national air and space intelligence center

wright-patterson air force base

NASIC-1031-0985-09

BALLISTIC AND CRUISE

MISSILE THREAT
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Key Findings

Threat History

Warheads and Targets

Ballistic Missiles

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles

Medium-Range and

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

Land-Attack Cruise Missiles

Summary

3

4

5

6

8

14

18

22

26

30

TWO

photo credits

Cover Top Left: AFP

Full page: AFP

p. 2. Top left: ISNA

Full page: Nouth Korean Television

p. 3. Bottom right: FARS

p. 4. Bottom left: German Museum, Munich

Bottom right: German Museum, Munich

p. 5. Bottom right: lonestartimes.com

p. 6 Top left: Pakistan Defense Force

Full page: PLA Pictorial

p. 7. Top left: Jane’s

Top right: Iranian Student News Agency (ISNA)

Center: Chinese Internet

p.8 Top left: Associated Press

Full page: NASIC

p. 9. Top left: Pyongyang Korean Central Television

Top right: ISNA

Bottom: Associated Press

p. 10. Top left: ISNA

Bottom left: Wforum

Right: Empics

p. 11. Top left: Source: Chinese Internet

Top right: Source: Associated Press

p. 12. Top: Associated Press

Center: Chinese Internet

Bottom left: Wforum 

p. 12. Bottom right: Indian MOD

p. 13. Top: AFP

Center: AFP

Bottom: Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs

p. 14 Top left: Advanced Systems Laboratory

Full page: Chinese Internet

p. 15. Top: ISNA

Bottom left: Chinese Internet

Bottom right: www.militarypictures.com

p. 16. Top left: AFP

Bottom left: AFP

Right: PA Photos

p. 17. Top left: PA Photos

Top right: FARS

p. 18 Top left: TommaX, Inc./ Military Parade Ltd.

p. 19. Top: Wforum

Bottom left: Nouth Korean Television 

Bottom right: NASIC

p. 20. Bottom left: NASIC

Bottom right: TommaX, Inc./Military Parade Ltd.

p. 21. Top left: AFP

Top right: Wforum

Bottom right: TommaX, Inc./Military Parade Ltd.

p. 22 Top left: Military Friendship and Literature Press

Full page: TommaX, Inc./Military Parade Ltd.

p. 23. Top: TommaX, Inc./Military Parade Ltd.

Cover: top left: Iranian 2-Stage Solid-Propellant MRBM 

Launch

Cover: background: Iranian 2-Stage Solid-Propellant MRBM

Top left: Indian Agni II MRBM

Background: North Korean Taepo Dong 2 ICBM/SLV

p.23. Center: NIMA College

Bottom left: Jane’s

Bottom right: TommaX, Inc./Military Parade Ltd.

p. 24. Top left: Wforum

Bottom left: Jane’s

Right: Center for Defense Information

p. 25. Top left: TommaX, Inc./Military Parade Ltd.

Top right: NASIC

Center: Wforum

p. 26 Top left: AFP

Full page: Dausslt

p. 27. Top: Aviation Week and Space Technology

Top left: Kentron Division of Denel (Pty) Ltd

Bottom left: TommaX, Inc./Military Parade Ltd.

Right: Jane’s

p. 28. Top left: Empics

Top right: NASIC

Bottom left: NASIC

Bottom right: Jane’s

p. 29. Top left: Pakistani MoD

Top right: NASIC

p. 30. Full page: TommaX, Inc./Military Parade Ltd.

p. 31. Top: Jane’s

Center: ISNA

Bottom: Chinese Internet 
Many countries view ballistic and cruise missile systems 

as cost-effective weapons and symbols of national power. 

In addition, they present an asymmetric threat to US 

airpower.

Many ballistic and cruise missiles are armed with weapons 

of mass destruction.

North Korea is continuing to develop the TD-2 that 

could reach the United States with a nuclear payload if 

developed as an ICBM. An intermediate-range ballistic 

missile (IRBM) and a new short-range, solid-propellant 

ballistic missile are also being developed. 

Iran has modified its Shahab 3 medium-range ballistic 

missile (MRBM) to extend its range and effectiveness and 

is developing technologies and capabilities applicable to 

longer-range missiles. In 2008, it conducted a test launch 

of a two-stage solid-propellant MRBM. In late 2008 

and early 2009, Iran launched multi-stage space launch 

vehicles (SLV) that can serve as a testbed for long-range 

ballistic missile technologies. With sufficient foreign 

assistance, Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of 

reaching the United States by 2015. 

China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile 

development program in the world. It is developing and 

testing offensive missiles, forming additional missile 

units, qualitatively upgrading certain missile systems, and 

developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses. 

China’s ballistic missile force is expanding in both size 

and types of missiles. New theater missiles continue to be 

deployed in the vicinity of Taiwan, while the ICBM force is 

adding the CSS-10 Mod 1 (DF-31) and CSS-10 Mod 2 

(DF-31A) ICBMs. The new JL-2 submarine-launched 

ballistic missile (SLBM) is also under development. 

Future ICBMs probably will include some with multiple 

independently-targetable reentry vehicles, and the 

number of ICBM nuclear warheads capable of reaching 

the United States could expand to well over 100 within the 

next 15 years. 

India and Pakistan continue to develop new short- and 

long-range ballistic missiles. Pakistan has tested its solidpropellant Shaheen 2 MRBM six times since 2004 and 

India has tested its new solid-propellant Agni III IRBM 

three times since 2006. India has stated that the solidpropellant Agni II MRBM is ready for deployment.

Russia still has over two thousand nuclear warheads 

deployed on ballistic missiles capable of reaching the 

United States. Although the size of the Russian strategic 

missile force is shrinking due to arms control limitations 

and resource constraints, development of new ICBM 

and SLBM systems is proceeding, and Russia is expected 

to retain the largest force of strategic ballistic missiles 

outside the United States. 

Land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) are highly effective 

weapon systems that can present a major threat to 

military operations. 

At least nine foreign countries will be involved in LACM 

production during the next decade, and many missiles will 

be available for export.

KEY FINDINGS

Missile Launches in Iranian Noble Prophet III Exercise

THREE

Top right: Pakistani Ghauri Launch

Background: SS-25 Road-mobile Launcher

in Red Square
THREAT HISTORY

Ballistic and cruise missiles present a significant threat 

to US and Allied forces overseas, as well as to the United 

States and its territories. Missiles are attractive to many 

nations because they can be used effectively against an 

adversary with a formidable air defense system, where an 

attack with manned aircraft would be impractical or too 

costly. In addition, missiles can be used as a deterrent or an 

instrument of coercion. Missiles also have the advantage 

of fewer maintenance, training, and logistic requirements 

than manned aircraft. Even limited use of these weapons 

could be devastating, because missiles can be armed with 

chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads.

Guided cruise and ballistic missiles were first used when 

Germany attacked targets in England and Northern Europe 

with V-1 cruise missiles and V-2 ballistic missiles during World 

War II. Although these missiles were inaccurate, their use 

resulted in tens of thousands of Allied casualties.

The ballistic and cruise missile threat continues to increase 

with the proliferation of missile technology. Over 20 

countries have ballistic missile systems, and missiles likely 

will be a threat in future conflicts involving US forces. 

Ballistic missiles have been used in several conflicts over 

the last 25 years, including the Iran-Iraq war, the Afghan 

civil war, the war in Yemen, the 1991 and 2003 Persian 

Gulf conflicts, and the Russian military action in Chechnya 

and Georgia. Although LACMs have not yet been widely 

proliferated, as many as 20 countries could possess cruise 

missiles in the next decade.

The US Air Force, in cooperation with the other services, 

is responsible for countering the ballistic and cruise 

missile threat through deterrence and, if necessary, active 

suppression. Threat suppression may include attacks on 

missile systems, both before launch and in flight, as well as 

attacks on their supporting infrastructure. This document 

includes information on some of the major current and 

projected foreign ballistic and cruise missile systems.

V-2 Ballistic Missile

V-2 Ballistic Missiles

FOUR

Top left: German V-2 Ballistic Missile

Background: V-1 Cruise Missile
Ballistic and cruise missiles can be armed with 

conventional or nonconventional warheads. Conventional 

warheads are filled with a chemical explosive, such as 

TNT, and rely on the detonation of the explosive and the 

resulting metal casing fragmentation as kill mechanisms. 

Nonconventional warheads include weapons of mass 

destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons), 

as well as nonlethal warheads, a relatively new class of 

warhead designed to disable equipment rather than harm 

personnel. Conventional, biological, and chemical weapons 

can be packaged in unitary (single) warheads and in 

submunitions (multiple small bomblets that are released 

at altitude to disperse over a wide area).

Conventional warheads can be optimized for specific types 

of targets. For example, submunitions can be used to 

create craters in an airfield runway or destroy armored 

vehicles. A penetrator warhead, which uses a relatively 

small amount of explosive surrounded by a heavy metal 

casing, can pass through a hardened structure, such as a 

bunker, to destroy its contents.

Many longer range ballistic missiles, and several types of 

LACMs, carry nuclear warheads. Most of these warheads 

have an explosive force that is tens to hundreds of times 

more powerful than the atomic bombs used in World War II.

Chemical and biological weapons are attractive to many 

Third World countries because they are much easier to 

produce than nuclear weapons. Many countries with 

chemical and biological warfare programs also are 

equipped with ballistic and/or cruise missiles. Accuracy is 

not very important for these weapons when used against 

urban areas or large concentrations of military forces. 

Chemical and biological weapons are capable of producing 

massive casualties, inducing panic and chaos in civilian 

populations, and severely degrading military operations.

WARHEADS AND TARGETS

FIVE

Many ballistic and cruise missiles are armed with nuclear 

warheads

Chemical and biological weapons can be packaged in

submunitions to be dispersed over a wide area

Top right: SS-18 Mod 4 ICBM

Full page: Iranian Shahab 3
Operational ballistic missiles are deployed in silos, on submarines, and on land-mobile 

launchers. Mobile missiles are favored by many nations because they can be hidden, greatly 

increasing their survivability.

In many short-range ballistic missiles, the entire missile remains intact until the warhead 

detonates. In longer range ballistic missiles, warheads are contained in separating reentry 

vehicles. Some long-range ballistic missiles carry multiple independently-targetable reentry 

vehicles (MIRVs), with up to 10 reentry vehicles (RVs) per missile. RVs reenter the Earth’s 

atmosphere at very high velocities, on the order of 4-5 miles per second at ICBM ranges.

Ballistic missiles can use solid- or liquid-propellant rocket propulsion systems. The trend in 

modern missile systems has been toward the use of solid propellants because of their reduced 

logistical requirements and simplicity of operation. However, some Third World nations have 

greater access to liquid-propellant technology and, therefore, continue to develop new liquidpropellant missiles.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

SIX

Top left: Pakistani Ghaznavi SRBM

Background: Chinese CSS-2 IRBM
Multiple-stage missiles, with each stage having its own 

independent propulsion system, are more efficient for 

longer range missions. ICBMs typically have two or three 

stages, with powerful liquid-propellant engines or solidpropellant motors to propel the payload toward its target, 

and a postboost vehicle with a much smaller propulsion 

system. A postboost vehicle can be used to improve the 

RV deployment accuracy for a single-RV missile. For a 

missile with a MIRV payload, the postboost vehicle is used 

to release RVs so that they follow different trajectories, 

allowing them to hit separate targets. Some MIRV missiles 

can hit targets separated by over 1,000 miles with a single 

missile.

A ballistic missile with a high-quality inertial guidance 

system is capable of delivering an RV within a few hundred 

feet of the target after a flight of over 6,000 miles. For 

many missiles, accuracy can be greatly improved by 

utilizing satellite-aided navigation. Missiles also can use 

maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs) with terminal 

sensors to attain very high accuracy. 

As more modern guidance technology is proliferated, 

countries will be able to improve the accuracy and lethality 

of their missile forces. However, even a missile with a 

SEVEN

guidance system only accurate enough to hit a large city is 

capable of inflicting massive casualties when armed with a 

weapon of mass destruction.

Many ballistic missiles carry penetration aids to improve 

the chances of an RV penetrating a ballistic missile defense 

system. Penetration aids are devices intended to deceive 

or jam sensors used to detect and track missiles and RVs. 

Penetration aids are of increasing importance to countries 

developing and operating ballistic missiles

Chinese Mobile Missile Test Sequence

Russian Bulava SLBM launch from a Typhoon class submarine Iran’s Safir space launch vehicle (SLV) can serve as a testbed 

for ballistic missile technology.

SRBM Short-range ballistic missile

<1,000 km (621 mi)

MRBM Medium-range ballistic missile

1,000-3,000 km (621-1,864 mi)

IRBM Intermediate-range ballistic missile

3,000-5,500 km (1,864-3,418 mi)

ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile

>5,500 km (3,418 mi)

SLBM Submarine-launched ballistic missile

Any ballistic missile launched from a

submarine, regardless of maximum range
Several countries are now producing and/or developing SRBM systems, while many other 

countries have purchased missiles or missile technologies from one or more of the missile 

producers. New SRBM systems are in development in several countries. China has deployed a 

very large force of modern solid-propellant SRBMs in the vicinity of Taiwan.

The Russian SS-1c Mod 1, also called the SCUD B, has been exported to more countries than any 

other type of guided ballistic missile and has proven to be a versatile and adaptable weapon. For 

example, the Iraqi SCUD missiles used during the 1991 Persian Gulf War had been modified to 

double their range. North Korea has produced its own version of the SCUD B, as well as the SCUD 

C, an extended-range version of the SCUD B.

SHORT-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES

EIGHT

Top left: Indian Prithvi SRBM

Background: SCUD B on Road-Mobile Launcher
SRBM

Although the SCUD was originally designed as a tactical 

battlefield support weapon, many countries view it and 

other SRBM systems as strategic weapons to be used 

against urban areas. Iraq used extended-range SCUD 

missiles as strategic weapons during both the Iran-Iraq 

war and the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Other countries 

could modify SCUD missiles to significantly improve their 

accuracy and use them against high-value military targets 

and cities.

Recent conflicts have highlighted missile defense 

capabilities and provided the incentive for continued 

missile defense development, in turn, motivating 

ballistic missile developers to pursue missile defense 

countermeasures. Some SRBM developers have already 

begun to develop countermeasures such as maneuvering 

reentry vehicles and are expected to continue 

countermeasure development.

NINE

Shahab 1 Launch during Noble Prophet II Exercise

North Korean Solid Propellant SRBM (Toksa)

The Chinese CSS-8 has been exported to Iran
SRBM comparison chart

TEN

SS-21 Iskander-E SS-1c

Mod 1

SS-1c

Mod 2

Prithvi Agni I Hatf-I Shaheen I CSS-6 CSS-7 CSS-8

Iranian Fateh-110 at Holy Defense Week Parade

Chinese CSS-6 SRBM on Road-Mobile Launcher Indian Agni I
RUSSIA

SCUD B Liquid Road-mobile 185

(SS-1c Mod 1) 

SS-1c Mod 2 Liquid Road-mobile 150+

SS-21 Mod 2 Solid Road-mobile 43

SS-21 Mod 3 Solid Road-mobile 75

SS-26 Solid Road-mobile 185+

Iskander-E Solid Road-mobile 170+

CHINA

CSS-6 Mod 1 Solid Road-mobile 370

CSS-6 Mod 2 Solid Road-mobile 550+

CSS-6 Mod 3 Solid Road-mobile 450+

CSS-7 Mod 1 Solid Road-mobile 185

CSS-7 Mod 2 Solid Road-mobile 370

CSS-8 1st stage: solid Road-mobile 93

2nd stage: liquid 

B611 Solid Road-mobile 93

 

NORTH KOREA

SCUD B Liquid Road-mobile 185

SCUD C Liquid Road-mobile 310

Toksa Solid Road-mobile 75

ER SCUD Liquid Road-mobile 435-625

 

INDIA

Prithvi I Liquid Road-mobile 93

Prithvi II Liquid Road-mobile 155

Dhanush Liquid Ship-based 250

Agni I Solid Road-mobile 435

 

PAKISTAN

Hatf-1 Solid Road-mobile 50

Shaheen I Solid Road-mobile 280+

Ghaznavi Solid Road-mobile 250

 

IRAN

Fateh-110 Solid Road-mobile 120+

Shahab I Liquid Road-mobile 185

Shahab II Liquid Road-mobile 310

CSS-8 Solid/Liquid Road-mobile 93

 

SYRIA

SCUD D Liquid Road-mobile 435

Note: All ranges are approximate. 

SRBM

DEPLOYMENT MAXIMUM

MISSILE PROPELLANT MODE RANGE (MILES)

characteristics

ELEVEN 

Chinese CSS-6 Mod 2 Pakistani Ghaznavi Road-Mobile SRBM Launch
SRBM

TWELVE

Chinese CSS-6 on Road-Mobile Launcher

Indian Dhanush SRBM Launch

Chinese CSS-6 Mod 1 SRBM

Chinese CSS-7 Mod 1 on Road-Mobile Launcher
SRBM

* The missile inventory may be much larger than

 the number of launchers, because launchers can 

 be reused to fire additional missiles.

launcher

order of battle

COUNTRY

MISSILE SYSTEM NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS*

SRBM

THIRTEEN

Indian Prithvi SRBM

Russian SS-21 Damage in Georgia Conflict

Russian SS-26 Iskander SRBM on Road-Mobile Launcher

Belarus 

SS-21s/SCUDs Fewer than 100

Kazakhstan 

SS-21s/SCUDs Fewer than 50

Syria 

SS-21s/SCUDS Fewer than 100

China 

CSS-6/CCS-7 More than 200

Libya 

SCUDs Fewer than 100

Turkmenistan 

SCUDs Fewer than 25

Egypt 

SCUDs/SS-1 Fewer than 25

North Korea 

Toksa/SCUDs Fewer than 100

Ukraine 

SS-21s/SCUDs Fewer than 200

India 

Prithvi-I/II Fewer than 50

Agni I Fewer than 25

Pakistan 

Ghaznavi/Shaheen-1 Fewer than 50

Vietnam 

SCUD-Bs Fewer than 25

Iran 

CSS-8/Fateh-110/SCUDs Fewer than 100

Russia 

SCUDs/SS-21/SS-26) Fewer than 200

Yemen 

SRBMs(SCUD/SS-21s) Fewer than 25
New MRBM and/or IRBM systems are in development in China, North Korea, Iran, India, 

and Pakistan. These are strategic systems, and most will be armed with nonconventional 

warheads. All of these countries except Iran have tested nuclear weapons. Neither Russia nor the 

United States produce or retain any MRBM or IRBM systems, because they are banned by the 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which entered into force in 1988. China has 

been very active in its development of MRBMs.

China’s long-term, comprehensive transformation of its military forces is improving its capacity 

for force projection and Chinese ballistic missiles play a key role in China’s effort to deny foreign 

military forces access to the region in any future conflict involving Taiwan. China currently deploys 

the nuclear-armed CSS-2, CSS-5 Mod 1, and CSS-5 Mod 2 for regional nuclear deterrence. China 

is also acquiring new conventionally-armed MRBMs to conduct precision strikes at longer ranges. 

These systems are likely intended to hold at risk, or strike, logistics nodes and regional military 

bases including airfields and ports. Notably, China is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile 

(ASBM) based on a variant of the CSS-5.

MEDIUM-RANGE & INTERMEDIATE-RANGE 

BALLISTIC MISSILES

FOURTEEN

Top left: Indian Agni III in Flight

Background: Chinese CSS-2 IRBM
North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile 

development program and has exported missile 

technology to other countries, including Iran and Pakistan. 

North Korea has also admitted its possession of nuclear 

weapons. The North Korean Taepo Dong 1 was used in 

an attempt to orbit a satellite in August 1998. Although a 

small third stage failed to place the satellite in orbit, the 

two-stage booster apparently performed successfully. The 

Taepo Dong 1 demonstrated technologies necessary for 

longer-range missile development. North Korea has an 

IRBM in development; this system could be exported to 

other countries.

Iran has an extensive missile development program and 

has received support from entities in Russia, China, and 

North Korea. The Iranian Shahab 3 MRBM is based on 

the North Korean No Dong missile. Iran has modified 

the Shahab 3 to extend its range and effectiveness. Iran 

claimed it tested an improved version of the Shahab 3 in 

2004. Subsequent statements by Iranian officials suggest 

the range is up to 1,250 miles for improved Shahab 3s 

and that Iran has the capability to mass-produce Shahab 

3 missiles. In 2008, Iran conducted test launches of two 

2,000- km-range two-stage solid-propellant MRBMs. In 

late 2008 and early 2009 it launched the Safir, a multistage space launch vehicle, that can serve as a testbed for 

long-range ballistic missile technologies. The 2009 test 

successfully placed a satellite in orbit. The Safir probably 

could achieve IRBM range if used as a ballistic missile.

India continues to develop and improve its ballistic 

missiles. Indian officials have stated that the solidpropellant Agni II MRBM is ready for deployment. The 

new solid-propellant Agni III IRBM has been flight-tested 

three times since 2006. Indian missile developers have 

also stated that they have the capability to produce an 

ICBM, with a range of about 3,000-3,700 miles

Pakistan continues to improve the readiness and 

capabilities of its Army Strategic Force Command and 

individual Strategic Missile Groups through training 

exercises that include live missile firings. Pakistan has 

tested its solid-propellant Shaheen 2 MRBM six times 

since 2004, and this missile system probably will soon be 

deployed.

MRBM 

IRBM

FIFTEEN

Iranian Shahab 3 MRBM 

Chinese CSS-2 IRBM Erected Agni II MRBM on display at 2004 Indian Republic Day Parade
comparison chart

SIXTEEN

CSS-2 CSS-5 Shahab 3 Agni II Agni III No Dong Ghauri Shaheen II

Indian Agni III IRBM Launch

Pakistani Shaheen II MRBM

Iranian Shahab 3 MRBM Mobile-Erector-Launcher

MRBM 

IRBM
China 

CSS-2 1 Liquid Transportable 1,900 5 to 10

 (Limited Mobility)

CSS-5 Mod 1 2 Solid Road-mobile 1,100+ Fewer than 50

CSS-5 Mod 2 2 Solid Road-mobile 1,100+ Fewer than 50

CSS-5 Conventional 2 Solid Mobile 1,100 Fewer than 30

CSS-5 ASBM 2 Solid Mobile 900+ Not Yet Deployed

Saudi Arabia (Chinese-produced)

CSS-2** 1 Liquid Transportable 1,750 Fewer than 50 

 (Limited Mobility)

North Korea

No Dong 1 Liquid Road-mobile 800 Fewer than 50

IRBM 1 Liquid Mobile 2,000+ Fewer than 50

India

Agni II 2 Solid Rail-mobile 1,250+ Fewer than 10

Agni III 2 Solid Rail-mobile 2,000+ Not yet deployed

 

Pakistan

Ghauri 1 Liquid Road-mobile 800 Fewer than 50

Shaheen II 2 Solid Road-mobile 1,250+ Unknown

 

Iran

Shahab 3 1 Liquid Road-mobile 800 Fewer than 50

 (All Variants)

Shahab 3 Variant 1 Liquid Road-mobile 1,200+

New MRBM 2 Solid Road-mobile 1,200+ Not yet deployed

IRBM/ICBM Undetermined Undetermined Undetermined Undetermined Undetermined

 

Note: All ranges are approximate. 

* There may be several missiles available for each launcher. 

** The exported CSS-2 has a conventional warhead.

NUMBER DEPLOYMENT MAXIMUM NUMBER

MISSILE OF STAGES PROPELLANT MODE RANGE (MILES) OF LAUNCHERS*

characteristics

SEVENTEEN

Pakistani Ghauri MRBM Launch Launch of New Iranian Solid-Propellant MRBM

MRBM 

IRBM
Russia retains about 2,000 nuclear warheads on ICBMs and most of these missiles are maintained 

on alert, capable of being launched within minutes of receiving a launch order. Although the size 

of the Russian ICBM force will continue to decrease because of arms control agreements, aging 

missiles, and resource constraints, Russia probably will retain the largest ICBM force outside the 

United States. Efforts to maintain and modernize the force are underway. The Russian SS-27 

Mod 1 ICBM, a missile designed with countermeasures to ballistic missile defense systems, is now 

deployed in silos in five regiments (48 missiles). Russia began deployment of the road-mobile 

version of the SS-27 Mod 1 in 2006. A MIRVed version of the SS-27, the SS-27 Mod-X-2 (RS-24), 

is currently in the flight test phase of development. In addition, Russian officials claim a new class 

of hypersonic vehicle is being developed to allow Russian strategic missiles to penetrate missile 

defense systems. 

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START I) treaty, which entered into force in December 1994, 

limits the United States and Russia to no more than 6,000 warheads each (including those on 

ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers). The 2002 Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions 

limits Russia and the United States to no more than 1,700-2,200 deployed warheads each by the 

end of 2012.

INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES

EIGHTEEN

Top left: Russian SS-27 Mod 1 Launch

Background: Russian SS-25 in Red Square 2008 Victory Day Parade
China’s ICBM force is intended as a strategic nuclear 

deterrent. China has a relatively small force of nucleararmed, liquid-propellant CSS-3 limited-range ICBMs 

and CSS-4 ICBMs capable of reaching the United 

States, but China has been developing and deploying 

advanced new mobile, solid-propellant ICBMs. Both 

the road-mobile, solid-fueled, CSS-10 Mod 1 and the 

longer-range CSS-10 Mod 2 have been deployed to 

units within the Second Artillery Corps. The deployment 

of road-mobile ICBMs is enhancing the survivability of 

the Chinese strategic missile force. The CSS-10 Mod 1 is 

capable of reaching targets throughout Europe and Asia 

as well as parts of Canada and the northwestern United 

States. The longer range CSS-10 Mod 2 will allow 

targeting of most of the continental United States. China 

could develop MIRV payloads for some of its ICBMs, and 

the number of warheads on Chinese ICBMs capable of 

threatening the United States is expected to grow to well 

over 100 in the next 15 years.

North Korea is developing the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) ICBM/

SLV, which could reach the United States if developed 

as an ICBM. Although both launches of the TD-2 ended 

in failure, the April 2009 flight demonstrated a more 

complete performance than the July 2006 launch. North 

Korea’s continued progress in developing the TD-2 clearly 

shows its determination to achieve long-range ballistic 

missile and space launch capabilities. The Taepo Dong 2 

could be exported to other countries in the future.

Iran has an ambitious ballistic missile and space launch 

development programs and, with sufficient foreign 

assistance, Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of 

reaching the United States by 2015.

ICBM

NINETEEN

North Korean Teapo Dong 2 Launch April 2009

Chinese CSS-10 Road-Mobile ICBM on parade

Russian SS-25 Road-Mobile Launcher
ICBM comparison chart

TWENTY

SS-18

Mod 4

SS-18

Mod 5

SS-19

Mod 3

SS-25 SS-27

Mod 1

SS-27

Mod-X-2

CSS-3 CSS-4 CSS-10 Taepo

Dong 2

Russian SS-25 Road-Mobile Launcher Russian SS-27 Mod 1 ICBM Launch
ICBM

Russia

SS-18 Mod 4 2 + PBV 10 Liquid Silo 5,500+ 104

SS-18 Mod 5 2 + PBV 10 Liquid Silo 6,000+ (total for Mods 4 & 5)

SS-19 Mod 3 2 + PBV 6 Liquid Silo 5,500+ 122

SS-25 3 + PBV 1 Solid Road-mobile 7,000 201

SS-27 Mod 1 3 + PBV 1 Solid Silo & road-mobile 7,000 54

SS-27 Mod-X-2 3 + PBV Multiple Solid Silo & road-mobile 7,000 Not yet deployed

 

China

CSS-3 2 1 Liquid Silo & transportable 3,400+ 10 to 15

CSS-4 Mod 2 2 1 Liquid Silo 8,000+ About 20

CSS-10 Mod 1 3 1 Solid Road-mobile 4,500+ Fewer than 15

CSS-10 Mod 2 3 1 Solid Road-mobile 7,000+ Fewer than 15

 

North Korea

Taepo Dong 2 2 1 Liquid Undetermined 3,400+ Not yet deployed

 

Note: All ranges are approximate. 

* These estimates do not include range extension from the postboost vehicle; some postboost vehicles provide 

 substantial range extension.

characteristics

Maximum

Number Warheads Deployment Range* Number of

Missile of Stages per Missile Propellant Mode (miles) Launchers

TWENTY-ONE

The Russian Dnepr space launch vehicle is based on the 

SS-18 ICBM.

Russian SS-27 Road-Mobile Launcher

Chinese CSS-10 Road-Mobile Launcher
Russia maintains a substantial force of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) with 

intercontinental-range missiles. Russia is developing new and improved SLBM weapon systems 

to replace its current inventory of Cold War vintage systems. An upgrade to the SS-N-23, named 

Sineva, is intended to replace the existing SS-N-23 on DELTA IV Class SSBNs. The SS-NX-32/

Bulava-30 SLBM is a new solid-propellant SLBM that is primarily intended for deployment 

on new DOLGORUKIY class SSBNs. Russian SLBMs are capable of launch from surfaced and 

submerged SSBNs from a variety of launch locations.

SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES

TWENTY-TWO

Top left: Chinese CSS-NX-3 Launch

Background: Russian Typhoon SSBN with Launch Tube Doors Open
SLBM

China currently has a single XIA Class SSBN that is 

intended to carry 12 CSS-NX-3/JL-1 missiles. In addition, 

the Chinese will deploy the new CSS-NX-14/JL-2 SLBM on 

new 12-tube JIN Class SSBNs. This missile will, for the first 

time, allow Chinese SSBNs to target portions of the United 

States from operating areas located near the Chinese 

coast.

India is developing two new naval systems, the Sagarika 

SLBM (which is expected to become operational after 

2010) and the Dhanush ship-launched ballistic missile (a 

naval version of the Prithvi land-based ballistic missile). 

The Dhanush is undergoing sea-based flight tests from an 

Indian naval surface ship.

TWENTY-THREE

Each Russian TYPHOON SSBN can carry 20 SS-N-20 missiles

Each Russian Delta IV SSBN can carry 16 SS-N-23 missiles

Indian Sagarika SLBM Test Launcher Russian SS-N-23 SLBM
SLBM comparison chart

TWENTY-FOUR

Chinese JIN-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Russian SS-N-18 SLBM

Chinese CSS-NX-3 SLBM Launch Sequence

SS-N-18 SS-N-20 SS-N-23 SINEVA CSS-NX-3 CSS-NX-14 BULAVA-30
SLBM

RUSSIA

SS-N-18 2 + PBV 3 Liquid DELTA III 3,500+ 96

SS-N-20 3 + PBV 10 Solid TYPHOON 5,500+ 40

SS-N-23/Sineva 3+PBV 4 Liquid DELTA IV 5,000+ 96

SS-NX-32 3+PBV 6 Solid DOLGORUKIY 5,000+ 16; Not yet deployed

 (Bulava) (BOREY)

TYPHOON 20; Not yet deployed

 

CHINA

CSS-NX-3/JL-1 2 1 Solid XIA 1,000+ 12; Not yet deployed

CSS-NX-14/JL-2 3 1 Solid JIN 4,500+ 12; Not yet deployed

 

INDIA

Sagarika Undetermined Undetermined Undetermined Undetermined 180+ Not yet deployed

Note: All ranges are approximate.

Maximum

Number Warheads Booster Submarine Range Number of

Missile of Stages per Missile Propellant Class (Miles) Launch Tubes

characteristics

TWENTY-FIVE

Russian SS-N-20 SLBM Launch The Chinese XIA SSBN can carry 12 CSS-NX-3 missiles

Russian SS-N-23 SLBM
Unlike ballistic missiles, cruise missiles are usually categorized by intended mission and launch 

mode (instead of maximum range). The two broadest categories are land-attack cruise missiles 

(LACMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Each type can be launched from an aircraft, ship, 

submarine, or ground-based launcher. LACMs are addressed in this document. 

A LACM is an unmanned, armed aerial vehicle designed to attack a fixed or mobile groundbased target. It spends the majority of its mission in level flight, as it flies a preprogrammed path 

to a predetermined target. Propulsion is usually provided by a small jet engine.

Because of highly accurate guidance systems that can place the missile within a few feet of the 

intended target, the most advanced LACMs can be used effectively against very small targets, 

even when armed with conventional warheads. LACM guidance usually occurs in three phases: 

launch, midcourse, and terminal. During the launch phase, a missile is guided using only the 

inertial navigation system (INS). In the midcourse phase, a missile is guided by the INS updated 

by one or more of the following systems: a radar-based terrain contour matching (TERCOM) 

system, a radar or optical scene matching system, and/or a satellite navigation system such 

as the US Global Positioning System (GPS) or the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System 

(GLONASS). The terminal guidance phase begins when a missile enters the target area and uses 

either more accurate scene matching or a terminal seeker (usually an optical or radar-based 

sensor).

LAND-ATTACK CRUISE MISSILES

TWENTY-SIX

Top left: Pakistani Babur Cruise Missile Launch

Background: Rafale with APACHE Cruise Missile
LACM

Defending against LACMs will stress air defense systems. 

Cruise missiles can fly at low altitudes to stay below 

enemy radar and, in some cases, hide behind terrain 

features. Newer missiles are incorporating stealth 

features to make them even less visible to radars and 

infrared detectors. Modern cruise missiles also can be 

programmed to approach and attack a target in the 

most efficient manner. For example, multiple missiles 

can attack a target simultaneously from different 

directions, overwhelming air defenses at their weakest 

points. Furthermore, the LACMs may fly circuitous 

routes to get to the target, thereby avoiding radar and 

air defense installations. Some developmental systems 

may incorporate chaff or decoys as an added layer of 

protection, though concealment will remain a cruise 

missile’s main defense.

TWENTY-SEVEN

The cruise missile threat to US forces will increase over 

the next decade. At least nine foreign countries will be 

involved in LACM production during the next decade, and 

several of the LACM producers will make their missiles 

available for export.

The success of US Tomahawk cruise missiles has 

heightened interest in cruise missile acquisition in many 

countries. Many cruise missiles available for purchase will 

have the potential to perform precision-strike missions. 

Many of these missiles will have similar features: a 

modular design, allowing them to be manufactured with 

a choice of navigational suites and conventional warhead 

options; the incorporation of stealth technology; the 

ability to be launched from fighter-size aircraft; and 

the capability to fly high-subsonic, low-altitude, terrainfollowing flight profiles.

KEPD-350 Cruise Missiles Carried on Tornado Aircraft

Russian AS-15 Cruise Missile Kh-101/Kh-102 Missiles on Test BEAR H Bomber

South African MUPSOW Cruise Missile
LACM comparison chart

TWENTY-EIGHT

Torgos MUPSOW SS-N-21 AS-4 AS-15 APACHE Popeye

Turbo

Storm

Shadow

KEPD-350 SCALP-EG Ra’ad Babur

Pakistani Ra’ad Air Launched Cruise Missile

The Black Shaheen is an export version of the French SCALP-EG cruise missile

KEPD-350 in Foreground, Storm Shadow in Background

Chinese YJ-63 cruise missile is carried by the H6 aircraft
LACM

CHINA

YJ-63 Air Conventional Undetermined Undetermined

DH-10 Undetermined Conventional or nuclear Undetermined Undetermined

 

FRANCE

APACHE-AP Air Submunitions 100+ 2002

SCALP-EG Air and ship Penetrator 300+ 2003

Naval SCALP Sub and Surface Ship Penetrator 300+ 2010+

 

UAE

BLACK Air Penetrator 250+ 2006

SHAHEEN* 

GERMANY, SWEDEN, SPAIN

KEPD-350 Air Penetrator 220+ 2004

 

INDIA, RUSSIA

Brahmos-A Air Conventional 150+ 2010+

 

ISRAEL

Popeye Turbo Air Conventional 200+ 2002

 

PAKISTAN

RA’AD Air Conventional or Nuclear 200 Undetermined

Babur Ground Conventional or Nuclear 200 Undetermined

 

RUSSIA

AS-4 Air Conventional or nuclear 185+ Operational

AS-15 Air Nuclear 1,500+ Operational

SS-N-21 Submarine Nuclear 1,500+ Operational

Kh-555 Air Conventional Undetermined Undetermined

New GLCM Ground Conventional less than 300 Undetermined

3M-14E Ship, Submarine, & Ground Conventional 185+ Undetermined

 

SOUTH AFRICA

MUPSOW Air and ground Conventional 125+ 2002

Torgos Air and ground Conventional 185+ 2006+

 

TAIWAN 

Wan Chien Air Conventional 150+ 2006

HF-2E Ground Conventional Undetermined Undetermined

 

UNITED KINGDOM

Storm Shadow Air Penetrator 300+ 2003

Note: All ranges are approximate and represent the range of the missile only. The effective system range may be 

greatly increased by the range of the launch platform.

*The BLACK SHAHEEN is an export version of the SCALP-EG.

characteristics

Maximum

System Launch Mode Warhead Type Range (miles) IOC

TWENTY-NINE

Pakistani Ra’ad Cruise Missile Brahmos-A Indian/Russian Cruise Missile
Ballistic missiles are already in widespread use and will continue to increase in number and 

variety. The availability of weapons of mass destruction for use on ballistic missiles vastly 

increases the significance of this threat. 

Despite an ongoing reduction in the size of the Russian strategic missile force, Russia probably 

will retain the largest force of strategic ballistic missiles outside the United States. The 

development of new ballistic missile systems (i.e., the SS-27 ICBM and the SS-N-23 Sineva and 

SS-NX-32/Bulava-30 SLBMs) is a high priority for Russia. Russian officials have claimed that a 

new class of hypersonic vehicle is being developed to allow Russian strategic missiles to penetrate 

missile defense systems. Russia is also offering the advanced new Iskander-E SRBM for export.

China is producing technologically advanced ballistic missiles and has sold ballistic missile 

technology to other countries. China has an extensive theater missile program and has deployed 

a large force of ballistic missiles in the vicinity of Taiwan. China is expanding the reach of this 

force to attempt to prevent foreign powers from becoming involved in any future regional 

conflict. China can already target the United States with a relatively small force of ICBMs, and 

China’s ICBM force will grow considerably. 

SUMMARY

THIRTY

Top left: Chinese CSS-4 ICBM Launch

Full page: Russian SS-18 Launch
North Korea is continuing the development of the Taepo 

Dong 2 ICBM/SLV and has an IRBM in development. 

North Korea has exported ballistic missile systems and will 

probably continue to do so.

Proliferation of LACMs will expand in the next decade. 

At least nine countries will be involved in producing 

these weapons. The majority of new LACMs will be very 

accurate, conventionally armed, and available for export. 

The high accuracy of many LACMs will allow them to inflict 

serious damage, even when the missiles are armed only 

with conventional warheads. US defense systems could be 

severely stressed by low-flying stealthy cruise missiles that 

can simultaneously attack a target from several directions.

Ballistic and cruise missiles, with their relatively low 

operating costs, their potential to penetrate defense 

systems, and their value as a symbol of national power, 

will continue to be the offensive weapons of choice for many 

nations. As such, they are threats that must be carefully 

considered in future military planning and operations.

THIRTY-ONE

Chinese CSS-5 MRBM Road-Mobile Launcher

Chinese CSS-6 SRBM

Iranian Shahab 3 MRBM Launch
NASIC-1031-0985-09

APRIL 2009

national air and space intelligence center

wright-patterson air force base

NASIC

Public Affairs Office

NASIC/CVH

4180 Watson Way

Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-5625

(937) 257-2345

This report contains material copyrighted by others. No claim of copyright 

is made for any included works of the US Government.

The Office of Naval Intelligence and Defense Intelligence Agency Missile 

and Space Intelligence Center assisted in the preparation 

of this document.