Naval Operations Concept 

2010

Implementing

The Maritime Strategy
The Coast Guard completely subscribes to this strategy. It reinforces 

the Coast Guard Strategy for Safety, Security, and Stewardship and 

it reflects not only the global reach of our maritime services, but 

the need to integrate, synchronize and act with coalition and 

international partners to not only win wars—but to prevent wars.

— Admiral Thad W. Allen, USCG

We do more than just respond; we prevent. In our Maritime Strategy 

we state that we believe that it is just as important to prevent wars 

as it is to win wars. That is done through our worldwide presence, 

our well-trained Sailors, and our very capable ships, airplanes, 

and submarines.

— Admiral Gary Roughead, USN

The basic premise of our newly published Maritime Strategy is 

that the United States is a force for good in the world—that while we 

are capable of launching a clenched fist when we must—offering 

the hand of friendship is also an essential and prominent tool in 

our kit. That premise flows from the belief that preventing wars 

means we don’t have to win wars.

— General James T. Conway, USMC
Preface

The daily service and sacrifice of Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen are constant reminders that we are a Nation at war. As we continue 

to stabilize Iraq and counter a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan, 

extremist ideologues, terrorists, criminals and rogue states still mar 

the international landscape, promoting their interests by undermining 

global stability. Concurrently, several key regional powers continue to 

significantly enhance their own military capabilities. To deal with the 

expanding range of these challenges, we must always be prepared and 

ready to assume new missions—today and tomorrow. 

Four years ago the Navy and Marine Corps presented a unified vision 

for the future—Naval Operations Concept 2006 (NOC 06). It served as 

an intellectual stimulus for evolving our Maritime Strategy to meet the 

challenges of the 21st century. The Navy and Marine Corps, joined by 

our seagoing partner, the U.S. Coast Guard, explored the ideas articulated 

in NOC 06 to inform development of our new Maritime Strategy. With 

the publication of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS-21)

in October 2007, NOC 06 fulfilled its purpose.

Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC 10) describes when, where and 

how U.S. naval forces will contribute to enhancing security, preventing 

conflict and prevailing in war. NOC 10 is not designed for a cursory 

reading; it is a publication intended for serious study by professionals. 

Readers will quickly discern several themes that collectively embody the 

essence of naval service to our Nation. Implicit in these themes is that 

Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen should expect to be engaged in 

both preventing and winning wars. These themes reflect the content of 

CS-21 as well as the guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense in 

the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense 

Review (QDR). 
The sea services have a long history of accomplishing diverse missions, 

from protecting American merchantmen during an undeclared naval 

war in the late 18th century, to establishing our naval prowess in the 

War of 1812, to suppressing the African slave trade and West Indian 

piracy in the 19th century, to fighting the major wars and confronting the 

irregular challenges of the 20th century. As the 21st century unfolds, we 

must continue to be effective warriors as well as informed and articulate 

ambassadors, serving our Nation’s interests and facilitating free global 

interaction from the sea.

 James T. Conway Gary Roughead Thad W. Allen 

General, U.S. Marine Corps Admiral, U.S. Navy Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard 

Commandant of the Marine Corps Chief of Naval Operations Commandant of the Coast Guard

The pathway of man’s journey through 

the ages is littered with the wreckage of 

nations, which, in their hour of glory, 

forgot their dependence on the seas.

—Brigadier General James D. Hittle, 

USMC (Retired), 1961

Military Historian and Theorist
	 Chapter 1 Introduction ...................................................................... 1

	 Chapter 2 The Naval Service.............................................................. 7

	 Chapter 3 The Overarching Concept: 

 The Sea as Maneuver Space ............................................. 13

	 Chapter 4 Forward Presence............................................................ 25

	 Chapter 5 Maritime Security............................................................ 35

	 Chapter 6 Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response............ 45

	 Chapter 7 Sea Control...................................................................... 51

	 Chapter 8 Power Projection.............................................................. 59

	 Chapter 9 Deterrence....................................................................... 73

	Chapter 10 Future Force Structure .................................................... 81

	 Annex A Relationship of Naval Operations Concept 2010 to 

 Joint Concept Development and Experimentation ..........94

	 Annex B Glossary and Endnotes.................................................... 96

Contents
Nor must Uncle Sam’s web-feet be forgotten. 

At all the watery margins they have been present. 

Not only in the deep sea, the broad bay, and 

the rapid river, but also up the narrow muddy bayou, 

and wherever the ground was a little damp, 

they have been and made their tracks.

—President Abraham Lincoln, 1863

16th President of the United States


Chapter 1

Introduction

As we think about this range of threats, it is common to define 

and divide the so-called “high end” from the “low end,” the 

conventional from the irregular; armored divisions on one side, 

guerrillas toting AK-47s on the other. In reality...the categories 

of warfare are blurring and do not fit into neat, tidy boxes. 

We can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction—

from the sophisticated to the simple—being employed simultaneously in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare. 

—Robert M. Gates, 22nd Secretary of Defense,

29 September 2008

Purpose 

Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC 10) describes when, where and 

how U.S. naval forces will contribute to enhancing security, preventing 

conflict and prevailing in war in order to guide Maritime Strategy 

implementation in a manner consistent with national strategy. NOC 10 

describes the ways with which the sea services will achieve the ends

articulated in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS-21).

 

. 

Relationship to Other Documents

NOC 10 supersedes NOC 06 and represents the evolution in naval 

operational concepts and capabilities needed to adapt to the relentless 

efforts of current and potential adversaries to find advantage in the 

maritime domain. Continuous innovation, by the United States, its allies 

and partners, and its adversaries, compels NOC 10 to be a contemporary 

document that guides current operations, as well as a forward looking 

effort to anticipate and describe the ways new capabilities can be integrated into joint force efforts to address emerging threats. In this regard, 

NOC 10 articulates how naval capabilities can be applied in support of 

the combatant commanders’ operations, contingency plans, and theater 

security cooperation (TSC) plans.

Chapter 1 Introduction
Naval Operations Concept 2010



Scope

The integration of naval capabilities to achieve specific joint mission 

objectives is the responsibility of commanders, who formulate their 

concepts of operations to achieve advantage and decision. In contrast, 

Service operational concepts are designed to describe the capabilities that 

operational commanders can expect the Services to provide, and indicate 

selected ways these capabilities can be integrated to achieve mission 

success. Consequently, NOC 10 is designed to inform development of 

joint concepts, plans and experimentation. The term “naval” and “the 

Naval Service” are used throughout this publication to encompass Navy, 

Marine Corps, and Coast Guard personnel and organizations.1

NOC 10 articulates the ways naval forces are employed to achieve the 

strategy conveyed in CS-21. Published in 2007, CS-21 described a set 

of core capabilities that added maritime security and humanitarian 

assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) to the traditional forward 

presence, deterrence, sea control, and power projection. Not to be 

viewed as discrete missions or functions, these core capabilities are 

intrinsically linked and mutually supporting enablers for achieving the 

Naval Service’s strategic imperatives: 

Regionally concentrated, credible combat power to:

n Limit regional conflict with deployed, decisive maritime power 

n Deter major power war 

n Win our Nation’s wars 

Globally distributed, mission-tailored maritime forces to:

n Contribute to homeland defense in depth 

n Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international 

partners 

n Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global 

system

NOC 10 does not prescribe Naval Service tactics, nor is it doctrine. Rather, 

it serves as a precursor to the development of both. It describes how the 

Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard operate together, and will be 

complemented by Service-specific concepts. Collectively, the ideas put 

forth are to be applied, tested, analyzed and refined through war games, 

exercises, experiments, and operational lessons learned. This innovation 


will ultimately inform future revisions of the NOC, as it is updated to 

remain relevant in the evolving security environment. 

In an increasingly complex world, naval forces provide the Nation with 

the global presence and the freedom of maneuver needed to influence 

world events. Persistently postured forward, naval forces are continuously 

engaged with global partners in cooperative security activities aimed at 

reducing instability and providing another arm of national diplomacy. 

Their expeditionary capabilities enable and support the joint force effort 

to combat both conventional and irregular challenges. NOC 10 describes 

how naval forces will blend “soft” and “hard” power2 in support of the 

approach, objectives and enduring national interests articulated in the 

National Defense Strategy (NDS). These enduring interests include 

“protecting the nation and our allies from attack or coercion, promoting 

international security to reduce conflict and foster economic growth, and 

securing the global commons and with them access to world markets and 

resources.”3 NOC 10 also expounds upon CS-21’s core capabilities: 

forward presence, maritime security, HA/DR, sea control, power projection 

and deterrence.

The organization of NOC 10 is not meant to imply, and does not reflect 

the relative importance of the Naval Service’s core capabilities. NOC 10 

is presented in a sequence designed to describe how globally dispersed 

naval forces conducting an array of steady state activities designed to 

prevent war will, when required, come together to prevail in crisis 

response or combat operations. NOC 10 describes The Naval Service in 

Chapter 2, followed by The Overarching Concept: The Sea as Maneuver Space

in Chapter 3. Each of the six subsequent chapters is dedicated to one of 

the core capabilities. Chapter 4 describes how Forward Presence enables 

the Naval Service to build partner capacity while facilitating its ability to 

perform all other missions. Chapter 5, Maritime Security, describes how 

naval forces will partner with others to promote safety, economic security, 

and homeland defense in depth. Similarly, Chapter 6 describes how naval 

forces will contribute to HA/DR. Chapters 7 and 8, Sea Control and Power 

Projection, describe how naval forces fulfill their warfighting responsibilities as part of a joint or combined force. Chapter 9 describes how the 

activities articulated in the preceding five chapters contribute to expanded 

Deterrence. Finally, Chapter 10 will discuss the Future Force Structure that 

supports the implementation of this concept on a global basis.

Chapter 1 Introduction
Naval Operations Concept 2010



Annex A describes the relationship between NOC 10 and joint concept 

development and experimentation. Annex B provides a glossary and 

endnotes. Unless otherwise noted, all definitions included in this 

publication are drawn from Joint Publication 1-02, the Department of 

Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 

It follows then as certain as that 

night succeeds the day, that without a 

decisive naval force we can do nothing 

definitive, and with it, everything 

honorable and glorious. 

—General George Washington, 1781

1st President of the United States


Chapter 2

The Naval Service

Chapter 2 The Naval Service

We will always be prepared, so we may always be free.

—President Ronald Reagan, 1984

40th President of the United States

Who We Are

The Naval Service is comprised of the active and reserve components and 

the civilian personnel of the United States Navy, the United States Marine 

Corps and the United States Coast Guard.

We are, first and foremost, men and women dedicated to the service of 

our Nation in peace and war. We are an all-volunteer force instilled with 

a warrior and guardian ethos. Our people are the foundation of our 

mission success. They possess willpower, creativity, inspiration, reason, 

knowledge, and experience to overcome adversity and accomplish any 

task. They exemplify the values of honor, courage, and commitment. 

We are an instrument of national power, employed to prevent conflict 

and, if necessary, prevail in war. We are organized, trained, and 

equipped primarily to operate and fight at and from the sea. The qualities 

that allow us to prevail in war also contribute to conflict prevention. 

These qualities include speed, flexibility, agility, scalability, readiness, 

mobility, self-sustainability, and lethality. 

What We Believe

We believe that the future is uncertain, and that the United States will 

be threatened by a variety of state and non-state adversaries, current and 

emerging. We believe that both state and non-state adversaries are likely 

to employ a hybrid of conventional and irregular methods to counter the 

United States’ advantage in conventional military operations. Thus, we 

must be prepared to overcome a range of adversaries employing a variety 

of capabilities and tactics. 
Naval Operations Concept 2010



We believe that naval forces uniquely contribute to overcoming diplomatic, 

military, and geographic impediments to access, while respecting the 

sovereignty of nations. Even as security, stability, and the global economy 

become more interdependent, resistance to a large U.S. military “footprint” abroad will continue to increase. Naval forces provide the ideal 

means in such a security environment to accomplish a wide variety of 

missions conducted independently or in concert with joint, interagency, 

international and non-governmental partners that share the United States’ 

interest in promoting a safe and prosperous world.

We believe that preventing war is as important as winning, and that prevention activities will constitute the most likely application of naval power.

Where We Operate

The Naval Service operates in the maritime domain, which consists of 

the “oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace 

above these, including the littorals.” The littoral is comprised of two 

segments. The seaward portion is that area from the open ocean to the 

shore that must be controlled to support operations ashore. The landward

portion is the area inland from the shore that can be supported and 

defended directly from the sea. 

A number of common, non-doctrinal terms also describe aspects of the 

maritime domain. Blue water refers to the open ocean; green water refers 

to coastal waters, ports and harbors; and brown water refers to navigable 

rivers and their estuaries. 

The complexity of the maritime domain, which encompasses the confluence of water, air, land, as well as space and cyberspace, is infinite in its 

variations. As a result, operations in the maritime domain are inherently 

challenging. The magnitude of this challenge increases as the proximity 

to land increases, with the most complex cases being operations that 

transition between water and land. 

This is the environment in which naval forces thrive. 

Naval forces will continue to be in high demand across the range of 

military operations (ROMO)4, largely because they effectively bridge 
Chapter 2 The Naval Service

the seams between water, land, and air. Leveraging our strong historic 

interdependencies, we task organize Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast 

Guard resources to achieve the requisite blend of capability, capacity, 

and legal authorities to suit the given situation and mission. Similarly, 

command relationships are tailored to each operation based on the 

mission specifics.

As we train for and conduct missions, we are mindful that the maritime 

domain is a precious resource shared by the global community. We will 

conduct effective combat training, using live and simulated methods, 

while ensuring that we sustain our naval preeminence and our record of 

good environmental stewardship. 

What We Provide the Nation

The Naval Service provides the Nation a multi-purpose team whose 

capabilities are applicable across the ROMO. While most frequently 

employed to prevent conflict, we are manned, trained and equipped to 

prevail in combat. We provide:

n Persistent presence, operating forward while respecting the sovereignty 

of others. Naval forces conduct military engagement and security 

cooperation to build partnerships; prevent and deter conflict; communicate our Nation’s intent; conduct crisis response and limited contingency operations; and when necessary, facilitate the introduction of 

additional naval, joint, or multinational forces, as well as interagency, 

multinational, or non-governmental organizations. 

n Self-sustaining, sea-based expeditionary forces, the Nation’s preeminent, 

combined-arms teams. Uniquely tailored to fight and win from the 

sea, we are manned, trained, equipped, and ready to operate without 

reliance on ports or airfields in an objective area. For the Naval Service, 

“expeditionary” is not limited to being “an armed force organized to 

accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.” Rather, being

expeditionary is one of our defining characteristics—we are ready 

to fight when we “leave the pier,” persistently forward postured, and 

self-sustaining throughout our deployments.
Naval Operations Concept 2010

10

n Maritime domain expertise, fully cognizant of the complexities of the 

water, air, and land environments and their interfaces. We are the only 

force skilled at operating in this maneuver space. We fight by achieving 

access, establishing local sea control and projecting power ashore as 

part of a joint or multinational team. We effectively employ a range 

of lethal and non-lethal capabilities to counter both conventional and 

irregular challenges in the maritime domain as well as space and 

cyberspace.

n Flexible force options, scalable with respect to capability, capacity, 

and legal authorities. Our forward posture is a cost-effective means 

of proactively influencing events and responding to crises. When 

required, these naval forces can be rapidly reinforced by other naval 

forces surged5

 from globally dispersed locations. Our inherent mobility, 

organizational agility, and self-sustainability provide combatant commanders with a variety of options, including the ability to command 

and control joint task forces from afloat and ashore, across the ROMO. 

n Expanded deterrence, through credible, maneuverable, forward 

deployed and scalable power projection capabilities—including 

ballistic missile defense and nuclear strike—and prevention activities 

that build capable partners and address the causes of instability and 

conflict. 

n Joint, multinational, and interagency enabling forces that facilitate 

the integration and application of all elements of national power.

Naval operational maneuver is a great advantage of 

maritime powers, past and present...An amphibious 

force under way will move about five hundred nautical 

miles in a day...On land an army maneuvering at operational speed against weak opposition will advance 

about twenty-five statute miles a day. Concisely, in 

speed of operational movement ships have an order-ofmagnitude advantage over an army...The introduction 

of aircraft and aerial logistics complicates this simplified description, but aircraft have never changed the 

threefold advantage of seapower...6

—Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN (Retired), 2008

Senior Lecturer

Department of Operations Research

Naval Postgraduate School
13

Chapter 3

The Overarching Concept:

The Sea as Maneuver Space

Chapter 3 The Overarching Concept

The objective should be to perform as far as practical the 

functions now performed on land at sea bases closer to the scene 

of operations.... This gives American power a flexibility and a 

breadth impossible of achievement by land-locked powers.7

—Samuel P. Huntington, 1954

Background

In the 21st century, information moves around the world almost instantaneously through cyberspace, and people and select goods quickly travel 

great distances by air. However, most materiel still moves the way it has 

for millennia—by sea. Ninety percent of the world’s goods travel by sea. 

Similarly, whenever the United States conducts military operations on 

foreign soil, the vast majority of U.S. joint force materiel continues to be 

transported by sea. 

Using the sea as maneuver space is the overarching concept of this 

publication. The Naval Service provides a sea-based force free from 

reliance on local ports and airfields. Naval forces continuously operate 

forward—and surge additional forces when necessary—to influence 

adversaries and project power. 

Opportunity and Challenge

Previous generations found deploying joint forces and sustaining them 

overseas to be a hazardous undertaking. Adversaries, applying their own 

naval power, sought to deny our transit across the oceans or, failing that, 

our landing on the far shore. In the first half of the 20th century, U.S. 

Navy and Marine Corps leaders developed the capabilities necessary to 

establish sea control and project power ashore where and when desired. 

Following World War II however, the importance of these capabilities 

waned as the United States enjoyed extensive basing rights overseas, 

to include secure ports and airfields. This network of overseas bases 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

14

has been significantly reduced since the end of the Cold War, even as 

the United States enters a new era characterized by a broad variety of 

strategic challenges that threaten its global influence. In addition to peer 

competitors with conventional and nuclear forces, the rise of non-state 

actors and the expansion of irregular challenges have dramatically 

increased the complexity of the security environment. 

The ability to overcome diplomatic, geographic, and military impediments to access has re-emerged as a critical enabler for extending U.S. 

influence and projecting power overseas. As noted in the Capstone 

Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO): 

The most likely occasions requiring the commitment of joint forces will 

arise, as they have for the past half-century, in places where few or no 

forces are permanently stationed. America’s ability to project power 

rapidly and conduct and sustain operations globally thus will remain 

critically dependent on air and maritime freedom of movement and on 

sufficient strategic and operational lift.8

Central Idea

The Naval Service uses the sea as maneuver space. Mobility and maneuverability constitute the Naval Service’s primary operational attributes, 

stemming directly from the ability of naval forces to move long distances 

quickly and efficiently, and to maneuver within the maritime environment to achieve advantage in relation to an adversary. 

Fully using the sea as maneuver space requires the: 

n Ability to collect and share information to enhance global awareness 

of activities in the maritime domain.

n Ability to employ, support and sustain task-organized forces over 

extended ranges and durations to conduct diverse and often concurrent missions: engagement; relief and reconstruction; security; and 

combat operations.

n Capability and capacity to confront irregular challenges, especially 

in the littorals.
15Chapter 3 The Overarching Concept

n Interoperable naval command and control (C2) capabilities that maintain due regard for national sovereignty, statutory responsibilities, and 

legal authorities among the various U.S. and international participants.

n Ability to be supported by, and to support, joint, interagency, and

international partners through seabasing.

Global Awareness

Global awareness is a broad, non-doctrinal term referring to the knowledge 

and understanding required for decision-making across the range of 

military operations (ROMO). Today, it is being improved through the 

cumulative result of professional development, technological enhancements, 

and cooperative information sharing. Professional development includes 

expanding the regional and cultural awareness that allows Sailors, Marines, 

and Coast Guardsmen to accurately understand situations and take appropriate action in a prudent and timely manner. The persistent forward 

presence of naval forces contributes to regional understanding, which is 

further enhanced through both unilateral and multi-lateral operational 

experience. Every Sailor, Marine and Coast Guardsman is a collector and 

user of information. An increasingly linguistically diverse and culturally 

savvy force is improving our ability to interact with local populations, 

establish trust-based relationships, and inspire information sharing. 

For the foreseeable future, global awareness will remain dependent upon 

the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of vast stores of collected 

data made available across global information networks. Today, this is 

increasingly accomplished through automation and advanced intelligence 

and information architectures. A key cooperative initiative to enhance 

global awareness is the national and international effort to improve 

maritime domain awareness (MDA). MDA is defined as “the effective 

understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that 

could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of a nation.” 

Enhancing MDA depends primarily upon facilitating the sharing of information among partners, and increasing the compatibility of the related 

systems. Information must be exchanged among a diverse network of 

military, government, and international partners; as well as private sector 

and commercial participants. With this in mind, sharing information 

at the lowest classification level that the situation permits will offer the 

highest benefit in terms of gaining trust, broadening cooperation, and 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

16

making comprehensive information available to the widest possible range 

of partners, decision makers, and tactical users. 

Employing Task Organized Forces

Task-organizing is the act of establishing an operating force, support 

staff, or logistic package of specific size and composition to accomplish 

a unique task or mission. The Naval Service combines ships, personnel, 

equipment, and its other inherent capabilities—often with forces and 

units from allies, partners, and other government agencies—in an 

adaptive manner to provide the right force at the right time to achieve a 

particular operational objective. 

Standard force packages comprised of units that train together prior to 

deploying overseas help the Naval Service respond effectively across 

the full range of military operations. Notionally, a carrier strike group 

consists of an aircraft carrier, carrier air wing, up to five surface combatants, a fleet oiler and a direct support submarine. An amphibious 

readiness group (ARG) normally consists of an amphibious assault ship 

(LHA or LHD), an amphibious transport dock (LPD) and a dock landing 

ship (LSD). In those cases when the amphibious assault ship does not 

contain a well deck, the ARG composition may be augmented to ensure 

that adequate well deck, vehicle square, and connector capacities are 

available. Independently deploying surface combatants and other units 

can join either of these force packages to create task groups with the 

capabilities necessary to secure the maritime maneuver space from air, 

subsurface or surface threats and accomplish the assigned mission. 

If necessary, whole force packages or task groups can be aggregated to 

create an expeditionary strike force (ESF) to support a large contingency 

operation or campaign. Generally, an ESF in support of the assault 

echelon of a single amphibious Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) will 

total 17 amphibious ships; a second MEB would require the surging of all 

remaining U.S. Navy amphibious ships. 

Effective aggregation of maritime forces relies on common tactics, techniques 

and procedures associated with intelligence, C2, fires, maneuver, logistics 

and force protection. This underscores the importance of sufficient joint 

and combined training, and of interoperable systems, to achieving and 

sustaining operational readiness. The Naval Service constantly seeks to 

sustain this critical foundation, to include allies and partners. 
17Chapter 3 The Overarching Concept

Once in theater, disaggregation of the standard force packages is the 

norm during peacetime operations. Smaller task organized action 

groups, down to individual units, are frequently established to conduct 

various combat missions as well as maritime security, maritime interdiction, security force assistance and humanitarian assistance and disaster 

response (HA/DR) missions within the assigned theater of operations. 

As a result, task organized force packages are increasingly being employed 

to complement the standard force packages, which also facilitates meeting 

the growing global demand for maritime forces. Navy and Marine 

component commanders and Coast Guard senior field commanders play 

a key role in this regard, requesting and employing tailored force packages to meet the combatant commanders’ requirements. 

Enhanced Marine Air-Ground Task Force Operations 

The ability to use the sea as maneuver space is the critical design consideration for Marine capabilities. As “soldiers of the sea,” the principal Marine 

Corps organization for all missions across the ROMO is the amphibious 

and expeditionary capable Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). 

Task-organized to meet mission requirements, MAGTFs vary in size from 

several hundred to as many as 75,000 Marines and Sailors. All, however, 

are composed of at least four core elements under a single commander: a 

command element, an aviation combat element, a ground combat element, 

and a logistics combat element. Other Service or multinational forces may 

also be assigned or attached to a MAGTF to meet mission needs. 

Since its inception, the MAGTF construct has proven itself highly 

flexible and adaptable. To ensure that future MAGTFs are equipped 

with the capabilities and capacities appropriate to the evolving security 

environment, the Marine Corps is exploring enhanced MAGTF operations 

(EMO). The EMO initiative is examining refinements to current tables of 

organization and equipment, as well as to select tactics, techniques, and 

procedures. These refinements seek to improve the ability of naval forces 

to: overcome challenges to access and mobility; employ, support, and 

sustain dispersed, subordinate maneuver units at extended distances or 

in compartmentalized terrain that creates physical separation from higher 

and adjacent units; interact effectively with local populations to understand a given situation and ensure that tactical actions support strategic 

goals; and perform engagement, relief and reconstruction, security and 

combat tasks in combination as appropriate to a given situation.
Naval Operations Concept 2010

18

Mindful of the Marine Corps’ enduring role as a naval, expeditionary 

force-in-readiness, the EMO initiative is driven by the premise that 

MAGTFs are primarily designed to be employed, supported and sustained from the sea. To operate from the sea, MAGTFs will be lean and 

agile—but still lethal. 

Confronting Irregular Challenges 

The Naval Service confronts irregular challenges at sea and in the 

littorals. Many of the threats in today’s dynamic security environment 

are irregular in nature, arising from state and non-state actors that 

operate from an increasing number of poor, corrupt, lawless, or weakly 

governed areas in the world. They achieve psychological, economic, and 

political effects through criminal, insurgent, and terrorist activities that 

are perpetrated with the help of extended support networks, resilient 

C2 structures, illegal funding sources, and off-the-shelf technologies 

and arms. Globalization and readily available advanced information 

technologies are accelerating the growth of such unlawful actors and their 

organizations, and intensifying the global impact they can create. 

Confronting irregular challenges within the maritime domain usually 

takes place as part of a comprehensive “whole of government” effort. 

Within that framework, the Naval Service supports U.S. government 

initiatives to help mitigate the causes of instability, improve governance, 

advance the rule of law and secure the flow of resources—frequently in 

concert with allies, partners, international organizations and non-governmental organizations. 

General purpose forces conduct the full range of military operations to 

this end, including maritime security, counter-proliferation, security 

cooperation, security force assistance, stability, maritime interdiction, 

counter-insurgency and HA/DR missions. Frequently, the unique circumstances associated with confronting irregular challenges require general 

purpose forces to apply their capabilities in innovative ways, such as 

strike-fighters using their weapons systems as non-traditional intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors. The Naval Services are 

also rebalancing their capabilities to enhance their effectiveness against 

irregular threats. The Navy’s Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), 

for example, is particularly well suited to conduct riverine operations, 

construction, maritime security training and civil affairs tasks. 
19Chapter 3 The Overarching Concept

The Marine Corps has also developed a range of initiatives that enhance 

its general purpose forces’ abilities to confront irregular challenges. 

Key among these are the Center for Irregular Warfare, the Center for 

Advanced Operational and Cultural Learning, the Security Cooperation 

Education and Training Center, the Marine Corps Information Operations Center, and the Marine expeditionary force staffs. The Marine 

Corps is also working with the Navy to establish force packages and 

combined training programs that will provide a tailorable “maritime raid 

capability” to address the diverse target sets that characterize irregular 

challenges. 

The Coast Guard’s Deployable Operations Group (DOG), comprised 

mostly of maritime safety and security teams with a special operations 

focus, brings together various specialized incident response, law enforcement and security teams into adaptive force packages for surge operations. Additionally, the Coast Guard has developed law enforcement 

detachments that enable U.S. Navy ships to conduct law enforcement 

operations, as well as train partner maritime forces to contribute effectively to the global effort to enhance maritime security. 

Naval Command and Control

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a 

properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces. 

Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement 

of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures 

employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and 

controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. 

Naval C2 relationships are based on a philosophy of centralized guidance, 

collaborative planning, and decentralized control and execution. With 

a long-standing practice of utilizing mission orders, naval C2 practices 

are intended to achieve relative advantage through organizational ability 

to observe, orient, decide and act. Mission orders enable continued 

operations in environments where communications are compromised or 

denied, allowing subordinates to exercise initiative consistent with the 

higher commander’s intent.

The integrated application of naval capabilities across a diverse range of 

missions requires a flexible approach to command arrangements. 

Command relationship options include operational control, tactical 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

20

control, or a “supported-supporting” relationship as described in Joint 

Publication 1 and are determined by the common superior commander, 

or establishing authority. Combat experience and the test of time have 

proven that the cooperative spirit of “supported-supporting” helps 

us optimize the effectiveness of all elements of the force. The type of 

relationship chosen by the establishing authority—usually a combatant 

commander—should be based on mission, authorities, nature and 

duration of the operation, force capabilities, C2 capabilities, operational 

environment, and recommendations from subordinate commanders. 

Many 21st-century problems require solutions that involve the coordinated application of all elements of national power, often applied in 

concert with the efforts of multinational and non-governmental organizations. At present, however, interagency and multinational coordination 

lacks a formal process framework and supporting architecture. Naval 

forces must therefore be capable of collaboratively planning, preparing, 

executing, and assessing operations through innovative application of the 

related naval processes. 

The Coast Guard is moving to improve interagency coordination in 

support of domestic port security through the Interagency Operations 

Centers (IOC) Project. This initiative is expanding the facilities and 

information systems within existing Sector Command Centers at highpriority ports so they can incorporate a multitude of diverse partners 

such as other law enforcement agencies, port authorities, and Department 

of Defense organizations. Designed to satisfy the mandates of the 

Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006, the IOC 

Project incorporates the successful characteristics of several Coast Guard 

interagency pilot projects cited as models by the Act. At the operational 

level, the interface between the Coast Guard’s IOC and the Navy’s 

maritime operations center (MOC) must support information sharing, 

collaborative planning, coordination of supporting operations, and agile 

C2 transitions in response to items of interest that are approaching U.S. 

ports and coastal areas.

Navy’s MOCs, established at all Navy component command headquarters, provide a common organizational framework through which Navy 

commanders exercise operational level C2. MOCs are functionally 

organized staffs that are trained, equipped and networked to support the 
21

commander’s efficient and effective C2 of a joint force maritime component 

(JFMCC) or joint task force (CJTF). They are sized to command and 

control day-to-day peacetime theater security cooperation missions and 

exercises; maritime security missions including counter-proliferation, 

maritime interdiction, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy and other tasking related to irregular challenges; ISR, ballistic missile defense (BMD) 

and strike missions; and diverse crisis response operations. Additionally, 

the MOC’s traditional hierarchy and organization is overlaid with collaborative cross-functional processes and is easily scalable to support the 

integrated planning, preparation, execution, and assessment required for 

major naval, joint, and multinational operations involving interagency, 

multinational and non-governmental organizations. 

Marine expeditionary force (MEF) and Marine expeditionary brigade 

(MEB) commanders may be tasked to lead or form an operational level 

Service component, joint force functional component or CJTF command 

element. These Marine commanders are supported by readily deployable 

command elements that include the communications, intelligence, and 

expeditionary support capabilities necessary to establish fully functioning 

headquarters afloat, in austere locations ashore, or various combinations 

thereof. These expeditionary headquarters have demonstrated their 

ability to provide the nucleus of a joint or multinational command and 

to enable a variety of interagency and non-governmental organizations. 

Presently, Marine Corps component commanders have the ability to 

provide the nucleus of a joint or combined headquarters capable of commanding and controlling a range of operations, from major multi-lateral 

training exercises to combat, as well as coordinating noncombatant 

evacuation and major HA/DR efforts. 

Seabasing 

Seabasing is the deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, 

and re-deployment of joint power from the sea, without reliance on land 

bases within the operational area. It provides joint force commanders with 

the ability to conduct select functions and tasks at sea without dependence 

on infrastructure ashore. Seabasing has wide applicability across the 

ROMO—from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence

activities to crisis response and contingency operations, to major operations and 

campaigns. It is a concept that employs a single ship, or task-organized 

mix of ships to achieve access and facilitate entry from the sea. 

Chapter 3 The Overarching Concept
Naval Operations Concept 2010

22

Naval Service seabasing supports not only naval, but also joint, 

interagency and multinational initiatives globally. The Naval Service 

continues to advance the capabilities that can be projected, sustained, 

supported, protected, and in some cases controlled, from the sea; but the 

full potential of seabasing is yet to be realized. For example, the current 

fleets of military sealift and merchant marine vessels that transport the 

preponderance of the joint force’s materiel remain largely dependent 

upon secure ports near the objective area for offload. Building upon 

the seabasing foundation provided by surface combatants, aircraft 

carriers, amphibious ships, and military sealift ships, ongoing initiatives 

are focused on enhancing the Naval Service’s capabilities to project 

task-organized forces at and from the sea. These capabilities include 

additional high-speed intra-theater lift, improved connectors that can 

transfer people and materiel at-sea,9 enhanced maritime prepositioning,10

and integrated naval logistics. These and other emerging initiatives will 

be employed in combination to reduce the joint force’s reliance on ports 

in the operational area. 

 

Seabasing is predicated on the ability to attain local maritime superiority. 

While a limited number of nations currently possess credible anti-access 

and area denial capabilities, naval forces are able to achieve sea control 

and sustain resilient sea-based operations in uncertain and hostile 

environments. Challenges to seabasing can also arise from coastal states 

that promulgate limitations on freedom of navigation based on their own 

environmental, conservation, immigration, sanitation, safety, customs, or 

security concerns. When directed, U.S. naval forces will challenge any 

restrictions that go beyond a coastal state’s legitimate authority under 

international law. 

Summary

Naval forces use the sea as maneuver space—the strategic concept embodied in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS-21). To fully 

exploit the sea as maneuver space, naval forces leverage global awareness 

of activities in the maritime domain; the ability to employ scalable combat 

power in task-organized forces over extended ranges and durations; 

capability and capacity to confront irregular challenges; flexible naval 

command and control; and mission-tailored seabasing capabilities. 
23
The primary purpose of forward-deployed naval forces 

is to project American power from the sea to influence 

events ashore in the littoral regions of the world across 

the operational spectrum of peace, crisis, and war.

—Admiral Jay L. Johnson, 1997

26th Chief of Naval Operations
25

Chapter 4

Forward Presence

Chapter 4 Forward Presence

The naval presence mission is simultaneously as sophisticated 

and sensitive as any, but also the least understood of all Navy 

missions. A well orchestrated naval presence can be enormously 

useful in complementing diplomatic actions to achieve political 

objectives. Applied deftly but firmly, in precisely the proper 

force, naval presence can be a persuasive deterrent to war. 

If used ineptly, it can be disastrous. Thus, in determining presence 

objectives, scaling forces, and appraising perceptions, there will 

never be a weapons system as important as the human intellect.

—Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN, 1974

34th President of the Naval War College11

Background

The Naval Service has a long history of maintaining a forward naval 

presence in areas of vital interest to the United States. Originally 

conducted to protect U.S. merchant shipping, promote overseas trade, 

and support diplomacy, over time the basis of our forward presence 

operations has evolved and expanded to include crisis response as well 

as conventional and nuclear deterrence. Naval forward presence is a 

key element of the U.S. global defense posture. The complementary 

elements of this defense posture—sea-based, land-based, and the 

surface and air connectors between—support and sustain U.S. military 

operations throughout the globe. 

The steady-state operations of sea-based naval forces enhance joint access 

by gaining familiarity with forward operating areas while also fostering 

the international relationships that may alleviate diplomatic impediments 

to access. They also provide the means to overcome geographic and, 

when necessary, military challenges to access. Forward postured 

naval forces deter adversaries; demonstrate U.S. commitment to our 

international partners; and respond rapidly to tension, coercion, crises 

and conflicts. Forward presence facilitates all other naval missions, most 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

26

importantly sea control, which is a necessary condition for the deployment and sustained employment of any joint or multinational force. 

Forward presence is achieved through a combination of forward 

stationed and rotationally deployed forces. Forward stationed forces are 

homeported overseas, where they conduct all training and most maintenance. The Navy and Marine Corps often refer to forward stationed 

units overseas as forward deployed naval forces (FDNF). The advantage of 

forward stationed naval forces is that they maximize continuous presence 

with a minimum number of ships. The benefits of forward stationing 

cannot be realized without host nation support from allies and friends—

a circumstance that is not taken for granted by the Naval Service and that 

merits collaboration to ensure such arrangements are mutually beneficial. 

Forward stationed ships may require relief by rotationally deployed forces 

when entering shipyards for extended maintenance periods.

Rotationally deployed forces are based in the United States but regularly 

deploy overseas to maintain continuous presence in key regions. The 

advantage of rotationally deployed forces is that they can be employed 

without extensive overseas infrastructure, basing rights, or other host 

nation support. The disadvantage is that multiple ships are required in a 

training, maintenance, deployment cycle to sustain continuous presence. 

With due consideration for maintenance and training requirements, ships 

in the rotation may surge for short-duration activities between regularly 

scheduled deployments or in response to a crisis. Some forces—such 

as hospital ships, repair ships, or tenders—only deploy episodically to 

support specific operations. 

Rotationally deployed ships complement forward stationed forces at 

main operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security 

locations. The Naval Service maintains forward stationed personnel and 

resources in diverse locations overseas, such as Bahrain, Cuba, Diego 

Garcia, Greece, Guam, Italy, Japan, Korea, Norway, Singapore, and Spain. 

This global architecture enables economical naval and joint force deployment, employment and sustainment. 

Critical enablers for U.S. forward naval forces are the combat logistics force 

ships and support ships operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC). 

The combat logistics force includes the ships and helicopters that resupply 
27Chapter 4 Forward Presence

combatant ships with fuel, food, parts, and ordnance while at sea, commonly termed “underway replenishment.” They allow the fleet to remain 

underway for extended periods and to fully use the sea as maneuver 

space. Support vessels include command ships, fleet ocean tugs, rescue 

and salvage ships, hospital ships, ocean survey ships and joint high speed 

vessels. Collectively, these ships support continuous forward presence 

and the overseas operations of U.S. and allied naval forces. As such, they 

are essential to the success of globally distributed operations.

Opportunity and Challenge

The forward presence of naval forces serves to contain and deter regional 

adversaries while increasing the engagement opportunities with allies 

and partners to promote collective security, enhance global stability and 

confront irregular challenges. As the security environment evolves from 

unipolar to multi-polar with the emergence of numerous states with 

significant economic and military power, the importance of seamless 

interoperability with allies and effective coordination with partners 

cannot be overstated. The imperative to build and sustain partnerships 

that measurably contribute to maritime security, deterrence and combat 

effectiveness comes at a time when sensitivity to U.S. bases overseas is 

rising and the overall number of U.S. forces stationed on foreign soil 

is much lower than during the Cold War. In this context, sea-based 

forward presence provides the opportunity to conduct cooperative 

activities with allies and an expanding set of international partners, 

while minimizing the political, economic, cultural, and social impacts 

sometimes associated with forward stationed U.S. forces. 

While forward, naval forces conduct planned activities focused on enhancing regional security and stability, such as security cooperation and 

security force assistance; maritime security operations; major training 

and readiness exercises; humanitarian and civic assistance; intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and information operations. 

These operations include allies and partners in bi-lateral and multilateral initiatives designed to address regional challenges and prepare 

for crisis response operations. The combatant commanders’ demand 

for forward postured naval forces—particularly carrier strike groups 

(CSGs), amphibious ready groups with embarked Marine expeditionary 

units (ARG/MEUs), and surface action groups—exceeds the current and 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

28

forecast capacity of the Naval Service. Since 2007 the combatant commanders’ cumulative requests for naval forces have grown 29 percent for 

CSGs, 76 percent for surface combatants, 86 percent for ARG/MEUs, and 

53 percent for individually deployed amphibious ships.12 

The challenge is to employ globally distributed, mission-tailored forces across 

a wide range of missions that promote stability, prevent crises and combat 

terrorism; while maintaining the capability to regionally concentrate credible 

combat power to protect U.S. vital interests, assure friends, and deter 

and dissuade potential adversaries. Forward forces and forces surged 

from the United States, along with those of allies and partners, must be 

sufficiently ready and interoperable to respond effectively across a broad 

spectrum of crises. 

Central Idea

Naval forces are ideally suited to shape and respond to the security 

challenges of the 21st century. The combination of forward stationed and 

rotationally deployed forces is a uniquely adaptable means to maintain 

global military presence while respecting the sovereignty of other nations. 

The presence of forward naval forces provides American policymakers 

with an expansive range of options to influence events and project power 

in peacetime, crisis, and war. These options are largely the result of 

interoperability with ally and partner maritime forces, achieved through 

effective, steady-state engagement activities; and the flexible employment 

of naval force packages that are tailored to specific capacity building, 

security cooperation or crisis response requirements.

Cooperative Action

The United States employs a “comprehensive” approach that focuses and 

synchronizes interagency efforts to promote good governance; the rule 

of law; social, economic and political development; stability; and global 

security. In this context, the Naval Service helps build partner capacity 

to maintain maritime security, respond to crises within the maritime domain, deter conflicts, and prevail in war. Building such capacity requires 

collaborative planning with partners—along with supporting regional 

allies and partners, international organizations, and non-governmental 

organizations—and a series of resulting activities that are conducted 
29Chapter 4 Forward Presence

over time to achieve sustainable improvements. Naval forces provide 

the persistent forward presence necessary to support such initiatives, 

either in a leadership role, or in support of other U.S. entities, allies or 

partners better suited to lead the effort. Moreover, the ability to optimize 

the composition of the forward forces to meet the evolving needs of U.S. 

partners maximizes the return on investment from each event. Forward 

naval forces are similarly employed to enhance interoperability with 

allies, leading to more effective shaping of the security environment and 

response to crises. 

Adaptive Force Packaging

Adaptive force packaging generates the globally distributed, mission-tailored 

forces required to resource the demands of the combatant commanders. 

The standard CSG and ARG force packages can be scaled up by 

incorporating additional ships; or disaggregated into smaller surface 

action groups or individual ships to conduct the full range of military 

operations, including capacity building, theater security cooperation 

(TSC) and combat operations. As global demands increase and TSC 

requirements become more refined, independently deploying units are 

frequently the best solution for many missions. In this regard, exploiting 

the inherent capability and flexibility of ships to fill non-traditional 

roles, such as the use of USNS maritime prepositioning ships for global 

fleet station, and high speed vessels for afloat staging base missions, is 

increasingly common. 

Beyond innovatively employing every class of ship operated by the Naval 

Service, adaptive force packaging also includes tailoring the crew composition and adding mission specific equipment to enhance effectiveness. 

For example, Marine detachments can be placed aboard large surface 

combatants, littoral combatants, and cutters to provide enhanced force 

protection; boarding and raiding capability; and mobile training teams.

Similarly, cultural, language, law enforcement, legal, intelligence, and 

special operations experts can augment crews; and civil affairs, health 

services, construction engineering, and ISR capabilities such as SCAN 

EAGLE can be embarked and employed as required. Importantly, adaptive force packaging is not constrained to ships—any capability or set 

of capabilities can be deployed and employed to accomplish an assigned 

mission—but the Naval Service is optimized to conduct expeditionary 

operations that are sustained from a sea base. 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

30

Forward Presence Force Posture

In the near term, forward presence force posture is necessarily shaped by 

ongoing commitments to Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING 

FREEDOM. These commitments currently involve approximately 20,000 

Marines conducting counterinsurgency, security cooperation, and civilmilitary operations in Afghanistan, plus another 2,000 Marines normally 

embarked on ships within the region. Also within the region are 24,000 

Sailors at sea and ashore conducting maritime infrastructure protection, 

explosive ordnance disposal, combat construction engineering, cargo 

handling, combat logistics, maritime security operations, rule of law 

operations, riverine operations and other critical activities. Additionally, 

more than 400 Coast Guardsmen are conducting essential port operations, 

port and oil platform security, and maritime interception operations. 

The Naval Service commitments cited above also encompass more than 

7,500 Individual Augmentees serving in a variety of joint or coalition 

billets.13 As these operations unfold, the size and composition of committed 

naval forces will evolve, but long after the land component presence is 

reduced, naval forces will remain forward and present in the region. 

 

For the foreseeable future, we will continue to maintain an FDNF CSG 

and ARG/MEU in the Western Pacific. We will also maintain continuous CSG and ARG/MEU presence in the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean 

and seek to deploy an additional ARG/MEU that will routinely shift 

between regions. Periodic aggregation of CSGs and ARG/MEUs into 

an expeditionary strike force will serve to demonstrate and sustain the 

proficiency to operate effectively as a large maneuver force. Whether 

forward stationed or rotationally deployed, these naval forces are present 

to protect U.S. vital interests, assure its friends, and deter and dissuade 

potential adversaries. 

The evolving security environment invites increased presence in the 

Mediterranean Sea. Likely tasks include, but are not limited to, surveillance, maritime security, counter-proliferation, noncombatant evacuation, 

humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR), and sea-based 

integrated air and ballistic missile defense (IAMD) operations. Naval 

forces present in the Mediterranean can also respond immediately to 

emergent crises and rapidly reinforce other naval and joint forces in the 

Arctic Ocean, Black Sea, Arabian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and along the west 

coast of Africa. To support similar responsiveness throughout the balance 
31Chapter 4 Forward Presence

of the world, surface ships, attack submarines, and guided missile 

submarines will rotationally deploy to meet combatant commander and 

other national tasking. 

In support of geographic combatant commanders’ long-term TSC and 

global maritime partnership (GMP) engagement missions, episodic global 

fleet stations (GFS) will be established in regions such as the Arabian Gulf, 

Southeast Asia, the Caribbean Basin, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Horn 

of Africa. The Global Fleet Station Concept of Operations defines GFS as “a 

highly visible, positively engaged, persistent sea base of operations from 

which to interact with partner nation military and civilian populations 

and the global maritime community.” This interaction will be conducted 

by a combination of Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard personnel, 

in concert with joint, interagency and international partners. GFS are 

supported by a combination of platforms such as amphibious ships with 

embarked special purpose Marine air-ground task forces (SP MAGTFs), 

maritime prepositioning ships, support vessels, and surface combatants, 

which together possess surface and vertical lift capability, endurance, 

space for a variety of detachments and equipment, and the ability to 

operate at the sea-land interface. 

To further support the combatant commanders’ TSC and maritime 

security efforts, high- and medium-endurance cutters will be rotationally 

deployed to maintain a presence in Mediterranean/African littoral waters 

and the Western Pacific/Indian Ocean, as well as the Caribbean Basin 

and Eastern Pacific. Additionally, law enforcement detachment (LEDET) 

teams and port security units (PSUs), in combination with other naval 

forces, will continue to enhance the combatant commanders’ capability 

to conduct the full spectrum of naval missions, especially in the littorals. 

LEDETs consist of active duty personnel who operate onboard U.S. and 

partner nation naval vessels in order to provide expanded law enforcement 

authority, expertise and capability to carry out interdiction and apprehension operations from U.S. and partner nation surface assets. LEDETs also 

provide partnership capacity through support and information exchange 

among joint, allied and partner nation maritime forces.14 PSUs are deployable Coast Guard reserve units organized for sustained port security. 

They provide waterside protection and layered defense of key assets such 

as: pier areas, high value units, and harbor entrances at the termination or 

origination point of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs).15 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

32

Many nations, including the United States, have national security interests in the Arctic. The Naval Service is prepared to operate in this unique 

and harsh environment, either independently or in conjunction with 

other nations. However, the lack of environmental awareness, navigation capabilities, and supporting infrastructure, as well as competing 

jurisdictional and resource claims, are significant challenges that must be 

overcome by naval forces. At a minimum, this will require the episodic 

deployment of submarines, icebreakers or ice-capable ships to the Polar 

Regions, as well as increased investments in icebreaking capabilities and 

associated technologies. 

Summary

The Naval Service employs globally distributed, mission-tailored forces to 

accomplish a wide range of missions that promote stability, prevent 

crises, and combat terrorism; while maintaining the capability to 

regionally concentrate credible combat power to protect U.S. vital interests; 

assure its friends; and deter, dissuade, and if necessary, defeat potential 

adversaries. Persistent forward presence, generated through a combination of forward stationed and rotationally deployed naval forces, provides 

American policymakers with an expansive range of options to shape and 

respond to the security challenges of the 21st century. 

Many of today’s maritime threats come from 

non-State actors that do not respect national borders, 

are not military in nature, and seek to blend into 

the normal course of legitimate activity in the 

maritime domain. Criminal actors are constantly 

learning, adapting and growing as they use 

the vastness of the oceans to their advantage, 

cloak themselves within the anonymity 

afforded to most maritime activities, exploit 

advances of globalization, and flourish in 

weak coastal States with poor governance.

—Admiral Thad Allen, USCG, 2007

23rd Commandant of the Coast Guard
35Chapter 5 Maritime Security

Chapter 5

Maritime Security

Naval power is the natural defense of the United States.

—President John Adams, 1796

2nd President of the United States

Background

As a maritime nation, the United States is dependent upon the sea for both 

national security and economic prosperity. The Nation is geographically 

blessed and bounded by two great oceans that have historically protected 

us from external threats and enabled us to garner the world’s resources 

and engage in the global markets. The safety and economic interests of the 

United States, its allies and partners critically depend upon the unimpeded 

trade and commerce that traverse the world’s oceans. Consequently, U.S. 

vital national interests are tied to a secure maritime environment, which 

in turn places global responsibilities upon the Naval Service. 

Maritime security is a non-doctrinal term defined as those tasks and 

operations conducted to protect sovereignty and maritime resources, 

support free and open seaborne commerce, and to counter maritimerelated terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime, piracy, 

environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration. Effective 

maritime security requires a comprehensive effort to promote global 

economic stability and protect legitimate ocean-borne activities from 

hostile or illegal acts in the maritime domain. In addition to security 

operations along the U.S. coastline, globally-distributed naval forces 

conducting maritime security operations contribute to homeland 

defense in depth.

Maritime security may be divided into individual or collective categories. 

Individual maritime security operations involve actions taken by a single 

nation-state to provide for its safety and security, consistent with its 

rights. While the responsibility and capacity of individual nations 

to secure their territorial waters is the foundation upon which global 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

36

maritime security is built, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

(CS-21) notes that unilateral action by a single nation cannot ensure the 

security of the global maritime commons: collective maritime security 

operations are required to unite actions of like-minded nation-states to 

promote mutual safety and security at sea. 

Opportunity and Challenge

The size and complexity of the maritime commons create unique security 

challenges for the international community as terrorists and criminals 

leverage the easily accessible, largely unregulated expanse of the maritime 

domain to mask and facilitate their illicit activities. Threats to safety 

and security include piracy, narcotics smuggling, human trafficking, 

weapons proliferation, environmental destruction, and the pilfering of 

natural resources. Identifying, tracking, and neutralizing these threats is 

essential to U.S. national security and the global economy. 

The sea is vast, the littorals extensive, and the threats to U.S. interests 

are varied, determined, and persistent. These conditions cannot be 

sufficiently shaped by the Naval Service alone, and demand that America 

partner with nations that share its interest in global maritime security 

and the prosperity it underpins. 

Central Idea

Global maritime security can only be achieved through the integration 

of national and regional maritime cooperation, awareness and response 

initiatives. To this end, unprecedented coordination among governments, the private sector, and multinational organizations including naval 

and maritime security forces, law enforcement agencies, customs and 

immigration officials, masters of vessels and other merchant mariners, 

shipping companies, and port operators is required. The Naval Service 

plays a critical role in facilitating this coordination, and is uniquely 

manned, trained and equipped to help allies and partners develop the 

maritime professionals, infrastructure, awareness and response capabilities that are a prerequisite for maritime security. The Nation’s globally 

distributed, mission-tailored naval forces not only conduct the full range of 

related operations—from unilateral assistance at sea, law enforcement 

and maritime interception operations to multinational counter-piracy 
37Chapter 5 Maritime Security

operations—they help willing allies and partners build the capacity, 

proficiency and interoperability to do the same. 

Increased Cooperation

The United States has numerous maritime law enforcement treaties and 

security arrangements to address various maritime security challenges, 

including drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, counter-piracy, fisheries 

enforcement, and proliferation security. Each agreement is unique and 

tailored to requirements, diplomatic and political relationships, and the 

domestic laws and policies of the participating nations. These agreements expand U.S. maritime authority and eliminate border seams that 

are exploited by illicit actors. As transnational maritime threats evolve, 

the Naval Service will continue to collaborate with the requisite U.S. 

authorities to develop any additional arrangements with foreign partners 

that are required to achieve maritime security. The Naval Service 

also supports mechanisms that underpin maritime security, including 

organizations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 

that has instituted vessel tracking, vessel and port security measures, 

and strengthened the Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea 

(SUA); international law including the U.N. Convention on the Law of 

the Sea; regional, multinational, and bilateral agreements; domestic laws 

and regulations; and private-sector practices and procedures. 

Within the U.S. Government, the Naval Service is a key stakeholder in 

the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) plan, which establishes protocols that facilitate coordinated, unified, timely, and effective 

planning and execution by the various agencies that have maritime 

responsibilities. Lead and supporting agencies are based on the location 

of the threat, existing law, desired outcome, magnitude of the hazard, 

response capabilities required, asset availability and authority to act. This 

interagency approach builds upon the unique contributions of each entity 

to respond to a full range of maritime security threats, including terrorism, and establishes the procedures to coordinate actions that frequently 

support a tactical response by the Naval Service. The Navy and Coast 

Guard, in accordance with the National Fleet policy, integrate their 

multi-mission platforms, infrastructure, and personnel to generate force 

packages tailored for specific maritime security responses and missions. 

This practice allows each Service to leverage the unique capabilities of 

the other, as part of a joint task force thousands of miles from the United 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

38

States, or in response to operational tasking close to home in support of 

civil authorities. The increasing commonality between Navy and Coast 

Guard systems, including radars, antennas, deck guns, airframes and 

unmanned systems, has improved both interoperability and sustainability 

during joint maritime security operations. 

The responsibility of individual nations to maintain maritime security 

within their waters is the foundation upon which global maritime 

security is built. U.S. allies and partners possess capabilities that range 

from limited port or coastal maritime security forces to major navies with 

potent sea control and power projection capabilities. U.S. naval forces, 

in accordance with combatant commander theater security cooperation 

(TSC) plans, collaborate with allies and partners alike to develop the 

expertise, infrastructure, awareness, and capacity to respond to the full 

range of maritime security threats and irregular challenges. 

Maritime Security Force Assistance (MSFA) 

MSFA comprises efforts to strengthen security burden-sharing with 

foreign military and civilian maritime security forces and government 

institutions, as well as multinational and regional maritime security 

entities. These activities assist partner naval forces to become more 

proficient at providing security to their populations. In the context of 

the global maritime commons, MSFA promotes stability by developing 

partner nation capabilities to govern, control, and protect their harbors, 

inland and coastal waters, natural resources, commercial concerns, and 

national and regional maritime security interests. MSFA activities are 

conducted across the range of military operations (ROMO) and during 

all phases of military operations, in coordination with U.S. government 

agencies and in support of larger U.S. policy goals. Many of the Coast 

Guard’s statutory missions align with foreign partner emerging demand 

to proactively deal with increasing threats to their sovereignty and 

resources. Geographic combatant commanders’ (GCC) theater campaign 

plans and security cooperation initiatives are evolving to encompass 

combined Navy and Coast Guard capabilities tailored to develop competencies of host nation maritime security forces. Often these nations 

do not possess the requisite assets and tactics to self-police. Navy ships, 

Coast Guard cutters coupled with complementary law enforcement 

detachments (LEDETs) and training teams are ideal instruments of soft 

power to effect national objectives.
39Chapter 5 Maritime Security

MSFA initiatives foster trust and interoperability with allies and enduring 

partners, increase capabilities and capacities to address conventional 

and irregular threats, reduce the ungoverned areas within the maritime 

domain, promote regional stability, and set conditions that dissuade 

disruptive acts through cooperative actions. Expeditionary operations, 

enduring partnership missions, as well as bilateral and multi-lateral 

exercises involving nearly every Naval Service capability comprise the 

most common MSFA initiatives. 

Fleet and Expeditionary Operations

Naval forces will often conduct MSFA concurrent with other forward 

operations. For example, while conducting security patrols around the 

Iraqi off-shore oil platforms, Navy and Coast Guard maritime security 

forces integrated Iraqi military personnel into the operation to improve 

their expertise and proficiency. Similarly, while maintaining port and 

waterway security, Coast Guard port security unit (PSU) and Navy maritime expeditionary security squadron members trained Iraqi naval forces 

on point and perimeter security defense operations under the supervision 

of the Iraq Training and Advisory Mission. As general purpose forces 

embarked on naval vessels, Marines also conducted MSFA with coalition 

and partner nation naval forces. In these cases, Naval Service personnel 

benefited from the MSFA activities as well, gaining a greater understanding 

of local customs and conditions, which enhanced their effectiveness. 

Likewise, Coast Guard cutters and LEDETs—active duty Coast Guard 

personnel employed on partner nation naval vessels in order to provide 

expanded law enforcement authority, expertise and capability to carry 

out interdiction and apprehension operations—frequently provide 

technical assistance to foreign law enforcement partners. Cutter boarding 

teams and LEDETs instruct, demonstrate and assist with searches, and 

evidence testing and processing. MSFA, in the form of advanced boarding procedure training, is increasingly requested by coalition partners 

and has reduced the risk associated with counter-piracy operations off 

Somalia. Additionally, the Coast Guard’s International Port Security (IPS) 

program assesses the effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures in the ports 

of U.S. trading partners pursuant to a U.S. statutory requirement. This 

form of MSFA evaluates countries’ implementation of the International 

Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, shares maritime security 

“best practices,” and makes recommendations for improvement.
Naval Operations Concept 2010

40

Enduring, Rotational Maritime Partnership Missions 

The global fleet station concept has given rise to a variety of enduring 

capacity-building activities that are supported by mission-tailored 

rotational forces. The Africa Partnership Station (APS) initiative 

exemplifies the rigorous, holistic approach to enhancing maritime 

security that the Naval Service employs around the world. Beginning 

with a specific maritime security condition to be achieved, for example 

“trafficking is stopped through western Africa,” individual country action 

plans are collaboratively developed with the littoral countries to build 

the cadre of maritime professionals, maritime security infrastructure, 

maritime domain awareness, and maritime security force response 

capability necessary to achieve the objective condition. The country 

action plans integrate and synchronize supporting activities by other 

U.S. government entities, as well as those of allies, other partners, 

international organizations, and non-governmental organizations that 

share a common interest in achieving the maritime security condition. 

The detailed planning that is the foundation of this approach facilitates 

resourcing the initiative, avoids duplication of effort among international 

stakeholders, and drives the long-term scheduling of rotational forces 

to maximize progress by the partner. Moreover, the synchronization 

of related country action plans through a regional action plan that establishes enabling capabilities such as regional coordination centers, serves 

to establish a regional capacity that is invariably required to achieve 

measurable improvements in maritime security. To this end, Naval 

Service capabilities are employed in both supported and supporting 

roles, and typically conduct training events, exercises, and combined 

operations with numerous partners during a single deployment. For 

example, a subset of APS includes the African Maritime Law Enforcement 

Partnership (AMLEP), in which Navy warships, Coast Guard cutters, and 

partner vessels with embarked Coast Guard LEDETs and mobile training 

teams (MTTs) conduct operations and professional exchanges to advance 

maritime security and law enforcement competencies. The character of 

such activities and required capabilities vary depending on the security 

enhancement sought—from protection of ports, off-shore infrastructure, 

undersea resources or the environment to the interdiction of illegal 

fishing, piracy, narcotics smuggling, human trafficking, and weapons 

proliferation—but the first principle for successful maritime partnership 

missions is a steadfast focus on planned activities that make progress 

toward the specific maritime security condition to be achieved.
41

Fleet and Regional Exercises and Training 

Bilateral and multi-lateral exercises serve to increase the proficiency, 

interoperability and confidence of U.S. naval forces and those of its allies 

and partners across the entire ROMO. Such exercises incorporate tailored 

training objectives to address the needs of the maritime security forces 

involved, from fundamental competencies such as basic naval seamanship 

to the most technically complex aspects of naval warfare such as ballistic 

missile defense, amphibious assault and undersea warfare. Exercises 

also bring together nations that otherwise would not conduct combined 

operations. Major maritime exercises include: Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), 

the largest combined exercise in the Pacific; Cooperation Afloat Readiness 

and Training (CARAT); Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism 

(SEACAT); Annual Exercise (ANNUALEX) with Japan; FOAL EAGLE in 

Korea; Baltic Operations Exercise (BALTOPS); and UNITAS, PANAMAX, 

and TRADEWINDS in the Western Hemisphere. All of these exercises 

involve ships, aircraft, and personnel ashore to conduct MSFA, ultimately 

improving the ability of U.S. naval forces to respond effectively to regional 

security threats in concert with its allies and partners. 

 

Enhanced Awareness 

Comprehensive maritime domain awareness (MDA) is the foundation 

of global maritime security. MDA requires an architecture that collects, 

fuses, analyzes and disseminates enormous quantities of classified and 

unclassified information regarding vessels, people, cargo, infrastructure, 

maritime areas of interest, and ongoing maritime security operations. 

The contributions of forward postured, persistent and culturally aware 

naval forces are critical, but not sufficient, to achieve comprehensive 

MDA. In fact, the combined efforts of the world’s naval forces—if they 

could be aligned through military-to-military relationships—would still 

be insufficient. Comprehensive MDA can only be achieved through 

the seamless collaboration of the entire maritime community—naval 

forces, maritime-related organizations, the shipping industry, insurance 

companies, and mariners of every ilk. The Naval Service is responsible 

for facilitating such collaboration among the naval forces of allies and 

partners as a matter of first priority, and among the balance of the 

maritime community secondarily. 

The basic objective of MDA initiatives is to discern who owns, operates, 

and controls a vessel; what activity is being conducted by the vessel; when 

Chapter 5 Maritime Security
Naval Operations Concept 2010

42

will the activity be conducted; where will the activity be conducted; 

why the activity is being conducted; and how illegal activities are being 

concealed. To this end, collaboration correctly begins with the sharing of 

information available from existing systems, such as shore-based, shipborne, and airborne radar systems, to build a common operating picture 

(COP). A comprehensive, real-time COP is considered as important 

for safe, effective maritime operations as clearly defined command and 

control relationships. Additional information to augment the basic radar 

COP can be gleaned from a variety of public databases and systems 

such as the Automatic Identification System (AIS). Similar to aircraft 

identification transponders, AIS is a protocol adopted by the International 

Maritime Organization to automatically share unclassified ship identification, safety of navigation and voyage information between AIS users 

operating in proximity to each other. This data is collected and fused with 

geospatial and oceanographic data to create increasingly comprehensive 

maritime domain awareness that can be shared with other U.S. agencies, 

allies and partners. The U.S. Coast Guard’s National AIS (NAIS) project, 

which collects data from AIS-equipped surface vessels in the Nation’s territorial waters and adjacent seas out to 2,000 nautical miles, is a conduit 

for maritime domain information that supports both Naval Service and 

international operations. 

Response Operations

U.S. naval forces, often in concert with joint general purpose and special 

operations forces, other government agencies, and international partners, 

actively respond to conventional and irregular maritime threats. Naval 

Service response operations include:

n Increased Surveillance and Tracking. Vessels of interest are subject to 

increased surveillance and tracking, using a wide variety of military 

and commercial space-based systems, as well as air, surface, and 

underwater sensors. These actions facilitate more efficient, effective 

interdiction operations and are increasingly conducted by long-range, 

extended-endurance unmanned platforms with multi-spectral sensors. 

n Combined Task Force (CTF) Operations. U.S. naval forces, in conjunction with allies and partners, will continue to conduct combined 

operations to counter specific maritime security threats such as piracy, 

smuggling and weapons trafficking. For example, the multinational 
43

task force CTF 151 was established in January 2009 to conduct 

counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and Somali basin. 

n Maritime Interception Operations (MIO). MIO monitor, query, and 

board merchant vessels to enforce sanctions against other nations 

such as those embodied in United Nations Security Council Resolutions and prevent the transport of restricted goods. Boarding teams 

comprised of Sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen and other law 

enforcement personnel are trained in visit, board, search, and seizure 

techniques and conduct specific missions in accordance with relevant 

authorities, laws, jurisdictions and capabilities. 

n Law Enforcement Operations. Law enforcement operations (LEO) 

are a form of interception operations distinct from MIO. Coast Guard 

cutters frequently conduct independent LEO while exercising Title 

14 authority in deep water and littoral environments. U.S. Navy and 

foreign naval vessels routinely embark Coast Guard LEDETs and shift 

tactical control to the Coast Guard while conducting LEO.

n Expanded Maritime Interception Operations. Expanded MIO (EMIO) 

are authorized by the President and directed by the Secretary of 

Defense to intercept vessels identified to be transporting terrorists 

and/or terrorist-related materiel that pose an imminent threat to the 

United States and its allies.16 

Summary

Global maritime security can only be achieved through the coordinated 

activities of governments, the private sector, and multinational organizations including naval and maritime security forces, law enforcement 

agencies, customs and immigration officials, and the maritime community 

writ large. The Naval Service plays a critical role in facilitating this coordination, and is uniquely manned, trained and equipped to help allies and 

partners develop the maritime professionals, infrastructure, awareness and 

response capabilities that are a prerequisite for maritime security. U.S. 

globally distributed, mission-tailored naval forces effectively conduct the full 

range of maritime security operations and are instrumental in building the 

capacity, proficiency and interoperability of partners and allies that share 

our aspiration to achieve security throughout the maritime commons.

Chapter 5 Maritime Security
For in this modern world, the instruments of warfare 

are not solely for waging war. Far more importantly, 

they are the means for controlling peace. Naval officers 

must therefore understand not only how to fight a war, 

but how to use the tremendous power which they 

operate to sustain a world of liberty and justice, without unleashing the powerful instruments of destruction 

and chaos that they have at their command.

—Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN, 1961

15th Chief of Naval Operations
45Chapter 6 Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response

Chapter 6

Humanitarian Assistance 

and Disaster Response

During the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries, the 

very thought that sea powers might regularly use naval platforms 

to deliver humanitarian aid, as opposed to cutting off and 

starving an enemy’s supply lines, would have seemed alien. 

In the twenty-first century, however, national power and 

prestige are more and more characterized by “soft power.” 

UNIFIED ASSISTANCE showed that “hard power” assets like 

aircraft carriers can also be the best providers of “soft power.”17 

—Bruce A. Elleman, Waves of Hope, 2007

Naval Historian

Background

On 26 December 2004 major portions of Southeast Asia were ravaged by 

a tsunami, a broad-ranging catastrophe that impacted thousands of 

communities and directly affected nine countries. Within days U.S. naval 

forces from around the globe were mobilized to provide aid. III Marine 

Expeditionary Force (III MEF) was designated as the command element 

for Combined Support Force 536 to conduct Operation UNIFIED 

ASSISTANCE. Twenty-two U.S. ships, including the ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

Carrier Strike Group, BONHOMME RICHARD Expeditionary Strike 

Group, USS ESSEX, USS FORT MCHENRY with a special purpose 

MAGTF, USCGC MUNRO, USNS JOHN MCDONNELL and six maritime 

prepositioning ships were diverted from their scheduled routes to render 

aid that included subsistence, medical support, engineering support, 

port hydrographic surveys and extensive debris removal. U.S. naval 

forces did not work in isolation; their immediate response evolved into a 

multifaceted effort that included other Services, other agencies, the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID), other countries, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private volunteer organizations.

Naval Service capabilities to establish maritime security and project 

combat power have repeatedly proven effective at responding to major 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

46

disasters. From 1970 through 2000, U.S. forces were involved in 366 

humanitarian missions, a number made more significant when compared 

to the 22 combat-related missions during the same period.18 In recent 

years, U.S. naval forces have responded to an earthquake in Pakistan, 

Hurricane Katrina on the U.S. Gulf Coast, typhoons in the Philippines, 

a mudslide on the island of Leyte, a hurricane in Nicaragua, cyclones 

in Bangladesh, and a bridge collapse in the United States. Even more 

recently, naval forces deployed to provide leading support to disaster 

relief operations following the earthquake that devastated Haiti. These 

forces included the aircraft carrier USS CARL VINSON, USS BATAAN 

ARG/22nd MEU, USS NASSAU ARG/24th MEU, USNS COMFORT, NECC 

personnel, PSU 307, USCGC FORWARD, HAMILTON, OAK, MOHAWK, 

TAHOMA and VALIANT, and more than twenty other U.S. ships. 

Operating without reliance on ports and airfields ashore, and in possession of organic medical support, strategic and tactical lift, logistics 

support, robust communications capabilities and premier planning and 

coordination tools, both globally-distributed and regionally concentrated

naval forces are ideally suited for “humanitarian assistance and disaster 

response” (HA/DR) in the littorals where the preponderance of the 

world’s population resides. Usually performed in support of U.S. 

government partners, HA/DR activities include, but are not limited to, 

defense support to civil authorities, humanitarian and civic assistance, 

foreign humanitarian assistance, foreign disaster relief, foreign assistance, 

humanitarian evacuation, development assistance, maritime environmental response operations, and selected aspects of security assistance, in 

accordance with their doctrinal definitions. 

Opportunity and Challenge 

The world population has been migrating to the littorals, creating a 

situation in which episodic natural or man-made disasters have greater 

potential to cause catastrophic human suffering. Both globally distributed

and regionally concentrated naval forces will continue to be called upon 

to conduct HA/DR operations, either in the lead or in support of an 

international effort. Additionally, geographic combatant commanders are 

increasingly employing humanitarian assistance proactively to promote 

safety, security, and stability. Both proactive and reactive HA/DR efforts 

are undertaken alongside the host nation; other participating nations; 
47

multinational, regional, and non-governmental organizations; and in 

close coordination with counterparts at the Department of State, USAID 

and other federal agencies. The challenge to U.S. naval forces is to 

enhance their ability to conduct HA/DR without degrading naval forces’ 

capability and proficiency to conduct more traditional naval missions. 

Given their forward presence, inherent mobility and flexible capabilities, 

U.S. naval forces are frequently the “force of choice” for such missions. 

However, the demands of emergent, reactive HA/DR can affect readiness, 

logistical sustainment and operational dwell, and often require contingency funding in order to reset those units involved. 

Central Idea

HA/DR is a core capability. Proactive HA/DR activities employ U.S. 

globally distributed, mission-tailored naval forces to address ally and partner 

needs that may not be directly related to national security, but they reflect 

the values and desires of the American people to render aid and reduce 

suffering. In so doing, these activities enhance or restore critical host 

nation capacity, provide an opportunity to engage with a broader crosssection of the host nation’s population, and build relationships that serve 

to increase trust. Activities undertaken during reactive HA/DR have a 

similar effect, but the often extreme circumstances and severe risks to the 

population that characterize such events demand an immediate response 

that can only be provided by expeditionary naval forces trained and 

proficient in diverse crisis response operations.

Proactive HA/DR 

Enduring, rotational missions like Pacific Partnership and 

Continuing Promise build critical partner capacity and improve 

disaster response readiness through training and the development of 

habitual relationships with relevant partner ministries, departments 

and officials. Such global maritime partnership initiatives, along with 

special purpose Marine air-ground task forces (SP MAGTFs) formed to 

conduct security cooperation activities, complement other joint, interagency, international and NGO efforts that leverage their own unique 

skills, expertise, and host nation contacts. The day-to-day coordination 

of Naval Service, joint, interagency, international and NGO proactive 

HA/DR efforts sets conditions for effective collaboration when an 

in-extremis response is required. 

Chapter 6 Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response
Naval Operations Concept 2010

48

Reactive HA/DR 

Reactive HA/DR operations not only meet the urgent needs of the 

partner, they enhance Naval Service mission readiness across the full 

range of military operations. Usually requiring only modest adjustments 

to how naval forces are organized, deployed, and employed, reactive 

HA/DR operations pose the same challenges to naval forces as those 

encountered during security related crisis response operations. Employing 

expeditionary naval capabilities—intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR), maneuverability, sustainability, lift, medical care, 

construction engineering, and more—combined with planning and 

command and control (C2) proficiency; joint and interagency protocols; 

habitual military-to-military and political-military relationships with 

partners; and growing relationships with other international and 

non-governmental organizations; the Naval Service is uniquely suited 

to respond to disasters and to provide humanitarian assistance across a 

broad range of circumstances. Formal C2, supported/supporting, and 

coordination relationships with the responding entities will be rapidly 

established to ensure that the responsible authority possesses the latitude 

and wherewithal to meet the unique demands of the crisis. In this 

regard, the Naval Service will be mindful of the host nation’s sovereignty 

and will respond with due regard for the host nation’s desires and the 

U.S. lead agency’s direction. 

 

The Naval Service has staged critical HA/DR supplies on select ships, and 

prepositioned larger quantities at forward locations around the world, 

including Souda Bay in the Mediterranean, Diego Garcia in the Indian 

Ocean and Guam in the Western Pacific. This posture reduces the 

response time for reactive HA/DR missions and permits the Naval Service 

to better leverage the flexibility of globally dispersed, mission-tailored forces. 

Summary

In today’s globally connected world, news of humanitarian crises 

and natural or man-made disasters is reported almost immediately. 

Although the primary focus of naval forces remains combat effectiveness, their multi-mission capabilities allow those same forces to provide 

rapid assistance that can mitigate human suffering and restore critical 

partner capacity. 

Events of October 1962 indicated, as they had 

all through history, that control of the sea means 

security. Control of the seas can mean peace. 

Control of the seas can mean victory. The United States 

must control the seas if it is to protect your security...

—President John F. Kennedy, 1963

35th President of the United States
51

Chapter 7

Sea Control

Chapter 7 Sea Control

As long as the sea is at our gates, North America will remain 

the last great island. Her strategy, if she is to win and survive, 

must be maritime...America’s safety and well-being depend in 

primary measure upon American ability to control and, even 

more important, to exploit control of the seas.19

—Colonel Robert D. Heinl, USMC, 1962

Military Historian and Defense Journalist

Background

Throughout U.S. history, control of the sea has been a precursor for 

victory in war and prosperity in peace. Sea control is the essence of seapower—it allows naval forces to close within striking distance of land to 

neutralize land-based threats to maritime access, which in turn enhances 

freedom of action at sea and the resulting ability to project power ashore. 

The interrelationship between sea control and power projection mandates 

that the Naval Service possess capabilities and capacity to concurrently 

shape conditions in the maritime, space and cyberspace domains, 

sufficient to accomplish the Nation’s defense strategy.

The vastness of the world’s oceans makes it impossible for the Naval 

Service to achieve global sea control. The combatant commanders’ 

operational objectives, the strategic maritime geography, and the capabilities of potential adversaries drive the scale of forward naval presence 

and surge capability necessary to conduct effective local and regional 

sea control operations. Such operations against a capable adversary 

cannot be wholly conducted from the sea—they will require the support 

of land-based aircraft for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR), undersea warfare, and aerial refueling. In this context, sea control 

operations are: 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

52

The employment of naval forces, supported by land and air forces as 

appropriate, in order to achieve military objectives in vital sea areas. 

Such operations include destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression 

of enemy sea commerce, protection of vital sea lanes, and establishment of local military superiority in areas of naval operations. 

While major battles to achieve sea control have not occurred since World 

War II, freedom of navigation and global maritime commerce are threatened every day by state and non-state actors who disrupt legal activities 

in the maritime domain and conduct piracy on the high seas. Moreover, 

deployment of joint forces and their sustainment during crisis response 

operations and land-centric conflicts is dependent on secure sea lines of 

communication. As a result, naval forces will for the foreseeable future 

conduct sea control operations to enforce freedom of navigation, sustain 

unhindered global maritime commerce, prevent or limit the spread of 

conflict, and prevail in war. 

Opportunity and Challenge

The unhindered movement of energy resources, commodities and 

durable goods by sea is the foundation of the global economic system and 

of every nation’s prosperity to a large extent. This universal dependence 

on the maritime domain motivates allies and partners alike to collaborate 

on maintaining maritime security, and to conduct sea control operations 

as part of a coalition when maritime security is disrupted or insufficient 

to safeguard global interests. 

The challenges to conducting effective sea control operations are diverse 

and complex; reflective of the diversity of the maritime, space and cyberspace domains that must be concurrently shaped to create the conditions 

for success, and the complexity of the full-spectrum naval, joint and 

combined missions that must be planned, resourced and synchronized to 

realize success. Chief among these challenges are:

n Increasingly capable blue water adversaries that are fielding quiet 

diesel and nuclear submarines, and new surface combatants armed 

with advanced torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles. 
53Chapter 7 Sea Control

n Theater anti-access weapons, including land and anti-ship ballistic 

missiles (ASBMs), advanced diesel submarines, and associated ISR 

networks. 

n Area denial weapons in the littoral, employed by both state and 

non-state actors, to include mines, coastal defense cruise missiles, 

swarming fast attack craft, mini-submarines and increasingly quiet 

and more capable submarines. 

n Technologies that disrupt space and cyberspace capabilities, 

particularly command, control, communication, computer, and 

intelligence (C4I) systems. 

Central Idea

Our ability to establish local sea control is fundamental to exploiting 

the maritime domain as maneuver space, protecting critical sea lines of 

communication, and projecting and sustaining combat power overseas. 

The persistent forward presence of U.S. naval forces promotes familiarity 

with the choke points, sea lanes, and littorals that comprise the strategic 

maritime geography, as well as the activities and conditions that affect the 

operational environment. Forward presence also facilitates engagement 

with allies and partners—many of whom possess potent sea control and 

power projection capabilities—who may share their superior regional 

knowledge and contribute to combined sea control operations. Naval 

forces achieve sea control by neutralizing or destroying threats in the 

maritime, space and cyberspace domains that constrain our freedom to 

maneuver, conduct follow-on missions, or restore maritime security. 

Achieving Sea Control

Naval forces conduct sea control operations in environments ranging 

from uncertain to openly hostile, and must frequently contend with 

adversary tactics such as: 

n Opposed Transit. An adversary seeks to deny U.S. and allied ability to 

use the sea lines of communication outside the theater of operations. 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

54

n Anti-access. An adversary seeks to prevent or delay U.S. and allied 

ability to approach and access the theater of operations, especially 

littoral areas, from the open ocean.

n Area denial. An adversary seeks to degrade or deny U.S. and allied 

operational effectiveness or freedom of action within the theater of 

operations by denying U.S. ability to conduct operations within and 

across domains, or U.S. ability to project power ashore. 

Addressing such threats requires offensive and defensive actions, 

including the employment of routine protective measures; the episodic 

countering of imminent attacks; and actively locating and neutralizing, 

or destroying, adversary threats that are holding naval forces at risk. 

Beyond traditional kinetic and non-kinetic threats, adversaries will likely 

conduct space and cyberspace attacks aimed at negating U.S. ability 

to command and control forces. To the extent possible, naval forces 

will deploy and employ redundant systems to maintain command and 

control of dispersed forces in the face of such threats, and will maintain 

proficiency in retaining the operational and tactical initiative when 

communications and information systems are degraded or denied. This 

imperative mandates detailed pre-operational planning and the delegation 

of authority to leaders with the experience and decision-making skills to 

exercise independent initiative consistent with commanders’ intent.

Opposed Transit

Adversaries with blue water capabilities may threaten combat and support 

forces transiting from their forward station, forward presence operating 

area, or point of departure in the continental United States to the theater 

of operations. Although U.S. naval forces can be surprised while transiting in blue water, there are few threats in the current security environment 

that can effectively challenge U.S. combatants in the open ocean. Thus, it 

is likely adversaries will focus on interdicting military sealift, expeditionary strike force, and merchant vessels deploying and sustaining the joint 

force. Alternatively, or concurrently, adversaries may elect to interdict 

commercial shipping to degrade the U.S. economy and capacity to support 

the conflict. In either case, naval forces will be required to neutralize or 

destroy air, surface and subsurface threats to high value vessels during 

their transit; using standard escort, area defense, integrated air missile 

defense, anti-surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) tactics, 
55Chapter 7 Sea Control

techniques and procedures. The requirement to defend long sea lines 

of communication can rapidly exceed the capacity of the Naval Service, 

leading to the use of convoys, routes defended by land-based capabilities, 

or undefended minimum risk routes. Employing ally and partner naval 

forces in combined operations to safeguard the deployment of coalition 

forces can often leverage their knowledge of local conditions, their operational expertise and support from peacetime bases to good effect. 

Anti-Access 

The range, precision and lethality of anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic 

missiles, and diesel submarines are being continuously improved. These 

capabilities can hold naval forces that are hundreds of miles from an adversary’s coast at risk; thereby degrading the U.S. ability to deter potential 

adversaries, assure allies, and accomplish military objectives with minimal 

losses. While the Naval Service is engaged in a variety of international 

initiatives to prevent the proliferation of these anti-access capabilities, it 

is aggressively enhancing legacy capabilities and developing new ones 

to disrupt the employment of these evolving threats and to successfully 

defend against them. Naval forces possess the capability and capacity 

to mitigate the risks posed by these threats to an acceptable level today, 

and will be able to deliver the operational and tactical effects expected by 

the combatant commanders for the foreseeable future. To this end, full 

spectrum operations in the maritime, space and cyberspace domains will 

be conducted by naval forces that persist in, neutralize or episodically 

enter the anti-access environment, depending on mission objectives. 

Area Denial 

Once naval forces defeat or circumvent opposed transit and anti-access 

threats to enter an overseas littoral, they become increasingly exposed 

to an array of land-based air, naval, and ground weapons that can be 

extended seaward to degrade naval force operational effectiveness. 

Area-denial weapons include submarines, mini-submarines, fast attack 

craft, coastal defense cruise missiles, guided munitions and mines. They 

can be employed by an adversary’s conventional forces, special operations 

forces, or proxy forces; as well as by non-state actors engaged in irregular 

warfare who may possess them. Area-denial weapons are intended to 

prevent unconstrained maneuver by U.S. naval forces. Submarines and 

mini-submarines, tasked with attriting naval forces within a defined 

operating area, are susceptible to the broad area and tactical ASW 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

56

systems available to U.S. naval forces. The employment of persistent 

ISR systems to cue time-sensitive targeting of fast attack craft, coastal 

defense cruise missiles and guided munitions systems that execute shoot 

and hide tactics is an effective way to suppress and eventually eliminate 

these threats. The greatest area-denial challenge in the maritime domain 

remains mines. Mines are cheap, numerous, widely proliferated, and capable

of constraining maneuverability from deep water past the surf zone to the 

maximum extent of the littoral. Current systems and procedures to clear 

mines from the deep water through the surf zone are effective, but slow, 

and in most cases require naval forces to enter the minefield. Moreover, 

those forces are often subject to harassment by area-denial weapons 

and fires from the shore. In the future, emerging mine countermeasure 

capabilities will allow naval forces to more effectively identify and neutralize mines without entering the mine danger area. 

Combined Arms Approach to Sea Control 

The Naval Service employs a combined-arms approach to achieve sea 

control. Mission-tailored forces integrate sea, air, land, space, cyberspace, 

and information operation capabilities employed from ships and submarines; carrier-, amphibious ship- and land-based aircraft; ground vehicles; 

and remote sites outside the theater of operations; to achieved assigned 

objectives. Marine amphibious forces, Navy Expeditionary Combat 

Command forces and the Coast Guard Deployable Operations Group 

operate cooperatively to bridge the seams between blue, green and brown 

water, the littoral, and regions further inland. Fleet Cyber Command, 

Marine Forces Cyberspace Command and Coast Guard Cyber Command 

conduct full spectrum computer operations in support of every element 

of the combined-arms team, as well as the joint, interagency and coalition 

elements that regularly augment naval force packages. The combinedarms approach leverages the following capability advantages to achieve 

sea control: 

n Superior warfare systems, which provide robust integrated air and 

missile defense, including ballistic missile defense; effective undersea 

warfare; and flexible network-centric attack options using organic and 

off-board weapons.

n Large numbers of combat ready platforms, achieved through enhanced 

reliability and efficiencies in the inter-deployment training cycle. 
57Chapter 7 Sea Control

n Increased operational range and endurance, achieved through 

improved energy management; increased energy efficiency; and the 

ability to use a variety of energy sources ranging from nuclear power 

to conventional petroleum-based fuels and new bio-fuels. 

n Improved interoperability between U.S. naval forces, other joint 

forces, allies and partners, achieved through improved networking, 

new employment concepts that leverage each Service’s or partner’s 

strengths and mutually beneficial engagement enabled by persistent 

forward presence.

n Resilient communication, navigation, ISR and targeting systems,

redundant pathways for key functions, and preplanned response 

procedures that ensure naval forces can continue to operate unimpeded by degradations in U.S. satellites or computer networks. 

•	Space Superiority, which enables dispersed, networked sea control 

operations through space-based command and control (C2), 

navigation, targeting, communications, and ISR systems. 

•	Cyberspace Superiority, enhanced by sound information assurance 

practices, which ensures that critical networks are defended and full 

spectrum computer network operations effectively support widely 

dispersed naval forces engaged in sea control operations.

Summary

Sea control is the foundation of seapower. The ability of U.S. naval forces 

to establish local and regional sea control is fundamental to exploiting 

the maritime domain as maneuver space, protecting critical sea lines of 

communication, and projecting and sustaining combat power overseas. 

Naval forces achieve sea control by neutralizing or destroying threats in 

the maritime, space and cyberspace domains that constrain our freedom 

to maneuver, conduct follow-on missions, or restore maritime security. 

To this end, naval forces employ a combined-arms approach that leverages 

the full spectrum of capabilities possessed by the Naval Service, joint 

force, interagency, allies and partners. 
The advantage of sea-power used offensively 

is that when a fleet sails no one can be sure 

where it is going to strike.20

— Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill, 1949

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 

1940-1945 and 1951-1955
59

Chapter 8

Power Projection

Chapter 8 Power Projection

Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a 

sea-based power possesses.21

—B.H. Liddell Hart, 1960

Soldier, Military Historian and Theorist

 

Background

During the Cold War, the United States maintained significant military 

forces overseas in close proximity to likely employment areas. Since the 

end of that conflict, the United States’ global network of air and land 

bases has diminished and U.S. military forces have largely transitioned 

to an expeditionary posture. Most Naval Service forces are now based 

in the United States and deploy overseas, rotationally or episodically, to 

meet operational requirements. In this “expeditionary era,” U.S. joint 

forces are increasingly challenged by geographic, diplomatic, and military 

impediments to access, necessitating a greater emphasis on sea-based 

power projection capabilities. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations

(CCJO) elaborates on this topic:

Diminishing overseas access is another challenge anticipated in the 

future operating environment. Foreign sensitivities to U.S. military 

presence have steadily been increasing. Even close allies may be 

hesitant to grant access for a variety of reasons. Diminished access 

will complicate the maintenance of forward presence, a critical 

aspect of past and current U.S. military strategy, necessitating new 

approaches to responding quickly to developments around the world as 

well as more robust exploitation of existing U.S. advantages to operate 

at sea and in the air, space, and cyberspace. Assuring access to ports, 

airfields, foreign airspace, coastal waters and host nation support 

in potential commitment areas will be a challenge and will require 

active peacetime engagement with states in volatile areas. In war, this 

challenge may require forcible-entry capabilities designed to seize and 

maintain lodgments in the face of armed resistance.22
Naval Operations Concept 2010

60

Power projection in its broadest sense is “the ability of a nation to apply 

all or some of its elements of national power—political, economic, 

informational, or military—to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain 

forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to 

contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability.” The United 

States has two broad military means—normally employed in combination—

for projecting power overseas: air power and seapower. The Naval 

Service possesses the capabilities to employ both, in concert with the 

other elements of national power. Air power provides a means to deliver 

fires, personnel (to include airborne and air mobile forces), and limited 

materiel very quickly. It is less effective, however, in delivering equipment 

and supplies in the volume necessary to sustain larger military operations.

Seapower provides a means to deliver fires, personnel (to include 

amphibious forces), and resources with somewhat less immediacy than 

air power, but in much greater weight and volume. The preponderance 

of naval and joint force materiel required to conduct sustained power 

projection operations is therefore delivered by sea. 

Beyond the deployment phase of an operation, strikes and amphibious 

assaults are the most common naval contributions to power projection. 

A strike is an attack to damage or destroy an objective or capability. 

Naval strike capabilities include ballistic or cruise missiles, aircraft, naval 

surface fires, electronic warfare, computer network attack, Marines, and 

naval special warfare teams. 

Operating from international waters, carriers and their embarked air 

wings are capable of dominating key aspects of the maritime domain 

for hundreds of miles. The surface combatants and submarines in a 

carrier strike group (CSG) conduct land attack missile strikes and protect 

the power projection forces from surface, subsurface, and air threats, 

including ballistic missiles. The mobility, operational independence, 

speed, endurance, range and volume of fires provided by a CSG support 

a wide variety of strike operations. This versatility and lethality is applied 

across the full range of military operations, from providing sustained, 

massed fires to defeat enemy ground formations to destroying terrorist 

base camps; conducting time-sensitive precision strikes against fleeting, 

high-value targets; protecting friendly forces involved in stability operations; and neutralizing enemy anti-access/area-denial defenses in support 

of amphibious operations. 
61Chapter 8 Power Projection

An amphibious assault involves establishing a landing force on a hostile 

or potentially hostile shore. Although landing forces may vary in size, 

they are normally organized as a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), 

each composed of four core elements: a command element, a ground combat 

element, an aviation combat element, and a logistics combat element. The 

largest, the Marine expeditionary force (MEF), is the Marine Corps’ 

principal warfighting organization and includes at least a Marine division, a Marine aircraft wing, and a Marine logistics group. The Marine 

expeditionary brigade (MEB) is the “middleweight” MAGTF and is 

composed of at least one reinforced infantry regiment, a Marine aircraft 

group, and a combat logistics regiment. The Marine expeditionary unit 

(MEU) is the typical, forward deployed MAGTF and is composed of a 

reinforced infantry battalion, a composite squadron of rotary, tilt rotor, 

and fixed-wing aircraft, and a task-organized logistics combat element. 

A special purpose MAGTF is a non-standing organization temporarily 

formed to conduct a specific mission. Amphibious assault ships, amphibious transport dock ships, and dock landing ships provide the afloat 

staging base required to project, sustain, and recover landing forces, 

while Navy assault craft units and beachmasters perform key support 

functions. Additionally, a host of naval capabilities required to establish 

sea control and neutralize anti-access/area denial threats may be critical 

to support the conduct of successful amphibious assaults. Additionally, 

the enhanced maritime prepositioning squadrons provide the means to 

rapidly reinforce and sustain expeditionary power projection with or 

without significant port and airfield infrastructure. 

While assault has been, and remains, the primary impetus for amphibious 

capabilities, their utility in conducting raids, demonstrations, withdrawals, 

and amphibious support to other operations is immense. U.S. naval 

forces have conducted more than 107 amphibious operations since 1990, 

with 78 of them falling into this “other” category. The majority of these 

were non-combatant evacuations, disaster relief, or similar crisis response 

operations conducted in austere and uncertain environments. 23 Indeed, 

one of the largest and most complex amphibious operations in modern 

history, the withdrawal of more than 6,200 United Nations’ peacekeepers 

from Somalia, was conducted under the threat of surface-to-air missiles 

in the hands of local militants. 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

62

To support large operations, globally dispersed, mission-tailored naval 

forces rapidly aggregate to form expeditionary strike forces (ESFs) 

capable of projecting overwhelming combat power from the sea. During 

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM I, for example, an ESF was formed 

from four carrier battle groups and two amphibious ready groups with 

embarked Marine expeditionary units (ARG/MEUs). The USS CARL 

VINSON, THEODORE ROOSEVELT, JOHN C. STENNIS, and ENTERPRISE provided the preponderance of strike sorties for the operation 

while the combatants in the ESF employed precision-guided cruise 

missiles and conducted supporting maritime interdiction operations. 

The USS PELELIU ARG/15th MEU and USS BATAAN ARG/26th MEU, as 

Task Force 58, were the first conventional forces ashore in Afghanistan. 

Projected, supported, and sustained from the North Arabian Sea at a 

distance of 450 miles, they opened a lodgment for the introduction of 

additional joint forces. This lodgment, Forward Operating Base Rhino, 

supported the seizure of Kandahar and subsequent operations several 

hundred miles further inland. 

Opportunity and Challenge

Globally distributed, mission tailored naval forces routinely engage with 

allies and partners to improve interoperability and to enhance proficiency 

in the conduct of combined operations. While the vast majority of 

crisis response operations undertaken by coalitions in recent years have 

involved sanctions enforcement, stability, humanitarian assistance, 

disaster relief and maritime interdiction missions, the experience gained 

is valuable when circumstances require naval forces to mount a major 

power projection campaign—as occurred with Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM. The persistent forward presence of U.S. naval forces not only 

enables such engagement and combined crisis response operations; it also 

facilitates the initiatives of the other elements of national power to inspire 

like-minded nations to project power together for the common good. 

While the Naval Service is capable of overcoming the geographic challenges inherent in projecting power globally, and enjoys fewer impediments to access than the other Services, naval forces face increasingly 

capable anti-access and area-denial threats. This circumstance requires 

naval and supporting forces to shape conditions synchronously across 

the sea, undersea, air, land, space and cyberspace domains in order to 
63Chapter 8 Power Projection

achieve assigned power projection objectives within acceptable risk. 

Additionally, the advantages in naval force capability and capacity 

enjoyed by many allies and partners with whom we have habitually 

shared common national security interests—and indeed those of the 

United States—relative to potential adversaries are declining over time. 

Coupled with an increasing number of diverse, concurrent crises perpetrated by both state and non-state actors, these circumstances demand 

that the Naval Service creatively apply its inherent adaptability, flexibility 

and reach to project power effectively. 

Central Idea

The character of a power projection operation reflects the objective—

such as destroying an adversary’s invading ground force or securing 

and restoring a partner’s commercial port capacity; and the operating 

environment—permissive, uncertain or hostile. In combination, these 

factors drive base, branch and sequel planning; tactics, techniques and 

procedures to be employed; and the tailored naval forces to be committed. 

A permissive environment is one in which the host country military and 

law enforcement agencies are able to maintain control of the operating 

area, and have the capability and intent to assist the operation. Forward 

postured naval forces routinely conduct a broad spectrum of power 

projection missions in permissive environments. The capabilities that 

allow naval forces to project and sustain combat power against a hostile 

adversary are the same capabilities that allow them to overcome damaged 

or limited local infrastructure; extract personnel from hazardous circumstances; provide emergency care; and restore the critical enablers for 

health and safety. Mobile command and control (C2), well decks, flight 

decks, surface and air connectors, emergency medical capability and 

cargo capacity all allow globally distributed, mission-tailored naval forces to 

conduct sea-based evacuations; respond to disasters; and when necessary, 

facilitate the introduction of additional naval, joint, interagency, 

multinational and non-governmental capabilities as part of a “whole of 

government” or international response. 

An uncertain environment is one in which the host government forces, 

whether opposed to or supportive of the operation, lack effective control 

of the territory and population in the operating area. Forward postured 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

64

naval forces frequently conduct noncombatant evacuation and embassy 

reinforcement missions in uncertain environments. Increasingly, naval 

forces are being tasked to project power into ungoverned or undergoverned areas being exploited as safe havens by terrorists, weapons 

traffickers, pirates, and other criminal elements. Counterterrorism, 

counter-piracy and counter-proliferation missions can involve strikes 

and amphibious raids conducted to kill or capture terrorists; destroy 

insurgent training camps; capture pirates or other criminals; seize illegal 

arms and contraband; rescue hostages; and secure, safeguard or remove 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Stability operations—such as 

those ongoing in Afghanistan, and the 1995 amphibious withdrawal of 

United Nations’ peacekeeping forces from Somalia—are representative 

of large scale power projection operations conducted in an uncertain 

environment. 

Operations in an uncertain environment are always conducted with the 

expectation of armed opposition. While potential adversaries—including 

non-state actors—are unlikely to mount fully integrated anti-access 

defense in an uncertain environment, they often possess a variety 

of lethal area denial weapons. Naval forces limit the effectiveness of 

such weapons through evolutionary tactics and new technologies that 

enhance over-the-horizon operations; connector range, speed and agility; 

shipboard defenses; mine and improvised explosive device (IED) countermeasures, and counter-fire, especially for the immediate suppression 

of threats. Information operations, to include deception, psychological 

operations, and the non-kinetic neutralization of adversaries’ C2 systems, 

are also employed in lieu of or in addition to kinetic attacks depending on 

the mission objective and extant rules of engagement.

A hostile environment is one in which adversary forces have control 

of the operating area, as well as the capability and intent to oppose the 

operation. The most challenging power projection mission in a hostile 

environment is an amphibious assault to enable the introduction and 

sustainment of a large follow-on force. Such operations require the full 

spectrum of naval, joint, and interagency capabilities to successfully 

establish local sea control and project power ashore. To this end, naval 

forces must accomplish three major, overlapping tasks.
65Chapter 8 Power Projection

Gaining and Maintaining Operational Access

Gaining and maintaining operational access in a sophisticated hostile 

environment will invariably require the full spectrum of lethal, nonlethal, conventional and special capabilities possessed by the United 

States, applied synchronously to shape and achieve advantage in the sea, 

undersea, air, land, space and cyberspace domains. The establishment of 

sea control, discussed at length in the previous chapter, permits the use 

of the sea as maneuver space and is an essential pre-condition for the use 

of strike operations to conduct decisive power projection ashore. When 

naval forces possess sufficient capabilities to persist in the operating 

area and successfully accomplish their assigned tasks while concurrently 

defending against the anti-access threats, sea control can be achieved 

and conditions can be set to project power ashore rapidly. As the reach, 

diversity, density and sophistication of anti-access capabilities increase, 

naval forces may establish local, episodic sea control in support of raids 

and other short duration amphibious operations if such a scheme of 

maneuver is sufficient to accomplish the operational objectives.

Otherwise, naval forces will use power projection operations—largely 

from the CSGs, their surface combatant escorts, and supporting submarines—to systematically neutralize robust anti-access threats in advance 

of the maneuver force.

Conducting Littoral Maneuver

Littoral maneuver is the ability to transition ready-to-fight combat forces 

from the sea to the shore in order to achieve a position of advantage over 

the enemy. It may be employed directly against an objective, including 

inland objectives, to accomplish the mission singly; to seize infrastructure 

or lodgments that will enable the arrival of follow-on forces; or to pose 

a continuous coastal threat that causes an adversary to fix, maneuver or 

dissipate his forces. 

The naval force capabilities employed to achieve sea control remain 

critical during littoral maneuver. Advanced, networked space-based 

sensors; long-range, persistent unmanned aircraft; and locally deployable 

air, surface and subsurface multi-spectral intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR) systems provide naval forces with improved 

battlefield awareness, rapid target acquisition/designation, and superior 

all-weather/obscured visibility combat effectiveness. Carrier air wings 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

66

and sea-based Marine tactical aviation provide air superiority over the 

amphibious operations area, air interdiction of adversary forces maneuvering toward the landing force, and close air support to augment highvolume naval surface fires from surface combatants. Rotary-wing aircraft, 

armed with air-to-surface missiles, embarked on surface combatants and 

amphibious assault ships, along with vertical/short takeoff and landing 

fixed wing aircraft from amphibious assault ships contribute fires in the 

littoral as required. Moreover, non-kinetic fires provided by electronic 

warfare systems and computer network operations can be employed to 

gain the initiative.

The mission, geography, weather and adversary’s capabilities all combine 

to create a unique set of seaward and landward littoral maneuver challenges. Adversary aircraft, coastal defenses, air defenses, submarines, 

surface combatants, fast attack craft (including suicide boats), maneuver 

forces, improvised explosive devices and mines (in the sea and very 

shallow water as well as on land), and a collection of weapons often 

referred to as G-RAMM—guided rockets, artillery, mortars and missiles—

must all be effectively countered. Additionally, littoral maneuver may 

also be subject to attack by irregular forces employing a variety of simple 

and sophisticated weapons. 

To offset these threats, especially widely proliferated first-generation 

anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), assault echelons will normally commence littoral maneuver from amphibious ships positioned—at least 

initially—over-the-horizon. This extends the range from, and reduces 

the ISR available to, the adversary. MEBs will normally provide the 

landing force building blocks for larger contingencies and major operations. When combined, two MEB assault echelons constitute the assault 

echelon of a MEF. Naval forces use high-speed vertical and surface 

means, singularly or in combination depending on the threat environment, to rapidly project this combat power ashore. During Operation 

DESERT STORM in 1991, for example, an all-vertical assault into the Al 

Wafrah gap was conducted due to the high concentration of sea mines. 

During Operation UNITED SHIELD in 1995, the amphibious withdrawal 

of United Nations forces from Somalia employed surface means only in 

order to avoid a significant surface-to-air missile threat. 
67Chapter 8 Power Projection

Enhanced MAGTF operations incorporate landing force capability and 

capacity refinements that improve the self-sufficiency of smaller units 

so that they can operate over greater ranges and for extended duration, 

as well as increasing their ability to operate from a wider variety of 

ships. It also includes the ability to conduct larger-scale operations by 

transitioning numerous maneuver units ashore via multiple, distributed 

points—versus establishing a single, contiguous beachhead—in order to 

avoid established defenses, natural obstacles, and the presentation of a 

concentrated, lucrative target. 

By keeping its command, aviation, and logistics elements afloat to the 

maximum extent possible, the MAGTF will further reduce vulnerabilities 

ashore while retaining a high degree of mobility and dexterity. This 

approach provides multiple options for employment of the ground 

combat element within the joint or multinational force commander’s 

scheme of maneuver. Included among those options is the ability to 

re-embark the ground combat element to conduct further amphibious 

operations aimed at outflanking an adversary, cutting enemy supply lines, 

or simply outpacing overland movement. 

Sustained littoral operations may also include the employment of coastal 

and riverine forces. Depending upon the environment and the mission, 

these forces may operate as independent units or be task-organized 

in combination with amphibious and strike forces. Embarkation of 

Marines, Coast Guardsmen, or Navy Maritime Expeditionary Security 

Force personnel aboard littoral combatants provides additional force 

employment options. 

Enabling the Arrival of Joint or Multinational Forces

Naval forces may be tasked with enabling the rapid build-up of joint or 

multinational forces in the objective area. Inasmuch as the finite number 

of amphibious ships will be committed to the assault echelons conducting 

littoral maneuver, the arrival of follow-on forces will be accomplished 

primarily through naval movement. Naval movement involves military 

sealift and merchant vessels transporting vehicles, equipment, and 

supplies in volume over strategic distances for offload at a port or expeditionary facility. Naval movement is normally employed in concert with 

the movement of personnel by strategic airlift. 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

68

Maritime prepositioning forces, which are composed of one or more 

maritime prepositioning ship squadrons loaded with follow-on force 

materiel; a Navy support element; and a MAGTF fly-in echelon, exemplify

the combination of naval movement and strategic airlift. Maritime 

prepositioning forces play a crucial role in rapidly reinforcing the assault 

echelons and bringing the full capabilities of the MEF into action. This 

approach merges the weight and volume advantages of sealift with the 

speed of airlift. However, unlike littoral maneuver, which projects units 

in a ready-to-fight condition, naval movement and strategic airlift are 

dependent upon secure infrastructure ashore to accept disaggregated 

elements, which must go through the process of reception, staging, 

onward movement, and integration before units can be employed. 

Naval movement and strategic airlift must therefore be enabled by seizing 

existing infrastructure intact or securing a lodgment for the establishment of expeditionary facilities. 

The seizure of existing ports and airfields intact is not always possible. 

Adversaries often concentrate defensive capabilities around these facilities 

and destroy key infrastructure when seizure becomes imminent. Even 

successful seizures can cause combat damage, and in some cases key 

infrastructure may not exist. Naval forces must therefore be capable of 

mine countermeasures operations, explosive ordnance disposal, and 

construction engineering in order to rapidly repair existing facilities or 

build expeditionary facilities. Sometimes, the joint force commander 

may intentionally avoid established ports and airfields—at least initially—

in order to make his scheme of maneuver less predictable. Current 

high-speed intra-theater connectors are capable of offloading onto 

austere facilities in a secure area, and expeditionary causeway systems 

can reduce reliance on existing infrastructure. In all cases, naval cargo 

handlers, combat logisticians, and maritime security forces facilitate the 

introduction of follow-on forces and other resources. 

The dependence upon secure infrastructure ashore is being partially 

alleviated through enhancements to maritime prepositioning and other 

forms of military sealift. Providing the ability to conduct selective offload 

and at-sea transfer of personnel and equipment from sealift platforms to 

amphibious ships or directly to air and surface craft capable of ship-toshore delivery will enable a more sea-based approach.24 
69Chapter 8 Power Projection

Naval Expeditionary Logistics

The ability to sustain naval forces—whether globally dispersed or aggregated to project power—is accomplished through an extensive defense 

distribution system comprised of military bases at home and abroad; 

expeditionary enabling and support forces; joint capabilities; host and 

partner nations; and private vendors. Built around the combat logistics 

force ships and support ships operated by the Military Sealift Command, 

naval expeditionary logistics provide an end-to-end supply chain capable of 

continuously providing parts, supplies, and equipment from the continental 

United States, or intermediate advanced bases, directly to naval forces at 

sea. With these assets, the full range of logistics distribution functions are 

possible even when overseas shore-based support is limited or nonexistent.

The ability to conduct logistics functions afloat enables naval forces to 

maintain station anywhere. The Navy and Marine Corps are moving 

beyond logistics interoperability to Naval Logistics Integration (NLI), which 

is enhancing the Naval Service’s ability to provide sea-based support to 

naval as well as joint and multinational forces operating at sea or ashore.

 

Command and Control Enhancements

The complexity, tempo, and distributed nature of power projection 

operations require precise coordination among all elements of the force, 

fully interoperable ISR sensors, processing systems, and associated data 

transport systems; and the ability to collect, process, and disseminate 

relevant information in near real time to support distributed fires and 

maneuver. These operational capabilities are being incorporated into 

Navy maritime operations center (MOC) and Marine Corps C2 capabilities, afloat and ashore. Additional C2 enhancements are simultaneously increasing protection of network, intelligence, and decision aid 

architectures that support decentralized execution and enhance joint 

coordination. Concurrently, collaborative planning, rehearsal, execution 

and assessment tools are being proliferated and beyond-line-of-sight, 

over-the-horizon, and on-the-move systems capable of operating in a 

degraded communications environment are being considered for landing 

forces and support craft. In many operating environments, however, this 

level of connectivity may be difficult to sustain, as emerging anti-satellite 

weapons, jamming technologies and precision strike weapons may 

damage or degrade U.S. network infrastructure. To allow effective power 

projection in the face of these challenges, the Naval Service has developed 

procedures to operate with only line-of-sight or no communications and 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

70

is reducing its reliance on reach-back support, while at the same time 

establishing more resilient networks that rely on distributed and redundant nodes in space, the atmosphere and on the surface. 

Summary

Globally distributed, mission-tailored naval forces and regionally concentrated 

naval forces both routinely project power. The character of a power 

projection operation reflects the mission and the operating environment—permissive, uncertain or hostile. Gaining and maintaining 

operational access in a sophisticated hostile environment will invariably 

require the full spectrum of lethal, non-lethal, conventional and special 

capabilities possessed by the United States, applied synchronously to 

shape and achieve advantage in the sea, undersea, air, land, space and 

cyberspace domains. Strike operations, executed primarily by the 

nuclear-powered aircraft carriers’ (CVNs’) embarked air wings, and 

surface and sub-surface launched land attack missiles, are our principal 

means of gaining and maintaining operational access. 

The establishment of sea control permits the use of the sea as maneuver 

space and is an essential pre-condition for decisive power projection 

ashore. Littoral maneuver is the ability to transition ready-to-fight 

combat forces from the sea to the shore in order to achieve a position 

of advantage over the enemy. It may be employed directly against an 

objective, including inland objectives, to accomplish the mission singly; 

to seize infrastructure or lodgments that will enable the arrival of followon forces; or to pose a continuous coastal threat that causes an adversary 

to fix, maneuver or dissipate his forces. The naval force capabilities 

employed to achieve sea control remain critical during littoral maneuver. 

MEBs will normally provide the landing force building blocks for larger 

contingencies and major operations. When combined, two MEB assault 

echelons constitute the assault echelon of a MEF. Naval forces use highspeed vertical and surface means, singularly or in combination depending 

on the threat environment, to rapidly project this combat power ashore. 

Enhanced MAGTF operations incorporate landing force capability and 

capacity refinements that improve the self-sufficiency of smaller units so 

that they can operate over greater ranges and for extended duration, as 

well as increasing their ability to assault from a wider variety of ships. 
71
Lying offshore, ready to act, the presence of ships and 

Marines sometimes means much more than just 

having air power or ship’s fire, when it comes to 

deterring a crisis. And the ships and Marines may 

not have to do anything but lie offshore. It is hard to lie 

offshore with a C-141 or C-130 full of airborne troops.

— General Colin Powell, U.S. Army, 1990

65th Secretary of State and 12th Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
73Chapter 9 Deterrence

Chapter 9

Deterrence

Indeed, force is never more operative than when it is known to 

exist but is not brandished.25

—Alfred Thayer Mahan, 1912

Naval Historian and Theorist

Background

Naval forces have historically provided nuclear and conventional means 

to discourage aggression and dissuade adversaries from hostile action. 

The ability of naval forces to rapidly deploy and indefinitely sustain credible combat power worldwide provides national decision-makers with 

an important tool to signal U.S. intent and resolve, deterring adversaries, 

assuring allies, and contributing to homeland defense in depth.26 

The Maritime Strategy underscores that preventing wars is preferable to 

fighting wars. This emphasis on war prevention calls for an expanded 

concept of deterrence to meet 21st-century threats.

Collectively, forward presence, maritime security, humanitarian assistance 

and disaster response (HA/DR), sea control, and power projection support 

and sustain an expanded form of deterrence. Going further, A Cooperative 

Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS-21) provided the Naval Service 

with a purposefully expanded view of deterrence. This new framework 

includes conducting prevention activities intended to address the 

conditions that lead to conflict, while discouraging aggressors through 

cooperative action and partnership. 

Opportunity and Challenge

In the 21st century the United States faces an expanding array of 

adversaries who threaten its vital interests. This includes both state and 

non-state actors who may pose regional, transnational, or global threats 

through irregular, conventional or nuclear means. Some potential adver-
Naval Operations Concept 2010

74

saries may not be deterred with nuclear or conventional retaliation, and 

may actually seek to elicit a U.S. reprisal to support their own strategic 

objectives. As described in previous chapters, U.S. forces are required to 

conduct a variety of military tasks, equally capable of globally distributed or 

regionally concentrated projection of both “hard power” and “soft power” as 

appropriate. This presents a challenge for naval forces—maintaining their 

advantages to prevent and deter conflict through nuclear and conventional 

means while evolving new, non-traditional deterrence capabilities.

Central Idea

Effective deterrence requires a comprehensive effort that includes all 

elements of national power. In support of this expanded approach, the 

Naval Service will employ a broader set of capabilities to assure partners, 

dissuade adversaries, and deter or limit hostile action. These include 

continued nuclear and conventional combat preeminence, as well as new 

capabilities to deter evolving threats posed by an array of current and 

potential adversaries. 

CS-21 calls for the naval forces to build confidence and trust among 

nations through collective security efforts that focus on common threats 

and mutual interests with an unprecedented level of cooperation within 

the Naval Service and the other instruments of national power and 

U.S. international partners. In this environment, deterrent effects are 

achieved through the inherent combat power of forward postured naval 

task forces, as well as globally distributed mission-tailored forces engaged in 

fostering, expanding and strengthening cooperative relationships, promoting stable and prosperous regional conditions, and preventing crises. 

An Expanded Deterrence Framework

Deployed naval forces are uniquely suited to this expanded approach to 

deterrence. They possess a credible and scalable ability to deter state and 

non-state adversaries using nuclear and conventional means. Through 

their inherent ability to maneuver, largely unfettered by diplomatic 

challenges to access and presence, naval forces support a wide range of 

credible deterrence options. To sustain this core capability, naval forces 

must continue to develop a broad and enduring deterrence portfolio by 

maintaining nuclear and conventional capability advantages, including 

sea-based ballistic missile defense (BMD). 
75Chapter 9 Deterrence

In addition, globally distributed naval forces—postured forward and in 

coordination with U.S. Government and international sea service 

partners—generate an expanded and non-traditional set of preventative

deterrent effects through partnerships, cooperative security and engagement. These prevention activities, focused on addressing regional, 

transnational, and global security challenges, are designed to limit the 

influence and constrain the actions of rogue governments and non-state 

actors. 

Collectively, this cumulative and mutually supporting framework provides U.S. national leadership with expanded deterrence options across 

a range of security challenges, and is the expanded deterrence capability 

the Nation requires. 

Nuclear Deterrence

The backbone of the Nation’s survivable nuclear deterrent will continue 

to be provided by the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force and its 

supporting command and control (C2) architecture. This demonstrated 

capability provides an enduring and credible deterrent against any state 

that would threaten, or actually employ, nuclear weapons. 

SSBNs serve as the ultimate guarantor of the U.S. assured second-strike 

capability. They are designed specifically for stealth and the precision 

delivery of nuclear warheads. As a virtually undetectable and survivable 

launch platform, SSBNs ensure that the United States will have sufficient 

nuclear forces to inflict unacceptable consequences on an adversary in 

response to a nuclear attack.

. 

We will continue to provide a nuclear deterrent that is persistent and 

maintained in a ready posture, while remaining subject to firm C2 

procedures and protected from conventional or irregular attack. 

The credibility and survivability upon which this deterrence rests is 

dependent upon robust acoustic and non-acoustic stealth, reliable longrange missiles, and an adaptable employment concept capable of holding 

adversaries at risk anywhere on the globe. To maintain a robust, secure 

and survivable nuclear deterrent, we will develop the technologies and 

communications architecture necessary to support the next generation of 

sea-based strategic deterrence. 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

76

Conventional Deterrence

It is difficult to overstate the time-tested conventional deterrent value of 

a forward postured, sustained and combat-capable naval force. Potential 

adversaries are constrained in their freedom to act by the probability of 

retaliation from overwhelming and technologically advanced offensive 

capabilities, combined with defensive measures that allow naval forces to 

fight effectively despite growing anti-access and area-denial capabilities. 

Conventional deterrence puts a premium on the credible ability to rapidly 

respond to aggression, and therefore regionally concentrated, combat-credible naval power plays a central role. Naval forces can quickly respond 

to emerging crises by bringing combat power where none existed before, 

and they can augment existing forces already in theater to signal U.S. 

political resolve in a crisis and further swing the local balance of power 

in the United States’ favor. The ability to rapidly deploy, and indefinitely 

sustain, combat power in a region helps ensure that an opponent cannot 

hope to wait out U.S. forces in the belief that at some point there will be a 

favorable “window of opportunity” for conventional aggression. Forward 

presence, sea control and power projection preeminence deter aggression 

through the credible threat of conventional retaliation and the certain 

denial of an adversary’s military objectives. 

A key to denying adversary objectives in the emerging strategic environment are effective maritime ballistic missile defense forces. Several 

nations have developed, tested and fielded ballistic missiles that threaten 

the U.S homeland, its territories, its forces deployed abroad, and its 

partners, friends and allies. Emerging technologies will make it possible 

for potential adversaries to inhibit naval forces from accessing littoral 

regions through the employment of short and medium-range ballistic 

missiles designed to attack ships at sea. As ballistic missile technology 

advances and proliferates, more nations are gaining or will gain the 

means necessary to attack both sovereign U.S. territory and deployed 

U.S. forces. The Nation has called for a BMD architecture that includes 

complementary capabilities for mid-course interception of missiles 

outside of friendly airspace and point defense protection of population 

centers, critical infrastructure and military bases. The Navy provides a 

deployable mid-course interception capability, which is already employed 

in the Western Pacific, Middle Eastern and European theaters. In addition to these maturing kinetic defense capabilities, we will continue to 
77Chapter 9 Deterrence

emphasize non-kinetic and “prior to launch” solutions that defeat the 

ballistic missile threat. 

Today, the robust air and missile defense capability of cruisers and 

destroyers is leveraged for maritime BMD. With the proper combat 

system upgrades, they will be able to focus sensors hundreds of miles 

over land to persistently monitor the airspace above a launch site. 

If a missile launch is detected, these ships can cue either sea-based or 

ground-based interceptors with accurate tracking and targeting data, and 

if equipped with advanced surface-to-air missiles, autonomously intercept 

incoming missiles. 

Surface combatants operating in international waters have great flexibility 

and can reposition in order to improve detection and interception. Ships 

conducting sea-based missile defense are sometimes tethered to a nominal

station, which could leave them less capable of other missions such as 

undersea warfare or strike. As a result, single-mission land systems are 

a more operationally and financially efficient method to address a fixed, 

known threat than equivalently capable multi-mission surface combatants. As the ballistic missile threat continues to grow across the globe, 

the Navy’s maritime BMD capabilities may be called upon to respond 

in all theaters. When expanded through the employment of linked 

maritime operations centers (MOCs), sea- and land-based ballistic missile 

defenses can be integrated into a globally deployable capability, scalable 

and responsive to the threat. 

Preventive Deterrence through Partnership

Effective theater security cooperation (TSC) and similar “soft power” 

activities promote a collective approach to mutual defense concerns while 

also addressing the conditions that result in conflict, thereby generating 

non-traditional deterrent effects.In this expanded deterrence framework 

partnership, cooperation and engagement strengthen relationships and 

extend overall capacities to stabilize and secure the maritime commons, 

creating effective and enduring disincentives to negative behavior. With 

maritime safety and security as a foundation for cooperation, global maritime partnerships enhance regional, transnational, and global security 

while also eroding support for disruptive extremist ideologies. Building 

partner capacity empowers like-minded maritime nations to address local 

and regional security issues and deter adversaries; and expands the reach 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

78

of the international maritime community to address other threats, such 

as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In this 

manner, the Naval Service’s cooperative engagement activities and 

partner capacity-building enhance the conditions that promote stability, 

prosperity and good governance within the global maritime commons. 

This is an approach advocated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

Give people something positive to hold on to instead of something negative to avoid. Give parents a chance to raise their children to a better 

standard of living than the one they themselves enjoyed. Do that and 

we deter not the tactics of terrorists—they will still try to kill—but 

rather the ends that they seek to achieve.27

Summary

As the Nation evolves its deterrence capabilities to meet the diverse challenges of the global security environment, it is important that naval forces 

appropriately apply the full range of nuclear, conventional, and cooperative means available to deter actions by state and non-state adversaries 

that threaten U.S. interests at home or abroad. 
79Chapter 9 Deterrence
A powerful navy we have always regarded 

as our proper and natural means of defense; 

and it has always been of defense that we 

have thought, never of aggression or of conquest. 

But who shall tell us now what sort of navy to build? 

—President Woodrow Wilson, 1914

28th President of the United States
81Chapter 10 Future Force Structure

Chapter 10

 Future Force 

 Structure

So far from being in any way a provocation to war, an adequate 

and highly trained navy is the best guarantee against war, the 

cheapest and most effective peace insurance. The cost of building 

and maintaining such a navy represents the very lightest 

premium for insuring peace which this nation can possibly pay.... 

The American people must either build and maintain an 

adequate navy, or else make up their minds definitely to accept 

a secondary position in international affairs, not merely in 

political, but in commercial, matters.

—President Theodore Roosevelt, 1901

26th President of the United States

Background

This Naval Operations Concept describes when, where and how 

U.S. naval forces are employed to prevent conflict and prevail in war. 

These demands place a premium on recruiting, developing, and retaining 

high quality Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen who are capable 

of adapting to a wide range of operational conditions and missions. 

To execute the Maritime Strategy and protect U.S. national interests, 

naval forces must be able to provide regionally concentrated, credible combat 

power, to include establishing sea control and projecting power whenever 

and wherever required. As the Maritime Strategy emphasizes, however, 

conducting theater security cooperation (TSC) and building maritime 

partnerships are equally essential elements of protecting access to the 

global commons, mitigating the causes of conflict and deterring aggression.

These efforts require globally distributed, mission-tailored forces. U.S. naval 

forces must also provide deterrence from nuclear attack against the 

homeland, and provide regional defense for U.S. forces, infrastructure, 

allies and partners against theater ballistic missile threats. These efforts 

require strategic deterrent forces. 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

82

Opportunity and Challenge 

The preceding chapters described how the Naval Service executes its 

core capabilities in a security environment characterized by an increasing

number of concurrent, diverse nuclear, conventional and irregular challenges, perpetrated by both state and non-state actors, that is evolving 

toward a new multi-polar balance of global power. The United States 

and particularly the Naval Service recognize the importance of allies and 

partners in this environment, and are committed to collaboratively building 

the interoperability and capacity necessary to share the burden of achieving 

global maritime security and providing for the common defense of likeminded nations. To this end, the Naval Service is rebalancing its force 

structure to address the blue, green and brown water threats potentially 

posed by very capable state adversaries, as well as the maritime security and 

irregular littoral challenges posed by both state and non-state adversaries. 

While armed conflicts between states occur infrequently, they are the 

greatest threat to the United States and demand sufficient numbers of 

technologically advanced “high-end” capabilities to ensure the United 

States can effectively deter, dissuade and if necessary defeat a peer 

competitor. Deterrence is enhanced and risk reduced if the Naval 

Service, allies and partners—in the aggregate—possess the high-end 

capability and capacity to decisively project power to counter coercion and 

aggression. Considering the growing costs of technologically advanced 

capabilities; the demand for balanced “high”- and “low”-end capabilities; 

and the intense competition for funding across all elements of national 

power, the Naval Service and its ally and partner counterparts are 

significantly challenged to sustain the naval forces necessary to project 

the power required in today’s—and tomorrow’s—security environment.

Central Idea

Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC 10) provides the basis for assessing 

the forces required to implement A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 

Seapower (CS-21). The Naval Service capabilities herein are carefully 

designed to address the requirement to concurrently enhance global 

maritime security, prevent and respond to crises, deter aggression, and 

defeat very capable adversaries. To this end, they have been informed by 

the operational needs of the combatant commanders and by current and 

anticipated resource constraints. 
83Chapter 10 Future Force Structure

Aircraft Carriers

Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs) and their embarked air wings 

provide responsive, flexible, sustainable strike capability and capacity 

that does not require diplomatic access. Aircraft carriers serve as the 

centerpiece of carrier strike groups (CSGs) during power projection 

operations. In the event of conflict, multiple CSGs can aggregate, along 

with other surge forces if required, to form an expeditionary strike force 

capable of projecting significant power at-sea and ashore. 

The standard CSG force package includes a CVN, air wing, up to five 

surface combatants, a direct support submarine, and a combat logistics 

force ship. The ships provide integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) 

to include ballistic missile defense; and strike warfare, undersea warfare, 

surface warfare, maritime security, and sustainment. When not conducting coordinated operations, these ships will often disaggregate to conduct 

dispersed security cooperation, counter-piracy, counter-terrorism or other 

maritime security operations in the theater.

In meeting steady-state combatant commander demand, the Naval Service 

will continue to maintain three CVNs forward deployed in regions of 

critical national interest. In addition to the three deployed CVNs, the 

inter-deployment training and maintenance process allows a minimum of 

two additional CVNs to be ready in 30 days and one additional CVN to 

be ready in 90 days, under a 3-2-1 construct. Adaptive force packaging 

will adjust the composition of each associated CSG to meet specific 

mission requirements. 

Aircraft

Aircraft provide a unique combination of speed, endurance, agility, reach 

and firepower, which complement other naval capabilities. Manned and 

unmanned naval aircraft are fully integrated into the majority of naval 

operations, performing a wide variety of functions and tasks. These 

include strike operations; offensive and defensive counter-air operations 

(OCA/DCA); offensive air support and assault support for landing 

forces as well as joint or multinational forces ashore; maritime patrol; 

surveillance and reconnaissance; airborne early warning; surface warfare; 

undersea warfare; electronic warfare; command and control (C2); logistics 

support; and search and rescue operations.
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84

Naval aircraft can be described in three broad categories: fixed wing 

aircraft; rotary-wing/tilt-rotor aircraft; and unmanned aerial systems. 

Aircraft from all three categories may be task-organized to provide the 

capability and capacity necessary to perform specific missions. Four 

common organizational constructs provide the basis for describing the 

Naval Service aviation force structure. 

Carrier air wings are comprised of aircraft designed to operate from 

CVNs. Each of ten wings embarks on a single carrier and will typically 

be comprised of four fighter/attack squadrons, one electronic warfare 

squadron, one early warning and control squadron, one or two helicopter 

squadrons, a two-plane fleet logistics support detachment and a detachment of unmanned aerial vehicles. 

Marine air wings constitute the aviation combat element of each 

Marine expeditionary force (MEF). They are designed to operate from 

a combination of ships and austere airfields. Their assets can be taskorganized to support deployed Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) as 

well as Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs) or special purpose Marine 

air-ground task forces (SP MAGTFs). Additionally, Marine fighter/attack 

squadrons are provided on a scheduled rotational basis to selected carrier 

air wings as part of Tactical Aviation Integration (TAI). Given their 

different mission portfolio, Marine air wings should not be confused with 

carrier air wings in size or composition. While the exact structure of 

each Marine air wing varies slightly, they are generally composed of six or 

seven fighter/attack squadrons, three vertical/short take-off and landing 

attack squadrons, one electronic attack squadron, five or six attack 

helicopter squadrons, six or seven medium lift helicopter or tilt-rotor 

squadrons, three or four heavy lift helicopter squadrons, a refueling/

transport squadron, a squadron of unmanned aerial systems, as well as 

organic C2 and expeditionary support groups. Marine rotary wing and 

tilt-rotor aircraft may be task-organized to support distributed operations 

from amphibious ships or austere locations ashore. In addition to providing the ability to command and control air operations, and operate in an 

expeditionary environment as a result of the aviation logistics capabilities 

resident in the Marine wing support squadrons, the Marine air wing also 

contributes key capabilities that support the MAGTF command element’s 

ability to function as the nucleus of a joint task force headquarters. 
85

Shipboard aviation detachments are designed to operate from ships 

with smaller flight decks. These usually include two or three helicopters 

and/or unmanned aerial vehicles conducting sea control missions such 

as surveillance, undersea warfare, surface warfare, maritime interdiction 

operations, and mine countermeasures; as well as security cooperation, 

logistics support, maritime reconnaissance and patrol, law enforcement, 

and search and rescue tasks. In cases where aircraft cannot embark on a 

ship, helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft may use ships with flight decks as 

refueling “lily-pads” to extend their range or time on mission. 

Land-based aviation units operate from U.S., ally and partner facilities, 

and are critical to our capability to establish sea control and conduct 

power projection operations. These aviation units include both manned 

and unmanned systems, and conduct a variety of operations, such as 

maritime reconnaissance and patrol, electronic warfare, aerial refueling, 

surface warfare and undersea warfare. Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard 

land-based aviation units may also be employed to conduct maritime 

reconnaissance and patrol, search and rescue, aerial refueling, logistics 

support, law enforcement, and environmental response activities. 

Amphibious Ships

The capabilities which allow an amphibious task force to provide globally 

distributed presence and rapid crisis response are the same capabilities 

that allow them to overcome limited or damaged local infrastructure 

during humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) missions 

and when aggregated, assure access through the delivery and support of 

an amphibious expeditionary landing force on a hostile shore. C2 suites, 

flight decks, well decks, vertical and surface connectors, medical facilities,

and carrying capacity allow amphibious forces to conduct sea-based 

security cooperation activities; build partnership capacity; respond to 

natural and manmade disasters; and, when necessary, facilitate the 

introduction of additional naval, joint, multinational, interagency, international, or non-governmental organization capabilities. As a result, 

amphibious ships are especially useful in supporting rotational ARG/MEU 

forward presence, global fleet station and special purpose MAGTF initiatives. In the event of conflict, forward stationed and rotationally deployed 

amphibious forces can aggregate with surged forces to overcome military 

access challenges and respond to crises up to major theater war. 

Chapter 10 Future Force Structure
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86

Maritime Prepositioning

Prepositioning ships are operated by the Military Sealift Command 

(MSC)28 and are forward postured where they can quickly close on areas 

of vital national interest. Currently three maritime prepositioning ship 

(MPS) squadrons are employed to carry Marine Corps equipment, supplies and ammunition as well as Seabee, expeditionary airfield, and field 

hospital equipment and cargo. The composition of the MPS squadrons 

provides the flexibility to respond to a broad spectrum of crises and 

support the full range of military operations. These ships have their 

own cranes, lighterage, and roll-on/roll-off ramps for pier-side offload in 

a secure port or in-stream in a secure near-shore area. Future enhancements to the prepositioning fleet will improve its ability to support 

vertical and surface means of arrival, assembly, employment, sustainment 

and reconstitution of forces at sea. 

New concepts for employment of prepositioning ships will increase 

their relevance and utility in steady state HA/DR, maritime security and 

maritime security force assistance (MSFA) operations, as well as their 

enduring role in power projection operations, where little or no port and 

airfield infrastructure exists and over-the-beach off-load is a necessity. 

These concepts will modify the loading and operations of prepositioning 

ships to balance the needs of steady state operations with those of largescale power projection operations. Each of the three MPS squadrons is 

being significantly enhanced with a large medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off 

ship (LMSR), a dry cargo/ammunition ship (T-AKE) and a mobile landing 

platform (MLP). In addition, one fleet tanker (T-AOT) and one container 

ship are maintained to support the three squadrons.

Submarines

Attack submarines (SSN) provide a unique combination of stealth, 

persistence, and firepower that complements other naval forces. Attack 

submarines possess potent surface warfare capabilities and are the 

preferred, most capable weapons systems to execute undersea warfare. 

Additionally, SSNs provide unique intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike warfare capabilities that are applicable across 

the range of military operations (ROMO). SSNs may deploy with CSGs 

to provide transit or operating area defense, but they are more likely to 

conduct independent deployments in support of combatant commander 

or national tasking.
87

Guided missile submarines (SSGNs) provide stealthy strike capabilities 

for power projection and conventional deterrence operations. Capable of 

covert land attack and insertion of special operations forces, SSGNs are 

independently deployed to accomplish specific tasking by the combatant 

commanders. 

Submarine ISR, sea control and power projection missions are fulfilled 

both by SSNs and SSGNs. As the SSGNs begin reaching the end of their 

service lives, starting around 2026, the Navy plans to transition their 

covert land attack capabilities to other platforms.

Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)

SSBNs are strategic national assets that provide continuous, uninterrupted and survivable sea-based nuclear deterrence. The SSBN force 

structure is tied to complex international negotiations and other considerations.

Large Surface Combatants

Inherently versatile with multi-mission platforms, large surface combatants—cruisers and destroyers—support every core capability in the 

Maritime Strategy. Large surface combatants have two primary power 

projection tasks: strike, using land attack cruise missiles; and naval 

surface fires using gun systems in support of forces ashore. While large 

surface combatants can project power ashore in this direct manner, they 

also perform sea control tasks that enable other forms of power projection. Aegis cruisers and destroyers conduct IAMD, including maritime 

ballistic missile defense (BMD); strike warfare; undersea warfare; and 

surface warfare missions to defend other naval maneuver forces, sustainment forces, and any aggregation of ships that form a sea base.

Large surface combatants support TSC, maritime security and deterrence 

primarily through episodic engagement with allies and partners that 

includes maritime interdiction, IAMD, amphibious assault, undersea 

warfare and surface warfare events. Such multinational training, combined with ongoing operations, enhances interoperability and proficiency, 

and serves to deter potential adversaries. Large surface combatants are 

also employed to defend global fleet station (GFS) and other engagement 

forces when they are employed in uncertain operating environments; 

merchant shipping in areas plagued by piracy; and to provide HA/DR. 

Chapter 10 Future Force Structure
Naval Operations Concept 2010

88

Increasingly, large surface combatants are tasked to provide maritime 

BMD. BMD operations can be oriented to defend U.S. or partner assets 

ashore, or to defend units at sea. While every effort is made to concurrently task the multi-mission capabilities of BMD-equipped Aegis cruisers 

and destroyers, regional BMD missions frequently require stationing the 

ships in locations where they otherwise would not be employed. This 

generates the requirement for additional ships beyond the number of 

large surface combatants necessary for sea control, power projection, and 

maritime security operations alone. 

Supporting these requirements calls for a significant inventory of large 

surface combatants (both cruisers and destroyers) with a growing 

number of them configured with BMD capability. BMD ships provide 

an additional dimension to conventional deterrence that is increasingly 

significant as ballistic missiles proliferate and become more sophisticated. 

The demand for BMD is growing rapidly, making it likely that the 

requirement for BMD-configured large surface combatants will increase 

over time. 

Small Surface Combatants

Small surface combatants are designed to economically counter surface 

and subsurface anti-access threats in the littoral. Today, frigates and 

specialized single-mission mine countermeasure (MCM) ships provide 

these capabilities, but their mission systems and numbers are limited. 

The littoral combatant ship (LCS) will address the most pressing 

capability and capacity shortfalls in the littoral. The LCS sea frame 

hosts modular mission packages that configure it to conduct mine 

countermeasures, surface warfare or undersea warfare missions. 

LCS sea frames with mine countermeasure modules will replace the 

current inventory of MCMs. The surface warfare module will complement and expand existing fleet capabilities to neutralize small boat 

threats in the littoral. The undersea warfare module will augment 

existing fleet capacity to counter the expanding threat posed by quiet 

diesel submarines. Importantly, the versatility and lift capacity of the 

LCS sea frame could support a wide range of secondary missions, including Marine and special operations forces afloat staging base support and 

sea-based fire support. 
89

LCSs are ideally suited for TSC operations, conducted independently or as 

part of a GFS. By operating in conjunction with joint high speed vessels 

(JHSVs), riverine craft and expeditionary security boats, LCS can expand 

Naval Service capacity for security force assistance (SFA) missions that 

today are conducted predominantly by patrol craft. 

The fast, shallow-draft and lift characteristics of the LCS sea frame 

guarantee that it will support a wide range of future missions and 

modules that will adaptively address the emerging sea control, maritime 

security, HA/DR, and sea-based requirements in the littorals. 

Major Cutters 

Major cutters are versatile, ocean-going vessels built to perform the full 

range of Coast Guard missions. These include high- and medium-endurance cutters (WHEC and WMEC, respectively). As multi-mission surface 

combatants, cutters can be deployed overseas to provide forward presence and conduct maritime security tasks. WHECs have the speed and 

endurance to deploy as part of a strike group to conduct sea control and 

power projection. WMECs normally deploy independently to support 

geographic combatant commanders’ (GCC) theater campaign plans, 

humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and are well suited to 

support GFS tasks. The national security cutter (NSC) and the offshore 

patrol cutter (OPC) will replace the WHEC and WMEC, respectively.29 

Patrol Craft

Patrol craft are designed for domestic littoral missions as well as overseas 

coastal interdiction operations. Overseas, these small combatant craft 

conduct both maritime security and coastal sea control missions. In the 

past the Navy and Coast Guard have transferred craft between Services 

to meet transitory requirements. While successful in the short term, 

this approach is not effective in a security environment that demands 

significant domestic and overseas patrol craft capacity. To overcome 

this challenge, the Naval Service will continue to pursue development 

of common patrol craft systems to reduce procurement costs and ensure 

interoperability. The Coast Guard is also in the process of replacing a 

portion of its patrol boat (PB) fleet with the fast response cutter (FRC). 

Chapter 10 Future Force Structure
Naval Operations Concept 2010

90

The Coast Guard inventory must maintain sufficient capacity to support 

geographic combatant commander TSC plans, expeditionary requirements requested through the Global Force Management process; and 

overseas contingency operations; in addition to its full suite of statutory 

domestic missions. 

Combat Logistics Force Ships

Combat logistics forces supply underway naval forces with fuel, food, 

parts, and ammunition. This unique capability enables U.S. naval forces 

to deploy and remain at sea indefinitely anywhere in the world. The 

combat logistics force is a key component of U.S. ability to use the sea 

as maneuver space and to sustain enduring forward presence with very 

limited overseas access. This element of the support fleet is continuously 

deployed and manned by rotating civilian mariner crews who carry 

out these highly specialized non-combat missions—permitting a high 

proportion of the overall force to be consistently deployed around the 

world. The capacity to support globally distributed, mission-tailored forces 

as well as regionally concentrated, credible combat power calls for a combat 

logistics force of fast combat support ships (T-AOE), T-AKEs, and underway replenishment oilers (T-AO).

Joint High Speed Vessels

Joint high speed vessels (JHSVs) are designed to quickly move people 

and materiel within or between regions, significantly enhancing forward 

logistics support. JHSVs can also fill a wide variety of TSC missions, in 

addition to supporting maritime security, HA/DR and power projection 

missions. These multipurpose ships are particularly well suited for GFS 

and SFA tasks due to their shallow draft, diverse embarkation options, 

and ability to access small and austere ports. A detailed concept of 

operations (CONOPS) is under development that will assist the Navy in 

determining the total requirement for these flexible vessels. 

Command and Support Ships 

There are a number of ships that support and sustain the continuous 

forward operations of U.S. naval forces. Command ships (LCC) provide 

sea-based C2 capability for naval commanders. Submarine tenders (AS) 

furnish maintenance and logistic support for nuclear attack submarines. 

Ocean-going tugs (T-ATF) provide the U.S. Navy with towing service 

and assist in the recovery of downed aircraft and disabled ships. Rescue 
91

and salvage ships (T-ARS) render assistance to disabled ships and provide 

towing, salvage, diving, firefighting and heavy lift capabilities to the 

fleet. Ocean surveillance ships (T-AGOS) gather global underwater 

acoustical data to support anti-submarine warfare system development 

and undersea warfare effectiveness. Dry cargo/ammunition ships 

(T-AKE) and float-on/float-off mobile landing platforms (MLP) enhance 

the capacity and flexibility of the three MPS Squadrons. Hospital ships 

(T-AH) are designed to provide emergency medical care in support of 

overseas combat operations. In recent years they have had an increasingly profound impact on HA/DR operations, and the Navy will continue 

to deploy a T-AH from each coast to conduct proactive humanitarian 

assistance and TSC missions. 

Icebreakers

Icebreakers (WAGB) and “ice-capable ships” assure access and assert U.S. 

policy in the Polar Regions. Emerging and expanding missions in the 

Arctic and Antarctic Polar Regions highlight the importance of these 

vessels in the context of the National Fleet policy. Polar icebreakers 

support science and research; supply remote stations; enforce sovereignty 

in U.S. waters; conduct Search and Rescue (SAR), marine environmental 

protection, and maritime law enforcement missions; and establish 

presence in international waters. They are the only means of providing 

assured surface access in support of Arctic maritime security and sea 

control missions. Icebreakers are specifically designed for open-water icebreaking with reinforced hulls, tailored hull forms, and rapid ballasting 

systems. Ice-capable ships have strengthened hulls to enable operations 

in ice-covered and ice-diminished waters, but have limited icebreaking 

capability. Increased international activity, new transoceanic shipping 

routes and competition for resources in the Polar Regions will require 

icebreakers for the foreseeable future. Current operations, maintenance 

support funding, and employment of these icebreakers involves complex 

interagency and scientific research community coordination.30

Summary: Relating Naval Forces to the Maritime Strategy

The relationship between major Naval Service platforms and the Maritime Strategy’s core capabilities—forward presence, maritime security, 

HA/DR, sea control, power projection and deterrence—are depicted in 

Table 1 on page 92. 

Chapter 10 Future Force Structure
Naval Operations Concept 2010

92

Core Capabilities

Naval Forces

Forward 

Presence

Maritime 

Security

HA/DR

Sea 

Control

Power 

Projection

Deterrence

Aircraft Carriers X X X X X

Aircraft X X X X X X

Amphibious Ships X X X X X X

SSNs X X X X X

SSGNs X X X X

SSBNs X X

Large Surface Combatants X X X X X

Small Surface Combatants X X X

Major Cutters X X X X X

Patrol Craft X X X X X

Combat Logistics Force X X X X X

Hospital Ships X X

Maritime Prepositioning X X X

JHSV X X X

Command and Support X

Icebreakers31 X X X X X

Table 1: Naval Forces Alignment with the Maritime Strategy
93

NOC 10 describes who we are as a Naval Service, what we believe, where 

we operate, and what we provide the Nation. In this era of strategic 

uncertainty, regionally concentrated and globally distributed naval forces are 

uniquely capable of preventing conflict and, when necessary, prevailing in 

war. The ability to overcome diplomatic, geographic, and military impediments to access is critical to projecting power overseas in support of U.S 

national interests and those of its allies and partners. Naval forces use the 

sea as maneuver space to overcome these impediments and to respond 

effectively to a broad range of nuclear, conventional and irregular challenges. 

To this end, the core capabilities in the Maritime Strategy—forward 

presence, maritime security, HA/DR, sea control, power projection and 

deterrence—manifest in the Naval Service, serving to promote peace and 

prosperity for the common good of the global community. 

The Naval Service operates in a security environment characterized by 

an increasing number of concurrent, diverse challenges, perpetrated by 

both state and non-state actors, that is evolving toward a new multi-polar 

balance of global power. The Naval Service recognizes the importance 

of allies and partners in this environment, and is committed to collaboratively building the interoperability and capacity necessary to share 

the burden of achieving global maritime security and providing for the 

common defense of like-minded nations. 

The Naval Service capabilities presented in NOC 10 represent a balance 

carefully designed to address the requirement to concurrently enhance 

global maritime security, prevent and respond to crises, and defeat very 

capable adversaries in accordance with the concept. The ideas in NOC 10 

will be refined over time through wargaming, experimentation, operational 

analysis and practical experience—ultimately resulting in changes to the 

way naval forces are employed. That said, it is unlikely such refinements 

will diminish the requirement for naval forces in the foreseeable future.

Most importantly, NOC 10 underscores that Sailors, Marines and Coast 

Guardsmen are, and will always be, the foundation of the Naval Service. 

They possess the willpower, creativity, inspiration, reason, knowledge, and 

experience to overcome adversity and accomplish any task. They are the 

driving force behind successful implementation of the Maritime Strategy. 

Summary
Naval Operations Concept 2010

94

Annex A

Relationship of Naval Operations 

Concept 2010 to Joint Concept 

Development and Experimentation

The National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military 

Strategy, and the National Strategy for Maritime Security establish U.S. 

strategic objectives. The Unified Command Plan, Guidance for Employment 

of the Force, Global Force Management Guidance, and Joint Strategic Capabilities 

Plan provide strategic guidance for joint force organization, deployment, 

and employment. The Guidance for Development of the Force and Quadrennial 

Defense Review provide similar top-level direction for evolving the requisite 

military capabilities for the future. 

Informed by these strategic objectives and guidance, as well as an estimate of trends that will dominate the future security environment, the 

family of Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC)32 describes how operations 

may be conducted 8 to 20 years in the future in order to provide the conceptual basis for experimentation and capabilities-based assessments.33 

The outcomes of experimentation and assessments underpin investment 

decisions leading to the development of new military capabilities beyond 

the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), ultimately leading to changes 

in policy and doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and 

education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). 

The Joint Operations Concepts Development Process is defined by Chairman, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02B, which states that, “Services, 

combatant commands, and Defense agencies conduct basic research, 

explore emerging technologies, generate innovative concepts, and 

conduct experimentation to develop service-unique or joint capabilities. 

These efforts provide the context for analyzing capabilities for the future 

joint force. The results of this analysis will influence planning, programming, budgeting and execution (PPBE) decisions as well as identify 

potential future concepts for the JOpsC family.”34

The role of Service-generated concepts is further elaborated in Chairman, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01G, Joint Capabilities Integration 

and Development System, which states that “The Services are responsible 
95Annex 

A Relationship of Naval Operations Concept 2010

for developing Service-specific operational concepts and experimenting 

within core competencies, supporting joint concept development with 

Service experimentation, providing feedback from the field, supporting 

joint experimentation, joint testing and evaluation, and overseeing integration of validated joint DCRs” (DOTMLPF change recommendations).35

NOC 10 provides the overarching concept that informs naval participation in joint concept development and experimentation. The material 

contained in NOC 10 is to be used in two mutually informative ways. 

First, it will guide how the Naval Service organizes, deploys, and employs 

current and programmed capabilities to accomplish near-term (inside the 

FYDP) implementation of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

(CS-21). Second, it will guide our participation in the JOpsC development process, experimentation, and assessment to support long-term 

(beyond the FYDP) joint capability development. Both of these applications

will require development of supporting concepts of operation (CONOPS), 

whereby approved concepts are applied against likely scenarios in order 

to inform both near-term and long-term DOTMLPF changes. 

 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

96

Annex B

Glossary

advance base—(DOD) A base located in or near an operational area whose primary mission 

is to support military operations. 

amphibious force—(DOD) An amphibious task force and a landing force together with other 

forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations. Also called AF. 

amphibious task force—(DOD) A Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious 

operations. The amphibious task force, together with the landing force and other forces, 

constitutes the amphibious force. Also called ATF.

assault echelon—(DOD) In amphibious operations, the element of a force comprised of 

tailored units and aircraft assigned to conduct the initial assault on the operational area. 

Also called AE.

assault follow-on echelon—(DOD) In amphibious operations, that echelon of the assault 

troops, vehicles, aircraft, equipment, and supplies that, though not needed to initiate the 

assault, is required to support and sustain the assault. In order to accomplish its purpose, it 

is normally required in the objective area no later than five days after commencement of the 

assault landing. Also called AFOE. 

civil affairs—(DOD) Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, 

trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civilmilitary operations. Also called CA. 

cooperative security locations—(DOD) A facility located outside the United States and 

U.S. territories with little or no permanent U.S. presence, maintained with periodic Service, 

contractor, or host-nation support. Cooperative security locations provide contingency 

access, logistic support, and rotational use by operating forces and are a focal point for 

security cooperation activities. Also call CSL. 

counterinsurgency—(DOD) Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, 

and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN.

cyberspace—(DOD) A global domain within the information environment consisting of the 

interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, 

telecommunications networks, computer systems, and imbedded processors and controllers. 

(Promulgated by the Deputy Secretary of Defense 12 May 2008; inclusion in DOD Dictionary 

pending.) 

defense support of civil authorities—(DOD) Civil support provided under the auspices of 

the National Response Plan. Also called DSCA.

developmental assistance—(DOD) U.S. Agency for International Development function 

chartered under chapter one of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, primarily designed to 

promote economic growth and the equitable distribution of its benefits.

DOTMLPF—(DOD) Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 

personnel, and facilities. 
97Annex B Glossary

forcible entry—(DOD) Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed 

opposition. 

foreign assistance—(DOD) Assistance to foreign nations, ranging from the sale of military 

equipment; to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and manmade disasters. U.S. assistance takes three forms—development assistance, humanitarian 

assistance, and security assistance. 

foreign disaster relief—(DOD) Prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of 

foreign disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the 

provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds, and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; 

the furnishing of medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs 

to essential services.

foreign humanitarian assistance—(DOD) Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the 

results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, 

disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in 

great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. forces 

is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement 

or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the 

primary responsibility for providing foreign humanitarian assistance. Foreign humanitarian 

assistance operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and 

possessions. Also called FHA.

forward operating sites—(DOD) A scalable location outside the United States and U.S. 

territories intended for rotational use by operating forces. Such expandable “warm facilities” 

may be maintained with a limited U.S. military support presence and possibly prepositioned 

equipment. Forward operating sites support rotational rather than permanently stationed 

forces and are a focus for bilateral and regional training. Also called FOS.

forward presence—(NDP 1) Maintaining forward deployed or stationed forces overseas 

to demonstrate national resolve, strengthen alliances, dissuade potential adversaries, and 

enhance the ability to respond quickly to contingency operations.

global fleet station—(GFS CONOPS) A highly visible, positively engaged, persistent sea 

base of operations from which to interact with partner nation military and civilian populations and the global maritime community. Also called GFS.

global maritime partnerships—(Proposed) An approach to cooperation among maritime 

nations with a shared stake in international commerce, safety, security, and freedom of the 

seas. Serves as a basis for building a global consensus on policy principles and for undertaking common activities to address maritime challenges by improving collective capabilities. 

Also called GMP.

homeland defense—(DOD) The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic 

population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other 

threats as directed by the President. Also called HD.

humanitarian and civic assistance—(DOD) Assistance to the local populace provided 

by predominantly U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This 

assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and 

funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited 

to (1) medical, dental, veterinary, and preventive medicine care provided in rural areas of 

a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling 

and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair 

of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit-training requirements that incidentally create 

humanitarian benefit to the local populace. 
Naval Operations Concept 2010

98

information environment—(DOD) The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and 

systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.

information operations—(DOD) The integrated employment of the core capabilities of 

electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, 

and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to 

influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making 

while protecting our own. Also called IO. 

insurgency—(DOD) An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted 

government through use of subversion and armed conflict. 

integration—(DOD) The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force 

that operates by engaging as a whole.

interoperability—1. (DOD, NATO) The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of 

assigned tasks. 2. (DOD only) The condition achieved among communications-electronics 

systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services 

can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of 

interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases.

irregular warfare—(DOD) A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 

legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect 

and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other 

capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Also called IW. 

landing force—(DOD) A Marine Corps or Army task organization formed to conduct 

amphibious operations. The landing force, together with the amphibious task force and 

other forces, constitute the amphibious force. Also called LF.

lighterage—(DOD) The process in which small craft are used to transport cargo or 

personnel from ship to shore. Lighterage may be performed using amphibians, landing 

craft, discharge lighters, causeways, and barges. 

lodgment—(DOD) A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when 

seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible, and provides 

maneuver space for subsequent operations.

main operating base—(DOD) A facility outside the United States and U.S. territories with 

permanently stationed operating forces and robust infrastructure. Main operating bases are 

characterized by command and control (C2) structures, enduring family support facilities, 

and strengthened force protection measures. Also called MOB. 

maritime domain—(DOD) The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the 

airspace above these, including the littorals. 

maritime security operations—(Proposed) Those operations conducted to protect sovereignty 

and resources, ensure free and open commerce, and to counter maritime-related terrorism, 

transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration. 

maritime superiority—(DOD). That degree of dominance of one force over another that 

permits the conduct of maritime operations by the former and its related land, maritime, and 

air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.
99Annex B Glossary

military engagement—(DOD) Routine contact and interaction between individuals or 

elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed 

forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, 

share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. 

Naval Logistics Integration—(DON) A coordinated Navy-Marine Corps effort to establish 

an integrated naval logistics capability that can operate seamlessly whether afloat or ashore.

noncombatant evacuation operations—(DOD) Operations directed by the Department of 

State or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, whereby 

noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, 

civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Also called NEOs. 

power projection—(DOD) The ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of 

national power—political, economic, informational, or military—to rapidly and effectively 

deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to 

contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability. 

seabasing—(DOD) The deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, 

and re-employment of joint power from the sea without reliance on land bases within the 

operational area. 

sea control operations—(DOD) The employment of naval forces, supported by land and air 

forces as appropriate, in order to achieve military objectives in vital sea areas. Such operations 

include destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression of enemy sea commerce, protection of 

vital sea lanes, and establishment of military superiority in areas of naval operations.

security assistance—(DOD) Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance 

Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other 

related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and 

other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national 

policies and objectives. Also called SA. 

security cooperation—(DOD) All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense 

establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, 

develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, 

and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. 

space—(DOD) A medium like the land, sea, and air within which military activities shall be 

conducted to achieve U.S. national security objectives.

stability operations—1. (DOD) An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other 

instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, 

provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and 

humanitarian relief. 2. (DoDD 3000.05) Military and civilian activities conducted across 

the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions. 

strike—(DOD) An attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability. 

terrorism—(DOD) The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; 

intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are 

generally political, religious, or ideological.
Naval Operations Concept 2010

100

Endnotes

1 Per Title 10, U.S. Code, section 101, and Title 14 U.S.C. §1-3, the Coast Guard is “a military 

service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times.” The Coast Guard may 

at any time provide forces and/or perform its military functions in support of naval component 

or combatant commanders. Also, “Upon the declaration of war if congress so directs in the 

declaration or when the President directs,” the entire Coast Guard may operate as a specialized 

service in the Department of the Navy. The Coast Guard is also, at all times, a Federal maritime 

law enforcement agency. Pursuant to 14 U.S.C. § 89(a), the Coast Guard has broad powers to 

“make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and 

waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression 

of violations of the laws of the United States.”

2 These terms were originated by Harvard professor Joseph Nye in a number of books and 

articles. Nye’s concept of “soft power” espouses that a nation’s culture (where it is attractive 

to others), political values (when lived up to), and foreign policy (when seen as legitimate and 

having moral authority) may “attract” a population away from competing ideologies, providing a 

complement to “hard power” such as military force. For example, during the Cold War the West 

used “hard power” to deter Soviet aggression and “soft power” to erode faith in Communism.

3 NDS 08, p. 2.

4 “Range of military operations (ROMO)” is a term that encompasses the myriad activities in 

which naval forces participate. These vary from deterring or winning wars through conventional, 

unconventional, or nuclear means to the various activities conducted in partnership with a diverse 

array of joint, interagency, multinational or non-governmental organizations which promote safety 

and security as well as ease human suffering. 

5 “Surge” is diverting forces from other operational, training, or maintenance activities to 

provide the capability or capacity necessary to satisfy a higher priority event.

6 Hughes, Wayne, “Implementing the Seapower Strategy,” Naval War College Review, (Newport, 

RI: Spring 2008), pp. 57-58.

7 Huntington, Samuel P., “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings, (Annapolis, MD: May, 1954), p. 491.

8 Mullen, Admiral Michael G., USN, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, (Washington, D.C.: 

Department of Defense, 15 January 2008), p. 3. 

9 Although not an approved doctrinal term, “connectors” is commonly used within joint concept 

development and experimentation to describe those air and naval surface craft used to shuttle 

personnel and resources between bases, afloat platforms, and locations ashore.

10 Maritime prepositioning ships carry Marine Corps equipment, supplies and ammunition as 

well as Seabee construction equipment, expeditionary airfields, and field hospital cargo, providing 

utility for a range of operations. Operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC), they are 

forward postured where they can quickly close on areas of vital national interest. Like other MSC 

ships, they have a “T” before their type-codes. To further distinguish them from combatants, their 

names are prefaced by “USNS” (United States Naval Ship) versus “USS” (United States Ship). 

11 Turner, Stansfield, “Missions of the Navy,” (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970’s, 

Naval War College Newport Papers, No. 30, September 2007), p. 49.

12 Data provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command as of 23 September 2009 and is based on a 

comparison of force requests for fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

13 USN considers all service members assigned to support Joint Manning Documents (JMD), 

Ad-Hoc, In-Lieu-Of (ILO) and Service Augment requirements as Individual Augmentees.
101Annex B Endnotes

14 The Coast Guard currently provides LEDET coverage of 2.0 for CENTCOM and 5.5 for 

SOUTHCOM, respectively. Increases in funding and end strength are needed to support growing 

combatant command (COCOM) demand as follows: 2.0 each to AFRICOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, 

PACOM (8.0) and 5.5 to SOUTHCOM. The future requirement for LEDETs is a 13.5 presence.

15 Current demand is a 1.0 PSU presence in the CENTCOM AOR and 1.0 PSU presence for 

SOUTHCOM.

16 For further discussion of EMIO, see Joint Publication 3-03, Joint Interdiction.

17 Elleman, Bruce A., Waves of Hope, (Newport, RI: Naval War College Newport Papers, Volume 

28, February 2007), p.117. 

18 Cobble, W. Eugene, Gaffney, H. H., and Gorenburg, Dmitry, For the Record: All U.S. Forces’ 

Responses to Situations, 1970-2000, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, May 2005), p. 8.

19 Heinl, Robert D., Jr., Soldiers of the Sea, (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1962), p. 604.

20 Churchill, Winston S., The Second World War: Their Finest Hour, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin 

Company, 1949), p. 479.

21 Liddell Hart, B. H., Deterrence or Defense, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960), p. 128.

22 Mullen, Admiral, Michael G., U.S. Navy, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, (Washington, 

D.C.: Department of Defense, 15 January 2008), p. 6.

23 The data cited in this paragraph has been obtained from multiple sources, to include: the 

electronic Chronologies of the United States Marine Corps, 1982-2007 and the official histories 

produced by the History & Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; SEA POWER 

FOR A NEW ERA: 2006 Program Guide to the U.S. Navy, Appendix A “Navy-Marine Corps Crisis 

Response and Combat Actions,” produced by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; and the 

Naval Review Issues of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 2003-2006. 

24 For example, current high-speed intra-theater connectors are capable of offloading onto 

austere facilities in a secure area. Increased use of expeditionary causeway systems or development 

of connectors may further exploit that characteristic to reduce reliance on existing infrastructure, 

as would the development of future connectors capable of offloading near-shore or on the beach.

25 Mahan, Alfred T. Armaments and Arbitration: or, the Place of Force in the International Relations of 

States. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1912) p. 105.

26 The core capabilities articulated in the Maritime Strategy establish the ways and means that 

naval forces apply to achieve deterrence, and align with the Deterrence Operations Joint Operating 

Concept. Through their inherent force projection, active and passive defense, global strike, domain 

awareness, command and control, and forward presence ways, naval forces possess the means 

to impose unacceptable costs, deny adversaries the benefits of their aggression, and encourage 

adversary restraint. 

27 Mullen, Michael G., “It’s Time for a New Deterrence Model,” (Washington, DC: Joint Force 

Quarterly, Issue 51, 4th Quarter 2008), p. 3.

28 MSC ships have a “T” before the type-code. To further distinguish them from combatants, 

their names are prefaced by “USNS” (United States Naval Ship) versus “USS” (United States Ship). 

29 Combatant commander demand calls for a 2.0 major cutter presence to meet theater campaign 

plan requirements (to include security cooperation and security force assistance) in Mediterranean/

African littoral waters and the Western Pacific/Indian Ocean. Demand for the Eastern Pacific and 

Caribbean Basin calls for a 6.0 cutter presence.

30 The current Icebreaker demand requires a 1.0 presence in the Arctic and 1.0 in the Antarctic. 

31 Icebreakers support Forward Presence. They also support Maritime Security, HA/DR, Sea 

Control and Deterrence in ice-covered and ice-diminished waters; Coast Guard icebreakers are the 

only means of providing assured surface access.
Naval Operations Concept 2010

102

32 The JOpsC family uses The Joint Operational Environment – The World Through 2020 and 

Beyond, An Evolving Joint Perspective: Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century, 

and Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project to 

provide insights into the dominant trends shaping the future security environment over the next 

20 years.

33 All concepts in the JOpsC family are posted at: http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare.

34 CJCSI 3010.02B may be viewed at: http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/

cjcsi3010_02b.pdf.

35 CJCSI 3170.01G may be viewed at: http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/

3170_01.pdf.

To learn more about the Navy, Marine Corps 

and Coast Guard, visit:

www.navy.mil

www.usmc.mil

www.uscg.mil