OCT 2017 NIGER AMBUSH 

SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION 

10 May 2018

1. The findings and recommendations with regard to the tragic events of 4 October

2017, that resulted in the deaths of four American and four Nigerien Soldiers, are based

on all available evidence concerning the actions and decisions by the members of a

U.S. Special Operations Forces team (USSOF Team), partner Nigerien forces, and

higher headquarters personnel during active combat near Tongo Tongo, Niger. The

investigation report, prepared by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), explains how

Sergeant First Class (SFC) Jeremiah Johnson1, Staff Sergeant (SSG) Bryan Black,

SSG Dustin Wright, and Sergeant (SGT) LaDavid Johnson gave their last full measure

of devotion to our country and died with honor while actively engaging the enemy. The

investigation report also shows how Nigerien and French units assisted without

hesitation to support the troops in contact and very likely saved the lives of U.S. and

Nigerien Soldiers, several of whom were wounded in the attack. The investigation team

examined documentary, photographic, audio, video, and testimonial evidence to make

findings of fact. It interviewed 143 witnesses, including survivors of the attack, one of

whom accompanied the team back to the battlefield to explain what happened during

the 4 October 2017 incident.

2. This investigation identifies individual, organizational, and institutional failures and

deficiencies that contributed to the tragic events of 4 October 2017. Although the report

details the compounding impact of tactical and operational decisions, no single failure or

deficiency was the sole reason for the events of 4 October 2017. To the extent this

report highlights tactical decisions made by Soldiers in the heat of battle, it should not

be overlooked that American and Nigerien forces fought courageously on 4 October

2017 despite being significantly outnumbered by the enemy.

3. Based on extensive review and analysis of all relevant information, the investigating

officer made the following findings:

a. At the request of the Government of Niger, U.S. Special Operations Forces

(USSOF) in Niger conduct a variety of counterterrorism and security force assistance 

activities with the Nigerien military to build the capacity of those forces to conduct 

operations to counter Boko Haram, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and the Islamic 

State in Iraq and Syria – Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS).

b. Prior to 4 October 2017, USSOF in Ouallam, Niger were concentrated on two

primary lines of effort: training and equipping a new Nigerien Counter Terrorism (CT) 

Company; and conducting operations with a separate Nigerien unit, until the new CT 

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SFC Jeremiah Johnson was promoted posthumously to the rank of Sergeant First Class. To avoid confusion, 

throughout this report SFC Johnson is referred to as Staff Sergeant (SSG) Johnson, as that was his rank at the time

of the attack and all witnesses referred to him as SSG Johnson. 
Company reached full operational capacity.

c. The USSOF Team involved in the attack on 4 October 2017 previously deployed

to Maradi, Niger in 2016. Team members knew when they returned from that

deployment they would go back to Niger one year later. From November 2016 to 

August 2017, the USSOF Team focused their training plan and deployment preparation

on the anticipated return to Niger in the fall of 2017. Personnel turnover during that 

year, however, prevented the USSOF Team from conducting key pre-deployment

collective training as a complete team. When they arrived in Ouallam, only half of the

team had conducted any collective training together.

d. In the first three weeks they were in Ouallam, the USSOF Team (hereafter

referred to as Team OUALLAM) concentrated primarily on training the new CT

Company. Prior to 3 October 2017, Team OUALLAM conducted two partnered 

operations with other Nigerien forces. 

e. On 3 October 2017, Team OUALLAM left Camp Ouallam with Nigerien forces on

a CT operation in the vicinity of Tiloa, Niger targeting a key member of ISIS-GS. Before 

departing, Team OUALLAM did not conduct pre-mission rehearsals or battle drills with 

their partner force. Once in Tiloa, the element was unable to locate the target, so Team

OUALLAM and their partner Nigeriens continued to a military camp near Tiloa and 

conducted a key leader engagement (KLE) with a partner force commander. Although 

USSOF have the authority to conduct CT operations with partner Nigerien forces, the 

initial concept of operations (CONOPS) submitted for this mission was not approved at

the proper level of command. Rather, the USSOF Team commander and the next

higher level commander at the Advanced Operations Base (AOB), the company-level 

command, inaccurately characterized the nature of the mission in the CONOPS. The

AOB commander then approved the CONOPS based upon an incorrect belief that he 

had the authority to do so. At the time of Team OUALLAM’s departure on the initial 

mission, no command higher than the AOB was aware that the mission sought to find/fix

and, if possible, capture a key member of ISIS-GS. The acting AOB commander (a 

captain) was the most senior officer aware of the true nature of the mission. Proper

characterization of the mission would have required approval by the Special Operations

Command and Control Element (SOCCE) commander, the battalion-level command, in

N’Djamena, Chad. 

f. Though the SOCCE commander was unaware of the true nature of Team

OUALLAM’s original mission, the AOB briefed the SOCCE commander on the new

intelligence. The SOCCE commander then directed a multi-team raid including a 

second USSOF Team and their partner Nigerien force out of Arlit, Niger as the main 

effort, and Team OUALLAM and their partner Nigerien force as the supporting effort. 

Weather forced the second USSOF Team to abort the air assault and the SOCCE

commander subsequently ordered Team OUALLAM to execute the mission. The

mission was unsuccessful in capturing the target. Some media reports alleged Team

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OUALLAM crossed the border into Mali in pursuit of terrorists. Those reports are false.

The SOCCE commander’s approval of this mission was within his authority and he 

remained in communication with his higher headquarters. Following the raid, Team

OUALLAM began their movement back to their home base.

g. While returning to base, Team OUALLAM’s partner Nigerien forces needed water

so the convoy stopped near the village of Tongo Tongo to resupply. While there, the

Team OUALLAM commander conducted an impromptu KLE with village leaders. At the

completion of the KLE, they departed the village and, at 1140 on 4 October 2017, Team

OUALLAM and their partner Nigeriens were ambushed immediately south of Tongo 

Tongo by a large enemy force. The American and Nigerien Soldiers dismounted and 

returned fire. The Team OUALLAM commander, the Nigerien force commander, and 

several Nigerien Soldiers attempted to counter attack the enemy in a flanking

maneuver, killing approximately four enemy personnel. Soon after, the enemy massed 

and began to envelop Team OUALLAM. Realizing then that the team was significantly

outnumbered by a well-trained force, the Team OUALLAM commander returned to the 

vehicles and ordered everyone to break contact and withdraw to the south. Team

members yelled to SSG J. Johnson, who acknowledged the order to withdraw by giving

a thumbs up. Team members threw canisters of smoke to mask their movement and,

under increasing enemy fire, the convoy began to withdraw. Two Nigerien vehicles and

one U.S. vehicle, including three U.S. Soldiers (SSG Black, SSG Wright, and SSG J.

Johnson) did not withdraw from the initial ambush site. They were last seen by team

members actively engaging the enemy from defensive positions near their vehicle and 

preparing to withdraw with the rest of the team. 

h. After the lead two vehicles began moving they lost visual contact with the third

vehicle. SSG Wright entered the third vehicle and began driving it slowly south while 

SSG J. Johnson and SSG Black moved next to the vehicle using it as cover while 

providing suppressive fire. During the movement, enemy small arms fire hit SSG Black

killing him instantly. SSG Wright halted the vehicle and dismounted. Despite increasing

enemy fire, both SSG Wright and SSG J. Johnson remained with SSG Black and 

attempted to provide cover and assess his wounds. Overrun by enemy fighters, SSG

Wright and SSG J. Johnson were forced to evade on foot. Approximately 85 meters

from the vehicle, enemy small arms fire hit SSG J. Johnson, severely wounding him.

SSG Wright stopped, returned to SSG J. Johnson, and continued to engage the enemy

until each was shot and killed by small arms fire. SSG Black, SSG Wright, and SSG J. 

Johnson were never captured alive by the enemy. As enemy fighters advanced through 

the ambush site, they fired several additional bursts into the bodies of the three 

Soldiers.

i. The front two U.S. vehicles and three partner vehicles moved approximately 700

meters south and consolidated at what the investigating team calls “Position Two.”

Realizing that the third vehicle and their associated personnel were not present, and 

after repeated attempts to contact them, four U.S. Soldiers moved on foot back to the 

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ambush site to find them. Four other members of Team OUALLAM and approximately

25 partner Nigeriens remaining at Position Two continued to engage advancing enemy

forces. The enemy pressed their attack with mounted and dismounted forces and 

began to envelop the remaining Soldiers from the east and from the south. The

remaining Team OUALLAM members at Position Two were forced to evade under

enemy fire. Prior to leaving Position Two, all team members acknowledged the order to 

break contact. U.S. and Nigerien Soldiers observed SGT L. Johnson running to his

vehicle. One vehicle carrying three members of Team OUALLAM and four additional

partner Nigeriens accelerated away from Position Two under heavy fire. Two U.S. 

Soldiers and three partner Nigeriens were wounded as the vehicle evaded enemy

fighters. One partner Nigerien was killed. The Soldiers in this vehicle were unaware 

that the team had become separated as they broke contact with the enemy. 

j. SGT L. Johnson was in a prone position to the rear of his vehicle when the order

to break contact was given. SGT L. Johnson acknowledged the order and, as the driver

of his vehicle, he and two partner Nigeriens attempted to get into his vehicle and follow. 

SGT L. Johnson and the two Nigerien Soldiers were unable to get into the vehicle and

were driven back to their prone positions by heavy enemy fire. Unable to reach the 

vehicle and with enemy forces rapidly closing on their position, they were forced to

evade on foot. Running in a westerly direction, the first Nigerien Soldier was shot and 

killed approximately 460 meters from Position Two. The second Nigerien Soldier was

shot and killed approximately 110 meters further to the west. SGT L. Johnson 

continued to evade, running west for an additional 450 meters before eventually seeking

cover under a thorny tree approximately 960 meters from Position Two. There, SGT L.

Johnson continued to return fire against the pursuing enemy. The enemy suppressed 

SGT L. Johnson with a vehicle-mounted heavy machine gun. Dismounted enemy then

maneuvered on SGT L. Johnson killing him with small arms fire. The enemy did not

capture SGT L. Johnson alive. SGT L. Johnson's hands were not bound and he was

not executed but was killed in action while actively engaging the enemy.

k. Under heavy fire from pursuing enemy vehicles and dismounted personnel, the

first vehicle continued north at a high rate of speed becoming stuck in a swampy area 

southwest of the original ambush site. With enemy fire increasing and becoming more 

effective, all personnel dismounted from the vehicle. The driver called over the radio

indicating they were about to be overrun. The radio call occurred 53 minutes after first

contact and was Team OUALLAM’s first request for assistance since first reporting

"Troops in Contact." The remaining U.S. and Nigerien personnel dismounted and 

began moving west. 

l. The four U.S. Soldiers who had returned to the ambush site killed several enemy

soldiers near the original ambush site but were unable to locate the vehicle or SSG

Black, SSG Wright, and SSG J. Johnson. Under heavy fire, they rejoined the rest of the

group dismounting from the vehicle stuck in the swamp. It was at this point they

realized SGT L. Johnson was not present. The enemy forces began engaging them

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with heavy fire forcing them to withdraw. The team members provided critical medical

care to the wounded, and evaded to a wooded area west of the ambush site. The 

combined group established a final defensive position, where they prepared to make 

their last stand. 

m. Upon receipt of the initial report of troops in contact, the AOB alerted Nigerien

forces while the SOCCE alerted the French through their liaison officer. Both partners

responded immediately. Nigerien ground forces departed 8 minutes after notification 

and arrived in Tongo Tongo approximately 4 hours and 25 minutes later due to 

distance, lack of roads, and rough terrain. French Mirage aircraft conducted the first

show of force approximately 47 minutes after receiving notification. A single Nigerien 

helicopter took off approximately 40 minutes after receiving the request. The helicopter 

diverted prior to arrival in Tongo Tongo in order to de-conflict airspace for French jets. 

Despite being armed, the French aircraft were unable to engage because they could not

identify U.S. troop locations and did not have communications with the team on the

ground. Instead, they flew at low altitude in four separate shows of force that caused

the enemy to retreat for cover, likely saving the lives of the surviving members of the 

USSOF Team. At approximately 1715, French forces from Task Force (TF)

BARKHANE arrived in two helicopters and evacuated the surviving Soldiers. 

n. A Nigerien ground quick reaction force located the remains of SSG Wright, SSG

Black, SSG J. Johnson, and one Nigerien Soldier as they swept through the ambush 

site. At approximately 1900 on 4 October 2017, the Nigeriens transferred the remains

of the three American Soldiers to U.S. custody. Additional U.S. and Nigerien ground 

forces remained in the Tongo Tongo area searching for SGT L. Johnson until 

approximately 0540 hours on the morning of the 5th before returning to base to refit and 

continue search and recovery operations. 

o. At 0320 on 5 October 2017, the Commander, AFRICOM deployed his theater

Crisis Response Force and called for the mobilization of nationally-controlled assets

trained and dedicated for personnel recovery (PR) missions. U.S. and partnered 

Nigerien forces continued to search for SGT L. Johnson using various surveillance 

platforms throughout periods of darkness and then using ground forces again beginning

at first light. 

p. On the morning of 6 October 2017, Nigerien forces recovered SGT L. Johnson's

remains approximately 960 meters from Position Two and approximately 1.6 km from

the original ambush site. The Tongo Tongo village elder first notified and then led 

Nigerien forces to the location of SGT L. Johnson's remains. When found, SGT L.

Johnson's hands were not bound and he was laying on his back with his arms to his

sides. At 1522 on 6 October 2017, the Nigeriens transferred the remains of SGT L. 

Johnson to U.S. custody. 

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q. The investigation determined SSG Jeremiah Johnson, SSG Bryan Black, SSG

Dustin Wright, and SGT LaDavid Johnson were killed by small arms fire while actively 

engaging the enemy. At no point were U.S. forces captured alive. 

r. During the recovery efforts there were many initial reports that U.S. systems

detected signals from equipment assigned to Team OUALLAM. Those reports proved 

false. U.S. systems did not detect any signals from any devices or Personnel Recovery

equipment assigned to Team OUALLAM during the Troops in Contact event near Tongo 

Tongo.

s. All four Soldiers killed in action sustained wounds that were either immediately

fatal or rapidly fatal, and were deceased by the time the initial site was accessible to

personnel recovery assets. All four Soldiers were killed in action before French and 

Nigerien responding forces arrived in Tongo Tongo. Both Soldiers wounded in action 

sustained injuries that were managed expeditiously by Team members. 

t. SGT L. Johnson evaded on foot to a location outside the immediate search area

of responding forces resulting in a 48-hour delay in finding his remains. Efforts to locate 

SGT L. Johnson were initially delayed by errant reporting that SGT L. Johnson was

being held in a village north of Tongo Tongo near the Mali border. U.S. forces focused

recovery efforts locating SGT L. Johnson, while simultaneously mobilizing additional

assets to conduct a specialized personnel recovery operation. 

u. While there is evidence to indicate that the enemy enjoys freedom of movement

in Tongo Tongo, there is not enough evidence to conclude that the villagers of Tongo

Tongo willingly (without duress) aid and support them. Additionally, there is insufficient

evidence to determine if villagers aided the enemy or participated in the attack. 

v. Contradictory and ambiguous CONOPS approval matrices between Special

Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA), Special Operations Command ForwardNorth and West Africa, SOCCE, and the AOB resulted in confusion regarding the proper

approval level for certain types of CONOPS. A reliance on templated CONOPS (cut 

and paste from previous CONOPS), a lack of attention to detail in quality control and 

quality assurance, and inadequate notification of CONOPS to SOCAFRICA all

contributed to a general lack of situational awareness and command oversight at every

echelon. The CONOPS development, review, approval, and notification processes

were pro-forma and did not reflect the detailed, deliberate planning and oversight tools 

they are intended to be.

w. The immediate response by French and Nigerien partner forces saved American

lives. Shows of force by French aircraft prevented surviving members of the team from

being overrun, and caused the enemy to break off their pursuit and flee the area.

Nigerien ground forces played a crucial role in securing the area and assisting in the

recovery efforts. 

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x. Individual members of the USSOF Team performed numerous acts of bravery

while under fire on 4 October 2017 and their actions should be reviewed for appropriate

recognition.

4. Based on the findings summarized above, the Commander, AFRICOM made

recommendations for adjustments in various areas. Broadly, these recommendations

include establishing clear and unambiguous guidance for the planning and approval of

military operations, conducting a holistic review of certain equipment requirements,

ensuring appropriate turnover procedures within the theater, and certain acts with

respect to coordinating support from partner nation forces.

5. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred

with the findings of the investigation and the recommendations of the AFRICOM

Commander as outline above. The Secretary has directed the AFRICOM Commander

to take immediate steps to implement his recommendations.

The Secretary also has directed actions at the Department, Service, and Combatant

Command levels to address systemic issues brought to light by this investigation. 

Accordingly, the Secretary of the Army and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations

Command are directed, inter alia, to: review the training and policies pertinent to

Special Forces soldiers that may impact their ability to effectively train foreign partners;

reinforce the role of U.S. forces as foreign partner advisors during counter-terrorism

operations; review personnel policies that affect units prior to deployment so that units

are able to train together throughout the pre-deployment period; and review and

minimize administrative requirements that detract from war-fighting readiness.

The Secretary of Defense directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness to review and update, as necessary, all Department of Defense instructions

and policies that may impact the ability of operational units to prepare for and deploy as

a cohesive, ready, combat force. 

The Secretary has given the leaders 120 days to review these matters, identify other

issues as appropriate, and provide a plan of action to successfully address them.

The Secretary also sent his memorandum and the investigation report to civilian and 

military leaders in the Departments of the Air Force and Navy, so they may also take 

steps, as appropriate, to maintain the expected levels of tactical discipline and 

operational competence to ensure this type of incident does not happen again. 

Personnel actions relevant to this incident, including recognition for acts of valor and

appropriate administrative or disciplinary action, if warranted, will be addressed by the 

military commands with administrative authority over personnel at issue. 

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