Air University

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AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

Unmanned 

Intratheater Airlift

Kevin J. McGowan

Major, USAF

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 45

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

December 2010
ii

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are 

available electronically at the Air University Research 

Information Management System website at http://

research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press website at 

http://aupress.au.af.mil.

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US 

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.
iii

Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

2 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . 15

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

3 TECHNOLOGY REVIEW/PROOF 

OF CONCEPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

4 PROPOSED SOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

5 SYNOPSIS OF CONCEPT OF 

EMPLOYMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Appendix

1 Contract Lift Configurations . . . . . . . . . . 65

2 John Warner National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 . . 67

3 Service RPA Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . 69

4 Concept of Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

v

Foreword

It is with great pride that Air Command and Staff College 

presents another in a series of award-winning student research projects from our academic programs that reach 

nearly 11,000 students each year. As our series title indicates, we seek to promote the sort of imaginative, forwardlooking thinking that inspired the earliest aviation pioneers, 

and we aim for publication projects which combine these 

characteristics with the sort of clear presentation that permits even the most technical topics to be readily understood. We sincerely hope what follows will stimulate thinking, invite debate, and further encourage today’s air war 

fighters in their continuing search for new and better ways 

to perform their missions—now and in the future.

ANTHONY J. ROCK

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant

vii

Abstract

The movement of supplies and personnel within the Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom 

areas of operation is currently extremely costly, hazardous, 

and inefficient. Frequent attacks against insecure lines of 

communication and difficult terrain have led to a constantly 

increasing tactical airlift requirement. As of September 2009, 

75 percent of all troop locations in Afghanistan and Iraq 

required resupply by ground convoy, airdrop, or verticaltakeoff-and-landing aircraft. Unfortunately, the Department 

of Defense (DOD) currently lacks the capability to fulfill all 

tactical airlift requests.

This paper investigates the DOD’s tactical logistical challenges and each service’s tactical lift requirements, especially with respect to the movement of supplies from forward supply hubs to forward forces. To address these 

challenges and requirements, the author suggests the use 

of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) as a potential solution. 

Focusing on existing and quickly emerging technologies as 

well as the joint operating requirements, the author proposes RPA performance and design characteristics along 

with a concept of employment that increases tactical lift 

capabilities and meets all current service requirements.

ix

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my research advisor, Budd Jones, for 

his guidance, insight, and assistance in reviewing, editing, 

and improving this paper. I also thank Donald Anderson, 

Air Mobility Command (AMC)/A9; Demetrius Glass, US 

Army/G4; Maj Thomas Heffern, US Marine Corps Unmanned 

Aircraft Systems Requirements; Maj Robert Hilliard, US 

Transportation Command/J3-ED; Robert Nagel, AMC/

A8XC; Lt Col Travis Burdine, AF/A2U; Mike Melnyk and LT 

Sidney Cochran III, Naval Safety Center; and LTC David 

Fleckenstein, US Army Combat Readiness Center, for their 

insight and assistance in gathering the data used in this 

study.

xi

Executive Summary

Recent military engagements have seen a radical shift in 

adversary tactics. In addition to confronting traditional 

conventional forces, the US military now faces an increasing use of irregular warfare tactics to offset the US technological and operational advantages. Long, slow, and predictable supply convoys along overstretched lines of 

communication also tend to place US supplies and troops 

at significant risk. This is further complicated by a general 

lack of logistical infrastructure and increasing requirements for US forces to assume positions in isolated and 

rugged locations. 

The low likelihood of these trends changing in future engagements places the DOD in a difficult position. How do you 

increase cargo movement to isolated forward operating bases 

(FOB) in relatively inaccessible locations while maintaining 

secure lines of communication? Operational and budgetary 

limitations coupled with tooth-to-tail ratio, shrinking force 

sizes, increasing logistical requirements, and deployment 

footprint concerns require immediate solutions, even if 

finding them means searching outside the box. This challenge dictates a movement away from traditional resupply 

means and an accompanying paradigm and doctrinal shift. 

Advancements in technology, increased needs, and shrinking budgets present the DOD with both challenges and opportunities. Augmenting the current tactical airlift system 

with a modular autonomous and/or semiautonomous unmanned tactical airlift aircraft offers a flexible, responsive, 

and inexpensive solution that will increase airlift capacity, 

minimize carbon footprint, reduce risk to ground and airlift 

crews, and reduce wear and tear on manned assets. 

The Problem

The DOD’s use of the spoke and hub distribution method 

has proven itself as an efficient and effective means of supply distribution. However, while the strategic lift portion of 

the factory-to-foxhole chain is well established and relatively efficient for routine shipments, the “last tactical mile” 

segment is less than ideal. Depending upon a combination 
xii

of fixed-wing, rotor wing, ground transport, host nation, 

and contract services, the last tactical mile segment of the 

cargo movement process is inefficient, typically service oriented, and in some cases extremely dangerous. In addition 

to an assortment of other factors, delivery delays resulting 

from the current tactical lift system can have a significant 

operational impact upon fielded forces from both a safety 

and a combat effectiveness perspective.1 

In Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom 

(OIF), insurgent and enemy force tactics and limited infrastructures have made the transport of supplies via ground 

both deadly and slow. These challenges have led to an increased reliance upon a combination of airdrop and airland 

flights to move supplies and personnel from major hubs 

directly to their points of need. Aircraft availability, weather, 

and terrain, however, have caused delayed movement and a 

requirement to move supplies by alternate means. 

In Afghanistan the general lack of passable roads to remote villages, FOBs, and deployed troops makes airlift the 

only viable option to resupply many locations. In fact, while 

FOBs have taken advantage of the limited number of runways, only about 24 percent of FOBs can be serviced by 

C-130 or larger aircraft.2 This lack of essential airland 

infrastructure has made vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) 

airlift, ground convoy, and airdrop essential pieces of the 

logistics system in both theaters.3

To address these needs and limitations, the Army and 

Marines rely heavily upon formations of rotor-wing and tiltrotor airlift assets to transport much-needed supplies and 

personnel.4 As most resupply is routine and predictable, 

regularly scheduled supply routes can be and typically are 

established. Unfortunately, although these routes tend to 

be effective, they are inefficient and tend to draw limited 

airlift assets away from their primary missions. Additionally, they waste fuel and time while exposing the flight crew 

and passengers to unnecessary risks. Furthermore, the increased utilization rates and harsh environments have also 

led to increased maintenance requirements and premature 

aging of the airlift fleet.5

Augmenting the military lift assets is an assortment of 

private and commercial fixed- and rotor-wing contract carriers. While the total quantity of cargo and passengers moved 
xiii

by these carriers pales in comparison to those lifted by military assets, these carriers provide an essential service. With 

significant passenger loads and cargo loads ranging from a 

few hundred pounds (lb.) to over 35,000 lb., these routine 

flights free up critical airlift assets for other missions and 

reduce military aircraft utilization.6 Unfortunately, however, the nature of this service imposes restrictions on the 

types and quantities of cargo private and commercial carriers can lift, particularly with regard to destinations and 

sensitive cargo, passengers, and missions.7 It can also limit 

mission responsiveness and flexibility.

Augmenting the airland capabilities is the steadily increasing airdrop utilization, capability, and capacity. While 

this trend will probably continue, thus far conventional airdrop has been unable to keep fielded forces adequately 

supplied in rugged terrain. Even the joint precision airdrop 

system and low-cost, low-altitude airdrop systems that are 

capable of hitting a target area of 50 meters are unable to 

reliably supply troops in urban environments or rough terrain (such as on a ridgeline or mountainside). Additionally, 

a forward location’s request for supplies takes an average of 

approximately 72 hours to be answered if the requested 

supplies are already in theater and several more days if 

they must be lifted in.8

Resupply flights, especially in combat situations, also expose crews and aircraft to a wide assortment of safety hazards. For example, between 11 September 2001 and 14 December 2009, spatial disorientation and brownout and 

whiteout conditions directly contributed to 10 US Air Force 

and 55 US Army rotor-wing mishaps in the Iraq and Afghanistan areas of responsibility (AOR) alone. The US Navy 

experienced an additional five Class A mishaps in the 

CH-46, HH-60, and UH-1 aircraft between 11 September 

2001 and 18 August 2008. Together these mishaps resulted 

in 49 US Army and 15 Navy/Marine Corps fatalities.9 Such 

human factors as “get-home-itis,” “mission-itis,” fatigue, 

overconfidence, and standards deviations can also significantly increase the chances of a mishap. Crew duty-day 

limitations coupled with crew rest location limitations and 

mission expectations may also place additional pressure, 

stress, and ultimately risk upon a crew. 
xiv

Despite the current airlift limitations and costs, the extensive OEF and OIF air bridges have saved countless lives 

and supplies. The increased utilization of fixed-wing and 

VTOL assets to support cargo movement needs have 

“decreas[ed] the need for hazardous ground convoys . . . and 

saved lives.”10 The increased airlift has also increased the 

responsiveness and speed of time-sensitive (TS)/missioncritical (MC) supply delivery. Despite these accomplishments, approximately 80 percent of supplies are still transported by ground convoy.11

While ground convoys can carry significantly more cargo 

than tactical airlift assets, their slow speeds result in convoy personnel being exposed to threats for extended periods 

along predictable routes. In high-threat environments, extended threat exposure times have direct safety implications upon the personnel involved in the convoys (typically 

from two to three personnel per vehicle). In fact, from 19 

March 2003 to 30 September 2007, improvised explosive 

devices (IED) killed 1,503 US service members in Iraq alone. 

Car bombs killed an additional 133. While not all of these 

fatalities occurred during resupply ground convoys, the fatalities do illustrate the significance of the problem. In fact, 

car bombs and IEDs were the leading causes of death in 

Iraq (43 percent) followed by hostile fire (31 percent) during 

this period.12 Likewise, in Afghanistan from 2003 through 

2009, IEDs accounted for approximately 49 percent of all 

US fatalities due to hostile action (35 percent of all US fatalities during this period).13

Requirements

While an official DOD tactical airlift capability gap and 

requirements list has not been published at the time of this 

report, each service has taken steps towards quantifying its 

respective needs for an unmanned or remotely piloted tactical airlift platform (hereafter referred to as MQ-A). While 

the identified requirements vary, the four focuses common 

among the services include (1) increase responsiveness 

through on-demand airlift for small loads (fewer than 3,000 

lb.); (2) remove, or at least reduce, the number of supply 

trucks on the road; (3) mitigate the impact of shortages in 

tactical airlift aircraft and aircrew (without significantly in-
xv

creasing carbon footprint); and (4) increase airlift capacity, 

accuracy, and responsiveness of delivery (without significantly increasing manpower). In all cases, the MQ-A is intended to augment existing manned tactical lift assets, 

thereby enhancing current lift capabilities, improving 

safety, and enabling manned assets to focus on other missions such as passenger or large cargo movement.

Considering the joint operating environment, any future 

tactical lift platform must meet the requirements for each 

service it is intended to support. After combining each service’s unmanned tactical lift requirements, as established 

to date, a list of joint unmanned intratheater airlift platform 

capabilities can be developed. Generally, the MQ-A must 

have an open architecture and be multimission capable, all 

weather, and net-centric. It must also be capable of carrying standard loads and potentially have an optionally 

manned capability. Underlying all these attributes is a need 

to be responsive, flexible, safe, survivable, inexpensive, and 

reliable.

As for specific capabilities, the MQ-A must be multirole 

capable, preferably utilizing mission modules, while remaining rugged and reliable with low maintenance requirements. Considering the hostile environments it will be required to operate in, it should be affordable and, given the 

right conditions, attritable. It must be able to operate under 

enemy fire; in a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 

and high-yield explosive or other high-risk environments; 

and in all weather conditions (to include restricted visibility). 

It should also be able to avoid most ground threats by cruising at altitudes outside their effective ranges and must be 

able to defeat most ground threats when operating within 

their threat envelopes. 

The MQ-A should be able to travel at least 500 nautical 

miles at speeds greater than 250 knots while carrying a 

payload of up to 3,000 lb.14 It must be capable of autonomous and semiautonomous operations to include autonomous 

VTOL in all weather conditions and threat environments. In 

addition, it should have an internal and/or external loadcarrying capability with no external loading equipment required. Considering the current operating environments, it 

should be small enough to operate in such confined spaces 

as an urban environment (preferably with a smaller foot-
xvi

print than current manned VTOL assets), a small clearing, 

a mountainside, or a ridgeline at elevations up to 12,000 

feet. It must also be easily deployed on board existing strategic lift assets with minimal disassembly.

Existing Technologies

While these requirements may appear excessive and beyond current capabilities, the technology already exists to 

make the MQ-A a reality. However, some roadblocks do 

exist. For example, most of the technologies are proprietary, and some are still in development. Based upon the 

aforementioned requirements, the primary technical concerns involve (1) multifunctionality (i.e., cargo, armed/unarmed intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance [ISR], etc.), 

(2) propulsion, (3) fielded-force landing-zone modification, 

(4) autonomous VTOL, (5) threat avoidance, (6) collision 

avoidance, (7) autonomous or semiautonomous route creation and modification, (8) automating manned aircraft, 

and (9) safety, although the latter is more a factor of design than technology.

Notes

(All notes appear here in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)

1. Delays can result from such problems as environmental, mechanical, 

and personnel limitations and enemy action. For example, cargo and/or 

personnel may remain at a distribution point while they await transportation. 

Other delays may result from maintenance, crew availability (e.g., qualifications, crew rest, etc.), the lift asset making additional stops en route to 

the cargo’s final destination, or even enemy action at the point of departure, en route, or at the final destination. Weather considerations, especially when considering helicopter operations, can also lead to delayed or 

even missed deliveries due to weather avoidance considerations (primarily 

from obscured visibility conditions).

2. As of 12 December 2009, Afghanistan had 16 paved and 35 unpaved 

runways (less than one-half the number of runways in Iraq). See Central 

Intelligence Agency, “Afghanistan,” World Factbook; and Anderson, OEF, 

COPs, and Bases.xlsx. Since 11 September 2001, the average AMC load is 

approximately 7,500 lb. of cargo and over 10 passengers per flight. See 

Lichte, Air Mobility Master Plan: 2010, 2.

3. VTOL airlift refers to all fixed-wing, rotor-wing, tilt-rotor, and any 

other platforms capable of conducting a VTOL.
xvii

4. Current doctrine calls for rotary-wing assets to fly always in formations of two or more aircraft regardless of the load being transported. This 

includes flights to move a small number of passengers with small cargo 

items even if one or more of the aircraft will be empty. While this practice 

enhances force protection, it is expensive, inefficient, and increases maintenance requirements.

5. Manske, Unmanned Airlift, 8; and Vice Chief of Staff Army/Vice 

Chief of Staff Air Force, Concept of Employment, 7.

6. In Afghanistan from January 2009 to June 2009, civilian fixed-wing 

carriers flew 4,700 sorties (4,686 of which were short takeoff and landing 

[STOL] flights) as compared to just over 1,600 US military fixed-wing 

flights (i.e., C-5, C-17, and C-130) with average cargo loads of 1,166 lb. 

and 14,812 lb., respectively. During this period, civilian rotor-wing aircraft flew 581 missions, with each mission having as many as 27 legs. 

These VTOL missions transported an average of 3,357 lb. of cargo and 40 

passengers per mission. The STOL aircraft averaged six passengers per 

flight. All together, the civilian STOL and VTOL aircraft transported 51,750 

passengers and 7,014,845 lb. of cargo during this period alone. Not including airdrop, special operations forces and Marine Corps missions, 

military fixed-wing aircraft transported over 24 million lb. of cargo. An additional 6,540,936 lb. of cargo were moved by theater express within Afghanistan from January to May 2009 with an average monthly load of 

1,308,187 lb. Unfortunately, as there is currently no central tracking system for cargo moved by rotor-wing aircraft in the tactical environment, the 

load data for military rotor-wing and tilt-rotor aircraft was unavailable. 

Per Anderson, YD-03 (assistant director, Analyses, Assessments, and Lessons Learned, AMC/A9), interview by the author, 19 January 2010. For 

load data, see US Transportation Command military and contract civilian 

carrier flying-hour and monthly activity spreadsheets (January 2009–

June 2009) for flights within Afghanistan. Since 11 September 2001, the 

average AMC load is approximately 7,500 lb. of cargo and over 10 passengers per flight. See Lichte, Air Mobility Master Plan: 2010, 2. 

7. Based upon US Transportation Command Flying Hour and Monthly 

Activity Log spreadsheets and an interview provided by Anderson. 

8. Ibid.

9. See Air Force Safety Automated System (AFSAS); Navy Safety Center, Class A Mishap Data for the Period of 1998–2008; and Army Combat 

Readiness/Safety Center, Class A, B, and C Mishap Data. Thirty-six of the 

55 Army mishaps (resulting in 47 fatalities) involved cargo- and troopcarrying aircraft. The remaining mishaps involved OH-58s and AH-64s.

10. Lichte, “Commander’s Intent,” 2.

11. Hilliard, US Transportation Command/J3, e-mail to the author, 16 

February 2010. Actual quantities of supplies and personnel transported 

via rotor wing and ground transportation were unavailable due to limitations in the current logistical tracking systems. While US Transportation 

Command and Air Mobility Command track cargo airlifted via the Air 

Force lift assets (to include airdrop), once the cargo is offloaded and transferred to the Army and Marine Corps at a forward supply location (e.g., 

Kandahar, Bagram, Baghdad, etc.), the cargo is considered “delivered to 

destination.” The “last tactical mile” movement of the supplies by rotor 
xviii

wing and ground transportation from this supply depot to other FOBs is 

tracked and kept by the individual units performing the supply movement 

(e.g., each combat air brigade maintains its own records). The lack of a 

central unifying database has made it virtually impossible to obtain reliable theaterwide intratheater cargo movement data. Without this data, an 

accurate comparison between quantities moved by airdrop, rotor wing, tilt 

rotor, and ground transport could not be made.

12. O’Hanlon and Campbell, Iraq Index, 18. 

13. iCasualties.org, “Operation Enduring Freedom.” 

14. Per US Transportation Command Flying Hour and Monthly Activity 

Log spreadsheets; and Anderson, interview. In Afghanistan from January 

to June 2009, civilian VTOL aircraft transported an average of 3,357 lb. of 

cargo per mission. Military VTOL cargo lift statistics were unavailable.
1

Chapter 1

Introduction

In view of the information GAO [General Accounting Office] developed and DOD’s position, the Congress should scrutinize proposed manned aircraft 

developments to assure that the DOD gives adequate consideration to the use of the remotely piloted vehicle technology for some missions. While 

DOD is making some use of the technology, there 

is a need to assure that its use is maximized where 

suited to save lives and money.

—General Accounting Office, 1981

(now General Accountability Office)

Remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) have been a reality of the 

modern battlefield since 1916 when Archibald Montgomery 

Low’s team invented the Aerial Target (AT) for the Royal Flying Corps.1 The AT later evolved into the first remotely piloted aircraft (the Ruston Proctor AT in 1917) to be used as a 

guided bomb. Low’s Royal Flying Corps Experimental Works 

developed the first guided rockets later that same year.2

Drawing on research and early RPAs flown during World War 

I and the interwar years, World War II saw both the Allies and 

Axis countries converting explosive-laden manned aircraft 

into RPAs (e.g., PB4Y-1, BQ-7) to be flown into enemy targets 

as guided cruise missiles or bombs.3 In the 1970s the Air 

Force’s BGM-34F fighter RPA and the highly maneuverable 

aircraft technology projects demonstrated how RPAs could 

outperform manned fighter aircraft.4

The current use of such RPAs as the Predator, Reaper, 

Warrior, and Global Hawk for armed and unarmed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions only 

scratches the surface with respect to medium and large 

remotely piloted platforms. While the use of persistent 

armed and unarmed ISR platforms in military operations 

has proven invaluable and ultimately essential to success 

on the battlefield, advancements in technology, increased 

needs, and shrinking budgets present the Department of 

Defense (DOD) with both challenges and opportunities. Op-
2

erational and budgetary limitations coupled with tooth-totail ratio, shrinking force size, increasing logistical requirements, and deployment footprint concerns dictate that we 

find solutions rapidly. We simply need to look at problems 

through a wider lens, consider all the tools available, and 

develop a solution, even if it means a significant paradigm 

or doctrinal shift. One area that deserves extra attention is 

the current and emerging capability gap with respect to tactical airlift and the role RPAs can play in addressing these 

limitations. An RPA designed to fulfill the joint tactical airlift requirements can offer an inexpensive, safe, flexible, 

and responsive option that can increase tactical airlift capabilities and save lives, even in conditions considered too 

hazardous for manned aircraft. 

The Current Logistical System

Under the current US Transportation Command system, 

cargo is moved from factory to foxhole via a spoke-and-hub 

system (similar to that used by commercial carriers). While 

the ideal system to the customer would be a movement of 

the personnel and equipment directly from the factory or 

home base to their final destination, this is far from efficient and certainly not realistic. Instead, strategic lift assets 

(i.e., ships and aircraft) move the cargo and passengers 

from their points of origin to the theater of operations 

through a series of major hubs. Once in theater, the personnel and equipment are typically moved to a distribution 

hub via a tactical lift asset where they await transport to 

their final destination via either a direct route (fig. 1) or a 

ring route/distribution circuit (fig. 2). 

While the strategic lift portion of the factory-to-customer 

chain is well established and relatively efficient for routine 

shipments, the last tactical mile segment is less than ideal. 

The process of moving cargo, especially mission-critical 

(MC) and time-sensitive (TS) shipments, into places where a 

channel has not been established is considerably more 

complicated and time intensive.5 Depending upon a combination of fixed-wing (e.g., C-17, C-130, etc.), rotor-wing (e.g., 

CH-53, UH/HH-60, CH-47, V-22, etc.), ground-transport 

(e.g., trucks, rail), host-nation, and contract transport using an assortment of fixed wing, rotor wing, and ground lift, 
3

the last tactical mile segment of the cargo movement process is inefficient, typically service oriented, and in some 

cases extremely dangerous. 

Delays

Since World War II airlift has become an ever-increasing 

necessity to fielded forces for not only resupply but also 

transport to and from the fight. To be effective, fielded forces 

require sufficient supplies where and when required. Again, 

the answer has pointed to airlift. Improved responsiveness 

from the US logistical system has ultimately resulted in 

greater expectations for immediate results. Unfortunately, 

these expectations for short request to delivery times can 

have significant results when not met. Logistical limitaDistribution Hub

Resupply Points

Figure 1. Factory to distribution hub with spoke distribution. (Created 

by the author.)

Figure 2. Factory to distribution hub with ring route/distribution circuit. 

(Created by the author.)

Distribution Hub

Resupply Points
4

tions, however, can and often do result in significant expected and unexpected delays for the personnel and equipment being transported. 

These delays, which will ultimately affect the effectiveness of the fielded forces, can emanate from an assortment 

of reasons. For example, cargo and/or personnel may remain at a distribution point while they await transportation. Other delays may result from maintenance, crew 

availability (e.g., qualifications, crew rest), the lift asset 

making additional stops en route to the cargo’s final destination, or even enemy action at the point of departure, en 

route, or at the final destination. Weather considerations, 

especially for helicopter operations, can also lead to delayed 

or even missed deliveries due to weather-avoidance considerations (primarily from obscured visibility conditions). 

Two other significant causes of delay are terrain and aircraft availability. For example, in 2008 Marine Corps Combat Logistics Battalion 3 (CLB-3) was charged with moving 

supplies to forward locations 60–90 kilometers (km) away 

(straight-line distance) over unprepared and unsecured 

routes in Afghanistan. A 60-km (37.3 miles) route could 

take anywhere from 16 to 54 hours depending upon the 

extent of enemy action and mechanical problems. According to the unit’s commanding officer (CO), the average 60-km 

patrol took approximately 20 hours to complete.6 This 

equates to a straight-line speed of approximately 1.87 miles 

per hour. Despite an interest to move as much cargo via 

airlift as possible, the unit’s access to only four CH-53s significantly hampered this goal.7 In fact, due to airlift limitations the CLB-3 was able to airlift only 650,000 lb. (approximately 5.5 percent of the supplies) using CH-53s. The 

remaining 11.2 million lb. of supplies were transported via 

ground convoy.8 Even along routes with established roads, 

force-protection considerations typically result in lowmovement rates, particularly in areas at high risk of an 

improvised explosive device (IED) or enemy force contact.

Regardless of the reason for the delayed delivery, the bottom line is the same: the passengers and equipment are 

delayed arriving at their final destination. These delays can 

have a direct impact upon the safety and effectiveness of 

fielded forces and convoy personnel.
5

Airlift

The movement of supplies and personnel in the last tactical mile from supply hub to point of need presents a series 

of significant challenges to the war fighter ranging from security of the logistical lines of communication to simple environmental concerns. In Operations Enduring Freedom 

(OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF), insurgent and enemy force 

tactics coupled with limited infrastructures have made the 

transport of supplies via ground both deadly and slow. 

These challenges have led to an increased reliance upon a 

combination of airdrop and airland flights using fixed- and 

rotor-wing assets to move supplies and personnel from 

major hubs directly to their points of need when required 

using the most expeditious and advantageous means available. Weather and terrain, however, have resulted in delayed 

movement or a requirement to move the supplies by alternate means. 

In Afghanistan the general lack of passable roads to remote villages, forward operating bases (FOB), and deployed 

troops makes airlift the only viable option for resupply for 

many locations. In fact, while FOBs have taken advantage 

of the limited number of runways, only about 24 percent of 

FOBs can be serviced by C-130 or larger aircraft.9 This lack 

of essential airland infrastructure has made vertical takeoff 

and landing (VTOL) airlift, ground convoy, and airdrop essential pieces of the logistics system in Afghanistan.10

To address these needs and limitations, the Army and 

Marines rely heavily upon formations of rotor-wing and tiltrotor airlift assets (primarily by flights of CH-47s, UH/HH60s, CH-53s, and V-22s) to transport much-needed supplies 

and personnel.11 As most resupply is routine and predictable (with locations changing as forces move within the 

area of operations [AO]), regularly scheduled supply routes 

can be and typically are established. For example, to service established operating locations, the Army flies helicopters on regularly scheduled ring routes to multiple locations 

regardless of the amount or nature of the cargo being moved 

(fig. 2). This system, like a city bus route, allows cargo or 

personnel to get on the aircraft at any point along the circuit for transportation to another location along the route.
6

A significant problem with this system is that aircraft 

may fly with underutilized cargo space and/or passenger 

seats to locations that don’t have inbound or outbound 

cargo or passengers. This process wastes fuel and time 

while exposing the flight crew and passengers to unnecessary risks. Cargo and/or passengers may also have to transit multiple locations before they arrive at their intended 

destination, resulting in unnecessary delays. While this 

system is far from efficient, it is predictable, convenient, 

and easy to schedule. 

Fulfilling the short-notice, small load, and passenger lift 

requirements is a combination of standby rotor-wing assets 

and an assortment of private and commercial fixed and 

rotor-wing carrier contracts (appendix 1 has additional 

contract asset information). While the total amounts moved 

by these carriers pale in comparison to those lifted by military assets, these companies have provided a significant 

number of VTOL and short takeoff and landing (STOL) 

flights with loads ranging from a few hundred pounds to 

over 35,000 lb. In Afghanistan alone from January to June 

2009, civilian rotor-wing aircraft averaged 3,357 lb. of cargo 

and 40 passengers per mission, and civilian fixed-wing aircraft averaged 1,166 lb. and six passengers per flight. These 

routine flights free up critical airlift assets for other missions and reduce aircraft utilization.12 While providing a 

crucial lift capability, the nature of this service imposes restrictions on the types and quantities of cargo that can be 

lifted by these assets, particularly about destinations and 

sensitive cargo, passengers, and missions.13

Augmenting the airland capabilities is a steadily increasing airdrop capability, capacity, and utilization, a trend 

that will probably continue in current and future conflicts. 

However, with limited access to large, secure drop zones, 

conventional airdrop has proven insufficient to keep fielded 

forces in rugged terrain supplied. To address this challenge, 

the Army has turned to the $100 low-cost, low-altitude 

(LCLA) airdrop system. Capable of landing within 50 meters 

of the intended target, this system helps to ensure the 

needed supplies (typically dropped in 250–560 lb. bundles) 

remain within the immediate area of the troops. Another 

advantage of this system is that it does not require drop-
7

zone (DZ) surveys before delivery, thereby enhancing delivery responsiveness.14

LCLA is a critical mode of distribution to platoon and platoon-sized 

locations. The accuracy of the LCLA method of airdrop prevents 

units from having to go outside of the wire to receive supplies because bundles of CL I, III, and V can be dropped inside of a very 

small window. This is critical because many of these locations do 

not have enough Soldiers on hand to provide force protection and 

secure a DZ and recover airdrop bundles simultaneously. In addition, the LCLA platform can be used to resupply Soldiers on patrols 

or in Ops [Operations]. The materials used to build the bundles are 

expendable, allowing patrols to receive the supplies and leave behind the packing material with no retrograde requirements.15

A significant drawback of the LCLA system, however, is 

the delivery method. System limitations require the drop to 

be made in good weather from a low altitude during daylight.16 This requirement makes the delivery aircraft a vulnerable target and highlights the position of friendly forces. 

In situations where an LCLA airdrop isn’t feasible, the required supplies can be dropped from an altitude of over 

25,000 feet using the joint precision airdrop system (JPADS) 

and the improved container delivery system with the same 

level of accuracy.17 These systems have not only increased 

aircrew safety but they have also allowed for standoff airdrop at night, which can help mask the location of friendly 

forces on the ground. 

The combination of additional need and greater accuracy 

has led to an exponential increase in aerially delivered supplies.18 Two serious drawbacks of JPADS, however, are that it 

is far more expensive than the LCLA, and it requires some 

equipment to be extracted following delivery (effectively increasing combat load and/or helicopter support requirements). Unfortunately, however, for locations such as along 

ridgelines and where troops are engaged in proximity to the 

enemy, 50-meter accuracy is still insufficient. In these cases, 

supplies that miss the small target area may ultimately be lost 

or even recovered by enemy forces. Yet the supplies must still 

be delivered by ground transport or VTOL assets. Another 

noteworthy drawback of the airdrop option is that it takes an 

average of 72 hours for a forward location’s request for supplies to be answered if the requested supplies are already in 

theater and several more days if the supplies need to be lifted 

in.19 While this may be acceptable for such routine supplies as 
8

food and water, which can be routinely scheduled and stockpiled, this turnaround time is too long for troops engaged with 

the enemy. The TS mission needs have led to a high reliance 

upon the limited rotor-wing TS/MC lift assets. The limited 

available airlift capacity has also left ground convoys as the 

primary means of cargo movement.

Regardless of the benefits, the heavy reliance upon and 

utilization of VTOL assets has not come without a cost. 

Harsh environments and constant use have strained and 

prematurely aged the limited fixed- and rotor-wing assets 

that the United States has become dependent upon.20 For 

example, the CH-47 is currently performing the majority of 

the Army’s MC/TS and personnel movement in the OEF/

OIF theaters because it is the best Army-owned asset available. Unfortunately, however, this added mission role has 

negatively impacted the CH-47 fleet’s ability to perform its 

primary mission functions in support of the ground combat 

units. More to the point, by diverting these crucial assets 

from the ground combat units, the fielded forces are granted 

reduced access to a highly flexible and capable transportation asset. The persistent use of formations and the extended operational requirements (including flight frequency 

and ranges)—coupled with harsh desert environments—

have also “generated a significant increase in the maintenance require[ments] for these aircraft.”21

Despite the current airlift limitations and costs, the extensive OEF and OIF air bridges have saved countless lives 

and supplies. Air Mobility Command’s (AMC) addition of 

the C-17 to the overtasked C-130 tactical intratheater airlift 

fleet, coupled with the Army’s and Marine Corps’s shift in 

the utilization of VTOL assets to support more cargo movement needs, has significantly increased airdrop and airland 

service, “decreas[ed] the need for hazardous ground convoys . . . and saved lives.”22 The increased airlift has also 

increased the responsiveness and speed of TS/MC supply 

delivery. Despite these accomplishments, approximately 80 

percent of supplies are still transported by ground convoy.23

Safety

All resupply flights, especially in combat situations, can 

and often do expose crews and aircraft to a wide assortment 
9

of safety hazards, long duty days, enemy fire (in combat 

zones), and environmental hazards (e.g., brownout, whiteout, icing, rain, and instrument meteorological conditions). 

For example, between 11 September 2001 and 14 December 2009, spatial disorientation, brownout, and whiteout 

conditions directly contributed to 10 Air Force and 55 Army 

rotor-wing mishaps in the Iraq and Afghanistan area of responsibility (AOR). Between 11 September 2001 and 18 August 2008, the Navy experienced five Class A mishaps in 

the CH-46, HH-60, and UH-1 aircraft. Together these mishaps resulted in zero Air Force, 49 Army, and 15 Navy/

Marine Corps fatalities.24 Such human factors as “get-homeitis,” “mission-itis,” fatigue, overconfidence, and deviations 

from standards can also significantly increase the chances 

of a crew being involved in a mishap. Crew duty-day limitations coupled with crew rest-location limitations and mission expectations may place additional pressure, stress, 

and ultimately risk upon a crew. 

While the danger to flight crews is notable, the current 

danger to ground personnel is far more significant. While 

ground convoys can carry significantly more cargo than 

tactical airlift assets, the slow speeds of ground convoys 

result in the convoy personnel being exposed to threats for 

extended periods. In high-threat environments, extended 

threat exposure times have direct safety implications upon 

the personnel involved in the convoys (typically from two 

to three personnel per vehicle). In fact, from 19 March 2003 

to 30 September 2007, 1,503 US service members died 

from IEDs in Iraq alone. An additional 133 died of car 

bombings. While not all of these fatalities occurred during 

resupply ground convoys, they do illustrate the significance of the problem. In fact, car bombs and IEDs were 

the leading causes of death in Iraq (43 percent), followed 

by hostile fire (31 percent).25 Likewise, in Afghanistan, 

from 2003 through 8 December 2009, 309 US fatalities 

occurred due to IEDs. This equates to 47.8 percent of all 

US fatalities due to hostile action in Afghanistan during 

this period (35.4 percent of all US fatalities during this 

period).26 Since 2001 these constant threats have also resulted in the loss of critical supplies and vehicles while 

simultaneously having a direct impact upon public perception (both US and foreign) and costs.
10

Overview

As several other studies have already been conducted on 

the feasibility of unmanned strategic airlift, this study assesses the use of RPA for the last tactical mile or unmanned 

intratheater airlift. More specifically, this study addresses 

these questions: (1) What operational requirements exist 

that would justify the employment of an RPA platform in 

the tactical environment? (2) Will current and forecast RPA 

technologies fulfill these requirements? and (3) How might 

these assets be employed?27

The next chapters build upon the background information presented in chapter 1. Chapter 2 discusses the operational requirements of fielded forces, and chapter 3 investigates existing and future RPA technologies that may be 

used to fulfill the identified requirements. Chapter 4 offers 

suggestions for a tactical airlift RPA (hereafter referred to as 

MQ-A), with chapter 5 offering a concept of employment for 

that platform.

Assumptions

Recognizing that a move to a remotely piloted intratheater airlifter may be a significant paradigm shift, this 

study assumes that the MQ-A will be used for transporting supplies and equipment until the safety of an RPA is 

demonstrated and people are willing to be transported by 

an aircraft without a pilot on board. Furthermore, the 

author assumes that RPAs will augment existing lift capabilities either through semiautonomous or autonomous operations. 

Additionally, while the Air Force gained the responsibility 

of providing the Army’s strategic and tactical airlift according to the Key West Agreement of 1948, this study does not 

presume which service(s) will operate the MQ-A once it is 

acquired.28 In the past, strategic lift was provided by US 

Transportation Command and is thus inherently joint in 

nature. The strategic lift segment, however, simply moves 

the personnel and equipment from the point of origin to a 

supply hub within the AOR. Once there, each service has 

typically been left to arrange its own lift (either internally or 

with a sister service) to the forces in the field. This practice 
11

has led to a close logistical relationship between the Army 

and the Air Force, but it has also resulted in the acquisition 

of service-specific lift assets. 

While this has traditionally offered each service the flexibility to employ its resources when and how desired (to include single-service operations when so tasked) to control 

its own supply chain, this method can lead to unnecessary 

redundancy and/or inefficiencies in a joint environment. 

Acquiring a common, multirole platform, however, would 

improve the acquisition of aircraft components and modules, servicing, and maintenance, and general familiarization and use in a joint environment. With this being said, 

the study makes no assumptions regarding who will or 

should operate the MQ-A, suggesting only that its acquisition and employment be focused on the joint requirements. 

Ultimately, the joint commands and the services will need 

to decide whether US Transportation Command, US Joint 

Forces Command, a single service, or a combination of services will be responsible for the last tactical mile of the 

factory-to-foxhole logistics chain.

Summary

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, US forces proliferate over 

large geographic areas. While not significant in itself, that 

only a small fraction of these locations are collocated with 

an airfield and a majority of them are connected by insecure lines of communication mean the task of resupply is 

both arduous and hazardous. Ground convoys, the primary 

source of resupply to forward locations, are significantly 

impacted by existing road systems and frequent attacks, 

factors that have driven a demand for more airlift. 

The current tactical airlift system, although effective, 

lacks sufficient numbers and the responsiveness and flexibility required by the fielded forces. The fixed-wing airlift 

system is dependent upon limited runway availability and 

the accuracy of imprecise airdrop systems servicing challenging troop positions. Meanwhile, range, environmental 

considerations, speed, and payload limitations significantly 

affect the limited number of lift helicopters. Enemy activity/

threats, weather, crew availability, and aircraft availability 

further affect all airlift assets. Making matters worse, an 
12

insufficient number of tactical lift assets is available to fulfill the lift needs.29

While the current logistical system has served the United 

States well, current and emerging threats and resource 

availability have made the continuation of existing practices extremely costly. What is needed is a system that is 

more responsive and capable of meeting the war fighter’s 

needs with minimal risk to aircrew and expensive aircraft. 

The answer to this dilemma will most likely require a logistical paradigm shift.

Notes

1. In accordance with HQ AF Flight Standards Agency Message A3A10-01–Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Terminology Clarification, 14 

January 2010, “Unmanned aerial vehicles” (UAV) will now be referred to as 

“remotely piloted aircraft” (RPA). When referencing the entire system (i.e., 

RPA and GCS), the system will be referred to as an unmanned aircraft 

system (UAS). The terms unmanned and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) 

will be used throughout this paper when the term is part of a formal title, 

a program description, is used in a direct quote of another source, or references its use in another document. RPA will be used in all other cases. 

2. Taylor, Jane’s Book of Remotely Piloted Vehicles.

3. NOVA, “Time Line of UAVs.”

4. McDaid and Oliver, Smart Weapons, 131; and Deets and Purifoy, 

Operational Concepts for Uninhabited Tactical Aircraft, 12-3.

5. Demetrius Glass (Logistics Management Specialist, Army Logistics 

Innovation Agency, Army G4), interview by the author, 14 January 2010. 

Glass was previously assigned to the Mobility Airlift Command, Air Staff, 

Joint Staff (J-4), and US Transportation Command.

6. Jernigan, to the author, e-mail, 10 December 2009. The e-mail contained information on typical combat logistics patrols for 1st Marine Logistics Group (Iraq 2006–2007) and 3d Marine Logistics Group (Afghanistan 

2008–2009). The e-mail attachment, “Typical Afghanistan CLP Breakdown,” included firsthand information on his units’ performance during 

these periods.

7. Jernigan, “Typical Afghanistan CLP Breakdown.”

8. Ibid.

9. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, Afghanistan had 16 paved 

and 35 unpaved runways (less than half the number of runways as can be 

found in Iraq). See Anderson, OEF, COPs, and Bases.xlsx. 

10. VTOL airlift refers to all fixed-wing, rotor-wing, tilt-rotor, and any 

other platforms capable of conducting a vertical take-off and landing.

11. Current doctrine calls for rotary-wing assets to fly always in formations of two or more aircraft regardless of the load being transported. This 

includes flights to move a small number of passengers of small cargo 

item(s) even if one or more of the aircraft will be empty. While this practice 
13

enhances force protection, it is expensive, inefficient, and increases maintenance requirements.

12. In Afghanistan from January to June 2009, civilian fixed-wing carriers flew 4,700 sorties (4,686 of which were STOL flights) as compared to 

just over 1,600 US military fixed-wing flights (i.e., C-5, C-17, and C-130) 

with average cargo loads of 1,166 lb. and 14,812 lb., respectively. 

13. Donald Anderson, YD-03 (assistant director, analyses, assessments, and lessons learned, AMC/A9), interview by the author, 19 January 2010. Data is based upon US Transportation Command Flying Hour 

and Monthly Activity Log spreadsheets provided by Anderson. 

14. 101st Sustainment Brigade, “Lessons Learned,” 1. 

15. 801st Brigade Support Battalion, “Lessons Learned,” 17.

16. 101st Sustainment Brigade, “Lessons Learned,” 1.

17. Benney et al., “Joint Medical Distance Support and Evaluation,” 3, 

5–7; Kauchak, “New Joint and Service Solutions”; and Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering Center, Precision Airdrop Technology 

Conference and Demonstration 2007.

18. Buxbaum, “Technological Advances.”

19. Anderson, interview. In Afghanistan alone, airdrop increased from 

approximately “2 million pounds in 2005 to 16.6 million pounds in 2008.”

20. Manske, Unmanned Airlift, 8.

21. Vice chief of staff Army/vice chief of staff Air Force, USAF Direct 

Support, 7.

22. Lichte, “Commander’s Intent,” 2. 

23. Maj Robert Hilliard, US Transportation Command/J3, to the author, 

e-mail, 16 February 2010. Actual quantities of supplies and personnel 

transported via rotor wing and ground transportation were unavailable 

due to limitations in the current logistical tracking systems. While US 

Transportation Command and Air Military Command track cargo airlifted 

via Air Force lift assets (to include airdrop), once the cargo is offloaded and 

transferred to the Army and Marine Corps at a forward supply location 

(e.g., Kandahar, Bagram, Baghdad, etc.), the cargo is considered “delivered 

to destination.” The “last tactical mile” movement of the supplies by rotor 

wing and ground transportation from this supply depot to other FOBs is 

tracked and kept by the individual units performing the supply movement 

(i.e., each combat air brigade maintains its own records). The lack of a 

central unifying database has made it virtually impossible to obtain reliable theaterwide intratheater cargo movement data. Without this data, an 

accurate comparison among quantities moved by airdrop, rotor wing, tilt 

rotor, and ground transport could not be made. 

24. Information obtained from the Air Force Safety Automated System 

(AFSAS), Navy Safety Center, and the Army Combat Readiness/Safety 

Center show that 36 of the 55 Army mishaps (resulting in 47 fatalities) 

involved cargo and troop-carrying aircraft. The remaining mishaps involved OH-58s and AH-64s. The overall spatial disorientation and visual 

obstruction mishaps for the Air Force, Army, and Navy/Marine Corps 

equaled 70 mishaps and 64 fatalities.

25. O’Hanlon and Campbell, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables, 18.

26. iCasualties.org., “Operation Enduring Freedom.” 
14

27. Mission-specific cargo load information, to include airlift, airdrop, 

convoy data, and supplied locations, is classified. However, although some 

of the resources reviewed in preparation for this paper are classified, the 

material presented in this paper is unclassified to ensure widest dissemination. Specific classified load data is maintained by US Transportation 

Command and by each service’s logistical agencies. 

28. Under the Key West Agreement of 1948, which defined the functions of each service, the Army retained responsibility for ground operations, and the Air Force was given responsibility of air operations. Particularly, the Army retained responsibility for ground operations to include 

ground-based air defense, but it relinquished the role of close air support, 

strategic airlift, and tactical airlift to the Air Force and sealift to the Navy. 

The Air Force gained the responsibility for strategic airlift, tactical airlift, 

close air support, strategic aerial warfare, and defense of the United States 

against aerial attack. The Navy was allowed to retain the Marine Corps 

(along with its aviation arm) and its own aircraft for air transportation. In 

the time since the Key West Agreement, the Air Force has, for the most 

part, moved from the tactical airlift role (outside the support provided by 

the C-130 and C-17) while the Army has filled this niche with its rotorwing fleet. See Maj David D. Dyche, Air Force, Military Reorganization. 

29. Hayes, “MAF/SOF/Helo Assignments.” In addition to there being 

insufficient assets in theater as of the end of 2009, the Air Force has a 

rated-officer deficit of 1,520 and will have an expected deficit of 1,836 in 

2014.
15

Chapter 2

Operational Requirements

[The] DOD appears to have addressed its strategic 

airlift gap, but there is a potential future tactical 

airlift gap.

—US Government Accountability Office 10-67

“Defense Acquisitions”

November 2009

Time sensitive/mission critical mission requirements create demand for delivery of equipment, 

supplies, and personnel that are generally nonroutine in nature and must be delivered to the point 

of need/point of effect in an accelerated time. 

These demands require the lift capacity to be supremely responsive to the supported commander’s 

immediate operational or tactical priorities. TS/MC 

demands cannot routinely be accommodated via 

the planned resupply and movement processes 

where efficiency is the primary consideration.

—Department of Defense (DOD)

Quadrennial Roles and

Missions Review Report

January 2009

By request of the DOD, the Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) conducted a study to “(1) identify the status of 

the DOD’s modernization and acquisition efforts and (2) determine how well the DOD is addressing any capability 

gaps and redundancies.”1 While conducting the study, the 

GAO determined that the DOD had addressed identified 

strategic airlift gaps but had failed to adequately address a 

potential tactical airlift gap. The report, released 12 November 2009, states that although the DOD currently fulfills the 

medium tactical-airlift requirements with the C-17 and the 

C-130, considering access limitations, this is an insufficient 

long-term solution.2 The current plan is to replace the C-17 

with the C-27J in this role, but the C-27J is not expected to 

be operational for at least another 15 years. Furthermore, 
16

questions remain regarding whether the C-27J will fulfill 

the DOD’s medium-lift needs, especially with a reduction 

in aircraft from 78 to 38 and its inability to perform VTOL.3

Unfortunately, these options fail to address the fact that 

approximately only 19 percent of supplied locations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan are accessible by fixed-wing aircraft 

(except by airdrop) and even fewer by C-130 or larger aircraft.4 Granted this statistic is only for current operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, but planning for tomorrow’s fight 

cannot ignore the fact that the United States has a long 

history of having troops operating in relatively inaccessible 

locations with poor logistical infrastructures (e.g., Korea, 

Vietnam, Africa, Afghanistan, Pacific Islands, and South 

and Central America). 

Furthermore, while the study addresses the movement 

of such large equipment as the Stryker and future mediumweight armored vehicles in theater, it does not address the 

need nor the methods used to supply troops who are geographically separated from runways. Additionally, it does 

not address the significant number of resupply flights to 

forward operating locations carrying relatively light loads 

(less than 3,000 lb.). This predictable and routine requirement is currently being fulfilled by ground vehicles and a 

limited number of VTOL aircraft, assets that could be used 

for larger loads, troop transport, and more complicated 

missions.

In addition, considering the relative successes terrorists 

and insurgents have had with IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan 

regarding attrition of forces and influencing public opinion, 

it is reasonable to expect that these tactics will continue in 

future conflicts. It is also reasonable to expect a persistent 

requirement to secure our lines of communication and to 

reduce the risk to US and allied service members via tactical airlift of personnel and equipment. Unfortunately, current supply movement requirements exceed airlift capabilities as evidenced by the United States’ near-maximum use 

of available airlift assets and its continued dependence 

upon ground and contract transport for a majority of its 

supply needs. These requirements for increased tactical 

airlift will require a shift in current tactical airlift doctrine 

and inventory. 
17

The Search for an RPA Solution

In May 2005 the Senate Armed Services Committee Report 109-69, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2006, stated that “the committee notes that dedicated 

unmanned aerial vehicles for movement of equipment and 

supplies could support Army expeditionary forces while reducing logistics, procurement, and operational costs.”5 It 

went on to direct the secretary of the Army to investigate 

and report findings regarding requirements, technical feasibility, and the cost of integrating remotely piloted aircraft 

systems for resupply into the future force unmanned aviation concepts of aerial vehicles.6

In October 2007 the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 highlighted the congressional preference for unmanned systems on the battlefield. It also required certification that an unmanned 

system is incapable of meeting the needs of the Department of Defense for acquisition of a manned system to 

proceed. The secretary of defense was also required to 

identify “missions and mission requirements, including 

mission requirements for the military departments and 

joint mission requirements, for which unmanned systems 

may replace manned systems” and to identify “a strategy 

and schedules for the replacement of manned systems 

with unmanned systems in the performance of the [identified] missions” (appendix 2, section 941, addresses the 

DOD policy on unmanned systems).7

In January 2008 Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) received a tasking from the Army Training 

and Doctrine Command to support the Army’s obligation to 

respond to the 2005 congressional tasking (109-69). Less 

than two months later, CASCOM produced a short paper, 

Logistics Re-supply Role of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

(UAS) Concept of Employment/ DOTMLPF Analysis, describing logistics roles for UASs. This document also included an 

initial concept of employment and a doctrine, organization, 

training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) analysis. The paper established a foundation for a more extensive analysis of logistics missions for UASs and their integration into the Army’s 

future modular force. In August 2008 CASCOM obtained 
18

funding from the Department of the Army (DA) G-4 to support the Army Regulation 5-5 study focusing on a UAS resupply role. At the same time, DA G-4 also funded a concurrent RAND study that concentrated on other logistics 

applications for UASs.8

The Marine Corps followed suit shortly thereafter followed by the Air Force. The 18 May 2009 United States Air 

Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047, 

signed by the secretary of the Air Force, Michael B. Donley, 

and the Air Force chief of staff, Gen Norton A. Schwartz, 

proposes UASs as a means to “increase the percentage of 

assets available for operations due to the distributive nature.” In addition to highlighting several desired attributes, 

it forecasts the acquisition of an MQ-L, a large RPA capable 

of “ISR, EW communications gateway and air mobility operations” by 2020.9 Subsequent discussions, however, suggest that an actual employment date (for at least a tactical 

lift UAS) would occur far sooner. Then, on 25 September 

2009 AMC/A7 and A8 released a request for information 

(RFI) for unmanned cargo aircraft to build a forum for discussion on the subject and as a means to assess current 

and emerging technologies. The ensuing unmanned intratheater airlift conference not only reviewed existing technologies and concepts but also helped to set the groundwork for establishing potential joint requirements.10

The Requirements

It is worth noting that to date, no formal list of tactical 

airlift capability gaps, or “needs,” has been officially released by the Air Force or the Army. The Marine Corps has, 

however, released the Universal Needs Statement (UNS) for 

the Cargo Unmanned Aircraft System (Cargo UAS), dated 27 

August 2008. Considering this document and the arguments made through various mediums, including the AMC 

Unmanned Intra-Theater Airlift Conference (17–18 November 2009), the author proposes the following “needs” for 

consideration:

1. Increase responsiveness through on-demand airlift 

for small loads (less than 3,000 lb.)11
19

2. Remove, or at least reduce, the number of supply 

trucks on the road

3. Mitigate the impact of tactical airlift aircraft and aircrew shortages (without significantly increasing 

carbon footprint)

4. Increase airlift capacity, accuracy, and responsiveness of delivery (without significantly increasing 

manpower)12

The bottom line is that the fielded force needs more, or at 

least an improved, tactical airlift. With the exception of predictable resupply needs (e.g., food, water, and toiletries), 

many MC and TS needs arise that require timely fulfillment. 

Unfortunately, regularly scheduled resupply routes may 

prove too inflexible, and airdrop frequently takes too long 

from request for delivery. Regarding airdrop, several locations (e.g., ridgelines, mountainsides, along bodies of water, 

populated areas, and inside a besieged compound), including forces engaged in close contact with the enemy, cause 

airdrop to be too imprecise and too dangerous. In these 

cases, accuracy of a few meters on a pallet containing essential supplies could mean the difference between success 

or failure or survival. What is needed is an accurate, flexible, 

and timely delivery system.

While the logistical system currently in use by the DOD 

is robust and capable for a Cold War conflict, it presently 

struggles to meet the demands of irregular warfare as being 

prosecuted today, especially for the last tactical mile. Not 

surprisingly, the locations and types of operations conducted by each service have led to a diverse set of tactical 

airlift requirements. In fact, each service has established its 

own set of requirements (appendix 3) for an MQ-A tailored 

for their specific needs. 

Considering the DOD’s ever-increasing joint focus and 

its limited budget, it is highly likely and arguably preferable 

that a single multifunctional platform be acquired that fulfills all the needs of each service. With this in mind, table 1 

summarizes the most stringent service requirements that 

must be achieved if all identified service needs are to be 

met. This is not to say that these are the only requirements 
20

but rather that they are tactical airlift RPA requirements 

previously identified by each service. 

Future tactical airlift assets must consider potential 

needs and requirements, not simply the needs of a single 

service. This requires designing a platform to address the 

limitations outlined in chapter 1, the needs outlined in 

chapter 2, and the service-specific requirements summarized in table 1. Airlift assets must also consider the requirements outlined in the United States Air Force UnTable 1. Joint RPA Requirements

Joint Requirement

Transport & 

Storage

Can fit inside 20 feet TEU ISO Containers and a C-17 

with minimal disassembly

Ship Operations Amphibious with small footprint

Assembly & 

Operation

Quick assembly

Radius @ 1600-lb. 

payload

500 nautical miles (nm) with 0.5 hours on station with 

cargo and a 2-hour intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) loiter time

Cargo Carriage Internal and external carrying capability with no external 

loading equipment required

Speed > 250 knots

Payload Up to 3,000 pounds

Operations Autonomous, semiautonomous, land via soldier signal, 

beacon or at preset LZ, reusable, autonomous collision 

avoidance, contingency management

VTOL Landing 

footprint

Small, small for ships, urban ops, roads, FARPS & 

FOBs, unprepared surfaces

VTOL Ops Altitudes 12K Density (750 pounds, 75 nm radius RFP)

En-route Ops 

Altitudes

Cruise at altitudes outside range of most ground threats 

(antiaircraft artillery [AAA], surface-to-air missile, small 

arms), able to avoid highly congested altitudes

Protection Small arms, large-caliber AAA, CBRN

Operation & 

Maintenance

Rugged, reliable & low-maintenance hours/flight hour, 

“Flying Truck”

Mission Multirole capable based upon attached module (airlift, 

ISR, electronic warfare [EW], close air support [CAS])

Price Affordable, attrition acceptable (Air Mobility Command 

suggested $10M)

Source: The individual service requirements can be found in appendix 3, Service RPA 

Requirements.
21

manned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009–2047. Most 

notably, future RPAs must be “multi-mission, all weather, 

net-centric, modular, [with] open architecture,” capable of 

carrying standard loads, and potentially having an optionally manned capability.13 Underlying all these attributes is 

a need to be responsive, flexible, safe, survivable, inexpensive, and reliable.

One of the advantages and shortcomings of manned aircraft is their ability to be responsive to rapidly changing 

requirements. Pilots are able to process a changing environment, assess changing requirements, determine the 

best course of action, and execute the adjusted plan. Another important aspect of responsiveness is the ability to 

have assets available to execute a mission when and where 

required. Unfortunately, however, environmental and enemy 

hazards coupled with crew rest requirements can result in 

manned aircraft not being available when required. 

To ensure mission success, an MQ-A should be able to 

enhance the capabilities available through manned platforms. 

For example, a fleet of autonomous or semiautonomous 

RPAs would not be restricted by the aforementioned aircrew limitations or a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) environment, thus 

making on-demand resupply a reality in diverse conditions. 

Having a semiautonomous RPA would also allow the aircraft to be retasked en route if required through the ground 

control station (GCS) or fielded forces via a portable uplink 

device (such as a personal digital assistant [PDA]). This 

MQ-A may be used to change a landing zone, put the aircraft in a holding pattern pending more favorable landing 

conditions, change missions (dependent upon on board 

modules), change routes, avoid obstacles/hazards, avoid 

ground threats, or return to base if the mission needs to be 

aborted. Given adequate sensors, an RPA can even achieve 

a sufficient amount of situational awareness to be fully autonomous in a rapidly changing environment, thereby further enhancing platform responsiveness and survivability 

while reducing manning requirements. A long-endurance 

time would further improve the aircraft’s operational flexibility, a key factor in future operations.

Mission flexibility is largely a product of having a modularbased design. Modularity, the ability of a system’s compo-
22

nents to be separated and recombined, allows a system to 

change missions based upon a selected payload. For example, attaching cargo pods to a given platform allows the 

RPA to be used for cargo transport while attaching ISR sensors, and weapons would allow the aircraft to be used in an 

armed reconnaissance role. Replacing the weapons with extra fuel tanks extends the persistence of the ISR platform 

over the selected target area. The potential also exists (given 

a large enough platform) to include or attach a cockpit and 

passenger module, thereby allowing the aircraft to transport passengers and operate in the existing international 

civil aviation organization (ICAO) national airspace systems 

(NAS) (including the United States). Effectively, aircraft capabilities and payloads can be tailored and scaled to meet 

specific mission requirements. However, to maximize the 

potential effects of a modular design, the system must also 

have an open architecture, thereby allowing components to 

be purchased from multiple suppliers/designers without 

proprietary concerns or expenses.

Critical to its ability to be customizable and flexible to 

mission needs is the aircraft’s operations envelope. The 

most essential capability, considering the environments in 

which it will be operating and the limited accessibility of 

fielded forces, is VTOL. Another essential capability is an 

ability to operate at high speeds (resulting in shorter transit 

times and greater responsiveness), long ranges, and high 

altitudes (for threat avoidance, a more efficient transit, and 

mountain operations). To better meet Army and Marine 

Corps requirements, the aircraft should have the capability 

to carry a slung (oversized) load and must be able to load 

and unload its payload without the aid of external equipment. It must also be operable by both trained aircrew and 

the fielded forces that will be loading and/or unloading the 

airlifted cargo. Most importantly, it must be able to take off 

and land autonomously.

Another key aspect of any platform, manned or unmanned, is that it must be safe to operate. Regarding an 

RPA, the ground personnel who will launch, service, and 

recover the aircraft is of greater concern than is the flight 

crew. The aircraft’s downwash must be conducted at velocities and temperatures suitable for humans to work in as 

must the engine noise levels. The aircraft must be able to 
23

land at a designated location reliably with little risk to 

ground forces operating in the immediate vicinity.14 Landing successfully will require it to have redundant systems, 

which will enable the aircraft to function and complete its 

mission in a hostile environment where satellite communication with the GCS is unavailable (lost link) and small 

arms fire may be encountered. This landing procedure 

must include the capability to operate in adverse weather 

conditions (to include brownout and whiteout conditions) 

and in conditions where visual, vestibular, or somatosensory 

hazards have traditionally resulted in large numbers of 

manned mishaps. It must also include all necessary sensors and autonomous maneuver capabilities to sense and 

avoid both airborne and ground hazards (including but not 

limited to aircraft, power lines, trees, buildings, and potentially even hostile fire). In other words, it must be survivable 

and reliable in all environments.

Regardless of an aircraft’s capabilities, the less time an 

aircraft spends on the line, the less effective the system is. 

As such, an MQ-A must have a high reliability and utilization rate regardless of the operating environment. The 

avoidance of technologies or components that traditionally 

have high maintenance rates will help to increase reliability 

rates. Utilizing simple and proven systems and technologies will also help to reduce maintenance requirements and 

costs while increasing reliability and utilization rates. To 

ensure mission flexibility and responsiveness, the MQ-A 

must have a higher reliability rate than manned aircraft.

Despite how autonomous, survivable, and reliable the 

system may be, some aircraft ultimately will be lost. In effect, that is one of the advantages of utilizing an RPA instead of a manned aircraft: the ability to fly a mission in 

conditions that are considered unsuitable or too hazardous 

for manned aircraft to operate in hostile CBRNE, adverse 

weather, or outside a crew-rest window. As such, the cost of 

an MQ-A must be low enough that the fear of its loss is not 

sufficient to preclude using it in hostile (or even friendly) 

environments. In addition to the RPA itself being inexpensive, the entire system (including the GCS, support equipment, maintenance, and daily operating expenses) must 

also be low enough so as not to make the acquisition of the 

system cost prohibitive. 
24

While inexpensive is a relative term requiring further 

quantification by the DOD, AMC has proposed $10 million 

as a starting figure for the platform. This figure does not 

include specialized mission modules. To help keep the cost 

down and maintain a high reliability rate, an MQ-A must 

have a simple construction and a design that is both inexpensive to maintain and easy to repair. Reducing the system complexity, minimizing the number of moving parts, 

and using off-the-shelf or easily and inexpensively fabricated components are additional considerations. 

To help keep replacement costs down and availability 

rates high, the RPA must be recoverable and reusable. Requiring supplied troops to carry the delivery vehicle with 

them degrades the performance of the fielded force. Likewise, requiring another manned flight to rendezvous with 

the fielded forces to extract the vehicle degrades overall 

mission effectiveness as it diverts that resource from another mission-essential task and slows down the operations 

tempo of the fielded forces. As neither option is acceptable, 

the RPA must be able to return to its main base of operations autonomously or semiautonomously with a short 

turnaround time. 

Summary

The environment MAF forces will operate in and 

the threats they will face are rapidly changing. The 

expeditionary nature of our primary customers, 

the U.S. Army and Marine forces, and their increased numbers stress the importance of MAF 

forces in meeting our national strategy. We find the 

majority of today’s air operations in theater are 

MAF missions and we can anticipate the high operations tempo for MAF forces will continue for the 

near term.

—Gen Arthur J. Lichte

Air Mobility Master Plan: 2010

A key to success is having the right personnel and materiel at the right place at the right time. This requires an efficient use of mobility assets. Assets that are under- or inap-
25

propriately utilized (i.e., carrying low-priority cargo rather 

than high-priority cargo or carrying cargo that is more appropriately transported through other means) can ultimately 

result in forces that are less effective or even ineffective.

Regardless of the method used to transport personnel 

and supplies to the customer, the supplies must arrive on time, 

where needed, and in sufficient quantity to meet the needs 

of the customer. Unfortunately, the current tactical lift segment of the distribution chain is insufficient to support the 

current demand. Resource availability/limitations and troop 

accessibility form a magnitude of problems for the delivery 

of required supplies and personnel. The call for increased 

airlift to improve timeliness of cargo delivery and to reduce 

the threat to ground personnel has also increased demands 

and risks upon aircrew. With that being said, aircrew and 

aircraft limitations coupled with a desire to expose fewer 

ground and flight personnel to risks make the addition of 

more manned aircraft to the theater an unviable option. 

Budget constraints leading to fewer large, expensive aircraft being purchased and sustained will require a more 

efficient use of available resources in an environment requiring greater airlift. This will require a modification of 

how current assets are utilized and/or the acquisition of 

additional airlift assets. The only way to increase airlift capacity (with existing assets) without significantly increasing 

our carbon footprint in the AOR is to reallocate asset usage. 

For example, increasing the number of fixed-wing airdrops, 

increasing general airlift ops tempos, and maximizing the 

use of available cargo capacity will all contribute to greater 

airlift capacity and efficiency. However, this will increase 

demands upon aircrew and aircraft resulting in increased 

risk to personnel and expedited aging of utilized airlift assets. It may also have a negative impact upon the movement of small packages and passengers within the theater.

With this in mind and considering the aforementioned 

restraints and requirements, the study argues that the best 

option would be to augment the existing lift capabilities 

with an inexpensive, autonomous/semiautonomous remotely 

piloted tactical VTOL airlift platform capable of meeting the 

current and forecast lift needs of the DOD. This option 

would provide enhanced, responsive, flexible, safe, surviv-
26

able, and inexpensive airlift without significantly increasing 

manpower requirements. 

Notes

1. US GAO, Defense Acquisitions.

2. Ibid., 33–34.

3. Ibid., 10–11.

4. Anderson, OEF, COPs, and Bases.xlsx.

5. US Senate, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 237.

6. Ibid.

7. US House, John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2007, 282.

8. Demetrius Glass (logistics management specialist, US Army Logistics Innovation Agency, US Army G4), interview by the author, 14 January 

2010; and US Army Combined Arms Support Command, Logistics Re-supply 

Role of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. 

9. US Air Force, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009–2047, 40.

10. AMC, Unmanned Intratheater Airlift Conference, conducted at Scott 

AFB, IL, 17–18 November 2009. Conference attendees included representatives from US Transportation Command, US Joint Forces Command, Air 

Staff A2U and A5X, Air Mobility Command, AF Research Laboratory, AF 

Squadron Officer College, Aeronautical Systems Center, US Army Training 

and Doctrine Command, US Combined Arms Support Command, Army 

Medical, Army G4, Office of Naval Research, Naval Air Systems Command, 

US Marine Corps, National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA), US 

Air Force Academy, Air Command and Staff College and 11 private RPA 

contractors. The purpose was to discuss potential requirements for an 

unmanned intratheater airlifter, to determine whether AMC should pursue an unmanned tactical airlifter, and to gain an appreciation for current 

and emerging UAS technologies. US Transportation Command’s future deployment and distribution assessment group, the US Army’s UAS Working 

Group, the Air Force’s UAS Working Group, and the Marine Corps’s UAS 

Requirements office are also investigating/considering using unmanned 

cargo platforms.

11. Requirements are based upon comments made by Army, Marine 

Corps, and Air Force personnel in attendance at the Unmanned Intratheater Airlift Conference, sponsored by the Air Mobility Command, and 

through e-mail and phone conversations after the conference. Conference 

attendees are listed in note 10. 

12. In Afghanistan from January to June 2009, civilian VTOL aircraft 

transported an average of 3,357 lb. of cargo per mission. Military VTOL 

cargo lift statistics were unavailable.

13. US Air Force, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009–2047, 33.

14. Significant hazards that must be considered include, but are not 

limited to, rotor contact, exhaust burns, noise levels, aircraft movement, 

and loss of controlled flight during approaches and landings. 
27

Chapter 3

Technology Review/Proof of Concept

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and the effects 

they provide have emerged as one of the most “in demand” capabilities the USAF provides the Joint Force. 

The attributes of persistence, endurance, efficiency, 

and connectivity are proven force multipliers across 

the spectrum of global Joint military operations.

—Michael B. Donley

Secretary of the Air Force

There is no longer any question of the technical viability and operational utility of UAVs. . . . The 

Task Force feels it is time for the DOD and the Services to move forward and make UAVs and UCAVs 

[unmanned combat air vehicles] an integral part 

of the force structure.

—Maj Gen Kenneth Israel

USAF, Retired

Cochair, Defense Science

Board Task Force on UAVs

and UCAVs

Modern ISR platforms (including but not limited to the 

US Air Force’s Predator, Reaper, Global Hawk, and Sentinel 

aircraft) have repeatedly demonstrated the utility, reliability, 

and survivability of remotely piloted platforms in both hostile and nonhostile environments. Recent use of armed 

Predators and Reapers has further demonstrated the advantages of having persistent, remotely piloted armed ISR 

platforms in combat and has effectively secured a place for 

RPAs in the modern and future battlefields. 

System Requirements

To realize a maximum benefit from a remotely piloted 

cargo platform, the MQ-A must be able to perform most, if 

not all, functions autonomously while maintaining the capability to retask or operate the vehicle remotely to effect 
28

mission changes when and where required. The aircraft 

must be able to be loaded and unloaded safely by ground 

personnel in all types of environments with minimal training. It must be capable of performing autonomous VTOL to 

and from forward flight with the ability for fielded forces to 

adjust the landing zone based upon the changing environment. While traveling en route between the supply location 

and the fielded forces, it must be able to navigate accurately to its destination, at the same time avoiding known 

ground threats (including obstacles and enemy troop formations) and airborne threats (including other aircraft) 

while carrying a cargo load and traveling at speeds far in 

excess of ground movement. It must also be able to quickly 

change roles based upon preloaded modules (e.g., cargo, 

ISR package, weapons, fuel tanks, and manned cockpit), 

and it must be able to accomplish this feat safely with little 

to no threat to ground personnel. 

As basic RPA functionality (to include autonomous, semiautonomous, and remotely piloted operations) has already 

been demonstrated through an assortment of existing 

fielded systems, this study does not address the feasibility 

of these features. What remains, however, is whether the 

technology exists to make the leap from current ISR platforms to fully autonomous or semiautonomous remotely 

piloted airlift platforms a reality in the near future and if 

not, to determine what is required. 

Based upon the aforementioned requirements, the primary 

technologies of concern involve (1) multifunctionality (e.g., 

armed/unarmed ISR, and cargo), (2) propulsion, (3) fielded 

force landing-zone (LZ) modification, (4) autonomous VTOL, 

(5) threat avoidance, (6) collision avoidance, (7) autonomous 

or semiautonomous route creation and modification, (8) automating manned aircraft, and (9) safety, although the latter 

is more of a factor of design than technology. 

Multifunctional/Modular

The functionality of any system is based upon the system’s design and components. Just as current manned systems can be used for multiple roles (e.g., the B-52 is being 

used as an ISR and weapons delivery platform, C-130 for 

cargo/troop transport and ordnance delivery, particularly 
29

the massive ordnance air blast [MOAB]), so can an RPA 

have multiple roles. The key is that the design of the system 

must include the ability to perform multiple roles. Take, for 

example, the MQ-1B, which fired its first Hellfire missile on 

21 February 2001. The Hellfire was originally designed as 

an ISR platform, and the addition of hard points and fire 

capabilities converted its platform from a nonlethal observer to a potential tank killer. This mission role change, 

however, does not prevent the system from being used in an 

ISR role. In this case the aircraft can be launched with a 

full load of fuel, or it can trade a few hours of flight time for 

a few Hellfire missiles.1

In a similar fashion, a basic RPA can be constructed to 

meet the specified joint performance requirements, and 

later its mission can be dictated by the modules that are 

attached to it before departure. For example, cargo can be 

transported on one mission in an external cargo module, 

and then the cargo module can be exchanged with an ISR 

module for the next mission. The ISR module can also be 

augmented with additional fuel or ordnance. Another module 

option might include a communications package that would 

allow the platform to serve as a communications relay station. Given a sufficiently large RPA frame, a manned cockpit module can be added to allow it to fly freely in the NAS, 

carry passengers, or perform complicated missions. The 

key, of course, is a modularly designed platform.

Propulsion

To be effective in all required operating environments, the 

MQ-A must be equipped with a propulsion system that is 

not only VTOL-capable but also able to operate at high altitudes (above most ground threats and in mountainous terrain) and speeds (> 250 knots). The four primary technologies 

that currently provide VTOL capability include (1) airships, 

(2) rotor wing, (3) tilt-rotor, and (4) ducted fan.2 This paper 

does not discuss airships, since they currently are unable 

to attain the required forward velocities (and arguably the 

required maneuverability and lift). 

Currently, most airlift-to-fixed-wing-inaccessible locations are serviced by rotor-wing aircraft. With respect to 

rotor-wing unmanned platforms, the MQ-18 (utilizing a 
30

four-rotor-blade design) can fly for more than 18 hours unrefueled, hover at 20,000 feet, and carry up to 2,500 lb.3 As 

this technology is proven (in both manned and unmanned 

platforms) and widely known, it does not warrant further 

discussion here with respect to proof of concept in this 

study. However, this technology does have limitations. 

Foremost is forward velocity. Aerodynamic limitations restrict rotor-wing aircraft to a forward velocity of approximately 250 knots.4 This rotor-wing speed limitation, however, can be overcome with special high-speed blades or a 

stowed rotor design.

Stowed rotor aircraft use a rotor wing to function as a 

helicopter during takeoff and landing phases of flight and 

another propulsion system for forward flight (either jet or 

propeller). Upon reaching a safe altitude after takeoff, a 

stowed rotor aircraft transitions to its cruise propulsion 

system and “stows” the rotor blades for the en route segment of flight. Upon reaching its approach or descent point, 

the aircraft slows, deploys its rotor, transitions to the rotor 

wing for primary flight, and performs a vertical landing. 

Slowed rotor technologies provide a slight variation of this 

simply by disengaging the rotors from the transmission after transitioning to the forward propulsion system. This 

method allows the rotors to auto rotate and still provide 

some rotational lift to supplement the wings, but they no 

longer are the primary means of propulsion. The rotors are 

reengaged for landing when the aircraft slows to a safe operating range. In September 1998 Carter Aviation Technologies 

completed its first successful flight of a five-seat slowed-rotor 

compound aircraft and demonstrated several advantages 

over conventional helicopters.5 The CarterCopter Technology 

Demonstrator has since achieved speeds in excess of 150 

knots with future models expected to reach speeds up to 

435 knots.6

Such tilt-rotor aircraft as Bell Boeing’s V-22 use two or 

more rotor-wing systems to take off vertically in the same 

manner as a helicopter but then rotate to a forward-flight 

configuration to effectively convert the aircraft from a helicopter into a traditional propeller aircraft. The rotors then 

rotate back to a vertical configuration for landing. The V-22 

is able to lift up to 20,000 lb. of cargo internally or 15,000 
31

lb. in a slung-load configuration and can fly at altitudes up 

to 25,000 feet (aircraft is unpressurized).7

Ducted- or lift-fan technologies, although less commonly 

known, have been in existence for almost as long as tiltrotor aircraft. Ducted-fan aircraft use a standard forwardthrust turbojet or turbofan engine that provides forward 

thrust while in forward flight. However, when performing 

hover or VTOL, engine bleed or exhaust air (e.g., Northrop 

Grumman’s XV-5A), or an auxiliary drive shaft (e.g., Lockheed Martin F-35) is used to power multiple internal ducted 

fans or blowers that produce vertical thrust. Another option is 

to simply redirect the thrust produced by the primary engine 

through internal ducting to outflow valves (e.g., Boeing/

BAE AV-8B Harrier II). While in forward flight, the fans and 

valves are covered or put into an aerodynamic configuration, and the main engine provides forward thrust at speeds 

and altitudes equivalent to other jet aircraft.

In these aircraft, engine thrust dictates the amount of 

vertical lift and directional outflow valves, puffers, or louvers used to affect pitch, roll, and yaw. Ryan’s XV-5A (flown 

during the 1960s), for example, used lift fans powered by 

engine bleed air to provide vertical lift in the same manner 

as a standard helicopter without any exposed blades. While 

stability problems plagued early ducted-fan aircraft, current technologies make this propulsion system stable and 

less complex than standard rotor-wing and tilt-rotor propulsion systems. 

While all four propulsion systems are proven technologies and are able to provide VTOL capability, the aircraft 

requirements outlined in chapter 2 tend to favor some technologies over others. For example, stowed rotor aside, the 

standard rotor-wing and tilt-rotor aircraft tend to be limited 

in forward speed and altitude. They also have large ground 

footprints (due to blade length), which in turn limit potential landing zones. The exposed blades also present a safety 

hazard to ground personnel operating in the immediate vicinity of an idling aircraft (particularly in areas of uneven 

terrain). The exhaust of tilt-rotor engines also creates a significant safety hazard. While the engine is in the VTOL configuration, engine exhaust is ported to the ground at temperatures in excess of several hundred degrees Celsius. 
32

Ducted- or lift-fan aircraft, on the other hand, have several advantages. Ducted-fan aircraft, like traditional rotorwing aircraft, have low downwash temperatures.8 Unlike 

rotor-wing aircraft, however, they have no exposed rotor 

blades, can quickly shut down or hide the lift fans by cutting off the exhaust air to the fans and/or by closing the 

access doors, thereby eliminating downwash while on the 

ground, and don’t have complicated, heavy transmission 

systems like rotor and tilt-rotor aircraft (reducing weight, 

maintenance requirements, and cost). Because they do not 

employ long rotor blades, ducted- or lift-fan aircraft have 

smaller footprints that allow them to operate in and out of 

more confined spaces. Additionally, in-wing ducted-fan designs fly at altitudes and speeds equivalent to jet aircraft.

Fielded Force Landing-Zone Modification

A distinct advantage of operating manned aircraft is the 

ability to adjust the mission execution when and where required. This includes the adjustment of a potential landing 

zone based upon the requirements of the dynamic environment. This need does not change when RPAs are introduced 

into this same environment. While pilots located in geographically separated GCS’s can alter the course, communication requirements between the ground personnel, aircrew, and aircraft make this option challenging at best.

To address this issue, Northrop Grumman, during the 

Agile Lion demonstration in December 2005, displayed the 

ability to establish an uplink/downlink to an airborne platform with a PDA using low-bandwidth iridium satellite 

communications (SATCOM) and ultra-high frequency (UHF) 

radio.9 During this exercise ground personnel were able to 

“ ‘pull’ [and] ‘push’ data-imagery, signals, intelligence, chat, 

e-mail [and] other information to and from a network of 

airborne and ground-based servers, allowing real-time collaboration among users.”10 In practice this makes it possible 

for fielded troops to download a graphic of the intended 

landing zone (sent to the PDA by the RPA), allow the receiver to approve or modify the landing zone, and then direct the aircraft to land or perform another action (such as 

return to base).11
33

Autonomous VTOL

The need for autonomous takeoff and landing capabilities stems from both technical and pilot limitations. Currently, due to bandwidth and data-transfer-rate limitations, 

RPAs that are not equipped with auto-land capabilities 

must be remotely piloted to the ground by a pilot or operator within line of sight of the target aircraft.12 Due to the 

nature of the proposed operations, having a GCS within 

visual range of each landing zone (for example on a forward 

ridgeline or in an urban environment) is not feasible. Furthermore, from a safety perspective, historically approximately 

25 percent of US Air Force Predator and Reaper Class A, B, 

and C mishaps occur from pilot error during the landing 

phase of flight.13

In addition to solving the bandwidth, pilot error, and potential signal jamming and disruption issues, an autonomous takeoff and landing system would also eliminate (or 

at least reduce) departure delays due to communication, 

aircrew coordination, and crew rest requirements, thereby 

increasing mission flexibility. An autonomous VTOL platform utilizing nonoptical sensors would also be able to take 

off and land in such visually obscured conditions as a 

sandstorm (or brownout), snowstorm (or whiteout), and 

complete blackout conditions that would make manned 

flight extremely hazardous. This is not to say, however, that 

an aircrew can’t assume control or retask the aircraft in 

flight but simply that it must be able to take off and land 

without a pilot in direct control. 

While fixed-wing aircraft have been using auto-land systems for years, VTOL auto-land systems have taken a few 

more years to develop. However, in 2000 Bell Helicopter 

successfully demonstrated the maturity of autonomous VTOL 

technologies through its Bell Helicopter Textron’s Eagle Eye 

Tactical VTOL RPA. At the Yuma Proving Grounds, Arizona, 

the Eagle Eye tilt-rotor RPA demonstrator (TR911X) repeatedly and accurately flew a designated route to a “capture 

point,” where it picked up landing instructions, flew a glide 

slope off of the UAV common automatic recovery system 

(UCARS) to within 15 feet where it transitioned from forward flight to a hover and then landed within two feet of the 

target landing point during all 10 attempts (average dis-
34

tance was less than one foot).14 The Northrop Grumman 

MQ-8B Navy Fire Scout is another example of an RPA that 

is capable of autonomous takeoffs and landings from any 

surface to include aviation capable warships.15

Threat and Collision Avoidance

A significant limitation of current RPAs is their ability to 

avoid threats. Threats can come in the form of hostile fire 

(e.g., small arms, antiaircraft artillery [AAA], and surfaceto-air missiles [SAM]), natural or man-made obstacles (e.g., 

terrain, vegetation, power lines, towers, and structures), 

weather, and other aircraft. To mitigate ground threats, the 

aircraft can operate at either altitudes or routes outside the 

effective range/reach of hazards, or it can employ threat 

detection/avoidance technologies (including countermeasures 

and threat-avoidance tactics/maneuvers). To avoid other 

threats, it must employ sense-and-avoid technologies.

Several threat detection and avoidance systems currently 

are employed on US aircraft. The use of a module or pod 

equipped with a directional infrared countermeasures system and/or other suppression/countermeasures can help 

to reduce the risk to the MQ-A in a variety of threat environments. When linked into the flight control system, the 

aircraft can autonomously execute evasive maneuvers 

faster than a manned platform. Alternate means of threat 

avoidance involve flying routes at altitudes that minimize the 

aircraft’s exposure to threats. 

For terrain avoidance, an assortment of technologies exists with sense-and-avoid potential hazards. For example, 

the automatic ground collision avoidance system (AutoGCAS) continuously monitors the aircraft’s performance 

and position relative to terrain (based upon loaded digital 

terrain elevation data) and automatically performs a recovery maneuver if the aircraft is put into a position where 

terrain impact is imminent within a given period. On the 

F-16, Auto-GCAS provides the pilot with a warning, and 

then, if the pilot does not take sufficient corrective action, it 

assumes control of the aircraft and puts it into a safe, 

wings-level attitude at a pitch necessary to avoid the identified obstacle. Once this flight regime is attained, control is 

returned to the pilot. During this system’s first flight tests 
35

in July–November 1998, it successfully recovered on all 316 

test cases (81 recreating past mishaps using flight data recorder data from the mishap aircraft).16 By May 2006 the 

system had been tested over 2,200 times with similar results.17

Auto-GCAS is scheduled to be installed on the US Air 

Force’s Block 40 and later F-16 aircraft starting in 2014.18

Wires and other manufactured obstacles present another 

significant hazard to low-flying aircraft. While difficult to 

see during daylight, thin wires tend to be virtually impossible to see at night, even with night vision goggles. EADS 

Defense Electronics’ Hellas system is a laser-based system 

that reliably detects even thin wires at a distance of 1,000 

meters. With a laser (which is harmless to the human eye), 

the system scans the area in front of the helicopter for obstacles. Detected obstacles are then presented in red on a 

depth and grey-scale image of the terrain in front of the 

aircraft to enable the pilot to observe and avoid obstacles 

that might otherwise be struck. This system is already being used by such foreign agencies as the Thai air force and 

the German federal police.19

Hazardous weather conditions present a constant threat 

to aircraft at nearly all altitudes. Hazardous weather detected by airborne radars can be avoided manually or automatically with weather detection/avoidance algorithms. Other 

hazardous conditions, such as icing, can be detected with 

such appropriate sensors as temperature and icing probes. 

How the aircraft avoids the threat depends upon the mode 

of operation, the airspace it is transiting, the conditions being encountered, and the aircraft’s phase of flight.

While operating in congested airspace (either in the combat AOR or in the national airspace system), the aircraft 

will need to be able to sense and avoid other aircraft. While 

traffic collision avoidance systems (TCAS) have been used 

by aircraft since the 1980s to detect other airborne aircraft, 

effectively enabling the pilot to take evasive maneuvers, 

this technology does not detect aircraft that are not transmitting an identification, friend or foe code. These aircraft, 

as well as those aircraft not transmitting their altitude, 

cannot be avoided by an automated system based upon 

TCAS. To counter this limitation, such companies as Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and Defense Research Associates 

(DRA) are working on sense-and-avoid technologies. While 
36

no systems are currently fully certified and operational, 

some success has been achieved in this field. For example, 

DRA, working with the US Air Force, has successfully developed and demonstrated a sense-and-avoid system that 

can detect small aircraft at distances far beyond the visual 

range of the human eye. This system uses a combination of 

optical sensors, processors, and collision-avoidance software to detect intruding aircraft and then warns the pilot of 

a potential conflict. This system, once fully operational, will 

enable RPAs to sense and avoid other aircraft and then execute autonomous evasive maneuvers.20

Autonomous or Semiautonomous 

Route Creation and Modification

Currently employed manned and remotely piloted aircraft 

use an assortment of mission-planning methods to determine the intended route of flight. A majority of current systems use one or more computer programs either to identify 

or to help identify and/or select a route of flight based upon 

known restrictions, hazards, or preferences.21 This route of 

flight is then loaded into the aircraft’s flight-management 

system either manually or automatically through a data transfer medium. Once in flight the aircraft can be directed to fly 

the predetermined route automatically (autonomous route 

following), or it can be modified in flight (semiautonomously) 

based upon revised information or direction. 

As the route of flight selection process is largely automated, a natural question arises: Does the route have to be 

determined by a person sitting at a computer terminal in a 

mission-planning facility, or can it be done on, or by, the 

aircraft? Being able to simply load a set of coordinates or a 

destination aerodrome ICAO identifier code into an aircraft’s flight management system (FMS) (equipped with 

flight planning software) would eliminate the need for a 

crew to transfer a route to the aircraft either wirelessly or 

manually. Such a system would allow for route modification by fielded forces after taking delivery to fulfill changing 

mission requirements without an in-depth knowledge of 

the airspace system. A simple “return to base” button would 

also make it possible for fielded forces to send the aircraft 

back to its origin by simply pressing a single button (or but-
37

ton combination). An internal fuel status monitor, similar 

to those on manned aircraft, should alert the individual 

modifying the flight plan if an insufficient quantity of fuel 

exists to perform the directed action. This should take into 

consideration the weight of the module being transported 

(either entered manually or calculated by the internal hoist/

locking system). This system should also prohibit departure until the condition has been resolved (i.e., the cargo is 

removed, or the aircraft is given a new location or more fuel).

With respect to en route navigation, current manned aircraft FMSs can also either modify a route of flight to precede directly to a follow-on point or return to a previous route 

of flight following evasive maneuvers (such as maneuvering 

around adverse weather or other air traffic). The same holds 

true for an automated system. This is simply a matter of 

utilizing an appropriate algorithm for the FMS to apply.

With a system that is capable of generating and flying a 

self-determined route, the question of full autonomy versus 

semiautonomy becomes a matter of preference rather than 

necessity. Such considerations may include the user’s level 

of trust in the system’s capabilities, available bandwidth, 

airspace being transited, and crew member availability. 

This is not to suggest that a positive control link can’t be 

established so a remote pilot can monitor and redirect the 

aircraft’s flight if required as is currently performed with 

the US Air Force’s R/MQ-1, RQ-4, and MQ-9 aircraft. 

Automating Manned Aircraft

While the current manned rotor-wing fleet is unable to 

fulfill many of the previously identified system requirements 

(e.g., speed), it has more than proven its ability to perform 

the tactical airlift mission. As such, one potential option is 

to modify surplus or existing manned platforms into remotely piloted platforms. Such an approach would take advantage of system capabilities, existing supply/maintenance 

infrastructures, and personnel familiarity. Exercising this 

option would also allow the aircraft to be flown manually 

(assuming the cockpit controls are not removed entirely) 

should the aircraft be required for a manned mission.

Converting manned aircraft into remotely piloted aircraft 

dates back to the two world wars when both sides converted 
38

bombers and other aircraft into remotely controlled cruise 

missiles or guided bombs. Later F-4 aircraft were converted 

into RQ-4s, but they are currently used as target drones. 

On 1 December 1984 the Federal Aviation Administration 

and the National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) 

crashed a remotely piloted Boeing 720 at Edwards AFB to test 

the fire-retarding capabilities of the FM-9 fuel additive.22 In 

December 2007 Boeing and the Air Force Research Laboratory demonstrated that a remotely piloted platform could 

aerially refuel. While the converted Learjet did not onload 

any fuel from the KC-135R, it successfully maneuvered autonomously among seven receiver positions that included 

20 minutes in the contact position.23 Other companies are 

making similar advancements with a variety of technologies 

for both receiver and tanker RPAs. In all cases the converted aircraft could be flown remotely or manually. 

A significant drawback of this approach, however, is that 

it does not address the extensive wear and tear to which the 

manned fleet is currently being subjected. Automating the 

aircraft could conceivably increase operational usage of 

these platforms without significantly increasing pilot requirements. However, aircraft availability (unless more aircraft are produced or returned to service) and increased 

maintenance requirements will need to be addressed. It is 

also conceivable that the additional aircraft usage could result in decreased platform life spans. Even more importantly, 

currently no platform can fulfill all the aforementioned joint 

requirements, resulting in some mission requirements remaining unfulfilled.

Safety

Safety is not something that is easily added to an existing 

system. In fact the best option includes safety considerations in the original design of the aircraft. In so doing, 

many safety hazards can actually be designed out of the 

aircraft, making the platform potentially safer than manned 

aircraft. Arguably the most significant safety concerns surrounding the MQ-A would encompass its propulsion system, obstacle and aircraft collision, lost link, component 

failure, takeoffs, and landings.
39

Exposed propeller blades, rotor blades, and jet-engine 

intakes create a significant hazard to ground personnel operating in the immediate vicinity of a running aircraft. On 

several occasions ground personnel have been injured 

(sometimes fatally) after being sucked into a jet engine or 

encountering a propeller or rotor blade. This includes both 

on the airport ramp and in the field. Exposed rotor blades 

have also encountered fixed and mobile obstacles during all 

phases of operation (startup, taxi, flight, takeoff, and landing) resulting in damage to the aircraft, damage to the object struck, and in some cases injury or death.

To help avoid propeller and rotor-blade contact, several 

methods can be employed. While in flight, sense-and-avoid 

technologies will keep the aircraft from known and detected 

obstacles. While on the ground, the rotor or propeller arc 

can be maintained well above the heads of personnel who 

would be operating around the aircraft. However, this does 

not protect personnel working near an aircraft operating on 

or next to sloping terrain. The rotor blades can also be 

shortened, creating a smaller footprint, or enclosed (as in 

the case of a fan in wing design). An easier, though less 

safe, design option would be to mark the rotor tips to make 

the rotor arc visible while in operation. 

Adopting a ducted-fan or Fenestron tail rotor design (e.g., 

RAH-66 and several Eurocopter aircraft) makes the tail rotor not only safer to ground personnel but also quieter, 

more efficient, and less susceptible to damage (e.g., foreign 

object damage [FOD] and tail strikes).24 A no-tail-rotor design, as used on medical helicopters, eliminates the tail rotor. This design uses ducted exhaust air routed through the 

tail boom to counter torque and aid in directional control.25

Another way to eliminate the need for a tail rotor is to incorporate counterrotating main rotor blades.

Adopting a ducted-fan-in-wing design would prevent personnel from being exposed to a rotating propeller/rotor by 

encasing the blade tips and then closing the exhaust louvers 

when idling on the ground. This design would necessitate, 

however, the use of a turbo-jet or turbo-fan engine to provide forward flight. The two primary hazards associated 

with a jet engine are the intake and the exhaust. By mounting the engine atop the fuselage (e.g., RQ-4), the risk of 

FOD and personnel being sucked into the intake is sig-
40

nificantly reduced. This design option can also reduce the 

engine’s heat signature from the ground.

Mid-air collisions with other aircraft, terrain, and ground 

obstacles pose a significant concern for not only remotely 

piloted aircraft but also manned aircraft. While as of 20 

January 2010 the US Air Force had experienced only one 

mid-air collision between an RPA and a manned aircraft, as 

more RPAs populate the skies, the risk of mid-air collisions 

will increase.26 The use of sense-and-avoid and obstacleavoidance technologies will help to mitigate this risk.

Lost link is another valid, though less significant, risk to 

personnel and machine. Before takeoff large RPAs are programmed with a specified mission (to include route) and 

basic flight rule and contingency information (i.e., what to 

do when a lost-link condition occurs). While lost-link conditions do occur, the number of mishaps caused by this condition is relatively insignificant. However, several aircraft 

have been lost due to meteorological conditions (e.g., icing) 

while executing lost-link procedures/routing (e.g., a pilot 

was unable to reroute the aircraft around hazardous weather). 

Designing the aircraft to autonomously operate in compliance with preloaded flight rules and avoid hazards during 

all phases of flight will eliminate nearly all chances of a 

mishap occurring due to a lost-link condition. Adding signal boosters and/or signal relay transmitters to other aircraft (e.g., E-3, E-8, high-altitude balloons, etc.) can also 

help to minimize lost-link occurrences and durations.27

A more likely mishap cause would be component failure. 

As with manned aircraft, aircraft components can and do 

fail for several reasons during all phases of flight. There 

have been many instances when a lost-link condition is a 

symptom, not a cause, of a more significant problem. For 

example, an electrical failure on the aircraft could result in 

the loss of its data link as well as other critical systems, 

eventually leading to aircraft loss. Minimizing the complexity 

of the aircraft (in design and operation) and having redundant systems will help to mitigate the risk of a mishap occurring due to a single-point failure.

In summary, the utilization of an autonomous VTOL capability would help to eliminate a significant number of 

manned and remotely piloted aircraft mishaps. As previously 

discussed, approximately 25 percent of Air Force R/MQ-1 
41

and MQ-9 Class A, B, and C mishaps from September 2001 

to January 2010 were due to pilot error during the landing 

phase of flight.28 Additionally, at least 70 helicopter mishaps, including 64 fatalities, have occurred in the OIF and 

OEF AORs alone between September 2001 and December 

2009 caused by spatial disorientation and/or visual obstructions (e.g., brownout, whiteout, etc.).29 Using autonomous 

VTOL functionality would eliminate human-factor-related 

RPA landing mishaps. It would also significantly reduce the 

number of manned aircraft mishaps by providing an alternate means of transport into and out of areas with hazardous conditions. That is not to suggest that this technology 

would eliminate all takeoff and landing mishaps. It does 

suggest that pilot error would no longer be a factor. For example, FOD ingestion or uneven landing-zone terrain could 

lead to a mishap. However, just as technology has matured 

so that routine and hazardous missions can be accomplished 

safely and more economically without the human element, 

landing-zone hazards can also be mitigated through landforce training and/or landing-zone preparation.

Notes

1. GlobalSecurity.org., “MQ-1B Armed Predator UAV.”

2. Other VTOL technologies include ejector fans, tilt shaft/rotor, tilt 

prop, tilt duct, tilt wing, tilt jet, deflected slipstream, vectored thrust, tail 

sitters, lift + cruise engines, lift + lift/cruise engines, and tip jets. 

3. MQ-18 is the military designation for the Boeing A160T Hummingbird. Another cargo RPA already deployed is the CQ-10A SnowGoose produced by MMIST. See STRATFOR, “US, Afghanistan”; Vogelaar, “Boeing 

A160T Unmanned Helicopter.”

4. GlobalSecurity.org., “Stopped-Rotor Aircraft.”

5. During flight tests between 1998 and 2008, the CarterCopter Technology Demonstrator (CCTD) became the only aircraft to achieve μ = 1 

(Mu-1). It has achieved a lift-to-drag ratio of 7 at 150 knots, twice as efficient as the best pure (noncompound) helicopters, and reached altitudes 

up to 10,000 feet. A new slowed-rotor compound prototype is under construction and is scheduled to fly in mid-2010. A primary objective of this 

follow-on prototype is to explore the high-speed cruise capabilities offered 

by this technology (> 250 knots) as well as lift to drag ratios in the 10–14 

range. See Jon Tatro, AAI Textron Industries Corporation (director, Advanced Concepts, New Products and Technologies, Unmanned Aircraft 

Systems), to the author, e-mail, 13 March 2010.

6. Carter, The CHT Slowed-Rotor/Compound Aircraft, 22.

7. Bell Boeing, V-22 Osprey Pocket Guide, 11.
42

8. In-wing-ducted fans use engine bleed or exhaust air to power the 

fan, but the vertical lift is generated using ambient air in the same manner 

as a traditional helicopter. In May 2009 Northrop Grumman conducted 

downwash temperature tests of engine exhaust air-powered in-wingducted fans and found the fan air temps to be low (unlike the ground temp 

issues associated with an F-35 or a V-22). Northrop Grumman’s ducted 

fan has turbine blades installed all along its outer perimeter. The exhaust 

duct leads to a plenum that encloses 140o of the fan circle on the fuselage 

side. The hot air pushes down through the turbines, losing energy and 

temperature, and then mixes with the fan air on exit. The vast majority of 

the air in the fan disk is ambient in temperature as it exits the fan. Since 

the fan pressure ratio is low, the air is not heated by passing through the 

fan blades as it is accelerated out. The air then exits, hits the ground, and 

travels rapidly over it in a skim layer about 10 inches thick. The test data 

found the peak temps about 6–10 inches above the ground layer and ambient for all the area under the fan. The peak temperatures were found in 

a C-shaped zone that mimics the shape of the turbine blade plenum 

around the lift fan (mostly from 150 to 180o F but with the peak along the 

pod side reaching 250o degrees F). The air that hit the ground never exceeded 150o F with all items in the high-temperature zone remaining safe 

to touch. While the engines were run from 30 to 45 minutes at a time, 

aircraft operations would involve only a few seconds of exhaust ground 

contact during takeoff and landing. No downwash is present while idling 

on the ground. Ducted-fan aircraft that use vectored thrust from the main 

engine for vertical lift (such as the AV-8B and F-35) have significantly 

higher exhaust temperatures. 

9. Melnyk, “AMC Industry Day.”

10. Stratford, “Northrop Grumman Advanced Information Architecture 

Concepts”; and Mike Melnyk (director, Fan in Wing Programs, Northrop 

Grumman), interview by the author, 15 January 2010.

11. Melnyk, interview.

12. Larger RPAs such as the Global Hawk, Predator, and Reaper are 

typically controlled via satellite uplink with a mission control element in a 

GCS hundreds or even thousands of miles away via satellite uplink. The 

time lag to transfer system information and video feed from the UAV to the 

satellite and then on to the GCS for display creates a several-second time 

lag between perceived condition and position and actual condition and 

position. This is further amplified by the fact that any pilot inputs take an 

equivalent amount of time to travel back to the aircraft for processing and 

action. The entire time lag between data transmission and pilot direct input receipt can take several seconds. While insignificant at cruise altitude, 

a time lapse of a second or two can mean the difference between a successful landing and a crash. Further complicating matters is the possibility of 

a lost-link condition due to an assortment of causes including, but not 

limited to, terrain, malfunction, scintillation, and mechanical failure.

13. See AFSAS, Class A, B, and C mishap data, 13 January 2010. 

While the RQ-4 Global Hawk uses an autonomous takeoff and landing 

system, US Air Force Predator and Reaper aircraft have no such capability. 

This deficiency has led to a significant number of mishaps during these 

phases of flight. From September 2001 to January 2010, 22 percent of the 
43

Predator and Reaper Class A, 45 percent of the Class B, and 25 percent of 

the Class C mishaps were due to pilot error during the landing phase 

alone. DODI 6055.7 offers the following definition for DOD mishaps.

Class A: The resulting total cost of damages to Government and other property in an amount of $1 million or more; a DOD aircraft is destroyed; or an 

injury and/or occupational illness results in a fatality or permanent total disability. Class B: The resulting total cost of damage is $200,000 or more, but 

less than $1 million. An injury and/or occupational illness results in permanent partial disability (Table E7.T1. of enclosure 7); or when three or more 

personnel are hospitalized for inpatient care (which, for accident reporting 

purposes only, does not include just observation and/or diagnostic care) as a 

result of a single accident. Class C: The resulting total cost of property damage is $20,000 or more, but less than $200,000; a nonfatal injury that causes 

any loss of time from work beyond the day or shift on which it occurred; or a 

nonfatal occupational illness or disability that causes loss of time from work 

or disability at any time (lost time case). 

See DODI 6055.7, Accident Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping, 3 

October 2000, 3.

14. Helis.com, Bell Eagle Eye; and Bell Helicopter, Eagle Eye Pocket 

Guide, 7.

15. Naval-Technology.com, “Fire Scout VTUAV”; and Northrop Grumman, 

“MQ-8B Navy Fire Scout.”

16. Mapes, Auto-GCAS.

17. Defense Oversight Council Aviation Safety Improvements Task 

Force Safety Technology Working Group, Fighter/Attack.

18. Surowitz, USAF ACC/SEF, to the author, e-mail, 10 March 2010. 

Auto-GCAS is scheduled to be installed on F-16 Block 40/42/50/52 aircraft only. 

19. Air Force News, “EADS and DRS to Develop Helicopter Obstacle 

Warning Systems,” 26 June 2007. 

20. Defense Research Associates, “Sense and Avoid.”

21. Hazards may include weather, ground threats (e.g., AAA and 

SAMs), terrain, and dense airspace.

22. Horton and Kempel, Flight Test Experience, 4, 16.

23. Boeing, “AFRL, Boeing Demonstrate That UAVs Can Perform Automated Aerial Refueling.”

24. Absolute Astronomy, “Tail Rotor”; and Aerospace Web, “Fenestron 

Tail Rotor.”

25. Aerospace Web, “Fenestron Tail Rotor.”

26. See AFSAS, 20 January 2010. The mishap involved an RQ-4 on 

final approach and an HH-60 on initial climb out.

27. Such high-altitude balloons as those built by Aerostar can achieve 

altitudes of over 128,000 feet carrying loads in excess of 5,000 lb. NASA 

has also demonstrated the ability to maintain an altitude of 110,000 feet 

for up to 100 days. High-altitude balloons have also been successfully 

tested with communication relay and imagery payloads. See Terdiman, 

“NASA Tests Super-High-Altitude Balloon”; NASA, “Wallops Flight Facility 

Goddard Space Flight Center Flight Summaries for FY08”; Rupar, Doffoh, 

and Mereish, “High Altitude Relay and Router,” 2007 NRL Review, 165–67.
44

28. Air Force Safety Automated System (AFSAS), Class A, B, and C 

mishap data, 13 January 2010.

29. Ibid.; US Naval Safety Center, Class A Mishap Data; and US Army 

Safety Center, Class A, B, and C Mishap Data. Thirty-six of the 55 US Army 

mishaps (resulting in 47 fatalities) involved cargo- and troop-carrying aircraft. The remaining mishaps involved OH-58s and AH-64s. The overall 

spatial disorientation and visual obstruction mishaps for the Air Force, 

Army, and Navy/Marine Corps equaled 70 mishaps and 64 fatalities. 
45

Chapter 4

Proposed Solution

As any solution depends on the problem it is intended to 

solve, so must the design of the MQ-A. It must also be provided within a specific context based upon accepted norms 

and/or assumptions. 

Assumptions

With this backdrop in mind, the conceptual solution proposed in this chapter will be based upon the following assumptions:

1. The joint MQ-A requirements outlined in chapter 2 

remain valid and unchanged.

2. Future operating environments will be similar to 

current operating environments regarding FOB accessibility (i.e., a significant number of troop formations will be inaccessible to fixed-wing resupply aircraft except with regards to airdrop or roads).

3. Commanders will primarily utilize the MQ-A for 

cargo movement and not for troop transport except 

where noted in this section. 

4. The US Air Force and US Army will not field any additional aircraft models not currently employed in 

OIF and OEF (with the exception of the C-27) for airlift. This is not to say the number of aircraft currently 

employed will remain fixed (e.g., the number of some 

rotor-wing assets may increase or decrease based 

upon aircraft availability and mission requirements).

5. Technologies discussed in this study are not proprietary and thus can be combined into a joint platform 

(e.g., a Northrop Grumman aircraft can employ a Bell 

auto-land system and a Boeing sense-and-avoid 

sensor package).

6. Current service employment concepts (and subsequent 

supply requirements) will remain largely unchanged.
46

7. MQ-A assets will be apportioned to the joint force by 

the joint force commander (JFC) and employed 

based upon the needs of the receiving functional 

commander.

MQ-A Description

After considering the aforementioned joint MQ-A requirements and the current and emerging technologies, the 

study proposes the following aircraft characteristics for 

consideration (a concept of employment will be presented 

in chapter 5).1 The MQ-A will be equipped with a turbofan-driven, in-wing-ducted-fan propulsion system capable 

of VTOL and forward velocities in excess of 300 knots. To 

avoid most ground threats and to achieve a greater range, 

the MQ-A will be able to achieve an altitude of at least 

30,000 feet. Later, while in a tactical environment, the 

MQ-A will be able to cruise at altitudes as low as 50 feet 

with autonomous terrain-mapping, terrain-avoidance, and 

threat-avoidance software. With a payload of approximately 

3,000 lb., it will be able to achieve an operational radius in 

excess of 500 nautical miles with enough fuel to return to 

base once the cargo is downloaded. To extend its transit 

range, the MQ-A will be able to replace its operational cargo 

module with an extended range fuel module and to fly at its 

maximum or optimum cruise altitude. 

To legally operate in the en route structure, the MQ-A 

will be equipped with the required NAS and ICAO navigation and communication equipment. This equipment will 

include area navigation/vertical navigation certification; 

very high frequency, UHF, high frequency, and SATCOM 

communication/navigation systems; Mode C and Mode S 

transponders; sense-and-avoid technologies; and the option to attach a manned pilot/passenger module (not necessarily pressurized).

While in flight the MQ-A will be able to operate autonomously but will be operated semiautonomously by a pilot 

and a sensor operator. Destination coordinates will be 

loaded into the onboard FMS by a ground operator or remotely by an aircrew in a GCS. The route will be determined by the aircraft’s onboard mission planning software, 
47

by mission planning software in the GCS, or manually by 

flight crew or ground personnel. Selected hazard-avoidance 

routes will consider terrain, obstacles, operating flight 

rules/restrictions, and known threats. During the flight the 

aircrew in the GCS will be able to assume control and either 

reroute the MQ-A or manually fly the aircraft. Onboard 

hazard sense-and-avoid sensors, including terrain, obstacle, and aircraft sensors, will alert the aircraft and monitoring aircrew of approaching hazards. If the monitoring aircrew fails to take corrective action, the aircraft will perform 

evasive maneuvers autonomously. Once the threat has 

been avoided, the aircraft will return to its previously designated mission.

When approaching its designated landing point, the 

MQ-A will power up the in-wing-ducted fans and slow to a 

nose level hover at a predesignated altitude over the predesignated landing zone. Using a PDA linked to the aircraft, 

the fielded forces can then approve the landing, adjust the 

landing point, direct the aircraft to hold, send the aircraft to 

its next destination, or direct it back to base. If the coordinates are not known or the landing zone is a moving target, 

such as on the back of a ship, a small short-range landingzone marker beacon/transmitter can be placed at the center of the intended landing zone and activated. Once instructed to use the marker, the aircraft will assume a 

position over the beacon and commence the vertical landing while maintaining its relative position over the marker. 

If a landing point is not acknowledged by the ground personnel, the landing decision will be deferred to the monitoring GCS crew. If a link is lost during the landing-zone acquisition and approval phase, the aircraft will perform a 

predetermined function to (1) hold to await further instruction, (2) proceed to the next waypoint, (3) land at the preloaded coordinates, or (4) return to base. The selected action will depend upon preloaded algorithms and/or the 

anticipated security of the intended landing zone.

Once approved for landing, the MQ-A will perform an autonomous vertical descent by using onboard global positioning system (GPS)/inertial navigation system (INS) and 

thrust vectoring (using the ducted-fan louvers) to maintain 

a position directly over the intended landing position. This 

procedure will allow the aircraft to land in a confined area 
48

without the ground personnel designating an approach corridor. It will also minimize side-loading strains on the landing gear during landing and reduce the chances of a landing roll.

To help minimize the chances of aircraft roll over while 

landing on an uneven surface, the aircraft will be equipped 

with four retractable landing-gear struts located at the 

forward and aft corners of each wing. The gear struts will 

place the aircraft fuselage (minus the mission module) 

and wings at least six feet above the ground to avoid potential damage due to small obstacles such as stumps and 

debris and to make it possible to walk and operate under 

the aircraft easily. Dual wheels on each strut (which auto 

lock after a predetermined roll distance upon landing) will 

allow the aircraft to assume a stable four-point footing 

and minimize potential negative mission impact should a 

tire fail. Manually releasing the auto-lock system will allow the aircraft to be pushed or to be pulled to a desired 

load, unload, or launch point.

While the ducted fan is powered by jet-engine exhaust 

air, vertical lift is provided by drawing ambient air from 

above the wing and blowing it down at exhaust temperatures below 100° C. To help ensure the safety of ground 

personnel operating under and around the aircraft, the 

ducted-fan louvers will remain closed while the aircraft 

idles on the ground. In this configuration, all jet exhaust 

will be ducted aft of the aircraft through the normal jet exhaust system. While maneuvering in flight or on the ground, 

variable thrust and the ducted-fan louvers will redirect fan 

exhaust as required to affect pitch, role, yaw, and taxi directions. The engine will be positioned on the top of the fuselage to minimize hazards to ground personnel and to reduce the risk of foreign object damage to the engine.

When the offload and/or onload is complete, ground personnel will either enter new destination coordinates (with 

an optional route of flight) into the aircraft’s FMS or select 

(1) to return to base (point of origin) or (2) to continue to the 

next en route stop. A microphone and speaker system with 

a direct link to the monitoring GCS will be located adjacent 

to the FMS input panel to facilitate communication between 

the ground personnel and the monitoring/controlling aircrew should mission changes or coordination be required. 
49

Once the takeoff command is received from ground personnel or the GCS, the aircraft will idle for a designated 

period (approximately 20 seconds) to give time for ground 

personnel to move to a safe distance from the aircraft and 

to minimize the time the aircraft is exposed to hostile fire in 

a combat situation. The MQ-A will then open the ductedfan louvers, power up the ducted fans using engine exhaust 

air, and increase power and takeoff capability autonomously. To minimize the chances for mishaps, all takeoffs 

and landings will be performed autonomously. Once a safe 

altitude is achieved, the MQ-A will transition to forward 

flight, disengage the ducted fans, close the louvers, and use 

the centerline thrust turbo-fan jet engine for en route flight.

To change taskings, mission modules can be interchanged and attached to wing and fuselage hard points. To 

assist with the changing, loading, and unloading of the primary fuselage module, the MQ-A will be equipped with an 

internal hoist system that can be operated from an externally accessible control panel. While the module is in the 

up configuration, electrically powered latches will be engaged to ensure the module remains attached to the aircraft during flight. The latch system will calculate the pod 

weight and adjust fuel calculations accordingly. An electronic 

umbilical cord will attach to the module to provide two-way 

communication between the module and the MQ-A. Nonproprietary mission modules will include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Cargo

2. Modular airdrop

3. Small package airdrop

4. ISR, with an extended-range fuel bladder 

5. ISR, with a multiple-ejector ordnance rack

6. ISR, with an extended sensor suite

7. Side scan radar with uplink to a manned reconnaissance platform or a ground control station

8. Extended-range fuel bladder
50

9. Manned pilot module with a cargo bay (capable of 

single litter medical-evacuation or dual-passenger 

transport)

10. Combat search and rescue capability

11. Communication relay suite2

As the MQ-A will perform all takeoffs and landings autonomously and fly most en route segments autonomously, 

the aircraft will be able to operate in conditions that would 

otherwise be considered hazardous for manned aircraft. 

Using a radar altimeter, GPS/INS position awareness, beacon homing, rapid automatic corrections, and sense-andavoid technologies, the aircraft will be able to perform VTOL 

in all weather conditions (e.g., whiteout, brownout, and 

high winds) and throughout the day without the risk of the 

pilot suffering from spatial disorientation or visual illusions. 

Hazardous weather conditions such as icing and thunderstorm activity will be avoided by using aircrew flightpath monitoring and onboard weather sensor equipment. If 

icing conditions cannot be avoided during takeoff or landing phases of flight, the aircraft’s anti-ice system is equipped 

to handle short flights in moderate icing. With the assistance of terrain mapping and precision course management, the MQ-A will be able to operate in mountains and 

canyons even with restricted visibility. The MQ-A will also 

be able to operate in a CBRNE or a hostile environment 

where commanders may not wish to send manned aircraft. 

When the aircraft is unable to operate independently of aircrew, the MQ-A will not need to wait for an aircrew to use 

the aircraft. This procedure will make on-demand, depotto-foxhole resupply a reality 24/7.

Powering the ducted-fans with engine exhaust air 

through valve-controlled internal ducting instead of an 

auxiliary drive shaft will help to minimize aircraft weight 

and maintenance. It will also minimize the potential for engine damage if something is sucked into a wing fan (even if 

the object stops the fan). Replacing typically hydraulic systems with electrically controlled and actuated aircraft systems (i.e., brakes, flight controls, and valves) will minimize 

servicing requirements and improve survivability. Light 
51

composite materials will help to minimize weight while 

maximizing payload, range, and endurance. 

To assist with transport beyond the aircraft’s extended 

operating range, the aircraft can be rapidly disassembled 

and transported in standard ship containers or on board a 

C-17 or a C-5. Mission modules can be transported individually or in specially designed module transport containers.

Notes

1. Several companies have working or proposed solutions to the problems presented in this document. While some solutions, including Boeing’s A160T Hummingbird, already have been unveiled to the public, several others are still behind closed doors—at least for the time being. The 

solution presented in this chapter draws upon existing, mature, or nearly 

mature technologies for working and proposed platforms that need only to 

be combined into a single system. Proprietary system-specific information 

has been omitted from this study to protect the rights of the companies 

that provided the research materials.

2. Due to the specialized ISR mission and its associated extended persistence requirements, unless wing extensions are added to the MQ-A to 

effectively increase the ground footprint, it is highly unlikely that the 

MQ-A will be able to compete with existing dedicated ISR RPAs with respect to persistence. While range and speed may partially offset this limitation, the MQ-A should be seen as an ISR augmentation platform when 

demand exceeds platform availability and not as a replacement for existing 

or future specialized ISR RPAs. The MQ-A’s primary role should remain 

focused on the movement of material in the tactical environment (e.g., 

cargo, munitions, and possibly personnel).

53

Chapter 5

Synopsis of Concept of Employment

This concept of employment (CONEMP) synopsis provides a brief overview of how the MQ-A unmanned intratheater airlifter will operate in support of US joint forces 

across the full spectrum of military operations. Refer to appendix 4 for a complete version of the CONEMP.1

Overview

As no single service has been identified to operate the 

MQ-A, two primary scenarios exist regarding MQ-A employment: (1) a single service is the sole employer of the MQ-A, 

and (2) the MQ-A is employed as a joint aircraft with multiple services integrating it into their respective logistical 

infrastructures. The MQ-A will augment current airlift aircraft as they are used by the DOD with a focus on TS and 

MC cargo movement while maintaining an ability to perform several other missions when and where required. 

Joint training and doctrinal and procedural commonalities 

among the services will help to ensure full integration of 

deployed units into the existing logistical systems. 

Organization

The MQ-A’s multirole capabilities make it an essential 

component of the joint force commander’s capabilities. 

Structuring MQ-A units as self-sufficient, semiautonomous, 

expeditionary units will optimize these units for future operations. The JFC will allocate MQ-A units (hereafter referred 

to as expeditionary airlift squadrons [EAS]) after they are deployed to supported commanders to help fulfill tactical airlift 

requirements with an emphasis on same-service support. To 

help ensure mission flexibility, the supported commanders 

will exercise tactical control (TACON) over the EAS with operational control and administrative control remaining with 

the EAS’s service component commander. 

Mission planning and coordination will be enhanced by 

collocating the EAS with the supported unit whenever pos-
54

sible. In cases where the EAS is not collocated with the supported unit, the EAS will provide a liaison officer to the supported unit to ensure proper coordination and asset 

utilization. EASs will coordinate TS/MC missions directly 

with the supported unit. Each service will also provide liaison officers to the combined air operations center (CAOC) 

to coordinate tactical airlift requirements. EASs and supported units will also provide representation to the joint 

planning and execution cells to help ensure efficient and 

maximum utilization of available resources. 

Intelligence

Acquiring timely and accurate intelligence information is 

essential to the successful execution of deployed operations. 

This acquisition is particularly critical in a tactical environment to ensure that mission planners and aircrew can 

safely and effectively employ assigned assets with minimal 

risk to friendly forces and equipment. Tactical intelligence 

will be provided to aircrew and mission planners by theater 

intelligence personnel assigned to the supported commander before mission execution and to commanders upon 

request. Relevant intelligence information will be pushed to 

all applicable parties before, during, and after mission execution or as appropriate.

Intelligence research, analysis, and dissemination will be 

provided in accordance with the supported command’s applicable guidance (i.e., doctrine, procedures, and instructions). Emphasis will be given to threat identification and 

analysis. Intelligence personnel assigned to the EAS will provide supplemental information and will assume primary 

threat/risk assessment responsibilities if assistance is unavailable from the supported unit. Under TACON the supported unit commander is granted risk-acceptance authority. 

Operations

While an EAS is allocated to a supported commander to 

enhance cooperation and effectiveness, general flight operations will be conducted in accordance with the EAS’s service guidance. Each service will also maintain waiver authority over its deployed assets, but risk acceptance will be 
55

delegated to the supported commander to help ensure maximum flexibility and responsiveness to changing operational 

requirements. It is also understood that the remotely piloted 

nature and the autonomous capabilities of the MQ-A may 

lend themselves to a higher risk acceptance level. Significant 

differences in the guidance governing the employment of 

RPA air assets will need to be resolved among the supported 

and supporting commanders before asset employment. 

The MQ-A’s autonomous VTOL and all-weather capabilities make it an ideal platform to conduct a wide range of 

missions in extremely hazardous conditions.2 Simplistic 

launch and recovery procedures further enhance mission 

flexibility and responsiveness. To launch the aircraft, ground 

personnel either will enter the coordinates or identifiers for 

the next destination into the onboard FMS or select one of 

two options that include (1) return to base (point of origin) 

or (2) continue to the next en route stop. The desired route 

of flight can be loaded manually into the aircraft’s FMS or 

remotely from the GCS. If a route of flight is not entered, 

the FMS will compute a route of flight based upon known 

airways, threats, terrain, and airspace restrictions.3 Once a 

takeoff command is received from ground personnel or from 

the GCS, the aircraft will give ground personnel a designated period to clear the immediate area before engaging 

the VTOL propulsion system. The in-wing-ducted fans then 

will power up and perform an autonomous vertical takeoff, 

climb to a safe altitude, and transition to forward flight. 

While the aircraft is en route to a destination, the route may 

be changed remotely by the GCS or autonomously to avoid 

hazards identified using a series of onboard weather, ground 

threat, terrain mapping, and obstacle-detection sensors.4

When approaching the predesignated landing point, the 

MQ-A will descend to a predesignated altitude and enter a 

hover over the designated landing point. The fielded forces, 

using a PDA linked to the aircraft, then will accept the landing point, adjust the landing point, direct the aircraft to 

hold, send the aircraft to its next destination, or direct it 

back to base. The aircraft can also be instructed to land on 

a small, portable, short-range marker beacon/transmitter if 

exact landing coordinates were not loaded into the aircraft 

before arrival. If a landing point is not acknowledged by 

ground personnel, the landing decision will be deferred to 
56

the monitoring aircrew. For aircrew unavailability or a lostlink condition, the aircraft will perform a predetermined 

function that includes instructions to (1) hold for further 

instructions; (2) proceed to the next waypoint; (3) land at 

the designated coordinates/marker; or (4) return to base. 

The selected action will depend upon preloaded algorithms 

and/or the anticipated security of the intended landing zone.

Once approved for landing, the MQ-A will perform an autonomous vertical descent to landing using onboard GPS/

INS systems and thrust vectoring (via ducted-fan louvers) 

to maintain a position directly over the intended landing 

position throughout the descent. This procedure will allow 

the aircraft to land in a confined area without ground personnel designating an approach corridor to avoid ground 

obstacles. Performing a controlled vertical landing also will 

help to minimize side-loading strains on the landing gear, 

and auto-locking brakes will help to reduce the chances of 

a landing roll. For ship operations, a crew monitoring the 

aircraft’s progress will assume control, fly it to the target ship, 

lock the aircraft to the mobile marker beacon/transmitter, 

and direct the aircraft to land. The MQ-A then will assume 

a position over the marker and perform a vertical landing 

onto the deck.

Many of the mission profiles flown during contingency 

operations have a direct application to military operations 

other than war and thus will be flown in the same manner. 

For example, the movement of cargo from a FOB to fielded 

troops 200 miles away over rough terrain is relatively the 

same mission as moving supplies from a supply hub to 

fielded forces, a nongovernmental organization, or an intergovernmental organization over unsafe roads during a humanitarian assistance mission. The aircraft’s airdrop capabilities enable it to supply locations with unsuitable landing 

zones, and the ISR modules can provide for a persistent 

around-the-clock ground surveillance in a border patrol, 

operating area, or search-and-rescue role. 

Logistics/Sustainment

A movement control team (MCT), provided by the supported unit, will perform all arrival/departure airfield control group (A/DACG) operations, including cargo and pas-
57

senger handling, at the supporting EAS’s main operating 

base. To help expedite the loading and unloading process at 

locations not serviced by an MCT, supported commanders 

shall ensure that all supported personnel are trained on 

basic aircraft operation (i.e., load, unload, and launch). 

Cargo and passenger load information will be centrally 

tracked by the MCT through established service logistical 

tracking systems. Where access to these systems is not 

available, cargo and passenger manifest data will be logged 

at the first suitable location.

When practical, excess capacity will be released to the 

Air Mobility Division in support of the common user airlift 

pool. Load requirements will be submitted in accordance with 

the Gulf Cooperation Council procedures and priorities. 

Common user movements will be monitored by the Air Mobility Division’s deployment and distribution operations center and will not take precedence over TS/MC requirements.

Normal aircraft maintenance will be conducted by the EAS 

and assisted by the supported unit. Data/forms management will be conducted through the EAS’s service-approved 

maintenance information systems. During deployed operations, maintenance personnel will perform actions consistent 

with day-to-day flying activities. Extended heavy maintenance and scheduled inspections and above may be conducted at a designated heavy maintenance location. A home 

station check equivalent may be conducted in theater. The 

aircraft will deploy with a minimum logistics manning package, supply assets (i.e., mobility readiness spares packages), and support equipment capable of sustaining 24/7 

operations for an initial 30-day period. Additional equipment will follow via strategic movement in the most expedient manner possible and will arrive no later than 30 days 

from initial employment. The logistics/maintenance unit 

will be equipped and manned accordingly.

All other sustainment for the EAS will be provided by the 

supporting service except for theater support normally provided to the other services by doctrine, DOD directive, JFC 

directives, or other intraservice support agreements. Base 

operating support agencies will coordinate and assist in 

formalizing memoranda of understanding/memoranda of 

agreements as required.
58

Communications/Navigation

Regardless of the type of mission conducted, the MQ-A 

will be required to operate in domestic, international, and 

contingency/military airspace. In all cases, flight planning 

and mission execution will be conducted in accordance 

with applicable airspace requirements. In some cases, restrictions by the air route traffic control center on RPA activities within its airspace can be avoided with a manned 

pilot/passenger module. Regardless of the mode of operation, procedures, restrictions, and requirements applicable 

to the airspace being transited will be complied with. Failure to have all required communication and navigation systems may result in restrictions or denial of airspace entry. 

Flights in military-controlled airspace shall be conducted in 

accordance with local operating procedures. 

Bandwidth limitations can also significantly affect mission effectiveness and the number of platforms that can 

operate in a given area. To help minimize bandwidth usage 

in a bandwidth-limited environment, autonomous operations will be conducted to the maximum extent possible 

with only basic aircraft status information (e.g., systems 

condition and position) being transmitted to the GCS during noncritical phases of flight. Direct line-of-sight data 

transmission to end users and relays through other netcentric platforms will also help to minimize satellite bandwidth usage.

Several hostile activities, environmental factors, and mechanical failures can result in lost link with the controlling 

or monitoring GCS. In addition to signal-protection operations, all flights will be launched either with a full flight 

plan loaded or with emergency routing that will be followed 

when a lost-link condition occurs. Due to the aircraft’s autonomous capabilities, the former option is preferred to 

minimize negative mission impacts should satellite connectivity be lost. However, during missions that require semiautonomous operations, a bingo point will be determined 

so that the mission will be aborted or modified if the communication link with the GCS is lost. In no cases should a 

lost-link condition result in loss of control of the aircraft 

and/or subsequent system/aircraft loss.
59

Legal

Disciplinary and Uniform Code of Military Justice authority 

will remain with the service member’s service component 

commander.

Notes

1. While the CONEMP assumes the employment of a platform that 

meets the criteria proposed in chapter 4, a majority of the guidance presented in this CONEMP can be applied with minor modifications to other 

RPA VTOL platforms.

2. Adverse weather or environmental conditions such as low-cloud 

cover, fog, blackout, whiteout, and brownout have limited to no impact 

upon MQ-A operations. The GPS/INS, stabilization instrumentation, radar 

altimeter, and obstacle/hazard sense-and-avoid technologies make it possible to operate the aircraft without visual cues. Furthermore, as the platform is remotely piloted (unless using a pilot/passenger module), the aircraft can operate in a CBRNE environment without risk to crew members. 

3. Autonomously determined routes should be verified by qualified aircrew before departure. Unverified routes should only be used in militarycontrolled airspace with special consideration given to en route altitudes. 

4. The integration of GPS/INS, weather radar, a DIRCM pod (or equivalent), auto-GCAS, and sense-and-avoid technologies enables the MQ-A to 

detect and ultimately avoid both ground and airborne threats and hazards. This sensor suite enables the MQ-A to operate everywhere between 

an extreme low-level altitude up to its maximum operating altitude of over 

30,000 feet in limited-to-no-visibility conditions.

61

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Existing, proven, and rapidly evolving technologies present the DOD with a unique opportunity to significantly enhance current tactical airlift capabilities without significantly increasing cost or carbon footprint. What is needed 

is a paradigm and concept of operations shift. 

Recommendations

The current operational environment has driven a need 

for increased tactical airlift, a need that cannot be completely fulfilled with existing airlift assets. Rather than increasing the manned tactical airlift fleet, the DOD should 

augment the current joint fleet with remotely piloted cargo 

platforms capable of autonomous and semiautonomous 

operations into routine and hazardous operational environments. Furthermore, service and joint doctrine should be 

modified to fully incorporate these remotely piloted platforms in all military operations. 

Presently, tactical airlift is accomplished by manned 

platforms at an operational cost to normally supported 

ground forces. Many of these missions, particularly routine 

and extremely hazardous missions, can be accomplished 

by remotely piloted platforms with minimal to no risk to 

aircrew or ground personnel, thus freeing manned assets 

for other missions. Augmenting the existing manned tactical airlift fleet with a remotely piloted platform capable of 

autonomous and semiautonomous operations would provide a means to dramatically increase intratheater airlift 

capacity, efficiency, aircrew safety, responsiveness, and 

flexibility while minimally increasing, or possibly even decreasing, overall carbon footprint and costs. In so doing, 

the MQ-A will decrease the need for ground convoys and 

contract ground and air carriers. 

Considering the tactical airlift requirements established 

by each of the services (summarized in chap. 2), chapter 4 

offers recommendations for the characteristics of a future 

unmanned intratheater airlifter. The concept of employment 
62

presented in chapter 5 further explains the functionality of 

the MQ-A platform and proposes a concept of employment 

for service consideration. However, recognizing other multiple options that can meet the established requirements, it 

is essential that the MQ-A be designed to fulfill most, if not 

all, of the tactical airlift needs of each service. 

Aircraft Characteristics

Regardless of the form the MQ-A assumes, it must address the needs of the services with several key characteristics. The MQ-A must be modular in design and be capable 

of fulfilling a wide assortment of missions depending upon 

the module attached. The basic air frame must be capable 

of autonomous and semiautonomous operations while en 

route and autonomous VTOL in all weather conditions and 

levels of satellite reception degradation. It should also be 

able to operate at altitudes and speeds comparable to jet 

aircraft while transporting up to 3,000 lb. of cargo at least 

500 nautical miles. 

To ensure maximum mission flexibility and responsiveness, ground personnel must be able to monitor and alter the 

mission profile when and where required. Ground personnel 

should also be able to communicate with the controlling GCS 

both during flight operations and during loading/unloading. 

To enhance deployability, the MQ-A should be self-deployable 

and/or transportable via current strategic lift assets. 

During all phases of operation, the MQ-A must present a 

minimal risk to ground personnel. While idling on the ground, 

the aircraft should minimize risk to ground personnel operating in the immediate vicinity. It should have low exhaust 

temperatures, an internal hoist system to lift modules, a 

significant ground clearance, and minimal to no chance of 

propeller or rotor-blade contact. While in flight, redundant 

systems should prevent system failure or loss of aircraft 

control following a single-point failure.

To maximize operating areas, the MQ-A must be capable 

of landing in confined and shifting landing zones. In addition 

to being able to land on a fixed coordinate, the aircraft must 

be able to lock onto and land on a small, mobile landingzone beacon/transmitter with a high level of accuracy. This 

will include landing on aviation-capable warships.
63

Summary

The challenging operational environments that we now 

face make airlift a greater necessity than ever. Conventional, counterinsurgency, and military operations other than 

war require the movement of supplies to isolated, perilous, 

and in some cases congested areas over insecure lines of 

communication. While airdrop technologies are improving, 

their inability to service some locations accurately, reliably, 

inexpensively, and without a requirement to extract airdrop 

materials demands the use of VTOL assets in hazardous 

conditions. Unfortunately, however, insufficient manned 

assets currently exist to service these urgent requirements 

while still fulfilling their primary missions of troop movement support. 

The RPA offers an inexpensive, safe, reliable, flexible, 

and responsive means to keep forward troops supplied in 

all conditions and environments. It also offers a means to 

reduce ground convoy requirements, supports intratheater/

intraship cargo movement, supports rapidly advancing troops, 

and supplies government and nongovernment organizations 

during humanitarian assistance and disaster response 

missions. Employed in sufficient quantities, it also offers 

the potential for a reduced manned airlift footprint. Existing and rapidly maturing technologies offer an opportunity 

to develop a multirole, modular platform capable of fulfilling each service’s tactical supply needs. While a shift to 

tactical airlift utilization may require a paradigm and doctrinal shift, a significant opportunity exists to increase intratheater airlift capacity, flexibility, and responsiveness without significantly increasing carbon footprints, costs, or risk 

to manned aircraft and their crews.

65

Appendix 1

Contract Lift Configurations

This document provides an abbreviated summary of lift 

assets currently employed in support of OEF and OIF. 

These lists are not all-inclusive, and operating costs are 

subject to change. The C-17 data has been added for comparison purposes only.

Short Takeoff and Landing (STOL) Lift Configurations

A/C Type 

(cost/hr)

Max Takeoff 

Weight 

(pounds)

Max 

Range 

(nautical 

mile [nm])

Pax Cargo 

Max 

(pounds)

Service 

Ceiling 

(feet [ft])

Lift-toDrag 

Ratio 

(L/D) (ft)

Casa 212 

($3,906)

17,600 777 20 6,200 25,000 984

Metro 

($4,179)

16,500 1,150 19 5,600 25,000 2,400

C-130J 

($5,005)

164,000 2,100* 128 44,000 28,000 1,500

Dash 8 

($5,015)

34,500 1,065 37 7,500 25,000 2,979

C-130 H 

($7,573)

155,000 1,300* 92 42,675 33,000 2,130

C-17

($6,662)

585,000 2,400** 102 170,900 45,000 -

Casa 235 

($8,427)

36,300 2,700 45 13,200 30,000 1,979

*with 35,000 lb. payload

**with 169,000 lb. payload

67

Appendix 2

John Warner National Defense 

Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2007

SEC. 941. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY ON 

UNMANNED SYSTEMS.1

(a) POLICY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense shall 

develop a policy, to be applicable throughout the Department of Defense, on research, development, test and evaluation, procurement, and operation of unmanned systems.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The policy required by subsection (a) 

shall include or address the following:

(1) An identification of missions and mission requirements, including mission requirements for the military 

departments and joint mission requirements, for which 

unmanned systems may replace manned systems. 

(2) A preference for unmanned systems in acquisition programs for new systems, including a requirement 

under any such program for the development of a 

manned system for a certification that an unmanned 

system is incapable of meeting program requirements.

(3) An assessment of the circumstances under which 

it would be appropriate to pursue joint development 

and procurement of unmanned systems and components of unmanned systems.

(4) The transition of unmanned systems unique to one 

military department to joint systems, when appropriate.

(5) An organizational structure for effective management, coordination, and budgeting for the development 

and procurement of unmanned systems, including an 

assessment of the feasibility and advisability of designating a single department or other element of the Department of Defense to act as executive agent for the 

Department on unmanned systems.

(6) The integration of unmanned and manned systems to enhance support of the missions identified in 

paragraph (1).
68

(7) Such other matters that the Secretary of Defense 

considers to be appropriate.

(c) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of Defense shall develop the policy required by subsection (a) in consultation 

with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(d) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date of 

the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the 

congressional defense committees a report containing—

(1) the policy required by subsection (a); and 

(2) an implementation plan for the policy that includes—

(A) a strategy and schedules for the replacement 

of manned systems with unmanned systems in the 

performance of the missions identified in the policy 

pursuant to subsection (b)(1);

(B) establishment of programs to address technical, operational, and production challenges, and 

gaps in capabilities, with respect to unmanned systems; and

(C) an assessment of progress towards meeting 

the goals identified for the subset of unmanned air 

and ground systems established in section 220 of 

the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as enacted into law by Public Law 106–398; 114 Stat. 1654A–38).

(e) UNMANNED SYSTEMS DEFINED.—In this section, 

the term ‘‘unmanned systems’’ consists of unmanned aerial 

systems, unmanned ground systems, and unmanned 

maritime systems.

Note

1. US House, John Warner National Defense Authorization Act.
69

Appendix 3

Service RPA Requirements 

Requirement USMC 

UNS/MCWL

Army JMR USAF

Air Mobility 

Command

Transport & 

Storage

20 ft TEU ISO 

containers

Inside C-17 with 

minimal disassembly

Not defined 

Ship 

Operations

Amphibious, small 

footprint

Amphibious, small 

footprint

Ship-based/ 

recoverable 

capable

Assembly & 

Operation

Quick assembly by 

Marines

Quick assembly Not defined 

Radius @ 

1600 lb. 

Payload

35 nm offshore, 250 

nm inland/75 nm 

from 12K density alt

254 nm, 0.5 hr on 

station cargo, 2 hrs 

ISR/attack

500 nm (can 

reduce payload 

to 500 pounds) 

Cargo 

Carriage

Internal & external, 

no handling equip 

at delivery

Internal & external Not defined 

Speed >250 knots (kts) >170 kts > 250kts

Payload 1,600 pounds, at 

least 4 drops per 

mission/750 

pounds at 12K 

density altitude

Not defined 500–3,000 

pounds 

Operations Autonomous, land 

via Soldier signal, 

beacon or at preset 

LZ

Autonomous, collision 

avoidance, contingency management

Autonomous, 

reuseable, 

flotation capable

VTOL 

Landing 

Footprint

Small, small for 

ships, urban ops, 

roads, FARPS & 

FOBs, unprepared 

surfaces

Small, small for ships, 

urban ops, roads, 

FARPS & FOBs, 

unprepared surfaces

Unprepared 

surface landing 

capable, 300 ft 

short takeoff and 

landing acceptable

VTOL Ops 

Altitudes

12K density (750 

pounds, 75 nm 

radius RFP)

6K 95 deg Not defined 

Protection Not defined Small arms, large 

caliber AAA, CBRN

Not defined 

O&M Reliable & low 

maintenance hrs/flt 

hr, “flying truck”

Rugged, reliable Not defined 
70

Requirement USMC 

UNS/MCWL

Army JMR USAF

Air Mobility 

Command

Mission Airlift Airlift Multirole capable 

based upon 

attached module 

(airlift, ISR, EW, 

CAS) 

Price Affordable, attrition 

acceptable

Affordable Inexpensive

Source: Mike Melnyk, “AMC Industry Day,” slide 9; US Marine Corps, “Solicitation Number: 

M6785409R9015”; Air Mobility Command Specialized Contracting Branch, “Solicitation Number, RFI_for_Unmanned_Cargo_Aircraft”; US Marine Corps, Universal Needs Statement 

(UNS) for the Cargo Unmanned Aircraft System (Cargo UAS); US Transportation Command 

Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center, “Request for Information: Future Deployment and 

Distribution Assessment”; and US Army Aviation Center of Excellence Concepts and Requirements Directorate, “Joint Multi-Role Aircraft Platform Industry Presentation.”
71

Appendix 4

Concept of Employment*

Purpose/Objective/Assumptions

1. Purpose/Objective/Assumptions

1.1. Purpose: This Concept of Employment (CONEMP) 

describes how the MQ-A Unmanned Intratheater Airlifter will operate in support of United States Joint 

Forces across the full spectrum of military operations. 

The MQ-A will augment current and forecast aircraft 

utilized by the DOD with a focus on Time Sensitive (TS) 

and Mission Critical (MC) cargo movement.

1.1.1. Operators. All services will employ the aircraft in manners deemed appropriate by the Combatant and/or Functional Commanders. This may 

include a service centric or joint employment concept based upon available resources.

1.1.2. Time Sensitive/Mission Critical. “Time 

sensitive/mission critical mission requirements 

create a demand for delivery of equipment, supplies, 

and personnel that are generally non-routine in nature and must be delivered to the point of need/ 

point of effect in an accelerated time period. These 

demands require the lift capacity to be supremely 

responsive to the supported commander’s immediate operational or tactical priorities. TS/MC demands cannot routinely be accommodated via the 

planned resupply and movement processes where 

efficiency is the primary consideration.”1

Dedicated airlift assets must be available and responsive to fulfill TS/MC requirements. As timeframe requirements for TS/MC cargo movement 

rarely allow for extensive delays between request 

and delivery, airlift assets must be available, re-

*This document is printed verbatim.
72

sponsive, and flexible to fulfill the taskings as and 

when directed by the deployed commander.

1.1.3. Expeditionary Airlift Squadron. For the 

purposes of this CONEMP, units employing the 

MQ-A in the deployed environment will be referred 

to as Expeditionary Airlift Squadrons (EAS). These 

units will include, as a minimum, the aircrew (e.g. 

pilots and sensor operators), mission planners, 

maintenance personnel and all mission essential 

equipment necessary to support and operate the deployed assets. Due to the nature of remotely piloted 

aircraft operations and in the interest of maintaining a minimal forward footprint, the aircrew, mission planners and mission support personnel not 

requiring physical access to the aircraft need not be 

collocated with the deployed assets. Geographic 

separation from the deployed forces or the operation 

of multiple platforms simultaneously may require 

the modification of some [of] the procedures outlined in this CONEMP.

1.2. Objective: The objective of this CONEMP is to help 

fulfill TS/MC cargo lift and other multi-role requirements 

through the employment of the MQ-A in all operating 

environments. While the actual tactics and doctrine for 

the MQ-A’s employment will vary with each service, the 

best practices should be captured in Service and joint 

doctrine, instructions, manuals and procedures.

1.3. Background: Current and arguably future conventional and counter insurgency operations will involve vast areas of operation and lengthy logistical support lines. These lines of communication are slow and 

difficult to secure, especially in the presence of insurgents. This limitation will drive an increased reliance 

upon airlift for the movement of critical personnel and 

supplies. Due to the extended mission ranges, high altitudes, increasing demands upon airlift, reduced accessibility to forward forces (i.e. in urban, wooded, and/

or mountainous terrain), a greater reliance on just-intime, TS/MC, and short notice movement missions, the 
73

reliance upon existing organic rotary and fixed wing 

support is unrealistic.

A few select rotary wing assets, particularly the CH-47, 

are performing a majority of the TS/MC cargo and personnel movement missions due to the simple fact that 

they are [the] best resources available. Furthermore, 

current doctrine calls for rotary wing assets to always 

fly in formations of 2 or more aircraft regardless of the 

load being transported, even if only one of the aircraft 

has a small item or a single passenger. This current 

practice is both very expensive and inefficient. The long 

distances between staging locations and forward units 

have resulted in rotary wing assets accumulating flight 

hours well above anticipated mission profiles. This has 

resulted in increased maintenance and expenses, particularly with regards to rotor blades, engines and 

transmissions. The increased workload on these limited 

assets to move routine and TS/MC loads has also removed these aircraft from their primary function of supporting the ground combat unit movement needs. 

Despite the significant effort being made to avoid ground 

threats by airlifting cargo and personnel over high risk 

areas, the airlift capacity is woefully short of requirements. Airdrop systems, although improving in accuracy, still require significant lead times and don’t have 

the ability to reliably drop cargo on a small drop zone 

(e.g. on a ridgeline, parking log, or small clearing). OEF, 

like some previous military operations, have seen an 

extensive number of forces take up positions in relatively inaccessible and treacherous locations that have 

limited to no truck access. These limitations have driven 

the requirement for helicopter lift, even at the expense 

of ground force movement requirements. Unfortunately, 

however, helicopters are slow, of limited supply, and expensive to maintain, especially in harsh climates. 

Regardless of the airlift advancements made to date, the 

limited number of airlift assets means that a majority of 

supplies must still be transported by ground convoy: a 

very risky and slow means of transport. Current and 

future logistical requirements dictate the introduction 
74

of a more efficient, flexible and responsive airlift option. 

The MQ-A offers a flexible, responsive, inexpensive, and 

low risk option to fulfill TS/MC requirements thereby 

freeing larger manned assets to return to their primary 

mission of ground force movement support.

1.4. Assumptions: This CONEMP applies to the employment of forces in conventional, counter-insurgency, 

and military operations other than war. The concepts 

presented in this CONEMP are predicated upon the following assumptions:

1.4.1. Future operating environments will be similar to current operating environments with respect 

to FOB accessibility (i.e. a significant number of 

troop formations will be inaccessible to fixed wing 

resupply aircraft except with regards to airdrop).

1.4.2. Commanders will utilize MQ-A primarily 

for cargo movement and not for troop transport.

1.4.3. The USAF and USA will not field any additional aircraft models not currently employed in OIF 

and OEF (with the exception of the C-27) for the 

purpose of airlift. 

1.4.4. Technologies discussed in this paper are 

not proprietary and thus can be combined into a 

joint platform (e.g. a Northrop Grumman aircraft 

can employ a Bell autoland system and a Boeing 

sense and avoid sensor package).

1.4.5. Current Service employment concepts (and 

subsequent supply requirements) will remain largely 

unchanged.

1.4.6. MQ-A assets will be apportioned to the joint 

force by the JFC and employed based upon the 

needs of the receiving functional commander.

1.4.7. It is possible for the supporting Expeditionary Airlift Squadron (EAS) and the supported unit to 

be of the same Service.
75

Organization

2. Organization

2.1. Overview: Due to the nature of the TS/MC requirements and force locations, the units employing the MQ-A 

will need to coordinate directly with the supported ground 

commanders. To help ensure these requirements are met:

2.1.1. The JFC will allocate forces to the functional and supported commanders based upon mission requirements. MQ-A support will be provided 

to supported units in the form of an EAS.

2.1.2. Each Service will provide liaison officers to 

the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) to coordinate tactical airlift requirements. The CAOC will 

maintain visibility on all tasked missions and will 

include regularly scheduled missions in the Air 

Tasking Order (ATO). Short or no-notice TS/MC 

missions and mission changes will be monitored via 

aircraft position sensors and crew reports.

2.1.3. Each EAS will include aircrew, planning 

and maintenance personnel. To facilitate coordination 

and integrated planning, the EAS will be collocated 

with the supported units to the maximum extent 

possible. The EAS will coordinate TS/MC missions 

with the supported ground commander directly.

2.1.4. Supported commanders will exercise TACON 

over allocated forces. While TACON will allow the 

supported commander to use and move forces as 

and when required to support mission requirements, it does not grant the supported commander 

waiver authority over DOD or Service regulatory 

guidance. OPCON will remain with the EAS Service 

component commander.

2.1.5. Short notice mission changes/requirements 

for supporting forces not allocated to the supported 

commander will be coordinated through the CAOC.

2.2 Command Relationships: The command structure 

for MQ-A equipped units will depend upon the Services 
76

employing them. Two primary scenarios exist: 1) a single 

Service is the sole employer of the MQ-A and 2) the 

MQ-A is employed as a joint aircraft with each Service 

having them integrated into their respective logistical 

infrastructures.

2.2.1. MQ-A as single Service asset: The supporting Service commander will exercise OPCON and 

TACON over assigned MQ-A units and will support 

routine cargo movement requests IAW [in accordance with] established airlift request procedures. 

To better fulfill TS/MC mission requirements, the 

supported commanders will be assigned TACON 

over EAS (to include mission and maintenance support personnel) to ensure adequate short notice airlift is available when and where required by the 

ground forces. OPCON will remain with the owning 

Service commander.

2.2.2. MQ-A as joint asset: Each Service will employ the MQ-A in accordance with Service doctrine 

and procedures. Excess sorties will be made available to the JFC/common user pool for allocation to 

the other functional commanders through the CAOC. 

Aircraft sortie allocations will be based upon mission 

requirements. In these cases, the functional commander will exercise TACON over the allocated forces. 

2.3. Force Generation: Each Service will maintain its 

own force rotation policies but will ensure that sufficient 

overlap occurs such that sufficient airlift support is 

maintained. This will include local orientation/familiarization training to ensure a smooth transition between 

outgoing and incoming forces. Each Service can position 

their respective Mission Control Element(s) (MCE) where 

they deem most effective. Each deployed EAS will include 

at least one fully qualified pilot. In the event that the 

MCE is not co-located with the supported forces, a Liaison Officer (LO) will be assigned to each deployed location to ensure optimal use of allocated resources.

2.4. Force Protection: Force protection for the EAS and 

supported unit will be provided by the supported 

unit/Service.
77

Intelligence

3. Intelligence

3.1. General: Timely and accurate intelligence information is essential to the successful execution of deployed operations. Intelligence provides enemy force capability and intent assessments to the commander, 

staff, and personnel executing the mission. A complete 

and accurate assessment of the operating environment 

as well as friendly and enemy forces is required at all 

stages of mission planning an execution. This is particularly critical in a tactical environment to ensure 

mission planners and aircrew can safely and effectively 

employ assigned assets with minimal risk to friendly 

forces and equipment. Tactical intelligence will be provided to aircrew and mission planners by theater intelligence personnel assigned to the supported commander 

prior to mission execution and to commanders upon 

request. Relevant intelligence information will be 

pushed to all applicable parties before, during and after 

mission execution as appropriate.

3.2. Responsibilities: Deployed intelligence assigned to 

the supported commander will support continuous flying operations. Intelligence research, analysis and dissemination will be provided in accordance with the supported command’s applicable guidance (i.e. doctrine, 

procedures, instructions, etc.). Special emphasis will be 

given to threat identification and analysis. Intelligence 

personnel assigned to the EAS will provide supplemental information and will assume primary threat/risk 

assessment responsibilities in the event support is unavailable from the supported unit. Intelligence personnel 

will rapidly push any intelligence information that will 

impact current or future operations to the commander 

and affected units.

3.3. Pre-mission briefings: Intelligence personnel shall 

ensure all crews receive pre-mission briefings IAW theater directives:
78

3.3.1. Pre-mission briefings will follow theater 

checklists, with briefing items to include: review of 

general battle situation; geo-political developments 

with impact on operations; significant changes in 

order of battle disposition; mission objectives with 

appropriate imagery of the objective area; mission 

threat assessment to include immediate area 

threats, ingress route threats, objective area threats, 

egress route threats, and anticipated threats at recovery/divert/abort fields. Pre-mission briefings for 

manned flights will also include Personnel Recovery 

(PR) information. 

3.3.2. The PR information provided to the pilot 

will include: a review of Combat Search and Rescue 

(CSAR) data on known survivors believed in the area 

of mission; review of Designated Areas for Recovery; 

theater authentication and recovery information; 

review of Evasion Plan of Action (EPA); and the provision of a PR kit with items as required by theater 

directives 

3.3.3. Pre-mission briefings will conclude with 

debriefing and reporting instructions to include a 

review of the Essential Elements of Information 

(EEI) and Mission Report (MISREP) instructions 

3.4. Post-mission debrief: Intelligence personnel shall 

ensure all missions are debriefed and all events are reported IAW theater directives: 

3.4.1. Crew debriefings will follow applicable 

checklists focusing on potential threat events, to include: Missile Warning System (MWS) events, Surface to Air Fire (SAFIRE) events; Spectrum Interference Resolution (SIR) events, communication problems 

and lasing events; and sightings of interest. 

3.4.2. Intelligence personnel will report all relevant events via MISREP within appropriate timeliness standards, IAW tasking authority requirements 

and theater directives 

3.5. Threat Assessments: Supported unit threat assessment policies and directives will take precedence 
79

over the supporting unit’s threat assessment policies. 

Under TACON, the supported unit commander is 

granted risk acceptance authority. All available intelligence sources will be used to provide mission planners 

and aircrews with a comprehensive threat picture and 

unit intelligence personnel will manage requests for information (RFI) as necessary. 
80

Operations

4. Operations

4.1. General: General flight operations will be largely 

dependent upon the EAS’s Service guidance on the employment of the MQ-A. While the remotely piloted nature 

and autonomous capabilities of the MQ-A may lend itself 

to a higher risk acceptance level, differences in the guidance governing the employment of remotely piloted air 

assets will need to be resolved between the supported 

and supporting commanders prior to asset employment. 

4.1.1. Risk Acceptance: The supported commander will conduct an operational risk assessment 

prior to employing the MQ-A. This assessment will 

consider, as a minimum, hazards presented by environmental conditions, enemy forces, cargo type 

and quantity, mission type, level of autonomy and 

operating area (e.g. urban, rural, mountainous, 

etc.). Operations in medium or high risk conditions 

will require a formal risk acceptance at a level appropriate to the risk being accepted. Risk assessment 

criteria, procedures and risk approval authorities 

will be agreed upon by the supporting and supported commanders prior to aircraft operation. 

4.1.2. Waiver Authority: Each Service will maintain appropriate waiver approval authority over assigned forces in accordance with established guidance unless delegated to the supported commander.

4.1.3. Multi-Mission: The MQ-A is a common use 

platform with a modular design to facilitate a wide 

range of mission sets. To change missions, mission 

modules can be interchanged and attached to wing 

and fuselage hardpoints. To assist with changing, 

loading, and unloading the primary fuselage module, 

the MQ-A is equipped with an internal hoist system 

which is operated from an externally accessible control panel. While the module is in the up configuration, electrically powered latches engage ensuring 

the module remains attached to the aircraft during 
81

flight. An electronic umbilical cord connecting the 

mission module to the MQ-A provides two-way communication between the module and the MQ-A’s 

communications and flight control systems. 

4.2. Tasking: Mission tasking is a multi-phased process that includes establishing mission requirements 

(traditionally presented in the form of an Air Mission 

Request (AMR)), a planning task and an execution task. 

To facilitate this process and ensure proper asset usage, Liaison Officers (LNO) will be integrated at the 

Higher Headquarters and supported/supporting unit 

levels. As the number of AMRs frequently exceeds available resources, supported unit commanders will validate and prioritize all airlift requirements/requests. 

Validated AMRs will be forwarded to the Plans cell.

LNOs at the Higher Headquarters and Air Mobility Division (AMD) will remain engaged during the entire tasking/planning process. In case of unfulfilled AMR requirements, the AMD LNO will forward a validated/prioritized 

list to the AMD for possible support. Supported unit 

LNOs to the AMD should monitor airlift requests to see 

if unused/excess supported unit missions may be suitable for AMD missions. 

4.3. Planning: All EASs and supported units will provide representation to the joint planning and execution 

cells. The Plans and Execution Cells will be collocated 

and will coordinate asset usage to fulfill validated AMRs. 

Whenever practical, the EAS will consolidate validated 

AMRs to maximize effectiveness and efficiency. Opportune cargo movement requests can be approved by the 

EAS commander both prior to and during mission execution provided they will not interfere with scheduled 

flights. The EAS will notify the supported unit to coordinate mission changes.

4.3.1. Plans Cell: The Plans Cell will: plan/build 

missions based upon validated AMRs and established Service and Mission Design Series (MDS) 

guidance, build flight itineraries, determine ACL 

and loads, receive mission requirements, enter data 

into Global Decision Support System (GDSS), deter-
82

mine routes/tactics, determine fuel stops, coordinate with maintenance for tail availability and usage, and ensure all planned flights are on the ATO. 

The supported unit commander will be notified of 

any capability shortfalls as soon as possible. The 

supported unit commander will approve all mission 

plans prior to execution. 

4.3.1.1. Cell composition: Each shift shall include, as a minimum: 1 x Pilot/Navigator/Combat 

Systems Operator; 1 x Loadmaster; 1 x Logistics 

Readiness Officer (LRO) requirements or 1 x 

Porter (2T2) requirements. 

4.4. Execution: A mission is considered in execution 

once the crew has been alerted. All requests to change 

the mission once it is in execution must be forwarded to 

the supported unit commander for approval prior to altering the mission. Approved mission change requests 

will flow from the supported unit commander or his delegated representative, to the EAS or crew, as appropriate, via applicable aviation command and control procedures. Mission changes due to operational requirements 

will be forwarded up to the supported unit commander 

via the same command and control process. 

The Execution authority for all missions is the supported unit commander normally exercised through the 

EAS commander. The Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR) will maintain 24/7 oversight on behalf of the 

CFACC [combined force air component commander] to 

include monitoring asset utilization and processing 

waivers for TS/MC missions.

4.4.1. Execution Cell: The Execution Cell will: 

alerts crews, execute missions, pass applicable info 

to the crew (i.e. MCE or MQ-A pilot), monitor mission progress, update GDSS, relay pertinent information to applicable parties within the CAOC, perform re-planning when necessary, and coordinate 

ATO changes. 

4.4.1.1. Cell composition: Each shift shall include, as a minimum: 1 x Pilot/Navigator/Com-
83

bat Systems Operator and 1 x Command and 

Control Specialist (1C3) or equivalent. 

4.5. TS/MC missions: The standard mission approval, 

planning, and execution process typically isn’t responsive enough to fulfill TS/MC mission requirements. In 

these cases, the supported unit commander and planning/execution staffs will perform all airspace coordination and ensure the CAOC is aware of any new flights 

and changes to the ATO. This is essential for any mission 

that will be flown above the coordination altitude, outside designated supported unit controlled airspace, or in 

airspace that requires deconfliction to avoid fratricide.

4.6. Mission Monitoring. Mission monitoring will take 

place on multiple levels: CAOC, AMD, Execution Cell, 

EAS/Supported Unit, MCE, en route stop locations, and 

other applicable agencies. As such, mission tracking 

through established logistic tracking systems such as 

command and control systems, GDSS and the Joint Air 

Logistics Information System-Next Generation (JALIS-NG) 

is essential for proper mission visibility and planning. 

Station command posts, the Execution Cell, and en 

route logistical offices will update all applicable tracking systems with pertinent information such as arrival 

time, departure time, advisory messages, cargo information, and maintenance status when new information 

becomes available. 

4.6.1. Reports. All Operations/Mission/Situation 

Reports will be IAW established guidance. 

4.6.2. Aircrew Responsibilities. The EAS command and control is the focal point for all mission 

support activities. The Aircraft Commander (either 

on the aircraft or in the GCS) must inform command and control of any factor that may affect mission accomplishment. When transiting a stop without a command and control agency, the Aircraft 

Commander is responsible for ensuring necessary 

mission information is placed into the command 

and control system by the most expeditious means 

available. 
84

4.7. Operating Procedures: In the absence of Service 

specific technical manuals, doctrine and instructions 

for the employment of the MQ-A, this section recommends some standard operating procedures for consideration. Operations outside Service and/or joint operating instructions will be approved by the appropriate 

waiver approval authority.

4.7.1. Autonomous/Semi-Autonomous Operations: 

An RPA is considered autonomous when it has 

ability and is entrusted to make substantial realtime decisions without human involvement or supervision. A system’s autonomy is independent of 

its ability to transmit information to another station 

for monitoring. Autonomous operations can rely 

upon pre-programmed waypoints or real-time internal logic determined routing. An RPA is considered 

semi-autonomous when it can operate partially or 

entirely autonomously but has a ground operator 

integrated into the control loop. In this case, a 

ground controller can offer revised direction to the 

RPA at any point during operation (e.g. ordinance 

release authorization, alter route of flight, etc.). 

4.7.1.1. Semi-Autonomous Operations: Semiautonomous operation is the preferred mode of 

operation. While the aircraft will take off and 

land autonomously, once the departure command is transmitted to the aircraft, aircrew 

should monitor the aircraft and mission progress so timely corrective inputs or mission/route 

changes can be provided when and where required. The MCE must be prepared to modify 

the aircraft’s mission and/or flight path based 

upon changing mission requirements and encountered hazards.

4.7.1.2. Autonomous Operations: While it is 

preferable that a MCE monitor aircraft operation during all phases of flight, the MQ-A was 

designed to operate autonomously. Autonomous 

operations by their very nature are inflexible. 

Pre-programmed routes and missions are flown 
85

with no MCE inputs once the aircraft departs. 

This may be done for a number of reasons: 1) a 

MCE is unavailable to monitor the mission/aircraft performance; 2) mission planners do not 

want the mission changed by external sources 

once the mission is initiated; or 3) the mission is 

considered routine and does not warrant mission monitoring by a MCE. 

Situations where autonomous operation will be 

permitted will be prior coordinated between the 

supported and supporting commanders. The 

CAOC will be advised of all autonomous flights. 

Prior to operating the MQ-A autonomously, special consideration will be given to en route hazards (e.g. weather, enemy activity, etc.), landing 

zone hazards (e.g. terrain, obstacles, etc.), operating altitudes, route of flight, airspace, and air 

traffic control coordination requirements. The 

route of flight and/or operating altitude may 

need to be adjusted to account for en route hazards and flight restrictions.

4.7.2. Air Tasking Order/Airspace Control Order: 

All flights will be conducted in accordance with procedures and restrictions outlined in the ATO and 

ACO. All regularly scheduled flights will be included 

in the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and the Airspace 

Control Order (ACO) to minimize conflicts and 

friendly fire incidents. A sufficient number of transponder codes will be reserved for short notice taskings not included in the ATO and ACO. The CAOC 

will be notified of all flights that were not specifically 

scheduled in the ATO and ACO. 

4.7.3. Flight Plan: The MQ-A will operate in both 

civil and military airspace while executing routine 

and contingency flights. In all cases flight planning 

and execution will be conducted in accordance with 

applicable airspace requirements.

4.7.3.1. Civil Airspace: Operation within civil 

airspace, even if transiting to or from a contingency area, will be in accordance with applicable 
86

national and flight information region requirements. This may require specific routes, specific 

procedures, and/or the utilization of a pilot 

module.

4.7.3.2. Military Controlled Airspace: Flights 

in military controlled airspace shall be conducted in accordance with local operating procedures (e.g. military flight rules such as MARSA 

(military assumes responsibility for separation), 

ATO, ACO, etc.). 

4.7.4. Weather: Adverse weather can have a significant impact upon flight operations. While the 

MQ-A can operate in reduced visibility conditions 

with limited to no impact upon normal operations, 

severe weather can result in aircraft loss and must 

be avoided. 

4.7.4.1. Briefing: Aircrew will receive a weather 

briefing prior to conducting flight operations in 

accordance with the supporting unit’s Service 

guidance. Supported commanders considering 

autonomous flight operations shall receive a full 

weather briefing for the entire intended route of 

flight prior to approving autonomous flight operations.

4.7.4.2. Ceiling and Visibility: Aside from landing zone validation, MQ-A operations are not 

significantly impacted by visibility restricting 

conditions (e.g. cloud, fog, white-out, brown-out, 

darkness, etc.). Provided the MQ-A has been 

provided sufficiently accurate landing coordinates, the MQ-A can take off and land in 0’/0 SM 

conditions (i.e. clouds down to surface and no 

measurable visibility). Commanders will assess 

the risk to ground personnel and equipment before approving operation in these conditions.

4.7.4.3. Severe Weather: Severe weather, to include icing, thunderstorms, hail, and heavy precipitation shall be avoided in accordance with 
87

Service guidance. Operations in severe weather 

conditions can result in loss of aircraft.

4.7.5. Lighting: The MQ-A is designed to take off 

and land autonomously using onboard position 

sensors. Visual sensors are used purely for the purpose of landing zone validation and ISR and are not 

required to perform the landing itself. As airfield 

lighting is not required for the MQ-A to takeoff or 

land, airfield lighting is not required. However, to 

help ensure the safety of ground personnel and to 

aid in landing zone validation, airfield lighting 

should be employed when operationally feasible.

4.7.6. Crash Fire Rescue: Operational requirements and limitations often require US forces to operate out of unprepared or hostile areas. These areas seldom have a fully functional crash fire rescue 

capability. While this is less than ideal, the supported commander can accept the risk of operating 

into/out of areas with limited or no crash fire rescue capabilities.

4.7.7. Departure/Arrival: The MQ-A is designed 

to take off and land autonomously in all environmental conditions. 

4.7.7.1. Departure: When the offload and/or 

onload is complete, ground personnel will either 

enter the coordinates or identifier for the next 

destination into the onboard FMS or select one 

of two options: 1) return to base (point of origin) 

or 2) continue to next en route stop. The desired 

route of flight can be loaded manually into the 

aircraft’s FMS or remotely from the GCS. If a 

route of flight is not inputted, the FMS will compute a route of flight based upon known airways, threats, terrain, and airspace restrictions. 

Once the takeoff command is received from 

ground personnel or the GCS, the aircraft will 

wait a designated period (20 seconds unless indicated otherwise) to give time for ground personnel to achieve a safe distance from the aircraft. It will then power up the in-wing ducted 
88

fans, perform an autonomous vertical takeoff, 

climb to a safe altitude and transition to forward 

flight. 

4.7.7.2. Arrival: The MQ-A is capable [of] landing at three types of landing zones: 1) predetermined geographic coordinates (such as a landing 

pad on an airport); 2) a ground personnel directed 

point; or 3) on a small, portable, short range 

marker beacon/transmitter (easily carried by 

ground personnel or fixed on a ship). When approaching the pre-designated landing point, the 

MQ-A will transition to a hover at 2,000 feet 

above ground level (AGL) at the designated coordinates. The fielded forces, using PDA linked to 

the aircraft, will then accept the landing point, 

adjust the landing point, direct the aircraft to 

land on the marker beacon, direct the aircraft to 

hold, send the aircraft to its next destination, or 

send it back to base. 

If a landing point is not acknowledged by the 

ground personnel the landing decision will be 

deferred to the monitoring aircrew. In the event 

of a lost link or aircrew unavailability, the aircraft 

will perform a predetermined function: 1) hold 

to await further instruction; 2) proceed to the 

next waypoint; 3) land at the designated coordinates/marker; or 4) return to base. The selected 

course of action will depend upon preloaded algorithms and/or the anticipated security of the 

intended landing zone.

Once approved for landing, the MQ-A will perform an autonomous vertical descent to landing 

utilizing onboard GPS/INS systems and thrust 

vectoring (via ducted fan louvers) to maintain a 

position directly over the intended landing position throughout the descent. This will allow the 

aircraft to land in a confined area without the 

ground personnel designating an approach corridor. It will also minimize side loading strains 

on the landing gear during landing and reduce 
89

the chances of a landing role. In the case of ship 

operations, a crew monitoring the aircraft’s progress will assume control, fly it to the target ship, 

lock the aircraft onto the mobile marker transmitter and direct the aircraft to land. The MQ-A 

will then assume a position over the marker and 

perform a vertical landing onto the deck.

4.7.8. Duty Day/Crew Rest: The supporting unit 

will comply with its Service specific crew rest and 

duty day limitations. Waiver authority for Aircraft 

Commander requested duty day waivers up to 2 

hours may be delegated to the supported unit’s 

equivalent command level. 

4.7.9. Flight Surgeon/Medical Issues: EAS personnel may use the supported unit’s Service medical staff (i.e. AF EAS personnel assigned to an Army 

unit may use Army medical staff).

4.7.10. Minimum Equipment List: Each Service’s 

minimum equipment list (MEL) will contain, as a 

minimum, a list of required items for contingency 

operations. This list will also identify items that can 

be waived by the supported commander if aircraft 

operation is required to support a TS/MC mission. 

The waiver authority for aircraft operation with less 

than the required minimum equipment required for 

the specified mission will be in accordance with 

supporting unit guidance.

4.7.11. Fuel Reserve: At takeoff, the aircraft must 

have sufficient fuel to fly to its destination, hold for 

45 minutes and then land or proceed to an alternate 

where fuel is available. 

4.7.12. Alternate: Alternate airfields must be secure locations with a ceiling of at least 2,000’ (1,000’ 

if a means exist to alter the landing zone verification 

hover altitude while the aircraft is en route) or precise landing coordinates. If the landing coordinate 

option is used, the area immediately surrounding 

the intended landing zone must be clear of obstacles. Whenever possible, unverified landings should 
90

be conducted using mobile landing zone beacons/transmitters.

4.7.13. En Route Procedures: The MQ-A can operate at altitudes over 30,000 feet and at speeds comparable to most jet aircraft. While the aircraft is 

equipped with terrain, hazard, and aircraft-avoidance 

technologies, every effort must be taken to ensure 

the intended flight path complies with established 

civil and military flight procedures and restrictions 

as appropriate to the airspace the aircraft is operating in.

4.7.14. Ground Operations: During takeoff and 

landing, the ducted fans will generate significant 

downwash. Loose material in the landing zone can 

become a hazard to personnel and may result in 

FOD ingestion. To minimize the risk to personnel 

and aircraft, the intended landing zone should be 

cleared of loose material prior to aircraft operation. 

Once on the ground, the MQ-A’s wheels auto lock 

and the ducted fan is depowered and completely 

covered by its thrust vectoring louvers. To minimize 

exposure to blowing debris and fan contact, personnel should remain clear of the fan ports until the 

fans are depowered, the louvers are fully closed and 

the aircraft has fully settled. While the main engine 

is running, personnel should also use caution to 

avoid the jet exhaust when transiting behind the 

aircraft.

Once the desired cargo and/or mission modules 

have been off loaded and/or on loaded, the aircraft’s 

next destination will be loaded into the FMS. Using 

the onboard FMS, or remotely via a controlling GCS, 

upload the destination (geographic coordinates or a 

location identifier code), a desired altitude (optional) 

and a route of flight (optional). Once the route has 

been loaded and verified, depress the takeoff button 

and egress the immediate area. The aircraft will wait 

20 seconds (or less if desired) before powering up to 

ensure sufficient time for ground personnel to reach 

a safe distance. If a route of flight or altitude is not 
91

selected, the FMS will select an optimum route and 

altitude based upon known threats, airways, restrictions and ICAO flight rules.

The weight of the pod attached to the center hoist system is calculated automatically by the MQ-A’s hoist 

system. If this weight is determined to be inaccurate 

or additional pods or munitions are attached to the 

aircraft, the total weight of all external loads will be 

entered into the FMS manually prior to departure.

4.8. Environments: MOOTW [military operations other 

than war} and contingency operations require 24/7 

support in all weather conditions. The MQ-A is designed 

to operate autonomously or semi-autonomously in all 

environments with minimal risk to personnel and equipment. While operating in a remotely piloted mode, the 

autonomous landing system is immune to environmental 

conditions that would otherwise contribute to human 

factor related mishaps (particularly spatial disorientation or visual illusion related mishaps). On board positional sensors also help mitigate the risk of collision 

with obstacles.

4.8.1. CBRNE: Unlike manned platforms, remotely 

piloted aircraft can operate in CBRNE environments 

with relative impunity for extended durations with 

little to no degradation in performance. This makes 

remotely piloted platforms an ideal choice for operation in these harsh conditions. 

When conditions are deemed too hazardous for 

manned aircraft to operate, or if decontamination is 

a considerable concern, the MQ-A will be equipped 

with the appropriate mission module and operated 

in an autonomous or semi-autonomous mode. Upon 

completion of the mission, the aircraft will be refueled and sent back into the hazardous area or decontaminated for later use.

4.8.2. Hostile: Resupplying friendly forces engaged in close contact with enemy forces is a high 

risk mission for manned aircraft. While some of 

these missions may require manned aircraft due to 
92

rapidly changing conditions or passenger ingress/

egress requirements, the MQ-A provides a lower 

risk option for these hazardous conditions. The 

landing zone verification process allows the friendly 

troops to accept, delay, or deny receipt of the inbound cargo. The aircraft’s small footprint will enable it to land in areas otherwise inaccessible to 

larger resupply helicopters such as the H-60 or even 

the H-1. This presents the ground forces with flexibility and greater force protection options without 

risking the lives of personnel on manned aircraft.

4.8.3. Threat Avoidance: The modern battlefield 

presents friendly aircraft with a wide assortment of 

threats ranging from small arms and AAA to SAMs 

and even other aircraft. The best chance for survival 

in this environment is to avoid the threat entirely (a 

necessity without countermeasures). 

4.8.3.1. Hostile Fire: By flying outside the effective operating envelope of these threats, an 

aircraft can significantly reduce or even eliminate the chances of being hit by a given weapon. 

The MQ-A’s range and wide operating envelope 

will enable the aircraft to fly around, over, or under the effective range of many threats. By using 

terrain following/avoidance technologies to fly 

at near treetop levels or through mountainous 

terrain at very high speeds, the MQ-A can minimize ground troop response times, get under enemy radar and even remain below the effective 

altitude of some ground threats. It can also 

cruise at altitudes over 30,000 feet to help reduce the risk of small arms, AAA, and SAM 

threats. Being able to hover at altitudes over 

12,000 feet also enables it to hover at an altitude outside the effective range of small arms 

and some surface to air missiles while acquiring 

a landing zone or performing an ISR role. 

The MQ-A’s vertical takeoff and landing profile 

also allows it to avoid overflying hostile forces 

while flying a vulnerable, low and predictable 
93

approach or departure path at slow speeds. The 

MQ-A’s low profile and ability to land in small 

clearings (such as between buildings or between 

CONEXs [container express]) allows ground 

forces to be resupplied in relatively secure locations thereby minimizing the risk of ground fire 

while onloading or offloading. The additional 

use of a DIRCM [directional infrared countermeasures] equipped pod or other suppression/countermeasure systems can also help 

reduce the risk of hostile fire.

4.8.3.2. Other Aircraft: As airspace becomes 

increasing congested and the number of remotely piloted aircraft increases, the threat to 

and from other aircraft due to mid-air collisions 

will also [increase]. By using sense and avoid 

technologies linked into the flight control system, the MQ-A is able to identify and avoid other 

aircraft, even when they aren’t equipped with or 

operating a transponder. 

4.8.4. Low Visibility: Reduced visual conditions 

are a significant contributor to helicopter mishaps. 

Most prevalent of these are white-out and brownout conditions which can lead to spatial disorientation or visual illusions in areas of loose snow or dirt. 

Likewise, the MQ-A can operate in conditions of low 

horizontal visibility such as in a dust, sand, or snow 

storms, conditions that would restrict or prohibit 

manned aircraft flight. Equipped with position sensors and an autonomous landing system that requires no visual cues, the MQ-A is able to operate 

normally in visually restricted conditions without 

performing a forward movement landing. While low 

ceilings and dense ground fog may restrict or inhibit 

the MQ-A’s ability to take landing zone validation 

imagery, accurate landing zone coordinates or the 

use of a landing zone marker beacon/transmitter 

can negate this requirement. The aircraft’s true vertical takeoff and landing profile further allows it to 

operate in areas deemed too hazardous for manned 

flight such as landing in a city street during a dust 
94

storm. Due to the aircraft’s ability to operate normally in low visibility conditions, the MQ-A will be 

the primary resupply option in visually restricted 

conditions (e.g. fog, low ceiling, loose or blowing 

sand/snow, etc.).

4.8.5. Mountainous: Mountainous terrain adds a 

significant challenge to flight operations. Rapidly 

rising terrain and narrow canyons can make maneuvering difficult. High pressure altitudes can also 

significantly reduce the performance of most rotorwing aircraft. A high precision navigation system 

ensures the aircraft remains on course in all weather 

conditions. The MQ-A’s terrain database coupled 

with its Automatic-Ground Collision Avoidance System further prevents ground collision should the 

aircraft get off course or be given a route of flight 

that would otherwise result in terrain impact. 

The aircraft’s ducted fans enable it to hover at altitudes up to 12,000 feet making most mountain 

landings a low risk event. Using the onboard terrain 

database, the flight management system automatically determines the landing zone elevation and adjusts the descent profile and hover altitudes to accommodate resupplying forces on mountains, hills 

or ridgelines. Coupled with the all weather precision 

course guidance, high altitude hover capability, terrain mapping, and terrain avoidance capabilities, 

the MQ-A can provide resupply service in mountainous terrain even with restricted or no visibility.

4.8.6. Urban: Urban environments present a 

unique challenge due to the immediate proximity of 

manmade structures, vegetation, power/telephone 

lines, and other obstacles. The confined nature of 

this environment makes helicopter resupply difficult and potentially very hazardous. The MQ-A’s 

small footprint and vertical approach and departure 

paths make ingress and egress from these confined 

areas a far lower risk activity. The landing zone validation imagery and adjustment capability will allow 

ground troops to approve or modify the desired 
95

landing zone based upon changing requirements or 

unforeseen conditions (such as unexpected power 

lines or vehicles in the pre-programmed landing 

zone). The small landing zone beacon/transmitter 

further enhances landing options, especially if sufficiently accurate coordinates cannot be obtained or 

the intended landing zone is visually obscured from 

above by sand, snow, fog, etc.

4.9. Contingency Operations: The MQ-A is a multirole, all weather, autonomous or semi-autonomous remotely piloted platform capable of high speed, high altitude and low-level terrain following flight with little 

preflight preparation time required. With a small footprint, 

high altitude hover and VTOL capabilities, an ability to 

operate into and out of virtually all locations to include 

little degradation in performance in CBRNE, hostile fire, 

or low visibility conditions, the MQ-A is the primary platform of choice for small cargo loads, short notice taskings and operations in hostile environments. Changing 

the mission modules will allow the MQ-A to perform a 

wide variety of missions when and where required.

4.9.1. Positioning/Depositioning: Capable of self 

sustained flight of over 1,300 nm using internal fuel 

tanks (and no mission modules) or 2,100 nm using 

an extended range fuel tank module, the MQ-A can 

either fly itself to a forward staging location or it can 

be broken down and transported via C-17, C-5, 

truck and/or sea lift in 20 foot shipping containers. 

The mission modules will be transported via airlift, 

truck, or sea lift (based upon mission requirements). 

Aircraft service equipment and personnel will be 

transported via strategic and tactical lift based upon 

mission requirements and transport availability. 

4.9.2. Cargo Lift: Using a cargo module attached 

to the fuselage, the MQ-A will transport small cargo 

loads (up to 3,000 pounds) to forward locations up 

to 500 nm away with enough fuel to return to base. 

Cargo transported in the cargo modules or the back 

of the pilot/passenger module will be secured to the 

maximum extent possible. Cargo can be loaded ei-
96

ther directly into a cargo module already attached to 

the aircraft or into a standalone module for later 

upload/attachment. While the cargo modules are 

climate controlled, they are not pressurized. As 

such, consideration should be given to identifying 

or restricting the transit altitude. 

Sample Scenario: Soldiers engaged in heavy fighting 

230 miles away require immediate resupply of ammunition and medical supplies until they can be either extracted or reinforced. Low visibility due to a 

sand storm has made resupply or extraction by 

manned rotor-wing assets already in theater impossible and close air support too dangerous.

After receiving the call for supplies, the Movement 

Control Team (MCT) gathers the requested supplies 

and loads the cargo module already attached to the 

MQ-A being preflighted for the mission. Meanwhile, 

the landing zone coordinates provided by the fielded 

forces are loaded into the mission crew element’s 

flight planning software. A route of flight is then determined and transmitted to the MQ-A’s FMS. Once 

the cargo is secured in the cargo module, the load 

team depresses the takeoff button next to the FMS 

and the launch sequence commences. 

20 seconds later, the ducted fan louvers open, exhaust air is ported from the engine to the ducted fans 

and the aircraft performs a vertical takeoff. After 

reaching 500 feet, the MQ-A transitions to forward 

flight, cruises to the designated landing zone coordinates at 250 kts and assumes a hover 2,000 feet 

above target area. While the sand storm has prevented visual confirmation of the landing zone, the 

troops direct the aircraft to land on the mobile landing 

zone transmitter already placed in the center of the 

intended landing zone. The MQ-A locks onto the short 

range transmitter, commences its vertical descent, 

and lands in the middle of the landing zone. 

Once on the ground, the ducted fans are depowered 

and the louvers close. Meanwhile, the ground troops 

quickly remove the supplies from the cargo module, 
97

secure the doors, and depress the return to base button. 20 seconds later the MQ-A jumps off the ground 

and returns to base.

4.9.3. Airdrop: Not all locations can support a 

VTOL aircraft on the ground. This may be due to 

excessive threat or a lack of a sufficient landing 

zone. In these cases, an airdrop module can be used 

to transport supplies to a target area and then drop 

them with or without a parachute. The preferred 

method of airdrop will be from a hover position but 

airdrop from forward flight can be accomplished if 

required for mission accomplishment or aircraft 

safety. All airdrop missions will be flown semiautonomously with the RPA pilot visually confirming the drop zone prior to package release.

4.9.3.1. Small Package Airdrop: The small 

package airdrop module utilizes trap doors on 

the bottom of a standard sized cargo module to 

selectively release small packages. Each bundle 

can be equipped with or without a parachute depending upon mission and drop requirements. 

4.9.3.2. Module Airdrop: The modular airdrop 

option involves dropping the entire module with 

up to 3,000 lb. of supplies with or without a 

parachute (depending upon mission and drop 

requirements). This is primarily used for loads 

that are too large to be dropped via the small 

package airdrop module. During contingency 

operations, airdrop modules should be considered expendable. During non-contingency operations (e.g. training), airdrop modules that were 

dropped with a parachute should be recovered.

4.9.4. Passenger Lift: While not designed for passenger lift, this is a viable option if other troop transport options are not available. Three primary scenarios exist where passenger transport may occur. 

In all cases it is essential to keep in mind that although the modules are heated the modules are not 

pressurized. Thus the aircraft’s en route flight altitude should be restricted to not higher than 10,000 
98

feet and at no time higher than 12,000 feet. While 

passengers are not on board the aircraft, the web 

seat(s) can be secured against the module wall and 

cargo can be loaded in its place. All takeoffs and 

landings will be conducted autonomously.

4.9.4.1. Option 1 (Pilot/Passenger Module – 

Piloted): Using a pilot module configured for a 

pilot and three passengers, a MQ-A pilot can 

semi-autonomously or manually fly the aircraft 

to the destination, land, onload or offload the 

passenger(s), and then either continue a mission or return to base. Piloted missions do not 

require active mission monitoring by a MCE unless mission requirements or EAS guidance dictate otherwise.

4.9.4.2. Option 2 (No-Notice Emergency 

Egress: Cargo Module – No Pilot): The second 

most likely scenario for passenger movement is 

a no-notice emergency egress or transport. In 

this case, a MQ-A, configured for cargo transport, is required to extract a small team or a 

seriously injured patient from a hostile environment. Personnel wishing to utilize this option 

should coordinate their intentions with the MCE 

in the GCS via the aircraft’s direct communication link. 

In this case, the cargo module can be emptied (if 

required) and the passenger(s) can be placed inside the module. In this scenario, the ground 

personnel must ensure an altitude (and destination) is programmed into the FMS that will be 

conducive to passenger transport. This can be 

done either manually through the FMS or remotely by the GCS. Furthermore, if the module 

is not configured with fold down seating, the 

only means of securing the passenger(s) may be 

the cargo tie-downs. In this case, a high potential for personal injury exists. Occupants should 

make every effort to minimize movement inside 

the module once the aircraft commences flight. 
99

4.9.4.3. Option 3 (Pilot/Passenger Module–No 

Pilot): Until the MQ-A’s reliability and safety 

have been proven, and personnel are willing to 

be transported by a remotely piloted aircraft, 

this scenario is highly unlikely. However, if this 

option is deemed desirable, a pilot module can 

be loaded with the module’s flight control authority deactivated (to prevent inadvertent passenger activation). To facilitate emergency communication between the passengers and the MCE, 

a communication link (either radio or SATCOM) 

will be kept active. In this configuration, all passenger carrying flights will be operated semiautonomously for the duration of the flight. 

Sample Scenario: There is a short notice tasking 

to move two passengers to a FOB 300 nm away 

but no helicopters will be able to depart for another 2 hours. After coordinating with the EAS 

commander, the supported unit directs the MCE 

pilot to fly the two individuals to the FOB. While 

the pilot calculates and loads the route of flight 

into the FMS, the MCT lowers the cargo module 

from the fuselage using the internal wench system, detaches it, pushes the MQ-A over the waiting pilot/passenger module, connects the umbilical cord, hoists it into position and engages the 

electrically powered locks. 

The pilot then performs a preflight, ensuring proper 

module-aircraft interface and calls for the passengers. The two passengers are escorted to the aircraft where they receive a safety briefing by the 

pilot and are secured in their seats. A few minutes 

later the aircraft powers up, performs an autonomous takeoff, and starts the flight to the FOB. 

Less than an hour later, the pilot directs the aircraft to land and the MQ-A performs the 2,000’ 

vertical descent to landing. Once on the ground, 

the in-wing ducted fans are depowered and 

sealed behind the louvers. The passengers disembark and the pilot takes control of unsched-
100

uled cargo that needs to go to another FOB before 

the aircraft returns to base. After receiving a 

quick approval for the mission change from the 

operations center, the pilot modifies the flight 

plan and departs. After a quick stop at the second FOB to drop off the cargo and onload fuel, the 

pilot returns to base with some mail and other 

small items of opportune cargo.

4.9.5. ISR: Using one of three ISR modules, standard, armed and side scan, the MQ-A can perform 

both armed and unarmed ISR missions. However, 

the MQ-A should not be considered the primary ISR 

platform. The MQ-A trades loiter time for speed, 

mission flexibility, a wide operating envelope, safety, 

and an ability to hover thousands of feet over a target area. These traits make the MQ-A an excellent 

choice to respond to short notice or urgent ISR requirements at extended distances. The MQ-A can 

get to the target area faster than the Predator, 

Reaper, and Warrior, can perform the ISR mission, 

hand it off to another aircraft (such as a Reaper) 

when it arrives and then either perform another 

mission or return to base. 

The standard and armed ISR modules utilize the 

same sensor package as can be found on current 

ISR RPAs. Due to the extra lift capacity, the remaining space in the module is used for either a fuel 

bladder for enhanced persistence (i.e. standard ISR 

module) or a multiple ejector ordinance rack (i.e. 

armed ISR module). The net-centric side scan module is equipped with a side scan radar that transmits the radar hits to other compatible aircraft 

(such as the J-STARS, RC-135, F-35, or F-22) operating within transmission range. 

All ISR missions (armed and unarmed) shall be 

flown semi-autonomously with all takeoffs and 

landings performed autonomously. Target acquisition and weapons engagement shall be conducted 

by the MCE.
101

Sample Scenario: A special forces team has potentially identified a high priority target in a mountain 

village but the RQ-1 currently monitoring the target 

only has another hour’s worth of loiter time before it 

must return to base for refueling. As the target is only 

180 miles away from the FOB, the CAOC has requested 

that a MQ-A launch in an armed ISR configuration to 

continue the surveillance and possibly engage.

A MQ-A is quickly configured with an armed ISR 

module and sent on its way. As the aircraft approaches the surveillance area, the MQ-A MCE clears 

the RQ-1 back to base and assumes the surveillance. 

Once positive verification is received that the individual is in fact the suspected high priority target, the 

MCE is directed to engage. The pilot locks onto the 

target and fires a Hellfire missile. After confirming 

that the target has been neutralized, the MQ-A assumes an ISR CAP in that area until a MQ-9 is able to 

replace it a few hours later.

4.9.6. Bomber: Configured with any of an assortment of bomb modules, the MQ-A can function as a 

remotely piloted bomber platform. The aircraft’s 

high airspeed and operating altitude allow it to 

quickly reach any target area within a 500 nm radius thereby reducing response time and enhancing 

ground support capabilities. Limited by weight, the 

multiple ejector bomb rack configurations can vary 

based upon mission requirements and desired endurance (increased ordinance weight decreases endurance). Once the bomb module is loaded several 

mission scenarios exist:

4.9.6.1. Autonomous vs. Pre-Programmed Fixed 

Targets: Similar to a cruise missile, the MQ-A is 

pre-programmed to fly a designated route 

against a designated fixed target(s) (e.g. a building, bridge, runway, power station, etc.). Upon 

reaching the designated drop point, the MQ-A 

will drop a predetermined type and quantity of 

ordinance before proceeding to the next target 

or returning to base. Functioning in an autono-
102

mous mode, the aircraft becomes a launch and 

forget platform until such time as it arrives at its 

designated landing point. The aircraft’s progress 

can be monitored but no further inputs are required from the MCE to execute the mission.

4.9.6.2. Semi-Autonomous vs. Pre-Programmed 

Fixed Targets: Operating in the same manner as 

the Autonomous vs. Pre-Programmed Fixed Target mission, the Semi-Autonomous vs. PreProgrammed Fixed Target mission has one significant difference, MCE input is authorized, or 

possibly even required prior ordinance release. 

At any point during the mission profile, the MCE 

can alter the aircraft’s route, destination, or ordinance release details. This mission profile is 

preferred if the target(s) requires visual identification prior to ordinance release or if there is a 

high likelihood of a mission change before the 

aircraft returns to base.

4.9.6.3. Semi-Autonomous vs. Pre-Programmed 

Dynamic Targets: Unlike the Autonomous and 

Semi-Autonomous vs. Pre-Programmed Fixed 

Target missions, the Semi-Autonomous vs. PreProgrammed Dynamic Target mission involves 

targeting opportune targets or late notice targets. In this case, the MQ-A will most likely be 

directed to hold in a designated holding area until such time as a potential target is identified. At 

which time the MCE transmits the target coordinates to the orbiting MQ-A. The aircraft then 

flies to the target, releases the desired ordinance, and either returns to a designated holding point or returns to base. 

4.9.6.4. Semi-Autonomous Close Air Support: 

In a similar manner to the Semi-Autonomous 

vs. Pre-Programmed Dynamic Targets mission, 

the MQ-A is launched and sent to a designated 

holding area. When friendly forces require close 

air support, the MQ-A will respond to the target 

area and take a general area photo from an alti-
103

tude outside the expected surface to air threat 

range. The photo is transmitted to the engaged 

ground troops and displayed on a PDA. The 

ground troops can then zoom in, tap on the desired target, and transmit the new target location to the orbiting MQ-A. The MQ-A will then 

drop the desired ordinance on the designated 

target(s). Utilizing glide bombs can help improve 

standoff distance while the use of laser guided 

and/or GPS guided bombs can improve accuracy. In this scenario, the role of the MCE is 

minimized while the bulk of the route and target 

planning is conducted by the fielded ground 

forces. In this case, although the ground forces 

will perform a majority of the target identification, the MCE will monitor aircraft performance 

and targeting to minimize chances of fratricide 

and help reduce the risk of a mishap.

Sample Scenario: With no cargo or TS/MC mission requirements, two MQ-As have been released to the common use pool for tasking. An 

hour later the CAOC tasks one of the MQ-As to 

bomb two targets to help prepare the battlefield 

for a pending ground operation. As the targets 

are two undefended bridges 450 miles away, the 

EAS opts to execute an autonomous mission saving the sole legal crew for other operations.

With the ordinance selected, the MCT replaces 

the cargo module with a bomb module and uploads the required precision munitions while the 

flight plan is uploaded to the FMS. Once the bomb 

release points are calculated and the munitions 

are programmed, the launch command is given. 

20 seconds later the MQ-A powers up and departs on its pre-programmed route. At the predesignated point, the MQ-A releases the first set 

of GBU-49s from 30,000 feet and then proceeds 

to the second target. After hitting the second target the MQ-A returns to base having disabled 

both bridges. 
104

Having flown the entire mission autonomously 

with only position monitoring along the way, the 

MQ-A arrives over the home station just under 3 

hours after departure. After coming to a hover 

2,000 feet over the landing pad, the launch and 

recovery team approves the landing via the PDA. 

The MQ-A performs the 2,000 vertical descent 

and lands on the landing pad for reconfiguration 

and refueling.

4.10. Military Operations Other Than War: Many of the 

same missions that would be performed during contingency operations will also be conducted during MOOTW. 

The most likely of these missions involve cargo movement and surveillance. The ability to change missions 

by simply changing the mission module provides the 

force with a significant level of flexibility and responsiveness to changing mission requirements.

4.10.1. Supply: In all types of MOOTW, the MQ-A 

can be used to transport cargo and supplies several 

hundred miles to the point of need rapidly and inexpensively. Supply missions during MOOTW will mirror the Cargo Lift mission conducted during contingency operations. The aircraft’s wide operating 

envelope and ability to operate into and out of unprepared locations makes the MQ-A an ideal choice 

for on demand movement of TS/MC supplies to all 

types of locations. The low exhaust temperatures 

and the MQ-A’s small footprint enable it to land in 

areas inaccessible to many helicopters. Its ability to 

operate in controlled airspace with or without a pilot 

on board also allows it to be used during peacetime 

in the US or anywhere the aircraft is required without establishing specialized airspace or making special arrangements with air traffic control services.

4.10.2. Humanitarian Relief: Humanitarian relief 

missions, such as those conducted in response to 

environmental disasters (e.g. earthquake, tsunami, 

forest fire, etc.) or significant manmade events (e.g. 

genocide, CBRNE, civil war, etc.) often involve damage/threat assessment and the mass lift of consum-
105

ables and medical supplies. In these cases, roads 

are often impassable (e.g. washed out, covered in 

debris, etc.) or too dangerous (e.g. threat of ambush, 

unstable roadway, etc.) to move mass quantities of 

supplies over long distances. 

The MQ-A provides a means to transport large 

amounts of supplies, in small quantities, to a significant number of dispersed locations without deploying a significant number of manned aircraft and 

supporting ground personnel. Furthermore, movement along insecure, damaged, congested, or unprepared roads is often slow or even impossible resulting in extensive delays between their departure 

from a supply hub and their arrival at the point of 

need. The MQ-A will cut this time exponentially, especially over longer distances (e.g. 40 minutes to fly 

200 nm vs. over 4 hours to drive it – assuming the 

roads are even passable). In the case of unstable 

and/or hostile environments, the MQ-A will transport supplies over the hazardous territory without 

risking convoys, manned aircraft, or their crews. 

Rescue workers will then receive the aircraft, unload the supplies and send the MQ-A back to the 

major distribution point for more. This distribution 

method will also help reduce the number of large 

supply hubs while simultaneously reducing the carbon footprint required to support them. 

While performing these missions, the EAS commander will determine when the MQ-A will be operated in autonomous or semi-autonomous mode. 

Factors to be taken into consideration include, but 

are not limited to, atmospheric conditions, risk of 

hostile activities, condition of landing zones, level of 

training/competency of ground personnel expected 

to load, unload and launch the aircraft, number of 

ground control PDAs, and hazardous terrain (e.g. 

significant number of power lines, downed trees, etc.).

4.10.3. Surveillance: Equipped with the standard 

ISR module, the MQ-A can perform many peacetime 

surveillance missions. In addition to performing ISR 
106

during a contingency operation, the MQ-A will conduct surveillance for the purpose of border patrol, 

coastal defense, counter drug operations, disaster 

and threat assessment, ground activity monitoring, 

and other overt and covert operations. Surveillance 

missions will be flown semi-autonomously.

4.10.4. Search and Rescue: Search and rescue 

missions typically require a significant number of 

resources to effectively search a large area on foot 

and from the air. This function is typically performed by civil air patrol and military aircraft visually scanning the target area in search of an aircraft 

or missing individual(s). Due to limitations of a visual search, the operation must be conducted in 

good weather during hours of daylight. 

The MQ-A, utilizing the standard ISR module, can 

help find heat sources and other objects 24 hours a 

day. Once located, the MQ-A can hover over the site 

and an emergency survival kit can be dropped to the 

survivor(s) from one of the aircraft’s hard points. The 

MQ-A can then either maintain a hover over the site 

or assume an observation orbit until manned rescue 

assets arrive to extract the personnel and/or equipment. If equipped with the CSAR module, the rescue 

basket can be lowered to extract the crewmember(s). 

The added operating hours, enhanced optical scan 

capabilities, ability to resupply, ability to extract 

crewmembers, and an ability to maintain a sustained 

observation position until rescue personnel arrive 

can all mean the difference between life and death. 

4.11. Training: To ensure successful joint operations, 

all EAS personnel and ground personnel who may be 

serviced by the MQ-A must be proficient in the operating procedures of the other Services. EAS personnel 

must be further proficient in all mission sets. The required proficiency levels will be maintained through 

joint training and common doctrine, procedures and 

techniques. Maintaining common operating procedures 

will further help reduce the chances of negative transfer 

when operating in a joint environment. 
107

4.11.1. Communication training: Aircrew and ground 

personnel shall receive training on phraseology and 

communication equipment used by all Services. 

4.11.2. Participation in Joint exercises, Joint Airborne/Air Transportability Training (JA/ATT) and 

Air Training Exercises (ATX) will enhance communication and cooperation between air and ground elements. The JA/ATT program should emphasize and 

incorporate TS/MC events. 

4.11.3. EAS planning cell, aircrew and LNOs associated with TS/MC missions should attend predeployment training with the supported unit(s). 

4.11.4. Ground personnel who may operate around, 

service, load or unload the MQ-A shall [receive] specialized handling training. This training shall ensure personnel are familiar with how to operate with 

the aircraft in an operational environment. This 

training will include how to review, approve, and 

modify landing instructions via the ground control 

PDA, change missing modules, and how to review, 

modify, and input flight instructions via the onboard FMS. Refresher training will be accomplished 

as required prior to deployment.
108

Logistics/Sustainment

5. Logistics/Sustainment: 

5.1. Cargo and Passenger Processing: The supported 

unit will provide a MCT and personnel to perform the 

arrival/departure airfield control group (A/DACG) operations to support cargo and passenger handling operations at the supporting EAS’s main operating base. 

These MCTs will have personnel trained and certified 

for loading and unloading all MQ-A mission modules. 

To help expedite the loading and unloading process at 

locations not serviced by a MCT, supported commanders shall ensure all supported personnel are trained on 

basic aircraft operation (i.e. load, unload, launch). 

5.1.1. Standard Cargo Movement. Standard cargo 

shall be required no earlier than 24 hours prior to 

scheduled departure. The MCT shall inspect and 

prepare all cargo. The supported unit shall establish a cargo priority system and inspect, prepare 

and document all cargo loads. 

5.1.2. Short-Notice Cargo Movement. Many TS/MC 

cargo loads will be shipped in much less time based 

upon mission requirements and aircraft availability. 

The Aircraft Commander will attempt to contact the 

supported unit commander (or designee) for coordination and approval. If contact cannot be established, the Aircraft Commander will use his/her 

best judgment. Generally, last minute or opportune 

cargo should be accommodated if it won’t adversely 

impact the mission.

5.1.3. Passengers: 

5.1.3.1. Passenger show times will normally be 

1 hour prior to departure, but not more than 2 

hours prior to scheduled departure time. Passengers will wait in a passenger-holding area 

established by the supported commander until 

escorted to the aircraft. 
109

5.1.3.2. If the aircraft will be flown remotely, 

the aircraft safety briefing will be provided to 

passengers by the supported unit’s passenger 

processing personnel. If the MQ-A will be flown 

by a pilot in the pilot/passenger module, the 

passenger safety briefing will be provided by the 

aircraft commander.

5.1.4. Forward Operating Bases With MCT: Users 

will drop off intended cargo for transport with the 

MCT who will process and load the cargo. The MCT 

will certify all hazardous cargo prior to transport. 

Cargo and passenger information will be logged into 

applicable logistics tracking system(s) if available.

5.1.5. Forward Operating Bases/Austere Locations without MCT: Although most major forward 

operating bases will have personnel trained on how 

to load and unload cargo from the MQ-A, some airland delivery and pickup locations will be made to 

austere locations with little or no formally trained 

cargo handling personnel. A placard will be posted 

on the side of the cargo modules with basic operating instructions including proper module door operation and how to launch the aircraft. An additional placard will also identify the maximum 

authorized cargo weight and refueling procedures. 

If no automated logistics tracking system is available, the cargo manifest, if produced, shall be left 

with the cargo inside the cargo module and processed at the first capable location. If the FOB is 

unfamiliar with, or has no formal process for processing/manifesting passengers, a passenger manifest will be left with the local ground commander 

prior to departure. Every effort will be made to accommodate movement of opportune or last minute 

cargo and passengers provided it will not negatively 

impact the scheduled mission.

5.1.6. TS/MC Supported Ground Commander/

User. The supported ground commander will adhere 

to the established movement timetable and ATO as 

much as possible. The EAS in conjunction with the 
110

supported commander will determine timeline deviations as required to meet TS/MC mission objectives and requirements. The supported ground commander will also correct all discrepancies found by 

the A/DACG, MCT, ATOC [Air Terminal Operations 

Center], or mobility force.

5.1.7. A/DACG; MCT; ATOC (If established at the 

airstrip/LZ/FOB). The supported unit’s movement 

control personnel shall: 

5.1.7.1. Perform the joint inspection hazmat certification of aircraft mission loads and manifests.

5.1.7.2. Process and handle passengers in accordance with Service guidance. 

5.1.7.3. Ensure passenger and cargo manifests are correct. 

5.1.7.4. Enter cargo/passenger data into the 

selected in-transit visibility manifesting system.

5.1.7.5. Ensure the user corrects joint inspection hazmat certification discrepancies. 

5.1.7.6. Maintain statistical data to account 

for the current status of all equipment, supplies, 

and personnel in aircraft loads. 

5.1.7.7. Ensure the user adheres to the established movement timetables. 

5.1.7.8. Provide loading team personnel and 

support equipment. 

5.1.7.9. Ensure all personnel are briefed on 

flight line safety, to include driving procedures, 

smoking rules, hand signals, and any local special precautions, restrictions and procedures. 

5.1.7.10. Retain a copy of corrected passenger 

and cargo manifests, hazmat certification records, and inspection records. A copy of all load 

documents will be provided to the aircrew. If the 

crew is not collocated with the aircraft, all pertinent data will be briefed to the MCE. 
111

5.1.7.11. Provide fueling, defueling, and emergency maintenance capabilities for deploying 

unit equipment. 

5.1.7.12. Establish and operate a passenger 

processing and holding area. 

5.1.7.13. Escort passengers to the aircraft. 

5.1.7.14. Brief passengers on aircraft safety if 

the MQ-A will be piloted remotely.

5.1.8. EAS Supporting TS/MC. For TS/MC operations at austere locations, the EAS will coordinate 

all mission requirements and confirm aircraft configuration with the supported ground commander/

user. Mission changes will be coordinated through 

the supported unit commander.

5.2. Common User Utilization: When practical, excess 

capacity will be released to the AMD in support of the 

common user airlift pool. Load requirements will be 

submitted IAW GCC procedures and priorities. Common user movements will be monitored by the Air Mobility Division/Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (AMD/DDOC) and will not take precedence 

over TS/MC requirements. 

5.3. Aircraft Maintenance: 

5.3.1. Aircraft Maintenance. Normal aircraft 

maintenance will be conducted by the EAS and supported by the supported unit. Data/forms management will be conducted through the EAS’s Service 

approved Maintenance Information Systems. During deployed operations, maintenance personnel 

will perform actions consistent with day to day flying activities. Extended heavy maintenance and 

scheduled inspections and above may be conducted 

at a designated heavy maintenance location. The 

home station check equivalent may be conducted in 

theater. The aircraft will deploy with a minimum logistics manning package, supply assets (mobility 

readiness spares packages (MRSP)) and support 

equipment to sustain 24/7 operations for an initial 
112

30 day period. Additional equipment will follow via 

strategic movement in the most expedient manner 

possible arriving NLT 30 days from initial employment. The Logistics/Maintenance Unit will be 

equipped and manned accordingly. 

5.3.2. Aircraft Generation. Aircraft generation is 

the cumulative effort required to launch and recover 

sorties. It includes activities that generate sorties 

and train personnel to generate sorties, and is predominantly accomplished in an on-equipment environment. EAS units will sustain capability to accomplish sortie generation for peacetime and 

wartime taskings. On-equipment maintenance is 

performed to prevent equipment/system failures, 

repair them when they occur, and improve airframe 

availability and reliability. Aircraft technicians ensure mission accomplishment by launching and recovering aircraft. During the launch and recovery of 

aircraft, deficiencies will be identified on aircraft 

and equipment and repair priorities will be aligned 

to most effectively meet mission requirements.2

5.3.3. Procedures. Personnel will perform maintenance IAW applicable technical orders and technical references. Aircraft waivers will be accomplished 

IAW the EAS Service directives. 

5.3.4. Contract Support: Aircraft could be maintained at the organizational and depot level by a 

contractor via Contracted Logistical Support (CLS)/ 

Interim Contractor Support (ICS). This includes actions and tasks involved in the servicing, repairing, 

testing, calibrating and inspecting to retain or restore aircraft and its related support equipment to a 

mission capable condition. Contractors will follow 

standard maintenance policy and procedures as 

outlined in the applicable contract or contractor deployment plan. The contractor will be responsible 

for spares, perform all maintenance, and repair at 

bed down locations and overseas contingency operations as required by supported commanders. 
113

5.3.5. Weapon System Spares and Supply Support: Normally, intra-theater supply support will be 

provided using MRSP designed to support a specific 

number of aircraft. All reach back for mission capable (MICAP) and MRSP replenishment will come 

from the supporting Service’s logistical support system (e.g. Air Force Global Logistics Support Center 

(AFGLSC)). The Standard Base Supply System 

(SBSS), or Service specific supply management system, will be used for retail accountability, issue and 

return of all spares, test equipment and support 

equipment. The inventory control point will maintain the capability to surge and self-support at en 

route, bare base, or wartime combat locations for 30 

days without resupply through the use of MRSP. 

5.4. Other Logistics. All other sustainment for the EAS 

will be provided by the supporting Service except for 

theater support normally provided to the other Services 

by doctrine, DOD Directive, JFC directives, or other intra-Service support agreements. Base operating support agencies will coordinate and assist in formalizing 

MOU [memoranda of understanding/MOAs [memoranda of agreement] as required. 
114

Communication/Navigation

6. Communication/Navigation:

6.1. General. Airlift aircraft must be able to operate in 

all types of airspace: domestic, international, and contingency/military airspace. Unique airspace requirements 

will require the use of specific communication and navigation systems and/or capabilities. Failure to have all 

required communication and navigation systems may 

result in restrictions or denial of airspace entry.

6.1.1. Civil (Domestic and International): To legally operate in civil airspace, the MQ-A must maintain operational communication and navigation 

equipment that is in compliance with the established airspace entry and transit requirements outlined in applicable aviation regulations (e.g. FAR/

AIM, ICAO, GP/AP). This equipment must be interoperable and reliable, and must function within 

the Communication Navigation Surveillance/Air 

Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) structure [formerly 

known as Global Air Traffic Management (GATM)]. 

Due to the operating environment of the MQ-A, this 

includes equipment necessary to comply with Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM), Minimum Navigation Performance Specifications (MNPS) 

and oceanic crossing requirements. 

Some national airspace systems do not allow remotely piloted vehicles to transit the airspace. In 

these cases, special coordination may be required 

with the ARTCC controlling that airspace to permit a 

one-time transitory flight and/or specific routing. If 

an agreement cannot be met that will satisfy mission 

requirements, or if preferred for alternate reasons, 

the MQ-A can be piloted and flown directly from the 

pilot/passenger module. In so doing, the MQ-A becomes a manned aircraft and can be flown IAW established airspace requirements and procedures.

6.1.2. Contingency (Battlespace/Operational Environment): Due to its role in delivering supplies, 
115

ISR services, transport, and close air support of forward forces in the tactical area of operations, aircraft must include secure communications, navigation, the latest Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) and 

other data equipment that enhances the battlespace 

awareness of the crew and the forces it supports. 

Any communication gaps between the MQ-A’s operators and fielded forces will need to be addressed 

and resolved by the supporting and supported commanders prior to aircraft employment.

6.2. Radios: To ensure maximum operability, the 

MQ-A is equipped with UHF, VHF, HF, and SATCOM 

radios to facilitate communication with other aircraft 

(military and commercial), Command Post, Tower, Radar Approach Control (RAPCON), Air Traffic Control 

Centers (ATCC)/Air Route Traffic Control Centers 

(ARTCC), and fielded forces. Guard frequency monitoring and transmission capabilities must be available for 

emergency broadcasts. Communications regarding aircraft status, maintenance, in-flight emergencies, and 

cargo operations are normally coordinated through the 

Command Post, or in the absence of a Command Post, 

with the fielded forces directly. 

6.3. Datalink: While the MQ-A is capable of fully autonomous operations, mission progress monitoring, 

communications, and semi-autonomous operations 

rely upon stable and secure datalink with the GCS. 

Loss of datalink with the GCS can have a significant 

impact upon mission success.

6.3.1. Bandwidth: Due to the extensive bandwidth requirements of net-centric and remotely operated vehicles, bandwidth management is a significant concern that must be addressed during all 

operations. While bandwidth capabilities are increasing through the use of data compression algorithms, secure and unsecure military and commercial satellite systems, and new technologies, there 

remains a finite amount of bandwidth at any given 

time. This limitation can impact not only mission 

effectiveness but also the number of platforms that 
116

can operate in a given area. To help minimize bandwidth usage, autonomous operations will be conducted to the maximum extent possible with only 

basic aircraft status information (e.g. systems condition and position) being transmitted to the GCS 

during noncritical phases of flight. Direct line of 

sight data transmission to end users and relays 

through other net-centric platforms will also minimize satellite bandwidth usage.

6.3.2. Net-Centric Operations: Net-Centric Operations involve the sharing of information to improve 

situational awareness through the networking of 

compatible systems. This capability can in turn lead 

to enhanced coordination and unity of effort. The 

MQ-A’s ability to share sensor information such as 

live video, targeting information and side scan radar 

hits with other aircraft and ground stations makes 

the MQ-A system an important component of theater net-centric operations. This capability decreases the need for duplicate systems on other 

platforms while improving overall mission effectiveness of the joint force. However, as the sharing of 

information is essential to successful operations, 

data distribution to non-essential personnel can decrease network performance and lead to information overload resulting in decreased mission effectiveness. The EAS commander shall ensure that 

aircraft system and sensor data is only transmitted 

to essential personnel and systems.

Net-centric operations, however, are dependent 

upon the compatibility of other systems, available 

bandwidth, radio frequencies, and the security of 

those transmissions. As such, all systems supporting net-centric operations must be maintained and 

protected to the maximum extent possible. 

6.3.3. Lost Link: Satellite systems are susceptible 

to a number of threats including jamming, spoofing, 

interference, scintillation, interception, physical attack, direction finding, and other effects. Any of 

these factors in addition to mechanical failure can 
117

result in lost link with the controlling or monitoring 

GCS. In addition to signal protection operations, all 

flights will be launched with either a full flight plan 

loaded or emergency routing that will be followed in 

the event of a lost link condition. Due to the aircraft’s autonomous capabilities, the former option 

is preferred. However, during missions that require 

semi-autonomous operations, a bingo point will be 

determined which, upon reaching, the mission will 

be aborted or modified if the communication link 

with the GCS is lost. In no cases should a lost link 

condition result in loss of control of the aircraft 

and/or subsequent system/aircraft loss.
118

Legal

7. Legal:

7.1. General. Disciplinary and UCMJ authority will remain with the service member’s service component 

commander.

Notes

1. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review 

Report, 38.

2. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 21-101, Aircraft and Equipment 

Maintenance Management, 29 June 2006, 70.
119

Definitions

Allocation The distribution for employment of 

limited forces and resources among 

competing requirements. Specific allocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclear weapons, forces, and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, 

nuclear weapons, and so forth.

Autonomous An RPA is considered autonomous for 

its ability to make substantial realtime decisions without human involvement or supervision. A system’s autonomy is independent of its ability to 

transmit information to another station for monitoring. Autonomous operations can rely upon preprogrammed 

waypoints or real-time internal logic 

determined routing.

Carbon footprint The total amount of carbon dioxide 

produced to directly and indirectly 

support an organization, event, product, or human activity. With respect to 

deployments, reducing carbon footprints involves less fuel/energy consumption and fewer troops in theater.

Cargo RPA An RPA capable of transporting materiel to units or individuals.

Class A mishap The resulting total cost of damages to 

government and other property in an 

amount of $1 million or more; a DOD 

aircraft is destroyed; or an injury and/

or occupational illness results in a fatality or permanent total disability. 

DODI 6055.7 (3 October 2000).
120

Class B mishap The resulting total cost of damage is 

$200,000 or more but less than $1 

million. An injury and/or occupational 

illness results in permanent partial 

disability (Table E7.T1. of enclosure 7); 

or when three or more personnel are 

hospitalized for inpatient care (which, 

for accident reporting purposes only, 

does not include just observation and/

or diagnostic care) as a result of a single 

accident. DODI 6055.7 (3 October 2000).

Class C mishap The resulting total cost of property 

damage is $20,000 or more but less 

than $200,000; a nonfatal injury that 

causes any loss of time from work beyond the day or shift on which it occurred; or a nonfatal occupational illness or disability that causes loss of 

time from work or disability at any 

time (lost time case). DODI 6055.7 (3 

October 2000).

Modularity The ability of a system’s components 

to be separated and recombined.

Point of effect A physical location designated by the 

functional component commander, 

service component commander, or a 

subordinate commander to support 

operations normally within the combat 

zone. 

Point of need The physical location designated by the 

JFC as a receiving point for forces or 

commodities, for subsequent employment, emplacement, or consumption. 
121

Remotely piloted 

aircraft (RPA)

Previously referred to as unmanned 

aerial vehicles (UAV). Powered aerial 

vehicles sustained in flight by aerodynamic lift over most of their flight 

path and guided without an onboard 

crew. They may be expendable or recoverable and can fly autonomously 

and/or be piloted remotely from 

ground and/or airborne control stations. As of 14 January 2010, the US 

Air Force will refer to all UAVs as RPAs.

SemiautonomousAn RPA is considered semi-autonomous 

when it can operate partially or entirely autonomously but has a ground 

operator integrated into the control 

loop. In this case, a ground controller 

can offer revised direction to the RPA 

at any point during operation (e.g., authorize ordnance release, alter route of 

flight, etc.). These commands would 

typically be high level.

Time sensitive 

(TS)/mission 

critical (MC) 

US Air Force: TS/MC–Soonest possible, highest priority (i.e., air evacuation, blood plasma, life, or death situations, etc.). An aircraft will be diverted 

from its current mission to support a 

time-sensitive mission.

US Army: TS–Delivery must be on the 

date/time required. 

MC–The mission will fail if the delivery 

does not occur.

Unmanned aircraft system 

(UAS)

A ground station linked with one or 

more UAVs. In essence, UAS refers to 

both the unmanned aerial platforms 

and its support system including 

ground control stations, equipment, 

and personnel.
122

unmanned aerial 

vehicle (UAV)

See remotely piloted aircraft (RPA).

*Note: Definitions were extracted from an assortment of 

DOD sources including, but not limited to, the DOD Dictionary, the United States Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009–2047, 18 May 2009, and the Department of Defense Quadrennial Roles and Mission Review 

Report, January 2009.
123

Abbreviations

A/DACG arrival/departure airfield control group

AAA antiaircraft artillery

ACO airspace control order

ADCON administrative control

AF Air Force

AFGLSC Air Force Global Logistics Support Center

AFSAS Air Force Safety Automated System

AMC Air Mobility Command

AMD Air Mobility Division

AMR air mission request

AO area of operations

AOR area of responsibility

ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Center

AT aerial target

ATCC air traffic control center

ATO air tasking order 

ATOC air terminal operations center

Auto-GCAS automatic ground collision avoidance system 

CAB combat air brigade

CAOC combined air operations center 

CAP combat air patrol 

CASCOM Combined Arms Support Command

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 

and high-yield explosives

CCTD CarterCopter Technology Demonstrator

CFACC combined force air component commander

CLB combat logistics battalion

CLS contracted logistical support

CO commanding officer 

CONEMP concept of employment

CONEX container express

CSAR combat search and rescue

DA Department of the Army

DDOC Deployment and Distribution Operations 

Center

DIRCM directional infrared countermeasures

DIRMOBFOR Director of Mobility Forces

DOD Department of Defense
124

DODI Department of Defense Instruction

DOTMLPF doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 

leader development and education, personnel, and facilities

DRA Defense Research Associates

DZ drop zone

EAS expeditionary airlift squadron

EW electronic warfare

FARPS forward arming and refueling points

FMS flight management system

FOB forward operating base

FOD foreign object damage

GAO Government Accountability Office

GCS ground control station

GDSS Global Decision Support System

GPS/INS global positioning system/inertial navigation system

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

ICS interim contractor support

IED improvised explosive device

ISO International Organization for Standardization

ISR intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance

JA/ATT joint airborne/air transportability training

JALIS-NG Joint Air Logistics Information SystemNext Generation

JFC joint force commander

JPADS joint precision airdrop system

km kilometer

kts knots

lb. pound

LCLA low cost, low altitude

LNO liaison officer

LZ landing zone

MAF Mobility Air Forces

MC mission critical

MCE mission control elements

MCT movement control team

MEL minimum equipment list
125

MICAP mission capable

MOA memorandum of agreement

MOAB massive ordnance air blast

MOOTW military operations other than war

MOU memorandum of understanding

mph miles per hour

MQ-A unmanned or remotely piloted tactical airlift platform

MRSP Mobility Readiness Spares Package

NAS national airspace system

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

ONR Office of Naval Research

OPCON Operational Control

PDA personal digital assistant

RFI request for information

RPA remotely piloted aircraft

SAM surface-to-air missile

SATCOM satellite communications

SBSS Standard Base Supply System

STOL short takeoff and landing

TACON tactical control

TCAS traffic collision avoidance system

TS time sensitive

UAS unmanned aircraft system

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UCARS UAV Common Automatic Recovery System

UCAV uninhabited combat aerial vehicles

UHF ultra-high frequency

VTOL vertical takeoff and landing

127

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