Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

by John A. Cope with Andrew Parks

STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 20

Center for Strategic Research

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National 

Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes 

the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, 

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, and Center for 

Technology and National Security Policy. The military and civilian 

analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute 

their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and 

participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach.

The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the 

Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 

unified combatant commands in support of the academic programs at 

NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and 

the broader national security community. 

Cover: Brazilian army soldiers patrol the Oiapoque River, border between 

Brazil and French Guyana, as part of Operation Agata 8 in Amapa State,

May 15, 2014 (Pedro FranÇa/AFP/Getty Images)
Frontier Security:

The Case of Brazil

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

Series Editor: Laura J. Junor

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

August 2016

By John A. Cope with Andrew Parks

Frontier Security:

The Case of Brazil
For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, please visit inss.ndu.edu/Publications.aspx.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those 

of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or 

any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a 

standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints 

or reviews.

First printing, August 2016

The INSS series of publications on Brazil and its emerging world role include Luigi Einaudi, Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement, Strategic Forum 266 

(March 2011); E. Richard Downes, Trust, Engagement, and Technology Transfer: Underpinnings of U.S.-Brazil Defense Cooperation, Strategic Forum 279 (August 2012); Patrice Franko, 

The Defense Acquisition Trilemma: The Case of Brazil, Strategic Forum 284 (January 2014); 

and the current title. All essays are available in English and Portuguese at ndupress.ndu.edu. 

The author wishes to thank Ambassador Luigi Einaudi, Dr. Christopher J. Lamb, Dr. Luis Bitencourt, and Andrew Parks for their many critical and helpful suggestions that improved the 

paper. He also wants to thank the technical support provided by Ana Maria Espitia, Advaith 

Thampi, Monica Rodriguez, and Krystal Cox.
Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................... 1

Introduction........................................................................................................ 3

A Complex Security Challenge......................................................................... 5

Prioritize the Amazon! ....................................................................................11

The Midwest and South...................................................................................24

Modernization and International Cooperation ...........................................26

Lessons from Brazil’s Experience ...................................................................31

Conclusion ........................................................................................................38

Notes ..................................................................................................................40

About the Authors............................................................................................43



1

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

Executive Summary

Over the past three decades Brazil has greatly improved its ability to monitor and control 

its long border. Achieving better management of the complex frontier security problem required a great deal of patience, trial and error, organizational adaptation, and good leadership. 

The Brazilian experience yields a number of important lessons for Brazil and for its neighbors 

in the Western Hemisphere. Improving performance required subordination of military priorities to civilian authorities; the repositioning of forces; better military-police cooperation; interagency and international cooperation; investment in technologies to give Brazil an advantage in 

the contest for best situational awareness; a long-term commitment; and guiding strategy documents supported by both civil and military authorities. Of overarching significance is the way 

the Brazilian military was able to reestablish the confidence of civilian leaders in the aftermath 

of decades of military rule. The result was a Brazilian military that is more professional, more 

respected, and better resourced than before. For the United States, the evolution of Brazilian 

frontier security is not only a developing good news story for hemispheric relations, but also a 

learning opportunity, since similar security problems have not always been so well managed in 

the United States.

Brazil faces a herculean challenge to defend national sovereignty and control access by 

land, river, air, and sea along the 10,000-mile land border it shares with 10 countries. The 

relatively developed and populous southern zone, roughly 4,000 miles, has traditionally been 

the priority defended by army mechanized and armored units. However, the majority of the 

frontier in the northern and western expanse of the Amazon rainforest has been sparsely 

populated and has had a minimal military presence. Interest in border security and regional 

development began to change in the 1970s as the pressure of environmental politics in Brazil 

and abroad increased.

Brazil’s approach to frontier security has evolved steadily over the past 30 years from passive, defensive, little contact with neighbors, and small military detachments (mostly army) 

working the arc of the Amazon from French Guiana to Bolivia to an aggressive, all-services strategy covering the whole border in close cooperation with the federal police and with 

increased bilateral coordination. The country’s evolving approach to the demanding tasks of 

guaranteeing the state’s authority and protecting vulnerabilities and natural resources is instructive for other governments facing similar challenges. Brazil’s relative success improving frontier 

security is notable because of its linkages to sustainable socio-economic development, interagency coordination, surveillance technology, and international cooperation. 
2 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

Brazil’s modern border policies began to take shape after the end of the 1964–1985 military dictatorship. The new civilian government supported a civilian and military border development initiative known as the Calha Norte program. This project stressed settlement and 

infrastructure construction and also introduced special border platoons along the northern 

frontier. The nascent program was fully supported in 2004 by an operational system for the 

surveillance of Amazonia (Sistema de Vigilância de Amazônia, or SIVAM). In 2008, the ministry of defense announced a National Strategy of Defense, championed by President Lula da 

Silva, which established regional priorities, directed the reorganization and repositioning of 

army, navy, and air force capabilities, and prescribed operational guidelines. Three years later, 

President Dilma Rousseff ’s government launched its Strategic Borders Plan, which instituted 

military–law enforcement security operations across the whole border against the full range 

of criminal activities. With this plan, the Brazilian congress granted the armed forces policing 

powers within 90 miles of the frontier.

In many ways, the National Strategy of Defense marked a clear turning point in frontier 

security. Of critical importance is that the strategy introduced what it calls the triple imperative 

of monitor and control, leading to requirements for mobility and ultimately presence. These three 

concepts govern the mid-term and long-range development of capabilities and force structure 

for each branch of the armed forces, and provide near-term guidance for the growing scope of 

roles that increasingly includes tasks in support of law enforcement. Implementing the Strategic 

Borders Plan over the last 5 years has resulted in gradually improved interdiction in the frontier zone against narcotics, weapons, and other illegal commodities. The way ahead intensifies 

integrated military and police operations, emphasizes the technical and procedural refinement 

of surveillance and communication capabilities, and strengthens security collaboration with 

neighboring countries.

While military and civilian agency progress in the border zone is real, it is hampered by 

the continued lack of an interagency legal framework, binding over time on all federal and state 

players, to promote sustainable development, regional integration, and national security. Forward movement still depends on presidential involvement and executive decrees. As often happens, interagency coordination is difficult and slow. Most recently, a harsh recession, currency 

devaluation, and a political crisis involving the president have led to budget constraints in many 

areas, including defense, in which there had been rising investment.

This analysis is the fourth publication from the Institute for National Strategic Studies on 

Brazil and its emerging world role.
3

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

Introduction

Terrorist incidents worldwide have underscored the demanding practical and political 

challenges governments face trying to manage porous frontiers to protect national sovereignty 

from the pressures created by refugees, migrants, an array of small-scale smugglers and larger 

organized criminal networks, and the spillovers of foreign conflicts. 

In the Western Hemisphere, the problems associated with frontier security are most apparent, complex, and instructive in Brazil. Its land border, shared with 10 countries, is peaceful, marked by efforts to achieve bilateral cooperation rather than settle longstanding disputes. 

Nonetheless, the border remains at risk and difficult to manage in the country’s distant, relatively underpopulated, and historically neglected frontier areas. Security concerns have increased 

as Brazil has emerged on the world stage. Pope Francis visited the country in 2013. Brazil then 

began hosting a series of major international sports events including the 2014 World Cup for 

soccer and the 2016 Summer Olympics and Paralympics, all of which provide tempting targets.

An underpopulated jungle frontier distant from major cities would present any country 

with a herculean test. In Brazil, the long Amazon section of the border, some 6,000 miles, was 

historically seen as bounding empty space. In the 1960s, this emptiness suddenly heightened 

military concerns about national security. Brazil’s military government in the 1960s and 1970s 

encouraged domestic migration to occupy Amazon lands. Road building and financial incentives provided a pathway that led to land clearing for large cattle ranches and plantation agriculture. The random development stimulated concerns outside Brazil about massive deforestation, 

disrespect for indigenous rights, and degradation of the environment.

The lack of both a near-term plan to defend sovereignty and a longer-term resource strategy 

to strengthen military capabilities to do so came to a head in 1985. International pressure over 

the health of the Amazon was building as a civilian government returned to office after 21 years 

of military rule. President José Sarney upheld the three tenets of the military’s Amazon policy—

sovereignty, security, and development—and approved the Calha Norte program to create presence with a small number of special border platoons that were located at strategic points north of 

the Amazon and Solimões rivers. While the federal government also encouraged infrastructure 

development in this enormous threatened area, the armed forces began a slow, poorly funded 

process of shifting forces from all services into the Amazon region. The Amazon Military Command was created in 1991 to accommodate the growing geopolitical importance of the region. 

Over the next two decades the military would adapt aerial surveillance, communications technology, and many other capabilities to meet the region’s security demands.
4 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

It was the 2008 National Strategy of Defense, however, that provided the missing strategic 

vision to protect Brazil’s territorial integrity, prioritized the Amazon region, and strengthened 

the military’s ability to support domestic and foreign policy in an increasingly unstable, unconventional security environment. This document marked the rehabilitation of the Brazilian 

armed forces from the long period of military rule (1964–1985) and the transformation of their 

mission from domestic order to national defense. Its guiding strategic doctrine of monitor and 

control, mobility, and presence continues to shape the efforts of the armed forces to reorganize, reposition, and strengthen their dissuasion capabilities. The National Strategy provided 

the defense sector with a rationale for funding wide-ranging modernization in a context of civilmilitary unity instead of friction. In fact, the defense budget as a share of government spending 

increased 28 percent from 2003 to 2010 (the Lula government) when the strategy was officially 

promulgated (see figure 1).

Countries tend to lack sufficient law enforcement manpower and deterrent capabilities to 

manage borders effectively. Homeland security police are widely scattered, so manmade barriers—fences and walls, supplemented by technological devices—have sometimes been used to 

minimize the absence of human presence and provide a deterrent. Brazil is no exception, but 

its complex geography precludes extensive physical barriers. The country has found that law 

Figure 1. Brazil’s Defense Budget and GDP Growth

Year

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

20032004

Defense Budget (USD Million) GDP (Current $US)

USD

USD Millions

200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016

3,000,000,000,000

2,500,000,000,000

1,500,000,000,000

2,000,000,000,000

1,000,000,000,000

500,000,000,000

0

Source: IHS Jane’s Defence Budgets, “Brazil’s Defence Budget and Military Capabilities,” April 2016.
5

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

enforcement and the armed forces must work together along the frontier, and where police presence is thin or nonexistent, the military needs policing powers. Both must find ways to exploit 

the advances of modern technology to support their efforts.

Much can be learned from the dynamics of Brazil’s response to controlling and regulating who and what passes across or flies over such a long and vulnerable land frontier. This 

study identifies the strategic vision and policies that guide the country’s efforts to guarantee its 

authority and protect natural resources in Amazonia and elsewhere. It describes the roles the 

armed forces play improving territorial security in the faixa de fronteira (the approximately 

90-mile-deep frontier zone), which is still developing and remains environmentally sensitive. 

The armed services have had relative success adapting to challenges of sovereign control, employing modern technology, close collaboration with law enforcement, and bilateral cooperation with neighboring countries. Brazil’s experience suggests lessons that would be of interest 

to other governments.

A Complex Security Challenge

Brazil’s land boundaries are almost two times the combined length of the U.S. border with 

both Mexico and Canada without Alaska. Brazil’s frontier with Bolivia alone (2,176 miles) is 

longer than the U.S.-Mexico border (1,933 miles). The Brazilian Atlantic coastline stretches for 

an additional 4,600 miles, with some of the country’s largest ports and major cities. The country’s land borders combine easily recognized terrain features and a few negotiated segments that 

Aerial view of Amazon Rainforest, near Manaus, the capital of Brazilian state of Amazonas (Wikipedia/Neil 

Palmer)
6 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

cross a variety of terrain and rely on boundary markers, which in some cases are missing. The 

most common geographic features, particularly in the west and south, are river courses, many 

of which are navigable for hundreds of miles. In the north, the boundary follows the mountainous terrain of the Guiana Highlands, which forms the divide between the Amazon Basin’s 

watershed to the south and the Orinoco River Valley and other rivers that flow north (see map). 

Much of the northern and western segments of the frontier are in tropical rainforests that had 

never been explored when the relevant bilateral treaty was signed and would not be surveyed 

until the 1960s. Today, largely inaccessible border areas in sparsely inhabited rainforests have 

been designated national parks, indigenous Indian reserves, and sometimes both.

The peaceful nature of Brazil’s land borders with 10 immediate neighbors is generally credited to the Baron of Rio Branco, José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior, Brazil’s minister of foreign 

affairs from 1902 to 1912. He negotiated treaties with all adjoining countries, leading to the 

diplomatic resolution of boundary controversies, principally over remote and poorly mapped 

regions of the Amazon Basin. His success formalized Brazil’s sovereignty from the Atlantic 

Ocean to the foot of the Andes Mountains.1

 Over half of the territory was gained using the legal 

doctrine of uti possidetis de facto—possession takes precedence over legal title. The presence of 

some Brazilian settlers, particularly in western areas, was invaluable.

The arc of the Amazon border from French Guiana to Bolivia defines Brazil’s Amazonia, 

which covers 45 percent of national territory and is home to over 7 percent of the population. Other Amazonian countries include Peru, Ecuador (not a neighbor), Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, and Suriname. Between Brazil and its neighbors, trans-boundary communication 

and transportation infrastructure, primarily bridges, is sparse in the north and west and most 

prevalent in the south and southeast regions, where 43 percent of Brazil’s population and a large 

percentage of the country’s industry are located. 

Brazil has a total of nine official border crossing points with Uruguay and Argentina and 

six with Paraguay and Bolivia. Trans-boundary movement in the Amazon Basin is physically 

more challenging with only three customs areas with Peru, three with Colombia (one shared 

with Venezuela), and one each with Venezuela, Guyana, and French Guiana.

Most travel takes advantage of extensive navigable river systems ranging from the huge 

Amazon River, on which oceangoing freighters can travel 2,300 miles as far as Iquitos, Peru, 

to smaller tributaries such as the Javari River on the border with Peru, which is navigable by 

motorized canoe for over 800 miles. The city of Manaus on the Rio Negro, founded in 1693 

and with 2 million inhabitants in 2014, is the main transport hub for the entire upper Amazon 

River—900 miles upriver from the Atlantic. Its busy and expanding free trade zone supports 
7

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

electronics, chemical, distilling, ship construction, and natural gas and petroleum refining industries. Between 2005 and 2015, container volume soared sevenfold, from 78,000 20-footequivalent units to 492,000. River transportation in the Amazon includes barges, small ships, 

and ferries. The growth of river traffic has led to the rise of piracy, particularly in the states of 

Amazonas, Pará, and Rondônia.2

 In good weather, local transportation also relies on the use of 

light aviation and helicopters. Few paved roads link the capital, Brasilia, with cities in northern 

and western states or connect the few neighboring border cities in the Amazon. Most roads that 

exist, including many sections of the 2,400-mile Trans-Amazonian Highway, are unpaved and 

difficult to maintain in an environment with frequent heavy rains.

Brazil does not face a conventional military threat to its sovereignty. The Atlantic Ocean, 

the Amazon rainforest, and the Andes create formidable natural barriers to the north, east, and 

west. To the south, the historic rivalry with Argentina has evolved into active cooperation best 

The Amazonas state has an extensive river system. The central west-east flowing river is the Amazon. Rio Negro 

flows north and merges with the Amazon south of Manaus. The three major tributaries flowing south to north are 

Rio Juruá (west), Rio Purus, and Rio Maderia (east).
8 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

characterized by the agreement in 2011 to hold a biannual brigade-level combined military 

exercise, Guarani, to improve interoperability. So long as its military planning was focused on 

Argentina, Brasilia paid minimal attention to the western and northern land frontiers. During 

the period of military government, however, the armed forces realized that they lacked the 

ability to defend Brazil’s sovereignty in this vast and rich but lightly populated region relatively 

far from the centers of Brazilian power. They feared neighboring countries might use the doctrine of uti possidetis de facto to seize unoccupied territory. In the 1970s, the armed forces 

launched a colonization program along the nation’s western frontier called the Super-Brazil 

da Amazonia. The government encouraged citizens, particularly those in the drought-stricken 

northeast, to move toward the frontier and help develop the territory. The armed forces established a few posts in Amazonia and initiated transportation infrastructure projects to help the 

national government integrate the western sector into the national economy and strengthen 

national security.

In the 1980s and 1990s, growing international concern about the depletion of natural resources in the vast Amazon Basin and foreign activism about endangered indigenous populations energized Brazilian nationalism and came to be seen as threatening Brazil’s sovereignty. 

Domestic controversies over land speculation, concerns about protecting Indian and rural 

workers’ rights, and huge, often uncontrolled Amazonian fires grabbed and sustained frontpage media attention worldwide. External criticism of Brazilian environmental practices by 

the United States, European countries, and some United Nations agencies turned caring for 

the rainforest and defending sovereignty in the Amazon into contentious public policy issues. 

Rural ranchers and large agricultural landholders confronted domestic and international conservationists. The turmoil ultimately led to many political and structural changes at the federal 

and state levels. Of particular importance was the creation of the Brazilian Environment and 

Renewable Resource Institute to coordinate environmental policy and oversee authorized extractive enterprises. Diplomatically, Brazil proposed that Amazonian neighbors collaborate and 

present a common front in response to international challenges to their collective sovereignty 

over the Amazon.3

 By the early 1990s, Amazonia had also become an important “rallying symbol” for a concerned Brazilian military.4

Environmental attention to the Amazon Basin increased at a time when narcotics smuggling across Brazil’s largely uncontrolled frontiers was also growing. The illicit exploitation of 

the Amazon’s natural wealth (gold, rare minerals, lumber, and many other commodities) was 

also expanding. The worrisome presence of Peruvian and Colombian narco-guerrilla units near, 

and sometimes in, Brazilian territory exacerbated the security challenge. Domestic criminal 
9

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

activities in Amazonia were deeply rooted locally and had a history reaching back to the smuggling of rubber out of South America from the late 19th century until World War II. Law enforcement along the border consisted of small and widely separated detachments of the federal police department and the Brazilian army. While generally viewed as competent, both police and 

military always lacked intelligence, manpower, material capacity, and funds needed to counter 

effectively the various forms of transnational organized crime active in the region.

In the 1980s and 1990s, federal and state governments were poorly prepared to confront 

surging illegal criminal activities as they expanded in Brazil’s eight Amazon border states. 

Prominent among them were thousands of Brazilian and neighboring illegal gold prospectors, 

or garimpeiros. Estimates vary between 30,000 and 100,000, many of whom were armed and 

intent on exploring land designated as belonging to the Yanomami Indians.5

 Brazil’s National 

Department of Mineral Production estimates that between 1977 and 1986, 1,569 tons of gold 

were lost due to illegal exploitation of natural resources and smuggling operations in Amazonia 

compared to the 167 tons recovered using legitimate methods. Illegal gold prospecting took, 

and continues to take, a heavy toll on the rainforest and its indigenous people. The Indians 

often retaliated, and there has been a loss of life on both sides. To this day, gold rushes occur 

Deforestation and illegal logging discovered in SIVAM satellite imagery (System for the Vigilance of the Amazon)
10 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

(such as in Mato Grosso state in late 2015), and garimpeiro wildcat gold panning impacts the 

region’s water, riverbeds, and fish. Neighboring farms are adversely affected by large-scale mining operations that use dredges and highly toxic mercury, which is required for gold extraction.

Another predatory clandestine industry, the illegal logging of mahogany and other highvalue hardwood species, has expanded significantly, driven by foreign demand for precious 

lumber, again frequently with violence on Indian land. Not only does illegal logging degrade the 

Amazon rainforest and its ecosystems, but corruption in the legal timber trade means that very 

little of the profit reaches the communities where the trees were found.6

Units of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) have been attracted 

to Brazil to purchase logistical support and by the profit potential of illicit gold mining, drug 

trafficking, and related activities.7

 The 1991 Traira River incident was a shock to Brazilian public opinion and an affront to the country’s sovereignty. A 40-man FARC unit attacked an army 

detachment of 17 in Brazil near two gold fields, killing three and wounding nine. The event 

highlighted Brazil’s alarming vulnerability. Despite an unprecedented cooperative BrazilianColombian military operation into Colombian territory by Brazilian special forces that eliminated the FARC unit and retrieved stolen equipment, incursions continue to occur, as has bilateral military cooperation and combined operations along sensitive parts of the border zone.8

Drug smuggling traverses Peruvian and Bolivian borders into the states of Acre, Mato 

Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, and Rondônia. Colombian and Peruvian cocaine also follows clandestine routes into Brazil from Paraguay. Extensive use of aircraft to transport drugs has diminished since Brazil passed a shoot-down law in 1998, but large quantities of narcotics are still 

moved by river. Today, cocaine paste often travels by boats aided by global positioning systems 

to labs in the Peruvian, Colombian, and Brazilian rainforest. The finished cocaine moves by 

fishing craft and scheduled passenger services to ports and then by oceangoing vessels to locations around the country. Consumption has risen steadily and significantly, making Brazil the 

second-largest consumer of cocaine in the Western Hemisphere after the United States. Brazil 

also serves as a transit country for illicit drugs from neighboring Andean countries destined 

primarily for Europe. By the mid-2000s, Brazil’s civilian and military leaders realized that drug 

trafficking and the organized crime networks involved posed a serious security problem, requiring the reluctant armed forces to become directly involved in the frontier zone supporting the 

federal and state police departments. Given the scale of the narcotics problem and the vast size 

of the borders, any progress in reducing drug trafficking is likely to be modest and incremental.9

Although the ubiquity of drug-related activities along all sections of Brazil’s frontier attracts the most police and military attention, there are other cross-border security concerns. 
11

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

Beyond checkpoints, the frontier is wide open. Brazilian and foreign criminal groups have created routes to smuggle into Brazil refugees from Haiti and other countries as well as controlled 

substances such as mercury and contraband commodities from weapons and cigarettes to software and used cars. Commodities transported illegally from Brazil include precious and semiprecious gems, uncertified commercial lumber, and fauna and flora.10 Contraband represents in 

2015 an estimated annual loss of around 100 billion real (equivalent to U.S. $288 million] to the 

economy, damage to local industry, and loss in tax receipts.11

Prioritize the Amazon!

Traditional military missions along the frontier were to monitor the border and provide 

other agencies with intelligence, logistical support, and training when needed. The armed forces’ approach to these roles changed radically over the last 30 years. Four major initiatives influenced the evolution of Brazil’s frontier security efforts. The first commenced in 1985 with a 

military and civilian border area development plan, the Calha Norte program, which began by 

deploying eight special border platoons from jungle infantry battalions to create posts along the 

border. From these locations and working with detachments from federal ministries, the army 

would develop local infrastructure. In 1992 Brazil launched the second initiative, the System for 

the Surveillance of Amazonia (Sistema de Vigilância de Amazônia, or SIVAM) with its integrated air traffic control, environmental, and surveillance information technologies. The system did 

not become fully operational until 2004. Led by Nelson Jobim, the ministry of defense in 2008 

announced a National Strategy of Defense, the third initiative, that established regional priorities and prescribed operational, stationing, and capability development guidelines. It took effect 

in 2010. Finally, in 2011, President Dilma Rousseff ’s government launched its Strategic Borders 

Plan by decree, which formalized and expanded joint military–law enforcement security operations across the whole land frontier against the full range of criminal activities.

The Calha Norte Program

Brazil’s armed forces, fearing foreign encroachment north of the Amazon and Solimões 

rivers, collaborated with an inter-ministerial work team to propose an ambitious plan, Programa Calha Norte (Northern Corridor), which President Sarney approved in December 1985. 

Initially classified in an effort to hide the precarious nature of the Brazilian presence along the 

frontier, the initiative was designed to establish a small, permanent military presence at selected 

sites able to watch and control rivers and other strategic locations, such as important Indian 

communities, and with other federal agencies encourage economic and social development.12
12 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

The ambitious initiative’s objective was to increase the presence of the federal government 

in an important part of the Amazon region, contributing to national defense by providing assistance to local settlements and securing the border. Calha Norte encompassed a crooked corridor of land approximately 150 miles wide and 3,900 miles long, for a total land area of 720,000 

square miles. The targeted populations were in the states of Amapá, Acre, Amazonas, Rondônia, 

Roraima, and municipalities in the Northern Corridor of the Amazon River in Pará state and the 

island Marajó. As originally conceived, the promotion of security and development involved four 

priority action areas: augmenting military and government presence in the zone, creating clearly 

demarcated international borders through surveying and physical markers, increasing bilateral 

relations (in terms of commerce and technical and infrastructural cooperation), and defining 

an appropriate policy for indigenous groups in the corridor, particularly the large community 

of Yanomami Indians. The rationale gradually expanded to include interdicting drug trafficking 

and preserving the environment. Regrettably, no federal ministry was tasked to coordinate the 

Figure 2. Growth of Special Border Platoons, 1985–2015 and Projected

Key: AOUC = additional outposts under construction; AOP = additional outposts planned.

Source: Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—South America, “Brazil’s Army Annual Reports,” 2015.

0

7

14

21

28

35

1985 1989 1991 1993 1999 2010 2015 AO

UC

AO

P

Number of Outposts

Year
13

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

program and manage its implementation. When the congress reduced funding after 1988, civilian ministries lost interest and failed to sustain their commitments.

By default, Calha Norte became a military-led development program to build bases, roads, 

and other infrastructure. The linchpin for the program was the placement of a small number 

of army special border platoons at strategic locations close to indigenous and other settlements 

along the northern border. In concept, the military post would be augmented by civilian expertise from government agencies to introduce a school, a medical clinic, a community center, 

a federal police agency, a bank, a system of communication, and perhaps an airfield built and 

maintained by the air force. The original eight posts would serve as community embryos and 

provide the foundation for future growth. In addition, Calha Norte funds would help the armed 

forces start to build bases, airfields, and other infrastructure in relatively close proximity to support units along the border. The army repositioned a helicoper force from southern Brazil to 

Manaus in 1991. The navy had a lesser role that emphasized securing rivers and bringing medical treatment to the riverine population, where possible, using two new hospital ships. Even 

though the army was able to increase the number of special border platoons over the course 

of the 1990s (see figure 2), overall implementation of the project proceeded slowly. The armed 

forces’ lack of funds was matched by insufficient civilian interest.13

Calha Norte suffered financially during the 1990s, receiving 3.5 percent of the estimated 

annual budget,14 as a result of its identification with the past military dictatorship at a time of 

increasing aversion to the armed forces. The military (mainly the army) continued to fund the 

program and kept it alive. With zones of instability near the borders with neighboring countries, the Amazon reemerged in the late 1990s as a region of paramount concern for Brazilian 

security, although without increases in funding. When President Fernando Henrique Cardozo 

created the country’s first ministry of defense in June 1999, he gave a strong voice to the defense 

of the Amazon and finally established a home for the management of the federal Calha Norte 

program in the ministry.

Then in 2004, President Lula revitalized Calha Norte as his administration brought renewed interest in and increased funding for Amazonian development and control of the frontier. During Lula’s two terms (2002–2010) and that of President Rousseff, there was greater 

funding as Brazil’s economy took off, but it fluctuated markedly in response to the price of commodities as well as domestic and international politics. From 2003 to 2014, the federal government allocated over R$3.8 billion on Calha Norte. Approximately 80 percent went to the civil 

development side in Amazonian municipalities ranging from paved roads and new schools to 

nurseries and soccer fields.15 With the overall growth in funding for Calha Norte, which after 
14 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

the 2008 National Defense Strategy remained constant for the ministry at approximately R$72 

million allocated, the armed forces were able to establish more bases for special border platoons 

and parent jungle infantry battalions as well as build airfields and naval facilities, expanding the 

military presence in the northern Amazon (see figure 3).

As Calha Norte celebrated its 30th anniversary in 2015, it had supported settlements in 

194 municipalities in 6 northern states. Only half were located within the faixa de fronteira, 

90 miles from the border and contributed to the surveillance and monitoring of that strategically relevant area.16 The remaining municipalities were further inland, showing how a bold 

Figure 3. Annual Budgets for the Calha Norte Project, 2003–2014

Sources: Calha Norte Annual Budget Reports.

0

80,000,000

160,000,000

240,000,000

320,000,000

400,000,000

480,000,000

560,000,000

640,000,000

720,000,000

800,000,000

200320042005

MOD/Civilian Agencies Budgets

R$

200620072008200920102011201220132014

MOD Civilian Agencies
15

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

and multidisciplinary government initiative can be of social significance to Brazilians.17 In 

2015, President Rousseff officially expanded the scope of the program to encompass the entire 

Amazon region.

The special border platoons at the heart of the Calha Norte project are an innovation that 

have proved their value over time. The members of these volunteer units, who are graduates 

of the Jungle Warfare Training Center, live with families in austere outposts, usually for a year. 

Many soldiers are from indigenous communities. The locations along the frontier usually are 

on an important river near a local or indigenous community. One strategic site along the frontier with Peru is adjacent to a Portuguese fortification from the 17th century. Beginning with 8 

special platoons, the number has grown over the last 30 years to 25, with 3 more in development and another 3 being planned (see figure 2). Each platoon has at least one officer, 50 to 70 

soldiers, a generator, and wireless communication. The platoon’s mission is captured by four 

words: life, work, vigilance, and combat. They perform a broad range of activities, most beyond 

traditional defense and military functions, such as growing crops, hunting/fishing, caring for 

livestock, building and repairing community infrastructure, providing education, first aid, and 

community protection, exercising police powers in their area, and maintaining the trust of the 

community. In other words, local governance and development, early warning, and limited law 

enforcement are in the hands of army personnel.18

After the Cardozo government created the ministry of defense, one of its first actions was 

to broaden the mission of the armed forces in the Amazon region from the traditional defense 

of national sovereignty to include combating narcotics trafficking and other forms of smuggling. 

The military’s new role was defined in two landmark federal laws. The 1998 Lei do Abate authorized the military to shoot down hostile aircraft, including those purported to be carrying drugs 

or other contraband, although several years passed before the installation of radars was complete 

and the law was enacted.19 A related federal law passed in 1999 gave the armed forces authority 

to search for contraband and make crime scene arrests in the border zone, which is understood 

to be the area within 90 miles of the border. The law emphasized that the military can

act through preventive and repressive actions in the border zone, at sea and in 

inland waters—regardless of the ownership, property, purpose or any encumbrance 

upon them—against transnational and environmental crimes, alone or in 

coordination with other agencies of the Executive Branch, conducting, among 

others, the following actions: I—patrolling, II—inspecting/searching people, land 

vehicles, ships and aircraft, III—on-scene arrests.20
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

In practice, members of the armed forces try to involve representatives of law enforcement, if 

possible, when an arrest must be made.

The System for the Surveillance of Amazonia

SIVAM, announced by the Brazilian air force in 1992, started initial operations with 50 

percent of the architecture in place in 2002 and became fully operational 2 years later. The project, in which Raytheon had a major role, continues to be refined as radar and other information 

technology becomes more capable. The system, overseen by the ministry of defense (Air Force 

Command), is a complex network of 25 fixed radars and airborne radars aboard sophisticated 

Air Force Embraer R-99A early warning aircraft, environmental sensors, satellite imagery terminals, wireless communication networks, computerized data collection, and ground-based air 

traffic monitoring centers designed for surveillance and coordination. State-of-the-art SIVAM 

architecture, which covers 61 percent of Brazil’s land mass, generates and disseminates information on border control and criminal activity. Of equal importance, the system enhances Brazil’s 

understanding of the Amazon’s ecology, as well as scientific, economic, and social development 

issues. SIVAM provides results in six areas:

■ environmental surveillance (maps, climate, and environmental data)

■ processing of meteorological information (maps, observations and patterns, early 

warning systems)

■ land and air surveillance (law enforcement, discovery of illegal air strips, tracking deforestation and illegal mining, drug cultivation and production areas)

■ monitoring and processing regional communications (official records of regional airwave communications)

■ air traffic control (flight security, radar-controlled airways, flight planning)

■ planning and control of regional operations (plans of action, operational support, 

emergency search and rescue).

The information gained through SIVAM is shared with the overarching System for the Protection of Amazonia (Sistema de Proteção da Amazônia, or SIPAM), which provides support, 
17

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

coordination, and oversight for sustainable development initiatives that are carried out by multiple public agencies working in the Amazon.21 The ministry of defense also is interested in having 

neighboring countries associate with SIVAM. Information is shared with Colombia and Peru.

National Strategy of Defense

From 2002 through 2007, the armed forces conducted a series of training maneuvers and 

law enforcement operations in remote areas across the country to assess the military’s ability to 

defend Brazil against a variety of potential threats. The objectives included information collection on the Amazonian region; testing unit readiness and deployment capabilities to the borders 

with all neighboring countries; learning from combined exercises in southern states and southeastern coastal areas; testing responses to simulated invasion scenarios; and exploring how to 

conduct law enforcement operations with federal and state police forces and other government 

agencies in different border zones. Military discussions with Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim 

(2007–2011) and knowledgeable government civilians led to the development of the ministry’s 

landmark 2008 National Strategy of Defense: Peace and Security for Brazil. Under the Brazilian 

Complementary Law that promulgated the strategy in August 2010, congress and the defense 

ministry became jointly responsible for the defense strategy. The law also required an unclassified white paper to inform the country. It is to be updated every four years, explaining how the 

armed forces are implementing the strategy.

Jobim’s consolidation of a new consensus on the legitimacy of Brazil’s defense needs reflected a major contrast in the attitudes of both the defense establishment and Brazil’s civil society. The strategy engages the Brazilian people to explain the aim of modernizing the national 

defense structure.22 The Brazilian Amazon has a prominent place. The northern and western 

sections of the national frontier are considered the most vulnerable parts of the country and 

regions where Brazil must be watchful and make an unconditional reaffirmation of its sovereignty. The document’s approach to territorial control reflects the well-established military belief that security requires sustainable development and preservation projects as well as measures 

taken by the uniformed forces. The latter continues the repositioning of forces from all services 

in Amazonia and the restructuring of some conventional capabilities to facilitate presence and 

operations there. Since 2008, the armed forces have improved communication capabilities and 

undertaken a number of joint security operations intended to increase the military’s presence in 

the faixa de fronteira. Funding from both the Calha Norte project and the ministry of defense 

made this possible. During Lula’s tenure, Brazilian defense budgets grew almost 28 percent as 

the entire federal government benefited from the country’s economic boom (see figure 1). As an 
18 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

indicator of progress, the Brazilian navy has had to establish nine regional commands of differing size in the vast Amazonia. The air force has seven, while the army has eight.23

The National Strategy of Defense assigns critical importance to the triple imperative of 

monitor and control, mobility, and presence. These three concepts govern the mid-term and 

long-range development of capabilities and force structure for each branch of the armed forces, 

as well as shaping their near-term operational doctrine. The first imperative emphasizes the 

ability to monitor and then control national airspace, territory, and jurisdictional waters. The 

scope of the concept stresses surveillance for early warning and identification, pattern analysis, 

and the acquisition of advanced means to strengthen these capabilities. In or over border areas 

and jurisdictional waters, Brazilian “front line” units from all services remain vigilant, perform 

surveillance tasks, and contribute information to an integrated monitoring system that benefits 

Admiral Mike Mullen, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, right, and Brazilian Minister of Defense Nelson 

Jobim, center, walk past Brazilian ship in Amazon River in Ipiranga, Brazil, March, 2009 (DOD/Adam M. Stump)
19

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

from satellite imagery. The second imperative of utmost importance is mobility, the ability of 

relatively nearby and strategic reserves to reach an operational area quickly and have the tactical capability to move within it. Mobility allows Brazil to overcome the limiting effects of the 

vastness of the nation’s land and sea frontiers in order to defend sovereignty. The final concept 

is military presence along the frontier and in forward reserve locations. The strategy makes 

clear that “given the continental dimensions of the national territory, presence may not mean 

omnipresence. A presence gains effectiveness thanks to its relation to monitoring and control 

and mobility.”24

The document also is a directive to “reposition the personnel of the armed forces.” The 

guidance validates the efforts of the armed forces over the last two decades, albeit with limited 

funds, to restructure and reposition forces from bases in southeast and south Brazil to a more 

challenging theater in the north and northwest. The military’s initial emphasis was on developing essential infrastructure needed to relocate forces. Adaptation to the Amazon operational 

theater presented huge challenges. The army, for example, had to create the Jungle Warfare 

Training Center in Manaus to teach servicemembers how to use the rainforest to their advantage. The service’s doctrine for small unit operations had to be modified for unconventional 

warfare. The demanding environment forced changes in communication capabilities and procedures, mobility (more aviation assets and river boats), logistics, and engineer construction 

on the saturated soil. Initially, the army created a small special operations capability, similar to 

U.S. Army Special Operations Forces, as a centrally located strategic reserve and direct action 

force for the border. For a better jungle infantry structure, the army gradually established jungle 

infantry brigades. They now are composed of one to four jungle infantry battalions. Selected 

battalions may have two to seven special border platoons, depending on the importance of their 

sector of the frontier. As required, the other jungle infantry battalions are mobile and operate 

in the rainforest around the platoon posts. Today, there are five jungle infantry brigades and 

one being formed, all within the north arc of the Amazon region. The units are 100 percent 

volunteer, and members receive 10 percent extra pay. The Amazon Military Command was 

positioned in Manaus to provide command and control of the jungle infantry forces. The army 

recently created a new, smaller Northern Military Command farther east in Belem.

The south Atlantic Ocean is becoming Brazil’s new Amazon. As in Amazonia, visions of 

riches—in this case oil and minerals in the continental shelf—have increased defense concerns. 

The Brazilian navy’s repositioning has increased attention to south Atlantic territorial waters. 

Navy doctrine emphasizes sea denial and deterrence in the “Blue Amazon.” Consistent with 

doctrine, Brazil purchased an aircraft carrier and submarines from France, which constitute a 
20 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

powerful deterrent force for the region and substantial protection for the country’s 4,600-mile 

coastline and its offshore and onshore resources. The aircraft carrier purchased from France in 

2000 is operational, and the navy has launched a program to build four conventional French 

Scorpene submarines and one nuclear-powered submarine. The shipyard that will build them 

was inaugurated in 2013. All submarines are expected to be operational by 2025. In addition, 

the navy is developing a Blue Amazon Management System (Sistema de Gerenciamento do 

Amazonia Azul, or SisGAAZ), known as SIVAM at Sea.25

The navy’s role in border security and waterway control in the terrestrial or “Green Amazon” and the Paraguay-Paraná River Basin in the south has led to another modernization program. The navy will increase its presence using more patrol craft and transport ships capable of 

navigating inland waterways.26 Since 2008, the navy has provided Pedro Teixeira– and Roraimaclass patrol vessels and several transport ships with helicopters and adapted them to work with 

marine units in order to ensure the control of river banks during riverine operations.27 New 

marine riverine brigades with riverside operations battalions have been formed. In the Amazon, 

the headquarters for the 2nd Fleet and a marine division have been established in Belem.

The air force fulfills important surveillance and monitoring functions in Amazonia with 

early warning and remote-sensing aircraft forward deployed to a limited number of all-weather 

airfields. Since 2015, a few non-weaponized unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) also 

perform these missions. Small transport aircraft provide in-region mobility for logistical support and medical evacuations. Super Tucano fighters often are scrambled to interdict clandestine aircraft crossing Brazilian air space. Air force construction engineers play an essential role 

building basic landing strips in difficult locations close to major Indian communities and, if 

possible, near special border platoons.28 It took 10 months in 2007, for example, to construct a 

700-meter-long strip of dirt and crushed rock to support an influential Indian community in a 

remote border area near Venezuela and Guyana. Heavy construction equipment had to be carried in piecemeal by helicopter and reassembled on the ground. Now there is at least one flight 

per month by the National Air Mail Service to deliver supplies, medicines, and occasionally 

healthcare personnel, all of which convey a sense of government interest.29

Border Security Operations

Early in her first administration (2011–2015), President Rousseff vowed to toughen border 

controls. The result was a law entitled Plano Estratégico de Fronteiras, the Strategic Borders 

Plan, unveiled in June 2011. Among other key elements, congress formally reaffirmed granting 

policing powers to the armed forces within 90 miles of the frontier to augment the efforts of the 
21

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

federal police to suppress illicit trafficking of narcotics and the smuggling of contraband and 

people. The Strategic Borders Plan called for the revitalization of Operation Sentinel (Sentinela 

da Pátria), which had begun in 2010. These operations are overseen by the ministry of justice 

and the federal police department with support from the armed forces. The law also created a 

new program to fight crimes on the frontiers, Operation Ágata, which is led by the ministry of 

defense and the armed forces with support from the federal police and other law enforcement 

agencies.30 In May 2013, President Rousseff decided to make combined military and police border operations a “constant” rather than a series of short-term in-and-out actions with specific 

objectives in different geographical locations.31 The Strategic Borders Plan has helped eliminate 

confusion of roles and missions between law enforcement agencies and the armed forces. The 

minister of defense has taken an unprecedented step to improve effectiveness by creating a 

joint military-police command center for border issues inside the ministry of defense. This has 

worked well. Brazil’s vice president has used the center to chair regular cross-agency meetings 

that bring together environmental, trade, and other officials.32

Patients receive dental care onboard ship Lieutenant Maximiano during Operation Agatha 6, October 2012 (Ministry 

of Defense/Felipe Barra)
22 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

Under the 2011 Strategic Borders Plan, the ministries of justice and defense expanded 

their collaboration on security operations to reassert control of border areas and disrupt smuggling and illegal activities. The Ágata series began in 2011; the ninth and tenth operations occurred in 2015. The duration of each operation is typically 30 days; each takes place along different sections of the frontier; and the size of the force varies. The largest operation to date, Ágata 

7, which occurred from May to June 2013, was timed to precede the Confederations Cup soccer 

tournament and the visit of Pope Francis. Ágata 7 spanned Brazil’s entire frontier and involved 

33,500 military personnel (all services) and an array of military equipment, as well as 1,100 

public servants from the federal police, federal highway police, and other state police agencies. 

Nineteen tons of narcotics were confiscated.33 During these operations, in addition to fighting 

crime, the military promotes civic-social actions with the aim of bringing medical and dental 

care to indigenous communities and poor local residents. It would not be uncommon to see a 

Brazilian air force field hospital on barges pushed by tugboats visiting communities along the 

Rio Negro and other navigable rivers. The first six Ágata operations resulted in 59,717 medical 

and dental procedures and 9,000 vaccinations.34

In addition to the Ágata series, the Brazilian army, navy, air force, and joint staff organize their own joint security exercises and operations throughout the Amazon region. These 

are done on a smaller scale but are still in collaboration with the federal police and civilian 

representatives from various government institutions and nongovernmental organizations. The 

army, for example, conducted Operation Curaretinga V in November 2014 with a series of combined security patrols along nearly 1,800 miles of the Brazil-Bolivia border. Almost a year later, 

in September 2015, the army and the police launched Operation Curare VI, a series of operations dedicated to the state of Roraima. The units operated in the inhospitable terrain along the 

1,153-mile border shared with Venezuela and Guyana. Satellite images provided by SIPAM/

SIVAM allowed the forces to locate and raid areas of the rainforest where illegal mining and 

logging were taking place as well as pinpoint and destroy clandestine landing strips.35 Positive 

outgrowths of contemporary border security operations have been improvements in the interoperability within the armed forces and the ease of collaboration between military units and 

the federal and state police. At least one border state, Mato Grosso, created a small, elite Special 

Group on Border Security (Grupo Especial de Fronteira, or Gefron) in 2002 to support federal 

agencies responsible for security of the frontier between Brazil and Bolivia. The police unit 

specializes in the prevention and repression of drug trafficking and smuggling, and the theft of 

property and assets. Gefron recently was recognized for outstanding performance at the border 

in 2015, having seized a record 1,770 kilograms of drugs.
23

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

The frequency of the confiscations, the quantities, and the variety of items seized have 

increased since 2011 with the advent of operations Ágata and Sentinel as well as army and navy 

collaborations with law enforcement agencies. The federal government finally instituted a regional database of items seized during these operations. In the first 6 months of 2011, militarypolice operations along the borders with Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Colombia, Bolivia, and 

Peru seized over 115 tons of drugs, 65,000 bottles of alcohol, 650 kilograms of explosives, 200 

vehicles, 4.2 million packs of cigarettes, and over 500 weapons.36 Two years later, during Ágata 

7, which covered the entire land border, 184,000 vehicles and over 12,000 river craft were inspected, leading to the confiscation of 25 tons of marijuana, 657 kilograms of cocaine, crack, 

and hashish, 4.9 tons of explosives, and 4.5 cubic meters of timber.37 In May 2014, Ágata 8, with 

over 30,000 military personnel operating along all borders, seized 40 tons of narcotics, which 

demonstrated that the lessons learned during Ágata 7 had been incorporated. The expansion 

of military and law enforcement cooperation has had an increasingly positive impact on smuggling activities and environmental degradation. Still, no matter how large and frequent the border security operations, the territorial extension of the frontier, and the Amazon itself, is so vast 

and the dexterity of criminal organization so skillful that any progress controlling the faixa de 

fronteira is likely to be modest and incremental.

The introduction of a few police and air force reconnaissance drones in 2015 has strengthened operations in border zones and provides a confidence-building way to assist a neighbor (if 

requested by Bolivia or another country). A drone’s ability to sustain monitoring of suspicious 

activities as well as provide surveillance in remote parts of the frontier sharpens the ability of 

the military and police to react.

While seizures of narcotics and weapons make headlines, less attention is paid to the trafficking of wild animals and other natural commodities, which has become a business worth 

over R$2.5 billion in Brazil.38 According to the World Wildlife Fund, as Brazilian authorities 

have increased pressure on transnational criminal networks, some traffickers have switched to 

smuggling exotic animals—a job with less risk of inspection and with a good profit.39 Perfume, 

chia seeds, and geodes also have been confiscated by customs authorities in the last year, usually 

along the Brazil-Paraguay border. Illegal logging and gold mining remain a problem along the 

northern frontier. In May 2013, the federal police launched Operation Ibira just to dismantle 

illegal logging activities in the state of Pará. More recently, the army’s Operation Curare in the 

adjoining state of Roraima destroyed 12 barges and 4 clandestine landing strips that organized 

criminal groups had been using to support large-scale illegal mining. Army personnel also 
24 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

seized about 1,200 cubic meters of illegal timber, the vehicles to transport it, fuel, and an assortment of equipment to harvest the timber.40

Weaknesses in Brazil’s Approach

All border areas in the faixa de frontiera have received greater attention for national security and sustained development since President Lula’s administration. The armed forces and 

law enforcement departments work hard to combat an array of domestic smugglers and transnational organized criminal networks and meet the humanitarian needs of Brazilians along the 

vast land border in 11 rural states. But in such an enormous region, real progress must be modest and uneven at best. Federal auditors from the Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts (Tribunal 

de Contas da União, or TCU) recently released a critical study of the government’s approach to 

border security. The TCU pointed to the lack of a legal framework and a master plan, binding 

over time on all federal and state players, to promote sustainable development, regional integration, and national security. Instead, forward movement depends on presidential involvement 

and executive decrees. As often happens, a second weakness is a lack of understanding within 

the federal government of the complexity of the challenges along the frontier and the subsequent difficult and slow interagency coordination process. A final weakness is the impact of a 

harsh recession, currency devaluation, and a political crisis involving the president. Brazilian 

defense spending has declined steadily from a peak in 2010. The 2016 defense budget, for example, suffered a real decrease of 6.2 percent. The future of the Integrated Border Monitoring 

System (Sistema Integrado de Monitoramento de Fronteiras, or SISFRON), in which there was 

rising investment, has been slowed. Analysts forecast that the severity of cuts will gradually 

lessen after 2019.41

The Midwest and South

The midwest and south constitute 40 percent of Brazil’s frontier. Most of the “twin cities” 

along Brazil’s borders are in this area. The challenge to national sovereignty and for control of the 

border zone from the state of Mato Grosso southeast to the state of Rio Grande do Sul and the 

Atlantic coast is no less intense but is different in several ways than in the Amazon region. The 

terrain continues to feature extensive river systems (the Paraguay, Paraná, and Uruguay rivers), 

generally flowing south rather than east and passing through land that is rolling savanna rather 

than rainforest. A unique feature is the Pantanal, a natural region encompassing the world’s largest tropical wetland area (54,000 to 75,000 square miles, depending on the season). It is located 

mostly in Brazil’s state of Mato Grosso do Sul but extends into portions of Paraguay and Bolivia. 
25

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

The main security concerns in the midwest and south are drug trafficking, including marijuana, 

and smuggling. The range of contraband items is different, emphasizing firearms, explosives, 

cigarettes, pharmaceuticals, and vehicles. With the relocation of many Brazilian army units to the 

Amazon, there is less military presence on land. There are no special border platoons at strategic 

locations. Security is mainly in the hands of law enforcement. The challenge the police face in 

this region, from a Brazilian perspective, is exacerbated by semi-lawless areas in Paraguay, the 

under-policing of Uruguayan and Argentine frontiers, and the growing role of Brazilian organized crime gangs such as the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital, or PCC) 

as the drug traffickers in neighboring countries.

The tri-border area encompassing the cities of Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, Foz de Iguaçu, 

Brazil, and Puerto Iguacu, Argentina, is renowned for its legacy of smuggling and for reputedly 

being the largest black market in the Western Hemisphere. Contributing to this reputation is 

money laundering and the financing of Middle Eastern terrorism. Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina cooperate to track and interdict the flow of money and contraband commodities. In 1996, 

the three governments created a Tripartite Command, which still functions to coordinate intelligence analysis and police operations against the many forms of organized crime in this area.42

Paraguayan plantations near the border with Brazil produce high-quality marijuana (approximately 5,900 tons annually). Moreover, the country is a conduit for cocaine from the Andean 

region (an estimated 40 tons annually). Brazilian crime groups have taken root in Paraguay. The 

PCC now plays a major role in trafficking narcotics to Brazil’s market and to international shipBrazilian navy patrol vessel with helicoper landing pad navigates Paraguay River along frontier zone with 

Paragruay (Military Operations Portal of the Ministry of Defense)
26 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

ping points and moving most of the other smuggled commodities. The federal police, the federal 

highway police, and state law enforcement agencies face the brunt of the security challenges supported by some army and air force capabilities and the Brazilian navy’s presence on navigable 

rivers. Looking ahead, the federal police has announced plans to establish 11 new bases along the 

frontier with Paraguay and purchase additional helicopters, riverine boats, and weapons.43

The border with Paraguay is a focal point for frontier security operations. A cooperative 

relationship began in 1988 when the Paraguayan ministry of justice and the Brazilian federal 

police signed a bilateral counternarcotics accord to assist Paraguay’s National Anti-Drug Secretariat in the eradication of marijuana grown close to their shared border. The two governments 

extended the scope of the agreement in 2011. The federal police share intelligence and work 

closely with their counterpart to improve technical and tactical capabilities. Operation New Alliance IV (2013), a recurring joint marijuana eradication initiative, is an example of successful 

collaboration.44 On the military side, each service in the Brazilian armed forces provides extensive military training and professional education to strengthen the ability of their Paraguayan 

counterparts to defend their country and control national territory. Since the adoption of the 

Strategic Border Plan, the ministry of justice has conducted numerous police operations with 

military support in the Sentinel series in the midwest and south. The ministry of defense has 

focused five of nine Ágata operations in this region either on a specific target area, such as the 

Paraguayan border, or as part of an all-borders security operation.

Modernization and International Cooperation

Brazil’s federal government has not been complacent in moving forward with the approach 

to frontier security spelled out in the National Strategy of Defense and its companion Strategic Border Plan. Implementing the strategy and plan has institutionalized security operations 

across the entire frontier zone, strengthened collaboration among the services and between the 

military and police, and improved their relations with other national and state agencies. There 

are weaknesses, however, that need to be addressed. Two particularly important weaknesses 

are information technology for surveillance to improve early warning of border violations and 

criminal activity and expanded bilateral action with neighboring countries to address shared 

security concerns.

Improved Surveillance

The National Strategy of Defense reminds the defense sector that technology cannot substitute for combat or men on the ground, but given the austere environment along most of the 
27

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

frontier, Brazil’s armed forces have had to rely on technical processes to reinforce their presence 

and physical capabilities.45 The military commands responsible for security along the northern 

and western frontiers in the Amazon rely heavily on the information from the comprehensive 

regional monitoring system, SIPAM, and its key component, the Amazon Surveillance System. 

Its meteorological data, satellite imagery, and radar images and remote sensor activations help 

manage air traffic and assist in pinpointing ongoing illegal activities. As a general matter, however, the government’s readiness to react anywhere along the entire border remains slow and 

often inadequate. The principal problem is early warning. Control centers are able to see illegal 

activities taking place, but this does not provide sufficient warning to activate a timely response.

Challenged by the emphasis on surveillance in the National Strategy of Defense but encouraged by SIVAM’s technological advancements, the army in 2010 began working with Atech, a 

Brazilian company with extensive experience in integrating systems and networks. The objective has been to design the SISFRON, for which the government intends to spend an estimated 

SIVAM-related satellite receivers for use at sites throughout Amazonia (System for the Vigilance of the Amazon)
28 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

R$12 billion throughout its planned 10 years of implementation. The system is best described 

as an electronic fence for real-time identification of threats and communication with command 

centers capable of activating operational units against any breach of security. SISFRON will 

integrate sensors along the entirety of the border, imaging radars, modern communications, 

decision-making support, towers for observation and the transmission of signals, optical and 

thermal cameras, satellite imaging, drones, special riverine vessels, and four operating centers. 

(At least 75 percent of its equipment will be manufactured by Brazilian companies.) The positioning of SISFRON will be based in part on the presence of special border platoons in the north 

and west, which will gradually increase in number from the current 25 to 48, and on army battalions and their brigade headquarters stationed at strategic locations in the midwest and south. 

An important challenge will be to mesh with SIVAM, the navy’s SisGAAz, and other major 

surveillance systems within the Brazilian armed forces.

The Army launched a SISFRON pilot project in November 2014 at the headquarters of the 

4th Mechanized Cavalry Brigade in Dourados, Mato Grosso do Sul. Most of the brigade’s units 

are stationed along the border with Paraguay, covering almost 360 miles. The test of the pilot 

project is to provide early warning and sustained surveillance across the entire length. Military 

authorities expect the pilot project will end in 2016. If successful and if funding permits, the 

project will be expanded north and south in the next phase. To the north, SISFRON will be 

used by the 13th Motorized Infantry Brigade in Mato Grosso to cover a 470-mile border with 

Bolivia and by the 17th Jungle Infantry Brigade in Rondônia and Acre to cover an 805-mile border with Bolivia and an 858-mile border with Peru. To the south, SISFRON will be established 

in an area under the responsibility of the 15th Mechanized Infantry Brigade in Paraná, a state 

that borders Paraguay (125 miles) and Argentina (176 miles). The armed forces anticipate the 

SISFRON project, integrated with SIVAM, could be fully operational by 2022 and ultimately 

cover Brazil’s entire land frontier.46 The country’s ongoing financial difficulties, however, have 

had a serious impact on the defense budget and slowed the progress of the SISFRON program. 

This has raised concern that by the time the program is completed much of the technology will 

have to be modernized.

Cooperation with Neighbors

Brazil’s defense of its sovereignty and control of a 10,000-mile border rely in part on its 

ability to cooperate and collaborate with neighbors. The Brazilian government traditionally prefers bilateral engagement on security issues instead of working within larger regional organizations in which consensus decisionmaking often proves difficult and actionable agreements are 
29

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

elusive. There are exceptions, however. Under growing international environmental pressure in 

1978, Brazil encouraged Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela 

to join the Amazon Cooperation Treaty (often referred to as the Amazon Pact) to secure the 

entire Amazon against any external intervention. In 1995, pact signatories established the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) to promote wide-ranging cooperation. In 2002, 

they created a permanent secretariat in Brasilia; meetings are held every 2 years. The original 

issues discussed at ACTO emphasized sustainable development, environmental protection, and 

indigenous rights—nothing related directly to security.

Brazil’s armed forces initiated bilateral regional military exchange meetings in the 1980s 

with Colombia, Venezuela, and Uruguay. They have continued on an annual or biannual basis. 

The initiative was expanded to include Paraguay, Peru, Guyana, Bolivia, and most recently Argentina. The first operational collaboration began in the 1990s as information-sharing between 

the Brazilian air force and its Peruvian and Colombian counterparts. Over the years, the countries have passed radar tracks, shared other information about unauthorized flights by drug 

traffickers, and discussed the control of airspace. There have been periodic air interdiction and 

pursuit training exercises with the Venezuelan air force, which led in 2005 to a Mutual Cooperation Agreement to Combat Aircraft Traffic Involved in Transnational Illicit Activities. While 

the two air forces continue to exercise together, the effectiveness of SIVAM in providing early 

warning of airspace violations and identifying illegal air strips for destruction reduced the urgency to ratify the agreement. Ten years later, it still has not been finalized. Efforts to revitalize 

the fight against drug trafficking along sections of the frontier brought Brazilian and Colombian 

law enforcement together in 2000 with the ongoing Operation Cobra. In 2003, Brazil launched 

similar actions with Peru (Operation Pebra) and Venezuela (Operation Vebra)—the first letters 

of each country’s name providing the name of the operation. The Brazilian army began maneuvers in remote areas that border Colombia in 2002. Today, the countries work together to fight 

organized crime along the frontier, including environmental offenses like illegal mining. Army 

units conducted parallel operations on both sides of the border in 2015 and 2016.47

The potential for regional defense cooperation seemed excellent with the announcement 

of the National Strategy of Defense in 2008. Brazil took this opportunity to convince neighbors 

to join a South American organization that, for Brazil, would be the linchpin of its continental 

strategy. The result was a Union of South American States (União de Nações Sul-Americanas, 

or UNASUR) founded in 2008, with a South American Defense Council organized in 2009. 

UNASUR and the defense council improved confidence-building among neighboring countries and facilitated routine meetings of defense, justice, and interior ministers. The members 
30 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

did not address the main security issue, cooperation against transnational criminal networks, 

until 2012. To date, UNASUR has shown little interest in having the nascent South American 

Defense Council tackle this complex and politically sensitive issue, which is beyond its current 

mandate.48

President Rousseff ’s 2011 Strategic Borders Plan reenergized Brazil’s efforts to enlist neighbors in joint efforts to target cross-border trafficking of narcotics, arms, and people and promote bilateral cooperation on matters of defense through the exchange of information, military 

training, and professionalization. The primary recipients of an increase in military and police 

training projects, managed by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency, have been the least-developed 

countries of Suriname, Guyana, and Paraguay. A neighbor of considerable interest concerning 

drug trafficking is Bolivia, particularly after the Evo Morales government expelled representatives of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in 2008 to demonstrate independence from 

the United States. Brazil and Bolivia began almost immediately to share intelligence and satellite imagery. The United States, working behind the scenes, provided some of the information 

as part of a trilateral project that expired in 2013. The federal police agreed to support their 

Bolivian counterparts in 2011 by flying reconnaissance drones in Bolivian airspace near the 

border to report on the production of coca plants and the trafficking of cocaine. In 2012, Brazil 

donated four helicopters to aid interdiction efforts. Bilateral collaboration on anti-drug efforts 

began to wane in late 2013, the result of unrelated diplomatic disagreements, and Bolivia turned 

to other international partners. Peru has played an active role sharing intelligence, and France 

recently sold Bolivia 13 mobile radars that can be positioned at important sites. In 2015, Brazil 

reengaged Bolivia concerning international crime networks.49

Brazil’s relationship with Peru is warmer and less problematic. An agreement was concluded with Peruvian law enforcement in 2010 to conduct joint anti-drug operations along 

their border. Both governments share intelligence and operational information and agreed to 

improve coordination by establishing bilateral police liaison posts in several Amazonian cities 

in both countries.

Brazil continues its close association with Colombia. In 2011, Bogotá was the first government to discuss opportunities for collaboration after President Rousseff announced the Strategic Borders Plan. Within 7 months, the two countries’ defense, foreign affairs, and justice 

ministries created and formalized the operation of a Bilateral Border Commission to share intelligence and coordinate joint mechanisms for operations to fight organized crime. The agreement quickly led to improved trade relations in the industrial security sector. More recently, the 

Bilateral Border Commission was expanded for a tripartite relationship that includes Peru. The 
31

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

navies of the three countries have already joined forces to combat transnational criminal activities in the Amazon region. Looking to the future, Brazilian officials are hopeful that success 

with SISFRON will provide a foundation for the development and implementation of a modern 

cooperative security framework with Colombia and other neighboring countries.50

In the future, Brazil’s cooperation with neighbors will be intensified and further challenged 

by the integration of regional transportation infrastructure in South America. In particular, the 

transcontinental highway spanning Brazil and Peru is nearing completion. This highway will 

speed transcontinental shipments from the coast and interior of Brazil to ports in Peru for onward shipment to China and other Asian countries. Once in use, this new land corridor will be 

a magnet not only for commercial traffic but also for illicit traffic, which will require new control 

procedures and technologies. The transcontinental highway moved forward despite strong opposition from environmental advocacy groups in both countries, and the same is true for other 

regional transportation proposals such as the development of multimodal axes to the Amazon 

Waterway by Peru and Ecuador. Peru’s project will connect the Pacific port of Paita with the 

Huallaga River port of Yurimaguas. Ecuador’s project envisions a Manta to Manaus corridor. 

Feasibility studies also have started on a transcontinental railroad megaproject involving China, 

Brazil, and Peru. 

Lessons from Brazil’s Experience

It is difficult to grasp the enormous magnitude of Brazil’s frontier environment or to comprehend the scope and scale of the challenges faced by civil and military authorities trying to defend national sovereignty and control a border zone that traverses 10,000 miles of not only dense 

tropical rainforest, inhospitable terrain, and ubiquitous river systems of great width, length, and 

power, but also huge tropical wetlands, extensive farm land, and large urban settlements. In addition, the frontier is dynamic and constantly changing. Authorized deforestation, for example, 

has resulted in newly arable land that can sustain communities, large soybean plantations with 

international markets, and a wide range of jobs. Development over the last 30 years also has attracted criminal organizations that are active in drug trafficking as well as illegal mining and logging, which have become lucrative alternative sources of income for many of these crime groups. 

These wildcat operations have led to the destruction of forest reserves and the habitat of many 

indigenous Indians. Securing the long border and protecting natural resources means providing security for Brazilians living not only within the 90-mile border zone but also well beyond 

it—over 20 million of them. While Brazil’s defense and law enforcement challenge is unique and 
32 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

demanding, there are seven interesting lessons from the country’s experience that may be useful 

to other countries.

First, progress with frontier security requires civil-military harmony, presidential leadership, the political will to allocate the resources to support development, guarantee national authority, and protect strategic vulnerabilities such as the Amazon, and a comprehensive national 

defense strategy to guide capacity-building and day-to-day operations. During the period of 

military rule from 1964 to 1985, Brazil lacked political legitimacy for efforts to control the 

northern border. The most the armed forces could accomplish was to begin to establish military 

presence with some reaction capability and to develop community infrastructure. Slow and 

limited progress began with the return to civilian rule and increased after the presidential election of Lula da Silva. During his two terms, stewardship of the Amazon became a highly emotional international issue under pressure from Europe and North America. Lula was a staunch 

defender of the country’s approach to caring for Amazonia and an advocate for protecting the 

frontier and fighting cross-border organized crime. With his involvement, the budgets for both 

Helicopters fly over Purus River in Paricatuba during Operation Amazon, September 2012 (Ministry of Defense/

Tereza Sobreira)
33

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

the civil agency and defense sides of the Calha Norte project began to increase, with a particular 

emphasis on development. President Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff, sustained his interest in 

responsibly developing Amazonia and strengthened frontier security. Her administration’s approach, embodied in her 2011 Strategic Borders Plan, pursued aggressively integrated military 

and police operations throughout the frontier zone. Though slowed by recent financial difficulties, many border security operations have supported preparations for major international 

events taking place in Brazil.

A turning point in Brazil’s approach to frontier security was the 2008 National Defense Strategy, a decree signed by President Lula. The strategy consolidated and clarified goals, prioritized 

regions (the north, west, and the south Atlantic), and discussed how the armed forces should be 

organized to defend sovereignty and provided guidelines for the performance of their roles and 

assignments in both peace and war. Of particular importance is the strategic approach embodied 

in the triple imperative—monitor and control, mobility, and presence. The scope of these three 

concepts is quite broad, ranging from where forces in each service would be stationed to a doctrine of joint operations. Defense of the frontier, particularly the Amazon, and having dissuasive 

capabilities to protect the country’s natural resources are priority missions, but the strategy also 

addresses important defensive sectors such as cybernetics, space, and nuclear power. The process 

of developing, coordinating, and promulgating the National Defense Strategy coincided with an 

increased share of funds for defense in the federal government’s expenditures (see figure 4, which 

also shows the growing impact of the economic recession after 2011).51

The triple imperative is now the foundation of Brazilian strategic thinking. As applied to 

the defense of the frontier zone (and the maritime equivalent), the military presence is desirable and difficult to realize and therefore must be approached flexibly. The national strategy 

stresses during peacetime “the versatility with which presence . . . is replaced with the capacity 

to be present (mobility) under the light of information (monitoring and control).”52 The mobility component is of utmost importance. The ministry of defense defines strategic mobility as the 

ability to quickly reach the theater of operations; tactical mobility is the skill to move rapidly in 

the theater. Mobility compensates for the vastness of the space to be defended and the shortfalls 

in resources to do it. Creating a mobile military supported by a mobile logistics apparatus is a 

sensible approach to guaranteeing a state’s authority and protecting its strategic vulnerabilities 

and material patrimony. Today, Brazil’s army is in the process of acquiring long-range transport 

aviation and increasing the number of medium-range helicopters to be able to deploy more 

quickly into less accessible regions. The army also is testing river patrol boats to improve its 

ability to counter smuggling activity.
34 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

Second, timely and accurate information is crucial for defense and law enforcement operations in a faixa de fronteira. In the early 1990s, Brazil’s federal government realized that it lacked 

adequate surveillance capabilities and had limited, often out-of-date intelligence about criminal 

activities along its difficult border. In addition, in the case of the northern and western zones, 

Brasilia realized it was poorly prepared for air traffic control and knew little about Amazonian 

ecosystems. SIVAM, which became fully operational early in the 21st century, was the first step 

toward correcting the deficiencies in knowledge. The system with radar and satellite surveillance and wireless communication technology succeeded. The ministry of defense continues to 

invest heavily in refining information technologies to create better ways to integrate monitoring 

capabilities on land and sea and in the air. Unfortunately, Brazil’s current financial difficulties 

have led to delays in the enhancement of border surveillance capabilities, although the ministry 

and the army are determined to fulfill the requirements. 

SISFRON, with its integrated use of modern radars, drones, sophisticated sensors, and 

night vision, is a relatively new domestic project to integrate with and move beyond SIVAM 

in protecting Brazil’s borders against smuggling and arms trafficking. If a country lacks the 

resources to invest in information technology and associated infrastructure, it can integrate 

existing radars and communications capabilities, as Brazil had done previously. This step can 

support information-sharing among the armed forces, law enforcement, and other national and 

state agencies tasked with protecting a border region.

Mexico has begun to adopt aspects of the Brazilian model. Mexico’s Aerial Surveillance 

System (Sistema Integral de Vigilancia Aérea, or SIVA) became operational at the end of 2013.53

Figure 4. Defense as Percentage of Government Expenditures

Source: Andrew MacDonald, IHS Jane’s Defence Budgets.

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Percentage of

Government Expenditures

Year
35

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

This system of long- and short-range radars, UAVs, and sensors focuses primarily on Mexico’s 

southeast border region and its off-shore exclusive economic zone. This region shares many 

characteristics with the Brazilian Amazon, such as difficult terrain, limited state presence, and 

high levels of illicit activity. Mexico based SIVA on the Brazilian model of using surveillance 

technology to support its border protection activities.

Third, effective control of Brazil’s 10,000-mile border zone and interdiction of wide-ranging smuggling operations require unprecedented collaboration between Brazil and its neighbors. Strengthening security partnerships with countries that share the dangers posed by international criminal organizations is a basic tenet of the 2008 National Strategy and the 2011 

Strategic Borders Plan. Efforts to collaborate are not new. The armed forces hold regional military exchange meetings annually or biannually with all neighbors except Suriname and French 

Guiana. Discussions with Colombia, Venezuela, and Uruguay began in the 1980s. There also 

are recurring combined military operations along both sides of a common border with a few 

countries. Brazil’s armed forces and federal police share intelligence, provide information about 

upcoming operations, and discuss cooperation with land, river, and air operations. Efforts to 

work together sometimes are stymied by unrelated diplomatic obstacles. In addition to the 

regular regional military exchange meetings, Brazil’s experience suggests three initiatives that 

have produced positive results. They include the Brazilian military or federal police providing 

technical and tactical training that enhances the recipient’s capabilities for border defense and 

moves toward interoperable forces speaking Portuguese and using Brazil’s radio communication protocols. A second initiative offers the external deployment of Brazilian drones for reconnaissance over frontier areas of interest to a neighbor’s government. The third, exemplified by a 

recent agreement between Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, aims at the joint development of defense 

products, in this case a commonly developed patrol boat designed to interdict the Amazon’s 

river systems.54

Fourth, collaboration within the Brazilian government contributes to operational success 

in the field. The integrated organization of the Ágata (Defense) and Sentinel (Justice) series 

of law enforcement activities mandated in the Strategic Borders Plan has produced positive 

results. Granting policing powers to the armed forces within the frontier zone also has been 

beneficial when the number of police agents is small and their rotations are frequent. While 

border crime and wildcat activities persist, improvements in surveillance have made their conduct more precarious and vulnerable to disruption. Ágata and Sentinel not only fostered collaboration among army, navy, and air force commands but also caused the military to work with 

police and civilian representatives from various government agencies. Closer collaboration is 
36 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

the goal. As mentioned previously, Ágata 7 in 2013 is an example of the massive integration of 

35,500 personnel from the army, navy, and air force as well as 1,100 public servants (federal 

police, federal highway police, state police, and officials from other federal and state agencies) 

for an operation that spanned the entire frontier. This integrative approach, which also can be 

seen in operations to regain control of Rio’s favelas (slums), has become the national norm, but 

not without some tension among players. More recently, the federal government took action to 

coordinate security operations along the frontier, which did not occur during the early Calha 

Norte years. The minister of defense established a joint military-police command center for 

border issues within the ministry. This mechanism has facilitated operational planning and 

encouraged coordination across many interested federal and state agencies. In addition, the 

armed forces and federal police department share information about upcoming operations with 

counterparts in neighboring countries that would be most affected. This helps minimize surprise, eliminates potential problems, and often denies criminals the ability to cross a river into 

another country or flee into another rainforest.

Fifth, the Brazilian armed forces realize that long-term commitment is critical. Sustainable 

border security requires the federal government to control territory, bring essential infrastructure and whole-of-government services to the local population, and demonstrate that officials, 

most often military, are there to stay and can be trusted. For decades, the army’s special border 

platoons have been the federal presence in a small number of strategic locations in the frontier 

zone. They have provided rudimentary governance, played a role in local development, as well 

as performed a security surveillance mission. Having the trust of local populations makes it 

difficult for criminals to operate. As an indicator of their importance, the 24 platoons along 

northern and western sections of the border are expected to increase gradually and ultimately 

almost double when SISFRON is fully operational. The creation of more border platoons is one 

of the measures planned to improve law enforcement actions. Their effectiveness has led the 

Colombian army to replicate the Brazilian model. Bolivia and Peru also are considering it.

Economic and social development on a larger scale, often by a public-private partnership, is inextricably linked to national security. An Amazon Regional Connection Program, 

for example, is under way. It will provide 4,680 miles of fiber optic cable run underwater along 

the banks of the Negro, Madeira, Solimões, Purus, and Juruá rivers in Amazonas state. The 

cable will improve digital communications infrastructure and connect 52 municipalities. The 

refurbishment of decaying roads, construction of bridges and short airfields, and the general expansion of transportation networks help federal and state agencies reach remote areas, 

introduce governance, and disrupt criminal planning of illegal activities. Many of the armed 
37

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

forces’ social-civic actions that are part of border security operations provide rural societies 

with much-needed medical and dental attention and access to fresh water and electricity as well 

as offering the opportunity for educational advancement. Brazil’s social-civil programs provide 

examples of how the federal government can increase its presence and win the trust of isolated 

local communities. The ministry of national integration has been working with Brazil’s border 

states on a plan for the regional and sustainable development of the frontier strip with the aim 

of promoting socio-economic development and trade integration in the country and with South 

American neighbors.55

Sixth, during the first two decades of the Calha Norte project, the armed forces (and after 

1999, the ministry of defense) lacked political support in the congress and consequently did not 

receive adequate resources, but they did what they could until support materialized during Lula’s presidency. While efforts to understand and react to the array of frontier security challenges 

in a largely unfamiliar environment were a slow process, the armed forces adopted a deliberate approach to test and evaluate different operational situations and responses. This effective 

procedure contributed to two landmark documents, the well-conceived National Strategy of 

Defense and the Strategic Borders Plan. The same approach was used in the creation of SIVAM. 

The Brazilian defense industry’s development of SISFRON also is being built on the experience 

with SIVAM, addressing its shortcomings, and based on the results of the pilot phase of implementation along a section of Brazil’s border with Paraguay.

Finally, the United States should approach cooperation with Brazil with caution on issues concerning frontier security and the Amazon’s environment. The country’s longstanding 

fear of foreign intervention on matters pertaining to rainforest conservation or indigenous Indian communities persists. Some segments of the country’s defense and security leadership 

are alarmed by discussion of the Amazon’s role as a global asset in climate change and other 

environmental protection issues, to include intense advocacy by prominent U.S. politicians. 

These groups continue to see the United States as the major threat to Brazil’s sovereignty over 

the Amazon despite respected in-country U.S. environmental programs. In the late 1990s, Brazil considered U.S. deployments of military radars to Colombia for anti-drug trafficking support and humanitarian exercises in other neighboring countries potentially threatening and 

demanded prior notification of such activities. In some circles, such suspicion persists. The 

National Strategy of Defense underscores that the armed forces must have dissuasive capabilities 

to defend sovereignty. The document directed the army to develop doctrine and capabilities to 

conduct nonconventional operations against an unnamed larger adversary focusing specifically 

on jungle warfare and border surveillance. While extensive consultations and dialogue have 
38 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

strengthened the generally friendly relationship over the past 20 years, little attention beyond 

counternarcotics technical assistance has been given to Brazil’s frontier security. Perhaps the 

best approach for the United States is to learn from Brazil’s experience. The United States has 

enduring difficulties with the concept of military-police cooperative operations, and certainly 

in conducting complex, multiagency, multinational security operations, so learning from Brazil’s experience would be beneficial.

Conclusion

The Brazilian approach to frontier security over the last 30 years has been a success on 

multiple levels. At the foundational level of civil-military relations, the Brazilian military demonstrated initiative, patience, and adaptability in recommending a new approach to frontier 

security and then serving as the junior partner of diverse civilian agencies during the 1980s and 

1990s when funding was slim and civilian partnering erratic. But the military proved reliable 

and dedicated to the Calha Norte program over time, which increased civilian trust that the 

military could be relied upon to play in a limited but professional manner.

On a technical and operational level, the military successfully adapted to the new mission focus with special border platoons and tailored aerial surveillance and communication 

technologies, successes that encouraged civilian authorities to eventually respond with more 

resources. The bulk of SIVAM capabilities were in place by 2002—that is, before the Brazilian gross domestic product and federal budget skyrocketed—demonstrating the military had 

won the confidence of civilian authorities for important mission areas such as air traffic control 

over the Amazon and the frontier surveillance mission (see figure 1). Similarly, when Brazilian 

military budgets increased as a share of government expenditures, civilian authorities wanted 

reassurance that the funds would be spent in accordance with a strategy that made sense for 

the nation as a whole. With the leadership of the minister of defense in coordination with the 

minister-in-chief of the secretariat of strategic affairs, the ministry of defense responded with 

the well-received 2008 National Strategy of Defense.

The 2008 National Strategy of Defense provided true strategic direction and cemented civilmilitary partnership in formulating national security strategy. In many ways, it was a landmark 

event signaling the formal rehabilitation of the Brazilian armed forces after their two-decade 

foray into domestic politics; their transformation from guardians of domestic order to a new 

posture for national defense; and their subordination to a national plan of defense to guide resource allocation that was supported by both civil and military authorities. Befitting a national 

plan rather than a military one, the document builds on Brazil’s progress managing border secu-
39

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

rity as a multi-agency, multinational cooperative venture. The same is true for the 2011 Strategic 

Borders Plan. With the military’s relocation and reorganization still taking place, the ministry of 

defense and the armed forces nonetheless took the initiative to work in close cooperation with 

the federal police department, other federal authorities, and state agencies. The results have 

been undeniably positive. A passive and dispersed military presence has been transformed into 

comprehensive civil-military cooperation and significantly improved interdiction efforts in the 

frontier zone.

The impact of Brazil’s economic recession that began in 2011 and the recent political crisis 

in response to widespread corruption have resulted in fewer resources for the military and the 

government as a whole. However, with a successful foundation of good civil-military relations 

in place, strong guiding strategy documents, and a proven track record of interagency and international cooperation, Brazil’s military should be able to weather the resource drought even 

better than it managed resource scarcity for Calha Norte in the 1980s and 1990s. In that respect, 

the Brazilian military is an example to its contiguous neighbors but also to the United States, 

which also by most accounts is entering a period of relative resource scarcity and demands for 

better interagency and multinational approaches to complex security issues.
40 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

Notes 1 E. Bradford Burns, A History of Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

2 “Brazil: Security,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—South America, March 24, 2016, 3–4.

3 Mark London and Brian Kelly, The Last Forest: The Amazon in the Age of Globalization (New 

York: Random House, 2007), 35–37.

4 Humberto Jose Lourencao, A Defesa Nacional e a Amazonia: O Sistema de Vigilancia da Amazonia (SIVAM) (Campinas: Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 2003), 54.

5 Elizabeth Allen, “Calha Norte: Military Development in Brazilian Amazonia,” Development 

and Change 23, no. 1 (1992), 90–91; Michael B. Ryan, “Calha Norte: Explaining Brazilian Army Presence in the Amazon,” master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1993, DTIC 93-27937.

6 Greenpeace, “The U.S. Connection to Illegal Logging in the Amazon,” February 2004.

7 William Mendell, “The Brazilian Amazon: Controlling the Hydra,” Military Review (July–

August 1999), 2.

8 Ibid., 3.

9 “Brazil: Security,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment.

10 Robert Muggah, “Securing the Border: Brazil’s ‘South America First’ Approach to Transnational Organized Crime.” Rio de Janeiro, Igarape Institute, 2013, 8; about 20 percent of the 7.5 billion 

packs of cigarettes sold in Brazil each year are smuggled into the country primarily from Paraguay. See 

Alejandro Ramos, “Illegal Trade in Tobacco in MERCOSUR Countries,” Centro de Investigacion do la 

Epidemia de Tabaquismo, 22–23, 54.

11 Rogerio Simoes and Dodge Billingsley, “Budget Cuts Threaten Brazilian Border Security,” 

Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 19, 2016, 5.

12 Luis Bitencourt, “The Importance of the Amazon Basin in Evolving Security Agenda,” in Environment and Security in the Amazon Basin (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center 

for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2002), 66.

13 Allen, 79–80.

14 Bitencourt, 67, and endnote 24.

15 Calha Norte annual budget reports for 2003–2014, available at <www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/

programa_calha_norte/relatorio_atividades/2003.pdf>.

16 “Programa Calha Norte,” available at <www.defesa.gov.br/index.php/programas-e-projectos/

programa-calha-norte>.

17 “Calha Norte 25 Anos,” 44, available at <www.defesa.br/arquivos/programa_calha_norte/

livro/pcn_livro.pdf>.

18 Major General Andre Luis Novaes, Brazilian Army, “Brazilian Army Strategies for the Amazon Region,” INSS Roundtable Discussion, Washington, DC, March 21, 2014.

19 Muggah, 14.

20 Ibid.

21 Thomas Guedes Costa, “SIVAM: Challenges to the Effectiveness of Brazil’s Monitoring Project for the Amazon,” and Clovis Brigagao, “Environmental and Security Monitoring in Amazonia,” both 

in Environment and Security in the Amazon Basin.
41

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

22 The strategy focuses on mid- and long-term strategic actions along three axes: the reorganization of the armed forces, the restructuring of the Brazilian defense industry, and the troop requirements policy for the armed forces. The new defense vision of the intersection between security and 

development is given international significance by Johanna Mendelson et al., Beyond Boundaries in 

Brazil: Innovating for Proliferation Prevention (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2015). 

23 “Brazilian Navy,” GlobalSecurity.org, available at <www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/

brazil/navy.htm>; “Northern Military Command in Vast Amazon Region,” Dialogo, March 29, 2013, 

available at <www.dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional_news/2013/03/29/

brazil-comando-militar>.

24 Ministry of Defense, National Strategy of Defense (Brasilia: Brazilian Ministry of Defense, 

2008), 11–19.

25 Ralph Espach, “Defense: Brazil’s Gamble on a Nuclear-Powered Submarine,” Geopolitical 

Information Services, May 8, 2013; “Brazilian Admiral Gives Briefing on Blue Amazon Management 

System,” Open Source Center, LAP 20100917357004, August 26, 2010.

26 Luiz Monteiro, “Os principais Programas da Marinha do Brasil,” PodorNaval.com, available at <www.naval.com.br/blog/destaque/peamb/11-os-principais-programas-da-marinha-dobrasil/#axzz2NuMKkAkK>.

27 National Strategy of Defense, 21.

28 Daniela Milanese, “FAB anuncia intenção de comprar 28 aviões KC390 da Embraer,” Estadao, 

July 21, 2010, available at <http://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/economia.fab-anuncia-intencaode-comprar-28-avioes-kc-390-da-embraer,28339,0.htm>; Stratfor, April 15, 2009.

29 Roberto Godoy, “Brazil: Defense of Amazon Region Beefed Up: FAB Builds Landing Strip 

Near Venezuela,” O Estado de São Paulo, 2007.

30 “DefesaNet-Fronteiras-PEF—Forcas Armadas e Policiais atuarao juntas no controle e 

combate aos crimes nas fronterias,” DefesaNet, available at <www.defesanet.com.br/fronteiras/noticia/1464/PEF---Forcas-Armadas-e-Policiais-atuaro-juntas-no-control-e-combate-aos-crimes-nasfronteiras>.

31 “Brazil’s Combined Border Operations to Become Constant,” Latin News, June 5, 2013.

32 Brian Winter, “Brazil’s ‘Gringo’: Its Borders,” Reuters Special Report, Thomson Reuters, 2012, 5.

33 “Brazil’s Army,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–South America, July 30, 2015, 1–3.

34 “Programa Nacional de Actividades Espaciais 2012–2021,” available at <www.aeb.gov.br>.

35 Cesar Modesto, “Operation Curare VI: Brazilian Armed Forces Fight Crime in Northern 

Border Region,” Dialogo, October 27, 2015.

36 Michel Temer et al., “Segurança nas fronteiras,” O Estado de São Paulo, available at <www.

estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso,seguranca--nas-fronteiras-,813244,0.htm>.

37 Muggah, 16.

38 Daniela Oliveira, “Brazil: Illegal Wildlife Trade a R$2.5 Billion-per-year Business,” Infosurhoy.

com, available at <http://infosurhoy.com/en_GB/articles/saii/features/main/2012/05/17/feature-02>.

39 World Wildlife Fund, “Unsustainable Wildlife Trade in the Amazon,” available at <http://wwf.

panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/amazon/problems/other_threats/wildlife_trade_amazon>.

40 Modesto. 
42 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

41 Simoes and Billingsley; IHS Jane’s Intelligence Briefing, “Brazil’s Defense Budget and Military 

Capabilities: Impact of Recession,” April 7, 2016. 

42 “Bilateral and Subregional Aspects of Security and Defense: The Experience of MERCOSUR, 

Bolivia, and Chile,” remarks by Ambassador Valter Pecly Moreira, Permanent Representative of Brazil, 

as President Pro Tempore of MERCOSUR, to the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security, Washington, DC, October 29, 2002.

43 “Brazil’s Army,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—South America, August 6, 2015; Michael 

Lohmuller, “Brazilian Organized Crime and Corrupt Politicians: Drug Trafficking in Paraguay,” InSight 

Crime, June 8, 2015.

44 See <http://infosurhoy.com/cocoon/saii/xhtml/pt/features/saii/features/main/2011/06/21/

feature-01>.

45 National Strategy of Defense, 11.

46 Adriana Weaver, “Technological Initiatives Help Brazilian Armed Forces Reduce Deforestation,” Dialogo, October 16, 2015, available at <http://dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/

features/2015/10/16/feature-02>; Andrea Barretto, “Brazilian Military in Defense of Borders and 

Cyberspace,” Dialogo, February 13, 2015; Andrea Barretto, “Brazil to Test Border Surveillance during 

Military Operations,” Dialogo, May 12, 2015; Orivaldo Perin, “Brazil: Border Security Program Prioritizes Amazon,” O Globo Online, June 6, 2011, http://oglobo.globo.com/rio/; Daniel Wasserbly, “Brazilian 

Army Launches Border Monitoring System,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 14, 2014.

47 Patricia Communello, “Armed Forces of Brazil, Colombia Cooperate to Fight Trans-Border 

Crime,” Dialogo, January 29, 2016.

48 Muggah, 19.

49 “Bolivia and Brazil Boast Anti-drug Ties,” Latin News, November 13, 2015; available at 

<www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2013/vol1/index.htm>.

50 “Brazil, Colombia Sign Agreement to Strengthen Binational Border Security,” Brasilia InfoRel, March 9, 2012; “Flying Start for the New Border Strategy,” Latin American Security and Strategic 

Review, July 2011; Ximena Moretti, “Navies of Brazil, Peru, and Colombia Join Forces to Fight Drug 

Trafficking,” Dialogo, May 29, 2015; Patrícia Communello, “Brazil and Colombia Expand Cooperative 

Security Efforts in Amazon Border Region,” Dialogo, May 27, 2016.

51 Consistent budgetary data over time for the Ministry of Defense proved to be difficult to find 

using different sources. IHS Jane’s Aerospace, Defense, and Security proved the best source of information.

52 National Strategy of Defense, 23.

53 Gustavo Castillo García, “Pone en marcha el gobierno nuevo sistema de vigilancia,” La 

Jornada, September 13, 2006, available at <www.jornada.unam.mx/2013/09/06/politica/022n1pol>. 

See also Iñigo Guevara y Moyano, “Sedena, Semar y la vigilancia de la frontera sur,” available at <http://

mexicoseguridad.mx/sedena-semar-y-la-vigilancia-de-la-frontera-sur/>.

54 “Colombia, Brazil and Peru to Develop Patrol Boat to Protect Amazon,” Fox News Latino, 

December 2, 2015; Communello.

55 Ministry of National Integration, “Discussion Paper of the Regional and Sustainable Development Plan for the Frontier Strip—Brazil Border Plan,” October 2012 version; Communello.
43

Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil

About the Authors

Colonel John A. Cope, USA (Ret.), is a Senior Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research 

(CSR), Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), at the National Defense Univeristy. He is 

a specialist on Western Hemisphere defense and security affairs, U.S. policy for Latin America 

and the Caribbean, civil-military relations, and defense education. Before retiring after 30 years 

in the Army, Mr. Cope served as Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs; Deputy Chief of Staff and Special Assistant to the Commander, U.S. 

Southern Command; and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, U.S. Army South. He 

commanded an infantry battalion in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and held senior 

staff positions in Washington, DC, Heidelberg, Germany, and other locations.

At the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Mr. Cope designed the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (now the William Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense 

Studies) and founded it in 1997. Also for OSD, he published International Military Education 

and Training: An Assessment, McNair Paper 44 (NDU Press, October 1995). His recent policy 

research and analysis has focused on five areas: security challenges in the Caribbean Basin and 

Mexico as in integral part of U.S. homeland defense, the strategic importance of Colombian 

President Álvaro Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy and U.S. support of his policy, the Defense 

Department’s engagement with Brazil and Chile, reform of the Inter-American Defense Board 

as an integral part of the system of hemispheric security, and the advancement of defense cooperation in the Americas.

Mr. Cope has contributed many articles and chapters on regional defense and security 

issues in several U.S. and foreign publictions. These include “Hemispheric Security: A New 

Approach,” co-authored with Frank O. Mora, Current History (February 2009); Reforming the 

Inter-American Defense Board, INSS Strategic Forum 258 (NDU Press, August 2010); “Strategic Shift in the Americas,” co-authored with Ambassador Luigi Einaudi, The National Interest

(forthcoming). Beginning in 2011, became the editor of a series of four papers on Brazil and 

its emerging world role. The current title, Frontier Security: The Case of Brazil, CSR Strategic 

Perspective 20 (NDU Press, July 2016), is the fourth essay in the series. Mr. Cope also guided 

to publication Hal Klepak’s Reflections on U.S.-Cuba Military-to-Military Contacts, Strategic Forum 295 (NDU Press, July 2016). Mr. Cope has numerous CSR Event Reports from his longstanding INSS Colleagues for the Americas Seminar series, a flagship program for the University begun 1994, and 15 Western Hemisphere security colloquia.
44 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 20

Mr. Cope graduated with a Bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Military Academy and Master’s 

degree from Duke University. He served in combat twice in Vietnam. Mr. Cope also taught at 

the U.S. Military Academy, U.S. Army War College (from which he graduated), the U.S. Marine 

Corps War College. His education includes a postgraduate program at The George Washington 

University.

Mr. Andrew Parks was a Research Intern in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute 

for National Strategic Studies, at NDU for Western Hemisphere affairs in 2013 when he completed the original research and analysis for this paper. He graduated cum laude from Wake 

Forest University in 2010 and was completing his Master’s degree in International Affairs at 

The George Washington University. Prior to his internship at INSS, Mr. Parks was an intern in 

the Bureau of Western Hempisphere Affairs at the Department of State, a policy intern at the 

Council of the Americas, and an intern for the Global Service Leaders Initiative at the Meridian 

International Center. Mr. Parks is a 2013 Finalist in the Presidential Management Fellowship 

Program and now works at the National Aeronautical and Space Administration.
Center for Strategic Research Senior Fellows

COL KRIS A. BAUMAN, USAF

Senior Military Fellow

MR. JOHN A. COPE

Senior Research Fellow

DR. T.X. HAMMES

Distinguished Research Fellow

DR. FRANK G. HOFFMAN

Senior Research Fellow

DR. LAURA J. JUNOR

Director

DR. CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB

Distinguished Research Fellow

DR. ANDRE LE SAGE

Senior Research Fellow

DR. THOMAS F. LYNCH III

Distinguished Research Fellow

DR. DENISE NATALI

Senior Research Fellow

COL RICHARD OUTZEN, USA

Senior Military Fellow

DR. JAMES J. PRZYSTUP

Senior Research Fellow

DR. PHILLIP C. SAUNDERS

Distinguished Research Fellow

For a complete list of INSS researchers and staff, please visit inss.ndu.edu.