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S. HRG. 113–609 

HEARING TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION 

OF MR. NICHOLAS J. RASMUSSEN TO SERVE 

AS DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL 

COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 

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(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

DANIEL COATS, Indiana 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

DAVID GRANNIS, Staff Director 

MARTHA SCOTT POINDEXTER, Minority Staff Director 

DESIREE THOMPSON-SAYLE, Chief Clerk 

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CONTENTS 

NOVEMBER 20, 2014 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California .................. 1 

WITNESS 

Rasmussen, Nicholas, Nominee to be Director of the National Counterterrorism Center ....................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 22 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

Letter dated November 15, 2014, from Michael Leiter supporting the nomination ........................................................................................................................ 3 

Letter dated November 16, 2014, from Matthew Olsen supporting the nomination ........................................................................................................................ 5 

Letter dated November 14, 2014, from Admiral William McRaven supporting 

the nomination ..................................................................................................... 7 

Letter dated November 14, 2014, from Sean Joyce supporting the nomination 9 

Letter dated November 17, 2014, from Juan Zarate supporting the nomination ........................................................................................................................ 10

Letter dated November 18, 2014, from Thomas E. Donilon supporting the 

nomination ............................................................................................................ 13 

Letter dated November 18, 2014, from Kenneth Wainstein supporting the 

nomination ............................................................................................................ 15 

Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees .................................... 38 

Additional Prehearing Questions ........................................................................... 61 

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 84 

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(1) 

HEARING TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATION 

OF MR. NICHOLAS J. RASMUSSEN TO SERVE 

AS DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL 

COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:22 p.m. in Room 

SD–562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne 

Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Chambliss, 

Warner, Heinrich, King, Burr, Risch, Rubio, and Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Let me just say to the soon-to-be Chairman of this Committee that this is not my usual way of operation. 

I like to be on time. We got into a bit of a problem in the caucus, 

and I just wanted to say that to you. 

The Committee will come to order. We meet today in open session to consider the President’s nomination of Mr. Nick Rasmussen 

to be the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center or, as 

we call it, NCTC. Mr. Rasmussen is well known and respected by 

the Committee. He has appeared numerous times in closed session 

as the Deputy Director of NCTC and, since Matt Olsen’s resignation, as the Acting Director. It is my intention, pending today’s session, to move this nomination quickly to the Senate and seek his 

confirmation before our adjournment in December. 

Mr. Rasmussen has been the Deputy Director of NCTC since 

2012. Prior to this, he served from 2007 to 2012 as the Senior Director for Counterterrorism at the National Security Council. He is 

well versed in terrorist threats to the United States and the growth 

of terrorist groups around the country. 

Mr. Rasmussen’s government service goes back to 1991, with a 

series of positions at the Department of State, the NSC, and 

NCTC. Mr. Rasmussen, I enjoyed reading in the background materials for this hearing that public service is part of your family, and 

I’m pleased to welcome your family here who have been in public 

service as well. 

I know that I speak for the Vice Chairman of the Committee, 

Senator Chambliss, who regrets he can’t be here with us today, and 

for myself when I say that we need a full-time, Senate-confirmed 

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2 

Director of the National Counterterrorism Center as soon as possible. I won’t go into the threats to our Nation, but they will go into 

the record, and it’s clear I think to all of us who deal in this situation, with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL in Iraq 

and Syria, we continue our efforts to defeat Al-Qaeda in the FATA 

of Pakistan, and the number of AQ affiliates and other terrorist 

groups across the world is growing. 

So it is a real problem and it is escalating. These groups now 

have safe havens in Syria, in Libya, across other parts of North Africa, and in many places on line. The threat from ISIL, the 

Khorasan Group, AQAP in particular, pose a direct threat to the 

United States homeland, both from external attack and from directed and inspired lone wolf attacks from within the United 

States. 

The NCTC needs to be at the front of our efforts to identify these 

attacks, as it has done many times in the past. At the same time, 

the Director of NCTC is the National Intelligence Manager for 

Counterterrorism and the official in charge of government-wide 

strategic operational planning to defeat terrorism. 

So, Mr. Rasmussen, you have a big job before you. I’ve gone 

through the answers to the questions that you’ve submitted. I see 

no problem whatsoever, but it’s a great pleasure to welcome you 

and your family here today. 

I would like to ask unanimous consent to put into the record the 

letter of support for Nick’s nomination from former NCTC Directors 

Mike Leiter and Matt Olsen, Admiral William McRaven, former Director, FBI—former Deputy FBI Director Sean Joyce, and former 

Deputy National Security Adviser Juan Zarate. 

In the interest of moving forward, let me stop, welcome the nominee, and ask Senator Burr for his opening statement. 

[Letters received by the Committee regarding the nomination of 

Mr. Rasmussen follow:] 

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SIC! I 

Michael Evan Ldcet 

1.7w Chain Bridge Road NW 

Washlngton,.DC wm6 

'li.>Z.S80.9W 

melelte(@gmail.com 

2014-33.46 

November 15, WI+ 

The Honorable Dianne. Feinstein 

Chairrtlan 

Select Committee on Intelligence 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 1.0510 

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss 

Vice Chairman 

Select Committee on Intelligence 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 1.0510 

Dear Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Chambliss: 

I write to provide my enthusiastic endorsement for the nomination ofNicholas]. Rasmussen as Diteetor of 

the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). As a former di~tor ofNCTC, as well as a supervisor and 

coll~ue ofNick's, I can'think of no person more· qualified and suited to take NCTC's reins d'uring this 

critical period. In my view Nick has the intellect, experience, temperament, and integrity that is necessary to 

be an exemplary Director. 

On the first point, Nick is simply brilliant. His knowledge of terrorism and critical regions like Syiia and East 

Africa is both deep·and broad~ He has an llidslve and inquisitive mind that represents the best of critical 

thinking. His appreciation for how regional dynamics· influence terrorist movements lends a sophistication 

that is rarely found in counterterrorism cir(les. In short, he is a first class mind and the American people will 

benefit.frorn these intellectual gifts If Nick is confirmed. · 

Second, Nick's experience make him an ideal leader ofNCTC. Having served at the Center twice before Is of 

course helpful. But equally lf not.moreimportllllt Nick's service at the Department of State and the National 

Securiry Council are indispensable experiences for bringing all members of the counterterrorism communlry 

together. If one looks at all counterterrorism professionals in the U.S. Government since 9/u1 Nick Is surely 

at the head of the class when It comes to understanding the many organization that must work·together to 

help protect the United States and our allies. 
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Third, Nick's temperament is ideal for the admittedly high pressure-and high stakes--of being the Director of 

NCTC. Nick is calm In the most tumultuous of storms and his easygoing manner has enabled him to 

navigate the trickiest ofbureaucratic rivalries. His many friends from multiple Administrations, both 

Democratic and Republican, are testament to his ability to forge both friendships and professional 

partnerships. This will undoubtedly continue should he be conflrmed. 

Last but most certainly not least Nick is of the highest integtity. I can think if no trait more important for 

the Director ofNCTC, who must provide hard truths to the President, Congress, and many others. Nick has 

the integrity to push aside any political or untoward pressure and speak the truth as he understands it. 

In sum, I have the utmost confldence that should the Senate conflrm Nick, the NCTC will be in 

extraordinarily able hands. Nick is a flne leader who I believe will continue to ensure that NCTC fulfllls Its 

critical mission in service of the American people. 

Please do not hesitate to contact me ifl may be of any further assistance to the committee. 

Sincerely 

Michael Leiter 

Director, NCTC (2.0o8-2.0u) 

Acting Director, NCTC (2.007·2.008) 
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The Honorable Dianne Feinstein 

Chairman 

Select Committee on Intelligence 

United ·States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Saxby Cbambliu 

Vice Cbainnan 

Seiect Committee on Intelligence 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

Matthew G. Olsen 

9608 Old Spr.ing Road 

Kensington, MD 20895 

(240) 780-6226 

No:vember 16,2014 

Dear Cbainnan Feinstein and Vice Chairman Chambliss: 

Re: Leuer of Recommendation jin' Nick Rasmu.fsen 

1114-3141 

This letter is in support of the President's nomination of Nick Rasmussen for the 

position of Director the National Counterterrorism Center. 

I have known Nick for the past ileveral years, first in his role as the Senior 

Director for Counterterrorism for two Administrations and then for the past tWQ and a 

half years as the Deputy Director of NCTC. Based on my first·hand experience working 

with Nick, 1 can say without reservation that there is no finer public servant or more 

worthy candidate for this position. 

Nick possesses the professional and personal attributes that make bim uniquely qualified to serve as the ·next Director ofNCT.C. First, he has a wealtti of relevant 

substantive experience in counterterrorism. For ov~ a decade, Nk:k has served. at the 

forefront of our·nation's counterterrorism efforts. As the Deputy Director ofNCTC 

during my tenure as Director, Nick's expertise was indispensible. We wbrked'side-by· 

side to integrate and analyze terrorism infonnation :and to inform the development of 

counterterrorism .actions and policies. In his fortner·role as senior staf.f.·mernber on the 

National Security Council, Nick gained an ullS\U1)aSSed qnderstanding of the evolution of 

the terrorism land..'ICape and the diverse threats facing the country. Moreover, Nick•s 

s1atU5 ~ an expert is widely recognized among intelligence agencies and across the 

government, His superb reputation has been an asset for NCTC as the organization has 

established its central role in the counterterrorism community.. 
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Second, Nick is a proven leader. As Deputy Director ofNCTC. he effcetively 

balanced the daily challenge oftrackin& tactical threat infonnation and, at the same time, 

driving stralqJie change for the Intelligence Community. He consistently has led 

NCTC's analytic efforts to monitor and assess developing plots and threats, making sure 

that this work met the highest possible standards for rigor and objcetivity. He also 

developed and implemented a vision for collaboration and partnership across 

counterterrorism agencies to ensure that our efforts are synchronized and effective. 

Beyond these attributes, Nick is regarded as a go-to leader botb within NCTC and 

throughout the government. He attained this status first during his time at the NSC, 

where he established his reputation as a well-informed and objective senior staff member 

and leader of interagency coordination meetings. Nick further demonstrated his 

leadership capabilities in guiding and buildiny the NCTC workforee, which responded 

enthusiastically to Nick's steady leadership during my time as Director. 

Third, Nick is a dedicated and selfless public servant. Since starting with the 

State Department, Nick's overridina professional goal has been to work tirelessly to 

protect the country. Without hesitation, he has taken on some of the toughest challenges 

in government. Nick's dedication is evident in his many years of work at the NSC to 

organim our counterterrorism efforts. including the bunt for Osama bin Laden. This 

spirit is also evident in his devotion to NCTC and his efforts to lead the organization to 

fulfill the role that Congress envisioned ten years ago in establishing the Center. Nick 

was one of the original NCTC statTmembers, helping to set up the Center a decade ago. 

His willingness to lead NCTC now is further proof of his commitment to service and out 

country's security. 

A closing note: Nick holds himselfto the highest poasible standards for integrity 

and professionalism. Every decision he makes is based on the facts. I have seen firsthand that be rigorously analyzes threat information and informs policy discussions 

without regard to politics or personal views. And he demands this same approach fiom 

everyone around him. This gives Nk:k. the credibility and stature to lead other elements 

of the counterterrorism community. This reputation also means that this Committee and 

the rest of Congress c:an always count on Nick to be an absolutely reliable source of 

information to help inform the many difficult dceisions that lie ahead. 

In sum, in my view, Nick is the right person to serve as the next Director of 

NCTC and to lead the Center into its next decade of service. Please feel free to contact 

me if l can provide any additional information as the Committee considers Nick's 

nomination. 

Sincerely, 

Matthew G. Olsen 
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The Honorable Dianne Feinstein 

Chairman 

Select·Oommlltee on Intelligence 

United Statet Senate 

waehlngton, DC 20510 

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss 

Vice Chairman 

Selec;t c~ on lnteiHgence 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

~Cit 2014-3341 

November 14, 2014 

Dear Chairman Feinstein end Vice Chairman Chamblin: 

Let me cut to the chase. I have known Nick Rasmunen Iince October 2001 when we 

served together in the Office.of Combatting Terrorlam on the National Security Council 

staff. I can say, wjtbgut W!tat!Qn. that no one-al)aQ!ytjlv no one. it better qualified to 

lead 1he National Counterterrorism ·Center (NCTC), than Nick Rasmuaaent ·Nick li the 

consummate proteselonaL He is wickedly smart. Incredibly hardworking, one of the 

moet dedicated public servants l knoW and, he's ·juat one hell of a gcod guy. 

Nick and I spent 2001·2003 on the NSC drafting policy and· strategy for the war on 

terrorism. When I departed In 2003 to go the Joint Special Operatlcna Command, Nick 

stayed on end continued through the Bush admin~ and into the new Obama 

adminiatratlon. We continued to stay in close contact even while I was deployed to Iraq 

and Afghanistan. 

Nick quickly-became recognized as a true·exper:t on counter.tarrorism (CT) and was 

pulled over to NCT.C to work in the Office of Strategy, Operations and Plans. While at 

his first NCT<:: autgnment. he reached out to everyone in the Interagency and to the 

mllltaiy CT practitioners to get their thoUghts on how bast to frame the CT problem and 

the poeslble aolutlOns. It was his willingnen toe~ outside NCYC that eamed him 

the respect of everyone he encountered. 

After some time at NCTC, it was apparent that the Administration·~ him back In 

the Office of Combatting Terrorism. Vilhan he. returned to the Nationa.t Security Council 

it· was in .the rOle of the SenloriOirector, one·ofthe most inftuentlai•CT positions in 

government. Once, again, 'Nick demonstrated thet.he was a "big tent• guy and h• 

worked br:oad!y, acroasths ln~cy. to provide·tbe Presidentthe best advice 

ponlble on counterterrorllm opeFationa. During my three years as the Commander of 

the Joint~ Operation· Command .(JSOC), Nick Rasmuaaen waalnyalyable in 
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getting the aapport from the White Housa•to conduct some of.the ·mosllmpoi'tilnt end 

consequential mlulona In the history Of military CT. NICk, of course, was 8lao a critical 

player during th•·planning and execution of'the ope~ to get Osama bin Laden. lt. 

was Nick Raamull8n that provided me the·guidance and counsel ·I needed aal 

interacled'wlth the President and memb.era of the NSC. 

Nick's ·time 011 the IIISC staff and. in NC:t'C put him at the center of Deputy's and 

Prlncipars Committee· Meetings on CT where he was excaptlona!ly 1109$1' at articulating 

the problem, outlining options, and helping drive the solutions. PoUcy makeraliatened 

to Nlck'a advice becausa it waaao thoughtful and so verv wen presented. 

Since departing the NSC in ~012, Nick has been serving: as the Deputy at NCTC and 

once again, his.ability to work across the ioteragency, to aee the "big r*t\lre11 and to 

make progress where others mtght'have failed Ia a. credit to his experience~ hla 

incluslveneaa and hia dedication. 

I have had the honor of working with the finest CT profaaaionals In the Nation. We lllr& 

bleaud aa.countr:y to have so tnany dedicated man and women working thla 

challenging laaue, but of all the ~· I haV8·WOrt<ed with, none 1£8 floor than ·Nick 

Rumu88801 I strongly urge ·the Committee to confirm Nick aa aoon as poAible. 

If you have any questions, pleaae do not hesitate to contact me. 

Admiral, (Retlrad) 
9 

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pwc 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein 

Chairman 

Select Committee on Intelligence 

United Statea Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss 

Vice Chainnan 

Select Committee on Intelligence 

United Statea Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

14 November 2014 

Dear Chainnan Feinstein and Vice Chainnan Chambliss: 

SSCI# 2014 -SS41 

I was pleased to hear that Nick Rasmussen was nominated as the next Director of the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) by President Obama. I have known and worked with Nick for 

approximately five years in my fonner positions as Executive Assistant Director of the National 

Security Bureau and as Deputy Director of the FBI. 

Nick has been a dedicated public servant for many years and is well respected within the intelligence 

community (IC). Nick brings an open mind, deep experience, and integrity to a vital position within 

the IC that we all depend on to predict and identify threats to our national security. In my interaction 

with Nick, he has displayed exceptional interpersonalakilla and has handled difficult situations with 

poise and determination. Nick is an outstanding communicator and has the ability to distill many 

concepts and facts into a clear and concise picture - a unique and valuable trait within NCTC. Alao, 

Nick shares the values important to you and your fellow committee members: honesty, teamwork, and 

a commitment to protecting the American penple. I.sst, Nick is a leader. He has held various positions 

with both formal and informal authority and has exhibited the skills necessary to bring a team together 

and accomplish the mission. 

Senator,! want to thank you and the other Committee members for considering this appointment. 1 

hold Nick in high regard and know, if confinned, he will be an exemplary public servant. 

Respectfully, 

SeanM.Joyce 

Partner for the Finn of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 

Sean.Joyce@us.pwc.com 

,. ............................................... , .................................................................................................................................................................................... . 

PricewaterlwuseCoopers, 1800 7l!sons Boulevard, McLean VA 22102 

T: +(I) 918-sooo. F:+ (1) 703-918-3100, www.pwc.com/ 
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SSCII· 2014 • S 841 

THE HONORABLE JUAN C. ZA:RATB 

5268'Winter View Drive 

Alexandria,VA:22312 

jczaratc@~rd,cdu. 

{703 725-4'156 

The Honomble Dianne Feinstein 

Chairman 

Set~ Committee on Intelligence 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss 

Vice Chairman 

Select Committee on Intelligence 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

RE: Nomination of Nicholas J. Rasmussen as Director, NCTC 

Dear Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Chambliss: 

I am writing to support enthusiastically the confirmation of Nicholas J. 

Rasmussen to be the next Director of the National Counterterrorism Center 

(NCTC). 

I have known and worked closely with Nick since 9/11, and comrider him a close 

colleague and friend. No one is more prepared than Nick to take·on the 

eballengesofbeing the next NCfC'Direetor in a period of dangerous and more 

diverse terrorist threats. rfoonftrmed, Nick wiD serve the country·weU- with 

integrity, ingenuity, and passion for NCl'Cs mission of protecting the·country. 

Nick is a longtime counterterrorism professional, having served in senior roles 

for three different Presidents at the National Security Council (NSC). He bas 

served at NCTCtwiee, initially helping with its founding in 2004,and then most 

recently·as the Deputy Directo~r. In 2007, !.asked: Nicltto return te the NSC to 

work with me·when I was.serviDg as the Deputy Nati!fJD&} 8ecurity Advisor for 

Combating Terrorism. and the Deputy .Assistant to President George W. Bush. It 

was Nick's standing m the counterterrorism community., his deep understanding 

of the evelutron of our co~terterrorism architeetiure and poHeies, and his 

unparalleled expertise and integrity that made his selection clear. 
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Nick served as· the Senior Director and helped us lead and shape policies and 

strategies in the final months of the Bush.Adminfstration, especially as we looked 

to transition these policies to ·a new administration in 2009. I relied on Nick's 

solid judgment, instiblcts, and expertise to manage our broad portfolio of 

transnational and' tel'rorism threats - including emefging reglonal.groups and 

threats. the·cballenge of piracy·off the coast of East Africa, the rescue of American 

hostages in 1C0louibia in July 2008, and America's response to·the Mumbai terror 

attacks in November·2oo8. 

When hiring Nick, I lqtew that he would represent critical.continuity and 

institutiqnal memory within the White H0use as we·transitioned to•a new 

administration and that any new team would need and want to rely on Nick. And 

the Obama Administration did. Nick served President Obama.~d then Assistant 

to the President John Brennan through the transition until June 2012, when he 

returned to NCI'C as the DeputY Director. At the White House, he was a source 

of stabUity and sober professionalism during a period of political transition. Nick 

led the Counterterrorism Security·Group (CSG) and supported some of the most 

important counterterrorism policies and measures in this period, including the 

operation that led to the death ofUsama bin Laden. 

Nick's nearly two decades of aperience give him deep insights into the changes 

in the counterterrorism thr.-t environment and the shifts in our policies and 

strategies to counter global terrorism. nus is a critical time to have an 

experienced leader like Nick running NCTC. He underst:ands intimately the 

substance, policy, and processea of America's. counterterrorism werk. In recent 

years as a member of the NCI'CDirector's Aqvisocy Board, I have been impressed 

with the leadership Nick has provided NCfC as its Deputy Director. Nick 

understandS the pivotal role Ncrc plays fer the intelligence and 

counterterrorism communities as threats morph, as well as its role in the 

policymaking and planning arenas. · 

Nick bas always commanded the respect of the counterterrorism community and 

these with whom he has worked.. His exJM'rience at the State Department. Ncrc, 

and the White House, along with his strong relationships on both sides·ofthe 

aisle, have deepened the confidence and trust people have in Nick. Importantly, 

he has earned the respect and admiration of the NCI'C workforce, havmg risen 

through the ranks of the young institution while treating everyone with respect 

and dignity. 

Nick bas lived' through some of the :most dangerous times in our oountry's history 

and bas always proved reliable, calm, and measured in his management mtbe 

terrorist threat. He has dbneso with integrity - always ·committed to•substance 

and the counterterrorism mission. He will be a candid and serious partner to you 

and Congress in securing the country. 

2 
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I have the utmost confidelice in Nick and am proud to·say that I know and have 

worked with•bim. ·As a father, husband, and private~; I sleep better at night 

knowing he is.JeadinsNCI'C. 

If confirlned, Niclc: is poised to take an the role ofNCTC Director, and I 

respeetfully encow:qe you• and the Senate ·to confirm him withaut:hesitatien. 

I am happy to answenny queations.you may have. Thank you fer your time, 

attention, and service to our countey. 

Sincerely, 

Juan C. Zarate 

3 
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0 2D14 -a a.e ·e 

O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP 

tU:IUNt; 

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(!f.NTIIRT CllY 

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November 1.8, 2014 

The Honorable DiSMe Feinstein 

Chairman 

Select Committee on Intelligence 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

•6•s Eye Street, NW 

Washington, D.C. aooo6•4001 

'fEUPUONE (llOS) 383•5)00 

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tdonilon@omm.com 

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss 

Vice Chairman 

Select Committee on Intelligence 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Chambliss: 

J understand that you are hOlding a bearing this week to consider President Obama's 

nomination of Nicholas RasmUSSen as Director of the National Countertemmsm Center. I am 

writing to strongly support Nick's nomination and confirmation. I have known Nick for two 

decades and have worked closely with him on a number of occasions on the most sensitive of 

issues and operations. Nick's character, integrity, management skills, temperament, and 

experience make him superbly qualified to serve as Director of the NCTC. 

I worked most closely with Nick during the 4 1/2 years that I served as Principal Deputy 

National Security Advisor and National Security Advisor to President Obarna. During that period 

Nick served as Senior Director for Countenenorism on the National Security Council staff. Nick, 

who had served in the same role on President Bush's NSC staff, was the indispensable person in 

formulating and implementing the President's counterterrorism strategy. He was really the heart 

and soul of our counter.terrorism efforts and coordinated the analysis and operations of all 

relevant deputments, agencies, and global .partners while leading ·his own team at the NSC. His 

professionalism was evident in many successful operations, including. the taid on Osama Bin 

Laden.'s compound in Abbotabad. 

Nick has I! solid grasp of the complex policy issues we face in the co.unterterrorism arena 

while·at·the same time deep experience in all the operational aspects of the. nation's 

countertenorism efforts. The President relied repeatedly on Nick's firm grasp of the risks and 

possibilities of a number of operations. A key reason that so many of us from the President on 

down looked to Nick's judgment is his integrity. Nick ean be.counted on to defend the nation, bt.lt 

always act consistent with the nation's laws and values. 
14 

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O'MEtVENY & MYERS LLP 

November 18,2014. Page 2 

Nick has strong relationships with the institutions that are key to an effecti:ve . 

counterterrorism effort. He works welt and clo$ely witli the intelligence, military, and policy 

communities. And' finally, Nick knows.the or-ganization he is.being nominated to lead.as well as 

anyone either serving at NC'FC or working closely with NC'FC f(lr a decade. 

Nick is an outstanding nominee and if confirmed will be an outstanding Di~tor of the 

NCTC. I support his nomination in the strongest terms. 

I am available to speak to you or your staff at any time to discuss the nomination. 

Thomas E. Donilon 

TED:Imp 

OMM_US:72916336.1 
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CADWALADER. 

November 18,2014 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein 

Chairman 

Select Committee on Intelligence 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20S 10 

Re: Recommendation of Nicholas J, Rasmussen 

SSCIII 20~4 -8381 

Codwlloder, WiolooniMm,l Taft•LlP 

700 Sixlll siroet. N.W, Wahinglan. DC 20001 · 

Tel•1 202118111l100 """+11102111!t,t400 - ...... ·--.._~_,..... 

ttouaton Bah Hong Kong ""'"'' 

The Honorable Saxby Chambliss 

Vice ChajtgJan 

Select Committee on Intelligence 

United States Senate 

Washi~~aton, DC 20Sl!O 

Dear Cbainnan Feinstein lind Vice Chainnan Chambliss: 

I write this letter in unqualified support for Nicholas Rasmussen's nomination for tho 

position of Director of the National Counter.terrorism Center. 

Having worked in tho law enforcement and national security fields at the Justice 

Department and the White House for 20 years, I was bleased to be colleagues with many 

exceptional public servants. Nick Rasmusson was a stand-out even among that group. 

. Nick and I worked closely together in 2008-2009, when I served as Homeland SecUrity 

Advisor and he was the Senior Director for Counterterrorism on the National Security Colllieil 

staff. Nick had been in position for a while before I came to the White House, and I quickly 

identified him as a go-to person. He has that rare combination of experience, knowledge and 

judgment that made him both a valuable day-to-day resource and an invalUable advisor du!ing 

times of crisi~. He also has tho good judgment, tho·openness to diWercnt opinions and tho 

humility we need in those we entrust to make criticall'lational security decisions. 

In addition, Nick is·completely focused on the national security mission and conducts 

himself without regard to politics or political conSiderations. He is a career professional in the 

tmest sense, and he has no agenda other than the safety and security of the American people. 

Over the years, Nick has earned the trust and ad!niration of multiple National Security 

and Homeland Security Advisoraand other high-level officials in the White Mouse and the 

lntelligenco Community. He has served with exceptional distinction as the Deplity Director at 
16 

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CADWALADER 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein 

The Honorable Saxby Cbambliss 

November 18,2Ql4 

NCTC, and 1 have absolute ·confidence that he will continue to prove himself a credit to the 

Intelligence Community as NCTC Director. 

Please feel frec.to conlact me if you should have ftu1hcr questions about Nick's 

qualificatilms. I am honored to speak on his behalf. 

Kenneth L. Wainstein 
17 

Senator BURR. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Nick, let me first say that I want to thank you for your many 

years of government service at the State Department, the White 

House, the ODNI, and at NCTC. And I thank you for the time that 

you spent with me the other day and your insight into the areas 

of interest that we had an opportunity to talk about. 

I’d like to welcome your wife, your parents. I know all three of 

you are proud of the progress of his career and I thank you for 

sharing him with the country, because it is invaluable. 

Over the last 10 years, you’ve focused primarily on analyzing the 

terrorist threat to our country and devising policies to address 

those threats. NCTC is going to need your experience in the years 

to come. 13 years after 9–11, we continue to face Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda affiliates in Somalia, Yemen, North Africa, 

Syria, and now the Indian subcontinent. Boko Haram in Nigeria, 

Al-Shabab in Somalia, ISIL and Al-Nusra Front in Syria and request, and the list goes on and on and on and on. 

These groups raise money via criminal acts, growing business enterprises, and in some cases state sponsorship. Extremists with 

technical degrees, special skills and expertise, building IEDs or 

being lured to support complex attack plotting. Western fighters, to 

include Americans, are exploiting local and regional conditions to 

train extensively before returning home. 

Here at home, we face the threat by home-grown violent extremists, extremists who often utilize the information and connections 

from on-line and plan smaller-scale simple plots that are harder to 

detect. These terrorists are capable, well organized, well financed, 

and they aspire to attack U.S. persons and facilities abroad and at 

home. The terrorist threat is more distributed and complex than 

ever before. We no longer have the luxury of focusing our attention 

on one group or on one region. 

You’re being asked to lead our Nation’s primary agency for integrating and analyzing all intelligence related to the terrorist threat 

and you do have your work cut out for you. This Committee will 

endeavor to provide you with the resources you need to address the 

threat and to keep our Nation safe. But the truth is that we’re 

going to have to make some difficult choices in the years to come. 

NCTC is a capable organization with excellent people. I fully expect 

you to lead an effective agency, under our watchful eye. But I can 

also assure you that, moving forward, we’re going to challenge you 

to improve the center to search for efficiencies. We’re going to ask 

tough questions and we’re going to push you to be better, and I 

look forward to you giving us direct and candid answers. 

I thank the chair and pledge on behalf of Vice Chairman Chambliss and this side of the aisle, Madam Chairman, that you can’t 

move too fast on this nomination for us. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Would you stand, please, Mr. Rasmussen. Would you repeat after 

me: 

I, Nick Rasmussen, do solemnly swear that I will give this Committee the truth, the full truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 

me God. 

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18 

TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS J. RASMUSSEN, NOMINATED TO 

SERVE AS DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I, Nick Rasmussen, do solemnly swear that I 

will give this Committee the truth, the full truth, and nothing but 

the truth, so help me God. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in other 

venues when invited? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to send officials from the 

NCTC and designated staff when invited? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to provide documents or any 

other materials requested by the Committee in order for it to carry 

out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Will you ensure that the NCTC and its officials provide such material to the Committee when requested? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to inform and fully brief to 

the fullest extent possible all members of this Committee on intelligence activities and covert actions, rather than only the Chairman 

and Vice Chairman? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Consistent with past commitments from 

the Director of National Intelligence, will you promise to brief the 

Committee within 24 or 48 hours of any terrorist attack or attempted terrorist attack if requested by the Committee? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. Please be seated, 

and we’d be interested in your opening statement. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. Senator Feinstein, 

Senator Burr, and members of the Committee: Let me start by 

thanking you all very, very much for considering my nomination to 

be the next NCTC director. I also want to express my appreciation 

for the efforts of the Committee staff. I know there’s a tremendous 

amount of work that goes into the preparation and review to support any confirmation hearing, and I’m very grateful. 

I’d also like to recognize and introduce my parents, Mary Jo and 

Gary Rasmussen, and my wife Maria Rasmussen. Their love and 

support means everything to me and I’m very glad they’re here 

with me today. 

As you remarked, Madam Chair, I’ve briefed this Committee several times, as recently as last week, in closed session in my capacity as the Deputy Director of NCTC. But this is my first opportunity to appear before the Committee in open session and I truly 

welcome that opportunity. 

I’m honored by the President’s trust and confidence in my ability 

to continue to serve in our national counterterrorism enterprise. 

Public service came naturally to me growing up in the Washington 

area, as I had to look no further than to my own family for example and inspiration. My father Gary and my mother Mary Jo moved 

to northern Virginia and Fairfax City from Wisconsin in 1962 so 

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19 

that my father could pursue a career in public policy. He was a career Federal employee, beginning at Department of Agriculture, 

working here on Capitol Hill for a short time as a junior staff member on the House side, and then retiring almost 40 years later as 

the most senior career official at the Department of Education. 

My mother was for a time a public school teacher in Fairfax 

County, while also playing an extremely active role in our local 

church and serving for over ten years on the board of the Northern 

Virginia Community College. Among my siblings, I have one who 

is an active duty military officer with two tours of duty in Afghanistan and another brother who proudly works in local government 

in Fairfax and volunteers in his church community. Again, everything I ever needed to learn about public service and public commitment I learned first-hand from my immediate family. 

I obviously have a long way to go before serving in government 

as long as my father, but I am currently on year 23 of my own public service career. I started my Federal Government career while I 

was a student at Wesleyan University, worked as an intern at the 

Department of Defense, working on the Korea Desk. After finishing 

graduate school at Princeton, I joined the Department of State as 

a Presidential Management Intern, a PMI, just as the United 

States was liberating Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm. 

During my tenure at the State Department, I was given many, 

many extraordinary opportunities, whether it was working on efforts to dissuade North Korea from pursuing nuclear ambitions, establishing a formal structure to implement the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia, or, latest in my State Department career, working 

towards a lasting resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 

But my career took a sudden turn in mid-2001 when I accepted 

a position on the National Security Council staff working on terrorism issues. My first day on the job was Monday, September 17, 

2001, six days after the 9–11 attacks. 

Since that day 13 years ago, I have been singularly focused for 

every day of my career on the Nation’s counterterrorism efforts. 

Those years include career positions at the White House under 

both Presidents Bush and Obama and at NCTC under Directors 

Brennan, Redd, Leiter, and of course Matt Olsen, who asked me to 

serve as his Deputy in June of 2012. Over those years, I’ve seen 

what I believe are vast improvements in our counterterrorism capabilities, structures, and policies. But that said, significant challenges remain and there is much, much work to be done. This is 

what makes the work of the men and women at NCTC so central 

to our national security. It’s exactly why I would very much like 

the opportunity to lead them and to serve alongside them as their 

director. 

The U.S., the United States, working with our allies and partners, has made great strides in dismantling the Al-Qaeda organization that attacked us in September 2001, but the relationship 

threat we face continues to evolve, as both of you indicated in your 

opening remarks. As the President said in May at West Point, ‘‘For 

the foreseeable future,’’ quote, ‘‘the most direct threat to America 

at home and abroad remains terrorism.’’ 

As the Committee well understands, instability in the Levant, 

the broader Middle East, and across North Africa has accelerated 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

20 

the decentralization of the Al-Qaeda movement. The movement’s 

once global focus under Usama bin Laden is now increasingly being 

driven by local and regional conflict and factors. All across these 

unstable regions, we are confronting a multitude of threats to the 

U.S. and our interests, from longstanding, well-known terrorist 

groups, but also from newer and much more loosely connected networks of like-minded violent extremists who operate without regard to national borders or established organizational norms. 

This Committee, better than almost any audience I ever engage 

with, understands in great detail the diverse and multifaceted 

threat picture we face from Al-Qaeda and its various affiliates. 

That threat picture also includes other Sunni terrorist groups, to 

include ISIL. It also includes Shia-aligned groups like Hezbollah 

and Iran’s Quds Force. It even includes home-grown violent extremists who live amongst us here inside the United States. 

So to sum up that threat picture, in my view we face a broader 

array of threats from a greater variety of terrorist groups and individual actors than at any point since 9–11. 

Further complicating this threat picture are, of course, our losses 

in collection as a result of unauthorized disclosure, the spread of 

extremist messaging via social media in new and different ways, 

and the need we face to balance technology-based analytic tools 

with people-focused, human resource-intensive, eyes-on analysis. 

If I’m confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working and 

helping the counterterrorism community overcome these challenges 

in the years ahead. 

Ten years ago, when Senator Susan Collins and Senator Joe Lieberman first put pen to paper in what would become the Intelligence Reform and Testimony Prevention Act of 2004, most in the 

country truly believed that a second large-scale catastrophic attack 

in the homeland was possible, perhaps even probable in the near 

term. Today the threat we face is quite different from then and I 

would argue that we are far better equipped to respond to it than 

we were perhaps in 2004. 

Earlier this year, as NCTC commemorated its tenth anniversary, 

we were very honored to host both authors of that landmark legislation in our auditorium. Senator Collins, you told the assembled 

workforce, quote: ‘‘There’s no doubt that information-sharing is far 

superior to what it was prior to the passing of the law in 2004, and 

there’s no doubt that the talented workforce here at NCTC has 

made a huge difference.’’ Unquote. Senator, I’m not sure that you 

could see the crowd very well through the stage lights at the auditorium there, but I can assure you that the members of our workforce at NCTC were beaming with pride when they heard your 

words. 

Ten years later, Senator Collins, I firmly believe that we can declare that your vision, that the Congress’s vision for NCTC, has in 

fact taken hold. That vision called for an integrated and motivated 

NCTC workforce, fully empowered with access to the right information, and armed with the best training and tools. I believe that vision for NCTC is growing stronger every day. 

Yet, we all know this is no time for complacency, for self-satisfaction, either at NCTC or anywhere else in the CT community. We 

understand well that significant challenges remain. The terrorist 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

21 

adversaries we face are persistent and adaptive, and so we too 

must learn and change and get better and improve every day. We 

must match and exceed their determination to attack us with our 

own will to make certain that they don’t succeed. 

In the current position I have as Deputy Director and now Acting 

Director, I’m reminded of 9–11 and the threat we face every single 

day. If confirmed by the Senate, I would bring the focus and urgency borne of that terrible day 13 years ago to everything I do as 

Director. I would aim to ensure the best and brightest continue to 

fill our ranks at NCTC and I would aim to ensure that they are 

equipped with the tools and the training they need to meet the terrorist threat. 

In my 23 years in government service, I’ve worn a number of 

hats, working in a number of difficult government organizations. 

No label means as much to me personally over that time as the 

label ‘‘member of the counterterrorism community.’’ Every day I’m 

privileged to work with truly outstanding friends and partners all 

across that CT community—at FBI, at CIA, NSA, the Defense Department, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury, 

with our State and local partners around the country, with our 

international partners, at the White House, and here on Capitol 

Hill, with you and with your staff. 

The job for which I’ve been nominated demands very much, but 

I’m thankful for the loving support of my family, my wife Maria, 

my parents; and I’d like to take this rare opportunity to thank her 

and to thank them publicly today. They’ve always been there to 

support me as I’ve pursued my career. 

Madam Chair, I’ve been part of the NCTC family since its inception in 2004. Even when serving President Bush and President 

Obama for several years on the NSC staff at the White House, I 

still felt very personally connected to the remarkable organization 

at NCTC, its vital mission, its uniquely qualified workforce, and its 

terribly critical place within the intelligence community. There’s no 

place in government where I would rather serve. 

Chairman Feinstein, Senator Burr, Senators, thank you as always for your steadfast support for the women and men who work 

every day at NCTC and for considering my nomination to be its 

next Director. I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Madam 

Chair. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rasmussen follows:] 

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Hearing to Consider the Nomination of Mr. Nicholas J, Rasmussen 

to Serve as Director of the National Counterterrorism Center 

Mr. Nicholas J. Rasmussen 

Acting Director, National Counterterrorism Center 

Statement for the Record 

November 20,2014 

Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Chambliss, and members of the Committee, let 

me start by thanking you all very much for considering my nomination to be the next 

Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. I also appreciate the efforts of the 

Committee staff, as I know there is a tremendous amount of preparation and review that 

goes into any confirmation hearing. Given the Senate's busy schedule and the many 

competing demands you face, it is clear the importance you bestow upon this position and I 

am grateful. 

I would also like to introduce my parents, Mary Jo and Gary Rasmussen, and my 

wife, Maria Rasmussen. Their love and support means everything to me and I am very glad 

they are here with me today. 

I have briefed this committee several times in closed, classified session in my 

capacity as NCTC's Deputy Director, but this is my first opportunity to testify before you in 

open session. l truly welcome this opportunity today. On several occasions I have cited 

this summer's report from the 9/11 Commissioners and its encouragement of government 

officials to speak openly and publicly about the threat we face and the actions we're taking 

to prevent terrorist attacks. I consider this public hearing to be one such opportunity and 

look forward to describing the threat and the challenges we face in a few moments. 

I am honored by the President's trust and confidence in my ability to continue to 

serve our nation's counterterrorism enterprise. Public service came naturally to me as I 

had to look no further than to my own family for example and inspiration. My father Gary 

and my mother Mary jo moved to northern Virginia in 1962 from Wisconsin so that my 

father could pursue a career in public policy. He was a career federal employee, beginning 

at the Department of Agriculture, then working here on Capitol Hill for a short time as a 

junior staff member, and retiring almost 40 years later as the most senior career official at 

the Department of Education. My mother was -- for a time --a public school teacher in 

Fairfax County, while playing an active role in our local church as well as serving for over a 

decade on the board of the Northern Virginia Community College. Among my siblings, I 

have one active duty military officer with two tours of duty in Afghanistan and another who 

proudly serves his community by working in local government and by volunteering in his 

church community. Again, everything I ever needed to learn about public service and 

commitment, I've learned first-hand from my immediate family. 

Although I have long way to go before serving as long as my father, I am currently on 

year 23 of my public service career. While a student at Wesleyan University, I started my 

1 
23 

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federal government career as an intern in the Department of Defense, working for thenAssistant Secretary for International Security Affairs Rich Armitage on the Korea Desk in 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense. After finishing graduate school at Princeton's 

Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, I joined the Department of 

State as a Presidential Management Intern just as the United States was liberating Kuwait 

during Operation Desert Storm. My first portfolio was focused on the Arabian Gulf region. 

I was humbled to work alongside some of our country's most talented and dedicated 

national security practitioners as they focused on creating a stable security architecture .for 

that critical region. 

Throughout my tenure at the Department of State, I was given many extraordinary 

opportunities, whether it was working on efforts to dissuade the Democratic People's 

Republic of Korea from continuing its nuclear ambitions, establishing a structure to 

implement the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia, or working towards a lasting resolution to 

the Arab-Israeli conflict. Then in mid-2001, I accepted a position on the National Security 

Council staff working for Richard Clarke, the National Coordinator for Security, 

Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism at that time. My first day on the job was 

Monday, September 17,2001, six days after the 9/11 attacks. 

Since that day thirteen years ago, I have been singularly focused on our nation's 

counterterrorism efforts every day, moving between career positions at the White House 

under Presidents Bush and Obama, and at the National Counterterrorism Center under 

Directors Brennan, Redd, Leiter, and of course Matt Olsen who selected me as his Deputy 

in June 2012. Over these years, I have seen vast improvements in our counterterrorism 

capabilities, structures and policies. That said, significant challenges remain. 

The United States, working with allies and partners across the globe, has made great 

strides in dismantling the al-Qa'ida organization that attacked us in September 2001, but as 

the 9/11 Commissioners noted in their July report, "the terrorist threat is evolving, not 

defeated." In fact, the President said as much in his May address to the graduating class at 

West Point, noting that, "For the foreseeable future, the most direct threat to America at 

home and abroad remains terrorism." This is what makes the work of the men and women 

at the National Counterterrorism Center so central to our national security, and why I 

would very much like the opportunity to lead and serve alongside them as their Director. 

As this Committee is well aware, instability in the Levant, the Middle East, and 

across North Africa has accelerated the decentralization of the al-Qa'ida movement The 

movement's once global focus under the direction ofUsama bin Laden is now increasingly 

being driven by local and regional factors and conditions. All across these regions, we are 

confronting a multitude of threats to the United States and our interests and allies 

overseas: from longstanding established terrorist groups to new and much more loosely 

connected networks of like-minded violent extremists that operate without regard to 

established organizational norms or national borders. As I noted in public testimony 

before another Senate Committee in September, this less centralized, more geographically 

dispersed threat is likely to result in more frequent low-level attacks against U.S. and 

Western interests overseas. 

2 
24 

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Most notably, the threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-or ISILpersists, with that ISIL threat being most acute in Iraq, Syria, and the surrounding region. 

But attacks either linked to or inspired by ISIL in Belgium and Canada, and recent arrests in 

Europe and Australia demonstrate that the threat beyond the Middle East is real, although 

thus far limited in sophistication. However, if left unchecked, over time we can expect 

ISlL's capabilities to mature, and the threat to the United States homeland ultimately to 

increase. 

In addition to ISIL, we are also very concerned about the threat from the Syria-based 

Khorasan Group. The counterterrorism community is continuously updating our 

assessments on the threat posed by the Khorasan Group to account for the impact of our 

military strikes. We remain particularly concerned about threats to commercial aviation 

from this group as well as from al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, which has tried three 

times in the past five years to take down commercial passenger and cargo aircraft destined 

for the United States. 

In addition to the high priority groups and networks I have already mentioned, the 

counterterrorism community works every day to understand and counter threats from a 

range of other terrorist groups, many of which receive less public attention. These include 

Sunni terrorist groups active in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, as well as Shia-aligned 

groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iranian-backed Qods force. 

Despite the array of threats we face from international terrorist groups, our analysts 

at NCTC have assessed for the past three years that the most likely immediate threat here 

in the United States is that of a relatively unsophisticated attack from a homegrown violent 

extremist (HVE), probably inspired or motivated by the Sunni extremist narrative that is so 

pervasive on the Internet. HVEs make use of a dynamic, evolving online environment to 

connect themselves virtually to a global movement of Sunni violent extremists. The threat 

these individuals pose to Americans here at home is being fueled by the conflict in Syria 

and Iraq and is proving particularly difficult to disrupt. 

Thus, the terrorist threat persists, and challenges abound. Further complicating the 

threat picture are losses in collection as the result of unauthorized disclosures, the spread 

of extremist messaging via social media, and the need to balance technology-based analytic 

tools with people-intensive eyes-on analysis. If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to 

helping the counterterrorism community overcome these challenges in the months and 

years ahead. 

Madam Chairman, I have been part of the NCTC family since its inception in 2004. 

Even when serving on the National Security Council staff at the White House, I still felt 

personally connected to this remarkable organization, its vital mission, its uniquely 

qualified workforce, and its terribly critical place within the Intelligence Community. 

There is no place in government where I would rather serve. 

3 
25 

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Ten years ago, when Senators Susan Collins and joe Lieberman first put a pen to the 

paper that would become the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004-

effectively codifying the existence of a National Counterterrorism Center-the country still 

believed a large-scale, catastrophic attack was possible, even probable in the near term. 

Earlier this year, as NCTC commemorated its lOth anniversary, we were honored to host 

both Senators in our auditorium, where they spoke to the workforce about the many 

obstacles they faced in bringing about true intelligence reform. For NCTC, they envisioned 

an integrated and motivated workforce with broad access to information in support of a 

single counterterrorism mission. Ten years later, I firmly believe we can declare their 

work to have been a success. That vision has taken hold, and I believe it is growing 

stronger every day. Yet this is no time for complacency or self-satisfaction, either at NCTC 

or elsewhere in the counterterrorism community. Our terrorist adversaries are persistent 

and adaptive, and so too must we learn and change and improve every day. 

In my current position, I am reminded of 9/11 and the threat we face every day. If 

confirmed, I would bring the focus and urgency born of that day to all of my efforts as 

Director. I would continue to build upon the joint nature of the Center and improve our 

information sharing at the federal, state and local levels and with key foreign partners. I 

would ensure the best and brightest continue to fill our ranks, and are equipped with the 

tools and training they need to meet the terrorist threat. They-and their colleagues 

throughout the intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, homeland security and military 

communities-are our best defense as a nation. 

In my 23 years of government service, I've worn a number of hats: intern, State 

Department and NCTC officer, NSC staffer, and now most recently, Senior National 

Intelligence Service officer. But none of those labels means as much to me personally as 

does the label "member of the Counterterrorism Community." I am privileged every day to 

work with truly outstanding friends and partners all across that CT Community-at FBI, 

CIA, NSA, at the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, justice, State, and Treasury, 

with our state and local partners, with our international partners, at the White House and 

here on Capitol Hill as well. 

The job for which I have been nominated demands much, but I am thankful for the 

loving support of my wife Maria and the rest of my family, who have been and will continue 

to be there to support me. 

Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Chambliss, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for 

your consideration of my nomination, and I look forward to your questions. 

4 
26 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. That was excellent. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. Rasmussen, in your written statement for the record you 

wrote, and I quote: ‘‘Attacks, either linked or inspired by ISIL, in 

Belgium and Canada, recent arrests in Europe and Australia, demonstrate that the threat beyond the Middle East is real, although 

thus far limited in sophistication. However, if left unchecked, over 

time we can expect ISIL’s capabilities to mature and the threat to 

the United States homeland ultimately to increase.’’ 

Could you expand on NCTC’s view of the threat from ISIL to the 

extent you can here in an unclassified setting, please? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I’d be happy to, Madam Chair. I tend to think 

of the threat ISIL poses currently as being somewhat in concentric 

circles. Because their capability is greatest in Iraq and Syria right 

now, I think our personnel there are potentially greatest at risk, 

particularly in Iraq, where our embassy security is, of course, as 

you know, a serious concern. 

In the front-line states around Iraq and Syria—Jordan, Turkey, 

Syria—Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia—there also we 

worry that ISIL has the capability and ability to potentially carry 

out attacks, to identify and mobilize personnel who could engage in 

attacks against U.S. personnel and interests. 

Beyond that, the next ring, the next outer ring I would look at, 

is into Western Europe, where the very language that you cited in 

your question indicates that ISIL looks at Europe as a potential 

theater of operations where it may carry out attacks against Western interests. 

Then lastly, the homeland, where we certainly believe that ISIL 

has aspirations over time to develop the kind of capability it would 

need to carry out a homeland attack. At this point, though, we assess that we’re far more at risk presently of attack from an individual home-grown violent extremist who may be inspired by, but 

not necessarily directed by, ISIL here in the homeland. 

Then the point about if left unchecked; we worry that the longer 

ISIL is left unchecked and is allowed to pursue and develop a safe 

haven, the more that capability is allowed to grow to carry out attacks in each of those theaters that I mentioned. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

I saw in your responses to our pre-hearing questions that you 

wrote that’ll be hiring more than 40 officers this year. It’s my understanding that, in addition to these 40, NCTC still has many vacant positions it needs to fill. So the question is, with respect to 

contractors, which we have some concerns about, how do you plan 

to fill the vacant spots at NCTC? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. First of all, thank you, Madam Chair. The support NCTC receives from this Committee in our efforts to maintain 

the best possible workforce could not be better. We’re very grateful 

for that. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. We’ll keep it going. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. The numbers you cite of 40 individuals who 

we’re looking to hire this year reflects what we call ODNI cadre, 

people who are hired and work in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. As you know and as most of the Committee 

knows well, NCTC has a blended workforce which includes permaLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

27 

nent cadre employees, but also detailed personnel from other intelligence community, and not just intelligence community, but other 

government organizations as well. To me that is the real lifeblood 

of NCTC, the expertise, the talent that we get from other departments and agencies. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, will the 40 be essentially transfers? 

Will they be a mix, and if so—— 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. 40 will be new cadre direct hire. At the same 

time, in parallel we’re pursuing an accelerated effort to try to get 

our detailee numbers up, for exactly the reason I just said: We 

need the talent that comes from other intelligence community partners. All of those partners are willing and very strong, strong supporters of NCTC as an enterprise. The challenge comes year in and 

year out as you try to keep the numbers up. They have their own 

staffing needs. In a period of budget uncertainty, they themselves 

sometimes struggle to meet their own internal efforts to staff themselves. So it’s a constant dialogue with them, as I would say, it’s 

a very positive dialogue with them, to make sure we can get talented officers from places like FBI, CIA, and other partners in the 

intelligence community. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN [continuing]. Thank you. 

Senator Burr. 

Senator BURR. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Nick, the Committee, as you know, is charged with providing 

vigilant oversight. A couple of questions that really go in line with 

what the Chairman had you rise and raise your hand and swear 

to. Would you agree that the Committee, to conduct effective oversight, that we should have access to the intelligence products produced by the intelligence community and in some cases be provided 

with the raw reporting that contributed to that analysis? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Yes, I believe that in some specific cases it 

would make sense to have access to that reporting. 

Senator BURR. Will you commit to providing the Committee complete and timely access to all NCTC products, reporting, and staff, 

if necessary, to assist in our oversight responsibility? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Yes. 

Senator BURR. I won’t get into staffing because I think you covered that with Senator Feinstein. Earlier this week, the Institute 

of Economics and Peace released its 2014 Global Terrorism Index. 

The report indicates that the deaths from testimony are at an alltime high. Significantly—specifically, the number of deaths attributed to terrorism is five times higher than it was in 2000, and 

we’ve witnessed a 61 percent increase in the last year alone. 

Would you agree that the threat from terrorism is at an all-time 

high? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I think as measured in the array, variety, and 

dispersion of terrorist threats across many different regions, the 

answer is certainly yes. 

Senator BURR. What is NCTC as the executive agent for our Nation’s strategy against terrorism going to do about it? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. The role that NCTC plays in carrying out strategic operational planning in support of the government is one that 

has us tied very closely to the National Security Council staff and 

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terrorism. We work with the National Security Council staff to develop whole of government plans to address our counterterrorism 

concerns in each of the theaters around the world, not just one single theater. As you would well expect, Senator, the effort to develop 

strategies against ISIL is at a particularly energetic pace right 

now. But our strategic operational planning capability is also 

brought to bear on the whole array of CT challenges we face in Africa, in Asia, in South Asia, every region you can think of. 

So I would consider our job at NCTC to make sure that we aren’t 

leaving any holes in that fabric of strategy as we look out across 

all of the different CT challenges that we face, while at the same 

time prioritizing where effort needs to be most energetically directed. That of course right now would argue for a lot of effort to 

be directed at the challenges we’re facing in Syria and Iraq. 

Senator BURR. Are you confident that NCTC can discover and 

are enabled to disrupt plots here in the homeland? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I would say that our ability to detect and potentially disrupt a plot involving a complex objective with a number 

of terrorist actors and a fair amount of communication, I would assess our odds as being very, very good at being able to detect and 

disrupt that, that kind of plotting. 

The more the plotting looks like what you and Chairman Feinstein talked about in terms of being an individual lone wolf actor, 

perhaps with no direct connection or even indirect connection to an 

overseas terrorist group, perhaps only a self-radicalized individual 

working alone on the Internet to develop his own capabilities, that 

decreases pretty dramatically our ability to use traditional CT tools 

to detect and potentially disrupt. So it’s hard to guarantee you or 

give you extreme high confidence that we would be able to detect 

and deter, disrupt, that kind of attack. 

Senator BURR. Do you think the administration and-or Congress 

should do more publicly to let the American people know the threat 

from terrorism and the fact that it’s growing, not declining? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I would certainly agree with you, Senator Burr, 

and that’s one of the reasons why this hearing being in open session I think is such a good thing. The 9–11 Commissioners during 

the past year, as they reviewed where we are this many years 

later, one of their calls was on the policy community to speak more 

often, more publicly, more forthrightly about the threat environment that we face. I would certainly look to contribute to that in 

my own way from NCTC. 

So much of what we do is necessarily in closed session and with 

you, with your staff, but there are certainly opportunities where we 

can speak more directly, particularly to the homeland aspects of 

the threat, which I referred to a minute ago, and the presence of 

home-grown violent extremists and the threat they pose to our 

communities. 

Senator BURR. Nick, last question. In your response to the Committee’s pre-hearing questions, you indicated that big data was one 

of NCTC’s biggest challenges. The IC and the United States Government as a whole are really struggling with that challenge. At 

NCTC, however, the correlation of big data is a life and death matter. I’m concerned that this issue doesn’t receive the proper attention and resources at NCTC. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

29 

Can you assure us that you’ll make this a top priority and that 

this effort will get the attention it needs? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Senator, you’re right to point to this issue as 

being one of our biggest challenges, and I can commit to you wholeheartedly to embrace this as one of my top priorities. On his way 

out the door, during his last couple of months of service at NCTC, 

Matt Olsen directed the creation inside NCTC of an office, of a new 

office, an Office of Data Strategy and Innovation, to do a better job 

than we thought we were doing of organizing our short, medium, 

and long-term vision in terms of how to make best possible use 

analytically of the data we have access to. 

Some of that will also involve developing new technological tools, 

taking advantage of broader efforts by the DNI, by Director Clapper, to create a new architecture for terrorism and for intelligence 

information for the entire intelligence community. We hope to leverage NCTC’s work as an early benefactor of that work to create 

a more cloud-based architecture for intelligence information across 

the IC. 

Senator BURR. I thank you for that and I hope you’ll keep the 

community updated on the progress that we make on that. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thanks very much. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

First of all, congratulations on your appointment, which I think 

is an excellent one. I appreciate very much that the President 

chose to put a career expert in this vital position and I thank you 

very much for your generous comments about the role that former 

Senator Joe Lieberman and I played in creating the NCTC. 

I do hope that you’ll let this Committee know if you encounter 

difficulties in getting detailees who are well qualified and experienced to come work at NCTC. I know it’s very hard for other components of the intelligence community and the FBI to let go of 

some of their most talented analysts, but for NCTC to be fully effective in these very dangerous times it is essential that we achieve 

that goal of jointness by having those detailees. So please do not 

hesitate to come to the Chairman, Ranking Member, any of us, if 

you do anticipate problems in that area. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I will. Thank you. 

Senator COLLINS. One of the findings of the 9–11 Commission 

was that border security and immigration were not seen as national security concerns prior to the attacks on our Nation on 9– 

11–01. The 9–11 Commission specifically found that 15 of the 19 

hijackers could have been intercepted through more diligent enforcement of our immigration laws. 

As the Acting Director of the NCTC, were you or any of your 

staff asked to scrub the President’s proposals for immigration 

changes that he will be announcing tonight? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. To my knowledge, NCTC or any of the personnel at NCTC were not involved in any effort? I’m not aware of 

whether there was elsewhere in the intelligence community such 

an effort, but not at NCTC, ma’am. 

Senator COLLINS. When President Obama created the 2009 

Guantanamo Review Task Force to evaluate which detainees could 

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30 

be transferred or released from Guantanamo, as I recall the head 

of NCTC was the executive director of that task force; is that correct? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Yes. In prior service, Matt Olsen held that position as chair of the task force. 

Senator COLLINS. Matt Olsen has told me that when the decision 

was made to exchange what have become known as the Taliban 5 

for the release of Sergeant Bergdahl, that NCTC was not consulted 

in that decision. To your knowledge, was anyone at NCTC consulted? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. My understanding is that in the context or in 

the process of moving to the transfer of those detainees there was 

a request for an intelligence assessment from the ODNI, from the 

intelligence community, and such an assessment was in fact prepared. It was prepared by another element of the ODNI, not at 

NCTC. 

Senator COLLINS. And that was despite the fact that the NCTC 

was acting as the executive director for the commission? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Well, I would—— 

Senator COLLINS. Or for the task force. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN [continuing]. Matt had that role in a previous, 

at a previous time. In the current processes that the administration 

is following for considering transfer of detainees, NCTC is being 

asked typically to produce threat assessments of what impact on 

security the potential return of a detainee may have. That did not 

happen in the case of the issue you’re referring to, madam. 

Senator COLLINS. I just want to be clear on this. So the normal 

process is for NCTC to be involved in putting together the package 

that is used by decisionmakers on how to classify the detainees; is 

that part correct? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. That’s correct. 

Senator COLLINS. But in the case of the Taliban 5 the NCTC was 

not asked to put together a new analysis that went beyond the previous analysis, which according to press reports found that these 

detainees were too dangerous to be released; is that correct 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Again, we did not have direct involvement in 

the production of the intelligence assessment. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Again, I want to thank you for your willingness to serve in what 

is a 24–7 very demanding job, and I think we’re very fortunate to 

have someone with your background and expertise. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. It looks like this is going to be a tough 

vote. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

I too want to—— 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. For TV, I was jesting. 

Senator RUBIO [continuing]. Thank you for your service to our 

country and congratulations on your appointment, and we look forward to moving forward quickly. 

Let me ask you a number of questions that are of interest to me 

and I think to everyone on the Committee. The first has to do with 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

31 

the planned reduction in U.S. commitment to Afghanistan and the 

growing concern that that would have implications on our ability 

to conduct effective counterterrorism operations in the region. 

There’s been one success in all of this has been the ability to erode 

core Al-Qaeda’s presence, for example in the FATA. If we lose territory in Afghanistan back to the Taliban, we could very easily be 

once again in a position where many of those elements reconstitute 

strength in an ungoverned space somewhere in Afghanistan. If the 

government is no longer capable of exercising presence in that region and with less of a U.S. commitment, that could be accelerated. 

What are your thoughts on the current plans to draw down 

forces in Afghanistan and the impact it would have on our counterterrorism efforts? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. As an intelligence community, we also are concerned about what potential effect the drawdown of U.S. forces may 

have on the ability of Al-Qaeda to regenerate capability, particularly in the northeastern parts of Afghanistan. The effort to train 

and equip a competent Afghan national security force is an important part of the effort to make sure that there is a capability to disrupt potential activity inside Afghanistan. We of course will maintain as robust as possible an intelligence collection framework to 

allow us to continue to monitor, track, and if necessary disrupt AlQaeda resurgence in that part of Afghanistan or certainly in Pakistan. But it will be a more challenging and more difficult collection 

environment than we face today. 

Senator RUBIO. My second question has to do with Iran. There’s 

been a lot of talk about some sort of deal with regard to their nuclear ambitions and the relaxation of sanctions against them. What 

has not been discussed enough is that Iran is the world’s leading 

sponsor of terrorism as a state, and certainly any economic growth 

and prosperity that would come about as a result of the relaxation 

of sanctions I believe would have an impact on their ability to fund 

and expand their already robust sponsorship of terrorism around 

the world. 

I was hoping you could share some thought with us, not just 

about what Iran does now, but what they might be able to grow 

and do if in fact these sanctions are relaxed and they have more 

access to global capital, more money basically, to sponsor these operations. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. The willingness and ability of Iran to support 

various Shia terrorist groups has always been very, very high on 

the list of concerns of the counterterrorism community and the intelligence community. One of the pathways to addressing that challenge has been to try to get Iran out of the business of thinking 

that carrying out those kind of acts advances their national interest, and ultimately they would see that as self-defeating and not 

advancing their interests. 

So I guess, speaking personally, in my own personal analysis 

anything that puts us in a position where we are more effectively 

dealing with Iran in a normal way would reduce the incentive for 

them to use that proxy network of Shia terrorist groups that they 

do in fact have at their disposal. There’s no doubt, Senator, you’re 

absolutely right, the capability of the terrorism apparatus sponsored by Iran is something that is threatening to the United States, 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

32 

not just in the region, in the Middle East, but all around the world 

and even potentially here at home. 

So I would place a priority in trying to, not necessarily seek to 

defeat that terrorism apparatus on the battlefield, as we have in 

our efforts against Al-Qaeda, but in effect trying to take them out 

of the business in some other fashion. That’s how I would think 

about it. But there’s no question, as we watch and worry about how 

Sunni-Shia tensions in the Middle East play out and how our interests in the region are put at risk by Shia-sponsored terrorist 

groups. But the focus on Iranian intentions will continue and be a 

very high priority. 

Senator RUBIO. Your statement about putting them out of the 

business of sponsoring terrorism, it calls to mind the potential that 

any sort of sanctions relaxation perhaps should be linked not just 

to a nuclear program, but to their sponsorship of terrorism, as a 

leverage point to get them to abandon those sorts of things. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I can’t speak to the policy context in which we 

would relax sanctions. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thanks, Senator Rubio. 

Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Rasmussen, I have been to your office, I’ve been to the CIA, 

I’ve been to the Pentagon, and have traveled recently, and the one 

major conclusion I have taken from those visits is the incredible 

quality of the people that we have working for us. They’re patriotic, 

idealistic, smart, and capable. And you’re Exhibit A today, and I 

just want to thank you, and I’m honored to serve this country along 

with you and your colleagues, and I hope you’ll take that word 

back. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Thank you, Senator. I really do appreciate that. 

Senator KING. We’ve talked about this before. Here’s my concern, 

and I urge you—I know that in the day to day work you’re focusing 

on threats and attacks and dealing with fires around the world, 

and that’s your basic mission. But we have to be thinking more 

strategically and long-term, it seems to me. We cannot simply kill 

these people and call that the solution to the worldwide terrorism 

problem. 

I’m looking—I remember from the fifties we had the containment 

strategy of George Kennan, that really worked with the Soviet 

Union. It took a long time, but it worked. And it was a strategy. 

It was a conscious, deliberate, well-developed strategy. I urge you 

to work with your colleagues, with the think tanks, with Rand Corporation or Brookings, whoever, to really work on a strategy for 

dealing with this problem other—in addition to the military response. 

Do you have any thoughts on that? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. It’s a terrific suggestion, Senator, and obviously 

the expertise about how to carry out effective counterterrorism policy does not reside only within the government. As you alluded to, 

research organizations, think tanks, not just in Washington, but all 

around the country and all around the world, have a role to play 

in helping us get this right. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

33 

The strategies that we try to help produce at NCTC in support 

of the National Security Council staff in my answer to Chairman 

Feinstein are typically whole of government strategies, not just relying on our intelligence capabilities or our military capabilities, 

but also trying to take advantage of the abilities, the resources we 

have across the government, to try to produce the conditions that 

would over time eat away at support for terrorism in some of these 

conflict locations overseas. 

At the same time, we all go into it understanding well that those 

efforts will ultimately take years, if not decades, to play out and 

for us to reap the benefits of those kinds of strategies, and in the 

mean time you’re left to manage a very difficult threat environment. 

Senator KING. I just want to be sure that we’re not simply putting out the fires. We’ve got to put out the fires, but we also have 

to be thinking long-term, it seems to me. Otherwise we’re in for a 

100-year war. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Exactly right, sir. 

Senator KING. This morning at a hearing at the House Intelligence Committee, an open hearing, I should mention, NSA Director Rogers said: ‘‘There shouldn’t be any doubt in our mind that 

there are nation states and groups out there that have the capability to forestall our ability to operate our basic infrastructure, 

whether it’s generating power or whether it’s moving water and 

fuel.’’ 

How concerned are you about terrorist groups using their own 

capacity or what I call hackers for hire to attack our infrastructure? How serious is the cyber attack threat? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I would agree with the NSA Director in what 

he said this morning. I think, as I understand it, the threat he’s 

referring to is more acute from state actors at present than from 

individual terrorists or established terrorist groups. 

Senator KING. Well, ISIL has shown a pretty good capability 

with the Internet. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Exactly, and it’s certainly a capability they aspire to develop and exercise. So, knowing that, we’re looking for 

ways to be ahead of them, both in our ability to defend our infrastructure, but also in our ability to detect key individuals who are 

engaged in that kind of activity and disrupt their activities. 

Senator KING. Edward Snowden, you alluded to this. You didn’t 

use the word. Isn’t it true that we’ve lost a lot of capability in 

terms of tracking some of these groups because they have gone 

dark, in part based upon their awareness that was given to them 

by the Snowden revelations, and that’s compromised our ability to 

protect ourselves? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I would agree with you. Not just the Snowden 

disclosures, but other disclosures of classified information and our 

collection capabilities, have caused our terrorist adversaries to 

adapt, to look for new ways of doing business, to find new platforms, to go dark in some cases, or just simply, as I said, find new 

ways in an attempt to keep us in chase mode as they move from 

potential platform to potential platform. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

34 

This is an ongoing challenge for the intelligence community. I 

know our colleagues at NSA are particularly focused on this. But 

you’re absolutely right, sir. 

Senator KING. And it’s a particularly serious danger because, in 

my view, with the terrorist threat intelligence is the first line of defense. These aren’t people that we can line up the Army or the 

Navy and shoot. We need to know where they’re coming and when, 

and intelligence is really—that’s why it’s so absolutely critical. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I would agree with you, sir. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And thank you, Senator. 

Senator—I was going to say ‘‘Warner’’—Heinrich. Excuse me, 

Martin. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Rasmussen, I want to thank you for being here today and 

for all of your public service. As you can see, you have an enormous 

amount of respect from this body. I wanted to ask you. Given your 

experience with the National Counterterrorism Center really going 

back to its inception, it’s clear that there are few in the Federal 

Government with your knowledge of the NCTC and its mission. In 

your responses to unclassified questions from the Committee, you 

talk a little bit about that unique role, particularly of NCTC analysis as outlined in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as well as the mission objectives assigned to 

NCTC through the DNI’s national intelligence strategy. 

I want to dig a little deeper, if I can, into the unique nature of 

the analysis that NCTC does relative to that done by a number of 

other intelligence community agencies. As you know, even though 

NCTC is effectively the primary U.S. Government organization 

tasked to analyze terrorist organizations, there are several other 

agencies within the IC track and they analyze terrorists as well. 

Can you articulate for us, how is the analysis conducted by NCTC 

truly unique compared to that done by these other agencies 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. One element that puts NCTC in a unique position to carry out the best possible analysis of terrorism information 

is our access to the full body of that terrorism information. That 

was the unique insight of the IRTPA, the effort to bridge the domestic-foreign intelligence divide. So an analyst sitting at NCTC 

will have access to whatever is available to the U.S. Government 

in terms of intelligence reporting from overseas collection efforts, as 

well as from domestic law enforcement investigations here at home, 

and that is not true of every other element of the intelligence community. So that puts NCTC, I would say, in a uniquely advantaged 

position. 

Now, that obviously plays out, that advantage, plays out more 

profoundly when you’re talking about homeland threats, where the 

bridge between domestic and foreign intelligence matters so much. 

I would not quibble at the talent, capability, or insight that analysts from most of my intelligence community partners could bring 

to the analytical effort on some of our key challenges overseas. 

During the period of—I’ll just give one example. During the period 

of our extended military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 

Defense Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency and their inLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

35 

telligence analysts were doing terrific work, most of it informed by 

time on the ground, and I would never do anything to suggest otherwise. 

But to answer your question, I think it’s access to information 

that makes that critical difference. 

Senator HEINRICH. Would you characterize the most unique 

thing as being able to see a bigger picture from multiple sources, 

and particularly when we’re talking about a combination of foreign 

and domestic? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Yes, I would. 

Senator HEINRICH. In your response to questions from the Committee, you also discussed the growing importance of monitoring social media and exploiting big data in tracking terrorist threats and 

conducting analysis. In your comments you mentioned that technology could help, quote, ‘‘implement privacy and civil liberty protections beyond the current basic safeguards that are already in 

place.’’ 

Could you elaborate a little bit on what you mean by that, and 

also sort of describe for us the shortfalls as you see them in the 

privacy and civil liberties safeguards that are currently in place? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. I wouldn’t so much describe it as shortfalls as 

much as—I guess what I was referring to with that answer, Senator, was the more we can do to automate and make happen technologically segregation of information, deletion of information, all 

of the things we commit to do as part of our adherence to the Attorney General guidelines, the more we can take the human element of that, where a human makes a mistake and inadvertently 

sees something, retains something, holds onto something that they 

did not have authorization to do, the more we can automate that 

process through technology and give ourselves the ability also to 

audit ourselves more effectively and therefore train more effectively, that’s what I was trying to get at with that. 

Senator HEINRICH. So it’s more about technology and implementation effectiveness than any sort of change in authorizations? 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Exactly, because on those rare occasions when 

we have had something go awry in terms of handling of information, we have found that it has almost universally been a matter 

of human error rather than any intent to mishandle, misuse, or not 

protect information. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you again. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

I believe this completes the questions. I would like members to 

know that it’s my intention to vote on this nomination as soon as 

possible when the Senate returns. It may be off the floor after 

Thanksgiving. Any member should submit questions for the record 

by next Monday so we can have the answers by the time the vote 

is taken, please. And we will do our level best to move this just as 

quickly as we can, Mr. Rasmussen. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Well, I’m very grateful for that, Madam Chair, 

and we’ll commit to getting every answer back to you as quickly 

and as expeditiously as possible. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. That’s fine. Can’t do better than that. So 

thank you very much for being here. 

Mr. RASMUSSEN. Thank you. 

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36 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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Supplemental Material 

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Insert offset folio 19 here 93215.019

SELECT C0~11\11TTEE ON 

INTELLIGENCE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY 

PRESIDENTIAL NO:NHNEES 
39 

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Insert offset folio 20 here 93215.020

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

~TED STATES SENATE 

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY 

PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES 

PART A· BIOGRAPIDCAL INFQRMATION 

I. NAME:. ______ ~N~ic~ho~la~s~J~-RH~m~~~~-------------------

2. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTII:. ___ .,.0212=81,..l..::%"'S'-"F""ai...,rf:..,ax....,.Co,.,u..,n,.,tv"-. V_..A.,_ ____ _ 

3. MARITAL STATUS: __ -'M.,...,ar.,.n.,·ed,.__ 

4. SPOUSE'SNAME: _____ [REDACTED] 

5. SPOUSE'S MAIDEN NAME IF APPLICABLE: _____ [ REDACTED J 

6. NAMES AND AGES OF CHILDREN: 

None 

7. EDUCATION SINCE IDGH SCHOOL: 

INSTITUTION 

Prineeton University 

Wesleyan University 

DATES AITENDED DEQREE RECEIVED PAt£! OF DEGREE 

1988 -1990 Master's In PublicJinternational Affairs 1990 

1983 -1987 B.A. 1987 

8. EMPLOYMENT RECORD (LIST ALL POSmoNS HELD SINCE COLLEGE, INCLUDING 

MILITARY SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF EMPLOYER, POSmON, TITLE OR DESCRIPTION, 

LOCATION, AND DATES OF EMPLOYMENT.} 

EMPLOYER 

ODNJJNCTC 

National Security Council Staff 

(ou detail from ODNJ/NCTC) 

POSmONfiTILE 

Deputy Director 

Sen Dir for CT 

LOCATION 

Liberty Crossing 

WhiteHouse 

ODNJ/NCTC Chief, Strategic Liberty Crossing 

Assessment 

(initially on detail from State Department before being permanently hired by ODNJ) 

2012- Present 

2007-2012 

2fl04..2007 
40 

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National Security Council Staff 

(on detail from State Department} 

Director for Regional CT Affairs White House 2001 -2004 

Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow 2001 

(teJiowsblp was considered a long tenn training assignment while at State Department) 

Department of State 

Department of Statll 

Department of State 

Special Asst to Middle East 

Coordinator 

State Dept. 

Special Asst to North Korea Coordinator 

Foreign Affairs Officer 

1996·2001 

1994-1996 

1991-1994 

Law rtrm of Stevens, Davis, Miller & Moser Messenger/driver 1990 

(temporary job after completion of graduate school pending security clearance from State Department) 

Department of State I US Embassy Manila Summer Intern 1989 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Research Fellow 1988 

Office of the Secretary of Defense Intern 1987 

9. GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCB (INDICATE EXPERIENCE IN OR ASSOCIATION WITH FEDERAL, 

STATE, OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING ADVISORY, CONSULTATIVB. HONORARY, OR 

OTHER PART-TIME SERVICE OR POSITION. DO NOT REPEAT INFORMATION ALREADY 

PROVIDED IN QUESTION 8): 

AU previous government experience is included in question #8. 

10. INDICATE ANY SPECIALIZED INTELLIGENCE OR NATIONAL SECURITY EXPERTISE YOU HAVE 

ACQUIRED HAVING SERVED IN THE POSITIONS DESCRIBED IN QUESTIONS 8 AND/OR 9. 

As set forth below, in the course of my 23+ years of government service, and parllcularly during the 

last 13 years when l have worked almost exclusively on terrorism and counterterrorism issues, I have gained 

significant experience with and perspective on terrorism related inteU\gence issues, including the analytic, 

operational, polley/strategy and management aspects of those Issues. 

NCTC Deputy Director 

• Responsible for all aspeets of NCTC operations and management, including serving as Acting 

Director when current Director is away. 

• In support of the NCTC Director, responsible for setting the strategic direction and vision for NCTC 

workforce and leadership team. 

• Responsible for representing NCTC in senior level interagency fora, with foreign partners, and with 

the Congress. 

Special Assistant to the fresident and Senior Director for CT. National Security Counct1 ~ 

• Managed and led team of 12 counterterrorism professionals providing staff support to the President, 

the National Security Advisor and the President's CT/Homeland Security Advisor on all aspects of 

intelligence, policy, strategy and operations related to terrorism. 
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• Conceptualized and developed CT strategies and policies. Managed and led the Counterterrorism 

Security Group (CSG), the primary Assistant Secretary level interagency poliey coordinating body 

for CT issues. 

Chief ofStrategk Assessments. NCTC {and other senior positions at NCTC from 2004 2007l 

• Participated in ''standup" of NCTC, including creation of Directorate of Strategic Operational 

Planning. 

• Drafted first NCTC Strategic Assessment of USG counterterrorism efforts. 

• Advised NCTC Director on policy/strategy issues. 

Director for Regional CT Affairs. National Security Council Staff 

• Contributed to development of policy and strategy against al-Qa'ida and affiliated terrorist groups in 

the period directly after the 9/11 attacks. 

II. HONORS AND AWARDS (PROVIDE INFORMATION ON SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS. 

HONORARY DEGREES, MILITARY DECORATIONS, CIVILIAN SERVICE CITATIONS, OR ANY 

OTHER SPECIAL RECOGNITION FOR OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OR ACHIEVEMENT): 

In 200012001, I was awarded an International Affairs Fellowsbip (IAF) by the Council on Foreign 

Relations. Far the period Jan -Aug, 2001, I served as an IAF Fellow in Residence at the CFR offices in 

Washington DC. I terminated the fellowship in August 2001 in order to accept 11 detail assigpment to the 

National Security Council staff. 

During my tenure at the State Department, I was the recipient of multiple Superior Honor A wards, 

both for individual and team accomplishment. 

Wbile serving at NCTC, I was awarded The NCTC Director's Award in 2005, as well as several 

performance awards. 

12. ORGANlZA TIONAL AFFILIATIONS (LIST MEMBERSHIPS IN AND OFFICES HELD WITI:IIN THE 

LAST TEN YEARS IN ANY PROFESSIONAL, CIVIC, FRATERNAL, BUSINESS, SCHOLARLY, 

CULTURAL, CHARITABLE, OR OTHER SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS); 

ORGANIZATION OFFICE HELD 

None 

13. PUBLISHED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES (LIST THE TITLES, PUBLISHERS, BLOGS AND 

PUBLICATION DATES OF ANY BOOKS, ARTICLES, REPORTS, OR OTHER PUBLISHED 

MATERIALS YOU HAVE AUTHORED. ALSO LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEECHES OR REMARKS YOU 

HAVE MADE WITHIN THE LAST TEN YEARS FOR WHICH THERE IS A TEXT, TRANSCRIPT, OR 

VIDEO.) IF ASKED, Wll.L YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF EACH REQUESTED PUBLICATION, TEXT. 

TRANSCRIPT, OR VIDEO? 

My only published writing consists of a short, opinion-editorial piece related to the Middle East 

peace process published in the Los Angeles 'Dmes during the time when I was serving as a Fellow at the 

Council on Foreign Relations during the spring of 2001. [am prepared to provide the Committee with a copy 

of the publication. 
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On several occ;u;ions as NCTC Deputy Director, I have given speeches or appeared at conferences as 

a panelist on a counterterrorism (CT)·related panel discussion. None have OO..n formally published as 

speeches, but I have attached prepared remarks for live such events which took place in a pubUc setting 

where press or other attention might have been generated. 

PART B ·QUALIFICATIONS 

14. QUALIFICATIONS (DESCRrBE WHY YOU BELIEVE YOU ARE QUALIFIED TO SERVE JN THE 

POSITION FOR WlllCH YOU HA VB BEEN NOMJNATED): 

I believe l have the experience and qualifications necessary to serve as Director of NCTC based on 

over 20 years of service in tbc national security field. 

The first phase of my career-spent in the State Department from 1991 through 2000- provided me 

with exposure to some of our nation's mQst challenging national security issues, including North Korea 

nuclear ambitions, the Middle East Peace Process, and our effom to create stable security architecture in the 

Arabian Gulf region after the first Gulf War. These experiences allowed me to develop critical thinking and 

analytical skills which proved transferrable as my career progressed and I began working in the CT field. 

In the period since 9/11, I have held a series of demanding, high-impact positions in organizations 

dedicated to protecting tbe American people from terrorist attack, advancing our efforu to disrupt and 

defeat our terrorist adversaries. I have gained a tremendous amount of experience with terrorism-related 

issues and demonstrated the leadership, collegiality and professional integrity required to run a large 

organi7.ation with n critical mission. I have a deep understanding of terrorism-related subject matter, 

including the gaps we have in our understanding of terrorism and terrorism organizations. 

My prior service on National Security Council staff (2001·2004) and later at NCTC (2004·2007) 

provided me with several years ofintensive training and experience in tile details of CT policy, strategy and 

analysis, beginning in tile aftermath of the 9/ll attack. Working in an often highly pressurized environment, 

those earlier periods of service affQrded me the opportunity to develop crisis management skills by observing 

our most senior officials in action. 

Immediately prior to my service as NCTC Deputy Director, I served as Senior Director for 

Counterterrorism at the National Security Council staff at tbe White House. 1n this capacity, I served both 

President Bush and President Obama in their efforts to develop CT strategies and policies aimed at defeating 

ai·Qa'ida and mitigating the full range of terrorist threats to U.S. interests. For approximately four years, I 

chaired. the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), the Assistant Secretary level policy committee that 

meets weekly to review terrorism threats and to develop appropriate policy responses. 

Leadership of the CSG required that I have an in-depth understanding of the cnpabillties, resources 

and authorities resident within each of tile key federal agencies/departments engaged in CT work, iucluding 

the departments/agencies that are part of the Intelligence Community. It also required tbat l develop and 

maintain a network of productive professional relationships with key CT leaders across the federal 

government. That network of professional peers and colleagues continues Ia serve me well in my current 

position at NCTC, and I have no doubt that my relationships with these peers/colleagues would deepen and 

expand if ram confirmed by tbe Senate to serve as NCTC Director. 

As Deputy Director and now as the Acting Director of NCTC, I have spent the last two years fully 

immersed in all aspects of NCTC's missions. As our highest priority, the NCTC Director and I ensured that 

all available terrorism infQrmation was analyzed and assessed and shared ;u; appropriate witb the widest 

possible set of partners, customers and consumers. I represented NCTC and tbe Intelligence Community in 

hundreds of interagency meetings aimed at mitigating threats to U.S. interests and developing more effective 

CT policies and strategies. The result has been, in my view, a growing sense that NCTC is at the cutting edge 

of the federal government's response to the challenge of terrorism. 
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In the wake of specific terrorism-related incidents affecting U.S. citizens or interests. I have led 

internal NCTC processes to review critic:ally our own performance and capabilities and to idenllfy and 

develop concrete ways in which we can more effectively carry ont our CT mission. I have sought to inculcate 

in our workforce a desire to constantly improve and enhance our performance and ()Ur support to our CT 

partners. 

During the last year, I have led effort~ to establish NCTC as a center of gravity for the national CT 

effort, placing greater emphasis on our efforts to collaborate, cooperate and add value. As pal"! of that effort, 

NCTC's Director and I recently created an Office of Data Strategy and Innovation, which we have charged 

with the task of maki11g sure NCTC is at the cutting edge of our nation's efforts to extract maximum analytic 

value from the terrori•m·related information we have at NCTC. If confirmed by the Senate and given the 

opportuulty to serve as Director of NCTC, t believe I would be well positioned to adva11ee NCTC's 

organizational growth and development, and to make a meaningful contribution to our national security 

through my leadership of NCTC's extremely talented and dedicated work force. 

PART C- POLITICAL AND FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS 

15. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES (LIST ANY MEMBERSHIPS OR OFFICES HELD IN OR FINANCIAL 

CONTRIBUTIONS OR SERVICES RENDERED TO, ANY POLITICAL PARTY, EI,.ECTION 

COMMITTEE, POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE, OR INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATE DURING THE 

LAST TEN YEARS); 

None 

16. CANDIDACY FOR PUBLIC OFFICE (FURNISH DETAILS OF ANY CANDIDACY FOR ELECTIVE 

PUBLIC OFFICB): 

Nrme 

17. FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS 

(NOTE: QUESTIONS 17A AND BARE NOT LIMITED TO RELATIONSHIPS REQUIRING REGISTRATION 

UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGfSTRA TION ACT. QUESTIONS 17 A, B, AND C DO NOT CALL FOR 

A POSITIVE RESPONSE IF THE REPRESENTATION OR TRANSACTION WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT 

IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE.) 

A. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REPRESENTED IN ANY CAPACITY (E.G. EMPLOYEE. 

ATIORNEY, OR POLITICAUBUSIN:ESS CONSULTANT), WITH OR WITHOUf COMPENSATION, A 

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, 

PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELA TIONSIDP. 

No 

B. HAVE ANY OF YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S ASSOCIATES REPRESENTED, IN ANY CAPACITY, 

WITH OR WITHOUf COMPENSATION, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENmY CONTROLLED 

BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP. 

No 
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C. DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE RECEIVED ANY 

COMPENSATION FROM, OR BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY FINANCIAL OR BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 

WITH, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR ANY ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN 

GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No 

D. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REGISTERED UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS 

REGISTRATION ACT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No 

18. DESCRIBE ANY LOBBYING ACTIVITY DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, OTHER THAN IN AN 

OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT CAPACITY, IN WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE ENGAGED FOR 

THE PURPOSE OF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INFLUENCING THE PASSAGE, DEFEAT, OR 

MODIFICATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION, OR FOR THE PURPOSE OF AFFECTING THE 

ADMINISTRATION AND EXECUTION OF FEDERAL LAW OR PUBLIC POLICY. 

None 

PART D ·FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST 

19. DESCRIBE ANY EMPLOYMENT, BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP, FINANCIAL TRANSACTION, 

INVESTMENT, ASSOCIATION, OR. ACTIVITY (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, DEALINGS 

WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON YOUR OWN BEHALF OR ON BEHALF OF A CLIENT), 

WHICH COULD CREATE, OR APPEAR TO CREATE, A CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE POSIDON 

TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED. 

None 

20. DO YOU INTEND TO SEVER, ALL BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITH YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYERS, 

FIRMS, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES AND/OR PARTNERSHIPS, OR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 

EVENT THAT YOU ARE CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE? IF NOT, PLEASE EXPLAIN. 

Not Applicable 

21. DESCRIBE THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS YOU HAVE MADE OR PLAN TO MAKE, IF YOU 

ARE CONFIRMED. IN CONNECTION WITH SEVERANCE FROM YOUR CURRENT POSIDON. 

PLEASE INCLUDE SEVERANCE PAY, PENSION RIGHTS, STOCK OPTIONS, DEFE.RRED INCOME 

ARRANGEMENTS, AND ANY AND ALL COMPENSATION THAT WILL OR MIGHT BE RECEIVED 

IN THE FUTURE AS A RESULT OF YOUR CURRENT BUSINESS OR PROFESSIONAL 

RELATIONSHIPS. 

Not Applicable 
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22. DO YOU HAVE ANY PLANS, COMMITMENTS. OR AGREEMENTS TO PURSUE OUTSIDE 

EMPLOYMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, DURING YOUR SERVICE WITH THE 

GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No 

23. AS FAR AS CAN BE FORESEEN, STATE YOUR PLANS AFTER COMPLETING GOVERNMENT 

SERVICE. PLEASE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS, 

WRITfEN OR UNWRITTEN, CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT AFTER LEAVING GOVERNMENT 

SERVICE. IN PARTICULAR, DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS, UNDERSTANDINGS, OR OPTIONS 

TO RETURN TO YOUR CURRENT POSITION. 

As a career civil se!"Vant, it is my current Intention to continue in go"Venunent service until I am 

eligible to retire. After ~'Ompleting go"l'emment service, I would hope to remain engaged in government 

affairs and/or national security policy in some capacity. At this point, I have no speeilie plans, nor do I hove 

any agreements or understandings in place related to employment after I complete the period of my 

government sei"Vice. 

24. IF YOU ARE PRESENTLY IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE, DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS OF SUCH 

SERVICE, HAVE YOU RECEIVED FROM A PERSON OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT AN OFFER OR 

EXPRESSION OF INTEREST TO EMPLOY YOUR SERVICES AFTER YOU LEA VB GOVERNMENT 

SERVICE? IF YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No 

25. IS YOUR SPOUSE EMPLOYED? IF YES AND THE NATURE OF THIS EMPLOYMENT IS RELATED 

IN ANY WAY TO THE POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE SEEKING CONFIRMATION, PLEASE 

INDICATE YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYER, THE POSITION, AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THE 

POSITION HAS BEEN HELD. IF YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT IS NOT RELATED TO THE 

POSITION TO WHICH YOU HA VB BEEN NOMINATED, PLEASE SO STATE. 

My spouse is not currently employed. 

26. LIST BELOW ALL CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS. FOUNDATIONS, TRUSTS, OR OTHER 

ENTITIES TOWARD WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OR IN 

WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE HELD DIRECTORSHIPS OR OTHER POSmONS OF TRUST 

DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS. 

NAME OF ENTITY POSmON DATESlffiLD SELF QR SPO!JSE 

None 

27. LIST ALL GIFTS EXCEEDING $! 00 IN VALUE RECEIVED DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS BY 

YOU, YOUR SPOUSE. OR YOUR DEPENDENTS. (NOTE: GIFTS RECEIVED FROM RELATIVES 
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AND GIFTS GfVEN TO YOUR SPOUSE OR DEPENDENT NEED NOT BE INCLUDED UNLESS THE 

GIFT WAS GIVEN WITH YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND ACQUIESCENCE AND YOU HAD REASON TO 

BELIEVE THE GIFT WAS GIVEN BECAUSE OF YOUR OFFICIAL POSmON.) 

I have received gilts from non-federal entities in the performan<:e of my government duties. In 

each insblnce, govemme~~t ethks attorneys and ethies officials have provided guidance and approval for the 

acceptance of any gilts. 

28. UST ALL SECURmES, REAL PROPERTY, PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS, OR OTHER INVESTMENTS 

OR RECEIVABLES WITH A CURRENT MARKET VALUE (OR, IF MARKET VALUE IS NOT 

ASCERTAINABLE, ESTIMATED CURRENT FAIR VALUE) IN EXCESS OF $1,000. (NOTE: THE 

INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE A OF THE DISCLOSURE FORMS OF THE 

OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT 

CURRENT VALUATIONS ARE USED.) 

DESCR.JPTION OF PROPERTY METHOD OF VALUATION 

[INFORMATION REDACTED] 

29. LIST ALL LOANS OR Ol'HER INDEBTEDNESS (INCLUDING ANY CONTINGENT L!ABIUTIES) IN 

EXCESS OF $10,000. EXCLUDE A MORTGAGE ON YOUR PERSONAL RESIDENCE UNLESS IT IS 

RENTED OUT. AND LOANS SECURED BY AUTOMOBILES, HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE, OR 

APPUANCES. (NOTE: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE C OF THE 

DISCLOSURE FORM OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETIDCS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY 

REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT CONTINGENT LIABILITIES ARE ALSO INCLUDED.) 

NATURE OF OBLIGATION NAME OF OBUGEE 

[INFORMATION REDACTED] 

30. ARE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE NOW IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR OTHER FINANCIAL 

OBLIGATION? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE BEEN IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR 

OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE 

EVER BEEN REFUSED CREDIT OR HAD A LOAN APPLICATION DENIED? IF THE ANSWER TO 

ANY OF THESE QUESTIONS IS YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

[INFORMATION REDACTED] 

31. UST THE SPECIFIC SOURCES AND AMOUNTS OF ALL INCOME RECEIVED DURING THE LAST 

FIVE YEARS, INCLUDING ALL SALARIES, FEES, DIVIDENDS, INTEREST, GIFTS, RENTS, 

ROYAL TIES, PATENTS. HONORARIA, AND OTHER ITEMS EXCEEDING $200. (COPIES OF U.S. 

INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THESE YEARS MAY BE SUBSTITUTED HERE, BUT THEIR 

SUBMISSION IS NOT REQUIRED.) 

[INFORMATION REDACTED] 
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[INFO~ATION REDACTED] 

32. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE THE COMMITIEE WITif COPIES OF YOUR AND YOUR SPOUSE'~ i 

FEDERAL INCOME TAX R.E11JRNS FOR THE PAST TifREE YEARS? 

Yes 

33. LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN Wl:llCH YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE FILE ANNUAL INCOME TAX 

RETURNS. 

In addition to our federal income tax returns, we file an income tax return in the Commonwealth or 

Virginia. 

34. HAVE YOUR FEDERAL OR STATE TAX RETURNS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF AN AUDIT, 

INVESTIGATION, OR INQUIRY AT ANY TIME? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS, INCLUDING 

THE RESULT OF ANY SUCH PROCEEDING. 

No 

35. IF YOU ARE AN ATTORNEY, ACCOUNT ANT, OR O'TIIER PROFESSIONAL, PLEASE LIST ALL 

CLIENTS AND CUSTOMERS WHOM YOU BILLED MORE THAN $200 WORTif OF SERVICES 

DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS. ALSO, LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN Wl:llCH YOU ARE 

LICENSED TO PRACTICE. 

Not applicable 

36. DO YOU INTEND TO PLACE YOUR FINANCIAL HOLDINGS AND TifOSE OF YOUR SPOUSE AND 

DEPENDENT MEMBERS OF YOUR IMMED!A TE HOUSEHOLD IN A BLIND TRUST? IF YES, 
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PLEASE FURNISH DETAILS. lF NO, DESCRIBE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR A VOIDING ANY 

POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST. 

No 

37. lF APPLICABLE, LIST THE LAST THREE YEARS OF ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORTS 

YOU HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO FILE wm-I YOUR AGENCY, DEPARTMENT, OR BRANCH OF 

GOVERNMENT. lF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF THESE REPORTS? 

Yes, for years 2011,2012 and 2()13. 

PART E- ETHICAL MATTERS 

38. HA VB YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING OR CITED POR A 

BREACH OF ETillCS OR UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BY, OR BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A 

COMPLAINT TO, ANY COURT, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION, 

DISCIPLINARY COMMIITBB. OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL GROUP? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No 

39. HA VB YOU EVER BEEN INVESTIGATED, HELD, ARRESTED, OR CHARGED BY ANY FEDERAL, 

STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY FOR VIOLATION Ofl ANY FEDERAL 

STATE, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE, OTHER THAN A MINOR 

TRAflfiiC OFFENSE, OR NAMED AS A DEFENDANT OR OTHERWISE IN ANY INDICTMENT OR 

INFORMATION RELATING TO SUCH VIOLATION? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No 

40. HA VB YOU EVER BEEN CONVICTED OF OR ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOLO 

CONTENDERE TO ANY CRIMINAL VIOLATION OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAflfiiC OFFENSE? IF 

SO. PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No 

41. ARE YOU PRBSENTL Y OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A PARTY IN INTEREST IN ANY 

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CNIL LITIGATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE 

DETAILS. 

[INFORMATION REDACTED] 

42. HA VB YOU BEEN INTERVIDWED OR ASKED TO SUPPLY ANY INFORMATION AS A WITNESS OR 

OTHERWISE IN CONNECTION Wmi ANY CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, FEDERAL, OR 
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STATE AGENCY PROCEEDING, GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION, OR CRIMINAL OR CIVIL 

LITIGATION IN TilE PAST TEN YEARS? lF SO. PROVIDE DETAILS. 

Yes. I was interviewed during 2013 in connection with an FBI investigation concerning 

compromise/leak or classified infonnation related to a disrupted terrorism plot in 2010. I was also 

interviewed during 2014 in cmmection with an FBI counterintelligence investigation. In both eases, I was 

interviewed because I was included in a large number of people who bad access by virtue of position to the 

information that was reportedly compromised. In neither ease was I the subject or the target of the 

Investigation. 

43. HAS ANY BUSINESS OF WIDCH YOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR, OR PARTNER 

BEEN A PARTY TO ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CRIMINAL OR CIVIL 

LITIGATION RELEVANT TO TilE PGSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED? IF SO, 

PROVIDE DETAILS. (WITII RESPECT TO A BUSINESS OF WIDCH YOU ARE OR WERE AN 

OFFICER, YOU NEED ONLY CONSIDER PROCEEDINGS AND LIT!GA TION THAT OCCURRED 

WIDLE YOU WERE AN OFFICER OF THAT BUSINESS.) 

No 

44. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ANY INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATION? IF SO, 

PROVIDE DETAILS. 

I have never personaUy been the subject of an inspector general investigation. I have cooperated 

with and participated In inspector general investigations or reviews of component organizations in which I 

served. 

PART F • SECUR!TY INFORMATION 

45. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DENIED ANY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED 

INFORMATION FOR ANY REASON? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN IN DETAIL. 

No 

46. HAVE YOU BEEN REQUIRED TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION FOR ANY SECURITY 

CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION? lF YES, PLEASE BXPLAJN. 

Yes. In 2004, I was required to take a polygraph examination in order to accept a detail assignment 

from the State Department to the National Counterterrorism Center. The exam was adminlstered by the 

United States Secret Service on behalf of the State Department. In 2013, I was required to take a polygraph 

el<llm in connection with my ODNJJNCTC security clearance reinvestigation. 

47. HA VB YOU EVER REFUSED TO SUBMIT TO A PGLYGRAPH EXAMINA TION7 lF YES, PLEASE 

EXPLAIN. 

No 
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PART G • ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

48. DESCRIBE IN YOUR OWN WORDS TilE CONCEPT OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF U.S. 

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN PARTICULAR, CHARACTERIZE WHAT YOU BELIEVE TO BE 

TilE OBLIGATIONS OF TilE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER AND THE 

INTELLIGENCE COMMITfEES OF THE CONGRESS RESPECTIVELY IN THE OVERSIGHT 

PROCESS. 

The concept of congressional oversight foJ" intelligence activities is grounded in both law and 

established prsctice. Under sections 501-503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended), the 

President, and by e1<tenslon the leaders of the Intelligence Community, han an affirmative obligation to keep 

the responsible congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of significant intelligence 

activities- including any significant anticipated lntelligenao activities and significant inteUlgence failures. 

This obligation applies to the National Counterterrorism Center and the Director of NCTC. 

In the late 1970s, both the E1<ccutive and Legislative Brsncbes of government determined that formal 

oversight of the Intelligence Connnunity (IC) was both necessary and desirable. Congress, as the elected 

representatives or the American public, would e1<ecute this oversight of the IC on behalf of the American 

public, while maintaining the security and secrecy necessary for intelligence agencies to perfonn their 

mission. In turn, the Intelllgence Community and its leaders were obligated to keep the Congress fully and 

currently informed on their activities. 

JC policies and procedures for meeting this obligation are delineated in Intelligence Community 

Directive 112, requiring Intelligence Community elements to provide full and current written notification to 

the congressional Intelligence committees of signiftcant anticipated Intelligence actions, significant intelligence 

failures, and illegal activities. In my current position and during my tenure as Acting Director, I have fully 

carried out this obligation. If confirmed, I intend to continue carrying out in full this obligation 8$ set forth in 

both law and IC policy. 

In keeping with established House and Senate rules, the ~ority of the NCTC's congressional 

oversight is conducted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), the House Permanent Select 

Committee on JnteDigenao (HPSCI) and the Defense Subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations 

Committees. Collectively, these are referred to "congressional intelligence committees." 

Beyond being required by statute, congres!iional oversight of intelligence aetivities is critical and 

essential to the proper functioning of a representative democracy. Because a high degree of secn>cy Is 

required to protect much of what the IC does, the American public is not afforded the opportunity to speak 

for or against those activities, to question their purpose or necessity, or to evaluate their continued 

effectiveness. The congressional intelligence committees provide this function and service by representing 

collectively the opinions and perspectives of their constituents and the broader American public. It is my 

belief that the members of these committees, and their staffs, have invested signmcant time and effort In 

developing an advanced understanding of the comple1< issues associated with intelligence collection, analysis 

and operations, thereby establishing themselves as the recognized subject matter experts on intelligence 

matters within their respective chambers. 

The unfortunate series of leaks and disclosures we have seen in recent years bas led the Congress ta 

re-examine intelligence activities previously authorized in the period following the 9/11 attacks on our 

country. While the public way in which this debate is proceeding produces difficult challenges and is not 

without risk in terms of bringing some degree of advantage to our adversaries, debate and dialogue over these 

issues Is necessary and essential, and in my view, should be welcomed. Tbe members of the Intelligence 

Community, like all federal public servants, serve as stewards of the publko trust. Should the public's elected 

representatives choose to modify or change the laws that authorize and bound the activities of the IC, the 

leaders of the Community are obligated to operste within those revised boundaries. 

If I were to be confirmed as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, I would pledge to 

operate within the boundaries of the law, and to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and 
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currently informed of NCTC activities in order to facilitate the conduct of proper oversight of NCTC by the 

legislative branch. 

49. EXPLAIN YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE 

NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER. 

The statutory responsibilities or the National Counterterrorism Center and its Director are 

deUneated in section 1021 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The law 

requires the Director to report to the President of the United States when exercising the Center's whole·of· 

government strategic operational planning functions, and to the Director of National Intelligence for all other 

activities and functions. 

NCTC's mission, and that of its Director, is focused singularly on the prevention, detection and 

disruption of acts of terrorism directed against the United States and its interests both at home and abroad. 

The largest share of NCTC resources is aimed at providing all-source intelligence analysis, ranging from 

strategic to tactical, and incorporating s<~uree information from across the full spectrum of collection 

disciplines. NCTC's unique statutory authorities allow its personnel to draw upon both foreign and domestic 

inteHigence to produce integrated analysis. 

Beyond its analytical mission, NCTC and its Director are responsible for ensuring that federal 

departments and agencies are provided with aU-source Intelligence support to eJ<ecnte assigned 

counterterrorism activities. NCTC has positioned itself as the information sharing and coUaboration hub of 

an Intelligence Community architecture focused on terrorism issues. NCTC has developed a regular battle 

rhythm of written products, secure video teleconferences and other mechanisms to ensure that federal 

departments and agencies have access to the latest, timeliest reporting and analysis on CT issues. In addition 

to serving federal partners In the executive branch, NCTC also supports the Congress with a constant flow of 

Information and analysis, both to the appropriate committees of the Congress, as well as to the Capitol Police 

El<ecutive Board. NCTC is also playing an increasingly Important role in providing terrorism information 

and analysis to the state, local and tribal community of customers, working closely with FBI and DHS. 

The Center and its Director are also responsible for maintaining the central and shared knowledge 

bank on known and suspected terrorists (KSTs), international terror groups, as well as the networks of 

support associated with KSTs and known terrorist groups. NCTC accomplishes this mission through the 

design. operation and maintenance of a cltlll&ified database caned TIDE, or the Terrorism Identities Datamart 

Environment. Operating under interagency developed and approved watchlisting guidance, identifying 

information on KSTs is provided to the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSCl to support watchlisting and 

screening by other federal agencies and departments. 

Finally, NCTC conducts whole·of-govemment planning to support the government's CT strategies 

and plans. This Is one area of its mandate where NCTC responsibilities extend beyond the bounds of the 

Intelligence Community, requiring that NCTC planners engage and coordinate with parroer:s all across the 

federal government to ensure that all elements of national power are mobilized to counter our terrorist 

adversaries. Working in close cooperation with the National Security Council staff, NCTC supports tbe 

President In the development of appropriate CT strategies and plans. 

Finally, the Director ofNCTC also serves as the National Intelligence Manager on CT intelligence 

matters for the Director of National Intelligence. In this capacity, NCTC leads the CT Conununity In 

identifying knowledge gaps in CT analysis and then focusing collection/production resources on closing those 

gaps. 
52 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 33 here 93215.033

AFFIRMATION 

I, Nicholas J. Rasmussen , DO SWEAR THAT THE ANSWERS I HAVE 

PROVIDED TO THIS QUESTIONNAIRE ARE ACCURATE AND COMPLETE. 

!t{!J!:Jof<j [SIGNATURE] 

(Name, 

<Notary) 

[SIGNATURE] 

CHAUNCEY ERIC OEWAYNE FOR6£S NOTARY PUBLIC 

REGISTRATION II 357756 COMMONWEAlTH OF VIRGINIA 

MY COMMISSION ~XPlR~S 

OCT09£R 31, 2017 
53 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 34 here 93215.034

TO THE CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE: 

In connection with my nomination to be the Director of the National 

Counterterrorism Center, I hereby express my willingness to respond to requests to 

appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate. 

----[SIGNATURE] 

Signature 

Date: --'r-'-f+(_,_f...c3+/__,:d>"-O_I_c.r-t __ _ l ( . I 
54 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 35 here 93215.035

! :1l1,·d :--,: 

Office of Government Ethics \, '\\ • ~~ l/ ~ ·)(ll I 

\\.I' 

The Htmomble Dianne Feinstein 

Chairman 

Select Committee on Intelligence 

United States Senate 

Washington. DC 2051 () 

Dem Madam Chairman: 

In accordance with the Ethics in Government Act or 197R. I enclose n copy of the 

linancial disclosure report tikd by Nicholas J. Rasmussen, who has been nominated by 

PreSident Obama ti1r the position of Director, National Counterterrorism Center. Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence. 

We have reviewed the report and have obtained ad vic~ from the agency concerning any 

possible cont1ict in light of its functions and the nominee's proposed duties. Also enclosed is an 

ethics agreement outlining the actions that the nominee will undertake to avoid conflicts of 

interest. Unless a date for compliance is indicated in the ethics agreement, the nominee must 

fully comply within three months of confirmation with any action specified in the ethics 

agreement. 

Based thereon, we believe that this nominee is in compliance with applicable lnws and 

regulations governing cont1icts of interest 

Enclosures 

Sincerely. 

[ SIGNATUP.E) 

Walter M. Shaub, Jr. 

Director 
55 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 36 here 93215.036

Susan Gibson 

Designated Agency Ethics Official 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

WBShlngton, D.C. 20511 

Dear Ms •. Gibson, 

NOV I 4 2U14 

1be purpose of this letter is to describe the steps that I will take to avoid m:ry actual or 

apparent conflict of inrei:est if confirmed for the position of the Director, National 

Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence. 

As ret[uired by I 8 U.S.C. § 20&(a), I wilLnot participate personally and sUbstantially in 

any particular matter that has a al!eet and predictable ·effect on ni.y financial interests or those of 

any persao whose interests are :imputed to me, unless I first obtain a written waiver, pursuant to 

I & U.S.C. § 208(b)(1), or qualify for a regulatory exemption, pursuallt to 18 U.S.C. 208(b)(2). I 

understand that the. interests of the following persons are implited to me: any spouse or minor 

child of mine; any general partner of a partnership in which I am a limited or general partner; any 

organization in which I sllf"e 311 an qfflcer, director, ~e, general partner or employee; and 

any pei:Son or organization with which I am negotiati,pg or :!lave an arrangement concerning 

prospective employment. 

I understand that as an appoinree I am :required to sign the Ethics Pledge (Exec. Order 

No. 13490) and tba:t I will be bound by tbe .reqtrl:rements and restrictions therein in addition to the 

commitments I have made in. this ethics agreement. 

I have been advised that this ethics agreement will be pasted publicly, consistent with 

5 U.S.C. § 552, on the website oftbe U.S. Office ofGovernment Ethics with other ethics 

agreements of Presidential nominees who file pHblic financial disclosure reports. 

Sincerely, 

[SIGNATURE] 

Nicholas J. RasmusSt;n 

Insert offset folio 37 here 93215.037LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

~~"P:!.\'l"'· 1~1n Executive Branch Personnel PUBLIC FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT Form A

Ol-{

u.s. om~ Gt"Qovcrmmp;n mhl~ ~~=~~:;',"~~::;rj¢<t\o RepotUng r"''-"' CmnduYm ji'w"""'"" IT'""'""lo" T•""""'"'"""'WAPPI'- Fee far L,a~-e FlU

! suc~a 0 c(lv~:rmlbl!ll~fK!rt -i'ltlnUnf:"tor~ Flk.."'f'O ...:t!~JIMom:l!,l..l;jJ\I~rJ ~; AllY indlvldual who J.a requir

AN\roN1~t I 1 Candidate 1 f thb report and does .to more t

Un. N~mt: flr.st 1'/ll,me and ~11dtlli! ltlltl:\l aJ~rtheaate the ~ls req

ReportL11g filed, or1 tf an extenston b: &m

Indlvldual't Na""" RASI,IUSSEN NICHOLAS J, th.IUl30 day& after Uw last aay 

filfns. extension period, shall h

'f!tleori'Mitlan Df/p;;l:t'tnlfU'It U.!' Agern:y (if Appllt.'ttblt>) wu.$200fee, Pooltlon for Wh!th 

Pl!lng ~rtelot, NCTC ODNI ~eportlns: P~:rt

lneum.brintt:' The reporting 

Locatlor'l. of Addr~1s tNumher; StrCet, t.;lcy~~~~ :~ llld Zfl' CDdtJ 'J'etepl'lonl! No. (Include Ar~Jt COrl~J the precelilng calendar year ~

--- IlofScheduleC an4Part I-OfS

PtOU!lt Office 1500 Tysons Mclean DrW&, Mct.&an VA '22101 1571-260.6161 wbt!n:! you musJ.alsQ lndude th

(ot"IOI'W;I.f~l\$~4rut;) 

~uptoth!!dateyouOie. P

11tlt: of l:'u~ltlonuJ aM D:1lttts} Heltl ~dull! DIs not applicable. t'Gs!tllnt(J) H~ld Ullth the. Jle®al Go\le:tiUU~t D!Jrlnl the Pntel!'d.I!Uil O.puty Director, NCTC Termination fllle.rr. The re

U MNlth&·{IfNot~4$AIMvvl Juno, 20t2.1o Prf;!sent (August 2014) ~r1n4 begins at the. erKl ot the 

coveted by your previous nun

at the date. or termination. Par

Nam~ ur Conltr»s!Mntll Cnmmlttt:t~ C:on.lh.lt~rlltK Nomln:ttlun Ou VGU Intend to Crt! a!.!!: n mtllO~:d DNer:olntd Trust? hc:ddenth.l Num.Jnee• SubJect Schtdulr! P 1$ uot app!lqtble. 

lO SetU[t! CunflrnttUon 

I~Sc.\W-Comm.~cn:l.-1\z.\\iqt'cul. 0Ye• "-'~l>b Nominees, New J!ntrl.ntt 

Candidates tot Presldcn

C!:nttk'Jllk.m !iignatur!! al' kefl(lrtlnJ:Iru.ilvtl.b..mt l)au O·funrli.iJ'.ty, \'ffllr) Vice Preddent: 

~-~TJPYth.uthe~t1.tl#H':ilUt hlY~ tt/!Cf)cJ !'!'-( Sthedute A·~The repnrt1ng 

nudcouU\ltfurmand•.U•tea~d ~an:uue.comptw:lllldJ::OITtfi.l far lncorne (BLOCK C} !s Ute: pr

tQI,hebe.nofmykrn':wllt!d~ [SIGNATURE] calendar year and the .current 

year up fothada.teoffU\ng. V

Otl\erlle'llew Sl,:tature of atru;:r R.evlewtr Date (Montll, Di'IY1 Ye~r) a.s of ;my date you choose tha

(J!'~Ited\1)' 31 days {lt the aate ol nung. -) Schedule: JI-Not appUcabl

--

Schedule C, Pa.rt l (Uab

AIRIQ'ethiCIO!Ikl&l'tOpinlop, ( Signature of p~!lJnal.~ ·At:e.nc~ f.thlu Offlrl.all~lewtnB: Offld-.1 Oat!' lMottl'h. DRy, Yw1 reporting pertod ts the preced

CMIMbuttoi'WIIImidooUII'!Miflf!din~ 

II /17 j;.ot'f 

year and t:he 01rrertt c.ate~dat 

f'l~l~ill.ajiM:I\I(!tbin~~ [SIGNATURE] any date you <:.hoosA that lS W

1::=,~==;:-(~lb 

of the date of flUng. 

--

Slc:n•ture 

--

/1 llate (Monm_DJ!y, Y~r} Schedule c. Part JI(Agr

Offlce: of GOVi!mment BtbJq 

11/17/2ol'/ N::ran..aements}-Show any jlgr

l!•e OnJy [SIGNATURE] artans,~enu a$ of the date o

CQ!1lmentt Qf Re\ll~lnl QnlWtts. ({f~d~IUQn~l .sm«.ll .reqlltred, 11ft! thit n\let'H JfdeAf Ibis~) { I Sch~dulc ti-The .reporttng 

thl!: pre.tedlng two calendar )

tbe.cut'r'C!n,t caiendtryeiU' up 

{!) \"'X" .._~<-£, ~<.toll, 0\')N-:l. • II\ 11\\o.l. 

(Cbri.k btJx l(fUI~g Mft:lli/O+lltanltd if hldl_tat~: num/)qo .of day$--) 0 oftuJng. 

At«IJ:I:Y Ute Onl

(Chr:d. box j(commc!IU41 .111: (Ont/nued un file' rev<!'~ slde) 0 QGB use Qnly 

-- -·-&!It""'-

Insert offset folio 38 here 93215.038LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

OOEFarml'II{R.cv. !'U2!1l!J 

Repon.Jna htdtvldual'a Ntn}e 

Rl\llMUSSEH, !>IICHOV\SJ. SCHEDULE A PageNulnbct

T 2 

Auets a11d Income ValuationOfAssets 

at dose of reporting period Income; type and amount. If '"None {or less than $

checked, no other entry Is needed 'fn Block C for tha

61.00< A BLOCK B B!.OCK C 

Ty e Amount product\.Qn of Income whlc;;h had a fair market -. S< 

.. • .... 0 'd -. 8 & s< 8 2 9 0 2 Q ln Jnrome durlng tb.e togetl,ler M § q (5 N O q 

"" 0 § q § d I 8 0 § 

Foryoursclf,atso.repurtthtumun=eandactual 8 ... :§ .£ o $i! § § S 8 8 vi§ 

ttl g ·::;: CJ d ": si a :'J § fil q vl g ;i Q. • J! ;; V: V: .,:._ ' § Q g- 8 C1 .S F' 'H a: f.l . .!! t; ::; ": • .;.. § ,....8 § lnconteofmorethanSl.OOO(exteptreportthc :5 • - r< 0 0 8 ....i q, K 8" g 'Q '2 i I:;:! 1.!1 I ' ' ..-.i ..-I 8 actual amount of ittl)' bonQrarla 0111:4 $ZOO of - § a 8 .ct .. §" § 0 .... i I} J j 'fj ._ • 8 8 8 8 K 8 

yourSp<1113e}. ...< !;f § § tl ...; vi B v tJ ...r ·r-; ·Jti' g ...; P 

• ui·-····-6·6 

' 

Othe

Incom

(Specif

Type& 

Actua

Antoum

jl ___ J-Kemp;tonc llquity Fund lRA--;;;;;; SOO'i:r;- -.- 1 1 Stale Departlneitt Federal Credl:l Union (cash """"""') 

I Vanguard lnd1Yidu41 RaUremeot AecounlRellffJ»>'Ilt Fund 203$ for apoosli!l 

t I Vanguard lndWkh.m! Retlrameot Aectlurrt -

T!irgel Relkament fuod '2030 for aaff 

4 1 Spollf.tfa HOO!$. Butlne$« X 

l X 

X )( 

X X 

X X 

X X I I I I I II I 1 1 

,....,., 

asseVIncqme I$ either th1!t¢ftbe nlt=r9i'jOintiY.f1eld 

Insert offset folio 39 here 93215.039LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

OOJUI~rm17a(Rev.l212011) 

~C,F,1t.Part2634 

l.J.S.O~ofOovcmntf)!JtE!hl~~t 

Do not completo Schedule B If you are a new entrant, nominee, or Vlco Presidential or Presidential Candidate 

~Jiilt\dlvidua!'J Name! I SCHEDULE B I'I&~NtJmhll

RASMUOOEN. N!CHOI.AS J. 3 

Part I: Transactions 

NoneO Report any ~un:base, sate, or exchange DQ not report a transiWtlentnvolvJng 

~fiJ;f;!~~rl:rJ:~;o=::rl~ of any property u.sed solelY as your personal resldence, or a uanss.ctlon. Jtolely between 

~~L 

Amount of ·rnru;KIIon (x

real property. st;oc:ks, bonds, commodity 

~~~~: 

~~~:C:~~:~~t~~~btodt g .:.g §

futures, and orl1,er securities when t):le. "'" .:.§ ~§ §§ §g amount Q[ the transactlon exceeded $1,000. to tndlcate sales made pursuMt to·.a {Me., &q I f ~n~ 

g

Jndude transacrton$ that m;:uJted tn a J.oos. certificate of diVe!>tlture from OCE. I.>.ty, rr.J 

~g~~ 

gg ·§ 

l~entif!t•Uon or Asmt$ ~ ;;~ ;;;~ ~~ ... c: ~~ ~;; ~~~~ ~-

balllple !:tm:n!JIIriltldCQfllmolj ' 1/t!W I ' 

' 

' 

. 

' 

·~~~~~~'J;. 

j~~~ ~:;; ~~~~~u~~c.z'J!~~:s:~~~Yd~t;:c~e~~~ra:se~:~: 

=~~~~:~~:

~~e:-~~~~!t~therheld 

Part II: Gifts, Reimbursements, and Travel Expenses 

~:~;::;r::!r:~t."m 

~K:~::.~:i~:Jbl:ft:~~::t:~~:::r:~-

the U.S. Oov~rnmont; given to your agency ln .connection with official tr

rtee.ived from reiB1ives: received by your spouse or dependent child total

fnod, or cnlcr!Bioment) receive from one souree totaling more than $:350 an~ !~1=:~1~=~~k~~~~;:;~~~~;s 

~f~~;~ed 

~~Ps1&':

d=~:{

{~ trave!~related cash reimbursements mceived from one source totalin~ more fhM $350, For conflicts analy:~is, it is helpful to indicate a basis fo.rrecelpt, suoh total wlue from one soUt'ce, exclude !terns vrorth ~0 or 1ess. See instru

~Y:rlf~.a~~~F~ 

=~~~f::~f~~~~r!l~f~~:~~~ 

~~~;~~~:1

ftl~rary, 

for oUlet' ~elusions, 

Qat(;$, and the natul'(l Qf !:'XJ)ml$C$ pf(!vided. El:clude anything given to you by 

Source (Nl!lil~ llnd AddrrH) JJrlet i)<!~(;rlptlon 

~m~~:~ . .'''~·~~~e::_.~~---

Altllrte ticket, hutc! fOOM 1ft ~~JJ incldem m nltlonal J::OUfet:ll,n~ 6/U/i!l (p!:rsonJ.ltCtiVIty unrclll<!d to ~"Jy) 

Ftanlr.)om:t,Sanfnnc:bt1l,CA t;tt;;W7._~--;;;i,~)- ...... ------------------------ 

I 

2 

' 

• 

' 

Insert offset folio 40 here 93215.040LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

OGEF<~rm278(ko:r.IM6tl) 

$C.FJthrt26l4 

U.S. Offieo:(I(Gov.unmlmtEtbi" 

JteporUnalnt!Mdua1's-NUW!. 

AASMUSSii'N, NIOl!QtNIJ. I SCHEDULE C 

Part I: Liabilities 

Report llablUctes over $1Qt)OO owed 

to any ot~e credJtor at any tlme dudng the reporting period by you. 

your spouse, or dependent children. 

Clu~ck the hlg~st amount QWed 

dur-Ing the r-eporting period. l!.xt:Jud-e 

c;rctlllcD lNitmllla.ndA~J 

a mortgag.e on your personal residence unless lt Is rented out; loans secured by a,utomOb!les, household furniture 

or appliances; and tlabilltles o~ to ce«aln relatives lts.ted ln lnstrocttons. Se~ inStrlU4:ions fQr tevolvlng dtarge accounts, 

Type or Uabll""t 

Examp~ 

IJ:H!L,fll~fiit~W~I~tt'l!!:..,oc ___ L~~~~.l!f.Oe!!.'l:J...~!!!.--._ 

r,;~,ttn Jurn~~. w.mn~o'Wn, oc· I rromtsney norc 

t I Weill F&I"!JI) 6al'lk I 

Mor~gl:l9!1 prlmary retldam::e 

NonoO 

Incurred "'" 

ti99 "" ~12 ""'"""""

4 

eateiOrv of Amount or Value (I!) Term ap(lUcabf.e If t~~~~~~~~~~~~~IUI~JlUi

!!!".!:.. .. onPemanli -~~~4-~~-+-~~-

X 

*This 

with the aut:gory apptles: only if the 1\~blllt.y Is SQjely that of the filet's spouse ar dependent ¢tlldren, If~ U~blllty Ia that of rhe !UI!r orR 'Joint liability of tlll!Ill~r spouse or depel'ldellt chlldren, m-ark the other higher c.aleple:a, as appropriate. 

Part II: Agreements or Arrangements 

Report your ngcel!me:nu or o\rraugcmenu for. (1) c.onttnutng participation ln. an employee benefit plan (e.g, pension. 4Qlk, deferred compensation); (2) t::ontlnua- tlon of payment by a former employer (Jnduding severance pa.ym<lnts); (3) leaves ~absence; and (4) future employment. See lnstructlons regarding the 

lng of ne.l,(ot!atlons for any of t\lest! atn~.ngements or benefits. 

Stuvs and Tll!rms of ll.l'l)' Agreement or Arr:tl'li'tfl'lent 

~mpte ----~- l'unuant to !)artnerahlp agrl!flmenc, w!ll r«e-1111! lUlllJI aum p:~yment o.f tapH~I.ummt tr p~rtnenhlp Jliit~ ~kultled on HtvicOl ptrl"or!'Md through l/00. ''""' ooe JanCA·&: Smtttt, flnmetiiWn, Statt- 

Insert offset folio 41 here 93215.041LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

QO£lfooa21t(~.ll/l0tl) 

SC..P.Jlt'af1~)4 

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RePQnlns Tndlvlrl11•l's N•rt~~J RASMUSSEN, hiiCHOlAS J. I SCHEDULED l"'''"''mbo< 5 

Part I; Positions Held Outside U.S. Government Report any posttlons held during the applicable reporting period, wlwther CQmpen- sated or not. Poslnons Include but are not limited to thosa of an oftker, director. organization 9r educall-onallnstltutlon. Bxclude po$itlpns with rcllgl

soci~!, fraternal, or pelitica1 enUt!es and those solely of ·an honor.a,ry trustee-. genera! partner, propt1c,tor, representative, emplo~ or consultant of 

any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business ent!:foftse or ai1v~ nou"proflt nat11re. 

nlutkm (Niuite and AddreuJ ofOr nlntlon Po:IJtlanHeld Pram (Mo., 

l~t'IAnn.(lffl.ock~u.·N'I',NY ~~~-,_ 

_______ -- ""'' EKamp~ ~AA;&i~~;;;t~,s;;;------------ 

;;;;;;;:----------1iii

I 

' 

' 

• 

' 

T 

Part II: Compensation in Excess of $$.,000 Paid by One Source P:c:~\,~~~P.;:;~f:i~t~:."M~i

RepQrt sources of more than SS,OOO compensation received by you or your noft1)ro0t organlza.tlon when Pte$identlal or Presldentlal C

~:l=~~~j~~~~~~~~cl~~~~~!~~r c~Yei~u~~~:t~'%~~~~ of you directly provlded the · !rervlces genernt!og ~fee or payment of more than $5,QOO. You 

corporation, ffnn, partnership, or other busfneas enterprise, or any {)tl\er need not reporr the U.S, Government as a source._ 

! Sw .. un (Mime ;:nd Addl'lllls) 

IJrld~rlpt!ot'l;ofllutlts ! 

t~Junei&S!rdth,tlrnuetaMI,Siau: ............. 

: li#nl~ 

~1et;-tful~.;{d~:f~;;; 

4s;;t'h).""Mo'";IM~I;;----.- ..... J$i'M~hi~OOWitti'Uftt"'veniiY"WM'rn.iU.OO-----~----- -

!1 

' 

' 

' 

' 

' 

-----------~--·-·--···-· - ·----- --·· 

-·----··--------
61 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 42 here 93215.042

SELECT COMlVIITTEE ON 

INTELLIGENCE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

Additional Prehearing Questions 

for 

Mr. Nicholas Rasmussen 

upon his nomination to be 

the Director of the 

National Counterterrorism Center 
62 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 43 here 93215.043

Responsibilities of the Director of tile National Counterterrorism Center 

QUESTION 1: The National Security Intelligence Refonn Act of2004 created 

the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the position of Director of the 

NCTC. 

• What is your understanding of the unique role of the NCTC within the 

Intelligence Community (I C)? 

The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) serves a unique and critical role within the 

Intelligence Community (IC), one that is clearly articulated in the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of2004 (IRTPA), which serves as the statutory basis forNCTC. 

Among its provisions, this law directs that NCTC: 

• Serve as the primary organization of the U.S. government for analyzing and integrating 

all intelligence possessed or acquired by the U.S. government pertaining to terrorism and 

counterterrorism (CT), excepting exclusively domestic terrorists and domestic CT. 

• Conduct strategic operational planning for CT activities, integrating all instruments of 

national power, including diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, 

and law enforcement activities within and among agencies. 

• Ensure agencies have appropriate access to and receive all-source intelligence support 

necessary to execute CT plans or perform independent alternative analysis. 

• Serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists 

(KSTs) and international terror groups, as well as their goals, strategies, capabilities, and 

networks of contacts and support. 

The law also directs the NCTC Director to advise the Director ofNational Intelligence (DNI) 

on the extent to which the CT program recommendations and budget proposals of the 

departments, agencies, and elements of the U.S. government conform to the priorities 

established by the President. 

No other CT component of the IC has this range of responsibilities. In conducting all-source 

analysis and maintaining the database that underpins all government watchlisting, NCTC is 

authorized access to all terrorism-related information, both foreign and domestic. NCTC's 

whole-of-government role in strategic operational planning is also unique. 

Beyond the statutory framework that sets NCTC apart from other IC components, the Center 

also enjoys a unique position within the IC due to the composition of its workforce. The mix 

of permanent employees, detailees, and contractors brings a unique diversity of skills, 

abilities, and backgrounds into NCTC. 

2 
63 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 44 here 93215.044

• What is your understanding of the specific statutory responsibilities ofthe 

Director? 

The statutory responsibilities ofNCTC and its Director are delineated in Section I 021 of the 

IRTPA. The law requires the Director to report to the President of the United States when 

exercising the Center's whole-of-government strategic operational planning functions, and to 

the DNI for all other activities and functions. 

NCTC's mission, and that of its Director, is focused singularly on the prevention, detection 

and disruption of acts ofterrorisrn directed against the United States and its interests both at 

home and abroad. The largest share ofNCTC resources is allocated to providing all-source 

intelligence analysis--from strategic to tactical-that incorporates information from the full 

spectrum of collection disciplines. NCTC's unique statutory authorities allow its personnel 

to draw all of tile both foreign and domestic intelligence possessed or acquired by the U.S. 

government to produce its integrated analysis. 

Beyond its analytic mission, NCTC and its Director are responsible for ensuring that federal 

departments and agencies are provided with all-source intelligence support to execute 

assigned counterterrorism activities. NCTC has positioned itself as the information sharing 

and collaboration hub of the IC counterterrorism architecture. NCTC has developed a regular 

battle rhythm of written products, secure video teleconferences, and other mechanisms to 

ensure that federal departments and agencies have access to the most current reporting and 

analysis on CT issues. In addition to serving federal partners in the executive branch, NCTC 

also supports the Congress with a constant flow of information and analysis, both to the 

appropriate committees of the Congress, as well as to the Capitol Police Executive Board. 

NCTC is playing an increasingly important role in providing terrorism information and 

analysis to the state, local, and tribal community of customers, working closely with and 

often through FBI and DHS. 

The Center and its Director are responsible for maintaining the U.S. government's central 

and shared knowledge bank on KSTs, international terror groups, and their contacts and 

support networks. NCTC accomplishes this mission through the design, operation and 

maintenance of a classified database called TID.E, or the Terrorism Identities Datamart 

Environment. Operating under interagency-developed and -approved watchlisting standards, 

identifying information on KSTs is provided to the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) 

to support watchlisting and screening by other federal agencies and departments. 

NCTC conducts whole-of-government planning to support CT strategies and plans. This is 

one area of its mandate where NCTC responsibilities extend beyond the bounds of the IC, 

requiring that NCTC planners engage and coordinate with partners all across the federal 

government to ensure tl1at all elements of national power are mobilized to counter our 

terrorist adversaries. Working in close cooperation with the National Security Council 

(NSC) staff, NCTC supports the President in the development of appropriate CT strategies 

and plans. 

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Finally, the Director ofNCTC serves as the National Intelligence Manager for CT 

intelligence matters for the DNI. In this capacity, NCTC leads the CT community in 

identifying knowledge gaps in CT analysis and then focusing collection/production resources 

on closing those gaps. 

• Have you discussed with Director Clapper his specific expectations of you, 

if confirmed as Director, and his expectations of the NCTC as a whole? If 

so, please describe these expectations. 

Director Clapper and I have discussed his expectations of me. First, I was gratified to learn 

that the DNI supported me to succeed Matt Olsen as Director ofNCTC and sought consensus 

across the Executive Branch for my potential nomination. 

Second, the DNI, respectful of the need not to assume confirmation, has simply told me to 

"do no harm" as Acting Director. If confirmed, I will be the third Director ofNCTC during 

the DNI's tenure, and he has indicated that he is interested in continuity and stability--not 

revolutionary change. 

So, I believe that if I am confirmed he would look to me to sustain the themes he has 

emphasized over the last four plus years. In my conversations with Director Clapper, he has 

consistently directed me-and former Director Olsen-to ensure that NCTC is fully and 

completely embracing and executing the roles and missions envisioned for NCTC in the 

IRTPA, most specifically with respect to the sharing of terrorism information and the 

production of terrorism analysis. He has further directed that NCTC continue to look for 

ways to reduce and ultimately eliminate unnecessary redundancy from across the IC with 

respect to terrorism analysis, while ensuring that we provide appropriate scope for 

competitive/alternative analysis. As NCTC addresses its challenges regarding analysis of 

large data holdings, Director Clapper has urged that NCTC integrate our information 

technology (IT) investment strategies such that we are able to take full advantage of lC 

efforts to evolve toward a common cloud-based platform where we can easily and securely 

share information across the IC. NCTC stands to benefit greatly from that effort as it takes 

shape. 

NCTC Mission 

QUESTION 2: The NCTC was designed to serve as the primary organization in 

the U.S. Government for integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to 

terrorism and counterterrorism and to conduct strategic operational planning by 

integrating all instruments of national power. 

• What is your assessment of the NCTC's current strengths and weaknesses? 

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NCTC's two greatest strengths are its exceptional workforce and its unique access to 

counterterrorism-related data. NCTC has a dedicated, diverse, and integrated workforce with 

nearly half of its personnel drawn from across the IC. This creates a collaborative, inclusive 

atmosphere of professionals with varied IC experiences. Additionally, NCTC's strong 

relationship with IC counterparts and its position as the only IC entity with access to all 

foreign and domestic data streams allows this uniquely diverse workforce to provide the most 

comprehensive, coordinated all-source analysis. I would also note that NCTC does not 

engage in, or direct, operations, and we see this as a strength that allows us a unique and 

neutral perspective for CT analysis and strategic operational planning. 

Because ofNCTC's reliance on the skills and background of military, law enforcement, 

intelligence and other national security professionals, the current fiscal environment creates 

challenges to maintain a diverse workforce that draws fully from and represents the IC. 

Budgeting uncertainty is complicating interagency efforts to provide detailees to the Center. 

NCTC is also challenged to manage and fully exploit the data to which it has access. NCTC 

must continue to invest in technology-based tools to power more comprehensive data 

analysis, increase the speed at which information sharing, analysis and collaboration can 

occur, and automate production workflows. NCTC's new Office of Data Strategy and 

Innovation will help integrate mission and technology. 

• What do you believe are the greatest challenges facing the NCTC? 

NCTC's greatest challenge is the evolving and adaptive threat we face-both at home and 

abroad-including addressing the growing risk posed by self-radicalized and "lone wolf" 

threats. In assessing the threat and how best to mitigate it, NCTC relies on the skills and 

background of military, law enforcement, intelligence and other national security analysts 

who are detailed to NCTC from across the U.S. government. As I noted previously, the 

current fiscal environment creates challenges to maintain a workforce that is diverse and 

draws fully from and represents the IC. NCTC is also grappling with how to best address 

"big data'' and the growing role of social media in counterterrorism analysis, which is why 

our focus on technology is paramount. The task of identifying terrorists and plots is futther 

complicated by collection challenges that have grown even more acute in the context of 

unauthorized disclosures. Increasingly terrorists are using secure means to communicate, 

greatly reducing our access to critical information about their plans, capabilities and 

intentions. As secure applications are more available, our job will become even harder. 

Finally, NCTC must continue to institutionalize its role in strategic operational planning by 

helping the CT community think and plan strategically in the midst of immediate threats and 

issues. Ensuring our efforts to implement CT policy and strategy are integrated and 

incorporate a whole-of-government approach will reduce gaps in planning and avoid the 

unnecessary duplication of efforts. 

• Please explain your vision for the NCTC, including your views on its current 

and future priorities and what the organization should look like five years 

from now. 

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My vision is for an NCTC that is fully staffed, with an agile, diverse workforce armed with 

the tools and data necessary to tackle the challenges 1 have previously described--an 

evolving and adapting threat, "big data," and a more security-conscious terrorist enemy. 

In the ten years since its establishment, NCTC has made significant progress in fulfilling the 

vision set out by the 9/11 Commission and the Congress in 2004. I believe NCTC has 

become a recognized center of gravity in the counterterrorism effort. lf confirmed, I will 

continue to build on the successes of my predecessors to evolve and improve the Center's 

capacity to carry out its mission. 

I cannot emphasize enough the importance of people, technology, and information sharing. 

These tools are all critical to achieving the vision set out for us by the Congress. We face a 

complex, evolving and diverse threat. We will only meet this threat through realizing the 

synergy of effective information sharing, constantly seeking innovation, and fmding the right 

expertise from across disciplines. · 

If confirmed, I would continue to focus investment on people and technology-the keys to 

increasing NCTC's success. I would support efforts to deepen integration and collaboration 

with state, local and tribal partners, as well as key foreign partners. l would also continue to 

promote information sharing and the integration of data necessary in our counterterrorism 

efforts, ensuring that appropriate technology is deployed to support NCTC's missions. 

• What specific benchmarks should be used to assess the NCTC's 

performance? 

We are a partner-and customer-oriented organization and, as such, we find that the best 

measure of our performance is the degree to which we are relied on by our partners and 

customers. We seek to be the first one they tum to, and the one partner they always want ai 

the table when decisions are being made. By that measure, NCTC is performing at a very 

high level. 

When looking at NCTC's performance, I would use a few key metrics to assess how we are 

doing in each of our core mission areas. For our analysis, we gauge readership and feedback 

from our products online through our CURRENT portal, which is available at the Top 

Secret/compartmented level, as well as the Secret level. We also get daily feedback from 

partners and senior leaders in department and agencies and from the White House. With 

respect to watch listing, we use the number of enhancements as an indicator of progress, as 

that is the best measure of how much useful information is contained or added in the 

database. We also monitor timeliness for Kingfisher visa screening systems to ensure we 

meet our and the Department of State's stated goals. We are mindful of any backlog in our 

processing ofKST nomination, enhancement, or removal requests. 

NCTC's performance also can be measured by the same standards NCTC, as the CT mission 

manager, uses to assess the !C's counterterrorism performance: 

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I. We evaluate the IC's progress against high priority CT intelligence gaps using objective 

measures. 

2. We assess customer satisfaction with overall CT intelligence support through a subjective 

survey. 

To evaluate our progress against high priority CT intelligence gaps, we bring together senior 

CT analysts and analytic managers from across the IC annually. These experts collaborate to 

identify and develop CT Priority Intelligence Gaps-topics that these experts identify as 

deserving particular analytic attention over the course of the next year. 

We also use a subjective approach to assess customer satisfaction with overall intelligence 

support to the CT mission. We annually survey a broad range of customers from five 

customer segments (DOD/Warfighter, Homeland Security, Law Enforcement, Policy, and 

non-Departmental Intel) to determine their satisfaction with CT intelligence support. 

Lastly, we recognize we are in a zero tolerance environment for our business. Any time we 

experience a terrorist attack on U.S. personnel at home or abroad, we go through a rigorous 

process of self-examination to ensure we continue to achieve the high standards to which we 

hold ourselves. 

Current Terrorist Threat 

QUESTION 3: The United States is arguably facing the most challenging threat 

environment since the September lllh attacks over a decade ago. 

• How do you characterize the terrorist threat that is confronting the United 

States at this time? 

The terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland is evolving. It is being driven by instability in 

critical regions, shifting local and regional factors and conditions, the increasing diffusion of 

the al-Qa'ida movement, and a more diverse and adaptive enemy. The terrorist threat today 

emanates from a more geographically dispersed area, increasing the likelihood oflow-level 

attacks against U.S. and other Western interests overseas and also unsophisticated plots by 

individuals and small groups in North America. 

The instability in the Levant, the Middle East, and Africa has contributed to a less 

centralized, more geographically dispersed threat environment than the South Asia-focused 

threat we encountered with the September 11th attacks. 

In the Levant and the Middle East, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has 

exploited the failure of the Syrian and lraqi states to maintain control over their more remote 

regions or to oppose them with effective fighting forces. ISIL represents a growing threat to 

U.S. personnel and facilities in the region, and has called on ISIL supporters to conduct 

attacks against the United States and U.S. interests in retaliation for coalition airstrikes. 

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The threat posed by the so-called Khorasan Group-a network of a! Nusrah Front and 

veteran ai-Qa'ida terrorists who share a history of training operatives, facilitating the 

movement of fighters and money, and planning attacks against U.S. and Western targetsremains a critical concern. 

The scope of the foreign fighters who are traveling to Syria to partie ipate in the conflict is 

adding to the complexity of the threat environment we face. Western fighters, to include 

Americans, are joining with ISIL, Khorasan, and ai-Nusrah, raising the possibility those 

groups will successfully direct and deploy fighters for attacks in the West or more individual 

extremists will return to their home countries and commit self-initiated attacks, as we saw in 

an attack on a Jewish Museum in Belgium in May. 

Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to prioritize efforts to attack the U.S. 

homeland, with a particular focus on aviation. Iran, Lebanese Hizballah, and Shia-aligned 

groups in the region remain on our radar. Lebanese Hizballah remains committed to 

conducting terrorist attacks against Israeli targets worldwide, while maintaining the 

capability for attacks against U.S. targets overseas. 

In Africa, the range of extremist/terrorist groups exploiting local and regional conditions 

across north and west Africa, to include al- Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb 

(AQIM), al-Murabitun, Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sharia groups in Tunisia and Libya, 

present a serious challenge and threat to U.S. interests in the region. Al-Shabaab has 

consistently and publicly threatened the United States, but the group has not attempted an 

attack outside of East Africa and does not appear at present to have the capability to carry out 

plotting beyond the East Africa region. 

In South Asia, the threat from al- Qa'ida core has been degraded but not defeated. As alQa'ida core's capabilities in Afghanistan and Pakistan have been degraded, attack planners 

have placed a greater emphasis on smaller and simpler plots against soft targets. The group 

continues to aspire to conduct larger-scale attacks against the West and here in the U.S. 

homeland. The recent announcement of the formation of a!- Qa'ida in the fndian 

Subcontinent (AQIS) and enduring threats from Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and 

Lashkar-i-Tayyiba are a reminder of the volatility ofthreat we face from South Asia thirteen 

years after the September 11th attacks, and at a time when we are drawing down our military 

presence in the region. 

Here at home, the evolving threat is being driven by both foreign-directed terrorist 

organizations and by homegrown violent extremists (HVEs). As we saw in Canada last 

month, HVEs who are unable to travel overseas for violent jihad may choose instead to plot 

against targets locally. HVEs, reacting to multiple motivating factors, have posed the most 

likely threat here in the United States for the past three years. They make use of a dynamic, 

evolving online environment to connect themselves virtually to a global movement of 

jihadists. HVEs likely will continue trying to carry out simple plots that do not require 

advanced skills, outside training, or communication with others, based on past plots and 

guidance promoted by overseas terrorist groups. 

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• In your opinion, is the NCTC adequately staffed to address your priorities 

identified above? 

We have focused our staff resources on existing mission priorities. As the threat we face has 

become more diverse and as we have assumed a more central role in the CT community, we 

have been constantly reevaluating our staffing needs and adjusting how we use our staff. As 

we encounter "surge" requirements like we are currently experiencing with respect to Iraq 

and Syria, we are sometimes compelled to put fewer resources against lower priorities and 

assume the risks that this approach entails. The heavy burden we place on our workforce is 

clearly reflected in the amount of overtime and compensatory time they have earned during 

the past two years. I am extremely proud of the dedication and hard work ofNCTC's 

workforce. 

• What impact does a shortage of detailees have on your mission? 

Obtaining sufficient detailee support to reach our authorized levels would allow NCTC to 

focus additional resources in key priority areas and enhance our efforts on select lower 

priority issues. I am committed to having a diverse detailee workforce that constitutes 

between forty and fifty percent of our workforce. 

NCTC was designed to have a reliance on detailees, and we draw strength from the diversity 

of hosting officers from across the U.S. government. As I noted earlier, this diversity is one 

of our greatest strengths. Having the opportunity to integrate people into the Center from 

other organizations gives us the opportunity to form an effective network across all of the 

agencies that have a stake in the CT mission. They have been and will continue to be key 

contributors to our mission. Some of our best partners in other agencies are those who came 

to NCTC at some point in their career and who understand who we are and what we do. A 

shortage of detailees degrades our available expertise, diminishes our surge capacity, and 

keeps us from being the interagency center of CT excellence we were designed to be. 

• The National Counterterrorism Center is housed within the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence, but the NCTC workforce and the rest of 

the ODNI workforce have very different demographics. Are there ODNI 

workforce policies that do not fully take into account the differences in the 

NCTC workforce? 

NCTC's senior leaders work closely within the ODNl to develop and tailor workforce 

policies that meet the specific requirements of the mission-driven NCTC workforce, ODNI 

recognizes that NCTC's workforce differs from that of the broader ODNI and we have been 

able to collaborate with ODNI and evolve workforce-related policies to be able to account for 

NCTC's workforce, especially with respect to managing our ODNI cadre members' career 

development. NCTC has also collaborated very effectively with ODNI to execute a new 

hiring initiative this year which will result in more than 40 newly hired officers joining 

NCTC's ranks this year. 

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• What actions will you take, if confirmed as Director, to ensure that NCTC is 

fully staffed? 

If confirmed, I would continue to consider the adequate resourcing of the Center among my 

highest priorities. I have discussed the status of our staffing with the DNI and PDDNJ and 

they understand the Center's staffing situation and are supportive of the Center's recruiting 

efforts. Since early this year, we have hired more than 40 new ODNI officers. Our greatest 

focus in terms of staffing is on ways to maintain and increase our detailee totals. I have 

personally worked with my IC peers to ask agencies to support joint duty rotations. A key 

strength ofNCTC remains the expertise drawn from our multi-agency composition. 

We are also working closely with the ODNI to hire additional ODNf permanent hires, and to 

streamline the processes we rely upon to get detailees from other IC agencies into NCTC 

jobs. 

Intelligence reform and counterterrorism 

QUESTION 4: What do you see as the most important outstanding priorities in 

the ongoing intelligence reform effort, as it relates to counterterrorism? 

While the IC has made significant progress implementing the IRTPA, there is work that 

remains to be done. Among the key priorities is to continue to advance information sharing. 

In some instances, the public disclosures of classified information have created a reluctance 

among foreign partners to share the classified, sensitive data that most illuminates analysts' 

understanding and identification of terrorists. This reluctance could migrate to the wider 

information sharing community. We cannot allow this to happen. 

The JC will also continue to grapple with how to exploit big data and social media for CT 

analysis. As a community, we must continue to address policies and technological 

limitations that have the effect of potentially constraining how completely we exploit the data 

available to the U.S. government. The community will need to invest in technology-based 

tools to power more comprehensive data analysis, increase the speed at which information 

sharing and collaboration occur, and automate production flows. Technology can also help 

implement privacy and civil liberty protections beyond the current basic safeguards in place. 

• How do intelligence gaps and the current collection environment more 

generally impact NCTC's mission? 

The dynamic and diverse nature of the terrorist threat requires continued NCTC and IC 

emphasis on targeting, collection, and analysis. Based on our understanding of intelligence 

gaps and IC posture against them, NCTC works with interagency partners to enhance the 

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IC's ability to address evolving terrorism threats as an integrated team. As a result, the IC is 

able to adjust its posture to focus limited analytic and collection capabilities to address the 

highest CT priorities and to advance capabilities to address future challenges over the long 

term. 

The current counterterrorism collection environment is challenging. The diverse set of 

nefarious actors operating across a broadening swath of geography is straining existing 

resources. In those areas that are most difficult to operate human sources, the community is 

increasingly reliant on imagery and signals intelligence. Unfortunately, frequent 

unauthorized disclosures and leaks have compromised certain signals intelligence collection 

efforts and reduced our ability to track terrorist communications. The IC is working to 

identify new opportunities to restore collection against our most significant threats. 

• Do you see any need for modifications to the statutory role or 

authorities of the Director of the NCTC? If so, please explain. 

I do not see a need for any such modifications at this time. If confirmed, I would work with 

the DNI and others to use the existing authorities to accomplish NCTC's statutory 

responsibilities. I would also keep this Committee fully informed if I identify a need for 

legislative modifications to my authorities. 

Pursuit teams 

QUESTION 5: Following the failed terrorist attack of December 25, 2009, NCTC 

created the "Pursuit Group" to help track down tactical leads that could lead to the 

discovery of threats aimed against the U.S. Homeland or U.S. interests abroad. 

• To what extent has the creation ofthis Group succeeded in ensuring that 

tactical leads are identified and tracked? 

By seeking less obvious connections, previously unknown identities, and seemingly 

unimportant details, rather than focusing on the high-profile elements of terrorism cases, 

Pursuit analysts ensure that more aspects of a terrorism case are explored. Pursuit has 

successfully worked with rc partner agencies to use data and tools to identify and pass 

actionable intelligence. 

The Pursuit Group uses specialized analytic tools that integrate and search multiple sources 

of data, assist with data visualization, and promote information sharing and knowledge 

management of research and connections identified. 

In 2013, the Pursuit Group identified and started tracking twenty categories of actions that tC 

agencies are taking based on the leads it developed. Since 2013, Pursuit disseminated more 

than 600 lead cables and recorded almost 800 actions taken by other IC agencies. Some of 

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these actions include FBI opening investigations, CIA and FBI engaging liaison partners, and 

State Department revoking visas. 

• How are the priorities of the Pursuit Group established? 

The Pursuit Group prioritizes any terrorism threads that have potential links to the homeland. 

Pursuit's first priority is intelligence reporting with a clear homeland connection. Pursuit's 

second priority is intelligence reporting that contains unique selector information on 

individuals allowing Pursuit analysts to search all systems and identify--or rule outpossible homeland linkages. Pursuit's third priority is intelligence reporting identifying 

members of terrorist networks overseas, or individuals who are part of a broader threat 

stream. 

Additionally, Pursuit analysts work collaboratively with their counterparts in the IC to ensure 

that they are adding value to the effort and not duplicating what other agencies are already 

working on. 

• What is the role of the Director of the NCTC in establishing those priorities? 

The previous Director ofNCTC worked with Pursuit to evaluate and update existing 

priorities, and consulted the expertise of his Director's Advisory Board to provide an outside 

perspective and input on these priorities. 

If confirmed, 1 would continue to shape the direction of the Pursuit Group's priorities and 

ensure that they are appropriately aligned with both the U.S. government's overarching 

terrorism priorities and the intent behind the Group's creation. 

• What is the role of the Pursuit Group in integrating the tactical 

counterterrorism analytical efforts of the various components of the 

Intelligence Community? 

Pursuit Group integrates tactical counterterrorism analytic efforts through its employment of 

detailees from across the IC. Given its mission-to identity non-obvious connections and 

linkages-some duplication in efforts across the departments and agencies is desirable. 

Pursuit Group analysts bring a deep understanding of their home agency's collection 

capabilities and authorities with them. Pursuit analysts also are embedded in various 

interagency task forces and war zone deployments, further integrating Pursuit capabilities 

and accesses throughout the IC. Pursuit employs these exclusive capabilities and accesses to 

identify new actionable leads by incorporating data from numerous agencies. Pursuit 

analysts are expected to explore leads more fully, optimize analytic tools for data analysis, 

and exploit data holdings from a tactical optic unavailable to individual agencies. 

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To support the tactical IC efforts, Pursuit provides investigative leads, collection 

requirements, and potential source candidates. Additionally, Pursuit supports information 

sharing among agencies with related investigations, and coordinates interagency meetings to 

promote communication. Pursuit's diverse workforce facilitates collaboration among IC 

components by providing a distinct perspective based on a fusion of intelligence data and 

tools. 

In partnership with Treasury's Office oflntelligence and Analysis, Pursuit hosts the 

Integrated Financial Intelligence Group, which conducts comprehensive CT and other 

financial intelligence research, enabling Pursuit to track CT financial leads. 

• Pursuit is closely tied with FBI's CT officers and synchronizes efforts on homeland 

threats coming from Pakistan, Yemen, Europe, and the Horn of Africa. 

• If confirmed, will you make any changes in the roles and responsibilities of 

the Pursuit Group? 

If confirmed, l do not see anticipate making changes to the roles or responsibilities of the 

Pursuit Group. I will continue to strengthen and expand the interagency partnerships that are 

critical to the Pursuit mission and to the Group's continued success. 

NCTC analysis 

QUESTION 6: What unique role does strategic counterterrorism analysis 

conducted at NCTC play, as compared to the analysis produced by other 

components ofthe Intelligence Community? 

ln accordance with the IRTPA, NCTC was designated by the Congress as the primary 

organization within the U.S. government for analysis of terrorism and terrorist organizations. 

NCTC directly supports the President and the NSC, the Congress, and other elements of the 

CT policy, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security communities through a 

wide range ofCT analysis. 

NCTC's strategic CT analysis fulfills the mission objectives outlined in the DNI's National 

Intelligence Strategy by providing senior policymakers and key stakeholders strategic 

intelligence analysis on enduring counterterrorism issues and anticipatory intelligence 

analysis on emerging conditions, trends, threats and opportunities to support national security 

decision-making. 

NCTC draws on the broad-based skills and backgrounds of a diverse analytic workforce 

drawn from across the IC, our unique access to the full range of CT information possessed or 

acquired by the U.S. government, an unparalleled track record of coordination and 

collaboration with key IC partners, and a strong emphasis on the employment of structured 

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analytic techniques to produce a unique body of work on strategic CT analysis. 

Unlike agency-specific analysis, nearly all NCTC's analysis is community-coordinated. This 

ensures policymakers are provided authoritative counterterrorism analysis that is consistent 

across the IC. Where analytic conclusions differ between agencies, those differences are 

highlighted and explored. 

QUESTION 7: What is the role of the NCTC, including through the Interagency 

Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT), in coordinating and publishing the 

Intelligence Community's assessments on terrorism? 

The Director ofNCTC chairs the IICT, oversees the Directorate of Intelligence production of 

strategic intelligence, and works closely with the National Intelligence Officer for 

Transnational Threats to ensure the broader IC is producing the full range of assessments on 

terrorism required to support effective development of policy. 

There are presently more than t 00 U.S. government agencies, departments, and other 

organizations involved with the IICT, and it is one of the few entities in the federal 

government that includes contact with all three branches of government. The Capitol Police 

represents the Legislative Branch; the Office of the Marshal of the Supreme Court represents 

the Judicial Branch, and there are approximately I 00 agencies from throughout the Executive 

Branch. All of these organizations are invited to the IICT's community twice-monthly 

meetings covering terrorism warning and other key counterterrorism issues. 

Terrorist Threat Warning Products 

The !ICT has five types of threat warning products: 

• Alert: Alerts are the highest level oflntelligence Community Terrorist Threat Warning. 

An Alert warns of a credible, specific, imminent attack against U.S. personnel, facilities, 

or interests with information the Community considers sufficiently specific and credible 

to enable implementation of local security measures. Alerts expire 30 days after issuance 

and CMnot be extended. There is a requirement for a SECRET version for wide 

distribution. 

• Advisory: An Advisory warns of a terrorist threat to U.S. personnel, facilities, or 

interests with information that is credible but general in liming and/or target. Advisories 

expire 45 days after issuance and may be extended for an additional45 days if it is 

determined that a valid threat remains. There is a requirement for a SECRET version for 

wide distribution. 

• Standing Advisory: A Standing Advisory warns of a persistently high threat 

environment for U.S. personnel, facilities, and interests from terrorists who have the 

intent and capability to conduct anti-U.S. attacks and is based on a body of credible 

· intelligence indicating the threat will remain high for the next 180 days. It can be 

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updated or rescinded prior to expiration if the threat environment changes. Upon 

expiration, the Community will determine if a new Standing Advisory will be issued. 

Alerts and Advisories can be issued in addition to a Standing Advisory to warn of 

specific threats. There is a requirement for a SECRET version for wide distribution. 

• Assessment: Assessments may warn of credible but non-specific threats, or provide indepth analysis on a specific terrorism topic, trend, or development for decision-making 

and policy support. 

• Memorandum: A short-form Assessment. 

Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Warning products may be suggested by any 

organization. Alerts and Advisories are voted on by the "Warn-8": NCTC, CIA, DIA, NSA, 

State/INR, FBI, DHS, and NGA. The IICT Executive Secretariat at NCTC polls these 

agencies on the need for Alerts and Advisories, and concurrence of five of the Warn-8 

agencies is required for a warning. For all products, the ITCT Executive Secretariat identifies 

the drafting agency; coordinates language with W arn-8 and other agencies as-needed; and 

produces the warning product for wide distribution across U.S. government circles, including 

at the Secret level to ensure widest possible dissemination. 

In addition to the riCT process, NCTC interprets its role as the primary organization within 

the U.S. government for analysis of terrorism and terrorist organizations to include a 

responsibility to coordinate its assessments with IC partners and to invite IC partners to 

publish their assessments in NCTC product lines. 

• NCTC analytic products are considered IC products, and represent the analysis of the 

entire CT community, to include highlighting analytic differences between IC agencies. 

• IC partners, including CIA, DIA, FBI, and DHS now author or co-author about a third of 

NCTC analytic products. 

Watch listing 

QUESTION 8: How do you assess enhancement efforts to the Terrorist Identities 

Datamart Environment (TIDE) following the Boston Marathon Bombing of April 

15,2013? 

In the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing, NCTC reviewed its enhancement 

processes and assessed that overall they were functioning as intended. At the time of the 

attack, Tamerlan Tsarnaev was in TIDE and properly watchlisted based on the information 

provided by our nominating partners. While our process was found to be functioning 

appropriately, NCTC did identity specific areas of improvement with regard to enhancements 

that could be used to improve the data within TIDE. NCTC's internal after action report was 

provided to the Intelligence Community's Inspector General in support oftheir review which 

was published this spring. We have attempted to use the lessons learned from the Boston 

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Marathon bombing case to help us devise more effective procedures to enhance the TIDE 

nominations process. 

QUESTION 9: According to the Committee's report on the failed attack of 

December 25, 2009, while the NCTC processed watchlisting information it had 

received, its standard practice did not include conducting additional analysis or 

enhancing existing records with more derogatory information. To what extent has 

this problem been addressed? 

The Congress and NCTC examined the Center's processes and systems in the wake of the 

attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Flight 253, and identified several gaps and 

shortcomings. Based on these lessons learned, significant changes were made to the 

watchlisting process. In January 2010, the President directed NCTC to focus more efforts on 

enhancing the records in the TIDE database. To support this effort, NCTC created the 

Directorate ofTerrorist Identities (DTI), whose sole purpose would be to maintain TIDE and 

enhance those records. 

• Prior to 12/25, our efforts centered on collecting information and building the database to 

support screening agencies. What we learned after 12125 was that it was equally 

important that we try to develop the most complete record possible to enable us to 

positively identify an individual, thus establishing TTDE as an analytic tool rather than 

solely a repository of information. 

• Concurrent with these enhancement efforts, the threshold for information on subjects to 

be included in TIDE and subsequently watchlisted was lowered as a matter of policy. 

This was a key decision point because as we teamed with Abdulmutallab, sometimes not 

all information on a known or suspected terrorist (KST) is immediately available but 

given time, analysts can piece information together. 

• In 2013, the U.S. government revised its watch listing practices to account for these 

changes. 

State and local governments 

QUESTION 10: What is the role of the NCTC in producing and disseminating 

intelligence for state, local and tribal partners? 

In partnership with the FBI and DHS, NCTC produces and disseminates terrorism and CT 

intelligence for state, local and tribal (SLT) partners. NCTC acts in support of FBI's and 

DHS's responsibilities to produce and disseminate intelligence for SLT consumers. 

NCTC's primary vehicle for identifying, producing, and disseminating relevant intelligence 

to SL T consumers is the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT). JCAT is the 

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successor organization to the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group 

(ITACG), which was created by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission Act of2007, but decommissioned in 2012 when its authorization for 

appropriations expired. 

JTACG, a joint organization staffed by DHS, FBI, and NCTC, was created by Congress to 

provide tailored federal intelligence through DHS and FBI that supports public safety and 

first responders within their state, local, and tribal jurisdictions. JCA T' s mission, 

organization, and processes closely mirror those conducted by ITACG. JCAT's mission is to 

improve information sharing to enhance public safety, in coordination with FBI and DHS. 

NCTC notified the Congress about the stand up of JCA T through a congressional notification 

on April 29, 2013. 

JCAT products routinely are coordinated through the intelligence analysis components of 

NCTC, DHS, and FBI before dissemination. JCAT disseminates intelligence products via 

FBI's Law Enforcement Online website, DHS's Homeland Security Information Network 

website, and also posts SLT products on NCTC's classified CURRENT website. 

FBI, DHS, and NCTC staff JCAT through resource burden sharing. In addition to federal 

officers from each of these three organizations, SLT officers also serve within JCAT. They 

receive equivalent security clearances, and assist their federal counterparts in identifying, 

producing and disseminating CT intelligence to SL T consumers. This unique staffing 

construct is the key to JCAT's success. 

• How is that role different than that ofthe FBI and the Department of 

Homeland Security? 

DHS and FBI are primarily responsible for producing and disseminating intelligence to SLT 

consumers. Because NCTC is the primary organization in the U.S. government for analyzing 

and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by our federal departments and 

agencies with regards to terrorism and counterterrorism, NCTC is uniquely qualified to 

ensure DHS and FBI have access to and receive all-source CT intelligence support they need 

to execute their missions. This activity is in keeping with the NCTC Director's 

responsibilities in the IRTPA. 

• If confirmed, what priority would you give this issue? 

If confirmed, I would continue to place this unique information-sharing role as one of 

NCTC's top priorities. NCTC is uniquely positioned to integrate intelligence and augment 

information sharing relevant to SL T consumers. In addition, as a joint NCTC, FBI, and DHS 

activity, JCAT adds significant value as an organization staffed jointly with federal, state, 

local, and tribal officers who can recognize and tailor terrorism and counterterrorism 

products for state and regional fusion centers, and first responders that enhance public safety 

across the United States. 

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Strategic Operational Planning 

QUESTION 11: Please describe the activities of the NCTC in carrying out its 

strategic operational planning responsibilities pursuant to the Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTP A). 

In accordance with Section 1021 of the IRTPA, NCTC works to integrate all elements of 

national power in U.S. counterterrorism efforts, ensuring a unity of effort. NCTC's 

Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (DSOP) regularly supports the NSC in this 

effort by providing strategic operational plans in support of U.S. counterterrorism objectives. 

This planning entails developing objectives and tasks, coordinating across departments and 

agencies, and assigning roles and responsibilities. NCTC then monitors the implementation 

of plans in concert with other agencies and produces impact assessments of key strategies in 

order to infonn policy discussion and deliberation. 

• To what extent does the Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning 

develop inter-agency plans for counterterrorism operations? 

NCTC's DSOP develops CT plans in response to requests made by the NSC staff for plans to 

support specific policy objectives established by the President or the NSC. These requests 

generally originate from intensive interagency deliberations carried out through the PPD 1 

process. In addition, NCTC has proposed the creation of new strategies or plans based on 

NCTC's analyses, assessments, or exercises conducted for the NSC. 

• Do you believe the Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning is 

performing its mission as directed in statute? 

Yes, T believe DSOP is performing its mission as envisioned by and in accordance with the 

IRTPA. 

QUESTION 12: As the threat from regional al Qaeda affiliates increases, what is 

the role ofthe Director of the NCTC in developing regional counterterrorism 

strategies? How are those counterterrorism strategies related to broader U.S. 

policies, particularly in Pakistan, Syria, Libya, Yemen, the Hom of Africa and the 

Sahel? 

NCTC supports NSC efforts to develop CT strategies, integrate whole-of-government CT 

actions, and assess their effectiveness in protecting the homeland, our people, and our 

interests. The Director ofNCTC does not have a role in the direct execution of any 

operations in support of broader U.S. government CT efforts. As such, NCTC is well 

positioned to serve as the honest broker in the interagency planning process. 

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Through DSOP, NCTC coordinates with the departments and agencies to facilitate informed 

decision making among senior U.S. government officials, ensuring the experience and 

expertise available across the government is effectively leveraged when developing regional 

CT strategies. This planning process drives the government to align ways and means with 

our desired CT ends, and also makes sure that our CT end states are nested under--and 

supportive of-broader U.S. government policy. 

The United States has policy priorities in Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, the Hom of 

Africa and the Sahel that are much broader, and often much more complex, than CT 

objectives. For example, while protecting the American people is always paramount, we also 

have an interest in the democratic transition and future stability of Yemen. In sub-Saharan 

Africa, U.S. priorities include democratization, improved governance, and economic growth. 

In Syria, the United States has concerns with human rights violations, a refugee crisis, and an 

end to a civil war. The United States must pursue its CT priorities while also working to 

alleviate the conditions terrorists exploit for safe haven and recruitment. 

QUESTION 13: Historically, the Committee has had difficulty in obtaining the 

strategies that are produced by NCTC's Directorate of Strategic Operational 

Planning. If confirmed, will you abide by the current accommodation that has 

been reached between the Committee and NCTC? 

Yes. lam familiar with the accommodation that has been reached with the Committee with 

respect to the strategies that DSOP produces and, if confirmed, 1 would continue to abide by 

it. 

QUESTION 14: What is your view ofthe proper role of Congress in overseeing 

the activities of the Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning? 

I believe the Congress is obligated to exercise its oversight role over all of NCTC' s activities. 

Pursuant to the IRTPA, NCTC conducts strategic operational planning at the direction of and 

in support of the President and the Executive Office of the President. If confirmed, I would 

continue to work closely with the Congress to facilitate its ability to perform its oversight 

function in keeping with accommodations agreed upon by NCTC and the Committee. 

National Intelligence Manager 

QUESTION 15: As the Counterterrorism Mission Manager for the Intelligence 

Community, the Director of the NCTC identifies intelligence gaps and resource 

constraints and sets collection and analytic priorities. 

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• What is your vision of the Director of the NCTC in the role of mission 

manager? Should the Director provide broad, strategic guidance, for 

example by prioritizing emerging regional terrorist threats? Should the 

Director provide guidance on the allocation of resources with regard to 

particular CT capabilities and platforms? 

If confirmed, as the CT Mission Manager, I would continue to promote organizing and 

prioritizing analysis and collection activities for terrorism and CT intelligence, with a 

particular focus on areas in which there are identified intelligence gaps or newly emerging 

requirements. Through the Unified Intelligence Strategy for CT, the Director of the NCTC 

provides strategic guidance to components of the IC regarding threat-driven priorities. 

• What is the role of the Director of the NCTC in providing guidance with 

regard to the allocation of resources among, and within elements ofthe 

Intelligence Community? 

The IRTPA mandates that the Director ofNCTC advise the DNI on government programs 

and budgets that support national counterterrorism priorities. Accordingly, I believe that the 

Director ofNCTC is obligated to work with CT program managers to understand where there 

are shortfalls and redundancies wherever resources are allocated against key CT objectives. 

As a matter of practice, the Director, in his National Intelligence Manager for CT role, should 

continue to serve as an advocate for the CT mission in the IC budget process and to provide 

recommendations to the DNI. NCTC is uniquely suited to offer these recommendations. 

• Given resource constraints, how should the Director of the NCTC identifY 

unnecessary or less critical programs and seek to reallocate funding? 

Under lRTPA, the Director ofNCTC is required to "advise the Director of National 

Intelligence on the extent to which the counterterrorism program recommendations and 

budget proposals of the departments, agencies, and elements of the United States 

Government conform to the priorities established by the President." In support of this 

responsibility, NCTC's Office of National Intelligence Management regularly reviews the 

performance of the IC's counterterrorism activities by department and agency, and makes 

recommendations for adjustments as appropriate. Additionally, given NCTC's position 

within the ODNI, the NCTC Director and his staff support the DNI's Chief Financial Officer 

in its consideration of Department and agency counterterrorism budgets. 

Congressional Oversight 

QUESTION 16: The Intelligence Reform Act (Section 102A of the National 

Security Act) provides that the DNl shall ensure compliance with the Constitution 

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and laws of the United States by elements of the IC through the host executive 

departments that manage the programs and activities that are part of the National 

Intelligence Program. 

• What are the principal matters to which this obligation relates, and what 

specific functions of the NCTC are of particular significance with regard to 

these matters? 

One of the responsibilities of the DNl, as outlined in IRTPA, is to ensure that the IC 

complies with both the Constitution and laws of the United States. This responsibility 

applies across the entirety ofNCTC's functions. Like the rest the IC, NCTC has the duty to 

analyze, produce, and disseminate critical intelligence to protect America and its interests 

abroad. Of note, NCTC is not a traditional intelligence "collector" but rather relies on the 

lawful collection of other departments and agencies in the execution of its mission. NCTC 

has the additional obligation to conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism 

activities. In carrying out all of its responsibilities, NCTC, like the Intelligence Community 

as a whole, must always act in a manner that complies with the Constitution and other legal 

requirements, protecting fully the freedoms and civil liberties, and privacy rights of the 

American people. 

Based on my prior experience, 1 recognize and value the close involvement of the Offices of 

the General Counsel, the Inspectors General, and the Civil Liberties Protection Officers in 

the operations of government. If confirmed, I would rely heavily on the staffs of these 

critical offices to ensure that the NCTC fulfills its mission in a manner that complies with the 

Constitution and all applicable laws. 

• What do you understand to be the obligation of the DNI, and the Director of 

the NCTC in support of the DNI, to keep the congressional intelligence 

committees fully and currently informed about matters relating to 

compliance with the Constitution and laws? 

During my career in public service, ! have viewed congressional oversight as an essential 

part of our constitutional system of checks and balances. Given the fact that most of the 

activities of the NCTC and the IC must remain secret, this relationship only becomes more 

important. As such, it is an integral responsibility of all components of the intelligence 

Community, including the ODNI and the NCTC, to be responsive to the congressional 

oversight process and to ensure our obligation to keep the congressional intelligence 

committees fully and currently informed of intelligence activities is taken very seriously. 

Intelligence oversight is critical to the successful operation of the IC, but it can only be 

effective if the IC views the intelligence committees as true partners and keeps them fully 

and currently informed of their activities. This entails communication with Congress on a 

regular and continuing basis. In furtherance of that partnership, NCTC regularly provides 

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this Committee with written notifications, briefings on intelligence issues and priorities for 

NCTC and the Committee, and hosts Committee members and staff. By doing so, we 

advance our collective ability to address the threats we face today, prevent further terrorist 

attacks, and remain consistent with American laws and values. 

If confirmed as the Director ofNCTC, I assure you that I would continue to abide by the 

responsibility to keep Congress fully and currently informed, consistent with the law. 

Presidential Policy Guidance 

QUESTION 17: Please describe your role in developing the "U.S. Policy 

Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism 

Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities." 

While I was serving at the NSC staff as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director 

for Counterterrorism, I participated in May and June of2012, in the production of the very 

initial drafts of the policy document that ultimately became the classified Presidential Policy 

Guidance (PPG). After moving to NCTC as Deputy Director in June 2012, I was 

intermittently involved in interagency policy discussions as the draft was reviewed and 

refined before it as ultimately approved by the President in May 2013. 

a. Has the Presidential Policy Guidance made our counterterrorism operations 

more effective? 

The PPG has allowed the U.S. government to effectively pursue terrorist targets while also 

institutionalizing the rigorous review process and legal and policy standards that guide these 

operations. In this way, the PPG forms a sustainable framework for our use of direct action 

against terrorist threats. 

At the time the effort to create the PPG was begun, the principal goals of the effort as r 

understood them were to: 

• Institutionalize and document the careful and deliberate approach that the USG and the 

CT Community was already employing with respect to use of force in CT operations 

outside the United States and areas of active hostilities. 

• Spell out in written form the procedures, steps and the policy standards that were being 

routinely applied to the conduct of such operations, that they could form the basis for 

these operations going forward. 

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• Contribute to the goal of greater transparency in our CT operations by documenting the 

careful, deliberate processes and the standards by which decisions about CT operationsparticularly lethal operations-were being made. 

By re.fining and documenting the careful and deliberate way in which these operations are 

approved and conducted and by contributing to greater transparency in our CT operations, I 

believe the PPG has made it easier for some of our key allies and CT partners to support 

those operations by sharing intelligence and/or providing other forms of support for our CT 

operations. J believe the PPG has likely contributed to making some of our CT operations 

more effective by making critical forms of CT cooperation with key partners more 

sustainable. By standardizing and institutionalizing the considerations and processes that 

inform our policymaking on direct action operations, we have become more effective in 

reviewing these operations and ensuring all appropriate national security equities are 

considered prior to approval. 

b. Do you believe the Presidential Policy Guidance is a good long tenn 

solution for this type of irregular warfare? 

I believe the PPG represents an important step forward in the effort to make our CT policies 

and operations more sustainable as threat conditions and the security enviromnent change 

over time. The PPG appropriately places direct action in context with other CT tools and 

provides a sustainable framework for the use of this important tool. The document contains 

provisions designed specifically to account for the fact that threat conditions may evolve over 

time and may cause the government to decide to review and potentially adjust either the 

procedures outlined in the document governing conduct of CT operations and/or the 

standards applied to certain proposed CT operations. In that regard, I believe the PPG has 

sufficient flexibility to serve as long-term policy guidance for addressing the CT threat faced 

by the United States. 

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SIC! I 

Questions for the RKord from Senator Wyden 

20 November 1014 

2014-3411 

Hearing to Consider the Nomination of Mr. Nicholas J. Rasmussen 

to Serve as DiFKtor ohhe National Counterterrorism Center 

Question #1: 

Responses of Mr. Nicholas J. Rasmussen 

Acting DiFKtor, National Counterterrorism Center 

In FKent year.s there have· been numerous instanees.ofintelligenee otllcials making 

inaeeurate public statements ~md refusing to eo""et the FeCOrd when asked to do 

so. Eumples include former NSA DiFKtor A:lexander1s repeated claims that the NSA was 

not engaged in the mass surveillance or Americans, and CIA Direetor Brennan's claim that 

the CIA bad not secretly 1pied ·on Senate computer tiles. Please explain how you will avoid 

falling into this culture of misinformation. 

If confinned as Director, I intend to continue to be forthright in response to questions from the 

Committee, whether posed in open or closed session. If I am constrained by classification in 

responding to· questions in open session, I will say that and defer discussion to closed session. If 

in closed session, I am ever constrained in responding fully or completely, I will explain why and 

work with partner agencies to provide the Committ~ timely and complete answers. 

Question #2: 

A big part of your job as NCTC Direetor will be ensuring data quality, since this is what 

allows the United States to focus on pursuing aetual terrorists, Instead of wasting time and 

resources pursuing innocent people. In a recent Oregon ease the TSA removed several 

people from the no-fly list after they sued the govemment, and this ease illustrates tbe 

challenge fairly well- there is widespread agreement that terrorists should be kept off of 

plan'll, a&d there is also widespread .agr.eement that it would be better if innoeent people 

did not have to sue the government simply to be removed from the no-fly list. While the 

ultin!ate responsibility for the no-fly list rests with the TSA, the list is based in large part on 

data that comes to the TSA via the NCTC. With this in mind~· please discuss how you 

approach the issue of ensuring data quality as an NCTC manager.. 

Part ofNCTC's responsibility in maintaining the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment 

(TIDE) database includes ensuring the quality of the data, making sure we have the right 

infomtation on koown and suspected terrorists which in tum enables timely and accurate 

identification by law enforcement, screening entities, and other partner agencies. This 

commitment means we must also ensure records are accurate and as complete as possible to 

minimize mis-identification ofinnocent persons. 

This issue commands high attention within NCTC, where we take the following steps to ensure 

the quality of infonnation: 
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o Entire teams within NCTC are dedicated to quality assurance and accuracy, from the 

regular auditing of staff to make sure they comply with standards to regular checks of 

U.S. person recards within TIDE. 

• NCTC works closelywitll its law enforcement and intelligence community partners to 

cortect·or remove inaccurate information ·in TIDE. 

• Before an individual is placed on the No Fly List, three agencies -the nominating 

agency, NCTC, and the Terrorist .Screening Center (TSC) -review the nomination .. 

• In addi*ion, NCl'C maintains.a robust enhancement process and regularly adds 

information to TIDE rec.ords. Enhanced records lead to stronger, .positive identification 

of known or suspected terrorists while decreasing false identification. of innocent 

travelers. 

Additionally, NCTC is participating in the interagency effort to reform the redress process. As a 

community, we are also actively seeking ways to be as transparent as possible with the public 

about watch listing, while remaining cognizant of our responsibility to protect sources ·and 

methods, and to assist in continuing to protect the American people. 

Question #3: 

As the US counterterrorism apparatus continues to adapt from focusing on a single large, 

fairly coherent terrorist organization to the more decentralized. threat presented by ISIL 

and AQAP, what do you think the US government is currently doing well, and W.hat you 

believe needs to be done better? 

The U.S. counterterrorism community effectively tracks.and disrupts terrorist plotting, and 

monitors and targets terrorist networks, when we are able to collect fimely and accurate 

intelligence. We have global' reach and resources that exceed those of most other states. 

Terrorist groups-such as ISIL and AQAP-justifiably draw much af our attention; these groups 

present the most significant thteats to our interests here in the hameland and overseas, and have 

the resources to execute attacks against us. Ev.en as the global tertorist movement has become 

more diversified, it is the lone actor-the person operating autside scope af a known extremist 

group--who most challenges the U.S. c.ounterterrorism community's disruption efforts. 

The qecentralization of the threat.and the challenges we face in •aur effort to disrupt that threat 

requires effec*iVe engagement with foreign. partners and successes in building their CT ·c!lpacity; 

Through improved inteiligence sharing relationships and by baistering the capabilities of pal'lr!er 

nations, we will be better positioned to monitor and disrupt threats wherever they ar.ise, w.ithaut 

relying solely on our own capabilities. The effort to •build CT capaCity in key partners faces 

many challenges and our success has been uneven and difficult to sustain over time. 

Unauthorized disclosure of classified infoiinatian has given terrorists greater insight into aur 

collection capabilities, and complicated our collection efforts. Terrorists are using new and 

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different means to communicate, and this greatly reduces our access to critical information about 

their plans, capabilities, and intentions. 

3