Kenneth All

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included. NDU Press would appreciate 

reprints or reviews. 

NDU Press publications are sold by t

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First printing. January 1995 

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ISBN 0-16-045577-4 

vi 
Greater love hath no man 

that a man lay down his life fo

Joh
Environment ..................

Situations and Missions .....

IL OPERATIONAL LF~SONS LEA

pl~i~g ......................... 

Mandates and Missions .

Mission Analysis: Entry an

Exit Strategies ................

Multinational Conflicts ...

Rules of Engagement .....

Personnel Selection and T

Joint Planning ................

Deployment ....................... 

Airlift ......................... 

Sealift ........................ 

Pre-positioned Shipping .

Administrative Requirement

Conduct of Operations .........

Command and Control ...

Mission Execution .........
Appendt~ C: Missions and Tasks 

UNITAF Civil-Military Operatio

(CMOC) ......................... 

About the Author .................... 
experience can teach us about pe

learned how we might improve 

across the spectrum of joint oper

This book represents the f

tool--the Joint Universal L

System--is being used to evaluat

its totality. With it, Colonel 

assesses the operation from it

humanitarian relief through the d

peace enforcement. He has orga

learned for ease of reading and en

numerous concrete and anecd

Although focused on the opera

insights of this study should 

strategists and policymakers as 

Lessons are only truly le

incorporate them into our pla

tactics, and training--a process 

some time. The author has taken 

step by identifying and articu
Lieutentant General, 

President, National D

xli 
j

leadership and support for this pr

Colonel Susan Flores, USMC, 

Lewis, both of INSS, provided Indi

their hard work throughout the p

by their many helpful suggestio

took shape. Dr. Fred Kiley, Direct

Defense University Press, and h

George Maerz managed all 

publication process with 

professionalism. Mr. Don B

Contreras, Ms. Rhonda Gross, 

Medrano of the NDU Graphics Dep

their unique talents to the design 

the illustrations contained in this 

Theresa Chapman of the NDU Lib

Peters of JFQ provided helpful b

technical support. 

Special thanks are also due 

people who reviewed the draft an

helpful suggestions: Ambassado
during the Somalia operations. 

While sincere thanks are due 

errors of fact and interpretation a

sole responsibility of the author. 

xtv 
If today you are a soldier, a sailor

marine, then you know In some ve

that the world Is a changed and 

Far from ushering in an era of pea

the Cold War was quickly follow

Operations Just Cause and Des

even as our Armed Forces were be

Cold War levels, they were being 

new class of military mission

operations, in Somalia, In part

Yugoslavia, and (at this writing) 

Peace operations are unique 

conducted with the Increasing In

international community, usuall

from the United Nations and som

United States as the lead partn

drawn from a number of differen

partnerships can create some real 

sides, but there are two importan
teaching on national security iss

one of the products of that pro

cooperation of the Joint Staff, 

National Defense University's Inst

Strategic Studies examined re

operations in Somalia filed in the 

Lessons Learned System (JULLS

relate them to joint doctrinal prin

other research on this subject. 

throughout this effort has been 

most important lessons at the o

primarily those which might be en

joint task force planning le

headquarters of its major for

Because this level is the one that 

strategic and the tactical, some of 

relevant here as well, but to 

problem, those insights are usua

either causes or effects. 

What makes the Somalia expe

xvi 
that, as the level of conflict Intensif

changed more than others. The 

elements examined here also pro

glimpse of the challenges imposed 

chaos, where the effects of a 

environment were made even mor

warfare and the absence of govern

As its title Implies, this book e

operational issues raised by our r

in Somalia, especially those 

teamwork required by joint forces

look at those operational 

comprehensive history either of U.S

Somalia or even of the key fun

examines. It is best described as a 

action review--a preliminary look a

major insights based on the bes

available. Where relevant, these in

compared to more detailed anal

phases of the operation, such 
through humanitarian assistance 

their military responsibilities w

professionalism. In fact, those sk

attitudes were especially important 

the effects of many of the proble

Those who took such initiatives an

"work-arounds" should be the firs

the importance of learning from th

A final caveat is that Somalia 

that occurred under unique circums

operations under different circumst

produce different results. Common 

that the lessons offered here shou

against changing mission requ

conditions. Future missions, howev

contain enough parallels--of failed 

hardships brought about by natu

made disasters--that the lesso

Somalia warrant close attention. 

xviii 


At the end of World War II, the 

helped to found the United Nations 

the original signers of the U.N. C

other provisions, the Charter 

important sections to help its mem

international peace and security,

Charter never uses the word, the g

these measures is peacekeeplng, 

observer or truce supervisory 

occurred after a conflict, when com

to have the benefit of a trusted thir

a buffer. Traditionally, these miss

known as "Chapter VI actions," 

section of the Charter deals wit

settlement of international disp

Chapter VII contains the term pea

referring to military intervention au

U.N. Security Council-- blockades, 

sanctions, forceflll disarmamen

military action. These categories h
and 1992. There is another impo

will come as no surprise to anyo

stepped in to break up a barrac

this same time, more than 800 pe

43 countries have been killed wh

the U.N. flag. 

There is no doubt that the incr

peace operations has strained t

United Nations to manage t

Because it deals more with dipl

control of military operations, U.N

New York maintains a relatively s

to oversee peacekeeping oper

Independent staff agency has trad

all administrative matters, includi

recently, the organization also lack

center capable of maintaining 24

cations with these worldwide de

every peacekeeping operation ta

U.N. control, but those that do h

organization or staff structure for 

However, they all answer to the 
time to be agreed upon and imp

especially important to note that t

laid down two basic principles for 

• Although the President will 

commandof U.S. forces, he does ha

to place American soldiers under 

control of a foreign commander 

serves our national interests. The 

and operational control are define

in chapter II. In fact, that situati

on many occasions in our military 

Revolutionary War to Desert Storm

• The larger the peace ope

greater the likelihood of combat, th

that the United States will agre

operational control of its for

commander. Participation of 

operations likely to involve com

conducted under the operationa

United States, an ad hoc coalition

regional security organization suc
Armed Forces to function more 

team. Although American for

operations in Somalia without 

standard peacekeeping doctrine

suggests that the following 

publications are especially rel

missions: 

• The most fundamental pr

we organize and operate are outl

0-2, Unified Action Armed Forc

key publication provides basic d

governingj oint operations, especi

control and the formation of join

• Another helpful tool in joint 

Joint Pub 5-00.2, joint Task 

Guidance and Procedures. 

discussions and detailed checklis

assist commanders and planne

joint policy and doctrine into oper

especially on short-notice contin

• Issued during our opera
p

termination as well as those that 

Unity of effort. The princi

command in war is difficult to atta

other than war. In these op

government agencies may often ha

nongovernmental organizations an

relief organizations playing import

Command arrangements may ofte

defined and many times will not in

authority as we in the milita

understand it. Commanders 

atmosphere of cooperation to achi

unity of effort. 

Security. Nothing about p

changes the moral and legal r

commanders at every level to take w

are required to protect their forces 

Inherent in this responsibility is 

capable of a rapid transition 

operations to combat whenever 

However, what makes this respons
may also change frequently. 

Perseverance. Peace operat

years to achieve the desired ef

underlying causes of confronta

rarely have a clear beginnin

resolution. Although this is a prin

debates about U.S. long-term 

operational application is that c

balance their desire to attain 

with a sensitivity for the long-te

that may impose some limitation

I~tlma¢ 7. Legitimacy is a fu

control over territory, the consen

and compliance with certa

standards. Each of these fac

actions not only of governme

peacekeepers--whose presence 

depends on the perception that th

reason for them to be there. D

where a government does not ex

must avoid actions that would 
and inquisitiveness. The common 

qualities is quality Itself: the qual

is fundamental to everything we 

the demanding environment of pe

If there is a common though 

running through these joint doctr

is that diplomatic, military, an

actions must be closely Integrat

operation. When correctly planne

each of these actions should rein

well-conceived humanitarian acti

will win friends among the local p

that wlll Improve the security situ

military tasks easier. With the ben

it is possible to see that operations 

successful when they recognize

diplomatic, military, and humani

and remarkably less so when they 
size, a land mass of almost 25

miles, nearly the size of New Eng

looks much like the low dese

American southwest--dry with 

and an annual rainfall of less th

drought that has plagued East A

the last decade has been esp

Somalia, with food and water sup

some areas, nonexistent. 

peacekeepers were forced to brin

if not all, of what they would eat 

I,in~ of Com~mmlcmticm, The 

network of paved roads runs m

main coastal cities of Mogadishu

and Berbera; however, this netwo

disrepair. Interior roads are mos

grading and other maintenance 

Mogadishu has the country's m

airport, although there are se

airstrips throughout the country. 

in the back country are 

12 ~IvlALIAOPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED 

complement to the limited air transpo~ation 

network, Somalia has a long coastline, but harbor 

facilties are either undeveloped or have fallen into 

disrepair. Mogadishu, Klsmayo, and Berbera have 

only limited cargo handling facilities. Because 

widespread civil unrest made normal maintenance 

and repair impossible, there was no functioning 

telephone system in Somalia. The combined effects 

of these factors made mobility and communications 

consistent problems for peace operations-- 

especially when measured against the need to help 

feed thousands of starving people. 

The frei~h~ PVT FP~gKLIN J. pulls into 

Ktsmgajo, ~ivertng supplies ~d fo~ st~affs in support 

of Op~n Restore Hope. 

Poliii_eal. ~though drought conditions were 

partially responsible for this situation, civil war had 
amounts of individual and heavy 

their way from government c

armories. After the fall of the Siad 

1991, the political situation deter

clans in the northern part of the 

secede. With drought condit

everywhere, clan warfare and ba

spread throughout Somalia. By 

conditions brought about a fa

proportions: more than one-half 

had perished of starvation and a

more were threatened. Somalia 

geographical expression rather tha

whatever it was called, the scal

suffering there had now captured 

the international community. 

Situations and Missions 

U.S. involvement in Somalia pr

three stages: Operation Pro

humanitariax~ assistance nlis
United Nations Operation in Som

whose mission was to provide 

and facilitate the end of hostilitie

50 UNOSOM observers sent in 

noticeable difference in either en

securing relief supplies but in 

Nations asked for increased 

President Bush responded by or

to support Operation Provide Rel

1992 through 9 December 1992. 

Organized by CENTCOM, th

operation was to "provide milit

support of emergency humanitari

and Somalia." Among lts objectiv

• Deploy a Humanitarian A

Team (HAS'I] to assess relief requ

and Somalia 

• Activate a Joint Task For

emergency airlift of food and sup

and Northern Kenya 

• Deploy (4) C-141 aircra

aircraft to Mombasa and Wajir, 
Operation 

Prcxnk~ ReUef 

(UNOSOM I) 

Restore Hope 

(UNITAF) 

USFORSOM 

(UNOSOM II} 

Dates 

15 Aug 

1992- 

9 Dec 

1992 

9 Dec 

1992- 

4 May 

1993 

4 May 

1993- 

31 Mar 

1994 

UN Security 

Council 

Resolution 

UNSCR# 

751 

dtd 24 Apr 

1992 

UNSCR# 

794 

dtd 3 Dec 

1992 

UNSCR# 

814 

did 26 Mar 

1993 

Despite the reinforcement 

throughout the next several mont

situation grew worse. In Novemb

with relief supplies was fired upon 
force. The U.N. mandate implie

missions: to provide humanitari

the Somali people, and to restore 

Somalia. Because of the implic

use force in establishing a secure 

the distribution of rclicf supplies

that the mandate referred to C

U.N. Charter, 

The CENTCOM mission s

reflected these objectives: "Whe

NCA, USCINCCENT will conduc

military operations in Somalia to 

air and sea ports, key Install

distribution points, to provide 

passage of relief supplies, pro

convoys and relief organization 

assist UN/NGO's in providing hu

under U.N. auspices. Upon esta

environment for uninterrupted 

USCINCCENT terminates and 

operations to U.N. peacekeeping 
~E OPERATIONAL CONTEXT 17 

U.S. _N~y S~es from Naval Mob~ Construction 

Battalion 1 pour concretejLoors in classrooms as p~ of 

a cWlc action progr~ of Operation Restore Hope. 

During its e~stence from 9 December 1992 

through 4 May 1993, UNITAF ultimately involved 

more than 38,000 troops from 21 coalition nations, 

~cluding 28,000 Americans, It clearly succeeded in 

its missions of stabilizing the security situationespecially by confiscating "technlcals," the crewse~ed weapons mounted on trucks and o~er 

wheeled vehicles. With better security, more relief 

supplies were distributed throughout the country, 

staving off the immediate threat of staPeation in 

many areas, However, plans for the termination of 

UNITAF and an orderly handoff of its functions to 

the permanent peacekeeping force, christened 

UNOSOM II, were repeatedly put off. U.N. 

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali urged delay until 
directed peacekeeping operation un

VII enforcement provisions of 

including the requirement for 

disarm the Somali clans 

• It explicitly endorsed th

rehabilitating the political institutio

of a member state 

• It called for building a secu

throughout the country, includin

region that had declared its indep

These far-reaching objectives went 

much more limited mandate of UN

those of any previous U.N. operatio

them, a full U.N. peacekeeping st

up in Somalia, headed by retired U

Jonathan Howe as Special Repre

Secretary General with Turkish Lie

Cevlk Bir as force commander 

multinational contingent. 

Rather than being in charge. U

in this operation was primarily con

of logistical support, with over 3
TIlE OPERATIONAL COI~ i 9 

specifically committed to that mission. 

Significantly, however, the United States was also 

asked to provide a Quick Reaction Forcewsome 

1,150 soldiers from the US ~my's 10th Mountain 

Division--that would operate under the tactical 

control of the Commander, U.S. Forces, Somalia. 

~e mission of the 4,500 Ame~can forces 

supposing UNOSOM Ii from 4 May 1993 to 31 

March 1994 was as follows: "When directed, 

UNOSOM II Force Command conducts military 

operations to consolidate, expand, and maintain a 

secure environment for the advancement of 

humanita~an aid, economic assistance, and 

political reconciliation in Somalia." 

Major G~eral Thomas Montgomery recet~s b~k briefs 

u~th the U.S. Q~k R~tton Force. 
other units, a major engagemen

October in which 18 Americans w

wounded--the bloodiest battle 

peacekeeping operation. Sho

President Clinton announced 

withdrawal of American troops th

31 March 1994. U.S. forces large

to force protection missions from 

mission until the withdrawal was 
Each of the three distinctly differ

operations in Somalia--Prov/de 

Hope, and IINOSOM II--can te

peacekeepers some important le

areas covered in this chaper: the 

ment, conduct and support 

operations. 

Planning 

The job of the mission planner is a

anticipating requirements even 

statement has been formalize

literally thousands of details 

operation to be successful or to g

those details when the concept 

changes, and doing all of these t

pressures that would cause brea

mortals. The CENTCOM planner
pgg

National Command Authorities (

mandate shapes not only the miss

that we perfos,,, but the way we ca

ho . 

• Second only to the basic 

command, the orgn=l~tion of the Jo

(JTF) is key because it must balanc

continuity with the integration 

capabilities. Organizational me

augmenting an existing headqua

marking a standard but adaptibl

packag~ but the selection of the nuc

driven by standard mission essentia

as mission, enemy, troops, terrn

available. 

Prior to establishing the airlift for 

CENTCOM dispatched a Humanitar

Survey Team to Somalia. No soo

arrived than the team found th
for the JTF. Although this choice 

a "Marine Corps flavor" to the ope

a continuity of relationships and 

was critical in view of the larger p

the JTF. Its particular challeng

multinational coalition of 

countries--many of them c

demonstrate broad internationa

U,N. mandate than to provide 

military capabilities. Even more 

need to align these operations wi

as many as 49 different U.N. a

relief agencies--none of which 

follow military directives. 

Not only was unity of comma

these circumstances but there 

control problem that offers an 

future planners, because the si

units forming the multinational 

from platoon to brigade. A rea

control was worked out, w

participants contributing brigad
under UNITAF included a Civil-Mil

Center and the division of the co

Humanitarian Relief Sectors that a

distribution of food and the assignm

areas of responsibility. The relativel

was also important in avoiding subs

by U.N. officials for UNITAF to beco

engaged in disarming the clans

commander limited the confisca

individual weapons, "technicals," a

that were a clear threat to his forc

The U.S. mission to support U

contrast, was considerably mor

although this fact may not h

appreciated when the operation be

command arrangements reflected 

operation was to take place unde

with U.S. Major General Thomas 

acting both as Commander, U.S. 

(USFORSOM), and as deputy to 

Commander in Somalia, Lieutenan

Bir. The potential for conflict in th
OPEPJkTIONAL LESSONS LEARNED 25 

of command relationships was clear: as a U.S~ 

Commander, MG Montgomery served under the 

command and control of CENTCOM, wl-dle as 

deputy to General Bir, he served under the 

operational control of the United Nations. Even 

more significant, however, was the fact that 

General Montgome~ ca~ed out his responsibilities 

through an unusual arrangement of operational 

and tactical control over assigned U.So forces. 

~ese key distinctions in levels of authority are 

shown in figure 4; their implications are discussed 

in pages 53-74. 

Colander, Central C~amrnen~ Generol Hoar is greeted 

by LtG~ Joh~ton, commcm~ of Restore Hope 

Mogadishu Airport. 
well-Ibrmed central nucleus bu

together in some haste--compos

Army officers individually recruite

Staff and units worldwide. 

While there may have been so

that such staff arrangements we

needed in a situation in which the 

longer had the lead, foot-dragging 

further complicated the transition 

and UNOSOM II. The initial slown

the UNOSOM lI staff was agg

composition; it was formed increm

voluntary contributions of the 

contingents who detailed personne

There certainly was an urgent ne

circumstances to insure a proper 

the key staffs of the incoming an

components, General Johnston h

that there was approximately a 

between the UNITAF and UNOSO

the incoming and outgoing staff co

co-located, and that detailed SO
,,

_E~,~-~,~_ ~ ~ 

UNISOM II AND USFORSOM 

• 

..... • 

I UNOSOM" I CENTCOM 

iBIR (TUR)*** I __ * 

DEP UNISOM l ' 

..... : Montgomery"r'l , USFORSOM 

i I ~ Montgomery "* :: .= ...... 

(C~C ON ) ~AC C~") (~ACO~) LI~ RE

_ I ~h. ~~J ..

~sP~oo~ ! o~ I I so.o~, .~! 

• _ L~._. 1 .... 
UNOSOM II mission--a fact that c

for the future that, if such transit

avoided altogether, they should at 

developed by the incoming and the 

Mission Analysis: Entry and Ex

Lessons 

• Although they are to some ex

the rntgsion, entry and exit strategie

planning criteria: they govern h

expect to go in and under what con

expect to get out. 

• One major military responsJJ)

operation is dete..-Ining an

success---keeping the chain of c~

as to where we are between entry 

avoiding the inevitable pressure

creep. ~P 

Examp/es 

Becausc it was relatively brief, the 
(OPCON) 

Tactical Control 

(TACON) 

may be exercised 

echelon at or belo

combatant comma

*Includes authorit

aspects of military 

training necessary 

missions assigned 

*Does not include 

for logistics or ma

administration, di

organization, or u

*Command author

attached forces or 

capability made av

*Limited to the de

local direction and 

or maneuvers nec

assigned missions 

S
an event that identified both a speci

and milestones such as the build

When these milestones were not rea

flagged a problem: how that problem 

however, is another matter. Althou

was not complete, U.S. forces were 

schedule. While their depart

represented a successful conclusion 

mission (as well as a useful signal to 

the lack of an effective trans

complicated conditions for both the 

exit for U.S. forces supporting UNO

Although both UNITAF and U

authorized as peace-enforcement m

Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, th

mandate reflected a consider

commitment of both security and 

assistance. This mandate, howeve

itself an invitation to the increasin

forces in combat situations, In fa

originally committed the United Sta

UNOSOM II believed that American 
him. In the aftermath of the 5 Ju

killed 24 Pakistani peacekeepers, 

played a prominent role in drafti

Concil Resolution 837, which 

apprehension of those parties r

resolution constituted another d

the mission, because its term

translated into a manhunt for Mo

Because those operations cle

capabilities of other UNOSOM II 

an immediate expansion in the 

Reation Force--now backed 

helicopters from the 10th Moun

well as Air Force AC-130 gunships

manhunt for Aideed led to the com

Force Ranger and to the cli

Mogadishu on the night of 3-4 O

2"nls deepening involvement 

combat operations during UNOS

criticized as "mission creep," des

these changes in both mission and 

resulted from specific decisions 
ways that should call into quest

mission and the mandate. In f

measures of success may well be th

reductions in the level of violence. O

Indicators may be expressed in 

numbers of children being fed, gall

water being pumped, or weapons be

While specific criteria will depe

mission, all must be capable of a

basic question: "How will we know 

won?" 

Multinational Contingents 

Lessons 

• Because multinational force

coalitions of the willing, p!Rnners m

the reduced tempo with which a 

conducts peace operations. 

• Different national capa

international dlfferences also aff

planning and the reality of peace op

....................................... ..............................................................
critical elements relating to 

participation in a peace operat

relationships, organization, logi

bilities, and even accounting p

difference was that in Restore Hop

reference were primarily negotiat

United States as the leader of the 

with UNOSOM II, these terms were 

the United Nations. 

No serious problems appear 

among the multinational conting

Restore Hope, possibly as the resu

decision to have the major contrib

send liaison officers to CENTCOM 

prior to dispatching their forc

General Johnston has also n

command arrangements outlined 

both unity of command and un

despite the challenges of leadin

diverse coalition: 
terms of reference became more 

Because most multinational conting

ours--make it a point to stay in c

their national capitals, concerns o

hunting for Aldeed grew along wit

potential for combat. The challenge 

a coalition force under these circum

seen in the subsequent statement 

Commander Lieutenant General Bi

lack of command authority over the 

as the most significant limitation o

or any other one organized unde

Certainly the authority of futu

commanders is a topic that will b

for some time to come. 

Another critical element for the 

difference between what is planned 

shows up. It is a basic fact of intern

many of the poorer countries that 

participated in peace operations 

because duty with the United N

portion of their military budget
operating. The equipment multinat

with them is not likely to be intero

identifying the most critical item

made to work together Is especia

communications and ammunition 

two of the more obvious examples. 

Rules of Engagement (ROE) 

• ROE are not only life and 

but also critical elements in d

success or fAil~re of a peace operat

that the dete~.~:lnation of ROE 

decision. 

• As h~mnt as they are, R

only to the extent that they can be 

applied by the forces carrying 

operation: that means keeping th

direct, and unclassified. 
p

three issues: the proper use 

confiscation and disposition of wea

handling of civilians detained by m

The most critical issue involved th

and the circumstances In which it w

With admirable simplicity, the 

listed four basic "no's:" 

• No "technicals," such as tr

mounted machine guns 

• No banditry 

• No roadblocks 

• No visible weapons. 

Because crew-served weapons--s

technicals--were seen as parti

regardless of whether the crew 

hostile intent, UNITAF comm

authorized to use "all necessary forc

and demilitarize them. But what did 

force" really mean? Did it amount 

sight?" UNITAF commander Mari

General Robert Johnston decided 

directed commanders to challenge 

........................................ .......................
escalated and resulted in Fragme

issued by the U.N. force commande

"Organized, armed militias, techn

crew served weapons are conside

UNOSOM Forces and may be e

provocation" (emphasis added). T

line of continuity between that 

increasing involvement of U.S. fo

operations. There was a noticeab

well in the way U.S. forces interp

stressing aggressive enforcemen

national contingents emphasized 

responses before using deadly forc

continued In effect until after U.S. 

force protection posture pending t

In January 1994, after a Mari

engaged a machine gunner atop 

were again amended to exclude 

collateral damage could not be co

These experiences suggest that 

applied as the direct result of care

command decisions, decisions th
move. In fact, there is an advant

that ROE are provided to the bellig

to know and firmly understand 

game. Finally, while on-scene co

generally be free to modify 

conditions on the ground, frequen

ROE should be avoided. The old 

"Order---Counter-order--Disorder" 

vital rules as well. Keep the ROE 

keep them consistent. 

Personnel SeIeetion and Train

Lesson 

The selection and ~m~ning of l~rs

Important for peace opera,fort

conventional mllltaxy opera,lobs--

Inol'e $0. 

l~¢ampI~ 

All three phases of the Somalia ope

the importance of this lesson as 
Some understanding of the diff

Chapter VI peacekeeping requ

Chapter VII enforcement action is 

In peacekeeping, Joint Pub 3-07.3 

up the required mindset: 

Peacekeeping requires an adjustm

and approach by the individual 

circumstances different from th

found on the field of battle--an a

suit the needs of peaceable Interv

than of an enforcement action. 

In addition to the individual c

discussed by that publication, the 

ones are probably good judgment a

action. 

Enforcement actions require al

addition to the ability to transition 

scale combat operations when 

Montgomery has noted the need fo

predeployment training standards
mission. 

One final point: peace ope

premium on certain specialists 

identified early and placed near 

deployment--possibly on the fir

include: trained Joint Operation

Execution System (JOPES) oper

specialists (especially those with ex

procurement), logisticians, law

specialists, WWMCCS ope

transportation organizers, public 

military police, combat engineers

operations specialists (PSYOPS), 

experts, as well as special forces 

important are people with specific 

language and the country. Becau

shortage of people with a working k

Somali language, linguists wer

contract both In the United State

Although this recruitment raised 

questions of operations security

proved very effective for most situa
• Turbulence is a constant~ it 

when you have to balance t

requiren~ts to plan an oper

flexibility needed by those wh

carrying it out. 

• While it may have certain 

Operations l~n~l~g and Ex

(JOPES) is the baseline syste

deployments, including those s

operations. 

l~mlples 

The 28,000 troops deployed duri

clearly presented the most chal

problems, beginning with the long

needed to establish "strategic air b

bases and other facilities being re

Given the air distances between t

and Somalia, overflight rights, re

route support arrangements req

time and effort to arrange. Curren
deployment always place great de

very limited infrastructure, but esp

like Somalia. That situation wa

because, in the words of the report

In contingencies, the tendency is f

consider themselves to be of 

importance that their presence is 

country first. Not everyone can 

first .... Higher rank should not 

higher precedence for arriving in-c

A better approach for the future, it 

be to organize JTF headquarters in 

with its associated logistics and co

and to deploy them in success

capabilities are added to the force. T

a reasonable approach when d

particularly austere operational env

allowing JTF commanders a better 

tailor forces and their support 

situation at hand. 
convoluted planning process. One 

(communications) staffwas not as

early enough to influence 

plannning, and the J6 director 

arrive in country until 2 weeks af

of UNOSOM II. 

Consistently strong opinions 

about the JOPES during all phase

operation. Complaints included 

of user-friendliness, the Infl

procedures, and the difficulty o

from other sources. Most obse

correctly note that the system 

planning tool that is also the back

operations system. The system's 

the point that JOPES takes discipl

Ideally with specifically trained pe

you don't want to go to eithe

operations without JOPES-smart 

when they are present, howeve

remember that there is a built-in 

the discipline needed to run that 
changes with a vengeance. Within 

changes to unit types, personnel, 

deployment dates had been 

making a hash of ARCENT's carefu

JOPES operators at ARCENT--n

armed-- labored for weeks to mak

of corrections required to ensu

equipment, and lift were in pr

Thereafter, the authority to mak

retained by the higher command. 

Deployment 

Possibly because they have a 

thankless as the joint planner, tho

conduct deployments of operation

remind us that amateurs talk abou

professionals talk about logistics. B

together in the execution of the b

power projection: airlift, sealift, an

equipment. The major share of th

for deployment rests with TRANSC
y 

Airlift 

• Although airll/t usually accc

perce~t of a total deployment, it 

percent--especlally in peace ope

• Data have to be managed 

other aspect of the operation

bookkeeping errors can cause ver

Example~ 

Airlift Is critical to a peace o

reasons: in most cases it is th

respond to a crisis and, until the 

it is the only way to sustain the in

of peacekeepers. These were esp

considerations throughout the S

because the Mogadishu airport 

handling no more than two ai

These space limitations were a 
Despite the remarkable succe

forecasting was a problem in t

shipment of hazardous cargo (usua

ammunition) and the movement 

supplies (food, water and othe

Hazardous cargo always requ

clearances and becomes an esp

issue when commercial carri

chartered. The movement of susta

became a problem early in Prov/de 

the lack of an interface between 

Military Standard Transportatio

Procedures (MILSTAMP) do

difficulties surmounted only th

work-arounds, 

Data differences also caused p

Time-Phased Force Deploym

supporting both Restore Hope a

Because the TPFDD expresses the 

concerning the kinds of units sent 

as well as the time they will enter 

it is built around Unit Line Num
the deployment of armies. In so

example, telephone calls, faxes, an

checks were needed to verify that 

reality" matched the airlift requi

the automated data base. Finally

airlift support from coalition 

UNOSOM II routinely set unreali

that were themselves based more 

guesswork than well-constructed 

Sealif( 

Lessons 

• As with airliil, data have t

much as any other as

operation--because small bookk

cause very large problems. 

• The "other 95 percent!' of a d

requirements that come by se

opport~m3ty to build a base w

peace operations for as long 

requires. However, the Joint persp
completely successful in overcom

data formats. The net effect of 

difficulty in managing TPFDD 

including late changes, inaccura

unreliable information--made sea

consistent a problem as it had bee

Several coordination issues und

that in logistics the integration of j

perspectives is not always clear. O

basic problems was over command 

the seaport of Mogadishu--a c

because the port facilities were in 

that only one ship could be han

There was some confusion over wh

Marine Corps, or Army was to be 

"common user seaport" becau

transportation unit doctrinally ch

mission did not arrive until well af

positioned ships were waiting out

point discussed in the next section

on at least one occasion held back 

in order to supply their own requir
pppg 

Lesson 

• When other lift: assets are str

physical 11~Its of geography and 

requirements for crisis action, it 

pre-positloned shipping be a

deploying forces when they need 

one instance during the Somalia 

pre~positioned shipping was ~ab

fundamental requirement. 

l~tples 

There is no question that pre-po

was a valuable asset in Somali

Marine Corps Maritime Prepositi

were able to offload essential 

supplies early in the deploym

austerity of the port facilities. The 

of this logistical support not on

burdens but also allowed UNITAF 

equipment packages to the uniqu
capacity to offload "in the stream." 

and the delay in deploying the Army 

specialists required to unload the 

change In plans. One of the s

Kismayo, but found conditions th

Another went on to Mombasa, b

officials had not contacted Kenya

clear unloading of the haz

(ammunition) carried by the ship

entry to the port and returned 

Eventually two of the ships spent a 

in two separate port areas before f

to their base at Diego Garcia. They 

a month but never unloaded their 

What is most troubling for the 

these problems took place in an en

was austere but not the scene o

operations. This example emphasiz

aspects of the deployment the 

integrating those things that mus

effectively: 

• Timely intelligence on the 
• Pe, ac~ operations impose 

adml~l.qtrative requirements 

aspects of the operation, mu

eirectlve~. 

Examp~ 

One of the most persistent admin

throughout operations in Somal

an efficient means to track fundi

of the operation, especially t

services provided to coalition p

these requests for support invo

into the country while o

consumables such as water 

absence of prior guidance and inc

created an administrative burd

overcome with the usual w

dedicated people. Lessening tho

future as we operate with red

require tighter financial control
U.S. forces by a declared enemy 

States--this despite the fact t

danger" pay had been approved fo

operating in Somalia. During UNO

logistical system came in for part

As one JULLS report stated." 

The U.N. procurement system is 

inefficient, and not suited to effec

operations in an austere enviro

United Nations acquires all of I

services on a reimbursable basis. U

the reimbursement is often delaye

with a final solution that may not.

provider. 

Two joint issues that arose duri

were finance support and pers

policies, Although pay operations a

the Defense Finance & Accounti

Navy and Marine Corps com

information through a single syste

shore and during operational de
a uniform policy was never esta

CENTCOM or the JTF, replacing 

a much more difficult task. Eve

was the potential morale prob

having people serving side-b

different tour lengths. 

During Restore Hope, muc

amphibious unlt as well a

multinational contingent were 

around the boundaries of 

International Airport. Despite 

comprehensive site plan had b

advance of this occupation, it qu

when different national continge

the coalition. Because many o

provided only small units, there w

except to house them at the 

encampments were soon claime

first-served basis. Apart fro

organizational problems stemmi

approach, safety suffered as 

encampments soon consumed a
54 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS ~A~IED 

and spread toward t~ways, ramps, and active 

runways. Air controllers lived in tents sm',id~ched 

between the edge of tile runway and high-powered 

M~nes deployed in support of Operatlon Restore Hope 

arrive ~ M~_tshu Airport on ctvtltan aLrcrofl~ 
three phases of the operation sh

the true professionalism of the A

sailor, airman, and marine. I

instances, Somalia showed as wel

dedication of a force that found it

while serving in the cause of pea

of those operations and their sig

level is best left to the in

components. The joint world a

operations in Somalia dealt muc

five areas presented here: comm

mission execution, civil-mili

negotiations, and intelligence. 

Command and Contr~l 

Lessons 

• It is a basic fact of life that t

control of a coalition nmst always 

the existence of parallel lin

especially when the mission 

involves combat. 

• The basic doct~.'-al principle
countryside, leading to incre

challcnges that in turn caused two m

Because the UNOSOM II headquart

organized nor equipped to function 

it had to undergo wrenching adju

great pressure. Even more seriousl

greater potential for combat increa

in those countries that had contri

what they had originally seen as a 

effort. 

This concern manifested itself i

tendency for some of these national 

seek guidance from their respective 

carrying out even routine tactical or

to published reports, the command

contingent went so far as to 

negotiations with the fugitive warlo

Aideed--apparently with the full 

home government. With America

United Nations requested this offi

command for insubordination. 

Government refused and life wen
still commanded and controlled (

"owned" forces) by CENTCOM. 

exercised his authority through an 

combination of direct support, op

and tactical control. These comm

were unusual but reflected th

American objectives for UNOSOM 

forces firmly under U.S. operat

reduce the visibility of U.S. com

operation, and to eliminate any m

those forces were under the comm

Nations. 

With the ever-deepening hun

the increasing involvement of th

operations, the decision to de

Ranger added an additional com

Because it was a strategic asset, T

had its own chain of command th

country by Army Major General W

and extended directly back to C

going through either U.S. or 

Although MG Montgomery did no
U.S. sources rather than relying on 

available from the coalition partne

Although this request represented 

that the level of violence was escal

there was no comprehensive reass

mission at the national level. 

Montgomery's request for armor 

refused in a decision that has recei

attention in light of the fateful Ra

that took place on the night of 3-4 

When the Rangers came under inte

it rapidly became clear that the Q

capability to rescue them. 

MG Montgomery and his staff 

situation by quickly organizing an 

using Malaysian and Pakistani unit

tanks and armored personnel car

any U.S. commander in more 

circumstances might have done in 

reserves. However, the most import

drawn from these events may 

reminder that command and con
purpose of this arrangement, in 

allow the JTF Commander to 

tactical missions while MG Mon

free to concentrate on his respo

Deputy U.N. commander. Althou

controlled all U.S. tactical forces I

the JTF nor USFORSOM control

Marine Corps forces, since thos

were still under the operati

CENTCOM. The JTF could not r

offshore forces for such things a

although they did obtain Marine 

teams through an Inform

arrangement." 

MG Montgomery has pointed 

these odd procedures were off

working relationships he enjoy

commanders tasked to support 

that "Ultimately the U.S. arrange

That undeniable fact is yet anoth

dedication and professionalism 

with commanding and carrying o
__[-- 

mission. However, there should be 

the fact that the greatest obstacl

command during UNOSOM II were 

United States on itself. Especially a

operation, these command arran

effectively created a condition that 

to set clear, unambiguous prioritie

and executing a comprehensive 

Instead, CENTCOM exercised long-d

over a number of organizationally co

in a remote theater of operations. 

II after-action report summed matte

Unity of command and simplicity re

principles to be considered when des

command architecture. The warf
not be exempted from those s

practical matter, it may also be us

planning for such operations w

questions: 

• Who shall conmmnd? 

* With what forces? 

• By what means? 

• To what ends? 

To the extent that we are u

operations to answer those ques

terms, difficulties similar to UNOS

again await us. 

~l|~sion IExeeution 

Lessons 

• Mission executio~ is xnore 

trained and wen-orgAni~d staJ~, 

joint envircmme~t of peace operat

• Forcible disannmnent is the 

peace operations: when you cro

entered a de facto state of war. 
y 

cadre of experienced personnel need

joint operations. Necessarily, staff p

"Army" rather than "joint". T

communications and ADP equipme

conduct joint operations are also mi

divisions. What made matters wors

spite of these anomalies, the division 

JTF mission and accepted the ha

responsibility in Somalia less than 

receipt of the trva-ning order. 

Other misconceptions Included th

that the JTF staff could be "small," 

the division's brigades could functio

a de facto Army component co

although the officer placed In comm

was an A~ my officer, Major General 

he had not previously been ass

divislon--a fact that made the establi

working relationships another b

many. The fact that the division acqu

under these demanding circumstanc

not only to its superb personnel but 
headquarters in charge of UNITAF, 

more demanding missions durin

became even more difficult bec

Command headquarters was not 

like a battle staff. The initia

manning this headquarters were 

overcome, with the result that key 

range supporting fires, combat en

operations--were either missing or 

hours a day. The JTF had to im

Operations Center using existing 

personncl, many of whom had no 

some of the areas for which 

responsible: joint and combined gr

fire support, air operations, 

intelligence. Equally important w

institute effective means for liaiso

multinational commands. While 

rapid adaptation clearly helped, 

these stressful situations to link cu

with future operations--and bot

overall mission requirements. 
a direct threat to the position of th

the local power structure and 

accordingly. The respective difficult

these two missions should conseque

"bright line on the ground" in plannin

operations. There is a basic concep

between arms control and disarmam

or limiting the major weapons of 

defeated military force can be thoug

of arms control, but to commit mi

the mission of forcibly disarming a 

commit tho.se forces to a combat situ

thereafter involve them as an active 

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, Pr

Special Envoy to Somalia, pointed 

application of force imposes special 

peacekeepers who wish to avoid be

belligerents. This challenge involves 

looks at the local populace as potenti

than likely enemies, that gi

warningsbefore the application of fo

hostile act; that limits the applicat
OPERATIONAL LESSONS LF~ARI'-;IED 65 

the minimum level required, and that constantly 

seeks to engage in a dialogue rather than being 

tricked into ove~eaction. U.S. forces throughout 

the operations in Somalia clearly did their best to 

follow that advice before the UNOSOM II mandate 

U.S. Marines commence a r~ on Mogadtshu's Bakara 

M~k~ in a r~ for ~ and m~tttons. One c~he 

yteld.ed enough to ~ a 2. 5- Wn truc~ 

made many of those points moot. Even then, 

Amebean forces were under standing orders to 

limit ci~-ilian casualties and collateral damage. 

According to General Montgome~, for example, 15- 

minute, 10-minute, and 5-minute warnings were 

no--ally given before attacking any target. 

Although the use of AC-130 gunships, helicopter 

rockets, and Ranger raids over the streets of 

Mogadishu clearly conveyed other messages to the 
pp

the future. 

• The HRO's can be our allies, bu

least be part of our planning an

efforts. 

E~lmpIe~ 

Although the civil affairs officer 

participant in many military operat

no doctrine in the collective experi

the services or the Joint Staff to co

in which a country had descended 

anarchy. Along the way, however

rediscovery of the need to con

diplomatic, and humanitarian effor

common whole. Although there w

single government in Somalia, ther

49 different international agencies, 

bodies, nongovernmental organizatio

Dealing effectively with those agenc

primary challenge for civil-military 

Somalia. This was an important fu

........................................ ....................................................................
OPEPJ~ONN~ LES~NS LEA~qED 67 

the HRO's not only provided many of the relief 

supplies that helped fight starvation, but agencies 

such as the Red Cross and Feed the Children were 

on the scene p~or to the arrival of our forces and 

long after their departure:. To this basic difference 

in perspective should be added another: for a 

variety of reasons, relief agencies tend to be 

suspicious of military and security personnel, even 

when they come as peacekeepers. 

Women and children l~e up for a meal ~ a 

center run by the Irish hum~itt~irt~n aid group Conc~ 

~e vill~ qf Walne V~Loin, Som_dlo. 

One thing that affected relations in Somalia was 

the pattern of accommodation that the relief 

agencies had followed to ensure they could work 

there effectively. ~Is usually meant hiring local 

security forces--often in concert v~.th the area,s 
to enter the country, but it also 

need to insure closer civil-milita

Sometimes these cooperative effort

but important things--such as 

representatives to fly "space availa

aircraft. More substantial efforts t

military forces during both Res

UNOSOM II worked side by si

agencies to dig wells, rebuild roads, 

and the like. With the need to co

key port areas and food distributio

became essential to provide photo 

relief workers. This requirement 

setting up procedures for verifying 

and personal bonafides because, 

said, "People came to view the ID 

official UNITAF certification of a pe

humanitarian worker and also as 

Finally, some agency had to issue t

regulate what privileges, if any, 

would convey. 

............................................. ....................
OPERATIONAL LESSONS ~ARNED 69 

A Somali boy has taken the Som_alt fascination for 

glasses one step.her by craj~ng apart for hL~f out 

of a ~carded shoulder shoe. 

For these and similar reasons, one of the most 

important initiatives of the Somalia operation was 

the establishment of the Civil-Military Operations 

Center (CMOC). Set up in December 1992 during 

the early stages of UNITAF, CMOC became the key 

coordinating point between the task force and the 

HRO's. Liaison officers from the major 

multinational contingents, together ~th the U.S. 

command, used this center as a means of 

coordinating their activities--such as providing 

military support for convoys of relief supplies and 

assigning pier space and port access to Mogadishu 

Harbor for the HRO's. These practical duties also 

lent themselves to the broadening of contacts 

between the military and civilan components, 
70 SOMALIA OPERA~ONS: LEMONS LF,_APJ~IED 

including the creation of parallel CMOC's in each of 

the nine Humanita~an Relief Sectors. Eventually, 

CMOC controlled the issue of ID cards and 

maintained a data mat~ showing the status of 

food relief supplies throughout the commamd's area 

of operations. Equally impo~ant, however, was the 

fact that CMOC was able to work closely ~th the 

U.S. trucks fdled uith medical personnd ~d ~icine 

l~e the sweets hu to perfolwl the flrst ~d 

civic ~n pr~~ ~ Som_dica 

Humanitarian Operations Center run by the United 

Nations--thus allo~ng a single focal point for all 

relief agencies operating ln-count~, he staff of 

CMOC was deliberately kept small in order to keep 

it focused on its mission of coordination and 

information exchange. ~ls innovation is 

sufficiently important as a precedent for the future; 
Joint Pub 3-07.3 notes that, in 

qualities of patience and restraint

must combine 

an approachable, understanding, 

manner with fairness and 

professional demeanor that st

diplomacy and reasoning will achie

arrogance, anger, disdain, coercion

Personnel must be able to cope po

each side seeks to press its posit

reacts vocally when stopped. 

These qualities are clearly part 

adjustment from the reaction

associated with military operatio

should be no mistaking how 

adjustment is during peace operat

One perspective was off

Montgomery, who noted that "cons

was a critical part of the proces

plans and preparing operations 
72 SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LEMONS D 

combined operation--not just those invol~ng peace 

operations. During UNOSOM II, however, the 

specific terms of reference guiding the participation 

of each multinational contingent as well as their 

different views of employment doctrine meant that 

actions could not be taken without broad 

agreement. Finding those areas of consensus, 

building on them, and applying them to specific 

operations are Inevitably complicated 

processes--and ones that are noticeably different 

form those that most military personnel are used 

to. However. MG Montgomery thought negotiating 

skills important enough to recommend that they be 

addressed at Army professional schools. 

U.S.&F. ~rkers unload flo~ from a C-130 Hercules 

aircraft ~ Operation Restore Hope workers b~ 

another day of humanltarian rellef effo~ to Somd~ 
negotiating skills, patience, and 

common sense." 

The fundamental importance 

this kind of a dialogue led to 

innovation: a "Combined Security C

allowed LTG Johnston and key mem

to meet frequently with Mohamm

other key clan leaders. This 

especially useful in gaining and 

cooperation with UNITAF mand

weapons cantonment. As LTG Joh

the purpose of that dialogue: 

Aldeed and All Mahdi were often u

the message we would send from 

but for the most part (they) comp

not like the characters you have to 

you are better able to uncover thei

intentions if you keep a commun

open (emphasis added). 
ever more intense involvement 

operations before it has quietly adm

that military people have 

intelligence is the key to any ope

those designed to secure the 

"information," is the term of choi

Somalia proved that, whateve

intelligence has a crucial role to 

end of the conflict spectrum as 

places. A wide range of intelligen

employed there, many of them f

Night-vision devices, ground-surv

tactical air reconnaissance, and u

vehicles all played important ro

tactical intelligence and early-warn

The most basic intelligence in 

conflict scenario is Invariably prov

the best and most important 

always being the soldier or mar

Patrol tactics and intelligence re

adjusted to allow his eyes and ear

commanders with better "situatio
dissemination through any intell

over which there is anything 

exclusive U.S. control. In addition, 

concern that sensitive U.S. intellige

methods might be compromised i

multinational operations. For both 

guidelines were developed and ad

limited the dissemination of inform

targetting and operational securit

permitted the flow of timely inte

coalition. U.S. officers serving in 

Force Command Staff normally 

conduit for information developed 

support of specific operatio

Montgomery often making the fi

dissemination. In all cases, howev

the Force Commander was kept f

the complete U.S. intelligence pictu

his area of operations. 

If there is a precedent for the 

peace operations present a 

"information war" in which the sid
In which the operation is head

CMOC to monitor the status of fo

Somalia from all relief agencies l

the creative use of information 

situational awareness throug

nontraditional mission indica

operations may suggest others. 

Support 

The unprecedented nature of t

Somalia created a new range of 

critical support services that mus

if the mission is to be successfu

telephone service of any kind, an

facilities as there were resemble

zone--yet the troops had to b

infrastructure hastily constru

American people kept informed o

and daughters were doing in 

inhospitable climate. Here again, 
management. 

ExampI~ 

Operation Provide Relief entered a

which there were few, if any, 

pathways between the strategi

operating base. The baseline 

capabilities they brought w

summarized in figure 6; such pa

serve as models for the future. 

During both Restore Hope and 

communications support provide

was generally superb, with "conne

overcome some of the inheren

ensuring that unity of effort., if no

being exercised. Part of what m

work was the presence of a liaison 

Defense Information Systems Age

the very start of the operation, an a

permitted some flexibility 

communications packages and 
gg(

• Commercial Satellite Terminal (INM

• Support Items: cables, generators 

• Others: handheld radios; public add

copiers, extra batteries, diskettes, co

operation utilized both military 

satellite linkages, although the 

efficiency of the commercial INMA

service were offset somewhat by th

$6 a minute. Another problem 

popularity of this system quic

capacity. Because this and other 

pathways became crowded, ev

signalling environment rapidly b

and required increasing attentio

confliction" of radio frequencies be

military units and HRO's. 

The size of the operating area a

country communications. Infantry 

operated more than 50 mil

headquarters, while transportation 
expedients flourished to protect th

wind and sand--including the ta

baggies across the opening to the 

way that allowed access to the 

effectively sealed out dust. 

The most significant 

interoperability problems occurre

forces and the multinational cont

UNITAF, these problems were m

important expedients: imposing 

management discipline over the f

and assigning full-time liaison offi

satellite radios to each of th

contingents--much as had been 

Gulf War. During UNOSOM II, ho

the U.S. no longer in charge, thos

discontinued. Instead, each ta

responsibility was commanded 

multinational contingents, whose 

responsible for ensuring that all fo

operational control had compa

cations equipment. Because a
a U.N. structure was establishe

1993. However, other com

responsibilities were effectively tu

signal battalion of the Army's 

Division. There is, unfortunately, 

division-level signal battalion coul

assume what amounted to 

communications mission, especia

so many different communication

being used, 

The internal interoperability pr

affected U.S. forces did not involv

like operational fiascoes: however, 

occur underline the continuing pro

equipment, procedures, and stand

environment. During Restore 

discovered that UNITAF, as a 

headquarters, used an obscure 

software called Enable OA, while 

most other military users, preferre

similar difficulty plagued their exch
OPEI~FIONAL LESSONS L~ED 81 

U.S. ArTny UH-60 Blackh~ hd~opter lands ~ the 

Belet Um ~strtp, dropping off soldiers flora 2nd 

Brig(Me, I Oth Mountain Dtv~ton, Fort Dr~ 1VE m 

sei~e the airstrip as p~ of a combtn~ U.S. and 

C~od~ assatJ_[t ~Ftng Op~atton Restore Hope. 

~-fis situation complicated, although it did not 

prevent, file transfers between the two 

headquarters: however, it illustrates the growing 

importance of "'officeware" in military operations 

and the problems resulting from mismatches. In 

the tactical arena, it was also discovered that the 

air-tasking order formats differed between the east 

and west coast ships of the Marine Amphibious 

Ready Groups--and that the same ~my and 

Marine single-channel tactical radios had acquired 

compatibility problems caused by differing 

upgrades. Most seriously, for the first 3 weeks the 

Navy was offshore, |he Army hospital in Mogadishu 
and required its own lane on th

information highway available to d

This is not a situation that mak

either a logistical or operational pe

after action report summarized the 

Time spent trying to learn and eng

{comparatively) few systems we we

with during Restore Hope could hav

spent providing higher quality, ov

Money spent on these circuits coul

long way to resolving our tn

problems. 

IIn4~ountry Logistics 

Lesson 

We have the t)nest theate~r-level 

support organization in the worl& 

sought a~er or modelled in any 

operation. 
organized around the U.N. L

Command (UNLSC}--a structure 

deliberately resembled an Army 

Group. 

This command was augmented 

personnel as well as task-organiz

smaller national contingents. Alth

reference for each member of t

contingent specified the types 

would give and receive, the gene

the UNLSC would provide com

(such as fuel and water) wh

contingents supplied their ow

(ammunition and maintenance

however, the wide variations i

brought by the national conting

there was a constant competiti

with the United States often 

difference. As the operation prog

intense combat, and with corres

logistical demands, the presu
Medical 

Lesson 

In peace operations, especially mu

it is essential that medical suppor

prepared to deal with some of 

deadly and exotic diseases. 

~amp!es 

The United States has had signific

coping with the challenges of 

austere environments. What mad

was that there were literally n

hospital facilities to augment thos

States was prepared to bring. One 

experience is that it will be usefu

track medical facilities theaterw

countrywide. As an example, it b

to arrange for the evacuation of U

neighboring Kenya and their trea

Another point is that medical inte
support to future coalition partne

~[edia 

Lesson 

An effective public info, uJation pr

to the success of any operation, 

involving peacemaking or peaceke

Nlcamplea 

The lessons learned from Somali

relations with the media suggest t

two things: 

• First, there must be an ef

dealing with visitors, including no

but congressional leaders and oth

The horror of the suffering In So

the role of American forces in 

operational setting were bound 

attention--and did so consistent

affairs operations in the military a

to handle such duties, but pla
officer defines that situation 

comment, TV appearance, or new

will similarly help to determine h

perceived at the tactical, operatio

levels. The uncomfortable gla

spotlight is a necessary part o

building process which, as 

pointed out, is an intrinsic p

operations in any multinational 

this was a lesson learned the ha

U.S. forces in UNOSOM II had n

organization. And one of the 

learned is that any U.S. force w

U.N. operation must have a fi

affairs secUon in the future° A

was sent a 30-man Joint Inform

and quality of coverage improv

thereafter. 

The responsibility of sha

awareness with the media is a 

g

mission has been accomplished. W

the importance of "perseverance

other than war, the real test of th

ensure that the United States r

project its power when neede

indefinite commitments at the exp

responsibilities worldwide. By itsel

in Somalia did not seriously Inte

reponsibilitles, but the record of 

into that most unfortunate country 

there must be limits to the 

American military power. That 

suggests the existence of certain 

peace operations indicating when 

being reached. One of them invo

military forces in nation-building

u~ich our forces should not 

responsible. While military power 

stage for such action, the real r
overtly threaten the peacekeep

reason: In societies where peac

needed, the distribution of arms 

power structures (political, cultur

tribal) that can be expected to 

their position. If the disarmament 

becomes an objective, then the

mistaking the fact that the t

mission have been committed to 

The uncertainties surroundi

operations also underline the 

understanding the strengths and 

United Nations and other internati

In the case of the United Nati

ensuring that its mandates are 

reflect a clear understanding of 

and its military implications. Th

this principle cannot be understa

experience shows just how direc

mandates of the United Nati

different missions of the military 

Future American policymakers f
President in PDD-25 have been pu

minumum, such reforms must 

effective means than those d

Somalia for commanding, controllin

and communicating with multi

committed to peace operations. 

These limitations should not bl

to the great strengths which U.N

humanitarian relief organization

international arena. Some of the 

contributions by U.S. and coal

Somalia were digging the wells, gr

and working side by side with man

listed in appendix B, agencies t

peacekeepers and peacebuilders. 

understand that their persp

permanent commitments, w

perspectives are necessarily shor

important is the recognition t

Integration of diplomatic and milita

humanitarian actions not only co

overall success of the mission but 
during UNOSOM II underline the 

lesson that should be adapted fro

of Combat: If it takes more tha

explain the command arrangemen

won't work. 

The way in which command w

the U.S. forces sent to Somalia al

careful attention in the future 

persistent problems in organizing 

While there is lively debate ab

unified commands should organiz

task forces," there should now be 

the organization of the headquarte

forces is an issue that should no 

last-minute arrangements. Mor

helps i[ any joint headquarters i

nucleus of people already accust

together, and it helps even more 

reflects solid expertise in joint 

operations. There should be n

developing and broadening this 

fundamental requirement for the A
operations has not rescinded the f

military operations. As always those 

begin with a strategy that focuse

interests. The lack of a consisten

focus was clearly one of the things t

the transitions between the variou

operation--the relative success of 

the task of UNOSOM II more di

fundamental military tasks are tho

developed from a clear strategy: m

and operations plans leading to 

objectives. While those tasks 

undertaken in Somalia, the record 

there also contains a clear warning 

Betmre of the temptation to do too 

Giving in to that temptation is 

hazard in an institution built 

attitudes and the expectation of s

more reason, then, to insure that 

any peace operation includes the se

indicators that can best me

accomplishment. What signs, for 
Three other issues arise fro

experience that may have e

significance because they show ho

power is adjusting to the realities 

War world: 

• In deployment patterns, fo

have long excelled at quickly movin

of forces, supplies, and 

overseas--precisely as we would h

event of a NATO reinforceme

operations, especially those wh

function is disaster relief or human

will certainly need to be able to 

deployments. Rather than mass

example, it may make more sense 

JTF commander in on the grou

possible and allow him to tailor 

needed. This will certainly mean a

and TPFDD procedures to allow 

flexibility. Conversely, it will a

greater emphasis on user disci

JOPES, in particular, is the 
higher level command, adva

promotion. The Somalia experienc

importance of knowing the country, 

ground, and the language as a p

military operations, with improv

instance making notably good use 

brought by Reserve Component per

recent example of the particular str

a commander schooled in a loc

provided by General Norman 

Although his exposure to Middle 

came primarily from his boyhood ex

region, this expertise was especi

leading the Gulf War coalition. Insu

of policy that the future officer 

similar strengths is an issue that m

addressed within the militar

establishment. 

• The third Issue is one t

summed up: Peace operations su

Somalia show how the training and 

of the men and women in our Arm
96 SOMALIA OPERATIONS; ~SSONS LEARNED 

important in adapting to the requirements of new, 

nontradttional missions as they are in carrying out 

the demands of more conventional scenarios, For 

those forces likely to be deployed as peacekeepers, 

supplementary training is always a good idea--for 

situation-specific orientations, for famllta~atton 

with typical operational tasks, and especially for 

building the staff competencies required by joint or 

multinational environments. 

There is, however, an important sense in which 

the most basic qualification of our Armed Forces to 

act as peacekeepers rests upon their credibility as 

warflghters. ~eir technical competence and 

physical prowess allow our soldiers, sailors, 

airmen, and ma~nes to prevail in any operational 

environmental: but their record of going in ha~'s 
CONCLUSIONS 97 

way in the cause of peace is one that preceded our 

intervention in Somalia and that will endure long 

after the controversies su~oundlng it have faded. 

President Clinton surely spoke for the Ameflcan 

people when he welcomed home the 10th Mountain 

Division after their redeployment from Somalia in 

March 1994: 

If there axe my debates still to be had about our 

mission in Somalia. let people have those 

debates ~th me. But let ~ere be no debate 

about how you c~ed out your mission .... You 

have shown ~e world what Amertcmas are made 

of. Your naUon is grateM m'~d your President is 

te~biy, te~bly proud of you. 
watch for their publication. 

Joint Publications 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pu

Warfare of the US Armed F

Government Printing Office, 

DC, 11 November 1991. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 

Action Armed Forces (UN

Government Printing Office, 

De, 11 August 1994. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3

for Joint Operations." U.S. 

Printing Office, Washington

September 1993. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint PUb 

Doctrine for Military Operation

War." (Draft) 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint PU
Techniques and Procedures fo

Operations." (Draft) Joint Chie

Pub 5-00.2, "Joint Task 

Guidance and Procedures." U

Printing Office, Washington, D

1993. 

Multi-Service PubHeations 

Air Land Sea Application Center

Procedures for Humanitar

Operations." (Draft) This p

development as of this writin

will adopt it into their publicati

completion. 

U~S. Army PubHeations 

Headquarters, Department of the 

Manual 7-98, "Operations in L

Conflict." U.S. Government Pr

Washington, DC, 19 October 

Headquarters, Department of th
the Soldier in Operations O

(OOTII0." U.S. Government 

Washington, DC, July 1994. 

U.S. Navy Publications 

Headquarters, Department of the N

ZZ 0050.1.94, "Maritime 

Operations." U.S. Government 

Washington, DC, 1 July 1994. 

IIeadquarters, Department of the N

XZ 0057.1.92, "Maritime 

Noncombatant Evacuation Ope

U.S. Govemment Printing Offi

DC, 30 May 1993. 

Headquarters, Department of the N

XZ 0021.1.93, "Expediti

Conducting Humanitarian Assl

U. S. Marine Corps Publication

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

Force Manual 1-5, "Maritim
Missions. U.S. Government 

Washington, DC, 1993. 

U. ~ Air Foree Pulblieations 

Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. Air 

Directive 35, "Special Oper

Government Printing Office, W

Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. Air 

Directive 3, "Military Operatio

War." (Draft) 

Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. Air 

Directive 12, "Airspace Contro

Zone." (Draft) 

IIeadquarters, U.S. Air Force. Air 

Directive 30, "Airlift Operations

Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans a

Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. 

(Second Edition, February 

USAF/XOXD, Washington, DC, 
Ahead? November 1993. 

Lewis, William H., and Marks, Edw

Failing States. January 1994. 

Maurer, Martha. Coalition Comma

1994. 

Quinn, Dennis J., ed. Peace Sup

and the U.S. Military. 1994. 
DCG 

CARE 

ADRA 

AMA 

COSV 

AICF 

SOS 

MERCY 

clothing 

Diakonic Care Germ

Assistance to childre

CARE International-

services for displace

Adventist Relief and 

Agrncy--Ald in local 

Africa Muslims Agen

welfare support serv

Coordination Comm

Organizations for Vo

Service---General ma

supervision services 

International Action 

Famine--Emergency 

service 

Chfldrens Emergenc

Services--Care and 

children 

Mercy International
NORCROSS 

ICRC 

FRCS 

OXFAM 

CWS 

ACORD 

AFSC 

IARA 

IIRO 

food and clothing aid 

Nordic Red Cross--P

emergency shelter an

International Commi

Cross--Observer Sta

Federation of the Re

Society--general coo

Oxford Famine Relie

relief organization 

Church World Servic

food and clothing 

Agency for Cooperati

Research 

Devlopment--Coordi

planning for infrastr

insititution building 

American Friends Se

Committee--Emergen

and feeding 

Islamic African Relie

to indigent Muslims 

International Islamic 
ACSSOM 

African Charity Soci

Maternity and Child

support program 

UNHCR 

UNICEF 

UNESCO 

UNDP 

UNCTAD 

ECOSOC 

United Nations llumanitmri

United Nations High 

for Refugees 

United Nations Chil

United Nations Educ

Scientific Organizati

United Nations Deve

Program 

United Nations Conf

and Devlopment 

Economic and Socia
IPun~hlo~ 

1. Validation of requests for milit

included requests within the Mog

haul convoy, security escorts to 

requests for support at specific 

UNITAF area of operations. Mi

HROs within a Humanitarian R

usually the responsibility of th

commander and his CMOC. 

2. Coordination of requests for 

within the various military compo

3. Convening and hosting ad hoc 

groups as an arm of the UNITAF 

involving complicated military 

numerous military units and HRO

4. Promulgating and explaining U
8. Acting as an interface, 

coordination agency between UNIT

HROs and UNOSOM headquarters 

9. Chairing Mogadishu Port Ship

which dealt with pier space, port ac

issues important to HROs. 

10. Acting as the agency that 

returned weapons confiscated 

organizations. 

11. Responding to emergency 

assistance from HROs in the Moga

by responding directly with CMO

requesting assistance via the 

Operations Center (JOC). 

12. Maintaining and operating a 2

the CMOC. 

13. Maintaining contact with reg
Corruaand 

Colonel Director 

Lt. Colonel Deputy Dir

Major 

Captain (2) 

MSgt 

SFC 

sgt 

Cpl and Below 

Operations 

Operations

Operati

Asst Opera

Operations 

Admin Chi

Asst Admin 

Driver/Sec

Maj or 

Captain 

SFC 

Cpl 

Transport 

Convoy/Co

Transpo

Asst Transp

Air NCO 

Driver/Sec
(Goldwater-Nichols) Act as an Arm

Fellow. In addition to operatio

assignments in the United States 

has served on the faculty of the 

Department, United States Milita

as Dean of Students at the Natio

COL Allard has written 

information warfare, the m

revolution, and defense procurem

most recent full-length-work, Co

and the Common Defense (Yale 

1990), won the 1991 National Secu

and is included on the professiona

list recommended by the Chairm

Chiefs of Staff. 

COL Allard holds a Ph.D. fr

School of Law & Diplomacy an

Harvard University. 

*U.S.G.P.O. : 1995-387-330:20002 
SOMALIA OPERAT

Lessons Learne

Composed in Brooklyn 

Titles set in Bodn

Cover design: Rhond