AIR UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Military Resistance to Humanitarian

War in Kosovo and Beyond

An Ideological Explanation

KENNETH R. RIZER

Major, USAF

Fairchild Paper

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615

September 2000
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied are solely those of the author,

and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the

Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release:

distribution unlimited.

 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Rizer, Kenneth R., 1964–

Military resistance to humanitarian war in Kosovo and beyond: an ideological

explanation / Kenneth R. Rizer.

 p. cm.

“Fairchild paper.”

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 1-58566-086-8

 1. United States—Military policy—Decision making. 2. Sociology, Military—

United States. 3. Civil-military relations—United States. 4. Humanitarian

intervention. 5. Peacekeeping forces. 6. Realism. 7. Liberalism. I. Title

UA23 .R54 2000

355’.033573—dc21 00-046236

This Fairchild Paper, and others in the series, is available electronically at the

Air University Research web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil under “Research

Papers” then “Special Collections.”

ii
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Areas for Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

 2 THE INSTITUTIONAL MILITARY . . . . . . . . . . . 9

The New Institutionalism and the Military . . . . 9

Organizational Behavior Model . . . . . . . . . . 10

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

 3 MILITARY VERSUS LIBERAL PHILOSOPHY . . . . 13

The Military Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Liberalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Conservative Officer Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

 The Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

 Republican Officer Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

 4 CONSERVATIVE VERSUS LIBERAL

VIEW OF FORCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

The Conservative Worldview . . . . . . . . . . . 21

iii
Chapter Page

The Realist View of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

The Liberal Worldview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

The Internationalist View of War . . . . . . . . . 26

Does the Military Have the Conservative

 Worldview? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

 The Holsti Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

 The Weinberger Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

 5 THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION CASE

FOR INTERVENING IN KOSOVO . . . . . . . . . . 35

Why Intervene? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

 US National Security Strategy . . . . . . . . . . 36

 Never Againism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

 Humanitarian Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

 6 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Significance for the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Illustrations

Figure

 1 Conservative National Interest Matrix . . . . . . . . 24

Table

 1 Ideological Identification of US Military

and Civilian Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

 2 Party Identification of US Military

and Civilian Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

iv
Table Page

 3 Respondents Listing Foreign Policy Goals

as Very Important . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

 4 Respondents Agreeing with Given US Foreign

Policy Propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

v
Foreword

Maj Kenneth R. Rizer’s Military Resistance to Humanitarian

War in Kosovo and Beyond: An Ideological Explanation is a

thought-provoking examination of the existence and implications of an institutional mindset within the US military. Major

Rizer compares the “military mind” with liberal and conservative

views and shows that officers tend to fall on the conservative

side of the philosophical and political spectrums. The author

demonstrates that an ideological gap exists between the US

military and its civilian leadership. He notes that issues in

civil-military relations arise as a result of the gap, as in the

Pentagon’s resistance to the Clinton administration’s “humanitarian war” in Kosovo.

Military Resistance to Humanitarian War in Kosovo and Beyond is based on research Major Rizer conducted while an Air

Force Olmsted Scholar at Stockholm University, Sweden. Air

University Press is pleased to present his essay as a Fairchild

Paper.

SHIRLEY BROOKS LASETER

Director

Air University Press

vii
Maj Kenneth R. Rizer, a 13-year Air Force veteran from Min -

neapolis, Minnesota, has been selected for promotion to

lieutenant colonel. He earned his Bachelor of Science Degree in

International Affairs from the United States Air Force Academy.

Following undergraduate pilot training, he flew the RF-4C

Phantom II reconnaissance aircraft in Korea, Germany, Texas,

and California, becoming an instructor pilot and Desert Storm

combat veteran. After transitioning to the F-16 Fighting Falcon, he served as an instructor pilot and flight commander at

Misawa Air Base, Japan. Major Rizer served two years as an

Air Force Olmsted Scholar at Stockholm University, Sweden,

and is presently studying Security Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He has a wife,

Cheri, and four children.

About the

Author

Maj Kenneth R. Rizer

ix
Acknowledgments

I am grateful to my adviser at Stockholm University, Professor

Bertil Nygren, and his assistant, Eva Erman, as well as Professor Jens Bartelson, my methodology professor. Their

lectures, encouragement, and critiques helped frame this

study. I would also like to thank Dr. Ole Holsti of Duke University for sharing his top-notch research with me. I thank Col

P. K. White, whose Kosovo clippings and E-mailed advice got

me started and kept me focused. I extend special thanks to

the Olmsted Foundation, which made the educational opportunity at Stockholm University available to me. Finally, I am

deeply indebted to the understanding and support of my wife,

Cheri, as well as my four children. Without their patience,

none of this would be possible.

xi
Preface

While much has been written about the so-called Clinton

doctrine of using military force to promote human rights in

the world, the military’s inherent resistance to such nontraditional missions has garnered little attention. My paper, which

was originally written in 1999 to fulfill the requirements for

completion of the Security and International Relations course

at Stockholm University, attempts to fill that void.

Humanitarian intervention is a new phenomenon, requiring

a certain degree of introspection within the national security

realm. Whether or not one agrees with the idea of intervening

militarily for human rights, a deeper understanding of both

sides’ views on the issue can only improve policy formulation

and implementation.

xiii
Abstract

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) success in the

Balkan conflict overshadowed Pentagon resistance to military

intervention in Kosovo. Using the new institutionalism, content analysis of actors’ statements, and recent civil-military

relations studies, this paper explains why the Pentagon op -

posed war in Kosovo, and why it will likely oppose future such

“humanitarian wars.”

This paper shows that the US military holds an institutionalized philosophy of conservative realism. This philosophy stems

from the nature of the profession, and is transmitted to succeed -

ing generations through the military’s unique cultural,

historical, and educational traditions. Within this philosophical

paradigm, the Pentagon views war as a legitimate political tool

used only as a last resort, and then only for promoting or

defending the nation’s survival or vital interests.

The Pentagon resisted military intervention in Kosovo because

intervention on behalf of human rights was incompatible with this

institutionalized, conservative philosophy. Indeed, the Clinton

administration’s justification for military intervention stemmed

directly from the liberal, Wilsonian tradition of basing foreign

policy on universal principles rather than interests. Such a

rationale was, and remains, antithetical to the military’s interest-based, conservative view of war.

The paper concludes that this military philosophy is unlikely to change in the short term, that it will continue to

strain relations with liberal administrations, and that it ultimately helps prevent cavalier uses of American military power.

xv
Chapter 1

Introduction

As air strikes became inevitable, many on the Joint Staff

expressed disbelief that we were actually going to go

through with it, because nobody believed that this was a

great course of action.

—Joint Staff 

Air Force Times

On 23 March 1999, following a diplomatic failure to gain

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s acceptance of the Interim

Agreement for Peace and Self-Government on Kosovo, the North

Atlantic Council authorized air strikes directed toward “disrupting the violent attacks being committed by the Serb Army

and Special Police Forces and weakening their ability to cause

further humanitarian catastrophe.”1 After a 78-day air campaign known as Operation Allied Force, Yugoslavian President

Slobodan Milosevic finally agreed to the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization’s (NATO) demands and the bombing stopped.

The fighting was over, but debate over its significance was

just beginning. Two aspects of the conflict made it unique,

and it was these two points that fueled discussion over its

meaning. The first was the expressed purpose of fighting not

for a national interest, at least in the classical sense, but for

human rights. While US foreign policy has always had a

strong moral element, this was the first time the United States

fought a sustained campaign for a purpose defined as less

than a vital national interest. Second, the Balkan conflict was

“arguably the first time in history that a conflict has been won

using airpower alone.”2 These two factors, fighting for human

rights and use of airpower alone, figure prominently in current

debates about future force employment. The crux of such debates is whether Kosovo was an aberration or a model for the

future.

To answer these questions, one should consider the US

military’s perspective. Contrary to postconflict reports, the deci1
sion to fight for less than vital national interests deeply divided the US Department of Defense. Although the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have understandably avoided revealing

their dissension over the prudence of intervening militarily in

Kosovo, some clues exist. Gen Dennis Reimer, the Army chief

of staff, stated that he had “concerns about whether airpower

would do it by itself. Others felt that air might do it.”3 Gen

Charles Krulak, the Marine Corps commandant, questioned

the efficacy of bombing in his testimony before Congress, asking rhetorically, “Will the strikes achieve an end?”4 The Economist reported that the “Pentagon top brass hates the idea of

getting embroiled in Kosovo peacemaking, which it regards as

social work.”5 Finally, Air Force Times reported that the joint

chiefs made clear their opposition to an air campaign in

Kosovo, but the administration of President William J. “Bill”

Clinton overruled them. “We went forward as the Joint Chiefs

and said, ‘This isn’t going to work.’ But, civilian leaders in -

cluding National Security Advisor Sandy Berger weren’t impressed. It was like ‘Well, OK, thanks, but if you were going to

do something like this, how would you do it?’”

6

Why were the joint chiefs against intervening militarily in

Kosovo? Is it possible to explain their resistance? What does

such resistance mean for future force employment? This paper attempts to answer those questions.

Objective

The paper explains the joint chiefs’ resistance to intervening

militarily in Kosovo based on the US military’s worldview. It

shows that the military has highly institutionalized values and

beliefs, meaning that they depend on common culture, norms,

and traditions. As a result of this culture, the officer corps has

become increasingly conservative, creating an ideological “gap”

between military and civilian leaders. This conservatism colors

the military’s view of international relations, producing a classical realist philosophy that supports military action only to

advance survival or vital interests.

This paper shows that contrary to the military view, the

Clinton administration’s justification for military intervention

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stemmed from the liberal, Wilsonian tradition of formulating

foreign policy based on universal principles rather than interests. Because such a rationale was antithetical to the military’s interest-based, conservative worldview, the joint chiefs

resisted the decision to intervene militarily in Kosovo.

Significance

While the study’s immediate intent is explaining a neglected

aspect of the decision to intervene militarily in Kosovo, the

paper’s conclusions have broader significance. Given that US

military resistance to “humanitarian war” is deeply embedded

and thus unlikely to change soon, future US policy toward

fighting for less than vital national interests will inevitably be

effected. One could argue that civilian control of the military

makes such dissent irrelevant, but that argument ignores the

fact that the military’s view of suitable missions and roles

affects defense budgets, training, and the conduct of combat

itself. The way the military perceives itself thus has a significant impact on future military capability.

Another, perhaps more important, effect of military resistance to humanitarian war is its potential impact upon civilmilitary relations. If the military’s view of suitable missions

differs significantly from the civilian leadership’s view, a risk

exists that the gap between the groups could become a fault

line. Such a rift occurred in 1964, when US military and

civilian leaders differed so much over military policy in Vietnam that the joint chiefs’ advisory role virtually ceased to

function.7 The estrangement had disastrous consequences

and serves as a warning for the future. From this standpoint,

understanding and managing the ideological gap between civilian and military leaders is a prerequisite for effective US

civil-military relations.

Methodology

This paper provides a content analysis of both the US military’s

institutional perspective toward military intervention and the

Clinton administration’s specific rationale for intervening miliRIZER

3
tarily in Kosovo. Content analysis means a focus on determin -

ing motives, values, beliefs, and attitudes from statements.8 In

other words, the paper examines what certain actors said and

then deduces the underlying meaning, or content, behind the

words. This paper focuses not on individuals, but rather on

the military as an institution. Given that military members

share certain “sociological background factors,”9 they are to

some extent products of the military environment. This is not

to say that military personnel are automatons. It merely

places the analysis at the institutional rather than the individ -

ual level in acknowledgment of the general sociological effect

the military has on individuals.

The difficulty in finding sources revealing specific JCS ob -

jections to military intervention in Kosovo drove this study to

the institutional rather than individual level of analysis. The

joint chiefs’ silence is due, presumably, to their professionalism in not revealing politically sensitive criticism of a sitting

president’s foreign policy. While much has come out regarding

military objections to the actual conduct of the war (a subject

that lies more firmly in the military’s realm than policy planning), the chiefs’ role in the decision to fight for Kosovo is still

somewhat of a mystery. One can expect more information on

this topic after the Clinton administration’s term ends and the

chiefs retire. One unnamed military source alluded to this

possibility while denying the author’s requests for information

on the chiefs’ views about military intervention in Kosovo:

“Your paper will be long filed away and dusty before that

information becomes available.”

Structure

This paper is composed of six chapters. Following this chapter’s introduction and definitions, chapter 2 examines and

describes the institutional character of the US military using

sociology’s new institutionalism . It validates the institutional

level of analysis in large organizations and details how institu -

tional values, beliefs, and philosophies propagate and persist

within the military.

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Building on chapter 2’s conclusion that institutional belief

systems can exist in the US military, chapter 3 identifies and

tests the presence of such a philosophy. It begins by presenting

Samuel P. Huntington’s claim that the US military possesses

an institutional philosophy that he calls conservative realism.

For clarification, the chapter then contrasts this philosophy

with its counterpart, liberalism. Finally, using recent civilmilitary relations studies, it tests Huntington’s claim regard -

ing an institutionalized military philosophy.

Chapter 4 further develops the conservative and liberal philosophies identified in chapter 3 by applying them to international relations. The chapter compares and contrasts the conservative and liberal views of the world, especially regarding

the use of military force. It explains why conservatives view

war as a political instrument for furthering national interests,

whereas liberals see war as a preventable aberration resorted

to in the name of universal values. Finally, it uses a recent

study to prove the US military indeed holds the conservative,

national interest-based worldview.

Chapter 5 outlines the Clinton administration’s justification

for war in Kosovo. Content analysis of various actors’ statements shows that the justifications clearly echo liberalism’s

philosophy, worldview, and conception of military intervention.

Chapter 6 summarizes this paper’s findings. It concludes that

the Pentagon resisted intervening militarily in Kosovo because

the operation was undertaken for liberal values the military

opposes. It then shows the greater implications of an institution -

alized military aversion to humanitarian war, offering some

points to ponder concerning such military actions in the future.

Definitions

This paper’s usage of certain words requires explanation.

References to the military or the Pentagon are to the officer

corps within the armed services and not the enlisted force or

the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The author excludes the

enlisted force because the study’s focus is on policy makers in

the military rather than the entire force. Conversely, the paper

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5
excludes Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen because he is

not a “product” of the US military and thus is not subject to

the same sociological factors that affect career military officers.

The concept of national interest inevitably crops up in any

discussion of warfare. This paper defines the term according

to Donald Nuechterlein’s National Interest Matrix which is discussed in chapter 4. For now it is enough to note that

Nuechterlein defines four levels of interest based on intensity.

A survival interest exists when the physical existence of the

country is in jeopardy because of attack or threat of attack. A

vital interest exists when serious harm to the nation would

occur unless strong measures, including the use of force, are

employed to protect the interest. Major interests are situations

where a country’s political, economic, or social well being may

be adversely affected but where armed force is deemed unnecessary. Finally, peripheral interests are situations in which

some national interest is involved, but the nation as a whole is

not particularly affected by a given outcome.1 0

In referring to threats, this paper adopts the A-list, B-list,

and C-list construction of former Defense Secretary William

Perry and Assistant Secretary of International Security Policy

Ashton Carter. These lists roughly parallel the first three levels of interest described above. A-list threats are those that

threaten US survival. B-list threats are imminent threats to

US interests, but not to the survival or way of life of Americans. C-list threats are important contingencies that indirectly

affect US security, but they do not directly threaten US interests. 1 1

Finally, conservatism and liberalism refer to different schools

of thought and philosophical traditions within the field of in -

ternational relations, and not necessarily to their everyday

usage in American politics. Conservatism, often referred to as

realism, is an international relations theory emphasizing the

self-interested competition of sovereign states. Liberalism, sometimes called Wilsonianism or internationalism, emphasizes the

rule of law and respect of individual rights. Chapters 3 and 4

explain these concepts in greater detail.

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Areas for Further Research

Although this study relies on some quantitative research, it

is predominately qualitative in nature. Hence, while it argues

that institutional philosophy was the primary source of Penta gon

resistance to military intervention in Kosovo, this argument

does not rule out other causal factors. Four alternative explanations for Pentagon resistance to military intervention in

Kosovo were considered but rejected for lack of sources. The

first alternative arose from application of Graham Allison’s

Organizational Behavior Model, in which organizational interests are paramount. Using this paradigm, the Pentagon might

have resisted military intervention in Kosovo because intervention threatened such military interests as retention, budgets, and service branch prestige. While this explanation may

have validity, no currently available information supports it.

A second possible explanation is interservice rivalry. While

one can imagine that certain branches of the military might

have had different views toward operations in Kosovo based

on parochial service interests, the currently available evidence

fails to adequately defend this explanation.

A third explanation could be that the interplay of the joint

chiefs’ individual personalities, philosophies, and interests determined the military’s resistance. Although examining individuals from such a rational actor perspective is a valid analytical

tool, the currently available sources do not support such an

investigation.

Finally, one could explain the military’s resistance to intervention in Kosovo by demonstrating that the proposed conduct of the conflict ran counter to military doctrine. Indeed,

the author initially intended to make that argument in conjunction with the philosophical one. While the conduct of op -

erations arguably failed, at least initially, to fulfill a number of

doctrinal requirements, few currently available sources linked

the planned conduct of Kosovo warfare to the chiefs’ initial

resistance. As this study focuses on the decision to fight in

Kosovo vice the conduct of the fighting, using the latter to

explain the former, especially in the absence of solid evidence,

pushed the bounds of inference too far. When more sources

become available, it may emerge that some or all of the JCS

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7
were against military intervention because the initial objectives, rules of engagement, force structures, and planned application of force ran counter to joint or individual service

doctrine.

Notes

1. Dr. Javier Solana, press statement, 23 March 1999, 3, on-line, Internet,

10 November 1999, available from http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/

p99-040e.htm.

2. Nick Cook, “Kosovo: War of Extremes,” Jane’s Defence Weekly , 8,

on-line, Internet, 8 September 1999, available from http://defence.janes.

com/defset.html.

3. Quoted in “Verbatim Special: The Balkan War,” Air Force Magazine,

July 1999, 43.

4. Johanna McGeary, “Standoff in Kosovo,” Time, 29 March 1999, 27.

5. “The Late March on Kosovo,” The Economist 350, no. 812 (27 March–2

April): 53–54.

6. Sean D. Naylor, “NATO Approach to Kosovo Strike: A Losing Battle?”

Air Force Times , 12 April 1999, 14.

7. H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert

McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New

York: HarperCollins, 1997), 84.

8. Evert Vedung, Political Reasoning, trans. David McCune (Beverly Hills,

Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982), 24.

9. Ibid., 23.

10. Described in Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Strategy:

An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems (Maxwell Air

Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988), 29.

11. Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New

Security Strategy for America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution

Press, 1999), 11.

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Chapter 2

The Institutional Military

The visitor strolling the halls of the Pentagon will see scores

of paintings and photographs depicting scenes and events

of past actions, some mundane and some heroic. Each

represents a decision; the decisions now provide powerful

tokens of identity and rules for future action.

—Graham Allison

 Essence of Decision:

 Exploring the Cuban Missile Crisis

Although the legal, medical, and clerical professions deal

with important issues of life and death, only military members

are expected, as a requirement of the mission to provide national security, both to put their lives at risk and take the lives

of others. Within a democratic society that values individual

life, the responsibility for applying and managing violence on

behalf of the state differentiates the military from other institutions and society in general. It creates a military culture

that strongly influences all members of the organization. This

institutionalization molds and constrains military leaders to

certain predictable patterns of behavior. According to Graham

Allison’s Organizational Behavior Model, if one understands

these institutional effects, one can predict the institution’s policies and viewpoints since they are results of regular patterns

of behavior.1

The New Institutionalism and the Military

According to sociology’s new institutionalism, institutions con -

strain individuals so that their interests emerge within normative and historical contexts.2

 This is not to say that individuals

lose their identities, but rather that institutions mold individ -

ual views by defining what is acceptable within the confines of

historical experience and institutional expectations. As Robert

Keohane says, “Institutions do not merely reflect the preferences

and power of the units constituting them; the institutions them9
selves shape those preferences and that power.”3

 In other words,

an institutional output such as a policy recommendation on

military intervention in Kosovo is much more than the sum of

the individual views of the JCS.

How does the military as an institution shape the chiefs’

views? It happens from absorption through socialization, educa -

tion, on-the-job training, or acquiescence to convention. 4 Within

the officer corps, the functional imperative of defending the

nation’s security creates “complex vocational institutions which

mold the officer corps into an autonomous social unit.”5 In the

Air Force, for example, these institutions include the Air Force

Academy, Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff

College, and Air University, among others.

In attending such institutions and acting according to their

espoused principles, officers internalize the institutional values,

ideas, and language which each of the services consciously

promotes. In the Air Force, for example, critical study of leadership, war theory, and military history constantly reinforce

the Air Force core values of “integrity first, service before self,

and excellence in all we do.” Such study performs the role of

transmission , a sociological process by which cultural understanding propagates. 6

 By repeated exposure, ideas and theories

become institutionalized. This acceptance influences everything

from the way individuals lead their lives to how they view such

decisions as, “Should the United States fight in Kosovo?”

Within the military, historical case studies are often used to

transmit relevant lessons learned to succeeding generations of

officers. This method increases continuity between the past and

present so that certain views or acts become objectified into

doctrine. Such doctrine, whether formal or not, colors the way

military leaders conceptualize and draw inferences from situ -

ations involving the use of force. 7 Specifically, institutionalized

doctrine and values create “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around

which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”8

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Organizational Behavior Model

Graham Allison, in his 1999 update to the classic Essence

of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis , uses the concept of institutionalism in formation of his Organizational Behavior Model. Allison maintains that acts and choices of large

organizations are outputs according to regular patterns of behavior.9 He applies Herbert Simon’s idea of bounded rationality ,

in which actors’ positions in organizations often determine

their views. To explain, predict, and understand these views,

one must understand the organization’s goals and conceptu -

alization of a situation.1 0 For Allison, a key to explaining organizational output is analyzing the organization’s percep -

tions, preferences, goals, and culture.1 1

Summary

An institutionalized military culture affects individual military members. Institutionalization molds and constrains military leaders to certain predictable patterns of behavior. This

molding of ideas occurs through transmission to succeeding

generations of officers by, among other things, attendance and

study at the services’ educational institutions. The process

presumably underlies the military’s institutional view of man,

the world, and war.

Notes

1. Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining

the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2d ed. (New York: Longman Press, 1999), 5.

2. Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism

in Organizational Analysis (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1991),

7 .

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 10.

5. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and

Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard

University Press, 1957), 16.

6. Lynne G. Zucker, “The Role of Institutionalism in Cultural Persistence,”

in Powell and DiMaggio, 87.

7. Powell and DiMaggio, 20.

8. Ibid., 8.

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11
Chapter 3

Military Versus Liberal Philosophy

As Clausewitz said, “All war presupposes human

weakness, and against that it is directed.” No one is more

aware than the professional soldier that the normal man is

no hero. The military profession organizes men so as to

overcome their inherent fears and failings. The uncertainty

and chance involved in the conduct of war and the difficulty

of anticipating the actions of an opponent make the military

man skeptical of the range of human foresight and control.

 —Samuel P. Huntington

 The Soldier and the State: 

 The Theory and Politics of

 Civil-Military Relations

The previous chapter discussed the possibility of institu -

tionalized values and beliefs in the US military; this chapter

confirms their existence. It begins by presenting Samuel P.

Huntington’s theory of an institutionalized military philosophy

that he defines as conservative realism. It then compares and

contrasts this philosophy with its antithesis, liberalism. Finally, the chapter tests the validity of Huntington’s claim

against the results of several studies of civil-military relations.

The Military Mind

In his classic study of civil-military relations, The Soldier

and the State , Huntington argues that military officers are

fundamentally different ideologically than their civilian counterparts. The “military mind” as he calls it, is an institutional

result of the military’s existence. The very need for the military

assumes conflicting interests between individuals, and acknowledges violence as a means to promote or protect those interests. To the military professional, conflict is inevitable because

people are selfish and egocentric and driven by needs for power,

wealth, and security. This pessimistic view does not rule out

elements of goodness, strength, and reason, but rather em13
phasizes, as Thomas Hobbes did, the inherent evil, weakness,

and irrationality of man. For this reason, the “leviathan” of the

state is created with the military as its source of external

security. The main responsibility of the military within such a

conception is to enhance the security of the state against

competing nation-states.1

In relation to national military policy, Huntington maintains

that the military mind views war as inevitable because of

competing state interests. As just noted and at a more fundamental level, he claims the military professional sees war’s

source in the nature of humanity itself. “To abolish war we

must remove its cause, which lies in the imperfection of hu -

man nature.”2 Given the belief that the causes of war lie in

human nature, the military mind is skeptical of institutional

devices for preventing war. Treaties, international law, and the

United Nations, for example, are of little help in promoting

peace; what matters are the power relationships between

states. 3

When it comes to restriction of commitments and the avoid -

ance of war, Huntington argues that although military professionals are not necessarily interested in political goals, they

are deeply concerned about the relationship between political

goals and military means. The soldier thinks “grand political

designs and sweeping political goals are to be avoided, not

because they are undesirable but because they are impractical. The military security of the state must come first. Moral

aims and ideological ends should not be pursued at the expense of that security.”4

In their advice to policy makers, Huntington’s military professionals oppose reckless, aggressive, or belligerent action. As

students of history, officers recognize the impossibility of predicting war’s outcome due to its uncertain nature. Given this

uncertainty, the military professional believes that war should

be a reaction to actual threats to the security of the state, and

generally should not be used except as a final recourse. 5

In sum, Huntington defines the military’s philosophy as one

of conservative realism: 

The military ethic emphasizes the permanence, irrationality, weakness,

and evil in human nature. . . . It recognizes the continuing likelihood of

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wars among nation states. . . . It emphasizes the importance of power

in international relations and warns of the dangers to state security. .

. . It urges the limitation of state action to the direct interests of the

state, the restriction of extensive commitments, and the undesirability

of bellicose or adventurous policies.6

Liberalism

Huntington goes on to contrast this military philosophy

with liberalism. Contrary to the cynical Hobbesian view that

people are self-interested, liberalism begins with the Lockian

presumption that people are basically good. As a result, peace

is the natural state rather than war. Since the sources of

conflict are external to the individual, liberals believe that

people must be free from political, social, and economic restraints upon their individual liberty. Because human behavior is a result of environmental more than innate factors,

liberals believe behavior is pliable and can be improved

through societal institutions. Thus, they trust to such institu -

tional devices as international law, international courts, and

international organizations rather than power-based relationships. While sometimes pacifistic, liberals may support a war

fought to further liberal ideals. To them, war as an instrument

of national policy is immoral while war on behalf of universally

true principles of justice and freedom is not.7

If Huntington is correct, the military as an institution has a

very different philosophy than that of liberalism. The following

section tests Huntington’s hypothesis of a conservative, realistic military philosophy.

Conservative Officer Corps

Huntington claimed in the 1957 first edition of The Soldier

and the State that military officers were, ideologically, conservative realists. More recently, Wall Street Journal defense reporter Thomas E. Ricks, in a widely read 1997 Atlantic

Monthly article and subsequent book, wrote that there was a

widening and dangerous gap between the post-cold-war US

military and civilian society. 8 Are these claims valid today and

can they be proven?

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Fortunately, a couple of recently published studies test Ricks

and Huntington’s hypotheses. The most widely reported was

conducted by Ole Holsti’s Foreign Policy Leadership Project

(FPLP), which surveyed military and civilian leaders every four

years between 1976 and 1996 on such issues as ideology,

party affiliation, values, and foreign and domestic policy preferences. Holsti recently updated his findings through new

data collected in 1998–99. Both of Holsti’s studies confirm

that Huntington and Ricks were correct about the conserva -

tive realism of military leaders compared with their civilian

counterparts (see the appendix for study group breakdown).

The Studies

Holsti’s 1998–99 study showed that 67 percent of US military leaders considered themselves “somewhat” or “very conservative,” compared with only 32 percent of nonveteran civilian leaders (table 1). Conversely, although only 4 percent of

the military leaders considered themselves “somewhat” or “very

liberal,” 38 percent of nonveteran civilian leaders did.

Table 1

Ideological Identification of US Military

and Civilian Leaders

1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 1999

Conservative

Military/Civilian 61/30 72/38 76/35 76/35 72/34 73/36 67/32

Moderate

Military/Civilian 23/27 24/27 17/28 20/27 24/28 25/28 28/28

Liberal

Military/Civilian 16/42 4/34 8/36 4/37 4/37 3/36 4/38

Source: Ole R. Holsti, “A Widening Gap between the US Military and Civilian Society?: Some Further

Evidence, 1998–99” (paper prepared for Triangle Institute for Security Studies’ “Project on the Gap between

the Military and Civilian Society,” Wheaton, Illinois, 27–29 October 1999), table 9.

Some long-term ideological trends are also noticeable. While

military leaders predominantly have identified themselves as

conservative since the FPLP study began in 1976, civilian leaders have exhibited about equal percentages in identifying themFAIRCHILD PAPER

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selves as liberal and conservative. Both military and civilian

leaders tend to be approximately 25 percent moderates, although

military leaders were slightly below that figure during the

1980s, when they also posted their highest percentages as

conservatives.

Ricks’s ideological gap between military and civilian leaders

has widened slightly since 1976. Military leaders now show 6

percent more conservatives and 12 percent fewer liberals, while

nonveteran civilian leaders have about the same percentage of

conservatives while becoming 6 percent less liberal. While the

increasing conservatism of the military is striking, equally

dramatic is the virtual disappearance of liberalism within the

armed forces.

Republican Officer Corps

The gap between military and civilian society is even more

pronounced when one looks at party affiliation (table 2). In the

same 1999 study cited above, 64 percent of military leaders

listed themselves as Republicans, compared with only 30 percent of nonveteran civilian leaders. While only 8 percent of

military leaders identified themselves as Democrats, fully 43

percent of the civilian leaders did.

Table 2

Party Identification of US Military

and Civilian Leaders

1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 1999

Republicans

Military/Civilian 33/25 46/28 53/30 59/29 61/30 67/34 64/30

Independents

Military/Civilian 46/31 40/30 29/27 27/27 26/24 22/22 17/20

Democrats

Military/Civilian 12/42 10/39 12/40 9/41 6/42 7/41 8/43

Source: Ole R. Holsti, “A Widening Gap between the US Military and Civilian Society?: Some Further

Evidence, 1998–99” (paper prepared for Triangle Institute for Security Studies’ “Project on the Gap between

the Military and Civilian Society,” Wheaton, Illinois, 27–29 October 1999), table 8.

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The long-term trend of party affiliation within the military is

particularly striking. Between 1976 and 1996, the percentage

of military leaders associated with the Republican Party rose

steadily from 33 to 67 percent, with a slight dip to 64 percent

in 1999. Most of this increase came at the expense of military

leaders describing themselves as Independents. In 1976 the

top choice of military leaders (46 percent of respondents) was

to identify themselves as Independents. Since then the percentage of military Independents has decreased every study

year, adding up to only 22 percent in 1999. Civilian party

affiliation was much more stable over this time, with the identification as Republicans, Democrats, and Independents being

approximately 30, 40, and 25 percent, respectively.

Summary

In sum, Huntington was partly right. Military officers are

clearly more conservative than their civilian counterparts.

This fact has sparked a great deal of recent debate on the

importance of the military reflecting the larger society’s values.

While some, like Huntington, argue that a conservative military

within a liberal society is necessary and good, others express

concern that the gap isolates a military which should be rep -

resentative of the democratic society it defends. Although this

debate is beyond the scope of this paper, the implications are

fundamental to the thesis that conservative philosophy was

behind Pentagon resistance to humanitarian war in Kosovo.

What Huntington did not foresee was the increased partisanship of today’s military. Increased identification with one

political party has sparked debate over the proper role of the

military in policy formulation. While purists believe the military should be apolitical, others acknowledge an important

role for the military in advocating its positions within the

political environment. Again, the debate is beyond the paper’s

scope. However, a predominantly conservative and Republican

military viewpoint, without doubt, affects the institution’s position regarding the use of force.

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Notes

1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and

Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard

University Press, 1957), 62–63.

2. Quoted in Huntington, 65.

3. Huntington, 65–66.

4. Ibid., 68–69.

5. Ibid., 69.

6. Ibid., 79.

7. Ibid., 90–91.

8. Ole R. Holsti, “A Widening Gap between the US Military and Civilian

Society?: Some Further Evidence, 1998–1999” (paper prepared for Triangle

Institute for Security Studies’ “Project on the Gap between the Military and

Civilian Society,” Wheaton, Illinois, 27–29 October 1999), 1.

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Chapter 4

Conservative Versus Liberal View of Force

I regard the Wilson-Bryan attitude of trusting to fantastic

peace treaties, to impossible promises, to all kinds of scraps

of paper without any backing in efficient force, as

abhorrent. . . . A milk-and-water righteousness unbacked

by force to the full is as wicked as and even more

mischievous than force divorced from righteousness.

—President Theodore Roosevelt

This age is an age . . . which rejects the standards of

national selfishness that once governed the counsels of

nations and demands that they shall give way to a new

order of things in which the only questions will be: Is it

right? Is it just? Is it in the interest of mankind?

—President Woodrow Wilson

Having shown that the military is predominantly conserva -

tive and Republican, this study extends the ideological discussion to the military’s view of force in international relations.

This chapter traces the roots of conservatism and liberalism,

and explains how adherents of these philosophies view using

force as an instrument of foreign policy. After comparing the

two philosophies, this chapter tests the hypotheses that an

institutionalized military view of force exists and that it is con -

sistent with the conservative model of international relations.

The Conservative Worldview

The conservative sees the world in terms of power relationships between sovereign states acting in accordance with their

national interests. The philosophy originated after the Reformation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the

unity provided by the Catholic Church was rejected and collapsed. The states of Europe needed some new principle to

justify their conduct.

21
They found it in the concepts of raison d’état and the balance of

power. Each depended on the other. Raison d’état asserted that the

well being of the state justified whatever means were employed to

further it; the national interest supplanted the medieval notion of a

universal morality. The balance of power replaced the nostalgia for

universal monarchy with the consolation that each state, in pursuing

its own selfish interests, would somehow contribute to the safety and

progress of all the others.1

Cardinal Richelieu (Armand-Jean du Plessis, Duke de

Richelieu), who was the first minister of France during most of

the Thirty Years War, became the “father of the modern state

system” through his relentless application of raison d’état for

the benefit of France.2 Despite being a cardinal in Catholic

France, Richelieu put French geopolitical interests ahead of

religious ones in opposing the Hapsburg attempt to reestablish Catholicism in Europe. By subsidizing both the Protestant

king of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus, and the Muslim Ottoman

Empire’s efforts against the Holy Roman Emperor, Richelieu

demonstrated that his only criterion in making alliances was

that they served French interests. 3 Under such a philosophy,

war was considered moral so long as it furthered the nation’s

interests. Following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, this

Machiavellian approach of using the national interest as the

guiding light of foreign policy became the norm in Europe.

While raison d’état provided a rationale for individual state

behavior, it failed in supplying answers to the challenge of

world order. 4 Lacking an overarching world authority to protect them, weaker states saw stronger ones as threats to their

existence. This resembled the Hobbesian “state of nature,” in

which life was an unchecked strife between self-interested

individuals. To escape the anarchy of this paradigm, individu -

als worked together to create the “leviathan” of the state. Like

these individuals, the European states preferred a measure of

security to total anarchy, but rather than depending on an

international leviathan, they turned to the balance of power.

The balance of power thus became the companion to raison

d’état, forming the second pillar of the conservative (classical

realist) approach to international relations. According to

author Chris Brown, different ways exist to define the balance

of power, but all theories have a single or root idea: “This root

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idea is the notion that only force can counteract the effect of

force, and that in an anarchical world, stability, predictability,

and regularity can only occur when the forces that states are

able to exert to get their way in the world are in some kind of

equilibrium.”5

Theoretically, the effect of a successful balance of power is

that most nations and, consequently, the international system

itself are more secure. In the same way that self-interested

individuals interacting economically create a free market (according to Adam Smith in Wealth of Nations), self-interested

states interacting politically create an international system

based on the balance of power. In both cases, the result of

self-interest is benign as all reap the benefits, respectively, of

a free market and a more secure international system.

The Realist View of War

This is not to say that war becomes unnecessary or is irrational under a balance of power system. Rather, conservatives

see war as a necessary and natural complement to the balance of power. Seen as a political instrument, war can both

preserve the balance and bring about change. 6 Within this

paradigm, sovereign states may have interests that the international political system cannot satisfy. Lacking an overarching world authority, these states may resort to the “selfhelp” of war to achieve their interests.

Although it seems intuitive that having many nations resolved to use war to further their interests is chaotic, disorderly, and dangerous, within a balance of power system, the

opposite is true. War actually becomes a moderating influ -

ence. As Kenneth Waltz says, “The constant possibility that

force will be used limits manipulations, moderates demands,

and serves as an incentive for the settlement of disputes.”7 In

this sense, Waltz argues, the threat of war in the international

system fulfills the same role as does the threat of strikes

domestically. In labor disputes, the threat of strikes encourages labor and management to face difficult issues, try to

understand each other’s problems, and work hard to find soRIZER

23
lutions. The possibility that conflicts among nations may lead

to long and costly wars has similarly sobering effects.8

While conservatives consider war legitimate and inevitable,

they believe it should be undertaken only in the name of

survival or vital national interests. Given the experience of the

past century, in which World War II alone caused more than

55 million casualties, war is viewed as a costly and tragic

occurrence that often proves difficult to control or predict.9

Given war’s destructive capability and uncertain nature, the

conservative views it as a last resort used only for the most

important reasons. Donald Nuechterlein illustrates this view

in his National Interest Matrix, which is the basis for figure 1.

Placement of the Xs in this matrix shows the classical realist view of force. “Intensity of Interest” refers to how important

a given interest is in a declining scale between “Survival” and

“Peripheral” interests (see definitions section, in chapter 1).

“Basic Interest at Stake” refers to categories of substantive

interest, arranged in roughly descending order. The thick vertical line represents the demarcation between what a state

should and should not support with armed force.1 0 For the

conservative, when expressed in terms of threats, this line

represents the difference between those threats that can directly harm the United States or its way of life (A-list and

 Intensity of Conflict

Basic Interest at Stake Survival Vital Major Peripheral

Defense of Homeland X

Economic Well-being X

Favorable World Order X

Promotion of Values X

Figure 1. Conservative National Interest Matrix

Source: Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988), 29.

FAIRCHILD PAPER

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B-list threats) versus those that can only indirectly affect US

security (C-list threats).

The conception that the nation should only fight for its

survival or vital national interests is consistent with Huntington’s summary of conservative realism in The Soldier and

the State. He writes that the military man “urges the limitation

of state action to the direct interests of the state, the restriction of extensive commitments, and the undesirability of bellicose or adventurous policies.”1 1 While war is the “continuation

of politics by other means,” moral aims and ideological ends

should not be pursued at the expense of the military security

of the state.1 2

In summary, the conservative philosophy of force stems

from a “realistic” worldview in which sovereign nations act in

their own best interests according to the principle of raison

d’état, or its more modern form, Otto von Bismarck’s realpolitik. The result of these efforts is a balance of power system

that contributes, at least theoretically, to stability. Within

such a system, war is a valid means of achieving and protecting national interests. Given war’s destructive and costly nature, it should be invoked only as a last resort in support of

national survival or vital interests.

The Liberal Worldview

The liberal worldview gained prominence as a result of the

tragedy of World War I. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919,

European leaders sought to refurbish the old balance of power

system while American negotiators tried to break from what

they saw as a failed model of international relations. In his

famous Fourteen Points, President Woodrow Wilson told the

Europeans that the international system should no longer be

based on the balance of power but on ethnic self-determination,

collective security, and open agreements.1 3 Whereas President

Theodore Roosevelt, a classical realist, believed that America

should assume an international role because of its self-interest, Wilson’s justification was more messianic: America had

an obligation, not to the balance of power, but to spread its

principles throughout the world. 1 4 For Wilson, these principles

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were that peace depended on the spread of democracy, states

should be judged by the same ethical standards as individu -

als, and national interest should be replaced by adherence to

international law. 1 5

This shift in focus from a predominantly national interestbased foreign policy to one based on universal principles is

the defining difference between the conservative and liberal

world views. Within the field of international relations, Wilson’s

thinking is summarized as liberal internationalism, or the adaptation of broadly liberal political principles to the management of the international system.1 6 Its absorption into the

foreign policy of virtually every US administration since is due

in large part to faith in America’s exceptionalism, a belief that

the United States is morally superior to the rest of the world.

This belief is the basis for a crusading ideology in which

“America’s special mission transcends day-to-day diplomacy

and obliges it to serve as a beacon of liberty for the rest of

mankind.”1 7 Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger writes,

“It is above all to the drumbeat of Wilsonian idealism that

American foreign policy has marched since his watershed

presidency, and continues to march to this day.”1 8

How does liberal internationalism contrast with conserva -

tive realism? Since liberals discount the Hobbesian view of

self-interested man, they reject the conservative, Darwinian

view that individuals and, by extension, states are locked in

inevitable competition and conflict. To the liberal, peace, not

war, is the natural condition since states have much more in

common than not, which naturally promotes cooperation

rather than conflict. As a result, the liberal internationalist is

more supportive of international institutions that “pool” the

efforts of states than the conservative realist, who is skeptical

about the efficacy of such organizations.

The Internationalist View of War

Whereas conservatives argue that war is inevitable, Wilson

argued that a league encompassing all nations could effectively resolve crises without war.1 9 If conflicts between nations

arose, Wilson believed that binding international arbitration

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was the key to peace. Assuming all nations had an equal

interest in peace and would therefore unite to punish those

who disturbed it, Wilson proposed a plan of collective security

in which each country guaranteed the security of all others,

thus eliminating the need for military alliances or a balance of

power system. Law would replace war as the underlying prin -

ciple of the system.2 0

Within this context, if collective security fails in deterring

war, peace-loving nations of the world will unite to combat the

aggressor. The cause they fight for, however, is not national

interest but a stable international order. As Wilson said in

requesting a declaration of war, “We shall fight for the things

which we have always carried nearest our hearts, for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a

voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of

small nations, for a universal domination of right by such a

concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all

nations and make the world itself at last free.”2 1 In other

words, the liberal fights for values in contrast to the conserva -

tive who fights for interests. To liberals, war as an instrument

of national policy is immoral while war on behalf of universally

true principles of justice and freedom is not.2 2

Does the Military Have

the Conservative Worldview?

Having defined the contrasting conservative and liberal

views of the world, the question for this study becomes: Does

the military in fact have the conservative worldview?

The Holsti Study

Ole Holsti’s previously referenced 1998–99 study of US civilmilitary relations asked a number of questions regarding foreign policy and the use of the military. Comparing the responses of military and nonveteran civilian leaders reveals

clear divergence on either side of this study’s reported cleft

between conservatives and liberals. The data does not demonstrate that the civilian leaders were liberal in their foreign

policy views, but the differences between the groups does

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27
show that the military leaders were significantly more conservative in international outlook.

Table 3 shows the percentages of military and nonveteran

civilian leaders who responded that a given foreign policy goal

was “very important.” As the table shows, military leaders

viewed human rights, humanitarian concerns, and international cooperation as significantly less important than did

their civilian counterparts. Only 13 percent of the military

leaders thought “promoting and defending human rights in

other countries” was “very important,” compared with 34 percent

of the civilians. In regards to the humanitarian concerns of improving “the standard of living in less developed countries” and “combating world hunger,” only 8 and 15 percent, respectively, of the

military leaders listed these as “very important” compared with

approximately 36 and 47 percent of their civilian counterparts.

Regarding international cooperation, approximately 10 and 20

percent fewer military leaders supported “strengthening the

United Nations” and “fostering international cooperation to solve

common problems,” respectively, than the nonveteran civilTable 3

Respondents Listing Foreign Policy Goals as Very Important

Military

Leaders

Nonveteran

Civilian

Leaders

Promoting and defending human rights in other countries 13 34

Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed

countries

8 36

Combating world hunger 15 47

Strengthening the United Nations 19 29

Fostering international cooperation to solve common

problems, such as food, inflation, and energy

42 60

Maintain superior military power worldwide 74 47

Source: Ole R. Holsti, “A Widening Gap between the US Military and Civilian Society?: Some Further

Evidence, 1998–99” (paper prepared for Triangle Institute for Security Studies’ “Project on the Gap between

the Military and Civilian Society,” Wheaton, Illinois, 27–29 October 1999), table 10.

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ians. Finally, nearly 75 percent of military leaders thought

that “maintaining superior military power worldwide” was

“very important” as compared with less than 50 percent of

nonveteran civilians.

In summary, the military leaders were much less willing to

regard the traditional internationalist foreign policy goals of

promotion of human rights, humanitarian assistance, and in -

ternational cooperation as “very important” than their civilian

counterparts were. Conversely, military leaders were more

willing than the civilians to support the classical realist foreign policy goal of maintaining superior military power world -

wide, although some of this disparity may be due to the military’s institutional interest in maintaining a large force.

In another series of questions, Holsti asked the groups their

positions on “certain propositions that are sometimes described

as lessons that the United States should have learned from

past experiences abroad.” Table 4 lists the percentages who either

“agreed strongly” or “agreed somewhat” to certain propositions.

To the statement, “The United States should give economic aid

to poorer countries even if it means higher prices at home,”

only 33 percent of the military leaders agreed compared with 52

percent of the nonveteran civilian leaders, showing once again

that the military is much less willing to support the liberal idea

of international humanitarian assistance than the civilians.

Table 4

Respondents Agreeing with Given US Foreign Policy Propositions

Military

Leaders

Nonveteran

Civilian

Leaders

The United States should give economic aid to poorer 

countries even if it means higher prices at home.

33 52

There is nothing wrong with using the Central Intelligence

Agency to try to undermine hostile governments.

65 44

The United States should take all steps including the use

of force to prevent aggression by any expansionist power.

79 57

Source: Ole R. Holsti, “A Widening Gap between the US Military and Civilian Society?: Some Further

Evidence, 1998–99” (paper prepared for Triangle Institute for Security Studies’ “Project on the Gap between

the Military and Civilian Society,” Wheaton, Illinois, 27–29 October 1999), table 11.

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Responses for two other statements reflect the conservative

realism of the military. In the first, 65 percent of military

leaders agreed with using the Central Intelligence Agency to

undermine hostile governments versus 44 percent of the civilian leaders. The military response is consistent with the classical realist tenet of putting national interest above moral concerns. Willingness to undermine a sovereign state through

covert means runs directly contrary to the internationalist

idea of using international institutions, international law, and

world public opinion to control hostile threats. The survey

response is a clear example of the military favoring national

interests over universal values.

The second example of the military’s conservative realism is

the response to the statement: “The United States should take

all steps including the use of force to prevent aggression by

any expansionist power.” Seventy-seven percent of military leaders supported that statement versus 52 percent of nonveteran

civilians. This comparison shows that the military leaders are

more willing to use force to combat state aggression, a reflection of the realist idea that challenges to the world order must

be met with force, unilaterally if necessary.

The Weinberger Doctrine

Further evidence of the military’s conservative worldview is

its widespread acceptance of the so-called Weinberger Doctrine.2 3 In a 1984 speech, Secretary of Defense Caspar Wein -

berger described six major tests to be applied when considering the use of US combat forces abroad, each of which reflects

the conservative view of war. Based primarily on the historical

lessons of Vietnam and the 1983 bombing of US Marines in

Beirut (and later affirmed through application in the Persian

Gulf War), these principles have become highly institutionalized in the US military.

The first test is straight from Huntington’s description of

conservative realism:2 4 “The United States should not commit

forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or

occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our

allies.”2 5 Closely linked to this test and acknowledging the

terrible cost of war, the sixth test states, “The commitment of

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US forces to combat should be a last resort.”2 6 This test directly reflects the conservative military belief that “war should

not be resorted to except as a final recourse.”2 7

The second test echoes the conservative view that war is

hard to control or predict, 2 8 so that if US troops are put into

combat, “It must be with the clear intention of winning . . . or

we should not commit them at all.”2 9 In other words, given

war’s high stakes and uncertain nature, it should not be resorted to without a full commitment.

The third test addresses the conservative desire to match

military means to political goals. 3 0 “We should have clearly

defined political and military objectives. And we should know

precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined

objectives.”3 1

The fourth test reinforces the third by requiring that the

forces committed be constantly reassessed and adjusted to

adapt to the changing environment or changing objectives.3 2

This idea both contributes to the “winning” of test two and the

matching of means to ends of test three.

The fifth test stems from what Huntington called the “undesirability of bellicose or adventurous policies.”3 3 It requires,

“There be some reasonable assurance we will have the support

of the American people and their elected representatives in

Congress.”3 4 Having to gain such approval serves as a brake

against open-ended or questionable military commitments.

Clearly, the military’s acceptance of the Weinberger Doctrine is consistent with the conservative worldview. More specifically, it embodies most of the conservative principles regarding the use of military force abroad.

Summary

This chapter compared conservative and liberal philosophies about military intervention, and showed through survey

data and the military’s acceptance of the Weinberger Doctrine

that the Pentagon’s worldview is one of conservative realism.

As demonstrated by survey data and consistent with that national interest-based view, the military was much less supportive of foreign policy goals related to human rights, humaniRIZER

31
tarian concerns, and international cooperation than were the

civilians. Equally consistent with conservative realism, military leaders were much more supportive of strengthening the

military, undermining hostile governments, and projecting US

power. Military acceptance of the Weinberger Doctrine’s principles reinforces the notion of an institutionalized Pentagon view

toward military intervention.

Notes

1. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 58.

2. Ibid., 58–59.

3. Ibid., 62.

4. Ibid., 66–67.

5. Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations (New York: St.

Martin’s Press, 1997), 105.

6. Ibid., 103–4.

7. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGrawHill, Inc., 1979), 113–14.

8. Ibid., 114.

9. Jimmy Carter, Living Faith (New York: Times Books, 1996), 100.

10. Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Strategy: An Introduction

to National Security Processes and Problems (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.:

Air University Press, 1988), 28–30.

11 . Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and

Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard

University Press, 1957), 69.

12. Ibid., 68.

13. Kissinger, 19.

14. Ibid., 30.

15 . Ibid.

16. Brown, 23.

17. Kissinger, 46.

18. Ibid., 30.

19 . Ibid., 52.

20. Brown, 24.

21. Kissinger, 48.

22 . Huntington, 90–91.

23. John T. Correll, “The Use of Force,” Air Force Magazine 82, no. 12

(December 1999): 38.

24. Huntington, 79.

25. Quoted in Correll, 38.

26 . Ibid.

27 . Huntington, 69.

28. Ibid., 63.

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29. Ibid., 38.

30 . Huntington, 68.

31. Quoted in Correll, 38.

32. Ibid.

33. Huntington, 79.

34 . Quoted in Correll, 38.

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Chapter 5

The Clinton Administration Case for

Intervening in Kosovo

The American people want their country’s foreign policy

rooted in idealpolitik as well as realpolitik. The United

States is uniquely and self-consciously founded on a set of

ideas, and ideals, applicable to people everywhere.

—Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott

This chapter focuses on the nonmilitary side of the decision

to intervene militarily in Kosovo. It outlines the Clinton administration’s policy on intervention for human rights, and

demonstrates how the lesson of Bosnia influenced the decision to intervene in Kosovo. Finally, it describes the administration’s application of the legal concept of humanitarian in -

tervention . Throughout the chapter, the case is made that the

administration’s policy toward human rights, both in theory

and practice, clearly reflected the liberal worldview.

Why Intervene?

One can argue that the Clinton administration’s decision to

intervene militarily in Kosovo was inevitable due to “brinkmanship diplomacy” in the Rambouillet process (named after

the city near Paris, France, where much of the failed negotia -

tions took place). Under such an argument, failure to carry

out Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and others’ repeated threats of military force would have threatened the

credibility and prestige of the United States. While this argu -

ment may have some validity, it is pure conjecture at this

point. Granting the benefit of the doubt, this study assumes

that the administration knew the possibility existed that its

threats might not have the desired effect upon the Milosevic

regime and that NATO, led by the United States, might be

forced to act. Given this assumption, the Clinton administra35
tion must have concluded that the situation in Kosovo was

worth the use of military force.

US National Security Strategy

A good place to begin this analysis is with the Clinton administration’s 1998 National Security Strategy Report , a congressionally mandated document outlining the nation’s grand

strategy, interests, and regional approaches to issues. In the

chapter, “Advancing U.S. National Interests,” the report says,

“We seek a world in which democratic values and respect for

human rights and the rule of law are increasingly accepted.

This will be achieved through . . . promoting an international

community that is willing and able to prevent or respond

effectively to humanitarian problems.”1 It further states, “In

some circumstances our nation may act because our values

demand it. Examples include responding to . . . violations of

human rights.”2

While the emphasis of these selections is clearly on such

liberal ideas as human rights, international law, and international community, these statements must be taken in the

context of the entire document, which blends concepts from

both the conservative and liberal views of the world. However,

these statements do show a predisposition to act in reaction to

violations of human rights. The intentionally vague qualifiers

“in some circumstances” and “may act” demonstrate that the

administration recognized the need for discrimination between

cases.

Never Againism

The Clinton administration’s predisposition for intervening

on behalf of human rights was strongly influenced by its in -

volvement in Bosnia. President Clinton, Secretary Albright,

and other national leaders of the Contact Group strongly believed they had waited too long to intervene in Bosnia, allowing thousands of needless deaths through “ethnic cleansing,”

a belief reaffirmed for the president by his reading of Richard

Holbrooke’s book, To End a War.

3

 President Clinton drew from

this experience when explaining America’s Kosovo policy.

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More than a month before the first NATO attacks in Kosovo

and Serbia, he said, “Bosnia taught us [that] violence we fail

to oppose leads to even greater violence we will have to oppose

later at greater costs.”4 Secretary Albright echoed the theme in

March when she said, “We are not going to stand by and

watch the Serbia authorities do in Kosovo what they can no

longer get away with in Bosnia.”5 Finally, in justifying the

military intervention in Kosovo, Clinton repeated the theme:

“In the Balkans, inaction in the face of brutality simply invites

more brutality.”6

This concept of never againism, which weighed so heavily on

the consciences of President Clinton and Secretary Albright,

has classic liberal roots—concern for individual human life

and preservation of human rights. Both the president and

secretary of state accepted the liberal idea that the United

States, as the world’s only superpower, had a moral obligation

to take action when such principles were threatened. Guilt

over late action in Bosnia (and no action in Rwanda, where

one million people were savagely killed)7 surely was reflected

in National Security Advisor Anthony Lake’s 1996 comment,

“When millions of human lives are at risk, the world’s most

powerful nation cannot simply sit on the sidelines. The American people will not allow it—and that is to their credit.”8

Humanitarian Intervention

While the notion of never againism influenced President

Clinton to take early action in Kosovo to protect the lives and

human rights of ethnic Albanians, the actual justification for

military force came from the concept of humanitarian interven -

tion, which is highly controversial in the realm of international

law. 9 The putative doctrine of humanitarian intervention has

two parts:

The use of force on behalf of universal values instead of the narrower

national interests for which sovereign states have traditionally fought;

and, in defense of these values, military intervention in the internal

affairs of sovereign states rather than mere opposition to cross-border

aggression, as in the Gulf War of 1991.10

According to this idea, states can lose their legal right to

internal noninterference (a basic right of sovereignty) in the

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case of gross violations of human rights.11 As John Shattuck,

assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and

labor, expressed it, “When early warning measures fail, active

intervention becomes necessary, especially when large numbers of civilians are threatened by violations of international

humanitarian law.”1 2 Thus, according to Dr. Javier Solana,

secretary general of NATO, NATO’s military action was directed toward

disrupting the violent attacks being committed by the Serb Army and

Special Police Forces and weakening their ability to cause further

humanitarian catastrophe. . . . Our objective is to prevent more

human suffering and more repression and violence against the civilian

population of Kosovo. . . . We must halt the violence and bring an end

to the humanitarian catastrophe now unfolding in Kosovo. . . . We

must stop an authoritarian regime from repressing its people in

Europe at the end of the twentieth century. We have a moral duty to

do so. 1 3

President Clinton added that Operation Allied Force was

designed “to deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent

civilians.”1 4

The application of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo has

its roots in classical liberalism. When President Wilson spoke

of fighting for “the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts, for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments,”1 5

he could have been speaking on behalf of Kosovo’s ethnic

Albanians. When Samuel Huntington wrote that “the liberal

will normally support a war waged to further liberal ideals

[because] war on behalf of universally true principles of justice

and freedom” is moral,1 6 he sounds remarkably like Dr. Solana

defending war in Kosovo or Assistant Secretary of State Shattuck defining humanitarian intervention.

The similarity between the rhetoric of the Clinton and Wilson administrations is no coincidence. Both shared a liberal

belief in America’s moral obligation to crusade for such universal values as democracy, human rights, and self-determination. In Kosovo, Clinton carried on the Wilson tradition as

adapted by President James E. “Jimmy” Carter Jr., namely,

that the civilized forces of the world have an obligation to

enforce human rights. 1 7 What made Clinton’s contribution to

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the liberal tradition unique was his willingness to intervene

militarily on behalf of these liberal values. This so-called “Carterism with bullets” is a messianic, crusading, and hawkish

view of the world that is entirely liberal. 1 8

Summary

The Clinton administration’s decision to intervene in Kosovo

was based on its policy of intervention for human rights and

was influenced by experience in Bosnia. The administration’s

application of humanitarian intervention was an inheritance

and extension of the liberal worldview. While promotion of h uman rights is nothing new in American foreign policy, pursuing

a value-based policy with military force, or Carterism with

bullets, is a new concept consistent with the liberal tradition.

Notes

1. National Security Council, National Security Strategy Report, October

1998, 5; on-line, Internet, 10 November 1999, available from

http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/nschome.html#doc.

2. Ibid., 5–6.

3. Michael Elliot, “Mission Uncertain,” Newsweek , 5 April 1999, 19;

Douglas Waller, “Packing Heat,” Time 153, no. 8 (1 March 1999), 33; Marc

Weller, “The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,” International Affairs 75,

no. 2 (2 April 1999), 212.

4. “A Toe in the Kosovo Waters,” The Economist 350, no. 8107 (20–26

February): 58.

5. Ibid., 58.

6. Elliot, 13.

7. Gerry Gendlin, “Dangers of the ‘Clinton Doctrine,’” National Security

Studies Quarterly IV, issue 2 (Spring 1998): 58.

8. Ibid., 53.

9. Michael Mandelbaum, “A Perfect Failure,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 5

(September–October 1999), 5; Weller, 217.

10. Mandelbaum, 5.

11. Ibid., 6.

12. John Shattuck, “Promoting the Rule of Law in the Post-Cold War

World,” National Security Studies Quarterly IV, issue 2 (Spring 1998): 81.

13. Dr. Javier Solana, press statement, 23 March 1999, 2; on-line,

Internet, 10 November 1999, available from http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/

1999/p99-040e.htm.

14. Elliot, 18.

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15. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994),

48.

16. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and

Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of

Harvard University Press, 1957), 91.

17. Paul Starobin, “The Liberal Hawk Soars,” National Journal, 14 May

1999, 3; on-line, Internet, 23 September 1999, available from

http://www.nationaljournal.com/njstories/0514nj1.htm.

18. Ibid., 3.

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Chapter 6

Conclusions

A democratic definition of the national interest does not

accept the distinction between a morality-based and an

interest-based foreign policy. Moral values are simply

intangible interests. Leaders and experts may point out the

costs of indulging these values. But if an informed public

disagrees, experts cannot deny the legitimacy of public

opinion. Polls show that the American people are neither

isolationist nor eager to serve as the world’s police. But

finding a middle course is proving difficult and complex.

—Joseph S. Nye Jr.

The US military holds an institutionalized philosophy of

conservative realism. This philosophy stems from the nature

of the military profession itself, and is transmitted to succeed -

ing generations of officers through the military’s unique cultural, historical, and educational traditions. The philosophy

affects everything from how officers live their lives to how they

view the world. Within this paradigm, the military views war

as a legitimate political tool undertaken only as a last resort,

and then only for promoting or defending the nation’s survival

or vital interests.

The Pentagon resisted the decision to intervene militarily in

Kosovo, at least in part, because fighting for human rights

was incompatible with the military’s conservative philosophy.

Indeed, the Clinton administration’s justification for military

intervention stemmed from the liberal, Wilsonian tradition of

basing foreign policy on universal principles rather than interests. Such a rationale was antithetical to the military’s interest-based, conservative realism.

Significance for the Future

The US military’s institutionalized conservatism and resistance

to humanitarian war pose three issues for the future. First,

because the military’s conservative philosophy is institutional41
ized, it is deeply entrenched. Given the profession’s unique

culture, in which tradition and hard-learned lessons resonate, it

is unlikely that the experience in Kosovo or the effects of a

single administration can significantly alter the underlying

military belief that the mission is to “fight and win the nation’s

wars” and that these wars must be based on the nation’s

survival or vital interests. While marginal, short-term changes in

force pos ture or philosophy may occur due to the efforts of a given

admini- stration, bureaucratic resistance to such change will be

strong.

Second, civil-military relations will inevitably be better when

administrations share the military’s conservative philosophy.

Liberal administrations will find little Pentagon support for

humanitarian war and related military operations. Although

respect for civilian control of the military is perhaps the most

deeply entrenched value in the US armed forces, military resistance to liberal applications of force could strain the civilmilitary relationship to the point where the military’s advisory

role diminishes. Such diminishment occurred in the early

years of the Vietnam War with disastrous consequences. To

avoid such occurrences in the future, military and civilian

leaders must recognize and bridge the philosophical gap separating them through mutual respect and earnest engagement.

Finally, a conservative military resistant to cavalier uses of

military force serves the nation’s interests. To prevent America

from searching, in John Quincy Adams’s words, for “monsters

to destroy,” a conservative military, armed with the institu -

tional memory of past wars won and lost, serves as an advisory brake to ill-conceived policies. Its advice, whether accepted or not, encourages a president to weigh carefully the

risks to American servicemen and women against the nation’s

policy objectives. Armed with such advice, the president can

better attempt to fulfill Leo Tolstoy’s dictum: “And it is as

much the duty of anyone who governs to avoid war as it is the

duty of a captain of a ship to avoid shipwreck.”1

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Notes

1. Leo Tolstoy, The Kingdom of God Is within You: Christianity Not as a

Mystic Religion but as a New Theory of Life , trans. Constance Garnett

(Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 153.

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Appendix

1998–99 Survey of American

Military Officers and Civilian Leaders

Military Leaders Number Percent

Army War College 72 9.9

Naval War College 334 46.2

National Defense University 156 21.6

Capstone 68 9.4

Command and Staff College 93 12.9

 Total 723 100.0

Civilian Leaders Number Percent

Who’s Who in America 575 58.1

Media 44 4.4

Politics 46 4.7

Clergy 65 6.6

State Department 37 3.7

Foreign Policy Experts 57 5.8

Who’s Who in American Women 80 8.1

Labor Leaders 31 3.1

Duke Seniors 54 5.5

 Total 989 100.0

43
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47
Military Resistance to Humanitarian

War in Kosovo and Beyond

An Ideological Explanation

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

John Jordan

Copy Editor

Lula Barnes

Book Design and Cover Art

Daniel M. Armstrong

Composition and

Prepress Production

Mary P. Ferguson