert

Rose Inn, Sergeant Wells headed for Building l3l-helping the wounded he

encountered along the way and telling those who were able to walk that they should

get themselves to the chow hall.33

By then many of the wounded were headed toward the dining hall: the false

alarm of a follow-on attack had encouraged people to move quickly into the interior

of the compound. Maj. Cynthia Coles described how the uncertainq, of the situation

motivated people to take action. "The rumor came around that they were coming

agani she remembere4 "and we weren't sure whether another explosion was coming, or whatever. But everyone just said, 'Run to the center of the compound' where

they had determined that if anything happened" it was the safest place, the furthest

away from the perimeterJ'Lt. Col. (Chaplain) Dennis E. Aleson, the senior chaplain

at the KhobarTowers, recalled: "We were all basically instructed to go the center of

the compound, amidst all the confusion." Dr. Treadway pointed out that "a lot ofpeople" started moving when they heard the rumor of another attack, because they had

neither weapons to protect themselves nor radios to tell them what was happening.3a

The false alarm also speeded up the task of moving the injured to the clinic. Lt.

Col. Douglas R. Cochran, commander of the 58th Fighter Squadron, directly connected the two events: "We [heard] someone running, screaming at the top of their

lungs, 'They're coming through the fence! They re coming through the

fence!' . . . We were told the fiage area and casualty collection point was right outside the chow hall. So we grabbed everybody and just hustled over there." Lt. Col.

Thomas McCarthy recounted: "We [had] started putting people on trucks and moving them into the interior of the compound. [The false alarm] made people put people on trucks a lot quicker and get back to the interior a lot quicker." Dr. Treadway

said that during the confusion caused by the spurious alarm he and others "tried to

throw a couple more people on that truck, and sent it on. Then we ran to the other

side of the base, away from Building 127, and tried to figure out what was going

on. --

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As time passed and no second atlack occurred an attitude of calm began to

develop. Within a surprisingly short period of time, a sense of order, and purpose,

emerged. Chaplain Aleson recalled: "There was a momentary panic there, when

somebody said there was . . . some other [threatening] activity about to happen and

everybody started running in panic-but quickly calmed down." Capt. Mike

Morelock was surprised how soon after the bombing order was restored: "It was

amaztngto me, it didn't seem to take much time at alll'36

As the airmen tumed their attention to helping one anotheq the sense of calm

was strengthened. Major Coles vividly recalled that'fthe fear, and the worry about

the bornb, and everything else went out the window. . . . I had my task-to do what

I was trained to do-to help treat, to help take care of the people who were injured."

SSgt. Rudolph Grimm II, a dental technician, described the tenor of things at the

clinic that night: "Everybody was calm. There was no screaming. People were helping other people." At a "hot wash" debriefing held on July 3, Dr. Robb looked at the

other medical personnel gathered around atl;ble with him and aske4 "Was it just

me, or wasthere a sense of calm that night?" To a person, the others agrced.37

The sense of calm that Dr. Robb identified rested on a foundation of moral and

physical courage. The training the airmen had received in medical care and other

areas proved helpful, but it was not the flrndamental reason the recovery began as

soon as it did. Training reflected alarger factor: the moral strength displayed that

night by the personnel of the United States Air Force. Brigadier General Schwalier

later stated: "To me, the real reason for the calm was the character of those 2,000

determinedAir Force men and women. . . character that was manifested ttnt night

in the professionalism, sense of mission, selflessness, and righteous patriotism displayed."38

The chaplains witnessed the moral courage of the airmen, and worked to further it. Like so many others, Chaplain Aleson, the wing's senior chaplain, had been

in his bedroom at the moment of the blast. And like a number of others, that night

would have been his last in his quarters; the next day he would have returned to the

States. The 4404thhad three other chaplains, but at the time of the attack, Maj.

(Chaplain) John Kovalcin, accompaniedbyAlC. Cynthia Bailey, was making a site

visit to Seeb Air Base, Oman, and Maj. (Chaplain) Kevin Boll and SSgt. Michael

O'Donnell were making one to Taif Air Base, Saudi Arabia. Only Capt. (Father)

Thomas Angelo, the wing's Roman Catholic chaplain, remained with Aleson that

night at the Khobar Towers. Aleson later said that, during the flrst minutes after the

explosion, "an overwhelming feeling" settled over him. Then he quickly came to

terms with the reality that "there were just two of us there. There were many, many

areas of need, that we needed to be at. And only two of us to do so."3e

Joined by his parhrer on his chapel readiness team, TSgt. Donnell Thompson,

and by Father Angelo, Chaplain Aleson headed for the interior of the complex. The

professionals of his career field, he explained follow a piece of simple guidance:

"Our number one rule is 'Go to the point of greatest need for our services as chaplains.' . . . And that was the clinic." In the area around that building, Chaplains
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Aleson andAngelo and SergeantThompson gave prayers, offered counseling, andlike everyone else around them -did whatever they could to aid the wotxrded. "We

helped bear litters," Aleson recounted, "handed out bottled water. We moved among

the literally hundreds of people who were on the ground outside [the clinic]."a0

The senior officers of the 4404th Composite Wing (Provisional) responded

quickly to the attack. The unit's commander, Brigadier General Schwalier, was at a

desk in Building 101, the visiting officers quarters where he and his group commanders resided. One of the security measures that the wing had underway

addressed the fact that all of wing's senior leaders lived in the same building. As

Lieutenant Colonel Traister had stated, "If someone attacks [Building 101], we

stand a good chance that we could lose our command element in one stroke." In

view of this, the wing was in the process of changing the housing arrangements of

its leaders. General Schwalier's successor, Brig. Gen. Daniel M. Dic( soon would

arrive in Dhahran and his quarters would be in Building 107, at the center of the

compound, rather than 101, near the western perimeter.al As the new group commanders arrived, they would take various housing, dispersed throughout the compound.a2

ln the meantime, Brigadier General Schwalier continued to use the visiting officers quarters. He already had written his end-of-tour report, and that night he was

composing a letter of welcome to his successor, Brigadier General Dick, who at the

moment was enroute to Saudi Atabia.a3 General Schwalier had completed three

words ("Dan, Welcome to") and had begun a fourth ("Dhahran"), when the blast

rockedhis aparfrnent. The force ofthe explosionpulledthe commander's hand across

his stationery cutting short the intended "Dhahran" and rendering it "Dh-."4 "I

rcmember jumping out of my chair," Schwalier later recalled, "running a few feet

behindme,togettoawindowandlookingout...andseeingablackcloud...rising."

The explosion shattered wery window in the commander3 quarters and upset all the

fumiture. The rooms, in the words of one witness, were "absolutely trashed."as

Brigadier General Schwalier quickly put on his flight suit, picked up his brick

radio, and checked on Col. Dale Bible. This officer, the commander of the 4409th

Operations Group at Riyadh Air Base, had come to Dhahran for the change of command ceremony and was stayrng in the same suite as the wing commander. General

Schwalier then ran across the hall to look in on Maj. Gen. Kurt B. Anderson, the

commander ofthe JointTask Force SouthwestAsia (JTF-SWA), who also had come

to Dhahran for the ceremony, and had arrived that aftemoon.a6

General Anderson's executive officer, Major Umstead, was hit by the blast

wave while he was in the kitchen oftheir suite. The force of the explosion threw him

across that room into a wall and onto the floor, and he suffered some lacerations.aT

Anderson, who had retired for the night, was cut on his arm by glass, a wound which

later became infected. The JTF-SWA commander gave no thought to the injury at

the time.a8

Generals Anderson and Schwalier ran together down the stairs from their sixthfloor suites. They jogged out of Building 101 and into the large parking lot on the

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northern end of the compound. They then sprinted across this lot to its western end

near the softball fields, where General Schwalier3 sport utility vehicle was pafked.ae

While the two senior officers were running toward Brigadier General

Schwalier's SW the wing commander heard over his brick radio the false report,

mentioned earlier, that the compound's fence had been attacked.50 Reaching his

vehicle, General Schwalier encounted the airman r,vho served as his personal security officer. The senior officer was immediately impressed that this young NCO was

ready to do his job: protect his wing commander. General Schwalier told his personal security officer that he and General Anderson would take his SUV to the

bomb site, not far to the nor*teast. He instructed the airman to follow him, in his

ov,n vehicle. Schwalier later praised the way this young man performed his duty, not

only during the trip the two generals made to Building 13l, but for long afterward'

The wing comrnander related: "I'll tell you, for the rest of that night, for the rest of

the next two days, there wasn't a time-and I was in my [SUV] and I was moving a

lot-there wasn't a time I didn't see him." Holding his hands closely together, the

general stated: "He was never more than this far away liom me."sl

While Brigadier General Schwalier drove from the northem parking lot toward

Building l3l, he saw fire chief Mello, who by then was using his bull hom to direct

people to the Desert Rose Inn. The wing commander questioned him and quickly

learnedthatlieutenant ColonelTraisterwas atBuilding 131 andthatthe compound's

perimeter was being secwed. At that point, General Schwalier later sai4 he became

"convinced that we're already taking cate" of perimeter security. His next thought

was: "I need to get my chiefs together, and we need to talk about what3 going on."52

Brigadier General Schwalier used his radio to call Col. Gary S. Boyle, the wing's

support group commander and directed him to assemble the wing's battle staff

"immediately''During those first minutes after the bombing, General Schwalier

talked over his radio with Colonel Boyle, with Lieutenant Colonel Traister, and

Colonel Bible. He also was of course in direct communication with Major General

Anderson, who remained with him.53

At Brigadier General Schwalier's direction, the wing battle staffwas to convene

in the Wing Operations Center (WOC) in "Tadtown," the collection of command

and operations buildings located on a section of Dhahran Air Base that was about

four miles from the Khobar Towers. This area had been created as a result of the

Saudi policy of keeping the key activities of theirAmerican guests grouped together in a sector away from the civilian flightlines of the Dhahran International Airport.

"Tadtown" was a piece of Air Force slang-its origin was connected to the first

name of then-Brig. Gen. Tad J. Oelstrom, who had commanded the 4404th Wing

from May until October 1992.54

While General Schwalier was driving from Building 13 I to the Tadtown WOC,

as he later recalled, "I remember talking" to General Anderson 'oand saying . . . I've

got to take care of the casualities-step nurnber one. Step number two, I've got to

account for my people." He continued: "And the thfud tstep] was, I've got to assess

the damage . . . . So those are the tasks that I took with me to the command post."55
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

The battle staffassernbled at 10:15 p.m. "The group commanders," Brigadier

General Schwalier stated 'kere there very quickly." The wing commander swiftly

related to his subordinates the three imperative tasks he had framed in his own mind

while enroute to the meeting: take care of the casualties; account for the wing's

members; and assess the damage.56

From the Tadtorvn WOC, Brigadier General Schwalier dispatched his subordinate officers on a series of assignments. Dr. Robb, the medical group commander,

had not attended this battle staffmeeting, because he was in dornrntovm Dhahran at

the time of the explosion. General Schwalier accordingly sent Col. peter R. Mooy,

the logistics group commander, to organize the triage area at the Desert Rose Inn.

'As it turned out," Schwalier later reflected, "he was exactly the right guy to send

because he was dovm there at the speed of light and [dealing] with the hundreds of

people who were out there at the triage larea]"s1 Meanwhile, in Dhahran Dr. Robb

had heard-and felt-the blast and headed for the KhobarTowers. He arrived at the

medical clinic at 10:25 p.m.58 It proved advantageous to have both colonel Mooy

and Dr. Robb on that part of the complex. The logistics officer continued to mobilize people and resources at the dining hall, allowing Dr. Robb and the other medical

professionals to give their immediate attention to the hundreds of patients.se

Like Dr. Robb, Colonel Boyle did not attend the 10:15 meeting, for the excellent reason that he already was at Building 13l. "Understandably, Gary Boyle had

excused himself," Brigadier General Schwalier stated, "because he had his job as

the on-scene commander and he ftad] to deal with the things that were happening at

the place of the explosion." Colonel Boyle had gone to Building 131 and become

the on-scene commander at the bomb site. Among his many immediate responsibilities, he supervised the search of the stricken dormitory for survivors and casualties.60

Lieutenant colonel rraister also did not aftend the battle staffmeeting-and for

the same reason as Colonel Boyle. He, too, had arrived at Building l3l very soon

after the bombing and already was where he was needed most: at the compoundb

northem perimeter, supervising the operations of the security police.6l

As for the remaining officers at the WOC, Brigadier General Schwalier

charged each with an important assignment. The wing commander sent col. scott

Gration, his operations group commander, to the Desert Rose Inn, to oversee the

accounting of the casualties and survivors. col. wayne L. Schultz, the vice commander of the 4404th, would remain at the woc and supervise communications.

He would help mitigate the pressure on the wing from the inevitable incoming flood

of requests for information. As for outgoing communications, colonel Schultz

would ensure that they were as accumte as possible.62

General Schwalier also directed Maj. Kevin Greenfield, the wingb judge advocate general, to the Ministry of Defense and Aviation O4ODA) Hospital to begin

identifiiing the Air Force patients as they arrived there. Major Greenfield and his

depufy, Capt. Lisa Winnecke, had been downtown with Mr. Marwan Darwish when

SSgt. Alfredo R. Guerrero had called the liaison officer from the roof of Buildins

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131. Dispatched by General Schwalier, Major Greenfield and Captain Winnecke

went to the MODA Hospital, where they soon leamed the n€Imes, ranks, and units of

some of the first Khobar casualties that facility received some of whom had been

admitted, while others had been seen and released. The JAG officers talked to a

number of people there and made blood donations. Greenfield and Winnecke also

learned at the MODA Hospital that some Americans who initially had been taken

there subsequently had been transferred to two other nearby locations:63 the Arabian

American Oil Company (ARAMCO) Hospital, just north of DhahranAir Base; and

King Fahd University Hospital, about seven blocks north of the Khobar Towers.s

This news about the airmen at these places provided one of the earliest accountings

of the Air Force inpatients and outpatients.65

One other assignment emerged fiom the 10:15 battle staffmeeting. General

Schwalier dispatched Colonel Bible to determine the extent of the damage to each

of the compound's buildings. General Dick laterpraisedthe efforts ofthe operations

group comrnander from Riyadh, and commented on his forhritous presence at the

Khobar Towers that night. General Dick noted that Bible's visit for the change of

command ceremony "proved out really well. We ended up having three general officers, plus an extra colonel, at Dhahran." He then added, with emphasis: "And we

had enough work for a// of us."66

The three general officers General Dick refened to were General Schwalier, the

wing commander; Maj. Gen. KurtAnderson, the JTF-SWA commander; and himself, the incoming wing commander. Dick had been flying on a chartered flight from

RamsteinAir Base, Germany, to DhahranAir Base wherl about 2 a.m. in the morning ofthe twenty-sixt\ the pilot came back from the cockpit wittr the news that there

had been a bombing in Dhahran. The aviator knew nothing further about events in

Saudi Arabi4 only that his company had instructed him to complete the flight.67

When the airplane parked on Dhahran Air Base around 5 a.m., Brigadier

General Dick looked out the window He did not see Brigadier General Schwalier, a

longtime friend with whom he had exchanged several elechonic mail messages that

spring and early summer, as the date for the change of command had approached.

The wing commander ordinarily would have been on the flightline, of course, to

meet his arriving successor and give him a brief orientation tour. General Schwalier

at the time was at the mortuary collection point that by then had been established at

the Air Mobility Command cargo terminal on Dhahran Air Base . In his place, a protocol officer fint greeted General Dick and then, within a minute, the wing commander arrived and related the tragic news to his successor.68

As Brigadier General Dick observed" there was pressing work for everyone. At

1 I :18 p.m., Major General Anderson and the other senior officers assembled in the

WOC had sent a message carrying the word of the attack to a number of organizations in Riyadh. These included the theater headquarters of the United States

Central Command (CENTCOM); the United States Air Force, Central Command;

the headquarters ofthe JTF-SWA; the United States Embassy; and the United States

Military Training Mission. At I I :35 Generals Anderson and Schwalier left the com63
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

mand post to make a frsthand survey of the bomb damage. An hour later the officers in the WOC sent a preliminary report on the bombing to a large number ofAir

Force headquarters and command posts across the United States.6e

The senior officers had responded promptly at the Khobar Towers, and elsewhere the story was the same. At 9:53 p.m. that Tuesday night in Dhahran, Saudi

Arabia, it was 8:53 at RamsteinAir Base, Germany, which lay two time zones to the

west but, like the United States, used daylight time. A telephone call from the theater

alerted Col. (Dr.) Dan L. Locker, who had been the United States Air Forces in

Europe command surgeon since August 1995, and he immediately called Col.

Marvin D. Meinders, Headquarters USAFE's chief formedical plans and readiness.

Colonel Meinders soon joined Dr. Locker at his office, on Hoover Street to the north

and east of Headquarters USAFE.T0

From here the two officers placed phone calls to U. S. Army Col. (Dr.) Ken

Farmer, the United States European Command command surgeon, and to several

Air Force medical operations officers. They quickly established what aircraft and

personnel were available to respond to the situation. The military services rotated

the "on call" responsibilif for medical emergencies like KhobarTowers, on a threemonth schedule. That June the Navy had the watch and the U.S. Naval Support

Activity at Naples, Italy, was its facility nearest Dhahran. Dr. Locker respected the

Navy's ability to perform the mission, but he knew that at that time, as was usually

the case, the Air Force's available airlift assets exceeded those of the Nalry. Once he

and Colonel Meinders learned what aircraft, equipment, and people each organtzation could get to Dhahran promptly, they concluded that the Air Force was better

placed to do the job. It had three F$ing Ambulance Surgical Teams, at Royal Air

Force Lakenheath, the United Kingdom; Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany; and

Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. The latter-about a five-hour flight from Dhahranleaped out as the best choice. Locker called Col. Carlisle Harrison, Jr., the commander of the 3fth Medical Group Hospital, at IncirlikAir Base, and alerted him that the

FAST team there very likely would receive the Khobar assignment.Tl

Southwest from Dr. Locker's office, across mainbase Ramstein, the 86th

Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron operated from a modest building on the flightline and, like all such units, contributed personnel to Operation Southem Watch. At

any given time the relatively small squadron of I 13 officers and airmen had 3 to 5 of

its members serving in standard ninety-day tours in Dhahmn. After the attack that

night, one of these squadron members telephoned the Aeromedical Evacuation

Coordination Center (AECC), which was housed on the first floor of the 86th AES

building and manned around the clock. In addition to this call from the theateq at

about 10:30 p.m. the Ramstein Tactical Air Control Center also notified the AECC.

The duty controller there phoned Col. (Dr.) James W Bost, who had commanded

the 86th since 1994: There had been a bombing at the Khobar Towers, the caller told

the commander, but details were not yetavallable.T2

Dr. Bost telephoned his executive staffand asked them to report to work. They

spent their next hours gathered around a table, brainstorming how the 86th would

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respond to the emergency. The earliest reports they had received suggested there

might be as many as 400 casualties, with more than 90 of them seriously injured.T3

"We had no idea of how many [patients] would need to be move{'Dr. Bost said

later, "nor when they would need to be moved. But it was our impression that with

the very small aeromedical staging flight inDhahran, . . . we were going to be needed fairly quickly." At l1:50 p.m. a call from the Tactical Airlift Control Center, at

Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, confirmed the earlier report of the attaclg and put the

86th on standby to make an alert launch.Ta

Col. (Chaplain) John Lundin, senior chaplain for the Kaiserslautern Military

Community, which included Ramstein Air Base and the Landstuhl Regional

Medical Center, recalled how the initial state of igrrorance eventually dissolved. "All

we hrew [at first] was that it was terrible," he stated "and that [patients] were going

to be coming through here. And slowly, as time went on, it began to sort [out] as to

how many people were going to actually end up here." Chaplain Lundin described

the tenor of things that night: "People became very focused, and very efficientvery quickly. . . . Working together as a team, everybody becomes very helpful, as

we try to figure out how to do this right, making sure that [our people] get the appropriate care."75

When it was 9:53 p.m. at the Khobar Towers and 8:53 p.m. at Ramstein, it was

2:53 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time at Patrick Air Force Base, on the Atlantic coast of

Florida. When a Southern Watch deployment was on, the home units usually heard

from Dhahran once a day, calling to have a document sent by fax to the theater or to

conduct other business. It happened that at the time the bomb exploded, an airman

fiom this Florida base was on the phone with a member of the 741st Maintenance

Squadron. From there, word traveled quickly to the building of the Tlst Rescue

Squadron, on the west side of the Patrick flightline.76

That afternoon of June 25, a small party was underway at the rescue squadron.

The Air Force had released the list oftechnical sergeants who had been selected for

promotion. Among the almost 4,800 was an NCO on the staffof the lst Rescue

Group who then was working in the same building as the 7lst. Col. Thomas R.

Friers, the group commander, drove across the base ffom his office in the 45th

Space Wing Headquarters to the rescue squadron's building on the flightline. After

attending the promotion ceremony and congrahrlating the sergeant, Colonel Friers

stayed for the socializing that nearly always follows such an event. During the

milling around and chatting, he said lateq someone asked him if he had heard about

ttre bombing in Saudi Arabia: a gasoline truck had exploded.TT

In a hangar across the flightline, the 741 st Maintenance Squadron was recognizing one of its members with an awards ceremony. Lt. Col. Donald R. Jozayt the commander of the Tlst Rescue Squadrorl attended this firnction, held as part of tlrc unit's

3:30 p.m. roll call. Here he pickedup the same hearsayreportthatFriers had gathered

at the squadron building: there had been a bornbing at the KhobarTowers.T8

Lieutenant Colonel Jozayt was not entirely convinced the story was true but he

retumed to his office at the Tlst Rescue Squadron's building and attempted to call

65
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

the deployed unit in Dhahan. He got no answer at the operations section and hied

some other numbers. Eventually he reached a staff sergeant in the command post

who could offer some preliminary information, which proved accurate as far as it

went. A bornb had gone offin the KhobarTowers; Building 133, the civil engineers

dormitory west of 131, which billeted some members of the 7lst, had been hit; the

wing battle staffhad convened. Colonel Jozayt asked the sergeant to call him when

more was knorvn, after the battle staffmeeting.Te

Colonel Friers had remained at the 71stb building after the promotion gathering

and now the two officers waited for additional information, and tried other phone

numbers. Lieutenant Colonel lozaTrr finally got through to the flightline at King

Abdul Aziz, where the maintainence crew was working on the HC-130 that had been

forced to retum early from its mission that day. The NCOs there confirmed the unfortunate news that Building 131 had been damaged, but they had little information

about the personnel of the 71st Rescue Squadron. It was a senior airman, a resident of

131, who eventually called Jozalt and verified the tragic facts of the attack. This

NCO had escaped the stricken dormitory and reached a telephone. Building 131 had

been badly hit, he related, and some members of the Tlst had been killed.8O

Once the tragic news was confirme4 Colonel Friers quickly decided that his

unit would need a central clearinghouse to cope with the information it soon would

be processing. All three squadrons of the lst Rescue Group were represented at the

Khobar Towers. In addition to the C-130 crews from the Tlst Rescue Squadron,

pararescue jumpers from the 41st Rescue Squadron and maintenance personnel

from the 741st Rescue Squadron served there. That aftemoon at Patrick, there was

no way to know the extent ofthe casualties across the three squadrons. Friers recognized that during the crisis ahead, information should be processed through a single,

cenfralized office, and the group headquarters offered the logical location for it.8l

The two officers left the rescue squadron's building and went to Colonel Friersb

office. The group commander asked his deputy, Lt. Col. Robert H. Holloway, to call

the three squadrons and begin recruiting volunteers for the crisis information center.

Friers also began arranging to acquire the additional phones that doubtless would be

needed in the group command section during the days ahead.82

Telephoning from Colonel Friers's office, Lieutenant Colonel Jozayt tried to

reach Lieutenant Colonel Shafer. Unknown then to Colonel lozafi, the deployment

commander had been injured in the bombing and taken to the ARAMCO Hospital.

Later that afternoon Jane Shafer, his wife, called Jozayt. She had talked to her husband over the phone and he had given her an unofficial, "close hold" accounting of

the casualties of the 71st. Six members of the squadron were believed dead. Shafer

himself had been released from the ARAMCO Hospital and had begun regrouprng

the squadron.S3

The fint communications from Dhahran came quickly to Patrick, and to Eglin

Air Force Base as well. Eglin was also a Florida installation, but its location west of

the Apalachicola River put it on Central Daylight Time. Here it was 1:53 p.m. when

the attack occurred at the KhobarTowers.

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Within minutes after the explosion, Col. David Hayes, the vice commander of

the 33d Fighter Wing, received a call from the theater reporting that there had been

a bombing in Saudi Arabia. The communication had come to Colonel Hayes

because the wing commandeq Col. Gary R. Dylewski, was then enroute to--as

events had it-Dhahran. The 60th Fighter Squadron had been tapped to participate

in a deploy'rnent to Doha, Qatar, as part ofAir Expeditionary Force III and it needed

some of the F-l5s belonging to its sister squadron, the 58th. That afternoon Colonel

Dylewski intended to take a commercial flight from Atlanta's Hartsfield International Airport to Dhahran. There he and other pilots would have picked up twelve of

ttre 58th Fighter Squadron's jets and flovm them to Doha, for the AEF III deployment. The wing commander was in the Atlanta airport when he learned of the

Khobar attack; he immediately returned to Eglin.84

Colonel Hayes called together the wing's squadron commanders and other officers for a battle staffmeeting, which convened at 3:30 p.m. in a conference room

appointed with a television set. The officers turned on the TV but left the volume

dov/n-so they could hold their discussion and at the same time wait for the Cable

News Network to break the story. By the mid-1990s CNN had firmly established a

reputation for rapid coverage of intemational events. In this case, though, the call

had come to Eglin so quickly that one of the battle staff officers later could accurately claim: "We had actually beat CNN." Capt. Brenda L. Campbell, the wingb

public affairs officeq recalled: "We sat and watched CNN, and they didn't have any

information at all. Normally CNN is our first look at whatb going on."85

The information that the Eglin officers had at 3:30 was sketchy. Colonel Hayes

told the battle staffhe had a first-hand report of a bornbing in Saudi Arabia. One

officer afterward recalled that the group was not "cavalier" about the possibility

there hadbeen fatalities, but suggestedthattheirpsychological defenses encouraged

them to assume that the members of their own 58th Fighter Squadron had not been

harmed. Information came in, as he characterized it, only "in bits and pieces," leaving the battle staffwith more questions than answers. Does the bombing involve us?,

the officers wondered. How bad was it? Were there injuries? Were there fatalities?

The group disbanded with the understanding it would assemble again when more

information was known. To meet the possibility that Eglin personnel hadbeen

involved in the bombing, Captain Campbell said, the officers "started gathering

emergency numbers, spouses' names, spouses'numbers, so they could start contacting people" if it became necessary.86

By 4:15 p.m. more news had arrived, and it was not good. By that time Lt. Col.

Doug Cochran had been able to call Eglin. It was definite that the attack had affected some members of the squadron, but it was not knorvn how many. At that early

juncture, thily were unaccounted for. By 4:15, too, the wives of some of the men in

Dhahran had called the battle staffofficers. They had heard from their husbands and

knew they had survived the bombing.8T

At 6 p.m. the battle staffconvened for the second time. By then Colonel Hayes

had more information from SaudiArabia. The explosion at the KhobarTowers had
Khobar Towers: T[agedy and Response

been a fair$ large one. It had occurred near a dormitory where members ofthe 58th

were housed. It was certain there had been fatalities; their extent was unknown. The

assembled officers now began to discuss seriously how information about the

bombing would be gathered and managed. "We then set in motion," one of them

said, "plans to be able to notiS, families."88

In Washington, D.C., an officer assigned to the Air Force Operations Centeq

located onthe mezzanine level of the Pentagon basement, had called Air Force

Chief of Staff Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman at 4:16 p.m. and informed him of the

bombing. General Fogleman spent the rest of the afternoon reading initial reports

about the casualties and other details about'*fiat had happened in Dhahran.8e

Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of StaffGen. John M. Shalikashvili, accompanied

by his senior communications technician Mr. Frank Angelo and others, was airbome for Panama when the news reached him. General Shalikashvili later recalled

that it'\vas not until we landed that the firll measure of the hagedy became known

to us." Mr. Angelo quickly began gathering information fiom the National Military

Command Center in the Pentagon, and from Headquarters CENTCOM in

Riyadh.eo

That aftemoon Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Sheila Widnall was testiffing

before the House National Security Committee when she received the news. She

raised her hand and told the chairman, Floyd Spence of South Carolina, that she

would have to leave the hearing. Dr. Widnall said she had just been informed of an

attack against Americans in Saudi Arabia "with a considerable loss of life." She

stood up and left at once. Her words and actions triggered a direct response from the

joumalists in the committee room. Later Dr. Widnall recalled: "I just left. It was

like . . . the old movie scene, where the reporters run to the phones."et

President Bill Clinton was in Washington that afternoon, preparing to leave for

Lyon, France for a summit meeting of the Group of Seven, the world's seven most

industrialized nations. The president spoke to reporters as word of the bombing

came to the White House. "The explosion appears to be the work of terrorists," he

stated. "And if that is the case, like all Americans, I am ouhaged by it . . . . Within a

few hours, an FBI team will be on its way to Saudi Arabia to assist in the investigation. Our condolences and our prayers go out to the victims, families, and their

friends." President Clinton closed his remarks with a commitment "We will pursue

this. America takes care of our own. Those who did it must not go unpunished."e2

By late afternoon on the East Coast of the United States, millions of people had

heard the early reports of the disaster. The bombing had occurred at night and for

several hours the darkness preventedjournalists Iiom taking photographs. The situation changed after daylight returned to Saudi Arabia on June 26. After 9 a.m. that

moming in Dhahran, or 2 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, CNN began broadcasting its

first videos of the bomb site. As Americans awoke that Wednesday morning and

watched the news before going to work, they saw an image on their television

screens that would become sickenly familiar: Building l3l, with its northem face

shorn off.e3
Response

I get goose bumps every time I tell this story

[about Khobar TbwersJ, because the people

were just tltere, when you needed them. It was

that way ull night long, and it was that way

for weeks afterward. I'm not talking about

just the medics. I'm talking about everyone.

Lieutenant Colonel (Dr.) Douglas J. Robb

Interim Commander, 4404th Medical Group
Chapter Six

Golden Hour

Medical professionals know that there is a limited period of opportunity to help

patients who have suffered extensive injuries. Care that is given at the scene of an

accident is vitally important, and research has shown that severe trauma patients

who reach surgery within sixty minutes have a significantly higher survival rate than

those who do not. What is done----or not done-for a person during that critical time

can mean the difference between healthy recovery and permanent disability, or even

between life and death. Medical professionals call this period of opportunity the

"Golden Hour."l

Lt. Col. (Dr.) Douglas J. Robb, interim commander of the 4404thWing's medical group and the senior doctor at the Khobar Towers on the night of the bombing,

applied this phrase to the aftermath of the terrorist attack. The time between l0 p.m.

and 1l p.m. on June 25, 1996, was the Golden Hour at Dhahran. During the vital

sixty minutes or so after the explosion, across the entire Khobar Towers compound,

some 2,000 airmen and soldiers administered medical aid to themselves and others.2

That night in Saudi Arabia, the Air Force's first aid program, formally referred

to as "self-aid and buddy care," or SABC, more than proved its value. SABC had

become increasingly important during the 1990s, as the Air Force continually

deployed large numbers of airmen to forward locations where medics might not

immediately be at the scene of a contingency. Airmen trained in self-aid and buddy

care could help themselves and others during the critical interval oftime before professional help arrived. In 1996 CMSgt David Bayliss, the manager of the medical

service specialty career field and the head of the SABC program, described its

extent and significance. "Every single bluesuiter," he pointed out, "except those

with specialized medical training, receive self-aid and buddy care faining. It's the

first echelon of medical treatment before medical personnel arrive."3

Doubtless many airmen wondered, until the night ofJune 25 ,1996, iftheir selfaid and buddy care training wasjust another "checkthe-box" exercise. "You never

know," one NCO mused "how people are going to respond. We always train for this,

that, and the other thing-but when the 'real deal'happens, how are people going to

react?" Months after the altack, a medical officer acknowledged harboring doubts

about how well self-aid and buddy care would work-until the night ofthe Dhahxan

bombing. Another KhobarTowers veteran conceded that during his SABC faining

he had often asked himself: if I ever encounter someone in the state of shock will I

71
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

recognize it? (That night near Dhahran, he got his answer: he found it was easy to

perceive the condition.) This same officer drew a candid conkast between the training he had experienced and the realif he dealt with at Khobar Towers. "We . . . do

exercises up the butt," he said bluntly, "and you get written up because you didn't

read a card on a guy's chest that showed what his injury was." But in an actual emergency like the Khobar bombing, he concluded, when people saw real wounds, they

knew what to do.a

Given the haumatic circumstances, it was not surprising that, in fact, there were

problems in administering self-aid and buddy care. One difficulty, which had a

commendable cause, was that at times so many airmen were trying to assist an

injured person that they got in one another's way. Lt. Col. Thomas A. McCarthy,

operations officer of the 58th Fighter Squadron, remarked that one of his "biggest

challenges" that night was organizing the good Samaritans who were attempting to

help one another. "People were falling over each other," he said, "trying to help." In

cases where there was a surplus of caregivers, he steered the excess helpers to aid

other wounded airmen or to altemate tasks.5

Another difficulty, which some might say also had a commendable cause, was

that some airmen were reluctant to acknowledge they needed medical care. Some of

the injured saw others who were more severely wounded than themselves an4 selfless to a fault, they refused to accept help. Dr. Robb, Capt. (Dr.) R. Morris Treadway,

and other medical professionals observed and commented on this pattem of behavior. Dr. Treadway pointed out that many of the survivors felt that their injuries were

"meaningless," in relation to the death of a friend, "so they [didn't] seek care." SSgt.

Rudolph Grimm II, a dental technician who aided the wounded at the medical clinic that night, recalled potential patients saying: 'No, no, no, take him-he's hurt

worse." A senior master sergeant, in an account he wrote in November 1997, puI

himself in the group described by Sergeant Grimm. With slight cuts on his legs and

arms, and a deep one in his hand, he reported to the clinic: "Every couple ofminutes

a different medic would come over and ask me if I was OK. I told them yes and

please go take care of someone with serious injuries. I got tired of this unneeded

attention on myself and left the clinic area."6 Brig. Gen. Daniel M. Dick, the

inbound commander of 4404th Composite Wing (Provisional) on the night of the

attack, said of the airmen like this one, "being great people, they knew that the medical system was totally overwhelmed. Not only overwhelmed that night-but in the

enzuing days."7

There also were the small problems that always occur when stressful circumstances tum simple tasks into difficult ones. SSgt. Selena P Husted, a law office

manager who helped many people that night, vividly remembered how hard it was

to get a first aid kit open. And after she did, "the gauze and sfirffwas sealed shut. I

remember trying to get in to it, and I could not. I was ripping it open with my teeth,

because I couldn't get into the stuff. It was very frustrating."8

Sergeant Husted, and uncounted others, overcame the small problems, and they

made self-aid and buddy care one of the "success stories" of Khobar Towers. Capt.

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Russell D. Barile, a pilot of the Tlst Rescue Squadron, detailed one specific example among the uncounted many that took place that night. Captain Barile recounted

how he and SrA. Rich Dixon, a pararescue jumper, entered Building 103, a dormitory at the corner ofTwelfth and Thirty-third Streets, and encountered "an individual

coming dor,vn the stairwell, being helped by another one. He had a severe laceration

on his right shin. Airman Dixon took offhis shirt, put it on there, put direct pressure

on it." Barile and Dixon then carried the man out of the dormitory.e

TSgt. Jefferson A. Craven, a resident of the fourth floor of Building 133 who

suffered multiple wounds, stated directly that self-aid and buddy care saved his life.

"If it wasn't for the four airmen that were living with me," Sergeant Craven asserted,

"I wouldn't be here: that's a fact. Self-aid and buddy care got us through that

tnight]." Craven's account was particulady compelling in its unvarnished honesty.

He said of the airmen who saved his life: "I remember fussing with them. They tried

to calm me do.,m, tell me to hang on, that the medics would be there. I said, 'Guys,

you gottia wake up. You don't know how bad this is."'10

Many airmen may have wondered before that night how well their SABC training would serve them, but when it counted, during the critical minutes after 9:53

p.m., they learned that it did" in spades. SSgt. Darryl A. Parker was one of the many

who remembered the fint aid techniques he had been taught and used them. "It was

the little things," he said, "like remembering to apply direct pressure to an open

wound and allowing the wound to clot as we placed bandages over the injured

areas . . . . Being able to remember these steps, and much more, being [able] to apply

the steps during a time of crisis, allowed the medical personnel to give a quick check

over and move on to other more serious injuries." Sergeant Parker drew a pointed

lesson from his experience at Khobar Towers: "For those ofyou that think you are

reading the PFE [the Performance Fitness Examination Study Guide] just fortesting

pu{poses, I am here and alive to tell you that what is in that book can mean the difference between life and death." "I think those exercises did help," Lt. Col.

(Chaplain) Dennis E. Aleson concluded. "When the bomb went off in Khobar

Towers, we didn't have time to look for checklists. . . . But people knew what to

do."ll

Faced with a sudden disaster, the airmen administered self-aid and buddy care,

improvising with whatever materials were at hand. Dr. Robb praised their resourcefulness: People arrived at the clinic with their wounds already bandaged'kith towels, with T:-shirts. Somebody fused] a broomstick handle for splints. Stuffthey

learned in self-aid and buddy care [training]."12

Hundreds of airmen helped each other, and although no one group could be

singled out above others, many Khobar veterans praised the work of the few

pararescue jumpers who were on the scene that night. These airmen, assigrred to the

7l st Rescue Squadron and other similar units, were skilled in two highly demanding

areas: jumping from aircraft. and providing medical aid as Emergency Medical

Technicians. Dr. Robb pointed out that of the eight pararescue jumpers on the compound at the time, only four were left standing after the explosion. They made up for
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

their numbers with their efforts. "It seemed like [the PJs] were everywhere," Dr.

Treadway said.r3

Dr. Robb recalled: "There was one guy I remember standing there, his head all

bandaged up, big old pararescue pack on, with all his medical supplies. He was in

shorts. There he was out on the patio [of the medical clinic], slipping an [intravenous] line in one of the casualties. I'll never forget that, as long as I live." Lt. Col.

Douglas R. Cochran, commander of the 58th Fighter Squadron, referred to another

dramatic episode: a PJ who had received "a pretty good cut" first sewed up his own

injury, and then began giving first aid to others. Four pararescuemen received the

Airman's Medal: MSgt. William F. Sine, SSgt. MatthewA. Wells, SrA. Michael D.

Atkins, and SrA. Gregory E. Randall. SrA. Eric Castor received a Purple Heart;

SrA. Rich Dixon and SrA. Dan Williams received Air Force Commendation Medals

with the Valor device.la

Capt. Michael D. Morelock, a pilot ofthe Tlst Rescue Squadron, recounted one

episode that showe dhow persistenl the PJs were in looking out for others. A resident

of the top floor of Building l3l, Captain Morelock had suffered cuts on his face,

head, and neckr5 and an ambulance had taken him to the Arabian American Oil

Company (ARAMCO) Hospital. A team of doctors and nurses examined the pilot,

took x-rays, cleaned his wounds, and began stitching him. Morelock laughed when

he recalled what happened then: "[SrA.] Mike Atkins, one of the PJs, was brought in

next to me. . . . He was getting stitched up, too. I remember him telling the doctors

exactly what &e thought was wrong with me!"r6

The PJs, firefighters, and securif policemen used their EMT skills that night,

and hundreds of other people who had no medical experience beyond their SABC

training did a remarkably effective job of helping one another. This spontaneous

effort by so many non-medical professionals was one of the most striking aspects of

the Dhahran bombing. "I found myself working in puddles of blood to aid the

injured," one NCO stated, "with no medical training at all." "Our success was not

only that we had all those doctors, nurses and technicians," Dr. Robb summed up,

"but that we also had 2,000 airmen and soldiers trained in first aid and buddy care."r7

Dr. Robb identified three ways that self-aid and buddy care proved significant

at the KhobarTowers. Fundamentally, it saved lives and limited injuries. SABC, he

pointed out, contributed to what medical professionals "call a decrease in morbidity,

because of loss ofblood or loss of function."l8

Second, the Air Force's first aid program was a force mulitiplier. Hundreds of

wounded arrived at the clinic, soon after the attack. "It doesn't take you long to get

super-saturated with 200, 300 casualties," Dr. Robb stated. "We had 500 total,

through the next couple of days . . . . I had 350 people, that night." Thanks to self-aid

and buddy care, all of the initial patients at the clinic had received help of one kind

or another, before they arrived there. "Those 350 people," he pointed out, "already

had a bandage on them, or a dressing, or whatever they needed." He recalled that at

the July 3 "hot wash" debriefing: "I looked at the other docs and said, 'Was it just

me" or drd evervbodv tltat came in have some fonn of initial first aid siven to them?'

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And they said, 'Everyone."' Because of self-aid and buddy care, the doctors at the

clinic could give their immediate aftention to the more severely injured patients,

confident that in every case the others already had received some initial help.

SABC, Robb concluded, "was a tremendous force multiplier. . . . The response

couldn't have happened ifwe hadn't had that extra 2,000 set ofeyes, hands, and ears

out there, helping us out."le

Dr. Robb also pointed to a third, and fundamentally important, atfibute of selfaid and buddy care. Instead of being trawnatrzedthe survivors quickly focused on

aiding the injured. Dr. Robb recalled that when he arrived at the clinic, "The first

thing I noticed was that every casualty had two or three fellow airmen attending to

them."2o

Instead of feeling abandoned" many of the wounded were reassured because

their comrades around them began helping them so promptly. Self-aid and buddy

care strengthened the morale of both the injrued and uninjrned. By giving airmen a

measure of control over events at a time of great stress, it contributed to the return of

calm and order. One of the doctors at the July 3 medical debriefing remarked about

how quiet the clinic had been that night. Other than the physicians and medics giving necessary directives, he recalled, you could hear a pin drop. "I think that's a tribute," Dr. Robb commented, 'hot only to the trust in the medical system, but to the

self-aid and buddy care."2l

While self-aid and buddy care, and other, haining was not the fundamental

cause of the recovery that began after the bombing, it reflected a larger point-the

moral and physical courage of the airmen. As Brig. Gen. Terry Schwalier, the wing

commander, later pointed out, the essential factor working that night was the high

character that his personnel displayed. Hundreds of airmen demonstrated their professionalism, sense of mission, selflessness, and patriotism.22

These highly motivated airmen aided their comrades so thoroughly that when

the injured began arriving at the medical clinic, Building lll,23 very soon after the

attack, all of them had received some initial medical help. The bomb had exploded

at 9:53 p.m.2a Within minutes, fire chief MSgt. Wayne Mello,25 the security police,

and others began directing people to the Desert Rose Inn, near the clinic.26 The frst

patient arrived at Building lll at 10:02 p.m. Dr. Treadway noticed that the initial

arrivals tended to be in better condition: the less severely injured airmen walked

faster, and reached the clinic sooner than those more badly wounded. The patients,

he said, "rolled in and rolled in."27 By 10:10, about thirty of the injured had gathered

at the clinic and the nearby dining hall.28

The injured arrived at these two buildings, in the middle of the Khobar Towers

compound, by a number of means. Some came alone; many were carried by other

airmen----on doors that had been blor,vn offtheir hinges, on ironing boards that had

survived the blast, on litters improvised from whatever was at hand. Dr. Robb

recalled the scene: 

.We 

saw people coming in, using blorvn out doors for stretchers.

They were bringing people in on chairs. They were doing what is called the 'twoman buddy carry.' People always joke about it when they are doing [it in] self-aid
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

and buddy care [training], but they were doing it-bringing them in in the two-personbuddy carry."2e

Nearly all the injured had suffered either lacerations from glass shards or blunt

trauma from flying objects. An observation that Dr. Robb made about Building l3l

also applied to some ofthe other living quarters: "The fully occupied dormitory was

immediately throvm into total darkness with shards of glass, concrete, furnifi.re, and

other debris flying at high velocigr. The blast occurred at atlme when many occupants were in the common lounge areas ofthe suites. Glass patio doors in the lounge

areas facing the blast produced a high volume of flying glass fiagments." These dangerous shards caused the most common injury, multiple cuts from window fragments. Robb estimated that, after the most severe cases were dispatched to hospitals

in Dhahran, 90 to 95 percent of the patients who remained had suffered glass

wounds.3o Blunt trauma from hurling objects accounted for the second most frequent injury. "There were a lot of contusions," Robb noted, "from people being

thrown up against walls and being hit by chairs and other objects."3l

Fortunately for the wounded there were eighty-one medical professionals on or

near the Khobar Towers that night.32 The 4404th Medical GroupS authorized manning provided for four flight surgeons. A shortfall at PatrickAir Force Base, Florida,

had reduced this number to three, but the unit's interim commander, Dr. Robb, was

himself a physician. So on June 25,1996, the group did have four flight surgeons:

Dr. Robb, Dr. Treadway, Maj. (Dr.) Roy Smith, and Maj. (Dr.) Steven P Goff.33

There were twenty-two other medical professionals--dentists, nurses, medical technicians, preventive medicine specialists, and administrative and supply personnelassigned to the KhobarTowers clinic at the time ofthe attack. These officers and airmen were off duty when the terrorists struck, but responded quickly and began

arriving at Building 111 just as the first patients did soon after 10 p.m.3a

The zl410th Aeromedical Evacuation Flight, assigned to nearby Dhahran Air

Base, provided ten more medical professionals: three nurses and seven medical

technicians.35 At the hour of the explosion, a few of these med techs were off the

compound; most of them, and all of the nurses, were in their dormitories. Like the

medical group personnel, these professionals reacted quickly. The med techs who

were away retumed promptly and shortly after 10 p.m. all of them were aiding the

injured, at the medical clinic and the Desert Rose Inn, and near the devastated

Building 13 L36 One of the nurses immediately went to work on the Army side of the

c{inic, the second on the Air Force wing, and the third wherever she could best help

at the moment.37

In addition to these personnel assigned to the 44lOth Aeromedical Evacuation

Flight and the 4404thwing's medical group, there were the four PJs and twentyeight crash rescue emergency medical technicians and firefighters of the wingS

civil engineering squadron. These professionals first went to the dormitories and

helped stunned and wounded residents evacuate their buildings. TSgt. George

Burgess, a resident of Building 13 I who helped the firefighter EMTs sweep his dormitory recounted how they worked: "We'd look for survivors, we'd find them, we'd

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pull them out . . . . Every floor we went on, we'd do a sweep of the floor. . . . We went

all the way to the top."38 After the PJs and firefighters conducted these evacuafion

sweeps, they reported to the clinic and the Desert Rose and aided the wounded there.

Their numbers brought the total ofAir Force medical professionals at Khobar that

night to sixty-eight.3e

Fortunately, there were still more caregivers on the scene. The Army operated

its clinic in the same facility with the Air Force, and manned it with a doctor, a

physician's assistant, and eight med techs.aO By 10:25 p.m. three allies-a British

flight surgeon, a British med tech, and a French flight surgeon-had joined the

effort at Building I I I and brought the total of medical professionals to eighty-one.ar

The medical people proved equal to the challenges posed that night, and so did

the available facilities. The more severely injured patients received their first treatment at the Air Force andArmy medical clinic, which occupied the ground floor of

a structure not far west of the Desert Rose Inn. This was Building I l l, patterned

along the same T shape as 131 and the other eight-story dormitories of the Khobar

Towers. Its upper floors housed people who worked downstairs in the clinic and

elsewhere on the compound. The crosspiece of the buildingb T ran north and south,

parallelling Twelfth Street, and the base of the T ran east and west. The clinic was

divided into Army and Air Force sections: the northem half of the crosspiece had

two USAF waiting rooms and three treatment rooms; the southem half, the Army

end, duplicated this pattern.a2 Airmen sometimes referred to the base of the T as the

"back" of the clinic, since it was situated farthest from the front entrance, on Twelfth

Sheet. It contained offices, an order$ room, and storage areas.43

The huge number of injured soon overwhelmed this small facility and the area

around it.aa During the month before the bombing, the clinic had heated an average

of twenty-four patients a day. Consistent with that figure, on the day before the

attack, the facility had seen twenty-five airmen. On the night of June 25, it saw hundreds. By 10:25 p.m., when Dr. Robb arrived from downtoum, patients filled all six

treatrnent rooms and two "code blues," emergency resuscitations, were taking place,

one on each side of the clinic.a5 The facility soon was "overflowing," Maj. Cynthia

D. Coles recalled as "people came in, in a steady stream.'46

The number of patients increased, and so did the severity of the cases. As Dr.

Treadway pointed out, the ambulatory and less seriously injured people reached the

clinic earliest. As time passed, airmen began carrying in the more severely wounded

casualties. "It got to the point," Treadway explained 'fthat we just decided we needed to set up a triage point outside [the clinic], where we could better see people and

send them to the proper area. And so we cleared most of the folks out of the clinic

itself and tried to get as many ambulatory folks [as possible] to walk out, and place

the injured-ambulatory in one area, and we were lining up stretchers in another

area," rrvhere the medics could watch them more easily.aT

The "triage" that Dr. Treadway mentioned comes from a French word that

translates to "sorting." Medical professionals use it to mean dividing patients into

categories to prioritize their care and transport. Triage is a critical process in any sitI

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

uation involving multiple casualties, and particularly so in cases like the Khobar

Towers, with a large number of them. In emergencies like the Dhahran bombing, the

caregivers must determine quickly which patients have life-threatening injuries that

demand immediate attention and which can be stabilized and given more help later.

By rapidly sorting the injured and prioritizing their treatment, caregivers can maxi

mize the number of survivors.a8

During the Golden Hour between l0 and 1l p.m., first a widespread effort of

self-aid and buddy care, and then an efficient use of triage, combined together to

save many lives. On the grounds outside the clinic, Dr. Robb and his fellow professionals quickly triaged hundreds ofpatients.ae The caregivers rapidly separated the

injured into three categories: immediate, delayed, and minimal treatment, and

helped at once the "immediate" cases. Dr. Treadway recounted: "We had several

medics going around giving people [intravenous lines], just hundreds of IVs. A lot

of the pararescue folks that were injured were helprng to put IVs in, too."50

Once the medical professionals had started the IV lines and given other aid to

the "immediate" cases, they began a follow-on effort of "re-triage]' or secondary

triage. This process was required because patients, of course, do not always remain

stable. An ongoing effort is necessary when there are multiple victims, and it is particular$ important when there are mass casualties. The caregivers have to reassess

continually the condition of the injured andupdate the triage. Dr. Robb summarized

the process: "We triaged and stabilized, and re-triaged and re-stabilized."5r

While the medical professionals did their life-saving work, Col. Peter R. Mooy,

the wing's logistics group commander, mobilized the personnel and resources needed to support them. At the 10:15 p.m. battle staffmeeting, Brigadier General

Schwalier had dispatched Colonel Mooy to the Desert Rose Inn. The logistics group

commander organrzedthe support effort at the dining hall and at the clinic, which

allowed Dr. Robb, the other doctors, nurses, and med techs to concentrate on patient

care. Brigadier General Dick praised this arrangement: while Colonel Mooy

"orchestrated the events gorng on at the clinic that night . . . Dr. Robb did a magnificent job" with patient care.52

Sergeant Grimm summarized Colonel Mooyb efforts that night: "There was a

colonel on the radio, running the show. He got the lights and water there quickly."

Dr. Robb vividly recalled "standing in that courtyard [of the clinic]. It hit me that

there were about two hundred people out there. I thought, 'Gosh, I could use some

lights around here. And I was no sooner thinking that, and there [were civil engineers] showing up, with lights."53

SSgt. Boris Rudinski, a ground equipment mechanic, was in his shop on the

military flightline when he received the telephone call to bring lighting to the

KhobarTowers. The bombing had knocked out almost all of the compound's street

light poles, and illumination was badly needed at places like Building 131, which

was being searched for casualties, and the medical clinic and Desefi Rose Inn,

where the injured were being treated. Sergeant Rudinski quickly transported a bank

of auxiliary lights, which were carried on a four-wheeled cart, to the blast site. When

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he got to Building 13 I 

, he later recalled "they were still pulling bodies out of the

building. I assiste4 [I] helped them with that." As for the medical clinic, the auxiliary lighting arrived there rapidly, too. "They got everything there quick," Sergeant

Grimm remembered, within fifteen or twenty minutes.sa

The episode of the lights was representative of a larger pattern that night: whenever Dr. Robb needed something, it arrived. "I remernber," he said, "one ofthe guys

sayrng, 'These people are going to get dehydrated. They just went through a big

shock.'No sooner did I even begin to think aboutlhat-andthere was Services [providing waterl .... There were the cops with protection; there were [the Civil

Engineers] with whatever we needed."55

There was no stronger example of the timely appearance of critically needed

aid than the arrival of the ambulances that night. Dr. Robb quickly recognized that

many of the injured airmen would require hospitalization. Some the patients had

larger, more severe wounds than others, and some had glass that would have to be

removed in emergency rooms. The medical group had its own fleet of ambulances,

but it was far, far too small to cope with the casualties caused by the at|ack. one of

these vehicles was in the repair shop that night, leaving only two available. Each had

a broken air conditioning system-a common problem in that part of the world.

Both ambulances were designed to carry four patients at a time-a pathetically limited capacity, given the hundreds of injured.56 With frank honesty, Dr. Robb recalled

his thinking at the time: "I remember standing there, going, 'How am I going to get

all these people down to the hospitals [in downtown Dhahran] with two ambulances?' It's a hell of a lot of trips."57

Within minutes after the blast, an employee of the Red Crescent Society-the

Saudi Red Cross- called the local Civil Defense ofiice and asked what information

was known about the explosion. At that time few hard facts were available, but the

picture soon began to sharpen. At 10:15 p.m. the crew of a Red Crescent Society

ambulance just north of the KhobarTowers spotted the devastation at Building 131

and called in the location of the disaster to their dispatcheq who quickly informed

the Civil Defense office of the precise point of the attack. This RCS employee also

immediately began dispatching the available Society ambulances-there were eight

then on duty-to the scene. While the Saudis took this initiative, Brigadier General

Schwalier placed a telephone call that expedited the directing of these badly needed

medical vehicles to the KhobarTowers.58

In addition to this help, Saudi Ministry of Health and local ambulances also

were soon speeding toward the compound. Driving through the gap that the bomb

had created in the fence along the northern perimeteqse the fint of these vehicles

arrived at the clinic at 10:27 p.m. Others appeared on its heels, the second arriving

fwo minutes later and the third, five. Eventually, more than twenty Saudi ambulances transported injured airmen from the Khobar clinic to hospitals in dorvntorvn

Dhahran. Dr. Robb later reflected: "We'll never know [how many Saudi vehicles

helped that nightl . . . . I'm going to guess we had twenty or thirty ambulances. They

just kept cycling."6o

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

In addition to the ambulances, a number of medical professionals also came to

the aid of the wounded airmen. At about 1l p.m. Dr. Ronald Price and another

physician from the emergency room staffof the ARAMCO Hospital arrived at the

clinic. Within half an hour a Saudi Ministry of Health team of doctors reached the

scene. This group was from Dammam Central Hospital, about eight miles from the

KhobarTowers, and was headed by the director of that facility's emergency department.61 The largest inflrx of professionals began at 12:30 a.m. on June 26, with the

arrival of two surgeons and twelve nurses in four ambulances from King Fahd

University Hospital, about seven blocks from the Khobar Towers. The expertise of

this pair of Saudi specialists proved particularly valuable; they helped with some of

the more difficult cases of removing glass and closing wounds.62 Other local professionals also arrived after 12:30: the Saudi Rail Organization contributed a doctor

and two nurses, while the King Fahd Military Medical Complex, located about

twelve miles south of Khobar toward Abqaiq, and al Mana Hospital, five blocks

north of the compound and near the Arabian Gulf, each sent an M.D. and an R.N.63

The Saudis and the Americans from the ARAMCO Hospital supplied not only

physicians and ambulances, but also critically important communications support.

The enormous explosion had knocked out the compound's telephone communications, and cell phone channels quickly became saturated. Under these circumstances, Saudi radio support played a vital role during the period immediately after

the attack. When Dr. Priceb team arrived in two ambulances at 1l p.m., they used a

land mobile radio to open communications with their facility, the ARAMCO

Hospital.6a

This help complemented the extraordinary efforts of the wing's own communications squadron. Its members reached the scene by 10:45 p.m. and quickly began

connecting dedicated lines directly to the Dhahran hospitals. Within two and a half

hours they had a communications system in place in the Desert Rose lnn's executive

dining room. This location eventually would become the Site Recovery Center, the

workplace of the permanent Disaster Control Group, the successor to the temporary

DCG that the security police had established soon after the attack.65 The comm airmen also supplemented the voice communications at the dining hall with a fax

machine that they brought from Building 103, a dormitory northwest of the Deserl

Rose. Installed in the clinic, this hardware helped deal with the high volume of

patient information and other data that had to be sent and received.ob

Communication with hospitals in Dhahran and elsewhere proved important, as

did the cooperation of the Saudis. TheAir Force had a memorandum of agreement

with the Ministry of Defense andAviation (TI4ODA) Hospital, and the American airmen were confident of its help. As for the others, the night of June 25, 1996, would

test their support. "In our hearts we hoped the other hospitals would respond," Dr.

Robb said afterward, "but you never know."67

Without exception, the Dhahran hospitals did their best for the American airmen. "Everybody," Dr. Robb stated, "was welcoming our patients with open

anns . . . . The response from the host nation hospitals was tremenduous. I don't

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think I could have asked for anything more." Dr. Treadway echoed Dr. Robb: "The

host nation response was . . . outstanding." One of the several official investigations

conducted after the bombing pointed out that, among other considerations, ambulance "transportation would have been inadequate had the Saudis not responded."68

At 10:30 p.m. an Air Force ambulance, one of the two available that night,

made the first departure from the clinic. It carried five patients to the MODA

Hospital, chosen as the primary destination because of its proximity and its MOA

with the Air Force. This dispatch represented a remarkable achievement: the bomb

had exploded just thirty-seven minutes earlier. The secondAir Force ambulance left

the clinic at l0:45.6e

The first Saudi ambulances had reached the scene just minutes before the Air

Force one made the initial departure. More and more of these host nation vehicles

joined the two USAF ones, and Dr. Price directed their flow. At I l:45 he learned

over his land mobile radio that the MODA Hospital was becoming overwhelmed by

arrivals, and he began dispatching the ambulances to the ARAMCO and King Fahd

University facilities. 70

The ambulances used an approach that allowed them to pull up in front of the

clinic, along Twelfth Street. MSgt. Dwayne R. Berry, who had been working out in

the gym at the time of the attack, was among the many who helped load the vehicles.

He compared the scene outside the clinic to the dispatch of "the NewYork City taxis

at the airport. We would load an injured person inside an ambulance, and roll them

in, and the next one would pull right up." The airmen tried to keep track of the

patients: "We found out who that individual was and then we would pass that to a

guy who was standing there. The ambulance driver would tell us, Okay, he's going

to so-and-so hospital. Okay, we'd get his name, This is Senior Airman so-and-so,

and he's going to [al Mana] Hospital. Okay, the ambulance is gone." The process

continued: "The next [ambulance] wouldpull up. We bring another cart around. . . .

And it went surprisingly well." By I a.m. of the twenty-sixth, the fleet of ambulances, two Air Force vehicles and more than twenty Saudi ones, had transported

about 200 patients to hospitals in Dhahran.Tl

Recounting their rides through the crty, a number of the wounded praised their

Saudi drivers, while at the same time describing what was fundamentally an alarming experience. The pafients found that their inability to communicate with the man

at the wheel, their igrrorance of their destinations, and other uncertainties raised during a night of terrorism all combined to make for a harrowing trip. Capt. Michael D.

Morelock abruptly learned that his stretcher would slide back and forth, as his

ambulance careened around the Dhahran street corners. "There was some confusion

about where we were going," he said" "and I remember thinking that that was the

scariest part of the night-that we were going to get lost, and that terrorists were

going to start shooting at the ambulance." lst. Lt. Stephanie Bronson, a civil engineeq stressed the problem ofthe language barrier: "I don't know how long [the trip]

took, but it was an unpleasant ride, to say the leastrbecause they didn't speak

English, and we didn't speakArabic. So we weren't sure where we were going, or if
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

we were going to get there." Shortly after that night, U.S. Army Lt. Col. Sherry

Connor, a member of the stress management team sent to Dhahran from the

Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, listened to the accounts given by some of these

ambulance patients. She related that they "talked about their horror of not knowing

if they were in enemy hands, and where they were going-and justfearl'72

While the ambulance rides proved a dramatic experience for some of the

wounded the preparation of the patients for transport had gone remarkably smoothly, given the circumstances. Dr. Price was impressed that the airmen at the clinic had

done extremely well in that regard. An emergency room doctor, he had received

training for dealing with mass casualties, and when he reached the Khobar clinic, he

was frankly surprised to find an order$ scene. Dr. Robb quoted Price's words: "I

was ready for mass casualties . . . . I showed up-and you guys had them all lined

up, and IVs in them all, bleeding stopped, people had sewed up the big cuts in the

clinic. . . . All you needed was transportation." When Dr. Price asked how all this

had been accomplished, Robb replied immediately: "Training. Training paid off."73

One specific example was the exercise that the medical group had conducted a

few days earlier, which ensured that during any emergency everyone knew the location of vital supplies. The bornbing created a harsh test of reality. Dr. Robb later

praised the group's performance that night. "I remember watching 'Mad Dog' [MSgt.

Luis G. Madrigal, supply sergeant] . . . . He was throwing stuffout the windows fof

the clinic] onto the patio," Robb related, "because he knew where [everything] was.

Everybody knew where the cots were, and everybody knew where everything was."7a

Training paid its rewards, and by I a.m. of the twenty-sixth, about 200 patients

had gone to nearby hospitals. Sometime around that hour, Dr. Robb assembled his

doctors, nursesr and med techs. Many airmen had been hospitalized, but there

remained another 150 to 200-no one knew the exact number-who still needed

treafinent for cuts and other injuries.T5 Dr. Robb and the others wanted if possible,

to take care of these remaining injured at the Khobar Towers, rather than further burden the local hospitals. The medical group commander asked his people directly:

"Do you think we can handle these folks?"76 Their answer was yes.

CMSgt. Paul K. Ayres, the wingb senior enlisted advisor, suggested that the

dining tables of the nearby Desert Rose Inn could be used for suture stations. The

chow hall, an uninspired, prefabricated building, was an unlikely setting for the

heroics that followed. (One general officer quipped that there "was nothing 'executive' about its executive dining room.") Despite the building's distance from the terrorist truck, the explosion had buckled its aging walls. This damage, however, was

more a commentary on the size of the bomb than on the soundness of the structure,

which the civil engineers had declared safe, and the medical personnel were able to

carry out ChiefAyes's idea.77

Dr. Treadway took the short walk northeast ffom the clinic to the Desefi Rose

Inn and began readying it for the job at hand. He later explained that an Air Force

meal facility in fact offered many of the features needed by a medical one: "The

chow hall was just a perfect set up. It was air conditioned. It was clean, had nrnning

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water, hot and cold running water. And every table is a bed. . . . It worked fantastic."78 In the Desert Rose Inn, and the clinic, the caregivers set up twenty-five to thirty suture stations.Te

Dr. Treadway and the other flight surgeons performed their work with calm

professionalism. Dr. Roy Smith had been the first physician to reach Building 131

in the wake of the blast. Later, he gave his attention to the many trauma cases that

came into the clinic. ABC News named him its "Person of the WeelC' for the last

week of June 1996.80

Dr. Steve Gofl a Schofield, Wisconsin, resident who had deployed to Saudi

Arabia from MalmstromAir Force Base, Montana, had declined Dr. Robb's invitation to make the dinner and shopping trip to downtown Dhahran earlier that

evening. He had remained at Khobar and suffered glass lacerations in the bombing.

Dr. Goffhelped the patients at the clinic, undeterred by a shard in his chest.8l Later,

even wtrile his ovsn wound was being bandaged, he continued sewing up injured airmen. Like those around him, Goffworked tirelessly, eventually helping more than

200 patients. In view of his own injury, he was taken to King Fahd University

Hospital; and on July 3, Air Force Chief of StaffGen. Ronald R. Fogleman presented him the Airman's Meda1.82

These flight surgeons did not work alone: nurses, med techs, EMTs, PJs, Saudi

physicians, and others joined them in suturing the wounded airmen. It was training,

not luck, which made this expertise available. "We teach our med techs how to sew,"

Dr. Robb pointed out. "Thatb important, in training."83

Fighter pilots also assisted with some of the suturing. These officers all have

exceptionally healthy nervous systems and during the emergency at the Khobar

Towers, they were able to hold scissors, cut sutures, dab wounds, and provide other

impromptu help to the medical professionals. Dr. Robb praised their contributions:

"F-15 pilots assisted the docs . . . .They did some good work."8a

During the early moming hours ofWednesday, June 26, many inexperiencedbut willing and capable-airmen sutured wounds. Dr. Robb recounted a single

example, among a large number. He reported this exchange with one young medical

technician: "Have you ever sewn before?" "Doc, my flight doc let me throw in a

stitch, one time." The medical group commander then told the young tech: "You're

qualified." Dr. Robb concluded the story: "I turned to Doc Treadway and I said,

'Keep an eye on him, help him out.'That's the kind of courage we saw people stepping forward, that night'{s

The caregivers began sewing up patients on the tables of the dining hall sometime after I a.m, and did not finish their work until after 5:30 on June 26.86 About

the time they were helping the last patients, Brigadier Generals Schwalier and Dick

visited the Desert Rose Inn. The incoming wing commander, who had arrived at

Dhahran Air Base only half an hour earlier, described the scene: "They were just

finishing up stitching up folks, cleaning their wounds. I can remember we walked

over and talked to one gentleman that was lying on a stretcher. He had a broken leg;

the leg had been casted. It was very sad, a very sa d eventl'87
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

The airmen faced tragedies that night, but they were not left isolated from the

rest of the Air Force and Defense Department. "Never at any time," Dr. Robb

emphasized, "did I feel alone." Throughout the ear$ morning hours, telephones

rang with offers of help. At 3:15 a.m., after CNN had carried an early, inaccurate

report that the bombing had caused multiple burn injuries, Col. (Dr.) Klaus O.

Schafer, Headquarters Air Combat Command's surgeon general, called the Khobar

clinic to offer a burn treatment team. At about the same time, Col. (Dr.) James

Roudebush, the U.S. Central Command surgeon general, telephoned to ask if blood

supplies were needed. After medical group personnel questioned the local hospitals

about their holdings, it was determined that this offer, like ACC's one of a burn

team, could be declined.88

Earlier than these calls, at I : 15 a.m., Capt. (Dr.) Ben Simmons, the U.S. Navy',

Central Command surgeon general, had telephoned his service's Administrative

Support Unit in Bahmin and directed it to augment the Khobar Towers clinic. The

ASU dispatched ten medical personnel, and supplies. Dr. Robb chuckled when he

recalled how this Naly team had to cross the King Fahd causeway from Bahrain,

'kith its six 'Check Point Charlies."'8e The unit cleared all of these security posts,

and reached Building l1l at 4:50 that morning, about the time that the exhausted

Khobar caregivers were beginning to sew up the last of their patients.eo

The timely arrival of the Navy team brought welcome reliefto the medical professionals who had been working since 10 p.m. the previous night. Dr. Robb put it

directly: "Our kids needed a little bit of sleep." Remembering the deep fatigue of

those early morning hours of the twenfz-sixth, he added: "I don't know what we

would have done, without [the Navy medical team] being there. We'd been up twenty-four, some ofus thirty-six [hours], atthatpoint, and we still had to continue twenty-four hour ops.'al

Nor was the ASU group the only assistance enroute to the Khobar Towers. The

United States Air Forces in Europe's surgeon general, Col. (Dr.) Dan L. Locker, had

leamed of the bornbing soon after it occurred. Dr. Locker immediately had gone to

his office on Ramstein Air Base, Germany, and begun coordinating the medical

response from Europe with U.S. Army Col. (Dr.) Ken Farmer, his counterpart at

Headquarters United States European Command, and with other officers. It soon

emerged that the Flyng Ambulance Surgical Team stationed at Incirlik Air Base,

Tirkey-a five-hour flight from Dhahran-was the unit best placed to respond to

this contingency. Dr. Locker had alerted Col. Carlisle Harrison, Jr., the commander

of the 39th Medical Group Hospital, at IncirlikAir Base, that this FAST team very

likely would be needed at Khobar.e2

After Dr. Locker placed this 'heads up" call to Turkey, he conferred again with

Headquarters EUCOM. It was firmly agreed that the FAST team at Incirlik was the

strongest choice to respond to the contingency at Dhahran. At 3 a.m. at that base in

Turkey, one time zone west of KhobarTowers, Lt. Col. (Dr.) Cesario F. Ferrer, Jr.,

activated the 39th Medical Group3 FAST team. Headquarters USAFE's first message to Dr. Ferrer advised him to expect 200 injured patients, another 60 who were

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in critical condition or hospitalized, and 19 deceased. The FAST team had just

completed its turn of three months of "on call" and was not on alert status, but

within two hours Dr. Ferrer selected and activated a twenty-three member team.e3

Dr. Locker later recounted how, about two and a halfhours after his second conservation with Headquarters EUCOM, he called Colonel Harrison and asked how

things were going. The hospital commander replied: "We're ready Io go!'ea

While Headquarters USAFE alertedthe 39thMedical Group at Incirlik, events

were in train elsewhere on RamsteinAir Base. At about 10:30 p.m. at Ramstein, the

base's Tactical Air Control Center had notified Col. (Dr.) James W. Bost's 86th

Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron of the bombing. Dr. Bost had assembled his

executive staffand they developed a concept of operations for a Dhahran mission.

At I I :50 p.m. the Thctical Airlift Contol Center at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, put

the 86thAES on standby for an alert launch.e5

In June 1996 rhe 86th AES was in its "standard mode" of providing aeromedical evacuation for Europe and southwestAsia. The squadron conducted emergency

operations when necessary and also flew scheduled missions, one a week to Lajes

Field, in the Azores, and one a week to Dhahran, its hub base for southwest Asia. As

Dr. Bost later explained: "The scheduled missions are planned and dweloped missions, based on requirements at medical treatment facilities in Ernope. And they are

flown exactly the same each weelg if there are patients to move from one facility to

another."96

That summer the 86th AES was flying thirteen C*9 Nightingale missions a

week within Ernope and supplementing reserve crews on two C-141 Starlift€r missions that returned to the United States each week. The squadron differed from others in that, because of its European basing, its medical air evacuation crews were

trained in three akcraft. The 86th used the C-9 for its standard missions, the C-141

for ones to the United States or to other theaters. and the C-130 Hercules for tactical ones, zuch as to Bosnia.eT

In addition to its routine operations, the 86thAES typically mwed about twenty-two 'trgent and priority" patients each month. The most efficient way to fansport these airmen was to divert an aircraft akeady inflight, and often the squadron

was able to do that. The 86th was very experienced, though, at conducting special

purpose missions when it became necessary to move urgent and priority patients.

The unit flew about six of these missions a month, operations of the kind required

by the Dhahran bombing.es

When the officers ofthe 86thAES discussed a concept of operations dwing the

night of June 25/26, they considered the number of aircrews they should send to

Dhahran. A standard aeromedical evacuation crew had five members: two nurses

and three technicians. For a mission likely to last more than about sixteen hours, the

86th augmented its aeromedical evacuation (AE) crews with an additional nurse and

additional tech. The seven members then could rotate their duties while airborne,

and each could gain some rest during a long flight. In this case, the executive staff

knew that the flying time liom Ramstein to Dhahran could be as long as ten hours,

85
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

and they believed that the number of patients might be large. The group concluded

that three augmented air crews would be appropriate for the Khobar mission.ee

In addition to the three augmented crews and two flight surgeons, Dr. Bost and

his staffdecided to send an advanced cadre (ADVON) team, which consisted of a

flight nurse, one AE technician, a duty officer, two controllers, and a Joint Medical

Regulating Office flight. The guidance that the 86th AES received from Headquarters EUCOM assumed that the unit would pick up the Khobar patients and

move them immediately. During their nighttime planning session, Dr. Bost and his

officers concluded that it would be usefirl to have an ADVON team that could help

manage the staging, and the flow, of patients at the Dhahran Air Base flightline.

They judged correctly, as Dr. Bost related, that the medical professionals at the

Khobar Towers "who would normally begin to organize and stage patients were

probably already very very involved" with giving emergency care and would welcome anADVON team's help with management and communications.l0O

About I a.m. on the twenty-sixth, the officers finished this preliminary planning, left their building on the Ramstein flightline, returned to their quarters, and

rested in preparation for the work ahead of them. The group reassernbled later that

moming and, as Dr. Bost later recalled "we revised the C-141s that had been identified by the [Ramstein Tactical Air Control Center], the transporting aerovac crews,

and we deployed [that] aftemoon." The 86thAES already had built some equipment

pallets for a relief mission to the Central African Republic, earlier that month, a

development that saved the unit some of the time it would need to preparc for the

Dhahran flight.ror

About 2:30 p.m. on Wednesday, June 26, two aeromedical evacuation C-l4ls

departed Ramstein for Dhahran Air Base. As plarured, the first carried the 86thb

ADVON team, two augmented medical crews, and two pallets of supplies and

equipment. The third of the augmented air crews flew on the second of the AE

Starlifters.l02

Also traveling with the first echelon of the 86th AES was a three-member

Critical Care Aeromedical Transport Team (C-CATT), of the 59th Medical Wing.

When Headquarters USAFE had alerted the 39th Medical Group at Incirlilg it also

put on notice this C-CAIT at Ramstein. Like the EAST team in Turkey, the critical

care unit in Germany began preparing to deploy in advance of its formal orders. The

chain of events started as early as 10:30 p.m. at Ramstein, when the baseb Tactical

Air Control Center had notified the 86thAES of the Dhahran attack. Half an hour

lateq theAeromedical Evacuation Coordination Center, housed in the same building

as Dr. Bost's rurit, alerted the C-CATT of the Khobar bombing and informed it that at

least one critical care team would be dispatched within the next twenty-four hours.

Maj. (Dr.) Thomas E. Grissom, an anesthesiologist, promptly mobilized a C-CATT

consisting of himself, a cilical care nurse, and a respiratory therapist. These three

personnel flew with the 86thAES on its early afternoon flight from Ramstein.l03

On that same C-141 with the C-CATT and medivac crews was a stress management team from the Landstutrl Regional Medical Center, about four miles south

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Golden Hour

of Ramstein. Occupying about 470 acres on top of windy Kirchberg Hill, the

LRMC was the largest Defense Departrnent hospital in Europe. This facility had a

long history ofproviding medical care during contingencies on that continent, in the

Middle East, and elsewhere.ls

The deployment of the Landstuhl stress management team was another activity that followed from Dr. Locker's telephone conversations with Headquarters

EUCOM. Around 3 a.m. at Ramstein, Dr. Farmer asked the LRMC to deploy a

stress debriefing team to Dhahran.r05 At the time of the Khobar attack, U.S. Army

Col. (Dr.) Kevin C. Kiley was attending a conference in Heidelberg, Germany. [n

his absence U.S. Army Col. (Dr.) Ney M. Gore, the LRMC's deputy commander

for clinical services, served as the hospital's acting commander, and he quickly

began mobilizing a stress management team.l06About 4 a.m. U.S. Army Col. (Dr.)

Normund Wong, the chief of the department of pyschiatry, called U.S. Army Lt.

Col. Bruce E. Crow, who had been chief of psychology since January 1995 and had

led a stress management team to Riyadh after the November 1995 bombing.

Colonel Wong asked Lieutenant Colonel Crow if he would be willing to lead

another such group to Saudi Arabia, and Crow immediately agreed. U.S. Army Lt.

Col. Sherry Conner, the chief of social work services, learned of the Dhahran

attack from a phone call in the early morning hours, sometime around 3 or 4 a.m.

For a while it remained uncertain whether she or another officer would serve as the

team's senior social work services member. By 7:30 a.m. it was confirmed that this

other professional was not available, and the assignment was hers.l07

The Landstuhl stress management team that emerged that moming consisted of

fifteen members, six officers and nine NCOs representing a broad spectrum of the

hospital's professional disciplines: psychology, social work, chaplaincy, occupational therapy, nursing, and psychiatry. It was composed of Army personnel, with the

single exception ofTSgt. James B. Cooper, Jr., an airman who was the 86th Medical

Squadron's NCO in charge of psychology services. Sergeant Cooper later emphsized how well the team worked together. "I was really proud to be a part of it," he

said. "We had a really good group of people."l08

These fifteen professionals had to begin mobilizing quickly because, among

other things, they would have to secure their country clearances for Saudi Arabia.

The team assembled promptly and were ready to leave Landshrlrl by 8 a.m. on the

twenty-sixth. "We had the vans ready to go," Lieutenant Colonel Crow sai4 "and it

was just a matter of getting people into the vans and their bags into the vans." The

LRMC stress management team was on the Ramstein flightline by about 9 a.m., and

eventually boarded the first of the two C-141s carry:r:lg the 86th AES crews, supplies, and equipment. "When we got on the aircraft," Colonel Crow related, "the

Ramstein-based crew, the medivac crew was on the aircraft, so we talked to them

and asked them w{rat they knew."loe

Dr. Locker coordinated with Dr. James Roudebush the deployment of this

Landstuhl team, the C-CATT from Ramstein, and the FAST team from Incirlik.

Over the phone at 3:50 a.m. in Dhahran, the CENTCOM surgeon general reviewed

8',7
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

with Dr. Robb these assets and those of the 86thAES. Dr. Roudebush informed the

senior physician at Khobar that the fwo C-141s which would carry the 86th3 AE

crews and ADVON team were standing ready at Ramstein. He also told Dr. Robb

that there was another pair of Starlifters on the East coast of the United States, two

KC-135 Stratotankers in Europe, and another two of these tankers in the eastem

g.g.tto

An intense spirit of cooperation prevailed that night. It was well evidenced in a

telephone conversation that Dr. Robb remembered having with Dr. Lockeq during

the morning of the twenty-sixth. Their dialogue featured a series of brisk affirmatives from the Headquarters USAIE command surgeon. Locker: "Doug, what do

you need?" Robb: "I could use some of lfrls, a couple of . . . boxes [of suture suppliesJ, a surgeon or two." Locker: "Check. On its way." Robb: "Combat Stress

Team." Locker: "Check. Already on its way''Robb: "I could use some more med

supplies." Locker: "Check. Already on its way"l I t

This concise exchange between two Air Force officers represented the professionalism that was evidenced over and over again that night. In htly 1997 Dr. Robb

reflected: "The people were just there,whenyou needed them. It was that way all

night long, and it was that way for weeks afterward. I'm not talking about just the

medics. I'm talking about everyonel'|I2

The care of the wounded was an inspiring success story but it was set against a

backdrop of tragedy. Among the hundreds of patients to reach the clinic were two

who were beyond help. Dr. Treadway chose the administrative area of the clinic,

which could not be used to care for the wounded, as the most appropriate temporary

resting place for these remains and an informal morgue was set up there at l1:55

p.m. Chaplain Dennis E. Aleson recalled that the two bodies "were put in back

rooms, away llom all the hustle and bustle at that point. I was called to go have

moments withthe bodies, which forme was having aword ofprayer, praying forthe

indMduals and their family members, who, atthat .. . time, would not have a clue as

to what had happened, yet."ll3

By 2:30 a.m. on Jwrc26, mortuary services personnel knew of thirteen fatalities: the two remains at the medical clinic, and eleven others recovered at the bombing site. By 3:15 a.m., they had established a count of sixteen; by 5:30 a.m., seventeen; by mid-morning, eighteen. By mid-day on the twenty-sixth, the final number-nineteen-was certain. I I a

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Chapter Seven

Accounting

The survivors of the Dhahran bombing had dealt quickly with the injuries of

the wounded and respectfully with the remains of the deceased. They then turned

their efforts to w{mt Lt. Col. Douglas R. Cochran, commander of the deployed 58th

Fighter Squadron, called the "next big challenge." They began accounting for the

personnel of the Khobar Towers. I

When Brig. Gen. Terry Schwalier met with his group commanders at the Wing

Operations Center, he instructed Col. Scott Gration, his operations group coilrmander, to go to the Desert Rose Inn and oversee the accounting of the casualties and

survivors. At the dining hall, Colonel Gration convened a meeting of the squadron

commanders and directed them to conduct a"face to face" accounting of their personnel.2 Many questions had to be answered, as soon as possible. Who were the survivors? Who were the injured, and where were they? At the Khobar Towers? In a

Dhahan hospital? Which one? Nineteen airmen had been killed. Who were they?

Who would notify their families of their death?

The terrorists struck without notice in the dead of the night and it was not surprising *rat false reports sprouted in the immediate aftermath of the bombing. One

officer who was at the KhobarTowers during the attack later stated that his colonel

in the United States had been told there were thirty-eight confirmed dea{ all of

them from his unit. A first sergeant acknowledged that accounting for persormel

"initially, in the chaos, was kind of hard." An officer assigned to a base that suffered

casualties fiom the bombing said that the first report received from Dhahran had

proven sadly wrong. The installation initially was told that its personnel had been on

a part of the compound away from the blas! and none had been harmed.3

It was not remarkable that these false reports surfaced; it was remarkable that

the personnel of the deployed units refuted them as quickly as they did. The

squadron commanders, first sergeants, and others conducted an efficient accounting

of the Khobar Towers personnel that night. Working under terrible circumstances

and improvising much of the process, they got the job done. "In a couple of

instances," one officer later conceded "I think we should have been a little more

carelLl. But overall, it was just amaztngthe way it worked."a

Two of the deployed squadrons suffered thirteen of the nineteen fatalities. The

58th Fighter Squadron lost eight personnel killed; the Tlst Rescue Squadron, five.

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Because of their casualties, these two units faced the greatest difficulties in accounting for their personnel, yet they did so in timely fashion, afeat that spoke volumes

about how well the airmen responded to the terrorist attack.5

The process posed, as Lt. Col. Doug Cochran said" a big challenge. It involved

a considerable number ofpeople. In the case ofhis otvn 58th Fighter Squadron, 259

officers and airmen had deployed to Dhahran. The personnel who lived at the

Khobar Towers were serving in a provisional wing; every person did not know

everyone else. It was hardly surprising that Lieutenant Colonel Cochran did not recognize on sight all259 mernbers of his ov,n deployed squadron. More than 40 had

come from units of the 33d Fighter Wing other than the 58th. Another complicating

factor was that the mernbers of a squadron did not necessarily live near one another.

In the instance of the 58th, they were scattered among five dormitories.6

The attack came at about l0 p.m. at night. At that hour many people were in

bed or in their sleepwear. They were not wearing uniforms or "dogtags," or carrying

wallets or purses.T Ambulances had rushed the badly injured casualties to hospitals

in dornmtown Dhahran. Despite the airmen's best efforts, as described by MSgt.

Dwayne R. Berry, to keep track of the patients'names and destinations, the vehicles

sometimes had to be dispatched without waiting for any record keeping.E

The trauma of the bombing, of course, further hindered the accounting. The

attack left some people, as one veteran of it pointed out, in a state of "semi-shock,"

and they reported in good faith that they had seen individuals whom, in fact they

had not seen. Second-hand information circulated in the night. An officer in the

States related: "I got a call from 'Bob,'and 'Bob'said that he saw 'Bill,'and 'Ted'

and Alice."'e

Colonel Cochran's most pressing problem was that he had no squadron roster,

and for a good reason. The immediate concem of the commanders, filst sergeants,

and everyone else that night, had been to evacuate the dormitories quickly. Only

later did the utility of a roster come to the fore. Drawing on his oum experience that

night in Buildingl2T, Cochran made the point well: "When you're picking yourself

up with a whole mouthful of glass, you're not thinking about those things."r0

The Personnel Support for Contingency Operations team maintained a computer database that would have been valuable to Colonel Cochran and the other

commanders, but the PERSCO offices had been located in Building 132. This structure stood just southwest of the blast site at dormitory l3 I and had been damaged by

the explosion. Airmen eventually would recover the PERSCO database, but not

until 4 a.m. in the moming of the twenty-sixth. The team then was able to produce a

list of personnel, with their dormitory assignments and room numbers, that proved

helpful to the 58th Fighter and other squadrons.rr

While the PERSCO database was at first unavailable, the bases back in the

States helped address this problem. At Colonel Cochran's home station of Eglin, for

example, during the evening of June 25, Ms. Linda Brown, the director of that base's

Family Support Center, and one of her staffdeveloped a list indicating which 58th

Fighter Squadron personnel were in Dhahran and which were not. She later

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Accounting

described her efforts: "Colonel Cochran was trying to determine who was missing,

or who they hadn't accounted for, by developing. . .a list of who was there ' . . .We

were . . . helprng him determine who should have been there, or who wasn't therewho had been sent home early, or whatever." The same process went on at Patick

and elsewhere in the States.12

The 58th overcame the lack of a squadron roster and other difficulties and

accounted for more than 90 percent of its personnel within an hour of the atiack.

There was only one way to begin: "We just sent people out," Colonel Cochran

explained "and did head counts." MSgt. Cedrick Williams, the 58thb first sergeant,

went to the Desert Rose Inn, where a large number of people from various units

were mingled together. He took a direct approach to identifying the members of his

squadron. "I walked through the crow{' Sergeant Williams recounted, "and I was

calling out '58th Fighter Squadron!' so that people in the 58th knew that they were

to follow me to a certain area, so that we could. . . do the accountability."l3

The 71st Rescue Squadron's early effort at accounting was similarto that of the

58th Fighter Squadron, with the added difficulty that its deployed commandeq LtCol. Thomas H. Shafer, had been wounded in the bombing and taken to the Arabian

American Oil Company Hospital. Capt. Russell D. Barile, a pilot in the 71st, had

been exercising at the gym at the time of the attack and later made his way to the

tiage area at the Desert Rose. Here he saw Lieutenant Colonel Shafer and other

members of his squadron and realized that he now was the rmit3 most senior uninjured officer.la

Captain Barile's situation with the 71st was similiar to Colonel Cochran's with

the 58th. The captain knew that at l0 p.m. the rescue squadron had a maintenance

crew at King Abdul Aziz Air Base, and like the 58th, its other personnel had been

scattered among the gymnasium, the "Khobar Konnection," and other places

across the compound. @y Lieutenant Colonel Shafer's later reckoning, at the time

of the blast, ten members of the gnit had been on the military flightline and twelve

others in the gyrn or other Khobar locations.) Furthermore, the Tlst was scheduled

to gain some new arrivals that night. Col. Thomas R. Friers, the commander of the

1st Rescue Group back at PatrickAir Force Base, Florida, later commented on this

complicating factor: "We had a couple [of people] enroute [to Dhahran] and we

didn't know if they were there yet. As a matter of fact, one or two arrived about an

hour after the bomb went off."15 Barile, like Cochran, had to work without a

squadron roster. The accounting, he state4 "took awhile because we didn't have a

list. All the lists of personnel of the squadron were in the building [l3l] that blew

up."l6

In the absence ofa roster, the Tlst identified its survivors and casualties in

much the same way as the 58th did. As Captain Barile later related: "We went basically offmemory. . . . We spent the rest of the night trying to get a good count' trying

to figure out what was going on." Like Colonel Cochran, Barile was assisted by his

squadron's deployed first sergeant. In the case of the 71st, this was MSgt. Dwayne

R. Berry who, like Barile, had been in the gym at the time of the blast'l7
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Captain Barile and Sergeant Berry had some reliable starting points for their

accounting. They had seen which officers and airmen had been with them in the

gyn, and they knew about the maintenance crew on ttre military flightline. Barile

and Berry also could account for other squadron members {ead, wounded, and

well-whom they themselves had encountered since the attack.l8

Like Sergeant Williams of the 58th, they used a direct method to rourd up the

personnel of their unit. As Sergeant Berry later put it, they "grabbed people" and

told them to stay put 'trntil we can get an accounting )' captainBaile got on a brick

radio and called the military flightline, where there was a personnel list. Like the

58th, the 71st finished its initial accounting quite rapidly, within an hour or two of

the explosion.le

The airmen made the accounting as quickly as they could, so that the losses

could be reported without delay. Hundreds of families would agonize until the facts

were confirmed. Aprompt accounting was also important so that the recovery operations at Building 13 I and elsewhere could be stopped as soon as possible. The blast

had left the dormitories and other sffuctures in uncertain condition and searchers

could be killed or injured if walls or floors gave way. At the same time, the rescue

workers wanted to be certain they had retrieved all of the injured, and all of the

remains, from Builling 13l and elsewhere. one officer summedup the importance

of the accounting process: "We need to letpeople know what's going on, and I need

to know whether I need to keep on digging out rubble, over there. If there's somebody who I havent accounted for, he may be buried alive."2o

No one had a more emotional task that night than the memben ofthe Search and

Recovery teams, who retrieved the remains fiom the stricken buildings and the rubble near them. Col. Gary S. Boyle, the 4404th Wing's support group commander, had

arrived quickly at the bombsite and acted as the on-scene commander. The commander of the wing's services squadron and chief of the SARteams was Maj. Robert E.

(Rob) Taylor. one SAR team was organized to search damaged buildings and another the areas around them. These teams were made up of members of the services

squadron familiar with mortuary affairs, assisted by firefighters from the civil engineering squadron, and by other volunteers. Later, after a mortuary collection point

had been established on DhahranAir Base, a third SAR team was assigned there.2r

TSgt. George Burgess, a resident of Building 131, volunteered to help the SAR

team that searched his dormitory. "Every time we did a floor," Sergeant Burgess

recalled, '\ve'd come out and we'd talk to colonel Boyle. Hed ask the condition of

the floor, and if we'd found somebody." Burgess later realizedthat colonel Boyle

had raised these questions because he was concerned about the soundness ofthe

struchrre and for the safety ofthe searchers.22

Sergeant Burgess distinguished between searching the upper levels of the dormrtory where he did not know the occupants, and his own first floor and the one

above of it, where the residents had been his friends. Half ayeal^lrter, his memories

were vivid: "I remember doing the sweeps. . . . we were on the first two floors, the

ground and the first floor. They were the hardest floors for me to go through,

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Accounting

because I lcnew the people." Searching for his friends in the darkened, dust-covered

rooms, the airman's emotions became so intense that he went through an out-ofbody experience. "I could see myself," Burgess recalled, "bending over abody. . . . It

was like a panoramic view. I'd actually [see myself] move around and check, to

make sure I was checking [a] pulse right." He described in simple terms his extraordinary experience: "It was like there were two of me in the room. I was watching

'him' [doing] what I was doing." Even during the minutes that Burgess lived

through this out-of-body experience, he recogrrized at some level what was happening to him, and he perservered in the job at hand. In his own words: "When I was

watching myself, I thought, 'I've lost it,' but, you know, yo u kept gotng!23

After Burgess and the other SAR workers removed the bodies from Building

13l, other airmen faced the equally emotional task of caring for them. Working at

thebomb site, members ofthe mortuary services squadronbegan,atll:25 p.m., the

sad duty of putting elwen remains into body bags. Some Saudi Arabian soldiers told

them that a local ambulance had taken at least one other deceased victim to a

Dhahran hospital. Somewhat later, just before midnight, medical personnel carried

two remains into the administrative rooms at the back of the clinic.2a

At l1:30 p.m., while the SAR team members were putting the remains into

body bags, the U.S. Army officer who commanded the Theater Communications

Management Cell telephoned Lt. Col. Jimmy M. Quinn, cornmander of the 44Mth

Communications Sqgadron. Housed in the Khobar compound's Building llT,lhe

TCMC was a United States Central Command function overseen by the 335th

Signal Command, U.S. Army Forces, Central Command.25 The Army and Air Force

held joint responsibility for communications in the southwest Asian theater. The

green-suited service had long experience in the region with this specialty, and cooperated closely with the blue suiters. In this case, the Army officer who commanded

the TCMC called Colonel Quinn to inform him that the telephones in his facility

had survived the bombing and remained in service.26

This was a helpful piece of information because Lieutenant Colonel Quinn

needed to find a viable location for the Site Recovery Centeq the facility where the

permanent Disaster Control Group would operate. The wing's prebombing plans

had called for putting the SRC in the civil engineering squadron's conference room,

but that area proved too small to handle the communications equipment required in

the wake of an atlack of this magnitude. Acting on the information from the TCMC,

LieutenantColonel Quinnand 1st. Lt. Stan S. Diamanti, one ofhis cornrnunications

officers, set out irnmediately for Building ll7, at the southeastem corner of the

compound. The two quickly determined that a room on that structure's first floor

could adequately house the SRC. By 1l:45 p.m., Colonel Quinn had settled on this

location in Building I 17 and had begun marshaling the personnel for it. Lt. Col.

Francis (Frank) W Shealy, deputy commander of the wing's support group; Maj'

Ronald D. Loyd, commander of its mission support squadron; Capt. Bob Jones,

chief of the PERSCO office of the mission support squadron; and other officers

helped get the SRC up and running by 1 1:55 p.m.27

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Sometime after I a.m. in the morning of June 26, one of the communications

officers serving on the Disaster control Group telephoned the Air Mobility

Command cargo terminal, on the east side of the runways of DhahranAir Base, and

talked to capt. Dennis v Red about setting up a mortuary collection point. captain

Red said that an MCP could be established in the baclg or northern, part ofthe large

AMC building, which was adjacent to Dhahmn's military flightline. The base's support plan provided for exactly this eventuality, because the AMC cargo terminal had

many of the features a morhxry collection point needed, including a warehouse that

could be cleared away promptly and a large garage. Most important, since the transports flew in fresh meat, vegetables, and other produce for the small commissary

that the United states Military Training Mission operated in Dhahran, the terminal

also had spacious walk-in lieezers.28

By I a.m. on the twenty-sixth, before the wing's services squadron personnel

had established the MCP at the AMC terminal, agencies all over the United States

were flooding the telephone lines into the SRC and the KhobarTowers clinic, asking

the names ofpatients, their status, and other questions. At least one officer who was

on the compound that night was willing to acknowledge later that considerable pressure was brought to bear on the wingt personnel to identify the casualties and to "let

people know what's going on." Another, from his perspective back in the States,

commented that in the wake of the bombing, communication "with Dhahran at the

time was not the best," because the personnel in the theater had so much to do.2e

Around 1:40 a.m. the wingb communications squadron began preparing to

move the SRC facility and its accompanying DCG penonnel from Building l 17 to

a side room of the Desert Rose Inn, its executive dining area. Brigadier General

Schwalier chose this new location because it stood closer to Building 13 I than

Building I 17 did. Further, by the early moming hour when this decision was made,

the medical caregivers had established their suture stations at the Desert Rose, making it the best place for getting immediate information about many of the Khobar

patients.3o

Communications personnel moved an initial telephone to the dining hall from

Building I 10, which stood just west of it. Then they laid cable, reprogrammed the

switches, andby 2:45 a.m. had put fifteen phones into the new SRC site.3l The comm

airmen also brought a collection of land mobile radios, and batteries and chargers for

them, to the Desert Rose krr from Building 103, a structtre on the east side of the

complex that had been damaged by the attack. AnArmy officer who visited the SRC

described it succinctly: "They had a bank ofphones set up to monitor all the communications pertaining to the disaster."32 A personnel specialist who was at the Desert

Rose that morning later praised the decision to relocate the SRC, the area selected for

it, and the rapid rate at which the communications squadron did its work.33

while the comm airmen performed their important tasks, the chaplains continued their orm professional efforts. Lt. col. (chaplain) Dennis E. Aleson, the senior

chaplain at Khobar Towers, and rSgt. Donnell rhompson, his chaplain readiness

team partner, had worked through the middle of the night at the medical clinic.

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Accounting

Retuming to their dormitory Building 131, they came upon a grcup of airmen from

the services squadron working in the street, placing into body bags the eleven

remains that had been recovered as of that time. As ChaplainAleson recotrnted he

and his parhrer "moved to be available to some of the people who were ttavrnatued

by that-some of those who had been searching [Building 13 1], the care givers, and

so on." Later, the two chaplains helped the services personnel load the eleven

remains into a refrigerated truck.34

Around 5 a.m. five airmen from the services squadron and a sixth, a volunteer

from the wing's transportation squadron, drove this vehicle and two others to the

Khobar Towers clinic. They removed the two remains from the back rooms of this

building and respectfi.rlly placed them with the other eleven. The three vehicles then

made a solemn convoy fromthe KhobarTowers to KingAbdulAziz andtheAMC

terminal, the mortuary collection point. A number of people praised the members of

the services squadron for their performance during that night and the following

days. Brig. Gen. Daniel M. Dick, Brigadier General Schwalier's successor, said of

them: "The great services [squadron] people...had to handle all the bodies, over

and over, as we tried to work the identification[s]. And there's just no way you can

train for that."3s

The chaplains worked closely with the services airmen, and they provided a

valuable ministry to the people around them at the MCP In September 1996,LL

Col. (Chaplain) Ray Hart, Headquarters Air Combat Command's chief of chaplain

readiness, spoke directly from his own experience about the role of chaplains during

the aftermath of tragedies like Khobar. Chaplain Hart commented that what

Chaplains Aleson and Thompson "did over there was very comforting to the troops.

I know. I've done it." The presence of the chaplains was helpful to the services airmen and to the others who came to the AMC terminal to identif,i the remains of

their friends. Chaplain Hart pointed out that although the mortuary services personnel were well trained, that did not remove the emotional burdens from their work.

He stated: "I know more than one person has told me [they are so affected that] they

can't talk about it."36

Beginning in the early morning hours of the twenty-sixth, survivors of the

attack began arriving at the terminal to face the painful task of identiflzing the

remains of mernbers of their units. Chaplain Aleson described the somber proceedings: "We had representatives from those squadrons with injured members who

were there with us, and we stood beside them as body bags were opened and they

sought to identifi co-workers. . . . It was difficult for all. But everyone was holding

up pretty well, I have to say the people were responding to the needs ofthe moment,

in this whole carnage, and everything around us." General Schwalier praised the

courage that so many evidenced during the identifications. He mentioned in particular one airman w{ro told him she volurteered to come to the terminal because it

was the last service she could perform for one of her comrades.3T

Among those who made the identifications was Lt. Col. Thomas A. McCartlry,

the operations officer of the 58th Fighter Squadron. Lieutenant Colonel Cochran,

95
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

commander of the deployed unit, had asked three of the 58th3 officers to identify

the squadron's deceased. TWo of these were maintenance officers, and Lieutenant

Colonel McCarthy served as the operations representative.38

Colonel McCarthy related candidly that when he arrived at the AMC terminal,

he encountered "the standard. . . red tape there, 'You can't look at these [remains],

until we get this-here [authorization].'And then there was the other side: 'Listen, we

need this accountability."'General Schwalier promptly resolved this issue: officers

and airmen would be permitted to view the remains and make identifications. "They

cut through the red tape," Colonel McCarthy summed up, "and that worked out, and

we looked at the bodies."3e

Officers from the services squadron provided the guidance that two pieces of

direct evidence, such as dog tags or ID cards, were required to confirm an identification at the scene. The personnel of the Dover Port Mortuary at Dover Air Force

Base, Delaware, held the responsibility for making the final, positive identifications.

Lieutenant Colonel McCartlry recalled the guidance he received at the AMC terminal: "They basically said, 'If you're not absolutely sure, don't say ary.thing. . . .

We're not going to use anything you say as positive IQ we're going to use fingerprints, DNA, and dental, once they get back to Dover."'40

At the time the services airmen had established the MCP, about 3 a.m. on the

twenty-sixth, that facility held the eleven remains recovered from Building 131 and

the two from the clinic. Colonel McCarthy and the other unit representatives viewed

these thirteen bodies. "And then it was a waiting ganel'he recalled "waiting for

[the other remains] to come in, either from the hospitals, or from digging them up

from the rubble."al

Earlier, while SAR teams had been putting the eleven remains from Building

13l into body bags, Saudi soldiers had told them that a local ambulance had taken

at least one deceased American to a Dhahran hospital. By 3: 15 a.m. this information

had expanded: by then it was knolm that there were three remains, rather than one,

at King Fahd Univenity Hospital. This raised the fatality count from thirteen to sixteen.a2

Around 5:30 a.m., at Building 13l, services personnel located a seventeenth

body. Somewhat earlier, Brigadier General Schwalier had picked up Brigadier

General Dick at the Dhahran flightline, and dwing the time that these remains were

being removed from the stricken dormitory the two senior officers pulledup in their

car and parked near the scene. General Dick later described the setting: "It was a just

a surreal sight as I stood there and looked at the facade ofthe building, gone....

There was. . . a backhoe, there, being driven by an Arab national or a third-country

national, digging in the rubble." The general, like many others, was impressed by the

peaceful quality of the scene, in the wake of so great a calamity. "It seemed socalml' he emphasized. "It was just like a construction site; but yet, here's this

bornbed out building. . . . They were in the process of recovering one of the fatalities

out of the building at that time. But what struck me was how controlled ever5thing

was being accomplished, at that time.'43 A few hours after the visit by the two gen96

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erals, around midmorning, services personnel located the eighteenth of the remains,

also at the bomb site.4

The moming of June 26was an emotional one, as survivors came to the MCP

to identify their friends, and it also was a time of dramatic reunions. Lt. Col. Thomas

H. Shafer, commander of the deployed 71st Rescue Squadron and a resident of the

top floor of Building 13 l, had been injured in the at|ack and taken to the ARAMCO

Hospital. Capt. Michael D. Moreloclg a pilot of the unit who lived in a suite on the

same level, had suffered glass cuts and an ambulance had carried him to the same

facility.as Captain Morelock recalled that after the ARAMCO doctors and nurses

had treated him, "Thatb where I met up with Colonel Shafer. He was there, too,

when I came out." For about two hours that Wednesday morning, the two officers sat

togetheq waiting for a bus that would take them back to the KhobarTowers. "That

was a good point," Morelock said lateq "where we could start talking about the status of the folks, and how people were doing, and what we needed to do next. . . . It

was a good time for us to just talk, get our heads together, and just deal with what

had happened."6

Later that moming, Lieutenant Colonel Shafer went to the AMC terminal and

participated in another reunion, this one with his friend Chaplain Aleson. The minister later described the poignant meeting: "Lt. Col. Tom Shafer, who I thought may

have been killed. . . all of a sudden he drove up, that morning in daylight, that

Wednesday moming. . . . He was involved with me in the chapel, and he was a good

frien4 and I was so relieved, when he stepped outlaT

The positive mood of this reunion soon gave way to other emotions, as the two

officers turned to the task at hand. Lieutenant Colonel Shafer, like many others that

moming, had come to the MCP to help identifr the remains. 'T stood by his side,"

Chaplain Aleson remembered, "as the body bags were opened and he identified

some members ofhis unit.'48

There were emotional episodes, throughout that day at the AMC terminal.

Chaplain Aleson recalled in particular a "big, burly sergeant, six-foot plus . . . . I saw

him go over into the far corner of the hangar and all of a sudden, he was away from

us, his shoulders were heaving." This NCO himself was a father, Aleson reflected

and "as he looked at the bodies, he just started to think about the wives, and the families, of those who had been killed. And that's when it got to him."ae

The sad process of identifying the remains of the deceased continued the rest of

the twenty-sixth. Sometime during the midday50 two NCOs of the wing's services

squadron located the nineteenth set of remains and anArmy vehicle carried this last

body to ttre AMC terminal.5l Very early that afternoon a morhrary affairs representative reported over the telephone to Headquarters United States Air Force, Cenfal

Command (CENTAF) that nineteen Air Force personnel were confirmed dead.52

Until 7:30 p.m. that evening, survivors continued to visit the MCP and view the

remains oftheir comrades.53 In eleven cases, they were able to identifypositively the

deceased. In the other eight they were not, and these remains later were transported

to the Dover Port Mortuarv as unidentified fatalities.5a
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

About 7:30 p.m., after the last visitors had tried to make identifications, the services personnel finished their tasks. They respectfully wrapped the nineteen

remains, retumed them to their body bags, tagged them with an evacuation number

and name-ifknown-andplaced them in transfer cases packedwith ice.55 The two

chaplains, who already had provided a spiritual ministry, now contributed physical

work. "That's where we began to examine the bodies," Chaplain Aleson said, and

"to clean them up...and to prepare them for shipment-packing ice that would go

into ttre transfer boxes with the bodies. . . preparing them for the shipment back to

DoverAir Force Base." There was hard work to be done, under emotional circumstances, and the chaplains pitched in. "'We were helping uncrate the transfer boxes,"

Aleson said. "Some of them had never been opened and we had to really work to get

them open. We were just doing whatever we could do."56

The chaplains and services airmen completed their tasks, though they met with

some difficulties. One issue was the supply of body bags: services personnel found

that they had only a dozen on hand. Their Army counterparts provided three and a

liner;57 an airman had collected these at Lucky Base, the Army facility near King

Abdul Aziz, and brought them to the AMC terminal shortly after 2 a.m.58 Airmen at

the medical clinic also asked the ARAMCO and the Ministry of Defense and

Aviation hospitals for body bags, suggesting that these two facilities could send

them in the empty ambulances they were dispatching to the compound. The MODA

Hospital was able to contribute some and delivered them as asked to the clinic. After

5:15 a.m, a services airman retrieved them from there and took them to the terminal.5e In addition to the Army and the MODA Hospital, there was a third soruce of

help. Sometime after 3 a.m. a mortuary affairs senior NCO called all of the command posts in southwest Asia and asked them to put their available body bags on

their next flights to Dhahran.60 A French transport that left Riyadh at 7 a.m. with

medical supplies, for the flight of about an hour and a half to Dhahran, complied

with this request. By 12:30 p.m. this source-and others in the theater-had delivered an adequate number of body bags from their prepositioned supplies.6r While

the mortuary teams waited for these, they wrapped some of the remains in blankets.62

A related issue was the supply of transfer cases. Sometime after 5 a.m. on the

twenty-sixth, a services NCO at Headquarters CENTAF called to ask what supplies

the airmen in Dhahran needed. There were about twenty transfer cases at hand that,

as it developed, would have been adequate-but there was no way of knowing so at

the time. The Dhahran airmen asked for sixty and were told that, like some of the

body bags, these could be flov,n in from assets prepositioned in the theater.63 From

this point, the story paralled that of the body bags. The same French cargo aircraft

that brought those items from Riyadh also carried a supply of transfer cases. A

flatbed truck delivered them from the Dhahran Air Base flightline to the AMC terminal. Like the body bags,by 12:30 p.m. all of the transfer cases had arrived.e

The airmen also needed ice to pack in the transfer cases, more than they had

available. As early as 9 a.m. on June 26, members of the wing's transportation

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squadron contracted with local sources for 1,600 pounds ofit. The services personnel expedited their efforts by obtaining a broadly worded purchasing agreement'65

Like the medical people at the clinic, those at the AMC terminal never felt

abandoned. After 1l a.m. on the twenty-sixth, a Headquarters CENTAF representative telephoned and offered a ten-mernber morhxry team. The Dhahran airmen at

first accepted. Later the HQ called back to confirm the need and although less than

a hour had passed, there had been time to reconsider. The services personnel at the

MCP had processed eighteen of the nineteen remains and they could see that the

headquarters team would not be needed.66

While the mortuary teams worked at their tasks and visitors came to the AMC

terminal to try to make identifications, otherAir Force mernbers did the same at the

hospitals in downtornrn Dhahmn. At the l0:15 p.m. battle staffmeeting immediately

after the bombing, Brigadier General Schwalier had dispatched Maj. Kevin

Greenfield" the wing's judge advocate general, and Capt. LisaWinnecke, his deputy,

to the MODA Hospital. The two officers promptly gathered information about the

Air Force patients there, and also at the ARAMCO and King Fahd Universrty hospi

tals.67 Through the night, other JAG personnel joined them, establishing themselves

as "points of contact," or representatives, at the MODA, King Fahd University,

ARAMCO, and King Fahd Military Medical Complex hospitals, helping to identify

the Air Force patients at these places and monitoring their status.68

At 3:20 a.m. in the morning of the twenty-sixth, Major Greenfield phoned in

with a remarkably precise accounting for General Schwalier. At that hour there were

thirty-four Air Force patients at MODA, two of them in the operating room' The

ARAMCO hospital had seen forty-four airmen who had been injured in the bombing: it had admitted seven, and would operate on one of them later that morning. Dr.

Frank Hartman had confirmed for Greenfield that the King Fahd University

Hospital had admitted three Air Force patients. The King Fahd Military Medical

Complex had taken two more, making a total of eighty-three patients who had been

hospitalized.6e

At 3:45 a.m. Major Greenfield and Captain Winnecke reported back to the

Wing Operations Center in the "Tadtov,n" section of DhahranAir Base, with a list

from the Dhahran hospitals, which was "as complete. . . as possible," given the circumstances. From the WOC they went on to the Site Recovery Center, which by

then was operating in the executive dining room of the Desert Rose Inn. The airmen

at the SRC did not know that the JAG officers had been sent to collect information

about the Air Force patients at the Dhahran hospitals and moreover, a rumor had

circulated that terrorists had bombed the mall where Greenfield and Winnecke had

been shopping with Mr. Marwan Darwish and Lt. Col. Christomer Dooley. When

Greenfield and Winnecke arrived at the Desert Rose, around 4:20 a.m., the bluesuiters there were not only grateful to gain the information the JAG officers brought,

they were relieved to see them.To

During the morning hours of the twenty-sixth, more airmen became available

to help, directly and indirectly, with the hospital identifications. SSgt. Selena P

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and vicinity

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King Fahd University

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KingAbdulAziz

Royal Saudi Air Base

King Fahd Medical Complex

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Husted" a law office manager, was among those who contributed to the effort. Like

so many others, Sergeant Husted had spent the night helping the wounded and at

about 4 a.m. that morning she lay dolm to get some badly needed rest. After three

hours sleep, the JAG airman was roused by a telephone call directing her to report to

the Site Recovery Center. By that hour, 7 a.m., a schedule was in place to keep the

SRC running around the clock, with its staffworking demanding shifts. An hour

later on that Wednesday moming, 8 a.m., teams of mediaal carc providers began

joining the JAG representatives uiho were still at the downtoum hospitals, working

to identify the Air Force patients and to update the information about their status.Tl

While the Wednesday morning hours passed Major Greenfield's information

grew sharper. As of 8 a.m., he believed that there were about eighty-five Air Force

patients in Dhahran, and he knew the identity and location of nearly all of them.72

During the morning, Sergeant Husted carried the updated lists of names and status

reports from the Site Recovery Center in the Desert Rose Inn to the WOC. At 9 a.m.'

when the SRC had been operating effectively from the dining hall for more than six

hours, the security police deactivated their interim Disaster Control Group.?3

During the morning, the JAG representatives at the MODA, King Fahd

University, and other hospitals continued to supply information about the status of

the Air Force patients in the dovmtown facilities, and a transition of the accounting

responsibility from the legal to the medical officers began. At about 8 a.m., Lt. Col.

(Dr.) Douglas J. Robb, the wing's senior physicia4 and other members of the wingb

medical group began making patient rounds at the Dhahran hospitals. After they

began this effort, late in the morning, the judge advocate general officers turned

over the responsibility of the accounting for the injured to the representative of the

wing's medical group on the DCG. This transfer made good sense, given that the

doctors and others from the medical group would continue to visit the hospitals and

determine the status of every patient.Ta

"By 10 a.m. [Wednesday] morning," Sergeant Husted later estimated, 'lve had

the names and status ofjust about everybody----even if the status was pendingexcept fortwo individuals."T5 Those final identifications proved agonizingly difficult.

At 4:50 p.m. that Wednesday afternoon, the care-provider team visiting the King

Fahd University Hospital found a patient in the intensive care unit who had been

brought there from the KhobarTowers. They immediately knew that identifying this

young male airman would prove difficult. He lay in a coma, with a respirator hrbe

dovm his throat. His face was lacerated his head shave4 and his body swollen.T6

To help with the identification, a group of officers came to King Fahd: Dr.

Robb; MajorTaylor, commander of the wingb services squadron; Capt. Bob Jones;

and some officers from the civil engineering squadron. Dr. Robb took two Polaroid

photographs of the ICU patient and brought them back to the Khobar Towers PERSCO office, acting on the possibility that someone on the compound would recognize the airman from these pictures.TT

While these officers visited King Fahd University Hospital, half a world away,

at Patrick, Eglin, and other bases across the United States, many people were wait-
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

ing anxiously for information from Dhahran. The bomb had exploded at2:53 p.m.

Eastem Daylight Time on Tuesday, June 25. col. Thomas R. Friers, commander of

the lst Rescue Group, Lt. col. Donald R. Jozay't, commander of the Tlst Rescue

Squadron, and many others at Patrick had learned the tragic news from Dhahran

within an hour of the attack. During the late afternoon, colonel Friers and his

deputy, Lt. col. Robert H. Holloway, had established a crisis information center in

the group's command section, located in Building 423, the headquarters of 45th

Space Wing, on Patrick's FalconAvenue.T8

Among Colonel FriersS first concerns that Tuesday afternoon was to communicate with the group's immediate superiors at the headquarters of the lst Fighter

wing, at Langley Air Force Base, virginia. At the time of the Khobar attack, the

wing commander, Brig. Gen. William R. Looney III, was tnAnaq,Jordan, serving

as the commander ofAir Expeditionary Force II. Friers telephoned the wingb vice

commander, col. Felix Dupr6, and gave him the unofficial information that he had

about fatalities and other preliminary news from Dhahran.Te

Another immediate concern was to develop a reliable list of all I st Rescue

Group personnel who were in Dhahran at the time of the bombing. In this regard"

colonel Friers faced some of the same difficulties as the commanders in Saudia

Arabia. Drawing up a list of this kind, he commented later, was "not as easy as it

sounds." It was no simple matter to account for each member of every squadron at

any given time. During a typical week, two or three people from the rescue group

traveled from Patrick to southwestAsia or retumed home. In the case of the Khobar

attack, two of the unitb members were enroute to Saudi Arabia at the time of the

explosion. At first it was not known at Patrick whether they had arrived before the

bombing; it tumed out that they reached the theater about an hour after the attack.

Friers later estimated that it took about twenty-four hours to develop an accurate list

of the group personnel who had been in Dhahran at the time of the explosion.so

Lieutenant Colonel Holloway recruited volunteers from all three of the rescue

group's squadrons to staffthe crisis information center. Four airmen worked the telephones, on shifts around the clock. During the late aftemoon and evening of June

25, phone calls flooded the Patrick crisis center, and they continued at a high volume

through thatTuesdayAN'ednesday night. colonel Holloway worked in the command

section until the early morning hours of the twenty-sixth, when colonel Friers

advised him to get what sleep he could. Neither officer could know it then, but the

rescue group's information center was to remain in constant operation for two and a

half days.8r

A similar scene took place at the Tlst Rescue Squadron,s building, on the

Patrick flightline. Members of the unit worked long hours, answering telephone

calls. "we acted as a switchboard,'Lieutenant colonel Jozayt said, "to patch folks

[in Dhahran] in to their families at home. we tried to answer the questions of the

wives and families, back here. . . . This continued alln1ght,,82

Sometime after l0 p.m. that night of the twenty-fifth, Lt. Col. Thomas H.

Shafer telephoned Patrick. It was then after 5 a.m. on wednesday. June 26. in

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Dhahmn. Released from the ARAMCO Hospital, Lieutenant Colonel Shafer by that

hour could give his home base a nearly complete accounting of the personnel of the

deployed Tlst Rescue Squadron. "Well before midnight here [at Patrick]," Colonel

Friers later said, "we had a good count of exactly who was there, and an initial

'triage' report on their injuries."83

By the best information available at the Florida base late that Tuesday night,

five members of the Tlst Rescue Squadron had been killed in the bombing and

nineteen others wounded. The count of five fatalities proved accurate. The figure of

nineteen wounded perhaps was low, chiefly because many of the injured airmen did

not come forward until after the crisis of the attack had passed.8a

With this information available, very late that night, Brig. Gen. Robert C.

Hinson, commander of the 45th Space Wing and the senior officer on Patrick, began

making arangements with the base3 morhrary affairs personnel. Somewhat later,

after 12:30 a.m. on the twenty-sixth, Colonel Friers called Lieutenant Colonel

Jozayl athis home. The two officers discussed who would notify the two families

living on or near the base of their loss. Jozayt believed that he, as the squadron commandeq should take the responsibility rather than the group commander. Colonel

Friers agreed and asked him to go to the base's casualty notification office.85

There Colonel JozaSrI awaited word from Headquarters Air Force Personnel

Center at RandolphAir Force Base, Texas. Although he and Colonel Friers believed

they had reliable, first-hand information from Dhahran, Joza5rt could not begin the

notifications until he received formal confirmation fromAFPC. It was after 1 a.m.

Wednesday morning when he left the casualty notification office, accompanied by

one of the Patrick chaplains. They drove a staff car up Florida state highway AIA

along the Atlantic coast to the first househol4 in Cocoa Beach, and then to the secon{ in the south Patrick housing complex.s6 It remained for otherAir Force personnel to noti$' the other three families. One lived in Palm Coast, rougbly ninety miles

north of Patrick and about a two-hour drive on either the A1A or Interstate 95. The

other two households were not in Florida.8T

West of Patrick at Eglin Air Force Base, and elsewhere, similar events took

place. Eglin maintained Central Daylight Time: its clocks had read l:53 p.m that

Tuesday when the bomb exploded. Within minutes after the attack, Col. David

Hayes, vice commander of the 33d Fighter Wing, had received a report of it, telephoned from the theater. With Col. Gary R. Dylewski, the wing commander, at

Atlanta's Hartsfield Airport enroute to Qatar, Colonel Hayes convened the unit's

squadron commanders and other officers in a battle staf meeting at3:30 p.m. and

after more information came from Saudi Arabia, which confirmed that the wing had

suffered casualties, a second one at 6 p.m.88

Sometime between these two battle staffmeetings, Col. Lee Weitzel, commander of the 96th Air Base Wing's mission support squadron, visited the Family

Support Center, located in Building 205 on Main Base Eglin. When he arrive4

Linda Brown was chairing a staff meeting. "There's been a disaster at Khobar

Towers," he told the group, "and we dont know what the extent of it is." Colonel

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Weitzel suggested that the Center's staffshould report to the 33d Fighter Wing area

of Eglin, where their help might be needed in noti$.ing the families of what had

happened. Ms. Brown and her fellow civilians locked up Building 205 and went

across Eglin to the command post located in the headquarters of the 33d Fighter

Wittg.un

In terms of geography, the Family Support Center stafftraveled from one part

of the enormous installation to anotheq because Eglin Boulevard divided the 33d

Fighter Wing area from Eglin Main Base. Yet in terms of military spirit, the facility

was a unified whole-as the Khobar tragedy demonstrated. Colonel Dylewski,

commander of the 33d, emphasized that during the aftermath of the bombing "the

cooperation with main base [Eglin] was great.... Those folks from the supporl

group, in particular, really pitched in and did everything they possibly could. All of

the main side did." Another officer of the 33d Fighter Wing, nicknamed the

'Nomads," emphasized: "There were folks who came forward and did a tremendous amount of good work for us, from the 96th Air Base side [of Eglin], who are in

fact 'warriors."' Remembering the spirit of solidarity that had prevailed during those

late June days, he added with great emotion: "[They] don't wear the 'Nomad'patch,

but they are Nomads in their heart."eo

This spirit was evidenced by officers, airmen, and cMlians all across Eglin that

afternoon, as they communicated with the people deployed in the theater to develop

a reliable accounting ofpersonnel, and as they worked to create a process for getting

information to the affected families.er All of the 33d's officers had been billeted in

Building l2l, andthe survivors of the bombing had been able to account for them

much more rapidly than the wing's larger and more dispersed number of enlisted

personnel. Sometime before 4:15 p.m. that aftemoon at Eglin, a telephone call from

Colonel Cochran had confirmed that the bomb had not killed any of 33d's officers.

All of the fatalities were among its airmen. "When the . . . entire enlisted corps is

unaccounted for," Lt. Col. Stan Hill, the wing's battle staff director, explained,

"they're all treated as possible fatalities"; the Eglin battle staffhad to accept that

"extremely difficult" working principle.e2

The Eglin staffhad to devote a yeoman effort to the accounting because, during

those first hours after the attack, the members of the 58th in Dhahran faced immediately pressing problems of their ov,n. "They were aw{Llly busy," Colonel Dylewski

stated, "trying to do their orm recovery." Because of this, both uniformed personnel

and civilians at Eglin contributed greatly to the effort to determine who was at

Khobar, who was enroute, and who was home.e3

During those first hours after the bombing, the battle staffofficers did not yet

know the status of every Eglin airman in the theater, but they felt a moral obligation

to communicate with the families of the deployed personnel. "We did not have a

direct responsibillty;' Lieutenant Colonel Hill commented, "to notify the families of

the people who were deployed. But. . . because our number one goal in our wing is

to take care of our own people, . . . we made a decision to call everyone whose loved

one was deployed, and get information to them." He stressed an objective held at

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Eglin, Pakick, and across the Air Force: "We kept the focus on the/amily . . .. Those

[families] are what this whole efortwas aboutlaa

The battle staff officers found that the wing's emergency action cards were

inadequate for the situation they faced that aftemoon. These forms identified a person to noti$, in the event of the confirmed death of a deployed airman. The cards

were fine for their intended purpose, Lieutenant Colonel Hill pointed out, but "if

you just want to call and tell someone that there's been an incident, and we're trying

to get information, and we'll get information to you as soon as we have it-the

emergency action data card and that system, is not effecivel'es

To meet their immediate need, Lieutenant Colonel Hill and some of the other

battle staffmembers quickly prepared a script for making the initial telephone calls

to the families. Another Eglin officer recalled: "They. . . put together a statement

that they read to every person that they talked to on the phone, so that the statement

wouldn't vary." Following the script, the caller identified himself, and then

explained: "There was an explosion at Khobar Towers at 1355 local which caused

injuries to an unknown number of people. Eglin personnel reside in this area, but

there are 30 buildings and we don't know exact$ which building took damage. This

is all the information we have now." The script next provided several telephone numbers for the Eglin command post and advised keeping the phone lines clear, particularly those to the spouses ofother deployed personnel, "so that we can contact

them." The caller then reminded the family member that questions from the press

could be referred to the wing's public affairs office, asked for the best telephone

number to call for future communications, offered the help of the chaplains, and

invited questions.e6

When Linda Brov'n and her employees from the Family Support Center arrived

at the 33d's command post, the battle staffofficers had the telephone script ready. A

few months lateq she recalled what happened that late afternoon: "[We] were told

that we would be calling family members to tell them-to speak from a scripttelling them what was known at the time. By the time we sat doum in our chairs and

got ready, reluctantly, to do this, the decision was made that, no, it was inappropriate

for us to be calling these families." By then the center's work day had ended and

Brown sent her employees home, "to sit by the phones to wait for a cMlian recall."

She and another staffmember remained at the command post, and worked on the

list of the members of the 58th Fighter Squadron and their whereabouts, which

would help Colonel Cochran with his accounting in Dhahran.eT

Uniformed personnel, rather than civilians, made the telephone calls. "We

pulled in the field grade officers," Lieutenant Colonel Hill recounted" the operations

officers, the assistant operations officers, the chief master sergeants, some master

sergeants, and others, and "called everyone we could get a hold of." Capt. Brenda L.

Campbell, the 33d Fighter Wing3 public affairs officer, recalled: "They... started

calling all the spouses and all the significant [others, the] girlfriends, that people

knew of, family-mother, father-if they weren't married, [or] didn't have a significant other."e8

105
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Identifzing and locating the people who should receive calls posed another

challenge. The emergency action cards had no telephone numbers, so the battle staff

officers turned to a database kept by the airmen of the 58th Fighter Squadron's

order$ room. This official source was supplemented by personal information provided by fellow unit members at Eglin. Did Sergeant A have a girlfriend? Had

Airman B been living with a relative other than his parents? In most cases, a fellow

squadron member could answer these questions.ee

Colonel Dylewski praised the creativity that the Eglin officers used to identify

w{rom to call, to prepare a telephone script, and to solve other problems raised by the

contingency. "There is no checklist that I know oI]'the wing commander said, "for

a terrorist bombing on the other side of the world that kills twelve of your people."

The command post personnel, as he pointed out, had "to think outside the normal

battle staff'box,'to ensure that all the proper notifications [were] done, all the right

things were done for the victims'groi1i"r.rrl00

The use of information gathered from personnel ofthe 58th and from the orderly room offered an excellent example of Colonel Dylewski's point. Thanks to it, the

command post telephone callers were able to talk to a great number of people. "By

the time it was over," Lieutenant Colonel Hill said candidly, "we were never 100 percent successful. But we were able to reach a large volume." Having read the script,

the callers also answered the questions of the spouses and others.l0l

While the Eglin officers and airmen dispensed information over their telephones, they also gained it, for by late that aftemoon many of the Khobar survivors

had called home llom Dhahran. When some spouses heard from the Eglin command

post, Captain Campbell related, they "would say immediately, 'Well, I've already

talked to my husband,' 'I've already talked to my wife,' 'I've already talked to my

friend.'We started gathering information [at Eglin] that way almost immediately. . . .

Part of the way we got a lot of our initial accounting was through conve$ations that

[spouses and others] had had directly''with their loved ones in the theater. Lieutenant

Colonel Hill praised the families who, after being called by the command post, then

heard from their spouse or friend in Dhahran, and immediately telephoned this news.

"They would call us baclg and go, 'Hey, I just heard llom Bob. Bob's OK.' . . . When

we got a call [ike that] from someone, we were able to close them out."102

At least one officer stated, howeveq that the phone calls from the survivors

directly to their families posed an embarrassment to the service. "It made the Air

Force look bad," he asserted. "It appeared we didn't know who was okay and who

wasn't."A particular difficulty with the earliest communications from the Dhahran

survivors to their homes was that they sometimes carried second and third hand

information. Sometimes a husband called his wife and assured her that he was fine,

and then added that he had seen airman X and officert or thatA had told him he

had seen B. Some of these secondary and tertiary reports proved reliable, but others

not. "You had to be careful with that," one officer observed "because I know in a

couple of instances we had folks who had talked to their spouse, and said, 'Oh sure,

I saw so-and-so,'which acflrally wasnt [correct]."103
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Lieutenant Colonel Hill emphasizedthat the command post treated all such

second and thild hand reports as hearsay. The Eglin officers never passed on to others any data they had received that way. They used only information that came from

one of two sources: official channels, or'\vhen the family called and said they had

talked to their loved oneJ'lo4

Lieutenant Colonel Hill also soon recognized that Eglin would need a single

manager of the information about its Khobar personnel. While many people would

serve in the command post, one person would have to take responsibility for the

database. It would have to be someone who became familiar over time with "the

names, the families who called in, the little things," as Colonel Hill put it. He

assumed the responsibility. He explained later that he was not "trying to be indestructible," but rather, the decision "was a function of--I didn't have my normal

nighttime [shift] person. [Maj. John 'Jazz'f Janazzo [the nighttime battle staffdirectorl did it for a couple of nights, but he had another operational tasking that hehad,

to go fill."lo5

As early as the night of June 25l26,Hilland the other Eglin battle staffofficers

knew that the nighttime shift would prove a critical time. Beginning that first afternoon of Tuesday, the twenty-fifth, telephone lines into the command post were in

heavy use during the daytime. During the night the calls tapered off, giving the command post workers an opportunity to gather all their notes on the day's phone conversations and compile them into a single database.106

The Eglin officers also knew from the beginning, from the afternoon of the

twenty-fifth, that as the bombing's fatalities became officially confirmed" their families would have to be notified as humanely and prompt$ as possible. In June 1996

Col. David A. Deptula, who had played a key role in plarming the Gulf War's air

campaign, was serving as the commander of the 33d Operations Group. Colonel

Deptula prepared a list of nineteen Eglin officers, in the grades of major through

colonel, who might be available for the notification duty.107

After Colonel Dylewski retumed to Eglin, he and other officers of the 33d

Fighter Wing discussed who should make the notifications. In a December 1996

interview, the wing commander identified the main factor in the determination they

reached. "The appropriate decision," Colonel Dylewski said '1vas that since there

was . . . an unmanageable amount for one person to do, it wouldn't be appropriate for

the wing commander to do one, and not any of the others, or two, and not any of the

others. . . . So we decided I would do none and we would send out. . . teams, to do

the notifications."l08

About 6:30 p.m. in the evening of the twenty-fifth, Lt. Col. (Chaplain) RayW

Hinsch, the chaplain ofthe 33d FighterWing, began training these teams of officers

who would notifi the bereaved families of their losses. Each group would consist of

a chaplain, a field-grade officer, and a medical professional. Chaplain Hinch conducted a training session and concluded it with a prayer.l0e

At around 9 p.m. a phone call from Eglin's Miiitury Personnel Flight directed

Chaplain Hinsch to assemble the nineteen notification teams at the Flight's inpro107
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

cessing room. About an hour and a half later, the requested time, the groups gathered at the MPH, located in Building 210 on Main Base Eglin. Earlier that nigffi,Lt'

Col. (Chaplain) Richard Parkinson at Hurlburt Field had telephoned Chaplain

Hinsch and alerted him that he was sending four chaplains ffom that installation,

just a short drive southwest of Eglin. These four professionals joined the Eglin

teams at the MPF 1lo

Around 11 p.m. the Military Personnel Flight received from Dhahran the

names of three Eglin personnel who had been officially confirmed as fatalities in

the bombing, and by I :30 in the morning of the twenty-sixth, two more.l 1 I Three of

the teams set out to make the notifications. In two cases other Air Force personnel

did so, because the families lived out of state.1l2 The three teams completed their

duty by 3:20 a.m. that Wednesday.rl3 Chaplain Hinsch was informed that no more

notifications would be made that morning, and he told the four Hurlburt chaplains

they could return to their home installation.lla

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Chapter Eight

Wednesday: At the Khobar Towers

During the early morning hours ofWednesday, June 26, 1996, airnenremained

at work on the military flightline of DhahranAir Base. SSgt. Jacques P Bruffy and

the other maintenance crew members continued their efforts to repair the HC-130

that had retumed sooner than intended, around 6:30 p.m. Tuesday evening. Working

through the night, under combat conditions, they found the electrical short that had

caused the fuel-correction light to flicker on and offand had brought the Combat

Shadow tanker back to its base early.

They finished the repairs around 5:30 a.m. that Wednesday morning. The

Saudis who lived near the Dhahran base were entitled to a period of "quiet hours,"

and the maintenance crew waited for 7 a.m., when they were permitted to run and

test the aircraft engines. The maintainers ran a successful series of operational

checks and finished their work about 8:30. Then they waited again, this time until

about 10 or 10:30, when they got permission to return to the Khobar Towers. By

then, Sergeant Brus' recalled, "My uniform was getting pretty. . . foul."l

Another NCO, MSgt. Dwayne R. Berry first sergeant of the deployed Tlst

Rescue Squadron, had been in the compound's g1'rnnasium when the bomb exploded. He spent the next hours helping search for survivors, accounting for the personnel of his unit, and dispatching ambulances to the Dhahran hospitals. After these

tasks, Sergeant Berry walked to the KhobarTowers lnn, the billeting office located

in Building 109, just north of the medical clinic, where he met his friend BookerT.

Rice, also a first sergeant.2

Sergeant Rice was helping the 4404th Wingb services squadron in its effort to

locate additional body bags. At the time of the attack, there were only a dozen on

hand at KhobarTowers, and during the early moming hours, airmen leamed where

there were more, in the immediate area and throughout the theater. Sergeant Rice

had determined that the wing might be able to get some body bags from a facility in

Oman, but at that time it was no easy task to get a line from Dhahran on the Defense

Switched Network. So Rice recruited his friend Sergeant Berry to help him make

telephone calls to the sultanate at the eastern end of the Arabian peninsula. Berry

agreed and began some phoning, while still wearing the weightJifters belt and exercise clothes from his gym work-out.3

It was a long night, too, for TSgt. George Burgess, the assistant flight chief

who, with his suitemates, had been cleanins his kitchen on the first floor of Buildine
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

131 when the blast rocked his quarters. After helping to search his dormitory and to

remove the remains of the deceased, Sergeant Burgess reported to Col. Gary S.

Boyle, the wing's support group commander. Colonel Boyle told him that the

injured were gathering at the Desert Rose Inn and asked him if he wanted someone

to take him there.

Burgess politely declined the offer. After his stressful experience at Building

13 I , he wanted to make the walk alone. As Burgess later put it: "I just took my

roundabout way of getting back." He reported to Lt. Col. Douglas R. Cochran, the

commander of his deployed squadron. Colonel Cochran asked Burgess a few questions about the state of things at Building 13 1, and the NCO told him w{rat he knew

from his own experiences.a

Lieutenant Colonel Cochranhadput apriority on accounting forhis squadronb

personnel before people dispersed to quarters to get whatever sleep they could.

Once that task was completed, he turned his attention to finding beds for his officers

and airmen for what remained of that night, Wednesday's early morning hours. It

went without saying that the airmen who had lived in Building 131 would have to

move elsewhere. In the interest of safety, the securif police sealed this dormitory

and the residents lost many of their belongings.5

Building 127, where the 58th Fighter Squadron's officers had been billeted,

was one of the structures that the civil engineering assessment teams initially considered uninhabitable. Although not nearly so damaged as 131, the dormitory evidenced a crack down its center. Sleeping in those quarters was out of the question;

the officers would have to spend the rest of the night elsewhere.o

For some people there was another reason, in addition to the physical damage

to the buildings, to occupy other quarters. A number of airmen were so traumatized

by the bombing that they did not want to return to their rooms. Lieutenant Colonel

Cochran recognized that "some folks would not walk back into a dorm room, or a

dorm building. They just felt uncomfortable with it. It brought back memories." His

observation paralleled the experience of an officer who had lived on the sixth floor

of Building 133, been injured in the bombing, and had escaped down the dormitory's stairwell with her suitemates. A few days later her work required her to return to

the roof of the building. "That was a horrible feeling," she later recalled, "going

back up those stairs that we had gone do'wn, that night . . . taking those stairs, to the

top." Perhaps inevitably, Building 131 in particular became the subject of rumors of

odd goings-on. One airman asserted: "I know the cops really hated to go in that

building."7

The members of the 58th Fighter Squadron, 71st Rescue Squadron, and other

units went about the business of finding altemative housing for the night. With

many of dormitory rooms unusable, Lieutenant Colonel Cochran's officers and airmen looked elsew;here. "By three in the morning," he recounted, "we had found

enough units that didn't have that much damage, so that they could take in folks. The

British squadron had a lot of room left over, some exfra beds." Sergeant Burgess

recalled: "We all ended up going over to the British barracks . . . . We stayed in the

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British building, and even [there] their windows were blovm out." Despite this damage, though, their allyb dormitory provided a place where the airmen could take

showers and try to sleep.8 In all, the British took in about a hundred American airmen for the remainder of the night. The French, too, offered some of their rooms. As

late as the morning of Friday, the twenty-eighth, fourteen airmen remained housed

in the French dormitory.e

Before the members of the 58th Fighter Squadron dispersed to the British dormitory and elsewhere for a few hours res! Lieutenant colonel cochran gave them a

short talk. He told them to reassemble later that same Wednesday morning, at 9

a.m., at their old, sficken quarters. There at Building l27,he said, they would be

given the "game plan" as to what the unit would do next. Lt. Col. Thomas

McCarthy, the squadron's operations officer, praised Cochran's leadership that

night. "He carried everything on his shoulders," Colonel McCarthy stated. "He did

not rest until everything was done and taken care of, to the expense of his own

health."lo

Lt. Col. Thomas H. Shafer performed the same role for the Tlst Rescue

Squadron. Released from theArabianAmerican Oil Company (ARAMCO) Hospital

that Wednesday morning,rl he began regrouping his officers and airmen.l2 Col.

Thomas R. Friers, commander of the lst Rescue Group, later spoke highly of

Colonel Shaferb performance in the wake of the bombing.l3

For Lieutenant Colonel Shafer, and everyone else, it proved a short night. Many

officers and airmen had no chance whatever to rest. The experience of Lt. col.

(Chaplain) Dennis E. Aleson, senior chaplain, and TSgt. Donnell Thompson, his

readiness team partner, was typical of scores of others. A communication from

Headquarters Air Combat Command's chaplains' office that Wednesday evening

reported: "[Chaplain] Aleson andTSgtThompson haven't had sleep in 37 hours, but

the adrenalin is flowing . . . . [chaplain Aleson] will call with an update after he gets

some rest."The entire 4404thWng, as its incoming commander, Brig. Gen. Daniel

M. Dick, later pointed out, got virtually no sleep "for two solid days. Everybody was

just running on adrenalin."la

Some people had the chance to lie down and rest during the early morning

hours of that wednesday, but discounted the opportunity as worthless. A senior master sergeant who was treated at King Fahd University Hospital the night ofthe twenty-fifth/twenty-sixth later recalled: "I was sewed up and retumed to base around

0500 [Wednesday, June 26]. I was too keyed up to sleep. I went up to my room,

washed offthe dried blood stains, put on my ruriform and went to work." Still others

tried to restore their exhausted minds and bodies, with poor results. one airman stated flatb: 'None of us had a restfi.rl sleep that moming."15

At 9 a.m. Wednesday, as planned, the members of the 58th Fighter Squadron

reassembled at Building l2'7.t6 Here they learned the "game plan," as Colonel

cochran had called it, for the next two days. Fint, the officers and airmen would

move from the Khobar compound to the military flightline, within the well-secured

Dhahan Air Base. Since the squadron already had been scheduled to leave soon,
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

everyone had begun packing before the night's attack. People would go back into

Building l27,refreve their bags, and move to the hangar area. At that hour, no one

could be entirely certain of the structural safeqr of the dormitory' After turning off

the building's electricity and water, the civil engineers permitted the members of the

58th to reenter it, under the guidance that the airmen file back into one room at a

time and gather their personal items quickly.rT

Lieutenant Colonel Cochran later said ofthe move to the flightline: "I felt more

secure. I knew that I had everybody inside a guarded area." "The flightline area was

more secure" than the compound, one airman contended. 'Nobody's going to get to

the resources." Another recalled: "The next night [WednesdayiThursday, June

261271we stayed with our aircraft. I felt a tittle more secure."l8

The second part of the game plan involved preparing to return to the United

States. "Airlift was being shuffled arounq' Colonel Cochran stated. The plan, as the

deployed squadron commander explained it that Wednesday morning, and lateq

"was to fly the main body, most squadron members, out the next morning

[Thursday, June 271. . . . After the main body flew out, we were going to fly the jets

out." The timing turned out to be "amazing," as Lieutenant Colonel McCarthy

pointed out: the bombing did not change the squadron's departure date.le

While the 58th Fighter Squadron moved to the flightline, the 71st Rescue

Squadron billeted in the Khobar Towers Inn, in the interior of the compound, near

the clinic.2o SSgt. John McCarthy remembered that he and other NCOs moved into

the suites there, sometime between 3 and 5 a.m. that Wednesday morning, and tried

to get what sleep they could. When they awoke, their first sight was of Master

Sergeant Berry, their first sergeant, along with two other NCOs, "running around

and getting us a set of clothes, and some toiletries, and some answers." Sergeant

McCarthy said of that Wednesday, the twenf-sixth: "We all tried to make sense of

the bombing and relax the best we could."2r

Over on the military flightline, the new quarters of the 58th Fighter Squadron

took on the informal character of a campground. Lieutenant Colonel McCarlhy

referred to it in exactly those terns: "We set up a camp over by our hangar, by where

our jets were." The airmen adjusted quickly to the makeshift arrangement. One

NCO described the mood as "somber," and recalled that people cooperated well.

When someone didn't have enough clothes, Colonel Cochran noticed, they traded

around for them.22 The airmen slept on cots and took showers in porlable facilities.

When some of the wounded began returning from the Dhahran hospitals that

Wednesday morning, bunks were set up for them and for the more severely injured

who eventually would have to be florn n out of the base.23

Many of the amenities on the flightline, and on the compound, were provided

by the two large American communities in Dhahran. The Arabian American Oil

Company's arca lay just off the northwest edge of Dhahran Air Base, and

McDonnell Douglas occupied a compound jutting out into the Arabian Gulf, a lifile

more than eight miles north of the Khobar Towers. During their longtime presence

in Saudi Arabia, these two organizations had gained the goodwill of the host gov-

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Wednesday: At the Khobar Towers

emment, and they also enjoyed close relations with the American military personnel

stationed in the country. "In Dhahran," one airman reflected, "youle separated from

your family, so you bond with the people therelza

when tragedy struck, the Americans in these Dhahran communities responded.

Lt. col. (Dr.) Douglas J. Robb, the interim commander of rhe 44}4rhMedical

Group, recalled: "within one or two days of the bombing, every single day we got

get-well cards, food, cookies, clothing from. . . the ARAMCO compound. . . .

There were more pairs of Levis, shirts, toothpaste, and toothbrushes than you could

shake a stick at." The ARAMCo and McDonnell Douglas communities, Master

Sergeant Berry remembered "brought us tons and tons of clothes-Tshirts, underwear, socks, jeans, shoes, belts. once the word got to the first sergeants, all our guys

went over and they gave us the first run at things.'25 Bruce Hamel, a native of San

Antonio, Texas, who lived in one of these communities, was impressed with how

much these corporate families wanted to help the airmen. He spoke for many of his

neighbors: "we want to say thank you for being here. This is our home-a home

that wouldn't be here if you weren't here." In addition to the thank-you gifts,

Americans who lived near Khobar Towers also volunteered for the clean-up effort

that continued for weeks after the aItack.26

The gifts Ilom the Americans in Dhahran were heartfelt in their simplicity. One

family of four on the ARAMCo compound, in a gesture typical of many others,

sent a batch of cookies and a note: "To the US Air Men & women: we are thinking

about all of you at this sad time . . . . we thank you for your work here." The schoolchildren of the American compounds sent some of the most touching gifts. one

gtrl's hand-drawn card carried this message: "Hi. I'm Kath4zn, I bet I know horvr/ you

feal about loosing a friend because my fiiend Marshell moovd and here's a picture

of how I felt." Dr. Robb commented about some of the artwork that he and others

received from the neighboring children: "you know, you get these cards from the

kids-fin! second, thir4 fourth graders. when you think about it, it's scary for the

kids: bombs going offin their tovm." He went on to observe that a "two-way healing

process" took place: "one for us. And two, it was kind of a catharsis for the children,

to express their feelings."27

Like the Americans at ARAMCo and McDonnell Douglas, the French and

British were quick to help the Khobar airmen. These allies provided housing immediately, the night of the bombing, and the next day they began contributing to the

clean-up that was to continue through the summer. Beginning that first wednesday,

British and French crews set to work with brooms, shovels, and cleaning equipment.28

The allies also helped the wing's support group to reoccupy fairly quickly

Building 132, which housed the Personnel Support for contingency operations

ofices. The 44}4thparticularly needed the use of its pERSCo records and facilities, to account for personnel, to deal with the other administrative work created by

the bombing, and to arrange for many of the airmen to return to the United States.

This part of the KhobarTowers' recovery had begun soon after the blast, wfien Maj.

113
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Ronald D. Loyd commander of the mission support squadron, had gone back into

Building 132 to make certain that none of his office workers had been trapped there.

Later, about 4 a.m. on the moming of the twenty-sixth, PERSCO recovered its database, critically valuable under the circumstances. Capt. Bob Jones, chief of the

office, and other team members reentered their devastated work area and found the

computers and data that were so important in accounting for the wingb personnel.

After clearing the broken glass and debris away from the hardware, they carried it to

captain Jones's quarters, in suite 5-2 of Building 109, the Khobar Towers Inn.

Working ffom this temporary location, the PERSCO team completed the task of

accounting for the KhobarTowers personnel.2e

As Lieutenant Colonel Shafer noted, the PERSCO team was able to regain its

Building 132 offices remarkably soon. The French workcrews continued to help the

wing's support group, and on the aftemoon ofThunday, htne2T ,they finished picking up many of the glass shards that had made the workspace hazardous. Volunteers

from the support group and the PERSCO team cleaned the damaged offices in

Buildmg 132, covered the blown-out windows with plastic, and ensured that every

room had a functioning air conditioner.3o

By the twenty-seventh, the PERSCO team again was operating in its old

offices. The physical activlty expended during the move proved theraputic and the

prompt return to a familiar setting boosted morale. Although surrounded by plastic

windows and other reminders of the bornbing, the team members were mofe comfortable in Building 132 thanthey had been in their temporary quarters, and they

could focus better on the issues ahead of them. With the accounting for personnel

completed, their next tasks included doing the administrative work needed to support the imminent return to the United States of a large mrmber of airmen and, during the days ahead, finding replacements forthose who hadbeen killed in the bombing, taken from the theater by medical evacuation, or wounded so badly they could

not perform theirjobs properly.3r

The PERSCO team, support group, and other airmen received valuable help

from the British and French and from the Saudis. The host nation had a history of

reasonably good relations with the United States, predating the GulfWar. lhe Saudi

medical staffs, Dr. Robb note4 remembered helping the Americans during and after

Operation Desert Storm. In the case of the Khobar Towers, Robb expressed gratihrde for the supporl he received, 'hot only from the Americans fin Dhahran], but

ftom the host nation. ShlffI'll never forget, as long as I live."32

The airmen also were helped by the third-country nationals or "TCNs," as the

Americans usually called them. The Saudis, like many other Middle Easterners,

often hired workers from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and other

Asian nations to cook, clean, maintain facilities, keep the grounds, and do other

work. A number ofAir Force mernbers praised these TCNs for their generous willingness to be helpful. Right after the bombing, a false alarm of a second attack was

raised-in part because so many Saudis and other nationals had tried to enter the

compound to aid the Americans. SSgt. John c. orlando said of the TCNs: "They

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were bringing water around . . . . They cooked food for us . . . . They were very helpfuI. People will surprise you with their compassion." MSgt. Cedric Williams, the

lrst sergeant of the 58th Fighter Squadron, recalled: "The TCNs working in the dining hall . . . were probably as shocked fby the bombing] as we were. They made sure

everybody got food."33

The meals were a welcome feature on that Wednesday, particularly to the

wounded airmen who already had begun to return to the Khobar Towers. By Dr.

Robb's accounting, the ambulances had taken 202 airmen to hospitals in Dhahran

after the bombing. These facilities admitted 71 patients, and treated and released the

other 13l, who began coming back to the compound during the morning of the

twenty-sixth.3a

Nearly all, if not all, of these ex-patients retumed to Khobar Towers on buses.

The experience of lst. Lt. Stephanie Bronson, a civil engineer, was typical ofmany.

A Saudi ambulance had carried her and a few others to the ARAMCO facility, just

northwest of King Abdul Aiv Ar Base. An American doctor on the staff removed

the glass shards from the lieutenant's feet and did some stitching for her and the others with her. She and her group spent the early morning hours of Wednesday in the

hospital lobby, exchanging stories with other Air Force veterans of the bombing.

The ARAMCO staffmade some phones available and the airmen called, or tried to

call, their families. Eventually a bus retumed them to the Desert Rose Inn. They

arrived sometime after 7 or 8 a.m, late enough that the dining hall no longer was

being used for suturing patients.35

AlC. Richard J. Lavallee, Jr., was another of the manyARAMCO patients who

retumed to the Khobar Towers by bus that moming. Using crutches because his

right leg had been injure4 Airman Lavallee rested in a hospital waiting room until

transportation arrived. He recounted: 'At about 0430, a bus came to take us back to

Khobar Towers. I got offthe bus and had to ask around where our unit was staymg.

They were staying in the Khobar Towers tnn (billeting); I got to my room at about

0500." Lieutenant Colonel Shafer and Capt. Michael D. Morelock were also among

the many who renrrned to the compowrd by bus.l6

While these 'lvalking wounded" returned to Khobar on their ovrn steam, the

Air Force patients who remained hospitalized received a high quality of treahrent'

Dr. Robb credited the Saudi doctors and staffmernbers for giving the airmen "compassionate and skillful care." When flight surgeons and otherAir Force medical professionals visited the Dhahran hospitals during the morning and early aftemoon of

the twenty-sixth, they came away impressed that their hosts had attended to both the

mental and physical health of the USA]F patients. The Saudis had grouped together

the Americans, protected them with security guards, given them magazines published in English, and provided them with telephones to make calls without charge.

Army Col. @r.) Edward B. Freyfogle was the chief of the Surgery Departrnent of

the Landstutrl Regional Medical Center and became thoroughly familiar with the

Khobar Towers patients later, after they arrived in Germany. He commended the

Dhahran staffs for the "excellent job" they had done in "triaging and stabilizing"
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

theirAir Force patients. His praise reflected on both the Saudi medical professionals

and the USAF's aeromedical evacuation system: "When we saw the patients, we

were very. . . pleased at how well they had been cared for."37

Many of the airmen who had been patients at the ARAMCO Hospital spoke

favorably of that particular facility. SSgt. Eric D. ziegler, the Building 131 resident

who had tested his alarm clock at the instant of the explosion, spoke well of the

treatment that he had received on the hospital's cardiac care unit. He described

ARAMCO: "It's like a modern, stateside hospital. They had evetything, and they

were ready" to care for a larger number of injured airmen than they in fact received.

Sergeant Ziegler was particularly impressed that one of the nurses used her own

credit card to call his wife in Florida and let her know how he was doing. Capt. Mike

Morelock praised the ARAMCO personnel: "People were just really iliendly and

helpful." Llke Ziegler, Lieutenant Bronson described the facility as "a nice, big,

clean hospital," and recalled that the staffmade telephones available for calls to

loved ones in the States.38

Although the local professionals had provided high-quality treatment,

American medical, and other, officers wanted the hospitalized airmen moved to the

Landshrhl Regional Medical Center, near Ramstein Air Base, Germany, as soon as

possible. The patients were receiving very good physical care, but their morale

would be stronger in a more familiar setting. U.S. Army Col. @r.) Ney Gore, the

LRMC's acting commander, praised the Saudis for doing a "magrificentjob," yet at

the same time stressed that the patients would be happy to transfer to an American

facility. An Air Force nurse commented: "The medical care [in Dhahran] is very

good; however, there is always a big push to get our troops back home, and get them

into our ovvn system." Although the airmen received first-rate care, at least a few

were unnerved by their foreign setting. In contrast to the experiences reported by

many at the ARAMCO Hospital, at least one Air Force patient at King Fahd

University Hospital told an interviewer that she spent the night of June 25126 "terified . . . because she didn't speak to anyone who spoke English, until the next morn-

' rrlo lns. -'

The effort to move the hospitalized airmen from Dhahran to Landshrhl began at

about 8 a.m. that Wednesday morning, when Dr. Robb and other members of the

wingb medical group started making the rounds of the Dhahran hospitals, visiting

the Khobar patients, evaluating their condition, and determining which of them

should be transported to the military flightline on DhahranAir Base and then medevaced to Germany. As the medical professionals undertook this effort, they also

assumed the responsibility of accounting for the injured, a task initially given to the

JAG officers.ao

Dr. Robb was keenly aware that accounting for the patients in Dhahran and

ensuring their continued care would prove challenging. He based his expectations

on hard experience: he had arrived at Ramstein Air Base the morning after the

August 28, 1988, air show disaster, which had resulted in about 500 total casualties.

Robb later said he had learned from that tragedy that "The medical response is one

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thing, but the aftermath is another." On thatWednesday in l996,he dtew onhisflutag expeience: "The next moming [June 26] I got the folks to 'go door to door.'And

I said" 'You need to call every single hospital."'Telephoning every facility ruled out

the possibility any airmen would go unaccounted.ar

While Dr. Robb and the other care providers made their rounds during the late

morning and ear$ afternoon, the number of hospitalized patients continued to

decline, as airmen were discharged and retumed to the Khobar Towers. At 8 a.m.,

about the time Robb and the others set out, the Mohammed al Dosha Hospital, a private facility located about three blocks north of the Air Force compound released

four airmen, who were picked up by an independent duty medical technician from

the United States Military Training Mission (USMTM). At2:10 p.m. al Mana

Hospital discharged one patient and, forty-five minutes later, ARAMCO four

more.42

The rounds made by the Air Force care providers established definite information about the numbers, locations, and status of the patients in the Dhahran facilities.

As of 5:30p.m., sixty-five airmenremainedhospitalized. The greatmajoritywere at

three locations: the Ministry ofDefense andAviation (MODA) Hospital, thirty-five

patients (thirty-three in stable condition, two seriously injured); King Fahd

University Hospital, eighteen (fourteen stable, three seriously injured one very seriously injured); and ARAMCO, eight (seven stable, one very seriously injured).

Three stable airmen remained at Mohammed al Dosha Hospital, and another in the

same condition at al Mana.a3

In the case of one of the King Fahd University patients, uncertainty remained'

At about 4:50 p.m., the care provider team visiting that hospital had discovered an

airman in intensive care, who had been brought there from the Khobar Towers. It

was obvious at first sight that identification would be difficult. The young man lay

in a coma, on a respirator; his head had been shaven, and his body was swollen. Dr.

Robb photographed him with a Polaroid camera and took two prints back to the

componnd, hoping they would help someone recognize this ICU paIient.4

At 7:30 p.m. that evening, two members of the wing's civil engineering

squadron who had studied the Polaroids identified the patient as belonging to their

unit. They believed he was AlC. Christopher B. Lester, a recent arrival in Dhahan

from Wrigtrt-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.as By that hour, wing personnel had

identified positively eleven of the nineteen remains at the Air Mobility Commandb

terminal, leaving eight unidentified. These eight deceased were sent to the Dover

Port Mortuary Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, as unidentified remains. At the

same time, the PERSCO office categorizedeight,exactlythe same number, airmen

as being on "duty status, [but their] whereabouts unknorvn," oT "DUSTWUN.'46

Following the identification made by the two CE squadron members, the PERSCO office reported Airman Lester's status to Headquarters Air Force Personnel

Center (AFPC) at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, as "very severely injured."

When this report was made, one of the Khobar personnel officers urged the AFPC

to be cautious about it. Doubtless others at the time agreed with this advice.aT
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

The most compelling reason for caution was that many wing personnel

believed that Airman Lester looked very much like SrA. Paul A. Blais, who on the

evening of the twenty-sixth remained among the missing. There was strong potential for a case of mistaken identity. Veterans of the bombing later pointed out that the

two young men had similar facial shape and feahres, hair coloq and small mustaches that were trimmed identically.a8 Brig. Gen. Daniel M. Dick, who had come to

Dhahran to serve as the wing's next commandeq studied the ID cards of the two airmen and the Polaroids taken in the ICU room, and concluded there was "no way in

the world" he could distinguish one young man from the other. The general

declared: "These guys could have been twin brothers l'4e The identification also was

hindered by the fact that the ICU patient at King Fahd University Hospital was heavily bandaged, on a ventilator, and badly swollen, which made it difficult to get finger or foot prints. To compound the problem still further, Airman Lester had been at

the KhobarTowers only a week, which reduced the number of wing personnel who

knew him well.5o

It was a time of wrenching uncertainty for the families of Airmen Blais and

Lester. In North Carolina, Curtis Tayloq a retired Air Force master sergeant and

Blaisb stepfather, found himself on an emotional pendulum. At first he refused to

believe that the young man he had raised from age five was dead. "I said, No,

absolutely, he's alive," Mr. Taylor later stated. "They'll find him." Then he slowly

began to resign himself to the news. There were eight unidentified remains, and

eight DUSTWUNs. The numbers added up, Taylor said. And yet again, he could not

grve up. "There was still a little something," Taylor believed,*that said he is alive."

Maria Taylor, Blais's mother, also had conflicting thoughts. She hoped her son

would come home, but she knew "it was a horrible blast. In my heart, I knew Paul

was dead somewhere. Not many people can survive something like that." Across the

United States many people anxiously followed the news: in Orlando, Florida, Paul

Blais, the airmanS natural father; in Pineville, West Virginia, Lester's family; and

elsewhere, other relatives and friends.5l

Officers of the wing's mortuary services squadron explained to those around

them that two sources of evidence were necessary to identify any remains: dog tags,

fingerprints, or certain recognition by someone who knew the deceased.52 Oficial

identification of remains could be done only by the Dover Port Mortuary,53 and the

status of anyAir Force member could be announced officially only by Headquarters

AFPC's Casualty Center, at Randolph Air Force Base.54 The reality of the matter,

however, was that the oficers and airmen at the Khobar Towers were under pressure

to expedite the identifications. Spouses, parents, and other family members were

telephoning the home bases of their Air Force relatives, the AFPC, and elsewhere,

and these offices in turn were calling Dhahran. One airman at the Khobar Towers

acknowledged "getting pressure from Randolphi'because the Casualty Center was

receiving telephone calls asking: "Is my son alive? Is my daughter alive?"ss

Speaking specifically of the Blais-Lester identification, one airman recalled:

"Generals and highJevel people were calling, wanting to know what was happen118

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WednesdaY: At the Khobar Towers

ing." Addressing a closely related issue, one officer acknowledged: "There was

tremenduous pressure-1uite honestly, too much pressure-to get the guys out, to

get the fatalities back home."56

At 10:35 that Wednesday night, an officer fiom the office of the surgeon general at Headquarters U.S. Central Command telephoned the 44Mth Medical Group

and asked the unit to verifu the status ofevery Khobar patient by categories that

detailed each airman's condition. The caller also asked for Airman Lester's home

phone number and Social Security number. The medical group confirmed this

information with the PERSCO office, and provided it as asked.sT This was where

the Blais-Lester case stood, as of midnight of Jwrc26127.

The Air Force eventually would take criticism on this issue of identifying its

personnel. The Nqu York Times, for example, reported on the Blais-Lester case on

July l, and noted pointedly: "The confusion was not sorted out until Friday evening,

more than three days after the blast."ss

In addition to the Blais-Lester case, the airmen in Dhahran dealt with many

other issues on June 26. While the care providers had made their rounds that morning, the 4|l}ftAeromedical Evacuation Flight had taken the first steps in the

aeromedical evacuation of the Dhahran patients. This provisional unit, manned like

other Southern Watch units on a temporary-duty basis, included three nurses and

seven medical technicians. The 4410th, as one officer outside the flight pointed out,

had been "utremely involved in the initial response to the bombing." Its mernbers

had suffered injuries themselves, and had helped suture and otherwise care for

patients at the medical clinic.5e

Now the 44l0th took on another responsibiliry Since there were no

Aeromedical Staging Facilities or Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facilities in Saudi

Arabia, the unit took the first step toward establishing one. Around l0 a.m. the

44l0th secured the use of a C-12 hangar that stood next to its own building on the

military flightline and belonged to the Greater USMTM Transportation Service,

and so carried the earthy acronymn of "GUTS." Later, with the arrival that

Wednesday night of personnel from the 86thAeromedical Evacuation Squadron,

this building would be developed as the ASF and holding area for the Khobar

patients who would be medevaced to Europe. The GUTS hangar would provide, as

one nurse explained" a secure area where the medical personnel stored their patient

records, medical supplies, and communications equipment. The ASF also was the

place, the same officer summed up, "where we planned to collect, triage, tag,

label, . . . rank [the patients] in terms of on-loading and oflloading. So that's where

we would maintain our operation, for the next couple of days."60

Having secured the GUTS hangar for the ASE, members of the 4410th joined

those of the medical group at the Site Recovery Center at the clinic. That midafternoon these officers began making the preliminary arrangements for two AE missions that would leave Dhahran the next day, Thursday, the twenty-seventh. Maj.

Cynthia Coles, a registered nurse in the 44l0th, recounted that her unit "set up shop

in the clinic, along with the medical group. We were working medevac issues, while

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

[Dr. Robb's medical teams] were out at the facilities, trying to get information and

feed it back to us. As soon as they got their data-names, types of injuries-they

handed it back to us."61

While the members of the wing's medical group, the 4410th, and others in

Dhahran extended themselves that Wednesday morning, the first forty of what eventually would become a much larger Federal Bureau of Investigation team arrived in

Dhahran. President Bill Clinton, in his first remarks to reporters about the attack, on

Tuesday aftemoon at the White House, had announced that within hours a group of

FBI agents would be enroute to Saudi Arabia to assist in the investigation of the terrorist action.62 The first mernbers of this team reached the bomb site the next moming. Mr. Marwan Darwish, the wing's liaison officer with the Saudis, secured their

country clearances and made other arrangements for their stay. The Air Force Office

of Special Investigations provided the initial quarters for the FBI team.63

As the first FBI agents reached the scene that moming, the wing's judge advocate general personnel were taking on a new task. In the immediate wake of the

bornbing their primary job, like everyone's, had been to care for the wounded. Later

Maj. Kevin Greenfield, the 4404th's JAG, and others had gone to the Dhahran hospitals and had begun the process of accounting for personnel. During the morning of

the twenty-sixth, they turned over that responsibility to the wingb medical group

and took up another issue: property claims.

While human losses, of course, held paramount importance, material ones also

needed attention. The KhobarTowers airmen had lost tens of thousands of dollars

worth of personal items, destroyed in their dormitory rooms by the bombing or

sealed offfrom them in its aftermath. As one NCO observed, "there would be hundreds ofpeople who didnl have [anything], not even a toothbrush." Donations from

ARAMCO, McDonnell Douglas, and others provied some immediate relief, but the

JAG would have to address the firndamental problem that the wing had suffered a

large loss in personal property.s

Processing property claims posed a considerable job, and the legal airmen had to

tackle it quickly. Around 11 a.m. that Wednesday, Brig. Gen. Terry J. Schwalier, the

wing commander, asked Major Greenfield to present a briefing at the command's I

p.m. staffmeeting that would describe the JAG's plan and procedures for dealing

with the property claims. For his part, the commander made the commitment tha! in

the words of one of the legal officers, "he would get us whatever we needed."6s

While continuing to man their seat on the Disaster Confiol Group, the JAG airmen took on several tasks at the same time. First, they had to find a place to do their

claims work. The JAG offices, like the PERSCO ones, had been located in Building

132 and, also like them, had been destroyed. Capt. Lisa Winnecke, the wingb deputy

JAG, searched the compound and determined that the best alternative was the "Ark,"

the Khobar Towers chapel, located in Building 13 in the southwest corner of the

compound.66

Working space posed one issue; having enough personnel was another. Maj.

Brian G. Koza of the 4409th Operations Group's JAG office telephoned from

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Wednesdav: At the Khobar Towers

Riyadh and offered some assistance. The KhobarTowers airmen accepted his offer,

and by I I a.m. they knew that TSgt. Rita E. Adams, aparalegal aide, would be on

the next flight to Dhahan.67

Lr addition to space and manning, the legal airmen needed equipment. Early in

the aftemoon they went through their old office in Building 132, looking for items

that could be salvaged. At first they pieced together enough hardware to assemble

two computers, but one of the pair later gave out. "We were able to scrape together a

computer," SSgt. Selena P Husted related, "but we didn't have a typewriter." She

praised a Saudi contracfing ofiicial who later supplied them with one. In an era of

high-speed electronic processors, this nineteenth century invention still held considerable value. Until the airmen got a typewriteq they had to fill out the claims vouchers by hand. This was extremely slow work, particularly, as Sergeant Husted pointed

out, "when you're talking about paying fifty claims a day-68

The legal airmen accomplished a great deal that Wednesday aftemoon. Major

Greenfield, accompanied by Sergeant Husted, briefed the JAG's claims plan to

Generals Schwalier and Dick and other senior officers at the 1 p.m. staffmeeting.

About an hour later, Major Greenfield and Sergeant Adams, rvho had arrived as

expected, began videotaping the damaged dormitory rooms. Through the middle of

the afternoon, Lt. Col. Christomer Dooley sat in for the JAG on the DCG, while

Captain Wirmecke rested so she could report at 6:30 p.m. to relieve him for the night

shift. At the same time Major Greenfield and the other available JAG personnel

moved equipment from their old office and set up the new one in the Ark.6e

By the middle of the aftemoon, the JAG airmen were confident enough about

starting the claims process that they announced their hours of operation. The wingb

public affain office quickly distributed a flyer that publicized the new location and

advised airmen that they could file their property claims from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m.,

beginning the following day.Ar article on the front page of the next issue of the

wingb newsletter, published Friday, the twenty-eighth, reinforced this publicity.T0

Wednesday evening the legal and finance officers discussed the best way to pay

out the property claims. It was decided that JAG office would make available an

emergency advance of up to $50 to airmen who needed toiletries and clothing. The

operating principle was that "since members had suffered an obvious loss, they

should be compensated right away." The legal personnel eventually processed 161

claims related to the bombing, totaling about $69,000.7r

At2:15 p.m., while the JAG airmen were removing whatever equipment they

could salvage from their bombed-out office, Brigadier General Schwalier learned

that within a matter of hours his unit would be hosting Secretary of State Warren

Christopher. President Clinton had considered making a trip to the KhobarTowers,

but decided that the arrangements required for a visit by the commander in chief

might interfere with the investigation of the bombing. In his place he sent Secretary

Christopher, who was then in Egypt and would fly to Dhahran that evening.T2

Acting on this short notice, the wing quickly began preparing for the secretary's

arrival. Army Col. James R. Ward, commander ofArmy Forces Central Command-
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Saudi Arabia, made the arrangements for the visit with the American Embassy in

Riyadh. As for the necessary preparations at Dhahran Air Base and the Khobar

Towers, General Schwalier later commended the work done by the wing's protocol

officer, lst. LL Dawn Harrington. She and many other airmen had to accomplish a

number of tasks, quickly. Communications personnel, for example, had to rapidly

install ten telephones and three international, direct-dial phone lines for thejournalists who would cover the secretary's trip.73

Around 6 p.m. Brigadier General Schwalier and Maj. Gen. Kurt B. Anderson,

the commander of the JointTask Force SouthwestAsia, went to the military flighl

line to meet Secretary Christopher's aircraft. While waiting in a private room set

aside for distinguished visitors, the two generals conferred with Saudi Foreign

Minister Prince Saud Faisal, Interior Minister Prince Ibn Abdul Aziz Nayef, and the

American charg6 d'affaires for Saudi Arabia, Mr. Ted Katouf. The secretary of

stateb airplane arrived a little after 6 p.-., and soon after he debarke4 he made a

few remarks to the press, emphasizing that the Dhahran bombing would not "deter

the United States from carry.ing out in any way" its mission in the region.Ta

Secretary Christopher talked briefly with his American and Saudi greeters in

the distinguished-visitors lounge. Joined also by Prince Bandarbin Sultan, the Saudi

ambassador to the United States, and other Saudi officials, the secretary completed

a rapid itinerary. He went first to Building 131 and saw the damage done at the

immediate scene of the bombing. Walking with Princes Faisal and Bandar near the

dormitory the secretary vowed that investigators would find the perpetrators of

what he called a "dastardly act of cowardice."75

Around 7:30 p.m. Secretary Christopher visited the MODA Hospital, where he

saw bothAmerican and Saudi patients who had been injured by the bomb. He called

on a young Saudi boy and girl who had been playing in al Khobar Park w{ren the

truck explodeil6 and also on two airmen who then were in the MODA HospitalS

intensive carevriI.TT On one of the regular-care wards, while Secretary Christopher

and Prince Bandar were at the bedside of TSgt. Harold R. Jautakis, from the 33d

Operations Support Squadron at EglinAir Force Base, the NCO entreated the senior

American diplomat: "If you can catch the people who did this, you really should

punish them bad." Prince Bandar promised Sergeant Jautakis that punishment

would be meted out unquestionably: "It will be swift, harsh justice."78

From the MODA Hospital, Mr. Christopher returned to Dhahran Air Base's distinguished-visitors lounge, where he conducted a press conference. It was evident

that the secretary had been moved by what he had seen and heard on his brieftour.

His voice broke at times as he condemned what had been a "direct attiack on the

United States and on our friends and allies," and he promised that the terrorists would

be found and brought tojustice, "horvever long it takes." The secretary praised the

heroism of the airmen who had faced the attack. He recounted to the journalists how

SSgt. Alfredo R. Guerrero had spotted the truck and then, rather than flee, had raised

the alarm. "Many are alive today," Mr. Christopher concluded "because of his heroism." The secretary of state returned to his plane and left at about 9:30 p.m.7e

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Wednesdav: At the Khobar Towers

Secretary Christopher left Dhahran with a favorable impression of the care that

the injured had received and more help was on the way to them. A stream of medical professionals arrived at the Khobar Towers during late Wednesday afternoon

and into the night. The first of these to arrive was the 39th Medical Group Flying

Ambulance Surgical Team. Lt. Col. (Dr.) Cesario F. Ferrer, Jr., had activated this

EAST team at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, at 3 a.m.local time, one time zone west of

the KhobarTowers. Within two hours, twenty-three medical professionals, selected

by Dr. Ferrer, were ready to leave for Dhahran. "when the call came in," he said

later, '\ye didn't have to ask anybody twice-we even had some people disappointed they couldn't come with us:'so By J a.m. a"mobility line" confirmed that each

member of the FAST team had the legal identification and other documents, such its

records of up-to-date immunizations and DNA testing, needed to leave Turkey.

Medical, intelligence, legal, and finance officers all briefed the deploying officers

and airmen. The 39th Medical Group's pharmacist reviewed the travel and personnel medications ofthe individual members and checked the medication roster of the

team to verify that it was current and complete. By 1l:30 thatWednesday moming,

airmen of the 39th Wing had loaded the FAST team's four pallets of gear and medical supplies on a C_141, and the twenty-three mernbers had boarded the Starlifter.

Within minutes, the transport left Incidik for Dhahran.8l

Once airborne for Saudi Arabia, the FAST team divided into three components.

Maj. (Dr.) Daniel DeCook, a general surgeon, served as chief of a surgical team that

consisted of himself; Maj. @r) stephen Garneq an orthopedic surgeon; Maj. (Dr.)

Sylvia Cayetano, an anesthetist; and an operating room staff. A medical team

included Capt. Belinda Haines, a medical nurse, who served as its chief; Capt. (Dr.)

Timothy Tuel, a family physician; Dr. Ferrer, himself a flight surgeon and the FAST

team's commander, who backed up Dr. Tuel; five nurses; and a number of technicians. The support team was made up of SSgt. Diego Cevallos, a logistic technician;

sSgt. Ray LeGrand, an administrative tech; and three other techs. MSgt. Troy R.

Hoopes acted as the FAST team's NCO in charge.82

The FAST team landed at DhahranAir Base at 4:35 p.m. and, not long after 5,

reported to Dr. Robb at the medical clinic.83 He quickly outlined the help he needed,

beginning that evening and continuing for the next several days. First, the FAST team

could contribute the staffthat would be required to keep the clinic rurming on a twenty-four-hour schedule. The U.S. Navyb Administrative Support Unit in Bahrain had

dispatched a ten-member medical team that had made a timely arrival at Khobar,

reaching the clinic just before 5 a.m. that morning. These ASU professionals had

spelled their exhausted Air Force colleagues, who had been sewing patients and otherwise working, straight through the night. The Navy team had rendered valuable

help during some crucial hours, but had to start on its retum trip to Bahrain, shortly

after the EAST team landed at King Abdul Aziz. With the ASU team's departure, Dr.

Ferrer's group was needed to keep the clinic running around the clock.e

The FAST team promptly integrated its members with those of the clinic's

medical and administrative staffs.8s "Really," Dr. Robb candidly acknowledged,
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

"the FAST team took over our clini d' At7 p.m. that wednesday evening, one of his

main objectives was met, when the Khobar Towers clinic began operating on a

twenty-four basis. The crisis of the bombing's immediate aftermath had passed but

many airmen still needed follow-up care. For days after the bombing, the clinic continued to see seventy to eighty patients every twenty-four hours. Dr. Daniel

Decook, chief of the Incirlik surgical team, commented: 'After the initial surge of

casualties, they would have been hard pressed to deal with the smaller injuries. we

did what we could do best for them." Patients who had been treated the night of the

attack returned to the clinic to have their wounds examined or re-dressed, their

stitches removed, or to receive other follow-on care. The FAST team, and the others

who continued to work at Building I I I during those late June days, spent most of

their time, as Dr. Ferrer put it, "caring for the walking wounded," as opposed to

treating the more severely injured, who remained in the Dhahran hospitals.86

In addition to staffing the clinic, Dr. Robb's second major request of the FAST

team was that its physicians help with making the rounds ofthose patients still in the

city. He and others had been doing that since that moming, and the FAST professionals now could augment their effort. The Incirlik personnel would contribute

their medical opinions as to which patients could be evacuated by air and would help

assess what support they would need.Later that same night of the twenty-sixth, Dr.

Ferrer would attend the initial planning meeting for the aeromedical evacuation.sT

Dr. Robb saw other tasks for the Incirlik professionals. Beside making rounds

at the Dhahran hospitals and working at the clinic, they could help set up and staff

the ASF that was being established in the GUTS hangar on the Dhahran flightline.

The FAST team also would contribute some administrative support in tracking

patient information and would provide some spot manning, beyond the shifts at the

clinic.88

In addition to the FAST team, other important medical help also reached

Dhahan Air Base that wednesday night, with the arival at l0: 10 p.m. of personnel

and equipment of ttre 86thAeromedical Evacuation Squadron, commanded by col.

(Dr.) James w Bost, and accompanied by a three-member critical care Aeromedical

Transport Team (c-cATT), commanded by Maj (Dr ) Thomas E. Grissom, from the

59th Medical wing. About 2:30 p.m. that afternoon at Ramstein, two aeromedical

evacuation c-141s had left Germany carrying the fint echelon ofthe 86thAES: two

flight surgeons, three augmented (seven-member)AE crews, a six-member advanced

cadre (ADVOI',I) team, and two pallets of supplies and equipment. Dr. Grissom's

accompanying C-CATT consisted of himself, an anesthesiologist; Capt. Van

Billingsley, a crifical care mrse; and TSgt. Terrance pinkston, a respiratory therapist.

The 86th AES and c-cATT had been able to respond rapidly because, as Dr. Bost

later put il "Our crews have been trained that things often happen quickly'se

These units arrived at Dhahran Air Base shortly after l0 p.m. local time, and

immediately began contributing to the recovery that was underway at the Khobar

Towers. Through the middle ofthe night ofJune 25126 atRunstein, Dr. Bost and his

ofrcers had brainstormed a concept of operations for their deployment to Dhahran.

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They had anticipated that the 4lhhAeromedical Evacuation Flight would select

the C-12 GUTS hangar, adjacent to its own building, to use as anASE 'As we were

sitting there thinking about it," Dr. Bost recalled, "the Aeromedical Evacuation

Flight sits there right on the ramp, right next to a large hangar that was used for U.S.

akcraft.And so we started deciding that, if we could get the aircraft moved out of

that hangar, we could simply change that into a staging operation." The officers of

the 86th also knew that the 4410ttr--just three nurses and seven medical technicians-would welcome the help of the AE unit. During their planning session at

Ramstein, Bost and his staffmade the sound assumption that the "people [of the

44l}thlwho would normally begin to orgarize and stage patients were probably

already very very involved, and did not have the capability to do it.'40

Lt. Col. Jacqueline E. Murdoch, chiefnurse ofthe 86thAES and a member of its

ADVON team, recounted the unit3 nighttime arival, about twenty-four hours after

the bombing. "We hooked up with [the 44l0th]," she said "as we always do when we

fly our routine missions intoDhahran. We got a feel for what needed to be done.'9r

After the ADVON team consulted with the 44I0Ih, they attended a meeting

with Dr. Robb and members of his medical group, personnel of the 44l0Ih, and Dr.

Ferrer, the chief of the FAST team. The officers of the 86th AES learned from this

session that they should prepare the ASF at the GUTS hangar for ttrirty ambulatory

patients and fifteen litters. Forthe benefit ofthe new arrivals, Dr. Robb reviewedthe

status of the airmen in the Dhahran hospitals, who had been visited during the

rounds made thatday. MajorColes ofthe 4410th summarizedthe meeting: themedical team "and the aerovac people got together, and we went over patient by patient

and decided whether [each] needed to be aerovaced out."e2

During the hours and days ahead, the personnel of 86thAES and Dr. Grissom's

three-member C-CATT team helped their Dhahran comrades in multiple ways.

Perhaps their most obvious contribution was material: the medical crews brought

intravenous fluids, litters, stanchions, blankets, and other essential AE equipment.

The 86th also brought important administrative help. As Lieutenant Colonel

Murdoch explained, the medevac of the Khobar patients required considerable planning and management. A process had to be put in place for collecting "all these

injured pe6onnel, staging them, doing our paperworlg our manifesting-because

even in a disaster situation, we always need to maintain good records, good accounting of who's on our airplanes, social security numbers, and so forttr . . . . We needed

to process people through, we needed to give each one a sunrmaly medical record,

to tell us what we needed to do in flight.'83

The 86th's ADVON team provided this support. sending this management cell

to Dhahran, Dr. Bost commented later, "tumed out to be a good decision." The

ADVON team proved helpfrrl in collecting patients, preparing them for flight, and

rurloading thern "It was kqi nr.Bost concluded "to making the operation go."ea

Dr. Bost emphasized the same point in an after-action report he wrote the next

month. "An aeromedical evacuation response to the Khobar Towers bombing," he

pointed out, "was generated in a very short period of time. . . . Deployment of an
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

ADVoNTeamwithpatientmanagement capabilitywas critical to flight line staging

and mission organization." Dr. Grissom reported: "The C-CAIT responded in a

timely fashion with the 86 AES for the terrorist bombing of the Khobar Towers."es

The medical professionals in Dhahran consistently praised the support they

received from the 86th AES and the C-CATT and FAST teams. Capt. (Dr.) R.

Morris Treadway, Jr., flight surgeon of the 58th Fighter Squadron, commended the

aeromedevac units for their quick arrival. Dr. Robb said of the c-cATT and FAST

teams: "I don't know what we would have done, without them being there.,,e6

In addition to this aid" another group arrived on the same starlifter that brought

the 86thAES and c-CArr teams: the stress management team from the Landstutrl

Regional Medical center. During the early morning hours of the twenty-sixth in

Germany, Army Lt. Col. Bruce E. Crow, the LRMC's Chief ofpsychology, had organized a group that represented a spectrum ofthe hospital's disciplines, including psychology, social work, chaplaincy, occupational therapy, nursing, and pyschiatry.

Landstutrl was anArmy facilig and all but one of this stress management team's fifteen members were "green suiters." The Air Force member was TSgt. James B.

Cooper, Jr., the 86th Medical Squadronb NCO in charge ofpsychology services.eT

This group got offtheir C-l4l atDhahranAir Base shortly after 10 p.m. an4

like both the 86th and the c-cATT, had reached Dhahran almost exactly twentyfour hours after the terrorist attack. It was a timely arrival. A professional concensus

holds that stress debriefing teams are most effective when they can intervene within

eight to seventy-two hours of the event. Sergeant cooper said of Landstuhl group's

arrival within twenty-four hours: "That was on the money. we saw that as a very

good thing, that we could get there so quickly after the bombing,'es

Lieutenant colonel crow telephoned back to Landstuhl's operations center and

reported the team's safe arrival. The group waited a short time for a bus that would

carry them on the ten-minute ride from the military flightline to the Khobar Towers.

Sergeant Cooper recalled: "Initially, when we got on the ground there, we had to

wait a little bit. . . . Some people met us and briefed us as to what was going on,

what had occurred." From these earliest encounters with Air Force personnel that

night, the LRMC team leamed that the bomb had killed and injured military personnel, and not any family members, a piece of basic information that was very

helpful in planning the stress debriefings.ee

The bus took Lieutenant Colonel Crow's group to the Khobar Inn where, twenty-four hours after the attaclq the billeting office continued its efforts to find rooms

for the many dormitory residents displaced by the bombing. "It was still very chaotic," one of the Landstuhl officers recalled. "There were a lot ofpeople trying to get

rooms." With the billeting office doubling and tripling airmen into rooms, the

LRMC group felt fortunate to get lodgings, on the fourth and fifth floors of the

Khobar Inn.lm Entering the rooms, one officer was abruptly confronted with the

destruction thathad cqused the team's visit: "And I don't think it truly ft# me until I

walked into my suite" and saw that "the windows had been blown out. The glass,

most of it, had been cleaned up, but the curtains were torn,'lol

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WednesdaY: At the Khobar Towers

After settling into their rooms about I 1 p.m., a few members of the stress management team walked the short distance east from the Khobar Inn to the Desert

Rose, for a late-night meal. Most turned in for the night, knowing, as Sergeant

Cooper put iq "the next day would be very busy"lO2 Lieutenant Colonel Crow, the

officer in charge, wanted to meet some of the Khobar personnel that night and get a

leg up on the work ahead. He, Sergeant Coopeq andArmy Lt. Col. Barry Minsky,

the Landstuhl team's chaplain, went over to the medical clinic, just to the south of

the Khobar Inn, and met with Dr. Robb and MSgL Patrick R. Stark, the medical

group's first sergeant. The doctor gave the Landstuhl group a helpful introductory

briefing, and the discussion then turned to where they could conduct their sessions.

Since the clinic, Building 1 I l, was one of the eight-story Khobar "towers," it offered

enough space to suit this purpose. The medical group made available to the

Landstuhl team their conference room, a nurseb office, and two day rooms.lO3

After meeting with Dr. Robb at the clinic, Lieutenant Colonel Crow and

Chaplain Minsky made the short trip to Building 13, the location of theArk.l@ Here

at the compound's chapel they learned that Khobar's religious professionals already

had arranged for any airman to receive counseling, at any hour around the clock.

When the terrorists had struclg roughly twenty-four hours earlier, there had been

only two chaplains on the compound: ChaplainAleson, the wing's senior chaplain,

and Capt. (Father) Thomas Angelo, its Roman Catholic one. The military's religious

community responded quickly to the at|ack. AnAir Force chaplain on a site Yisit in

Oman returned to Khobar; two Naly chaplains reported from Bahrain; two more

Air Force chaplains came from Riyadh;I05 and a RoyalAir Force chaplain, visiting

British troops in the area, also joined the group. By the middle ofWednesday morning, less than twelve hours after the bombing, Chaplain Aleson summed up, '\ve had

eight chaplains, and additional support." With these professionals on the scene, the

Khobar airmen could receive religious counseling twenty-four hours a day. "The

chapel itself,'ChaplainAlesonpointed out,'lvas not heavily damaged, andbecame

a round-the-clock operation."106

After Colonel Crow learned that the chaplains were so well staffed for counseling, he next wanted to meet with the medical representative and other members of

the Disaster Control Group. While Chaplain Minslry went back to the Khobar Inn

and joined those who had tumed in for the night, Crow and Sergeant Cooper107

headed for the Site Recovery Centeq which by then had been operating in the executive dining room of the Desert Rose Inn for almost twenty-four houn. The NCQ

the only blue-suited member of the Landstuhl team, later reflected that Colonel

Crow wanted him along "basically because I 'speakAir Force."'108

At the Desert Rose, Colonel Crow and Sergeant Cooper first "grabbed a quick

bite to eat in the dining facility" and then visited the SRC. They introduced themselves to the Disaster Control Group and talked with them, a conversation that was

important, as Cooper later explained, in helping the stress management team to

learn quickly how the wing operated and where its units were located' The

Landstuhl goup wanted to find out when lhe 4404lhheld its important meetings, so

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

that its orm sessions could be scheduled around them, and it wanted recommendations about which personnel should be debriefed first.rOe

While Colonel Crow was talking with Capt. Cindy Pollert, the medical group's

representative on the DCG, one of the more fortuitous events in the recovery at the

Khobar Towers took place. The three ranking officers then on the compound

Generals Anderson, Schwalier, and Dick-walked into the room together. It was a

striking turn of luck for the Landstuhl team; they would lose no time searching for

Khobar's senior leaders. Colonel Crow took his opporhrnity: "I introduced myselfto

General Schwalier, told him who we were. . . told him that the team was ready to

go, and asked him what guidance he could give us."

General Schwalier walked Colonel Crow over to a map of the compound that

had been pinned up on the wall of the executive dining room. The wing commander

pointed out to the stress team chiefthe buildings that had been hardest hit by the

bombing, and identified the 58th Fighter Squadron, the 71st Rescue Squadron, and

the other units that had occupied them. The personnel in those dormitories, General

Schwalier told Colonel Crow, concemed him the most. He advised the debriefing

team to give its highest priority among them to the fighter squadron, because it was

scheduled to retum to Eglin that next day, Thursday, the twenty-seventh, at 10 a.m.

Crow later recalled his immediate thought "Oh my goodness, how are we going to

touch base with these folks?"

In light of General Schwalierb information andpriorities, Colonel Crow decided he would send part of his team to the King Abdnl Aziz flightline early the next

moming. Crow reported later in uniting the guidance that he had given at the time:

"Time and circumstances permitting, the team will conduct an appropriate level of

debriefing prior to the squadron's departure." At the least, they would be able to

meet with the unit3 commander and flight surgeon.

The chance meeting with General Schwalier and the other senior officers at the

SRC proved invaluable to the Landstuhl team. If not for this lucky encounter,

Colonel Crow would have gone to bed with much less information about the units

that most needed his team's attention. Above all, he would have remained ignorant

ofthe imminent deparhrre ofthe 58th Fighter Squadron.ll0

Colonel Crow and Sergeant Cooper had done more than a good day and night's

work. After the meeting with the generals, they left the Desert Rose, retumed to the

Khobar Inn, and tumed in for what remained of the night. I I I

Across the KhobarTowers compound some were joining them in getting badly

needed rest, while others were heading for the military flightline, where a moving

ceremony would take place during the early morning hours. For most airmen, that

hne26 had been a tiring day. For a nurnber of them, like MSgt. Kevin Smith, it had

been "pretty much a clean-up-where-youJive day." For some, the memories of that

Wednesday blurred as the pace of events accelerated. "That day seemed to go pretty

quickly,' Capt. Michael D. Morelock recalled, 'Just because there was so much

going on at that point."112 For all of them, one thing was cerlain. By the end of Jure

26, 1996, at Khobar Towers, a remarkable recovery had begrrn.

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Chapter Nine

Wednesdav: Elsewhere

When the bomb exploded in Dhahran, Army Col. (Dr.) Kevin C' Kiley, commander of the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center and U.S. Army Europe

Regional Medical Command, was attending a conference in Heidelberg, Germany'

In his absence, Army Col. (Dr.) Ney M. Gore, the LRMC's deputy commander for

clinical services, was the acting commander of the hospital and the ERMC.I

Sometime shortly before 3 a.m. on Wednesday, J:g/ile 26, 1996,Dt. Gore received a

telephone call from Headquarters U.S. Army Europe's Crisis Action Team

(USAREUR CAT). There had been a bombing in the Khobar Towers, Saudi

Arabia. Hundreds had been injured; the exact numbers ofwounded and killed were

unknorvn. The details were sketchy, but it was certain that a large percentage of the

casualties were Americans.2

It happened that Dr. Kiley also had been away from Landstutrl seven months

earlier, at the time of the Riyadh bombing. Reflecting on the two episodes later, Dr.

Gore recalled that he had been new to his assignment at the time of the earlier at|ack

and acknowledged that he had felt pressed by his responsibilities. Then he added

that by the time of the Jrine 1996 Dhahran bombing, he knew the Landshrtrl hospital and its people and he felt better about his situation.

Dr. Gore had much to do, and quickly, beginning atlhat3 a.m' hour. He knew

that Landstuhl had some time to get ready for the arrival of any patients from

Dhahran, but how much time was unknown. Dr. Gore began a long round of telephone calling.3

Among his first calls was one to Army Col. (Dr.) Edward B. Freyfogle, chief

of the LRMC's surgery department. Dr. Gore passed on the initial information that

he had: the number of casualties was unknown, but presumed to be many. Dr.

Freyfogle in turn began notif,ring the members of the surgery department. He also

took another measure, at that early hour. Dr. Freyfogle spoke fluent German and, in

addition to being chief of surgery he also served as liaison to the medical facilities

in the area, including the Bundeswehrzentralkrankenhaus (military cenhal hospital), located in Koblenz, and the University of Hamburg Hospital. The American

surgeon described the former as Germany's "Walter Reed, Wilford Hall, and

Bethesda, all rolled into one." Dr. Freyfogle took the step of calling these German

hospitals and putting them on standby to help. Although events proved their assis-
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

tance unnecessary he later said with confidence: "I'm absolutely positive they

would have supported us, lock, stock, and barrel.'a

Like Dr. Freyfogle, Dr. Gore also telephoned some of the area hospitals.

Landstutrl could readily make available 180 beds, and another 40 without great difficulty. During those earliest hours, however, the number of Dhahran casualties

remained unknown, and the hospital's acting commander knew that his facility

might need help. Dr. Gore spent a good bit of the time before 4 a.m. placing calls to

German hospitals and planning for that contingency. The Heidelberg and wiirzburg

University hospitals agreed to provide additional beds, if needed.5

Dr. Gore arrived at a preliminary plan if the LRMC received a large number of

severely tnjured airmen: aeromedical evacuation aircraft would bring the casualties

from Dhahran to Ramstein. From there the 86th Aeromedical Staging Flight, the

only ASF in Europe, a ten-member unit commanded by Lt. Col. Dawn M.

oerichbauer, would transport the patients the four miles south to Landstuhl. clearly

the LRMC would be the best place, at least at first, for those patients who needed

the most care. After Landstuhl had admitted all of the critical-care airmen it could

readily receive, its staffwould triage the others. The more severely injured of them

would be transferred to Heidelberg, about fifty miles away, and the less so to

Wiirzburg, more than twice as far.6

In addition to making these calls, Dr. Gore also moved to ensure that there

would be rapid well-coordinated communication among the LRMC and other organizations. Soon after 3 a.m., he alerted the hospital's plans, operations, and training

division to establish an emergency operations center. As Army Maj. Gary Newman,

the chief of the PO&T division, was able to report later, the "activation of the EOC

went smoothly." This hospital emergency command center soon was in communicationwiththe USAREURCAT, the Headquarters United States European Command

CAf, Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe, and many other organizations that already were coordinating medical help for the wounded airmen at the

KhobarTowers.T

Also among Dr. Gore's early moming calls was one that began the mobilization

of a stress management team. In response, Army Lt. Col. Bruce E. Crow quickly

had organized a fifteen-mernber unit that represented many of the hospital's disciplines. These professionals were ready to leave Landstuhl by 8 a.m., were on the

Ramstein flightline around 9, and, along with the 86th Aeromedical Evacuation

Squadron and Critical Care Aeromedical Transport Team, left at about 2:30 p.m.

The Landstuhl stress management team would reach Dhahran that night, roughly

twenty-four houn after the bombing.8

In addition to this telephoning, Dr. Gore also was soon in communication with

the hospitalS department of nursing. Army Col. Caro$n Bulliner, its deputy commander, leamed about the bombing by a phone call from the nursing supervisor on

duty at the time, and shortly afterward, she discussed the news with Dr. Gore, who

happened to be her neighbor. within an hour of hearing about the attaclg around 4

a.m., Colonel Bulliner reported to the hospital, as did Dr. Gore. During these hours

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WednesdaY: Elsewhere

before wednesday's dawn, she said lateq "we were trying to find out the magrritude

of the issue, and how soon we would need to start reacting'"

A person unfamiliar with the workings of the enormous Landstuhl facility

might assume that colonel Bultiner's obvious course was to begin calling her staff

and directing them to report to the hospital, but in fac! this was not the case. The

stress management team, which needed to secure country clearances and make

other arranglments, had to be mobilized quickly, but this was not the situation with

the nursing departrnent. In this instance, it was better to take a longer view. "I knew

if we had many casualties," colonel Bulliner later explained" the necessary manning

"would stress the staF-if not over a day, at least over many, several days." So an

early recall of a large number of nurses would have been a mistake. It wasn't until

about 6:30 a.m. that Colonel Bulliner "let the staff know what had happened,

because by that time we were pretty well awat€'that no patients would be aniving

at Landstuhl until at least much later in the day.v

About an hour and a half earlier, around 5 a.m., Army Sergeant Mike Ertell had

telephoned Ms. Marie Shaw, chief of the LRMC's public affairs office, and told her

the news from Khobar Towers. The two of them represented the office's entire stafl

and they quickly agreed they would report early that workday' Ms' Shaw had been

working ut f*irtott since the early 1980s, and she teal:E:ed from her long experi-

"nr. ttit patients would be coming to the LRMC-and so would members of the

intemational press.lo

once at work that moming, Marie Shaw set up a press center in the hospital's

managed care division, which had the necessary telephone lines and computers that

her own modest office lacked. She also knew that she and Sergeant Ertell alone

wouldnt be able to cope with the large number ofjoumalists who soon would begtn

arriving at Landstuhl. Ms. Shaw called *re public affairs offices of Headquarters u'S.

nurope-an Command and U.S. Commander in Chief, European Command, both at

Stuttgart (Vaihingen, Germany), discussed the situation, and asked for assistance.

These organizations realized that they, too, would be stressed for manning if any of

the Dhahran patients were brought to Europe. Headquarten USCINCEUR's public

affairs office agreed to detail one person to the LRMC. Vaihingen was only about

seventy-five miles to the southeast, and this officer reported to Landstuhl that afternoon. In addition to getting this help, Ms. Shaw also quickly arranged to have urough

press badges and escorts riady, when the media representatives began arriving.ll

The press center began taking calls that morning, but Ms. Shaw could not yet

confirm forthe inquiring joumalists that any of the Dhahran airmenwouldbe transported to Landstuhl. She instead directed their attention to a blood drive that the hospital,s department of pathology and area laboratory services began preparing that

moming. Landstuhl had been providing plasma for the Army's forces in Bosnia and

recently they had been asked for more. In view of this request and the arrival of an

unknorlryr number of Khobar Towers patients, the blood drive's goal, as Army Maj'

Michael Daines, chief of the pathology department, stated was 100 units. It eventually collected 140.12

131
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

By the time the pathology staffwas setting up this blood drive in the hospitalb

Heaton auditorium, representatives of at least five international news organiza- tions-the Associated Press, National Broadcasting company, columbia

Broadcasting System, Air Force News, and one British tr.*rpup"t-already had

arrived at Landstuhl. Dr. Kiley rehrmed from Heidelberg that morning and conducted a press conference, held also in the Heaton auditorium. Although Ms. Shaw still

could not give these reporters information about the numbers and arrival times of

the Khobarpatients, she did give them the opportuni[z to cover the preparations for

the blood drive, interview Dr. Kiley and others, and do some filmine.li

Marie Shaw had the best possible reason for not telling the journalists how

many patients were coming: the hospital staffdid not yet know. Dr. Freyfogle later

recalled the tenor of things that morning: "of course, we were clamoring for news,

to separate the facts fiom the rumor. And we'd get driblets, here and there.,'..In any

situation like this," Lieutenant colonel oerichbauer reflected, ..there is a hurry-upand-wait, hurry-up-and-wait, until you get the definitive answer in.,'la

one thing was certain that wednesday morning: given that the flight time from

Dhahran to Ramstein was about six hours, no patients could reach Lanistuhl soon. 15

The LRMC staffwas guaranteed a fixed amount of pranning time, and made excellent use of it. Dr. Freyfogle later reflected that every event involving mass casualties

can be categoized into one of two groups. There are imminent ones, like the

Ramstein air show disaster, in which the number and types of injuries are unknown,

and no time available for planning.And there are diitant ones, like the Khobar

Torvers bombing, in which the number and condition of the injured may be uncertain at first, but are known by the time the patients are transported to Landstuhl.

These cases allow time for planning and preparing. The LRMC staffused wisely the

hours before the airmen arrived. "we spent most of the day [wednesday the twentysixth] planning," one of the hospital's senior officers said later. ,.we had the time to

make some smart decisions, as opposed to having to [make the] 'knee-jerk-reaction'

kind of decisions that are not always the best.',r6

one specific example of this came that morning, when Dr. Kiley, coronel

Bulliner, and other staffmembers discussed how the arrival of the Khobar patients

might affect the nursing deparhnent's staffing and the hospital's ongoing operations.

If the LRMC had to care for a large number of airmen for two auyr oi longer, the

facility might have to curtail some of its services. The officers considered this issue,

and decided that the salient point was that there was no evidence yet that the number

would be extuaordinarily high. "Since we already had surgeries scheduled-patients

planning to have their surgery," colonel Bulliner related, "[we decided] ihat *"

would go ahead and do the surgeries. [we would] pretty much keep operations as

normal during the day as we could.',17

At noon Dr. Kiley convened an all-hospital staffmeeting in the LRMC's conference room. Dr. Gore gave a detailed briefing, using the information he had, as he

later said, to dampen any anxieties that might have developed.ls The senior staff

mernbers gave reports that confirmed that Landshrtrl at that hour already stood well

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WednesdaY: Elsewhere

prepared to receive alargenumber of Khobar patients. Colonel Bulliner described

ireidepartment's plans for housing a hundred airmen and discussed the numbers of

available beds, on four of the hospital's wards. The LRMC could accept twenty' perhaps as many as thirty, intensive-care patients, without any augmentation. In addition, the United States Army Medical Materiel Centeq Europe, in Pirmasens, fewer

than fifteen miles south of Landstuhl, held in storage five modules that could

increase the hospital's critical-care capacity. The USAMMCE could send these bed

packages to the LRMC and they could be set up that day, well before any Dhahan

flights would land at Ramstein.le

At this same meeting, Major Daines reported on the blood drive and Col. 1Or.)

Frederick A. Steckel, chief of iadiology, detailed his department3 preparations. Lt.

Col. Theodore S. Nam of the department of pyschiatry announced that a family support centeq staffed by chaplains, Red Cross workers, the hospital's social work services professionals, and others, would open the next morning' Marie Shaw

described the news media's high interest in Landstuhl's preparations for the Dhahran

airmen, and her creation of a press center. other attendees gave equally detailed and

confident, reports. This all-staffmeeting was followed by a conference among Dr.

Kiley andthe chiefs of his medical deparfrnents. This session, too, carried a positive

tone.20

The aftemoonprovided other instances of the Landstuhl staffusing its preparation time to good advantage. colonel Bulliner related one example: the decision to

put all of the Khobar patients on a single ward. She emphasized that she "left the

ptuotring of how we were going to manage the patients" to her senior staff, "who

were very very competent. They had dealt with these kinds of issues before." They

weighed ihe meri6 ;f having the airmen all on one ward, or on two or more. That

aftemoon the exact number of patients remained unknornm, but it was certain that

one ward would accomodate tfu-em. The senior nurses, Colonel Bulliner recounted,

..came back to me and said, 'You know, it will probably be better if we put all the

patients on [ward] 14, rather than trylng to put them on a couple different wards, to

move all the,existing patients offthat ward and just have that for Saudi patients.'That

workedjustbeautifully. . . . That was the staff's idea'"2r

In the nursing deparfrnent, and elsewhere in the hospital, personnel leaves wefe

curtailed: not canceled but curtailed. The Landshrhl Regional Medical center stood

ready to receive the Khobar patients. "Then," Marie Shaw stated "we had the long

wait."22

Across the Atlantic Ocean from Landstuhl, at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida,

the Tlst Rescue Squadron was continuing to cope with the aftermath of the bombing. The unit's executive officer, Capt. Stephanie Shaw, reported to work that

wednesday morning and found that telephones were "ringing everywhere. . . . It

took. . . about a week before the phones finally stopped ringing'"23

Calls also continued to ring into the crisis information center that Col' Thomas

R. Friers had established at the headquarters of the lst Rescue Group, in Patrick's

Building 423, across the base fiom the Tlst's building on the flightline. The volume

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

of communications remained so high that representatives from the group's three

squadrons continued to man the center for two and a half days. Mosl of the calls

were incoming-from family members asking about their relatives who were serving southem watch assignments in Dhahran. colonel Friers later reflected, ..And of

course, the hardest part: we continued to get calls from [the families of] some of

those that I was pretty sure were deceased, but I couldn't say anything, yei.,'2a

The difficult task of notifying the families of their lossls fraa U"gun during the

earliest hours of the twenty-sixth. During the daytime of that wednesday, another

notification remained to be made. As Lt. col. Donald R. Jozayt, commander of the

71st Rescue Squadron, later recounted, someone would have to make the drive

north and west fiom Patrick to orlando, the home of paul Blais, the natural father of

SrA. Paul A. Blais. "we were to tell the father," Lieutenant colonel Jozavt said.

"he's missing, but presumed dead."2s

colonel Friers well knew that Lieutenant colonel Jozaythad,been awake into

the early hours, performing the stressful task of notifying trvt of the bereaved families of their loss. Rather than arouse the squadron commander, the group commander telephoned instead the Tlst Rescue Squadron. A major and a sergeant from the

unit made the drive to orlando. Mr. Blais was himself a veteran and he interpreted

the arrival of an Air Force officer and NCo at his home to mean that his son was

dead. No, they told him, there was some hooe.26

That wednesday afternoon, colonel Friers and Lieutenant colonel Jozaytmet

with Lt. col. (Father) Phillip D. Nguyen, the I st Rescue Group,s chaplain. The three

officers discussed their initial ideas for a memorial service for the patrick airmen

who had been killed in Dhahran. They envisioned a brief; small, and private ceremony, which would be held perhaps as early as Friday, ttre twenty_eighth.27

Not long after this preliminary meeting, events began moving in a different

direction. Early that evening, a member of the headquarters staffof the lst Fighter

wing, at LangleyAir Force Base, virginia, telephoned colonel Friers with a 

..heads

up." President Bill clinton, then at the summit meeting of the Group of Seven in

Lyon, France, might attend the patrick Air Force Base memorial service fbr the

Dhahran airmen. The caller emphasized that this was no more than a'.heads up,"

and that the information was to be kept ,,close hold.,'

colonel Friers left his office only somewhat later than usual in the evening of

the twenty-sixth. Lt. col. Robert H. Holloway, his depu[', had run the crisis information center until the early morning hours of that wednesday, then had gone home

to get what sleep he could, and now reported to relieve the group commaider. when

colonel Friers arrived at his house that night and tumed on his television,s cNN

channel, he heard the newscaster announce that president clinton would be attending the Patrick ceremony.28

At EglinAir Force Base, the tempo and tenor of events was much the same as

at Patrick. The 33d Fighter wingb battle staffhad frst met at 3:30 p.m the previous

day and eventually would devote seven meetings to the Khobar Towers recovery.

Between these meetings, it worked continuous$ on accounting for Eglin's person134

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WednesdaY: Elsewhere

nel, notiffing the bereaved families, andmany other issues. OnWednesday, htrrc26,

the battle staffremained manned by more than twenty officers and airmen, as it

would the next day as well. As the process of accounting for Eglin's personnel

reduced the number of airmen categoizedas "duty status, whereabouts unknolvn,"

Lt. Col. stan Hill, the wing's battle staffdirector, himself took responsibility for

these cases.2e

During one of the earliest battle staffmeetings, it had been decided that a project officei should be assigned to each one of the bereaved families, and by

Wednesday, Lieutenant Colonel Hill was also able to begin working closely with

these points of contact.3o Col. Gary R. Dylewski, commander of the 33d Fighter

Wing, regarded the creation of these POCs "one of the best decisions we made '...

At eiery battle staffmeeting, we could get an update [from the family project officersl on what [every] family's situation was." The Pocs knew immediately if their

particutar family needed airline tickets, billeting, money, meals, counseling, transportation, or other assistance. These project officers, Colonel Dylewski emphasized

l.did un unbelievable amount of work around the clock, and they spent a lot of

money out of their orvn pocket, when they couldn't get the money that was available,

immediately. . . . There are a thousand stories out there, that we'll never know, about

the families getting taken care ofby these folks." The wing initiaily agreed to assign

one airman per family and then came to realize, as Linda Brown, the director of the

base's Family Support Center, said, that "this was a twenty-four-hour job."

Eventually, two or three POCs worked with each family":t

Linda Brornm contributed great energy to one of Eglin3 most important recovery efforts, the "People Place." "The People Place," Lieutenant Colonel Hill

explained, "was a concept from the 96th Mission Support Squadron commander,"

Col. Lee Weitzel. Organiied by Ms. Brornm and her Family Support Center staff, this

operation made available, on a twenty-four-hour basis and in a single building,

many services that Eglin families would need during the days following the Khobar

tragedy: information and referral assistance, crisis counseling, child care, a spouseto-ipouse progfam ofvolunteer "supporters," Red Cross resources, line badge and

identificationiard replacement, fiavel vouchers, chaplain support, and several others. When Linda Brown had attended the battle staffmeeting on Thursday evening,

she had been asked to set up this collection ofvaluable services, gathered into a single location, convenient to the families they would help.32

colonel Dylewski credited Linda Broum with the idea of establishing the

People Place in the 33d Fighter Wing's Field Training Detachment building, rather

than asking the unitb family members to make the long trip to the Support

center on Eglin Main Base.33 The FTD facility, Building 1363, proved an excellent

location for this operation. It stood not far south of the taxiways of the 33d Fighter

Wing, and just *"it of th" unit's headquarters, on Nomad Way''o

rne rio building was a training faciliry and its classrooms were well suited to

the immediate need. Its adminisfative offices had desks, telephones, photocopiers,

and fax machines. Had Linda Brown been forced to set up the People Place in a
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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

vacant building, it would have become necessary to locate and install all of this

office equipment, at a loss of hours or even days to Eglin's families-at the very

time when they most needed help. In addition to this advantage in hardware, the

FTD building offered an even more important benefit, its ornm professional workers.

"The resident staffof the Training Detachment (Building t:og whicrr became the

People Place)," Linda Brovm wrote in her after-action report, "was outstanding. on

lur*duv and Sunday, they left admin offices open so wi could use phones, desks,

3", *9- xerox. They arranged for [signs that would direct] visitors to the people

Place."35

After a noon meeting of the Family Support center's staff and others, the

People Place opened at2 p.m. on wednesday, the twenf-sixth. The FTD staffand

33d Fighter wing personnel blanketed the enormous base with signs that gave directions to the building.36 colorful flyers publicized the people place and listed many

of its multiple services. In a personnel message welcoming the rehrming Nomads,

Colonel Dylewski alerted them to the assistance that was available at the FTD building: "No one has all the answers on how we will rebuild the damage done by the terrorists' cowardly act. But as aid in the first step in the long and painfui healing

process, Team Eglin has pulled together an extensive group of mental health and

family support experts who will work 24 hours aday for as long as it takes to help

get everyone through the difficult days ahead,3i

Staffed by the Family Support center director herself and only fourteen others,

the People Place met colonel Dylewski's commitment of round-the-clock operations. Linda Brown later stated: "we thought we could handle it, but the people

Place was running twenfy-four hours [a day], and we spread ourselves thin."3d In

addition to being small, the staffwas divided: it worked from two locations. After

the People Place opened on the twenty-sixth, some of its operations moved into the

hangar ofthe 58th Fighter Squadron, a short distance north ofthe FTD building and

on the taxiways.3e From these two places, this diverse, enormously valuable service

continued to support Eglin's families into July.4o

"The People Place and the battle stafi" colonel Dylewski later reflected, ..were

the centers of activity around here." pointing to the people place's counseling and

other activities, he stated that it "rendered invaluable service." Lieutenant Colonel

Hill praised the variegz of services it offered, emphasizing that ,.the Red Cross, hos_

pital, and the crisis action intervention teams from the hospital . . . all kinds of support from the community was focused in the people place." In her after action

report, Linda Brown summed up: "The people place provided an oasis of comforl,

physically located exactly where it should have been-in the [33d Fighter wing]

work area. The People Place represented the whole base to the 33 FW and the 33

FW to the rest of the base and civilian community." About six months after the

hagedy, Ms. Brown commented: "I was greatly comforted that the 33d battle staff

always remained focused on the families of the victims."al She emphasized the

same point in her after action report: "The 33 FW and people place focus never was

diverted from the families and 33 FW personnel.,,a2

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In the conclusion of Ms. Brornrn's report, she reflected on the inestimable worth

of the People Place. "The money spent and the hours worked" she wrote, "were

appropriate; the victim-families have been tragically impacted, but they have no

doubt Eglin and the surrounding civilian communities care. Though never envisioned by the various base disaster support plans, the People Place proved invaluable

as an information outlet for the outpouring ofpublic sympathy and concem, and for

centralized services and support.'43

While Linda Brov,n and many others worked during that Wednesday aftemoon

to get the People Place up and running, Capt. Brenda Campbell, the 33d Fighter

Wingb public affairs officer, had spent long hours preparing to work withjournalists

during the days ahead. As soon as the news had arrived on Tuesday aftemoon, she

was cerlain there would be an "astronomical" press interest in the Khobar Towers

bombing. Immediately after the first reports from Dhahran, Captain Campbell's

small office quickly began receiving assistance llom Main Base Eglin because, as

she later said, "they have a lot of resources that we needed"-manning and other

help. The public affairs office of the Air Force Development Test Center, for example, issued a press release on Tuesday evening, and promptly sent a copy to the 33d

Fighter wing. In addition to such help from Main Base Eglin, captain campbell

also was gratified that she "immediately had people calling . . . from Hurlburt asking

me if I needed help." This neighboring installation reinforced the 33d Fighter Wing

with PA officers who were experienced, Campbell said, with "the magnitude of

what we were going to face."4

Not far behind these reinforcements, members of the intemational press began

arriving at Eglin during wednesday's early morning hours. "Before you knew it,"

Captain Campbell recalled, "we had people on our doorstep. I mean it was within

hours." The joumalists remained at Eglin in large numbers from that Wednesday

through Monday, the first of July.

Captain Campbell and the other public affairs specialists gave their flrst attention to helping Maj. Gen. Stewart E. Cranston, the AFDTC commander, and

Colonel Dylewski prepare for a press conference, which they would hold at9 a.m.

on the twenty-sixth. "We worked all night," Campbell related, "to get questions

ready, to get answers ready." Ear$ that morning, the PA officers briefed General

Cranston and Colonel Dylewski, in advance of their press conference.a5

The 9 a.m. session with the joumalists went well. "This is obviously an extemely difficult time for all involved," General Cranston told the reporters. "We ate, of

course, mobilizing all of our resources to provide what comfort we can to the families that have suflered a loss.'46

A common theme ran through these experiences at Eglin, Patriclq Landstuhl,

and elsewhere throughout the Air Force. In the aftermath of the tragedy, people

readily did w{ratever their circumstances required. Landstutrl's Dr. Freyfogle stated:

"If I've leamed anything from mass-casualty experiences, it is that 100 percent of

the people will do anything they are told to do, gnder those circumstances. That, you

can absolutely count on." Patrick's Colonel Friers expressed great confidence and

t3'7
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

pride in the people both "over there, and back here." Eglin's Colonel Dylewski

emphasized that on his base, the response "wasn't like a normal staff action, that

would take days to get something done. . . . People realized ttrat it needed to be done

now, because people needed it, and people were hurting."41 And so it was on

Wednesday, hne 26, 1996, everywhere in the United States Air Force.
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Help for the wounded in the parking lot behind Building l3 l, with more the severely

injured receiving help from those with lesser injuries.

Lt. Col. (Dr.) Douglas Robb with patients aboard the medical evacuation airuaft(top

left), Gen. Michael Ryan, commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, with patients on the

aircraft in Germany (top right), and Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (above).

Opposite page: Lt. Col. (Chaplain) DennisAleson speaks at the departure ceremony

(top), a casket is loaded into a C-5 (center), and all 19 caskets aboard the afucraft

(bottom).

l4l
A C 141 and a C-9 on the Eglin runway (lop). Arnbulances waiting for patrents (center)

at Eglin. Maj. Gen. Stewart Cranston, AFDTC commander, and Capt. (Dr.) Monis

Treadway (behind General Cranston) visitpatients aboardthe medevac aicraft(bottom).

Opposite page: Patients are assisted offand carried offthe medevac aircraft.

t42
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At Eglin, Khobar veterans speak with members

of the press (top'); Col. Gary Dylewski, 33d

FighterWing commander, Maj. Gen. Stewart

Cranston, and President Bill Clinton talk at the

foot of the stairs to President Clinton's aircralt

(above); and F-15s fly a missing man formanon(lefi).

Opposite page: During the Eglin memorial

ceremony, an enofinous flag hangs in King

Hangar (top'), injured airmen at the liont of the

audience (center), and ColonelDylewski and

President Clinton speak at the ceremony (boltom).

144
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An overall view of the PatrickAFB Khobar

memorial during the dedication ceremony

(topi), the Patrick memorial with engraved portraits of the five airmen from Patrick killed in

the atrack(above), and a flyover of an

HC 130 during the ceremony (left).

Opposite page: The Khobarmemorial at

Eglin AFB (top). A row of memorials in llont

of the Enlisted Heritage Hall on Gunther

Annex, Maxwell AFB , Alabama (center), wilh

a close view of the Khobar memorial (bottom

left).The Khobar memorial at Prince Sultan

Air Base, Saudi Arabia (bottom right).

146
III
{IIII II1ttI
Secretary of the Air Force Sheila Widnall and Lt.

Col. Douglas R. Cochran, comflvrnder of the 58ttr

Fighter Squadron (top).CapI. (Dr.) R.Morris

Tieadway (above). Col. Thomas R. Friers, commander of the lst Rescue Ctroup (right).

Opposite page: Brig. Gen. Terryl J. Schwalier and

Maj. Gen. Kwt B. Andenon, commander of Joint

Task Force Southwest Asia at a press conference

(top). Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman presents Maj.

(Dr.) StevenP Goff anAirman3 Medal (cente).

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry speaks to

reporters in front of Building 131 (bonom).
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Acting Secretary of the Air Force E Whitten

Peters speaks atthe dedication ofthe Patrick

AFB mernorial (top). Sevetary of Deferse

William S. Cohen and Chairman ofthe Joint

Chiefs of StaffGen. John M. Shalikashvili

announce at a press conference that Brig. Gen.

Terryl J. Schwalier will not be promoted to

major general (center). Maj. Gen. Daniel M.

Dick(lefi), as a brigadier geneml, succeeded

Gen. Schwalier as zl404th Wins commander.
Chapter Ten

Three Departures from Dhahran

Col. Scott Gration, commander of Ihe 4404th Composite Wing's operations

group; Lt. Col. (Chaplain) Dennis E. Aleson, the wingb senior chaplain; and CMSgt.

Paul K. Ayres, the unit's senior enlisted adviser, planned the memorial service and

deparhre ceremony for the deceased airmen of the Khobar Towers. This memorable

eventtookplace during the middle ofthe night ofWednesday/Thunday,Jwrc26l27,

1996. The ceremony was conducted in a floodlit area around the nose of a C-5A

Galaxy on the military flightline of Dhahran Air Base. This transport aircraft,tall

number 60022, had been in Dhahran when the terrorist bornb exploded. Following

the ceremony, it would carry the remains of the nineteen airmen back to the United

Siates, to the Dover Port Mortuary at DoverAir Force Base, Delaware.r

After midnight a group of well over one thousand Air Force personnel began

assemblying in a sharply deployed squadron formation. Many others from the United

States Military Training Mission (USMTM) also came to pay their respects. One

Saudi national was present: Colonel Abdullah al-Qahtani, who was the Royal Saudi

Air Force security wing commander for King Abdul Aziz and the director of the Joint

Forces Support Unit for the Eastern Province, a role that made him the liaison officer

to the American and other foreigr military personnel in Dhahran.2

The United States flag, and two others, stood in the floodlit area. By June 1996

the Tlst Rescue Squadron had served in Operation Southem Watch more than two

years, so long that the unit kept one stand of its colors in Dhahran. The third flag was

that of the 4404th Composite Wing @rovisional). A podium with a microphone

wired to a series of speakers also stood in place.3

The ceremony began less than twenty-eight houn after the bombing. A few minutes before I : 15 a.m., two operators directed a flightline tractor into the area in front

of the C-5A. Behind this vehicle rolled four pallet trailers, each carrying four flagdraped transfer cases, followed by a fifth carrying three of them. Earlier that night,

mortuary services personnel and volunteers had loaded these caskets onto the trailers

and had secured in place each of the flags,aand members of the Tlst Rescue

Squadron had placed their unit's patch on the five transfer cases of their comrades.5

Now, around I : 15, the operators positioned the train of pallet trailers near the nose of

the great transport aircraft. At the suggestion of Maj. Gen. Kurt B. Anderson, com151
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Khobar Towers: Tragedy I and Response

mander of the Joint Task Force Southwest Asia, public affairs personnel taped the ceremony, which was telecast byAmerican news agencies during the following days.6

ChaplainAleson came to the podium and spoke briefly, reading verses of scripture he had selected, and Chief Master Sergeant A1.res also delivered a few short

remarks. It was about l:20 a.m. when Brig. Gen. Terry Schwalier stepped forwar{

addressed the group, and led it in a long, final salute of their comrades.T

Then the fint of nineteen parties, each made up of six pall bearers, approached

the lead trailer and the first of the nineteen flag-draped caskets.8 The units that had

been stricken by the bombing contributed volunteers to these groups, and Maj.

Robert E. (Rob) Taylor, the wing's services squadron commandeq had instructed

them in the procedures for the ceremony. One party after another reverently took one

of the nineteen transfer cases from its flightline vehicle and slowly carried it up the

ramp into the C-5A. At about 1:40 a.m., the last pall bearer group brought the final

case into the hansport.e

Chaplain Aleson later recalled a poignant episode that occurred during the

memorial service. While the ceremony was taking place, he related, "around the nose

oftheC-5A,onthetarmac...in[the] darkness,...acoupleofhundredyardsaway

was.. . the weekly rotator that had landed. And the people fof the 2TthFighter

Squadron, from Langley Air Force Base, Virginia] were just getting offthat; they

were later than normal." Chaplain Aleson was struck by the timing of their debarking:

"So this is the scene that was greeting them, as the newcomers into the AOR, the area

of responsibility, anived. You can imagine what was going through their minds."1o

General Schwalier recalled the same episode. 'As they taxied in," he said, '1hey

saw the wing in formation by the C 5, knowing what had taken place, knowing what

was going on. It made an impression on the arriving airmen," as well as those participating in the service. After the departure ceremony, the wing commander made a

point of meeting this incoming rotator and addressing its passengers.rl

General Schwalier characterized the ceremony as extremely emotional and very

well done.12 General Anderson also spoke highly of the way in which the memorial

service was conducted. Lt. Col. Thomas H. Shafer, commander of the deployed Tlst

Rescue Squadron, pointed out that, although by the time this ceremony was held only

a few members of his unit remained in Dhahan, the event was very meaningful for

those who were stlllthere. He also believed that this service helped the maintenance

airmen who had been on the military flightline at the time of the bombing feel connected to what had happened at the Khobar Towers. One young airman from another

unit doubtless spoke for many of his comrades: "We needed to say goodbye in our

o\,\n way, and heal . . . . They are your fellow servicemen; they deserve that respect."l3

An officer from the 58th Fighter Squadron and one from the Tlst Rescue

Squadron served as escorts for the flight to the Dover Port Mortuary. The second of

these representatives was one of the rescue squadron's pilots, Capt. Michael D.

Morelock. Minutes before the bombing, a security policeman had wamed him and

his roomate, Capt. Matthew Winkleq to leave their room on the top floor of Building

I 3 I . Both had been wounded in the blast, Captain Winkler the more seriously of the

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Three Departures from Dhahran

two. Captain Morelock had taken a wild ambulance ride to the Arabian American Oil

Company Hospital, had been treated there, and retumed to the Khobar Towers by bus

with Lieutenant Colonel Shafer the morning of the twenty-sixth.1a

Captain Morelock later recounted that, during that Wednesday aftemoon, he was

asked to perform the escort assignment by a lieutenant colonel or colonel unknown to

him. He recognized the honor of performing this duty and readily accepted it, but he

was troubled by some of his immediate circumstances: he was still wearing the

scrubs of the ARAMCO Hospital and needed a flightsuit or a desert camouflage uniform. "I didn't have any [travel] orders," he later recalled. "I had an ID card, because

I had gone back [into my bedroom] for that. So it was just me and an ID card."ls

A medical technician loaned Captain Morelock his flightsuit. The pilot found

that it was a size too small, but was happy to have it. As for his lack of travel orders,

Morelock related: "I was concerned about what was going to happen u4ren I arrived.

They said don't worry about it, you'll be taken care of when you get out there."r6

The ceremony plannen originally had hoped that the remains of the deceased

would depart Saudi Arabia at midnight of the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh.

Members of the unit's operations group had been in communication with Air

Mobilif Command working to locate an aircraft and pilot to accomodate that departure time. AMC officers identified a KC-10A Extender, which performed as both a

transport and tanker, but it developed that the pilot who was bringing this airplane to

King Abdul Azlzwas not qualified to perform air refueling, required by any flight

from Dhahran to DoverAir Force Base. The Air Mobility Command planners then

looked for a pilot who could fly the C 5.{ that was at hand. They found one at al

Dhafra Air Base, the United Arab Emirates, and dispatched a C l4l Starlifter to

bring him to Dhahran. Adopting this alternative postponed the departure from midnight until about 3 a.m. June 27 .tj

"Once we lifted off" Captain Morelock said, "I slept. That was the first time I

had slept, the whole time [since the bombing] . . . . Once I got on the airplane, it

caught up with me."18

The C-5A climbed into tkre early moming sky over Saudi Arabia. The aircraft

would refuel once during its nonstop flight to the United States; its estimated time of

arrival at Dover Air Force Base was I I : I 5 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time.le The remains

of the nineteen deceased airmen had left Dhahan.

During the evening of that same Thursday, June 27,the wounded airmen also

began leaving Saudi Arabia. At 7:30 that moming, Lt. Col. (Dr.) Douglas J. Robb,

interim commander of the wing's medical group, met with representatives of the

44lfthAeromedical Evacuation Flight; the 39th Medical Group Flying Ambulance

Surgical Team (FAST team), which had arrived from Incirlik Air Base, Tirkey, at

about 4:30 p.m. the previous aftemoon; the S6thAeromedical Evacuation Squadrorl

which had come {iom RamsteinAir Base, Germany, shortly after 10 p.m. the night
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

before; and the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center stress management team, which

had arrived on the same C-141 as the 86thAES.20

During this meeting on Thursday morning, these care providers reviewed how

the patients would be discharged from the Dhahran hospitals and how the FAST team

and others would transport them to the Aeromedical Staging Facility that had been

established in the Greater USMTM Transportation Service ('GUTS') hangar on the

Dhahran Air Base flightline. The great majorif of the hospitalized airmen were at

three facilities: the Ministry of Defense andAviation (MODA) Hospital, King Fahd

University Hospital, and the ARAMCO Hospital. One of the 4404th Medical

Group's ambulances, a fleet of MODA ambulances, and one of the hospital's

minibuses would transport the patients fiom that facility to the ASE Two medical

group ambulances and a King Fahd University arnbulance bus would bring the airmen from that hospital to the flightline. In the case ofARAMCO, its own vehicles

would fill the role. A General Motors Suburban belonging to the medical group was

assigned to a fourth hospital, Mohammed al Dosha.2r

Following this meeting, around 8 a.m., the medical care providers made the

rounds of the Dhahran hospitals and began preparing for the discharge of some of the

patients and for their medical evacuation.z2 The medical group's information that

morning was that sixty-six airmen remained at these local facilities.23 Five of these

patients were in seriously rnjured condition, and two were very seriously injured.2a

Subtracting these seven, there were fifty-nine airmen who were candidates for

aeromedical evacuation. The care providers selected as oneAirForce doctor stated, a

mixhre of lesser injured anrbulatory patients and a few of the "moderately injured"

for the first flight from Dhahran (of an eventual four flights).25 One NCO later

recalled how he leamed that he would soon be leaving Saudi Arabia. That Thursday

moming, two senior officers came into his room at King Fahd Universiq/ Hospital

and chatted with him. "They were going to pull us [patients] back to the main

hangar," he related, for flights to the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center.26

Six members of the Landstuhl stress management team accompanied the medical professionals when they made these rounds, two of them (an officer and an

enlisted member) going to each of the three hospitals that held nearly all the remaining patients. Army Lt. Col. Bruce E. Crow, the officer in charge of the group,

described how its members interacted with the airmen who were about to be discharged. They asked informal questions, he said, such as "'What do you need?'

'Does your family know youte here? '. . . From the more psychological point of view

[they asked], 'How are you doing?' and just addressed whatever needs they co,tldi'21

Army Lt. Col. Sherry Connoq another member of the Landstuhl team, commented

along the same lines. They went to the hospitals, she reflected, "to provide some crisis intervention and get a better understanding of what was going on, to help assess

the patients."28

Lieutenant Colonel Connor accompanied Dr. Doug Robb and others to the King

Fahd UniversiS' Hospital. The medical gfoup commandeq she recalled months later,

"wnazedme. He hadnl had any sleep for two days, but he was still going, and still

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Three DePartures from Dhahran

sharp." Colonel Connor remembered in particular that, after meeting with a hospital

director, Dr. Robb fielded questions from journalists of the Cable News Network. "I

was sitting next to him when they interviewed him;' she related, "and I was just

amazed at how well he di4 with what little sleep" he had been able to get.2e

The medical professionals and debriefers set out for the hospitals around 8 a.m.

By then the members of the 4410thAEf; of the advanced cadre of the 86thAES, of

the FAST team, and those of the stress management team who had not gone to the

three Dhahran facilities had assembled at the ASF hangar. There they made the final

arrangements for receiving the airmen from the hospitals. The caregivers'plans for

ordering food offered a good example of their thorough preparations. This was no

time for a shortage of meals, and they arranged to have enough of them for sixty people delivered to the GUTS hangar. These five dozen servings represented one more

than the total number of patients to be medevaced eventually-and far more than

were needed immediately for the patients who would depart on the first two flights.3O

It was also around 8 a.m. that four members of the stress management team met

with Lt. Col. Douglas R. Cochran, commander of the 58th Fighter Squadron, and

some of the unit's medical personnel.3r Alerted by General Schwalier that the

Dhahran veterans ofthe squadron would be departing thatThursday, Lieutenant

Colonel Crow had sent this quartet Iiom their KhobarTowers billeting to the military

flightline, half an hour earlier.32 The Landstqhl group already knew, from General

Schwalier's discussion with their team chief, that they would not have much time to

interact with the officers and airmen of the 58th before the unitb personnel retumed

to Florida. After they arrived at the AMC terminal, they saw that it was not an appropriate setting for their stress management debriefings. Given the rough setting and

the limited time, they recommended to Colonel Cochran that the 58th receive formal

debriefings after it returned to its home base. A member of the stress management

team telephoned the Eglin base psychiatrist and advised him of the circumstances.33

With the preparations at the ASF complete , at9 a.m. the Air Force care providers

notified the doctors at the MODA Hospital, and later at the other facilities, that the

patients u'ho had been identified for the first aeromedivac flight should be ready by

1l:30 that morning. Earlier, when the Americans had begun discussing with the

Saudis the discharge and evacuation of the Dhahfan patients, the host-nation physicians were impressed that the Air Force caregivers would be able to move the injured

airmen so soon. The aeromedical evacuation capabilities of the United States, or

American "care in the ai{'had advanced to a point beyond the assumptions of the

local doctors. The Saudis, Dr. Robb later reflected, "probably found it hard to believe

we had aircraft with capabilities for advanced cardiac life support, suction, ventilators, all the cardiac equipment you would need, and the critical care nurses.

And . . . the physicians you've been working with are the ones that are going to back"

to Landstuhl with the patients.3a

Dr. Robb understood the initial reaction ofthe Saudi physicians and he had invited them to tour the aeromedical evacuation C-141s that would transport the airmen

to Europe. "They were arnazedl'he found, "at the capabilities we had." Like Dr.
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Robb, Col. (Dr.) Dan L. Locker, the United States Air Forces in Europeb surgeon

general, noted that the Saudis were impressed with the USAF3 medical capabilities,

particularly the level of care that could be given to airbome patients. Dr. Locker

described the intellectual exchange that took place between the medical professionals

of the two nations: the Saudis leamed about the advanced medevac facilities and procedures ofthe united States Air Force, while the Americans gained from the Dhahran

doctors detailed information about the status of the patients.3s

In addition to the Saudis' lack of experience with the capabilities of American

"care in rhe uri the strong professional "invesfinenf in the airmen they had aided

shaped their first reaction to the prompt discharge of the Air Force patients. They had

provided theAmericans, as Dr. Robb was prompt to say, compassionate and skillful

care. Then, much sooner than the Saudi physicians expected, they were told that these

patients would be leaving their hospitals. "Remember," Dr. Robb pointed out, "these

weren't 4404th Medical Group patients. These were MODA's patients; ARAMCO

patients; [King Fahd] University Hospital's patients."36

Recognizing the professional invesfinent that the Saudis had in the injured airmen, Dr. Robb fint invited the Dhahran care givers to tour the medevac C l4l s, and

later asked them also to help load the patients onto these aircraft. The local professionals expressed their appreciation at being given this opportunity to participate in

the medical evacuation. "It brought closure to them," Dr. Robb observed, "because

they had become part" of the successful response to a terrible tragedy.3T

At about 12:30 p.m. that Thursday, the FAST team began bringing the first

patients to the ASE38 The Landshrhl team mernbers who had gone to the hospitals

that morning remained there, and they and other care givers also helped hansport the

airmen to the flightline. once there, they remained at the GUTS h*g*, interacting

with the patients while they waited to board their c-l4l and making themselves

available to the medical professionals, as well. "We talked to [the airmen]," Colonel

connor recalled, 'lvho were coming around and waiting. we just basically tried to be

there to listen, to be supportive."3e

When the C l4l made its return flight to Germany, carrying the patients to

RamsteinAir Base, the aircraft would not be able to fly at as high an altitude as it had

while inbound to Saudi Arabia. The flightline crews accordingly loaded additional

fuel onto the Starlifter. At the same time, the physicians at the ASF assessed the

patients as they arrived from the three principal Dhahran hospitals and Mohammed

al Dosha, and determined which would travel on the first medevac flisht and which

on the second.ao

Around 4:30 p.m., the FAST team and other care givers began loading the first

patients. Twenty-two airmen boarded the medevac C-141, ten of them ambulatory

twelve on litters.ar Brigadier General Schwalier later described the scene, as the

patients passed through a "gauntlet" of about five hundred well-wishers. "I remember being so impressed," the wing commander stated, "as each nurse would team up

with a casualty, and one at a time they'd come do'*n the gauntlet. . . . They had a

process that they were following that was pretS impressive."a2

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Three DePartures from Dhahran

An augmented (seven-member) aeromedical evacuation crew of the 86thAES

would man this C-141, tail number 40629, during its return trip to Ramstein.43 At

5:35 p.m. this initial AE ftight from Dhahran, mission AMRFZI4O15l79, launched

from the King Abdul Aziz flightline. Dr. Robb used a defense switched network

phone line to place a direct call to Army Col. (Dr.) Ney M. Gore, the acting commander of the Landstuhi hospital alerting him that the first of the Khobar patients

now were airborne for Germany.a

Twenty-one patients, twelve of them ambulatory and nine on litters, boarded the

second AE C-14 l, tail number 60131, mission AMRF 44013 17 9. The after-action

report of the 86th AES related in precise, military prose: "The first flight left at

1735L local time] and the second aI l942L.All casualties were enplaned without

incident.'45

The 86th AES had brought three augmented crews to Dhahran. One had

manned the first medevac flight, and another took responsibility for the second. The

third crew, as one of its mernbers summed up, 'kould stay behind and manage the

follow-on collection of patients for subsequent missions."a6 No airman on either of

the first two AE flights required critical cafe, and the three-member Critical Care

Aeromedical Transport Team that had flown in with the 86th AES also could rernain

in Dhahran. This c-cAIT team would stand available for a third or laterAE fligtr1.+z

The FAST team stayed as well, and would continue to staffthe Khobar Towers

clinic for another four days. "We got our moneyb worth out of the FAST teaml'

observed Capt. Michael Weems of the 44lOthAEE "They were a huge help because

the people here were exhausted."a8

Shortly after 7:40 p.m., the second of the AE C-141s climbed away from the

runway on what the Saudis called King Abdul Aziz Air Base. The first two medevac

aircraft and their patients had left Dhahran.

The 58th Fighter Squadron's farewell to Dhahran became a story of frustration.

The F-15 unitwas scheduledto leave DhahranAirBase at 10:30 a.m. inthe morning

of Thursday, the twenty-seventh.ae A commercial chafier, a Lockheed L-1011

TriStar,50 would carry the squadron's main body, about 150 personnel' back to Eglin

Air Force Base, Florida.5l This civilian transport had arrived during the memorial service on the flightline, bringing to Dhahran the members of the 27thFightet Squadron

ffom Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, who were rotating in behind the 58th. Now it

would rehrm the "Nomads" to Eglin.52

Lieutenant Colonel Cochran, the deployed squadron's commander, and five

other fighter pilots would fly the unit's F-l5s from Dhahan to their Florida home.

Five of these Eagles were "C" models; one was a*D:s3 After the atctaft and the

main body left, twenty-two maintenance personnel would remain in Dhahran.5a

The senior officer of ttre departing main body was Lt. Col. Thomas McCarttry,

the operations officer of the 58th Fighter Squadron, who had been in Lieutenant

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Colonel Cochran's suite at the time of the bombing and who had gone to the moduary to help identify the remains of the deceased. That Thursday moming, after the

squadron had spent more than a day in its "encampment" on the Dhahran military

flightline, the departing members began packing up. A fleet of trucks carried them

and their baggage to the AMC terminal.55

The squadron mernbers settled themselves into the seats of the L-10 I I . The

civilian captain of the commercial airplane, who was well familiar with the religious

prohibition of alcohol in SaudiArabia, came on the intercom and announced that he

would buy drinks for all of the airmen, as soon as they were over Egypt. "There was

a loud, thunderous cheer," Lieutenant Colonel McCarthy remembered "as we took

off" Exhausted by the events of the preceding day and night, nearly all of the 150 or

so passengers soon fell asleep. Among them was TSgt. George Burgess, the young

airman who had helped search Building 131 in the wake of the explosion. "I remember we took ofi and I said, 'Thank you!,"'he recalled. "I was relieved, as soon as I

felt the wheels go up. I though! 'OK,' and I fell asleep." A few minutes later, TSgt.

Mike Goffnoticed that the plane leveled offsooner than he expected.56

After the L-1011 had been airbome for about half an hour, Colonel McCarthy

related the stewardess and captain approached and told him, 'othey've got a problem,

theyle going to have to turn around." There was trouble with one of the airliner's

slats, a difficulty that explained Sergeant Goff's observation: the plane could not

climb above 10,000 feet. colonel Mccarthy continued the story in present tense:

"we tum around and land back at Dhahran. Everybody gives this big cheer because

they think we're at Shannon, Ireland" or, at the least, in Cairo, and I had to tell them,

'No, we're back in Dhahran."' Sergeant Burgess, among the many who had fallen

asleep, remained slurnbering until a stewardess woke him and told him they were

landing. He remembered vMdly how his mood swung from elation to depression: "I

said,'All righl!'And she said, "Wete back. We had to go back.' I said ,Oh, n6.,"57

While the 58th Fighter Squadron's main body made its short, disappointing

flighq Lieutenant colonel cochran remained a busy officer. He knew that as of that

Thursday morning, at least ten members of the unit remained hospitalized in

Dhahran. He and Capt. (Dr.) R. Morris Treadway, Jr., a flight surgeon, set out to

check on these patients. when they retumed to King Abdul Aziz, rhey leamed the

bad news: the L*1011 had a'blown flap" and had been forced to return. There were,

as Dr. Treadway readily saw, "a lot of unhappy faces." Brigadier General Schwalier

met with these Khobar veterans after their unforhrnate return, and characterized their

mood candidly: "I remembertalking to the very emotional and angry and still shellshockedAir Force professionals [of the 58th Fighter Squadron]-I would describe

them in that way."58

At2:30 p.m. that aftemoon, Col. Dale Bible, the commander of the 4409th

operations Group who had come to Dhahran for the wing's change of command ceremony and stayed on to help in the wake of the attaclg received some bad news about

the L-101l. The airliner was "hard broke": its slat problem could not be readily

fixed. Even had it been repairable, no mechanic who was qualified to work on this
Three Departures from Dhahran

commercial plane was available in Saudi Arabia at the time. Fixing the TiiStar was

not an option; a substitute aircraft would have to be found.se

From AMC's perspective, several factors came to bear on this problem. The

command's airlift planners were responsible for maintaining the efficiency of all

transport scheduling, around the globe. C 5s that ordinarily could have been sent to

Dhahran to pick up the stranded airmen were flying other missions at the time.60

The airmen of the 58th Fighter Squadron, and others on the scene in Dhahran,

had a different perspective. "Our sensei' Brigadier General Schwalier said, '\vas that

the AMC bureaucracy would not bend to the needs of the field commandeq in that

situation." The Eglin airmen had ditriculty accepting the contention that there were

missions with a higher priority than their retum home. When it became knovm that

two C-141s would substitute forthe L-1011, Lieutenant Colonel McCarthywas told

that these transports had no comfort pallets. He said flatly: "Believe me, nobody

cares about comfort pallets. at this point."6l

General Schwalier focused his attention that afternoon on the answer rather than

the question. "I didn't care what the problem was with the airplane," he said lateq

'lvhat I cared about was getting those people home." He asked the Wing Operations

Center to tell the AMC schedulers: "We need to get these people home. I don't care if

it's an alert aircraft; get a live aircraft here." The wing officers found that AMC was

'1rnbending." General Schwalier related what happened next "So [Brig. Gen.] Dan

Dick [the incoming commander of the 4404th Composite Wing] got involved. [He]

spent the rest of the aftemoon-taking much too much time, making phone calls to

the [airlift contoollers]-talking at the general officer level."62

There was evidence that, in addition to the generals in the theater, officers even

more senior in rank actively intervened to arrange the transportation for the standed

airmen of the 58th Fighter Squadron. One officer who was in Dhahran Ilnt day lalet

stated: "I guess [AirForce Chief of Staff] General [RonaldR.] Fogleman, alongwith

the generals in southwest Asra made some C-l4Is avqilable to us . .. . The leadership oftheAirForce . . . did some goodwork.'63

The generals and the AMC planners identified two C-141s that would substitute

for the broken commercial airliner. After an aftemoon and evening of frustrating

delay, eighty members of the 58th Fighter Squadron boarded one of these Starlifters,

with the call sign Reach 60140, and sixty-eight others went on the other, call sign

Reach 50269. The first of these fansports left Dhahran at 7:08 p.m. that Thursday

night, the second about twenty minutes later. The two C-141s made a stopover at

Rota Naval Station, Spain, where they were well received. Lieutenant Colonel

McCarthy commented: "They took care of ts great. They opened up the dining hall,

fed us meals, and got us back on the airplane."@

As Colonel Cochran intended the squadron's F-l5s left Dhahran after the main

body. Three of the fighters, using call signs Cube 34, 35, and 36, arrived on Moron

Air Base, Sparl on Friday, June 28, at2:49 p.m. The other three, Cube 31 through

33, landed there about two hours later. At 9 p.m. that night, the six fighten together

launched from the Spanish base for the flight over the Atlantic to Eglin.65

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

The 7l st Rescue Squadron left Saudi Arabia without the frustration encountered

by the 58th Fighter Squadron. The HC-130 unit had begun its departure earlier than

the F-15 one had. By the time of the flightline memorial service, as Lieutenant

Colonel Shafer later pointed out, many members of the rescue squadron already had

left Dhahran Air Base. The unit's situation was not typical. Its personnel usually

served sixty-day rotation tours, rather than the standard ninety,66 and the squadron

itself had been assigrred to Dhahran for more than two years. A special operations

group was scheduled to assume its mission,6T and the members of the 71st had to

"swap out" quickly with the arriving personnel. Because this rescue squadron had

served on Southern Watch so long without being relieved by another unit and

because its people did not serve the standardJength tour, it had no experience with

making a unit-to-unit transition. Nonetheless, as Colonel Shafer stated the circumstances dictated that the best course was to send home as many people as promptly as

possible.68

The bombing had indisputably affected the unit. Five members of the Tlst

Rescue Squadron had been killed and a number of others worurded. Capt. Russell D.

Barile, the pilot who had become the unit's senior officer when Lieutenant Colonel

Shafer was hospitalized, was the only aircraft commander who remained uninjured.

No radio operator had survived the attack; a copilot would have to fill the role.

Colonel Shafer himself was the only remaining navigator, and he had been injwed.

Just two of the squadron's loadmasters, and only one flight engineer, remained uninjured.6e

On Thursday, Jvne 27 , 

the 7l st Rescue Squadron began planning for the departwe of its few remaining members. Its deployed fint sergeant, MSgt. Dwryne Beryr,

scheduled the unit's debriefing sessions with the stress management team that had

arrived the previous night from Landstuhl. When he had finished this task,

Lieutenant Colonel Shafer advised him: "Dwa1ne, we're going to get people out of

here." The deployed squadron commander asked the first sergeant to consult with the

Travel Management Office, and begin making the arrangements for nineteen of the

unit's members to leave Dhahran on that night's rotator flight back to the United

States. Colonel Shafer identified the people who would leave with that group, and the

word of the departwe plans moved quickly through the 7lst. During the twenty-sevent[ Captain Barile later recalled, "They told us, 'Hey, everyoneb going home."'7O

Captain Barile's information proved accurate: everyone in the rescue squadron

was going home, in groups. After the first nineteen left on the twenty- seventh, other

members of the Tlst soon followed them. Some would return to PatrickAir Force

Base on the afternoon of Friday, the twenty-eight\ others on the following evening.

A few squadron members remained in Dhahran a while longeq for the unit still had a

fair amount of adminishative and other tasks to finish. Captain Barile himself and

Master Sergeant Berry, whose work with the first sergeants council kept him busy,

were among those who stayed in the theater a few more days. The last sizeable group,

twelve members of the unit, departed on July 1.71 The Khobar veterans of the 71st

Rescue Squadron and ofthe 58th Fighter Squadron had left Dhahran.

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Chapter Eleven

Honoring and Remembering

At 10:45 a.m. on Thursday, June 27 , 1996, about a half hour ahead of its estimatedtime of arrival, the C-5A Galaxy carrying the remains ofthe nineteen airmen

landed at the Dover Port Morhrary at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware.r At 12:15

p.m., an arrival service, closed to all journalists except those who represented Air

Force News, was conducted on the Dover flightline. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen.

Ronald R. Fogleman, Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Sheila Widnall, Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of StaffGen. John Shalikashvili, the families of the decease4 and about

seven hundred Dover personnel met the C 5A. Instead of delivering a eulogy,

General Fogleman in silence pinned a Purple Heart on, and then saluted, each of the

nineteen flag-draped caskets. From Dover Air Force Base, the remains of the

deceased airmen were transported to funeral homes selected by their families.2

Personnel at the Dover Port Mortuary positively identified eighteen of the nineteen remains. Only one name remained on the list ofunidentified airmen, SrA. Paul

A. Blais.3 However, the doctors and other personnel at the Dover mortuary studied

the forsenics ofthe nineteenth set of remains and determined that they did not match

the medical records ofAirman Blais.a

After this development, Air Force personnel in Dhahan believed it most likely

that the patient who remained in the intensive care unit of King Fahd University

Hospital was SeniorAirman Blais, and the remains at Dover were those of AlC.

Christopher B. Lester. Beginning in the earliest moming hours of Saturday, Jlur.rc29,

at Khobar Towers, and throughout that day, medical and other personnel made continuous efforts to identify positively the ICU patient. Acquaintances ofboth men visited the intensive care ward to try to make an identification. Medical personnel took

blood samples. (It turned out that both airmen had type "A+i ye| another similarity

between them.) They also did footprinting, dental mapping, and fingerptintittg.t

At 5 p.m. Lt. Col. (Dr.) Douglas J. Robb, the interim comrnander of the 4404th

Wing's medical group, accompanied by dental surgeon LL Col. (Dr.) Bruce Lauder

and dental technician SSgt. Rudolph Grimm II, arrived at the King Fahd hospital. Dr.

Lauder and Sergeant Grimm took x-rays of the patient's teeth. At 6:15 the first of

their films were processed, and confirmed the patient's identification. His tooth number thirty-two had been extracted: the identical condition appeared in the dental

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

records of SrA. Paul Blais.6 In the meantime, Dover personnel had matched the medical records ofAlC. Christopher Lester with the last set of remains at the mortuary.

Air Force officials formally expressed regret for "all hardship and pain caused to both

families" by the unfortunate delay in making these identifications.T

Well before the Blais-Lester case had been resolved, aI 12:25 a.m. on Friday,

June 28, the first of the aeromedical evacuation C-l4ls, tail number 40629,had

arrived at RamsteinAir Base, Germany. It was met at the flightline by personnel of

the 86thAeromedical Staging Flight, commanded by Lt. Col. Dawn M. Oerichbauer,

and by four buses that transported the Khobar Towers patients the four miles south to

the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center.8

There were poignant scenes during this trip through the early morning darkness.

At the llont of one of the buses, an Army nrnse stood near the litter of an airman

whose eyes were covered with patches and reassured him during the ride to the hospital. "I remember one ofthe eye patients," she recalled, nine months later. "I held his

hand" the whole way back, and explained to him where we were going, and that he

was okay."e

The secondAE C-l4l,tail number 6013'T,reached Ramstein at l:45 a.m. Capt.

Matthew Winkler, who had been wounded while evacuating Building 131, praised

the Landstulrl stafffor the reception they gave the arriving patients. When the buses

rolled up Kirchberg Hill, passed through Gate 2, and stopped in front of the huge hospital, its personnel 'Vere ready to go-ready to help us," he related. Captain Winkler

continued: "We pulled up in buses, there were rows and rows of wheel chairs, and

rows and rows ofpeople with stretchers, ready to carry people that couldnt walk."lo

One distracting incident occurred during the otherwise smooth arrival. An unattended briefcase, discovered near the hospital enfiance, understandably stirred the

emotions of those nearby. It was soon establishe4 however, that this small piece of

luggage posed no threat: a press team had unintentionally abandoned it.rr

The forty-three patients were promptly admitted to the LRMC, each with a doctor assigned to them. One mrse remembered the quiet tension that prevailed before

the aitmen came onto her floor. Then, "when the first wheelchairs arrived on the

war{' she recalled, "there was an aura of 'Here come our heroes."'12

Across the Atlantic Ocean, hne 2'l had been a busy day at Patrick Air Force

Base, Florida. Col. Thomas R. Friers, the commander ofthe lst Rescue Group-and

others-leamed that their installation's memorial service for the Khobar airmen

would be held on Sunday, the thirtieth. The details of the ceremony began to take

shape on the twenty-seventh, as officials at the White House and officers at

Headquarters USAF provided more information to the local planners at Patrick.13

ThatThursday afternoon the base staffheld a meeting to plan for the memorial

service. Brig. Gen. Robert C. Hinson, the commander of the 45th Space Wing and

Patrickb senior officer, was on leave to attend his sonb wedding, so Col. Patrick J.

Carr, the 45th's vice commander, chaired the session. He advised Colonel Friers that

he would take care of the base support for the memorial service, so that Friers could

continue to look after the people of the 71st Rescue Squadron and others of the res-
Honoring and Remembering

cue group. Colonel Carr "really did' take care of the base, Friers later emphasized.

He also stressed that "the base and the community bent over backwards.Ilwas unbelievablel'14

During the evening ofthe twenty-seventh, Patrick's Wellness Center sponsored a

dinner and a seminar to help the base begin its healing process. A psychiatrist, a

pyschologis! and base chapel and Red Cross personnel participated in this evening

program. They "did a super job," Colonel Friers conclude4 for the "7lst Squadron

family" and lor others on the base.l5

On the following day, Friday, June 28, Colonel Friers and Lt. Col. Donald R.

Jozayt, commander of the 71st Rescue Squadron, held a midmorning news conference, which the local television and radio stations carried "livel'Colonel Friers gave

the press an overview briefing, describing the role that Patrick's 71st Rescue

Squadron played in Dhahmn, the number of people it typically had stationed there,

and what was then knovm about the situation. Lieutenant Colonel Jozalt answered a

number of questions flom the reporters. The officers were able to announce that

Patrick's fint retuming airmen would arrive that afternoon.16

Roughly four hundred miles to the northwest, at EglinAir Force Base, the twenty-seventh was an equally busy day. The 33d Fighter Wing's day{o-day flying operations were canceled, allowing personnel to concentrate on the Khobar recovery. The

unit's commandeq Col. Gary R. Dylewski, later reflected: "It was a busy time, but not

unmanageable-thanks to the great help we got from everybody at Eglin."17

Twenty or more people continued on duql in the Eglin battle staff, around the

clock. The base remained tightly focused on helping its families. When any specific

issue arose, Lt. Col. Stan Hill, the battle staff's directoq explained, "Team Eglin'

addressed it by answering what was always the fundamental question: "What is right

for these families?"l8

Eglin's personnel kept up with their work, and they met a stem pace to do it. "We

were answering 2,000 phone calls a dayl'Capt. Brenda Campbell, the 33d Fighter

Wng's public affairs officer, stated. "We had a stack, three inches thick, of news

queries." Captain Campbell praised the help she received from other agencies. [n the

immediate wake of the bombing, public affairs officers----upeienced ptfrlic affairs

officers-had come to her assistance from the Air Force Development Test Center on

Main Base Eglin and fiom nearby Hurlburt Field. Over the following days, others

arrived-from Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida; WrighfPatterson Air Force Base,

Ohio; and Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. Eventually, twenty-five PA officers

mobilized at the modest office of the 33d Fighter Wing.'e

Back in Dhahran, a third of the way around the world, there was no stronger evidence of the continuing recovery than the 4404th Composite Wing's remarkably

prompt retum to flying its missions. OnThursday, Jtne2T,the C l30s of the rescue

squadron rehrrned to the air; and the following afternoon, the F-l6s were back on

their Operation Southem Watch patrols. Normal flight operations resumed on the

twenty-ninth. Dr. Robb expressed admiration for the air and flightline crews: "It was

almost like we didn't miss a beat. We started flvine missions as soon as we could."2O

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The airmen knew that their deceased comrades would want them to resume the

Southern Watch mission as quickly as possible. Getting Air Force planes back into

the sky was one way of paying tribute to the airmen who had given their lives.

Another was the formal memorial service that the 4404th Composite Wing held at

10:30 a.m. on Friday, June 28.21

The wing planned and organized this service within just twenty-four hours. Lt.

Col. (Chaplain) Dennis E. Aleson, the senior chaplain in Dhahran at the time of the

bombing, pointed out "We had a lot ofpeople doing a lot of different things to make

this happen. And it happened with class." He then offered a reminder about the condition of the wing's personnel on that Thursday and Friday: "We're talking about people who at this stage were operating on almost nothing but adrenaline."22

ChaplainAlesonb description applied to himself as well as hundreds of others.

Like so many around him, from the time of the explosion just before 10 p.m. on

Tuesday, he had continued to fi.mction on very liule sleep. Late Thursday night, he

had "hit a wall" and been forced to take a few hours nap. By 4 a.m. Friday, he was

rested enough that he could begin working on the opening statement and meditation

that he would give during the memorial service later that morning. Aleson's work was

disrupted when, because of a false bomb threat, the security police cleared his building. Finally he outlined his meditation on three small pieces of paper. He later

recalled thinking at that time: "OI! Lord, it's up toYou. This is going to happen."23

Others also worked hard that morning of the twenf-eighth to prepare for the

ceremony. Airmen of the services squadron turned the Air Mobility Command passenger terminal into an appropriate setting for a memorial service. They hung white

cloth backdrops and brought in nineteen flower arrangements, one for each of the

deceased. Personnel from the communications squadron set up a sound system.

Chain were brought in ffom another terminal, enough to seat more than 400 people.

An order of service, titled "Honoring and Remembering," was prepared.2a

Unlike the memorial service held during the ear$ monring hours ofWednesday,

which had been closed to the press, this one was opened to the news media. The

Cable News Network and other national networks televised parls of the ceremony.

"There were TV calneras all over the place," Chaplain Aleson remarked.25

The service beganat 10:30 a.m., with ChaplainAleson giving a short statement

of purpose. Maj. (Chaplain) John Kovalcin delivered the opening prayer. It closed

with: "Give us more courage to persevere in our mission. And Almighty Father,

embrace us to ease our pain-wipe away our fears and mend our hearts in Your

name, Lord, we pray."26 The congregation of several hundred people sang the hymn

"Faith of Our Fathers," and Father Kovalcin then read Psalm 90 and Psalm 23.27

Three senior officen-Brig. Gen. Terry Schwalier, the wing commander; Col.

Scott Gration, commander of the wing's operations group; and Lt. CoL Thomas H.

Shafer, commander of the deployed Tlst Rescue Squadron-then offered some personal reflections. "This memorial service is not about nineteen anon).rnous people,"

Lieutenant Colonel Shafer stated. "These were my friends. Captain [Christopher J.]

Adams was also my room mate." The blast had struck as Colonel Shafer had been

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Honoring and Remembering

returning to his bedroom for a pair ofshoes. His feet had been cut, and he had been

left dazed and surrounded by broken glass and other debris. Someone had found a

pair of boots for him: they were the ones that had belonged to Capt. Chris Adams. In

his remarks during the memorial service, Colonel Shafer said of these boots: "I still

am wearing them. I can't take them off. I don't really want to.'48

Chaplain Aleson later reflected on Colonel Shafer's presentation: 'No one had

the attention of the people more than he did. . . . It was very emotional." Chaplain

Aleson also pointed to a remarkable coincidence that occurred in the order of service.

He had chosen the poetic lines of Isaiah 40:31 to filI what would have been a blank

space on the lower righthand side ofthe program. Colonel Shafer, without consulting

him, had selected exactly the same Scripture for the text of his ovrn remarks: "Those

who hope in the Lord will renew their strength. They will soar on wings like eagles;

they will run and not gro'w weary, they will walk and not b e faintlze

Following the personal reflections, Chaplain Aleson gave a meditation and the

congregation sang "Lord, Guard and Guide the Men Who Fly." This hymn ended

with the lines: 'Aloft in solitudes of space, Uphold them withYour saving grace. O

God protect all those who fly, And all who work and serve nearby." Capt. (Father)

Thomas Angelo offered the closing prayer.3O

This memorial service formed an important part of the healing process that was

just beginning in Dhahran. Brigadier General Schwalier praised those who had contributed to it and commented that it was "done supertly." U.S. Army Gen. J. H.

Binford Peay III, commander of United States Central Command, and Maj. Gen.

Kurt B. Anderson, commander of Joint Thsk Force Southwest Asia, also spoke highly of the service. Chaplain Aleson commented on its value to the airmen in Saudi

Arabia: it 'helped us tum beyond our present moment to the future."ll

In Germany, on the Friday of the memorial service in Dhahran, the wounded airmen of the 4404th spent the day in their beds at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center.

They received excellent care, delivered by a one-to-one physicianto-airman ratio.

"We decided fairly early on," Army Col. (Dr.) Edward B. Freyfogle recalled 'that

every patient would have an attending doctor," and added that the number ofpatients

made that policy possible. "The attending doctor would be in charge of that patient

to include lining up every single consultation, until some other service or doctor had

agreed to accept that patient, under his or her personal service." The airmen commented favorably on the care they received at Landstuhl.32 Capt. Matt Winkler

praised the LRMC staff's "excellent, excellent job . . . . They did a super job." For

SSgl. Eric D. Ziegler, rvho had been testing his alarm clock when the blast struck

Building l3 l, the highlights of his LRMC stay were simply the chance to rest and to

take a shower his first since the twenty-fifth of June.33

Nearly all of the aimen who had arrived at Landstuhl during the early hours of

Friday, the twenty-eighth, left the hospital for the United States on the moming of the

next day, SatLrday, the twenf-ninth.34 The hospital originally planned to discharge

the Khobar airmen on Sunday, June 30, but this was advanced a day, primarily to

allow the patients who were well enough to make a trans-Atlantic flight to retum to

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

the States for the memorial services that would be held that weekend.35 "We got them

evaluated," Dr. Freyfogle summed up, "and then, all of a suddeq they were out of

here." The patients'charts had be photocopied and much other administrative work

done-luickly to meet the new discharge date. But the impetus for an early retum

home became compelling, once it was known that President Bill Clinton would be

attending the memorial services. "The president wanted you home," Captain Winkler

said. "Everybody wanted you home."36

On the aftemoon of June 28, as Colonel Friers had announced at that momingb

press conference, Patrick greeted its initial retumees. The first airmen of the 71st

Rescue Squadron to leave Dhahran were the nineteen who had deparled on the twenty-seventh. A "rofatot''from the theaterbrought this group, largely maintenance personnel, into Atlanta's Hartsfield International Airport. Colonel Friers praised the

cooperation from the locals there: "Everybody bent over backward for us."37

Colonel Friers felt shongly that the Khobar veterans should retum to their home

base on an HC-130 Combat Shadow, the aircraft they flew for their country. "It was

really neat to put them on [their] own unit airplane," he said, "and let them land on the

runwaytheyhad departed ftom."An airman who returned with a later group that also

was met by an HC-130 and by personnel of the Tlst Rescue Squadron was pleased

to see the familiar aircraft, and the familiar faces. "That was very nice," he commented. "That was touching, to me."38

The HC-130 carried these Air Force members back to their Florida home station that Friday aftemoon, where a very large and enthusiastic crowd awaited them.

Base personnel had learned from airmen in the theater the names of the passengers

on this first rehrrning aircraft, on the one following it, and, a day lateq on a C-9

Nightingale that would transport the wounded Patrick airmen from Landstuhl. A

thorough telephone and door-to-door effort informed the families of the Khobar veterans ofthe identities of these passengers andthe arrival times of the three aircraft. In

addition, as Lt. Col. Donald R. Jozayt,the commander of the 71st Rescue Squadron,

pointed out, "everybody who was at worK'that Friday "came out to meet the airplanes. It was preffy uplifting.'8e

It was a sunny Friday aftemoon on Florida's "Space Coasf' when the HC 130

taxied up to the waiting crowd at Patrick. The second aircraft followed it closely, and

an enornous gathering of people cheered the two aircraft. The members of the

crowd, most ofthem women and children, wore colorfirl summer clothing and waved

smallAmerican flags as the planes taxied in.a0

A jubilant welcoming met the retuming airmen, who soon were offthe atrcraft

and hugging and kissing their families. Colonel Friers recalled the scene on Patrick's

ramp: 'fthe people out there with flags, it was great." A young airman said later, with

considerable feeling, that he was impressed by the large size of the crowd and the outpouring of emotion: "It put a tear in my eye. I didn't expect that. News people, everything like that. I didn't expectthatmuch!4l

David Wittman, Bob Grover, and other reporters from Brevard County's

Channel 2 News, and other local iournalists covered the retum of the Patrick airmen.
Honoring and Remembering

Among the early retumees, Capt. BenWalsh spoke to the press soon after leaving the

HC-130. First Lt. Stephanie Bronson, a civil engineer, was an officer from Patrick

who, '*4ren these first two aircraft arrived at her home base, was still in Dhahmn. She

had been treated for the glass cuts in her feet at the ArabianAmerican Oil Company

(ARAMCO) Hospital and the staffthere had made a telephone available to her, but

she had not been able to reach her husban4 Donald Bronson. As of that aftemoon,

Friday, the twenty-eighth, while other families were being reunited on the Patrick

flightline, her spouse still had not heard from her. Donald Bronson gave television

reporters an interview flom the couple's quarters in South Patrick's housing, which a

local station ran under the trailing title "Waiting forWord." Lieutenant Bronson eventually got through to her husband on a phone line, continued her work with the 45th

Civil Engineering Squadron that helped the recovery at the KhobarTowers, and left

SaudiArabia for the United States on September 19.42

The press continued to report on events at Patrick, and a second happy arrival

occurred on the following evening, when another group ofthe Tlst Rescue Squadron

retumed to Patrick. This time a rotator from the theater flew to Philadelphia

Intemational Airport. Once again, the local cooperation was strong: when the military aircraft approached, the airfield manager immediately gave it permission to land.

Again, as inAtlanta, the Khobar veterans went directb onto an HC-l30, which took

them to their homecoming at Patrick.a3

On that Saturday evening, the C 9 carrying the patients from Landstuhl arrived

at Patrick at about the same time as the Combat Shadow. Among these returnees,

who deplaned wearing "Ramstein Air Base" T:shirts, was stretcher-bome Capt.

Thomas E Edman, a resident of the seventh floor of Building 131 who had been

severely wounded and treated at King Fahd University Hospital.a A child held a sign

declaring "Welcome Home Matt," when Capt. Matthew Winkler, Captain Edman's

suitemate, left the C-9. His wife, Kim Winkle! gave an interview to local reporters,

as did MSgt. William E Sine, one of the pararescue jumpers who had done such good

work in the wake of the bornbing.a5

Lt. Col. Thomas H. Shafer, commander of the deployed 71st Rescue Squadrorq

and another eleven members of the unit returned to the States a few days after their

comrades. They left Dhahran on July l, and spent twenty-four hours in Frankfort,

Germany. On July 3, aDeltaAirlines flight brought them into AtlantaS Hartsfield

Intemational Airport where, like the others, they were met by an HC 130 that carried

them to their home base. These arrivals were joyous occasions, but there remained

the inescapable fact that five of the airmen, as one officer ofthe 71st poignantly stated rerurned to Dover rather than Patrick.a6

The same was, of course, equally true at Eglin. The Khobar veterans returned

there primarily in three groups: the main body ofthe 58th Fighter Squadron, the officers who flew the squadronb F-15s back to the base, and the wounded who returned

on a medevac aircraft. Just as at Patrick, a joyous homecoming awaited the main

body of the squadron when it reached Eglin at about I p.m. on Friday, the twentyeighth. A large crowd dressed in comfortable sunmer attire stood along the runway

167
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

in the 33d FighterWing's area of the base. Many of the women and children carried

American flags and a few held clumps of red, white, and blue balloons. When two

C 5s taxied up, a young child asked, "Where's he going to stop?" A mother

answered: "Right here. Right here, honey, right here in front." The two huge transports rolled to a stop. The crowd members raised their national flags high, and the

engines of the big planes stirred the air and set these hand-held banners fluttering.aT

The crowd rivetted its attention on the aircraft that parked to their right. Its door

opened and a man in a desert battle dress uniform came down the short exit ladder.

He was followed immediately by another, and another, and anotheq each ducking his

head dov,n under the door and making the brief steps dorvn to the tarmac. A reception

line awaited the deplaning airmen. Among its members were Maj. Gen. Stewart E.

Cranston, commander of the Air Force Development Test Center; Col. Gary R.

Dylewski, commander of the 33d Fighter Wing; and Col. David A. Deptula, commander of the 33d Operations Group. These officers gave each ofthe aniving airmen

a quick salute, a long handshake, and sometimes a {iiendly slap on the shoulder.a8

The crowd of friends, children, and wives, some carrying flowers with yellow

ribbons, rolled forward to greet the returnees. "It's good to be backl," a young airman

called into a nearby video camera. A scene of hugging, kissing, and crying followed

and then several of the Dhahran veterans began'to walk offthe flightline, carrying

their infant children.ae

"I was glad to touch down, I'll tell yonl'said TSgt. George Burgess, who had

helped search Building l3l in the wake of the bornbing. An officer offered his perspective on the reception: .We made it back to a real good welcome.. . .

Everybody's concern was with two things: the families, and the concern with the people who were not with them, either because they were deceased or injured." Capt.

(Dr.) R. Morris Treadway, a flight surgeon who had resided in Buildingl2T ,was a little surprised by the size of the turnout at Eglin and by the amount of press attention.

"We dont realize how big a deal something like this is," he reflected. "We get caught

up tn doing ourjobs . . . . Here we were, at the center of world events."so

Anticipating that the press would take an intense interest in the retuming aimen,

public affairs officers had designated an area nearthe edge of the flightline where the

Khobar veterans who wanted to meet with the joumalists could do so. At the same

time, those who wanted to be reunited with their families, avoid the media representatives, and go to the privacy of their homes were equally able to do so. No doubt

many of the retuming airmen agreed with one of their comrades who praised this

arrangement. "It was good," he said, "the way they had it set up. lt wasn't like the

media could come out and greet you, which I was thankful for. . . . If you wanted to

talk to the media, you could. The rest of [the retumees could] just funnel off"sl

The first airman who entered the press area was met with the obvious request:

"Tell us what happened."As he began to reply to this question, a second of the Eglin

retumees, SSgt. John C. Orlando, took up a position a bit futher down the flightline

and also starled talking to the joumalists. Sergeant Orlando said, among other things,

that while he was happy to see his wife and son, he felt grief for the families whose
Ilonoring and Remembering

loved ones were not retuming. Soon a third airman, and then others, joined in the discussion with the press. Capt. Brenda Campbell, the 33d Fighter Wing's public affairs

officer, later expressed pride in the Dhahran veterans who met with the journalists.

"There were a couple [of them]," she said, "who were just brilliant. I mean, young

guys standing up there telling it like it was. They were just fantastic."52

There was another dramatic retum to Eglin, when, at 1:55 p.m. on Saturday,

June 29, six F l5s (five "C" models and one "D") appeared in the strrnmer sky over

the northern Florida base. The fighters had left Dhahran the previous day and flew to

their home station by way of MoronAir Base, Spain. Two of the six Eagles flew off

to the side, and as the main body of four neared the Eglin flightline, one aircraft

pulled offto create a "Missing Man" formation. Lt. Col. Douglas R. Cochran, commander of the deployed 58th Fighter Squadron, taxied his fighter into the parking

space farthest to the left of the awaiting crowd. He was greeted first by his wife, rvho

wore a "broken wings" pin on her shirt, and two children, and then by Major General

Cranston and Col. David Hayes, the vice commander of the 33d FighterWing. The

other five pilots parked and soon were out of theirjets as well.sl

Not long after these six F 15s had returned home, a medevac C-141, tail number 60137, anivedbehindthem. Nearwhere this aircrafttaxied in, General Cranston,

his wife Peggy Cranston, and Colonel Dylewski formed a reception line to greet

Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Sheila Widnall and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen.

Ronald R. Fogleman and their spouses, Mr. William S. Widnall and Mrs. Fogleman,

always addressed as Miss Jane Fogleman. Ambulances and medical buses stood

nearby, as the C-l4l rolled to a stop. Generals Fogleman and Cranston boarded the

aircraft and spoke to the patients on their bunks, welcoming them home.sa

The ambulatory wounded exited the C-141, wearing Tshirts they had received

at Landstuhl: white ones, with the Air Force emblem in black at their center,

"Ramstein" above this s1'rnbol and "Germany" below. As at Patrick, the crowd waited patiently and then a joyous scene followed. SrA. Michael J. Dolinar, Jr., who had

left Building 13 I with TSgt. George Burgess and had been treated at the Ministry of

Defense and Aviation Hospital, was carried fiom the aircraft on a litter; six of his

friends crowded around him. An anxious young wonum climbed into an ambulance

that carried a wounded airman, her boyfriend. The C-141's crevnnembers said that

the patients had been both "solemn" and "cheery" dunng the flight home.ss

After greeting the returning wounded, General Fogleman, Secretary Widnall,

and their spouses also visited the "People Place," which was not far from the 33d

Fighter Wing's taxiline. This center already had helped start the heahng process at

Eglin, and it would continue to supporl the grieving base during the days ahead.

Linda Brown, its manager, later praised the dignitaries for their time spent at the

People Place, in a few heartfelt words: "That was valuable."s6

At l1 a.m. on the following moming, Sunday, June 30, a memorial seryice was

held in Eglin's Hangar 130, commonly known as King Hangar. It stood north of the

Eglin Parkway, a main avenue divided to run one way in each direction. King Hangar

was located on the base's flightline between the shopette and Building l.s7

r69
t

I

Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Large as King Hangar was, that Sunday morning a congregation of about 4,500

overflowed its capaci[u. An enormous American flag hung from an overhead crane,

usually used to lift aircraft parts.58 Twelve wreaths, one for each of the deceased airmen from Eglin, stood in front of the congregation. Eleven survivors of the bombing

were in the front row. Some had walked to the ceremony, some had come in wheelchain, and some had been wheeled in on hospital beds.5e Members of the families of

the deceased also sat in the front row.60

General Cranston escofted President Bill Clinton to his seat.6r The chief executive's visit to Eglin had been well planned, and a number of officers praised the

advance work done by the White House. One complimented in particular the professionalism of the president's stafi another that of the White House press corps.62

The Eglin memorial service began with Col. (Chaplain) LaVeme L. Schuelleq

who would later survive the September 71,2001, terrorist attack on the Pentagon,

giving the welcoming remarks. Lt. Col. (Chaplain) Ray W Hinsch, who had headed

Eglin's family-notification teams, delivered the invocation. The congregation sang

two verses of "America the Beautiful," and Chaplain Hinsch read Psalm 91. Mrs.

Kathryn Rash sang "On Eagle's Wings," and Chaplain Schueller read from the

Gospel ofJohn.63

Then Colonel Dylewski came to the podium. He began his remarks by reminding the congregation that "Freedom involves risk. As proud members of the 33d

Fighter Wing, we bear the burden of that risk each time we set foot on foreign soil or

launch missions into the dark of night." The deaths of the Eglin airmen, Colonel

Dylewski stated, "may cause us to ask many questions, but of one thing I am certain:

If they could speak to us today, they would tell us to press on. And press on, we

will."6a

Following Colonel Dylewski's remarks, President Clinton walked up the bluecarpeted steps to the podium. He wore a dark suit, white shifi, and a black tie with a

muted white pattern. After acknowledging the many civilian and military dignitaries

present, the president turned to the heart of his remarks: "To those brave servicemen

who were injured, we thank God for your presence here today. To the families of the

twelve men who we honor today who died in the service of our nation, these men represented the best ofAmerica, and they gave America their best."6s

"There is a passage in Isaiah," President Clinton reminded the congregation, "in

which God wonders, 'Whom shall I send and who will go for us?'Isaiah answers:

'Here am I, Lord. Send me."'The president continued: "These men we honor today

said to America, 'Send me."'

Near the close of his remarks, President Clinton listed the names of the twelve

deceased airmen from Eglin. Refening to the nickname of the 33d FighterWing, the

commander in chief said: "Our Nomads have ceased their wandering. They have

come home."66

Chaplain Schueller gave the benediction, and after the postlude, pilots of the

59th Fighter Squadron flew over King Hangar in a "Missing Man" formation.

Reflecting on the memorial service months later, Colonel Dylewski said that it had
Honoring and Remembering

been "done right for the families" and also praised the dignified conduct of the journalists who covered the ceremony.6T

As President Clinton left King H*g, he spoke with each ofthe families in the

front row and hugged the young son of TSgt. Thanh V (Gu$ Nguyen'68 He also

shook hands with each of the wounded airmen. President Clinton's "coming out

herej' one officer commented, "that was a class act." AlC. Cielito Valenci4 a resident of Building 131 who had been severely injure4 greatly appreciated the presidentb visit, although, he ruefully reflected, he wished he had met him under other circumstances.69

A motorcade of a dozen or more vehicles took the chief executive from King

Hangar to Air Force One. President Clinton shook hands with General Cranston and

Colonel Dylewski, talked with them briefly, then mounted the airplane's stairs. He

saluted the- farewell party and entered the presidential atrcraft. Air Force One taxied

offand launched for Patric( flying into a blue sty dotted with a few small clouds.70

President Clinton was scheduled to reach Patrick at l:20 p.m.; he arrived somewhat earlier than that. Brig. Gen. Robert C. Hinson, the commander of the 45th

Space Wing who had been on leave to attend his son's wedding, drove through the

night to reach the base that Sunday morning. Colonel Friers helped him prepare for

the president's arrival and the memorial service by briefing him about the recent

events at Patrick. When President Clinton deplaned fromAir Force One, he quickly

got into a staffcar with General Hinson and his wife, Karen Hinson. The chief executive traveled from base operations on the flightline to the base chapel (Building

439), named the Seaside Chapel because it stood on the eastem edge of Patrick and

was not far west of the Atlantic Ocean, just across Florida state highway 1A 1 .71

President Clinton met with the families of the deceased airmen from Patrick in

the annex of the Seaside Chapel. This facility had been chosen because its individual

rooms allo,i/ed for the privacy of the bereaved relatives. Lt. Col. Donald R. Jozayt,

commander of the 71st Rescue Squadron, escorted President Clinton from room to

room. "It was quite obvious" to Lieutenant Colonel Jozayt, Colonel Friers cornmented several months lateq "that the president was qurte movedby the whole thing."

While President Clinton met with the families, Florida Governor Lawton M.

Chiles. Jr.. Gen. John Shalikashvili, and other digrritaries traveled to the base conference center (Building 401), where they met a large group of Patrick's Khobar veterans. 

,A lot of them," Colonel Friers noted "were badly beat-up, cut up, banged up.

Some of them were on cnrtches, or in rvheel chairs." From here, the dignitaries went

to the base theater @uilding 431), next to the Seaside Chapel, where the memorial

service began at 2:5 0 p.m.1 2

A large nafional flag filled the wall behind the theater stage and formed a backdrop to the speaker's podium, chaplain's chak, akar, and choir. Seven wreaths stood

between the itage and the congregation: one for each of the five Patrick airmen, and

for SSgt. Ronalll L. King, r,vho had deployed from offi.rttAir Force Base, Nebraska,

anO forLtC. Christophei B. Lester, fromWright-PattersonAir Force Base, Ohio.73 A

short flieht of stairs ran from the theater floor to the stage.Ta

t7t
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

There were about 750 seats in the theater, and additional chairs supplemented

them. People also stood at the back of the room and around the sides. The congregation totaled about 1,000. The original intention had been to limit attendance to members ofthe I st Rescue Group. After it was learned that the president would participate

in the ceremony, the guest list was expanded to include visiting dignitaries, local cMc

leaders, and a few airmen who until recently had been -"-b..r of the rescue

group.75 Two television cameftrs in the theater made it possible for many others on

Patrick to watch the ceremony and also provided a video "feed" to the cable News

Network and other outlets.T6

The Patrick chapel choir, composed of nineteen women, nine men, and an

organist sang a prelude. Colonel Friers escorted President Clinton to his seat, and Lt.

col. (Father) Phillip D. Nguyen, chaplain of the rst Rescue Group, offered an openingprayer. The base chapel choir and congregation sang "Lord, Guard and Guide the

Men who Fly," a hymn that also had been sung at the Dhahran memorial service, and

Capt. Mahender Dudani read ffom the Scriptures.zT

colonel Friers walked to the speaker's podium, pausing at the base of the stage

statrs to acknowledge the seven wreaths. During his remarks, he verbally-and physically-saluted the deceased airmen and spoke with gratitude for the support that

Patrick had received fiom the community around it, and the nation. ,,The outpouring

of love has been absolutely overwhelming, and we thank all ofAmerica fo. that.,'zs 

-

President clinton followed colonel Friers at the podium. He made much the

same remarks as he had at Eglin, tailored somewhat to this second audience. ..while

the modern world brings to all of us many new opportunities," the chief executive

pointed out, "it also leaves us more open to the forces of intolerance and destruction,

and especially to terrorism." Speaking of the nineteen airmen who were killed in the

bombing, President clinton said: "They were taken before their time, felled by the

hands of hatred in an act whose savagery is matched only by its cowardice."Te

One officer who was present later recalled that the Presidentb words were "well

received. . . . He was clearly moved, no doubt of it. I think it was really ereat that he

came."8o

Maj. Gen. (chaplain) william J. Dendinger, the Air Force chaplain, pronounced

a benediction, Mr. Stewart Trushkowsky bugled "Thpr," and the chapel choir and

congregation sang "when Peace Like a River." colonel Friers escofted the president

from the theater, introducing him to each ofthe wounded airmen, who were seated in

the front row. "The president stopped, ' colonel Friers later recalled, and chatted with

some of the wounded "and then we went outside . . . . His car was waitins."81

President clinton had made an unhurried deparnre from Eglin,-and did the

same from Patrick. "He staye{' colonel Friers continued, "shaking my hand and for

a minute or so, and just chatted." A limosine took the president to the flightline, where

he shook hands with many in the crowd, talked with people, and por"d fo. a photograph with one couple. He stood talking with General and Mrs. Hinson for some

time, before climbing the stairs into Air Force one. president clinton gave a final

wave to the crowd, and then stepped through the aircraft door.s2

t72
Honoring and Remembering

The president's visit to Patrick represented only one aspect of the enoffnous

national, and local, support for the base in the aftermath of the tragedy in Saudi

Arabia. A sign in front of the First Baptist Church in Cocoa Beach was typical of

many marques seen along the Space Coast, throughout the summer of 1996:

.?A.EB.: We SupportYoq We're Praying ForYou." Local businesses offered various

forms of help. With family members ofthe deceased arriving to attend the memorial

service, hotels offered free or discounted rooms, rental agencies loaned cars without

charge, and other retailers volunteered their goods or services.83

Colonel Friers said of the local community: "This place-absolutely unbelievable, the support we got from this place." Another Patrick officer noted candidly that

in the past he had often taken telephone calls from residents complaining about the

noise from the airbase. Following the bombing, the content ofthese communications

abrupt$ changed: We were "getting calls all the time, people wanting to do something. [t was] pretty overwhehning." An airman who had been deployed to Dhahran

during the fiagedy praised his neighbors. "They were very very much conceme{' he

related. "They really pitched in with my family while I was gone"84

In addition, organizations and individuals, most of them neighbors of Patrickbut also others from around the world-sent financial contributions to the families of

the deceased airmen. The lst Rescue Group headquarters established the "Patrick

Pantry Organization" and ensured that these donations were properly distributed.

Colonel Friers said of these contributions: "You couldn't have asked for better support. It was unbelievable."ss

ln a July 1 letter published four days later rnlhe Missileer, the Patrick base newspapeq Colonel Friers expressed heartfelt thanks for this outpouring of community

support. 'Nothing can ever preparc you," he stated, "for the shock, grief, and utter

diibelief that comes with a tragedy like we experienced last week." He noted that

"total despair can quickly take over," but "that was not the case here at PatrickAFB

for one simple reason-the 45th Space Wing, the entire PatrickAFB family' and the

surrounding communities pulled us through." Colonel Frien closed by pointing out

that the "healing has begun and we are back at work sending our [rescue] people in

harm's way fso] that others may live. we will never forget our corlrades who gave the

ultimate sacrifice nor the caring, giving people of the Space Coast and Patrick

dpBr'>36

The support of the community surrounding Eglin was equally heartening.

Colonel Dylewski was unstinting in his praise of the response from people on-and

around-the base. "The efforts put forth," he reflected, a half year after the tragedy,

"by the organizations on this base and by individuals on this base, and outside, in the

local communiqr, were just incredible. Everybody did whatever was necessary' gave

urhatever waS neceSSary-time, money, ene{gy, congem." He summed up: "Anything

we needed and asked for, somebody stepped up and provided it.'{7

Lt. Col. Stan Hill, director of the 33d Fighter Wing's battle stafl asserted: "The

local community was just absolutely marvelous. We got absolutely tremendous support from the people along this coast." Lt. col. Thomas A. McCarthy, the deployed

I tJ
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

58th Fighter Squadron's operations officer, agreed: "I thought that both the base community and the cMlian community arctxrdhere were outstanding,as were a lot ofthe

American people. we're still [in December 1996] getting letters from people,

expressing their condolences, their pride."88

on wednesday, July 3, three days after the memorial services at Eglin and

Patrick, Gen. Ronald Fogleman visited the Khobar Towers. The Air Force chief of

stafflater explained the timing of his trip: 'T waited for about a week until after all the

high-profile people had gone through Dhahran and then went to Saudi Arabia

myself." (Secretary of State warren christopher had visited Dhahran on June 26, and

Secretary of Defense william J. Perry was there three days later.) General Fogleman

arrived early in the morning of July 3 and was met by Brigadier General Schwalier.

The wing commander escorted the chief of staffto his quarters, a suite in the middle

of the united states Military Training Mission compound on Dhahran Air Base.8e

At General Fogleman's quarters, Brigadier General Schwarier briefed him on the

events before and after the bombing. This meeting presented these two senior officers

with their first opportunity for a one-on-one talk. After General Schwalier gave his

briefing, he said to General Fogleman that he recognized that the bombing would

have an impact on the Air Force and that, at the appropriate time, he would offer his

resignation. In a Decemb er 1997 interview, the chief of staff recalled this meeting

with General Schwalier, the wing commander's suggestion that he resign, and his

reply to that offer. "I sat down with [Brigadier General Schwalier]," General

Fogleman recounted, "listened to what he had to say-to include his offering to retire

to remove any kind of a target for people to attack both the institution and individuals.

I told him at that time that I did not want him to retire but to get the facts out.', In this

same interview, General Fogleman quoted his own remarks to General Schwalier at

thetime: "This is an important issue having to do with whether we support our troops

in the field when we send them out there, and if you have screwed up, you can expect

to be held accountable. If you haven't, then I will support you."e0

After this candid exchange, the two generals visited the Ministry of Defense and

Aviation Hospital, King Fahd universiff Hospital, ARAMCq and other Dhahran

hospitals that had cared for the wounded airmen, and in appreciation, General

Fogleman presented their staffs with plaques.el At each of these facilities, the chief of

staff offered his thanks, and at one of them, he received a particularly noteworthy

reply. After General Fogleman expressed his heartfelt gratitude to one senior Saudi

health administrator, the official answered that it was a solemn medical duty ro rrear

all patients, that medicine knows no cultural boundaries.e2

The two generals returned to the Khobar Towers to tour the bomb site in ftont

of Building 131, and then walked to the medical clinic, Building l1l. Brigadier

Schwalier later offered the opinion that General Fogleman'lvas awondeful influence, that day." The chief of staff stopped to talk with every group of people he

encountered. "You could see . . . on their faces-there were smiles," General

Schwalier noted, that the airmen appreciated General Fogleman's conversations

with them.e3
Honoring and Remembering

One particularly memorable episode highlighted the chief of staf's visit to the

clinic. When General Fogleman and his group arrived at this facility, a week after the

attaclg it remained busy. Many airmen who had received stitches on the night of the

bombing were having their suhles removed and the clinic staffwas hard at work.

SrA. Andrea Richards, a medical technician of the deployedTgfh Fighter

Squadron, was completely focused on her business when General Fogleman entered

the clinic about 10:45 that Wednesday morning. He engaged several of the medical

personnel in conversation, as he did everywhere he went that moming. The clinic

itaffchatted with him while they went about their work with one salient exception.

Airman Richards was so absorbed in helping a patient that she rernained oblivous to

the fact that the Air Force's senior general was at her elbow. When the chief of staff

tried to draw her into a conversation, the young airman gave perfunctory answers and

remained intent on her job. Brigadier General Schwalier recalled the young NCO's

demeanor: "She didn't care if it's the president . . .who it is, she's got a job to do'"

Soon everyone in the clinic was closely watching the interaction between

General Fogleman andAirman Richards, and doubtless wondering how the four-star

general would react to her casual-at-best attention to his comments. The chief of staff

was not angered by the airman's apparent disinterest, but instead was impressed with

her intense dedication. General Fogleman, after receiving only brief answers to a

series of questions, finally asked SeniorAirman Richards what she was going t'o do

when she returned to the States. She replied that she had to study for her airman promotion test she was up for staffsergeant.

"It was beautifirl, the next few moments," Brigadier General Schwalier later

recalled. General Fogleman "looked over to his exec, his ops officer at the time, and

said 'Gee, can't we take care of that?"'The aide realized immediately that the chief

of staff was suggesting that this single-minded airman should receive a stripes-forexceptional-performers promotion, commonly knorvn by its acronymn-a STEP

promotion. The executive officer answered" "Sir, I think that is within your authority."

General Fogleman told SeniorAirman Richards: "Young lady, we're going to take

care of that, right now. You are a staffsergeant."

At that moment everyone in the clinic began clapping. Suddenly it all dawned on

the young NCG-that it was the Air Force chief of staffwho had been speaking to

her, that she had received a STEP promotion, and that her new grade and pay rate

would take effect immediately. To the amusement of every observer, StaffSergeant

Richards indulged in a celebratory dance. "IIwas a great momentl' Bigadier General

Schwalier said. "It was just wonderful."ea

After this high-note event, General Fogleman finished his morning with a walk

to the "Ark," the Khobar Towers chapel, which was located in Building 13, in the

southwest corner of the compound. This building was the workcenter of the wing's

religious professionals and also, since the aftemoon of Wednesday, June 26, of the

judge advocate general persormel who were processing the propertyJoss claims of

the Dhahran airmen. General Fogleman encouraged ttre chaplains and lawyers, and

thanked them for their efforts.

t7s
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

The chief of staff then walked from the Ark back into the center of the compoun4 for lunch at the Desert Rose Inn. while passing the clinic, General Fogleman

and his escorts saw the very recently promoted Staff Sergeant Richards, talking to

two other airmen of that rank. She was showing them her new sfipes and-for the

first ofmany times during her life--she was telling the story of how she had received

them.es

Just after the noon hour, an impressive ceremony followed the midday meal at

the Desert Rose. Using a hand-held microphone, General Fogleman addressed a

large group of airmen who sat around the rectangular dining tables that, just the week

before, had served as operating tables. The chief of staffgave a compelling twelveminute speech on the significance of the oath taken by every member of the United

States Air Force. It was, as Brigadier General Schwalier later reflected, "an emotional moment for all concemed.'46

General Fogleman then presented fourAirman's Medals, to Maj. (Dr.) Steven p

Gofl SSgt. Alfredo R. Guerrero, SrA. Corey p Grice, andAlC. Christopher T.

wagar. Dr. Gofl a week earlier in this same KhobarTowers dining hall, had rendered

aid to others, undeterred by a glass shard in his ovm chest. while his oum wound was

being bandaged, he continuing sewing up patients. Staffsergeant Guerrero had spotted the truck-bomb and radioed other security policemen about it. Along with

Guerrero, Airman First class wagar and Senior Airman Grice had alerted the residents of the top floors of Building l3 I to evacuate their dormitory minutes before the

bornb exploded. The three SPs also had assisted the wounded in the wake of the blast.

These four men received a firm, 'lvell-done" handshake from General Fogleman,

and a long sustained round of applause from their comrades.eT

The audience at the Desert Rose Inn was made up of airmen who, like Dr. Goff

and the three security policemen, served in support functions. Brigadier General

Schwalier wanted General Fogleman to visit also with some of the wing's --operators," so from the dining hall the group drove to DhahranAir Base. There the chief of

staffaddressed a group of flightline personnel in a drivethrough hangar that housed

some of the fighters that flew Southem watch missions, and he commended the aircrews for renewing their operations so promptly after the terrorist attack.eS

Major General Anderson later met General Fogleman at the base's Air Mobility

command ramp, and leaving at about 2 p.^., the two officers flew to Riyadh.

Brigadier General Schwalier later commented that it was evident that the chief of

staffhad been through an emotional day. About two weeks after the visit, General

Fogleman himself wrote: "when I visited the l4404th wing onl July 3, I was

extremely impressed with the professional manner in which every person was handling the aftermath of this attack on our people. . . . It is an honor to be associated

with the outstanding men and women in today,s Air Force."ee
Chapter Tvelve

After the Attack

President Bill Clinton first spoke to the press about the KhobarTowers bombing

at the White House on the aftemoon ofTuesday, June 25, 1996. He told reporters that

within a few hours a Federal Bureau of tnvestigation team would be on its way to

Dhahran to help investigate the terrorist attack. The next morning, the first forty of

what eventual$ would become a much larger FBI team arrived on the compound.

With the Air Force Office of Special Investigations providing their original quafters,

these professionals soon were at work, gathering, preserving, and studying the evidence left in the wake of the attack.l One of the FBI agents joined the Air Force personnel who staffed the Site Recovery Center just after I 0 a.m. on June 27 , and about

half an hour lateq the FBI team set up a command post of its orvn in the Furnihne

Management Office, the underground garuge that had been converted to a storage

laciliry just west of the sfficken Building l3l .2

The Air Force supported the FBI effort in a number of ways. First, it joined the

White House in providing aircraft to fly the investigating agents to SaudiArabia and

back to the United States as needed. Second large numbers of airmen selflessly volunteered time from their ofldu$z hours to help the FBI team sift through the rubble

at the bomb site and in the dormitories, looking for forensic evidence. Brig. Gen.

Terry Schwalier, the commander of lhe 4404th composite wing (Provisional),

praised the hundreds of members of his unit who contributed to this effort, while at

the same time they continued to pull their required shifts. Thir4 the airmen provided

other forms of aid. For example, when the FBI had difficu$ getting supplies through

the Saudi Arabian customs offices quickly, wing members donated more than 200

unilorms and other provisions to the agents.l

Perhaps the Air Force's most unusual confibution to the FBIS effort involved the

"boom box'portable radios that airmen during the 1990s commonly carried with

them on deployments. The terroristbomb had destroyed a larye number ofthese popular items, along with other pieces of personal property, in the Khobar Towers dormitories. During the days after the attaclg airmen brought many ofthese "tashed' (as

one staffsergeant aptly described them) boom boxes to the wing judge advocate genera13 office. Their ou,ners offered these radios, and other items of substantial value

that obviously had been ruined, as evidence that they were entitled to an advance payment on their claims of personal property losses. The JAG personnel examined the

boom boxes, quickly confirmed that they were damaged beyond repair, and piled

177
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

them in a corner. A fash dumpster would have been the next stop for these radios, but

one of the FBI agents pointed out that the magnets in their speakers could be used to

sift through the sand and rubble, and locate metal objects. As one airman concluded

the story of boom box magnets: "They made nifty little tools, and all the volunteers

got one."a

In addition to the FBI investigation, congress conducted several hearings about

the bombing and published t'wo reports on it within about two and a half months. The

first of the these, an August 14, 1996, staffreport of the House National Securify

committee, chaired by Floyd Spence of South carolina, suggested that the Dhahran

attack represented an intelligence failure. (coincidently, Secretary of the Air Force

Dr. Sheila widnall had been testifying to this same committee, when the bombing

took place.) This House panel report's primary observation was that the 'turprepardness of U.S. forces stationed in Saudi Arabia for the magnitude of the terrorist bomb

in Dhahan raises significant questions about the adequacy of the intelligence support. while intelligence information was provided it was not of either the quality nor

the quantity necessar:y to alert commanders to the magnitude of the terrorist threat

they faced." Moreover, this committee report developed the theme that the Air Force's

ability to protect its forces in saudi Arabia was hindered by the serviceb acfing on the

pretense that operation Southem watch was only a temporary mission, despite the

fact that it had been conducting it for four years and it was unlikely that Iraq would

begin complying with the United Nations resolutions any time soon. "The

Department of Defense needs to review other ongoing operations," the committee

concluded, "to ensure that U.S. force protection needs and u.S. security interests are

not being compromised by the limitations inherent in running quasi-permaneru operations under the politcally acceptable rubric of .temporary, operations."5

on the other hand, the House National Securif committee report did not fault

the actions of individuals stationed in Dhahran or elsewhere in the region. It, in fact,

praised the commanders in the theater for their aggressive and proactive security

efforts after the November 1995 Riyadh bombing. It singled out for favorable comment Lt. col. James J. Traisteq the commander of the 44}4thcomposite wing's

security police squadron.6

The second congressional report, published about a month lateq arrived at a

polar-opposite conclusion. The work ofthe Senate Select committee on Intelligence,

chaired by SenatorArlen Specter ofpennsylvania, it focused on the question of

'vltrether or not the Dhahran bombing represented an intelligence failure. This Senate

committee took no interest in the contention of its House colleagues that the pretense

of Southem watch being a temporary mission had hindered the protection of Air

Force personnel in Saudi Arabia. The Senate committee instead riveted its attention

on the issue of the alleged intelligence failure and concluded emphatically that there

had not been one. "The totalifz of the threat information available to the Deparhlent

of Defense," it asserted, "as well as the posture of the Intelligence community at the

time of the Khobar Towers bornbing makes clear that an intelligence failure, either in

collection, dissemination or analysis, did not occur. Military commanders in the
After the Attack

region and in Washington received highly relevant threat information for ayear and a

half prior to the Khobar Towers bombing."T

While these Congressional reports were being prepared' another investigation

was underway, one that eventually would overshadow them. Three days after the

Dhahran bornbing, Secretary of Defense william J. Perry directed a task force to

make "an assessment of [the] facts and circumstances surrounding [the Khobar

Towers] attack and of the security of U.S. forces in the U.S. Central ComrnandArea

of Responsibilityl{ To head this effort, Secretary Perry selected Gen. (U.S. Army

retiredi Wayne A. Dolr,ning, who had just retired on May 1 as the commander in

chief of theU.S. Special Operations Command. During the Gulf Wm he had commanded the Joint Special bperations command. His near$ thirty-four years of

active duty also included two combat tours during the Vietram War and service in

OperationJust Cause, the Panama contingency of December 1989'e

Secretary Perry asked General Downingb task force to begin its assessment "as

soon as possible" so that the secretary could "advise the president and the Congress

of the conclusions reached at the earliest possible opportunity." The panel was to

report within forty-five days (roughly, in mid-August) or to notiff Secretary Perry if

it needed more time.1o This initial charter stated that General Dorming was not to

"conduct an investigation to fix fault or find wrongdoing; however, evidence of possible negligence or wrongfirl misconduct by U.S. personnel should be forwarded to

USCENTaOM for dispoiition." On July 10, Secretary Perry amended this original

charter, directing the panel to identify those officials who were responsible for

actions needed to improve, or upgrade, the protection of the forces in southwest Asia.

Two days later, on the twelfth, he stated in a letter to two Senators that the Downing

commission would determine personal responsibility for the Khobar Towers attack

andwhetherthere hadbeen abreach of duty. The task force beganits workbyreviewing previous reports and documents about force protection in southwest Asia and

thin started interviewing service personnel who were involved with security issues at

Dhahran and elsewhere in the theater.ll

While General Downing's commission started its investigation, the 4404Ih

Wing's change of command ceremony, postponed from Wednesday, June 26,by the

bombing the preceding night, was held on Monday, July 15. The extension of

Brigadiei General Schwalier3 tour was determined on the night of ttre attack, dudng

onsof his earliest telephone conversations with Lt. Gen. Carl E. FranklirS cornmander of U.S. Central Command Air Forces. General Schwalier later recalled this

exchange with General Franklin: "'Terry, we'd like you to stay.'And I sai4 'Sb that's

exactly what I expect.' . . . That was the communicationl't2

By the time of General FoglemanS July 3 visit to Dhahran, it had been determined that the proposed change of command ceremony would be held on the fifteenth, and it was then that General Schwalier first leamed of the new date' General

Schwalier also recalled this commgnication: "When the chief came over, he said

.I've talked to [Brig. Gen. Daniel] Dick; we want you to stay until the fifteenth. I've

talked to the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] about that."'r3

179
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Maj. Gen. Kurt B. Anderson, commander of the Joint Task Force Southwest

Asia, presided over the occasion, as Brigader General Schwalier relinquished command to Brigadier General Dick. The departing wing comman der later iharacteized

the ceremony as very well done and praised Generar Anderson's conduct of it.

Brigadier General Dick also commended the professionalism that the JTF-swA

commander and others brought to the event.la

General Dick came to the Dhahran assignment from Langley Air Force Base,

virginia, where he had been Headquarters Air combat command,s inspector general. He then had more than 3,300 flying houn in F-4 phantoms and F-16 Fighting

Falcons and had been an instructor pilot in both of these fighters. General Dick had

commanded the 33d Tactical Fighter squadron at Shaw Air Force Base, South

Carolina, and the 388th Fighter Wing at Hill Air Force Base, Utah.ls

It was an interesting sidebar to the Khobar Towers story that Generals Dick and

Schrvalier were longtime friends. During october l9g4 through February 19g5, they

had been members ofthe same F-16 class at the 5gth ractical rraining wing,s school

on MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Schwalier was then a lieutenant colonel; Dick a

major. The two young officers checked out on the fighter with a class of fewer than

twenty officers, roomed near each other in the same dormitory and played golf

together. They accordingly got to know each other quite well, and remained in communication during their subsequent careers. 16

Following the change of wing command from General Schwalier to General

Dick on July 15, the former commander remained in Dhahran several more days. on

the nineteenth he met with General Downing and his task force. General Schwalier

then retumed to the U.S. and began his next assignment, in the pentagon. He became

the chief of a directorate within Headquarters usAF's Deputy chief of StaffforAir

and Space Operations. I 7

Like theirwing commander, the airmen veterans ofthe KhobarTowers bombing

promptly rehrmed to their duties in the States. Journalists found it remarkable that

nearly all of therrl including the wounded, soon were back at work in the assignments

they had held before deploying to Saudi Arabia. Among the hundreds of tnese men

and women, TSgt. Donald Herlacher retumed to his maintenance duties with the 7l st

Rescue squadron at its home station on patrickAir Force Base, Florida, along with

the other maintainers who had worked on the HC-130 that had been forced to come

back to base earlier than planned on the night of the bombing. MSgt. Dwayne R.

Berr)', who had been exercising in the gyrn at the time of the explosion, also was back

at work on Patrick in early July. Lt. col. Douglas R. cochran, Lt. col. Thomas A.

Mccar*ry, and the other officers of the 58th Fighter Squadron who had been in the

command suite of Building 127 onthe night of the attack soon resumed their duties

on Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. TSgt. George Burgess, ssgt. Eric D. ziegler, and,

many other airmen who had been billeted in Building l3l also were able to return to

their assignments at Eglin and elsewhere. In october 1996, aninterviewer asked

sergeant Ziegler about how he and others around him had survived the attack in relatively good shape. "we all got pretty lucky, I guess," he commented. ..I still have

180

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After the Attack

aches and pains in my 1eft hip, my palm is not completely healed and I don't have firll

range of motion in [my] fingers, but I'm back at work." SSgt. Alfredo Guerrero who,

lvithetC. ChristopherWagar, had fint spotted the truck-bomb, attracted for a time

the attention of the national press. By late August, he too was serving again with his

home unit, the 95th Security Police Squadron on Edwards Air Force Base,

California.r8

on July 10,l9g6,Lt. col. (Dr.) Douglas J. Robb, Jr., the interim cornrnander of

ftrc 4404thWing's medical group, relinquished command of this unit to Colonel

Rolando R. Santa Ana. Dr. Robb returned to Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, u{rere

he commanded the 347th Aerospace Medicine Squadron. He might have agreed with

the contentionthat good fortune was an element inthe promptreturn of so manyAir

Force members, including the wounded, to their duties in the States. But Robb

emphasized two practical points: the immediate "buddy care" that the airmen gave

one another that night and the excellent medical treatment that they received from

Saudi andAmerican medical professionals, then and later.re

While many vekrans of the bombing resumed their duties at their home stations,

senior Departrnent of Defense officials considered an important "force relocation"

for SaudiArabia. On July 4, Secretary ofDefense Perry told a group ofreporters:

"We had under consideration before the [Khobar Towers] bombing-and will intensify that consideration-moving some of the forces out of Riyadh. Itb an urban area,

and itb the hardest area to try to gain protection for." About two weeks later, Secretary

Perry announced that as many as 4,000 American military personnel stationed in

Riyadh, Dhahran, and perhaps other Saudi cities would move into more remote sites

in the desert.2o

The Khobar airmen were destined for Prince Sultan At Base, located in the

sands about seventy miles south-southeast of Riyadh. The Saudis had begun developing this facility, named for Prince Sultan bin ll:bdul Azu, the kingdom's second

d"p"ty premier, Minister of Defense and Aviation, and inspector general, shortly

before the GulfWar. During that conflict, the Americans knew it as al Kharj Air Base,

an installation with the name of the province in which it was located and of a small

torvn about fifteen miles away.2l konically, the 4404thWing's direct predessor unit

had been stationed there during the summer of I 991 .22

When U.S. Air Force personnel first deployed there during Operation Desert

Shield" construction had been underway for only about a yeal and the airmen found

little in the way of facilities. Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner had remarked that'Al

Khad . . . started out as a runway/parking apron-and nothing else-surrounded by

sand."23 The earliestAmerican arrivals found ttrat the tallest fixhre on the base was a

one-foot taxilight.z4 USAF engineering teams soon transformed al Kharj into a

viable installation, uhich the Americans affectionately nick-named "Al's Garage," or

"Camelot,"25 and during the Gulf War it served as an important fighter and C-130

base. After that conflict it was largely abandoned, but later the Saudis began a construction program, erecting several buildings that would support their air defense and

other operations. Theywere manyyears from completingtheirconstructionprogram,

r8l
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

however, when the American airmen began moving there from Dhahran during the

late summer of 1996.26

A new chapter in the history of Prince sultanAir Base began early in the moming ofAugust 2, when Lieutenant General Franklin, who was visiting SaudiArabia at

the time, telephoned Brigadier General Dick. The CENTAF commander asked the

new wing commander to come to Riyadh for a conference that night. Accompanied

by most of his group commanders, General Dick flew on a KC-135 sfiatotanker to

the Saudi capital and met with General Franklin in the JTF-SWA conference room.

At this nighttime session, General Dick later related, the cENTAF commander

briefed him and his subordinates that they'lvere going to move two bases [Riyadh

and Dhahran] and. . . were going to do it in forty-five days." Some of theAmericans

serving in Riyadh would move to the Eskanvillage compound" about a dozen miles

from the capital. otherAir Force personnel at Riyadh, and all of those at the Khobar

Towers, would go to Prince Sultan Air Base, roughly seventy miles.27

General Dick related that after hisAugust 2 meeting with General Franklin, he

and his officers "stayed in Riyadh for several days to hold the initial meetings with

the Royal saudi Air Force." These discussions took a few days because, he explained,

it was a feafire of Saudi culture that even though prince Sultan and Secretary perry

had agreed the Americans would move to prince sultan Air Base, "that doesn't necgslarily mean that everybody agrees with that." once the meetings began, General

Dick observed that many of the senior RSAF officers "werent real fired up over it,

this whole idea. Because the saudis were building prince sultan , obviously,for their

use."28

The saudis were favorably impressed, however, with how rapidly the united

States Air Force began accomplishing the daunting task of moving trvo bases within

a month and a half. on August 5, u.s. Army Maj. Gen. Norman williams (Headquarters U.S. central command's J-4) and General Dick, accompanied by about

twenty other American officers, visited Prince Sultan Air Base for the first time. Late

during the previous day, the saudis had given the USAF permission to land five c-5

Galaxies on the base. Early on the fifth, the fint of these enormous transports arrived

and General Dick and his group came in later that morning on a Saudi c-130.

"when we landed [at Prince sultan];' the wing commander related 'ke stepped out

on the ramp and the Saudis wenl 'Oh, one ofyour C-5s is already here.',,

what the Saudis did not know was that the Americans were rapidly generating

more of these huge cargo planes. onAugust 5, the Arab hosts feated Major General

williams and his party graciously, giving them a thorough tour of princi sultan, an

informative round of briefings, and an excellent meal. The visit ended in the afternoon and" as the Americans were preparing to reboard the Saudi c-130, one of the

RSAF generals noticed that there now were two Galaxies parked on the ramp. ,,oh,',

he said to his guests, "I see there that another one of your c-5s is here." General

williams was able to smile at him and reply, 'No, thatb the fourttr and fifth c-5, the

olher ones have already come and oflloaded today while we have been in briefings.,,

General Dick said of this episode: "At that moment, I felt tremendous pride in what

r82
After the Attack

the United States Air Force could do. The Saudis couldn't believe how fast we could

move."29

The move from KhobarTowen to Prince Sultan, designated "Operation Desert

Focus," had to be completed within forty-five days, and it immediately encountered

difficulties. Although the Saudi construction progmm had erected many buildings,

the base lacked electricity, water, and sewage systems. "We literally started out,"

General Dick recalle4 "kind of sitting in the dirt," eating Meals Ready to Eat, the

cold rations that all military members called by their acronym, 

rc14pgt,30

The base also lacked ut aicraft contool system. When the first C-5s arrived'

General Dick explained, an aircraft controller "had to go out on the runway. . . to

make sure there were no camels or wild dogs on it. When the C-5 showed up, it flew

over the base, [the controller] got them on the radio and sai4 'It looks like the runway's clear, so you can land if you want."'

In addition to aircraft control, other communication systems were poor or

nonexistant. "When I got [to Prince Sultan]," General Dick related, 'fthe phone book

was one page . . . because there were only about twenty phones in the entire wing . . . .

The phones didn't work half the time." Nor could the base's radios be relied on,

because there were no transmitter towers to amplify their signals.3l

These deficiences were overcome by the hard work, day and nighg of Colonel

Suzanne M. (Sue) Waylett',s 823d Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy operational

Repair Squadron Engineer-much better knornm by its acroqrm "RED HORSE'-

from Hurlburt Field Florida; of Colonel Peter Mooy's logistics group of the 4404th

Wing; and of many others. General Dick summarized at the time the achievements of

the RED HORSE engineers at Prince Sultan Air Base: "They literally built this entire

place. This is a phoenix that has risen out of the desert." The move from Dhahran repiesented the new wing commander's first extensive experience with the "loggies"

and he was impressed that these specialists "know how to contact and move equipment, move vehicles, move stuff. I've got atremendous respect forthe logistics community." General Dick added: "I just had never worked with them before. They are

truly magnificentl'32

The move from Riyadh to Prince Sultan involved a shorter distance than from

Dhahran to the same place, and less materi6l, and so it was completed ahead of the

transfer from the Khobar Towers. "Basically, Riyadh went first," General Dick

recounted, "Dhahran went second . . . . The big airplanes [tankers and airbome waming and control system aircraft based at Riyadh] could carry a lot of their or'r'n stuff

dovim fto Prince Sultan]. fuyadh was only about sixty miles from [Prince Sultan].

That was the easy piece."33

Despite all the problems, the move from Dhahran to Prince Sultan was more

than worth the effort-it was necessary. A month before the undertaking, Secretary

Perry contended: "We calrnot deal with [tenorist] attacks adequately just by moving

fences and just by putting more Mylar on glass. We have to make some fundamental,

drastic changes in the way we configure and deploy our forces." In a February 5,

1997, interview, General Dick pointed out: "We were stuck in an urban environment
I

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

in both Dhahran and Riyadh. we needed to get out of that urban environment.

coming here into the middle of no place, at prince sultan, was exact$ the right thing

to do." Addressing the same point almost exactly a year later, he emphasized that the

new station '\vas safe" and that the move had been..the right thing to do."3a

The Khobar Towers complex that the Air Force vacated remained as it had been

before the bombing, with one excepion. In the autumn of 1997, a little more than a

year after the Americans departed, the Saudis razed Building 13l, the most badly

damaged structure on the compound. A group of Saudi militarypolice and other ofrcials watched as a demolition team exploded a set of charges that brought dorm the

dormitory.35

For the airmen who left the Khobar Towers for prince sultan, the greatest challenge of their move could not have been foreseen and, unfortunately, came in the

middle of it. At this particularly inopporhrne time for the Americans, Saddam

Hussein declared both the northern and southem "no fly'' zones null and void and on

August 30, r996,Iraqi armored columns oveffan the Kurdish city of lrbil. This turn

of events forced the 44Mttr wing to prepare for cornbat. The kaqi dictatorb aggression, General Dick remembered with dismay, "threw such a wrench into the system

for us. Now, I not only had to continue moving, but I had to prepare and conduct combat operations against kaq."36

on September 2, several crews made up of third country nationals were at work

on DhahranAir Base, pulling dovin trailers, packing materials, and otherwise making

ready for the move to Prince Sultan. while they labored, Saddam3 aggression led to

an abrupt directive to the 4404th wing: preparc to attack kaq's air defense system. In

the midst of an enormous move, the airmen responded quickly. At sunset, wrng personnel escorted the TCNs offDhahran Air Base, and then threw themselves into the

new job at hand. They worked through the night of September 2/3, a humid miserable run ofhours during which the temperature never dropped below 92 degrees

Fahrenheit. By 3 a.m. on the third, the wing's maintenance crews had a "package" of

fighters ready. "God love those great maintenance guys;' General Dick declared" '\ve

loaded up all of the airplanes, we had all of the missions planned.,'

while the maintainers were hard at work, chairman of the Joint chiefs of Staff

Gen. John M. Shalikashvili conferred through the night with Saudi Arabia's King

Fahd bin Abdul Aziz. The monarch decided not to let the united States use bases

within his kingdom for attacks against kaq. The 4404th wing's air crews woke up on

September 3 to leam this disappointing news.

The unit had readied for combat-without showing its hand. 'As the sun czrme

up the next moming," General Dick related "when the TCNs came back to continue

working on the trailers to move them and continue packing up, everything looked

exactb like it did when they went home the night before. There was absolutely no tip

offto anybody of the tremendous activity that took place that night."37

Denied the use of Saudi bases, President clinton directed cruise and Tomahawk

missile attacks against kaq and extended the southern no-fly zone over that country

from 32 to 33 north latitude, a line just south of Baghdad. on Septemb er 3 and. 4,

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B-52s of the 2d Bomb Wing, based at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana,

launched cruise missiles, and U.S. Navy warships in the Arabian Gulf fired

Tomahawks against air-defense targets in southem kaq.38

Despite Saddam's aggression, the move continued. On September 13, the kaqis

fired SA-6s at three of he 4404thWing's F-16s. The date happened to be a Friday

and yet on that supposedly unlucky day, every one of Saddam's weapons missed.

Around l0 p.m. on that nighq with the deadline to complete the move just four days

away, the Iraqi dictator's truculance introduced another complication. At that hour

Lieutenant General Franklin told Brigadier General Dick that, since King Fahd had

denied the Americans the use of Saudi bases, the wing commander should move to

Shaikh Isa, Bahrain, half of his squadron of F-16CJs and his entire squadron of

F-16CGs, which were arriving from MisawaAir Base, Japan, and have these fighters ready for combat by the next moming. "So we had to set up operations," General

Dick later explained, "and establish another air base right in the middle of the move.

Again, remember, I'm conducting combat operatiors against kaqJ'

A lone tragedy marred the wing's dramatic accomplishment. In late Septernber,

after the formal period of the move had passed AlC. Roberto D'Amato fell from a

two-and-a-halfton truck loaded with baggage. Airman D'Amato, a security policeman who had just arrived from Dhahran on a C-130, suffered fatal injuries'

At 3:36 p.m. on September l7,Ihe last of the wing's F-16s left Dhahran for

Prince Sultan. The launch of this fighter meant that the move was completed within

its forfy-five day limit-to the day. General Dick summarized the experience:

"Between the terrorists, the time line, Saddam, bases in other countries, it was a heck

of a forty-five days."3e

Overcoming the many obstacles that General Dick had summarized" the wing

had moved more than 78 aircraft, over 4,000 USAF personnel (230 British and 170

French military members also left Khobar for Prince Sultan), and about 25,000 tons

of equipment-all within the demanding deadline of forty-five duyt.oo Secretary

Perry called it "a logistics miracle." "The things we di{'General Dick stated'kere

absolutely annztng.I just can't tell you how proud I was of the men and women in

the Air Force, and the 4404th"41

On August 30, in the midst of the move from Dhahran to Prince Sultan,

Secretary of Defense Perry forwarded the report of General Dovming's task force to

Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Sheila E. Widnall and Air Force Chief of StaffGeneral

Ronald R. Fogleman. "I ask that you consider and, as you deem appropriate, take

action," the secretary wrote in a cover letter, "conceming issues raised in the report

regarding how the Air Force organizes, fains and equips to support forces deployed

to a unified command. I have made no determination as to any individual actions or

omissions, subjects on which I defer to your judgment and disposition.'42

Acting on this guidance from Secretary Perry on September 4 Secretary

Widnall and General Fogleman directed Lt. Gen. James E Record the Twelfth Air

Force commander, "to consider and to make recommendations on issues raised in

General Dou'ning's report regarding"-they then followed Secretary Perry's word185
I

I

I

Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

tng-"how the Air Force organizes, trains and equips to support forces deployed" to

U.S. Cenfal Command. "This is a critical task" the secretary and chief of staffstated. "You are to identify the Air Force resources you require in support of it, and they

will promptly be made available to you."

In addition to this tasking, Secretary Widnall and General Fogleman also gave

Lieutenant General RecordS task force a legal authority that General Douning's had

not held. They designated him, as the commander of the TwelfthAir Force, "the disciplinary review authority and General Court-Martial ConveningAuthoriff regarditg *y actions or omissions byAir Force personnel, associated with the bombing of

the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on June 25, 1996 . .. . Appropriate disposition regarding any individual, w{rether consisting of no action, administrative

action, nonjudicial punishment, court-martial, or otherwise, is entirely within your

discretion as commander, TwelfthAir Force, under applicable directives."

The secretary and the chief of staff asked General Record to submit a written

report within ninety days, although in mid-September Dr. widnall told reporters that

the general would be given more time if he requested it. She also commented that she

did not think the KhobarTowers bombing resulted from

problems in the Air Force. Secretary Widnall contended that the terrorist attack suggested just the opposite: it was a rare event that stood in sharp contrast to the usual,

safe day{o-day operation of theAir Force.a3

General Record was well experienced in how the Air Force supported the unified commands, as his ownTwelfthAir Force, which he had commanded since June

1995, contributedthe USAF component of U.S. Southern Command. He was also a

veteran of the vietnam war (with more than 600 combat missions), and had served as

the deputy commander of Joint Thsk Force Middle East, the vice commander of

Twelfth Air Force, and the commander of JTF-swA. These, and several other assignments, made him higtiy qualified to head a task force on the Dhahran bombing.a

The panel, consisting often colonels and one lieutenant colonel from a cross-section of career fields, had been working about two weeks when, on September 16,

Deputy Secretary ofDefense John P White released the findings ofthe Dovming task

force. Addressing its original taslg to assess security in U.S. cenfal comrnand's area

of responsibiliS', the report fowrd that force protection "practices were inconsistent in

Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf region." The Dorvning ReportS fifth finding stated: "Because of the lack of published standards (Finding 1), inadequate command

structwe (Finding 3), and existing comrnand relationships (Finding 4), standards and

practices for force protection vary widely. [r the absence of definitive guidance, site

comrnanders approach force protection based on general guidance from their service

commmands and/or their own knowledge and experience and that of their staff.'a5

The Douming Report also addressed the issue later added to its charter, to determine the officials responsible for the attack. Some of the panel's findings directed

responsibility in a general way-impersonally and broadly. It contended, for example, that the chain of command had not provided adequate guidance about security to

Brigadier General Schwalier and the other commanders in the theater. The Downins

i
After the Attack

Reportb fint finding stated: "There are no published DoD physical security standards for force protection of fixed facilites.'46 It also concluded that the comrnanders

had not been supported with adequate firnds. Finding 2 reported: "Force protection

requirements had not been given high priority for funding.'47

In addition to these general findings, the Downing Report directed specific

attention to the commander of the 44}4thComposite Wing. Its Finding 20, doubtless

its most controversial one, stated: "The commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional) did

not adequately protect his forces from a terrorist attack." Brigadier General Schwalier

was the only person whom the Dor,vning Report singled out as bearing some responsibility for the failure to protect the forces.a8

Among the many points addressed by the Dor,vning task force, some of which

remain classified, one of the most debated was the factthat the northern perimeter

fence stood not far from the dormitories at that end of the compound. This proximity

had allowed the terrorists to bring the bomb close to Building 131. The Downing

Report stated: "During his tour of duty, Brigadier General Schwalier never raised to

his superiors force protection matters that were beyond his capability to colrect' Nor

did he raise the issue of expanding the perimeter or security outside of the fence with

his Saudi counterparts in the Eastem Province." Press accounts published in July

1996 also highlighted the subject of moving the northern perimeter fence'ae

Another controversy followed from the fact that the windows of Khobar's dormitories and other buildings had not been treated with Mylar, an inert plastic. Some

commentators argued that this covering or one similar would have reduced the flying

glass shards that had caused most of the casualties. The Downing Report stated: "In

+he 44hthWing (Provisional) budget, items such as Mylar, a shatter resistant window film coating, and surveillance systems for the fence line were deferred rmtil budgets in later years, despite the fact that funds for requested items, even unfirnded

requirements, had never been denied by U.S. Air Forces cental command or u.S.

Air Cornbat Command."so

The Downing Report also directed attention to the inadquate alarm systems of

the American compound, still another issue that would remain controversial' "The

warning systems in the U.S.-occupied portion of Khobar Towers were limited to

Giant Voice," it state4 "a system designed during Operation Desert Storm to alert

people of Scud missile attiacks, and manual warnings, like knocking on doors . . . .

Although GiantVoice provided an audible siren and voice capability, the system had

limited application." The task force also reported: "Procedures to test the evacuation

system and the emergency waming system at KhobarTowers were never exercised.

The GiantVoice procedures were elaborate, unwieldy. and did not work."sr

The report also pointed to the lack ofevacuation practices, another disputed

issue that became influential over time. The report contended: "The 4404th Wing

(Provisional) and subordinate groups and squadrons did not practice evacrurtion procedures. There was an evacuirtion of two buildings for a suspected bomb package in

May 1996 that served to replace a planned rehearsal of evacuation procedures. One

planned exercise was apparently canceled because of Saudi sensitivities."52

187
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Following the release of the Downing Report, the Deparfinent of the Air Force

issued an official statement on that study. "The Dovming Report," it noted "will provide u.S. central command and the Air Force additional proposals to consider in

some very specific areas to include clarifiing command relationships, responsibilities and authority, and improving the integration of command guidance." The statement concluded by directing attention to the work underway by General Record's

group. "The Secretary of the Air Force and the chief of Staf it related. "have directed Lt. Gen. James E Record to consider and make recommendations on issues raised

in the Dou,ning report regarding how the Air Force organizes, trains and equips support forces deployed to U.s. central command. His focus will be on the matter of

force protection."53

Two days after the release of the Dovming Report, on the morning of September

18, Secretary Perry testified about the Dhahran bombing to the House National

Security committee, and that afternoon to the Senate Armed Services committee.

one military journalist reported that the secretary of defense addressed the

congressmen with "his voice choking back emotion" and that he "disarmed most of

his congressional critics by a forthright acceptance of responsibility for the bombing." Secretary Perry told the House committee: "I will not p articipate in the game of

passing the buck. I will not seek to delegate responsibiliff for this hagedy on any of

my military commanders." "They have served our country with enormous distinction

and considerable sacrifice," he continued, "and they deserve our gratitude, not our

blame. To the extent that this tragedy resulted from a failure of leadership, that

responsibility is mine, and mine alone."54

On October 31, about a month and a half after Secretary perry's testimony,

General Record reported to General Fogleman and Secretary widnall, and on

December l l, the results of his work became public. His study group made thirteen

recommendations to improve the protection of forces assigned to Cenfal Command

and elsewhere. These included designating a general officer-led Air Stafforganization to oversee force protection, developing Air Force Instructions to supplement

Defense Department guidance on force protection, and developing formal statements

of requirements for surveillance systems for installation security.55

The Record Report addressed a number of controversial points that had been

discussed in the Downing Report and in the press. on the issue of the northern

perimeter fence, it pointed out that 'Neither the July 1995 nor the January 1996

AFosI [Air Force office of Special Investigations] vulnerability Assessment contained a recommendation to extend the perimeter or enhance stand-off distances."

The Record Report contended that the northem perimeter distance was adequate, in

view of the size of a bomb likely to be used against the compound and went flrther

to state: "The RSo [Regional Security officer, in the u.S. Embassy in Riyadh] indicated that fhis office] would not have questioned an 80-foot stand-offdistance even if

the known threat had included a 1,000 pound bomb. . . . Additionally, the U.S.

consul General in Dhahran stated that 'the thought of a 20,000 or even 5,000 pound

bomb driving up was pretty inconceivable.,'56 I
After the Attack

As for installing Mylar, the report noted that "Brigadier General Schwalier programmed for [a] four million dollar [Mylar] project in the Wing's Five-Year Facilities

Improvement Plan. Brigadier General Schwalier made this decision to defer immediate installation after discussions with his Support Group and Civil Engineering

Squadron commanders, and considering a variety of factors, including the thenknornrn threat, the effects of other security enhancements which had been or were

being implemented to mitigate risks, the cost and complexity of the project, the

absence of DoD [Departrnent of Defense] orAir Force requirements for the installation of Mylar, the fact that Saudi approval would have been necessary, and other competing priorities."5T

The Record Report addressed the Dorvning task force's findings concerning the

absence of an alarm system. "The Dovming Report was critical of the lack of a fire

alarm system," it state4 "suggesting that the Wing might have been more successful

in evacuating the building if it could have relied on a fire alarm system rather than the

floor-by-floor notification system that was used. The Civil Engineering Squadron

commander at Khobar Towers at the time of the bombing, Lt. Col. Robbin

Schellhous, explained that the installation of a fire alarm system (in addition to the

smoke detectors already there) was not a high priority because the buildings were

constructed out of concrete." The Record Report added: "There are no DoD standards for waming systems, and the Saudi construction standards for KhobarTowers

did not require a fire alarm system."58

On the subject ofbuilding evacuations, the Record team reported: "While some

Wing personnel interviewed by the Downing Task Force stated that they were not

aware of any building evacrultions prior to the June 25th bombing, a review of the

4404th Security Police Squadron Desk Blotters reveals at least eight buildings were

actually evacrnted at Khobar Towers because Wing personnel discovered suspicious

packages. In fac! Building 131, the building in front of which the bomb exploded,

was evacuated [on] May 9, 1996 because of a reported suspicious package, which

tumed out to be a tool box. " The report continued: "The buildings were evacrxrted in

five minutes or less, an interval which the Support Group commander and the Wing

Fire Chief who were in charge of the evacuation scenes, considered to be as fast as

possible. The testimony suggesting no evacuations may be attributable to the fact that

Wing personnel worked in shifu around-the-clock."sq

General Record had been given disciplinary-review authority and court martialconvening authority. On Decernber 20,1996, he reported: "I have considered everyone in the military chain of command with Force Protection responsibilities associated with the Khobar Towers incident. I have not discovered any evidence that causes

me to believe anyone in that chain of command, or elsewhere, committed any offense

punishable under the fUniform Code of Military Justice] or failed to meet Air Force

standards."60

Three days later Secretary Widnall and General Fogleman reported to Secretary

Perry and Deputy Secretary of Defense White on the Record Report. They forwardedto these senior officials General Record's recommendations about force protection
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

in central command's area of responsibility and elsewhere. Secretary widnall and

General Fogleman also reviewed the Record group's finding that no service member

had been derelict in the performance of his duty and that no court-martial action was

warranted. They concluded: "we support Lt Gen Record's conclusion and believe

that no further action is required."61

About a month later, on January 29, 199'/, Deputy Secretary White replied to

Secretary widnall. He noted that 'fthe Air Force will be conducting a further review

of those issues, focusing on several matters that were not fully considered by

Lieutenant General Record" and stated: "My review of the Record report leads me

to conclude that such firther examination is a prudent course of action and I commend you for it." Mr. White agreed with Secretary Widnall's, and General

Fogleman's, conclusion "that no action under the Uniform code of Military Justice

is called for against any member in the chain of command." while expressing this

agreement, he also stated that the Air Forceb "further review" would give "further

consideration to the propriety of administrative action," as opposed to action under

theUCMJ.

Deputy Secretary white pointed to a number of specific issues that he believed

deserved further shrdy, beyond the work of the Record group. He stated for example,

that the first part of its report "lacks sufficient explanation of the rationale upon

which certain recommendations are offered. Among these are recommendations that

relate to command and control of [intelligence from human sources] service personnel, 'expanding'the rules of engagement in countries where there is no status of

forces agreement, and Lieutenant General Record's conclusion that there is no need

for organized intelligence assets at the wing level."

Mr. white listed some other specific issues meriting further investigation.

"First" he noted, 'T recommend a stronger effort to assess communications deficiencies at the time of the bombing." Second, he suggested'oa more thorough development of the facts" about the planning and practicing for evacuations that the M04th

wing had done before the attack. "Thirq'he listed, "the facts conceming training,

equipping and manning the guard force warrant greater examination." Mr. white also

suggested further study of the procedures for transporting personnel and moving

convoys, a subject addressed by the Downing Report, but not included in General

Record's charter. "FinalM'he concluded, "notwithstanding that extensive and commendable efforts were made to protect the Khobar Towers complex from a penetration attack, additional factual investigation of the adequacy of efforts to protect

against the very type of attack that ultimately occurred is necessary.,,

While suggesting to Secretary Widnall that another study group be commissioned to pursue these issues, Secretary white set no deadline for its work. "The wisdom of your decision to continue the examination into the outstanding issues highlighted by the Downing and Record reports," he stated, "must be matched by a degree

of thoroughness that will only be achievable if sufficient time and effort are dedicated to this review. . . . I encourage you to take as much time as you believe necessary

to carry out this additional assessment."62
After the Attack

About a week later, on February 5, 1997, Secretary Widnall and General

Fogleman asked Air Force Inspector General Lt. Gen. Richard T. Swope and Air

Force Judge Advocate General Maj. Gen. Bryan G. Hawley to examine the issues

that Mr. White had suggested deserved further study. SecretaryWidnall and General

Fogleman also gave Generals Swope and Hawley a second task. While they and Mr.

White agreed with General Record's finding that no court-martial action was warranted, they told the generals: "The first matter to be addressed is whether the actions

or omissions of any Air Force member merit adminisfative sanctions."63

Lieutenant General Swope and Major General Hawley were highly qualified to

head such an investigation. General Swope had been the weapons officer ofthe 555th

Tactical Fighter Squadron at Udorn Royal Thai Air Base, Thailand, during the

Vietram War; the inspector general at Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, 1989- I 990;

commander ofthe ThirteenthAir Force, 1994-1996; andAir Force inspector general

since April 1996. General Hawley had long experience in Air Force legal assignments, as a staffjudge advocate at base, numbered air force, and major command

legal offices. He had held that position at Ninth Air Force and USCENTAE,

1988-1990; at Headquarters Military Airlift Command (and chief counsel, U.S.

Transportation Command), 1990-1991; at Headquarters Air Combat Command,

1994-1996;and at Headquarters USAF since February 1996.64

These two senior officers were supported by an investigative team of twelve

members, nine appointed by Lieutenant General Swope on February 6 and three othen by Major General Hawley eleven days later. Headed by a team chief and a legal

advisor from the Air Force IG office, this group included experts in the areas of security, human-source intelligence, fire and disaster preparedness, counterintelligence

and anti-terrorism, and intelligence, as well as additional legal advisors.65 Consistent

with Mr. Whiteb suggestiorl Secretary Widnall and General Fogleman assigned no

deadline to their study.66

The Swope-Hawley Report was completed in April 1997, although not published nntil months laIer.67 It concluded that the commanders of the 4404th Wing

"and all those in the force protection chain of command" were 'Vigorous and diligent

and fully engaged in providing the fulI range of security for the Khobar Towers compound. No adminisfiative sanctions are warranted."68

The Swope-Hawley Report addressed the several specific issues that Mr. White

had listed. It also discussed a number of the particular points that had been widely

debated during the months after the bombing, including the proximity ofthe northern

fence to the dormitories at that end of the compound. The Swope-Hawley Report

noted the efforts of Air Force personnel to get this boundary moved firther north,

away from the housing are4 and stated there were "indications that suggested that the

Saudis would never agree to move the perimeter." The report quoted the consul general in Dhahran as saying 'Now for them [the wing] to have extended the perimeter,

I think it would have required moving of heaven and earth.'6e

As for the issue of window coverings, the Swope-Hawley Report found that

Brigadier General Schwalier had concluded "that the threat was not high enough to

191
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

warrant its immediate installation. Specific information concerning Mylar that he

had available was that its utility was uncertiain, installation required special skills and

estimates were approximately $50 a square meter." The report also pointed out that

'fthe standoffdistances for the postulated threat achieved by the fence-barrier combination plus the additional distance provided by added Saudi security at the northern

perimeter were thought to be adequate to prevent a major problem. Though he

deferred immediate installation, the wing commander included Mylar in his long

range plan to ensure his successors would not lose sight ofa potential option for risk

reduction should it be necessary."7O

The Swope-Hawley team examined the issue of the Khobar Towers alarm system and reported that the "decision not to install a fire alarm system was based on the

construction of the facilities and the opinions of numerous fire chiefs and headquarten fire protection specialists that such a system was not required. Based on these

inputs, the wing commander, support group commander and civil engineering

squadron commander defened the planned upgrade, the $250K cost

for a fire alarm system into the wing's first Five-Year Facilities Improvement Plan."

The study team did not believe it could state positively that the use of a bornb-threat

alarm, as opposed to a fire alarm, would have reduced significantly the number of

casualties. "While the activation of an automated system (not fire) for the building

would most likely have had more people moving toward exits," the Swope-Hawley

Report stated" "the short time between recognition of the threat and the explosion

makes any meaningful estimates of survivability unlikely"Tl

As for building evacuation exercises, the Swope-Hawley Report found that the

wing had no formal progam to practice them. However, like the Record Report, it

emphasized that the airmen had evacuated some of the facilities on the compound

several times during the months before the bombing, when suspicious packages had

been reported. Based on evidence from security police blotters and airmen interviews, the Swope-Hawley team charted fourteen such evacuations that took place

between November 14, l995.and June 14. 1996.72

When the results of the Swope-Hawley investigation eventually were published,

two Air Force reports were on record supporting General SchwalierS actions. These

two documents, however, proved less influential with the press and public opinion

than the findings of the Dov,ning task force and of some of the Congressional investigaton, which had received earlier publicity. In March 1997 , well before the release

of the Swope-Hawley Report, the Air Force Times reported that'fthe Dovming commission finding that 'the commander of the 4404thWing (Provisional) did not adequately protect his forces from a terrorist attack'has prompted questions from

Congress and the public about why no disciplinary actions have been taken."73

While criticism of the wing commander mounted, General Fogleman put his

ovrn views on the record. As controversy grer,r/ during the late summer of 1996, he

emphasized the difficulty of recognizing small pieces of significant information

within mountains of intelligence, and counseled against second-guessing the commanders in the field. "You can go back with that 20-20 hindsight," General Fogleman
I

I

I

After the Attack

stated that September, "and see all this stray voltage and say, 'Well, everybody lcrew

that.' Well, everybody didn' t know thatl'7 4

As the investigations continued, the chief of staffbecame concemed that action

against General Schwalier would have a chilling effect on other local commanders.

"There are many commanders sitting out there in the field waiting to see what happens in this case," he told the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 25,

1997.*If they, despite their absolute best efforts, are targeted by somebody in an act

of war, and somebody is killed and, no matter what they have done, this town, this

city, this climate cries for their scalp, I hate to think what this will do to the force."75

General Fogleman also pointed out to the committee that, by the time of the bombing, General Schwalier had implemented thirty of thirty-six recommendations to

improve the security of the Khobar Towers that the AFOSI had made in its

VuJnerabilityAssessments, a fact noted in the Record Report.76

During the investigations, and after his retiremen! General Fogleman stated that

those who had called for punishing the Dhahran wing commander had not seen all

the facts. In a December 1997 interview with military historian Richard H. Kohn, he

asserted: "I watched people in Washington make statements on the basis of no factual knowledge whatsover."77

On July 28, 1997, General Fogleman announced that he would retire before

September l, a year before his four-year term as chief of staffexpired. He became the

firstAir Force chief of staffto cut short his tour voluntarily. General Fogleman stated

he was retiring early in part because he believed that one or more Air Force ofiicers

would be unfairly held responsible for the terrorist attack in Dhahran.T8

Press reports connected General Fogleman's annormcement to "a decision due

this week" by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, who had succeeded Secretary

Perry on January 24, 1997 ,7e "on whether to sanction Air Force officers for leaving"

the Khobar Towers complex "lulnerable to the June 1996 explosion." In his statement on Monday, July 28, General Fogleman said: "I reached my decision this weekend after much deliberation, and it is my intent that this announcement defuse the

perceived confrontation between myself and Secretary Cohen over the Khobar

Towers terrorist bombing last year."

Although press reports emphasized the connection between the Air Force chief

of staff's early retirement and Secretary Cohen's impending announcement about

Brigadier General Schwalier's promotion, General Fogleman's decision had alarger

context. While the chief of staff said on July 28 tl:r;t he intended to defirse the perceived confrontation between the secretary of defense and himself, he also stated:

"My values and sense of loyalty to our soldiers, sailors, Marines and especially our

airmen led me to the conclusion that I may be out of step with the times and some of

the thinking of the establishment. This puts me in an awkward position." General

Fogleman emphasized an issue larger than General Schwalierb promotion as he continued: "If I were to continue to serve as Chief of StaffoftheAir Force and speak out,

I could be seen as a divisive force and not a team player. I do not want the Air Force

to suffer for my judgment and my convictions."80

r93
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Professor Kohn, in an introduction to his interview with the retired Air Force

chief of stafl published in Decernber 1997, pointed out that "General Fogleman's

decision to leave was neither a resignation nor an act of protest; it was a retirement.

Had he resigned in protest, he would have waited until the Secretary of Defense

announced his decision in the Schwalier case and explained publicly and unambiguously that the request for retirement was the product of disagreements over specific

decisions and policies." "Instea{" Kohn noted" "General Fogleman chose to leave

quietly''8r

In his final remarks during his interview with Professor Kohn, the chief of staff

did not speak narrowly about the Dhahran bombing, but rather in much broader

terms. "In my heart, on the personal level and on the professional level," General

Fogleman stated, "I concluded that my continued service was not in the best interest

of the Air Force, in Washington 

"vhere 

I was serving, given my beliefs, and considering the advice I was offering to our national leadership."82

The Senate had confirmed Brigadier General Schwalier's promotion to major

general before the KhobarTowers bombing. It was to become effective on January I,

l99l ,but the Air Force announced that action on it would be delayed" "pending the

resolution of an inquiry into the circumstances the June 25,1996,terrorist bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia."83

On July 3 I , 1997 

, 

rhree days after General Fogleman's early retiremen! Defense

Secretary Cohen, accompanied by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John

M. Shalikashvili, presented his report, "PersonalAccountabilif for Force Protection

at Khobar Towers," at a Pentagon briefing and press conference. Addressing the

assembled journalists Ihat day, Secretary Cohen stated: "I found that Brig. Gen.

Terryl Schwalier, the wing commander at the time, did not adequately assess the

implications of a possible attack on the perimeter of the Khobar complex. As a result,

he did not develop an effective plan for responding to a perimeter attack. Based on

this finding, I have concluded that it would not be appropriate to promote Brigadier

General Schwalier to the rank of major general."sa

In Secretary Cohen's July 31 press conference, he discussed two specific issues

that his report also developed. 'As my report explains," the secretary stated, "there

were several security deficiencies, but two of them stood out. First, Khobar Towers

had no effective alarm system to warn of an impending terrorist attack. Second, the

evacuation plans for the residents in Khobar Towers were inadequate, and the command had not developed, tested, and trained personnel to use evacuation plans."85

On the same day that Secretary Cohen presented his report, General Schwalier

issued a statement announcing that he had requested retirement. He cited three things

that constantly had been "at the forefront" ofhis thoughts before, and after, Secretary

Cohen announced his decision. "Firsf ' General Schwalier sai{ "my overriding emotion is one of sadness for the victims and their families. Our airmen did-and continue to-- carry out the duties our government sends them to do in faraway places.

These duties and places involve risk. We, as Americans, must be proud of them and

support them." He continued: "Second my strong desire is that the cowards respon-
After the Attack

sible for this tragedy-the terrorists-be captured and punished. Thir4 my intense

hope is that comrnanders in the field will not be unduly criticized every time something bad happens." General Schwalier went into retirement, and the question of his

promotion remained an issue for many years.86

In the aftermath ofthe KhobarTowers bombing, Americans remained frustrated

that the perpetrators were not captured and punished. From the outset ofthe investigation, United States officials were disappointed with the cooperation they received

from Saudi Arabia. Soon after the attrack it became evident that the enormous differences between the criminal justice systems of the two countries, combined with the

Saudi view thatthe KhobarTowers bombing was an internal matter oftheirkingdorrl

would prove frustrating to American investigaton.8T

An incident that took place the moming after the explosion exemplified how the

two nations, within a matter of hours after the bombing, already were responding

very differently to it. The Saudi governmentregardedthe terrorist strike as an embarrassment and wanted the visible evidence of it destroyed as soon as possible.

Accordingly, when Brigadier Generals Schwalier and Dick arrived at Building 131

around 5:30 a.m. on June 26, a Saudi or third-country national was bulldozing tlre

site. The United States government, in contrast, believed the scene of the attack

should be preserved, because it contained evidence critically important in determining who was responsible for the at|ack. It took the intervention of the wing cornmander and other senior officials to stop the bulldozing.88

Episodes like this one convinced manyAmericans, from the earliest days of the

investigation, that they would have difficulty getting full cooperation with the Saudis.

U.S. officials found that although the local authorities collaborated closely with the

FBI team in the forensic study of the bomb fragments on the compound they were

not cooperative in regard to the suspects they held in the case.8e Very soon after the

bombing, the Saudi governrnent began detaining a number of their own nationals,

who were virtually all, if not all, radical dissident Shiite Muslims.eo FBI director

Louis J. Freeh traveled to Saudi Arabia tw'ice within seven days in July 1996, to ask

law enforcement officials there to observe U.S. legal standards in the investigation

and to gain access forAmerican investigators to the suspects being held. He was not

successfirl in either effort.er In late January 1997,lvk. Freeh and Attorney General

Janet Reno complained publicly that Saudi officials were not sharing the results of

their investigation of the bombing.e2

In the face of these frustrations, there seemed to be a break in the KhobarTowers

case during the spring of 1997. On March l8 in an Ottawa suburb, the Royal

Canadian Mounted Police arrested on an immigration charge Hani Abdel Rahim alSayegh, a Saudi national who was a Shiite Muslim dissident.e3 Canadian investigators concluded that the Dhahran bombing was the work of a militant group of Shiite

Saudi Arabians, with links to Hezbollah, the pro-Iranian organizalion based in

Lebanon. They identified two conspirators in the Khobar Towers plot: Ahmed

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Ibrahim Ahmad al-Mughassil, whom they characteized as its "masterminfr' and

Jaafar Chueikhat who was arrested by Synan agents soon after the attack and was

found dead in his prison cell in Sgia under suspicious circumstances.e4 Canadian

officials alleged that Mr. Sayegh drove the white Chewolet Caprice used as a getaway

car by the bombers and the Canadians sought a deportation order for him in one of

their federal courts.e5 In May that court ruled that Sayegh could be deported, and the

following month, Canadian immigration officials and Mounties brought him to

Washington, D.C.e6

At first, FBI and other Justice Department officials hoped that Sayegh would

provide valuable information about the Khobar Towers bombing. They intended to

arraign him on charges of conspiring to killAmerican nationals in a case unrelated to

the Dhahran attack. In exchange for a reduced sentence on these charges, Sayegh was

to tell what he knew about the Khobar bombing and perhaps shed light on the question of whether the attrack had been planned solely by Saudi dissidents or whether the

kanian government also had been involved.eT

This arrangement came unravelled in early July, when the suspect denied having

any information about the terrorist act in Dhahran and contended that he had been in

kan at the time. Sayegh's attorney stated that his client had misled his oum lawyers as

well as FBI agents about the extent of his knowledge of "individuals and practices"

related to terorism inside Saudi Arabia, suggesting that he did so with the hope of

being deported liom Canada to the United States, rather than to Saudi Arabia. In a

D.C. federal court on July 30, Sayegh pleaded not guilty to the conspiracy charges,

which unhinged his agreement with the American authorities.e8 Lacking the evidence necessary to bring the suspect to trial, Justice Department officials dropped the

charges against Sayegh that autumn and later extradited him to Saudi Arabia.ee

Mr. Freeh publicly held the Saudis responsible for the collapse of the Sayegh

case, stating that they had failed to provide evidence against the suspect that could be

used in a U.S. court. The American govefllment was frustrated by this particular

episode and, more flrndamentally, by the lack of Saudi cooperation in the investigation. Moreoveq the two nations arrived at different assessments of the responsibilif

for the bombing. Based on evidence the Canadians had gathered in the Sayegh case

and on information from other sources, U.S. officials suspected that the Khobar

Towers attack had been perpetrated by Saudi Shiite extremists, supported by Iran's

radical Islamic govemment.rOO Saudi Arabia took another point of view. OnMay 22,

1998, Interior Minister Prince Ibn lxbdul Anz Nayef w{ro confiolled his country's

police force, stated that the bombing was solely the work of Saudi dissidents and flatly denied any Iranian or other foreign involvement.l0t

As U.S. officials became increasingly frustrated with the Saudis over the investigation, the Americans wound doun their efforts in Dhahran. Although the Justice and

Defense Depaltalents vowed that they would not close the Khobar Towers case, the

FBI with&ew virtualy all of its investigators from SaudiArabia. By June 1998 only

one agent, who served as a legal altachl and liaison to the Saudis, remained in

Dhahran.lo2
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After the Attack

Three years later, however, the Khobar Towers case took a heartening turn. On

June 2l ,2001 , a federal gand jury in Alexandria, Virginia delivered a forty-six-count

indictment against thirteen Saudis and one Lebanese national, charging them with

carrying out the Dhahran bombing. The prosecutors secured this legal document just

days before the five-year statute of limitations would have expired on its charges of

attempted murder and conspiracy.l03

The June 21 indicfrnent did not include any kanian nationals, nor did it direct$

accuse Iran oflegal responsibility for the Khobar Towers attack. In a press conference

held the same day, however, Attorney General JohnAshcroft, who had assumed that

post on February 1, forcefirlly addressed this subject. He blamed unnamed kanian

officials for the bombing, stating that they had "inspired, supported, and supervised"

the fourteen men named in the indictrnent, all of whom, he pointed out, were members of Hezbollah.lo4

The June 2001 indictnnents again raised hopes ofa break in the case. "I :Im very

confident that they will be brought to justice," Mr. Freeh said of those who had been

indicte4 "and hopefirlly in the United States, some of them, at some point." Air Force

Chief of StaffGen. Michael E. Ryan, stated: "These indictments sendthe message to

all terrorists that ttrey will be hunted dorvn and will pay for their crimes."l0s President

George W Bush, who had taken office in January 2001, reasserted the commitment

to pursue the case, made by President Clinton five years earlier. At the time of the

indictments, President Bush told the families of the Khobar Towers victims: "Your

government will not forget your loss, and will continue working, based on the evidence, to make sure thatjustice is done"106

The optimism raised by the indictments soon dissipated. According to Saudi

Interior Minister Prince Nayef, eleven of the fourteen suspects named in the document already were being held in jails in his country. The United States had no extradition treaty with Saudi Arabia. In an interview that Prince Nayef gave soon after the

indicfrnents, he made it clear that extraditing the eleven suspects was not a negotiable

issue. "The trials must take place before Saudi judicial authorities," he asserted, "and

our position on this question will not change. No other entity has the right to try or

investigate any crimes occurring on Saudi landsJ'Io7

Mr. Kenneth Katzman, a Middle East analyst with the Congressional Research

Service, offered a feason for Saudi Arabia's position on the investigation. "If the

Saudis give these people to us," he suggested, "they're going to obviously be afraid

that the FBI will develop stronger evidence that the Iranians were involved. That

would just completely throw them offtrack with Iran. . . . The foreign policy drove

how this thing was going to come out."lo8

Many years after the Khobar Towers bombing, the case remained unresolved.

With the passing of time, it became less likely that the eleven prisoners held by the

Saudis would be brought to justice in an American court, and less likely that any of

the other three suspects would be arrested. In December 2006, federul trial judge

Royce C. Lambeth mled that Iran bore significant responsibility for the Dhahran

bombing and its government should pay damages to surviving family mernbers of

r97
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

airmen killed in the attack. There was considerable uncertainty, however, that the

fifty-five relatives who participated in this lawsuit would ever obtain any ofthe damages awarded flr"-.10e Uncertainties like this, controversies, and frusfiation continued to surround the Dhahran terrorist attack.

Nonetheless, a few firm conclusions can be drawn about the Khobar Towers

tragedy. First, the bornbing had a larger context, which emerged in the horrendous

events that took place about five years later in NewYork City, Washington, D.C., and

southern Pennsylvania. After Septemberl 1, 2001, it became possible to view the

altack at the Khobar Towers, like those at the World Trade Center in February 1993,

Riyadh in November 1995, the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in

August 1998, the USS Cole in October 2000, and others, as precursors to the despicable assaults on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon that led President George

Vl Bush to declare war on terrorists around the world. I 1 0 American officials believed

that the Dhahran bombing had been perpetrated by Saudi dissidents, supported by

Irar\ rather than the al Qaeda network and the Taliban government ofAfghanistan,

who were responsible for the September 1l attacks.rlr Nonetheless, the fiagedy in

Dhahran in 1 996 prefigured the ones in New York and Washington five years later.

Second, Americans can be proud of their airmen who were on duty at the

Khobar Towers on the night of hure 25, 1996. These men and women were keenly

aware that they served in a dangerous part of the world and yet they were quietly

determined to perform their mission, without fanfare. Captain Matthew Winkler, a

pilot of the 71 st Rescue Squadron who was wounded in the bombing, offered a point

of view shared by many others in his situation. "We knew we were in a hot spot," he

stated. And then he added, without a hint of emotion: "It comes with the territory. It

comes with ourjob."l12

Third, the caregivers in Dhahan and elsewhere held a common attitude about

helping the airmen who had been wounded by the bombing. Although they of course

regreted that the tragedy had taken place, they welcomed the opportunity to use their

professional skills to aid their comrades. Like Captain Winkler, SSgt. MaryAnna

Schuchman of the Landshrtrl Regional Medical Center also spoke for many of her

fellow professionals. "I'm just really glad that I was able to help," she stated 'khen

the time 

"urn",l13 Finally, one of the most heartening aspects of the Khobar Towers tragedy was

that the airmen received superb professional care. An exchange between one caregiver and one patient at Landstuhl no doubt represented the gratitude expressed by hundreds ofother KhobarTowers vetemns. CapIanLydraE. Vasquez, a medical-surgical

nurse at the LRMC, recalled asking one of her patients, "What can I do to make

things easier for you?" The airman replied: "You're doing it already. I'm so grateful

to be here"ll4

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Epilogue

The conduct of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein brought about Operation

Southern Watch and other military operations to enforce a series of United Nations

resolutions. In mid-September 2002, roughly a year after al Qaeda's tenorist attiacks

on the United States, President George W Bush called on the United Nations to confront the Baghdad dictator, who had been defring the UN for more than a decade.

The chief executive stated that the United States, with or without the support of the

United Nations, would act if Saddam failed to comply with the UN resolutions that

called on him to end his programs of weapons of mass destruction. On the evening

of March 11.2003. President Bush issued an ultimatum that Saddam and his sons

must leave Iraq within forty-eight hours.l

Saddam ignored this warning, and the United States launched a military action,

Operation kaqi Freedom, with American and British ground forces moving llom

northem Kuwait into kaq. Air operations soon followed andAmerican units began

entering Baghdad on April 5. Saddam went into hiding, but soldiers of the 4th

Infantry Division captured him in December 2003.2

It took only about three weeks to seize Baghdad and remove Saddam from

power. Operation Southern Watch contributed a great deal to this success. The

twelve years ofsorties that had enforced the southem and northem no-fly zones had

given the Air Force valuable information about kaq's military behavior; and before

Operation Iraqi Freedom began, the American airmen increased their Northern and

Southern Watch strikes, helping to reduce the air defenses that Saddam could

employ against them. In addition, Prince Sultan Air Base was the site of the

Combined Air Operations Center that directed air operations during the Baghdad

campaign and during Operation Enduring Freedom's strikes against al Qaeda and

the Taliban inAfghanistan. At the height of these operations, Prince SultanAir Base

provided a home to about two hundred coalition aircraft.3

In these and other ways, Operations Northern and Southern Watch contributed

to Operation Iraqi Freedom. But at the same time, the coalition's success in ending

Saddam's regime meant that the flights to enforce the no-fly zones were no longer

needed. Operation Southern Watch, which had brought the American airmen to the

KhobarTowers, ended when Operation Iraqi Freedom began.a

With the end of Saddam's regime, the Air Force also began to leave Prince

SultanAir Base. The CAOC went into "mothball" status and the USAF aircraft left

during the spring and summer of 2003. During an August 2 I ceremony that inactivated the 363d Air Expeditionary Wing, its commander spoke poignantly of the

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

short, but significant, history of the Air Force presence at Prince Sultan. "We came

here under difficult circumstances following the Khobar Towers bombing," Col.

James Moschgat reflected. "The mission thrived and prospered here, and I believe

our legacy will live on."5

Operation SouthernWatch came to an end. The dictator it contained during the

1990s had been defeated and captured. But the mission that the United States Air

Force once served in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia-and the nineteen airmen who gave

their lives for it-were not forgotten.

On June 25, 1999, the third anniversary ofthe bombing, Acting Secretary ofthe

Air Force F. Whitten Peters dedicated a Khobar Towers exhibit in the Enlisted

Heritage Hall on the Gunther Annex of Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. It features a dramatic backdrop, an enlarged photograph of Building 131 after the terrorist attack. In front of this compelling image are three manequins in the uniforms

wom by three of the airmen who were killed in the bornbing: AlC. Justin R. Wood,

SSgt. KevinJ. Johnson, andMSgt. Michael G. Heiser. The exhibit also displays artifacts that were recovered after the explosion, and an Air Force News videotape

relates the story ofthe bombing and its aftermath.6

This visual presentation includes coverage of another Khobar Towers memorial, one that was dedicated at Prince Sultan Air Base about a year after the attack.

One Air Force writer said of this monument: "Many airmen deployed to Prince

Sultan Air Base often would visit a place on [that] base that held the reason for why

they were there. That place was the KhobarTowers Memorial." In June 2003, as the

Air Force was departing Prince Sultan, a ceremony was held at this monument and

it was then moved to the Air Force Museum, at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,

Ohio. The memorial's inscription reads: "Their sacrifice shall blaze as a flame in our

hearts."7

Leaving the Enlisted Heritage Hall video program with its coverage of the

Prince Sultan/Wright-Patterson memorial, a visitor sees twelve monuments in front

of the building. Among them is one, sponsored by the Michael G. Heiser

Foundation, of a sword mounted on a stone base. Its flont is inscribed: "Khobar

Towers Dhahran, Saudi Arabia htne 25,1996." Two of its other faces list, by base,

the casualties of the terrorist attack. The fourlh side reads: "The sword of retribution

and vigilance for our 19 lost warriors so others may live."

Located appropriately near this memorial is one to another casualty ofterrorism,

SMSgt. Sherry Olds, a graduate of the Senior Noncommissioned Officer Academy

who was killed in the bornbing of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya, two years after the

KhobarTowers attack. It is also fitting that Gunterb monument to the Dhahran casualties stands near one to Operation kaqi Freedom, which ended the reign of Saddam

Hussein. The actions of this Iraqi dictator had necessitated Operation Southern Watch

and brought theAmerican airmen to the KhobarTowers.8

A year after the official opening of the Gunther exhibit, on the fourth anniversary of the bombing, a beautiful memorial was dedicated at PafickAir Force Base.

A striking monument of nine panels in rose granite, it stands at the southern end of

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Epilogue

the installation's ceremonial area, just north of Thor Street and the 45th Mission

Support Group Headquarters, Building 425.The other three sides of this park-like

setting are bordered by FalconAvenue on the west, Edward H. White Street on the

north, and Titan Road on the east. A large flagpole flying Old Glory is the most

prominent feature of the ceremonial area. Its perimeter is decorated by a colorful

display of the flags ofthe fifty states and by the palm trees often found in this part of

Florida. Not far northeast of the ceremonial area stands Building 439, the Seaside

Chapel uihere, on Sunday, June 30, 1996, President Bill Clinton met with the families of the deceased airmen from Patrick. Just south of this chapel is Building 431,

the base theater where, on the same day, the memorial service was held.e

The curved design of Patrick's KhobarTowers memorial draws the viewer's eye

to its center. On its cenfral panels are the porhaits and names of the five airmen from

Patrick who gave their lives in Dhahran: Capt. Christopher J. Adams, Capt. L.

TimothyHaun, MSgt.Michael G. Heiser, SSgt. KevinJ. Johnson, andAlC. JustinR.

Wood. Below these names appear those of the other fourteenAir Force casualties.lO

Another beautiful Khobar Towers memorial, this one of gray granite, stands on

Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Appropriately, it is just across Nomad Way from

Building l3l2,the home of the 58th and 60th Fighter Squadrons (eight of Eglinb

casualties were mernbers of the 58th and one was a member ofthe 60th), and not far

from Building 13 15, the headquarters of the 33d Fighter Wing. A walkway lined by

four granite benches, two on either side, leads the visitor flom Nomad Way into a

small plaza with the memorial, four more benches, and poles that fly the flags of the

United States and of the 33d Fighter Wing. An encircling stand of oaks and pines,

common on Eglin, buffer the area fiom the nearby parking lots and roadways.

Running across the top of the memorial are the poignant words President

Clinton spoke at the Sunday, June 30, service: "Our Nomads have ceased their wandering." Below this quotation are twelve panels, one for each of Eglin's casualties:

SrA. Jeremy A. Thylor, TSgt. Daniel B. Cafourek, AlC. Brian W McVeigh, TSgt.

Patrick P Fennig, AlC. Brent E. Marthaler, SrA. Earl E CartreIte,Jr., Sgt. Millard D.

"Soup" Campbell, TSgt. Thanh V (Gu$ Nguyen, AlC. Joseph E. Rimkus, AlC.

Joshua E. Woody, AlC. Peter J. Morgera, and MSgt. Kendall K. Kitson, Jr. Each

panel has its airman's porhait, name, his city and state of enlistment, unit, career

field, and an epitaph.

In front of this gray granite memorial and centered between the plaza's two

flagpoles is a distinctive monument, with a flaming sword like the one on the

emblem ofthe 33d FighterWing. Its inscription reads: "This monument is dedicated to the brave warriors who were killed by a terrorist bomb at Khobar Towers,

Saudi Arabia, on June 25,1996. They made the ultimate sacrifice as guardians of

this grateful nation. We shall never forget them." The base of this monument stands

above a pool, which is encircled by seven granite markers. Here the visitor can read

the names of the Dhahran casualties who were fiom bases other than Eglin: the five

from Patric[ AlC. Christopher Lester, Wright-PattersonAir Force Base, Ohio; and

SSgt. Ronald L. King, OffrttAir Force Base, Nebraska.rr

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

At night the area is floodlit, and during the day mockingbirds call from the

nearby oaks and pines. The visitor also hears another sound, for the Khobar Towers

memorial is not far from Eglin's flightline. Overhead there is a prolonged, growling

rumble that turns back into itself. A fighter clirnbs into the sky, and the United States

Air Force continues to perform its mission.
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Appendix: Biographical Sketches

The twelve biographical sketches below are based on information compiled by

the 33d Fighter wing's office of Public Affairs, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. The

ranks and names are given as in the text.

Technical Sergeant Daniel B. Cafourek

-Home 

of record: Watertorvn, South Dakota.

-33d Fighter Wing Maintenance Professional of theYear, 1995.

-{onsidered by most as the "Resident Mechanic of the F-15."

-From a close friend: The consgmate professional, indisputably recognized as the

squadron's finest crew chief. He carried out his duties with quiet resolve and

dedication to detail. The first certified technician in the wing.

-Personally, 

Dan had one of the largest hearts and strongest commitments to

friendships. His stoic demeanor was shed when carousing with friends, when his funloving and utterly hysterical persona shone through. He loved his wife, friends, fast

cars, tuning up his '93 Mustang, and rock and roll.

Sergeant Millard D. Campbell

-Home of record: Angelton, Texas.

-Nicknames: 

"Dee" and "Soup."

-Noncommissioned 

Officer, Daily Flight Operations.

-Dee accepted his duties without question, and carried them out with resounding

quality and expertise. He effectively transitioned into his current position prior to

deploying to Saudi. The job requires the technical knowledge to make quick and precise decisions. He not only performed brilliantly at that position but also at operations

scheduling.

-Dee was quiet and mild mannered. He was the right hand of all supervisors. He

made sure all operations specialists assigred to him were well taken care of. He always

made sure all the younger airmen had somewhere to go during the holidays.

-Dee 

loved baseball and was drafted out of high school to play professionally, but he

declined that opportunity and took a scholarship to attend college. After meeting his

loving wife Marie (his equal in personality and character), he joined the Air Force. He

played squadron softball and, ofcourse, led the team in hits, home runs, and runs batted in. Dee is a class act who will be missed by all.

SeniorAirman Earl R Cartrette, Jr.

-Home 

of record: Sellersburg, Indiana.

-Nicknames: 

"JR" and "Spoon-man."

-A practical joker who kept times in Saudi light-hearted'

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

-Drew a clown character on the squadron bulletin board to convey lighthearted messages.

-A crew chief by trade, he was assigned to the Support Section.

-He enjoyed auto racing and spent time rebuilding a chevy Nova. His father had

owned this car and then sold it before he passed away in 1992. JR bought it back and

was rebuilding it as a tribute to him.

Technical Sergeant Patrick P. tr'ennig

-Home of record; Greendale, Wisconsin.

-Flightline Expeditor.

-Pat was well traveled, having served in seven assignments during sixteen years of

service.

-He excelled as a Flightline Expeditor because he was able to juggle the many

demands of daily flying while taking care of the young men and women on the flightline. He was loved and respected by his subordinates because of his devotion to them.

Pat was selfless; he was the first to volunteer for any deployment. During 1993_1996

he deployed in support of operation Uphold Democracy and operation Southern

Watch three times.

-Pat loved the Air Force, traveling, shooting, scuba diving, aad spear fishing. He

liked the finer things in life: gourmet food good wine, good scotch, and he wouldn't

hesitate to pay $50 for a good" hand-rolled cigar.

-Pat lived life to the fullest and seized every minute!

Master Sergeant Kendall Kitson

-Home of record: Yukon, Oklahoma; born in Virginia.

-Nickname: "K.K."

-Had a doum-to-earth sense of humor.

-Remembered 

for his straightforward sayings, such as: "Let me look into my crystal

ball and see what I can find to support the mission.',

-Always kept his cool as production superintendent, even when the jets were not

cooperating.

-Enjoyed boating and fishing and volleyball with the froops in Saudi.

Airman First Class Brent E. Marthaler

-Home of record: Cambridge, Minnesota.

-Was nominated the 58th Fighter Squadronb .Airman of the euarter.',

-Winner of the Top Performer of the Month for TAMS Flight in lantnry 1996.

-{rew chief of the squadron commander's jet, always observed putting in an "extra

effort" to keep his jet flying.

--€reat attitude: polite; instrumental in keeping spirits high.

-At shift change, Brent would enthusiastically yell to his comrades: "Good morning,

mid shift."

-Devoted time teaching Sunday School class to children at the Eglin Base chapel.
Biographical Sketches

Airman First Class Brian W. McVeigh

-Home of record: Debary, Florida.

-{rewchief.

-Had a very quiet personality.

-Enjoyed 

weight lifting: one pilot recalled, "Brian would crush your hand when you

shook hands with him at the jet."

-He was a big fan of auto racing.

Airman First Claes Peter J. Morgera

-Bom in Massachusetts.

{ame to Eglin Air Force Base from the 53d Fighter Squadron, Spangdahlem,

Germany.

-Assistant 

Dedicated Crew Chiefi earned an Air Force Achievement Medal for maintaining his aircraft aIa90.2 percent fully mission-capable rate, well above the 84 percent standard for the Air Force in Europe.

-Deployedto 

Incirlik, Turkey, in support of Operation Provide Comfort.

-Assigned 

to the 33d Operations Support Squadron in January 1996 as an end of

runway technician.

-Volunteered 

to go to Saudi so he could upgrade to five level the right way, "By

crewing jets."

-Pete 

was a reliable and hard-working professional.

-He enjoyed playing darts, shooting pool, and going to the beach.

-He was a very caring individual-never without a smile.

Technical Sergeant Than V. Nguyen

-Bom in Saigon, SouthVietram.

-Nickname: 

"Gus." When he arrived in the U.S., he and his brother had the same first

name; he was baptized in the Roman Catholic Church and given the nameAugustino.

---Gold Flag Combat Oriented Repair Initiative Manager.

-Directly responsible for his wing being recognized as having the most productive

Gold Flag program inAir Combat Command.

-A key contributor to a Gold Flag grand total savings of $4.613 million in fiscal

years 1994 and 1995 and in the first quarter offiscal yem 1996.

-Viebramese 

linguist protocol volunteer for EglinAir Force Base.

-Volunteered 

many hours in the commtmity helping victims of Hurricane Opal.

Airman First Class Joseph E. Rimkus

-Home 

of record: Madison. Illinois.

-Nickname: 

"Dinky:'

-Weapons 

Load Crew.

-Very respectful, well mannered-he always wore a necktie when visiting his grandmother because she liked seeing him in one.

-Always 

volunteered for additional duties and never complained.

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Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

-Enjoyed 

playing basketball.

-Was a "closet barbet'': while in Saudi, enjoyed cutting his friends hair.

Senior Airman Jeremy A. Taylor

-Born in Kansas.

-Assigned 

to the 33d Maintenance Squadron as a jet engine mechanic.

-Son of a career military father, a retired Chief.

-Played soccer in high school, became an avid beach volleyball player at Eglin.

-During 1993-1996, coached childrens' soccer teams on Eglin; during 1995, coached

womens'softball.

-An outgoing personality who enjoyed cookouts with his fellow mechanics.

-Very close to his family: talked to them on the phone every Sunday.

Airman First Class Joshua E. Woody

-Home of record: Coming, California.

-Weapons 

Load Crew.

-A selfless worker with an outgoing personality. He was upbeat, spirited, and always

had a smile on his face.

-He was an accomplished high school wrestler.

-Recentlymarried, 

he was looking forwardto returning home to his new spouse.

The five biographical sketches below appeared in ttre 45th SpaceMng Missileer,

l:l (July 5, 1996), 1, 8, and 9:

Captain Christopher J. Adams was called "Chris" by his friends. He had two

loves in his life: his best friend and fiancee Air Force Capt. Karen oullette and their

new 32-foot cabin cruiser "Diamond Ring." He named his boat for his girl because

after their upcoming wedding, Chris and Karen were going to sail "Diamond Ring" to

the Bahamas for the honeymoon that will never be . . . . Most of their friends received

the wedding invitations a few days before the blast.

According to friends, Captain Adams knew he and Karen were getting married

five years ago. It was the last thing on their "Five Year Plan." They were right on schedule, too, according to his friend and fellow squadron member Capt. Jed Hudson. The

five years were up in October, time to settle dourn and start a family.

"Chris would drop everything in a second to help someone else," said fellow pilot

Capt. Ted Ferguson, who also was Captain Adams'roommate. The two captains met

when they were stationed at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, in 1990, assigned to

the 4l st Tactical Airlfift Squadron.

The captain's peers said his concern was always his people. "That was his job as

an officer. When he had a decision to make as an aircraft commander, his concern was

always his crew-what was best for his creq" said Capt. George Kochis, pilot. "And

everyoneb input was important, from the junior airman up."

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Biographical Sketches

Captain Ferguson agrees. "Chris would do anything for the good of the squadron

and the good of its people. One year at Chrisfinas, Chris volunteered to take a Saudi

rotation for a married guy so he could spend the holiday with his family."

Captain Adams also volunteered for and participated in airlift operations during

Operation Desert Calm and was selected to fly a sensitive mission filming the oil fires

of Kuwait during Desert Storm. He later deployed to support Provide Promise, the

humanitarian airlift to Bosnia, and flew 16 missions under combat conditions.

Captains Hudson and Adams were with Chris the day before he shipped out to

Saudi. They took Diamond Ring for a voyage on the Indian River, and promptly ran

her aground. . . . Captain Hudson said they spent a good part ofthe night fylng to get

the boat free so he could dock it and catch his flight the next day.

The loadmasters affectionately referred to Airman First Class Justin R Wood

as "Junior," because he was the youngest member of the squadron. They even gave

him his oun aircraft . . . the eight-foot C-130 model mounted in front of the 71st. It

was meant to be a joke-to raze lhe young loadmaster, who squadron members

described as "successfirlly guillible" as the new guy.

Jnnior joined the 71st on January 5, 1995 . He was the flrst active duty loadmaster

to go from civilian to fully qualified loadmaster, a job normally reserved for experienced personnel. He was on his second deployment to Saudi Arabia and just two

weeks shy of his 21st birthday-which he would have celebrated July l6-when he

died. But during his short life, he managed to fly 34 combat support missions, and his

actions contributed to the squadron being credited with 10 lives saved.

Squadron members describe Airman Woods as the person who kept everyone

laughing with his Jim Carey'AceVentura" impressions.

He was always "on" according to MSgt. Julien Johnson. "He was just like a puppy

is. The energy he gave offto the rest of the squadron was uplifting," said Sergeant

Johnson, a fellow loadmaster. "There wasn't a dorvn side to Justin. He was fuIl of energy. He could put a smile on anyone's face."

That's the hard part for his buddies in Dormitory Building 506, said Senior Airman

Robert Carceiri, who was Airman Woods' fellow loadmaster and dorm neighbor.

"We are like a family. He was always making everyone laugh. He was the happiest person I knew,"Airman Carceiri said.

"You couldn't walk by him without cracking a smile," said Sergeant Johnson.

"The only time I ever saw him down was when he fell in love with Pocahantas at

DisneyWorld."

"Yeah," said Airman Carceiri. "He did everything he could to get her attention . . .

but she just brushed him off."

But that was Junior being Junior, according to Sergeant Johnson. "He was always

moving, doing something. Once, when we were in Nevada, we went to Las Vegas and

he won $90 in a nickel slot machine. When they came to give him the money they

found out he wasn't 2l andhe was asked to leave the premises and told to not come

back."

207
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

That was cool with Junior, because he took that 90 bucks and bought rollerblades.

He spent the rest of his time of rollerblading everywhere.

"That's just the way he was," said Sergeant Johnson. "He was an entertainer. I still

can't believe he's gone."

Anyone who didn't really know Captain Leland Timothy 66Tim" Haun, would

describe him as a quiet person. But he was very well rounded, according to his peers,

who described him as ajokester, artist, comedian, ferocious reader ofbooks, but first

and foremost a family man. He earned a Bachelor's Degree in Industrial Arts from

Fresno State university in July 1989 and joined the Air Force that same month as a

navigator.

His first duty assignment was to the 4lst Elecfronic Combat Squadron at DavisMonthanAir Force Base, Aizona, where he made quite a name for himself during a

hatning exercise, according to MSgt. Julien Johnson, a loadmaster with the 71 st.

"On the HC-130 we do a lot of radar jamming," Sergeant Johnson said. "During

this particular exercise, they were going in with the ground forces, and their objective

was to knock out the communication with the ground battlefield. Instead of hitting the

battlefield, captain Haun cut the comm with the chow hall and the battle line. Nobody

got called for brealdast or lunch, so the war games came to a standstill because nobody

had eaten anything. The next day they got debriefed and were told that certain frequencies couldn't be jammed anymore because people had gone 1 8 hours without eating."

He was knovyn for those same types of antics at the 71st.

Captain Haun joined the rescue squadron in June 1994. He was credited with saving a life when he participated in a rescue offa ship, 1,600 miles offthe coast of

Florida.

The captain distinguished himself in Dhahran, too, according to his friend and

coworker Captain Kochis.

"He played volleyball in college and was very good at it, but he wouldn't play in

Saudi withus. . . . I guess we weren't good enough forTim," he joked.

The other thing was the volume of mail Captain Haun received in Saudi. "He

always had mail coming in from his family. constantly. And he always sent letters to

them, too," Captain Kochis said. "He would get at least two letters a day from home!"

"How can I explain to you how great this guy was?" said Captain Jenson. "I

mean, I know how I feel, but I can't describe it. There really arenl anv words. But that's

what he was-great."

Master Sergeant Michael G. Heiser joined the 71st Rescue Squadron in

Decernber 1995 as an airborne communications system operator and c-Flight superintendent. He hadn't been at the squadron long before he went away to the HC-130

combat Rescue School at Kirtland Air Force Base. New Mexico. which is a must for

all members of the squadron who participate in rescue operations. He graduated from

Kirtland and had only been back in the squadron a few months before he was sent to

Dhahran to put to practice what he spent months learning.

208
Biographical Sketches

Sergeant Heiser was new' but he made a good first impression on his flight commander, capt. Ben walsh: "when I called him in and told him he was going to be the

new flight supervisor, Sergeant Heiser expressed concern to me that he was too new to

do a good job. I told him I knew he could do the job or I wouldn't have selected him.

He was that conscientious."

Like CaptainAdams, Sergeant Heiser was in the process of settling down in a new

house with his fiancee, Nancy, when he was killed.

Staff Sergeant Kevin J. Johnson was referred to simply as "K.J." None of his

fellow engineers remember why or how he got his nickname, but his friend TSgt.

Bruce Soto said K.J. really enjoyed the moniker.

But his real passion was flying.

According to coworkerTSgt. Dave Lovell, K.J. was always flying. Since becoming a C-I30 flight engineer in 1983, he amassed a total of 5,600 flying hours in a

C-I30 aircraft, 87 of those hours in combat and 280 in combat flight support. A lot of

those hours were spent away from his three children and his wife.

"His wife Shryl wants it known that he loved to fly, and he enjoyed the life [of a

flye4," said Sergeant Soto, fighting back tears as he talked about the guy he'.s knovm

since 1984, when they were both assigned to the 62d Thctical Airlift Squadron at Little

RockAir Force Base, Arkansas. "His devotion to duty was paramount. He never hesitated to volunteer for a mission. He was always 100 percent committed and always

available when we needed him."

K.J.'s devotion to duty had also paid offin a way he will never know. His peers

never got a chance to tell K.J. that right after he left for Saudi, they had recornmended

him for upgrade to flight evaluator-the highest level of proficiency a flight engineer

can attain.

ln addition to his flying, K.J. worked in supply as an additional duty. TSgt. charles

',Stretch" Meador, a loadmaster who worked with Sergeant Johnson in supply, said he

could always hear K.J. coming, because the sergeant insisted on carrying his keyring in

the bottom pocket ofhis flightsuit.

"He couldn't sneak up on you. You could hear him a mile awayl' Sergeant Meador

said. "I used to hear him do'*n the hall and yell ouq 'Hey, K.J.,' and he wondered how

I always knew it was him."

In addition to being devoted to both his family and *re military Sergeant Johnson

was dedicated to the Lord. He was a faithful member of the Holy Name of Jesus parish

in Indiatlantic, which held a memorial service for its brother on June 28.

His christian beliefs helped through another tragedy in 1985, when a c-130 from

his unit crashed at Fort Hood said Sergeant Soto. K.J. was there to help the families of

those who died just as others are gathered around his family now in their time of grief.

. . . K.J. would have wanted it that way.

This biographical sketch of Staff Sergeant Ronald L. King appeared in a booklet

published on the occasion of the 55th Wingb 1999 Birthday Ball:

209
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Looking for a way out of Battle Creek, Michigan, and to see the world" Ronald L.

King enlisted in the Air Force on Septernber 17, 1976. The next 20 years were filled

with exactly what he yearned for-excitrement, havel, and education. In 1985, after nine

successful years as a reprograhics technician, he cross-trained into the contracting

career field. In 1986, he moved to Nellis Air Force Base, Nelada, and specialized as a

supply buyer and small purchase administrator. In January 1989, he volunteered for

assignment to Dhahran, saudi Arabia, where he negotiated a $100,000 contract for

training aids for the Royal Saudi Infanty corps-the first of its kind. Returning to the

states in January 1990, he was assigned to the 55th contracting Squadron, offiittAir

Force Base, Nebraska. Serving as a purchasing agent in the commodities flight, King

became an expert in computer purchases. During operation Desert Shield he often put

in exha hours to ensure emergency computer purchases were made. In three weeks,

King purchased l,l8l items, exceeding the standard by 470 percent! In December

1992, King moved to Ankara Air Base, Turkey, in support of Operation provide

comfort, a humanitarian relief effort in northern haq. During the next l0 months, he

was responsible for the administration of the Turkish Base Maintenance Contract,

where he identified 55 unauthorized contract modifications totaling over $46 million in

unrecorded costs. He also discovered an undetermined amount of relief aid not reaching

the Kurdish refugees, tracked do'*m the vendors, and reestablished required delivery

dates. Having applied for retirement n 1996, he volunteered to postpone his plans and

accept a final temporary assignment to the 4404thwing (Provisional) at King Abdul

AzizAir Base, Dhahran. Much ofhis time was spent purchasing materials and supplies

for the fitress center renovation. Just days short of retuming home to his family, he was

killed in the truck bomb explosion at the Khobar Towers. Kingb love of country, pursuit

of excellence, and outstanding professionalism reflect great credit on himsel{ his family, his squadron, and the Air Force. He was posthumously awarded the Meritorious

Service Medal and the Purple Heart for outstanding service to his country.

This biography of Airman First class christopher B. Lester appeared in the order

of service at his memorial service at wrieht-Patterson Air Force Base. ohio. on Julv 1 .

r996:

Airman First Class Christopher B. Lester was a Power Production Specialist for

the 88th civil Engineer Squadron. Airman Lester was bom in wyoming county, west

virginia, on February 15,1971. He graduated from Pineville High school in 1995.

Airman Lester entered basic military training on July 19, 1995. He graduated

from Basic Power Production Specialist School at SheppardAir Force Base, Texas. on

November 26, 1995, he was assigned to the 88th Civil Engineer Group, WrightPattersonAir Force Base, Ohio.

Airman Lester took charge of maintenance on 35 mobile generators immediately

upon arrival at Wright-Patterson. He also was being trained to maintain aircraft arresting barriers. He was a top-notch airman, dedicated to learning the most he could in his

career.

I

I

i
Biographical Sketches

Airman Lester was awarded the basic Civil Engineer Badge on November 7,

1995. His military decorations include the Purple Heart, Air Force Outstanding Unit

Award National Defense Service Medal, and the Air Force Training Ribbon.

Airman Lester enjoyed softball, basketball, weightlifting, as well as riding motorcycles with members of his shop. He volunteered his time to support squadron fi'rnd

raisen, such as working at Kingb Island.

Airman Lester volunteered for this contingency tour in Saudi Arabia and was

looking forward to the challenge. It was his first deployment.

OnTtesday, Jtme 25, 1996, Airman Christopher Lester, in the company of l8 fellow airmen, was translated from the Church militant to the Church triumphant. His

body will await the resurrection in his home tovm of Pineville, WestVirginia.

He is survived by his mother, Judy; father, Cecil; sister, Jessica; brother, Cecil, Jr.;

his fiancee, Andrea Brooks; together with a great number of family and friends, and a

nation that is deeply gratefirl unto God for one who has served faithful unto death.

2tl
Notes

Chapter One

1. "DailyAircraft Discrepancies," 25 Jun96,

2359 zuht time, in History of the ,l404th Wing

@rovisional), 1 May 3l Jul96, 12 vols., vol. 7,

supporting document II-D56; interview with

SSgt. Jacques P Brutry, C-130 engine mechanic, 7lst Rescue Squadron, PafickAFB, Fla., 5

Feb 97;*MX25 Jun [Daytime]," an undated

note written by Lt. Col. Thomas H. Shafer, commander, deployed 71st Rescue Squadron; "71st

Rescue Squadron History," web page ofthe 7 1 st

Rescue Squadron,24 Aug 98. The History of

the 4404th Wing (Prov.) for 1 May-31 Jul 96

hereafter is cited as ,l404th Wing History with a

volume number and, for volume one (the narrative volume), a page number. For volumes two

ttrough trvelve (the volumes of supporting documents) a supporting document number is

given and, inthe cases where that documenthas

page numbers, apage ntrnber. This official unit

history is classified secret-no foreign-waming

notice: intelligence; all of the material used

from it, throughout this work, is unclassified.

Among the 4404thWing History's supporting

documents is the wing's after action report on

the Khobar Towers bombing: "Khobar Towers'

Terrorist Bombing 25 Jun 96: After Action

Report," Sep 96. ,t404th Wing History vol. 8,

supporting document VI-1. This document is

for official use only and could not be used

directly in a published work. It nonetheless was

helpful in confirming many details found in

other, open sources. The front section quotation

is from an interview of Col. Gary R. Dylewski,

Commander, 33d Fighter Wing, by SSgt. Yancy

Mailes, Historian, 33d Fighter Wing, Eglin

AFB, Fla., 18 Dec 96. Col. Dylewski was promoted to brigadier general on I Aug 99 and to

major general on 1Jan02 (USAF biography of

Maj. Gen. Gary R. Dylewski, Jun 02). The

"Tragedy" section quotation is from a memorandum from the Air Force Office of Special

Investigations Operating Location Cenhal

Command to the deputy commander in chief,

US Cenfal Comman4 25 Jtn96.

2. Brufr interview; Shafer, "MX 25 Jun

fNighttime]:'

3. Interview with Capt. Matthew Winkler,

pilot, 71st Rescue Squadroq PatrickAFB, Fla.,

5 Feb 97.

4. Bruffy interview; SSgt. John McCarthy's

account ofthe Khobar Towers attack, undate{

late Jun or ear$ Jul 96; A1C. Richard J.

Lavallee, Jr.,'s account of the Khobar Towers

attach tndate4 late Jun or early Jul 96.

5. Winkler interview; undated map of the

Khobar Towers, provided by the Air Force

Manpower and Personnel Center to the Air

Force Chiefof Staff3 operations group. Anumber ofmaps were used to prepare this wort. This

one was referred to more often than the others

and is cited hereafter as the "Air Force Khobar

Towers map."A modified copy of it appears on

page 1 1 in chapter one. Among the several other

maps used another particularly helpful one was

the undated "ARCENT-SA Building Evacuation Plan: Khobar Towers, Dhalran, Saudi

Arabia." Lt. Col. Sherry Conner, DSW USA,

chiel social work services, U.S. Army Europe

Regional Medical Command and Landshrhl

Regional Medical Center (LRMC), Landshrhl,

Germany provided a copy ofthis map. It is cited

hereafter as the "Army KhobarTowers map" to

distinguish it from the more frequently referenced "Air Force Khobar Towers map."

6. Interview with MSgt. Dwayne R Berry, Aforms administrator and deployed first sergeant

Tlst Rescue Squadron, PatrickAFB, Fla., 5 Feb

97; author's interview of Brig. Gen. Daniel M.

(Dan) Dick, Commandeq 4404th Composite

Wing @rov.), LangleyAFB,Va.,4 Feb 98. Brig.

Gen. Dick was promoted to major general on I

Aug 98 and retired on I Jul 03 (US$ biography of Maj. Gen. Daniel M. Dick, Jul 03).

7. Interview with SSgt. Eric D. Ziegleg crew

chief, 58th Fighter Squad,ron, EglinAFB, Fla., 4

Dec96; interview of TSgt. George Burgess,

213
Notes to pages 6-10

assistant flight chief, 58th Fighter Squadron, by

SSgt. Yancy Mailes, historian, 33d Fighter

Wing, and the authog EglinAFB, Fla., 5 Dec

96; interview of AlC. Cielito Valencia, supply

technician, 58th Fighter Squadron, by SSgt.

Yancy Mailes, historian, 33d Fighter Wing,

EglinAFB, Fla., 1 I Feb 97.

8. Berry interview The 7 I st Rescue Squadron

moved iiom PatrickAFB, Fla., to MoodyAFB,

Ga., in May 97 ("71st Rescue Squadron

History').

9. Berry interview.

10. Air Force KhobarTowers map; interview

with Lt. Col. Thomas A. McCarthy, operations

officer, 58th Fighter Squadron, EglinAFB, Fla.,

4 Dec 96; interview with Capt. (Dr.) R. Morris

Treadway, Jr., flight surgeon, 58th Fighter

Squadron, EglinAFB, Fla.,5 Dec 96.

1 l. Interview of Col. Douglas R. Cochran,

Commander, 58th Fighter Squadron, by SSgt.

Yancy Mailes, historian, 33d Fighter Wing,

Eglin AFB, Fla.,20 Dec 96; McCarthy interview. A fourth officer, assistant operations officer Maj. Steve Moore, also lived in the suite, but

already had returned to Eglin AFB with the

unit's advanced cadre (McCarthy interview).

On the pattem ofthree suites per floor, twentyfour per dormitory see Air Force News Service

(AFNS), SSgt. Joel Langton,45th Space Wing

public affairs, "Officer recalls Khobar Towers

tragedy," 27 hn2000, and "Tlpical Building/

Suite Floor Plan," chapter one, page 8, copy

provided by Lt. Col. (Dr.) Douglas J. Robb,

::rn-** 

347th Aerospace Medical Squad12. Burgess interview; McCartlry interview.

13. McCarthy interview; Cochran interview.

1 4. McCartlry interview.

15. Burgess interview.

16. Ibid.; John l,ancaster, "Bombing Increases

U.S. Tioops' Sense oflsolation in Saudi ArabiA '

Was hingt on Po s t, 29 Jw 9 6, A-22.

17. Ziegler interview.

18. rbid.

1 9. Ibid.; biography ofTSgt. Panick P Fennig,

prepared by Capt. Brenda Campbell, 33d

Fighter Wing public affain office, undated.

20.Ziegler ntewiew.

21 . Interview with SSgt. Alfredo R. Guerrero,

security policeman, 95th SP Squadron, Califomia City, California, 9 Nov 96; Capt. Leah

Bryant, "Tested by terror: Command cop

214

becomes hero when he puts job above self,"

Leading Edge 38:8 (Aug 96), 5; Steven

Watkins, "'They didn't hesitate,"' Air Force

Times 56:49 (8 Jul 96), 13; Lt. Gen. RichmdT.

Swope, Inspector General, and Maj. Gen.

Bryan G. Hawley, Judge Advocate General,

"Report of Investigation: Khobar Towers

Bombing, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia," Apr 97, 3

vols., 1:36 (hereafter cited as Swope-Hawley

Report). After the KhobarTowers bombing, the

Air Force redesignated its security police, or

SPs, as security forces.

22. Guenero interview; interview with SSgt.

Selena P Husted, law officer manageq 45th

SpaceWing, PatrickAFB, Fla.,6 Feb 97;nterview with Lt. Col. (Chaplain) Dennis E. Aleson,

senior chaplain, 4404th Composite Wing

(Prov.), NellisAFB, Nev., 7 Nov 96.

23. Guerrero interview.

24. Ibid; Watkins, 'They didn't hesitate," 13.

25. Guerrero interview; Bryant, "Tested by

terror," 5.

26. Guerrero interview; "Khobar Tower

Chronology ofEvents," SP squadron entry for

25 Jw 96, 2150, n a chronology compiled by

SrA. Ronald J. Biggs, Jr., historian, 4404th

Composite Wing @rov.), 8 Aug 96. SrA. Biggs

integrated several chronologies which had been

prepared by subordinate units ofthe 4404th

Wing and made them available in this one valuable source (hereafter cited as "Khobar

Chronology"). These chronologies also appear

in the 4404th Wing's after action report on the

bombing.

27 . Ai Force Khobar Towers map; Bruce W

Nelan, "Gulf Shock Waves," Time 148 (8 Jtil

96), 21 . Pictr.res taken by Capt. Robert L. @ob)

Jones ofthe 99th Mission Support Squadron,

NellisAFB, Nev., and other amateur andprofessional photographers were helpful in describing

the features of the area. "Jersey''or'New Jersey'' barriers, hear,y concrete obstacles similar to

the ones fint used to confrol fraffic on the New

Jersey Tumpike in the 1950s.

28. Executive Summary of"Report ofKhobar

Towers Bomb Damage Survey," prepared by

the Defense Special Weapons Agency and the

Army Corps ofEngineers, Jul 96, 3 (hereafter

cited as Bomb Damage Survey Executive

Summary);Air Force KhobarTowers map. The

*Climatological Data' chart in the 4404th Wing

History vol. l,124, shows that the weather on
25 Jun96 was unremarkable. The photographs

taken by Capt. Jones again were helpful in writing this paragraph.

29. Schwalier conversation notes. 23 Feb 99:

Watkins, "They didnt hesitate;' 13; -ing Operations Center Log ofEvents, entry for 25 Jun

96,2200,n4404thWing History vol. 10, supporting document VI-l 1; Nelan, "Gulf Shock

Waves." 21: interview with SrA. Ronald J.

Biggs, Jr., Historian, 4404th Composite Wing

(Prov.), NellisAFB, Nev., 8 Nov 96; "The KhobarTowers Bombing Incident," StatrReport of

the House National Security Committee, 14

Aug 96, 2 (hereafter cited as HNSC Report).

The reference to "31st Street" in the last of

these sources is confusing because the street

jogged hvice and the section of it that was south

of al Khobar Park was entirely within the

Khobar Towers compound. The report apparently means that the two vehicles were on

Thirty-first Street west of the park and used

that route to enter its parking lot. An undated

commercial map, the Eng. Zaki M.A. Farsi

map of the "Eastern Region: Dammam-Al

Khubm-Dhahran-Qatif" (hereafter cited as the

Eastem Region map), proved extremely helpful in establishing the street patterns of al

Khobar. The author conducted a tape-recorded

oral history interview with Brig. Gen. Terry

Schwalier (USAE, ret.) on 23 and24 Feb 99,

cited many times elsewhere throughout these

notes, and also took notes on their conversations during those two days. The notes on these

conversations and the interview are cited by

date, either 23 or 24 Feb 99.

30. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," entry for SP

squadron, 2150 ,25 Jtn96; Schwalier conversation notes, 23 Feb 99; Nelan, "Gulf Shock

Waves," 2l; Bomb Damage Survey Executive

Summary, 4. Some press accounts had the Caprice following the huck, rather than preceding

it (David B. Ottaway and Brian Dufly, "Iranian

Aide Linked To Bombing Suspectl' Washington Post, 13 Apr 97, A 8). Gen. Schwalieq

who, as commander of the 4404th Composite

Wing (Prov.), had as much information about

the attack as any American, stated that the

Caprice entered the lot ahead ofthe truck. SrA.

Biggs, who worked with the Federal Bureau of

Investigation team that investigated the bombing immediately afterward, said the same

(Schwalier conversation notes, 23 Feb 99;

Notes to pages 10-12

Biggs interview; see also the wing Operations

Center Log of Events, entry for 25 Jun 96,

2200). One ofrcial report, the HNSC Report, 2,

first mentions the car as following the fuck. But

four sentences later in the report's narralive,

without explanation, it refers to the huck as

being "positioned behind the car." Presumably

the order of the two vehicles is reversed in the

flrstmention; oncethis assumption is made, the

account flows logically. Beyond this slip, the

HNSC Reportis avaluable source onthe movements ofthe car andtruck. Otlreroffrcial reports

speak about both vehicles, but say nothing

about the order oftheir approach. After the

attack, many sources referredto the bomb-vehicle as a sewage h'uck (Schwalier conversation

notes, 23 Feb 99; Dick interview with author;

Rebecca Grant, "Khobar Towers," Air Force

Magazine 81:6 (Jr.rn 98), 47). The FBI investigators concluded that the explosives in the truck

were covered with sewage (Bomb Damage

Survey Executive Summary, 4). SSgt. Guerrero

and the other airmen of course had no idea of

the tankerb contents that night.

3 I . Schwalier conversation notes. 23 Feb 99;

HNSC Report.2: Biggs interview.

32. Guerrero interview; Schwalier conversation notes, 23 Feb 99; HNSC Report, 2. In Mm

97, while Canadian officials sought a depoftation order from their own country for Hani

Abdel Rahim al-Sayegh, a suspect in the bombing, it was alleged that Mr. Sayegh drove a "signal car" on the night of25 Jun 96. In this version, Mr. Sayegh pulled a vehicle into the parking lot north of the Khobar Towers complex,

and a second car and a tanker followed him.

Sayegh flashed his lights, signalling the other

two vehicles to enter the parking lot (Anthony

DePalma, "Canada Links Pro-kanian Group To

SaudiAttackat U.S. BarracksiNew York Iimes,

28Mar97.44\.

33. HNSC Report, 2; Guerrero interview. To

illustlate thattankertrucks were common in the

area. on24 Feb 99, Gen. Schwalier showed the

author a photograph ofone being seatched by

security policemen and their dogs, at the main

gate of the Khobar Towers.

34. Guerrero interview.

35. Ibid.; Nelan, "Gulf ShockWaves," 21.

36. Guerrero spotted the huck at about 10:50

p.m.; the explosion took place at 10:53. Biggs,

"Khobar Chronology," SP squadron entries for

215
t

i

1

Notes to pages 12-15

25 Jrn 96,2150 and 2153; "Khobar Towers

Bombing: Medical Response: Force Protection

Lessons Learned," an undated briefing prepared by Lt. Col. (Dr.) Douglas J. Robb, Commander, 347th Aerospace Medicine Squadron,

for Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ronald R.

Fogleman. The wing Operations Center Log of

Events, entry for 25 hn96,2200, gives an estimated time for the explosion and puts the time

between Guererro's sighting and the blast at

three to four minutes.

37. Guerrero interview; Bradley Graham,

"Bomb Won't Deter U.S. in Gulf, Officials

Sayi WashingtonPost,21 hn96,A 1; SwopeHawley Report, I :75; Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," SP squadron entry for 25 lun 96, 2l5l;

Biggs interview; 4404th Security Police Squadron Commander's End ofTour Reoort. 14 Mar

26 Juln96,in44%thWing History. vol. 8. supportrng document VI-7 (hereafter cited as SP

CommanderEOTR).

38. Husted interview; SSgt. Selena P Zuhoski

[nee Husted], 45th Space Wing's judge advocate's office, to Dr. Perry D. Jamieson, Air

Force History SupportOffice (AFHSO),30 Oct

98 and Nov 98; US Military Training Mission

staff telephone directory 1 Jd 97; SwopeHawley Report, l:75; Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," judge advocate entry for 25 htn96,

2240.

39. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," SP squadron entry for 25 Jrm 96,2151; Swope-Hawley

Repoft, 1:75.

40. Swope-Hawley Report, 1:75; Biggs interview. The Saudis designated this organization

the Royal Saudi Land Force Military Police.

They commonly were called the "Red Berets"

or, even less formally, the "Red Hats," referring

to color and style oftheir uniform caps (SwopeHawleyReport, l:44).

41. Guerrero interview; Graham, "Bomb

Wonl Deter U.S.," A-1.

42. Guerrero interview; Schwalier conversation notes, 23 Feb 99. See also Biggs interview

and a document written by SrA. Cmig J. Dick.

The "humvee" or "hummer" derived its nicknames from HMMW! the acronl.'rn for its full

designation: High Mobility Mulitpurpose

WheeledVehicle. It gained a popular reputation

during the GulfWar akin to that of the jeep duringWorldWarIL By the earlytwenty-first century, its commercial versionhadbecome ahighpriced status vehicle.

43. Guerrero interview; Watkins, "They didn't

hesitate," 13; MSgt. Louis Arana-Barradas,

TSgt. Ray Johnson, and SSgl. Carl Norman,

"Southern Watch Continues Despite Bombngi'Airmanfr,:8 (Aug 96), 18.

44. Watkins, "They didn't hesitate;' 13;

Guerrero interview.

45. Winkler interview; "25 hn 96: Mike

Morelock," an undated accormt written by Capt.

Michael D. Morelock; interview with Capt.

Michael D. Morelock, pilot, 71st Rescue

Squadron, PatrickAFB, Fla.,4 Feb 97.

46. Winkler interview.

47. Watkins,'They didnl hesitate," 13.

48. Winkler interview; Morelock interview;

"25 htn96: Mike Morelock."

49. Morelock interview; Winkler interview;

interview wiflr Col. Thomas Frien. Commander,

1 st Rescue Group, Patrick AFB, Fla, 4 Feb 97 .

50. Aleson interview. Chaplain Aleson, a

close friend oflt. Col. Shafer, talked to him the

moming after the attack. Their meeting at that

time is discussed in chapter seven.

5l . Morelock interview; Winkler interview

52. Notes taken during a telephone conversation with Lt. Col. Thomas H. Shafer, deployed

commander, 71st Rescue Squadron,20 Feb 97;

Winkler inlerview; McCarthy interview.

53. Guerrero interview; Biggs, "Khobar

Chronology," SP squadron entry for 25 Jun 96,

21 53; Robb,'Medical Response."

t

I

I

Chapter Two

1. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry

Report to the President on the Protection ofU.S.

Forces DeployedAbroad" 15 Sep 96,2; EliotA.

Cohen, director, Gulf War Air Power Sutttqt,5

vols. (Washington, D.C., 1993), fII:part2 (Supporl), 8; First Lt. Ken Hofftnan, "USMTM: A

History of Trainingl' Southetn Watch 6:17 Q3

216

Apr 97), 5. For a valuable overview ofthe background of diplomatic and military events in

Southwest Asia before 1990, see Richard G.

Davis, "Roots of Conflict: A Military Perspective on the Middle East and the Persian Gulf

Crisis," a monograph published by the Center

for Air Force History in | 993.
2. The strength of the haqi units in Kuwait is

from the unclassified version ofthe Departrnent

of Defense's Final Repoft to Congress: Conduct of the Persian GulfWar (Nasfingan,D.C.,

1992),4. On King Fahd's decision to accept

American forces into his territory see what is to

date the best diplomatic history ofthe GulfWar:

Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The

Gulf Coffict 1990 1991: Diplomacy andWar

in the New World Order (P'nncetarl N.J., 1993),

86 89and92-93.

3. A good starting point in the literature on the

Gulf Wm is RickAtkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston and

New York, 1993). The reader then can turn to

the memoirs of two senior leaders: Colin L.

Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American

Journey (New York, 1995) and H. Norman

Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre,1/ Doesn't Take a

l1ero (NewYork, et a1., 1992). Tom Clancy with

Gen. Fred Franks, Jr. (USA, ret.), Into the

Storm: A Sndy in Command (NewYork, I 997),

a combination of biography and memoir,

recounts the l99l GulfWar ground campaign

from the perspective of one of the corps commanders. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E.

Trainor, The Generals'War: The Inside Story of

the ConJlict in the Gulf (Boston, et al., 1995)

represents the first significant revisionist work

about the conflict. There is a sizeable literature

on the GulfWar air campaign. Readers who are

daunted by the lengthy five volumes of the

nnclassified Gulf War Air Power Survey can

read Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen,

Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report

(Washington, D.C., 1993). Richard P Ha1lion,

Storm oyer lraq: Air Power and the Gulf War

(\Mashington and London, 1 992) argues the thesis, as its first page "boldly'' declares, that "air

power won the Gulf war." Tom Clancy with

Gen. Chuck Homer (JSAF,ret.), Every Man a

77ger (New York,1999), uses the same format

as Clancy's work with Gen. Franks and recounts

the air campaign from the viewpoint of its commander. The numbers of Air Force personnel

assigned to the theater can be found in the Gaf

War Air Power Suney,5: part I (Statistical

Compendium), 124.

4. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero,

48 1-9 1 ; Resolution 687 ( I 99 I ), adopted by the

Security Council at its 298 1 st meeting, on 3 Apr

l99l . TINSCR 687 also called for a llN observNotes to pages 15-17

er unit to monitor a demilitaized zone which

would be established along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti

bordeq extending ten kilometers into kaq and

five into Kuwait. This DMZ would have created

a "trip wire" against a future repetition of

Saddam Hussein's aggression to the south. Gen.

Schwarzkopf opposed the idea, the State Department withdrew its support for it, and this

provision of UNSCR 687 went unenforced

(Resolution 687 (1991) andAtkinnn, Crusatu,

490-91).

5. Patrick E. Tyler, "Baghdad FormallyAgrees

to 'Unjust' U.N. Conditions For Permanent

Cease Fire," New York Times, 7 Apr 91, A-1.

6. Atksnson, Crus ade, 488 utd 489; Freedman

and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 4M1,420.

7. Atkinson, Crusade,489; Freedman and

Karsh, The Gulf ConJlict, 419-20. The terms of

the temporary cease-fire at Safwan permitted

the Iraqis to make helicopter flights, in view of

the air campaign's damage to their roads and

bridges. Saddam exploited this provision to use

his gunships against the Shi'ites (Atkinson,

Crusade,489; Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf

Conl\ict,407,420).

8. Resolution 688 (1991), adopted by the

Secnrity Councilatits29S2dmeeting on 5 Apr

91; Paul Lewis, "U.N. Votes to Condemn

Handling of Iraqi Rebels," l/ew York Ttmes,6

Apr 91, A-5; Atkinson, Crusade,490.

9. Clifford Krauss, "U.S. Will Airdrop Food

And Clothes To Kurds In Iraq," New York Times ,

6Apr 91,A I ; Clyde Haberman, "6 U.S. Planes

BeginAirlifting ReliefTo Kurds In kaqi Nau

York Times, 8 Apr 9 I, A-l ; William T. Y'Blood,

"From the Desertto the Mountains," in Bemard

Nalty, ed., W\nged Shield, Winged Sword: A

History of the United States Air Force, 2 vols.

(Washington, D.C., 1997), 2:486. See also

Robert H. Scales, Jr., and the Desert Storm

Study Project, The U.S. Amy in the Gulf Ll'ar:

Certain Wctory (Washington, D.C., 1994),

341-53.

10. Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Warns Against

Attack By haq on Kurdish Refugees|' NewYork

Times,77 Apr 91, A-10; Scales, Certain Wctory,35l 52.

I 1. Andrew Rosenthal, "BushAccuses Iraq of

Breaking Truce in Fighting Piebelsl' Netv York

Times, 14 Mar 91, A-l; Thomas L. Friedman,

"DecisionNot to Help Iraqi Rebels Puts U.S. in

an Awkward Position," New York Times, 4 Apr

2r7
Notes to pages 17-19

91,A-1.

12. Patrick E. Tylea "Elusive Victories in

lraql' New York Times,25 htl92, A-l; Atkinson, Crusade, 498; Michael R. Gordon,

"British, French and U.S. Agree To Hit Iraqi

Aircraft in the South," New lork Times, 19 Aug

92,1.-1.

13. John Lancaster, 'Allies Declare 'No-Fly

Zone' nlnql' Washington Post,21 Aug92, Al;

Gordon, "British, French and U.S. Agree."

14. Resolution 949 (1994), adopted by the

Securif Cor.rncil at its 3488th meeting, on 15

Oct 94; Perry, Report to the President, 3.

15. Col. M. Perini, HQ Air Combat Command,E{2, to the Directors of the HQ Air

Combat Command Staff, 26 Jun 96; MSgt.

David Masko, "Coalition partners ready to

move to Prince Sultanl' Southem Watch 5'.34 (4

Sep 96), 3; HQ US Central Command biography of Gen. J.H. Binford Peay III, Oct 94;

USAF biographies ofGen. John P Jumper, Sep

05; Lt. Gen. Carl E. Franklin, May 98; and Maj.

Gen. Kurt B. Anderson, Jun 96. Lt. Gen. Jumper

was promoted to general in Nov 97 and became

Air Force Chief of Staffin Sep 01.

16. 4404th Wing History vol. 1, l; Y'Blood

"From the Desert to the Mountains," 487;

Schwalier interview,23 Feb 99.

17. Schwalier interview, 23 Feb 99; USAF

biography ofBrig. Gen. Terryl J. Schwalier, Feb

96; Grant, "Khobar Towers," 42. The Arabic

name of the Eastem Province appears on a map

in Richard M. Swa;n, " Luclqt War " : Third Amry

in Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworlh, Kans.,

1 997 ), 5. Ctr an| " Khobar Towers," 42, notes that

Gen. Schwalier was the wing's twelfth commander and narrowly speaking this is correct. If

the TAC lineage, which began with Col. Roberl

Hinds as the unit's first commander, is taken

into account, Gen. Schwalier was the wing's

thirteenth commander (Gen. Schwalier's comments on "Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response" manuscript, 2l Oct 04).

18.4404th Wing History vol. 1, 3 5 and

95-99. The names of the wing's key personnel

also appear in the entries ofBiggs, "Khobar

Chronology," and were discussed with Gen.

Schwalier in a conversation on 23 Feb 99.

Commenting on the "Khobar Towers" manuscnpt in Oct 04, Gen. Schwalier noted that Col.

Schultz had been a member of the Colorado Ai

National Guard. Col. Scott Gration was Dro218

moted to brigadier general on I Oct 99 and to

major general on I Apr 03 (USAF brography of

Brig. Gen. Jonathan S. Gration, Feb 05). In Jun

96 the medical group commander's position

was in transition from a three-months assignment to a one-year one. There was a gap

between the tours of Lt. Col. (Dr.) Robefi N.

Bertoldo, the last group commander to serve

three months, and Col. (Dr.) Rolando R. Santa

An4 the flrst to serve a year. It was filled by Dr.

Robb (4404thWing History vol. l, 3-5, 95-99;

interview with Lt. Col. Douglas J. Robb,

Commandeq 347th Aerospace Medical Squadron, Moody AFB, Ga., 6 Jun 97; "Change of

Command Ceremony: 440th Medical Group

(Prov.), King Abdul Aziz Air Base, Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia," 10 Jul 96). Dr. Robb was promoted to colonel on 30 May 2000 and to

brigadier general on lJune 2007 (USAF biography of Brig. Gen. (Dr.) Douglas J. Robb, July

07).

19. Y'Blood, "From the Desert to the Mountainsl' 487; Schwalier intervieq 23 Feb 99.

20. Y'Bloo4 "From the Desert to the Mountains," 487; Schwalier intervieq 23 Feb 99;

4404th Wing, wing Operations Centeq Air

Tasking Order chart for 25 Jun 96, :-r:'4404th

Wing History vol. 7, supporting document

II_D56.

21. Gen. Wayne A. Downing (USA, ret.),

"Force Protection Assessment of USCENTCOM AOR and Khobar Towers: Report of the

Do*ning Assessment Task Force," 30 Aug 96,

14 (hereafter cited as Downing Repofi). The

wing was operating from eleven locations in

four counfries at the time Gen. Schwalier reported. Schwalier interview, 23 Feb 99. The deployment of air expeditionary forces to the region

expanded these numbers at times to as many as

twelve sites in five countries (Grant, "Khobar

Towers," 42).

22. Statement by Gen. J.H. Binford Peay,

Commander in Chiel U.S. Central Comman4

Cenffal Command news release. 27 hl 96:

Philip Shenon, "G.l.'s in Saudi Arabia on Alet

as Plan forAttack Is Reporte{' ly'ew York Times,

12 Jul 96,.48; 4404thWing History vol. 1, 93.

23.Peny, Report to the President, 5; Col. M.

Perini to the Directors of the HQ Air Combat

Command Stafl 26 hn96.

24. Frien interview; notes taken during atelephone conversation with Capt. Robert L. Jones,
Personnel Support for Contingency Operations

(PERSCO) officer, 99th Mission Support

Squadron, NellisAFB, Nev.,20 Jun 97.

25. Col. M. Perini to the Directors of the HQ

Air Combat Comrnand Staff,26 Jun 96; Jones

conversation notes, 7 Nov 96.

26. Swope-Hawley Report, I :63.

27. LRMC Stress Management Team's After

Action Report, 20 Aug 96, L

28. Guerrero interview; Jones conversation

notes,20 Jtm 97.

29. Interview with Lt. Col. Donald Jozaf,

Commandeq 71st Rescue Squadron, Patrick

AFB, Fla.,4 Feb 97.

30. Grant, "Khobar Towers," 42; Downing

Report, 14; LRMC Stress ManagementTeam's

AfterAction Report, 20 Aug 96, l; Dick interviewwith author.

3 I . Jones conversation notes, 20 Jun 97.

32. Commenting on a draft ofthis work in Oct

04, Gen. Schwalier pointed out that the 58th

Fighter Squadron was the wing's primary air-toair unit, but not its only one. The 4404th's F-16s

also flew air-to-air missions.

33. 33d Fighter Wing's public affain biography of Lt. Col. Douglas R. Cochran, May 95;

Cochraninterview

34. Ziegler tntewiew; McCarthy interview.

35. John Lancaster, "Few See Saudi Stability

Threatened by Militants," Washington Post,21

Jun96,24; Perry Report to the President,2;

Patrick Pexton, "Desert Moves," Air Force

Iimes 57 :4 (26 Alg 96), 3.

36. Schwalier intervi ew, 23 Feb 99.

37. Notes taken during telephone conversations with Saeed Al Ahmed, Islamic Section,

andAlice Umbarac, Press Section, Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, 10 Jul 97; Peter Mansfield The Arabs (London, et al., 1985),206,348.

38. "The Remarkable Transformation of the

Dammam Dhahran-A1-KhobmTiiangle," web.

page ofthe Royal Embassy ofSaudiArabia,29

Jun 98; Mansfield The Arabs,348; Umbarac

conversation notes, 10 Jul 97.

39. Downing Report, 41;Bradley Graham,

"Perry Calls U.S. Military Housing in Saudi

Arabia Safe but Austere," Washington Post, I

Dec 96. A-37: Saeed Al Ahmed conversation

notes; Perry, Report to the President,4.

40. Swope-Hawley Repor! 1 :57. Photographs

taken by Capt. Jones, and others, contributed to

this description ofthe KhobarTowers complex.

Notes to pilges 19-22

On 23 Feb 99, the author showed Gen.

Schwalier a map of the compound labeled

"Khobar Towers"; the general immediately

remarked that it represented only the American

part ofthe complex.

41. Statement by Gen. J.H. Binford Peay,

Central Command news release. 27 Jtl 96:.

Perry, Reportto the President, l; Col. M. Perini

to the Directors of the HQ Air Combat Command Stafi 26 hm96; Swope-Hawley Report,

1:57; Schwalier conversation notes, 23 Feb 99.

42. Sch*dier conversation notes,24 Feb 99.

A nine-tenths of a mile distance can be established from a map in the Bomb Damage Survey

Executive Summary, 2. Capt. Matthew Winker,

ajogger, ran the perimeter and also put the distance at nine-tenths of a mile (Winkler interview).

43. Air Force Khobar Towers map; Sch*dier

conversation notes,24Feb99. On the origin of

the "Towers" in "KhobarTowers," it is noteworthy that Lt. Col. James J. Traiste! the commander ofthe wingb security police squadron, used

the noun'towef interchangeably with'building'in his end of tour report (SP Commander

EOTR).

44. Army KhobarTowers map; plan of a typical floor ofa KhobarTowers dormitory provided by Col. Robb; Robb interview The photographs taken by Capt. Jones also contributed to

this description of the Khobar Towers comporlnd.

45. Schwalier comments on "KhobarTowers';

Grant, "Khobar Towers," 42; Schwalier interview,23 Feb 99; Dick interview with author;

AFHSO oral history interview 26. The Eastem

Region map established the Khobar TowersARAMCOdistance.

46. 4404thctil Engineering Squadron, FiveYear Facilities Improvement Plan FY 96 FY

00,24May 96, in 4404th Wing History vol. 7,

supporting document IV-2, 8, 9.

47. Swope-Hawley Report, 1:57; Schwalier

conversation notes,24 Feb 99. Here again, the

photographs taken by Capt. Jones, and others,

contributed to this description of the area

aroundthe compound.

48. Undated "Dhahran Area Guide Map,"

provided by the Air Force Manpower and Personnel Center to the Air Force Chief of Staff's

operations group; Eastem Region map; Winkler interview. Photographs taken by Capt. Jones

2t9
!

I

I

I

Notes to ptges22-25

and others of the area arorlnd the comoound

again were helpfirl.

Chapt

1. Atkinson, Crusade, 416 23; Donatella

Lorch, *Twisted Hulk ofWarehouse Tells a Crrim

Story of Deathi New York Times,27 Feb 91,

A-l 8; Schwalier conversation notes, 23 Feb 99.

2. Howard Schneider, "Bombing in Saudi

City Kills Ameicutl' Washington Post,7 Oct

01,A-1.

3. Lancasteq "Few See Saudi Stabilif Threatened."

4. Schwalier interview, 23 Feb 99. See also

Grant "Khobar Towers," 43.

5. Elaine Sciolino, "Blasts Wreck U.S.

Military Aid Installation-3 5 to 40 Are Wounded inAttack;' New York Times, 14 Nov 95, A 1 ;

"Background: Terrorism in the AOR," an undar

ed, unpaginated report written by SrA. Ronald J.

Biggs, historian ofthe 4404th Composite Wing

(Prov.); Perry, Reportto the President, 2. 'AOR"

is an acroryrm for "area ofresponsibility"; in the

title of SrA. BiggsS report, it refers to the U.S.

Cenhal Command's area of responsibility,

SouthwestAsia.

6. Grant, "Khobar Towers," 43; Sciolino,

"Blasts Wreck U.S. Military Aid Installation,"

A l; Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Commanders at

Saudi Base Defend Efforts to Avoid Attack,"

NcwYorkTimes,28 Jun 96,A-1; message from

the Office of the Secretary of State to all diplomatic and consular posts, and several other

addressees, "Public Announcement-Saudi

Arabia"" 15 Nov 96. 2336 ztlutn"rc.

7. Lancaster, "Few See Saudi StabilityThreatene{'A 24; Philip Shenon, "Officials Say Size

of Bomb Caught Military by Surprise," New

York Times. 27 Jun 96. A-1.

8. Nelan, "Gulf Shock Waves," 23; Grant,

"KhobarTowers," 43.

9. Grant, "KhobarTowers." 43.

10. Interview with Maj. Bennie L. Umstead II,

executive officer to the commander of the Joint

Task Force Southwest Asia, Andrews AFB.

Md.,19Aug97.

1l. Grant, "KhobarTowers,"43; "US. Commanders at Saudi Base," New York Times,28

Jun 96, A-1 ; AFHSO KhobarTowers oral history rnterview 31.

12. Dorvning Report, 48; AFHSO Khobar

220

49. "MajorAir Force deployments," Air Force

frmes 56:47 (24 Jun 96), 31.

Three

Towers oral history interview 5. See also interview 23. Another 4404th Wing document also

was used in writing this paragraph.

13. Grant, "KhobarTowers," 43.

14. Lt. Gen. James F. Record, "Independent

Review of the KhobarTowers Bombing: Part

A," 31 Oct 96, and "Part B, Accountabilif

Review," 3 volumes, 20 Dec 96, B, I:71 (hereafter cited as the Record Report; this is a secretno foreign document, but all the material used

from it is unclassified); Swope-Hawley Report,

I :33; Biggs interview; Crant, "KhobarTowers,"

43. The base commander established the threatcon level on the basis of many sources; in the

case of oversea installations, these included

information liom the US embassy in the country (Swope-Hawley Report, l:8G87; Umstead

interview). On the security measures taken at

the KhobarTowers between the Riyadh bombing and 25 J:un96, see also the 4404th Wing

History vol. l, 68 70. This section is unclassified; one ofits paragraphs is "for official use

only." Wing documents show that the wing

commander addressed the Battle Staff Directives to his group commanders, for them to

implement.

15. Swope-Hawley Repoft, 1 :6; "Explanation

of Terrorist Threat Conditions," Appendix D of

the HNSC Report, citing Air Force Insfuction

31-210, I Jul 95. See also the Guerrero and

Biggs interviews. lnAug 01 the Deparhnent of

Defense, adopting a recommendation of the

USS Cole Commission, replaced term "threatcon" with "force protection condition," or

"FPCONT'(SSgt. Amy Parr, "Changes made to

force protection programs," The Beam,Bollng

AFB, D.C., 59:31 (10Aug 0l), l).

16. "Explanation of Terrorist Threat

Conditions,"Appendir D ofthe HNSC Repofi;

1 lth Wing offrce of public affairs, "KnowYour

Threatcons," 24 Aug 94. A commander declaredThreatcon Charlie u4ren either a specific

incident or broader intelligence information

indicated that a terrorist action was imminent.

The additional measures at this level included

increasing securif police manning; reducing to

a minimum the number of entrances to the

Chapter Three
installation; checking the identification of every

person enteringthe facility; prohibiting all pmkrng next to structures; suspending all non-essential activities; and restricting the wearing ofuniforms and operating of govemment vehicles in

the local communi[2. Threatcon Delta went into

effect when a terrorist attack had occurred or

when there was intelligence that one was about

to take place against a specific target. Some of

the additional measures that would be taken at

this highest level represented classified information; unclassified ones included identifying

all ofthe vehicles in the area and searchins all

packages and brielcases. Air Force lnsnuc,-tion

3l-210 also recognized as the base level ofits

conditions a "Threatcon Normal," a routine

security posture ("Explanation of Terrorist

Threat Conditions," Appendix D of the HNSC

Report). For an example ofhow one specific

security measure-the numbers of secwity

police manning posts -{iffered between

Threatcon Bravo and Threatcon Charlie, see the

Swope-Hawley Report. I :32.

17. Swope-Hawley Report, 1:132; Guenero

interview; Biggs interview; interview with

SSgt. Jefferson A. Craven, high-voltage electrician, 45th Civil Engineering Squadron, Patrick

AFB. Fla.. 6Feb97.

18. Grant, "Khobar Towers," 43; Biggs interview; Guerrero interview.

19. SP Commander EOTR: Grant. "Khobar

Towem," 43; Central Command operating location of the Air Force Ofrce of Special Investigations to the Deputy Commander in Chief,

Central Command, 25 Jun 96 (hereafter cited as

AFOSI OL, 25 Jun 96); HNSC Report, 6. See

also Grant, "Khobar Towers," 45, and Record

Repofi, B, I:71.

20. Record Report, B, I:71; HNSC Report, 6;

Grant, "Khobar Towers," 43-44.

21. Record Report, B, I:72;Biggs, "Khobar

Chronology," entries for safety, 2210, and SP

squadron, 2215,25 Jtn96;Schwalier conversation notes, 23 Feb 991, notes taken during conversations with SrA. Ronald J. Biggs, Jr., historian of the 4404th Composite Wing (Prov.),

NellisAFB. Nev.. 8 Nov 96.

22. Record Report, B, I:72; Schwalier comments on "Khobar Towers:'

23. hid. This Vulnerabiliry Assessment remains classified. There are open-source discussions of it in the unclassified version of the

Notes to pnges25-29

Record Report; in the Downing Report, 3, 47,

49,50; and a particular$ good one in Grant,

"KhobarTowersi 44 45.

24. Grant, "Khobar Towers," 44. See also

Record Report, B, l:7 0-7 2.

25. Record Report, B, l:7012. Like the Jan

96 AFOSI Vulnerabilities Assessment, the Jul

95 one remains classified. There are opensource discussions of it in the unclassified version of the Record Report, and the Dolvning

Report,3,47,50.

26. Cfiaoi:I., "Khobar Towers," 44. On the VulnerabilityAssessment itself, see note 23.

27. Record Rep ort, B, l:7 2.

28. Grant, "Khobar Towersi 44. On the VulnerabilityAssessment itself, see note 23.

29. Record Report, B, l:74; Grant, "Khobar

Towers," 44.

30. Grant, "Khobar Towers," 45; Royal Embassy of SaudiArabia, National Guide & Atlas

ofthe Kingdom ofSaudi Arabia (Jeddah, Saudi

Arabia, 1989), 106; "Transformation ofthe

Dammam Dhahran-Al-Khobar Triangle";

Robb interview.

31. Grant, "Khobar Towers," 45; AFHSO

Khobar Towers oral history interview 8.

32. Commander, 4404th Wing (Prov.), Battle

Staff Directive 9 6-6, 25 hn 96, 0900 zulu time,

rn 4404th Wing History vol. 72, supporting

document U 16; Husted interview.

33. Biggs, "Background: Terrorism in the

AOR"; HNSC Report, 1l; Bradley Graham,

"Bomb Kills 23 Americans at Saudi Base,"

Washington Post,26 Jw96,A l.

34. "Previous Attacks and Threats in Saudi

Arabia," Washington Post,27 Jtn96, A2\

Commander, 4404th Wing (Prov.), Battle Staff

Directive 96-2,20May 96, 1300 21u time, in

4404thWing History vol. 12, supporting document U-16; Biggs, "Background: Terrorism in

theAOR."

35. SP Commander EOTR

36. Schwalier interview, 23 Feb 99; Record

Report, B, I:106.

37. Schwalier interview, 23 Feb 99; SP

Commander EOTR. See a.lso HNSC Report, 6.

38. HNSC Report, 7; SP Commander EOTR.

39. SP Commander EOTft Schwalier interview, 23 Feb 99; HNSC Report, T; Grant,

"Khobar Towers," 45; AFOSI OL, 25 hn 96.

The map on page I I does not show tower dormitory 201 ; it stands offthe mea represented, to

221
Notes to pages29-32

the southwest. It appears on other maps, including the "Dha}ran Area Guide Map," provided

by HQ Air Force Manpower and Personnel

Center to the Air Force Chief of Statr's operatlons group.

40. SP Commander EOTR; AFOSI OLCENT to the Deputy Commander in Chief,

USCENTCOM , 25 Jw 96. See also the Air

Force Khobar Towers map.

41. Grant, "KhobarTowers," 45.

42. "Previous Attacks," Washington Post,

A-24; HNSC Report, 1 1.

43. Philip Shenon, "Saudi Rebuffed U.S.

Efforts To Interrogate 1995 Bombers," New

York Times, 28 Jun 96, A-1 ; Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Grror Blast at Saudi Bas e]' Intemational

Herald Tribune, 14 Nov 95, 1; Philip Shenon,

"Saudi Bombers Got Outside Support, Perry

Tells Panel,"New YorkTimes,l0 Jul 96,A-1.

44. Grant, "Khobar Towers," 46; Schwalier

interview, 23 Feb 99; Swope-Hawley Report,

1:82.

45. Grant, "Khobar Towers," 46; Schwalier

interview. 23 Feb 99'. Schwalier conversation

notes,23 Feb 99; Swope-Hawley Reporl, l:82.

An unclassified portion ofa classified intelligence report prepmed for the Air Force Chief of

Staffgives an exact date, in May.

46. Schwalier interview, 23 Feb 99. A documentprovidedby the Joint Chiefs of Staffoffice

ofpublic atrairs was used to date the Chairman's

tnp

47.Text of speech 129 May 961 by Chairman

ofthe Joint Chiefs of StatrGen. John M. Shalikashvili, Office of the Special Assistant for

Public Affairs of the Office of the Chairman,

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minor changes inpunctuation were made in the Chairman's 29 May

speech at Dhahran as quoted in this paragraph.

Gen. Schwalier pointed out that the issue of terrorism was never raised during Gen. Shalikashvili's visit and that the Chairman evidently considered the region safe enough for his wife to

accompany him on this tour (Schwalier interview,23 Feb 99).

48. Swope-Hawley Report, l:106 7; SSgt.

Guy Renkel, "Threatcon Bravo: More than just

long hours," Gulf Wew 7 :16 (1 8 Apr 96), 3; see

also Swope-Hawley Report, 1 :10G7 . A M04th

Wing document also was used to write this

paragmph.

49. Biggs, "Background: Terrorism in the

222

AOR." Checking cars for explosives was much

on the minds of a number ofpeople, in addition

to the security police. See, for example, Robb

and Husted interviews.

50. Swope-Hawley, I : 132. A wing "stand up"

was the commander's meeting with his or her

staff, typically held weekly. The group commanders and other subordinates would report

briefly to the wing commander on their area of

responsibility and receive his or her guidance on

specific issues.

51. Schwalier interview, 23 Feb 99; Biggs,

"Background: Terrorism in the AOR." On the

security meetings, see also the Umstead interview.

52. AFOSI OL, 25 hn96.

53. Record Repoft,B,l:1 4; Schwalier conversation notes, 23 Feb 99; AFHSO Khobar Towers oral history interview 3 l; Grant, "Khobar

Towers." 42: Schwalier comments on "Khobar

Towers." On Gen. Schwalier's interest in secrnity briefings, see also Biggs, "Backgrourd: Terrorism in the AOR."

54. Schwalier interview, 23 Feb 99;' AFHSO

Khobar Towers oral history interview 3 I .

55. Biggs interview; Schwalier interview, 23

Feb 99; "Saudi Bombers Got Outside Support,"

New York Times, l0 Jul 96, A 1 ; Biggs, "Background: Terrorism in theAOR." See also Husted

interview.

56. AFOSI OL, 25 Jun 96; SP Commander

EOTR;Air Force KhobarTowers map.

57. Commander, 4404th Wing (Prov.), Battle

Staff Directive 96-4, 31 May 96, 1700 zulu

time,in4404thWing History vol. 12, supporting document U-l6; Biggs interview; AFOSI

OL, 25 Jun 96. On the distances, see SwopeHawley Report, 1:106 and the Eastern Region

map. Gen. Schwalier also confirmed them in a

23 Feb 99 conversation.

58. SP Commander EOTR; Record Report,

B. I:106rAFOSI OL.25 Jun 96.

59. SP Commander EOTR: AFOSI OL, 25

Jun 96.

60. Commander, 4404th Wing @rov.), Battle

StaffDirective 96-5, 4 Jun 96, 0700 zulu time;

Schwalier interview 23 Feb 99.

61. Burgess interview; interview with lst. Lt.

Stephanie Bronson, civil engineeq 45th Civil

Engineering Squadron, PatrickAFB, Fla.,6 Feb

97; interwiew with SSgl. Boris Rudinski, 74lst

Maintenance Squadron, Patrick AFB, Fla., 5

(
Feb 97.

62. Interview with Capt. Russell D. Barile,

pilot, Tlst Rescue Squadron, PatrickAFB, Fla.,

4 Feb 97; Capt. Jeff Prichard, 59th Fighter

Squadron, quoted in Steven Komarow, "There

was warning, but it still wasn't enough," U,t4

Today,21 lun96,lA.

63. Grant, "Khobar Towers," 45; Record

Report, B, I:26.

64. Nathan Alderman, 347th Wing public

affairs, "Dhahran doctor details disaster," 12 Jul

96, memorandum copy of an Air Combat

Command News Service story; Robb interview; roster of the 4404th Medical Group, 6 Jul

96; Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," entry for

transportation squadron, 1000,20 Jun96, 1000.

65. Record Report,B,l:24; Schwalier interview, 23 Feb 99; SSgt. Richard Roberts,

"Terrorism: Real threat exists in AOR; stay

alerf be obsewant I' Gulf l4ew 1 :25 (20 Jun 96),

3; Dick interview with author; Maj. Gen. Dan

Dick (IJSAE ret.), comments on "KhobarTowers: Tragedy and Response" manuscript, 17

May05.

66. HNSC Report, 7; "Shaw wounded come

homel' The ltem, ShawAFB, S.C., 30 Jun 96,

7A; Philip Shenon, "Saudis Offer U.S. Full

Cooperation tn Bombing Inquiry," Ncw York

Times,l Jul 96, A-1. In writing this paragraph

Notes to pages 33-46

the author also used unclassified material from

some summary papers and memoranda that

remain classified.

67. HNSC Report, 7. On the Saudi reservations about moving the northem perimeter, see

also press accormts such as Jack Kelley, *Wamings plentitul in Saudi bombing," USA Today,

26 Atg96,16{ and "US. General Didn'tTell

Superiors of Saudi Refusal to Widen Buffer,"

Washington Post, 2 Jul 96, A-5.

68. Shenon, "Saudi Bombers Got Outside

Suppor! ' A-1; "Shaw woundo{" The ltem,30

Jun 96, 7A; hanscript of U.S. Navy Capt.

Michael Doubleday's Deparhnent of Defense

news briefing, 2 Jul 96,2:30 p.m. See also

"Pentagon backs off assertion that Saudis

refusedtougher sednry:' Philadelphin Inquirer,

3 Jul 96, 10.

69. "US. General Didn'tTell Superiors"A-5;

"U.S. Commanders at Saudi Basel' New York

Times,28 Jun96,A-1.

70. "U.S. Commanders at Saudi Basel' New

York Times,28 Jun 96, A l; Graham, "Bomb

Wonl Deter U.S.," A-1.

71. Bomb Damage Survey Executive Summary,8.

72. AFHSO KhobarTowers oral history interview 29; Dick interview with author.

73. AFOSI OL, 25 hm96.

Chapter Four

l. Umstead interuiew; Dick interview with

author; Air Combat Command News Service to

Air Combat Comrnandunit public affairs offtcers and other addressees, 15 Jul 96. Gen. Dick

was promoted to major general on 1 Aug 98 and

retired on I Jul 03.

2. Umstead interview; Treadway interview;

interview with Maj. Cynthia Coles, assistant

chief, standardization and evaluation, 86th Operations Group, 86th Aeromedical Evacuation

Squadron, RamsteinAir Base, Germany, 6 Mar

3. Alderman,'Dhahran doctor details disastet''; Robb interview. Even after Dr. Robb and

his companions refumed to the Khobar Towers

and learned from a secwity policeman at the

gate about the bombing, Robb continued to

believe there had been an explosion dorvntown:

he assumed there must have been a multiple

bombing.

4. HNSC Report, 1; Umsteadinterview

5. Bruffyinterview.

6. Shafer conversation notes.

7. Berryinterview.

8. Barile interview; Berry interview.

9. Barile interview; Berry tnterview

1 0. McCarthy interview.

1 1. Ibid.; Valencia interview; Cochran interview.

12. Mccarthy interview; Treadway interview

13. McCarthy interview

14. Burgess interview; list of active duty personnel injwed at Dhahran compiled by the Secretary of the Air Force's office of public affairs,

28 Jun 96 (hereafter cited as Secretary's list of

injured personnel); list of hospitalized casualties prepared by the PERSCO office, Mission

Support Squadron, 4404th Composite Wing

@rov.), 29 Jrm 96 (hereafter cited as PERSCO's

list of hospitalized casualties); Schwalier con223
III

Notes to pages 46-50

venation notes, 24 Feb 99. Some sources, such

as PERSCO's list ofhospitalized casualties and

PERSCO office messages, referto the MODA

complex as "MODA l." Gen. Schwalier explained that there were several such facilities

across Saudi Arabia and that the "1" identifed

this one as being in Dhahran as opposed to, for

example, MODA 3, in Riyadh (Schwalier conversation notes,23 Feb 99). The MODA complex included King Abdul Aziz Air Base Hospital. Air Force personnel generally used the

term "MODA Hospital" to mean the King

Abdul Aziz Hospital (Dr. Kamat Shahab, chief

of surgery KingAbdulAzizAir Base Hospital,

to Perry D. Jamieson, 10 Apr 99).

15. Burgess interview

16. rbid.

17. Ibid.; Ziegler interview. The exchange is

quoted as Sgt. Burgess recalled it in his oral history interview: Ziegler did not quote himself in

his interview, and Burgess is the befier wifiress

to his own words. Ziegler's memory of Burgess's reply was in fact very similar: "you sit

right there, and I'll be up." As in many other

instances where two or more interviewees discussed the same subject in their interviews, the

accounts in these furo interviews. given six

ffi1ff "O* *, sfesstul night, me remarkably

18. Burgess interview.

19. Zieglerinterview.

20. rbid.

21. rbid.

22. lbid.; William Matthews, "Most hurt in

bombing retum ta dutyl' Air Force Times 57:13

(28 Oct 96), 3l; Secretary's list of injured personnel.

23. Ziegler nterview; Burgess interview.

24. Ziegler nterview; Burgess interview.

25. Burgess interview Sgt. Burgess provided

SrA. Jerwoski's name in a subsequent conversation with SSgt. Yancy Maites, hisrorian, 33d

FighterWing.

26. Burgess interview; Ziegler interview; list

of confirmed deceased, compiled by the

Secretary of the Air Force's office of public

affairs, I Jul 96 (hereafter cited as Secretary's

list of confirmed deceased).

27. Burgess interview; Treadway interview;

Matthews, "Most hurt in bombing," 31. For 

a

few of many references to the importance of

shoes that night, see Aleson interview; Bronson

224

interview; Winkler interview.

28. Burgess interview; Ziegler interview;

Secretary's list of i4iured personnel.

29. Barlle interview; Morelock interview;

PERSCO's list of hospitalized casualties.

30. Morelock interview; Ziegler interview;

Burgess interview.

31. Burgess interview. Many sources mentioned the unceftainty aboutthe condition ofthe

building, or the possibility of further attacks.

For a few examples see Coles interview and Lt.

Col. Thomas H. Shafer's undated nominations

of Capt. Russell D. Barile, MSgt. Dwayne R.

Berry, and others for the Airman's Medal;

Morelock interview.

32. Guerrero interview; Watkins, "They didnl

hesitate," 13; transcript of 'Aftermath of Saudi

Bombing," ABC World News Tonight, ABC

Television, 27 Jun96,6:30p.m.; Bryant, "Tested by terror," 5.

33. Guerrero interview.

34. Christopher Dickey, "Target: America,"

Na,vsweek 128:7 (8 lul 96), 27 ;Watkins, "They

didnthesitate," 13.

35. Winkler interview; Morelock interview.

36. Winkler interview; Morelock interview.

See also "25 Jun 96: Mike Morelock."

37. Winkler interview; Morelock interview;

"25 Jw96: Mike Morelock."

38. Winkler interview; Secretary's list of injured personnel; PERSCO's list of hospitalized

casualties.

39. Morelock interview; Col. Shafer's undated

nomination of Capt. Michael D. Morelock for

the Airman's Medal; Friers interview.

40. Morelock interview; Winkler interview

41. Morelock interview; "25 hn 96: Mike

Morelock."

42. Ibid.; Winkler interview.

43. Morelock interview; '25 hn 96: Mike

Morelock."

44. Morelock interview; Secretary's list of

injured personnel; PERSCO's list of hospitalized casualties.

45.*25 Jw 96: Mike Morelock"; Morelock

interview.

46. Morelock interview; *25 htn 96: Mike

Morelock."

47. Morelock interview; Col. Shafer's undated

nomination of Capt. Moreloc! Aleson interview. See also Berry interview. The day after the

bombing, MSgt. Dwayne R. Berry the first I
sergeant ofthe deployed 7 1 st Rescue Squadron,

traveled with Col. Shafer to visit the wounded

members of the Tlst who were patients in

Dhahran hospitals. Sgt. Berry characteized

Col. Shafer as "swerely injured."

48. Morelock interview.

49.lbid.; Ziegler interview; Burgess interview.

50. Morelock interview; Graham, "Bomb

Won't Deter U.S.." A-1: Col. Shafer's rmdated

nomination of MSgl. William F. Sine for the

Airman's Medal; Secretary's list of injured persorurel.

51. Col. Shafer's undated nomination of SSgt.

Matthew A. Wells for the Airman's Medal:

Notes to Pages 50-54

Morelock interview; Winkler interview.

52. Morelock interview; Winkler interview.

53. Guerrero interview; Biggs interview;

AFNS video tape, at the KhobarTowers exhibit

in the Enlisted Heritage Hall, GunterAnnex,

Maxwell AFB. Ala.. 12 Dec 03.

54. Secretary's list of injured personnel;

Guererro interview. A document written by

SrA. Dick also was used to write this paragraph.

55. Col. Shafer's undated nomination of Capt.

Lawrence H. Branch for the Airman's Medal;

Secretary's list of injured personnel.

56. Schwalier conversation notes,23 Feb 99;

Secretary's list of injured personnel.

57. Biggs interview.

Chapter Five

1. Secretary's list of confirmed deceased; "Air

Force clarifies status of Dhahran attack victims,"

AFNS Review,3 Jul 96,3. Biographical sketches of the deceased appear in the backmatter.

2. Secretary's list of confirmed deceased; "Air

Force clarifies stafus," 3. Airman Morgera's unit

andTSgt. Nguyenb nickname are given as they

appear on the KhobarTowen mernorial at Eglrn

AFB.

3. Secretary's list ofconfirmed deceased;

'Air Force clarifies status," 3. This sowce lists

Capt. Haun as LelandT. Haun, while the KhobarTowers memorial at PatrickAFB, Fla. has

L. Timothy Haun. His fulI name was Leland

Timothy Haun, and he went by Tim Haun. The

71st Rescue Squadron moved from Patrick

AFB to Moody AFB, Ga., about ayear after

the Khobar Towers bombing (AFNS, 'Air

Force announces force structure changel'2

May 97).

4. Secretary's list of confirmed deceased.

AlC. Lester's rank is givenhere as it appears on

the Khobar Towers memorials at Eglin and

PatrickAFBs.

5. Robb, "Medical Response"; McCarthy

interview.

6. Robb, "Medical Response." Messages sent

by the PERSCO otrice of the 4404th Mission

Support Squadron state that Dr. Robb pronounced the nineteen dead on the scene. One

example among the nineteen: message from the

PERSCO ofrce of the zl-zfQ{ffi ffi55161 Support

Squadronto HQAirForce Personnel Center and

several other addressees, "Casualty Report,

Initial Death Report, Hostilei 29 ixr96,0145

zulutime.

7. Message from the PERSCO office of the

4404th Mission Support Squadron to HQ Air

Force Personnel Center, *Casualty Report, Abbreviated. Hostile," 22 Jrtl96, 1435 zulu time.

At least two facton give weight to these numbers. First, the PERSCO office was the personnel office ofthe deployed unit and its statistics

were official ones. Second by 22 Jul nearly a

month hadpassed afterthebombing and areliable accounting became feasible. The two airmen very severely injured were SrA. Paul A.

Blais and SrA. Roger K. Kaalekahi. The seven

severely injured were: Capt. Sandra J. Beneway,

SSgt. Manuel J. Carrasco, MSgl. George G.

Dyer III, Capt. Thomas F, Edman, AlC. Shawn

K. Hale, AlC. Jon C. Schamber, and AlC.

FrankD. Sills.

8. Robb, *Medical Response." The Downing

task force adopted Dr. Robb's numbers: Downing Report, 55. Gen. Schwalier, writing soon

afterthe attaclg gave a lowerfigure (148) forthe

number taken to hospitals in Dhahran, but a

very similarone (69) foradmissions @rig. Gen.

Terryl J. Schwafter, "Dhahran Bombing Fatality

Accountability," 30 Jun [96]). The medical

group's "Chronological Record of Medical

Care," Standard Form 600 report for Jun 96

gave the same number as Dr. Robb for those

hospitalized (202) and stated that the clinic saw

425 patients on 25 Jun. This figwe presumably

included the 20 or so airmen that the facility

would feat during any given day. The "Chrono225
Notes to pages 54-57

logical Record" puts the nurnber hospitalized at

67 (4404th Wing History vol. 7, supporting

documentV 4). Dr. RobbS figures, given in the

text, represent the most mature, and best, statistics.

9. Treadway intenriew.

10. Robb interview; Treadway interview;

notes taken during a telephone conversation

with SMSgt. Fred Clarlq Recognition Programs

Branch, Directorate of Personnel Programs

Management, HQ Air Force Personnel Center,

RandolphAFB, Tex., 17 Nov 97; Julie Bird "In

the wake of disaster...Airmen iniured in

Dhahran will receive Purple Hearts." )i, Forrn

Times 57:ll (5Aug 96),7.

1 1. Graham, "Bomb Won't Deter U.S.," A-l ;

"4404th Medical Group (P) Events Chronology," enhy for 1 Jul 96, 1000, chronology compiled by the 44A4Ih Medical Group (Prov.), 22

Jul 96 (hereafter cited as "4404th Medical

Group Chronology"); Robb interview A report

persisted that, somewhat later than the truck

bombing at the Khobar Towers, a series of

bombs exploded in a doumtown Dhahran shopping mall frequented by Americans and other

foreigners. Many of the Saudi casualties may

have occurred there. (See the wing Operations

CenterLog ofEvents, entryfor25 Jun 96,2311,

tn 4404th Wing History vol. 8, supporting documentM 1 1; 'Dhahran up close and Personali

an undated account written by SSgt. Darryl A.

Pmker, the noncommissioned officer in charee

of the Small Computer Concept Center; M-cCarthy interview; Husted interview.) Dr. Robb

and other medical professionals compiled the *4404th Medical Group Chronology" soon

afterthe attrack, and SrA. Biggs includedmateria.l from it in his "Khobar Chronology."

12. Dick interview with author; Schwalier

interview, 24 Feb 99; Graham, "Bomb Won't

Deter U.S.," A-1. Gen. Dick stated that the

Americans saw two deceased children in an

emergency room. It is very unlikely that these

were the two young people Secretary Christopher visited because on 26 Jun State Department representative Nicholas Bums predicted

ofthe children whom the Secretary called on:

"They're both going to make it, they re in pret[z

good spirits." (Graham, "Bomb Won't Deter

U.S.," 1.) As Gen. Dick, Dr. Robb, and others

emphasized, the Saudis would not discusss their

casualties.

226

13. 4404thWing History vol. 1, 81.

14. Barile interview.

15. Morelock interview; Bomb Damage Survey Executive Summary, 1.

16. Bomb Damage Survey Executive Summary, l; Defense Special Weapons Agency,

"Dhahan Cratet''briefing slide, n.d.; Burgess

interview.

17. Bomb Damage Survey Executive Summary,3.

18. Ibid.,2; McCarthy interview; Biggs interview.

19. Bomb Damage Survey Executive Summary, 4. Early press accounts put the leld much

lower (Graham, "Bomb Won't Deter U.S.,"

A-1: Shenon. "Saudi Bombers Got Outside

Support,"A-l).

20. Robb, "Medical Response"; Defense

Special Weapons Agency, "Murrah Building

Oklahoma City" briefing slide, n.d.; Robert

D. McFadden, "Blast Hits Trade Center,

Bomb Suspected; 5 Killed, Thousands Flee

Smoke In Towers," New York Times,27 Feb

93, A-l; John Kifrrer, 'At Least 3l Are Dead,

ScoresAre Missing After Car Bomb Attack In

Oklahoma City Wrecks 9-Story Federal

Office Building I' New York Times, 20 Apr 95,

A-1. The "Medical Response" briefing states

that the explosive tonnage at Oklahoma City

was greater than at the KhobarTowers, but the

Defense Special Weapons Agency source, a

stronger one on this point, shows that the

opposite was the case.

21. Berry interview; Umstead interview;

Schwalier conversation notes, 23 Feb 99;

Husted interview; McCarthy interview.

22.Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," SP squadron entry for 25 Jtm 96,2154; Khobm Towers

map.

23.Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," SP squadron enfiy for 25 Jun 96. 2 I 55.

24. Schwalier comments on "Khobar Towers"; Schwalier conversation notes, 23 Feb 99;

Biggs conversation notes. The SP squadron

entry for25 Jrm 96,2275,hasthe DCG "ordered to activate" at that time, but in his 21 Oct 04

comments, Gen. Schwalier statedhe directed its

activation'lvithin the first few minutes" a{ler

the bombing.

25. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," SP squadron entry for 25 J:ur:'96,215'7.

26. Ibid.; Guerrero interview; TimAlbritton to
U.S. Army, Cenhal

G-2, 6 Nov 97.

27.Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," SP squadron entry for 25 Jun 96, 2201. At 6 a.m. the next

morning, the security police released the two to

the custody of Lt. Bader Dewish, the Royal

Saudi Military Police commander in the area

(Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," SP squadron

entry for 26 Jun 96, 0600; unclassified portions

of classified documents were used to identif'

Lt. Bader). Col. Traister said of Lt. Bader: "He

is a true asset to our security enhancement. It is

my pleasure to have knorvnhim and work with

him. A true professional." (SP Commander

EOTR.)

28. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," SP squadron entry for 25 Jtn 96, 2157 .

29. Guerrero interview; Coles interview;

Tieadway interview. Many ofthose interviewed

who were at the KhobmTowers that night mentioned this bogus alarm ofa second attack. See

also Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," SP squadron

entry for 25 Jwt 96, 2157 .

30. Biggs, "KhobmChronology," SP squadron

entry for 25 J'n96,2155. TheArmy Khobar

Torvers map, which is labeled as a building erzacuation plan, identifies the area immediately

south of the Desert Rose km as "Rally Point 1,"

and the area south ofthe medical clinic as "Rally

P ont 2 !' If Army planners had decided before 25

Jun 96 to use the Desert Rose Inn and medical

clinic as "rally points" in an emergency, their

intentions hadno effect onthe wents the night of

the bombing. Gen. Schwalier later offered two

points about these map designations. First, he

pointed out that although he coordinated all of

his battle staffdirectives with the Army, as well

as the French and British, he remained una\ryare

of anyArmy plans to use the clinic and dining

hall as rally points. Second, he noted that as far

as he knew, noArmy personnel reported to either

ofthese buildings that night (Schwalier conversation notes, 23 Feb 99). The Air Force Khobar

Towers map hasthe medical clinic labeled incorrectly as Building 108. It was Building 111; 108

was just to the northeast (Air Force Khobar

Towers map; Army Khobar Towers map). SSgt.

Rudolph Grimm II, a dental technician who

lived and worked in Building 111, brought this

map error to the author's attention.

31. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," SP squadron entry for 25 Jun 96, 2157 , and fransportaNotes to pages 57-60

Command-Saudi Arabia tion squadron entry for 25 Jtn 96' 2205;

Umstead interview.

32. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 25 Jw96,22A; Robb interview; testimony of MSgt. [Wayne] Mello, appendix to

Secretary ofDefenseWilliam S. Cohen, Report

on Personal Accountability for Force Protection

at KhobarTowers,3l Jrtl97, 14 (hereafter cited

as Cohen Report); Lt. Col. Douglas Robb,

Office of Health and Environment, Office of

the Surgeon General, HQ USAFE, to Dr' Perry

D. Jamieson, AFHSQ 8 APr 98.

33. Col. Shafert mdated nomination of SSgt.

Matthew A. Wells for the Airman's Medal.

34. Coles interview; Aleson interview.

35. Cochran interview; McCarthy interview;

Treadway interview.

36. Aleson interview; Morelock interview.

37. Coles interview; interview with SSgt.

Rudolph Grimm II, dental technician,45th

Medical Group, PatrickAFB, Fla., 6Feb97;

Robb interview; Biggs, "Khobar Chronologyi

clinic entry for 3 Jul 96, 1400.

38. Schwalier comments on "Khobar Towers." The ellipses are Gen. Schwalier's.

39. MSgt. M. Lipparelli, HQ Air Cornbat

Command Chaplains Office to [Lt. Col. T.]

Wuerffel, HQ Air Education and Training Command Chaplains Offrce,26 Jun 96. Col. (Chaplain) John Lundin, senior chaplain for the

Kaiserslautem Military Community, which

included RamsteinAir Base, Landstuhl Regronal Medical Center, Kleber Kaserne, Vogelweh

Complex, and other facilities, explained that

dtring the 1990s, the Air Force had a shortage of

Roman Catholic chaplains and itwas fortunate

that one happened to be available for Khobar

Towers at its time of need (interview with Col.

(Chaplain) John Lrmdin, senior chaplain for the

Kaiserslautem Military Community, Ramstetn

Air Base, Germany, 3 Mar 97; Dan Cragg'

Guide to Military Installations Qvlechanicsburg'

Pa.,1994),357-58).

40. Aleson interview; Lt. Col. (Chaplain) S.

Frick, HQ Air Combat Command Chaplains

Office, to Col. (Chaplain) J. Blair, HQ USAE,

Personnel, Materiel, and Readiness Division,

Ofrce ofthe Chiefofthe Chaplain Service, and

other addressees, 27 Jun 96; Biggs' "Khobar

Chronology," chaplain entry for 25 Iw 96,

2155. On the chaplains' response to the attack,

see also the Chaplains Office Report, I May to

227
Notes to pages 60-63

I Aug [96] and Lt. CoL (Chaplain) Dennis E.

Aleson's Operation Southern Watch After

Action Report, 27 Mar4 Jul 96, in the 4404th

Wing History vol. 2, supporting documents

I-10 and I-14.

4 1. Schwalier interview, 24 Feb 99 ; Schwalier

comments on "Khobar Towers,'; Sp CommanderEOTR.

42. Schwalier comments on "Khobar Towers."

43.Matt Labash, "The Scapegoat: How the

Secretary of Defense Ended the Career of an

Exemplary Air Force Genera1," The Weekly

Standard 3:l I (24 Nov 97). 20-21 ; Air Combit

Command News Service to All Air Combat

Command Unit Public Affairs Officers and

other addressees, 15 Jul 96. An excerpt of

Labash's article appeared, in Air Force Iimes

58:18 (8 Dec 97), 12-16. OnGen. Schwaliert

letter writing that night, see also Dick interview

with author. Gen. Schwalier's end oftour renort

is in the 4404th Wing History. vol. 7. supporting

documentlII 5.

44. Dick interview with author. Durins this

interview. Gen. Dick produced a scrapbool and

showed the author the original note, written in

pen on Gen. Schwalier's stationery. Probably for

greater clarity, the Labash article altered the text

slightly, to: "Dan, Welcome to Dhah. . .', This

work follows the original note: "Daq Welcome

to Dh-."

45. Schwalier interview, 24 Feb 99; Dick

interview with author.

46. Schwalier interviettt, 24 Feb 99.

47. Umstead interview.

48. Ibid; Dick interview with author.

49. Schwalier intervi ew, 24 F eb 99.

50. Ibid.; Schwalier comments on..Khobar

Towers."

51. Schwalier interview, 24 Feb 99.

52.Ibid.

53. Ibid.; Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," operations group entry for 25 hn96,2153. SrA.

Biggs and SSgt. Guerrero identified the

"Saber" call signs used on the brick radios.

54. Brggs, "Khobar Chronology," operations

group entry for 25 hn96,2215; Biggs conversation notes; Swope- Hawley Report, l:121;

Schwalier conversation notes, 23 Feb 99; USAF

biography of Lt. Gen. Tad J. Oelstrom. Oelstrom was promoted to lieutenant general on I

Attg97, when he became superiniendent of the

228

USAF Academy. The author also found information about Tadtown in the unclassified portions of some classified documents.

55. Schwalier interview,24 Feb 99.

56. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," operations

group entry for 25 Jun 96,2215; Schwalier

interview, 24Feb99.

57. rbid.

58. Robb interview; "4404th Medical Group

Chronology," entry for 25 Jrm96,2225.

59. Dick interview with author.

60. Schwalier interview, 24 Feb 99; Biggs,

"Khobar Chronology," operations group entry

for 25 Jtn 96, 22 I 5; Burgess interview

61. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," SP squadron entry for 25 hn 96, 2155.

62. "Talktng Paper on Dhahran Bombing

Fataliff Accountability"; Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," operations group entry for 25 Jun96,

2215; Schwalier interview, 24 Feb 99; Schwalier

comments on "Khobm Towers."

63. "Talking Paper on Fatality Accountability"; "4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 25 hn96,2240; "Khobar Towers

Chronology of Events," clinic and JAG entries

for 25 Jr.rn 96,2240; Col. Robb to Dr. Perry D.

Jamieson, 8 Apr 98; Husted interview. The

wing Operations Center Log of Events has

Gen. Schwalier give Maj. Greenfield this taskingatthe22I5battle stafmeeting and also has

an entry for an hour later: "Moda HospitalJAG sent for accountabiliq"' (entries for 25 Jm

96, 2215 and231 5, in the 4404thWing History

vol. 8, supporting document VI-l 1). The *4404th Medical Group Chronology" covers

Greenfield's assignment in a 2240 entry, which

also relates some of the information that the

major obtained. Gen. Schwalier gave the JAG

this tasking shortly after 2215, and began to

hear back from him by telephone at 2240.

Asked on 23 Feb 99 if these times were approximately correcl Gen. Schwalier agreed.

64. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 25 Jun 96,2240.KngEdtdUniversity

Hospital was administered by King Faisal

Universiry Hospital. This fact, ard thefu identical initials, inhoduced confusion about these

two facilities in some Air Force documents

(notes taken during an interview with Dr. Feher

S. Alsharil assistant medical attache, Medical

Section, Royal Embassy of SaudiArabia, 8 Apr

99;Dr.Kamal Shahab, chief of surgery King
Abdul Aziz Air Base Hospital, to Perry D.

Jamieson, AFHSQ 10 Apr 99).

65. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entryfor25 Jw96,2240.

66. "Talking Paper on Fatality Accountabiliry"; Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," operations group entry for 25 Jun96,2215;Dick

interviewwith author.

67. Air Combat Command News Service to

AllAir Combat Command Unit PublicAffain

Officers, and others, 15 Jul 96; Umstead interview; Dick interview with author.

68. Dick interview with author; Schwalier

comments on "Khobar Towers."

69. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," operations

group entries for 25 Jun 96, 2318 ar.rd 2335;

unclassified portion of a classified message

sent by the 4404th Composite Wing Operations

Centerto HQAir Combat Command and other

addressees. 25 Jun 96. 2135 zulu time.

70. lnterview with Col. (Dr.) Dan L. Locker,

USAFE comrnand surgeoq RamsteinAir Base,

Germany, 4Mar 9'7. On I Jul 97 Col. Locker

was promoted to brigadier general and assigned

to command the 81 st Medical Group; he retired

on I Aug 02 (USAF biography of Brig. Gen.

(Dr.) Dan L. Locker, Jun 02). The use of daylight

time in Europe but not SaudiArabia sometimes

created confusion, a point made by Lt. Col.

Bruce Crow, USA, chiefofpsychology, LRMC,

Germany during a 10 Mar 97 interview.

71. Locker interview; 39thAerospace Medicine Squadron Commander to the USAFE Surgeon General, [Plans office], "39th Medical

Group FAST (Flytng Ambulance Surgical

Tearn) medical response to the Dhahran, Saudi

Arabia tenorist bombing, 26 Jur3 Jul 96," 16

Jul 96. "FAST team" is a common Air Force

useage, with a redundancy: the "T" in the

acronym "EAST" stands for'team."

T2.lntorview with Col. (Dr.) James W Bost,

Commander, 86th Aeromedical Evacuation

Squadron, Ramstein Air Base, Germany, 4 Mar

97 ; 86th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron

Surgeon General to the 86th Operations Group

Commander and other addressees, "Medical

After Action Report, Dhaluan Bombingl' 22

Jul 96 (hereafter cited as 86th AES After Action

Report.)

73. Bost interview; 59th Medical Wing

Critical Care Aeromedical Transport Team

@eployed) to the 86thAeromedical Evacuation

Notes to Pages 63-67

Squadron Commander and other addressees,

"Medical After Action Report, Dhahran Bombnei 17 Jul 96 (hereafter cited as 59th Medical

Wing After Action Report).

74. Bost interview; S6thAeromedical Evacuation Squadron Surgeon General to the 86th

Operations Group commander and other addressees, 22 htl96; Medical Group Chronology, entry for 25 Jun 96, 2350. The small

Dhahran aeromedical staging flight referred to

by Dr. Bost mustered three nurses and seven

medical technicians that night (Robb, 'Medical

Response"; Coles interview).

75. Lundin interview.

76. Friers interview.

77 . lbid.; Bryant Jordan, "4,794 will add a

sffipel' Air Force Times 56:47 (24 Jun 96), 8.

The line nurnbers ofthe technical sergeants who

had been promoted had become available in

Saudi Arabia the same day (interview with

MSgt. Cedric Williams, first sergeant, 58th

Fighter Squadron, Eglin AFB, Fla., 4 Dec 96).

78. Jozayt interview.

79. rbid.

80. Ibid. All Khobar Towers telephone service, including the Defense Switched Network,

went out immediately after the bombing

@owning Report, 47; point paper on the communications impacts from the Dhahran bombing, prepared by the Operations Division, Directorate of Mission Systems, Deputy Chief of

Stafffor Communications and Information, HQ

USAE. 1Jul96).

81. Friers interview.

82. Ibid.; Jozal interview.

83. Jozayt interview.

84. "Khobm Bombing Chronology," entry for

25 Jw 96, 1 355 (chronology prepared by SSgt.

Yancy Mailes, historian, 33d Fighter Wing, on

29 Jw96); interview with Lt. Col. Stan Hill,

Commander, 33d Operations Group, Eglin

AFB, Fla., 5 Dec 96; Dylewski interview. For a

survey history of the Air Force's AEE, see

Richard G. Davis, "Immediate Reach, Immediate Power: The Air Expeditionary Force and

American Power Projection in the Post Cold

War Era'Air Force History and Museum hogram pamphlet, 1998. In 2003, the Atlanta airport was renamed Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta

International Airport to honor former mayor

MaynardH. Jackson.

85. Mailes, "Khobar Bombing Chronology"'

229
Notes to pages 67-75

entry for 25 Jun 96, 1530; Hill interview; interview with Capt. Brenda L. Campbell, public

affairs officer, 33d Fighter Wing, Eglin AFB,

Fla.,5 Dec 96.

86. Hill interview; Campbell interview.

87. Mailes, "Khobar Bombing Chronology,"

entry for 25 Jun 96, 1615.

88. rbid., 1800.

89. lnterview ofAir Force Chief of Staff Gen.

Ronald R. Fogleman byAir Force historian Dr.

Richard P Hallion, 4 Nov 97; "significant

Event Notification Record," an undated summary paper found in the files of the Regional

Plans and Issues office ofthe office ofthe Deouty Chief of Stafffor Air and Space Operations.

HQUSAE

90. Gen. John M. Shalikashvili (JSA, ret.) to

[Brig. Gen. DavidA. Armstrong (USA, ret.)], I

Jan 98, with a marginalia note by Gen. Armstrong, 7 Jan 98. A document prepared in the

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staffwas also used in writing this paragraph.

9 I . Interview of Secretary ofthe Air Force Dr.

Sheila Widnall by Dr. George Watson, historian,

AFHSO,27 Oct97.

92. Grahun, "Bomb Wont Deter U.S.,"A-1;

transcript of "Bombing in Saudi Arabia," CBS

Evening News, CBS Television, 25 Jun96,7

p.m.

93. Fogleman interview; DOD photograph

number 96062GN-{000G{02; Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," entry for 26 Jun 96, 0919.

Chapter Six

l. Bryan E. Bledsoe, Robert S. Porteq and

Bruce R. Shade, Brady Paramedic Emagency

Care (Jpper Saddle River, N.J., 1997), 1074.

See also Daniel Limmeq Bob Elling, and

Michael F. O'Keefe, Essentials of Emergency

Care: A Refresher for the Practicing EMT:B

(Upper Saddle River, N.J., 1996),203.The

"Response" section quotation is from the Robb

rnterview.

2. Robb, "Medical Response"; Capt. Timothy

Bailey withNathanAlderman, "Buddies Cme{"

A irman Xl,:70 @ ec, 9 6i), I I.

3. Bailey, 'Buddies Cared' 11.

4. Interview with SSgt. John C. Orlando, information management specialist, 58th Fighter

Squadron, EglinAFB, Fla.,4 Dec 96; AFHSO

KhobarTowers oral history interviews 36 and 8.

5. McCanhyinterview

6. Robb interview; Treadway interview;

Grimm interview; [a U.S. Army noncommissioned officer] to U.S. Army, Central

Command-Saudi ArabiaG--2,6 Nov 97. Sst.

Grimmb superior, Lt. Col. (Dr.) Bruce L*di.,

said ofhim in his monthly report: "SSgt Grimm

was treated and released for minor iniuries sustained in the 25 Jun 96 terrorist bombins. He

had great presence of mind and was a riajor

contributor in the ensuing mass casualty

response." (4404th Wing History vol. 7, supporting document V-5B.)

7. Dick interview with author.

8. Hustedinterview.

9. Barile interview; MSgt. William Sine,4lst

230

Rescue Squadron/DOJ, toDr. PerryD. Jamiesoq

AFHSq 8 Sep 98.

10. Craven interview.

I 1. Parker, "Dhahran up close and Personal";

Aleson interview.

12. Robb interview.

13. Downing Report, 55; Robb interview;

Treadway interview.

14. Robb interview; Cochran interview; Col.

Shafer's undated nominations of SrA. Michael

D. Atkins, SSgt. Matthew A. Wells, SrA.

Gregory E. Randall, and MSgt. William F, Sine

for the Airmanb Medal; MSgt. William Sine,

41st Rescue Squadron/DOJ, to Dr. Perry D.

Jamieson,AFHSQ I and 8 Sep 98.

1 5. Morelock interview; Col. Shafer's undated

nomination of Capt. Michael D. Morelock for

theAirman's Medal.

16. Morelock interview.

17. Parker, "Dhahran up close and Personal";

Bailey, "Buddies Care{' 11.

18. Robb interview.

19. Ibid.; *M04thMedical Group Chronology," enfy for 3 Jul 96, 1400.

20. Robb interview; Schwalier comments on

"Khobar Towers"; Bailey, "Buddies Care{' 9.

21. Robb interview; *4404th Medical Group

Chronology," entry for 3 Jul 96, 1400.

22. Schwalier comments on "Khobar Towers:'

23. On the designation of this building, see

chapter five, note 30.

24.Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," SP squad-
ron entry for 25 hxr96,2153 Robb, "Medical

Response."

25. Biggs, "Khobar Cbronology," clinic entry

for 25 Jun 96,2202; Robb interview;"4404th

Medical Group Chronology," entry for 25 Jun

96,2202;testimony of MSgt. fWape] Mello'

appendix to the Cohen RePort, 14'

26. Biggs, "Khobar Chronologyi SP squadron entry for 25 Jun 96, 2157 , and transportation squadron entry for 25 Jtxt96,2205;Umstead interview.

27 . ^4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 25 Jun96,2202;Tteadway interview.

28. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entryfor25 Jw96,2210.

29. Ibid.; Robb interview.

30. William Matthews, "Shrnning blast drew a

swift medical responsel' Air Force limes 56'.49

(8 Jul 96), 13; Robb, "Medical Response";

Robbinterview.

3 I . Matthews, "Stmning blast," 13.

32. Robb,'Medical Response."

33. Treadway interview; Matthews, "Stunning

blast," 13; Robb interview; Bailey, "Buddies

Care{' 1 0. PERSCO's list of hospitalized casualties and the Bailey article refer to Dr. Goffas a

captain; Dr. Treadway identified him as a major,

as did a 1 7 Jul 96 caption on an ofrcial Air Force

photograph of him receiving the Airman's

Medal.

34. Robb, "Medical Response";Bailey, "Buddies Cared," 10. The figure twenty-two is derived from Dr. Robb's briefing to Air Force

Chiefof StatrGen. RonaldR. Foglemaq which

puts the Air Force clinic total at twenty-six.

Bailey's article in Airman gives the Air Force

clinic total as twenty-five.

35. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 25 Jun 96,2202;Robb, "Medical Response"; Coles interview. Members of the

4404th were justifiablyproud oftheir efforts on

the night of 25 Jrm 96. Airmnn magazineb initial coverage ofthe bombing, anAug 96 article,

mentioned the Air Force andArmy medical personnel who flew to Saudi Arabia, but not the

members of the 4404th, 4410th, and others

already on the scene. The periodical soon heard

from readers in Dhahran who believed it had

slighted the contributions ofthose already in

place (Arana-Barradas, Johnson, and Norman,

"southern Watch Continues," 19; 'Airmail"'

Airman ){J-10 @ec 96), 30).

Notes to Pages 75-79

36. Coles interview; "440tth Medical Group

Chronology," entry for 25 hn 96, 2202.

37. Coles interview.

38. Robb,'Medical Response"; Bailey, "BuddiesCared' I l; Burgess interview.

39. Bailey, "Buddies Cme{ ' I l; Robb, "Medical Response."

40. Robb, "MedicalResponse"; Bailey, "Buddies Cmed' 10.

41. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 25 Jun96,2225;Batley, "Buddies

Cme{ ' I 1; Robb, 'Medical ResPonse."

42. Robb interview; Grimm interview; Coles

interview. Dr. Robb provided a floor plan of the

clinic, which apPears in the text.

43. Aleson interview; Treadway interview'

The floor plan provided by Dr. Robb labels

every room in the clinic, including those in the

administrative wtng'

44. Tieadway interview; Grimm interview'

45. "Chronological Record of Medical Care"'

Standard Form 600 reports forMay andJun96'

in the 4404th Wing History vol. 7, supporting

documents V-3 and Y4; *4404th Medical

Group Chronolory," entry for25 in96,2225;

BailJy, "Buddies Cared' 9; Coles interview'

46. Coles interview.

47. Treadway interview.

48. J.E. Mansion, ed., Heath's Standard

French and English Dictionary,2 parts (Boston, et al., 1939), 1:859; Harvey D. Grant,

Robert H. Murray, Jr., and J. David Bergeron,

Emergency Care (Englewood Cliffs' N'J',

1986),458.

49. Alderman, "Dhahran doctor details disaster." Air Combat Comrnand News Service also

transmitted at least one other version of this

account, through the command's electronic

mail service, on 11 Jul 96' These two news service stories are substantially the same. Another

variant, co-authored and edited for publication'

is Bailey "Buddies Cmed."

50. Alderman, "Dhahran doctor details disastel'; TreadwaY interview.

51. Grant, Murray, andBergerorl Ezteryency

C are, 4601' Robb interview.

52. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," operations

group entry for25 hm96,2215;Dick interview

withauthor.

53. Grimm interview; Robb interview.

54. Rudinski interview; Grimm interview'

55. Robb interview.

23r
Notes to pages 79-83

56. Ibid.; Treadway interview; Dor.vnins Re_

port,55.

57. Robb interview.

58. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,,'

entries for 25 \n96,2155 and2215; Coies

rnterview.

59. "4404th Medical Group Chronology,,,

enhy for 25 Jw96,2230; Dick interview with

author.

60. "4404th Medical Group Chronology,',

entry for 25 Iun96,2230; Robb interview. Dr.

Robb doubtless provided the figure wtrich

appears in the Downing Report: ,.2O-30 ambu_

lances making multiple hospital runs', (Do.nnrng Report, 55).

_61 Robb interview; -44}4thMedical Group

Chronology," entries for 25 Jun96,2300 and

23 30; Eastern Region map.

62. *4404rh Medical Group Chronology,',

entry for 26 Jun 96, 0030; Eastem Regron mip;

Robb interview.

63. "4404th Medical Group Chronology,',

entry for 26 Jvrt96,0030; Dr. Kamal Shahab.

chief of surgery King Abdul Aziz Air Base

Hospital, to Perry D. Jamieson, AFHSO, 10 Apr

99; Eastem Region map. The Dorvning Report.

55, offers very slightly different statistics than

this chronology about the Saudi doctors and

nurses who reachedthe clinic before I a.m. The

text follows the medical group's chronology

because this source is more detailed than the

Dor,rming Report. The chronology identifies the

hospitals and other organizations that con_

tributed to the etro4 states the number of M.D.s

and R.N.s each senl and gives their arrival times.

64. Downing Report, 55;,,4404th Medical

Group Chronologyi enty for25 Jun 96,2300.

See also point paper on the communications

impacts from the Dha}ran bombing, prepared

by the Operations Division's Directorjte of

Mission Systems, Deputy Chief of Staff for

Communications and Information, He USAI]

I Jul 96.

65. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,',

entry for 25 hn96,2245; point paper on com_

muncatrons lmpacts, I Jul 96; Dick interview

with author.

66. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology,', commtmi_

cahons squadron entry for 26 Jun 96, 0300.

67. Robb interview.

_68. Ibid.; Treadway interview; Downing

Report,55.

232

69. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 25 Jun 96,2230; Robb interview;

"4404thMedrcal Group Chronologyi entry for

25 Jun96,2245.Dr. Tieadway said the ambulances were designed to carr)' four passengers;

the medical group's chronology stated that this

first run transported five. The circumstances

explain the extra patient (Tieadway interview;

"4404thMedrcal Group Chronology," entry for

25 Jw96,2230).

70. Robb interuiew; *M04th Medical Group

Chronology." entry for 25 Jtxt 96, 2345.

7 L Berry interview; " 4404th Medical Group

Chronology," entry for26 Jun 96, 0100.

72. Morelock interview; Bronson interview;

interview with Lt. Col. Sherry Conner, DS\{

USA, chief, social work services. LRMC" l0

Mar97.

73. Robb interview.

74.Ibid.

75. Ibid.; *4404th Medical Group Chronology." entry for 26 Jun 96, 0 I 00.

76. Robb interview.

77.lbid.; Dick interview with author.

78. Tleadway interview

79. Robb interview; *44}4thMedical Group

Chronology," enfy for 26 Jun 96, 0 1 00.

80. Treadway interview; Daniel Cude, ..Shaw

physician makes a difference," The ltem,shuxr

AFB, S.C.,29 Jun 96, lA.

81. 'U.S. Air Force Chiefof Staffpresents the

Airman's Medal to Maj. Steven Gotf' tZ.lut gO

description ofa 3 Jul 96 Joint Photographic

Experts Group photograph, in Kharmn.HTM,

29 Nov 97 file, "Khobar Files" computer disk.

documents ofCapt. Erik B. Polrlmann, assistant

chief of stafl G-2, HQ U.S. Army Forces

Central Command-Saudi Arabia; Robb interview; Treadway interview.

82. Robb interview; HNSC Report, 20;

PERSCO's list of hospitalized casualties;

Bailey, "Buddies Cared," 10; "U.S. Air Force

Chief of Staffpresents theAirman's Medal to

Maj. Steven Goff" I7 Jul 96.

83. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,,'

entry for 26 Jun 96, 01 00; Robb interview.

84. Robb interview; Col. (Dr.) Douglas J.

Robb, comments on "Khobar Towers: Tragedy

and Response" manuscript, 27 Jun 05.

85. Robb interview.

86. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,,,

entry for 26 Jtn 96,0530. Drs. Robb and
Notes to Pages 83-87

Treadwaybothrecalledworkinguntilafter6or ical Group chrorrology_has the_two C-141s

7 a.m. (Robb interview; Tread'iay interview). leaving Ramstein Air Base at 1505 Dhahran

ST.Dickinterviewwithauthor. time, 1405 at Ramstein (*44}4thMedical

88. Robb interview; *44}4thMedical Group GroupChronology,"entryfor26Jun96, 1505).

Chronology," entry for 26 hn96,0315. Coi. The Landstutrl stress management team's after

Schafer wis promoted to brigadier general on 1 action report gives !t a1 "approximately 1400"

Sep 97 (JSAF biography oiBrig.-Gen. Klaus (Commander, Psychology Service, LRMC to

O.'Schaier, Nov 97). iol. Roude6ustr was pro- Col. Kevin C. Kiley, Commander, LRMC, 27

moted to brigadier'general on I Jul 98 and to Jun 96 (hereafter cited as Commander, Psymajor genera'i onZiMay 01. On 4Aug 06, he chology Service, to 51t9!.1i^Commandeq

was pr;moted to lieutenant general and became Psychology Service, LRMC, "After Action Rethe Air Force surgeon general (USAF biogra- view: LRMC SfiessTeamDeploymentto Saudi

phy of Lt. Cen. lates d. Rouaiush, Aug dQ. Arabia in Response to a Terrorist Bombing"' 4

89 . 

*4404th Medical Group Chronology," Sep 96, n.p. (hereafter cited as the LRMC After

entry for 26 Jut96,0115; Cmdr. G.J. Hume, ACtion Rwiew). The after action reports of the

pubiic Affairs Office, He U.S. Navy Central 59th Medical Wing3 Critical Care Aeromedical

command, to Dr. Perry o. lamieson, aFHso, Transport Team and of the 86th Aeromedical

l6Mar98; Robb interview. Evacuation Squadron, wfrich arebetter sources

g0. *4404th Medical Group chronology," on this point, put the departure at 1230 ztfit

entry for 26 Jun 96, 0450. time, 1430 local time at Ramstein (59th Medi9 t . Robb interview. cal Wing After Action Report; 86th AES After

92. Locker interview; 39th Wing Public Action Report). The departure was delayed

Affairs Office biography of Col. Carlisle Har- because the aircraft had to be reconfigured and

rison, Jr., n.d. because some supplies and pallets arrived late.

93. Locker interview; European Theater Although the unit saved time by Titg the palcommand center and the Surgeon General's lets built for the cental African Republic deoffice, HQ U.S. Commander i.r chi.f, e*o- ployment, that mission did not involve mass

p.ur 6o.irund to HQ USAFE and other casualties and additional equipment had to be

uddr"rr""r, "Medical Support to USCINC- added for the Khobar Towers mission (86th

CENT-Dahahran, SA Bombing," 26 Jun96, AES AfterAction Report; inleryiew with Lt'

0601 21u time; 39th Aerospace Medicine Col. Bruce Crow, USA, chief of psychology'

Squadron commander to ttre usans Surgeon LRMC, and officer in charge, Dhahran shess

General, [Plans office], l6 Jul 96. The activa- managementteam, LRMC, 10 Mar97; see also

tion time bf 3 a.m. in Turkey is fiom the 39th interview widr TSgt' James B. Coo^per, Jr., nonAerospace Medicine Squa&on commander's commissioned officer in charge of psycholory

memorandum. The "4404th Medical Group services, 86th Medical Squadron, LRMC' l0

Chronologyi entry for 26 Jun 96,0330 has HQ Mm 97). The overriding point is that the depmUSAff al#rng tL" fa.St t u- at 3:30 a.m. in ture was remarkably expeditious: the rmit left a

Dhahran, 1:30 a.m. at Ramstein Air Base, little over twenty-four hours after receiving its

Germany. first notice, by telephone @ost interview)'

g4.Lockerinterview. 103''4404thMedical Group Chronology"'

g5.AESAfterActionReport;Bostinterview; entry for 26 Jun96,0330; 86th AES After

..44Mth Medical Group chronoloryj'entry for ActionReporfi 5gthMedicalwingAfterAction

25 Jw96,2350. RePort'

96. Bost interview. lO4' *4404th Medical Group Chronology"'

g7.Ibid. entry for 26 Jun96' 0350; Cragg' Guide to

98. Ibid. Military Insnllations,358,361'

99. Ibid.; 86thAES AfterAction Report. 105. European Theater gommand Center and

100. 86th AES After Action Report; Bost the Surgeon General's Offrce of HQ U.S. Cominterview. mander in Chief; Elnopean Command to HQ

101. Bost interview. USAFE and otlrer addressees' "Medical Support

102. 86thAES AfterAction Report. The Med- to USCINCCENT-Dhahran, SA Bombingi

z3J
Notes to pages 87-92

26 Jun 96, 0601 21u time; Commander.

Pyschology Service. ro Kiley. 27 Jun and 3 | Jul

96.

106. Notes taken during an interviewwith Col.

(Dr.)NeyM. Gore, USA, deputy comrnanderfor

clinical services, U.S. Army Europe Regional

Medical Command and Landstuhl Resional

Medical Cenrr. T Mar97. Col. Kiley was-fiocked to the rank ofbrigadier general on 12 Aug 96

(LRMC biography of Brig. Gen. Kevin C. Ki1ey,

M.D.. n.d.).

107. Crow interview; Conner interview. Col.

Conner outranked Col. Crow, but deferred to

Crow's Riyadh experience; the two officers

agreed that Crow should head the team.

108. LRMC After Action Review; Cooper

interview.

109. Interview with Col. Carolyn Bu1liner.

USA. deputy commander for nuning. LRMC,

I I Mar 97 : Crow interview.

110. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,',

enhy for26 Jun 96,0350; Robb interview; Web

Administrator, Otrice of the Surgeon General,

HQ US Central Command, to Dr. Perry D.

Jamieson,AFHSQ 24 Mar 98.

1l l. Robb interview. See also Locker interview This exchange was part ofthe first of

many conversations between the these tw.o oficers. ln Mar 97, Dr. Locker estimated that they

conferred at least once a day for the next ten to

twelve days.

112. Robb interview.

113. Treadway interview; *4404th Medical

Group Chronology," entry for25 Jtn96,2355;

Aleson interview.

ll4. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entries for 26 htn96,0230, 0315, 0530, and

2100. It is difficult to state the exact time when

the count reached nineteen (see chapter seven,

note 50).

1. Cochraninterview.

2. Schwalier, "Dhahran Bombing Fatality

Accountability"; Schwalier conversation notei.

23 Feb 99: Schwalier commenrs on ..Khobar

Towers."

3. AFHSO KhobarTowers oral history interviews 8.9. and 10.

4. AFHSO KhobarTowers oral history inter_

views 8.9. and 10.

5. Secretary's list of confirmed deceased. A

document prepared by the wingb mission support squadron also was used in writing this para_

graph.

6. Cochran interview. Col. Cochran estimated

that he knew about half of the squadron members on sight. A message sent flom the Eglin

Command Post about 8 a.m. on 27 Jun put the

total number of 33d Fighter Wing personnel

then rnDhahran at232 (message fromthe Eglin

Command Post to the office of the Directorfor

Operations, HQ Central Command and several

other addressees, "SitRep 33 FW, Eglin AFB,

Fli 27 Jw96,1255 zulutime).

7. Dick interview with author; Jones conversation notes, 7 Nov 96.

8. Beny interview; Husted interview; Dick

interview with author.

9. AFHSO Khobar Towers oral history interviews I 7 and | 2. See also interview 10.

234

Chapter Seven

10. Cochran interview Where rosters were

available, they listed personnel by their room

assignments. PERSCO officers also prepared a

weekly listing (Jones conversation notes, 7 Nov

e6).

11. Schwalier, "Dhahran Bombing Fatality

Accountabilifr." A document prepared by the

wing's mission support squadron also conhibuted some of the information in this oaragraph.

12. Interview of Linda Brown, director, Eglin

AFB Family Support Center, by SSgt. Yancy

Mailes, historian, 33dFighterWing, EglinAFB,

Fla.. l6 Dec 96; Friers interview.

13. Cochran interview; Williams interview.

14. Morelock interview; Barile interview.

15. Barile interview; Col. Shafer's undated

notes on the 71st Rescue Squadron's accounttng; Friers interview.

16. Bmile interview.

17. Ibid.; Berry interview.

18. Barile interview; Berry interview.

19. Ibid.

20. On the uncertain and dangerous condition

of the buildings, see Coles interview; Col.

Shafer's undated nominations of Capt. Russell

D. Barile, MSgt. Dwayne R. Berry, and others

for the Airman's Medal; Morelock interview.

On the importance of prompt accounting, see
AFHSO Khobar Towers oral history interview

8.

21. Burgess interview. Documents created by

the 4404th Wing's services and civil engineering squadrons also were used to write this paragraph.

22. Bwgess interview.

23.Ibid.

24. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entries for 25 hm96,2325 and2355. See also

Treadway and Aleson interviews.

25. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," communications squadron entry for 25 Jun 96, 2330; Al

Moyers, Air Force Communications Agency

History Office to Dr. Perry D. Jamieson,

AFHSO, 30 Nov 98. The later source refers to

the Army unit as the 335th Signal "Company,"

but a HQ ARCENT-Saudi Arabia organization

chart identifies it as a "Comrnand."

26. Biggs, "Khobar Chronologyi communications squadron entry for 25 hn96,2330.

SrA. Biggs provided information onArmy-Air

Force communications cooperation.

27 . 4404th Civ1l Engrneering Squadron, FiveYear Facilities Improvement Plan FY 96-FY 00,

24May 96,page 19, in 4404th Wing History

vol. 7, supporting document [V-2; Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," commrmications squadron

entries for 25 Jun 96,2330,2345; Biggs,

"Khobm Chronolory," SP squadron enfy for 25

Jr.rn 96, 2345; Biggs, "Khobar Chronology,"

clinic entry for 25 Jun 96, 2355. The wing's civil

engineers and others were awme the conference

roomwas inadequate to serve as a Site Recovery

Center (SRC) in the aftermath of so major an

event. The unit's Five-Year Facilities Improvement Plan, page 19, provided for consfucting a

new SRC (,l4O4thWing History vol. 7, supporting document IV2). A document prepmed by

the wing's mission support squitdron identifies

the officerswho helpedestablishttre SRC, andit

puts the time of its activation slightly emlier than

does the chronology cited here.

28. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," firstofthree

services squadron enfies for 26 Jun 96, 0100-

0130; Aleson interview; Dick interview with

author.

29. "4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

clinic entry for 26 Jun 96, 0100; AFHSO KhobarTowers oral history interviews 8 and 18.

30. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," communications squadron entry for 26 \n96,0140;

Notes to Pages92-97

Schwalier, "Dhahran Bombing Fatality Accountability."

31. Biggs, "Khobar Chronologyi communications squadron entry for 26 Jun 96,0245.

32. Biggs, "Khobar Chronologyi communications squadron entry for 26 Jun 96' 0145;

Crowinterview.

33. This praise appears in a report prepmed in

a personnel offtce ofthe wing's mission support

squadron.

34. Aleson interview; Lt. Col. (Chaplain) S.

Frick, HQ Air Combat Command Chaplains

Office, to Col. (Chaplain) J. Blar, HQ USAf;

Personnel, Materiel, and Readiness Division of

the Office ofthe Chief ofthe Chaplain Service'

and other addressees, 27 Jun 96; '4404th Medical Group Chronology," enhy for 25 htn96,

2325.

35. Biggs. "Khobar Chronology"' services

squadron entry for 26 Jun96,023G{300 and

clinic entry for 0500; *4404t}' Medical Group

Chronology," entry for 26 Jlurl'96,0230; Dick

interview with author.

36. Interview with Lt. Col. (Chaplain) Ray

Hart, chief, chaplain readiness, office of the

command chaplain, HQ Air Combat Command, LangleyAFB,Va., 12 SeP 96.

37. Aleson interview; Schwalier conversation

notes,23 Feb 99.

3 8. McCartlry interview.

39. Ibid.; Schwalier conversation notes,23

Feb 99.

40. Jones conversation notes, 7 Nov 96; Biggs

inten iew; McCarthy interview.

41. McCarthy interview.

42. "44}4thMedical Group Chronology," services squadron entry for 25 hn 96,2325;

Biggs, "Khobm Chronologyi entry for 26 Jun

96, 040G{430; Schwalier, "Dhahran Bombing

Fatality AccountabilitY."

43. *4404t}' Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 26 Jun 96,0530; Biggs, "Khobar

Chronology," services squadron entry for 26

Jtm 96. 0530-O600; Dick inteMew with author.

On the bulldozing nem Building I 3 I mentioned

here by Gen. Dick, see chapter twelve.

44. *4404th Medical Group Chronology"'

entry for 26 Jun 96, 0900. Gen. Dick's mention

of rernains being recovered at that time probably refers to the body that mortuary services

personnel reported finding in room D suite 1'

on the ground floor of Building l3l, sometime

235
Notes to page 97

between 7:30 and 8 a.m. on 26 Jun (Biggs,

"Khobar Chronology," services squadron entry

for 26 Jun 96, 073H800). The precise times

that the eighteenth and nineteenth remains were

found are difficult to establish. The clinic enhy

for 26 Jun 96, 0800, in BiggsS "Khobar Chronology," states there were "18 [remains] in

morgue," according to a PERSCO list. This

time may be a bit early; it is significant that the

entry for this date and time in the medical group

chronology, which the "Khobar Tower,, chronology drew on, is nearly identical, but does not

include the phrase "18 in morgue." The time

that the nineteenth ofthe remains was located is

even more difficult to establish; see note 50

below. The compilers ofthese chronologies

should not be faulted for the omissions and

inconsistences ofthese sources. but rather thev

deserve great credit lor keeping track of a larye

amomt of information, under diffrcult circumstances.

45. Morelockinterview; Col. Shafer,s undated

nomination of Capt. Michael D. Morelock for

theAirman's Medal.

46. Morelock interview.

47. Aleson interview.

48. rbid.

49. rbid.

50. Sources offer a wide range oftimes for this

event. The earliest one found 7:30 a.m. on26

Jm 96, can be inferred from the second ofthree

"Khobar Chronology" services squadron entries for that date, 073H800: "19 casualties/

injuries." It is extremely doubtfirl that nineteen

fatalities had been established that early. The

phrase "casualtieVinjuries" is ambiguous, and

no comparable entry appears in the,,4404th

Medical Group Chronology." Moreover, both of

these chronologies clearly state that eighteen

remains had been found by 9 a.m., so that the

locating of the nineteenth must have occurred

later than that ('4404flt Medical Group Chronology." clinic enfly for 26 Jun 90,09001 Biggs.

"Khobar Chronology," entry for 26 Jun 96,

0900). The question ofwhen the nineteenth of

the remains was found is further clouded by a

services squadron entry in the "Khobar Chronology" for26 Jun 96,0900-1930. It states that

"at this point," rrr,trich cannot be earlier than g

a.m., there were "16 sets of remains in the

refrigerator" at theAMC terminal. This number

is low. By 9 a.m. there certainly were seventeen,

236

and very likely eighteen, bodies at the MCP See

the citations in notes 43 and 44, above. The

medical group chronology offers the latestttme,

9 p.m. on 26 hn, for locating the nineteenth

body: "Per Mortuary Affairs, another deceased

found in the bomb site rubble. Total count: 19

deceased" (-4404th Medical Group Chronology," enhy for 26 Jtn96,2100). Other sources

contradict a time so late as this. A services

squadron entry inthe "KhobarChronology" for

26 hn96, 1230-1300, for example, states that

two NCOs located "one additional set of

remains," doubtless the nineteenth, between

12:30 and.l p.m. This source is convincing in its

details: it identifies the NCOs and mentions that

the body was taken to the MCP by an Army

transport. ln addition, the entry for 2100 on 26

Jun in the medical group chronology is very

similar in wording to one for 0530 on that day,

r,vhich suggests that the information given for

2100 was entered for an incorrect time. Giving

' midday''as the time when the nineteenth body

was found is based on tltee services squadron

entries in the "Khobar Chronology" for 26 Jun

96: ll3Fl200, which states that the "body

count' at that time was "I9 dea{' andthat eighteen of the nineteen remains had been orocessedl 1200 1230, which states that sometime

between noon and 12:30 p.m. a mortuary services representative reported to HQ CEN:IAF

that there were nineteen confirmed dead;

1230-1300, discussed above, which details the

retrieving of the nineteenth body. While some

readers might like to know the precise times

when events took place, the remarkable fact is

that, given the stress ofthe situation, the participants kept track of information as closely as

they did.

51. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," services

squadron entry for 26 hn96,1230 1300.

52.lbid. The time is imprecise; see note 50

above.

53. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," services

squadron entry for 26 Jtn96,0900-1930.

54. This follows Gen. Schwalier's accounting,

written soon after the event, and the second of

three "Khobar Chronology" services squadron

entries for26 Jun 96,073H800, which lists by

rank and last name elwen "preliminary identifications." When Col. McCarthy was interviewed, six months later, his recollection was very

similm: "We viewed all nineteen that were dead.
I'd say, ten ofthem you could identify and the

other nine, there was no way you could identify

them." Gen. Dick stated that the unit commanders, frst sergeants, and supervisors eventually

identified fourteen of the remains.

55. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," services

squadron enhy for 26 hm96,0900 1930.

56. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," chaplain

entry for 26 Jun 96, 0300; Aleson interview.

57. Biggs, "Khobar Chronologyj'clinic enfy

for 26 Jur 96, 0215.

58. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," second of

three services squadron entries for 26 Jw 96,

0100-0130; Husted interview; Biggs, "Khobar

Chronology," clinic urtry for 26 Jun 96,0215.

59. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," clinic

entries for 26 hm96.0215. and 0515 and services squadron entry for 26 Jm 96, 050H530.

60. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," services

squadron entry for 26 Jun 96, 030G{330. See

also services squadron entry for 26 J.un 96,

050H530.

61. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," first of three

services squadron entries for 26 Iw 96,

0730-{800, and another services squadron

entry for the same date, 120V7230. That the

French aircraft in fact left at 0700, and that its

main cargo was medical supplies, see Biggs,

"Khobar Chronology," clinic entry for 26 Jun

96,0700.

62. SrA. Biggs provided information about

the use ofblankets. See also Biggs, "Khobar

Chronology," third ofthree services squadron

entries for26 Jun 96,010G4130.

63. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," mortuary

services squadron entry for 26 Jun 96, 0500-

0530, andthe secondofthree services squadron

entries forthe same date,053H600.

64. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," morhrary

services squadron entry for 26 hn 96,

050G{530; the second of three mortuary services squadron entries for the same date, 0530

0600 (flatbed truck transport); first ofthree

mortuary services squadron enfies for the same

date, 073G{800; services squadron entry for

the same date, l20F1230.Tt:m;tthe transport in

fact left at 0700, see clinic entry for 26 Jun 96,

0700.

65. Biggs, "Khobar Chronologyj' transportation squadron entry for 26 Jttrt96,0900, and

services squadron entry for the same date,

1030-1 100.

Notes to Pages 98-101

66. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," services

squadron entries for 26 Jun 96, 1 100-1 130 and

1 130-1200.

67. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 25 hn 96, 2240; Btggs"'Khobar

Chronology," clinic entry for 25 Jun 96' 2240;

Col. Robb to Dr. Perry D. Jamiesoq AFHSO' 8

Apr 98. On the question of*rhen Gen. Schwalier

dispatched Maj. Greenfield, see chapter five,

note 63.

68. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology,"judge advo

cate erfty for 26 Jun 96, 0800. Some Air Force

documents obscwe the identity of the fourth of

these hospitals. Thejudge advocate entry in the

"Khobar Chronology" just cite4 for example,

followed a JAG source and called this facility

the "KKMMC," without fianslating the abbreviation. Details about this fourth hospital and its

location were found on the web page of Helen

Ziegler and Associates, Incorporated and also

are in Dr. Kamal Shahab, chief of surgery Ktng

Abdul Aziz Air Base Hospital, to Perry D'

Jamieson, AFHSQ 10 APr 99'

69. Wing Operations Center Log of Events,

entry for 26 Jw 96,0320, in 4404th Wing

History vol. 8, supporting documentVl-I1.

Virhnlly the same information appears, with

the hospital names abbreviatod, in the "4404th

Medical Group Chronology," entry for 26 Jun

96, 03 15.

70. Biggs, "Khobm Chronology,"judge advocate entry for 26 Jun 96,0345; Husted interview; SSgt. Selena P Zuhoski (nee Husted) to

Jamieson.

71. Husted interview; Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," mortuary services squadron entry for

26 Jun 96, 063G{700;"4404+hMedical Group

Chronology," entry for 26 Jun 96, 0800.

72. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 26 Jw96,0800; Biggs' "Khobar

Chronology," judge advocate entry for 26 Jun

96. Maj. Greenfield's estimate, at that early

morning how, was reasonably close to Col.

Robbb later figure of seventy-one patients admitted (Robb,'Medical Response").

73. Husted interview; Biggs, "Khobm Chronolory," SP squadron entry for 26 Jun 96' 0900.

74. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology,"judge advocab enay for26 Jun 96, 0800. This same entry

shows that at 8 a.m. on the twenty-sixth the JAG

representatives were still in place at the MODA'

ARAMCO, and King Fahd Univenity hospitals

237
4

Notes to pages 101-107

and at the King Fahd Military Medical Complex. The accounting responsibility moved in a

gradual and orderly transition. JAG entries in

the "Khobar Chronology" note that ,.In late

moming/early aftemoon [of 26 Jun], we were

able to handthis [accounting forthe status ofthe

injuredl offto [the] med folks" e6 Jun,0345);

and that "Late in moming, hand off [of accounting for injuredl was made to medical SRC rep"

(26 Jun. 0800). The *4404th Medical Group

Chronology" states: "MCC [medical clinii

commander] takes over patient hacking from

legal and SRC" (26 Jun, 1400).

75. Husted interview. Sgt. Husted's use ofthe

phrase "stafus . . . pending" makes her accounting ofthe midentified compatible withthose of

Col. McCarthy and Gen. Dick. See note 54

above.

76. "4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 26 Jm 96, 1650; Biggs interview;

Grimminterview.

77. Jones conversation notes, 7 Nov 96:

Schwalier. "Dhahran Bombing Fatatiry Accountability."

78. An undated Patrick AFB map, ..45th

Services Squadron Facilities Map." sirows the

location of this and other major buildings on

the installation. The hrrival of the news of the

bombing at Patrick is discussed in chapter

five.

79. Friers interview; SSgt. J. Bowden, lst

FighterWing Command Post systems administrator, to Dr. Perry D. Jamieson, AFHSe ..Re:

Col. Dupre," 16 Jul 98, 10:59 a.m. Col. Dupr6

was promoted to brigadiergeneral in May 2000

and to major general in Jul 03. He retired in Jul

05. (USAF biography of Maj. Gen. Felix

Dupr6, Jul05.)

80. Friers interview.

81. rbid.

82. Jozal interview.

83. Friers interview.

84. rbid.

85. Ibid.; Jozayt interview. Brig. Gen. Robert

C. Hinson was promoted to major general in

Aug 98 andto lieutenantgeneral inJul2000. He

retired in Sep 03. (USAF biography oflt. Gen.

Robert C. Hinson, Sep 03.)

86. Friers interview; Jozayt interview. On the

clock times involved, see also the Secretary's

list of confirmed deceased.

87. Friers interview; 'Air Force clarifies status

238

of Dhahran attack victims,"lr?VS Review, 3 llul

96,3.

88. This paragraph summarizes events rmhich

are discussed in greater detail in chapter five.

89. Broum interview.

90. Dylewski interview; AFHSO Khobar

Towers oral history interview 12.

91. Dylewski interview; Hill interview;

Browninterview.

92. Hill interview.

93. Dylewski interview; Brown interview.

94. Hill interview.

95. rbid.

96. Ibid.; Campbell interview; undated telephone script in the files of the 33d Fighter Wing

History Office. Col. Hill may have written the

script on his ou'n, although he modesf avoided claiming so in an oral history interview conducted in Dec 96. Capt. Campbell praised his

performance during the days afterthe bombing:

"Lt. Col. Hill was amazing."The same couldbe

said of the efforts of Capt. Campbell herself,

and of many Air Force officers, airmen, and

cMlians during those late June days.

97. Brown interview.

98. Hill interview; Campbell interview.

99. Hill interview.

I 00. Dylewski interview.

l0l . Ibid.; Campbell interview.

102. Campbell interview. See also Hill interview. This phenomena represented the natural

desire of survivors to communicate with their

loved ones, and of course was not limited to

Eglin personnel. In a number of the AFHSO

oral history interviews about the Khobar

Towers bombing, the subjects acknowledged

making such calls or referred to others placing

them.

103. AFHSO Khobar Towers oral history

interviews 12and,l0.

104. Hill interview.

105. rbid.

106. rbid.

107. 'Notification Officers," an undated note

written by Col. DavidA. Deptul4 Commander,

33d Operations Group, in the files of the 33d

Fighter Wing History Office. Col. Deptula was

promoted to brigadier general in Sep 99, to

major general nJan|2, and to lieutenant general in Oct 05 (USAF biography of Maj. Gen.

DavidA. Dephrla, Jan 07).

108. Dylewski interview. This interview men-
tions a lower number of teams than in "Chronological Sequence of Events After Terrorist

Bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; Eglin

AFB, Florida-25 Jun 96," an undated chronology prepared by Ll Col. (Chaplain) Ray W

Hinch, chaplain, 33d Fighterwing. The number

of teams may have increased over time.

I09. "Battle Staff: KhobarTowers Bombing"'

26 h:rir96,1300, briefing prepared by Lt. Col.

Stan Hill, director, 33d FighterWing battle staff;

Hinch, "Chronological Sequencel' entry fot25

Jun 96, 1830; Mailes, "Khobar Bombing Chronology," entry for 25 Jun 96, I 830.

1 10. Hinch, "Chronological Sequence," entries for 25 Jnn 9 6,2100 and2230. In Jrm 98 the

AFHSO commander, Col. Christine Jaremko,

who had served a 94 97 totx atEglin, provided

information about the location ofthe MPF

111. "Battle Staff: KhobarTowers Bombing,"

26 Jun96, 1300; Mailes, "Khobar Bombing

Chronology," entries for 25 hn96,2300, and

26 Jw96,0130. Messages from the PERSCO

Notes to Pages 107-112

office of the composite wing in Dhahran also

contain offrcial information about the notifications, and the Secretary's list of confirmed

deceased gives clock times that are consistent

with the ones in this ParagraPh.

I 12. Hinch, "Chronological Sequence;' erfiry

for 25 Jun 96,2230-126 Jun 961 0230. Messages sent from the theater also confirm the

locations of the families.

I 13. Hinch, "Chronological Sequence," entry

for25 J'tn96,223V[26 J';r;'96] 0230, seems to

give the time as 2:30 a.m. on Wednesday moming, but Mailes, "Khobm Bombing Ctronology'"

"ntty 

fot Z6 Jnn 96, 0130, and the "Battle Staff:

Khobar Towers Bombingl' 26 Jun 96' 1300

briefing expressly state that the three teams

comoleted the notifications at 3:20 a.m. It is

likely that the 0230 time given in "Chronological Sequence" represents a mistaken reversing

ofthe interior digits.

1 14. Hinch, "Chronological Sequence," entry

for 25 hn96,2230_186 Jwt9610230.

Chapter Eight

1. BruSinterview.

2. Berry interwiew. The Army Khobar Towers

map and the Air Force Khobar Towers map,

used togetheq identify Building 109 as the billeting office.

3. Berry interview

4. Burgess interview.

5. Cochran interview; McCarthy interview;

Dick interview with author; Schwalier comments on "Khobar Towers." See also Tim

Albritton to ARCENT G2, 6 Nov 97.

6. 4404th Wing History vol. 1 

, 81 ; McCarthy

interview.

7. Cochran interview; AFHSO Khobar Towers oral history interview 29; correspondence

provided by Capt. Erik R. Pohlmann, USA,

depuf G-2, HQ ARCENFSaudi Arabia.

8. Cochran interview; Burgess interview.

9. Cochran interview; Biggs interview; Biggs,

"Khobar Chronologyj' services squadron entry

for 28 Jun 96, 1000-1030.

10. Cochran interview; McCarthy interview

1 1. Morelock hterview; Aleson interview

12. Jozaytintewiew.

13. Friers conversation notes.

Command, 26 J:un 96; Dick interview with

author.

15. [A U.S. Army noncommissioned officer]

to U.S. Army, Central Command-Saudi Arabia

G-2, 6 Nov 97; SSgt. McCarthy's KhobarTowers atlack account.

16. At least one published account implies a

later time for the reassembly; the version here

follows Col. Cochran's interview. See also

Jason A. Smallheer, "Eglin moums Nomads,

Members of 33d Fighter Wing recount trip

home from hell to honor comrades;' Leading

E dge (38:3) Artg 9 6, 2-3.

17. Cochran interview; McCarthy interview;

Smallheer, "Eglin moums Nomads," 3.

18. Cochran interview; AFHSO Khobar

Towers oral history interviews 7 and 13.

19. Cochran interview; Mccarthy interview

20. AlC. Lavallee's Khobar Towers aflack

account.

2l . SSgX. McCarthy's Khobar Towers aftack

account.

22. McCarthy interview; AFHSO Khobar

Towers oral history interview 9; Cochran rnterview.

14. Lt. Col. R. Hart to all assigned personnel 23. McCarthy interview; Burgess lnteru.lew'

at the Ofrce of the Chaplain, ffh ai Combat See also interview with Lt. Col. Jacqueline

239
Notes to pages 113-118

Murdock, chief nurse, 86th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, RamsteinAir Base, Germany

4Mar97.

24. Berry interview; Biggs interview The

locations ofthe two communities were found on

the Eastern Region map and discussed with

Gen. Schwalier on 23 Feb 99.

25. Robb interview; Berry interview. See also

Husted interview.

26. MSgt. Dale Warman, ,.Communiry lends

hand to Dhahran airmen." IFNS Review,3 Jll

96,7; Robb interview.

27. Undated note from anARAMCO family

to Lt Col (Dr.) Douglas J. Robb; photocopy of

a child's hand-drawn card, provided by-Col.

Robb; Robb interview. See also Husted interuew.

28. Shafer conversation notes.

29.Ibid.; Schwalier comments on ,.Khobar

Towers"; Schwalier, "Dhahran Bombine Fatal_

ity Accountability." A document prepared by

the 4404th Wing's mission suppofi squadron

also contributed some ofthe information in this

paragraph.

30. Shafer conversation notes; Khobar Chronology," flrst oftwo services squadron entries

for 27 Jun S6, 1030 | 100. Here. roo, a document prepared by the wing's mission support

squadron contributed some of the information

in this paragraph.

3 L A document prepared by the wing's mission suppoft squadron provided the information

in this paragraph.

32. Robb interview. Air Force Chief of Staff

Gen. Ronald Fogleman came to Dhahran on 3

Jul (an episode covered in chapter eleven) and

visited the Saudi hospitals that had aided the

American airmen. Whenhe offeredhis heartfelt

thanks to one senior Saudi health administrator,

the official replied rhat ir was a solemn medical

duty to treat all patients: medicine knows no

cultural boundaries (Robb comments on.,Kho_

barTowers').

33. Guerrero interview; Orlando interview;

Williams interview.

34. Robb, "Medical Response.,,

35. Bronson interview. The ..44404th Medical

Group Chronology," enhy for 26 Jun 96, 0530,

has the suturing completed by that hour. Drs.

Robb and Treadway recalled working rmtil after

6 or'7 a.m. (Robb interview; Treadwav inter_

view).

240

36. AlC. Lavallee's account of the Khobar

Towers attac( Morelock interview.

37. Robb intewiew; '4404rh Medical Group

Chronology." entry for 26 Jun 96, 1400; interview with Co1. (Dr.) Edward B. Freyfogle,

USA, chief, department of surgery LRMC, 7

Mar97.

38. Ziegler interview; Morelock interview;

Bronson interview.

39. Gore interview notes; Murdoch interview.

Col. Conner cited the remarks of the Air Force

patient at King Fahd University Hospital.

40. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 26 Jun 96,0800; Robb interview;

Coles interview. See also Treadway interview.

After the 58th Fighter Squadron's 9 a.m. meeting, Dr. Treadway joined this team of care

providers in making the hospital rounds. On the

transition of the accounting responsibilif, see

chapter seven, note 74.

41. Robb interview This estimate of casualties in the Ramstein air show bagedy was given

by Col. Freyfogle, who at the time was assigned

to the LRMC, which received 120 patients from

the disaster.

42.'4404th Medical Events Chronology,',

entries for 26 Jun 96, 0800, 1410,1455.

43.Ibid., 1730.

44. "4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entries for 26 Jtn 96, 1650; Biggs interview;

Grimm interview; Jones conversation notes, 7

Nov 96; "Talking Paper on Dhahran Bombing

Fatality Accountability."

45. "4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for26 Jun 96, 1930; Jones conversation

notes, 7 Nov 96; Dick interview with author.

46. Jones conversation notes, 7 Nov 96;

Schwalier, "Dhahran Bombing Fatalib/ Accountabilifz"; Biggs, "Khobar Chrono1ogy,,,

second ofthree services squadron enhies for 26

Jun 96, 0730-0800. See also A.J. Plunkett,

"Hampton airman alivel' Daily Press, Langley

AFB,Va.,30Jun96,A 1.

47. Schwalier, "Dhahran Bombing Fatality

Accountability"; Jones conversation notes, 7

Nov 96.

48. Schwalier, "Dhahran Bombing Fatality

Accountability"; Dick interview with author;

Biggs interview; Jones conversation notes, 7

Nov 96.

49. Dick interview with author; Biggs interview. Such observations are always subiective.
Conhadicting the overwhelming testimony on

this point, at least one airman adamantly contended that Blais and Lester looked nothing

alike (AFHSO Khobar Towers oral history

interview 27).

50. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 26 Jun 96, 1650; Biggs interview;

Dick interview with author.

51. Plunkett, "Hampton airman alive," A-l ;

Dennis Thompson, Jr., "Patrick dealt another

blowl' Florida Today, 28 Jun 96, 1A; Jozayt

interview.

52. Biggs interview; Jones conversation notes,

7 Nov 96. A document prepared by the wing's

mission support squadron also was used in writing about the Blais-Lester case.

53. Dover Port Morhrary summary paper,

"Dover AFB Sigmficant Events-1996," n.d.;

Jones conversation notes, 7 Nov 96.

54. Biggs interview. See also Jones conversation notes, 7 Nov 96.

55. AFHSO KhobarTowers oral history rnterview 4. A document prepared by the wingb mission support squadron also provided evidence

of ttris.

56. AFHSO Khobar Towers oral histories 27

and 70.

57 . "4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 26 Jun 96,2235.

58. David E. Sangeq 'Clinton Leads Rites for

Dead In Saudi B l:astl' N ew York Tunes, I Jul 96, 1 .

59. "4404th Medical Group Chronology," 25

Jun 96, 2202; Robb, 'Medical Response"; Coles

interview; Murdoch interview. On the 4410th's

role in the immediate aftermath of the attack, see

chapter six, note 35.

60. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 26 Jtn96,1005; 86th AES Surgeon

General to the 86th Operations Group Commander and other addressees, "Medical After

Action Report, Dhahran Bombing," 22 Jty''96;

Murdoch interview. The "4404th Medical

Group Chronology," entry for 26 Jun 96, 1 500,

has AE teams setting up "aeromedical evacuationpatientholding areas" inthe GUTS hangar

at that hour.

61. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 26 Jun 96, 1500; Coles interview.

62. Gralnm, "Bomb Wont Deter U.S.," A-1;

Schwalier interview, 24 Feb 99; CBS, "Bombing in Saudi Arabia."

63. Biggs conversation notes; Schwalier interNotes to Pages 118-122

view,24 Feb 99.

64. Grant Hales, Air Combat Command command historiaq to Larry Benson' Office of the

Air Force Historian, l0 Jul 96; Husted interview.

65. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology,"judge advocate entry for 26 Jun 96, I 100.

66. Khobar Towers Air Force map; Hales to

Benson, 10 Jul 96; Biggs, "Khobar Chronology,"judge advocate enffies for 26 Jun 96' 1 100

and 1410; Husted interview.

67. Biggs, "Khobar Chronologyi bothjudge

advocate entries for 26 Jun96,1100; Husted

interview.

68. Biggs, "KhobarChronolory," judge advocate entries for 26 htn 96, 1400 and 1900;

Hustedinterview.

69. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology,"judge advo

cate entries for 26 Jun 96, 1300, 1500, 1520'

1845. Lt. Col. Dooley was the US Military

Training Missionk judge advocate general and

worked out of its Riyadh and Dhahran offtces'

He had been with Maj. Greenfield and Capt'

Winnecke in Dhahran for dinner and shopping

at the time of the attack, remained with them,

and helped the 4404th's judge advocate personnel in the aftermath of the bombing.

70. Biggs, "KhobarChronolory," judge advocate entries for 26 Jun 96, 1515 and7520;

'Additional info forwing members: Claims and

legal office," GulfWew 1:2 (28 Jun 96)' 1.

7 t . eiggs, "rhobar Chronology," judge advocate entry for 26 Jun96,2030;4404th Wtng

History vol. 1, 10. Unclassified material from

another source, not cited here' shows that the

eventual total in individualproperty claims paid

by the entire Defense Departrnent significantly

exceededthis $69,000.

72. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology,"judge advocate enhyfor26 Jun96, 1415; Schwalierinterview, 24 Feb 99; Dickey, "Targef Ametlcal' 24'

73. Schwalier intervieq 24 Feb 99; Army

Forces Central Command-Saudi Arabia Hist'orical Summary, Sep 97, 11 and unumbered appendix page; Biggs, "Khobar Chronolory," communications squadron entry for 26 Jun 96, 1415 

'

7 4. Graharn,"Bomb Wont Deter U.S.," A-l'

Information provided by Gen. Schwalier also

was used in writing this section about Secretary

Christopher's visit to Dhahran.

75. Dickey, "Target" America," 25; Paul

Richter, "I Kept Finding Bodies-Not a tnt Of

241
Notes to pages 122-127

Them Breathing I' Washington post, 27 Jrn 96,

A-24. Press articles and photographs docu_

mented that anumber of Saudi officials accom_

panied the Secretary ofState. For two examples

among many, see Brian Dufrr and others,

"Bombs in the desert," U.S. News & World

Report l2l:2 (8 Jul 96), 28, and Nelan, ..Gulf

Shock Waves," 23.

76. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,,'

entry for 26 Jun 96, 1930; Schwalier interviiw,

24 Feb 99; Graham, "Bomb Won't Deter U.S.."

A-1.

77. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entries for 26 Jun 96, 1730 and 1930.

78. Steven Erlanger, "survivors of Saudi

Explosion Knew at Once ItWas a Bomb.",A/ew

York Times, 27 Jun 96,4. .l ; Secretary's list of

injured personnel; Richter. ..1 Kepi Finding

Bodies,"A-24.

. 

79. Schw.alier interview, 24 Feb 99; Erlangeq

"Survivors of Saudi Explosion," A-l; Richter, "l Kept Finding Bodies," A-24.

80. 39thAerospace Medicine Squadron Com_

mander to the USAFE Surgeon General. [plans

officel, 16 Jul96;AFNS story 960657,.Incirlik

team fills void after Dhalran bombine." 10 Jul

96. On the activation time of 3 u.-. iiT*k",r.

see chapter six. note 93.

81. 39thAerospace Medicine Squadron Com_

mander to USAFE Surgeon General. The

"4404thMedical Group Chronology," entry for

2:; h;l;r96, 1235, has the FAST team departing

Tlrkey at 1235, Dhahran time, which matchei

with an I 130 boarding, Incirlik time.

82. 39drAerospace Medicine Squadron Commander to USAFE Surgeon General.

83. This follows the unit's after-action reoort:

the medical group chronology has the FAST

team arrive at the clinic at 5:15 p.m. (39th

Aerospace Medicine Squadron Commander to

USAFE Surgeon General; *4404th Medical

Group Chronol ogyl' enlry for 26 Jun 96, I 7 1 5).

84. 39th Aerospace Medicine Squadron Commander to USAFE Surgeon General. The contribution of the ASU team is heated in chaoter

six. Its departure rime is given in the ..44(i4th

Medical Group Chronologyi entry for 26 Jun

96,1700.

85. "4404th Medical Group Chronology,', entry for 26 Jw96, 1 900. For the tie to the jdmin_

istrative staff, see "4404th Medical Grouo

Chronology." 25 Jun 96,2355.

242

86. Robb interview; *4404th Medical Group

Chronology," entry for 26 Jtn96, 1900; AFNS,

"Incirlik team fills void after Dhahran bombing," 10 Jul 96.

87. 39thAerospace Medicine Squadron Commander to USAFE Surgeon General; *4404th

Medical Crroup Chronology," entry for 26 Jvn

96,2200.

88. 39thAerospace Medicine Squadron Commander to USAFE Surgeon General.

89. " 4404th Medical Group Chronology,,' enny for 26 hn96,2210:86thAES AfterAction

Report; 59th Medical Wing After Action Report; Bost interview. On the departure time of

these units from Ramsteiq see chapter six, note

tu.

90. 86thAES AfterAction Report Bost inter-

\1ew.

91. Murdoch interview.

92. 86th AES After Action Report; *4404th

Medical Group Chronologyi entry for 26 Jun

9 6, 2200; Coles interview.

93. 86thAESAfterAction Reporfi 59th Medical WingAfterAction Report; Murdoch inter94. Bost inter-view

95. 86thAES AfterAction Reporr; 59th Medical Wing After Action Report.

96. Treadway interview; Robb interview.

97 . The formation and dispatch of the Landstuhl shess management team is discussed in

chapter six.

98. Commander, Psychology Service, to

Kiley, 27 Jrm96; Crow interview; Cooper interview.

99. Crow interview; Cooper interview; Commander, Psychology Service, to Kiley 27 Jun

96.

100. AFHSO Khobar Towers oral historv

interview 56; Crow interview. Most ofthe tearn

evidently billeted on the fourth floor (Commander, Psychology Service, to Kiley, 27 Jun

96). Col. Conner, and perhaps others, had

rooms on the fifth (Conner interview).

101. AFHSO Khobar Towers oral history

rnterview 48.

102. Crow interview; Cooper interview.

103. Crow interview; Commander, psychology Service, to Kiley, 21 Jun96; Cooper interview. Sgt. Cooper mentioned SgL Stark3 attendance at this meeting. Stark signed his firll name

to a letterpublishedby Aitmanmagazine ('Air-
maill' AirmanXL:l0 (Dec 96),30).

104. Crow interview. On the location of the

Ark, see Husted interview; Aleson interview;

Air Force KhobarTowers maP.

105. Crow interview; Aleson interview; Lt.

Col. R. Hart, chaplains ofrce, HQ Air Combat

Command, to all chaplainpersonnel assignedto

Air Combat Command 26 Jun 96. The Riyadh

chaplains, who belonged to the Air Education

and Training Command were sent to Dhahran

at7 a.m. thatWednesday moming (Lt' Col. T.

Wuerffel, chaplains office, HQ Air Education

and Training Command, to J' Blair and [B.

Thomasonl. 26 Jun 96). This message mentions

three "CS fchaplain service] personnel": the

third member of the party was an NCO (CMSgt.

J. Skowom, chaplains office, HQAir Combat

Comman{ to Lt. Col. R. Hart, chaplains offrce,

HQ Air Combat Command and all chaplain

personnel assigned to Air Combat Command,

27 hm96).Lackof transportation prevented the

Dhahran chaplain who had been visiting Taif

AirBase atthetime ofthe attackfrommaking a

prompt return to the Khobar Towers (Biggs,

"Khobar Chronology," chaplain entry for 26

Jun 96, 1430). BymidaftemoononThursday 27

Jun in Dhahran, there were ten chaplains at the

KhobarTowers and, as late as a day later, there

were "still seven chaplains presenf'(Biggs,

Notes to P^gesl27-\32

"Khobar Chronology," chaplain entry for 26

Jun 96, 1430; Col. H. Jones, chaplains office,

HQAir Combat Command to all chaplainpersonnel assigned to Air Combat Command' 28

Jun 98).

1 06. Hart to all chaplain personnel, 26 Jun 96;

Aleson interview.

107. Crow interview As Col. Crow remembered the sequence ofevents, he "dropped off"

Chaplain Minsky and "ran into" SSgt. Cooper

on his way to the Desert Rose Inn. Sgt' Cooperb

account suggests that he continually accompanied Crow from the Khobar Inn. Cooper grves

details which make it certain that he attended

the meeting with Dr. Robb and Sgt. Stark

(Cooper interview). Both men were drawing on

their memories of events that had taken place

nine months earlier, in the dead of nighg after a

long flight, and under difficult circumstances'

and both gave excellent interviews.

108. Crow interview; Cooper interview'

109. Ibid.

110. Crow interview; Commander, Psychology Service, to KileY,21 hm96.

11 1. Crow interview; Cooper interview.

112. Interview with MSgt. Kevin Smith, air

traffic controller liaison, 45th Operations

Support Squadron, PatrickAFB' Fla, 6Feb 9'7 ;

Morelock interview.

I

Chapter Nine

I . Gore inte.wiew notes. Col. Kiley was frocked to the rank ofbrigadier general on 1 2 Aug 96

(Kiley biography).

2. Gore interview notes; Plans, Operations'

andTraining Division ofHQ U.S. Army Europe

Regional Medical Commandto the Commander

of the U.S. Army Europe Regional Medical

Center, 13 Sep 96 (hereafter cited as the ERMC

After Action Report). That it was before 3

a.m.-probably just shortly before that houris evident from the logbook of the LRMC emergency operations center (hereaftercitedas EOC

logbook), provided by SSgt. Brian J. Peplinskr'

USA, the NCO in charge of the EOC, and from

the Freyfogle interview.

3. Gore interview notes.

4. Freyfogle interview; homepage of the

Bundeswehrzentralkrankenhaus, 15 Jul 99.

5. Gore interview notes.

6. Ibid.; interview with Lt. Col. Dawn M.

Oerichbauer, Commandeq 86th Aeromedical

Staging Flight, LRMC, ll Mar 9'l'

f . Bnfr,td nter Action Report; directory of

kev oersonnel of the U.S. Army Europe Regronal Medical Command and the LRMC , Jan97;

EOC logbook.

8. See chapters six and eight.

9. Bulliner interview.

10. Notes taken during an interview with

Marie Shaq chief of the LRMC public affairs

office, LRMC, 8 Mar 97.

I 1 . Marie Shaw interview notes; ERMC After

Action Repon.

12. Marie Shaw interview notes; mtervlew

with Marie Shaw, chief of the LRMC public

affairs offrce, LRMC, 8 Mar 97; ERMC After

Action Report; Matthews, "stunning blast,"

I J.

13. Marie Shaw interviewnotes; ERMCAfteT

Action Report; Marie Shaw interview'

243
l

Notes I to pages 132-135

14. Freyfogle interview; Oerichbauer inter_

!.rew.

15. Crow interview. Col. Crow's estimate of

the flight time matched almost exactly with that

of the first medevac aircraft carrying Khobar

patients from Dhahran to Ramstein (*44}4th

Medjcal Group Chronology." entries lor 27 Jun

96,1735, and 28 Jun 96, 0125).

16. Freyfogle inlerview; AFHSO Kiobar

Towers oral history interview 60.

17. Bullinerinterview.

18. Co1. (Dr.)KwinC. Kiley,USA, Summary

of LRMC Prepartions for Receipt of 26 Jun 96

Dhahran Truck Bombing Casmlties, a 26 Jrln

96 mernorandum forthe record; Gore interview

notgs.

I 9. Gore interview notes; ERMCAfterAction

Report. See also Bulliner interview.

20. Summary of LRMC preparations, 26 Jun

96; Matthews, "stunning blast drew a swift re_

sponse," 13;ERMC- LRMC directorv" Jan 97.

2 l. Bulliner interview.

22.Ibid.; Marie Shaw inrerview.

23. Interview with Captain Stephanie Shaw,

executive officer, Tlst Rescue Squadron. pat_

rickAFB, Fla.,4 Feb 97.

24. Friers interview.

25. Jozayt interview; Thompson, ..patrick

dealt another blow," lA.

26. Jozalrtntemiew.

_2,7.Fiers interview; ..In Memory Of Those

Who Served: Memorial Service, Bise Theater.

Pahick AFB. Fla.. JLur 30, 96,'order of serwice.

45th Space Wing Ftistory Ofl-ice working files.

28. Friers interview.

29. Mailes, "Khobar Bombing Chronology,',

enfiy for 25 Jun 96, 1530; Hill interview.

30. Dylewski intervi ew;Htll intewiew. Wich

ofthe early baflle staffmeetings remains a ques_

tion. The decision may be related to on" *hi.h

was made at the third one, held at 6 a.m. on26

Jun, to assign a project officer to each iniured

airman who returned to Eglin. but this siems

lale (notes taken by SSgt. yancy Mailes at the

33d Fighter Wing battle staffmeeting, 26 Jun,

0600). The first and second meetings, held at

3:30 and 6 p.m. on the twenty-fifth, are strone

candidates and. given the inlormation availabli

to the wing at the time ofeach, the second meet_

tng is the more likely (tr4ailes, .,Khobar Bomb_

ing Chronology," entries for 25 Jtur 96" 1530

and 1800).

244

31. Dylewski interview; Brown interview. A

list of these points of contact as of 28 Jun 96

shows that in all but one case, two NCOs were

assrgned to each family.

32. Col. Gaty R. Dylewski, 'A Message to all

Nomads from the 33d Fighter Wing Commander," n.d.; Linda Brown, "Dhalran Bombine

Lessons Leamed: Eglin AFB Family Suppoi

Center, n.d. (hereafter cited as FSC AAR). There

are difficulties in determing the time ofthe first

discussion about establishing the people place.

The time given here is derived from the FSC

AAR and from the Brou.n interview. The latter

makes it clear that Ms. Broum leamed about the

attack from Col. Lee Weitzel during the interval

between the first two battle statrmeetings, 3:30

and 6 p.m. on Tiresday 25 Jun. The FSC AAR

implies that the guidance to set up the people

Place came at the initial battle staffmeetins she

aflended the 6 p.m. one. A fi.rther complicition

is that in the interview, Linda Brown slared tlut

the FSC "got involved" in KhobarTowers ..after

the third battle staffmeeting." Since that conference did not take place until 6 a.m. on the twenty-sixth, this remark can only be taken to mean

that she and her staffbegan working on establishing the People Place that moming. The statement also sharpens the distincfion between an

active involvement by the FSC staffon Wednesday moming, in conhast to an earlier decision to

have them make telephone notifications, late the

previous aftemoon, which was soon reversed.

See the Brorm interview and chapter seven. The

People Place was Col. Weizel s concept (Hill

interviewl notes taken at the 33d Fighter Wing

battle staffmeeting,26 Jun 96, 1800).

33. Dylewski interview. Among those best

placed to know about the choice of location,

Col. Dylewski addressed the subject the most

directly. Perhaps out of modesty, Linda Brown

spoke ofthe choice oflocation in passive voice

(Brown interview). It is possible to infer from

Col. Hill's interview that the FTD site was Co1.

Lee Weitzel's idea, but he didn't directlv sav so.

34. Dylewski. 'A Message to all Nomads";

EglinAFB official map, 30Aug 96. The author

toured the FTD building on 5 Dec 96. In Linda

Brown's after action report and an interview, she

recommended that family support center directors should identifu, in advance of emergencies,

buildings on their bases like this one (FSC

AAR; Brown interview).

!

1
35. FSCAAR.

36. Mailes, "Khobar Bombing Chronology,"

entries for 26 Juln 96, 1200 and 1400; FSC

AAR; Brorrm interview.

37. Dylewski, 'A Message to all Nomads."

38. FSC AAR; Brown interview. Ms. Brown

went on to point out that this thin manning resulted from the difficulty of estimating the

wort load during the days ahead and certainly

not from anyone's unwillingness to help. She

noted that Hurlburt Field, which stood nearby,

and Tyndall AFB, which also was close, just

east of Panama City, would have sent augmentees. Eglin's memoranda of agreement also

would have brought help from the family-supoort units of other services on installations

within Florida, like the Pensacola Naval Air

Station, and also from beyond the state, such as

the Coast Guard tenants of the New Orleans

NavalAir Station.

39. Dylewski, 'A Message to all Nomads";

Hill interview. From the context around Col.

Hill's comments about the move to the fighter

squadron's hangar on the flightline, it can be

Notes to Pages 136-152

inferred that this relocation was intended to protect the privacy of the family mernbers, ifjournalists became intrusive.

40. Browninterview

41. Dylewski interview; Hill intervieW FSC

AAR; Brorvninterview.

42. FSCAAR.

43. rbid.

44. Campbell interview; "Explosion in Saudi

Arabia," Air Force Development Test Center

oress release numb er 96- 033 , [25 Jun 96] .

45. Campbell interview. Maj. Gen. Cranston

was promotedto lieutenant general on2Dec97

and ietired on 1 Mar 2000 (JSAF biography of

Lt. Gen. StewartE. Cranston, I Mar2000).

46. Campbell interview; Arana-Barradas,

Johnson, andNorman, "SouthemWarch Continues," 18. A similar reporting of Gen' Cranston3

remarks appeared in Rajiv Chandrasekaren,

"shockWaves Envelop Florida Bases' Families

Aronnd the Country," Washington Post,21 Jw

96,A24.

47. Freyfogle interview; Friers interview;

Dylewski interview.

Chapter Ten

l. "4404th Medical Group Chronology," entry

for 27 Jun 96, 0100; Aleson interview; Biggs,

"Khobar Chronology," services squadron entry

for26 hn96,2100-2130. A document provided by Gen. Schwalier also was used in writing

these paragraphs about the departure ceremony.

2. Schwalier interview 24 Feb 99; SwopeHawley Report, 1:101. A document written by

the commander of the 4404th Support Group

was also used in writing this paragraph'

3. Shafer conversation notes; "Khobar Bonrbing," video tape provided by Ll Col. Shafer, 4

Feb 97 (hereafter cited as "Lt. Col. Shafer's

tape'); Aleson interuiew.

4. Aleson interview; Lt. Col. Shafer's tape;

Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," services squadron

entry for 26 Jun 96,233V2400. The counter on

Lt. Col. Shaferb video tape established the times

given in this section.

5. Shafer conversation notes; Morelock interview.

6. Schwalier intervtew 24 Feb 99

7. Aleson interview; Lt. Col. Shaferb tape.

8. Lt. Col. Shafer's tape. This tape shows that

the parties had six members. The services

squadron entry for 26 J'tn96,1930-2000, in

Biggs's "Khobar Chronology," states that the

original plan was to use I 14 pall bearers and

that this number was reduced to 58. Either a

decision was made to revert to the original

scheme, or this entry's 58 may refer to the number of individuals who participated rather than

the mrnber ofpall bearerpositions-some people may have served with more than one party'

The mghttime lighting of the video tape makes

it impossible to identi$ individuals.

9. Biggs, "Khobar Chronologyj' second oftwo

services squadron entries for 26 Jw 96,

213V2200 andttre third oftlnee services squadron entries for 2300-2330; Lt. Col. Shafer's tape'

10. Aleson interview. The unit of the inbound

oersonnel is identified inthe Cochran interview

and in the 4404thWing History vol. 1, 87.

1 1. Schwalier interview, 24 Feb 99. Very early

that Wednesday aftemoon, Gen' Schwalier announced his intention to address the newcomers

on this flight. See Biggs, "Khobar Chronology,"

operations group entry for 26 Jun 96,1224.

12. During a 24 Feb 99 interview, Gen'

Schwalier characterized the ceremony as'very

245
Notes to pages 152-156

well done." He carried this praise further in the

document referred to in note 1 above. See also

Biggs, "Khobar Chronology,', services squad_

ronenty for27 Jun 96,0100-{130.

13. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology,,' services

squadron entry for 27 Jun 96,0100-0130:

Shaler conversation notes; AFHSO Khobar

Towers oral history interview 4. An interview

with the deployed first sergeant ofthe squadron

also mentions that relatively few members of

the unit remained in Dhahran by the time of the

ceremony @erry intetview).

14. Morelockinterview

15. rbid.

16. rbid.

17. Schwalier interview, 24 Feb 99. The

search for a qualified pilot very likely led to

more than one departure time being posted for

this flight. A services squadron entry in the

"Khobar Chronology," for 26 Jun 96,2100_

2130, has the departure scheduled for 0200.

Another services squadron entry in the same

source, for 27 Jvn 96,0130 -0200, and the *4404th Medical Group Chronologyl,2T Jun

96, 0130, both have the C-5A departing at

0130. The time almost certainly was latei at

around 3 a.m. When Lt. Col. Frank Shealv. the

depury commander of the suppon goup and its

commander during the nighttime shift, called

the flightline at2:40 a.m. and asked about the

arcraft's status, he was told it had neither taken

offnor taxied (Biggs, "Khobar Chronology,"

transportation squadron entry for 27 lun96,

0240). When the author asked Gen. Schwalier

about this point in Oct 99, the general replied:

"Based on thetimingofthe flightline ceremony,

the night support group commander's (Shealv,s)

status call. and my recollection of the next

moming's discussion, I am confident that the

C 5's departure was significantly later than

0130-again, more like 0300.,'Schwalierto Dr.

Perry D. Jamieson, AFHSO, 10 Oct 99.

1 8. Morelock interview.

19. This estimated time of arival adiusts the

projected one loLrnd in Biggs. '.K}obir Chronology," services squadron entry for 27 Jrri.96,

003H100, and hansportation squadron entry

lor 27 Jun 96. 0 | | 4, which assume a departure

of I:45 a.m. local time.

20. " 4404th Medical Group Chronology," entry for27 Jm96, 0730. The ar.rivais ofthe FAST

team, 86th AES, and Landstuhl shess manase_

246

ment team are discussed in chapter eight.

21. 39th Aerospace Medicine Squadron

Commander to the USAFE Surgeon General;

"4404fltMedical Group Chronology," entry for

27 Jtn 96,0730. A section in chapter eight

describes how the 441Oth Aeromedical Evacuahon Flight esrablished the ASF in the GUTS

hangm; the disposition of the patients by hospital, as ofthe evening ofthe twenty-sixth, is also

detailed in chapter eight.

22. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,,'

entry for 21 J:un96,0730; Commander, psychology Service, to Ktley, 27 hn 96.

23. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 27 Iw96, 1120. The figure of sixtysx is one higher than the last accounting, at 5:30

the previous aftemoon ("44041h Medical Group

Chronology." entry lor 26 Jun 96. 1730.).

24. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,',

entry for 27 Jun 96,1120.

25. Ibid.,0730; Locker inrerview.

26. Craven interview.

27. Commander, Psychology Service, to

Kiley- 27 Jun 96; Conner interview; Crow inter28. Conner interview.

29.Ibid.

30. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 27 Jun 96, 0800.

31. The * M}4thMedical Group Chronology"

gves the time of the meeting as 8 a.m. This time

is supported by the LRMC AfterAction Review,

which states that the team offour was disoatched

at 7:30 a.m. (Commander" Psychology Service.

to Kiley,27 Jun 96).

32. This time is the one given in Commander,

Psychology Service, to Kiley, 27 Jung6.Interviewed in Mar 97, Col. Crow suggested a broad

period of time that moming during which he

dispatched the team, and his estimate was consistent with the 7:30 a.m. given in this document.

33. Commandeq Psychology Service, to

Kiley. 27 Jun 96; Crow inren iew.

34. *4404th Medical Group Chronoiogy,"

entry for 27 Jun 96,0900; Robb interview;

Robb comments on "KhobarTowers."

35. Robb interview; Locker interview.

36. Robb comments on "Khobar Towers";

Robb interview

37. Robb interview.

38. 39th Aerospace Medicine Squadron
Commander to USAFE Surgeon General. The

4404th Medical Group chronology has the first

patients arriving at noon; the after action report

-of 

the 86th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron

puts the time somewhat later ('4404th Medical

Group Chronologyi entry for27 Jun96'1200;

86th AES After Action RePort).

39. Crow interview; Conner interview.

40. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 27 Jun 96, 1630; 86th AES After

Action Report.

41. 39th Aerospace Medicine Squadron

Commander to the USAFE Surgeon General;

* 44}4thMedical Group Chronology," entries

for2'l Jvr96,1630, and 1735; 86thAESAfter

Action Report.

42. Schwalier interview,24 Feb 99.

43. "M}4thMedical Group Chronologyi' enty for 27 Jun 96, 1735; 86th AES AfterAction

Report.

44. "M}4thMedical Group Chronology," entry lor 27 Jun 96. 17351 Conner interview

45. *44}4thMedical Group Chronology," entry for 27 Jw 96, 1942; 86th AES After Achon

Reoort.

ak. gOtn ABS ater Action Report; Mwdock

inter-view.

4'7. 59th Medical Wing After Action Report;

86th AES After Action Report. Two more AE

missions were flown to Landstuhl. At 12:01

p.m. on Sunday 30 Jun, a third C-141 left for

Germany with fifteen patients, including SrA.

Paul Blais, u*ro been positively identified at

King Fahd University Hospital the previous

evening. It arrived at RamsteinAir Base at 8:15

p.m. The four{r and lastAE C-141 mission left

KingAbdulAziz at9 a.m. onWednesday 3 Jul

and arrived in Germany at 5:10 p.m. the same

day. It carried three patients from other stations

in southwest Asia, whose transport was classified "routine"; its fourth passenger was the last

of the Khobar airmen who had been hospitalized in Dhahran (*44}4th Medical Group

Chronology," entries for 30 Jun 96, 1201 and

2015; 3 Jul 96,0800,0900, and 1710).

48. 3gthAerospace Medicine Squadron Commander to USAFE Surgeon General; AFNS,

"lncirlik team fills void after Dhahran bombingl'

49. LRMC After Action Review.

50. Eglin CommandPostto J3C, HQ Central

Command. and several other addressees' "SitNotes to Pages 156-159

Ren 33 FW Eelin AFB, Fl." 27 Jun 96, 1255

zulu time; eiggs, "Khobar Chronology," logistics group entrY for2'7 Jwt96,1430'

S llEslin Corffnand Post to J3C, HQ Central

Comman4 and several other addressees, "SitRep 33 FW, EglinAFB, Fli 2'7 Jw96,2045

zuiu time; 'Aircraft Chronology" prepared by

SSgt. Yancy Mailes, historian, 33d Fighter

Wing,28 Jun96.

52. Mccarthy intervieq Cochran interview'

53. Cochran interview; message from the

EelinCommandPostto J3C, HQ Cenhal Comnin4 and several other addressees, "SitRep 33

FW, EglinAFB, Fli'28 Jun 96, 2200 zduttme;

'Notei from the arrival of the six F-l5s (5C'

1D)," SSgt.Yancy Mailes, historiaq 33dFighter

Wing,29 Jun 96.

54. Cochran interview.

55. McCarthY interview.

56. Ibid.; Burgess interview; Smallheer'

"Eelin mourns Nomadsj' l.

S1. Mccarthy interview; Burgess interview'

58. Cochran interview; Treadway interview;

Schwalier interview 24 Feb 99.

59. "Khobar Towers Chronology of Eventsi'

services squadron entry for 2'7 Jut96,140{'l_.

1430, and transportation squadron entry for 27

Jun 96, 1430; Eglin Command Post to J3C, HQ

Central Command, and several other addressees, 27 Jtn96, 1255 zulu time'

60. Schwalier intervieq 24Feb 99; message

from the Eglin Command Post t'o J3C, HQ Cenhal Comnrand" and several other addressees, 27

Jtn96,1255 zulutrme.

61 . Schwalier interview, 24 Feb 99; McCarthy

interview.

62. Schwalier intervi w4 24 F eb 99'

63. AFHSO KhobmTowers oral history interview 8. In additionto this issue, Gen' Fogleman

took a direct interest in the transportation ofthe

wounded, as well. Col. (Dr.) Dan L' Locker,

USAFE'S surgeon general, summarazied the

ChiefofStaff1 guidance on this subject: "He

made it known that he wanted more than

enough laetomedical evacuation airlift]' What-

.u.. ih. t .ponse is needed make sure Yoy'vg

got that, plus a little [more]." (Locku intelvrew l

" 

64. ngiin Command Post to J3C, HQ Central

Command and several other addressees, 27 Jun

96,2045 zulu time; Mailes, 'Aircraft Chronology"; McCardrY internew'

65. Eslin Command Post to J3C' HQ Central

a A1
Notes to pages 160-163

Command, and several other addressees, 2g Jun

96,2200 zulu time; Mailes, ,Aircraft Chro_

nology."

66. Shafer conversation notes; Jozavt inter_

view

67. Shafer conversation notes; Barile inter_

view.

68. Shafer conversation notes.

69. Barile interview.

70. Berry interview; Barile interview. The

departure date ofthe first group, ofnineteen

personnel, was established from these interviews and also the Morelock interview and the

Shafer conversation notes.

71. Berry interview; Stephanie Shaw internew; Bmile interview.

Chapter Eleven

1. Col. John P pope, He Air Combat Com_

mand Battle StaffDirector, to the He Air Com_

bat Command Battle StatrOperatioirs Officer,

28 Jw96, 4 p.m. On the C 5A,s estimated time

ofarrival, see chapter ten, note 1 9.

2. Secretary of theAir Force's office ofpublic

affairs filrn, "Air Force Tiibute to Fallen-Com_

rades," DoverAFB,Del.,27 hn 96; Col. John p

Pope to the HQAir Combat Command Battle

Staff Operations Officer, 2g Jw 96, 4 p.m.:

MSgt. Louis A. Arana-Barradas, 'Airmen s

remains brought home,', AFNS, 27 Jun 96:

interview olMichael C. Tocchetti, chief morn:_

ary officer, Dover port Morfurary by SSgt. C.

Mike Sibley, 436thAirlift Wing hisiorian, and

theauthor, 12Jun97.

3. Audio tape recording ofa tour ofthe Dover

Port Mortuary, DoverAIB, Del., conducted bv

Michael C. Tocchetti, chief mortuary officei.

for Dr. Perry D. Jamieson, Af HSO. and SSst.

C. Mike Sibley, historian, 436thAirlift Wins. i2

Jtn 97 ; " 4404th Medical Group ChronolJgy,"

enhyfor28 hm96,2145.

4. Tocchetti interview.

5. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,', en_

tries for 29 Jun96,0030,0100, OZOU'OZSO.

0330. 0430, 0500, 06r s. 0800, 1430.

6. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,', en_

tnes for29 Jun 96,1445,1615, 1700, l8fS. See

also entries for 1945 and 2130, and Grimm

interview. Lt. Col. (Dr.) Bruce Lauder stated in

his monthly report: ..The dental staffcoordinat_

ed with AFIP [the Armed Forces Institute of

Pathologyl to assist with the positive identifica_

!on-9i9ry olthe hospialized bombing casual_

ties." (4404th Wing History vol. 7, sulporting

document V 5B.) The AFIp was a tri_iervici

Departrnent ofDefense agency, located on I 6th

Street Northwest in the District of Columbia.

^7 :llMth Medicat Group Chronologyi.entry

for 29 Jun 96. 03 | 5; Jordan, .A serious-case...4.

248

8. *4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

entry for 28 Jun 96, 0125; EOC logbook. This

latter source shows that two busses transported

patients from the first flight, and two from the

second. On the ASF's operations, see Oerichbauer interview.

9. AFHSO Khobar Towers oral historv interview 52.

l0. "44}4thMedical Group Chronology," entry for 28 Jun 96, 0245; Winkler interview.

Traffic using the autobahn Ilom Ramstein can

converuently enter Landstuhlb Gate 2. Vehicles

could reach Gate 1 only after driving through

downtown Landstuhl and then climbing a steep

and winding street up Kirchberg Hill, -encounl

tenng cars and pedestrians in both places. This

emphatically was not a good route for ambulances. The author discussed these access pattems wrth Marie Shaw, chiefofthe LRMC public affairs office. on | | Mar 97, and drove the

challenging approach to Gate 1 several times

during that same month.

I L Interview with SSgt. Brian J. peplinski,

USA. initial NCO in charge of the emergency

operation center, LRMC, 11 Mar 97.

12. Freyfogle interview; interview with2dLt.

Kate Van Arman, USA, nurse, 8-D medical

unit,LRMC, l1Mar97.

13. Friers interview.

14. Ibid.; AFNS press release, .Air Force

releases screening board results,', Feb 96.

15. Friers interview.

16.Ibid.

I 7. Dylewski interview.

18. Hill interview.

19. Campbell interview. Commentine on a

draft of "Khobar Towers" in Oct 04,--Gen.

Schwalier noted rhat unlike Eglin. Dhahran had

received no additional public afairs oficers. It

'Vould have been vety helpfil,l' he stated.

20. Grant, "Khob arTowersl, 47 ; 4404th Wine
History vol. 1, 87; Robb interview. See also

Dick interview with author.

2l . "Honoring and Remembering: A Memorial Service ofthe 4404thWing (P), KingAbdul

Aziz Air Base, Dhahran, Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia," 28 Jun 96. Maj. Bennie L. Illmstead II

provided the author with a copy of this order of

service.

22. Aleson interview.

23. rbid.

24. Ibid.; "Honoring and Remernbering."

25. ME. Debbie Millett, 'Nellis chaplain

speaks of experience in Dhahran," Bzllsqte,26

Jul 96. 8; Aleson interview.

26. "Honoring and Remembering." SrA'

Biggs provided the author with two copies of

Chaplain Kovalcinb prayer. One is titled "Memorial Prayel'; they me otherwise identical.

27. "Honoring and Remernbering."

28. Ibid.; ABC television footage on Lt. Col'

Shaferb tape. Chaplain Aleson commented that

Col. Shafer's remarks were 'lhe most potgnant

and the most moving part of that service' He,

first of all, is a person of deep faith, and he

talked out of his o'*'n faith experience."

29. Aleson interview; "Honoring and Remembering"; Isaiah 40:3 l.

30. "Honoring and Remembering."

31. Schwalier intervieq 24 Feb 99; Aleson

interview.

32. Freyfogle interview; Bulliner interview.

33. Winkler interview; Ziegler interview.

34. Gore interview notes. SrA. Paul Blais,

who was positively identified on Sahrday 29

Jun, remained at Landshrhl seveml more days,

as did another ICU patient. Airman Blais later

was medically retired and hospitalized at Thmpa

Veterans Hospital in Tampa, Fla. Matthews,

"Most hurt in bombing." 3l; Friers inteffiew' A

few patients with eye injuries went from

Landstuhl to Walter ReedArmy Medical Center, Washington, DC, rather than to their home

stations (Gore interview notes).

35. lnterview with MSgt. Janice M. Sjoberg'

USA, superintendent of administrative services, 86th Aeromedical Staging Facility,

LRMC, 11 Mar97; Craveninterview

36. Frefogle intewiew; interview with Capt'

Robin F. ErchingeE ward 14 C/D nune manager, departrnent of nursing, LRMC, 10 Mar 97;

Sjoberg interview; Winkler interview.

37. Stephanie Shaw interview; JozaytrnterNotes to Pages 164-169

view; Friers interview. On the departure of the

nineteen, see the last two paragraphs ofchapter

ten.

38. Friers interview; AFHSO KhobarTowers

oral hislory interview 25'

39. JozaYinterview.

40. Local television news footage on Lt' Col'

Shafer's tape.

41. Ibid.; Friers interview; AFHSO Khobar

Towers oral history interview 25.

42. Local television news footage on LL Col'

Shafer's taPel Bronson intervlew

43. Jozayt interview.

44. Local television news footage on Lt' CoI'

Shafer's tape; Friers interview.

45. Locil television news footage on Lt' Col'

Shafer3 tape.

46. Baril; interview; Jozayt interview; AFHSO

Khobar Towers oral history interview 21'

47. Smallheer, "Eglin mourns Nomads"' 3;

46thTestWing Multimedia Center, "58th Fighter Squadron Arrival 28 Jun 96." SSgt' Yancy

Mailes provided the author a copy ofthis videg

tape; hereafter it is cited as "SSgt. Mailes's tape'"

+S. SSgt. Mailes's tape, "58th Fighter SquadronArrival28 Jun 96."

49.Ibid.

50. Burgess interview; AFHSO KhobarTowers oral history interview 8; Treadway intervrew.

51. Camobell interview; SSgt' Mailes3 tape'

"58th Fighter Squadron Arrival 28 Jun 9.6";

AFHSO Khobar Towers oral history intervrew

number 13.

52. SSgt. Mailes's tape, '58th Fighter Squadron Arrival 28 Jun 96"; Smallheer, "Eglin

moums Nomads," 3; Campbell interview'

53. Mailes,'Notes from the arrival of the six

F-15s"; SSgt. Mailes's tape, "58th Fighter

Squadron Arrival 28 Jt:l:' 9 6 I'

i4. Muil"t, "Notes from the arrival of the six

F-15s"; SSgt. Mailes's tape, "The Wounded^

Retum i-Iomi"; Brovm interview. The names of

sDouses sometimes can be found in official Atr

Force biographies but because of increased

intemational terrorism, information about the

families of senior officers is less widely published than il once was. Mr. Widnall appears in

the entry about his wife in Marquis Who's Who'

Iilho's-Ilho in America 1998,2 vols' (New

Providence, N.J., 1997), 2:4617 .

55. SSst. Mailes's tape, "The Wounded

249
Notes to pages16g-172

Retum Home"; Mailes, ..Notes from the arrival

ofthe six F-l5s.,'

56. Brou'n interview.

.57. 'Memorial Service, King Hangar, Eglin

AFB, Fla., Sunday 30 Jun 96"; undatedl.ir

Force map ofEglinAFB, Fla. The Federal News

Service transcript shows that the president

spoke at I 1 : 15 a.m. (Federal News Service han_

scnpt, "Remarks by president Clinton at a

Memorial Service forU.S. BombineVictims in

Saudi Arabia. Eglin AFB, fla.,"lO Jun 96.

I | : I 5 a.m. ). SSgr. yancy Mailes provided the

author a copy of the order of service for the

Eglin ceremony.

58. David E. SangeE ..Clinton Leads Rites for

Dead In Saudi Blasti, Nau york Iime-s. I Jul 96. l; SSgt. Mailes's rape. 'A Memorial Service

honoring those who died in the Defense of

lryd"_- in SaudiArabia, King Hangar, Eglin

AFB, Fla., Sunday 30 Jun, 96.',

59. SSgt. Mailes's tape, .A Memorial Ser_

vice . . . Jun 30, 96',; Sanger, ..Clinton Leads

Rites-" l.

60. SSgt. Mailes's tape, ,A Memorial Seruce . . . Jun 30, 96"; Smallheer, .Eglin moums

Nomads," 4.

61. SSgt. Mailes,s tape, ,A Memorial Ser_

vice...Jun30,96."

62. AFHSO KhobarTowers oral history inter_

vrews 12 and 10.

_ 

63- "Memorial Setvice, King Hangar"; SSgt.

Mailes's tape,'A Memorial Service. . . Jun 3"0,

96"; Col. LaVerne L. Schueller to Col. Chris

Hallion and others. 2l Sep 01.

64. Fnal draft of Col. Dylewski.s remarks at

the 30 Jun 96 memorial service, 33d Fiehter

Wing History Office working files; SSgj.

Mailes's tape,'A Memorial Service. . . Jun 3"0.

96."

65. SS$. Mailess tape. .A Memorial Ser_

vice. . . Jun 30. 96": Lr. Col. Shafer.s taoe:

Federal News Service hanscript, ,.Remarks'by

President Clinton," i0 Jun 96.

66. Federal News Service transcriot.

"Remarks by President Clinton,." 30 Jun 9O:

SSg. Mailes's rape. 'A Memorial Service. . .

Jun 30, 96"; See also the Office of the White

House Secretary's transcript. -.Remarks by the

President at Memorial Service for Servicemen

Killed in Dhatmn, Saudi Arabia,,' 30 Jun 96.

_ 

67 "Memonal Service, King Hangar,,; SSgt.

Mailes's tape,'A Memorial Service. . . Jun 3-0.

2s0

96"; Dylewski interview.

68. SSgt. Mailes's tape, 'A Memorial Service. . . Jun 30, 96"; Smallheer, .,Eglin moums

Nomads,"4.

69. SSgt. Mailes's tape, 'A Memorial Service . . . Jun 30, 96"; AFHSO Khobar Towers

oral history interview 8;Valencia interview.

70. SSgt. Mailes's tape, 'A Memorial Serlrce...Jun30,96."

71. Friers interview; Iocal television news

footage on Lt. Col. Shafer,s tape; notes taken at

Patrick AFB. 23 Jum04. Ir hid been intended

that Col. Friers would ride with president Clin_

ton and Gen. Hinson, since he might be better

able to answer some of the coimander in

chief's questions than the commander of the

45th Space Wing, who only recently had rehrmed to Patrick. As it tumed out, no embarass_

ment followed from the two senior officers

being separated (Friers interview).

7 2. Fiers interview; 45th Services Squadron

map of Patrick AFB. Feb 02; notes taken al

PatrickAFB, 23 hn04.

73. Lt. Col. Shaferb tape,..lstRescue Grouo,

Dhahran lncident Memorial Service, patriik

AFB, June 30, 1996"; "Memorial Service. Base

Thealer. Patrick AFB, Fla., June 30. i996...

Mark Cleary. hisrorian of rhe 45th Space Wing,

provided the author with a copy ofthis order of

service. A memorial service also was held for

Airman Lester, in Hangar 148 of Wrighf

Patterson AFB on I Jul. Bruce Hess of the

Aemautical Systems CenterHistory Office sart

the author a copy of the order of service for this

ceremony. SSgt. King was recognized in a bookletpublished forthe 55thWingb 1999 Birthday

Ball. TSgt. Tracy Reed ofthe 55thWins Historv

Office provided a copy ofthis booklet.

74. Lt. Col. Shafer,s tape, ..lst Rescue

Group. . . June 30, 1996."

75. Friers interview; futa Elkins, ,Loca1 

ser_

vices will remember the slainl' Ftorida Tottav28Jun96,A4.

76. Friers interview.

77.Lt. CoL Shaferb tape, ,.1st Rescue Grout

. . . June 30. 1996.": SSgr. Mailes's tape, .A

Memorial Service . . . June i0, 1996."

78. Lt. Col. Shafer's tape, "lst Rescue Group

.. . June 30. 1996"; Col. Thomas R. Friers to

Dear Patrick AIB Family and Local Communities, 1 Jul 96.

79. Bill Clinton, "Americans who made a dif_
ferencel' Air ForceTimes 56:50 (15 Jul 96), 37;

David E. Sanger, "Clinton Leads Two Memorials for Victims of Saudi Bombing," Ncw York

Ttmes,ltul96,A1.

80. AFHSO oral history interview I 8.

81. Lt. Col. Shafer's tape, "lst Rescue

Group . . . June 30, 1 996": Friers interview.

82. Friers interview; Lt. Col. Shafer's tape,

"1st Rescue Group . . . June 30, 1996."

83. Cutline on photograph accompanying

Thompson, "Patrick dealt another blow," A-1;

Friers interview

84. Friers interview; AFHSO KhobarTowers

oral history interviews 19 and 23.

85. Friers interview; Col. Friers also provided

a documentusedto write this paragraph.

86. Col. Friers to Patrick AFB and Local

Communities, 1 Jul 96; "Editorials & Opinionsl' Missileer,PatrickAFB, Fla.' 5 Jul 96' 2.

The punctuation of Col. Friers's remarks was

changed for clarity.

87. Dylewski interview.

88. Hill interview; McCarthy interview.

89. Richmd H. Kohn, ed., *The Early Retirement of Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of

Statr, USAf;" ,4 erospace Power Joumal XY'.7

(Spring 01), 15; "Visit of the Secretary of

Defense the Honorable William J. Perry to the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabi4 J'xrc 29-30, 1996i

in 4404thwing History vol. 1 0, supporting document Vl 17; Schwalier intervieq 24 Feb 99;

Schwalier comments on "KhobarTowers." Sec.

Christopher's visit is discussed in chapter eight.

90. Schwalier interview, 24 Feb 99; Kohn,

"Early Retirement;' 15 16'

91. Schwalier interview, 24Feb 99. A documentprovidedby Gen. Schwaliermentions Gen.

Fogleman's presentation of the plaques. Some

sources have the chief of staffvisiting five hospitals, another says six ("4404th Medical Group

Chronologyj' artry for3 Jul 96, 0800-1000)'The

three facilities mentioned in this paragmphtreated the overwhelming majority of the American

patients. Mohammed al Dosha Hospital treated

six airmen and al Mana one ('4404th Medical

Group Chronology," entry for 3 Jul 96, 0800

1000; "4404th Medical Group Chronology,"

"Casualty Summary Update' entry). A sixthhospital may well have received a visit from Gen.

Fogbman. In any case, it is certain that more than

sirinstitrtions aided the Americans. The zl4Mth

Medical Group chronology, after listing the five

Notes to Pagesl72-176

hosoitals mentioned in the text and this note,

ooints out that approximately "60 more patients

iwere] teated andreleased [from] vmious hospitals; no available documentation due to

overwhelming patient load/minimal administative support availabilitY."

92. Robb comments on "KhobarTowers'"

93. Schwalier intervieq 24 Feb 99' A document provided by Gen. Schwalier mentions

Gen. Fogleman's presentation of the plaques'

On the building designation ofthe medical clinic, see chapter five, note 30.

9a. Biggs, "Khobar Chronology," Medical

Group entry for 3 Jul 96, 1045; Schwalier interviett,Zq Feb 99. Col. Robb also discussed this

episode with the author in a lunchtime conversation on 6 Jtm 97.

95. Schwalier interview, 24 Feb 99'

96. Video of Gen. Fogleman at the Desert

Rose Inn, dated 3 Jul 96, 12: l0 p.m', on LL Col'

Shaferb tape; Schwalier interview,24Feb99' A

document provided by Gen. Schwalier mentions that the Air Force oath was Gen' Fogleman's maintoPic.

97. Video of Gen. Fogleman at the Desert

Rose Inn, on Lt. Col. Shafer's tape; "US' Air

Force Chief of Staff presents the Airman's

Medal to Maj. Steven Goffj' Defense Link photograph and caption 9607 03-F 2095R-{05 ;

"ds.-Ait Fot". Chief of Staffpresents theAirman3 Medal to StaffSgt. Alfredo R. Guerrero,"

Defense Link photograph and caption 960703--

F-2095R-O06; "U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff

presents the Airman's Medal to SrA' Corey P

'Grice," 

Defense Link photograph and cap!i9n^

g60703-F2095R O07; "US. Air Force Chief

of Staffpresents theAirman's Medal toAirman

lst Clasi ChristopherT. Wagar," Defense Link

photograph and caption 960703-F-2095R'

bog. Ssnt. Cuemero also laler received the

Nonconimissioned Officer Association's 97

VanguardAward (AFNS, "Edwards NCO earns

VansuardAward for actions," 29Apr 97)'

981 Schwalier intervieq 24Feb 99' A document provided by Cen. Schwalier also mentions

this segment of Gen. Foglemanb visit'

99. Schwalier interview, 24 Feb 99 Gen'

Ronald R. Fogleman, "Fogleman commends

Air Force men and womenl' The Flyer, Langley

AFB,Va., 19 Jul96, 5. A documentprovidedby

Gen. Schwalier supplied a few of the details in

this paragraPh.

251
n*otes to pages 177-l8l

Chapter Ttvelve

1. Graham, "Bomb Won't Deter U.S..,'A_l:

Schwalier inrerview. 24 Feb 99; CBS. ..Bomb_

ing in Saudi Arabia."

2. Biggs, "Khobar Chrono1ogy,,, Sp squadron

entries for 27 Jun 96, 1006 and 1030; Air Force

KhobarTowers map.

3. Transcript of a Department of Defense

news briefing by Lt. Gen. Howell M. Estes.

director for operations (J-3), Joint Chiefs oi

Stafi 12 Ju1 96; Schwalier intervi ew,24Feb 99;

Biggs interview.

4. Hustedinterview.

^ ^5 

. HNSC Report. The quotations are on pages

20 and,21.

6. HNSC Report, 8-9; pexton. ,,Desert

Moves," 3.

7. "Senate Select Committee on Intellisence

Staf Report on the KhobarTowersTerrori-stAt_

tack," 11, attached to lBrig. Gen. Lansford E.

Trapp, Jr.,l chief of the Secretary of the Air

Force's offjce oflegislative liaison, to Secretarv

of the Air Force Dr. Sheila Widnall, 12 Sep 96.

8. Downhg Report l.

.9 Ib]q, 1-2; Departrnent of the Army biogra_

n_frl of Gen. Walne Allan Dowring, I May 96.

The open literature about the ..blaik world'of

special operations is limited. Gen. H. Norman

Schwarzkopf mentioned Gen. Dou.rine in his

memoir, H. Norman Schwarzkopf with peter

Petre,It Doesn't Take a Hero (Newyork. et al..

1992^), 470: Gen. Downing s career during the Gull War is discussed at greater lengfi in

Atkinson, Cnrade, t4(H3, 144, 17 4, til -S S.

360.474: and in the revisionisr work, Michael

R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Gen_

erals'War: The Inside Stor-1 of the Conflict in

t he Gulf (B oston, et al., I gg i), 24 | 46. 3 40_42.

| 0. Drafl of the Secretary ol Defense to Gen.

WayneA. Dovming, USA (ret),n.d., attachedto

amemorandum from He US$'s depuw chief

of stafffor plans and operation's directorate of

plans to the Chief of Staffand other ofices. 2g

Jun 96; 'Assessment of Khobar Towers Bomb_

ing: Charter," attached to Gen. John M. Shali_

kashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staffto the

Secretary ofDefense,28 Jun 96.

I l. Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman.

Joint ChieFs of Staflto the Secretarry of Defense.

28 Jun 96; Dorvning Report, 2. A document

252

provided by Gen. Schwalier also was used to

write this paragraph.

12. Air Combat Command News Service

release, "Dhahran Wing Changes Command,;

Schwalier interview, 24 Feb 99.

I 3. Schwalier interview, 24 Feb 99.

14. Air Combat Command News Service

release, 'Dhahran Wing Changes Command";

Dick interview with author. A document pro_

vided by Gen. Schwalier also was used in writrng this paragraph.

15. USAF biography of Maj. Gen. Daniel M.

Dick, Jul 99; Air Combat Command News

Service release, "Dhalnan Wing Changes Command."

16. Dick interview with author

17. Schwalier interviev,t, 24 Feb 99;Schwalier

biography. A document provided by Gen.

Schwalier also was used in writing this paragraph.

18. This paragraph was based on interviews

with the airmen it mentions, and on Matthews.

"Most hurt in bombing." 3 l: Bryant..'Tesred by

terror," 4, 8.

19. "Change of Command Ceremony 4404th

Medical Group 1Prov.;. King Abdul Aziz Air

Base, Kingdom ofSaudiArabi4' 10Jul96, ceremony program, copy provided by Col. Conner;

Robb interview.

20. MSgt. David P Masko, ..Coalition forces

on the move in the deserll' Southern Watch 5:32

(21 Aug96),1 ; Philip Shenon, ,.For Safety, pentagon May Scatter G.L's Around Saudi Arabia.',

Nevv York 7ime.s. 18 Jul96, | .

21 . Dick interview with author; ,,2210611999:

Prince Sultan at inauguration ceremony of

Prince Sulran Air Base," Saudi Arabian Information Resource web site,4 Jan 02.

22. Schwalier interview, 23 Feb 99; 4404th

WingHistory vol. 1, 1.

23.'221061 1999: Prince Sultan at inaueuration

ceremony": Clancy and Homer. Everl Man a

Dger fNew York. | gSq ). 307. After rhe CulfWa4

Lt. Gen. Homer was promoted to general,

served as commander of Air Force Soace

Command" and retired on I Oct 94 (USAF biography of Gen. CharlesA. Homer, Sep 93).

24. William T. Y'Blood. Sharpening rhe

Eagle's Talons (WashingIon, DC, 1993), 102
and see 102n. This Air Force History and Museums Program monograph is classified secretno foreigr; the information used here is unclassified.

25. Bill Gertz, "Miracle in the Desettl' Air

Force Magazine 80:1 (Jan 91),61; William T.

Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion (Washinglon, DC, n.d.), 94n. This Air Force History

and Museums Program monograph is classified

secret-no foreign; the material used here is unclassified.

26. James P Coyne, Airpower in the Gulf (Arlington, Va., 1992),23; Gertz, "Miracle in the

Desert." 60; Dick interview with author.

2T.Dickinterview with author; transcript of

interview of Brig. Gen. Daniel M. Dick by

SSgt. Richard Brink, historian,4404th Composite Wing (Prov.), Prince Sultan Air Base'

Saudi Arabia, 5 Feb 97, hereafter cited as the

SSgt. Brink interview of Dick; Mask, "Coalition forces on dte move," l; John R. Anderson,

"Troops adjust to life in the desertl' Air Force

Times 57:13128 Oct 96). 31.

28. Dick interview with author.

29. SSgt. Brink interview of Dick. See also

Dick interview with author.

30. MSgt. David P Masko, "Meeting the

Southem Watch Standar{'Air Force news release, Sep 96; SSgt. Brink interview of Dick. An

unclassified briefing slide titled "Tent City Layouf in a classified 21 Jul 96 briefing' found tn

the frles ofthe Regional Plans and Issues of;fice

ofthe ofrce ofthe Deputy Chiefof StaffforAir

and Space Operations, HQ USAE, was also

used in writing this paragraPh.

31. SSgt. Brink interview of Dick.

32. TSgt. MiconnaJ. Boaldin, "REDHORSE

builds tent city in Saudi Arabia," Air Force news

release, Aug 96; Dick interview with author;

SSgt. Brink interview of Dick.

33. SSst. Brink interview ofDick.

34. Gera, 'Miracle in the Desert," 62; SSgt'

Brink interview of Dick; Dick interview with

author.

35. Grant, "Khobar Towers," 47; Gen.

Schwailer to Dr. Perry D. Jamieson, AFHSQ 6

Nov 04. Capt. Erik B. Pohlmann, USA, assistant chief of staff, G-2, HQ U.S. Army Forces

Central Command-Saudi Arabia, provided

color transparencies of the demolition of

Building 131.

36. Perry, Report to the President, 2; Bradley

Notes to Pages 181-187

Graham and Dan Balz, "haqi Attack Raises

U.S. 'Concern,"' WashingtonPost, I Sep 96'

A-1; Bradley Graham, "U.S' Launches More

Cruise Missiles Against kaq," Washington Post'

4 Sep 96, A-1 andA20; "U.S. forces launch

cruiie missiles at Iraqi facilities," Southern

Watch 5:34 (11 Sep 96), 1; SSgt. Brink interview of Dick.

37. SSgt. Brink interview of Dick'

38. "U.S. forces launch cruise missiles,"

Southern Watch, ll SeP 96' 1.

39. SSgt. Brink interview of Dick'

40. G;rz,*Miracle in the Desert"' 62;Dick

interviewwith author.

41. Gertz,"Miracle in the Desert," 6l; Dick

interview with author.

42. Secrelary of Defense William J' Perry to

the Secretary of the Air Force, 30 Aug 96; Air

Force Chiefof Staf Gen. RonaldR. Fogleman

and Secretary ofthe Air Force SheilaWidnall to

the Secretary ofDefense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 23 Dec 96.

43. Ait Fo."" Chief of Staff Gen. Ronald R'

Foeleman and Secretary of the Air Force Sheila

B.-WianAt to ttreTwelfthAir Force Comrnandeq 4 Sep 96; William Matthews, "Will anyone

be punished?," Air Force Times 57:9 (30 Sep

96). 13.

4+. UsAf biography of Ll Gen. James F'

Record, Jul96. Lt. Gen. Recordretiredon 1 Feb

97.

45. Record Report, A: Tab B, 53-56; Federal

News Service hanscript of Defense Department special briefing, 16 Sep 96; Dounring Reoort. 21. ' 

46. Dovming RePort, 8-l l.

47.Ibid., I l-13.

48. Ibid.,44-53; Steve Macko, "Report Says

Pentagon Failed to Take Adequate Security

Measrtres," Emergency Net News Service release, 18 Sep 96. See also William Matthews'

'A Threat Not Mel A Report Blames a Commander and Lax Security Policiesl' Air Force

Times 57'.9 (30 SeP 96)' 12.

49. Downing Riport, 48. For examples of

Dress reports, see Shenon"'saudis Offer U'S'

iull Coooeration," l; Bradley Craham. "U'S'

General illOn't f"U Superiors," A-1; Shenon,

"Saudi Bombers GotOutside Support"'A-1; R'

Jeffiey Smith, "Intelligence Report Wamed of

Saudisecurity Probl emsl' Washington Post, | |

Jul 96, A-1.

253
Notes to pages 187-194

50. Downing Report, 49. Commentine on

lK}gbar Towers: Tragedy and Response-'. in

Oct 04, Gen. Schwalier called the list clause

quoted here "blatantly false" and stated that his

end of tour report graded the wing,s logistical

support from its numbered air force as unsatis_

factory.

5 1 . Dovming Rep ort, 52, 53 .

52.tbid..,52.

53. AFNS release..'Air Force issues shtement

on Dov,nring Reporr;' [l 6 Sep 96].

54. Patrick Pexton, "Responsibili[2. . . is mine

alonel'Air Force Iimes 57:9 (30 Sep 96), 13.

Secretary Perry's testimony to the Senate com_

mittee that afternoon was similarly worded. See

Office of the Assistant Secreary of O.f.*. fo.

Public Affairs News Release, Opening State_

31ft bt Secretary of Defense William J. perry

before the Senate Armed Services Commitd.

I 8 Sep 96.

55. Lt. Gen. James F. Record to the Air Force

Chief of Staff and the Secretary of theAir Force,

31 Oct 96, copy accompanying the Record

Report; Bradley Graham, .,Bombprobe 

Soares

ALr Force Officers." Washingron post, 12 Dec

96, A-1; Eric Schmitt, .Air Force Inquirv

Clears General In Saudi Bombing That Killei l9i New York Times, 12 Dec 96, A-1. A_12:

Fogleman and Widnall to the Secretary of De_

fense and the Deputy Secretary ofDefense;

Record Report, A: vi-viii.

56. Record Report, B, I: 44 and 45.

s7 . rbid,37 .

58. rbid.,35.

59. Ibid.,32_33.

60.Ibid.,69.

61 . Foglunan and Widnall to the Secretarv of

Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Deferxe.

62. Depu[z Secretary of Defense John p

White to the Secretary of the Air Force.29 Jan

97.

63. Air Force Chief of StaffGen. Ronald R.

Fogleman and Secretary ofthe Air Force Sheila

E. Widnall to the Inspector General and the

JudgeAdvocate General, 5 Feb 97.

64. USAF biographies of Lt. Gen. RichardT.

Swope, Jul 96, and Maj. Gen. Bryan G. Hawley,

Sep 98. Gen. Swope retired on I Oct 9g; Gen.

Hawleyon I Mar99.

65. Air Force Inspector General Lt. Gen.

Richard T Swope to Col. William J. Corbett III

and others, 6 Feb 97; Air Force Judge Advocate

254

General Maj. Gen. Bryan G. Hawley to H.

Gordon Wilder and others, 4 Apr 97; SwopeHawleyReport,3.

66. Fogleman and Widnall to the Inspector

General and Judge Advocate General.

67. Swope-Hawley Report, cover page;

Schwalier comments on "Khobar Towers.,,

68. Swope-Hawley Report, 150.

69.tbid.,t02.

70. Ibid., 149. For the inclusion of Mylar window coverings in the five-year plan 

, see 4404th

Civil Engineering Squadron, Five-year Facilities Improvement Plan FY gGFy 00, 24 Mav

96. n 44Mh Wing History. vol. 7. supporring

document IV-2, pages 15, 18, and 23. Commenting on "Khobar Towers," Gen. Schwalier

noted another factor in the Mylar decision: the

wrng had purchased healy cmtains for the dormitory windows during the previous year.

71. Swope-Hawley Report, 30, 31. For the

inclusion ofthe alarm system in the five-year

plan. see 4404th Civil Engineering Squadron.

Five-Year Facilities Improvement plan Fy

9 6-FY 00, 24 May 96, n 4404thW ngHistory

vol. 7, supporting document IV-2 ,15,18,23.

72. Swope-Hawley Repor! I 7-l 8.

73. William Matthews, "Fogleman: Don't

Punish Dhahran Commander,"l ir Force Trmes

57:32(l0Mar97'),3.

74. Patrick Pexton, "Report says military had

wamings of Saudt attacki Air Force Itmes 57:8

(23 Sep 96), 6, emphasis added.

75.Eic Schmitt,'A' ForceAgain Says Gen.

Was Not Negligent in Saudi Bombing," i/ew

YorkTimes, 14 Apr 97,A-13.

76. Matthews, "Don't Punish Commander";

Record Report. B. I:24,43, and 89.

77. Matthews, "Don't Punish Commander,';

Kohn, "Early Retirement," 15.

78. Eric Schmitt, "Citing Investigation, Top

Gen. Seeks to Leave the Air Force,' New york

Times, 29 Jul 97, A-1. See also Bradley

Craham. "Chief of Sr.affOf Air Force Resisns

Postl' Washington Posr^29 Jul97, A l.

79. Graham, "Chief of Staff Resigns,,, A,1 ;

Office ofthe Secretary of Defense biography of

William S. Cohen, n.d.

80. Graham, "Chiefof StaffResigns,"A l.

81. Kohn, "EarlyRetirement," 7.

82.tbid.,23.

83. Bradley Graham, "Gen. penalized in Saudi

Bombing," Washington Post,3l Jul 97. A l:
Suzann Chapman, 'Aerospace World: Khobar

Report Delays Promotionl' Air Force Magazine

80:4 (Apr 97), 13; Rebecca Grant, "The Second

Sacking ofTerryl SchwalieC',41r Force Magazine 89:4 (Apil06),41.

84. Transcript of a Department of Defense

news briefing on the KhobarTowers bombing

by Kenneth H. Bacon, Secretary of Defense

William S. Cohen, and Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, 31 Jul 97, 2 p.m. See also Secretary of

Defense William S. Coherl "Personal Accotmtability for Force Protection at Khobm Towers,"

31 Jul 97.

85. See note above.

86. "schwalier requests retirement," AFNS

release, 31 Jul 97. Gen. Schwalier's executive

officer gave his opinion ofthe generalS conduct

during the periodbetween the bombing and late

Jul97, ina letterto the editorof,4ir ForceTimes'.

Lt. Col. Daniel Woodward, "Schwalier maintains 'the high goun{"' Air Force frmes 57:51

(21 J:ul 9'l), 23. In May 01 Gen. Schwalier himself wrote a letter to the editors of Air Force

Magazine,tnt*ilichhe commented on an article

in the publication's Mm 97 issue that had contrasted the actions taken in response to the

Dhahran and the USS Cole attacks, and suggested that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reopen the KhobarTowers case. Brig. Gen.

Terryl J. Schwalier (US$ ret'), "There's More

to the Story," lir Force Magazine 84:5 (May

0l),4, 6.

87. Pierre Thomas, "Freeh to Advise Saudis

on hobe," Washington Post, Jtt'96, A24.

88. Biggs interview; Dick interview with

author. See also "KhobarTowers Chronology of

Events," operations group entry for 26 Jun 96'

0644. Unclassified material from another Air

Force document also was used in writing this

paragraph.

89. R. Jeftey Smit[ "US. RequestsAccess to

Saudi Bomb Su spects:' Washington Post, 13 Jtil

96,A-15.

90. Ibid., A-l ; R. Jeffrey Smith, "FBI Director

Travels to Saudi Arabia," Washinglon Post,23

Nov 96,A-17.

91. Smith, "U.S. Requests Access"'A-l;

Thomas, "Freeh to Advise Saudisl' A24.

92. John Mintz, "saudis May Purchase U.S'

F-16 Fighters; Bethesdab Lockheed Martin in

Line for Multibillion-Dollar Deal I' Washington

Post.3l Jan 97.,{-1. See also Roberto Suro and

Notes to Pages 194-197

Pierre Thomas, "Freeh Criticizes Saudis on

Bomb Probe; Kingdom Has Withheld Important Evidence, FBI Director Saysi' Washingtan

Post,23 Jm97,A-1.

93. DePalma, "Canada Links Pro-Iranian

Groupi'A-l; DePalma, "Saudi Handed Over"'

A-1, A-8; *CanadaHolds Saudi In Bornbing

of G.l.sl' New York Times,Z3 Mx 97 , A-1'

94. DePalma, "Cartada Links Pro-Iranian

Group," A-1, ,{-6; DePalm4 "Saudi Handed

Over,"A-8.

95. DePalma, "Canada Links Pro-Iranian

Group," A-6; DePalm4 "Saudi Handed Over,"

A-8. Canadian officials were said to have alleged that Sayegh drove a "signal car'" (See

chapter one, note 32.)

eO. antlony DePalma"'Judge Says Canada

Can Deport Suspect in Lethal Saudi Bombing"'

New York Times, 6 MaY 97, A-7; DePalma,

"Saudi Handed Overi A-l'

97. DePalma, "Saudi Handed Over," A-1'

A-6.

98. David Johnston, "suspect in 96 Saudi

Bombing Says He Was in Iran at the Time"'

New York Times, 8 Jul 97' A-1, A-12; David

Johnston, "Saudi Suspect Pleads Not Guilry

Disrupting Deall' Na,u York Times, 3l ltl 97 '

A-18.

99. Roberto Suro, "Freeh Says Saudis Block

Bomb Evidence i New York Times, ll Sep 97,

A-10; "U.S. Judge to Drop Charges Against

Satdt i Na,v YorkTimes, 11 Oct97,A-4; "Saudi

Bombing Suspect Questioned," Washington

Post,3l Oct99, A-34.

100. Thomas W Lippmar\'Gore Visits U'S'

Unit In Saudi Desertl' Washington Port,3May

98,A-25; John Lancaster, "saudiAbsolves han

of 1996 Bombing That Killed 19 U.S. Soldien"'

Washington Post,23May 98,A26' See also

John Daniszewski, "saudis Find No Foreign

Role In Blast," Ios Angeles Ttmes,23 May 98,

A

101. Norman Kernpster, "US. Indictrnents In

'96 Bombing Roil Saudi Arabia," Los Angeles

Times,24 Jun 01, 3; "Saudi Absolves Iran"'

Washington Post,23 May 98, 4-26' See also

Daniszewski, "Saudis FindNo Foreign Rolej' 1'

hince Nayefhad visited the bomb site wift Sec'

Christopher. Gens. Anderson and Schwalieq

and others, on the evening of 26 Jun 96' See

chapter eight.

tOZ. ftritip Shenon and David Johnston,

25s
Notes to pages 197-200

"U.S.-Saudi Inquiry Into 1996 Bombins Is

FallingApart," New yorkTimes,2l Jun 9g. A_t.

ln Mar 01, Mr. Freeh persuaded the Justjce De_

partrnent to reassign the investigation liom the

Washington, DC, U.S. attorneyb office to Fed_

eral prosecutors in Richmond, Va. (..Bomb

Probe Reassignedi' llashington posr,25 Mar

0l,A-6).

103. David Johnston, '.14 Indicted Bv U.S. In

'96 Saudi Blasr." New york Times. Zi lw OtA-1. The Lrbanese national, identified onlv as

'Tohn Doe," was alleged to have helped convert

1!: tr:k for carrying explosives. Dan Eggen,

"U.S. Trials Unlikely For Khobar Suspects,',

Was hington Post, 23 hn 0 l, A22.

104. Johnston, "14 IndictedBy U.S.,,'A_1.

105. Ibid.; USAF biography of Gen. Michael

E. Ryan, Sep 0l; AFNS, .Air Force officials

respond to Khobar Towers indictonents,,' 2l Jun

01.

I06. Johnston, "14Indicted By U.S..,'A_1.

107. "U.S. Indictments In .96-Bombing..'tos

Angeles 7imes,24 Jun 01, 3.

108. Eggen, "U.S. Trials Unlikely,' Washing_

tonPost,23 Jl.:r;'0t,A-22.

109. Neil A. Lewis, "Judge Links Iran to .96

Attack in Saudi Arabia," Ncw York Iimes, 27

Dec 06,A-13.

I10. Robert D. McFadden, "Blast Hits Trade

Center, Bomb Suspected; 5 Killed, Thousands

Flee Smoke InTowers i NewYorkTimes,2T Feb

93,A-1 ; Elaine Sciolino, "Bomb Kills 4Americans in SaudiArabial'NauYorkIimes, 14 Nov

95, A l; James C. McKinley, Jr., ..Bombs Rip

Apart 2 U.S. Embassies In Africa; Scores Killed; No Firm Motive Or Suspects." New york

Times,S Aug98. A -l ; John E-Bums and Steven

Lee Myers, "Blast Kills Sailors on U.S. Shio in

Yemen." New York Times,l3 Oct 2000, A L

I I L Peter Slwin and Dan Eggen, ' FBI Director Links Some Hijacking Suspects to al ea€d4 '

W'ashington Post,28 Sep 01, A-18; Rowan

Scarborough and Jerry Seper, "Pieces ofEvidence Come Together As A Picture Of Bin

Laden," Washington Iimes, 3 Oct 01, l.

I 12. Winkler interview.

I I 3. Interview with SSgt. MaryAnna Schuchman, cytotechnologist, LRMC, 7 Mar97.

114. Interview with Capt. Lydia E. Vasquez,

medical-surgical nurse, LRMC, tl Mar 97 .

Epilogue

1. Karen DeYoung, ,.Bush Urges U.N. to

Stand Up to Hussein, Or U.S. WillAc(' Wash_

ington Post, 15 Sep 02, A-3; Dana Milbank and

Mike Allen, "President Tells Hussein to Leave

Iraq Within 48 Hours or Face Invasion;

Ultimatum Is DeliveredAfter U.N. Effort Fails,..

Washington Posf, 18 Mar 03, A-1.

2. fuckAtkinson, peter Baker, andThomas E.

licks,'21 Days to Baghdad: Confused Start,

Swift Conclusionl' Washington post, 13 Apr

03, A I, A-3+-A 35; Rajiv Chandrasekaran. *Hussein Capnred: U.S. Forces Uncover lraqi

Ex-Leader Near Home Townl, Washinxtoi

Post. 15 Dec 03. A -1. Some noteworthy itles

on the Baghdad campaign include: Michael R.

Gordon and Bemard E. Trainer, Cobra II:The

Insi"de Story of the lwasion and Occupation of

lrag (NewYork,2006); RickAtkinson, 1n /re

Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat

(New York, 2004): and Tommy Franks with

Malcolm McConnell, Americai Soldier (New

York 20M).

3. Interview with Col. Charles Westenhoff

(USAR ret.), contractor, Checkmate Office,

256

Headquarters United States Air Force, 19 Jul

05; Jim Garamore, "US. aircraft leavine Saudi

Arabian base."Air Force Print News.29lpr03;

Eric Schmitt, "Saudis Are Said To Assure U.S.

On Use ofBasesl' NewYork Iimes,2gDec 02.

A- l; "Americans officially end era at prince

SultanAir Basel' The Beam,5 Sep 03, l. Unclassified material from the draft of a classified

Air Force report on Operation Iraqi Freedom

was also used in writing this paragraph.

4. "Americans officially end er4" 5 Sep 03. In

Dec 98 France stopped is sorties to enforce the

southem no-fly zone and it later opposed the kaq

War, but the United Kingdom continuedto help

enforce the UN resolutions and it also contributed to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Military

Analysis Nefivork, "Operation SouthemWatch,,

13 May 03, available athttp://www.fas.oqg;..US.

aircraft leavingbasei 29 Apr03.

5. 'U.S. aircraft leaving basel, 29 Apr 03;

"Americans officially end era:'5 Sep 03. See

also Staff Sergeant A.J. Bosker, ..Goodbye,

Prince Sultan," Airman XLVII:10 (Oct 03),

2+-29.
6. Invitation to the dedication ceremony,

Khobar Towers memorial exhibit, Maxwell Air

Force Base-Gunter Annex, Ala., 25 Jun [99];

Air Force News, "Khobar Towers: Exhibit

memorializes fallen airmen," n.d.; notes and

photographs taken by the author at the Enlisted

Heritage Hall, Maxwell Air Force Base-Gunter

Armex.Ala.. 12Dec03.

7. Notes taken by the author at the Enlisted

Heritage Hall, 12 Dec 03; "Gone, but not forgottenl' Airman XLMI: 10 (Oct 03), 27.

8. Notes and photographs taken by the author

at the Enlisted Heritage Hall, 12 Dec 03.

Notes to P^ges20V202

9. Secretary of the Air Force E Whitten Peters'

Rernarks at the KhobarTowers Memorial Dedication, PatrickAir Force Base, Florida' 25 Jun

2000; notes taken by the author at the Khobm

Towers Mernoriat, PatrickAir Force Base, Fla''

23Jw04.

10. Notes and photographs taken by the

author at the KhobmTowers memorial, Patrick

Air Force Base, 23 Jun 04.

1 1. These three paragraphs, and the last one,

me based on notes and photographs taken by the

author at the Khobar Towers memorial, Eglin

Air Force Base, Florida, 21 Jun 04.

257
Sources

The foundation of this book is a collection of oral history interviews. About

seventy Air Force officers, aimen, and other individuals told me and other historians about their experiences with the Khobar Towers bombing. The list below gives

the contributor; his or her rank at the time of the interview; the historian, if other

than the author; where the session took place; and its date. Audio tapes of these

interviews are held by the Air Force Historical Studies Office.

Lt. Col. (Chaplain) Dennis E. Aleson, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada,

November 7,1996

Capt. Russell D. Barile, PatrickAir Force Base, Florida, Febr:uary 4,1997

U.S. Army SSgt. Robert H. Barrett, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center,

Germany, March 8, 1997

U.S. Army SSgt. Todd M. Bentley, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center,

Germany, March 10,1997

MSgt. Dwayne Berry, PatrickAir Force Base, Florida, February 5,1997

SrA. Ronald J. Biggs, Jr., Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, November 8,1996

Col. (Dr.) JamesW Bost, RamsteinAirBase, Germany, Match4,l997

lst Lt. Stephanie Bronson, PatrickAir Force Base, February 6,1997

Linda Bror,vn, by SSgt. Yancy Mailes, EglinAir Force Base, Florida,

December 16,1996

SSgt. Jacques P Bruffy, PatrickAir Force Base, Florida February 5,1997

U.S. Army Col. Caro$n Bullingeq Landstuhl Regional Medical Center,

Germany, March ll,1997

TSgt. George Burgess, by SSgt. Yancy Mailes and the author, EglinAir Force

Base, Florida, Decernber 5,1996

U.S. Army SSgt. Katsu Cannon, Landstuhl Regional Medical Centeq

Germany, March 7,1997

Col. Douglas R. Cochran, by SSgt. Yancy Mailes, Eglin Air Force Base,

Florida. December 20. 1996

Maj. Cynthia Coles, Ramstein Air Base, Germany, March 6, 1997

U.S. Army Lt. Col. Sherry Conner, Landstuhl Regronal Medical Center,

Germany, March 10,1997

TSgt. James Coopeq Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, March

10,199',7

TSgt. JeffersonA. Craven, PatrickAirForce Base, Florida, February 6,1997

U.S. Army Lt. Col. Bruce Crow, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center,

Germany, March 10, 199'7

2s9
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

Brig. Gen. Daniel M. Dick, LangleyAir Force Base, Virginia,February 4,

1998

Col. Gary R. Dylewski, by SSgt. Yancy Mailes, EglinAir Force Base, Florida,

December 18, 1996

Capt. Robin E Erchinger, Landstutrl Regional Medical Center, Germaay,

March 10,1997

U.S. Army Col. @r.) Edward B. Frefogle, Landstutrl Regional Medical

Center, Germany, March 7,1997

Col. Thomas R. Friers, PatrickAir Force Base, Florida, February 4, l99j

MerylnT. Garcia, R.N., Landshrhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, March

7,1997

U.S. Army SSgt. GinaA. Green, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center,

Germany, March 7,1997

SSgt. Rudolph Grimm II, PatrickAir Force Base, Florida, February 6,l99l

SSgt. Alfredo R. Guerrero, private residence, November 9,1996

Lt. Col. (Chaplain) Ray Hart, LangleyAir Force Base, Virginia, Septernber

12,1996

Lt. Col. Stan Hill, EglinAir Force Base, Florida, December 5,1996

SSgt. Selena P Husted, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, February 6, l99j

Lt. Col. Donald R. JozaTt, PatrickAir Force Base, Florida, February 4, 1997

U.S. Army SSgt. Alexis King, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany,

March 8.1997

SrA. Daniel R. Koeppl, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, March

7,1997

Col. (Dr.) Dan L. Locker, RamsteinAir Base, Germany, March4, 1997

Col. (Chaplain) John Lundin, Ramstein Air Base, Germany, March 3, 1997

U.S. Army SSgt. Tyrone Lymos, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center,

Germany, March 8, 1997

Lt. Col. Thomas A. McCarthy, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, December 4,

1996

Capt. Michael D. Morelock, PatrickAir Force Base, Florida, February 4, 1997

Lt. Col. Jacqueline E. Murdoclg RamsteinAir Base, Germany, March4, 1997

Lt. Col. Dawn M. Oerichbauer, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center,

Germany, March ll,1997

U.S. Army Corporal Donny P Otrg, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center,

Germany, March 10, 1997

SSgt. John C. Orlando, Jr., EglinAir Force Base, Florida, December 4, 1996

U.S. Army SSgt. Harold Patterson, Landstutrl Regional Medical Center,

Germany, March ll,1991

U.S. Army SSgt. Brian Peplinski, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center,

Germany, March ll,1997

SrA. Joseph J. Powell, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, March

tt,1997

260
Sources

Lt. Col. (Dr.) Douglas J. Robb, Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, }'lrlre 6, 1997

SSgt. Boris Vl Rudinski, PatrickAir Force Base, Florida, February 5,1997

SSgt. MaryAnna Schuchman, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany,

March 7, 1997

Brig. Gen. (retired) Terryl J. (Terrl,) Schwalier, private residence, Febtuary 23

and24,1999

U.S. Army SgtlC. Rito R. Serna, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center,

Germany, March 10,1991

Marie Shaw, Landstulrl Regional Medical CenteE Germany, March 8,1997

Capt. Stephanie Shaw PatrickAir Force Base, Florida, Februny 4,1997

MSgt. Janice Sjoberg, Landshrhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, March

ll, 1997

MSgt. Kevin Smit[ PatrickAir Force Base, Florida, February 6,199'7

SSgt. Darren M. Staggers, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany,

March ll,1997

U.S. Army Capt. Shajuanda D. Strickland, Landshrhl Regional Medical

Center, Germany, March 10, 199'7

SrA. David R. Thompson, Landstutrl Regional Medical Center, Germany,

March 7,1997

Michael Tocchetti, DoverAir Force Base, Delaware, June 12, 1997 (In addition to this oral history Mr. Tocchetti gave the author and SSgt. C. Michael Sibley

a tour of the Charles C. Carson Center for Mortuary Affairs, Dover Air Force Base,

Delaware, on June 12,1997 .)

Capt. (Dr.) R. Morris Tieadway, Jr., EglinAir Force Base, Florida, December

5,1996

Maj. Bennie L. Umstead II, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland" August 19,

199',7

Al C. Cielito (Lito) Valencia, by SSgt. Yancy Mailes, Eglin Air Force Base,

Florida, February ll, 1991

U.S. Army 2d Lt. Kate Van Arman, Landshrhl Regional Medical Center,

Germany, March ll,1997

Capt. Lydia E. Vasquez, Landstutrl Regional Medical Center, Germany, March

ll,1997

U.S. Army Capt. LauraWedel, Landstuhl Regional Medical Centeq Germany,

March 10,1997

MSgt. Cedrick Williams, EglinAir Force Base, Florida, December 4, 1996

Col. (Chaplain) J. Rick Wilson, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, September

12,1996

Capt. Matthew Winkler, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, February 5, 1997

SSgt. Eric Ziegler, EglinAir Force Base, Florida December 4, 1996

Another valuable source for this work is SSgt. Eric O. Grzebinski's official history of the 44}4thComposite Wing (Provisional) covering the crucial period May

26r
Khobar Towers: Tragedy and Response

l-July 31, 1996. This narrative is supported by a particularly strong collection of

documents. Sudden hagedies like the KhobarTowers bombing point up the value of

having historians continually in place with field units.

There are several helpful articles about the Dhahran attack. The best introduction to the subject is a brief, but well written, account by Rebecca Grant: "Khobar

Towers," Air Force Magazine (Volume 81, Number 6, June 1998, pages 4147).

There are several other useful articles on the bombing and related issues, most of

them appearing in military publications. Air Force Times sIaff writer William

Matthews compiled a series of stories, to mark the first anniversary of the attack:

"One Year Lateri Air Force Times (Yolume 57, Number 48, June 30, 1997, pages

12-14, 16, 18). On the medical care that the young airmen gave one another, see

Capt. Timothy Bailey and Nathan Alderman, "Buddies Care{' Airman (Volume

XL, Number 10, December 1996, pages 8-1 l). A prominent military historian's

interview of General Fogleman appears in Richard H. Kohn, ed., "The Early

Retirement of Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of Stafl United States Air Force,"

Aerospace Power Journal, (Volume X! Number 1, Spring 2001, pages 6 23).The

thesis of an article about Brig. Gen. Schwalier is stated in its title: Matt Labash,

"The Scapegoatl' The Weekly Standard (Volume 3, Number I l, November 24,

1997,pages2O-29). The move from Dhahran to Prince SultanAir Base is recounted by Bill Gertz, "Miracle in the Desertl' Air Force Magazine (Volume 80, Number

l, January 1997, pages 6W). The newspapers of major American cities, and of

several Air Force bases, published articles that give interesting details about

Operation Southern Watch, the Khobar Towers bombing, and the aftermath of the

attack. Many of these are cited in the endnotes. Unclassified versions ofthe official inquiries into the Dhahran hagedy are available on the internet.

Three important books were published while this manuscript was being

reviewed. Written after Iranian responsibility for the Khobar Towers bombing was

firmly established, Kenneth M. Pollock, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Betyveen

Iran and Amerrca (Ir{ew York , 2004) puts the attack in its diplomatic context and

weighs the merits of U.S. retaliation against Iran. Like Pollock3 work, Bill Clinton,

My Life (NewYorlg 2004) and Louis J. Freeh, My FBI (l.lewYork, 2005) appeared

too late to be used in this book.

262
Index

Numbers in bold inlic ndicate illushations.

Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia: 80

Adams, Christopher J.: 13, 14, 50, 53, 55,

164,r6s,20r

Adams,RitaE.: 121

Advanced cadre teams: 86, 88,124,125,126

Aeromedical Evacuation Coordination

Center: 64,86

Aeromedical evacuation crews: 85, 86, 124,

125, r57

Aeromedical ewcuation missions: 119, 130,

157 , t62

Aeromedical Staging Faciltty: 119,124, 125,

154, 155, 156

Aeromedical Staging Flight 130, 162

Afghanistan: 198, 199

Air Combat Command: 18, 24, 43, 84, 95,

111,180, r87,r9r

Aircrafttypes (Iraqi)

Hind helicopter gunship: 16

Hip helicopter gunship: 16

Aircraft types (Saudi Arabian)

C 130:182

Aircraft types (U.S.)

A-l0ThurderboltII: 19

B-52 Stratofortress: I 85

C-5 Galaxy: 140, 142, l5l, l5Z, 153,

159, 16r, 168, 182, 183

C-9 Nightingale'.85, 142, 166,167

C-l2Huron: ll9,l25

C2lLeaqet:43

C-130 Hercules: 18, 19, 85, 181, 185

C-141 Starlift€r: 85, 86, 87, 88, 123, 124,

126,153,1s4, 155, rs6, 157 , 

r59,

162,169

EF-11lARaven: 18

F-4 Phantom II: 180

F 4GWildWeasel: l8

F-15 Eagle: 9, 19, 67, 83, 144, 157, 159,

160. 167.169

F-16 Fighting Falcon: 163, 180, 185

F-l6C:18

F 16CG: 185

F-I6CJ: 185

HC-130P Combat Shadow: 5, 19, 44, 66,

109, 146, 160, 163, 166,167 ,180

KC-I0A Extender: 153

KC-135 Stratotanker: 88, 182

L-1011 TriStar: 157, 158, 159

MC-130 Combat Talon: 17

RF-4CPhantomII: 18

Air Expeditionary Forces

IL 102

III:67

Air Force Commendation Medal:74

Air Force DevelopmentTest Cefiet'. 137,

147. 163.168

Air Force Instructions: 188

Air Force tnstruction 3l-210: 25

Air Force Museum: 200

Air Force News: 132.161,200

Air Force Office of Special Investigations: 9,

26, 27, 30,3 1, 35, 58, 120, r77, r88,

193

AirForceOne: l7l,l72

Air Force Operations Center: 68

Air Force Personnel Center: 54,103,117 ,

118

Casualty Center: 118

Air Forces (IJ.S.)

Ninth: 18.24. 191

Thirteenth: l9l

Twelfth: 185, 186

Air furce frmes:192

Airmanb Medal : 40, 7 4, 83, I 48, 149, 17 6

Air Mobility Comnvmd: 63, 94, 95, 96, 97,

98, 99, 117, 153, 155, 158, 159, 164,

176

Air Staff: 188

Alabama: 140.147.200

Aleson, Dennis E.: 18, 58, 60, 73, 88, 94, 95,

97 ,98, rrl,127 , 140, l5l, 152, 164,

165

Alexandri4 Virg irua; 797

Alfied P Murah Building, Oklahoma City,

Oklahoma: 56

'Al's Garage": 181

American Broadcasting ComPanY: 83

American Embassy, Saudi Arabia'. 23, 29

AmericanRedCross: 133, 135, 136, 163

Anderson, Kurt B.: 18, 34, 43,60,61,122,

128, 148, l5l,152,165, 176, 180

Angelo, Frank 68

Angelo, Thomas: 59, 60, 127 ,165

Angelton, Texas: 53

Apalachicola River: 66

Arabian American Oil Company : 20, 21, 3 I'

ll2,rl3,r20

Arabian American Oil Company Hospital:

263
Index

50, 63, 66, 7 4, 80, 81, 91, 97, 98, 99,

103, 1ll, 115, 116, n7, r53, rs4,

ts6. 167 . r74

Arabian Gulf: 22, 30, 37, 80, 185, 186

Arabic language:20,81

ARAMCO. See Arabian American Oil

Company.

"Ark' (Khobar Towers Chapel): 120, 121,

r27, t75,176

Army Forces Cenfal Command-Saudi

kabia:721,122

Ashcroft, John: 1 97

Ash Sharqiyah, SaudiArabia: 18

AssociatedPress: 132

Atkins, Michael D.: 74

Atlant4 Georgia: 67, 103, 166, 167

Atlantic Ocean: 103, 133, 159, 162, 165, 17 |

Ay'res, Paul K.: 18, 82, l5I, 152

Azores: 85

Anaq,, Jordan: 102

Baghdad" Iraq: 16, 17,184,199

Bahrain: 22, 27, 28, 32, 44, 84, 123, 127, lg5

Bailey, Cynthia: 59

Baker,Andrew: l8

Bandar, Prince bin Sultan: 122

Bangladesh:114

Barile, Russell D. : 44, 48, 55, 56, 73, 91, 92,

160

Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana: 185

Battle Creelg Michigan: 53

Battle StatrDirectives: 24, 3 I

Bayliss, David:71

Bedouins: 20,21

Berry, Dwayne R.: 6,44, 56,81,90,91,92,

r09,t12,113, 160, 180

Bible, Dale E: 18,32,60,61, 63, 158

Biggs, Ronald J., Jr.: 18

Billingsley,Van: 124

Bisby,Arttrw: 6,44

Blais, Paul, Jr.: I 18, ll9, 134, 16l, 162

Blais, Paul, Sr.: I 18, 134

Boll, Kevin: 59

Bosnia:85,131

Bost, James W : 64, 65, 85, 86, 124, 125

Boyle, Gary S.: 18,28, 33,35,6t,62,92,

ll0

Branch, Lawrence: 51

Brelard County, Florida: 166

British forces: 21, 29, 30, 32, ll0, I I l, I 13,

114, 127, 185, 199. See also Great

Britain; United Kingdom.

264

Bronson, Donald: 167

Bronson, Stephanie: 81, I 15, 116, 167

Brown, Linda: 90, 103, 104, 105, 135,136,

137, t69

Bruffy, Jacques P.: 44, 109

Bulliner, Caro$n: 130, 131, 132,133

Bundeswehzentralkrankenhaus: 129

Burgess,Andre: 18

Burgess, George: 7, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 55,

76 77,92,93, t09, I10, 158, 168,

169, 180

Burhite, Bradley K.: 18

Bums, Nicholas: 54

Bush, George: 15, 16, 17, 20, 23

Bush, George W: 197 ,198, 199

Cable News Network: 67, 68, 84, 134, 1 55,

t64,172

Cafourelg Daniel B.: 53,201

Cairo,Egypt:158

Califomia: 9.53. 181

Cambridge, Minnesota: 53

"Camelot" (slang): 18I

Campbell, Brenda L.: 67, 105, 106, 137, 163,

169

Campbell, Millard D.: 53, 201

Camda:196

Carr, Patrick J.: 162, 163

Carfette, Earl E. Jr.: 53.201

Castor, Eric: 74

Casualties: 53-55. See also Duff status,

whereabouts unknown; Remains of

the deceased; Wounded airmen.

Cayetano, Sylvia: 123

Central Afi-ican Republic: 86

Central Command. ,See United States

Central Command.

Central CommandAir Forces. See United

States Central Comrnand Air Forces.

Central Intelligence Agency: 29

Cevallos, Diego: 123

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 30, 68,

l6t,171, t79,184

Chamel 2 News, Brevard County, Florida:

r66

Chapel (Khobar Towers). 12V21, 127 

,

175,:76

Used as

Chewolet Caprice: 10, 12,28, 196

Chiles. Lawton M.. Jr.: 171

Christopher, Warren: 54, 121, 122, 123, 17 4

Chueikhat, Jaafar:196
IIIIIrI)II

CMI engineers : 55, 66, 7 6, 7 9, 81, 92, 93,

115,117 ,167 ,189,92

Clinic (KhobarTowers Building 1l l): 54,

57 40, 62, 7 4, 7 5, 7 6, 7 8,'.7 9, 82-84,

94-96, 99, 109, 124, 127, 17 

4

Clinton, William J.: 68,120,l2l, 134, 144,

145,166,170, 17l, 172, 177 , 184,

197,201

Clovis, California: 53

Cochran, Douglas R.: 6, 7,44,45,58,67,74,

89, 90, 91, 95-96, r04, 105, 1 10, 1 1 1,

112, 149, 155, r57 ,158, 159, 169,

180

Cocoa Beach, Florida: 103, 173

Cohen, William S.: 1 50, 193, 194

ColdWar:15

Coles, Cynthia D.: 43, 57, 58, 59, 77, ll9,

125

Colorado Air National Guard: 1 

8

Columbia Broadcasting System: 132

Combined Air Operations Center: I 99

Congressional Research Service: I 97

Connor, Sherry: 82, 87, 754, 155, 156

Cooper, James B., Jr.: 87 ,126,127 ,128

Coming, Califomia: 53

Cranston, Peggy: 169

Cranston, Stewart E.: 137 

, 142, 144,168,

169, 170, 17r

Craven, JeffersonA.: 73

Critical Care Aeromedical Transport Team:

86, 87, 124, r25, 126, 130, 157

Crow Bruce E.; 87, 126, 127, 128, 130, 154,

155

Cruise missile: 184

Daines, Michael: 13l, 133

D'Amato, Roberto: 185

Dammam, Saudi Arabia: 20

Dammam Central Hospital: 80

Dammam Number 7 oil well: 20

Darwish, Marwan:. 12, 62, 99, 120

Debary, Florida: 53

DeCook, Daniel: 123, 124

Defense Special Weapons Agenry: 34,55,56

Defense Switched Network: 1 09

Delaware: 96, ll7, 151, 161

Dendinger, Willian J.: 17 

2

Department of Defense: 29, 34,84,87,1"18,

181, 187, 188, 189, 196

Departrnent of Justice: I 96

Department of the Air Force: 1 88

Dephrla, DavidA.: 107, 168

Index

Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space

Operations: 180

Deputy Secretary of Defense. See White,

John P.

Desert Rose Inn (Khobar Towers Dining

Hall): 57, 58, 61, 62, 7 5, 77, 78, 80,

82, 83, 89, 91,94,99, 101, ll0, ll5,

127,128,1',76

Desert Shield. See Operation Desert Shield.

Desert Storm. See Operation Desert Storm.

Al DhafraAir Base, UnitedArab Emirates:

l)J

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia: 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 15,

1v20, 2224, 30, 32, 33, 43, 50, 54,

60, 6248, 7 r,',lz, 7 4, 7 5, 7 8_81,

83-90, 93, 94, 96, 98, 99, 1011,

105, 106, 109, rl2-r4,116-26,

t29-3 4, 137, r 5 141, 16349, l',l 2,

r7 4. r'7 s, 177 -86, 188, 191, 193,

195-98.200.201

Map, Dhahran andVicinitY: 100. See

a/so DhahranAir Base.

Dhahran Air Base, Saudi Arabia: 5, 19, 22,

25, 30, 3r, 36, 43, 44, 46, 61, 63, 83,

86,92,94,98,99, r09, lr1, ll2, 116,

122, 123, 124, 126, l5r, 154, rs1,

158, 160, 174, 1',76, r82, 184. See

al s o Dlnkran; King AMul Aziz Air

Base, SaudiArabia.

Dhahran International Airport: 22, 46, 6l

Diamanti, Stan S.:93

Diclq Craig J.: 12,51,52

Dick, Daniel M .: 43, 60, 96, l2l, 128, I 50,

159,179,180,182,195

Introduced: 2l

Quoted: 21, 35, 63,',12, 7 8, 83, 95, 96,

111, 118, 183, 183-84, 184, 185

Dining Hall: See Desert Rose hm.

Disaster Control Group: 26, 56, 57, 80, 93,

94, r0l,120,121, l2'7, r28

Ditkner,KurtB.: l8

Dixon. Rich:73.74

DNA @eoryribonucleic acid) : 9 6, 123

Doha, Qatar: 67

Dolinar. Michael J., Jr.: 46, 47 , 169

Dooley, Christomer: 12, 99, l2l

Dormitory: typical floorplan,8. See also

Khobar Towers, Buildings, numbered.

Doubleday, Michael: 34

DoverAir Force Base, Delaware:96,98,117 '

151, 153, 161

Rernains fiansported to: 152-53, 161
Downing Reporl 1 85-88, 189, 190, 192 l l September terrorist attacks: 23, lj\, lgg

Dou'ning Task Force'. 179, 1 80, I 85-88, I 89, Emergency medical technician s: 73, 7 4, j 6, 190,192 83

Index

Dover Port Mortuary: 96, 97, ll7, l 18, 151,

152, 16l,162,167

Dou,ning, Wayrc A.:179,180, 185-88, 189,

t90, r92

Dudani, Mahender: 172

Dupre', Felix: 102

Duty status, whereabouts unknoun: 117,

118,135

Dye, Craig E.: 45

Dye, Lori: 45

Dylewski, Gary R.: 67, 103, 104, 106, 107,

135, 136, 131,r38,144, 14s, 163,

169,170,171, 173

Eastem Province, Saudi Arabia: I 8, 23, 15 l,

187

Edman, Thomas F,: 13, 49, 50, 51, 167

EdwardsAir Force Base, Califomia: 9, 181

Edwardsville, Illinois: 53

Eglin Air Force Base, Florida: 6, 20 

, 53 , 54 ,

66, 67, 90, 101, 103, 105, 106, 107,

108, 122, 128, 138, 145, 155,157.

rs9, 167, 168, 169, r70, 172, 180.

See also 58th Fighter Squadron.

Ar Force Development Test Center: 137,

r47, 163,168

Buildings, numbered

l:169

205: 103,104

210: 108

1312:201

1315: 201

1363: 135-36. See also "People

Place."

Community support: 173 74

Events after bombing: 13417, 163

Family Support Center: 90, 103, 104,

105, 135, 136

Field Training Detachment Building:

135-36. See also "People Place."

Hangar 130. See King Hangar.

King Hangar: 1 45, 169, l'70, li l

Main Base Eglin: 103, 104, 108, 135,

r37, 163

Memorial: 147,201-2

Military Personnel Flight 107, 108

"People Place": 135, 136-37, 169

Rnnway: 142,144

Streets

EglinBoulevard: l0

EglinParkway: 169

NomadWay: 135,201

Egypt 121,158

Emergency Operations Center (Landshrhl

Regional Medical Center): 130

English language: 20, 81

Enlisted HeritageHall: 146, 147

Khobar Towers memorial: 1 4 7, 200

Ertell, Mike: 131

EskanVillage: 20, 182

Europe: 85, 87. 88. I I 9. I 55

Faisal, Prince Saud: 122

Family Support Center (EglinAir Force

Base, Florida): 90, 103, 104, 105,

135,136

Farmer, Ken: 64,84,87

Federal Bureau of Investigation : 29 

, 31 , 68 ,

120,177,178, 195, 196, r97

Fennig, Patrick P.:7 ,9, 53,201

Ferrer, Cesario F., Jr.: 84, 85,123,124, 125

Field Training Detachment Building (Eglin

Air Force Base, Florida): 135-j6. See

also "PeoplePlace)'

58th Fighter Squadron: 6,7 ,46,53,54,58,

67,72,74,89, 90, 91, 92,95,96, 104,

105, 106, 1 10, l l 1, 112, tt5, t28,

136, 149, ts2, r55, 160,167,169,

174,180,201. See also EglinAir

Force Base, Florida.

Retums to Eglin Air Force Base: 157-59

Typical tour: 19-20

Fire chief: 58, 61, 75, 189

First aid: 7 l, 72, 73, 7 4, 7 5, 7 8

First Baptist Church, Cocoa Beach: 173

Five-Year Facilities Improvernent Plan:

2122.189.t92

Flights

86th Aeromedical Staging: 130, | 62

441 Oth Aeromedical Evacuation : 7 6 - 1 19.

120,125,153,155,157

Floor plan (dormitory): 8

Florida: 6, 20, 53, 65, 66, 103, 155, 157, 162,

163, 166, 169, 17 1, 173, 1 80, 183,

201

Florida State Highway 1A1: 103,171

Flying Ambulance Surgical Team : 64 , 84 , 87 ,

123-24, 124, 125, 126, t53, 154, 155,
156,157

Fogleman, Miss Jane: 169

Fogleman, Ronald: 40, 68, 83, 148, 159, 161,

169, 185, r86, 188, 189, 190, 191

Early retirement : 192-94

Meeting with Brig. Gen. Schwalier: 174,

179

Visit to Khobar Towers: I 74-76

Fort Bliss, Gxas: 21

Fort Huachuca, Aizona:, 2l

4404th Composite Wing (Provisional): 6, 12,

24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 3 t, 33, 43, 56,

59, 60, 61, 62, 7 r, 72, 7 6, 92, ll1,

rr3, r20, 127, 150, 151, 159, 161,

163,164,165,176, 177, 1',78, 179,

181, 183, 184, 185, 187, 189, 190,

191, 192. See also Terryl J. Qerry)

Schwalier; Daniel M. Dick.

Aircraft assigned: 1 8-l 9

Change of command ceremony: 179-80

Facilities improvement plan: 2112, 189

Historyof: 18

Keypersonnel: l8

Locations: 19

Move to Prince Sultan Air Base: 1 8l-85

Organization: 18

Personnel assigned: 19

Rotation policy: 19

Southem Watch operations: I 8-1 9

Wing Operations Center: 61, 62, 63, 64,

89,99, 101, 159

Battle Staffmeeting in: 6l-64

France: 17,68,98, 134. See alsoFretch

forces.

Frankfort, Germany: 167

Franklin, Cml E.: 18, l'79, 181, 185

Freeh, Louis J.: 196,197

French forces: 27,29,30, I I 1, I 13, I 14, 185

See alsoFrance.

Freyfogle, Edward B.: 1 15, 129,130,132,

137,165, 166

Friers, Thomas R.: 49, 65, 66, 91, 102, lll,

r33, r34, r37 

, 149,162,163, 166,

171, t'72

Fumiture Managernent Office: 177

Garner, Stephen: 123

General Motors Suburban ambulance: 154

Georgia: 181

Germany: 52, 64, 86, 87, 124, 129, 130, 153,

156, r57 ,162,16s,167, 169

GiantVoice: 187

Index

Goff, Mike: 158

Goff, Steven P: 76, 83, 148, 176

"Golden Houl': 71, 78

Gore, Ney M.: 87, 116, 129, 130, 132, 157

Gration, Jonathan S. (Scott): 18,62,89, 151,

164

Great Britain: 17, 132. See also Bitish

forces; United Kingdom.

Greater USMTM Transportation Service:

ttg, 124, 125, 154, 155, 156

Greendale, Wisconsin: 53

Greenfiel4 Kevin C.: 12, 18, 62, 63, 99, l0l,

120,121

Grice, Corey P: 9, 10, 12,40,48,49, 51,176

Grimm, Rudolph II: 59, 7 2, 7 8, 7 9, 16l

Grissom, Thomas E.: 86, 124, 125, 126

Group ofSeven: 68, 134

Groups

1st Rescue: 49, 65, 66,91, 102, I 1 1, 133'

134,149, 161,172,173

33dLogistics:53

33d Operations: 107, 168

39th Medical: 84, 85, 86, 123,153

45th Mission Support 201

4404th Logtstics: 18, 1 83

4404th Medical 78, 7 l, 7 6, 1 13, 1 19,

120,154,156, 161, l8l

4404th Operations: 1 8, 15 I

4404th Supporr 18, 189

4409th Op€rations: 18, 19, 32, 60, 120,

158

Grover,Bob:166

Guerrero, Alfredo R.: 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 40,

48, 49, 51, 56, 57, 62, 122, 17 6, l8l

GulfView:30,33

GulfWm: 16, 17, 18, 20, 27, 23, 107, 774,

179, l8l

Gunther Armex, Alabama: 146, I 47, 200

Haines, Belinda: 123

Hamel,Bruce:113

Hangar 130 @glinAir Force Base, Florida).

See King Hangm.

Harrington, Davtn:-122

Harrison, Carlisle, Jr.: @,84,85

Hart, Ray: 95

Hartrnan, Frank 99

Hartsfiel4Wayland: 18

Hartsfield Intemational Airport: 67, 103,

166, 167

Haun, L. Timothy (Tim): 53,201

Hawley, BryanG.:197-92

267
Index

Hayes, David: 67 , 103,169

Headquarters Pacific Air Forces: 191

Headquarters United States Air Force: 162,

180. 188. 191

Heaton auditorium: 132

Heidelburg, Germany: 87 , 129,132

Heidelburg University Hospital: 1 30

Heiser, Michael G.: 53, 200,201. See also

Michael G. Heiser Foundation.

Herlacher. Donald: 5. 180

Hezbollah: 195,197

Hill, Stan: 104, 105, 106, 107, 135,136,163,

r73

HillAir Force Base, Utah: 180

Hinsch, RayW: 107, 108, 170

Hinson. Karen: 171.172

Hinson, Robert C.: 103, 162, 17 1, 172

Hoffinan, Dustin:7

Holloway, Robert H.: 66,102,134

Hoopes,TioyR.: 123

Homer, CharlesA.: 181

Hospitals. See also ArabianAmerican Oil

Company Hospital, Bundeswehzentralkrankenhaus; Dammam Cenhal

Hospital; Heidelberg University

Hospital; King Fahd Military Medical

Complex; King Fahd University

Hospital; Landshrhl Regional Medical

Center; Al Mana Hospital; Ministry

of Defense andAviation Hospital;

Mohammed al Dosha Hosoital:

Walter Reed Hospital: Wiliord Hall

Medical Center.

Map of Dhahran hospitals: 100

House National Security Committee: 68,

178, 188

Hurlburt Field, Florida: 108, 137 , 163, 183

Husted, Selena P: 72,99,l0l,I2l

Incirlik Air Base, Turkey: 17, 64, 84, 85, 86,

87,123,124,153

India:114

lnterstate Highway 95: 103

Irwestigations of the Khobm Towers bombing

Dovr.ning Task Force: I 79-80, 1 85-88,

r89,190,192

Federal Bureau of Investigationl l'77J8

House National Security Committee: 178

Record Task Force: I 86, I 88-90

Secretary of Defense-Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff: 194

Senate Select Committee on Intellisence:

268

t78J9

Swope-Hawley Team: 1 9 0-9 2

Iowa: 17

lrarn: 16, 29, 195, 196, 197, 198

Iraq: 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 178, 184, 185,

199

hbil,Iraq:184

Isaiah, Book of: 165, 110

Islam: 20, 23,27,29. See also Muslims;

Shi'ite Muslims; Sunni Muslims.

Ianazzo,John: 107

Japan: 185

Jautakis, Harold R.: 122

Jerowski, Steve: 47

Jersey barriers: 10, 25, 26, 28, 29, 32, 3 7, 3 8,

39, s3

John, Gospel of: 170

Johnson, Kevin J.: 53,200,201

Joint Chiefs of Staff. See Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs ofStaff.

Joint Forces Support Unit, Eastem Province,

SaudiArabia:151

Joint Medical Regulatrng Office: 86

Joint Special Operations Command: 17 9

Joint Task Force Middle East: 186

Joint Task Force Southwest Asia: l7 , 18,24,

30, 34, 43, 44, 60, 63, 122, t49, | 52,

165, 180, 182, 186

Jones, Bob: 93,101,114

Jordan:28,702

Jozayt, Donald R.: 65, 66, 102, 103, 134,

163.166.17r

Judge advocate general: 63, 99, 101, 116,

120, t2t, r77

Jumper, John P: 18, 24

Kaiserslautem Military Community,

Germany: 65

Katznan,Kenneth: 197

Al Kharj Air Base, Saudi Arabia: 18, 181

Al Khobar, SaudiArabia: 10,23

History of: 20

"Khobar Konnection": 3 1, 56, 91

Al Khobar Park 10, 22, 24, 34

Khobar Towers : 1 5, 19, 3 6, 4 0, 66, 67, 134,

137, 151, 152, 158,161, 163, t67,

168, 171, t',76, 1',77, 178, 179, 186,

189, 190, 193, r94, r95, t96, 197,

198. See alsoDhahran, Saudi

Arabia; Dhahran Air Base; 4404th

Composite Wing (Provisional);
lnvestigations of the bombing; King

Abdul AzizAir Base.

Accounting for personnel of: 89-108

Bombing of: 43 52

Buildings, numbered. See alsoT

BuildingTypical Suite Floor Plan;

U.S. Sector Khobar Towers

Housing Complex.

13: 120, l2l, 127, 17 5, 17 6

l0l:29,43,55,56,60

103: 55,73,80,94

104: 55

107: 60

109: 109, ll4. Seealso Khobar

Towers Inn.

I l0: 94

I11. See Clinic.

ll7:29.93.94

120:56

127 : 6, 7, 29, 36, 43, 44, 46, 47, 55,

57, 58,90, 104, I 10, tIt, tl2,

168, 180

128: 55

129:55

130: 36,55

l3I: 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 24, 29, 33, 35,

36, 40, 41,45-48, 5 1-53, 55,

56, 58, 61, 62, 6243, 66, 68,

7 4-7 9, 83, 90, 92-97, 109-10,

I 10, I 16, 122, 139, 148, ts2,

158, 162, 165, 167 49, l7 t,

174, 176, t77, 180, 187, 189,

r95,200

Razed, 184

132:55,90, 1 13, 114,120, l2l

133: 35, 43, 53, 54, 55, 66, 73, 1 10

207:29

Chapel:|20 21, 127, l7 5 :7 6

Clinic: 54, 5740, 62, 7 4, 7 5, 7 6, 7 8,79,

82-84, 94-96, 99, 109, r24, 127,

174

Day after bombing: 109-28

Desert Rose km: 57 , 58 , 6l , 62, '7 5 , 77 ,

78, 80, 82, 83, 89, 91, 94,99,10t,

110,115, r27,128,176

Dining hall: .See Desert Rose krn.

Description of c ompowtd: 2W22

History of: 2G-21

Immediately after bombing: 53-54

Immediately before bombing: 5-l 4

Khobar Towers Inn: 109, 112, 114, 126,

r27, t28

Index

Mapof: 11

Medical response to bombing: 71-88,

Move to Prince Sultan Air Base: l8l-85

Northem perimeter fence: 187, 188, l9l,

r92

Responsibility for the bombing: 195-98

Security measure s at: 23 I 5

Site Recovery C eftor 57, 80, 93, 94, 99,

101, ll9,127,128,177

Streets

Eighth: 6, 21,31,37,45

Thirty-Fifth: 21,29,31

Thirty-First: 21, 22, 31, 33, 3 8, 53

Thirty-Seventh: 29

Thir5,-Third: 31, 56, 57

Twelfth: 21, 28, 29, 3 l, 3 8, 53

Surrounding area:22

Khobar Towers chapel: 120, l2l, 127, 17 5,

176

Khobar Towers Inn: 1 09, ll2, 114, 126, 127 

,

128

Al Khubar: 20

Kiley, Kevin C. : 87 , 129, 132, 133

King, Ronald L.: 53,171,201

King Abdul Aziz Air Base, Saudi Arabia: 5,

t5, 18, 22, 66, 9r, 95, 98, ll5, 123,

128, 151, 153, 157, 158. See also

DhahranAir Base.

King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz: 15, 184, I 85

King Fahd causeway:27 ,84

King Fahd expresxttay; 22

King Fahd Military Medical Complex: 80,

99

King Fahd University Hospital: 50, 63, 80,

81, 83, 96, 99, 101, rl1, 116, rl7,

118, 154, 156, 161, 167,174

King Hangar (Eglin Air Force Base, Florida):

145, 169, 170, r7r

KirchbergHill: 87, 162

Kitson, Kendall K., Jr.: 53,201

Koblenz, Germany: 129

Kohn, Richard H.: 193,194

Koury, Laura: 18

Kovalchin, John: 59, 164

Koza, Brian G.: 120

Kurds: 16. 17. 184

Kuwait: 15, 16, 20, 199

Ladtkow, Mark E.: 45

Lambeth, Royce C.: 197

Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Gerrnany:

s2, 65,82,86, 87, I 15, 116, 126, 127,

269
Index

t28,137, 141,1s4, r55,156, ts7 , 

r@,

162, t6s, 166, 167, 169, 198

Emergency Operations Center: 130

Heaton auditorium: 132

On day after the bombing: 129-33

Ward 14: 133

LangleyAir Force Base, Virginia: 102,134,

r52,157,163,180

Lauder,AlfredB. @ruce): 43, 161

Lavallee. Richard J., Jr.: | | 5

Lebanon: 195,197

LeGrand Ray: 123

Lester, ChristopherB.: 53, l17, l18, 119,

161 , t62, 17 1,201

Levi'sjeans:113

I-nvy,Babe:7

Locker, DanL.;64,84, 85, 87, 88, 156

Lockheed Martin Corporation: 157

Looney, William R., III: 102

Louisiana: 185

Loyd, Ronald D .: 93, ll3-14

Lucky Base, Saudi Arabia: 21, 98

Lundin, John: 65

Lyon, France: 68,134

M-16 rifle: 57

M-60 machine gn: 25, 32, 38

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: 17, 33, 180

Madrigal, Luis: 33, 82

MalmstromAir Force Base, Montana: 83

Al Mana Hospital: 80, 81, I 17

Marathon Man:7,44

Marthaler, Brent E.: 7 ,53,201

M*A*S*H*:21

Massapequa Park, NewYork: 53

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 146, 147,

200

Enlisted Heritage HaIl:146, 147

Khobm Towers memorial: 1 4 7, 200

McCarthy, John: 112

McCarthy, Thomas A: 6, 7, 14, 44, 45, 56,

58,72,95,96, 111,112, 157 , 158,

159, 173, 180

McDonnell Douglas Corporation: l 12, l 13,

120

McVeigh, Brian W: 53, 201

MealsReadytoEat 183

Meinders, Marvin D.: 64

Mellow, Wayne: 58, 61, 75

Memorials

EglinAir Force Base,Floida: 147,

2012

270

Enlisted Heritage Hall, Maxwell Air

Force Base, Alabama: 147,200

Patrick Air Forc e Base, Floida: I 46,

200 201

Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia:

147,200

Memorial services

Departure from DhahranAir Base, Saudi

Arabia:151 52

Dhahran Air Base, Saudi Arabia: 16445

Eglin Air Force Base, Florida: 145,

169 :71

PatrickAir Force Base, Florida; 17lJ2

Mercedes-Benz tanker: I 0

Michael G. Heiser Foundation: 200

Middle East: 87 ,ll4, 197

Map: xviii

Military Airlift Command: 191

Military Personnel Flight (EglinAir Force

BaseFlorida): 107,108

Miller, William: 6, 7, 44, 45

Ministry of Defense andAviation: 15, l8l

Ministry of Defense andAviation Hospital:

46, 48, 49, 51, 54, 62, 63, 80, 81, 98,

99, 101, lt7, 122, 154, t55, t56, 169,

174

Ministry of Health: 79, 80

Mink,AllanL., II: 18

Minsky, Barry:127

MisawaAir Base, Japan: 185

Missileer:173

'Missing Man" formation: 169,170

Mobile Aeromedical Staging Facility: 1 1 9

Modesto, California: 5 3

Mohammed al Dosha Hospital: ll7,154,

156

Montana:83

MoodyAir Force Base, Georgia: 181

Mooy, Peter R.: 18,62,78,183

Morelock, Michael D.: 13, 14, 48, 49, 50, 51,

55,59,74,81,97, lls,128, ts2, ts3

Morger4 Peter J.: 53, 201

MoronAir Base, Spain: 159, 169

Mortuary collection point: 92, 94, 95, 97, 99

Moschgal James: 200

A1 Mughassil, Ahmed Ibrahim Ahmad: I 96

MLrdoch, Jacqueline E.: 125

Muslims: 16. Seealso Islam; Shi'ite

Muslims; Sunni Muslims.

Mylar: 187, 189,192

Nam, Theodore S.: 133
Naples, Italy:64

National Broadcasting Company: 132

National Military Command Center: 68

National Museum of the United States Air

Force:200

National Naval Medical Center: 129

Naye{, Prince Ibn Abdul Aziz: 122, 196, 197

Nebraska: 171,201

New Hampshire: 53

New Jersey barriers. See Jersey barriers.

Nevvrnan, Gary: 130

NewYork, NewYork 56, 81, 198

Netv York Times: 719

Nguyen, Phillip D.: 134,l'/2

Nguyen, Thanh V (Gus): 53, 17 l, 201

"Nomads": 104, 136, 157, l7 0

North Carolina: 118

O'Donnell, Michael: 59

Oelstrom,TadJ.: 6l

Oerichbauer, Dawn M.: 130, 132, 162

Office of Program Management-Saudi

Arabian National Guard'. | 5. 23 - 24

OffirttAir Force Base, Nebraska: 171,201

Ohio: 53, 117,163, 171,200,201

Oklahoma: 53,56

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma: 56

Olds, Sherry: 200

Olivier, Laurence: 7

Oman:59. 109.127

OperationAlysse: 17

Operation Desert Focus: 181-85

Operation Desert Shield: 15 

, 20 , 2l , 

l8l

Operation Desert Storm: 16,187 . See also

GulfWar.

Operation Enduring Freedom: 199

Operation Iraqi Freedom: 199, 200

Operation Jural: 17

Operation Just Cause: 179

Operation Northem Watch: I 99

Operation Provide Comforl 17, 18

Operation Provide Comfort Task Force: 18

Operation Southern Watch : 9, 1 522, 23, 30,

64,6s, 119,134, r51, 160, 163, 164,

r76, r78,200,199200

Orlando, Florida: I 18, 134

Orlando, John C.: 114, 168

Ottawa, Canada: 195

Overbay, Anthony: 24

Palm Coast. Florida: 53. 103

Panama: 68, 179

Index

Panama City, Forida: 53

Paramormt Pictures: 7

Pararescue jumpers: 5 l, 66, 73, 7 4,'7 6, 77,

83

Parker, DarylA.: 73

Parkinson, Richard: I 08

Pakistan: 114

Patrick Air Force Base, Florida; 6, 53, 65, 66,

76,9r, r01,102, 103, r05, r37 ,160,

166, t67, 169, r71,172,174, 180

Buildings, numbered

401: l7l

423:102,133

425:201

431:171,201

439 (Seaside Chapel): 171,201

Chapel choir: 172

Community support: 173

Events after bombing: 13314, 16243

Memorial: I 46. 150. 202201

7 1 st Rescue Squadron: 6, 13,32, 49, 50,

5 1, 53, 55, 65, 66, 73, 74, 89, 91,

92,97, r02, 103, 109, l l0, ll1,

r 12, 128, 133, 134, 15r, 1s2, 163,

164, 166, 167, r7l, 180, 198

Retums to PatrickAir Force Base: 160

South Patrick housing area: 167

Sheets

Edward H. White Streel 201

FalconAvenue: 102,201

Thor Street: 201

TitanRoad: 201

Wellness Center: 163

Patrick Pantry Org eliliz;anon 17 3

Patriot missile: 21

Peay, J.H. Binford III: l7,18,33,165

Pennsylvania: I78,198

Pentagon: 23,68,170, 1 80, 194, 198

"People Place": 135, 136-37 , 169

Performance Fitness Examination Study

Guide: 73

Peny, William J.: 34, 148, 149, 174,181,

182, 183, 185, 188, 193

PERSCO. See Personnel Support for

Contingency Operations.

Personnel Support for Contingency

Operations: 54, 90, 93, 101, I 13, I 14,

117.119.120

"Person of the Week": 83

Peters. F. Whitten: 150.200

Philippines: l14

Pineville, West Virginia: 53, I 17

271
Index

Pinkston,Terrance: 124

Pirmasens, Germany: 133

Plans, Operations, and Training Division

(I-andstuhl Regional Medical Center):

130

Pollert, CinthiaY. (Cindy): 43, 128

Price, Roland: 80, 81, 82

Prichard, Jeff: 33

Prince SultanAir Base, Saudi Arabia: 146,

r99,200

Khobar Towers memorial: I 47, 200

Move from Dhahran to: I 8 1-85

Prince Sultan binAbdulAziz: 181, 182

Psalms. Book of: 164-170

Purple Heart: 54,74, 161

AlQaeda:198,199

Al-Qahtani, Abdullah: 1 5 I

Qatar:67,103

Quinn, Jimmy M.: 93

Ralston, JosephW:24

Ramstein Air Base, Germany: 63, 64, 65, 84,

85, 86, 87, 88, 1 16, t24, 125, t30,

132, 133, 153, 156, 1s7, 162, 167,

169

Hoover Streel 64

Tactical Air Control Center: 64. 85. 86

Ramstein air show disaster (flutag disaster):

116-17, 132

Randall, GregoryE.:74

RandolphAir Force Base, Texas'. 54,103,

il7,118

Rapid Engineer Deployable Healy

Operational Repair Squadron

Engineer (RED HORSE): 183

Rash, Kathryn: 170

Raths, DavidV: 18

Record, James F.: 185, 186, 188-90, 192

Record Report: 188-90" 192

Record Task Force: 186, 1 88-90

Red, DennisV: 94

Red Crescent Society: 79

Red Cross. .lee American Red Cross.

"Red Hats": 12

Regional Security Offrcer: 188

Remains of the deceased, transported to

DoverAir Force Base. Delaware:

t52 53,161

Reno, Janet: 195

Rice, BookerT.: 109

Richards. Andrea: 175. 176

272

"Right Start" briefings: 3 l, 56

Rimkus, Joseph E.: 53, 201

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: 12, 15, 18, 19, 20, 23,

24, 31, 32, 43, 60, 63, 68, 87, 98, 121,

t22, 127, 129, 176, 181, 182, 183,

184, 188

Riyadh bornbing : 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,

32,34,87,178, 198

Robb, Douglas I.: 78,33,43, 53, 54,59,62,

7 1, 72, 77, 101, l l5, 116, 117, 120,

t23, 124, r25, 127, 141, ls3, 154,

r55,rs1,161,181

Quoted: 69, 73, 7 4, 7 5, 7 6, 78, 79, 80,

80 81, 82, 83, 84, 88, ll3, ll4,

1 15, I 16, rt7, 12324, t26, 156,

163

Rosehill, Kansas: 53

RotaNaval Station, Spain: 159

Roudebush, James: 84, 87, 88

RoyalAirForce: 127

Royal Air Force Lakenheath, United

Kingdom: 64

Royal Canadian Mounted Police: 195

Royal SaudiAirForce: 151, 182

Rudinski. Boris:78.79

Ryan, Michael: 14 1, l9'7

Saddam Hussein: 15, 16, 17, 23, 184, 185,

199,200

SafwanAir Base, Iraq: 16

San Antonio, Texas: 1 13

SantaAna, Rolando R.: 181

Saudi Arabia: 5, 6, 9, 12, 15, 16, 1820, 23,

24, 27 -it, 34, 54, 55, 57, 5941,

634s, 67,68, 71, 80, 81, 83, 87, 93,

96, 102, 103, 109, 112, 114-16, ll9,

120, 122, 123, t29, I33, 153 50, 16s,

167, r73, 174, r77, 178, 180 87, 189,

195-98, 200,201. See alsoDhabran;

Riyadh.

Saudi Ernbassy: 29

Saudi Ministry of Defense andAviation: 15,

181

Saudi Ministry of Health: 79, 80

Saudi National Gtrard: 23

Saudi Rail Organization: 80

Al Sayegh, HaniAbdel Rahim: 195-96

Schaeffer. Joel: 5.44

Schafer, Klaus O.: 84

Schellhous, Robbin: 189

Schofiel4 Wisconsin: 83

Schuchman, MaryAma: 198
Schueller, LaVeme L.: 170

Schultz, Wayne L.: 18, 62

Schwalier, Terryl J. (Terry): 6,19,20,24,25,

26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 35, 43, st-52,

56, 60, 63, 7 s, 78, 79, 83, 89, 94, 9s,

96, 99, 120, r2t, 122, 128, 1 48, r50,

t52, tss, 158, 159, 164,16s, t74,

176,r77,179, 180, 186, 187, 189,

t9t. r92.195

lntroduced: 18

Promotion: 193-95

Quoted: 21, 24, 29, 31, 32, 34, 59, 61, 62,

95, 156, l7 s, 176

Retirement: 194 95

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman: 16

ScottAir Force Base, Illinois: 65, 85

Tactical Airlift Control Center: 65, 85

Scud missile: 23, 187

Search and Recovery teams: 92, 93, 96

Seaside Chapel: I7 l, 201

Secretary of the Air Force: 19. See also F.

Whitten Peters; James G. Roche;

Sheila Widnall.

Secretary of Defense. See Cohen, William S.;

Perry,WilliamJ.

Secretary of State. See Christopher, Warren.

Securif' Forces. ,See Security Police.

Secwity Police: 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 25, 29, 32,

33, 48, 51, 52, s6, 57, 58, 62, 7 4, 7 s,

80. 176. 178

Deskblotters: 189

Seeb Air Base, Oman: 59

SelfAid and Buddy Care: 7 7, 72, 73, 7 4, 7 5,

78

Sellersburg, Indiana: 53

SenateArmed Services Committee: 188, 193

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence:

178

Senior Noncommissioned OfrcerAcademy:

200

71st Rescue Squadron: 6, 13, 32, 49, 50, 51,

53, 55, 65, 66, 7 3, 7 4, 89, 91, 92, 97,

102, t03, 109, I 10, ltl, tr2, 128,

r33,134, tst, ts2, 163, 164, t66,

167, l7 l, 180, 198. See also Patick

Air Force Base.

Retums to PatrickAir Force Base,

Florida: 160

Shafer, Jane: 66

Shafer, Thomas H.: 13, 14, 44,50,55,66,

91, 97, r02, 103, I I 1, tt4, 115, r52,

1 53, 160, 164, 165, 167

Index

Shaikh Isa, Bahrain: 185

Shalikashvili, John M.: 30, 68, 16l, l7 I,

t84, t94

Shannon, keland: 158

Shaw, Marie: 131, 132, 133

Shaw, Stephanie: 133

ShawAir Force Base, South Carolina: 18,

180

Shealy, FrancisW:93

Shi'ite Muslims: 16, 17, 195, 196. See also

Islam: Muslims: Surmi Muslims.

Shreveport, Louisiana: 53

Simmons, Ben: 84

Sine, William E : 51, 7 4, 16'7

Site Recovery Center: 57, 80,93,94,99,

101, 1 19, 127, 128, r77

Smith, Ken: 5,44

Smith, Kevin: 128

Smith, Roy: 76,83

SoukS Supermarket:23

South Carolina: 18,68, 178, 180

South Dakota: 53

Southem Watch: .See Operation Southern

Watch.

Southwest Asia: 16, 20, 85, 102, 159

SouthwestAsia service medal: 7

Space Coast: 166, 173

Spain: 159, 169

SpangdahlemAir Base, Germany: 64

Specter, Arlen: 178

Spence, Floyd:68, 178

Squadrons

2TthFighter: 152,157

33d Maintenance: 53

33d Operations Supporl 53, 122

33d Tactical Fighter: I 80

4lst Rescue: 66

45th Civil Engineeing: 167

58th Fighter Squadron : 6, 7, 46, 53, 54,

58, 67,'72, 7 4, 89, 90, 9r, 92, 95,

96, 104, 105, 106, rl0, lll, 112,

I 15, 128, 136, 149, 1s2, 155, 160,

167, 169, 17 4, 180, 201. See also

Eglin Air Force Base.

Returns to EglinAir Force Base,

Florida: 157-59

59ttr Fighter: 170

60th Fighter: 53, 67, 201

7 | st Rescue: 6, 13, 32, 49, 50, 5 l, 53, 55,

65, 66, 73, 7 4, 89, 91, 92, 97, r02,

103, 109, 1 10, t 1 l, r12, r28, 133,

134, tsr, r52,163,164, 166, 167 ,

ztJ
Index

171. 180. !98. See also Patick

Air Force Base.

Returns to PatrickAir Force Base.

Florida: 160

T9thFighter:175

86thAeromedical Evacuation: 64, 85, 86,

87, 88, l l 1, r24, 125, 126, 130,

r53, t54, ts5,1s7

86th Medical: 87, 126

88th Civil Engineering: 53

95th Security Police: I 8 I

96th Mission Support: 135

347th Aerospace Medical: 1 8l

472th Openions Support: 48

555th Tactical Fighter: 191

741st Maintenance: 65

741st Rescue: 66

823d Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy

Operational Squadron Eng:ineer:

183

440 4th Civ il Engineering : I 89

4404th Communications Squadron: 93

,l404th Mission Support 54

Personnel Support for Contingency

Operations (PERSCO): 54, 90,

93, 101, 1r3, rr4, r17, lt9,

t20

4404th Security Police: I 89

Stanton. Andre L.: 48. 5l

Stark, Patrick R.: 127

State Deparhnent: 24, 29, 3 |

Steckel, Frederick A.: 133

Stratham, New Hampshire: 53

Stripes for Exceptional Performers promotion:

175

Stuttgart Air Base, Germany: 13 1

SultanHashimAhmad: 16

Sunni Muslims'. 16. See alsolslam;'

Muslims; Shi'ite Muslims.

Swope, RichardT.: l9l 92

Swope-Hawley Investigation: I 90-92

Swope-HawleyReporl I90 92

S1'ria: 196

Szell, Christian: 7

Tactical Air Command: 18

Tactical Air Confol Center @amstein Air

Base, Germany): 64,85, 86

Tactical Airlift Conhol Center (Scott Air

Force Base, Illinois): 65, 85

"Tadtown": 61.62.99

274

TaifAir Base, Saudi Arabia: 59

Taliban: 198, 199

Thlil Air Base, I;iaq: l7

Taylor, Curtis: 118

Taylor, Jeremy A.: 53, 201

Taylor, Maria: 118

Thylor, Robert E .: 92,101, 152

T Building. typical suite floor plan: 8

Thailand: 191

Theater Communications Management Cell:

Y)

Third-country nationals: 1 14, I 15, 184, 195

39th Medical Group Hospital: 64, 84

Thompson, Donnell: 59, 60, 94, 95, 1 | 1

Threatcon Alpha: 24,25

Threatcon Bravo: 25

Threatcon Charlie: 25

Threatcons (threatening conditions): 25

Tomahawk missile: 184, 185

Traister, James J.: 12, 28, 32, 35, 56, 60, 61,

62, r78

Travel Management Office: 160

Treadway" R. Morris (Mo): 43, 45.47 ^ 54,

57, s8, 72, 7 4, 7 5, 7 6, 77, 78, 81, 82,

83, 88, r26, 142, 149,158, 168

Trushkowsky, Stewart: 17 2

Tuel,Timothy: 123

Turkey: 16, 17, 64, 84, 86, 123, 153

Tlndall Air Force Base, Florida: 163

Udom Royal ThaiAir Base, Thailand: 191

Umstea4 Bennie L.: 24, 43, 56, 58,60

Uniform Code of Military Justice: I 89, 190

UnitedArab Emirates: 44, 153

United Kingdom:17,64. See also Bril:rsh

forces; Great Britain.

UnitedNations: 15, 16, 178,199

Resolutions: 16. 17. 199

United Service Organizations: 31

United States Air Forces in Europe: 64,84,

85,86,88, 141,156

CrisisActionTeam: 130

United States Army : 19, 27, 23, 54, 93, 94,

98. See alsoFotl Bliss; Fort

Huachuca; Lucky Base.

4th hfantry Division: 199

6th Battalion, 52d Air Defense Aftillery:

21

54th Signal Battalion: 2l

335th Signal Command: 93

Patriot Task Force: I 9
United StatesArmy Corps of Engineers: 34,

55 56

United StatesAmy Europe: 129

Crisis Action Gam: 129, 130

Regional Medical Command: 129

United States Army Forces, Central

Command: 29-30-93

United StatesArmy Medical Materiel Center,

Europe: 133

United States Cenfral Command: 16, 17, 24,

33, 63, 68, 84, 87, 93, fig, 16s, 179,

182,186,188,190

United States Central CommandAir Forces:

18, 63, 97, 98, 179, 182, 187, r9r

United States Congress.,See United States

House of Representatives; United

States Senate.

United States Consul General (Dhahran,

SaudiArabia): 188, 191

United States Embassy bombmgs:

Kenya:198,200

TNuana:198

United States Embassy, SaudiArabia: 63,

122,188

United States European Command: 64, 84,

8s" 86.87. 131

Commander in Chief: 131

Headquarters Crisis Action Team: 1 30

United States House of Representatives: 178,

179. r88.192

National Securi6r Committee: 68, 178,

188

United States Marines: 193

United States Military Training Mission: 12,

15, 63, 94, 117, 119, t5t, t7 4

United States Naval Support Activi[',

Naples, ltaly 64

United States Navy: 64, 84, 123, 127, 185

United States Nar,y Adminishative Support

Unit" Bahrain: 84. 123

United States Nary, Central Command: 27,

28,84

United States sector, Khobar Towers housing

complex: 1l

United States Senate: 178, I94

Armed Services Committee: 188, 193

Select Committee on lntelligence: 178

United States Southem Command: 186

United States Special Operations Command:

179

United States Transportation Command: 191

Index

University of Hamburg Hospital: 129

USS Colebombing: 198

Utah: 180

Vailhingen, Germany: 13 I

Valencia, Cielito: 171

Valor device: 74

Vasquez, Lydia E.: 198

Viefiram War: 179. 186. 191

Virginia: 134, 152, 157, 163, 180, 197

Vulnerability assessments: 26, 27, 188, 193

Wagar, Christopher T.: 9, I 0, 12, 13, 40, 48,

49,51,176, t8l

Walsh, Ben: 167

Walter Reed Hospital: I 29

Ward, James R.: 121

Ward 14 (Landstuhl Regional Medical

Center): 133

Washington, D.C.: 68, 193, 194,196,198

Watertorvn, South Dakota: 53

Waylett, Suzanne M.: 183

Weather: 9, 10

Weems,Michael: 157

Weitzel, Lee: 103, 104, 135

Wellness Center (PatrickAir Force Base,

Florida): 163

Wells, Matthew: 5 1, 58, 7 4

white, John P: 186, 189, 190, 191

White House: 68, 120, 162,170,177

Widnall, Sheila: 68, 149,16l,169, 178, 185,

186, 188, 189, 190, 191

Widnall, William S.: 169

Wilford Hall Medical Center: 129

Wlliams. Cedric: 91. 92. 115

Wlliams, Dan:.74

Williams, Norman: 182

Wing Operations Center: 61, 62, 63, 64, 89,

99, 101, 159

Battle Staffmeeting in: 6l-64

Wings

lst Fighter: 102,134

2dBomb: 185

4th Thctical Fighter: 18

33d Fighter: 19, 67, 90, 103, 104, 105,

r07, 134, 135, 136, 137, 163, 168,

169,170, r73,20r

39th:123

45th Space: 65, lA, rc3, rc\ 171,173

58th Tactical Training: I 80

59thMedical: 86, 124

275
Index

96thAirBase:103, 104

363d Air Expeditionary: I 99

388th Fighter: 1 80

4404th Composite Wing @rovisional): 6,

12,24,26,27,28,29,30, 3 1, 33,

43, s6, 59, 60, 6t, 62, 7 1, 72, 7 6,

92,111, tl3, r20,127, r50, l5L

159, t6t, 163, t64, 165, 176,177 ,

178,179,181, 183, 184, 185, 187,

189, 190, 191,192. See also

Terryl J. (Terry) Schwalier; Daniel

M. Dick.

Aircraft assigned: 1 8-19

Change of command ceremony:

179-80

Facilities improve ment plan: 2 | 22,

189

Historyof: 18

Keypersonnel:18

Locations: 19

Move to Prince SultanAir Base:

181_85

Organization: l8

Personnel assigned: 19

Rotation policy: 19

Southern Watch operations: I 8-19

Wing Operations Center: 61,62,63,

64,89,99,101, 159

Battle Staff meeting: 6144

7440th Composite @rovisional): 17 . See

al s o 4404th Composite Wing

(Provisional).

Winkler, Kim: 167

Winkler, Matthew: 13,14, 49, 50, 152, 162,

r6s, t66, t67,198

Winn, David: 33

Winnecke, Lisa A.: 12, 62, 63, 99, 120, l2l

Wisconsin:83

Wittrnan, David: 166

Wong, Normund: 87

Wood, Justin R.: 53, 200, 201

Woody, Joshua E.: 53,201

WorldTrade Center: 23,56, 198

Worlnded airmen:.54, 139, 143

Arrive at EglinAir Force Base: 167-69

Arrive at PatrickAir Force Base:76G67

Medical care: 71 88

Retumto duty inU.S.: 180 81

Transported to Landstuhl: 153-57, 162

Transported to U.S.: 165-66

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio: 53,

tt'l, 163,171,200,201

Wiirzburg Universif Hospital: 1 30

Yukon, Oklahoma: 53

Ziegler, Eric D.: 7 ,9,46,47 ,48,51, 116,

165, 180-81

216