The ROK–U.S. Alliance: Where 

Is It Headed?

by Kim Dong Shin

Strategic Forum

F

or half a century, the alliance between

the Republic of Korea and the United

States has focused on the threat posed

by North Korea. But today, as South Korea

moves toward reconciliation with the North

on the basis of a strong and credible deterrence, a new approach is required to guide

the future of the alliance.

South Korea and the United States need

a strategic plan that defines shared objectives and the means for achieving them. This

plan would identify possible problems that

could occur en route to these objectives and

suggest how to avert them, plus what the two

countries would need to do if the problems

were to happen anyway. 

A strategic plan would help guide the

current discussions on the future of the alliance. It would give direction to the alliance

and provide both Korean and American audiences with a clearer vision of why we maintain an alliance and what we gain from it.

Such a plan might have helped avert the

current nuclear weapons crisis with North

Korea; now, it is needed to resolve the crisis.

It should identify a mutually agreeable approach to propose to North Korea as part of

multilateral discussions, an approach agreed

to by the other regional players.

Developing such a plan will not be easy

because Seoul and Washington do not view

some critical issues in the same manner. But

the effort to describe and explain these

differences may resolve some of them and

prepare the way for adjusting the U.S. military presence in Korea and creating a peace

regime on the Korean Peninsula.

The National Security Strategy of the

United States of America (September 2002)

provides an important framework from which

to examine the current crisis on the Korean

Peninsula and other challenges in Northeast

Asia. With its focus on terrorism and weapons of

mass destruction (WMD), this strategy is concerned with North Korea as much as, if not

more than, any other state. In particular, North

Korea poses a unique set of challenges in regard

to WMD. North Korea stands in sharp contrast

to the Republic of Korea (ROK) on issues such

as human rights, democracy, and market

economies. The National Security Strategy

suggests that the United States should revitalize

its alliance with South Korea, while encouraging North Korea to transform its political and

economic system. Yet South Korea and the

United States are currently having some difficulties in developing a consensus on how to

approach Pyongyang, and appear to have no

clear plan to operationalize the strategy to deal

with North Korea.

At issue are increasing ROK pride coupled

with economic and other successes, the North

Korean nuclear weapons development program,

and the U.S.-led war on global terrorism. As

South Korea and the United States are marking

the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty, internal and external confusion lingers and a crisis looms, caused by

Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program and the

political repercussions of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In Europe, due to varying national interests, some countries opposed military action by

America and Britain against Iraq. While South

Korea and Japan supported coalition forces in

Iraq, there are concerns in both countries over

future preventive military actions by the United

States. But the focus of the security debate in

Northeast Asia continues to be Pyongyang’s

nuclear weapons development. Sensitive differences in American and South Korean assessments of and predictions about these clandestine nuclear programs, coupled with concern

about the dangers of war, have led to broad

debate on the series of North Korean actions

and even some claims that the United States is

responsible for this crisis.

Nationalist anti-American sentiments seen

among some South Korean media and citizens,

and reactive anti-Korean sentiments in the

United States that are often exaggerated by

some American media reports, have led to an

eruption of demands for reductions and relocations of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea,

further straining the time-honored alliance of

the two nations. Differences appear to persist in

their assessments of the current situation and

expectations for the future, including on

whether they can accommodate the unraveling

situations and have confidence in their own

capabilities to resolve them.

South Korea and the United States need to

overcome the current crisis originating from

North Korean nuclear weapons development

and search for a more mature and advanced

relationship. As we prepare for another 50 years

of alliance, anti-American and anti-Korean

sentiments caused by biased perceptions and a

lack of mutual understanding should not be

allowed to drive our foreign policies and damage the alliance. Differing assessments and

predictions about North Korean nuclear

weapons and U.S. forces in Korea could become

too divisive and aggravated. Before then, our

two nations should revitalize the alliance and

No. 197

April 2003

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points

No. 197, April 2003
strengthen security cooperation by resolving

problems and pursuing closer consultation far

in advance. We should develop a strategic plan

that defines shared objectives—such as

strengthening and better balancing the alliance, or achieving peace and prosperity on

the Korean Peninsula—and identify feasible

paths toward these objectives. Such a plan

would also define possible crises that could

occur en route to these objectives and suggest

how to avert them and what we would need to

do if they were to happen nevertheless. While

reality may diverge from such a strategic plan,

periodic adjustments would bring us back on

track, just as with other operational plans.

Triangular Relations

North Korea, South Korea, and the United

States find themselves in different situations.

South Korea is facing a shift in political power

in which younger generations with a more

liberal outlook have become mainstream.

They demand breakthroughs in their relations

with the United States as well as North Korea

in order to put an end to a South-North standoff and to expedite a peace regime on the

peninsula. Meanwhile, the United States is

leading a global war against terrorism, having

focused its mind and might on dismantling

Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and dethroning Saddam Hussein.

But the United States is also demanding

that the rogue state of North Korea abandon its

secret nuclear programs. The Bush administration wants to see North Korean progress in

five areas:

■ nuclear weapons

■ other WMD, including chemical and biological weapons

■ missiles

■ conventional forces

■ human rights.

The comprehensive approach, or package

deal, to resolve the North Korean problem is

still on the table waiting for Pyongyang to

understand that U.S. intentions are benign and

that benefits will be forthcoming. 

For its part, North Korea remains a closed

society that repeatedly imposes a “march of

affliction” on its populace in the face of what it

perceives as imminent American military

attacks. North Korea also appears to have a

lingering fear about the widening gap in national power with the South, causing

Pyongyang to feel increasingly vulnerable and

desperate. While North Korea craves to be

empowered, its economic and political difficulties leave it with few options—other than

nuclear weapons—to achieve empowerment.

Anti-American sentiments have tapered off

in South Korea, though this generally has not

been recognized in the United States. (Meanwhile, anti-Korean feeling apparently is on the

rise in America.) These anti-American sentiments, epitomized by the so-called candlelight

vigils and demonstrations, were ignited and

sustained by a tragic accident involving two

South Korean schoolgirls, the acquittals of two

U.S. soldiers involved, and what many South

Koreans perceived as insincere and belated

American apologies. The street demonstrations

peaked around the presidential election in

December 2002 and have since decreased.

Although some street demonstrations continue

in South Korea, they are noticeably subdued

and staged largely in the name of pacifist,

antiwar causes. A number of pro-American

demonstrations also have occurred.

According to a Korean public opinion

survey conducted in February 2003, only 7

percent of the respondents favored an immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea,

while 43.1 percent supported gradual reductions, and 47 percent desired their continued

presence. Thus, although support for reductions

has increased over the years, nearly 90 percent

of South Koreans favor some level of U.S.

military presence on the peninsula. The same

respondents expressed their views on the candlelight demonstrations: 74.5 percent sought

revision of the Status of Forces Agreement

(SOFA), and only 12.7 percent sought to express

anti-American sentiments. Many South Korean

voices have called for a “more equal” alliance

with the United States to reflect Korea’s significant economic and political advancements.

Koreans are looking for equality in terms of

both the SOFA and operational control of forces.

On the other hand, South Korean demonstrations and other actions have caused a sense of

betrayal and indignation in the United States,

and Congressional debates have begun over

possible reductions of American troops in Korea.

Against this background, the North Korean

nuclear weapons crisis poses a huge challenge

for the alliance. There are basically two conflicting views in South Korea today regarding

the North’s continuation of a nuclear weapons

program. One view is that Pyongyang is not

capable of developing nuclear weapons and is

simply bluffing, seeking direct talks with Washington to help overcome its perennial economic

crisis and energy shortage. The other view is

that while Pyongyang may want some negotiations with Washington, it will never abandon its

nuclear weapons programs, even if doing so

would eventually secure a U.S. guarantee of

regime survival. Prescriptions on how to deal

with the nuclear problem differ accordingly.

Seoul-Washington

Tensions

Similarly, Seoul and Washington show a

slight difference in their assessments of Pyongyang’s nuclear development, its linkage

with international terrorist organizations, and

the role each expects the North to play. These

differences might have arisen from differing

national interests, threat perceptions, and

strategies, and from problems in information

sharing. The dominant analysis in Washington, for instance, is that Pyongyang has moved

from seeking negotiations to seeking real

possession of nuclear weapons. Some in Washington have even expressed readiness to use

military options to resolve the nuclear problem,

if necessary, as a last resort. But President

George W. Bush has repeatedly emphasized that

Washington remains in agreement with the

2 Strategic Forum No. 197, April 2003

Kim Dong Shin is a visiting scholar in the Center for Asia Pacific Policy at the RAND Corporation. General

Kim served as Deputy Commander of the Combined Forces Command, Chief of Staff of the Republic of Korea

Army, and ROK Defense Minister. This paper was originally presented at a Pacific Symposium sponsored by

the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies and the National Defense University in March 2003. The author

may be contacted at (301) 393–0411, extension 7382. (General Kim acknowledges the contributions of Bruce

Bennett of RAND and Kim Changsu of the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses in preparing this paper.)

South Korea is facing a

shift in political power in

which younger generations with a more liberal

outlook have become

mainstream
government of President Roh Moo-hyun on the

principle of peaceful resolution.

Nevertheless, the United States decided to

dispatch additional forces to fill the vacuum

created around the peninsula as some U.S.

forces in the region moved toward the Persian

Gulf and Iraq. North Korea has responded

strongly to these measures. From a North

Korean perspective, the deployment of bombers,

a carrier, and F–117s into the peninsula region

appears to be exactly the military package the

United States might send to carry out a surgical

strike against its nuclear facilities. North Korea

has claimed a right to take preemptive action

against U.S. targets, which creates concern that

an escalatory spiral could lead to another war

on the Korean Peninsula.

Reacting to highly visible anti-U.S. demonstrations in South Korea, many Americans—

including journalists, scholars, and Members of

Congress—have begun to voice displeasure.

Some even demanded a possible reduction and

relocation of American troops stationed in South

Korea. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

stated that he is ready to discuss issues of restructuring and relocating U.S. forces in Korea

with the ROK government in his drive for a

worldwide readjustment of American forces. But

security analysts are concerned about the profound impact on the deterrence posture that

could result from rapid reductions of American

forces and the relocation of U.S. ground forces

south of Seoul. Of particular concern is the

possible impact on the so-called tripwire effect of

having significant U.S. forces on the route of

any possible North Korean invasion.

South Korea and the United States see the

necessity to develop their alliance further, with

highest priority on managing the current crisis

on the peninsula through a peaceful resolution

of the North Korean nuclear weapons problem.

The two nations also emphasize trilateral policy

cooperation and coordination among Seoul,

Washington, and Tokyo and search for a multilateral approach to resolving this problem. At

the 34th Security Consultative Meeting held in

Washington in December 2002, South Korea

and the United States agreed to conduct a joint

study on the future of their alliance and signed

terms of reference for the Future ROK–U.S.

Alliance Policy Initiative that will enable formal

discussions on procedures for strengthening

their alliance over the next 10 years.

Toward a Strategic Plan

South Korea and the United States need to

devise a more concrete strategic plan that can

guide the alliance through the coming years.

This plan should identify alliance objectives and

means for achieving them. The U.S. National

Security Strategy would serve as one basis for

formulating these objectives and strategies;

South Korea also needs to develop its own national security strategy to serve as a counterpart

reference. From these two strategies, a combined

strategic plan should flow naturally. The plan

should identify possible stumbling blocks in the

coming months and years and suggest both how

these might be avoided and how to cope with

them should they occur.

Resolve the Nuclear Problem. First,

South Korea and the United States need to

resolve the existing North Korean nuclear

weapons problem promptly and with priority.

As a first step in formulating a strategic plan,

our governments should work together to:

■ determine a mutually agreeable option to

propose to North Korea as part of multilateral

discussions. Prepare this option in the next month.

■ present this option to the other regional

players (especially Japan and China) and work with

them to develop a multilateral position on resolving

the crisis.

■ make it clear to North Korea that the security of its government, its access to economic

support, and its potential movement toward a peace

regime are contingent on accepting the multilateral proposal.

■ work together to address issues in areas

where North Korea disagrees or wants other actions

and resolve these issues.

Build a Peace Regime. We can expect

that one objective of this combined strategy

would be “Building a Peace Regime on the

Korean Peninsula,” which is one of the 10

major policy goals of the new ROK government. The combined strategic plan should lay

out an approach to accomplish this objective,

including efforts by South Korea and the

United States to:

■ push forward a South-North peace declaration or a peace treaty only in conjunction with real

tangible progress in arms control. To this end, Seoul

should consider proposing to Pyongyang a joint

study to define a future roadmap for their relations.

■ conduct South-North arms control in conjunction with reductions of U.S. forces.

■ demand openly and strongly that Pyongyang

accept confidence-building measures, abandon its

nuclear and other WMD programs, and implement

arms control, while encouraging it to shape an

environment for reform and openness as well as

change in its perceptions about America.

■ assist South Korea in perceiving the alliance

and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) as conducive to

building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

Meet Basic Preconditions. Before moving

ahead with adjusting the ROK–U.S. alliance

and/or reducing and relocating the USFK as

part of rebalancing the relations in general, the

following preconditions should be met:

■ ROK armed forces should improve their

military planning capabilities in hardware and

software. They have limited experience in making

an independent war plan of their own and lack

independent deterrent capabilities against North

Korea and other regional threats, particularly in

intelligence-gathering capability.

■ Verifiable arms control should be implemented between the Koreas. Otherwise, anti-American sentiments in South Korea might give a wrong

signal to Pyongyang that Washington is willingly

withdrawing its forces from South Korea, which in

turn will lead Pyongyang to make a miscalculation

about the security situation on the peninsula.

■ A package deal should be pursued between

Washington and Pyongyang in which the North’s

nuclear and other WMD programs, missiles, and

conventional forces are exchanged for U.S. force

reductions and relocations.

■ Closer prior consultation and full understanding should come before adjusting the alliance

and the USFK. Any important decision lacking

mutual understanding and laden with emotion

should be avoided.

■ Consensus should be formed between the

American and Korean governments and their

populaces. Concrete action plans should be prepared

in advance.

Implement the Alliance Policy Initiative.

On the implementation of the Future

ROK–U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative, South

Korea and the United States should:

■ resolve some prominent issues that affect the

daily lives of South Koreans, such as SOFA, with full

consultation, but also make sure that we do not

No. 197, April 2003 Strategic Forum 3

security analysts are concerned about the profound

impact on the deterrence

posture that could result

from rapid reductions of

American forces
4 Strategic Forum No. 197, April 2003

endanger more substantial and vital issues, such as

the overall ROK–U.S. alliance.

■ lead the joint study and gradually allow

other governmental agencies, the National Assembly

and the U.S. Congress, and government-funded

research institutes to join them (Track 1).

■ complement Track 1 by fostering discussions

among the academia, media, and civilian organizations (Track 2).

■ work to build a consensus between the two

nations and foster mutual support.

Prepare for Change in Operational

Control. The ROK government should prepare

to receive wartime operational control by:

■ preparing now for a transfer of all the

delegated authorities currently exercised by the

Commander, Combined Forces Command, Korea, as

a major step leading to a transfer of wartime operational control.

■ considering an option in which a ROK

general officer exercises temporary operational

control during joint exercises, in conjunction with

USFK reductions and relocations.

■ increasing the ROK defense budget from 

2.7 percent of gross domestic product to 3 percent

(at a minimum) to facilitate force improvement

programs.

Shape a Stable Environment for the U.S.

Military Presence. In parallel with shaping a

more mature alliance that better befits a

changing security environment in Northeast

Asia, the ROK government should:

■ make an objective assessment of the contributions that the ROK–U.S. alliance and the American

military presence have made for the past 5 decades in

terms of ROK economic growth and democratization

and give generous support to the formation of an

advanced alliance for the 21st century.

■ shape a favorable and stable environment

for U.S. forces to station in South Korea by providing diplomatic, financial, and social assistance to

improve their overall quality of life.

Conclusion

The year 2003 marks the 50th anniversary

of the ROK–U.S. alliance. The alliance has

played an important role in promoting regional stability and world peace. But like any

relationship, it needs work and guidance now

to mature to a new level. The measures suggested above would be concrete steps in the

right direction. Done properly, these efforts can

strengthen the ROK–U.S. alliance so that it will

support the security needs of both of our countries for another 50 years.

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