22 March 2010

Joint Mobilization Planning

Joint Publication 4-05
PREFACE

i 

1. Scope 

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for the planning and 

conduct of joint military mobilization and demobilization, as well as some additional 

methods of force expansion, including use of volunteers and Presidential Reserve Callup. It also provides the context for joint participation in the planning and programming 

activities undertaken within the Department of Defense, especially those activities aimed 

at the reconstitution of military capability to deter any future threat to national security.

2. Purpose 

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and 

other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and 

training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their 

appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the 

JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems 

most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of 

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components 

of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances 

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the 

contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance.
Preface

ii JP 4-05 

Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military 

command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United 

States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should 

evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where

applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

LLOYD J. AUSTIN III

Lieutenant General, USA

Director, Joint Staff
SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION (JP) 4-05, DATED 11 JANUARY 2006

• Incorporates consolidated content from JP 4-05.1, Manpower Mobilization 

and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component Callup, which will be 

discontinued upon publication of this revision 

• Replaces the previous strategic national mobilization framework of 

graduated response with one that emphasizes maintaining a level of 

mobilization that is commensurate with the threat 

• Adds “sustainability” as a mobilization tenet 

• Eliminates brief discussion of “national direction and control” and “military 

command and control” 

• Provides updated information on mobilization roles and responsibilities 

within Department of Defense (DOD) 

• Reorganizes and updates the discussion of the twelve mobilization resource 

areas 

• Discusses mobilization planning implications of the latest strategic policy and 

planning guidance documents, particularly Guidance for Employment of the 

Force, Guidance for Development of the Force, Global Force Management 

Implementation Guidance, and the DOD Master Mobilization Guide, and 

adds an explanation of mobilization reporting 

• Adds “Restoring pre-positioning ships and embarked equipment and stores” 

as a new recovery planning activity, and includes a new section of 

mobilization planner demobilization responsibilities 

• Revises Appendix B list of automated tools to include the Defense Readiness 

Reporting System and the Enhanced Status of Resources and Training 

System 

• Adds annexes to Appendix C providing additional information and detail on 

the mobilization information management plan 

iii 
Summary of Changes 

 JP 4-05 iv 

Intentionally Blank 
 v 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................... ix 

CHAPTER I 

 MOBILIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY 

 • Introduction ......................................................................................................... I-1 

 • The National Perspective .................................................................................... I-2 

 • The Joint Military Perspective ............................................................................ I-5 

CHAPTER II 

 MOBILIZATION TENETS 

 • Introduction ........................................................................................................ II-1 

 • Mobilization Tenets .............................................................................................II-1 

CHAPTER III 

 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

 • Introduction ...................................................................................................... III-1 

 • Joint Military Mobilization Planning and Execution ....................................... III-1 

CHAPTER IV 

 RESOURCE AREAS 

 • Introduction ...................................................................................................... IV-1 

 SECTION A. ENABLING RESOURCES: ENVIRONMENT, LEGAL 

 AUTHORITIES, FUNDING ....................................................................... IV-1 

 • General ............................................................................................................. IV-1 

 SECTION B. MANPOWER .................................................................................. IV-7 

 • Sources of Military Power ............................................................................... IV-7 

 • Mobilization Personnel Management Policy ................................................... IV-7 

 • Civilian Manpower ............................................................................................ IV-8 

 • Manpower Mobilization Options ....................................................................... IV-9 

• Impact of Manpower Mobilization and Activation on Other Resource 

 Areas ................................................................................................................ IV-11 

 • Employer and Community Support ................................................................. IV-12 

 SECTION C. MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT ................................................. IV-13 

 • Sources of Materiel and Equipment ................................................................. IV-13 

 • Material and Equipment Mobilization Options ............................................. IV-13 
Table of Contents 

 

 SECTION D. TRANSPORTATION .................................................................... IV-15 

 • Sources of Mobilization Transportation ........................................................ IV-15 

 • Transportation Mobilization Options ............................................................. IV-15 

 • Impact of Transportation Mobilization on Other Resource Areas.................. IV-17 

 SECTION E. FACILITIES .................................................................................. IV-18 

 • Sources of Facilities ....................................................................................... IV-18 

 • Facilities Mobilization Options ...................................................................... IV-19 

 • Impact of Facilities Mobilization on Other Resource Areas .......................... IV-20 

 SECTION F. INDUSTRIAL BASE ..................................................................... IV-20 

 • Industrial Mobilization Sources...................................................................... IV-20 

 • Industrial Mobilization Options ..................................................................... IV-20 

 • Impact of Industrial Mobilization on Other Resource Areas...........................IV-21 

 SECTION G. TRAINING BASE ......................................................................... IV-22 

 • Sources and Options for Expanding Training Base Capacity ........................ IV-22 

 • Impact of Training Base Expansion on Other Resource Areas ..................... IV-23

 SECTION H. HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT.................................................... IV-23 

 • General ........................................................................................................... IV-23 

 • Sources of Emergency Health Service Support ............................................. IV-24 

 • Options for Mobilizing Health Service Support ..............................................IV-24 

 • Impact of Health Service Support Mobilization on Other Resource Areas.....IV-26 

 SECTION I. COMMUNICATIONS .................................................................... IV-26 

 • Sources and Options for Mobilization Communications Support ...................IV-26 

 • Impact of Communications Mobilization Activities on Other Resource 

 Areas ................................................................................................................IV-26 

 SECTION J. HOST-NATION SUPPORT............................................................ IV-27 

 • Sources of Host-Nation Support .................................................................... IV-27 

 • Coordinating Host-Nation Support..................................................................IV-27 

 • Impact of Mobilizing Host-Nation Support on Other Resource Areas............IV-28 

CHAPTER V 

 MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION 

 • Introduction ....................................................................................................... V-1 

 SECTION A. MOBILIZATION PLANNING ........................................................ V-2 

 • Mobilization Planning and Operation Plans ..................................................... V-2 

 • Mobilization Plans and Military Campaign Plans ............................................ V-3 

 • Mobilization Estimate of the Situation ............................................................. V-3 

 • Mobilization Planning During Contingency Planning ...................................... V-4 

vi JP 4-05 
Table of Contents 

 SECTION B. MOBILIZATION EXECUTION ................................................... V-10 

 • Mobilization Decisions and Orders ................................................................ V-10 

 • Monitoring the Status and Progress of Mobilization ...................................... V-11 

 SECTION C. MOBILIZATION REPORTING...................................................... V-11 

• Reporting Requirements ................................................................................... V-11 

• Four Subjects Require Reporting...................................................................... V-14 

CHAPTER VI 

 JOINT DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION 

 • Introduction ...................................................................................................... VI-1 

 SECTION A. DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING ................................................. VI-1 

 • Demobilization and National Security ............................................................. VI-1 

 • Demobilization Planning Guidelines ............................................................... VI-2 

 • Planning Considerations .................................................................................. VI-3 

 • Recovery Planning ........................................................................................... VI-4 

 SECTION B. EXECUTION ................................................................................... VI-4 

 • General ............................................................................................................. VI-4 

 • Demobilization Execution ............................................................................... VI-5 

 SECTION C. MOBILIZATION PLANNER DEMOBILIZATION 

RESPONSIBILITIES ....................................................................................................VI-6 

• Purpose...............................................................................................................VI-6 

• Preliminary Actions ...........................................................................................VI-6 

• Planning .............................................................................................................VI-9 

• Execution .........................................................................................................VI-11 

APPENDIX 

 A Legal Authorities .............................................................................................. A-1 

 B Automated Tools ................................................................................................ B-1 

 C Mobilization Information Management Plan ..................................................... C-1 

 D Mobilization Working Group ........................................................................... D-1 

 E Mobilization Estimate ........................................................................................ E-1 

 F References .......................................................................................................... F-1 

 G Administrative Instructions ............................................................................... G-1 

GLOSSARY 

 Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ....................................................................... GL-1 

 Part II Terms and Definitions...................................................................................GL-4 

 vii 
Table of Contents 

viii JP 4-05 

FIGURE 

 I-1 Levels of Military Commitment ................................................................... I-3 

 I-2 Levels of Mobilization .................................................................................. I-6 

 I-3 Reserve Component Call-up Decisionmaking................................................I-7 

 II-1 Mobilization Tenets .................................................................................... II-1 

 III-1 Joint Staff Mobilization Responsibilities ................................................... III-3 

 III-2 Military Department Secretary Responsibilities ........................................ III-4 

 IV-1 Examples of Environmental Statutes Affecting Mobilization ................... IV-5 

 IV-2 Military Manpower Mobilization: Sources and Options ......................... IV-10 

 IV-3 Materiel and Equipment Mobilization: Sources and Options ..................IV-14 

 IV-4 Transportation Mobilization: Sources and Options ..................................IV-16 

 IV-5 Facility Mobilization: Sources and Options ..............................................IV-19 

 IV-6 Industrial Mobilization: Sources and Options ......................................... IV-21 

 IV-7 Expanding Training Base Capacity: Sources and Options ..................... IV-23 

 IV-8 Health Service Support Mobilization: Sources and Options ....................IV-25 

 V-1 Major Mobilization Plans and Planning Systems ....................................... V-3 

 V-2 Contingency Planning Process .................................................................... V-6 

 V-3 Operation Plan Reserve Component Requirements...................................... V-8 

 V-4 Example: Reserve Component Requirements Summary............................. V-9 

 V-5 Manpower Mobilization Execution Process ............................................... V-10 

 V-6 Reserve Component Decision-making Process .......................................... V-12 

 V-7 Mobilization Reporting Information Flows................................................ V-13 

 VI-1 Demobilization Planning Guidelines ......................................................... VI-2 

 VI-2 Representative Demobilization Actions in Resource Areas ........................VI-5 

 VI-3 Demobilization Activities ............................................................................VI-7 

 VI-4 Demobilization Policy Issues.......................................................................VI-8 

 VI-5 Demobilization Planning Functions.............................................................VI-9 

 A-1 United States Code - Reserve Component Accessibility ............................ A-3 

 C-A-1 Planning Activities.................................................................................... C-A-1 

 C-B-1 Reserve Component Call-up Decision-making Activities.........................C-B-1 

 C-C-1 Mobilization Activities ..............................................................................C-C-1 

 C-D-1 Monitoring and Reporting Activities........................................................ C-D-1 

 C-E-1 Demobilization Activities ..........................................................................C-E-1 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

ix 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

• Discusses Mobilization and the National Security Strategy 

• Describes the Objectives of Mobilization Tenets 

• Covers the Roles and Responsibilities of Mobilization Planning 

• Discusses the Resource Areas Required for Mobilization Planning 

• Discusses the Planning and Execution of Mobilization 

• Considers the Joint Planning and Execution of Demobilization 

Overview 

Mobilization is the process 

of assembling and 

organizing national 

resources to support 

national objectives in time 

of war or other 

emergencies. 

Mobilization includes assembling and organizing 

personnel and materiel for active duty military forces, 

activating the Reserve Component (RC) (including 

federalizing the National Guard), extending terms of 

service, surging and mobilizing the industrial base and 

training bases, and bringing the Armed Forces of the 

United States to a state of readiness for war or other 

national emergency. There are two implied processes: 

The military mobilization process and the national 

mobilization process. 

Mobilization And National Security 

The National Perspective. 

Global Force Management. 

The National Security Strategy, National Defense 

Strategy, and the National Military Strategy detail 

national objectives and interests. Implicit is the need to 

maintain and improve a capability to rapidly and 

efficiently mobilize forces and resources to respond to 

threats across the range of military operations. 

Global Force Management is a process that integrates 

force assignment, apportionment, and allocation. It 

provides insights into the global availability of US forces 

and capabilities, and a process to quickly and accurately 

assess the impact and risk of assigning, apportioning, 

and allocating forces and capabilities among combatant 

commands. The two key components are: Consolidated 

force allocation under specific joint force providers, and 

a quarterly Global Force Management Board. 
Executive Summary 

x JP 4-05 

Total Force Policy. 

The Joint Military 

Perspective.

The Total Force Policy guides mobilization planning 

and the development of procedures for the employment 

of reserve military power. Military retirees, 

Department of Defense (DOD) civilian personnel, 

contractor personnel, and force multipliers (e.g., 

employer and community support) are also considered. 

Mobilization and demobilization in joint planning and 

operations rely upon the Joint Operation Planning and 

Execution System as the principal system for 

translating policy decisions into operation plans 

(OPLANs) and operation orders (OPORDs) in support 

of national security objectives. 

Mobilization Tenets 

Tenets of Mobilization. 

Objective. 

Timeliness. 

Unity of Effort. 

Flexibility. 

Sustainability. 

There are five mobilization tenets: objective, 

timeliness, unity of effort, flexibility, and sustainability. 

Joint operations are directed toward clearly defined 

objectives. Planning for joint operations provides the 

basis for determining the role mobilization is required 

to play in order to achieve the objectives. 

Timely mobilization of resources is essential to 

achieving overwhelming force on the battlefield at the 

right time and place, and to seizing and maintaining the 

initiative. 

Unity of effort in mobilization demands the integrated 

efforts of the nation’s military and supporting resource 

areas toward achievement of common objectives. 

Flexibility is needed to develop an appropriate response 

in a crisis, overcome unforeseen problems, adapt to 

uncertainties, and adjust to the friction of war. 

Mobilization sustainability is the ability to continuously 

provide logistics and personnel services necessary to 

maintain and prolong operations until successful 

mission completion. 
Executive Summary 

xi 

Roles And Responsibilities 

Office of the Secretary of 

Defense. 

Joint Planning and 

Execution Community. 

Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. 

The Joint Staff. 

Combatant Commanders. 

Military Departments and 

United States Coast Guard. 

Department of Defense 

Agencies. 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) assists the 

Secretary of Defense (SecDef) in managing 

mobilization by developing implementing guidance, 

and compiles reports on the costs of military 

operations. 

The joint planning and execution community 

collectively plans for mobilization, deployment, 

employment, sustainment, redeployment, and 

demobilization of joint forces. 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) prepares 

integrated plans for mobilization, establishes planning 

relationships, develops mobilization options and 

recommendations, general strategic guidance on 

industrial mobilization programs, monitors the status of 

mobilization and prepares required reports. 

The Joint Staff supports CJCS in integrating the 

mobilization plans of the Military Departments and 

DOD agencies, with the Joint Staff Logistics 

Directorate as the focal point. 

Combatant commanders (CCDRs) organize and employ 

assigned and attached forces, are principally 

responsible for preparing OPLANs and OPORDs, and 

participate in developing strategies and plans; as part of 

operational planning, they determine mobilization 

requirements and schedules. 

The Military Departments provide forces and logistic 

support to the CCDRs as directed by SecDef. Unless 

transferred to the Department of the Navy in time of 

war, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) is under 

control of the Secretary of Homeland Security 

(SECHS). USCG units under SECHS may be assigned 

to a CCDR with the approval of SECHS. The Military 

Departments and the USCG provide trained forces to 

the CCDRs, prepare detailed mobilization plans 

identifying the forces and support to be provided and 

execute mobilization. 

Five DOD agencies, referred to as combat support 

agencies, support joint military mobilization: 
Executive Summary 

xii JP 4-05 

 Defense Information Systems Agency. Participates 

in communications system mobilization planning, 

collects and analyzes telecommunications 

requirements from these planning activities, and 

develops mobilization plans. 

 Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Based on the 

Services’ mobilization plans, develops plans to 

support the Military Departments and other 

customers with DLA-managed materiel and 

services. 

 Defense Contract Management Agency.

 Provides worldwide contract management services. 

 Defense Finance and Accounting Service.

 Helps to develop financial management annexes to 

OPLANs, develops guidance on personnel pay, and 

ensures financial systems support to mobilization. 

 National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).

 In peacetime, develops mobilization plans to ensure 

geospatial intelligence support to joint forces in 

crisis and war. In crisis and war, NGA executes 

plans for increased data collection and increased 

production and distribution of its products. 

Joint Deployment Process 

Owner and the Distribution 

Process Owner. 

Mobilization Planner. 

United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), as 

the Joint Deployment Process Owner, is the DOD focal 

point to improve joint deployment processes. United 

States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), as 

the Distribution Process Owner, supports USJFCOM 

and other joint force providers in planning and 

execution of mobilization, and provides the strategic 

distribution capability to move forces and materiel. 

The mobilization planner assists DOD, Service, and 

joint agencies in assigning the task of developing and 

promulgating policies and procedures to activate and 

deactivate RC personnel under peacetime and crisis 

response conditions. 

Resource Areas 

Twelve Resource Areas. Military mobilization requires assembly and 

organization of resources in twelve interdependent 

areas: legal authorities, funding, environment, 

manpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, 

facilities, industrial base, training base, health service 

support (HSS), communications, and host-nation 
Executive Summary 

xiii 

Enabling Resources. 

Legal Authorities. 

Funding. 

Environment. 

Manpower. 

Materiel and Equipment. 

support (HNS). Activity in any one area may have an 

influence on each of the others. 

Commanders and mobilization planners consider the 

impact of mobilization on the environment as well as 

requirements of legal authorities and funding to enable 

the timely execution of mobilization activities. These 

three areas are known as enabling resources. 

A range of legal authorities enable or limit mobilization 

and emergency actions. Many of these authorities are 

available to the President in any level of emergency; 

others only with a declaration of national emergency. 

Still others are reserved by Congress. Statutes 

providing emergency authority specify the level of 

emergency at which they can be invoked and action 

required to invoke them. 

To facilitate mobilization for unplanned military 

operations, it is necessary to ensure that sufficient 

funding is available for known obligations. 

The US has a substantial framework of environmental 

laws. Awareness of environmental issues, 

requirements, and liabilities or penalties associated with 

noncompliance mandate identification and resolution of 

environmental issues that affect mobilization. 

Manpower mobilization augments the peacetime Active 

Component military end strength. Sources of 

manpower include members of the RC, military 

retirees, volunteers with prior service, and nonprior 

service (NPS) personnel who volunteer. In addition to 

the call-up of manpower from reserve and retiree 

manpower pools, three other actions can be taken to 

ensure adequate manpower during mobilization: stoploss, stop-movement, and personnel redistribution. 

Civilian manpower to include government service 

employees and contractors also must be carefully 

managed. 

This resource area includes all classes of supply. 

Materiel and equipment mobilization consists of many 

activities grouped under two major tasks: increasing the 

availability of materiel and equipment, and alleviating 

shortages. 
Executive Summary 

xiv JP 4-05 

Transportation. 

Facilities. 

Industrial Base. 

Training Base. 

Health Service Support. 

Transportation resources are required to support 

mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, 

redeployment, and demobilization operations. These 

assets move units and equipment. Often, these units are 

mobilized early to support deployment, which in turn 

may impact manpower resources. 

DOD uses a wide variety of facilities to house, train, 

equip, and support personnel and to provide storage, 

maintain equipment, and conduct operations. Bases, 

depots, medical facilities, airfields, and seaports are 

examples. Facilities that can support increased 

workloads during mobilization are obtained from 

commercial facilities; unused and standby capacity at 

existing facilities; and new capacity developed on 

property acquired. Options for expanding facilities 

include reopening unused capacity, initiating 

emergency military construction projects to increase 

capacity at existing facilities, and acquisition of new 

facilities. Facilities expansion may impact other 

resource areas such as manpower. 

The US industrial base includes commercial and 

government-owned production facilities. Foreign 

producers of essential components, parts, and 

ammunition are included, as foreign producers may be 

the only source for certain items. The Canadian 

defense industry is recognized as part of a single North 

American defense industrial base. Accelerated 

production or industrial base expansion may affect a 

number of the other resource areas. 

The Services expand their training bases to train NPS 

personnel, and to provide reclassification and refresher 

training for those who need it. Training base output 

requirements are determined and compared to available 

capacity. If there is a shortfall, additional capacity is 

added by mobilizing additional assets, hiring civilian 

employees and/or obtaining contractor support. Each 

option impacts other resource areas, such as manpower, 

materiel and equipment, facilities, HSS, and funding. 

Theater, continental United States (CONUS), and 

aeromedical evacuation HSS are expanded to treat, 

evacuate, receive, and redistribute casualties. HSS 
Executive Summary 

xv 

Communications. 

Host-Nation Support. 

requirements are determined from decisions 

establishing the theater medical support, theater patient 

evacuation, and force health protection policies. 

Factors such as casualty rates, transportation resources, 

and help determine the theater HSS required. 

Expanding HSS may burden the manpower, materiel 

and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial 

base, training base, HNS, and legal resource areas. 

The US military uses its own communications systems 

to execute many requirements, but frequently relies 

upon commercial providers for administrative support 

needs. The President has authority during national 

emergency or war to regulate and control 

telecommunications resources, allowing for measures 

to ensure the operation and security of 

telecommunications services. DOD’s Global 

Information Grid assets support DOD, and in times of 

crisis or war, assets supporting other departments and 

agencies of the US Government, may be made 

available. Expanding capacity in this area would likely 

have minimal impact on other areas. 

Manpower, equipment, facilities, and services provided 

by host or allied nations can offset requirements US 

military resources. There are a number of agreements 

with allied nations and various means to create new 

HNS support arrangements as required. Implementing 

HNS agreements primarily will impact the providing 

nation’s or nations’ resource areas. 

Mobilization Planning And Execution 

Mobilization plans. 

Mobilization Planning and 

Operation Plans. 

Mobilization plans support CCDRs’ OPLANs, concept 

plans, OPORDs, and campaign plans, and prepared by 

the Military Departments and DOD agencies. They 

reflect requirements for force expansion and expansion 

of the CONUS base to sustain the mobilized force for 

as long as necessary. Mobilization plans explain how 

to accomplish force and resource expansion, and are 

carefully integrated among participants and the twelve 

resource areas. 

The Guidance for Development of the Force, Guidance 

for Employment of Force, and DOD Master 

Mobilization Plan provide SecDef guidance for 
Executive Summary 

xvi JP 4-05 

Mobilization Plans and 

Military Campaign Plans. 

Mobilization Estimate of the 

Situation. 

Mobilization Planning 

During Contingency 

Planning. 

Mobilization Decisions and 

Orders. 

Monitoring the Status and 

Progress of Mobilization. 

Mobilization Reporting. 

mobilization planning. The CJCS amplifies this 

guidance to facilitate the Military Departments and 

CCDRs in preparing mobilization plans that support 

OPLANs. 

A campaign plan has important implications for 

mobilization planners. Strategic objectives, force 

levels, and time constraints are key elements of 

information for executing mobilization planning and 

initiating force and resource expansion options. 

A commander’s estimate of the situation provides a 

logical process by which a commander considers all the 

circumstances affecting the military situation and 

arrives at a decision on a course of action to accomplish 

the mission. A staff estimate is similar, producing a 

conclusion or recommendation for the commander. 

The mobilization estimate applies the staff estimate 

concept to mobilization planning. 

During peacetime, mobilization planners participate in 

two main activities: maintaining a mobilization base 

and participating in contingency planning to develop 

detailed mobilization plans to support OPLANs. 

CJCS recommends to SecDef the assets to be called up 

and their planned use when RC forces are mobilized. 

SecDef must approve the execution of a mobilization 

OPORD. After the President’s approval, SecDef 

directs the Military Departments to proceed. The 

Services publish mobilization orders, and OSD may 

issue implementation instructions and provide 

additional policy guidance. Some mobilization actions 

require the notification of Congress. 

Accurate and timely information on the status and 

progress of mobilization is needed at all levels. 

Information in each of the resource areas is analyzed 

and coordinated with other resource area proponents to 

provide recommendations for controlling, replanning, 

redirecting, or stopping mobilization. 

Reporting involves extracting information that is 

obtained from monitoring and providing the data to 

appropriate organizations. There are formal and 

informal reporting requirements. Formal requirements 
Executive Summary 

xvii 

Subjects of Required 

Reporting. 

are specified in statutes or directives, and three formal 

reports are generated: RC requirements from each 

OPLAN which lists RC requirements; the mobilization 

report; and (during partial mobilization) the President’s 

report to Congress. 

Four subjects require reporting: 

 Problems in providing forces; 

 RC forces no longer required; 

 Mobilization information to Joint Staff Director of 

Operations as required; and 

 Demobilization schedules. 

Joint Demobilization Planning And Execution 

Demobilization. 

Demobilization and 

National Security. 

Demobilization Planning 

Guidelines. 

Planning Considerations. 

Demobilization is the process of transitioning from a 

conflict situation or wartime military establishment and 

defense-based economy to a peacetime mode while 

maintaining national security and economic vitality. 

From a national perspective, the results of a successful 

demobilization process put the nation in a position to 

respond to future security challenges. Policies should 

be established to regulate the pace of demobilization 

and retain the military capability required to ensure 

post-conflict national security commitments. 

Lessons from past wars and mobilizations suggest the 

following demobilization guidelines: 

 Mission First. Demobilization plans support the 

post-conflict mission as it evolves; 

 Begin Planning Early. Soon after mobilization 

starts; 

 Coordinate and Communicate Plans and Policies. 

Coordinate within and outside DOD, and have 

public information programs. 

The following apply to demobilization planning: 

 Demobilizing the Armed Forces may range from a 

simple return of mobilized personnel and units to 

previous status, to a broader process of deactivating 

units and reorganizing; similar considerations apply 

to a demobilization of defense industry; 

 Recovery activities must be planned along with 

demobilization; 

 Demobilization planning is accomplished at the 
Executive Summary 

xviii JP 4-05 

Recovery Planning. 

Beginning Demobilization. 

Mobilization Planner 

Demobilization 

Responsibilities. 

Preliminary Actions. 

Demobilization Planning’s 

Two Subactivities. 

Demobilization Execution. 

Execution Tasks.

national, theater and supporting levels; and 

 The key to military demobilization is the supported 

geographic CCDR. 

Recovery planning is coordinated with demobilization 

planning, and includes reset actions in the theater and 

CONUS to restore force readiness and capability to 

respond, in the short term, to a future threat. 

Demobilization can begin before the end of the crisis or 

war but most such activity will begin after the conflict. 

Demobilization is mainly a Military Department 

responsibility, but the supported and supporting 

commanders help coordinate and synchronize. As with 

mobilization, assets in other resource areas are required 

to support the demobilization of manpower and 

equipment; but as support requirements decline, 

demobilization takes place in the other resource areas. 

Demobilization planning should occur during an 

operation and demobilization must be integrated into 

the redeployment, reflecting the post-conflict missions 

of supported commanders. 

Preliminary actions primarily involve establishing and 

disseminating broad guidance that the mobilization 

community incorporates into mobilization plans. 

Demobilization planning is divided into two 

subactivities: plan the demobilization force and plan 

demobilization support required. This includes 

consideration of demobilization and redeployment 

activities and schedules. 

Before demobilization starts, mobilization planners 

must ensure that a unit or individual will not be needed 

for the operation. During execution, mobilization 

planners constantly tailor the demobilization operation 

envisioned in the plan to the evolving situation. 

These tasks are inherent in demobilization execution: 

 Educate the Leadership. Provide the 

decisionmakers with information, including the 

schedule of units and the number of personnel to be 

demobilized and units and personnel already 

demobilized; 
Executive Summary 

xix 

 Review and Modify Demobilization Concepts and 

Support Plans. Monitor the existing plan to ensure 

accuracy and conformance to actual circumstances, 

and coordinate and update as needed; 

 Monitor Changing Requirements and Theater 

Backfill Requirements. Demobilization is a fluid 

process, and planners continue to review changing 

operational requirements which may result in units’ 

being demobilized or extended; 

 Seek Demobilization Approval. The supported 

CCDR identifies units and individuals no longer 

required for operations in the redeployment plan; 

 Develop Demobilization Schedule. Working 

closely with affected organizations and 

USTRANSCOM, the Services create a 

demobilization schedule; 

 Monitor RC Mobilizations and Demobilizations. 

Planners track and report on RC units from the start 

of mobilization through demobilization; 

 Highlight Critical Support Issues. By various 

communications means, the mobilization planner 

presents conflicts and critical issues to the 

leadership and the appropriate organizations for 

resolution. 

 Terminate Legal Authorities. When demobilization 

is complete and RC forces no longer needed to 

support the operation, action is taken to terminate 

the legal authority by which RC forces were 

activated. 

CONCLUSION 

This publication provides fundamental principles and 

guidance for the planning and conduct of joint military 

mobilization and demobilization, as well as some 

additional methods of force expansion, including use of 

volunteers and Presidential Reserve Call-up. It also 

provides the context for joint participation in the 

planning and programming activities undertaken within 

the DOD, especially those activities aimed at the 

reconstitution of military capability to deter any future 

threat to national security.
Executive Summary 

xx JP 4-05 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER I 

MOBILIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY 

“The Congress shall have power . . . To provide for calling forth the Militia to 

execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; 

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for 

governing such part of them as may be employed in the Service of the 

United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the 

officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline 

prescribed by Congress.” 

Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8 

1. Introduction 

a. Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing national resources 

to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. Mobilization 

includes assembling and organizing personnel and materiel for active duty military 

forces, activating the Reserve Component (RC) (including federalizing the National 

Guard), extending terms of service, surging and mobilizing the industrial base and 

training bases, and bringing the Armed Forces of the United States to a state of readiness 

for war or other national emergency. There are two processes implied in this description. 

(1) The military mobilization process by which the nation’s Armed Forces are 

brought to an increased state of readiness. 

(2) The national mobilization process of mobilizing the interdependent 

resource areas (see Chapter IV, "Resource Areas") to meet non-defense needs as well as 

sustaining the Armed Forces across the range of military operations. 

b. From a national strategic perspective, the importance of a responsive 

mobilization capability to our national security is implicit in the President’s National 

Security Strategy (NSS) and its derivatives, the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and 

the National Military Strategy (NMS). The United States employs its military 

capabilities at home and abroad in support of its strategies in a variety of operations. 

These operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a range of military 

operations that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence 

activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations, and if necessary, major 

operations and campaigns. The use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security 

cooperation, and deterrence activities shapes the operational environment and helps to 

keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed 

conflict while maintaining US global influence. This chapter examines the relationship 

between mobilization and national security from both perspectives. It concludes with a 

discussion of demobilization, an essential first step toward maintaining national security 

after a crisis or war. 

 I-1 
Chapter I 

2. The National Perspective 

 a. National Security Strategy. As a nation, the United States preserves its 

security by the judicious application of national power to achieve national objectives 

derived from national interests. The President identifies national interests and objectives 

in the NSS of the United States. National interests and objectives are the ends of our 

national security strategy. The ways and means for achieving these ends are made 

apparent in broad terms by the President through the use of the diplomatic, informational, 

economic, and military instruments of national power. Programs for maintaining a strong 

national defense depend on our maintaining a strong economy, infrastructure, and viable 

network of multinational security alliances. 

 b. National Defense Strategy. The NDS outlines how the Department of Defense 

(DOD) will support the objectives outlined in the NSS, including the need to strengthen 

alliances and build new partnerships to defeat global terrorism and prevent attacks against 

us, our allies, and our friends; prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and 

our friends with weapons of mass destruction; work with others to defuse regional 

conflicts, including conflict intervention; and transform national security institutions to 

face the challenges of the 21st century. The NDS acts on these objectives, evaluates the 

strategic environment, challenges, and risks we must consider in achieving them, and 

maps the way forward. 

c. National Military Strategy

(1) The National Military Strategy provides overarching policy for military 

objectives in support of the President’s National Security Strategy. Explicit in the 

military strategy is the assertion that we can meet the challenges of the foreseeable 

future with a total force — a carefully tailored combination of Active Component (AC) 

and RC (including Retired Reserve), together with retired military personnel, DOD 

civilian employees, and DOD contractors. Implicit in the military strategy is the need 

to maintain and improve the capability to rapidly and efficiently mobilize forces and 

resources to respond to natural disaster challenges at the low end of the range of military 

operations and to deter or counter a broad spectrum of serious threats to our national 

security, such as threats to the homeland. 

(2) Figure I-1 depicts a representative range of military commitments together 

with the levels of mobilization and emergency authorities available to the President when 

RC forces are needed for an appropriate response. Congress has provided the 

President with a comprehensive menu of authorities for tailoring an appropriate 

response in a crisis. Several of these are available without a declaration of national 

emergency. Others require Presidential or Congressional emergency declarations. 

Detailed discussions of mobilization levels and emergency authorities are provided in 

Chapter IV, “Resource Areas,” and Chapter V, “Mobilization Planning and Execution.” 

I-2 JP 4-05 
Mobilization and National Security 

d. Global Force Management 

(1) Global Force Management (GFM) is a process that integrates force 

assignment, force apportionment, and force allocation. It provides comprehensive 

insights into the global availability of US military forces and capabilities, and provides 

senior decisionmakers a process to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of 

proposed changes in assigning, apportioning, and allocating forces and capabilities 

among combatant commands. Two important attributes of GFM include being able to 

globally assess force sourcing risk in order to address mitigation options; and enabling 

global sourcing with the best force sourcing option, regardless of command, organization, 

or Service to which the force or personnel are assigned. 

(2) There are two key components to GFM:

(a) Consolidated force allocation under specific joint force providers: US 

Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) for conventional forces; US Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM) for special operations forces and US Transportation Command 

(USTRANSCOM) for mobility forces. US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) acts 

as the joint functional manager for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets 

and their associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination. 

LEVELS OF MILITARY COMMITMENT

TOTAL

MOBILIZATION

FULL

MOBILIZATION

PARTIAL

MOBILIZATION

PRESIDENTIAL 

RESERVE CALL-UP

RESERVE COMPONENT 

VOLUNTEERS

SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION

LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING

FURTHER FORCE 

EXPANSION

PRESIDENTIAL

OR 

CONGRESSIONAL

DECLARATION OF 

NATIONAL

EMERGENCY

CONGRESSIONAL 

DECLARATION

OF NATIONAL 

EMERGENCY

LEVELS OF MILITARY 

COMMITMENT

EMERGENCY 

AUTHORITIES

LEVELS OF MOBILIZATION

GLOBAL

MULTIPLE REGIONAL 

CONTINGENCIES

REGIONAL 

CONTINGENCY

PEACE OPERATIONS

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN 

ASSISTANCE

COUNTERDRUG

CIVIL DISTURBANCE

NATURAL DISASTER

Figure I-1. Levels of Military Commitment

 I-3 
Chapter I 

(b) A quarterly Global Force Management Board (GFMB), hosted by the 

Director of the Joint Staff and led by the Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-3), 

made up of general/flag officer representation from all joint force providers, combatant 

commands, and Services. The GFMB develops and provides strategic-level GFM 

guidance to enable the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to make proactive, informed force 

management decisions. 

e. Force Sourcing—Assignment, Allocation, and Apportionment 

(1) Title 10, US Code (USC) delineates responsibilities for assignment, 

allocation, and apportionment of forces. SecDef assigns forces/capabilities, allocates 

forces/capabilities, provides planning guidance to combatant commands, and provides 

overarching strategic guidance to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). 

(2) GFM’s primary role in supporting decisionmaking is its integration of 

the three processes of assignment, apportionment, and allocation. This integration 

aligns operational forces against known apportionment and allocation requirements in 

advance of planning and deployment preparation timelines. 

(3) The Unified Command Plan, Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum 

(Forces For), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Guidance for Employment of 

the Force (GEF), and Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 

United States, are the baseline documents that establish the policy and procedures in 

support of GFM. The CJCS issues Global Force Management Implementation Guidance 

(GFMIG), which further delineates GFM processes: 

(a) Provides direction from SecDef regarding assignment of forces to 

combatant commanders (CCDRs); 

(b) Includes the force/capabilities allocation process that provides access to 

all available military or Department of Defense resources to support combatant 

commands for both steady-state rotational requirements and requests for capabilities or 

forces in response to crises or emergent contingencies; 

(c) Includes apportionment guidance provided in the JSCP; and 

(d) Informs joint force, structure, and capability assessment processes. 

(4) GFM informs DOD’s assessment processes by identifying sporadic or 

persistent under-sourced or hard-to-source forces/capabilities. 

(5) USJFCOM focuses on the global allocation of combat, combat support, and 

combat service support capabilities and forces to support combatant command 

requirements. USJFCOM uses GFMB-developed and approved guidance to recommend 

global sourcing solutions. Combatant commands, Military Departments, and the National 

Guard Bureau provide force/capability commitment, availability, and readiness data to 

I-4 JP 4-05 
Mobilization and National Security 

USJFCOM and its assigned Service components. Additionally, USJFCOM assesses the 

ability to sustain joint presence, operational commitments, and global surge capabilities 

over time based on allocation decision/actions in effect. Reporting on the readiness, 

disposition, and development of sourcing recommendations for forces/capabilities 

sourced by USSOCOM, USSTRATCOM, and USTRANSCOM will be coordinated by 

those combatant commands with the Services and other CCDRs to CJCS. 

3. The Joint Military Perspective 

a. Total Force Policy. The Total Force Policy is one fundamental premise upon 

which our military force structure is built. Military retirees, DOD civilian 

personnel, contractor personnel, and force multipliers (such as employer and 

community support considerations) are included under their umbrella to reflect the value 

of their contributions to our military capability. Total Force Policy guides thorough 

mobilization planning and the development of procedures that are essential to the 

timely employment of reserve military power. To further codify Total Force Policy, 

SecDef has issued a directive on managing the RC as an operational force. 

b. Mobilization and Demobilization in Joint Planning and Operations. The 

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the principal system 

within DOD for translating policy decisions into operation plans (OPLANs) and 

operation orders (OPORDs) in support of national security objectives. The joint 

operation planning process is an integral part of JOPES, serving as an adaptive and 

collaborative tool in supporting contingency and crisis action planning (CAP). 

Total Force Policy 

The Total Force Policy was used during Operations DESERT SHIELD 

and DESERT STORM and more recently, Operations ENDURING 

FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, which involved the largest 

mobilization and deployment of reserve forces since the Korean War. 

There was significant reliance on military retirees, Department of 

Defense civilian personnel, and contractor personnel for critical skills 

and performance of many essential tasks. 

SOURCE: Various Sources 

(1) Mobilization

(a) The mobilization function includes activation (order to active duty 

[other than for training] in the federal service) of the RC, federalizing the National 

Guard, and surging and expanding the industrial base. Figure I-2 illustrates levels of 

mobilization. 

 I-5 
Chapter I 

FORCE 

EXPANSION

ALL EXISTING

ACTIVE AND/OR

RESERVE 

FORCE

STRUCTURE

UP TO 1,000,000

READY 

RESERVES

FORCES 

AND/OR

RESOURCES

UP TO 200,000

SELECTED

RESERVES

(INCLUDING

UP TO 30,000

Individual 

Ready Reserve)

VOLUNTARY

CALL-UP

TITLE 10, USC, 

SECTION 12301 (d)

NO TIME LIMIT

FORCE ACTIVATION OPTIONS

TOTAL MOBILIZATION

FULL MOBILIZATION

PARTIAL MOBILIZATION

PRESIDENTIAL RESERVE CALL-UP

CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATION

OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY

PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATION

OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY

Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 12301 (a)

Title 10, USC, Section 12302

Title 10, USC, Section 12304

INVOLUNTARY 

CALL-UP (NOT TO SCALE)

Title 10, USC, 

Section 12301 (b)

15 DAYS 365 DAYS 24 MONTHS

DURATION OF AVAILABILITY

CRISIS DURATION +

6 MONTHS

LEVELS OF MOBILIZATION

Figure I-2. Levels of Mobilization 

(b) Because the most visible mobilization activity is the activation of RC 

members, there has been a tendency to focus planning on manpower issues. 

Mobilization, however, involves much more than expanding and filling the military 

force with people. The force must be equipped, trained, and sustained over time if it is 

to achieve and maintain its designed capability. Mobilization activities require the 

support of the private sector (employers and community), DOD civilian workforce, 

and contractor support. They also require increased resources in the areas of materiel, 

transportation, facilities, industrial production, training base capacity, health service 

support (HSS), and communications. Actions may be required to ensure continued 

compliance with, or obtain temporary waivers of environmental protection laws. 

Adequate funding and sufficient legal authorities are also required to initiate and sustain 

mobilization activities. Mobilization, therefore, includes determining and satisfying 

I-6 JP 4-05 
Mobilization and National Security 

 I-7 

demands for those resources required to support the total force during deployment, 

employment, sustainment, and redeployment. Figure I-3 illustrates responsibilities 

associated with RC call-up decisionmaking. 

RESERVE COMPONENT CALL-UP DECISIONMAKING Mobilization 

Planning 

Community 

Pre-Mobilization 

Review and 

Coordination 

Educate 

Senior 

Leadership on 

RC Potential 

Interpret Policies 

for Use of 

Reserve 

Component 

Confirm Preplanned 

Mobilization 

Capabilities 

Recommend 

Changes in 

Peacetime 

Budgeting 

Priorities 

Mobility 

Demobilization 

Policy to Suit 

Contingency 

Prepare 

Decision 

Packages 

Common 

Activities 

(For all) 

 Identify POC 

network 

 Convene 

preliminary 

meetings 

focused on 

“what if” 

questions using 

current 

information 

 Analyze lessons 

learned from 

similar crises 

 Consider 

potential 

supporting 

requirements 

 Manage media 

relations and 

coordinate with 

public affairs 

officer 

 Conduct 

meetings 

and/or 

briefings on 

RC 

mobilization 

policies: 

availability, 

mobilization 

and 

deployment 

criteria, call-up 

procedures, 

and the 

different 

categories of 

RC and their 

potential use 

 Review and 

modify call-up 

instructions and 

procedures 

 Recommend 

modifications and 

exceptions to 

policy 

 Coordinate with 

legal counsel 

 Review policies 

and/or 

procedures for 

“conscientious 

objectors” and 

Servicemembers 

Civil Relief Act 

 Estimate 

ability of 

mobilization 

activities to 

meet plan 

schedule 

 Identify 

capability 

shortfalls 

 Review 

unfunded 

mobilization 

requirements 

 Coordinate with 

resource area 

proponents for 

adjustments to 

internal funding 

priorities 

 Initiate 

planning for 

the return of 

RC to civilian 

status 

 Respond to 

information 

requests as 

appropriate 

Joint Staff  Become familiar 

with RC call-up 

procedures 

 Review 

operation plan 

 Be prepared to 

recommend 

level of call-up 

 Review legal 

authorities 

 Review 

mobilization 

plans, policies, 

and 

procedures 

 Brief 

leadership on 

call-up 

authorities and 

specific 

qualities of RC 

 Identify 

opportunities for 

joint use of 

Service 

mobilization 

assets 

 Monitor 

development of 

RC deployment 

criteria 

 Confirm 

monitoring 

and reporting 

systems: 

coordinate 

reporting 

requirements 

 Seek 

opportunities for 

cross-Service 

utilization of RC 

assets 

 Seek 

opportunities 

for crossService 

utilization of 

RC 

demobilization 

facilities and 

assets 

 Prepare 

Draft 

Decision 

 Package 

Staff Draft 

Decision 

 Package 

with 

Services 

Forward 

Package to 

Chairman of 

Joint Chiefs 

of Staff 

POC – point of contact RC – Reserve Component 

Figure I-3. Reserve Component Call-up Decisionmaking 

(c) Mobilization planning complements and supports joint operation 

planning. It is accomplished primarily by the Services and their major subordinate 

commands based on SecDef guidance. It requires development of supporting plans by 

other federal agencies. Just as the Services mobilize their reserve organizations and 

individuals to augment military capability, supporting federal agencies must oversee 

mobilization of the support base required to sustain the mobilized force. 

 (d) The Joint Staff supports the CJCS in his role as principal military 

advisor to the President and SecDef; facilitates resolution of conflicts for scarce resources 

among the Services, CCDRs, and DOD agencies; provides input for resolution of claims 

for resources between the military and civil sectors in wartime; and oversees mobilization 

planning. To facilitate the CJCS’s role in such mobilization matters, the mobilization 

working group (MWG) has been established. The MWG is chaired by the Logistics 

Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-4)/Division Chief for Sustainment, Mobilization, and 

Plans Division and is designed to enhance communications among the Office of the 

cretary
Chapter I 

MANAGING THE RESERVE COMPONENT AS AN OPERATIONAL 

FORCE 

It is the Department of Defense policy that: 

 a. The Reserve Component (RC) provide operational capabilities 

and strategic depth to meet US defense requirements across the full 

spectrum of conflict including under Title 10, US Code (USC), Sections 

12301, 12302, 12304, and 12306. 

 b. The Active Component (AC) and RC are integrated as a total 

force based on the attributes of each component and its core 

competencies. 

 c. Homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities are 

total force missions. Unity of effort is maintained consistent with 

statutory responsibilities in operations involving federal forces and 

non-federalized National Guard forces with federal forces under federal 

command and control and non-federalized National Guard forces under 

state command and control. 

 d. The RC provides connection to and commitment of the 

American public. 

 e. The continuum of service is utilized to enhance the 

effectiveness of and sustain the all-volunteer force with flexible service 

options that are attractive to a broad population. 

 f. Utilization rules are implemented to govern frequency and 

duration of activations. Since expectation management is critical to 

the success of the management of the RC as an operational force, 

these rules enhance predictability and judicious and prudent use of the 

RC. 

 g. Voluntary duty, per Title 32, USC, Section 12301(d) and Title 32, 

USC, Section 502(f)(2) is encouraged to meet mission requirements. 

 h. The RC is resourced to meet readiness requirements per Title 

10, USC, sections 3013, 5013, and 8013. RC resourcing plans shall 

ensure visibility to track resources from formulation, appropriation, 

and allocation through execution. 

 i. Outreach services are established and available for RC 

members, their families, and employers from pre-activation through 

reintegration.

Robert M. Gates 

Secretary of Defense 

29 October 2008 

 I-8 
Mobilization and National Security 

Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the Services when military operations 

warrant the use of the RC. 

Appendix D, “Mobilization Working Group,” contains specific policy and procedures 

related to the MWG. 

(2) Demobilization. Demobilization is the process of transitioning from a 

conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a 

peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. 

Implied in this description are two types of activities: those associated with reducing the 

percentage of the nation’s production capacity devoted to the Armed Forces and defense 

industry, and those undertaken to maintain national security and economic vitality. These 

tasks, which historically compete for resources, can make the management of 

demobilization even more complex and challenging than mobilization. 

Demobilization planning and execution are covered in Chapter VI, “Joint Demobilization 

Planning and Execution.” 

 I-9 
Chapter I 

I-10 JP 4-05 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER II

MOBILIZATION TENETS 

"Active Component (AC) forces are ready for combat and Reserve 

Component (RC) forces are in a proper state of readiness for mobilization to 

active service." 

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

1. Introduction 

 As shown in Figure II-1, there are five mobilization tenets that describe the 

characteristics of successful mobilization and provide the foundation for mobilization 

doctrine. The tenets are: objective, timeliness, unity of effort, flexibility, and 

sustainability. 

MOBILIZATION TENETS

OBJECTIVE

UNITY OF EFFORT

FLEXIBILITY

SUSTAINABILITY

TIMELINESS

Figure II-1. Mobilization Tenets

2. Mobilization Tenets 

a. Objective. Joint operations are directed toward clearly defined, decisive, and 

achievable objectives. Planning for joint operations provides the basis for determining 

whether the mobilization of reserve forces and other resources is required to achieve the 

objectives. Commanders and operational planners must clearly understand the 

mobilization implications associated with their plans to ensure that needed resources 

are identified, mobilized, protected, and used effectively. Requirements for activating 

RC forces must be clearly identified, as well as the need to expand the capability or 

 II-1 
Chapter II 

capacity of other resource areas. Commanders and operational and mobilization 

planners must coordinate their efforts to ensure that the time necessary for 

mobilization actions is clearly understood, and the resulting impacts clearly identified and 

addressed. 

b. Timeliness. Timely mobilization of all resources is essential to achieving 

overwhelming force on the battlefield at the right time and place. It is also essential to 

seizing and maintaining the initiative. We must be able to act faster than the adversary is 

able to react. Achieving effective mobilization of resources requires timely 

indications and warnings of the threat and appropriate response to such indications and 

warning; efficient mobilization procedures and frequent exercises and rehearsals; RC 

forces with the resources necessary to maintain required readiness levels; a supportive 

employer and community base; a civilian workforce prepared to support military 

TIMELINESS FROM 20TH CENTURY WARS 

Timeliness has always been a major problem in mobilization. In World 

War I, industrial mobilization was geared to a projected big push 

planned for the summer of 1919. The surprising success of the lastditch German offensive in the spring of 1918, followed that autumn by 

the climactic Allied counteroffensive, precipitated the commitment of 

US troops to combat armed and equipped with British and French 

rather than American supplies and weaponry. 

In World War II, personnel mobilization could never be completely 

synchronized with requirements. The result was a recurrent boom and 

bust cycle with regard to enlisted and junior officer replacements. 

Partially trained troops repeatedly had to be stripped out of units in 

training to fill up units in combat or about to be deployed, thereby 

delaying the combat readiness of later deploying units. 

The rapid demobilization after World War II, and neglect of military 

readiness in the immediate postwar period, left the United States 

without a viable capability for responding to a crisis that arose with 

little or no warning. The unfortunate result was that we were woefully 

unprepared for the surprise North Korean attack on South Korea in 

June 1950. We conducted a desperate delaying action, and were nearly 

forced off the Korean peninsula at Pusan, before reinforcing units and 

other resources could be mobilized and deployed to effectively counter 

the initial North Korean offensive. 

Major mobilization decisions during Operation DESERT SHIELD/ 

DESERT STORM were deliberately synchronized with United Nations 

resolutions and US congressional action. In so doing, these decisions 

not only satisfied the operational requirements of our joint military 

forces, they also provided clear signals of US resolve to adversaries, 

allies, and the US public, whose continuing policy support was critical 

to its success. 

Various Sources 

II-2 JP 4-05 
Mobilization Tenets 

missions; contractors prepared for their roles; stockpiles of materiel and equipment to 

sustain the force until industrial base output can be expanded; and synchronized plans 

for the expansion of transportation, facilities, training base, HSS, communications, and 

other support necessary to deploy, employ, sustain, redeploy, and, when appropriate, 

demobilize forces. 

c. Unity of Effort. Unity of effort in mobilization demands the integrated 

efforts of the nation’s military and supporting resource areas toward achievement of 

common objectives. Integration is achieved through the effective use of planning and 

execution processes that provide for timely and thorough coordination within the chain 

of command and among DOD, other federal agencies, and the private sector. A 

manpower call-up, without employer and community support, is not sustainable over a 

long period of time. The failure to integrate mobilization activities within and among the 

various resource areas could delay the arrival of units and individual replacements in the 

operational area or impair their combat effectiveness. 

UNITY OF EFFORT: WORLD WAR I 

The absence of unity of effort contributed to a confusing and wasteful 

World War I mobilization. Only the most rudimentary advance planning 

had been accomplished before the US declaration of war in April 1917. 

There was little coordination of personnel and materiel acquisition 

activities. Hundreds of thousands of conscripts reported to hastily 

constructed training installations that would not be supplied with 

enough organizational clothing, equipment, and weapons to properly 

equip them for several months. 

The Government, civilian economy, and Services competed for 

resources without a competent coordinating authority. War production 

was chaotic. Priorities for raw materials, labor, and electric power were 

determined in ad hoc negotiations among public and private officials. 

East Coast ports of embarkation were quickly overwhelmed, and inland 

transportation became so congested that the President was forced to 

nationalize the country’s railroad system. 

A sealift shortage, evident even before German submarines began 

sinking merchant ships faster than new ones could be built, cast 

doubts on the nation’s ability to deploy forces to Europe even after 

they were trained and equipped. The net result was that half-trained 

US forces were sent to France in British vessels. The forces were 

largely equipped with British and French artillery, tanks, machine guns, 

and aircraft, and were required to undergo further training before they 

could be used effectively on the battlefield. 

Various Sources 

 II-3 
Chapter II 

d. Flexibility. Flexibility is necessary to develop an appropriate response in a crisis, 

overcome unforeseen problems, adapt to uncertainties, and adjust to the friction of war. 

Flexibility for mobilization planning and execution has been provided for in JOPES 

and in the comprehensive set of legislated emergency powers that give the President, in 

his constitutional role as Commander in Chief, wide latitude in crafting a response to a 

developing crisis. There are substantial emergency authorities available to the 

President before a declaration of national emergency, such as the Presidential Reserve 

Call-up (PRC) authority and authorities establishing the priority of industrial production 

for defense needs. Other authorities are made available to the President upon a 

declaration of national emergency. The National Emergencies Act provides that when 

the President declares a national emergency, he must specify the powers he is invoking. 

Although the powers are limited to those specifically invoked, others may be 

subsequently invoked. This provides the President the flexibility to act incrementally 

FLEXIBILITY: OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM 

Flexibility overcame limitations in planning, force structure, and 

capabilities in a number of instances during Operation DESERT 

SHIELD/DESERT STORM in 1990-1991. The availability of prepositioned supplies and a fairly extensive host-nation infrastructure 

enabled the combatant commander to turn the absence of a fully 

developed deployment and transportation schedule to tactical 

advantage at the beginning of the crisis by gambling on the 

deployment of combat elements at the expense of logistic and 

administrative support units. 

Forces deployed to the theater had insufficient organic transportation 

capability to carry out the campaign plan. Intensive efforts by the Joint 

Staff and the Department of State mobilized critical ground transport 

from host-nation and allied assets to execute the planned offensive. 

The decision to deploy the US Army’s VII Corps from Europe showed 

considerable flexibility. Besides powerful combat forces, VII Corps 

also included a fully structured support command, which proved 

extremely useful in addressing theater logistic shortfalls. 

Although Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM did not provide 

a truly strenuous test of production surge capabilities, industry did 

accelerate output of critical supplies, equipment, and munitions. 

Perhaps the best example of flexibility in this area was the deployment 

of a system prototype still undergoing developmental testing, the Joint 

Surveillance Target Attack Radar System aircraft. Its advanced 

technology gave the combatant commander the capability to monitor 

the battlefield and look deep behind enemy lines in a way never before 

possible. 

Various Sources 

II-4 JP 4-05 
Mobilization Tenets 

to signal US resolve in developing crises and to authorize certain preparatory actions 

without causing undue provocation. JOPES also provides flexibility in mobilization by 

delegating authority to the maximum extent consistent with control to promote freedom 

of action by subordinates and ensure continuity when communications are disrupted. 

The joint planning and execution community (JPEC) also contributes to flexibility 

by developing a wide range of military response options for consideration by 

decisionmakers. Flexibility also demands a system for accurately monitoring the 

status and progress of mobilization and the ability to replan, reprogram, and redirect 

mobilization activities to work around bottlenecks and resource shortfalls, and for 

providing protection of the force, equipment, and infrastructure being mobilized. 

e. Sustainability. Mobilization sustainability is the ability to continuously provide 

logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until 

successful mission completion. Timely, rapid mobilization planning is critical to 

ensuring logistics sustainability. Sustainability in joint operations provides the joint 

force commander (JFC) flexibility, endurance, and the ability to extend operational 

reach. To maintain sustainability, commanders must ensure personnel services, health 

services, field services, quality of life, and general supply support are adequate. Effective 

sustainment determines the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive 

operations, allowing the JFC to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Sustainment is 

primarily the responsibility of the supported CCDR and subordinate Service component 

commanders in close cooperation with the Services, combat support agencies, and 

supporting commands. 

 II-5 
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 4-05 

Intentionally Blank 
CHAPTER III

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

"Force projection allows a JFC [joint force commander] to strategically 

position and concentrate forces to set the conditions for mission success." 

Joint Publication 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations

1. Introduction 

 This chapter describes roles and responsibilities for joint military mobilization 

planning and execution. These roles and responsibilities extend from the President and 

SecDef down through the combatant commands, Services, and DOD agencies to 

installations for the entire process to be complete. The roles and responsibilities of the 

various federal agencies that mobilize national resources to support and sustain the 

nation’s military forces in time of war are outside the scope of this publication, but it is 

important to understand that virtually every federal department and agency would 

provide significant support to DOD if warranted by an emergency situation. 

2. Joint Military Mobilization Planning and Execution 

a. Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(1) In time of crisis and war, OSD assists SecDef in managing mobilization 

by developing implementing guidance for issuance by SecDef to the Joint Staff, Military 

Departments, and DOD agencies. OSD assembles cost data and compiles reports on the 

costs of military operations, as required by law. 

(2) Basic guidance to direct and coordinate mobilization planning within DOD 

is contained in the DOD Master Mobilization Guide (MMG), which implements DOD 

responsibilities under the National Security Council national security emergency 

preparedness policy. The MMG is the first level of mobilization planning. It 

identifies mobilization responsibilities for DOD components and describes the tasks to be 

performed in peacetime and at the time of mobilization. It provides a common 

foundation for the preparation of detailed mobilization plans by the Joint Staff, Military 

Departments, and DOD agencies. 

(3) Mobilization planning is heavily influenced by the JSCP, which tasks the 

CCDRs, their Service components, and the Military Departments to develop and refine 

OPLANs and supporting mobilization plans. Another influence on mobilization 

planning is DOD Directive (DODD) 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve Forces, which 

specifies DOD policy regardless of component. 

 

b. Joint Planning and Execution Community. The JPEC collectively plans for 

the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and 

demobilization of joint forces. 

 III-1 
Chapter III 

(1) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CJCS, in consultation with the 

other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepares integrated plans for military 

mobilization. Through Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 

3110.13, Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, CJCS 

establishes planning relationships. CJCS develops mobilization options and 

provides mobilization recommendations to SecDef. CJCS is also responsible for 

preparing and submitting to SecDef general strategic guidance for the development 

of industrial mobilization programs. CJCS also monitors the status and progress of 

mobilization and prepares required reports for submission by the President to the 

Congress. 

(2) Joint Staff. The Joint Staff supports CJCS in integrating the mobilization 

plans of the Military Departments and DOD agencies. The J-4 is the focal point in the 

Joint Staff for integrating mobilization plans and coordinating mobilization execution. 

The mobilization responsibilities of the Joint Staff are shown in Figure III-1. 

(3) Combatant Commanders. The CCDRs organize and employ assigned 

and attached forces and are principally responsible for the preparation of OPLANs 

and OPORDs. They participate in the development of national military and theater 

strategies and participate in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 

(PPBE) process in addition to their operation planning responsibilities. As part of their 

operation planning responsibilities, CCDRs determine mobilization requirements, 

identify RC forces, and schedule their deployment, and based on additional planning 

guidance, the CCDRs incorporate information on capabilities required into campaign 

plans, OPLANs, and OPORDs. The CCDRs are also responsible for training and 

readiness oversight for assigned RC forces when not on active duty or when on active 

duty for training. 

(a) Supported Combatant Commanders. Supported CCDRs are tasked 

in the JSCP or by other joint operation planning authority to prepare specific plans. 

They identify the RC capabilities needed to support the plan; identify time-phased 

requirements for RC capabilities; and identify the RC capabilities needed for 

reinforcement, for deployment and movement of the force, and for backfill of deployed 

capabilities. This planning establishes the capabilities required and sustaining 

capabilities upon which supporting mobilization plans are based. This planning 

requires extensive coordination among the supported CCDRs, supporting CCDRs, and 

the Services. Supported CCDRs request invocation of emergency mobilization 

authorities when ordered to execute OPORDs requiring mobilization support. 

III-2 JP 4-05 
Roles and Responsibilities 

JOINT STAFF MOBILIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES 

JOINT STAFF 

DIRECTORATE RESPONSIBILITIES 

Reviews manpower-related mobilization requirements. 

Identifies options for personnel augmentation, validates augmentation requests, and 

recommends appropriate authorities. 

Monitors the allocation and prioritization of inductees to the Services. Manpower and 

Personnel, J-1 

Initiates manpower mobilization reporting for the Joint Staff during a crisis and serves as 

the Joint Staff point of contact for matters pertaining to manpower mobilization reporting 

policies and procedures. 

Intelligence, J-2 

Validates national intelligence augmentation support requirements for national intelligence 

support teams, quick reaction teams, and augmentation from national intelligence 

agencies that involve personnel or equipment. 

Provides the combatant commander's requirements and the J-3's recommendation to the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the need for mobilizing Reserve 

Component units. 

Operations, J-3 

Presents alert and mobilization packages through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

to the Secretary of Defense for final approval. 

Prepares joint mobilization estimates and studies. 

Prepares mobilization planning guidance for use by the combatant commanders and 

Services. 

Determines the adequacy and feasibility of mobilization plans to support operation plans. 

Serves as the Joint Staff point of contact for legal authorities pertaining to mobilization. 

Monitors the status and progress of mobilization and prepares required reports for 

submission by the President to Congress. 

Develops recommendations for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the 

level of mobilization, emergency authorities required, and the need for induction under the 

Selective Service Act. 

Serves as the Joint Staff point of contact for matters pertaining to materiel and equipment, 

transportation, facilities, industrial base, health service support, and their impact on the 

environment and the economy. 

Logistics, J-4 

Develops joint mobilization doctrine, policies, procedures, and reporting instructions. 

Develops concepts for military mobilization to support strategic concepts and objectives. 

Strategic Plans and 

Policy, J-5 Prepares recommendations for declarations of national emergency and war. 

Through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides Joint Staff position to the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments concerning mobilization 

requirements for communications during mobilization. 

Communications 

Systems, J-6 Ensures the design of command and control systems is capable of supporting the 

President, Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Military Departments, and combatant 

commanders during mobilization. 

Operational Plans and 

Joint Force 

Development, J-7 

Plans, conducts, and evaluates mobilization exercises. 

Force Structure, 

Resources, and 

Assessment, J-8 

Serves as the Joint Staff point of contact concerning Active/Reserve Component mix and 

other force and resource development issues. 

Figure III-1. Joint Staff Mobilization Responsibilities 

 III-3 
Chapter III 

(b) Supporting Combatant Commanders. Supporting CCDRs are tasked 

in the JSCP or by other joint planning authority to provide augmentation forces and 

other support to designated supported CCDRs. They may also require mobilized 

assets to accomplish their respective support missions. Their supporting plans include 

mobilization requirements when appropriate and, when needed, supporting CCDRs 

should request the mobilization of resources through the supported CCDR. As noted 

above, extensive coordination is required to ensure that all mobilization requirements are 

identified. 

(4) Military Departments and United States Coast Guard (USCG). The 

Military Departments provide forces and logistic support to the CCDRs at the 

direction of SecDef. In peacetime, and until transferred to the Department of the Navy in 

time of war, the USCG serves under the control of the Secretary of Homeland Security 

(SECHS). USCG units under the Department of Homeland Security control may be 

assigned to a CCDR with the approval of SECHS. The Military Departments and the 

USCG provide trained forces to the CCDRs. They prepare detailed mobilization 

plans identifying the actual forces and support to be provided and execute mobilization

at the direction of SecDef. Specifically, the Secretaries of the Military Departments 

have the responsibilities shown in Figure III-2.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT

SECRETARY RESPONSIBILITIES













Prepare military and industrial mobilization plans

Identify and request invocation of emergency authorities 

necessary to implement mobilization plans

Plan for the fill and sustainment of organized and/or 

structured units with all categories of personnel and 

equipment

Mobilize and demobilize their portion of the Reserve 

Component in crisis and war

Mobilize their civilian work force in crisis and war

Reorganize, reconstitute, and redeploy rotational forces 

during a sustained crises and war

Figure III-2. Military Department Secretary Responsibilities 

III-4 JP 4-05 
Roles and Responsibilities 

(5) DOD Agencies. Five DOD agencies, referred to as combat support 

agencies, have significant responsibilities for supporting joint military mobilization. 

These include Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense Logistics Agency 

(DLA), Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service (DFAS), and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). 

DISA and NGA receive operational direction from and report through CJCS to SecDef. 

The following paragraphs summarize the roles and responsibilities of each of these 

agencies in support of joint military mobilization. 

(a) Defense Information Systems Agency. DISA participates in all 

communications system mobilization planning activities. DISA collects and analyzes 

the telecommunications requirements derived from these planning activities, and 

develops mobilization plans. DISA modifies its mobilization plans, if required, and 

ensures the responsiveness of the Defense Communications System to the actual 

requirements of the President, OSD, Joint Staff, CCDRs, and Services. DISA also 

supports the National Communications System (NCS) and employs the nation’s 

commercial communications resources to support defense requirements. 

(b) Defense Logistics Agency. Based on the Services’ mobilization plans, 

DLA develops plans to support the Military Departments and other authorized 

customers with DLA-managed materiel and services. These plans include substantial 

industrial preparedness planning based on the CCDRs’ critical item list (CIL) and 

extensive production base analysis conducted in coordination with OSD, the Joint Staff, 

and the Military Departments. Across the range of military operations, DLA provides 

logistic support to the Services, advises the Joint Staff and CCDRs on the status of 

inventories of DLA-managed items, and recommends resource allocations and 

production priorities when appropriate. DLA also has a disposal, reutilization, and 

marketing mission, and is responsible for the disposal of hazardous waste, excess 

property, scrap, and demilitarized property generated by DOD activities. 

(c) Defense Contract Management Agency. DCMA is the combat 

support agency that provides worldwide contract management services. With the Armed 

Forces’ increased use of contractors in theaters, DCMA’s role has become critical to 

formulating productive relationships with the Joint Staff, CCDRs, and senior acquisition 

executives to provide the best possible support. 

(d) Defense Finance and Accounting Service. DFAS is the focal point 

for joint financial management issues. DFAS works with the CCDRs to develop the 

financial management annexes to joint OPLANs. DFAS develops guidance regarding 

personnel pay issues, providing entitlement and tax information to members and 

dependents, and ensuring that the financial systems are able to support mobilization 

efforts. DFAS has formed a DFAS-wide crisis management system to ensure that all 

DFAS crisis coordination centers are informed of financial management issues as they 

occur. 

 III-5 
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 4-05 

(e) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. In peacetime, NGA 

develops and maintains mobilization plans to ensure continued geospatial 

intelligence (GEOINT) support to joint forces under crisis and wartime conditions. 

NGA, in conjunction with DLA, provides the CCDRs with operational levels of 

geospatial information and services (GI&S) GEOINT products sufficient to meet initial 

mobilization requirements. In crisis and war, NGA executes its plans and procedures 

for increased data collection and increased production and distribution of its products. 

 

For more discussion on GI&S and GEOINT see JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence 

(GEOINT) Support to Joint Operations. 

c. Joint Deployment Process Owner (JDPO) and the Distribution Process 

Owner (DPO). USJFCOM as the JDPO serves as the DOD focal point to improve the 

joint deployment process. USJFCOM and other joint force providers are supported by 

USTRANSCOM during the planning and execution of the deployment and redeployment 

process. USTRANSCOM, as the DPO, provides the strategic distribution capability to 

move forces and materiel in support of JFC operational requirements and to return 

personnel, equipment, and materiel to home and/or demobilization stations. The JDPO 

and the DPO shall provide applicable guidance throughout the planning and deployment 

process. 

For more information on the Joint Deployment Process Owner, see DODI 5158.05, Joint 

Deployment Process Owner and JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 

d. Mobilization Planner. The role of the mobilization planner is to assist DOD, 

Service, and joint agencies in assigning the task of developing and promulgating policies 

and procedures required to activate and deactivate RC personnel under peacetime and 

crisis response conditions. The mobilization planner provides subject matter expertise on 

the sourcing and employment of RC forces in support of contingency planning and the 

execution of OPORDs. The mobilization planner may be an RC member activated at the 

outset of a contingency to augment DOD, joint, Service or combatant command staff or 

he/she may be an AC or RC subject matter expert already on the staff. The mobilization 

planner performs various roles and tasks in supporting the mobilization and 

demobilization of RC personnel. The roles and tasks may include: reviewing and 

updating projected RC requirements; coordinating reporting requirements; determining 

sourcing of immediate manpower augmentation; reviewing mobilization plans, policies, 

and procedures; monitoring the mobilization process; and monitoring force assignments 

against requirements. 
CHAPTER IV

RESOURCE AREAS 

“Still unclear was the nation’s willingness to learn the war’s lessons about 

preparedness. It was plain that the materiel side of mobilization was the 

most costly, complex, and time consuming. The war, (referring to World War 

I) Assistant Secretary of War Benedict Crowell said had ‘upset the previous 

opinion that adequate military preparedness is largely a question of trained 

manpower.’” 

Mobilization, Center for Military History Pub 72-32

1. Introduction 

a. Military mobilization requires the assembly and organization of resources in 

twelve interdependent resource areas (legal authorities, funding, environment, manpower, 

materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, HSS, 

communications, host-nation support [HNS]). Commanders and mobilization 

planners should understand the activities occurring in any one area may have an 

influence on each of the others (e.g., activating additional manpower creates adverse 

consequences for businesses and local communities; it increases demands for 

additionaUUl materiel and equipment, transportation, and additional workloads at 

affected facilities; and may affect the mobilization timeline). Depending on the situation, 

activating additional manpower could also generate requirements for additional industrial 

production, training base capacity, HSS, communications support, and HNS. Increasing 

levels of manpower and other resources may create economic shortfalls by shifting 

labor away from economic production and to military operations (e.g., over 27 

percent of RC pilots are employed by US airlines). The call-up of RC pilots can 

adversely affect the airline industry and possible Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) 

support. Some mobilization actions may be delayed until these conflicts are resolved by 

either complying with environmental protection standards or by obtaining temporary 

waivers. The appropriate legal authorities and funding would also have to be obtained to 

enable the call-up. 

b. This chapter provides an overview of major mobilization activities by 

resource area. The discussion in each resource area includes listing the sources of the 

resource, the options available to decisionmakers for using the resource, and the 

likely impact a mobilization decision made in one area could have on the other 

areas. 

SECTION A. ENABLING RESOURCES: ENVIRONMENT, 

LEGAL AUTHORITIES, FUNDING 

2. General 

 Each of the twelve resource areas, discussed in the following sections of this chapter, 

contribute to developing, expanding, sustaining, or positioning military capability so that 

it may be applied to protect our national security interests in an emergency. 

 IV-1 
Chapter IV 

Commanders and mobilization planners consider the impact of mobilization 

activities on the environment as well as the requirements of legal authorities and 

funding to enable the timely execution of mobilization activities. The combatant 

commands, Services, and subordinate commands have an obligation to consider possible 

environmental effects with respect to construction, modernization, and other activities in 

order to facilitate mobilization and demobilization, to include obtaining environmental 

permits as required by applicable US law. Mobilization planners should also anticipate 

and plan for the impact of additional facility, training land, and range usage resulting 

from the influx of personnel and increased operating tempo. This section discusses, in 

turn, the sources of these enabling resources as well as the options available and actions 

necessary to obtain them. 

a. Legal Authorities

(1) Categories of Legal Authority. There is a broad range of legal 

authority that enables or limits mobilization and emergency actions. Many of these 

authorities are available to the President in any level of emergency; others become 

available with a Presidential declaration of national emergency. Still others have been 

reserved by the Congress pending passage of a public law or joint resolution of national 

emergency or declaration of war. 

(2) Action Required to Invoke Legal Authorities. Statutes providing 

emergency authority specify the level of emergency at which they can be invoked 

and implemented. Once invoked, the President may delegate his authority to lower 

levels (e.g., SecDef, Secretaries of the Military Departments, CCDRs) (Title 3, USC, 

Section 301). As provided in the National Emergencies Act of 1976, Title 50, USC, 

Section 1631, the President must specify the authority upon which he or other 

officers will act and such specification must be identified in executive orders 

published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress. Requests to mobilize 

personnel generally require the identification of a specific level of emergency to trigger 

the applicable authority. For example, when mobilization requests are received from the 

Military Departments or CCDRs, the requests are integrated by the Joint Staff and 

forwarded with a draft executive order to SecDef as a recommendation for Presidential 

action. For various reasons, including international sensitivities and a policy goal of 

minimizing impacts upon RC members, major mobilization actions, such as involuntary 

personnel call-ups, are often conducted incrementally and may involve seeking legal 

authority on an incremental basis. Failure to obtain the requested authority in a 

timely fashion could preclude or limit the desired activity in one or more resource 

areas. Appendix A, “Legal Authorities,” contains a more complete description of key 

legal authorities relative to mobilization. 

IV-2 JP 4-05 
Resource Areas 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY 

DEPARTMENTS, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SUBJECT: Partial Mobilization for World Trade Center and Pentagon 

Attacks 

Pursuant to section 12302 of Title 10 of the United States Code and 

the Executive Order 13223 of September 14, 2001, entitled “Ordering 

the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty and Delegating 

Certain Authorities to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 

Transportation,” I hereby delegate to the Secretaries of the Military 

Departments authority to order to active duty Ready Reserve members 

as follows: 

(1) Army: not more than 10,000 members of the Army Ready 

Reserve to provide combat support and combat service support. 

(2) Navy and Marine Corps: not more than 3,000 members of the 

Naval Ready Reserve and not more than 7,500 members of the Marine 

Corps Ready Reserve. 

(3) Air Force: not more than 13,000 members of the Air Force 

Ready Reserve. 

The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall coordinate their 

exercise of the authority delegated by this memorandum with the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or his designee. 

The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall submit to me 

requests for additional authority to order Ready Reserve units and 

personnel to active duty as necessary, after coordination with the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

I hereby redelegate to the Secretaries of the Military Departments 

the President’s authorities under Sections 123, 123a, 527, 12006, 12302, 

and 12305 of Title 10, United States Code. The authorities delegated by 

this memorandum may be redelegated to civilian subordinates who are 

appointed to their offices by the President, by and with the advice and 

consent of the Senate. The authorities granted herein may not be 

exercised to exceed general officer, field grade officer, and E-8 and E-9 

enlisted personnel authorizations. The Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Force Management Policy may issue such instructions consistent 

with the memorandum as may be necessary to ensure the effective 

implementation of this memorandum. 

Donald Rumsfeld 

Secretary of Defense 

14 September 2001 

 IV-3 
Chapter IV 

b. Funding

(1) Funding considerations often require special attention. To facilitate 

mobilization for unplanned military operations, it is necessary to ensure that sufficient 

funding is available for known obligations. At the outset of an operation, senior 

decisionmakers should be aware of the magnitude of associated costs and recognize 

the possible impacts on other areas. It may be necessary to seek additional 

appropriations or authorizing legislation to fund the mobilization. CJCS does not make 

funding decisions. In peacetime, CJCS assesses the impact of operational resource 

requests made by the Military Departments and DOD agencies in the PPBE process and 

recommends to SecDef how available funding should be distributed to implement the 

NMS. In wartime, CJCS, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may provide 

advice to the President and SecDef concerning funding priorities. 

(2) A major mobilization will affect virtually all resource areas, well 

beyond the costs of salaries, benefits, and subsistence of the personnel involved. The 

costs of transportation, housing, HSS, training, personnel security investigations, and 

equipping the force should be included in estimating the total cost and included in 

supplemental or amended funding requests. 

c. Environment

(1) General. The US has a substantial framework of environmental laws. 

Awareness of environmental issues, requirements for compliance, and the liabilities or 

penalties associated with noncompliance mandate the identification and resolution of 

environmental issues that affect mobilization. It is DOD policy to comply with 

applicable environmental laws and regulations although national security exemptions 

may be available (Department of Defense Instruction [DODI] 4715.6, Environmental 

Compliance). The implications of this policy affect several resource areas. For example, 

in the case of a statute that does not provide for a national security exemption, legislation 

may be required to provide temporary relief from regulatory requirements. Some issues 

regarding environmental matters in the US may require resolution through the 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), such as minimizing environmental impacts 

while making modifications to achieve compliance. Additional manpower and other 

resources may be required to ensure continued compliance with environmental 

protection requirements. Military personnel who violate the criminal provisions of 

certain environmental statutes could be prosecuted. DOD is responsible for 

complying with environmental laws applicable to the continental United States (CONUS) 

military locations. Overseas, US policy is to take potential environmental impacts under 

consideration and follow Final Governing Standards, which are based on applicable hostnation standards, the DOD Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document, and 

applicable international agreements (such as treaties, status-of-forces agreements, or 

bilateral agreements), with the most stringent standards taking precedence. 

IV-4 JP 4-05 
Resource Areas 

(2) Types of Environmental Statutes Affecting Mobilization. Figure IV-1 

highlights four categories of environmental statutes which mobilization planners 

consider. 

(a) Compliance. Compliance statutes require DOD facilities to meet 

pollution emission standards; to obtain and maintain Federal, state, and local permits to 

release pollutants; and to meet record keeping, training, and reporting requirements. 

EPA, USCG, state, and local inspectors conduct periodic inspections for compliance. 

Examples of compliance statutes include: Clean Air Act (Title 42, USC, Section 7401), 

Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Title 33, USC, Section 1251), and the Resource 

Conservation and Recovery Act (Title 42, USC, Section 6901). 

EXAMPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES 

AFFECTING MOBILIZATION

COMPLIANCE

CLEAN-UP

CONSERVATION

IMPACT ANALYSIS

Clean Air Act

Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 

Liability Act

Defense Environmental Restoration Program Act

Endangered Species Act

Coastal Zone Management Act

National Environmental Policy Act

Figure IV-1. Examples of Environmental Statutes Affecting Mobilization 

(b) Clean-up. Certain statutes obligate DOD to protect human health 

and the environment from past activities that have contaminated the land (e.g., 

firing ranges and waste disposal sites). Included are sites DOD now owns, or has owned 

in the past, and non-DOD property where DOD operations have been conducted or DOD 

waste disposal has been arranged with the property owner. Enforcement of clean-up 

statutes normally relies on clean-up orders or agreements. DOD is required to survey 

 IV-5 
Chapter IV 

all of its property in the United States and territories for potential hazardous waste 

disposal sites and identify those that require clean-up. The worst cases are identified on 

the EPA National Priorities List, and the clean-up is regulated by EPA. Examples of 

clean-up statutes include the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 

and Liability Act (Title 42, USC, Section 9601) and the Defense Environmental 

Restoration Program Act (Title 10, USC, Section 2701). 

(c) Conservation. Conservation statutes include a wide variety of 

requirements for DOD, including the acquisition and use of non-DOD federal lands 

with specific restrictions on designated wilderness areas, wild and scenic rivers, national 

monuments, and coastal zones. Also included are requirements for the management and 

protection of wildlife and protection of historical property. This legislation affects DOD 

training areas. These statutes are predominantly federally enforced but may also be 

enforced through citizen suits. Examples of conservation statutes are the Endangered 

Species Act as amended (Title 16, USC, Section 1531) and the Coastal Zone 

Management Act as amended (Title 16, USC, Section 1451). 

(d) Impact Analysis. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 

Title 42, USC, Sections 4321-4361, requires that major federal actions significantly 

affecting the quality of the human environment be preceded by a detailed statement by 

the responsible federal official. This statement identifies environmental effects of the 

proposed actions that cannot be avoided and alternatives to the proposed actions. 

Mobilization activities, particularly as they relate to facilities, may trigger the need for 

an environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement. Mobilization 

planners should consult with staff legal counsel to determine whether planned 

activities constitute a major federal action or otherwise require specific actions 

under this law. 

(3) Options for Obtaining Relief from Environmental Requirements 

(a) The potential impact that mobilization might have upon the 

environment should be identified in supporting mobilization plans and should provide for 

compliance with applicable environmental laws. If it appears compliance may not be 

possible, legal counsel should be consulted to determine what, if any options may be 

available. Possible options include negotiations with federal, state, and local agencies to 

develop acceptable alternative means of environmental protection; seeking a national 

security exemption under certain laws; and, a request for legislation may be submitted to 

exempt critical industries and DOD organizations from regulatory requirements. 

Triggers should be established during mobilization planning so that the required 

environmental waivers can be prepared before training of mobilized forces is jeopardized 

during a crisis. 

(b) Planning for actions to remedy damage caused as the result of waivers 

or noncompliance with environmental standards during mobilization should be taken as 

soon as possible. For example, additional military and civilian personnel with needed 

IV-6 JP 4-05 
Resource Areas 

skills such as explosive ordnance disposal may be required to clean up the operational 

area. 

(c) Response to no-notice emergencies and contingencies should not be 

delayed due to National Environmental Protection Act requirements. Documentation 

should take place as soon as possible. 

For additional guidance on environmental considerations for operational planning, see 

JP 3-34, Joint Engineering Operations.

SECTION B. MANPOWER 

“People and not things are the fundamental factor determining the outcome 

of war.” 

General Lo Jui-Ching 

May 1965 

3. Sources of Military Manpower 

 Manpower mobilization augments the peacetime AC military end strength. Sources 

of military mobilization manpower include members of the RC, military retirees, 

volunteers with prior service, and nonprior service (NPS) personnel who volunteer. 

These resources are organized by law to provide responsiveness in crises. Figure IV-2 

associates these sources of manpower with manpower mobilization options and the 

actions required to initiate a call-up. The legal authorities required for the call-up of the 

various manpower pools are listed with the corresponding option. All personnel 

augmentation requirements should be identified, validated, and sourced either through the 

Service components or the Joint Staff/Military Departments. 

Note: Though legal authority allows Secretaries of the Military 

Departments to draw on Reserve Component (RC) forces (which 

include retirees) during times of crisis, the impact of transferring 

productive members of the civilian sector into the military must be 

carefully weighed. Commanders must prudently weigh their needs to 

support a crisis with RC members with the needs of the civilian sector 

and the impact on future RC readiness. An increasing reliance on the 

RC could eventually diminish employer and community support and 

thus RC participation. 

4. Mobilization Personnel Management Policy 

 In addition to the call-up of manpower from reserve and retiree manpower pools, 

three other actions can be taken to ensure adequate manpower during mobilization. 

These are stop-loss, stop-movement, and personnel redistribution actions. Stop-loss 

actions allow the Military Departments to retain personnel beyond their terms of service. 

 IV-7 
Chapter IV 

Stop-movement actions refer to a number of policy and procedural actions that can be 

taken by the Military Departments to stabilize AC and RC personnel and ensure the 

maximum number are available for assignment to high-priority duties. These activities 

may include canceling temporary and permanent change of station travel, changing tour 

length policies, and curtailing attendance at Service schools. Redistribution actions are 

also taken within the Military Departments during a crisis to ensure that high-priority 

units are maintained at the highest level of personnel readiness until an efficient 

personnel fill and replacement pipeline can be established. 

5. Civilian Manpower 

 Civilian manpower is an integral part of the DOD Total Force Policy. Future 

crises will require careful management of the civilian work force. 

a. In theaters, government service employees and contractors, with skills essential to 

support military missions, may remain after other US civilians and their families have 

been evacuated. The Services and DOD agencies designate these government service 

employees and contractors as emergency-essential and provide necessary training and 

other support for their crisis and wartime duties. Other government service employees 

and contractors with critical skills may deploy to the theater individually or with 

supported military units. The geographic combatant commander (GCC) determines 

admission requirements to the theater, and the respective Services and agencies 

implement those requirements for their employees. Some foreign-national civilian 

employees (local or third country nationals) may also remain to support the mission 

based on the need for their skills, level of danger, and agreements with the host country. 

 b. In the United States, the Services and DOD agencies reallocate incumbent 

civilian personnel from peacetime to the highest priority functions through detailing, 

reassignment, and cross-training. When a crisis begins, the Services and agencies 

activate recruiting area staffing committees to find local solutions for meeting these 

requirements. Solutions can include: 

(1) Overtime and extended workweek authorizations. 

(2) Implementing plans for replacing employees ordered to active duty 

because of RC or retired-military obligations. 

(3) Using civilian retirees and retired military personnel not expected to be 

recalled. 

(4) Using employees on loan from other federal, state, or local agencies. 

(5) Using contractors.

(6) Advertising and allocation of new employees after hiring. 

IV-8 JP 4-05 
Resource Areas 

(7) Activating applicable crisis procedures with Office of Personnel 

Management regional offices and with state and local employment offices to provide 

required applicants on an expedited basis. 

6. Manpower Mobilization Options 

a. Manpower mobilization options provide great flexibility to the President and 

SecDef for responding to a crisis. Response levels are tied to the legal authorities 

available before a Presidential declaration of national emergency or a congressional 

declaration of national emergency or war as shown in Figure IV-2 and Figure I-1. Before 

a declaration of national emergency, the Secretaries of the Military Departments 

can call for RC volunteers who have needed skills and activate them for short periods of 

time. RC volunteers were used effectively during Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo 

and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. In addition, both volunteer 

reservists and recalled retirees were used during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in Iraq. 

PRC authority makes up to 200,000 reservists (including up to 30,000 Individual Ready 

Reserve [IRR] members) available for up to 365 days (Title 10, USC, Section 12304). It 

was also used effectively during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and 

during operations in Haiti. This authority can be used to send a strong signal of US 

resolve to friends and foes alike and can serve as a prelude to mobilization. A 

Presidential declaration of national emergency and invocation of the partial 

mobilization authority makes up to one million members of the Ready Reserve 

available for up to 24 consecutive months (Title 10, USC, Section 12302). This partial 

mobilization authority includes members of the IRR, which is an additional source of 

trained manpower to be used as Service needs dictate. Like the PRC, activations under 

this authority can be made incrementally or all at once to meet the needs of the crisis as it 

develops. Full mobilization may be ordered in time of war or national emergency 

declared by Congress or when otherwise authorized by law (Title 10, USC, Section 

12301[a]). Under full mobilization the Retired and Standby Reserves become available, 

as well as Ready Reserves not called previously. Manpower requirements for force 

expansion beyond the peacetime-authorized force structure and sustainment in a 

protracted conflict may require legislation authorizing activation of the Selective 

Service System (SSS) for the conscription of additional forces. Some retirees are 

available for recall during all levels of mobilization (Title 10, USC, Sections 688(a), 

690(c), and 12307). 

b. Although volunteerism is important, the mobilization planner should be judicious 

in exercising this course of action (COA). The use of RC volunteers is very attractive 

because they can fill PRC billets, but do not count against the Service’s PRC personnel 

cap for tours of 365 days or less. As such, the use of volunteers can add significantly to a 

Service’s ability to meet the ever-increasing requirement to support peacetime 

commitments and ongoing operations. However, excessive use of volunteers removes 

personnel from RC units, which could result in a reduction of the unit’s readiness in the 

event of unit mobilization. Individual voluntary reserve participation affects the 

availability of the member in a mobilization augmentation role. Another condition 

mobilization planners must take into account is SecDef’s dwell time policy which 

 IV-9 
Chapter IV 

MILITARY MANPOWER MOBILIZATION: SOURCES AND OPTIONS 

SITUATION SOURCES OF 

MANPOWER 

MOBILIZATION 

OPTIONS ACTION REQUIRED 

Domestic emergency 

(e.g., natural disaster, 

civil disturbance) 

Army National Guard and 

Air National Guard 

Federalize National Guard 

troops under Title 10, US 

Code (USC), Sections 

12406 and 331-333 

President publishes 

proclamation and an 

executive order. 

Volunteers from the 

National Guard and 

Reserve 

Call for volunteers under 

Title 10, USC, Section 

12301(d) 

Secretaries of the Military 

Departments solicit 

volunteers with needed 

skills and publish call-up 

orders. 

Regular and Reserve 

retirees with 20+ years of 

active service 

Recall retirees under Title 

10, USC, Section 688(a) 

Secretaries of the Military 

Departments publish callup orders. 

Volunteer enlistees Enlist qualified volunteers Military Departments 

accept qualified applicants 

in accordance with 

Department of Defense 

and Service standards and 

policies. 

Selected Reserve 

- Units 

- Individual Mobilization 

Augmentees (IMAs) 

Call to active duty up to 

200,000 Selected 

Reservists (no more than 

30,000 members of the 

Individual Ready Reserve 

[IRR]) under Title 10, USC, 

Section 12304 

(Presidential Reserve Callup) 

President publishes 

executive order. Military 

Departments publish callup orders based on 

Secretary of Defense 

(SecDef) implementing 

instructions. President 

must report to the 

Congress within 24 hours 

on anticipated use of 

forces. 

Any level of emergency 

(with or without a 

declared national 

emergency) 

Draftees Initiate conscription The President and SecDef 

request amendment to the 

Selective Service Act (Title 

50, USC, Section 451) 

authorizing conscription. 

Ready Reserve 

- Units 

- IRRs 

- IMAs 

Call to active duty up to 

1,000,000 Ready 

Reservists for up to 24 

months under Title 10, 

USC, Section 12302 

(Partial Mobilization) 

Presidential proclamation 

of a national emergency 

and an executive order (or 

congressional declaration 

of national emergency). 

Military Departments 

publish call-up orders 

based on SecDef 

implementing instructions. 

Remaining Ready 

Reserve 

Retired Reserve 

Standby Reserve 

Call to active duty 

remaining Reserve 

Component personnel 

under Title 10, USC, 

Section 12301(a) (Full 

Mobilization) 

Passage of legislation or a 

joint resolution of the 

Congress declaring war or 

national emergency. 

Military Departments 

publish call-up orders. 

War or national 

emergency 

New units and personnel Add new force structure 

and personnel necessary 

to achieve national security 

objectives (Total 

Mobilization) 

Passage of legislation 

authorizing additional force 

structure and manpower. 

Figure IV-2. Military Manpower Mobilization: Sources and Options 

establishes the length of time RC units cannot be mobilized after demobilizing from a 

prior mobilization/call-up. 

IV-10 JP 4-05 
Resource Areas 

7. Impact of Manpower Mobilization and Activation on Other Resource Areas 

a. Selected Reserve Manpower. Mobilized Selected Reserve units create timephased demands for all classes of supply, especially rations, fuel, and ammunition; 

major items of equipment; and repair parts. They also create temporary, but significant, 

demands for intra-CONUS transportation as they move from home stations to 

marshalling areas for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration with the 

gaining force commander. The RC is an economical contribution to the force mix, 

however planners must anticipate the cost of adequate housing and proper 

outfitting of the RC in a contingency. They create increased workloads at existing 

facilities for personnel support, energy, housing, training areas, and storage and may 

require construction of new facilities. They create demands for additional industrial 

base output of all classes of consumables and for major end-items when war reserve 

stocks are depleted. Mobilized Selected Reserve units and personnel may impose 

additional demands on the training base if some unit members are unskilled or have 

not completed mandatory training. They may create significant demands on HSS as 

they mobilize. Dependents of RC members will also impose additional workloads on 

CONUS base support services and health care resources. 

b. Individual Augmentees. An individual augmentee (IA) is a United States 

military member assigned to a specific unit and billet for the purpose of filling in for, or 

augmenting, members of that unit. IAs can be used to fill shortages or when an 

individual with specialized knowledge or skill sets is required. As a result, IAs can 

include members from an entirely different branch of service. The current IA system 

works on a combination of ordered and volunteer assignments mirroring manning 

requirements. 

c. Considerations for Individual Augmentees. Individuals mobilized from the 

various sources (IRR, military retirees, and Standby Reserve) place the same demands on 

other resource areas, as described above for Selected Reserve manpower, once they 

report to their assigned units. Before they are assigned to a unit, however, they create 

demands for intra-CONUS transportation; for an initial issue of clothing and 

individual equipment; and for subsistence, housing, and health care. Most 

individuals mobilized as IAs will need reclassification or refresher training at the 

training base, placing unique timeliness demands on the organizations tasked with 

processing and training. If assigned overseas for unit backfill or as replacements, they 

will place a demand for a nonunit personnel space on the strategic transportation 

system and require weapons, ammunition, and mobility bags. 

d. Nonprior Service Manpower. NPS manpower (draftees and volunteers) 

imposes essentially the same demands as IA imposes on the other resource areas. 

Because they are untrained at accession, they will impose demands on the training 

base for basic and initial skills training. 

 IV-11 
Chapter IV 

e. Civilian Manpower. Civilian personnel create demands on resource areas based 

on their employment categories. DOD civilian employees at military installations 

normally live at home and only require a salary and workspace to do their jobs. A DOD 

civilian or contractor employee required in the theater may require clothing, chemical 

and biological defense equipment and training, passports and visas, housing, and 

subsistence; intra-CONUS, intertheater, and intratheater transportation; basic battlefield 

survival training; and HSS, as well as becoming an additional force protection 

consideration. The use of DOD civilian and contractor personnel or local nationals frees 

military personnel to perform operation vice ancillary supporting tasks. DOD civilians, 

along with system support and external support contractors, are often used to augment 

military forces in noncombat operations. Sometimes, these personnel have critical skills 

that are lacking in the Services. The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 

(LOGCAP) provides contingency support to augment Army force structure. The Air 

Force Contract Augmentation Program and global contingency construction provide 

contingency support for the Air Force and Navy, respectively. 

 f. Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW). The CEW program provides a preidentified source of civilian manpower to support DOD combat operations, 

contingencies, emergencies, humanitarian missions, and other expeditionary 

requirements. The CEW is both position-based and person-based facilitating the 

organizing, training, and equipping of civilians for rapid response and quick assimilation 

into new operational environments. 

8. Employer and Community Support 

 The success of the nation’s defense is dependent on the availability of highly trained 

members of the total force. DOD has assigned the National Committee of Employer 

Support for the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR) the responsibility of promoting both 

public and private understanding of the National Guard and reserve in order to 

gain US employer and community support. This is accomplished through 

programs, personnel policies, and practices that encourage employee and citizen 

participation in the National Guard and reserve programs. NCESGR’s mission is to 

obtain employer and community support to ensure the availability and readiness of 

reserve/guard forces. Among their many responsibilities, the NCESGR assists in 

preventing, resolving, and/or reducing employer and employee problems and 

misunderstandings that result from National Guard or reserve membership, training, and 

duty requirements. This is accomplished through information services and informal 

mediation as well as assisting in the education of National Guard and reserve members 

with respect to their obligations and responsibilities to employers. This resource is 

available to military leaders, employers, and reservists in resolving issues impeding rapid 

and effective mobilization. 

a. Impact of RC Utilization on the Economy and Employers. Employer and 

community support is crucial to maintaining a viable source of military manpower — RC 

personnel. Mobilization impacts the economy, employers, and the community, and 

that impact must be factored into the mobilization plans. Repeated call-ups may create 

IV-12 JP 4-05 
Resource Areas 

adverse consequences for employers and members of the RC; as do separate call-ups of 

different RC members in the same geographic area. Commanders and joint mobilization 

planners should be aware that a local economy could be dramatically affected if 

Military Department Secretaries choose to recall significant numbers of RC 

members from the same geographic area. Commanders and mobilization planners 

should also be aware that the call-ups may have an impact on key national economic 

segments. Critical economic segments closely related to RC call-ups include 

communications, transportation (especially airline services), and public services (e.g., 

police, fire, and medical). 

b. The Military Department Secretary should not use RC call-ups as a long-term fix 

to active duty force structure shortfalls unrelated to the call-up contingency. It must be 

remembered that continued reliance on the RC requires the transferring of productive 

members of the economy and community into the military which may result in 

diminished employer and community support over time thus adversely impacting RC 

readiness and retention. 

SECTION C. MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT 

9. Sources of Materiel and Equipment 

 The materiel and equipment resource area includes all classes of supply. It 

includes equipment on hand in units, remain-behind equipment in theater, war reserves, 

pre-positioned equipment, and the output of the depot maintenance system and industrial 

base. Additional sources include items in the security assistance pipelines and off-theshelf items from domestic and foreign commercial sources. These sources and the 

options and actions for obtaining them are listed in Figure IV-3. 

10. Materiel and Equipment Mobilization Options 

 Materiel and equipment mobilization consists of many activities that can be 

grouped under two major tasks: increasing the availability of materiel and equipment 

to accommodate the needs of a larger active force, and alleviating shortages by allocating 

or redistributing materiel and equipment in accordance with validated priorities. 

These activities can be undertaken either separately or in combination. 

a. Increasing Materiel and Equipment Availability. Decision options that 

increase materiel and equipment availability include the release of war reserve and depot 

stocks, accelerating the output of the depot maintenance system, diverting items from 

foreign military sales and other security assistance programs, accelerating production 

rates of existing contracts for items like clothing, ammunition, vehicles and combat 

systems, rations, and procurement of commercial substitutes from domestic or foreign 

sources. Each of these actions increases the number of items in the supply pipeline. 

Except for the diversion of items earmarked for security assistance programs, these 

options are exercised by the Military Departments, DLA, and other DOD agencies as 

they provide for the logistic needs of their forces assigned to the CCDRs. Action to 

 IV-13 
Chapter IV 

MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT MOBILIZATION: SOURCES AND OPTIONS 

SOURCES OF MATERIEL 

AND EQUIPMENT MOBILIZATION OPTIONS ACTION REQUIRED 

Continental United States/intheater equipment on hand in 

units 

Redistribution based on 

emergency priorities 

Military Department decisions 

based on supported 

commanders’ requirements 

and priorities. 

War reserve and prepositioned stockpiles Release stocks Military Department decisions 

for retail items. Joint Materiel 

Priorities and Allocation 

Board decisions for 

wholesale stocks insufficient 

to meet demands of all 

claimants. 

Depot system Accelerate output Military Department decisions 

based on supported 

commanders’ requirements 

and priorities. 

Industrial base Accelerate output Military Departments and 

Department of Defense 

agencies act to surge 

production of needed materiel 

and equipment. 

Materiel and equipment in 

security assistance pipelines 

Divert needed equipment 

from security assistance 

pipelines 

The President and Secretary 

of Defense decision based on 

a determination that national 

security requirements 

outweigh political 

consequences. 

Domestic and foreign 

commercial vendors 

Purchase off-the-shelf 

products that meet military 

requirements 

Military Department and 

Department of Defense 

agency decisions based on 

Federal acquisition 

regulations. 

Figure IV-3. Materiel and Equipment Mobilization: Sources and Options 

divert items from security assistance programs could have a significant impact on our 

relations with affected allies. This decision should follow discussions with the 

Department of State and specific chiefs of mission and country teams and the President 

or SecDef action. However, once diverted and allocated to a Military Department, they 

are distributed as determined by the owning Military Department. 

b. Allocating Materiel and Equipment Shortages. Shortages of Service-unique 

items are resolved by priority and allocation decisions made internally by the Military 

Departments based on OPLAN priorities, and guided by DOD policy to equip earlier 

deploying units before those scheduled to deploy later, regardless of Service component. 

When confronted with a materiel or equipment shortage common to two or more US 

military claimants, SecDef, with the advice of CJCS, determines priorities among the 

Services. The Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB) executes this 

responsibility. The JMPAB is chaired by the J-4, Joint Staff and includes other Joint 

IV-14 JP 4-05 
Resource Areas 

Staff directors as well as general or flag officer representatives from the Military 

Departments. In multinational operations, the United States may be responsible for 

providing significant materiel and equipment support to one or more allies or coalition 

partners. When shortages occur, priority and allocation decisions for resolving 

conflicts among multinational partners, or between US claimants and multinational 

partners, are made by SecDef. 

SECTION D. TRANSPORTATION 

11. Sources of Mobilization Transportation 

 Transportation resources are required to support mobilization, deployment, 

employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization operations. Mobilization 

activities are supported principally by intra-CONUS air, rail, highway, pipeline, port 

facilities, and inland waterway assets of commercial firms. These assets move units and 

unit equipment through the mobilization process from home stations to marshalling 

areas to ports of embarkation; individual augmentees from their homes to reception and 

training sites and then to replacement centers and ports of embarkation; and individual 

issue equipment from production and storage sites to ports of embarkation. 

Deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment operations are supported 

primarily by intertheater air lift and sealift, which move units, nonunit personnel, and 

sustainment items (nonunit equipment and supplies) from the United States to the 

theaters. RC transportation terminal units provide the military interface at commercial 

seaports of embarkation, deployment support units assist with loading the equipment on 

commercial transportation, and port security companies provide security at military 

ocean terminals. In many cases, these units are mobilized early to support 

deployment from CONUS. The sources of additional transportation resources for 

mobilization and the options for mobilizing them are listed in Figure IV-4. In some 

situations, additional transportation assets may be required before substantial 

deployments can be executed. 

See JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, for further information on 

deployment and redeployment.

12. Transportation Mobilization Options 

 A variety of options are available for mobilization of intertheater and intratheater 

airlift assets. Air Mobility Command assets can quickly be expanded by the Air 

National Guard, Air Force Reserves, and the airlift assets of the US Navy Reserve. 

Also, the fleet can be augmented via contract commercial charters, and through 

CRAF. Limited peacetime sealift, operated by Military Sealift Command, can be 

augmented by voluntary or contract charter, activation of the Maritime Administration 

(MARAD) Ready Reserve Force (RRF), chartering, requisition of US-flag and effective 

US-controlled shipping (US-owned but under foreign registry). The Voluntary 

Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) is the primary sealift mobilization program and 

was developed through a partnership between DOD, Commander, United States 

 IV-15 
Chapter IV 

TRANSPORTATION MOBILIZATION: SOURCES AND OPTIONS 

SITUATION 

SOURCES OF 

TRANSPORTATION 

AUGMENTATION 

TRANSPORTATION 

MOBILIZATION OPTIONS ACTIONS REQUIRED 

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT 

Reserve Component air mobility 

assets 

Task Air Mobility Command, 

gained, Air Reserve Component, 

and Naval Reserve assets 

Secretaries of the Air Force and 

Navy activate units and individuals 

with an appropriate call-up order. 

Voluntary charter Charter available commercial 

aircraft 

Commander, US Transportation 

Command 

(CDRUSTRANSCOM) obtains 

commercial charter aircraft. 

Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) 

Stage I 

Activate when required to 

augment capacity 

CDRUSTRANSCOM activates 

and operationally directs CRAF I 

assets with Secretary of Defense 

(SecDef) approval. 

CRAF Stage II Activate when required to 

augment capacity 

CDRUSTRANSCOM activates 

and operationally directs CRAF II 

assets with SecDef approval. 

STRATEGIC SEALIFT 

Commercial Sealift Utilize available commercial 

vessels when required to 

augment US Transportation 

Command (USTRANSCOM) 

controlled fleet 

CDRUSTRANSCOM obtains 

commercial shipping. 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

reduced operational status ships 

Activate when required to 

augment sealift capacity 

CDRUSTRANSCOM activates as 

required. 

Ready Reserve Force CDRUSTRANSCOM activates as 

delegated by SecDef 

CDRUSTRANSCOM requests 

through Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); SecDef 

approves by agreement with the 

Secretary of Transportation 

(SECTRANS); Maritime 

Administration (National Defense 

Reserve Fleet) implements. 

Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 

Agreement (VISA) 

Activate when required to 

augment sealift capacity 

CDRUSTRANSCOM, with 

approval of SecDef, activates 

VISA with concurrence of 

SECTRANS. 

Voluntary Tanker Agreement Activate when required to 

augment sealift (tanker) capacity 

CDRUSTRANSCOM activates as 

required. 

CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (CONUS) TRANSPORTATION 

Any level of emergency 

Commercial air, rail, highway, 

barge, transportation terminal unit 

Activate the Contingency 

response program. Mobilize 

seaport of embarkation 

transportation terminal units 

The Contingency response 

program team assembles at the 

call of CDRUSTRANSCOM to 

prevent or resolve transportation 

shortfalls. Secretary of the Army 

publishes call-up order for 

transportation terminal units. 

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT 

CRAF Stage III Activate when necessary to 

augment airlift capacity 

CDRUSTRANSCOM activates 

and commands CRAF III assets 

with the approval of the SecDef. 

Foreign voluntary charters Charter available foreign aircraft CDRUSTRANSCOM enters into 

agreements with foreign carriers 

consistent with the Fly American 

Act. 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) Allied Pre-committed Civil 

Aircraft Program aircraft 

Request NATO resources when 

required to augment US airlift 

capacity 

North Atlantic Council requests 

reinforcements and responds to 

requests for airlift. 

STRATEGIC SEALIFT 

Requisitioned US-flag and 

effective US-controlled shipping 

vessels 

Requisitioned as required to meet 

sealift requirements 

With declaration of national 

emergency, SECTRANS 

requisitions ships at the request of 

SecDef. 

Naval Inactive Fleet of the 

National Defense Reserve Fleet 

Activate when required to 

augment sealift capacity 

With declaration of national 

emergency, CDRUSTRANSCOM 

requests through CJCS; SecDef 

orders activation. 

CONUS TRANSPORTATION 

National emergency or war 

Air, rail, highway, and barge Seek priorities and allocations of 

domestic transportation when 

required to augment capacity 

With declaration of national 

emergency, the President invokes 

priorities and allocations for DOD. 

Figure IV-4. Transportation Mobilization: Sources and Options 

IV-16 JP 4-05 
Resource Areas 

Transportation Command, Department of Transportation (DOT) (Maritime 

Administration), and the US Flag commercial sealift industry. VISA represents an 

improved way to meet mobilization readiness requirements. Foreign-owned flag ships 

are also a potential source of additional sealift through chartering. After activation of the 

MARAD RRF, additional ships can only be activated from the National Defense Reserve 

Fleet as attrition fillers or to fill additional requirements for sealift. 

13. Impact of Transportation Mobilization on Other Resource Areas 

 Mobilization of transportation resources will substantially affect the manpower 

resource area because highly skilled operators and crews are required, as well as 

maintenance cargo handling, and security personnel, at ports and trans-shipment points. 

The impact on ports, airfields, highways, pipelines, railroads, and inland waterways; 

facilities required for activation, maintenance, and storage; and repair parts and 

materials handling equipment may be significant. Legal authorities and funding are 

required to enable transportation resource expansion. Influence on the training base 

could be significant in a protracted conflict with high attrition rates of operator or crew 

personnel. 

a. Augmenting Intertheater Air Mobility. Each additional aircraft affects 

runway, throughput, marshalling, and temporary storage capacity at airfields. 

These factors could become constraints at departure, en route, and arrival airfields. 

Aircrews require subsistence and transient quarters, and aircrew shortages and crew 

rest considerations could also become constraints. Influence on the military training base 

should be minimal unless commercial carriers lose their capability to conduct their 

respective training. Some additional demands will be placed on the industrial base as 

stocks of repair parts are depleted. Shortages of aviation fuel, lubricants, repair parts, 

hull and liability insurance, and qualified mechanics could become constraints. 

b. Augmenting Strategic Sealift. In addition to applicable constraints listed above, 

the charter, requisition, or activation of each additional ship draws on the available 

pool of licensed officers, and certified merchant seamen. The withdrawal of 

commercial vessel insurance and war-risk exclusion for crew life insurance may also 

constrain the use of commercial vessels. To surmount this constraint, the President may 

authorize SecDef, acting through the Secretary of Transportation, to issue war-risk 

insurance under Title XII of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (Title 46, USC, Section 

1285). Additionally, Title 46, USC, Section 8103(g) requires that deck and engineer 

officers, if eligible, be a member of the Navy Reserve if serving on vessels on which an 

operating differential subsidy is paid, or on vessels (except a vessel of the Coast Guard or 

Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation) owned or operated by the DOT or by 

a corporation organized or controlled by the DOT. Crew shortages could become a 

constraint, particularly if market forces and mortality rates result in a reduced pool of 

available private sector US merchant mariners. Also, pulling ships from normal 

commercial service can have adverse long-term impacts on the commercial sealift 

carrier’s business. Ships require berthing and anchorage space at ports, which, 

together with temporary storage, staging areas, cargo handling capabilities, and 

 IV-17 
Chapter IV 

transportation mode links, determine throughput capacity. Laws governing the handling 

of hazardous materials, such as ammunition, limit the number of ports that can handle 

such loads. Dry docks, shipyard facilities, and skilled labor are required for 

activation and periodic refitting. Constraints in the other resource areas should be 

minimal except in extreme conditions marked by high attrition. Additionally, shortages 

of stevedores may be experienced if heavy demands are placed on multiple commercial 

ports within the same geographic area. 

c. Augmenting Intra-CONUS Transportation Resources. DOD can request 

that DOT issue priority service or allocation orders to the commercial 

transportation industry to support DOD requirements. Demands in the other 

resource areas should not be significant, except in extreme circumstances. Spot shortages 

in operator, crew, or maintenance personnel could occur if large numbers of commercial 

carrier employees are ordered to military duty or if local transportation demands are 

heavy. Spot shortages of fuel, repair parts, maintenance, and trans-shipment facilities 

could also occur during peak periods. At some installations, capacity of railheads and 

spurs could be a constraint. 

d. Service-unique self-deployment. Planners should keep in mind that some 

Service personnel/units (e.g., combat aircraft and aircrews) deploy to theater on board 

their own warfighting equipment. Sometimes combat aircraft carry a full load of 

weapons and/or support equipment and crew members. 

SECTION E. FACILITIES 

“Fleets cannot operate without bases.” 

Major General John A. Lejeune, US Marine Corps 

(Testimony to House Naval Affairs Committee, 13 March 1920) 

14. Sources of Facilities 

 DOD uses a wide variety of facilities to house, train, equip, and support 

personnel. Facilities are also needed to provide storage, maintain equipment, and 

conduct operations. Military bases, depots, medical treatment facilities, airfields, and 

seaports are representative examples. Facilities with the capacity for supporting 

increased workloads during mobilization are obtained from the following sources: 

commercial facilities that support DOD in peacetime; unused and standby capacity at 

existing government facilities; and new capacity developed on property acquired by 

DOD through lease, purchase, or exercise of other legal means. These are listed in Figure 

IV-5, together with the options and actions for acquiring needed facilities during 

mobilization. 

IV-18 JP 4-05 
Resource Areas 

FACILITY MOBILIZATION: SOURCES AND OPTIONS 

SITUATION SOURCES OF 

FACILITIES 

FACILITIES 

MOBILIZATION 

OPTIONS 

ACTIONS REQUIRED 

Existing government 

property 

Standby capacity Activate standby capacity Military Departments act within 

available funding 

Unused capacity Develop unused capacity 

Military Departments initiate 

emergency military construction 

projects using unobligated funds 

(Title 10, US Code (USC), Section 

2803) or Secretary of Defense 

(SecDef) Contingency 

Construction Authority (Title 10, 

USC, Section 2804) 

Newly acquired 

property 

Lease, purchase, and develop 

as required 

Any level of 

emergency 

Optimize supply chain 

management to minimize facility 

requirement 

Existing government 

property Develop unused capacity 

Military Departments initiate 

emergency military construction 

projects with additional authorities 

available upon declaration of 

national emergency 

Newly acquired 

property 

Lease, purchase, and develop 

as required 

-SecDef authorizes modifications 

to current military construction 

program within military 

construction appropriations and 

unobligated family housing funding 

(Title 10, USC, Section 2808). 

National 

emergency or war 

Recaptured former 

government property 

Recapture and develop as 

provided by law 

SecDef acts under statutory 

provisions for recapture of 

specified parcels of former federal 

property 

Figure IV-5. Facility Mobilization: Sources and Options 

15. Facilities Mobilization Options 

 Options for expanding facilities during mobilization include reopening unused 

capacity with actions short of new construction, initiating emergency military 

construction projects to increase capacity at existing facilities, and acquisition of new 

facilities through the recapture of former federal property. Facilities can include all kinds 

of military installations, airfields, and seaports in and outside CONUS. 

a. Initiate Emergency Military Construction. SecDef and Secretaries of the 

Military Departments can initiate emergency military construction projects with 

unobligated balances of military construction funds, the SecDef contingency construction 

authority, or with a modified military construction program, enabled with a declaration of 

national emergency and unobligated military construction and family housing funds. 

Beyond these options, construction of new or expanded facilities requires a request for a 

supplemental military construction appropriation. Waivers or relief from environmental 

protection statutes and some occupational health and safety regulations may need to be 

requested through the appropriate chain of command. 

 IV-19 
Chapter IV 

b. Acquire Additional Real Property and Commercial Facilities. Under the law, 

hundreds of parcels of former federal property may be recaptured to provide land and 

improved infrastructure for conversion into needed facilities. In addition, privately 

owned lands may be acquired by condemnation for defense purposes, such as training or 

manufacturing of ammunition and other materiel. Reacquiring ex-federal property must 

be handled in accordance with applicable federal and military regulations before use, and 

this process may take some significant time and effort. For example, an environmental 

baseline survey will be needed to determine the condition of the property to be acquired.

16. Impact of Facilities Mobilization on Other Resource Areas 

 Expanding facilities will require more manpower, both military and civilian, to 

staff tenant organizations and provide required services. The greatest impact will be 

on the civilian side in the form of contract construction workers and DOD personnel 

employed to expand tenant support services. Host-nation civilians will provide the bulk 

of this support overseas. There will be a significant local demand for construction 

materials and equipment — from stocks and from the industrial base. As the facility 

grows in capacity or expands operations, the increased population will require more 

HSS and other support services. If these resources are available, the impact on planned 

facilities expansion will be minimal. Shortfalls in these areas will reduce capacity and 

constrain productivity. 

SECTION F. INDUSTRIAL BASE 

17. Industrial Mobilization Sources 

 The US industrial base includes commercial production facilities and 

government-owned facilities. Some of the government-owned facilities are 

government-operated and some are contractor-operated. Foreign producers of essential 

components, parts, and ammunition are included, because foreign producers may be 

the only source for components of major equipment items. Because of the unique 

relationship existing between the US and Canada, the Canadian defense industry is 

recognized as part of a single North American defense industrial base. The capabilities 

of Canadian industry may be included in US industrial preparedness planning. 

Figure IV-6 lists these sources together with the options and actions required to expand 

their output. 

18. Industrial Mobilization Options 

 Industrial base expansion includes actions to accelerate production within the 

existing industrial infrastructure, add new production lines and factories, and 

implement provisions of the Defense Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS). 

Because many components of key military items of equipment are now procured from 

foreign sources, increased emergency procurement from these sources has become, of 

necessity, a major industrial mobilization option. 

IV-20 JP 4-05 
Resource Areas 

INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION: SOURCES AND OPTIONS 

INDUSTRIAL BASE 

SOURCES 

INDUSTRIAL 

MOBILIZATION 

OPTIONS 

ACTIONS REQUIRED 

DOMESTIC INDUSTRY 

Commercial producers of 

goods and services 

Accelerate production 

from current sources of 

goods and services 

Military Departments and Defense 

Logistics Agency contract for accelerated 

production from current producers of 

materiel based on planned or actual 

consumption rates and prioritized 

requirements of the combatant 

commanders. 

Expand production 

base capacity 

Using the Defense Priorities and 

Allocation System (DPAS), Title 50, 

United States Code, Section 2071, obtain 

priority performance on Department of 

Defense contracts and orders. 

Using DPAS authorities and streamlined 

acquisition procedures, increase 

industrial capacity for production of 

materiel and equipment required to 

sustain the mobilized force. 

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE 

Government-owned/ 

government-operated 

production facilities 

Primary industrial base 

to support peacetime 

training, deployment, 

contingency operations, 

war, peacekeeping, 

antiterrorism, homeland 

defense, and to protect 

and secure the US 

forces’ technological 

advantage against our 

adversaries. This 

encompasses foreign 

military sales and other 

service support. 

Government-owned/ 

contractor-operated 

production facilities 

See above 

Accelerate production rates or activate 

standby and laid-away production 

capacity at governmentowned/government-operated facilities and 

government-owned/contractor-operated 

facilities. 

FOREIGN INDUSTRY 

Commercial producers of 

goods and services 

Seek additional production from foreign 

suppliers. 

Figure IV-6. Industrial Mobilization: Sources and Options 

19. Impact of Industrial Mobilization on the Other Resource Areas 

a. Expand the Industrial Base. Surge production and industrial base expansion 

will require additional skilled manpower from the non-defense sectors of the national 

economy. Local manpower shortages could develop in areas hardest hit by extensive 

military manpower mobilization and competition between DOD contractors and others 

for limited numbers of the same skills. Materiel and equipment stocks, 

transportation, and facilities could be significantly affected if raw materials, finished 

products, tools, and test equipment become short; local and long distance hauling is not 

 IV-21 
Chapter IV 

sufficiently manned; and new construction does not meet the demand. Additional legal 

authorities may be invoked or requested from the Congress upon the determination 

that DOD production in a crisis is being adversely affected. Environmental and 

occupational health and safety regulations may also require waivers. Substantial 

additional funding may be required to enable increased production. 

b. Implement the DPAS. The DPAS is authorized by the Defense Production Act 

(Title 50, USC, Section 2071) and allows preferential treatment for contracts or 

orders relating to certain approved defense or energy programs for military 

production and construction, military assistance to any foreign nation, and stockpiling. 

This authority specifically includes reordering national priorities and rationing available 

industrial resources (articles, materials, services, and facilities, including construction 

materials). The Department of Commerce is responsible for DPAS activities concerning 

industrial resources. Accordingly, DOD will coordinate with the Department of 

Commerce concerning industrial resource issues requiring resolution through DPAS. 

c. Obtain Allied Production Support. DOD has become increasingly reliant on 

foreign production of essential components, repair parts, tools, and test equipment 

needed for domestic production of virtually all major weapons systems and other key 

items of materiel and equipment. Wartime surge and industrial base expansion can be 

expected to have a significant impact on foreign producers as well. The reliability of 

these sources could significantly influence the ability to provide needed materiel and 

equipment to support and sustain operations. Conversely, the availability of foreign 

production support in areas where the domestic production base can no longer expand 

could have substantial positive results on the manpower, materiel and equipment, and 

facilities resource areas. Similar to domestic source problems, foreign supplier problems 

should be forwarded through the DPAS chain for resolution by OSD and the Department 

of Commerce. 

SECTION G. TRAINING BASE 

20. Sources and Options for Expanding Training Base Capacity 

 The Services expand their institutional training bases to train NPS personnel to 

support and sustain an expanded force structure. The training base also provides 

reclassification and refresher training for IAs who need it. Based on the rate of force 

expansion and attrition due to casualties, disease, and nonbattle injuries, training base 

output requirements are determined and compared to available capacity. If there is 

a shortfall, additional capacity is added by mobilizing additional training organizations 

from the RC, by hiring DOD civilian employees, and by contracting for additional 

instructors and other training resources from the private sector. Sources, options, and 

actions for expanding training base capacity are listed in Figure IV-7. 

IV-22 JP 4-05 
Resource Areas 

21. Impact of Training Base Expansion on Other Resource Areas 

 Training base expansion may have significant impact on the manpower, 

materiel and equipment, facilities, HSS, and funding resource areas. It may also 

affect the environmental, transportation, industrial base, communications, and legal areas. 

It is not expected to have any measurable influence on HNS, although the training of 

allied military personnel, along with security assistance and other agreements, could 

affect the training base capacity. 

SECTION H. HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

22. General 

 Theater, US, and aeromedical evacuation (AE) HSS are expanded to serve the 

mobilized force and provide the capability to treat, evacuate, receive, and redistribute 

casualties in the US. HSS requirements are determined from decisions establishing 

the theater medical support, theater patient evacuation, and force health protection 

EXPANDING TRAINING BASE CAPACITY: SOURCES AND OPTIONS 

SITUATION 

SOURCES OF 

ADDITIONAL 

TRAINING BASE 

CAPACITY 

TRAINING BASE 

EXPANSION 

OPTIONS 

ACTIONS 

REQUIRED 

Military Departments 

act to expand their 

institutional training 

establishments. 

Wartime policies and 

programs of 

instruction 

Implement wartime 

training policies and 

programs 

Implement wartime 

programs of 

instruction; extend 

the training day and 

training week; 

increase class size. 

Reserve Component 

training units 

Expand existing 

training centers and 

schools 

Call-up Reserve 

Component training 

base augmentation 

units as required. 

Any level of 

emergency 

New training centers 

and schools 

Add new training 

centers and schools 

Call-up remaining 

Reserve Component 

training base 

augmentation units; 

activate new training 

units; acquire new 

training facilities and 

support. 

Figure IV-7. Expanding Training Base Capacity: Sources and Options

 IV-23 
Chapter IV 

policies. Several factors, such as casualty rates, population at risk, availability and 

readiness of HSS units, transportation resources, blood supplies, and HNS assist in 

determining the theater HSS required. CONUS hospital beds and facilities are 

increased to accommodate the expected flow of casualties and increases in the 

population of the CONUS support base. The AE system is increased to employ the 

necessary contingency AE elements required to support the increased intratheater, 

intertheater, and CONUS evacuee requirements. The nonactive duty beneficiary 

population eligible for government health care may be transferred to a managed 

care/TRICARE contract as requirements for serving uniformed military beneficiaries 

approach the available capacity. Military Department mobilization plans should 

include provisions for activating RC HSS professionals for theater medical support 

as required. 

23. Sources of Emergency Health Service Support 

 The sources of skilled HSS manpower and hospital beds to meet emergency and 

wartime requirements for health care are listed in Figure IV-8, together with the options 

and actions required to mobilize additional health care capacity. 

24. Options for Mobilizing Health Service Support 

a. Options for mobilizing additional HSS professionals parallel those for other 

manpower skills. In time of national emergency, the transfer of members of the United 

States Public Health Service (USPHS) commissioned corps to DOD may also provide 

additional health service professionals. 

b. Theater HSS and aeromedical support is expanded by calling up, transferring, 

and reassigning health service professionals AC and RC HSS units and hospital ships 

deployed to the theater. See JP 4-02, Health Service Support, for specific information on 

organic DOD HSS capabilities. Some mobilized RC personnel are assigned to CONUS 

medical treatment facilities as backfill. This enables the facilities to support care of 

returning casualties and the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) missions. 

c. The CONUS HSS base is expanded, as necessary, to provide care for 

casualties returned from the theater. In addition to expanding CONUS military 

hospitals, this process may also include implementing, in turn, the Department of 

Veterans Affairs (DVA)-DOD Contingency Plan and the NDMS, which provide 

additional beds and professional staff from DVA and commercial civilian resources. 

IV-24 JP 4-05 
Resource Areas 

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT MOBILIZATION: SOURCES AND OPTIONS 

SITUATION 

SOURCES OF 

HEALTH SERVICE 

SUPOPRT 

MOBILIZATION 

HEALTH SERIVCE 

SUPORT 

ACTIONS REQUIRED 

Reserve Component 

health service 

support units and 

individuals 

Mobilize/activate 

volunteer individuals 

and units of the 

Selected Reserve 

Military Departments 

order units and volunteer 

individuals to active duty 

within the limits of 

Presidential authorities 

invoked. 

Department of 

Veterans Affairs 

hospitals 

Implement 

Department of 

Veterans Affairs 

Department of 

Defense (DOD) 

Contingency plan 

DOD and Department of 

Veterans Affairs act in 

accordance with the 

Department of Veterans 

Affairs and DOD Health 

Resources Sharing and 

Emergency Operations 

Act (Public Law 97-174, 

as amended) when DOD 

requirements exceed 

supply of continental 

United States military 

hospitals. 

Any level of 

emergency 

Host-nation health 

care systems 

Activate host-nation 

support agreements 

Geographic combatant 

commander requests 

support in accordance 

with agreements. 

Reserve Component 

health service 

support units and 

individuals 

Mobilize remaining 

Reserve Component 

health service 

support units and 

individuals 

Military Departments 

order Reserve 

Component units and 

individuals to active duty. 

Domestic civilian 

health care system 

Transfer United 

States Public Health 

Service 

commissioned 

members to DOD or 

United States Coast 

Guard (USCG) 

United States Public 

Health Service assigns 

members not already 

assigned under exisiting 

memorandums of 

understanding, to DOD or 

USCG with Secretary of 

Defense (SecDef) or 

Secretary of the 

Department of Homeland 

Security request and 

Presidential executive 

order. 

National 

emergency or war 

Activate National 

Disaster Medical 

System 

SecDef acts under 

provisions of Public 

Health Service Act when 

bed requirements exceed 

capacity of DOD and 

Department of Veterans 

Affairs. 

Figure IV-8. Health Service Support Mobilization: Sources and Options 

 IV-25 
Chapter IV 

25. Impact of Health Service Support Mobilization on Other Resource Areas 

 The process of expanding theater HSS may significantly burden the manpower, 

materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, training base, 

HNS, and legal resource areas. Increasing the CONUS HSS base may significantly 

influence the manpower, materiel and equipment, facilities, and industrial base resource 

areas. It could also affect the transportation and training base areas, and it may require 

expanded legal authority. The transfer of dependent and retiree health care support to the 

managed care/TRICARE contract may have a significant impact on funding. The impact 

of mobilization in the remaining resource areas is not expected to be significant. 

SECTION I. COMMUNICATIONS 

26. Sources and Options for Mobilization Communications Support 

 Although the US military utilizes its own communications systems to execute many 

national defense/crisis response requirements, it frequently relies upon commercial 

providers to fulfill its administrative support needs. For this reason, the 

Communications Act of 1934 provides the President with substantial authority 

during times of national emergency or war to regulate and control virtually every form 

of telecommunications resource at the national and local levels. Included within this 

authority are devices and stations for wire, radio, and microwave transmissions. The 

Department of Homeland Security, the manager of the NCS, monitors situations that 

could develop into emergencies, provides recommendations for the use of resources, and 

maintains liaison with commercial providers. In time of national emergency or war, the 

President may invoke special war powers under Section 706 of the Communications Act 

(Title 47, USC, Section 606). These powers allow the President to take immediate 

measures to ensure the continuous operation and security of telecommunications 

services without negotiations or the consent of those who are affected. DOD’s Global 

Information Grid (GIG) assets support the DOD. Other NCS assets support other 

departments and agencies of the US Government. These other assets may be made 

available to DOD in crises and war when the GIG capacity is exceeded. The Joint Staff 

controls only a few communications assets, which are allocated during emergencies to 

provide additional communications in the theater. 

27. Impact of Communications Mobilization Activities on Other Resource Areas 

 Virtually all communications resources required come from unused and 

redirected capacity maintained in peacetime. Some increases in personnel to 

accommodate additional operations, maintenance, and security needs may be required. 

The impact on other resource areas is expected to be minimal, except as the result of 

unexpected attrition or protracted operation, which would generate requirements to 

replace fixed infrastructure. 

IV-26 JP 4-05 
Resource Areas 

SECTION J. HOST-NATION SUPPORT 

28. Sources of Host-Nation Support 

 Manpower, equipment, facilities, and services provided by host or allied nations 

during war or emergency can offset requirements for corresponding US military 

resources that are not affordable or practical to maintain in peacetime. A number of 

agreements are maintained with an ever-growing array of allies for defense 

cooperation. Every effort should be made through the Department of State and DOD to 

establish some form of mutual support, defense cooperation, and/or acquisition and 

cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs) with US allies and friends around the globe. 

Initial cooperation can be achieved by helping to establish a database of military and 

commercial capabilities available in each nation, as well as standardized procedures to 

allow for rapid communication and understanding in a crisis situation. Additionally, this 

process enhances diplomatic efforts during peacetime and facilitates crisis 

management/contingency decisionmaking by quickly providing more options to US and 

multinational leadership. Direct HNS can be provided by an ally’s military units that 

are organized and equipped for that specific purpose. Financial arrangements may 

have already been established on a bilateral basis with a formula spelled out formally in a 

defense cooperation agreement. However, other arrangements may be made based on the 

situation at hand, to include multinational agreements with a regional or coalition 

organization or the United Nations (UN). Financial reimbursement policies and 

procedures may be developed through the use of in and out audit surveys (UN system) or 

some other process. Indirect support may be provided by host-nation commercial entities 

with licensing agreements or permissions granted by an allied government. 

29. Coordinating Host-Nation Support 

a. Implement Existing Agreements. Mutual support agreements, ACSAs, or 

defense cooperation agreements may be in effect between the US and the HN. Such 

international agreements may adequately provide for support. 

b. Develop New Agreements. The variable and uncertain nature of global security 

threats may create situations where it is necessary to negotiate new agreements providing 

for HNS. Commanders and persons responsible for mobilization should identify such 

needs as early as possible and consult with staff legal counsel to determine whether new 

agreements are required. Legal counsel should assist in the development of new 

agreements by coordinating with relevant combatant command staff judge advocates and 

by ensuring compliance with DOD and CJCS directives related to the negotiation of 

international agreements. The variable and uncertain nature of global security threats 

may create unforeseen situations where it may be necessary to seek ad hoc HNS. Such 

support is normally obtained through government-to-government negotiations or through 

negotiations conducted at a mutually agreed lower level. 

See JP 4-08, Logistic Support of Multinational Operations, for more details. 

 IV-27 
Chapter IV 

IV-28 JP 4-05 

For North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) doctrine, ratified by the US, see the 

Allied Joint Publication-4 Series of publications and associated NATO standardization 

agreements. 

30. Impact of Mobilizing Host-Nation Support on the Other Resource Areas 

 Implementation of existing or additional mutual support or defense cooperation 

agreements, depending on the nature of the support provided, will affect the providing 

nation’s or nations’ resource areas, particularly manpower, materiel and equipment, 

transportation assets, and possibly facilities. Careful consideration should be given to the 

impact upon the host-nation and its capabilities compared to the offset of US resource 

requirements. 
CHAPTER V

MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION 

“The Greeks by their laws, and the Romans by the spirit of their people, took 

care to put into the hands of their rulers no such engine of oppression as a 

standing army. Their system was to make every man a soldier, and oblige 

him to repair to the standard of his country whenever that was reared. This 

made them invincible; and the same remedy will make us so.” 

Thomas Jefferson 

(Letter to Thomas Cooper, 1814) 

1. Introduction 

a. Mobilization plans support CCDRs’ OPLANs, concept plans, OPORDs, and 

campaign plans. They are detailed plans prepared by the Military Departments and DOD 

agencies. They are based on policy and planning guidance in the GEF, Guidance for 

Development of the Force (GDF), GFMIG, DOD MMG, and in tasks specified by the 

CJCS in the JSCP. They reflect requirements for force expansion with RC units and 

IAs and for expansion of the CONUS base to sustain the mobilized force for as long as 

necessary to achieve military and national security objectives. Mobilization plans explain 

how force and resource expansion is to be accomplished. 

b. Mobilization is a complex, time-sensitive process with many participants and 

activities. Mobilization plans must be carefully integrated among participants and the 

twelve resource areas. Mobilization execution must be sequenced and carefully 

synchronized to ensure that resources are available to the supported and supporting 

commanders when needed. The CJCS, supported by the Joint Staff, integrates 

mobilization planning and monitors the status and progress of mobilization execution. 

CJCS advises SecDef on establishing priorities; allocating resource shortages among 

claimants; and redirecting execution activities, when necessary, to eliminate bottlenecks 

and overcome unforeseen problems. 

c. The Mobilization Information Management Plan (MIMP) provides guidance on 

information systems related to mobilization planning and execution. This plan identifies 

the flow of information related to mobilization under both contingency and crisis action 

planning, and is designed to provide a coherent and accurate status of mobilization 

efforts. Appendix C, “Mobilization Information Management Plan,” contains specific 

policies regarding the MIMP. 

d. Opportunities to determine the validity of mobilization plans and practice 

mobilization procedures are provided by periodic CJCS-sponsored worldwide 

command post exercises. These exercises may involve SecDef, OSD, the Joint Staff, 

the Services, the combatant commands, and other selected federal agencies. These may 

be augmented by field training exercises conducted by combatant commands and/or 

Services. 

 V-1 
Chapter V 

e. This chapter provides a joint perspective of mobilization planning, execution, 

and reporting. It explains the relationships between mobilization plans, OPLANs, and 

campaign plans. It introduces the mobilization estimate of the situation, a tool to assist 

the thought processes of commanders and mobilization planners. It describes the joint 

mobilization planning processes. It also provides an overview of the mobilization 

execution process. 

SECTION A. MOBILIZATION PLANNING 

2. Mobilization Planning and Operation Plans 

a. The GEF, GDF, and DOD Master Mobilization Plan provide SecDef guidance for 

mobilization planning in support of joint operations. The CJCS amplifies the guidance in 

the JSCP. 

b. CJCSI 3110.13C (Classified), Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic 

Capabilities Plan, guides the Military Departments and CCDRs in preparing mobilization 

plans that support the OPLANs developed in the contingency planning process. The 

planning guidance is focused on the areas of manpower and industrial mobilization. 

Manpower mobilization requirements derived for each contingency establish the level of 

mobilization assumed for each contingency and drive the determination of mobilization 

requirements in the twelve resource areas. The industrial mobilization guidance requires 

the Military Departments to conduct industrial preparedness planning and to maintain a 

production base that will support contingency requirements. 

c. During the contingency planning process, the Military Departments furnish 

mobilization-related information to the CCDRs, who incorporate it into the OPLANs 

under development or revision. The major mobilization plans and planning systems are 

shown in Figure V-1. 

d. Manpower mobilization information furnished by the Military Departments for 

inclusion in OPLANs provides the foundation for detailed planning in the other 

resource areas. This information comprises the number of AC and RC personnel required 

by Service and skill for each option included in the OPLAN. The functions are: 

(1) Direct support for each option; i.e., units and individuals needed to 

augment the supported commander’s combat and support force. 

(2) CONUS base; i.e., units and individuals required for the level of CONUSbased expansion to support each option. 

(3) CONUS and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) backfill; 

i.e., units and individuals required to replace those deployed to the theater. 

(4) Strategic transportation; i.e., units and individuals needed to augment 

peacetime strategic air mobility and sealift capabilities. 

V-2 JP 4-05 
Mobilization Planning and Execution 

3. Mobilization Plans and Military Campaign Plans 

A campaign plan has important implications for mobilization planners. Firm 

strategic objectives, force levels, and time constraints are key elements of information 

with which the commander and mobilization planner can execute mobilization planning 

and initiate additional force and resource expansion options if needed. Additional 

industrial mobilization and the reinstitution of the draft may be indicated in the campaign 

plan if there is an expectation of a long war with high materiel and personnel attrition. 

Conversely, if the campaign plan expects a short war with low attrition, mobilization 

planners can concentrate on managing mobilization at a lower level. 

A more complete discussion of campaign plans is provided in JP 5-0, Joint Operation 

Planning.

MAJOR MOBILIZATION PLANS AND 

PLANNING SYSTEMS













Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution 

System 

Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan

Air Force War and Mobilization Plan

Marine Corps Mobilization, Activation, Integration, and 

Deactivation Plan

Coast Guard Manpower Mobilization and Support Plan

Figure V-1. Major Mobilization Plans and Planning Systems 

4. Mobilization Estimate of the Situation 

a. A commander’s estimate of the situation provides a logical process of 

reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the 

military situation and arrives at a decision as to a COA to be taken to accomplish 

the mission. A staff estimate is similar, with the major difference being that the 

culmination of the staff estimate process is a conclusion or recommendation 

communicated to the commander. 

 V-3 
Chapter V 

b. The mobilization estimate format in Appendix E, “Mobilization Estimate,” 

applies the staff estimate concept to mobilization planning. The mobilization estimate 

provides a tool for mobilization planners to make a systematic appraisal of 

mobilization requirements and options. Although designed from the point of view of 

the Joint Staff, J-4, the format may be adapted to fit the circumstances for other Joint 

Staff directorates and of mobilization planners on the CCDR, Service component 

commander, and Service headquarters staffs. 

c. Like other staff estimates, the purpose of the mobilization estimate is to 

determine whether the mission can be supported and which COA is best. The 

mobilization estimate requires input from all functional areas of the Joint Staff, Service 

staffs, and the corresponding staff sections at the combatant commands. Although not 

every situation demands an extensive planning effort, the mobilization process is 

complex and involves interactions among resource areas that may influence the 

outcome of the analysis. It is important, therefore, that the mobilization proponent on a 

staff establishes and maintains effective communications with the other staff sections. 

d. The accuracy of the information gathered to complete paragraph 2 of the 

estimate and the quality of the analysis made in paragraph 3 of the estimate are essential 

to the validity of the mobilization estimate.

(1) In paragraph 2, a net assessment is made of the mobilization capability 

in each resource area. The net assessment consists of the time-phased mobilization 

capability or capacity in each resource area compared to the requirements of each COA. 

Shortages or overages should be identified and quantified in terms of the unit of measure 

used in the area (e.g., number of personnel, training seats, short tons, hospital beds, days 

of supply). 

(2) In paragraph 3, estimates of the impacts of mobilization activities in 

each resource area on the other areas are made to determine if the mobilization action 

is feasible. For example, when a COA requires training base expansion, the analysis 

process for paragraph 3 should establish that there are enough qualified instructors, 

facilities, equipment, and medical support for an expanded training establishment. A 

shortage in one or more of these areas will limit the training base expansion and may 

render the COA infeasible. 

e. The completed analysis should support conclusions concerning the feasibility 

or infeasibility of each COA with respect to mobilization and the ultimate staff 

recommendation on the best COA. 

5. Mobilization Planning During Contingency Planning 

 During peacetime, mobilization planners in the JPEC participate in two 

primary activities: maintaining a mobilization base and participating in the contingency 

planning process to develop detailed mobilization plans to support OPLANs. 

V-4 JP 4-05 
Mobilization Planning and Execution 

a. Maintaining a mobilization base at resource levels adequate to support the 

mobilization requirements of OPLANs is a full-time peacetime task for mobilization 

planners in all resource areas. Training exercises are used to evaluate adequacy of 

mobilization plans, resources, and training. The mobilization base is defined as a pool 

of resources that can be made available to permit force expansion and sustainment 

when necessary. The two most critical resources in the mobilization base are manpower 

and industrial base capacity because of the time and expense involved in developing 

skilled military and civilian personnel and technologically sophisticated military 

equipment. 

(1) Manpower Programs. With policy and planning guidance provided by 

OSD, the Military Departments manage manpower programs, which include RC 

manpower pools, with the numbers of personnel and the skill mix required to meet 

estimated wartime sustainability requirements. The IRR and other IA pools are 

maintained by a combination of laws and policies, such as the 8-year military service 

obligation (Title 10, USC, Section 12103) and programs for recruiting and retaining 

skilled RC personnel. Manpower programs are funded through the PPBE process. 

Manpower mobilization base maintenance is also supported by the SSS, which will draw 

on a pool of 18- to 26-year-old registrants if a military draft is required to sustain the 

force and is enabled by legislation. 

(2) Industrial Preparedness Programs. Military Department and DOD 

agency objectives for materiel and equipment sustainability are to maintain war 

reserve stocks of critical equipment in sufficient quantities to fulfill estimated 

sustainability requirements until industrial base output can be expanded to meet expected 

consumption rates. The basis for industrial preparedness planning is the CCDRs’ 

CIL. The CIL is the accumulation of current inventory items (consumable and nonconsumable) that each CCDR has identified as deficient through routine reporting in the 

CJCS’s Joint Forces Readiness Report. 

(3) Maintaining a mobilization base in the other resource areas requires 

planning and investment by the Military Departments for mobilization activities such as 

facilities and training base expansion, mobilization of strategic and CONUS 

transportation resources, and expanding HSS capabilities. 

b. Contingency planning is planning that occurs in non-crisis situations. 

Mobilization planning takes place in every phase of the contingency planning process. In 

contingency planning, the total requirement for RC forces to support the OPLAN must be 

identified and documented once the plan is complete. The RC requirements summary 

tables list the aggregate RC support necessary for the execution of the OPLAN, and are 

used as the numerical justification for requesting specific legal authorities and levels of 

mobilization, and will be included in annex A (Task Organization). Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and 

Execution System Volume II: Planning Formats establishes the standard formats and 

guidance for developing OPLANs. 

 V-5 
Chapter V 

For further information see CJCSI 3110.13C, Mobilization Guidance for the Joint 

Strategic Capabilities Plan.

c. Functions of the Contingency Planning Process. The functions of contingency 

planning as depicted in Figure V-2 include strategic guidance, concept development, plan 

development, and plan refinement. Each step of the RC requirements process (in context 

with the contingency planning process) is described in subsequent subparagraphs. 

V-6 JP 4-05 

CONTINGENCY PLANNING PROCESS

CCDR combatant commander

GDF Guidance for Development of the Force

GEF Guidance for Employment of the Force

LEGEND

TPFDD

Draft TPFDD

GEF/

GDF

OPLAN 

Draft PLAN

Joint Strategic 

Capabilities 

Plan

Supported 

CCDR Total 

Force 

Requirements

Preliminary Major 

Operation of 

Campaign 

Assessment 

(Supporting CCDRs)

Doctrinal 

Review

Additional 

Strategic 

Guidance

Concept 

Development

Plan 

Development

Plan 

Refinement

Strategic 

Concept

Supported 

CCDR 

Submits Total 

Force 

Requirements

Major 

Operations of 

Campaign 

Impact 

Assessment

Alternate 

Sourcing 

(Supporting 

CCDRs)

OPLAN operation plan

SVC service

TPFDD Time-Phased Force and Deployment 

Data

Figure V-2. Contingency Planning Process 
Mobilization Planning and Execution 

(1) Strategic Guidance. The GFMIG provides for the apportionment of major 

combat forces and selected special operations forces (SOF). These and other force 

requirements are broadly defined by the supported CCDR’s strategic concept and timephased force and deployment data (TPFDD) letter of instruction (LOI) to guide plan 

development. Strategic guidance planning should accomplish the following: 

 (a) Consider implications of RC use that are not limited to the strategic 

guidance function of contingency planning. Apportioned RC combat forces and major 

theater combat service (CS)/combat service support (CSS) are known but visibility of 

smaller RC units will only occur after sourcing is complete. Provide input or feedback on 

RC requirements and assumptions to the staffing of high-level guidance documents such 

as the GEF, GDF, JSCP, and CJCSI 3110.13C, Mobilization Guidance for the Joint 

Strategic Capabilities Plan. 

 (b) Participate in the planner’s development of the supported CCDR’s 

TPFDD LOI and related actions to ensure that RC mobilization guidance and taskings are 

visible and understood for apportioned RC major combat forces, SOF units, and theater 

level CS and CSS units. 

 (c) Review the LOI to ensure the stated requirement for the aggregate RC 

requirements are contained in annex A (Task Organization) to the OPLAN. 

(2) Concept Development. During this function, the mobilization planner 

becomes familiar with the CCDR’s strategic concept and TPFDD LOI and checks each 

for consistent RC planning factors such as force structure available during the planning 

cycle, scheduled conversions, activations, and inactivations. If there are inconsistencies, 

the mobilization planner provides immediate feedback to the supported CCDR. The 

product created during concept development is the supported CCDR’s total force 

requirement. 

(3) Plan Development. During plan development, plan TPFDD sourcing 

occurs (See Figure V-2). The Services select units to meet the time-phased requirements 

of the supported CCDR. When the Services source a plan TPFDD, the contingency 

planner, with the mobilization planner’s advice, adds an important dimension to the 

sourcing process by considering where Service capabilities reside. These selected units 

may be active forces, a combination of AC and RC, or even combinations that include 

civilian and contractor support. After requirements are determined, there must be a 

concerted effort to identify component sourcing, either AC or RC, to increase the 

accuracy of specifying the total RC units and manpower required. At the end of this 

phase, the draft TPFDD is available. Normally, this provides the bulk of the RC 

requirement and enables the supported combatant command’s mobilization planner to 

create the draft RC requirements. At this point, the TPFDD is sourced and considered 

final. However, the RC requirements must still be finalized by each Service using 

TPFDD data. The Services and supporting CCDRs give the supported CCDR draft data 

that must be compiled and included in the supporting plans to complete the RC 

 V-7 
Chapter V 

requirement (See Figure V-3). Once a plan is completed, the original mobilization 

assumptions are either validated or refuted. 

OPERATION PLAN 

RESERVE COMPONENT REQUIREMENTS









Reserve Components in the area of responsibility

Transportation Enablers

 

Mobilization/Deployment Supporters

Active Component Backfill

-- Supported combatant commander (CCDR) obtains from 

time-phased force and deployment data after Services 

source force list

-- Supported CCDR obtains from US Transportation Command

-- Supported CCDR obtains from Services

-- Supported CCDR obtains from Services

Figure V-3. Operation Plan Reserve Component Requirements 

(4) Plan Refinement. In plan refinement, the Joint Staff (JS) conducts a formal 

review of the OPLAN. The J-4 mobilization planner and other Joint Staff directorates’ 

review the RC requirements summaries and supporting data. The supporting CCDRs and 

Services finalize requirements in several areas: movement of the force, mobilization and 

deployment support, sustainment operations, and backfill capabilities. CONUS-based 

and other forces supporting the deployment are not included on the TPFDD, but the 

requirements are identified and planned. During execution planning each requirement is 

justified, the RC unit is selected, and called to active duty. 

d. RC Requirements Summary Tables. The summary tables identify RC forces 

and support forces required to accomplish the following: deploy to the GCC’s area of 

responsibility (AOR); move the force; assist in mobilization, deployment, and 

sustainment; and backfill departing AC units and individuals. Too often, war planners 

are unaware of the total RC requirement to support the OPLAN under development. The 

CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II: Planning 

Formats, JSCP; and CJCSI 3110.13C, Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic 

Capabilities Plan, require completion of annex A (Task Organization) to OPLANs. The 

RC portion of annex A (Task Organization) should contain the number of RC 

requirement summaries necessary to support requests for mobilization legal authorities. 

For instance, if the flexible deterrent option (FDO) phase of the plan requires PRC and a 

subsequent phase requires partial mobilization, separate RC requirements summaries 

must be prepared for each of these phases to support the requests for PRC and 

V-8 JP 4-05 
Mobilization Planning and Execution 

subsequently for partial mobilization. It is not necessary to prepare a separate RC 

requirement summary for each OPLAN FDO. Mobilization planners analyze FDOs in 

the aggregate to determine the point at which PRC becomes necessary and prepare one 

summary to support the request. These summaries provide senior leadership with the 

data required to determine the level of mobilization necessary to execute various 

functions during planning. Figure V-4 is an example of a CCDR’s RC requirements 

summary to support an FDO associated with an OPLAN. This summary would be used 

by the mobilization planner to justify a recommendation to request a PRC. Figure V-4 is 

an example of a CCDR’s RC requirement summary to support OPLAN execution. The 

total RC requirement is over 200,000 reservists, indicating that partial mobilization 

authority is necessary for OPLAN execution. 

(1) RC in AOR. During the plan development (following CCDR submission of 

total force requirements and development of a draft TPFDD), the Services calculate and 

provide the supported CCDR with two sets of data (RC unit and RC non-unit personnel 

in the TPFDD) that produce the RC manpower numbers in the “RC in AOR” column. 

This number is calculated to provide the best estimate of the RC portion of TPFDD nonunit personnel. This includes planned fillers and replacements, who may not all come 

from the AC, particularly if planning the second of two major operations or campaigns. 

For example, if 10,000 fillers and replacements are planned for deploying units, a planner 

might estimate that 2,000 of these would be RC. This could be based on predetermined 

assumptions such as physical location of active or RC forces; time to call-up and deploy 

RC forces; duration of decisive force in plan execution; or requirements to consider 

another major operation or campaign. Even though the plan and the TPFDD may not 

specify AC or RC for fillers and replacements, the mobilization planner provides the 

planner with assistance to define the RC portion of this requirement to complete the table. 

EXAMPLE: RESERVE COMPONENT REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY

OPLAN 1234 X FDO(s) RC26 PLAN EXECUTION 

S 

V 

C 

RC IN 

AOR 

MOVE THE 

FORCE 

ASSIST MOB/ 

DEPLOY/SUSTAIN 

BACKFILL TOTAL RC 

PERSONNEL BY 

SERIVCE 

IMA IRR/SELRES CONUS OCONUS 

USA 0 1,200 310 900 700 350 3,460 

USN 0 300 33 1,200 600 220 2,353 

USAF 0 1,300 140 1,550 990 20 4,000 

USMC 0 25 60 90 270 150 595 

USCG 0 0 3 15 0 10 28 

TOTALS 2,825 546 3,755 2,560 750 10,436 

AOR – area of responsibility 

CONUS – continental United States 

FDO – flexible deterrent option 

IMA – individual mobilization augmentee 

IRR – Individual Ready Reserve 

MOB – mobilization 

OCONUS – outside the continental United States 

OPLAN – operation plan 

RC – Reserve Component 

SELRES – Selective Reserve 

SVC – Service 

USA – United States Army 

USAF – United States Air Force 

USCG – United States Coast Guard 

USMC – United States Marine Corps 

USN – United States Navy 

Figure V-4. Example: Reserve Component Requirements Summary 

 V-9 
Chapter V 

(2) Move the Force, Assist Mobilization, Deployment, or Sustainment, and 

Backfill. During plan refinement, the Services, supporting CCDRs, USTRANSCOM, 

and other agencies define their non-TPFDD requirements to support complete plan 

execution. The Services coordinate with these organizations to identify actual RC forces 

needed to meet these requirements. 

SECTION B. MOBILIZATION EXECUTION 

6. Mobilization Decisions and Orders 

a. CJCS recommends to SecDef the assets that are to be called up and their 

planned use when RC forces are to be mobilized to augment the AC. SecDef approval 

is required for the execution of a mobilization OPORD. Figure V-5 shows the 

mobilization execution planning process. In preparing a mobilization recommendation to 

the President, the following should be considered: 

MANPOWER MOBILIZATION EXECUTION PROCESS

Military Department 

Secretaries Execute to Meet 

Combatant Commander/ 

Services Requirements

Ceilings Ceilings

Guidance Guidance

Press Release Press Release

Reserve 

Component 

Call-up 

Executive Order

Congressional 

Delegations, 

Oversight 

Committees, 

and Public 

Affairs 

Notifications of 

Units Identified 

for Training/ 

Mobilization

Secretary of 

Defense Develops 

Implementation 

Guidance

Secretary of 

Defense 

Delegates to 

Military 

Department 

Secretaries, 

and Sets 

Ceilings

Secretary of 

Defense 

Coordinates 

with Secretary 

of Homeland 

Security for 

United States 

Coast Guard

Secretary of 

Delegates to 

Commandant 

United States 

Coast Guard

Homeland 

Security

Figure V-5. Manpower Mobilization Execution Process 

V-10 JP 4-05 
Mobilization Planning and Execution 

(1) Assessments of the Services, CCDRs, and Service component commanders. 

(2) Input from the Joint Staff. 

(3) Technical advice, legal opinions, and policy considerations from OSD. 

b. After the President’s decision to initiate mobilization, SecDef directs the 

Military Departments to proceed. The Services publish mobilization orders in 

accordance with their respective procedures. OSD may issue implementation instructions 

and provide additional policy guidance, if required. 

c. Some mobilization actions require the President or SecDef to notify the 

Congress. For example, some legal authorities require reports at specific intervals. 

Others require specific information on how the authority is being used and how long it 

will be needed. Reports on expenditures related to the crisis are also required. The CJCS 

and the DOD Comptroller are normally responsible for preparing these reports, which 

require continuous coordination throughout the JPEC. Figure V-6 illustrates the RC 

decision-making process.

7. Monitoring the Status and Progress of Mobilization 

Because mobilization involves interrelated activities in twelve resource areas, 

SecDef, OSD, CJCS, Secretaries of the Military Departments, and other members of the 

JPEC need accurate and timely information on the status and progress of mobilization. 

Information received by proponents in each of the resource areas is analyzed and 

coordinated with the other resource area proponents to provide decisionmakers with 

recommendations for controlling, replanning, redirecting, or stopping mobilization 

operations. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

(JOPES), Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures), provides detailed procedures 

and automated information to support operations planning and execution. 

SECTION C. MOBILIZATION REPORTING 

8. Reporting Requirements 

a. Reporting involves extracting information that is obtained from monitoring 

activities; then, providing the data to appropriate organizations that are involved with 

mobilization and demobilization. The mobilization planner responds to formal and 

informal reporting requirements. The formal requirements are those specified in statutes 

or directives such as reporting to Congress, the Joint Staff, or the Services. Three formal 

reports are generated: RC requirements from annex A (Task Organization) of each 

OPLAN which lists the total RC requirements; the mobilization report (MOBREP); and 

during partial mobilization, the President’s report to Congress. Figure V-7 illustrates the 

information flow for these reports. 

 V-11 
Chapter V 

RESERVE COMPONENT DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 

(SUBSEQUENT CALL-UP OR TRANSITION FROM PRESIDENTIAL 

SELECTED RESERVE CALL-UP TO PARTIAL MOBILIZATION)

CCDR combatant commander

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

COA course of action

JS Joint Staff

NSC National Security Council

LEGEND

NO

YES YES

Partial 

Mobilization

Request 

Required?

Additional 

Request

Required?

Message Request 

for 2nd OPLAN/COA 

Execution/

More RC Forces

Sequential Call-up 

Request

CCDR Requests 

RC Force for 

Sequential Call-up 

(# or Time)

JS Signs Request with 

Other CCDRs/SVCs 

Requirements; Staffs 

Recommend to 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs 

of Staff for Additional 

Authority

Secretary of 

Defense, JS or NSC 

Requests 

Presidential 

Declaration of 

National Emergency

CCDRs/SVCs Request 

for Partial 

Mobilization

JS Coordinates 

Request

JS Form 136 with Partial 

Mobilization 

Recommendation 

(Coordinate with SecDef, 

SECHS, CCDRs, SVCs)

SecDef 

Recommendation

SecDef 

Review

CJCS Letter 

Request

CJCS 

Review/

Approval 

President Declares 

National Emergency/ 

Authorizes Partial 

Mobilization

OPLAN operation plan

RC Reserve Component

SecDef Secretary of Defense

SECHS Secretary of Homeland Security

SVC service

Figure V-6. Reserve Component Decision-making Process 

b. Informal or special case reporting may be required in response to congressional 

requests and queries. Future rotation plans, mobilization capability or status requests, 

limitations on reservists, seasonal or personal information, and redeployment and 

demobilization plans may be required to fulfill informal or special case reporting 

requirements. 

V-12 JP 4-05 
Mobilization Planning and Execution 

MOBILIZATION REPORTING INFORMATION FLOWS

CCDR combatant commander

IAW in accordance with

mob mobilization

MOBREP Military Manpower Mobilization and 

Accession Status Report

RC reserve component

LEGEND

SITREP situation report

SORTS Status of Resource and Training System

SVC service

TPFDD Time-phased Force and Deployment Data

USC United States Code

Reports and 

Data to 

Congress

Report to Congress: Every Six Months 

(Partial Mob Only: IAW Title 10, USC, 

Section 12302)

 Name of unit, service, and/or RC

 Statement of mission for each unit

 Evaluation of each unit's performance

 Where each unit is deployed

 Necessity for retaining on active duty











Secretary of 

Defense 

Reports 

Status to 

President and 

Congress

CCDRs, SVCs 

Monitor 

Manpower 

Mobilization

Joint Staff 

Orders Joint 

Reporting

Mob Status 

(Incl Ceilings 

Locations, 

Capability)

NO

YES

Reports

Joint Staff 

Prepares 

Consolidated 

Reports for 

Chairman of 

the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff 

for Congress

Secretary of 

Defense 

Reports Status 

to President 

and Congress

Ad Hoc 

Reporting as 

Required

At Partial 

Mob?

TPFDD

SORTS

SITREPs

MOBREP

CCDRs, SVCs 

Generate 

Reports

Joint Staff 

Consolidates 

Unit/Individual 

Data

Figure V-7. Mobilization Reporting Information Flows 

c. Once the Services begin to order RC units and individuals to active duty, the joint 

reporting process begins. Joint reporting entails reporting on people and units. The 

MOBREP shows people available and/or mobilized. After direction from the Office of 

 V-13 
Chapter V 

V-14 JP 4-05 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs (OASD[RA]), the Services daily (or 

as otherwise directed) submit the MOBREP to OASD(RA). Units update the Status of 

Resources and Training System database which is available for review on the local area 

network. 

9. Four Subjects Require Reporting

a. Problems in Providing Forces. The Services must notify the requester and the 

JS if they are unable to provide RC forces by the specified dates. Then, the JS can 

attempt to resolve the problem. This is not a formal report, but is required promptly to 

ensure expeditious resolution. 

b. RC Forces No Longer Required. All organizations monitor their missions to 

determine when RC capabilities are no longer required or if it is feasible to provide other 

means of support. Organizations with releasable RC forces inform the appropriate 

Service; in turn, the Service coordinates with USJFCOM/USSOCOM to determine if 

forces are needed elsewhere. 

 c. Mobilization Information to J-3 Director of Operations As Required. The JS 

J-4 coordinates with the J-3 briefing team to ascertain the information needed. 

d. Demobilization Schedules. The Services have primary responsibility to 

demobilize their units and personnel. The Services will reconcile demobilization 

timelines with the supported CCDR’s priorities and will notify CCDRs who have 

assigned/attached RC forces of the planned demobilization dates and corresponding 

timeline accounting for demobilization movement and out processing. 
CHAPTER VI

JOINT DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION 

 VI-1 

1. Introduction 

a. Demobilization is the process of transitioning from a conflict situation or 

from a wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a 

peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. It 

involves more than releasing personnel from active duty, deactivating units, and 

reorganizing the RC. Although these activities drive the process, capability or capacity in 

the other resource areas must be reduced and reorganized at the same time. As in 

mobilization, activities in each resource area during demobilization will affect each 

of the others. For this reason, close coordination among resource area proponents is just 

as important during demobilization as it is during mobilization. 

b. This chapter provides the national and joint military perspectives of 

demobilization planning and execution. It also provides guidelines for demobilization 

planning and execution and an overview of demobilization activities in the twelve 

resource areas. 

SECTION A. DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING 

2. Demobilization and National Security 

a. From a national perspective, the results of a successful demobilization process 

should put the United States in a position to respond to future challenges to our 

national security. Policies should be established to regulate the pace of demobilization 

and retain the military capability required to ensure post-conflict national security 

commitments. Force structure changes are not inherent to the demobilization process. 

Industrial base and other civil sector resources mobilized during the conflict will be 

released to fuel the post-conflict national economy. 

b. The scope of demobilization will vary according to the extent of the 

preceding mobilization. The scope of mobilization can range from a relatively brief use 

of a few volunteer reservists to a protracted force and resource expansion well beyond the 

original peacetime levels. 

c. From a joint military perspective, demobilization plans should reflect the postconflict missions of supported GCCs and be synchronized with plans for recovery, 

“Resolved, that the commanding officer be and he is hereby directed to 

discharge the troops now in the service of the United States, except twentyfive privates, to guard the stores at Fort Pitt, and fifty-five to guard the stores 

at West Point and other magazines, with a proportionate number of officers; 

no officer to remain in service above the rank of a captain.” 

Resolution of the Continental Congress 

(Disbanding the Continental Army, 2 June 1784) 
Chapter VI 

VI-2 JP 4-05 

DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING GUIDELINES

Mission First

Begin Planning Early

Coordinate and Communicate Plans and Policies

Figure VI-1. Demobilization Planning Guidelines 

reconstitution, and redeployment operations. DOD policies for the release of reservists 

and RC units ordered to active duty should first reflect military requirements and 

then considerations of equity and fairness for military personnel and their families. The 

demobilization personnel management programs of the Military Departments will be 

challenged to facilitate the return of Service members and their families to civilian life 

and need to provide substantive transition assistance, such as screening for medical care

requirements and potential long-term health care support, and assistance in availing 

themselves of statutory reemployment rights, as members reenter the civilian workforce. 

National Guard and reserve units and members ordered to active duty to augment the AC 

will, consistent with operational requirements, receive priority for redeployment. They 

will be released from active duty as expeditiously as possible. 

3. Demobilization Planning Guidelines 

 Studies of the demobilizations following the two World Wars and the Gulf War 

provide valuable lessons for today’s demobilization planners and have been distilled into 

the following guidelines illustrated in Figure VI-1 for demobilization planning and 

execution: 

a. Mission First. Demobilization plans must support the post-conflict mission as it 

evolves. The supported commander’s immediate postwar priorities should come 

first. As the transition to a post-conflict state proceeds, long-range national security 

objectives should drive demobilization activities to ensure the Armed Forces are prepared 

for the next crisis. 

b. Begin Planning Early. Demobilization planning should begin soon after 

mobilization starts. 
Joint Demobilization Planning and Execution 

 VI-3 

c. Coordinate and Communicate Plans and Policies. The demobilization policies 

and procedures that worked best in the past were those that had been developed and 

coordinated by interested personnel and agencies both within and outside DOD. Public 

information programs that explained demobilization policies helped gain and maintain 

public support. 

4. Planning Considerations 

a. Demobilizing the Armed Forces could be a relatively straightforward return of 

mobilized/activated units and individuals to their former status. It could also be a broader 

process including measures such as deactivation of units, rapid discharge of individuals, 

and a major reorganization of the RC. Similarly, demobilization of the defense 

industry could range from an almost total reconversion of a defense-oriented industrial 

base to a simple reduction in the output of a few providers who surged production to meet 

the near-term demands of a short-lived crisis. 

b. Recovery activities must also be planned along with demobilization. These 

include activities for restoring force readiness (reset/reconstitution) and controlling the 

rate of industrial base conversion to avoid disrupting the national economy. As 

manpower is being released from the Services and industrial production is being cut back, 

the Services must retain or replace skilled manpower required to restore readiness and 

replenish war reserves and other stocks to be prepared for the next crisis. 

c. Demobilization planning is accomplished at two levels. At the national level, 

the President and SecDef must decide on the rate of demobilization and the size and 

composition of the post-conflict force structure and its resource base. These nationallevel decisions drive demobilization planning and resource requests at the theater and 

supporting levels. They also guide the post-conflict activities of the supported and 

supporting commanders. 

d. The key to military demobilization is the supported GCC. The supported 

GCC’s mission and requirements should take precedence over all others. Other general 

planning factors should include: 

(1) The situation and requirements in other theaters. SecDef, with the advice of 

CJCS, should establish a priority of support. 

(2) Future missions in the theater. 

(3) Availability of strategic lift for redeployment. 

(4) CONUS reception and processing capacities for manpower and materiel. 
Chapter VI 

VI-4 JP 4-05 

5. Recovery Planning 

a. Recovery planning should be closely coordinated with demobilization 

planning. Recovery includes the reset actions necessary in the theater and CONUS base 

to restore force readiness and a credible capability to respond, in the short term, to a 

future threat. Included are activities such as: 

(1) Rebuilding of major equipment items. 

(2) Restoring personnel strength and training readiness to required wartime 

levels for future contingencies. 

(3) Restoring war reserve stocks to acceptable levels. 

(4) Maintaining essential industrial surge and expansion capabilities. 

(5) Finalizing recovery of redeployed equipment returned to CONUS or 

addressing shortages created by remain-behind equipment requirements. 

(6) Terminating war-related contracts for the convenience of the government. 

(7) Reestablishing contracts at garrison or home base as troops return. 

(8) Restoring pre-positioning ships and embarked equipment and stores. 

b. The planning and resourcing of these activities are the responsibility of OSD 

and the Military Departments. CJCS assists SecDef in providing strategic direction for 

these efforts. 

SECTION B. EXECUTION 

6. General 

 Demobilization activities can begin before the end of the crisis or war as the need 

for resources diminishes and assets for demobilization support become available. Most 

demobilization actions, however, will commence following the conflict when 

immediate post-conflict missions have been assigned by the supported GCC and 

requirements for military forces and resources decline. Although demobilization, like 

mobilization, is essentially a Military Department responsibility, the supported and 

supporting commanders play coordinating and synchronizing roles. In any event, 

the CCDRs monitor the status and progress of demobilization and concurrent 

recovery operations to assess the adequacy of actions to restore readiness of assigned 

forces to required levels for future conflicts. 
Joint Demobilization Planning and Execution 

 VI-5 

7. Demobilization Execution 

 Following redeployment, the Military Departments deactivate units or return them to 

a reserve status. Military personnel are released from active duty or returned to reserve 

status. The number of civilian employees may be reduced. Materiel and equipment

may be returned to bases of origin or other reserve/guard units, moth-balled, stored, 

distributed to other nations through foreign military sales or other security assistance 

programs, destroyed, sold for scrap, or turned over to the Defense Reutilization and 

Marketing Office. As with mobilization, assets in the other resource areas are required to 

support the demobilization of manpower and equipment; but as these support 

requirements decline, demobilization activities are accomplished in the other resource 

areas. Representative actions in other resource areas are listed in Figure VI-2. 

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOBILIZATION ACTIONS IN RESOURCE AREAS

RESOURCE AREA ACTION

Material/Equipment War reserve stocks are restored to acceptable levels and redeployed equipment returned 

to the continental United States (CONUS) is recovered. 

Manpower 

Cargo handling and port security Reserve Component (RC) are mobilized to support the 

redeployment of materiel and equipment returned to CONUS. Move returning activated 

units and personnel to homestations/demobilization sites and return them to reserve duty 

as appropriate. 

Transportation Strategic air mobility and sealift assets are deactivated or returned to the RC or to the 

private sector. 

Facilities Builidings are closed, sold, or returned to the private sector or host nations. Staffing is 

reduced. Contracts for services and utilities are reduced or terminated. 

Industrial Base Contracts are reduced in scope or terminated. Production capacity is laid away or 

converted to commercial use. 

Training Base Capacity is reduced by closing training centers or reducing staffs and other resources to 

provide capacity based on future demands. 

Health Service Support 

Hospital resources and staffs provided by the National Disaster Medical System or the 

Department of Veteran Affairs-Department of Defense Contingency Plan are released 

when no longer required. Medical force structure is deactivated or returned to a reserve 

status. Contracts with nongovernment and host-nation providers are terminated. 

Appropriate medical screening and assessment of long-term medical needs for affected 

personnel is undertaken. 

Communications Support National and joint assets are redeployed. Leased capacity and equipment from 

commercial sources are reduced in scope or terminated. 

Host-Nation Support 

Agreements and contracts with host governments or commercial providers are 

renegotiated or terminated. For specific guidance of acquisition and cross-servicing 

agreements, refer to Department of Defense Directive 2010.9. 

Environment Military Departments and Department of Defense agencies act to meet environmental 

standards and regulations with cleanup and other appropriate activities. 

Legal Authorities The President informs the Congress when legal authorities invoked for the crisis are no 

longer needed and are revoked or rescinded. 

Funding Funding required for demobilization and recovery activities is provided in accordance 

with established peacetime procedures. 

Figure VI-2. Representative Demobilization Actions in Resource Areas 
Chapter VI 

VI-6 JP 4-05 

SECTION C. MOBILIZATION PLANNER DEMOBILIZATION 

RESPONSIBILITIES 

8. Purpose 

 This section describes the mobilization planner’s role in the demobilization process. 

Only the manpower portion of the demobilization process is discussed. RC units and 

individuals are released from active duty under the demobilization process. Although not 

as time-sensitive as mobilization, demobilization is a complex operation that requires 

detailed planning and execution. 

a. Demobilization planning should occur during an operation for the following 

reasons: expiration of authorized service time; changes in the forces required; or political 

emphasis to demobilize forces. Mobilization and demobilization may occur 

simultaneously. Consequently, each Service must ensure that demobilization plans 

are flexible, consistent, responsive, and sufficiently comprehensive to meet all 

contingencies. From a joint military perspective, demobilization plans should reflect 

the post-conflict missions of supported GCCs and be synchronized with plans for 

recovery, reconstitution, and redeployment operations. DOD policies for the release 

of reservists and RC units ordered to active duty should first reflect military 

requirements and then considerations of equity and fairness for military personnel and 

their families. 

b. Poorly planned and executed demobilization operations will have two major 

impacts: degradation to supported operations and reduced support for the RC

program. Demobilization needs to be integrated into the redeployment. From a joint 

military perspective, demobilization plans should reflect the post-conflict missions of 

supported commanders and be synchronized with plans for battlefield recovery and 

redeployment operations. Figure VI-3 shows the demobilization activities. 

c. A summary of these activities and the specific tasks the mobilization planner 

accomplishes is found in Annex E, “Demobilization Activities,” to Appendix C, 

“Mobilization Information Management Plan.” This summary is a reference of the tasks 

that must be accomplished at each organizational level to avoid poorly planned and 

executed demobilization operations. 

9. Preliminary Actions 

Preliminary actions set the stage for planning and executing a successful 

demobilization. Primarily, they involve establishing and disseminating broad 

guidance that the mobilization community incorporates into mobilization plans. 
Joint Demobilization Planning and Execution 

 VI-7 DEMOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES CCDR combatant commander EO executive order JS Joint Staff RC Reserve Component SVC service TPFDD Time-phased Force and Deployment Data LEGEND Redeployment TPFDD Reports SVCs Issue Demobilization Instructions Gaining Commanders Process RC Units/Individuals Off Active Duty Develop Messages, Lists of Returning/Deactivating Units/Individuals Joint Staff Monitors Status; Prepares Reports to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Secretary of Defense Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Recommends Termination of RC Recall Authority President Revokes Executive Order CCDR Message: Recall Authority No Longer Needed SVCs Demobilize RC Forces JS 136 to Revoke EO (Coordinate with CCDRs, SVCs, Secretary of Defense) Secretary of Defense Coordinates with Secretary of Homeland Security for Termination of RC Recall Secretary of Defense Withdraws Authority When Last Units/Individuals Are Released from Active Duty; Notify President Redeployment SVC Component Requests SVC Demobilization Instructions Redeployment TPFDD Secretary of Defense Establishes Policies for Demobilization Demobilization Plan Developed or Refined CCDR Updates Redeployment Plan (Including Units and Individuals) Begin Demobilization Expiration of Authorization, Force Changes Required, Conflict Resolution, Political Decisions RC Released to SVC Component for Redeployment

Figure VI-3. Demobilization Activities 
Chapter VI 

VI-8 JP 4-05 

a. Establish Demobilization Concepts and Policies. Mobilization planners assist 

in selecting units for demobilization, defining the process, and integrating demobilization 

into the joint operation planning and execution system. DODD 1235.10, Activation, 

Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserves, establishes demobilization 

policy. This directive states that “Units and individuals of the Ready Reserve ordered to 

active duty without their consent shall be kept on active duty no longer than absolutely 

necessary. They shall be released from active duty as promptly as possible, consistent 

with operational requirements.” This directive includes the following additional policies: 

(1) Units activated as a unit should be demobilized as a unit; 

(2) Medically cleared personnel should be demobilized with their unit; and 

(3) To the extent feasible and consistent with operational requirements, follow 

on missions should be assigned to active component forces rather than call-up of 

demobilized RC units. Figure VI-4 gives examples of demobilization policy issues and 

Appendix F, “References,” lists other documents that provide mobilization guidance.

b. Provide Input to the JSCP on RC Forces Demobilization. Mobilization 

planners address issues such as demobilization support requirements, assumptions on 

release of forces, RC support of redeployment operations, and times necessary to conduct 

demobilization. Broad references to demobilization may be appropriate for inclusion in 

the JSCP while more detailed assumptions and guidance should be included in the 

classified document, CJCSI 3110.13C, Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic 

Capabilities Plan (U), published subsequent to each JSCP. 

DEMOBILIZATION POLICY ISSUES









To the extent operationally feasible, redeploy Reserve 

Component forces first

Management of partial units (if only part of unit needed)

Use of volunteers, contractors, and host-nation support

Retaining on active duty only those forces necessary

Figure VI-4. Demobilization Policy Issues 
Joint Demobilization Planning and Execution 

 VI-9 

10. Planning 

 Demobilization planning involves reviewing policies and establishing procedures

to demobilize. Planners determine operational support requirements and identify the 

forces to demobilize and those to support the demobilization operations. The planning 

function is divided into two subactivities: plan demobilization force and plan 

demobilization support (See Figure VI-5).

a. Plan Demobilization Force. This activity establishes the criteria for selecting

forces for demobilization, selecting units, and developing a time-phased schedule. This 

is essentially the same thought process followed during execution. Tasks in planning

the demobilization force include:

(1) Determine Redeployment and Demobilization Strategy. The Services 

develop broad concepts for demobilization that are the basis for subsequent detailed 

planning. These areas include ports, demobilization stations, equipment return policies, 

medical processing and follow-up, personnel support requirements, and equipment 

disposition. 

For additional guidance on redeployment, see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment 

Operations. 

FORCE

SUPPORT

Determine redeployment 

support requirements

Determine required 

outprocessing

Determine, source, and approve 

forces needed to support 

demobilization

Provide guidance

Determine redeployment and 

demobilization strategy

Develop tentative 

demobilization schedule

DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING FUNCTIONS

Figure VI-5. Demobilization Planning Functions 
Chapter VI 

VI-10 JP 4-05 

 (a) Mobilization planners must consider carefully those functional areas 

where most, if not all, of the capability is in the RC. If additional units must be 

mobilized, shortages of the capability could exist. For example, units may not be 

available to provide a rotational base in the functional area; in that case, with the onset of 

another operation, the RC may not be able to support both contingencies. 

 (b) Equipment retrograde has manpower implications. Equipment 

may be returned from the mission location directly to the unit or may be sent to a 

processing center for refurbishment. Sometimes equipment may remain in the theater or 

be transferred to other nations. These considerations may cause personnel from 

demobilizing units to stay behind to process the equipment. The mobilization planners 

must incorporate these decisions into demobilization plans. 

(2) Develop Tentative Demobilization Schedule. The Services create a 

tentative demobilization schedule based on the assumed level of mobilization. This 

schedule is used to develop more detailed plans and to estimate resource requirements. 

Likewise, the commands where the RC forces will be assigned develop schedules to 

determine support requirements and to ensure the continuation of specific capabilities. 

Mobilization planners must ascertain if replacement units are required; if they are, the 

mobilization planners then coordinate with force planners to schedule the overlap with 

the replacement units. 

b. Plan Demobilization Support. In this second subactivity mobilization planners 

consider the specific forces, such as medical, logistic, and transportation, needed to 

Equipment retrograde considerations may cause personnel from 

 demobilizing units to stay behind to process the equipment. 
Joint Demobilization Planning and Execution 

 VI-11 

support demobilization; also, they develop more detailed demobilization procedures. 

During this effort, the mobilization planners must address the support issues such as 

backfill, ports, demobilization stations, equipment retrograde, processing, and 

redistribution, outprocessing procedures, and leave policies. Demobilization support 

tasks include: 

(1) Determine Redeployment Support Requirements. Having determined 

the RC forces required to support the redeployment of units and individuals, supported 

CCDRs coordinate with force planners to incorporate these additional requirements into 

the TPFDD. Other organizations coordinate their requirements with the Services. 

(2) Determine Required Outprocessing. The Service mobilization planners 

allot the time and resources necessary for personnel, finance, legal, and medical 

processing accomplished at the transportation hubs and demobilization stations. They 

ensure that these factors are integrated into planned movement schedules and that 

organizations with RC forces are given the information. Service mobilization planners 

also plan for the homecoming support and ceremonies. 

(3) Determine, Source, and Approve Forces Needed to Support

Demobilization. The Services and CCDRs develop and source the additional manpower 

needed to support the redeployment; to backfill for departing units; and to support 

homecoming activities within CONUS. After the Services approve the additional 

requirements, these must be integrated with all other mobilization resources to ensure that 

ceilings are not violated. 

11. Execution 

a. Before demobilization is executed, mobilization planners must ensure that a unit 

or individual will not be needed for the operation. Politically, recall of units once 

demobilized will be difficult to justify; therefore, the Services should be conservative in 

releasing forces, especially if they involve unique units or skills. In assessing the 

continuing need for the RC forces, the mobilization planners must consider the entire 

DOD response, since an RC unit not needed by one component may be useful to another 

organization. 

b. During execution, mobilization planners constantly tailor the demobilization 

operation envisioned in the plan to the evolving situation. They staff recommendations 

and obtain decisions regarding units and individuals to be demobilized and adapt the 

demobilization support structure. 

c. Mobilization planners participate in the following execution tasks: 

(1) Educate the Leadership. Provide the decisionmakers with information on 

demobilization plans and policies, including the schedule of units and the number of 

personnel to be demobilized and those units and personnel already demobilized. When 

staffing demobilization recommendations, the mobilization planners ensure that both 
Chapter VI 

VI-12 JP 4-05 

public and congressional affairs are included in the actions. The mobilization planners 

should alert their leadership that RC call-ups may continue through all phases of an 

operation to provide an evolving logistics operations support system which must continue 

after the combat or crisis phase is complete. It is particularly important to ensure that the 

leadership does not prematurely recommend ending the emergency which may provide 

the legal basis for the mobilization of needed RC forces.

(2) Review and Modify Demobilization Concepts and Support Plans. The 

mobilization planners need to update the existing demobilization plan, created in the 

planning environment, to ensure that the demobilization concepts, policies, and 

supporting plans are accurate and reflect actual circumstances. They staff the 

demobilization plans with the appropriate organizations to verify that the users 

understand the demobilization concept and to enable them to modify their plans and 

operations. 

(3) Monitor Changing Requirements and Theater Backfill Requirements. 

Since demobilization is a fluid process, the mobilization planners continue to review 

changing operational requirements which may result in units’ being demobilized or 

extended. The supported CCDR must notify the Services, JS, and supporting CCDRs 

when units or individuals are no longer required or when it is feasible to use alternative 

manpower sources. If the requirement continues to exist, the appropriate Services, 

supported CCDR, and supporting CCDRs must request authority to extend the active 

duty period or obtain rotational units for replacement. 

(4) Seek Demobilization Approval. The supported CCDR identifies units and 

individuals no longer required to support operations in the redeployment plan. Based on 

the redeployment plan, each Service will develop a demobilization list which is then 

disseminated within the Service for action. Authority to approve the demobilization list 

will depend on the Service and the particular operation that may be delegated. 

(5) Develop Demobilization Schedule. Working closely with the affected 

organizations and USTRANSCOM, the Services create a demobilization schedule. The 

schedule includes forces to be demobilized, specific demobilization times, and projected 

release dates from theater, ports, and demobilization stations. When the schedule is 

complete, the Services ensure that organizations with RC forces review the schedule and 

update their supporting plans. 

(6) Monitor RC Mobilizations and Demobilizations. The mobilization 

planners start monitoring and reporting on RC units from the beginning of mobilization 

and these activities continue through demobilization. This tracking is necessary to obtain 

information to keep the leadership and Congress apprised of RC actions during the 

operation. Chapter V, “Mobilization Planning and Execution,” Section C, “Mobilization 

Reporting,” covers this function in detail. 

(7) Highlight Critical Support Issues in Situation Reports (SITREPs) and 

Other Forums. Using the SITREPs, other JOPES reports, and special functional reports 
Joint Demobilization Planning and Execution 

 VI-13 

or news groups, the mobilization planner presents conflicts and critical issues to the 

leadership and the appropriate organization. The mobilization planners’ early action 

enables the responsible individuals and commands to resolve issues expeditiously before 

they become roadblocks to further activities. 

(8) Terminate Legal Authorities. Once RC forces are no longer needed to 

support the operation, demobilization of remaining RC forces will occur. Upon complete 

demobilization the JS will inform the SecDef that there is no longer a need for RC forces 

in support of the operation. The SecDef may terminate the authorization to order RC 

forces to active duty (if such authorization was granted or delegated to the SecDef), direct 

the Services to terminate the order to activate RC forces, or inform the President so that 

the Presidential authorization may be withdrawn. This authority automatically is 

terminated if the President or Congress retracts the original declaration of national 

emergency. The same legislation that authorizes mobilization implements certain 

emergency authorities and capabilities. These depend upon the original mobilization 

authority continuing for their enforcement. Examples of this legislation include those 

which suspend certain laws pertaining to the promotion, separation, and retirement of 

active duty personnel (stop loss) and the suspension of Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration regulations. Until the need for supporting or related authorities is 

eliminated, planners should urge the SecDef, through the CJCS, not to rescind the order 

or declaration authorizing the call-up.
Chapter VI 

VI-14 JP 4-05 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX A

LEGAL AUTHORITIES 

1. General 

 a. Flexible and adaptive mobilization planning requires a range of options available 

both before and after a national emergency is declared. A broad range of legal authorities 

support mobilization actions ranging from mobilization for contingency operations, 

which does not require a declaration of national emergency, as well as full-scale war or 

other national emergencies. Due to the highly specific nature of legal authorities 

supporting mobilization actions, it is important that the JPEC and commanders 

responsible for mobilizing reserve forces consult frequently with staff legal counsel to 

ensure specific actions are implemented consistent with legal requirements. 

 b. Mobilization legal authority is available without a declaration of national 

emergency when invoked by the President or, upon delegation, SecDef, Secretary of a 

Military Department, or authority designated by the Secretary concerned under the 

provisions of Title 10, USC, Section 12301. Examples of such authorities are the PRC 

pursuant to Title 10, USC, Section 12304; the President’s option to suspend any 

provision of law pertaining to promotion, retirement, or separation of a Service member 

during an RC activation (the stop-loss authority) pursuant to Title 10, Sections 123 and 

12305; the Military Department Secretaries’ authority to recall regular and reserve 

military retirees pursuant to Title 10, USC, Sections 12307 and 12308; and authorities 

requiring priority performance on defense contracts pursuant to Title 50, USC, Section 

2071. 

 c. A national emergency can be declared by the President, the Congress, or both. 

Current law regarding national emergencies is contained in the National Emergencies Act 

of 1976 (Title 50, USC, Sections 1601-1651). The act provides that when the President 

declares a national emergency, the specific authorities must be included in the 

declaration, or by one or more contemporaneous or subsequent executive orders. 

Presidential powers are limited to those authorities invoked until the President 

subsequently announces the invocation of additional specified authorities (Title 50, USC, 

Section 1631). Congress may terminate the President’s declaration at any time with a 

concurrent resolution and must review the declaration and situation every six months 

(Title 50, USC, Section 1622). 

 d. The National Emergencies Act of 1976 greatly reduced the risk that a declaration 

of national emergency would send overly provocative signals of US intent to adversaries 

and unduly alarm allies. With the same broad range of emergency powers, the President 

can now tailor the national response in a crisis, without undue provocation, and convey 

more accurate signals of US intent to allies as well as adversaries. 

 e. The War Powers Resolution (WPR) (Title 50, USC, Sections 1541-1548) is a 

statute, enacted over Presidential veto, that attempts to impose limits upon the President’s 

authority as Commander in Chief over the armed forces to introduce the Armed Forces of 

the United States into hostilities or potentially hostile situations. Presidents have 

consistently maintained that the law unconstitutionally intrudes upon Presidential 

 A-1 
Appendix A 

authority. Among other things, the statute attempts to impose consultation and reporting 

requirements related to the introduction of armed forces into hostilities. While no 

President has accepted the limitations imposed by the WPR, Presidents have directed the 

DOD to prepare reports “consistent” with the reporting provisions of the WPR. 

Accordingly, while the statute itself does not control mobilization, the President may 

require the preparation of a report, “consistent with the provisions of the WPR,” 

regarding the status of the US forces, including mobilized RC forces, involved in 

hostilities. 

 f. The “Digest of War and Emergency Legislation Affecting the Department of 

Defense, 2003” lists nearly 400 emergency authorities available for mobilization and 

crisis planning. This appendix identifies and briefly describes or provides excerpts of 

many legal authorities relevant to those emergency authorities most likely to affect joint 

mobilization planning and execution. Additional resources with mobilization authorities 

include the “Selected Defense-Related Laws” (Vol II - as amended through December 

31, 2003), published by the Committee on Armed Services of the US House of 

Representatives. These references should assist planners, but do not eliminate the need to 

consult with staff legal counsel. 

2. Manpower 

 Individual and unit members of the RC and retired personnel may be ordered to 

active duty voluntarily or involuntarily under authorities provided in Title 10, USC. 

Figure A-1 illustrates RC accessibility. 

 a. Voluntary Order to Active Duty. The Military Department Secretaries may 

order any member of the RC, under their jurisdiction, to active duty with the consent of 

the member (National Guard [Title 32, USC] also requires consent of the state governor) 

at any time (Title 10, USC, Section 12301[d]). Funding is the limiting factor for the use 

of this authority. RC members who are voluntarily on active duty for over three years, or 

a cumulative more than three years over a four-year period, will be counted against AC 

end strengths. RC personnel are exempted from certain officer and enlisted grade limits. 

 b. Presidential Reserve Call-up. The President may activate any unit, and any 

member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of the Selected Reserve or any 

member of the IRR (designated as essential under regulations prescribed by the Military 

Department Secretary concerned) without their consent for periods of up to 365 days 

when it is determined necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission 

(Title 10, USC, Section 12304). Not more than 200,000 members of the Selected 

Reserve and the IRR may be on active duty under this section at any one time, of whom 

not more than 30,000 may be members of the IRR. Specifically, the law provided the 

authority for the President “to order a unit or member to active duty to provide assistance 

in responding to an emergency involving a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass 

destruction; or a terrorist attack or threatened terrorist attack in the US that results, or 

could result, in significant loss of life or property.” The 365-day limit (increased in 

Section 522 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007) is tied to 

A-2 JP 4-05 
Legal Authorities 

UNITED STATES CODE – RESERVE COMPONENT ACCESSIBILITY 

Title 10, 

US 

Code 

(USC) 

Armed Forces 

Statute Execution Action 

Member 

Consent 

Required? 

Pax 

Limit? Duration Comment 

Title 10, 

USC, 

Section 

12301(a) 

In time of war or of 

national emergency 

declared by Congress, 

or when otherwise 

authorized by law, an 

authority designated by 

the Secretary 

concerned 

Full Mobilization/Ready Reserve 

Order any unit or 

member not assigned 

to a unit to active duty 

No No War, 

emergency + 

6 months 

Includes activation 

of member for 

training 

Title 10, 

USC, 

Section 

12301(b) 

At any time, an 

authority designated by 

the Secretary 

concerned 

Order any unit or 

member not assigned 

to a unit to active duty 

No No No more than 

15 days/year 

Title 10, 

USC, 

Section 

12301(d) 

At any time, an 

authority designated by 

the Secretary 

concerned 

Volunteers/Entire Reserve Force 

Order or retain a 

member on active duty 

Yes No No limit Army National 

Guard and Air 

National Guard 

requires consent of 

governor 

concerned 

Title 10, 

USC, 

Section 

12302 

In time of national 

emergency declared by 

the President or when 

otherwise authorized by 

law 

Partial Mobilization/Ready Reserve 

Order any unit or 

member not assigned 

to a unit to active duty 

No Yes. No 

more than 

1M. 

No more than 

24 

consecutive 

months 

Title 10, 

USC, 

Section 

12304 

President determines it 

is necessary to 

augment the active 

forces for any 

operational mission or 

to provide assistance in 

responding to an 

emergency involving a 

terrorist attack or use of 

weapons of mass 

destruction (actual or 

threatened), then he 

authorizes the 

Secretary of Defense 

(SecDef) to call to 

active duty 

Presidential Reserve CallUp/Selected Reserve 

Order any unit or 

member not assigned 

to a unit to active duty 

No 200K 

overall 

from 

Selected 

Reserve 

and 

individual 

Ready 

Reserve 

(IRR) (up 

to 30K 

from IRR 

[must be 

in special 

IRR 

category 

to be 

available]) 

Up to 365 

days 

Includes activation 

of member for 

training. May not 

be used to provide 

assistance to US 

Government or a 

State for a serious 

natural or 

manmade disaster, 

accident, or 

catastrophe 

unrelated to 

terrorism. 

Title 10, 

USC, 

Section 

12306

In time of emergency 

when additional 

capabilities are required 

as authorized by 

section 12301 of this 

Title, the Secretary 

concerned with 

approval of SecDef

Order units and 

members of the Standby Reserve

Yes (but 

can be 

superseded 

by the 

SecDef 

based on 

need) 

Defined 

within Title 

10, USC, 

Section 

12301 

Within 

parameters of 

Title 10, 

USC, Section 

12301 above 

Includes activation 

of member for 

training 

Title 10, 

USC, 

Section 

12307 

At any time – including 

war, national 

emergency declared by 

Congress – the 

Secretary concerned 

Order qualified Retired 

Reservist to active duty 

No Defined 

within Title 

10, USC, 

Section 

12301 

See Title 10, 

USC, 

Sections 688 

and 12301(a) 

Includes activation 

of member for 

training 

Title 32, 

USC 

The National Guard 

(Provides federal funding for qualifying duties performed under the command and control of Governor of 

State/Commonwealth/Territory). 

Title 14, 

USC Coast Guard Reserve and Auxiliary 

Figure A-1. United States Code – Reserve Component Accessibility 

each unit or individual and starts with the day that particular unit or individual is called 

up (therefore rotations are feasible as long as the cap is not exceeded and no personnel 

 A-3 
Appendix A 

are retained involuntarily on active duty in excess of 365 days). PRC automatically 

brings the operation within the Title 10, USC definition of a “contingency operation.” 

Presidential declaration of a national emergency is not a prerequisite to authorizing PRC. 

Recalled reservists do not count against active duty end strengths. 

 c. Partial Mobilization Authority. Following a Presidential declaration of national 

emergency, the President may order to active duty (other than for training) up to 

1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve, without their consent, for a period not to 

exceed 24 consecutive months (Title 10, USC, Section 12302) (24 cumulative months by 

DOD policy). As with PRC, the clock starts for each unit or individual as of the time 

they enter involuntary active duty. 

 d. Full Mobilization Authority. The President, upon a congressional declaration of 

national emergency or war may authorize the Military Department Secretaries, or their 

designees, to order to active duty any member of the RC, without their consent, for the 

duration of the emergency or war plus six months (Title 10, USC, Section 12301[a]). 

Members in inactive or retired status are not recallable under this provision without the 

approval of SecDef. 

 e. Total Mobilization Authority. The President, upon a congressional declaration 

of national emergency or war, and with passage of legislation authorizing force 

expansion, may authorize the Services to add new forces and personnel necessary to 

achieve national security objectives. 

 f. Active Duty Retiree Recall. Under Title 10, USC, Section 688 and regulations 

established by SecDef, the Military Department Secretaries are authorized, at any time, to 

recall (without their consent) retired members of the ACs, members of the Retired 

Reserve who were retired under Title 10, USC, Sections 1293, 3911, 3914, 6323, 8911, 

or 8914, or members of the Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Reserve (this includes reserve 

members who retired from active duty with less than 20 years under Temporary Early 

Retirement Authority). This authorization does not require a declaration of national 

emergency or war. 

 g. Retired Reserve Recall. Reserve members in a retired status (other than those 

who fall under the provisions of Active Duty Retiree Recall described above) may be 

recalled involuntarily to active duty only in time of war or national emergency as 

declared by the Congress. This authority requires that the Military Department 

Secretaries, with the approval of SecDef, first determine that there are not enough 

qualified reservists, available in the required categories, to fill the required billets (Title 

10, USC, Section 12301[a]). 

 h. Recall of the Standby Reserve. Units and members in the Standby Reserve may 

be ordered to active duty (other than for training) only as provided in Title 10, USC, 

Sections 12301(a) and 12306. In addition, this authority requires that the Military 

Department Secretaries first determine that there are not enough qualified members in the 

Ready Reserve in the required categories who are readily available. 

A-4 JP 4-05 
Legal Authorities 

 i. Call to Active Duty of Delayed Entry Program Personnel. Qualified personnel 

with no prior military service may be enlisted as untrained members of the IRR for up to 

365 days before reporting for active duty under Title 10, USC, Section 513. All such 

persons may be ordered to active duty under all provisions of the law and regulations 

applying to the IRR. 

 j. Stop-Loss Authority. This authority stops normal attrition of experienced 

military personnel through expiration of enlistments, retirements, and other routine 

releases from active duty. With this authority, during any period RC members have been 

involuntarily ordered to active duty, the President may suspend any provision of law 

relating to retirement, promotion, separation of military personnel determined to be 

essential to the national security (Title 10, USC, Section 12305). 

 k. Conscription. If Congress deems it necessary under the Selective Service Act 

(Title 50, USC, Sections 451-473), the SSS can begin involuntarily drafting eligible, 

nonexempt men for military service. Repeal of Title 50, USC, Section 467(c) is 

necessary before the SSS may initiate an involuntary draft of NPS personnel. 

 l. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). 

USERRA (Title 38, USC, Sections 4301-4335) is a federal law intended to ensure that 

persons who serve or have served in the Armed Forces (AC or RC) or other “uniformed 

services” are: 

 (1) not disadvantaged in their civilian careers because of their service; 

 (2) promptly reemployed in their civilian jobs upon their return from duty; and 

 (3) not discriminated against in employment based on past, present, or future 

military service. 

 m. The Service member’s Civil Relief Act provides a number of statutory 

protections for activated military members, especially for members of the National Guard 

and reserve forces. Examples include a 6% rate cap on obligations, a 90 day stay of 

proceedings, and the right to terminate auto and residential leases under certain 

circumstances. Members should contact their servicing staff judge advocate for further 

information. 

3. The Defense Production Act of 1950 

 Authority for expanding capability or capacity in the materiel and equipment, 

transportation and industrial base resource areas is provided by the Defense Production 

Act. This act (Title 50, USC, Sections 2061-2171), which has been periodically revised 

and renewed by Congress, provides the basis for the DPAS. It authorizes the President, 

in peace, conflict, and war, to divert national resources deemed critical to the national 

defense from civil to military use, and reorder economic priorities to provide for the 

 A-5 
Appendix A 

national defense and national security. Specifically, the President may require private 

sector providers of materials and services, identified as essential and critical to national 

defense, to give priority performance to defense contracts and orders. The President may 

also authorize government agencies, like DOD, DOT, and Department of Commerce, to 

guarantee loans needed by defense contractors to expedite production, deliveries, or 

service. 

4. Facilities 

 There are three fundamental emergency authorities available to facilitate 

construction projects required to expand facilities during mobilization. 

 a. Emergency Construction Authority. The Secretary of a Military Department is 

authorized by Title 10, USC, Section 2803 to execute emergency military construction 

projects if the Secretary determines: the project is vital to the national security or to the 

protection of health, safety, or the quality of the environment; and the requirement for the 

project is so urgent that to defer it for the next military construction authorization act 

would be inconsistent with national security or to the protection of health, safety, or the 

quality of the environment. Per Title 10, USC, Section 2803 the maximum amount a 

Secretary may obligate in any fiscal year is $50 million, taken from the unobligated 

balances of funds appropriated for military construction. 

 b. Contingency Construction. SecDef is authorized by Title 10, USC, Section 

2804 to execute contingency military construction projects, before a declaration of 

national emergency, upon determination that the deferral of the projects would be 

inconsistent with national security or national interest. Specific funding limits can 

change each year. Members should consult with staff judge advocate to determine 

current contingency construction limits and requirements. 

 c. Construction Authority in the Event of a Declaration of War or National 

Emergency. In the event of a declaration of war or the declaration by the President of a 

national emergency requiring use of the Armed Forces, SecDef may undertake 

construction projects needed to support the Armed Forces without specific legislative 

authorization. Such projects, however, must be able to be completed within the total 

amount of unobligated military construction funds, including funds appropriated for 

family housing per Title 10, USC, Section 2808. 

 d. Recapture and Condemnation of Real Property. There are more than 60 

permanent laws in the USC authorizing the President, SecDef, or specified Secretary of a 

Military Department to recapture specific parcels of former federal property for defense 

purposes. In general, the availability of these authorities is contingent on a declaration of 

national emergency by the President or Congress or the existence of a state of war. As a 

practical matter, many of these sites have been rendered virtually unusable for defense 

purposes, because of commercial development undertaken over the years since some of 

these laws were enacted (some as early as 1925). The US Army Corps of Engineers, 

however, maintains a list of properties still usable for national defense purposes. In 

A-6 JP 4-05 
Legal Authorities 

addition, Title 10, USC, Section 2663 authorizes Secretaries of the Military Departments 

to bring condemnation proceedings, in courts with appropriate jurisdiction, to acquire 

land or facilities deemed necessary for a variety of defense purposes including 

construction of training sites, and production of explosives or other munitions of war. 

5. Training Base Expansion 

 There are no legal authorities specifically directed to expansion of the military 

training base in connection with mobilization. Training base expansion activities, 

however, may require activation of RC training units and individual manpower, 

expansion of facilities, equipment, and transportation resources, under emergency 

authorities pertaining to these resource areas. Training base expansion plans must also 

take into account the provision of Title 10, USC, Section 671, which requires a minimum 

of 12 weeks of basic training (or its equivalent), with some exceptions, before assigning 

any member of the Armed Forces to duties OCONUS. The intent of this law is to ensure 

that no Service member is assigned overseas without essential battlefield survival skills. 

6. Health Service Support 

 a. Activation of RC HSS units and individuals is governed by the same authorities 

for mobilizing other manpower skills as discussed in paragraph 2 above. 

 b. The President is authorized by Title 42, USC, Section 217 to declare the 

commissioned corps of the USPHS a military service in time of war or national 

emergency. 

 c. Under the provisions of the DVA and Department of Defense Health Resources 

Sharing and Emergency Operations Act (Title 38, USC, Section 8110[a]), the DVA will 

make beds available to DOD for the care of military casualties. 

 d. The NDMS, established and administered by the Department of Health and 

Human Services under the authority of Executive Order 12656, “Assignment of 

Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities,” provides backup support to DOD and DVA 

HSS in caring for military casualties. Although not legally obligated, nonfederal public 

and private hospitals have agreed to provide about 100,000 beds to augment DOD and 

DVA resources, if needed in an emergency. This commitment is triggered when SecDef 

determines military casualties threaten to overburden the DOD and DVA systems. 

7. Communications 

 Section 706 of the Communications Act of 1934 (Title 47, USC, Section 606) 

authorizes the President, during times of emergency or war, to exercise extraordinary 

management or control over national telecommunications resources to meet requirements 

for telecommunications services beyond those normally provided by individual 

commercial suppliers or government agencies. 

 A-7 
Appendix A 

A-8 JP 4-05 

8. Host-Nation Support 

 Authorities for obtaining HNS manpower and services are provided for in various 

treaties and other international agreements to which the US is a signatory, including 

numerous logistic agreements. 

Refer to JP 4-08, Logistic Support of Multinational Operations, for further HNS 

information. 

9. Environment 

 Major environmental protection statutes affecting mobilization are discussed in 

Chapter IV, “Resource Areas.” While the President has the authority, when in the 

national interest, to authorize an exemption from certain environmental laws, seeking 

such an exemption would require highest-level action within DOD. Executive Order 

12088 and DOD policy require full compliance with applicable environmental laws and 

regulations, unless an authorized exemption or exception is obtained. 

10. Funding 

 The following emergency authorities are available to DOD to provide essential 

funding for mobilization and other emergency defense expenditures. 

 a. Budget Supplemental. SecDef may submit additional appropriations requests to 

Congress to meet urgent requirements. 

 b. Budget Amendment. SecDef may submit budget revisions to Congress before 

the congressional appropriations process has been completed. 

 c. Reprogramming. SecDef may reprogram funds within appropriations thresholds 

established by Congress to meet the requirements of any emergency. Reprogramming 

actions above established thresholds must be submitted to Congress for approval. 

 d. Transfer Authority. Authority and thresholds for transferring funds between 

appropriations are established in the current appropriations act. Transfers that exceed 

thresholds require congressional approval. 

 e. Deficiency Authority (Food and Forage Act). Title 41, USC, Section 11 

permits DOD to obligate funds in excess of amounts authorized and appropriated to cover 

necessities of the current year, under circumstances in which appropriations for clothing, 

subsistence, fuel, quarters, transportation, or medical and hospital supplies are exhausted. 

This authority ensures the availability of sufficient funds to care for the unexpected 

increases in DOD personnel strength as a result of a crisis and mobilization. 
APPENDIX B

AUTOMATED TOOLS 

1. General 

 The JPEC: 

a. Prepares systems to monitor forces and phases of the crisis or mobilization. 

b. Plans for information management systems to consolidate automated data 

processing (ADP) support for all functional areas of a mobilization, thereby reducing the 

total number of varying systems carrying similar data. 

c. Reduces administrative functions to meet mobilization surge requirements. 

d. Reviews ADP procedures that stimulate development of effective 

communications system capabilities for enhanced crisis response. 

e. Designs and tests mobilization-related ADP systems to ensure their ability to 

operate effectively. 

2. Planning 

 The Services mobilize, train, equip, and prepare forces, including the RC, for 

movements in CONUS to meet scheduled deployment and employment dates. 

Movement of mobilized RC units from home station to mobilization station may be a 

support installation responsibility. The Military Surface Deployment and Distribution 

Command, a USTRANSCOM component command, is responsible for planning intraCONUS movements to support mobilization and deployment using OPLAN TPFDD files 

and intra-CONUS movement data. The Services and DOD agencies will provide 

significant RC mobilization-related movement requirements to USTRANSCOM. The 

supported CCDR prioritizes and validates requirements to USTRANSCOM. 

USTRANSCOM then coordinates with the support installation and supported CCDR to 

resolve movement constraints and advises CJCS of transportation capabilities in CONUS. 

During deployment, USTRANSCOM monitors the movement of forces and materiel by 

common-user lift from home station to the destination. In this circumstance, 

USTRANSCOM will immediately be able to identify a conflict so resolution can be 

obtained from CJCS and the appropriate CCDR. 

3. Reporting Systems Supporting Mobilization 

a. JOPES Deployment Database. JOPES is the primary system for use in planning 

joint military operations. It consolidates policies and procedures for developing, 

coordinating, disseminating, reviewing, and approving joint OPLANs and bridges the gap 

between contingency planning and the CAP process. In most cases, data derived from 

JOPES are also used during execution. The CAP procedures contained in JOPES 

delineate the procedures for developing response actions under time-constrained 

conditions. 

 B-1 
Appendix B 

b. Joint Medical Analysis Tool (JMAT). The Joint Staff, J-4 is tasked to 

coordinate the HSS mission for the GCCs and the CONUS sustaining base. The tool 

approved for HSS planning is the JMAT. JMAT is an automated application program 

that takes Service-specific casualty figures, using a contingency planning theater patient 

movement policy, merges those figures to provide joint requirements, and projects the 

impact of an operation on the force health protection HSS system. JMAT produces 

credible medical requirements estimates for such things as beds, patients to be moved 

(evacuated), Class VIII (both medical resupply and blood), losses to be replaced, and 

numbers of hospital admissions to NATO Role 3 facilities. In addition, JMAT provides 

medical requirements estimates for population-at-risk reports, planning factors used and 

bed capabilities as compared to bed requirements report. The JMAT will also “pull and 

load” a population-at-risk report from the TPFDD and merge Service scenarios to create 

a joint scenario. 

c. Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning Process (JIMPP). JIMPP is the generic 

term for the planning and analytic process to be used by the Services, DOD agencies, and 

Joint Staff to: 

(1) Prepare industrial mobilization plans linked to contingency and crisis action 

planning procedures, development, and execution. 

(2) Provide the analytical framework to perform the industrial analyses required 

by the Joint Strategic Planning System and OSD. 

(3) Establish baseline national industrial base capability assessments tied to 

potential military demand. 

(4) JIMPP is used during contingency planning to conduct capability and risk 

assessments, emergency procurement budget mechanisms, time-phased requirements 

lists, and narrative COAs. Output may be forwarded to OSD and other federal agencies 

for use in broader industrial mobilization planning. As an analytical tool, JIMPP allows 

planners to address “what if” questions from both the supply and demand sides. 

Expected outputs of the process include supply-side option summaries for level of 

mobilization, estimates of a mobilizable force, and assessments of plan feasibility. 

JIMPP consists of three components: a requirements module, which produces weapons 

and munitions requirements, associated shortfalls, replacement of losses, and 

consumption rates; a vendor-level module for specific options and capabilities (compares 

each item requirement with its production rate and produces surge and mobilization 

requirements and shortfalls); and an industry-level module for a macroeconomic sectorlevel analysis of mobilization requirements and capabilities for 240 industrial sectors. 

d. Logistic Sustainment Analysis and Feasibility Estimator (LOGSAFE). 

LOGSAFE provides planners the capability to estimate the logistical requirements of an 

OPLAN and to determine logistic supportability for various COAs. LOGSAFE performs 

a series of three activities: generate general and sustainment requirements plus supply 

B-2 JP 4-05 
Automated Tools 

buildup, compare sustainment requirements with available stockages for logistical 

sustainability assessment, and provide decision aid outputs and interface of suitable data 

for various transportation models. 

e. Joint Engineering Planning and Execution System (JEPES). JEPES provides 

a common automated system for the civil engineer planners at the combatant commands 

and their components to determine the feasibility of the civil engineering force, 

construction material, and facilities to support OPLANs. Further, it is used to: 

(1) Generate time-phased facility requirements based on an OPLAN. 

(2) Analyze and assess engineering support by comparing facility requirements 

to in-theater facility assets and host nation, contract, and troop engineering capability. 

(3) Provide facility feasibility assessment, manpower, materiel, and nonunit 

cargo requirements for other processes. 

f. Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST). JFAST 

provides rapid analysis of the transportation feasibility of OPLANs and COAs before 

validation by the supported combatant command and transportation acceptance by 

USTRANSCOM. 

g. Department of Defense Emergency Authorities Retrieval and Analysis 

System (DEARAS). DEARAS is a specialized computer-assisted legal research system 

for items such as statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions defining DOD legal 

authority to act in an emergency. 

h. Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems Automated 

Message Preparation System (JAMPS). JAMPS provides automated aids to reduce 

operator training times for creation of tactical messages, reduce errors in message 

creation, and speed message generation and transmission. Message preparation and 

formats are standardized to expedite message traffic across the Services. 

i. Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS). GSORTS is an 

information management system designed to support the decision-making process of the 

President, SecDef, and CJCS. GSORTS supports the registration of units, reporting of 

basic unit identity elements, monitoring of unit status, and distribution of unit information 

throughout the JPEC. Distributed information includes unit location, strength, readiness 

factor, and category levels for equipment and personnel. Individual units update the 

GSORTS database by a Defense Information Systems Network communications link. 

The system constitutes the single automated tool for maintaining and updating unit status. 

j. Global Decision Support System (GDSS). GDSS is the worldwide command 

and control system for the execution of strategic airlift and air refueling during 

peacetime, contingencies, and war. GDSS is used to monitor and manage all operational 

 B-3 
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 4-05 

DOD air mobility missions throughout the world including all organic, commercial, and 

air refueling missions. 

See JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, Appendix A, Enabler Tools, for 

more information on enabler tools. 

k. Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). DRRS is a mission-focused, 

capabilities based internet application that provides the CCDRs, Services, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, and other key DOD users a collaborative environment in which to evaluate the 

readiness and capability of the Armed Forces to carry out assigned tasks. This enables 

users to find units which are both ready and available for deployment in support of a 

given mission. 

l. Enhanced Status of Resources and Training System (ESORTS). ESORTS 

feeds DRRS and provides a more complete readiness assessment system by directly 

measuring outputs – the ability to conduct a task or mission to the prescribed standard – 

along with inputs. The system is designed to come much closer to the goal of 

understanding “ready for what?” ESORTS provides a vehicle for each organization from 

individual units to combined forces to report on its ability to achieve the performance 

standard of its mission –essential tasks under the conditions of the assignments. 
APPENDIX C

MOBILIZATION INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PLAN 

1. General 

a. When circumstances dictate the formation of an MWG, a MIMP will be 

developed. The MIMP is designed to provide guidance on information systems used in 

mobilization planning and execution. It identifies the flow of information related to 

mobilization during a crisis action. 

b. Misconceptions regarding the mobilization process and the resultant procedures 

are as prevalent as are the abundant sources of information. This plan identifies the 

various sources and uses of existing mobilization data to enhance awareness and 

understanding of this data. 

c. The MIMP is published separately by the logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4). 

2. Information Holders 

 Each Service has visibility over its personnel as the entry-point for mobilization 

processing. Additionally, numerous DOD components track mobilization activities data, 

such as the following: 

a. Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-1). As the proponent 

for manpower and personnel policies and procedures, the JS J-1 receives personnel status 

reports from the Services. This report provides daily visibility of the number and 

category of RC personnel called up under Title 10, USC authority. 

b. J-4. As the proponent for mobilization activities of the Joint Staff, manages 

mobilization ceilings associated with partial mobilization and PRCs, and requisite 

reporting to Congress. 

c. Assistants to CJCS for National Guard Matters and Reserve Matters. 

Established as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1998, these 

two assistants advise the CJCS on National Guard and reserve matters, respectively. 

d. Joint Staff (J-39). Joint Staff Deputy Directorate for Global Operations, 

Readiness Division (J-39). The Joint Staff office of primary responsibility for all 

readinees reporting applications and systems. 

e. CJCS Legal Counsel. Maintains visibility over proper application of statutory 

requirements as they pertain to mobilization. 

f. CJCS Legislative Assistant. Maintains visibility over mobilization activities to 

support congressional inquiries. 

g. CJCS Public Affairs. Maintains visibility over mobilization activities to support 

media inquiries. 

 C-1 
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 4-05 

h. OSD (Reserve Affairs). Maintains visibility over RC members called to active 

duty under Title 10, USC authority. 

i. DFAS. Maintains visibility of all Service members for pay purposes. 

j. Defense Manpower Data Center. Maintains visibility of all Service members 

for congressional and other special interest reporting purposes. 

3. Information Flow 

a. The flow of mobilization information depends on the operational environment – 

crisis or noncrisis. 

b. When in a crisis environment such as a wartime or other scenario, information 

related to mobilization activities typically flows through the current operations 

team/current action team. 

c. During a noncrisis scenario, information related to mobilization activities 

typically flows through legislative affairs or public affairs channels and then to the 

Service Manpower and Reserve Affairs departments for resolution. Public affairs issues 

will be presented at the DOD level. 

4. Information Tools 

 A wide array of recurring products are created by the information holders, containing 

data specific to mobilization. The MIMP identifies the specific mobilization reports 

generated by the various information holders to expand awareness of these products in 

managing mobilization activities. Information holders are encouraged to inform the Joint 

Staff J-4 of any changes regarding recurring products related to mobilization activities to 

allow the MIMP to remain current. 
ANNEX A TO APPENDIX C 

PLANNING ACTIVITIES 

Mobilization 

Planning 

Community 

Develop Concept Develop Plan Develop 

Supporting Plan Analyses 

Common 

Activities 

(For all) 

 Provide preplanning input 

 Provide CCDR 

strategic concept 

feedback 

 Plan participation 

 Determine levels of 

mobilization 

necessary to support 

projected RC force 

requirements 

 Answer questions 

on the justification of 

RC call-ups 

 Validate or refute 

defense planning 

guidance and/or 

JSCP planning 

assumptions 

Joint Staff  Confirm tasking for 

RC requirements 

summary 

 Review completed 

OPLAN and most 

probable FDO 

Service  Source specific RC 

units 

 Requirements for 

complete operation 

plan and most 

probable FDO: 

 RC in AOR 

 RC unit personnel 

in TPFDD 

 RC non-unit 

personnel in TPFDD 

 Move the force, 

assist mobilization, 

deployment, and/or 

sustainment 

 Backfill

Supported 

Command 

 Draft, coordinate, 

and issue the TPFDD 

LOI 

 Comply with 

requirements for 

operation plan 

 FDO determination 

Subordinate 

and/or 

Supporting 

Commands 

USTRANSCOM 

Components JTF 

 Requirements for 

complete operation 

plan and most 

probable FDO: 

 Move the force 

 Assist mobilization, 

deployment, and/or 

sustainment 

 Backfill 

AOR – area of responsibility 

CCDR – combatant commander 

FDO – flexible deterrent option 

JSCP – Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

JTF – joint task force 

LOI – letter of instruction 

OPLAN – operation plan 

RC – Reserve Component 

TPFDD – time-phased force and deployment area 

USTRANSCOM – United States Transportation Command 

Figure C-A-1. Planning Activities 

 C-A-1 
Annex A to Appendix C 

C-A-2 JP 4-05 

Intentionally Blank 
ANNEX B TO APPENDIX C 

RESERVE COMPONENT CALL-UP DECISION-MAKING ACTIVITIES

Mobilization 

Planning 

Community 

Pre-Mobilization 

Review and 

Coordination 

Educate 

Senior 

Leadership 

on RC 

Potential 

Interpret 

Policies for Use 

of Reserve 

Components 

Confirm Preplanned 

Mobilization 

Capabilities 

Recommend 

Changes in 

Peacetime 

Budgeting 

Priorities 

Modify 

Demobilization 

Policy to Suit 

Contingency 

Prepare 

Decision 

Packages 

Common 

Activities 

(For all) 

 Identify POC 

network 

 Convene 

preliminary 

meetings focused 

on “what if” 

questions using 

current 

information 

 Analyze 

lessons learned 

from similar 

crises 

 Consider 

potential 

supporting 

requirements 

 Manage media 

relations and 

coordinate with 

public affairs 

officer

 Conduct 

meetings 

and/or 

briefings on 

RC 

mobilization 

policies: 

availability, 

mobilization 

and 

deployment 

criteria, and 

the different 

categories of 

RC and their 

potential use

 Review and 

modify call-up 

instructions and 

procedures 

 Recommend 

modifications and 

exceptions to 

policy 

 Coordinate with 

legal counsel 

 Review JAG 

policies and/or 

procedures for 

“conscientious 

objectors” and 

Soldiers and 

Sailors Act

 Estimate 

ability of 

mobilization 

activities to 

meet plan 

schedule 

 Identify 

capability 

shortfalls

 Review 

unfunded 

mobilization 

requirements 

 Coordinate 

with resource 

area proponents 

for adjustments 

to internal 

funding 

priorities

 Initiate planning 

for the return of RC 

to civilian status

 Respond to 

information 

requests as 

appropriate 

Joint Staff  Become familiar 

with RC call-up 

procedures 

 Be prepared to 

recommend level 

of call-up

 Review legal 

authorities in 

Title 10, USC 

 Review 

mobilization 

plans, 

policies, and 

procedures 

 Brief 

leadership on 

call-up 

authorities 

and specific 

qualities of 

RCs

 Identify 

opportunities for 

joint use of 

Service 

mobilization 

assets 

 Monitor the 

development of 

RC deployment 

criteria 

 Confirm 

monitoring and 

reporting 

systems: 

coordinate 

reporting 

requirements

 Seek 

opportunities for 

cross-Service 

utilization of RC 

assets

 Seek 

opportunities for 

cross-Service 

utilization of RC 

demobilization 

facilities and assets

 Prepare Draft 

Decision 

 Package Staff 

Draft Decision 

 Package with 

Services 

Forward 

Package to 

Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff 

Service  Review 

monitoring and 

reporting 

requirements 

 Consider 

sources of 

immediate 

manpower 

augmentation 

 Start planning 

for demobilization 

 Review 

Service 

mobilization 

doctrine for 

unit and 

individual callup 

 Review 

civilian 

mobilization 

plans 

 Develop 

deployment 

criteria consistent 

with the needs of 

the CCDR 

 Review Service 

Readiness 

Processing 

policies 

 Validate 

policies for use of 

civilians, 

contractors, and 

other non-DOD 

agencies 

 Validate 

projected RC 

requirements of 

OPLAN within 

DOD guidance 

 Coordinate 

with program 

assessment and 

budget office to 

raise visibility of 

unfunded 

mobilization 

requirements 

 Recommend 

changes to 

eliminate 

shortages 

 Determine 

redeployment 

criteria for RC unit 

equipment and 

personnel 

 Coordinate with 

National 

Committee for 

Employer Support 

of the Guard and 

Reserve 

 Coordinate 

on Draft 

Decision 

Package 

Supported 

Command 

 Ensure RC 

OPLAN support 

requirements are 

projected 

 Ensure 

theater-unique 

requirements 

are known to 

force 

providers 

 Review 

mobilization 

doctrine and 

policy 

 Brief command 

on RC 

capabilities and 

limitations to 

support plan 

 Validate 

projected RC 

requirements of 

OPLAN 

 Support efforts 

to adjust 

funding 

priorities 

 Develop 

redeployment 

priorities and 

schedule 

 Coordinate 

on Draft 

Decision 

Package 

Subordinate 

and/or 

Supporting 

Commands 

USTRANSCOM 

Components 

Joint Task 

Force 

 Review RC 

requirements 

projected by 

CCDR 

 Review RC 

requirements 

to move force, 

backfill 

displaced 

units, and 

assist in the 

mobilization 

and 

deployment 

process 

 Brief 

leadership on 

RC 

mobilization 

doctrine 

 Review 

mobilization 

doctrine and 

policy 

 Brief command 

on RC 

capabilities and 

limitations to 

support plan 

 Validate 

projected RC 

requirements 

 Support efforts 

to adjust 

funding 

priorities 

 Review 

demobilization 

doctrine 

 Support 

redeployment 

and/or 

demobilization 

operations 

 Coordinate 

on Draft 

Decision 

Package 

 Begin to 

evaluate need 

for subsequent 

RC 

augmentation 

CCDR – combatant commander 

DOD – Department of Defense 

JAG – Judge Advocate General 

OPLAN – operation plan

POC – point of contact 

RC – Reserve Component 

USC – United States Code 

USTRANSCOM – United States Transportation Command

Figure C-B-1. Reserve Component Call-Up Decision-making Activities 

 C-B-1 
Annex B to Appendix C 

C-B-2 JP 4-05 

Intentionally Blank 
ANNEX C TO APPENDIX C 

MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES

Mobilization Planning 

Community Execution 

Common Activities 

(For all) 

 Coordinate with public affairs officer 

 Monitor unit and individual mobilization schedules 

 Review missions needed to be supported to ensure all 

requirements have been met 

Joint Staff  Monitor force requirements 

 Coordinate and refine execution policies and guidance 

Service  Coordinate and refine execution policies and guidance 

 Monitor and adjust call-up procedures for individuals 

 Manage call-up against ceilings 

 Ensure that TPFDD is updated as combatant commander 

requirements change 

 Notify Congressional Delegations for call-up prior to public affairs 

announcement 

Supported Command  Ensure theater-unique requirements that impact upon the RC are 

known to force providers 

 Ensure that TPFDD is updated as requirements change 

Subordinate and/or Supporting 

Commands USTRANSCOM 

Components Joint Task Force 

 Ensure that TPFDD is updated as requirements change 

 Ensure unique requirements that impact upon the RC are known 

to force protection 

USTRANSCOM – United States Transportation Command 

RC – Reserve Component 

TPFDD – time-phased force and deployment data 

Figure C-C-1. Mobilization Activities 

 C-C-1 
Annex C to Appendix C 

C-C-2 JP 4-05 

Intentionally Blank 
ANNEX D TO APPENDIX C 

MONITORING AND REPORTING ACTIVITIES

 C-D-1 

Mobilization Planning 

Community Monitoring Reporting 

Common Activities 

(For all) 

 Monitor the status of mobilization 

 Monitor unit and individual 

demobilization schedules

 Gather information to respond to 

various requests 

 Report RC forces no longer needed

Joint Staff  Monitor force requirements 

 Determine any special information 

requirements and assign reporting 

requirements

 Direct Services provide input for 

Report to Congress (partial 

mobilization) 

 Prepare Report to Congress 

 Provide mobilization information as 

required 

 Review military manpower 

mobilization and accession status 

report

Service  Monitor force requirements 

 Monitor sourcing 

 Enter data into RC Apportionment 

tables 

 Submit MOBREP to Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

 Report on problems in providing 

forces 

 Submit input data to Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff for Presidential 

Report to Congress

Supported Commands  Enter data into RC Apportionment 

tables

Subordinate and/or 

Supporting 

Commands 

USTRANSCOM 

Components 

Joint Task Force 

MOBREP – mobilization report 

RC – Reserve Component 

USTRANSCOM – United States Transportation Command 

Figure C-D-1. Monitoring and Reporting Activities 
Annex D to Appendix C 

C-D-2 JP 4-05 

Intentionally Blank 
ANNEX E TO APPENDIX C 

DEMOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES

 C-E-1 

Mobilization 

Planning 

Community 

Preliminary 

Actions Planning Execution 

Common 

Activities 

(For all) 

 Establish 

demobilization 

concepts and 

policies 

 Provide 

guidance 

 Educate the leadership 

 Review and modify 

demobilization concepts and 

support plans 

Joint Staff  Provide input 

to the JSCP 

 Monitor RC mobilizations 

and demobilizations 

 Validate support and 

rotational requirements 

 Resolve any conflicts in 

resource alignment 

 Propose that the SecDef 

rescind legal authorities 

Service  Determine 

redeployment 

and 

demobilization 

strategy 

 Develop 

demobilization 

schedule 

 Determine 

required 

outprocessing 

 Determine, 

source, and 

approve forces to 

support 

demobilizations 

 Monitor RC mobilizations 

and demobilizations 

 Monitor changing 

requirements and theater 

backfill requirements 

 Execute demobilization 

schedule 

Estimate and source 

support and rotational 

requirements 

 Seek demobilization 

approval 

 Solve or adjudicate 

conflicting resource claims 

Supported 

Command 

 Develop 

tentative 

demobilization 

schedule 

 Determine 

redeployment 

support 

requirements 

 Determine, 

source, and 

approve forces to 

support 

demobilizations 

 Offer candidates for 

demobilization 

 Estimate and source 

support and rotational 

requirements 

 Highlight critical support 

issues in SITREPs 

Subordinate 

and/or 

Supporting 

Commands 

USTRANSCOM 

Components 

Joint Task 

Force 

 Develop 

tentative 

demobilization 

schedule 

 Determine 

redeployment 

support 

requirements 

 Determine, 

source, and 

approve forces to 

support 

demobilizations 

 Offer candidates for 

demobilization 

 Estimate and source 

support and rotational 

requirements 

 Highlight critical support 

issues in SITREPs 

JSCP – Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

SecDef – Secretary of Defense 

RC – Reserve Component 

SITREP – situation report 

USTRANSCOM – United States Transportation Command 

Figure C-E-1. Demobilization Activities 
Annex E to Appendix C 

C-E-2 JP 4-05 

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX D

MOBILIZATION WORKING GROUP 

1. Purpose 

a. When circumstances dictate, the CJCS will establish an ad hoc MWG. The 

MWG is designed to enhance communications between OSD, the Joint Staff, CCDRs, 

and Services when military operations warrant the use of involuntarily recalled RC forces 

and/or the federalization of National Guard units. 

b. The MWG will be chaired by the J-4 and will convene to address mobilization 

issues resulting from military operations. 

c. Members are encouraged to raise issues in the forum of the MWG as appropriate 

to enhance a DOD-wide approach regarding the mobilization of RC forces and/or the 

federalization of National Guard units. 

2. Participants 

a. The MWG will be chaired by the J-4. 

b. The following offices/components are requested to provide at least one 

representative to the MWG: 

(1) J-1, J-4, assistants to CJCS for National Guard and reserve matters, Legal 

Counsel, and Public Affairs. 

(2) OSD (Reserve Affairs). 

(3) CCDR liaison officers as required. 

(4) Services – Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard (when 

considered for Title 10, USC mobilization as a service in the Department of the Navy), as 

required. 

(5) National Guard Bureau representatives. 

(6) USPHS representatives. 

 D-1 
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 4-05 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX E

MOBILIZATION ESTIMATE 

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 

 Originating Organization 

 Place of Issue 

 Date-Time Group, Month, Year 

Mobilization Estimate Number ___________________ 

References: a. Maps and Charts. 

 b. Other Pertinent Documents. 

1. ( ) Mission. State the CCDR’s missions, taken from the mission analysis, planning 

guidance, or other statements. (Look specifically for Reserve Component and federalized 

National Guard unit missions.) 

2. ( ) Situations and Considerations 

 a. ( ) Assumptions 

 b. ( ) Mobilization Situation 

 (1) ( ) Availability of Manpower. 

 (2) ( ) Transportation. 

 (3) ( ) Equipment/Materiel. 

 (4) ( ) Health Service Support. 

 (5) ( ) Facilities. 

 (6) ( ) Industrial Base. 

 (7) ( ) Training Base. 

 (8) ( ) Communications. 

 (9) ( ) Host-Nation Support. 

 (10) ( ) Environment. 

 (11) ( ) Legal Authorities. 

 (12) ( ) Funding. 

 E-1 
Appendix E 

E-2 JP 4-05 

 (13) ( ) Security issues. 

3. ( ) Mobilization Analysis of Courses of Action. Make an orderly examination of the 

manpower, equipment/materiel, transportation, health service support/health force 

protection, industrial, training bases, communications, and legal authority resource areas 

that affect the proposed courses of action to determine the manner and degree of that 

effect. The objective of this analysis is to determine whether the mobilization 

requirements can be met and to isolate the implications that should be considered by the 

CCDR in the commander’s estimate. 

 a. ( ) Analyze each course of action from a mobilization point of view. 

 b. ( ) The mobilization factors in subparagraph 2b are the factors to be analyzed for 

each course of action under consideration. Examine these factors realistically from the 

standpoint of time-phased requirements versus actual or programmed capabilities that 

may affect the mobilization course of action. 

 c. ( ) Throughout the analysis, keep mobilization considerations foremost in mind. 

The analysis is not intended to produce a decision. It is intended to ensure that all 

applicable mobilization factors have been properly considered and to serve as the basis 

for comparisons in paragraph 4. 

4. ( ) Comparison of Courses of Action 

 a. ( ) List the impact that manpower mobilization for each level, including 

Presidential Reserve Call-up has on the other resource areas from a logistic directorate’s 

point of view. 

 b. ( ) Develop a work sheet that identifies decisions that must be made in all 

resource areas based on the mobilization decision. 

5. ( ) Conclusions 

 a. ( ) State whether the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a 

mobilization standpoint. 

 b. ( ) State which mobilization course of action can best be supported from a 

transportation, equipment/materiel, and health service support/force health protection 

standpoint. 

 c. ( ) Identify the major resource area deficiencies that must be brought to the 

attention of the CCDR. Provide recommendations from the Services as to the methods to 

eliminate or reduce the impact of those deficiencies. 

 (Signed) _______________________ 
APPENDIX F

REFERENCES 

The development of JP 4-05 is based upon the following primary references: 

1. Legal Authorities 

 a. The Constitution of the United States. 

 b. Title 10, United States Code. 

 c. Title 14, United States Code. 

 d. Title 32, United States Code. 

 e. Title 37, United States Code. 

 f. Title 42, United States Code. 

 g. Title 46, United States Code, Chapter 27. 

h. Title 50, United States Code. 

2. Department of Defense 

a. Guidance for Deployment of the Force. 

b. Guidance for Employment of the Force. 

 

 c. DODD 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force. 

d. DODI 1215.06, Uniform Reserve, Training, and Retirement Categories. 

e. DODD 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve Forces. 

f. DODI 1235.09, Management of the Standby Reserve. 

g. DODD 1235.10, Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready 

Reserve.

h. DODI 1235.11, Management of Individual Mobilization Augmentees. 

i. DODD 1235.13, Management of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and the 

Inactive National Guard. 

j. DODD 1250.1, National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and 

Reserve (NCESGR). 

 F-1 
Appendix F 

k. DODI 3020.37, Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During 

Crises. 

l. DODI 4715.6, Environmental Compliance. 

m. DODI 5158.05, Joint Deployment Process Owner. 

n. DODI 8260.03, Organization and Force Structure Construct for Global Force 

Management. 

o. DOD 4500.54-G, Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide. 

3. Joint Staff 

a. CJCSI 1301.01C, Individual Augmentation Procedures.

 b. CJCSI 3100.01B, Joint Strategic Planning System. 

 c. CJCSI 3110.13, Mobilization Guidance for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. 

d. CJCSM 3122.01C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), 

Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures). 

e. CJCSM 3122.02C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) 

Volume III (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and 

Deployment Execution). 

f. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) 

Volume II – Planning Formats. 

 g. CJCSM 3150.13B, Joint Reporting Structure Personnel Manual. 

h. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

i. JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations. 

j. JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations.

k. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

l. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. 

m. JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 

n. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 

F-2 JP 4-05 
References 

o. JP 4-02, Health Service Support. 

p. JP 4-07, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common-User Logistics 

During Joint Operations. 

q. JP 4-08, Logistic Support of Multinational Operations. 

r. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

4. Service 

a. Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System. 

b. Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan. 

c. Marine Corps Mobilization, Activation, Integration, and Deactivation Plan. 

d. Air Force War and Mobilization Plan. 

e. Commandant, United States Coast Guard Instruction, M3061.1, Coast Guard 

Manpower Mobilization and Support Plan. 

 F-3 
Appendix F 

F-4 JP 4-05 

Intentionally Blank 
APPENDIX G

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

1. User Comments 

 Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: 

Doctrine and Education Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. 

These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and 

organization), writing, and appearance. 

2. Authorship 

 The lead agent for this publication is the Director for Logistics J-4. The Joint Staff 

doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics J-4. 

3. Supersession 

 This publication supersedes JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning, 11 January 2006; 

and JP 4-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Manpower Mobilization 

and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Call-up, 11 November 1998, 

is cancelled. 

4. Change Recommendations 

 a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

electronically to the Lead Agent, with information copies sent to the Joint Staff J-7 Joint 

Doctrine and Education Division and to the US Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting 

Center, Doctrine and Education Group. Routine changes should be submitted 

electronically to US Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine and 

Education Group, and info the Lead Agent the Joint Staff J-7 Joint Doctrine and 

Education Division. 

 b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this 

publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an 

enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to 

notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication 

are initiated. 

 c. Record of Changes: 

 CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

 NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

 __________________________________________________________________ 

 __________________________________________________________________ 

 __________________________________________________________________ 

 G-1 
Appendix G 

G-2 JP 4-05 

5. Distribution of Publications 

 Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is 

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint 

publications must be in accordance with DOD 5200.1 R, Information Security Program. 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

 a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET) and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

 b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside 

the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint 

publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the 

local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3,200 

MacDill Blvd., Bolling AFB, Washington, DC 20340-5100. 

 c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and 

deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications. 
GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1 

AC Active Component 

ACSA acquisition and cross-servicing agreement

ADP automated data processing

AE aeromedical evacuation

AOR area of responsibility

CAP crisis action planning 

CCDR combatant commander 

CEW Civilian Expeditionary Workforce 

CIL critical item list

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

COA course of action

CONUS continental United States

CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet

CS combat service 

CSS combat service support 

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency

DEARAS Department of Defense (DOD) Emergency Authorities 

Retrieval and Analysis System

DFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DODD Department of Defense directive

DODI Department of Defense instruction

DOT Department of Transportation 

DPAS Defense Priorities and Allocation System

DPO distribution process owner 

DRRS Defense Readiness Reporting System

DVA Department of Veterans Affairs

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

ESORTS Enhanced Status of Resources and Training System 

FDO flexible deterrent option

GCC geographic combatant commander

GDF Guidance for Development of the Force 

GDSS Global Decision Support System 

GEF Guidance for Employment of the Force 

GEOINT geospatial intelligence

GFM Global Force Management
Glossary

GL-2 JP 4-05 

GFMB Global Force Management Board

GFMIG Global Force Management Implementation Guidance 

GIG Global Information Grid

GI&S geospatial information and services

GSORTS Global Status of Resources and Training System 

HNS host-nation support 

HSS health service support 

IA individual augmentee 

IRR Individual Ready Reserve 

J-1 manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff 

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff

J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff

JAMPS Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control 

Systems (JINTACCS) automated message preparation 

system

JDPO joint deployment process owner

JEPES joint engineer planning and execution system

JFAST Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation 

JFC joint force commander

JIMPP joint industrial mobilization planning process 

JMAT joint medical analysis tool

JMPAB Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

JP joint publication

JPEC joint planning and execution community 

JS the Joint Staff

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

LOGSAFE logistic sustainment analysis and feasibility estimator

LOI letter of instruction 

MARAD Maritime Administration

MIMP Mobilization Information Management Plan

MMG DOD Master Mobilization Guide

MOBREP mobilization report 

MWG mobilization working group 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCESGR National Committee of Employer Support for the Guard 

and Reserve

NCS National Communications System

NDMS National Disaster Medical System

NDS national defense strategy
Glossary

GL-3 

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NMS National Military Strategy

NPS nonprior service 

NSS National Security Strategy

OASD(RA) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

 (Reserve Affairs)

OCONUS outside the continental United States

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operation order 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PPBE Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 

PRC Presidential Reserve Call-up 

RC Reserve Component 

RRF Ready Reserve Force

SecDef Secretary of Defense

SECHS Secretary of Homeland Security

SITREP situation report 

SOF special operations forces

SSS Selective Service System

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data 

UN United Nations 

USC United States Code 

USCG United States Coast Guard

USERRA Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 

Rights Act

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command

USPHS United States Public Health Service

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

VISA Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement 

WPR War Powers Resolution 
PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-4 JP 4-05 

activation. Order to active duty (other than for training) in the federal service. See also 

active duty; federal service. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05) 

active duty. Full-time duty in the active military service of the United States. This 

includes members of the Reserve Component serving on active duty or full-time 

training duty, but does not include full-time National Guard duty. Also called AD. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source JP.) 

Armed Forces of the United States. A term used to denote collectively all components 

of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when mobilized 

under Title 10, United States Code to augment the Navy). (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 1 as the source JP.) 

availability date. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02) 

consumption rate. The average quantity of an item consumed or expended during a 

given time interval, expressed in quantities by the most appropriate unit of 

measurement per applicable stated basis. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05) 

contingency operation. A military operation that is either designated by the Secretary of 

Defense as a contingency operation or becomes a contingency operation as a matter 

of law (Title 10, United States Code, Section 101[a][13]). It is a military operation 

that: a. is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members 

of the Armed Forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or 

hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing force; or b. is 

created by definition of law. Under Title 10, United States Code, Section 101 

(a)(13)(B), a contingency operation exists if a military operation results in the (1) 

call-up to (or retention on) active duty of members of the uniformed Services under 

certain enumerated statutes (Title 10, United States Code, Sections 688, 12301[a], 

12302, 12304, 12305, 12406, or 331-335); and (2) the call-up to (or retention on) 

active duty of members of the uniformed Services under other (non-enumerated) 

statutes during war or national emergency declared by the President or Congress. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)

delayed entry program. A program under which an individual may enlist in a Reserve 

Component of a military service and specify a future reporting date for entry on 

active duty that would coincide with availability of training spaces and with personal 

plans such as high school graduation. Also called DEP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-

05) 

demobilization. The process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military 

establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration 

while maintaining national security and economic vitality. See also mobilization. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05) 
Glossary

GL-5 

draft. 1. The conscription of qualified citizens in military service. See also active duty. 

(JP 4-05) 2. The depth of water that a vessel requires to float freely; the depth of a 

vessel from the water line to the keel. (JP 4-01.6) (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source JP for Definition 1.) 

dwell time. 1. The time cargo remains in a terminal’s in-transit storage area while 

awaiting shipment by clearance transportation. (JP 4-01.6) 2. The length of time a 

target is expected to remain in one location. (JP 3-60) 3. The period of time 

between the release from involuntary active and the reporting date for a subsequent 

tour of active duty pursuant to Title 10, United States Code, Section 12302. Such 

time includes any voluntary active duty performed between two periods of 

involuntary active duty pursuant to Title 10, United States Code, Section 12302. 

(DODD 1235.10) (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-01.6, JP 3-60, 

and DODD 1235.10 as the source publication for Definition 1, 2, and 3 respectively.) 

federal service. A term applied to National Guard members and units when called to 

active duty to serve the United States Government under Article I, Section 8 and 

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution and the Title 10, United States Code, sections 

12401 to 12408. See also active duty; Reserve Component. (Approved for 

replacement of “Federal service” and its definition in JP 1-02.) 

force shortfall. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

home station. The permanent location of active duty units and Reserve Component units 

(e.g., location of armory or reserve center). (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05) 

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign 

forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on 

agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 4-0) 

Inactive National Guard. Army National Guard personnel in an inactive status not in 

the Selected Reserve who are attached to a specific National Guard unit but do not 

participate in training activities. Upon mobilization, they will mobilize with their 

units. In order for these personnel to remain members of the Inactive National 

Guard, they must muster once a year with their assigned unit. Like the Individual 

Ready Reserve, all members of the Inactive National Guard have legal, contractual 

obligations. Members of the Inactive National Guard may not train for retirement 

credit or pay and are not eligible for promotion. Also called ING. See also 

Individual Ready Reserve; Selected Reserve. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05) 

individual mobilization augmentee. An individual reservist attending drills who 

receives training and is preassigned to an Active Component organization, a 

Selective Service System, or a Federal Emergency Management Agency billet that 

must be filled on, or shortly after, mobilization. Individual mobilization augmentees 

train on a part-time basis with these organizations to prepare for mobilization. 
Glossary

GL-6 JP 4-05 

Inactive duty training for individual mobilization augmentees is decided by 

component policy and can vary from 0 to 48 drills a year. Also called IMA. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source JP.) 

individual mobilization augmentee detachment. None. (Approved for removal from

JP 1-02.)

Individual Ready Reserve. A manpower pool consisting of individuals who have had 

some training or who have served previously in the Active Component or in the 

Selected Reserve, and may have some period of their military service obligation 

remaining. Members may voluntarily participate in training for retirement points 

and promotion with or without pay. Also called IRR. See also Selected Reserve. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05) 

industrial mobilization. The transformation of industry from its peacetime activity to 

the industrial program necessary to support the national military objectives. It 

includes the mobilization of materials, labor, capital, production facilities, and 

contributory items and services essential to the industrial program. See also 

mobilization. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source 

JP.) 

industrial preparedness. The state of preparedness of industry to produce essential 

materiel to support the national military objectives. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source JP.) 

industrial preparedness program. Plans, actions, or measures for the transformation of 

the industrial base, both government-owned and civilian-owned, from its peacetime 

activity to the emergency program necessary to support the national military 

objectives. It includes industrial preparedness measures such as modernization, 

expansion, and preservation of the production facilities and contributory items and 

services for planning with industry. Also called IPP. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source JP.) 

initial active duty for training. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. A system of joint policies, 

procedures, and reporting structures, supported by communications and computer 

systems, that is used by the joint planning and execution community to monitor, 

plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, 

redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. Also 

called JOPES. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

mobilization. 1. The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support 

national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. See also industrial 

mobilization. 2. The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought 

to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating 
Glossary

GL-7 

all or part of the Reserve Component as well as assembling and organizing 

personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the Armed Forces includes but is 

not limited to the following categories: a. selective mobilization — Expansion of the 

active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to 

mobilize Reserve Component units, Individual Ready Reservists, and the resources 

needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is 

not the result of an enemy attack. b. partial mobilization — Expansion of the active 

Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the 

President (not more than 1,000,000 for not more than 24 consecutive months) to 

mobilize Ready Reserve Component units, individual reservists, and the resources 

needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national 

emergency involving an external threat to the national security. c. full mobilization 

— Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the 

President to mobilize all Reserve Component units and individuals in the existing 

approved force structure, as well as all retired military personnel, and the resources 

needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national 

emergency involving an external threat to the national security. Reserve personnel 

can be placed on active duty for the duration of the emergency plus six months. d. 

total mobilization — Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by 

Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel 

beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to 

meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an 

external threat to the national security. Also called MOB. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

mobilization base. The total of all resources available, or that can be made available, to 

meet foreseeable wartime needs. Such resources include the manpower and material 

resources and services required for the support of essential military, civilian, and 

survival activities, as well as the elements affecting their state of readiness, such as 

(but not limited to) the following: manning levels, state of training, modernization of 

equipment, mobilization materiel reserves and facilities, continuity of government, 

civil defense plans and preparedness measures, psychological preparedness of the 

people, international agreements, planning with industry, dispersion, and standby 

legislation and controls. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as 

the source JP.) 

mobilization exercise. An exercise involving, either completely or in part, the 

implementation of mobilization plans. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 

with JP 4-05 as the source JP.) 

mobilization site. The designated location where a Reserve Component unit or 

individual mobilizes or moves after mobilization for further processing, training, and 

employment. This differs from a mobilization station in that it is not necessarily a 

military installation. See also mobilization; mobilization station; Reserve 

Component. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05) 
Glossary

GL-8 JP 4-05 

mobilization staff officer. The action officer assigned the principle responsibility or 

additional duties related to Reserve Component mobilization actions. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source JP.) 

mobilization station. The designated military installation to which a Reserve 

Component unit or individual is moved for further processing, organizing, equipping, 

training, and employment and from which the unit or individual may move to an 

aerial port of embarkation or seaport of embarkation. See also mobilization; 

mobilization site; Reserve Component. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05) 

national emergency. A condition declared by the President or the Congress by virtue of 

powers previously vested in them that authorize certain emergency actions to be 

undertaken in the national interest. Action to be taken may include partial, full, or 

total mobilization of national resources. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-28) 

nonprior service personnel. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Presidential Call-up. Procedures by which the President brings all or a part of the Army 

National Guard or the Air National Guard to active federal service under Title 10, 

United States Code, Section 12406, and Chapter 15. See also active duty; federal 

service; Presidential Reserve Call-up. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

Presidential Reserve Call-up. Provision of a public law (Title 10, United States Code, 

Section 12304) that provides the President a means to activate, without a declaration 

of national emergency, not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve and 

the Individual Ready Reserve (of whom not more than 30,000 may be members of 

the Individual Ready Reserve), for not more than 365 days to meet the requirements 

of any operational mission. Members called under this provision may not be used 

for disaster relief or to suppress insurrection. This authority has particular utility 

when used in circumstances in which the escalatory national or international signals 

of partial or full mobilization would be undesirable. Forces available under this 

authority can provide a tailored, limited-scope, deterrent, or operational response, or 

may be used as a precursor to any subsequent mobilization. Also called PRC. See 

also Individual Ready Reserve; mobilization; Presidential Call-up; Selected Reserve. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

production base. The total national industrial production capacity available for the 

manufacture of items to meet materiel requirements. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as the source JP.) 

Ready Reserve. The Selected Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, and Inactive National 

Guard liable for active duty as prescribed by law (Title 10, United States Code, 

Sections 10142, 12301, and 12302). See also active duty; Inactive National Guard; 

Individual Ready Reserve; Selected Reserve. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-

02.) 
Glossary

GL-9 

remain-behind equipment. Unit equipment left by deploying forces at their bases when 

they deploy. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05) 

Reserve Component. The Armed Forces of the United States Reserve Component 

consists of: a. the Army National Guard of the United States; b. the Army Reserve; c. 

the Navy Reserve; d. the Marine Corps Reserve; e. the Air National Guard of the 

United States; f. the Air Force Reserve; and g. the Coast Guard Reserve. Also called 

RC. (Approved for replacement of “Reserve Components” and its definition in JP 1-

02.) 

Reserve Component category. The category that identifies an individual’s status in the 

Reserve Component. The three Reserve Component categories are Ready Reserve, 

Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. Each reservist is identified by a specific 

Reserve Component category designation. (Approved for replacement of “reserve 

component category” and its definition in JP 1-02.) 

Retired Reserve. All Reserve members who receive retirement pay on the basis of their 

active duty and/or Reserve service; those members who are otherwise eligible for 

retirement pay but have not reached age 60 and who have not elected discharge and 

are not voluntary members of the Ready or Standby Reserve. See also active duty; 

Ready Reserve; Standby Reserve. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05) 

Selected Reserve. Those units and individuals within the Ready Reserve designated by 

their respective Services and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as so essential to 

initial wartime missions that they have priority over all other Reserves. Selected 

Reservists actively participate in a Reserve Component training program. The 

Selected Reserve also includes persons performing initial active duty for training. 

See also Ready Reserve. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-05) 

Selected Reserve strength. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

Standby Reserve. Those units and members of the Reserve Component (other than 

those in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve) who are liable for active duty only, 

as provided in Title 10 , United States Code, Sections 10151, 12301, and 12306. 

See also active duty; Ready Reserve; Reserve Component; Retired Reserve. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

stop-loss. Presidential authority under Title 10, United States Code, Section 12305 to 

suspend laws relating to promotion, retirement, or separation of any member of the 

Armed Forces determined essential to the national security of the United States 

(“laws relating to promotion” broadly includes, among others, grade tables, current 

general or flag officer authorizations, and E8 and 9 limits). This authority may be 

exercised by the President only if reservists are serving on active duty under Title 10, 

United States Code authorities for Presidential Reserve Call-up, partial mobilization, 

or full mobilization. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)
Glossary

GL-10 JP 4-05 

training and readiness oversight. The authority that combatant commanders may 

exercise over assigned Reserve Component forces when not on active duty or when 

on active duty for training. As a matter of Department of Defense policy, this 

authority includes: a. Providing guidance to Service component commanders on 

operational requirements and priorities to be addressed in Military Department 

training and readiness programs; b. Commenting on Service component program 

recommendations and budget requests; c. Coordinating and approving participation 

by assigned Reserve Component forces in joint exercises and other joint training 

when on active duty for training or performing inactive duty for training; d. 

Obtaining and reviewing readiness and inspection reports on assigned Reserve 

Component forces; and e. Coordinating and reviewing mobilization plans (including 

post-mobilization training activities and deployability validation procedures) 

developed for assigned Reserve Component forces. Also called TRO. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 1) 

training unit. A unit established to provide military training to individual reservists or to 

Reserve Component units. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-05 as 

the source JP.) 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE LOGISTICS COMMUNICATIONPLANS SYSTEMS

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to

fill extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the

development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 4-05 Logistics













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group

JP 3-0

OPERATIONS

JP 4-0