No. 180, April 2001 Strategic Forum 1

Strategic Forum

T

en years after the Cold War, the United

States is still looking for an organizing

principle to guide policy toward Russia.

Because of its systemic weakness, neither

partnership nor competition is an appropriate

concept. Washington should put aside its

search for a comprehensive concept in dealing with Moscow and pursue a case-by-case

approach rooted in specific U.S. interests.

Priority interests involve a redefined

strategic relationship, including Russian

acquiescence to national missile defense;

collaboration by Moscow in combating the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

and other destabilizing technologies; and

inducing Russia to base its behavior on respect for the international norms to which it is

committed. The United States should be prepared to deemphasize other issues, such as

conventional arms sales, that do not threaten

core national interests.

The Bush administration needs to communicate its intent to respect Russian interests, while making it clear that a productive

relationship will depend primarily on Russian

willingness to adhere to the values shared by

the United States and other democratic nations. The choice of what kind of relationship

Russia wants is largely in its own hands.

However, Russia’s chaotic policymaking

and the mismatch between its ambitions and

capabilities preclude resolving key bilateral

issues. Therefore, prospects for engaging

Russia constructively appear dim and the

United States will have to go it alone in areas

where Russian acquiescence is lacking.

Ten years after the end of the Cold War,

mutual hopes that a comprehensive partnership would replace containment as the major

organizing theme in U.S.-Russian relations

have not been realized. The record of the 1990s

has left both Russia and the United States

unsatisfied. Russia looks back at the decade

with bitterness and a feeling of being marginalized and slighted by the world’s sole remaining superpower. It is also disappointed by its

experience with Western-style reforms and

mistrustful of American intentions. The United

States is equally disappointed with Russia’s lack

of focus, inability to engage effectively abroad,

and failure to implement major reforms at

home. A comprehensive partnership is out of

the question. Renewed competition or active

containment are also not credible as organizing principles. Russia’s economic, military and

political/ideological weakness makes it an

unlikely target of either U.S. competition or

containment. Not only is Russia no longer a

superpower, but its status as a regional power is

in doubt.

Current thinking about Russia is divided

among four basic approaches: Forget Russia,

Enfant Terrible Russia, Evil Russia, and

Russia First. The Forget Russia view holds

that Russia is too weak, too corrupt, and too

chaotic to matter. After 10 years of trying to

help Russia, the United States should focus its

resources and attention on more deserving and

important world issues.

The Enfant Terrible view holds that,

although Russia has been an irresponsible and

irritating partner, it is too weak to hurt the

United States and therefore need not be feared

in earnest. President Vladimir Putin’s visits to

Cuba and North Korea, courtship of Slobodan

Milosevic, and welcoming of Iranian President

Mohammad Khatami to Moscow are of little

strategic consequence and thus not worth our

attention. This view presupposes the existence

of an important U.S.-Russian bilateral agenda

and the need to protect it from childish and

irresponsible Russian grandstanding. 

The Evil Russia view holds that Russian

courtship of Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea

is a deliberate effort to undermine U.S. influence in the world and recreate the Soviet

empire. Analysts embracing this view take less

notice of Russia’s diminished capabilities than

of ambitious rhetoric by Russian politicians.

Given Russia’s evil purposes, the United States

is already on a collision course with it and

might as well do everything it can to box

Russia in.

The Russia First view holds that Russia

still is the most important issue on the U.S.

foreign policy agenda. It accepts the premise

that the two sides have shared interests and

that Russia, once reborn as a stable, prosperous democracy, can be a U.S. partner and ally.

Therefore, the United States should actively

assist Russia in its transformation and engage

it in a broad and intense relationship with

renewed vigor and creativity.

There are shortcomings in all of these

approaches. Notwithstanding its precipitous

decline, to Forget Russia is clearly not an

option: the country’s geographic expanse,

nuclear arsenal, and proliferation potential

simply make it impossible for U.S. policymakers

to ignore. The Enfant Terrible view fails to take

Russia seriously and ignores the very real problems that exist between the two countries. The

Normalizing U.S.-Russian

Relations

by Eugene B. Rumer and Richard D. Sokolsky

No. 180

April 2001

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points
Evil Russia view risks inflating the threat and

making the myth of evil Russia a self-fulfilling

prophecy. The Russia First view is not

grounded in reality. After a decade of failure, it

should be clear that neither the specter of

Russia’s past nor the promise of its future

warrants a position near the top of the U.S.

foreign policy agenda.

The Need for Normalcy

Russia’s external weakness and internal

problems have left the United States without

an effective interlocutor, either as partner or

competitor. Thus, the United States should deal

with Russia on a case-by-case basis to advance

our interests, in much the same way we deal

with most other countries. This path will

sometimes lead toward partnership with Russia and at other times toward competition. It

may even result in a situation where Russia

and the United States find themselves as partners and competitors simultaneously in different parts of the world or on different issues.

Given its size, history, strategic nuclear

capabilities, and future potential, one is

tempted to overstate the importance of relations

with Russia and put them at the top of the U.S.

national security agenda. Except for geography

and nuclear weapons, however, there is little at

this stage to justify making relations with

Russia a top priority. Undoubtedly, Russia can

inflict unacceptable damage on the United

States. But fear of Russian nuclear weapons

should not be the driving element of the relationship. The hostility and ideological differences that divided the superpowers during the

Cold War are gone. The prospect of Russia

consolidating and rebuilding itself under a

militant authoritarian, nationalist regime is

remote. Therefore, fears of a deliberate surprise

attack on the United States are unjustified.

Despite a number of bilateral undertakings outside the Cold War-style security agenda,

ranging from regional diplomacy in the

Balkans to investment, U.S. engagement with

Russia, with the notable exception of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Initiative, is

limited. American investment in Russia is a

fraction of what it is in Europe or China, trade

rarely exceeds a few billion dollars a year, and

political and cultural relations are limited at

best. In other words, beyond traditional Cold

War issues, the United States has an extremely

narrow relationship with Russia, let alone

enough of a stake in it to merit a special place

on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Nonetheless,

while Russia is not a major player in Europe or

Northeast Asia, its proximity to Europe, Japan,

and China make it a focus of U.S. policy.

New Security Agenda

Throughout the 1990s the nature of U.S.

strategic interests in Russia shifted considerably. With the demise of the adversarial relationship, strategic stability has become a secondary or even tertiary concern for the United

States. By contrast, proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction (WMD)—and Russia’s role

in aiding and abetting this trend—has

emerged as a preeminent national security

challenge. U.S. security concerns with Russia,

therefore, are increasingly related to Russia’s

weakness and loss of control over its WMD,

rather than deliberate nuclear threats. The

challenge is preventing and controlling problems that stem from Russian weakness.

With the declining relevance of mutual

assured destruction (MAD) as the basis for

both the U.S. nuclear posture and U.S.-Russian strategic relations, defense against longrange ballistic missile attack has emerged as

one of the most prominent bilateral issues.

Currently, no issue on the U.S. national security agenda is more important than national

missile defense (NMD). There is a broad national consensus on the necessity of building 

a defense against limited ballistic missile

attacks. The question facing U.S. policymakers

is not whether to proceed with NMD deployment, but how and when. Thus, U.S. policy

toward Russia will be greatly affected by decisions in NMD. No administration official—

past or present—has articulated this sequence,

but its logic is inescapable, based on the national consensus about missile defense and the

declining importance of Russia on the U.S.

foreign policy agenda.

Accordingly, security policy toward Russia

needs to be adapted to new priorities. Pursuing

a new agenda will require adjusting our view of

Russia and how much it matters to us and in

world affairs. The United States cannot allow

fears of Russian nuclear capabilities to drive its

nuclear doctrine and force posture. Russia is

neither a superpower nor our enemy. In consequence, the United States should stop sizing

and structuring its strategic forces to implement a targeting strategy based on Cold War

arithmetic. Likewise, the Cold War approach to

arms control, which focuses on negotiating

legally binding treaties that codify numerical

parity and perpetuate the MAD principle, is no

longer relevant to U.S. strategic priorities.

Efforts to maintain this anachronistic process

are a distraction. Worse still, they make it more

difficult for the United States and especially

Russia to agree on NMD and the future of the

Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In particular,

both countries need to stop allowing considerations of preserving MAD, strategic stability, and

numerical parity to drive their policies. 

Bringing Russia to terms with NMD policy

will be the key challenge facing the Bush

administration in its Russia policy. Politically

and strategically, reaching a compromise with

Russia on a future NMD system that will allow

Moscow and Washington to preserve the ABM

Treaty is preferable, because it would help the

United States avoid the domestic and international fallout that would attend a unilateral

decision to withdraw from the ABMT. Thus, to

gain Russia’s acquiescence in NMD plans, the

Bush administration will need to reassure

Russia of its benign strategic intentions and

demonstrate with concrete actions that an NMD

system is not designed to give the United States

a first strike capability against Russian strategic

forces. Such steps could include: 

■ reducing strategic forces, unilaterally if

necessary, to 1,000–1,500 deployed warheads; 

■ reducing the alert status of strategic

forces;

■ allowing Russia to retain intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple,

independently targetable reentry vehicles

(MIRVs), which would allay Russian concerns

about NMD deployment’s impact on its retaliatory capabilities and allow it to sustain its

2 Strategic Forum No. 180, April 2001

Eugene B. Rumer is a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National

Defense University. Mr. Rumer can be contacted at (202) 686-2369 or rumere@ndu.edu. Richard D. Sokolsky

is currently a visiting fellow in the institute.

no issue on the national

security agenda is more

important than national

missile defense
strategic force posture in the most economical

way possible;

■ helping Russia to revitalize its decaying

early warning system;

■ looking for ways, without compromising

its effectiveness, to adjust the size, capabilities,

and architecture of a prospective NMD system

to make it less threatening to Russia;

■ pursuing a cooperative approach with

Russia, both globally and in Europe, to deploying missile defenses; and 

■ engaging Russia in a strategic dialogue

to promote better understanding of each side’s

nuclear policies.

Even if the administration were prepared

to take this path, it would still need to brace

itself for a Russian effort styled after the early1980s campaign to derail deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in

Europe. Leaving no doubt that an NMD deployment decision is unstoppable is a necessary, but

perhaps not sufficient, condition for securing

Moscow’s agreement to amend the ABM Treaty.

For a variety of reasons—Putin’s uncertain

control of the military, the fractiousness of

national security policymaking, and the lack of

clearly articulated foreign policy priorities—

the Putin government is likely to temporize on

a negotiated solution to the NMD/ABM Treaty

problem for as long as possible. It is also likely

to continue its international campaign to build

pressure against a U.S. deployment decision.

Indeed, given the domestic political context,

Putin may be reluctant to invest his political

capital and prestige in a difficult fight to overcome the opposition to NMD within the Russian military and security establishment.

Thus, the possibility remains that, even if

the new administration succeeds in creating an

aura of inevitability around NMD deployment,

the Putin government will maintain its opposition to changes in the ABM Treaty and force the

United States to bear the onus of withdrawing

from the treaty. If this were to occur, Russia

would likely retaliate, although the precise

nature of its response is difficult to predict in

large part because economic constraints will

limit the options available to Putin. More

importantly, the Russian response will be

constrained politically and strategically by the

refusal of the United States to engage in renewed competition.

Russia will almost certainly take whatever

measures it deems necessary to maintain an

effective strategic deterrent in the face of NMD

deployment. However, U.S. decisions on the

future of its strategic force posture could significantly affect the nature and scope of this

effort. Under any conceivable circumstances,

the Russian military response to NMD deployment is unlikely to trigger a renewed U.S.-

Russian arms race. The United States will not

increase the size of its strategic offensive forces

or missile defenses in response to Russia’s

reaction; and Russia’s tiny defense budget and

the shrinkage of its missile production infrastructure cannot sustain significant increases

to a force structure that is rapidly obsolescing. 

Russia has threatened to withdraw from

other arms control treaties should the United

States decide to deploy NMD and withdraw

from the ABM Treaty. Whether Moscow would

carry out these threats, which are intended to

drive a wedge between the United States and its

allies over NMD, is an open question. Leaving

aside the question of resources that might be

available to the Russian leadership to pursue

these retaliatory options, it is worth noting that

Moscow gains advantages from these treaties,

especially information on Western militaries

forces from inspections, data exchanges, and

other verification arrangements. In addition,

the practical military significance of Russian

repudiation of these treaties is limited, unless

Moscow takes the provocative but unlikely step

of deploying new intermediate-range nuclear

missiles in violation of the Intermediate-Range

Nuclear Forces Treaty, which would undermine

relations with Europe.

More problematic from a U.S. perspective

is whether a unilateral NMD deployment decision will have a negative impact on Russian

nonproliferation behavior. Russia is already

behaving badly in this area, and its assistance

to Iran’s nuclear weapons and missile development program is a major impetus to NMD

plans. More importantly, Russia’s proliferation

policies are driven to a significant degree by

domestic considerations rather than external

threat perceptions. These include commercial

gains, personal profit, the continuing influence

of the Russian defense industrial complex and

the relevant Russian security ministries, and

government unwillingness or inability to rein

in freewheeling Russian enterprises. Consequently, failure to reach agreement on the

NMD/ABM Treaty issue is unlikely to have an

appreciable impact on Russian nonproliferation policies, although Moscow could provide

countermeasures technologies to help states of

concern overcome missile defense.

Russian Behavior at

Home and Abroad 

The U.S. experience of the 1990s in trying

to engineer Russia’s internal evolution has left

a legacy of dissatisfaction and mutual suspicion in both countries. That experience

demonstrated the limited U.S. ability to provide

effective support while respecting Russian

sensitivities. It has also showed that Russian

reform and political and economic development is best left to the Russians. Still, the

United States cannot turn a blind eye to Russian domestic conditions. At the very least, no

U.S. administration can afford to do so for

political reasons, since crime and corruption,

freedom of religion, the well-being of various

ethnic groups, and other such issues command

strong grassroots support in the United States.

Indeed, the efforts of Russian nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs) to promote democratic

reform in Russia have produced an NGO constituency in the United States whose views

cannot be disregarded. Russia’s internal political climate will endure as a U.S. concern.

Russia’s neighbors in the former Soviet

Union represent another area of concern. While

none has emerged as an important U.S. partner

or a major threat, Washington has repeatedly

endorsed their independence and provided

them with material and political support.

Through its actions and official statements

since 1991, the United States has created a

perception that it is the de facto guarantor of

their independence. A reversal or erosion of

their independence as a result of external

interference—Russian or otherwise—would

run counter to U.S. interests and reflect negatively on the United States. Moscow’s continuing problems in Chechnya make it clear that it

has neither the resources nor the vision necessary to play the role of the security manager in

the former Soviet Union. Nor can the United

No. 180, April 2001 Strategic Forum 3

Russia will almost

certainly take whatever

measures it deems

necessary to maintain an

effective strategic

deterrent in the face of

NMD deployment
4 Strategic Forum No. 180, April 2001

States acquiesce to the Russian aspiration for a

droit de regard over its neighbors—which

Moscow considers a legitimate interest—

without compromising their independence and

sovereignty.

Russian respect for these two U.S. concerns—human rights and relations with the

former Soviet states—will not be easy to secure. Given the limited nature of U.S. interests

in much of the former Soviet Union, the United

States has two effective levers at its disposal. It

can offer financial support to programs that

further human rights and the independence of

the former Soviet states. In addition, in the

event it disapproves of Moscow’s actions in

these areas, Washington can keep high-level

political contacts to a minimum, thus in effect

downgrading the bilateral relationship with

Moscow. In most other areas—cutting off CTR

funds, for example—the United States would

run the risk of undermining its own interests.

Engaging the Allies

Managing the U.S.-Russian relationship

will require close coordination and consultation

with our European allies, including the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization. The United States

and its European allies see Russia in very different terms. Growing U.S. perceptions of Russia

as a former superpower in terminal decline are

not shared in Europe, where Russia is given

better odds of making a comeback. Still, Europe’s geographic proximity to Russia means

that it poses a major security concern either as

a failing state or as a regional power on the

mend. Coupled with European nervousness

about NMD, Europe presents Russia with an

opportunity to conduct its anti-NMD diplomacy

and attempt to rekindle transatlantic tensions.

Consulting with the allies on Russia,

therefore, will be a crucial element of U.S.

policy toward Russia and Europe. The United

States will need to make clear that it has no

desire to weaken or isolate Russia. At the same

time, the Bush administration will need to

dispel allied illusions about Russia and its

prospects either as a partner or as a problem.

Indeed, the Bush administration should underscore that its NMD policy must not be seen in

isolation but rather as part of a much broader,

forward-looking vision—to move beyond Cold

War-era strategic doctrine and force structure

and to address the real security threats to the

United States and its allies, notably the proliferation threat that stems from Russian weakness.

Focusing on NMD

The importance of NMD on the national

security agenda of the United States means that

the new administration will need to be selective

in engagement with Russia. While the United

States can ill-afford to ignore major security

issues, such as WMD proliferation and CTR, it

should not burden the agenda with complaints

about Russian conventional arms sales and

unilateral sanctions that have little hope of

deterring or punishing Russian behavior.

Russia’s inclination to sell the cheap and

reliable systems its industry still can produce is

not likely to be affected by U.S. demarches,

since these sales are seen by Moscow as a major

source of export revenues. In the longer run,

Russia’s ability to develop, manufacture, and

sell highly sophisticated conventional weapons

is likely to erode due to the deterioration of the

defense industrial sector. Thus, the United

States should not become overly preoccupied

with Russian sales of small arms, relatively

unsophisticated artillery systems and infantry

equipment, or current-generation fighter

aircraft. In short, the United States should

adopt a more discriminating approach to

Russian arms sales, which would also enhance

the credibility of U.S. demarches to Moscow in

key areas that really matter to U.S. interests.

While seeking to convince the Russian

Government of the extent of its commitment to

NMD, the administration will need to underscore to Russian elites that the United States is

ready for engagement on a host of issues.

These include strategic arms reductions,

whether unilateral, parallel, or negotiated;

cooperation in developing missile defenses and

modifying the ABM Treaty; talks about Russian

accession to the World Trade Organization; and

expanding cooperation on regional and

transnational issues ranging from terrorism to

stability in Central Asia. However, only a few of

these—such as Russian cooperation in promoting stability and reducing threats in Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf—merit a

prominent place on the high-level agenda

between the two governments and can be

handled at the expert level.

The Bush administration faces the challenge of convincing Russian leaders and political elites that the key to a successful relationship with the United States is in their hands,

that only they can make the right choice that

will put the two countries back on the path

toward cooperation and partnership. That

challenge also entails communicating to

Russia that a positive relationship with the

United States calls for a certain comfort level

with Russia for the people and the leaders of

the United States. And this will depend to a

large degree on Russian willingness and ability

to abide by the principles and values the United

States and its allies share at home and abroad.

Russia’s position in today’s world does not

entitle it to a special relationship with the

United States. Russia is in decline, its population shrinking, its economy in tatters, its government in disarray, and its leadership unable

to articulate a realistic vision for renewal and a

clear sense of national identity. In light of these

conditions, the United States cannot force

Moscow to embrace democratic principles and

values, including respect for human rights,

press freedom, and sovereignty of one’s smaller

neighbors. Nor does the United States have the

leverage to force Moscow to abandon its fondness for regimes that are hostile to the United

States. But the United States should not compromise on important interests or principles

and should be ready to confront Russia when

its actions threaten these interests.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by

members of the National Defense University as well as

other scholars and specialists in national security affairs

from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions,

and recommendations expressed or implied within are

those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect

the views of the Department of Defense or any other

agency of the Federal Government.

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the United States should

not become overly

preoccupied with Russian

sales of small arms