Transnational and geopolitical challenges 

are shaping the security environment in 

Southeast Asia. Rapid economic change, actual 

and potential disease epidemics, and a growing 

sense of shared interest and grievance among 

the region’s Islamic populations are among the 

region’s main transnational concerns. In its most 

extreme form, Islamist sentiment has manifested 

itself in jihadist movements, including some with 

connections to al Qaeda.

Geopolitically, China’s rise poses a 

multifaceted strategic challenge to the region. For 

China, Southeast Asia is an arena of opportunity: 

geographically proximate, economically attractive, and historically subordinate with influential 

resident Chinese populations. Southeast Asia 

sits astride sea lanes that are rapidly becoming 

China’s energy lifeline. Moreover, Chinese 

security analysts see Southeast Asia as the weak 

link in any U.S. effort to contain China.

Following 20 years of rapid economic 

development, Southeast Asia in the early 1990s 

was an increasingly vibrant, cohesive, and selfconfident region. Regional institutions, notably 

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN), reflected the growing sense of regional 

identity and shared purpose.

The Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s 

produced a sudden adverse shift in the region’s 

economic and political climate; undercut ASEAN; 

triggered political upheaval in Indonesia, the 

region’s largest and most important country; and 

created openings for militant Muslim groups as 

the fabric of political and social authority weakened. These same forces generated something 

akin to a power vacuum and provided a strategic 

opening for China that Beijing has moved skillfully 

to exploit.

After a long period of post-Vietnam inattention, America’s security planners rediscovered 

Southeast Asia as a “second front” in the war 

on terror and built productive counterterrorism 

cooperation with most governments. The longstanding U.S. military (naval and air) presence 

continues to be seen as buttressing the region’s 

stability and prosperity. What is missing is a comprehensive U.S. security strategy for the region 

that addresses the pervasive sense of Muslim 

grievance, which jihadists have exploited, 

and that takes seriously the Chinese strategic 

challenge in Southeast Asia.

Regional Dynamism

The security situation in Southeast Asia is 

remarkably complex, with multiple forces and 

trends emanating from within the region and 

impacting it from without. The forces at work 

fall into two broad categories. One involves 

globalized, transnational, and multinational 

factors, such as rapid economic change with 

profound implications for political stability; the 

sudden emergence of militant jihadist networks 

that have mounted violent attacks against the 

political and cultural status quo in much of the 

region; and transnational environmental and 

health issues typified by the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic and current concerns regarding avian flu. Second, the 

dramatic growth in Chinese power (economic, 

military, and diplomatic) confronts the region 

with a situation familiar to traditional geopolitics. Both Chinese policy and some regional 

responses (notably those of Singapore) reflect 

a sophisticated understanding of the nuances 

of classic realpolitik.

An observer of Southeast Asia over the 

last three or four decades has to be struck by 

the sheer dynamism—the pace of change and 

transformation—that has characterized the 

region. Much of that dynamic has been economic. From roughly the mid-1960s through 

the mid-1990s, the core countries (Thailand, 

Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia) were, 

along with South Korea and Taiwan, the fastest 

growing economies in the world. These were the 

Asian Tigers (less developed countries that had 

become “newly industrialized countries”). They 

were the subjects of a major World Bank study 

in 1993 entitled The Asian Miracle. The macroeconomic statistics were reflected in facts on 

the ground. Per capita incomes quadrupled and 

quintupled during this period. Urban centers 

such as Kuala Lumpur were transformed from 

sleepy tropical backwaters into cosmopolitan 

cities, with all the accompanying benefits and 

drawbacks. Lives were transformed utterly. In 

Malaysia, for example, the sons and daughters 

of Malay rice farmers and Chinese shopkeepers 

have found their way to elite American universities and into the high-rise glass towers of the 

capital working for multinational corporations.

Southeast Asia’s economic transformation 

was bracketed in geographic and temporal terms 

by developments in Japan and China. Japan, of 

course, set the template for Asian modernization 

by making the transition in the early 20th

century. Also, the spectacular Japanese postwar 

economic recovery set the standard for Asia’s 

Tigers. China, slower off the mark, had begun

Strategic Forum

No. 222

October 2006

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

No. 222, October 2006 Strategic Forum 

Southeast Asian Security 

Challenges: America’s Response?

by Marvin C. Ott
 Strategic Forum No. 222, October 2006

to show the dramatic effects of Deng Xiaoping’s 

reforms by the early 1980s. By the late 1990s, 

China, on a massive scale, was the fastest 

growing single economy in the world, and today, 

as measured by purchasing power parity, it is 

second in size only to that of the United States. 

In short, Southeast Asia’s economic dynamism 

has to be seen in association with the farreaching modernization of Japan, China—

and, even more recently, of India.

The word dynamism implies movement 

both up and down, and in 1997–1998, the 

Asian financial crisis rolled across much of 

the region, inflicting difficulties on Singapore, 

the Philippines, and Vietnam; severe pain on 

Thailand and Malaysia (as well as South Korea); 

and devastation on Indonesia. Meanwhile, the 

Japanese economy had ceased to grow with the 

collapse of the “bubble” in 1991–1992 and 

remained in a condition of near stasis until 

recently. The picture in China is quite different 

with almost unbroken and often spectacular 

growth through the 1990s to the present. Instead 

of slowing, the pace of that growth seems to be 

holding or even increasing, with the World Bank 

projecting a white-hot 10.4 percent for 2006.1

Economics is power, and for Southeast Asia, the 

balance of influence has begun to shift unmistakably from Japan to China.

The region’s dynamism has been manifested politically, particularly in the development 

of regional institutions and consciousness. In 

the 1950s and 1960s, the term Southeast Asia

had only geographic or cartographic meaning. 

It simply denoted a place on the map between 

India and China. The inhabitants of that space 

identified themselves in cultural, ethnic, or 

national terms but not as “Southeast Asian.” 

That is no longer the case. Southeast Asia is a 

real place with a coherent identity and some 

claim on the loyalties of people who live there.

This remarkable development is in part the 

byproduct of economic modernization and, with 

it, growing intraregional contact. It is also the 

product of regional institutions, most notably 

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN), established in 1967 and subsequently 

expanded to include all 10 Southeast Asian 

states. Founded when communist movements 

were active throughout the region, ASEAN has 

broadly succeeded in its principal goals of 

strengthening the region’s resistance to external 

manipulation and subversion and creating a 

security community in which intraregional 

disputes are settled by nonmilitary means. It has 

also presented a broadly united diplomatic front 

to the rest of the world on several key issues. 

Integral to these achievements, the governments 

of Southeast Asia have developed dense webs of 

interaction with each other, particularly among 

the original five members: Thailand, Malaysia, 

Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

Here again, dynamism can have its 

downside. The expansion of the association in 

1996–1997 to include Cambodia, Laos, and 

Burma added three new members that were very 

different from the founders—less developed, 

less committed to free markets, less acculturated 

into the “ASEAN Way,” and hardly democratic. 

The new entrants would have been hard to 

digest under the best of circumstances, but their 

accession coincided with the regional economic 

downturn. Not surprisingly, the traditional 

ASEAN search for consensus has proven difficult, 

and the organization’s future viability has been 

seriously questioned. In the years immediately 

following ASEAN’s expansion, the region faced 

a succession of challenges including massive 

forest fires in Indonesia (that sent clouds of 

choking “haze” over neighboring countries), 

civil war in East Timor, human rights abuses 

in Burma, and a quasi-coup in Cambodia 

without an effective cooperative response. The 

most recent challenges have come in the form 

of militant Islamic terrorism, an upsurge in 

maritime piracy, and viral epidemics (SARS 

and avian flu).

In the latter instances, ASEAN has 

responded more purposefully. Broadly speaking, 

that response has taken the form of organizing 

ministerial and working level meetings designed 

to share assessments and information and to 

promote coordinated (or at least compatible) 

policy responses. In the case of diseases, a major 

emphasis has been placed on transparency and 

candor with regard to the spread and risk of 

infection. With regard to terrorism, the emphasis 

has been in shared intelligence and criminal 

databases. For maritime security, the first steps 

have been taken toward joint patrols and 

contingency planning.2 All of these efforts are 

in an early and tentative stage with concrete 

results as yet uncertain.

From a strategic perspective, the sudden 

adverse shift in the region’s economic climate, 

the declining fortunes of ASEAN, and the severe 

political and economic difficulties in Indonesia 

raise the specter of a power vacuum. The 

Southeast Asia of the early 1990s was vibrant, 

self-confident, and cohesive and was beginning 

to invest significant resources into modernized, 

professional militaries. Perhaps most important, 

the region’s leader and cornerstone—a successful and modernizing Indonesia—was clear 

to all. Political stability, whether democratic, 

authoritarian, or some hybrid, seemed a hallmark of the region. At that time, it was not too 

fanciful to imagine Southeast Asia as an integral 

part of an evolving organic East Asian power 

balance with China, Japan, a resurgent South 

Korea, and eventually India, all in counterpoise 

and providing an overall stability.

The picture in 2006 is more complex and 

problematic. The Asian financial meltdown of 

the late 1990s was a systemic crisis that not 

only encompassed the collapse of currency 

values and aggregate gross domestic product 

but also broke the back of the 32-year Suharto 

regime. Suddenly, Indonesia was cast adrift 

in uncharted political waters. At the same time, 

the loosened grip of central government 

control offered an opening for militant jihadist 

elements on the fringes of Indonesian Islam 

to organize, proselytize, and plan.

In the last 2 years, Indonesia has made 

a remarkably successful transition to a 

functioning democracy. Malaysia, too, has 

moved from a long period of one-man dominance to a healthier, more genuinely democratic 

order under Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad 

Badawi. But Thailand and the Philippines have 

been shaken by political crises that highlight 

continued difficulties in building mature 

Marvin C. Ott is a Professor of National Security Policy in the National War College at the National 

Defense University. Comments may be directed to ottm@ndu.edu.

economics is power, and 

for Southeast Asia, the 

balance of influence has 

begun to shift from Japan 

to China
No. 222, October 2006 Strategic Forum 

democracies that enjoy widespread, durable 

legitimacy. Paradoxically, the September 2006 

military coup in Thailand represented a 

hopeful development in the consolidation of 

Thai democracy. Prime Minister Thaksin 

Shinawatra, although popularly elected, was a 

thoroughly autocratic personality who had 

concentrated power in his own hands to a 

degree unprecedented since the martial law 

regimes of the 1950s and 1960s. Thaksin 

attached little value to Thai democratic institutions. The animating force in his political 

Southeast Asia
career was a consuming drive for personal 

wealth and power, and he did pose a real threat 

to Thai democracy—all the more so because 

he exploited and distorted democratic institutions to his own ends. The king, whose devotion 

to Thai democracy is unquestioned, had clearly 

reached the same conclusion. Consequently the 

monarchy and army acted in concert to depose 

a civilian strongman for the authentic purpose 

of restoring Thailand’s democracy on a less vulnerable constitutional foundation.

Economically, the region has done much 

to rebound and rebuild from the financial crisis. 

But one lesson remains vivid: in a globalized 

economy, private foreign investment, which has 

been the lifeblood of much of the region’s economic development, is highly volatile, and when 

investor sentiment turns negative, the effects 

can be sudden and dramatic. Moreover, in the 

post–financial crisis period, China has replaced 

Southeast Asia as the destination of choice 

for foreign investors looking to Asia.

Transnational Terrorism 

It has long been an article of faith that 

Islam in Southeast Asia has a moderate, tolerant, live-and-let-live quality that distinguishes it 

from more doctrinaire varieties prevalent in the 

Middle East. Prior to 9/11, most experts would 

have answered “no” if asked whether international terrorist organizations would find favorable conditions for organizing in Southeast Asia. 

But the discovery of networks affiliated with al 

Qaeda in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia 

(with advanced planning for a series of massive 

bombings in Singapore) proved that assessment 

inaccurate. It soon became clear that the region 

was vulnerable to penetration by violent Muslim 

militants for a variety of reasons beyond simply 

the presence of over 200 million Muslims.

First, the geography of the Muslim areas 

with sprawling archipelagos and unpoliceable 

borders created a certain irreducible exposure. 

Second, the collapse of the Suharto regime in 

Indonesia weakened police, military, and intelligence agencies—the first line of defense against 

terrorist penetration. Third, devout Muslims, 

particularly in Indonesia and the Philippines, 

saw themselves marginalized by secular 

(Indonesian) or Christian (Filipino) governments. This produced a sense of victimization 

that meshed with the message from Osama bin 

Laden and others. Fourth, money from the 

Persian Gulf (particularly Saudi Arabia) has 

flowed into Southeast Asia, propagating a strict, 

doctrinaire version of Islam through schools 

and mosques. Finally, the mujahideen war 

against Soviet occupation in Afghanistan had a 

galvanic effect. No one knows how many young 

Muslim men left Southeast Asia to join the 

mujahideen; it may have been a few thousand 

or only a few hundred. But those who went 

received training in weapons and explosives. 

They were indoctrinated into a militant jihadist 

worldview and became part of an international 

clandestine network of alumni from that victorious struggle. With the war over, many returned 

to Southeast Asia ripe for recruitment into 

local terrorist organizations dedicated to the 

destruction of non-Muslim communities, 

Western influence, and secular governments.

In the period since 9/11, efforts by law 

enforcement and intelligence organizations 

have revealed much that was previously 

unknown about these organizations. They fall 

into three types: international terrorist groups, 

such as al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), 

whose agenda includes attacks on U.S. interests 

and the establishment of a pan-Islamic 

“caliphate”; social extremists, such as Laskar 

Jihad in Indonesia, that accept the existing 

national state but attack non-Muslim elements 

within it; and traditional Muslim separatists, 

such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 

(MILF) in the southern Philippines and the 

Pattani National Liberation Front in southern 

Thailand, that seek a separate Muslim state.

One of the questions affecting the security 

future of Southeast Asia is whether the predominantly Muslim societies in the region can find a 

way to neutralize and absorb the militants into 

a broader, moderate body politic.

The picture is greatly complicated by 

linkages between groups including JI and al 

Qaeda, between Abu Sayyaf and al Qaeda, and 

between JI and the MILF. Further complications 

arise from alleged links between elements of 

the Indonesian military and Laskar Jihad and 

another similar group, the Islamic Defenders 

Front. In short, the wiring diagram for terrorism 

in Southeast Asia would depict interactive 

networks with multiple agendas.

The most important single enabling factor 

in the growth of these networks is governmental 

weakness in Indonesia. The 32-year rule of 

Suharto precluded the development of a new 

generation of political leadership and deeply 

corrupted the instruments of state security—

police, intelligence, and military. As a consequence, it has proven very difficult to establish 

an effective government and security apparatus 

in post-Suharto Indonesia. The Megawati 

administration initially reacted to 9/11 and the 

arrests in Singapore by denying the presence of 

similar al Qaeda–affiliated groups in Indonesia. 

The October 2002 bombings in Bali forced 

Jakarta to acknowledge the reality and at least 

temporarily silenced overt supporters of the most 

militant groups. The subsequent police investigation (importantly aided by Australian experts) 

surprised many by producing a quick string 

of arrests. Bombings of the Marriott Hotel and 

Australian embassy in Jakarta and again in Bali 

in the years since appear to have solidified a 

view among most Indonesians that JI is a 

genuine threat—if only because in each case, 

the vast majority of casualties were Indonesian.

Other governments reacted to 9/11 in 

different ways. President Gloria Arroyo, backed 

by a strong majority of public opinion in the 

Philippines, invited U.S. forces to assist (training, intelligence, and civil affairs) the armed 

forces of the Philippines in its operations against 

Abu Sayyaf, a self-declared militant 

Islamic group with some ties historically to 

al Qaeda but with a record of largely criminal 

activity. Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad 

in Malaysia seized the opportunity to rebuild tattered relations with the United States, 

culminating in a cordial visit to the White 

House. Both Singapore and Malaysia 

cooperated closely through police, intelligence, 

and customs in counterterrorism with 

U.S. counterparts. By contrast, Thailand’s 

Prime Minister Shinawatra initially tried 

 Strategic Forum No. 222, October 2006

one of the questions 

affecting the security future of Southeast Asia is 

whether the predominantly 

Muslim societies in the 

region can find a way to 

neutralize and absorb the 

militants into a broader, 

moderate body politic
to stake out a position of neutrality. This 

produced a strong critical backlash from 

Thai elites who saw the prime minister’s 

action as jeopardizing Thailand’s longstanding 

alliance with the United States. Subsequently, 

the Thaksin government affirmed its full 

cooperation in America’s war on terror. At the 

same time, Thaksin’s autocratic and insensitive initiatives in southern Thailand bear much 

of the blame for inflaming Muslim opinion in 

that area.

China: On the March?

The People’s Republic of China is 

central to any discussion of Southeast Asian 

politics, economics, and security. China is Asia’s 

aspirant and, to an increasing extent, real, 

great power. By its geographic centrality, 

its population size, and its cultural strength 

and sophistication, Imperial China often 

exerted a kind of natural primacy through 

three millennia of East Asian history. After the 

humiliation of Western colonial penetration 

and Japanese military occupation, China has 

sought to reassert its historical prominence. 

Mao Zedong’s first words on leading his 

victorious armies into Beijing were: “China 

has stood up.” Nevertheless, for most of the 

following four decades, China was preoccupied 

with domestic difficulties and disasters (largely 

self-inflicted) and the daunting demands of 

economic development. But with the consolidation of the economic reforms of paramount 

leader Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, China 

finally began its long delayed and oft-derailed 

emergence as a modern, powerful state.

China’s growth in power coincides with 

the contemporary disappearance of the 

strategic threats—from Russia in the north 

and west and Japan in the east—that have 

historically constrained the Middle Kingdom. 

This has left Beijing with the latitude to 

assert its ambition—an ambition that has 

a natural strategic focus.

From China’s perspective, Southeast Asia 

is attractive, vulnerable, and nearby. There are

many phrases in Chinese that characterize 

the Nanyang (South Seas) as golden lands of 

opportunity. For three decades, Southeast Asia 

has been a region of rapidly growing wealth, 

much of it generated and owned by ethnic Chinese. Even after wholesale despoliation of tropical forests and other natural endowments, the 

physical resources of Southeast Asia remain 

impressive. Also, the world’s busiest sea lanes 

traverse the region. With the exception of 

Indonesia, individual states that comprise the 

political map of Southeast Asia are only a 

fraction of China’s size. The southern border of 

China abuts Southeast Asia along the northern 

borders of Burma, Laos, and Vietnam.

It is an axiom of realpolitik that policy 

and strategy must be based on, in the first 

instance, the capabilities of other actors—

particularly rivals and potential adversaries. 

While any precise measure of China’s national 

capabilities will be elusive, the trend and the 

potential are quite clear. China’s capabilities 

are multidimensional: economic, military, and, 

increasingly, diplomatic and political.

Over the last 15 years or so, China’s gross 

domestic product has grown at annual rates 

of around 9 percent with a large swath of the 

coast from Hainan to Shanghai producing 

rates even (and significantly) higher. This 

in turn has supported annual double-digit 

increases in military expenditures. Growing 

budgets have been broadly committed to 

a program of military modernization and 

professionalization, with a heavy emphasis on 

modern technology and personnel sufficiently 

educated to use it. Expert observers foresee a 

Chinese military capable of projecting force 

on a sustained basis beyond China’s coastal 

periphery within 10 to 20 years.

The days of rigid, ideologically strident 

Chinese “diplomacy” have long since been 

superseded by a cosmopolitan sophistication 

that would do Chou En-lai proud. Finally, 

for Southeast Asia, Chinese power has an 

additional potential dimension: the presence 

of large (and economically potent) ethnic 

Chinese populations in almost every major 

urban center.

Chinese officials have been insistent that 

China’s intentions toward Southeast Asia are 

entirely benevolent—nothing other than to 

join with the region in a common endeavor of

economic development and regional peace and 

security. Beijing has energetically pushed trade 

and investment ties, including a centerpiece 

China-ASEAN free trade agreement. Bilateral 

framework agreements for cooperation on 

multiple fronts have been negotiated with every 

Southeast Asian government. Political and diplomatic interactions at all levels have become 

a regular, even daily, feature of the news. Also, 

Beijing has made clear its desire to extend 

cooperation into the security sphere. China has 

become a primary supplier of economic and 

military assistance to Burma, Cambodia, and 

Laos. Meanwhile, Chinese officials and scholars 

seek to allay unease by noting that the traditional tribute system of China’s imperial past 

was, by Western standards, quite benign.

Can Southeast Asia bank on the nonthreatening character of China’s rise? Predictions are always hazardous, but there are several reasons to be cautious.

History strongly suggests that when new 

great powers arise, the implications for smaller 

or weaker nations on their periphery are 

seldom pleasant. Examples include Germany 

and central Europe, Japan and East Asia, Russia and central Asia and the Caucasus, and the 

United States and Latin America. It remains to 

be seen whether China is uniquely immune to 

the temptations of state power.

As Maoism and Marxism have lost their 

ideological appeal, the Chinese leadership has 

turned to nationalism to legitimize authoritarian rule. This has included a comprehensive 

program of state-sponsored patriotism in 

schools and mass media nurturing a sense 

of Chinese victimization (“a hundred years 

of humiliation”) at the hands of the West. In 

recent years, these powerful emotions have been 

focused on Taiwan and how the United States 

and Japan have allegedly stolen China’s 

national patrimony. Territorial irredentism is a 

potent political force, and there are growing 

fears that Beijing, against all sane counsel, 

could actually resort to force against Taiwan.

In 1992, the Chinese People’s Congress 

codified in legislation Beijing’s claim that the 

South China Sea is rightfully the sovereign 

territory of China. Since the flare-up in the 

Mischief Reef dispute in the mid-1990s, China 

has soft-pedaled its claims. But it has not 

disavowed them and continues to strengthen 

Chinese outposts in the Spratleys.

No. 222, October 2006 Strategic Forum 

growing Chinese power 

must be at the center of 

any security strategy formulated by the Southeast 

Asian states
definition, such a Japan will resist being an 

instrument of American strategic designs.

Fourth, China is determined that Taiwan 

will come under the sovereign jurisdiction of 

Beijing. (That much is clear; what is less clear 

is exactly how much real authority, how much 

actual control, will meet China’s minimum 

requirements.)

Fifth, China aspires to a day when the 

South China Sea will become, in effect, a 

Chinese lake and will be accepted as such 

internationally. As previously noted, China’s 

territorial sea law stipulates Chinese sovereignty 

over the South China Sea—and authorizes 

the use of force to keep foreign naval and 

research vessels away.3

Sixth, China expects that Southeast 

Asia will be progressively subordinated to 

Beijing’s strategic interests. Perhaps the 

closest analogy would be the assertion, in 

time, of a kind of Chinese Monroe Doctrine 

for Southeast Asia. Such a strategy would 

seek to expel any non-Asian (and Japanese) 

military presence from the region and create 

a strategic environment in which Southeast 

Asian governments understood that they were 

not to make any major decisions affecting 

Chinese interests or the region without first 

consulting, and obtaining the approval of, 

Beijing. It is with this scenario in mind that 

several ASEAN governments have watched 

with concern China’s growing influence in 

Burma and to a lesser, but significant, extent 

in Laos and Cambodia.

Whither America?

The United States is a key, even indispensable, factor in the Southeast Asian security 

equation but is in danger of falling short of its 

potential and responsibilities. What is missing 

is a sophisticated understanding of the growing 

complexities of the security environment and 

a conscious, comprehensive strategy to deal 

with them.

After a long period of post-Vietnam 

inattention, American security planners have 

rediscovered Southeast Asia as a second front in 

the war on terror. This has produced a variety 

of initiatives to strengthen liaison and cooperation with intelligence, police, and customs 

counterparts in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, 

the Philippines, and Indonesia. In Indonesia, 

congressional restrictions on cooperation 

Chinese scholars, writing with official 

sanction, characterize U.S. strategic intentions 

toward China as “encirclement” and “strangulation.” They identify Southeast Asia as the 

weak link in this chain and the point where 

China can break through and defeat attempted 

American “containment.” 

China’s ambitious program for harnessing and exploiting the Mekong River will have 

the side effect, intended or otherwise, of making 

downstream states such as Laos, Cambodia, and 

Vietnam hostage to Chinese decisions concerning water flow. The Mekong is as much the economic lifeblood for these nations as the Nile is 

for Egypt.

The very agreements and linkages that 

Beijing cites as evidence of benign intent can 

also be seen as a web designed to tie these states 

to China. Contemporary Burma comes close 

to fitting the profile of a Chinese client state. 

When Singapore’s deputy prime minister visited 

Taiwan, a semi-official commentator from 

Beijing promised that Singapore would pay 

“a huge price” for such temerity.

What emerges from this picture is a 

multifaceted strategic challenge to Southeast 

Asia. Chinese diplomats have worked assiduously and successfully to portray that challenge 

as opportunity and not threat. Recent public 

opinion polling shows clear evidence of their 

success. China registers favorably with publics 

throughout most of Southeast Asia. This 

coincides with a precipitous drop in favorable 

opinions of the United States since the advent 

of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The durability of these sentiments is a 

question. What is not—or should not be—

is that growing Chinese power must be at the 

center of any security strategy formulated by 

the Southeast Asian states—and by the United 

States in the region.

Recent developments in Southeast Asia 

have created strategic opportunities for China. 

America’s military center of gravity in the 

region—Clark Air Force Base and Subic Naval 

Base in the Philippines—has disappeared. 

ASEAN, so confident and vibrant in the mid1990s, saw its coherence and international 

standing decline precipitously by the end of the 

decade. The same organization that seemed to 

face China down after the 1995 Mischief Reef 

confrontation was mute and ineffective when 

the issue reprised in 1998. The near collapse 

of Indonesia created, in strategic terms, a void 

 Strategic Forum No. 222, October 2006

where a cornerstone once had been. In short, the 

balance of power between China and Southeast 

Asia had shifted in Beijing’s favor. Recently, Chinese officials have been heard on more than one 

occasion to refer to Southeast Asia (borrowing 

from Churchill) as “the soft underbelly of Asia.”

What Does China Want?

What exactly does China seek in Asia 

generally and Southeast Asia specifically? No one 

outside the Chinese leadership can answer that 

question with precision. We do not have the minutes of the Standing Committee of the Politburo 

meetings on this question. Moreover, different 

elements of the Chinese government—notably 

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the People’s 

Liberation Army—have often conveyed rather 

different impressions to foreign counterparts. 

To some extent, those differences are no doubt 

contrived to persuade and obfuscate. But they 

also may reflect a genuine lack of consensus in 

the senior leadership. Nevertheless, it is possible 

to identify a series of Chinese strategic objectives 

in general terms with some confidence.

First, China surely prefers a peaceful and 

prosperous Asia, one that will be a continuing 

source of trade and investment so critical to 

China’s modernization. Moreover, such a benign 

environment will allow China to avoid the trap 

that the Soviet Union fell into—that is, allowing military expenditures to rise to the point 

that they undercut the economic and political 

viability of the state.

Second, China wants a sharp diminution 

in U.S. influence in Southeast Asia, especially in 

terms of its military deployments to the region 

and its encircling (from China’s perspective) 

chain of bilateral security arrangements with 

many of China’s neighbors.

Third, China seeks a Japan that is passive, 

defensive, and strategically neutered—one that 

has effectively withdrawn from the competition 

for power and influence in Asia. Almost by 

after a long period of 

post-Vietnam inattention, 

American security planners have rediscovered 

Southeast Asia as a 

second front in the war 

on terror
be rooted in societal dislocation and economic 

hardship, particularly as both generate large 

numbers of underemployed and poorly 

educated young men who are ambitious, 

energetic, Islamic, and frustrated. Some of it 

derives from a pervasive sense in Muslim 

communities that they are not given the respect 

by local authorities or foreign governments 

(especially the United States) that is their due. 

A viable U.S. counterterrorism strategy must 

move well beyond police, intelligence, and 

military programs to help countries such as 

Indonesia tackle the socioeconomic vulnerabilities that provide openings for the jihadists.

To be fully effective, all this needs to be knit 

together into a comprehensive American security 

strategy for Southeast Asia—something that 

does not presently exist.

What Should Be Done? 

The United States has effective policies 

(for example, counterterrorism) and initiatives 

(tsunami relief) regarding Southeast Asia, 

but these do not add up to a security strategy.

The jihadist threat must and will be 

managed by Southeast Asian governments and 

societal organizations. Beyond counterterrorism 

assistance, Washington can assist by doing two 

things: finding multiple ways to convey respect 

for Islam and Islamic institutions, including 

greatly enhanced avenues for contact between 

Americans and Southeast Asian Muslims, and 

building more robust political/diplomatic ties 

with the region that convey a message of sustained American interest and support. The latter 

could and should include U.S. adherence to 

ASEAN’s founding document, the Treaty of Amity 

and Cooperation,4 and an annual U.S.–ASEAN 

Summit.

The recent signing of a U.S.–ASEAN 

framework document pledging active efforts to 

strengthen economic ties and work toward a 

summit is a useful first step. But what is needed 

most of all is a change in Washington’s tone 

and attitude—less lecturing, less dictating, 

more listening, more consultation, more respect.

China poses a very different kind of 

challenge, one that is classically geostrategic. 

Washington has been slow to recognize the 

significance of that challenge or to take steps 

to meet it. The following are some proposed 

initiatives designed to kickstart a process. In 

general, American strategists should:

with the Indonesian armed forces, due to 

human rights concerns, have diverted much 

U.S. security assistance to the police.

The election of retired general Susilo 

Yuhoyono as president of Indonesia provides 

Washington with the prospect of a new 

Indonesian government that can be an effective 

security partner. Washington took the necessary 

enabling step by ending longstanding restrictions on military cooperation and assistance. 

The 2006 bilateral security talks between U.S. 

and Indonesian defense officials held in Washington were notable for their cordiality and an 

atmosphere of high expectations.

Meanwhile, the most dramatic consequence of the U.S. focus on terrorism has 

been the return of American troops to the 

Philippines—to exercise, train, and assist. Most 

specifically, U.S. Special Forces have supported 

operations by the Philippines armed forces 

against Abu Sayyaf.

The tsunami disaster of December 2004 

added an interesting new dimension to the 

security picture. Four countries—the United 

States, Japan, Australia, and India, with 

Singapore serving as a logistics hub—mounted 

major humanitarian and relief operations using 

their primarily military assets. This effort was ad 

hoc, spur-of-the-moment, and remarkably well 

coordinated and effective. Southeast Asia has 

never had a true multilateral security mechanism. In this case, four countries from outside 

the immediate region but with security interests 

within it demonstrated that they could work 

together effectively. It gave security planners 

something to note and think about.

The other principal role is the primary 

one played by U.S. forces over the last several 

decades. As the strongest military power in the

region, but one with no territorial designs, 

U.S. forces have served to buttress regional 

stability—the necessary precondition for 

economic growth. American forward-deployed 

forces have been the proverbial gendarmes 

keeping the peace by assuring that neighborhood disputes do not flare out of control and 

larger neighbors are not tempted to impose 

their interests. In the process, they have assured 

that sea lanes through the region remain 

open to commercial traffic without danger 

of interdiction. This broad role will remain vital 

as the region navigates a period of economic 

and political uncertainty and adjusts to growing 

Chinese power. Since the loss of access to naval 

and air bases in the Philippines, the U.S. 

military has relied upon negotiated access 

to facilities in a number of Southeast Asian 

countries—most notably in Singapore, where 

an aircraft carrier pier to accommodate the 

Navy has been constructed.

China and militant Islam pose quite 

different and multidimensional challenges. 

China’s geopolitical ambitions in Southeast Asia 

and its challenge to U.S. security interests 

are not simply, or even primarily, military. 

They are instead diplomatic, economic, 

institutional, and cultural, buttressed by the 

reality of growing power. Southeast Asian governments such as Singapore and increasingly 

Indonesia are responding with a strategy that 

seeks to “enmesh” China and the United States, 

along with other external powers (for example, 

Japan, Korea, India, Russia, and the European 

Union) in a multifaceted web of connections 

to Southeast Asia that serve to underwrite the 

status quo. Institutional manifestations of this 

effort include the ASEAN Regional Forum, 

ASEAN + 3, and Asia-Europe Meeting.

The first East Asia Summit meeting in 

Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 was instructive. Fearing that the event would be “captured” 

by China, ASEAN engineered additional invitations to India, Australia, and New Zealand. 

Chinese interest in the conclave, which had 

been high, clearly diminished with the expanded 

list of invitees. By contrast, India enthusiastically 

accepted its invitation to join, in effect, the 

strategic game in Southeast Asia. The architects of this emerging strategy look to the United 

States not only for effective guarantees and 

counterterrorist support but also for a full 

panoply of soft power initiatives involving 

trade, investment, public affairs, education, 

diplomacy, and institution-building.

Soft power is also key for dealing with 

transnational challenges. We should not delude 

ourselves into believing we fully understand 

the sources of terrorism. Some of it seems to

the United States 

has effective policies 

and initiatives regarding 

Southeast Asia, but 

these do not add up to 

a security strategy

No. 222, October 2006 Strategic Forum 
helpful in understanding the full import of what 

China is doing and possible U.S. counterinitiatives.

For most of the three decades since the 

end of the Vietnam War, U.S. security policy has 

treated Southeast Asia as if it hardly existed. 

Such benign neglect might be tolerable if the 

United States did not face formidable strategic 

challenges to its interests in the region. But it 

does, and America can ill afford to sleepwalk 

through the next decade in Southeast Asia. 

Too much is at stake.

Notes

1 World Bank, China Quarterly Update, August 2006, 

available at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCHINA/

Resources/318862-1121421293578/cqu08-06.pdf>.

2 Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have begun joint 

efforts to monitor and patrol the Malacca Straits while the 

Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei have agreed to joint 

maritime patrols covering the Mindanao-Sulawesi corridor.

3 Robert G. Sutter, “East Asia: Disputed Islands and 

Offshore Claims,” Congressional Research Service Report, July 28, 

1992, 6.

4 Treaties of this type are typically misunderstood by 

Americans as primarily legal documents. They are not; instead, 

they are diplomatic and political expressions of solidarity and 

mutual support. There is no serious reason for the United States 

not to ratify the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.

■ systematically think through U.S. interests, 

goals, and the challenges/threats to them

■ assess U.S. resources and capabilities 

(including those that come through leveraging security partnerships in the region) relative to interests 

and threats

■ formulate a strategy designed to maximize 

U.S. interests consistent with resource constraints

■ judge the degree to which the United States 

is willing to accommodate the growth of Chinese 

power and influence in the region

Operating from this general background, 

specific issues will need to be addressed. U.S. 

planners must:

■ clarify U.S. thinking regarding sea lanes 

(Malacca Straits and South China Sea routes) as to 

their status under international law, U.S. vital interests at stake, and the circumstances in which the 

United States would act militarily to defend those 

interests. Provide authoritative prominent statements 

of the U.S. position to repair the current ambiguity 

on the public record.

■ propose/initiate a security dialogue with 

each of the Southeast Asia countries to be conducted 

at whatever level the counterpart government prefers. 

Make this a true dialogue in which the United States 

receives as well as transmits. This will be difficult to 

start with a number of governments (for example, 

Malaysia) and may begin as a secret interchange 

among intelligence professionals. But as this 

dialogue becomes established, it will provide a 

vehicle for serious consultations regarding regional 

security issues and potential areas of collaboration. 

The payoff would come with a meeting of the 

minds concerning China.

■ provide the sinews for a new multilateral 

security arrangement in Southeast Asia. The 

tsunami relief effort rapidly took shape as a four-part 

operation involving Japan, Australia, India, and 

the United States. Initial potential missions include 

maritime security (counterterrorism, counterpiracy, 

and environmental protection) and disaster mitigation and prevention. Any initiatives would have 

to be carefully vetted with the governments of the 

region. These four countries have demonstrated the 

capability to provide critical security services to the 

region. The fact that China is not included because 

it currently lacks such capabilities is fortuitous.

■ conduct an extended research and analysis 

effort aimed at understanding the full nature and 

extent of China’s strategic reach into Southeast Asia. 

Done properly, this will be a multiyear, perhaps 

multidecade, effort requiring the development of 

extensive assets that do not presently exist. For example, China has apparently put in place an extensive 

program of schools in a number of Southeast Asian 

countries (Cambodia is one) that has gone almost 

entirely unnoticed by Western intelligence agencies.

■ assist think tanks in the region to develop 

analytical and personnel capabilities. At present, the 

only Southeast Asian country with a critical mass of 

world-class security strategists is Singapore. Incipient 

capabilities exist in Hanoi and Jakarta, and to a 

degree in Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. Beijing has 

taken effective advantage of the lack of strategic 

sophistication in Southeast Asian capitals. It is in 

America’s interest to remedy this situation.

■ reassess policy toward Burma and consider 

the consequences for U.S. security interests of continued sanctions that effectively drive the Burmese junta 

into the arms of China

■ assess the strategic implications of China’s 

drive to harness and develop the Mekong. Private 

contractors working with the World Bank might be 

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

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I nstitute for N ationa L S trategic S tudies

Stephen J. Flanagan

James A. Schear Director	 David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press

 Strategic Forum No. 222, October 2006