alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §20307. Enforcement

#### (a) In general

The Attorney General may bring a civil action in an appropriate district court for such declaratory or injunctive relief as may be necessary to carry out this chapter.

#### (b) Report to Congress

Not later than December 31 of each year, the Attorney General shall submit to Congress an annual report on any civil action brought under subsection (a) during the preceding year.

(Pub. L. 99–410, title I, §105, Aug. 28, 1986, 100 Stat. 927; Pub. L. 111–84, div. A, title V, §587, Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2333.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was formerly classified to section 1973ff–4 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section.

#### Amendments

2009—Pub. L. 111–84 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a), inserted heading, and added subsec. (b).
### §1330. Omitted

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section, acts May 26, 1941, ch. 133, 55 Stat. 203; Dec. 26, 1941, ch. 626, §2, 55 Stat. 860; Dec. 26, 1941, ch. 636, 55 Stat. 872; Aug. 29, 1949, ch. 518, §3(b), 63 Stat. 676; July 14, 1953, ch. 194, §3, 67 Stat. 151; Aug. 28, 1954, ch. 1041, title III, §313, 68 Stat. 905, initially contained supplemental provisions relating to wheat and corn marketing quotas; marketing penalty for cotton and rice; crop loans on cotton, corn, wheat, rice, tobacco, and peanuts, but was amended generally in 1954 to make it inapplicable to corn. See section 1340 of this title.

Section was not enacted as part of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 which comprises this chapter.
§ 1900.01 Authority and purpose. ( a ) This part is issued under the authority of and in order to implement the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), as amended (5 U.S.C. 552); and in accordance with the CIA Information Act of 1984 (50 U.S.C. 3141); section 102A(i) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 3024(i)); and section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended (50 U.S.C. 3507). It contains procedures that CIA follows in processing requests for records submitted under the FOIA. The procedures in this part should be read in conjunction with the text of the FOIA and the Uniform Freedom of Information Fee Schedule and Guidelines published by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB Fee Guidelines).
( b ) Requests made by individuals for records about themselves under the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a) are processed in accordance with CIA's Privacy Act regulations, set forth at 32 CFR part 1901, as well as under this part.
( c ) Other than as expressly provided in this part, this part creates no right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

October 31, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver 131664-65(86) Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, IN RE CONTEMPT OF MARK ALLEN Justices MURDOCK

________________ _______________ __________/

AMERICAN AXLE & MANUFACTURING, Plaintiff-Appellee, SC: 131664, 131665 COA: 262786, 265111 Wayne CC: 03-320706-CZ

v

MARK ALLEN MURDOCK and JUANITA DENISE MURDOCK, Defendants-Appellants.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the motion for re consideration of this Court’s August 29, 2006 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously.

d1023 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 31, 2006

Clerk
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WOLFGANG NEBMAIER,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

JOSEPHINE COUNTY, a political entity in

the State of Oregon along with all related

regulatory entities, past or present, engaged

in the violation of 7:301, the Morrill Act of

Jul y 2nd, 1862. (in the following “Josephine

County” ),

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 18

- 35743

D.C. No. 1:18

- cv

- 01258

- MC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 19, 2018 **

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

Wolfgang Nebmaier appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his actio n alleging claims under the Morrill Act of 1862 , 7 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously conclud es this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

FEB 25 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 18

- 35743

§ 301 . We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.

Wilhelm v. Rotman , 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28

U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington , 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)

(order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Nebmaier’s action because the Morrill

Act of 1862 does not provide a private right of action. See UFCW Local 1500

Pension Fund v. Mayer , 895 F.3d 695, 698

- 99 (9th Cir. 2018) ( setting forth

circumstances under which the court may interpret a private right of action, and

explaining that a private right of action requires evidence of a congressional intent

to create a private right and a private remedy).

Nebmaie r ’ s request to strike defendant’s answering brief

, set forth in his

reply brief, is denied

.

Defendant’s pending motion (Docket Entry No. 15) is denied.

AFFIRMED.
### §1471j. Penalties

A person that disposes of any feed made available to a livestock producer under this subchapter other than as authorized by the Secretary shall be (1) subject to a civil penalty equal to the market value of the feed involved, to be recovered by the Secretary in a civil suit brought for that purpose, and (2) guilty of a misdemeanor and, on conviction thereof, subject to a fine of not more than $1,000, or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.

(Oct. 31, 1949, ch. 792, title VI, §612, as added Pub. L. 100–387, title I, §101(a), Aug. 11, 1988, 102 Stat. 931.)

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective 15 days after Aug. 11, 1988, see section 101(c)(1) of Pub. L. 100–387, set out as an Effective and Termination Dates of 1988 Amendment note under section 1427 of this title.

#### Inapplicability of Section

Section inapplicable to 2014 through 2018 crops of covered commodities, cotton, and sugar and inapplicable to milk during period beginning Feb. 7, 2014, through Dec. 31, 2018, see section 9092(b)(12) of this title.

Section inapplicable to 2008 through 2012 crops of covered commodities, peanuts, and sugar and inapplicable to milk during period beginning June 18, 2008, through Dec. 31, 2012, see section 8782(b)(12) of this title.

Section inapplicable to 2002 through 2007 crops of covered commodities, peanuts, and sugar and inapplicable to milk during period beginning May 13, 2002, through Dec. 31, 2007, see section 7992(b)(12) of this title.

Section inapplicable to 1996 through 2002 crops of loan commodities, peanuts, and sugar and inapplicable to milk during period beginning Apr. 4, 1996, and ending Dec. 31, 2002, see section 7301(b)(1)(L) of this title.
#### Dana Alia, Appellant, v Brian Fiorina et al., Respondents.

[833 NYS2d 761]—

Rose, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Stein, *1069J.), entered January 30, 2006 in Greene County, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

While plaintiff was riding his bicycle past defendants’ house, defendants’ dog ran into the road toward him, struck the front wheel of his bicycle and caused him to fall. Alleging both negligence and strict liability, plaintiff commenced this action to recover for his injuries. Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, alleging that they had no notice that their dog had any propensity to interfere with traffic. Supreme Court granted the motion, and plaintiff appeals.

The Court of Appeals has made clear that a cause of action for ordinary negligence does not lie against the owner of a domestic animal which causes injury *(see Bard v Jahnke,*6 NY3d 592, 597-599 [2006]; *Morse v Colombo,*31 AD3d 916, 917 [2006]). Rather, the sole viable claim is for strict liability and, to establish such liability, there must be evidence that the animal’s owner had notice of its vicious propensities *(see Bard v Jahnke, supra*at 596-597; *Collier v Zambito,*1 NY3d 444, 446-447 [2004]). As “[v]icious propensities include the ‘propensity to do any act that might endanger the safety of the persons and property of others in a given situation’ ” *(Collier v Zambito, supra*at 446, quoting *Dickson v McCoy,*39 NY 400, 403 [1868]), a dog’s habit of chasing vehicles or otherwise interfering with traffic could be a “vicious propensity.” However, in the absence of such proof, there is no basis for the imposition of strict liability *(see Hyde v Clute,*235 AD2d 909, 910 [1997]). Further, the alleged violation of a local leash law is irrelevant because such a violation is only some evidence of negligence, and negligence is no longer a basis for imposing liability. Nor will a violation of the local leash law give rise to an inference that defendants had knowledge of their dog’s propensity to interfere with traffic *(see Hansen v Perez,*12 AD3d 1141, 1141 [2004]; *Akley v Clemons,*237 AD2d 780, 783 [1997]).

Here, defendants established that, although their dog had occasionally run into the road and stood there, they knew of no incidents when it had ever charged or chased vehicles or impeded the flow of traffic. Nor had they received any complaints that the dog had ever interfered with traffic on the road in any way. This evidence was sufficient to shift to plaintiff the burden of raising a question of fact as to defendants’ knowledge that the dog had previously interfered with traffic. However, plaintiffs evidence that the dog was occasionally allowed to run loose and would then sometimes go into the road is insufficient to raise a question of fact on this issue *(see*
      *1070
      *Hansen v Perez, supra*at 1141; *Staller v Westfall,*225 AD2d 885, 885 [1996]).

Peters, J.E, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
HUC_CODE HOLE_DIRECTION_TYPE 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957

19020301D 19020302D 19020505V 19020601D 19020601V 19020602V 1 19050404V 19060205 D 19060304D 19060304V 19060401D 19060401H 19060402D 19060402V 19060403 D1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

11976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

1 32 38 5 22 12 1 9 2 7 29 23 6 29 29 9 13 1 1 2 1 3 3 12 7 9 11994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 1 3 1 1 1 1 4 1 3 1 8 1 1

1

2 1 1 7 13 1 8 4 5 3 8 3 7 2

1 27 20 24 10 3 7 8 12 7 4 1 1 1 4 1

1
### §20164. International cooperation

In carrying out the provisions of this subchapter, the Administration, subject to the direction of the President and after consultation with the Secretary of State, shall make every effort to enlist the support and cooperation of appropriate scientists and engineers of other countries and international organizations.

(Pub. L. 111–314, §3, Dec. 18, 2010, 124 Stat. 3355.)

| Revised Section | Source (U.S. Code) | Source (Statutes at Large) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 20164 | 42 U.S.C. 2484. | Pub. L. 85–568, title IV, §404, as added Pub. L. 94–39, §8, June 19, 1975, 89 Stat. 223. |

Section
EXHIBIT
23.1





Consent
of Independent


Registered
Public Accounting Firm





Provectus
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.


Knoxville,
Tennessee





We hereby
consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form
S-8 (Nos. 333-99639, 333-86896, 333-73994 and 333-109354), and on Form S-2 (Nos.
333-124951and 333-119619) of Provectus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. of our report
dated March 30, 2009, relating to the consolidated financial statements, which
appears in this Form 10-K.





/s/ BDO Seidman, LLP





Chicago,
Illinois


March 30,
2009
#### NORMAN v. CAMERON

No. 433P97

Case below: 127 N.C.App. 44

Petition by petitioners (Norman and Foust) for discretionary review pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 denied 6 November 1997. Motion by Attorney General to dismiss appeal allowed 6 November 1997.
§ 1903.3 State law applicable. ( a ) Unless specifically addressed by the regulations in this part, traffic safety and the permissible use and operation of vehicles within an Agency installation are governed by State law. State law that is now or may later be in effect is adopted and made a part of the regulations in this part.
( b ) Violating a provision of State law is prohibited.
### §543. Review of congressional committee structures

It is the sense of Congress that each House of Congress should review its committee structure in light of the reorganization of responsibilities within the executive branch by the establishment of the Department.

(Pub. L. 107–296, title XV, §1503, Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2309.)
P. 1 

# OAR Box 

# 1865 Prepped by Charmelle Mathews



### Document

Number: 

# 46 ) IV-E-3 4 Docket Number: 

# A-83-2 7

Printed 12/3/20089:15:29AM

Sheet 46 of 105P. 2 

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# C_2012138EN.01002201.xml

| 12.5.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 138/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.5.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/22

---

Judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal (Second Chamber) of 29 September 2011 — Mische v Parliament

(Case F-93/05) (1)

(Civil service - Appointment - Recruitment and simultaneous transfer to another institution - Grading under new, less favourable rules - Admissibility of the action - Interest in bringing an action - Action out of time)

(2012/C 138/40)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Harald Mische (Brussels, Belgium) (represented: initially by G. Vandersanden and L. Levi, lawyers, and subsequently by R. Holland, B. Maluch and J. Mische, lawyers)

Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: K. Zejdová and L.G. Knudsen, Agents)

Intervener in support of the defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Arpio Santacruz and I. Šulce, Agents)

Re:

Annulment of the Parliament’s decision classifying the applicant at grade A*6 following a competition published before the entry into force of the new Staff Regulations, under the less favourable provisions of those regulations (Article 12 of Annex XIII to Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 723/2004 amending the Staff Regulations of Officials) and an application for damages

Operative part of the judgment

The Tribunal:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders each party to bear its own costs; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders each party to bear its own costs;

| 3. | Orders the Council of the European Union, the intervener, to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Council of the European Union, the intervener, to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 315, 10.12.2005, p. 15 (case initially registered before the Court of First Instance of the European Communities under the Number T-365/05 and transferred to the Civil Service Tribunal of the European Union by order of 15.12.2005).

---
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.

47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 97-50137

(Summary Calendar)

_________________

RUSSELL L GANT,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

GARY JOHNSON, Director, Texas Department of

Criminal Justice, Institutional Division,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Texas

(W-96-CA-477)

July 9, 1998

Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Russell L. Gant, Texas prisoner # 640934, argues that the

district court erred in dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas

petition as barred by the one-year statute of limitations provided

in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
-2-

(AEDPA).

After the district court dismissed Gant’s habeas petition,

this court held that a habeas petition that is filed in the

district court within one year of the passage of AEDPA is timely.

See United States v. Flores, 135 F.3d 1000, 1005-06 (5th Cir.

1998). Gant filed his petition approximately three months after

the effective date of AEDPA. Accordingly, the district court’s

dismissal of Gant’s habeas petition is VACATED and the case is

REMANDED for further proceedings.

VACATED AND REMANDED.
#### (A) Wanda Wozniak et al., Respondents, v. Willie Dychowski et al., Appellants. (Aug. 1, 1962.) (B) George Doxater et al., Respondents, v. William Corin, Appellant. (July 2, 1962.) (C) Verline McMillan, Appellant, v. Frank Scherer et al., Respondents. (July 2, 1962.) (D) Anna Klein et al., Plaintiffs, v. Leo S. Bukowski, Defendant. Leo Bukowski, Respondent, v. Samuel T. Macaluso, Jr., Appellant. (June 18, 1962.) (E) Irma T. Petrossi, Appellant, v. Jack Galvin, Respondent. (July 2, 1962.) (F) William F. Reiber, Respondent, v. Walter F. Roberts, Appellant. (July 2, 1962.) (G) In the Matter of Pauline Fenu et al., Appellants, v. Clarence Foertch et al., Respondents, and Genevieve R. Renaud, Intervenor-Respondent. (Two eases.) (Aug. 9, 1962). (H) Erika Robb et al., Respondents, v. City of Buffalo, Appellant. (Aug. 9, 1962.)

[In each case] Appeal dismissed unless records and briefs are filed and served on or before date indicated.
§ 634.14 Restoration of driving privileges upon acquittal of intoxicated driving. The suspension of driving privileges for military and civilian personnel shall be restored if a final disposition indicates a finding of not guilty, charges are dismissed or reduced to an offense not amounting to intoxicated driving, or where an equivalent determination is made in a nonjudicial proceeding. The following are exceptions to the rule in which suspensions will continue to be enforced. ( a ) The preliminary suspension was based on refusal to take a BAC test.
( b ) The preliminary suspension resulted from a valid BAC test, (unless disposition of the charges was based on invalidity of the BAC test). In the case of a valid BAC test, the suspension will continue, pending completion of a hearing as specified in § 634.11. In such instances, the individual will be notified in writing that the suspension will continue and of the opportunity to request a hearing within 14 calendar days. ( 1 ) At the hearing, the arrest report, the commander's report of official disposition, information presented by the individual, and such other information as the hearing officer may deem appropriate will be considered.
( 2 ) If the hearing officer determines by a preponderance of evidence that the individual was engaged in intoxicated driving, the revocation will be for 1 year from the date of the original preliminary suspension.
( c ) The person was driving or in physical control of a motor vehicle while under a preliminary suspension or revocation.
( d ) An administrative determination has been made by the state or host nation licensing authority to suspend or revoke driving privileges.
( e ) The individual has failed to complete a formally directed substance abuse or driver's training program.
No. 8188.

#### State National Bank *v.*Williams, Recorder, etc.

(Decided January 12, 1904.)

Error to Circuit Court of Cuyahoga county.

*Messrs. Brewer, Cook & McGowan,*for plaintiff in error.

*Messrs. Johnson & Dunlap,*for defendant in error.

Judgment affirmed.

Spear, Davis, Shauck, Price and Crew, JJ., concur.
#### § 536.73 Statutory authority for the Military Claims Act.

The statutory authority for this subpart is contained in the Act of August 10, 1956 (70A Stat. 153, 10 U.S.C. 2733), commonly referred to as the Military Claims Act (MCA), as amended by 90-521, September 1968 (82 Stat. 874); Public Law 90-522, September 1968 (82 Stat. 875); Public Law 90-525, September 1968 (82 Stat. 877); Public Law 93-336, July 8, 1974 (88 Stat. 291); Public Law 98-564, October 1984, (98 Stat. 2918); and Public Law 103-337, October 1994 (108 Stat. 2664).
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2
 CERTIFICATE OF THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
   (1)
    
    The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2006, which
this statement accompanies, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period
ended March 31, 2006 fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of ElkCorp.
  By
    
    /s/ Gregory J. FisherGregory J. FisherChief Financial Officer
§ 631.12 Objectives. The primary objectives of off-installation operations are to— ( a ) Render assistance and provide information to Service members.
( b ) Preserve the safety, and security of service members.
( c ) Preserve good order and discipline among Service members and reduce off-installation incidents and offenses.
( d ) Maintain effective cooperation with civil authorities, and community leaders.
§ 635.12 Amendment of records. ( a ) *Policy.* An amendment of records is appropriate when such records are established as being inaccurate, irrelevant, untimely, or incomplete. Amendment procedures are not intended to permit challenging an event that actually occurred. Requests to amend reports will be granted only if the individual submits new, relevant and material facts that are determined to warrant their inclusion in or revision of the police report. The burden of proof is on the individual to substantiate the request. Requests to delete a person's name from the title block will be granted only if it is determined that there is not probable cause to believe that the individual committed the offense for which he or she is listed as a subject. It is emphasized that the decision to list a person's name in the title block of a police report is an investigative determination that is independent of whether or not subsequent judicial, non-judicial or administrative action is taken against the individual.
( b ) In compliance with DoD policy, an individual will still remain entered in the Defense Clearance Investigations Index (DCII) to track all reports of investigation.
###### Editorial Note on Part 724

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 724 appear at 65 FR 62616, Oct. 19, 2000.

#### § 724.811 Privacy Act information.

Information protected under the Privacy Act is involved in the discharge review functions. The provisions of SECNAVINST 5211.5C shall be observed throughout the processing of a request for review of discharge or dismissal.