MCWP 2-1 

Intelligence Operations

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 143 000036 00
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Headquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, DC 20380-1775

10 September 2003

FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 2-1, Intelligence Operations, builds on

the doctrinal foundation established in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 2,

Intelligence. It provides tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for Marine air-ground

task force (MAGTF) intelligence operations. This publication is intended for commanders, other users of intelligence, and intelligence personnel who plan and execute intelligence operations.

This publication supersedes MCWP 2-1, Intelligence Operations, dated 19 February

1998.

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

EDWARD HANLON, JR.

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding General

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Publication Control Number: 143 000036 00

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
MCWP 2-1, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Fundamentals

Intelligence Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

Maneuver Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

Developing Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

Data, Information, and Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

The Intelligence Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

Intelligence Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

Relationship to Command and Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

Relationship to Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

Principles of Intelligence Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

Intelligence Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

Support the Commander’s Estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

Develop the Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

Provide Indications and Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

Support Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

Support Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

Support Combat Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

The Commander’s Role in the Intelligence Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

Focus the Intelligence Effort. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

Participate in the Intelligence Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

Use Intelligence in Decisionmaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

Support the Intelligence Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

Evaluate the Results of Intelligence Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

Information Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

IO-Related Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

The Role of Intelligence in IO is Continual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

Required Intelligence Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

Chapter 2. Command and Control

Decisionmaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act Loop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

Intelligence and the OODA Loop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Decisionmaking Approaches: Analytical and Intuitive . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2
iv _________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

The Planning, Decision, Execution, and Assessment Cycle. . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

Intelligence Support to Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

Planning Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

Mission Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

COA Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5

COA War Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Orders Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

Resource Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8

Linkage to Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8

Generation of Tempo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8

Chapter 3. Developing Intelligence

Intelligence Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

Priority Intelligence Requirement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

Characteristics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

Planning and Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

Requirements Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

Requirements Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

Directing the Intelligence Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6

Collection Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

Production Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

Dissemination Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

Planning the Intelligence Support System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

Imagery Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8

Signals Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8

Human Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9

Measurement and Signature Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9

Open-Source Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9

Counterintelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10

Processing and Exploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10

Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10

Levels of Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11

Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12

Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12

Delivery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13

Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14

Architectures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-15

Utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-15

Application of the Intelligence Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-17

Counterintelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-17

Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-17

CI Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-18

CI Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-19
Intelligence Operations ___________________________________________________________________________________________ v 

Chapter 4. Concept of MAGTF Intelligence Support

Role of the Organic Intelligence Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

The Unit Intelligence Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

The Unit Intelligence Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Required Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

The MAGTF Intelligence Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

MAGTF Intelligence Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Special Staff Officers under Staff Cognizance of G-2 Officer. . . . . . . 4-4

MAGTF Intelligence Units. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9

Organization of MAGTF-Level Intelligence Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9

Employment of MAGTF Intelligence Units. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11

Focused Intelligence Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12

Intelligence Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12

Split-basing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12

Task Organization of Intelligence Support Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-13

Intelligence DSTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-13

Intelligence Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-13

External Intelligence Support to the MAGTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14

MARFOR Component Intelligence Section. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14

National, Theater, Joint, and Other Service Intelligence Support . . . . 4-16

Augmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-17

Supporting Establishment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-17

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-17

Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18

Navy Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18

Personnel Augmentation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18

Marine Corps Forces Reserve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18

Chapter 5. Operational Maneuver from the Sea

Required Intelligence Capabilitites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

Planning and Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2

Processing, Exploitation, and Production. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2

Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3

Utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3

Planning and Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3

Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4

Processing, Exploitation, and Production. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4

Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4

Utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5

Chapter 6. Sustained Operations Ashore

Required Intelligence Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

Planning and Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2
vi _________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

Processing, Exploitation, and Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3

Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3

Utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4

Chapter 7. Military Operations Other Than War

Required Intelligence Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

Planning and Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

Processing, Exploitation, and Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3

Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3

Utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3

Chapter 8. Joint Operations and Multinational Operations

JFC and Component Commander Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1

Joint Intelligence Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1

Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2

Marine Intelligence Section and Unit Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2

MARFOR Component Headquarters or

MAGTF CE as a JTF Headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2

Multinational Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2

Appendices

A. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

B. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

List of Figures

1-1. The Information Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

1-2. Key Considerations of the Intelligence Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

1-3. Relationship Between Intelligence Functions and Operations . . . . . . . 1-7

2-1. The Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act Loop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

2-2. Intelligence Support to Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

3-1. The Marine Corps Intelligence Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

3-2. The Intelligence Cycle—Macro View. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

3-3. The Intelligence Cycle—Micro View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

3-4. Intelligence Development and the Intelligence Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

3-5. Planning and Direction Phase Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

3-6. Intelligence Requirements Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

3-7. Requirements Satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6

3-8. MAGTF Primary Organic Collection Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8

3-9. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11

3-10. Graphic Climatology Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13

3-11. Graphic Intelligence Estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14

3-12. Notional Marine Expeditionary Force Intelligence Architecture . . . . 3-16
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ vii 

3-13. Application of the Intelligence Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-18

3-14. The Counterintelligence Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-20

4-1. Special Staff Officers and Relationships under the

Staff Cognizance of the MEF G-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

4-2. AC/S G-2’s Principal Subordinate Staff Officers

and their Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

4-3. Intelligence Battalion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10

4-4. Intelligence Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14

4-5. The National Intelligence Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-16

5-1. Intelligence Considerations During OMFTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2

6-1. Intelligence Considerations During Sustained Operations Ashore . . . . 6-2

7-1. Intelligence Factors in MOOTW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2
CHAPTER 1

FUNDAMENTALS

Intelligence is knowledge of the battlespace and

of the threat forces in that battlespace. Knowledge is generated in support of the commander’s

decisionmaking process and is the result of the

collection, processing, exploitation, evaluation,

integration, analysis, and interpretation of available information about the battlespace and threat.

Intelligence Objectives 

Intelligence has two objectives: to reduce uncertainty by providing accurate, timely, and relevant knowledge about the threat and the

surrounding environment, and to assist in protecting friendly forces (to include Department of

Defense [DOD] personnel, family members,

resources, facilities and critical information)

through counterintelligence (CI).

Uncertainty pervades the battlespace—it is a

fundamental attribute of war. First and foremost,

intelligence should support the commander’s

decisionmaking process by reducing uncertainty about the hostile situation. Intelligence

should accomplish the following actions to

achieve this objective:

O Identify and evaluate existing conditions and

capabilities.

O On the basis of those existing conditions and

capabilities, estimate possible enemy courses

of action (COAs) and provide insight into possible future actions.

O Aid in identifying friendly critical vulnerabilities that the threat may exploit. 

O Assist in developing and evaluating friendly

COAs.

The fog and friction of war will never allow the

commander to have a perfect picture of the battlespace. Because intelligence deals with the

greatest number of unknowns—questions about

an unfamiliar area and a hostile enemy who is

actively trying to conceal information about his

forces and intentions—there will almost always

be gaps in intelligence, and the knowledge provided will lack the desired degree of detail and

reliability. Intelligence cannot provide absolute

certainty. It attempts to reduce the uncertainty

facing the commander to a reasonable level by

collecting relevant information, placing it in context to provide knowledge, and conveying it in

the form of images to enhance understanding.

CI is information gathered and activities conducted

to protect against espionage, other intelligence

activities, sabotage or assassinations conducted by

or on behalf of foreign governments or elements

thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons or

international terrorist activities.

CI activities consist of active and passive measures, functions, and services. CI measures, functions, and services are intended to deny a potential

adversary information that might increase the

effectiveness of hostile operations against friendly

forces; detect and neutralize foreign intelligence

collection; and deceive the enemy as to friendly

capabilities and intentions. In so doing, CI

increases uncertainty for the enemy, thereby making a significant contribution to the success of

operations. CI services identify friendly vulnerabilities, evaluate security measures, and assist in

implementing appropriate plans to enhance a unit’s

force protection posture against the threats of sabotage, subversion, and terrorism.
1-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

Maneuver Warfare

The essence of war is a violent clash between

independent wills, each trying to impose itself on

the other. War’s defining attributes of friction,

uncertainty, fluidity, disorder, and complexity

combine with the various dimensions of human

nature to make war a fundamentally unpredictable activity. To succeed in war, Marines must be

able to operate effectively in this uncertain, chaotic, complex, and fluid environment.

The Marine Corps philosophy for winning under

these conditions is based on rapid, flexible, and

opportune maneuver. MCDP 1, Warfighting,

states that, “Maneuver warfare is a warfighting

philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s

cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and

unexpected actions which create a turbulent and

rapidly deteriorating situation with which the

enemy cannot cope.” Maneuver warfare requires

maneuver in time and space to achieve superiority over the enemy. It concentrates on those

actions that present the enemy with a series of

dilemmas where events happen unexpectedly and

faster than the enemy can react. Concepts central

to executing maneuver warfare follow:

O Orienting on the enemy. Maneuver warfare

attacks the enemy “system,” the combination

of physical, moral, and mental components that

make up an enemy or an enemy force. This

means focusing outward on the particular characteristics of the enemy.

O Centers of gravity (COG) and critical vulnerabilities. COG are sources of moral or

physical strength, power or resistance that are

critical to the enemy’s ability to resist. Critical

vulnerabilities are components of the enemy

system that are both crucial to the functioning

of the system and vulnerable to exploitation.

Identifying and exploiting an enemy’s COG

and critical vulnerabilities help focus combat

power toward a decisive aim.

O Main effort. The main effort is the unit

assigned responsibility to accomplish the key

mission within the command. It is directed

where there is the best opportunity to succeed

and at the objective that will have the most significant effect on the enemy, normally a critical vulnerability.

O Commander’s intent. Commander’s intent

describes the purpose behind the task assigned

in a mission. It provides continuing guidance

when the tactical situation changes and permits

the exercise of initiative in harmony with the

commander’s desires.

O Mission tactics. Mission tactics assign subordinates a task without specifying how it must

be accomplished. They permit subordinates to

exercise initiative in adapting to ever-changing situations.

O Tempo. Tempo keeps the enemy off balance,

thereby increasing his friction. Speed, initiative, and flexibility generate and maintain a

tempo that the enemy cannot match.

Accurate and timely intelligence is a prerequisite

for success in maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare is based on a firm focus on the enemy and on

taking action that avoids enemy strengths and

exploits enemy critical vulnerabilities. It means

acting in a manner and at a time and place that

the enemy does not expect and is not prepared. It

requires decision and action based on situational

awareness—a keen understanding of the factors

that make each situation unique. Intelligence provides the knowledge of the enemy and the battlespace that permits the commander to reduce

uncertainty, identify opportunities for success,

assess risk, outline intent, and make decisions

that provide focus, generate speed and tempo,

and achieve decisive results.

Developing Intelligence

Data, Information, and Intelligence

Intelligence is not simply another term for information. Intelligence is more than an element of
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 1-3 

data or a grouping of information; it is a body of

knowledge. Knowledge occupies a unique place in

the information hierarchy, which is a framework to

distinguish between various classes of information.

(See figure 1-1.) 

There is a clear and important distinction between

raw data, information, and intelligence. Intelligence is not a mass of unfocused data or even a

collection of related facts. In fact, giving a commander every piece of data without providing

meaning can increase uncertainty by overloading

the commander with incomplete, contradictory or

irrelevant information. To be intelligence, data

must be placed in context to provide an accurate

and meaningful image of the hostile situation.

Intelligence is developed by analyzing and synthesizing data and information to produce knowledge

about the threat and the environment. The commander combines this knowledge with knowledge

of the friendly situation and employs experience,

judgment, and intuition to understand the situation. The commander then applies this understanding in making decisions.

The Intelligence Cycle

Intelligence is the output of a process that converts

data and information into knowledge that applies to a

specific military decision. The process used to

develop intelligence is called the intelligence cycle.

This cycle is the process by which information is

planned for, obtained, assembled, converted through

analysis into intelligence, provided to decisionmakers, and, ultimately, used in making decisions. (See

figure 1-2.)

The intelligence cycle consists of a series of

related activities that translate the need for intelligence about a particular aspect of the battlespace

or threat into a knowledge-based product that is

provided to the commander for use in the decisionmaking process. In this sequence, intelligence needs are identified and a plan is

developed for satisfying those needs. Data are

collected, processed into information, and converted into intelligence through analysis and synthesis. The resulting knowledge is then provided

to the commander as an intelligence product that

is used in making decisions. The information

used to produce intelligence is derived from a

variety of sources. Intelligence information; i.e.,

information used to generate intelligence, is commonly drawn from three types of data: intelligence, sensor or combat.

Understanding Synthesized,

Visualized

Knowledge

Evaluated,

Integrated,

Analyzed

Information

Formatted, Plotted,

Translated, Correlated

Data Raw Signals

Judgment

Cognition

Processing

Figure 1-1. The Information Hierarchy.

Intelligence Cycle Key Considerations

Planning and direction. Identify intelligence requirements.

Plan intelligence operations and 

activities.

Support the formulation of the 

commander’s estimate of the 

situation.

Collection. Develop the required intelligence 

structure.

Use organic, attached, and

supporting intelligence sources to 

collect intelligence.

Processing, exploitation, and 

production.

Conversion of raw data and

information into a suitable form of 

intelligence.

Dissemination. Timely provision of intelligence, in 

appropriate form, to those who 

need it.

Utilization. Use of intelligence.

Figure 1-2. Key Considerations of

the Intelligence Cycle.
1-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

Intelligence data is derived from assets primarily

dedicated to intelligence collection; e.g., imagery

systems, electronic intercept equipment or human

intelligence (HUMINT) sources.

Sensor data is derived from sensors whose primary mission is surveillance or target acquisition;

e.g., air surveillance radars, counterbattery radars,

and remote ground sensors.

Combat data is derived from reporting by operational units. Because of their highly perishable or

critical nature, combat data and sensor data are

sometimes used to effect decisions without being

converted into intelligence. Although the

demands of the ongoing battle may require rapid

action, decisions based on raw, unprocessed data

or single pieces of data should be avoided.

Processing, analysis, and synthesis of data and

information into intelligence can be accomplished

rapidly at all levels. We seek knowledge—accurate intelligence, not incomplete, unfocused, or

unevaluated information—to enhance our understanding and base our decisions. The intelligence

cycle works continuously to satisfy intelligence

shortfalls and confirm or refute fragmentary information. Once collected and processed, information is converted into intelligence through the

application of experience and judgment. Information is analyzed to determine its significance and is

synthesized with other relevant information to

build a coherent picture of existing conditions and

capabilities. This picture is then used to predict

possible outcomes of environmental conditions

and enemy actions. Results are conveyed to the

commander in an intelligence product. Because

humans understand situations best as images—

mental pictures—intelligence is produced and disseminated in graphic form whenever possible. The

process is completed when the knowledge provided is applied to influence decisionmaking.

Intelligence Operations

Intelligence personnel and organizations perform

a number of separate and distinct activities and

functions that are collectively known as intelligence operations. Intelligence operations are conducted to provide intelligence in support of the

decisionmaking process of commanders down to

the small-unit level. The primary focus of Marine

Corps intelligence operations is generating tactical intelligence; i.e., intelligence that supports the

planning and conduct of tactical actions.

Although the focus is on tactical intelligence, the

Marine Corps must draw on both strategic and

operational intelligence resources and, in certain

circumstances, be prepared to conduct intelligence operations at the operational and even strategic level. Intelligence reduces uncertainty and

supports the decisionmaking process by—

O Describing the battlespace.

O Identifying key factors in the battlespace that

can influence operations.

O Defining and evaluating threat capabilities.

O Identifying the enemy’s COG and critical vulnerabilities.

O Assessing enemy intentions.

Relationship to Command and Control 

Intelligence is a fundamental component of command and control (C2). C2 is the means by

which a commander recognizes what needs to be

done and sees to it that appropriate actions are

taken. A principal aim of C2 is to enhance the

commander’s ability to make sound and timely

decisions. Intelligence facilitates the commander’s decisionmaking process by making a

major contribution to the understanding of the

battlespace and the threat. Intelligence is also an
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 1-5 

integral element of the process through which

the commander implements decisions. Inadequate or imperfect intelligence can significantly

inhibit the ability of a commander or subordinates to carry out these decisions. Lack of a continuous, effective intelligence effort also

degrades the quality of feedback to the commander about the unfolding situation; it is this

feedback that allows the commander to modify

the actions of the command as needed.

Because intelligence is crucial to success on the

battlefield, it must be given command attention.

The commander drives intelligence by focusing

the intelligence effort through the definition of

the mission, articulation of his intent, and designating priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).

A PIR is an intelligence requirement (IR) associated with a decision that will critically affect the

overall success of the command’s mission. PIRs

are a subset of commander’s critical information

requirements (CCIRs) and are focused on the

environment and the threat.

Relationship to Operations

Intelligence is inseparable from operations. Intelligence drives operations by shaping the planning and execution of operations. It provides a

menu of factors that the commander considers

when making a decision. Specifically, intelligence—

O Identifies potential advantages offered by the

environment.

O Describes limitations imposed by the environment.

O Ascertains and assesses enemy strengths to be

avoided.

O Uncovers enemy critical vulnerabilities that

can be exploited.

O Recommends COAs based on factors of the

battlespace and threat.

O Enables rapid decisionmaking and generating

and maintaining tempo.

Operational actions develop logically from intelligence. A commander with effective intelligence knows the nature of the terrain, weather

conditions, the composition and status of the

infrastructure in the area of operations, the

makeup and attitude of the population that will be

encountered, and how the combined effects of

these factors will influence mission accomplishment. Intelligence provides knowledge of threat

capabilities, strengths, COG, and critical vulnerabilities, along with insight into the enemy’s intentions. Integrating intelligence on the threat and

the battlespace helps to provide the commander

with situational awareness, which is used to

determine the decisive time and place to strike.

Intelligence and operations must be linked throughout the planning, decision, execution, and assessment (PDE&A) cycle at all levels. Intelligence

shapes the plan and provides the knowledge that

facilitates execution. It identifies changes in the situation that require modification of the plan or that

trigger decisions during the conduct of the operation. At the same time, the nature of the mission and

the concept of operations focus and shape the intelligence effort; intelligence that is not relevant to the

mission is useless. IRs and intelligence operations

are continually evaluated to ensure that they are

focused on supporting mission accomplishment.

Principles of Intelligence Operations 

O The focus is on tactical intelligence. The focus

of Marine Corps intelligence operations is on

the generation of tactical intelligence. However,

there are no sharp boundaries between levels of

intelligence; they merge and form a continuum. In some instances Marine Corps tactical

intelligence operations will support operational

and strategic IRs.

O Intelligence is focused downward. Intelligence must be available to commanders at all
1-6 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

levels. Although the management of intelligence collection and production is centralized

in the MAGTF command element (CE), the

focus is on providing the intelligence needed to

plan and execute the mission to every unit

involved in the operation. Requirements of the

entire force will be considered in directing the

intelligence effort. Critical products will be

pushed down to the tactical commander, who

will be able to pull additional intelligence support as needed.

O Intelligence drives operations. The Marine

Corps’ warfighting philosophy depends on

timely, accurate intelligence for success. Intelligence is the critical underpinning for each

phase of the PDE&A cycle.

O Intelligence activities require centralized

management. Good intelligence is the result of

the integration of many separate and specialized collection, processing, and analytical

resources. The scarcity of these assets, coupled

with the requirement to focus on the commander’s PIRs, creates the need for centralized

coordination and management. This centralization will be done in the MAGTF CE, under the

direction of intelligence officers who are trained

and experienced in the management of multidiscipline, all-source intelligence operations. (Allsource intelligence is intelligence that incorporates all available sources of information in the

development of the finished intelligence product.) Although centralized coordination and

management is required for efficient and effective use of intelligence assets, it is critical for

the commander who is exercising centralized

control to allocate appropriate resources to

ensure that needs of subordinate commands that

are crucial to mission accomplishment are

properly addressed.

O The G-2/S-2 facilitates use of intelligence. The

intelligence officer enables effective use of

intelligence throughout the command. As the

principal disseminator of intelligence, the intelligence officer ensures that the full implications

of the intelligence picture are understood. To do

this, the intelligence officer must be a full and

continuous participant in the planning process.

O Intelligence must be tailored and timely.

Intelligence must be tailored to the requirements of the user, provided in a useful format,

and received in time to affect the decisionmaking process. Delivery of the right intelligence—not simply data or information—to the

right place at the right time must be the guiding

principle of all dissemination efforts.

O Utilization is the final step of the intelligence

cycle. Intelligence has no inherent value; its

value is derived from its support of decisionmaking. The intelligence cycle is not complete

until the intelligence that has been developed is

used to plan and/or execute operations.

Intelligence Functions

All six functions are carried out continually during the PDE&A cycle at all levels throughout the

force. However, particular functions may be

stressed more during one phase of the cycle. Different units may emphasize one or two functions

over the others based on individual missions. (See

figure 1-3.)

Support the Commander’s Estimate

Intelligence supports the formulation and subsequent modification of the commander’s estimate of

the situation by providing as accurate an image of

the battlespace and the threat as possible. Intelligence supports initial planning and decisionmaking. One of the principal tools used in this function

is intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB).

IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. IPB helps to provide an appreciation

for the characteristics of the area of operations and

the enemy capabilities, weaknesses, and COAs.

This knowledge affords the commander an understanding of the battlespace and the opportunity to

exploit enemy critical vulnerabilities.
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 1-7 

Develop the Situation

Situation development provides continuing

knowledge of unfolding events to help update the

estimate of the situation. It is a dynamic process

that assesses the current situation and confirms or

denies the adoption of specific COAs by the

enemy. It helps refine our understanding of the

battlespace and reduces uncertainty and risk. Situation development occurs during execution and

provides the basis for adapting plans or exploiting opportunities.

Provide Indications and Warning

Indications and warning (I&W) serve a protective

purpose, providing early warning of potential

hostile action. They help prevent surprise and

reduce risk from enemy actions that run counter

to planning assumptions.

Support Force Protection

Force protection is the set of comprehensive

security measures, collection activities, and operations that are undertaken to guard the force

against the effects of enemy action. Intelligence

supports force protection by identifying, locating, and countering foreign intelligence collection, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism

capabilities. Support to force protection requires

detailed and accurate assessments of threat force

capabilities and intentions and facilitates efforts

to deny the enemy the opportunity to take offensive action against our forces.

Support Targeting

Intelligence supports targeting by identifying target systems, critical nodes, and high-value and

high-payoff targets as well as by providing the

intelligence required to most effectively engage

these targets.

Support Combat Assessment

Combat assessment is the process used to determine the overall effectiveness of military operations and identify requirements for future actions.

Intelligence supports the entire combat assessment process and is directly responsible for battle damage assessment (BDA), which is one of

the principal components of combat assessment.

BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of the

damage resulting from the application of military

force. BDA estimates physical damage to a particular target, functional damage to that target,

and the capability of the entire target system to

continue its operations.

Intelligence Functions Decisionmaking Operational Activities

Support to commander’s estimate. Plan a mission. Develop and analyze COAs.

Situation development. Execute the mission. Monitor execution.

Modify plan as necessary.

Indications and warning. Orient on contingencies. Increase readiness.

Develop contingency plans.

Support to force protection. Force protection. Support operations security (OPSEC).

Nuclear, chemical, and biological defense.

Support deception plan.

Support to targeting. Plan fire support. Attack targets.

Support to combat assessment. Reorient forces.

Plan future operations.

Consolidate, pursue, exploit.

Reattack targets.

Figure 1-3. Relationship Between Intelligence Functions and Operations.
1-8 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

The Commander’s Role in

the Intelligence Process

Intelligence is an inherent and essential responsibility of command. Commanders must come to

think of command and intelligence as inseparable, just as they commonly think of command

and operations as inseparable. They must study

and understand the theory and the practice of

intelligence doctrine. They must be personally

involved in the conduct of intelligence activities,

and provide guidance, supervision, judgment, and

authority to ensure a timely and useful product.

Focus the Intelligence Effort

The commander must provide the guidance and

direction necessary for the effective conduct of

intelligence activities. Intelligence assets will

rarely be sufficient to satisfy every requirement.

Thus, the intelligence effort must be focused on

clearly articulated priorities that drive the concept

of intelligence support and the collection, production, and dissemination efforts. The commander

provides this focus through articulating the commander’s intent, planning guidance, and the command’s PIRs.

Participate in the Intelligence Process

Although the intelligence officer manages the

intelligence effort for the commander, the commander is responsible for the results. Effective

participation requires an understanding of the

practical capabilities and limitations of intelligence personnel, equipment, procedures, and

products. The commander should supervise the

process, interjecting guidance and direction at

key points to ensure that the process is responding to the commander’s intent; e.g., the commander should define the scope of the IPB effort,

identify the preferred intelligence product format, and establish priorities among subordinate

commands’ IRs.

Use Intelligence in Decisionmaking

Intelligence exists for the primary purpose of aiding the commander’s decisionmaking process.

Although the intelligence officer facilitates the

use of intelligence throughout the command by

providing timely dissemination of the intelligence

product and ensuring that the meaning of the

intelligence is understood, the commander makes

the judgment of its operational impact. The commander makes a personal analysis of the intelligence product and arrives at the estimate of the

situation that serves as the basis for the decision.

This act is the responsibility of the commander

and no one else.

Support the Intelligence Effort

Intelligence is a team effort. Good intelligence is

the result of integrating many separate and specialized collection, processing, and analytical

resources. Some of these resources are organic to

the unit; many are provided by units or agencies

outside the command. Intelligence operations by

organic assets normally cannot succeed without

support from throughout the command. Reconnaissance teams must be inserted, sensors

implanted, and communications assets provided

for dissemination. Timely and effective intelligence dissemination requires dedicating significant C2 assets. Once an operation begins, nearly

every Marine will have the occasion to observe

significant facts about the enemy and environment. All personnel should understand and carry

out their responsibility to collect and report information. The commander must ensure that all

members of the unit understand the importance

placed on intelligence and the requirement to

support the intelligence effort. External support

must be requested and coordinated. The intelligence staff executes the procedures to obtain the

required support, but does so in the name of the

commander. When the command’s support

requirements go unsatisfied, the commander must

intervene, lending command authority to obtain

the support.
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 1-9 

Evaluate the Results of Intelligence Activities

The commander must provide feedback to the

intelligence support system. Feedback should

identify where the intelligence provided met

expectations and where and how it fell short. Key

areas to evaluate include product content, presentation, timeliness, and overall usefulness. Meaningful evaluation of the intelligence effort

provides the basis for its continual improvement.

Information Operations

Intelligence support is required to conduct information operations (IO). Specific intelligence is

required for planning and deconfliction and for

employing military disciplines available to

achieve IO effects. Intelligence is inextricably

linked to facilitating core and supporting IO disciplines in offensive or defensive postures. As a

product, intelligence supports IO in the same

manner provided to all operations. Planning for

IO cannot be conducted without intelligence on

adversary information and information systems,

perceptions, and critical vulnerabilities in their

C2 process. Each capability used in an IO context will have separate and continuous intelligence support requirements. The psychological

profiles of adversary commanders and forces are

themselves an important element within the overall assessment process.

Planning

Intelligence support to IO planning is conducted

as part of the IPB process. One of the key outputs from IPB is an analysis of the desired objectives and/or end states of stakeholders. These

desires are usually categorized relative to broad

capability. The categories may be elements of

national power such as politics, economics, military, and society. Capability analysis processes

within IPB also provide detail on stakeholder

capacity and intent to conduct or sustain defensive and offensive IO. Intelligence support will

aim to define critical nodes and vulnerabilities

within the adversary's information structure;

these include the key personnel, equipment, procedures and protocols involved in the transfer of

information required for successful C2. Such

intelligence support will orient key aspects of the

operation plan towards the systematic disruption

of critical nodes and information bearers.

Friendly force staff advice, linked to intelligence

advice on adversary COAs and CI advice on the

threats to security, provide the operations planning process with the background to decide the

protective measures required for own nodes and

information bearers. Accurate, timely, and

directed intelligence provides the foundation that

IO decisions are based. 

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace 

IPB is a continuous process used to develop a

detailed knowledge of the adversary's use of information and information systems. Intelligence support for IO planning builds upon traditional IPB

and provides the essential basis for planning IO

through the following considerations:

O The adversary commander's freedom of action

and the freedom of action allowed to subordinates

(decisionmaking process). This includes adversary perceptions of the situation (political, social,

and cultural influences) and developments.

O Adversary IO capability, intent, morale, and

vulnerability to offensive IO.

O C2 aspects such as key personnel, target audiences, headquarters, communications nodes,

databases or intelligence collection systems.

C2 nodes that appear in more than one adversary COA should be highlighted for targeting.

O Technical knowledge of a wide array of information, C2, intelligence, and media systems.

O Assessments of friendly vulnerability to adversary IO.

IO-Related Force Protection

Knowledge of the threat—adversaries, their intent,

and capabilities—is a key consideration in the risk
1-10 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

management process. CI and counterreconnaissance

contribute directly to force protection by denying

critical information to potential adversaries. Many

IO IRs require significant lead-time to develop collection sources, access, and databases. Potential

intelligence collection sources should be developed

as early as possible; a clear statement of MAGTF

IRs is essential. IO will require development of

extensive intelligence analytical products to obtain a

detailed knowledge of cultural factors, and adversary use of information and information systems.

The Role of Intelligence in IO is Continual

Changes in attitudes, actions, operating patterns, and

enemy information systems must be detected, analyzed, and reported to ensure that IO continues to

achieve the desired operational effect. Assessing

ongoing IO activities is a crucial and extremely

challenging responsibility of intelligence as targets

must be monitored to determine the effectiveness of

the IO efforts. To achieve complete synthesis, IO

must be incorporated into the MAGTF's intelligence, BDA, and targeting cycles. The impact of

many IO actions may be difficult to measure. Indicators of success or failure must be carefully crafted

in advance. Since IO will often not produce the

same directly observable effects used for traditional

BDA, IO execution will challenge the intelligence

system to develop other measures of effectiveness.

Once detected, these indicators should be integrated

into operational planning and targeting systems, and

appropriate action can be taken.

Intelligence enables the planning and execution of

successful operations. MAGTF operations are characterized by unity of effort, high tempo, timely decisionmaking, rapid execution, and the relentless

exploitation of opportunities. Intelligence operations

must have the flexibility, agility, and sustainability to

support these types of operations. Expeditionary

Maneuver Warfare, as the Marine Corps’ current

capstone concept, lays the foundation for MAGTF

operations. MAGTF operations include--

O Operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS).

O Sustained operations ashore.

O Military operations other than war (MOOTW).

O Joint.

O Multinational.

Each operation presents unique challenges and

considerations for intelligence support. Many

MAGTF operations will be executed as joint

operations and with allies, coalition or multinational partners. Intelligence activities in joint and

multinational operations require special planning

and coordination.

Required Intelligence Capabilities

As a warfighting function, intelligence applies

broadly across the full range of military operations. The following required intelligence capabilities are common to all operations: 

O Conduct intelligence planning and direction.

O Perform intelligence collection management.

O Process and exploit intelligence.

O Produce intelligence.

O Disseminate intelligence.

O Facilitate intelligence’s use.

O Perform intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and CI operations.
CHAPTER 2 

COMMAND AND CONTROL

C2 aims to reduce the amount of uncertainty that

commanders must accept—to a reasonable

point— to make sound decisions. Intelligence is a

principal component of C2. Intelligence is a process conducted specifically to aid the commander in decisionmaking by reducing this

uncertainty. Intelligence operations support the

commander’s PDE&A cycle by helping to build

situational awareness and providing insight into

the nature of the problem facing the commander.

Intelligence provides knowledge concerning the

environment and the enemy while furnishing an

estimate of potential enemy activities. This knowledge is used by the commander to devise workable,

flexible plans; make sound and timely decisions;

monitor events to ensure proper execution; and

modify decisions quickly in response to changing

situations or to exploit fleeting opportunities. 

Decisionmaking

The principal aim of C2 is to enhance the commander’s ability to make sound and timely decisions. Decisionmaking is a time-competitive

process that depends in part on the availability of

the right elements of information at the right time

and place. Without the information that provides

the basis of situational awareness, no commander can make sound decisions. Intelligence

operations focus on providing the right elements

of information concerning the threat and the environment; i.e, intelligence, required to generate

situational awareness and fuel the decisionmaking process.

Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act Loop

A simple model that is known as the observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop is used to

describe the C2 process. (See figure 2-1.)

The OODA loop applies to any two-sided conflict, whether combatants are individuals or large

military formations. When engaged in conflict,

participants—

O Observe. Take in information about the environment, the friendly status, and the threat. 

O Orient. Make estimates, assumptions, analyses, and judgments about the situation to create

a cohesive mental image.

O Decide. Determine what needs to be done,

whether it is an immediate reaction or a deliberate plan.

O Act. Put the decision into action.

OBSERVE

ORIENT

DECIDE

ACT

Figure 2-1. The Observe, Orient, Decide,

and Act Loop.
2-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

The OODA loop reflects how decisionmaking is

a continual, cyclical process. In any conflict, the

participant who can consistently and effectively

cycle through the OODA loop faster—who can

maintain a higher tempo of action—gains an

increasing advantage with each cycle. The essential lesson of the OODA loop is the importance of

generating and maintaining tempo.

Intelligence and the OODA Loop

Intelligence supports all phases of the OODA

loop. Intelligence operations facilitate the exercise of C2 by helping to reduce the uncertainty

confronting the commander, providing a significant part of the knowledge needed to reach the

decision, and assisting in monitoring the implementation and effects of that decision.

O Observe. Intelligence collection operations

observe threat activity and current environmental conditions. All-source analysis of the

collected intelligence information is provided

to enhance the commander’s situational awareness and understanding of the battlespace.

O Orient. The image of the battlespace presented

by intelligence, coupled with the predictive

analysis of the IPB process, helps orient the

commander. It aids in comparing the current

situation to the desired end state and in identifying COAs to achieve that end state.

O Decide. Intelligence enables decisionmaking by

helping define what is operationally possible and

most advantageous. It provides the framework for

assessing the potential COAs against existing

environmental conditions and threat capabilities,

vulnerabilities, and likely responses.

O Act. Intelligence supports execution by providing a shared picture of the battlespace to all levels of command and by meeting the intelligence

needs of all levels of commanders involved in

the conduct of operations. Once the concept of

operations has been formulated, the focus of

intelligence activities shifts from developing the

wide-scope intelligence required for COA selection to providing detailed, tailored intelligence to

support mission planning and execution. Intelligence is also critical to generating and maintaining tempo in C2. During execution, supporting

intelligence operations are conducted to monitor

enemy reactions, protect the force from enemy

counteraction, and assess the effects of ongoing

operations. The continuing intelligence development effort aids the commander in effectively

cycling through the OODA loop faster to gain an

increasing advantage over the enemy.

Decisionmaking Approaches:

Analytical and Intuitive

In analytical decisionmaking, several options for

solving the problem at hand are identified, studied, and compared to arrive at the best solution.

In intuitive decisionmaking, the commander

assesses the situation to recognize a pattern.

Once a pattern is identified, experience and judgment guide the commander in evaluating the key

elements of the problem and rapidly determining a satisfactory solution. Each approach has

different strengths and weaknesses; although

conceptually distinct, the two are rarely mutually exclusive.

Intelligence supports analytical decisionmaking

by helping to identify the options available and

provide the framework (in the form of estimates

and studies focused on the threat and key factors

of the battlespace) for analysis and comparison of

those options. Intelligence supports intuitive decisionmaking by providing the knowledge that

helps the commander to recognize emerging patterns. The same methodology is used to develop

intelligence support for both decisionmaking

approaches. Application of that methodology will

vary based on the specifics of each situation and

the decisionmaking style of the supported commander. The goal remains the same: to provide a

knowledge-based intelligence product that can be

applied to make a sound decision.
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 2-3 

The Planning, Decision, Execution,

and Assessment Cycle

The PDE&A cycle provides a framework for

implementing C2. It translates the cognitive process of the OODA loop into a concrete series of

actions taken by the commander and the staff to

plan and execute an operation. To be effective,

intelligence operations must be linked to the

commander’s decisionmaking process and the

resulting operational activity. Therefore, intelligence operations are integrated with the

PDE&A cycle. Specific intelligence tasks are

carried out to support each phase of this cycle.

While the level of command, time available, and

specific tactical situation will influence how the

PDE&A cycle is carried out and the degree of

detail applied in performing intelligence activities, the same basic intelligence development

process is employed in deliberate and rapid

planning scenarios and supports analytical and

intuitive decisionmaking.

Intelligence support to planning begins with providing a basic description of the environmental

conditions and enemy situation in the projected

area of operations (AO). As plans are developed

and refined, the intelligence effort becomes more

narrowly focused on identifying the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities and potential COAs and generating mission-specific intelligence products that

support detailed planning and execution of specific operational activities. Finally, during mission

execution, intelligence operations concentrate on

the satisfaction of requirements linked to key operational decisions and the recognition of exploitable opportunities as they arise in the battlespace.

Intelligence Support to Planning

Planning is the process of developing practical

schemes for taking future actions. It represents an

effort to project operational concepts and designs

forward in time and space. During the planning

process, the commander assesses the situation,

builds a vision of the battlespace, and develops

the desired outcome of the battle or campaign.

Planning is oriented on the future because the primary objective of intelligence is to reduce uncertainty about the future. Intelligence makes a

critical contribution to this process. Much of the

intelligence effort is “front loaded” to support

planning; a substantial portion of intelligence

development must be completed during this

phase. Intelligence provides a comprehensive

image of the battlespace and the threat and helps

commanders to provide for constant or predictable aspects of the environment, come to an

understanding on the general direction of future

actions, and anticipate possible threat force

actions and reactions.

Planning Models

The choice of planning model is made on the

basis of a variety of factors, including the mission, level of command, command relationships,

time available, and preferences of individual

commanders. All planning models have the same

basic elements in common. They—

O Determine what needs to be done.

O Identify one or more COAs to accomplish the

required tasks.

O Study the COAs to test feasibility, identify

support requirements, and select the most

promising alternative.

O Convey instructions to subordinates to execute

the plan.

Intelligence development follows the same basic

process, no matter which planning model is used.

While the specific steps and sequence used in

planning may vary, the requirement to provide

focused, continuous intelligence to shape the

planning process remains constant. A generic

planning model will be used to outline the baseline methodology for providing intelligence support to planning. The components of this generic
2-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

model are mission analysis, COA development,

COA analysis, and plan/orders development. For

a more complete discussion of planning and the

planning process, see MCDP 5, Planning, and

MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process.

(See figure 2-2.)

Mission Analysis

Mission analysis is conducted to identify the

tasks required to accomplish the mission,

develop baseline knowledge of the situation, and

determine what additional information is

required to facilitate the planning process. Intelligence supports mission analysis through providing basic intelligence on the nature of the AO

and the threat. Intelligence operations are

guided by the results of mission analysis: formulation of initial commander’s intent, planning

guidance, and PIRs.

Mission Receipt

The receipt of the mission starts the formal planning cycle. However, preliminary planning is

normally conducted before the receipt of a mission to anticipate future taskings and potential

actions required to accomplish those taskings.

Intelligence, in performing its I&W function, will

monitor a command’s area of interest and identify developing crisis situations and/or potential

missions. The commander uses this information

to anticipate future missions and to direct the

staff to accomplish preliminary planning and

intelligence development before the arrival of

formal mission tasking. Much of this preliminary

Operational

Graphics to

OPORD 99-XX

Objective

Objective

Objective

OPORD,

OPLAN

or

FRAGO

XX

XX

IPB Products

Basic Studies

Mission-Specific

Intelligence

Products and

Collection, Production,

and Dissemination

Plans

Intelligence

Estimate

and

Refined,

Prioritized

Threat COAs

Threat COA 1

Threat COA 2

Target Folder

Collection Plan

Production Plan

Dissemination Plan

High-Value Targets

Planning and Decisionmaking

Mission

Analysis

Write

OPORD

Mission

Taskings to

Intelligence

Units

COA

Development

Analyze

and Compare

COAs

(War Game)

and Decide

Figure 2-2. Intelligence Support to Planning.
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 2-5 

work is carried out by the intelligence section,

including collecting basic data on the threat and

the environment, IPB analysis, and disseminating intelligence throughout the staff.

Information Requirements and Exchange

The process of identifying IRs and gathering and

distributing information within the staff, and

throughout the command, begins during preliminary planning and intensifies once the mission is

received. Intelligence is provided about threat

forces and the AO, focusing on the advantages and

limitations presented by the environment and the

strengths and critical vulnerabilities of the threat.

This intelligence is disseminated through a variety

of media: the distribution of basic products (maps,

imagery, and threat forces studies); the conduct of

orientation briefings, and IPB analysis. The continuous, interactive process of IR development also

begins. Products provided by the intelligence section stimulate additional questions from the commander and members of the staff. These questions

are translated into new or refined IRs. The new

requirements are then used to focus the intelligence development process.

Mission Analysis

The commander makes a critical contribution to

the operation during this step, setting the stage

for the completion of planning and mission execution. During mission analysis, the commander

and the staff draw together all available intelligence and information, focus it on the assigned

mission, develop an understanding of the tasks to

be accomplished, and formulate a rough concept

of how to best accomplish those tasks. The result

is an initial statement of commander’s intent and

commander’s planning guidance that focuses the

remainder of the planning process.

The intelligence officer is a full participant in

mission analysis. During mission analysis, the

intelligence officer does the following:

O Orients the commander and the other members

of the staff to the battlespace and the nature of

the threat.

O Aids in forming the commander’s intent by

helping to define what is operationally possible

and most advantageous. This is accomplished

primarily through IPB and the analytical process. These results identify the threat’s COG,

strengths, and critical vulnerabilities and indicate the potential advantages and limitations

imposed by the environment.

O Receives guidance from the commander to help

shape the intelligence effort. Guidance can take a

variety of forms: a statement of commander’s

intent, a list of PIRs or direct instructions from the

commander about intelligence needs or concerns.

COA Development 

Building on the knowledge gained through mission analysis, the commander and staff next

develop a concept for carrying out the required

tasks that embodies the commander’s intent and

planning guidance. This concept (or COA)

encompasses general schemes for the execution

of maneuver, fires, logistics, and other supporting functions necessary for successful implementation of the basic concept. 

When time permits, the staff usually develops

several COAs on the basis of the commander’s

intent and planning guidance. Intelligence supports this process by the following: 

O Continuously updating the view of the battlespace.

O Defining operational possibilities through the

IPB process.

O Identifying intelligence gaps that cannot be

filled by organic collection assets.

O Providing the focus on the enemy through

identifying the threat’s COG, critical vulnerabilities, and potential COAs, emphasizing the

most likely and most dangerous of these

COAs.

O Ensuring that the commander and staff receive,

understand, and use relevant, focused, knowledge-based intelligence that enhances their

understanding of the situation, rather than a

stream of unfocused information.
2-6 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

The intelligence officer interacts with the staff

throughout the COA development process, integrating continuing intelligence development

efforts with the potential COAs in an effort to

ensure that intelligence will be available to support any COA selected. 

When an intuitive approach is used, intelligence

helps the commander recognize emerging patterns, identify a workable solution, and rapidly

evaluate that solution. Products developed

through the IPB process present intelligence in

the form of images that permit decisionmakers to

quickly visualize the situation, see patterns, and

assess potential alternatives.

COA War Game

After COAs are developed, they are analyzed and

compared to identify the best COA and the concept of operations to implement that COA. Time

permitting, the staff conducts a detailed analysis

of each COA; each principal staff officer prepares a formal estimate of supportability. When

possible, COAs should be wargamed to predict

the action, reaction, and counterreaction dynamics of each COA.

Intelligence assists COA analysis by the following:

O Identifying and refining threat COAs and actions/

reactions to friendly COAs under consideration.

O Playing the role of the enemy in the wargaming process.

O Developing an independent evaluation of each

friendly COA based on an understanding of the

environment and the potential threat response

and the ability to provide intelligence support

to that COA.

O Helping to focus the staff on the factors of the

environment and the enemy, emphasizing the

degree of uncertainty and resulting risk associated with each COA.

The intelligence officer’s full participation is crucial to successful COA analysis. It is during this

step that the full implications of the intelligence

estimate are absorbed and applied. To maximize

this contribution, the intelligence officer must be

able to “think red”—analyze the situation from

the enemy’s perspective—and “think blue”—

understand the intent and construct of friendly

plans and operations. Combining these two perspectives enables the intelligence officer to assess

the potential effects of threat force actions on the

potential COAs.

When time is not available to wargame and conduct a complete COA analysis, the commander

makes a rapid mental assessment of available

options. The situational awareness that is provided

in large part through intelligence guides the commander in evaluating these options and quickly

selecting one that offers potential for success.

Orders Development

Based on the COA analysis, the commander

selects a COA, refines the intent, and gives further guidance on developing the detailed concept

of operations and supporting plans or orders. The

emphasis of the intelligence effort, which is

focused on the commander’s intent, the selected

COA, and the identified PIRs, shifts from developing basic and broad-scope intelligence in support of conceptual planning to providing specific

intelligence that facilitates functional planning,

detailed planning, and mission execution. The

intelligence tasks of I&W and supporting the

commander’s estimate continue, but situation

development, support to targeting, and support to

force protection now receive increased emphasis.

A concept of intelligence support is prepared to

allocate intelligence resources in accordance with

the main effort and the concept of operations.

COA analysis and wargaming results are used to

develop and implement collection, production,

and dissemination plans to support the chosen

COA. IPB efforts are intensified in an effort to

satisfy PIRs and develop the in-depth intelligence required for the detailed planning of specific operational activities. Intelligence sections

prepare and disseminate products that embody
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 2-7 

the results of the IPB process and intelligence

collection activities to provide a shared view of

the battlespace at all levels of the force. At the

same time, they deliver mission-specific intelligence in response to the extensive and precise

functional and detailed planning requirements of

units that will execute the operation. CI plans and

measures are prepared and implemented to conceal our intentions and protect the force. Results

of these intelligence activities shape and develop

the overall plan/order and the plan’s comprehensive supporting annexes and appendices. 

Execution 

During execution, the plan is refined, implemented, and adapted in response to changes in

the situation and action/reaction of the enemy. C2

is a process that generates swift, appropriate, and

decisive action and provides a means of continuously assessing developments that provide the

basis for adapting. The commander uses a variety of techniques and measures to supervise,

monitor, and modify the execution of the plan,

thereby shaping the battle and maintaining unity

of effort. The intelligence effort must be responsive to the needs of mission execution and ensure

a continuous flow of intelligence throughout the

force to maintain a shared picture of the battlespace and satisfy new requirements developed

by the operating forces.

Intelligence operations are integrated with the concept of operations to enhance force protection,

develop situational awareness, and support combat assessment. The results of these operations are

used to modify the plan or exercise tactical

options, thereby enabling rapid decisionmaking as

well as generating and maintaining tempo. The

information developed through these activities is

entered into the continuous intelligence development process, which provides the basis for planning future operations.

Intelligence support to execution differs in significant ways from intelligence support to planning.

First, while intelligence support to planning

requires developing a large volume of basic intelligence and preparing broad-scope estimates to

develop and analyze COAs, intelligence support

to execution involves the satisfaction of a much

larger body of IRs in a significantly greater

degree of detail. For example, during COA development, it may be sufficient to tell a MAGTF or

ground combat element (GCE) commander that

an enemy mechanized force is located in a general area and has an approximate number of tanks

and armored personnel carriers of various types.

However, the subordinate unit tasked with establishing a blocking position opposite that enemy

force will require more detailed information on

enemy disposition. In another example, the nature

of the intelligence required by a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) commander to decide if a

raid or tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel

(TRAP) mission is feasible is fundamentally different from the type and detail of intelligence

required by the raid or TRAP personnel force

commander who will execute that mission.

A second major difference between intelligence

support to planning and intelligence support to

execution is the time available for developing the

intelligence product. Often days, weeks, and sometimes months are available to provide intelligence

support to planning, but intelligence support to

execution must normally be developed in hours,

minutes or even seconds. Success in execution

often depends on the ability to provide immediate

answers to critical questions concerning threat

force dispositions, actions, and intentions. 

Finally, the uncertainty and disorder that are

inherent in the nature of war manifest themselves primarily during execution. Once execution begins, interaction between the opposing

wills of friendly and enemy forces normally

causes significant and fundamental changes in
2-8 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

the situation. Discerning environmental conditions and enemy capabilities and intentions

becomes increasingly difficult once these forces

are set in motion. Yet it is at precisely this time

that commanders require detailed and accurate

intelligence to help cope with the uncertainty.

The combined factors of the extensive nature of

the IRs, the degree of detail required, the limited

time available, and the uncertainty inherent during execution make providing intelligence support to execution the most significant intelligence

challenge. Intelligence operations must be prepared to meet this challenge and to provide the

flexibility and agility required to deliver continuous situational awareness, identify opportunities,

and facilitate rapid decisionmaking.

Intelligence support during execution focuses on

providing the commander with practical knowledge that gives an exploitable advantage over the

enemy. Although eliminating uncertainty during

execution is impossible, focused intelligence

operations can reduce uncertainty by providing

situational awareness and identifying opportunities as they present themselves in the battlespace.

Intelligence provides I&W of new or unexpected

enemy activities, enhances efforts to engage the

enemy through support to targeting, assists in

protecting the force through CI measures and

operations, and supports the planning of future

operations by providing timely and accurate

BDA. Three key factors for ensuring effective

intelligence support during execution are

resource allocation, linkage to operations, and

generation of tempo.

Resource Allocation

Since IRs will always exceed available intelligence

resources, intelligence operations must focus where

they can have the greatest effect. A detailed and

well-thought-out concept of intelligence support,

developed in accordance with the commander’s

intent and concept of operations, will provide an

appropriate allocation of intelligence capabilities

between the main effort and supporting efforts. It is

particularly important that Marine Corps forces

(MARFOR), MAGTF, and major subordinate commands (MSCs) who control the tasking of intelligence units and capabilities provide access to

critical intelligence resources for their subordinate

elements. Those intelligence resources best suited

to satisfying current, tactical, mission-specific IRs,

such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or terrain

analysts, should be allocated to units responsible

for executing the mission.

Linkage to Operations

To provide effective support to execution, intelligence operations must be linked to planned and

ongoing operational activity. Intelligence operations are conducted based on the results of the

IPB process, wargaming, and the planning process. Collection, production, and dissemination

plans are developed to support execution of specific tactical options, engagement of targets, and

selecting branches and sequels to the operation

plan. Intelligence personnel must have continuous awareness of planned and ongoing operations to monitor potential enemy reactions,

identify new opportunities, and assess the effects

of actions on the enemy. Close and continuous

synchronization of intelligence activities and

operations is essential to developing timely, tailored, and relevant intelligence that facilitates

rapid decisionmaking and exploitating opportunities in the battlespace.

Generation of Tempo

Intelligence operations during execution must

facilitate the generation of tempo. First, intelligence operations generate tempo through prioritization. By focusing intelligence operations on

satisfying PIRs and supporting the main effort,

intelligence is developed that is directly linked to

the commander’s intent and C2 effort. Next,

intelligence facilitates tempo by supporting the

decisionmaking process. Intelligence that provides situational awareness and the ability to recognize emerging patterns enables the commander

to employ intuitive decisionmaking to make rapid
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 2-9 

decisions that help generate tempo. Finally, intelligence facilitates tempo by providing knowledge—key elements of data and information that

have been analyzed, synthesized, and placed in

context to help provide situational awareness—

not just a mass of unprocessed information or

unrelated pieces of data. The critical factor is not

the amount of information provided, but key,

focused intelligence that is available when

needed and in a useful form that improves the

commander’s knowledge of the hostile situation

and his ability to act. Intelligence operations must

have the flexibility, agility, and responsiveness to

rapidly collect and process relevant information,

develop a focused product, and deliver that product to the affected commander in an easily understandable form and in time for the commander to

take appropriate action.
CHAPTER 3

DEVELOPING INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence is developed through the use of

the intelligence cycle. This process consists of

a sequence of related activities that translate

requirements for various types of information

into intelligence that is furnished to the commander for use in the decisionmaking cycle.

During this sequence, intelligence needs are

identified; a plan is formulated and directions

are given for satisfying those needs, data is

collected, processed, and exploited for usable

information that is then transformed into a tailored, useful intelligence product that is disseminated to and utilized by the appropriate

commander or unit. This process is called the

intelligence cycle. At the same time, a parallel

process is used to develop CI plans and measures that deny information to an adversary to

protect our forces and help ensure the effectiveness of our operations.

Figure 3-1 shows the six steps of the Marine

Corps intelligence cycle. These steps define a

sequential and interdependent process for the

development of intelligence. Intelligence operations are conducted within the framework of the

intelligence cycle; the entire cycle or a specific

step within the cycle may be the focus of a particular intelligence activity. Moreover, all intelligence, regardless of the scope of the

requirement or level of command, is developed

by following these steps. (See figures 3-2 and

3-3, page 3-2.)

No single phase of the cycle is more important than

the others. All of the phases are interdependent.

Without proper direction, the other phases will not

focus on the correct objectives. Without effective

collection, there may be too much or too little information and what information there is may prove to

be irrelevant. Without processing and production,

there is a mass of random data instead of the

knowledge needed for the planning and execution

of operations. Intelligence is meaningless unless it

reaches the right people in time to affect the decisionmaking process and in an understandable form.

An understanding of the process used to develop

intelligence is critical to the execution of successful intelligence operations. All personnel involved

in the development and use of intelligence must be

aware of their role in the process. They must

understand the relationship between the steps in

the process to ensure that intelligence focuses on

the mission and facilitates rapid decisionmaking in

Planning

and Direction

Production

Processing

and Exploitation Dissemination

Utilization Collection

Figure 3-1. The Marine Corps

Intelligence Cycle.
3-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

the execution of successful combat operations.

(See figure 3-4.) Intelligence Requirements

An intelligence requirement (IR) is a requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the command’s knowledge and understanding of the

battlespace or enemy forces. (JP 1-02)

IRs drive the intelligence cycle. Properly articulated, mission-oriented requirements focus the

intelligence effort and provide the foundation for

successful intelligence operations.

The Intelligence Cycle — Macro View

During a routine review of the situation in the Marine Expeditionary Force’s (MEF’s) area of interest, the G-2 notes that a

recent change in government in one of the countries has created the potential for instability over the next year. The G-2

directs the development of an intelligence estimate to support potential contingency operations in this country. Working

with the Marine Corps force G-2 section and the pertinent

combatant command’s joint intelligence center, the MEF collections section submits requests for imagery intelligence

(IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and HUMINT support. As information is received, the MEF G-2 section’s allsource fusion platoon (AFP), with the assistance of the topographic platoon, the imagery intelligence platoon (IIP), and

the radio battalion, processes and exploits the information to

produce the estimate and supporting studies. The estimate is

completed within a month. The G-2 directs that copies be forwarded to all major subordinate commands (MSCs) and staff

sections, with priority to the forward-deployed MEU. The G-2

also recommends to the commanding general that the scenario for the MEF’s upcoming command post (CP) exercise

be based on this estimate to introduce MEF personnel to this

contingency area, identify planning requirements, and

develop potential COAs. The MEF G-2 has directed the

development of a comprehensive intelligence product that is

focused on an operational requirement. Extensive organic

capabilities as well as external resources were integrated to

collect data, process it into information, and produce the finished intelligence. The product was then disseminated to and

utilized by the units and staff sections with contingency

responsibility for the identified area. The intelligence formulated focuses on the mission and facilitates rapid

decisionmaking in the execution of successful combat

operations. 

Figure 3-2. The Intelligence Cycle—

Macro View.

The Intelligence Cycle—Micro View

The regiment S-2 section receives a report from one of their

reconnaissance teams that an enemy artillery battery has just

passed their observation post (OP) and turned off the road.

Knowing that enemy artillery is the top targeting priority, the

intelligence watch immediately begins developing the target.

The S-2 chief checks the map and notes that there are three

potential firing positions (identified through the IPB process)

close to, but out of visual range of, the reconnaissance OP.

The S-2 chief also knows that UAVs are in direct support of the

regiment at this time. The S-2 chief alerts the fire support coordination center (FSCC) concerning the potential target and

works with the FSCC and air officer to divert an ongoing UAV

mission to search the potential firing positions. The UAV

quickly locates the enemy artillery in the second firing position.

The S-2 chief confirms that the enemy weapons can range

friendly positions and, based on their observed activity, are

preparing to attack. Using this intelligence, the FSCC coordinates a counterfire mission against the enemy artillery. The S2 chief successfully executed the intelligence cycle in a matter

of minutes. He understood the requirement to develop targeting information, directed the collection of information,

processed the information and produced the desired intelligence, that is, a target, and disseminated that target to the

FSCC, who utilized that intelligence to engage the target.

Figure 3-3. The Intelligence Cycle—

Micro View.
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 3-3 

An IR is a missing piece of information about the

enemy or environment that a commander needs

to know to make a sound decision. In its simplest

form, an IR is a question about the threat or the

battlespace, the answer to which is required for

the planning and execution of an operation.

Examples follow:

O Will the highway bridge support assault

amphibious vehicles? 

O Will weather conditions interfere with planned

air operations?

O Are port facilities and conditions suitable for a

maritime prepositioning force pierside offload?

O Can the enemy air defense system threaten

low-flying helicopters?

O What is the reaction time of the enemy garrison

located south of the amphibious objective area?

Requirements fall into two categories: IRs

and PIRs. PIRs and IRs replace the terms

essential elements of information and IRs.

Priority Intelligence Requirement

A PIR is an intelligence requirement associated

with a decision that will critically affect the overall success of the command’s mission. (MCDP 2)

Commander's Decision

Intelligence

Information

Intelligence Development

Mission and

Commander's Intent

The

Intelligence

Cycle

Utilization

Dissemination

Production

Processing

and Exploitation

Collection

Planning

and Direction

The

Information

Hierarchy

Understanding

Knowledge

Information

Data

Uncertainty

Commander

Intelligence

Intelligence

Data

Sensor

Data

Combat

Data

Figure 3-4. Intelligence Development and the Intelligence Cycle.
3-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

IRs cover the entire spectrum of information that

is needed concerning the battlespace and the

threat. The scarce intelligence assets and limited

time available will rarely permit the satisfaction

of all of a command’s IRs; thus, it is important to

focus the intelligence effort on those requirements that are critical to mission success. These

critical IRs are designated as PIRs. PIRs are the

subset of the CCIRs that focus on the threat and

the environment. CCIRs are intelligence and

information requirements the satisfaction of

which the commander deems critical to decisionmaking and mission success. PIRs are linked to

specific decisions and, in effect, constitute the

commander’s guidance for intelligence. Notional

PIRs follow:

O What size force is defending amphibious force

objective B?

O Which bridges over the Sand River are intact?

O Will the enemy use chemical weapons against

the beach support area on D-day?

There is no standard list or set rule for determining PIRs. Each tactical situation poses distinct

problems and specific gaps in intelligence. However, the commander will often have PIRs that

concern the most likely enemy COA, the most

dangerous enemy COA, and critical enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited.

Characteristics

PIRs and IRs have the following characteristics.

Each PIR or IR—

O Asks only one question.

O Focuses on specific facts, events or activities

concerning the enemy or the battlespace.

O Is tied to mission planning, decisionmaking,

and execution.

O Provides a clear, concise statement of what

intelligence is required.

O Contains geographic and time elements to limit

the scope of the requirement.

Requirements may be simple or complex. It is

important to understand that the nature and scope

of PIRs and IRs will vary with the mission and

the level of command, and on the particular phase

in the PDE&A cycle. Requirements will generally become more focused as the intelligence

cycle is executed. During execution, the intelligence effort should be directed against a small

number of PIRs that are closely linked to the concept of operations.

Planning and Direction

The planning and direction phase of the intelligence cycle consists of those activities that identify pertinent IRs and provide the means for

satisfying those requirements. (See figure 3-5.)

Intelligence planning and direction is a continuous function and a command responsibility. The

commander directs the intelligence effort. The

intelligence officer manages this effort for the

commander based on the intent, designation of

PIRs, and specific guidance provided during the

planning process.

Figure 3-5. Planning and Direction

Phase Functions.

Requirements Development

Identification of Requirements

Concise, mission-oriented IRs provide clear

direction to the intelligence effort. The entire

staff and all subordinate commanders play a

role in developing the command’s IRs. The

intelligence officer formulates most of the initial requirements by using the original mission

Requirements Development

Requirements Management

Collection Management

Production Management

Dissemination Management
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 3-5 

tasking together with knowledge of the threat,

familiarity with the operating area, and experience derived from participation in the commander’s decisionmaking process to anticipate

the majority of the basic intelligence needs. As

the planning process continues, the commander, other staff officers, and subordinate

commands expand on previously identified

requirements and develop new ones. Requirements are generally linked to proposed COAs

or potential decisions. The intelligence officer

records, collates, and refines these requirements as they are identified and maintains a

consolidated list of requirements.

Designation of PIRs

The commander makes a critical contribution to

the intelligence effort by designating the PIRs. As

COAs and supporting information requirements

are developed, the satisfaction of certain IRs will

be essential to mission success. The identification

of these “show stoppers” forms the basis for designating PIRs. The intelligence officer, with input

from other members of the staff, draws up a recommended list of PIRs. PIRs will be listed in priority order relative to their importance to mission

accomplishment. In forming this list, the G-2/S-2

considers the requirements of his own command,

subordinate commands, adjacent commands, and

any direction received from higher headquarters.

Recommendations are submitted to the commander who reviews, refines, and approves the

command’s PIRs. In designating PIRs, the commander establishes the following:

O What he wants to know (intelligence required).

O Why he wants it (linked to operational decisionmaking).

O When he needs it (latest time that the information will be of value).

O How he wants it (format, method of delivery).

Once approved and distributed, PIRs constitute

the core of the commander’s guidance for the

intelligence process.

Requirements Management

Management of IRs is a dynamic process that

encompasses the continuous evaluation of the

following:

O Importance of each requirement to mission

success.

O Information and assets needed to satisfy each

requirement.

O Resources that are presently committed toward

fulfilling that requirement.

O Degree that the requirement has been satisfied

by completed intelligence activities.

Processing Requirements

Developing requirements and designating PIRs

are not one-time efforts. There is a dynamic flow

of new requirements, existing requirements are

satisfied or no longer relevant, and the relative

importance of each requirement changes as the

PDE&A cycle progresses. (See figure 3-6.) As

requirements are developed, the intelligence

officer validates, refines, and enters them into the

management system. 

Validation ensures that the requirement is relevant to the mission, has not already been satisfied, and does not duplicate other requirements.

Inactive

IR List

PIR

IR

(Active)

Nonvalid

Requirements

Commander

G-2/S-2

and Staff

Higher

Headquarters

Subordinate

Commanders

Master

IR

List

Figure 3-6. Intelligence Requirements

Management.
3-6 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

Refining the requirement entails placing it in the

proper format, identifying all information components related to the requirement, and adding

appropriate qualifiers such as geographic limitations or time constraints. During refinement, similar or related requirements may be combined

into a single, comprehensive requirement.

A requirements management system is an essential tool that provides a means to monitor the

effort to satisfy each requirement. Each intelligence section must develop a system appropriate

to its mission and echelon. Minimal components

of any system are a numbering system, identification of who submitted the requirement, designation of collection and production resources

committed to satisfying the requirement (or noting

when it was submitted to higher headquarters or

supporting forces, if organic assets are not available), timeliness requirements, dissemination

instructions and information, and a mechanism to

ensure user satisfaction.

Determining Priorities

The intelligence officer must continually reassess

the emphasis given to each requirement and

realign the priorities according to commander’s

intent and the current phase of the PDE&A cycle.

The intelligence officer must also periodically confirm assignment of priorities with the commander

to ensure that the intelligence effort is focused in

accordance with the commander’s desires.

Requirements Satisfaction

Once a requirement has been identified, validated,

refined, and prioritized, the intelligence officer

must determine how to satisfy the requirement

and, if it can be satisfied by organic assets, allocate

the appropriate intelligence assets to develop the

desired intelligence. If the requirement cannot be

satisfied by organic assets, it must be submitted to

higher headquarters or supporting forces/agencies

for satisfaction. In determining how to satisfy a

requirement, the intelligence officer must consider

each step in the intelligence cycle to ensure that

the plan encompasses the entire process from collection through utilization. The intelligence officer

must identify the information needed, where and

how to get it, how to package the intelligence into

an appropriate product, and how to deliver that

product. Normally, an IR will generate a requirement to do the following:

O Collect data or information.

O Process and produce intelligence in the scope

and form that answers the question.

O Disseminate the information to a particular user

by a specific time. (See figure 3-7.)

Directing the Intelligence Effort

Intelligence direction consists of the requirements

development and management process described

above combined with the associated functions of

collection management, production management,

and dissemination management. Because the possible questions about the enemy and the AO are practically infinite but intelligence assets are limited, the

intelligence effort must be managed at each step in

the process. Management of requirements, collection, production, and dissemination ensures that the

effort is focused on the PIRs and delivers knowledge that facilitates sound tactical decisionmaking.

IT

Identify Landing Beaches

ICR

Imagery,

Hydrographic

Surveys

IDR

Distribute

40 Copies

IPR

All-Source

Beach Study

PIR/IR

ICR IPR IDR

Example:

Figure 3-7. Requirements Satisfaction.
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 3-7 

Collection Management

Collection management is the process of converting IRs into collection requirements, establishing

priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring

results, and retasking, as required. Its purpose is

to conduct an effective effort to collect all necessary data while ensuring the efficient use of limited and valuable collection assets.

Production Management

Production management encompasses determining the scope, content, and format of each product; developing a plan and schedule for the

development of each product; assigning priorities among the various intelligence production

requirements; allocating processing, exploitation,

and production resources; and integrating production efforts with collection and dissemination. As

with collection management, the goal is to make

effective and efficient use of limited resources

and ensure that the production effort is properly

focused on established priorities.

Dissemination Management

Dissemination management involves establishing dissemination priorities, selecting dissemination means, and monitoring the flow of

intelligence throughout the command. Its

objective is to deliver the required intelligence

to the appropriate user in the proper form at the

right time while ensuring that individual consumers and the dissemination system are not

overloaded by attempting to move unneeded or

irrelevant information. Dissemination management also provides for use of security controls

that do not impede the timely delivery or subsequent use of intelligence while protecting

intelligence sources and methods.

Planning the Intelligence Support System

This activity includes designing and establishing

the structure that is necessary to provide intelligence support throughout the course of an operation. The intelligence officer looks at the entire

body of IRs rather than at individual IRs or PIRs.

The intelligence officer anticipates the continuing intelligence needs of the force as it carries out

its mission and designs an intelligence support

system that has the capability, flexibility, and

redundancy to satisfy these needs. After the support system concept is developed, the resources

needed to build the system are identified,

requested, and acquired. Factors taken into consideration during this effort follow:

O Task organization of intelligence units.

O Identification of personnel and equipment

requirements.

O Requirement for liaison teams.

O Connectivity with national, theater, joint, and

multinational force intelligence assets.

O Communications and information systems (CIS)

requirements.

O Logistic requirements.

O The need for specialized capabilities; e.g.,

linguists.

Collection

Collection is the gathering of intelligence data

and information to satisfy the identified requirements. The collection phase encompasses

assembling relevant information from sources

that are already on hand or available from other

intelligence organizations: intelligence databases, studies, maps, and a workbook or situation map. Collection consists of the activities of

organic, attached, and supporting intelligence

collection assets to gather new data and deliver

it to the appropriate processing or production

agency; i.e., the execution of collection operations. Functions carried out during the execution of collection operations follow:

O Mission planning.

O Positioning of assets to locations that are favorable to satisfying collection objectives.
3-8 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

O Data collection.

O Reporting.

O Supervision of individual collection missions.

Intelligence data and information are collected by

a variety of intelligence assets, each with unique

capabilities and limitations. (See figure 3-8.) 

Figure 3-8. MAGTF Primary

Organic Collection Assets.

The value of a collection source is not necessarily

related to the sophistication or cost of that source,

but rather to its ability to gather pertinent data

from the collection target—the enemy or environmental consideration that is the subject of the particular intelligence collection requirement.

Successful intelligence operations require access

to data from all types of collection resources:

organic, joint, national, and multinational. Collection operations are executed to gather data

from all suitable and capable assets, balancing the

capabilities of one type of collector against the

limitations of another to provide “all-source” data

input to the processing and exploitation and production phases. The primary types of intelligence

data used to produce tactical intelligence are

described in the following paragraphs.

Imagery Intelligence

Imagery intelligence is intelligence derived from

the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and

radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar

wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display

devices, or other media. (JP 1-02) 

Principal sources of imagery are national overhead reconnaissance systems; manned aircraft

such as the F-14 or F/A-18 with the Advanced

Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System, the

U-2 or the Joint Surveillance Target Attack

Radar System; and UAVs. IMINT provides concrete, detailed, and precise information on the

location and physical characteristics of the environment and the threat. It is the primary source

of information concerning key terrain features,

installations, and infrastructure used to build

detailed intelligence studies and target materials.

The main limitation of IMINT is the time

required to task, collect, process, and analyze

the imagery. Detailed planning and coordination is required to ensure that the results of

imagery collection missions are received in time

to affect the decisionmaking process. Imagery

operations can be hampered by weather, the

enemy’s air defense capability, and his camouflage, cover, and deception activities.

Signals Intelligence

SIGINT is intelligence information derived from

the interception, processing, and analysis of foreign communications, noncommunications electronic emissions, and instrumentation signals.

SIGINT is provided by the radio battalion; the

Marine tactical electronic warfare squadron; and

an integrated network of national, theater, and

joint force SIGINT support agencies. SIGINT

provides timely and accurate data on enemy

forces that may include details on enemy composition, identification, and location. It can also

give insight into the enemy’s current status and

activities and future intentions. SIGINT is one of

the primary means for providing I&W of enemy

actions. It is also a principal contributor to intelligence support to IO through its analysis and

exploitation of the enemy’s C2 system. Principal

limitations of SIGINT are that the enemy must

transmit signals that can be exploited and that

Radio Battalion

Force Reconnaissance Company

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (VMAQ)

Marine UAV Squadron (VMU)

Ground Sensor Platoon (GSP)

Division Reconnaissance Battalion

CI/HUMINT Company

Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 3-9 

collection assets must be capable of intercepting

and positioned to intercept those signals.

Human Intelligence

HUMINT is a category of intelligence derived

from information collected and provided by

human sources. (JP 1-02)

HUMINT operations cover a wide range of activities, including reconnaissance patrols, aircrew

reports and debriefs, debriefing of refugees, and

interrogations of enemy prisoners of war. Principal dedicated HUMINT resources are ground

reconnaissance units; the CI and interrogatortranslator assets of the MEF CI/HUMINT company; and national, theater, and other Service

HUMINT elements. All Marines participating in

an operation can obtain significant information

about the threat and environment. Intelligence

operations must aggressively employ Marines as

HUMINT sources by teaching them the importance of observing and reporting.

HUMINT can provide insight into intangible

factors such as tactics, training, morale, and

combat effectiveness that cannot be collected by

technical means and offers the best potential

source to discern future plans and intentions.

HUMINT is particularly important in MOOTW,

in which the nature of the mission and of the

threat generally provide a lucrative environment for HUMINT operations. 

HUMINT has two main limitations as follows:

O HUMINT operations generally require placing

humans at risk to gain access to their targets.

For that reason, IRs should be satisfied through

technical collection means, if possible, before

considering the use of human resources.

O HUMINT responsiveness can be limited in certain circumstances because of the time it takes

to plan the activities, position the assets, collect

the data from what are often hostile or noncooperative sources, and report the information to

exploitation and production centers, which are

often located a significant distance from the

collection site.

Measurement and Signature Intelligence

Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT)

is intelligence information gathered by technical

instruments such as radars, passive electro-optical

sensors, radiation detectors, and remote ground

sensors. Although the primary tactical application

of these devices is to collect sensor data, which is

generally provided directly to operations centers for

immediate decisionmaking, the data collected can

also provide significant intelligence information on

enemy movements and activities. Key MAGTF

MASINT capabilities are remote ground sensors,

weapons locating radars, and air surveillance

radars. These sensors provide an efficient means to

maintain surveillance over large portions of the battlespace. Their limitations include the logistic support required to maintain the equipment, the

requirement to place the sensors in proximity to the

surveillance area, and the exploitable electronic signatures associated with some of the sensors.

Open-Source Intelligence

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public. (JP 1-02)

OSINT sources include books, magazines, newspapers, maps, commercial electronic networks and

databases, and radio and television broadcasts.

OSINT involves no information that is classified at

its origin or acquired through controlled collection.

National and theater intelligence production centers

have access to a range of OSINT sources. MAGTF

intelligence agencies can receive OSINT through

these centers in addition to collecting information

from open sources that are available in the AO.

OSINT can be a valuable source of geographic,

political, economic, sociological, and cultural information, particularly in security, humanitarian assistance or peace operations. In multinational

operations, OSINT provides intelligence that can be

readily shared with members of a multinational

force. However, the sources of OSINT should be

carefully evaluated to determine the accuracy and

reliability of the information provided.
3-10 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

Counterintelligence

CI is the intelligence function concerned with

identifying and counteracting the threat posed by

foreign intelligence capabilities and by organizations or individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. The principal

objective of CI is to assist with protecting DOD

personnel, family members, resources, facilities,

and critical infrastructure. CI provides critical

intelligence support to command force protection

efforts by helping identify potential threats, threat

capabilities, and planned intentions to friendly

operations while helping deceive the adversary as

to friendly capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. CI increases uncertainty for the enemy,

thereby making a significant contribution to the

success of friendly operations. CI also identifies

friendly vulnerabilities, evaluates security measures, and assists with implementing appropriate

security plans. The integration of other intelligence disciplines, CI, and operations culminates

in a cohesive unit force protection program.

Processing and Exploitation

Processing and exploitation involves the conversion of collected data into information that is suitable for the production of intelligence. Processing

is largely a technical function that does not add

meaning to the data but that is necessary to convert the data into a form that people can understand. Examples of processing include

developing a piece of film, translating a document or communications intercept from a foreign

language or converting electronic data into a

standardized report that can be analyzed by a system operator. Some types of data require minimal processing. They may be collected in a form

that is already suitable for production. Processing may also take place automatically during collection. Other types of data require extensive

processing, which can affect the timeliness and

accuracy of the resulting information.

Data may be further exploited to gain the fullest

possible advantage. For example, an aerial photograph or a frame of UAV video may be exploited

by imagery interpreters to identify specific pieces

of equipment or measure the dimensions of structures found on that image. When resources are

required to accomplish the processing and exploitation phase, it is crucial that processing requirements be prioritized and managed according to

the PIRs to ensure that critical information is

extracted first.

Production

Production is the activity that converts information into intelligence. It involves the evaluation,

interpretation, integration, analysis, and synthesis of all information that is relevant to a particular IR to answer the question that has been asked.

Production fuses new information and existing

intelligence from all sources to provide meaningful knowledge that can be applied to the decisionmaking process. During the production phase,

information is—

O Evaluated to determine pertinence, reliability,

and accuracy.

O Analyzed to isolate significant elements.

O Integrated with other relevant information and

previously developed intelligence.

O Interpreted to form logical conclusions that

bears on the situation and supports the commander’s decisionmaking process.

O Applied to estimate possible outcomes.

O Placed into the product format that will be most

useful to its eventual user.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

IPB is the primary analytical methodology used

to produce intelligence in support of the decisionmaking process. It furnishes a framework for

integrating intelligence and operations throughout

the PDE&A cycle. IPB is a systematic, continuous, mission-focused process of analyzing the
Intelligence Operations ________________________________________________________________________________________ 3-11 

environment and the threat in a specific geographic area. (See figure 3-9.)

Figure 3-9. Intelligence Preparation

of the Battlespace.

IPB provides a means to interpret information

and understand the battlespace that can be

applied in any operational situation. Through the

IPB process, information that has been collected

and processed is analyzed, synthesized, and used

to estimate possible outcomes that can affect mission accomplishment. The result is knowledgebased intelligence that is incorporated into a variety of intelligence products. 

Although IPB is fundamentally an intelligence

process, successful application of the process to

support planning and execution depends on the

participation of the commander and the entire

staff. The commander is responsible for intelligence production and IPB. The commander

focuses the IPB effort by defining the area and

key factors to be studied. The commander’s guidance and the complete involvement of the staff

are necessary to ensure that the IPB effort encompasses aspects of concern for all warfighting

functions and provides detailed and accurate

intelligence for COA development and detailed

planning. Finally, the commander ensures that the

IPB process is fully integrated with mission planning and execution. IPB is an effective tool only

when the results are used to develop plans and

support decisionmaking during execution. 

IPB emphasizes providing intelligence in the

form of graphics and images—formats that help

the commander to rapidly visualize, assimilate,

and apply the intelligence in the decisionmaking

process. During planning, products generated

from IPB place large volumes of intelligence in

context, providing situational awareness for

everyone involved in the planning effort. These

products form the basis of, or are combined with,

the planning tools and decision support aids prepared by other staff sections to provide an integrated planning and execution support product.

During execution, the use of graphics display

intelligence increases the commander’s ability to

discern patterns as they are emerging and to conduct intuitive decisionmaking, thereby increasing

operational tempo.

Levels of Production

Intelligence production can be extremely simple

or incredibly complex. At the MAGTF CE level,

particularly during deliberate planning, production normally entails developing detailed, allsource estimates and studies through the combined efforts of several intelligence support elements. During tactical execution, time

constraints and the demands of the ongoing battle require rapid processing and production, with

an emphasis on developing simple, missionfocused intelligence products such as a handannotated image of a helicopter landing zone

(HLZ), a target description or an overlay depicting current and future enemy dispositions. An

enlisted intelligence specialist on duty in an

infantry battalion command post may develop

dozens of intelligence products during his watch

in the form of answers to questions concerning

the enemy situation, targets or terrain to be traversed. Valuable intelligence does not result

solely from the investment of time or resources.

It is developed by placing relevant information

in context, converting it into knowledge through

analysis and synthesis, and applying that knowledge to the decisionmaking process.

There is inherent friction between the desire to

provide as complete and accurate an intelligence

product as possible and the continuous requirement to support the time-sensitive urgency of tactical decisionmaking. In practice, these

conflicting demands must be balanced by using

Define the Battlespace Environment

Describe the Battlespace Effects

Evaluate the Adversary

Determine Adversary COAs
3-12 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

stated direction, such as the commander’s intent

and PIRs, and knowledge of the operational situation to determine when to finish and disseminate

the product. To provide a framework to make

these determinations, intelligence production can

be viewed as occurring on two levels: deliberate

and immediate.

Deliberate production is employed when there is

sufficient time to thoroughly evaluate, analyze,

and synthesize all available information and produce a formal intelligence product such as a written intelligence estimate, scheduled report or

detailed target/objective area study.

Immediate production is conducted to identify,

process, and place in context elements of data,

information, and intelligence that have a direct

effect on ongoing or near-term operations. These

elements are subjected to a compressed version

of the production process, and the resulting product is rapidly disseminated to those who are

affected. Immediate production is normally conducted during execution and results in simple,

mission-specific intelligence products: situational assessments or answers to specific, individual IRs. There is no absolute distinction between

the two levels. The nature of the situation and

pertinent IRs will dictate the amount of time

available to complete each production effort.

Likewise, IPB methodology should be used during both types of production. However, during

immediate production, a rapid mental evaluation

and integration of the relevant factors of the

threat and environment are used, usually building on a deliberate production effort that has

already been completed.

Dissemination

Dissemination is the timely conveyance of intelligence to users in an appropriate form. Many

times, intelligence operations focus almost exclusively on the collection and production phases,

with the intelligence cycle often breaking down

because insufficient attention is given to the dissemination phase. Dissemination must be planned

and supervised to the same degree as collection

and production or we risk failure of the intelligence support function. Determining the form

and selection of the means to deliver the product

are key aspects of the dissemination process.

Form

Determining the form to be used in disseminating the intelligence product is a function of several factors: the purpose of the intelligence

product, the urgency and relevance of the intelligence to ongoing operations, the type and volume of the intelligence, the user’s capability to

receive intelligence products, and the dissemination means available. Because decisionmaking is a mental process and human beings think

and understand primarily in the form of images,

the goal of intelligence dissemination is to convey an accurate image of the battlespace or

threat to the decisionmaker in a form that facilitates rapid understanding of that image. For this

reason, graphics are the preferred dissemination

form. (See figure 3-10 and figure 3-11 on page

3-14.)

Although oral briefings and written reports are the

primary dissemination forms used today, the use of

automated systems is increasing the capability to

develop graphic products. Imagery, overlays, diagrams, and schematics enhanced with appropriate

textual data and annotations will be used as the

baseline dissemination format whenever possible.

However, in time-sensitive situations, the verbal

report or short text message may be the most expeditious dissemination form. Whether oral, text or

graphic, intelligence products should use standard

formats whenever possible. Standard formats facilitate ease of preparation and dissemination, as well

as usability of the intelligence product.
Intelligence Operations ________________________________________________________________________________________ 3-13 

Delivery

Delivery of the intelligence product to the right

person in a timely manner is directly related to

the choice of the means used to disseminate that

product. Dissemination is managed by using a

combination of methods, channels, and modes to

convey the product to the user.

Methods

There are two basic methods used to disseminate

intelligence: supply-push and demand-pull. A

supply-push system pushes intelligence from the

collectors/producers to the users as it becomes

available. The main advantage to this method is

that users do not have to initiate requests to

receive products. However, there is potential for

information overload in a supply-push system. To

prevent information overload, the dissemination

node should tailor what it is passing through the

system, not simply dump everything that it has

received or developed.

The demand-pull mode provides access to intelligence on an as-needed basis. The user draws the

required intelligence from the intelligence support

system through a series of searches or inquiries. The

use of demand-pull decreases the volume of intelligence being transmitted and diminishes the possibility of overwhelming units with superfluous products.

However, demand-pull can also reduce the timeliness of dissemination by developing and providing

intelligence only after a request has been received.

Dec Jan Feb Mar

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Apr May

Minimum Degrees

Maximum Degrees

%

Precipitation

N

S

W E

Prevailing Winds

NW 2 - 4 Knots

H

L

75

59

H

L

71

55

H

L

73

58

H

L

83

66

H

L

96

76

H

L

105

86

Northeast Monsoon Spring Transition

Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May

Figure 3-10. Graphic Climatology Study.
3-14 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

The dissemination system must provide the flexibility to use either method, “pushing” important

or time-sensitive intelligence directly to the users,

while at the same time permitting them to “pull”

other relevant intelligence as needed from readily

accessible sources such as a database or a watch

section at an intelligence center.

Channels

Intelligence is disseminated by using two types

of channels: standard and alarm. Standard dissemination is used for routine intelligence and is

transmitted according to a set order and format,

usually along established command or staff

channels. Examples include the formal staff

briefing and standardized reports. The alarm

channel is used to disseminate critical, time-sensitive intelligence that can have an immediate

effect on the conduct of the operation, such as

I&W of hostile activity. I&W alarms must be

disseminated rapidly to all units that are affected

by that intelligence. Although the standard channel is used to satisfy the majority of dissemination requirements, care must be taken to monitor

the flow of what is passing through the pipeline

to ensure that the intelligence provided is timely

and pertinent to the units receiving it. A particularly important connection that is often

neglected in standard dissemination is lateral

dissemination; intelligence must flow laterally

between units as well as up and down the chain

of command. The exchange of intelligence

between the GCE, aviation combat element

(ACE), and combat service support element

(CSSE) is an especially important link in ensuring that all commanders have a shared picture of

the battlespace.

Modes

Finally, intelligence is disseminated in one of two

modes: broadcast or point-to-point. In broadcast

340

305

COA #1 - Defend in Place

Figure 3-11. Graphic Intelligence Estimate.
Intelligence Operations ________________________________________________________________________________________ 3-15 

dissemination, intelligence that affects the majority of units is sent simultaneously to a broad audience. Examples include I&W alarms, intelligence

products developed by the MAGTF G-2 section

that support the entire MAGTF, and reporting

from organic collection assets. Broadcast dissemination may be web-based. Successful use of the

broadcast mode depends on several factors,

including judicious selection of what intelligence

is broadcast, the ability of the appropriate users to

monitor the broadcast, and employment of a processing methodology or system to filter and

select for detailed examination only those broadcast items that are pertinent to the user’s requirements. Undisciplined use of this mode can

quickly lead to information overload. In the

point-to-point mode, intelligence is sent to a specific user or users, normally in response to a specific request or requirement, and is passed along

sequentially as appropriate. Dissemination across

the system is slower but is more focused and can

provide intelligence that is tailored to the needs

of each individual unit. Point-to-point dissemination may be enhanced through the use of classified e-mail systems.

Architectures

Intelligence architectures provide the means to

disseminate intelligence. (See figure 3-12 on

page 3-16.) Dissemination planning analyzes and

anticipates the dissemination requirements and

designs the appropriate architecture to meet those

requirements. The architecture should employ all

methods, channels, and modes in a flexible, integrated system. The objective is to provide the

right intelligence to the appropriate user in a

timely manner, while at the same time not overwhelming him with a massive amount of unfocused data.

Architectures will be developed with the objective of facilitating the exchange of graphic intelligence throughout the force, down to the lowest

tactical echelon. The means will consist of a

combination of procedures, CIS, and communications networks, effectively supervised by intelligence specialists to ensure that the dissemination

requirements are being satisfied. The intelligence

architecture must be interoperable with the overall CIS architecture employed by the MAGTF

and the joint force.

Utilization

Intelligence has no inherent value. Its value is realized through its support to operations. Thus, the

intelligence cycle is not complete until the intelligence that has been developed is used in decisionmaking during planning and/or execution. The

commander is responsible for the effective use of

intelligence and for ensuring that decisions are

based on the foundation provided by intelligence.

The intelligence officer facilitates the effective use

of intelligence, supervises the entire intelligence

development effort, and assists the commander

and the staff in understanding the intelligence

product and its application.

The utilization phase also provides the basis for the

continuous functioning of the intelligence cycle. On

one hand, utilization will determine whether a

requirement has been completely satisfied; requirements that have not been met will require additional

intelligence development efforts. On the other hand,

the satisfaction of one requirement normally generates new or additional requirements, the answers to

which are needed to further refine or focus the decisionmaking process. In either case, utilization provides guidance and feedback that are used to initiate

the next iteration of the cycle.
3-16 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

NIMA NSA

CIA DIA

DMS NIPRNET SIPRNET JWICS

DIA

MIDB

NIST

NIST

JDISS

JDISS

IAS MEF IAS

Trojan Spirit

IOS

IOW

IOW

National

Agencies

JTF

Service

Component

Headquarters

MEF CE

Intel Bn IOC

Division

MAW

FSSG

MEU CE

Regiments

Marine

Aircraft

Group

Battalions

Squadrons

TDN

TDN

TDN

Topographic Platoon

UAV

Radio

Battalion

Remote

Sensors

CI/HUMINT

IIP

IMINT

SIGINT

(TEG)

Intel Bn/IOC

and Other Intelligence

Resources

(TPC)

TDN

TDN

TDN

(RRS)

(TRSS)

(TCAC)

(CHATS)

(TERPES)

(MAGTF

SIDS)

Reconnaissance

ACE/

VMAQ

CHATS=CI/HUMINT automated tool set

CIA=Central Intelligence Agency

CI/HUMINT=counterintelligence/human intelligence

DIA=Defense Intelligence Agency

DMS=Defense Message System

IAS=Intelligence analysis system

IIP=imagery intelligence platoon

intel bn=intelligence battalion

IOS=intelligence operations server

IOW=intelligence operations workstation

JWICS=Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System

MAW FSSG=Marine Aircraft Wing Force Serv ice Support Group (USMC)

MIDB=modernized integrated database

NIMA=National Imagery and Mapping Agency

NIPRNET=Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network

NIST=National Intelligence Support Team

NSA=National Security Agency

RRS=remote receive station

SIDS=secondary imagery dissemination system

SIPRNET=Secret Internet Protocol Router Network

TCAC=Technical Control and Analysis Center

TDN=tactical data network

TEG=Technical Exploitation Group

TERPES=tactical electronic reconnaissance processing and evaluation system

TPC=topographic production capability

TRSS=tactical remote sensor system

Figure 3-12. Notional Marine Expeditionary Force Intelligence Architecture.
Intelligence Operations ________________________________________________________________________________________ 3-17 

Application of the Intelligence Cycle

The intelligence cycle is a procedural framework

for developing mission-focused intelligence support. It is not an end in itself, nor should it be

viewed as a rigid set of procedures that must be

carried out in an identical manner on all occasions. The commander and the intelligence

officer must consider each IR individually and

apply the intelligence cycle in a manner that

develops the required intelligence in the most

effective way.

Application of the intelligence cycle will vary

with the phase of the PDE&A cycle. In theory,

a unique iteration of the intelligence cycle is

carried out for each individual requirement. In

practice, particularly during the planning

phase, requirements are grouped together and

satisfied through a single, concurrent intelligence development process. During the planning phase, intelligence development is

generally carried out through two major iterations of the intelligence cycle.

The first primarily supports decision planning.

Completing this iteration of the intelligence cycle

results in preparing and using basic intelligence

products—an intelligence estimate, supporting

studies, and IPB analysis—that describe the battlespace and threat. These products form the basis

for developing and selecting COAs.

The second iteration of the intelligence cycle supports execution planning. Decision and execution

planning are defined and discussed in MCDP 5. It

is an outgrowth of selecting the COA and forming

a concept of operations. Implementing the collection plan, refinement of IPB analysis, and generating mission-specific intelligence products are

integrated with the concept of operations to support mission execution. During execution, requirements are satisfied on a more individualized basis.

New requirements are usually generated in

response to a specific operational need. Each

requirement is unique and must be satisfied in a

timely manner to facilitate rapid decisionmaking

and generating or maintaining tempo. (See figure

3-13 on page 3-18.)

The intelligence cycle will also be applied differently depending on the mission and the organizational level of the unit. For example, a MAGTF

G-2 section will normally have a separate section

that is specifically responsible for each phase of

the intelligence cycle—a collections section, processing and exploitation agencies, a production

element, and a dissemination section—with an

intelligence operations section providing planning and direction for the overall effort. At the

MAGTF level, intelligence is normally developed

to satisfy multiple requirements concurrently,

with simultaneous collection, processing, production, and utilization efforts being carried out by

the separate functional sections. In contrast, a

battalion or squadron S-2 section must carry out

the cycle with a limited number of resources. It

will generally focus on a single requirement or a

small number of closely related requirements,

moving through each phase of the cycle sequentially until that requirement is satisfied.

Counterintelligence

CI is the function of intelligence that is concerned with identifying and counteracting the

threat posed by hostile intelligence capabilities

and by organizations or individuals engaged in

espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism.

The objective of CI is to enhance the security of

the command by denying an adversary information that might be used to conduct effective

operations against friendly forces and to protect

the command by identifying and neutralizing

espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism

efforts. (MCWP 2-14, Counterintelligence)

Responsibilities

CI, like all intelligence matters, is a command

responsibility. In preparing for operations, all units

must develop a CI plan and implement appropriate
3-18 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

CI measures to protect themselves from potential

threats. The unit intelligence officer plans, implements, and supervises the CI effort for the commander. The G-2/S-2 may have access to or request

support from MAGTF CI units and specialists to

assist in developing CI estimates and plans. All

members of the command are involved in executing the CI plan and implementing appropriate CI

measures. Key participants in this process and their

specific responsibilities follow:

O G-3/S-3-overall security and force protection,

OPSEC, counterreconnaissance, and deception.

O G-6/S-6-CIS security.

O G-1/S-1-information security.

O Headquarters commandant-physical security of

unit CP and echelons.

CI Planning

CI planning at all levels is conducted by using a

standard methodology that consists of three steps:

developing a CI estimate, conducting a CI survey, and developing the CI plan.

The CI Estimate

The CI estimate details the capabilities and limitations of foreign intelligence, subversive, and

terrorist organizations that could carry out actions

Mission

Receipt

Intelligence

Requirement

Planning and Direction,

Collection,

Processing and

Exploitation, Production,

Dissemination

Intelligence

Estimate,

Supporting Studies,

IPB Analysis

Utilization

Mission-Specific

Intelligence,

IPB Products, and

Collection, Production,

and Dissemination

Plans

PIR

NAIs

HVTs

HPTs

Develop

and Select

COAs

Planning and Direction,

Collection,

Processing and

Exploitation, Production,

Dissemination

Utilization

Mission

Execution Intelligence

Cycle

Operational

Decision

New

PIR/IR

Intelligence

Cycle

Operational

Decision

New

PIR/IR

Intelligence

Cycle

Operational

Decision

New

PIR/IR

Figure 3-13. Application of the Intelligence Cycle.
Intelligence Operations ________________________________________________________________________________________ 3-19 

against friendly units and facilities or against

individuals, groups or locations of concern to our

forces, such as the local population or civilian

organizations operating in the area. It also provides an estimate of possible and probable COAs

that these threat organizations will adopt. Intelligence and CI analysts of the MAGTF CE and CI/

HUMINT company will normally prepare a comprehensive CI estimate that addresses threats to

the MARFOR or MAGTF by using an IPB methodology that is focused on CI factors and the CI

threat. However, each level of command must

conduct its own evaluation to determine which of

the adversary’s capabilities identified in the

MAGTF CI estimate represent a threat to their

particular unit. The CI estimate must be updated

on a regular basis. The revised estimate or appropriate CI warning reports must be disseminated to

all units involved in the operation.

The CI Survey

The CI survey assesses a unit’s security posture

against the threats detailed in the CI estimate. The

CI survey should identify vulnerabilities to specific foreign intelligence, espionage, sabotage,

subversion or terrorist capabilities and provide recommendations on how to eliminate or minimize

these vulnerabilities. The survey should be as

detailed as possible. During the planning phase of

an operation, it may be possible to do a formal,

written survey. CI specialists from the CI/

HUMINT company may be available to assist in

this effort. In a time-compressed situation, the survey will likely result from a brief discussion

between the appropriate intelligence, operations,

communications, and security personnel. In either

case, it is critical that the survey look forward in

space and time to support developing the CI measures necessary to protect the unit as it carries out

successive phases of the operation; i.e., the survey

makes recommendations to improve the CI posture

of the command for now and in the future.

The CI Plan

The CI plan details the activities and operations

that the command will use to counter the CI

threat. It includes procedures for detecting and

monitoring the activities of foreign intelligence

and terrorist organizations and directs the implementation of active and passive measures that are

intended to protect the force from these activities. The CI plan is based on the threats identified in the CI estimate and the vulnerabilities

detected by the CI survey. The MAGTF staff CI

officer normally prepares a detailed, comprehensive CI plan that addresses the entire MAGTF.

Included in the MAGTF CI plan are details of the

employment of dedicated CI capabilities and the

conduct of specialized CI operations intended to

detect and neutralize or eliminate specific CI

threats. Plans of subordinate MAGTF elements

closely follow the MAGTF plan, normally adding

only security measures that apply to their specific units. As with all plans, CI plans must be

continually updated to ensure they are current

and support ongoing and future operations.

CI Measures

CI measures encompass a broad range of activities designed to protect against the CI threat. The

two general categories of CI measures are active

and passive.

Active CI measures are those measures that are

designed to neutralize or eliminate the foreign intelligence effort and adversary sabotage, subversion, and

terrorism capabilities. Counterreconnaissance operations and deception activities are examples of active

measures that are routinely employed by all units.

Complex active CI measures such as counterespionage operations, counterterrorism operations, screening and interrogations, and CI force protection source

operations are conducted only by CI personnel or

other specialized organizations following the direction of the joint force and/or MAGTF commanders.
3-20 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

Passive CI measures are designed to conceal and

deny information to foreign intelligence personnel and protect friendly personnel and installations from sabotage, subversion, and terrorism.

Camouflage, security of classified material, emission control, information systems security, noise

and light discipline, and physical access control

are examples of passive CI measures that are

employed extensively by all units.

The CI process is summarized in figure 3-14. For

further details on CI responsibilities, planning,

measures, and operations, see MCWP 2-14.

Prepare CI Estimate

Conduct CI Survey

Develop CI Plan

Implement CI Measures

Figure 3-14. The Counterintelligence

Process.
CHAPTER 4

CONCEPT OF MAGTF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

Marine intelligence operations are conducted

primarily to facilitate the planning and execution

of MAGTF operations through the development

of tactical intelligence. The concept of MAGTF

intelligence support ensures that the required

intelligence is available to commanders at all levels throughout the force in time to influence their

decisionmaking process. Key elements of this

concept follow:

O Fully manned and capable organic intelligence sections down to maneuver battalion/

squadron level.

O Directing the intelligence effort and maintenance of a robust collection, production, and

dissemination capability at the MAGTF level.

O Employing specialized intelligence units to provide dedicated collection, processing, exploitation, and production of all-source intelligence.

O Creating key intelligence nodes at any level to

concentrate intelligence support at critical

times and locations. (These nodes are created

through task organization, split-basing, and the

use of intelligence direct support teams

[DSTs].) An intelligence DST provides an

enhanced intelligence capability to a supported intelligence section. A DST consists of

one officer and several enlisted intelligence

specialists. DSTs are organic to the MEF and

each MSC G-2 sections. 

O Full use of the intelligence support available

from national, theater, joint, other Service

component, and multinational forces to

enhance MAGTF intelligence capabilities.

O Augmentation from global sourcing (noncommitted operating forces, the supporting establishment, and the Reserves) to enhance

intelligence support to the MAGTF.

This intelligence support concept provides organic

intelligence sections to commanders at all levels.

These sections develop intelligence to satisfy their

units’ unique requirements. This intelligence supports their commander’s tactical decisionmaking

process and generates tailored intelligence products to facilitate mission execution. 

Unit intelligence sections are supported by a primary MAGTF intelligence node that can perform all types of intelligence operations. The

MAGTF G-2, through its combat intelligence

center (CIC), provides centralized direction for

the collection, production, and dissemination

efforts of organic and supporting intelligence

assets and ensures that these efforts remain

focused on satisfying the PIRs that are essential

to mission success. At the MEF CE level, the

intelligence operations center (IOC) is the primary MAGTF intelligence node. Concentration

of specialized intelligence capabilities in the

radio battalion, the intelligence battalion, and the

force reconnaissance company under this centralized direction facilitates unity of effort, effective

employment of limited assets, and the collection

and production of all-source intelligence.

The concept of intelligence support acknowledges

the need to focus intelligence efforts in support of

particular MAGTF elements during different

phases of an operation. The MAGTF intelligence

structure has the flexibility to provide such focused

support through task organization. Enhanced support can be provided employing DSTs and integrating MAGTF intelligence assets.

Recognizing that organic intelligence capabilities

may be limited in particular environments, the

MAGTF can draw on the full range of national, theater, joint, other Service, allied, and multinational

intelligence assets. When available, these capabilities will be fully integrated into MAGTF intelligence operations. If a separate Marine component
4-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

headquarters is established, it will support the

MAGTF by performing those intelligence functions not directly related to warfighting, to include

the following:

O Conducting detailed operational-level intelligence planning.

O Providing Marine intelligence liaison to joint

task force (JTF) and other component intelligence elements.

O Monitoring the status of MAGTF intelligence

collection and production requests for supporting and external support requirements.

O Planning the development and monitoring the

adequacy of the JTF/MAGTF’s intelligence

architectures and the flow of intelligence to the

MAGTF.

O Supporting Marine participation in intelligence

support to the joint targeting process. 

If a separate Marine component headquarters is

not established, then the MAGTF CE’s CIC will

perform these functions. MSCs and other

MAGTF elements will be able to access these

external capabilities through the MAGTF intelligence architecture to pull available intelligence

products on demand. Specialized intelligence

units; e.g., the radio battalion or intelligence battalion, will have connectivity with appropriate

external agencies to coordinate tasking or support.

Any MAGTF that is committed to an operation

can be supported by intelligence assets of nondeployed MAGTFs, the supporting establishment or

the Reserves. This support could consist of augmentation to fill shortfalls in manpower, equipment or specialized capabilities and assistance in

developing intelligence in response to a Serviceunique requirement. Flexibility to draw on assets

from across the Marine Corps provides the ability

to tailor and enhance particular intelligence capabilities based on the requirements of the committed

MAGTF commander. 

Role of the Organic Intelligence Section

Most commands from the battalion/squadron

level and above in the operating forces have an

organic intelligence section. The unit intelligence officer and section occupy the central role

in the concept of MAGTF intelligence support.

They focus the intelligence effort to develop, disseminate, and ensure effective use of intelligence

in support of tactical operations. Intelligence

drives operations and remains responsive to mission requirements through close and direct contact with the commander, key staff officers, and

subordinate unit leaders.

The Unit Intelligence Officer

The commander directs the intelligence effort.

The intelligence officer manages this effort for

the commander, acting as the principal advisor on

intelligence and implementing activities that

carry out the commander’s intelligence responsibilities. The intelligence officer is a full participant in the commander’s decisionmaking

process, ensuring that intelligence is effectively

used throughout the command during all phases

of mission planning and execution. Key responsibilities follow:

O Facilitate understanding and use of intelligence

in the planning and execution of operations.

O Support situation development and the commander’s estimate of the situation by identifying enemy capabilities, strengths, and critical

vulnerabilities and opportunities and limitations presented by the environment.

O Assist the commander in developing PIRs.

O Ensure that the command’s IRs are received,

understood, and acted on by organic and supporting intelligence assets.

O Develop and disseminate all-source intelligence products that are tailored to the unit’s

mission and concept of operations.
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 4-3 

O Monitor the effective flow of intelligence

throughout the command.

O Provide BDA data and analysis to assist the

combat assessment process.

The Unit Intelligence Section

The unit intelligence section supports the commander, the intelligence officer, and the entire

command through the production and dissemination of mission-oriented intelligence products.

Primary functions follow:

O Conduct IPB analysis for the unit’s AO and

interest.

O Develop and maintain a comprehensive intelligence estimate.

O Tailor intelligence produced at all levels to

meet specific unit requirements.

O Form collection plans and support requests to

satisfy unit PIRs and IRs.

O Maintain an accurate image of the battlespace

and enemy situation.

O Prepare target analysis and target intelligence

products.

O Recommend CI and force protection measures.

O Provide linkage to supporting intelligence assets.

Each organic intelligence section performs all six

intelligence functions described in chapter 1.

However, the priority and level of effort applied

to the different functions will vary with the type

of unit, level of command, and assigned mission.

For example, an infantry battalion S-2 section

will normally focus on support of the commander’s estimate and situation development,

while the S-2 of a combat service support (CSS)

unit may concentrate on support of force protection, and the intelligence section of a fixed-wing

Marine aircraft group usually places priority on

support of targeting and combat assessment (particularly BDA).

Required Capabilities

To carry out these responsibilities, organic intelligence sections must have the following capabilities:

O Sufficient manning to carry out assigned

responsibilities.

O Training in all aspects of tactical intelligence

development, emphasizing the production of

tailored, all-source, mission-specific intelligence products.

O Organic collection, processing, production, and

dissemination assets appropriate to its mission

and level of command.

O Connectivity to other MAGTF intelligence assets

to provide a common picture of the battlespace,

receive warning and other critical intelligence,

and achieve access for “pulling” pertinent intelligence in response to unit requirements.

O Formation as a base for developing a larger

intelligence support node, task-organized to

provide expanded intelligence capabilities during particular phases of an operation.

The MAGTF Intelligence Section

The MAGTF intelligence section resident in the

MAGTF CE is the focal point for intelligence

operations and development in the MAGTF. 

MAGTF Intelligence Officer

The MAGTF G-2/S-2, supported by the CIC and

its subordinate sections, provides centralized direction for the MAGTF’s comprehensive intelligence

effort. The G-2/S-2 serves as the intelligence

officer for the MAGTF commander. The CIC

serves as the primary intelligence node for the

entire MAGTF. As such, the CIC must remain

responsive to the requirements of all MAGTF elements. The MAGTF intelligence section performs

the following tasks:

O Provides centralized direction for MAGTF intelligence operations.
4-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

O Plans and implements a concept for intelligence support based on the mission, concept of

operations, and commander’s intent.

O Consolidates, validates, and prioritizes IRs of

the MAGTF.

O Recommends MAGTF PIRs to the MAGTF

commander.

O Maintains a consolidated, all-source production center in the MAGTF all-source fusion

center (AFC).

O Plans, develops, and directs the MAGTF collection, production, and dissemination plans

and operations.

O Directs the employment of MAGTF organic

collection assets through the surveillance and

reconnaissance cell (SARC) and the operations control and analysis center (OCAC).

O Submits consolidated requests for external

intelligence support through the Marine component headquarters to appropriate agencies.

O Links the MAGTF to national, theater, joint,

other Service, and multinational intelligence

assets and operations.

O Prepares a comprehensive CI plan with recommended force protection measures.

O Supervises the execution of appropriate active

and passive CI measures, CI functions, and CI

services.

In addition to the responsibilities of all MAGTF

intelligence officers, the MEF assistant chief of

staff (AC/S) G-2 exercises staff cognizance over

several special staff officers and their intelligence units/organizations. (See figure 4-1.) 

The AC/S G-2 has staff responsibility for intelligence and intelligence operations. The commander relies on the intelligence officer to

provide information on weather, terrain, and

enemy capabilities, status, and intentions.

Through the intelligence OPLAN and supporting

intelligence, CI, and reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plans, the G-2 validates and plans

information requirements; coordinates intelligence priorities, integrates collection, production, and dissemination activities; allocates

resources; assigns specific intelligence and reconnaissance missions to subordinate elements; and

supervises the overall intelligence, CI, and reconnaissance efforts. Specific responsibilities follow:

O Develop and answer outstanding MEF and

subordinate units’ priority information requirements and information requirements by planning, directing, integrating, and supervising

organic multidiscipline MEF and supporting

intelligence operations.

O Prepare appropriate intelligence, CI, and reconnaissance plans and orders for the MEF and

review and coordinate the all-source intelligence CI and reconnaissance plans of JTFs,

theaters, and other organizations.

O Submit and coordinate all-source collection,

production, and dissemination requirements

beyond the capability of the MEF to satisfy to

higher headquarters for JTF, theater or national

intelligence support.

O Ensure intelligence information is rapidly processed, analyzed, and incorporated where

appropriate in all-source intelligence products,

and rapidly disseminated to all MEF and external units requiring these.

O Evaluate JTF, theater, and national all-source

intelligence support and adjusting stated IRs, if

necessary.

O Identify and correct deficiencies in intelligence, CI, and reconnaissance personnel and

equipment resources.

O Incorporate intelligence in training exercises to

improve MEF individual, collective, and unit

readiness.

O Facilitate understanding and use of intelligence

in support of the planning and execution of

MEF operations.

Special Staff Officers under the Staff 

Cognizance of G-2 Officer

G-2 Operations Officer

The G-2 operations officer has primary responsibility for intelligence support to the commanding

officer and the remainder of the CE in support of
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 4-5 

current and future operations. Specific responsibilities include the following:

O Coordinate and provide intelligence support to

the commander, the G-3 operations section,

and the rest of the commander’s battle staff.

O Serve as the G-2 representative to the MEF CE

crisis action team.

O Coordinate, provide, and supervise intelligence support to the MEF CE current operations center, future operations center, and force

fires.

O Plan, direct, and supervise the Red Cell.

O Provide recommendations on PIR and IR validation, prioritization, and taskings to the AC/S

G-2 and the intelligence support coordinator

(ISC). The intelligence battalion commander is

dual-hatted as the ISC.

O Coordinate and supervise the transition of

intelligence planning and operations from G-2

plans to G-2 future operations, and from G-2

future operations to G-2 current operations, to

effectively support the MEF’s “single battle”

transition process.

O Plan, direct, and supervise MEF liaison teams

to external commands; e.g., the JTF and joint

Deputy Assistant

Chief of Staff

G-2

SSO Section

Intel Support

Coordinator

IOC

Ops

Branch

Current

Ops

Future

Ops

Tgt

Intel

Red

Cell

Liaison

Section

G-2 Admin

Plans/Policy

Branch

Planning

Imagery and

Mapping

CI/HUMINT

SIGINT/EW

Weather

Staff Cognizance

Command

Assistant

Chief of Staff

G-2

Figure 4-1. Special Staff Officers and Relationships

under the Staff Cognizance of the MEF G-2.
4-6 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

functional components headquarters, and intelligence organizations.

O Coordinate with the ISC and MEF MSCs’ G-2

operations officers to ensure unity of effort of

MEF intelligence operations.

O Provide intelligence input and other support to

MEF warning and fragmentary orders and to

operations related reporting; e.g., periodic situation reports.

O Coordinate intelligence training for the MEF

G-2 section and providing G-2 oversight for

and integration of the entire MEF intelligence

training program.

O Perform other intelligence support and tasks as

directed by the AC/S G-2.

G-2 Plans Officer

The G-2 plans officer has primary responsibility

for intelligence support to the future plans cell.

Specific responsibilities follow:

O Plan the MEF concept of intelligence operations for approval by the AC/S G-2 and subsequent implementation by the integrated staff cell

based upon the mission, threat, commander’s

intent, guidance, and concept of operations.

O Lead, coordinate, and provide intelligence support to MEF G-5 future plans section.

O Plan and coordinate intelligence support requirements for and the deployment of intelligence elements and resources into the AO.

O Provide recommendations on PIR and IR validation, prioritization, and taskings to the AC/S

G-2 and the ISC.

O Coordinate, in conjunction with the ISC, G-2

development of Annex B (Intelligence) and

Annex M (Geospatial Information and Services) to MEF OPLANs.

O Keep the G-2 section, other CE staff sections,

intelligence liaison personnel, augmentees, and

others apprised of MEF intelligence planning

actions and requirements.

O Identify requirements and provide recommendations to the G-2 operations officer for MEF intelligence liaison teams to external commands; e.g.,

the JTF or other components’ headquarters and

intelligence agencies.

O Coordinate and develop policies for MEF intelligence, CI, and reconnaissance operations.

O Plan, direct, and supervise the MEF G-2’s

imagery and mapping, CI/HUMINT, SIGINT,

and weather sections.

O Perform other intelligence support and tasks as

directed by the AC/S G-2.

Intelligence Battalion Commander/

Intelligence Support Coordinator

The intelligence battalion commander is responsible for planning, directing, collecting, processing, producing and disseminating intelligence,

and providing CI support to the MEF, MEF

MSCs, subordinate MAGTFs, and other commands as directed. 

Garrison. In garrison the principal task of the

intelligence battalion commander is to organize, train, and equip detachments that support

MAGTFs or other designated commands to

execute integrated collection, intelligence analysis, production, and dissemination of intelligence products.

During Operations. During operations the intelligence battalion commander is dual-hatted as the

ISC, serving as such under the direct staff cognizance of the MEF AC/S G-2. The intelligence

battalion’s S-3 section, along with the operations

center element of the MEF G-2, form the core of

the ISC support effort, with planning, direction,

and C2 conducted within the IOC’s support cell.

As the ISC, he is responsible to the MEF AC/S

G-2 for the overall planning and execution of

MEF all-source intelligence operations. Specific

responsibilities of the ISC during actual operations follow:

O Implement the concept of intelligence operations developed by the G-2 plans officer and

approved by the AC/S G-2.

O Establish and supervise operation of the MEF

IOC, which includes the support cell, the
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 4-7 

SARC, and the production and analysis (P&A)

cell. Generally the IOC will be collocated with

the MEF CE’s main CP.

O Develop, consolidate, validate, and prioritize

recommended PIRs and IRs to support

MAGTF planning and operations. The ISC is

tasked to perform PIR and IR validation and

prioritization only during operations when the

IOC is activated. During routine peacetime

operations, the PIR/IR validation and prioritization tasks are the responsibility of the MEF

CE’s G-2 operations officer.

O Plan, develop, integrate, and coordinate MEF

intelligence collection, production, and dissemination plans, to include the effective organic and

external integration and employment and staff

cognizance of MEF SIGINT, CI, HUMINT,

geographic intelligence, IMINT, ground remote

sensors, ground reconnaissance, and tactical air

reconnaissance intelligence collections, production, and dissemination operations.

O Develop, in conjunction with the G-2 plans

officer and G-2 operations officer, and complete Annex B (Intelligence) and Annex M

(Geospatial Information and Services) to MEF

operation orders (OPORDs).

O Plan, develop, integrate, and coordinate intelligence and CI support to the commander’s estimate, situation development, I&W, force

protection, targeting, and combat assessment.

O Manage and fuse the threat (or red) common

operational picture (COP)/common tactical

picture (CTP) inputs from subordinate units

and external commands and intelligence agencies into the MEF CE’s threat COP/CTP.

O Provide intelligence support to the MEF CE G-2

section and the MSCs.

O Prepare the intelligence and CI estimates to

support G-2 plans.

O Plan, develop, and coordinate intelligence CIS

architecture, to include its integration with and

support of MEF IMINT and other intelligence

and reconnaissance requirements.

O Coordinate and integrate all-source intelligence

operations with other Service components, JTF

joint intelligence support element (JISE), theater joint intelligence center (JIC) or joint analysis center, and national intelligence agencies

and operations to include all aspects of intelligence reach back support.

O Assist with the evaluation and improvement of

MEF all-source intelligence, CI, and reconnaissance operations.

O Perform other intelligence support and tasks as

directed by the AC/S G-2.

Figure 4-2 is a summary of the principal responsibilities of the AC/S G-2’s three principal subordinate staff officers.

Figure 4-2. AC/S G-2’s Principal Subordinate 

Staff Officers and their Responsibilities.

Collection Management/Dissemination

Officer. The collection management/dissemination officer (CMDO) is sourced from the intelligence battalion’s S-3 section and is a key

subordinate to the intelligence battalion commander/ISC during operations. The CMDO is

Intelligence Support Coordinator

• Plan and execute intelligence operations to support all MEF IRs.

• Establish and direct the IOC (P&A cell, SARC, and support cell).

• IR management (collection, production and dissemination) validation, 

prioritization, and tasking per AC/S G-2 direction.

• Intelligence operations command of intelligence battalion and staff 

cognizance over SIGINT, CI, HUMINT, MASINT, IMINT, and air/

ground reconnaissance (or designated G-2 elements).

G-2 Operations Officer

• Intelligence support to MEF CE battlestaff and current operations

center agencies.

• Coordination and support to higher and adjacent headquarters and 

agencies.

• Recommends IR validation, prioritization, and tasking to AC/S G-2.

• Establish and direct intelligence elements and support to the current 

operations center, future operations center, target intelligence section,

force fires, Red Cell, and MEF intelligence liaison teams.

G-2 Plans Officer

• Intelligence support to the G-5 future planning team for future

planning IRs.

• Recommend IR validation, prioritization, and tasking to AC/S G-2.

• Establish and direct the G-2 future planning intelligence element.

• G-2 section’s imagery & mapping, CI/HUMINT, SIGINT, and weather 

sections (less that under the staff cognizance of the ISC).
4-8 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

responsible for formulating detailed intelligence

collection requirements and intelligence dissemination requirements and tasking and coordinating internal and external operations to satisfy

these. The CMDO receives validated PIRs and

IRs and direction from the ISC, and then plans

and manages the best methods to employ organic

and supporting collection and dissemination

resources through the intelligence collection and

dissemination plans (tabs to Appendix 16, Intelligence Operations Plan, to Annex B.) The CMDO

is also responsible for validating and forwarding

national and theater intelligence collection

requests from the MEF and MSCs typically using

appropriate intelligence tools and TTP. He also

is responsible for coordinating intelligence CIS

requirements and maintaining awareness of available CIS connectivity throughout the MAGTF

and with key external organizations.

During operations the CMDO works within the support cell. In coordination with the P&A cell officer

in charge (OIC), the SARC OIC, G-2 operations

officer, intelligence/reconnaissance commanding

officers/OICs, and the MEF G-6, the CMDO is

responsible to the ISC for the following tasks:

O Determine and coordinate the collection effort

of PIRs/IRs that may be collected via intelligence, CI, and reconnaissance resources.

O Determine PIRs/IRs and prepare requests for

intelligence that are beyond organic capabilities and prepare submissions to higher headquarters and external agencies for support.

O Recommend dissemination priorities, development of intelligence reporting criteria, and

advise on and selecting dissemination means.

O Develop and coordinate all-source intelligence

collection plans, coordinate and integrate these

with MEF, other components, JTF, theater, and

national intelligence production operations.

O Develop and coordinate all-source intelligence

dissemination plans and supporting architectures for voice and data networked communications, and coordinate and integrate these with

MEF, other components, JTF, theater, and

national intelligence CIS and dissemination

operations.

O Monitor the flow of intelligence throughout the

MEF and ensure that it is delivered to intended

recipients in a timely fashion and satisfactorily

meet their needs.

O Evaluate the effectiveness of MEF and supporting intelligence collection and dissemination

operations.

SARC OIC

The SARC OIC is also an immediate subordinate

of the ISC and is responsible for supervising the

execution of the integrated organic, attached, and

direct support intelligence collection and reconnaissance operations. The SARC OIC is responsible to the ISC for accomplishing the following

specific responsibilities:

O Coordinate, monitor, and maintain the status of

all ongoing intelligence, CI, and reconnaissance collection operations. This includes—

P Missions, tasked intelligence collection requirements, and reporting criteria for all collection missions.

P Locations and times for all pertinent fire support control measures.

P Primary and alternate CIS plans for routine

and time-sensitive requirements for intelligence users (collectors, the SARC, and key

MEF, CE, and MSC C2 nodes) to support

ongoing C2 of collection operations and dissemination of acquired data and intelligence

via the most expeditious means.

O Conduct detailed intelligence collection planning and coordination with the MSCs and

intelligence, CI, and reconnaissance organizations’ planners, with emphasis on ensuring

understanding of the collection plan and specified intelligence reporting criteria.

O Ensure other MAGTF C2 nodes; e.g., the current operations center or force fires are apprised

of ongoing intelligence, CI, and reconnaissance

operations.
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 4-9 

O Receive routine and time-sensitive intelligence

reports from deployed collection elements;

cross-cueing among intelligence collectors, as

appropriate; and the rapid dissemination of

intelligence reports to MAGTF C2 nodes and

others in accordance with standing PIRs/IRs,

intelligence reporting criteria and dissemination plan, and the current tactical situation.

P&A Cell OIC

The P&A cell OIC is the third principal subordinate to the ISC, with primary responsibility for

managing and supervising the MEF’s all-source

intelligence processing and production efforts.

Key responsibilities follow:

O Plan, direct, and manage operations of the AFP

(to include the fusion, order of battle, IPB, and

target intelligence/battle damage assessment

teams), the topographic platoon, the IIP, the

DSTs, and other P&A elements as directed.

O Coordinate and integrate P&A cell operations,

estimates, and products with the MEF G-2 section’s G-2 operations branch and its Red Cell

operations and estimates.

O Maintain all-source automated intelligence

databases, files, workbooks, country studies,

and other intelligence studies.

O Plan and maintain imagery, mapping, and

topographic resources and other intelligence

references.

O Administer, integrate, operate, and maintain

intelligence processing and production systems, unclassified general service and senstitive compartmented information systems; e.g.,

the intelligence analysis system or the image

product library.

O Analyze and fuse intelligence and other information into tailored all-source intelligence

products to satisfy all supported commanders’

stated or anticipated PIRs and IRs.

O Develop and maintain current and future

intelligence situational, threat, and environmental assessments and target intelligence

based upon all-source analysis, interpretation, and integration.

Manage and fuse the threat COP/CTP inputs

from subordinate units and external commands

and intelligence agencies into the MEF CE’s

threat COP/CTP.

MAGTF Intelligence Units

The limited number of specialized intelligence

assets, coupled with the requirement to integrate and

focus intelligence operations on the satisfaction of

the command’s PIRs, creates the need for centralized management. Intelligence units whose capabilities support the entire MAGTF are employed in

general support of the MAGTF with staff cognizance exercised through the G-2/S-2. Certain intelligence units are capable of performing operational

tasks in addition to their primary intelligence functions. For example, a force reconnaissance team

may carry out a laser target designation mission or a

UAV may be used to assist in maneuver control.

Likewise, radio battalion may support maneuver

and fires through electronic attack operations. The

MAGTF G-2/S-2 provides centralized direction for

these assets and facilitates unity of effort, the production of all-source intelligence, and the effective

use of limited resources in support of the requirements of the entire force. Direction is provided primarily through MAGTF-level intelligence C2

agencies; e.g., the SARC and the OCAC. Subordinate elements of the MAGTF retain organic intelligence assets and OPCON appropriate to their

mission and level of command; e.g., division

ground reconnaissance units remain under the

OPCON of the division commander.

Organization of MAGTF-Level

Intelligence Units

Radio Battalion

The radio battalion provides ground-based SIGINT,

electronic warfare (EW), communications security
4-10 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

monitoring, and special intelligence

communications capability to support MAGTF

operations. In addition to directing the employment

of its subordinate elements, the radio battalion is the

focal point for MAGTF ground-based SIGINT

operations. It plans and coordinates these activities

through the OCAC.

Intelligence Battalion

The intelligence battalion plans, directs, collects,

produces, and disseminates intelligence and provides CI support to the MEF, MSCs, subordinate

MAGTFs and other commands as directed. This

support is usually provided by a task-organized

detachment sent to the supported command.

Within the intelligence battalion is a headquarters company, a P&A company, and a CI/

HUMINT company. (See figure 4-3.).

Headquarters Company

The headquarters company consists of a systems

support platoon, collections platoon, and the

GSP. The systems support platoon maintains the

intelligence systems within the battalion in garrison and in the field should the battalion deploy.

The collections platoon manages intelligence

requirements for the battalion. The GSP is

responsible for planning, controlling, and managing the employment of unattended ground remote

sensor equipment in support of MAGTF operations or other commands as directed.

P&A Company

The P&A company consists of an AFP, a topographic platoon, and an IIP. The AFP provides

fused intelligence to the supported MAGTF and

CO

MEU(SOC)

Support Teams

P&A

Company

AFP

IIP

Topographic

Platoon

DSTs

XO

CI/HUMINT

Company

CI /HUMINT

Platoon

HUMINT

Expeditionary

Team

Headquarters

Company

GSP

Systems Support

Platoon

Collections

Platoon

Figure 4-3. Intelligence Battalion.
Intelligence Operations ________________________________________________________________________________________ 4-11 

assists MSC intelligence sections in providing situational awareness to their commanders and

staff. The topographic platoon provides geographic intelligence products and services, geodetic and topographic surveys, and hydrographic

analysis. The IIP provides imagery analysis support and dissemination to the MAGTF and other

commands as directed.

CI/HUMINT Company

The CI/HUMINT company provides CI and

HUMINT support to MAGTF operations. This

support encompasses the full range of tactical CI

and HUMINT operations, including screening

operations, interrogation/debriefing of enemy

prisoners of war and persons of intelligence interest, conduct of CI force protection source operations, conduct of CI surveys and investigations,

preparation of CI estimates and plans, translation

of documents, and limited exploitation of captured material. In addition, the CI/HUMINT

company maintains a technical surveillance countermeasures team with equipment. CI/HUMINT

Marines deploy as a task-organized HUMINT

exploitation team (HET) in direct support of

MAGTF’s and subordinate elements. 

Force Reconnaissance Company

The force reconnaissance company conducts preassault and deep postassault R&S in support of

MAGTF operations. The company uses specialized insertion, patrolling, reporting, and extraction techniques to carry out amphibious and deep

R&S tasks in support of the MAGTF. The company can perform a variety of other operational

tasks. When a conflict exists between the requirements for R&S and other missions, the MAGTF

commander determines the priority of tasking for

the company based on recommendations from the

G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3.

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron (VMU)

VMUs provide day/night, real-time imagery reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition in

support of the MAGTF. The unique capabilities of

the UAV can also be used to support target

engagement, assisting in the control of fires/supporting arms and maneuver. Squadrons are under

the administrative control of the Marine aircraft

wing (MAW). However, because of the limited

number of assets and the critical capabilities they

provide to the entire force, the MAGTF commander retains OPCON of the VMUs. 

Employment of MAGTF Intelligence Units

MAGTF intelligence units are employed to meet

the requirements of the entire force. The MAGTF

G-2/S-2 develops a concept of intelligence support, which employs these units on the basis of

the MAGTF mission, PIRs, concept of operations, and commander’s intent. This concept must

integrate intelligence activities with operations to

provide key intelligence to commanders to enable

rapid and effective decisionmaking. Based on the

results of IPB analysis and the concept of operations, assets are positioned to satisfy PIRs,

expose enemy vulnerabilities, monitor key locations, detect and assist in the engagement of targets, and identify opportunities as they arise in

the battlespace.

Intelligence units are employed in either general or direct support. Under general support,

units are tasked by the MAGTF commander

through his G-2/S-2 to satisfy the requirements of the entire force. Because of the limited number of specialized intelligence assets

and their ability to develop intelligence that is

relevant to current and future operations in all

areas of the battlespace (deep, close, and rear),

general support is the preferred support relationship. Under direct support, the requirements of a supported commander are given

priority. Direct support is used to focus intelligence support for particular phases of an operation or to create enhanced intelligence nodes

in support of MAGTF subordinate elements.

When MAGTFs smaller than a full MEF are

deployed, they will normally be supported by
4-12 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

attached, task-organized detachments from the

intelligence battalion, the force reconnaissance

company, and the radio battalion.

Focused Intelligence Support

Intelligence must be integrated with the mission,

commander’s intent, and concept of operations

and should normally be weighted to support the

main effort. The MAGTF intelligence structure

has the flexibility to tailor its capabilities to meet

the requirements of various types of expeditionary operations and to adapt to changing operational needs during the execution. For each

operation, the MAGTF G-2/S-2 will assess the

IRs and develop a concept of intelligence support that positions assets where they can best satisfy those requirements. Intelligence nodes will

be used to focus support within the MAGTF.

Split-basing will be used to build intelligence

nodes within and outside the AO to deliver comprehensive and reliable intelligence support while

reducing the size of the deployed force. Intelligence units and DSTs are employed to tailor and

enhance the capabilities of organic intelligence

sections or to create task-organized intelligence

nodes in response to specific requirements.

Intelligence Nodes

The MAGTF can create a series of intelligence

nodes, thereby providing focused intelligence

support to specific units or areas based on the

tactical situation. In the concept of intelligence

support, the MAGTF G-2/S-2, in conjunction

with the MSC intelligence officers, task-organizes the MAGTF’s intelligence units and uses

intelligence DSTs to deliver the required intelligence capabilities at key points and times.

Although these nodes normally support a specific unit, they can also be used in an area-support mode where an intelligence node is

established to support all units operating in a

particular sector of the battlespace. For example,

during sustained operations ashore, an intelligence node could be built to support units operating in the MAGTF’s rear area. Such a node

could be built around a DST and specialists

from the CI/HUMINT company and topographic

platoon. This node might support the rear area

operations center, CSSE units operating in the

area or any security detachments located within

the node’s area of responsibility.

Split-basing

Intelligence nodes can also be used to tailor the

footprint of the intelligence organization within

and outside of a designated AO. Intelligence

assets are positioned where they can best carry

out their assigned functions. In many cases, it

may not be necessary or desirable to forward

deploy the entire MAGTF intelligence structure. The concept of operations, C2 support system, physical space limitations, and resource

and/or logistical or other constraints may

require the split-basing of intelligence assets. 

Split-basing is the positioning of critical capabilities within the AO to support the deployed

commander and forces, while maintaining indepth intelligence management, processing,

exploitation, analysis, and production elements

in rear areas, intermediate support bases, staging areas or garrison locations. Split-basing

enables reach back capabilities and can enhance

the intelligence effort by providing continued

access to sophisticated, nondeployable intelligence capabilities and resources. At the same

time, it reduces the footprint of the deployed

force, diminishing risk from enemy action and

decreasing the administrative and logistic support requirements.

Split-basing is especially useful—

O When operations are conducted in areas with

minimal infrastructure and support.

O When there are limitations on the number of

personnel who can be deployed within the

operating area.
Intelligence Operations ________________________________________________________________________________________ 4-13 

O During the deployment phase when it may not

be possible to immediately move all required

elements of the intelligence structure to the forward area.

However, the advantages of split-basing must be

assessed against its costs, particularly its critical

dependence on responsive and reliable communications support.

Task Organization of Intelligence

Support Units

Task organization of intelligence support units

is one of the principal means for the MAGTF

commander to shape the intelligence effort. The

collection, exploitation, and unique production

capabilities of specialized intelligence units significantly enhance the ability of supported G-2/

S-2 sections to develop timely, mission-focused

intelligence.

Intelligence battalion, force reconnaissance company, and radio battalion elements are task-organized to provide tailored intelligence capabilities.

Specific capabilities provided are based on the

threat, the supported unit’s anticipated requirements

(as determined through IPB), and the concept of

operations. Elements from some or all of the intelligence battalion’s subordinate companies are combined into intelligence battalion detachments. The

CI/HUMINT company provides HETs. The radio

battalion forms task-organized SIGINT support

units (SSUs), which provide a mix of SIGINT and

EW capabilities.

When MAGTFs smaller than a full MEF deploy,

an intelligence battalion detachment, a HET,

force reconnaissance platoons, and a radio battalion SSU will normally be attached to the

MAGTF CE. In MEF operations, when the entire

radio battalion, intelligence battalion, and force

reconnaissance company are employed, detachments, HETs, SSUs, and platoons may be placed

in direct support as required to provide tailored

intelligence capabilities or to create an enhanced

intelligence node in support of an MSC or other

MAGTF element.

Intelligence DSTs

Intelligence DSTs are organic to the intelligence

battalion and each of the division, MAW, and

force service support group G-2 sections. Teams

are made up of one officer and several enlisted

personnel who have a mix of intelligence specialty skills. DSTs are used to provide an

enhanced analytical and dissemination capability

to a unit intelligence section and to link the intelligence structure to the supported units. As

assigned by the G-2, they augment the supported

unit’s intelligence section to carry out the following tasks:

O Perform P&A in support of future operations.

O Tailor AFC and other external source intelligence products to the needs of the supported

commander.

O Assist in the management of external intelligence support requirements.

O Facilitate dissemination of intelligence received

from external sources.

The MEF and MSC G-2s use their DSTs to tailor and focus intelligence support to units designated as the main effort or to create enhanced

intelligence nodes at key times and places in

the battlespace.

Intelligence Coordination 

Establishing and supervising operation of the MEF

IOC, which includes the support cell, the SARC,

and the P&A cell, requires a high degree of coordination at all levels. Generally the IOC will be collocated with the MEF CE’s main CP. See figure

4-4 on page 4-14 for the basic IOC organization.
4-14 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

External Intelligence Support to the MAGTF

MARFOR Component Intelligence Section

Future military operations will normally be

joint operations and may require establishing a

MARFOR component headquarters. The

Marine component is the level of command that

deals directly with the JFC—the theater combatant commander or JTF commander—for

MARFORs assigned to combatant command or

the JTF. The Marine component functions at

the operational level of war to advise and assist

the JFC in employing MARFORs while supporting the MAGTF. The Marine component

commander coordinates operational actions

with the JFC and the other component commanders so that the MAGTF commander can

concentrate on warfighting.

Responsibilities

The Marine component intelligence section plays a

crucial role in supporting the component commander and staff and in providing intelligence support to the MAGTF. The Marine component

supports and enhances the planning and execution

of MAGTF intelligence operations through close

and continuous coordination with the JFC, joint

force headquarters, and other component intelligence organizations. The Marine component G-2

section maintains situational awareness and provides a limited analytical capability to support the

component future planning responsibility. It does

not normally conduct collection operations or

engage in detailed, formal intelligence production.

It facilitates, but does not control, the flow of intelligence to the MAGTF. The component relieves

the MAGTF commander of intelligence functions

that are not directly related to warfighting.

IOC

P&A

Cell

Support

Cell SARC

Watch Section

AFC

• Fusion Team

• OOB Team

• IPB Team

• TGTINTEL/BDA Team

Topo Platoon

IIP

SIGINT Analysis Section

DSTs

Watch Section

CI/HUMINT Co Rep

GSP Rep

Force Recon Co Rep

Radio Bn Rep

VMU Rep

ATARS Rep

JSTARS CGS Team

Collection Management and Dissemination Section

Weather Section

Systems Support Section

Administrative Support Section

Figure 4-4. Intelligence Operations Center.
Intelligence Operations ________________________________________________________________________________________ 4-15 

Functions

The size of the Marine component G-2 section

will vary with the size of the JTF and the scope

of the operation. For major joint operations, the

Marine component intelligence section provides

the following functions:

O Planning. The intelligence section plans and

coordinates component and MAGTF connectivity to national, theater, and JTF intelligence architectures. The Marine component

develops the architecture to provide the

MAGTF with timely, tailored national and

theater intelligence. The component G-2

coordinates the provision of additional Service intelligence support (units, personnel,

and equipment) to the MAGTF through the

Service chain of command.

O Collection management. The intelligence section monitors the status of MAGTF collection

requests for supporting and external collection

resources. The MARFOR leverages joint and

national collection resources in support of the

MAGTF. It advocates Service component and

MAGTF requirements in theater and JTF collection forums and recommends the allocation

and tasking of national, JTF, and other component assets to meet MAGTF requirements.

O P&A. The intelligence section provides situational awareness to the component commander and staff and limited P&A to support

the future planning responsibilities of the component headquarters. This function requires the

establishment of a watch section and an analytical element that can tailor operational-level

intelligence products to satisfy the needs of

component planning cells. The component G-2

monitors the status of and coordinates support

for MAGTF production requirements and

requests for intelligence that are submitted to

joint force or supporting intelligence agencies.

O Dissemination. The intelligence section monitors the adequacy of the intelligence architecture and the flow of intelligence to the

MAGTF. Intelligence is disseminated directly

to the appropriate MAGTF elements, not

through the component headquarters unless

specifically required. However, the MARFOR

facilitates and accelerates the flow of critical

intelligence to the MAGTF. The component

intelligence section remains aware of current

MAGTF requirements and ensures that intelligence that is developed or received by the theater or JTF that can satisfy those requirements

is disseminated to the MAGTF.

O Support of targeting. The intelligence section

supports Marine component participation in the

joint targeting process, including representation

at various joint target intelligence and/or targeting forums as required. Performing this function ensures that MAGTF target intelligence

collection and production requirements as well

as collection requirements for support of combat assessment/BDA are adequately supported.

Liaison

The intelligence section provides liaison elements

and personnel augmentation to various JTF and

other component intelligence organizations. Liaison elements may be provided to the following:

O JISE.

O Other Service or functional component intelligence sections.

O The regional SIGINT operations center.

O The joint force J-2 CI/HUMINT staff element.

O The HUMINT operations cell.

O Task force CI coordinating authority, other

joint intelligence organizations such as the

joint interrogation and debriefing center or the

joint document exploitation center.

O The intelligence elements of various alliance or

coalition partners.

Liaison teams or personnel augmentation may

be sourced from the Marine component G-2

section, Service augmentation to the component G-2 section, the MAGTF, or some combination of the above.
4-16 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

National, Theater, Joint, and Other Service 

Intelligence Support

Marine Corps intelligence assets are optimized

for the production of tactical intelligence in support of MAGTF operations. National, theater,

joint, and other Service intelligence assets provide unique capabilities that are not duplicated in

the MAGTF intelligence support structure. (See

figure 4-5.) The MAGTF has the ability to use

external intelligence assets to enhance its organic

capabilities, bringing the full range of these

resources to bear on MAGTF requirements. The

following are key external capabilities that support MAGTF operations:

O National- and theater-level intelligence analysis and production.

O Geospatial information and services (GI&S).

GI&S describes the collection, production, and

dissemination of information about the earth, and

replaces the term mapping, charting, and geodesy.

Central

Intelligence

Agency Defense

Intelligence

Agency

National

Security

Agency

Army

Intelligence

Navy

Intelligence

Air Force

Intelligence

Marine

Corps

Intelligence

Activity

National

Imagery

and Mapping

Agency

National

Reconnaissance

Office

Department of

Justice (FBI)

Department

of Treasury

Department

of Energy

Department

of State

Director

of Central

Intelligence

Community

Management

Staff

National

Intelligence

Council

Department of

Defense (DOD)

Elements

Department

Intelligence

Elements

(Other than DOD)

Independent

Agency

Figure 4-5. The National Intelligence Community.
Intelligence Operations ________________________________________________________________________________________ 4-17 

O Analysis and production of target intelligence

and target materials.

O National imagery collection and exploitation.

O SIGINT support from the National Security

Agency and the US Cryptologic System.

O National- and theater-level CI and HUMINT

collection.

O Liaison elements from national and theater

intelligence agencies.

MAGTF Access to External Support. The Marine

component headquarters or the MAGTF intelligence section will be the focal point for all external intelligence support to the MAGTF. In major

joint operations, a Marine Service component

headquarters will be established, and the component G-2 performs this function. When no Service component headquarters is established, the

MAGTF acts in this role. Intelligence derived

from external sources is used to build a common

picture of the battlespace and is incorporated into

other intelligence products that are provided to all

MAGTF elements. MSCs and other subordinate

units will be able to access external intelligence

support resources through the MAGTF’s intelligence architecture.

Required Capabilities

The following capabilities are required to fully

use the resources of external intelligence support assets:

O Personnel trained and experienced in the capabilities, limitations, tasking, and employment procedures of external intelligence support assets.

O Sufficient, reliable CIS connectivity and interoperability with national, theater, and other Service

intelligence C2 centers and architectures.

O The ability to receive, process, and disseminate

information gathered by national and theater

collection assets.

O Integrating Marine intelligence specialists into

national, theater, and Service intelligence organizations to articulate Marine Corps capabilities and requirements and to optimize

intelligence support to expeditionary forces.

O Establishing liaison between the MARFOR/

MAGTF and supporting intelligence agencies

through dedicated communications and the

exchange of liaison officers.

Augmentation

Like all MAGTF components, intelligence support assets are flexible and respond to a variety of

operational missions. They are configured for

rapid deployment and can be tailored to meet the

requirements of a particular operation. Although

each MAGTF is furnished with a baseline intelligence capability to accomplish its anticipated

mission, changes in the situation or mission tasking may require augmentation. When a MAGTF

is committed to an operation, the intelligence

assets of any remaining units in the operating

forces can be called on to provide this augmentation. MAGTFs smaller than a MEF will normally be supported by their parent MEF; a fully

deployed MEF can be augmented by the assets of

any other MEF. Augmentation may consist of

providing entire intelligence units, selected

equipment or individual personnel with specialized skills. Support may also consist of providing intelligence products that cannot be

developed by the deployed MAGTF or its supporting joint intelligence activity.

Supporting Establishment

Marine intelligence personnel and organizations of

the supporting establishment enhance and sustain

the intelligence activities of the operating forces.

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

The Marine Corps maintains a Service-level intelligence capability in the Marine Corps Intelligence

Activity (MCIA). MCIA focuses on crisis and predeployment support to expeditionary warfare. It

complements the efforts of theater, other Service,

and national intelligence organizations. It provides
4-18 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

unique threat, technical, and geographic intelligence products that are tailored to Marine Corps

operating forces preparing for deployment. It also

coordinates Marine Corps Service collection, production, and dissemination requirements by acting

as the Service collection, production, and dissemination manager. MCIA is collocated with the

National Maritime Intelligence Center, Suitland,

MD and at Marine Corps Base, Quantico, VA.

Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion

The Marine cryptologic support battalion provides Marine Corps participation in national and

Department of the Navy cryptologic activities

worldwide. These Marines perform tasks that are

directly related to their military occupational specialty, contributing to the national, theater, and

Department of the Navy SIGINT collection, production, and dissemination effort while gaining

invaluable skill maintenance and enhancement

opportunities. The battalion is collocated with the

Naval Security Group, Fort Meade, MD and augments the operating forces with trained SIGINT

personnel during crises and exercises.

Navy Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center

The Navy Marine Corps Intelligence Training

Center (NMITC), Dam Neck, VA trains Navy

and Marine Corps personnel in basic, intermediate, and advanced intelligence methods and applications. During contingency operations, NMITC

supports the operating forces through the provision of intelligence training via mobile training

teams and/or selective personnel augmentation.

Personnel Augmentation

The supporting establishment is also a source

of experienced intelligence personnel who can

be called on to fill contingency billets in the

intelligence structure of a deploying or committed MAGTF.

Marine Corps Forces Reserve

The mission of Marine Corps Forces Reserve is

to provide trained units and/or personnel to augment, reinforce or reconstitute active duty

MARFORs during times of war or national

emergency. Intelligence capabilities of the

Marine Corps Reserve are complementary to

those of the active component. This includes

individual mobilization augmentee and individual ready reserve personnel and selected Marine

Corps Reserve units (including two force reconnaissance companies), a GSP, an imagery interpretation unit, and several interrogator-translator

and CI teams, which provide increased depth to

limited active component capabilities.

Individual mobilization augmentee members of

the Marine Corps Reserve Intelligence Program

and the Marine Corps Reserve Cryptologic Program routinely support the training and operational activities of the active component.
CHAPTER 5 

OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA

OMFTS is the maneuver of naval forces at the

operational level that projects sea-based power

ashore to deal a decisive blow. OMFTS is a bold

bid for victory that aims to exploit a significant

enemy weakness. It embodies the application of

the principles of maneuver warfare to a maritime

campaign. Success in OMFTS depends on the

ability to seize fleeting opportunities and quickly

take advantage of exposed enemy vulnerabilities.

See MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations.

OMFTS relies on intelligence to drive planning,

option selection, and maneuver execution. To

support OMFTS, intelligence operations must be

conducted across the strategic, operational, and

tactical levels of war. Starting with strategic considerations and working down to tactical dispositions, intelligence uncovers the threat’s COG,

strengths, and weaknesses, thereby exposing critical vulnerabilities to be exploited by naval forces

operating from the sea. Intelligence also assesses

the potential for maneuver offered by the battlespace, including identifying entry points where

the force can establish itself ashore. The term

entry point encompasses beaches, boat landing

sites, HLZs, and drop zones that can establish

elements of the force ashore. Intelligence also

provides the foundation for effective force protection and IO efforts. These efforts help surprise,

preempt, disrupt, and disorient the enemy during

OMFTS execution.

Required Intelligence Capabilitites

O Perform IPB and situation development covering a broad maneuver space.

O Analyze threat forces to determine COG and

critical vulnerabilities.

O Conduct detailed terrain and hydrographic

analysis to identify suitable entry points.

O Ensure connectivity and interoperability with

national, theater, and joint forces’ intelligence

assets, which provide intelligence support

before the arrival of naval forces in the objective area.

O Provide stand-off collection assets that can satisfy force requirements from over-the-horizon.

O Provide organic imagery, SIGINT, HUMINT,

CI, remote sensor, GI&S, and ground and

aerial reconnaissance assets that can satisfy

MAGTF tactical collection requirements as the

force transitions ashore.

O Provide responsive processing, exploitation,

and production capabilities that can rapidly

develop the critical intelligence required to

support timely decisionmaking.

O Provide dissemination systems that link widely

dispersed forces afloat and ashore.

O Provide flexible intelligence units and organizations that can rapidly transition ashore with

minimal degradation of support.

O Provide in-depth support to force protection

and information operations activities.

Planning and Direction

There are a number of unique intelligence considerations for OMFTS. (See figure 5-1 on page 5-2.)

During the planning phase, the MAGTF intelligence officer provides centralized direction for the

intelligence efforts of the entire MAGTF. Navy and

Marine intelligence assets operate together from an

afloat amphibious force intelligence center, which is

normally located on the amphibious force flagship.

Initial requirements are broad in scope and are

aimed at providing a general description of the battlespace and the threat. As planning progresses,

requirements become increasingly focused on

uncovering critical vulnerabilities and providing
5-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

intelligence that is relevant to the COAs under consideration. The intelligence flow will be predominately from the top down—from national and

theater activities—until organic naval intelligence

capabilities can be brought to bear. A comprehensive, systematic management effort is required to

ensure that the necessary support is requested and

received. At the same time, Navy and Marine intelligence officers must also develop detailed plans for

the positioning and employment of the organic intelligence assets to support the concept of operations.

Collection

Collection operations in the planning phase are

conducted primarily by national and theater

assets. These assets can collect information in

denied areas without compromising operational

security and/or perform their missions at significant stand-off distances. However, the small

number of these systems and inherent limitations on their capabilities normally result in

developing an incomplete intelligence picture.

Advance force or preassault collection operations by naval assets will often be required to

confirm and further develop the situation. An

intensive intelligence effort must be provided in

support of advance force or preassault operations; this intelligence support is required to

select the proper targets for advance force or

preassault collection operations, and ensure that

these activities do not reveal the intent of the

overall operation.

Processing, Exploitation, and Production

Initial production efforts are directed at providing an extensive description of the battlespace

and threat. This description is required to focus

the planning effort. Under the direction of senior

Navy and Marine intelligence officers, the

MAGTF, GCE, ACE, CSSE, Navy amphibious

staff, and flagship intelligence sections engage

in a cooperative effort to develop intelligence

products that support the entire force. Individual intelligence sections will normally concentrate on their particular areas of expertise,

thereby satisfying their units’ requirements

while contributing a broad-scope product to the

general intelligence production effort. For

example, the MAGTF G-2/AFC may focus on

describing the battlespace and the enemy’s C2,

logistics, and reserves, while the GCE studies

enemy ground forces, the ACE looks at the air

and air defense threats, and the flagship intelligence department concentrates on the naval and

coastal defense threat. From this effort, the

ATFIC provides a comprehensive IPB analysis,

an intelligence estimate, and supporting intelligence studies and products. As the planning

phase continues, production efforts concentrate

on identifying enemy vulnerabilities to be

exploited and providing estimates and other

intelligence products to support the specific

COAs that are under consideration.

In the final stages of the OMFTS planning process, the production effort shifts to developing

mission-specific intelligence products that focus

on the selected COAs. These products include

Intelligence 

Cycle

Key Considerations

Planning and 

direction.

Centralized direction from ATFIC.

Transitioning of key capabilities ashore.

Collection. Initial dependence on national/theater capabilities.

Employment of organic assets in advance force/

preassault operations.

Processing,

exploitation, and 

production.

Broad-based effort focusing on entry points and 

enemy vulnerabilities.

Extensive support to CI and IO.

Dissemination. Widely dispersed units afloat and ashore.

Need for rapid intelligence flow to exploit fleeting 

opportunities.

Utilization. COA selection shaped by intelligence.

Choice of entry points, objectives, and targets driven 

by intelligence.

Figure 5-1. Intelligence Considerations

During OMFTS.
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 5-3 

IPB graphics, beach and HLZ studies, and target/

objective area studies. An extensive all-source

intelligence effort is conducted to support deception, OPSEC, psychological operations (PSYOP),

and EW planning in accordance with the

MAGTF commander’s overall IO strategy. During this stage, the production effort becomes

increasingly decentralized as GCE, ACE, and

CSSE intelligence sections focus on specific

requirements of their units. The MAGTF intelligence section continues to provide products to

support the entire force, with efforts concentrated on those MAGTF elements designated as

the main effort.

Dissemination

Dissemination in OMFTS presents significant

challenges. Naval forces can be widely dispersed and may not assemble until late in the

planning phase, if at all. Advances in technology

have improved the capability to disseminate

information between forces afloat, but there

continue to be limitations on the quantity and

quality of intelligence that can be exchanged. In

particular, dissemination systems will be taxed

by the volume of intelligence products, especially critical graphic products that must be distributed during the planning phase. Intelligence

officers at all levels, working in coordination

with unit operations and CIS officers, must

develop plans that provide for dissemination of

key intelligence in a timely manner to all elements of the MAGTF. They must be particularly

careful to include in these plans units located on

ships that are not equipped with the latest C2 or

intelligence systems.

Utilization

During the planning phase, intelligence is used to

develop and select COAs and prepare detailed

plans for implementing the selected COAs. After

providing an initial orientation to the battlespace

and the threat, the intelligence officer assists the

commander and the staff in analyzing the

enemy’s strengths and weaknesses to identify

COG and critical vulnerabilities that can be

exploited. COAs are developed that take advantage of identified weaknesses to accomplish the

assigned objective. The intelligence effort is

refined on the basis of the COAs under consideration, providing answers to IRs generated during

COA development. The intelligence developed

through this interactive process aids the commander in selecting a favorable COA. Once the

COA is chosen, intelligence shapes the concept

of operations and supporting plans. Designation

of objectives; selecting entry means, points, and

times; and identifying targets are all based primarily on intelligence. Particular attention is given

to steps that preserve surprise and that preempt,

disrupt or disorient the enemy’s response to our

actions; e.g., force protection measures, and IO

(including, but not limited to, physical destruction, military deception, OPSEC, PSYOP, and

EW) plans.

Planning and Direction

The ATFIC will continue to act as the central

node for the direction of the intelligence effort.

As the operation unfolds, intelligence nodes can

be established ashore to support units carrying

out mission tasking. Depending on the nature

and scope of the operation, most of the MAGTF

intelligence structure can remain afloat or all of

it may transition ashore. Movement of significant portions of the MAGTF intelligence structure ashore must be planned in detail to ensure a

rapid transition with minimal degradation of

support capability. If it is fully established

ashore, the MAGTF intelligence section

becomes the central node for intelligence direction. The ATFIC acts in a supporting capacity

and continues to provide connectivity and services that cannot be readily established ashore. 
5-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

IRs that arise during execution are normally time

sensitive. Intelligence direction must anticipate

these requirements and establish a responsive collection, production, and dissemination structure

to satisfy them. Designation of PIRs that are

based on the results of IPB analysis, the commander’s intent, and the concept of operations is

critical. Using these factors to designate PIRs

ensures that the intelligence effort remains

focused on providing key intelligence to decisionmakers in a timely manner.

Collection

Collection operations transition from depending

on national and theater capabilities to relying primarily on organic assets. Collection activities are

integrated with the concept of operations. The

objective is to develop the intelligence required

to make key decisions regarding maneuver, targeting, and future plans. Collection assets are

focused on key areas that are associated with the

scheme of maneuver, location and development

of critical targets, and combat assessment.

Reports of units maneuvering through the battlespace and/or in contact with the enemy are a

significant source of information. This information must be transmitted to the appropriate intelligence section to help maintain situational

awareness and refine the threat assessment. The

MAGTF continues to employ national and theater-level collection support against targets

located deep in the area of influence, throughout

the area of interest, and against less time-sensitive requirements.

Processing, Exploitation, and Production

Rapid processing and production of intelligence

are emphasized to support timely decisionmaking. OMFTS depends on decisive action and generating rapid operational tempo to break the

enemy’s cohesion and ability to resist. Intelligence sections must demonstrate the flexibility,

agility, and responsiveness to quickly recognize

enemy vulnerabilities and identify opportunities

as they develop during the battle. To do this,

intelligence sections at all levels must be aware

of ongoing tactical activities and potential enemy

reactions. They must be able to rapidly integrate

all-source intelligence information with sensor

data and combat reporting to develop and maintain a coherent picture of enemy dispositions and

an assessment of enemy intentions. They must be

able to convey this picture and assessment (preferably in graphic form) to commanders in time to

exploit identified opportunities. In addition to

supporting the ongoing battle, intelligence sections must also be fully engaged in planning for

future operations (continuing IPB analysis, delivering combat assessment inputs and BDA results,

satisfying new IRs, and participating in the decisionmaking process).

Dissemination

Dissemination is an even greater challenge during

OMFTS execution than during planning. Intelligence developed during the processing, exploitation, and production step must be rapidly

disseminated to the units that are able to act on

that intelligence. These forces may be widely dispersed afloat, airborne, and ashore while engaging in rapid maneuver and contact with the

enemy. The dissemination system must be flexible and reliable and focus on the importance and

quality of the intelligence distributed rather than

on its volume. Dissemination plans must provide

alarm channels for warning data and must ensure

that pathways remain open for passing critical

intelligence that directly affects PIRs or identified

decision points. Measures that can help to reduce

the volume of intelligence traffic follow:

O Limit routine reporting.

O Set filters to eliminate information that is not

pertinent to the tactical situation.

O Establishing minimal reporting thresholds for

the generation of intelligence reports.

O Providing alternate means for collection and

other intelligence support requests.

Dissemination plans must permit two-way dissemination, providing a means for subordinate
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 5-5 

elements to pass along data, information or intelligence that they collect or develop that identifies

new enemy vulnerabilities or enhances situation

development for the entire force.

Utilization

Utilization of intelligence during the execution of

OMFTS is rapid and decentralized. Intelligence

identifies enemy vulnerabilities as the battle

unfolds.Once developed, this intelligence is

quickly disseminated to the MAGTF elements

that can act on it, thereby enhancing the ability of

individual units to exploit opportunities as they

arise. Through integration with operations, assets

are positioned to develop new intelligence as the

concept of operations is carried out and the

enemy responds. Timely collection, analysis, and

dissemination of intelligence provides commanders with an accurate picture of the battlespace and

the ability to recognize new opportunities as they

arise. Commanders use this intelligence to select

branches and sequels to the COA, attack targets,

protect their own forces, assess the results of their

actions, and plan future operations.
CHAPTER 6

SUSTAINED OPERATIONS ASHORE

Sustained operations ashore require broad-based

intelligence support that bridges the operational

and tactical levels. Tactical plans are based on the

results of operational-level intelligence assessments, which identify the enemy’s COG and critical vulnerabilities throughout the theater of

operations. MAGTF intelligence operations contribute to the operational-level assessments while

translating the conclusions from these assessments into relevant tactical intelligence. Considerations for developing intelligence in support of

sustained operations ashore are similar to those

for OMFTS. Intelligence support during the execution of sustained operations ashore requires the

same agility and responsiveness as in OMFTS,

with the focus on providing critical intelligence

to support timely decisionmaking. However, sustained operations ashore are normally conducted

over a greater land area and with a larger force

than in OMFTS, creating the requirement for a

larger and more widely distributed intelligence

support structure. The need for integration with

theater, joint, multinational, and other Service

intelligence assets is also greater.

Required Intelligence Capabilities

O Field and sustain intelligence structure to support

MEF-level operations over extended periods.

O Execute all intelligence functions of a Service

component headquarters, including full participation in theater or JTF intelligence activities.

O Ensure sufficient and reliable CIS systems connectivity and interoperability with theater,

joint, and other Service intelligence assets participating in the operation.

O Conduct IPB and situation development in support of operational- and tactical-level planning.

O Provide organic imagery, SIGINT, CI,

HUMINT, remote sensor, GI&S, and ground

and aerial reconnaissance assets that can satisfy MAGTF tactical requirements.

O Provide processing, exploitation, and production capabilities that can supply the extensive

products required to support MEF-level planning and execution.

O Provide dissemination systems that link widely

dispersed and rapidly maneuvering forces.

O Provide area specialists and linguists with

skills that are pertinent to the AO.

O Support force sustainment operations through

detailed logistic intelligence.

O Support force protection efforts conducted

throughout a large operating area, with emphasis on the security of critical rear area C2 and

logistic facilities.

Planning and Direction

Intelligence direction during sustained operations ashore will be centralized during the planning phase and increasingly decentralized during

execution. IRs are extensive and cover all aspects

of the threat and the battlespace. Comprehensive

collection, production, and dissemination efforts

will be required to satisfy these requirements.

Detailed management is necessary to ensure that

these efforts are properly focused and integrated

to meet the needs of the entire force. The

MAGTF intelligence section will act as the primary intelligence node, developing intelligence

to support the MAGTF commander, staff, and

subordinate elements. The Marine component

headquarters serves as the focal point for connectivity with the theater or JTF intelligence structure. During the planning phase, timeliness of
6-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

intelligence production may not be as critical

because the planning process for sustained operations ashore normally takes place over an

extended period and offers the opportunity to use

more time and resources to answer those requirements. (See figure 6-1.)

Once execution begins, the emphasis is on satisfaction of time-sensitive requirements to support

operational and tactical decisionmaking. Intelligence nodes will be created at selected times and

places to provide tailored intelligence support to

units executing specific phases or aspects of the

concept of operations. Intelligence direction must

balance the support provided among close, deep,

and rear operations and the support to current and

future operations. 

The intelligence structure required to support

sustained operations ashore is normally more

extensive than that used in other types of

MAGTF operations. A detailed planning effort

must be undertaken to ensure that the necessary assets are tasked, deployed, and positioned where and when they are required.

Sustained operations ashore are frequently

based on a theater combatant commander’s

approved operations plan or other standing contingency plans that include provisions for a

baseline intelligence support structure. These

plans must be adapted and tailored to the particulars of the current and projected operational

situation. Intelligence plans use a buildingblock approach, phasing in capabilities to keep

pace with the buildup of operational forces.

Planners must remain aware that intelligence

capabilities must be in place to support the earliest steps of the planning phase; therefore, a

robust intelligence structure is normally

required in the initial stages of the deployment.

Many of the intelligence activities conducted during sustained operations ashore will be joint.

Intelligence plans must provide for connectivity

with the theater or joint and other component

intelligence assets and for participation in theater

or JTF intelligence mechanisms. An extensive

liaison effort will be required to ensure that

MAGTF IRs and operations are fully coordinated with those of joint and other Service intelligence activities. The MARFOR and MAGTF will

require significant personnel augmentation to

meet the broad scope of intelligence activities in

sustained operations ashore and provide liaison

teams to the numerous joint and supporting force

intelligence agencies. This augmentation can be

drawn from residual forces, the supporting establishment or the Reserves. 

Collection

Sustained operations ashore will normally be supported by the full range of national- and theaterlevel collection capabilities and by the organic

assets of the participating component forces. Collection priorities for national and theater assets

will be determined by the JFC. The bulk of these

assets will usually be targeted against overall theater/JTF objectives. Marines must participate in

the joint collection management and production

processes to ensure that MAGTF PIRs receive

Intelligence Cycle Key Considerations

Planning and direction. MAGTF acting as central mode.

Need for broad intelligence structure with 

extensive liaison requirements.

Collection. Competition for national, theater, and JTF 

support.

Reliance on organic assets to satisfy many 

tactical requirements.

Support to BDA.

Processing, exploitation, 

and production

Wide-scope effort that bridges operational 

and tactical levels.

Importance of target and geographic 

intelligence.

Dissemination. Extensive CIS infrastructure.

Widely dispersed units.

Timely support.

Utilization. Need to integrate operational and tactical 

levels of intelligence and operations.

Support to sustainability functions.

Figure 6-1. Intelligence Considerations During 

Sustained Operations Ashore.
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 6-3 

appropriate support from the theater/JTF level.

However, even if MAGTF requirements are

given priority, the results of national and theater

collection operations cannot be relied on to completely satisfy the number of requirements developed during extended sustained operations ashore

or to provide the level of detail needed for tactical planning and execution. For this reason, the

MAGTF must depend on its organic collection

assets to provide the bulk of its tactical intelligence information, particularly during the execution phase. The MAGTF must be prepared to

plan and execute imagery, SIGINT, HUMINT,

ground reconnaissance, and CI force protection

source operations throughout its AO. This

includes collection activities in support of deep

operations and the planning of future operations.

MAGTF collection plans must be coordinated

with those of higher, adjacent, and supporting

commands to ensure the following:

O All requirements receive adequate coverage.

O Collection assets are employed efficiently with

minimal overlaps.

O Collection operations are sufficiently integrated

to permit free exchange of collection targeting

data and tracking of collection targets as they

move through the battlespace.

Processing, Exploitation, and Production

Processing, exploitation, and production efforts

in support of sustained operations ashore parallel those for OMFTS. The scope of the initial

production is broad, with the focus narrowing

as particular COAs are selected and a concept

of operations is developed. Geographic intelligence production takes on added importance.

Geographic intelligence helps identify opportunities for ground and air maneuver and determine line-of-sight profiles for observation,

weapons employment, and the effective use of

communications-electronic equipment. Mapping enhancements, lines-of communications

studies, and IPB graphics (such as cross-country mobility, weather effects, and combined

obstacle overlays) are key intelligence products

that support sustained operations ashore.

Threat analysis must be comprehensive and generally deals with large ground and air formations.

This analysis covers reserves and committed forces

and must consider all factors that affect the

enemy’s ability to fight at the operational and tactical levels, including leadership, doctrine, training,

readiness, and sustainability. An extensive production effort is devoted to supporting CSS operations. The main components of this effort are

studies on the local climate, infrastructure, and

resources and on the threat to our rear area and

lines of communications. Products from national,

theater, and JTF intelligence agencies contribute to

the production effort, but many of these products

will have to be tailored by the AFC and GCE,

ACE, and CSSE intelligence sections to satisfy particular MAGTF requirements. During execution,

emphasis is placed on rapid processing and production of tactical intelligence to support decisionmaking in the current battle, while at the same time

providing detailed intelligence to shape plans for

future operations.

Dissemination

The ability to develop and maintain a shared

picture of the battlespace among the diverse

components of the joint force is essential.

MAGTF and Marine component dissemination

architectures not only must provide for distributing intelligence within the MAGTF, but also

must permit the timely exchange of intelligence

with the theater or JTF headquarters, other component commands, and adjacent and supporting

units. Marine intelligence architectures must be
6-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

fully integrated with the theater or JTF structures. This requires detailed planning and coordination because each theater and JTF has a

unique architecture and sometimes separate

channels are used for the dissemination of finished intelligence, imagery, SIGINT, HUMINT,

and CI information. Dissemination during the

early phases is normally simplified by establishing a reliable, redundant communications system between fixed or semi-fixed CPs. However,

even a robust communications system will be

challenged by the requirement to distribute a

large volume of maps, imagery, and other

graphic products during the planning stage.

During execution, the dissemination challenges

are similar to those of OMFTS; i.e., ensuring the

rapid distribution of time sensitive, mission-critical intelligence to widely dispersed units on the

move or in contact with the enemy. A number of

techniques can be used to prevent the loss of

intelligence that is needed for timely decisionmaking in the stream of intelligence data and

information. Some follow:

O Establishing alarm dissemination channels.

O Using broadcast mode for specialized intelligence reporting.

O Employing DSTs or designating a specific element of the intelligence section as a dissemination team.

O Linking dissemination to factors developed in

the other phases of intelligence development,

such as PIRs, named areas of interest, highvalue targets, and high-payoff targets.

O Giving particular attention to the distribution of

updated imagery and graphic intelligence products to units that cannot be supported from

fixed or semi-fixed intelligence support nodes.

Utilization

The use of intelligence in sustained operations

ashore follows the same principles as its use in

OMFTS. The difference lies in the scope of the

effort required and the need to integrate intelligence and operations simultaneously at multiple

levels: theater or JTF, MARFOR, MAGTF,

MSC, and tactical units (regiments/groups/battalions/squadrons/detachments).

In sustained operations ashore, intelligence is used

to form operational and tactical plans that will

accomplish campaign objectives. Broad-based

strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence on

the enemy and the AO is used by intelligence and

operational planners in an interactive process to

identify COG and critical vulnerabilities that can

be attacked or exploited to achieve campaign

objectives. This in turn leads to COA development, selection, and refinement, an effort that

must be coordinated and integrated from the theater/JTF down to the tactical level. Intelligence

helps determine the main and supporting efforts;

designate objectives, times, and locations for these

efforts; and identify the support required for each

to succeed. During execution, intelligence helps

develop the situation, supporting decisions on

whether to continue or modify the plan and

whether to exploit success or take advantage of

new opportunities. At the same time, intelligence

facilitates the planning of follow-on operations

through support to combat assessment and providing continuing IPB analysis. Intelligence helps

plan and conduct critical sustainability functions,

contributing key logistic intelligence and force

protection recommendations.
CHAPTER 7

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

MOOTW refers to the conduct of Marine and

naval expeditionary operations across the range of

military operations short of war. MOOTW encompass a wide variety of activities intended to deter

war, resolve conflict, promote peace, and support

civil authorities. MOOTW encompass a broad

range of 16 possible missions and tasks, each of

which has its own unique IRs. (See MCDP 1-0.)

Intelligence activities in MOOTW are characterized by the following:

O The initial lack of detailed intelligence databases on the AO.

O An extensive list of nonstandard IRs that must

be satisfied to support planning and execution.

O A rapidly changing situation resulting from crisis conditions in the AO.

O A compressed time frame for intelligence

development.

O Restrictions on collection operations.

Intelligence shapes operations during MOOTW

as it does during other types of expeditionary

operations. However, in addition to understanding the physical environment and the threat, the

commander must have intelligence on political,

economic, and sociological conditions to develop

sound military plans that will accomplish the

assigned mission.

To support MOOTW, MAGTF intelligence operations and supporting assets must be maintained

in a high state of readiness. MAGTF intelligence

sections must focus on areas with the greatest

potential for executing contingency operations

and must be able to respond with minimal warning and preparation. They must also be flexibile

to adapt to the wide variety of potential missions,

possessing the expertise and specialized capabilities to provide intelligence across the full range

of MOOTW.

Required Intelligence Capabilities 

O Forward-deployed intelligence sections that are

manned, trained, and equipped to respond to a

variety of short-notice contingency operations.

O Deployable intelligence assets that can be rapidly

“surged” to augment the capabilities of a forward-deployed MAGTF committed to MOOTW.

O Specialized knowledge concerning infrastructure, political, economic, cultural, and sociological conditions in a variety of geographic

areas.

O The ability to perform IPB and situation development that focuses on unconventional threat

forces, such as security forces, paramilitary

groups, insurgents, and terrorists.

O Organic CI and HUMINT capability that is

prepared for operation in a variety of MOOTW

scenarios.

O SIGINT assets that can collect information

from nontraditional targets.

O Dissemination systems that link widely dispersed forces.

O Connectivity to national, theater, joint, and multinational force intelligence assets to provide intelligence support during planning and execution.

O Area specialists and linguists with skills that

are pertinent to the AO.

O Expertise in the operations and functioning of

non-DOD government agencies, international

coalitions, and nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs). (An NGO is a transnational organization of private citizens that maintains a consultative status with the United Nations. NGOs

may be professional associations, foundations,

businesses or groups with a common interest in

humanitarian assistance. Examples include the

Red Cross and the Cooperative for Assistance

and Relief Everywhere.)
7-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

Planning and Direction

There are certain unique intelligence considerations during MOOTW. (See figure 7-1.) Direction of the intelligence effort in MOOTW will

generally be highly decentralized. During

MOOTW, MAGTF elements can be spread

across a wide area, each with a different mission

and facing a unique situation. While a central

node will be needed to direct the efforts of

MAGTF intelligence assets and coordinate external support, the bulk of intelligence will be provided by subordinate intelligence sections

supporting their individual units. Consideration

should be given to directing the intelligence

effort on an area-support basis rather than a unit

support basis. In an area-support system, intelligence nodes are created to support all units operating in the designated area. IRs will be extensive

and diverse. Many will deal with topics and

threats that are not normally confronted during

conventional operations. Individual intelligence

sections and nodes must be provided with expertise or with access to resources that can satisfy

these nonstandard requirements. 

MOOTW are often generated as a result of

fast-moving crisis situations. Intelligence plans

must emphasize readiness and flexibility to

respond to MOOTW requirements in a timely

manner. MAGTF intelligence sections at all

levels must maintain an awareness of potential

contingency missions and adopt a “lean forward” approach toward anticipating requirements. Forward-deployed MAGTFs must

possess all required intelligence capabilities to

function in a wide variety of MOOTW missions. The active Marine service components

(Marine Forces Atlantic or Pacific) must be

prepared to rapidly deploy additional or specialized assets to augment the capabilities of

the forward-deployed MAGTF.

In planning the intelligence structure required to

support a particular MOOTW, several factors must

be considered. The MAGTF intelligence section,

whether afloat or ashore, must have connectivity to

all supporting external intelligence agencies. It is

often necessary to augment subordinate intelligence sections to provide an enhanced capability

to support the independent activities of their units.

There are normally extensive contacts with organizations outside the US military command structure during MOOTW. Liaison and information

exchange with non-DOD agencies and NGOs and

multinational and/or host nation military and security forces must be anticipated.

Collection

Because MOOTW present nontraditional targets,

collection operations must blend the capabilities

and limitations of all available assets. Satisfaction

of unique MOOTW requirements often requires

the use of specialized capabilities or innovative

approaches to the employment of standard assets. 

During the planning and initial phases of the

operation, national and theater assets will be

relied on to satisfy basic requirements concerning entry points, infrastructure, and conventional

Intelligence Cycle Key Considerations

Planning and direction. Decentralized direction.

Need for muliple intelligence support nodes 

with specialized capabilities.

Collection. Nonstandard requirements.

Importance of HUMINT, CI, and nontraditional 

collection activities.

Processing, exploitation,

and production.

Focus on infrastructure, political, economic, 

and sociological factors.

Use of nonstandard production formats.

Dissemination. Large number of independent units operating 

throughout the area.

Intelligence exchange with joint, multinational, 

and nonmilitary units.

Utilization. Need to monitor effectiveness and effect of 

ongoing operations.

Support to force protection, civil affairs, PSYOP, 

and sustainability.

Figure 7-1. Intelligence Considerations

in MOOTW.
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 7-3 

aspects of the threat. Because supporting intelligence agencies often have limited capabilities in

MOOTW situations, organic assets are brought to

bear as early as possible, including being

employed as part of the advance party or lead element of the force. The nature of the MOOTW

environment, threat, and requirements often

present a lucrative opportunity for the conduct of

HUMINT and CI collections operations. A

MAGTF committed to a MOOTW must have a

robust CI and HUMINT capability, augmented

by appropriate area specialist and linguist support. This capability should be deployed as soon

as practical to initiate force protection collection

operations and establish necessary liaisons. The

MAGTF must also exploit open sources and

maintain contact with non-DOD government

agencies and NGOs.

Processing, Exploitation, and Production

Intelligence production requirements in MOOTW

are normally focused on nontraditional subject

areas. For example, detailed knowledge of the

host nation’s economic, transportation, medical,

and public works infrastructure will be required

to develop plans for humanitarian assistance

operations. Threat studies to support a peacekeeping mission must encompass an extensive

treatment of political, cultural, and sociological

factors related to various insurgent or paramilitary factions in addition to the threat’s military

capabilities. Use of area specialists and expertise

from external intelligence organizations, nonDOD agencies (State Department, US Agency for

International Development, etc.), and NGOs is

crucial to satisfying these requirements. Production formats must be adapted to the requirements

of a particular situation. Normal IPB analysis

must be modified to highlight factors crucial to

the specific MOOTW mission. Processing and

production in MOOTW must be responsive to the

needs of the numerous small elements that may

be conducting independent activities throughout

the AO. Production in support of these elements

must be tailored to specific mission requirements

and provide details pertinent to the small-unit

level. Intelligence that increases the situational

awareness of individual Marines, such as information on local customs, language, and health

and sanitation, is an important part of this effort.

Dissemination

Dissemination during MOOTW must provide for

the timely distribution of intelligence to a large

number of elements that are widely dispersed

throughout the AO. Creating intelligence support

nodes for a specific area or region will aid the

dissemination effort, but only if these nodes are

equipped to receive all-source intelligence (in

particular imagery and graphic products) from

supporting collection and production agencies.

Dissemination plans must also include provisions for the exchange of intelligence with other

Service and multinational units participating in

the operation, non-DOD agencies, and NGOs.

Interoperability, sanitation, declassification, and

releasability must all be considered and determined before such exchanges can occur.

Utilization

Intelligence shapes the planning and execution of

MOOTW just as it does in other types of operations.

During planning, intelligence helps determine the

nature and scope of the operations and tasks

required to accomplish the mission, the size and

type of forces required, and the location and duration of the effort required. During execution, intelligence is used to enhance the effectiveness of

ongoing operations, assess the results of completed

activities, and identify follow-on missions and tasks

that will help accomplish the overall objective.

Emphasis is also placed on intelligence support of

specialized functions that have enhanced importance during MOOTW: logistics, force protection,

civil affairs, and PSYOP.
CHAPTER 8

JOINT OPERATIONS AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

A coordinated intelligence effort makes a critical

contribution to the success of joint operations.

MAGTFs participate in full partnership with

other Services in joint operations. MAGTF intelligence operations are fully integrated with joint

intelligence activities to ensure unity of effort,

mutual support, and effective employment of limited intelligence resources.

Multinational operations are “military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically

organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance.” (JP 1-02) MARFORs may participate in a

wide variety of multinational operations, ranging

from routine bilateral exercises to coalition warfare

in major regional contingencies. Instances of unilateral US military operations are becoming less frequent, particularly in MOOTW. Marine units must

be prepared to carry out intelligence operations in

the context of multinational operations.

Effective intelligence support in joint operations

depends on the following:

O Agreement on policies and procedures.

O Mutual intelligence support.

O Shared intelligence capabilities and assets.

O Full interoperability and connectivity among

participants.

O Robust liaison.

JFC and Component Commander 

Responsibilities

JFCs are responsible for all aspects of intelligence support within their commands. They have

the responsibility and authority to determine,

direct, and coordinate all mission-related collection and analysis activities through centralized or

apportioned collection and production management efforts. Component commanders remain

responsible for the intelligence function within

their commands and use organic intelligence

capabilities to support their assigned missions.

The JFC makes national, theater, and joint force

intelligence assets available to support the efforts

of the component commanders. At the same time,

component capabilities must be available to assist

the joint intelligence effort.

Joint Intelligence Structure

The JFC is assisted in carrying out intelligence

responsibilities by the joint force J-2. The J-2

exercises many of the JFC’s intelligence functions while acting as the senior intelligence

officer in the joint force. Intelligence assets of the

joint force headquarters are consolidated in a

JISE. The combatant (theater) command is supported by a JIC, which is a standing intelligence

element. A JISE is a temporary agency established to provide support to a particular JTF. The

JISE provides intelligence support to the JFC and

the entire joint force. Marine intelligence specialists will be assigned to the JISE to articulate

Marine capabilities and requirements, influence

decisions, and optimize intelligence support to

the Marine component. Key functions performed

by the JISE follow:

O Centralized collection, production, and dissemination management for joint force and supporting intelligence assets.

O All-source intelligence production to satisfy

JFC and component requirements.

O Developing and maintaining data bases that

support planning, operations, and targeting.
8-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

O Producing target studies and materials.

O Providing access to supporting national and

theater intelligence assets.

Each theater establishes its own intelligence

architecture, providing connectivity between the

national- and theater-level intelligence organizations, the JTF, and its component commands.

MARFOR and MAGTF intelligence architectures must be able to plug into the architectures

of any theater where they might be employed.

Procedures

Joint intelligence activities are governed by joint

intelligence doctrine contained in JP 2-0, Joint

Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations,

and supporting manuals in the 2-series of JPs.

Joint intelligence doctrine is supplemented by

combatant commanders’ TTP for intelligence

developed by each theater command. During

joint operations, Marine intelligence activities

will adhere to joint doctrine and any published

theater TTP pertaining to that operation.

Marine Intelligence Section

and Unit Responsibilities

O Operate in accordance with joint intelligence doctrine, theater TTP, and individual JTF procedures.

O Participate in joint intelligence mechanisms to

coordinate collection management, intelligence

production, HUMINT and SIGINT collection

operations, target intelligence support, intelligence architectures, CI activities and collection

operations, and other intelligence operations.

O Provide intelligence support to the joint force

headquarters or other JTF components as directed.

O Contribute personnel and other assets to augment the J-2 section and JISE if requested.

O Employ joint or other component intelligence

assets.

O Enter the JTF intelligence architecture.

O Exchange liaison elements with the J-2, JISE,

and/or other JTF components as required.

MARFOR Component Headquarters or

MAGTF CE as a JTF Headquarters

A Marine component headquarters or a MAGTF

CE may be designated to provide the nucleus of a

JTF headquarters.The MARFOR or MAGTF G-2

must be prepared to function as the JTF J-2, with

the G-2’s intelligence section serving as the base

for establishing a JISE. To carry out this function,

MARFOR and MEF G-2 sections must prepare

plans for operating as a JTF J-2 and conduct the

training to be able to execute these plans. Plans

should be based on joint doctrine and theater TTP

and should include J-2/JISE organization, personnel and equipment requirements (with their augmentation sources), a baseline intelligence

architecture, and standing operating procedures.

Each MARFOR and MEF G-2 section should

establish a standing JTF intelligence planning cell

made up of intelligence specialists who are knowledgeable in joint force and other Service intelligence capabilities, limitations, and operating

procedures to develop these plans.

Multinational Operations

There is no single intelligence doctrine for multinational operations. Each coalition or alliance must

develop its own doctrine. The coalition commander determines standardized procedures for

coalition forces. NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs) and quadripartite standing

agreements among US, British, Canadian, and

Australian forces provide standards and guidance

to conduct military operations by forces in these

alliances. STANAG 2936, Intelligence Doctrine,

governs intelligence operations. Joint intelligence

doctrine and architectures provide a framework for

developing the multinational intelligence support

structure. Multinational intelligence operations are

based on the following principles:
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ 8-3 

O Maintain unity of effort. Intelligence operations must be directed at the common threat. A

threat to one alliance member should be considered a threat to all.

O Make adjustments. Effective multinational

operations require minimizing the differences

in national concepts of intelligence support.

Commanders and their intelligence officers

must be willing to make adjustments to

national procedures to share intelligence and

integrate intelligence operations. Special

arrangements should be considered for developing, communicating, and using intelligence

where there are differences in nations’ language, culture, doctrine, terminology, organization, and equipment.

O Plan early and concurrently. Multinational

forces’ IRs and procedures should be identified, planned, coordinated, and exercised

before execution.

O Share all necessary intelligence. Each coalition

member should share intelligence that supports

planning and execution. However, information

about intelligence sources and methods should not

be shared unless absolutely necessary. The methodology for exchanging intelligence should be

developed and exercised before operations begin.

Authorization for foreign disclosure should be

obtained and procedures for sanitation and declassification should be developed as part of this planning process. During execution, the exchange

must be monitored and adapted to ensure that it is

meeting the needs of all coalition partners.

O Conduct complementary intelligence operations.

Each nation’s intelligence assets capitalize on

their strengths and offset the weaknesses of

other members’ assets, providing the coalition

with the most effective blend of capabilities.

Many potential allies may not possess the range

of US intelligence capabilities; therefore, US

intelligence sections must expect to take the

lead in developing intelligence during multinational operations. Particular attention must be

given to provisions for sanitation, declassification, and releasability of intelligence developed

by US forces and agencies to coalition partners.

Personnel who are knowledgeable in these techniques and procedures must be included in the

MAGTF or Marine component intelligence section. Intelligence plans must provide for connectivity with multinational forces and liaison

elements with appropriate linguistic and area

specialist skills.
APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

Section I. Acronyms

ACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aviation combat element

AC/S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .assistant chief of staff

AFC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . all-source fusion center

AFP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . all-source fusion platoon

AIntP. . . . . . . . . . Allied Intelligence Publication

AO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .area of operations

ATARS . . . . . . . . . . . . advanced tactical airborne

reconnaissance system

ATFIC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . amphibious task force

intelligence center

BDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battle damage assessment

C2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .command and control

C2W . . . . . . . . . . . command and control warfare

CCIR . . . . . . . . commander’s critical information

requirements

CE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . command element

CGS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . common ground station

CHATS . . . . . . . CI/HUMINT automated tool set

CI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .counterintelligence

CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . Central Intelligence Agency

CIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat intelligence center

CIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . communications and

information systems

CMDO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . collection management/

dissemination officer

Co . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .company

COA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . course of action

COG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . center of gravity

COP. . . . . . . . . . . . . common operational picture

CP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . command post

CSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat service support

CSSE. . . . . . . . . .combat service support element

CTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .common tactical picture

CV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . critical vulnerability

DIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . Defense Intelligence Agency

DMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Defense Message System

DOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of Defense

DST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .direct support team

EW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .electronic warfare

FBI . . . . . . . . . . .Federal Bureau of Investigation

FRAGO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .fragmentary order

FSCC. . . . . . . . . . fire support coordination center

FSSG. . . . . . . . . . . . . force service support group

GCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ground combat element

GI&S. . . . . . .geospatial information and services

GSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ground sensor platoon

HET. . . . . . . . . . . . . .HUMINT exploitation team

HLZ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . helicopter landing zone

HUMINT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . human intelligence

I&W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . indications and warning

IAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .intelligence analysis system

ICR . . . . . . . . intelligence collection requirement

IDR . . . . . intelligence dissemination requirement

IIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . imagery intelligence platoon

IMA. . . . . . . . individual mobilization augmentee

IMINT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .imagery intelligence

intel bn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . intelligence battalion

IO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . information operations

IOC . . . . . . . . . . . . .intelligence operations center

IOS . . . . . . . . . . . . .intelligence operations server

IOW . . . . . . . intelligence operations workstation

IPB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . intelligence preparation of

the battlespace

IPR . . . . . . . intelligence production requirement

IR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .intelligence requirement

ISC . . . . . . . . . . intelligence support coordinator

JIC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint intelligence center

JISE. . . . . . . . . joint intelligence support element

JSTARS . . . . . . . . . . . . Joint Surveillance Target

Attack Radar System

JTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint task force

JWICS. . . . . . . . . . .Joint Worldwide Intelligence

Communication System

MAGTF . . . . . . . . . Marine air-ground task force
A-2 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

MARFOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine Corps forces

MARFORRES . . . . . . . . Marine Forces Reserve

MASINT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . measurement and

signature intelligence

MAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine aircraft wing

MCDP . . . . . . Marine Corps doctrinal publication

MCIA . . . . . . Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

MCWP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps

warfighting publication

MEB . . . . . . . . . . .Marine Expeditionary Brigade

MEF . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Expeditionary Force

MEU . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Expeditionary Unit

MEU(SOC) . . . . . . . . Marine Expeditionary Unit

(Special Operations Capable)

MIDB . . . . . . . . .modernized integrated database

MOOTW. . . . . military operations other than war

MSC . . . . . . . . . . . . major subordinate command

NGO . . . . . . . . . . .nongovernmental organization

NIMA . . National Imagery and Mapping Agency

NMITC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Navy-Marine Corps

Intelligence Training Center

NIPRNET . . . . . . . . Nonsecure Internet Protocol

Router Network

NIST . . . . . . National Intelligence Support Team

NSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Security Agency

OCAC . . . . operations control and analysis center

OIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . officer in charge

OMFTS . . . . . operational maneuver from the sea

OODA. . . . . . . . . observe, orient, decide, and act

OP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . observation post

OPCON. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operational control

OPLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .operation plan

OPORD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operational order

OPSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operations security

OSINT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . open-source intelligence

P&A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . production and analysis

PDE&A. . . . . . . . . planning, decision, execution,

and assessment

PIR . . . . . . . . . priority intelligence requirements

PSYOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . psychological operations

R&S . . . . . . . . . . reconaissance and surveillance

recon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . reconaissance

rep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . representative

RRS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .remote receiver station

SARC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . surveillance and

reconnaissance cell

SIDS . . secondary imagery dissemination system

SIGINT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .signals intelligence

SIPRNET . . . . . . . . . . . . Secret Internet Protocol

Router Network

SSU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SIGINT support unit

STANAG . . . . . . . . . . standardization agreement

TCAC . . . Technical Control and Analysis Center

TDN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical data network

TEG. . . . . . . . . . . . Technical Exploitation Group

TERPES . . . . . tactical electronic reconnaissance

processing and evaluation system

TGTINTEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .target intelligence

TRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .tactical recovery of

aircraft and personnel

TPC . . . . . . . . . topographic production capability

TRSS. . . . . . . . . . . .tactical remote sensor system

TTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactics, techniques,

and procedures

UAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .unmanned aerial vehicle

VMU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marine unmanned aerial

vehicle squadron

Section II. Definitions

all-source intelligence—Intelligence products

and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, including, most

frequently, human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open source

data, in the production of finished intelligence.

(JP 1-02)

battle damage assessment—1. The timely and

accurate estimate of damage resulting from the

application of military force, either lethal or nonlethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle

damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground,

naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ A-3 

assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the

operators. Battle damage assessment is composed

of physical damage assessment, functional damage

assessment, and target system assessment. Also

called BDA. (JP 1-02) 2. The timely and accurate

estimate of the damage resulting from the application of military force. BDA estimates physical

damage to a particular target, functional damage to

that target, and the capability of the entire target

system to continue its operations. (MCWP 2-1)

centers of gravity—1. Those characteristics,

capabilities, or localities from which a military

force derives its freedom of action, physical

strength, or will to fight. Also called COG. (JP 1-

02) 2. A key source of strength without which an

enemy cannot function. (MCDP 1-2)

collection—The gathering of intelligence data

and information to satisfy the identified requirements. (MCWP 2-1)

collection management—1. The process of

converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements, establishing priorities, and tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection

sources or agencies, monitoring results and retasking, as required. (JP 1-02) 2. Its purpose is to

conduct an effective effort to collect all necessary

data while ensuring the efficient use of limited and

valuable collection assets. (MCWP 2-1)

combat data—Data derived from reporting by

operational units. (MCWP 2-1)

command and control—1. The exercise of

authority and direction by a properly designated

commander over assigned and attached forces in

the accomplishment of the mission. Command

and control functions are performed through an

arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a

commander in planning, directing, coordinating,

and controlling forces and operations in the

accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2.

(JP 1-02) 2. The means by which a commander

recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it

that appropriate actions are taken. (MCDP 6)

commander’s critical information requirements—

Information regarding the enemy and friendly

activities and the environment identified by the

commander as critical to maintaining situational

awareness, planning future activities, and facilitating timely decisionmaking. Also called CCIR.

(MCRP 5-12C)

commander’s intent—A commander’s clear,

concise personal articulation of the reason(s)

behind one or more tasks assigned to a subordinate. It is one of two components of every

mission statement which supports the higher and/

or supported commander’s intent and guides the

exercise of initiative in the absence of instructions. (MCRP 5-12C)

counterintelligence—Within the Marine Corps,

CI constitutes active and passive measures

intended to deny a threat force valuable information about the friendly situation, to detect and

neutralize hostile intelligence collection, and to

deceive the enemy as to friendly capabilities and

intentions. Also called CI. (MCWP 2-1)

critical vulnerability—An aspect of a center of

gravity that if exploited will do the most significant damage to an adversary’s ability to resist.

Also called CV. (MCRP 5-12C)

descriptive intelligence—Class of intelligence

which describes existing and previously existing

conditions intended to promote situational awareness. Descriptive intelligence has two components: basic intelligence, which is general

background knowledge about established and

relatively constant conditions; and current intelligence, which is concerned with describing the

existing situation. (MCRP 5-12C)
A-4 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

dissemination—Conveyance of intelligence to

users in a suitable form. (JP 1-02)

dissemination management—Involves establishing dissemination priorities, selecting dissemination means, and monitoring the flow of

intelligence throughout the command. The objective of dissemination management is to deliver

the required intelligence to the appropriate user in

proper form at the right time while ensuring that

individual consumers and the dissemination

system are not overloaded by attempting to move

unneeded or irrelevant information. Dissemination management also provides for use of security controls that do not impede the timely

delivery or subsequent use of intelligence while

protecting intelligence sources and methods.

(MCWP 2-1)

estimative intelligence—Class of intelligence

which attempts to anticipate future possibilities

and probabilities based upon descriptive intelligence in the context of planned enemy and

friendly operations. (MCRP 5-12C)

human intelligence—1. A category of intelligence

derived from information collected and provided

by human sources. (JP 1-02) 2. HUMINT operations cover a wide range of activities encompassing reconnaissance patrols, aircrew reports and

debriefs, debriefing of refugees, interrogations of

prisoners of war, and the conduct of CI force

protection source operations. Also called

HUMINT. (MCWP 2-1)

imagery intelligence—Intelligence derived

from the exploitation of collection by visual

photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electrooptics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film,

electronic display devices, or other media. Also

called IMINT. (JP 1-02)

indications and warning—Those intelligence

activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United

States or allied military, political, or economic

interests or to US citizens abroad. It includes

forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the

imminence of hostilities; insurgency; nuclear/

non-nuclear attack on the United States, its overseas forces, or allied nations; hostile reactions to

United States reconnaissance activities; terrorists’ attacks; and other similar events. Also called

I&W. (JP 1-02)

intelligence—1. The product resulting from the

collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information

concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained

through observation, investigation, analysis, or

understanding. (JP 1-02) 3. Knowledge of the

enemy and the surrounding environment that is

needed to support decisionmaking. (MCDP 2)

intelligence cycle—The steps by which information is converted into intelligence and made

available to users. (JP 1-02)

intelligence data—Data derived from assets

primarily dedicated to intelligence collection: imagery systems, electronic intercept equipment, human

intelligence sources, and so on. (MCWP 2-1)

intelligence discipline—A well-defined area of

intelligence collection, processing, exploitation,

and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources. There are five major

disciplines: human intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence,

signals intelligence (communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence), and open-source

intelligence. (JP 1-02)
Intelligence Operations _________________________________________________________________________________________ A-5 

intelligence operations—The variety of intelligence tasks that are carried out by various intelligence organizations and activities. (JP 1-02)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace—

1. An analytical methodology employed to

reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy,

environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace

builds an extensive data base for each potential

area in which a unit may be required to operate.

The data base is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and

terrain on operations and presents it in graphic

form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace

is a continuing process. Also called IPB. (JP 1-

02) 2. A systematic, continuous process of

analyzing the threat and environment in a

specific geographic area. (MCWP 2-1)

intelligence requirement—1. Any subject,

general or specific, upon which there is a need for

the collection of information, or the production of

intelligence. Also called IR. (JP 1-02) 2.

Questions about the enemy and the environment,

the answers to which a commander requires to

make sound decisions. (MCDP 2)

joint force—A general term applied to a force

composed of significant elements, assigned or

attached, of two or more Military Departments,

operating under a single joint force commander.

(JP 1-02)

joint intelligence center—The intelligence

center of the joint force headquarters. The joint

intelligence center is responsible for providing

and producing the intelligence required to

support the joint force commander and staff,

components, task forces and elements, and the

national intelligence community. Also called

JIC. (JP 1-02)

joint operations—A general term to describe

military actions conducted by joint forces, or by

Service forces in relationships (e.g., support,

coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do

not create joint forces. (JP 1-02)

main effort—The designated subordinate unit

whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to the overall mission success. (MCRP 5-12C)

maneuver warfare—A warfighting philosophy

that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion

through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and

rapidly deteriorating situation with which the

enemy cannot cope. (MCDP 1)

measurement and signature intelligence—

1. Scientific and technical intelligence obtained by

quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric,

angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from

specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the

target. The detected feature may be either reflected

or emitted. Also called MASINT. (JP 1-02) 2.

Intelligence information gathered by technical

instruments such as radars, passive electrooptical

sensors, radiation detectors, and remote ground

sensors. (MCWP 2-1)

open-source intelligence—1. Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public. Also called OSINT. (JP 1-02) 2.

OSINT sources include books, magazines, newspapers, maps, commercial electronic networks and

databases, and radio and television broadcasts.

OSINT involves no information that is classified at

its origin or acquired through controlled collection.

(MCWP 2-1)

priority intelligence requirements—1. Those

intelligence requirements for which a commander

has an anticipated and stated priority in his task

of planning and decisionmaking. Also called PIR.

(JP 1-02) 2. An intelligence requirement MCWP

2-1 Intelligence Operations A-5 associated with a
A-6 _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 2-1

decision that will critically affect the overall

success of the command’s mission. (MCDP 2)

production management—Encompasses determining the scope, content, and format of each

product; developing a plan and schedule for the

development of each product; assigning priorities among the various IPRs; allocating processing, exploitation, and production resources; and

integrating production efforts with collection and

dissemination. (MCWP 2-1)

sensor data—Data derived from sensors whose

primary mission is surveillance or target acquisition: air surveillance radars, counterbattery

radars, and remote ground sensors. (MCWP 2-1)

signals intelligence—1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in

combination all communications intelligence,

electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted.

2. Intelligence derived from communications,

electronics, and foreign instrumentation signals.

Also called SIGINT (JP 1-02)

situational awareness—Knowledge and understanding of the current situation which provides

timely, relevant and accurate assessment of

friendly, enemy and other operations within the

battlespace. Also called SA. (MCRP 5-12C)

tactical intelligence—1. Intelligence that is

required for planning and conducting tactical

operations. (JP 1-02) 2. Tactical intelligence

concerns itself primarily with the location, capabilities, and possible intentions of enemy units on

the battlefield and with the tactical aspects of

terrain and weather. (MCDP 2)

warfighting functions—The six mutually

supporting military activities integrated in the

conduct of all military operations: command and

control, intelligence, maneuver, fires, logistics,

and force protection. (MCRP 5-12C)
APPENDIX B

REFERENCES

Standardization Agreement (STANAG)

2936 Intelligence Doctrine - AIntP-1(A)

Joint Publication (JP)

2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

1 Warfighting

1-0 Marine Corps Operations

2 Intelligence

5 Planning

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

2-14 Counterintelligence

5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process