30 June 2010

Joint Fire Support

Joint Publication 3-09
i 

PREFACE 

1. Scope 

 This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for planning, 

coordinating, and executing joint fire support across the range of military operations. 

2. Purpose 

 This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and 

other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, 

education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in 

preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the 

authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the 

JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the 

overall objective. 

3. Application 

 a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, 

commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, 

subordinate components of these commands, and the Services. 

 b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances 

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the 

contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. 

Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military 

command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United 

States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should 

evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where 

applicable and consistent with US laws, regulations, and doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

LLOYD J. AUSTIN III 

Lieutenant General, USA 

Director, Joint Staff 
Preface

ii JP 3-09 

Intentionally Blank
iii

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-09, DATED 13 NOVEMBER 2006 

AND SUPERSESSION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-09.1, 

DATED 28 MAY 1999

• Consolidates Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures for Laser Designation Operations, into JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, 

and cancels JP 3-09.1 

• Clarifies what constitutes nonlethal fires and their purpose

• Expands the discussion of the joint fires element to explain the key functions 

and tasks it generally performs 

• Updates the descriptions of the component fires command and control entities 

provided by the Services; to include new descriptions: forward air controller 

(air), tactical air controller (air), joint forward observer, joint tactical air 

controller and joint air component coordination element 

• Adds paragraphs on the Advance Field Artillery Tactical Data System and 

Theater Battle Management Core Systems 

• Eliminates detailed discussion on datums, coordinates systems, and area 

reference systems and references JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to 

Joint Operations, for the source of this information

• Inserts new Joint Fire Support Assessment paragraph

• Adds an Airspace Coordinating Area subparagraph under Airspace 

Coordinating Measures paragraph in Appendix A

• Incorporated the JP 3-09.1 material into new Appendix C

• Modifies the definitions of counterfire, fires, schedule of fire, and supporting 

fire

• Creates new term and definition for concept of fires

• Removes from JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms, the terms and definitions for: at my command, backscatter, 

call fire, call for fire, continuous illumination fire, direct support artillery, 

enlisted terminal attack controller, fire, fire, barrage (specify), fire capabilities 

chart, fire control, fire control radar, fire control system, fire coordination, fire 

for effect, fire message, fire mission, fire plan, firepower, firing chart, laser, 

laser footprint, laser linescan system, laser pulse duration, laser target 

designating system, laser-target/gun-target angle, laser target marker, laser 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-09 

target making system, low angle, low angle fire, low angle loft bombing, offset 

lasing, pulse code, pulse repetition frequency, rate of fire, special operations 

terminal attack controler, spillover, and submunition
v 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ vii 

CHAPTER I

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT OVERVIEW

• Introduction ............................................................................................................... I-1 

• Concept of Fires ........................................................................................................ I-2 

• Employment Considerations ..................................................................................... I-3 

• Synchronization of Maneuver and Fires ................................................................... I-4 

• Synchronizing and/or Integrating Maneuver and Interdiction .................................. I-5 

CHAPTER II

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT COMMAND AND CONTROL

• Introduction .............................................................................................................. II-1 

• Joint Fire Support Command and Control ............................................................... II-1 

CHAPTER III

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING AND EXECUTION

• Introduction ............................................................................................................ III-1 

• Joint Fire Support Planning ................................................................................... III-1 

• Other Planning Considerations .............................................................................. III-4 

• Joint Fire Support Planning Process ...................................................................... III-7 

• Joint Fire Support Coordination ........................................................................... III-12 

• Joint Fire Support Assessment .............................................................................. III-16 

• Joint Fire Support and Force Capabilities ............................................................ III-17 

• Joint Fire Support Coordination Measures and Reference Systems .................... III-20 

• Combat Identification .......................................................................................... III-20 

• Mitigation of Collateral Damage ......................................................................... III-21 

APPENDIX

 A Control and Coordination Measures ................................................................. A-1 

 B Joint Fire Support Operation Order Format ....................................................... B-1 

 C Laser-Guided Systems ........................................................................................ C-1 

 D References ......................................................................................................... D-1 

 E Administrative Instructions ................................................................................ E-1 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-09 

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1 

Part II Terms and Definitions .............................................................................. GL-6 

FIGURE

II-1 Typical Joint Fires Element ............................................................................. II-3 

III-1 Joint Fire Support Planning Process ............................................................. III-8 

 A-1 Fire Support and Control Measures .............................................................. A-3 

 A-2 Fire Support Coordination Line .................................................................... A-4 

 A-3 Restrictive Fire Line, Fire Support Area, and Zone of Fire .......................... A-8 

 C-1 Airborne and Ground Designator Advantages and Disadvantages ..................C-6 

 C-2 Example of Safety Zone, Acquisition Area, and Optimal Attack Zone ...........C-8 

 C-3 Hellfire Designator Exclusion Zone .................................................................C-9 
vii 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Describes the Joint Fire Support System 

• Discusses Joint Fire Support Command and Control 

• Delineates Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution 

Overview

Scope and Purpose This publication provides fundamental principles 

and guidance for planning, coordinating, and 

executing joint fire support across the range of 

military operations. It sets forth joint doctrine to 

govern the activities and performance of the Armed 

Forces of the United States in joint operations and 

provides the doctrinal basis for interagency 

coordination and for US military involvement in 

multinational operations.

Introduction

Command and Control The foundations of joint fire support are based 

on the elements of combat power, the principles 

of joint operations, and joint functions. The 

elements of combat power are combined to provide 

the basis for the generation of overwhelming 

firepower. The fire support system has its roots in 

the firepower element of combat power. 

Joint Fire Support

is Synchronized to Collectively 

Ensure Effective Fires.

Synchronized joint fire support requires the 

coordinated interaction of all of the elements of 

the fire support system, thorough and continuous 

planning, aggressive coordination, and vigorous 

execution. The fire support system includes the 

target acquisition, command and control (C2), and 

attack/delivery systems that must function 

collectively to ensure effective fires are delivered 

where and when the commander requires them.

Fires Fires. Fires are defined as the use of weapon 

systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect 

on a target. All fires are normally synchronized and 

integrated to achieve synergistic results. Fires can 
Executive Summary

viii JP 3-09 

be delivered by air, land, maritime, or special 

operations forces (SOF).

Joint Fires Joint Fires. Joint fires are defined as fires 

delivered during the employment of forces from two 

or more components in coordinated action to

produce desired effects in support of a common 

objective.

Joint Fire Support Joint Fire Support. Joint fire support is defined as 

joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and SOF to 

move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, 

airspace, and key waters in support of the joint force 

commander’s (JFC’s) scheme of maneuver.

All Fires Should Support Joint 

Force Commander Objectives. 

The concept of operations (CONOPS) describes 

how actions of the joint force components and 

supporting organizations will be integrated, 

synchronized, and phased to accomplish the 

mission, including potential branches and sequels.

All fires should support the JFC’s objectives. Some 

fires will support maneuver forces, and other fires 

are independent of maneuver and orient on creating 

specific effects.

Supported Commanders The land and maritime force commanders are 

the supported commanders within the areas of 

operations (AOs) designated by the JFC. In 

coordination with the land and/or maritime force 

commander, those commanders designated by the 

JFC to execute theater and/or joint operations area

(JOA)-wide functions have the latitude to plan and 

execute these JFC prioritized operations within land 

and maritime AOs. Any commander executing such 

a mission within a land or maritime AO must 

coordinate the operation to avoid adverse effects 

and fratricide. If those operations would have 

adverse impact within a land or maritime AO, the 

commander assigned to execute the JOA-wide 

functions must readjust the plan, resolve the issue 

with the land or maritime component commander, 

or consult with the JFC for resolution. 

Preventive Measures for 

Limiting Fratricide

Commanders must identify and assess situations 

that increase the risk of fratricide. The primary 

preventive measures for limiting fratricide are 
Executive Summary

ix

comprehensive combat identification training, 

command emphasis, disciplined operations, fire 

support coordination measures, airspace 

coordination measures, close coordination among 

component commands, rehearsals, reliable and 

interoperable, battle tracking, effective procedures, 

and enhanced situational awareness.

Fundamental and Beneficial 

Effects of Teamwork

Combining joint fire support and maneuver relies on 

the fundamental and beneficial effects of teamwork, 

unity of effort, and synchronization of capabilities 

in time, space, and purpose. Maneuver and joint 

fire support are complementary functions that 

are essential to achieving JFC objectives. Joint 

fire support destroys, neutralizes, or suppresses 

enemy forces and disrupts enemy maneuver, both 

on the surface and in the air, which assists the 

maneuver of friendly forces.

Joint Fire Support Effects Typically, the execution of joint fire support has 

an immediate or near term effect on the conduct 

of friendly operations. 

Complementary Operations Synchronizing and/or integrating interdiction 

and maneuver (air, land, and maritime) provides 

one of the most dynamic concepts available to the 

joint force. Interdiction and maneuver usually are 

not considered separate operations against a 

common enemy, but rather normally are considered 

complementary operations designed to achieve the 

military strategic and operational objectives.

Joint Fire Support Command and Control

Synchronization and

Integration

The JFC, using systems that allow rapid response to 

changes as they occur, is responsible for ensuring 

the synchronization and integration of joint fires.

The challenge for the JFC is to integrate and 

synchronize the wide range of capabilities at his 

disposal. 

The Operations Directorate of 

a Joint Staff

The operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) 

serves as the JFC’s principal staff advisor for the 

coordination, integration, and synchronization of 

joint fire support with other major elements of 

operations such as C2, intelligence, movement and 
Executive Summary

x JP 3-09 

maneuver, protection, and sustainment. The J-3 

recommends, coordinates, reviews, designates, and 

disseminates fire support coordination measures, 

maneuver control measures, and airspace 

coordinating measures as part of overall concept of 

the operations for joint fires and joint fire support. 

Joint Fires Element The JFC may approve the formation of a joint 

fires element (JFE) within the J-3. The JFE is an 

optional staff element comprised of representatives 

from the J-3, the components, and other elements of 

the JFC’s staff, to include the intelligence 

directorate of a joint staff targeting staff, logistics 

directorate of a joint staff, plans directorate of a 

joint staff, and others as required. The JFE is an 

integrating staff element that synchronizes and 

coordinates fires planning and coordination on 

behalf of the JFC and should be physically located 

near the joint task force joint operations center, 

collocated with the information operations cell if 

possible. The JFE assists the J-3 in accomplishing 

responsibilities and tasks as a staff advisor to the 

JFC.

Joint Targeting and 

Coordination Boards

Typically JFCs organize joint targeting coordination 

boards (JTCB). The JFC has the responsibility to 

conduct planning, coordination, and deconfliction 

associated with joint targeting. When a JTCB is not 

established and the JFC decides not to delegate 

targeting oversight, the JFC may perform this task at 

the joint force headquarters. Typically, however, 

the JFC may establish a JTCB and appoints the 

deputy JFC or a component commander to chair it. 

Unique Fire Support

Command and Control

Agencies

The land, air, maritime, and SOF components of a 

joint force all have unique fire support command 

and control agencies.

Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution

Integration in the Joint 

Planning Process

The key to effective integration of joint fire 

support is the thorough and continuous inclusion 

of all component fire support elements in the 

joint planning process, aggressive coordination 

efforts, and a vigorous execution of the plan. 
Executive Summary

xi

Joint Fire Support Planners Joint fire support planners and/or coordinators 

actively participate with other members of the staff 

to develop estimates, give the commander 

recommendations, develop the joint fire support 

portion of the CONOPS, and supervise the 

execution of the commander’s decision. The 

effectiveness of their planning and coordination is 

predicated on the commander providing clear and 

precise guidance.

Purpose of Joint Fire Support 

Planning

The purpose of joint fire support planning is to 

optimize its employment by integrating and 

synchronizing joint fire support with the 

commander’s maneuver plan. During the planning 

phase, commanders develop a CONOPS, 

including the concept for fires. Commanders 

determine how to shape the operational 

environment with fires to assist maneuver and 

how to use maneuver to exploit the use of joint 

fire support.

Four Basic Fire Support Tasks Effective joint fire support depends on planning for 

the successful performance of the following four 

basic fire support tasks: support forces in contact; 

support the CONOPS; synchronize joint fire 

support; and sustain joint fire support 

operations. 

Wartime Posture When the instruments of national power 

(diplomatic, information, military, and economic) 

are unable to achieve national strategic objectives or 

protect national interests without force, the US 

national leadership may decide to conduct a 

major operation involving large-scale combat, 

placing the United States in a wartime posture. 

In such cases, the goal is to prevail against the 

enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, 

and establish conditions favorable to the United 

States, the host nation, and its multinational 

partners.

Crisis Response and 

Contingency Operations

Joint fire support employed in support of crisis 

response and contingency operations may be the 

same as those employed for major operations and 

campaigns but are normally more restrictive in their 

application. 
Executive Summary

xii JP 3-09 

Security Cooperation and

Deterrence Operations

Lethal joint fire support employed in support of 

security cooperation and deterrence operations are 

normally the most restrictive in their application and 

may be limited to defensive fires only.

Multinational Operations Fire support coordination in multinational 

operations demands special arrangements with 

multinational forces and local authorities. To 

maximize the fires of the multinational force and to 

minimize the possibility of fratricide, the 

multinational force commander and staff must 

become familiar with each nation’s capabilities and 

limitations in munitions, digital capability, and 

training, to ensure that they develop good fire 

support coordination throughout the multinational 

force.

Joint Fire Support Planning Joint fire support planning is accomplished utilizing 

both the targeting and joint fire support estimate 

processes. It is a continual and cyclical process of 

planning, synchronizing, and executing joint fires 

involving tactical, operational, and strategic 

considerations that also utilizes joint fire support 

command, control, and communications systems 

and architectures. Initiated during mission analysis 

and continuing through post-execution assessment, 

the joint fire support planning process includes the 

following steps: end state and the commander’s 

objectives; target development and prioritization; 

capabilities analysis; commander’s decision and 

force assignment; mission planning and force 

execution; and assessment.

Agencies Involved in 

Coordinating Joint Fire

Support

Agencies involved in coordinating joint fire support

employ several principles which are extensions of 

the four basic fire support tasks. 

• Plan early and continuously. 

• Ensure continuous flow of targeting 

information. 

• Consider the use of all lethal and/or 

nonlethal attack means. 
Executive Summary

xiii

• Use the lowest echelon capable of 

furnishing effective support. 

• Furnish the type of joint fire support 

requested. 

• Use the most effective joint fire support 

means. 

• Avoid unnecessary duplication. 

• Coordinate airspace. 

• Provide adequate support. 

• Provide for rapid coordination. 

• Protect the force. 

• Analyze effectiveness. 

• Provide for flexibility. 

Joint Fire Support

Coordination 

Joint fire support coordination includes all efforts to

deconflict attacks, avoid fratricide, reduce 

duplication of effort, and assist in shaping the 

operational environment. Coordination 

procedures must be flexible and responsive to the 

ever changing dynamics of warfighting.

Assessment Assessment is a continuous process that measures 

progress of the joint force toward mission 

accomplishment. The JFC and component 

commanders assess the operational environment and 

the progress of operations, and compare them to 

their initial vision and intent.

Combat Identification Combat identification is the process of attaining 

an accurate characterization of detected objects 

in the operational environment sufficient to 

support an engagement decision. Depending on 

the situation and the operational decisions that 

must be made, this characterization may be 

limited to “friend,” “enemy,” “neutral,” or 

“unknown.” In other situations, other 

characterizations may be required — including, 
Executive Summary

xiv JP 3-09 

but not limited to, class, type, nationality, and 

mission configuration.

Mensuration Mensuration is the act of precisely measuring 

something and is commonly used in targeting to 

refer to the exact measurement (location) of a 

target’s geographical coordinates. Point 

mensuration has always been an important part of 

targeting, since the points measured represent the 

desired points of impact for the munitions 

employed. As the accuracy of weapons delivery has 

improved, the importance of mensuration has grown 

in proportion and is a vital part of targeting. 

Principle of Proportionality Under the law of armed conflict, the principle of 

proportionality requires that the anticipated loss of 

civilian life and damage to civilian property 

incidental to attacks must not be excessive in 

relation to the concrete and direct military 

advantage expected to be gained. Commanders 

therefore have the responsibility to attempt to 

minimize collateral damage to the greatest extent 

practicable. Collateral damage estimation is an 

important step in the target development process.

However, it should not preclude the inclusion of 

valid military targets on a target list.
I-1 

CHAPTER I

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT OVERVIEW

1. Introduction

a. The joint force commander (JFC) and component commanders, with the 

assistance of their staffs, integrate and synchronize joint fire support in time, space, and 

purpose to increase the effectiveness of the joint force. The JFC organizes forces to 

accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations (CONOPS). The 

organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet planned phases of contemplated 

operations and any development that may require a change in plan. The JFC establishes 

subordinate commands, assigns responsibilities, establishes or delegates appropriate 

command and support relationships, and establishes coordinating instructions for the 

component commanders. The JFC provides guidance to integrate components’ 

capabilities and synchronize the execution of fires. Systems for delivering firepower may 

be limited, and there are competing priorities for employing these assets. Therefore, 

JFCs and their staffs carefully balance resources and requirements over the course of a 

joint operation to ensure the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities required to 

achieve the objective.

b. The foundations of joint fire support are based on the elements of combat power, 

the principles of joint operations, and joint functions. The elements of combat power are 

combined to provide the basis for the generation of overwhelming firepower. The fire 

support system has its roots in the firepower element of combat power. The principles of 

joint operations provide a set of time-tested guidelines for combining the elements of 

combat power and employing fire support. Joint functions are related capabilities and 

activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations 

to include fires. 

c. Synchronized joint fire support requires the coordinated interaction of all of the 

elements of the fire support system, thorough and continuous planning, aggressive 

coordination, and vigorous execution. The fire support system includes the target 

acquisition (TA), command and control (C2), and attack/delivery systems that must 

function collectively to ensure effective fires are delivered where and when the 

commander requires them. 

(1) Fires. Fires are defined as the use of weapon systems to create specific 

lethal or nonlethal effects on a target. All fires are normally synchronized and 

integrated to achieve synergistic results. Fires can be delivered by air, land, maritime, or 

special operations forces (SOF). 

“Joint fire support is defined as joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and 

special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, 

airspace, and key waters.”

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations
Chapter I

I-2 JP 3-09 

(2) Joint Fires. Joint fires are defined as fires delivered during the 

employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to 

produce desired effects in support of a common objective. Joint fires are provided to 

assist forces (air, land, maritime, or SOF) in conducting operations across the range of 

military operations. 

(3) Joint Fire Support. Joint fire support is defined as joint fires that assist air, 

land, maritime, and SOF to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, 

and key waters in support of the JFC’s scheme of maneuver. Integration and 

synchronization of joint fire support with the movement and maneuver of the supported 

force is essential. Prerequisites for effective joint fire support are interoperable systems,

broad understanding of the differing strengths and limitations of each Service’s 

capabilities and how they are applied, and clear agreement about how those capabilities 

will be integrated in any given operational setting.

2. Concept of Fires

The CONOPS describes how the actions of the joint force components and 

supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the 

mission, including potential branches and sequels. The commander defines 

responsibilities by providing guidance to the staff and subordinate commanders. Integral 

to the CONOPS is the concept of fires. The concept of fires describes how lethal and 

nonlethal joint fires will be synchronized and integrated to support the JFC’s operational 

objectives. The JFC determines the enemy’s center of gravity (COG), associated critical 

factors, and decisive points and how the application of fires can assist in creating the 

desired effects to attain the objective. The JFC can also highlight the anticipated critical 

actions, times, and places that would serve as triggers for friendly action. The JFC 

determines the sequencing of key events and emphasizes the desired end state. Some 

fires will support maneuver forces and other fires are independent of maneuver and orient 

on creating specific effects. All fires should support the JFC’s objectives. The JFC 

provides guidance on his objectives and desired effects and priorities and what 

effects of fires should have on the enemy (e.g., deny, disrupt, delay, suppress, 

neutralize, destroy, or influence). In addition, the JFC provides guidance on munitions 

usage and restrictions. The JFC also provides guidance on restricted targets and a nostrike list (NSL). Restricted targets are targets that have specific restrictions imposed

upon them. Actions that exceed specified restrictions are prohibited until coordinated 

and approved by the establishing headquarters (HQ). This list also includes restricted 

targets directed by higher authorities. Items on an NSL are those objects or entities 

characterized as protected from the effects of military operations under the law of armed 

conflict, international law and/or rules of engagement (ROE). Additional considerations 

for an NSL could include conventions, or agreements, or damaging relations with the 

indigenous population. The JFC may also make available specific assets for operational 

area-wide employment, such as Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMSs), sensorfuzed weapons, or Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs), and nonlethal assets 

designed to enable or disable materiel, personnel, and networks. 
Joint Fire Support Overview 

I-3 

3. Employment Considerations

a. Complementary and Interdependent. The JFC integrates diverse fires assets 

from air, land, maritime, SOF, and multinational forces. To maximize the effects of fires, 

complementary and interdependent actions are required. These actions include planning, 

target acquisition, execution, and assessment. 

b. Command and Control in Operational Areas. The land and maritime force 

commanders are the supported commanders within the areas of operations (AOs) 

designated by the JFC. Within their designated AOs, land and maritime force 

commanders integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate 

this integration and synchronization, such commanders have the authority to designate 

target priority, effects, and timing of fires within their AOs.

(1) Synchronization of efforts within land or maritime AOs with theater and/or 

joint operations area (JOA)-wide operations is of particular importance. To facilitate 

synchronization, the JFC establishes priorities that will be executed throughout the 

theater and/or JOA, including within the land and maritime force commander’s AOs. 

The joint force air component commander (JFACC) is normally the supported 

commander for the JFC’s overall air interdiction (AI) effort, while land and maritime 

component commanders are supported commanders for interdiction in their AOs. 

(2) In coordination with the land and/or maritime force commander, those 

commanders designated by the JFC to execute theater and/or JOA-wide functions have 

the latitude to plan and execute these JFC prioritized operations within land and maritime 

AOs. Any commander executing such a mission within a land or maritime AO must 

coordinate the operation to avoid adverse effects and fratricide. If those operations would 

have adverse impact within a land or maritime AO, the commander assigned to execute 

the JOA-wide functions must readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the land or 

maritime component commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution. 

(3) A joint special operations area (JSOA) is a restricted area of land, sea, and 

airspace, defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities, for use by a joint special 

operations component or joint special operations task force (JSOTF) for the conduct of 

special operations (SO) (e.g., a discrete direct action mission or longer term 

unconventional warfare operations). JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate 

simultaneous conventional and SO. Within the JSOA, the joint force special operations 

component commander (JFSOCC) is the supported commander. 

c. Unity of Effort. Component forces’ planning, execution, and TA capabilities 

often overlap. Due to the diversity of systems capable of providing joint fire support, C2, 

and TA, the JFC must ensure unity of effort throughout the joint force. 
Chapter I

I-4 JP 3-09 

4. Synchronization of Maneuver and Fires

a. Combining joint fire support and maneuver relies on the fundamental and 

beneficial effects of teamwork, unity of effort, and synchronization of capabilities in 

time, space, and purpose. As a principle of war, maneuver is the movement of forces in 

relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver 

— or threaten delivery of — the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force. 

Maneuver positions forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, 

physical momentum, and massed effects. The focus of maneuver is to render opponents 

incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and physical cohesion (their ability to 

fight as an effective, coordinated whole) rather than by destroying them physically 

through attrition. 

See Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, for a more detailed discussion on 

maneuver.

b. Maneuver and joint fire support are complementary functions that are 

essential to achieving JFC objectives. Maneuver is conducted to achieve positional 

advantage in respect to the enemy action to accomplish the mission. The principal 

purpose of maneuver is to gain positional advantage relative to the enemy COG in order 

to control or destroy associated critical capabilities (CCs). Maneuver of forces relative to 

enemy CCs can be key to the JFC’s operation. Through maneuver, the JFC concentrates 

forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and physical 

momentum. Chances of successful maneuver are improved with fire support and 

movement. Joint fire support destroys, neutralizes, or suppresses enemy forces and 

disrupts enemy maneuver, both on the surface and in the air, and influences populations

which assists the maneuver of friendly forces. Joint fire support may be used separately 

from or in combination with maneuver to achieve strategic objectives or destroy, 

neutralize, or suppress enemy ground, maritime, and air forces, and influence 

populations. Through effective maneuver of friendly forces, the enemy can be placed 

into a position of disadvantage. If the enemy remains in position, their forces may be 

isolated and destroyed by fires delivered by land, air, maritime, and SOF. If the enemy 

withdraws, attempts to establish new defensive positions, or maneuvers their forces for 

counterattack, they may be exposed to unacceptable losses caused by the effective use of 

joint fire support. When exploiting the effects of maneuver, commanders use joint fire 

support to neutralize the enemy’s forces and destroy their will to fight. Maneuver and 

firepower (joint fire support) are complementary dynamics of combat power. Although 

one might dominate a phase of the battle, their synchronization is a characteristic of 

successful military operations. The synchronization of fires and maneuver makes the 

defeat of larger enemy forces feasible and enhances the protection of friendly forces. 

“Battles are won by fire and by movement. The purpose of the movement is to 

get the fire in a more advantageous place to play on the enemy. This is from 

the rear or flank.”

George S. Patton Jr.

War As I Knew It
Joint Fire Support Overview 

I-5 

c. Prevention of Fratricide. The destructive power and range of modern weapons, 

coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of modern combat, increase the potential 

for fratricide. Risk management must become fully integrated while planning and 

executing operations. Commanders must identify and assess situations that increase 

the risk of fratricide. Commanders then incorporate guidance into all plans to minimize 

and control risks by implementing preventive measures. The primary preventive 

measures for limiting fratricide are comprehensive combat identification (CID) training, 

command emphasis, disciplined operations, control measures, fire support coordination 

measures (FSCMs), airspace coordinating measures (ACMs), close coordination among 

component commands, rehearsals, reliable and interoperable coordination systems, battle 

tracking, and enhanced situational awareness (SA). Recent developments in automation 

and blue force tracking tools, as well as any singular preventative measures identified 

above, assist in preventing fratricide, but must not be used as a sole means for clearance 

of fires. The risk of fratricide is greatly reduced when engagement decisions are vested 

with well-trained and qualified personnel. However, there is a trade-off between 

reducing fratricide with restrictive rules and enduring higher friendly casualties by the 

enemy. Therefore, fire support coordination and synchronization must be emphasized by 

the JFC. Special instructions may also specify particular means to prevent fratricide in 

specific missions.

d. Effects. Typically, the execution of joint fire support has an immediate or near 

term effect on the conduct of friendly operations. Component commanders employ joint 

fires to create the effects described in their CONOPS by synchronizing fires against the 

enemy. Detailed integration and coordination with supported and supporting forces is 

required. Planning allows detailed integration of joint fire support assets for anticipated 

time-sensitive targets (TSTs) and other immediate targets.

e. Nonlethal Fires. Nonlethal fires are any fires that do not directly seek the 

physical destruction of the intended target and are designed to impair, disrupt, or delay 

the performance of enemy forces, functions, or facilities, or to alter the behavior of an 

adversary. Nonlethal fires can be created using nonlethal or lethal weapons/capabilities. 

Nonlethal fires are primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while 

minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property 

and the environment. Employment of nonlethal fires and other nonlethal capabilities 

must be integrated into operations to produce synergistic results. Examples include 

masking smoke, nighttime area illumination, area denial, and employment of some 

information operations (IO) capabilities, such as electronic attack (EA) and computer 

network attack (CNA), that deceive the enemy, disable the enemy’s C2 systems, and 

disrupt operations. The employment of nonlethal fires is especially important when 

restraint and limitations on the use of deadly force are directed. 

5. Synchronizing and/or Integrating Maneuver and Interdiction

Interdiction is an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military 

surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise 

achieve objectives.
Chapter I

I-6 JP 3-09 

a. Synchronizing and/or integrating interdiction and maneuver (air, land, and 

maritime) provides one of the most dynamic concepts available to the joint force. 

Interdiction and maneuver usually are not considered separate operations against a 

common enemy, but rather normally are considered complementary operations designed 

to achieve the military strategic and operational objectives. Moreover, maneuver by air, 

land, or maritime forces can be conducted to interdict enemy military potential. Potential 

responses to integrated and synchronized maneuver and interdiction can create a dilemma 

for the enemy. If the enemy attempts to counter the maneuver, enemy forces may be 

exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the enemy employs measures to 

reduce such interdiction losses, enemy forces may not be able to counter the maneuver. 

The synergistic combined arms effect created by integrating and synchronizing 

interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in optimizing leverage at the operational 

level.

b. The land or maritime commander should clearly articulate the vision of maneuver 

operations to other commanders that may employ interdiction forces within the land or 

maritime AO. The land or maritime commander’s intent and CONOPS should clearly 

state how interdiction will enable or enhance land or maritime force maneuver in the AO 

and what is to be accomplished with interdiction (as well as those actions to be avoided, 

such as the destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain munitions in a 

specific area). Once this is understood, other interdiction-capable commanders normally 

can plan and execute their operations with only that coordination required with the land 

or maritime commander. However, the land or maritime commander should provide 

other interdiction-capable commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and 

execution of interdiction operations within the AO.

c. JFCs must prioritize activities to support the maneuver and interdiction needs of 

all forces and take action to mitigate any factor interfering with their effective 

employment. In addition to normal target nomination procedures, JFCs establish 

procedures through which land or maritime force commanders can specifically identify 

those interdiction targets they are unable to engage with organic assets within their 

operational areas that could affect planned or ongoing maneuver. These targets may be 

identified individually or by category, specified geographically, or tied to a desired effect 

or time period. Interdiction target priorities within the land or maritime AOs are 

considered along with theater and/or JOA-wide interdiction priorities by JFCs and are 

reflected in all the related resourcing decisions. The JFACC uses these priorities to plan, 

coordinate, and execute the theater and/or JOA-wide AI effort. The purpose of these 

procedures is to afford added visibility to, and allow JFCs to give priority to, targets 

directly affecting planned maneuver by air, land, or maritime forces.

See JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction, for a more detailed discussion of interdiction. 
II-1 

CHAPTER II

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Introduction

 This chapter reviews the joint force command structure and the fire support functions 

employed to control joint fires. It includes their roles, responsibilities, and some of the 

targeting systems available to them. The successful application of joint fire support 

depends on the close coordination of these functions. Joint fire support must function in 

a coordinated and integrated manner to support the commander’s objectives. 

2. Joint Fire Support Command and Control

a. Joint Force Commander and Staff

 (1) Joint Force Commander. The JFC, using systems that allow rapid 

response to changes as they occur, is responsible for ensuring the synchronization and 

integration of joint fires. The challenge for the JFC is to integrate and synchronize the 

wide range of capabilities at his disposal. The JFC’s intent will normally be to bring 

force against the opponent’s entire structure in a near simultaneous manner to overwhelm 

and cripple the enemy’s capabilities and will to resist. In this effort, liaison elements play 

a pivotal role in the coordination of joint fire support. 

 (2) Directorate of Operations

 (a) The operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) serves as the JFC’s 

principal staff advisor for the coordination, integration, and synchronization of joint fire 

support with other major elements of operations such as C2, intelligence, movement and 

maneuver, protection, and sustainment. These functions may include: 

 1. Developing estimates of the situation and courses of action (COAs). 

 2. Developing mission-type orders and guidance for JFC approval. 

 3. Developing operation orders (OPORDs), and operation plans 

(OPLANs).

 4. Developing joint fire support targeting guidance, objectives, and 

priorities for JFC approval. 

“A superiority of fire, and therefore a superiority in directing and delivering fire 

and in making use of fire, will become the main factors upon which the 

efficiency of a force will depend.” 

Marshal of France Ferdinand Foch

Precepts and Judgments, 1919
Chapter II

II-2 JP 3-09 

 5. Coordinating and assessing joint operations. 

 6. Coordinating ROE. 

 7. Recommending, coordinating, reviewing, designating, and 

disseminating FSCMs, maneuver control measures, ACMs as part of overall concept of 

the operations for joint fires and joint fire support. 

 8. Maintaining munitions supply status and logistic concerns affecting 

joint force operations. 

 9. Ensuring IO are fully integrated and synchronized with operations. 

 10. Establishing a joint fires element (JFE).

 11. Organizing and serving as a member of a joint targeting 

coordination board (JTCB), if established by the JFC. 

 (b) The JFC may approve the formation of a JFE within the J-3. The JFE is 

an optional staff element comprised of representatives from the J-3, the components, and 

other elements of the JFC’s staff, to include the intelligence directorate of a joint staff

targeting staff, logistics directorate of a joint staff, plans directorate of a joint staff, and 

others as required. (See Figure II-1.) The JFE is an integrating staff element that 

synchronizes and coordinates fires planning and coordination on behalf of the JFC and 

should be physically located near the joint task force (JTF) joint operations center, 

collocated with the IO cell if possible. The JFE assists the J-3 in accomplishing 

responsibilities and tasks as a staff advisor to the JFC. JFE key functions and tasks 

generally include the following: 

1. Develops JOA-wide joint targeting guidance, objectives, and 

priorities (normally accomplished in conjunction with component planners as part of the 

joint planning group [JPG]). 

2. Coordinates, deconflicts, and validates target nominations at the 

JFC level and higher. 

3. Coordinates component input to the joint integrated prioritized 

target list (JIPTL). Prioritizes and forwards the JIPTL to the JTCB for review and 

approval and then manages the approved JIPTL.

4. Coordinates, maintains, and disseminates a complete list of 

FSCMs within the JOA to avoid fratricide and deconflicts with other current or future 

operations, to include managing the restricted target list (RTL) and NSL.

5. Develops the roles, functions, and agenda of the JTCB for JFC 

approval. 
Joint Fire Support Command and Control 

II-3 

6. Organizes a strategy team to address intermediate targeting efforts 

to bridge the gap between current and future operations. 

TYPICAL JOINT FIRES ELEMENT

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff

J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff

J-8 structure, resource, and assessment 

directorate of a joint staff

LEGEND

provides input to

direct participation

standing

organization group formed 

as required

Commander,

Joint Task Force

JFE DIRECTOR

Targeting 

Section

Operations 

Section

Plans 

Section

Component/ 

Service Liaisons - 

Representatives

Headquarters Staff 

Liaisons - 

Representatives

JOINT FIRES ELEMENT (JFE)

Joint Force

Special Operations

Component Commander

Interagency 

Partners

J-2

Joint Force 

Air

Component Commander

National Intelligence 

Community

J-3

J-5

Joint Force

Land

Component Commander

Multinational 

Partners

J-4

J-8

Joint Force

Maritime

Component Commander

Joint Targeting 

Coordination 

Board

Figure II-1. Typical Joint Fires Element
Chapter II

II-4 JP 3-09 

7. Reviews/recommends intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) collection requirements to include assisting the joint intelligence 

support element in developing targets. 

8. Develops the joint fires estimate and COAs.

9. Monitors TST and component-critical target operations for the J-3. 

Recommends procedures for engaging TSTs and component-critical targets. 

10. Recommends JTF high-payoff targets (HPTs) to the JPG. 

11. Coordinates joint fires and targeting ROE issues. 

12. Develops collateral damage prevention procedures based on 

commanders’ guidance and higher level directives.

13. Conducts assessments of joint fires and targeting in coordination 

with higher HQ and components.

 (c) J-3 staffing may vary based on how the JFC forms the joint force HQ 

and the component forces for the operation. The J-3’s augmentation requirements will 

depend on a variety of factors, including the mission, expected complexity and duration 

of the operation, peacetime staffing levels, expertise of the new operations staff, and the 

joint force composition. Such augmentation should provide the capability to accomplish 

fires planning and coordination functions relevant to the operation. 

 (d) Some joint force operations may require only limited augmentation. In 

this case, the JFC might choose to absorb augmentees directly into existing joint force 

staff sections and divisions. For example, the JFC may augment the joint operations 

center with additional personnel from the combatant commands or Services to ensure 

continuous operations capability. 

 (e) Information systems bring critical information together for collation, 

collaboration, interpretation, and analysis to enable decisionmaking. Information

systems, personnel, equipment, and a variety of related procedures support the execution 

of joint fire support missions. Unity of effort is key to the effective coordination of joint

fire support. Vertical and horizontal integration is also essential for effective joint fire 

support. For this reason, Service and functional components provide a hierarchy of 

coordinators, coordination agencies, and liaison officers that interface with commanders 

at each level of execution. These coordinators have one goal in common — to effectively 

direct the integration and employment of joint fire support to accomplish the mission.

 (3) Joint Force Staff Functions. To effectively plan joint fire support, 

planners must understand the objective, purpose of the operation, and the commander’s 

intent. Subordinate JFCs will translate the combatant commander’s guidance and 

strategy into clearly defined and attainable operational level objectives. They then write 
Joint Fire Support Command and Control 

II-5 

supporting OPLANs and OPORDs to attain those objectives. These plans and orders will 

contain a CONOPS that describes joint force employment. Joint fire support priorities 

and goals are typically listed as part of the overall priorities and goals within the 

CONOPS. The commander’s estimate and the CONOPS assist in focusing the 

employment of all assets, to include those providing joint fire support. 

 (a) Commander and Staff Estimates. Estimates help the commander 

clearly understand the situation and select the best COA. The estimate results in an 

accurate visualization of the current enemy and friendly situation, a visualization of the 

goal or mission, and a clear expression of COAs. Consideration of how to employ fires 

continues throughout the estimate process.

 (b) Concept of Operations. The CONOPS is key in describing how the 

commander anticipates the operation unfolding. The concept is based on the 

commander’s selected COA and describes where and how friendly forces engage the 

enemy. In the CONOPS, the commander describes how the action of each of the 

components or supporting commands fit together to accomplish the assigned mission. 

The CONOPS discusses joint force maneuver and the application of joint fire support. 

The joint fires discussion should reflect the JFC’s concept for application of available 

fires assets. Guidance for joint fire support should address the following: 

 1. Joint force policies, procedures, and planning cycles. 

 2. Joint fire support assets for planning purposes. 

 3. Priorities for employing TA assets.

 4. Areas that require joint fire support to support operational 

maneuver.

 5. TSTs.

 6. High-value targets (HVTs) and HPTs.

 7. Anticipated joint fire support requirements.

 8. FSCMs. 

 (4) Synchronizing Command and Control Assets. The JFC utilizes C2 to

synchronize efforts in a number of key areas, such as ISR. Appropriate joint, Service, 

and national agencies engaged in ISR activities must support the efforts to integrate and 

synchronize fires. To support the synchronization of fires, C2 must be responsive to the 

user, and be capable of real-time information management and data processing. 

See JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 
Chapter II

II-6 JP 3-09 

 b. Joint Targeting Coordination Board. The JFC has the responsibility to conduct 

planning, coordination, and deconfliction associated with joint targeting. Typically, the 

JFC establishes a JTCB and appoints the deputy JFC or a component commander to chair 

it. When a JTCB is not established and the JFC decides not to delegate targeting 

oversight, the JFC may perform this task at the joint force HQ. If the JFC so designates, 

a JTCB may be either an integrating center for this effort or a JFC-level review 

mechanism. In either case, it should be comprised of representatives from the staff, all 

components and, if required, their subordinate units. The primary focus of the JTCB is to 

ensure target priorities, guidance, and the associated effects are linked to the JFC’s 

objectives. Briefings conducted at the JTCB should focus on ensuring that targeting 

efforts are coordinated and synchronized with intelligence and operations (by all 

components and applicable staff elements). The JTCB must also maintain a current joint 

target list, RTL, NSL, and current and planned FSCMs. (The JFC JFE will receive 

component lists and FSCMs, then collate and disseminate current and planned target lists 

and FSCMs.) The JTCB may assist the JFC in developing or revising the targeting 

guidance and/or priorities. The JTCB maintains a macro-level view of the operational 

area and ensures targeting nominations are consistent with the JFC’s intent. In a 

multinational environment, the JTCB may be subordinate to a multinational targeting 

coordination board. 

See JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

c. Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS)

 (1) When conducting multinational operations, some contributing nations may 

not have connectivity to the joint force information systems. This will require an 

additional communications system to ensure that these forces and organizations have 

interoperability to remain a viable contribution to the multinational effort.

 (2) The JFC can facilitate information sharing by coordinating with the 

supported commanders to establish a coalition local area network such as the 

CENTRIXS. CENTRIXS provides one example of establishing and maintaining 

multinational connectivity at the tactical and operational level, with reachback

capability to the strategic level. 

 d. Component Fires Command and Control

 (1) Joint Force Land Component

 (a) US Army Joint Fire Support Command and Control Agencies. Fire 

support personnel are assigned at all levels from company to theater army (which may 

also be the Army Service component commander or joint force land component 

commander [JFLCC] HQ). A company fire support officer (FSO) leads the fire support 

team (FIST). Battalion/squadron/brigade combat team FSOs lead the fires cell at their 

respective HQ and are assisted by subordinate FSOs and fire support noncommissioned 

officers (NCOs). The commander of the brigade combat team’s fires battalion is 
Joint Fire Support Command and Control 

II-7 

identified as the fire support coordinator and the commander’s primary advisor on the 

planning for and employment of field artillery (FA) and fire support and the integrations 

of lethal and nonlethal fires. The chief of fires (COF) leads the fires cell found from 

division to theater army level. He is assisted by cell FSOs and fire support NCOs. The 

fires cell can send representatives (FSOs and/or fire support NCOs) fires elements to 

other sections or cells within the HQ. These fire support personnel advise the 

commander on fire support capabilities and joint fire support C2, effective use of fires 

assets, and assist in the planning, coordination, and execution of fires. 

 1. Chief of Fires (Army). The US Army COF is the senior FA officer 

permanently assigned as the full-time fire support staff advisor to the commander and 

staff at division and higher HQ. The COF performs all the staff functions associated with 

fire support. Additionally, as fire support cell supervisor, the COF works with the 

commander and his staff to integrate fire support and IO (core supporting and related 

capabilities) with each other and into the unit’s concept of operation. 

 2. Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD). The US Army 

provides a BCD as the interface for selected operational environment functions between 

the Army forces (ARFOR) and the air commander, or the US Air Force Service 

component commander. A BCD is collocated with the joint air operations center 

(JAOC), combined air operations center, or the Air Force air and space operations center

(AOC). The BCD interface includes exchanging current intelligence and operational 

data, support requirements, coordinating the integration of ARFOR requirements for 

ACMs, FSCMs, and theater airlift. A BCD can also be tasked to perform ARFOR 

interface duties for subordinate US Army HQ. The BCD is not a fire support cell, but 

acts as the ARFOR senior liaison element and also can perform many fires functions. 

When a US Army HQ is the land commander, the BCD serves as the land commander’s 

liaison to the air component commander. 

 3. Liaison. Although liaison elements from other Services are found 

at supported Army units, various liaison elements such as Marine liaison, naval air 

liaison, special operations liaison element (SOLE), and Navy surface operations liaison 

elements usually link up with the BCD at the JAOC when appropriate. Typically, ground 

liaison officers for fighter and airlift wings and other liaison officers may also be 

provided. 

 4. Fires Cell. The fires cell of the theater army operational command 

post oversees the application of joint fire support, artillery, rockets, and offensive IO in 

support of theater army operations. Responsibilities include: 

 a. Coordinating and synchronizing all aspects of operational fires 

with component commands, major subordinate commands, and multinational forces.

 b. Synchronizing fires with other governmental agencies. 
Chapter II

II-8 JP 3-09 

 c. Overseeing the development of the theater army operational 

fires objectives, supporting target nominations, and attack guidance through the execution 

of joint boards and cells.

 d. Participating as members of the joint and theater army target 

coordination board, candidate target review boards, and other boards as required. 

See Field Manual (FM) 3-09, Fire Support. 

 5. US Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC). The 

AAMDC is the Army’s operational lead for theater air and missile defense (TAMD) and 

plans, coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes the operational elements of TAMD. The 

AAMDC, normally collocated with the JAOC, operates in direct support (DS) of the area 

air defense commander (AADC) and is fully integrated into the AADC’s air defense C2

system. The AAMDC attack operations cell and intelligence section integrated within 

the JAOC conduct analysis and targeting focused specifically against the theater missile 

(TM) threat. Analysis includes such actions as developing TM information requirements, 

building operational patterns and profiles, identifying trigger events, analyzing launch 

events, conducting countermobility analysis, and identifying electronic warfare (EW) 

vulnerabilities. TM targeting actions include nominating attack strategies and submitting 

target nominations and mission requests directly to the JAOC. When appropriate, the 

AAMDC commander or representative participates in the JTCB. Also, the AAMDC and 

BCD will coordinate and synchronize their operations at the JAOC. 

See FM 3-01.20/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP[I]) 

3-2.30, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for JAOC/AAMDC 

Coordination.

 (b) US Marine Corps Joint Fires Command and Control Agencies. 

Depending upon the mission, the decision of the JFC, and their capabilities, US Marine 

Corps (USMC) forces may be employed as the joint force land component, as part of the 

joint force land component, as the joint force maritime component or as part of the joint 

force maritime component, or as the joint force air component. Marine Corps forces will 

operate as a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) consisting of a command element, a 

ground combat element (GCE), an aviation combat element (ACE), and a logistics 

combat element. The MAGTF commander will retain operational control (OPCON) of 

organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF ACE is the support of the 

MAGTF GCE. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets normally will be in 

support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF commander will make sorties available to 

the JFC, for tasking through the JFACC, for air defense, long-range interdiction, and 

long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF DS requirements will be 

provided to the JFC for tasking through the JFACC for the support of other components 

of the joint force or the joint force as a whole. Various agencies and elements exist

within the MAGTFs to assist commanders in the execution of their fires responsibilities. 

These agencies may be used for either landing force (LF) or sustained land operations. 

The Marine expeditionary force (MEF) command element organizes a force fires 
Joint Fire Support Command and Control 

II-9 

coordination center (FFCC), which is responsible for overall fires coordination. At each 

level below the MEF command element (division, regiment, and battalion), a fire support 

coordination center (FSCC) is established as an advisory and coordination agency within 

the GCE. The FFCC and each FSCC is staffed with representatives of the various Marine 

Corps and Navy supporting arms whose roles differ at the various levels. For example, 

during the initial phase of an amphibious operation, while control and coordination 

responsibility of supporting arms is still afloat, the MAGTF typically provides the LF

representation in the Navy’s supporting arms coordination center (SACC). 

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for additional information.

 1. Commanders. In an amphibious operation, the commander, 

amphibious task force (CATF), exercises the overall responsibility for coordination of 

naval surface fire support (NSFS), air support, and LF artillery fire support. When the 

commander, landing force (CLF), normally the MAGTF commander, is established 

ashore, the CATF may pass this responsibility to the CLF. Once the passage of control 

ashore is executed, the CLF will coordinate fires within the AO. When control is afloat, 

the senior naval fire support coordination agency is the SACC. 

See JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. 

 2. Liaison. LF representatives coordinate requests of LF elements 

ashore, monitor fire support activities, and plan additional requirements. This includes 

continued liaison with the SACC and close coordination with the Marine air command 

and control system (MACCS). LF representatives in the SACC make appropriate 

recommendations regarding troop safety, type and means of delivery, and record all 

target information for future reference ashore. Once control passes ashore, the MAGTF 

commander executes responsibilities through the FFCC or FSCC ashore. This 

responsibility includes continued liaison with the SACC along with close coordination 

with the MACCS.

 3. Force Fires Coordination Center. The FFCC is the senior fire 

support organization for the MAGTF. As such, it assists the MAGTF commander in the 

planning, coordination, execution, and assessment of fires for a MAGTF. While the 

FFCC assists the commander in fighting the single battle, its focus is on the deep fight. 

The FFCC coordinates those matters that cannot be coordinated by the GCE (FSCC), 

ACE Marine tactical air command center (TACC), or combat service support operations 

center for integration of fire support plans. Additionally, it assists in providing fires in 

support of close and rear fight. FFCC liaisons are sourced to provide close and 

continuous coordination. 

 4. Fire Support Coordination Center. The FSCC is a single location 

that centralizes communications facilities and personnel for the coordination of all forms 

of fire support for the GCE. The USMC employs a designated ground combat officer as 

a fire support coordinator (FSC), who acts as the direct representative of the CLF for the 

planning and coordinating of all available fire support. The FSCC is organized and 
Chapter II

II-10 JP 3-09 

supervised by the FSC and is collocated with, and in support of, the operations officer. A 

USMC FSCC normally includes an air section, naval gunfire liaison section, and artillery 

section to plan and execute fires in support of the scheme of maneuver. Additionally, a 

mortar section may be included in the FSCC for an infantry battalion, but will not be 

found at any other level of C2 for fire support coordination. 

 5. Tactical Air Command Center. The Marine TACC is the senior 

agency of the MACCS. It provides the facilities for the commander of the ACE and the 

battlestaff to command, supervise, and direct MAGTF air operations. The Marine TACC 

is usually established ashore incrementally, beginning with a tactical air direction center 

(TADC). When the commander of Marine Corps forces is also the JFACC, he will 

augment the Marine Corps TACC with elements from other components to create a 

JAOC.

 6. Direct Air Support Center (DASC). The DASC is an organization 

within the MACCS and serves as the Marine Corps central coordination point for all 

aircraft support to GCE-user agencies at all echelons. The DASC assigns direct air 

support aircraft to terminal control agencies, provides aircraft ingress and egress route 

instructions, and disseminates advisory information. When control is afloat, the Navy 

tactical air control center (TACC) supervises the ashore DASC’s operation. When 

control is ashore, the Marine TADC or Marine TACC supervises the DASC’s operations. 

The DASC is normally the first major air control agency to land in an amphibious 

operation. The DASC becomes operational when control of the operation is passed 

ashore and collocates (physically or electronically) with the senior FSCC. 

 7. Marine Corps Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). The Marine 

Corps TACP establishes and maintains facilities for liaison and communications between 

supported units and appropriate control agencies. An air officer leads the TACP, 

normally with three teams assigned per maneuver battalion. Their mission is to inform 

and advise the supported ground unit commander on the employment of supporting 

aircraft and to request and coordinate air support missions. In addition, the TACP 

provides terminal attack control for close air support (CAS) missions.

 8. Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC). The Marine Corps 

TAOC is subordinate to the Marine Corps TACC. Among its duties, the TAOC provides 

safe passage, radar control, and surveillance for CAS aircraft en route to and from target 

areas.

 9. Shore Fire Control Party (SFCP). The supporting Marine Corps 

artillery battalions provide SFCPs to supported units. The SFCP consists of an NSFS 

liaison team and an NSFS spotting team. The NSFS liaison team is specifically organized 

to handle NSFS liaison matters for the supported commander, while the spotting team is 

charged with requesting and adjusting fires of assigned DS ships and general support 

(GS) ships. 
Joint Fire Support Command and Control 

II-11 

 (2) Joint Force Maritime Component/Commander Navy Forces

 (a) Supporting Arms Coordination Center. The SACC is configured 

with the communications facilities required to coordinate artillery, air, and naval surface 

fires. Functioning as a fire support coordinating element for the maritime forces, the 

SACC is supervised by the supporting arms coordinator. During amphibious operations, 

the SACC is the primary agency that coordinates and controls all supporting fires for the 

CATF to establish the LF ashore.

 (b) Navy Tactical Air Control System. The Navy tactical air control 

system is the principal air control system afloat. The senior Navy air control agency is 

the Navy TACC. During amphibious operations, and before control is passed ashore, 

Navy TACC controls all air operations within the amphibious objective area (AOA). The 

Navy TACC is responsible for planning and conducting air operations, including CAS. 

Typically, the Navy TACC is onboard the amphibious task force (ATF) flagship. If the 

JFACC’s command operations center is afloat, the Navy TACC may support operations 

for the JAOC. The Navy TACC has two sections that control and integrate CAS: 

 1. Air Traffic Control Section (ATCS). The ATCS provides initial 

safe passage, radar control, and surveillance for CAS aircraft in the AOA. The ATCS 

can also provide early detection, identification, and warning of enemy aircraft.

 2. Air Support Control Section. The air support control section 

supports the Navy TACC by controlling, supporting, or transferring control to subsidiary 

tactical air direction controllers afloat or ashore. The section is located in the SACC and 

coordinates with the Navy TACC to assist in the deconfliction of air missions, routes, and 

requests for fires. 

 (3) Joint Force Air Component Commander. JFCs normally will designate a 

JFACC, whose authority and responsibilities are defined by the establishing JFC based 

on the JFC’s CONOPS. See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed 

Forces of the United States, for additional guidance on the organization of joint forces. 

Conversely, a transition from JFACC to JFC staff may also be directed when the JFC 

determines that operational requirements warrant such a change. The Air Force, Navy, or 

Marine Corps component commander may be designated as the JFACC. However, the 

following discussion is based upon US Air Force fires C2 capabilities when the 

commander Air Force forces is designated as the JFACC. The JFACC normally 

exercises OPCON over US Air Force forces through the theater air ground system and 

exercises tactical control or has a support relationship with other forces/capabilities made 

available for tasking. The focal point for tasking and exercising control of these forces is 

the JAOC. The JAOC performs the tasks of planning, coordinating, controlling, 

reporting, and monitoring the execution of joint air operations. 

 (a) Joint Air Operations Center. The JAOC is structured to operate as a 

fully integrated node and staffed by members of all participating components to fulfill the 

air commander’s responsibilities. The JAOC synchronizes air operations with joint force 
Chapter II

II-12 JP 3-09 

air, land, and sea operations through centralized planning, direction, and coordination of 

air operations. The JAOC is the senior joint air power C2 element in the joint force and 

is the JFACC’s agent for providing centralized planning and decentralized execution of 

joint air operations. The JAOC typically produces the joint air operations plan, air 

tasking order (ATO), airspace control plan, and air defense plan. 

See JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, for additional detailed 

guidance on JAOC operations. 

 (b) Air Support Operations Center (ASOC). The ASOC is the principal 

Air Force C2 node for integrating air power into Army land operations. As a direct 

subordinate element of the JAOC, the ASOC is responsible for the direction and control 

of air operations directly supporting the Army land operation. It processes and 

coordinates air missions requiring integration with other supporting arms and ground 

forces. The ASOC is usually collocated with the senior Army tactical echelon, and 

coordinates operations with the permanently aligned TACP and the JAOC. The ASOC 

has five primary functions. It manages CAS assets within the supported ground 

commander’s AO; processes CAS requests and controls the flow of CAS aircraft; 

deconflicts airspace coordination measures and fire support coordinating measures with 

aircraft; assigns and directs attack aircraft, when authorized, to the joint terminal attack 

controllers (JTACs); and manages the Air Force air request net and its specific tactical air 

direction net frequencies. Additionally, the ASOC may also coordinate in other mission 

areas, to include AI, air defense, ISR, joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD), 

and joint personnel recovery. 

 (c) Tactical Air Control Party. The TACP is the principal Air Force 

liaison element collocated with Army maneuver units from battalion through corps. The 

TACP has two primary missions: advise ground commanders on the capabilities and 

limitations of air operations, and provide the primary terminal attack control of CAS. 

TACPs coordinate ACMs and deconflict aircraft with Army fire support. TACPs are 

organized into expeditionary air support operations groups or squadrons that are aligned 

with their respective Army corps, division, or brigade HQ. 

 (d) Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC[A]). The FAC(A) is a 

specifically trained and qualified aviation officer who exercises control from the air of 

aircraft engaged in CAS of ground troops. The FAC(A) is normally an airborne 

extension of the TACP. The FAC(A) also provides coordination and terminal attack 

control for CAS missions as well as locating, marking, and attacking ground targets using 

other fire support assets. 

 (e) Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) (TAC[A]). The TAC(A) is an 

officer who coordinates, from an aircraft, the actions of other aircraft engaged in air 

support of ground or sea forces. The TAC(A) also expedites CAS aircraft-to-JTAC 

handoff during “heavy traffic” CAS operations. 
Joint Fire Support Command and Control 

II-13 

 (f) Joint Fires Observer (JFO). A JFO is a trained and certified Service 

member who can request, adjust, and control surface-to-surface fires, provide targeting 

information in support of Type 2 and Type 3 CAS terminal attack control, and perform 

autonomous terminal guidance operations (TGO). JFOs provide the capability to exploit 

those opportunities that exist in the operational environment where a trained observer 

could be used to efficiently support air delivered fires, surface-to-surface fires, and 

facilitate targeting. JFOs cannot perform terminal attack control of CAS missions and do 

not replace a trained and certified JTAC.

 (g) Joint Terminal Attack Controller. A JTAC is a qualified (certified) 

Service member who, from a forward position, directs the action of combat aircraft 

engaged in CAS and other offensive air operations. A qualified and current JTAC will be 

recognized across the Department of Defense (DOD) as capable and authorized to 

perform all types of terminal attack control.

See JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, for more detailed information about C2 of CAS 

operations. 

 (h) The Control and Reporting Center (CRC). The CRC is a deployable 

battle management platform employed at the tactical level to support joint air operations. 

It is directly subordinate to the Air Force AOC and can operate independently or in 

combination with other C2 elements. CRC operators are able to support all the same 

mission areas as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) although limited by 

line of sight communications and radar coverage. The JAOC assigns the CRC a 

geographic area, within which it manages all air defense, offensive air and airspace 

management activities. The CRC can disseminate air defense warnings and an air picture 

to other C2 nodes through data links and its extensive communications capabilities. 

(i) Joint Air Component Coordination Element (JACCE). The JFACC 

may establish one or more JACCEs with other commanders’ HQ to better integrate joint 

air operations with their operations. When established, the JACCE is a component level 

liaison that serves as the direct representative of the JFACC. A JACCE is normally made 

up of the liaison element(s) of the Service designated to provide the JFACC. The JACCE 

does not perform any C2 functions and the JACCE director does not have command 

authority over any air forces. The JACCE facilitates the integration of joint air power by 

exchanging current intelligence, operational data, support requirements, and by 

coordinating the integration of JFACC requirements for ACMs, FSCMs, personnel 

recovery, and CAS. JACCE expertise should include plans, operations, ISR, space, 

airspace management, air mobility, and administrative and communications support. 

 (4) Special Operations Component

 (a) The JFSOCC exercises overall responsibility for coordination of all fire 

support in support of SO and, when tasked, fire support using SOF assets in support of 

other elements of the joint force. SOF coordinate fire support through both external and 

SOF channels. Within SOF channels, various elements are established to assist 
Chapter II

II-14 JP 3-09 

commanders in the execution of their fire support responsibilities. SOF elements that 

provide C2 and/or liaison capabilities include:

 1. Joint Special Operations Task Force. The JSOTF is a JTF 

composed of SO units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special 

operation or prosecute SO in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The 

JSOTF may have conventional units assigned or attached to support the conduct of 

specific missions. The JSOTF staff coordinates joint fire support with other components 

of the joint force and US Government agencies. As appropriate, the staff can form a JFE. 

 2. Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander 

(JSOACC). The JSOACC is the commander within a joint SO command responsible for 

planning and executing joint SO air activities, and for ensuring effective coordination, 

synchronization, and integration of such activities with conventional air operations. The 

JSOACC will normally be the commander with the preponderance of aviation assets 

and/or greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support assigned 

and attached SO aviation assets. When a joint special operations air component is 

established as a functional component of a JSOTF, the commander, joint special 

operations task force (CDRJSOTF) normally exercises OPCON of all assigned and 

attached joint SO aviation assets through the JSOACC. However, there are also 

circumstances where the CDRJSOTF may elect to place selected SO aviation assets 

under separate control. A key responsibility of the JSOACC is to ensure close liaison is 

accomplished with other SOF components and with the conventional air components of 

other Service and/or functional component commands. The JSOACC ensures liaison 

with the JFACC is accomplished through the SOLE in the JFACC’s JAOC. Through the 

SOLE, the JSOACC ensures SO aviation activities are closely coordinated, synchronized, 

and integrated with the JFACC’s operations to ensure airspace coordination, flight safety, 

operations security, and unity of effort. 

 3. Naval Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG) and Naval 

Special Warfare Task Unit (NSWTU). Naval SOF assigned to the SO commander are 

normally under the C2 of an NSWTG or NSWTU. The NSWTG is a naval special 

warfare organization that plans, conducts, and supports SO in support of fleet 

commanders and SO commanders. The NSWTU is a subordinate unit of an NSWTG.

 4. Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE). 

The SOCCE is the focal point for the synchronization of SOF activities with land and 

maritime operations. The SOCCE is normally employed when SOF conduct operations 

in conjunction with a conventional force. It collocates with the command element of the 

supported commander and performs C2 or liaison functions directed by the SO

commander. The focus of the coordination is on the synchronization of firepower and 

deconfliction of joint fires. 

 (b) Special Operations Fire Support Coordination. Liaison between 

SOF and other elements of the joint force is critical to both effective support and the 

prevention of fratricide. SOF liaison elements provide SOF expertise to coordinate, 
Joint Fire Support Command and Control 

II-15 

synchronize, and deconflict SO both in support of conventional forces and when SO are 

conducted unilaterally. SOF C2 organizations such as an NSWTG and/or NSWTU or 

SOCCE may provide (or act as) liaison elements for coordination of fire support with 

their respective Service components. Additionally, the following elements are capable of 

providing fire support coordination for SOF: 

 1. Special Operations Liaison Element. The SOLE is a team 

provided by the SO commander to the JFACC (if designated) or appropriate Service 

component air C2 organization to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate SO air, surface, 

and subsurface operations with conventional air operations. The SOLE director works 

directly for the SO commander and is not in the SOF chain of command, thus command 

authority for mission tasking, planning, and execution of SO remains with the SO

commander. The SOLE director places SOF ground, maritime, and air liaison personnel 

in divisions of the JAOC to integrate with the SO staff. The SOLE coordinates 

appropriate FSCMs to help avoid fratricide. 

 2. Special Tactics Team (STT). STTs are a task-organized element 

of US Air Force SOF that may include combat control, pararescue, and SO weather 

personnel. Functions include austere airfield and assault zone reconnaissance, 

surveillance, establishment, and terminal control; tactical weather observations and 

forecasting; combat search and rescue; combat casualty care and evacuation staging; as 

well as coordinating, planning, and conducting air and ground fire support and terminal 

attack control. STTs are a part of the theater SOF and are normally under OPCON of the 

SO commander. When supporting air operations, tactical control of these teams should 

be assigned to the air commander through the AOC as an extension of the theater air 

control system. However, because the STT can be employed by both SOF and theater air 

structures, it is imperative that apportionment, allocation, command relationships, and 

control authority be clearly stated and understood by SO and air commanders. 

 3. Special Operations Coordination Element (SOCOORD). The 

SOCOORD serves as the primary advisor to a US Army corps or MEF commander with 

regard to SOF integration, capabilities, and limitations. The SOCOORD is a functional 

staff element of the corps (or MEF) operations officer and serves as the J-3 SOF advisor, 

with augmentation, if the corps (or MEF) is established as a JTF. 

 4. Joint Air Component Coordination Element to the Special 

Operations Task Force. The JFACC provides a JACCE to other commanders in the 

JOA to assist in coordinating joint air operations. For SOF, the JACCE will typically be 

located at the JSOTF and work with the JFE. The JACCE provides the JSOTF with air 

power expertise for both SOF and conventional air force assets. The JACCE represents 

the JFACC for joint air operations and the JSOACC commander at the JSOTF on issues 

relating to SOF and conventional air force integration into the ground scheme of 

maneuver. The JACCE is the focal point for all preplanned air requests (e.g., CAS, 

airlift, ISR, EW), and is responsible for validating JTAC’s currency and qualifications 

upon entry into theater and tracking JTACs for all SOF components. The JACCE will be 

active in both future planning and current operations at the JSOTF, and will work closely 
Chapter II

II-16 JP 3-09 

with the JFE to pass the most responsive assets to immediate engagements that may 

require fire support. 

 5. Joint Fires Element. The SOF JFE plans, coordinates, 

synchronizes, and executes fire support to safeguard both friendly ground and air units 

while expediting joint fires. Together with the JACCE, the JFE will monitor and rapidly 

respond to SOF joint fires requests. The JFE/JACCE team can efficiently determine the 

most responsive resource and delivery means to respond to immediate support requests. 

The JFE consolidates FSCMs for the JSOTF, tracks team locations, and reports them to 

the SOLE to aid the air-ground deconfliction process. 

e. Joint Fire Support Coordination, Targeting, Surveillance, and Management 

Systems

 (1) Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS)

 (a) JADOCS facilitates the integration of joint/coalition fires. Digital 

integration of US and allied joint fires systems enables timely execution of TSTs, HPTs, 

and HVTs. The enhanced JADOCS allows for improved internal and external 

coordination/execution of immediate targets by providing a suite of tools and interfaces 

for horizontal and vertical integration across functional areas. It is currently installed on 

over 900 systems worldwide, is the baseline for the Naval Fires Control System, and is a 

major segment of the intelligence application package for theater battle management core 

system (TBMCS) functionality at wing and squadron levels. The automated four 

dimensional deconfliction capability aids in the reduction of fratricide, thereby expediting 

prosecution of targets. 

 (b) The joint management function provides the ability to rapidly change 

and display operational graphics and FSCMs while conducting joint fire support. It uses 

the JADOCS engagement zone manager (EZM) and the common geographic reference 

system to portray operational and some tactical operational graphics and FSCMs for both 

linear and nonlinear situations. The EZM enables operators to quickly create and change 

FSCMs and coordinate them between components for rapid approval and display. When 

used in conjunction with the control measures manager, which enables rapid change and 

display of FSCMs, these tools enable the JFC and components to visualize friendly fires 

in three dimensions over any area. Operational graphics can also be overlaid with 

imagery and terrain data to improve SA and planning. 

 (c) The AI planning and execution function provides more effective 

employment of AI assets through timely and improved information flow for the 

identification, assignment, and nomination of AI targets. It enables the joint force 

component commanders and staff to allocate air resources in a more efficient manner 

through early assessment of potential and planned missions. AI provides the ability to 

monitor ATO execution through all phases and provides immediate visibility into AI 

nominations throughout the targeting process, including periodic updates to tune AI 

missions and maximize joint fires.
Joint Fire Support Command and Control 

II-17 

 (d) The counterfire-common operational picture (CF-COP) function 

provides a near real-time picture of the artillery battle. It allocates cannon and rocket 

resources for more efficient counterfire operations through digital integration at multiechelons; from joint/multinational level down to tactical firing units. CF-COP also 

includes munitions allocation and status. 

 (e) The FSCMs analysis function provides a means for assessing changes 

and movements of the fire support coordination line (FSCL) on current and planned 

missions in the ATO. It provides immediate visibility of targets exposed or covered by 

movements in the FSCL and offers the JFC and staff opportunities to assess the 

consequences prior to movement. 

 (f) The multinational coordination and integration function facilitates the 

integration of coalition artillery with respect to both the counterfire battle and other 

surface fires missions.

 (g) The operational area visualization function enables improved SA. It 

uses tools that provide visualization of coordination measures, ingress and egress routes, 

and air defense threats. It also enables the commander and staff to visualize friendly fires 

in three dimensions over any area. Control and coordination measures also can be 

overlaid with imagery and terrain data to improve SA and planning. 

 (2) Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS)

 (a) AFATDS is a fully automated C2 and communications system that 

prioritizes targets and pairs them with optimal fire support weapon systems. It gives 

commanders timely, accurate, and coordinated fire support to prioritize and engage 

targets. AFATDS can execute as a completely automated system, but allows for human 

intervention whenever necessary or at optional points. Configurable commanders’ 

guidance is factored into each mission. Tailorable options and rule sets are available for

target processing, weapon pairing, information distribution, and communications

redundancy. AFATDS supports planning, execution, movement control, artillery mission 

support, FA fire direction operations, and target analysis and engagement. 

 (b) Unit relationships are user-configurable to adapt to changing needs and

force structure. The system provides agility, allowing for the establishment of the sensorto-shooter link while enforcing mission coordination requirements. AFATDS provides

critical SA. Both friendly and enemy unit graphics are displayed, along with target

information from multiple sources. Due to multilevel communications across the

network, unit status and weapon platforms are monitored and updated continually on the

map. Information may be directly accessed from the map symbols. Friendly and enemy

units, targets, and operational areas can all be seen. Each AFATDS workstation may

filter the information to be displayed, allowing the commander to monitor the dynamic

current situation, missions processing through the system, and target updates from a

unique perspective. 
Chapter II

II-18 JP 3-09 

 (c) AFATDS is not limited to FA communications, but can communicate 

and exchange data with Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, and North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) systems. It is interoperable with all fires subsystems including 

gun display unit, artillery fire control systems, Firefinder Radar, Airborne Target

Handover System, and forward observer (FO) system. It interoperates with the Army 

Battle Command Systems suite. The system also interoperates with joint level automated

systems such as Tactical Airspace Integration System, TBMCS, Joint Surveillance and

Target Attack Radar System (Ground Control Station), and Global Command and

Control System, as well as with Allied FA C2 systems such as the United Kingdom’s 

Battlefield Artillery Target Engagement System and the German ADLER. It operates 

over wire, combat net radio, mobile subscriber equipment, and satellite and can

communicate over local area network for SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network

(SIPRNET)/Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) and Enhanced 

Position Location and Reporting System operations. 

 (d) The planning function within AFATDS allows for detailed planning 

and COA analysis by projecting friendly and enemy positions, guidance specific to the 

plan, and a task organization for the plan. In order to assist with the planning function, an 

enemy template tool is provided. A system tool supports multiphase maneuver COAs 

and can compare and recommend the best COA considering commander’s priorities. 

Plans can be easily disseminated. The planning activity does not affect the current 

situation until the operator implements the plan. Plans are implemented into the current

situation by phase — this immediately updates the unit task organization guidance, 

geometry, and target database to reflect changes.

 (e) Target analysis and engagement is a robust aspect of AFATDS. Target 

list management functions allow for copy and merge, target duplication checks, sorting,

searching, and target data reception and transmission. Fire plans and schedules of fires

guidance can also be applied to target analysis (e.g., target selection standards, HPTs, 

decay time, target prioritization). The fire support system task list alone can contain a 

100-rule set of prioritized target to weapon system parings and a prioritized list of 

commander’s preferences. Preplanned missions can be linked to sensor reports for 

dynamic targeting. The system can deal with many weapons and pair those weapons to 

targets, minimizing the sensor to shooter timeline. The system can filter sensor reports so 

that every report does not have to be engaged, and the system also selects the best 

weapon and munitions based on target parameters (e.g., environment, countermeasures, 

target location error [TLE], age), the munitions required (e.g., effects capability, hazard 

area), and weapon status (e.g., response time, current mission load, ammunition 

inventory). AFATDS can determine quantities of munitions to achieve a desired target 

damage effects. The system will filter targets and process missions based on a

configurable mission value and precedence. The system analyzes cannon, mortar, rocket,

ATACMS, fixed- and rotary-wing air, naval gun, standard missile, and Tomahawk as 

possibilities for weapons. It deconflicts ground and airspace encroachments (spatial 

coordination is four dimensional, including time analysis), is fully automatic, and keeps 

interested nodes appraised of targeting information. The system considers commanders’ 

guidance, latest unit status, mission history, and effects algorithms, which determine 
Joint Fire Support Command and Control 

II-19 

munition quantity for both guided and unguided munitions. During mission processing, 

the operator may view and tailor the system recommendation. The intervention display 

shows all key data and analysis results. 

 (3) Theater Battle Management Core System

 (a) The TBMCS is a force level integrated air C2 system. TBMCS 

provides hardware, software, and communications interfaces to support the preparation,

modification, and dissemination of the force-level air battle plan (ABP). The ABP

includes the ATO and airspace control order (ACO). TBMCS unit-level operations and

intelligence applications provide Air Force wings the capability to receive the ABP, parse 

it, and manage wing operations and intelligence to support execution of the ABP. 

 (b) TBMCS supports the development and sharing of a common relevant

operational picture of theater air and surface activity. Common TBMCS applications and

interfaces provide a network for joint force data sharing. The TBMCS intelligence and

targeting applications at the theater JFACC level, at the ASOC, and at the DASC support

the coordination of precision engagement fires, safe passage zones, and near real-time

warnings of impending air attack. The air and surface surveillance and weapons

coordination engagement options enable synchronized operations and employment of the

correct weapons for each target to generate the desired results. Engagement intentions

and results assessments are shared by all TBMCS network participants, contributing to

improved decisionmaking by commanders. 

 (c) TBMCS links tactical aviation and related units to the JFACC. When 

properly employed, TBMCS is a tool enabling linkage from the operational objectives of 

the commander, joint task force, through the JFACC, to the tactical activity of individual 

units. It also facilitates air battle planning, intelligence, operations, and execution 

functions for theater air operations; and enables coordination among higher, adjacent, and 

subordinate units and across Service boundaries. 

 (d) TBMCS fielding includes every theater air component, all Navy aircraft

carriers and command ships, all Marine air wings, and all Air Force flying wings and

ASOC squadrons. Army BCDs also interface with TBMCS. TBMCS uses two primary 

databases: the air operations database and the Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB). 

TBMCS contains a combination of processes and tools to support ATO production, 

which is the primary product TBMCS. 

 (4) Airborne Warning and Control System. The AWACS provides radar 

control and surveillance of air traffic. The AWACS’s range, flexibility, and C2 system 

capabilities enable it to operate directly subordinate to the JAOC. It is able to provide 

many of the capabilities of the CRC, depending upon mission configuration and the needs 

of the theater. It can establish data links with other C2 nodes, such as the ASOC, and can 

disseminate air defense warnings and an accurate air picture. AWACS can also provide 

limited functions of the ASOC and TAC(A). AWACS cannot provide positive CID of 

ground targets. 
Chapter II

II-20 JP 3-09 

 (5) Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). JSTARS 

performs theater-wide C2 and ISR support missions. JSTARS provides radar 

surveillance and targeting information to component commanders to develop an 

understanding of the enemy situation and to support operations. JSTARS mission 

capabilities contribute to an understanding of the friendly and enemy situation and assist 

ground, air, and naval commanders in delaying, disrupting, and destroying enemy forces 

and C2 of friendly forces, in accordance with the JFC’s overall objectives. JSTARS 

supports these component operations by providing continuous wide area surveillance and 

targeting support to commanders equipped with common ground station and Joint 

Service Work Station. JSTARS can also support air operations to include AI, CAS, 

offensive counterair, and nontraditional missions. JSTARS can also provide limited 

functions of the ASOC and TAC(A). JSTARS cannot provide positive CID of ground 

targets.

 (6) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs). UASs offer the joint force 

significant capabilities and are integrated into all levels by the Services. UASs can be 

employed for higher risk and longer endurance missions with varying levels of autonomy 

and survivability because they have no aircrew design limitations. As an ISR platform, a 

UAS can provide timely ISR required for attacking and assessing targets (e.g., TSTs, 

HPTs, and HVTs). They offer a broad range of collection capabilities, including 

communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, electro-optical, infrared imagery, 

and real-time imagery. In addition, a UAS can provide target marking, laser designation, 

communications gateway extension (e.g., communications relay, network extension),

ordnance delivery, and weapons effects assessment in support of joint fire support (see 

Chapter III, “Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution,” subparagraph 7a[3], 

“Unmanned Aircraft Systems”). In all of these capacities, UAS provide the JFC with 

options that have significant risk management advantages, such as persistence and 

minimal risk to friendly personnel, over manned systems. 

 (7) Service Assets. Each Service operates additional assets such as the US

Army’s Airborne Reconnaissance Low-Multifunction, the US Navy’s EP-3s, or the US 

Air Force’s RC-135s and U-2s that, if allocated or used in a net-centric reporting 

environment, can also provide timely intelligence support to joint fire support. 
III-1 

CHAPTER III

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING AND EXECUTION

1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the planning and coordination of joint fire support. Joint fire 

support planning and coordination ensures that all available joint fire support is 

synchronized in accordance with the JFC’s plan. The key to effective integration of 

joint fire support is the thorough and continuous inclusion of all component fire

support elements in the joint planning process, aggressive coordination efforts, and 

a vigorous execution of the plan. Commanders should not rely solely on their joint fire 

support agencies to plan and coordinate joint fire support. A continuous dialogue 

between the commander, subordinate commanders, and joint fire support planners must 

occur.

 a. Joint fire support planning is an integral part of the overall planning process. 

Joint fire support planners and/or coordinators actively participate with other members of 

the staff to develop estimates, give the commander recommendations, develop the joint

fire support portion of the CONOPS, and supervise the execution of the commander’s 

decision. The effectiveness of their planning and coordination is predicated on the 

commander providing clear and precise guidance. 

 b. All components can plan for and coordinate joint fire support. Integral to the 

commander’s CONOPS is the concept of fires. Just as the JFC’s intent and CONOPS 

should take into account the integration and synchronization of tactical, operational, and 

strategic operations, the CONOPS for component commanders should integrate and 

synchronize joint fire support at the tactical as well as the operational level. Joint fire 

support planning and coordination must be continuous and its execution decentralized. 

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, for a more detailed 

discussion of planning and operational considerations. 

2. Joint Fire Support Planning

The purpose of joint fire support planning is to optimize its employment by 

integrating and synchronizing joint fire support with the commander’s maneuver plan. 

During the planning phase, commanders develop a CONOPS, including the concept 

for fires. Commanders determine how to shape the operational environment with 

fires to assist maneuver and how to use maneuver to exploit the use of joint fire 

support. Objectives are restated in terms of what effects are required from joint fire 

“Commanders and leaders must remain flexible and therefore, must keep plans 

simple. Be nimble of mind.”

General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff (1993-1997), quoted at Ft. Polk
Chapter III

III-2 JP 3-09 

support. Decisive operations, freedom of action, massing the effects of firepower, and 

depth and simultaneity are typical considerations. Joint fire support planners are 

responsible for advising commanders on the best use of available joint fires support, 

developing joint fire support plans, issuing necessary orders in the name of appropriate 

commanders, and implementing approved joint fire support plans for the component or 

joint force. Joint fire support requirements are considered throughout the JFC’s planning 

and decision-making processes and during all phases of an operation.

 a. Planning. Contingency planning of joint fire support is a complex task. Joint fire 

support planning becomes even more complex during crisis action planning due to the 

limited time to plan and coordinate operations that may require rapid execution. During 

crisis situations, joint fire support planning must expeditiously organize and prioritize 

limited assets to synchronize fires.

 b. Basic Joint Fire Support Tasks. Effectiveness of the joint fire support effort is 

measured by creating desired effects on the enemy, setting conditions for decisive 

operations, and supporting joint force operations. Effective joint fire support depends 

on planning for the successful performance of the following four basic fire support 

tasks:

 (1) Support Forces in Contact. The commander must provide responsive joint 

fire support that protects and ensures freedom of maneuver to forces in contact with the 

enemy throughout the operational area. 

(2) Support the Concept of Operation. The CONOPS clearly and concisely 

expresses what the JFC intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available 

resources. The concept of fires must describe how joint fires will be synchronized and 

integrated to support the JFC’s objectives as articulated in the CONOPS. 

 (3) Synchronize Joint Fire Support. Joint fire support is synchronized 

through fire support coordination, beginning with the commander’s estimate and 

CONOPS. Joint fire support must be planned both continuously and concurrently with 

the development of the scheme of maneuver. Further, operations providing joint fire 

support must be synchronized with other joint force operations (e.g., air operations, 

cyberspace operations, ISR functions, SO, and IO) in order to optimize the application of 

limited resources, achieve synergy, and avoid fratricide.

 (4) Sustain Joint Fire Support Operations. Joint fire support planners must 

formulate joint fire support plans to reflect logistic limitations and to exploit logistic 

capabilities. Ammunition, fuel, food, water, maintenance, transportation, and medical 

support are all critical to sustaining joint fire support operations.

 c. Planning Considerations Across the Range of Military Operations
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution 

III-3 

 (1) Major Operations and Campaigns

 (a) To achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the 

US national leadership may decide to conduct a major operation involving large-scale 

combat, placing the United States in a wartime state. In such cases, the goal is to prevail 

against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions 

favorable to the United States, the host nation, and its multinational partners. 

 (b) Major operations and campaigns are complex and require detailed 

planning. Joint fire support for major operations may include, but is not limited to, the 

lethal effects of air support by manned and unmanned aircraft, NSFS, artillery, mortars, 

rockets, and missiles, as well as nonlethal effects from EA, CNA, and other nonlethal

capabilities. 

(c) Major operations and campaigns involve an ever-changing balance of

offensive, defensive, and stability operations throughout all phases of the operation. 

Stability operations are missions, tasks, and activities that seek to maintain or reestablish 

a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency 

infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. As the mission in stability 

operations is to restore vital national services, rather than destruction of an enemy force, 

the ROE will normally limit the level of lethal fires employed in support of these 

activities. Additionally, planners must consider the impact of joint fires on stability 

efforts throughout the operation; this includes the impacts of fires conducted during the 

early combat phases on later stabilization and reconstruction phases of the operation. 

 (2) Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

 (a) Crisis response and contingency operations can be a single small-scale, 

limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration

involving combat. The associated general strategic and operational objectives are to 

protect US interests and/or prevent surprise attack or further conflict. 

 (b) Joint fire support employed in support of crisis response and 

contingency operations may be the same as those employed for major operations and 

campaigns but are normally more restrictive in their application. 

 (3) Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

 (a) Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations 

encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is 

tasked to support other government agencies (OGAs) and cooperate with 

intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the United Nations or NATO, and other 

countries to protect and enhance national security interests and deter conflict. These 

operations usually involve a combination of conventional and unconventional forces and 

capabilities as well as the efforts of OGAs, IGOs, and nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs) in a complementary fashion. 
Chapter III

III-4 JP 3-09 

 (b) Various joint operations, such as a show of force or enforcement of 

sanctions, support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve and willingness to use 

force when necessary. Others, such as humanitarian and civic assistance programs, 

promote international stability by enhancing a climate of peaceful cooperation.

 (c) Lethal joint fire support employed in support of security cooperation 

and deterrence operations are normally the most restrictive in their application and may 

be limited to defensive fires only. 

3. Other Planning Considerations

 a. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Limited ISR assets that will be 

in high demand by numerous entities, make it imperative that fire support planners 

carefully consider their ISR requirements and closely coordinate with ISR planners. 

Target and munition selection, mitigation of collateral damage, and assessment cannot be 

accomplished without accurate and timely ISR support. 

 b. Terminal Guidance Operations

 (1) TGO are those actions that provide electronic, mechanical, voice, or visual 

communications that provide approaching aircraft and/or weapons additional information 

regarding a specific target location. Various ground elements or aircrews conducting a 

wide variety of missions can search for, identify, and provide the location of targets using 

systems like Global Positioning System (GPS), laser designators/range finders, aircraft 

targeting pods, etc. Unless qualified as a JTAC or FAC(A), personnel conducting TGO 

do not have the authority to grant weapons release to attacking aircraft. These functions 

must be done by appropriate C2 authorities or a JTAC/FAC(A). 

Note. Terminal guidance is guidance applied to a weapon between midcourse guidance 

and arrival in the vicinity of the target and may be a function of TGO, CAS, interdiction, 

or other missions. 

 (a) TGO can be used to facilitate attacks on targets in locations where the 

supported commander determines that the distance from friendly forces to the target is 

adequate to preclude the need for a JTAC or FAC(A) to perform detailed integration of 

each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces. 

 (b) TGO independent of CAS (not in close proximity to friendly forces)

requires personnel conducting TGO to have direct or indirect communications with the 

individual operating/commanding the delivery system, plus connectivity with TGO 

weapons release authority.

 (2) For TGO to be successful, C2 is essential; ACMs and radio procedures need 

to be established and understood by all participating units and aircrew. TGO may 

leverage CAS, TST, or other tactics, techniques, and procedures to aid in execution (such 
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution 

III-5 

as the CAS nine-line briefing format), but TGO should not be confused with CAS 

operations requiring detailed integration performed by a qualified JTAC or 

FAC(A) in close proximity to friendly forces.

 c. Acquisition of Targets

(1) Laser designator and coordinate seeking weapons (CSW) acquisition 

devices can enhance current capabilities of artillery, NSFS, and aircraft in the delivery of 

munitions. Both aircraft (manned and unmanned) platforms and ground based observers 

can laser-designate targets for laser-guided weapons and provide precision coordinates 

for CSW. Employment of lasers can provide fire support personnel with precise target 

marking, enhanced visual TA, and surprise. It can also reduce the weapon and/or sortie 

attack requirements. However, several factors — environment, laser system inherent 

limits, target types, and laser code management — affect laser employment. Joint fire 

support planners and fire support coordinators must understand advantages and 

limitations when employing lasers. Additional guidance can be found in Appendix C, 

“Laser-Guided Systems,” and JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support).

(2) Planning for using CSW assets in major combat operations carries 

significant implications for intelligence resources. Given the high volume of targets in 

the early days of an operation, advance preparation of targeting solutions will be essential 

for meeting commanders’ guidance for target effects and ROE for collateral damage 

minimization. Just as target systems analysis is crucial to identify vulnerabilities for 

attack, the concept of “aimpoint development” must be applied to optimize and 

coordinate the precise effects achievable with CSW employment.

(3) Aimpoint development involves interactive application of point 

mensuration, weaponeering, and collateral damage estimation (CDE). This, in turn, 

requires suitably skilled target analysts using integrated toolsets to reduce human 

pointing and transcribing errors. Saving mensurated points into the MIDB requires 

individual operator certification as prescribed in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Instruction (CJCSI) 3505.01A, Target Coordinate Mensuration Certification and 

Program Accreditation. In addition, significant workload is involved in deriving

mensurated coordinates, weaponeering, and performing CDE for each joint desired point 

of impact data set as defined in Defense Intelligence Agency Instruction 3000.002, 

US/Allied Target Analysis Program.

 d. Nuclear Fires Planning. Joint nuclear fires are collaboratively planned by US 

Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) in support of the JFC’s efforts in accordance with 

guidance supplied in overarching policies such as the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

(JSCP) and JSCP-Nuclear. Planning efforts are differentiated as either strategic planning 

or theater planning. Only the President of the United States may authorize the 

employment of nuclear weapons through the Commander, USSTRATCOM. Specific 

execution details and operational procedures can be found in USSTRATCOM’s Global 

Strike Plan and Emergency Action Procedures.
Chapter III

III-6 JP 3-09 

 e. Consequence of Execution Planning. When targeting enemy weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) storage sites, weapon systems, or production facilities, the fires cell 

must complete detailed consequence of execution planning to determine the potential 

release hazards due to the strike. Ground commanders in the target area must be advised 

of the predicted hazard area and must be given enough time to take appropriate force 

protection measures. Effects on the local civilians must be anticipated and planned for as 

well. This planning must be done not only for WMD sites, but also for targets known or 

suspected to contain toxic industrial chemicals or materials.

 f. Multinational Considerations

 (1) Military operations will normally be joint and often multinational. Fire 

support coordination in multinational operations demands special arrangements with 

multinational forces and local authorities. To maximize the fires of the multinational 

force and to minimize the possibility of fratricide, the multinational force commander and 

staff become familiar with each nation’s capabilities and limitations in munitions, digital 

capability, and training. This also enhances the capability to conduct fire support 

coordination throughout the multinational force. These special arrangements include 

communications and language requirements, liaison personnel, and interoperability 

procedures. A standard operating procedure (SOP) should be established for fire support 

to achieve the most effective results for its use by the multinational force. To maximize 

the effectiveness of fire support, the multinational force staff performs the following:

 (a) Integrate joint and multinational systems and procedures to determine 

priorities, and identify and track targets.

 (b) Identify delivery systems.

 (c) Assess post-attack results.

 (d) Clear fires.

 (e) Plan and coordinate the use of FSCMs. 

 (2) Examples of coordinated fire support arrangements: 

 (a) Establish NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs). These 

provide participants with common terminology and procedures. When operating with 

countries not in NATO, similar SOP agreements must be made. 

 (b) Use SOF teams assigned to multinational units to provide the JFC an 

accurate evaluation of capabilities, location, and activities of multinational forces, thus 

facilitating the JFC’s C2. 

 (c) Establish guidelines for clearance of indirect fires in the ROE. See JP 

3-16, Multinational Operations, for further information.
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution 

III-7 

 (d) Use a standard datum.

 (e) Establish common meteorological procedures and standards. 

 (f) Provide liaison officers as required. 

 (g) Establish/coordinate the multinational ROE before beginning hostilities, 

and continually refine them during operations. 

 (h) Establish the policy for indirect fire systems using non-precision 

munitions within the ROE. 

 (i) Establish the policy for using smoke, illumination, and cluster munitions 

with inherent high dud potential within the ROE. 

 (j) Establish SOPs for how digitally and non-digitally equipped forces 

operate together. When automatic interfaces are unworkable, determine liaison officer 

requirements. 

 (k) Establish a multinational target numbering system.

4. Joint Fire Support Planning Process

a. Introduction. Joint fire support planning is accomplished utilizing both the 

targeting and joint fire support estimate processes. It is a continual and cyclical process 

of planning, synchronizing, executing, and assessing joint fires involving tactical, 

operational, and strategic considerations that also utilizes joint fire support 

communications systems and architectures. Initiated during mission analysis and 

continuing through post-execution assessment, the joint fire support planning process 

includes the following steps: end state and the commander’s objectives; target 

development and prioritization; capabilities analysis; commander’s decision and force 

assignment; mission planning and force execution; and assessment (see Figure III-1).

More detailed information on this and related processes can be found in JP 3-60, Joint 

Targeting, and the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Fires and 

Targeting Handbook. 

 (1) The JFC and component commander staffs synchronize joint fire support 

operations to optimize effects in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative 

combat power at a decisive place and time. To facilitate synchronization efforts, 

commanders and staffs must have a thorough knowledge of joint and Service doctrine, 

major system capabilities, and procedures. 

 (2) Joint fires and fire support are coordinated and synchronized through the 

joint targeting cycle. The purpose of targeting is to integrate and synchronize fires into 

joint operations. Targeting also supports the process of linking the desired effects of fires 
Chapter III

III-8 JP 3-09 

to actions and tasks at the joint force component level. The joint targeting process allows 

the component commanders to independently plan, coordinate, and utilize organic fires 

and fire support in their AOs to support the JTF CONOPS, while synchronizing joint 

fires across the JOA. The JTCB, in particular, requires each of the components to brief 

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING PROCESS

BDA battle damage assessment

CONOPS concept of operations

JIPTL joint integrated prioritized target list

LEGEND

MOE measure of effectiveness

MOP measure of performance

CONOPS 

Development

Target Product 

Development

Weaponeering

Consolidate Target 

Development, BDA, and 

Capability Analysis

Assign Forces to 

Targets/Missions

Collateral Damage 

Estimation

Issue/Revise 

Plans and Orders

Mission Analysis

Plan and Update

Effects

Targeting Guidance

Confirm and 

Reattack

Approved JIPTL

End State and Commander's Objective

Mission Planning and Force Execution

Assessment

Target Development and Prioritization

Capabilities Analysis

Commander's Decision and Force Assignment

Planning Guidance

Engagement 

Options

Combat 

Assessment

Reattack 

Recommendations

BDA Post-Operation 

Activities

Measure

MOP/MOE

Munitions 

Effectiveness 

Assessment

Target System 

Analysis

Apportionment

Dynamic 

Targeting

Execute Issue Orders

Target Identification 

and Nomination

Figure III-1. Joint Fire Support Planning Process
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution 

III-9 

their scheme of maneuver and show how it supports the JTF CONOPS and works within 

targeting guidance, prior to the JIPTL review. This effort allows both component and 

joint fires to be deconflicted, coordinated, and synchronized. 

 b. Targeting

 (1) Most JFC and component requirements for joint fire support are planned 

and executed using the joint targeting process. The purpose of targeting is to integrate 

and synchronize fires into joint operations. Targeting is the process of selecting and 

prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering 

operational requirements and capabilities. The targeting cycle is a rational and iterative 

process that methodically analyzes, prioritizes, and assigns assets against targets 

systematically to create those effects that will contribute to the achievement of the JFC’s 

objectives. It also supports the process of linking the desired effects of fires to actions 

and tasks at the joint force component level. 

 (2) Within military operations, targeting must be focused on creating specific 

effects to achieve the JFC’s objectives or the subordinate component commander’s 

supporting objectives. Targeting proceeds from the definition of the problem to an 

assessment of the results achieved by the executed COAs. The process allows for the 

testing of multiple solution paths, a thorough understanding of the problem, and the 

refinement of proposed solutions. The joint targeting process is flexible and adaptable to 

a wide range of circumstances.

Detailed information on targeting can be found in JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

 c. Component Planning Steps. This process consists of a series of interrelated 

steps, requiring joint force staff and component cross coordination throughout. 

 (1) Receipt of Mission. Upon receipt of a mission, joint fire support personnel 

assist the commander in mission analysis. Joint fire support personnel must understand 

the commander’s guidance on the following: 

 (a) Specific COAs.

(b) Objectives and end state. 

(c) ISR. 

 (d) TSTs, HVTs, and HPTs.

 (e) Use of weapons effects and special munitions such as blast, 

fragmentation, cluster, nuclear, mines, and lasers.

 (f) Acceptable risks.
Chapter III

III-10 JP 3-09 

 (g) C2. 

 (h) Commitment of the reserve force.

 (i) Critical events to be considered. 

 (j) Commander’s assumptions. 

 (k) ROE.

 (l) Assessment. 

 (m) Host nation concerns. 

 (2) Target Analysis. The commander establishes targeting guidance that must 

be incorporated into the joint fire support planning process. The commander establishes 

the priorities and describes the importance of a target set and/or category in relation to a 

given situation or phase of operation. During an air assault operation, for example, 

attacking known enemy air defense systems may be more important than attacking enemy 

artillery sites. Targeting tactics, techniques, and procedures are discussed in JP 3-60, 

Joint Targeting. The overall effectiveness and efficiency of the joint fire support 

planning process increases as leaders consider the following: 

 (a) The type and amount of delivery assets and munitions available.

 (b) The effectiveness of weapon system and/or munitions. 

 (c) The size, type, ability to detect, and posture of the target. 

 (d) Joint fire support asset characteristics (range, accuracy, rate of fire, and 

response time).

 (e) Civilians and damage to civilian objects.

 (f) Target selection standards and decision criteria for target reattack.

 (g) Damage criteria.

 (3) Preparing the Joint Fire Support Estimate. Typically component staffs 

employ the use of a joint fire support estimate. This estimate influences how available 

joint fire support resources are employed to support the possible COAs and helps joint 

fire support planners and/or coordinators integrate and synchronize the employment of 

joint fire support resources. The estimate is a realistic appraisal of the effort required 

to support the operation. It serves as a basis for identifying joint fire support priority 

requirements that support the commander’s intent. Factors that could affect the mission 

and may be considered in the joint fire support estimate include the following: 
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution 

III-11 

 (a) The task organization of subordinate forces and their missions. 

 (b) The availability of joint fire support resources, including FA, CAS (by 

both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft), NSFS, SOF, EW, and ISR assets.

 (c) The probable enemy fires plan.

 (d) Enemy fires capability.

 (e) The identification of TSTs, HVTs, and HPTs. 

 (f) Consumption factors (type and quantity), positioning requirements, and 

priority of logistic support.

 (g) Joint fires-related decision points. 

 (4) Issuing the Commander’s Estimate. Based on information provided in 

the staff estimates, the commander issues an estimate. It should provide joint fire support 

planners and/or coordinators with guidance regarding prioritization of targets, desired 

effects, and reattack. 

 (5) Course of Action Analysis. COA analysis is a systematic review process 

performed by a commander and staff to determine the best COA for a given operation. 

Each COA must be analyzed to consider the implications of both friendly and enemy 

options during an operation. Joint fire support planners and/or coordinators are key 

players in this analysis process. They advise the commanders on the joint fire support 

assets available and recommend the most effective use of these assets. As the analysis 

progresses, joint fire support planners and/or coordinators continuously evaluate the 

integration of joint fire support into the commander’s emerging concept of operation, to 

include branches and sequels. As a result of this interaction, the commander’s options 

are influenced by the availability and allocation of joint fire support assets. The finished 

product of this analysis is a COA that integrates joint fire support with maneuver and 

synchronizes operations. Joint fire support planners use the results of COA development 

in the targeting process. 

 (6) Initiating Planning Actions. Once the commander decides on a COA, 

joint staff and fire support planners: 

 (a) Refine named areas of interest, decision points, and HVTs/HPTs.

 (b) Integrate and refine the collection, TA, and assessment plan. All 

collection assets are tasked and integrated to ensure there are no gaps in the coverage of 

the AO.

 (c) Develop joint fire support tasks, responsibilities, and requirements.
Chapter III

III-12 JP 3-09 

 (d) Develop the joint fires employment concept and joint fire support plan. 

 d. The Joint Fire Support Plan. See Appendix B, “Joint Fire Support Operation 

Order Format,” for an example format.

5. Joint Fire Support Coordination

 a. Joint fire support coordination includes all efforts to deconflict attacks, avoid 

fratricide, reduce duplication of effort, and assist in shaping the operational environment. 

Coordination procedures must be flexible and responsive to the ever-changing 

dynamics of warfighting. Simplified arrangements for approval or concurrence should 

be established. Coordination is reflected in the CONOPS and in the sequencing and 

timing of actions to achieve objectives. Coordination is enhanced when joint fire support 

personnel clearly understand the commander’s intent. A very important part of the 

coordination process is the identification of potential fratricide situations and the 

necessary coordination measures to positively manage and control the attack of targets.

 (1) Synchronization. Joint fire support coordination is a flexible process that 

must be kept as simple as possible to produce the desired results. The JFC and 

component commanders synchronize joint fire support operations to place the right 

attack means on the correct target at the precise time. To achieve synchronization, 

commanders and staffs must have a thorough knowledge of each Service’s doctrine, 

major systems, significant capabilities and limitations, and often their tactics, techniques, 

and procedures.

 (2) Principles. Agencies involved in coordinating joint fire support employ 

several principles. These principles are extensions of the four basic fire support tasks 

discussed earlier in this chapter.

 (a) Plan Early and Continuously. To effectively integrate joint fire 

support with the scheme of maneuver, planning must begin when the commander states 

the mission and provides the command guidance. Whenever commander’s guidance is 

needed during planning, joint fire support planners and/or coordinators should solicit that 

guidance from the commander. Planning is continuous and keeps pace with the dynamics 

of the battle. Whenever possible, direct coordination can increase the probability for 

success. The tactical unit providing the support should contact the unit being supported 

to conduct detailed tactical planning. This is especially important, and often the hardest 

to execute, when the support is being provided across component boundaries such as 

during CAS. 

 (b) Ensure Continuous Flow of Targeting Information. Joint fire 

support planners and/or coordinators should ensure that TA requirements for joint fire 

support are identified and focused on detecting priority targets. Staffs ensure that target 

information from all sources is evaluated and routed to the appropriate attack means. 

This includes information from all echelons and from adjacent and supporting elements. 
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution 

III-13 

 (c) Consider the Use of all Lethal and/or Nonlethal Attack Means. 

Joint fire support planners and/or coordinators consider all attack means available at their 

level and higher levels. They also consider the command guidance for the use of these 

attack means in the present battle and in future battles.

 (d) Use the Lowest Echelon Capable of Furnishing Effective Support. 

In order to keep joint fire support responsive, the lowest level having effective means 

available should deliver it. Joint fire support planners and/or coordinators must 

determine what is needed. If assets are inadequate, they must request additional joint fire 

support from the appropriate echelon or component. Coordination among Service and 

functional components should occur at the lowest possible echelon. When coordination 

cannot be accomplished or additional guidance is required, the next higher echelon 

should be consulted. 

 (e) Furnish the Type of Joint Fire Support Requested. The requester is 

usually in the best position to determine joint fire support requirements. However, joint 

fire support planners and/or coordinators are in a position to weigh the request against the 

commander’s guidance on priority targets and the current and future needs for joint fire 

support. The component, unit, or organization providing the fire support is normally best 

able to provide the detailed targeting planning for optimum results.

 (f) Use the Most Effective Joint Fire Support Means. Requests for joint 

fire support are transmitted to the force capable of delivering the most effective joint fires 

within the required time. When developing a recommendation for the appropriate 

weapon system, the joint fire support planners and/or coordinators should consider 

the nature and importance of the target, the engagement time window, the 

availability of attack assets, and the results desired. In some circumstances, it may be 

necessary to sequence the attack by fixing the enemy with immediately available joint 

fire support assets, while coordinating a subsequent more detailed attack by more 

effective assets. It may be necessary to use multiple assets to create the desired effects on 

a target.

 (g) Avoid Unnecessary Duplication. A key task for joint fire support 

planners and/or coordinators is to ensure that duplications of joint fire support are 

resolved. 

 (h) Coordinate Airspace

 1. All component commanders must have the freedom to use airspace 

to achieve the JFC’s objectives and must have maximum flexibility to use assets (organic 

and joint) within that airspace. Effective airspace management requires a responsive 

airspace control system, standardization, minimal restrictions, and continuous 

coordination among all airspace users. Joint planning and coordination are necessary 

to minimize mutual interference while deploying and employing air defense and fire 

support assets. 
Chapter III

III-14 JP 3-09 

See JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, and JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air 

Operations, for additional information. 

 2. Commanders, assisted by joint fire support planners and/or 

coordinators, must ensure that conflicts between surface-based indirect fire and air 

operations are minimized. For example, an uncoordinated attack deep into the surface 

AO by the joint force land component could result in an unexpected repositioning of 

enemy air defense just prior to a planned air strike. Similarly, an uncoordinated air 

mission beyond the FSCL could influence the wrong enemy force and interfere with the 

ground scheme of maneuver. 

 3. All Services operate systems for airspace control. When similar 

Service systems are linked with the airspace control authority by communications, 

standardized procedures, and liaison, they become part of the integrated airspace control 

system. The highest probability of interference between aircraft and surface-to-surface 

weapons occurs at relatively low altitudes in the immediate vicinity of firing locations 

and target impact areas. FSCMs and ACMs exist within a network of component joint 

FISTs, liaison parties, and fire coordination elements. Using FSCMs and ACMs 

correctly can prevent fratricide and duplication of effort while increasing the 

effectiveness of air-to-ground and ground-to-ground ordnance. 

JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, contains a detailed discussion on airspace control. 

 (i) Provide Adequate Support. The mission and commander’s guidance 

determine the amount and type of joint fire support needed for success. Joint fire 

support planners and/or coordinators must inform the maneuver commander when 

joint fire support requirements exceed capabilities.

 (j) Provide for Rapid Coordination. Commanders must establish 

procedures and responsibilities for the rapid coordination of joint fire support. In 

some circumstances, coordination of joint fire support will be detailed and done in 

advance. In other instances, due to operational circumstances, coordination will be rapid 

and less detailed. Poor communication and collaboration procedures or inadequate 

FSCMs may delay the delivery of joint fires, or the clearance of those fires, and 

jeopardize the force. Joint fire support planners and/or coordinators must know the 

availability of assets, the CONOPS, the commander’s intent, FSCMs in effect, ROE, 

clearance of joint fires procedures, and any other restrictions. 

 (k) Protect the Force. Given the complexity inherent in joint fire support, 

prevention of fratricide must always be a high priority. Commanders at all levels 

must consciously and deliberately reduce the potential for fratricide. 

 1. In the execution of joint fire support, joint forces must implement 

measures to reduce the risk of fratricide to include disciplined execution of OPORDs, the 

ACO, depth, vertical and horizontal coordination among forces, CID procedures, and 

detailed situation awareness.
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution 

III-15 

 2. The change of established FSCMs and/or ACMs must be 

coordinated as far in advance as possible. All joint force coordinating agencies must 

inform their forces of the effective times and locations of new FSCMs and/or ACMs. 

Following direction to execute the change, the component operations cells should 

confirm the changes to ensure that affected forces are aware of new FSCM and/or ACM 

locations and that associated positive control measures are being followed. 

 3. Additional measures that may be considered to protect the force 

include: 

 a. Guidance and restrictions governing the authority, use, 

reporting, marking, and clearing of mines and munitions with high sub-munitions dud 

rates. 

 b. Restrictions on the use of incendiary munitions where resulting 

fires might endanger maneuvering forces. 

 c. Guidance regarding cessation of NSFS to ensure safety of 

amphibious shipping and joint forces operating in the AOA. 

 d. Policy on use of selected munitions and fuzes (e.g., variable 

time fuze) in the JOA and/or AO. 

 e. Development and disciplined use of common operational 

graphics and associated maneuver and ACMs and FSCMs throughout the joint force. 

 f. Special safety precautions to be observed during ship-to-shore 

movement and with operations involving helicopterborne assaults. 

 g. Weapons employment restrictions. 

 h. Target identification and engagement criteria. 

 i. Prohibited targets.

 (l) Analyze Effectiveness. During an operation, the effectiveness of joint 

fire support is continuously evaluated to ensure that it is achieving the commander’s 

intent.

 (m) Provide for Flexibility. Joint fire support planners and/or 

coordinators must anticipate and provide for future contingencies. On-order missions and 

the careful positioning of assets give the commander the flexibility to respond to 

changing battlefield conditions.

 b. Control and Coordination Measures. Within their operational areas, land and 

maritime commanders employ permissive and restrictive FSCMs to expedite attack of 
Chapter III

III-16 JP 3-09 

targets; protect forces, populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural 

significance; clear joint fires; deconflict joint fire support operations; and establish 

conditions for future operations. Along with other control measures, FSCMs and their 

associated procedures help ensure that joint fire support does not jeopardize troop safety, 

interfere with other attack means, or disrupt operations of adjacent subordinate units. 

Maneuver commanders position and adjust control measures consistent with the location 

of friendly forces, the concept of the operation, anticipated enemy actions, and in 

consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. The 

primary purpose of permissive measures is to facilitate the attack of targets. Permissive 

measures facilitate reducing or eliminating coordination requirements for the engagement 

of targets with conventional means. Restrictive measures impose requirements for 

specific coordination before engagement of targets. Control and coordination measures 

are discussed in detail in Appendix A, “Control and Coordination Measures.” 

6. Joint Fire Support Assessment

Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of 

employing joint force capabilities during military operations. The JFC and component 

commanders assess the operational environment and the progress of operations, and 

compare them to their initial vision and intent. 

a. The assessment process begins during mission analysis, when the commander and 

staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward 

accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective, and continues 

throughout execution. Assessment actions and measures help commanders adjust 

operations and resources as required, determine when to execute branches and sequels, 

and make other critical decisions to ensure current and future operations remain aligned 

with the mission and end state. 

 b. Assessment is conducted at all levels of war. At the operational and strategic 

levels it is typically more wide-ranging than at the tactical level and uses measures of 

effectiveness that support strategic and operational mission accomplishment. Strategicand operational-level assessment efforts concentrate on broader tasks, effects, objectives, 

and progress toward the end state. Tactical-level assessment typically uses measures of 

performance to evaluate task accomplishment. The results of tactical tasks are often 

physical in nature, but also can reflect the impact on specific functions and systems. 

Assessment of results at the tactical level helps commanders determine operational and 

strategic progress, so JFCs must have a comprehensive, integrated assessment plan that 

links assessment activities and measures at all levels. 

c. At the tactical level, combat assessment (CA) encompasses many tactical-level 

assessment actions and has implications at the operational level as well. CA typically 

focuses on determining the results of weapons engagement (with both lethal and 

nonlethal capabilities), and thus is an important component of joint fires, joint fire 

support, and the joint targeting process. To conduct CA, it is important to fully 

understand the linkages between the targets and the JFC’s objectives, targeting guidance, 
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution 

III-17 

and desired effects. CA is composed of three related elements: battle damage 

assessment, munitions effectiveness assessment, and reattack recommendations or future 

targeting.

For more on assessment, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, and 

the USJFCOM Joint Fires and Targeting Handbook. 

7. Joint Fire Support and Force Capabilities

 a. Lethal. Following is a general discussion of lethal capabilities available to the 

JFC for joint fire support planning. 

 (1) Fixed-Wing Aircraft. The flexibility, range, speed, lethality, precision, and 

ability to mass at a desired time and place contributes significantly to the overall joint fire 

support available to a JFC. Fixed-wing aircraft offer the versatility and capability to 

deliver combat power against the enemy when and where needed to attain objectives 

across the range of military operations. The ability of aircraft to employ precision-guided 

munitions offers a distinct advantage over other weapon systems in many cases. Guided 

weapons can correct for ballistic, release, and targeting errors in flight. Manned aircraft 

can offer the advantage of providing immediate attack assessment. Also, stealth 

technology and the ability to employ air launched conventional standoff weaponry offer 

unique advantages and, in effect, may achieve their own local air superiority due to their 

reduced detectability.

 (2) Attack Helicopters. The US Army normally employs attack helicopters as 

maneuver units capable of conducting two basic types of attack missions, close combat 

attack and interdiction attack. US Army attack helicopters can also perform CAS

functions when operating in support of another component. The USMC employs its 

attack rotary-wing aviation primarily as a CAS platform. As an integral part of the 

MAGTF, the ACE deploys as a supporting element to the GCE to execute CAS missions 

in support of ground maneuver elements. Attack helicopters are capable of employing 

precision guided weapons and providing terminal guidance for other weapon platforms. 

They are also capable of operating during periods of limited visibility.

(3) Unmanned Aircraft Systems. The long endurance capability of UASs has 

demonstrated that UASs can be critical to the support of TST, HVT, and HPT missions. 

Situations may require UASs to support CAS, strike coordination and reconnaissance, AI, 

and other joint fires missions. Specific tasks for the UASs may include: target 

acquisition/marking, terminal guidance of ordnance, providing precision coordinates for 

GPS-aided munitions, delivery of onboard precision-guided ordnance, battle damage 

assessment, and retargeting (i.e., shoot-look-shoot). In the TST role, UASs are routed, 

controlled, and deconflicted in the same manner as fixed- and rotary-winged manned 

aircraft, as outlined in joint doctrine. Current weapons employed by unmanned aircraft 

are in the 500-pound class or less and are usually GPS- or laser-guided. 
Chapter III

III-18 JP 3-09 

 (4) Missiles

 (a) ATACMS provides long-range, surface-to-surface fires against high 

value, well-defended targets, day or night, and in near-all weather conditions. The 

ATACMS missiles fired from the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and the High 

Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers deliver warheads that include 

antipersonnel/antimateriel bomblets, unitary high-explosive charges, or guided 

submunitions. ATACMS can support a full range of operations including TSTs, JSEAD, counterfires, and in strikes requiring high levels of accuracy. Their inherent low 

risk, accuracy, and range make these missiles a very viable option against stationary, nonhardened targets.

 (b) US Navy TLAMs can be effective in engaging well-defended targets at 

long distances and provide a potent precision employment option to the joint force. Their 

inherent low risk, accuracy, and range make these missiles a very viable option against 

stationary, non-hardened targets. The TLAM weapon system may require coordination 

with the strike and mission planners in theater at the maritime component commander’s 

HQ. Planning is an ongoing process, independent of the decision to use the weapon and 

can run in parallel to the decision process. With proper planning, TLAMs are capable of 

conducting short-notice employment, day or night, with few weather restrictions. TLAM 

strikes may be conducted without air support and/or when manned aircraft loss is 

considered to be likely. TLAMs are also capable of neutralizing enemy air defenses to 

facilitate a much larger attack by land- and maritime-based airpower. In theater, the 

associated afloat planning systems suites provide the joint force maritime component 

commander with the capability to plan new missions or modify selected missions in the 

operational area.

 (c) The US Air Force conventional air-launched cruise missile (CALCM) is 

a near-precision, GPS-aided standoff weapon launched from a B-52. Mission planning 

for the CALCM is accomplished by reachback, and close coordination is required 

between missile planners, B-52 aircraft planners, and AOC planning staffs. 

 (d) The joint air-to-surface standoff missile (JASSM) is a US Air Force air 

launched, low observable (LO), subsonic cruise missile specifically designed to penetrate 

air defense systems. The missile incorporates GPS guidance with an infrared seeker in 

the terminal phase of flight. Optimizing JASSM’s full precision and LO capabilities 

requires prior coordination with both strike units and target intelligence agencies.

 (5) Rockets. The MLRS and the HIMARS launchers provide the joint force 

with effective counterfire and attack of enemy defenses, light materiel, and personnel 

targets. These weapon systems supplement cannon artillery fires by delivering large 

volumes of firepower against selected targets. The MLRS and HIMARS typically fire 

free-flight rockets against area targets and guided munitions against point targets. The 

guided MLRS rocket provides another precision attack capability to support maneuver 

forces and provide interdiction of HPTs and HVTs.
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution 

III-19 

 (6) Cannon Artillery and Mortars. Although cannon artillery and mortars 

primarily provide close supporting fires to maneuver forces, they can also perform other 

roles such as interdiction to support maneuver, or J-SEAD to facilitate air operations. 

New precision artillery rounds, such as the Excalibur, provide all weather precision strike 

capability for point targets in close proximity to friendly forces. 

 (7) Naval Surface Fire Support

 (a) The general mission of NSFS ship units in an amphibious operation is 

to support the assault by destroying or neutralizing shore installations that oppose the 

approach of ships and aircraft, defenses that may oppose the LF, and defenses that may 

oppose the post-landing advance of the LF. 

 (b) When the number of ships permits, each assault battalion will be

assigned a ship in DS. The DS mission establishes a one-to-one relationship between an 

NSFS ship and the supported unit. The ship delivers fires on planned targets and targets 

of opportunity in her zone of fire (ZF), which normally corresponds to the zone of action 

of the supported unit. When possible, ships capable of performing simultaneous missions 

will be given a DS mission to allow for maximum firepower to the forward units of the 

LF.

 (c) The GS mission requires an NSFS ship to support the force as a whole 

or that portion of the force to which the ship is assigned. A ship in GS attacks targets in 

the ZF which corresponds to the zone of action of the supported unit. Prearranged fires 

are delivered in accordance with a schedule of fires published in the ATF OPORD and 

the NSFS plan in the LF OPORD. Fires may also be allocated to a subordinate unit for a 

specific mission(s). Upon completion of the mission(s), the ship reverts to GS. Ships in 

GS support regimental-sized units or larger. 

For further details and information on lethal joint fires assets, see FM 3-09.32, Marine 

Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-16.6B, Navy Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures (NTTP) 3-09.2, AFTTP(I) 3-2.6, J-FIRE, Multi-Service Procedures for the 

Joint Application of Firepower.

 b. Nonlethal. Following is a general description of nonlethal capabilities available 

to the JFC that facilitate joint fire planning and support. It is important to note that 

nonlethal weapons are not without risk; but they are weapons explicitly designed and 

primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel while minimizing 

fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the 

environment. 

 (1) Information Operations. The integration and synchronization of fires with 

IO through the targeting process is fundamental to creating the necessary synergy 

between IO and more traditional maneuver and strike operations. While all IO 

capabilities can be used in joint fire support, EA and CNA are discussed below. 
Chapter III

III-20 JP 3-09 

 (a) Electronic Attack. EA is the division of EW involving the use of 

electromagnetic (EM) energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack 

personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or 

destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires. EA includes: 

actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the EM spectrum, such as 

jamming and EM deception, and employment of weapons that use either EM or directed 

energy as their primary destructive mechanism (e.g., lasers, radio frequency weapons, 

particle beams).

 (b) Computer Network Attack. CNA is the division of computer network 

operations that uses computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information 

resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks 

themselves.

 (2) Other. Other nonlethal joint fire support includes obscurant fires to mask 

friendly positions and illumination fires when required for night operations. 

8. Joint Fire Support Coordination Measures and Reference Systems

 a. Fire Support Coordination Measures. See Appendix A, “Control and 

Coordination Measures,” for a detailed discussion of FSCMs.

 b. Global Area Reference System (GARS). GARS provides commanders a 

worldwide common frame of reference for joint force SA to facilitate coordination, 

deconfliction, integration, and synchronization. For further guidance refer to JP 2-03, 

Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. 

9. Combat Identification 

CID is the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in the 

operational environment sufficient to support an engagement decision. Depending on the 

situation and the operational decisions that must be made, this characterization may be 

limited to “friend,” “enemy,” “neutral,” or “unknown.” In other situations, other 

characterizations may be required — including, but not limited to, class, type, nationality, 

and mission configuration. CID characterizations, when applied with combatant 

commander ROE, enable engagement decisions and the subsequent use, or prohibition of 

use, of lethal and nonlethal weaponry to accomplish military objectives. CID is used for 

force posturing, C2, SA, and strike/no-strike employment decisions. Comprehensive CID 

training, in conjunction with effective CID procedures and available technology, can 

greatly reduce the risk of fratricide. Effective CID not only reduces the likelihood of 

fratricide, but also enhances joint fire support by instilling confidence that a designated 

target is, in fact, as described.

 a. The JFC’s CID procedures should be developed early during planning and ROE 

development. When developing the JFC’s CID procedures, important considerations 

include the missions, capabilities, and limitations of all participants including 
Joint Fire Support Planning and Execution 

III-21 

multinational forces, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. There are many different CID procedures 

and systems currently in use by US and multinational forces. Experience has proven that 

early identification of common CID procedures significantly increases CID effectiveness.

 b. CID-related information exchange orients on SA for friendly and neutral forces, 

restricted sites and structures, and identification of threat objects. During mission 

execution CID information requires constant coordination and should be conveyed to 

decisionmakers in an understandable manner. 

10. Mitigation of Collateral Damage 

 a. Collateral damage is defined as, “The unintentional or incidental injury or damage 

to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling 

at the time.” Such damage is not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the 

overall military advantage anticipated from the attack. However, even though such fires 

may be lawful, commanders should ensure fires do not negatively impact operational or 

strategic objectives.

 b. Under the law of armed conflict, the principle of proportionality requires that the 

anticipated loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property incidental to attacks must 

not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be 

gained. Commanders therefore have the responsibility to attempt to minimize 

collateral damage to the greatest extent practicable. CDE is an important step in the 

target development process. However, it should not preclude the inclusion of valid 

military targets on a target list.

c. Target coordinate mensuration is a process for measurement of a feature or 

location on the earth to determine an absolute latitude, longitude, and height, and it is 

used in targeting to refer to the exact location of a target. Point mensuration has always 

been an important part of targeting, since the mensurated points represent the desired 

points of impact for the munitions employed. As the accuracy of weapons delivery has 

improved, the importance of mensuration has grown in proportion. When accomplished 

before ATO execution, it permits employment of an entire class of weapons (those, like 

GPS-aided and cruise missiles that guide to pre-set coordinates). This allows JAOC 

personnel to significantly shorten the dynamic targeting portion of the targeting process. 

Guided munitions guide to the mensurated point they are programmed to attack, so 

accurate mensuration is vital to their employment. However, mensuration is not required 

for accurate employment of all weapons. 

 d. WMD targets are a particular problem. Although the initial impact of a 

conventional munition on a WMD target may cause little collateral damage, secondary 

effects could include a release/dispersal of chemical, biological, or radiological material 

or even an imperfect detonation of a nuclear device. For this reason, WMD targets are 

usually placed on an RTL; however, mission priorities to combat WMD and/or military 

necessity may require JFCs to engage joint fires on WMD targets. JFCs should plan for 
Chapter III

III-22 JP 3-09 

follow-on operations to manage the consequences and mitigate the effects of collateral 

damage from WMD. 

For more information on WMD, see JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction, and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and HighYield Explosives Consequence Management.

 e. In most operations, political or legal constraints require the creation of an NSL. 

These are locations with legally protected status, or that are placed off-limits to attack for 

important policy reasons. 

 f. Collateral damage may be minimized through many different methods. 

Choosing an appropriate weapons system, munition warhead, warhead fuzing, and final 

attack axis are all methods used to mitigate collateral damage. 

 g. As discussed earlier, nonlethal fires can be used to confuse, damage, deceive, 

delay, deny, disorganize, disrupt, influence, or locate the enemy. The development of 

nonlethal weapons has recently drawn greater interest due to the restraints imposed on 

using lethal fires and greater public sensitivity to military and civilian casualties. 

Accordingly, JFCs and planners should seek joint fire support options that mitigate 

collateral damage and minimize noncombatant and/or civilian casualties, 

particularly in heavily populated areas. The employment of nonlethal fires in 

supporting these operations will also be governed by their political impact.

For further information on mitigating collateral damage, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting;

the methodology contained within CJCSI 3160.01, No-Strike and the Collateral Damage 

Estimation Methodology; and CJCSI 3122.06C, Sensitive Target Approval and Review 

(STAR) Process. 
A-1

APPENDIX A

CONTROL AND COORDINATION MEASURES

1. Fire Support Coordination Measures

Locations and implementing instructions for FSCMs are disseminated electronically 

by message, database update, and/or overlay through both command and joint fire 

support channels to higher, lower, and adjacent maneuver and supporting units. 

Typically they are further disseminated to each level of command, to include the 

establishing command and all concerned joint fire support agencies. Not all measures 

may apply to a joint operation. However, knowledge of the various FSCMs used by each 

component is necessary for the effective use of joint fire support.

a. Planning and Coordination Considerations. The establishment or change of an 

FSCM established by the JFLCC is typically initiated through the J-3 operations cell and 

ultimately approved by the JFC. FSCMs enhance the expeditious engagement of targets, 

protect forces, populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural 

significance, and set the stage for future operations. Commanders position and adjust 

FSCMs consistent with the operational situation and in consultation with superior, 

subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. The operations cell informs 

coordination elements of the change and effective time. Conditions which dictate the 

change of FSCMs are also coordinated with the other agencies and components as 

appropriate. As conditions are met, the new FSCM effective time can be projected and 

announced. Following direction to execute the change, the operations cell should 

confirm with all liaison elements that the FSCM changes have been disseminated. This 

ensures that affected units are aware of new FSCM locations and associated positive 

control measures are being followed, thus reducing the risk of fratricide.

b. STANAG 2245, Field Artillery and Fire Support Data Interoperability, and 

STANAG 5620, Standards for the Interoperability of Fire Support Automated Data 

Processing Systems, are examples of international joint fire support agreements. Before 

commencing operations both joint force and component staff members must verify the 

status of FSCMs in a multinational operation.

c. Before discussing coordinating measures, a brief background on operational 

environment geometry will provide a better understanding for the application of the 

different types of FSCMs.

(1) Operational areas may be contiguous or noncontiguous. When they are 

contiguous, a boundary separates them and when noncontiguous, they do not share a 

boundary; the CONOPS links the elements of the force. Noncontiguous operational areas 

normally are characterized by a 360-degree boundary with the higher HQ responsible for 

the area between noncontiguous operational areas. Within both contiguous and 

noncontiguous areas, operations may be linear or nonlinear in nature.
Appendix A

A-2 JP 3-09

(2) In linear operations, commanders direct and sustain combat power toward 

enemy forces in concert with adjacent units usually along lines of operations with 

identified forward lines of own troops (FLOTs). Emphasis is placed on maintaining the 

position of the land force in relation to other friendly forces usually resulting in 

contiguous operations where surface forces share boundaries. Linear operations are 

normally conducted against a deeply arrayed, echeloned enemy force or when the threat 

to lines of communication (LOCs) requires control of the terrain around those LOCs. In 

these circumstances, linear operations allow commanders to concentrate and integrate 

combat power more easily.

(3) In nonlinear operations, forces orient on objectives without geographic 

reference to adjacent forces and are usually characterized by more operations in 

noncontiguous areas. Nonlinear operations emphasize simultaneous operations along 

multiple lines of operation from selected bases. Nonlinear operations place a premium on 

intelligence, mobility, and sustainment.

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for more on linear and nonlinear operations and 

contiguous and noncontiguous operational areas.

2. Permissive Measures

a. Coordinated Fire Line

(1) Purpose. The coordinated fire line (CFL) is a line beyond which 

conventional indirect surface joint fire support means may fire at any time within the 

boundaries of the establishing HQ without additional coordination. The purpose of the 

CFL is to expedite the surface-to-surface engagement of targets beyond the CFL without 

coordination with the land commander in whose AO the targets are located.

(2) Establishment. The CFL is usually established by a brigade or division 

commander equivalent, but it can also be established, especially in amphibious 

operations, by a maneuver battalion. It is located as close to the establishing unit as 

possible without interfering with the maneuver forces. There is no requirement for the 

CFL to be placed on identifiable terrain. However, additional considerations include the 

limits of ground observation, the location of the initial objectives in the offense, and the 

requirement for maximum flexibility in both maneuver and the delivery of supporting 

fires. Subordinate CFLs may be consolidated by higher HQ.

(3) Graphic Portrayal. The CFL is graphically portrayed by a dashed black 

line, with “CFL” followed by the establishing HQ above the line and the effective datetime group (DTG) below the line (see Figure A-1).

b. Fire Support Coordination Line

(1) Purpose. FSCLs facilitate the expeditious engagement of targets of 

opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. An FSCL does not divide an AO. The 
Control and Coordination Measures

A-3

FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapon systems using any type of 

munition against surface targets (see Figure A-2).

(2) Establishment. An FSCL is established and adjusted by the appropriate 

land or amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with 

superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. The FSCL is a term 

oriented to air-land operations and is normally located only on land; however, in certain 

situations, such as littoral areas, the FSCL may affect both land and sea areas. If 

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION LINE

LEGEND

XX XX

XX

Forward Boundary

Objective

Not A 

Boundary

PERMISSIVE

Fire Support 

Coordination 

Measure

FSCL XCORPS

FSCL XCORPS

O/O 

l

l

l

Enhances the expeditious attack of targets and sets the stage for future 

operations.

Established by appropriate level commander in consultation with superior, 

subordinate, and supporting commanders.

Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders.

FSCL fire support coordination line O/O on order

Figure A-2. Fire Support Coordination Line

FIRE SUPPORT AND CONTROL MEASURES

LEGEND

airspace coordination area

altitude

coordinated fire line

division

effective

free-fire area

fire support coordination line

maximum

mechanized

minimum

no-fire area

phase line

restrictive fire area

ACA

ALT

CFL

DIV

EFF

FFA

FSCL

MAX

MECH

MIN

NFA

PL

RFA

RFA

3D Mech Div

080800ZAUG

To

100800ZAUG

MAX ALT

MIN ALT

FSCL XCORPS

051230ZAPR

CFL 25 DIV

080800ZAPR

PL

DELTA

PL

DELTA

ACA

XCorps

MIN ALT 300FT

MAX ALT 4000

MA00000000 to MA00000000

MA00000000 to MA00000000

EFF 091200ZAUG

NFA

3D Mech Div

EFF-080800ZAUG

FFA

XCorps

080800-081600ZAUG

Or

EFF-080800ZAUG

XXX

XXX

XX

BOUNDARY

Figure A-1. Fire Support and Control Measures
Appendix A

A-4 JP 3-09

possible, the FSCL should follow well-defined terrain features to assist identification 

from the air. In amphibious operations, the FSCL is normally established by the CLF 

after coordination with the CATF. Changes to the FSCL require notification of all 

affected forces within the AO and must allow sufficient time for these forces and/or 

components to incorporate the FSCL change. Current technology and collaboration tools 

between the elements of the joint force determine the times required for changing the 

FSCL. The JFC should establish a time standard in his guidance for shifting FSCLs. 

Whenever possible, restrictive measures are employed by commanders to enhance the 

protection of friendly forces operating beyond the FSCL — measures such as restrictive 

fire areas (RFAs) and no-fire areas (NFAs).

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION LINE

LEGEND

XX XX

XX

Forward Boundary

Objective

Not A 

Boundary

PERMISSIVE

Fire Support 

Coordination 

Measure

FSCL XCORPS

FSCL XCORPS

O/O 

l

l

l

Enhances the expeditious attack of targets and sets the stage for future 

operations.

Established by appropriate level commander in consultation with superior, 

subordinate, and supporting commanders.

Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders.

FSCL fire support coordination line O/O on order

Figure A-2. Fire Support Coordination Line
Control and Coordination Measures

A-5

(3) Graphic Portrayal. The FSCL is graphically portrayed by a solid black 

line extending across the assigned areas of the establishing HQ. The letters “FSCL” are 

followed by the establishing HQ above the line and the effective DTG below the line. 

FSCLs do not have to follow “traditional” straight-line paths. Positioning the FSCL on 

terrain identifiable from the air is a technique that may further assist in fratricide 

prevention. Curved and/or enclosed FSCLs have applications in nonlinear joint 

operations (see Figure A-2).

(4) Employment. Use of an FSCL is not mandatory. Forces engaging targets 

beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow 

necessary reaction to avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the land. In exceptional 

circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the engagement 

of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide 

and waste resources. Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface 

engagement operations are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force 

commander. This control is exercised through the operations staff or with predesignated 

procedures. The FSCL is not a boundary — the synchronization of operations on either 

side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the establishing commander out to the limits of 

the land or amphibious force boundary. The establishment of an FSCL does not create a 

free-fire area (FFA) beyond the FSCL. When targets are engaged beyond an FSCL, 

supporting element’s engagements must not produce adverse effects on or to the rear of 

the line. Engagements beyond the FSCL must be consistent with the establishing 

commander’s priorities, timing, and desired effects and deconflicted whenever possible 

with the supported HQ.

(5) Considerations. The decision on where to place or even whether to use an 

FSCL requires careful consideration. If used, its location is based on estimates of the 

situation and CONOPS. Location of enemy forces, anticipated rates of movement, 

concept and tempo of the operation, organic weapon capabilities, and other factors are all 

considered by the commander. The FSCL is normally positioned closer to the FLOT in

the defense than in the offense; however, the exact positioning depends on the situation. 

Placing the FSCL at greater depths will typically require support from higher organic HQ 

and other supporting commanders. Also, when the FSCL is positioned at greater depth, 

there is greater requirement for detailed coordination with the establishing commander.

(a) Air strikes short of the FSCL (both CAS and AI) must be under positive 

or procedural control to ensure proper clearance of joint fires (e.g., JTACs or FAC[A]s). 

Land commanders must consider the need for extra control measures. 

(b) By establishing an FSCL close-in, yet at sufficient depth so as to not 

limit high-tempo maneuver, land and amphibious force commanders ease the 

coordination requirements for engagement operations within their AOs by forces not 

under their control such as NSFS or AI.

(c) Coordination of engagements beyond the FSCL is especially critical to 

commanders of air, land, and SOF units operating beyond the FSCL. Such coordination 
Appendix A

A-6 JP 3-09

is also important when engaging forces are employing wide-area munitions or those with 

delayed effects. Finally, this coordination assists in avoiding conflicting or redundant 

engagement operations.

(d) The establishing commander adjusts the location of the FSCL as 

required to keep pace with operations. In high-tempo maneuver operations, the FSCL 

may change frequently. A series of predisseminated “on-order” FSCLs will help 

accelerate the coordination required. The establishing commander quickly transmits the 

change to higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting HQ to ensure engagement operations 

are appropriately coordinated by controlling agencies. Anticipated adjustments to the 

location of the FSCL are normally transmitted to other elements of the joint force 

sufficiently early to reduce potential disruptions in their current and near-term operations. 

Careful planning and coordination is essential for changes to the FSCL. This planning is 

necessary to minimize the risk of fratricide and avoid disrupting operations.

(e) Varying capabilities for acquisition and engagement may exist among 

adjacent commanders in a multinational operation. Normally, corps level commanders 

may establish an FSCL to support their operations. Layered FSCLs and multiple, 

separate, noncontiguous corps and/or MEF FSCLs positioned at varying depths create a 

coordination and execution challenge for supporting commanders (e.g., tracking effective 

times, lateral boundaries, and multiple command guidance). In cases such as these when 

the components share a mutual boundary, the JFC or JFLCC may consolidate the 

operational requirements of subordinates to establish a single FSCL. This FSCL may be 

noncontiguous, to reflect the varying capabilities of subordinate commands. A single 

FSCL facilitates air support, accommodates subordinate deep operations requirements, 

and eases coordination of FSCL changes.

c. Free-Fire Area

(1) Purpose. An FFA is a specific designated area into which any weapon 

system may fire without additional coordination with the establishing HQ. It is used to 

expedite joint fires and to facilitate jettison of aircraft munitions.

(2) Establishment. An FFA may be established only by the military 

commander with jurisdiction over the area (usually, a division or higher commander). 

Preferably, the FFA should be located on identifiable terrain; however, it may be 

designated by grid coordinates or GARS.

(3) Graphic Portrayal. The FFA is graphically portrayed by a solid black line 

defining the area and the letters “FFA” within, followed by the establishing HQ and the 

effective DTG (see Figure A-1).

d. Kill Boxes

(1) Definition. A kill box is a three-dimensional area used to facilitate the 

integration of joint fires.
Control and Coordination Measures

A-7

(2) Purpose. When established, the primary purpose of a kill box is to allow 

lethal attack against surface targets without further coordination with the establishing 

commander and without terminal attack control. When used to integrate air-to-surface 

and surface-to-surface indirect fires, the kill box will have appropriate restrictions. The 

goal is to reduce the coordination required to fulfill support requirements with maximum 

flexibility, while preventing fratricide. A kill box will not be established specifically for 

CAS missions.

(3) Establishment. A kill box is established and adjusted by supported 

component commanders in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and 

affected commanders, and is an extension of an existing support relationship established 

by the JFC.

See FM 3-09.34/MCRP 3-25H/NTTP 3-09.2.1/AFTTP(I) 3-2.59, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Employment, for further information.

3. Restrictive Measures

a. Restrictive Fire Line

(1) Purpose. The restrictive fire line (RFL) is a line established between 

converging friendly forces — one or both may be moving — that prohibits joint fires or 

the effects of joint fires across the line without coordination with the affected force. The 

purpose of the line is to prevent fratricide and duplication of engagements by converging 

friendly forces.

(2) Establishment. The commander common to the converging forces 

establishes the RFL. It is located on identifiable terrain when possible. In linkup 

operations, it is usually closer to the stationary force to allow maximum freedom of 

action for the maneuver and joint fire support of the linkup force.

(3) Graphic Portrayal. The RFL is graphically portrayed by a solid black line, 

with “RFL” followed by the establishing HQ above the line and the effective DTG below 

the line (see Figure A-3).

b. No-Fire Area

(1) Purpose. The purpose of the NFA is to prohibit joint fires or their effects 

into an area. There are two exceptions:

(a) When the establishing HQ approves joint fires within the NFA on a 

mission-by-mission basis.

(b) When an enemy force within the NFA engages a friendly force and the 

engaged commander determines there is a requirement for immediate protection and 

responds with the minimal force needed to defend the force.
Appendix A

A-8 JP 3-09

(2) Establishment. Any size unit may establish NFAs. If possible, the NFA is 

established on identifiable terrain. It may also be located by a series of grids or by a 

radius from a center point.

(3) Graphic Portrayal. The NFA is graphically portrayed as an area outlined 

with a solid black line with black diagonal lines inside. The letters “NFA” are within, 

followed by the establishing HQ and the effective DTG (see Figure A-1).

RESTRICTIVE FIRE LINE, FIRE SUPPORT AREA, 

AND ZONE OF FIRE

DIV division

DS direct support

FSA fire support area

FSS fire support station

LEGEND

GS general support

LOD line of departure

RFL restrictive fire line

ZF zone of fire

DS

GS

015 TRUE

015 TRUE

DS

FSA II

RED 1 BLUE 2

X

X

FSA I

015 TRUE

ZF6

ZF4

ZF3

XX

XFSS I

LOD LOD

RFL 1st DIV

121200ZAUG

Figure A-3. Restrictive Fire Line, Fire Support Area, and Zone of Fire
Control and Coordination Measures

A-9

c. Restrictive Fire Area

(1) Purpose. An RFA is an area where specific restrictions are imposed and in 

which joint fires, or the effects of joint fires, that exceed those restrictions will not be 

delivered without coordination with the establishing HQ. The purpose of the RFA is to 

regulate joint fires into an area according to the stated restrictions.

(2) Establishment. A maneuver battalion or higher echelon normally 

establishes an RFA. Usually, the RFA is located on identifiable terrain, by grid, or by a 

radius from a center point. To facilitate rapidly changing operations, on-call RFAs may 

be used. The dimensions, locations, and restrictions of the on-call RFA are prearranged.

(3) Graphic Portrayal. The RFA is graphically portrayed by a solid black line 

defining the area and the letters “RFA” within, followed by the establishing HQ and the 

effective DTG. The restrictions may be included within the graphic if space allows, or 

reference may be made to a specific OPORD or OPLAN (see Figure A-1).

d. Zone of Fire

(1) Purpose. A ZF is an FSCM that includes the area within which a 

designated ground unit or fire support ship delivers, or is prepared to deliver, joint fire 

support. Joint fires may or may not be observed. Land is divided into ZFs which are 

assigned to gunfire support ships and units as a means to coordinate their efforts with 

each other and with the scheme of maneuver of the supported ground unit. Units and 

ships assigned ZFs are responsible for engaging known targets and targets of opportunity 

according to their mission and the guidance of the supported commander.

(2) Establishment. The commander of the maritime force providing NSFS 

establishes and assigns ZFs for the forces. The ZF for an artillery battalion or a ship 

assigned the mission of DS normally corresponds to the AO of the supported unit. The 

ZF for an artillery battalion or a ship assigned the mission of GS should be within the 

boundaries of the supported unit. When used in conjunction with naval gunfire, the size 

and shape of a ZF will depend on the following:

(a) Boundaries of Zone of Fire. In order to permit ready identification by 

the spotter and the individual fire support ship, the boundaries of the ZFs should be 

recognizable both on the terrain and on a map. It may be necessary to divide a large ZFs 

into two or more smaller zones due to considerations discussed below. The boundaries of 

ZFs of DS ships should correspond to the zones of action of the LF units supported. 

(b) Size. The size of each ZF should be such that the fire support ships, or 

ships assigned to observe and/or destroy targets, will be able to accomplish the mission in 

the time allocated. When ZFs are delineated, known or suspected targets scheduled for 

destruction in each zone are plotted, and then the number and type of targets are 

compared to the capability of the ship. 
Appendix A

A-10 JP 3-09

(c) Visibility. Observation from seaward is a desirable feature for ZFs, 

since it permits a ship to deliver more accurate and rapid fire. 

(d) Accessibility to Fire. The ZFs must be accessible to the trajectory of 

the fire support ship(s) assigned to the zone.

(3) ZFs are also assigned to FA units by their higher HQ. The ZF for FA units 

assigned to a maneuver unit or assigned the mission of DS corresponds to the AO of the 

parent or supported maneuver unit. The ZF for an artillery unit assigned the mission of 

reinforcing corresponds to the ZF of the reinforced artillery unit. The ZF for an artillery 

unit assigned the mission of GS-reinforcing corresponds to the ZF of the reinforced 

artillery unit and is within the AO of the supported maneuver unit. The ZF for an 

artillery unit assigned the mission of GS corresponds to the AO of the supported 

maneuver unit.

(4) Graphic Portrayal. ZFs are delineated by the use of broken lines (solid 

lines if unit boundaries are used) and are designated by Arabic numerals, e.g., “ZF3” (see 

Figure A-3).

4. Maneuver Control Measures

a. Boundaries

(1) Purpose. A boundary is a maneuver control measure. In land warfare, it is 

a line by which surface AOs between adjacent units and/or formations are defined. 

Boundaries designate the geographical limits of the AO of a unit. Within their own 

boundaries, units may execute joint fires and maneuver without close coordination with 

neighboring units unless otherwise restricted. Normally, units do not fire across 

boundaries unless the fires are coordinated with the adjacent unit or the fires are beyond 

an FSCM, such as a CFL. These restrictions apply to conventional and special munitions 

and their effects. When fires such as smoke and illumination affect an adjacent unit, 

coordination with that unit is normally required. A commander can, in certain situations, 

decide to fire across boundaries at positively identified enemy elements without 

coordination. However, direct and observed joint fires should be used when firing across 

boundaries at positively identified enemy forces when there is no time to coordinate with 

adjacent friendly units.

(2) Establishment and/or Portrayal. Any commander given an AO can 

establish boundaries for subordinate units. These boundaries will be respected by all 

Service and functional components. Boundaries are depicted as solid black lines with a 

symbol placed on the boundary to show the size and designation of the highest echelons 

that have the boundary in common. If the units are of unequal size, the symbol of the 

higher unit is shown and the designation of the lower unit is given completely (see Figure 

A-1).
Control and Coordination Measures

A-11

b. Phase Lines

(1) Purpose. A phase line (PL) is a maneuver control measure used by land 

forces for control and coordination of military operations. It is usually a recognizable 

terrain feature extending across the zone of action. Units normally report crossing PLs, 

but do not halt unless specifically directed. PLs can be used to identify limits of advance, 

monitor rates of movement, control joint fires (when dual designated as an FSCM), or 

define an AO. The purpose of each PL and any actions required by forces affected by the 

PL will be specified on the OPORD of the establishing HQ.

(2) Establishment and/or Portrayal. Any commander given an AO can 

establish PLs. A PL is depicted as a solid black line labeled “PL” and assigned letters, 

numbers, or code name designations (see Figure A-1).

c. Fire Support Area and/or Fire Support Station

(1) Purpose. A fire support area (FSA) is an appropriate maneuver area 

assigned to fire support ships by the maritime commander from which they deliver 

surface joint fire support to an operation ashore. An FSA is normally associated with 

amphibious operations but can be used whenever it is desirable to have a fire support ship 

occupy a certain geographic position. A fire support station (FSS) is an exact location at 

sea from which a fire support ship delivers fires. This designation is used to station ships 

in order to be able to reach certain targets. For example, a ship in an FSA may not be 

able to reach a certain target except when it is stationed at the FSS.

(2) Establishment. The officer in tactical command, typically the CATF,

establishes FSAs and FSSs. In amphibious operations when engagement groups are 

formed and separate landing areas are designated, the CATF may assign each 

engagement group commander the responsibility for control of naval gunfire support 

within the area.

(3) Graphic Portrayal. FSAs are designed with Roman numerals (FSA I, II, 

III) and are shown on the NSFS operations overlay. FSSs are designated by numbers 

(FSS 1, 2, 3) and are shown on the NSFS operations overlay as an X indicating the exact 

position of the ship (see Figure A-3).

5. Airspace Coordinating Measures

a. Airspace Coordinating Measures. ACMs are critical to the successful 

employment of joint fires. A key to effectively coordinating joint fires is to constantly 

view the operational environment as a three dimensional area. ACMs are nominated 

from subordinate HQ through component command HQ, and forwarded to the airspace 

control authority in accordance with the air control plan. Most ACMs impact on direct 

and indirect joint fires trajectories and UASs because of their airspace use. Some ACMs 

may be established to permit surface joint fires or UAS operations. The component 

commanders ensure that ACM nominations support and do not conflict with joint 
Appendix A

A-12 JP 3-09

operations prior to forwarding to the JAOC. The airspace control authority approves 

formal ACM nominations and includes them in the ACO. The airspace control authority 

consolidates, coordinates, and deconflicts the airspace requirements of the components 

and publishes the ACMs in the ACO. The ACO is normally published at least daily and 

is often distributed both separately and as a section of the ATO. 

See JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, and JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air 

Operations, for further information on C2 of air operations.

b. Normally, ACMs such as minimum risk routes will terminate in the vicinity of the 

FSCL. However, the situation may require establishing active and planned ACMs 

beyond the FSCL to facilitate rapid change of both the FSCL and ACM. ACMs may be 

established to facilitate operations between the FSCL and the land force commander’s 

forward boundary. Ground infiltration and aerial insertion and/or extraction of SOF or 

long-range surveillance teams as well as attack helicopter maneuver are operational 

examples.

c. Changes to ACMs within a land force AO are initiated by the component’s air 

control element with airspace control authority approval. One common procedural ACM 

that impacts on the delivery of aerial fire support is a coordinating altitude. A 

coordinating altitude separates fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. The JFC approves the 

coordinating altitude, which is normally specified in the air control plan. The airspace 

control authority is the final approving authority for changes, which are requested 

through airspace coordination channels. Fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft planning extended 

operations penetrating this altitude should, whenever possible, notify the appropriate 

airspace control facility.

d. Airspace Coordination Area (ACA). The ACA is the primary ACM which 

reflects the coordination of airspace for use by air support and indirect joint fires.

(1) Purpose. ACAs are used to ensure aircrew safety and the effective use of 

indirect supporting surface joint fires by deconfliction through time and space. The ACA 

is a block or corridor of airspace in which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from 

friendly surface fires. A formal ACA (a three dimensional box of airspace) requires 

detailed planning. More often an informal ACA is established using time, lateral 

separation, or altitude to provide separation between surface-to-surface and air-delivered 

weapon effects. 

For additional information on the ACA, see JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, and JP 3-52, 

Joint Airspace Control.

(2) Establishment. The airspace control authority establishes formal ACAs at 

the request of the appropriate component commander. ACAs require detailed planning. 

Though not always necessary, formal ACAs should be considered. Vital information 

defining the formal ACA includes minimum and maximum altitudes, a baseline 

designated by grid coordinates at each end, the width (on either side of the baseline), and 
Control and Coordination Measures

A-13

the effective times. When time for coordination is limited, an informal ACA is used. In 

an informal ACA, aircraft and surface joint fires may be separated by time or distance 

(lateral, altitude, or a combination of the two). The informal ACA can be requested by 

the maneuver commander requesting CAS or employing helicopters, and is approved at 

battalion or higher level. Both types of ACAs are constructed with the assistance of the 

air liaison officer to ensure they meet the technical requirements of the aircraft and 

weapon systems.

(3) Graphic Portrayal. A formal ACA is shown as an area enclosed by a solid 

black line. Depicted inside the enclosed area are “ACA,” the establishing HQ, the 

minimum and maximum altitudes, the grid coordinates for each end of the baseline, and 

the effective DTG or the words “on order.” Informal ACAs are not normally displayed 

on maps, charts, or overlays (see Figure A-1). 
Appendix A

A-14 JP 3-09

Intentionally Blank
B-1

APPENDIX B

JOINT FIRE SUPPORT OPERATION ORDER FORMAT

ANNEX XX (JOINT FIRE SUPPORT) TO OPERATION ORDER NO## [code 

name] — [issuing HQ]

(Include heading if annex distributed separately from OPLAN/OPORD.)

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

(1) Include a detailed description of enemy fire support and air defense assets.

(2) List enemy rocket, cannon, missile, and air force units. Include those 

organic to maneuver units. List all fire support units that can be identified as being 

committed or reinforcing. Consider all identified fire support units within supporting 

range as being in support of the committed force. Include the number of possible enemy 

air sorties by day, if known. Estimate the number, type, yield, and delivery means of 

enemy chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons available to the 

committed force.

b. Friendly Forces

(1) State the concept of fires.

(2) Provide adjacent units’ concept of fires, if applicable.

(3) Include supporting air, land, and maritime forces.

c. Environment

(1) Terrain. List terrain aspects that would impact operations.

(2) Weather. List weather aspects that would impact operations. 

(3) Civil considerations. List civil considerations that would impact 

operations. Refer to civil-military operations annex as required.

2. MISSION. State the joint fire support mission for the operation.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Joint Fires. Describe how joint fires will be used to support the 

CONOPS. State the priority of joint fire support. This must be consistent with what is in 
Appendix B

B-2 JP 3-09

the concept of fires in the OPORD/OPLAN. Address the objectives for using air, land, 

and maritime fires.

b. Air Component

(1) General. Briefly describe the air commander’s concept for the use of air 

power.

(2) Air interdiction.

(3) Close air support.

(4) Electronic attack. Refer to IO annex as required.

(5) Intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance operations. Refer to ISR 

annex as required.

(6) Miscellaneous. State the following:

(a) The ATO’s effective time period.

(b) Deadlines for submission of AI, CAS, search and rescue, and EW 

requests.

(c) The mission request numbering system based on the target numbering 

system.

(d) Joint suppression of enemy air defense taskings from the land 

component commander.

(e) Essential ACA measures — such as coordinating altitude, target areas, 

minimum risk route requirements — identified in the ACA annex.

c. Land Component

(1) General. Include the concept for use of cannon, mortar, rocket, and missile 

fires in support of shaping operations.

(2) Organization for combat.

(3) Allocation of ammunition.

(4) Miscellaneous. Include the following:

(a) Changes to the targeting numbering system.
Joint Fire Support Operation Order Format

B-3

(b) The use of pulse repetition frequency (PRF) codes.

(c) Positioning restrictions.

d. Maritime Component

(1) General. Include the concept for use of NSFS and TLAMs.

(2) NSFS Organization.

(3) Miscellaneous.

(a) Trajectory limitations or minimum safe distances.

(b) Frequency allocations.

(c) Reference to an NSFS annex.

e. Nuclear Operations

f. Smoke Operations

g. Target Acquisition. Include information pertaining to the employment and 

allocation of TA systems and EW assets. 

h. Coordinating Instructions

(1) List the targeting products (target selection standards matrix, HPT list, and 

attack guidance matrix).

(2) List FSCMs.

(3) Refer to time of execution of program of fires.

(4) Include ROE.

(5) List fire support rehearsal times and requirements.

(6) List target allocations.

(7) Specify the datum or coordinate system to be used.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Identify the location of munition transfer points and 

ammunition supply points, or refer to the logistics annex. List the controlled supply rate.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
Appendix B

B-4 JP 3-09

APPENDIXES:

1. Air Component Support

2. Land Component Support

3. Maritime Component Support

4. SO Component

DISTRIBUTION: (If distributed separately from OPLAN/OPORD)
C-1

APPENDIX C

LASER-GUIDED SYSTEMS

1. General

a. Laser-guided systems provide the joint force with the ability to locate and engage 

targets with an increased first-round hit probability. Laser-guided systems can effectively 

engage a wide range of targets, including moving targets. Laser-guided weapons 

(LGWs) can reduce the number of weapons and/or weapon systems required to create an 

effect or achieve an objective, because of increased accuracy. Based on the threat level 

and environment, laser-guided systems provide additional capabilities, but also have 

distinct limitations. In any laser designating situation, strive for simplicity and use all 

available resources to help ensure first-pass success.

b. Laser Capabilities. Laser designators radiate a narrow beam of pulsed energy. 

Current tactical lasers operate in the near infrared wavelength spectrum, which is not 

visible to the human eye. When within range, the laser designator can be aimed so the 

energy precisely designates a chosen spot on the target. Laser target designators (LTDs) 

mark targets for laser spot trackers (LSTs) and LGWs. Some laser systems can 

accurately determine target range and location. When coupled with horizontal and 

vertical scales, they can measure target azimuth and elevation. 

c. Laser Target Ranging and Designation Systems. Laser target ranging and 

designation systems can provide accurate range, azimuth, and elevation information to 

locate enemy targets. These systems may vary from handheld to aircraft-mounted 

devices and perform similar functions with varying degrees of accuracy. In combination 

with GPS, lasers can provide accurate enemy target locations. In addition, lasers in 

combination with GPS can provide for target area analysis. This analysis can be used to 

fire weapons accurately at the enemy, to accurately locate future friendly observer 

locations, and to enable friendly forces to effectively conduct maneuver operations as 

well as command and control their forces by accurate identification of terrain reference 

points.

d. Laser Acquisition Devices. Of the two types of laser acquisition devices, the 

first, the LST, is used to aid visual acquisition of the target to be attacked by another 

weapon. This type of laser acquisition device is normally mounted on fixed-wing aircraft 

or helicopters. The second type of acquisition device is a seeker and guidance kit 

mounted on LGWs which guide on coded laser energy. 

e. Basic Considerations. There are five basic considerations for using LSTs or 

LGWs:

(1) Line of sight (LOS) must exist between the designator and the target and 

between the target and the LST/LGW.

(2) PRF codes of the laser designator and the LST/LGW must be compatible.
Appendix C

C-2 JP 3-09

(3) The direction of attack must allow the LST/LGW to sense enough 

reflected laser energy from the target for the seeker to acquire and lock on the target.

(4) The LTD must designate the target at the correct time, and for the correct 

length of time. If the length of time is insufficient, the seeker head could break lock and 

the flight pattern of the LGW becomes unpredictable.

(5) The delivery system (air or ground) must deliver the LGW within the 

specific LGW envelope to ensure the weapon can physically reach the target. There is an 

increased hazard to friendly forces when aircrews release weapons behind friendly 

lines.

f. Environmental factors can affect laser designators and seeker head

performance. Tactics and techniques must consider low clouds and fog, smoke, haze, 

snow and rain, solar saturation, and other visually limiting phenomena.

g. Beam divergence and target size. Laser spot size is a function of beam 

divergence and the distance from the laser designator to the target. If an LTD has a beam 

spread or divergence of 1 milliradian, its spot would have a diameter of approximately 

one meter at a distance of 1,000 meters in front of the designator. If this spot were aimed 

at a 3-meter by 3-meter box 3,000 meters away the laser spot would be as wide and tall as 

the box.

h. Target Reflection. Most surfaces have a mixture of mirror-like and scattered 

reflections. Laser energy reflects in an arc, but is strongest at the angle where it would 

reflect if the surface were a mirror. If the LTD is perpendicular to a surface the reflection 

can be seen from all angles on the designated side, but can be detected best near the laser 

to target line (LTL), which is a line from the LTD to the target usually expressed in 

degrees magnetic. When the surface is at an angle to the laser designator, the angle of 

strongest reflection is also predictable. Glass, water, and highly polished surfaces are 

poor surfaces to designate because they reflect laser energy in only one direction. This 

requires the seeker to be in this small region and looking toward the reflected energy to 

achieve TA. Battlefield dynamics will rarely provide the opportunity to perfectly align 

laser designation/reflectivity in the direction of approaching aircraft or munitions. Strict 

adherence to laser cones or baskets and center mass target designation will best ensure 

success.

i. Opponent Use of Laser Countermeasures. US opponents realize the 

importance of laser countermeasures in a conflict with the United States or its 

multinational partners. Many of the techniques for countering laser energy and sensitive 

electro-optical equipment are common knowledge throughout much of the world. US 

opponents are well-equipped to detect and counter the sophisticated laser designator and 

guidance systems used by the armed forces of Western nations.

j. Legal Uses of Lasers on the Battlefield. Protocol IV to the Certain Conventional 

Weapons Convention (Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons) prohibits the use of lasers 
Laser-Guided Systems

C-3

specifically designed to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision. For all other 

types of lasers, such as those used for detection, targeting, range-finding, 

communications, and target destruction, parties to the Protocol have an obligation to 

“take all feasible precautions to avoid the incidence of permanent blindness to 

unenhanced vision.” The DOD Policy on Blinding Lasers recognizes that accidental or 

incidental eye injuries may occur on the battlefield through the use of lasers for detection, 

targeting, range-finding, communications, and target destruction; however, it is DOD 

policy “to strive, through training and doctrine, to minimize these injuries.”

For a discussion of laser-guided considerations for CAS, see JP 3-09.3, Close Air 

Support.

For additional information on laser operations, see FM 3-09.32/MCRP 3-16.6A/NTTP 3-

09.2/AFTTP(I) 3-2.6, JFIRE, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the 

Joint Application of Firepower.

2. Laser Hardware

a. Laser-Guided Weapons. All LGWs home on PRF-coded reflected laser energy. 

Some LGWs require target lock-on before launch (LOBL) and during the entire time of 

flight. Other LGWs allow target lock-on after launch (LOAL) and require illumination 

only during the terminal portion of flight. All LGWs require illumination until weapon 

impact. Typical laser-guided weapons include:

(1) Laser-guided bombs (LGBs). Paveway II, III, and enhanced Paveway III 

(GPS aided).

(2) Laser-guided missiles (LGMs). AGM-65E Laser Maverick and AGM-114 

HELLFIRE. LGMs generally provide greater standoff launch ranges than LGBs. 

Greater range provides increased survivability for aircrews operating in a high threat 

environment. Aircrews and JTACs must exercise caution when launching LGMs from 

behind friendly troops.

(a) Laser Maverick employment considerations include:

1. In the event the laser signal is lost, the weapon will safe itself and 

overfly the target. The Maverick system allows aircrew to engage targets designated by 

either air or ground sources with inflight selectable PRF codes.

2. Delivery aircraft must have unobstructed LOS to the target to 

achieve Maverick lock-on.

3. The missile requires LOBL.

4. The Maverick and the laser designator must be set to the same PRF 

code prior to launch.
Appendix C

C-4 JP 3-09

5. For other than self-designation, the attack heading must be adjusted 

to optimize the reflected laser energy.

(b) Hellfire employment considerations include:

1. In the event the laser signal is lost after lock-on, the missile seeker is 

programmed to begin searching for properly coded laser energy. The Hellfire system 

allows aircrews to engage targets designated by either air (buddy or autonomous, fixed 

wing or rotary wing) or ground forces with inflight selectable PRF codes.

2. The Hellfire can be employed in a LOBL or LOAL mode. In 

LOBL, the missile must acquire the laser energy prior to launch. In LOAL, the missile 

can be fired from defilade or behind a mask and climbs on a preprogrammed profile, 

searching for properly coded laser energy as it executes its fly-out. The trajectory of the 

missile can be altered by delaying laser designation.

3. The Hellfire missile uses last pulse logic in case of under spill and to 

protect the designator. The missile will hit the most distant laser spot within the seeker 

field of view.

4. The Hellfire is unimpeded by ceilings of 2,000 feet (ft) above 

ground level (AGL) and above. For employment under ceilings below 2,000 ft the 

aircrew will vary the missile mode, designator delay, and employment range to shape the 

trajectory. The rule of thumb minimum ceiling for Hellfire employment is 500 ft AGL.

(3) Cannon Launched Guided Projectile - Copperhead

(a) Copperhead is a 155-millimeter, cannon-launched, guided projectile 

with a shaped-charge warhead and a laser seeker. When fired at a moving or stationary 

hard point target, Copperhead homes in on laser energy reflected from the target during 

the final part of its trajectory. A remote laser designator provides laser energy. 

Copperhead is best used against multiple targets in large target arrays outside the range of 

maneuver direct fire weapon systems (approximately 3,000 meters). Copperhead may 

engage a single target or very few widely separated targets if they are HPTs; for example, 

an enemy commander’s vehicle. Targets appearing within the range of maneuver direct 

fire weapon systems should be engaged by Copperhead only when the maneuver 

commander directs or when the direct fire systems are unable to engage the targets.

(b) Copperhead targets can be engaged as either planned targets or targets 

of opportunity. Planned targets are preferred because the firing battery requires less 

reaction time. Most often, the target-of-opportunity technique is used only during 

offensive operations.

For more information on Copperhead employment, see FM 3-09.42, Fire Support for the 

Brigade Combat Team.
Laser-Guided Systems

C-5

(4) Laser-Equipped UASs

(a) General Procedures

1. Employment. Laser-equipped UASs utilize the same procedures 

and communications as an airborne laser designator operator (LDO). In some cases, the 

UAS may also act as a strike aircraft, using the same procedures as other strike aircraft.

2. Target Acquisition Considerations. If a laser-equipped UAS is 

being utilized by the LDO, coordination between the UAS flight crew and the attack 

aircrew is critical for both safety and laser geometry. LST-equipped strike aircraft should 

notify the LDO that they are LST capable upon arriving on-station. The LDO, through 

standard communication, will then direct the UAS mark onto the target. The LDO may 

pass the UAS laser PRF code to the attack aircraft, or the attack aircraft may pass its 

weapons code to the LDO. 

3. Deconfliction of Airspace. Standard procedures used by LDOs to 

deconflict fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft apply to laser-equipped UASs employed 

on laser designation operations. Proper laser geometry and 2,000-ft altitude blocks for 

the UAS stationing orbit are recommended when using a UAS to mark for strike aircraft. 

b. Laser Target Designators. Ground laser target designators (GLTDs) are 

employed by ground forces to illuminate targets with laser energy. LGWs use this 

energy to guide to the target. LSTs use the reflected laser energy as a reference point for 

lock-on and tracking. The laser energy PRF is adjustable and must match the PRF setting 

on the weapon or tracker. GLTD ranges vary from 10 meters to 5 kilometers. Airborne 

laser target designators (ALTDs) are carried on aircraft and provide the same function as 

the GLTD. ALTDs are capable of very long range lasing and are normally employed 

below 30,000 ft AGL. See Figure C-1 for advantages and disadvantages of airborne and 

ground designators.

Note: The PRF of LGBs is normally only adjustable prior to flight and cannot be 

changed once airborne. Most missiles such as Maverick and Hellfire can be adjusted inflight. JTACs and aircrews must ensure the laser designator PRF matches the code 

programmed into the weapon or the weapon will not guide.

c. Laser Rangefinders/Target Locating Devices. Laser rangefinders (LRFs) use 

low power laser pulses to measure range to an object. Digital magnetic compass 

systems will not provide the accuracy needed for a single inertially-aided munition 

weapon to hit a point target. Target locating devices are devices that incorporate an

LRF, magnetic or gyroscopic compass, tilt measurement devices, and GPS. These 

systems measure the range and angles from its position provided by the GPS to 

mathematically derive a target location. If used correctly the quality of the target location 

is generally much better than that of a hand-derived coordinate. The accuracy of the 

coordinate is dependent on many variables. Errors are induced by inaccurate GPS

data, poor azimuth, range and elevation data, system calibration, and user skill. 
Appendix C

C-6 JP 3-09

These errors are magnified with range and can result in significant TLEs. Due to 

the variables listed previously, TLEs may vary from 10 meters at 1 kilometer to 

more than 300 meters at maximum ranges.

d. Laser Spot Trackers. LSTs are systems that allow acquisition of a coded laser 

designated target. LSTs are laser sensors that provide heads up display cueing for 

aircraft equipped with these systems. While scanning for laser energy, these systems 

have a limited field of view that depends on range and switch settings. In general, the 

chances of acquisition are improved when cueing aids such as target marks, landmarks, 

and inertial navigation system/GPS coordinates help the pilot point the aircraft in the 

direction of the target.

3. Laser Designation Operations

a. Laser designation operations are divided into three primary categories: laser 

target ranging, TA, and weapons guidance.

(1) Target Ranging. Target ranging systems can provide accurate range, 

azimuth, and elevation information to identified targets.

AIRBORNE AND GROUND DESIGNATOR 

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

TYPE DESIGNATORS

AIRBORNE 

 2. Overhead Wheel 

 Position

1. Trail Position 

3. Offset or Opposing 

 Wheel Position

GROUND

Increased standoff

Larger target area footprint

Larger laser spot size

Increased susceptibility to 

 podium effect

Increased probability of 

 success (spot detection)

Increased standoff

Axis restrictive

Increased platform 

 predictability

Decreased platform 

 predictability

Good standoff

Decreased effectiveness in 

 target areas with varying 

 vertical developments 

 (podium effect)

Axis restrictive

Increased susceptibility to 

 podium effect

Coordination intensive

Axis restrictive

Increased designator 

 exposure

Coordination intensive

Decreased platform 

 predictability

Excellent standoff

Smaller laser spot size

Decreased targeting 

 ambiguity

Rapid battle damage 

 assessment

ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

Figure C-1. Airborne and Ground Designator Advantages and Disadvantages
Laser-Guided Systems

C-7

(2) Target Acquisition. TA involves the use of an LST carried by the aircraft 

and an LTD aimed by a ground team or in some cases from the same or another aircraft. 

(3) Weapons Guidance. Weapons guidance allows an LGW to home in on 

reflected laser energy placed on a target by an LTD. This allows precision delivery of 

weapons, some at standoff distances.

b. Laser Designation Position. In selecting a laser designation position, the LDO 

must consider LOS, expected munitions trajectory, tactical situation, cover and 

concealment, weather, and communications requirements. The LDO should select 

positions that are near expected locations of high priority targets while minimizing 

risks to friendly forces. If redundant LTDs are going to be employed, mutual support 

and coordination with maneuver elements should be addressed. The observer or 

controller team should determine its position as accurately as possible.

c. Employment. When employing LSTs, GLTDs, and LGWs, the following 

procedures will be used.

(1) Attack headings and LTLs, sometimes called designator target lines or 

pointer target lines, are normally pre-coordinated between the LDO and LGW-employing 

aircrew. The LTL is normally expressed in degrees magnetic unless otherwise requested.

(2) Safety Zone. Due to the possibility of false target indications from 

atmospheric scatter of the laser beam close to the laser exit port, attack headings should 

avoid the safety zone unless the tactical situation safely dictates otherwise. The safety 

zone is defined as a volume of airspace in the shape of a cone (generally 20 degrees) 

whose apex is at the target and extends equidistant either side of the target-to-laser 

designator line (see Figure C-2). This cone has a limit of plus or minus 10 degrees in the 

horizontal plane and a vertical limit of 20 degrees. Aircraft may engage targets from 

above the cone, as long as they remain above the 20 degrees. This safety zone will 

primarily affect low altitude delivery aircraft passing close to the LDO location. The 

minimum safe altitude for aircraft will vary with the aircraft’s distance from the target. 

Aircrews may have difficulty determining how high they need to fly to remain above the 

20-degree cone. Due to the possibility of false target indications, final attack headings 

must avoid the 20-degree safety exclusion zone, unless the tactical situation dictates 

otherwise.

(3) Fratricide. Designator profiles behind the launch platform are 

inherently the safest and will minimize the possibility of fratricide. The possibility 

of fratricide still exists while operating anywhere within the optimal attack zone. It 

is highest in the designated safety zone or when a false lock-on is achieved. Attack 

headings should be planned with consideration for friendly forces and noncombatant 

civilian locations. Ultimately the primary mechanisms for limiting fratricide are 

command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among component 

commands, rehearsals, and enhanced SA.
Appendix C

C-8 JP 3-09

(4) The attack zone is inside a 120-degree cone whose apex is at the target and 

extends to 60 degrees on either side of the target-to-laser designator line and is outside 

the 20-degree safety zone. To give the laser trackers/weapons a better chance of 

acquiring the reflected laser spot, a smaller, 90-degree, cone (+/–45 degrees) is preferred,

and the optimum attack axis is normally from 10 to 45 degrees on either side of the 

target-to-laser designator line. 

(5) Aircrews should verify that they are attacking the correct target through 

additional means (such as visual description, terrain features, and non-laser target marks).

(6) Hellfire Designator Exclusion Zone. The LTL must be given to the 

aircrew in degrees magnetic. The aircrew needs this information to align the helicopter, 

ensuring positive seeker lock-on of the LGM for LOBL delivery or positive in-flight 

Acquisition 

area

Acquisition 

area

Laser seeker/ 

weapon platform 

prohibited

Laser seeker/ 

weapon platform 

prohibited

EXAMPLE OF SAFETY ZONE, ACQUISITION AREA, 

AND OPTIMAL ATTACK ZONE

TARGET

FOV

NOTE: Seeker field of view (FOV) must not encompass area of laser designator.

Laser seeker/ 

weapon platform

= Low risk

= Moderate risk

= High risk

L

L

L

M

M

M

o

o

60

45

H

H

H

Laser target designator

o 20 Safety zone (+/- 10 

degrees of centerline)

Avoid weapon release unless 

the situation necessitates

Figure C-2. Example of Safety Zone, Acquisition Area, and Optimal Attack Zone
Laser-Guided Systems

C-9

seeker lock-on of the LGM for LOAL. The LTL will also allow the aircrew to prevent 

inadvertently engaging the LTD. The LDO must be outside a 30-degree by 40-degree

zone from the aircraft, but within a 120-degree cone from the target (see Figure C-3).

d. Terrain and Target Concealment

(1) If the LDO suspects that the target may be partially masked from the view 

of the incoming laser weapon, the LDO should aim the laser at a point on the target 

believed to be within LOS of the seeker. If the target is well concealed, the laser spot 

may be aimed at some overhead or nearby object. However, this method is not preferred 

and should be used only when the situation demands an immediate attack on the target.

HELLFIRE DESIGNATOR EXCLUSION ZONE

22K ft altitude

At 8 km downrange

Designator 

exclusion zone

Not to scale

Airborne and ground designators 

must be 120-degree cone 

area.

 within 

Airborne and ground designators 

must be 30- by 40-degree 

no-fly zone.

outside

15K ft crossrange At 8 km downrange

Shooter

Target

30 o

o o

o

o

30 60

60

30

40 o

LEGEND

ft feet K thousand km kilometers

Figure C-3. Hellfire Designator Exclusion Zone
Appendix C

C-10 JP 3-09

(2) If a designated mobile target moves out of the view of the LDO, it may 

still be possible to salvage the attack. A point near the target may be designated until the 

target again comes into view or until designation responsibility can be passed to another 

operator who has the target in sight. It is also possible to move the laser spot to another 

target in the immediate vicinity. If the LST or LGW has already locked on, the laser spot 

should be moved slowly and without interrupting laser output to the new target location. 

e. LDO Survivability. To enhance survivability, the LDO should keep designation 

time to the minimum necessary for the weapon or seeker being used. This reduces the 

time available for the enemy to detect, locate, and act to suppress the LTD and/or LDO.

f. Laser Designation Timing. Successful use of LGWs or LSTs depends on the 

ability of the LDO to designate the target at the proper time. Laser designation must be 

closely coordinated with the delivery of an LGW. Timing requirements should take into 

account the following:

(1) Weapons requiring LOBL.

(2) Weapons allowing LOAL.

(3) Remaining LTD battery life (if applicable).

(4) Laser radiation time constraints due to overheating.

(5) Susceptibility to laser countermeasures.

g. Joint Interoperability. Laser designation operations and weapons delivery units 

must have compatible and secure communications equipment and common secure codes 

or the authentication codes necessary for joint communications on non-secure nets.

4. Execution Considerations

a. Target Acquisition Considerations

(1) Using LTDs can provide a fast and accurate means of marking targets for 

both LGWs and LST-equipped aircraft. Using target coordinates, smoke, and 

illuminating flares complements LTD target-marking and improves the chances for 

successful first pass TA. Without cueing, aircraft may be pointed too far away from the 

target to acquire the laser spot. Therefore, when the tactical situation allows, 

supplemental marking is recommended to avoid losing sorties or having to re-attack. 

Care should be taken to avoid obscuring the target with the visual mark.

(2) Attack Angles. Aircrews release or launch LGWs so the reflected laser 

energy will be within the seeker field of view at the appropriate time. The maximum 

allowable attack angle (laser-to-target/seeker-to-target) depends upon the characteristics 
Laser-Guided Systems

C-11

of the weapon system employed. If the angle is too large, the seeker will not receive 

enough reflected energy to sense the laser spot.

(3) Coordination with JTAC. If the attack aircraft has an LST, the JTAC can 

designate the target for aircrew identification. The aircrew can use the LST to visually 

locate the target. Once the aircrew locates the target, it can conduct an attack using 

unguided ordnance. 

(4) Employment of LGBs in conjunction with coded LTDs is either 

autonomous or assisted. Autonomous LGB employment uses the CAS aircraft’s 

onboard LTD for terminal weapons guidance. Most aircraft capable of delivering LGBs 

can provide on-board autonomous self-designation. Assisted LGB employment uses an 

off-board LTD for terminal weapons guidance. This is typically accomplished by a 

ground team operating a GLTD (such as a ground/vehicle laser locator designator) or by 

another aircraft (known as buddy lasing). Aircraft without on-board ALTDs that can 

carry and deliver LGBs but have no on-board terminal weapons guidance capability 

require assisted LGB employment. Coded LTDs are ground and airborne systems 

that have two specific purposes. First, they provide terminal weapons guidance for 

LGWs. Second, they designate targets for coded LSTs. Coded LTDs emit laser energy 

with a PRF and require input of specific laser codes for operation. Codes are assigned to 

LGWs and directly relate to the PRF that harmonizes the designator and seeker interface. 

Coded LTDs used for terminal weapons guidance must be set to the same code as 

the LGW. Certain LGWs, such as LGBs, are coded prior to takeoff and cannot be 

changed once the aircraft is airborne. However, all coded LTDs, with the exception of 

the AC-130H, can change codes while airborne. (Note: The AC-130H’s LTD is 

permanently preset with only one code [1688] and cannot be changed.) The JTAC will 

have to coordinate efforts to ensure both the aircraft and designator are on the same code. 

Coordination for the LTD to match the LGW code is conducted through the ATO, 

DASC/ASOC, or JTAC nine-line briefing. Sometimes, an LTD will serve the dual 

purpose of target designation for a coded laser acquisition/spot tracker and terminal 

weapons guidance for LGWs. In these cases, the LTD, LST, and LGW must have the 

same code. Laser codes are always passed as four digits to avoid confusion. When 

briefing LST-equipped aircraft, include the four-digit laser code and LTL in accordance 

with the CAS briefing format. If aircraft check in with a different code, then it is the 

JTAC’s responsibility to make appropriate corrections. Even if the aircraft is capable of 

self-designation, the JTAC should have a backup GLTD ready if it is available.

(5) Laser Designation Time. The aircrew may request a longer laser-on time 

based on munitions characteristics. If communications are unreliable, the JTAC should 

begin designating 20 seconds before time on target or with 20 seconds remaining on time 

to target (unless the aircrew is using loft delivery). Laser designation time with LGBs 

delivered from a loft profile will vary depending on the weapon being delivered. Refer to 

appropriate tactics manuals for loft laser designation time rules of thumb. While 

reducing laser operating time is important in a laser countermeasure environment or when 

using battery-operated designators, designation time must be long enough to guarantee 

mission success.
Appendix C

C-12 JP 3-09

b. LGW Delivery

(1) TA is usually followed by the delivery of LGWs. Some LGWs, such as 

laser Maverick, and low-level LGB and/or Paveway III, can be released at ranges that 

may reduce the delivery aircraft’s exposure to enemy air defense systems and increase 

aircraft survivability.

(2) Once released, the weapon homes in on reflected laser energy. 

(3) Like any air delivered weapon system, the maneuver commander must fully 

understand and accept the consequences of a possible failure of the weapon to properly 

guide to the target. The final decision to release LGWs from behind friendly lines in 

a laser designation operations environment rests with the maneuver commander.

c. Concept of Employment

(1) Tactical Air Control Party. The TACP is the Marine Corps or Air Force 

tactical air control agency located with the supported ground unit. Its functions are 

providing air liaison, advising on the use of air assets, and coordinating and controlling 

laser designation operations missions to support the ground commander’s scheme of 

maneuver. The TACP provides the terminal attack control of laser designation 

operations in support of ground forces.

(2) Fire Support Team, Combat Observation and Lasing Team (COLT),

and FO Procedures for LDO. When possible, the LDO should be located with the 

FIST/COLT, and the FIST/COLT should place a radio close to the LDO (USMC LDOs 

may or may not be collocated with their FOs). Placing a radio close to the LDO will 

minimize the need to relay laser calls between the pilot and the FIST/COLT. At times, 

the LDO will not be with the FIST/COLT and may not be able to see the target. The 

LDO will coordinate laser designation with the FIST/COLT. When the LDO and 

FIST/COLT are not together, aircrews may make laser calls directly to the FIST/COLT

on a frequency assigned by the LDO in the remarks section of the LDO briefing. In 

situations where the USMC LDO is not in an optimum position to designate the target, 

the LDO may control the aircraft with the FO actually designating the target. The USMC 

LDO and FO can communicate and coordinate using the TACP local net; however, prior 

coordination is required.

d. Rotary Wing Procedures

(1) General. Using rotary-wing aircraft to deliver LGWs allows the ground 

commander to destroy high-threat-point targets. Rotary-wing aircraft may be equipped 

with any combination of ALTDs, LSTs, and LGWs. All LTDs can assist laser-systemequipped rotary-wing aircraft in TA and provide terminal weapons guidance. Rotarywing aircraft are employed by the Army as maneuver elements under direct control of the 

ground commander or aviation unit commander. One of the functions of Marine attack 

helicopters is to provide laser designation operations in support of the MAGTF. Precise 
Laser-Guided Systems

C-13

engagements will be aided by the use of LGWs. Army SO attack helicopter crews are 

also trained to perform laser designation operations with LGWs.

(2) Laser Designation for Rotary-Wing Aircraft

(a) Employment. Laser designation for TA provides fast and accurate 

target hand-off. Certain rotary-wing aircraft are equipped with LSTs and aid the pilot’s 

visual TA by providing cockpit indications on the location of the laser spot. TA can be 

followed with the delivery of either LGWs or nonguided weapons. The aircraft can 

designate either for their own weapons or for other rotary-wing or fixed-wing aircraft.

(b) Communications between the LDO and the aircrew is essential for 

positive target hand-off to LST-equipped rotary-wing aircraft. Positive target hand-off 

requires prior coordination. The LDO must provide the appropriate laser code, LTL in 

degrees magnetic, and laser spot offset (if applicable).

(3) Laser Designation for Rotary-Wing Aircraft with HELLFIRE LGMs. 

The lock-on and launch ranges of LGMs can be several miles. LGMs provide extended 

standoff for high-threat targets. The pilot has several options for firing mode, firing 

method, and missile seeker lock-on.

(a) Firing Modes

1. Single Fire or Manual Mode. In the single-fire mode, one missile 

is launched. This mode can be used with autonomous direct, remote direct, and remote 

indirect fire methods, as discussed below.

2. Rapid Fire. Rapid fire is a technique of launching two or more 

missiles on the same code. Multiple targets can be engaged by launching missiles at least 

8 seconds or more apart, as specified by the LDO. Once the first missile hits the first 

target, the LDO must smoothly move the laser spot to the next target.

3. Ripple Fire. In the ripple fire mode, missiles are fired one after the 

other on different codes. For best effect, multiple LTDs should be used to achieve ripple 

fire. Each LTD operates on a different laser code, and the weapon’s seekers are coded to 

match each designator.

4. Rapid or Ripple Fire. Using multiple codes and LTDs, the 

combination of rapid or ripple fire can be achieved.

(b) Firing Methods

1. Direct Fire Method. Direct fire is achieved using either 

autonomous or remote LTDs. When using remote designators, the rotary-wing aircraft is 

free to resume terrain masking or engage other targets after each LGM launch. This 

capability is called “fire and forget” and increases aircraft survivability and flexibility.
Appendix C

C-14 JP 3-09

2. Indirect Fire Method. Indirect fire is achieved by using remote 

LTDs. Vulnerability of rotary-wing aircraft to enemy direct-fire weapons and radar 

detection is minimized by employing LGMs in the indirect-fire method. The LGM is 

launched while the aircraft is positioned behind masking terrain features, like trees and 

hills. The pilot selects a trajectory for the LGM (either high or low) over the masking 

terrain feature. The seeker will then locate and lock on to the remote laser-designated 

target.

(c) HELLFIRE Missile Seeker Lock-on Options

1. Lock-on After Launch. The LOAL option can be used in the 

direct-fire mode and is always used for the indirect-fire method. The LGM is launched 

on a trajectory toward the target with seeker lock-on occurring in flight. This option 

allows missile launching toward the target area during adverse weather, hazy days, long 

ranges, or temporary target obscuration. Lock-on will occur when the obstruction to the 

seeker’s view dissipates or is bypassed during the approach to the target area.

2. Lock-on Before Launch. The LOBL option requires direct LOS to 

the target and requires the seeker to be locked on to the target before launch.

(d) Fratricide. To keep the Hellfire missile from locking onto the 

designator instead of the target, Angle-T between the designator-target line and the 

missile target line should be less than 1,065 mils (60 degrees). The LDO must ensure the 

launch platform operator knows the location of the observer so that the launch platform 

can be repositioned if necessary for safety.

For additional information on the Army FA laser operations, see FM 6-30, TTP for 

Observed Fire.

See FM 3-09.32/MCRP 3-16.6A/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP(I) 3-2.6, JFIRE, Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower, for 

additional information on laser operations.

See JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support, for expanded discussion of laser-guided considerations 

for CAS.
D-1

APPENDIX D

REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-09 is based upon the following primary references:

1. DOD Publications

a. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of

Force for US Forces.

b. CJCSI 3160.01, No-Strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology.

c. CJCSI 3505.01, Target Coordinate Mensuration Certification and Program 

Accreditation.

d. CJCSI 3900.01 Series, Position Reference Procedures.

e. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

f. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

g. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

h. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

i. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

j. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

k. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

l. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.

m. JP 3-05, Joint Special Operations.

n. JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support.

o. JP 3-13, Information Operations.

p. JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.

q. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

r. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

s. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.
Appendix D

D-2 JP 3-09

t. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.

u. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

v. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

2. Multi-Service Publications

a. FM 3-01.20/AFTTP(I) 3-2.30, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

for JAOC/AAMDC Coordination.

b. FM 3-09.32/MCRP 3-16.6B/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP(I) 3-2.6, JFIRE, Multi-Service

Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower.

c. FM 3-09.34/MCRP 3-25H/NTTP 3-09.2.1/AFTTP(I) 3-2.59, KILL BOX, MultiService Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Employment.

3. Service Publication

FM 6-30, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire.

4. Combatant Command Publications

a. USJFCOM Joint Fires and Targeting Handbook.

b. USSTRATCOM Global Strike Plan and Emergency Action Procedures.
E-1 

APPENDIX E

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

1. User Comments 

 Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

CDR, USJFCOM, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Doctrine and Education Group, 116 

Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content 

(accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance. 

2. Authorship 

 The lead agent for this publication is USJFCOM. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor 

for this publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5). 

3. Supersession 

 This publication supersedes JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, 13 November 2006. 

JP 3-09.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Laser Designation Operations, 

dated 28 May 1999, is cancelled. 

4. Change Recommendations 

 a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//DOC GP// 

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// 

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to CDR, Joint Warfighting Center, 

Doctrine and Education Group and info Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force 

Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. 

 b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change 

source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a 

proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services 

and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7, when changes to source 

documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 

 c. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix E

E-2 JP 3-09

5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is 

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must 

be in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program.

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. The Joint Staff will not print copies of electronic JPs for distribution. Electronic 

versions are available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET) and 

https://jdeis.js.smil.mil (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine 

(NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant 

commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments 

or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché 

Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Bolling AFB, 

Washington, DC 20340-5100. 

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the 

Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs.
GL-1 JP 3-09 

GLOSSARY 

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

AADC area air defense commander 

AAMDC US Army Air and Missile Defense Command 

ABP air battle plan 

ACA airspace coordination area 

ACE aviation combat element (MAGTF) 

ACM airspace coordinating measure 

ACO airspace control order 

AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 

AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction) 

AGL above ground level 

AI air interdiction 

ALTD airborne laser target designator 

AO area of operations 

AOA amphibious objective area 

AOC air and space operations center (USAF) 

ARFOR Army forces 

ASOC air support operations center 

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System 

ATCS air traffic control section 

ATF amphibious task force 

ATO air tasking order 

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System 

BCD battlefield coordination detachment 

C2 command and control 

CA combat assessment 

CALCM conventional air-launched cruise missile 

CAS close air support 

CATF commander, amphibious task force 

CC critical capability 

CDE collateral damage estimation 

CDRJSOTF commander, joint special operations task force 

CENTRIXS Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System 

CF-COP counterfire common operational picture 

CFL coordinated fire line 

CID combat identification 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CLF commander, landing force 

CNA computer network attack 

COA course of action 

COF chief of fires 

COG center of gravity 

COLT combat observation and lasing team 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-09 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CRC control and reporting center 

CSW coordinate seeking weapons 

DASC direct air support center 

DOD Department of Defense 

DS direct support 

DTG date-time group 

EA electronic attack 

EM electromagnetic 

EW electronic warfare 

EZM engagement zone manager 

FA field artillery 

FAC(A) forward air controller (airborne) 

FFA free-fire area 

FFCC force fires coordination center 

FIST fire support team 

FLOT forward line of own troops 

FM field manual (Army) 

FO forward observer 

FSA fire support area 

FSC fire support coordinator (USMC) 

FSCC fire support coordination center 

FSCL fire support coordination line 

FSCM fire support coordination measure 

FSO fire support officer 

FSS fire support station 

ft feet 

GARS Global Area Reference System 

GCE ground combat element (MAGTF) 

GLTD ground laser target designator 

GPS Global Positioning System 

GS general support 

HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 

HPT high-payoff target 

HQ headquarters 

HVT high-value target 
Glossary 

GL-3 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

IO information operations 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff 

JACCE joint air component coordination element 

JADOCS Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System 

JAOC joint air operations center 

JASSM joint air-to-surface standoff missile 

JFACC joint force air component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFE joint fires element 

JFLCC joint force land component commander 

JFO joint fires observer 

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander 

JIPTL joint integrated prioritized target list 

JOA joint operations area 

JP joint publication 

JPG joint planning group 

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

J-SEAD joint suppression of enemy air defenses 

JSOA joint special operations area 

JSOACC joint special operations air component commander 

JSOTF joint special operations task force 

JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 

JTAC joint terminal attack controller 

JTCB joint targeting coordination board 

JTF joint task force 

LDO laser designator operator 

LF landing force 

LGB laser-guided bomb 

LGM laser-guided missile 

LGW laser-guided weapon 

LO low observable 

LOAL lock-on after launch 

LOBL lock-on before launch 

LOC line of communications 

LOS line of sight 

LRF laser rangefinder 

LST laser spot tracker 

LTD laser target designator 

LTL laser-to-target line 

MACCS Marine air command and control system 

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force 

MCRP Marine Corps reference publication 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-09 

MEF Marine expeditionary force 

MIDB modernized integrated database 

MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NCO noncommissioned officer 

NFA no-fire area 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NIPRNET Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 

NSFS naval surface fire support 

NSL no-strike list 

NSWTG naval special warfare task group 

NSWTU naval special warfare task unit 

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures 

OGA other government agency 

OPCON operational control 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operation order 

PL phase line 

PRF pulse repetition frequency 

RFA restrictive fire area 

RFL restrictive fire line 

ROE rules of engagement 

RTL restricted target list 

SA situational awareness 

SACC supporting arms coordination center 

SFCP shore fire control party 

SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network 

SO special operations 

SOCCE special operations command and control element 

SOCOORD special operations coordination element 

SOF special operations forces 

SOLE special operations liaison element 

SOP standard operating procedure 

STANAG standardization agreement (NATO) 

STT special tactics team 

TA target acquisition 

TAC(A) tactical air coordinator (airborne) 

TACC tactical air command center (USMC); 

 tactical air control center (USN) 

TACP tactical air control party 

TADC tactical air direction center 
Glossary 

GL-5 

TAMD theater air and missile defense 

TAOC tactical air operations center (USMC) 

TBMCS theater battle management core system 

TGO terminal guidance operations 

TLAM Tomahawk land attack missile 

TLE target location error 

TM theater missile 

TST time-sensitive target 

UAS unmanned aircraft system 

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command 

USMC United States Marine Corps 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

ZF zone of fire 
GL-6 JP 3-09 

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions 

found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, will reflect this publication as the source document for 

these terms and definitions. 

air interdiction. Air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the 

enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against 

friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. Air interdiction is conducted at 

such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with 

the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

airspace control authority. The commander designated to assume overall responsibility 

for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area. Also 

called ACA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

airspace coordinating measures. Measures employed to facilitate the efficient use of 

airspace to accomplish missions and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly 

forces. Also called ACMs. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

airspace coordination area. A three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area, 

established by the appropriate ground commander, in which friendly aircraft are 

reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. The airspace coordination area may be 

formal or informal. Also called ACA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09.3) 

air tasking order. A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate 

units, and command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities and/or forces 

to targets and specific missions. Normally provides specific instructions to include 

call signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. Also 

called ATO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-30) 

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land 

and maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire 

operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for 

component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also 

called AO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

at my command. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

backscatter. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

boundary. A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating 

coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or 

areas. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 
Glossary 

GL-7 

call fire. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

call for fire. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

center of gravity. The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, 

freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

close air support. Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets 

that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of 

each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: 3-0) 

collateral damage. Unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects 

that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. 

Such damage is not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall 

military advantage anticipated from the attack. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-60) 

combat identification. The process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected 

objects in the operational environment sufficient to support an engagement decision. 

Also called CID. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09) 

computer network operations. Comprised of computer network attack, computer 

network defense, and related computer network exploitation enabling operations. 

Also called CNO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 3-13) 

concept of fires. A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses how 

lethal and nonlethal fires will be synchronized and integrated to support the 

commander’s operational objectives. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement, that clearly and concisely 

expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be 

done using available resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of 

the operation. Also called commander’s concept or CONOPS. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

continuous illumination fire. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

coordinated fire line. A line beyond which conventional and indirect surface fire 

support means may fire at any time within the boundaries of the establishing 

headquarters without additional coordination. The purpose of the coordinated fire 

line is to expedite the surface-to-surface attack of targets beyond the coordinated fire 

line without coordination with the ground commander in whose area the targets are 

located. Also called CFL. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09) 

counterfire. Fire intended to destroy or neutralize enemy weapons. Includes 

counterbattery and countermortar fire. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-09 

defilade. 1. Protection from hostile observation and fire provided by an obstacle such as 

a hill, ridge, or bank. 2. A vertical distance by which a position is concealed from 

enemy observation. 3. To shield from enemy fire or observation by using natural or 

artificial obstacles. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-09 as the 

source JP.) 

directed energy. An umbrella term covering technologies that relate to the production of 

a beam of concentrated electromagnetic energy or atomic or subatomic particles. 

Also called DE. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-09 as the source 

JP.) 

direct support artillery. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

electronic attack. Division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic 

energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or 

equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat 

capability and is considered a form of fires. Also called EA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-13.1) 

electronic warfare. Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed 

energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic 

warfare consists of three divisions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and 

electronic warfare support. Also called EW. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.1) 

enlisted terminal attack controller. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

field artillery. Equipment, supplies, ammunition, and personnel involved in the use of 

cannon, rocket, or surface-to-surface missile launchers. Field artillery cannons are 

classified according to caliber as follows: 

Light — 120mm and less. 

Medium — 121-160mm. 

Heavy — 161-210mm. 

Very heavy — greater than 210mm. 

Also called FA. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-09 as the source 

JP.) 

fire. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

fire barrage (specify). None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

fire capabilities chart. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

fire control. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

fire control radar. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-9 

 

fire control system. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

fire coordination. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

fire for effect. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

fire message. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

 

fire mission. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

fire plan. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

firepower. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

fires. The use of weapon systems to create specific lethal or nonlethal effects on a target. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

fire support. Fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special 

operations forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in 

pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09) 

fire support area. An appropriate maneuver area assigned to fire support ships by the 

naval force commander from which they can deliver gunfire support to an 

amphibious operation. Also called FSA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09) 

fire support coordination. The planning and executing of fire so that targets are 

adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-09) 

fire support coordination center. A single location in which are centralized 

communications facilities and personnel incident to the coordination of all forms of 

fire support. Also called FSCC. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 

3-09 as the source JP.) 

fire support coordination line. A fire support coordination measure that is established 

and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within their 

boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected 

commanders. Fire support coordination lines facilitate the expeditious attack of 

surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. A fire support 

coordination line does not divide an area of operations by defining a boundary 

between close and deep operations or a zone for close air support. The fire support 

coordination line applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapon systems using 

any type of ammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond a fire support coordination 

line must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary 

reaction to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements attacking targets beyond the fire 
Glossary 

GL-10 JP 3-09 

support coordination line must ensure that the attack will not produce adverse effects 

on, or to the rear of, the line. Short of a fire support coordination line, all air-toground and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate 

land or amphibious force commander. The fire support coordination line should 

follow well-defined terrain features. Coordination of attacks beyond the fire support 

coordination line is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and special 

operations forces. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this 

coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the fire support 

coordination line. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide and 

could waste limited resources. Also called FSCL. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09) 

fire support coordination measure. A measure employed by land or amphibious 

commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide 

safeguards for friendly forces. Also called FSCM. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

fire support element. That portion of the force tactical operations center at every 

echelon above company or troop (to corps) that is responsible for targeting 

coordination and for integrating fires delivered on surface targets by fire-support 

means under the control, or in support, of the force. Also called FSE. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-09) 

fire support officer. Senior field artillery officer assigned to Army maneuver battalions 

and brigades. Advises commander on fire-support matters. Also called FSO. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-09 as the source JP.) 

fire support station. An exact location at sea within a fire support area from which a 

fire support ship delivers fire. Also called FSS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

firing chart. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

forward observer. An observer operating with front line troops and trained to adjust 

ground or naval gunfire and pass back battlefield information. In the absence of a 

forward air controller, the observer may control close air support strikes. Also called 

FO. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-09 as the source JP.) 

free-fire area. A specific area into which any weapon system may fire without 

additional coordination with the establishing headquarters. Also called FFA. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09) 

grid coordinates. Coordinates of a grid coordinate system to which numbers and letters 

are assigned for use in designating a point on a gridded map, photograph, or chart. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09) 

high-payoff target. A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the 

success of the friendly course of action. High-payoff targets are those high-value 
Glossary 

GL-11 

targets that must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of the friendly 

commander’s mission. Also called HPT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-60) 

high-value target. A target the enemy commander requires for the successful 

completion of the mission. The loss of high-value targets would be expected to 

seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly commander’s 

area of interest. Also called HVT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-60) 

inertial navigation system. A self-contained navigation system using inertial detectors, 

which automatically provides vehicle position, heading, and velocity. Also called 

INS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09) 

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of 

electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military 

deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related 

capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated 

decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-13) 

interdiction. 1. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military 

surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to 

otherwise achieve objectives. 2. In support of law enforcement, activities conducted 

to divert, disrupt, delay, intercept, board, detain, or destroy, as appropriate, vessels, 

vehicles, aircraft, people, and cargo. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-03) 

joint fires. Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more 

components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common 

objective. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

joint fires element. An optional staff element that provides recommendations to the 

operations directorate to accomplish fires planning and synchronization. Also called 

JFE. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-60) 

joint fire support. Joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and special operations forces 

to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, 

subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing 

commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, 

attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air 

operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The 

joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish 

missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 
Glossary 

GL-12 JP 3-09 

joint targeting coordination board. A group formed by the joint force commander to 

accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited 

to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, 

and refining the joint integrated prioritized target list. The board is normally 

comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if 

required, component subordinate units. Also called JTCB. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-60) 

kill box. A three-dimensional area used to facilitate the integration of joint fires. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09) 

laser. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

laser footprint. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

laser guided weapon. A weapon which uses a seeker to detect laser energy reflected 

from a laser marked/designated target and through signal processing provides 

guidance commands to a control system which guides the weapon to the point from 

which the laser energy is being reflected. Also called LGW. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-09) 

laser linescan system. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

laser pulse duration. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

laser rangefinder. A device which uses laser energy for determining the distance from 

the device to a place or object. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09) 

laser seeker. A device based on a direction sensitive receiver which detects the energy 

reflected from a laser designated target and defines the direction of the target relative 

to the receiver. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09) 

laser spot. The area on a surface illuminated by a laser. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02 with JP 3-09 as the source JP.) 

laser spot tracker. A device that locks on to the reflected energy from a laser-marked or 

designated target and defines the direction of the target relative to itself. Also called 

LST. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-09 as the source JP.) 

laser target designating system. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

laser target designator. A device that emits a beam of laser energy which is used to 

mark a specific place or object. Also called LTD. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02 with JP 3-09 as the source JP.) 

laser-target/gun-target angle. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-13 

laser target marker. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

laser target marking system. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

low angle. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

low angle fire. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

low angle loft bombing. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

mensuration. The process of measurement of a feature or location on the earth to 

determine an absolute latitude, longitude, and elevation. For targeting applications, 

the errors inherent in both the source for measurement as well as the measurement 

processes must be understood and reported. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-60)

no-fire area. An area designated by the appropriate commander into which fires or their 

effects are prohibited. Also called NFA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09.3) 

nonlethal weapon. A weapon that is explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to 

incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to 

personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. Also called 

NLW. (1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-28) 

no-strike list. A list of objects or entities characterized as protected from the effects of 

military operations under international law and/or rules of engagement. Attacking 

these may violate the law of armed conflict or interfere with friendly relations with 

indigenous personnel or governments. Also called NSL. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-60) 

offset lasing. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

phase line. A line utilized for control and coordination of military operations, usually an 

easily identified feature in the operational area. Also called PL. (1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-09) 

positive control. A method of airspace control that relies on positive identification, 

tracking, and direction of aircraft within an airspace, conducted with electronic 

means by an agency having the authority and responsibility therein. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: 3-52) 

prearranged fire. Fire that is formally planned and executed against targets or target 

areas of known location. Such fire is usually planned well in advance and is 

executed at a predetermined time or during a predetermined period of time. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09) 
Glossary 

GL-14 JP 3-09 

procedural control. A method of airspace control which relies on a combination of 

previously agreed and promulgated orders and procedures. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-52) 

pulse code. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

pulse repetition frequency. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

rate of fire. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

restrictive fire area. An area in which specific restrictions are imposed and into which 

fires that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with 

the establishing headquarters. Also called RFA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09) 

restrictive fire line. A line established between converging friendly surface forces that 

prohibits fires or their effects across that line. Also called RFL. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-09) 

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate 

the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate 

and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called 

ROE. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1-04) 

schedule of fire. Groups of fires or series of fires fired in a definite sequence according 

to a definite program. The time of starting the schedule may be on call. For 

identification purposes, schedules may be referred to by a code name or other 

designation. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

special operations terminal attack controller. None. (Approved for removal from JP 

1-02.) 

spillover. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

submunition. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

supporting fire. Fire delivered by supporting units to assist or protect a unit in combat. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 3-09 as the source JP.) 

targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate 

response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

target of opportunity. 1. A target identified too late, or not selected for action in time, 

to be included in deliberate targeting that, when detected or located, meets criteria 

specific to achieving objectives and is processed using dynamic targeting. There are 

two types of targets of opportunity: unplanned and unanticipated. 2. A target visible 
Glossary 

GL-15 

to a surface or air sensor or observer, which is within range of available weapons and 

against which fire has not been scheduled or requested. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-60) 

terminal guidance operations. Those actions that provide electronic, mechanical, voice 

or visual communications that provide approaching aircraft and/or weapons 

additional information regarding a specific target location. Also called TGO. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09) 

time-sensitive target. A joint force commander designated target requiring immediate 

response because it is a highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity or it poses (or 

will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces. Also called TST. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-60) 

zone of action. A tactical subdivision of a larger area, the responsibility for which is 

assigned to a tactical unit; generally applied to offensive action. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-09.) 

zone of fire. An area into which a designated ground unit or fire support ship delivers, or 

is prepared to deliver, fire support. Fire may or may not be observed. Also called 

ZF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09) 
Glossary 

GL-16 JP 3-09 

Intentionally Blank 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATION

PLANS SYSTEMS

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to

fill extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of

the development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-09 Operations