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Echelon Defense: The Role of Sea Power in

Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy

Ryan D. Martinson

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Recommended Citation

Martinson, Ryan D., "Echelon Defense: The Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy" (2018). CMSI Red Books. 15.

http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/15

CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE 

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 

Newport, Rhode Island

Echelon Defense

usnwc.edu/Research-and-Wargaming/Research-Centers/China-Maritime 

-Studies-Institute

Ryan D. Martinson

The Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy
Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island 

Center for Naval Warfare Studies 

China Maritime Study No. 15 

February 2018

President, Naval War College

Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley, U.S. Navy

Provost

Dr. Lewis M. Duncan

Dean of Naval Warfare Studies

Thomas J. Culora

Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and 

editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies

Peter A. Dutton

Naval War College Press

Director: Dr. Carnes Lord 

Managing Editor: Robert C. Ayer

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The China Maritime Studies are extended research projects 

that the editor, the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the 

President of the Naval War College consider of particular 

interest to policy makers, scholars, and analysts. 

Correspondence concerning the China Maritime Studies 

may be addressed to the director of the China Maritime 

Studies Institute, usnwc.edu/Research-and-Wargaming/

Research-Centers/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute. To 

request additional copies or subscription consideration, 

please direct inquiries to the President, Code 32A, Naval 

War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, Rhode Island 

02841-1207, or contact the Press staff at the telephone, fax, 

or e-mail addresses given.

Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act 

of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States. This 

document may be freely reproduced for academic or other 

noncommercial use; however, it is requested that reproductions credit the author and China Maritime Studies series 

and that the Press editorial office be informed. To obtain 

permission to reproduce this publication for commercial 

purposes, contact the Press editorial office.

ISSN 1943-0817

ISBN 978-1-935352-64-8

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Martinson, Ryan D., author. | Naval War College (U.S.). China Maritime

 Studies Institute, issuing body.

Title: Echelon defense : the role of sea power in Chinese maritime dispute

 strategy / Ryan D. Martinson.

Other titles: China maritime studies ; no. 15.

Description: Newport, Rhode Island : Naval War College Press, 2018. |

 Series: China Maritime Study ; No. 15 | “China Maritime Studies Institute,

 U.S. Naval War College.” | Includes bibliographical references.

Identifiers: LCCN 2018004420| ISBN 9781935352648 | ISBN 1935352644

Subjects: LCSH: Sea-power—China. | China—Military policy. | Sea control. |

 Maritime boundaries—China. | Territorial waters—South China Sea. | South

 China Sea—Strategic aspects.

Classification: LCC VA633 .M37 2018 | DDC 363.28/60951—dc23 | SUDOC D

 208.213:15

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018004420


The opinions expressed in this publication are the perspectives of the author and do 

not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its 

components or the views of the government of the People’s Republic of China or 

any of its components. 

Acknowledgments: The author would like to thank Robert Ayer, Peter Dutton, and 

Isaac Kardon for their generous efforts to improve this study. Any errors or shortcomings are the author’s alone. 

Introduction: Echelon Defense in Action

On April 10, 2012, two Chinese law-enforcement cutters on joint patrol in the 

South China Sea received orders to proceed immediately to Scarborough Shoal, 

a disputed cluster of rocks 140 nautical miles west of Subic Bay, the Philippines. Earlier 

that day, a Chinese fisherman aboard one of several boats moored in the lagoon had 

transmitted an alarming message to authorities in his home port in Hainan: “Philippine 

Navy ship number 15 heading this way.”1

Ship number 15 was BRP Gregorio del Pilar, an elderly former U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) 

cutter now serving as a frigate in the Philippine navy. Not long after the first message arrived in Hainan, sailors operating from the ship entered the lagoon and approached the 

Chinese boats. At this point, the fisherman sent a final message: “They’re boarding.”2

For Chinese fishermen sailing to Scarborough Shoal, the dangers to life and property 

were well-known. Despite China’s long-standing claim to the feature, the Philippines had 

administered it for decades. Since the 1990s, a number of incidents had occurred as a 

result of adventurous (and state-backed) Chinese fishermen risking personal safety for 

the precious commodities to be found in the lagoon—above all, coral and giant clams.

What had changed was China. In recent years, Chinese law-enforcement authorities—

especially an agency called China Marine Surveillance (CMS)—had increased patrols 

dramatically to disputed waters in the South China Sea, in part to protect Chinese fishermen such as these. They were prepared for just such a crisis.

The two Chinese cutters, CMS 75 and CMS 84, arrived on the scene just as Philippine 

sailors prepared to arrest the suspected poachers.3

 On the orders of senior officers in 

Beijing, the two ships maneuvered between Gregorio del Pilar and the entrance to the 

lagoon, physically preventing access to the Chinese fishermen. Despite their superior 

firepower, the Philippine forces did not escalate the confrontation. Doing so might have 

precipitated a military conflict, which the Philippines could not possibly win. Gregorio 

del Pilar itself would not last long in any modern clash of arms.4

 And who knew? Chinese naval forces might be in the area already.5

The Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy

Echelon Defense 
2 china maritime studies

The tactical stalemate at Scarborough Shoal did not end tidily. Instead, it turned into a 

lengthy standoff that attracted worldwide attention. Both China and the Philippines kept 

vessels at the shoal, but neither side dared to use force to contest the other’s presence. 

Gregorio del Pilar was called home quickly, replaced by a less menacing Philippine coast 

guard cutter, and the Chinese fishing trawlers originally involved in the incident soon 

were allowed to leave.6

 But these concessions were not enough for Beijing. China needed 

to win something.

After several weeks of fruitless diplomatic negotiation, China opted to escalate. People’s 

Republic of China (PRC) statesmen condemned the Philippine leaders for “bullying” 

their country, and issued vague threats through media mouthpieces.7

 China sent more 

vessels to the scene. On May 22, Philippine authorities counted seventy-six Chinese utility boats bobbing in the lagoon, with twenty trawlers also in the vicinity—this during a 

period when Chinese fishermen should have been observing an annual fishing moratorium.8

 Moored nearby were their protectors: half a dozen Chinese coast guard cutters.9

Meanwhile, China used other tools of statecraft, including an informal embargo on 

Philippine bananas, to punish the much weaker disputant.10

The pressure paid off. By early June, Philippine diplomats, clearly desperate for the feud 

to end, were speaking openly of de-escalation.11 On June 15, President Benigno Aquino 

III ordered the country’s ships back to port to avoid an approaching typhoon.12 Apparently believing that some agreement existed with Beijing, Aquino publicly declared that 

the standoff was over.13

If any agreement existed, Beijing did not honor it. Not long after the storm cleared, Chinese fishing and constabulary vessels returned to Scarborough Shoal. And now it was 

theirs. It remains so to this day.

In an interview several months after the standoff had ended, Cheng Chunfa, the head 

of CMS operations in the South China Sea, took credit for the victory at Scarborough 

Shoal on behalf of his service. Chinese forces had maintained a “dominant position” (主

导地位) throughout the two-month crisis. In doing so, they had played a pivotal role in 

restoring Chinese territory. With this triumph, they had pioneered a “new model” (新的

模式) for prosecuting the “rights-protection struggle.”14

This was not exactly true. The use of sea power to impose one’s will on another nation 

in operations short of war is far from novel. In fact, it is a very old model, often called 

“gunboat diplomacy.”15

Yet Cheng’s claim contains some truth. China indeed has developed a distinct approach 

for using sea power to assert its maritime claims, and the Scarborough Shoal incident 

was the supreme validation of that approach.16 Key components of Chinese sea power 

are integrated into what PRC strategists call an “echelon defense system” (梯次防卫体
echelon defense 3

系).17 On the front line, China deploys coast guard forces—cutters such as CMS 75 and 

84—operating on the pretext of routine law enforcement. They directly vie for influence 

over disputed space using verbal threats backed up by nonlethal measures, but never 

armed force. To their rear, on the second line, looms the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

Navy (PLAN) surface fleet. Even if not always physically in the vicinity, its power and 

mobility exert a deterrent effect on foreign decision makers from the region, forcing 

them to compete on China’s terms.18 This coercive function also is directed at countries 

such as the United States that might intervene on behalf of competing claimants.

As the events at Scarborough Shoal suggest, China’s echelon defense approach has 

achieved remarkable successes. Since 2006, when this model began to take form, the 

geographic frontiers of PRC influence and control have expanded dramatically. Meanwhile, the influence and control of other states have undergone a corresponding contraction. Because of the resulting increase in tensions at sea, some frontline Chinese forces 

have described this campaign as a “war without gun smoke.”19

China’s success in this campaign is a function of the model’s ability to exploit two key 

asymmetries with other states.20 First, China is far more powerful than most other 

disputants, a disparity that has increased dramatically over the last decade. Coastal 

states in Southeast Asia simply do not have the fiscal and industrial resources to invest 

in the naval and coast guard tools needed to compete with China. This resource gap 

is exacerbated by the nature of the maritime arena, where a great advantage accrues to 

states that have the wherewithal to keep more forces at sea.21 Second is an asymmetry of 

resolve between China and the only other states capable of competing with it in these 

waters, Japan and the United States. Extremely cautious about how it builds and uses sea 

power, Japan has shown that it is less willing to assume the degree of risk needed to halt 

Chinese expansion than China is to pursue it. While this self-restraint may be morally 

commendable, it has failed to elicit a reciprocal response from China.22 For its part, the 

United States, which is not a direct claimant, has remained neutral in most of the maritime disputes, insisting only that they be handled on the basis of international law and 

without coercion or intimidation.23 Clearly, then, the outcome of this contest means less 

to the United States than it does to China, which is fighting for much more than abstract 

principles.24

China’s echelon defense approach exploits these two asymmetries while remaining 

within the constraints of Chinese grand strategy, what PRC propagandists call “peaceful development.” Beijing desires to leverage its growing power to alter the status quo in 

its favor. Yet it generally seeks to avoid encounters that might risk armed conflict and 

tarnish its reputation, outcomes that could undermine the stability so important to its 

economic goals. Relying on coast guard forces backed up by naval power allows China 

to pursue both objectives simultaneously. In the words of one PLA analyst, it ensures 
4 china maritime studies

“room for action” (有为空间), while at the same time ensuring a certain degree of “room 

for maneuver” (回旋余地) for Chinese diplomacy.25

This monograph examines China’s use of naval and coast guard forces to advance its 

maritime claims in the period since 2006. These include claims to sovereignty over 

dozens of land features, such as Scarborough Shoal. They also include rights to use and 

administer vast swaths of ocean that China claims on the basis of its particular interpretation of international law. Chinese leaders believe that the United Nations Convention 

on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entitles them to jurisdictional rights over three million 

square kilometers of maritime space, often referred to as China’s “blue national territory” 

(蓝色国土). Nearly half of this space, Chinese leaders frequently lament, is contested by 

other states. To defend these “maritime rights,” Chinese ships are charged with a whole 

host of missions that often are conducted well out of sight of land.

Part 1 outlines China’s maritime claims, the value that Chinese leaders ascribe to them, 

and the overall objectives driving PRC policy. Part 2 looks at the naval and coast guard 

forces charged with defending and advancing these claims: their organizations, doctrines, and capabilities. Part 3 sketches the strategic context of China’s echelon defense 

approach. Part 4 zeroes in on the six major types of operations the Chinese coast guard 

and navy conduct in disputed areas. The monograph concludes with an accounting of 

PRC expansion over the ten-year period from 2006 to 2016, including key decisions that 

guided and enabled that expansion.

Part 1: China’s Blue National Territory

China uses sea power to defend and advance its position in two major types of maritime disputes. The first involves claims to territory—that is, sovereignty over islands 

and other land features. China’s territorial claims are concentrated in the East and the 

South China Seas. In the East China Sea, it claims sovereignty over Diaoyu Island (钓鱼

岛) and a handful of nearby islets, which Japan, the other claimant, collectively calls the 

Senkaku Islands. Aside from a period of U.S. occupation following World War II, Japan 

has exercised administrative control over the islands since the late nineteenth century. In 

December 2008, China began taking steps to contest that control actively, in large part 

by operating coast guard forces in waters surrounding the disputed islands.

In the South China Sea, China claims sovereignty over all the land features within the 

“nine-dash line” (九段线) or “dashed line” (段续线), including the Paracel Islands 

(Xisha, 西沙), Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal (collectively called Zhongsha, 

中沙), and the Spratly Islands (Nansha, 南沙). Most of these features are tiny spits of 

sand and coral. Few, if any, of the features, and none in the Spratlys, satisfy UNCLOS 

standards for full-fledged islands entitled to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ).26 Indeed, 
echelon defense 5

Macclesfield Bank and James Shoal (south of the Spratlys) are fully submerged at low 

tide and therefore yield no maritime entitlements whatever.

China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea bring it into disagreement with Taiwan 

(all features), the Philippines (Scarborough Shoal and the Spratlys), Brunei and Malaysia 

(some of the Spratlys), and Vietnam (all the Paracels and Spratlys).27 China currently occupies all the major Paracel features and seven of the Spratly features.28 Since mid-2012, 

it has exercised control over Scarborough Shoal, but has not moved to occupy it.

Figure 1. China’s Maritime Claims in the East and South China Seas
6 china maritime studies

The second category of maritime dispute involves “maritime rights.” This refers to the 

rights of coastal states to use and administer certain areas of the ocean, as outlined in 

international law—above all, UNCLOS. These areas, or zones, include the territorial 

sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, and, in some cases, a continental shelf. Within its twelvenautical-mile (nm) territorial sea, a coastal state exercises a degree of sovereignty akin 

to that exercised on land. The extent of a coastal state’s rights diminishes the farther 

away one moves from the coast. In the EEZ, for instance, the rights of a coastal state are 

strictly circumscribed. They do, however, include the exclusive right to exploit any and 

all resources that may exist in the water and seabed, which makes this zone extremely 

valuable.29

China’s many territorial disputes inevitably create disputes over maritime rights, because 

land determines the shape and extent of any resulting zones of sovereignty and jurisdiction. Further complicating matters, the standards for determining maritime rights are 

themselves contested. Islands capable of human habitation, for example, generate EEZs. 

Other land features, called “rocks” and “low-tide elevations” (LTEs), generate few or no 

maritime rights.30 Conflicting positions on the legal status of different land features—

whether island, rock, or LTE—lead to disputes over maritime rights.

Disputes also can result when states separated by narrow seas (those less than four 

hundred nautical miles across) disagree on how to divide the space. China and Japan, 

for instance, still have not settled their jurisdictional boundaries in the East China Sea, 

a problem with no necessary relationship to the dispute concerning sovereignty over the 

Senkaku Islands. China claims resource and other maritime rights out to the Okinawa 

Trough, well east of the median line between it and Japan.31 In the Yellow Sea, China and 

both North and South Korea have yet to define their maritime boundaries.32

In the South China Sea, disputes over maritime rights are exacerbated by the fact that 

China has not defined its jurisdictional claims fully. To do so, it would need to draw 

baselines (i.e., starting points for maritime zones) around its claimed land features, 

indicating the status of individual features, and explain the significance of the nine-dash 

line. Perhaps seeing advantage in delay and ambiguity, it has done few of these things. 

Beijing has drawn baselines around the Paracels (in a 1996 declaration), but it has yet to 

do so for any of the Spratly features.33 Moreover, authoritative Chinese sources frequently claim Chinese jurisdiction over two million square kilometers in the South China 

Sea—roughly the area within the nine-dash line—but China has not defined the nature 

of that jurisdiction explicitly. China claims some brand of “historic rights” (历史性权益) 

in the waters bounded by the nine-dash line.34 Again, the Chinese government never has 

indicated fully what these rights entail, or specifically where they exist.35 However, key 

policies and regulations governing the activities of Chinese oil and gas companies and 

fishermen suggest that Chinese leaders assume the nine-dash line gives China expansive 
echelon defense 7

“rights” to exploit marine resources within its limits.36 Figure 2 depicts the nine-dash 

line.37

Figure 2. China’s “Nine-Dash” Line in the South China Sea
8 china maritime studies

The statements and actions of China’s sea services shed light on the practical significance of the nine-dash line.38 The PLA Navy operates on the assumption that China has 

“historic rights” to all the resources, both living and nonliving, within the nine-dash line, 

often referred to as China’s “traditional maritime border in the South China Sea” (南

海传统海疆线).39 This view also reflects mainstream assumptions within the Chinese 

coast guard.40 As will be discussed below, frontline rights-protection operations take 

place in all the waters within the nine-dash line.

Why China’s Maritime Claims Matter

China’s claims to sovereignty over offshore islands and to jurisdiction over water space 

are important for economic, military, and political reasons. Economically, if China 

achieved control over the three million square kilometers of waters it claims, Chinese 

firms and individuals could exploit the fish, petroleum, gas, and other resources that 

exist in and beneath those waters. Since these waters already are fished intensively, 

the economic value of biological resources in these waters is very real. The amount of 

exploitable hydrocarbon resources in the seabed of disputed areas of the East and South 

China Seas is much more theoretical. In Chinese texts, the South China Sea is depicted 

as a “second Persian Gulf.”41 It is difficult, however, to know to what extent this claim reflects a facts-based assessment, to what extent it is wishful thinking, and to what extent it 

is another justification for extending Chinese control over these strategically important 

waters.42 China’s endowments of terrestrial resources, always poor, are now heavily depleted; this may amplify the value of offshore resources in the eyes of Chinese leaders.43

China’s maritime claims also have significant military value. China’s eastern seaboard is 

its economic heartland and home to a massively disproportionate share of the Chinese population.44 Chinese analysts believe that threats to these centers of wealth have 

increased as a result of improvements in the capacity of foreign navies to project power 

ashore.45 Therefore, Chinese policy makers seek to expand “strategic space” (战略空间) 

or “strategic depth” (战略纵深) between potential adversaries and the Chinese homeland. They hope to achieve this by increasing Chinese presence at remote distances from 

the Chinese coast and restricting or denying foreign access and maneuver within the 

so-called first island chain.46 As PLAN senior captain Xie Shiting wrote in a 2014 article, 

China seeks “to be able to detect and engage the attacking foreign forces at a distance 

as far away as possible [from the homeland].”47 Controlling island frontiers hundreds of 

miles from the mainland coast and the waters between them offers a means to alleviate 

this vulnerability.48

Moreover, by expanding peacetime presence and control over these claimed waters, 

China can improve its chances of preventing other states from threatening its vital sea 

lines of communication (SLOCs)—and, conversely, enable China to disrupt others’ 
echelon defense 9

SLOCs—in the event of a military conflict. This is an extremely important consideration, given China’s acute dependence on seaborne communications for international 

trade in raw materials and manufactured goods.Probably reflecting mainstream thinking in the Chinese military, two authors writing for a magazine published by the PLA 

Academy of Military Science assert that “pushing the depth of maritime defense out to 

the first island chain and normalizing military presence there is the only way for China 

to change its passive position with respect to SLOC security and ensure that China’s 

SLOC security is not subject to [the will of] another state.”49

The matter of maximizing “strategic space” in the seaward direction is of special concern, given that Chinese leaders believe that China’s gravest threats are located offshore.50

In a speech delivered in August 2013, the then director of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), Liu Cigui, explained, “It can be predicted that for a period of time going 

forward China will face increasing challenges as it tries to safeguard its maritime rights 

and interests. The ocean will very likely be the primary direction from which China will 

face interference in the strategic period of opportunity for development and threats to 

national security.”51 In the words of two Chinese government analysts, “Today and for 

some time into the future, China’s security situation in the landward direction will be 

basically stable; security threats mostly come from the seaward direction.”52

China’s maritime claims also have significant, if intangible, political value. That others 

vie for areas that rightly belong to China is an emblem of disrespect. The need to maintain national dignity creates incentives for the PRC to repudiate and undermine others’ 

claims, even if the objects under dispute have very little intrinsic value.53 When the other 

disputant is a weaker state, its obstreperous actions are apt to offend Chinese leaders’ 

image of China as a great power—an image that has been fostered by Xi Jinping’s policy 

to restore national greatness (“the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”).54 In the 

case of disputes involving Japan, these emotional elements are compounded by historical 

memories of being “bullied” and occupied during the hundred years leading up to the 

founding of the PRC—the so-called Century of National Humiliation.55 Since the Chinese party-state holds a monopoly on the only tools that can preserve Chinese dignity in 

the face of foreign disrespect, leaders no doubt face certain pressures to act, even when 

doing so may not be in the national interest.56

Naturally, there is much debate about the extent to which each of the above factors 

drives Chinese behavior at sea. This study does not seek to settle this debate. All three 

are certainly in play. When combined, they create a strong impetus for Chinese leaders 

to invest in and use the capabilities needed to improve China’s position in its disputes.57
10 china maritime studies

The Growing Value of Disputed Land and Sea

The value of China’s claims has increased over time, creating greater impetus to invest 

in and use tools to assert them. One can track this change in official documents, such 

as the biennial iterations of the PRC national defense white paper. The first was published in 1998. However, it was not until the eighth iteration, released in April 2013, that 

Chinese policy makers first dedicated a section to the military’s role in safeguarding 

“maritime rights and interests.”58 This maritime focus was emphasized further in the 

most recent national defense white paper, published in 2015.59

Tracking language on maritime affairs in party congress reports reveals a similar trend. 

The Sixteenth Party Congress Report (November 2002) called for China to “engage in 

marine development.” The Seventeenth Party Congress Report (October 2007) cited the 

need to “develop the marine economy.”60 Both of these documents reflect the partystate’s emphasis on the ocean’s importance to economic development. To these economic 

aims, the Eighteenth Party Work Report added that China must “resolutely safeguard 

national maritime rights and interests,” a pointed reference to defending and advancing 

China’s position in its disputes.61

The growing importance of China’s maritime claims also can be seen in other state documents, such as five-year plans. It was not until the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005) 

that Chinese policy makers included content on the need to protect China’s “maritime 

rights and interests.” It has done so in every five-year plan since, with increasing “rightsprotection” content in each new iteration.62 The Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016–20), 

issued in March 2016, devotes a whole section to what might be called the civilian 

component of China’s maritime dispute strategy, openly acknowledging that China’s 

maritime rights and interests are not constant, but expanding. 

[China] will effectively safeguard territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests. 

It will strengthen the capabilities of its maritime law-enforcement agencies, deepen research on maritime-related historical and legal issues, conduct overall planning for the use 

of various types of means to safeguard and expand [emphasis added] national maritime 

rights and interests, properly handle foreign infringements, and safeguard freedom of 

navigation and sea-lane security in China’s jurisdictional waters. It will actively participate 

in the establishment and protection of international and regional maritime order, improve 

mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation on maritime issues, and promote pragmatic 

cooperation on maritime issues. It will improve coordination mechanisms for maritime 

affairs, strengthen top-down design for maritime strategy, and formulate a maritime basic 

law.63

In recent years Chinese policy makers have come to regard sovereignty over offshore islands—and perhaps even maritime rights—as “core interests” (核心利益). The international press reported the earliest inklings of this policy shift in 2010. However, Chinese 
echelon defense 11

diplomats appear to have backtracked soon afterward.64 Other authoritative sources 

continued to use the term.65

Xi Jinping erased any ambiguity during remarks delivered at a July 2013 politburo session devoted to discussion of policies for building China into a “maritime power” (海洋

强国), at which he declared that China would never sacrifice “core national interests.”66

Now China’s maritime claims regularly are described as “core interests.” For example, 

at a July 2016 meeting in Beijing, then–PLAN commander Adm. Wu Shengli purportedly told USN Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson that China “would not 

sacrifice its sovereign rights/interests in the South China Sea. These are China’s core 

interests.”67

China maintains extensive maritime claims in the East and South China Seas, many of 

which other states contest. These include claims to sovereignty over islands and other 

land features and the right to use and administer the ocean. China’s territorial claims are 

of long standing. However, the geographic extent and content of China’s maritime rights 

claims are both ambiguous and evolving. This is especially true in the South China 

Sea, where China has yet to draw baselines around its island claims in the Spratlys or 

formally define the significance of the nine-dash line. Chinese leaders believe that the 

country’s maritime claims have significant economic, military, and political value. Over 

time, this value has grown. In consequence, the PRC leadership has felt a strong impetus 

to invest in new tools to defend and advance China’s maritime claims.

Part 2: White Hulls, Gray Hulls

To defend and advance China’s maritime claims, Chinese leaders have at their disposal an 

oceangoing fleet comprising hundreds of vessels drawn from maritime law-enforcement 

agencies and the PLA Navy.68 These ships represent a vast range of size, function, and capability. Together, they give Chinese leaders many options with which to pursue national 

objectives.

This section outlines the organizations and platforms that play the largest role in China’s 

maritime dispute strategy. It also broadly sketches the doctrinal and legal bases for their 

operations along China’s maritime frontier.69

The Coast Guard Fleet

Unlike the United States, China does not operate a single maritime law-enforcement 

agency responsible for the full range of “coast guard” missions. Rather, it funds a number 

of different agencies, each of which contributes to ensuring order and safety at sea and to 

securing national borders. In mid-2013, China began the process of integrating several 
12 china maritime studies

of these agencies into a new organization called the China Coast Guard (中国海警局) 

(CCG). The vast majority of the white-hulled ships performing sovereignty—or “rightsprotection”—operations now are painted with CCG colors and pennant numbers. 

However, this superficial sign of unity should not obscure the fact that the China Coast 

Guard does not yet exist as a single, homogeneous organization. Rather, the China Coast 

Guard should be seen as an amalgam of the four agencies brought together to create it:

• China Marine Surveillance (中国海监)

• China Fisheries Law Enforcement (中国渔政)

• China Maritime Police (边防海警)

• Antismuggling Police (缉私警察)

Because they feature prominently in the period under study, the first two of these agencies merit closer attention.

China Marine Surveillance. Before being integrated into the China Coast Guard, China 

Marine Surveillance was a maritime law-enforcement agency within the State Oceanic 

Administration—itself overseen by the Ministry of Land and Resources. Nobody affiliated with China Marine Surveillance attempted to disguise its paramilitary identity. 

Indeed, authoritative publications have referred to China Marine Surveillance as China’s 

“second navy.”70

Tracing its roots to 1983, China Marine Surveillance was charged with performing administrative law-enforcement (行政执法) functions—preventing illegal land reclamation, mining of sea sand, discharge of pollutants, and other environmentally destructive 

activities—and defending China’s maritime claims, called “rights-protection law enforcement” (维权执法).71 Small craft, motorboats, and light-displacement steel-hulled vessels 

performed the former, while the service’s oceangoing cutters primarily focused on the 

latter. The service clearly regarded rights protection as its core mission.72

China Marine Surveillance comprised both national-level units funded by the central 

government and local-level units owned and operated by coastal provinces, counties, 

and cities. National-level units were organized into detachments (支队), ten total, distributed across three regions, north, east, and south, responsible for the Bo Hai (Gulf of 

Chihli) / Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea, respectively. However, ships 

based in a given region commonly sailed beyond their jurisdictions to contribute to 

rights-protection activities in other areas, especially the South China Sea.73

While nominally part of China Marine Surveillance, local-level units operated largely on 

the basis of a different set of laws and regulations, often drafted by the local government 

that funded them. For many years, local-level units seldom had cause to leave the country’s territorial sea. But starting in 2009, the State Oceanic Administration began asking 
echelon defense 13

local-level units—provincial-level units, in particular—to contribute to rights-protection 

operations.74 For instance, after its commissioning in 2009, the six-hundred-ton CMS 

9012, owned and operated by Shenzhen City, performed a number of rights-protection 

patrols in the South China Sea.75 All rights-protection missions were organized at the 

national level (国家的统一部署). Local-level units received compensation in the form 

of fuel and other subsidies.76

At the end of 2012, China Marine Surveillance operated twenty-eight cutters displacing at least a thousand tons, by far the most of any coast guard agency. The core of the 

fleet consisted of thirteen new ships built in the 2005–12 period. These thirteen vessels 

performed the bulk of the service’s rights-protection missions.77

Fisheries Law Enforcement. Until 2013, China Fisheries Law Enforcement (FLE), an 

agency overseen by the Ministry of Agriculture, was the second major coast guard 

service active along China’s maritime frontier.78 To be sure, FLE forces had pressing fisheries administration functions to fulfill, most of which were inoffensive to other states. 

Indeed, in some respects the agency fostered international cooperation; for instance, its 

vessels and personnel worked with the U.S. Coast Guard to deter and defeat high-seas 

drift-net fishing in the Pacific Ocean.79

However, FLE vessels also regularly performed rights-protection missions. Indeed, Fisheries Law Enforcement spearheaded China’s quiet annexation of Mischief Reef in late 

1994. For years prior to the creation of the China Coast Guard, Fisheries Law Enforcement regularly kept a cutter on station at the disputed Spratly feature.80 Most fisheries 

rights-protection patrols involved efforts to protect Chinese fishermen and expel foreign 

fishermen operating in Chinese-claimed waters. But FLE forces also sometimes performed operations that had no plausible connection to the service’s claimed responsibilities. FLE ships were involved in the harassment of USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) and 

USNS Victorious (T-AGOS 19) in March 2009.81

Like China Marine Surveillance, Fisheries Law Enforcement vessels comprised both 

national- and local-level units, with the national-level forces initially performing the 

bulk of rights-protection patrols, but local-level units playing increasingly prominent 

roles over time. The 570-ton FLE 45001, a ship owned by Guangxi Autonomous Region, was the first local-level cutter to patrol the Spratlys, doing so in June 2010.82

Fisheries Law Enforcement operated far fewer large cutters than did China Marine Surveillance—just a dozen displacing over a thousand tons—before it was incorporated into the 

China Coast Guard.83 All these were national-level cutters. Because of the small size of the 

national fleet, many administrative functions were performed by smaller-displacement, 

local-level ships. Again, whereas rights protection was the core responsibility of China 
14 china maritime studies

Marine Surveillance, it was only one of several major functions of Fisheries Law 

Enforcement.

Coast Guard Reform

For over a decade, Chinese commentators had called for unifying the country’s many 

maritime law-enforcement agencies into a single organization. The old model of charging each of several different agencies with a narrow set of responsibilities led to inefficiency, waste, and bureaucratic rivalry, a situation derisively called “five dragons stirring 

up the sea” (五龙闹海).84 Chinese leaders, too, were acutely aware of the need for greater 

administrative unity. However, it ultimately took an ambitious new national leader (Xi 

Jinping) and a new high-level commitment to transform China into a “maritime power” 

to prompt the PRC to begin what has been an extremely difficult and still-incomplete 

reform.85 A desire to enhance the fleet’s ability to conduct rights-protection operations 

drove the reform.86

The China Coast Guard was established officially in July 2013. Information about the 

new agency remains scarce and sometimes contradictory. Administratively it is overseen 

by the State Oceanic Administration. When conducting rights-protection operations, 

the China Coast Guard operates on behalf of—i.e., “in the name of ” (名义)—the State 

Oceanic Administration. However, these operations are subject to the “operational guidance” (业务指导) of the Ministry of Public Security. What that means in practice never 

has been articulated clearly.87

The current commandant (局长) of the China Coast Guard is Meng Hongwei (孟宏伟), 

who serves concurrently as the vice-minister of the Ministry of Public Security.88 Meng’s 

administrative status is higher than that of the director of the State Oceanic Administration, a source of friction that likely has hampered reform.89 The China Coast Guard has 

two vice-commandants (副局长).90 The service also has appointed directors of functional departments, analogous to USCG assistant commandants.

The China Coast Guard has three regional branches: North, East, and South. These are 

roughly equivalent to the two USCG area commands (Pacific and Atlantic). The regional 

branches oversee “contingents” (总队)—akin to USCG districts—located in each of 

China’s eleven coastal provinces and provincial-level cities. Beneath these contingents 

are the Chinese analogues of USCG district units, called “detachments” (支队).91 Of 

note, local-level CMS and FLE organizations were not included in the reorganization, 

although the China Coast Guard officially is charged with guiding their work.92 Thus, 

ships with CMS and FLE colors and pennants still patrol the maritime frontier.

At the national headquarters level, members of all four original agencies work in some 

degree of conjunction. The same appears to be true at the regional branches. However, 

CCG contingents still are not integrated fully. Indeed, CMS detachments continue to 
echelon defense 15

exist. At the time of this writing (early 2017), the China Coast Guard still does not even 

have a common service uniform.

However, while the CCG reform is still very much a work in progress, it already is 

impacting rights-protection operations in two key ways. First, coordination among the 

different agencies has improved. Former CMS and FLE vessels now regularly deploy 

together to trouble spots, which they seldom did in the past. Moreover, rights-protection 

deployments now are overseen by a single command center in Beijing, which can and 

does communicate directly with ships at sea.93 This enables vessels from different regions 

to be directed to areas where they are needed. For instance, in 2015 eight ships based in 

the north of China were ordered to conduct rights-protection operations in the South 

China Sea, by far the service’s largest theater of operations.94

Second, former China Maritime Police (CMP) units now regularly operate in disputed 

waters.95 Before being incorporated into the China Coast Guard, the China Maritime 

Police spent most of its time performing its public security and antismuggling missions 

on or near the shore.96 A specialized force within the People’s Armed Police (PAP), it was 

considered part of China’s armed forces. Like other parts of the PAP, officers and enlisted 

personnel (官兵) had military ranks. They also had true police powers, which China 

Marine Surveillance and Fisheries Law Enforcement did not.

Former CMS and FLE vessels (and ships under contract to be built before the reform) 

continue to perform the majority of rights-protection operations. However, CMP forces 

now frequently operate with them. Identifiable by their five-digit pennant numbers, 

CMP ships are equipped with 30 mm and—on the most recent ship classes—76 mm 

deck guns. They patrol the Paracels; indeed, they played a key role in organizing the 

2014 defense of China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) Rig 981 (discussed 

in part 4).97 Former CMP vessels now conduct missions to the Senkakus, Scarborough 

Shoal, and the Spratly Islands.98 Moreover, special operations forces (特勤队员) from the 

former China Maritime Police now are assigned to at least some former CMS and FLE 

cutters.99

When the China Coast Guard was created in mid-2013, Chinese leaders did not indicate 

what kind of organization it would become: a civilian agency like China Marine Surveillance, or a component of the armed forces like the China Maritime Police. The Chinese 

government still has not answered this question publicly. However, officer recruitment 

efforts begun in late 2014 suggest that Chinese leaders intend for it to become a military 

organization akin to the China Maritime Police.100

Slow progress in the reform probably has hampered efforts to improve tactical capabilities. Since so many aspects of the CCG organizational identity—doctrine, chain of 
16 china maritime studies

command, training, etc.—have yet to be defined, ships and crews from different backgrounds still do not work together as they should.101

Other Agencies

The China Coast Guard has not supplanted all of China’s other maritime agencies. The 

Ministry of Transport continues to operate two organizations with authorities and responsibilities at sea: the Maritime Safety Administration and the China Rescue and Salvage 

Service. Both chiefly focus on marine safety, including by performing search and rescue, 

maintaining navigation aids, and certifying vessels and their crews.102 These two agencies 

are not on the front line and rarely engage in adversarial encounters with foreign mariners.

A few exceptions are worth citing. In July 2005, during a period of heightened tension 

with Japan, a three-thousand-ton Maritime Safety Administration cutter patrolled the 

East China Sea to show Chinese commitment to continuing operations at the Chunxiao 

gas field.103 In 2013, Maritime Safety Administration forces performed three rightsprotection patrols in the South China Sea, one of which covered 5,628 nautical miles and 

involved three cutters and a shipborne helicopter.104 Both Maritime Safety Administration and China Rescue and Salvage Service cutters helped defend CNOOC 981 during 

its deployment to disputed waters south of the Paracels in 2014.

Coast Guard Force Structure

With over 120 ships displacing more than a thousand tons, China operates by far the 

world’s largest fleet of blue-water coast guard cutters.105 Valued for their endurance, 

seaworthiness, and ability to intimidate, these large vessels perform the bulk of rightsprotection operations.106 The vast majority belong to the China Coast Guard.

As an amalgam of four formerly independent services, the China Coast Guard commands a hodgepodge of vessels, including purpose-built cutters, former research vessels, 

and auxiliaries and combatants transferred from the PLA Navy. These range from 

brand-new vessels built in the great force expansion that began in 2012 to ships launched 

when Mao Zedong still ruled China. The large number of ship classes confounds efforts 

at generalization.

Until very recently, most constabulary vessels involved in rights-protection operations lacked armament. CMS ships were unarmed, save for a small number of assault 

rifles kept aboard. Some FLE cutters were equipped with deck-mounted machine guns. 

Reflecting their civilian nature, CMS and FLE cutters were called gongwuchuan (公务

船), literally, “ships for carrying out official business.” As components of China’s armed 

forces, CMP vessels were considered “warships” (舰). They had traditional deck guns, 

but did not sail to disputed waters. Many ship classes delivered since the CCG reform 

began are equipped with cannon.
echelon defense 17

Chinese coast guard forces use a variety of nonlethal means to coerce foreign mariners. 

Most constabulary ships have powerful water cannon and sirens. For instance, CMS 

8002, a ship owned by Fujian Province, possesses water cannon that can hit targets at 

one hundred meters and sirens that can reach 153 decibels.107 At least some CMS and 

FLE ships were equipped with jamming capabilities.108

Several newer classes of ships do deserve mentioning, because they reflect an effort to 

standardize the fleet. Moreover, because of their advanced capabilities, they are likely to 

play the most prominent roles in future rights-protection operations. Displacing twelve 

thousand tons, the Zhaotou-class cutters are particularly noteworthy because they are 

easily the largest coast guard ships in the world.109 Table 1 enumerates these new classes, 

citing their USN Office of Naval Intelligence class names, ships commissioned to date, 

and other pertinent information.

Provincial-level CMS and FLE units also operate several dozen oceangoing cutters, none 

displacing more than two thousand tons. Some of these have been painted with CCG 

colors and pennant numbers; many have not. Sansha City—which nominally governs all 

Chinese-claimed space in the South China Sea—owns and operates a small fleet of maritime law-enforcement cutters. These vessels include the 2,600-ton former FLE 310.

110

Of ce of Naval 

Intelligence Class 

Name

Displacement 

(tons)

Ships in the Class Notes

Zhaotou 12,000 2901, 3901 Armed with one 76 mm cannon. 

Owned by former CMS units.

Shuoshi II 5,800 1501, 2501, 2502, 

3501

Unarmed. Owned by former CMS 

units.

Zhaolai 4,800 1401, 2401, 3401, 

3402

Unarmed. Owned by former CMS 

units.

Shucha II 4,000 1305–1307, 2305–2308, 

3306–3308

Unarmed. Owned by former CMS 

units.

Zhaoyu 3,500 1301–1304, 2302–2304, 

3301, 35305, 3303–3305

Armed with one 30 mm cannon. 

Owned by former FLE and CMP units.

Zhaoduan 4,000 46301, 46302, 31303 

(more building)

Called 818 class. Resembles a Type 

054A frigate. Armed with one 76 

mm cannon and two 30 mm cannon. 

Owned by former CMP units.

Zhaojun 2,700 46111, 46112, 44111, 

33111, 21111 

(more building)

Called 718 class. Armed with one 76 

mm cannon. Owned by former CMP 

units.

Zhaotim 1,700 1102–1104, 3104–3106, 

21115, 31115, 33115, 

35115, 37115, 46115

Armed with one 30 mm cannon. 

Owned by former FLE and CMP 

units. Three vessels owned by current 

provincial-level FLE units.

Table 1. Major New Ship Classes of the China Coast Guard

Notes: CMP = China Maritime Police; CMS = China Marine Surveillance; FLE = Fisheries Law Enforcement.
18 china maritime studies

The Chinese coast guard has seen tremendous expansion in absolute numbers. During the 2009–12 period, the Chinese government made a series of decisions to invest in 

new ships. First, it empowered and supported local-level CMS and FLE organizations to 

procure new ships. In early 2010, the Chinese media revealed that provincial-level CMS 

agencies would receive national funding to build a total of thirty-six oceangoing rightsprotection cutters, all displacing between 600 and 1,500 tons. The first of these was 

delivered in early 2013. At the time of this writing, nearly all have been commissioned.111

Second, national-level CMS, FLE, and CMP units also began procuring large numbers of 

new ships. Many of these displaced over three thousand tons. The first began reaching 

the fleet in early 2014, after the CCG reform had begun. They therefore all have CCG 

colors and pennant numbers. In late 2016, the China Coast Guard began commissioning 

the first units of two new armed ship classes, the Zhaoduan and Zhaojun (see table 1). 

This could mean dozens of more ships in the coming years.

Third, at the same time that new cutters were being built from the keel up, the PLA Navy 

transferred large numbers of ships to Chinese agencies to meet immediate needs. In late 

2012, for example, China Marine Surveillance received a number of former PLAN ships, 

mostly fleet auxiliaries.112 In 2015, former CMP units under the China Coast Guard 

received three PLAN Type 053 H2G (Jiangwei I) frigates.113 Figure 3 shows the growth in 

numbers of blue-water (i.e., greater than one thousand tons) coast guard cutters.114

Figure 3. Growth in Numbers of Blue-Water CCG Cutters
echelon defense 19

Legal Bases for Rights Protection

When operating in disputed waters, the Chinese coast guard does so on the pretext of 

routine domestic maritime law enforcement. In bridge-to-bridge communications with 

foreign mariners, Chinese coastguardsmen often invoke domestic and international law 

to justify their actions. Therefore it is useful to examine what China considers to be the 

legal bases for these operations, even while acknowledging that the regime uses the law 

as an instrument of statecraft.115

In August 2016, China’s Supreme People’s Court issued two judicial interpretations 

defining the authorities of Chinese maritime law-enforcement agencies to handle 

foreign and domestic violations taking place in China’s claimed jurisdictional waters. 

The interpretations concluded that the Chinese coast guard has the authority to arrest 

foreign mariners suspected of poaching in China’s claimed jurisdictional waters and 

charge them with violations of the criminal code. It also authorizes criminal proceedings 

against foreigners found merely entering China’s claimed territorial waters. This gives 

Chinese maritime law-enforcement officers new weapons with which to conduct rightsprotection missions. However, to date this tool has not been used.116

Rules and regulations issued at the local level also justify coast guard activities in disputed areas. This is especially true in the case of Hainan, the province that nominally 

exercises jurisdiction over all two million square kilometers of Chinese-claimed waters 

in the South China Sea. Hainan’s fishing and public security regulations, both recently 

revised, have a direct bearing on disputed land and seas. The November 2012 revision 

of the province’s Regulations for the Management of Coastal Border Security and Public 

English Name Chinese Name Issued/Revised

Marine Environmental Protection 

Law of the PRC

中华人民共和国海洋环境保护法 1982, 1999

PRC Fisheries Law 中华人民共和国渔业法 1986, 2000, 2004

Law of the PRC on the Territorial 

Sea and Contiguous Zone

中华人民共和国领海及毗连区法 1992

Provisions of the PRC on Administration of Foreign-Related Marine 

Scienti c Research

中华人民共和国涉外海洋科学研究管理规定 1996

Law of the PRC on the Exclusive 

Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf

中华人民共和国专属经济区和大陆架法 1998

Law of the PRC on the Administration of Sea Areas

中华人民共和国海域使用管理法 2001

Law of the PRC on Island 

Protection

中华人民共和国海岛保护法 2009

Table 2. National Laws Guiding Law-Enforcement Activities in Disputed Areas

Note: PRC = People’s Republic of China.
20 china maritime studies

Orderwas aimed pointedly at redressing the issue of foreign vessels operating “illegally” 

in Hainan’s jurisdictional waters.117

To date, China’s coast guard reform has not been accompanied by any major revisions 

to Chinese maritime law. This could change soon. China is in the process of drafting a “maritime basic law” (海洋基本法). When issued, this document should outline 

explicitly the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of China’s maritime law-enforcement 

forces and formally define their functions in China’s maritime dispute strategy.118

The Navy Surface Fleet

The PLAN surface fleet long has played an important role in defending and advancing 

China’s position in the country’s maritime disputes. Indeed, surface combatants were 

the chief protagonists in two conflicts directly involving disputed offshore islands: the 

1974 battle of the Paracels and the March 1988 clash at Johnson Reef.119 In the peacetime 

“rights-protection struggle,” the PLAN surface force is very active in both the East and 

South China Seas, even though it now often operates on the “second line.”

Operations Other Than War. The peacetime missions of the PLAN surface fleet in disputed waters are considered “military operations other than war” (非战争军事行动).120

According to the 2013 edition of the Science of Military Strategy, an authoritative volume 

published by the Academy of Military Science, the PLA Navy serves to “effectively safeguard sovereign rights in the maritime domain, stop infringements and illegal activities 

at sea, and ensure the normal pursuit of China’s maritime production, development, and 

scientific/research activities.” It also explicitly states that the “precondition” (前提) for 

any of these efforts is that the navy must not jeopardize “the overall stability [emphasis 

added] of the maritime situation.”121

The PLA Navy has an explicit law-enforcement function in disputed waters.122 This role 

is outlined in the 2009 Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, written by Sr. Capt. 

Ren Xiaofeng of the PLA Naval Research Institute (NRI). For instance, the Chinese navy 

is authorized to “adopt necessary measures to expel [unauthorized foreign naval vessels] 

operating in China’s territorial sea.”123 In the case of foreign civilian vessels operating in 

Chinese-claimed territorial waters in a manner inconsistent with innocent passage, the 

Chinese military should “act independently or assist Chinese maritime law-enforcement 

forces to prevent, halt, or correct and dispose of ” the offending vessel. This includes the 

use of “coercive law-enforcement measures.”124

The PLA Navy also is expected to conduct law enforcement in the EEZ. In the Handbook, Ren points out that the ineffectiveness of China’s maritime law-enforcement forces 

compels the navy to play a constabulary role in jurisdictional waters. Operations include 

“acting alone or assisting other maritime law-enforcement forces to prevent, halt, punish, and crack down on behavior that illegally violates Chinese sovereign rights over 
echelon defense 21

marine resources.”125 Prescribed measures include boarding, inspections, expulsions, 

detentions, and legal proceedings.126 Ren also recommends this approach for handling 

foreign vessels conducting marine scientific activities in Chinese-claimed jurisdictional 

waters. In the case of foreign military vessels conducting “illegal” surveys in China’s EEZ, 

the PLA Navy is expected to reference instructions governing handling of foreign fishing 

vessels operating illegally in Chinese jurisdictional waters. However, the Handbook states 

that commanders must be careful to take into account the “special circumstances” inherent in the fact that this is a foreign naval vessel.127

Aside from enforcing China’s maritime claims, the PLA Navy serves as an instrument by 

which to communicate Chinese intentions. It conveys Beijing’s resolve and ability to defend and advance China’s interests to deter foreign states from acting in ways that harm 

those interests. This deterrent function is outlined in authoritative PLA writings going 

back decades. For example, the 1999 edition of the Science of Military Strategy (published by China’s National Defense University) states that in the context of defending 

China’s maritime claims, the PLA Navy serves a “maritime military deterrent function.” 

By “showing” (显示) naval power, China can “put pressure on the other side, deterring 

it from daring to resort to the use of force out of fear of the difficult-to-bear and severe 

consequences that would result.”128 During international crises, China could send surface 

vessels to the contested area to “make the potential opponent not dare to act rashly [轻

举妄动], thereby helping to prevent escalation and deter war.”129

A nonscholarly volume published by the PLA Navy suggests how Chinese leaders generally see the service’s deterrent function: 

[T]he navy uses various types of channels to show its power, thereby exerting an invisible pressure on the counterpart, deterring him from daring to act rashly for fear of the 

consequences, or force him to retreat for fear of consequences, thereby achieving the aim 

of “subduing the enemy without fighting,” and realizing the navy’s strategic objectives. 

. . . The navy can show its power through naval exercises, escort operations, patrols, and 

weapons testing on and beneath the sea.130

Navy leaders are very conscious of the diplomatic impact of their actions. One PLAN 

political officer acknowledged that a Chinese surface vessel patrol through disputed waters is “not just a military operation. It is also a political operation. . . . [It] demonstrates 

the spirit of the Chinese military and its warfighting capabilities, shows our country’s 

will and resolve to safeguard maritime sovereignty, and serves our diplomacy.”131 Another PLAN officer described how during patrols through disputed waters the fleet must 

“actively work in concert with the overall situation of Chinese diplomacy.”132

Deterring foreign leaders from using military force is a key mission of the surface fleet. 

In this context, the fleet is seen as a tool with which to “subdue the enemy without fighting” (不战而屈人之兵).133 “The enemy,” of course, means other disputants. But it also 
22 china maritime studies

means deterring any “powerful adversary” (强敌)—e.g., the United States, and perhaps 

Japan—from “interfering” (干预) or “getting involved” (介入) in China’s maritime 

disputes.134 This deterrence function is no doubt a key driver in China’s evolution from a 

“near seas” to a “far seas” naval strategy designed (in part) to enable fighting a powerful 

adversary as far away from the Chinese coast as possible.135

Force Structure and Organization. Almost all elements of the PLAN surface fleet patrol 

disputed waters. These range from tiny missile boats to twenty-thousand-ton amphibious transport docks (LPDs), and include both defenseless minesweepers and some of the 

most advanced surface combatants in the world. Each is a unique tool in the struggle at 

sea. During the last five years, the PLA Navy has built modern surface combatants at a 

rate so fast that it is often described as “dropping dumplings into boiling water” (下饺

子).136 This production rate has changed the makeup of the surface fleet dramatically.

Since 2012, the PLA Navy has built large numbers of new surface combatants, including 

destroyers (both Type 052C and 052D), frigates (054A), and corvettes (056 and 056A). 

These new ships have vastly improved combat capabilities (and therefore coercive potential) and, owing to their larger displacement, have greatly improved endurance compared with the classes they replaced. The PLA Navy has evolved rapidly from a coastal 

force based on submarines and missile craft to a first-rate, blue-water navy centered on 

large surface combatants.137 This has tremendous implications for the service’s ability to 

maintain presence in disputed areas and to influence the decisions of foreign leaders.

In 2016 alone, the PLA Navy commissioned twenty-three new surface vessels. By contrast, the U.S. Navy commissioned just six surface ships in 2016.138

Excluding the aircraft carrier Liaoning (CV 16), which is not yet patrolling disputed 

waters, destroyers are the most capable units in the Chinese surface fleet. At the most 

advanced end, the PLA Navy operates Type 052C (Luyang II) and 052D (Luyang III) 

destroyers. These ship classes have phased-array radars and advanced missiles housed in 

vertical launching systems, and their capabilities may approach those of the U.S. Navy’s 

Arleigh Burke–class destroyers. At the time of this writing, China has commissioned six 

Type 052C destroyers and five of the follow-on Type 052D destroyers, with eight more of 

the latter in various stages of construction.139 The PLA Navy also operates four Sovremennyclass destroyers procured from Russia to fill a gap while it developed modern destroyers 

and advanced antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) of its own.140

The PLA Navy fields some two dozen Type 054A (Jiangkai II) frigates, another modern 

surface combatant.141 In 2013, the PLA Navy began receiving a new class of ship: the 

Type 056 (Jiangdao) “light frigate,” or corvette. At only 1,300 tons, the Type 056 corvette 

appears to be purpose-built to patrol Chinese-claimed waters within the first island 
echelon defense 23

chain. To date, the service has commissioned over thirty Type 056 hulls, with at least half 

a dozen more in various stages of construction.142

The PLA Navy also owns and operates large numbers of earlier-generation frigates, 

destroyers, corvettes, and minesweepers. Their poor war-fighting capabilities would 

render them almost valueless in a modern, high-end conflict. However, they remain useful instruments of peacetime coercion, especially when directed against weaker states in 

Southeast Asia.

Amphibious warfare ships are also active in disputed areas. The most capable class in 

this category is the Type 071 LPD; four ships of the class have been commissioned to 

date. At twenty thousand tons, this ship closely resembles the USN San Antonio class. 

It contains a large well deck for landing craft (including the air-cushioned type) and a 

flight deck for embarked helicopters. But other, smaller amphibious vessels, such as tank 

landing ships (LSTs), also patrol disputed waters.143

# Type Name (hull #) Fleet Month

 1 Frigate Jingzhou (532) ESF January

 2 Minesweeper Rongcheng (811) ? January

 3 Icebreaker Haibing (722) NSF January

 4 LST Tianmushan (916) ESF January

 5 Fleet-replenishment ship Gaoyouhu (966) ESF January

 6 Corvette Jingmen (506) SSF January

 7 LPD Yimengshan (988) ESF February

 8 Survey ship Dengjiaxian (?) ESF February

 9 Corvette Tongren (507) SSF February

10 Frigate Xiangtan (531) ESF February

11 LST Wuyishan (914) ESF March

12 LST Culaishan (915) ESF March

13 LST Wutaishan (917) ESF March

14 Icebreaker Haibing (723) NSF March

15 Corvette Qujing (508) SSF June

16 Destroyer Yinchuan (175) SSF July

17 Fleet-replenishment ship Honghu (963) SSF July

18 Fleet-replenishment ship Luomahu (963) SSF July

19 Corvette Huai’an (509) ESF August

20 Corvette Baoding (511) ESF December

21 Corvette Heze (512) ESF December

22 Minesweeper Donggang (814) ? December

23 Frigate Binzhou (515) ESF December

Table 3. PLAN Surface Ships Commissioned in 2016

Notes: ESF = East Sea Fleet; LPD = amphibious transport dock; LST = tank landing ship; NSF = North Sea Fleet; SSF = South Sea Fleet.
24 china maritime studies

PLAN auxiliary vessels are active along China’s maritime frontier. These ships, most of 

which lack combat power, conduct presence missions in conjunction with other purposes. For instance, the auxiliary water tanker Beishui 572 has performed at least seven 

rights-protection patrols to the Spratlys, probably as part of a supply mission to Mischief 

Reef.144

The PLAN surface fleet includes large numbers of fast-attack craft, such as the Type 022 

(Houbei) missile boat. Despite their impressive ASCM payloads, these ships are small 

and have poor endurance. Therefore, they are unable to play a direct role in the most 

remote areas along China’s maritime frontier. Indeed, these units have roots in an earlier 

age when the PLA Navy focused chiefly on coastal defense and a possible conflict in the 

Taiwan Strait. Still, Type 022 fast-attack craft can be—and have been—deployed to the 

disputed Paracel Islands to signal Chinese intentions.145

PLAN surface vessels are distributed across three regional fleets and their subordinate units. The East Sea Fleet (ESF), headquartered in Ningbo (Zhejiang), is charged 

with handling disputes with Japan in the East China Sea. The South Sea Fleet (SSF), 

headquartered in Zhanjiang (Guangdong), performs the bulk of operations intended 

to uphold China’s claims in the South China Sea. Both fleets operate large numbers of 

amphibious warfare ships, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, minesweepers, auxiliaries, and 

fast-attack craft.

Prior to early 2016, peacetime surface fleet deployments were organized and commanded by PLAN leaders in Beijing and at regional fleet headquarters. In late 2015, the 

PLA began a major organizational reform, which has stripped the navy of significant 

authorities. Peacetime deployment decisions now are made by theater commands (战

区), the successors to the military region (军区), with the PLA Navy focusing its attention on building and training the fleet. Each theater command is responsible for security 

threats in a given “strategic direction.”146 The Eastern Theater Command, headquartered 

in Nanjing (Jiangsu), commands and coordinates PLAN surface combatant activities 

in the East China Sea. The Southern Theater Command, Guangzhou (Guangdong), is 

responsible for the fleet movements of the SSF. Its most important mission is “safeguarding China’s rights and interests in the South China Sea.”147

Support Infrastructure. The capacity to provide presence in disputed waters involves 

more than ship numbers; it is also a function of the location and capacity of shore-based 

support facilities. Well-equipped bases located close to disputed areas provide easier 

access to fuel, food, water, and other necessities. This cuts down on transit times to and 

from the theater of operations, allowing ships to spend more time deployed. Since 2012, 

China has invested heavily in shore-based infrastructure for both naval and coast guard 

forces.
echelon defense 25

In the East China Sea, China has constructed new naval facilities at Nanji Island, located 

just 165 nm northwest of Uotsuri-shima in the Senkakus. These facilities include a 

seventy-to-eighty-meter pier, which already may be hosting surface combatants deploying to disputed areas in the East China Sea.148 China also has begun construction on a 

new 120-acre base for the China Coast Guard in the city of Wenzhou—much closer to 

the front line than other coast guard bases. When completed, the facility, called the Wenzhou Command and Comprehensive Support Base, will have six berths for coast guard 

cutters and will be able to accommodate the China Coast Guard’s new twelve-thousandton Zhaotou-class cutters.149

The benefits of forward basing are especially pronounced in the South China Sea, 

given the great distances between the mainland and the areas China claims. Since early 

2014, China has invested huge sums to transform its facilities in the Spratlys from tiny 

outposts into major military complexes. With its enormous lagoon and extensive facilities, the new base at Mischief Reef already is serving as a hub for Chinese surface vessels 

operating in the Spratlys. Port and berthing facilities to the southwest at Fiery Cross Reef 

place Chinese surface forces even closer to the more remote sections of the nine-dash 

line and the key shipping lanes traversing the South China Sea.150 Subi Reef hosts China’s 

third enormous basing complex in the Spratlys.

Aside from enabling increased presence in disputed waters, these new facilities provide 

other advantages. They allow for a surge of forces during a crisis. Placing significant 

combat power so close to the territory of other states also increases the credibility of 

Chinese efforts to exercise military coercion, especially to deter other states from using 

force against coast guard cutters or Chinese civilians.

Jointness

The Chinese coast guard and the PLA Navy constitute separate organizations, but they 

operate as components in an integrated echelon defense system. To maximize the effectiveness of this approach, they must be able to coordinate their activities, share information, and operate jointly in the event of a crisis. They currently do this with some degree 

of success.

This was not always the case. For many years, China lacked the ability to coordinate national strategy effectively across different agencies and the military. In 2012, China created the Central Maritime Rights and Interests Leading Small Group (中央海洋权益工

作领导小组), a decision-making body led by Xi Jinping that was charged with formulating and coordinating maritime dispute strategy. The creation of this leading small group 

likely improved policy coordination among the groups responsible for implementing the 

PRC’s dispute strategy.151
26 china maritime studies

Prior to the coast guard reform, China Marine Surveillance maintained the closest 

interservice relationship with the PLA Navy. In part, this was a result of an institutional 

kinship that goes back decades. For years after its founding in 1964, the State Oceanic 

Administration was managed (代管) by the PLA Navy on behalf of the State Council. 

Many CMS personnel started their careers in the navy. The PLA Navy has educated 

CMS officers at military institutions such as the PLAN Command College in Nanjing, 

the Dalian Naval Academy, and the Bengbu Academy for Noncommissioned Officers.152

PLAN units have trained CMS personnel on important skills, such as landing helicopters 

on ships at sea.153 PLAN strategists also have helped to design and assess approaches for 

using the maritime law-enforcement fleet in rights-protection operations.154

China Marine Surveillance and the PLA Navy established a mechanism for sharing 

information and coordinating activities as early as 2002. This occurred following a joint 

effort to monitor Japan’s operations to salvage an armed North Korean trawler the Japan 

Coast Guard (JCG) sank in late 2001 in (undisputed) Chinese jurisdictional waters.155

By late 2007, China Marine Surveillance and the PLA Navy had set up “coordination 

mechanisms for maritime operations” (海上行动协调配合机制) at the regional level 

(i.e., between the three navy fleets and their corresponding CMS contingents).156 Subsequent years saw repeated calls for these mechanisms to be strengthened.157

Now that both the PLA and the China Coast Guard are in the process of major organizational reform, interservice coordination mechanisms no doubt are in flux.158 If the past 

is any guide, coordination of peacetime ship deployments will occur largely among the 

China Coast Guard’s regional branches and the PLAN fleets or the new theater commands.

The available materials shed little light on the extent to which the Chinese navy and 

coast guard share intelligence. As mentioned above, China Marine Surveillance and the 

PLA Navy had established intelligence-sharing mechanisms as early as 2002.159 But these 

systems were probably never very satisfactory.160 While FLE vessels were not as active 

in disputed waters, they received information on foreign activities from Chinese fishing 

vessels, which operate all over the near seas and beyond.161 It is unclear how and to what 

extent Fisheries Law Enforcement shared this intelligence with the Chinese military or 

other coast guard forces.

Naval and coast guard forces ideally would share real-time information about foreign 

activities in disputed areas. However, the services evidently did not use similar or even 

compatible command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.162 This appears to be changing. CCG ships now 

are being fitted with the HN-900 datalink systems that the PLA Navy currently uses. 

This should improve greatly the sharing of tactical information between coast guard and 
echelon defense 27

naval forces at sea, allowing both services to contribute to and benefit from a common 

operating picture.163

During most operations, it is probably adequate that naval and coast guard forces be 

generally aware of their respective locations and missions. Crises, however, demand 

much higher standards of interoperability. To hone these skills, the PLA Navy and components of the Chinese coast guard periodically conduct joint exercises. In September 

2014, for instance, the PLAN’s ESF and selected maritime law-enforcement forces held a 

three-day exercise in the East China Sea called Haishen-2014. The aim was to improve 

the PLA Navy’s ability to provide “support and cover” (支援掩护), its key mission in 

disputed areas. The exercise involved large numbers of vessels, including destroyers, 

auxiliaries, and submarines.164

Similar exercises also take place in the South China Sea. In late August 2016, for instance, a “large-scale maritime rights-protection” exercise was held in the Gulf of Tonkin 

involving elements of the PLA (navy, ground forces, and air force) and various maritime 

law-enforcement entities, including the China Coast Guard, local-level FLE and CMS 

units, and the China Rescue and Salvage Service. One aim of the exercise was to improve 

the ability of the PLA and coast guard forces to conduct joint rights-protection operations, such as defending Chinese oil rigs from the type of assaults that Vietnam directed 

against CNOOC 981 in 2014.165 As will be discussed below, sometimes these exercises 

serve the political function of signaling Chinese intentions. But they also meet legitimate 

desires to improve interoperability.

When coast guard and naval forces are operating in the same area, logic suggests that the 

senior service should assume tactical command. Evidence indicates that this indeed occurs, at least some of the time. While on patrol in the Spratlys in May 2013, for instance, 

the PLAN frigate Jiangmen “successfully organized coast guard vessels to investigate 

and expel [查证驱赶] several foreign fishing and transport vessels” operating without 

consent in Chinese-claimed waters.166

Part 3: Sea Power and Strategy

Echelon defense is an approach for using sea power to defend and advance China’s 

maritime claims. It employs a division of labor between China’s two primary sea services, leveraging the particular advantages of each. This part examines the strategic and 

operational considerations underlying China’s echelon defense approach. It also outlines 

the chief functions it serves in China’s dispute strategy.167

“Rights” vs. “Stability”

China has powerful incentives to build and use instruments of coercion—including naval and coast guard forces—to advance its maritime interests. In Chinese parlance, such 
28 china maritime studies

actions often are referred to as “rights protection” (维权, weiquan). At the same time, 

however, Chinese leaders must weigh desires for gain against the potential consequences 

of zealous pursuit of claims. China has a strong interest in maintaining a healthy degree 

of stability in its relations with neighboring states, which Chinese policy makers believe 

is vital to maintaining an external environment congenial to its economic development. 

At the Sixteenth Party Congress (November 2002), the then Party leader Jiang Zemin 

introduced the concept of a “period of strategic opportunity.” He identified the first two 

decades of the twenty-first century as a time in which China would be able to focus on 

making itself strong and rich.168 Thus, while “rights protection” is extremely important 

to Chinese leaders, options to advance the country’s claims must be weighed against this 

emphasis on “maintaining stability” (维稳, weiwen) in China’s foreign relations.169 The 

decision to rely largely on coast guard forces backed up by the navy should be seen as a 

compromise between these two contradictory desires.

Bristling with armaments, naval warships are instruments and symbols of violence. The 

PLAN surface fleet has formidable combat capabilities, especially the modern platforms 

commissioned in the last five years. These vessels are equipped with missiles that can 

destroy targets well beyond the horizon, allowing them to influence foreign decisions 

even when they cannot be seen. Not surprisingly, this menacing aspect can exert a 

persuasive effect on a potential foe. However, it also can lead to risky escalation with a 

disputant who will not be cowed, and possibly armed intervention from a foreign great 

power. Moreover, relying too heavily on warships can undermine China’s efforts to craft 

an image of a state pursuing “peaceful development.”170 The PLA Navy is aware of the 

difficult balancing act it must perform. As then–ESF deputy commander Rear Adm. 

Zhang Huachen admitted, the PLA Navy “must both safeguard national interests from 

foreign violation and safeguard the stability of the overall situation. This is the Party’s 

policy. Fulfilling these requirements presents a great challenge to the navy.”171

Coast guard vessels, by contrast, are not typically instruments of war but of peacetime 

order. What armaments they possess have little or no utility on the modern battlefield. 

Yet in the peacetime struggle at sea they can perform a wide range of missions successfully, and can do so without the negative repercussions that would accompany 

reliance on the navy. In the words of one PAP analyst, “Unlike naval forces, the coast 

guard enjoys exceptional advantages. As a representative of the Chinese government, 

it can use any means aside from use of force to conduct vigorous rights-protection law 

enforcement.”172 Moreover, constabulary actions do not offer outside powers a pretext to 

intervene.173 According to a textbook published by a top Chinese maritime university, 

“Using maritime law-enforcement forces to safeguard maritime rights and interests 

provides the state with much more room for maneuver than if it used the navy, and is 

therefore more beneficial for protecting the national image.”174 As one PLAN analyst 
echelon defense 29

wrote, “[u]sing maritime law-enforcement forces to safeguard sovereignty allows the 

Party to avoid being criticized for ‘gunboat diplomacy’ and allows for protracted pressure to be exerted on the adversary.”175

The “rights-stability” concept also guides when and how Beijing elects to use sea power 

in disputed waters. It has led to the development of at least two stratagems for pursuing 

the former without jeopardizing the latter.

First, China tends to seize on the minor provocations of another disputant, using them 

as a pretext for a response of greater vigor than the original offenses themselves.176 As a 

result, the other state both is a net loser in the exchange and is cast as the instigator of increased tension. Macau University researcher You Ji calls this China’s “one-plus strategy.” 

Aside from Scarborough Shoal, the classic case is the 2012 Senkaku Islands imbroglio. 

The Japanese central government purchased three of the disputed islets from private 

owners to prevent the governor of Tokyo from doing so (and perhaps building on them). 

Thus, Japan was opting for the lesser of two evils. China’s response was far more escalatory. Immediately after the purchase transaction, PRC leaders initiated regular deployments of constabulary vessels to the territorial sea—operations intended to undermine 

Japan’s administration of the features.177

The one-plus stratagem is not acknowledged openly in Chinese sources. Rather, it is a 

theoretical construct that seems to fit the pattern of some PRC behavior. However, Chinese officials do admit openly the punitive nature of their approach. For instance, while 

speaking at a 2014 event, an SOA official said that it is China’s “principled stance” (原则

立场) to force states that provoke China to pay a “corresponding price” (相应的代价).178

Second, Chinese expansion takes place on the basis of proactive changes to the status 

quo. To avoid engendering instability, these actions often take place unobtrusively, 

resulting in a gradual undermining of other states’ claims. This preference for incrementalism is a widely recognized characteristic of China’s approach.179 For instance, while 

appearing on a current affairs program in July 2015, Shi Yinhong, a civilian researcher 

with close ties to the party-state, and Li Jie, an analyst from a PLAN research institute, 

agreed that China’s maritime dispute strategy in the South China Sea was described best 

as bubu weiying (步步为营)—“building fortifications after each new advance.”180

Not all decisions about how to handle China’s maritime disputes are made on the basis 

of strategy. Sometimes parochial interests may intrude on the policy-making process. 

For many years, Chinese maritime law-enforcement agencies vied with each other for 

influence and acclaim. Surely some decisions were made in the interest of advancing 

bureaucratic interests. To the extent that this thesis ever offered a plausible explanation for China’s seaward expansion since 2006—and the case never has been made 
30 china maritime studies

persuasively—the 2013 CCG reform should dampen local activism as a factor driving 

Chinese behavior at sea.181

To some degree, Chinese leaders are driven to act for the sake of domestic legitimacy— 

that is, the need to show the Chinese people that the Chinese Communist Party is 

defending the honor and interests of the Chinese nation. This factor is probably most 

salient when Chinese leaders are faced with a sudden incident with another state, especially a state that historically has “bullied” China (e.g., the United States and Japan).182 In 

such cases, Chinese leaders may experience some pressure to respond. However, because 

the Chinese Communist Party—operating through the Central Propaganda Department—has broad powers to decide which narratives are presented to the Chinese people, 

Chinese leaders are not nearly as vulnerable to domestic pressure as those in democratic 

states.183

The Functions of Sea Power in Chinese Dispute Strategy

Where expedient, China prefers to place maritime law-enforcement vessels on the 

front line in rights-protection operations,where they serve two primary functions: they 

manifest or embody China’s maritime claim; and they forcibly assert, or enforce, these 

claims through coercive actions at sea.184 With its modern combat capabilities, the PLAN 

surface fleet primarily operates on the second line, where it serves to discourage escalation. Both services perform the fourth major function of sea power in Chinese dispute 

strategy: intelligence collection.

Manifest China’s Claims. By being present in disputed waters, Chinese vessels embody 

or manifest China’s claims. Depending on the circumstances, presence can exert one 

or more political effects. First, it shows Chinese administration, thereby bolstering a 

narrative of Chinese ownership. Second, it demonstrates to other disputants China’s 

commitment to its claims. In this sense, Chinese presence operations are analogous to 

USN freedom-of-navigation “operational assertions.” Third, sending ships to contested 

areas to manifest China’s claims provides a means by which Beijing can exert pressure on 

other states to comply with its wishes. This pressure differs from a threat because it is an 

action that already has been taken. Its coercive value lies in another state’s desire for it to 

end. Both coast guard and naval forces perform operations that serve this function, but 

less-threatening coast guard cutters are often the preferred instrument.

Enforce China’s Claims. Chinese constabulary vessels and warships also may be tasked 

with forcibly asserting—or enforcing—China’s claims by directly vying for control 

in disputed areas. In such cases, Chinese ships serve as instruments of low-intensity 

conflict. This ability distinguishes surface vessels from other tools of national power. 

Chinese ships can threaten foreign vessels with a whole range of measures and can follow through on many threats, without using armed force. For instance, they can damage 
echelon defense 31

foreign vessels and endanger foreign crews by targeting them with powerful water cannon, destroying or confiscating equipment, and even bumping and ramming.185

Enforcing China’s claims is an end in and of itself; that is, it achieves the aim of exercising administrative control over Chinese-claimed waters, ensuring that China can enjoy 

the economic, security, and other benefits of that control. But doing so also serves 

political aims. In taking action, China follows through with threats, providing a fund 

of credibility for future threats. Forcibly asserting China’s rights to use and administer 

disputed waters is also a more coercive means of pressuring other disputants to comply 

with China’s wishes.

Operations to enforce China’s maritime claims are performed primarily by coast guard 

forces. There are, however, limits to the white-hull/gray-hull distinction. The PLAN surface fleet is far more active along China’s maritime frontier than commonly is assumed. 

Navy warships do not simply lurk beyond the horizon while coast guard and militia 

forces commit the actual acts of aggression. The PLA Navy has an enforcement function, 

and it sometimes performs it.186

Discourage Escalation. PLAN surface ships serve certain key functions that coast guard 

cutters cannot, because of their lack of modern armaments. When a surface vessel has 

real combat capabilities, its presence in disputed areas assumes a more menacing aspect. 

This ability not only to communicate but to follow through with threats makes naval 

forces superior instruments of deterrence. A warship conveys the will and ability to act if 

some redline is crossed.187

The PLAN surface fleet does not do this alone. Indeed, the full power-projection capabilities of the Chinese military as a whole constitute a latent threat to foreign leaders 

considering certain policy actions. However, the PLAN surface fleet’s ability to provide 

targeted threats by maintaining protracted, visible presence in an area under dispute 

distinguishes it from other forms of military power.188

Prior to 2006, there was little impetus for the PLA Navy to serve this deterrent function. 

Rather, the need has arisen from concern that the expansion of China’s own frontline 

activities might elicit an armed response. This important strategic dynamic is well 

recognized in Chinese sources. As one authoritative PLAN source put it, while patrolling 

disputed waters, the navy “shows the military’s resolve and capability to actively support 

rights-protection law-enforcement operations.”189 In a 2012 interview, senior CMS officer Sun Shuxian acknowledged that having coast guard and naval forces maintain close 

coordination is vital to ensuring that the former do not “get pushed around” (吃亏). In 

Sun’s words, “We must always maintain military deterrence. If a neighboring state uses 

force against one of our maritime law-enforcement vessels, it will suffer a devastating 

assault.”190
32 china maritime studies

The vehicle for PLAN presence in disputed waters is the “combat readiness patrol” (战备

巡逻).191 When conducted to deter foreign aggression against unarmed or lightly armed 

vessels, these operations are called “support and cover” (支援掩护).192 The most common PLAN approach for conducting this mission is to operate twenty to thirty nautical 

miles away from frontline coast guard forces, depending on the circumstances, prepared 

to intervene if necessary.193 This presence forms the second line in China’s echelon 

defense system.

In recent years, as the PLA Navy has expanded the geographic scope of its operations, 

these patrols have become one segment of longer missions that may take a task force 

beyond the first island chain into the Pacific Ocean. These missions are called “combat 

readiness patrols and far seas training” (战备巡逻远海训练). Chinese sources readily 

acknowledge their political importance. One such mission occurred from January to 

February 2014 and involved a PLAN surface flotilla comprising a Type 071 LPD (Changbaishan), a Type 052C destroyer (Haikou), and a Type 052B destroyer (Wuhan). The 

twenty-three-day voyage covered eight thousand miles, taking the formation through 

disputed waters in the South China Sea, into the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, 

and returning via the East China Sea. On arrival in Zhanjiang, the task force was met 

by the then PLAN deputy political commissar Vice Adm. Wang Sentai (王森泰) and 

the then PLAN political commissar, Adm. Liu Xiaojiang (刘晓江). In his speech, Wang 

stated that the mission had “fully demonstrated China’s resolve to safeguard national 

sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.”194

Aside from forward-presence operations, the PLAN surface fleet also communicates 

deterrence signals through military exercises. One noteworthy example took place in 

October 2012, during a tense period in China-Japan relations over the Senkaku Islands. 

The PLA Navy, China Marine Surveillance, and Fisheries Law Enforcement conducted 

a very public joint exercise in the East China Sea. In the exercise scenario, a coast guard 

ship was rammed by a foreign naval vessel in disputed waters. The PLA Navy was called 

to the scene to assist the damaged ship and protect Chinese administrative presence.195

The timing, location, content, and publicity of the exercise clearly suggest that the 

purpose was to signal Chinese resolve to dispatch the navy if Japan responded forcibly 

to China’s recent dramatic increase in coast guard patrols to the Senkakus. As one PLAN 

officer pointed out, “With this exercise, we amply showed China’s ability and determination to safeguard territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.”196

More recently, the Chinese fleet played an important signaling role in the days leading 

up to and following a legal decision that an UNCLOS tribunal issued on the validity of 

Chinese claims and the legitimacy of the country’s actions in disputed parts of the South 

China Sea. In late June and early July 2016, the Chinese military conducted a number 

of very public exercises in the South China Sea.197 The most important of these was a 
echelon defense 33

massive live-fire exercise that took place near the Paracels on July 9. Over one hundred 

ships and dozens of aircraft from all three fleets participated in a simulated great-power 

war at sea. The PLA Navy officially insisted this was a “routine exercise,” but Li Jie, a 

naval analyst at the PLA NRI, admitted that it was intended to “show China’s power and 

capabilities, send a warning to extraregional powers, and convey a serious statement to 

regional powers.” With the exercise, China “showed its resolve to defend maritime rights 

and interests and maritime territory.”198

If deterrence fails, the presence of PLAN surface vessels gives the PRC an option to 

respond immediately with force and ensure that China is not on the losing side of any 

armed clash. As one researcher at China’s National Defense University put it, placing the 

PLA Navy on the second line means that “any opponent with the audacity to escalate 

from contention between coast guards to a combat operation will suffer a catastrophic 

armed response from China.”199 In this context, the navy serves as a “backstop” (后盾) 

and provides “security guarantees” (安全保障) for the constabulary fleet as it operates 

on the front line.200

Not being the side to fire first is a much-emphasized part of the PLA identity. If force is 

used against Chinese state vessels, the PLA Navy would be expected to respond in kind. 

This principle often is captured in the phrase (first uttered by Mao Zedong) “If nobody 

attacks me, then I won’t attack. But if somebody does attack me, I must counterattack” 

(人不犯我, 我不犯人, 人若犯我, 我必犯人).201 Speaking in similar terms, Vice Adm. 

Huang Jiaxiang stated, “We’ll never fire the first shot, but if the other side fires the first 

shot, we will resolutely counterattack.”202 PLAN scholar Sr. Capt. Zhang Wei claims 

that China’s doctrine is to “never fire the first shot, but not to let the other side fire the 

second shot.”203

Even if one accepts that the “doctrine of the second shot” reflects PLA orthodoxy—and 

there is reason to believe that it may not—it may be applied cynically.204 For example, 

video footage of the March 1988 Johnson Reef conflict suggests that the PLA Navy 

goaded the Vietnamese to fire first, providing it with a pretext for what ultimately turned 

into a massacre of dozens of Vietnamese troops.205

Collect Intelligence. Intelligence operations indirectly contribute to China’s maritime 

dispute strategy by providing Chinese civilian and military leaders with a timely, accurate “picture” of foreign activities in disputed areas.206 Intelligence collection is a core 

mission of China’s constabulary forces. In a 2013 interview, a CMS officer acknowledged 

that when patrolling disputed waters, one of the service’s key functions is to monitor 

foreign infringements, a mission he euphemistically called “understanding what’s going 

on” (了解情况). If other states violate Chinese rights, Chinese law-enforcement entities 

“must be the first to know.”207 This mission often is framed in legal terms: tracking and 
34 china maritime studies

documenting the activities of foreign vessels and aircraft are described as “collecting 

evidence” (取证).

China Marine Surveillance had and the China Coast Guard now has special units called 

“rights-protection law-enforcement detachments” (one for each regional branch) to 

perform intelligence-collection functions. These detachments, set up in 2008, embark a 

handful of personnel on ships sailing to disputed waters. These personnel handle verbal 

communications with foreign mariners, document these encounters with photographs 

and video footage, file reports, and transmit information to commanders ashore.208

Intelligence collection, of course, is a very important function of PLAN surface vessels. 

When ships are at sea, they actively monitor and document all ships and aircraft they encounter, using data links to keep shore-based commanders fully apprised in real time.209

For instance, during a two-month-plus patrol to the Spratlys that began in August 2014, 

the PLAN frigate Huai’nan identified more than four hundred “suspicious targets.” This 

provided shore-based commanders with “accurate information” with which to make 

timely decisions.210

PLAN ships deploy analogues to USN “snoopy teams,” called “evidence-collection 

personnel” (取证员).211 In October 2013, the Chinese LST Jiuhuashan was on patrol 

when it discovered an unknown fishing vessel operating in “sensitive waters” in the East 

China Sea. The LST’s crew proceeded to track the foreign trawler, taking photos and 

video footage until it departed the area. The onboard “security officer” (保卫干事) then 

processed these materials and cataloged them as “evidence” of a foreign violation.212

This collection effort is an important component of the surface-fleet mission in disputed 

waters. However, the fleet is less effective than aviation assets such as unmanned aerial 

vehicles and fixed-wing aircraft—which can cover a much larger swath of ocean—and 

Chinese fishing vessels, which are far more numerous.213

China relies on coast guard and naval forces to defend and advance its position in its 

maritime disputes. Chinese leaders assign many frontline rights-protection missions 

to the unarmed or lightly armed constabulary fleet. These missions involve sailing to 

disputed waters to manifest and enforce China’s maritime claims. However, there are 

some functions that only warships can perform. Where activities in disputed areas risk 

a foreign response, China may deploy gray-hulled naval vessels to discourage escalation, influencing foreign decisions from afar. When forward deployed, units of both 

sea services actively collect intelligence on foreign activities in the air, on the water, and 

beneath the sea.

Decisions about how Chinese leaders use the country’s two sea services—which missions are performed, when, and by which service—reflect strategic considerations 
echelon defense 35

openly acknowledged in Chinese sources and suggested through patterns of behavior. 

Chinese policy makers seek to use the country’s growing power to diminish foreign 

influence over Chinese-claimed land and sea areas, but their decisions are constrained 

by another strong desire to maintain stability in China’s foreign relations. Chinese leaders have adopted at least two stratagems to enable the country to pursue rights better 

without jeopardizing stability. China’s most assertive behavior often comes in the wake 

of minor provocations from other states. Moreover, Beijing has opted for a gradualist 

approach, which some Chinese analysts describe as “building fortifications after each 

new advance.”

Table 4 outlines the four primary functions served by naval and coast guard forces in 

China’s dispute strategy.

Part 4: Echelon Defense

China’s naval and coast guard forces generally are arrayed in what Chinese strategists 

call an “echelon defense” posture. Maritime law-enforcement vessels perform most, but 

not all, frontline operations to manifest and enforce China’s maritime claims. The PLA 

Navy operates on the second line, where its presence serves to warn foreign leaders 

against responding forcefully to the assertive behavior of China’s frontline forces, and 

to intervene if deterrence fails. What follows is a close examination of the five primary 

frontline operations that Chinese forces perform: sovereignty patrol, blockade, tracking 

and monitoring, obstruction and eviction, and escort. Where possible, this analysis also 

includes data about the disposition of naval forces on the second line in China’s echelon 

defense approach, performing a sixth type of operation: support and cover.

Function Performed By Description

Manifest China’s 

maritime claims

Mostly CCG Maintain presence in disputed waters. Serves to

1. Uphold the narrative of Chinese ownership

2. Communicate China’s commitment to its claims

3. Pressure other disputants to comply with Chinese wishes

Enforce China’s 

maritime claims

Mostly CCG Forcibly assert PRC claims by using threats and nonlethal 

measures against foreign mariners operating “illegally” in 

Chinese-claimed waters. Serves to

1. Follow through with threats made by Chinese diplomats/

statesmen (to ensure the credibility of future threats)

2. Pressure other disputants to comply with Chinese wishes

3. Control Chinese-claimed waters

Discourage foreign 

escalation

PLAN only Maintain presence in disputed areas to convey a threat of 

consequences if another state escalates or intervenes

Collect intelligence Both services Track and report on foreign activities in Chinese-claimed areas

Table 4. The Functions of Sea Power in Chinese Dispute Strategy

Notes: CCG = China Coast Guard; PLAN = People’s Liberation Army Navy; PRC = People’s Republic of China.
36 china maritime studies

Sovereignty Patrol

Chinese coast guard and naval forces can influence island disputes through the conduct 

of two types of frontline operations. First, by sailing to waters adjacent to a disputed 

feature, Chinese forces can manifest Beijing’s claim to that feature. Such missions, herein 

called “sovereignty patrols,” serve a whole range of political functions, from bolstering 

a narrative of Chinese ownership to exerting pressure on foreign leaders. (As discussed 

in the next section, the PRC also uses sea power to blockade access to certain disputed 

features as a means to assert control over the features themselves.)

Whenever an element of the Chinese surface fleet approaches within twelve nautical 

miles of a disputed feature, this is a political act. The political objectives may differ, 

depending on the particular circumstances. Indeed, in any given case Chinese leaders no 

doubt seek to achieve more than one objective. Sometimes these sovereignty patrols take 

place during crises; more often they occur on the pretext of routine administration of 

“Chinese” sovereign territory.

China’s policy for managing its dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands relies very 

heavily on the sovereignty patrol. For decades, China’s claim to the features was almost 

entirely theoretical. Chinese diplomats told their Japanese counterparts that the islands 

were China’s. Chinese newspapers and textbooks stated this was the case. However, with 

very few exceptions, PRC authority never actually extended there.214

This changed in 2008, when Chinese leaders decided to establish an administrative presence near the features. In December of that year, two CMS cutters entered the territorial sea of the Senkaku Islands and lingered for some nine hours.215 In service lore, this 

operation is known as the “12-8 Patrol,” for the month and day on which it took place. 

The mission commander was instructed to “show presence, manifest jurisdiction, and 

declare sovereignty.”216

Unlike later sovereignty patrols to the Senkakus, the 12-8 Patrol was not framed as a 

reaction to some Japanese “provocation.” It occurred during a period of rapid expansion 

in Chinese coast guard presence in disputed waters. Like other such operations, the 12-8 

Patrol was conceived at least in part to communicate China’s commitment to its claim. 

More importantly, perhaps, the mission was seen as necessary to bolster the legitimacy 

of China’s position. Chinese decision makers likely had come to believe that China’s 

claim to the features was weakened by its total acquiescence to Japanese administration. Not long before the 12-8 Patrol took place, vice-commandant of China Marine 

Surveillance Sun Shuxian publicly explained, “Internationally, there are two customs 

[惯例] with respect to disputed waters. One is whether or not you have exercised effective management [over the disputed area] and the second is that effective control is 

superior to historical evidence. In our case, this area is ours, and it was so beginning 
echelon defense 37

with our ancestors. But this alone is of no use. One must show effective control. China 

Marine Surveillance must show presence and manifest jurisdiction in our jurisdictional 

waters.”217

During the two years following the 12-8 Patrol, no Chinese vessels sailed to the features.218 This changed in the wake of two crises, one in 2010, the other in 2012. On 

September 7, 2010, while piloting the 166-ton trawler Minjinyu 5179 near the Senkaku 

Islands, a Chinese fishing captain named Zhan Qixiong intentionally rammed his vessel 

into two JCG ships.219 Japan detained Zhan and his crew and impounded the vessel.

When it became clear that the Chinese fishermen would not be released immediately, 

the PRC responded by issuing formal protests through diplomatic channels and delaying bilateral meetings set to take place later that month.220 Japanese authorities released 

fourteen of the crewmembers and the trawler on September 13 and 14, respectively. 

However, the captain remained in custody and faced the possibility of prosecution, and 

perhaps jail time.

When Zhan’s detention was extended on September 19, China began taking moreforceful actions to pressure Japan to release him. PRC diplomats and statesmen publicly 

threatened serious consequences and suspended governmental exchanges. China also 

arrested four Japanese citizens working in China to dispose of World War II–era chemicals, charging them with espionage—a blatant act of hostage taking.221 It also may have 

enacted informal economic sanctions by halting the export of rare earths—inputs vital 

to the Japanese economy.222 Japanese officials released Zhan on September 24, openly 

acknowledging that PRC pressure tactics ultimately forced this decision.223

Chinese coast guard forces played a key role in China’s handling of the crisis. Immediately after Fisheries Law Enforcement learned of the disappearance of Minjinyu 5179, it 

sent two cutters (FLE 201 and FLE 202) to the area to guard Chinese fishing vessels still 

operating there.224 On Minjinyu 5179’s release, the ship sailed back to China under the 

escort of FLE 202 and two Chinese trawlers. Later in the month, when China sought to 

increase pressure on Japan to release Zhan Qixiong, it sent back FLE 201 and a second 

cutter, FLE 203, to waters just outside the territorial sea, this time with a Chinese reporter aboard to increase pressure on Japan and show Chinese citizens that the leadership was doing something.225

The biggest significance of the 2010 incident was not that Chinese actions at sea had 

effected the release of Zhan Qixiong. They did not; their use was just one tool of many 

that Chinese leaders employed to exert pressure on Japan. Rather, this event provided 

a pretext for establishing a larger administrative footprint near the Senkakus. An FLE 

official portended this outcome in a statement made in the days following Zhan’s release: 

“Going forward, Fisheries Law Enforcement will begin normalizing patrols to waters 
38 china maritime studies

near Diaoyu [Uotsuri] Island.”226 In the months following the incident, Chinese constabulary vessels indeed operated occasionally near the disputed features. For example, three 

FLE cutters sailed to waters near the Senkakus on October 24. In three instances—occurring in August 2011, March 2012, and July 2012—Chinese ships actually entered the 

territorial sea.227

An article that appeared in the SOA-owned China Ocean News in the days following the 

second of these intrusions sheds further light on the rationale for normalizing patrols 

to the Senkakus. Published under the byline of “maritime current affairs commentator 

Dong Mu” (a pseudonym), the article states that, given their status as representatives 

of the state, constabulary vessels allow China to “use positive action to reiterate China’s 

consistent position with respect to its sovereignty over Diaoyu Island and its associated 

islets.”228 The purpose of these operations, then, was to reinforce China’s claims through 

physical presence.

Real “normalization” of Senkaku patrols did not begin until September 2012, following 

a second crisis. As mentioned earlier, the Japanese central government purchased three 

of the disputed islets from private owners to preempt others from doing so—an action 

meant to preserve, not alter, the status quo. China responded with a dramatic expansion 

in the frequency of sovereignty patrols to adjacent waters, including the territorial sea.

To some extent, authoritative Chinese claims that these actions were aimed at sending 

a message to Japanese leaders—a declaration of “China’s firm determination to defend 

sovereignty and maritime rights and interests”—may be taken at face value.229 Japan’s 

“nationalization” of the Senkakus may have been perceived as an affront to Chinese 

leader Hu Jintao, who personally requested that Japan not take this measure.230 Moreover, Japan’s public denial of the existence of a territorial dispute no doubt gave impetus 

to the dispatch of Chinese vessels to prove the absurdity of this claim.231

However, Beijing’s asymmetrical response suggests that Chinese leaders were looking 

for a pretext to establish a firmer foothold in these waters. That is, this was a clear-cut 

example of the “one-plus strategy,” which the outcome of the Scarborough Shoal incident 

(just three months earlier) had shown to be a winning approach to dispute management. 

China’s biweekly coast guard patrols, which continue to this day, directly undermine 

Japan’s administration of the Senkakus, to the point that Japan now no longer exercises 

effective control.232

To date, only coast guard vessels have conducted sovereignty patrols to the Senkakus. 

Presumably, Chinese leaders have judged that naval presence in sovereign Japanese 

waters would cross a redline and risk conflict. However, Chinese naval vessels gradually 

are pushing the limit. In June 2016, for the first time, a PLAN surface combatant sailed 
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through the contiguous zone (i.e., the 12 nm belt just outside the territorial sea) of one of 

the islands.233

More importantly, the surge of coast guard presence near the Senkakus that began in 

September 2012 appears to have been accompanied by PLAN surface fleet deployments 

to signal a commitment to protect China’s new foothold. Chinese warships patrolled waters near the Senkakus through the worst of the crisis, and perhaps longer.234 Responding 

to a question about the PLA Navy’s role in the Senkaku dispute with Japan, Xing Guangmei, an analyst from a PLAN research institute, claimed, “The navy has adopted the 

common international approach, whereby maritime law enforcement is on the front line 

and naval forces are nearby patrolling and providing support and cover. Thus, whenever 

anybody sees China Marine Surveillance vessels patrolling on the front line, the navy is 

definitely nearby awaiting orders. Once our law-enforcement forces encounter danger, 

the navy will immediately be on its way to help.”235

China’s policies for using sea power as an instrument for handling the Senkaku dispute 

are influenced strongly by Japan’s status as a great power, allied to a superpower. China 

must be very careful that it does not cross a redline that results in an armed clash and 

perhaps even a regional conflict.

In the South China Sea, China faces no such adversary. Chinese surface vessels routinely 

conduct sovereignty patrols to many, if not most, of the disputed features in the South 

China Sea. Moreover, they do so without the need for the pretext of a foreign provocation. Chinese constabulary forces, lightly armed and operating on the basis of providing routine law enforcement, are particularly well suited for this type of operation. The 

vehicle for the CCG presence near disputed features is the “regular rights-protection 

patrol” (定期维权巡航).236

Sovereignty patrols to James Shoal merit special attention. This feature appears on Chinese maps and is depicted no differently from any other land feature. However, the shoal 

is submerged under roughly twenty meters of water. No artful distortion of international law can justify Chinese ownership of this section of seabed deep within Malaysia’s 

EEZ.237

And yet Chinese coast guard and naval vessels on occasion sail to these waters deep in 

the southern part of the South China Sea, hover above the shoal, hold oath-taking ceremonies, and sometimes drop stone sovereignty markers into the ocean.238 For instance, 

on the morning of March 26, 2013, sailors aboard the Type 071 LPD Jinggangshan held 

a ceremony on the ship’s flight deck in which they declared the following: “We are the 

sailors of the glorious South Sea Fleet. Here, facing the national flag at the motherland’s 

James Shoal, we solemnly swear to follow the command of the Party; be able to fight 

and win wars; be upright in behavior; plant roots in the South China Sea, do great deeds 
40 china maritime studies

in the South China Sea, and guard the South China Sea; resolutely safeguard national 

sovereignty; and work hard to achieve the dream of building China into a powerful 

country.”239

Chinese vessels conduct sovereignty patrols to James Shoal to assert China’s claim to 

these waters, which fall within the nine-dash line. Indeed, in the words of one authoritative source, the act of dropping a sovereignty marker allows China to “quietly express 

its strong will” to defend its sovereignty.240 However, there is at least one domestic factor 

driving these patrols. From childhood, Chinese citizens learn that James Shoal is “the 

southernmost extent of Chinese territory” (中国领土的最南端, or 中国领土的最南

点).241 If this narrative is to have any credibility, representatives of the Chinese state 

actually must go there from time to time. In this respect, then, Chinese ships serve to 

perpetuate a national myth.

Blockade

Scarborough Shoal proved that Chinese naval and coast guard forces have the ability to 

seize disputed land features without resorting to armed force. After the standoff ended 

in June 2012, Chinese coast guard forces physically began preventing Philippine fishing 

and constabulary vessels from accessing the shoal, daring Philippine leaders to escalate 

and American leaders to intervene.242 Neither did.

In the context of China’s peacetime dispute strategy, a blockade is a maritime operation 

designed to exercise control over a land feature by interdicting seaborne communications to that feature. Chinese ships rely on threats to discourage foreign vessels from approaching and, if necessary, resort to nonlethal measures to force them to depart. These 

may include bumping and firing water cannon.243

Even if armed force is not used, blockading foreign access to a disputed land feature is an 

extremely provocative act that easily could lead to the negative outcomes that Chinese 

leaders seek to avoid: an armed clash, a damaged reputation, and foreign intervention. 

The case of Scarborough Shoal suggests certain preconditions for success. These include 

a suitable pretext for action (in this case, the arrest of Chinese fishermen) and signs of 

passivity from other disputants and their allies.

These conditions were not present in early 2014, when China attempted to blockade 

Philippine access to another disputed feature, this time in the Spratlys. Second Thomas 

Shoal (also known as Ayungin Shoal and Ren’ai Shoal) is a teardrop-shaped feature 

located about one hundred nautical miles west of Palawan—well within the Philippine 

EEZ. It is fully submerged at high tide; therefore it is not entitled to a territorial sea. It 

sits in the shadow of China’s massive new installation at Mischief Reef, just twenty nautical miles to its west.
echelon defense 41

In 1999, a few years following China’s occupation of Mischief Reef, the Philippines 

grounded a World War II–era troop transport vessel (BRP Sierra Madre) at Second 

Thomas Shoal. Since then, it has stationed a tiny garrison of marines on the dilapidated 

hulk. The garrison is entirely reliant on regular resupply from Palawan by ship, making it 

very vulnerable to blockade.244

For years, the PRC approach consisted of verbal complaints. This changed in 2013, when 

Chinese maritime law-enforcement vessels first established a regular presence near 

Second Thomas Shoal in May of that year.245 However, as late as August, CCG vessels 

did little more than patrol and monitor the feature.246 Then, in March 2014, CCG ships 

attempted to prevent Philippine supply vessels from reaching Sierra Madre to replenish 

the garrison, escalating what had been a presence mission to the level of an enforcement 

operation.247

China’s attempted blockade failed. Philippine leaders clearly were committed to maintaining their foothold at the shoal. They had learned their own lessons from Scarborough Shoal, and since the Philippines actually occupied Second Thomas Shoal, more was 

at stake. Acting under the spotlight of the international press, Beijing proved unwilling 

to take the steps needed to halt Philippine access to the feature forcibly—i.e., bumping, 

ramming, and other types of soft force. The Philippines did not offer China the needed 

pretext for action. Moreover, it appears that in this case the United States took a more 

proactive approach to supporting its ally. For instance, the U.S. Navy deployed patrol 

aircraft to the area during supply runs to signal American opposition to the attempted 

blockade and to intimidate the coast guard forces implementing it.248

Since a contested blockade rests on continuous, vigilant presence and the willingness to 

use coercive measures if necessary, it is both expensive and risky. A political agreement 

that recognizes the new status quo is naturally far more preferable. Recent developments 

at Scarborough Shoal show how the pressure of successful enforcement coupled with 

economic and other inducements can lead to the political outcome Chinese leaders seek. 

The new Philippine administration of President Rodrigo Duterte has accepted PRC 

control over Scarborough Shoal and has sought accommodation on that basis. As part 

of a political détente between the two countries—which promises economic and other 

benefits for the Philippines—China began allowing some Philippine fishermen to access 

the feature in the second half of 2016. This was not a return to the status quo ante—China retains administrative control over the feature. But by making a small concession and 

offering modest inducements in the form of economic investment, it has gained tacit 

acceptance of this control, reduced tensions, and a total reorientation of the Philippines’ 

foreign policy toward closer ties with China and a corresponding downgrading in U.S.-

Philippine relations.249
42 china maritime studies

Tracking and Monitoring

China’s sea services help Chinese leaders defend and advance the country’s “maritime 

rights”—that is, the PRC’s claimed rights to use and administer certain sections of the 

ocean that it bases on China’s particular interpretation of international law. On the lower 

end of the escalation spectrum, they may track and monitor foreign “infringements,” an 

operation aimed at manifesting China’s claims and collecting intelligence. The primary 

targets are foreign fishing vessels and survey ships.

The East China Sea has been the setting for a number of such operations. For example, 

in July 2004 Japan began hydrocarbon exploration in the East China Sea, hiring the Norwegian surveying vessel Ramform Victory for the purpose. Since China claims resource 

and other maritime rights out to the Okinawa Trough (well east of the median line between its coast and Japan’s), it regarded these surveying operations as an infringement.250

PRC leaders called on China Marine Surveillance to deploy cutters to track and monitor 

developments and to engage in verbal harassment. These operations, which continued 

through 2005, apparently did not involve behavior that seriously threatened the safety 

of the ship and crew of Ramform Victory. According to Chinese sources, China Marine 

Surveillance conducted a total of 146 aircraft patrols (架次) and eighteen ship patrols 

(艘次), during which servicemembers recorded 807 minutes of video footage and 7,232 

photographs of Japanese “infringements” and communicated bridge to bridge more 

than five hundred minutes of verbal protest (喊话—literally, “yelling words”).251 These 

were the metrics that mattered. Such operations served to signal Chinese displeasure 

and to manifest physically China’s claim to jurisdiction over these waters.252 In the words 

of CMS officer Yu Zhirong, their purpose was to “show the attitude and position of the 

Chinese government.” 253

Obstruction and Eviction

Chinese naval and coast guard forces sometimes are authorized to impede the operations of foreign vessels in Chinese-claimed waters actively. In many cases, verbal 

threats—accompanied by the use of floodlights and loud sirens—are enough, especially 

when a threat is transmitted from the bridge of China’s larger and more menacing 

ships.254 When verbal threats fail to bring compliance, Chinese forces may take forcible 

measures to compel foreign ships to cease their activities. Chinese coast guard vessels are 

equipped with advanced water cannon that can reach targets up to one hundred meters 

away and damage sensitive ship hardware such as radar and communications equipment.255 Chinese ships also may threaten collision, and even may bump foreign vessels 

intentionally.256

Foreign fishing trawlers are the most common victims of these enforcement operations. 

Most such activities are conducted in the South China Sea, about which few fisheries 
echelon defense 43

agreements exist. China regularly “expels” (驱离 or 驱赶) Vietnamese fishing vessels operating near the Paracel Islands. In the Spratlys, China prevents foreign fishermen from 

using waters near Chinese-controlled features, but seldom in other areas.

Indeed, there remain large sections of the South China Sea in which foreign fishermen 

continue to operate unmolested. The great distance from the Chinese mainland, coupled 

with the vast area of ocean to be patrolled, has created practical challenges for Chinese 

law-enforcement forces operating there.257 Moreover, when Chinese forces compel a 

foreign fishing vessel to leave a given area, there is nothing to prevent it from returning 

or sailing to another area. China has not asserted exclusive fishing rights in all sections within the nine-dash line—at least, not yet. Lastly, China has yet to draw baselines 

around Scarborough Shoal or the Spratlys. Thus, it has no declared EEZ to enforce in 

these waters.

Both naval and coast guard forces impose Chinese prerogatives on foreign fishermen. 

Because managing fisheries is a classic constabulary role and because China seeks to 

avoid conjuring images of Chinese warships bullying tiny foreign fishing trawlers, coast 

guard cutters perform the bulk of the work. Prior to 2013, this chiefly had been the 

responsibility of Fisheries Law Enforcement; now it falls within the purview of the China 

Coast Guard as a whole.258

The PLA Navy also conducts these types of operations, presumably when coast guard 

vessels are absent. For instance, in February 2011 the Chinese frigate Dongguan fired 

three warning shots to evict a Philippine fishing vessel anchored at Jackson Atoll in the 

Spratlys.259 In September 2012, the PLAN frigate Shaoguan conducted a thirty-four-day 

patrol of the Paracels, during which it “investigated and expelled” (查证驱离) seventeen 

foreign vessels, probably all Vietnamese trawlers.260 On March 20, 2013, the Type 037 

subchaser Wanning pursued and fired on a Vietnamese fishing vessel operating near the 

Paracels.261

Foreign surveying vessels operating in Chinese-claimed waters are the second major 

target of Chinese surface-force operations. In 2011, CMS and FLE ships tracked and 

interfered with the operations of several surveying vessels hired by the Philippines 

and Vietnam. In March of that year, CMS 71 and CMS 75 drove away Veritas Voyager,

which had been operating near Reed Bank, north of the Spratlys.262 In May 2011, CMS 

84 cut the towed cable of Binh Minh 2, a surveying vessel owned by PetroVietnam, as it 

conducted surveys east of Nha Trang, in waters within the nine-dash line.263 Binh Minh 

2 suffered a similar fate in November 2012, in waters south of the Paracels. In June 2011, 

at least two FLE cutters conducted a joint operation with Chinese fishing vessels (probably piloted by militiamen) to destroy streamers that Viking II was towing as it surveyed 

waters off the southern coast of Vietnam (within the nine-dash line).264
44 china maritime studies

The PLA Navy also has targeted foreign surveying vessels. In 2012, the minesweeper 

Luxi encountered a Vietnamese surveying vessel under escort by three armed trawlers 

near Triton Island in the Paracels. Luxi outmaneuvered the trawlers and aggressively approached the surveying ship, forcing it to depart the area.265

Chinese forces also obstruct foreign surveying vessels operating in disputed waters in 

the East China Sea. Again, Chinese coast guard forces are the main protagonists in these 

missions. In February 2012, CMS 66 interfered with the operations of the unarmed JCG 

surveying ship Shoyo (HL 01) operating twenty nautical miles east of the Chunxiao gas 

fields. On the evening of February 19, the Chinese vessel threatened Shoyo by approaching within 0.3 nm, forcing it to halt its operations. The Japanese ship, accompanied by a 

second JCG vessel, Takuyo (HL 02), reportedly departed the area the next morning. This 

was one of at least three such incidents in the East China Sea between 2010 and 2012.266

Escort

Chinese coast guard and naval forces safeguard the economic activities of Chinese civilians—witting and unwitting actors in the country’s dispute strategy. Together, they assert 

China’s maritime rights, above all the right to exploit resources in the water and seabed. 

The fleet underwrites their activities by ensuring their safety and preventing foreign 

intimidation. Often, protection is provided by means of physically “escorting” (护航) 

Chinese vessels as they operate in disputed waters.

Chinese efforts to exploit disputed waters are driven to some extent by a desire to reap 

the material benefits that may accrue from these activities. That is, there is a profit motive for Chinese civilians who are bold enough to go to disputed areas and an economic 

incentive for the government to encourage them to do so.267 But clearly, Chinese leaders 

also support these initiatives because they are a means to manifest and enforce China’s 

claims. At an October 2012 maritime affairs conference in Hainan, then–SOA director 

Liu Cigui outlined this line of reasoning as follows: 

Hainan Province’s strategic position is extremely important. Earnestly safeguarding 

China’s rights and interests in the South China Sea involves China’s core interests. This is 

not just the responsibility of the State Oceanic Administration. It is also the sacred mission of Hainan’s leaders in the Party and government. We must . . . scientifically develop 

fisheries resources in the South China Sea, rationally develop the oil/gas resources in the 

South China Sea, and energetically develop marine tourism. We must pursue development 

and exploitation of marine resources in order to manifest China’s concrete presence in the 

South China Sea and manifest China’s sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea 

and their adjacent waters.268

Empowering Chinese firms to explore and develop oil and gas resources is a key prong 

in China’s dispute strategy. In May 2012, on the occasion of a drilling operation conducted by the newly built, deepwater, semisubmersible drilling rig CNOOC 981, an 
echelon defense 45

SOA-run newspaper quoted CNOOC chairman Wang Yilin as saying that the rig, which 

he called “movable national territory,” would “make new contributions to the advancement of China’s maritime power strategy and [efforts to] safeguard China’s maritime 

sovereignty.”269

This rationale no doubt motivated the rig’s first mission to disputed waters, in 2014. 

In May of that year, it was deployed south of Triton Island in the Paracels. Vietnam 

responded with vigor, sending coast guard and militia forces to harry its operations. 

Because of the expense of the rig and the scale and energy of Vietnam’s response, China 

was forced to employ dozens of cutters from several coast guard agencies to enforce an 

exclusion zone (警戒区) around it.270 The Chinese ships formed a protective perimeter, 

interposing themselves between the rig and the Vietnamese militia and coast guard ships 

seeking to approach it. They also engaged in aggressive maneuvering, including ramming Vietnamese vessels, sinking at least one.271 Chinese forces purposely targeted their 

powerful water cannon at the smokestacks and radar and other electronic equipment of 

the Vietnamese vessels. The fleet succeeded in preventing the Vietnamese vessels from 

reaching the rig—but it was a very expensive, complex, and risky undertaking.272

Smaller in scale but equally intense confrontations had occurred in these waters as early 

as 2006. In June 2007, for instance, several CMS cutters accompanied a Sinopec vessel 

as it conducted seismic surveys south of the Paracels. According to Chinese accounts 

and video footage, Vietnamese paramilitary vessels sailed in front and obstructed the 

movements of the Sinopec ship and its escorts. Ultimately, the CMS forces chose to 

ram the smaller Vietnamese vessels, a desperate act meant to reverse their own passive 

position.273

Chinese naval and coast guard ships also ensure the security of Chinese fishermen operating in disputed waters.274 The presence of Chinese fishermen helps manifest China’s 

maritime claims.275 As a commander at a PAP Border Defense Force unit based in a 

Hainan fishing village observed, “We should thank these fishermen, for if they weren’t 

fishing at Scarborough Shoal or the Spratlys, who could prove that these places are 

ours?”276 The Chinese government encourages their presence through subsidies (direct 

and in-kind) and direct payments, as well as salaries for seafarers serving in the maritime militia.277

Fishermen have been the cornerstone of Chinese dispute strategy in the South China 

Sea since at least 1985, when the PRC inaugurated a new policy known by the eightcharacter slogan “in developing the Spratlys, fishing should be first” (开发南沙, 渔业先

行).278 In the 1980s and ’90s, as Chinese fishermen began operating in the Spratlys and 

other remote sections of the South China Sea, some faced harassment and arrest by foreign military and law-enforcement forces.279 FLE and later CCG vessels patrolled these 
46 china maritime studies

waters to protect them.280 These patrols permit Chinese fishermen to operate anywhere 

within the nine-dash line, pledging to protect all who follow this rule.281 For instance, in 

April 2012, cutter FLE 310 was ordered to come to the aid of Chinese fishermen facing 

harassment from Vietnamese “gunboats” while operating just off Vietnam’s coast but still 

within the nine-dash line.282

To improve the effectiveness of coast guard protection of Chinese civilian mariners, in 

2006 China began funding a program to install Beidou satellite navigation/communication devices on fishing vessels, beginning with those boats operating in the eastern 

sections of the South China Sea. With this equipment, Chinese fishermen could keep 

Chinese authorities apprised of developments at sea and call for help when they came 

under threat. Since Fisheries Law Enforcement had far too few oceangoing cutters for 

them to be present in sufficient numbers, in late 2009 these ships began convoying fishing fleets to the more perilous sections of the South China Sea.283 Both of these efforts 

improved security for Chinese fishermen—but they also resulted in greater tensions with 

neighboring states.

Waters within the southernmost areas of the nine-dash line have been particularly 

prone to conflict over fishing rights. A large section of what Chinese fishermen call the 

“southwest fishing grounds” falls within Indonesia’s EEZ.284 When Indonesia attempts to 

enforce its coastal-state rights within these waters, incidents occur. For example, on May 

12, 2010, FLE 301 and 302 were ordered to rescue nine Chinese fishermen aboard a Chinese trawler on which an Indonesian naval vessel had fired. After steaming two hours to 

the scene, the Chinese commander thwarted the attack by placing his cutters between 

the trawler and the Indonesian ship, which elected not to respond with armed force.285

On June 23, 2010, a similar incident took place in these same waters in which FLE 303

and 311 interposed themselves between three Chinese fishing vessels and the Indonesian naval forces attempting to board them.286 In March 2013, FLE 310 was involved in 

another serious incident in the southwest fishing grounds: an Indonesian coast guard 

vessel detained a number of Chinese fishermen. FLE 310 subsequently tracked down 

and confronted the Indonesian ship and, through a combination of threats and possibly 

communication jamming, compelled the Indonesian forces to release their Chinese 

captives.287

In the first half of 2016, the Indonesian government began a campaign to crack down 

on Chinese fishing in these same waters. Three separate incidents took place in four 

months. In each case, the China Coast Guard failed to prevent the detention of the 

Chinese crews. When Indonesia used force against Chinese fishermen, China did not 

respond in kind.288
echelon defense 47

Chinese forces also escort Chinese fishermen operating in the East China Sea. Indeed, 

the September 2010 trawler collision near the Senkakus stemmed from a dispute over 

fishing rights, even if the original incident quickly evolved into a crisis over the land 

that generated those rights (i.e., the Senkaku Islands). The same is true of a more recent 

incident. In August 2016, twenty Chinese constabulary vessels—including a number 

of armed cutters from the former China Maritime Police—escorted a fleet of several 

hundred Chinese fishing trawlers to fishing grounds near the Senkaku Islands. Some 

fishing vessels and coast guard ships entered the Senkaku territorial sea. Japan did not 

attempt to remove the Chinese trawlers forcibly, opting instead to track and monitor 

their activities.289

This incident is noteworthy because it suggests how provocative actions in disputed 

areas may be driven by factors unrelated to the dispute itself. Chinese leaders may see 

maritime disputes as offering a means—or, in the words of a senior SOA analyst, “capital” (资产)—with which to pressure foreign leaders to amend or cease certain unrelated 

policies.290 One very well connected PLAN academic concluded that the August 2016 

Senkaku operation was designed to warn Japan of the possible consequences of insinuating itself further into the disputes in the South China Sea.291

If the use of force is out of the question, defending Chinese use of disputed waters is 

far more difficult than denying foreign use of the sea.292 When protecting an oil rig or 

surveying vessel, Chinese ships must position themselves between the assailants and 

their defenseless quarry, physically blocking foreign ships from approaching. The initiative clearly lies with the attacker. Chinese leaders learned this bitter lesson during the 

Date Description

March 20 A Chinese trawler was boarded by an Indonesian  sheries law-enforcement vessel, its 

crew taken into custody, and the ship towed back to port in the Natuna Islands. On 

the way, a CCG cutter freed the trawler by ramming.a

May 27 An Indonesian frigate boarded a Chinese trawler, detained the crew, and towed the 

vessel back to port in the Natuna Islands. A CCG ship arrived on the scene but did not 

intervene. The frigate initially  red shots that damaged the trawler.b

June 17 An Indonesian warship  red shots at several Chinese trawlers, injuring one crewman. 

One  shing vessel was impounded; another was damaged. A CCG cutter arrived on 

the scene but did not intervene.c

Table 5. China-Indonesia Fishing Incidents in 2016

Notes: 

CCG = China Coast Guard.

a. Ankit Panda, “Indonesia Summons Chinese Ambassador after South China Sea Stand-Off near Natuna Islands,” The Diplomat,

March 21, 2016, thediplomat.com/2016/03/indonesia-summons-chinese-ambassador-after-south-china-sea-stand-off-near 

-natuna-islands/; Jane Perlez and Yufan Huang, “Harrowing Trip for Chinese Trawler before Bump in Territorial Tensions,” New 

York Times, April 9, 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/04/10/world/asia/harrowing-trip-for-chinese-trawler-before-bump-in 

-territorial-tensions.html?_r=0.

b. Chandni Vatvani, “Indonesia Seizes Yet Another Chinese Vessel,” Channel News Asia, May 30, 2016, www.channelnewsasia 

.com/news/asiapacific/indonesia-detains-yet/2827122.html?cid=cna_flip_070214. See also Niniek Karmini, “South China Sea: 

Indonesian Navy Fires Shots, Seizes Chinese Fishing Boat,” Sydney Morning Herald, May 31, 2016, www.smh.com.au/world/

south-china-sea-indonesian-navy-fires-shots-seizes-chinese-fishing-boat-20160531-gp7s45.html#ixzz4ADUjENdb.

c. Jake Spring, Ben Blanchard, and Kanupriya Kapoor, “Indonesian Navy Fires on Chinese Boat, Beijing Says One Injured,” 

Reuters, June 19, 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-china-indonesia-ship-idUSKCN0Z50FG.
48 china maritime studies

2014 defense of CNOOC 981, when a few Vietnamese ships commanded by bold leaders 

pinned down large numbers of Chinese forces.

Given the great distances involved, protecting Chinese fishermen from foreign harassment remains a very difficult mission, even given recent increases in Chinese coast 

guard presence and the widespread use of Beidou hardware. Despite Chinese efforts, in 

May 2014 the Philippines succeeded in arresting eleven Chinese fishermen for poaching 

in disputed waters off Half Moon Shoal in the Spratlys.293

Chinese coast guard forces serve on the front line in operations intended to ensure 

the security of Chinese civilians in disputed areas. However, where the risk exists of 

provoking an armed response, PLAN surface combatants likely linger nearby, on the 

second line. China deployed surface combatants to the scene during the 2014 defense of 

CNOOC 981.294 Gray hulls were no doubt present during earlier clashes in these same 

waters. Because the presence of gray hulls communicates a quiet signal, these operations 

seldom are publicized, and therefore little is known about how frequently they occur.295

PLAN surface combatants probably seldom conduct frontline escort operations in disputed areas.296

Dispute Type Operation Type Primary Function(s) Surface Fleet Action

Island sovereignty

Sovereignty patrol Manifest China’s claims; 

collect intelligence

Sail to waters surrounding a disputed feature

Blockade Enforce China’s claims Prevent foreign access to 

a disputed feature

Maritime rights

Tracking and monitoring Manifest China’s claims; 

collect intelligence

Follow foreign vessels 

operating “illegally” in 

Chinese-claimed waters; 

urge them to leave

Obstruction and eviction Enforce China’s claims Use nonlethal measures 

to force foreign vessels 

to cease “illegal” activities and depart Chineseclaimed waters

Escort Enforce China’s claims Use nonlethal measures 

to prevent foreign vessels from obstructing 

the “legal” operations 

of Chinese civilians in 

Chinese-claimed waters

Both Support and cover Discourage escalation; 

collect intelligence

Sail to and linger in 

disputed waters; signal 

a threat to use force to 

protect Chinese vessels; 

be prepared to act on 

that threat

Table 6. Major Operation Types in China’s Echelon Defense Strategy
echelon defense 49

In China’s echelon defense approach, elements of Chinese sea power operate on two 

lines. Frontline operations involve efforts to manifest and enforce China’s maritime 

claims. They include operations that often, although not exclusively, are conducted by 

China’s maritime law-enforcement forces. There are five major types: sovereignty patrol, 

blockade, tracking and monitoring, obstruction and eviction, and escort. Second-line 

operations—the exclusive province of PLAN surface combatants—serve to discourage 

escalation by providing “support and cover” for frontline forces, whose assertive actions 

sometimes risk an armed response from other disputants. Together, these six operations 

constitute the “grammar” of the saltwater component of China’s dispute strategy.

Part 5: New Frontiers

When examined over time, China’s use of the echelon defense approach in its maritime 

disputes suggests a vigorous but politically sensitive campaign to turn the country’s 

claims into reality. By many measures, this campaign has been extremely successful: Chinese ships are sailing to places they seldom, if ever, went before; the density of Chinese 

presence in disputed waters has increased dramatically; and China has converted this 

presence into increased influence and control. Most importantly, China has achieved 

these gains while avoiding the instability that would accompany a campaign that relied 

on more-overt forms of military aggression. Part 5 assesses China’s seaward expansion 

during the period 2006–16 and examines the key decisions that guided that expansion. It 

concludes with a discussion of the political and strategic costs China incurs by its use of 

the echelon defense approach as a tool in its dispute strategy.

Increased Presence

Over the last decade, the presence of Chinese coast guard and naval forces in disputed 

waters has grown at an astonishing rate. This is immediately evident when deployment 

patterns in 2006 are compared with those of 2016. In 2006, among China’s many maritime law-enforcement agencies, only the national-level units of China Marine Surveillance and Fisheries Law Enforcement operated in disputed areas. Both, however, did so 

only rarely.

In the East China Sea, early 2006 saw China begin production at the Chunxiao gas 

fields.297 Although Chinese production facilities were located in undisputed waters 

west of the median line, Japan opposed them because they exploited reserves that may 

straddle the Japanese-claimed maritime boundary. Thus, CMS vessels patrolled these 

waters to ensure security.298 In the middle of 2006, as the result of a State Council decision (discussed below), the service began maintaining a more regular presence in the 

East China Sea; but this presence probably seldom extended east of the median line, and 

certainly never into waters adjacent to the Senkaku Islands. For its part, Fisheries Law 
50 china maritime studies

Enforcement was in the sixth year of systematic EEZ fisheries patrols (专属经济区渔政

巡航), which included missions within the large joint-fisheries zone in the East China 

Sea.299 However, there is no evidence that its cutters deployed to other disputed areas in 

the East China Sea, such as those in the vicinity of the Senkakus.300

In 2006, PLAN surface combatants probably rarely, if ever, patrolled contested parts of 

the East China Sea. In January 2005, two Sovremenny-class destroyers had sailed to the 

Chunxiao gas fields, purportedly the first time the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force 

had observed these advanced (by contemporary PLAN standards) vessels.301 In September 2005, five Chinese surface combatants patrolled another controversial gas field 

near the median line. However, there is no evidence that PLAN warships systematically 

ventured into disputed waters.302 Indeed, in 2006 the PLA Navy had not yet begun to 

conduct “far seas” training regularly, which meant the fleet had no opportunity to transit 

contested areas on the way into the western Pacific via the Miyako Strait. Surface combatant training beyond the first island chain would not occur until 2007.303

Aside from those to the Paracels—islands that are close to the mainland and entirely 

under PRC control—Chinese patrols to disputed waters in the South China Sea were 

extremely rare in 2006. CMS cutters maintained no regular presence near Scarborough 

Shoal or in the Spratlys—that would not happen until 2007 or 2008. For its part, Fisheries Law Enforcement kept a single lonely cutter at Mischief Reef. Chinese fishing vessels 

operating elsewhere in the Spratlys were largely on their own, and sometimes paid a 

price for this absence of Chinese power.

The PLA Navy maintained tiny outposts at the handful of PRC-occupied features in 

the Spratlys. The available information does not indicate the extent of PLAN surfacecombatant presence in these areas, but it was probably quite low.304 In this period, PLAN 

warships were not yet sailing through the Strait of Malacca into the Indian Ocean—it 

would be another two years before China sent its first escort task force to the Gulf of 

Aden. Nor did the service send ship formations through the Bashi Channel for “far seas” 

training; again, that would not happen until 2007. To summarize: in 2006, the PLAN 

surface fleet rarely was seen in the South China Sea, aside from waters adjacent to the 

Paracels.

The next decade would witness an utter transformation in PLAN and coast guard operations in the East and South China Seas. In 2016, at two-week intervals Chinese constabulary vessels sailed in formations of three to five ships to the Senkaku Islands, where 

they routinely entered the territorial sea. Most of these ships displaced at least three 

thousand tons; beginning in December 2015, many formations included at least one 

armed cutter. The vast majority of Chinese coast guard vessels operating in disputed waters in the East China Sea now answered to a single chain of command under a unified 
echelon defense 51

maritime law-enforcement agency (the China Coast Guard), with all the improvements 

to coordination this implies. However, some ships operating east of the median line were 

owned by China’s provincial maritime law-enforcement agencies, which in 2006 were 

not authorized or equipped to participate in the “rights-protection” struggle.

Ten years later, PLAN surface combatants regularly were conducting “combat readiness 

patrols” to sensitive areas of the East China Sea.305 Many of their operations probably 

took them east of the median line, within striking distance of the Senkakus, so they could 

provide “support and cover” for the Chinese coast guard’s frequent patrols there. In 2016, 

PLAN ship formations regularly steamed through the Miyako Strait for “far seas” training, including, in December of that year, China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning.

306

In the South China Sea, changes in the geographic scope and density of the Chinese 

surface-vessel presence were equally pronounced. CCG vessels—including some armed 

elements of the former China Maritime Police—now conducted regular patrols to all 

areas within the nine-dash line. Painted in CMS and FLE colors and pennant numbers, 

large cutters from provincial and even municipal coast guard agencies now contributed 

to the guarding of China’s maritime frontier.

In 2016, China kept a permanent constabulary presence at Scarborough Shoal and the 

Luconia Shoals. When operating in the eastern and southern sections of the South China 

Sea, Chinese coast guard forces could seek shelter and support at enormous new facilities at Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and, above all, Mischief Reef, from which they easily 

could monitor the tiny contingent of Philippine marines at Second Thomas Shoal.307

The PLA Navy, too, by then was crisscrossing the South China Sea regularly. By the 

end of 2012, the PLA Navy had “normalized” (常态化) its presence in the Spratlys, 

and perhaps in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal.308 In 2016, Chinese warships were so 

numerous that they could afford to shadow USN ships during their patrols in the South 

China Sea.309 Massive new facilities at Chinese-occupied features in the Spratlys ensured 

excellent support for increased presence in these waters. Unlike in 2006, PLAN ships 

now regularly sailed through disputed waters in the South China Sea on their way to 

other places, either the Indian Ocean via the Malacca Strait to fight piracy in the Gulf of 

Aden, or the western Pacific via the Bashi Channel for “far seas” training.

Increased Enforcement

In large parts of the East and South China Seas, China’s maritime claims were almost 

purely theoretical in 2006. Since then, Chinese vessels have established a regular presence in all three million square kilometers of Chinese-claimed waters. China’s sea 

services also have led new efforts to use threats to enforce China’s maritime claims, 

sometimes in the face of foreign resistance. Whereas expanded Chinese presence can be 
52 china maritime studies

traced to 2006, the majority of known enforcement operations have occurred since 2010. 

What has China gained?

In the East China Sea, the Chinese coast guard, backed up by the PLA Navy, effectively 

underwrites Chinese civilian use of disputed areas. Chinese fishermen now operate with 

impunity in all Chinese-claimed waters in the East China Sea, including in the territorial 

sea of the Senkakus. Chinese gas production operations along the median line continue unabated, and even have expanded in recent years, although not yet into disputed 

areas.310 With its regular patrols to the Senkakus, the Chinese coast guard has turned 

the disputed islets into a no-man’s-land for either side.311 Japanese fishing rights in the 

disputed sections of the East China Sea still are respected, the joint fisheries agreement 

remaining in effect. However, were Japanese ships to resume surveying in Chineseclaimed waters east of the median line, they likely would face harassment and obstruction from the Chinese coast guard. No such operations have been attempted since 2012.

China likewise has achieved major gains in the South China Sea over the last decade. 

Since mid-2012, Chinese sea power has enforced Chinese sovereignty claims to Scarborough Shoal. A similar attempt at Second Thomas Shoal in 2014 failed, but a more tractable administration under President Duterte, combined with the fragility of the current 

Philippine occupation, obviates the need for further action—the crumbling Sierra Madre

soon could be the victim of time and tide.

Chinese fishermen now sail securely in large swaths of the South China Sea. With one 

exception in May 2014, Chinese fishermen operating in the Spratlys have not been 

harmed or arrested in years.312 Speaking in August 2014, the head of a Hainan-based 

fishermen’s association could report as follows: 

Over the past year, our biggest sentiment is that we feel much safer. Not only have 

maritime law-enforcement patrol vessels strengthened their patrols, the government has 

installed Beidou navigation systems on every fishing vessel at no cost. No matter where we 

go, the command center knows where we are. No matter what kind of problem arises at 

sea, as long as we inform the relevant department, a maritime law-enforcement ship will 

quickly arrive on the scene. As long as we request it, they send help.313

China’s fisheries-escort operations have been less successful in the more remote sections 

of the South China Sea. Since late 2009, Chinese coast guard vessels have escorted Chinese trawlers to waters within Indonesia’s EEZ.314 These missions succeeded in keeping 

Chinese fishermen safe, even though they resulted in incidents in 2010 and 2013. In the 

first half of 2016, Indonesia forcefully contested Chinese fishing activities in its EEZ, 

arresting Chinese fishermen in clear view of Chinese coast guard forces. However, since 

then the China Coast Guard may have tightened its escort operations: no such incidents 

occurred in the first half of 2017, despite Indonesia’s continued commitment to enforce 

its EEZ rights near Natuna.315
echelon defense 53

Since at least 2006, Vietnam has contested vigorously the deployment of oil/gas exploration vessels to waters near the Paracels. China has the technical means to exploit seabed 

resources in disputed waters, but the CNOOC 981 incident shows the limits of China’s 

echelon defense approach when exercised against a committed foe. At the time of this 

writing, China has yet to begin oil/gas production in any contested areas of the South 

China Sea.

In recent years, China has cracked down on Vietnamese fishing activities in the Paracels, 

although the degree of enforcement tends to track the peaks and troughs of SinoVietnamese relations.316 As long as they do not venture too close to Chinese-controlled 

features, foreign fishermen appear to be able to operate freely in most other disputed 

areas in the South China Sea. Still, the fear of encountering a Chinese coast guard cutter 

on the open ocean no doubt has had a dampening effect on some foreign fishing activities. China’s presence near the Luconia Shoals, for example, purportedly has scared away 

Malaysian fishermen, even though it appears that Chinese cutters are not enforcing fully 

Chinese sovereignty claims in these waters.317

Decision Points

Over the last decade, China has pursued its claims in the East and South China Seas 

with ever-increasing vigor. Relying on sea power coupled with other instruments of 

statecraft, China has expanded the frontiers of its control and influence within the first 

island chain. This expansion is understood best as an outcome of four major decisions, 

all made or endorsed by leaders at the most senior levels of government.

The first was to establish a constabulary presence in all Chinese-claimed waters. This 

can be traced to July 2006, when then-premier Wen Jiabao approved a new policy 

requiring CMS ships to conduct “regular” (定期) rights-protection patrols in Chineseclaimed waters in the East China Sea.318 Chinese leaders subsequently decided to expand 

patrols to other areas. By the end of 2007, the service could claim a “comparatively high 

degree” of rights protection in all waters over which China claimed jurisdiction.319 By the 

end of 2008, China Marine Surveillance stated that it had regularized rights-protection 

patrols to all jurisdictional waters, “from the Yalu River to James Shoal.”320 This expansion included the inaugural Senkaku patrol in December of that year.321

The regular rights-protection patrol system led to a geographic expansion in coast guard 

presence in Chinese-claimed waters. Over time, it also meant an increase in the concentration of Chinese cutters in disputed waters. By 2012, China Marine Surveillance was 

maintaining at least nine ships constantly at sea, with at least six patrolling the waters of 

the South China Sea.322 Aggregate numbers of patrols increased tremendously over the 

2008–12 period. In 2008, CMS ships performed 113 regular rights-protection ship patrols, sailing a total of 212,242 nm.323 But by 2012, China Marine Surveillance conducted 
54 china maritime studies

172 ship patrols covering 172,000 nm just in the South China Sea alone.324 In 2013, the 

last year such numbers were released, China Marine Surveillance as a whole conducted a 

total of 347 rights-protection patrols (543,652 nm).325

Chinese leaders placed special emphasis on patrolling “waters in which rights infringements take place most frequently.”326 According to one pseudonymous article published 

in an SOA-run newspaper, “the more controversial the waters and the more sensitive the 

place, the greater the focus of China Marine Surveillance patrols. This is the responsibility of China Marine Surveillance regular rights-protection patrols. In the future, we will 

continue to strengthen this [approach].”327

The newly created China Coast Guard has assumed the rights-protection duties of China 

Marine Surveillance and Fisheries Law Enforcement.328 It has carried on the regular 

patrols to the Senkakus that began in September 2012, generally maintaining the same 

tempo, albeit with more and larger vessels performing each mission.329 The China Coast 

Guard also has expanded maritime law-enforcement presence to new areas, especially 

in the South China Sea. In August 2013, for instance, CCG ships began “patrolling and 

monitoring” (巡航监控) the waters adjacent to the North and South Luconia Shoals, 

tiny features roughly ninety nautical miles from the coast of Malaysia and well within its 

EEZ.330 By early 2015, the character of these patrols had become something much more 

permanent: “keeping watch” (值守), the same term used to describe Chinese operations 

near Second Thomas Shoal.331 Indeed, automatic identification system (AIS) data indicate 

that CCG vessels are now stationed at the Luconia Shoals on a near-permanent basis.332

The second key decision, discussed in detail in part 2, was to increase vastly the size and 

capabilities of the Chinese fleet. This was actually a series of decisions made between 

2009 and 2012, with each new decision more ambitious in scope and scale. Chinese leaders made these decisions as the rights-protection campaign unfolded and they discovered what could be gained from adroit use of sea power.

The third key decision was to convert China’s new presence in disputed waters into a 

commitment actually to enforce some of China’s claims, where possible. This decision 

to begin vying with other states for control can be documented in the available sources. 

For example, the “Outline Plan for National Maritime Development (2006–2010),” 

a foundational policy document that the State Council approved in February 2008, 

contains numerous mentions of China’s need to safeguard maritime rights and interests. 

To do so, it recommended that China “strengthen its monitoring and management [监

管] of jurisdictional waters.”333 Sometime in the subsequent three years, however, this 

call for “monitoring and management” was replaced or supplemented by the language of 

control.
echelon defense 55

In publicly available discourse, this new focus can be traced to 2011.334 Soon after he 

became SOA director in February 2011, Liu Cigui announced that his organization’s 

aims for 2011 included “strengthening control over jurisdictional waters” (强化管辖

海域的控制力).335 CMS leaders actively spread this new message.336 National planning 

documents also recognized the new goal. In March 2012, the State Council approved a 

document called “National Maritime Functional Zoning (2011–2020),” which outlined 

preferred zones of economic activity in China’s claimed jurisdictional waters. Among 

other things, this document charged local and national government entities with responsibility for “creating, according to the law, a system of comprehensive administrative 

control over all of China’s jurisdictional waters.”337

The language of control now dots official discourse. It appears in the text of the Twelfth 

Five-Year Plan for Maritime Development, released in April 2013. Like the “Outline Plan 

for National Maritime Development (2006–2010)” that it supersedes, this document 

repeatedly cites the need to safeguard maritime rights and interests. However, unlike the 

earlier document, it calls for China to “strengthen effective control over jurisdictional 

waters” and “raise the capacity to achieve administrative control” over disputed areas.338

The language of control now is invoked often in discussions about China’s strategy to become a “maritime power” (海洋强国).339 At the January 2013 National Maritime Work 

Conference in Beijing, Xu Shaoshi, head of the Ministry of Land and Resources, stated 

that if it is to become a maritime power, “China’s struggle for maritime rights and interests must be strong and effective and it must do more to strengthen its ability to exert 

administrative control over the ocean.”340 Indeed, during an interview at the time of the 

Eighteenth Party Congress, then–SOA director Liu Cigui defined a “maritime power” as 

a state that “has formidable comprehensive power with respect to developing the ocean, 

exploiting the ocean, protecting the ocean, and controlling the ocean.”341

Such discourse finds parallels in the writings of officers in the PLA Navy, suggesting 

that this policy decision was endorsed by senior leaders within the party-state. In an 

August 2014 speech commemorating the 120th anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese 

War, then–PLAN commander Wu Shengli wrote that in the face of growing discord in 

the near seas, China must “continuously strengthen administrative control over claimed 

waters.”342 In a very important March 19, 2014, article in the navy’s official newspaper, 

Rear Adm. Zhang Zhaoyin, then deputy commander of the South Sea Fleet, described 

China’s approach to handling its maritime disputes in his area of responsibility. Admiral 

Zhang cited “administrative control” as the goal and outlined how his service would 

help take the initiative to achieve it. Zhang called for closer cooperation with maritime 

law enforcement. China would have to build up its maritime law-enforcement forces, 

which in his view were still too weak. As it did so, China must “continually augment the 

strength of its administrative control and rights protection within the South China Sea, 
56 china maritime studies

gradually achieving effective administrative control over Chinese jurisdictional waters in 

the South China Sea.”343

The fourth decision was to be less compromising. This new attitude is implied by the 

three decisions discussed above. However, in 2012 there seems to have been a more 

fundamental shift, one that Xi Jinping endorsed personally. This new reluctance to 

compromise is captured in an oft-repeated Xi Jinping quote, which succinctly expresses 

the Xi Jinping doctrine for handling China’s maritime disputes: “We love peace, and will 

continue to take the path of peaceful development, but we absolutely cannot give up our 

legitimate rights and interests, much less sacrifice core national interests.”344

This shift may have been prompted by a sincere (albeit delusional) belief that China’s 

earlier efforts at conciliation had gone unreciprocated. As one Chinese analyst wrote 

about this sense of disappointment, “It was regrettable that our good-hearted hopes were 

frequently ignored, that our friendly attitude was seen as a loophole to be exploited.”345

Perhaps reflecting the mainstream view, one researcher at the PAP Academy claimed 

that Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “keeping a low profile” (韬光养晦) actually “caused 

China’s maritime territory and maritime rights and interests to be repeatedly gobbled 

up by neighboring states.”346 America’s growing involvement in East Asian affairs as part 

of the “rebalance to Asia”—inevitably interpreted to be an enhanced form of American 

“containment” of China—reinforced the PRC’s belief that more action was called for.

Chinese leaders and analysts see this decision to be less compromising as a fundamental 

shift in how the regime balances the two contradictory objectives of rights and stability. 

As the director of the SOA’s Department of International Cooperation, Zhang Haiwen, put 

it in a September 2014 speech, China’s current maritime dispute policy “is not like in the 

past when China simply said that the big aim was a stable periphery, and that everything 

else must yield to stability. In my view, for 10–20 years stability maintenance held the 

dominant position. But in recent years, China has balanced this out, meaning that stability 

maintenance and rights protection are now in a dynamic equilibrium [动态平衡].”347

The Costs of Coercion

If seen as a military campaign to control space, China’s echelon defense strategy has 

achieved much in the last ten years. The PRC has undermined foreign control over 

disputed land features and strengthened its influence over human activity in disputed 

waters. However, these gains have not come without costs.

While China has avoided armed conflict with other disputants, the success of its strategy 

nevertheless has antagonized and alienated its neighbors.348 In response, they have 

sought better relations with China’s rivals. Since 2010, Japan has bolstered its relationship with the United States, in large part as a response to assertive Chinese behavior 

in the East China Sea. In April 2014, the United States and the Philippines signed the 
echelon defense 57

Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, allowing the U.S. military wider access to 

Philippine military installations.349 Both the Philippines and Vietnam have turned to 

Japan to provide material support in the form of coast guard cutters.350 In the end, the 

very success of China’s echelon defense approach has spurred a foreign response that 

ultimately could lead to a diminution of China’s sense of security.

Moreover, Chinese actions have spawned fear and suspicion in the United States, the 

only state powerful enough to tip the scales against China. While America is not a disputant, Chinese actions raise grave concerns about the future of American access to the 

waters of East Asia. Chinese naval and coast guard forces currently represent a modest 

but very real threat to American freedom of navigation. To date, Chinese efforts to impede U.S. naval operations in these waters largely have centered on defenseless specialmission ships such as USNS Impeccable, Effective, Victorious, Loyal, and Bowditch, which 

routinely operate within the first island chain.351 Harassment directed against these ships 

largely has taken place in undisputed waters, and has been fairly rare.352 However, China 

never has renounced its opposition to the presence of U.S. naval vessels in Chineseclaimed jurisdictional waters, and it continues to differentiate between commercial 

freedom of navigation (legitimate, welcome) and the freedoms of foreign naval vessels 

(illegitimate, unwanted). American strategists therefore cannot discount the threat of 

future incidents.

As China consolidates control over disputed areas, the waters within which American 

ships might face obstruction and other threats will continue to expand. Moreover, now 

that China has built major military bases in the Spratlys, special-mission ships—and the 

forces that would come to their rescue in any incident—must worry about the presence 

of significant Chinese combat power at their rear.353 In sum, although largely directed 

against other states, PRC actions have primed the United States to play a more active role 

balancing against China’s seaward expansion and to strengthen its ability to threaten and 

destroy Chinese forces at sea—outcomes that bring into question the ultimate worth of 

China’s echelon defense approach.

Since 2006, China has enlarged dramatically the geographic frontiers of its influence 

and control in the near seas of East Asia. It has done this in large part through adroit use 

of unarmed or lightly armed constabulary vessels backed up by Chinese navy surface 

combatants, in what Chinese strategists call an echelon defense approach. Application 

of this approach has expanded and intensified over time, the result of at least four major 

decisions by senior Chinese leaders. These include decisions to establish a regular constabulary presence in all Chinese-claimed waters, to invest heavily in new surface vessels 

for both the coast guard and the navy, to convert passive presence in disputed areas into 
58 china maritime studies

a national effort to vie for control over space, and to be less compromising toward other 

disputants. When viewed as a campaign to assert Chinese claims, the echelon defense 

approach has been quite effective. However, its successes have come at the cost of damaged relations with its neighbors and the United States. Already the fears and suspicions 

that PRC actions at sea have spawned are driving policies certain to erode the foundations of PRC prosperity and security that have stood for close to forty years.

Notes

1. A Border Defense Force duty officer who 

received the message from the threatened 

Chinese fishermen passed this information up 

the chain of command. His superiors contacted 

the South China Sea China Marine Surveillance 

Command Department in Guangzhou, which 

ordered the two nearby CMS vessels to the 

scene. As events unfolded, the CMS Command 

Center in Beijing took direct command of the 

two CMS cutters involved in the incident. See 

龙泉 [Long Quan], 理性看待中菲黄岩岛对峙

[“Rationally Examining the Scarborough Shoal 

Confrontation”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean 

News], April 20, 2012, p. 4. See also 张杰, 闫昆

仑 [Zhang Jie et al.], 黄岩岛事件中的 “第一

哨站” [“The ‘First Outpost’ of the Scarborough 

Shoal Incident”], 海南日报 [Hainan Daily], July 

22, 2012, p. 3, available at epaper.southcn.com/ 

.nfdaily/html/2012-07/22/content_7106588.htm; 

and 许春媚 [Xu Chunmei], 海南潭门边防派

出所: 曾上报黄岩岛事件首份信息 [“Tanmen 

Hainan Border Defense Duty Station: It Passed 

on the First Messages during the Scarborough 

Shoal Incident”], 海南日报 [Hainan Daily], 

July 5, 2012, available at www.chinanews.com/

gn/2012/07-05/4009968.shtml. These two 

sources were first cited in Conor M. Kennedy 

and Andrew S. Erickson, “Model Maritime 

Militia: Tanmen’s Leading Role in the April 2012 

Scarborough Shoal Incident,” Center for International Maritime Security, April 21, 2016, cimsec 

.org/model-maritime-militia-tanmens 

-leading-role-april-2012-scarborough-shoal 

-incident/24573.

2. Xu Chunmei, “Tanmen Hainan Border Defense 

Duty Station.”

3. Floyd Whaley, “Philippines and China in a 

Standoff at Sea,” New York Times, April 12, 2012, 

query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C

05E1D91431F931A25757C0A9649D8B63. An 

FLE vessel stationed 340 nm south at Mischief 

Reef also was ordered to the scene, but it did not 

arrive until the next day. See 韩永 [Han Yong], 

and 关向东 [Guan Xiangdon], 对峙黄岩岛

[“Confrontation at Scarborough Shoal”], 中国新

闻周刊 [China Newsweek], May 14, 2012, p. 28.

4. For an earlier authoritative report on this 

encounter, see 孙安然 [Sun Anran], 中国海

监在黄岩岛保护我被困渔船 [“CMS Protects 

Chinese Fishing Vessels Trapped at Scarborough 

Shoal”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], April 

13, 2012, p. 1.

5. Some evidence suggests that the confrontation 

took place “within the missile envelope” (在海

军导弹的射程之内) of at least one PLAN surface combatant. Han Yong and Guan Xiangdon, 

“Confrontation at Scarborough Shoal,” p. 28.

6. Indeed, several of the original vessels involved 

in the incident were operated by components 

of China’s maritime militia. They later returned 

to the shoal to take part in the standoff. See Kennedy and Erickson, “Model Maritime Militia.”

7. See Brian Spegele, “Rhetoric Rises on South 

China Sea Standoff,” Wall Street Journal, May 8, 

2012, www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527

02304363104577391700507048644. A People’s 

Daily editorial published on May 8 sarcastically 

warned the Philippines that China would be 

happy to work with the Philippines to “jointly 

create a ‘Scarborough Shoal model’ [黄岩岛模

式]” if it continued its provocations. 秦宏 [Qin 

Hong], 面对菲律宾, 我们有足够手段 [“We 

Have Ample Means with Which to Face the 

Philippines”], 人民日报海外版 [People’s Daily 

Overseas Edition], May 8, 2012, p. 1, paper 

.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2012-05/08/

content_1047405.htm. On May 15, Chinese 

state councillor Dai Bingguo warned that China 

would not accept bullying from smaller states, 

“such as the Philippines.” See Craig Hill, “We 

Won’t Be Bullied, Top Chinese Diplomat Warns 

Philippines,” China Daily, May 16, 2012, 

chinadailymail.com/2012/05/16/we-wont-be 

-bullied-top-chinese-diplomat-warns 

-philippines/.

8. The moratorium began at noon on May 16, 

2012. It encompassed all waters north of 12 

degrees latitude. 崔莹 [Cui Ying], 我国南海大

部分海域将进入伏季休渔期 [“Most Waters in 

China’s South China Sea Will Begin a Fishing 

Moratorium”], 新华网 [Xinhua Online], May 13, 
echelon defense 59

2012, news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2012 

-05/13/c_111940832.htm.

9. Brian Spegele, “Philippines Accuses China of 

Fanning Sea Tensions,” Wall Street Journal, May 

23, 2012, www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052

702304065704577421952278868514.

10. Andrew Higgins, “In Philippines, Banana 

Growers Feel Effect of South China Sea Dispute,” Washington Post, June 10, 2012, www 

.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in 

-philippines-banana-growers-feel-effect-of 

-south-china-sea-dispute/2012/06/10/ 

gJQA47WVTV_story.html?utm_term 

=.0c4fff998cc7.

11. “Philippines: DND Hopeful Panatag Shoal Impasse Will End Peacefully,” Asia News Monitor,

June 5, 2012; Robert Ourlian, “More Philippine 

Disputes with China Loom, Says Aquino,” Wall 

Street Journal, June 7, 2012, www.wsj.com/

articles/SB1000142405270230329660457745251

2040287258.

12. Brian Spegele, “Beijing to Withdraw Fishing 

Boats from Disputed Shoal,” Wall Street Journal,

June 18, 2012, www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142

4052702303379204577474162595763298.

13. “Philippines Says Chinese Ships Pull-Out from 

Disputed Reef as per Agreement,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, June 19, 2012. The U.S. government also apparently believed that an agreement 

existed for a mutual withdrawal from the shoal. 

Chinese diplomats deny that any agreement was 

reached. See Geoff Dyer and Demetri Sevastopulo, 

“US Strategists Face Dilemma over Beijing 

Claim in South China Sea,” Financial Times, July 

9, 2014, www.ft.com/content/b2176dea-0732 

-11e4-81c6-00144feab7de.

14. 潘虹 [Pan Hong], 维护南海海洋权益时不我

待—访中国海监南海总队总队长成纯发 [“We 

Cannot Wait Any Longer to Safeguard Maritime 

Rights and Interests in the South China Sea—an 

Interview with the Head of the CMS South 

China Sea Contingent”], 中国海洋报 [China 

Ocean News], November 30, 2012, p. 5.

15. The term gunboat diplomacy refers to a specific 

function of sea power in peacetime and is not 

used as a term of derogation. Chinese sources 

naturally do not regard the behavior described 

in this study as gunboat diplomacy (炮艇外交). 

James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919–1991: 

Political Applications of Limited Naval Force, 3rd 

ed. (New York: St. Martin’s, 1994).

16. This study defines sea power as those instruments the state wields directly to achieve 

objectives on or from the sea. Chinese sea 

power comprises Chinese naval and maritime 

law-enforcement forces. It excludes discussion of 

the maritime militia, which serves a supporting 

function in Chinese dispute strategy. Chinese 

sources regard coast guard forces as elements of 

Chinese sea power. Writing in the journal China 

Military Science, PLAN vice admiral Duan 

Zhaoxian defined maritime law enforcement as 

one component of Chinese “sea power” (海洋力

量), the function of which is to “effectively control the sea and achieve maritime security.” See 

段昭显 [Duan Zhaoxian], 论建设海洋强国的

战略目标 [“On Strategic Objectives for Building 

China into a Maritime Power”], 中国军事科学

[China Military Science], no. 3 (2013), p. 24. Sr. 

Capt. Zhang Wei regards coast guard forces as 

part of China’s “sea power” (although she uses a 

slightly different phrasing—海上力量—as does 

her colleague, now-retired PLAN senior captain 

Li Jie). See 张炜 [Zhang Wei], 中国特色海权

理论发展历程综述 [“A General Review of the 

History of China’s Sea Power Theory Development”], 学术前沿 [Frontiers], no. 7 (2012), p. 

34, and 李杰 [Li Jie], 建设海洋强国要发展

海上力量 [“To Build China into a Maritime 

Power It Must Develop Maritime Power”], 中

国海洋报 [China Ocean News], November 18, 

2013, p. 1. In a paper examining the sources of 

China’s maritime insecurity, Du Bo, Feng Liang, 

and Gao Xinghua from the PLAN Command 

College classify China’s coast guard as part of 

the country’s “maritime security forces” (海上安

全力量). See 杜博 [Du Bo], 冯梁 [Feng Liang], 

and 篙兴华 [Gao Xinghua], 我国海洋安全: 问

题, 原因与政策 [“China’s Maritime Security: 

Issues, Reasons, and Policies”], 唯实 [Weishi], 

no. 8 (2013), p. 93.

17. This approach is described in 吴寒月 [Wu 

Hanyue], 中国共产党海防思想研究 [The 

History of CCP Maritime Defense Thought] 

(Beijing: National Defense Univ. Press, 2013), 

p. 106. See also 史春林 [Shi Chunlin], 中国海

洋管理和执法力量整合后面临的新问题及

对策 [“Issues Faced in the Wake of Integration 

of Chinese Maritime Management and LawEnforcement Forces and Policy Options”], 中国

软科学 [China Soft Science], no. 11 (2014), p. 6. 

Shi is a professor at Dalian Maritime University. 

See also 孙利 [Sun Li] and 徐佳慧 [Xu Jiahui], 

军事专家: 中国海警局将与海军形成梯次防

卫体系 [“Military Expert: China Coast Guard 

Will Form an Echelon Defense System with 

the Navy”], 中广网 [China National Radio 

Online], March 11, 2013, mil.cnr.cn/ztl/2013lh/

zxxx/201303/t20130311_512126943.html. Some 

Chinese refer to an “echelon defense system” 

with fishing vessels on the front line. Fishing vessels crewed by maritime militia forces 

are indeed important instruments in China’s 

maritime dispute strategy. However, this “third 

sea force” will not be discussed in great detail in 
60 china maritime studies

this monograph. 梁芳 [Liang Fang], 建设海洋

强国迫在眉睫 [“Now’s the Time to Build China 

into a Maritime Power”], 国防参考 [National 

Defense Reference], March 10, 2015, www.81.cn/

jwgz/2015-03/10/content_6389144.htm.

18. Edward Luttwak examines this coercive function 

of navies in his excellent volume The Political 

Uses of Sea Power. See Edward N. Luttwak, The 

Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore, MD: 

Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974), p. 31.

19. The Chinese term is 一场没有硝烟的战争. It 

commonly is used in the context of frontline 

CMS rights-protection operations. See, for 

instance, 纪念中国海监南海总队成立10周年

[“Commemorating the 10th Anniversary of the 

Founding of the South China Sea Contingent of 

China Marine Surveillance”], 国家海洋局南海

分局 [Website of the South China Sea Branch of 

the State Oceanic Administration], September 21, 

2009, www.scsb.gov.cn/scsb/fjdt/200909/0f4cc32

56ebf4b8cbd157b8e264dfd3e.shtml. See also 张

延敏 [Zhang Yanmin], 坚定信心维护海洋权

益 [“Confidently Safeguard Maritime Rights and 

Interests”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 

January 18, 2013, p. 3; 赵叶苹 [Zhao Yeping], 亲

历中越舰船南海对峙 [“Personal Witness to a 

Confrontation between Chinese and Vietnamese 

Ships in the South China Sea”], 国际先驱导

报 [International Herald Leader], July 24, 2009, 

news.xinhuanet.com/herald/2009-07/24/ 

content_11764017.htm; and 芦垚 [Lu Yao] and 

钱亚平 [Chen Yaping], 东海海监维权十年: 如

同一场没有硝烟战争 [“10 Years of CMS Rights 

Protection in the East China Sea: Just like a War 

without Gun Smoke”], 瞭望东方周刊 [Oriental 

Outlook], September 24, 2012, news.sina.com 

.cn/c/sd/2012-09-24/114225240228.shtml.

20. My analysis of “asymmetries” was inspired by 

remarks made by Peter Dutton. Dutton sees 

slightly different asymmetries: (1) China’s 

strength advantage vis-à-vis other disputants 

and (2) America’s lack of “gray zone” forces with 

which to compete with China.

21. If contested, peacetime control of the sea relies 

on the constant presence of surface vessels. 

However, even the largest ship cannot remain at 

sea for more than a few months; all ships must 

return to port to avoid typhoons, receive repairs, 

perform preventive maintenance, rest crews, 

and take on supplies. Thus, huge advantages 

accrue to states with the financial and industrial 

wherewithal to keep surface vessels at sea. For 

more on the physical attributes of the ocean 

and their impact on maritime strategy, see Ian 

Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare (New 

York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 16–18.

22. Adam Liff, “‘Self-restraint’ with Japanese 

Characteristics,” Asia Maritime Transparency 

Initiative, March 10, 2016, amti.csis.org/self 

-restraint-with-japanese-characteristics/.

23. U.S. Defense Dept., The Asia-Pacific Maritime 

Security Strategy: Achieving U.S. National 

Security Objectives in a Changing Environment

([2015]), available at www.defense.gov/ 

Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA 

%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy 

-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF.

24. America’s lack of resolve is largely an outcome 

of an “asymmetry of interests” with China. This 

concept is borrowed from Alexander L. George, 

Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an 

Alternative to War (Washington, DC: United 

States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), p. 13.

25. See Sun Li and Xu Jiahui, “Military Expert: 

China Coast Guard Will Form an Echelon 

Defense System with the Navy.”

26. An UNCLOS tribunal formally decided this 

issue in the case of Republic of the Philippines v. 

People’s Republic of China (PCA case no. 2013-

19). See South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. 

China), Case No. 2013-19, Award (Perm. Ct. 

Arb. 2016), pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/

sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf. 

For a brief summary of the decision, see Permanent Court of Arbitration, “The South China 

Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines 

v. the People’s Republic of China),” press release, 

July 12, 2016, pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/

sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press 

-Release-No-11-English.pdf.

27. For a still-useful reference on China’s territorial 

claims, see Greg Austin, China’s Ocean Frontier: 

International Law, Military Force, and National 

Development (Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1998).

28. China occupies the following seven Spratly 

features: (1) Mischief Reef (美济礁), (2) Fiery 

Cross Reef (永暑礁), (3) Subi Reef (渚碧礁), (4) 

Cuarteron Reef, (5) Johnson Reef (赤瓜礁), (6) 

Gaven Reef (南薰礁), and (7) Hughes Reef (东

门礁).

29. United Nations Convention on the Law of the 

Sea pt. V, opened for signature December 10, 

1982 [hereafter UNCLOS], available at treaties 

.un.org/ (entered into force November 16, 1984).

30. Ibid., arts. 13, 121.

31. James Manicom, “China’s Claims to an Extended 

Continental Shelf in the East China Sea: Meaning and Implications,” Jamestown Foundation 

China Brief 9, no. 14, July 9, 2009, jamestown 

.org/program/chinas-claims-to-an-extended 

-continental-shelf-in-the-east-china-sea 

-meaning-and-implications/.
echelon defense 61

32. The Yellow Sea maritime boundary disputes 

have remained comparatively quiet. This study 

examines only disputes in the East and South 

China Seas.

33. The PRC declared its baselines in the Paracels 

on May 15, 1996. See Declaration of the 

Government of the People’s Republic of China 

on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea (May 15, 

1996), www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATION 

ANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1996 

_Declaration.pdf. The Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs has indicated that China’s claims to 

maritime rights in these waters are based on the 

Spratlys “as a whole,” and that the archipelago 

can generate zones of jurisdiction beyond the 

territorial sea. This would contradict a July 2016 

UNCLOS tribunal ruling, which stated that 

none of the Spratly features, individually or collectively, meets the standards of an “island” (entitled to an EEZ). On March 24, 2016, Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Hua Chunying 

stated that “China claims maritime rights and 

interests based on the Spratly Archipelago as a 

whole.” On July 8, 2016, a second Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Hong Lei, stated, 

“As a whole, China’s Spratly Archipelago has 

maritime rights and interests such as a territorial 

sea, EEZ, and continental shelf.” See 2016年3月

24日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会

[“The 24 March 2016 Regular Press Conference 

Held by Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Hua Chunying”], 外交部网站 [Website of 

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], March 24, 2016, 

www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1350452 

.shtml. See also 2016年7月8日外交部发言人洪

磊主持例行记者会 [“The 8 July 2016 Regular 

Press Conference Held by Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs Spokesperson Hong Lei”], 外交部网

站 [Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 

July 8, 2016, www.mfa.gov.cn/nanhai/chn/fyrbt/

t1378698.htm. On July 12, 2016, China issued 

a statement describing its claims in the South 

China Sea. These include (1) sovereignty over 

the Dongsha Islands (i.e., Pratas Islands), Xisha 

Islands (i.e., Paracel Islands), Zhongsha (i.e., 

Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal), and 

Nansha Islands (i.e., Spratly Islands); (2) the 

internal waters, territorial sea, and contiguous 

zone that these islands generate; (3) the EEZs 

and continental shelves these islands generate; 

and (4) (unspecified) historic rights (历史性权

利). See “Full Text of Chinese Gov’t Statement 

on China’s Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime 

Rights and Interests in South China Sea,” 

Xinhua News, July 12, 2016, news.xinhuanet 

.com/english/2016-07/12/c_135507754.htm. 

Government-affiliated scholars have sought to 

justify this approach. See 张颖 [Zhang Ying], 南

沙群岛法律地位辨析 [“Examining the Legal 

Status of the Spratly Archipelago”], 中国海洋

报 [China Ocean News], October 15, 2015, p. 3, 

and 密晨曦 [Mi Chenxi], 中菲南海争议: 唯有

双边谈判是解决正道 [“The China-Philippines 

South China Sea Dispute: Bilateral Negotiation Is the Only Way Forward”], 中国海洋报

[China Ocean News], August 24, 2016, p. 2. Both 

articles were written by researchers at the China 

Institute for Marine Affairs (CIMA).

34. M. Taylor Fravel, “Traditional Fishing Grounds 

and China’s Historic Rights Claims in the 

South China Sea,” Maritime Awareness Project,

July 11, 2016, maritimeawarenessproject 

.org/2016/07/11/traditional-fishing-grounds 

-and-chinas-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/. Article 14 of the Law of the PRC on the Exclusive 

Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (1998) 

states that, while China accepts these UNCLOSbased zones of jurisdiction extending from its 

land territory, this does not impact its claims to 

certain unidentified “historic rights” to other 

parts of the ocean. See 中华人民共和国专属经

济区和大陆架法 [“Law of the PRC on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf ”], 

中国人大网 [NPC], June 26, 1998, www.npc.gov 

.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/05/content_5004707 

.htm. The PRC document on file at the UN 

wrongly translates 历史性权利 (lishixing quanli)

as “historical rights.” See Exclusive Economic 

Zone and Continental Shelf Act (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 

Cong., June 26, 1998), www.un.org/depts/los/

LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/

chn_1998_eez_act.pdf. Notably, for many years 

the SOA’s China’s Ocean Development Report

did not mention “historic rights.” This changed 

starting with the 2013 iteration of the report. 海

洋发展战略研究所课题组 [China Institute for 

Marine Affairs Special Topic Group], 中国海洋

发展报告 (2013) [China’s Ocean Development 

Report (2013)] (Beijing: Ocean, 2013) [hereafter 

ODR 2013], pp. 46, 48; 海洋发展战略研究所课

题组 [China Institute for Marine Affairs Special 

Topic Group], 中国海洋发展报告 (2014) 

[China’s Ocean Development Report (2014)] 

(Beijing: Ocean, 2014), p. 280.

35. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 

justified publicly Chinese fishing activities in 

the southernmost sections of the South China 

Sea (within Indonesia’s EEZ) on the basis of a 

claim to “traditional fishing grounds.” See 外交

部发言人华春莹就印尼海军舰船袭扰枪击中

国渔船渔民事答记者问 [“Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs Spokesperson Hua Chunying Responds 

to a Reporter Question on the Indonesian Naval 

Vessels Armed Attack on a Chinese Fishing 

Trawler”], 外交部网站 [Website of the Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs], June 19, 2016, www.fmprc 

.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1373394.shtml.
62 china maritime studies

36. The “rights” of Chinese fishermen to operate within the nine-dash line are officially 

outlined in 南沙渔业生产管理规定 [Regulations for Managing Spratly Fisheries Production], available at hd.hinews.cn/2/hyr_page 

.php?xuh=79530. This document defines the 

Spratlys as “the waters and islands within the 

dashed line, south of 12 degrees latitude.” See 

also Hainan Province’s 海南省南沙渔业生产

安全管理规定 [Regulations on Management 

of Safety of Fisheries Production in the Nansha 

(Spratly) Islands]. This document regulates fishing in the Spratlys, which are defined as “the waters and islands within China’s traditional border 

[传统疆界线] south of 12 degrees latitude.” 

Chinese coast guard forces enforce these regulations. In July 2012, the Chinese government 

opened drilling blocks that tracked the western 

boundary of the nine-dash line. It also objects 

to foreign surveying and drilling operations on 

that basis. At present, China does not attempt to 

regulate fishing in all areas within the nine-dash 

line. China’s annual fishing moratorium does 

not include Spratly waters (i.e., areas south of 12 

degrees latitude). For an excellent discussion of 

China’s opposition to foreign oil and gas activities taking place within the nine-dash line, see 

Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle 

for Power in Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. 

Press, 2014), chap. 5. For information on China’s 

own drilling blocks, see Lu Na, “CNOOC: US 

Firms May Join Oil Exploration Bids,” China 

.org.cn, July 18, 2012, www.china.org.cn/ 

business/2012-07/18/content_25942312.htm.

37. This map was included in China’s May 7, 2009, 

response to a joint Vietnam-Malaysia submission to the Commission on the Limits of the 

Continental Shelf, submitted on May 6, 2009. 

The Chinese note does not mention the ninedash line. See “Submissions to the Commission: 

Joint Submission by Malaysia and the Socialist 

Republic of Viet Nam,” UN Division for Ocean 

Affairs and Law of the Sea, May 7, 2009, www 

.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/

mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf.

38. Gao Zhiguo and Jia Bingbing, The Nine-Dash 

Line in the South China Sea: History, Status and 

Implications (Beijing: Haiyang, 2014), p. 82. See 

also U.S. State Dept., China: Maritime Claims 

in the South China Sea, Limits in the Seas 143 

(Washington, DC: Office of Ocean and Polar 

Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International 

Environmental and Scientific Affairs, December 

5, 2014), available at www.state.gov/documents/

organization/234936.pdf.

39. This claim is made by Zhang Wei and Feng 

Liang in their very important volume Maritime 

Security of the State. 张炜 [Zhang Wei] and 冯梁

[Feng Liang], eds., 国家海上安全 [Maritime 

Security of the State] (Beijing: Haichao, 2008), p. 

484. Their language is almost identical to that 

used by Sr. Capt. Ren Xiaofeng in his Handbook 

on the Law of Naval Operations. Both claim that 

China issued a statement to this effect when it 

ratified UNCLOS in May 1996. In fact, China 

submitted its declaration to the UN on June 7, 

1996, and it contains no mention of the ninedash line. See 任筱锋 [Ren Xiaofeng], 海上军

事行动法手册 [Handbook on the Law of Naval 

Operations] (Beijing: Haichao, 2009), p. 111. For 

China’s actual declaration, see “Declarations and 

Statements [upon Ratification of UNCLOS],”

UN Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea,

www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/

convention_declarations.htm#China Upon 

ratification.

40. See, for instance, 张辉 [Zhang Hui], 从国家安

全看东海及南海问题 [“Examining Problems 

in the East China Sea and South China Sea 

from the Perspective of National Security”], 

国防 [National Defense], no. 2 (2017), p. 79. 

The author, who directs the Maritime Law 

Enforcement Research Institute at the China 

Maritime Police Academy, writes, “China enjoys 

historic rights to fishing, navigation, and oil/gas 

development in waters . . . within its traditional 

maritime border in the South China Sea.”

41. In a 2016 article, Hainan governor and former 

SOA director Liu Cigui claimed that more than 

forty billion tons of oil, more than sixteen trillion square meters of natural gas, and seventy 

billion tons of combustible ice have been “verified” (探明) in the South China Sea. See 刘赐贵

[Liu Cigui], 坚决扛起建设海洋强国的历史使

命 [“Resolutely Shoulder the Historical Mission 

of Building China into a Maritime Power”], 求

是 [Seek Truth], August 2, 2016, theory.people 

.com.cn/n1/2016/0802/c40531-28604161.html. 

For more on methane hydrate, or “combustible 

ice,” see Mimi Lau, “Beijing Finds Fresh ‘Fire 

Ice’ Reserves in South China Sea,” South China 

Morning Post, June 27, 2016, www.scmp.com/

news/china/policies-politics/article/1981922/

beijing-finds-fresh-fire-ice-reserves-south 

-china-sea.

42. For a U.S. Energy Information Administration 

(EIA) estimate of oil and gas reserves in 

the South China Sea, see “South China Sea,” EIA,

February 7, 2013, www.eia.gov/beta/international/

regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=SCS.

43. For a recent Chinese assessment of the location 

and amount of resources in the South China 

Sea, see 李金蓉 [Li Jinrong], 朱瑛 [Zhu Ying], 

and 方银霞 [Fang Yinxia], 南海南部油气资

源勘探开发状况及对策建议 [“The State of 

Exploration and Development of Oil Resources 

in the Southern Part of the South China Sea and 
echelon defense 63

Policy Suggestions”], 海洋开发与管理 [Ocean 

Development and Management] 31, no. 4 (April 

2014), pp. 12–15.

44. These points are made in 唐复全 [Tang Fuquan] 

and 伍轶 [Wu Yi], 中国海防战略探要 [“A 

Study of China’s Coastal Defense Strategy”], 

中国军事科学 [China Military Science], no. 

5 (2007), p. 93. About 94 percent of China’s 

population lives in the eastern one-third of the 

country. “China Facts,” National Geographic 

Online, travel.nationalgeographic.com/travel/

countries/china-facts/. See also Henry Gass, 

“More Chinese on the Coast, Less Fish in the 

Sea,” Scientific American, August 8, 2014, www 

.scientificamerican.com/article/more-chinese 

-on-the-coast-less-fish-in-the-sea/.

45. 刘中民 [Liu Zhongming], “海权”与“海洋权益”

辨识 [“Understanding the Differences between 

‘Sea Power’ and ‘Maritime Rights and Interest’”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], April 

18, 2006, p. 3. This fear of being vulnerable to 

American assaults from seaward has deep roots, 

going back to the First Gulf War and the Kosovo 

war. 尚金锁 [Shang Jinsuo], 吴子欣 [Wu Zixin], 

and 陈立旭 [Chen Lixu], 毛泽东军事思想与

高技术条件下局部战争 [The Military Thought 

of Mao Zedong and Local War under High-Tech 

Conditions] (Beijing: PLA Press, 2002), pp. 

248–49. This point is also mentioned in 师小

芹 [Shi Xiaoqin], 论海权与中美关系 [On Sea 

Power and Sino-U.S. Relations] (Beijing: Military 

Science, 2012), p. 207. This point also is made 

in Tang Fuquan and Wu Yi, “A Study of China’s 

Coastal Defense Strategy,” pp. 95–96.

46. The authors of China’s Ocean Development 

Report (2011) describe the value of certain 

disputed islands as follows: “Some islands have 

special status; maybe they are places of strategic 

importance, or important for resources; their 

value is reflected in control over sea-lanes, and 

resources that belong to them, and expanding 

maritime defense depth; their significance is 

extremely important for national security, social 

stability, and economic development.” See 海洋

发展战略研究所课题组 [China Institute for 

Marine Affairs Special Topic Group], 中国海洋

发展报告 (2011) [China’s Ocean Development 

Report (2011)] (Beijing: Ocean, 2011) [hereafter 

ODR 2011], p. 118. Also, in an interview with a 

China Ocean News reporter, Jia Yu, Deputy Director, CIMA, stated that, aside from resources 

and other economic reasons, China’s commitment to safeguarding its maritime rights and 

interests comes down to the need to expand 

strategic space for the sake of security and development. 江涛 [Jiang Tao], 维护海洋权益开拓

发展空间—访国家海洋局海洋发展战略研究

所副所长贾宇 [“Safeguard Maritime Rights and 

Interests and Expand Development Space—an 

Interview with CIMA Deputy Director Jia Yu”], 

中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], June 4, 2012, 

p. 1. These ideas are shared by another SOA 

expert interviewed for a November 2012 issue 

of People’s Navy, the official newspaper of the 

PLAN. 邢广梅 [Xing Guangmei], 让海洋权益

根植人心 [“Let Maritime Rights and Interests 

Take Root in the People’s Hearts”], 人民海军

[People’s Navy], November 8, 2012, p. 4. The 

SOA expert states, “Only by effectively safeguarding national maritime rights and interests 

can China obtain rich marine resources, and 

expand national strategic security and development space.” Chinese strategists see the ocean 

as a “security barrier” (战略屏障), the function 

of which is to shield China from foreign threats. 

This view no doubt amplifies the importance of 

controlling Chinese-claimed waters. See 陈浩

[Chen Hao] and 杨朝钊 [Yang Chaozhao], 海洋

是国家战略的坚实支点 [“The Ocean Is a Solid 

Stronghold of National Strategy”], 解放军报

[PLA Daily], October 10, 2016, p. 6.

47. 谢适汀 [Xie Shiting], 新形势下经略海洋维

护海权的科学指南 [“A Scientific Compass for 

Strategically Managing the Sea and Safeguarding 

Maritime Rights and Interests in the Context 

of the New Situation”], 中国军事科学 [China 

Military Science], no. 4 (2014), p. 84.

48. An important discussion of the strategic and 

economic value of China’s maritime claims, especially those in the South China Sea, took place 

at an academic conference held at the Shanghai 

University of Politics and Law in November 

2011. At the conference, Sr. Capt. Hua Xiaoping 

from the South Sea Fleet cited the following factors that made the South China Sea important 

to China: (1) Its resources could help sustain 

China’s economic development. (2) The South 

China Sea is a vital, strategic sea-lane impacting 

China’s national security. (3) It is important for 

expanding China’s defensive depth (防御纵深). 

(4) It is the direction through which China can 

“break through” (突破) in a geostrategic sense 

(i.e., break through the confines of the first 

island chain). (5) What happens in the South 

China Sea impacts other areas important to 

China. See 南琳 [Nan Lin], 第一届中国海权战

略与国家安全学术研讨会综述 [“A Summary 

of the First Academic Conference on Chinese 

Sea Power Strategy and National Security”], 国

际观察 [International Review], no. 2 (2013), p. 

30.

49. Expanding strategic depth, the authors believe, 

also will help achieve the peacetime goal of 

“checking the long-term, close-in surveillance conducted by America and Japan.” 李远

星 [Li Yuanxing] and 刘兴 [Liu Xing], 海上

战略通道安全面临的威胁及对策 [“Threats 

to Security of Strategic Sea-Lanes and Policy 
64 china maritime studies

Recommendations”], 国防 [National Defense], 

no. 3 (2014), pp. 16–17. The meaning of the 

term maritime defense, or haifang (海防), has 

evolved over time. Originally, it meant the 

development of coastal installations to protect 

Chinese territory from foreign invasion. As 

such, the term was translated best as “coastal 

defense”; indeed, some Chinese sources still 

translate it thus. In this conception, the Chinese 

surface fleet played a minor role. The term’s 

evolution has accommodated the growth of 

China’s maritime interests going forward. Since 

the early 1980s, the frontiers of Chinese ocean 

defense have moved out from the Chinese coast 

to the edge of these new zones of jurisdiction 

and remote islands. According to the deputy 

commander of the Shantou Garrison District 

in Guangdong Province, now “the ultimate aim 

of maritime defense is to ensure that the state’s 

maritime interests are not infringed.” See 谢毫

生 [Xie Haosheng], 我国海防面临的安全威

胁与加强海防建设的战略性思考 [“Strategic 

Considerations of the Security Threats Faced 

by China’s Maritime Defense and Strengthening Maritime Defense Construction”], 国

防 [National Defense], no. 6 (2009), p. 23. In 

a 1996 article, PLA Naval Research Institute 

researcher Liu Zhenhuan stated that “according to UNCLOS, the scope of China’s maritime 

defense should and must expand to include all 

of China’s jurisdictional waters, including out to 

the edge of the EEZ and continental shelf, and in 

the South China Sea out to the edge of China’s 

traditional maritime frontier [i.e., the nine-dash 

line]. China’s ‘maritime defense line’ will extend 

all the way down to James Shoal.” As a result 

of this evolution, Chinese surface vessels, not 

infantrymen in bunkers, are now the primary 

guardians of China’s “maritime defense line” (海

防线). See 刘振环 [Liu Zhenhuan], 联合国海

洋法公约评述 (下) [“Comments on UNCLOS 

(Part 2)”], 国防 [National Defense], no. 11 

(1996), p. 15. For a detailed discussion of the impact of UNCLOS on China’s maritime defense, 

see 王士强 [Wang Shiqiang] and 高新生 [Gao 

Xinsheng], eds., 中外海防发展比较研究 [Comparative Research on Ocean Defense Development 

in China and Abroad] (Beijing: Military Science, 

2011), pp. 295–309. The role of UNCLOS in the 

evolution of the concept of “maritime defense” 

is also emphasized in 李兆春 [Li Zhaochun] 

and 高新生 [Gao Xinsheng], 海防概念的释读

[“An Explanation of the Concept of Haifang”], 

中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], August 24, 

2016, p. 2. In a 2014 article, two researchers 

from the PLA Academy of Military Science 

examined the evolution in missions and tasks of 

China’s maritime defense. The authors point to 

changes in strategic factors, not UNCLOS, as the 

key drivers in China pushing out its maritime 

defense to the edge of the so-called near seas. 

See 张忠良 [Zhang Zhongliang] and 贺宏礼

[He Hongli], 新中国成立以来海防使命任务

的演变 [“Evolution in the Mission and Tasks 

of Maritime Defense since the Founding of the 

People’s Republic of China”], 军事历史 [Military 

History], no. 1 (2014), pp. 27–30.

50. For example, in an August 2016 statement, 

Central Military Commission member Chang 

Wanquan, citing Xi Jinping, made special mention of the “security threats from the seaward 

direction” (来自海上方向的安全威胁). See 常

万全: 更加深入扎实做好海上方向动员准备

[“Chang Wanquan: More Deeply and Solidly 

Make Preparations for Mobilization in the 

Seaward Direction”], 新华社 [Xinhua], August 

2, 2016, news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016 

-08/02/c_1119324936.htm. In a September 2016 

synopsis of Xi Jinping’s thinking on military 

strategy and its relationship to grand strategy, 

three researchers from the Academy of Military 

Science wrote, “Chairman Xi has clarified the 

requirements with respect to preparing for the 

military struggle. History proves that states that 

embrace the sea thrive and those that abandon 

the sea decline; when the state is powerful, its 

sea power is formidable; and when the state is 

weak, its sea power is weak. As China becomes 

increasingly integrated with the rest of the 

world, the seaward direction is becoming an important direction in which our strategic interests 

are expanding and the direction in which there 

exists strategic space to ensure the country’s 

long-term stability. Over the long term, China 

will face many types of contradictions and 

struggles in the seaward direction, including 

containment and countercontainment, separatism and counterseparatism, and infringement 

and counterinfringement. The maritime security 

environment will become more complex. Taking 

into account China’s national security situation 

and changes in the patterns of war, Chairman 

Xi has emphasized that the starting point for 

preparations for the military struggle should be 

on winning informatized wars. He has stressed 

the maritime military struggle and preparation 

for military struggle, effectively controlled major 

crises, appropriately handled chain reactions, 

and resolutely defended territorial sovereignty, 

unity, and security. Implementing these requirements has benefited Chinese efforts to seize the 

strategic initiative in the preparation for military 

struggle.” See 姜铁军 [Zhang Tiejun], 释清仁

[Shi Qingren], and 车兴飞 [Che Xingfei], 强

国强军战略先行——深入学习贯彻习主席新

形势下军事战略方针重要论述 [“Advancing 

the Powerful Country and Powerful Military 

Strategy—Deeply Studying and Implementing 

Xi Jinping’s Important Discourse on Military 
echelon defense 65

Strategic Guidelines in the New Situation”], 解

放军报 [PLA Daily], September 2, 2016, theory

.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0902/c40531-28686808

.html.

51. 刘赐贵 [Liu Cigui], 深入学习贯彻习近平总书

记重要讲话精神为建设海洋强国做出新贡献

[“Deeply Study the Spirit of Xi Jinping’s Important Speech and Contribute to China’s Efforts 

to Become a Maritime Power”], 中国海洋报

[China Ocean News], August 19, 2013, p. 1. Liu 

reiterated this message in an important article 

published in China Ocean News in June 2014. 

刘赐贵 [Liu Cigui], 努力实现从海洋大国向

海洋强国的历史跨越 [“Work Hard to Realize 

the Historic Leap from a Big Maritime State to a 

Powerful Maritime State”], 中国海洋报 [China 

Ocean News], June 7, 2014, p. 1.

52. 张海文 [Zhang Haiwen] and 王芳 [Wang Fang], 

海洋强国战略是国家大战略的有机组成部分

[“Maritime Power Strategy Is an Organic Part 

of Grand Strategy”], 国际安全研究 [Journal 

of International Security Studies], no. 6 (2013), 

p. 63. At the time, these two authors worked at 

CIMA, a think tank within the State Oceanic 

Administration.

53. For an example of this reasoning, see 一言 [Yi 

Yan], 坚定不移地维护国家海洋权益 [“Resolutely and Unswervingly Safeguard Maritime 

Rights and Interests”], 中国海洋报 [China 

Ocean News], May 4, 2012, p. 5.

54. See 中共中央文献研究室 [CCP Document 

Research Laboratory], ed., 习近平关于实现中

华民族伟大复兴的中国梦论述摘编 [Excerpts 

from Xi Jinping’s Discourse on Realizing the 

China Dream of the Great Rejuvenation of the 

Chinese Nation] (Beijing: CCP Document Press, 

2013).

55. For an excellent study of the means by which 

Chinese nationalism affects Chinese views of 

the world, see Peter Hays Gries, China’s New 

Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy

(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2005). 

Chinese maritime law-enforcement officers may 

be at least in part animated by similar emotions. 

In the words of one frontline CMS officer, 

“Early modern China had no maritime defense. 

This caused China to suffer one hundred years 

of national humiliation. Today, frontline lawenforcement personnel are the first barrier to 

guard the motherland’s maritime borders. The 

history of humiliation can never be repeated!” 

赵建东 [Zhao Jiandong], 维权执法信心百倍

[“Supreme Confidence in Rights-Protection 

Law Enforcement”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean 

News], March 14, 2014, p. 2.

56. Speaking about the disputes in the South China 

Sea, PLAN political commissar Adm. Miao 

Hua stated that they “touch upon territorial 

sovereignty, energy resources, geopolitics, and 

development space, and they involve the overall 

situation with respect to stable national development and impact the feelings of the Chinese 

people.” See 吴昊 [Wu Hao], 海军政委苗华谈

南海问题: 寸土必争, 寸海必保 [“PLA Navy 

Political Commissar Miao Hua Talks about the 

South China Sea: China Will Fight for Every 

Inch of Territory and Protect Every Inch of 

Ocean”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], 

April 5, 2016, www.81.cn/rd/2016-04/05/ 

content_6994240.htm.

57. For a great discussion of the value of China’s 

maritime claims, see M. Taylor Fravel, “Why 

Does China Care So Much about the South 

China Sea? Here Are 5 Reasons,” Monkey Cage 

(blog), Washington Post, July 13, 2016, www 

.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/

wp/2016/07/13/why-does-china-care-so-much 

-about-the-south-china-sea-here-are-5-reasons/.

58. 白皮书首列专节阐述维护国家海洋权益

[“For the First Time the White Paper Includes 

a Dedicated Section on Maritime Rights and 

Interests”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 

April 17, 2013, p. 1. For the actual document, 

see Information Office of the State Council, The 

Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces 

(April 16, 2013), available at news.xinhuanet 

.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681 

.htm. The concept of “maritime rights and interests” first appeared in Chinese law in the 1992 

PRC Law of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. See 海洋发展战略研究所课题组

[China Institute for Marine Affairs Special Topic 

Group], 中国海洋发展报告 (2009) [China’s 

Ocean Development Report (2009)] (Beijing: 

Ocean, 2009) [hereafter ODR 2009], p. 99. The 

report is produced annually by researchers at 

CIMA. Authoritative Chinese sources define 

maritime rights as the “rights and freedoms enjoyed by a state on the basis of relevant international law and domestic law” and maritime interests as “the various benefits that a state can gain 

through exercising its maritime rights.” See ODR 

2011, p. 108. SOA leaders generally use this definition in their speeches. For example, 高悦 [Gao 

Rui], 坚决维护我国的海洋权益 [“Resolutely 

Safeguard China’s Maritime Rights and Interests”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], July 1, 

2013, p. 1. This definition also appears in a very 

important 2011 volume entitled Maritime Rights 

and Interests and China. Production of this volume was overseen by a committee that included 

a former director of the State Oceanic Administration, the former president of China Ocean 

University, and six other senior members of 

China’s maritime affairs community. See 干焱平 

[Gan Yanping] and 刘晓玮 [Lu Xiaowei], eds., 
66 china maritime studies

海洋权益与中国 [Maritime Rights and Interests 

and China] (Beijing: Ocean, 2011), p. 48. The 

PLA’s definition of maritime rights and interests

generally accords with the SOA’s: “the rights and 

interests enjoyed by a state at sea. They include 

sovereignty in the territorial sea; sovereign 

rights and jurisdictional rights in the contiguous 

zone, EEZ, and continental shelf; rights enjoyed 

on the high seas and in the international seabed; 

and the right of innocent passage through the 

territorial sea of other states.” See 中国人民

解放军军语 [Dictionary of Military Terms] 

(Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 

September 2011), p. 26. Strictly speaking, the 

term maritime rights and interests pertains to the 

space on, above, and below the sea. Claims to 

offshore islands are considered to involve issues 

of “territorial sovereignty” (领土主权). See 海

洋发展战略研究所课题组 [China Institute for 

Marine Affairs Special Topic Group], 中国海洋

发展报告 (2015) [China’s Ocean Development 

Report (2015)] (Beijing: Ocean, 2015) [hereafter 

ODR 2015], p. 285. In wider Chinese discourse, 

the term maritime rights and interests frequently 

encompasses claims to sovereignty over offshore 

islands and other land features. This conflation 

of terms is not incidental, given that sovereignty 

over land determines the extent of maritime 

space within which a state may legitimately lay 

claim to maritime rights. For more on this point, 

see 刘楠来 [Liu Nanlai], 维护海洋权益要有

全球视野 [“To Safeguard Maritime Rights and 

Interests One Needs a Global Perspective”], 中

国海洋报 [China Ocean News], November 14, 

2013, p. 1, and 吴继陆 [Wu Jilu], 正确认识海洋

维权形势坚决维护国家海洋权益 [“Correctly 

Recognize the Maritime Rights-Protection Situation and Resolutely Safeguard Maritime Rights 

and Interests”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean 

News], November 19, 2012, p. 2. In the context 

of surface fleet missions, “rights protection” 

encompasses efforts to defend Chinese claims 

to both land and sea against other claimants 

and interested parties in their many maritime 

disputes.

59. As Dennis Blasko writes, defense of China’s 

maritime rights and interests was the “main 

theme” of the 2015 white paper. See Dennis J. 

Blasko, “The 2015 Chinese Defense White Paper 

on Strategy in Perspective: Maritime Missions Require a Change in the PLA Mindset,” 

Jamestown Foundation China Brief 15, no. 12 

(June 19, 2015), jamestown.org/program/the 

-2015-chinese-defense-white-paper-on-strategy 

-in-perspective-maritime-missions-require-a 

-change-in-the-pla-mindset/.

60. CIMA researcher Gao Zhiguo made this point 

during his remarks at a January 2013 conference 

organized by the SOA. See 香山论坛: 建设中国

特色海洋强国 [“Xianshan Forum: Building a 

Maritime Power with Chinese Characteristics”], 

中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], January 1, 

2013, p. 3.

61. The full sentence calls for China to “increase its 

ability to develop marine resources, develop the 

marine economy, protect the marine environment, resolutely safeguard national maritime 

rights and interests, and build China into a 

maritime power.” 胡锦涛在中国共产党第十八

次全国代表大会上的报告 [“Hu Jintao’s Report 

at the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist 

Party”], November 17, 2012, news.xinhuanet 

.com/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_113711665.htm. 

Earlier party congress reports did mention 

“maritime rights and interests,” but only in the 

context of the missions of the Chinese military. 

See, for instance, Jiang Zemin’s report at the 

Fourteenth Party Congress, 江泽民在中国共产

党第十四次全国代表大会上的报告 [“Report 

Delivered by Jiang Zemin at the Fourteenth 

Party Congress”], 中国共产党新闻网 [News of 

the Communist Party of China], cpc.people.com 

.cn/GB/64162/64168/64567/65446/4526313

.html.

62. See Ryan D. Martinson, “The 13th Five-Year 

Plan: A New Chapter in China’s Maritime 

Transformation,” Jamestown Foundation China 

Brief 16, no. 1 (January 12, 2016), jamestown 

.org/program/the-13th-five-year-plan-a-new 

-chapter-in-chinas-maritime-transformation/.

63. See chap. 41, sec. 3, of 中国国民经济和社会

发展第十三个五年规划纲要 [“Outline of 

13th Five-Year Plan for China’s Economic and 

Social Development”], 中国网 [China Online], 

March 17, 2016, www.china.com.cn/lianghui/

news/2016-03/17/content_38053101.htm. This 

assumption also is expressed frequently in the 

statements of officers in the Chinese military. 

For example, in an important speech given on 

the 120th anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese 

War, then–PLAN commander Adm. Wu Shengli 

stated that the specific meaning of the term 

maritime rights and interests is “continuously 

evolving with the times.” See 吴胜利 [Wu 

Shengli], 深刻吸取甲午战争历史教训坚定不

移走经略海洋维护海权发展海军之路 [“Profoundly Absorb the Historical Lessons of the 

First Sino-Japanese War and Unswervingly Take 

the Path of Strategic Management of the Sea, 

Safeguarding Maritime Rights, and Developing 

the Navy”], 中国军事科学 [China Military Science], no. 4 (2014), p. 2.

64. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Can 

China Defend a ‘Core Interest’ in the South 

China Sea?,” Washington Quarterly 34, no. 2 

(Spring 2011), pp. 45–59.
echelon defense 67

65. In 2010, for instance, CMS ships protected a 

Chinese surveying vessel operating in disputed 

waters near the Paracels. The SOA officially described this operation as protecting China’s “core 

interests” in the South China Sea. 2010年中国

海监十件大事 [“Ten Major Events for CMS in 

2010”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], May 

10, 2011, p. 5. A People’s Daily editorial published during the Scarborough Shoal standoff 

warned the Philippines that Scarborough Shoal 

constitutes a “core interest” for China. See Qin 

Hong, “We Have Ample Means with Which to 

Face the Philippines.”

66. In the last paragraph of an official summary 

of Xi’s remarks, he is cited as saying, “We must 

safeguard national maritime rights and interests. 

. . . We love peace, and will continue to take the 

path of peaceful development, but we absolutely 

cannot give up our legitimate rights and interests, much less sacrifice core national interests.” 

For the official summary of Xi’s remarks, see 

Xi Jinping, 进一步关心海洋认识海洋经略海

洋推动海洋强国建设不断取得新成就 [“We 

Need to Do More to Take Interest in the Sea, 

Understand the Sea, and Strategically Manage 

the Sea, and Continually Do More to Promote 

China’s Efforts to Become a Maritime Power”], 

人民日报 [People’s Daily], August 1, 2013, 

paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2013-08/01/

nw.D110000renmrb_20130801_2-01.htm. In 

the weeks following Xi’s remarks, China Ocean 

News ran a series of front-page articles, written 

by internal and external experts, interpreting 

the significance of the politburo meeting, in 

many instances highlighting the “core interests” 

language. The 2015 Ocean Development Report 

states that Xi’s mention of “core interests” refers 

to sovereignty over islands. See ODR 2015, p. 

299. The 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development cites territorial integrity as a core interest. 

This makes clear that offshore islands fall under 

that rubric. See Information Office of the State 

Council, “China’s Peaceful Development,” Xinhua, September 6, 2011, news.xinhuanet.com/

english2010/china/2011-09/06/c_131102329 

.htm. CIMA researcher Zhang Xiaoyi made this 

point in an April 2016 article. 张小奕 [Zhang 

Xiaoyi], 实现中美在南海航行自由的共同

利益 [“Realizing the Common Interests of 

China and the U.S. with Respect to Freedom of 

Navigation in the South China Sea”], 中国海洋

报 [China Ocean News], April 12, 2016, p. 2. For 

another representative use of this term, see Yi 

Yan, “Resolutely and Unswervingly Safeguard 

Maritime Rights and Interests.”

67. 吴登峰 [Wu Dengfeng] and 莫小亮 [Mo 

Xiaoliang], 吴胜利会见美国海军作战部长 就

南海问题深入交换意见 [“Wu Shengli Met with 

the U.S. Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations and 

Exchanged Views on the South China Sea”], 新

华社 [Xinhua], July 18, 2016, news.xinhuanet 

.com/mil/2016-07/18/c_1119238489.htm. The 

PLA Navy also uses this language in internal 

discourse. For example, in an August 2014 

article, the deputy director of the PLAN political 

department, Rear Adm. Zheng Hengbin, stated, 

“How China effectively controls the sea and 

safeguards its maritime rights is the great challenge it faces as it builds itself into a maritime 

power. This involves great questions associated 

with China’s core interests.” The author thanks 

Conor Kennedy for sharing this article. 郑亨斌

[Zheng Hengbin], 强化海洋意识 建设海洋强

国 [“Strengthen Maritime Consciousness and 

Build China into a Maritime Power”], 中国双

拥 [China Double Support], August 5, 2014, syzz 

.mca.gov.cn/article/lltt/201408/20140800679898 

.shtml. In a January 2017 article describing Xi 

Jinping’s approach to diplomacy, Yang Jiechi 

mentions the need to safeguard “maritime rights 

and interests” in the section on China’s “core 

interests.” See 杨洁篪 [Yang Jiechi], 在习近平总

书记外交思想指引下不断开创对外工作新局

面 [“Continuously Creating New Situations for 

Foreign Affairs Work While Being Guided by Xi 

Jinping’s Thinking on Diplomacy”], 人民日报

[People’s Daily], January 14, 2017, p. 7, available 

at paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2017-01/14/

nw.D110000renmrb_20170114_1-07.htm.

68. This study defines an oceangoing vessel as a ship 

displacing at least five hundred tons.

69. Since both the Chinese coast guard and the 

Chinese navy are undergoing major institutional 

reform and growing rapidly, discussion of organization and force structure should be assumed 

to be current only as of January 2017.

70. 于嬴 [Yu Ying], 赵颖翡 [Zhao Yingfei], and 郭

益科 [Guo Yike], 中国海监: 碧海亮剑 [“China 

Marine Surveillance: Bright Sword in the Blue 

Ocean”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], February 

22, 2010, p. 4. See also 王新艺 [Wang Xinyi], 巡

航执法: 改变了的中国海洋维权格局 [“Patrol 

Law Enforcement: It Changed China’s Maritime 

Rights-Protection Situation”], 当代海军 [Modern Navy], no. 8 (2011), p. 60.

71. According to one authoritative source, maritime 

rights-protection law enforcement (海洋维权

执法) is defined as “law-enforcement behavior 

directed at infringements of national maritime 

rights and interests. Its aim is to safeguard state 

sovereignty, sovereign rights, jurisdictional 

rights, and rights of control [管制权]. Maritime 

rights protection uses the law as a basis, is 

guided by policy, relies on patrols, and uses law 

enforcement as a means.” 胡连 [Hu Lian], 维权

执法方式值得深入研究 [“Rights-Protection 

Law Enforcement Is Worth Researching in 
68 china maritime studies

Depth”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 

March 3, 2009, p. 2. Two SOA researchers have 

defined rights-protection law enforcement as 

“an administrative law-enforcement function 

performed for the purpose of safeguarding state 

sovereignty and maritime rights and interests. It 

is a fundamental measure and means used by a 

state to safeguard maritime rights and interests 

on the basis of maritime law.” 范晓婷 [Fan 

Xiaoting] and 罗婷婷 [Luo Tingting], 海洋维

权执法的法律依据之辨 [“Discourse on the 

Legal Basis of Maritime Rights-Protection Law 

Enforcement”], 行政与法 [Administration and 

Law], no. 12 (2009), p. 77.

72. Rights protection has been described as the 

service’s “primary” (首要) responsibility. See, 

for instance, 忠诚使命护海疆 砥砺奋进铸华

章—中国海监继往开来踏上新征程 [“Faithful 

to Its Mission to Protect the Maritime Border It 

Has Written a Remarkable Chapter: CMS Begins 

a New Journey”], PRC Ministry of Land and 

Resources, July 23, 2013, www.mlr.gov.cn/xwdt/

hyxw/201307/t20130723_1244589.htm. It also 

has been called the “top priority” (重中之重). 

See, for instance, 王秋蓉 [Wang Qiurong], 海

监工作正在实现跨越式发展 [“CMS Work Is 

in the Process of Leapfrog Development”], 中国

海洋报 [China Ocean News], January 25, 2013, 

p. 4. See also 今年要扎实抓好的六大主要任

务 [“The Six Key Tasks We Must Perform This 

Year”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], February 27, 2011, p. 3. In a February 2013 speech, 

the then director of intelligence and information operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Capt. 

James Fanell, famously called China Marine 

Surveillance “a full-time maritime sovereignty 

harassment organization.” Few knew more about 

what this service actually was doing in disputed 

areas than Captain Fanell. Bill Gertz, “Inside 

the Ring: Blunt Warning on China,” Washington 

Times, February 6, 2013, www.washingtontimes 

.com/news/2013/feb/6/inside-the-ring-blunt 

-warning-on-china/.

73. For instance, in early 2011 CMS 17, a nationallevel cutter belonging to the 1st Detachment 

(based in Qingdao, Shandong), conducted a patrol to James Shoal, during which it obstructed 

the operations of a foreign surveying vessel 

operating in Chinese-claimed waters. 我的船长

我的船—“中国海监17”船年度出航301天纪

事 [“My Captain and My Boat—‘A Record of the 

301 Days CMS 17 Spent at Sea Last Year’”], 人

民网 [People Online], February 6, 2012, politics 

.people.com.cn/GB/70731/17034156.html.

74. This decision, implemented in 2009, was 

outlined in an SOA document called 关于省级

海监机构开展海洋维权巡航执法工作的通知

[Notification on Provincial-Level CMS Organizations Initiating Maritime Rights-Protection 

Law-Enforcement Patrols]. See 王世岗 [Wang 

Shigang], 北部湾海洋维权执法亟待加强

[“Maritime Rights-Protection Law Enforcement 

in the Gulf of Tonkin Needs to Be Urgently 

Improved”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 

February 6, 2015, p. 3, and 海上执法能力建

设四地谈 [“A Discussion of Construction of 

Maritime Law-Enforcement Capabilities in Four 

Places”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 

March 18, 2016, p. 4. Notably, the whole March 

18, 2016, issue subsequently was removed from 

the China Ocean News website, presumably because it contained content that later was judged 

too sensitive to release.

75. 苏涛 [Su Tao], 海洋维权的中坚力量 [“The 

Backbone of Maritime Rights Protection”], 中国

海洋报 [China Ocean News], June 13, 2014, p. 3. 

CMS 9012 also has the distinction of being one 

of the few CMS cutters, if not the only one, with 

deck guns.

76. See, for instance, 江苏省海洋渔业指挥部

[Command Department of the Jiangsu Ocean 

and Fisheries Department], 中国海警局维权

处领导考察中国海警2113舰 [“A Leader from 

the Rights Protection Department of the China 

Coast Guard Bureau Visits CCG 2113”], 江苏

省海洋渔业厅 [Jiangsu Ocean and Fisheries 

Department], March 27, 2015, www.jsmfm.gov 

.cn/Show.aspx?id=74581. See also “A Discussion 

of Construction of Maritime Law-Enforcement 

Capabilities in Four Places.”

77. In November 1999, Chinese policy makers approved a major CMS shipbuilding program, to 

be completed in two phases. The phase I plan, 

to produce five new one-thousand-ton cutters 

and one new three-thousand-ton cutter, was 

completed in 2005. These were CMS 17 (one 

thousand tons), CMS 27 (one thousand tons), 

CMS 46 (1,100 tons), CMS 51 (1,900 tons), CMS 

71 (one thousand tons), and CMS 83 (three 

thousand tons). Phase II ships joined their 

respective national-level units in 2010 and 2011. 

They included one three-thousand-metric-ton 

ship and six new one-thousand-metric-ton 

ships: CMS 15 (1,500 tons), CMS 23 (one thousand tons), CMS 26 (one thousand tons), CMS 

50 (three thousand tons), CMS 66 (one thousand 

tons), CMS 75 (1,300 tons), and CMS 84 (1,740 

tons). 王孟霞 [Wang Mengxia], 中国海洋: 40

年风雨兼程 [“China’s Oceans: 40 Years of Trials 

and Hardships”], 中国船检 [China Ship Survey], 

no. 8 (2004), p. 7.

78. ODR 2013, pp. 261–62, explicitly identifies 

China Marine Surveillance and Fisheries Law 

Enforcement as the two services that perform 

the bulk of rights-protection missions and that 

operate most in China’s claimed EEZs.
echelon defense 69

79. Ibid., p. 277; Lyle Goldstein, “China: A New 

Maritime Partner?,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 133/8/1,254 (August 2007), pp. 26–31.

80. 肖乐 [Xiao Yue] and 李明爽 [Li Mingshuang], 

中国渔政指挥中心主任陈毅德谈“十二五”

渔政事业发展 [“Director of the Fisheries Law 

Enforcement Command Chen Yide Talks about 

Fisheries Law Enforcement Developments 

during the ‘Twelfth Five-Year Plan’”], 中国水产

[China Fisheries], no. 8 (2011), p. 6. For an account of the first FLE mission to Mischief Reef, 

see 刘添荣 [Liu Tianrong], 一次历史性的巡

航: 中国渔政31号船首航南沙纪实 [“A Historic 

Patrol: An Account of FLE 31’s First Trip to the 

Spratlys”], 中国水产 [China Fisheries], no. 12 

(1994), pp. 12–13.

81. Jonathan G. Odom, “The True ‘Lies’ of the Impeccable Incident: What Really Happened, Who 

Disregarded International Law, and Why Every 

Nation (Outside of China) Should Be Concerned,” Michigan State Journal of International 

Law 18, no. 3 (2010), pp. 1–42. See also Raul 

Pedrozo [Capt., USN], “Close Encounters at 

Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident,” Naval War 

College Review 62, no. 3 (Summer 2009), pp. 

101–11. On the evening of March 4, 2009, Victorious was operating in the Yellow Sea (roughly 

125 nm from China’s coast) when an FLE cutter 

illuminated it with a high-intensity spotlight and 

then crossed its bow at just 1,400 yards. While 

operating seventy-five miles south of Hainan on 

March 8, 2009, Impeccable was threatened with 

collision by a number of PRC vessels, including 

at least one FLE cutter. See “Raw Data: Pentagon 

Statement on Chinese Incident with U.S. Navy,” 

Fox News, March 9, 2009, www.foxnews.com/

politics/2009/03/09/raw-data-pentagon-statement 

-chinese-incident-navy.html.

82. 王春楠 [Wang Chunnan] and 卢冬琳 [Lu 

Donglin], 广西渔政巡南沙保礁护渔扬国

威—看广西勇士的风采 [“Guangxi Fisheries Law Enforcement Patrols the Spratlys and 

Performs Reef Protection Duties—See Brave 

Guangxi People in Action”], 广西新闻网

[Guangxi News Online], May 5, 2013, www 

.gxnews.com.cn/staticpages/20130505/

newgx5185941f-7504741-7.shtml.

83. From 2006 to 2013, Fisheries Law Enforcement received just five new cutters displacing 

more than a thousand tons, as follows: FLE 311

(2006), FLE 88 (2009), FLE 310 (2010), FLE 206

(2012), and FLE 312 (2013). FLE 88 later was 

returned to the PLA Navy. Ridzwan Rahmat, 

“PLAN Re-inducts Fuchi-Class Vessel from 

Fisheries Agency,” IHS Jane’s Navy International,

August 4, 2014, www.janes.com/article/41590/

plan-re-inducts-fuchi-class-vessel-from-fisheries 

-agency.

84. For a still-useful description of this era, see Lyle 

J. Goldstein, Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea: 

Challenge and Opportunity in China’s Improving Maritime Enforcement Capabilities, China 

Maritime Studies 5 (Newport, RI: Naval War 

College Press, 2010), available at usnwc.edu/

Research-and-Wargaming/Research-Centers/

China-Maritime-Studies-Institute.

85. This was a top-down reform imposed on the 

sea services. As of early 2016, organizational, 

personnel, and budgetary integration was “not 

where it should be” (没有到位). See 李培志 [Li 

Peizhi], 建设海洋强国战略背景下中国海警体

制改革的思考 [“Ideas on Reform of the China 

Coast Guard in the Context of China’s Strategy 

of Becoming a Maritime Power”], 武警学院学

报 [Journal of the Chinese People’s Armed Police 

Force Academy] 32, no. 3 (March 2016), pp. 

49–50. This echoes a comment a senior CCG 

officer made in May 2015. See 索有为 [Suo 

Youwei], 陈启任 [Chen Qiren], and 周冬华 

[Zhou Donghua], 我海警坚守南海维权执法36

年 守美济礁40多航次 [“A China Coast Guard 

Officer Has Done Maritime Rights-Protection 

Law Enforcement in the South China Sea for 

36 Years and Participated in More Than 40 

Missions to Guard Mischief Reef ”], 中国新闻

网 [China News], May 7, 2015, www.china.com 

.cn/military/2015-05/07/content_35509917.htm. 

As one senior CCG officer admitted in January 

2017, “Since the creation of the China Coast 

Guard, the ranks of maritime law-enforcement 

personnel are much more enthusiastic about 

their work, but there still exist many practical 

difficulties. I hope that related reform work can 

achieve a breakthrough and resolve the current 

problems as quickly as possible.” 高悦 [Gao Liu] 

et al., 集聚智慧力量 续写海洋新篇——全国海

洋工作会议分组讨论侧记 [“Gather Together 

Wisdom and Power to Write a New Chapter: A 

Record of Breakout Discussions at the National 

Maritime Work Meeting”], 中国海洋报 [China 

Ocean News], January 9, 2017, p. 4.

86. 崔凤 [Cui Feng] and 宋宁而 [Song Ning’er], 

eds., 中国海洋社会发展报告(2015) [Report 

on the Development of Ocean Society of China 

(2015)] (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic 

Press, 2015), p. 141.

87. For a useful discussion of CCG reform, see 何

杰 [He Jie], 中美日海洋执法机构的组织架

构对比 [“A Comparison of the Organizational 

Structures of Chinese, American, and Japanese 

Maritime Law-Enforcement Organizations”], 

舰船科学技术 [Ship Science and Technology] 

38, no. 8 (August 2016), pp. 149–53. The author 

works in the General Logistics Department of 

the China Coast Guard.
70 china maritime studies

88. In November 2016, Meng was elected to serve as 

president of the international police organization Interpol, a post he will hold until 2020. 

Meng’s biography is available at the Interpol 

website: www.interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/

Structure-and-governance/Meng-Hongwei. The 

SOA website still identifies Meng as the commandant of the China Coast Guard.

89. For a discussion of the challenges this has created, see Linda Jakobson, “China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors,” Lowy Institute 

Report, Lowy Institute, December 2014, p. 18, 

www.lowyinstitute.org/files/chinas-unpredictable

-maritime-security-actors_3.pdf.

90. The two vice-commandants are Maj. Gen. Wang 

Hongguang (王洪光), an active-duty PAP officer, and Chen Yide (陈毅德), former director of 

the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command. The 

CCG political commissar is the SOA director, 

currently Wang Hong (王宏). For information 

on Wang Hongguang, see 邢桂杰 [Xing Guijie], 

海警队伍党委书记培训班举行开班仪式

[“Opening Ceremony Held for Training Class 

for China Coast Guard Party Secretaries”], 中国

人民武装警察部队学院网站 [PAP Academy], 

June 14, 2016, www.wjxy.edu.cn/xyyw/316722 

.jhtml. For confirmation of Chen Yide’s position, 

see 陈菲 [Chen Fei], 中国海警圆满完成首次

出访 [“China Coast Guard Satisfactorily Completes First Visit Abroad”], 中华人民共和国国

防部网站 [Ministry of Defense], June 18, 2016, 

www.mod.gov.cn/diplomacy/2016-06/18/ 

content_4677152.htm. The SOA website 

provides only the names of the commandant 

and the political commissar. 国家海洋局网站

[Website of the State Oceanic Administration], 

www.soa.gov.cn/zwgk/bjgk/ldjs/ldjslb/.

91. For a more thorough comparison of the China 

Coast Guard with the coast guards of other 

states, see 祁斌 [Qi Bin], 美日韩海警执法体

系与装备新动态 [“New Developments in U.S., 

Japan, and Korea Coast Guard Systems and 

Equipment”], 中国船检 [China Ship Survey], 

no. 2 (2016), pp. 91–96.

92. The organization and responsibilities of the 

China Coast Guard were outlined in a document that the State Council issued in June 2013. 

See 国家海洋局主要职责内设机构和人员编

制规定 [“Provisions for the Primary Responsibilities, Organization, and Staffing of the State 

Oceanic Administration”], 中华人民共和国

中央人民政府 [Website of the Central People’s 

Government of the People’s Republic of China], 

June 9, 2013, www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-07/09/

content_2443023.htm. The State Council document says that the State Oceanic Administration 

(working through the China Coast Guard) is 

responsible for “guiding and coordinating the 

maritime law-enforcement work of local agencies.” One indication of the relationship between 

local-level maritime law-enforcement agencies 

and the China Coast Guard can be seen in the 

fact that a thank-you letter was sent to the crews 

of two Fujian-owned cutters for participating 

in an escort mission to the Senkakus in August 

2016. 中国海警局来信感谢中国海监8003

船、8027船 [“China Coast Guard Bureau Sends 

a Letter to Thank CMS 8003 and CMS 8027”], 

福建省海洋与渔业厅 [Website of the Fujian 

Province Oceans and Fisheries Department], 

August 24, 2016, www.fjof.gov.cn/xxgk/hydt/

stdt/201608/t20160824_70778.htm.

93. Ryan D. Martinson, “From Words to Actions: 

The Creation of the China Coast Guard” (paper 

presented at the “China as a ‘Maritime Power’ 

Conference,” hosted by the Center for Naval 

Analyses, July 28–29, 2015), pp. 41–43, available 

at www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/Creation-China 

-Coast-Guard.pdf; 范凌志 [Fan Lingzhi], 中

国海警讲述抢救菲渔民始末: 顶十四级台风

救人获菲律宾同行感谢 [“China Coast Guard 

Recounts the Rescue of Filipino Fishermen: 

Conducting a Rescue in a Class 14 Typhoon and 

Receiving Thanks from Colleagues in the Philippine Coast Guard”], 环球时报 [Global Times], 

December 3, 2016, world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/

2016-12/9766227.html; 吕宁 [Lv Ning], 把船

当作家——记“中国海警2306”船船长林庆

雄 [“Make the Ship a Home—a Profile of the 

Skipper of CCG 2306 Lin Chuanxiong”], 中国

海洋报 [China Ocean News], December 16, 

2016, p. 3.

94. 王晶 [Wang Jing], 全面推进北海区海洋事业创

新发展 [“Fully Promoting Innovative Development of Maritime Endeavors in the Northern 

Bureau”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 

February 4, 2016, p. 3.

95. Their ships have been painted with CCG colors 

and five-digit pennant numbers. Former CMS 

and FLE ships have four-digit pennant numbers.

96. In rare cases, China Maritime Police did operate in disputed areas to advance the broader 

rights-protection mission. In 2006, its ships were 

involved in a confrontation with Vietnamese 

paramilitary vessels near the Paracel Islands. 

See 邓新建 [Deng Xinjian], 海警战士何崇俊为

民献真情 [“Coast Guard Warrior He Chongjun 

Shows True Sentiment to the People”], 法制日

报 [Legal Daily], February 27, 2008, www.legaldaily 

.com.cn/misc/2008-02/27/content_806642.htm. 

Sometimes the service’s antismuggling mission 

brought it into remote waters. For instance, in 

December 2009 a China Maritime Police cutter 

sailed to waters just west of the Bashi Channel to 

interdict a Hong Kong–registered fishing vessel 

purportedly intending to smuggle two tons of 
echelon defense 71

cocaine into China. The vessel ultimately was 

boarded near the Pratas Islands. 惠珍珍 [Hui 

Zhenzhen] and 游春亮 [You Chunliang], “西沙

常客”海警44101舰 [“CCG 44101 Is ‘Frequent 

Guest of the Paracels’”], 法制日报 [Legal Daily], 

June 20, 2016, www.legaldaily.com.cn/army/

content/2016-06/20/content_6679781.htm

?node=80561.

97. One authoritative source says that elements 

of the former China Maritime Police worked 

together with the PLA Navy to organize the 

defense of the rig. See 刘征鲁 [Liu Zhenglv], 这

些年, 人民海军在前进! [“In Recent Years, the 

PLA Navy Has Been Advancing!”], 中国海洋报

[China Ocean News], July 29, 2016, p. 4, epaper 

.oceanol.com/shtml/zghyb/20160729/62001 

.shtml.

98. Ryan D. Martinson, “Deciphering China’s 

Armed Intrusion near the Senkaku Islands,” 

The Diplomat, January 11, 2016, thediplomat 

.com/2016/01/deciphering-chinas-armed 

-intrusion-near-the-senkaku/. For vessels 

owned by former China Maritime Police units 

sailing to Scarborough Shoal, see 董芳 [Dong 

Fang], 新快报记者揭开海警44101舰神秘面

纱 [“Xinkuai News Reporter Lifts the Mysterious Veil of CCG 44101”], 新快报 [Xinkuai 

News], June 7, 2016, news.xkb.com.cn/guang 

dong/2016/0607/433552.html. See also Hui 

Zhenzhen and You Chunliang, “CCG 44101 Is 

‘Frequent Guest of the Paracels.’” For former 

China Maritime Police units sailing to the 

Spratlys, see 南海研究论坛 [South China Sea 

Research Forum], June 5, 2016, www.nhjd.net/

article-2949-1.html. This research forum shows 

a photo of CCG 46305 on patrol in the Spratlys. 

The 2nd Detachment of the Hainan contingent 

of the China Coast Guard began conducting patrols to the Spratlys in 2015. See 宋体 [Song Ti], 

海南海警二支队举办建队20周年庆祝活动

[“The Second Detachment of the Hainan Coast 

Guard Holds an Activity to Celebrate the 20th 

Anniversary of Its Founding”], 中新网海南

[China Net Hainan], November 22, 2016, www 

.hi.chinanews.com/hnnew/2016-11-22/428359 

.html. At least one ship from the 2nd Detachment of the Hainan contingent was operating in 

the Spratlys in January 2017. See 为伟大祖国

守岁, 边防官兵倍儿自豪! [“For Staying Up All 

Nights for the Motherland, Border Defense Soldiers Feel Extremely Proud!”], 中国军网 [China 

Military Online], January 28, 2017, www.81 

.cn/jmywyl/2017-01/28/content_7470178.htm. 

According to a Xinhua article, “[I]n recent 

years, ships from the Second Detachment of the 

Hainan contingent of the China Coast Guard 

have sailed to the Spratlys on several occasions 

to conduct rights-protection law-enforcement 

operations.” 郑玮娜 [Zheng Weina] and 朱卫

军 [Zhu Weijun], 海南海警二支队春节期间巡

航南海保平安 [“Second Detachment of Hainan 

Coast Guard Patrols the South China Sea and 

Keeps the Peace during the Spring Festival”], 新

华社 [Xinhua], February 2, 2017, news.xinhuanet 

.com/politics/2017-02/02/c_1120400685.htm.

99. These forces also might be called “SWAT personnel.” 冯志 [Feng Zhi], 当前海警巡航急需解

决的问题及对策 [“Problem and Countermeasures for Problems Associated with Coast Guard 

Patrols”], 公安海警学院学报 [Journal of China 

Maritime Police Academy] 14, no. 4 (2015), p. 72. 

100. Ryan D. Martinson, “The Militarization of China’s 

Coast Guard,” The Diplomat, November 21, 2014, 

thediplomat.com/2014/11/the-militarization-of 

-chinas-coast-guard/. On November 29, 2016, 

three hundred men and women selected from 

among recent graduates of Chinese universities completed four months of basic training in 

Guangzhou and received direct commissions as 

officers in the China Coast Guard. That their 

uniforms indicated they belonged to the PAP 

suggests that the China Coast Guard may in fact 

be evolving into a component of the PAP. This 

was the second class since this recruitment program began in 2014. See 廖键 [Liao Jian] and 姜

宗平 [Jiang Zongping], 航拍军营“成人礼” 300

多名海警战士转正啦 [“An Aerial Photograph 

of a ‘Coming of Age Ceremony’ in Which More 

Than 300 Coast Guard Warriors Receive Their 

Commissions”], 中国军网 [China Military 

Online], December 1, 2016, hi.people.com.cn/

n2/2016/1201/c231187-29396236.html.

101. This created particular difficulties during the 

defense of the CNOOC 981 oil rig in 2014. 丁

超平 [Ding Chaoping], 试论当前如何强化海

警实战化训练 [“On How to Improve the China 

Coast Guard’s Realistic Combat Training”], 公安

海警学院学报 [Journal of China Maritime Police 

Academy] 13, no. 4 (December 2014), p. 12.

102. For more on these two agencies, see Martinson, 

“From Words to Actions,” pp. 27–29.

103. 杨中旭 [Yang Zhongyu], 东海争议: 中日贴身

出招 [“Dispute in the East China Sea: China and 

Japan Lock Up and Throw Down”], 中国新闻周

刊 [China Newsweek], July 25, 2005, p. 14.

104. 李文华 [Li Wenhua], 俞磊 [Yu Lei], and 庞博

[Pang Bo], 海权在握, 海洋兴国—21世纪中

国的交通海权建设 [“Grasping Sea Power and 

Using the Sea to Rejuvenate the Nation—Building 21st Century Chinese Transportation Sea 

Power”], 中国海事 [China Maritime Safety], no. 

8 (2014), p. 14.

105. There is a broad consensus that ships displacing at least a thousand tons are best suited for 

“rights-protection” work. 李朗 [Li Lang] et al., 

论建设我国统一的海上专属经济区执法船队
72 china maritime studies

[“On Building a Unified EEZ Law-Enforcement 

Fleet”], 海洋开发与管理 [Ocean Development 

and Management], no. 8 (August 2013), pp. 

28–30.

106. The missions and equipment of the oceangoing 

elements of the China Coast Guard often are 

described in terms usually reserved for naval 

forces. For example, when a three-thousand-ton 

cutter was delivered to the China Coast Guard 

in October 2014, an authoritative news article 

reported that the new ship had “strong combat 

capabilities.” 王晶 [Wang Jing], “中国海警1306” 

船入列北海总队并首航 [“CCG 1306 Enters 

Service and Conducts First Patrol with North 

Sea Contingent”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean 

News], October 17, 2014, p. 2.

107. 赵宁 [Zhao Ning], 解密“中国海监 8002”船—

探访中国海监福建省总队 [“Demystifying 

CMS 8002—Visiting the Fujian Province CMS 

Contingent”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 

March 15, 2013, p. 3.

108. Scott Bentley suggests that FLE 310 is equipped 

with jamming capabilities. See Scott Bentley, 

“Mapping the Nine-Dash Line: Recent Incidents 

Involving Indonesia in the South China Sea,” The 

Strategist, October 29, 2013, www.aspistrategist 

.org.au/mapping-the-nine-dash-line-recent 

-incidents-involving-indonesia-in-the-south 

-china-sea/. According to an authoritative 2011 

article, at least some CMS vessels are installed 

with “listening and jamming equipment” (侦

听和干扰设备), used for rights-protection 

purposes. See 长足发展 亮点纷呈 成绩斐

然 ——“十一五”期间中国海监事业发展回

眸 [“Outstanding Development with Many 

Achievements—a Review of CMS Development 

during the 11th Five-Year Plan”], 中国海洋在

线 [China Ocean Online], March 1, 2011, www 

.oceanol.com/zfjc/dwjianshe/11024.html. This 

article was published originally in the March 1, 

2011, issue of China Ocean News, but in 2016 

that whole issue was removed from the paper’s 

website.

109. The first of the class (CCG 2901) joined the 4th 

Detachment of China Marine Surveillance in 

July 2016. At the time of this writing, it had not 

yet patrolled disputed waters. The other ship 

of the class (CCG 3901) patrolled the Paracels 

in May 2017. Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Coast 

Guard’s New ‘Monster’ Ship Completes Maiden 

Patrol in South China Sea,” The Diplomat, May 

18, 2017, thediplomat.com/2017/05/china-coast 

-guards-new-monster-ship-completes-maiden 

-patrol-in-south-china-sea/; Ryan D. Martinson, 

“East Asian Security in the Age of the Chinese 

Mega-cutter,” Center for International Maritime 

Security, July 3, 2015, cimsec.org/east-asian 

-security-age-chinese-mega-cutter/16974.

110. Ryan D. Martinson, “The Lives of a Chinese 

Gunboat,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

142/6/1,360 (June 2016), pp. 34–39.

111. The formal decision to build these ships likely 

was made before 2010. 王秋蓉 [Wang Qiurong], 

全面启动省级海监巡航船舶建造计划 [“Comprehensively Launch the Shipbuilding Plan for 

Provincial-Level CMS Patrol Cutters”], 中国海

洋报 [China Ocean News], May 25, 2010, p. 4.

112. Notably, eighty-three PLAN sailors were transferred with these ships. 孙鼎 [Sun Ding], 海监

队员是怎样炼成的 [“How CMS Personnel Are 

Trained”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 

December 27, 2013, p. 3.

113. Andrew Tate, “China Converting Old Frigates 

into Coastguard Cutters,” Jane’s Navy International, July 28, 2015. These three ships have the 

hull numbers 31239, 31240, and 31241, indicating that they belong to the Shanghai contingent 

of the China Coast Guard, a former China 

Maritime Police unit.

114. The tremendous rate at which the Chinese 

constabulary fleet has grown since 2012 has 

created a problem: China lacks enough trained 

coastguardsmen to crew the new ships. As a 

stopgap measure, the service has allowed hiring 

of contractors to fill out the crews. Notwithstanding these efforts, the China Coast Guard 

may not be operating at full capacity. 汪晓

依 [Wang Xiaoyi], 房建孟到中国海监第四

支队调研 [“Fang Jianmeng Arrives at the 4th 

Detachment of the China Marine Surveillance to 

Conduct a Survey”], 国家海洋局 [State Oceanic 

Administration], January 14, 2016, www.soa.gov 

.cn/xw/hyyw_90/201601/t20160114_49719.html.

115. For more on the role of the law in China’s 

maritime disputes, see Isaac Kardon, “China’s 

Maritime Interests and the Law of the Sea: Domesticating Public International Law,” in China’s 

Socialist Rule of Law Reforms under Xi Jinping,

ed. John Garrick and Yan Chang Bennett (New 

York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 179–96.

116. 罗书臻 [Luo Shuzhen], 最高法院发布审理我

国管辖海域相关案件司法解释 [“The Supreme 

People’s Court Issues a Judicial Interpretation of 

Cases Taking Place in China’s Jurisdictional Waters”], 新华网 [Xinhua Online], news.xinhuanet 

.com/legal/2016-08/02/c_129197642.htm. This 

was a two-part interpretation. For the actual 

documents, see 最高人民法院关于审理发生在

我国管辖海域相关案件若干问题的规定 

(一) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court 

with Respect to Certain Questions on Trying 

Related Cases That Occur in China’s Jurisdictional Waters (Part 1)], 最高人民法院 [Supreme 

People’s Court], August 2, 2016, www.court.gov 

.cn/zixun-xiangqing-24261.html. See also 最高
echelon defense 73

人民法院关于审理发生在我国管辖海域相关

案件若干问题的规定 (二) [Provisions of the 

Supreme People’s Court with Respect to Certain 

Questions on Trying Related Cases That Occur 

in China’s Jurisdictional Waters (Part 2)], 最高

人民法院 [Supreme People’s Court], August 2, 

2016, www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-24271 

.html. The Supreme People’s Court elaborated on 

the interpretation in a Q&A session published 

on the same day the documents were made public. The Chinese official who was interviewed 

explicitly stated that one goal was to push back 

against foreign fishing and surveying vessels 

operating “illegally” in Chinese jurisdictional 

waters. See 罗书臻 [Luo Shuzhen], 依法积极

行使海上司法管辖权 统一涉海案件裁判尺

度 [“Positively Enforce Maritime Judicial Jurisdictional Rights According to the Law and Unify 

the Judgment Standards for Maritime Cases”], 

中国法院网 [China Court], August 2, 2016, 

www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2016/08/

id/2047234.shtml.

117. In November 2012, the Hainan People’s Congress revised the 海南省沿海边防治安管理条

例 [Hainan Province Regulations for the Management of Coastal Border Security and Public 

Order]. It went into effect on January 1, 2013. 

The full text is available at www.hq.xinhuanet 

.com/hngov/2013-01/04/c_114233756.htm. The 

revision purportedly was aimed at addressing increased smuggling, theft, and other illegal activities in Hainan’s jurisdictional waters. A Hainan 

People’s Congress spokesperson stated that it 

also was aimed at addressing problems with 

“foreign vessels and personnel illegally entering 

Hainan’s jurisdictional waters . . . and even 

internal waters and harbors” to engage in illegal 

activity. 海南省人大发言人就修订《海南省

沿海边防治安管理条例》答记者问 [“Hainan 

People’s Congress Spokesperson Answers Questions about the Revised Version of the ‘Hainan 

Province Regulations for the Management of 

Coastal Border Security and Public Order’”], 海

南网 [Hainan News], December 30, 2012, www 

.hinews.cn/news/system/2012/12/31/015302773 

.shtml. A one-year retrospective on the revised 

law claimed that it had succeeded in “increasing the force of the province’s crackdown on 

foreign vessels and personnel illegally entering 

Hainan’s jurisdictional waters.” See 朱晨鹏 [Zhu 

Chenpeng] and 王文涛 [Wang Wentao], 《 海

南省沿海边防治安管理条例》实施一年效果

佳 [“Good Results in the Year since Implementation Began for the ‘Hainan Province Regulations 

for the Management of Coastal Border Security 

and Public Order’”], 新华网 [Xinhua Online], 

January 2, 2014, www.hq.xinhuanet.com/

legal/2014-01/02/c_118800743.htm. In November 2013, the Hainan People’s Congress passed 

“measures” (办法) for the province to implement the PRC Fisheries Law in Hainan’s jurisdictional waters (海南省实施《中华人民共和

国渔业法》办法). This document is available 

at www.hainan.gov.cn/data/law/2013/12/1900/. 

These measures, which took effect on January 1, 

2014, require that “foreigners or foreign fishing 

ships entering sea areas administered by Hainan 

and engaged in fishery production or fishery 

resource surveys should receive approval from 

relevant departments of the State Council.” The 

translation comes from Taylor Fravel, “Hainan’s 

New Fishing Rules: A Preliminary Analysis,” 

The Diplomat, January 10, 2014, thediplomat 

.com/2014/01/hainans-new-fishing-rules-a 

-preliminaryanalysis/. See also Isaac Kardon, 

“Hainan Revises Fishing Regulations in South 

China Sea: New Language, Old Ambiguities,” 

Jamestown Foundation China Brief 14, no. 2 

(January 17, 2014), jamestown.org/program/

hainan-revises-fishing-regulations-in-south 

-china-sea-new-language-old-ambiguities/.

118. Ryan D. Martinson, “Maritime Strategy with 

Chinese Characteristics?,” The Diplomat, March 

25, 2016, thediplomat.com/2016/03/maritime 

-strategy-with-chinese-characteristics/.

119. For more on these conflicts, see M. Taylor 

Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes 

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2008), 

pp. 272–96. For a recent treatment of the battle 

of the Paracels, see Toshi Yoshihara, “The 1974 

Paracels Sea Battle: A Campaign Appraisal,” Naval War College Review 69, no. 2 (Spring 2016), 

pp. 41–65.

120. The 2015 Science of Military Strategy published 

by China’s National Defense University (2015 

SMS) states the PLA Navy performs the following types of military operations other than war: 

(1) 海上反恐 (counterterrorism at sea), (2) 海

上救援 (maritime rescue operations), (3) 维护

国家海洋权益 (safeguarding maritime rights/

interests), (4) 海上军事安全合作 (maritime 

military security cooperation), and (5) 维护海

上战略通道安全等 (safeguarding security of 

strategic sea-lanes). 肖天亮 [Xiao Tianliang], 

ed., 战略学 [Science of Military Strategy] 

(Beijing: National Defense Univ. Press, 2015) 

[hereafter 2015 SMS], pp. 343–44.

121. While sharing the same title, this volume is 

unrelated to the 2015 SMS. 寿晓松 [Shou Xiaosong], ed., 战略学 [Science of Military Strategy] 

(Beijing: Military Science, 2013) [hereafter 2013 

SMS], p. 210.

122. 2013 SMS, p. 163.

123. Ren Xiaofeng, Handbook on the Law of Naval 

Operations, p. 178. According to the Handbook
74 china maritime studies

(p. 178), the PLA Navy should “warn” unauthorized foreign naval vessels operating in Chineseclaimed territorial sea. If the foreign vessel does 

not leave, the military “has the right to issue 

another warning, issue a severe warning, fire a 

warning shot, expel, and expel by use of force, 

among other measures.”

124. Ibid., p. 185.

125. Ibid., p. 188.

126. Ibid., p. 189.

127. Ibid., p. 192.

128. 王文荣 [Wang Wenrong], ed., 战略学 [Science 

of Military Strategy] (Beijing: National Defense 

Univ. Press, 1999) [hereafter 1999 SMS], pp. 146, 

283. For a later discussion of the PLA Navy’s 

deterrent role in maritime disputes, see 2013 

SMS, p. 146. For a full treatment of the coercive 

uses of the PLA Navy, see 张启良 [Zhang 

Qiliang], 海军外交论 [On Naval Diplomacy] 

(Beijing: Military Science, 2013). Zhang is not 

a naval officer. However, his PhD dissertation 

(which later became On Naval Diplomacy) won 

an award in 2008 and ultimately was published 

by the Academy of Military Science.

129. 1999 SMS, pp. 284–85.

130. 曲令泉 [Qu Lingquan], 蓝色呼唤 [The Call of 

the Blue] (Beijing: Haichao, 2013), p. 191.

131. 项建勋 [Xiang Jianxun], 海上政治工作要做实

[“Political Work at Sea Must Be Real”], 人民海

军 [People’s Navy], April 28, 2014, p. 3.

132. 李景伟 [Li Jingwei], 在远海大洋砥砺战斗精神

[“Tempering Combat Spirit in the Far Seas”], 人

民海军 [People’s Navy], May 4, 2015, p. 3.

133. 2015 SMS, p. 125. This aphorism commonly 

appears in discussions about the role of the navy 

in China’s maritime dispute strategy. It appears 

in chapter 3 of The Art of War.

134. 2015 SMS, p. 127. The 2015 SMS contains 

innumerable references to Chinese concerns 

about the need to counter possible foreign 

intervention. The 2013 SMS also makes frequent 

reference to the need to deter outside intervention in a regional conflict. Fravel and Twomey 

cite the 2013 SMS in their controversial 2015 

Washington Quarterly article in which they 

attempt to debunk the notion that China has 

a “counter-intervention” strategy, but only 

mention one of several instances in which 

discussion of countering foreign intervention 

occurs in the 2013 SMS. They therefore dismiss 

it as insignificant. The concept of countering 

foreign intervention is discussed in the 2013 

SMS as follows: p. 99 (involving Taiwan); pp. 

101, 113 (in a section on fighting against the 

“hegemon,” China should achieve “initiative” 

[主动权], and “increase the risk and cost of an 

opponent implementing strategic deterrence and 

in particular armed intervention” [武力干预]); 

p. 209 (countering the “involvement” [介入] 

of a “powerful enemy” [强敌] is regarded as a 

“combat operation” [作战行动]); and p. 216 (in 

a regional war under informatized conditions, 

the PLA Navy needs to emphasize “fighting out” 

in a war in which “external forces” [外部势力] 

are trying to conduct “military intervention” 

[军事干预]). M. Taylor Fravel and Christopher 

P. Twomey, “Projecting Strategy: The Myth of 

Chinese Counter-intervention,” Washington 

Quarterly 37, no. 4 (Winter 2015), pp. 171–87.

135. This point was made at the press conference 

for the release of China’s 2015 national defense 

white paper. Sr. Col. Wang Jin was asked for the 

reasoning behind China’s decision to shift its 

naval strategy to give greater focus on the socalled far seas (i.e., waters beyond the first island 

chain). In his response, Wang states that the advent of precision-guided weapons has expanded 

the battle space, implying that China now needs 

to be able to fight as far away from the Chinese 

heartland as possible. The only possible adversary in this scenario is the United States. See 国

新办《中国的军事战略》白皮书新闻发布会 

(实录) [“A Transcript of the Press Conference 

for the Release of China’s National Defense 

White Paper ‘China’s Military Strategy’”], 凤凰

网资讯 [Phoenix News], May 26, 2015, news 

.ifeng.com/a/20150526/43839648_0.shtml.

136. For a useful discussion of developments with 

the PLAN surface fleet, see NIDS China Security 

Report 2016: The Expanding Scope of PLA Activities and PLA Strategy (Tokyo: National Institute 

for Defense Studies, 2016), pp. 12–15, available 

at www.nids.go.jp/publication/chinareport/pdf/

china_report_EN_web_2016_A01.pdf.

137. For more on recent developments in China’s 

surface fleet, see Peter A. Dutton and Ryan D. 

Martinson, eds., China’s Evolving Surface Fleet, 

China Maritime Studies 14 (Newport, RI: Naval 

War College Press, 2017).

138. For information on new Chinese ships, see 中

国海军近3年入列军舰29艘含3艘052D驱逐

舰 [“In the Last Three Years the Navy Has Commissioned 29 Ships Including Three Type 052D 

Destroyers”], 中国广播网 [China National 

Radio Online], March 8, 2016, military.cnr.cn/

wqzb/fwgc/20160308/t20160308_521558691 

.html. See also 陈国全 [Chen Guoquan] and 闫

培 [Yan Pei], 2016海军入列舰艇大盘点, 总吨

位15万吨! [“An Overview of PLA Navy Ships 

Commissioned in 2016, over 150,000 Tons 

Total!”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], 

January 9, 2017, www.81.cn/hj/2017-01/09/

content_7439774.htm. The six ships that the 
echelon defense 75

U.S. Navy commissioned in 2016 are as follows: 

USS Detroit (LCS 7), USS Montgomery (LCS 8), 

USNS Brunswick (T-EPF 6), USNS Carson City

(T-EPF 7), USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), and USS 

John P. Murtha (LPD 26). See the U.S. Naval 

Vessel Register at www.nvr.navy.mil/.

139. Among their improvements over the Type 052C, 

the Type 052D destroyers have longer-range 

surface-to-air missiles. Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and 

Missions for the 21st Century (Suitland, MD: 

2015), p. 15, available at www.oni.navy.mil/ 

Intelligence_Community/china.html. These 

figures come from the Jane’s Fighting Ships

equipment database.

140. In late 2016, the PLAN Sovremenny-class 

destroyers began receiving major refits. See 蓝

盾 [Lan Dun], 重获新生的东海重剑——人民

海军“现代”级驱逐舰改装猜想 [“Receiving a 

New Lease on Life—a Look at the Refitting of 

the ‘Sovremenny’-Class Destroyers”], 中国海洋

报 [China Ocean News], December 2, 2016, p. 4.

141. These figures come from the Jane’s Fighting Ships

equipment database.

142. 刘征鲁 [Liu Zhenglv], 继承荣光重铸辉

煌—湘潭舰的前世今生 [“Inheriting Honor 

and Recasting Glory—the Past and Present 

Incarnations of the Vessel Xiangtan”], 中国海

洋报 [China Ocean News], March 25, 2016, p. 4. 

These figures come from the Jane’s Fighting Ships

equipment database.

143. For a very useful discussion of China’s amphibious force, see the Dennis Blasko chapter in 

Dutton and Martinson, China’s Evolving Surface 

Fleet, pp. 1–16.

144. 计如林 [Ji Rulin], 何巍 [He Wei], and 杨欣儒

[Yang Xinru], 12名海娃叫美济 [“12 Children of 

Sailors Are Named ‘Meiji’”], 人民海军 [People’s 

Navy], May 31, 2013, p. 3.

145. In mid-2016, during a period of heightened 

tensions in the South China Sea, at least one 

Type 022 missile boat deployed to the Paracels. 

震慑不安分的邻居 海军022导弹快艇镇守永

兴岛 [“Intimidating Recalcitrant Neighbors: A 

Navy Type 022 Fast Attack Craft Guards Woody 

Island”], 凤凰网资讯 [Phoenix News], May 18, 

2016, news.ifeng.com/a/20160518/48791046_0 

.shtml#p=1.

146. 攻坚, 从“脖子以上”开始——怎么看改革总

部体制、大军区体制、大陆军体制 [“When 

Tackling the Problem, We Must Start from the 

Neck and Above—How to Look at Reform of 

the General Departments, Military Regions, and 

the Ground Forces”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], 

October 4, 2016, p. 4.

147. Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, “China’s 

Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms,” Strategic Forum (April 2016), 

inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/

SF-294.pdf; Dennis J. Blasko, “The New PLA 

Joint Headquarters and Internal Assessments of 

PLA Capabilities,” Jamestown Foundation China 

Brief 16, no. 10 (June 21, 2016), jamestown.org/

single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45511&no 

_cache=1. See also 冯春梅 [Feng Chunmei] and 

倪光辉 [Ni Guanghui], 南部战区司令员: 维

护南海权益是最重要使命 [“Commander of 

the Southern Theater Command: Safeguarding Rights and Interests in the South China 

Sea Is Our Most Important Mission”], 人民日

报 [People’s Daily], February 28, 2016, military 

.china.com.cn/2016-02/28/content_37890965 

.htm, and 高毅 [Gao Yi], 南部战区: 全力跑

好“第一棒” [“Southern Theater Command: 

Vigorously Running the ‘First Let’”], 解放军画

报 [PLA Pictorial], no. 3a (2016), pp. 38–41. The 

latter article mentions the challenges that PLAN 

officers face, given the broadened scope of their 

work in the new joint headquarters in the Southern Theater Command.

148. “Pier for Warships Built on Chinese Isle West of 

Senkakus,” Japan Times, August 19, 2016, www 

.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/08/19/national/

politics-diplomacy/pier-built-warships-chinese 

-military-site-close-senkakus/.

149. This information comes from an announcement posted on the website of the Wenzhou City 

Port and Shipping Authority (温州市港航管

理局) in June 2015. It since has been removed. 

For English-language coverage of this plan, see 

“China Coastguard Plans Wenzhou Surveillance Base as Beijing Looks to Bolster Claims to 

Disputed Diaoyu Islands,” South China Morning 

Post, June 14, 2015, www.scmp.com/news/

china/diplomacy-defence/article/1821265/china 

-coastguard-plans-wenzhou-surveillance-base.

150. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative has 

tracked reclamation and construction at features 

in the Spratlys. For a description (with photos) 

of construction at the seven features that China 

occupies, see “Country: China,” Asia Maritime 

Transparency Initiative, amti.csis.org/island 

-tracker/chinese-occupied-features/. China also 

has invested heavily in land reclamation and new 

facilities in the Paracels. Also see Victor Robert 

Lee, “Satellite Images: China Manufactures Land 

at New Sites in the Paracel Islands,” The Diplomat,

February 13, 2016, thediplomat .com/2016/02/

satellite-images-china-manufactures-land-at 

-new-sites-in-the-paracel-islands/.

151. The Rights Protection Leading Small Group 

works through its office (办公室). The office 

contains representatives from the Ministry of 
76 china maritime studies

Land and Resources, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of 

Agriculture, and the PLA. The Rights Protection 

Leading Small Group also solicits guidance 

from an experts group (专家组) comprising 

leading scholars and analysts of maritime affairs. 

Unfortunately, very little open-source information is available about this organization. 彭美

[Peng Mei], 师小涵 [Shi Xiaohan], and 邢丹

[Xing Dan], 中国海警局亮剑--中国海警局诞

生终结“五龙治海” [“The China Coast Guard 

Flashes Its Sword—the Creation of the China 

Coast Guard Ends the Era of ‘Five Dragons 

Managing the Sea’”], 人民文摘 [People’s Weekly], 

no. 9 (2013), paper.people.com.cn/rmwz/

html/2013-09/01/content_1307445.htm. See 

also Bonnie Glaser, “China’s Maritime Rights 

Protection Leading Small Group—Shrouded in 

Secrecy,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 

September 11, 2015, amti.csis.org/.

152. 孙安然 [Sun Anran], 中国海监训练基地落户

海军蚌埠士官学校 [“CMS Training Base Set 

Up at the Navy’s Bengbu NCO School”], 中国海

洋报 [China Ocean News], November 22, 2011, 

p. 1.

153. 周和建 [Zhou Hejian] and 李国军 [Li Guojun], 

东海总队组织船载直升机地勤操作培训

[“The East Sea Fleet Organizes Training on 

Landing on Ships”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean 

News], April 26, 2011, p. 6.

154. For instance, Sr. Capt. Feng Liang of the PLAN 

Command College has done work on these 

issues. See Ryan D. Martinson, “Panning for 

Gold: Assessing Chinese Maritime Strategy from 

Primary Sources,” Naval War College Review 69, 

no. 3 (Summer 2016), p. 33.

155. 张惠荣 [Zhang Huirong], 十年海监精气神 继

往开来新篇章 [“Ten Years of CMS Spirit: Looking Back While Embarking on a New Chapter”], 

中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], October 

28, 2008, p. 2. At the time he wrote this article, 

Zhang was the director of the SOA’s East Sea 

Branch. Zhang writes that the 2002 crisis led to 

the “creation of a coordination mechanism 

[协调机制] for Chinese diplomats, CMS, and 

the military.” For a primary-source Chinese 

account of the CMS role in monitoring the 

Japanese salvage operation, see 刘振东 [Liu 

Zhendong], 一次难忘的东海海上较量: 东海不

明国籍沉船事件专项维权执法侧记 [“An Unforgettable Maritime Contest in the East China 

Sea: A Partial Account of the Rights-Protection/

Law-Enforcement Operation following an Incident Involving the Sinking of an Unidentified 

Foreign Vessel in the East China Sea”], 海洋开

发与管理 [Ocean Development and Management], no. 10 (2008), pp. 47–49.

156. 张惠荣 [Zhang Huirong], 以十七大精神统领

东海区海洋行政管理工作 [“Using the Spirit 

of the 17th Party Congress to Lead Maritime 

Administration of the East Sea Area”], 中国海

洋报 [China Ocean News], December 11, 2007, 

p. 2. This article refers to the need to strengthen 

the mechanism as it existed between the CMS 

East Sea Contingent and the PLAN East Sea 

Fleet. See also 王林强 [Wang Linqiang], 守护好

北海, 为子孙后代造福——专访国家海洋局北

海分局局长洪福忠 [“Protecting the North Sea, 

Creating Happiness for Future Generations—an 

Interview with the Director of the North Sea 

Branch of SOA Hong Fuzhong”], 中国网 [China 

Online], June 12, 2012, fangtan.china.com.cn/

zhuanti/sdxf/2012-06/12/content_25626475 

.htm.

157. See, for instance, 王秋蓉 [Wang Qiurong], 理顺

体制机制 提升执法层次——中国海监总队印

发《中国海监2010年工作要点》 [“Improve 

the System and Improve the Quality of Law 

Enforcement—China Marine Surveillance Issues Its ‘CMS Highlights of 2010’”], 中国海洋

报 [China Ocean News], March 23, 2010, p. 4. 

See also 维护国家海洋权益服务海洋经济发

展——国家海洋局南海分局海洋事业发展巡

礼 [“Safeguard Maritime Rights and Interests 

and Serve Marine Economic Development—a 

Summary of the Development of the Southern 

Branch of SOA”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean 

News], March 9, 2012, p. 8.

158. In a January 2014 report, the then SOA director 

(and CCG political commissar), Liu Cigui, 

called for the “deepening of the maritime 

coordination mechanism used by the military 

and the China Coast Guard.” Taken at face value, 

this would suggest that such a mechanism had 

been put into place already. However, given that 

the China Coast Guard had been set up just 

half a year earlier, Liu may have been referring 

to the longstanding CMS-PLAN mechanism. 

推动海洋强国建设不断取得新成就——刘

赐贵在全国海洋工作会议上所作工作报告

摘编 [“Achieve Results in the Construction of 

China into a Maritime Power—Excerpts from 

the Report Given by Liu Cigui at the National 

Maritime Work Meeting”], 中国海洋报 [China 

Ocean News], January 17, 2014, p. 3. Prior to 

2014, China Maritime Police forces seldom 

operated in disputed waters and therefore lacked 

mechanisms for coordinating with the PLA 

Navy. Now that former China Maritime Police 

forces are operating along the maritime frontier, 

such mechanisms must be established, but as of 

mid-2014 they had not been. See 梁卫华 [Liang 

Weihua] and 严春梅 [Yan Chunmei], 论海军

海警联合行动的装备保障 [“On Equipment 

Support for Navy and Coast Guard Joint Operations”], 公安海警学院学报 [Journal of China 
echelon defense 77

Maritime Police Academy] 13, no. 3 (September 

2014), pp. 47–48. The authors, both affiliated 

with the PLA Navy, acknowledge the existence 

of such a mechanism between China Marine 

Surveillance and the PLA Navy, but point out 

that the China Maritime Police and the PLA 

Navy lack such a mechanism.

159. As of 2004, two CMS officers reported that 

“the two services have formed preliminary 

work mechanisms for intelligence sharing and 

coordination, and these are effective to a certain 

degree.” 吴强 [Wu Qiang] and 赵胜汝 [Zhao 

Shengru], 海洋权益维护执法对策分析 [“An 

Analysis of Measures for Law Enforcement to 

Safeguard Maritime Rights and Interests”], 海洋

开发与管理 [Ocean Development and Management], no. 6 (2004), p. 41.

160. In a late 2015 article, a professor from the PLAN 

University of Engineering lamented that China 

had “not even come close to a situation where 

information was adequately shared” among the 

coast guard, navy, and other government entities 

involved in the handling of maritime crises. 陈

仕平 [Chen Shiping] and 孙君 [Sun Jun], 简

论新形势下优化多元主体应对海上危机机

制 [“A Brief Discussion of Ways to Enhance 

the Mechanisms for Multiple Entities Handling 

Maritime Crisis in the New Situation”], 海军工

程大学学报 [Journal of the Naval University of 

Engineering] 12, no. 4 (December 2015), p. 34.

161. 刘斌 [Liu Bin], 张璐 [Zhang Lu], and 房硕

[Fang Shuo], 中国在南海的真实存在 [“China’s 

Real Presence in the South China Sea”], 南方

周末 [Southern Weekend], July 22, 2011, www 

.infzm.com/content/61522.

162. A 2015 Office of Naval Intelligence report 

indicates that most coast guard vessels use 

commercial-grade hardware. Office of Naval 

Intelligence, The PLA Navy, p. 46. Authoritative Chinese sources call for the two services to 

integrate their C4ISR systems, suggesting that 

such integration does not yet exist. Writing in 

late 2014, a professor at the China Maritime 

Police Academy states that command, control, 

communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems 

installed on CCG vessels must be “interconnected” (互联) with PLAN C3I systems. 赵伟东

[Zhao Weidong], 中国海警力量体系建设——

基于新海防安全观的思考 [“Constructing a 

System for China Coast Guard Forces—Thinking Based on the New Concept of Maritime 

Defense Security”], 公安海警学院学报 [Journal 

of China Maritime Police Academy] 13, no. 4 

(December 2014), p. 54. Li Peizhi, a professor at 

the PAP Academy, writes that the China Coast 

Guard should “attach importance to establishing 

C4ISR automated command systems that are 

compatible with those of the navy.” Li Peizhi, 

“Ideas on Reform of the China Coast Guard,” p. 

53. Technical incompatibility between command 

systems is also lamented by Sr. Col. Wang Deli in 

an early 2016 article in National Defense. Wang 

writes, “The civilian and military forces taking 

part in joint control operations have different 

methods of command and each method has a 

different level of technological sophistication. 

Standards of construction are different, compatibility [兼容性] and interoperability [互通性] are 

fairly poor, and it is difficult to achieve timely 

sharing and rapid processing of command 

information.” 王德礼 [Wang Deli], 海防管控联

合行动指挥体制构建问题探悉 [“An Examination of Questions Associated with Constructing 

a Command System for Joint Maritime Defense 

Control Operations”], 国防 [National Defense], 

no. 1 (2016), p. 72. Fisheries Law Enforcement, for instance, used the “FLE Management 

Command System” (中国渔政管理指挥系统), 

which was launched in November 2007. As of 

early 2017, this web-based system had not been 

supplanted by a CCG system. For background 

on the creation of this system, see 运用现代信

息技术全面提升渔政管理能力——就中国渔

政管理指挥系统功能及应用前景访农业部渔

业局局长、中国渔政指挥中心主任李健华

[“Use Modern Information Technology to Fully 

Raise Fisheries Law Enforcement Management 

Capabilities—an Interview with the Director of 

the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries Department / Director of the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command Li Jianhua about the Function 

and Prospects for Use of the Fisheries Law Enforcement Management Command System”], 中

国水产 [China Fisheries], no. 12 (2007), pp. 6–7. 

The Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for Development 

of Informatization of Agriculture and Rural 

Areas records the establishment of this system 

as an achievement of the period of the Twelfth 

Five-Year Plan (2011–15), which indicates it 

took several years before the system was fully 

operational. 《“十三五”全国农业农村信息

化发展规划》 [“Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for 

Development of Informatization of Agriculture 

and Rural Areas”], 中华人民共和国农业部

[PRC Ministry of Agriculture], August 29, 2016, 

www.moa.gov.cn/govpublic/SCYJJXXS/201609/

t20160901_5260726.htm.

163. Joshua Hickey, interviews by author, various 

times.

164. 虞起正 [Yu Qizheng] and 姜峰 [Jiang Feng], 中

国海军东海舰队举行“海神一2014” 海上作战

支援实兵演练 [“The PLA Navy East Sea Fleet 

Holds ‘Haishen-2014,’ a Maritime Operational 

Support Exercise”], 新华网 [Xinhua Online], 

September 14, 2014, news.xinhuanet.com/

mil/2014-09/14/c_1112473605.htm.
78 china maritime studies

165. 中国在南海举行大型维权演习: 三军出动

轰6临空支援 [“China Holds a Large-Scale 

Rights-Protection Exercise in the South China 

Sea: H-6 Bombers Provide Support”], 新浪

[Sina], August 31, 2016, mil.news.sina.com.cn/

china/2016-08-31/doc-ifxvixeq0804933.shtml. 

This article was released originally by a PLAN 

social media account.

166. 赵长宏 [Zhao Changhong], 巡海护礁写忠诚

[“Being Loyal While Patrolling the Ocean and 

Safeguarding Reefs”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 

June 13, 2014, p. 3.

167. In this monograph, dispute strategy refers to 

China’s overall national approach to handling 

its maritime disputes. Echelon defense is one 

component of dispute strategy.

168. 全面建设小康社会, 开创中国特色社会主义

事业新局面——在中国共产党第十六次全国

代表大会上的报告 [“Comprehensively Build a 

Moderately Well-Off Society, Inaugurate a New 

Situation in Which to Pursue Socialism with 

Chinese Characteristics—Report from the 16th 

Congress of the Chinese Communist Party”], 

November 17, 2002, Xinhua, news.xinhuanet 

.com/newscenter/2002-11/17/content_632239 

.htm.

169. Stability maintenance (i.e., weiwen) diplomacy

is defined as “a foreign policy that emphasizes 

the big picture, seeks common ground while 

maintaining differences, prioritizing stability, 

minimizing disputes, using economic relations 

to advance political relations, giving more 

than taking, and exercising a high degree of 

restraint.” The purpose of weiwen diplomacy 

is to “seize and fully exploit the 20-year period 

of strategic opportunity, to create a comparatively advantageous peripheral environment 

for China’s peaceful rise.” 王生 [Wang Sheng] 

and 罗肖 [Luo Xiao], 国际体系转型与中国周

边外交之变: 从维稳到维权 [“The Transition 

in the International System and the Change in 

China’s Diplomacy toward Its Neighbors: From 

Maintaining Stability to Safeguarding Rights”], 

现代国际关系 [Contemporary International Relations], no. 1 (2013), p. 9. Chinese concern for 

stability has roots in the 1980s, when Chinese 

leaders adopted the policy of “shelving disputes 

and engaging in joint development” (搁置争

议, 共同开发). For a recent discussion of this 

policy, including its lack of tangible outcomes, 

see 温勇 [Wen Yong], 新形势下维护海洋权益

解决海洋争议的思考—对邓小平 “主权属我, 

搁置争议, 共同开发” 思想的再探讨 [“Considerations on Safeguarding Maritime Rights and 

Interests and Resolving Maritime Disputes in 

the New Situation—a Reconsideration of Deng 

Xiaoping’s Ideas on ‘Sovereignty Belongs to 

China, Shelve the Disputes, and Engage in Joint 

Development’”], 中国军事科学 [China Military 

Science], no. 2 (2015), pp. 67–74.

170. In the words of a professor at the China Maritime Police Academy, to rely too heavily on the 

PLA Navy to regulate peacetime activities in 

disputed waters would “easily give rise to the 

vigilance [警觉] of other states.” 张辉 [Zhang 

Hui], 海上安全形势与中国海上安全 [“The 

Maritime Security Situation and China’s Maritime Security”], 国防 [National Defense], no. 1 

(2011), p. 16. 

171. 必须加强维护海洋权益提高保护海上运输的

能力 [“We Must Strengthen Efforts to Safeguard 

Maritime Rights and Interests and Improve Our 

Ability to Protect Marine Shipping”], 中国海洋

报 [China Ocean News], March 9, 2010, p. 3.

172. Li Peizhi, “Ideas on Reform of the China Coast 

Guard,” p. 53.

173. 徐焰 [Xu Yan], 中菲南海争执几十年 [“On 

the Past Several Decades of China-Philippine 

Contention in the South China Sea”], 学习时报

[Study Times], May 24, 2012, theory.people.com 

.cn/GB/49157/17979636.html. The author, Xu 

Yan, is a professor in the Strategic Studies Department of China’s National Defense University. 

He writes of China’s preference for placing coast 

guard vessels on the front line: “In character, 

it is not a military operation. It is maritime 

law enforcement. In the context of doing one’s 

utmost not to allow the situation to escalate 

into a conflict, this approach can compel the 

opponent to stop an action. From the perspective of international law, it will make it hard for 

outside states thinking about intervening to find 

a pretext to do so.”

174. 王琦 [Wang Qi] et al., 海洋行政管理学

[Maritime Administrative Management] (Beijing: 

People’s, 2013), p. 32. Preference for maritime 

law enforcement fits with China’s general 

approach for handling international disputes. 

Doing so, writes PLAN senior captain Zhang 

Junshe, allows China to “show its indisputable 

jurisdictional rights in claimed waters, while 

at the same time handling any conflicts with 

justification [有理], in a manner to China’s 

advantage [有利], and with restraint [有节].” 

This expression “with justification, in a manner 

to China’s advantage, and with restraint” (有理, 

有利, 有节) frequently appears in discussions 

pertaining to China’s dispute policy. It comes 

from a March 1940 Mao Zedong memo entitled 

“On the Question of Strategy with Respect to 

a United Front in the War against Japan” 

(《目前抗日统一战线中的策略问题》). For 

more on this term, see Alastair Iain Johnston, 

“The Evolution of Interstate Security CrisisManagement Theory and Practice in China,” 

Naval War College Review 69, no. 1 (Winter 
echelon defense 79

2016), p. 35. The PLA Navy is also guided by the 

“justification, advantage, restraint” principle. 

This commonly is used to describe the approach 

of PLAN surface vessels when conducting 

combat-readiness patrols in disputed waters. 侯

瑞 [Hou Rui] and 王志鹏 [Wang Zhipeng], 闻

令动若风发--感受东海舰队某驱逐舰支队

战斗作风 [“In Fine Fettle—Experiencing the 

Combat Spirit of an East Sea Fleet Destroyer 

Unit”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], December 1, 

2014, p. 1; Li Jingwei, “Tempering Combat Spirit 

in the Far Seas,” p. 3.

175. Wu Hanyue, The History of CCP Maritime 

Defense Thought, p. 142.

176. There is evidence that China has intentionally 

provoked foreign leaders into making decisions 

that invite Chinese aggression. See Ryan Martinson and Katsuya Yamamoto, “Three PLAN 

Officers May Have Just Revealed What China 

Wants in the South China Sea,” National Interest,

July 9, 2017, nationalinterest.org/feature/three 

-plan-officers-may-have-just-revealed-what 

-china-wants-21458.

177. You Ji, Deciphering Beijing’s Maritime Security 

Policy and Strategy in Managing Sovereignty Disputes in the China Seas, Policy Brief (Singapore: 

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 

October 1, 2013), available at www.rsis.edu.sg/. 

For an account of Japan’s decision to purchase 

the islands, see Sheila A. Smith, Intimate Rivals: 

Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China

(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2015), pp. 

224–28.

178. 张海文: 当前海洋局势及我国海洋战略的思考

[“Zhang Haiwen: The Current Maritime Situation 

and Thoughts on China’s Maritime Strategy”], 中

国出版网 [China Publishing], www.chuban.cc/

tpxw/201409/t20140930_159639.html.

179. China’s incrementalist approach is recognized 

widely by American scholars and analysts. See, 

for example, Elbridge Colby et al., “Tailored Coercion: Competition and Risk in Maritime Asia,” 

Center for a New American Security, March 

21, 2014, www.cnas.org/publications/reports/

tailored-coercion-competition-and-risk-in 

-maritime-asia. See also Robert Haddick, 

“Salami Slicing in the South China Sea,” 

Foreign Policy, August 3, 2012, foreignpolicy 

.com/2012/08/03/salami-slicing-in-the-south 

-china-sea/.

180. For more on the Shi and Li comments, see 

Ryan D. Martinson, “China’s Great Balancing Act Unfolds: Enforcing Maritime Rights 

vs. Stability,” National Interest, September 11, 

2015, nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-great 

-balancing-act-unfolds-enforcing-maritime 

-rights-13821. A 2014 report published by the 

National Institute for South China Sea Studies 

declared that in 2014 “China built fortifications 

after each new advance, searching for a balance 

point between rights protection and safeguarding regional peace, stability, and development.” 

王子谦 [Wang Ziqian], 《2014年南海地区形势

评估报告》出版发行 [“2014 Report on the Situation in the South China Sea Is Published”], 中

国新闻网 [China News], August 27, 2015, www 

.chinanews.com/gn/2015/08-27/7493341.shtml. 

For an authoritative Chinese source outlining 

the principle of gradual or “step-by-step resolution” (逐步解决) of China’s maritime disputes 

instead of “achieving objectives in one big move” 

(一蹴而就), see Wu Hanyue, The History of CCP 

Maritime Defense Thought, pp. 143–44.

181. Linda Jakobson made the most empirically 

satisfying effort to bear out this thesis in “China’s 

Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors.” M. 

Taylor Fravel also has suggested that Chinese 

behavior at sea may be “a product of either 

bureaucratic autonomy or a competition among 

different departments for greater resources 

and authority.” M. Taylor Fravel, “Prepared 

Statement for Hearing on ‘Investigating the 

China Threat, Part One: Military and Economic 

Aggression,” House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 28, 2012, archives.republicans 

.foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA00 

-WState-FravelT-20120328.pdf.

182. Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and 

Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia Univ. 

Press, 2012), pp. 199–201.

183. Andrew Chubb closely examined five major cases 

of Chinese maritime assertiveness and found 

little evidence of popular nationalism as a driver 

of policy decisions. Andrew Chubb, “Nationalism as a Driver of Chinese Maritime Behavior” 

(paper delivered at the China Maritime Studies 

Institute annual conference, Newport, RI, May 

2–3, 2017).

184. The coast guard is often identified as the most 

important instrument for safeguarding Chinese 

maritime rights and interests in peacetime. See, 

for instance, Duan Zhaoxian, “On Strategic 

Objectives for Building China into a Maritime 

Power,” p. 24. In a July 2011 speech commemorating the five-year anniversary of “regular rightsprotection patrols” and the commissioning of 

CMS 50, SOA director Liu Cigui referred to 

China Marine Surveillance as “the primary force 

for safeguarding maritime rights and interests 

in peacetime.” 中国海监定期维权巡航执法

五周年总结表彰大会暨“中国海监50”船入列

仪式举行 [“An Awards Ceremony for the Fifth 

Anniversary of CMS Regular Rights-Protection 

Patrols Was Held Together with a Ceremony for 
80 china maritime studies

the Commissioning of CMS 50 ”], 海洋开发与

管理 [Ocean Development and Management], 

no. 8 (2011), p. 3. For further discussion of the 

advantages of using maritime law-enforcement 

forces as instruments in dispute policy, see 张辉

[Zhang Hui], 论加强中国海洋执法力度的途径

[“On Approaches to Strengthening China’s Maritime Law Enforcement”], 社会纵横 [Social Sciences Review], no. 1 (2014), p. 77. As one CMS 

officer noted, “To avoid escalation, frontline law 

enforcement is usually carried out by maritime 

law-enforcement ships and aircraft.” Wu Qiang 

and Zhao Shengru, “An Analysis of Measures for 

Law Enforcement to Safeguard Maritime Rights 

and Interests,” p. 41. In the words of one professor at the People’s Armed Police Academy, “Due 

to the sensitivity of its status, it is inconvenient 

for the navy to handle incidents involving 

maritime disputes in peacetime. By not using 

the navy, China can avoid an inadvertent armed 

clash [擦枪走火] or escalation.” Li Peizhi, “Ideas 

on Reform of the China Coast Guard,” p. 53.

185. The Chinese surface fleet is not the only tool 

on which China relies to advance strategic 

objectives in its maritime disputes. Indeed, 

China can leverage (and has leveraged) many 

different instruments of state power to persuade 

other states to accept—or acquiesce to—China’s 

claims. These include economic and diplomatic 

levers. For example, China has pressured other 

disputants by halting the export of Chinese 

commodities (such as rare earths to Japan) and 

impeding the import of foreign products, such 

as bananas from the Philippines. Moreover, the 

PRC has other military tools that might be used 

to dissuade foreign states from acting in ways 

that harm Chinese interests. These include other 

components of the PLA Navy, such as submarines and aircraft; the PLA Air Force; and the 

PLA Rocket Force (formerly called the Second 

Artillery). But despite their important roles on 

the modern battlefield, none of these other tools 

can match the political and military value of the 

surface vessel in the type of peacetime strategy 

China is pursuing. Aircraft can fly to trouble 

spots, but must soon return to base. To signal 

intentions, shore-based missiles can be moved to 

the scene of a controversy, or they can be fired as 

part of a test or exercise. However, short of using 

force, most of these instruments have limited 

ability to impact human activity at sea. The 

stealth of submarines makes them an excellent 

instrument of warfare, but this same attribute 

limits their utility as tools of diplomacy. Surface 

vessels, by contrast, combine mobility, visibility, 

and endurance. As a result of these qualities, 

they provide leaders a range of options to communicate intentions. They also present diverse 

options for following through with threats 

without using armed force, including nonlethal 

means such as bumping and use of water cannon. This makes them the most effective tool to 

communicate threats to foreign mariners, and 

thereby directly influence events at sea. Chinese 

expansion in maritime East Asia rests largely on 

the movements of its fleets. Other components 

of maritime power can play and have played a 

role in Chinese strategy. These include the energy and fishing industries. By empowering Chinese firms to operate in disputed areas, Chinese 

leaders can put pressure on other disputants and 

help justify the presence of Chinese cutters and 

warships to protect them. As will be discussed in 

part 4, encouraging Chinese economic activities 

in disputed waters is a key prong of China’s dispute strategy, and one that relies heavily on the 

support of China’s naval and coast guard forces. 

China’s “maritime militia” (海上民兵) is another 

instrument used to assert Chinese claims, but it 

does not fall neatly into the categories above. It is 

a component of China’s “armed forces,” yet those 

elements active in disputed waters often are 

disguised as civilian mariners, especially fishermen. Indeed, any given voyage may involve both 

militia and private (i.e., economic) activities. 

The militia sometimes works closely with 

Chinese naval and coast guard forces operating 

on the front line. In sum, surface vessels are 

excellent platforms with which to signal Chinese 

intentions to other states. If signaling fails, they 

are capable of actually imposing China’s will on 

foreign mariners without using armed force. 

Both of these advantages are well recognized by 

Chinese strategists and the sailors who actually 

exploit them. For more on China’s geoeconomic 

tools, see Karen Lema, Manuel Mogato, and 

Chris Buckley, “Philippines Seeks New Markets 

amid Sea Dispute with China,” Reuters, May 17, 

2012, www.reuters.com/article/uk-philippines 

-china-idUSLNE84G02520120517. See also 

Smith, Intimate Rivals, pp. 192–93. For an alternative view on China’s rare-earth embargo, see 

Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive 

Is China’s New Assertiveness?,” International 

Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 23–28. On 

China’s use of “geoeconomic” tools, see Robert 

D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, War by 

Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft

(Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard Univ. 

Press, 2016), pp. 93–128. The PLA Air Force 

has played a growing role in China’s maritime 

disputes. For instance, in July 2016 the PLA Air 

Force sent bombers, fighters, and other aircraft 

to the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal. For more 

on this, see Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga et 

al., “China Signals Resolve with Bomber Flights 

over the South China Sea,” War on the Rocks,
echelon defense 81

August 2, 2016, warontherocks.com/2016/08/

china-signals-resolve-with-bomber-flights 

-over-the-south-china-sea/. For more on the 

maritime militia’s supporting role in disputed 

areas, see 陈典宏 [Chen Dianhong], 联训联

演建强海上民兵 [“Joint Training and Joint 

Exercises to Build the Maritime Militia”], 中国

国防报 [China National Defense Newspaper], 

July 16, 2015, www.81.cn/zjsymfc/2015-07/15/

content_6587070.htm. For a discussion of the 

relationships among the militia, navy, and 

coast guard in the South China Sea, see 赵叶

苹 [Zhao Yeping] and 陈爱娣 [Chen Aidi], 南

海执法遭遇嚣张外籍船 [“South China Sea 

Law Enforcement Encounters Arrogant Foreign 

Fishing Vessels”], 国际先驱导报 [International 

Herald Leader], May 28, 2015, news.xinhuanet 

.com/herald/2015-05/28/c_134278421.htm. For 

more on the maritime militia, see the excellent 

work of Conor Kennedy and Andrew Erickson, 

especially their multipart series on militia units 

based in Hainan published by the Center for International Maritime Security. For more on the 

comparative advantages of surface vessels, see 

Wang Shiqiang and Gao Xinsheng, Comparative Research on Ocean Defense Development in 

China and Abroad, p. 429. See also Colin Gray 

and Roger Barnett, Seapower and Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), pp. 

9–13. Understanding of the particular strategic 

value of surface vessels is also evident at the 

fleet level. While patrolling the East China Sea 

in December 2012, the crew of the Type 054a 

frigate Wenzhou convened a meeting to discuss 

the merits of the surface vessel in sovereignty 

operations. One conclusion was that “the surface 

vessel has the characteristics of visibility [可视

性] and range [远洋性], making it an important 

platform for defending maritime rights and 

interests in peacetime.” 王志鹏 [Wang Zhipeng], 

海上维权血性水兵镇海疆 [“Brave Sailors on 

Maritime Rights-Protection Patrol Guard the 

Maritime Frontier”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 

January 11, 2013, p. 2.

186. There may be a view among some strategists 

in the PLA Navy that the service should play a 

more active role on the front line. For instance, 

writing in mid-2016, the former director of the 

PLAN Research Institute and a current member 

of the PLA Strategic Planning Consultative 

Committee, Wang Xiaoxuan, recommended 

that China “raise the law-enforcement status of 

Chinese naval forces and transition from the 

present role of being a support and cover force 

to a frontline law-enforcement force.” 王校轩

[Wang Xiaoxuan], 关于中国南海安全的几点

思考 [“A Few Thoughts on Security in the South 

China Sea”], 国际观察 [International Review], 

no. 4 (2016), p. 28.

187. As PLA scholar Zhang Qiliang writes, the mere 

presence of PLAN forces in Chinese-claimed 

waters “is itself a powerful carrier of deterrence 

information.” Having surface vessels conduct 

sovereignty patrols serves several functions. 

In the East China Sea, such operations remind 

other states not to “underestimate” China’s 

ability and will to protect its interests and deters 

external powers from “getting involved” (介

入) in the disputes. Naval patrols in the South 

China Sea remind other states that China is the 

most important party (主体) in the resolution of 

maritime disputes and that they should not feel 

“at ease” (心安理得) about violating Chinese 

claims, and warns them that they should not 

“strive for further gains” (得寸进尺) or “stir up 

trouble” (挑起事端). Zhang Qiliang, On Naval 

Diplomacy, pp. 267–68.

188. Edward Luttwak makes this important distinction between latent and active threats (or, in his 

words, “suasion”). Luttwak, The Political Uses of 

Sea Power, pp. 11–38.

189. 李唐 [Li Tang], 海军常态化巡逻覆盖万里海

疆 [“The Navy’s Normalized Patrols Cover the 

Ten-Thousand-Mile Maritime Border”], 人民海

军 [People’s Navy], June 23, 2014, p. 1.

190. 席志刚 [Xi Zhigang], 大陆海监打造准海岸

警卫队 [“Mainland China’s CMS Is Becoming 

a ‘Quasi–Coast Guard’”], 凤凰周刊 [Phoenix 

Weekly], no. 20 (July 13, 2012), blog.sina.com 

.cn/s/blog_5db34b3b0102w1sl.html.

191. For an authoritative description of the “combat 

readiness patrol,” see 海军政治部 [PLA Navy 

Political Department], 中国海军——维护国家

安全和发展利益的重要战略支撑 [“The PLA 

Navy—an Important Strategic Support for Safeguarding National Security and Development 

Interests”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], 

April 23, 2015, www.81.cn/jmywyl/2015-04/23/

content_6455536_4.htm. This routine presence 

in disputed waters is sometimes punctuated by 

military exercises. For instance, in May 2013 

the PLAN frigate Jiangmen conducted a livefire exercise in waters adjacent to the Spratlys. 

“Jiangmen Missile Frigate in Live-Ammunition 

Fire Training,” People’s Daily Online, May 16, 

2013, en.people.cn/90786/8245659.html.

192. For an authoritative example of this term’s use in 

Chinese sources, see 熊争艳 [Xiong Zhengyan], 

孙建国副总参谋长答《瞭望东方周刊》记

者问 [“Deputy Chief of the General Staff Sun 

Jianguo Responds to Questions from Oriental 

Outlook”], 瞭望东方周刊 [Oriental Outlook], 

March 3, 2015, www.81.cn/jwgz/2015-03/03/

content_6376746_5.htm.

193. 刘章仁 [Liu Zhangren], 论海警海军协同配

合提高海洋管控能力 [“On Coordination and 
82 china maritime studies

Cooperation between the Coast Guard and Navy 

in Order to Increase China’s Ability to Control 

the Ocean”], 公安海警学院学报 [Journal of 

China Maritime Police Academy] 13, no. 3 (September 2014), p. 53. This description appears 

in a section describing common approaches for 

coordinating coast guard and naval activities in 

peacetime operations. The author’s description 

matches observations made by the U.S. Navy. As 

the Office of Naval Intelligence noted in a 2015 

report, the Chinese navy “sometimes deploys 

surface combatants to waters adjacent to rights 

protection cutters, in apparent coordination 

with its unarmed sister service.” Office of Naval 

Intelligence, The PLA Navy, p. 45.

194. 甘俊 [Gan Jun], 南海舰队远海训练编队返

港, 海军副政委王森泰到码头迎接并讲话 [“A 

Far Seas Training Formation from the South Sea 

Fleet Returns to Port, Deputy Political Commissar of the Navy Wang Sentai Meets Them Pier 

Side and Gives a Speech”], 人民海军 [People’s 

Navy], February 12, 2014, p. 1. The ship formation sailed to James Shoal, where leaders held 

a sovereignty ceremony. 蒋涛 [Jiang Tao] and 

高毅 [Gao Yi], 中国海军南海舰队远海训练

编队巡航曾母暗沙 [“South Sea Fleet Far Seas 

Training Formation Patrols James Shoal”], 中国

新闻网 [China News], January 26, 2014, www 

.chinanews.com/mil/2014/01-26/5784019.shtml. 

A similar mission took place in March–April 

2013. It involved four surface combatants: the 

LPD Jinggangshan, the destroyer Lanzhou, and 

the frigates Yulin and Hengshui. Jinggangshan

embarked an air-cushion landing craft and a 

company of PLAN marines. The formation, 

which was commanded by South Sea Fleet commander Vice Adm. Jiang Weilie, sailed through 

the South China Sea and then through the first 

island chain into the western Pacific, completing 

a large loop. The mission lasted sixteen days. 杨

琼 [Yang Qiong], 中国海军展开战备巡逻远

海训练, 维护海权能力将提升 [“The Chinese 

Navy Conducts Combat Readiness Patrols and 

Far Seas Training, Ability to Safeguard Maritime 

Rights Will Improve”], 国际在 [China Radio 

International], March 21, 2013, gb.cri.cn/

27824/2013/03/21/6611s4060404.htm; 高毅 

[Gao Yi] and 甘俊 [Gan Jun], 远海训练成为

战斗力生成助推器 [“Far Seas Training Has 

Become a Boost for Combat Power Generation”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], April 2013, p. 

1. A similar mission took place in May 2016. It 

involved six vessels in total, all from the South 

Sea Fleet: three destroyers (Hefei, Lanzhou, and 

Guangzhou), two frigates (Sanya and Yulin),

and a comprehensive supply ship (Honghu). 

The formation sailed through the South China 

Sea, Indian Ocean, and western Pacific before 

returning home. These missions serve political 

functions, but another key focus is to improve 

the PLA Navy’s ability to fight in distant waters. 

黎友陶 [Li Youtao] and 吴登峰 [Wu Dengfeng], 

南海舰队战备巡逻远海实兵对抗训练编队起

航 [“South Sea Fleet Combat Readiness Patrol 

and Far Seas Confrontation Training Begins”], 

新华社 [Xinhua], May 4, 2016, news.xinhuanet 

.com/politics/2016-05/04/c_1118803250.htm.

195. 方立华 [Fang Lihua] and 琚振华 [Ju Zhenhua], 

海上维权联合出击 [“A Joint Attack for the 

Purpose of Maritime Rights Protection”], 人民

海军 [People’s Navy], October 22, 2012, p. 1. See 

also ODR 2013, p. 270.

196. 方立华 [Fang Lihua] et al., 铸就海上维权盾

牌—东海协作2012 军地海上联合维权演习

掠影 [“Forging a Maritime Rights-Protection 

Shield—a Glimpse at ‘East China Sea Cooperation 2012,’ a Joint Civil-Military Rights-Protection 

Exercise”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], October 

23, 2012, p. 1. The deputy commander of the 

exercise was the head of the East China Sea 

contingent of China Marine Surveillance, Liu 

Zhendong. In an interview, Liu stated that 

“PLA Navy support is vital to [离不开] China 

Marine Surveillance rights protection patrols.” 

The exercise commander was the deputy chief 

of staff of the PLAN East Sea Fleet, Chen Hao. 

The second deputy commander of the exercise 

was an FLE officer named Zhou Tong. 孙利

[Sun Li] and 方立华 [Fang Lihua], 我国成功

举行“东海协作—2012”军地海上联合维权演

习 [“China Successfully Holds East China Sea 

Cooperation–2012 Civil-Military Joint RightsProtection Exercise”], 中广网 [China National 

Radio Online], October 19, 2012, mil.cnr.cn/jstp/

yczp/201210/t20121019_511168583.html.

197. For example, on June 22 an amphibious assault 

unit conducted a live fire exercise while under 

simulated attack. 黎友陶 [Li Youtao], 顾亚根

[Gu Yagen], and 李伟 [Li Wei], 南海舰队某登

陆舰支队组织实战条件下实弹射击演练 [“A 

South Sea Fleet Amphibious Unit Organizes a 

Live-Fire Exercise under Realistic Conditions”], 

中国新闻网 [China News], June 23, 2016, www 

.chinanews.com/mil/2016/06-23/7915174.shtml.

198. 黎友陶 [Li Youtao] and 陈国全 [Chen Guoquan], 海军三大舰队在南海举行实兵对抗演

习 [“The Navy’s Three Fleets Conduct a Confrontation Exercise Involving Real Forces in the 

South China Sea”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], July 

9, 2016, p. 1. See also 陈国全 [Chen Guoquan] 

and 肖永 [Xiao Yong], 南海点兵, 三大舰队背

靠背立体攻防 [“Forces in the South China Sea, 

Three Fleets Back to Back Three-Dimensional 

Attack and Defense”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], 

July 13, 2016, p. 1, and 郭媛丹 [Guo Yuandan], 

专家解析我南海军演:4上将坐镇3大舰队出

动战役级规模! [“Experts Analyze Exercises in 
echelon defense 83

the South China Sea: 4 Flag Officers Involved, 

3 Fleets Combine for an Exercise of Campaign 

Scale!”], 环球时报 [Global Times], July 9, 2016, 

w.huanqiu.com/r/MV8wXzkxNDgzMzFfM 

TM4XzE0NjgwNDQyNDA=. Another article 

published in an authoritative newspaper run 

by the State Oceanic Administration claimed 

that the purpose of the exercise was to send 

a signal to the United States, specifically, “to 

convey the powerful will of the Chinese people 

and the Chinese navy to resolutely safeguard 

state sovereignty.” Liu Zhenglv, “In Recent Years, 

the PLA Navy Has Been Advancing!” At the 

time, the United States had augmented its naval 

presence in the region, presumably to signal 

America’s resolve not to tolerate PRC aggression 

in the period prior to and following the tribunal 

decision. See, for instance, “Two Carrier Strike 

Groups Double Down in Western Pacific,” U.S. 

Navy, June 18, 2016, www.navy.mil/submit/ 

display.asp?story_id=95284.

199. Xu Yan, “On the Past Several Decades of ChinaPhilippine Contention in the South China Sea.”

200. For a civilian discussion of this “backstop” function, see 陈明义 [Chen Mingyi], 切实加强维

护海洋权益工作 [“Earnestly Strengthen Work 

on Maritime Rights and Interests”], 中国海洋报

[China Ocean News], May 8, 2013, p. 1. China’s 

2013 national defense white paper describes this 

function as providing “security guarantees” (安

全保障) for maritime law-enforcement rightsprotection operations. Information Office of 

the State Council, The Diversified Employment 

of China’s Armed Forces. SOA analysts have 

called the PLA Navy an “important defensive 

military force” working in conjunction with 

Chinese maritime law enforcement to safeguard 

maritime rights and interests. ODR 2011, p. 124. 

As early as 2004, CMS officers acknowledged 

that when their service conducted frontline 

rights-protection operations, “in special situations, PLA Navy ships and aircraft hang back 

and provide security guarantees.” Wu Qiang and 

Zhao Shengru, “An Analysis of Measures for 

Law Enforcement to Safeguard Maritime Rights 

and Interests.”

201. Wu Hanyue, The History of CCP Maritime 

Defense Thought, p. 90.

202. Vice Admiral Huang emphasized this point 

when he was asked about the intensifying “rightsprotection” situation in early 2013. 刘川 [Liu 

Chuan] et al., “两会”代表委员高度评价盛赞中

国海监 [“Representatives to the Two Meetings 

Praise China Marine Surveillance”], 中国海洋

报 [China Ocean News], March 4, 2013, p. 1.

203. 崔鲸涛 [Cui Jingtao], 建设海洋强国要以强大

的海军作支撑——海军军事学术研究所研究

员张炜谈十八大报告 [“Building China into a 

Maritime Power with Support from a Powerful 

Navy Serves—Naval Research Institute Researcher Zhang Wei Talks about the 18th Party 

Congress Work Report”], 中国海洋报 [China 

Ocean News], November 14, 2012, p. 2.

204. There is another school of thought in the PLA 

Navy that recognizes that “in modern wars at 

sea if you don’t fire the first shot, then you won’t 

have a chance to fire the second shot” (现代化

海战打不出第一枪, 就没有机会打1出第二

枪). 王万峰 [Wang Wanfeng], 兵撒大洋, 如何

做到攥指成拳? [“With Forces Spread All over 

the Ocean, How Do We Form a Fist?”], 人民海

军 [People’s Navy], November 25, 2013, p. 3.

205. Hayton, The South China Sea, pp. 82–83.

206. For a useful general discussion of the roles of 

navies and other maritime forces in “picture 

building,” see Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide 

for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 264–65.

207. 蓝疆卫士 [“Blue Border Guards”], 走遍中

国 [Traveling around China], 南海纪行 [South 

China Sea Travel Notes series], episode 8, aired 

December 31, 2013, by China Central Television 

(CCTV), available at news.cntv.cn/2013/12/31/

VIDE1388496485764597.shtml/.

208. 孙运道 [Sun Yundao], 能打胜仗的“铁军”——

中国海监北海维权支队强队之梦 [“The ‘Iron 

Army’ That Can Win Wars—the Dreams of the 

CMS North Sea Rights-Protection Detachment”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], May 

10, 2013, p. 4; 吕宁 [Lv Ning], 特别能吃苦特

别能战斗——记“人民满意的公务员集体”中

国海监东海维权执法支队 [“Extremely Able 

to Eat Bitterness and Engage in Combat—a 

Record of the CMS East Sea Rights-Protection 

Law-Enforcement Detachment], 中国海洋报

[China Ocean News], December 20, 2013, p. 4. 

Also see 秦昕 [Qin Xi] and 罗茜 [Luo Qian], 海

上忠实的瞭瞭望与记录--记中国海监南海维

权执法支队执法队 [“Loyalty at Sea: A Profile 

of the China Marine Surveillance South China 

Sea Rights-Protection Law-Enforcement Detachment”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 

October 21, 2016, p. 3. Members of rightsprotection law-enforcement detachments work 

closely with the Tianjin-based National Maritime Information Center (国家海洋信息中心), 

an organization overseen by the State Oceanic 

Administration. For information on its role in 

supporting rights-protection operations, see 徐

胜 [Xu Sheng], 改革创新 开创海洋信息工作新

局面 [“Reform and Innovation to Create a New 

Situation for Maritime Information Work”], 中

国海洋报 [China Ocean News], March 5, 2014, 

p. 1. See also 中国海洋年鉴编纂委员会 [China 

Ocean Yearbook Compilation Committee], 2014 
84 china maritime studies

中国海洋年鉴 [2014 China Ocean Yearbook] 

(Beijing: Ocean, 2014), pp. 277–78.

209. 王庆 [Wang Qing], 紧扣实战, 一路巡航一路

练——东海舰队某驱逐舰支队锤炼官兵打赢

本领 [“Focus on Warfighting, Training While on 

Patrol—an East Sea Fleet Destroyer Unit Trains 

Sailors on the Skills Needed to Win a War”], 人

民海军 [People’s Navy], October 25, 2014, p. 2.

210. 赵向虎 [Zhao Xianghu] and 陈显龄 [Chen 

Xianling], “千里眼”, 难见父亲最后一面

[“Known as the ‘Man Who Saw Everything,’ He 

Could Not See His Father One Last Time”], 人

民海军 [People’s Navy], November 18, 2014, p. 2.

211. 陆凯 [Lu Kai], 用法理依据捍卫海洋权益, 培养

取证人才队伍摸索取证部署模式 [“Use Legal 

Evidence to Defend Maritime Rights and Interests, Cultivate Evidence-Collection Personnel 

and Explore Models for Evidence Collection”], 

人民海军 [People’s Navy], April 29, 2014, p. 1. 

See also 王志鹏 [Wang Zhipeng], 军舰出海文

书新任“取证员” [“When the Ship Puts to Sea 

the Secretary Becomes the ‘Evidence Collector’”], 

人民海军 [People’s Navy], March 11, 2013, p. 3.

212. 李静杰 [Li Jingjie], 取证人员有了固定战位

[“Evidence-Collection Personnel Have Been 

Given Fixed Roles”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 

November 4, 2013, p. 2.

213. One mid-2011 account claims that “more than 

90 percent of foreign special mission vessels 

are first discovered by Chinese fishing trawlers, which then report the information to the 

relevant departments.” Liu Bin, Zhang Lu, and 

Fang Shuo, “China’s Real Presence in the South 

China Sea.”

214. In April 1978, China did send dozens of fishing 

vessels to waters adjacent to the islands to put 

pressure on Japan during the negotiations of the 

Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. 

Daniel Tretiak, “The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 

1978: The Senkaku Incident Prelude,” Asian 

Survey 18, no. 12 (December 1978), pp. 1235–49. 

Others argue that this decision stemmed from 

Chinese domestic politics. Reinhard Drifte, “The 

Japan-China Confrontation over the Senkaku/

Diaoyu Islands—between ‘Shelving’ and ‘Dispute Escalation,’” Asia-Pacific Journal 12, iss. 30, 

no. 3 (July 27, 2014), p. 16, apjjf.org/-Reinhard 

-Drifte/4154/article.pdf.

215. “Trends in Chinese Government and Other 

Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku 

Islands, and Japan’s Response: Records of 

Intrusions of Chinese Government and Other 

Vessels into Japan’s Territorial Sea,” Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs of Japan, www.mofa.go.jp/region/

page23e_000021.html.

216. 郁志荣 [Yu Zhirong], 钓鱼岛海域常态化巡航

执法须高度重视 [“We Must Place Heavy Emphasis on Normalized Law-Enforcement Patrols 

in the Waters of the Diaoyu Islands”], 军事文摘

[Military Digest], no. 3 (2014), p. 13.

217. 徐春柳 [Xu Chunliu], 中国海监总队: 中国海

监将加强对争议海域管辖 [“China Marine 

Surveillance: CMS Will Strengthen Its Jurisdiction over Disputed Waters”], 中国网 [China 

Online], December 10, 2008, www.china.com 

.cn/policy/txt/2008-12/10/content_16924510 

.htm. CMS officer Liu Zhendong explained 

a similar rationale for the 12-8 mission: “It is 

not in China’s interest to let the Diaoyu Island 

issue cool down. We must stir it up. If we do not 

take action, according to international custom 

it might become Japan’s after 50 years” (p. 12). 

Aside from entering the territorial sea (which 

was the most important objective of this mission), the second most important objective was 

to “collect information on waters surrounding 

the feature,” which China lacked because its 

vessels had never been there before (p. 11). 中

国海监巡航钓鱼岛三周年记 [“A Look at the 

Three-Year Anniversary of the First CMS Patrol 

to Diaoyu Island”], 东西南北 [East West South 

North], no. 24 (2012), pp. 10–12.

218. From January 2009 to August 2010, no Chinese 

vessel entered the contiguous zone or territorial 

sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands. “Trends in 

Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the 

Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands.”

219. China blamed Japan for the collision. The subsequent release of a video by a member of the 

Japan Coast Guard shows the Chinese trawler 

to be at fault. The video is available on YouTube: 

www.youtube.com/watch?v=LhtPsskJe5k.

220. For a very good recounting of the sequence of 

events following the ramming incident, see Jessica Chen Weiss, Powerful Patriots: Nationalist 

Protest in China’s Foreign Relations (New York: 

Oxford Univ. Press, 2014), pp. 168–75.

221. The Japanese citizens were released a few days 

after the release of Zhan Qixiong. Smith, Intimate Rivals, pp. 191, 193.

222. Ibid., p. 192.

223. The local prosecutor cited the “effect on the 

people of our nation and China-Japan relations” 

as the key reason for releasing Zhan Qixiong. 

Weiss, Powerful Patriots, p. 176.

224. One authoritative account states that the purpose was to “engage in fisheries management activities according to the relevant laws, safeguard 

order with respect to fisheries production, and 

protect the security of Chinese fishermen and 

their property.” ODR 2011, p. 491.
echelon defense 85

225. FLE 201 departed Shanghai on September 

23 and arrived near the Senkakus at 1600 the 

next day. Outmatched in size and numbers 

(and perhaps seamanship), FLE 201 and FLE 

203 were blocked physically from entering the 

territorial sea by the Japan Coast Guard. The 

Chinese reporter was Cheng Gang, from the 

Global Times. 程刚 [Cheng Gang], 钓鱼岛巡航

日记一: 我船员智斗日本巡逻舰 [“Diary Entry 

1 of Diaoyu Island Patrol: My Shipmates Vie 

with Japanese Patrol Ships”], 环球网 [Huanqiu 

Online], September 23, 2010, world.huanqiu 

.com/roll/2010-09/1130288.html. See also 程刚

[Cheng Gang], 钓鱼岛巡航日记二: 中国渔政

船驶近钓鱼岛 日本海空联手纠缠堵截 [“Diary 

Entry 2 of Diaoyu Island Patrol: China Fisheries 

Law Enforcement Vessel Approaches Diaoyu 

Island While Japan Tries to Block It from the 

Air and Sea”], 环球网 [Huanqiu Online], world 

.huanqiu.com/roll/2010-09/1130269.html, and 

余向东 [Yu Xiangdong] and 康存栋 [Kang 

Cundong], 中国渔政将在钓鱼岛附近海域开

展常态化巡航 [“China Fisheries Law Enforcement Will Begin Normalizing Patrols to Waters 

near Diaoyu Island”], 中国渔业报 [China 

Fisheries News], September 27, 2010, news.ifeng 

.com/mainland/special/zrczdydxz/content-2/

detail_2010_09/27/2639897_0.shtml. China 

used coast guard deployments to the island as 

a means to put pressure on Japan to release the 

Chinese citizens taken into custody. However, 

Chinese leaders no doubt felt pressure to do 

something to assuage the desires of Chinese patriots for retribution. By sending vessels to these 

waters, China could show the Chinese people 

that it was doing something to punish Japan for 

having the temerity to arrest Chinese fishermen 

operating in “Chinese” waters.

226. Yu Xiangdong and Kang Cundong, “China 

Fisheries Law Enforcement Will Begin Normalizing.” In a pseudonymous commentary article 

published by a Xinhua-owned publication, this 

operation was described as “the first step toward 

normalizing patrols of Fisheries Law Enforcement cutters to Diaoyu Island.” See 海韬 [Hai 

Tao], 中国渔政钓鱼岛突击日本防线 [“China 

Fisheries Law Enforcement Breaks through 

Japan’s Defense Lines at Diaoyu Island”], 国际先

驱导报 [International Herald Leader], October 

28, 2010, news.xinhuanet.com/herald/2010 

-10/28/c_13579530.htm.

227. “Trends in Chinese Government and Other 

Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku 

Islands.”

228. 冬木 [Dong Mu], 中国海监巡航钓鱼岛海

域的启示 [“Revelations from CMS Patrols to 

Waters Adjacent to Diaoyu Island”], 中国海洋

报 [China Ocean News], March 30, 2012, p. 4.

229. 唐少曼 [Tang Shaoman], 请祖国和人民放

心—中国海监北海总队钓鱼岛巡航记 [“The 

Motherland and the People Should Be at Ease—

a Record of CMS North Sea Contingent’s Patrols 

to Diaoyu Island”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean 

News], October 19, 2012, p. 5.

230. Shi Jiangtao, “Hu Warns Japan over Planned 

Purchase of Diaoyu Islands,” South China Morning Post, September 10, 2012, www.scmp.com/

news/china/article/1033054/hu-warns-japan 

-over-planned-purchase-diaoyu-islands.

231. Yu Zhirong, “We Must Place Heavy Emphasis,” 

p. 14.

232. This point was made in an authoritative article 

published in China Ocean News. The author 

writes that normalizing patrols to the Senkakus 

“strengthened to an enormous degree the extent 

of Chinese control over Diaoyu Island and 

effectively smashed Japan’s so-called ‘effective 

control’ [over the features].” Wang Qiurong, 

“CMS Work Is in the Process of Leapfrog 

Development.”

233. Ayako Mie, “First Chinese Warship to Skirt 

Senkakus Triggers Protest from Tokyo,” Japan 

Times, June 9, 2016, www.japantimes.co.jp/

news/2016/06/09/national/chinese-frigate-sails 

-near-senkakus-russian-military-vessels/.

234. For instance, in mid-December 2012, a fourship formation from the PLAN East Sea Fleet 

sailed through waters adjacent to the Senkaku 

Islands. The formation comprised two destroyers (Ningbo and Hanzhou) and two frigates 

(Zhoushan and Ma’anshan). The formation 

was commanded by Rear Adm. Qiu Yanpeng, 

Deputy Commander, East Sea Fleet. A sevenship formation from the North Sea Fleet had 

patrolled these same waters two months earlier. 

梁庆松 [Liang Qingsong], 我海军舰艇编队

在钩鱼岛附近海域巡航 [“A PLA Navy Ship 

Formation Patrols Waters near Diaoyu Island”], 

人民海军 [People’s Navy], December 12, 2012, 

p. 1. Two separate incidents occurring near the 

Senkakus in January 2013 suggest that PLAN 

warships were conducting combat-readiness 

patrols in the vicinity of the disputed features. 

On January 19, 2013, a PLAN frigate directed 

fire-control radar at a Japan Maritime SelfDefense Force (JMSDF) helicopter. On January 

30, 2013, a second PLAN frigate directed its 

fire-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer. Mizuho 

Aoki and Reiji Yoshida, “Chinese Target-Locked 

JMSDF Ship, Chopper,” Japan Times, February 6, 

2013, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/02/06/

national/politics-diplomacy/japan-says-chinese 

-warships-locked-weapons-radar-on-msdf/. See 

also “China Military Officials Admit Radar Lock 

on Japanese Ship, Says Report,” South China 
86 china maritime studies

Morning Post, March 18, 2013, www.scmp.com/

news/china/article/1193600/china-military 

-officials-admit-radar-lock-japanese-ship-says 

-report.

235. 黄子娟 [Huang Zijuan], 专家称中国海监若

在钓鱼岛遇险海军将即刻赶到 [“Expert Says 

That If China Marine Surveillance Encounters Dangers near Diaoyu Island the Navy 

Will Come Right Away”], 人民网 [People 

Online], July 11, 2013, mil.huanqiu.com/

observation/2013-07/4117322.html.

236. In a December 2013 CCTV 4 documentary, a 

CMS officer admitted that his service patrolled 

“all the waters within the nine-dash line.” “Blue 

Border Guards.” Other maritime law officers 

also talk about the nine-dash line as indicating 

the scope of their responsibilities. For example, 

in 2013 an FLE officer claimed he had “been everywhere within the nine-dashed line.” 姜浩峰

[Jiang Haofeng], 中国海上安保升级 [“China’s 

Maritime Security Is Kicked Up a Notch”], 山西

青年 [Shanxi Youth], no. 7 (2013), p. 31.

237. For more on the status of James Shoal, see 

Hayton, The South China Sea, pp. 116–17.

238. The PLA Navy’s first visit to James Shoal apparently took place in May 1983. A training squadron comprising two PLAN auxiliaries sailed to 

the feature as part of a six-thousand-nauticalmile training mission that took them into the 

western Pacific. 1983年5月18日 我国海军远

航航海实习船队启航 [“The Chinese Navy’s 

Long-Distance Training Fleet Set Sail on 18 May 

1983”], 人民网 [People Online], August 1, 2003, 

www.people.com.cn/GB/historic/0518/1638.html. 

See also John W. Garver, “China’s Push through 

the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests,” China Quarterly 

132 (December 1992), p. 1008. The destroyer 

Nanchang was supposedly the first Chinese 

warship to anchor at James Shoal, doing so on 

May 12, 1984. 张海龙 [Zhang Hailong], 梁立

虎 [Liang Lihu], and 孙尧 [Sun Yao], 回顾中国

海军的051时代: 创出“曾母暗沙第一锚” [“A 

Retrospective on the Age of the 051 Destroyer: 

Noted for Being ‘the First Ship to Anchor at 

James Shoal’”], 当代海军杂志社 [Navy Today 

Press], September 9, 2016, military.china.com/

history4/62/20160909/23514624_all.html.

239. 白瑞雪 [Bai Ruixue] and 甘俊 [Gan Jun], 海

军编队在曾母暗沙举行宣誓仪式 [“A Navy 

Formation Holds an Oath-Taking Ceremony 

at James Shoal”], 新华网 [Xinhua Online], 

March 26, 2013, news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2013 

-03/26/c_124506274.htm. For a similar instance 

that took place a year later, see 中国南海舰队巡

航曾母暗沙宣示主权 [“China South Sea Fleet 

Patrols James Shoal to Declare Sovereignty”], 

南华早报中文网站 [South China Morning 

Post], January 27, 2014, www.nanzao.com/sc/

national/14c315512b9f9f1/zhong-guo-nan-hai 

-jian-dui-xun-hang-zeng-mu-an-sha-xuan-shi 

-zhu-quan. Constabulary vessels also conduct 

these types of ceremonies. For an example involving an FLE ship, see Martinson, “The Lives 

of a Chinese Gunboat,” p. 37. For an example 

involving China Marine Surveillance, see 何仲

仁 [He Zhongren], 吴恒昊 [Wu Henghao], and 

皮履渊 [Pi Luyuan], 南海维权的排头兵 [“The 

Vanguard of Rights Protection in the South 

China Sea”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 

May 4, 2012, p. 5. See also Liu Bin, Zhang Lu, 

and Fang Shuo, “China’s Real Presence in the 

South China Sea.”

240. 罗茜 [Luo Xi], 南沙主权碑的故事 [“Stories 

of Spratly Sovereignty Tablets”], 中国海洋报

[China Ocean News], February 25, 2015, p. 4.

241. It is also called “China’s southernmost point” (我

国最南端), in recognition of the fact that James 

Shoal is not a land feature.

242. China’s blockade was not as absolute as often 

suggested. In August 2013, for instance, a 

Chinese reporter witnessed the failed efforts 

of CCG 3368 to scare away a Philippine fishing 

vessel approaching Scarborough Shoal. The 

Philippine skipper just managed to pilot his boat 

into the lagoon, where the three-thousand-ton 

Chinese ship could not operate. The Chinese 

ship soon was ordered to Mischief Reef to seek 

shelter from an approaching storm. Four days 

later, when CCG 3368 returned to Scarborough 

Shoal, the Philippine fishing vessel already had 

departed. 周超 [Zhou Chao], 值守南海的忠诚

卫士 [“The Loyal Warrior on Guard Duty in the 

South China Sea”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean 

News], March 28, 2014, p. 3.

243. Motorboats embarked on Chinese cutters have 

proved a useful tool for handling encounters 

with small Philippine fishing vessels at Scarborough Shoal. For example, in a January 2015 

encounter, a small boat launched from a China 

Coast Guard ship evicted three noncompliant Philippine vessels operating near the reef. 

Manuel Mogato, “Philippines Says Chinese 

Ship Rammed Fishing Boats in Scarborough 

Shoal,” Reuters, February 4, 2015, www.reuters 

.com/article/2015/02/04/us-philippines-china 

-idUSKBN0L81IM20150204. China’s Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs claimed that on January 29, 

2015, a CCG ship encountered three Philippine 

fishing vessels that were “illegally lingering” 

(非法逗留) near the feature. The CCG ship 

dispatched a boat to “evict” (驱离) them. In that 

process, there was “light bumping” (轻微擦碰). 

2015年2月5日外交部发言人洪磊主持例行

记者会 [“5 February 2015 Press Conference of 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Hong 
echelon defense 87

Lei”], 中华人民共和国驻美利坚合众国大使馆

[Embassy of the PRC in the United States], February 5, 2015, www.china-embassy.org/chn/fyrth/

t1234731.htm.

244. See Michael Green et al., Countering Coercion 

in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of 

Gray Zone Deterrence (Washington, DC: Center 

for Strategic & International Studies, 2017), pp. 

170–71. This excellent study offers detailed accounts of some of the key incidents discussed in 

this monograph.

245. This presence also included intrusions into the 

lagoon. For example, the Fujian-owned CMS 

8002 patrolled waters around Second Thomas 

Shoal in May and June 2013. On one occasion, 

it sent a motorboat into the lagoon for over an 

hour, during which it photographed the Philippine outpost. See 蔡正文 [Cai Zhengwen], 福建

省总队上半年工作回顾 [“A Look Back at the 

Work of the Fujian Province Contingent in the 

First Half of 2013”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean 

News], July 19, 2013, p. 3.

246. Jeff Himmelman, “A Game of Shark and Minnow,” New York Times Magazine, October 27, 

2013, www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/ 

2013/10/27/south-china-sea/.

247. For a detailed account of China’s harassment and 

interdiction operations, see Green et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, pp. 183–200.

248. Carmela Fonbuena, “US Helped PH Navy in 

Ayungin Mission,” Rappler, April 11, 2014, www 

.rappler.com/nation/55262-ph-ayungin-mission 

-us-assistance. See also Nikko Dizon, “AFP 

Uses Couriers to Foil China Spies,” Philippine 

Daily Inquirer, April 29, 2014, globalnation 

.inquirer.net/103076/afp-uses-couriers-to-foil 

-china-spies, and “US Plane over Ayungin Shoal 

Proves All-Out Support to PH,” Manila Times,

April 5, 2014, www.manilatimes.net/us-plane 

-over-ayungin-shoal-proves-all-out-support-to 

-ph/87652/.

249. Ben Blanchard, “Duterte Aligns Philippines with 

China, Says U.S. Has Lost,” Reuters, October 

20, 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-china 

-philippines-idUSKCN12K0AS; CNN Philippines Staff, “Duterte on Filipinos’ Fishing Rights 

in Scarborough Shoal: ‘I Leave It to the Chinese 

Authorities,’” CNN Philippines, October 22, 

2016, cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/10/22/

Duterte-Filipino-fishing-rights-Scarborough 

-Shoal-leave-it-to-the-Chinese-authorities.html.

250. 2004年中国海洋行政执法公报 [2004 Report 

on Chinese Administrative Law Enforcement], 

国家海洋局网站 [Website of the State Oceanic 

Administration], January 10, 2005, www.soa 

.gov.cn/zwgk/hygb/zghyxzzfgb/2004nzghyxzzf

gb/201212/t20121217_22991.html.

251. 李慕瑾 [Li Mujin], 中国东海监视日本调查

船 海监依法监管东海 [“CMS Tracks Japanese 

Surveying Vessel and Monitors the East China 

Sea According to the Law”], 新华网 [Xinhua 

Online], February 27, 2006, news.xinhuanet 

.com/world/2006-02/27/content_4233133.htm.

252. Eventually, in June 2008, China and Japan came 

to an agreement to mitigate tensions stemming 

from the Chunxiao gas field. ODR 2011, p. 121.

253. 郁志荣 [Yu Zhirong], 东海维权: 中日东海钓

鱼岛之争 [Rights Protection in the East China 

Sea: Sino-Japanese Contention in the East China 

Sea and the Diaoyu Islands] (Shanghai: Wenhui, 

2012), p. 217.

254. For an authoritative account of Chinese 

protocols when expelling foreign vessels, see 

Feng Zhi, “Problem and Countermeasures for 

Problems Associated with Coast Guard Patrols,” 

p. 72.

255. Two researchers at the China Maritime Police 

Academy describe water cannon as a “coercive 

means of expelling” (强制性的驱离手段) 

foreign vessels. They write, “At present, in many 

situations (especially in confrontations with 

foreign ships in waters where sovereignty is 

disputed), the use of water cannon has become 

common.” 李世雄 [Li Shixiong] and 藏建忠

[Zang Jianzhong], 舰艇维权执法视角下的水

泡改进与使用技术研究—以型舰为例 [“Improving Water Cannon Tactics in the Context 

of Rights-Protection Law Enforcement—Using 

the Type 618B Cutter as an Example”], 公安海

警学院学报 [Journal of China Maritime Police 

Academy] 14, no. 1 (March 2015), p. 1.

256. These tactics are described by a CMS officer in 

“Blue Border Guards.”

257. For a useful discussion of these factors, see Liu 

Bin, Zhang Lu, and Fang Shuo, “China’s Real 

Presence in the South China Sea.”

258. 曹彩容 [Cao Cairong], “我们的岗位在船

上”——走进“中国海警1307”船 [“‘My Place Is 

on the Ship’—a Close Look at CCG 1307”], 中国

海洋报 [China Ocean News], March 4, 2016, p. 

3.

259. Greg Amurao, “A Shoal Too Far in South China 

Sea,” Asia Times, July 21, 2012, www.atimes 

.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NG21Ae01.html 4.

260. 石安辉 [Shi Anhui] and 吴亮 [Wu Liang], 韶关

舰转隶后赴三沙战备巡逻 [“After Being Transferred Shaoguan Heads to Sansha for a Combat 

Readiness Patrol”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 

September 22, 2012, p. 2.

261. Mac Lam and Richard Finney, “Vietnamese 

Fishing Boat Fired On, Set Ablaze,” Radio Free 
88 china maritime studies

Asia, March 25, 2013, www.rfa.org/english/

news/vietnam/boat-03252013152934.html. See 

also “Vietnamese Fishing Boat Fired On, Set 

Ablaze,” VietNamNet Bridge, March 26, 2013, 

english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/society/69725/a 

-quang-ngai-s-fishing-boat-shot-by-chinese 

-vessels.html.

262. Carl Thayer, “China’s New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” 

International Journal of China Studies 2, no. 3 

(December 2011), p. 561.

263. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South 

China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, 

no. 3 (2011), p. 306. Footage of this incident 

is available on YouTube at www.youtube.com/

watch?v=xTws82pQIEs.

264. Ramses Amer, “China, Vietnam, and the South 

China Sea: Disputes and Dispute Management,” 

Ocean Development & International Law 45, no. 

1 (2014), p. 23. This section relies heavily on the 

thorough account of these incidents found in 

Hayton, The South China Sea, pp. 144–46.

265. 刘文平 [Liu Wenping], 剑啸雷海一先锋—南海

舰队扫雷舰大队长吴光怀献身强军实践纪事

[“Whistling Sword and Thunder from the Sea—

a Chronicle of the Exploits of the Commander 

of a South Sea Fleet Minesweeper Unit Wu 

Guanghuai”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], June 26, 

2013, p. 3.

266. In May 2010, CMS 51 tracked and verbally 

harassed a Japanese surveying ship operating east of the median line. “Japan Protests to 

Beijing over East China Sea Chase,” Washington 

Times, May 5, 2010, www.washingtontimes.com/

news/2010/may/5/world-scene-49614984/. A 

similar incident occurred in September 2010. 

James Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters: 

China, Japan, and Maritime Order in the East 

China Sea (Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. 

Press, 2014), p. 183. For information on the February 2012 event, see 蔡岩红 [Cai Yanhong], 中

国海监在我东海管辖海域展开维权执 [“China 

Marine Surveillance Conducts Rights-Protection 

Law Enforcement in Chinese Jurisdictional 

Waters in the East China Sea”], 法制日报 [Legal 

Daily], February 23, 2012, www.legaldaily 

.com.cn/index_article/content/2012-02/23/

content_3372579.htm?node=5955. See also 吕

宁 [Lv Ning], 中国海监66船好样的! [“CMS 

66 Is a Grand Vessel!”], 中国海洋报 [China 

Ocean News], September 21, 2012, p. 5, and 吕

宁 [Lv Ning], 有效体现对东海的主权和管辖

权 [“Effectively Manifesting Sovereignty and 

Jurisdictional Rights in the East China Sea”], 中

国海洋报 [China Ocean News], September 14, 

2012, p. 5.

267. For a discussion of economic drivers, see 

Hongzhou Zhang, “Chinese Fishermen in 

Disputed Waters: Not Quite a ‘People’s War,’” 

Marine Policy 68 (June 2016), pp. 65–73.

268. 陶燕燕 [Tao Yanyan] and 邓韶勇 [Deng 

Shaoyong], 刘赐贵应邀出席海南省海洋工

作会议 [“Liu Cigui Attends Hainan Province 

Maritime Work Meeting”], 中国海洋报 [China 

Ocean News], October 25, 2012, p. 1. Liu made 

this point on other occasions. For instance, in 

a May 2013 meeting with a senior official from 

Hainan Province, he stated that “from the big 

picture perspective, developing the marine 

economy is an important manner and means 

of safeguarding maritime rights and interests.” 

康明乐 [Kang Mingle], 要把维权和发展结合

起来统筹考虑 [“China Must Integrate Rights 

Protection and Development and Give Comprehensive Consideration”], 中国海洋报 [China 

Ocean News], May 28, 2013, p. 1. In August 

2013, the vice-governor of Hainan Province, Ji 

Wenlin, made a similar statement, suggesting 

this consensus pervades all levels of government. 

Ji said, “Developing the maritime economy is 

the core task for accelerating the construction 

of Hainan into a maritime power; it is also at 

present an effective means to safeguard national 

maritime rights and interests.” 依托海南优势发

展海洋经济 维护南海主权 [“Rely on Hainan’s 

Strengths to Develop the Maritime Economy 

and Safeguard Sovereignty in the South China 

Sea”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], August 

1, 2013, p. 1.

269. 一业 [Yi Ye], 中国能源开发挺进深海—我国

首座深水钻井平台“海洋石油981”在南海开

钻 [“Chinese Resource Development Steps into 

the Deep Water—China’s First Deepwater Drilling Rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 Performs Drilling 

Operations in the South China Sea”], 中国海洋

报 [China Ocean News], May 11, 2012, p. 1. This 

point also is made in a December 2012 China 

Ocean News recapitulation of major maritimerelated events in 2012. 盘点2012 [“Looking Back 

at 2012”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 

December 31, 2012, p. 3.

270. These included national-level CCG units (including many from the former China Maritime 

Police), provincial-level CMS and FLE units, 

and forces from the Ministry of Transport 

(Maritime Safety Administration and China 

Rescue and Salvage Service). This operation 

also included support from a large maritime 

militia contingent.

271. “Vietnam Boat Sinks after Collision with Chinese Vessel,” BBC News, May 27, 2014, www.bbc 

.com/news/world-asia-27583564.

272. Dong Fang, “Xinkuai News Reporter Lifts the 

Mysterious Veil of CCG 44101.”
echelon defense 89

273. This confrontation is described in “Blue Border 

Guards.” In July 2011, a CMS flotilla guarded the 

surveying vessel Tanbao, owned by Guangzhou 

Marine Geologic Survey, as it operated near 

the Paracel Islands. Tanbao faced “interference” (干扰) from four “armed vessels” operated 

by an unnamed state, almost certainly Vietnam. 

After a “protracted confrontation” involving 

aggressive maneuvering and near collisions, 

the foreign vessels, at least according to the 

Chinese account, were compelled to depart the 

area. Lv Ning, “CMS 66 Is a Grand Vessel!” CMS 

conducted a similar escort operation in May–

August 2010. Ryan D. Martinson, “Shepherds 

of the South Seas,” Survival 58, no. 3 (2016), pp. 

199–200. See also 蔡岩红 [Cai Yanhong], 中国

海监对我管辖海域定期维权执法三年对外国

军事调查测量船实施监管100余艘次 [“During 

Three Years of Regular Rights-Protection Patrols 

CMS Has Monitored Foreign Naval Surveying Vessels over 100 Times”], 法制日报 [Legal 

Daily], February 28, 2011, www.legaldaily.com 

.cn/government/content/2011-02/28/content 

_2488744.htm?node=21502.

274. Chinese surface ships also have provided 

security for other types of vessels. For instance, 

when the SOA’s deep-sea submersible Jiaolong

conducted its first deep-sea dive in the South 

China Sea in 2010, several CMS cutters were 

asked to escort Jiaolong’s mother ship in case 

foreign obstruction occurred. 罗茜 [Luo Xi], 护

送“蛟龙”入海 [“Escorting Jiaolong as It Enters 

the Sea”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 

December 17, 2010, p. 5.

275. In the words of two Chinese academics publishing in an SOA journal, “Just the presence of 

Chinese fishermen in the South China Sea is the 

most direct embodiment [体现] of the rights 

China claims in the South China Sea.” 郑泽民

[Zheng Zemin] and 王国红 [Wang Guohong], 

南海权益维护中的渔民作用探析 [“An Analysis on the Role of Fishermen in Protection of 

Rights and Interests in the South China Sea”], 

海洋开发与管理 [Ocean Development and 

Management], no. 10 (2014), p. 41.

276. 曾鸣 [Zeng Ming], 军舰边的渔船: 黄岩岛争

端中的中国渔民 [“Fishing Vessels near Naval 

Ships: The Chinese Fishermen in the Scarborough Shoal Dispute”], 南方周末 [Southern 

Weekend], May 3, 2012, www.infzm.com/

content/74860.

277. Martinson, “Shepherds of the South Seas,” p. 

191. For evidence of direct payments of large 

sums of money to linger in disputed waters 

for political purposes, see Teo Cheng Wee, 

“South China Sea—Part Three: China’s FrontLine Fishermen,” Strait Times, April 5, 2016, 

www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/south-china 

-sea-part-three-chinas-front-line-fishermen.

278. From 1956 to 1985, the PRC prohibited Chinese 

fishing vessels from operating in the Spratlys. 

Martinson, “Shepherds of the South Seas,” p. 

190.

279. ODR 2011, p. 494. For an account of some of 

these incidents involving just fishermen from 

Tanmen village in Hainan, see Kennedy and 

Erickson, “Model Maritime Militia.” 

280. 陈毅德 [Chen Yide], 马为军 [Ma Weijun], and 

杨昌健 [Yang Changjian], 新形式下作好护渔

维权维稳工作的思考与建议 [“Thoughts and 

Suggestions for Doing Fisheries Rights Protection and Stability Maintenance Work under the 

New Circumstances”], 中国水产 [China Fisheries], no. 3 (2012), pp. 12–16.

281. Liu Bin, Zhang Lu, and Fang Shuo, “China’s 

Real Presence in the South China Sea.” This 

article quotes Huang Zuoping, a senior officer 

in the South China Sea branch of Fisheries Law 

Enforcement, as saying, “When Chinese fishing 

vessels approach the nine-dashed line, we’ll tell 

the fishermen that they should not cross the 

boundary. If the fishing vessels send us a distress 

signal, we’ll hurry over to save them.”

282. The harassment of the Chinese trawlers ceased 

before FLE 310 arrived. Martinson, “The Lives 

of a Chinese Gunboat,” p. 36.

283. Martinson, “Shepherds of the South Seas,” p. 

196.

284. The southwest fishing grounds are located at 4–6 

degrees latitude, 109–12 degrees longitude. Ibid.

285. 深情守护 [“Protecting from the Bottom of 

Our Hearts”], 走遍中国 [Traveling around 

China], 南海纪行 [South China Sea Travel Notes

series], episode 4, aired December 27, 2013, by 

CCTV, available at news.cntv.cn/2013/12/27/

VIDE1388149863832999.shtml.

286. 梁文悦 [Liang Wenyue], 孤独守礁人演绎南沙

精神 [“Those Who Guard Chinese Reefs Show 

the Spratly Spirit”], 南方日报 [Southern Daily], 

August 9, 2012, epaper.southcn.com/nfdaily/

html/2012-08/09/content_7112367.htm.

287. Bentley, “Mapping the Nine-Dash Line.” 

288. Aaron L. Connelly, “Indonesia in the South 

China Sea: Going It Alone,” Lowy Institute for 

International Policy, December 2016, www 

.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indonesia-south 

-china-sea-going-it-alone#_edn14.

289. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Status of 

Activities by Chinese Government Vessels and 

Chinese Fishing Vessels in Waters Surrounding 

the Senkaku Islands,” Japan Ministry of Foreign 
90 china maritime studies

Affairs, August 26, 2016, www.mofa.go.jp/

files/000180283.pdf.

290. 香山论坛: 建设中国特色海洋强国 [“Xiangshan Forum: Building the Country into a 

Maritime Power with Chinese Characteristics”], 

中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], January 1, 

2013, p. 3. This comment was made by then–

CIMA director Gao Zhiguo. Gao was one of two 

maritime experts invited to brief the politburo 

during its July 2013 meeting, at which Xi Jinping 

outlined China’s “maritime power” strategy. Xi 

Jinping, “We Need to Do More.”

291. Commenting through her social-media account 

on August 7, 2016, PLAN senior captain Liang 

Fang (梁芳) wrote, “If Japan wants to resolve 

East China Sea issues in the South China Sea, 

then we will respond in kind by resolving South 

China Sea issues in the East China Sea and augment our presence near Diaoyu Island.” Liang 

published this comment on her Weibo account 

under the name of 国防大学梁芳. Liang is a 

member of the experts group that advises the 

Maritime Rights Protection Leading Small 

Group. She has met with and received instructions from Xi Jinping himself. 褚振江 [Chu 

Zhenjiang] and 罗金沐 [Luo Jinmu], 梁芳: 勇

闯战略研究“高地”的女大校 [“Liang Fang: The 

Woman Who Boldly Entered the ‘Heights’ of 

Strategic Studies Research”], 中华儿女 [China 

Profiles], no. 8 (2015), p. 73.

292. This point is made by a CMS officer in “Blue 

Border Guards.” It is also a conventional wisdom 

of naval combat. Gray and Barnett, Seapower 

and Strategy, p. xi.

293. Two of the fishermen were minors and therefore 

ultimately did not face trial. “Philippine Trial of 

Chinese Fishermen Stalls without Interpreter,” 

Reuters, June 17, 2014, www.reuters.com/

article/2014/06/17/us-philippines-china

-fishermen-idUSKBN0ES0S020140617.

294. Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy, p. 

30. A Reuters photographer captured an image 

of a PLAN surface combatant near the rig in 

mid-July. Ben Blanchard, “Amid Sea Dispute, 

China Calls for Deeper Defence Ties with 

Vietnam,” Reuters, March 29, 2016, in.reuters 

.com/article/southchinasea-china-vietnam 

-idINKCN0WV04L.

295. For more on the challenges of relying on opensource materials to understand the disposition 

of the Chinese fleet, see James E. Fanell and 

Ryan D. Martinson, “Countering Chinese Expansion through Mass Enlightenment,” Center 

for International Maritime Security, October 18, 

2016, cimsec.org/countering-chinese-expansion 

-mass-enlightenment/28781.

296. “Fisheries protection and escort” (护渔护航) 

is frequently cited in Chinese texts as one key 

mission of the PLAN Type 056 corvette. However, the author knows of no cases in which the 

corvette has performed this mission on the front 

line. 新型导弹护卫舰鄂州舰入列东海舰队

[“The New Type Guided-Missile Frigate Ezhou

Is Commissioned into the East Sea Fleet”], 人

民网 [People Online], January 19, 2017, military 

.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0119/c1011-29035832 

.html.

297. “Production Begin [sic] at Chunxiao Gas Field,” 

China Daily, August 6, 2006, www.chinadaily 

.com.cn/china/2006-08/06/content_657939.htm.

298. By Chinese accounts, JCG vessels were prowling 

these waters. Li Mujin, “CMS Tracks Japanese 

Surveying Vessel and Monitors the East China 

Sea According to the Law.”

299. For a useful map of the “Provisional Measures 

Zones,” see Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters,

p. 79.

300. FLE EEZ patrols encompassed rights-protection 

missions, but they also included uncontroversial 

fisheries management operations in areas not in 

dispute. For an example of an EEZ patrol circular, see 农业部办公厅 [Office of the Ministry of 

Agriculture], 关于开展2010年专属经济区渔政

巡航管理工作的通知 [“Circular on Initiating 

Management Work for 2010 EEZ Fisheries Law 

Enforcement Patrols”], 北大法意 [Peking University Fayi], February 2010, www .lawyee.org/

Act/Act_Display.asp?ChannelID=1010100&RID

=660366&KeyWord=. The EEZ patrol regime 

was intended to be conducted by national-level 

units, but local-level ships could be pressed into 

action if needed (which they always were). 中华

人民共和国渔政渔港监督管理局 [PRC Fisheries Law Enforcement and Fishing Harbor Management Department], 《专属经济区渔政巡

航管理规定》 [Regulations for Managing EEZ 

Fisheries Law Enforcement Patrols], available 

at www.cnfm.gov.cn/yyzfyzj/zsjjqyyzf/200512/

t20051229_2681396.htm.

301. Christopher H. Sharman, China Moves Out: 

Stepping Stones toward a New Maritime Strategy,

China Strategic Perspectives 9 (Washington, 

DC: National Defense Univ. Press, 2015), p. 11, 

available at inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/

stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-9.pdf.

302. Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 

2014, p. 40, available at www.mod.go.jp/e/

publ/w_paper/2014.html; “Oil and Gas in 

Troubled Waters,” The Economist, October 6, 

2005, www.economist.com/node/4489650.

303. Information Office of the State Council, The 

Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces;

Sharman, China Moves Out, pp. 13–17.
echelon defense 91

304. M. Taylor Fravel suggests that “the PLAN has 

conducted regular patrols in the disputed waters 

since around 2005.” The author has been unable 

to verify this claim. Fravel, “China’s Strategy in 

the South China Sea,” p. 310.

305. The 2016 Japan white paper states that “Chinese 

naval vessels appear to conduct operations in the 

East China Sea continuously.” Japan Ministry of 

Defense, Defense of Japan 2016, p. 53, available 

at www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2016.html.

306. Andrew Tate, “China’s Liaoning Carrier Group 

Ventures into West Pacific for First Time,” IHS 

Jane’s 360, December 30, 2016, www.janes.com/

article/66622/china-s-liaoning-carrier-group 

-ventures-into-west-pacific-for-first-time.

307. For excellent content on China’s development 

of bases in the Spratlys, see the Asia Maritime 

Transparency Initiative website at amti.csis.org/

island-tracker/chinese-occupied-features/.

308. In June 2012, a spokesperson from the Chinese 

Ministry of Defense stated that “the Chinese 

military has already established a normalized 

combat readiness patrol system in Chinese 

jurisdictional waters.” 国防部:中国军队在管辖

海域已经常态化战备巡逻 [“Ministry of Defense: Chinese Military Has Already Normalized 

Combat Readiness Patrols in Its Jurisdictional 

Waters”], 中国网 [China Online], June 28, 2012, 

www.china.com.cn/military/txt/2012-06/28/

content_25759355.htm. In May 2013, authoritative Chinese sources revealed that Chinese vessels 

had “normalized” patrols within the Spratlys, and 

that presence would be further augmented. 中国

海军对我南沙海域进行常态化战备巡逻 [“The 

Chinese Navy Conducts Normalized Patrols in 

Spratly Waters”], 中国政府网 [Government of 

the PRC], May 16, 2013, www.gov.cn/gzdt/2013 

-05/16/content_2403854.htm. For more on the 

“normalization” of PLAN patrols in disputed 

waters, see Li Tang, “The Navy’s Normalized 

Patrols Cover the Ten-Thousand-Mile Maritime 

Border.” See also 倪光辉 [Ni Guanghui] and 

高毅 [Gao Yi], 南海舰队常态化战备巡逻

南沙 [“South Sea Fleet Normalized Combat 

Readiness Patrols of the Spratlys”], 人民日报

[People’s Daily], May 14, 2013, politics.people 

.com.cn/n/2013/0514/c1001-21469490.html. 

In May 2014, USS Blue Ridge observed a PLAN 

destroyer and frigate operating in the vicinity of 

Scarborough Shoal, suggesting a regular naval 

presence in these waters as well. Erik Slavin, 

“Blue Ridge Encounters Chinese Ships near 

Disputed Isle,” Stars and Stripes, May 9, 2014, 

www.stripes.com/news/blue-ridge-encounters 

-chinese-ships-near-disputed-isle-1.282222.

309. This analysis borrows from the assessments of a 

former director of intelligence and information 

operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Capt. James 

Fanell, USN (Ret.) Mina Pollmann, “Expert 

Panel Forecasts Asia-Pacific Dynamics and Maritime Security,” Center for International Maritime 

Security, February 6, 2017, cimsec.org/expert 

-panel-forecasts-asia-pacific-dynamics-maritime 

-security/30840. Tracking of USN ships operating in especially sensitive areas probably began 

earlier. In May 2015, for example, USS Fort 

Worth was trailed by a PLAN frigate as it sailed 

through the Spratlys. Erik Slavin, “US Mulls 

Larger Role near Disputed South China Sea 

Territory,” Stars and Stripes, May 13, 2015, www 

.stripes.com/news/us-mulls-larger-role-near 

-disputed-south-china-sea-territory-1.345817.

310. As of July 2015, Japan had identified sixteen 

Chinese structures in the gas fields near the median line in the East China Sea. “Japan Discloses 

Photos of China’s Gas Development in East 

China Sea,” Japan Times, July 22, 2015, www 

.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/07/22/national/

politics-diplomacy/japan-discloses-photos 

-chinas-gas-development-east-china-sea/.

311. In April 2013, CMS ships halted Japanese civilians who were attempting to approach one of the 

islands. 中国海监成功驱离日侵权船只 [“CMS 

Succeeded in Expelling a Japanese Vessel”], 解放

军报 [PLA Daily], April 24, 2013, p. 4. See also 

高悦 [Gao Yue], 筑就一道蓝色长城——记中

国海警船编队首次巡航钓鱼岛 [“Building a 

Blue Great Wall—a Record of the First China 

Coast Guard Patrol to the Diaoyu Islands”], 中

国海洋报 [China Ocean News], December 5, 

2013, p. 1.

312. “Philippine Trial of Chinese Fishermen Stalls 

without Interpreter.”

313. 中国海上巡航覆盖整个南海 海上维权更主

动 [“China’s Maritime Patrols Cover All of the 

South China Sea and Maritime Rights Protection Is More Proactive Than in the Past”], 人民

网 [People Online], August 27, 2014, military 

.people.com.cn/n/2014/0827/c172467-25548356 

.html.

314. 苏稻香 [Su Taoxiang] and 周皓 [Zhou Hao], 

护渔编队南沙行: 一日千里 4天抵西南渔

场 [“Fisheries Protection Flotilla Heads to 

the Spratly Islands: It Steams One Thousand 

Kilometers in a Day and Reaches the Spratly 

Fisheries in Four Days”], 新华网 [Xinhua Online], April 7, 2010, news.xinhuanet.com/2010 

-04/07/c_1220494.htm.

315. See Stimson Center, “Roundtable Discussion 

with Indonesian Minister of Maritime Affairs 

and Fisheries Susi Pudjiastuti,” filmed May 12, 

2017, YouTube video, posted May 15, 2017, www 

.stimson.org/content/roundtable-discussion 

-indonesian-minister-maritime-affairs-and 

-fisheries-susi-pudjiastuti.
92 china maritime studies

316. In 2011, local- and national-level FLE ships 

expelled fifty-three foreign fishing vessels 

operating “illegally” in all Chinese-claimed 

waters. ODR 2013, p. 272. During the one-year 

period from July 2012 to July 2013, Chinese 

maritime law-enforcement forces drove away 

164 foreign fishing vessels operating in the 

Paracels alone. 段欣毅 [Duan Xinyi] and 李

学山 [Li Xueshan], 三沙一年驱赶164艘次

外国渔船 南海侵权侵渔势头得到遏制 [“In 

One Year Sansha Expelled 164 Foreign Fishing 

Vessels and the Rights Infringement Situation 

in the South China Sea Has Been Contained”], 

人民网 [People Online], July 18, 2013, politics 

.people.com.cn/n/2013/0718/c1001-22245544 

.html. Still, one must be careful when drawing 

conclusions, for such numbers do not capture 

fluctuations in Vietnamese activities in these 

waters—the other key variable. According 

to Chinese accounts, these intrusions have 

increased. Sansha City officials have stated that 

“foreign fishing activities that violate Chinese 

rights in the waters of the Paracels (especially 

those conducted by Vietnam) are increasing year 

by year. In 2013, 319 boats infringed Chinese 

fisheries in the Paracels. In the first five months 

of 2014, 237 boats infringed Chinese fisheries.” 

Zhao Yeping and Chen Aidi, “South China Sea 

Law Enforcement Encounters Arrogant Foreign 

Fishing Vessels.” China occasionally has detained Vietnamese fishermen for their activities 

in the Paracels. For instance, on March 4, 2012, 

FLE forces took into custody the crews of two 

Vietnamese fishing boats, purportedly caught 

using explosive charges to fish in the Paracels. 

The twenty-one Vietnamese fishermen were 

kept in detention on Woody Island for nearly a 

month and a half. Ultimately they were released, 

after signing a letter promising never to return. 

They returned to Vietnam on one of the two 

fishing vessels, the second having been confiscated. 梁钢华 [Liang Ganghua], 中国渔政部门

释放一越南西沙侵渔渔船及越南渔民 [“China 

Fisheries Law Enforcement Releases a Vietnamese Fishing Vessel and Vietnamese Fishermen 

Caught Infringing Chinese Rights”], 新华网

[Xinhua Online], April 21, 2012, gd.xinhuanet 

.com/newscenter/2012-04/21/content_25106574 

.htm.

317. “Presence of China Coast Guard Ship at 

Luconia Shoals Spooks Local Fishermen,” 

Borneo Post Online, September 27, 2015, www 

.theborneopost.com/2015/09/27/presence 

-of-china-coast-guard-ship-at-luconia-shoals 

-spooks-local-fishermen/.

318. 吴琼 [Wu Qiong], 中国海监定巡执法全海域

[“China Marine Surveillance Conducts Regular 

Law-Enforcement Patrols in All Waters”], 中

国海洋报特刊 [China Ocean News, special 

supplement], July 22, 2014, p. 41. The original 

idea to expand presence apparently came from 

Rear Adm. Xu Hongmeng, who proposed it after 

being briefed about the rights-protection situation in the East China Sea. When China Marine 

Surveillance was created, the scope of its rightsprotection operations was fairly modest. It 

primarily focused on tracking and (sometimes) 

harassing foreign surveying vessels operating in 

China’s (uncontested) EEZ. CMS ships seldom 

sailed to disputed waters, and such missions that 

did occur happened at irregular intervals. ODR 

2009, p. 424. See also ODR 2011, p. 480. Tracking and monitoring foreign surveillance vessels 

in China’s EEZ is a mission that China Marine 

Surveillance did right up until it was integrated 

into the China Coast Guard. For instance, 

from 2007 to 2010, China Marine Surveillance 

recorded more than one hundred instances of 

“tracking and monitoring” USN surveillance 

vessels operating in China’s EEZ. Wang Xinyi, 

“Patrol Law Enforcement: It Changed China’s 

Maritime Rights-Protection Situation,” p. 61. 

For an account of the 2001 tracking of USNS

Bowditch, see Yu Zhirong, Rights Protection in 

the East China Sea, pp. 190–91. For additional 

information on how the Bowditch incident led to 

the development of the model for tracking foreign naval surveillance vessels in the EEZ, see 郁

志荣 [Yu Zhirong], 董奚戟 [Dong Xiji], and 张

颖 [Zhang Ying], 魂系东海再铸蓝色辉煌, 记

中国海监东海总队海洋维权执法 [“CMS East 

Sea Department Achieves New Glory, a Record 

of CMS East Sea Department Rights-Protection 

Law Enforcement”], 海洋开发与管理 [Ocean 

Development and Management], no. 4 (2005), p. 

59.

319. 2007年中国海洋行政执法公报 [2007 Report 

on Chinese Administrative Law Enforcement], 

国家海洋局 [State Oceanic Administration], 

March 13, 2008, www.soa.gov.cn/zwgk/hygb/

zghyxzzfgb/2007nzghyxzzfgb/; 秦静 [Qin Jing], 

请祖国放心—黄海定期维权巡航侧记 [“Motherland, Please Be at Ease—a Record of Yellow 

Sea Regular Rights-Protection Patrols”], 中国海

洋报 [China Ocean News], January 18, 2011, p. 

5.

320. For an excellent discussion of the expansion 

of rights-protection patrols in the South 

China Sea, see Andrew Chubb, “China’s 

Expansion of ‘Regular Rights Defense Patrols’ 

in the South China Sea: A Map, Courtesy of 

CCTV,” South Sea Conversations, September 

4, 2014, southseaconversations.wordpress 

.com/2014/09/04/chinas-expansion-of 

-regular-rights-defense-patrols-in-the-south 

-china-sea-a-map-courtesy-of-cctv/.

321. This mission actually was regarded as a “special 

rights-protection operation” (专项维权执
echelon defense 93

法行动)—that is, not “routine.” 蔡岩红 [Cai 

Yanhong], 中国海监东海总队加强我国钓鱼岛

等海域巡航执法 [“East China Sea Contingent 

of CMS Strengthens Law-Enforcement Patrols 

to Diaoyu Island”], 法制日报 [Legal Daily], September 16, 2012, www.legaldaily.com.cn/index 

_article/content/2012-09/16/content_3844923 

.htm?node=5955.

322. For the nine-ship figure in 2012, see 赵颖翡

[Zhao Yingfei], 浪尖上的中国海监: 中国海监

定期维权巡航执法工作发展纪实 [“CMS Up 

on the Wave: A History of the Development of 

CMS Regular Rights-Protection Patrols”], 海洋

开发与管理 [Ocean Development and Management], no. 6 (2012), pp. 46–49. For information 

on the six-ship standard in the South China 

Sea, see 中国海监南海总队去年累计巡航南

海17万海里 [“CMS South Contingent Patrolled 

170,000 Nautical Miles in the South China Sea 

Last Year”], 新华网 [Xinhua Online], January 

22, 2013, news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013 

-01/22/c_114462283.htm.

323. The Chinese word for “patrols” used here is 

艘次 (souci). 2008年中国海洋行政执法公

报 [2008 Report on Chinese Administrative 

Law Enforcement], 国家海洋局 [State Oceanic 

Administration], March 30, 2009, www.soa.gov 

.cn/zwgk/hygb/zghyxzzfgb/2008nzghyxzzfgb/.

324. 刘晓晟 [Liu Xiaocheng], 今年南海定期维权巡

航执法第一航次起航 [“This Year’s First Regular Rights-Protection Patrol in the South China 

Sea Commences”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean 

News], January 25, 2013, p. 2.

325. China Ocean Yearbook Compilation Committee, 2014 China Ocean Yearbook, p. 129. CMS 

detachments (which still exist) sometimes release information. For instance, in 2014 the 7th 

Detachment, located in Guangzhou, performed 

sixty “rights-protection” patrols, the most in its 

history to that date. 中国海监第七支队亮出

精彩数据 [“CMS Seventh Detachment Reveals 

Its Excellent Data”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean 

News], March 6, 2015, p. 2. “Regular rightsprotection patrol” figures are an imperfect 

proxy for tracking Chinese presence in disputed 

waters, because they also include some operations that take place in undisputed waters.

326. For this quote, see 海洋发展战略研究所课题组

[China Institute for Marine Affairs Special Topic 

Group], 中国海洋发展报告 (2010) [China’s 

Ocean Development Report (2010)] (Beijing: 

Ocean, 2010), p. 169. Also see 2008 Report on 

Chinese Administrative Law Enforcement. 

327. Yi Yan, “Resolutely and Unswervingly Safeguard 

Maritime Rights and Interests.” For more on 

this, see Xi Zhigang, “Mainland China’s CMS Is 

Becoming a ‘Quasi–Coast Guard.’”

328. In the decade prior to the CCG reform, Fisheries Law Enforcement apparently did not see 

the same dramatic expansion in presence in 

disputed waters. The service had far fewer ships 

and far more responsibilities. Rights-protection 

missions were managed by the Ministry of Agriculture and conducted as part of the EEZ patrol 

system (专属经济区渔政巡航) set up in 2000. 

In 2006, Fisheries Law Enforcement conducted a 

total of 317 EEZ patrols, covering 218,000 nautical miles, with FLE cutters spending a combined 

3,165 ship days at sea. 刘增胜 [Liu Zengsheng] 

and 柳正 [Liu Zheng], eds., 中国渔业年鉴

[2007 China Fisheries Yearbook] (Beijing: China 

Agricultural, 2007), p. 29. In 2012, Fisheries Law 

Enforcement conducted 279 patrols covering 

283,350 nautical miles and involving 3,958 ship 

days at sea. 刘增胜 [Liu Zengsheng] and 李书民

[Li Shumin], eds., 中国渔业年鉴 [2013 China 

Fisheries Yearbook] (Beijing: China Agricultural, 

2013), pp. 82–83.

329. “East China Sea Tensions: Approaching a Slow 

Boil,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 

April 14, 2016, amti.csis.org/east-china-sea 

-tensions/.

330. 深化改革 奋发有为推动海洋强国建设不断取

得新成就——刘赐贵在全国海洋工作会议上

所作工作报告摘编 [“Deepen Reform and Take 

Action to Achieve New Results toward Building 

China into a Maritime Power—Excerpts from 

Liu Cigui’s Report at the National Maritime 

Work Meeting”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean 

News], January 17, 2014, pp. 2–3.

331. 深化改革 依法治海推动海洋强国建设实现

新跨越--王宏在全国海洋工作会议上的工作

报告 (摘编) [“Deepen Reform, Govern the Sea 

on the Basis of Law, Take a New Step toward 

Building China into a Maritime Power—SOA 

Director Wang Hong’s Report at the National 

Maritime Work Meeting (Excerpts)”], 中国海洋

报 [China Ocean News], February 10, 2015, pp. 

2–3. For use of this term in the context of Second Thomas Shoal, see China Ocean Yearbook 

Compilation Committee, 2014 China Ocean 

Yearbook, p. 129.

332. For a brilliant review of recent PRC interest in 

the Luconia Shoals, see Andrew Chubb, “Luconia 

Breakers: China’s New ‘Southernmost Territory’ 

in the South China Sea?,” South Sea Conversations, June 16, 2015, southseaconversations 

.wordpress.com/2015/06/16/luconia-breakers 

-chinas-new-southernmost-territory-in-the 

-south-china-sea/. The China Coast Guard also 

has escorted large fleets of fishing vessels to 

waters adjacent to the Luconia Shoals. “China 

Coast Guard Vessels Escort Fishing Boat Flotilla 

into Malaysian Waters,” Japan Times, March 30, 
94 china maritime studies

2016, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/30/

asia-pacific/china-coast-guard-vessels-escort 

-fishing-boat-flotilla-malaysian-waters/. For a 

very interesting firsthand account of the CCG 

presence at the Luconia Shoals, see “Australian 

Farmer Causes Storm in South China Sea Territorial Dispute,” ABC News, August 7, 2016, www 

.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-08/malaysian-flag 

-rasing-causes-south-china-sea-incident/7679024.

333. 国家海洋事业发展规划纲要 (2006-2010年) 

[“Outline Plan for National Maritime Development (2006–2010)”], State Oceanic Administration, September 17, 2009, www.soa.gov.cn/zwgk/

fwjgwywj/gwyfgwj/201211/t20121105_5264 

.html.

334. While public recognition of a new policy to 

pursue control over all claimed waters began in 

2011, this policy may have been put in place in 

2010 or even 2009. Language from a September 

14, 2012, article in an SOA-owned newspaper 

suggests this to be the case: “In recent years, 

the East China Sea China Marine Surveillance 

contingent has taken steps to achieve the work 

objective put forward by the State Oceanic 

Administration Party Committee to ‘strengthen 

control over China’s jurisdictional waters.’ 

These steps include innovating its approach 

to patrols, expanding the geographic scope of 

patrols, and augmenting the vigor of patrols.” Lv 

Ning, “Effectively Manifesting Sovereignty and 

Jurisdictional Rights in the East China Sea,” p. 5. 

This article also states that “people in positions 

of responsibility in the CMS East China Sea 

contingent regard maritime rights and interests 

as ‘core interests.’” That China anticipated 2012 

to be a year of conflict in the South China Sea 

also is suggested by the comments made by Lü 

Bin, a senior official in the State Oceanic Administration, while visiting the 7th Detachment 

of China Marine Surveillance in Guangzhou 

in February 2012. During his visit, Lü toured 

CMS 75. Among his recorded remarks while 

visiting the ship, Lü promised that “this year’s 

maritime rights-protection tasks will be heavier 

than in the past.” Two months later, CMS 75 and 

a second cutter confronted Gregorio del Pilar at 

Scarborough Shoal. 孙安然 [Sun Anran], 国家

海洋局纪委书记吕滨视察中国海监第七支

队 [“SOA Commissioner of Discipline Lü Bin 

Inspects the CMS 7th Detachment”], 中国海洋

报 [China Ocean News], February 20, 2012, p. 1.

335. 2011年全国海洋厅局长暨党风廉政建设工

作会议在京召开 [“The 2011 National Good 

Governance Meeting for Municipal, Provincial, and National Maritime Leaders Opens in 

Beijing”], 海洋开发与管理 [Ocean Development 

and Management], no. 2 (2011), p. 3. Liu reiterated this theme in June and again in November 

of that year. 国家海洋局加大定期维权巡航

力度强化管辖海域控制力 [“SOA Expands 

the Force of Regular Rights-Protection Patrols 

and Strengthens Control over Jurisdictional 

Waters”], 法制日报 [Legal Daily], June 9, 2011, 

epaper.legaldaily.com.cn/fzrb/content/20110609/

Articel01013GN.htm.

336. For instance, in January 2012, just a few months 

before the Scarborough Reef standoff, CMS officer Sun Shuxian told a reporter that the goal of 

China Marine Surveillance for 2012 would be to 

“strengthen control over jurisdictional waters.” 

孙安然 [Sun Anran], 推动海监事业健康有序

快速发展 [“Promoting the Healthy, Orderly, 

and Rapid Development of Maritime Surveillance Work”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 

January 6, 2012.

337. 全国海洋功能区划 (2011-2020年) [“National 

Maritime Functional Zoning (2011–2020)”], 

State Oceanic Administration, April 18, 2012, 

www.soa.gov.cn/zwgk/fwjgwywj/gwyfgwj/201211/

t20121105_5255.html. This preference for the 

language of control occurred in parallel with 

calls to “strengthen jurisdiction” (强化管辖) 

over claimed waters. At the commissioning 

ceremony for the three-thousand-ton CMS 50 in 

July 2011, Liu Cigui put forth three requirements for CMS work. For his second point, Liu 

stated, “China Marine Surveillance must fully 

raise its ability to safeguard maritime rights and 

interests. In accordance with the plans and policies of the Party center, it must declare China’s 

claims, strengthen jurisdiction, [and] fully 

deepen regular rights-protection patrol work.” It 

is very likely, then, that this shift in language reflects a change in policy endorsed by the highest 

leadership. “An Awards Ceremony for the Fifth 

Anniversary of CMS Regular Rights-Protection 

Patrols Was Held Together with a Ceremony for 

the Commissioning of CMS 50,” p. 3. Frontline 

CMS officers clearly have internalized this aim 

of strengthening jurisdiction. A CMS officer 

interviewed in 2013 for Traveling around China

listed “strengthening jurisdiction” as one of the 

service’s three overall purposes. The other two 

were “demonstrating sovereignty” and “collecting evidence” (i.e., of foreign violations). “Blue 

Border Guards.” Similar language appears in 

key documents guiding the work of Fisheries 

Law Enforcement. The Ministry of Agriculture’s 

Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Fisheries Development (2011–2015), for instance, pointedly cites 

the goal of “strengthening normalization of 

Fisheries Law Enforcement patrols and the vigor 

of rights-protection patrols in sensitive waters.” 

全国渔业发展第十二个五年规划 (2011–2015

年) [National Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Fisheries Development (2011–2015)], 中华人民共

和国农业部网站 [Ministry of Agriculture], 
echelon defense 95

October 17, 2011, www.moa.gov.cn/ztzl/shierwu/

hyfz/201110/t20111017_2357716.htm.

338. This plan was drafted on the basis of the earlier 

document, so comparing the language of the 

two documents provides insights into changing 

policies. 国家海洋事业发展“十二五”规划

[Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Maritime Development], 国家海洋局网站 [Website of the State 

Oceanic Administration], April 11, 2013, www 

.soa.gov.cn/zwgk/fwjgwywj/shxzfg/201304/

t20130411_24765.html. At a January 2013 work 

conference for the South China Sea branch 

of the State Oceanic Administration, party 

secretary Qian Honglin pointed out that one 

of the organization’s goals in 2013 would be to 

“more effectively and more forcibly conduct 

law-enforcement patrols in China’s jurisdictional 

waters and comprehensively raise capacity for 

true administrative control in Chinese jurisdiction waters in the South China Sea” as part of 

overall efforts to improve “rights-protection” 

work. 南海分局召开2013年工作会议 [“The 

South China Sea Branch of SOA Holds Its 2013 

Work Meeting”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean 

News], January 25, 2013, p. 3. On the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the SOA, Liu Cigui 

published an article in which he wrote that going 

forward the SOA would “fully safeguard China’s 

maritime rights and interests, and strengthen 

control over jurisdictional waters.” 刘赐贵 [Liu 

Cigui], 在建设海洋强国的伟大征程中铸就辉

煌——纪念国家海洋局成立50周年 [“Create 

Glory on the Great Journey of Building China 

into a Maritime Power—Commemorating the 

50th Anniversary of the Founding of SOA”], 中

国海洋报 [China Ocean News], July 22, 2014, 

p. 1. In the same month as the 2013 SOA work 

conference, CMS party secretary Sun Shuxian 

published an article in China Ocean News to set 

the overall tone of his agency’s activities in the 

new year. This meant, among other things, “consolidating the fruits” of 2012 and “strengthening 

administrative control” over disputed waters 

and land features. 孙书贤 [Sun Shuxian], 做好

维权行政执法工作 提高海洋综合管控能力

[“Perform Rights Protection and Administrative 

Law Enforcement and Raise Capacity to Achieve 

Comprehensive Administrative Control at Sea”], 

中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], January 28, 

2013, p. 1.

339. Michael McDevitt, Becoming a Great “Maritime 

Power”: A Chinese Dream (Arlington, VA: CNA,

June 2016), www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/IRM 

-2016-U-013646.pdf.

340. 黄冉摄 [Huang Ranshe], 全国海洋工作会议在

京召开--中央领导对大会召开及海洋工作作

重要批示 [“The National Maritime Work Meeting Opens in Beijing—Central Party Leaders 

Provide Important Instructions”], 中国海洋报

[China Ocean News], January 11, 2013, p. 1.

341. 刘赐贵: 十八大报告首提“海洋强国”具有重要

的现实和战略意义 [“Liu Cigui: The Fact That 

the 18th Party Congress Work Report Mentions 

‘Maritime Power’ Has Important Real and Strategic Significance”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean 

News], November 12, 2012, p. 1.

342. In this same sentence, Admiral Wu also wrote 

that China should “effectively contain hot spots 

from escalating and getting out of control.” This 

is the stability side of the rights-stability dialectic. Wu Shengli, “Profoundly Absorb the Historical Lessons of the First Sino-Japanese War 

and Unswervingly Take the Path of Strategic 

Management of the Sea, Safeguarding Maritime 

Rights, and Developing the Navy,” p. 3.

343. 张兆垠 [Zhang Zhaoyin], 切实有效维护海洋

权益 [“Earnestly and Effectively Safeguard Maritime Rights and Interests”], 人民海军 [People’s 

Navy], March 19, 2014, p. 2. In his 2014 article 

in China Military Science, Sr. Capt. Xie Shiting 

discusses the need for China to “expand the 

space under Chinese administrative control.” Xie 

Shiting, “A Scientific Compass for Strategically 

Managing the Sea and Safeguarding Maritime 

Rights and Interests in the Context of the New 

Situation,” p. 84.

344. Xi Jinping, “We Need to Do More.” Xi used 

a similar formulation in his 2017 New Year’s 

message: “We will continue to embrace peaceful 

development, and we will continue to resolutely 

defend our territorial sovereignty and maritime 

rights and interest. China will not tolerate 

anybody taking issue with this!” 国家主席习

近平发表二〇一七年新年贺词 [“Chinese 

President Xi Jinping’s New Year’s Eve Message for 2017”], 新华社 [Xinhua], December 

31, 2016, news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016 

-12/31/c_1120227034.htm. Another oft-cited Xi 

Jinping quote reflecting China’s new, less compromising approach was uttered by Xi during a 

speech given in July 2016 to commemorate the 

ninety-fifth anniversary of the founding of the 

Chinese Communist Party: “The Chinese people 

don’t believe in evil, but nor are they afraid of 

evil; they don’t stir up trouble, but nor are they 

afraid of trouble. No foreign country should 

expect that we will barter with our core interests. 

Don’t expect us to allow harm to be done to our 

sovereignty, security, and development interests. 

We won’t swallow that bitter fruit.” 习近平: 在

庆祝中国共产党成立95周年大会上的讲话

[“Xi Jinping: Speech Given at the Ceremony 

Commemorating the 95th Anniversary of the 

Founding of the CCP”], 新华社 [Xinhua], July 

1, 2016, news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016 

-07/01/c_1119150660.htm. In a June 2014 
96 china maritime studies

meeting, Xi signaled his heightened concern 

for “maritime defense” (海防) by calling on 

Chinese forces to “resolutely safeguard territorial 

sovereignty and maritime rights and interests” 

and build “a wall of copper and iron for border 

and maritime defense.” 李宣良 [Li Xuanliang] 

and 黎云 [Liang Yun], 习近平: 筑牢边海防铜

墙铁壁 [“Xi Jinping: China Will Build a Solid 

Wall of Copper and Iron for Border and Maritime Defense”], 新华网 [Xinhua Online], June 

27, 2014, news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014 

-06/27/c_1111357748.htm. For an authoritative 

discussion on the evolution of Chinese maritime 

defense under Xi Jinping, see 侯胜亮 [Hou 

Shengliang], 论中国边海防转型建设 [“On the 

Transformation of China’s Border and Maritime 

Defense”], 中国军事科学 [China Military 

Science], no. 6 (2015), pp. 69–75. A PLAN 

representative to the 2016 National People’s 

Congress interpreted China’s maritime activism 

in the Xi Jinping era as follows: “In recent years, 

under the strong leadership of the Party Central 

Committee and Xi Jinping, we have given some 

beautiful ‘combination punches’ in the struggle 

for maritime rights protection. We’ve achieved 

historic breakthroughs with respect to strategic 

management of the sea and safeguarding 

maritime rights.” 孙国强 [Sun Guoqiang], 建设

海洋强国需要一支 强大海军 [“To Build Itself 

into a Maritime Power China Needs a Powerful 

Navy”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], March 9, 

2016, p. 1. For more on the concept of “strategic 

management of the sea,” see Ryan D. Martinson, 

“Jinglue Haiyang: The Naval Implications of Xi 

Jinping’s New Strategic Concept,” Jamestown 

Foundation China Brief 15, no. 1 (January 9, 

2015), jamestown.org/program/jinglue-haiyang 

-the-naval-implications-of-xi-jinpings-new 

-strategic-concept/#sthash.3mnZtJea.dpuf.

345. Yi Yan, “Resolutely and Unswervingly Safeguard 

Maritime Rights and Interests.” Similar logic was 

outlined in an important July 2014 PLA Daily

article published under the byline of a major 

research institute within the Chinese Academy 

of Military Science. The authors admit that in 

recent years China has operated more aggressively along its maritime periphery than it did in 

the past. This shift in behavior was prompted by 

a perceived need to “forcibly strike back at other 

disputants.” The authors then write, “Experience 

shows that given the urgent needs of safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and development interests, the only way to establish the 

standing of the Chinese state and military [国威

军威], deter the provocations of our counterparts, and safeguard the security of border and 

maritime defense is to contend for every inch of 

land and sea, and, at the key moment, to dare to 

flash the sword [亮剑] and lash out [出手].” 军

事科学院国家边海防研究中心 [Academy of 

Military Science Border and Maritime Defense 

Research Center], 治国先治边, 维护边海防

安全要敢于斗争善于斗争 [“To Govern the 

State We Must First Govern the Periphery, in 

Safeguarding Border and Maritime Defense We 

Must Dare to Struggle and Excel at Struggling”], 

解放军报 [PLA Daily], July 1, 2014, p. 6.

346. Li Peizhi, “Ideas on Reform of the China Coast 

Guard,” p. 49.

347. “Zhang Haiwen: The Current Maritime Situation 

and Thoughts on China’s Maritime Strategy.” For 

a general discussion of the rights-protection/

stability-maintenance balance, see Martinson, 

“China’s Great Balancing Act Unfolds.” 张洁

[Zhang Jie], 黄岩岛模式与中国海洋维权政策

的转向东 [“Huangyan Model and the Shift of 

China’s Maritime Rights-Protection Strategy”], 

东南亚研究 [Southeast Asian Studies], no. 4 

(2013), pp. 25–31. Zhang collaborated with 

several other scholars on an early 2013 article 

that characterized 2012 as a “turning point,” at 

which Chinese maritime policy transitioned 

from Deng Xiaoping’s “keeping a low profile” 

(韬光养晦) to “taking the initiative” (主动作

为). 张洁 [Zhang Jie] et al., 海上纷争与中美

博弈—中国周边安全形势 [“Maritime Disputes 

and Sino-U.S. Contention—China’s Peripheral 

Security Situation”], 世界知识 [World Affairs], 

no. 2 (2013), p. 15. People’s Daily online cites a 

similar judgment that Jin Canrong, a professor and administrator at Renmin University’s 

School of International Studies, made in the 

aftermath of China’s seizure of Scarborough 

Shoal. Yao Chun, “China Shifts Its Maritime 

Strategy,” People’s Daily (English), July 16, 2012, 

en.people.cn/90883/7876606.html. A Chinese 

newspaper cited Wu Shicun, president of the 

National Institute for South China Sea Studies, 

making the following comment: “[Since 2012] 

China has become much more assertive [积

极有为] with respect to the South China Sea 

issue. Strategically, it takes the initiative [lit., 

“proactively attacks”—主动出击]. Tactically, it 

is continually upgrading its rights-protection 

methods.” “China’s Maritime Patrols Cover All 

of the South China Sea and Maritime Rights 

Protection Is More Proactive Than in the Past.” 

The authoritative ODR 2013 states (p. 49) that 

“in 2012 indeterminate factors increased and 

frictions and disputes over maritime rights and 

interests became enflamed.”

348. As Michael Mazarr points out, even if force 

is not used, the success of strategies such as 

the one China is pursuing in the East China 

Sea and South China Sea will lead to vigorous 

countermeasures from other disputants. Michael 

J. Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict (Carlisle Barracks, 
echelon defense 97

PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army 

War College Press, 2015), pp. 69–70.

349. Renato Cruz De Castro, “Philippine Supreme 

Court Approves EDCA: Unlocking the Door for 

the Return of U.S. Strategic Footprint in Southeast Asia,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 

February 1, 2016, amti.csis.org/philippine 

-supreme-court-approves-edca-unlocking-door 

-return-u-s-strategic-footprint-southeast-asia/.

350. Kiyoshi Takenaka, “Japan to Provide Patrol Ships 

to Vietnam amid Maritime Row with China,” 

Reuters, September 7, 2016, www.reuters.com/ 

article/us-asean-summit-japan-vietnam 

-idUSKCN11D2CB; Manuel Mogato, “Philippines Gets First Coastguard Boat from Japan to 

Boost Security,” Reuters, August 18, 2016, www 

.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-philippines 

-japan-idUSKCN10T11V.

351. These ships often transmit AIS signals, which 

allows open-source tracking of their operations.

352. The March 2009 attack against USNS Impeccable is the most noteworthy of these incidents, 

because of the aggressiveness of the tactics used. 

The decision to harass USN special-mission 

ships in early 2009 clearly was a national policy: 

harassment took place in different sea areas and 

involved multiple agencies. However, it appears 

that the head of the South China Sea branch 

of Fisheries Law Enforcement, Wu Zhuang, 

personally decided to unleash China’s maritime 

militia on Impeccable. Martinson, “Panning 

for Gold,” p. 30. According to the account 

published on the website of a Guangdong fisheries administration agency, “In 2009, the U.S. 

Navy surveying vessel Impeccable intruded into 

China’s EEZ, impacting the normal production 

activities of Chinese fishing vessels. Chinese 

fishermen and trawlers spontaneously came 

to the scene, and a Fisheries Law Enforcement 

vessel commanded them to intercept and expel 

[the American ship], thereby forcefully protecting the rights and interests of Chinese trawlers 

and fishermen.” 中国渔政 蓝色国土的守护者

[“Fisheries Law Enforcement Is the Protector 

of China’s Blue Territory”], 廉江市海洋与渔业

局 [Lianjiang City Oceans and Fisheries Bureau], 

February 22, 2011, www.ljhyj.gov.cn/Shownews 

.asp?Sid=79. The South China Sea branch of 

Fisheries Law Enforcement commemorated the 

first anniversary of the attack on Impeccable. According to an article appearing on the branch’s 

website, “Chinese fishermen and China Fisheries 

Law Enforcement successfully intercepted and 

expelled the U.S. Navy spy ship Impeccable.” 

For this they “received the high praise of their 

superiors and the Chinese people.” Wu Zhuang 

spoke at the commemoration ceremony. 记住

扬眉吐气的那一天 [“Remembering the Day 

We Held Our Heads High”], 农业部南海区

渔政局 [South China Sea Branch of Fisheries Law Enforcement], March 10, 2010, www 

.moa.gov.cn/sydw/nhyzj/dwjs/sxjs/201003/

t20100310_2110849.htm. For his success in the 

struggle at sea (presumably including the harassment of Impeccable), Wu received an award and 

a commendation at the Fourth National Border 

and Maritime Defense Work Meeting, held in 

January 2010. 中国渔政南海总队被授予全国

边海防工作先进集体并受表彰 [“The South 

China Sea Contingent of Fisheries Law Enforcement Receives Collective Commendation at the 

Fourth National Border and Maritime Defense 

Work Meeting”], 农业部南海区渔政局 [South 

China Sea Branch of Fisheries Law Enforcement], 

February 1, 2010, www.moa.gov.cn/sydw/nhyzj/

gzdt/201002/t20100201_2110433.htm. The U.S. 

Defense Department also concluded that the attack on Impeccable did not result from a decision 

made at a senior level. Speaking in January 2011, 

then–Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, 

“We think the civilian leadership was not aware 

of the aggressive approach by Chinese ships 

to the USNS Impeccable a few years ago.” Jim 

Garamone, “U.S.-Japan Pact Has Demonstrated 

Worth, Gates Says,” U.S. Department of Defense,

January 13, 2011, archive.defense.gov/news/

newsarticle.aspx?id=62451. On December 15, 

2016, a PLAN submarine rescue vessel snatched 

a USN underwater glider while USNS Bowditch

was recovering it in waters roughly fifty nautical 

miles northwest of Subic Bay. This incident took 

place in an area that Beijing does not claim. As 

such, this action was either an attempt to steal an 

American asset for intelligence purposes or was 

intended to signal to American leaders China’s 

dissatisfaction with the recent statements of 

then-president-elect Donald Trump on Taiwan 

or some other recent U.S. action that cannot be 

identified from publicly available sources. China 

officially claims that the PLAN vessel happened 

to find the glider and treated it as a navigational 

hazard. China returned the glider four days after 

it was taken. Terri Moon Cronk, “Chinese Seize 

U.S. Navy Underwater Drone in South China 

Sea,” DoD News, December 16, 2016, www 

.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1032823/

chinese-seize-us-navy-underwater-drone-in 

-south-china-sea; “Statement by Pentagon Press 

Secretary Peter Cook on Return of U.S. Navy 

UUV,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 19, 2016, www.defense.gov/News/News 

-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1034224/

statement-by-pentagon-press-secretary-peter 

-cook-on-return-of-us-navy-uuv; “China to 

Hand Over Underwater Drone to U.S. in Appropriate Manner,” Xinhua, December 18, 2016, news 

.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-12/18/c_135913344 

.htm. For further analysis, see M. Taylor Fravel, 
98 china maritime studies

“The Implications of China’s Seizure of a U.S. 

Navy Drone,” Maritime Awareness Project,

December 21, 2016, maritimeawarenessproject 

.org/2016/12/21/the-implications-of-chinas 

-seizure-of-a-u-s-navy-drone/.

353. As Peter Dutton points out, the new Spratly 

bases have turned the South China Sea into a 

strategic strait, in which foreign ships can be 

menaced from two directions. Peter Dutton, “A 

Maritime or Continental Order for Southeast 

Asia and the South China Sea?,” Naval War College Review 69, no. 3 (Summer 2016), pp. 10–11.
About the Author

Ryan D. MARTINSON is a researcher in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the 

Naval War College. He holds a master’s degree from the Fletcher School of Law and 

Diplomacy at Tufts University and a bachelor’s of science from Union College. Martinson has also studied at Fudan University, the Beijing Language and Culture University, 

and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center. He previously served as deputy director of the China 

Exchange Initiative.