February 2006 Defense Horizons  

Defense

Cognition and Cavalry

Opinions are sharply divided about whether George Armstrong 

Custer was a brilliant tactician or a compulsive risk-taker. In turn, 

was the massacre at the Little Bighorn the result of rare misfortune or 

inexcusable audacity? We will not try to settle the arguments between 

Custer’s detractors and apologists. (We doubt either camp would settle 

on terms short of the other’s total capitulation!) Rather, we will try to 

understand Custer’s thought process, using a new, explanatory model 

of cognition in combat.1 More importantly, at least for nonhistorians, 

we will consider what Custer’s thought process can tell us about military decisionmaking in this era of networked warfare.2

Why select this flamboyant, 19th-century cavalry officer as 

the subject for an inquiry into 21st-century military decisionmaking? Surely, analysis of cognition in today’s warfare must take into 

account the revolution in information technology, which began a 

century after Custer met his death in Montana. After all, by today’s 

standards, Custer’s “bandwidth” was negligible—binoculars and 

some scouts. Moreover, in contrast to today’s complex global security 

environment and unpredictable operating conditions, Custer faced 

known enemies in known places with known weapons and tactics.

Nevertheless, there are good reasons to consider Custer. To 

start with, 19th-century cavalry action was a precursor of the fastbreaking, distributed warfare that is becoming pervasive in the 

networked era. Cavalry missions (reconnaissance, deep strike, 

disruption) and strengths (speed, flexibility, autonomy) are broadly 

relevant in current warfare. By its nature and purpose, cavalry had 

to be able to respond to the unfamiliar and the unanticipated. More 

than their counterparts, who directed set-piece infantry maneuvers 

and artillery bombardments, cavalry commanders had to make 

quick decisions under fluid and ambiguous conditions, often without 

guidance from higher authority, not unlike tactical-level officers in 

networked warfare.3

In any case, basic lessons on military operational decisionmaking are ageless. How fallible humans can make sense of information, 

draw on experience, analyze options, and decide in the face of danger, urgency, and uncertainty is a concern as old as warfare. While 

cognitive performance has become more important in determining 

military outcomes with the advent of information networks, it has 

Overview

The combination of abundant networked information and 

fluid, unfamiliar situations in the current era makes it at once possible and imperative to improve decisionmaking in combat. The key 

to improvement is to integrate faster reasoning and more reliable 

intuition into a cognitive whole to achieve battle-wisdom. Although 

the technologies that both demand and facilitate battle- wisdom 

are new, military history holds lessons on combining reasoning and 

intuition in conditions of urgency, danger, and uncertainty. 

Today’s fast and distributed style of war has antecedents in 

the reconnaissance and strike operations of 19th-century American 

cavalry, which depended on similar qualities—speed, flexibility, 

and command “at the edge.” Cavalry officers had to make quick 

decisions in unfamiliar circumstances with imperfect information, 

and without seeking instructions. 

There may be no more arresting case of fateful decisionmaking by a commander in combat than that of George Armstrong 

Custer at the Battle of the Little Bighorn. Custer’s reliance on his 

legendary intuitive powers, which had produced many victories 

during the Civil War, was his undoing. Instead of analyzing his 

options when he learned of Major Reno’s failed attack and Indian 

strength, he evidently satisfied himself that his original plan still 

made sense. Famous for his self-confidence, Custer never asked 

himself the critical question: Could I be wrong?

Although intuition remains central to decisionmaking under 

time pressure, the ability to combine intuition with reason in the 

crush of battle is increasingly important to commanders. The 

need for this combination of cognitive skills has implications for 

the recruitment, retention, development, selection, training, and 

education of military decisionmakers.

Custer in Cyberspace

by David C. Gompert and Richard L. Kugler

A publication of the

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

F e b r u a r y 2 0 0 6

Number 51

Horizons
 Defense Horizons February 2006

never been unimportant. We should do all we can to comprehend 

these phenomena—all the more reason to seek lessons on decisionmaking from military history. 

In that history, there may be no more arresting case of fateful 

decisionmaking by a commander under pressure than the one provided by the battle known as 

Custer’s Last Stand. Custer 

happens to be a particularly 

interesting case of how and 

how not to combine experience-based intuition and 

information-based reasoning, which is crucial in 

today’s world of uncertainty 

and abundant information. 

Custer, as we shall see, had 

a problem-solving approach that worked well in most circumstances. 

Of the more than 20 battles he fought in the Civil War, only one could 

be judged a defeat—a record that not only reveals impressive cognitive performance but may have also contributed to Custer’s elevated 

self-regard. Notwithstanding this genuine prior success, Custer’s decisionmaking failed catastrophically at the Little Bighorn. The contrast 

offers rich fuel for analysis, provided we can deduce why and how he 

made the decisions he did.

The pages that follow will move back and forth between 

early-21st-century networking theory and mid–19th-century cavalry 

experience. We first suggest a model for effective thinking and 

decisionmaking in combat when time is short, danger is great, and 

conditions are both unfamiliar and dynamic. We call this battle-wisdom. Then we look at how Custer thought relative to that model. 

While recalling his victories as a young general in the Civil War, we 

will concentrate on his defeat at the Little Bighorn. We find Custer’s 

final battle especially illuminating on three critical matters: the balance and integration of intuition and reasoning, the management of 

information and time to gain the time-information advantage, and 

the ability to adapt rapidly and learn in action. 

Was Custer battle-wise, in the sense of using both intuition 

and reasoning to arrive at timely yet sound judgments? If so in his 

earlier battles—including stunning Civil War victories—why not in 

his last one? How does one square Custer’s reputation among those 

who served with him for always knowing the right thing to do with his 

decisions at the Little Bighorn? By examining Custer in that light, 

we hope to learn about good and bad decisionmaking under severe 

conditions, and perhaps a little about the man and the Last Stand 

that bears his name. 

Battle-Wisdom

Cognitive performance has always been important and often decisive in combat. Lee outfoxed Hooker at Chancellorsville, but not Meade 

at Gettysburg; Eisenhower fooled the Wehrmacht’s generals about the 

D-Day landings; Franks stunned and rolled up the Taliban and, a year 

later, demolished Saddam’s army with revolutionary tactics (and technology). Such superiority in thinking and decisionmaking is becoming more crucial than ever because of the combination of bountiful 

networked information and 

greater complexity in military 

operations. If the technology 

of the information revolution 

is making improved military 

decisionmaking possible, the 

turmoil of the geopolitical 

revolution is making it essential. Moreover, 21st-century 

enemies, such as al Qaeda, 

are exploiting information to 

complicate and confuse our strategic and operational reasoning. In 

this regard, while we will not analyze the decisionmaking of Custer’s 

Indian counterparts—Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, and Gall—we are 

struck by the similarity between their apparent cognitive abilities and 

those of some of today’s enemies of the United States.4

When conditions are complex and dynamic, time is short, and 

critical information is available, the key to making good decisions is 

to blend intuition with reasoning—more specifically, reliable intuition with timely reasoning.

■ Intuition is demanded by urgency. Research in many fields—military, law enforcement, emergency medical service, fire fighting—shows that 

the greater the time pressure, the more decisionmakers rely on intuition.5

Military commanders with intuitive powers can be especially purposeful, 

bold, agile, responsive, and even inspirational. For our purposes, intuition is 

based on a mental model or “map” an individual brings to a situation, wholly 

or largely based on experience and only lightly influenced by new information. The intuitive decisionmaker does not weigh the risks and rewards of 

alternative courses of action but identifies and then proceeds down the 

path he or she has been conditioned to believe is right for circumstances 

like those at hand. Because of its time-efficiency, intuition can be invaluable. However, because it is based on experience, the reliability of intuition 

depends heavily upon whether the circumstances at hand are broadly familiar. When circumstances are strange, intuition can be inadequate, flawed, 

and even hazardous.

■ Conversely, reasoning—structured, logical analysis—is important 

when heightened complexity and change (unfamiliarity) deplete the utility 

of experience on which intuition depends. Time permitting, reasoning can 

help, especially when it augments intuition. Reasoning makes use of newly 

gleaned information to confirm and correct intuition, to compare alternative 

courses of action, and to anticipate consequences of multiple contingencies. 

However, because reasoning can be time-consuming, decisionmakers tend 

to marginalize it when time is precious, as it often is in combat. It follows 

that the decompression of time—the easing of urgency—and related mining of information are crucial for introducing reasoning and thus cognitive 

effectiveness to intuition. Therefore, it is not a case of substituting analysis 

for intuition, but integrating the two. 

For an example of an intuitive commander, think of George Patton. For one who excelled in reasoning, think of Dwight Eisenhower. 

David C. Gompert (gompertd@ndu.edu) and Richard Kugler (kuglerr@ndu.

edu) are Distinguished Research Professors at the Center for Technology and 

National Security Policy at National Defense University.

when conditions are complex and 

dynamic, time is short, and critical 

information is available, the key 

to making good decisions is to 

blend intuition with reasoning
February 2006 Defense Horizons  

Each had strengths and weaknesses; each was a great, if imperfect, 

commander. Together, they were a potent package.6 Battle-wisdom, 

as we define it, combines the strengths of the two in a single “ideal” 

decisionmaker.

Persons who are good at balancing and blending reliable intuition with timely reasoning tend to be very “self-aware”—that is, to 

know or be able to determine objectively when and how much they can 

count on their own intuition. Before making irretrievable decisions, 

they will ask themselves if their prefabricated mental models are 

applicable to the situation at hand. The military establishment should 

favor such people in recruitment, retention, and assignment.7 Beyond 

that, the ability to balance and blend intuition and reasoning can be 

developed and ought to be stressed in military training and education. 

By recognizing the importance of both components and the need to 

integrate them, development programs can make most soldiers more 

battle-wise. 

The method by which decisions are made during operations is 

crucial. There is a need to stress what we call rapid-adaptive decisionmaking, in which self-aware intuition is employed heavily but 

provisionally when time and information are scarce, thus gaining 

time to get more information and to introduce reasoning to enhance 

cognition. Initial judgments are mainly intuitive and conditional; 

analysis need not produce paralysis; and haste is obviated by flexibility. Such an approach can be taught and practiced. 

Four particular battle-wise abilities are especially important 

in the age of networked warfare—but also, it would seem, in 19thcentury cavalry action:

■ Anticipation

■ Decision speed

■ Opportunism

■ Learning in action.

Each of these abilities is aimed at gaining and exploiting an 

operational time-information advantage, by which we mean the product of, or synergy between, 

time and information.8 Wellinformed anticipation can 

make time an ally—and an 

enemy of the enemy—from 

the outset of hostilities. 

Decision speed can provide 

an edge in controlling the 

tempo and course of action. 

Opportunism seizes fleeting conditions that offer 

nonlinear gains; when two 

opposing forces are both potentially vulnerable, the force that strikes 

at the moment the other is especially vulnerable can prevail. Learning 

in action, as the term implies, means getting smarter and adjusting 

rapidly and continuously despite complexity and confusion—all the 

more advantageous if the enemy is relying on a script that events 

have superseded. Taken together, time-information superiority offered 

by these abilities means that information can be used to defeat 

urgency—long the bane of rational military decisionmaking. 

Battle-wisdom is especially important today because plentiful 

networked information facilitates it and increasingly dynamic operating conditions demand it. But it is also a useful model for analyzing decisionmaking in Custer’s day, especially for cavalry, for which 

time-information was key. Cavalry had to act with speed in the face 

of uncertainty while also sensing, using, and sharing information. 

As we shall see, the management of information and time figured 

centrally in Custer’s choices and fate at the Little Bighorn.

Massacre at the Little Bighorn

The massacre of Custer and a large portion of his 7th Cavalry 

Regiment at the Little Bighorn in June 1876 is one of the most 

perplexing battles in American military history.9 Exactly why were 

Custer and his 210 troops massacred? Historians, pundits, and 

archaeological experts have argued over this question for years, and 

have produced a torrent of books on the subject. While multiple 

theories abound, two are common: Custer as foolhardy glory-seeker, 

and Custer as victim of circumstances beyond his control. The first 

theory holds that in a quest for glory, Custer unwisely attacked a 

far larger Indian village than he could handle. The second theory 

holds that Custer was undone not only by unexpectedly fierce Indian 

resistance, but also by bad terrain, the failure of two subordinates to 

come to his aid with reinforcements, and the loss of cohesion among 

the five companies that he led.

Both theories have some merit: Custer bit off more than he 

could chew; and he was victimized by unfortunate circumstances, if 

not feckless colleagues. Yet, as we shall see, neither theory provides 

a satisfying explanation for the massacre. While Custer may have 

been seeking glory, he was no fool. He was a top-notch cavalry commander, and his tactics were consistent with U.S. Army doctrine at 

the time. On the other hand, while the situation snowballed against 

Custer, it did not make annihilation inevitable. Moreover, the situation was fathered by Custer’s own decisions, and until near the very 

end he could have saved his command simply by changing course. 

If Custer’s tactical 

decisions during the battle 

were not foreordained, yet 

resulted in calamity, why 

did he make them despite 

several opportunities to 

make better decisions that 

could have saved him and 

his men? While the truth 

lies buried with Custer, 

we offer our own hypothesis. Early in the battle, he 

formed a mental model, based on his experience and general assessment of the situation, of how the 7th Cavalry should engage the Indians. This mental model, embodied in a hammer-and-anvil battle plan 

that was standard for cavalry operations and had succeeded in the 

past, led him to expect victory. When his plan began breaking down 

in the face of surprises and adversity, he still clung to it, rather than 

battle-wisdom is especially 

important today because plentiful 

networked information facilitates 

it and dynamic operating 

conditions demand it
 Defense Horizons February 2006

cited for his performance at the first battle of Bull Run, where his G 

Company of the 2d Cavalry, one of few Union units that did not flee, 

covered the retreat of others.11 At Gettysburg, he initially faltered but 

rallied to rebuff a Jeb Stuart attack aimed at flanking the Union Army. 

After Gettysburg, he participated in sharp fights in Virginia, winning 

several and slipping away on a few occasions when the Confederates 

seemed to have him trapped. In the spring of 1864, he joined Grant’s 

march toward Richmond and Petersburg. Custer helped stave off a big 

Confederate attack at the bloody Wilderness battle. Afterward, Grant 

marched to further carnage at North Anna River and Cold Harbor, but 

he also sent Sheridan’s cavalry corps, with Custer as a brigade commander, on a bold dash toward Richmond. Custer played a major role 

in a victory at Yellow Tavern, and narrowly averted disaster at Trevilian 

Station. In the fall of 1864, he joined Sheridan, who was charged with 

rebuffing a major Confederate advance up the Shenandoah Valley. 

Once this defensive effort had 

succeeded, Sheridan launched 

a sustained counteroffensive 

aimed at driving the Confederates out of the Shenandoah. 

Custer was one of Sheridan’s 

key commanders at such victorious battles as Winchester, 

Tom’s Brook, Cedar Creek, and 

Waynesboro. In the spring of 

1865, Custer helped lead Grant’s effort to encircle Lee’s Army of 

Northern Virginia as it left Richmond to flee westward. Custer contributed importantly to victories at Dinwiddie Court House, Five Forks, 

and Sayler’s Creek. His division was the one that finally blocked the 

Confederate flight, thus compelling Lee’s surrender at Appomattox 

Court House. During these long months of intense fighting, Custer 

often stymied Confederate attacks that imperiled Union forces, and he 

inflicted some of the biggest routs on Confederate cavalry of the Civil 

War, against the legendary Jeb Stuart and Jubal Early.

When the war ended, Custer was chosen to help lead the Union 

Army’s victory parade in Washington DC. This honor reflected not only 

his panache and celebrity but also his record on the battlefield. Custer 

was envied and disliked by some, who called him an arrogant martinet 

or worse. But his reputation as a brave, skilled commander was reflected 

in many flattering comments by subordinates who served under him. As 

one of his officers said, “Some called him rash, but that is all bosh. He 

displayed a great deal of bravery, but I don’t think that you could call it 

rashness. He never took his men in any place where they couldn’t get 

out.” Or, as another said: “He was certainly the model of a light cavalry 

officer, quick in observation, clear in judgment, and resolute in execution.” One of his brigade commanders summed up his talent this way: 

“Custer was a fighting man through and through. There was in him an 

indescribable something—call it caution, call it sagacity, call it the real 

military instinct, it may have been genius—by whatever name entitled, 

it nearly always impelled him to do the right thing.”12

Setting the Stage for the Little Bighorn 

Custer’s troubles at the Little Bighorn did not owe to lack of 

experience at fighting Indians on the Great Plains. After the Civil War, 

using reasoning to re-evaluate his premises and analyze his options. 

As the battle unfolded, Custer received information indicating that 

serious rethinking and revision were in order, and he had time to do 

so. Instead, he intensified pursuit of his original attack plan, which 

propelled him to disaster. Custer had shown flexibility in many prior 

battles, but not at the Little Bighorn. 

Custer’s Success in the Civil War

The idea that Custer was a compulsive risk-taker and poor 

tactician is belied by his success in the Civil War. Custer graduated from West Point in the spring of 1861. Assigned to the Army of 

the Potomac, he quickly attracted the attention of General George 

McClellan and other top brass because of his obvious talent for war, 

which was manifested at Bull 

Run, Brandy Station, and other 

early battles. Within 2 years, 

he was promoted to brigadier 

general and given command 

of the 2d Michigan Cavalry Brigade, which had four regiments 

and 2,400 troops. Successful 

at Gettysburg and subsequent 

battles, he was promoted to 

major general in September 1864 and given command of the 3d

Cavalry Division with three brigades and 7,500 troops. Here again, 

he performed well, earning the gratitude and admiration of generals 

Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan—all tough and dispassionate judges 

of battlefield commanders. 

During 1863–1865, Custer led his brigade and division in 23 

cavalry engagements, many of them major battles with formidable 

Confederate forces. He won most of them decisively, and while he 

suffered a few reversals, he never lost in a calamitous way. Widely 

regarded to have a natural flair for combat, he consistently showed 

professional skill at sizing up a complex situation quickly and seeming to know how to act. Like most seasoned cavalry commanders, 

including Sheridan and the Confederate Army’s Jeb Stuart, he 

believed that unhesitant offensive action was key to victory. He 

practiced the art of rapid mobility, which required fast thinking. He 

regularly made use of such cavalry tactics as frontal assaults and 

flanking maneuvers. He earned a reputation for being able quickly to 

read the terrain, discern the strength and tactics of the enemy, grasp 

his mission, craft an effective battle plan, and lead his troops to success. While he was aggressive and suffered casualties, he was known 

for his stewardship of the lives of his troops. He also showed skill at 

changing tactics in fluid situations and at extracting his forces from 

tough jams. In one battle, he was surrounded by Confederate troops, 

but he led a bold counterattack through enemy lines, thus saving his 

force. On other occasions, upon realizing that his offensive operations were headed toward trouble, Custer shifted gears or even broke 

off the engagement, thus avoiding defeat and heavy casualties.10 In 

sum, Custer was, early in his career, living proof of the power of 

intuition in military decisionmaking.

Historians of the Civil War agree with this positive portrayal 

of Custer because the record supports no other conclusion. He was 

in sum, Custer was, early 

in his career, living proof of 

the power of intuition in 

military decisionmaking
February 2006 Defense Horizons  

and began congregating along the border of 

central Montana and northern Wyoming. The 

Army reacted by sending a force of 2,400 

troops, divided into three columns, to force 

the Indians back to their reservations. From 

Bismarck, General Alfred Terry led about 900 

troops, including Custer’s 7th Cavalry; from 

western Montana came Colonel John Gibbon at 

the head of about 500 troops; and from southern Wyoming came General George Crook, 

with about 1,000 troops. Confident of success 

because the Indians normally did not gather at 

a single big village—the land normally could 

not support thousands of them—Army commanders judged that any one of these columns 

could defeat any Indian force it encountered.

The several Army leaders, not just Custer, 

underestimated the strength and ferocity of the 

Indians. Whereas their experience led them 

to expect no more than 800 Indian warriors 

hesitant to give battle, in reality a huge village 

was gathering, composed of thousands of Indians with at least 1,500 battle-ready warriors. 

On June 17, hundreds of Indians launched a 

surprise attack against Crook about 30 miles 

south of the site of the Little Bighorn battle 

that ensued. The Indians showed unexpected 

aggressiveness and prowess at large operations. For a time, Crook was endangered, but 

when he counterattacked and employed a 

flanking maneuver, the Indians fled. Crook 

retreated, leaving subsequent fighting to Terry, Custer, and Gibbon.

Unaware of Crook’s battle, and of the strength and assertiveness 

of the enemy it revealed, Terry (with Custer) and Gibbon brought their 

forces together on June 21 in southern Montana. Suspecting an Indian 

village was located somewhere along the Little Bighorn or Rosebud 

Rivers, they decided that Custer would lead his 600 troops and 35 

Indian scouts southward along the Rosebud, which flowed about 30 

miles east of the Little Bighorn. He was to march rapidly as far as 

125 miles, then turn around and march northward along the Little 

Bighorn. Meanwhile, a slower-moving column led by Terry and Gibbon 

would march south along the Little Bighorn with about 500 troops, 

reaching the Little Bighorn valley on June 26. The overall aim of this 

two-pronged movement was to find the Indians, prevent them from 

escaping, and attack them. Terry hoped that even if a pincer attack 

by both columns was unrealistic, at least one of these columns, most 

likely Custer’s, would fight and win a major battle.13 

Still underestimating enemy capabilities, the commanders 

agreed that Custer had strength enough to win by himself. Indeed, 

Custer turned aside a Terry offer of four additional companies plus 

Gatling guns and cannons, fearing they would slow him down. After 

marching along the Rosebud about 60 miles, Custer discovered Indian 

trails leading westward, suggesting a village on the Little Bighorn, 

further north than had been imagined. He promptly turned west and 

marched toward the valley. Early on June 25, he arrived on a high peak 

he was made a lieutenant colonel, given command of a single regiment, and sent to Kansas to protect settlers against Indian attacks. 

For him and other cavalry officers, the fighting was quite different 

from the Civil War. Preferring to operate in small raiding parties 

against vulnerable targets, the Indians tried to avoid pitched battles 

with well-armed cavalry troops. Only about 1,000 troopers were killed 

during the entire 30-year war—a sign of few big battles. Custer and his 

troops mostly experienced lengthy patrols and infrequent clashes with 

small Indian forces. But in 1868, he led a big cavalry assault against an 

Indian village at Washita, Oklahoma. Attacking at dawn from multiple 

directions, Custer surprised and quickly overran the village, killing or 

capturing a large number of Indians—an experience that may have 

shaped his expectations. 

In 1873, Custer led the 7th Cavalry Regiment to a new home at 

Bismarck, North Dakota, where it was scattered over a wide area to 

protect settlers and pacify the land. That year, the 7th Cavalry had 

several brisk fights with Sioux Indians, who had a reputation for bellicosity. The next year, Custer led a survey of the Black Hills in South 

Dakota, during which gold was discovered. The resulting onrush of 

gold prospectors heightened tension with the Sioux, who had been 

granted treaty rights to the Black Hills and regarded it as sacred 

religious territory. Violence increased, mostly in the form of small 

clashes with raiding parties. 

Momentum toward a big battle began building in early 1876, 

when large numbers of Sioux and Cheyenne left their reservations 

The Little Bighorn Campaign, 1876

Terry-Custer’s Column Terry-Gibbon’s Column

Custer’s 7th Cavalry Crook’s Column

Terry’s Column Rivers

Gibbon’s Column Battle Site

Yellowstone River

Rosebud River

Little Bighorn River

Bighorn River

Crook’s Battle, 17 June 1876 Little Bighorn Battle

25 June 1876
 Defense Horizons February 2006

overlooking the valley. His scouts detected a large Indian village about 

15 miles to the north. Terry and Gibbon were a full day away.

Custer’s Decisions

Custer’s first big decision was to attack on June 25 rather 

than the next day. Critics have claimed that Custer was trying 

to beat Terry and Gibbon to the punch to monopolize the glory. 

Perhaps so, but he also had other considerations in mind. Evidently, he originally planned to attack on June 26. But early on 

June 25, he became aware that two small Indian hunting parties 

had discovered his force. Fearful that 

the Indians would flee the village 

and escape altogether, thus spoiling 

the entire campaign, Custer decided 

to act immediately. His decision had 

logic, but it also had drawbacks. 

It denied Custer the opportunity to 

scout the village and surrounding 

terrain. It also meant that Custer 

would have to attack in the middle 

of the day, into a wide-awake Indian 

camp. Had he not been detected, a 

dawn attack on June 26 could have 

caught the Indians asleep, for their 

perimeter security was not good. The 

attack on June 25 caught the Indians 

by surprise but not unprepared.14

Custer’s scouts told him that the 

village contained at least 1,500 warriors. Despite this, he was still confident that the 7th Cavalry could win if 

it attacked at once. Custer’s march to 

the village took several hours. About 

13 miles from the village, at noon, 

he decided to divide the 7th Cavalry 

into three separate columns, each of 

battalion size. He kept a battalion of 

five companies with 210 troops under 

his personal command, and assigned 

a battalion of three companies to 

Major Marcus Reno. These two columns were to advance toward the 

village on opposite sides of a creek. In 

addition, he sent a battalion of three 

companies under Captain Frederick 

Benteen 3 miles westward to reconnoiter terrain that Custer could not 

see. While Benteen’s task was to keep 

the Indians from escaping in that 

direction, he was told to stay within 

prompt recall distance.

Custer’s decision to divide his 

force has been criticized by many writers because it meant that none of these 

columns would have enough troops to defeat an Indian force which 

Custer by then knew to be over 1,500-strong. But again, he had his 

reasons. Custer envisioned a hammer-and-anvil attack in which rapid 

operations of all three columns would be coordinated, thus striking 

the Indians from both sides of the village and compelling them to surrender. Doubtless he accepted the risks of facing a large enemy force 

because he had confidence in his force and discounted the ability of 

the Indians to foil his design. His experience told him that the Indians 

would not attack. At the time, Custer did not imagine that both Reno 

and Benteen would perform poorly, leaving him exposed to the full 

Indian force.

Custer Battlefield

Deep 

Ravine

Medicine Tail Coulee

Custer

Benteen

Reno

Custer reconnaissance company

Ravine or Coulee
February 2006 Defense Horizons  

When Custer was within 3 miles of the village, at 3:00 p.m., he 

ordered Reno to attack it from the south. Reno set out with his troops 

mounted. Custer then made another critical decision. Rather than 

support Reno directly, he led his command of five companies on a 

6-mile march along a high, steep ridgeline that paralleled the village 

on its eastern side, across from the narrow Little Bighorn River. He 

intended to advance along the ridge, concealed from the enemy by its 

rugged terrain, so that he could swoop down on the village from the 

north, thus encircling it. He also sent urgent orders to Benteen to join 

the main body. But Custer’s decision to march along the ridge drew his 

column too far away from Reno and Benteen for them to reinforce him 

(which, as it turned out, they made no attempt to do).

Much depended on Reno diverting the Indians’ attention from 

Custer and on Benteen arriving promptly when summoned. Neither 

occurred. When Reno met resistance, he dismounted his troops and 

advanced in skirmish formation. When the Indians counterattacked and 

threatened to flank him, Reno retreated into a nearby grove of trees at 

3:30 p.m. Twenty minutes later, Reno and his embattled troops fled the 

grove in a mad dash across the Little Bighorn and up a hill (now “Reno 

Hill”), there to establish a defensive position. About 40 of Reno’s troops 

were killed. Meanwhile, Benteen’s march took a full hour—more time 

than it should have taken. When his force arrived at 4:20 p.m., it joined 

Reno not Custer, who by then was 6 miles away.

As Custer made his march of about 1 hour along the ridgeline, he 

became aware of Reno’s mounting troubles. According to eyewitnesses, 

twice Custer paused to observe or get reports on Reno’s situation—the 

initial advance, then the troops dismounting in the face of stiff resistance, then the retreat into the woods.15 Despite this information, 

instead of returning to join Reno, Custer chose to hasten northward in 

hope of encircling the village as soon as possible. He also sent another 

urgent appeal to Benteen to “come quick.” Custer lost sight of Reno 

by the time of the latter’s retreat across the river, which extinguished 

all hope of a successful hammer-and-anvil attack. The Indians were 

then free to mass against Custer, and did so as soon as his presence 

became known when he sent two companies on a diversionary attack 

on the village down Medicine Tail Coulee. Rather than attack the village there, he returned to the ridgeline and continued the remaining 

distance to the far end of the ridge, where his Last Stand took place. 

Exactly what happened on Last Stand Hill has long been 

unclear and controversial. Evidently, Custer was not overrun immediately. Reno and Benteen heard heavy firing to the north from 4:25 

p.m. to 5:10 p.m. They cautiously marched about 2 miles to Weir 

Point, but then, fearing too many Indians, returned to their hilltop 

position. They were uncertain about what happened to Custer, but 

were too preoccupied guarding against further attack to ride to his 

Last Stand Battlefield

Cavalry Right Wing: 3 Companies
 Defense Horizons February 2006

aid. The next day, 350 survivors on Reno Hill were rescued when the 

Indians left the valley and Terry’s force arrived.

On Last Stand Hill, archaeological data suggest a complex story 

that did not have to end in a massacre. When Custer arrived there, 

Indian opposition was light. Custer could have easily escaped danger by marching eastward toward open space and then back toward 

Reno and Benteen. Indeed, one of Custer’s Crow scouts fled east to 

safety when he was told by a civilian scout to save himself. Custer 

chose to stay on the hill with his troops deployed to make an attack. 

Apparently waiting for Benteen to arrive, he sent a company down 

to the river to find a crossing point. Custer waited 20 minutes for 

the company to return, during which time he could have reviewed 

his options and chosen a better one. Meanwhile, Indian strength at 

Custer’s end of the battlefield was building, thanks to Reno’s buckling at the other end.16

Custer’s final decision, as far as we know, was to have his column 

remain in an offensive posture, but dismounted so they could return 

fire effectively. Now separated from their horses, Custer’s force could 

no longer flee quickly. They were arrayed into two widely separated 

wings: two companies with Custer on Last Stand Hill and three companies about a mile to the rear. This disposition may have made sense 

for an offensive strategy, but it was bad for repelling a big attack. The 

force was not organized into a tight-knit defensive posture of echeloned lines to permit coordinated fires. Their formation left them vulnerable to attack by large numbers of Indians, who used the high grass 

to draw close and deluge the cavalry troops with arrows and repeating 

rifles.17 The massacre probably began when the right wing suddenly 

collapsed, sending frightened troopers toward Custer’s left wing. Few 

made it. Custer was left on Last Stand Hill with only two companies to 

fend off hundreds of Indians sensing victory. The end came quickly.

Custer’s decisions to attack the Indian village on June 25 

and to divide his command into three dispersed battalions have 

been justifiably questioned by historians. But these decisions did 

not doom him, and there 

was some basis for them, 

given what Custer knew 

when he embarked on the 

operation. True, a unified 

frontal assault on the village would have been more 

prudent. But his hammerand-anvil plan stood a better chance of capturing the 

entire village, and it was 

consistent with Army doctrine. Nor did the failures of Reno and 

Benteen seal Custer’s fate. Rather, it was his decision to continue 

his rapid march along the ridgeline toward Last Stand Hill after 

learning of Reno’s initial rebuff and of the enemy’s greater-thanexpected strength and aggressiveness. While Custer may not have 

known that Reno’s force had scrambled across the river and onto 

a defensive hilltop position, he knew that Reno and thus his plan 

were in trouble. Yet he accelerated his march toward the far end 

of the village. On Last Stand Hill, he had a final chance to break 

contact when he realized, as he must have, that Benteen was not 

going to show. Yet he chose to stay there in an offensive posture, 

heightening his vulnerability and inviting annihilation.

Despite collapsing odds, Custer stuck with his plan and, evidently, with his vision of victory. His last known words were “Hurrah 

boys, we’ve got them!” Had he broken contact and reconstituted 

his forces, with modest losses, the 7th Cavalry could have remained 

capable of pursuing and most likely defeating the Indians if they fled. 

Custer’s failure to take this option and his apparent blindness to the 

mounting risks of disaster, while hard to explain, may provide the key 

to lessons of enduring significance concerning cognition in battle. 

Findings

We cannot be sure of what was running through Custer’s head 

during his last hours. We have noted several mistakes, including, as 

it turned out, his choice of a plan that splintered his force and his 

haste in executing that plan. In addition, neither Reno nor Benteen 

carried out the mission as Custer expected. For our purposes, though, 

the error of greatest significance and interest is the one that actually 

produced the massacre. As noted, Custer had information that should, 

rationally, have called into question the wisdom of completing his 

plan. The premise of the plan was that Reno’s anvil would hold, yet 

Custer knew that it was not holding. Even if he did not know that Reno 

was in full retreat, he knew that the enemy had not been fixed by the 

anvil. This same information could also have alerted Custer that the 

enemy he was facing was large and aggressive, in contrast to his expectations and to the small and cautious Indian forces of his experience. 

His confidence, until it was too late, is hard to square with the reality 

he could and evidently did observe. 

We have also noted that Custer, while in possession of this 

information, had ample time to reflect, gather additional information, and weigh his options before taking further action. There is 

no evidence that Custer hesitated once Reno’s failure became a 

known possibility. If there was urgency after he learned that Reno 

had fallen back to the grove, 

it was generated by Custer 

himself rather than by circumstances or enemy moves. 

Despite new facts, Custer 

kept going toward the victory 

promised by the confidence 

in his plan. We do not attribute this to inflexibility—

Custer had previously shown 

himself to be creative and 

supple—but instead to Custer’s failure to question his intuition 

despite facing circumstances unlike those that had formed it. 

As an alternative hypothesis, perhaps Custer reasoned that the 

hammer must strike even faster with the anvil cracking. If so, his 

objective in hurrying to the far end of the village to attack would 

have shifted from exploiting Reno’s anticipated success to relieving 

Reno’s actual failure. (Maybe Custer also hoped that Benteen would 

join him to restore favorable odds for victory, though it must have 

become clear that this would not happen as Custer waited on Last 

Stand Hill.) By this interpretation, Custer did objectively analyze 

his options once new information had shattered his plan, as opposed 

to proceeding chiefly on intuition and self-confidence. Could the 

Custer’s apparent blindness 

to the mounting risks of disaster 

may provide the key to lessons 

of enduring significance 

concerning cognition in battle 
February 2006 Defense Horizons  

Last Stand thus have been the result of a heroic attempt by Custer 

to save Reno, as opposed to a vainglorious attempt to destroy the 

Indian force? Does it mean he identified and analyzed his options 

and elected to proceed not despite Reno’s failure but because of it?

Perhaps—but we remain convinced that Custer relied too 

heavily on intuition and not enough on rigorous reasoning of the 

sort needed to question his premises. Had Custer systematically 

weighed his options, he should have concluded that a divided force 

was not the best way to prevail against an enemy known to be large, 

proven to be aggressive, and, with Reno’s failure, able to turn on 

his small force. As the battle unfolded, the information available to 

Custer increasingly implied 

that the risks of continuing 

with his plan of attack, for 

whatever reason, were decidedly greater than the risks of 

reversing direction and joining up with Reno. Indeed, 

whether Custer’s motivation 

was to complete the victory 

he originally expected or to 

avert a defeat he now feared—maybe a mix of both was in his 

mind—his action of proceeding to Last Stand Hill, there to wait in 

an offensive stance, could have been assessed as the high-risk option 

against the big force he faced, based not only on what we know now 

but also on the information Custer had at the time. Analysis, had 

it been done, would have indicated that by continuing his attack, 

neither saving Reno nor winning the battle was realistic. Instead, 

Custer’s choice exposed his command to being massacred. The 

danger should have been especially obvious when he arrived at Last 

Stand Hill, saw bad terrain and Indians moving toward him, and realized Benteen was nowhere to be seen. Whatever his final objective, 

Custer’s cognition never strayed from his original model, formed by 

very different experience and unshaken by mounting evidence of its 

disutility and escalating danger to his troops.18

Measuring Custer’s Decisionmaking against 

the Precepts of Battle-Wisdom

Balancing and integrating intuition and reasoning: Custer 

obviously relied excessively on intuition—on his mental model and 

the experience from which it was formed. Intuitive decisionmaking 

had always been Custer’s strong suit, and he had not acquired the 

wisdom of questioning it. At the Little Bighorn, Custer’s intuitive 

decisionmaking was buttressed by his specific assumptions about the 

capabilities of Indian forces, the brilliance of the plan, and the advantages of swift attack. That these assumptions all proved optimistic is 

less critical than what Custer did when facts to this effect became 

known to him. The best evidence that Custer relied mainly on his intuition—unreliable, in these circumstances—instead of augmenting it 

with reasoning is that he proceeded as he did. It is difficult to see how 

objective reasoning, had Custer taken time to conduct it, would have 

revealed that his best option was to proceed as planned. While Custer’s 

intuition failed him, it is interesting to ask whether it might have saved 

him. Having found ways out of fixes before, his experience might have 

helped. That it did not is probably because the conditions he faced at 

the Little Bighorn were unfamiliar and increasingly adverse, which 

is precisely when cold, hard reasoning based on current information 

must come to the fore. In sum, Custer’s powerful intuition, normally a 

great asset, became a liability when it left no room for the reasoning 

that the situation demanded.

Gaining the time-information advantage: Custer did not either 

use information to gain time or use time to gain information. Of 

course, given Custer’s unbroken faith in his original plan, neither 

more time nor more information would have seemed critical to 

him. Indeed, he seems to have placed more stress on making fast 

time than on collecting good 

information. Instead of easing urgency, reasoning’s foe, 

he intensified it. The effect 

was to compress both time 

and information, when what 

he needed—and should 

have known he needed—was 

more of both. There was no 

apparent reason for him to 

rush—unless, of course, he felt that he had no choice if he was to 

save Reno (when in fact he did have a choice). There was every 

reason for Custer to rethink and seek more information, once he 

knew the plan was not working and the enemy was more formidable 

than anticipated. If anything, Indian decisionmakers displayed timeinformation superiority over Custer, despite the fact that it was he 

who sought the battle and initiated hostilities at a time of his choosing. Custer began with a time-information advantage, and Sitting 

Bull, Crazy Horse, and Gall took it from him. 

The ability to adapt rapidly and learn in action: Custer failed 

a core test of battle-wise ability: learning in action. Of all his failures, 

this one is the hardest to understand, given Custer’s reputation for 

knowing the right thing to do in combat. Custer could not be accused 

of being rigid or doctrinaire; his record suggests the opposite. Nor 

can it be said that he had no options at the Little Bighorn: he had 

several that were better than the course he took, not just with 20–20 

hindsight but with the information he had. Custer went with his plan 

not because he was incapable of adapting but because his intuition 

told him he did not need to adapt. To learn why, we need to imagine 

how his mind worked.

Custer was both a brilliant tactician and a willing risk-taker, 

rather than one or the other. It was this mix that ultimately brought 

him and his troops to their end. Military history reveals that the combination of brilliance and boldness can be advantageous when the 

tactics devised are the right ones. But what if the chosen tactics prove 

to be wrong, as they can for even the smartest commander? It is at 

this point that risks can sky-rocket, and that intuition must be married 

with reasoning. Otherwise, the self-confidence and impatience that 

often accompany brilliance, as in Custer’s case, can be fatal.

At the root of Custer’s failure was his lack of self-awareness. It 

does not appear that Custer suffered from much doubt about himself 

and his cognition, to put it mildly. After all, he went from last in his 

class at West Point to general officer in 2 years, which both reveals 

and may have contributed to a surplus of confidence in his decisionmaking. Custer had known mainly victory, rarely defeat, and never 

intuitive decisionmaking 

had always been Custer’s strong 

suit, and he had not acquired 

the wisdom of questioning it
10 Defense Horizons February 2006

Defense Horizons is published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. CTNSP 

publications are available online at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other 

department or agency of the Federal Government.

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

 Hans Binnendijk

Director

disaster. Again, Custer was not innately stubborn, as his career shows. 

He had made deft escapes on several occasions, which may have fed 

his belief that he could get out of any jam. At the Little Bighorn, Custer 

may have been less certain of complete victory than of being able to 

cheat defeat if his gamble 

failed. Whether too sure of 

his success or too confident 

of his improvisational talent, 

Custer appears to have been 

relying heavily on a mental 

model that did not take an 

unexpected and deteriorating reality sufficiently into 

account. 

We know that such 

reliance on intuition is common when time is short. But, as already 

observed, if Custer was under intense time pressure, it was of his own 

making. Time ran out for the 7th Cavalry because Custer hurried along 

the ridge line to Last Stand Hill. In all likelihood—there is no way of 

knowing—Custer did not measure the risks and benefits of a set of 

options upon receiving unsettling new information, but instead went 

with his intuition. 

Intuition travels a different cognitive route than analysis.19

Whereas the latter involves identifying all interesting options before 

comparing them and choosing one, the former runs rapidly through 

familiar approaches one by one until a “solution” occurs to the decisionmaker. The intuitive decisionmaker’s mental map thus quickly 

reveals a path that ought to work, though not necessarily the best 

path. This ability can be invaluable, which is why so many great commanders have exceptional intuitive powers. 

That the intuitive map can be right in some circumstances, 

however, does not make the decisionmaker battle-wise. It is because 

the map might be wrong in some situations—especially strange ones 

like the one Custer faced at the Little Big Horn—that the self-aware 

decisionmaker will ask whether experience is applicable and intuition 

is reliable. There is little reason to think that Custer asked himself 

that critical question—indeed, doubting himself would have been out 

of character. Had he asked himself if the map was right, the rational, 

objective answer could hardly have been affirmative. Custer’s poor 

self-awareness, owing to past successes, accounts for his inability to 

learn in action. It was less that he ignored risk than that he “knew” he 

could handle it. 

The decision that led to the Last Stand is an exquisite case 

of how not to blend intuition and reasoning in combat. At the very 

moment when intuition from experience was bound to mislead him, 

Custer employed it with his usual gusto. At the very moment when 

intuition formed by experience was misleading him, Custer banked it 

with his usual confidence. The reason for the massacre was not simply 

Custer’s reliance on intuition, which had served him well repeatedly. 

Nor was it an inflexible attachment to his original plan. Rather, it was 

that specific circumstances arose that called for a self-aware decisionmaker to question and override intuition, despite past success, in favor 

of reasoning. The massacre occurred because Custer was the wrong 

man for that moment. 

Crazy Horse and Gall are the ones who got the time-information 

advantage at the Little Bighorn, despite having been attacked. They, 

too, had options once Reno’s attack failed. They might have pursued 

Reno through the grove of trees, across the river and onto the hill. However, at about the same time they had Reno on the run, Custer tipped 

them off to his presence by his diversionary attack down Medicine 

Tail Coulee. In a very short 

time—minutes—they apparently decided to let Reno go, 

not to buy Custer’s feint, and 

to concentrate their strength 

where they anticipated Custer 

would make his real attack. 

Along with Custer’s failures, 

this reveals the leverage of 

rapid adaptive decisionmaking. By out-reasoning Custer, 

the Indians managed to strike him at a moment of his maximum vulnerability, created by his failure to use time and information to think 

of a better course of action. In sum, the massacre required a specific 

combination of circumstances, Custer’s lack of self-awareness, and 

battle-wise Indian leaders.20

Notwithstanding the specificity of the conditions at the Little Bighorn, the lesson has value today—and not just for senior commanders 

like Custer. One of the consequences of the network revolution and corresponding distribution of authority is that many more persons up and 

down the ranks will be making combat decisions than compared to the 

days of centralized command and control. Power is migrating from headquarters “to the edge.”21 Therefore, it is essential to foster battle-wisdom 

not just for senior officers but also for the junior officers and noncommissioned officers leading units in the field. The lesson of Custer can be 

applied as readily to the major in charge of a small, mechanized column 

as to the major general in charge of a large joint expeditionary force.

The goal, simply stated, is to have in such positions of authority 

consistently battle-wise decisionmakers who are capable of rapid 

adaptive decisionmaking. The military needs leaders at every level 

who can combine reliable intuition with quick reasoning to gain 

and exploit time-information in battle. As we enter the age of networked warfare, when cognitive excellence can provide the decisive 

edge, this goal has become strategically important. But the case of 

Custer—his many successes and his final failure—suggests that it 

will not be an easy goal to achieve. 

Custer shows that a military decisionmaker may seem to be 

battle-wise in many circumstances but not in other especially risky 

ones, when the consequences of failing to blend intuition with 

the military needs leaders 

at every level who can combine 

reliable intuition with quick 

reasoning to gain and 

exploit time-information
February 2006 Defense Horizons  11

reasoning may be disastrous. This suggests a need to track and test 

performance under real or at least simulated combat pressure. Moreover, as in Custer’s case, the decisionmaker may not be sensitive to 

the limits of his or her intuition. This underscores the importance 

of inculcating explicit and objective self-awareness. Finally, military 

commanders may feel that time simply does not permit structured 

reasoning. This points to the need to develop adaptive decisionmaking methods and habits that permit reasoning despite urgency.

Meeting these challenges demands using all the tools that 

affect whether and how battle-wise persons end up making such 

decisions in combat. Those tools lie mainly in military personnel 

systems and policies. People with battle-wise potential must be 

sought in recruitment, developed, and favored for line responsibility 

starting early in their careers. Strong intuition should continue to be 

favored; but so too must analytic skills, which unfamiliar conditions 

may demand. Self-awareness—crucial to integrating intuition and 

reasoning—must be stressed in development and advancement, as 

should the key battle-wise abilities. Training and education should 

emphasize analysis under pressure, using intuition judiciously and 

effectively, and adaptive decisionmaking. 

Custer’s shortcoming was not his intuitive prowess, which can 

be important and even indispensable in military decisionmaking, as 

it was for most of Custer’s career. Rather, it was his poor self-awareness. An impressive record and undeniable abilities notwithstanding, Custer had a fatal flaw—quite literally—in his inability to ask, 

simply, “Might I be wrong?” The military personnel system of today 

should be one in which an officer incapable of asking that question 

would not hold an important command in an important conflict. Perhaps there is a place in the military for officers with such absolute 

confidence in their intuition that they leave no room for reasoning 

and thus little room for error. But under conditions of rapid operating tempo, unfamiliar and unpredictable situations, and clever, 

reasoning adversaries—like the Little Bighorn, as well as many of 

today’s operations around the world—that place is not in battle making life-and-death decisions.

The U.S. military will always have its Custers: self-assured, 

driven, impatient. Yet, it is on other cognitive qualities, those that 

deliver consistent battle-wisdom—combining intuition and reasoning—regardless of circumstances, that the Nation increasingly and 

vitally depends.

Notes1 David C. Gompert, Irving Lachow, and Justin Perkins, “Battle-Wise: Gaining 

Cognitive Advantage in Networked Warfare,” Defense and Technology Paper 8 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2005). Battle-wisdom 

is the effective melding of reliable intuition and efficient reasoning to gain time-information superiority in complex, intense, and possibly confusing networked warfare. 

Battle-wisdom demands self-awareness, the abilities to anticipate, decide quickly, 

seize opportunities, adapt in action, and the willingness to lead and learn. In practice, 

it also depends on implementation of the smart-pull principle of information-management and delegation of authority. Battle-wisdom may be employed to increase the 

exposure time of enemy forces and reduce that of one’s own—a key factor in tipping 

the balance of vulnerability to one’s advantage. 2 The authors are grateful to John Doerner, official historian at the Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument, for his constructive comments on this paper. 3 Today’s special operations forces often operate like Civil War cavalry: in small, 

agile, decoupled units, behind enemy lines; disrupting and reconnoitering enemy 

forces and confusing enemy decisionmakers with flexible, entrepreneurial tactics. 

Network-centric operations often call for such forces and operations. 4 While Sitting Bull was the chief of the village and directed overall Indian 

strategy, Crazy Horse and Gall were the operational commanders. 5 Gary Klein, Intuition at Work: Why Developing Your Gut Instinct Will Make 

You Better at What You Do (New York: Random House, 2005). Klein’s work on intuition has paid immense dividends in preparing people, including military personnel, 

to make decisions under pressure. Battle-wisdom largely embraces Klein’s research 

and insights but, in addition, stresses the importance of complementing intuition 

with analysis, especially in the face of unfamiliar conditions, change, and abundant 

information, increasingly common in today’s security environment. 6 Stephen Ambrose, Americans at War (Jackson, MS: University of Mississippi 

Press, 1997). 7 Policy recommendations along these lines are offered in detail in Gompert et 

al, Battle-Wise. 8 Time-information is the product of time and information. In decisionmaking, 

time can be made more valuable if it is used to gather, evaluate, and exploit information. In turn, the ready availability of credible and useful information can permit 

better use of time, compensate for a lack of it, and, in effect, make it last longer. 

The quality of a decision improves as a function of both time and information. The 

enhancement of time-information, thanks to networked information, should improve 

the quality of urgent decisions. 9 Whereas the 7th Cavalry was defeated at the Little Bighorn, Custer’s entire 

contingent was massacred. Counting Custer’s contingent, total 7th Cavalry losses at 

the battle were 262 killed and others wounded. 10 For details, see Gregory J.W. Urwin, Custer Victorious: The Civil War Battles of 

General George Armstrong Custer (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983). 11 Custer’s personal bravery throughout his career appears to have been a factor in the willingness of his men to fight with utmost loyalty, confidence, and similar 

bravery. However, we have no reason to believe that excessive willingness to face 

personal risk contributed to faulty decisionmaking at the Little Bighorn, as there is 

ample evidence that Custer never squandered the lives of his men. 12 All quotes from Urwin. 

13 For details, see Wayne Michael Sarf, The Little Bighorn Campaign, March–

September 1876 (Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books Inc., 1993). General Terry’s 

written orders to Custer make clear that Custer could deviate from the original plan 

to march to the lower Rosebud if he had “sufficient reason.” Not knowing exactly 

where the Indians were located, but expecting them to be along the lower Little 

Bighorn, Terry evidently hoped that Custer’s 7th Cavalry would fight the battle, rather 

than his own smaller, less mobile force. 14 For details, see John S. Gray, Custer’s Last Campaign: Mitch Boyer and the 

Little Bighorn Reconstructed (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991). 15 We find unpersuasive the argument that because Custer’s view of Reno was 

obstructed by hills he simply proceeded along the ridge as planned, assuming the best. 

Accounts suggest that Custer was told how Reno was faring. 16 For analysis, see Richard Allan Fox, Jr., Archaeology, History, and Custer’s 

Last Battle (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993). 17 Custer’s troops were armed with single-shot rifles that were good at long 

distances but could not generate the rapid fires needed to prevail in close combat. 18 Yet a third hypothesis is that Custer continued along the ridge despite word 

of Reno’s failed attack because he wanted to prevent the Indians from escaping. If so, 

it does not alter our analysis that failure to question his intuition kept Custer from 

selecting a safer and better option. 19 The best work on intuition as it relates to military affairs, in our view, is that 

of Klein. 20 For portrayals of Crazy Horse, Gall, and Sitting Bull, see Evan S. Connell, Son of 

the Morning Star: Custer and the Little Bighorn (New York: Perennial Library, 1984). 21 For a good treatment of the decentralization of authority, see David S. Alberts 

and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge: Command and Control in the Information 

Age (Washington, DC: CCRP Publication Series, 2003). 
12 Defense Horizons February 2006

The DefenseHorizons Series

Sweden’s Use of Commercial Information 

Technology for Military Applications 

(Defense Horizons 50)

Franklin D. Kramer and John C. Cittadino examine the advantages of

buying commercial information technology for the military. Sweden has

done so routinely, whereas the United States is still debating whether

commercial technology can do the job in defense applications.

A New Military Framework for NATO 

(Defense Horizons 48)

Hans Binnendijk, David C. Gompert, and Richard L. Kugler propose

a comprehensive military framework to guide future NATO improvements.

They envision capabilities in five critical areas: a new NATO Special

Operations Force, the NATO Response Force, high-readiness combat

forces, stabilization and reconstruction forces, and assets for defense

sector development.

Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: 

New Methods for a New Era (Spring 2006)

Richard L. Kugler, one of the foremost practitioners of the critical art

of national security policy analysis, encapsulates more than three decades

of his experience in this unique book. He virtually defines the discipline,

breaking down policy analysis into three major components—strategic

evaluation, systems analysis, and operations research—applying the latest

methods of each to real world examples and the daunting issues facing the

United States in today’s global environment.

Russia and NATO: Increased Interaction in 

Defense Research and Technology 

(Defense Horizons 49)

Donald C. Daniel and Michael I. Yarymovych explore the opportunities and obstacles for increasing cooperation between the defense

research and technology communities in Russia and in NATO.

The Changing Landscape of Defense Innovation 

(Defense Horizons 47)

Paul Bracken, Linda Brandt, and Stuart E. Johnson survey how

some companies have exploited innovation in nontraditional ways.

Applying this business model to national defense, the authors argue that

the DOD should transform by shifting some resources from new hardware to processes (integrated systems) and retrofits of legacy systems.

Battle-Wise: Seeking Time-Information 

Superiority in Networked Warfare 

(Spring 2006) 

This book is an inquiry into improving the operational thinking and

decisionmaking of U.S. military individuals, teams, and forces. David C.

Gompert, Irving Lachow, and Justin Perkins argue that advancements

in information networking present a unique chance to improve cognitive

effectiveness in battle. Toward this end, they introduce the new concept

of battle-wisdom, the blending of reliable intuition with timely reasoning

in complex, dynamic, time-critical, and information-rich environments.

More from the Center for Technology and National Security Policy . . .

Forthcoming Books

For more information on these and other CTNSP publications, visit the Web site at: http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html