* Of the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 04-1053

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

EDWARD COFIELD,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Lynch, Circuit Judge, Leval,* Senior Circuit Judge, 

and Lipez, Circuit Judge. 

John F. Palmer, for appellant.

James F. Lang, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom

Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, and Frank M.

Gaziano, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for

appellee.

 

December 10, 2004
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LEVAL, Senior Circuit Judge. The defendant Edward Cofield

brings this appeal from his conviction in the United States

District Court for the District of Massachusetts for possession of

heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), and being a convicted

felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 922(g). The defendant moved to suppress evidence seized

from him by the Boston police following his arrest. The district

court conducted a hearing and denied the motion. The defendant

then entered a conditional plea of guilty, preserving his right to

appeal from the denial of the suppression motion. Defendant was

sentenced to 180 months imprisonment, followed by three years of

supervised release on the firearms count, and to concurrent terms

of 12 months imprisonment and a year of supervised release on the

heroin count. He brought this appeal. We affirm.

Background

On the afternoon of June 15, 2001, Officer Kenneth Hearns of

the Boston Police Department, a plainclothes narcotics

investigator, saw the defendant Cofield on Washington Street in

Roxbury. Hearns recognized Cofield, from having arrested him on

January 10, 2000 after seeing him chase and attempt to stab another

man. When the police officers had overtaken and apprehended

Cofield on that prior occasion, they had found a knife on his

person and a bundle of thirteen bags of heroin on the ground next

to him. Cofield had been charged with heroin possession and armed
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assault. Hearns knew that Cofield had failed to make a court

appearance on that charge and was wanted as a fugitive. He

confirmed by police radio that there was a warrant outstanding for

Cofield’s arrest and made contact with backup. He was joined by

Officers Jay Broderick and Michael Ross to assist in the arrest.

The officers approached Cofield and told him he was under arrest.

Cofield struggled to free himself from the officers’ grasp, but was

soon handcuffed. Officer Broderick quickly frisked Cofield’s

pockets and found a glassine bag containing heroin.

While they waited for a police car to transport Cofield to the

nearby precinct, the officers noticed that Cofield was acting

nervous and “high-strung.” Cofield said to Hearns, “If I ran right

now, would you be mad at me?” The officers decided to search

Cofield once he had been transported to the station house. Among

their reasons for not searching him more fully on the street was

the desire to avoid calling attention to themselves and

compromising their undercover roles. Approximately ten minutes

after arrival at the station house, Hearns undertook to search

Cofield. The search was conducted in a hallway near the booking

desk. There were no other people under arrest there at the time.

Hearns began to search Cofield’s hat and shoes without finding

anything. He then asked Cofield to open his denim shorts. Cofield

turned to face the wall and dropped his shorts. Hearns then told

him to take his underwear down. Cofield took his underwear down
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slowly and carefully, using two hands. Hearns, observing from

behind, saw a dark object sticking out from the underpants. As

Cofield lowered his underpants slowly, a .32 caliber Beretta pistol

fell out. Cofield kicked it under his denim shorts. The police

quickly recovered it. The present prosecution was based on

Cofield’s possession of the heroin, the pistol, and the ammunition.

Cofield’s motion to suppress was based on the argument that

the officers lacked the necessary degree of probable cause,

reasonable suspicion or concern for their safety that would justify

a strip search. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district

court denied the motion on the grounds that (1) the circumstances

supported a reasonable suspicion that Cofield was in possession of

weapons and/or narcotics, and (2) the officers had good reason to

fear for their safety. The court may also have relied on

inevitable discovery. This doctrine was discussed during argument,

but was not expressly relied on in the court’s final summary of its

ruling.

Discussion

The lawfulness of a strip search depends on whether the

circumstances reasonably justify such an intrusive invasion of

privacy. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979); Swain v.

Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1997). Appellate review is de

novo. See, e.g., United States v. Sargent, 319 F.3d 4, 8 (1st Cir.

2003). In considering the question of reasonableness, a court must
1 Without suggesting that there were not reasonable grounds

to search based on possible possession of narcotics, we also

consider the threat to officer safety. We recognize that Officer

Hearns testified that the motivation of his search was to find

narcotics. Nonetheless, if an objective assessment of the

circumstances would have justified a concern about a concealed

weapon, a court properly takes that concern into account in

determining the reasonableness of the search, even though it was

not the searching officer’s motivation. See, e.g., Whren v. United

States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1996) (finding that the Supreme

Court’s “cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional

reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations

of the individual officers involved” and stating that “the Fourth

Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to

be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective

intent”); United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 23-24 (1st Cir.

2003) (“[T]he subjective intent of the police plays no role in the

analysis of a motion to suppress under the Fourth Amendment. . . .

Rather, the question is whether [the search was] objectively

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”).

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assess the totality of the circumstances, including “the scope of

the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the

justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is

conducted.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. The inquiry is of a practical

nature, calling for a sensible assessment of the circumstances.

Well-justified concern for the safety of police officers can of

course furnish important justification.

The police officers had excellent reason to believe that

Cofield might be in possession of both weapons and narcotics, and

that he might pose a threat to their safety.1 There was also good

reason to believe such things might be hidden in his underwear.

Among the circumstances which supported such a concern were the

following: Officer Hearns knew Cofield to be a narcotics dealer;
2

 This court has observed in discussing the reasonableness of

a strip search that “[i]t is common knowledge that controlled

substances often are concealed on the person of users and dealers

alike.” Burns v. Loranger, 907 F.2d 233, 238-39 (1st Cir. 1990).

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officers had found a glassine baggie of heroin in Cofield’s

exterior pocket, suggesting a likelihood that he may have more

heroin on his person; from his own personal experience, as well as

his professional familiarity with narcotics traffic, Officer Hearns

knew that narcotics dealers often carry narcotics and weapons

concealed in their undershorts;2 and Cofield had appeared tense and

nervous and had struggled to avoid arrest. Furthermore, the

previous year Hearns had seen Cofield try to stab a man and had

found Cofield to be in possession of thirteen bags of heroin. All

these circumstances supported a reasonable inference that Cofield

might well be concealing a weapon, posing a danger to the police

and others, as well as contraband narcotics evidence, which Cofield

might find a way to hide or dispose of if it was not promptly

secured.

Bell also requires consideration of the manner in which the

search is conducted, with attention to whether it exceeds

reasonable bounds or is done in a needlessly humiliating fashion or

with improper motivation. See Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d

107, 113 (1st Cir. 2001); Swain, 117 F.3d at 8. In the present

case, the strip search was conducted in a professional manner with

no more intrusion than necessary to accomplish the proper law
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enforcement purpose. The officers did not require Cofield to

assume humiliating poses, expose himself in an unnecessarily public

place or to members of the opposite sex, remain exposed for

unreasonable durations, or endure degradation or ridicule. Nor was

there any suggestion of any abusive or unprofessional motivation on

the part of the officers. Compare Swain, 117 F.3d at 8 (“distinct

possibility” that strip search was ordered to “impos[e] sexual

humiliation . . . as a punishment for . . . non-cooperation”), with

Wood v. Hancock County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 354 F.3d 57, 69 (1st Cir.

2003) (noting appellant did not challenge manner of search where

“done in a private area, by a single officer of the same gender,

and without physical contact”); Roberts, 239 F.3d at 113 (manner of

search reasonable where conducted in private, search was entirely

visual, and no accusations of abuse); Burns v. Loranger, 907 F.2d

233, 235 & n.6 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting plaintiff did not challenge

manner of strip search, where visual search only, performed by

officer of same gender, and in a private location). 

Nor was the strip search unreasonable in relation to the

nature and seriousness of the offenses in which Cofield was

believed to be involved. Cofield was a fugitive on the serious

charges on which Hearns had first arrested him in January 2000. He

was now subject to prosecution for the earlier assault and heroin

offenses, his flight to avoid that prosecution, and the new heroin

discovered through the Washington Street pat-down. See Roberts,
3

 Because we affirm on the basis of the reasonableness of the

search, we have no need to rule on the alternate ground of the

inevitability of the gun’s discovery. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams,

467 U.S. 431 (1984) (applying the doctrine of inevitable discovery

to admit evidence); United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 42-45 (1st

Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Ford, 22 F.3d 374, 377-81 (1st

Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736 (1st

Cir. 1986) (same).

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239 F.3d at 112 (more latitude to strip search prisoners charged

with offenses “generally associated with weapons or contraband”);

see also Miller v. Kennebec County, 219 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2000)

(agreeing with district court that there was ample evidence to find

strip searches unjustified, “particularly” because offense for

which plaintiff was detained gave rise to no suspicion of

concealment of weapons or contraband).

Considering all these circumstances, we believe that the

district court was eminently justified in concluding that the

search was reasonably conducted and well within the standards of

Bell.

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Affirmed.