View from the East: 

Arab Perceptions of United States 

Presence and Policy 

Brent J. Talbot and Michael B. Meyer 

INSS Occasional Paper 48 

February 2003 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
ii
iii

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of 

the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. The 

paper is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

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 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Foreword vii 

Executive Summaries ix 

THE ARAB PERCEPTION AND CONSENSUS PROBLEMS: 

IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 

Brent J. Talbot

Introduction 1 

The Perception Problem 3 

The Consensus Issue 11 

 Islamic Radicals 13 

 Islamic Revivalists (Reformists) 14 

 Islamic Government in Theory 15 

 Colonialism in the Middle East and the 

 Introduction to Democracy 23 

Policy Recommendations and Conclusion 30 

 Conclusion 33 

Notes 34 

ARAB PERCEPTIONS TOWARD US FOREIGN POLICY: WHY 

PERCEPTIONS MATTER AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO 

IMPROVE AMERICA’S IMAGE IN THE ARAB WORLD, 

Michael B. Meyer 

Introduction 41 

Iraq—“The Innocent Suffer” 46 

The Arab-Israeli Crisis—The Seminal Issue 51 

Adding Fuel to the Fire—The Second Intifada 62 

Conclusions—Implications for US National Security and 

 Policy Recommendations to Improve America’s Image 

 in Arab Eyes 68 

Notes 79 
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FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this forty-eighth volume in the 

Occasional Paper series of the United States Air Force Institute for 

National Security Studies (INSS). This timely and insightful set of 

papers written by two USAF area specialists provides 

complementary—and together comprehensive—coverage of the 

critical topic of Arab perceptions of United States policy. Further, 

the papers expand that coverage to address in detail some of the 

implications of those perceptions for US military presence and 

policy in the region. Brent Talbot focuses his analysis on the key 

segment of the region’s population that stands between the totally 

dispossessed and deprived radical base and some entrenched, 

corrupt regimes. This Arab majority, he argues, can reshape the 

region’s states into culturally compatible and accountable (if not 

purely democratic by western standards) revisionist Arab and 

Islamic political and economic states that are much more 

compatible with United States values and presence. This is a 

significant message in terms of the longer-term strategic postscript 

to the current US-Iraq conflict. Mike Meyer focuses his analysis at 

the more operational level of US military personnel on the ground 

in the region, but comes to complementary conclusions as to United 

States public diplomacy and presence. He argues that American 

military personnel and programs must purposefully shape the 

relationships—and through them perceptions and attitudes—with 

the emerging military and political leaders in this region of 

transition. This approach also provides a key element to the statebuilding exercise that will likely soon present itself. Together the 

two papers suggest a wisdom of experience—academic and 

practical—that is essential to the high-stakes endgame that lies 

before us. 

About the Institute

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Institute; and the Air Force Long-Range Plans Directorate (XPXP). 
vii

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viii

THE ARAB PERCEPTION AND CONSENSUS PROBLEMS: 

IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 

Brent J. Talbot 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

This paper is a preliminary effort to assess Middle Eastern 

perceptions of the US and the resulting effect on US foreign policy 

in the region. My effort follows a three part outline: a) Arab 

perceptions of the US; b) how a lack of consensus within the civil 

polity, especially the relationship between governments and Islamic 

forces, impedes progress in the various states of the Arab world and 

contributes to misperception; and c) US policy recommendations 

and conclusions. 

Arab perceptions have turned virulently anti-western in recent 

years. The Arab-Israeli dispute has been a particular “sore spot” 

since Arabs believe the US could pressure Israel into accepting 

peace with the Palestinians. Arab media and education efforts also 

contribute to misperceptions by misinforming the Arab public. 

Moreover, US policy is viewed as anti-Muslim, a crusade against 

the “axis of evil,” and unfair due to practices that favor Israel over 

the Arabs. 

The lack of consensus—disagreement over what is the real 

problem and who is the real enemy—complicates any hope of Arab 

unity. Not only are populations alienated from governments, but 

they see Islam as their only solution, and Islamic solutions fit into 

two major categories: radical extremism along the lines of Osama 

bin-Laden and company, and a more democratic revivalist or 

reformist variety, that unfortunately, has suffered from government 

efforts to equate it with radicals. Revivalists also suffer from a lack 

of recognition by the populace. Still, revivalist elements are present 

in the few reform-minded governments of the region and it is hoped 

that their examples might be illuminated for others to follow. 

A return to Islam is sought by peoples of the region. Islam is 

the only legitimate means of opposing corrupt, autocratic regimes. 

The US should support peaceful transitions toward Islamic reforms 

as the overall policy strategy in the region. 

Overall Goal: Achieve Peaceful Transitions toward Islamicstyle democracy. 

--Increase the pressure on corrupt Arab regimes to share power 

with Islamic revivalists (consistent with US values); reward 

governments showing democratic tendencies such as Jordan, 
ix

Bahrain, Kuwait, Morocco, and Qatar. This will also improve 

America’s image by eradicating the “hypocrite factor” that results 

from US aid to corrupt regimes. 

--Encourage economic reform to alleviate the plight of 

demography (goes hand in hand with democratic reforms). 

--Increasing the pressure on the Palestinians and Israelis to 

move the peace process forward is a most essential element due to 

its role as the biggest problem area vis-à-vis Arab perceptions of the 

US. More importantly, solving this problem eliminates a major 

scapegoat Arab governments have used to put off reforms. 

--Increase efforts to sell image of America as a value-laden 

society (not corrupt as portrayed in Hollywood stereotypes) in order 

to improve understanding between Arabs/US, which in turn, will 

improve Arab image of democratic government and improve the 

likelihood of their evolution towards democracy in the region. 

ARAB PERCEPTIONS TOWARD US FOREIGN POLICY: 

WHY PERCEPTIONS MATTER AND WHAT CAN BE 

DONE TO IMPROVE AMERICA’S IMAGE IN THE ARAB 

WORLD, Michael B. Meyer 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Arab perceptions of US foreign policy toward the Arab world, 

particularly since the onset of the second, or Al-Aqsa, intifada, are 

extremely poor. United States foreign policy is viewed by Arab 

populaces and certain members of Arab governments as biased 

against the Arabs and in favor of Israel. Some Arabs are aggravated 

that the US maintains a military footprint in the Arabian (or 

Persian) Gulf, and others criticize the US for what they claim is 

giving only lip service to promoting democracy in the Middle East. 

Two dominant issues that incite Arab opinion against US foreign 

policy are America’s handling of Iraq over the past decade and 

America’s orientation toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. This paper 

seeks to introduce and explain in detail Arab reactions to US 

foreign policy toward the Arab world. 

For this research, the author relied heavily on discussions he 

had during his tour as Air Attaché in Damascus, Syria, on 

conversations he participated in as Political Advisor at US Central 

Air Forces (USCENTAF), on interviews with subject matter experts 
x

in Washington, DC, and on press reporting from the Arab world 

and from some US sources. 

The author believes image matters. Negative perceptions 

harbored by Arabs toward US foreign policy endanger US national 

security interests by threatening moderate Arab governments allied 

with the US and by encouraging extremism against America. While 

Arab popular perceptions toward US foreign policy are unlikely to 

change in the near future, the US must pursue proactive initiatives 

to favorably affect Arab opinion over the long term and, thus, 

protect US interests. To better promote its image in the volatile 

Middle East, America must adopt an enhanced approach to better 

project the political, economic, diplomatic, and informational 

instruments of power. 
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THE ARAB PERCEPTION AND CONSENSUS 

PROBLEMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY IN 

THE MIDDLE EAST 

BRENT J. TALBOT 

INTRODUCTION

Although Islam is not in power in any Arab state, it has 

effectively replaced socialism, secularism, and Arab 

nationalism as the dominant form of opposition to all 

regimes. 

 --Ziad Asali1

Throughout the Muslim world, there is widespread 

bitterness against America, even among pragmatic and 

well-educated businessmen and professionals, who may 

sincerely deplore recent atrocities, condemn them as evil, 

and feel sympathy with the victims, but who still resent 

the way Western powers have behaved in their countries. 

This atmosphere is highly conducive to extremism. 

 --Karen Armstrong2

In the West we have witnessed the democratization and 

modernization of our societies and the accompanying forces of 

secularization throughout the last century, especially during the 

more recent decades. For example, America has witnessed 

courtroom battles further separating the state from religion such as 

the outlawing of prayer in public schools. We have observed the 

growing importance of individual rights, the triumph of a 

woman’s rights over those of her unborn child, and a call for the 

“celebration of diversity.” As the influence of traditional 

Christian religious values has thus declined, America has 

continued to become more modern, prosperous and increasingly 

secular. However, this deterioration of values is viewed by the 

Arab and Islamic world as evidence of western decadence and 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

2

corruption. Their view of our world is overshadowed by this 

important-to-understand, religiously based perception. 

Religion is often an overlooked factor in the study of 

international relations. As a social science discipline, 

international relations was founded upon a tradition of seeking 

rational explanations for the behaviors of mankind in a nationstate setting, which meant that religion became a less-important 

factor with the evolution of modernization and its effects upon 

interstate relations. Yet in the Arab and Islamic world, religion 

has remained a major focal point and is presently the major 

legitimate force opposing the secular, autocratic (and often 

corrupt) governments of the region. Thus, one cannot discuss 

relations between the Arab world and the West without 

understanding the crucial role of religious perceptions. 

It is the purpose of this paper to first, identify common 

perceptions of the West held by Arabs that came about due to 

what I consider a lack of information and misperception. Second, 

I want to elaborate on how the breakdown of consensus among 

Arabs/Islamists foretells a dangerous future for the Middle East. 

The lack of consensus means that there are two major groups 

competing for power—governments and Islamists—and the 

Islamists are further divided into two general categories of 

radicals and revivalists/reformists. The continuation of 

deteriorating conditions could bring about the overthrow of 

governments and victory for the radicals if democratic reforms are 

not enacted. I will also discuss the ramifications of Islamic 

political thought within this setting. Finally, I want to identify US 

policy options that may help to bring about reform in the region in 

an effort to unite Islamic forces behind the revivalists toward a 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 3

common good that satisfies US interests and brings about the best 

possible future for Arabs. 

THE PERCEPTION PROBLEM

The perception problem in the Middle East became a serious 

matter of public interest in the West during the aftermath of alQaida attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 

2001 (hereafter “9/11”) “when cameramen caught crowds 

celebrating in Gaza or people expressing satisfaction in Cairo and 

other cities in the region over the demise of the WTC.”3

 Although 

these scenes likely reflected a minority, they shocked much of the 

world outside the Middle East and particularly in the United 

States. Were they representative of Arab views? Do the Arabs 

hate America, and if so, why? 

The Arab-Israeli dispute is the primary source of Arab 

irritation against the United States. Indeed, a 2001 poll of Saudis, 

Kuwaitis, Emirates, Egyptians, and Lebanese Arabs concluded 

that 60 percent of the Arab public in those states claimed the 

Palestinian conflict as the “single most important issue” of 

personal concern.4

 Moreover, Hilal Khashan’s study of Levant 

Arabs indicated that the Palestinian question concerns the entire 

Arab, and even the Islamic, world.5

 Furthermore, Arab news 

sources put an anti-American slant on the historical passage of the 

UN resolution calling for the partition of Palestine. They portray 

US pressure from President Truman as the major factor; the 

President did indeed pressure Greece and Liberia to vote for 

partition.6

 What is ignored is the equal or greater role of the 

Soviet Union in obtaining passage of the partition vote. Lewis 

describes the significant influence of the Soviets in procuring a 

majority of votes, and that they gave de-jure recognition after the 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

4

vote, whereas the US limited itself to de-facto recognition of the 

Jewish state. Such arm-twisting helped to carry the resolution by 

a mere three votes since a two-thirds majority was required to pass 

in the General Assembly. Moreover, the Soviet Union was the 

first to supply Israel with arms through its Czech lackey; and later, 

other Europeans, especially the French, continued to supply Israel 

with weapons (including help with nuclear weapons development, 

according to Cohen7

). It was not until after 1967 that the US 

supplied weapons to Israel.8

 Despite this, the Arab News claims 

that “America thus doomed the people of Palestine to a life of 

destitution, exile and suffering. It deflected their history from its 

preordained course, robbed them of their patrimony and reduced 

their sense of nationhood to a fragment.”9

 These are powerful 

words of condemnation pointed at the United States instead of 

others who played the larger role in early Israel-Palestine history. 

Arabs believe the United States, as a superpower, imminently 

capable of pressuring the Israelis to grant Palestine statehood and 

to end its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. During the past 

two years, well over 1800 Palestinians have died at the hands of 

the Israeli military and over 600 Jews have fallen victim to suicide 

bombings and other attacks by radical, militant Palestinians.10 

The Saudi Foreign Minister expressed this concern when, during a 

New York Times interview, he appeared “angrily frustrated” about 

President Bush’s failure to do more. Bush’s perceived lack of 

effort “makes a sane man go mad” according to the Minister. The 

Saudis are reportedly bracing for a “furious gathering storm” 

among their populace over the Palestinian plight.11 Moreover, an 

Arab businessman reported that during a telephonic conference 

between United States and Arab business leaders, he expressed 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 5

frustration over American views, stating that “all they want to 

know about is Israel and its security. What about the Palestinians 

and their security? We will not compromise on what is a 

legitimate issue.”12 

Animosity is especially manifest among Palestinians, as 

evidenced by the number identifying themselves as supporters of 

radical Islamic groups. Only 15 percent supported such groups 

during December 2000, but 18 months later (April 2002), over 26 

percent supported groups like Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the AlAqsa Brigades, which are opposed to peace negotiations brokered 

by the United States.13 Furthermore, though the Egyptian 

government signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1978, it now 

“encourages the Egyptian press to be hostile towards Israel.”14 

The Egyptian government is the largest Arab recipient of US aid 

and is thus working directly against US interests with such a 

policy. Lastly, Islamic states gathered in Malaysia in April 2002 

and voted on a resolution which declared that Palestinian 

resistance to Israel could not be viewed as terrorism, including 

suicide bombers who act within Israel’s borders. Some 57 

Muslim states attended the Organization of the Islamic 

Conference (OIC) meeting and a majority voted contrarily to 

United States views in its conduct of the war against terrorism.15 

Hendawi concludes that suicide bombers are now portrayed as the 

“ultimate Palestinian heroes” and “gone is the optimism of the 

mid-1990s when peace seemed a realistic proposition.”16

The Arab media is a leading source of misperceptions among 

the Arab populace. In an al-Jazeera talk-show that aired 10 July 

2001 (before the WTC/Pentagon attacks), bin-Laden was 

portrayed as an Arab hero who stood up to the West. The talk-
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

6

show host declared that “bin-Laden has made the greatest power 

in history shudder at the sound of his name, while the . . . 

heavyweights [other Arab leaders] arouse only America’s pity and 

ridicule.” On the same program, a viewer from Jordan who called 

in stated that “anyone who attacks bin-Laden and accuses him of 

terrorism stands with the enemies of our nation.”17 Al-Jazeera

claims a viewership of over 35 million Arabs and is thus the most 

influential television station in the Middle East, a region where 

most people claim to get their news from television. The New 

York Times reports that Al-Jazeera broadcasts a mix of antiAmericanism and anti-Zionsim, and that its independent 

“reporters see themselves as anti-imperialists . . . convinced that 

the rulers of the Arab world have given in to American might.”18 

Misperceptions also abounded after 9/11 when many in the 

Arab world did not believe bin-Laden was responsible for the 

attacks. For example, a regional Arab opinion poll concluded that 

31 percent of respondents blamed Israel for the attacks on the US 

while only 27 percent blamed bin-Laden.19 Even more shocking, 

a (non-Arab) Pakistani poll reported that 71 percent of 

respondents agreed that 4000 Jewish workers had not gone to 

work in the twin towers the morning of 11 September because 

they had been warned by Mossad (Israeli Secret Service) agents 

who were responsible for the attacks. Though the rumor was 

traced back to Hezbollah news sources in Lebanon, it was carried 

throughout the region on state-run and private news channels as 

well as leading newspapers.20 Interestingly, even the Syrian 

Defense Minister professed this belief at a Damascus meeting 

where he was hosting a delegation of western military officers 

from the British Royal College of Defence Studies.21
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 7

As America went after the Taliban government in 

Afghanistan, Arab news channels reported it as a war against 

Islam, especially after President Bush called the War on Terror a 

“crusade,” invoking memories of Christian Crusaders retaking the 

Holy Land from Arabs during the 11th and 12th centuries.22 

Bush’s “axis of evil” speech strengthened this view because twothirds of the axis (Iran and Iraq) is Muslim, and the terrorist 

organizations he named during the speech were all Muslim.23 

Palestinians were particularly opposed to intervention in 

Afghanistan. A Bir Zeit University poll found 76 percent opposed 

to joining the US-led coalition and an even greater number, 89 

percent, believed the United States was not justified in attacking 

Afghanistan. Additionally, 64 percent felt that the attacks actually 

violated Islamic law.24 As an interesting insight, Kuwaiti liberal 

parliamentarian Ahmad al-Rubei has said that because of media 

reports, “the Arab person is waking up and going to sleep every 

day with the different and exaggerated analyses that are not based 

on realities but rather on wishes and prefabricated positions. 

Every news item in any US newspaper is being treated as a 

complete truth, every US statement is taken as part of the official 

policy, and every analysis, though very imaginative, is taken very 

seriously.”25 

Indeed, US government declarations regarding Iraq and the 

removal of Saddam Hussein from power are especially worrisome 

to the Arab populace. Pressure has mounted since UN Security 

Council Resolution 1441 (8 November 2002) required a return of 

weapons inspectors and threatened Iraq with “serious 

consequences” if they were not allowed to return. The inspectors, 

which had been in place during the aftermath of the Gulf War to 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

8

search out Weapons of Mass Destruction, had subsequently been 

forced out of the country by Saddam in 1998, and none of the 

enforcement mechanisms of earlier Security Council resolutions 

were invoked as punishment. Inspectors are now back due to the 

new resolution; however, the Iraqi regime’s weapons declaration, 

mandated by 1441, has left many questions unanswered. 

Recently, inspectors uncovered undeclared chemical artillery 

rockets as well as documents related to uranium enrichment 

indicating potential violations of the new resolution.26 Thus, the 

pressure to oust Saddam builds as of this writing and war is a 

distinct possibility in the near future. 

Most Arab states are reluctant to support American efforts to 

oust the Iraqi leader without UN approval. Moreover, key 

members of the Security Council, namely veto-wielding members 

France, Russia, and China, along with several non-permanent 

members, are at least initially reluctant to approve the use of force 

against Saddam and prefer continued inspections, especially since 

the items found to date are “short of a ‘smoking gun,’” according 

to these and other potential allies.27 This means that the United 

States has not yet done enough to convince allies of the need for 

war at this time; and interestingly, Bush has declared America 

will fight without UN approval in a reduced coalition if 

necessary.28 This does not bode well for obtaining Arab support 

against Saddam unless more is done to persuade allies to vote for 

a Security Council war resolution. 

Such reluctance is expressed in various ways throughout the 

region. In the United Arab Emirates, typically considered pro-US, 

women in a university political science class have said that “any 

war against Iraq would be a war against them.” Despite their 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 9

disdain for Saddam, they believe “conflict will breed more 

extremism” and are “no longer sure whether America is friend or 

foe.”29 In believing that the war could create more bin-Laden 

types, these students demonstrate a sense of increasing frustration 

among the Gulf populace toward United States policies in the 

region. Even Egypt has been reluctant to grant use of its Cairo 

airport as a transit point for military supplies that may be used 

against Iraq. An aide to President Mubarak stated that Egypt 

cannot allow use of its airfields without UN authorization for war 

due to the “extreme sensitivity” of public opinion.30 Recent polls 

back this finding (69 percent of Egyptians hold an unfavorable 

view of the US) and in West-friendly Jordan, 75 percent have 

expressed an unfavorable view of America.31

Also worrisome is the attitude of typically pro-Arab 

intellectuals and businessmen. Mohammed Ali Musfir, a USeducated professor in Qatar, said “Americans are very blind with 

their power, and they do not read our culture.”32 Furthermore, 

while discussing the impending war against Iraq, Ghassan alSulaiman—a Saudi businessman who has a vacation home in 

California and is also US-educated—said “five years ago I never 

would have imagined the US acting like this, like a bully . . . and 

if people like me feel this way, then you have to imagine how 

other Arabs are feeling.”33 Such attitudes are likely prevalent, and 

if so, the US should reconsider the way it is handling the situation. 

Of greater concern is a recent report of the Washington-based 

Middle East Institute (MEI), whose top leadership visited Egypt 

and Saudi Arabia—key American allies in the region—to assess 

the mood. They report that Arabs in those countries perceive the 

US as being driven by the 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

10

Six C’s—cowboys, colonialism, conspiracy, Coca-Cola, 

cowardice, and clientitus. The client is Israel. The 

cowardice is the perception that we are a schoolyard 

bully. Coca-Cola is the symbol of an alien consumer 

society; conspiracy is based on unrealistic expectations of 

US capabilities; colonialism is premised on a US drive to 

control oil; and cowboys is drawn form a Hollywood 

style perception that the [Bush] Administration shoots 

from the hip. The reality is that when Arabs think of the 

United States they think of Israel.34

MEI ascertains that these perceptions will be “magnified tenfold if 

the United States invades Iraq,” and though neither country is 

expected to abandon the United States, both Egypt and Saudi 

Arabia are concerned about the “long-term consequences of 

America’s standing in the region” and for their positions as 

supporters of the United States. War is likely to fuel “an 

incredible impulse to turn to Islam and fundamentalism and away 

from moderate institutions and democracy,” and Arabs fear that 

Americans fail to recognize this fact. Equally disturbing is news 

from Arab political analysts reporting greater antagonism towards 

the US than at any time in recent memory, and that such 

perceptions are driven by stereotypes which bear little 

resemblance to reality or the intent of US policy.35

In sum, Washington should give heed to Arab opinions in the 

region, especially when moderate and typically pro-western forces 

begin to speak out against planned US actions, and efforts to undo 

the stereotypes and false Hollywood images should also be 

considered. Graham Fuller relates the following synopsis of the 

problem: 

The US tendency to disregard popular Muslim concerns 

as Washington cooperates with oppressive and insecure 

regimes fosters an environment in which acts of terrorism 

become thinkable and, worse, even gratifying in the eyes 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 11

of the majority. The vast bulk of Muslims, of course, will 

go no further than to cheer on those who lash out. But 

such an environment is perhaps the most dangerous of all, 

because it legitimizes and encourages not the tolerant and 

liberalizing [revivalist] Islamists and peacemakers, but 

the negativistic hard-liners and [radical] rejectionists.36

THE CONSENSUS ISSUE

During the same timeframe that the West has become modern 

and more secular, the Arab world has faced two major crises, 

according to Bernard Lewis. The first is “economic and social: 

the difficulties arising from economic deprivation and, still more, 

economic dislocation, and their social consequences [a 

phenomenon widely reported in the press]. The other is political 

and social—the breakdown of consensus, of that generally 

accepted set of rules and principles by which a polity works and 

without which a society cannot function [italics added for 

emphasis].”37 The crises have elevated the legitimacy of Islam as 

the “dominant form of opposition” against ruling regimes, but it is 

a disjointed opposition lacking the consensus required to remove 

and replace governments.38 As evidence of a consensus problem, 

Ziad Asali indicates that neither the “regimes” nor the “Islamist 

opposition . . . represents a majority, since a large middle-ground 

is occupied by politically marginalized or impoverished sectors of 

society,” but they are the “two major internal forces” that shape 

the “political dynamics” of the region.39 

Islamic opposition is also disjointed in two ways: first, it 

focuses its fury upon the West and in particular, the United States 

and not just upon its own governments. Western colonial powers 

were blamed, not only due to their perceived role as harbingers of 

immoral principles, but also because they were viewed as the 

muscle behind the ruling Arab elite, none of which had been 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

12

elected by their peoples and most of which had become corrupt 

and autocratic. Moreover, passing blame to the West was 

encouraged by the Arab regimes through their monopoly on 

education and the media, which were used to vilify the West and 

make it the scapegoat for all problems endemic to the state. 

Governments sought to deflect blame from themselves, and thus 

pointed to the West or the plight of the Palestinians as the real 

cause of suffering and the lack of development in the region. 

Thus, blaming the West for its own ills is a major occupation of 

Arab society, and it contributes to Arab perception of the United 

States. Secondly, the Islamic opposition is again divided into two 

loose groupings which I prefer to label as the extremists or 

radicals and the reformists or revivalists (thus avoiding the 

generic term fundamentalist), which again is evidence of a lack of 

consensus, making it difficult to generate a united front against 

government corruption. 

Islamic Radicals 

Osama bin-Laden is the champion Islamic radical of the 

present. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 (2001), the USS Cole attack 

(2000), and the US embassy bombings in Africa (1998) were all 

attributed to bin-Laden’s al-Qaida terrorists who are attempting to 

remove US influence from the Middle East so that they might 

then conquer the corrupt regimes of the region and replace them 

with Islamic government.40 According to a RAND study, their 

rationale for wanting to replace Arab leaders ties back to rejection 

by those very regimes that had supported them during their time 

as Mujahedeen warriors in Afghanistan. After beating the 

Soviets, the core al-Qaida veterans expected to be welcomed 

home as heroes; but instead, Middle Eastern governments became 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 13

suspicious of their religious fervor. The arrival of American 

troops to fight the Gulf War and the continued repression of Islam 

by the American-backed regimes provided ample grounds for 

their desire to renew their fight against a new enemy: the US.41 

Kepel adds that they had been “completely divorced from the 

social realities of the world around them, locked as they were into 

a sectarian religious logic.” Moreover, their efforts in the early 

nineties to “export jihad” into Bosnia, Algeria, and Egypt were 

thwarted with western assistance; western aid which came to them 

during the Mujahedeen era had evaporated. Though they had 

beaten a Soviet “evil empire,” they were now viewed as “terrorists 

and fanatic criminals” themselves.42 Even among Middle 

Easterners, according to a Wall Street Journal source, “few people 

endorse bin Laden’s goals or his methods;” still, this Arab also 

believes that “bin Laden constitutes the only so far effective 

acknowledgement of discontent. The United States misses the 

boat because it is identified with support of Israel and discredited 

regimes.”43 In other words, many in the Muslim world view binLaden as a Robin Hood of sorts, brave enough to stand up to the 

United States and wage war against the West in his desire to 

restore the Islamic Caliphate and rid the Muslim world of western 

and particularly American influence. 

Islamic Revivalists (Reformists) 

So, what about the revivalists? Interestingly, early 20th

century Islamic reformist movements sought to mix western and 

Islamic thinking to create Islamic democracies. Leading Islamic 

scholars of the era believed there was a “natural affinity of Islam 

with science and reason,” which justified the mixing of secular 

and Islamic traditions, and that “reason [w]as given by God to 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

14

protect humankind from either excess or adulteration of 

religion.”44 Though early experiments for reform went astray, 

Many Muslim scholars among the intelligentsia continue to call 

for moderation and government reform. Unfortunately, they are 

most often ignored by the media or jailed by the government, and 

their small numbers and lack of recognition have left them with 

little influence.45 

As stated earlier, the lack of consensus results from a number 

of fault lines in the Arab world: Arab governments versus 

society, Islamic radicals versus revivalists, “Arab street” tensions 

split between the dislike of their own governments and disdain for 

the West. One must also mention the artificial borders that 

resulted from colonialism and split the Arab nation into a number 

of states creating further tensions between governments. With so 

many fault lines, it was easy for the West to destabilize the 

Arab/Islamic nation during the colonial period. I will try to 

address these fault lines by reviewing the historical pattern of 

Islamic government, how it was modified by western influence, 

and how the introduction of democratic principles led to revivalist 

thought, which has the potential of providing an alternative future 

for the region. 

Islamic Government in Theory 

Ibn Khaldun, a fourteenth century Arab philosopher, laid the 

foundation of Arab political thought with his description and 

theory of the rise and fall of states. Interestingly, he began his 

theory by highlighting the inherent evil nature of man and his 

need for a ruler to keep himself under control. Khaldun notes: 

“people need someone to exercise a restraining influence and keep 

them apart, for aggressiveness and injustice are in the animal 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 15

nature of man.”46 Thus, a ruler is needed, someone who in 

Khaldun’s words has “royal authority . . . the person who 

exercises a restraining influence, therefore, must be one of 

themselves. He must dominate them and have power and 

authority over them, so that no one of them will be able to attack 

another. This is the meaning of royal authority.”47 

Khaldun’s theory divides his world into two groups: the 

sedentary, city dwellers who live more prosperous lives and 

entrust the defense of their lives and property to a royal authority; 

and the Bedouin, who depend on the land and their animals for 

survival and are more independent and take care of their own 

needs. Because the Bedouin live in the desert and rule 

themselves, they need a special type of restraint in order to 

maintain a peaceful society. Khaldun calls this “group feeling”—

asabiya in Arabic. He also states that only blood ties can produce 

this feeling, ties of kinship and tribalism. Due to the earlier 

mentioned natural injustice of man, asabiya is required to 

overcome aggression. The leaders among the Bedouin are greatly 

honored, and this respect for them generates obedience and order 

among the group. Because this self-restraint is inherent among 

the Bedouin, it makes them a more religious and worthy society 

than the sedentary who are coerced to obey their governors. 

Khaldun then relates the cycle behind his theory. As the Bedouin 

rise in strength and conquer sedentary societies, they eventually 

become sedentary themselves because of their removal from the 

harsh Bedouin lifestyle and the loss of asabiya brought about by 

the mixing of blood lines. Eventually, their generation falls and is 

conquered by another outside, more noble and worthy Bedouin 

force. And so repeats this cycle of Arab history.48
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

16

Khaldun’s theory provides interesting insight into the nature 

of Middle Eastern governments. As is easily observed, most tend 

to be authoritarian. Even in states like modern Egypt which has 

the semblance of democracy, the authority of Mubarak prevails.49 

In the early stages of governmental development Khaldun 

recorded the importance of royal authority in civilized developed 

regions. These authorities were totalitarian in nature. Among the 

Bedouin tribes outside the developed regions, rulers led without 

the need for a popular vote. As the Bedouin conquered the more 

civilized societies, they ruled in the same way a tribal leader 

would rule: with domination. This tradition influences the nature 

of authoritarian governments in the Middle East today. 

Additionally, one must consider why the royal authority was 

overthrown in Khaldun’s theory. He basically states that the new 

Bedouin conquerors were “more worthy.” Because of their closer 

ties to asabiya, they were closer to their culture and religion, and 

in that respect deserved to be followed. They deserved to be the 

new rulers replacing those corrupted by the luxuries of sedentary 

life. 

Such a cycle of renewal has been followed throughout Middle 

Eastern history. According to Dekmejian, at least eight cycles of 

declines followed by Islamist responses can be documented since 

the Umayyad decline in the eighth century.50 Extremists in the 

Middle East today justify their actions through this constant need 

for self renewal. Most existing governments are corrupt and are 

not fulfilling the peoples’ needs, so the “more worthy” extremists 

have a right, like the Bedouin of old, to attempt to overthrow 

them. The reformers, revivalists, see this same need, but seek 

reform in a more peaceful way. There are also theoretical 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 17

differences that separate the ideologies of the extremists from the 

revivalists. 

In early Islam, Hiro suggests the Caliphate suppressed 

independent thinking because it would lead to opposition which 

would in-turn lead to chaos. Order needed to be maintained at all 

costs.51 This contributed to the development of authoritarianism 

and slowed the technological advancement of the Arab/Turkish/ 

Persian world which had competed with and maintained an edge 

over Christian Europe until 1683, when the Ottomans failed to 

capture Vienna.52 This turning point was followed by the rise of 

European colonial empires, including the loss of the Balkans and 

Tartarstan in the late eighteenth century and an even bitterer blow 

in 1798 when Napoleon conquered Egypt.53

For the Ottomans, these losses drove them to the Tanzimat 

reforms of the nineteenth century which introduced western legal 

codes, the founding of military schools, creation of a Constitution 

and parliament, and other western style reforms aimed at helping 

them compete with the West. At the same time, they were 

seeking the secularization of Muslim society.54 Still, the Ottoman 

Empire continued to decline and experience the loss of more and 

more territory to the West. Finally, Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-

1909) decided it was time to change direction. In 1878 he 

suspended the constitution, dissolved the parliament, and worked 

to undo earlier secular reforms. “He repudiated Islamic 

modernism and turned to traditional Islamic values and 

thought.”55 Although his reforms failed to save the empire, they 

lengthened the path toward modern Islamic reform, a path which 

had already been started by the Salifiyah movement beginning in 

the seventeenth century. 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

18

Even before the Tanzimat reforms, Arabs were dissatisfied 

with Turkish rule. The Salifiyah movement was dedicated to the 

“puritanical reform” of Islam. It arose in various regions from the 

seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries: the Wahabbi 

movement in the Arabian Peninsula, the Shawkani movement of 

Yemen, the Sanusi movement in Libya, and the Mahdi movement 

in the Sudan.56 Each movement became the ideological basis for 

religious reform and a challenge to Ottoman power. 

Interestingly, some of the leading theoreticians of these early 

movements were not extremist in their views, but were more 

revivalist in nature. Rifa’a al-Tahtawi encouraged the adoption of 

European scientific ideas. He viewed modern scientific thought 

as compatible with Islam, and the lack of Islamic progress in this 

realm contributed to its weakness vis-à-vis the West.57 AlTahtawi also developed a theory of politics. He saw a need for 

legislative, judicial and executive functions of government, but 

believed they must be “restrained by higher laws. The ‘ruled’ 

must be allowed to acquire freedom and public benefits, and their 

civil rights should be upheld. The ruler should consult both the 

ulama and scientific specialists in the course of governing. 

Furthermore, he should be influenced by public opinion.”58 AlTahtawi did see a danger, however, and “warned that, in France, 

people believed that national welfare and human progress could 

take the place of religion.”59 Thus, it was still important to 

maintain an emphasis on morality and faith. 

Jamal al-Din al-Afghani’s ideas were similar to those of alTahtawi. He noted too that science and the Quran were not in 

disagreement. He also had political views and played a 

fundamental role in formulating the Islamic response to domestic 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 19

development and western imperialism. Al-Afghani blamed the 

state of Islamic society on the corruption of Islamic leaders who 

had “allowed superstition and ignorance to replace reason and 

enlightenment.”60 He also placed emphasis on the need for 

morality and faith. He stated that “whenever the cause for 

progress weakens, the result is backwardness and decadence, and 

whenever the reason for the fall is eliminated, the result is 

progress.” 61 Al-Afghani even went so far as to assert that the 

Europeans emerged from backwardness with the religious 

reformation of Martin Luther.62 It is therefore logical that a 

religious reformation of Islam would correct the misfortunes of 

the past and bring about a return of Islamic glory. It is interesting 

to note that, according to Hiro, al-Afghani proposed a 

parliamentary system of government which he saw as being in 

line with Islamic precepts.63 

Al-Afghani was later involved in condemning the Shah of 

Iran for giving a tobacco concession to the British. One of alAfghani’s followers, Imam Mirza Hassan Shirazi, decreed that the 

faithful should stop smoking until the Shah had withdrawn the 

tobacco concession. This was the first open challenge to an 

authoritarian regime in the Middle East, and public opinion 

actually led to the Shah’s withdrawal of the concession. In other 

words, the weight of the majority overruled the monarch. The 

Shah’s authority was no longer divine. 

Twentieth century philosophers built upon the ideas of the 

earlier theorists, but evolved primarily into two schools of 

thought. Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood 

(1928) in Egypt, initiated the first school which called for more 

radical measures to bring about a return of Islamic government. 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

20

He saw only two choices for the Arab world: to follow the path of 

the West and succumb to its lifestyle and system, or to choose the 

path of Islam, which meant a return to Islamic principles, 

civilization and culture, rule by a Caliph, who by definition is 

both a political and religious leader, and unification of the Arab 

peoples. Abd al-Qadir Awdah, a leading theoretician of the 

Brotherhood, clarified the arguments of al-Banna. He stated that 

Islam is not just a religion but a system and a state. Every order in 

the Quran and Sunnah requires Islamic rule and an Islamic state. 

“Religion cannot exist without the state, nor can the state be 

sound without religion.”64 Still, in a more moderate tone, he also 

stated that the Caliph should be chosen by the community and 

may only rule so long as he does what God commands. If he 

deviates, then the community may depose him and instate another. 

Thus, Islamic government is not a “dictatorship, because it is 

limited by the Quran as a constitution.”65

Others (al-Mubarak, an-Nubhani) also supported the radical 

argument. In many instances the Hadith calls for Islamic rule, and 

the Prophet Muhammad himself established an Islamic state. 

Without a Caliph today, Islam is in a state of backwardness and 

degradation, remote from the teachings of Islam according to the 

radicals. All Muslims are sinners until they establish the Islamic 

state and unite all of (or at least Arab) Islam. Interestingly, this 

state should be established by militant means, just as the Prophet 

first established it, in order for its establishment to come to pass, 

according to an-Nubhani. Khaldun’s theory outlining the 

necessity for renewal could be used as justification for the use of 

force. After all, the Bedouin were “more worthy” and deserved to 

conquer the sedentary. Perhaps an-Nubhani saw himself as a 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 21

modern Bedouin with the more worthy cause. This school of 

thought provides the rationale for bin-Laden’s actions: living a 

simple lifestyle in Afhgan caves instead of using his wealth to live 

comfortably in an effort to claim asabiya and appeal to the 

modern Arab masses. Still, even an-Nubhani’s thinking allows 

for an election of a council of ministers and admits the Caliph is 

not meant to be a dictator or saint.66 

Jadaane closes with a revivalist argument that more closely 

resembles the earlier philosophies of al-Afghani and al-Tahtawi, 

as outlined by Professor Abd al-Hamid Mutawalli (Egypt, 1977). 

Islam is not a state, but contains a general basis for a ruling 

system in the state. The Quran does not outline an actual form of 

government, and the Caliphate is not a principle of government; it 

is merely one form that is not considered possible in our time. 

The Quran does, however, give general guidelines for a 

government system. Muhammad Ahmad Khalafallah and 

Muhammad Amarah (1973) agree with Mutawalli. “Questions of 

government are left by God’s authority to man and his 

commitment to public good.”67 The state is national in nature and 

should be committed to Sharia, but legislation in the state is left to 

the community of men. There needs to be a separation of 

religious and civil life, and the community should choose its head 

of state according to its own circumstances. 

This idea leads away from Arab nationalism and supports 

more democratic ideals. Elections are prescribed as the best way 

to ensure stability. The main emphasis behind this school of 

thought is that the Quran laid out guidelines for a government 

system and God delegated man to work out the details. This 

alternative then, according to Jadaane, should be more acceptable 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

22

to Muslims because it avoids the “extremes of temporal 

radicalism,” as proposed in the first school calling for a return to a 

Caliph-led state, and it “saves Islam from slipping into the 

labyrinth of adventurous experiments.”68 He concludes with 

criticism directed towards the radicals: the “shortcut preferred by 

our ideal desires may not be the best way to reach ‘the cursed 

tree’ and climb it.”69 Such revivalist reforms based upon Islam 

have greater promise of ensuring stability and improving 

conditions in the Middle East. They allow for the participation of 

the community in the governmental decisionmaking process, and 

this is the best way to alleviate the frustrations of the masses. 

Let us now turn our discussion to western colonialism and 

how it interfered with traditional Islamic development and 

alienated the Arabs against the West. This alienation has made it 

more difficult for western-style democracy to flourish in the 

region, but still, the West influenced the various sub-regions and 

contributed to the development of states currently existing on the 

Middle Eastern map. Also, by introducing the concept of 

democracy, many Islamic reformers have found parallels in 

Islamic concepts from the Quran mentioned in the next section of 

this paper. 

Colonialism in the Middle East and the Introduction to 

Democracy 

Westernization in the Middle East began during the time of 

the earlier mentioned Tanzimat reforms in the nineteenth century 

which coincided with the subjugation of regions lost by the 

Ottomans. Over time, most of North Africa was conquered by the 

French. The Italians conquered Libya after a twenty-year effort in 

the early twentieth century. The British ended up in control of 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 23

Egypt in 1880, and after World War I and the final collapse of 

Ottoman Turkey, they split control over the North Arabian 

Peninsula and the adjoining Levant with the French. With the 

Russians, the British divided spheres of influence in Iran as well. 

Coastal regions, Yemen and Oman, as well as the small Gulf 

Sheikdoms also fell under British influence. Only the Central 

Arabian Peninsula remained independent where the state of Saudi 

Arabia emerged. 

Western domination continued in most of the Middle East 

until well after the Second World War. Colonial policy generally 

skewed development within the region. Owen asserts that the 

West worked to “divide and rule.” For example, the French 

created an Alawi mini-state in Syria and carved out Lebanon as a 

separate Maronite state. Furthermore, trade was regulated to the 

benefit of the colonizing state, and contracts and concessions went 

to foreign colonials rather than Arab nationals. No central banks 

were established, and tariffs were forbidden.70 Yet, colonization 

accelerated social change in the region. Job creation moved 

people from old village communities to the cities and introduced 

them to political activity.71 Arab national leaders became 

important political actors as states became more centralized. At 

first, the king or leader could be coerced to support the colonial 

position and provide continuity and a method of dismissing 

popularly elected governments trying to achieve greater autonomy 

through nationalist movements. Over time, however, these same 

leaders could also become aware of their growing power and lead 

the nationalist movements themselves. Such was the case of King 

Hussein of Jordan. Others were overthrown because of their close 

alliance with the colonists and did not survive long after 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

24

independence, as in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Iraq.72 

Independence came gradually to the region, but economic and 

political dependence continued for some time (and still exists in 

some regions). 

In the 1950s Nasser led a revolt in Egypt which eventually 

turned into a Pan-Arab movement with a goal to reunify the lost 

Arab supra-state. His socialist ideologies promised improvement 

in providing the basic necessities of life, eradication of the 

injustices of imperialism, and establishing a “sound democratic 

society.”73 Interestingly, Nasser’s movement was not Islamist in 

nature (nor was it a democracy) and in fact sought a secular 

socialist path, considering Islam only as a part of Egypt’s heritage. 

Yet, his military success in obtaining control of the Suez Canal 

was perceived as an Arab victory over western colonialism. He 

was revered throughout the Arab world for his ideals even though 

Islam was not central to his ideology. Other socialist regimes also 

came to power during this period—the Baath in Syria and Iraq, 

the FLN in Algeria—and competing with Nasser, they also sought 

an Arab union. Within Egypt, however, the Muslim Brotherhood 

eventually rose up against Nasser because of his secularism. The 

Brotherhood’s dissent led to increased government control over 

mosques, religious schools, and public utilities. As the 

government became more and more centralized, it was viewed as 

more and more responsible for the problems of society, and 

Islamic organizations like the Brotherhood gained popular 

support. The same thing occurred in other secular states, and 

populations viewed their leaders as replacements to the western 

colonial powers who had borrowed and adopted western ways.74 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 25

This culminated in the growth of Islamist movements in the 1970s 

and 80s which continues to this day. 

What is most interesting about the end of colonialism is that 

nearly all the regimes that arose to replace western masters turned 

out to be authoritarian. Just as Khaldun’s theory predicted, a new 

“royal authority” would arise to replace the corruption of the 

turned-sedentary predecessor. Unfortunately, most of the 

replacement royal authorities—current Middle Eastern rulers—are 

also corrupt. Evidence of this is revealed in Khashan’s survey 

which also provides government satisfaction ratings. Well over 

90 percent of the Levant Arabs are either “unhappy” or “very 

unhappy” with their governments. Moreover, when asked 

whether “the ruling elite . . . work for the best interest[s] of the 

people,” 62 percent “strongly disagree” and a further 26 percent 

“disagree,” which means a total of 88 percent of respondents 

don’t really trust their governments. Sixty-eight percent call for 

government reform, and 23 percent expressed a desire to actually 

overthrow their governments.75 Esposito maintains that the 

autocratic governments are less interested in establishing political 

legitimacy than in perpetuating authoritarian rule.76 Lacking 

legitimacy, they have been challenged by the only legitimate force 

left in Muslim society: Islam. This is why there is so much 

power behind the Islamist movements. This power led to the 

Iranian revolution in 1979, but it was taken over by extremist 

clerics who have also turned out to be authoritarian, repressive 

rulers. Unfortunately, many Islamists believe their current rulers 

use western-style governments to suppress them and continue to 

fail to provide for their needs. In reality, it is a loyal police force 

and military that keeps the so called “western front” intact. But 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

26

the revivalists know better. They understand that the Middle 

Eastern regimes are neither democratic nor western in nature, but 

have simply used outdated bureaucratic authoritarian forms of 

government which have since been abandoned in the West. It is 

the revivalist philosophy which offers the most hope for reform in 

the name of Islam. 

The Quran contains the concepts of shura (consultation), ijma 

(consensus), and Maslah (public interest).77 A traditional Arab 

tribal leader was not customarily given license to rule arbitrarily; 

he would normally consult with the majlis (tribal council). In 

theory, this meant the ruler was held accountable by the tribal 

council, and in fact, selection of a new tribal leader was subject to 

this council’s approval. His position was not necessarily 

hereditary. This suggests that a democratic-like system of 

restraint was in place among the Bedouin because the tribal leader 

was to use consultation of the majlis to reach consensus in the 

name of the public good.78 

It must be noted that democracy does not necessarily mean 

the “accountability of elected officials by means of regular 

elections where all citizens can vote. This [typical western form] 

can be termed ‘electoralism.’”79 A conference held at the US 

Institute of Peace considered the topic of Democracy and Islam, 

and noted that electoralism requires a highly developed and 

educated society and a political culture that supports tolerance and 

compromise. These values may not exist throughout the Middle 

East and thus make electoral, western-style democracy very 

difficult to achieve. Yet, there is a demand for greater 

participation in politics with the rising discontent attributed to 

poor socioeconomic performance, and as noted above, this 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 27

demand is justified in the precepts of the Quran. Perhaps public 

dissatisfaction will lead to “hybrid regimes” in the Middle East, 

which conferees defined as a mixture of democratic institutions 

and practices with some persisting patterns of authoritarianism.80

A modern example of a hybrid regime is Jordan. The late 

King Hussein established a policy of “inclusion.”81 This meant 

that the Islamic movement was brought in and allowed to 

participate in the government rather than being repressed as it has 

been elsewhere. This inclusion forced the King to walk a fine line 

during the Gulf War because of popular support for Saddam 

Hussein and his stand against the West, even though the King 

likely preferred to support the coalition against Iraq. By not 

intervening nor dissolving parliament during this crisis, he added 

a great amount of credibility to his regime. In fact, during the 

1993 elections the Islamists lost a share of the seats they had 

originally gained in the first elections of a few years earlier. Still, 

Ambassador Odeh of Jordan claims that the Islamists play an 

important opposition role in the government and that their 

concerns have been “effectively channeled to a democratic 

political institution.”82 He further states 

In the Arab world, it’s wrong to judge democracy by 

western criteria. Comparing western democracy with 

Islamic democracy is like comparing silver with gold. In 

the Arab world, I believe, a synthetic version of 

democracy will emerge, a democracy that fits in our 

culture.83

More recently, Bahrain has also initiated democratic reforms 

along the lines of a hybrid regime, still under the monarch who 

has now declared himself a King. He has recently released 

political prisoners and held parliamentary elections in which he 

allowed men and women, Shia and Sunni to vote. The new King 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

28

has even emptied the prisons of political detainees and meets 

regularly with a leading Shia cleric and major opposition figure 

who had been jailed by his father.84

It is interesting to note that other regimes that have prevented 

democratic reform, such as Algeria, have a lot more problems 

than Jordan or Bahrain. In Algeria, Islamists sought reform 

through the ballot box but were stopped by the military, fearing an 

authoritarian Islamist takeover. The Islamic Salvation Front 

(FIS) had arisen in the 1980s in opposition to the single party 

government organization, FLN. It organized using Islamic 

institutions, schools, and mosques, and during the 1991 elections, 

when finally allowed to run nationally, FIS won 47 percent of the 

vote. Second round runoff elections scheduled for January 1992 

were canceled by the military. Robin Wright asserts that FIS was 

not to be feared. Even though the party would have dominated 

the parliament, the president would have had two years with veto 

power to counter any attempts to radically change the 

constitution. This would have allowed ample time to develop 

compromise positions between the opposing groups.85 It is also 

interesting to note that in the first local elections held in 1990, FIS 

had a million more votes than in the 1991 parliamentary 

elections.86 Perhaps they, like the Brotherhood in Jordan, would 

have lost some of their support, once in power, and ceased to be 

such a threat to the FLN. It is too bad that we will never know 

what the outcome might have been. Instead, civil war erupted 

between the Islamists and the government, and now Islam is seen 

as the most cohesive and pro-democratic force in Algeria.87 

To sum up, western colonization alienated the Middle East 

against the West and its governmental forms, but most of this 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 29

alienation is due to the misuse of those forms by current, 

illegitimate regimes. The call for reform is not so much alienation 

against the West as it is alienation against the authoritarian 

regimes currently in power in most Middle Eastern states. Many 

of these governments profess democracy, but run unopposed in 

their elections under a system of bureaucratic authoritarianism. In 

Algeria, this is best highlighted by the ruling regime that allowed 

democratic reform, but then balked when it saw results requiring 

it to share power with the Islamic opposition. Quranic 

interpretation shows that democratic principles and Islam are 

compatible. Modern revivalists realizing this will call for 

democratic reforms to rescue their societies from corruption. 

Such corruption has arisen from sedentary regimes that have 

maintained power far too long. 

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 

The overall aim of US policy should focus upon the creation 

of peaceful transition opportunities to move Arab governments 

toward Islamic revivalist reforms. All other foreign policy goals 

should support this effort. Revivalists offer the best means of 

bringing legitimacy to government, of creating greater consensus, 

and it is they who are most likely to overcome past perceived 

injustices and work with the West towards democratic and 

economic reform. To get there, I feel that the US must first turn 

up the pressure on corrupt Arab regimes in an effort to nudge 

them towards inclusion. Such efforts must remain consistent with 

US values, and governments showing such tendencies should be 

rewarded. Examples include Jordan and Bahrain as described 

herein, as well as Kuwait, Morocco, and Qatar. This push will 

also go a long way toward eradicating the “hypocrite factor” that 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

30

has plagued the US due to its past support of corrupt, 

authoritarian, anti-democratic regimes. When Islamists see that 

the US no longer accepts corrupt governments at face value, they 

will more likely be accepting of US engagement in the region.88 

Interestingly, much of the current debate regarding Iraq is 

focused on what type of post-war government will be established 

to replace Saddam. Fouad Ajami has said that “A new war 

[against Iraq] should come with the promise that the United States 

is now on the side of reform. . . . America has not known or 

trusted the middle classes and the professionals in these lands. 

Rather, it has settled for relationships of convenience with the 

autocracies in the saddle.”89 Iraq then, could serve as the catalyst 

for governmental reform in the Middle East. A new democratic 

government in Iraq will send a message to others in the region that 

the US is withdrawing its support from those that refuse to 

restructure their governments. 

Second, going hand-in-hand with friendly pressure towards 

revivalist-style democratization is encouragement for economic 

reform. In a region prone to high birth rates and young 

populations, the need for job creation is extreme, and the lack of 

economic stratification has led to social problems (urban 

migration; unemployment; unequal distribution of food, land, 

capital, etc.) and severely deteriorating economic conditions. 

Economic incentives offered by the US and other western states 

should encourage economic and simultaneous democratic reform. 

Third, the US must increase pressure on the Palestinians and 

the Israelis to move the Peace Process forward. This is a most 

essential element due to its role as the biggest problem area vis-àvis perceptions of the US. Moreover, impending changes in Iraq 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 31

could provide a catalyst for reform among the Palestinians. After 

all, Saddam’s defeat in the 1991 Gulf War cleared the way for the 

Madrid Conference and the eventual Oslo Peace Process. So the 

overthrow of Saddam this time around could also provide such an 

impetus. Doran suggests that the road to peace in Palestine may 

actually run through a Baghdad administration that cooperates 

with the US.90 More importantly, solving the Palestinian-Israeli 

dispute would eliminate a major scapegoat Arab governments 

have long used to justify the lack of democratic and economic 

reforms. In addition, among Arabs, the Palestinians are the most 

educated, contain the best semblance of a middle class, and are 

thus the most ripe for democratic reform. Pressuring the 

Palestinian authority towards reform will not only create avenues 

for peace with Israel, but allow them to serve as an example of 

democratic/economic success to other Arabs. 

Finally, the US must work in other ways to sell the image of 

America as a value-laden society that is not corrupt as portrayed 

in Hollywood stereotypes. By engaging the Islamic religious 

authorities to condemn terror and suicide as violations of Islam—

convincing them of the need to “delegitimize the proposition that 

violence and conspiracy are to be used against any ‘enemy’ of 

Islam,”91—and by focusing an education campaign on values, 

Muslims might be convinced that the West (particularly the 

United States) is closer-aligned to their religious values than is 

realized on the “Arab street.” Discourse is particularly important 

to this endeavor, which is “about promoting a respectful, popular 

dialogue toward a more cooperative future. Traditional foreign 

policy approaches must now be supplemented by a global 

engagement that reflects the revolutionary changes of the 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

32

information revolution.”92 Increasing Arab awareness of religious 

as well as other human-rights oriented western values could help 

to improve understanding between Arabs and the United States. 

We need to convince them that we still deserve the label “people 

of the book.”93 The short-lived Pentagon “Office of Strategic 

Influence” was set up for such a mission vis-à-vis the Middle 

East,94 and we need to undertake such an effort regardless of the 

fate of that office. At the same time, the US must also engage the 

international community to ensure its support in dealing with this 

critical region. The case of Iraq is of particular concern, because 

removing Saddam unilaterally, or with only limited international 

support, will make it much more difficult to cooperatively rebuild 

the government in Baghdad and “win the peace.” Dialogue is 

crucial to this endeavor, and as mentioned before, Iraq could serve 

as a catalyst for reform throughout the entire region. 

Conclusion 

In the West, secularization has long preceded political reform. 

In the Middle East, secular reform led to socialist movements and 

authoritarian regimes that are now discredited and labeled corrupt 

western forms. A return to Islam is sought as a way to end 

government corruption. This return can take two paths: one is 

radical violence that most likely will simply replace one form of 

authoritarian corruption with another, as occurred in Iran; or the 

other is a revivalist path, one that allows a compromise between 

current regimes and Islamic movements with a more 

democratically-oriented solution. Islam is the only legitimate 

force capable of initiating the needed reform. But, it must come 

from democratic principles, reformist philosophy, and not from 

radicals who will only add to the turmoil. Peaceful transitions to 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 33

democracy like that now occurring in Jordan and Bahrain are 

much more likely to bring long term stability to the region than 

repression and revolution such as in the Iranian or Algerian cases. 

There is hope for the future, but that hope lies in the ability of 

Middle Eastern governments to share power with Islamic 

revivalist movements and not simply suppress them in order to 

continue the royal authority of a corrupt, sedentary regime, simply 

buying time until eventual overthrow, only to repeat Khaldun’s 

cycle and lead nowhere. In the West we can increase that hope by 

supporting democratic movements and not prejudging the 

outcome of perceived Islamic threats, and by discontinuing our 

support of corrupt, authoritarian regimes that no longer have the 

support of their people. In this way, we might be able to help the 

movements along and mediate between the revivalists and the 

regimes in their struggle to allocate power and develop Islamic 

versions of democracy. 

NOTES 

 

1

 Dr Ziad Asali (President of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 

Committee), “Arab-American Perceptions of US Policy toward the 

Middle East, Middle East Policy IX (June 2002): 34. 

2

 Karen Armstrong, “Ghosts of Our Past,” Modern Maturity (January/ 

February 2002): 45. 

3

 Nejla Sammakia, “The Role of the Media After September 11,” 

Paper presented at the International Meeting on Global Trends and 

Human Rights, Geneva, 10-12 January 2002, 6. 

4

 Joseph Farah, “Just What is Arab PR?” Jerusalem Post, 10 August 

2001, 14. 

5

 Khashan’s 1999 survey included Syrians, Lebanese, Jordanians, and 

Palestinians. Forty-five percent of those surveyed claimed the 

Palestinian question concerned the “Arab world” and 40 percent also 

claimed it as an “Islamic world” concern. See Hilal Khashan, “Arab 

Attitudes Toward Israel and Peace,” Policy Focus #40 (Washington, 

DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), 4,19. 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

34

 

6

 Fawaz Turki, “Follies of American Exceptionalism,” Arab News. 

Online at www.arabnews.com. 

7

 Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Colombia 

University Press, 1998), 49-66. 

8

 Bernard Lewis, “The Revolt of Islam,” The New Yorker (November 

2001). Online at www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/ 

011119fa_FACT2. Accessed on 3 October 2002. 

9

 Turki. 

10 Death stats reported by Hamza Hendawi, “Ordinary Arabs Join 

Ranks of Militants as their Governments Pursue Path of 

Negotiations,” Associated Press Cairo, 28 September 2002. 

11 As reported by Tony Blankley, “Arabian Storm Rising,” 

Washington Times, 14 November 2001, 19. 

12 James Dorsey, “US Publicity Efforts in Terror War Fall on Deaf 

Ears in Muslim Nations,” Wall Street Journal, 7 November 2001. 

13 Kathy Kiely, “Extremist Voices Drown Out All Others in 

Mideast,” USA Today, 5 April 2002, 1. 

14 “Once We Started Fighting Israel We Lost Democracy,” MEMRI 

#104, 20 June 2000. Online at http://memri.org. Accessed on 8 

October 2002. 

15 “Death Wish,” Washington Post, 4 April 2002, 16. 

16 Hendawi. 

17 “Terror in America Retrospective: A bin-Laden Special on AlJazeera Two Months Before September 11,” MEMRI #319, 21 

December 2001. Online at http://memri.org. Accessed on 8 October 

2002. 

18 Fouad Ajami, “What the Muslim World is Watching,” New York 

Times Magazine, 18 November 2001. 

19 Published in An Nahar, a Lebanese newspaper. See Ariel 

O’Sullivan, “Syrian Defense Minister Blames WTC Attacks on 

Israel,” Jerusalem Post, 19 October 2001, 1A. 

20 Among Pakistani respondents, 13 percent considered the story a 

rumor and another 16 percent thought it was baseless. Michael 

Dobbs, “Myths Over Attacks on US Swirl Through Islamic World,” 

Washington Post, 12 October 2001, A22. 

21 O’Sullivan, 1A. 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 35

 

22 Sammakia, 7. 

23 Riad Abdelkarim, “PR Alone won’t win Arab, Muslim Hearts and 

Minds,” Arab News, 6 February 2002. Online at 

www.arabnews.com. Accessed on 24 April 2002. 

24 Lamia Lahoud, “Palestinians Demonstrate Against US Attacks,” 

Jerusalem Post, 14 October 2002, 3. 

25 Ahmad al-Rubei, writer for Asharq al-Awsat, a London daily 

Arabic language newspaper, 14 January 2003. Reprinted in GulfWire 

E-Newsletters, 23 January 2003. 

26 Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus, “US Hastens to Assess Pair of 

Iraq Findings,” Washington Post, 17 January 2003, 1. 

27 See Julia Preston, “Short of a ‘Smoking Gun,” Allies Ask Why the 

Rush?” New York Times, 22 January 2003; and Bill Nichols, “Bush 

Lacks Votes in UN, Diplomats Say,” USA Today, 23 January 2003, 

4. 

28 Michael R. Gordon, “Fighting Solo if Necessary,” New York 

Times, 23 January 2003, 1. President Bush reaffirmed this view 

during his State of the Union Address, stating that “the course of this 

nation does not depend on the decisions of others.” Still, he also 

mentioned that the Secretary of State is scheduled to meet with UN 

Security Council officials to share intelligence on Iraq’s weapons 

programs, a move that is hoped to sway allies. President quoted in 

Michael R. Gordon, “Bush Says Hussein is Giving Aid to Terror,” 

New York Times, 29 January 2003, 1. See also Glenn Kessler and 

Karen DeYoung, “Powell to Brief UN Panel on Weapons Data,” 

Washington Post, 29 January 2003, 1. 

29 Jane Perlez, “In Search for Democracy, US is Rejected as a 

Guide,” New York Times, 28 September 2002. 

30 Jane Perlez, “Arab Leaders Glumly Brace for Inevitable War,” 

New York Times, 8 October 2002. 

31 December 2003 survey by the Pew Research Center reported in 

Evan Osnos, “Moderate Arabs Shudder, Denounce US as Gulf 

Bully,” Chicago Tribune, 22 January 2003. 

32 Quoted in Osnos. 

33 Qouted in Osnos. 

34 Visit took place during December 2002. See Edward S. Walker, 

“Gloomy Mood in Egypt and Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Institute 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

36

 

Perspective, 22 January 2003.Reprinted by Gulfwire E-Newsletters, 

23 January 2003, 1. 

35 Ibid, 1-2. 

36 Graham E. Fuller, “The Future of Political Islam,” Foreign Affairs

81 (March/April 2002): 56. 

37 Bernard Lewis, The Middle East (New York: Simon and Shuster, 

1995), 385. 

38 Asali, 34. 

39 Ibid, 34. 

40 Bin-Laden claims that he fights the US for “the removal of the 

man-made laws that America has forced on its agents in the [Middle 

East] area so that this [Arab] nation could be ruled by the Book 

[Quran] that has been sent down by its Creator, Allah.” Moreover, he 

said that “America will never dream of safety, until safety becomes a 

reality for us living in Palestine. . . . America won’t be able to leave 

this ordeal unless it leaves the Arabian Peninsula, and it stops its 

involvement in Palestine, and in all the Islamic world. See Osama 

bin-Laden, interview with Tayseer Allouni, Kabul correspondent for 

Al Jazeera, 21 October 2001. Online at www.muslimthai.com/jehadonline/ article.php?a=252. Accessed on 23 January 2003. 

41 Brian Michael Jenkins, Countering al Qaeda (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2002), 3-4. 

42 Giles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: 

Harvard University Press, 2002), 300-301. 

43 James M. Dorsey, “US Publicity Efforts in Terror War Fall on 

Deaf Ears in Muslim Nations,” Wall Street Journal, 7 November 

2001. 

44 Jamal al-din al-Afghani (1838-1897) is a major Islamic scholar 

considered by many to be the father of Islamic modernist thought. 

His ideas (as well of those of his student, Muhammad Abdu) are 

outlined in Roy R. Andersen, et al, Politics and Change in the 

Middle East (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001), 160-161. 

45 Support for this view can be found in “On the Struggle Against 

Corruption in the Arab Regimes,” The Middle East Media Research 

Institute (MEMRI) # 411, 14 August 2002. Online at 

http://memri.org. Accessed on 8 October 2002. 

46 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History

(Princeton: Princeton University Press), 47. 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 37

 

47 Ibid, 47. 

48 Ibid, 91-122. 

49 Mubarak ran unopposed in Egyptian elections. Voters had the 

choice of voting yes or no for him, and everyone knew he would win. 

See Christopher Dickey, "Step Forward. Now Inch Back." 

Newsweek, 11 October 1993, 40. 

50 R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 

University Press, 1985), 9-12. 

51 Dilip Hiro Holy Wars: The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism (New 

York: Routledge, 1989), 45. 

52 Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? (Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 2002), 16-17. 

53 Ibid, 21-31. 

54 Hiro, 46-47. 

55 Ibid, 49. 

56 Tereq and Jacqeline Ismael, Government and Politics in Islam

(New York: St Martin's Press, 1985), 25-26. 

57 Ibid, 26-27, 30. Al-Tahtawi (1801-1873) was an Egyptian Imam 

who served as a Muslim missionary to France. He read many 

Western political works while in France and was influenced by the 

works of Voltaire, Rousseau and Montesquieu. 

58 Ibid, 34. 

59 Ibid, 30. 

60 Ibid, 28. 

61 As quoted in Ismael, 31. 

62 Ibid, 31. 

63 Hiro, 50. 

64 Fahmi Jadaane, "Notions of the State in Contemporary ArabIslamic Writings," in G. Luciani, ed., The Arab State, 258. 

65 Ibid, 259. 

66 Ibid, 267-272. 

67 Ibid, 277. 

68 Ibid, 282. 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

38

 

69 Ibid, 283. 

70 Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the 

Modern Middle East (New York: Routledge, 1992), 17-19. 

71 Ibid,19. 

72 Ibid, 20-21. 

73 John L.Esposito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 

University Press, 1984), 127. 

74 Ibid, 128-130. 

75 Khashan, 16-17. 

76 John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New 

York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 15. 

77 See Hiro, 45, and Mehdi Noorbaksh, "The Middle East, Islam and 

the United States: The Special Case of Iran," Middle East Policy, Vol 

II No 3, 86, for further discussion of these principles in relation to 

democracy. 

78 Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: the Search for Legitimacy 

(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), 90. 

79 Timothy D. Sisk, Islam and Democracy (Washington, DC: US 

Institute of Peace Press, 19992), 8. 

80 Ibid, 8-9. 

81 Ibid, 45. 

82 Ibid, 47. 

83 Ibid, 47. 

84 Yaroslov Trofimov, “Bahrain’s Bold Rebuff to its Islamic Rebels: 

Democracy and Rights,” Wall Street Journal, 25 October 2001, A1. 

85 Sisk, 39. 

86 Ibid, 38. 

87 Ibid, 41. 

88 In a recent speech to the Jeddah Economic Forum, the Jordanian 

Prime Minister encouraged Arab governments to build open and 

democratic civil societies. See “Arabs Must Become More 

Democratic to be Competitive: Jordan PM,” AFP, 19 January 2003. 

This is the type of thinking that should be encouraged and rewarded 

by US policymakers. 
Talbot—Arab Perception and Consensus 

 39

 

89 Fouad Ajami, “Iraq and the Arabs Future,” Foreign Affairs 82 

(January/February 2003): 5-6. 

90 Michael Scott Doran, “Palestine, Iraq, and American Strategy” 

Foreign Affairs 82 (January/February 2003): 22. It might also be 

said that cutting Saddam’s support to Palestinian suicide bombers 

would aid in calming relations between the Palestinians and Israelis. 

91 Richard C. Hottelet, “How to Dissolve Terror at the Roots: 

Education,” Christian Science Monitor 10 January 2003, 11. 

92 Jamie Frederic Metzl, “For a Digital Marshall Plan,” The Christian 

Science Monitor, 28 March 2001, 9. 

93 This term is used in the Quran and names both Jews and Christians 

as “people of the book”—referring to the Old Testament, which is 

also scripture to Muslims. 

94 See “From Uncle Ben’s to Uncle Sam,” The Economist, 23 

February 2002. 
ARAB PERCEPTIONS TOWARD US FOREIGN 

POLICY: WHY PERCEPTIONS MATTER AND 

WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE AMERICA’S 

IMAGE IN THE ARAB WORLD 

MICHAEL B. MEYER 

INTRODUCTION 

“We Arabs know American foreign policy is biased in favor 

of the Israelis,”1

 remarked an Arab League official to the author in 

December 2001. Backing up his assertion, the official referenced 

Secretary of State Colin Powell’s November 2001 remarks on the 

“Larry King Live” television program. On that program, Powell 

stated, “We are pro-Israel.” The Arab League official’s 

remembrance of the Secretary’s comments is as significant, 

though, because he failed to recall Powell’s other comments 

during the very same television program. Immediately after 

Powell voiced America’s support for Israel in front of Larry King, 

the Secretary remarked, “But I’m also pro-humankind. And I am 

also pro-Palestinian, to the extent that they are human beings, to 

the extent that they have a desire to see their children grow up in 

peace.” 2

 The Arab official’s recollection and his perception of 

Secretary Powell’s comments, even if not complete, is both telling 

and representative of what many—if not most—Arabs think about 

United States foreign policy. While Arabs might not objectively 

consider the whole spectrum of US relations with Arab states and 

organizations, when Arabs evaluate United States foreign policy 

toward their region, Powell’s supposed “pro-Israel” remarks only 

further confirm what a majority of the Arab world have thought 

for at least the past few years. Arabs believe that American 

foreign policy is unjust in its treatment of Arab states and peoples, 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

42

and that the United States is biased against Arabs and in favor of 

Israel.3

Addressing Arab perspectives on the cause of the current 

turmoil in the region, Shibley Telhami writes, “This is not about 

the objective reality of where the blame lies; it is about entrenched 

perceptions. The public in the Middle East blames the powers that 

be, and sees Israel as the most powerful state in the region, an 

occupier of Arab lands, and the United States as the anchor of that 

order.”4

 Poor perceptions encourage outrage. 

Anti-American resentment on the part of Arabs is not a new 

phenomenon. Christian Science Monitor writer Cameron Barr 

remarks, “The roots of this anger lie in US political manipulations 

in the region during the 1950s and 1960s. . . . As the world’s only 

superpower, the US is bound to make some people unhappy at 

least some of the time.”5

 William Quandt, a Middle East expert 

and a former member of the National Security Council staff, notes 

that a portion of Arab resentment towards the US derives from 

America’s dominant role in the world. “On the one hand, 

everyone is awed by US power, but on the other, they distrust 

it. . . . There is a certain inevitability that Middle Easterners will 

view the United States with suspicion simply because it is the 

most powerful country in the world—quite apart from its 

policies.”6

 Similarly, Dr. Shireen Hunter of the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies who specializes in the Middle 

East, Central Asia, and Islam, emphasizes the Arab world’s 

feeling of vulnerability vis-à-vis the West and more specifically 

the United States.7

Beyond traditional pockets of resentment toward the US on 

the part of some Arabs due to cultural rifts and due to jealously 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

43

about America’s status as a superpower, the past few years have 

witnessed a new kind and depth of virulent anti-Americanism 

spreading across the Middle East. Fouad Ajami, in a Foreign 

Affairs piece, draws attention to the “rancid anti-Americanism 

now evident in the Arab world,” and he remarks, “From one end 

of the Arab world to the other, the drumbeats of anti-Americanism 

have been steady.”8

 Intense anti-US sentiment held by extremist 

groups was manifested in the attack on the World Trade Center in 

1993, the attacks on US military forces in Saudi Arabia in 1995 

and 1996, the attacks against the US embassies in Africa in 1998, 

the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, and most recently the attack 

on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. While these 

reprehensible attacks were committed by extremists who are 

certainly not representative of Arabs as a whole, some of the very 

same issues that motivated the extremists to act also outrage Arab 

populations and anger Arab governments in the Middle East. 

Examples of recurring themes that irritate the Arab masses are 

the US military presence in the Arabian Gulf and America’s 

perceived ambiguous stand on promoting democracy in the 

Middle East. In a part of the world where history is seldom 

forgotten, secular and religious Arabs alike draw parallels between 

the US presence and influence in the region today and that of 

European crusaders centuries ago.9

 In the spring of 2001, a Saudi 

Arabian Ambassador assigned to a European country pointedly 

asked the author, “When will the United States ends its arrogance 

and withdraw it military forces from the Gulf?”10 While public 

details are sketchy, and officials on both the Saudi and US sides 

have intentionally played down the apparent rift and even sought 

to repair it in the summer of 2002. Since the fall of 2001, it 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

44

appears that elements of the Saudi royal family and government 

(generally one and the same) are growing increasingly wary of the 

US military presence in the Kingdom.11 The US presence inside a 

fiercely proud and independent country that bills itself as the 

keeper of the two holy Islamic cities of Mecca and Medina12

draws unwanted notice and criticism to the Islamic Saudi 

government from both non-religiously and religiously motivated 

Saudi societal elements. This opposition has on more than one 

occasion already waged violent demonstrations against the US and 

the Saudi governments, as was the case in the 1995 and 1996 

bombings. In short, the US military presence in Saudi Arabia 

threatens the Saudi ruling family’s legitimacy with many 

religiously-minded Saudis. 

Another charge levied by Arabs against the US involves 

America espousing democracy and pluralism while supporting 

Arab regimes that regularly practice repression. Critics of US 

foreign policy claim America plays lip service to and selectively 

promotes democracy as it conveniently suits US strategic 

interests. “How can the US criticize the Iraqi government for 

being repressive but not America’s friend, Saudi Arabia? Saudi 

Arabia is one of the world’s most repressive societies,” remarked 

a Syrian doctor. Arabs charge that America supports regimes like 

Egypt and Saudi Arabia that promote the status quo and stability, 

allow the US use of military operating locations and airspace, 

ensure the US access to oil, and themselves crack down on 

popular Islamic and secular civic-minded movements.13

Beyond pockets of jealously over the US being the world’s 

sole superpower, the resentment caused by the US military 

footprint in the region, and America’s questionable record for 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

45

supporting democracy in the Middle East, in the past decade two 

paramount issues associated with US foreign policy have 

particularly agitated Arabs from both private and public walks of 

life: America’s handling of Iraq and America’s position toward 

the Arab-Israeli conflict. These two issues have caused a large 

percentage of Arabs from every country in the Middle East, from 

every religious group, and from every social class to conclude that 

United States foreign policy toward the Arab world is unjust and 

grossly in favor of Israel, at the expense of the Arabs.14 This 

paper, covering in depth the two salient issues of America’s 

involvement with Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict, explains from 

the Arab perspective why such a large percentage of Arabs believe 

United States foreign policy toward the Arab world as unjust and 

biased. 

Due to America’s reliance on Gulf oil, its military presence in 

the Arabian (also known as Persian) Gulf, its desire for stability in 

the Middle East, and because of America’s historic role as the 

principal mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the United States is 

closely linked to the Arab world.15 While relationships between 

America and Arab governments and peoples are most often 

oriented around common interests, the foundations of 

relationships are built on perceptions. It is important that America 

and its policies are well-received in the Middle East—not because 

it is pleasant to be liked, but because negative perceptions equate 

to security risks for the US. It is in America’s national interest to 

promote a positive image. Hatred breeds horrible acts of 

extremism and encourages terrorists who will target America and 

America’s friends in the region. Disdain toward America in Arab 

lands will likely eventually force moderate Arab governments, 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

46

now friendly to the US, to distance themselves from the US in 

order to save their own privileged positions in society. Therefore, 

America must proactively pursue enhanced initiatives in the 

political, economic, diplomatic, and informational (public 

diplomacy) realms to improve its image in the eyes of Arabs. 

IRAQ—“THE INNOCENT SUFFER” 

In the eyes of many Arabs, Iraq is a country that has been 

damaged by aggressive American policies that have hurt the 

common people and hardly touch the regime of Saddam Hussein. 

In the late 1980s, Iraq and its capital, Baghdad, were considered 

particularly advanced amongst Arab countries. This is not 

surprising, considering Baghdad had been a major center of Arab 

culture and learning for centuries, and since its citizens were some 

of the most educated and well-trained people in the Arab world. 

Rick Francona, an American military officer who worked as a US 

intelligence liaison with the Iraqi military, visited Baghdad in 

1988 and remarked that the city was “a fascinating, vibrant, 

almost electric place.” Francona, a well-traveled Air Force officer 

and specialist in Arab politics and language, also noted in 1988 

that despite the Iraqi capital city having endured over seven years 

of war with Iran, “Baghdad remained a beautiful city” with 

“history, charm, and character,” and “Baghdadis were proud of 

their capital.”16

The feeling that Baghdad was a pearl and that Iraq was a 

model country for other Arab states to emulate was shared by 

Arab citizens from other Middle East states. A professional 

Syrian educated in economics and with familial ties to the Syrian 

government, who worked abroad in the Gulf remarked, “Iraq’s 

economic and social well-being was the envy of most Arabs.”17 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

47

Baghdad and Iraqi society have changed, however, since the Gulf 

War. The former pearl of the Arab world has become quite 

tarnished. 

In the wake of the Gulf War and after over a decade of 

sanctions against Iraq, it is obvious from media images and from 

numerous sources that Saddam and his regime continue to live 

quite comfortably, while ordinary Iraqi citizens suffer. Syrians 

with family members in Iraq note that their relatives’ lives are 

materially much worse than before sanctions, while Saddam 

continues to live in luxury, unchecked.18 Outside Iraq and in other 

Arab capital cities, the presence of Iraqi taxi drivers, selling 

cheaply made goods from their dilapidated cars, garners sympathy 

in the region for the Iraqi people. 

The United States has placed responsibility for Iraq’s 

economic demise in the 1990s squarely on the shoulders of 

Saddam Hussein, citing the Iraqi dictator’s intransigence when 

dealing with the United Nations. Whether or not the Iraqi regime 

has thumbed its nose at the UN, people from across the Arab 

world lay blame for the drastic decline of the Iraqi people’s living 

conditions at the feet of America. Arabs feel that common Iraqis 

are paying an intolerably disproportionate penalty for the acts of 

the Iraqi regime, especially considering the relative 

ineffectiveness of UN sanctions that fail to punish Saddam.19 In a 

December 2001 commentary, Arab journalist Ahmed Bouzid 

opined that sanctions have cost “the lives of half a million of our 

own children, devastating thus a whole generation of Iraqis, and 

reducing what was once far and ahead the most modern Arab 

country to a backward nation barely able to subsist.”20 Arab 

writer and Professor Kamil Mahdi likewise writes, “The 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

48

consequences of such a catastrophe will be with Iraq and the rest 

of the region for generations to come.”21 Arabs argue that the 

resentment caused over America’s hard-line stance that damages 

Iraqi society will taint Arab, and particularly Iraqi, impressions of 

US policies for years to come.22

Some Arabs are puzzled why US foreign policies continue to 

target Iraq in such a harsh fashion, especially when Iraq and the 

US once cooperated rather closely in the Middle East. Arabs are 

quick to point out that the United States actively supported 

Saddam Hussein during the 1980s, when Iraq opposed Iran during 

the Iran-Iraq War.23

During the 1980s and just preceding the Gulf War, argue 

Arabs, “America’s Saddam” was every bit as much a dictator as 

he was in the late 1990s and into the next decade.24 The fact that 

Saddam has been ironfisted during his rule in Baghdad is not a 

matter of contention between Americans and Arabs. Francona 

noticed the oppressive security environment in Baghdad in 1988, 

when Saddam was America’s man in the Gulf, and wrote 

“Government control was evident everywhere.”25

Arabs point out that Saddam’s tough rule and treatment of 

Iraq’s people is not an aberration for the way Iraqi leaders have 

dealt with their people over the course of that country’s history.26 

So it is not surprising that Arabs note that an Iraq and Middle East 

with or without Saddam is tolerable. One Arab wrote, “Iraqis will 

be content to live under Saddam as they have for two decades 

before the sanctions.”27 Some Arabs have argued that it would be 

better for US foreign policy—and perhaps safer for the region in 

light of ongoing Iranian ambitions—for America to work with 

Saddam instead of against him. Along the same lines, Arabs point 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

49

out that some of America’s key Arab government allies, 

particularly Saudi Arabia, are no more benevolent or democratic 

than Saddam when dealing with internal dissent.28

In the wake of the Gulf War and after a decade of sanctions, 

Arabs argue that Saddam no longer possesses a credible military 

threat to countries aligned with the US and to American interests 

in the region. They draw attention to the fact that America still 

seeks to degrade the Iraqi military threat, which was expanded 

mostly to fight the same enemy that America opposed during the 

1980s—Iran. Meanwhile, Arabs are quick to point out America’s 

own close ally and recipient of billions of dollars of US military 

assistance per year, Israel, employs American-made Apache 

helicopters and F-16 fighter aircraft against Palestinians without 

impunity in the Israeli-occupied territories. Additionally, while 

the US does not put pressure on Israel about its nuclear weapons 

program, Saddam is regularly lambasted for possessing weapons 

of mass destruction.29 Palestinian intellectual Edward Said 

remarked in a spring 1998 editorial, “The media have been 

feeding the public a diet of stories about hidden weapons of mass 

destruction in Iraq, which may have them for all I know, but 

which are neither a threat to anyone nor, in fact, have been proved 

by anyone to exist. The United States, reserving for itself the right 

to stand above all the norms of international behavior, is 

determined to strike if diplomacy does not work.”30

Arabs in both the Mediterranean and the Arabian Gulf also 

express their concern that the “Iraq issue” has become a 

convenient excuse for the United States to maintain a constant and 

robust military presence in the Gulf. As the predominant 

powerbroker in the region, Arabs argue that America could have 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

50

easily disposed of Saddam during or immediately after the Gulf 

War if the US had truly desired. A Gulf official remarked that a 

very high percentage of Arabs believe the US is merely playing a 

“game” with Saddam and that America will not force the Iraqi 

leader out of power, because that could spell the end of America’s 

desired hegemony in the Gulf.31

As a tangible indicator of Arab discontent with US military 

action in the Middle East against Iraq, frustration over 

OPERATION DESERT FOX in mid-December 199832 resulted in 

anti-American protests in Arab and Muslim countries.33 Some of 

them became very violent, as was the case on 19 December in 

Damascus. On that day, a crowd of thousands pelted the US 

Embassy in downtown Damascus with stones and ransacked the 

residence of the American Ambassador. While it can be argued 

that rapidly quelling the riots was beyond the capability of the 

Syrian security services, American diplomats in Damascus felt 

that the Syrian government was delivering an indirect message to 

the American government by permitting the outpouring of 

emotion to get out of hand.34 Very few public events, particularly 

protests, are truly spontaneous in a country known for its 

pervasive security environment. Adding more credibility to the 

theory that the Syrian government turned a blind eye in the early 

stages of the attack is the fact that the American embassy is 

located in the same neighborhood that is heavily patrolled by 

plainclothes Syrian presidential security guards.35 It is probably 

no coincidence the violence took place at the same time that the 

Syrian government was beginning to restore formal economic 

relations with Baghdad. 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

51

In summary, Arab journalist Ahmed Bouzid’s plea regarding 

Iraq rings true with both Arab populations and elites throughout 

the Middle East when he writes, “Why do Americans hate us 

[Arabs] so much that they would insist on imposing a decade-long 

embargo that has done nothing but ensure the misery of ordinary 

civilians?”36 Arabs uniformly hope what they see as America’s 

cruel and hypocritical vendetta against Iraq will come to an end. 

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS—THE SEMINAL ISSUE 

“Regarding America’s foreign policy toward the Arabs, we 

don’t actually expect the US to be one hundred percent unbiased, 

but we do wish the US was just ten percent unbiased.”37 This 

comment by a prominent Syrian businessman with very strong 

links to the Syrian government accurately highlights an opinion 

that has strongly resonated for years throughout the Middle East. 

In fact, what is seen as America’s unjust approach to the ArabIsraeli conflict is the most frequently voiced issue unfavorably 

tainting Arab opinion of the United States. Even before the 

violent intifada erupted in late 2000, Arabs were already very 

aggravated by what they labeled as a definite American bias 

toward Israel and against the Arabs. Arabs see Israeli influence in 

the US government as pervasive at all levels, including within the 

legislative and executive branches. A journalist writing in a Saudi 

newspaper commented in a fall 2000 article, “Israel still has the 

Congress on its side, which always echoes the Israeli position,” 

and “Washington must start to look at the area with a just 

perspective.”38

Because of their proximity to Israel and because Israel 

occupies land once belonging to them, citizens of Syria and 

Lebanon, perhaps more than any other people from sovereign 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

52

Arab states, feel they have suffered at the expense of unbalanced, 

and even almost unbridled, US support for Israel.39 From 1999 to 

2001, hundreds of government and private Syrians in both official 

and unofficial forums fervently expressed their opinion to the 

author that the US has intentionally stacked the cards in the region 

in favor of Israel and against the Arab states. An educated, 

professional Jordanian citizen married to a Syrian and living in 

Damascus commented to the author, “I think that US foreign 

policy toward the Middle East has always been biased toward 

Israel. I don’t understand what the US gets from supporting Israel 

at the expense of abandoning the Arabs.”40

Very senior-level Syrian military officers regularly lectured 

American military attaches, both in public speeches and in private 

conversations, at Syrian military-sponsored dinners in 2000 and 

2001 about the “inherent unevenness and inconsistencies” in US 

foreign policy toward the Arab countries. Several Syrian generals 

bluntly stated that it is not in America’s strategic interest, 

especially since the Arabs possess such great oil reserves, to back 

Israel—a nation of only seventeen million people—at the expense 

of the Arab states with a composite population of about three 

hundred million. Astute Syrians pointed out to the author that 

several prominent US officials, including Secretary of State 

George Marshall, opposed the US recognizing Israel in 1948 for 

fear of damaging relations with Arab states.41

In the late 1990s and into the next decade, many Syrians 

attributed what they viewed as anti-Arab policies to the fact that 

prominent Jewish persons held important positions in the Clinton 

Administration.42 This opinion was echoed during a March 2001 

US Air War College trip to Damascus, when Syrian Defense 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

53

Minister Mustafa Talas lectured US military officer delegates that 

the Syrians had heard that President Clinton “loved our people” 

but several key cabinet posts were held by Jews. Talas expressed 

his belief that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had been 

openly working for the Jews.43 Most American official visitors to 

Syria and diplomats accredited to Damascus are regularly 

subjected to rhetoric about perceived American bias against the 

Arabs and in favor of the Israelis from the Syrians. 

Talas’ verbal backlash to the 2001 Air War College 

delegation can be partially attributed to the collapse of Syrian trust 

and what Syrians deemed as false hope they placed in the George 

H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations. Because of President 

George H. W. Bush’s and Secretary of State James Baker’s efforts 

to closely cooperate with the Arabs, especially during the Gulf 

War, Syrians and Arabs held those former officials in high esteem. 

Arabs believed the first Bush was more inclined to be objective 

with Arabs than were previous American administrations. Syrian 

President Hafiz al-Asad took a risk and signed on to the coalition 

against Iraq by contributing troops during the Gulf War. While 

Iraq had been a rival to Syria, on many levels, Hafiz al-Asad’s 

standing with America in 1990-1991 in the Gulf was extremely 

controversial with his public. One Syrian doctor remarked, “Just 

remember us siding with the coalition forces during the Second 

Gulf War, while the public opinion was against it.”44

Several Syrians told the author that Bush’s, and America’s, 

credibility was boosted in the Arab world when, in 1992, Bush 

attached strict conditions to Israel for loan guarantees meant for 

new Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories. Most Arabs 

and a large portion of the international community interpret the 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

54

establishment of new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza strip 

as violations of international law under UN Security Council 

Resolutions 242 and 338. Bush’s delay in loan guarantees 

angered Israel.45 In the eyes of the Arabs, Bush had the courage to 

stand up to Israel and, generally, had even-handedly dealt with the 

Arab-Israeli conflict.46

Just a few years later, Syrians were optimistic that Clinton 

could convince Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, a seemingly 

more reasonable man than Barak’s predecessor, Benjamin 

Netanyahu, to negotiate land for peace, as was called for under the 

Madrid Peace Process formula.47 In the end, and in the eyes of the 

Syrians, Clinton failed.48 The ultimate culmination point of 

Syrian disappointment with the past administration came at the 

March 2000 Geneva Summit between Presidents Asad and 

Clinton. In the lead-up to the summit, Clinton reportedly 

promised the Syrian president “good news,” and the ailing Asad 

traveled to Switzerland to accept what he hoped would be a 

promising offer from the Americans and Israelis. Asad believed 

that Barak was finally ready to propose Israel’s complete 

withdrawal from lands Israel occupied on the Golan Heights, up to 

the 4 June 1967 line. This was reasonable, since former Prime 

Minister Rabin, by many accounts, had already quietly made this 

promise to Asad in 1994, before Rabin’s untimely assassination in 

1995. 

However, as the 1967 “border” was never formally 

demarcated, the precise location of that line is difficult to 

ascertain. The border was merely a line which Syrian tanks 

guarded before Israel launched pre-emptive attacks against the 

Arabs in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. In the Syrian mind that 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

55

border touched Lake Tiberias (also known as the Sea of Galilee) 

on the northern part of the lake and then ran through the middle of 

the lake, or at a minimum touched the lake on the east of the body 

of water. At Geneva, Barak, through Clinton, proposed that the 

Israelis control not only all of Lake Tiberias’ waters, but also 

maintain a small strip of land for security on the eastern portion of 

the lake. Therefore, the Syrians would lose complete control over 

the shoreline and any right to water.49

When they heard nothing new from Clinton regarding the 

Israeli position, Asad and the Syrians balked, and they left Geneva 

embittered. The Syrian/Lebanese-Israeli track of the peace 

process effectively died. In what was seen as a public insult to the 

Syrians, Clinton officials charged that Asad had been inflexible, 

and the ball was in the Syrian President’s court. Syrian citizens 

angrily shot back that the US diplomatic effort was amateurish 

and that Clinton never should have summoned Asad to Geneva 

without offering something new.50 Hafiz al-Asad, who involved 

Syrian in the peace process since 1991 and who most Syrians 

argue really did want an “honorable” peace, died in June 2000 and 

was succeeded by his son, Bashar. 

Beyond the Syrian frustration with what they perceive as 

America failing to deliver a just solution regarding the return of 

historic, now Israeli-occupied Arab lands, Syrians are also 

incensed over the US condemning Syria for that country’s support 

to what it considers “liberation” groups. Syrians are angry that 

backing for Palestinian groups like the Popular Front for the 

Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and for Hizballah has landed Syria 

on the US State Department’s list of states that sponsor terrorism. 

Syrian officials and citizens argue that Syria supports popular 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

56

movements that merely seek to end the Israeli occupation of 

historic Arab lands. After all, runs the Syrian argument, how can 

such organizations which maintain offices in Damascus and 

funnel weapons to “freedom fighters,” be considered terrorists if 

they strive to attain what is called for in United Nations 

Resolutions 242, 338, and 425—return of traditionally Arabcontrolled lands occupied by Israel? America and its coalition 

partners fought in 1991, after all, to restore land to Kuwait from 

Iraq, citing UN resolutions as justification for action. One 

frustrated Syrian appealed to the author, “They [Israel and the 

United States] call us terrorists, and expect us to sit and watch 

them [Israel] occupying our land and humiliating our people.”51

In reference to Arab forces seeking an end to Israel’s 

occupation of Arab lands, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk alShara’ had this to say to the UN General Assembly in the Fall of 

2001: “Syria was the first country to call in 1985 for convening 

an international conference under the auspices of the United 

Nations to define terrorism and to differentiate it from the struggle 

of peoples for national liberation. Israel invented new types of 

terrorist practices in order to continue its occupation of Arab 

territories. . . . How could anyone fail to differentiate between 

terror and resistance? Anyone who would like to target terrorism 

in our region must target the Israeli terrorism first and foremost, 

because what Israel does is the utmost form of terrorism that is 

absolutely shorn of human feeling.”52 Syrians and, for that matter, 

Arabs in general view American moves to condemn Arab attempts 

to gain back lands that once belonged to them as hypocritical. 

Just a month after the Foreign Minister’s appeal in the UN, 

the Syrian Ambassador to the United States reaffirmed the Syrian 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

57

and Arab positions on peace and terrorism, stating, “Syria seeks a 

comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in accordance with UN 

resolutions.” Furthermore, “Syria has no connection with 

terrorism; Syria seeks to uproot terrorism in all its forms”—a 

direct reference to Israel.53 Arabs across the Middle East 

emphatically charge the US with holding double standards for 

claiming Arab “liberation” groups are terrorists, while Israel 

continues to brutally treat Arabs in lands where they once ruled. 

Perhaps the “liberation” organization that evokes the most 

pride from Arabs across the Middle East is Hizballah in Lebanon. 

This group is supported by not only Iran, but also by Syria; and it 

serves as one of the few remaining pressure points Syria can apply 

against Israel. Arabs credit Hizballah’s military efforts in the 

1980s and 1990s as having been the impetus for Israel’s 

withdrawal from south Lebanon in the spring of 2000. Most 

Syrians openly engage in hero worship when they speak about 

Hizballah’s accomplishments against the Israelis in southern 

Lebanon, and they note that Hizballah has succeeded where most 

other Arab organizations have failed at forcing Israelis to concede 

territories back to Arabs.54 During a Spring 2001 trip the author 

took with Syrians through Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, several wellto-do Syrians—most of whom had occasional political contacts 

with Syrian government officials in Damascus—eagerly donated 

cash along the road to youths waving Hizballah flags and 

collecting money for the group. During his two years in 

Damascus, the author observed no other group that attracted the 

same level of admiration on the part of private Syrian citizens.55

Hizballah’s continued actions against Israeli occupation 

forces in the Sheba Farms area is controversial but continues to 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

58

receive strong support from Syrians.56 The UN certified Israel’s 

withdrawal from southern Lebanon complete in 2000, in 

accordance with UN Resolution 425. In a move backed by the 

US, Sheba was deemed by the UN not part of Israeli-occupied 

Lebanon, but instead, part of Israeli-occupied Syria, which is 

covered under UN Resolution 242. While Israel is no longer 

technically violating the UN resolutions applying to Lebanon, 

Arabs still claim Sheba as part of Lebanon, and thus in their eyes, 

Hizballah is warranted to continue attacks in the area. Syrians do 

not so easily distinguish between Israeli occupation of Lebanon 

and Israeli occupation of Syria, and they are prepared to continue 

the fight. Syrian Ambassador Zoubi predicted, “As long as Israel 

is not in compliance with UN resolutions, Hizballah will remain 

active.”57

During Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s time in office as Israel’s 

Prime Minister, Syrian perception of US foreign policy turned 

from bad to abysmal. In the spring of 1999, after Barak’s victory 

and assumption of office, Syrians believed that a door for peace 

between Arabs and Israel might finally be opening after the 

difficult Netanyahu years. Geneva, however, slammed that door 

shut, only further confirming to Syrians that the US could not be 

trusted as an honest broker.58 Public perception of America in 

Syria, and across the Arab world, took a nose dive when the 

Palestinians’ situation in the Occupied Territories became grave in 

late 2000, a subject to be covered in-depth in the next chapter. 

Syria’s Palestinian neighbors to the south are perhaps even 

less impressed than Syrians with America’s record for acting as an 

honest broker in America’s desire to assist in delivering an 

equitable peace to the Middle East. Palestinians optimistically 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

59

went into the Oslo Peace Talks in the early 1990s. Sara Roy notes 

that the Palestinians sought “their own state, which must consist 

of a contiguous West Bank and Gaza, a connection between them, 

and only minor adjustments to 1967 borders.”59 Prior to the 1967 

Arab-Israeli War, Arab control extended over East Jerusalem, 

including Muslim holy sites.60 By the late 1990s, though, 

Palestinian and Arab hopes were dashed. Arabs believe that the 

much-touted, American-supported Oslo agreements were more 

about “process” and Israeli stalling—while Israel expanded Jewish 

settlements in the Occupied Territories—than about attaining 

actual peace and prosperity for both parties. In short, the Arab 

argument goes, the Palestinians had been cruelly manipulated by 

the Israelis and their American ally, and Oslo created a diversion 

on Israel’s path to gobbling up more and more Palestinian land 

and rights.61

Palestinian intellectual Edward Said’s words in a 1998 essay, 

regarding America’s role as a negotiator in the peace process, 

accurately represented Arab opinion: “It [the United States] can 

pretend that it can be all things to all parties; that pose has been 

shown for the miserable ruse that it has always been. The United 

States has also lost the support of even those Arab and Islamic 

states who are its supposed allies, so appallingly insensitive and 

hypocritical has its behavior been in coddling Israel and at the 

same time demanding compliance from the Arabs.”62

In order to more clearly understand Arab perceptions relating 

to America’s involvement in the peace process, a brief overview 

of Palestinian attitudes towards the peace process and Oslo is 

warranted. Jerusalem Media and Communication Center public 

opinion poll results highlight growing Palestinian dissatisfaction 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

60

with what they believe have become increasingly fruitless efforts 

to deal with Israel. In December 1996, Palestinian support for the 

peace process was recorded at 78%, while support for Oslo stood 

at 75%. By December 2000, those numbers were 47% for the 

peace process and 39% in favor of Oslo. The poll’s analyst 

remarked that Palestinians were relatively optimistic in 1996 

because they had faith that the peace process and Oslo would 

“help them achieve their national aspiration of ending occupation 

and building an independent state.” After only a few years, 

though, Palestinian support greatly declined because of “the 

deteriorating political and economic conditions of Palestinians as 

a result of Israeli violations of Interim agreements, continued 

Israeli settlement activity and Palestinian land confiscation, 

closures and restriction of movement of Palestinians, and the fact 

that most aspects of Palestinian life remained under Israeli 

control.”63

Under Oslo, life became more difficult rather than easier for 

Palestinians. Augustus Richard Norton notes “[Since Oslo], the 

quality of life has declined, especially as measured by per capita 

income, which has shrunk 20 percent in the West Bank . . . and 25 

percent in Gaza. The comparable figure for Israel has increased 

. . . 11 to 15 times the Palestinian level. Put simply, peace did not 

produce an economic bonanza for the Palestinians.”64 By the late 

1990s, unemployment soared to approximately 20% in the West 

Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip. Palestinians became increasing 

impoverished and desperate as Oslo “progressed.”65

Under Oslo, Palestinian wages and the aggregate Palestinian 

economy declined as Israelis tried to prevent violent Arab acts of 

extremism by closing Palestinians out of Israeli-occupied areas 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

61

and out of Israel proper. What this meant is that Palestinians 

could not transit to and from their jobs, move freely from one 

Palestinian area to another, or even visit their holy sites in 

Jerusalem. Israel imposed 342 days of total closure on 

Palestinians in the Gaza strip and 291 days of total closure on the 

Palestinians in the West Bank from 1993 to 1996. Less stringent 

closure rules were applied on other days during those years.66

Another serious bone of contention for Palestinians regarding 

the Oslo Peace Process has involved their lack of physical control 

over traditional Palestinian land. Under the Palestinian Authority, 

and as a desired outcome of Oslo in the 1990s, the Palestinians 

looked forward to the creation of a Palestinian state by 1998 in the 

West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Even if that had come to fruition, 

however, the West Bank and Gaza Strip only represented 22% of 

pre-1948, historic Palestine.67 By mid-2000, though, the 

Palestinians had complete control over only 17.2% of the West 

Bank, and that land was not all located together. Instead, Israeli 

roads and settlements resulted in the Palestinian-controlled 

territory being carved up into small enclaves. Sara Roy notes 

Palestinian areas “were noncontiguous and remained isolated 

cantons separated by areas under complete jurisdiction of Israel.” 

So, when the Camp David II summit in July 2000, under the 

tutelage of President Clinton, failed to offer the Palestinians more 

than 90% of the West Bank, again broken up by Israeli roads and 

settlements, Palestinians and the entire Arab world were naturally 

frustrated.68

A Palestinian negotiator, in a letter to US Congressional 

members, wrote that the Camp David proposal “fell far short of 

minimum requirements for a viable, independent Palestinian 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

62

state.” Under the proposal by Israeli Prime Minister Barak, the 

Israeli offer “would have made Palestine nothing more than Arab 

‘Bantustans’ perpetually at the mercy of Israeli economic and 

military closures.”69 By the summer of 2000, it was clear that 

Israel would not withdraw completely from the territories it 

occupied beginning in 1967. Additionally, Palestinians’ economic 

prospects were dim, and the Palestinians felt socially humiliated. 

It has been evident from the mass outpouring of Arab emotion, as 

regularly highlighted in the international press since the fall of 

2000, that people from across the Arab world are sympathetic to 

the Palestinian cause and have shared common frustration over 

Israeli and US policies. 

ADDING FUEL TO THE FIRE—THE SECOND INTIFADA 

Arab outpouring of emotion over the plight of the Palestinians 

has been expressed across the Arab world in the form of proPalestinian demonstrations and riots against Israel and the US 

since fall of 2000. The al-Aqsa, or second, intifada was born 

following Ariel Sharon’s controversial visit to the common site of 

the Temple Mount and the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem at the 

end of September 2000.70 Sharon’s act of boldly forcing his way 

to the site with Israeli police escort into the area of Islam’s third 

holiest site added fuel to a fire that was bound to break out in the 

wake of what the Palestinians and Arabs already perceived was 

the end of the peace process.71 Large and sometimes violent 

demonstrations protesting Israeli and American policies toward 

the Palestinians occurred in several Arab capitals and cities in 

subsequent weeks, including Rabat, Cairo, Manama, Muscat, and 

Damascus. 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

63

Damascus was the site of particularly fierce outbursts aimed 

at America, as the Syrian regime and new President Bashar alAsad were willing to allow Arab displeasure to be visibly 

displayed. Because there are no formal diplomatic relations 

between Syria and Israel, there is no Israeli Embassy in 

Damascus. Instead, the American Embassy, as a symbol of both 

Israeli and American policies in the mind of incensed Arabs, 

served as a symbolic target against which to vent frustration. On 

4 October 2001, a crowd of approximately three thousand 

Palestinian and Syrian students, mostly in their twenties, rioted 

outside the walls and attacked the American embassy with large 

rocks and bricks. Embassy windows were broken, and one Syrian 

managed to scale the embassy wall and tear down the US flag 

from the top of the main building before being subdued by the 

Marine security guards.72

Two days later on the first declared “Palestinian Day of 

Rage,” a hostile crowd of several thousand Palestinian young men 

from Palestinian refugee camps/neighborhoods in Damascus, 

along with Syrian young men, staged a particularly violent display 

against American interests. Demonstrators burned Israeli and 

American flags in the streets of Damascus. In an attempt to reach 

the embassy, rioters threw Molotov cocktails and bricks at Syrian 

riot police blocking their route. Policemen in and around the 

vicinity of the embassy responded to the crowd with tear gas and 

warning shots fired in the air. Syrian police bloodied scores of 

protesters as some were dragged away to custody, unconscious. 

Several Syrian policemen were also injured. For the next few 

weeks, additional violent demonstrations followed, although 

Syrian police protected the US Embassy, and rioters were repelled 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

64

at a greater distance from the building. As a signal to the US 

Ambassador and to United States diplomats, and as a means for 

allowing Syrians and Palestinians to vent their aggression, the 

Syrian government organized more peaceful protests in October 

2000 in Damascus. These orchestrated demonstrations in the 

vicinity of the US embassy sometimes consisted of more than 

twenty thousand public sector workers, university students, and 

high school students ordered to march in the streets near the 

embassy. Demonstrators carried individuals in the air, covered in 

shrouds and symbolically representing dead Palestinians killed by 

Israelis in the Occupied Territories. Demonstrators also carried 

banners and large pictures of Palestinian children killed during 

fighting in Israel, and they shouted anti-US and anti-Israeli 

slogans while they burned American and Israeli flags. On a busy 

main street in Damascus, a giant poster of a Palestinian boy, 

Mohammed al-Dura, who was shot to death by Israeli forces while 

cowering at his father’s side in the early stages of the intifada in 

Palestine, hung for weeks in the vicinity of several embassies and 

along the route to the American embassy. Without doubt, this 

poster was placed there with the approval of the Syrian 

government, since nothing appears on Syrian streets without 

regime approval. 

The demonstrations against the US diplomatic mission in 

Damascus in the fall of 2000, which were either undoubtedly 

approved or ordered by the government—at least the less violent 

ones—expressed the sentiment of Arab peoples throughout the 

Middle East. While most in the Arab world did not go to the 

extremes exhibited by the rioters in Damascus, the hatred 

demonstrated and the excitement for striking out at something 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

65

American was a perfect manifestation of how many Arab citizens 

feel about the US after years of Palestinian suffering. 

During the second intifada, Arabs have been particularly 

distraught with what they view as an Israeli hard-line approach to 

the Palestinians. They see this Israeli approach as directly backed 

and funded by the United States. They are also angered by 

America’s willingness to prevent the international community 

from stepping in and stopping what they view as Israel’s slaughter 

of Palestinian citizens, who have died at a rate about three times 

the rate of Israelis since the beginning of the violence. In 

addition, America’s provision of large amounts of military aid and 

financial aid to Israel, versus much more conservative amounts for 

the Palestinians, has been a bone of contention with Arabs. Since 

the fall of 2000, Israel’s employment of sophisticated US-origin 

military equipment against the lightly armed Palestinians has 

outraged Arabs. An official with the Kuwait Information Office, 

Dr. Shafeeq Ghabra, remarks that Arabs “notice that the Israelis 

are using American-made Apache helicopters and F-16s.”73 An 

academic at Cairo University vents, “What has it [the United 

States] done to stop Israeli acts of terror, which the US makes 

possible through supplies of state-of-the-art military hardware?”74

Also frustrating to Arabs is what they view as American 

obstruction of UN efforts to create an impartial international 

monitoring force in the occupied territories. Twice in 2001—the 

latest of which was in mid-December—the US vetoed a UN 

Security Council resolution calling for international monitors to be 

sent to the West Bank and Gaza. The resolution in December 

2001 was sponsored by the Arab countries Egypt and Tunisia, and 

it also called for a cessation of violence between Israel and the 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

66

Palestinians, as well as the resumption of peace talks between the 

two sides. A Palestinian UN official called the US action 

“unreasonable,” saying, “We are the little guys. We are the 

people under occupation, and it is our right and a duty to come to 

the body responsible for peace and security, to the United 

Nations.”75 Between May 1990 and mid-December 2001, the US 

vetoed six Security Council resolutions related to the IsraeliPalestinian dispute, further tainting US foreign policy in Arab 

eyes. 

The Al-Aqsa intifada has also adversely affected America’s 

relations with the Gulf States. In the past few decades, these 

countries have not placed a large emphasis on the Arab-Israeli 

conflict as a theme in their strategic relations with the US. This is 

changing, though. An American expert with great insight into the 

Gulf is Dr. John Duke Anthony, President and CEO of the 

National Council on US-Arab Relations. In testimony delivered 

on 31 July 2001 before Congress, Anthony noted that the 

Palestinian issue has tainted US relations with the Gulf States. 

Before the House of Representatives he stated, “The simmering 

disappointment of GCC leaders at the way they see Washington as 

having treated Palestinian issues has accelerated considerably 

since the onset of the Al-Aqsa intifada. . . . They [GCC peoples] 

admit to a sense of growing pain in their hearts. Neither the elites 

nor rank-and–file in any of these countries is oblivious to the 

implications for domestic and regional stability that flow from the 

prevailing perception that the United States is anything but ‘evenhanded’ or ‘honest,’ or an ‘honest broker,’ when it comes to the 

question of Palestine.”76
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

67

Dr. Anthony’s assertion that the Arab-Israeli conflict evokes 

deep-seated negative sentiment and is having unfavorable 

consequences in the way Gulf rulers and elites view the US is 

backed by observations of American officials. Colonel Bernard 

Dunn, US Defense Attaché to Saudi Arabia from 2000-2002, 

noted in December 2001 that, since the beginning of the second 

intifada, the Saudis have been upset with America’s handling of 

the Palestinian-Israeli crisis, and this has hampered US-Saudi 

security cooperation.77 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

Near Eastern Affairs Ryan Crocker, a former US ambassador to 

several Arab states, acknowledged also in December 2001 that the 

intifada has had a “corroding effect on American interests” 

throughout the Middle East.78 During office calls with very senior 

Arab military officials attended by the author in the summer of 

2002 in several Arab countries, several prominent officers opined 

that the Palestinian-Israeli situation must be solved prior to the US 

or a US-led coalition targeting Saddam Hussein.79

Perhaps most damning is a January 2002 statement to the US 

from the Saudi Crown Prince himself: “I don’t see the sense of 

justice and the sense of righteousness ordained by God Almighty 

in what is happening in the [Israeli-occupied, Arab] territories. 

When you look at your own nation [the United States] and how it 

was founded, the principles were justice, righteousness, equity, 

and concern for eliminating evil and decadence and 

corruption. . . . I have great concern about America’s credibility 

and I care about how America is perceived. As friends and as 

your allies, we are very proud of our relationship with you. In the 

current environment, we find it very difficult to defend America, 

and so we keep our silence. Because to be frank with you, how 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

68

can we defend America?”80 While most contempt for US foreign 

policy on the part of Arabs is held primarily by the common 

people in Middle Eastern societies, and not as much by the elites 

who send their children to America to study and who vacation in 

the US, there could easily come a day when Gulf officials can not 

ignore the voice from the expanding masses. “People power” may 

well significantly impinge on America’s ability to maneuver in the 

Middle East and to project its interests in a region so vital to US 

national security interests. 

CONCLUSIONS—IMPLICATIONS FOR US NATIONAL 

SECURITY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

IMPROVE AMERICA’S IMAGE IN ARAB EYES 

Because of America’s stance toward the Israeli-Palestinian 

conflict and because of its handling of Iraq during the past decade 

plus, both public and private Arab citizens’ perception of US 

foreign policy is worse in late 2002 than perhaps at any previous 

time in history. Do Arab perceptions about American foreign 

policy really matter, though, as America navigates its course 

through the treacherous waters of Middle East politics and 

security? If so, what initiatives should the US pursue to improve 

its image in the eyes of the Arab world? This section concludes 

that Arab perceptions do matter and are important, since negative 

perceptions endanger American security interests in the region and 

on US soil. Additionally, the paper recommends that, in order to 

better its image in the Middle East, the US must modify its 

policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, increase financial aid, 

expand its diplomatic efforts, and more aggressively pursue a 

public diplomacy campaign. 

It would seem that Arab governments and organizations might 

distance themselves from the US as Arab officials themselves and 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

69

particularly their populations become more suspect and even 

hateful of America and what it stands for in Arab eyes. By spring 

and summer of 2002, certain indicators hinted that the Arab states 

were at least somewhat distancing themselves from the US. For 

months, heavy criticism was heaped on the US in the Arabic 

press. In a concrete example of the results of strained ties between 

the US and Arab world, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce 

for Africa and the Middle East Molly Williamson remarked that 

America’s composite trade with the Arab world was down by 

approximately twenty-five percent during the first six months of 

2002, as compared with the first half of 2001.81

Widely reported rifts in US-Arab ties emerged when President 

George W. Bush suggested in the summer of 2002 that Palestinian 

Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat must be removed before a 

viable Palestinian state could emerge. Regarding extensive talk of 

possible US or US-led military action against Iraq, the Egyptian, 

Jordanian, and Gulf governments cautioned restraint; they 

publicly announced that their territory could not be used to base 

US forces prepared to attack Iraq. On 7 August 2002, Saudi 

Foreign Minister Saud Feisal publicly stated that Saudi Arabia 

could not be used as a US launching pad to attack Iraq. He 

emphasized this was Saudi Arabia’s public and private positions.82

Official Arab rhetoric, though, is often inconsistent with Arab 

actions. When it comes to Arab cooperation with the United 

States even the staunchest Arab critics have regularly found 

reason to work with America, despite dissatisfaction with 

American policies. Surprisingly, the same Syrian government that 

has been so critical of the US in recent years has cooperated with 

America since 11 September 2001 by sharing intelligence on 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

70

terrorist cells and groups. Syrian information given to the US 

apparently helped prevent an attack by extremists against 

American servicemen in the Gulf sometime in 2002.83

In mid-September 2002, following months of a worsening 

trend in Saudi-US relations, in the wake of and Riyadh’s claim 

that US military forces could not base out of the Kingdom in the 

event of an attack on Iraq, Saudi officials seemed to conduct an 

about face. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Feisal noted that if the 

United Nations authorized force against Iraq, the United States 

could apparently stage military operations out of Saudi Arabia 

because “everyone is obliged to follow through.”84 Even lacking 

UN backing, Saudi will still likely follow the US lead to smite 

Saddam. Other Arab countries also changed course and refuted 

earlier statements which hinted that US forces attacking Saddam 

would not be welcome in their countries. Qatar’s Foreign 

Minister Hamad bin al-Thani, in reference to potential US 

requests to base American military forces in Qatar remarked, “We 

always consider requests from our friends. We consider the 

United States our ally.” Jordan, a country with close ties to both 

Iraq and to Palestinians, seemed to acquiesce to America, as well, 

when its Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher relayed, “Jordan has 

a strategic, political, and economic relationship with the United 

States, and certainly, Jordan will not jeopardize this 

relationship.”85

By late September, it seemed that negative Arabs opinion 

toward US foreign policy had ostensibly done little to actually 

create a fissure in government-to-government security relations 

between the US and Arab countries. At least with regard to the 

Gulf nations, US-Arab cooperation even expanded. Progress 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

71

included the continued construction of the joint Qatari-US airbase 

and a US air operations center at al-Udeid, photos of which 

appeared on Internet sites in the summer of 2002.86 As part of a 

trip around the Gulf, and at a conference in Kuwait on 21 

September 2002, the Commander of US Central Command, 

General Tommy Franks, remarked that US military forces in the 

Arabian Gulf have stepped up training with host militaries there. 

The day before, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister remarked that 

Kuwait would support action against Iraq, provided it had United 

Nations backing.87

Facts like the ones above hardly indicate a freeze in official 

relations in the short term or even the more ominous “clash of 

civilizations” predicted by Samuel Huntington. In his book, 

Huntington notes, “The twentieth-century conflict between liberal 

democracy and Marxist-Leninism is only a fleeting and superficial 

historical phenomenon compared to the continuing and deeply 

conflictual relation between Islam and Christianity.”88 Perhaps his 

comments are a bit premature when examining official US-Arab 

relations; however larger societal rifts could develop over time. 

Ideological and emotional differences may exist between 

America and its Arab partners, especially over the Palestinian 

issue, but a very pragmatic symbiosis still dominates the current, 

official relationship. America and its allies require access to Gulf 

oil, and Arab states like Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 

the United Arab Emirates are unlikely to soon abandon the 

security umbrella provided by US military forces. America 

represents a shield for Gulf countries against Iran and Iraq. 

Because the US and the Arab world are so inextricably linked in 

the economic and security spheres, Arabs’ negative perceptions of 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

72

US foreign policy is unlikely to create a real chasm in official USArab relations during the immediate-to-intermediate term. 

While official relations will continue generally unabated in 

the near future, and likely for at least the coming few decades, 

American officials would not be wise to disregard the dangers to 

US national security because of negative Arab perceptions of US 

foreign policy. The “Arab street,” or Arab populations in the 

Middle East from all socio-economic backgrounds, which many 

analysts regularly dismiss as irrelevant in Middle Eastern politics, 

often see relations with America quite different from their leaders. 

These disgruntled and marginalized individuals represent a 

growing pool of religious extremists or secular extremists driven 

by perceived injustice. Extremists pose a challenge to moderate 

Arab states’ long-term domestic stability. Additionally, 

extremists will threaten America by committing further terrorist 

acts against Americans and US facilities both overseas and within 

America’s borders. 

Ominously, the number of disgruntled Arab citizens—the 

same group that is largely hostile toward US policies—is rapidly 

growing. Most Arab governments have either no plans or poorly 

developed plans for dealing with a glut of un- or underemployed 

young people. A third of Saudis of working age are unemployed, 

and more than half the population is under the age of twenty.89 

Egypt, a country of great strategic importance to the US because it 

controls the entry and exit of US naval ships through the Suez 

Canal and because most US military air traffic en route to the 

Arabian Gulf over flies its territory, is now struggling to dole out 

unimaginative jobs to its burgeoning population. Fewer public 

sector jobs—a traditional social welfare safety net—handed out 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

73

each year equates to less loyalty by lower class Egyptians for the 

Egyptian government. 

One late morning in 1995 while in an Egyptian military 

building, the author woke up one of four young soldiers 

“guarding” the key to a bathroom door. One sleepy soldier 

opened the door to a bathroom for the author, which appeared safe 

enough without a lock. Egypt and other Arab government’s 

calculate that it is better to pay a soldier or public servant a salary 

of $100 or less than have that same individual unemployed and on 

the street—a lucrative target for recruitment by Islamic opposition 

figures. In short, angry Arab populaces across the Middle East, 

which have been demonstrating against Israel and the US in larger 

numbers than those seen in several decades, represent a real threat 

to the stability of Arab governments friendly to the US. Over the 

long term, Arab internal intelligence and security organizations 

will have to be more oppressive to subvert citizens opposed to 

their governments continually siding with the US, or Arab 

officials will have to take their people’s opinions more into 

consideration when drafting their responses to US policies. 

Arab popular scorn will undoubtedly motivate Arab 

extremists to continue to lash out at American interests. Each 

Israeli reprisal against Palestinians, especially ones employing 

American F-16 fighters or Apache helicopters, which attract only 

mild criticism by American administration officials unwilling to 

highlight the possible illegality of such Israeli action in terms of 

UN resolutions, further motivates Arab extremists to attack the 

US. American diplomats and American businesspersons will face 

increased risk of attack or kidnapping. Poor perceptions of the US 

in Arab countries hosting US forces will likely force the US 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

74

military presence—rather apparent to locals in some Middle East 

countries—to become and more isolated from Arab population 

centers, such as has been the case during the past decade in 

countries like Saudi Arabia. Force protection measures will 

become increasingly more crucial at US military forces, US 

embassies, and US business centers and compounds in the Middle 

East. 

The fact that a large percentage of Arab citizens hold US 

policies in contempt is unlikely to change in the near future due to 

the current difficult conditions in the Middle East. Because of 

disdain generated by America’s commitment to Israel as a special 

partner and because of differences between American and Arab 

positions over Iraq, Arab resentment is not likely to soon 

dissipate. However, there are several measures that the US can 

take to mitigate Arab perceptions of US foreign policy and even 

stem future contempt. Reducing the magnitude of Arabs’ negative 

perceptions will take a more determined and sustained effort by 

the US government, which must employ the complete gamut of 

political, economic, diplomatic, and informational (public 

diplomacy) instruments of power. 

Considering, again, the seminal issue in eyes of Arabs is the 

Arab-Israeli conflict, politically, the US would quiet millions of 

enraged Arab voices if the US would tenaciously and consistently 

push for an internationally-recognized Palestinian homeland, 

encompassing the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. As an 

admirable and courageous first step in the policy arena, President 

Bush and the United States called for the creation of a Palestinian 

state twice publicly in 2002. President Bush’s administration is 

the first US administration to formally take such a stance. On 12 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

75

March 2002, the US put forth a Security Council resolution, which 

was passed 14-0, “affirming a vision” of a Palestinian state and 

calling for an end to the violence in Israel/Palestine.90 Then, in 

another encouraging step, President Bush on 24 June 

unequivocally called for the creation of a Palestinian state. The 

President even criticized Israeli tactics toward the Palestinians, 

stating, “It is untenable for Palestinians to live in squalor and 

occupation.” He made references to the pre-1967 boundaries—

those before Israeli occupation of traditional Arab lands—as a 

starting point for Israeli-Palestinian discussions “based on UN 

Resolutions 242 and 338, with Israeli withdrawal to secure and 

recognized borders.”91

Unfortunately, however, President Bush has marginalized 

Chairman Arafat in the US Administration’s vision for a future 

Palestinian government. While Arafat is despotic and corrupt, and 

probably should go, he was recognized by the US, under the 

previous administration, as the elected leader of the Palestinians. 

The US must find a way to civilly marginalize Arafat, so that 

another, more enlightened Palestinian leader can emerge, without 

allowing Israel to repeatedly attack his headquarters. The 

administration has wisely criticized such aggressive Israeli action 

against Arafat but hesitates to actually alienate or punish Israel. 

Additionally, while the US vehemently emphasizes Iraqi refusal to 

abide by UN resolutions, it fails to take concrete steps to punish or 

rebuke Israel for failing to adhere to UN prescriptions. Certainly a 

tall order, to genuinely improve its image in the Arab work, the 

United States must be willing to pressure the Israelis to return 

historic Arab territories back to the Arabs (that they held before 

1967) for a Palestinian state, help broker a solution over how 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

76

Jerusalem can be equitably ruled or administered by both Israelis 

and Palestinians, and address the Palestinian refugee issue. 

Finally, America must place as much priority on solving the 

Israeli-Palestinian morass as it does on pursuing Saddam Hussein. 

The US should not abandon its special relationship with Israel, but 

America should not allow Israel to steamroll the Palestinians, 

either. 

Turning to the economic instrument of power, increased 

amounts of aid, properly accounted for once it is placed in foreign 

hands, must be granted to give the despondent members of 

struggling Arab societies hope of a better life. Instead of 

potentially seeing America as a rich, far-away land that is not 

concerned with the welfare of the world community, increasing 

amounts of American aid must be earmarked for less fortunate 

members of the international community. Financially assisting 

countries like Yemen, which is a hotbed for extremism, in a 

serious and substantial way, might even help strengthen Arab 

governments friendly to the United States. Encouraging in this 

regard is President George W. Bush’s 15 March 2002 speech at 

the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, where he 

promised a $5 billion increase in official US aid over three budget 

years, to begin in fiscal year 2004.92 While it is debatable if this 

amount will make a significant difference, the message sent to the 

Middle East and other developing countries is important. 

Realistically, aid dispersed must be monitored carefully to prevent 

money from ending up in the bank accounts of foreign 

government officials and their cronies. 

Another instrument of power that American officials should 

increasingly pay attention to is the diplomatic one. US 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

77

professional diplomats, including State Department Foreign 

Service Officers and military attaches, receive only minor public 

diplomacy training. According to the findings of an Independent 

Task Force on Public Diplomacy sponsored by the Council on 

Foreign Relations, only one hour of the seven-week course for 

new Foreign Service officers is dedicated to public diplomacy 

training.93 During training, military attaches also receive little 

training in presenting the US perspective on events. 

Additionally, America’s professional diplomats are grossly 

under-funded when it comes to entertainment funds and budgets. 

Because reimbursable representational funds are extremely tight 

for mid-level diplomats sent abroad—a US State Department 

diplomat can afford to host only a few dinners or functions in his 

home each year—American diplomats do not have the chance to 

properly mix in highly social Middle Eastern societies. While 

opportunities are limitless to spend time with Arabs while on 

assignments abroad, the unwritten rule in Arab society is that you 

must invite to be invited. In other words, if an American diplomat 

does not have proper funds to host dinners and functions, and also 

the inclination to spend extensive time with Arabs in a social 

setting, then that diplomat will not be consistently invited to Arab 

social functions. 

Real rapport between American diplomats and Arab foreign 

nationals, which will help dismantle distrust over time and 

introduce accurate American viewpoints to Arab citizens 

sometimes tainted by grossly inaccurate press reports, is not built 

by official handshakes. Confidence and trust is built by spending 

countless late nights together talking, eating Arabic food, and 

drinking coffee or tea. What might seem to some Americans as 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

78

idle talk and wasted time engaging in informalities builds genuine 

bridges between Arabs, who are typically social and hospitable by 

nature, and Americans seeking to help Arabs better understand the 

constraints and nuances of US foreign policy. Strong 

relationships built today between junior- and mid-level US 

diplomats and Arab citizens at all societal levels will be the 

cornerstones of future American-Middle East relations and will 

help overcome misunderstandings. 

Closely tied to diplomacy, and directly related to proactively 

shaping Arab perceptions of US foreign policy, is the 

informational instrument of power. The State Department has the 

primary responsibility for public diplomacy outreach programs, 

but educational and cultural exchange programs have suffered 

drastic cuts in recent years. Since 1993, funding for such valuable 

resources has been cut thirty-three percent from $349 million to 

$232 million.94 This trend must reverse itself as programs like the 

American Language Centers in several Arab cities provide not 

only English language training for young Arab students and 

professionals, but also put a human face on American values by 

placing dedicated American teachers in front of Arab audiences. 

Regarding mass media and the broadcast of US views to the 

Arab world, American music, movies, and popular culture are 

popular with Arabs, but the United States has done a rather poor 

job in recent times of actively explaining and promoting US 

public positions to the Arab world. Over the past decade, US 

government sponsored media programs, like the Voice of America 

radio network, have received less priority and funding. In 2002, 

Christopher Ross, a retired State Department official and former 

Ambassador to Syria remarked, “In the ten years between the Cold 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

79

War and September 11, we had forgotten about the outside 

world.”95 Public diplomacy programs are a proactive way of 

preventing disagreements over misinterpreted positions, and they 

create a more accurate public awareness in the Arab world of US 

intentions and positions. In short, there must be a concerted effort 

to deliver the “American message” to the Middle East in a format 

which appeals to Arabs.96

America’s image is suffering in the Arab world. As long as 

Arabs perceive that America is biased in favor of Israel, and as 

long as Arabs contend that America’s policies hurt common Iraqi 

citizens, US credibility will continue to suffer amongst Arabs. To 

ensure unhindered diplomatic and military access to the region 

well into the future and to ebb the tide of extremism projecting 

across the Middle East and into America itself, US policy makers 

must act with haste to improve America’s tarnished image by 

employing more expansive political, economic, diplomatic, and 

informational instruments of power. 

NOTES 

 

1

 League of Arab States Mission official, interviewed by author, 

Washington, DC, 19 December 2001. Throughout this paper, 

because the topics are often considered rather politically sensitive, the 

author does not list the names of the Arab individuals interviewed. 

Without anonymity, Arab sources might be hesitant to discuss such 

subjects with a diplomat or with an American military officer, despite 

the fact that the topics are unclassified. This stems in part from the 

sources’ concern over portraying their own Arab people in a negative 

light (this relates, in part, to Arab culture) and for fear of their own 

governments possibly enacting retribution against them. 

2

 “Secretary of State Colin Powell on CNN’s ‘Larry King Live,’” 26 

November 2001, US State Department web site, n.p., on-line, 

Internet, available from http://uninfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/ 

01112701.html. 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

80

 

3

 This paper is based mostly upon comments and writings from 

educated, elite Arabs. By “elite” the author means Arabs generally at 

the top of Arab society, which is a minority. (There is not a large 

middle class in Arab countries.) Most Arab elites interviewed for this 

paper have connections or at least inroads into Arab governments. 

Arab sources are typically government officials, wealthy private 

citizens—businessmen or other professionals—and journalists. Many 

are Western educated, and most have either traveled extensively or 

lived in the West or in the United States. From his discussion with 

Arabs, professional readings, and personal experiences in the Middle 

East, the author contends that the sources’ views are representative of 

dominant opinions in the Arab world. When it comes to the 

emotional issues discussed in this essay—Iraq and the Arab-Israeli 

conflict—the author believes the so-called “Arab street,” or bulk of 

Arab citizens, feel very much the same as those in their society who 

are wealthier or more educated. In fact, because the “Arab street” is 

less exposed to outside (and various) views, and more subject to 

government propaganda in places like Syria, the author believes that 

the general populace feels even more strongly than Arab elites that 

American policies are biased and unjust. For instance, in the spring 

of 2000, a poor Syrian policeman (most Syrian policemen are poor) 

spoke with the author in a street in Damascus. The policeman told 

the author that he did not like Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 

and US foreign policy; this was in the wake of the failure of the 

Geneva summit between President Hafiz al-Asad and President Bill 

Clinton. The policeman, who was likely exposed mostly to Syria’s 

government-controlled media, could not explain why he did not like 

US policies, only that he despised them. 

4

 Shibley, Telhami, “It’s Not About Faith: A Battle for the Soul of 

the Middle East,” Current History 100, no. 650 (December 2001): 

417. 

5

 Cameron W. Barr, “US Policy in Mideast under Scrutiny,” 

Christian Science Monitor Internet Edition, 13 September 2001, n.p., 

on-line, Internet, available from http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/ 

0913/p2s1-uspo.html. 

6

 William Quandt, “New US Policies for a New Middle East?,” in 

The Middle East and the United States: A Historic and Political 

Reassessment, 2nd ed, ed. David W. Lesch (Boulder, CO: Westview 

Press, 1999), 432. Quandt was a member of the National Security 

Council staff during the Nixon and Carter administrations; he was 

intimately involved in the Camp David Accords between Israel and 

Egypt. 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

81

 

7

 Shireen T. Hunter, Director of Islam Program at Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, interviewed by author, Washington, DC, 18 

December 2001. Hunter is also an occasional television commentator 

on Islamic, Middle East, and Central Asian events. 

8

 Fouad Ajami, “The Sentry’s Solitude,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 6 

(November/December 2001): 2-3. 

9

 Interviews, Damascus, Syria, June 1999-June 2001. 

10 Interview, Damascus, Syria, 16 June 2001. 

11 Numerous press items were released on this subject in January 

2002. For example, see, David B. Ottaway and Robert G. Kaiser, 

“Saudis May Seek US Exit,” Washington Post, 18 January 2002, n.p., 

on-line, Internet, available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/ 

wp-dyn/A64536-2002Jan17. 

12 Mecca is considered the first most holy city in the Islamic religion, 

while Medina is the second most holy city. Mecca was the birthplace 

of Islam’s prophet Mohammed Ibn Abdullah al Quraish, and the city 

is the site of the annual Islamic haj, or pilgrimage. In the year 622, 

Mohammed migrated from Mecca to Medina, and eight years later he 

triumphantly returned and conquered Mecca. Mecca is the site of the 

Grand Mosque, while the Great Mosque is located in Medina. 

13 Interviews, Damascus, Syria, June 1999-June 2001. 

14 Ibid. 

15 For purposes of this paper, the “Arab world” stretches from across 

North Africa, from Morocco to Egypt, through the Levantine states of 

Jordan, Syria, Israel/Palestine, into the Arabian Peninsula—including 

the Arabian Gulf countries, and into Iraq. This paper does not 

include opinion from peoples in Turkey, Iran, South Asia, or Central 

Asia, although individuals and states there, in many cases, would 

likely have similar thoughts. The paper is not concerned with Islamic 

opinion, per say, although the majority of people in the Arab world 

are Muslims. Considering Islamic versus Arab opinion toward 

American foreign policy opens up a separate (although sometimes 

common) set of concerns based on religion, or interpretation of 

religion. Instead, this paper seeks to explain complaints common to 

Arabs of various religions and ethnic sub-groups across the Arab 

world. 

16 Rick Francona, Ally to Adversary: An Eyewitness Account of 

Iraq’s Fall from Grace (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 

1999), 13, 16. 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

82

 

17 E-mail from Syrian who grew up in Syria and spent extensive time 

living in the Arabian Gulf, received by author, 13 March 2002. 

18 Interviews, Damascus, Syria, spring 2000. 

19 Interviews with Syrian businessmen, Syrians with family links to 

the Syrian government, and with Arab diplomats assigned to Syria, 

June 1999-June 2001. 

20 Ahmed Bouzid, “Why Do They Hate Us So Much?,” Washington 

Report on Middle East Affairs 20, no. 9 (December 2001): 14. 

21 Kamil Mahdi, “The Iraq Sanctions Debate: Destruction of a 

People,” Middle East International, no. 615 (24 December 1999): 

22. 

22 Interviews, Damascus, Syria, June 1999-June 2001. 

23 Ibid. Francona’s Ally to Adversary briefly covers the US-Iraqi 

security relationship during the 1980s, including sharing technical 

intelligence, 9-30. 

24 Interview with former Iraqi citizen and Defense Language Institute 

Arabic language instructor, Spring 1994. This instructor’s family left 

Iraq because of political repression. More specifically, Iraqi internal 

security personnel, who demanded her brother join the military, 

repeatedly sought him out. 

25 Francona, 17. See pages 14-19 for a good description of Iraq’s 

pervasive security climate. 

26 Interview with Gulf official, December 2001. 

27 E-mail from Syrian cited in footnote number two above. 

28 Interviews, Damascus, Syria, June 1999-June 2001. 

29 Ibid. 

30 Edward W. Said, “Gulliver in the Middle East” (an essay originally 

appearing in Al-Ahram Weekly, 26 February 1998), in The End of the 

Peace Process: Oslo and After, updated edition, (New York: 

Vintage, 2001), 241. 

31 Interview with Gulf official, December 2001. 

32 Following Iraq’s obstruction of UN weapons inspectors attempting 

to accomplish their duties, the US military initiated strikes, called 

OPERATION DESERT FOX, against Iraq on 16 December 1998. 

Targets included suspected WMD-associated facilities, surface-to-air 

missile sites, command and control facilities, airfields, and 

Republican Guard facilities. For additional information about the 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

83

 

operation, see Linda D. Kozaryn, “Saddam Abused His Last Chance, 

Clinton Says,” American Forces Information Service News Articles, 

17 December 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from 

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec1998/n12171998_9812171.htm

l and Paul Stone, “Desert Fox Target Toll Climbs Past 75 Iraqi 

Sites,” American Forces Information Service News Articles, 18 

December 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from 

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec1998/n12181998_9812182.htm

l. 

33 Arab governments, in general, maintain rather tight control over 

their societies. “Spur-of-the-moment” protests in Arab states are 

sometimes allowed by Arab governments as a means to let common 

citizens vent their anger. Protests are, in effect, a pressure valve 

meant to dissipate anger toward outside influences and to prevent 

Arab citizens from turning their frustrations toward their own 

governments. 

34 Interviews with various US diplomats at US Embassy Syria, 

Damascus, Syria, June 1999. 

35 The American Embassy in Damascus is located in the upscale 

Malki/Abu Romani district of Damascus. The Syrian Presidential 

offices and apartment are located approximately a half-mile away 

from the embassy. 

36 Bouzid, 14. 

37 Interview with Syrian businessman with strong professional and 

familial links to the Syrian government, Damascus, Syria, 25 May 

2001. 

38 Jamal Khashoggi, “War Against Terror: A Saudi Perspective,” 

Arab View, Fall 2001 (no date posted), n.p., on-line, Internet, 

available from http://www.arabview.com/article.asp?artID=105. 

39 Palestinians are not included here, since Palestinians have not 

achieved governance over a sovereign Palestinian state. Instead, as of 

early 2002, Palestinians held autonomy over limited territories in the 

West Bank and Gaza Strip. These are the areas that the Palestinian 

Authority hopes to incorporate into an actual, recognized state. 

40 E-mail from private Jordanian citizen living in Syria (in response to 

author’s e-mail questions), received by author, 4 November 2001. 

41 Interviews, Damascus, Syria, June 1999-June 2001. For an 

explanation of prominent US officials who opposed US official 

recognition of Israel upon creation of that country, see Robert D. 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

84

 

Kaplan, The Arabists: Romance of an American Elite (New York: 

The Free Press, 1993), 85-87. 

42 Interviews, Damascus, Syria, June 1999-June 2001. 

43 Group interview, Syrian Defense Minister LtGen Mustafa Talas, 

interviewed during visit of US Air Force War College, 14 March 

2001. 

44 E-mail from private Syrian (in response to author’s e-mail), 

received by author, 10 November 2001. 

45 William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the 

Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Washington, DC: The Brookings 

Institution, 1993),405-407, 411. 

46 Interviews, Damascus, Syria, June 1999-June 2001. 

47 The land Asad and the Syrians/Lebanese believed they could 

reacquire from Israel were territories on the Israeli-occupied Golan 

Heights and in Southern Lebanon, the return of which is called for in 

UN Resolutions 242, 338, and 425. Syria exercises tremendous 

control over Lebanese domestic and foreign policies. Historically, 

Lebanon was part of Greater Syria, before the colonial British and 

French powers carved up the Middle East. 

48 Interviews, Damascus, Syria, fall 2000. 

49 Patrick Seale, “Bye-Bye Dennis Ross,” Al Hayat (English version), 

11 November 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from 

http://www.mafhoum.com/press/sealeh2.html. The popular story 

circulating around Damascus at the time of the Clinton-Asad meeting, 

and directly thereafter, was that Asad had swum in Lake Tiberias and 

barbecued on its shore as a child. Asad, however, grew up in a 

village in the mountains of Syria, far from Lake Tiberias. It is more 

likely that he never visited the lake as a child. The line of reasoning 

went that since Syrians had access to the lake at one time, they must 

again—as a result of the peace process—have access to the lake and 

its eastern shore. 

50 Interviews, Damascus, Syria, 2000. 

51 E-mail from Syrian cited in note number 44 above. 

52 Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Al-Shara’, “H.E. Mr. Farouk AlShara’, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic, at 

the 56th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 

14 November 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from 

http://www.syrianmission.org/fmeb56.htm. 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

85

 

53 Syrian Ambassador to the United States, H.E. Rustom Al-Zoubi, 

interviewed by author, Washington, DC, 20 December 2001. 

54 Interviews, Damascus, Syria, May-June 2000. 

55 Interviews, Damascus, Syria, April 2000-June 2001. 

56 Interviews, Damascus, Syria, 2001. 

57 Zoubi interview. Note that Lebanon, until the colonial powers 

divided the Middle East up after World War One, was part of historic 

Syria. Hafiz al-Asad claimed that the division between Lebanon and 

Syria was artificial and that the populace in the two countries was 

merely “One people living in two lands.” 

58 Interviews, Damascus, Syria, June 1999-June 2001. 

59 Sara Roy, “Why Peace Failed: An Oslo Autopsy,” Current History

101, no. 651 (January 2002): 16. 

60 Before the 1967 Arab-Israeli (Six-Day or June) War, Jerusalem 

was a partitioned city, with Israel controlling West Jerusalem, and 

Jordan controlling East Jerusalem. Islamic, Jewish, and Christian 

holy sites were all located in then-Arab territories. 

61 Interviews with Palestinians and Syrians, Damascus, Syria, June 

1999-June 2001. 

62 Edward W. Said, “Gulliver in the Middle East” (an essay originally 

appearing in Al-Ahram Weekly, 26 February 1998), in The End of the 

Peace Process: Oslo and After, updated edition, (New York: 

Vintage, 2001), 241-242. 

63 Dr. Lama Jamjoum, “Palestinian Opinion Pulse,” from Jerusalem 

Media and Communication Center, Volume 2, no.4, June 2001, n.p., 

on line, Internet, available from http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/pop/ 

01/jun/pop4.htm. 

64 Augustus Richard Norton, “America’s Middle East Peace Crisis,” 

Current History 100, no. 642 (January 2001): 5. 

65 Roy, 13. 

66 Ibid., 12-13. 

67 Ibid., 16. 

68 Ibid, 15-16. 

69 Palestinian Peace Process Negotiator quoted in Debrorah Sontag, 

“The Palestinian Conversation,”New York Times Magazine, 3 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

86

 

February 2002, n.p., on-line, Intenet, available from 

http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/03/magazine/03PALESTINE.html. 

70 The first intifada, or Palestinian uprising, occurred from 1987-

1991. It is often credited with forcing the Israelis to the peace table. 

Regarding the first intifada, Dilip Hiro wrote, “Actions by the Israeli 

security forces—involving firings, curfews, harassment, arrests and 

house searches and demolitions—severely disrupted Palestinian life. 

During the first four years of the intifada 1413 Palestinians were 

killed. . . . The refusal of the Palestinians to call off the intifada, 

convinced the Israeli government of the futility of continued 

suppression of them and denial of their national identity and the right 

to self-rule, and paved the way for the Israeli-Palestinian Liberation 

Organization Accord in September 1993.” Dilip Hiro, Dictionary of 

the Middle East (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 123-124. 

71 The al-Aqsa Mosque, from where Muslims believe the prophet 

Mohammed ascended into heaven, is also in the direct vicinity of the 

Jews’ historic Temple Mount site. 

72 Author personally observed riots and demonstrations in Damascus 

in October 2000. 

73 Dr. Shafeeq N. Ghabra, “Violent Face of Extremism Unveiled,” 

Gulfwire: Voices from the Region, 1 November 2001, n.p., on-line, emailed to author. Gulfwire located at www.arabialink.com/GulfWire. 

74 Mustafa Kamel El-Sayad, “To An American Friend,” Al-Ahram 

Weekly On-line, no. 561, 22-28 November 2001, n.p., on-line, 

Intenet, available from www.//ahram.org.eg/weekly/2001/561/ 

op10.htm. 

75 “US Vetoes UN Terror Resolution,” USA Today.com, World, 15 

December 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from 

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2001/12/15/us-veto.htm. 

76 Dr. John Duke Anthony, “The Impact of the Palestinian Al-Aqsa 

Intifada on US Relations with Key Arab Countries: The GCC 

Region,” testimony delivered to the US House of Representatives, 

United States Congress, Washington, DC, 31 July 2001. 

77 Former US Defense Attaché to Saudi Arabia (and former US 

Defense Attaché to Syria) Col Bernard J. Dunn, interviewed by 

author, Washington, DC, 22 December 2001. 

78 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Ryan 

C. Crocker, United States State Department, interviewed by author, 

Washington, DC, 21 December 2001. 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

87

 

79 Discussions with senior Arab military officers in multiple Arab 

countries, August 2002. 

80 Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz quoted in Elaine 

Sciolino, “Saudi Affirms US Ties but Says Bush Ignores Palestinians’ 

Cause,” The New York Times on the Web, 29 January 2001, n.p., online, Internet, available from http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/29/ 

international/middleeast/29SAUD.html. 

81 Remarks delivered by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 

Africa and the Middle East Molly Williamson during National 

Council on US-Arab Relations conference, Washington, DC, 9 

September 2002. While overall trade with the Arab world was down, 

however, in Jordan, where between fifty and sixty percent of the 

population is Palestinian and thus seemingly motivated to closely 

scrutinize ties with the US over grievances, that country’s trade with 

the US was up by twenty-nine percent by early September 2002 in 

comparison with the January-September timeframe in 2001. This is 

despite ongoing fierce Palestinian and Israeli retribution and counterretribution in 2002. 

82 Donna Abu-Naser, “Saudi: US Can’t Use Kingdom to Attack 

Iraq,” Washington Post, 8 August, 2002, available from Gemstar EBook. Syria has undoubtedly been prompted to pragmatically 

cooperate with the US in the war against terrorism because Damascus 

has also historically opposed Islamic extremists. President Hafiz alAsad waged an internal war against the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria 

in the late 1970s and early 1980s, culminating in the death of multiple 

thousands in Hama in 1982. 

83 Howard Schnider, “Syria Evolves as Anti-Terror Ally,” 

Washington Post, 24 July 2002, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from 

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A60219-2002Jul24.html. 

84 Todd S. Purdum, “Saudis Indicating US Can Use Bases if UN 

Backs War,” New York Times, 16 September 2002, n.p., on-line, 

Internet, available from www.nytimes.com/2002/09/16/ 

international/middleeast/16IRAQ.html. 

85 Daniel Williams and Nora Boustany, “Arab Countries Bending to 

US Influence on Iraq,” Washington Post, 23 September 2001, page 

A-01, on-line, Internet, available from www.washingtonpost.com/ 

ac2/wp-dyn/A53133-2002Sep22. 

86 Walter Pincus, “Hussein Tries to Mend Fences with Neighbors: 

Officials Say Iraq Acts to Forestall US Attack,” Washington Post, 19 

July 2002, available from Gemstar E-Book. This article states the US 
Meyer—Arab Perceptions 

88

 

is spending $1 billion to upgrade and expand military facilities in 

Qatar. 

87 “General: US Set for Any Iraq Action,” Associated Press, 21 

September 2002, available through America Online. 

88 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of the 

World Order (New York, NY: Touchstone, 1996), 209. 

89 “Number of Jobless Saudis Hits 3.2 Million,” Reuters Press 

Service, 22 September 2002, available through America Online. 

90 “Text of UN Security Council Resolution on Mideast,” Reuters

Press Service, 13 March 2002, available through America Online. 

91 Karen DeYoung, “President Outlines Vision for Mideast: 

Palestinian Statehood Depends on Arafat’s Removal, Bush Says,” 

Washington Post, 25 June 2002, available Gemstar E-book. 

92 Andrzej Zwaniecki, “President Bush Committed to Development, 

State’s Larson Says,” Washington File, US Department of State 

International Information Programs, 18 March 2002, n.p., on-line, 

Internet, available from www.uninfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/

display.pl?p=/products/washfile/la.../newsitem.shtm 3/18/02. 

93 Peter G. Peterson, “Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism,” 

Foreign Affairs 81 no. 6 (September/October 2002): 89. 

94 Ibid., 93. 

95 Karen DeYoung, “Bush to Create Formal Office to Shape US 

Image Abroad,” Washington Post, 30 July 2002, A1, A13. 

96 A couple of encouraging recent developments have taken place in 

this area. In the spring of 2002, Radio Sawa began broadcasting to 

the Arab world in a format more attractive to young audiences. 

Additionally, the Bush Administration announced in the summer of 

2002 its plan to create an Office of Global Communications out of the 

White House as lead agent for public diplomacy.