COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR 

PEACE OPERATIONS 

Written By 

DR. DAVID S. ALBERTS 

and 

DR. RICHARD E. HAYES 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

NDU Press Book 

May 1995 
Table of Contents 

Introduction......................................................................................................................... 1 

Key Concepts...................................................................................................................... 2 

Tensions Between Principles of War and Peace Operations ............................................ 11 

Military Capabilities Required for Success ...................................................................... 16 

Recent US Experience with Command Arrangements..................................................... 17 

Alternative Approaches to Command Arrangements....................................................... 34 

Assessing Alternative Command Arrangements .............................................................. 45 

Conclusions....................................................................................................................... 57 

Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 60 
1 

Introduction 

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the United States (US) as the only 

remaining superpower in a world increasingly characterized by disorder, the US has 

found itself involved in a number of "peace operations." These are complex, nontraditional missions that areas much political as they are military. Moreover, their 

successful conduct requires the US military to work with a wide variety of institutions 

and organizations; including foreign governments, non-national political actors, 

international organizations, and private voluntary organizations (PVOs), as well as the 

variety of US government agencies and foreign military forces who are typically part of a 

peace operations coalition. 

The debate regarding the wisdom of and the conditions under which the US should 

engage in such peace operations continues unabated. However, the reality for the defense 

establishment is that these operations will remain important for the foreseeable future. 

The consequences of failure to perform them effectively cannot be over-emphasized. 

Massive human rights abuses in Haiti, starvation in Somalia, genocide in Rwanda, 

persecution of minorities in Iraq, bitter ethnic warfare in the former Yugoslavia, and 

continued civil war in Cambodia are all too obvious examples. 

While there are many differences between these non-traditional operations and more 

customary combat missions, they share the requirement for effective command and 

control (C2). Indeed, because overwhelming force can often overcome C2 problems in 

warfare, but cannot be counted on in peace operations, command arrangements may be 

more important in peace operations. 

By almost any measure, the US experience shows that traditional C2 concepts, 

approaches, and doctrine are not particularly well suited for peace operations. This paper 

(1) explores the reasons for the mismatch between traditional US C2 and peace 

operations, (2) examines alternative command arrangements approaches, and (3) 

describes the attributes of the command arrangements needed to manage peace operations 

effectively. 

The approach is to, first, briefly examine the key concepts - C2, command arrangements, 

and peace operations - needed to compare peace and war missions; second, review the 

command arrangements employed in a variety of recent coalition warfighting and peace 

operations and lessons learned from those experiences; third, review state-of-the-art 

knowledge for designing ideal command arrangements; and finally, posit a system for 

assessing the adequacy of command arrangements in peace operations. This allows the 

US experience in peace operations to serve as an empirical basis for the development of 

improved approaches, concepts, and designs for command arrangements. 
2 

Key Concepts 

Command and Control 

Command and control is the military term for management of personnel and resources. 

Because warfare is qualitatively different from other aspects of society, C2 concepts both 

pre-date, and have evolved separately from industrial management. Few human 

endeavors have either the time criticality or the high cost of error of warfare. These two 

crucial characteristics have shaped thinking about C2. 

The official US definition of C2 is provided in a Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication (JCS 

Pub. 1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms), "The exercise of authority and 

direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the 

accomplishment of a mission."This includes the militarily crucial term, command, which 

is formally defined (also in Pub. 1) as, 

The authority that a commander in the military service lawfully exercises 

over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the 

authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and 

for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and 

controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It 

also includes the responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline 

of assigned personnel. 

Several things are worth noting about these definitions. First, C2 involves the exercise of 

authority over assigned forces. Second, the term C2 is quite encompassing, including 

personnel arrangements, procedures, systems, and facilities. Third, C2 extends well 

beyond decision making and issuing orders, to include the full cycle of decision making 

activities, from situation assessment, planning (anticipatory decision making),and 

gathering the information needed to assess the effectiveness of the actions taken, back to 

assessment of the situation resulting from those actions and of enemy responses to them. 

C2 also includes taking responsibility for the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of 

the military organization. In other words, C2 includes responsibilities that are associated 

with motivation, leadership, team building, management, and control. 

The term "command and control" did not come into use until after World War II (WWII). 

Prior eras referred only to command. While no one knows why the language changed, 

two of the explanations offered are worth noting. One argues that it derives from the 

proposition that, "One commands men, while one controls machines." This approach 

recognizes the increasing reliance on hardware and technology on the battlefield. The 

other explanation suggests that when a situation reaches a certain level of complexity (or 

chaos), people must concentrate on control. Hence, tacking the word "control" onto 

command gives it the proper emphasis. Derivatives from this theory have brought us C3 

(adding communications), C3I (adding intelligence), and C4I (adding computers). For 

purposes of this paper, C2 is taken to imply all these dimensions. 
3 

Some authors have stressed the difference between command and control. For example, 

Bolger (1990) notes the difference between the leadership role of the commander and the 

more quantitative control processes that are largely undertaken by the staff. More 

recently, LTG Schoffner(Commander, Combined Arms Center, US Army), stressed that 

same difference, which is shown graphically in Figure 1. 

• Command is primarily an art. Commanders formulate concepts, visualize a future 

state, assign missions, allocate resources for those missions, assess risk, and make 

decisions. During the fight, commanders see and understand the battlefield, go to 

the right place at the right time, and anticipate change. Commanders lead, guide, 

and motivate their soldiers and organizations to accomplish missions and to win 

decisively. Command is the commander's business. 

• Control, on the other hand, is a science of regulating forces and functions on the 

battlefield to execute the commander's intent. Control is a more precise means 

through which staffs support their commander's intent and work with other staffs. 

Control...is primarily the staff's business. (Schoffner, 1993) 

Van Creveld (1985) adds an important perspective by stressing that command is an effort 

to deal with uncertainty and that command and control systems exist to support that 

effort. From this perspective, the leadership component of C2 helps by creating own 

force capability and ensuring that those forces perform effectively. The systems that 

provide information about the war-fighting environment and communicate that 

information and the commander's directives throughout the command are also crucial for 

success. 
4 

Command can take three very different forms in peace operations: Combatant Command 

(COCOM), Operational Control (OPCON), or Tactical Control (TACON). Combatant 

Command means owning the forces. The commander has the full range of authority and 

responsibility inherent in the concept of military command. Because governments will 

almost never surrender sovereignty and aspects of command, such as force structure, 

promotion, and discipline, commanders in peace operations seldom have genuine 

COCOM over forces not from their own nation. 

Operational Control allows for maximum control without full command or 

the burden of support. Some officers describe this as the equivalent of 

long-term leasing. The Clinton Administration policy on reforming 

multilateral peace operations, embodied in Presidential Decision Directive 

25 (PDD-25) indicates that the US President will, "on a case by case basis, 

consider placing appropriate US forces under the operational control of a 

component UN commander to achieve specific military objectives."It 

notes that, 

Operational control is a subset of command. It is given for a specific time frame or 

mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to US forces already deployed by the 

President and assign tasks to US units led by US officers. Within the limits of operational 

control, a foreign UN commander cannot: change the mission or deploy US forces 

outside the area of responsibility agreed to by the President, separate units, divide their 

supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change the internal organization. 

Tactical Control is equivalent to short-term rental. A commander is allowed to use forces 

without the burden of supporting them, but also knows that they may be reassigned at any 

time. JCS Pub. 1 does not recognize TACON as an official term, but notes that in NATO 

it means, "the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or 

maneuvers necessary to assign missions and assigned tasks." 

Note, also, that when a commander has OPCON or TACON of forces, they retain their 

linkage to another military organization which retains a range of authorities over and 

responsibilities for them. As forms of control, OPCON and TACON do not convey the 

full set of command responsibilities and prerogatives. 

Major US military operations are now almost always "joint." This simply means that 

forces from more than one Service participate under a single commander. In addition, as 

the size of US forces has been drawn down and US military posture has evolved from one 

based on large, forward-deployed forces toward one of expeditionary forces based in the 

continental United States (CONUS), the likelihood that any one unified CINC will have 

COCOM of all the forces required for a large operation has declined. To permit optimal 

use of important, scarce resources, new unified and specified commands such as 

TRANSCOM (the Transportation Command) and SOCOM (the Special Operations 

Command)have been created to support the more traditional geographic CINCs such as 

CINCPAC (Commander in Chief, Pacific) or CINCCENT (Commander in Chief, Central 

Command). 
5 

Current doctrine for US war-fighting C2 is shown in Figure 2, "Typical Joint C2." The 

National Command Authority (NCA), which consists of the President and his advisors 

(including the Joint Chiefs of Staff),provides overall strategic guidance. One CINC, 

usually a theater commander such as CINCPAC or CINCCENT, provides the operational 

guidance inclose cooperation with the commander of the CJTF (Combined Joint Task 

Force). Supporting CINC efforts are directed by the NCA (CINCs are equals and do not 

direct one another's efforts) and coordinated at all appropriate levels. The CJTF is usually 

made up of force components that are functionally differentiated - air, ground, maritime, 

logistics, and so forth. The CJTF is seldom the unit with COCOM for all these forces. 

Indeed, CJTF's are often ad hoc organizations made up of a commander and a rapidly 

assembled staff. Ideally, however, they include a commander of appropriate rank and 

experience with an existing staff, perhaps augmented to ensure adequate capacity and 

appropriate expertise to manage the assigned forces effectively. 

Command Arrangements 

While military systems can be understood in terms of C2, this language is too narrow to 

describe the organizational and institutional arrangements necessary for peace operations. 

As is discussed in detail below, peace operations are qualitatively different from warfighting and involve political relationships as much or more than military ones. US forces 

engaged in operations other than war (OOTW) are, for example, sometimes one 

component of the US country team, which is led by the US ambassador. Often 

coordination must also be effected with other parts of the US Government. In many 

cases, US forces in peace operations are part of a coalition, working in partnership with 

host country or other foreign forces, but not having direct command over them. Most 

peace operations also involve working closely with a variety of non-governmental 
6 

organizations (NGOs) and/or private voluntary organizations (PVOs)such as the Red 

Cross or Doctors Without Borders, whose humanitarian or other functions make them 

important to overall mission accomplishment. In some cases, such as Somalia or Haiti, 

US forces must also work directly with local political or traditional leaders (tribal or clan 

chiefs, etc.). Effective military C2 depends on organized, effective, and efficient 

interactions with the entire range of relevant actors. 

Relationships with these actors are anything but military command relationships. Indeed, 

few of them will take direction from military leaders. Yet, the ability to achieve military 

missions during peace operations depends on dealing with them effectively. Information 

must be exchanged with this diverse group of players. They must be taken into account 

when the situation is assessed, when alternative courses of action are developed and 

considered, when decisions are taken, when actions are being coordinated, and when 

directives for military forces are developed. This broad set of relationships needed for 

success is more properly understood as "command arrangements" than as any 

relationship found in the military C2 literature. To be successful in peace operations, a 

system of effective command arrangements must be developed. 

Peace Operations 

The last key term needed to understand this analysis is "peace operations."Even the 

language for describing peace operations remains unsettled, at least partly because the 

explosion of relevant experience continually introduces new interpretations and 

distinctions. Wiseman (1983) notes the distinction between operations carried out under 

Chapter VI of the UN Charter, dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes, and those 

carried out under Chapter VII, dealing with enforcement measures. He credits former UN 

Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold with creating the phrase, "Chapter VI and-a-half" 

to describe situations that fall between the two categories. However, Hammarskjold was 

referring to the absence of UN Charter references to armed peace-keeping missions rather 

then the current UN experience of inserting combat troops to impose the international 

will on belligerents. The key distinctions are illustrated on Figure 3, "Spectrum of Recent 

United Nations Peace operations." Note that wars are not peace operations. When the 

international community, or one or more nations acting on behalf of the international 

community, enters a war to reverse aggression, as was the case in the Korean Conflict 

and Operation Desert Storm, the goals are classic warfare goals - imposition of your will 

on the enemy by force of arms- and the proper command arrangements and C2 systems 

are best derive from the history, theory, and relevant technological state-of-the-art in 

warfare. Note, also, that many cases move between situations. October 1994, US and 

coalition partner troop movements to the Iraq-Kuwaiti border, for example, could have 

deteriorated from a Chapter VII situation into war-fighting had the Iraqis not backed 

down. 

Classic peacekeeping operations (Chapter VI) assume that the parties to a conflict want 

peace and desire the presence of the peace operators. Hence, the military missions 

implied are really quite minimal - monitoring and reporting on the maintenance of ceasefires and demilitarized areas or providing a buffer force in zones of disengagement 

between the belligerents. Only minimal force is required. In fact, Mackinlay (1989) 
7 

identifies "use of force only in self- defense" as one of the principles of UN peacekeeping 

during the Cold War era. Moreover, the normal response by the United Nations was to 

retreat whenever consent was absent or overwhelming military force was encountered 

(Wiseman, 1983). However, the withdrawal of UN peacekeeping forces under pressure 

has been long considered a very serious step, inviting the recurrence of conflict. Indeed, 

one of defining events of the UN peace-keeping tradition was the withdrawal of the 

United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from the Middle East in May of 1967, which 

was followed in June by the Six Day War. Whether withdrawal stems from a lack of will 

on the part of the UN, participating countries, or public opinion, it removes the direct 

international sanction from the situation. Moreover, the threat to withdraw peacekeepers 

is often a powerful incentive for the parties to control their actions and forces and thus 

maintain the peace. 

The maintenance of stable conditions under which peace can flourish is the primary goal 

in peacekeeping operations. Successful peacekeeping operations can be sustained for 

years, or even decades (as they have in Cyprus, for example), because they represent a 

stable political situation, bloodshed is avoided, and the costs of observer forces are 

modest. Other examples of straight-forward, Chapter VI peacekeeping, include the Sinai 

and Golan missions in the Middle East and deployments in Macedonia to monitor 

embargo compliance and border crossings. 

By contrast, the use of military force to protect international peace and order, which 

belongs under the self-defense provisions of UN Charter, is international war. The 

Korean Conflict and Operation Desert Storm were major regional conflicts fought under 

United Nations mandates to deny success to international aggressors. The purposes of 

these UN- sanctioned military operations extended beyond creating or maintaining a 

peaceful state of affairs in the regions where they were fought to include preservation of 
8 

the principle that military aggression is wrong and must not become an accepted way for 

states to settle their disputes. This view is an extension of the feeling that the international 

community has a responsibility for checking naked aggression and should come to the aid 

of countries that are threatened or attacked. 

Both the Korean Conflict and Kuwait invasion situations were converted from wars to 

Chapter VII peace imposition operations when the hostilities were concluded and UN 

forces and Chapter VII mandates were converted to the use of force to ensure that peace 

terms were obeyed by unwilling aggressors. Similarly, the UN mandates that limit Iraqi 

military activities in border areas in order to protect minority populations are peace 

imposition operations, because force is maintained along the borders to impose the 

international community's will on Iraq, even within its own sovereign territory. 

Hence, just short of international war lies the region where the international community 

becomes involved because the consequences of allowing a conflict to continue are 

unacceptable. Widespread starvation in Somalia led to conversion of a Chapter VI 

peacekeeping mandate(1992) into Chapter VII peace imposition operations in 1993 by a 

US dominated coalition of UN forces under the command of a Turkish general. Initial 

success based on the overwhelming US force presence encouraged the UN to convert the 

Somalia mission to a peace enforcement one, with considerably less military force 

available. However, this mission failed and the peace operators have been withdrawn, as 

they were in the earlier UNEF operations, leaving Somalia to resolve its own conflicts. In 

these cases of peace imposition, the parties are in active conflict and the international 

community uses force or the threat of force to halt the bloodshed. 

Somewhat less dangerous situations, also under Chapter VII, call for peace enforcement

operations designed to hold the parties to an agreement that not all of them endorse 

strongly, to buy the time needed to raise the level of trust between the belligerents and to 

create an atmosphere in which they can participate in peaceful resolution of problems. 

These enforcement operations are likely to involve one party that does not believe that 

peace is the most favorable state of affairs. Sometimes, as in the many-sided conflicts in 

and around Bosnia-Herzegovina, peace enforcement deals with several parties unhappy 

with the existing arrangements by which the peace is maintained. 

When the international community takes the decision to intervene in a situation where the 

parties do not have consensus on the terms of peace, whether in the form of peace 

imposition or peace enforcement, the military elements of the peace operators have been 

assigned an extremely difficult mission. On the one hand, the physical risk is great, which 

means that the peace forces must be armed at least well enough to protect themselves. In 

many cases, their effectiveness depends on the perception that they have the military 

capability to take the offensive and impose their will on those who violate the established 

peace arrangements. At the same time, creation of an atmosphere of trust is essential. The 

peace forces cannot be seen as taking sides, lest they become participants in the conflict. 

Withdrawal is nota realistic option because it is a sign of weakness and/or a signal that 

the international community has failed to create the conditions necessary for peace. 

Finally, while the onus for failed peacekeeping operations falls on the belligerents who 

break their own peace arrangements and force peacekeepers to withdraw, the public 
9 

"blame" for failure of peace imposition or peace enforcement operations falls on the 

peace operators and their governments. 

In essence, the act of intervening makes the peace operators responsible for the outcome, 

despite the fact that they do not have full or direct control over the situation. For example, 

Somalia's apparent return to political and economic chaos is seen as a failure of the US 

and the UN, even though the political culture there is the root cause of the problem. 

Key Relationships Between Types of Peace Operations 

The distinction between traditional peacekeeping operations and the more active roles of 

peace enforcement and peace imposition were explored in detail at a workshop sponsored 

by the Center for Advanced Command Concepts and Technology (ACT) of the Institute 

for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in the summer of 1994 

(ACT,1994a). The insights derived from the workshop are summarized in Figure 4. 

Beyond the very different nature of the peace operators in Chapter VII as compared with 

Chapter VI operations, the nature of the command and control arrangements they imply is 

also striking. 

• The military missions change, from assuring stability through information and 

non-military deterrence, to more active ones of military deterrence, defense or 

denial of territory or military functions (such as flights over certain regions), and 

coercion or compellance. 

• The less stable the situation, the greater the military component of the mission, 

and vice-versa. The ability of a military force to act and be perceived as acting 

impartially declines with the degree of force it must apply to achieve its mission. 

• The measures of success for peacekeeping are stability and a transition to a longterm peace. Chapter VII operations must cross the "Great Divide" to Chapter VI 

peace operations before they can be seen as successful. Lengthy peace imposition 

or peace enforcement operations are failures by definition - bloodshed continues, 

stability does not really exist, peace is a chimera. 
10 

The most important single insight from the ACT Workshop on Combined and Coalition 

Peace Operations was, however, that peace operations close to the Great Divide 

represent the greatest challenge and account for the vast majority of troubled situations 

in the Post-Cold War era. 

In the words of the Workshop report, 

The popular phrase, "Chapter VI and a half operation," far from being a 

cute way to note the clever ambiguity of international diplomacy, was in 

fact a reci pe for disaster in which members of the international 

community inserted themselves into a conflict situation with the mindset, 

forces, and posture of a peacemaker. That is, they were organized and 

prepared for (and had sold their various constituencies on) an operation 

"above the GREAT DIVIDE," when the situation on the ground really 

belonged "below the GREAT DIVIDE." 

Indeed, the most difficult peace operations are those close to this dividing line. The closer 

the situation is to war (as often in the initial steps of peace imposition) the more useful 

are classic military command arrangements and practices. However, it is very difficult to 

transition to peacekeeping from active peace imposition or from even peace enforcement. 

Perhaps more importantly, peacekeeping operators who are faced with substantial active 

resistance may lack the force to defend themselves, the capacity to transition to more 

active military missions, or both. The tensions between the basic missions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement are a major challenge in designing C2 arrangements. 
11 

Tensions Between Principles of War and Peace Operations 

Neither command arrangements nor C2 systems (including commanders, staffs, and the 

equipment they use to perform C2 functions) actually carry out military missions. Rather, 

they perform the functions that organize, direct, and enable others to carry them out. 

Hence, they have no intrinsic value; their role is instrumental - they facilitate mission 

accomplishment. Effective command arrangements result ineffective military operations. 

One way the quality (effectiveness)of military operations has traditionally been assessed 

has been in terms of the proper balancing of the "principles of war" that have been used 

as shorthand guidelines by generations of military leaders. 

For a variety of reasons (ranging from the genuine complexity of military operations and 

the diversity of cultures within which the military art is practiced to simple egotism and 

the idiosyncracies of leading authors), no single list of principles of war has gained 

universal acceptance. An excellent concise summary of the candidates is included as an 

appendix to Hughes (1986). He compares lists from 350 BC (Sun Tsu) through 1976 

(Gorshkov). A fairly standard list is found in the US Army's basic field manual of 1945, 

which identifies seven principles: 

• Objective - All military activities must be focused on accomplishing the assigned 

mission or objective, which must, therefore, be clearly stated and understood by 

military leaders, staff, and personnel at all levels. 

• Simplicity - Because of the "friction" and "fog" of war as well as the difficulty of 

coordinating actions across time and space, military plans should be as simple as 

possible and must be within the capability of the forces in volved. When coalition 

forces are involved, this also includes transparency: making sure all elements of 

the force understand the plans fully. 

• Unity of Command - Divided command arrangements multiply the likelihood of 

confusion about the objective and the synchronization of forces as well as inviting 

multiple agendas in military councils. 

• Offensive - Passive military operations allow the adversary to select the time, 

place and terms of combat, permitting him to maximize his force's potential. 

Gaining control of selected aspects of the situation or accomplishing missions are 

both more likely and more efficient when the initiative is seized and the terms of 

battle are dictated to the enemy. 

• Concentration of Superior Force (sometimes termed Economy of Force) - No 

military organization can expect to have adequate forces to overwhelm the enemy 

in all places at all times. Superior command and control uses a variety of 

techniques to focus military pressure at critical times and places on the battlefield 

or within the campaign. This requires the ability to understand terrain, to know or 

infer from doctrine the disposition and activity of enemy forces, and to maneuver 

effectively. 
12 

• Surprise - However achieved, surprise confers massive advantage. Whether it 

consists of attacking along an unexpected axis, using weapons unknown to the 

enemy, adopting tactics that are unfamiliar, employing feints, decep tion 

operations, or psychological warfare; mission accomplishment is enhanced when 

surprise is achieved. 

• Security - Commanders must al so prevent their own forces from being surprised 

and take calculated risks rather than gambling their forces. Hence, security is 

vital. It ranges from counterintelligence to protect battle plans and commun 

ications security to surveillance plans and flank security elements. 

The principles of war are both interrelated (concentration of force depends on objective, 

simplicity, and unity of command) and somewhat contradictory. For example, 

concentration of force is always balanced against security; surprise almost always 

requires more complexity in the battle plan, etc. How- ever, effective C2 succeeds in 

balancing these different elements and making them mutually reinforcing. Similarly, 

effective command arrangements for peace operations must balance principles related to 

peace. 

While they may involve the use of force, peace operations are not war-fighting 

operations. As a consequence, both of their different purposes and of the different 

environments in which they take place, peace operations often force commanders to 

violate principles of war, which both increases the short-term military risk to the peace 

forces and makes their military commanders very uncomfortable. These conditions are 

exacerbated when the operations in question become coalition operations. 

The first principle of war that must be abandoned by peace operators is Surprise. Given 

that peace operations are intended to build trust and verify the continuation of an agreed 

set of physical conditions(a demilitarized zone, separation of forces, etc.), the peace 

forces themselves must be visible and prevent creating uncertainty on the"battlefield." 

Their physical security, as well as the stability of the peace arrangements, depends on the 

absence of surprises. As uncomfortable as the scene of US Marines landing at night on a 

Somali beach under television lights made the professional military feel, it was a correct 

peace operation event - the possibility of an accidental encounter with some party to the 

conflict there was minimized by advanced notice. 

As soon as Surprise is abandoned, Security is compromised. More importantly, however, 

peace operators must accept much greater risk than war-fighting troops. One of the 

interesting issues the US has faced in peace operations is that the traditional 

peacekeeping countries, such as the Scandinavians, believe that US forces are poorly 

suited for this type of duty because they are unwilling to take enough risk. For example, 

when US forces were first sent to Macedonia to join the UN peace observers there, the 

local UN commander noted that he could not trust US troops to allow themselves to be 

captured by hostile parties, which might bean essential part of local success as 

peacekeepers. Field operations by US forces were delayed while local training and 

situation familiarization were accomplished. 
13 

No principle of war is more violated in peace operations than the Offensive. Peace 

operations are inherently reactive and passive. Even when one of the parties appears to be 

preparing to violate a peace agreement, the peace operators are usually con-strained to 

warning the parties and threatening action if a violation occurs. In some cases, where the 

perceived costs of renewed violence are more than the risks assessed, peace forces might 

be moved into positions that make the violation more difficult, more visible, or more 

dangerous for the violator. However, even these types of action will certainly be seen as 

provocative or destroying trust by some parties. As noted earlier, in simple peacekeeping 

operations, the UN has traditionally threatened withdrawal as its most aggressive 

proactive action. 

Concentration of Superior Force can only be a last-resort tactic for peace operators and 

is often seen as provocative. Given that the peace forces do not want to become parties to 

the conflict, they must avoid creating threats to the belligerent parties. Moreover, 

assembly of major forces draws the attention of the parties and may cause them to 

concentrate their own forces, thereby creating a more dangerous situation. If anything, 

peace forces want to remain dispersed and ubiquitous in the areas they are responsible for 

monitoring. 

The principles of war that ought, ideally, be preserved in peace operations are Unity of 

Command, Objective, and Simplicity. However, even these are very difficult to achieve 

in any coalition operation and have proven extremely difficult in coalition peace 

operations. 

First, Unity of Command in a multinational force is virtually impossible. Neither the US 

nor any other power is likely to allow their forces to join a multinational peace operation 

and cut their ties to the national command structure and political agenda. The experience 

in Somalia, where national groups maintained dual chains of command and multiple 

agendas predominated, is mirrored by the independence of French behavior in Rwanda 

and the need for separate command arrangements for Arab forces in the Desert Storm 

coalition. Most authors now call for a conscious effort to achieve "Unity of Purpose" in 

peace operations. Even this is a very real challenge and depends as much or more on 

diplomatic relationships as on military ones. Moreover, even the military relationships 

must be more consultative than directive-driven. 

The principle of the Objective is obviously influenced heavily by the lack of Unity of 

Command. However, the importance of clearly articulated objectives is magnified in 

multinational forces. Given the absence of common doctrine or language, both detailed 

review of specific military objectives and the exchange of liaison officers to ensure ongoing dialogue and communication become essential for success. 

Simplicity also becomes a watchword in coalition operations, but is inherently much 

more difficult to achieve. Not only are the forces involved often very different in the level 

of sophistication of their weapons, training, and communications equipment; they are 

also often unfamiliar with one another. In many cases they have serious communications 

problems - linguistic and technical. Attempts at complex operations are, therefore, 

fraught with peril. Commanders must rely on a combination of tools, such as assigning 
14 

geographic and functional responsibilities to forces that have a history of working 

together effectively and using mission assignments that do not ask too much of forces 

with limited professionalism. These assignments must also be made in ways that are 

politically sensitive, so that home governments are receptive and the elements of the 

peace force perceive that they have appropriate roles. Making simple plans under these 

trying circumstances requires sophisticated and complex decision making and 

coordination. 

All this having been said, however, forces with missions such as peace imposition may 

well be conducting classic military operations. They will be relying on traditional 

principles of war except where that reliance makes it more difficult to achieve their 

overall mission. Such forces may well need to concentrate superior forces, rely on 

surprise, take measures to ensure the security of their forces and operating bases, and 

seize the military initiative. However, the goals of their operations will typically be 

limited and their offensive operations designed to establish the credibility of their forces 

and induce the parties to make greater efforts to find political solutions. They are unlikely 

to include the destruction of major forces or the creation of dangerous situations in which 

military force will be continually required to ensure the peace. 

The realistic principles for coalition peace operations therefore might best be stated as: 

• Unity of Purpose; 

• Consensus Planning; 

• Simplicity; 

• Adaptive Control; and 

• Transparency of Operations. 

The first three of these principles are closely interrelated. Unity of Purpose is created 

and maintained by adopting Consensus Planning. This permits the interaction necessary 

both to "hear" the range of national agendas relevant to the operation and to build 

confidence within the coalition. At the same time, Simplicity is essential both to ensure 

that consensus can be built and to make it easy to maintain the clear objectives and 

procedures on which effective Unity of Purpose depends. The lack of mutual doctrine, 

linguistic barriers (both cultural and professional), and differential levels of capability 

and training within a multinational force make complex plans into recipes for defeat. 

Where sophisticated military operations are required, they need to be stated as simple 

functional elements of the plan and left to specific national forces with the requisite 

capabilities (US, NATO, or other modern military establishments). In many cases these 

burdens will fall on US forces. 

Simplicity is the only principle that survives from the original list. In the context of 

coalition peace operations, however, its connotation shifts to both keeping the set of 

military plans simple and appropriate for the forces assigned and ensuring that directives 
15 

are clear and perceived correctly by all the elements of the peacekeeping force and the 

other agencies and organizations who are supporting the peace effort or whose activities 

will be impacted by them. In this sense,"simplicity" requires enormous effort and is also 

related to transparency. 

The other two principles are derived primarily from the nature of peace operations and 

the environments in which they are undertaken. The need for Adaptive Control is driven 

by the essentially passive and reactive nature of peace operations. It refers to 

understanding the situation well enough to specify the range of possible futures that can 

evolve, collecting and assimilating the information necessary to recognize which of those 

futures is emerging, and taking timely action to influence the course of events such that 

the mission or objective is achieved. Given that peace operations must be reactive, the 

only intelligent level of control to seek is adaptive, and the preparation of contingency 

plans to control major developments allows the maximum "pre-real time" planning. This 

also helps to keep plans simple and to allow consensus planning rather than reactive, ad 

hoc planning in a time-stressed environment. 

Transparency of Operations is primarily desirable so that the parties to the conflict are 

not surprised by peace operator actions and are given minimal opportunity to 

misunderstand them. For example, regular patrolling designed to minimize the 

opportunity for mischief is preferable to irregular patrolling designed to catch violators 

red-handed. Announced convoys of supplies and prearranged evacuations allow the peace 

operators to accomplish important objectives without creating uncertainty about their 

cargoes, purposes, or movements. Trans-parent operations are also easier to keep simple 

and generate consensus about. Hence, they are most likely to preserve Unity of Purpose

in the coalition. 
16 

Military Capabilities Required for Success 

Command and control and principles of war are not substitutes for having the full suite of 

military capabilities required for success. These include the basic military functions: 

• Force structure appropriate to the mission, 

• Personnel with appropriate experience and training, 

• Intelligence about the situation and potential adversaries, 

• Capacity for planning and coordination, 

• Logistics support, 

• Communications systems, and 

• Effective capability for civil-military relationships. 

These, in turn, must be applied in the heavily political context predominant in peace 

operations, as well as in concert with associated humanitarian efforts. 
17 

Recent US Experience with Command Arrangements 

Ideal command arrangements or C2 have not been achieved in recent US experience, 

particularly when coalition forces have been used for peace operations. Even when the 

US has been organizing its own forces, either as independent military organizations or as 

part of a coalition, US joint doctrine has not always been followed. For a variety of 

reasons, largely related to the political situations surrounding the peace operations, C2 

and other command arrangements have tended to evolve over time and be shaped by 

factors far removed from the key goals of organizing, deploying, or employing an 

effective force. 

An Example Coalition Peace Operation: Somalia 

Real-world peace operations are complex. Their organizational structures and command 

relationships evolve over time as a function of the missions assigned, the situation on the 

ground, both as the mission is first undertaken and as it evolves over time, the national 

governments involved, the forces each contributes, and the institutions that participate, 

such as the United Nations. Figure 5 shows, for example, the organizational structure of 

United Nations Forces in Somalia (UNOSOM) in the summer of 1993. Eighteen different 

nations contributed forces. Fourteen of them reported directly to the Force Commander, 

General Bir from Turkey. These ranged in size from companies to brigades and 

represented a myriad of different levels of military competencies and languages. All the 

national forces except those of the US were nominally under combatant command 

(COCOM) to UNOSOM - they were UNOSOM's forces to command and UNOSOM was 

responsible for their logistical support. 
18 

In fact, these forces operated under a variety of employment restrictions and maintained 

direct contact with their national governments. Missions were negotiated with them, not 

assigned to them. Three countries (Morocco, Zimbabwe, and Botswana), sent their forces 

under COCOM to the French brigade commander. However, these forces also retained 

direct ties to their home governments and participated actively in defining their own 

military missions and roles. Thus, the traditional military command prerogatives implicit 

in COCOM could not be fully exercised. Logistics support was often dependent on US 

forces, though the civilian UN procurement system was also active on some logistics 

matters. 

In fact, both the UN mission and the role of US forces in that mission developed over 

time and across changing circumstances. ACT was fortunate enough to host a workshop 

that reviewed the evolution of the coalition and its mission with the senior US officer 

who participated (ACT, 1994b). These events are also reviewed from the perspective of 

the US central command in a recent account of Operation Restore Hope (Freemanet. al, 

1993) by the US Deputy CENTCOM. 

US forces were nominally under the tactical control (TACON) of UNOSOM, but only 

when committed. As a practical matter, they were controlled by MG Montgomery, US 

Army, who was both the Deputy UNOSOM commander and the commander of all US 

forces in Somalia (USFORSOM). The structure reporting to him is shown in Figure 6. 

The main fighting elements were organized into a Quick Response Force (QRF) which 

was available for TACON to UNOSOM when MG Montgomery felt it was needed, a 

decision on which he consulted the US CINC responsible for the region, CINCCENT. 
19 

The US Logistic Support Command was continuously under MG Montgomery's OPCON 

in his role as Deputy UNOSOM commander. (As noted earlier, OPCON provides for 

longer-term control over the forces than TACON, while both relieve the commander 

from providing logistics support to the force.) This was the logical relationship for the 

Logistics Support Command because UNOSOM (a) had very limited independent ability 

to support forces under his command, and (b) relied on the US Logistic Support 

Command to support most of the national forces for which UNOSOM had nominal 

COCOM. Other US forces in and near Somalia reported to USFORSOM. Special Forces 

are, by US doctrine, provided by SOCOM as a supporting CINC. Both US doctrine and 

practice prevent the assignment of military intelligence organizations to UN or other nonUS commands, so the Intelligence Support Element (ISE) assigned in Somalia reported to 

USFORSOM. Smaller US military elements not assigned to the Quick Reaction Force 

also stayed within the US C2 network and were subject to US command arrangements. 

UN command arrangements were also in accordance with standard UN structures and 

practices. Figure 7 shows the major features of that UN system. The design is functional 

and heavily administrative. The"legislation" of the Security Council provides the 

mandate for action, which is the responsibility of the Secretary General. His 

Undersecretary for Peace-keeping is supported by military advisors, a situation center, a 

policy and analysis unit, and an executive (administrative) office. None of these is in the 

direct military C2 system or network or have any formal command relationship with 

military forces. The geographically organized Office of Operations coordinates regional 

activity, but does not play any military command role. Support comes from two separate 

divisions - one for Planning and one for Field Administration and Logistics. UN logistics 
20 

support for military peace operations has been continually and heavily criticized as too 

slow, too cumbersome, and too expensive to support military operations. The major role 

of the US Logistic Support Command in Somalia was partly an effort to get around the 

costly, time-consuming, and often ineffective UN procurement processes. 

Direction and guidance for the UN force commanders in the field(UNOSOM in this case) 

come from the Secretary General, the Undersecretary, and the UN resolutions 

themselves. In fact, MG Montgomery and analysts of the Somalia experience agree that 

the UNOSOM commander and his headquarters were guided heavily by the text of the 

UN resolutions themselves. This presented two different but related problems: 

1. The military commanders in the theater and their staffs were required to work at all 

three levels of command (strategic, operational, and tactical) while lacking the command 

experience and staff support needed, particularly at the strategic level. An in-theater 

headquarters was translating strategic guidance into tactical instructions. 

2. While the UN resolutions indicate the responsibilities (missions and objectives) of UN 

forces and identify some limits on them, they do not automatically provide either the 

political authority or the military capacity (forces, logistics, information needed, etc.) to 

accomplish those missions or the authority to acquire the necessary assets and support 

needed to achieve them. 
21 

Not surprisingly, the UNOSOM command arrangements were not perceived as working 

well, and the UN had great difficulty in conducting successful peace operations in 

Somalia. 

Each of the individual elements of the command arrangements in Somalia make perfect 

sense when looked at in isolation and from the perspective of both the national 

governments and the United Nations. However, taken together, they made force 

management cumbersome and ultimately ineffective. The UNOSOM case is an important 

and instructive situation, particularly for the dangerous "Chapter VI and-a-half 

operations." 

• All three levels of command - strategic, operational, and tactical - had to be dealt 

with in the UNOSOM headquarters. Normally the strategic is accomplished by a 

national military joint or general staff, the operational by the theater commanders, 

and the tactical by the commanders of the force elements. Hence, enormous 

pressure for essential and time-critical work was placed upon the UNOSOM 

headquarters. 

• The number of immediate subordinate commanders was far beyond the span of 

control considered desirable in any military or organizational structure. 

• The effects of this multiplicity of lines of command were compounded by the 

complexity of the authority relationships involved. National governments had to 

be consulted, either directly or indirectly, on almost all decisions affecting the 

roles, missions, or actions of forces nominally under UN command. 

• The sheer size of the headquarters communications and control components 

became amazing. Any national loop involved translators, dedicated 

communications systems, and liaison officers, all of whom were required to 

ensure that tasking and reporting were clearly understood. These people, in turn, 

required logistic support, space, communications, and information management 

resources. 

• The absence of standards and common doctrine had broad, pernicious effects. 

Lack of technical standards forced proliferation of overlapping and redundant 

channels of communication. Lack of common doctrine made it inordinately 

complex to develop, coordinate, communicate, adjust, or execute plans, even for 

simple operations. 

• The forces included in UNOSOM ranged from fully professional front-line units 

to one military organization that showed up with no uniforms, boots, or weapons. 

UNOSOM had to manage logistics support for all except the US forces and, to a 

lesser extent, the French. These demands, again, multiplied the work load in and 

the pressure on the headquarters. 

• The UNOSOM commander relied on traditional methods for assigning roles and 

missions to forces. Less-capable forces were given geographically and funct 
22 

ionally limited tasks (e.g. guarding the airport). Forces were assigned to a reas 

where they would not have to work with other UN forces with whom national 

problems might emerge. US forces were reassigned the role of Quick Reaction 

Force because of their superior mobility and firepower, rapid planning ability, and 

quick response capacity. Adopting these time-tested methods allowed UNOSOM 

to function, but often slowly and in ways that were less than perfectly 

coordinated. 

War-fighting Coalition Structures 

Peacekeeping operations are not all that unusual in their complexity. Typical war-fighting 

command arrangements for coalitions also evolve on the basis of international precedent 

and national practices and priorities; they change over time as the situation changes. 

Figure 8 shows the US ideal "combined force structure with national integrity."At its top 

is the multinational alliance or authority from which legitimacy and guidance are derived. 

The US Government (USG) does not accept this multinational authority except in the 

form of coordination unless the commander is an US officer, thus preserving sovereign 

control over US actions and forces. 

The international authority (UN, NATO, etc.) provides strategic direction to the 

combined command. This may be, but does not have to be, headed by a US officer. The 

US has a Unified Command (one of our CINCs) who has COCOM of all US forces 
23 

assigned to the combined command. The terms of the combined command's relationship 

to the US Unified Command and his subordinates will vary with the mission, US role, 

and the nationality of the combined commander. 

Operation Desert Storm provides a practical example of how this theory was 

implemented in a real case. The Desert Storm coalition operated under the terms of a UN 

resolution, but was a case of UN sanction and enforcement where individual member 

nations were free to contribute and define their own roles. The three major western force 

contributors(the US, the UK, and France) each provided a theater commander, as did the 

Saudi Arabians on behalf of the Arabic and Islamic nations(see Figure 9). While the US 

CINCCENT was considered the first among these equals, his leadership did not take the 

form of "command," but rather of vigorous personal leadership and coordination 

reinforced by the size of US forces and the superior C2 systems they brought to the 

theater. Indeed, a special coordinating center, known by the unfortunate acronym of C3IC 

(Combined Coalition Coordination and Intelligence Center), had to be created to ensure 

integration and coordination among these four major organizations. Beyond this, 

McCausland(1994) reports that CENTCOM created 109 three- and four-man 

coordination teams to focus on particular issues. This practice mirrors one of the major 

tools employed by Eisenhower to manage the Operation Overlord coalition and the 

subsequent fighting in western Europe during WWII. Each of the four theater force 

commanders had at least nominal COCOM of the national forces reporting to him. As 

Figure 10 indicates, the Joint Forces Command was in turn made up of elements from the 

armed forces of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and other (largely Arabic or Islamic) nations. 

National linkages and consultations with National governments were routine throughout 

the structure, often as an explicit part of the agreement to participate. 
24 

US commanders had to remain aware of the need to maintain the coalition throughout the 

campaign. Indeed, several important decisions were influenced by the relatively 

looseness of the bonds of the coalition. For example, US assistance to Israel against the 

Scud threat was seen as necessary to keep Israel out of the conflict and thereby preserve 

Arab participation. Similarly, the decision to end the war without attacking toward 

Baghdad was heavily influenced both by the limits of the formal UN mandate for the 

Gulf War and by the need to maintain the coalition. 
25 

The four-part substructure both made cultural and national relationships easier to manage 

and also assisted the span-of-control issue, although it also complicated the decision 

process. The illustrations are somewhat misleading in that they do not show the myriad of 

countries that made limited contributions of medical personnel, single vessels, or goods. 

Each of these countries coordinated their activities with one or more of the major and 

subordinate military organizations, with close attention both to national agendas and to 

international political considerations. 

The Desert Storm coalition also employed the time-tested procedure of assigning 

geographic and functional missions consistent with force capabilities and political 

objectives. For example, air elements with inferior night flying capability were assigned 

daylight missions. Similarly, the relatively light French ground forces were assigned an 

area of operations where they were unlikely to encounter heavy armor. When the British 

Tornado aircraft experienced disproportionate losses because of their high-risk mission 

(cratering Iraqi runways), both the mission and the tactics used to accomplish it became 

serious issues for the coalition. At the same time, great care was given to ensuring that 

the Arab forces, particularly those of the Saudis and Kuwaitis, were given meaningful 

roles in both ground and air fighting. In some cases this meant assigning other, highly 

capable forces to support them or back them up. For example Saudi and Kuwaiti fighter 

aircraft sometimes formed the first-line air defense for the coalition forces, but never the 

last line. Similarly, the sectors assigned to Arab force on the ground were selected so that 

heavier coalition forces could assist them if the fighting became heavy. 

Overall, the coalition command arrangements for Desert Storm were very consistent with 

those employed by the Western allies in World Wars I and II or by the UN command 
26 

during the Korean Conflict. Keytools, besides physical separation and assignment of 

roles and missions consistent with the capabilities of each force, included exchange of 

liaison officers, continuous coordination among senior political and military leaders, use 

of functionally specific coordination teams, and development of a repertoire of adaptive 

contingency plans so that the coalition minimized the need for rapid decision making on 

novel problems. Key problems remained lack of linguistic (both professional and 

vernacular) and doctrinal consistency as well as maintenance of sovereign control over all 

national military forces. 

Then There Are The Messy Cases: The UN in Yugoslavia 

While the US experience in coalition and peace operations is complex, it pales in the face 

of situations such as the UN operations in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (Figure 

11). UN authority comes from resolutions in the Security Council but is exercised 

through the UN Secretary General. He, in turn, has a Special Representative who acts as 

the direct link to the peace operators but is also an active part of the process of attempts 

to limit the conflict and negotiate genuine peace arrangements among the parties. That 

representative has played a direct military role, at times calling for or blocking specific 

military actions such as NATO air strikes because of their impact on the political 

situation. 

None of the senior UN military commanders in this force are US officers, nor are they 

drawn from a single country. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) 
27 

includes elements from twenty-three different countries(including Russia), many of 

which have units on the ground. Three major subordinate commands have been 

organized: one in Croatian, one in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and one in Macedonia. US force 

elements are included in the UNPROFOR Macedonia, which is a peacekeeping 

organization that monitors military movements and shipments of supplies across the 

border of the Macedonian province of the former Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR Croatian is 

somewhat closer to the "Great Divide" than UNPROFOR Macedonia; it largely monitors 

peace arrangements that have been in place for some time. Bosnia-Herzegovina, 

however, is constantly in turmoil, with the Sarajevo sector sometimes a relatively quiet 

place for peacekeeping and sometimes a bloody mess where peace enforcement is 

essential. Bosnia-Herzegovina is the general area where peace imposition may prove 

necessary, although the forces that would be required are far larger than those the current 

participants (including the US) have been willing to provide. The command arrangements 

with national forces are all dependent on sovereignty issues, so the UN commanders have 

COCOM of few of their forces' elements. 

At least two other outside organizations are also very important in the former Yugoslav 

area. On the one hand, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is 

conducting large-scale humanitarian efforts throughout the region. Those on UNHCR 

missions must be protected and escorted, as well as considered whenever military 

activities are contemplated. Actions by UNPROFOR that complicate UNHCR operations 

are considered somewhat counter-productive. At the same time, NATO is deeply 

involved in the area, providing "teeth" in the form of:(1) a naval embargo designed to 

reduce arms availability and to punish those parties seen as violating UN resolutions or 

peace arrangements, as well as (2) NATO air power to strike symbolic targets when 

cease-fire violations occur or UN personnel are threatened. The US provides the 

communications backbone for these UN forces, which also connect through Lt. Gen. 

Rose, who is "double-hatted" as a UNPROFOR and NATO officer. The US and the other 

NATO partners also provide the bulk of the Logistics support to UNPROFOR. 

If one of these coalition peace forces is examined in greater detail, the cost of all this 

complexity is thrown into relief. Figure 12 shows the command relationships active in 

Operation Deny Flight, which is only one of UNPROFOR's working missions. Operation 

Deny Flight is the name used to cover US and NATO air support to the UNPROFOR 

Area of Responsibility (AOR). In addition to the overall complexity inherent in any air 

operations (for example, having Search and Rescue available on call), several other 

points should be noted. 

• UNHCR's humanitarian operations (the Bosnia-Herzegovina Airdrop and 

Sarajevo Airlift) are included in the tasking, including the information necessary 

to provide protection for the aircraft involved. However, UNHCR requests for 

support are funneled through UNPROFOR as well as coordinated with military 

air control centers. 

• The US and NATO command structures are closely connected, with CINCEUR 

and SACEUR staffs both involved at the theater level. 
28 

• Local command is organized into Task Forces which actually command and 

control air operations in the AOR; and 

• Theater reconnaissance is conducted by US assets which provide their 

information to the relevant air control centers. 

Figure 12 shows only military command arrangements and makes no effort to display the 

myriad political and functional relationships that surround and constrain the military 

system. Given this, the true complexity of peace operations becomes even clearer. 

Humanitarian Operations in Rwanda 

US involvement in Rwanda illustrates: (1) the way peace operations evolve, rather than 

occurring as the result of deliberate planning and design, (2) the intimate relationship 

between humanitarian and peace issues, and (3) a very different set of command 

arrangements than those previously depicted. The UN became involved in Rwandan 

peacekeeping during 1993 as part of the settlement of a civil (tribal)war. A few hundred 

peacekeepers (about 700 in June of 1994) were deployed under the United Nations 

Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) commanding what was perceived to be a 

minimal-risk situation. A number of NGOs and PVOs were involved in humanitarian 

operations to help care for the victims of the civil war. Schroeder (1994) provides a 

description of this operation and lessons learned from the perspective of USCINCEUR. 
29 

When the leadership of the unity government was killed by a surface-to-air missile, tribal 

violence erupted overnight, resulting in massacres across the land, as well as creating 

hundreds of thousands of refugees. The French, acting as the traditional colonial power 

and with motives many found questionable (their support for the ousted government was 

widely known), sent in troops and created a safe area for many refugees in one sector of 

Rwanda. Huge numbers of other refugees fled across international borders, 

overwhelming the humanitarian efforts to care for them and creating vast camps of sick, 

starving, and dehydrated individuals. The two key issues became closely linked: (1) 

unless the bloodshed could be stopped and people's confidence restored, they would not 

leave the camps to go home, but (2) those still in the camps required immediate relief, 

which encouraged them to stay in the camps. Many found themselves choosing between 

the threats of death from disease and tribal enemies at home. 

US involvement, in the form of Operation Support Hope (Figure 13),came relatively late, 

after the initial crisis and exodus were largely complete, when inadequate food, water, 

and sanitation were beginning to make disease a major factor in the refugee camps. From 

the US perspective, C2 arrangements were relatively simple: USCINCEUR was the 

responsible Unified Commander. He created JTF Support Hope with a three-star 

commander(the Deputy CINCEUR) who had the rank and experience necessary to deal 

with the national leaders and international organizations active in the region. US forces 

were largely support elements and were organized geographically, with a flag-rank JTFForward commander to integrate their efforts. TRANSCOM, responsible for long haul 

airlift, acted as a key supporting CINC. 
30 

The US C2 arrangements were generally reported to have worked well, though the 

commanders and their staffs "met on the ramp" rather than being a team with experience 

at solving problems together. This slowed activities in the first several days. US presence 

was largely confined to support troops, with just enough combat elements to ensure 

physical security. US combat elements did not go into Rwanda except as limited security 

escorts for engineers, airport specialists, and other technical personnel. 

Command arrangements with the broader set of actors were much more chaotic. 

UNAMIR elements sought to create and maintain peaceful areas, but lacked the mandate 

or force to intervene and were themselves sometimes targets of rampages. The NGOs and 

PVOs sought to protect the population, particularly at orphanages and hospitals, and to 

provide relief for the refugees both on the road and in the camps. They sought security 

and logistic support from the peace operators. The French followed their national agenda, 

both when inserting their troops and later in withdrawing them despite the UN's and 

other's pleas to leave them in place. Other nations tended to work directly with the UN 

but often requested US logistic support. 

The UNHCR sought to coordinate efforts and ensure logistic support, but its procurement 

bureaucracy made this difficult. At one point, for example, the US set up a number of 

water generation units, only to discover that the UN had not made provision for trucks to 

haul the bottled water from them to the refugees. The initial UN public affairs position 

was that the US should have brought in trucks as well as water generation plants. Like 

other identified problems and bottlenecks, this one was resolved, but people suffered 

while it was being worked out. 

Lessons from Recent US Experience with Command Arrangements 

While reviewing the empirical experience is somewhat discouraging, some very clear 

lessons can be gleaned by thoughtful comparison of these recent US experiences. If 

performance is to improve, both positive and negative aspects of the experience must be 

understood. Moreover, the analysis should not stop with description but should explore 

the implications of the observed patterns. 

One obvious pattern is that the need for the broadest possible coalition participation and 

issues of sovereignty combine to create cumbersome networks of military command, far 

exceeding the ideal span of control for effective management. The unwieldy structures of 

the 23-nation UNPROFOR and the 18-nation UNOSOM are prime examples. Strategies 

for combating this problem include clustering smaller national force elements under 

senior commanders from "natural leader" countries, as was done with the Saudis in 

Desert Storm and the French in UNOSOM. At the same time, the lack of common 

language and doctrine in these multinational coalitions could be addressed by 

establishing: 

• international standards for communications, including language qualifications; 

• a core multinational dictionary and basic doctrine, which are widely published; 

and 
31 

• training programs and exercises involving potential coalition forces. 

The US would greatly benefit from these developments and should, base on its 

experience in peace operations, encourage their development and adoption by 

international organizations like the UN and regional organizations such as the 

Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization for African Unity (OAU). 

Second, decision making through the types of cumbersome command arrangements that 

tend to emerge is also inherently slow. Elements of the peace force are constrained by the 

mandates provided by the UN or other authority for the operation, by considerations 

affecting the safety of their forces, and by national political agendas. Moreover, they are 

almost never fully COCOM to the peace operation commander, which means that, 

whenever unanticipated situations emerge, considerable discussion will be required 

before effective action is possible. Consensus-creation, which is required for unified 

action, takes time. 

• The mechanisms to communicate quickly when novel situations arise must, 

therefore, be put in place at the outset of the operation. These may take the form 

of local area networks for exchange of information, periodic meetings of the 

parties, provisions to assemble leaders rapidly, or teleconferencing. 

• Equally important, planning must be forward-looking and identify 

contingencies,"trigger" events or situations, and appropriate reactions before the 

fact. 

Failure to offset the inherently slow decision making of consensus systems will surrender 

the initiative to those who oppose peace. 

The time-tested techniques of geographic separation, small teams created to coordinate or 

trouble-shoot specific functions, and assignment of functions that reflect the capabilities 

(political, military, and logistic) of the elements of the peace operations force remain 

valuable. While some improvement in the quality of forces might be generated by 

programs of standardization, training, and multinational exercises, overall levels of 

competence and equipment will continue to vary widely. Moreover, national political 

agendas will impact mission assignments. Organizing for success will require 

consideration of all these issues. Some patterns of success appear in this area. 

• Rapid response activities and areas where combat is likely are best assigned to the 

most capable military forces, normally those of the US and its NATO allies. 

Separate organizations, such as the QRF in Somalia and the NATO air forces in 

UNPROFOR, can maintain war-fighting C2 and rapid-response capability, 

limiting their command arrangements with the more cumbersome overall peace 

operation to deciding the condition sunder which they should act and limitations 

on their activities. 

• Very few peace operations forces have adequate logistics capacity to sustain 

themselves independently. The few that do (and the US has by far the greatest 
32 

such capacity) should be tasked and organized to provide log istics support el 

ements to the overall force. This process would be facilitated if (a) international 

standards were adopted for basic supply items and (b) the existing UN 

procurement system could be set aside during peace operations and replaced by 

more responsive, field-oriented systems. 

Regardless of other command arrangements, the classic technique of exchanging liaison 

officers has also proven valuable. In Desert Storm this extended in some cases to having 

more capable military forces provide trainers (often US Special Forces) who stayed on in 

an advisory capacity during hostilities. Similarly, liaison officers were often the key to 

effective working relationships in Somalia. 

Insights from the Available Evidence 

1. Peace operations into the 21st Century will remain dominantly"polyglot," in that 

multiple nations will participate; the military elements of peace forces will vary widely in 

competence, doctrine, organization, and level of modernization; and a wide range of 

actors will participate (national governments, international organizations, NGOs, PVOs, 

local and regional officials, traditional authorities, and ethnic/religious groups). 

2. Military command and control (C2) will remain part, but only apart, of the larger set of 

command arrangements necessary to conduct peace operations, because peace operations 

will remain at least as much political as they are military activities. However, military C2 

for peace operations cannot be planned or judged outside the larger context of command 

arrangements. 

3. The command arrangements found in past coalition and peace operations were all 

cumbersome and highly decentralized at the strategic and operational level, but heavily 

centralized in terms of tactical C2 relationships. The senior commander in typical 

coalition peace operations: 

• did not have genuine COCOM of the forces nominally under his command, 

• lacked the staff capacity (numbers, experience, information processing capability, 

and communications systems) to support his C2 needs, and 

• had inadequate logistics capacity to support his forces. 

The forces themselves did not share common military doctrine, language, or standards. 

4. Successful peace operations require an understanding of the definition of success. For 

peacekeeping operations, this means creating and maintaining arrangements by which the 

parties can live peacefully while they develop trust and seek to work out long-term 

political stability. However, for peace imposition or peace enforcement, the measure of 

success is material progress toward and across the "Great Divide" to peacekeeping. The 

cost in blood and national treasure of extended peace operations where violence is not 

controlled means that these operations cannot be sustained over time. Hence missions, 
33 

objectives, and orders must be proactive toward creating stability so that peacekeeping 

can achieve more active roles, promptly. 

5. When peacekeeping fails, the belligerent parties take the blame because they have 

destroyed their own set of agreements. When peace imposition or peace enforcement 

fails, the peace operators get the blame and risk casualties. They have failed to control a 

situation they explicitly sought to control, even at high risk. 

6. Operations near the Great Divide are the most difficult. Peace operators must be 

perceived as neutral to be successful, which is very difficult if they are engaging one of 

more of the parties in the name of peace. Equally important, the peace operations forces 

are at greatest risk when the situation is unstable. 

7. UN procurement systems have proved too cumbersome and bureaucratic to support 

fast-moving peace operations. They need reform, and Peace operators need an 

independent set of procurement officials, particularly individuals with military and 

disaster relief experience. 
34 

Alternative Approaches to Command Arrangements 

The preceding material focuses largely on history and fact: how military establishments 

have established and applied command arrangements. However, an important body of 

material has also been built up on the theory of command and control. That body of 

knowledge is particularly important in conceptualizing how command arrangements 

might be designed and the range of situations (or operating environments) in which 

different approaches might prove wise. 

Few serious analyses of alternative approaches to command arrangements have been 

conducted, partly because C2 community research has been preoccupied with 

communications and computer systems, and partly because command has generally been 

understood as an art, often driven strongly by the personalities and styles of individual 

military leaders. The major exception to this neglect has been a long-running discussion 

concerning the degree of centralization in command arrangements. Historically, 

command arrangements have gone from more centralized to more decentralized 

approaches, in large measure because of complexity of the war-fighting environment and 

the limits on the technologies available for gathering information and distributing 

directives. 

Figure 14 illustrates the evolution of approaches to command arrangements. The vertical 

axis ranges from the simple battlefields of classical armies, which were commanded by 

individuals who took into consideration only the immediate terrain, weather, and forces; 

to the combat of modern warfare in which relevant actors are spread over vast distances, 

from space to undersea and underground locations. The horizontal axis represents the 

degree of centralization inherent in the dominant command arrangements. 
35 

As the complexity of the environment to be controlled and the technologies available to 

commanders have evolved, command arrangements have also evolved. Heroic, individual 

leaders who could dominate a battlefield were the state-of-the-art until forces became so 

large and the environment so complex that organized staffs were required to coordinate 

forces out of physical contact with one another. Napoleon is generally credited with 

developing staff planning and logistics systems that permitted massive armies to operate 

effectively. The Prussians took these ideas further and produced staff planning and 

communications systems that enabled centralized control over widely dispersed forces, 

taking advantage of the technologies of industrial society. These more or less centralized 

staff systems proved to be transitional, as forces became so large and operating 

environments so complex as to defy centralized control with the available technologies. 

The Germans are normally acknowledged as having recognized that the time needed to 

collect information from the fighting front, move it to the center, make a new "optimum" 

decision, plan and coordinate a new course of action, transmit the plan to the forces, and 

have them implement the new plan was too long to enable them to react to battlefield 

developments in time to take advantage of opportunities as they arose. In the 20th 

century, they developed more decentralized approaches that exploited the speed and 

firepower of modern forces by permitting, even requiring, initiative at lower levels. The 

classic analyses of these developments are Van Creveld (1985) and Keegan (1987).This 

process culminated in blitzkrieg, which permitted the Germans to fight and win a number 
36 

of local battles that their opponents at the beginning of World War II (the French and 

Russians in particular)were barely aware of before they were over. This decentralized 

model was essential because the Germans lacked the technology for greater control from 

the center. Some authors (e.g. Leonhard, 1994) argue today that modern warfare should 

be based on this "mission tactics"approach, but note that it is not clear that senior US 

commanders are culturally and psycho-logically capable of relinquishing central 

command. 

However, since WWII, the technologies for collecting and communicating information 

have grown faster than the complexity of what must be controlled. As Figure 14 shows, 

the most modern military establishment in the world, that of the US, is in the process of 

using those technologies to recentralize the battle. In Desert Storm the US-led coalition 

was able to establish a major advantage over the Iraqis in information about the 

battlefield. The Iraqi forces largely fought blind, and their commanders found themselves 

committing their forces piecemeal. Many are now arguing (e.g. Alberts, 1994) that 

emerging technologies will enable the US to move toward true "information warfare,"in 

which fully centralized, optimal decision making becomes possible because of "total 

battlefield awareness" and "information dominance." 

Alternative Command Arrangement Systems 

More than a decade ago the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA, at the time 

called the Defense Communications Agency) sponsored broad research on a variety of 

historical systems approaches to command arrangements (Hayes et. al, 1983a and Hayes 

et.al, 1983b), including that of the United States (in WWII, Korea, Vietnam, and various 

crises),UK (in WWII and the modern period), the USSR (in WWII and the modern 

period), Israel (in 1956, 1967, 1973), China (in the modern period),NATO, and others 

perceived to have effective military establishments. Lessons learned and changes made 

by outstanding commanders such as Eisenhower, Nimitz, and Bradley, as well as within 

significant commands(such as the 12th Air Force and the British Fighter Command 

during World War II), were also examined. 

One product of that historical and comparative research was the identification of three 

major types of C2 approaches, each with at least two important subtypes. All six 

approaches have been successful, but each is more appropriate for some types of warfare 

than others. Figure 15 shows these subtypes and the relative headquarters capacity 

(information processing and military art capability) required to apply them successfully. 

The key distinction is the level of centralization required, ranging from the heavily 

distributed "control-free" to the inherently centralized"cyclic" approaches. The three 

categories of directive specificity reflect the level of detail required in the directives 

issued by headquarters in each type of system, ranging from mission-specific through 

objective-specific to order-specific. 
37 

Control-free command centers (the most distributed approach) seek to assign missions to 

their subordinates, who are then expected to employ all the assets available to them to 

accomplish the missions. This requires a military organization where the lower echelons 

are competent and trusted implicitly by the higher echelons. The system designed by the 

Germans for World War II is the case that fits most clearly in this category. The success 

of Germany's blitzkrieg was due not only to the superior weapons and mobility of 

German forces, but also to the capacity of their officers and non-commissioned officers to 

operate independently, even under trying conditions. (The fact that Hitler and the Nazi 

Party often interfered with this system is one major reason that it did not work effectively 

all the time.) 

The Israelis admired the philosophy of the German approach, but felt that it was perhaps 

too decentralized, particularly given their narrow margin for error in wars that threatened 

the extinction of their country. They have developed selective-control systems in which 

higher headquarters also issue mission-type orders and expect subordinates to take broad 

and deep initiatives. However, their higher headquarters follow the battle in detail and are 

prepared to intervene in the event of a major opportunity or major threat that the lowerlevel command does not perceive or cannot manage. This approach requires great 

discipline on the part of the senior commanders, who have tactical-level information and 

considerable skill as tactical commanders, but only intervene when operational or 

strategic level issues emerge. In essence, the Israelis prefer rapid reaction on the 

battlefield but seek to maintain the capability for central intervention. 
38 

Taken together, the control free and selective control systems comprise the more general 

class of mission-oriented command and control arrangements. Each level tends to assign 

missions to its subordinates and permit them to define further details of the military 

situation, beginning with selecting the objectives necessary to accomplish the missions. 

The presumption is that the commander on the scene has more current and accurate 

information than superior headquarters and has adequate resources to exploit local 

opportunities and protect the force while accomplishing the mission. Moreover, through a 

combination of doctrine, training, experience, and mission orders, the subordinate 

commander is presumed to understand the intent and overall concept of the operation of 

the superior commander so that local actions will not be inconsistent with the larger 

military mission or the actions of other commanders. 

UK doctrine can best be understood as problem-bounding. That is, the higher 

headquarters tend to compose their directives in terms of the objectives to be 

accomplished, but to couch them in very general terms. Hence, directives are more 

specific than mere mission assignments and some explicit boundaries (deadlines for 

achieving some objectives, guidance on risks that might be accepted or avoided, etc.) are 

articulated. British plans for an operation tend to be less detailed than those of 

Americans, often by a factor of three to one, reflecting this lack of detail. 

For their parts, the US Army and Navy have, since World War II, tended to issue 

problem-solving directives in which missions and objectives are articulated for two 

levels of subordinates and substantial guidance about how the objectives are to be 

achieved is also included. Although this approach provides more detailed direction than 

the UK philosophy, considerable room remains for lower-level initiative and creativity in 

accomplishing the objectives. At the same time, however, the high-technology assets 

which US forces tend to employ often mean that subordinates are heavily dependent on 

senior commanders for key assets such as lift, intelligence, supplies, or precision 

munitions. 

Together the problem-bounding and problem-solving approaches comprise the objectiveoriented approach to command arrangements. They assume some level of trust, 

creativity, and initiative in subordinate commands, but stress synchronization of assets 

and actions. As a result, they assume greater coordination and more continuous contact 

between superior and subordinate and among subordinate commands. This provides 

greater control. These systems were brought to fruition by the resource-rich in "attrition 

wars" where superior material and technology were applied to wear down adversaries 

with limited resources (such as Axis powers in World War II). 

Ultimately someone in every military system issues orders to subordinates(directives that 

tell units and people what to do, where to do it, and when it is to be done). However, this 

is only done by headquarters above the tactical level in very centralized systems (or in 

cases where politically sensitive assets such as nuclear or chemical weapons are 

involved). These have historically been systems where the commanders at lower levels 

are considered quite weak and unable or unlikely to take the initiative or develop 

effective courses of action on their own. 
39 

The Cold War era Soviet system, for example, can best be described as interventionist, 

in that it relied heavily on central authority to issue directives, but also maintained very 

detailed information about the battle (requiring continuous and specific reports from 

subordinates two layers down) and attempted centralized control through detailed 

directives. The Soviets used exercises and training of front line units to ensure that they 

could execute a variety of quite standard maneuvers, from breakthrough assaults and 

river crossings for land forces to standardized attack patterns against US carrier battlegroups at sea. Senior headquarters specified the time and place for such preplanned 

operations and controlled them through the preplanning process. 

The greatest degree of centralization occurs, however, when the senior headquarters 

issues orders to all subordinates, but does so on the basis of a preset cycle time. The 

Chinese Army and the Soviet World War II forces adopted this approach because their 

communications structures could not provide continuous information to the central 

headquarters and because their subordinate organizations were culturally unable to 

display initiative in the absence of detailed directives. The US Air Force has followed the 

same approach since World War II, but fora very different reason - the complexity of air 

operations has meant the information required, coordination needed, and relative scarcity 

of the assets involved tend to drive the decision making up the chain of command. The 

USAF has chosen to invest in communications systems so they can issue orders at the 

numbered Air Force level. The 24-hour air tasking order is cyclic, however, in part 

because the amount of processing needed to develop these intricate plans requires 

relatively long lead times. 

The existence of these six distinct types of command and control systems in prominent 

military establishments helps to explain why coalition operations are plagued by 

"interoperability" problems at the cultural, organizational, and procedural (doctrinal) 

levels, to say nothing of the technical communications systems they use. 

Capacity Requirements for Different Types of Command Arrangements 

Major differences exist in the capacities required for the six types of command 

arrangements. Figure 16 illustrates those differences. 
40 

First, assuming that the quality of information provided is constant across all cases, the 

more centralized the decision making, the more information required at the higher 

headquarters, which means greater detail in each situation update transmitted. However, 

major differences exist in the frequency with which updates are required. Control-free 

systems, in which the central commander is not seeking to control the schedule of events 

closely, require infrequent updates. The two approaches that seek to issue objectivespecific directives, problem-bounding and problem-solving, require moderately frequent 

updates. Cyclic command assumes periodic, paced updates, the lowest frequency. 

Interventionist and selective control systems, both seeking to assert themselves on an asrequired basis, must have almost-continuous updates about the situation, making the 

capacity required very high. 

The information-processing capacity required for these different approaches also varies 

widely. This represents the effort needed to receive the appropriate inputs, transform 

them into information the C2 system can act on, and conduct the necessary operations to 

support decision making. Because the volume of input and output to be processed is 

lowest for control-free systems, the processing capacity required is also low. This grows 

as the degree of centralization rises. However, cyclic approaches, because they have a 

low update rate, need less processing capacity than their interventionist counter-parts, 

which must be ready to act at any time. In general, greater capability to acquire, 

integrate, move, and process larger amounts of information rapidly makes morecentralized decision making possible. 
41 

Indeed, current discussion of the need for new C2 approaches in an era of "information 

warfare" explicitly considers situations where the best (most current, accurate, and 

complete) information may no longer be located at the subordinate command engaged in 

the field, but rather may be located at higher headquarters. This implies a change in the 

"best" approach to C2, although considerable choice exists in how information is 

distributed using state-of-the-art technologies. Whenever speed of decision making 

becomes crucial, creation of automated approaches to decision making becomes relevant. 

The amount of internal information processing required is minimized in control-free 

systems and maximized in those systems seeking to issue orders from the top, particularly 

the interventionist model. The same pattern generally holds for the quantity of output 

generated and, therefore the coordination and explanation of what is wanted. Here, 

however, the interventionist approach (as practiced by the Cold War era Soviets) is able 

to take advantage of pre-real time learning by subordinates so it can, in essence, call 

plays like a football team and does not have to provide detailed instructions in every 

order. However, this approach limits the flexibility of the command system, making it 

difficult to make subtle adjustments in response to opportunities or threats on the 

battlefield. 

Finally, the different command approaches require very different capacities among the 

subordinate commanders and their organizations. In general, the more centralized the 

command arrangements, the less required from subordinates. Competence here refers to 

the ability to plan, coordinate, and execute military functions. Similarly, the lesscentralized systems require more creativity and initiative on the part of subordinate 

commands. In fact, classic cyclic systems(such as that of Stalinist Russia during World 

War II) are perceived to punish subordinate commands that undertake creative activities 

or move off the detailed orders they are given. 

The degree of centralization adopted also influences the degree to which automation can 

be used to achieve the capacity required. Figure 17 shows these relationships. Missionspecific systems primarily assign highly creative roles to the higher headquarters, with 

selective-control systems both needing more overall capacity and having more potential 

for automation of those functions they perform. Objective-oriented systems (which 

require somewhat more capacity) can be more automated. In particular, the problemsolving system in which detailed guidelines and planning for logistics and other support 

are relatively simple to automate can be managed at the higher levels. Interventionist 

systems need the most capacity, but are also the easiest to automate because they rely 

more on prior training and are designed to generate prepackaged"good enough" or 

suboptimal solutions that can be implemented successfully. Cyclic headquarters are 

designed to do the same work as interventionist (issue orders) but perform each task less 

often, which reduces their need for overall capacity. 
42 

Command Arrangements and Operating Environments 

The variety of command arrangements adopted by successful military systems over time 

and space should make it clear that there is no single "correct" approach. Rather, there are 

alternative approaches that are better and worse in different circumstances. The 

environment in which the system operates (the physical, political, social, economic, 

military, and technological situation in which the military force is working) is one of the 

most important of these. The ability of more appropriate C2 arrangements to offset gross 

imbalances in military force is limited. However, the closer the balance among forces, the 

greater the potential for C2 differences to determine the outcome. 

Figure 18 was developed to analyze war-fighting environments, but its basic logic also 

applies to peace operations. It illustrates what happens when different philosophies are 

adopted in different types of military environments. The controlling characteristic of the 

environment is the ratio of the pace of battle to the speed of the C2 system -in other 

words, the rate at which the situation changes and the speed with which the C2 system 

can sense those changes make a decision about whether and how to react to them, and 

initiate the desired action. In maneuver warfare, for example, the pace of battle and the 

relative slowness of the C2 system interact to create a large number of local battles 

fought with local resources and information. At the other end of the spectrum, in static 

warfare, such as World War I trench warfare, the C2 system is faster than the changes on 

the battlefield, which means there is no penalty for the time spent in centralized, 
43 

optimized decision processes. Near the center, in attrition warfare, the ratio approaches 

1:1. 

In maneuver warfare systems, all other things being equal, decentralized C2 

arrangements have the advantage. The decentralized German blitzkrieg, for example, 

allowed division and lower commanders to fight and win engagements and even battles 

that the French C2 system hardly knew were taking place. The centralized French system 

took too long to assemble the information, make decisions, and transmit directives. The 

Germans, with excellent officers at all levels, simply did not attempt centralized, 

optimized operations. 

At the other end of the spectrum, in static-warfare systems, centralized systems have the 

advantage. The Eastern front of World War II provides a good illustration. After the 

Russians had retreated, stretching the German lines and attriting their ranks, the front 

stabilized. During this period Stalin operated a centralized, cyclic system, giving orders 

each day to all commands. Despite severe shortages of material, the Soviet forces were 

able to manage their static battle to frustrate, and ultimately defeat, the German forces. 

In attrition warfare, where material and depth of force prevent exploitation of local 

victories, the type of objective-oriented systems favored by the US and UK proved to be 

superior. Neither local victories base on local information nor ponderous "optimum" 

choices prove adequate to overcome superior material properly employed. Objectiveoriented approaches synchronize force elements well enough to defeat any adversary 
44 

when the pace of battle and speed of C2 processes are nearly equal. They prevent major 

surprises and use contingency plans to prevent catastrophic defeats. 

One challenge for peace operators comes from the fact that coalition operations are 

almost always heavily decentralized, which means they are not in a position to respond 

rapidly. As a consequence, the enemies of peace are often free to select the crucial time 

and place to strike. On one level, this is simply restating the principle that peace 

operations cannot realistically strive to take the offensive. More importantly, however, 

this implies that they must seek to achieve adaptive control- to foresee the set of possible 

futures and take steps to influence the course of events so that unacceptable futures are 

prevented and desirable ones encouraged. Thinking about alternatives available to the 

enemies of peace and finding ways to structure the situation so that their interests and 

actions coincide with those seeking peace become very important. This can be as simple 

as ensuring observation, documentation, and media attention when peace terms are likely 

to be violated, or as complex as creating incentives for cooperation between groups with 

very different world views. 

Another consequence of the variety of levels of centralization found in military systems 

is the fact that coalition forces are unlikely to share common C2 or command 

arrangements approaches. When forces with fundamental differences in understanding of 

the degree of information they should report, the detail that should be contained in 

directives, and the degree to which subordinate organizations should take initiative are 

placed in one military organization; the potential for confusion is massive. Reporting, 

situation assessment, course of action analysis, decision making, coordination, crafting 

directives, and implementation all become massively complicated when people with 

different training, experience, habits, and expectations of command arrangements must 

work together. In itself, this variety of backgrounds slows the process as well as creates 

opportunities for errors. 
45 

Assessing Alternative Command Arrangements 

Designing an appropriate set of command arrangements for coalition peace operations 

requires a clear understanding of the essential functions to be performed and the qualities 

desired - the objective criterion for success. 

The Essence of Command Arrangements: Key to Measuring Success 

Command arrangements are the systems by which military and political-military 

organizations make and implement decisions in an operating environment. Figure 19 

shows the essential elements of this process (Hayes, 1983a).Note that the command 

arrangements always exist in the context of a larger environment, which includes military 

elements (own, adversary, and potentially other forces which are not directly included in 

the network), physical and ecological factors (terrain, weather, and so forth), as well as 

the political, social, and economic. The purpose of the system of command arrangements 

is to control some selected features of this environment (for peace operations this might 

include keeping military forces out of demilitarized zones, preventing the flow of arms 

across a border, or other explicit tasks), which is the equivalent of accomplishing 

assigned missions. 

However, the system of command arrangements and the decision makers it serves do not, 

in and of themselves, execute operations or accomplish missions. Rather they create 
46 

favorable circumstances, develop plans, ensure that the materials needed are available, 

coordinate activities, and undertake representational and decision functions that enable 

other (usually subordinate) organizations to accomplish missions. The plans they create 

consist of five key elements: 

• missions (or objectives) to be accomplished; 

• assets (resources) to support each mission; 

• boundaries which organize these efforts in space; 

• schedules (either explicit times or sequences) which organize the efforts over 

time; and 

• contingencies under which the first four elements change. 

Success (effectiveness) consists of creating directives and coordinating requests for 

assistance from actors who are not subject to military command. Such directives should 

(1) reflect the planning process,(2) be implemented successfully without change beyond 

the contingencies explicitly built into them, and (3) have the desired impact on the 

environment. 

The processes inherent in command arrangements (which are always part of the process, 

whether explicitly or not) are also illustrated in Figure 19. They include: 

• monitoring the environment, that is, developing facts about it; 

• understanding the larger patterns that the facts describe or imply such that, if no 

new initiatives are undertaken, the command understands how the future is likely 

to unfold (including multiple possible futures when the information is incomplete, 

inconsistent, or ambiguous); 

• identifying alternative courses of action (including doing nothing or continuing 

with the existing course of action) that could influence which future(s) occur; 

• assessing each alternative course of action, including predicting the likely 

consequences of following each, as well as their feasibility; 

• deciding, i.e., choosing among the available courses of action; 

• directing, in other words, preparing and issuing guidance to those organizations 

who are responsible for execution or whose cooperation is needed. 

While these six steps are inherent in any system of command arrangements, four other 

processes are also normally involved and contribute to success: 

• information seeking, which is undertaken when a commander recognizes the 

need for some specific information; 
47 

• reporting to inform superiors, subordinates, those in lateral positions, or the 

general public (through the media); 

• inquiries to clarify directives or reports received or to resolve inconsistencies 

within and among the elements of information received; and 

• coordinations undertaken to synchronize activities. 

These four additional activities are particularly crucial in peace operations where the 

number and variety of actors, their lack of prior experience working with one another, 

and the absence of common, reliable communications systems often make timely 

information collection and dissemination very difficult. 

Quality of Command Arrangements Performance 

Given an understanding of what command arrangements are and the different ways they 

can be structured, the issue of how their performance should be assessed must still be 

addressed before better command arrangements can be designed for coalition peace 

operations. Command arrangements operate to determine both the flow of information 

within and among the actors and the nature and process of decision making. Assessment 

should, therefore, start by examining the structures, functions, and capacities of the 

support systems that provide and process the information needed for achieving goals and 

missions. 

As Figure 20 illustrates, there are at least three distinct level at which the value of these 

information management command arrangements could be assessed: (1) system 

performance (the qualities of the elements that make up the system), (2) attributes (or 

qualities) of the information provided to decision makers, and (3) the overall value of the 

information within the decision making system. These three levels interact, with 

problems at the poorer levels almost always leading to lower performance at the higher 

levels. If, for example, the information available is out of date (level 2), then good quality 

decisions (level 3) become unlikely. Similarly, if the systems that must move information 

around among the actors are unreliable (level 1), the information available to decision 

makers will tend to be out of date (level 2). Hence, performance at all three levels should 

be assessed so that diagnosis of causes for problems is possible. 
48 

System performance measures describe the individual elements of command 

arrangements. Communications speed and capacity between important headquarters or 

actors, the size and reliability of the memory located at each node in the system, and the 

reliability of communications systems (mean time between failure, percentage time 

down, etc.) are simple system performance characteristics. 

Information attributes deal with the quality of the information available in the system of 

command arrangements. They include such things as: 

• completeness of the information; 

• accuracy of the information; 

• age of the information; 

• consistency of information across nodes in the command structure; 

• correctness of understandings; 

• correctness of consequences predicted; and 

• fidelity of the directives to the decisions made. 
49 

Note that "information" here means not only factual data, but also the capture, storage, 

selection, integration, and interpretation of information that support the essential 

command arrangements processes. 

The third level, measures of information value, is much more difficult to operationalize 

than the lower levels. Information value is measured in terms of impact on the 

environment. The core measure is "effectiveness,"having the desired impact in the 

environment. The speed of the command arrangements versus the pace of change in the 

environment (timeliness of decision processes) must also be considered a measure of 

information value. More-over, the efficiency of the process (what it costs to be effective) 

is also an overall measure of the system's performance, particularly in peace operations 

that must be conducted under austere fiscal conditions. Several other attributes should 

also be considered when assessing command arrangements from an overall perspective, 

including user acceptance, the capability required (experience, training, mental 

capacity, etc.) to operate the system, and its security, which is particularly critical in the 

Information Age when we need to protect our C2 from attacks. (See Hayes [1991] for a 

discussion of the full set of attributes that should be considered when assessing a system 

of command arrangements.) 

As Figure 20 illustrates, these three levels of analysis are believed(hypothesized) to be 

related and the form of that relationship is assumed to be a positive correlation. That is, 

better system performance leads to better information, better information to better 

decision making. However, the relationships between these levels are not always well 

understood and are certainly not simple linear patterns. For example, there are hundreds 

or thousands of relevant actors and platforms on a modern battlefield, but providing 

complete information about their location and identity will overwhelm any human 

decision maker; so there is a level at which completeness becomes counter-productive. 

Similarly, understanding that multiple futures are possible does not mean that good 

command arrangements explore each and every one of them in detail _ the workload 

would overwhelm the system. 

Note that failure at any level makes success at the next higher level more difficult and 

only the highest level (value of information) reflects the utility of the command 

arrangements. The lower-level measures(system performance and information attributes) 

are diagnostic - when top-level problems occur, they can almost always be traced back to 

lower levels. 

Direct measurement of overall value is difficult, so intermediate decision variables are 

often used as surrogates for overall value(good decision process being assumed to 

increase the likelihood of good decisions), as diagnostics, or as cross-checks on the more 

abstract efforts to judge overall effectiveness, timeliness, or efficiency. Figure 21, 

adapted from Alberts (1980), illustrates this practice and also shows the linkages between 

levels in the assessment process. 
50 

Good decision processes correlate with good decisions. For example, organizations that 

believe there is only a single future possible and that they know what it is are very 

vulnerable to poor decision making (see Dixon [1976] and Janis [1982]). This tendency 

has also been documented in US C2 systems under a variety of conditions (Hayes, 1990). 

Hence, the number of possible futures considered, and particularly the number of 

decisions made where only a single future is considered, are indices of decision process 

quality worth monitoring. Other such indices include the variety of options generated for 

consideration, the variety of viewpoints entertained, and the accuracy of predictive 

statements about future developments. As is discussed in detail below, the time spent 

making decisions is itself a factor in making those decisions easier or more difficult, 

because slower processes force decision makers to deal with a greater range of 

uncertainty. 

Measurement of Command Arrangements Quality 

While system performance and attributes of information can be measured directly, the 

overall value of information - which is the true value of a set of command arrangements 

and the only way to compare alternative sets - are inherently multi-dimensional, not 

always directly measurable, and will vary across operating environments. 

These points are illustrated in Figure 22, which is also drawn from Alberts (1980). First, 

any system of command arrangements must be given an overall utility value, particularly 

in order to compare it with other alternatives, that is focused on several key attributes, 

including system-wide value added, system life-cycle costs, and system flexibility and 
51 

adaptability. Hence, there is no single dimension for evaluation. Given the vicious 

tradeoffs present in peace operations(costs versus military capability, etc.) this fact is 

particularly important for these analyses. 

These key dimensions cannot be estimated from a single context, but rather must be seen 

across the range of situations (scenarios) considered relevant. Failure to take into account 

the wide range of situations where peace operations coalitions may have to operate or the 

pace of change within the context of any one such operation would fatally flaw the 

analysis. The inclusion of a range of experiences in this paper is an effort to ensure 

consideration of an adequate range of situations and the inherent dynamic patterns. 

Equally important, direct measurement of value added is impossible. Good command 

arrangements can be recognized by a variety of indicants, or measures, that reflect good 

process but are not success in and of themselves. For example, good decision making is 

associated with: 

• reflecting the uncertainty inherent in situations that consider multiple possible 

futures; 

• keeping the number of alternatives considered (futures assessed and courses of 

action considered) within the cognitive limits of most participants - 3 to 7 

alternatives at most; 
52 

• gathering information from, and involving in decision making councils, all the 

actors who are relevant; and 

• looking ahead at potential counter-measures from opponents of any particular 

course of action, including coalition partners. 

In essence, these types of measures are defenses against "Groupthink"(Janis, 1982 and 

1989) and other errors that creep into complex decision-making systems. 

Value added is more directly measurable in terms of the effectiveness, timeliness, and 

efficiency of decision making. Even here, however, measurement is a complex process. 

For example, plans that can be implemented within the contingencies built into them are 

desirable because they allow the entire force, organization, or set of organizations 

involved to work together according to "pre-real time" decisions. Plans can enable a 

commander to achieve several different levels of control over the environment. 

Reflexive control is achieved by command arrangements that provide such a rich 

understanding of the situation that the commander can predict and take advantage of 

adversaries' capabilities and actions. Cold War era Soviet doctrine sought to achieve this 

level of control. The current advocates of information warfare maintain that this level of 

insight will soon be technically possible. Systems that seek this level of control are 

always risky because of potential errors in (a)their information and (b) their projections 

of adversary actions. 

When in adaptive control, the commander understands that the battlefield is not fully 

predictable, but that the range of future developments is limited. By monitoring the battle 

and understanding which situations are emerging, the commander can design contingency 

plans to ensure success regardless of what actually occurs. While less efficient than 

reflexive control, adaptive control is also less risky because it takes into account changes 

in the environment, including alternative adversary courses of action. This level of 

control has been sought by US doctrine since World War II and is necessary for 

successful peace operations. 

Direct control occurs when the commander understands the battle well enough to exert 

pressure (moral and physical force), but has no clear sense of how much is required to 

accomplish the objective. Hence, the system seeks primarily to monitor the status of the 

battle and to ensure continuous application of force, in the same way that a thermostat 

continues to signal for heat in a building until the preset temperature is reached. Because 

it lacks the capacity and flexibility to use alternative courses of action, direct control is 

inferior to adaptive control. In peace operations, direct control implies lack of flexibility 

and agility, which threatens mission accomplishment. 

Trial and error is what management systems do when confronted with novel 

circumstances and limited understanding of the situation. It provides only minimal 

control. An ignorant system acts on its environment(or fails to act), observes the 

consequences, then reacts. Often its initial actions take the form of the familiar, which is 

predictable to an adversary and inappropriate for novel situations. Predictable actions 
53 

may, however, be appropriate in peace operations where adversary uncertainty is 

dangerous. When challenged, however, the initial trial and error plan tends to fail rapidly 

and must be replaced. Over time, trial and error systems are replaced by direct control 

and even more advanced levels of control, but only if they survive enough interactions to 

"learn" useful rules. This is the challenge facing many peace operations, particularly 

when their own initial success alters the basic situation to be controlled (as occurred in 

Somalia). 

Finding ways to measure the effectiveness of C2 objectively was the most challenging 

aspect of the initial Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment Tool effort (Hayes, et.al 

[1983a]) to develop valid, reliable quantitative indicators of C2 quality. However, once 

the background research was completed, a very powerful answer became obvious. Since 

head-quarters are supposed to create plans (in the form of directives)that work and since 

"working" means keeping the environment within anticipated boundaries, the key to 

objective assessment is to examine the degree to which the plan accomplishes its stated 

mission. The headquarters will abandon or modify the plan if it perceives that plan is 

failing or will fail. Observers or analysts can recognize failure by the fact that the 

headquarters changes one or more of the basic elements of the original plan (missions, 

assets, boundaries, or schedules) beyond those contingencies explicitly built into that 

original plan. The pattern of interactions with the environment overtime and across a 

series of decision cycles provides evidence of the typical level of control achieved. The 

greater the level of control achieved, the more successful the command arrangements. 

HEAT research has also shown that success is contagious _ effective performance in 

earlier periods is associated with success in later periods; success in some functional 

arenas is associated with success in others (Hayes, et. al, 1993). 

Moreover, greater control also implies improved performance on other crucial types of 

performance - timeliness, flexibility, and efficiency of the system. Command and control 

systems have generally been considered to be better when they are faster. John Boyd, 

drawing on experience in air combat, postulated that, in order to be successful (i.e. 

effective, or win in battle), C2 systems need to be faster than the C2 systems opposing 

them. Using dogfights between aircraft as his metaphor, he argues that "turning inside the 

enemy's decision loop" is the key to success. Note that his position is not that speed is an 

unmitigated good, only that C2 systems that are faster than those of the opponent will be 

successful. Boyd's argument is consistent with HEAT theory, which postulates a decision 

and action C2 cycle in the con- text of a potentially hostile dynamic environment. This 

argument and some of its implications are reflected in Figure 23. They include: 

• The impact of a command and control cycle does not begin until after battlefield 

events have been perceived, reported, processed into decisions and plans (which 

have to be issued and coordinated), and the subordinate units have time to do their 

planning and implementation. 

• To be useful, the "vision" of the C2 system has to extend to the end of the period 

during which the plan will be implemented, not just to the beginning of that time; 
54 

• Headquarters that are "fast" and supported by "fast systems" are able to establish 

control (take actions) with a shorter vision into the future. Hence, slow C2 

systems face a double burden. Not only must they understand and predict further 

into the future, they must also accept greater risk that the situation will have 

changed before their decision cycle can have an impact. Hence, there is a greater 

likelihood that their plans will fail. 

Moreover, when plans fail and the headquarters must go beyond the contingencies built 

into them, the command and control process must be repeated. This further slows the 

ability of the commander to control the battle and increases the workload on the C2 

system. Hence efficiency(again, the price or effort required to be effective) is lost when 

the command and control cycle is slow, all other things being equal. 

However, things are not always equal. Boyd's formulation recognizes that the adversary's 

C2 systems vary in speed, which immediately implies that the C2 speed needed for 

success is not a constant. Equally important, but outside Boyd's original theory, is the fact 

that other features of the environment (such as the weather or the political context)can 

also affect the need for C2 speed. Finally, as the figure indicates, the ability to see ahead 

also changes the need for speed. Successful information war, which either immobilizes an 

enemy or provides clear indications that no immediate threat exists, provides time for 

performing more complex and detailed planning. Sometimes physical circum-stances also 

help. For example, Eisenhower could take the time for inordinately detailed and complex 

planning for the invasion of Europe because he had the ultimate choice of when to initiate 

combat. Similarly, the US and its allies were able, through a variety of political, military 
55 

and intelligence systems, to purchase time to prepare for Desert Storm. Both forces were 

able to select the crucial times and places for decisive combat and won because they 

followed the principle of the initiative. 

Too rapid a C2 system can even be a disaster. The Japanese at Midway, for example, 

made a series of rapid decisions about whether they would attack US land-based air or 

aircraft carriers. These decisions were made so rapidly that the Japanese carriers were 

still in the process of rearming their aircraft to comply with the latest set of directives 

received when they were attacked and sunk by American aircraft. The Japanese had 

effectively immobilized their forces by giving a series of orders with no time between 

them to allow implementation. Similarly, had the US felt impelled to engage Iraq as soon 

as it had forces in the Kuwaiti theater, Desert Storm would have been a very different 

conflict. Hence, speed is not always an unmitigated good in C2 systems. However, speed 

is an important element in C2 systems: 

• controlling the pace of battle (choosing the time and place for decisive action) so 

that it is advantageous is always good; 

• the ratio of the pace of battle (how fast the situation changes) to the speed of the 

C2 system (how fast the organization can recognize situational changes, grasp 

their meaning, decide what [if anything] to do about them, and cause its forces to 

react) is crucial; and 

• when a military organization is surprised (its current plan is infeasible and must 

be changed beyond the contingencies built into it), speed becomes almost an 

unmitigated good. 

Under any circumstances, however, rapid C2 systems that do not generate high-quality 

decisions and plans have little value. Indeed, they ensure rapid failure. 

Integrated Measurement of Command Arrangements 

Given the multidimensional nature of evaluation, the fact that a variety of situations must 

be considered, and the fact that the important evaluation dimensions are somewhat 

related to one another; structured analysis is important. Key structural issues for such 

analysis include: 

• relationships between and among the three levels (system performance, 

information attributes, and information value) should be explicitly mapped; 

• attributes should be weighted for relative importance; 

• a selected range of scenarios (environments for analysis) should be weighted; and 

• assessment should be based on achieving a balance among the key dimensions, 

not just the highest score on one index. 
56 

This last point is worth emphasizing. A wonderful set of command arrangements that is 

so expensive that it cannot be bought, fielded, or maintained is not as useful as a good 

system that can be counted on when needed. 

Generating the evidence for such analyses is a major challenge in itself. As a first 

approximation, analysis of current experience (such as that offered in this paper) is the 

only valid way to proceed. However, real world experience is always analytically messy - 

atypical situations, personalities, and circumstances predominate. Initial findings can be 

refined and improved in a variety of different ways, each with some very real 

imperfections in terms of generalizability or validity. Ranging from most to least realistic 

and costly, the set of sources for research, development, and system refinement include: 

• field exercises; 

• test beds with detailed environmental and adversary replication; 

• command post exercises; 

• seminar war games; 

• expert opinion focus groups; 

• man-in-the-loop simulations; 

• formal modeling and simulation; as well as, 

• theory and analysis. 

As greater control and replicability are achieved (the analysis is made more reliable), 

losses in validity occur. As validity rises, so do the costs of information collection. A 

healthy program of research and development will use a range of these approaches, not 

relying on one or two. Only in this way can validity and reliability be achieved cost 

effectively. 
57 

Conclusions 

Military forces are blunt instruments. Peace operations involve subtle missions. This 

fundamental mismatch between the classic functions of military force and those required 

for successful peace operations makes careful design of command arrangements an 

essential step if effectiveness is to be achieved. 

This paper has reviewed (a) the unique demands and requirements for successful 

command arrangements in peace operations, (b) a range of US experience in recent 

coalition warfare and peace operations, (c)the state-of-the-art knowledge of alternative 

approaches to command arrangements, and (d) the approaches necessary to assess 

alternative command arrangements. A variety of important, cross-cutting conclusions 

emerge from these analyses. 

Guidelines for Future Peace Operations 

At the most general level, a few key guidelines emerge. First, military plans and 

operations need to be segregated from, but informed by, the other activities associated 

with the peace operations - political activities, humanitarian activities, etc. Hence, the 

rich set of command arrangements needed are in addition to the military C2 system 

required. 

Second, the use of military force needs to be controlled at the adaptive level - that is, the 

set of actions to be taken needs to be thought through and coordinated (politically as well 

as militarily) in the form of contingency plans to be triggered by recognizable actions or 

patterns of action. While this implies considerable C2 capacity and prior planning, it is 

the only realistic way to take timely military actions in peace operations. Whenever 

possible, standards for equipment and doctrine should be created to facilitate "real time" 

interactions. 

Third, the command arrangements must be connected effectively to the military C2, 

which means functional communications systems, opportunities for exchange of 

information, and exchanges of liaison personnel. Wherever possible, open meetings of 

the broad set of entities associated with the peace operation should be encouraged. The 

value of information and the importance of exchanging it need to be stressed when 

dealing with NGOs and PVOs. 

Fourth, time-tested techniques and approaches should be used to simplify the command 

arrangements in coalition operations. Assignment of missions based on capability, 

assignment of separate physical space to different commands, use of coordination teams, 

and exchange of liaison officers should be coupled with the creation of networks that 

permit informal communications among the coalition members and those working with 

them. Mission-type orders will be necessary because of the diverse nature of the forces 

involved and the inherent decentralization of their tactical organization. 

Fifth, the principles of peace operations are fundamentally different from those of warfighting. They include: 
58 

• Unity of Purpose, not unity of command; 

• Consensus Planning, not hierarchical decision making; 

• Simplicity, particularly where multinational operations are involved; 

• Adaptive Control, rather than initiative; and 

• Transparency of Operations, rather than surprise and security. 

Balance among these principles is needed at all levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) 

and in all types of command arrangements(political as well as military, coordinated as 

well as hierarchical, etc.). 

Sixth, adequate capacity needs to be created and functions separated so that each level of 

command has a clear role and the necessary personnel, experience, linkages, information, 

and information-handling capacity to succeed. Where needed, this implies 

communications systems, computers, command transportation, translators, and liaison 

personnel. 

Seventh, because of the inherently decentralized, slow, and reactive command 

arrangements in coalition peace operations, commanders must use mission-oriented 

directives, and military command structures should limit the number of subordinate 

organizations reporting to key commanders. Prior investments are needed to facilitate 

these inter-actions, including: 

• establishment of standards for all aspects of peace operations relate to interoperability: communications systems, computer systems, operational language 

and procedures, levels of equipment and training for force elements contributed to 

peace operations, and so forth; 

• development and publication of international doctrine for peace operations, 

including key issues such as rules of engagement (ROE) and contingency 

planning; 

• seminars, war games, and exercises involving commanders, staffs, political 

advisors, NGOs, PVOs, international organizations, and force elements likely to 

be involved in peace operations; 

• creation of prepackaged communications systems; networks for exchanging 

information within and among different agencies, governments, force elements, 

and other actors; and computer systems for processing information; and 

• contingency plans for individual peace operations that are unambiguous enough to 

act as guidelines for action when the peace operation is challenged. 
59 

Failure to deal with these issues before deploying forces greatly increases the risks of 

mission failure and unnecessary casualties among peace forces and those they are trying 

to protect. 

Eighth, except when US military presence is considered essential for symbolic reasons 

(e.g. Golan Heights or Macedonia), US forces are far better employed in peace 

enforcement and peace imposition missions than peacekeeping. US forces are trained for 

combat and must be retrained for any peace operation. They are best used where the 

possibility of their employing overwhelming force is realistic. Moreover, the powerful 

symbolism associated with the US in general and the US military in particular often 

makes it difficult for parties to a conflict to perceive US forces as impartial. Finally, US 

policy and US force activities are subject to micro-analysis in the media, which can 

complicate peacekeeping and sometimes requires constructive ambiguity and selective 

"non-perceptions." 

Finally, valid and reliable assessment of command arrangements is essential if they are to 

be improved. This means taking the time and trouble to apply existing methodology and 

measurement systems both to the past experience with peace operations and to the most 

realistic set of war games, laboratory experiments, simulations, and exercises available. 

Measurement needs to be made not only at the level of system performance and 

information attributes, but also at the higher-order levels of indicators of decision process 

quality and overall performance. Key dimensions such as value added, life-cycle costs, 

and system adaptability must be assessed across a range of relevant scenarios. 
60 

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