History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

and

The First Indochina War

1947-1954

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for Public Release

Distribution Unlimited

Office of Joint History

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, DC * 2004

20050627 099
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the first Indochina War,

1947-1954.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Indochinese War, 1946-1954--United States. 2. United States. Joint Chiefs of

Staff-History-20th century. 3. Indochina-Foreign relations-Indochina.

4. United States-Foreign relations-Indochina. 5. United States-Foreign

relations-1945-1989. I. Title: Joint Chiefs of Staff and the first Indochina War,

1947-1954. II. United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Joint History Office.

DS553.1.H57 2004

959.704'12--dc22

2003027687

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov-Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800-DC area (202) 512-1800

Fax: (202) 512-2250, Mail Stop: SSOR Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16-072430-9
Foreword

Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic

direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have

played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS

relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of

Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their

current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis

provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the

United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official

history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization and as a source of information for staff studies, will be readily recognized.

Written to complement The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy series, The

Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam series focuses upon the activities of

the Joint Chiefs that were concerned with the conflicts in Indochina and later Vietnam. The nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the sensitivity of the

sources used caused the volumes of the series to be written as classified documents.

Classification designations are those that appeared in the classified publication.

This volume describes those JCS activities related to the war in Indochina during the period 1947-1954. The original text was a collaborative effort of the entire

Historical Section, JCS, including: Major Norman E. Cawse-Morgon, USAF, Major

William P Moody, USAF; Captain Ernest Giusti, USMCR; Captain Wilber M. Hoare,

USA; Lieutenant (ag) Norman B. Ferris, USNR; Second Lieutenant Robert M. Utley,

USA; Mr. Vernon E. Davis; Mr. Samuel A. Tucker; Mr. Paul K. Wood; Mr. Eugene A.

Green; Miss Julia A. Coppa; Mrs. Pauline S. Butler; Mrs. Janet W. Ball, and Mrs. Celia

G. Crown. An unclassified version was published as The History of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam-History of the

Indochina Incident, 1949-1954 (Michael Glazier: Wilmington, DE, 1982). The current version has been substantially revised by Dr. Walton S. Moody who condensed

the first five chapters into a single chapter revising and updating the material and

revised later sections of the book to reflect evidence and scholarship currently

available. Dr. Walter S. Poole reviewed Dr. Moody's work, and Dr. David A. Armstrong edited the resulting manuscript. Ms. Susan Carroll prepared the Index and

Ms. Penny Norman prepared the manuscript for publication.

The volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an official

publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been

v
considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only

and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of. Staff on any

subject.

Washington, DC DAVID A. ARMSTRONG

October 2004 Director for Joint History

vi
Preface

One of the results of the warfare that raged in Southeast Asia in the late 1940s

and early 1950s was to put Vietnam on the map. The decolonization of French

Indochina left the region divided into four independent states: North Vietnam,

South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Officially known as "Annamites," the Vietnamese, the major ethnic group in Indochina, were largely settled in three territories: Tonkin in the north, Annam in the center, and Cochin in the south, with Hanoi,

Hue, and Saigon (since 1975 Ho Chi Minh City) as the respective capitals. Cambodia and Laos were included with these among the five territories of Indochina.

When a provisional government in Hanoi declared the independence of the "Democratic Republic of Viet Nam" (DRV) on 2 September 1945, it claimed to mark the

culmination of generations of political struggle to secure a national identity for the

Vietnamese people. The war that followed between the communist-led forces of

the DRV and the forces of the French Union would lead to the creation of the two

states, each claiming to embody this Vietnamese national identity.

For the United States, the Second World War had brought new knowledge of

Indochina and its problems. The Americans in Indochina at the time managed to disappoint the expectations of both sides in the impending struggle, but the military

services managed to extricate themselves with minimal cost. As between the combatants, the French and the Viet Minh insurgents, America had every reason to avoid

involvement until the situation came to be seen as a communist threat to all of Southeast Asia. The preferred solution would have been to win the support of the Vietnamese people to resist that threat. But the communist-led Viet Minh seemed to most

Vietnamese as the only force that truly represented the cause of national independence. This left the military forces of the French Union as the primary means to hold

Indochina. France, with all its troubles, was a crucial ally, especially in holding

Europe against Soviet power. The problem was that Indochina was drawing off some

of France's best soldiers and sapping that nation's morale. The dilemma could only

be solved by a seemingly unattainable victory or by abandoning an Asian empire.

For the United States and for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the years from 1947 to

1954 were a period when these problems slowly grew in importance. Efforts to

build a Vietnamese army bore little fruit. If the French gave up, the question of

direct American intervention would arise. The potential engagement of US armed

forces in a land war in Southeast Asia was a daunting prospect. But there were

dangers to any alternative strategy. The problem reached crisis proportions in the

early months of 1954, when dangers of a serious split with a valuable ally, the loss

of a strategically crucial region to communism, or even a major war with the communist bloc all seemed to come together.

vii
Contents

1. World War II and the Coming of the Indochina War 1

French Indochina and the Coming of the Pacific War 1

The Formation of the Viet Minh .... ........ 5

America and Indochina, 1942-1945 ......... ....... 6

Crisis and Policy ............ ... ............ 9

The French Return and the Americans Depart .... .. 13

2. Stalemate and US Noninvolvement ......... ... 19

Military Situation in the Spring of 1947 ......... ... 20

The French Break with the Viet Minh ......... ... 21

The Bao Dai Plan ........ ............ .. 24

Culmination of the Bao Dai Solution .. ...... .. 27

American Policy toward Indochina, 1947-1949 .... .. 31

3. Origins of American Involvement,

June 1949-June 1950 .... ......... 35

Drawing Lines in Indochina, June 1949-January 1950 36

Emergence of a Far Eastern and Indochinese Policy. 41

Beginnings of American Aid .... ........ ... 43

Indochina on the Eve of the Korean War ...... .. 50

4. Impact of War in Korea, June 1950-January 1951 . . 53

The Erskine Report .............. 54

France and the Crisis in Indochina ... ........ .. 58

MAAG Indochina ....... ............. .. 61

Development of US Policy toward Indochina,

July-December 1950 .... ........... .. 63

5. The De Lattre Episode, 1951 ... ....... .. 69

The Military Situation in Indochina Improves. ......... 70

Singapore Conference ..... .......... .... 76

The Pleven Visit ...... ............ .... 77

The Visit of General de Lattre ... ...... .... 79

Inter-Allied Military Conferences ... ...... .... 81

Progress of Aid to Indochina .. .... ... ..... 83

ix
Contents

6. The Truman Administration's Struggle, 1952 .... 89

The Military Situation in Indochina .... ........ 89

Development of American Policy toward Indochina. 92

The Five-Power Military Conference on Southeast Asia. 97

Development of the Aid Program during 1952 ........ .. 100

The French Home Front Begins to Crack ......... .. 104

7. The Eisenhower Administration and the

Navarre Plan, 1953 ...... ........ . .. 107

The Main Course of United States Policy ..... ..... 108

The French and Indochinese Political Scenes. ......... 117

Main Features of the US Aid Program ...... .... 121

Conclusion ......... ......... . ....... 126

8. Dien Bien Phu, Bermuda, and Berlin,

November 1953-March 1954 ... ......... 129

The O'Daniel Report and Dien Bien Phu ... ..... 130

The Bermuda Conference ....... ........... 132

Support for the Navarre Plan ... ............... 133

NSC 177 and Crisis Planning ..... .......... 135

The Deepening Crisis ....... ............ 141

The Berlin Conference ....... ............ 148

9. Prelude to Geneva, March-May 1954 ......... .. 151

The Radford-Ely Conversations .... ........ .. 152

Conditions of Intervention ...... ........ .. 155

The French Make Their Request ........ 158

Mr. Dulles and Admiral Radford Go to Paris . ... ..... 164

10. Geneva and the End of Intervention ..... ..... 169

French Armistice Proposal and US Reaction. ......... 169

Conditions for American Intervention .... ...... .. 176

French Attempts to Secure Unconditional Intervention. 179

US Military Plans for Intervention ... ......... .. 184

Training of Native Troops .... ........... 188

11. Toward a New Alliance ..... ........... 195

United States Strategy in the Far East ... ........ .. 195

Movement toward Agreement at Geneva ......... .. 200

Final US Position toward Settlement ... ........ 202

Anglo-American Discussions ....... ........ 206

US Unilateral Declaration on Geneva ... ........ .. 209

x
Contents

12. Conclusion ...... .............. .. 213

Appendices

1. Summary of the Aid Program ..... .......... 217

2. Text of NSC 64/1, 21 December 1950 ... ...... 223

3. Text of NSC 124/2, 25 June 1952 .... .......... 227

4. The Initial Viet Minh Terms at Geneva ......... .. 231

5. Text of the Final Declaration-Geneva Conference . . . . 233

Photos

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Meet the Press, 13 February 1950 18

2. Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal in Conference

with the Joint Chiefs, 1948 ... ............... 18

3. A Meeting in the Pentagon, 25 November 1952 ...... 88

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 22 January 1954 ......... .. 128

Abbreviations and Acronyms ..... .......... 237

Principal Civilian and Military Officers .. ....... 239

Notes .............. .................. 243

Index .............. .................. 275

xi
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

and

The First Indochina War

1947-1954
1

World War II and the Coming

of the Indochina War

French Indochina and the Coming of the Pacific War

T he French had extended their control over Indochina gradually. First occupied

in 1859, Cochin became a French colony in 1867 and remained the only French

territory in Indochina. Protectorates were established over the other territories

during the 1880s and 1890s. The imperial dynasty of the Nguyen family at Hue

retained nominal authority over Tonkin and Annam, the Emperor Bao Dai taking

the throne in 1925 at the age of twelve. Like Bao Dai, the Kings of Cambodia and

Laos were guided by French Residents; the French Governor-General at Saigon

held supreme power in Indochina. By the 1940s the population of the region passed

twenty-five million, two-thirds of them ethnic Vietnamese, while the Khmer (Cambodians) and Laotians were the next groups in importance. Other communities

included Chinese (especially in Cholon, adjacent to Saigon) and tribal groups in the

Central Highlands, often known as "Montagnards" (hill people).1

Culturally, the Vietnamese had absorbed much from China, including Buddhism for the peasant masses and Confucianism for an elite educated in Chinese

writing (a romanized form of Vietnamese writing emerged in the nineteenth century). Nevertheless, the central political tradition was one of resistance to Chinese

imperial expansion. In fact, China had ceded its claims to the region to France. The

French had encountered fierce military resistance during the 1880s before pacifying Tonkin and Annam. Under French rule the mandarin (Confucian scholar-gentry) class had been undermined, and many began to merge into a new urban middle

class intelligentsia. The peasants seem to have suffered an increasingly precarious

status on the land mostly due to exploitation by French and Vietnamese entrepreneurs. Mines and factories began to create a working class under harsh conditions.

1
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Many Vietnamese became Catholics, but most peasants retained their folk traditions and Buddhist sympathies. A few Vietnamese rose to form a Francophilic

upper class.2

Economically, the French preferred developing Indochina as a source of raw

materials and a market for French products. Some industry appeared, but rice was

the leading export, especially from the rich Mekong delta of Cochin and the Red

River delta of Tonkin. Rubber and coal were among the other products. In time

Vietnamese ("Tonkinese") contract laborers were recruited under virtual slave conditions to work in the French islands of the South Pacific. At the same time, French

medical researchers made the Pasteur Institute a leading center for tropical medicine, and engineers developed the waterways to increase rice production. By the

early twentieth century a railroad ran from the port of Haiphong in Tonkin to the

interior of South China in Yunnan Province.3

French colonists sought their fortunes in Indochina from the start. By 1940

there were some 40,000 Europeans in the region. The scale of French participation

in government can be seen in the observations of a French official who visited the

American-controlled Philippine Islands in the 1920s and who saw many government jobs held by Filipinos that would have belonged to Frenchmen in Indochina.4

Although some local elections were permitted, France made no effort to prepare

the Indochinese for greater political autonomy.5

As the defeated mandarin generation died out, new groups emerged to support

the cause of national independence. Often guided by Chinese and Japanese exponents of Asian modernization and resistance to the West, these groups had little

contact with the peasants or workers. Grievances against unfair land tenure laws,

the corvee (obligatory labor), and taxes on salt, tobacco, and alcohol occasionally

led to unrest in rural areas, as in 1908. On the other hand, as many as one hundred

thousand Indochinese served in France during the First World War as soldiers or

laborers. In the wake of the war, as Saigon grew, reaching a population of one million in the 1940s, intellectuals and workers began to organize. French-educated

intellectuals formed a legal Constitutionalist Party. Grass-roots religious movements took hold in rural Cochin. Two sects, the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao, became

numerous and influential. Middle-class intellectuals in 1927 formed other nationalist groups, including the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD or Nationalist Party) in

Hanoi. The VNQDD took the Chinese nationalists (Kuomintang) as their model.

Other revolutionary groups formed and survived, sometimes hiding out in China,

sometimes eluding the French police in Indochina, and sometimes benefiting from

amnesties decreed by the government in Paris.6

The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917 also came to provide a model for

some Vietnamese seeking independence. In 1919 Lenin formed the Third, or Communist, International (Comintern) and at the Second Congress of that organization

in 1920 presented his "Theses on the National and Colonial Questions." A "First

Congress of the Peoples of the East" held at Baku in the same year proclaimed the

2
World War If and the Coming of the Indochina War

message that Soviet communism supported the struggles of Asian peoples against

European imperialists. By the middle 1920s the Comintern had an agent ready to

work in Vietnam. 7

Later known to the world as Ho Chi Minh (the one who enlightens), this agent

was then going by the name Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen the patriot). The son of a

mandarin of peasant origin who had refused to work for the French, he had originally been named Nguyen Sinh Cung and renamed Nguyen That Than at the age of

ten. From northern Annam, he had been educated in Hue and had taught school

before shipping as a mess boy on a passenger liner, under the name Ba. After many

travels he found himself in Paris at the time that the French Communist Party was

formed; there he read Lenin's "Theses." Quoc then formed a group of revolutionary

colonial natives in Paris before going to Moscow to be trained by the Comintern. In

January 1930, Nguyen Ai Quoc gathered a number of groups in a house in British

Hong Kong to form the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP).8

The new party suffered disaster almost immediately, as 1930 saw a series of

unsuccessful uprisings in Indochina. Both the VNQDD and the communists supported revolts and suffered under the French reprisals that followed. Finding shelter where they could, especially in South China, the leaders survived as best they

could; Nguyen Ai Quoc was actually reported dead. In fact he had been arrested in

Hong Kong by the British and released in 1933. He then went to Moscow, where he

apparently was an instructor in the Comintern's training program for several years.

At the end of the 1930s, Vietnamese revolutionaries remained active. The Communists and the VNQDD were not the only groups; there was even a Trotskyist party

in Saigon. But French power seemed unshaken in Indochina. It was only when

France joined with Great Britain in September 1939 in war against Hitler's Germany that fate began to bring opportunities to the ICP.9

America had little knowledge of Indochina in 1940. Thirteen years before, the

US consul in Saigon had advised that there was no need to submit a monthly political report to the State Department, as there were no political developments to

report. The American presence of a few missionaries and businessmen generated

little interest back home. Reports of the uprisings in 1930 retailed the French characterization of them as "communistic." By the late 1930s, however, Americans were

learning more about nationalism in Indochina. A new consul observed such tendencies, and in 1937 French Indochina, by Virginia Thompson, exposed the conditions

of the peasant work force and asserted that Nguyen Ai Quoc's main emphasis was

nationalistic. Still, such reports, as well as the occasional article in National Geographic, gave the American public little idea that Indochina was an area of importance. It was not until the summer of 1940 that the US Government had reason to

have a policy of any kind toward French Indochina.10

By then, Japan controlled vast areas of northern and eastern China, and the

Kuomintang government at Chungking was virtually cut off from the sea. While the

United States wanted to help China in its struggle with the invader, the means of

3
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

getting aid to the Chinese were limited. However, there were ways into the interior

of China. The Japanese estimated that over 40 percent of Chiang's supplies came

through the port of Haiphong and via the Yunnan railroad. Tied down by its war in

Europe, France was unwilling to close the railroad.1'

But on 10 May the Germans launched their offensive against the Low Countries

and France, and on 17 June the new French Prime Minister, Philippe Petain, asked

for an armistice. Soon Petain and his government were installed at Vichy, outside

the German-occupied zone. On 19 June the Japanese Government demanded that

France close the Yunnan railroad. Although the French Governor-General yielded,

he sought time to prepare resistance to further demands. In the region France had

little more than a cruiser and some 50,000 troops, including natives. Early in

August the Japanese demanded that Vichy grant it full transit rights as well as economic concessions in Indochina. Vichy decided to temporize while seeking support

from the Americans.12

James C. Dunn, political adviser to the Department of State, advised the

French Ambassador that the United States was exerting what pressure it could on

the Japanese. After receiving a rebuff from Germany, Vichy advised the United

States that they had no choice but to yield. On 29 August a Franco-Japanese accord

was signed in Tokyo. Further maneuvering failed to ward off a military agreement,

and on 23 September Japanese troops crossed the frontier from their zone in China

into Tonkin. French resistance collapsed in two days. Although the French continued to govern the region, the Japanese held all the key positions in Tonkin. Following a brief war with Thailand, the French were also forced to cede some Cambodian territory. '

3

Secretary of State Cordell Hull responded to the French concessions by advising the French of US displeasure, and the State Department protested to the Japanese. The French asserted that the Americans had agreed to the accord with Japan,

forcing the State Department into a public denial. The Japanese reply was also

unacceptable, and the US Government announced a loan to the Chinese Government and cut Japan off from exports of scrap iron. These steps began a new escalation of tensions between the United States and Japan. On 27 September 1940,

Japan, Italy, and Germany became formal allies in the Tripartite Pact.' 4

The United States refused requests from Vichy to buy armaments for use to

defend Indochina against Japanese encroachment.' 5 The American government

chose to rely on the fleet at Pearl Harbor and, later in 1941, a buildup of air power

in the Philippines to deter further Japanese action. In April 1941 Japan and the

Soviet Union concluded a neutrality treaty that gave the Japanese a free hand in

Southeast Asia.' 6 However, this treaty did not preclude Asian communists from

intensifying their resistance to Japanese occupying forces.

To support its planned push to the south, especially to seize control of the oil

of the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia) as a substitute for American oil, Japan

decided to extend its occupation zone in Indochina. Accordingly, on 12 July 1941,

4
World War II and the Coming of the Indochina War

Japan demanded bases in southern Indochina. Washington immediately instructed

Ambassador William D. Leahy in Vichy to delay French action. The Japanese move

underscored the seriousness of the situation and led to President Franklin D. Roosevelt approving an embargo on oil and the freezing of Japanese assets on 26 July.

On 21 September Japanese troops started moving into Cochin, and by the end of

the month Vichy had acquiesced.'7 Events unfolded with grim inevitability, and on 7

December the Japanese offensive began with attacks on the Americans at Pearl

Harbor in Hawaii as well .as in the Philippines, the British in Malaya, and the Dutch

in their islands. Within days the grand alliance of America, Great Britain, and the

USSR against the powers of the Tripartite Pact formed.

A factor in bringing the United States into a global war was that French

Indochina, while occupied by the Japanese, remained under the administration of

Vichy France was itself under strong German influence. The United States did not

yet support the Free French led by General Charles de Gaulle and based in London.

Interested in maintaining relations with Vichy, President Roosevelt supported

assurances to the French that he favored the restoration of all of France's possessions at the end of the war; this remained American policy to the end of 1942. On 7

November 1942, US and British forces landed in French North Africa, and the

Vichy forces capitulated after three days. Meanwhile, the Germans overran unoccupied France, confinring Vichy's puppet status. It became clear soon after that Roosevelt's motives in promising the restoration of France's colonial empire had been

to induce Vichy's cooperation with American plans. That need having passed, a

new policy emerged. Once troops were ashore in North Africa, the President

ceased to show much interest in restoring France's empire."8

The Formation of the Viet Minh

A fter the 1930 uprisings in Indochina the various communist and nationalist

groups had struggled to survive. Leaving Moscow, Nguyen Ai Quoc had gone

to Yenan in 1938 and spent time with Mao Tse-tung's Chinese communists before

going to South China in 1939. His ideas on organizing the peasants for revolution

reflected the influence of Mao's ideas on the subject. The Chinese communists in

1938 were beginning their resistance to the Japanese occupation of North China.

Despite Mao's quarrel with Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang, the ICP found shelter in

South China and even survived under British police surveillance in Hong Kong. The

Kuomintang and its supporters were trying to organize resistance to the Japanese,

and after the invaders had occupied Indochina the Vietnamese groups had become

useful for guerrilla operations. Nguyen Ai Quoc connected with other agents of the

Indochinese Communist Party, including Vo Nguyen Giap and Pham Van Dong.

Because of Kuomintang suspicion, the Communists sought to remain clandestine

and worked through front organizations.'9

5
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

In May 1941, Quoc managed to gather some communists in the hills across the

Chinese frontier in Tonkin, a region since known as the Viet Bac, the main area of

the insurgents' hideouts. There the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh (Viet Nam Independence League), known as the Viet Minh, a coalition of Vietnamese nationalists

under communist leadership was formed. Although organized shortly after the

Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, the Viet Minh were, nevertheless, committed to

guerrilla war against the Japanese.20 When Germany attacked the Soviet Union on

22 June 1941, the French communists rallied to the support of the Free French, but

as the French in Indochina remained aligned with Vichy, they remained, along with

the Japanese, the enemy of the Viet Minh.

Vo Nguyen Giap began to organize guerrilla forces in Tonkin, and resistance

groups began to emerge throughout Vietnam. Increasingly, the Viet Minh was the

most successful in recruiting promising supporters and operating effective forces

on the ground in Indochina, small and poorly armed as they were. The Chinese tried

to encourage noncommunist Vietnamese groups, and in April 1942 Quoc was arrested. Some nationalists of the VNQDD in China helped organize a new "Revolutionary

League," usually known as the Dong Minh Hoi, consciously modeled on the Kuomintang. But neither this nor any other Vietnamese group proved effective at organizing a unified effort, and the Chinese finally released Quoc in June of 1943. Apparently about this time, he began to be known as Ho Chi Minh, the better to divert

Chinese attention from his communist connections. At Liuchow (Liuzhou) in March

1944 the Viet Minh and the Dong Minh Hoi combined under Chinese auspices. 2

1

America and Indochina, 1942-1945

F irst meeting on 9 February 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were involved

only tangentially with Indochina for some time. The JCS became the American

half of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) that consisted of the members of the

British Chiefs of Staff Committee as well as the JCS and bore responsibility for the

strategic direction of the Anglo-American war effort. Indochina had been important

primarily because of its strategic position bordering on China and the splendid harbor at Cam Ranh Bay; in 1942 the Allies included Indochina in the China Theater of

Operations. President Roosevelt strongly supported building up Chiang's China as

a postwar great power. Chiang was given command of the China Theater, under

American strategic direction and with an American Chief of Staff at Chungking.

American advisers also served with the Chinese forces. Beginning on 9 August

1942, US aircraft based in China (Tenth Air Force until March 1943, then Fourteenth Air Force) struck Japanese targets in Indochina. In 1943 the Allies also set

up a Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) under Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten.

Mountbatten arrived at a "gentlemen's agreement" with Chiang that SEAC regular

forces might operate in Indochina if necessary, and boundaries might be adjusted

6
World War II and the Coming of the Indochina War

accordingly. But clearly, the efforts of the Chinese to utilize Vietnamese irregulars

in Indochina were in keeping with the assignment of the region to their theater.22

By 1943 the French Committee of National Liberation had established its

headquarters at Algiers. The committee asserted its commitment to the restoration of French rule over the entire colonial empire. With this went a vague pledge

for self-government by the peoples involved; for example, on 7 December 1943 the

committee announced that "the French mean to give a new political status by

which, within the French community [rights] will be reshaped and established on

a wider scope; a status whose institutions will have a more liberal character.... ",23

The French began to organize a battalion-sized force for special operations

against the Japanese in Indochina which put them at cross purposes with President Roosevelt, whose personal antipathy toward Charles de Gaulle affected all

US policy concerning France.

Over time the Joint Chiefs of Staff learned of the complications that might

arise over the French colonies. In January 1943, President Roosevelt told the

Chiefs that Ambassador Robert Murphy had exceeded his authority in conveying

assurances to the French before the North Africa landings.24 For some time Roosevelt's views on Indochina had been based on his hostility toward the European

colonial empires, a view that was not unusual in America. His son Elliot recalled

him commenting: "The native Indo-Chinese have been so flagrantly downtrodden

that they thought to themselves: Anything must be better, than to live under French

colonial rule!"25 The President said he did not intend to be "wheedled into" helping

the imperial powers regain their possessions.26

Late in the same year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again heard from the President

on this subject. The occasion was a request from the French Committee of National Liberation for arms and for a seat on the. Pacific War Council, the diplomatic

body in Washington representing the countries involved in the war against Japan.

The arms were to be in addition to those received for the Free French forces in

Europe, and the request made explicit the committee's desire to send troops to the

Far East.27

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee2

" reviewed the French request and concluded that there was no military need for French forces in the Pacific war that

would justify the allocation of equipment. Reconquering Indochina had no strategic

importance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the report on 8 November 1943.

President Roosevelt went further. The Chiefs' assumption that Indochina would be

returned to France at the end of the war was incorrect, and the United States

would make no such commitment. The State Department was equally unresponsive

to the request concerning a seat on the Pacific War Council. Roosevelt made it

clear at his meetings with the Prime Minister of England, Winston S. Churchill, that

he favored some form of international trusteeship for Indochina (under the then

fashionable idea that colonized peoples were usually not "ready" for self-government). The Joint Chiefs of Staff ignored further French requests. This was the

7
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

general policy of the government, and the Joint Chiefs avoided making the President's views on Indochina explicit to the French. 29

Policy concerning irregular or clandestine operations in French Indochina

proved a much more complicated matter and would lead to a lengthy controversy

over who was to blame for what in the region. American officials in the Far East

had difficulty determining what American policy actually was, much less implementing it. With the Fourteenth Air Force, commanded by Major General Claire L.

Chennault, USA, at Kunming in Yunnan, attacking the Japanese, the Americans

needed targeting information and aid for downed air crewmen. Working with the

Chinese, Chennault's staff was able to develop the necessary contacts. At the same

time, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was interested in developing intelligence sources and clandestine forces in Indochina, especially among the Montagnards. Late in 1944, Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA, then commanding in the China Theater, told Chennault that Ambassador Hurley was concerned

about the degree of cooperation with the French. Hurley made it clear that his concern stemmed from the President's unwillingness to support imperialist ambitions

in Southeast Asia.30

In July 1944 the French asked the British to intervene with the Americans to

give them a role in the war against Japan. The British Chiefs of Staff advised the

Joint Chiefs of Staff that they agreed that there was no reason for active participation of French field forces in the Far East. However, they did favor a French mission at SEAC to coordinate clandestine operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

responded with ambiguous statements that rejected a French mission at SEAC but

supported French participation in planning at that headquarters. 31

Meanwhile, the Free French established military missions at Calcutta, India,

and at Kunming where they developed good working relations with the Fourteenth

Air Force. The French groups were to begin to organize resistance to the Axis in

the Far East.32 In August 1944, allied forces entered Paris, and a provisional government was established under de Gaulle. The new government made no secret of its

intention to regain all colonial possessions. At the same time, the French administration in Indochina abandoned Vichy and began to establish contact with Paris.

President Roosevelt continued to support an international trusteeship for

Indochina and steadfastly refused to commit the United States to French recovery

of its empire. But, in declining health, occupied with a variety of problems, and

sympathetic to the need to use all forces against the Axis, he made some compromises. In October 1944 he told the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, that Mountbatten should help the French but not "ask questions" that would prejudice political action. At the conference with Churchill and Stalin at Yalta in February,

Roosevelt told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States should support the

French fighting the Japanese but not align itself with the French.33

Cooperation was further complicated by the sensitivity of Wedemeyer's position in China. He asked the French what they thought of a Chinese push from

8
World War If and the Coming of the Indochina War

Yunnan into Indochina and learned that the French were suspicious of any move

by the Chinese. The French in Washington used these contacts to garner JCS support for clandestine operations in Indochina. The Joint Staff Planners (JSP) were

consulted and concluded that the French were seeking an implicit statement of US

policy. Meanwhile, the British were trying to establish their interest in the Indochina area and subvert US policy. Therefore, these French suggestions and any further

ones should be referred to the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC);

SWNCC, in turn, temporized until the issue was overtaken by events in Indochina.3

Mountbatten and Wedemeyer were working at cross-purposes; because of their

disagreements, communications had been chancy. Then, on 23 January 1945, Fourteenth Air Force fighters mistakenly shot down three British bombers on a clandestine mission over Indochina. The two commanders were unable to iron out their

differences, and Wedemeyer complained to Washington that Mountbatten was

operating in Indochina without his permission.3 5

In Indochina, the Viet Minh survived attacks by the Japanese and the French.

Heavy flooding created famine conditions in which as many as two million persons

are thought to have died. Allied bombing aimed at transportation nets cannot have

helped conditions. At the same time, the contacts between French agents in SEAC

and the French in Indochina were conducted with a remarkable amateurishness

that made it clear to the Japanese that the colonial administration could not be

trusted. By the beginning months of 1945, observers were freely predicting strong

action by the Japanese. On 2 February 1945 the French attach6 in Chungking asked

Wedemeyer whether the French could expect support if they opposed a Japanese

takeover. Wedemeyer received an affirmation of existing policy of noninvolvement

from Washington.3 6

Crisis and Policy

0 n 9 March 1945 Japanese action ended the awkward situation of mutual suspicion and apparent cooperation. They seized power in Indochina and interned

those French officials and forces that could not escape. A few thousand French

troops under Generals Sabattier and Alessandri managed to get to south China,

covered part of the way by close air support from the US Fourteenth Air Force.

Meanwhile, the Japanese declared that Vietnam was now independent under the

rule of the Emperor Bao Dai, who in turn adhered to the coalition of Japanese puppet states in the Far East. Bao Dai attempted to base a government on such proJapanese groups as the Restoration League and the Dai Viet (Greater Viet Nam

Nationalist Association).37

On 12 March the French embassy in Washington asked for assistance for the

French resistance in Indochina; a formal French request to the CCS called for intelligence support, closer coordination, and air operations for bombing and airdrops

9
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

of equipment.38 Wedemeyer, then in Washington, met with Roosevelt and learned

that the President still did not want to help the French. Nevertheless, by 19 March

he was ready to allow operations "to help French provided such aid does not interfere with planned operations." 39 However, the President continued to enjoin caution about French and British political motives in Indochina. At the time of his

death at Warm Springs, Georgia, on 12 April 1945, Roosevelt was negotiating with

Churchill about the terms for cooperation between Mountbatten and Wedemeyer

over Indochina.40

In Paris, the Japanese action in Indochina brought an affirmation of French

policy to regain the region. On 24 March the Provisional Government issued a

statement outlining a postwar plan for Indochina. The French Empire, reconstituted as the French Union, would include an Indochinese Federation consisting of the

five territories. All forms of ethnic discrimination would be abolished. Representative assemblies would be elected, but international affairs would be handled in

Paris, and the Governor-General would appoint the executive officials. 41 In prewar

Indochina this declaration might have been acceptable to most Vietnamese nationalists, but in 1945 it was not enough.

For the Viet Minh the Japanese coup was an opportunity to move toward a

national uprising. The unsettled conditions of a country in famine, under foreign

occupation, and a weak government given little power by the occupier and

despised as foreign puppets by everyone else created what the leadership termed a

"preinsurrectionary" phase. The Viet Minh called for a united front against the

Japanese and declared their willingness to cooperate with French resistance

groups in Indochina. Giap's military forces began a cautious guerrilla campaign

against the Japanese, while a "Liberated Zone" took shape in the Viet Bac. The Viet

Minh made a point of declaring that, as the allies of the Soviet Union, the United

States, and the United Kingdom, they were on the winning side. The surrender of

Germany in May 1945 could be presented as proof of impending victory. The uprising would come, whether or not Allied forces actually reached Indochina.42

The Japanese coup wiped out the Allied intelligence contacts within the

French administration; the OSS largely started from scratch. Teams began working

with Sabattier and Alessandri, and elements of their forces took part in some clandestine operations in Tonkin. However, the French were at a distinct disadvantage,

since the Vietnamese population was unwilling to work with them, and on one

occasion even guided a French party into a Viet Minh ambush. One American officer reported: "I don't think the French will ever do a hell of a lot of good in

Indochina because Annamite hatred makes it a more dangerous place for them

than for us." 43 In fact, Americans came to fear being mistaken for French.

The Army Air Forces Air Ground Aid Service at Kunming had contacted Ho Chi

Minh about providing him with equipment to help rescue Allied fliers downed in

Indochina. The OSS was also interested in Viet Minh support, and on 16 July 1945 a

team under Major Allison K. Thomas parachuted into Tonkin near Thai Nguyen and

10
World War 11 and the Coming of the Indochina War

were met in person by Ho Chi Minh-whom they came to know as "Mr. C. M. Hoo."

Thomas's party worked with the Viet Minh over the coming month and provided

some weapons, although the subsequent French assertion that the OSS had

"armed" the Viet Minh was an exaggeration.4

Ho appears to have told Thomas of the Viet Minh position on a return of the

French. The Viet Minh leader had attempted to advise the French mission at Kunming of the Vietnamese demands that a national assembly be established and that

the French commit themselves to complete independence for Vietnam within five

to ten years. Bound by the declaration of March 24, the French essentially ignored

Ho's demands. 45

Ho Chi Minh anticipated the news on 15 August of Japan's surrender. The

atomic attack on Hiroshima on 6 August set off wide speculation that the Japanese

were finished. For the Viet Minh this was the signal for the general uprising, and

they were on the move. On 14 August a congress at Thai Nguyen formed a coalition

People's Liberation Committee. Following a massive rally in front of the National

Theater in Hanoi on 19 August, the Viet Minh took control of the city as the Japanese looked on. Local resistance crumbled throughout Tonkin and Annam. On 25

August Bao Dai abdicated at Hue. These were heady days; Vietnamese who lived

through the time never forgot it. Even in Cochin, although the Viet Minh had far

less control and were forced to play a lesser role than in the north, a United

National Front joined in a group called the Committee of the South at Saigon which

was headed by a Viet Minh agent, Tran Van Giau.46

On 22 August the first Americans arrived in Hanoi, headed by an OSS officer,

Major Archimedes L. A. Patti. They were accompanied by Major Jean Sainteny, a

French intelligence officer from the mission in Kunming. The French in Hanoi were

not in any position to oppose the Viet Minh. The four or five thousand French

troops interned in the citadel by the Japanese were still there. Patti was on the platform for the ceremonies at Hanoi on 2 September attending the declaration of independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Ho Chi Minh was the

President of the Provisional Government, and he told Patti that the new republic

wanted good relations with the United States. The declaration of independence

quoted the Americans' own declaration of 1776 as well as the French Declaration

of the Rights of Man of 1789.47

The Viet Minh had seized the moment. Their position on the ground was sustained by rising popular enthusiasm owing to famine, Japanese occupation, and the

memory of French oppression as well as the communists' organizing skills. The

assistance of the Americans had been useful but not crucial. Only a fraction of

their weapons had come from the Americans. Many had been captured from the

French or the Japanese, and with the final Japanese surrender in the offing, it

appears that stocks of their weapons found their way into the hands of Vietnamese

nationalist groups, especially the Viet Minh. Later French allegations that the Americans had "armed" the Viet Minh were essentially false. But the Americans on the

11
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

scene were basically uninformed about US policy and were largely unaware that

their government no longer posed any objection to French return to Indochina.48

President Roosevelt's opposition to the French regaining Indochina had come

under heavy opposition, and he had been forced into pragmatic adjustments to

allow the French to help fight the Japanese. With his death, US policy became formally neutral in the sense of neither supporting nor opposing the French. On 14

April 1945 SWNCC decided to seek a firm policy statement from President Harry S.

Truman. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in a draft statement to the effect that

the United States would do nothing for France that it would not do for any other

ally, would not oppose restoration of Indochina to France, and would favor, in principle, French participation in the war against Japan. The State Department could

not agree, and the statement did not go forward. Over the spring of 1945 proposals

for a trusteeship for Indochina faded away. De Gaulle voiced his resistance, and at

the United Nations Conference at San Francisco the matter never arose. On 8 May

Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., informed French Foreign Minister

Georges Bidault that the United States had never officially opposed French sovereignty over Indochina.49 And on 2 June SWNCC submitted a statement on the Far

East to President Truman that included the statement, "the United States recognizes French sovereignty over Indochina."50

Americans on the ground in the Far East had little clear idea of what government policy actually was, let alone what changes were being made. At the end of

May, Wedemeyer was increasingly frustrated at Mountbatten's actions in running

special operations in Indochina without permission. The two commanders were

still appealing to their own governments over the matter. Ambassador Hurley supported General Wedemeyer in his concern. But General Marshall in his reply to

Wedemeyer's complaints pointed out that US policy now welcomed French participation in the war against Japan. A trusteeship in Indochina was unlikely. There was

no objection from a policy standpoint to Mountbatten's operations in the region. 5

1

The Truman administration left it to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur,

who was to command the invasion of Japan, to decide what assistance the French

could provide; nothing was to be done specifically to get troops to Indochina. The

French advised that two divisions would be ready for the Far East, the 9th Colonial

Infantry Division (DIC) by the end of June and the 1st DIC by the end of July. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that shipping for these divisions would not be ready

nor be required for months. When the heads of government met at Potsdam in July,

the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that the French would eventually be employed

against Japan but decided to stall on equipping the divisions. The CCS also agreed

that in the event of a Japanese surrender the China Theater should be responsible

for occupying Indochina north of the 16th parallel; SEAC would take over south of

that line.52

12
World War II and the Coming of the Indochina War

The French Return and the Americans Depart

T he surrender of Japan did not bring immediate peace to Asia. But the US Government assumed that its goal now was to get out of the region. In Indochina,

America recognized French sovereignty but did not consider itself obliged tohelp

them regain control and did not want to appear to be helping. Sensitivity to Asian

and American opinion alone would have justified a policy that seemed to eliminate

any need to keep troops or spend money in the region. No sooner had the news of

the surrender become known than the French asked for transportation to Indochina for the two divisions previously promised for the war effort. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff were happy to refer the matter to the British. While neither the British nor the

Americans had aircraft available to move Alessandri's men back from China into

Indochina, shipping was soon available for the troops coming from Europe. 53 The

French troops, commanded by General Leclerc, began to arrive in the Far East by

the end of September 1945.4

The Potsdam agreement did not require waiting for the French. Chiang KaiShek (with Wedemeyer advising him) and Admiral Mountbatten were responsible

for occupying Indochina and disarming and repatriating the Japanese. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the State Department wanted to disassociate the United States

from SEAC as quickly as possible; the American advisers accompanying the Chinese forces in northern Indochina were to avoid any political involvement.

The Chinese commander for northern Indochina was Lieutenant General Lu

Han, a relative of the Yunnan warlord Lung Yun, and his troops were largely the

warlord's men. The Kuomintang thus hoped to weaken the warlord; Lu Han's

motive in the occupation was to enrich himself, his family, and his adherents. His

agenda apparently was not known by the French and Americans in the region. His

adviser was Brigadier General Philip E. Gallagher. Until Lu Han's arrival in Hanoi

on 18 September, the small group of Americans with Patti and the OSS group

observed the Viet Minh gaining control of the situation. Under the circumstances,

cross-purposes hardly begin to describe the welter of goals of the Viet Minh, other

Vietnamese nationalists, the French, the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Americans.

General Gallagher's mission was doomed to being misunderstood because of the

expectations everyone had of the Americans.55

The French understood that they needed protection. French civilian residents

of Hanoi were subject to frequent attacks by Vietnamese and the prisoners of war

remained unarmed in the citadel. Lu Han began by refusing to allow the French

flag to fly at the ceremony of surrender by the Japanese. Patti had warned that

arming the French would lead to fighting with the Vietnamese; Gallagher secured

the release of the Frenchmen in the citadel but refused to arm them. A major fiasco resulted from Chinese efforts to manipulate the currency. When the Frenchcontrolled Bank of Indochina tried to rescue the piaster, it incurred the ire of the

13
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Chinese and the DRV. Gallagher was only partially successful in ending the crisis

in November.5 6

The French complained to the US Government about Gallagher. Although the

charge that he had met secretly with the Chinese to keep the French out of northern Indochina was proven to be unfounded, his observations in correspondence

with General Wedemeyer would not have pleased Paris. "I pointed out [to Ho Chi

Minh] frankly that my job was not as a representative of the State Department nor

was I interested in the political situation.., that I was merely working with Lu Han.

Confidentially I wish the Annamites could be given their independence, but of

course we have no voice in this matter."57 Wedemeyer needed Gallagher's staff elsewhere, and the War Department was concerned that Gallagher was becoming a liability. On 12 December he was recalled from Indochina, and an official American

presence in north Indochina ceased. 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted even less to do with the situation in southern

Indochina. Advanced elements of an OSS team were among the first Allied personnel

parachuted into Cochin, arriving 1 September. The team chief, Major A. Peter Dewey,

arrived on 4 September, and the British commander, Major General Douglas Gracey,

reached Saigon two days later. An Anglo-French agreement committed SEAC to turning over southern Indochina to the French. In Saigon the Committee of the South

was trying to hold its position among the Japanese, Trotskyists, noncommunist

nationalists, the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai sects, the Binh Xuyen (a powerful crime syndicate), and the beleaguered local French community. British-Indian troops did not

begin arriving in force until 20 September, and Gracey, refusing to rely on the Committee of the South, gave the task of keeping order to the Japanese. The Committee

staged a massive demonstration on 17 September to protest. Gracey armed the

French prisoners of war, who then went on a rampage. The Committee of the South

responded with a general strike, and the Binh Xuyen massacred 150 French civilians.

The OSS team, whose missions involved helping any Americans and looking for war

criminals, offended General Gracey by contacting the Vietnamese leaders. On 26 September Dewey was killed in an ambush, apparently mistaken for a Frenchman,

although at the time the circumstances were a complete mystery.5 9

In October Leclerc and his troops began to reach Cochin. Leclerc outlined his

plans to Dewey's successor, who then received orders from Washington to avoid all

political contact. Meanwhile, British-Indian and French troops began to take control of southern Indochina. A schedule for turnover to the French was concluded

on 9 October, and troops reached Phnom Penh, Cambodia, the next day. By 25

October the French had a full division available, talks with the Committee of the

South had failed, and the Viet Minh were driven from Saigon. Although they managed to eliminate the Trotskyists, the united front in the south had broken up.

Admiral Georges Thierry d'Argenlieu, the new French High Commissioner for

Indochina, arrived in Saigon on 31 October.60

14
World War II and the Coming of the Indochina War

American policy meanwhile was aimed at disassociating the United States as

much as possible from Indochina. In spite of State Department hesitation, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff insisted on reducing US participation in SEAC to a liaison team. On

15 October 1945 SWNCC agreed to US withdrawal from Mountbatten's command

as soon as possible, "in order that the implication of United States participation in

Southeast Asia Command policies and activities in the Netherlands East Indies and

Indo-China may be eliminated immediately."61 The reduction to a US liaison team at

SEAC took effect 1 November, but no public notice was given of this action until

January 1946, which weakened the benefit of a clear separation from Dutch and

French efforts to restore their colonial empires.6 2

At the end of January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that the British planned to

withdraw from Indochina and leave the French in charge south of the 16th parallel.

The Joint Chiefs did not want the British to relinquish authority for disarming and

repatriating Japanese troops, a task that was still far from complete, as this would

require renegotiating the surrender agreement. This position won SWNCC

approval, and on 1 February the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the British to retain

control. The British Chiefs of Staff objected but agreed to a compromise by which

Lord Mountbatten would retain a reduced position in Indochina solely for the purpose of repatriating the Japanese, while leaving southern Indochina otherwise

under French control. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to this arrangement. 63

The Chinese Government at Chungking had succeeded in removing Lung Yun

and was willing to withdraw Lu Han's troops from Indochina. In Tonkin the Chinese continued to hope that the Dong Minh Hoi could gain control of the country.

The Viet Minh, however, continued to hold the upper hand. Ho Chi Minh's success

at combating famine and organizing the population bore fruit in the negotiations

and in the election of 6 January 1946 that gave the Viet Minh control of the DRV

national assembly. A coalition government with the Dong Minh Hoi forced the Chinese to choose between the Viet Minh and the French. D'Argenlieu's visit to

Chungking and negotiations between China and France produced a treaty on 28

February. France gave up all its concessions in China under the "unequal treaties."

In turn China would give up control of northern Indochina effective 31 March.6

The French asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff to approve the transfer

agreement. On 3 April the CCS approved the transfer and prescribed that the

French should assume overall responsibility for the repatriation of the Japanese

in both parts of Indochina. The British Chiefs of Staff announced the transfer of

this responsibility in southern Indochina effective 13 May. Meanwhile, the Chinese began their withdrawal from northern Indochina. While some Chinese

troops remained in control of parts of the Laotian highlands until September

1946, when they captured the opium harvest, Tonkin was largely free of Chinese

troops by the summer.65

The French were back in Indochina to deal with the Viet Minh on their own.

Each side's expectations of the Americans had been disappointed. Whatever his

15
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

sincerity, Ho had expressed hope for support from the United States. Among the

French there were many signs of bitterness over what they perceived as American

betrayal. It is true that Roosevelt had been less than forthright about his unwillingness to let the French return to Indochina, and Patti and Gallagher may have been

somewhat indiscreet in their dealings with the Viet Minh. But some of the allegations by French participants were without foundation. In particular, it was alleged

that the Americans in Hanoi, motivated by an "infantile anticolonialism" (as Sainteny termed it), had incited Viet Minh opposition (as if that had been necessary) to

promote US economic interests in the region. 66 In fact, whatever the vagaries of

American policy, one of its wellsprings was to avoid any responsibility for developments in Indochina, hardly the way to advance selfish imperialistic schemes. As for

obstruction, the lack of shipping, however convenient a rationale for delaying the

movement of French troops, had been a perennial issue throughout the Second

World War. But accusations of American double-dealing would later surface whenever there was criticism of French policy and action in Indochina.

In any case, France was in a critical situation. The determination of de Gaulle's

government to return to their eastern empire was evidently popular with the voters. The French Communist Party was in the government coalition and was reluctant to risk its position by supporting Ho Chi Minh's aspirations for full independence. As 1946 began, the Constituent Assembly was meeting in Paris. De Gaulle

resigned from office on 20 January and Felix Gouin succeeded him. During the

year the French frequently voted on constitutions and assemblies before a new

constitution took effect for the Fourth Republic (and for the French Union) in the

fall. Bidault succeeded Gouin in June.67 Against a backdrop of instability in France,

d'Argenlieu labored to extend French control in Indochina.

For his part, Ho Chi Minh struggled to balance the demands of the nationalists

who insisted on immediate and total independence and his willingness to accommodate French demands. Stalin was hoping to help the French Communist Party

as well as obtain French cooperation with his German policy against the AngloAmerican position. Lacking strong support from Moscow, Ho was forced into a

conciliatory approach. On 6 March he reached an accord with Sainteny. The

French agreed to recognize the DRV within the French Union and gained the right

to move troops into Tonkin.68

The rest of 1946 saw continued dispute over the implementation of the March 6

Accords. Vietnam cannot be said to have been at peace as incidents continued; it

was really a matter of averting full-scale war. Vietnamese nationalists denounced

Ho's concessions to the French, and Bao Dai abandoned his support for the DRV

and went to Hong Kong. Long and arduous negotiations followed in Indochina and

in France. Ho spent most of the summer in France trying to find an accommodation. The French concluded pacts with the Kings of Cambodia and Laos in January

and August. D'Argenlieu took steps to undermine an accord and strove to make

sure that Cochin did not fall under the DRV. An agreement of 14 September

16
World War 11 and the Coming of the Indochina War

between Ho and the Minister for Overseas France, Marius Moutet, sought to avert

total collapse.6 9

Tensions escalated, however, and. on 20 November an incident involving a

French patrol boat in Haiphong harbor led to sporadic fighting in the town. Lieutenant General Jean Valluy in Saigon, with backing from d'Argenlieu, then in Paris,

overruled the local commander and ordered forcible action to gain control of

Haiphong. A devastating naval bombardment on 23 November helped the French

clear the town. This incident seems to have persuaded Ho Chi Minh that further

efforts at a peaceful settlement were hopeless. The French reinforced their positions in the north. Ho made a last-minute appeal to the new acting head of the

French Government, the socialist Leon Blum, which French authorities seem to

have prevented from reaching him. Warned by an agent, the French in Hanoi were

on alert on the evening 19 December when the Viet Minh struck. After days of brutal house-to-house fighting, the French cleared the city. Ho and the Viet Minh got

away to the countryside. Giap announced a general offensive against the French

and fighting spread over Tonkin. Blum declared that France wanted a peace based

on the consent of the Vietnamese people, once order was restored.70 The eight-year

war had begun.

17
Departtmen of Defense Photo (Sgt. Hall)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff meet the press. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson (seated, left) confers

with General Omar N. Bradley (seated, right), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at an informal press

conference. Standing left to right are: General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, USAF; General J.

Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, USA; and Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, USN.

ZII

Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal in conference with the Joint Chiefs, 1948. Left to

right: General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USAF; Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, USN; General Omar N. Bradley,

USA; and Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, USN.
2

Stalemate and US Noninvolvement

After the war, the American armed forces focused on their primary postwar

tasks, demobilization and the occupation of former enemy territory. The emerging

challenge of Cold War between the free nations and the communist bloc did not

seem to entail any involvement in the embattled French possessions of Southeast

Asia. Although Ho Chi Minh was undoubtedly a communist, the Viet Minh could

still appear to Americans, if they paid any attention at all, as a nationalist coalition

fighting French colonialism. The British had given up India and Burma, and the

Dutch had agreed to let Indonesia go, but the French insisted on fighting for their

Asian empire.

Developments in Indochina and in Europe were to involve the United States

once again in Southeast Asia. In Indochina the war went on for nearly three years

before American aid began to arrive. The French found themselves unable to end

the war in that time. Once the Communist Party had left the government in Paris

early in 1947, there was no thought to giving up the effort to regain control of the

Asian empire. Further French attempts at conciliation with the Viet Minh failed.

The succession of governments and the French authorities in Indochina tried both

military and political solutions to no avail. Americans were often critical of the

French failure on both counts. The critics tended to overlook the effectiveness of

the Viet Minh's guerrilla tactics, with the widespread support of the Vietnamese

population, in keeping their forces intact against the seemingly overwhelming

superiority of the French Union Forces. A major offensive against the Viet Minh at

the end of 1947 finally ended without decisive results. The proposed political solution, rallying noncommunist Vietnamese around the former Emperor Bao Dai, was

undermined by suspicions that the French had no intention of granting real independence. For the French, however, after the demoralizing losses of the First

19
JC'S and the First Indochina War; 1 94 7-1954

World War, the catastrophe of 1940, and the need for foreign help to liberate

France, the need to prove that they were still a great power outweighed considerations of cost.

In Europe, France aligned with the West and the Truman administration's Cold

War policies increased American commitments to the French. The Truman Doctrine, formulated early in 1947, specifically applied to Greece and Thrkey, but enunciated the principle that the United States would assist countries resisting aggression. The Marshall Plan, announced in June 1947, was intended to provide

American economic assistance to European countries, including France, in their

postwar recovery programs. In 1948 a serious crisis over Berlin drew France into

the creation of a democratic West Germany. And on 12 April 1949, France was one

of the nations that joined in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) for the security of the West. The fact that over one hundred thousand of

France's best troops and substantial sums of money the Republic could hardly

spare were tied down in Indochina limited the contribution the French could make

to European defense. A settlement of the war along the lines of the Bao Dai solution began to seem the preferable alternative to the United States. It allowed the

United States to oppose communism, to favor independence for colonized Asian

peoples, and to get its French ally out of a debilitating mess.

Military Situation in the Spring of 1947

The outbreak of war in late 1946 tended to unify the various parties in the Viet

Minh-controlled DRV in opposition to France. The Viet Minh had long been

under attack from other nationalist parties and extremist elements within the coalition, all of whom strongly opposed Ho Chi Minh's apparent willingness to compromise with the French. In early 1947, however, the DRV concentrated on the conduct of military action, procurement of supplies, control of the flood relief program

in Tonkin, and coordination of the nationwide educational program. All DRV parties now joined in the non-controversial policy of supporting the war against the

French and in a common effort to achieve social and economic progress. To bring

the various parties together, the DRY government was twice reshuffied, giving the

appearance of more equal representation to all political forces in the nationalist

alliance, but in fact the communists and Viet Minh representatives continued to

dominate the government.'

During the first five months of 1947, Ho Chi Minh's attempts to reach a peaceful settlement through negotiation gradually ceased in the face of French intransigence. Although the French Premier declared his willingness to submit the unity of

Cochin China to a popular referendum, he insisted that all previous agreements

had been made null and void by the Viet Minh attack in December. Firmly adhering

to this view, the French Government rejected a Vietnamese proposal for an

20
Stalemate and US Noninvolvement

armistice based on the accord of 6 March; it also rebuffed a peace appeal by Ho

Chi Minh on 20 February calling for an end to the war, independence, and unity

within the French Union.2

This diplomatic impasse was reflected in the military situation. From February

on it became increasingly clear that the war had reached a stalemate. In the early

weeks of the conflict the French had regained control over the major cities of the

Tonkin Delta and had lifted the siege of Hue. Elsewhere, except for the principal

highway from Haiphong to Hanoi, the road system and most of the countryside

were in the possession of the Viet Minh forces. The fighting had spread from

Tonkin southward into Cochin China, and bands of nationalist guerrillas appeared

from time to time on the outskirts of Saigon to harass the numerically superior

French forces. 3

Early in 1947 the Viet Minh commanded a force of approximately 150,000 troops,

but the units of this force were still basically guerrilla formations. Only about onethird of the troops were organized and equipped with small arms; heavy weapons

included about 50 artillery pieces, 650 automatic weapons, and 150 mortars. 4

The Viet Minh army was concentrated in Tonkin, but Giap was also able to control most of Annam's long coastline against relatively weak French opposition. In

Cochin China, the lack of unity among the nationalist forces and French military

strength restricted the Viet Minh to ineffective guerrilla activity. In the north, however, Giap's larger, better equipped, and better organized units were more successful, and by 7 February they had inflicted 1,855 casualties on the French.5

The French budget for 1947 called for the expenditure of $25 million to support

the campaign in Indochina during the first three months of the year. Although desperate efforts were being made in Paris to trim other budgetary expenses, there

was little protest, except by the Communists, against the government's proposals

to increase military spending for Indochina.6

The French Break with the Viet Minh

he caretaker government of Leon Blum, which had responded to the outbreak of

fighting in Indochina by insisting on the restoration of order, gave way in January 1947 to the first constitutional government of the Fourth Republic. Headed by

Paul Ramadier, this government was an uneasy coalition of left-wing parties, including the Communists. During the early months of 1947 Ramadier struggled with economic instability, colonial troubles (in Madagascar as well as Indochina), and the

question of the future of Germany, in which the divergent views of the Americans

and the Soviets gave the French little leeway. The Communists were uncomfortable

with the Indochina war and Ramadier's wage-freeze program. In May they split with

the government over a major strike and were forced out of the government. From

that point, the one French political party that, for whatever reason, expressed

21
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

reservations about the war in Indochina was largely without influence. The Fourth

Republic was sliding into a posture of immobilisme, in which a succession of weak,

short-lived governments showed little capacity to institute bold new departures of

any kind.7 In spite of growing reason to believe that the war would require unacceptably drastic measures, France was in no position to take extreme steps or to hold out

hope to Vietnamese nationalists.

In March, while French forces battled the Viet Minh in Indochina, French legislators fought each other on the floor of the National Assembly in a series of

spirited debates on Indochina policy. On three separate occasions, the Communist delegates walked out of the chamber after sharp verbal clashes; once, blows

were exchanged. A Communist deputy, Pierre Cot, accused the government of

instructing French troops to use the accord of 6 March 1946 as a lever to bring

about a coup d'etat. He stated that the day of colonialism was over and that the

only practical policy was one of free collaboration and association with the

Indochinese people.8

In rebuttal, Premier Ramadier took the position that the French constitution of

October 1946 invalidated several provisions of the March 6 Accords.9 He made no

promise of negotiation or peace in Indochina, saying only that:

We have done everything possible, conceded everything reasonable; it did

not work. One of these days there will be some representatives of the Annamite people with whom we can talk reason. If it is desired, France will not

oppose union of the three countries nor refuse to admit the independence of

Viet Nam within the French Union. 10

At the end of the debate on Indochina, the Premier received a vote of confidence from the Assembly. The delegates approved his position on Indochina by a

vote of 410-0, with 195 abstentions. The balloting appeared to indicate that French

Communists were not seriously concerned with the struggle for independence in

Vietnam except as it served their own ends. Although the Communist deputies

withheld their votes, their fellow party members in the cabinet voted with the

majority in support of the war. Also, the Communist Vice-Premier, Marcel Thorez,

signed a directive ordering military action against the Viet Minh."

Throughout April and May, the French adhered to an inflexible policy toward

Indochina; there was little progress toward a settlement. In March, Emile Bollaert, Radical-Socialist parliamentarian and politician, replaced Admiral d'Argenlieu, who had been the subject of increasing criticism. Bollaert arrived in Saigon

on 1 April and immediately set to work to implement Ramadier's policy. He

announced in May that "France will remain in Indochina and Indochina will

remain within the French Union. That is the first axiom of our policy... We do

not admit that any group has a monopoly on representing the Vietnamese people."12 This assertion was the first important indication that the French were considering doing business with someone other than Ho Chi Minh in their search for

22
Stalemate and US Noninvolvement

a solution to the Indochinese problem. This idea was soon to become the keystone of French policy, but in April there were several items holding a higher

place on M. Bollaert's agenda. First, agreements had to be negotiated with Cambodia and Laos, to draw them more closely into the French sphere and reduce

the possibility that they would, at some future time, join with Vietnam to oppose

the French.

On 6 May, Cambodia changed from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy.

The new government included a cabinet responsible to an elected bicameral legislature, the functions of the upper house being mostly advisory. Division of

power among three branches of government-executive, legislative, and judicial-provided a system of checks and balances. All power emanated from the

King; his authority, however, had to be exercised in accordance with the constitution, and each of his acts, except those pertaining to palace matters, had to be

signed by the Prime Minister and one other member of the cabinet."1 On 11 May, a

Laotian constitution, similar to that of Cambodia, was promulgated. Despite the

complete newness of representative government in the country, the document

was seemingly assured of strong popular support owing to its approval by a

"highly respected" monarch.'4

The DRV continued to press the French for a settlement. As early as February,

Ho Chi Minh stated the terms on which he proposed to base all future negotiations

when he said, "we want unity and independence within the French

Union.... [Then] we will respect the economic and cultural interests of France in

this land."" On 19 April 1947, the DRV Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a proposal

for "the immediate ending of hostilities and the opening of negotiations for the

pacific settlement of the conflict" to the French Government. In reply, the French

drew up a series of clearly unacceptable demands and sent Paul Mus, M. Bollaert's

personal counselor, to contact the DRV leaders.' 6 He was directed to request the

Vietnamese forces to:

1. Cease immediately all hostile acts, terrorism and propaganda.

2. Deliver over the greater part of their armament.

3. Allow free circulation of French troops throughout Viet Minh territory.

4. Surrender hostages, prisoners and deserters."7

These demands made it a foregone conclusion that the Mus mission would

fail. It was hardly correct to claim, as did the Minister of Overseas France, that

the mission failed only because of the clause in the French demands concerning

the handing over of foreigners in the ranks of the Viet Minh.18 Bollaert had

accomplished little more than his predecessor; revision of French policy was

long overdue.

23
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

The Bao Dai Plan

T he failure of the Mus mission in early May convinced the French that talks with

Ho Chi Minh would serve no purpose. They decided to encourage and assist

the formation of an anti-Viet Minh government for Indochina. French emissaries

had been in touch with Bao Dai in Hong Kong as early as March, but he had

declined to commit himself to any particular course of action. Indications were,

however, that the ex-Emperor realized the strength of his position and that he

would demand concessions similar to those insisted upon by Ho Chi Minh. It was

M. Bollaert's task to bring Bao Dai to agreement on terms favorable to the French.

A number of Vietnamese nationalists were willing to work with Bao Dai to create a

new central government under French auspices. Among these nationalists were the

exiled leaders of the VNQDD and Dong Minh Hoi who, after losing control of the

nationalist movement to the Viet Minh in 1945, had fled to China where they had

established a "National Union Front" under Chinese sponsorship. This group of

Bao Dai supporters was soon augmented by the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao, and a number of mandarins and monarchists in Annam.19

These political elements constituted a core around which Bao Dai could form

an anti-Viet Minh government; the French saw to it that a steady procession of

nationalist leaders called upon the former Emperor to keep this idea firmly planted

in his mind. In response, Bao Dai gravitated toward a position of alignment with

the National Union Front, twice rejecting Viet Minh suggestions that he negotiate

with the French in the name of the DRV.20

On 5 July 1947, Bao Dai finally broke his long silence, declaring that:

If all Vietnamese place their confidence in me, and if through my presence

I can contribute to reestablishing good relations among our people and France,

I will be happy to come back to Indochina. I am neither for the Viet Minh nor

against it. I belong to no party... Peace will return quickly if the French are

only ready to admit that the spirit of our people is not the same today as it was

ten years ago.21

Bollaert was busy preparing the way for Bao Dai's return to Indochina. During

May, he presided over the installation in Saigon and Hue of two "Provisional

Administrative and Social Committees." These two groups worked with the French

to rally Indochinese public opinion behind the Bao Dai restoration movement. The

committee in Saigon demanded the unification of Vietnam, the admittance of a free

and independent Vietnam to the French Union, and the creation of a central national government disassociated from the DRV. 22

Even with French support it was clear that Bao Dai's only hope for lasting success lay in securing from France the two major concessions that Ho Chi Minh had

failed to obtain. Conscious of this, Bao said in September: "I want first of all to get

24
Stalemate and US Noninvolvement

independence and unity for you."23 As the French learned, he did not intend to

compromise on these terms.

In a last bold attempt to come to terms with the DRV, the French High Commissioner planned a striking departure from his government's recent policy of

intractability toward Ho Chi Minh. Bollaert decided to direct a conciliatory speech

to the DRV on 15 August, the day on which India and Pakistan received their independence. He intended to offer Ho Chi Minh a cease-fire and French recognition of

an independent Vietnam within the French Union. Before he could make his

speech, Commissioner Bollaert was summoned to France for consultation, presumably because news of the content of his address had reached the French Government. When Bollaert arrived in Paris, the French Cabinet was called into session and the Mouvement Populaire Republicaine (MRP) members made clear their

firm opposition to taking any action from which Ho Chi Minh might profit. It would

be the Viet Minh who would be strengthened if there were to be a truce in Vietnam,

and therefore, France could not afford peace. 24

Commissioner Bollaert finally gave his speech on 10 September, but it bore little resemblance to the original. No mention was made of either a truce or independence for Vietnam, and the address included the condition that all of the proposals put forth by the High Commissioner would have to be accepted without

alteration. It stipulated that:

a. The Indo-Chinese people must agree to remain in the French

Union.... On the other hand, France will not interfere in the three disputated

States' [Cochin China, Annam, Tonkin] decision to join in a Vietnamese Federation or remain aloof.

b. France is prepared to surrender direct and indirect administration to a

qualified Government.

c. The French will retain control over foreign relations, although the IndoChinese States are expected to participate in the representation of the

Union....

d. The French Republic will ensure the coordination of the military

resources to be pooled by all members of the French Union (including Viet

Nam) for the defense of the Union as a whole.

e. Collaboration among the several States in such general problems as

customs, currency, immigration policy, and in economic development will proceed under the aegis of the French High Commissioner.

f. The High Commissioner will further guarantee the protection of French

interests in Indo-China and will oppose any interference by one State in the

internal affairs of another.

g. The French pledge themselves not to take reprisals against the Vietnamese, and all prisoners will be exchanged under conditions of reciprocity.25

Ho Chi Minh rejected these terms. It appears probable that the French offer

had been purposely vague and unacceptable in order to provide an excuse for

25
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

resuming military operations the following month. The rainy season was drawing

to a close, and good fighting weather was expected.2

"

From October 1947 to the beginning of 1948, a lull occurred in the French-Bao

Dai conversations while the French military forces attempted to "liquidate" the

DRV and clear the way for Bao Dai's return. Although the French Minister of War

had estimated that it would require a force of at least 500,000 men to take back the

areas controlled by the Viet Minh,27 not more than 60,000 French troops were utilized during the fall campaign. The objectives of this drive were to close the China

frontier, cut DRV lines of communication, kill or capture the DRV leaders, and

destroy, as far as possible, their regular army.28

The French succeeded in cutting the principal supply route between Tonkin

and China, but traffic continued to move freely across other parts of the border.

Although they captured large stocks of DRV military supplies and seized two

broadcasting stations, shortages of manpower and supplies forced the French to

withdraw from many of the areas they had occupied. "None of the principal DRV

leaders were killed or captured [and] ... DRV political and military resistance to

the French remained basically unimpaired."29 The unsuccessful fall offensive cost

the French heavily. It was reported that France spent more than $33,613,446 (4 billion francs) monthly on Indochina during this period and lost over 600 men a

month in combat.30

Before military operations had ceased, Bao Dai and M. Bollaert resumed negotiations. On 8 December, aboard a French cruiser in D'Along Bay, they initiated a

secret protocol, in which Bao Dai tentatively agreed to return to Indochina as soon

as France sanctioned a united Vietnam. The following were reported to be the

terms of agreement:

(1) Viet Nam, which will include Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin-China, will

be granted "independence" within the French Union;

(2) Viet Nam will have an "independent" army, which will, however, be

"available for defense of any part of the French Union";

(3) foreign relations are to be conducted by France, with Viet Namese

included in the French Foreign Service; and

(4) there will be common customs and integration of transportation facilities in the several states of Viet Nam.3 1

The D'Along Bay Agreement did not measure up to the expectation of Bao

Dai's supporters in Hong Kong and Vietnam. They urged him to disavow it and seek

more favorable terms.3 2 Taking the position that he had approved the protocol in

the capacity of a private individual, Bao Dai soon renounced the agreement.33

The French were not ready to give up hope of reaching an agreement. On 23

December 1947, the French Cabinet announced that it had instructed M. Bollaert

"to carry on, outside the Ho Chi Minh government, all activities and negotiations

necessary for the restoration of peace and freedom in the Vietnamese countries."3 4

By making the Bao Dai restoration solution the official policy of France, the

26
Stalemate and US Noninvolvement

French Government enhanced Bao Dai's bargaining position. But M. Bollaert, during several interviews with Bao Dai in January, refused to compromise on his terms

of 8 December. While both Bao Dai and the French agreed that he was to return to

head a provisional government in Vietnam, they differed on procedure. Bao Dai

insisted upon unity and independence prior to his return, whereas the French

wanted him to return immediately as head of a nationalist government with which

they could then negotiate regarding the manner in which unity and independence

would be realized. 35

Following Bai Dai's return to Hong Kong in March 1948, a growing coolness

became apparent in his relations with the French. While Bao Dai doubted French

assurances that they would no longer attempt to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh, the

French for their part suspected that the former Emperor was engaged in undercover dealings with the Viet Minh.36 Another factor contributing to Bao Dai's suspicion

of French intentions was the announcement on 4 March 1948 of the foundation

under French auspices of a Thai Federation in upper Tonkin. This step appeared to

indicate a French desire to weaken any Vietnamese government that might come to

power by setting up French-controlled political subdivisions under the pretense of

protecting minority rights. There was a precedent for such a French policy in

Admiral d'Argenlieu's recognition of the Cochinchinese Republic during the

Fontainebleau Conference and, later, the establishment of a separate Moi state in

southern Annam.

Culmination of the Bao Dai Solution

As 1948 unfolded, Bao Dai remained adamant in refusing to return to Indochina

without official French recognition of Vietnamese independence and unity that

the French were not prepared to grant. Reluctantly they turned to General Nguyen

Van Xuan, President of the Provisional Government of South Viet Nam (Cochin

China), to form a provisional government for Vietnam.

Plans for the establishment of such a government were formulated in consultation with Bao Dai, and differences between the various nationalist elements in

opposition to the Viet Minh were gradually resolved. Finally, on 20 May 1948, a

number of representatives from Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China, "all of whom

had been hand-picked by Xuan and approved by the French," met at Saigon as a

"Vietnamese Congress" to form a central government for Viet Nam.37 Bao Dai's

approval of General Xuan, expressed in a letter that General Xuan read before the

delegates, was sufficient to overcome the remaining opposition to the general's

leadership. Without debate, he was designated President of the "Provisional Central Government" of Viet Nam, which was later to supersede the government of

Cochin China. The new government would negotiate with France on the status of

27
JCS and the First Indochina War, 194 7-1954

Vietnam and would be replaced by a permanent government as soon as agreement

regarding the powers and responsibilities of the latter was reached.

The weakness of the new government was recognized by all. Powerful elements

from among the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao movements refused to lend it their support.

Le Van Hoach, ex-President of the defunct Cochin China Republic, rejected an offer

of the Vice Presidency. Moreover, administrators of ability were dissuaded by the

temporary nature of the new government from joining its ranks; they preferred to

wait until Bao Dai returned to Vietnam before offering their services.

The Xuan regime was formally installed at Hanoi on 6 June. The day before,

Bao Dai had met with General Xuan and M. Bollaert at D'Along Bay to seek mutual

understanding. Out of this meeting came an agreement wherein the French promised to recognize the unity and independence of Vietnam within the French Union

as a state associated with France.38 The text of this agreement as reproduced by a

French source follows:

1. France solemnly recognizes the independence of Viet Nam, whose unity

must be freely accomplished. For its part, Viet Nam proclaims its adherence to

the French Union in the capacity of a State associated with France. The independence of Viet Nam is limited only by that which its attachment to the

French Union imposes upon itself.

2. Viet Nam pledges itself to respect the rights and interests of French

nationals, constitutionally to ensure respect for democratic principles, and to

give priority to French councilors and technicians for the needs of its internal

organization and its economy.

3. After the constitution of a provisional government, the representatives

of Viet Nam will pass with the representatives of the French Republic various

arrangements of a cultural, diplomatic, military, economic, financial, and technical nature.39

It appeared that an acceptable basis for an anti-Viet Minh government had been

laid down in the D'Along Bay Agreement. But the gift of independence was hedged

with qualifications, unity was yet to be accomplished, and the fact was that the

French had dealt with a group that did not control the country. Paris seemed reluctant to implement the agreement. Gaston Palewski, de Gaulle's political advisor,

said on 7 June that the formation of the Provisional Central Government was "illegal and in violation of the French Constitution."40 Two days later, M. Coste-Floret,

Minister of Overseas France, told the National Assembly that the agreement did

not imply French recognition of the unity of Vietnam, since the status of Cochin

China could be changed only with formal approval of the French Parliament. He

went on to state that France would not approve a Vietnamese army, apart from

police forces, nor would a separate Vietnamese diplomatic service be tolerated.

Vietnamese public opinion "reacted with great discouragement" to these declarations, and the prestige of the Xuan government sank lower.4

"

28
Stalemate and US Noninvolvement

The D'Along Bay Agreement was not ratified by the French National Assembly

until 19 August, and then only "in principle." It was under constant attack by a

number of influential Frenchmen. Georges Bidault, Minister of Foreign Affairs and

a leader in the MRP, said that the concessions granted by M. Bollaert were "very

dangerous" in view of probable repercussions in French North Africa. He condemned the use of the word "independence" in any form. 42 The failure of the Paris

government to implement the agreement speedily cost the French more in terms of

Vietnamese popular support than they had gained by signing it in the first place;

more and more Vietnamese began to believe further negotiations with the French

useless.43 In view of his failure to persuade Bao Dai to return to Indochina without

further concessions, M. Bollaert was recalled to France, and Leon Pignon, formerly

French Commissioner in Cambodia, took his place on 20 October 1948.44

By the end of 1948, the Xuan government was so obviously a puppet administration that it steadily lost ground in its efforts to win popular support. No Vietnamese of any stature would consent to serve in the administration, and there were

rumors of graft and corruption at all levels. It controlled no territory of its own; the

governors of north, south, and central Vietnam felt no responsibility to General

Xuan, and in the south Governor Huu openly defied him. Although the French proclaimed that they had granted independence to Vietnam, French administrators

refused to turn over the most limited powers to General Xuan. Even in areas where

a Vietnamese administration existed, the French retained control of the army,

police forces, and the financial structure. 45

By contrast, Ho Chi Minh's government in its third year of existence controlled

the greater part of the countryside. In these areas over half the population lived

producing practically all the food. The DRV aimed at economic self-sufficiency,

directing its efforts toward raising the living standards of the peasants. To this end

it set up factories to manufacture items formerly imported, such as textiles and

weapons urgently needed by the Viet Minh army. It endeavored to increase food

production and won considerable popularity by lowering land rents as much as 25

percent. 46 The DRV continued to pose as a nationalist movement during 1948.

Although communist control was being tightened, little in the way of communist

inspiration appeared openly in its activities and policies. As yet, it did not reject the

Bao Dai restoration plan, appearing to entertain the hope that the ex-Emperor

could be brought to join Ho Chi Minh in combating the French.47

The military situation changed little throughout 1948. The French retained control of Saigon, Hanoi, and Haiphong and established small garrisons in Annam, but

attempts to expand local perimeters met with little success. At the same time, the

Viet Minh gradually stepped up the pace of their activities and harassed the French

throughout all of Vietnam; the north-south lines of communication were immobilized, owing to the inability of French units to seize and hold them.48 In view of the

growing difficulty in replacing casualties and troops who had been rotated, the

French offered bonuses to all officers and men who extended their service in

29
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Indochina beyond two years. 49 In January and February of 1948, a twelve thousandman French task force undertook offensive operations in Cochin China, the overall

effect of which was to expand French control slightly in the Saigon and Mekong

River delta areas.50 The French also began an offensive in Tonkin during October, as

they had the previous year. Their objective was to secure communications between

Hanoi and outlying garrisons; they failed, "owing to low morale, inadequate military

transportation facilities, and the replacement of French troops by locally recruited

forces of doubtful loyalty.""'

Not having achieved appreciable military success, the French again resumed

talks with Bao Dai; there was now a note of haste in the negotiations. A series of

Chinese Communist victories seemed to foreshadow the collapse of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the appearance of a potential Viet Minh ally on the northern

border. Since the French and Bao Dai were still far apart in their demands, a compromise seemed in order if they were to collaborate successfully in creating a government capable of drawing popular support away from Ho Chi Minh.

During the winter of 1948-1949, the French-Bao Dai negotiations made considerable headway and, on 8 March 1949, Bao Dai and President Auriol of France

reached a "compromise agreement" at the Elysee Palace in Paris. By means of an

exchange of letters, a program for the future of Indochina was agreed upon:

... France recognized the independence of Vietnam within the French

Union. In foreign relations, the government of Vietnam was limited in its independence by its membership in the French Union; internally, Vietnam's autonomy was confirmed, except for certain limitations in the judicial sphere. Vietnam

was to have its own national army, and French forces stationed in Vietnam in

peacetime were to be confined to designated bases, garrisons, and communication facilities. Vietnam undertook to give priority to French political and technical advisers. It agreed to reciprocal assurances concerning the status and properties of nationals and the freedom of enterprises in both countries, and to

similar guarantees with regard to French educational institutions in Vietnam.

Vietnam was to enter into a monetary and customs union with the other

Indochinese states, and joint institutions were to be created to harmonize the

interests of the three states with each other and with those of France.52

Had the French attitude kept pace with this document, a Bao Dai government

would have had at least a fair chance of capturing enough popular support to function effectively. The "new" French approach was almost indistinguishable from the

old. Ex-Premier Ramadier expressed the attitude of a good many Frenchmen

when, during March 1949, he said: "We will hold on everywhere, in Indo-China as in

Madagascar. Our empire will not be taken away from us, because we represent

might and also right."5 3

Until the French Assembly formally declared Cochin China a part of Vietnam,

the Elysee Agreement was worth nothing. Therefore, on 12 March 1949, the Assembly voted to authorize the creation of a Territorial Assembly of Cochin China, the

30
Stalemate and US Noninvolvement

sole function of which was to vote union with Vietnam. This it did on 23 April. A

month later the French Assembly ended the colonial status of Cochin China,

which, henceforth, was to be "attached to the Associated State of Vietnam."5 4

The way was now open for the Elysee Accord to go into effect. On 14 June,

Bao Dai and the French High Commissioner met at a formal ceremony in Saigon to

exchange letters in confirmation of the agreement. Bao Dai assumed the position

of "Chief of State" of the "Independent State of Viet Nam" and General Xuan's illfavored government resigned in favor of the new regime. Vietnam was united, but

only on paper. Before real unification could take place, the French and the new

State of Viet Nam had to cope with the Viet Minh.

American Policy toward Indochina, 1947-1949

T he war in Indochina posed a dilemma for the makers of American foreign policy. Aid to the French might alienate the peoples of Southeast Asia from the

Western Powers. Support for complete independence for the Vietnamese might

lead to a communist state in Indochina. The State Department sought to steer a

middle course. While recognizing French sovereignty, the United States refused to

supply the French with arms or ammunition to help them assert it. And while

opposing an independent Vietnamese state, the United States sought to persuade

the French to abandon their "outmoded colonial outlook" and grant the Vietnamese a large measure of autonomy. Such a concession, the State Department

hoped, would strengthen the hands of anticommunist Vietnamese. As a special ad

hoc committee of the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) stated it:

Our objective is a prompt, peaceful, and lasting settlement of the present

French-Vietnamese dispute providing for the creation of a stable Vietnamese

state that will remain in voluntary association with France and will meet the

legitimate demands of the Vietnamese for self-government, and be responsive

to their fundamental interests. We consider the creation of such a state as the

best defense against disintegrative tendencies in Indochina that could lead to a

chronic disorder and political extremism, offer opportunities for the extension

of Communism, or tempt the intervention of other powers.55

Long before the committee set this objective down on paper, the State Department had found it difficult to achieve. Four days after the outbreak of hostilities,

Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson had invited the French Ambassador to a

conference at the State Department. Expressing deep concern over the situation in

Indochina, Acheson made it clear that, while the United States did not wish to

mediate the Franco-Vietnamese conflict, it was willing to offer its "good offices" to

the French. From every point of view, Mr. Acheson asserted, it was essential that

the Indochina question be settled as soon as possible, by conciliatory means.

31
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Two weeks later, the French rejected Mr. Acheson's offer of "good offices";

they preferred to handle the problem their own way. The immediate French military objective in Indochina, said M. Lacoste, Minister in the French embassy, was

"to restore order and reopen communications." Once order was restored, the

French would try to live up to the accord of 6 March and to the modus vivendi of

15 September 1946. When asked whether he believed the French could restore

order "within the foreseeable future," M. Lacoste answered in the affirmative but

"without much evidence of conviction."5 6

Because of the instability of the current French Government, the United States

did not press the matter further. When the Chinese proposed joint mediation by the

United States, British, and Chinese Governments, the State Department rejected

the idea, partly on the ground that any appearance of intervention would provide

political ammunition for the French Communists. Throughout the remainder of

1947 the State Department avoided measures that might embarrass the French

Government. While repeating its offer of "good offices," the State Department coupled it with a disclaimer of American intentions to mediate the Franco-Vietnamese

conflict and with a frank statement that the United States had no specific solution

to propose. Other than urging the French to adopt a more conciliatory attitude

toward the Vietnamese and to keep the United States informed of developments,

the State Department adhered to the position that the Indochina problem was one

for the French and Vietnamese.

Once in 1947 the State Department ventured slightly beyond that position, with

negligible results. In September Secretary of State George C. Marshall informed the

American Ambassador to France, Mr. Jefferson Caffery, of his concern over reports

that the French were planning to launch an offensive against the Vietnamese in the

dry season toward the end of September. "It is obvious," Secretary Marshall said,

"that such an offensive, if it took place under these conditions, would have serious

effect on public opinion here which would be reflected in a Congress which will be

called upon to consider extensive financial aid for western European nations,

including France." Secretary Marshall asked Ambassador Caffery to find out whatever he could about this offensive. Ambassador Caffery reported that he had talked

informally with M. Bidault along the lines suggested by Secretary Marshall. Bidault

"understood" the American point of view and said that as far as he knew there

were no plans for such an offensive. Whether or not M. Bidault was misinformed is

uncertain, but early in October the French launched a major military offensive "to

annihilate the Viet Minh forces in Tonkin."57

By the summer of 1948 the State Department had decided to urge the French

toward more decisive action to settle the Indochina conflict, but to avoid any pressure that might imperil the French Government. As Secretary of State Marshall

viewed the situation, nothing should be left undone that would strengthen the

"truly nationalist groups" in Indochina at the expense of the communists. In July

the French were informed that the United States believed they were faced with two

32
Stalemate and US Noninvolvement

alternatives: either they must promptly and unequivocally approve the union of

Cochin China with the rest of Vietnam and carry out the D'Along Bay Agreement or

they would lose Indochina. As an inducement to earnest effort, the French were

informed that, once they put this program into effect, the United States would publicly support it as a "forward looking step" toward solving the Indochina problem

and toward fulfilling the aspirations of the Vietnamese. The French were also told

that when these measures were adopted the United States would reconsider its

policy of withholding assistance to Indochina through the Economic Cooperation

Administration. But something more than promises was required to obtain action

from the French Assembly, and in October Ambassador Caffery reported that he

saw little hope of obtaining any positive action toward a solution for Indochina.58

As the war continued the United States drew closer to direct involvement.

Alarmed by the communist victory in China, the State Department looked for ways

to avert a communist Vietnam. To Mr. Acheson there appeared no alternative to

supporting Bao Dai, and in May 1949, he told the American consul in Saigon that no

effort should be spared by the Western Powers or by the noncommunist nations of

Asia to assure the success of Bao Dai. At the proper time and under the proper circumstances, said Mr. Acheson, the United States would do its part by extending to

Bao Dai official American recognition. And it would do much more; it would provide Bao Dai with military and economic aid. But before these steps were taken,

Mr. Acheson wanted both the French and Bao Dai to demonstrate that American

assistance was justified. The French should make every possible concession to

make the Bao Dai government attractive to the nationalists. Bao Dai should

demonstrate his own capacity to conduct his affairs wisely enough to obtain popular support. Otherwise, the Bao Dal experiment would be doomed to failure."9

By 1949, the conditions affecting American policy in Indochina were changing.

The North Atlantic Treaty was an alliance that included France. In the Far East, the

Chinese communists were clearly gaining the upper hand in their war with the KMT.

In January Peking fell to the communists, and in April they took Nanking. The

Nationalists began to collapse, and the Viet Minh found that Mao's forces were

across the border. Time was now running out for the West in Indochina. At the same

time, the news in September 1949 that the Soviets had exploded an atomic bomb

created a sense that the communist bloc was on the move. The threat to the French

in Indochina suddenly seemed a threat to the whole region of Southeast Asia.

33
3

Origins of American Involvement,

June 1949-June 1950

In 1948 French officials suggested that American economic assistance to the

Bao Dai regime would help stabilize Vietnam. Likewise, the weaknesses of French

Union Forces in Indochina could be attributed to a lack of adequate equipment. No

formal request for US help from the French Government arrived until February

1950, but in the State and Defense departments planning for an aid program started

in the summer of 1949. Planners saw two overall objectives in Southeast Asia: the

containment of communism and the encouragement of noncommunist nationalist

movements.1 The deteriorating situation in Indochina pushed the Truman administration into action. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were given the task of organizing a program of military assistance for the French in Indochina and planning the allocation

of money. In December 1949, the JCS began to call for an integrated policy on

Southeast Asia.

The Chinese nationalists withdrew to the island of Taiwan in December 1949.

On 18 January 1950 the Chinese Communist regime recognized the Democratic

Republic of Vietnam, and in February Mao Tse-tung and Stalin concluded a friendship treaty. The French put the Bao Dai regime in place by the end of 1949. The

United States recognized the "Associated States" of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos

on 7 February 1950. In Washington, the State Department initiated the final decision to aid the French with a study known as NSC 64 (National Security Council).

Circulated to the JCS and other officials in March 1950, this paper urged "all practicable measures designed to protect US security interests in Indochina." President

Truman approved NSC 64 on 24 April.

Southeast Asia was important as a source of oil, rubber, and other strategic

materials, either for the free world or for its enemies, as a potential springboard for

35
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

attacks on the Philippines or India and as a threat to the sea lanes between the

Pacific and the Indian Oceans. According to the Secretaries of State and Defense:

the choice confronting the United States is [either) to support the French

in Indochina or to face the extension of Communism over the remainder of the

continental area of Southeast Asia and possibly farther westward. We would

then be obligated [either] to make staggering investments in that part of Southeast Asia remaining outside of Communist domination or to withdraw to a

much-contracted Pacific line of defense. 2

France's defeat could mean the end of her empire and status as a great power,

and it would be a blow to US prestige. The Joint Chiefs of Staff supported this

assessment and moved to implement plans for aiding the French; they favored

establishing a US military aid group in Indochina and machinery for interdepartmental coordination of aid to Indochina. The military aid program would give the

JCS a critical role in policy concerning Indochina.

Drawing Lines in Indochina, June 1949-January 1950

T he logical path for Mao Tse-tung to follow in a conquest of Southeast Asia lay

through Indochina, where the situation was ideally suited to communist penetration. China and Vietnam possessed a common boundary over 500 miles long.

Direct support of the Viet Minh war effort over this border was anticipated, and the

threat of overt Chinese intervention was a possibility. Without foreign aid the Viet

Minh had resisted the French for over three years. Even if Ho Chi Minh failed to

secure Chinese aid, the war gave no signs of ending.

This situation had its repercussions in Europe, and the United States found

that the Indochinese war endangered erection of a Western European security system. It was becoming increasingly apparent to the United States that France's ability to become an effective partner in the North Atlantic alliance would be gravely

jeopardized by the drain on her resources stemming from the war in Indochina.

The annual expenditure of $500 million for Indochina was damaging a French

economy struggling to recover from the effects of World War II. Approximately $1.5

billion had already been consumed combating the Viet Minh insurgents. 3 Since

1948, the United States had been attempting to revive the French economy with

Marshall Plan dollars, a process largely nullified by French budgetary requiremefits

for Indochina. The North Atlantic Treaty had been signed on 4 April 1949, and

French troops were expected to play a vital role in the European army that the

United States proposed to equip. Yet French Union Forces approximating 156,000

ground troops, plus three fighter squadrons, three transport squadrons, and a small

navy, were tied down in Indochina. 4 By the end of 1949, the French Expeditionary

36
Origins of American Involvement, June 1949-1954

Corps had suffered 16,270 casualties.5 The consequences to France's prestige of an

Indochinese defeat would hamper her contribution to the European coalition.

The Indochinese situation during the latter half of 1949 offered little hope for

improvement. Most discouraging was the persistent evidence of closer ties

between Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse-tung. As the Communist Chinese moved closer

to the Tonkin frontier in the fall of 1949, the Viet Minh underwent a change that

gave promise of future collaboration between China and the DRV. Ho Chi Minh had

previously posed as a genuine anticolonial patriot fighting for a democratic, independent Vietnam; now, he publicly identified himself more closely with international communism.'

Viet Minh fighting techniques were also changing. Although guerrilla tactics

and large-scale infiltration remained the dominant characteristics of Viet Minh

operations, regularly organized combat units began to make their appearance. The

French outposts in Tonkin were subjected to intensified pressure, and their supply

became a serious problem. By the close of 1949, the fort at Dong Khe, lying

between Lang Son and Cao Bang on the Tonkinese border, had to be provisioned

entirely by air. French Union Forces abandoned a number of scattered strong

points in northern Tonkin and concentrated on strengthening and extending the

defensive perimeter around Hanoi.7

The base of the French difficulties was the nationalist-colonialist conflict that

had prevented a military decision for three years. French efforts to solve the political problem were directed at implementing the Elysee Accords of 8 March 1949.

The failure of these accords to effect a lasting political solution was probably due

to the fact that neither the Vietnamese people nor the sovereign Asian nations

believed the new government sufficiently representative of the people or independent of French domination.

Bao Dai was proclaimed Chief of State on 14 June. A week later the government of General Nguyen Van Xuan resigned but consented to serve temporarily

while Bao Dai consolidated his position. Although no constitution was promulgated, two ordinances issued on 1 July defined temporary agencies by which Vietnam

was to be ruled pending the establishment of internal stability. The principal governing institutions, as outlined by the ordinances, were to be the Chief of State, a

cabinet with a prime minister, and the Consultative National Council.

The members of the Cabinet were appointed by, and responsible to, the Chief of

State. The members of the Consultative National Council were designated by the

Chief of State on the basis of their ability to represent regional and national interests and express public opinion. The council was to develop into a more representative organ, and it was anticipated that the appointments of the councilors would

later be confirmed by popular election. The ordinances also specified that upon the

restoration of peace, an elected Constituent Assembly would replace the Consultative National Council and decide upon the future government. For the time being,

government by executive was established on all levels." The Consultative National

37
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Council did not meet until September 1952, and then under a different name. The

Constituent Assembly was never convened. As a result, the Bao Dai government

was essentially authoritarian. In addition, the nature and organization of the future

government remained extremely vague. The preamble to Ordinance No. 1 left open

the question of whether Vietnam's political authority would be concentrated in a

republic or a constitutional monarchy, a highly centralized or loosely federated

regime. One reason for Bao Dai's failure to unify the country behind his government

was that while it would not have been realistic to expect a truly representative government, in view of the instability of the internal situation, it was obvious to all that

Bao Dai's source of power lay with the French, not with the Vietnamese people.

Although the ordinances of 1 July established Bao Dai's regime, specific agreements had to be concluded to transfer services from the French colonial administration to the Vietnamese government, and the French National Assembly had to

ratify the 8 March Accords. As the first step in this process, a Joint Commission

convened at Saigon in August 1949. The commission sat for four months, and on 30

December signed twenty-nine specialized conventions by which the French

arranged to hand over certain internal administrative services to the Bao Dai government. Although the concessions to native independence were substantial,

France still dominated in such fields as military affairs, press and information, the

judiciary, and police.9 Acceptance of the status of an Associated State within the

French Union entailed a limitation on the right to engage in international relations.

The Vietnamese were especially sensitive to the restriction of their right to send

diplomatic representatives abroad. By the agreements of 30 December, the French

retained key functions that made Bao Dai extremely vulnerable to charges of being

a French puppet. The privileged position that Frenchmen continued to enjoy, both

in government and society, did not impress the Vietnamese or their Asian neighbors as a significant reduction in French influence.

Although the French encountered a more troublesome political problem in

Vietnam than in the other two Associated States, they faced similar difficulties in

Laos and Cambodia. Treaties with Laos and Cambodia were signed on 19 July and

8 November 1949. These agreements closely resembled the Elysee Accords with

Vietnam. Implementing conventions concluded with Laos on 6 February 1950, and

with Cambodia on 15 June 1950, transferred sovereignty to the two kingdoms on

the same basis as the agreement of 30 December 1949 with Vietnam. The governing

structures that evolved in Laos and Cambodia were, however, more representative

than those in Vietnam. Although the two smaller states were presided over by

hereditary monarchs, the national assemblies were popularly elected and exercised

important legislative powers.10

The United States watched with great interest French efforts to translate the 8

March promises into reality. Consistent with its twin aims of halting the spread of

communism and encouraging noncommunist nationalist movements, the State

Department desired the Bao Dai government to be sufficiently independent of

38
Origins of American Involvement, June 1949-1954

France to win the support of Vietnamese nationalists, as well as the respect and

recognition of other Asian countries. Beginning in the summer of 1949, the State

Department encouraged the French to interpret the 8 March Accords liberally

enough to achieve these aims. Although American sympathy for Vietnam's new

regime was publicly declared in June 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson doubted that the French intended to make the essential concessions. The Secretary felt

that the United States could not back a puppet regime; recognition and aid must be

withheld until the French understood the necessity of making the solution attractive

to the nationalist elements and until the Bao Dai regime itself demonstrated a

capacity for independent government. Despite their denials, Secretary Acheson

feared that French officials in general, and High Commissioner Leon Pignon in particular, regarded the Elysee Agreement as a final concession, whereas the American

view was that it was but one step in the evolution of Vietnamese independence."'

The United States and Great Britain worked together to induce the French to

declare their purpose of adjusting the French-Vietnamese relationship in a liberal

manner. Indochina was a subject for discussion at tripartite talks held 28 September 1949 between Secretary Acheson and the British and French Foreign Ministers,

Ernest Bevin and Robert Schuman. On this and subsequent occasions, Schuman

declared his agreement with the American view that the 8 March Accords were one

step in the evolution of the Indochinese problem. But French delay in implementing the Elysee Accords led the United States to doubt the sincerity of his declaration. State Department experts believed France unwilling to make liberal concessions to Vietnamese independence, or to publicize the concessions already made,

for fear of causing trouble in North Africa. Schuman was urged to push ratification

of the 8 March Accords in the National Assembly and to place as few restrictions

as possible on Vietnamese conduct of their own foreign relations. In particular, the

United States and Great Britain wished to see Associated States affairs transferred

from the Department of Overseas Possessions to the Foreign Ministry. Schuman,

however, felt that this could not be done until after the accords were ratified by the

National Assembly.'2

The United States and Great Britain attached great importance to French concessions to Vietnam in the field of foreign affairs. They felt that unless France

made these concessions the Asian nations would refuse to recognize the Bao Dai

regime as it was not truly independent. Recognition by such sovereign Asian countries as India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Burma was considered essential to the success of Bao Dai's attempts to strengthen his government. These nations were highly respected in the Far East because they had rid themselves of foreign rule. The

United States and Great Britain felt that recognition of Vietnam by these states

might influence wavering Vietnamese intellectuals to back Bao Dai. At the very

least, it would improve his standing with the rest of the world. Finally, acceptance

of Vietnam into the community of Asian nations would place the Western Powers

in a better position to extend recognition and aid.

39
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Unfortunately, the Asian countries did not look with favor upon the Elysee

solution. India regarded Bao Dai as a French puppet with no genuine popular support. The Indian attitude was not improved by the strained relations with France

over continued French rule in Pondichery. Despite British and American prodding,

Indian Prime Minister Nehru refused to recognize Vietnam, and the other Asian

nations, with the exception of Thailand, followed his lead. While urging the Asian

countries to reconsider their stand, the State Department, in January 1950, decided

to extend diplomatic recognition to Vietnam as soon as the French National

Assembly should ratify the 8 March Accords, an event anticipated in late January.1 3

After an acrimonious debate and a vote of 396-193, the French National Assembly formally approved the 8 March Accords on 29 January 1950. That same day,

actually before the parliamentary vote, United States Ambassador-at-Large Philip

C. Jessup, in Saigon, extended the congratulations of the United States to Bao Dai

on his assumption of the powers transferred early in January and expressed "confident best wishes for the future of the State of Viet Nam with which [the United

States] looks forward to establishing a closer relationship.... ",14 Formal recognition of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia followed. The United States Consulate at

Saigon was elevated to legation status, although Consul Edmund Gullion continued

to represent the United States in Vietnam until Minister Donald R. Heath arrived on

5 July 1950.

Even before ratification of the Elysee Accords, however, opposition in the

Indochinese war had stiffened. American and British efforts to secure world backing for Bao Dai were accompanied by evidence of similar Soviet activities on

behalf of the Viet Minh. On 19 January Communist China recognized the DRV as

the legitimate government of Vietnam; the Kremlin followed suit twelve days later.

Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Albania, and Yugoslavia subsequently

recognized the Viet Minh. Secretary Acheson, commenting on the international

diplomatic support that Ho was receiving, declared that "The Soviet acknowledgment of this [the Viet Minh] movement should remove any illusions as to the

'nationalist' nature of Ho Chi Minh's aims and reveals Ho in his true colors as the

mortal enemy of native independence in Indochina.""5 American recognition of Bao

Dai was accompanied by similar action on the part of England and twenty-five

other western countries. Indochina became an increasingly important center of

conflict in the diplomacy of the Cold War.

The situation in Indochina at the close of 1949 pushed the United States to

adopt a positive stand. The Viet Minh was growing stronger; the French were growing weaker. Increasing Chinese activity promised to strengthen the Viet Minh, and

the possibility of Chinese intervention made future prospects dim. The Bao Dai

solution gave scant hope of unifying the Vietnamese in support of the war effort,

and it was received with suspicion by most of the Asiatic nations. Throughout the

latter half of 1949, the United States had been reassessing its interests in the Far

East and by January 1950 it had arrived at an appreciation of the vital role of the

40
Origins of American Involvement, June 1949-1954

Indochinese war in the contest for Southeast Asia. On this appreciation, plus a realization of France's precarious position, the decision to assist the French was taken.

Emergence of a Far Eastern and Indochinese Policy

T he decision to help France combat the Viet Minh was the logical outgrowth of

a reassessment of American interests in Asia. This process began in the summer of 1949 in the National Security Council but was given considerable impetus

by a bitter dispute in Congress that served to focus public and official attention on

Asia. The result was the formulation of an Asian policy that emphasized the

Indochinese problem and prescribed a program of assistance to bolster anticommunist forces in Indochina.

The movement leading to the National Security Council actions on Asia was

initiated in the summer of 1949 by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. Secretary

Johnson deprecated the "day-to-day, country-by-country approach" of United

States policy in Asia. On 10 June 1949 he called upon the staff of the National Security Council to determine exactly how American security was threatened by the

current situation in the Far East and to formulate tentative courses of action for

consideration by the National Security Council. These courses of action, he emphasized, should be coordinated for the whole region and outline specific objectives to

be attained. 16

While this study progressed behind the scenes, a congressional battle over the

military assistance bill heightened public concern for the Far East and laid the

basis for the Indochinese aid program. Although the arms bill was primarily concerned with equipping the projected North Atlantic Treaty armies, a group led by

Senator William Knowland (R, CA) sponsored a section to appropriate funds for

assisting the Nationalist Chinese armies on Formosa. But the State Department had

abandoned the Nationalist cause and administration forces refused to accept any

Asian aid formula that mentioned Chiang Kai-shek or Formosa. Several attempts at

compromise failed, but at length a plan was agreed upon by the opposing factions.

This resulted in Section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, the so-called

Connally Amendment, which set aside the sum of $75 million, to be spent at the

President's discretion, for combating communism in "the general area of China."17

This money was eventually spent in a manner different than that intended by

Senator Knowland. On 17 December 1949 the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a plan

for programming Section 303 funds. They defined "the general area of China" as

including "not only China proper, but also such areas as Hainan and Formosa,

French Indo-China, Burma and Thailand."'8 The JCS took the first step in shifting

the battle for Asia from China to Southeast Asia. The inclusion of Indochina in "the

general area of China" provided for an early program of assistance in the French

struggle against Viet Minh.

41
JCS and the First Indochina War, 194 7-1954

In recommending methods for employing the $75 million, the JCS did not

appraise American strategic interests in the Far East or point out the importance of

Southeast Asia and Indochina to the United States. They merely proposed to undertake overt and covert measures to support anticommunist forces and undermine

communist movements in the countries of Southeast Asia. They had nevertheless

laid the groundwork for a series of important policy decisions reached by the

National Security Council within the next two months and created a vehicle by

which those decisions could be carried out.

The National Security Council study prepared at Secretary Johnson's request

and considered by the Council on 29 December warned of the threat to United

States security of communist expansion in the Far East. It reaffirmed that the loss

of Asia to communism would secure for the USSR and deny to the United States a

power potential of the first magnitude, a major source of raw materials, and control of coastal and overseas lines of communication. It would also seriously threaten America's defensive island chain. To counter this danger, American objectives in

Asia should include the reduction and eventual elimination of Soviet influence and

the prevention of any power relationships that might threaten "the peace, national

independence or stability of the Asiatic nations." Specifically, the study proposed

that the United States provide military assistance and advice to Asian nations

threatened by external aggression and internal subversion and use its influence to

resolve the nationalist-colonialist conflict to satisfy nationalist demands with minimum strain on the colonial powers.1

"

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the conclusions of the National Security

Council report were too general; they desired an integrated policy toward Asia,

embodying more concrete courses of action. "The time has come," the JCS

declared, "for determination, development, and implementation of definite United

States steps in Asia, otherwise, this nation will risk an even greater and more disastrous defeat in the ideological conflict in that area." Section 303 of the Mutual

Defense Assistance Act provided the means for initiating immediate action in specific areas; the JCS recommended that an urgent program for spending this money

be undertaken. 20

The National Security Council revised the original report; the resulting policy

declaration, NSC 48/2, established more clearly a course of active "support," as distinguished from "encouragement," of Asian countries threatened by communism.

The United States would provide "political, economic, and military assistance and

advice where clearly needed to supplement the resistance" of noncommunist governments in the Far East. Authority was given for immediate programming of Section 303 funds, and an ad hoc committee was formed by the JCS to decide how

best to spend the money.2

1

The United States' resolve to adopt a definite stand in Asia was indicated by

Secretary of State Acheson in two public speeches. Before the Washington Press

Club and the Commonwealth Club of California, the Secretary declared that the

42
Origins of American Involvement, June 1949-1954

United States was now prepared to grant military and economic assistance to

selected Far Eastern countries where it was "the missing component in a problem

which might otherwise be solved."22

During January and February 1950, it became apparent that a successful solution of the Indochinese problem was an essential precondition to attaining the new

objectives in Asia. NSC 48/2 recognized the necessity of giving "particular attention" to Indochina by urging the French to remove the barriers preventing Bao Dai

from winning native allegiance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were more specific. In

proposing military aid programs for certain Southeast Asian countries, they

warned that the situation in Indochina would be greatly complicated should the

Communist Chinese come to the aid of the Viet Minh. An Asian aid program should

give first priority to anticommunist forces in Indochina; the sum of $15 million programmed for Indochina from Section 303 funds.23 The judgment of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff indicated a growing conviction that the war in Indochina was among the

most critical and immediate concerns to the United States.

In late April 1950, the President approved NSC 64 which noted the growing

strength of the Viet Minh, the possibility of active Communist Chinese intervention,

and the failure to date of French efforts to solve the political problem. The significance of Indochina in US eyes was concisely stated: "It is important to the United

States security interests that all practicable measures be taken to prevent further

Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indochina is the key area of Southeast

Asia and is under immediate threat." The Departments of State and Defense were

directed to prepare a program embracing "all practicable measures designed to

protect United States security interests in Indochina."2 4

In January 1950 the United States, by adopting NSC 48/2, abandoned the

uncertain and seemingly confused approach to Asian problems apparent throughout 1949 and took a definite stand against communist expansion in the Far East.

By adopting NSC 64, the United States, in April 1950, decided that the most direct

means of attaining the overall objective lay in concentrating American efforts on

the battle for Indochina. The next step would be to inaugurate a program of assistance aimed at neutralizing Viet Minh strength and stabilizing the Associated

States economies.

Beginnings of American Aid

T he principle of extending military and economic aid to threatened Asian countries had been agreed upon by February 1950, and Indochina had been determined the area in most immediate danger. The United States, however, had yet to

make specific commitments or enter formal arrangements. During the spring of 1950

the aid machinery was developed and the program of assistance to Indochina began.

43
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Although the United States had concluded by February that the French would

have to be helped in Indochina, negotiations on the subject were opened by

France. French overtures were inspired by communist recognition of Ho Chi

Minh's government. Paris interpreted the action of Moscow and Peiping as presaging Soviet or Chinese aggression in Indochina and realized that substantial outside

assistance was imperative. Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador in Washington, presented an aide-memoire to the State Department on 16 February which urged the

United States to make a public "affirmation of solidarity before the Communist

menace" as a warning to China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

and to undertake immediate measures to grant military and economic aid to

France and the Associated States in Indochina. The French also suggested that the

"French and American General Staffs" jointly examine French and Vietnamese military requirements and the military situation in general.25

A week later, Alexandre Parodi, Secretary General of the French Foreign

Office, further emphasized the need for help. In discussing Indochina with American Ambassador David Bruce and Minister Charles Bohlen, Parodi warned that the

United States must inaugurate a program of long-term assistance or France might

be forced to withdraw from Indochina. French withdrawal was precisely what the

United States feared. Since the success of any program of external assistance

would be decided by the French determination to remain in Indochina, the United

States considered it necessary to obtain a firm French pledge to continue the war.

Ambassador Bruce and Mr. Bohlen impressed Secretary Parodi with this fact in

unequivocal terms.26

The final decision to undertake the Indochinese military assistance program

was reached in March. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed that $15 million be

set aside for Indochina and $10 million for Thailand. The State and Defense Departments approved the recommendations on 6 March. Secretary Acheson advised the

President that "The choice confronting the United States is to support the French

in Indochina or to face the extension of communism over the remainder of the continental area of Southeast Asia and possibly farther westward." He recommended

that $15 million be reserved from the Section 303 fund to finance the beginnings of

a military aid program for Indochina, plus $10 million for Thailand. President Truman approved the recommendation on 10 March 1950.27

A program of economic aid was slower in developing; the reports of two surveys and a conference in progress in the Far East would play a major role in determining the form of these programs. Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup had been

visiting various Asian countries since December; Jessup's mission was to analy3ze

the situation in Asia and report his recommendations for an integrated Far Eastern

policy. Robert Allen Griffin headed an economic survey team charged with formulating a coordinated economic aid policy for Asia. In addition the Southeast Asian

chiefs of diplomatic missions met in Bangkok, Thailand, in February to discuss

regional problems and consider prospective economic programs.

44
Origins of American Involvement, June 1949-1954

The diplomats at the Bangkok conference believed that emphasis should be

placed upon Point IV type technical aid to increase Asian capacity for self-help, and

they agreed that the focal point of the Southeast Asian economic program should be

Indochina.2" The recommendations of Dr. Jessup in March and Dr. Griffin in May

coincided substantially with the Bangkok conclusions. Both of these authorities

were convinced that only through Indochina could Southeast Asia be saved from

communism, and they believed that small amounts of money properly spent would

go far toward achieving this result. 29 As the program subsequently developed, however, the emphasis was on economic projects of immediate benefit to the war effort.

Nevertheless, the program, as originally conceived, was based upon the Bangkok

conference conclusions and upon the Griffin and Jessup recommendations.

The decision to undertake an economic aid program was not made public until

11 May, when Secretary Acheson, at the conclusion of the London Foreign Ministers Conference, announced the American intentions. On 24 May separate notes

were delivered to representatives of the Associated States in Saigon and to the

President of the French Union in Paris. These notes defined the nature of the proposed assistance. It would, declared the notes, be "complementary to the effort

made by the three Associated States and France, without any intention of substitution."30 Robert Blum was placed in charge of the Special Technical and Economic

Mission (STEM) to the Associated States, and he was to begin work even before

the bilateral agreements regulating the arrangement were concluded. It was

announced in June that $23.5 million from unexpended China Aid Funds would be

spent in Indochina for Fiscal Year 1951.

In spite of the obvious importance of economic aid in achieving stability, the

prospect of military equipment in large quantities had more immediate effect on

the political atmosphere of Indochina. The announcement of prospective American

assistance created new complexities in French-Vietnamese relations and in Vietnamese domestic politics. Repercussions were felt alike in Paris and Washington

and resulted in strained relations between the two capitals that affected the development of the aid program. The French realized that a military assistance program

would represent a direct American investment in the Indochinese war and feared

that it would be used as a lever for American pressure in the political field. French

apprehension was misdirected; it was the Vietnamese who attempted to turn the

pending aid program to their own political advantage.

In discussions with France over American arms aid, the United States emphasized the fact that a political solution was essential to military success. France,

however, regarded immediate conclusion of an agreement to furnish military equipment to French troops in Indochina of infinitely greater importance. The French

position was summed up in instructions given to Foreign Minister Robert Schuman

by the Cabinet before the London Foreign Ministers Conference. Schuman was to

impress upon Secretary Acheson that, if the United States wanted to save Indochina from communism, it should quit encouraging Bao Dai to believe he could win

45
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

greater independence and proceed to the more urgent business of supplying aircraft and arms to French forces in Indochina. France was amazed that the United

States insisted upon discussing future Vietnamese independence from France

when Vietnamese independence from communism was at stake.3

Y

Although Paris feared that the United States would insist upon greater French

concessions to Bao Dai as a condition for arms aid, the American position was that

for the present the French had conceded enough provided they executed the Elysee Accords in good faith. The State Department held that "Bao Dai and Co." were

"barely able to discharge responsibilities they are now facing," and tried to convince France that the United States was not arguing for further immediate concessions.32 The State Department did believe, however, that not only must Bao Dai win

the allegiance of the Vietnamese people but the Asian countries must also be convinced that Vietnam would evolve into a truly democratic, independent nation.

France was pressed to make a public declaration of what had been accomplished

by the 8 March adjustment and a public promise of future concessions. France

refused to make such a statement, protesting that it would encourage the belief

that the 8 March settlement had not granted a high degree of independence.33

Paris feared that the United States would use the arms program to win Bao Dai

more independence, and the Bao Dai government apparently decided that American

generosity might be used to accomplish this purpose. As early as January, Vietnamese actions indicated they intended using the arms program to their own advantage. A list of military and economic requirements for Vietnam, prepared by Bao Dai's

staff without French knowledge, was handed to Ambassador-at-Large Philip Jessup.34

On 18 March 1950, Charg6 d'Affairs Gullion warned that "responsible Vietnamese

believed they held the whiphand on the French and could play us off against them" in

an effort to acquire functions not contemplated by the 8 March Accords.3 5

This judgment appeared valid in light of an astute move by the Vietnamese government a week later. Defense Minister Phan Huy Quat outlined to Gullion a plan

for equipping the Vietnamese army without French participation. Quat's plan envisioned an American-equipped Vietnamese army trained and advised by United

States military personnel. Although Gullion labeled Quat's views "fantastic," he

admitted that the Vietnamese attitude raised serious problems.36 The logical outgrowth of the proposal would have been an American-controlled Vietnamese army

serving under the operational command of the French army within a state of the

French Union. Meanwhile, the French had submitted their list of arms requirements and briefed American military attach6s at the legation in Saigon on their

equipment deficiencies. The list was prepared by the French General Staff in

Indochina without consultation with Vietnamese officials. The United States confronted two estimates of arms needs and a delicate diplomatic problem.

If the United States decided to deal with the Vietnamese government in equipping the indigenous army, the French would be highly incensed and probably withhold essential cooperation. But a measure of Vietnamese authority in the direction,

46
Origins of American Involvement, June 1949-1954

of their own military affairs was implicit in the 8 March Accords. To deal exclusively with the French would contradict the American position on the accords and

increase Franco-Vietnamese tension and undermine Vietnamese friendship for the

United States. The separate Vietnamese overtures to the United States had already

caused friction between High Commissioner Leon Pignon and the Bao Dai government and led the French to force the resignation of Premier Nguyen Phan Long.

Commissioner Pignon flatly informed the United States that France, and not

the Associated States, must control distribution of arms. In Pignon's view, the

"operations of receiving and distributing important quantities of material involve a

series of complex technical problems which only the French military services can

resolve at this time." Since the French Commander-in-Chief in Indochina was

responsible for the conduct of military operations, he must direct the distribution

of materials. The French lists would be prepared by the French commander, acting

in his capacity of Chief of Staff of National Defense for each Associated State, and

"There can be no question of changing this established program (procedure).",37

The United States needed to devise an aid formula that would have minimum

adverse effect on the political situation. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized the political implications of military aid, they believed that because of the

urgent need for immediate shipment of arms, the aid program should be adapted to

the reality of French control of Vietnamese affairs. The requirement estimates

drafted by the French General Staff reflected a more realistic appraisal of military

needs, and contained more information essential to programming, than the "broadly generalized Bao Dai list." Consequently, deliveries should be made to French

authorities, with such Vietnamese participation in reception as the Secretary of

State might desire. Although development of a coordinated aid policy for all Southeast Asia was necessary, the JCS believed that Indochina should be given top priority and shipments dispatched with haste. The Joint Chiefs recommended that

French requests be carefully analyzed and military aid integrated with political and

economic programs. This could be accomplished by the creation of a Southeast

Asia Aid Committee composed of representatives of the State and Defense Departments and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) charged with drafting

and executing an overall aid program for Southeast Asia. Although final approval

of all requirements would rest with the Joint Chiefs, a military aid group should be

established in Indochina to screen French requests and coordinate them with

French operational plans.38

The French gave the American plan a chilly reception; they wanted American

arms with no strings attached. Their views indicated a desire that the United States

simply fill French orders for equipment without attempting to influence types or

quantities of material or how it was employed. General Marcel Carpentier, French

Commander-in-Chief of Indochina, said that he "would welcome" a United States military mission but wished it to be as small as possible and a part of the attach6 group

at the American legation in Saigon. Although he "would welcome" representatives of

47
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

the Associated States in the receiving and distributing apparatus, only the French

High Command "would be equipped [to] receive and stock American materiel for

Indochina." Charg6 d'Affaires Gullion, however, believed that General Carpentier

could be induced to moderate his stand on the size of the military aid mission.39

A formula designed to satisfy Vietnamese demands for participation in the aid

program was agreed upon in April. The Vietnamese High Military Committee, a

French organ with Vietnamese representatives, would devise the arms programs

for submission to the United States. Mixed commissions, including Vietnamese

officers, would receive and distribute the equipment. Similar organizations would

perform these duties in Laos and Cambodia.40 Implicit in the arrangement was

French control, and in practice the Vietnamese were not admitted to programming

conferences until the summer of 1952. The many problems created by the new

character of the Indochinese struggle and the new American role in Far Eastern

affairs indicated that Indochina and Southeast Asia would occupy a prominent

position on the agenda for the approaching American-British-French Foreign Ministers Conference, scheduled for May 1950.

In preparing for the Foreign Ministers Conference, the State Department faced

the knotty problem of formulating a position that would resolve the Franco-Vietnamese conflict over control of the aid program. The State Department decided

upon a compromise under which the United States, in aid matters, would treat "the

three Associated States and the French as a unified force"; this implied French control of all aid. Although military success depended upon political success, it also

depended upon the vigor with which the French prosecuted military operations.

The more political concessions the French made in Indochina, the less they had to

fight for. Although not abandoning its desire for a French declaration of future

intentions, the United States was led to accept an arms program with a few surface

concessions to Vietnamese pride, but controlled by France. 41

The JCS, in light of recent statements by General Carpentier, advised the Secretary of State to "make unmistakable the firm desire of the United States to send a

military aid group to Indochina at the earliest possible date .... " They linked this

to a rejection of the French suggestion made in February that the "French and

American General Staffs" proceed to a "joint examination" of the Indochinese military situation; the same purpose could be accomplished by consultation between

the aid mission and the French High Command in Indochina.4 2

The Foreign Ministers Conference convened in London early in May. Discussions on Indochina were taken up primarily on a bilateral basis between Secretary

Acheson and Foreign Minister Schuman, who declared that France accepted primary responsibility for holding Indochina against the communists and promised

that she would not withdraw. He pointed out, however, that the continued drain on

French resources made it impossible for France to carry on alone in Indochina and

at the same time meet her obligations in the defense of Western Europe. Therefore,

the United States must support France in the war against the Viet Minh.43 Secretary

48
Origins of American Involvement, June 1949-1954

Acheson gave assurances of American aid but emphasized that no large sums of

money would be available until Congress convened. Although $20 million could

probably be programmed before 30 June, he declared, the extent of future support

would be up to Congress, which also must reckon with American obligations

throughout the world.'4

The Secretary voiced his concern about Bao Dai's failure to gain prestige at

home and abroad but did not press the point. Schuman affirmed France's intention

of granting more autonomy to the Associated States when internal conditions

made it safe to do so. Reflecting French discontent with American interest in Bao

Dai, M. Schuman predicted that "If the United States gives France its support in the

military field and trusts it for the internal development of its policy, a happy ending

will be achieved." He did state that France was removing all restrictions on the

diplomatic representation of the Associated States and had reached a decision to

establish a "Ministry for relations with the Associated States." This new ministry

would be charged with handling Associated States affairs and would be staffed

with personnel who thoroughly understood the new status of the Associated

States.45 It was hoped that this would remove the stigma of colonialism inherent in

regulation by the Ministry of Overseas Possessions.

The May Foreign Ministers Conference quieted American fears that France

would abandon Indochina to the communists and clarified for France American

intentions on military and economic aid. Politically, it marked a further French

concession to the independence of the Associated States, though the public

announcement of intention desired by the United States was still not forthcoming.

It also coordinated American, British and French policy on Southeast Asia,

although Great Britain, fearing Commonwealth reaction, refused to join in a tripartite declaration of solidarity and collaboration to resist communism in the region.

The May Foreign Ministers Conference cleared the way for early inauguration

of aid shipments to Indochina. In Washington, machinery was devised to handle a

long term, coordinated aid program for Southeast Asia. On the policy level, the

Southeast Asia Aid Committee, proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in March, was

established. In June its name was changed to the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee (SEAAPC) to distinguish it from an operating agency. SEAAPC was charged

with coordinating general policy for political, economic, and military assistance to

Southeast Asian countries. The Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee (FMACC), an interdepartmental organ that supervised worldwide military assistance programs, was still to have final responsibility for policy matters involving

military assistance to Southeast Asia. The two committees would cooperate closely

on military aid policy.46

On the operating level, economic assistance would be handled by the Economic

Cooperation Administration in Washington and a Special Technical and Economic

Mission in Indochina. Responsibility for the military program was lodged with the

Office of Military Assistance (OMA), Department of Defense. A Military Assistance

49
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Advisory Group (MAAG) attached to the American legation in Saigon was to screen

French requests and oversee distribution of the material. Both OMA and MAAG

Indochina would work closely with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and use screening criteria drafted by the JCS.11

A special Joint Survey Team, with representatives from the State and Defense

Departments, was to be sent to Southeast Asia. The mission of the team was to

gather information on the internal situation in the various Southeast Asian countries benefiting from the program and to make recommendations regarding specific

on-the-spot organization necessary to carry out the program efficiently. Neither the

shipment of material nor the formation of MAAG Indochina was to be delayed

pending the survey team's report.48 The Secretary of Defense appointed Major General Graves B. Erskine, USMC, to head the military section of the Joint Survey

Team. 49 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, early in June, proposed that the $15 million

already earmarked for expenditure in Indochina be augmented by an additional $16

million for equipment, supplies, and training. They further advised that, of all Asian

aid programs, Indochina should have first priority.5,

The spring of 1950 saw the beginning of a program of military assistance to

French and Associated States forces fighting in Indochina and a program of economic aid designed to stabilize the economies of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Although the initiation of these programs marked the fulfillment of recommendations made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as early as the preceding December, it was

the logical outgrowth of basic policy decisions reached in January and February

and was spurred by fear of a disintegration of France's will to continue the war.

Indochina on the Eve of the Korean War

D uring the first half of 1950, the decisions reached and actions taken by the

Western Powers and the Soviet bloc with regard to Indochina gave an international significance to the Indochinese war. The American-led coalition was arrayed

behind France to free Indochina and Southeast Asia from the threat of communist

subversion and domination. The recognition of Bao Dai's government by the United

States and other powers of the free world cleared the way for the American decision to grant military assistance to France and the Associated States. Recognition

of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam by the communist world presaged similar

aid agreements with the Viet Minh. When, in June 1950, the Korean conflict put a

new complexion on the Cold War, the power alignment had formed in Indochina.

Although the prospect of large quantities of American arms encouraged new

determination and hope of success among French and Vietnamese forces, the

introduction of Soviet and Communist Chinese equipment to Viet Minh troops vastly improved Ho Chi Minh's ability to wage war. By June 1950, intelligence estimates

indicated that Communist China and the DRV had agreed upon a general plan for

50
Origins of American Involvement, June 1949-1954

Chinese aid and participation in Viet Minh operations. Reinforcing this fact, the

intelligence sources discovered that during March 1950 alone Viet Minh forces

received from China fifty-two thousand rifles, together with a quantity of automatic

weapons, mortars, and artillery pieces. The makings of a major buildup were perceived in the development of a supply corridor from China through northern

Tonkin to central Annam. In this region roads were improved, bridges built, concealed supply dumps established, and airfields constructed. Two training camps,

which intelligence agencies estimated capable of accommodating twenty to thirty

thousand Viet Minh troops, were established in South China. The presence of Soviet training teams at these centers was strongly suspected."'

The new Viet Minh strength did not immediately affect the. military situation.

Although the Viet Minh possessed new and dangerous capabilities, it was apparently holding them in reserve. The pressure on the French, however, was undiminished. During the fighting season of 1949-1950, French Union Forces succeeded in

clearing and securing the Red River delta in Tonkin, but on Tonkin's vital northern

frontier the French retained only a few scattered and hard-pressed outposts that

were supplied with great difficulty.5 2

If the French could anticipate better days to come, there was little good news

in the current military and political situation. The drain on the financial and manpower resources of France and the Associated States continued. The Vietnamese

army, authorized by the agreements of 30 December 1949, was still no more than a

hope for the future. Many of the old political problems remained, with some new

ones created by the measure of autonomy granted under the 8 March Accords.

As the US Government started putting together the usual alphabet soup of

agencies for coordinating the aid program for Indochina, the National Security

Council was the venue for an even broader study of American policy. By April a

report logged in as NSC 68 was calling for major increases in the American defense

program. Couched in the language of the global struggle between the free world

and the communist bloc, this report was a perfect fit with the NSC papers that saw

Southeast Asia as a battleground in the struggle.

In any case, the influx of equipment to both sides was likely to intensify the

conflict. The failure of the Bao Dai regime to win serious public support in Vietnam, as well as French suspicions concerning the role of the proposed MAAG,

showed that American policy faced serious challenges. The French tried to reassure the Americans that simply passing them the necessary equipment would

ensure final victory. In a sense, the Americans had little confidence that the French

could win complete control of Indochina, but no one was ready to do the fighting.

American policymakers would soon learn that the situation in Indochina was more

critical than they realized.

51
4

Impact of War in Korea,

June 1950-January 1951

The first shipments of American equipment for Indochina were being prepared

for loading when forces of the communist regime in North Korea struck across the

38th parallel, attacking the pro-American regime in South Korea. The beginning of

the Korean War on 25 June 1950 came as a surprise to American leaders, but NSC 68

had given notice of a new aggressiveness on the part of the communist bloc. The

war in Indochina was clearly part of a broader struggle in the Far East. When he

decided to send ground troops to South Korea, President Truman also ordered an

acceleration of the aid program for the French in Indochina. The challenge was to

find the means to fight in Korea and at the same time provide ever-increasing quantities of materiel to the French Union Forces (especially including Vietnamese) in

Southeast Asia. The possibility of direct intervention by the Chinese Communists

against the French also loomed until they appeared in North Korea in November.

The French forces went through a crisis in the fighting. Serious setbacks eliminated any ability to block the movement of supplies or reinforcements to the Viet

Minh from China. The Americans hoped that the misfortunes would galvanize the

French into more effective action. In any case, while French politicians were trying

,to square the circle by giving Vietnam its independence while retaining control, the

military command in Indochina betrayed its suspicions of the Americans. The United States' insistence on assurance that their aid was being used effectively was not

welcomed by the French.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff took a grave view of the strategic situation in the Far

East. In their view NSC 64 was not out of date. In conjunction with increased

American aid, they proposed revisions to emphasize how important it was for the

French to commit themselves to an independent Indochina with a national army. It

was essential to avoid a general war with the Chinese Communist regime; Chinese

53
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

intervention in Korea ended any suggestion that American troops might be used in

the Indochina theater. The Joint Chiefs continued to advocate a major aid program,

although they objected to sending light bombers to the French. In that case they

were overruled by Secretary Acheson and the new Secretary of Defense, George C.

Marshall. The proposed revision of NSC 64 was not adopted, but the Joint Chiefs of

Staff continued to push for urgent measures by the United States and France.

On 27 June 1950 President Truman announced the intervention of American

armed forces in Korea, and he had "directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina and

the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those

forces."' The first result was the approval of the JCS recommendation to increase

the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) aid programmed for Indochina by

$16 million, bringing military aid for Indochina from Fiscal Year 1950 funds to $31

million. As of 31 July the Army was scheduled to provide $11.9 million in equipment, the Navy $15.3 million, and the Air Force $4.9 million.2

Although the aid program was slow at the start, supplies soon began to make

their way by sea and by air to Saigon. On 30 June eight C-47s loaded with spare

parts arrived in the Indochinese capital. The Director, Office of Military Assistance

(OMA), reported that on 31 July Army equipment for twelve Indochinese battalions

was afloat, consigned to the High Military Committee of the Army of the French

Union. A French aircraft carrier was scheduled to take on forty F6F aircraft in California in September, while another French ship was expected to depart the United

States in the near future with eighteen LCVPs (landing craft, vehicle, personnel),

six LSSLs (support landing ship, large) and other mixed cargo. The first shipment

of infantry equipment arrived in Saigon on 10 August and was delivered to the

French supply facilities. 3

Further grants of military aid to Indochina were not long in coming. President

Truman, on 1 August, asked the Congress for a Fiscal Year 1951 supplemental

appropriation of $4 billion for the MDAP. The general appropriations bill, which had

already been submitted, was passed on 6 September and included $75 million for

"Aid to the General Area of China." Of this amount Indochina was scheduled to

receive $25.7 million. Three weeks later the supplemental appropriations bill

requested by the President was passed with $107.3 million allocated to Indochina.

By 31 October 1950, the total Fiscal Year 1951 program for military aid to Indochina

was $133 million; this sum was in addition to the $31 million Fiscal Year 1950 funds.4

The Erskine Report

T he Joint State-Defense MDAP Survey Mission for Southeast Asia, headed by

Mr. John F. Melby of the Department of State, arrived in Saigon on 15 July.

Major General Graves B. Erskine, USMC, was chief of the military group, which

54
Impact of War in Korea, June 1950-January 1954

included members from each of the armed services and the United States Coast

Guard, which was included because of the smuggling problem in Indochina. For a

period of three weeks members of the mission talked with French and Indochinese

officials, both military and civilian, and observed conditions in the country. The

High Commissioner for Indochina was recalled to Paris during their stay, so they

were unable to hold final talks with him; many of the Indochinese officials were in

France attending the Pau Conference. Nevertheless, the members of the mission

believed that they were able to accomplish their alms.

Before leaving Saigon for Singapore on 7 August the MDAP Survey Mission

submitted a bulky interim report on Indochina to the Foreign Military Assistance

Coordinating Committee (FMACC). This report set forth most of the criticisms of

French actions in Indochina and the far from optimistic estimates of future

prospects which would be echoed by American representatives in Indochina inthe

years that followed. The absolute interdependence of the military, political, and

economic problems in the country; the mutual distrust and lack of good faith

between French and Indochinese on all levels; and the lack of offensive spirit in

the French high command and the poor strategic distribution and use of its forces

were stressed by General Erskine. Investigations by the mission, wrote General

Erskine, indicated that there were "grounds to doubt that the French authorities

have sincerely put forth their best efforts to train and equip a Vietnamese army and

thus remove one of the great sources of distrust now existing."

The basic problem in establishing internal security in Indochina and defeating

the Viet Minh was winning the cooperation of the people. Military victory was necessary, but it was unlikely to be decisive without a political solution that included

concessions on the part of the French and definite plans for eventual independence

of Vietnam. In the words of the report:

The magnitude of the problem which confronts the French in this respect

[internal security against communism] can hardly be overestimated.... Many

elements which have aligned themselves with the Communists are basically

hostile to Communism, but believe that the problem of independence must be

solved first and other problems subsequently. It should be noted, parenthetically, that no responsible Vietnamese suggest the desirability of the total withdrawal of French forces at present on the grounds that this would only result

in an early Communist victory. Rather, they speak of a timetable for independence and assumption by the French of responsibility for defense against outside attack, leaving internal matters to the Vietnamese. Much public opinion

which finds itself in open opposition to the Viet Minh secretly supports the Viet

Minh as the group which is having the greatest success in opposing the French.

These Vietnamese elements, at the same time, are skeptical of French protestations. The great political problem which confronts the French in Indochina,

therefore, is to persuade the Indochinese that they will implement their signed

agreements, and at the same time, to persuade that co-operation with the Communists will not, in the end, secure Vietnamese independence, but will represent only another form of subjection to an external force. At the present

55
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

moment, it may be questionable whether the French can do this in view of the

long standing suspicion and deep-seated hatred with which the Indochinese

regard the French.... It is the opinion of the Mission that unless some agreed

political-solution can be found, the French will, in time, find themselves eliminated from the scene.5

The United States, the mission believed, should continue to use its influence to

obtain implementation in good faith of the political programs agreed upon by the

French and Indochinese.

The report went on to the statement, significant for the history of the American

effort to hold Indochina against communism, that the mission made its recommendations and observations without particular reference to the internal situation in

France or to that nation's commitments in NATO. All too often in the succeeding

years reports such as this were acted upon without reference to the political situation in metropolitan France, yet that situation was a morass in which every solution to the basic political problem stated by the mission faltered. Regardless of the

variations of public opinion in France. on the Indochina question, the various

French governments considered themselves the guardians of the French Empire

(officially the French Union) on which rested France's prestige and her position as

a great nation. American pressure for concessions to the Indochinese exerted on

the French governments through diplomatic channels, for the most part, had to

overcome the natural resistance of those governments to giving up part of France's

colonial position. Even when a French government did make important concessions, their implementation was delayed and resisted by the colonial administrators and the army.

6

The MDAP Survey Mission found that the existing military aid program was

inadequate. General Erskine noted that there had been a considerable increase in

Viet Minh offensive capabilities in recent months, as well as a developing threat of

invasion by the Chinese communists in support of Ho Chi Minh. As a result the

French urgently needed more equipment, and they turned over a list to the survey

mission on its arrival in Saigon. The mission viewed the French requests as reasonable but requested that the MAAG, Indochina, the first elements of which had

arrived in the country, screen the list and furnish its comments to the mission

before it left the Southeast Asia area. The mission did state that the materiel

requested seemed to be the maximum that the French and Indochinese forces were

capable of using without reinforcement.7

The Indochina Report of the Survey Mission was received in Washington toward

the end of August and action on its recommendations began immediately. An estimate of the Indochinese situation, submitted to the JCS by the Joint Intelligence

Committee on 25 August, confirmed General Erskine's view that Viet Minh capabilities for launching an offensive had grown; it stated that the Viet Minh intended to

make a large-scale attack and that their preparations would be sufficiently complete

for it to begin on 1 September. A French offensive during the period of good autumn

56
Impact of War in Korea, June 1950-January 1954

weather would, with the troops and equipment presently available, only postpone the

Viet Minh attack since the rebels could retreat across the Chinese border. The Joint

Intelligence Committee regarded covert participation by the Chinese in a Viet Minh

offensive as more probable than overt aggression. The Committee's estimate noted,

however, that a communist attack in Indochina in September might reduce United

Nations pressure in Korea at a time when the buildup of General MacArthur's forces

would be reaching considerable proportions.8

The JCS were well aware of the urgency of the situation when, on 6 September,

the Secretary of Defense requested them to prepare "an interim program of items

for immediate supply action based upon the lists of current military requirements"

contained in the Erskine Report. This task was given to the Ad Hoc Committee on

Programs for Military Assistance, which reported on 16 October.9 In the meantime,

the French had experienced a severe reverse in Tonkin and were impatient for

more military aid. On 12 October the French Minister of Defense, Jules Moch,

pressed Secretary of Defense Marshall for a schedule of aid to be furnished for

Indochina, and especially for quick delivery of thirty B-26 light bombers. When

asked for their recommendation on furnishing the bombers, the Joint Chiefs

replied that while the planes would not materially aid the situation in Indochina

their diversion to that country could weaken United States capabilities in Korea

and Europe. They recommended against sending the aircraft. The Secretaries of

State and Defense overruled the JCS and ordered the immediate programming of

twenty-one B-26s, the remaining nine to be included in the final Fiscal Year 1951

program for Indochina. These aircraft were to be furnished on a priority ahead of

all other MDAP programs and equal to that of requirements for the Far East Air

Force (FEAF) scheduled to be shipped subsequent to 1 November.10

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Programs of Military Assistance on 16

October was approved two days later. A program of $133 million worth of equipment was set forth, to be provided as a matter of urgency. The list included ninety

F8F and thirty B-26 aircraft, three PC vessels and other light craft, considerable signal and engineer equipment, other ground force supplies, and a large amount of

ammunition for all three services The committee noted that only a small amount of

the aid could be shipped within sixty days, and placed its standard of availability at

six months. Certain items, such as Army general purpose vehicles and SCR 300

radios, were in short supply; none could be furnished in that time. Fulfilling the

program would occasion deficiencies in essential equipment for United States

forces (especially Army) in being and scheduled for activation within the next six

months, although precautions had been taken to insure that equipping such units

would not be seriously hampered.

Because French authorities were in charge of the campaign in Indochina and

in control of the native armies, the ad hoc committee recommended, and the JCS

agreed, that all military assistance should be delivered to the French with "such

participation by the representatives of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as the

57
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Secretary of State may deem appropriate." The Joint Chiefs informed the Secretary of Defense that increases in military aid should be provided in accordance

with operational plans that were acceptable to the United States and therefore

the recommended assistance to Indochina would be observed and supervised by

the MAAG in Saigon.nI

On 23 October the Joint Chiefs of Staff program was approved; it was assigned

a priority immediately below that of United States forces in combat or alerted for

early movement to the Korean area and above all military assistance programs

other than those in direct support of the Korean effort.12 The services lost no time

in scheduling what deliveries they could. In a message of 26 October the Chief of

Staff of the Army instructed General Douglas MacArthur to ship to Indochina at the

earliest possible date a considerable amount of ordnance spare parts, signal equipment, some armored cars, one hundred 105mm howitzers, and a large quantity of

ammunition. The Navy began shipping fighter aircraft and additional small vessels,

and the Air Force scheduled the first flight of seven B-26s to leave the United

States by 1 November. Cargo tonnages shipped to Indochina were low during October and November but increased during December, so that by the end of 1950 a

total of 43,400 measurement tons had been sent, of which over 19,000 measurement tons had been dispatched in the last month. 13

France and the Crisis in Indochina

D uring the latter half of 1950 the military position of the French forces in

Indochina constantly grew worse. The estimates of the MDAP Survey Mission

and the Joint Intelligence Committee concerning the dangerous increase in Viet

Minh offensive capabilities were borne out in a dramatic fashion along the northeast Tonkin border. On 16 September rebel forces organized for conventional combat struck at the border post of Dong Khe destroying two companies of the French

Foreign Legion in a two-day battle. As a result the important post at Cao Bang

became untenable and its evacuation was ordered. In the first week of October the

garrison, consisting of three battalions, left Cao Bang for Thatkhe while a similar

force started from Thatkhe to meet and reinforce it. After joining, the two groups

were smashed by a massive Viet Minh attack and scattered, to straggle back to

Thatkhe. A week later only about one-seventh of the six-battalion force had

reached Thatke, which was being evacuated in turn.1 4

Although the forces engaged at Cao Bang were small by World War II standards, they were considerable for the Indochina war and the defeat was all but a

disaster for the French. Before the year was out they were compelled to abandon

all of their northeast border outposts except Moncay, which was near the coast.

This withdrawal opened the border and strengthened the communications of the

Viet Minh with the Chinese communists in Southeast China. The rebels had easier

58
Impact of War in Korea, June 1950-January 1954

access to supplies and equipment. Moreover, they were in a position threatening

the rice-rich delta. Not only was the military position of the Viet Minh greatly

strengthened and their morale bolstered, but also the triumph at Cao Bang

increased their prestige among the Indochinese people.

The autumn Viet Minh campaign had important repercussions in other areas; it

spurred the flow of American military aid. It also prompted the French to make

certain concessions to Vietnamese nationalism and to speed implementation of

some already made. A new strategy was devised, calculated to meet the shift of the

Viet Minh from guerrilla to conventional warfare, and a new commander was sent

out to implement it.

On 17 October General Alphonse-Pierre Juin, French Resident General in

Morocco, an officer with long experience in colonial affairs, arrived in Saigon to

review the military situation with an eye to changing French strategy and possibly

reinforcing the effort in Indochina. He was accompanied by Jean Letourneau, Minister of State for the Associated States in the French Cabinet, whose mission was

to assess the political actions required to halt the rapid deterioration of the French

position. After a week-long survey the two men returned to Paris to report to the

French Government. On the basis of their reports the French Government took

some drastic, necessary, but long-belated actions. In the military sphere, the basic

decision was made to pass from a defensive strategy of "pacification" in Indochina

to concerted offensive effort to destroy the Viet Minh forces. To accomplish this

Letourneau was given increased power over the military direction of the war,

enabling him to coordinate the activities of the armed service bureaus as they concerned Indochina. To complement the unification of direction in France, the government decided to unite in the person of General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny the

functions of High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in Indochina. This step,

it was hoped, would eliminate much of the conflict between the French political

and military functionaries in Indochina, which had contributed greatly to the confusion of aims, the defensive strategy, and the defeatist attitudes of the French

forces. The National Assembly backed these decisions with a strong resolution

voted by a large majority.15

Alongside the military reforms, which were begun in November and December,

the French Government made some sweeping political concessions to satisfy the

claims of Indochinese nationalism and attract support for the fight against communism. The 27th of November saw the signing at Pau, in France, of ten conventions

regulating the internal relations of the Associated States and the influence of the

French in the Indochinese economy. The Elysee Accords of 8 March 1949 had stipulated that an interstate conference (Conference inter-etats) was to be held

between France and the three Indochinese states to determine the scope of joint

committees that were to be erected to govern communications facilities, foreign

trade and customs, immigration control, finance, and economic planning. This conference had met on 29 June 1950 and continued for four months with little real

59
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

progress but with mounting friction and controversy. Not only was the position of

the French delegates removed from that of the Associated States, but also quarrels

developed among the states themselves, the representatives of Laos and Cambodia

resenting what they felt to be an attempt by the Vietnamese delegation to dominate

them. After the military defeats of October, however, it behooved the French to

compromise. The conference was rapidly and, to some extent, successfully

brought to a close with agreement on the subjects specified, plus conventions regulating the port of Saigon and navigation of the Mekong River. A group of interstate

agencies was set up, staffed by personnel of all fo'ur countries, to take over the

tasks of the "common services" of the former Indochinese Union, which had been

administered directly by the French High Commissariat. Agreement on a monetary

union and a customs union of the Associated States preserved to a large extent the

economic unity of the peninsula.

Neither the French nor the Indochinese were really satisfied with the Pau

accords. Frenchmen who felt that France's prestige rested on her empire believed

that too much had been given up. The Indochinese, while recognizing the fact that

the Pau conventions were an advance from the Elysee agreements, wanted much

more independence than the French had been willing to concede. From the standpoint of the Indochinese nationalists, French control was perpetuated by the inclusion of French representatives in the joint agencies and by the guarantees protecting French interests in money and banking, foreign investments and exchange, tariff

policy and customs control, and certain educational establishments. The port of

Saigon and navigation on the Mekong remained under the effective control of

Frenchmen. Too many French officials were to remain in Indochina. The Pau conventions, insofar as they were aimed at stimulating native support for a "free and

independent Vietnam" and for the fight against communism, fell short of the mark.1"

Although the Pau conference began before the autumn attacks of the Viet

Minh, the fact that the signing of the conventions came hard on the heels of a

series of French defeats gave the impression French concessions were the result

of those defeats. Vietnamese who regarded the Viet Minh as the most successful

force working for Indochinese independence were strengthened in their belief.

Events buttressed the argument that more was to be gained for Vietnamese freedom by permitting the French forces to fall before communist guns than by supporting an army that, if victorious against Ho Chi Minh, might be used to reassert

colonial government.

In early December the French made another concession intended to bestow on

the Emperor Bao Dai the missing halo of sovereignty and to convince the Indochinese that the French would convey the powers of government to them as rapidly as

possible. This concession was the establishment of an independent national Army

of Vietnam, a step long desired by the JCS and urged on the French by the Department of State in Washington and by Minister Donald Heath in Saigon. The measure

was decided upon by the French and Vietnamese Governments in October, and

60
Impact of War in Korea, June 1950-January 1954

about six weeks were spent in discussions at Dalat about the size, organization,

and command structure of the army. Finally, on 8 December, the retiring High Commissioner, Leon Pignon, signed a military convention with officials of Vietnam.

According to the agreement Bao Dai would be in supreme command of the national army, but responsible to the French High Command in Indochina. French officers and cadres, in Vietnamese uniforms and paid by Vietnam, would be subject to

Bao Dai's command. The army was not expected to be effective for at least a year,

after which it might be able to take over certain "pacification duties," freeing

French units for offensive work in the north.

It was obvious that a Vietnamese army would require heavy support from the

MDAP; there was no other source of armament and supplies. Nevertheless, no American representative was invited to the discussions at Dalat. Edmund A. Gullion, the

Special Assistant for MDAP to the American Minister at Saigon, complained to Washington, that this "appeared further to delay implementation of the project."'7

The concessions made by the French in the autumn of 1950 came too late. The

growing strength of the Viet Minh, the threat of invasion by the Communist Chinese, as well as their increasing ability to support the Viet Minh materially and

politically, and the growing distaste in France for the war meant that there was not

enough time for the measures to have the desired effect. The critical importance of

the time factor was apparent to American observers in Indochina. Minister Heath

reported from Saigon, "Had French willingly made two years ago 1950 concessions

and had Bao Dai and his government had two years experience under new formula,

there would have been radically different IC [Indochina] situation. Basic political

question today is whether there is time enough to utilize new political framework

to mobilize mass allegiance behind Bao Dai."18

MAAG Indochina

G eneral de Lattre's arrival in Indochina presaged a change in the French attitude

toward the American military aid program and toward the MAAG in Saigon.

While welcoming American assistance, French commanders had shown considerable

suspicion of American military personnel sent to Saigon to administer the program.

Upon their arrival in Indochina, General Carpentier observed that the MAAG was

larger than he had anticipated and had arrived without his agreement. At the end of

August, the first full month of MAAG activity in Saigon, Mr. Gullion reported "some

atmosphere of reluctance about French cooperation." He attributed this to the fact

that the French High Command had not understood the necessity for, or the advantages of, having the MAAG in Indochina, and had even mistaken its functions. More

important in explaining the French attitude were the fears of some officials that the

MAAG personnel would attempt to interfere in the political and military affairs of

61
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Indochina. Despite some improvement in the MAAG's relations with the French, the

latter continued to regard the group with less than enthusiastic approval. 19

The MAAG was hampered in accomplishing its mission by several conditions.

The group was to screen and pass to the Department of Defense French requests

for military aid, and observe and supervise the distribution and use of the equipment provided under the program. For these tasks the thirty-eight officers and

enlisted men authorized for the MAAG were too few. The authorization was later

increased, but the group continued to suffer from a shortage of personnel.

Screening of French requests was based on JCS screening criteria (to eliminate

nonmilitary items, etc.), French and Indochinese needs, and availability of personnel trained to use the materiel requested. The cooperation of the French military

authorities was necessary; it was not immediately forthcoming. The MDAP monthly report from Saigon for October 1950 contains a complaint about the poor liaison

between French officials and the MAAG; this "led the French Command to deny

the abandonment of Cao Bang even after it had taken place, to withhold information on the extent of French losses in the North, to keep the Legation and MAAG in

ignorance of military developments in Tonkin and of French plans for coping with

the new situation." Both the legation and MAAG "made every effort to impress

upon the French authorities the imperative need for adequate military briefings if

the MDAP were to have its maximum effect and by the end of the month definite

signs of improvement were to be noted."20 Nevertheless, sufficient information on

French-Indochinese forces continued to be unavailable to MAAG. No troop bases,

or even order of battle, were furnished by the French, and screening had to be

done by "educated guess." French supply and accounting procedures often made it

impossible for the Americans to determine exactly what the forces had on hand. As

a result MAAG personnel sometimes hesitated to amend French requests when

they were excessive. 21

In observing and supervising the use of end items provided under MDAP, the

Army Section of the MAAG was impeded by French restrictions. Because Air Force

equipment was employed chiefly at fixed installations, such as airbases, its day-today use and maintenance could be checked. Similarly the Naval member of MAAG

could inspect ships, which were in more or less constant use and readiness. Army

members were not allowed to go into the combat areas to view the employment and

care of ground force supplies. Inspections of troop units were scheduled beforehand with the French Command. Units to be inspected had been sent to rearward

areas and prepared for the event. The entire inspection was performed with paradeground spit and polish and with French officers accompanying the American. Such

inspections were limited to MDAP equipment only; the French guarded from view

that which they themselves had furnished. The value of the inspections for calculating French needs and for determining the efficiency with which American materiel

was used was impaired by these procedures. In distributing MDAP equipment, the

MAAG dealt almost exclusively with French authorities who desired to minimize

62
Impact of War in Korea, June 1950-January 1954

contacts between Americans and Vietnamese. Not until the end of 1951 was the

MAAG able to'require that signatures of Vietnamese officials appear on manifests of

supplies delivered to native units. There is no evidence, however, that shipments

destined for any of the Associated States were withheld by French authorities.22

By the end of December 1950 the change wrought by the new French commander was noticeable, and the MDAP report for January 1951 stated that "relations

between the MAAG and the French Command were unquestionably better than at

any previous point of the Indochina program."2

13 By contrast, General Carpentier, as

late as November, was described as "mildly skeptical about American aid."24

On 23 December at Saigon Minister Heath signed an "Agreement for Mutual

Defense Assistance in Indochina" with representatives of the Associated States and

France. This agreement provided for military assistance, in accordance with Public

Law 329, 81st Congress, to the four states fighting in the peninsula. Similar to

MDAP agreements between the United States and other recipient nations, the

agreement stated: "With respect to aid received from the United States of America,

each State shall designate a member or representative of the High Military Committee and authorize such person to receive... the title to the materials received."

With respect to MAAG Indochina, the Associated States and France were "to

extend to such personnel facilities freely and fully to carry out their assigned

responsibilities, including observation of the progress and the technical use made

of the assistance granted."2 5

Development of US Policy toward Indochina,

July-December 1950

A t the outbreak of the Korean conflict, American policy toward Indochina was

set forth in NSC 64 and NSC 48/2. There was general agreement that everything possible must be done to maintain Indochina, and especially Tonkin. With its

forces tied down in Korea, the United States would confine itself to providing military aid in the form of munitions and equipment. Within the government, the

Department of Defense was the most anxious about the dangers in Southeast Asia;

this concern was stimulated by constant prodding by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They

saw a threat to the United States strategic position in the Far East inherent in a

communist Viet Nam, and were eager to act with the resources at hand.

The advanced position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff became clear in the first week

of July, when the Joint Chiefs were required to comment on a National Security

Council paper dealing with "The Position and Actions of the United States with

Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation." The

question was what to do in the event China provided overt military assistance to Ho

Chi Minh. If such assistance were given the Viet Minh forces the JCS commented

63
JCS and the First Indochina War, 194 7-1954

that, "the United States should increase its MDAP assistance to the French and urge

the French to continue an active defense, with the United States giving consideration

to the provision of air and naval assistance." Also, the United States should ask the

United Nations to call upon its members to make forces available to resist the

aggression by Communist China.26 On 14 August, in commenting on a revision of the

same NSC paper, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that in the event of overt

attack by Communist Chinese forces against Indochina the United States should support France and the Associated States, in concert with the United Kingdom; accelerate and expand the present military assistance program; and mobilize to the extent

necessary to meet the situation. Other agencies represented in the NSC drew back

from such a strong position. The National Security Council's decided to accept the

recommendation of the JCS on supporting French and Indochinese forces and on

stepping up MDAP assistance. Mobilization was not accepted and was replaced with

a stipulation that, should the Chinese Communists attack Indochina, the United

States should not engage in a general war with them.27

A similar difference in attitude appeared during the preparations for talks

between the Foreign Ministers of France and Great Britain and the Secretary of

State in September. A State Department position paper on Indochina submitted to

the JCS recommended that Secretary Acheson emphasize liberal implementation

of the Elysee agreements and that the political program must not be delayed. The

French should be urged to speed the formation of new national armies and to

intensify their information activities in Asia. The Secretary was also to recommend

staff talks between the United States, United Kingdom, and France regarding "pooling and coordination of resources in Southeast Asia in the event of invasion."2

" In

their comments the Joint Chiefs noted that

the recommendations as a whole do not reflect the urgency which, from

the military point of view, should be attached to planning, preparing for, and

providing adequate means to insure the security of Indochina.... Intelligence

reports indicate that the Viet Minh military preparations may be sufficiently

complete in the very near future to launch a large-scale effort to seize control of

all of Indochina. Prior to 1 January 1951, the currently planned level of United

States military aid to the French and native allied forces of Indochina should

increase their military capabilities but not to the extent of counterbalancing

Viet Minh capabilities. In view of these considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

suggest that the proposed United States position take cognizance that the situation in Indochina is to be viewed with alarm and that urgent and drastic action

is required by the French if they are to avoid military defeat in Indochina....

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the French be urged to conclude the

Pau conference immediately and successfully, to give widespread publicity to its

accomplishments, and to initiate bolder political measures. Regarding the military

staff talks, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that the "coordination of resources" be

changed to "coordination of operations." They also wished Secretary Acheson to

64
Impact of War in Korea, June 1950-January 1954

indicate to the French that increases in military aid would be provided in accordance

with operational' plans acceptable to the United States and compatible with United

States capabilities. But, because of the situation in Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

asked that the Secretary "Inform the French that, regardless of current US commitments for provision of certain assistance to French Indochina, the United States will

not commit any of its armed forces under present circumstances."29 The records of

the September Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meetings do not indicate that Secretary

Acheson exerted much pressure on the French. He seems to have wished to let the

JCS work out their problems in the proposed military staff talks. The Secretary did

refuse a French request that the United States furnish tactical air support for the

French forces. 30

In October the Joint Chiefs of Staff pressed for stronger and more precise

American policy than that contained in NSC 64; particularly concerned that there

was "no clearly stated United States policy covering the contingency of an attack

on Indochina by Viet Minh forces supplied and/or otherwise aided by Communist

China."3' The deteriorating situation in Indochina after the defeat at Cao Bang

demanded a revision of American policy. The apparent collapse of communist

resistance in North Korea seemed to offer an opportunity; if the Korean conflict

could be quickly wound up, the United States global strategic position would be

greatly strengthened, and some American armed forces would be freed for employment in other areas.

On 18 October General J. Lawton Collins laid before his colleagues a proposal

for reappraising the government's stand. "I believe that the loss of Indochina would

be suich a blow to the US strategic position in the cold war that its loss is unacceptable, if we can possibly avoid it," he wrote. "All practicable measures" to deny

Indochina to the communists should be explored, including "even the use of US

armed forces if the situation can be saved in no other way." The Army Chief of Staff

forwarded a study prepared by G-3 recommending that the United States "be prepared to commit its own armed force." But any such commitment must not endanger the US strategic position in the event of a world war; it must offer a reasonable

chance of success, and it should be done in concert with other UN members.32

The Joint Chiefs considered General Collins' views in preparing comments on

a proposal by the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee for a new National Security

Council decision on United States policy toward Indochina. This proposal roughly

conformed to the ideas of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although it did not provide for

the use of American armed forces and in their opinion did not reflect the urgency

of the current situation in Indochina.33 The JCS delayed their comments while

awaiting a report from Brigadier General Francis G. Brink, commander of the

MAAG in Saigon. They had instructed General Brink to confer with General Juin

during the latter's visit to Indochina and to furnish them an estimate of the chances

of French success against the Viet Minh. By the time the Joint Chiefs of Staff were

ready to present their recommendations on the paper by the Southeast Asia Aid

65
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Policy Committee the Communist Chinese had struck in North Korea and a longer

war was in prospect. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs would not advise using American combat forces in Indochina in the foreseeable future.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent their recommendations on the Southeast Asia Aid

Policy Committee's proposal to the Secretary of Defense on 28 November. Instead

of commenting on the paper they proposed their own broad policy, a revision of

NSC 64. As NSC 64/1 it was presented on 21 December to the National Security

Council for consideration. The JCS proposal listed both short-term and long-term

objectives for the United States in Indochina. For the short term, the report stated:

"The United States should take action, as a matter of urgency, by all means practicable short of the actual employment of United States military forces, to deny

Indochina to communism." The French should continue to have the main responsibility for "the restoration of peace and security" in Indochina. The French should

prepare the overall military plan, under which the United States was to provide

logistical support. American and French authorities in Indochina should handle

allocations to the French and to the Associated States. It was essential that the

French should move toward self-government for Indochina and the creation of

national armies. The French should provide additional forces until these national

armies could be effective. The US Government needed to make sure that the

French established an effective military command, "Eliminate its policy of 'colonialism'," and support recognition of the Associated States in Asia. The United

States should also be prepared to use all means short of war and the use of American forces against a Communist Chinese intervention in Indochina. The French

should also not refer the problem to the United Nations or withdraw from the war.

For the longer term, a regional security organization in Southeast Asia that included the Associated States and other countries should be formed.

An "Analysis," written by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, accompanied

the draft policy and explained the strategic concept that kept the Joint Chiefs of

Staff from recommending armed intervention. Involvement of United States forces

against Viet Minh forces, according to the Committee, would be likely to lead to a

war with Communist China, which would probably be a prelude to global war. The

chief enemy in a global war, "in all probability," would be the USSR, and the principal theater would be Western Europe. The strength of the Western Powers was

insufficient to fight a war on the Asian mainland and accomplish Allied objectives

in Europe.3 4 This line of reasoning was generally accepted by the American Government at the time.

Despite the urgency communicated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National

Security Council did not adopt NSC 64/1; NSC 64 remained the basic United States

position on Indochina for months. Nevertheless, the JCS strove to realize the objectives that they advocated, and other agencies of the government gradually moved

toward their point of view. The policy enunciated in NSC 64 was modified by the

66
Impact of War in Korea, June 1950-January 1954

prevailing climate of opinion in Washington, and movement toward a stronger

stand on the Indochina question was apparent at the end of 1950.

Although the Chinese intervention in Korea lowered the chance of China coming directly to the aid of the Viet Minh, the situation in Europe and the Far East in

the last weeks of 1950 was grim. Secretary Acheson succeeded in galvanizing the

NATO allies to agree to a unified military command, to which Truman named General Dwight D. Eisenhower, USA, in the waning days of the year. American troops

were to go to Europe, but the allies had to do their part. The diversion of many of

France's best officers and noncommissioned officers to Indochina became all the

more serious. The unwillingness of the French Government to dispatch young conscripts to the Far East was stronger as these men were needed in Europe.

The French recognized the urgency of the situation in Indochina. Perceiving

that a lack of leadership was part of the problem, they sent General Jean de Lattre

de Tassigny as High Commissioner and Commander in Chief; de Lattre's reputation

in France was like that of Eisenhower or Patton in the United States. His arrival at

Saigon in December was expected to boost French morale. With American aid, the

new commander might begin to reverse the fortunes of the French.

67
5

The De Lattre Episode, 1951

Stabilization of the front in Korea and the beginning of the buildup of American

military force in Europe gave some breathing space to the United States and its

allies. Negotiations between the United Nations Command and the communist

forces in Korea began in July 1951 but were soon deadlocked. In Indochina de Lattre gained some local successes. Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1951 the situation was serious, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a directive to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) to prepare plans for covering a French evacuation

of Tonkin. Meanwhile, President Truman was reluctant to increase the amount of

aid to the French.

United States policy regarding Indochina changed little during 1951. The basic

document, NSC 64, was not revised during 1951; NSC 48/2 was replaced in May by

48/5, but the section of the new paper that concerned Indochina continued current

policies including the decision not to commit US armed forces.1 Whatever evolution of policy occurred resulted from American participation in various military

and diplomatic conferences; from liaison and consultation between the French,

British, and American commands in the Far East; and from decisions on several

specific questions. None of these actions occasioned major alteration in American

aims in Indochina during the year.

Pressures to change policy increased, however. The Joint Chiefs were concerned about preserving American freedom of action in Southeast Asia. They

opposed participation in the three-power (American, British, and French) military

conference that met at Singapore in May and, when it did take place, made sure

that no major commitments resulted. Foreseeing further pressure from the French

and British to commit the United States to an allied strategy in the region, possibly

involving American combat forces, the JCS sought to make their position clear

when de Lattre visited Washington in September. The pressure for closer coordination continued. When the French Prime Minister 2 visited the United States in

69
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

January, the question of possible Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina

had come up. The Joint Chiefs of Staff offered an American response to de Lattre

that would strike directly at Chinese military power rather than trying to stem the

tide in Tonkin. They warned the Secretary of Defense, Robert A. Lovett, who had

succeeded Marshall in September, that, without political guidance, further talks

with the allies would not produce useful results.

But de Lattre was suffering from cancer. After his visit to Washington, he

returned to France and was replaced in Indochina by General Raoul Salan and a

civilian High Commissioner, Jean Letourneau. The great hopes the French had

placed on de Lattre made his death on 11 January 1952 all the more tragic. American confidence in the French war effort, never robust, began to decline.

The Military Situation in Indochina Improves

D uring 1951 the French military position in Indochina showed a definite

improvement. In the early part of the year General de Lattre, by consolidating

his defenses, was able to repulse a series of attacks and inflict heavy losses on the

Viet Minh while keeping his own losses relatively low. In November the French commander undertook a limited offensive in the Hoa Binh area southwest of Hanoi.

The French forces successes under de Lattre were made possible by American

military assistance. The effect of United States support became apparent in midJanuary, when the Franco-Vietnamese forces defeated the largest offensive the Viet

Minh had yet mounted. About forty thousand rebel troops fought in the battle of

Vinh Yen, and their losses may have been as high as six thousand. Minister Heath

reported from Saigon that the French victory could "in very large part be attributed

to the action of French air, artillery, especially 105 mm. howitzers, and napalm, all

of which were provided to the French Forces under the Mutual Assistance Defense

Program (MDAP)." The aid program, he continued, "has thus in its first full-scale

test been fully vindicated."3

Some of the equipment used in repulsing the Viet Minh offensive had arrived at

Hanoi only in the nick of time, as the result of personal intervention by General

Brink, who asked General MacArthur's headquarters to have materiel shipped from

the Far East Command (FECOM) stocks outside established MDAP channels. De

Lattre acknowledged the value of this assistance; his public expressions of gratitude promoted better relations between the French and the Americans in Indochina. The attitude of the French toward the MAAG changed from suspicion and

annoyance to qualified approval that eased the work of the agency during the

months that followed.4

After the battle of Vinh Yen, the French and Vietnamese forces made a series of

minor advances, recapturing several outposts around the Tonkin Delta perimeter.

At the same time they repulsed a number of Viet Minh attacks, reportedly inflicting

70
The De Lattre Episode, 1951

severe losses on the enemy, and forged ahead with a campaign to clean the rebels

out of the delta area itself. Early in April the French reported intercepting a radio

broadcast by Ho Chi Minh ordering his troops, who had been maneuvering in daylight in organized units since January, to revert to guerrilla warfare. While this

report indicated some discouragement in Viet Minh ranks, the rebels did not give

up the initiative in Indochina. Their attacks continued, in general with little or no

success, until the rainy season slowed all military operations in the country.5

With the return of good weather in the autumn the French returned to the

offensive for the first time since their defeat at Cao Bang in the preceding year. In a

well-executed surprise move they advanced out of the delta to capture and fortify

positions in the Cho Ben-Hoa Binh area southwest of Hanoi. The purposes of this

operation were political as well as military. De Lattre hoped to disrupt Viet Minh

communications and collection of rice, while impressing public opinion with his

initiative and skill and demonstrating to the United States the fact that he was

using American equipment to good advantage.

The Hoa Binh offensive proved to be less than a strategic success. It overextended French lines and weakened the defense of the Hanoi perimeter, opening the

door to heavy Viet Minh infiltration into the delta area. By the end of the year it

was apparent to American observers in Indochina that the French would be hard

pressed to maintain the position at Hoa Binh (which was being subjected to counterattack by regular Viet Minh troops), since they had to protect the delta from

rebel infiltration.' Nevertheless, the French and Vietnamese forces were in better

condition With respect to training, spirit, equipment, organization, and strategic situation at de Lattre's death than when he had taken over the High Command.

General improvement in the military situation in Indochina during 1951

brought no corresponding development in Vietnamese internal political affairs. The

basic problem continued to be lack of public support for the Bao Dai government

and for the struggle against the Viet Minh. Behind the indifference of the natives lay

their unabated dislike of the French colonial officials, who seldom relaxed their

resistance to the reforms dictated from Paris or ceased to interfere in the internal

affairs of Vietnam. Bao Dai could not shake the identification of his regime with

French policies and his new army with the French High Command.

Despite the concessions to Indochinese nationalism in the Pau Conventions,

the reduction of French control over the economic and political life of the Associated States was scarcely visible to the average person in Vietnam. The turnover of

authority was painfully slow and grudgingly conceded by French officials. For

some of the delays the French were not entirely responsible. It was difficult to find

Vietnamese sufficiently experienced in governmental administration to handle the

agencies to be transferred. But the easing of the military situation seems to have

reduced the French sense of urgency for carrying out political reforms begun in

more trying times. Gullion reported from Saigon that as early as March more confident French officials, including General de Lattre, had begun to utter doubts about

71
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

the wisdom of maintaining the current tempo and limits of Vietnamese independence.7 The United States Government, which had been pushing the French toward

more rapid reforms, relaxed its pressure. The official attitude of the State Department was that the Pau Conventions, formally instituted in December 1950, had satisfied Indochinese nationalist aims. American officials, however, continued to urge

the French to implement the conventions and establish the national armies.8

The equivocal character of French policies was reflected in the actions and attitudes of General de Lattre who, until his death on 11 January 1952, was probably the

most important single factor in Vietnamese politics. On the one hand the High Commissioner considered himself a "kingmaker" who would go down in history as the

father of Indochinese independence. In April, at a ceremony commemorating the

victory of Vinh Yen, he pledged himself to "fulfill the independence of Vietnam." "I

have come," he announced, "to accomplish your independence, not to limit it."9 On

the other hand, General de Lattre represented France and "independence" meant

independence within the French Union. A few weeks before uttering his April

pledge the general had remarked to Minister Heath, "These states [the Associated

States of Indochina] could hardly hope to enjoy the same status as members of the

British Commonwealth since France has spent too much to protect them."10

Native nationalists were not content with the rate at which authority was being

transferred to the Bao Dai government. General de Lattre seems to have wished to

clear up the Viet Minh rebellion before devoting his time and energy to political reorganization. Certainly the demands of the military situation were more immediate; the

one reform that the High Commissioner was most active in accomplishing was the

establishment of the Vietnamese National Army. But his attitude was not conducive

to harmonious relations with the Vietnamese government and people, who wanted to

see immediate evidence of independence. The general was impatient of administrative details and with the failures and mistakes of inexperienced native officials. This

trait caused him to intervene personally in the internal affairs of Vietnam, much to

the annoyance of Bao Dai and his premier, Tran Van Huu. The Emperor frequently

complained to Minister Heath about de Lattre's interference and referred with disgust to the "colonial-minded advisors" retained by the High Commissioner.'

On 20 January the Vietnamese cabinet was dissolved to form a new government, still under Tran Van Huu, with a broader base representative of the major

noncommunist political groups. This attempt to draw into the government the dissident nationalist parties ended in a fiasco, presaging the failure of the Premier to

win any great measure of popular support. After a month of negotiations, intrigues,

and squabbles, Tran Van Huu emerged with a cabinet very much like the last. The

Premier held the portfolios of the Defense Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

and the Ministry of the Interior.12 The involvement of de Lattre and French officials

in the governmental shake-up cannot be determined, but Gullion reported that in

April "Some of the animosity at French intervention in the cabinet crisis in February had begun to subside."' 3

72
The De Lattre Episode, 1951

The reshuffling of Huu's government was only one of the factors that delayed

the organization of the Vietnamese National Army during the first half of 1951. A

similar crisis in France, which began at the end of February and lasted until 9

March, resulted in the replacement of the Pleven cabinet by one under Henri

Queuille. The uncertainty accompanying the change paralyzed activity in Saigon

and in Paris. Development of the army was impeded by disagreements between the

French and the Vietnamese governments over the amount of money each should

contribute to its support, by the failure of the Saigon government to complete its

budget, by the lack of trained cadres, and by the inability of Premier Huu to find a

suitable defense minister and a chief of staff. Also, while MDAP materiel for the

French Union Forces was arriving at a generally good rate (seven ships unloaded

over ten-thousand long tons at Saigon during April), equipment for the projected

Vietnamese battalions was coming in slowly. While recruiting for twenty-four battalions was proceeding satisfactorily, the new army was meeting competition from

the French Union Forces, who recruited more than seven thousand Vietnamese

during March and April. Such French activity gave rise to charges of bad faith in

their agreement to establish national armed forces in Vietnam.14

Despite confusion and delay some increase in the national armies of the Associated States was achieved during the year. As of 1 May the regular Army of Viet

Nam consisted of about 38,500 men. Cambodia and Laos, whose needs were comparatively small, had under arms 7,500 and 4,000 men. The program for the Vietnamese army called for the formation of four divisions during 1951. An expansion

to eight divisions was decided upon later in the year. By the time of General de Lattre's death the Vietnamese Regular Army comprised thirty-seven battalions with

strength of approximately 65,000 men augmented by various auxiliary units (59,000

men) and semi-military forces. In the Associated States as a whole, men in the regular and auxiliary forces numbered over 132,000; those in semi-military forces

about 76,500.15 Seriously deficient in training, leadership, and the will to fight, these

forces, despite being combined with the 189,000 troops of the French Union in

Indochina, did not give the French High Command an overwhelming superiority

against the Viet Minh.

A primary purpose in establishing the national armies had been to stimulate public enthusiasm for the "independent" governments of the Associated States and for

the struggle against the Viet Minh. In this respect, the project cannot be described as

a great success. The measure of its achievement in 1951 can be seen in the results of

the various mobilization measures authorized by the Vietnamese cabinet on 15 July.

A series of decrees from the Huu government asserted the principle of obligatory

military service and authorized the conscription of sixty thousand men in four increments for a period of two months training, after which they were to form a partially

trained reserve. It also announced its plans to draft eight hundred specialists and

technicians for the National Army and to select one thousand candidates for training

73
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

as reserve officers. This program did not meet the demands of the situation according to observers in the American Legation, who reported:

Actually, the severely limited scope of the planned mobilization falls far

short of supplying Viet Nam's basic military needs. The calling up of 60,000

men for only two months of training is an expensive gesture which is ill afforded by the shaky military budget; further, two months of training will provide no

semblance of a trained manpower pool. Similarly, the call-up of only 1000 candidates for reserve officer training is woefully inadequate of estimated requirement; at least four times that number of both categories of personnel are needed to round out the present four division national army. This estimate, of

course, makes no allowance for normal attrition or for the necessity of a rapidly expanded force. 16

Even this modest program fell short. Little more than half of the specially

selected candidates reported for training. The second increment of conscripts was

released after only five weeks of training, and the fourth increment was never summoned. Of the first increment of fifteen thousand men, only seven percent could be

persuaded to enlist in the National Army after completing their training; the quota

of eight hundred specialists to be drafted was reduced to five hundred. 17

The response to the mobilization program was scarcely an indication of popular support for the Vietnam government or the National Army. Some French officials blamed the non-arrival of MDAP materiel as well as financial difficulties for

the indifferent success of the project. American observers noted that the Vietnamese government had done a poor job of selling mobilization to people for

whom the Confucian contempt of military service was traditional. Public apathy,

which the National Army and mobilization were intended to decrease, was the

chief stumbling block for the mobilization scheme.'8

Another mark of the National Army's failure was the defection of some of the

Cao Dai forces. In June the Cao Dai Chief of Staff led 2,500 of his troops out of

Vietnam into Cambodia to "await developments." The immediate causes of this

action probably were attempts to subordinate forces, such as those of the Cao Dai,

to the National Army, and the curtailment of the subsidy paid by the French to the

Cao Dai troops. A more basic reason was the belief that Vietnam had not been

given full independence and was not likely to achieve it under Tran Van Huu.19

Near the end of the year, the situation in Vietnam was complicated by the

growing enmity between the High Commissioner and the Premier. General de Lattre was disturbed by Huu's inability to develop the vigorous and popular government necessary to military as well as political success. He had misgivings concerning Huu's use of state funds and the Premier's monopoly of the most important

posts in the government. Huu seemed convinced that the High Commissioner was

bent on having the determining voice in all Vietnamese affairs. The tensions

between the two men, which persisted until de Lattre's death, exacerbated the old

French-Vietnamese quarrels and weakened their efforts against the Viet Minh.20

74
The De Lattre Episode, 1951

The struggle for control of Vietnamese policy became apparent in October

when both men returned from visits to the United States. By November General de

Lattre was hinting that he might use his "influence" to replace Huu. Huu waved the

banner of nationalism, sought the support of dissident groups, including the Cao

Dai and the Dai Viet, and revived democratic projects, such as the establishment of

popular assemblies. At the end of November, when de Lattre and Huu went to Paris

to attend the first meeting of the High Council of the French Union, their rivalry

became even more bitter. Their rivalry ended with de Lattre's death, but Huu's position had grown so weak that his government fell a few months later.21

The de Lattre-Huu dispute affected the meeting of the High Council of the

French Union. Before the meeting the Vietnamese delegation had been expected to

press for an alteration of the quadripartite committee structure laid down in the

Pau Conventions, which permitted the French to dominate committees that supervised the governmental departments and activities of the Associated States. It was

also expected to ask for admission to the United Nations (desired by the United

States but considered premature by the French) and for changing the system of

representation between Vietnam and France by an exchange of ambassadors. Premier Huu refrained from advocating ambitious reforms. The meeting settled a few

minor matters and decided certain procedural questions; the French did agree to

UN membership for the Associated States. Again a major inter-state conference

ended without satisfying the demands of Indochinese nationalism. 22

The political position of the anticommunist elements in Vietnam improved very

little during 1951. Americans in the legation at Saigon observed a few hopeful

developments such as the growth of the National Army, a revival of export trade

and commerce, and the beginnings of a conscious Vietnamese administration. But

the essential objective of attracting wide popular support for the government was

not achieved. Given a breathing spell by de Lattre's military prowess, the French

sank into old colonial routines instead of building a strong Vietnamese government

recognized and respected by loyal citizens.

On the other side, the Viet Minh in 1951 took the final steps in achieving an

orthodox communist organization. At two congresses in February and March the

Lao Dong (Workers) Party was formed and the Viet Minh League consolidated into

the Lien Viet (National United) Front. These actions tightened communist control

of the Viet Minh movement, and their hard core, the Lao Dong, was officially recognized as the dominant force. The Lao Dong now exercised direct authority over the

civilian population in the Viet Minh occupied areas. There was a purge of government officials at all levels; those who remained in power were solidly communist

and supporters of the Soviet bloc of nations.23

Toward the end of the year the Viet Minh began to suffer severely. A food shortage arose when French successes interfered with communist rice collection by

tightening defenses around the rice producing areas and stiffening peasant resistance against Viet Minh demands. This resistance also led to a serious financial

.75
JCS and the First Indochina War, 194 7-1954

deficit, owing to the difficulty of collecting taxes. In addition, the Viet Minh had to

combat corruption and inefficiency in its own ranks. Combined with the losses suffered in combat, these factors partially offset the advantages obtained from tighter

communist control of the rebel movement.24

Singapore Conference

T he first important international military conference that concerned Indochina

in this period was held at Singapore. With the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, Secretary Acheson, during the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meetings in

September 1950, had made an agreement with the British and French that military

commanders of the three nations in the Far East should meet to discuss the

defense of Southeast Asia. The meeting took place in May, but only after the Joint

Chiefs of Staff objections to holding it had been overridden. At the time the Joint

Chiefs had agreed to United States participation in discussions, the Korean conflict

had been going well for the United Nations forces. The Chinese intervention placed

such heavy demands on American fighting strength that the JCS could visualize no

means of assisting Indochina other than increasing the flow of supplies in the event

of an emergency; there was little that could be accomplished by a conference. Any

matters that might require consultation with the French in Indochina could be handled through General Brink, who had already conferred with Generals Juin and

Carpentier. Furthermore, the JCS regarded the Chinese intervention as having so

changed the general strategic situation in the Far East that new basic decisions at

the political level were required. Until such decisions were made there would be

little value in holding the tripartite military discussions.

The Joint Chiefs advanced these arguments when they recommended to Secretary of Defense Marshall early in January that no military conference on Indochina

be held in the near future.25 But an agreement had been made, the French insisted

that the meeting be held, and the State Department exerted pressure on the Department of Defense to carry out the obligation. Political considerations were overriding, and on 9 February Secretary Marshall directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to proceed with the arrangements. The JCS complied but resolved to limit the scope of

the discussions and not permit them to deal with "matters of strategy affecting

United States global policies and plans." Instead of sending the Commander in

Chief, Far East, who was preoccupied with the Korean operations, the Joint Chiefs

directed the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), to designate an officer from

his command to take part in the conference as the United States representative.

This officer was to be assisted by General Brink. 26

After some delay in working out meeting arrangements and an agenda, General de Lattre, General John Harding, Commander of British Forces in the Far

East, and Vice Admiral A. D. Struble, USN, met in Singapore on 15 May. Before

76
The De Lattre Episode, 1951

the conference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had made plain to the British and French

their view that the discussions should be confined to studying the situation in

Southeast Asia and that the conclusions reached by the participants would in no

way commit their respective governments.2 7

Although the talks were concerned with the defense of all Southeast Asia, there

was general agreement that Indochina presented the most critical problem and that

the defense of Tonkin was the key to the security of the entire area. The delegates

recommended continuing the accelerated delivery of material aid and periodic meetings between military representatives of the three powers to discuss the Indochinese

logistical situation. They also proposed increasing the exchange of intelligence information between the commanders in the Far East using existing channels, and conferences at regular intervals between the chiefs of the British and French military intelligence staffs in Singapore and Saigon, with participation by American intelligence

officers. Such meetings would help alleviate the difficulties that all experienced in

securing adequate information about Communist Chinese armed forces and lines of

communication and about arms smuggling to communist guerrilla forces.

The delegates considered an invasion of Indochina by the Chinese Communists, and their report included a French estimate of the reinforcements required to

defend Tonkin against them. They finished their work by making recommendations on certain logistical questions in Indochina, on control of contraband, and on

control of shipping in Southeast Asian waters in the event the communists began

operations on the high seas.28

The recommendations contained in the report of the Singapore Conference were

not immediately put into effect; they were subjects for negotiations between the

three governments for the rest of the year. For the most part the British and French

were anxious to have them carried out. The Joint Chiefs were averse to American

participation in further tripartite military conversations on the defense of Indochina,

including the conferences on intelligence and logistics problems recommended in

the report. They feared that the British and French might try to erect a new Combined Chiefs of Staff organization or an overall three-power command for Southeast

Asia. They wished to keep their hands free so that a new global war might not find

them encumbered by established combined commands (other than NATO). But disagreements between the three governments over the recommendations of the Singapore Report, as well as changing circumstances, would oblige the Joint Chiefs of

Staff to participate in another three-power military conference in January 1952.

The Pleven Visit

W hile the Joint Chiefs of Staff were arguing against the Singapore Conference,

two meetings were held in Washington between American officials and

important figures in the French Government. The first, and the more important,

77
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

took place on 29-30 January when Prime Minister Rene Pleven visited the United

States for talks with President Truman. The President and M. Pleven agreed that,

while it was necessary to resist aggression in the Far East, nevertheless, "The U.S.

and France should not over-commit themselves militarily in the Far East and thereby endanger the situation in Europe." They also agreed that the "interested

nations" should maintain continuous contact on the problems of the area, but

when M. Pleven proposed the establishment of a British, French, United States

consultative body to coordinate Far Eastern policies the President declined,

expressing preference for existing mechanisms.

With reference to Indochina, the Prime Minister assured President Truman that

France would continue to resist communist aggression. Truman promised to expedite deliveries of increased quantities of material under the aid program. But the

French wanted more. For the National Armies, they said 58 billion francs (approximately $166 million) would be required, of which the combined budgets of France

and Vietnam could supply only 33 billion (approximately $97 million). They formally requested the United States to furnish additional aid of $70 million to make up

the deficit. President Truman "held out no hope" for the provision of such assistance. As Secretary Acheson informed the National Security Council, "We cannot

become directly involved in local budgetary deficits of other countries." The Secretary of State did initiate detailed studies in the hope of devising "some other

method to assure that necessary funds for the development of the National armies

be forthcoming."29

During the conversations the French also asked for an aircraft carrier for service in Indochina. The CVL Langley had recently been transferred to France for use

in Mediterranean waters and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unwilling to provide

another at this time. Secretary of Defense Marshall, however, informed M. Pleven

that the conditions imposed on the employment of the Langley would be lifted to

permit its operation in Indochinese waters if the French chose.30 The carrier, which

was being refitted in the United States, joined French naval forces in July, enabling

the French to keep at least one carrier constantly in service in Indochina.

The threat of a Communist Chinese invasion of Tonkin, which colored every

assessment of the Indochinese situation, was also discussed by the President and

the Prime Minister. In accordance with JCS advice, the French were informed that

in the event an invasion forced the French to retire from Tonkin, the United States

would not commit any ground troops but would, if possible, assist in the evacuation of French forces.31 The Chiefs had been working on this problem for some

weeks. On 26 December 1950 General Juin had written to Secretary Marshall saying that if the Communist Chinese came in, the French would have to pull out of

Indochina. A National Intelligence Estimate published a few days later contained

the opinion that even a relatively small force of Chinese, combined with the Viet

Minh, would be able to drive the French from the delta in a short time.32 In mid-January, the Joint Chiefs directed CINCPAC to prepare plans to give United States

78
The De Lattre Episode, 1951

naval and air support in case the French requested aid in evacuating their forces

from Tonkin under communist pressure. These preparations were not to be disclosed to the French but, after the Truman-Plevan discussion of the subject, General Bradley recommended to Secretary Marshall that CINCPAC be permitted to

coordinate his plan with General de Lattre. On 28 March the Joint Chiefs of Staff

authorized CINCPAC to consult with the French Commander.n

Other subjects, such as the European situation, were discussed by the President and the Prime Minister, but the most important result of the conversations

was a better understanding of the other's attitude toward Indochina. President Truman hewed to the line of established American policy. Pleven planted in the minds

of American officials the idea that France would require direct budgetary support

to carry out the plans for the National Army of Vietnam.

Two months after the Prime Minister's visit the President of France, Vincent

Auriol, arrived in Washington, bringing with him the Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman. Once again Indochina was a subject for discussion, but there was no change

in the American position. The conferences with Auriol and Schuman added nothing

to the results of the Pleven visit.

The Visit of General de Lattre

O f more significance for the development of United States policy toward

Indochina was the visit of General de Lattre in September, but it was in the

preparations made by the JCS for his visit that its greatest importance lay. In considering the position they would take in discussion with the French Commander,

the Chiefs concluded that current policy needed revision. On 14 September they

recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the National Security Council make

a review.3

An advance in JCS thinking was implicit in the position paper adopted for the

talks. One of the items in their paper read: "It would be in the United States security interests to take military action short of the actual employment of ground forces

in Indochina to prevent the fall of that country to Communism." This statement

was a modification of the policy that no United States armed forces would be committed in Indochina other than air and naval forces required to aid in a French

evacuation of Tonkin. It was followed by another important paragraph:

If the Chinese Communist Government intervened in Indochina overtly,

appropriate action by U.S./U.N. forces might include the following:

(1) A blockade of the China coast by air and naval forces with concurrent

military action against selected targets held by Communist China, all without

commitment of United States ground forces in China or Indochina; and

(2) Eventually the possible participation of Chinese Nationalist forces in

the action.35

79
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

The ideas in this paragraph were not new. For months the Joint Chiefs had

considered them in connection with the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.

Since July, however, the opening of armistice negotiation in Korea had given the

concepts increasing importance, for the conclusion of an armistice would release

strong communist forces that might be directed against Indochina. Taken together,

the paper provided a basis for a review of United States Indochina policy, and the

ideas behind it were eventually included in the National Security Council's study

that superseded NSC 64 nine months later.

The conversations between de Lattre and Defense Department officials were

for the most part about the aid program for Indochina. A good deal of time was

spent in explaining the limitations, such as those imposed by congressional appropriations, under which the MDAP operated. Procedures for administering the program were agreed upon. General de Lattre had brought with him a list of items

badly needed in Indochina: trucks, combat vehicles, signal equipment, and automatic weapons. General Collins promised delivery by 1 January, provided shipping

was available, of all of the ground force items on the list except 2,700 radios, only

one-fourth of which could be provided. The United States Government, General

Collins assured de Lattre, would do all it could for Indochina and would attempt to

make deliveries as early as possible.36

General de Lattre put forth the thesis that the conflicts in Korea and Indochina

were actually one war and should be fought as such. The implications of his theory

were that there should be a single command for both and a single logistical organization under which requirements of the Indochina war would have equal priority

with those of Korea. He was unable to convince American officials or the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, who told the Secretary of Defense (since 17 September, Robert A.

Lovett) that while they recognized the two wars as "but two manifestations of the

same ideological conflict between the USSR and the Western World.... It would be

wholly unacceptable ... to attempt, under existing circumstances, to integrate the

forces of the Western World engaged in the two wars .... 37

De Lattre's visit had other effects; he succeeded in dramatizing for the American

people the issues of the Indochinese war. He painted a rosy picture proclaiming that

the Associated States were indeed independent, that France had abandoned all rights

and privileges but was retaining the risks and burdens of the war, that the governments of the Associated States were gaining in popular support, and that popular

elections would be held as soon as the military situation permitted. Nevertheless, his

statements were not unwelcome to the United States Government, since they helped

to justify, in the public mind, government support for the French and Indochinese.

The controlled Indochinese press extolled the general's trip to Washington as a

tremendous victory for French policy. The legation reported:

De Lattre was also credited with being successful in his presentation in

the United States of the "one war (Korea and Indochina) in the Far East"

80
The De Lattre Episode, 1951

theme, press accounts made it appear that his visit had resulted in a vast

increase and acceleration of shipments of arms and materiel for Indochina....

De Lattre also issued a rather flamboyant open letter to Bao Dai in which

he claimed to have radically changed American thinking about Indochina, with

the implication that all aid programs would now be very greatly stepped up.38

The French statements were greatly exaggerated; no basic change in American

policy, or in the aid program, had occurred. Some adjustments in the administration of the MDAP relative to Indochina had been made, and delivery of certain critical items was speeded up. General de Lattre departed from Washington in an

atmosphere of mutual respect and understanding, and there was considerable disappointment in the American capital at the news of his death in January.

Inter-Allied Military Conferences

O ne of the few recommendations of the Singapore Conference realized in 1951

was the institution of tripartite intelligence conferences in Southeast Asia. In

the first of these conferences United States officers participated as "observers." At

the end of August the Joint Chiefs of Staff had informed the British and French

Chiefs of Staff by memorandum that they were willing "to direct U.S. intelligence

officer participation in joint meetings with the French and British Armed Forces

Intelligence Staffs in Saigon and Singapore on a regular basis .... " The British made

arrangements for an initial conference in October, to which the French agreed. At

first the JCS declined to take part in this meeting, considering it premature, but

since the British felt committed to meet with the French, they consented. As they

regarded certain items in the proposed agenda as beyond the competence of such a

conference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCPAC to designate a representative to attend only as an observer. They did not want this representative to subscribe to or aid in preparing "agreed estimates" that might bind them in the future.39

The conference met in Saigon on 9-10 November. American armed services

attaches stationed in the various Southeast Asian capitals and an officer of the Far

East Air Force attended, along with the official representative of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Captain E. T. Layton, USN, designated by CINCPAC. Both British and French

were disappointed that the Americans were not there as full participants. But

Admiral Radford, in forwarding the report of the conference to the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, remarked that "as observers the U.S. delegation met the objectives of the

conference, i.e., 'the further exchange of information,"' and recommended that the

observer status be continued for future meetings.

The information revealed at the Saigon Conference was not startling to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. A member of the French delegation presented an estimate of

the situation but gave no data on French plans of operations. His conclusions were

81
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

interesting because of their moderate optimism, in contrast to recent estimates of

General de Lattre, who had been publicly predicting an end to the war in as few as

fifteen months if China did not interfere. The French delegation expected no "spectacular change in the situation, but only slow suffocation of the moral and armed

strengths of the Viet Minh." The conference was on the whole successful, and "some

sound and valuable information" was exchanged. It made the delegates aware of

each other's problems and procedural shortcomings that could be remedied in

future meetings. 40

In late autumn it was becoming apparent that the Biitish and French Governments were not satisfied with United States interpretations of the results of the Singapore Conference. The disagreement rested on a basic conflict. The British and

French wanted an overall strategy for the defense of Southeast Asia closely coordinated between the three powers by some sort of tripartite organization. They wanted to have the United States more deeply committed to the defense of the area than

American policies would allow. The United States held that cooperation should be

achieved through existing mechanisms and strove to avoid any commitment in

Southeast Asia that might limit its military flexibility in the event of a global war.

Early in November the British Government surfaced the issue in an aide-memoire addressing the Chinese threat in Southeast Asia. The British position was that

2. That part of the Singapore Report dealing with operational aspects

made it clear that in the event of Chinese invasion of South East Asia considerable reinforcements would be required for successful resistance and that these

could only come from outside the area. The provision of such reinforcements

involves priorities that could only be settled in the light of an agreed tripartite

policy for the defence of South East Asia and the relation of that defence to

global strategy.

3. His Majesty's Government believes that a meeting of the United Kingdom, United States and French Chiefs of Staff to formulate such a policy and

to make recommendations to the three Governments would be desirable.

They consider that the forthcoming Meeting of the N.A.T.O. Military Committee in Rome affords a convenient opportunity for such a meeting. .... 41

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted nothing to do with the suggested meeting. "In

effect," they wrote the Secretary of Defense, "this proposal by the British reopens

the entire question of the establishment of a single military organization for the

strategic direction of the armed forces of the Western World in a global war." They

would not agree to the formation of such an authority "even by implication" at this

time. Not only would it superimpose another structure over the NATO command

organization but it would also be premature, it would be labeled warmongering,

and, since the USSR did not seem intent on global war at this time, it was unnecessary. Furthermore, the alignment of the Western nations and their contributions

in a future conflict was not rigidly fixed and could not be forecast with sufficient

accuracy to justify an immediate decision on a future command organization. The

82
The De Lattre Episode, 1951

JCS declined the invitation, but added that they would not object to conversations

restricted to economic and political matters affecting Southeast Asia.42

At the end of November, when General Bradley attended the NATO meeting in

Rome, the British and French strongly urged him to agree to tripartite discussion

between the Chiefs of Staff on the Singapore Report. They proposed to hold a conference in Washington early in January. Despite his protest that the JCS thought a

meeting unnecessary, they asked him to have the matter reconsidered when he

returned to the United States.43 This he did, and on 28 December the Joint Chiefs

changed their minds, assented to a conference with the provision that the discussions would involve no commitment on their part. They issued invitations for a

meeting in Washington; the meeting was in, session when the news of General de

Lattre's death arrived on 11 January.4

By the end of 1951 other agencies of the American Government had joined the

Joint Chiefs of Staff in calling for a review of United States policy toward Indochina.45 Almost half a year was to pass, however, before the President and the National Security Council formally approved a new policy. Nevertheless, the ideas that

prompted the Joint Chiefs to urge a revision appeared in JCS actions and planning

even before the new National Security Council decision was made and affected

their participation in the Washington Conference.

Progress of Aid to Indochina

D uring the first four months of 1951 MDAP aid flowed to Indochina at a constant rate, averaging over 10,000 long tons per month exclusive of aircraft and

vessels delivered under their own power. In May, however, shipments fell off

sharply and the average monthly tonnage unloaded at Saigon from July through

September was only 4,147 long tons. The lowest point was reached in October,

when only 1,772 long tons of MDAP cargo were received in Indochina.46

In May the French and Vietnamese began to express considerable anxiety over

the delay of expected shipments for the National Army. A seven months delay in its

activation schedule was attributed to this cause by the Vietnamese government.

From Saigon the United States legation reported:

... In assessing the matter at the end of the month [May] it was determined

that out of 34 planned battalions-of which 27 already exist-only eight battalions had been fully equipped and three partially equipped, whereas 16 battalions have been activated with only equipment supplied from French reserve.

The fmal 7 battalions, which are to be activated by February, apparently have

little prospect of obtaining army equipment from the FY 1951 program. In the

Legation's opinion this is a serious situation since ultimate solution of the

entire Indochinese problem is strongly dependent on accelerating the development of an adequate Vietnamese national army.47

83
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

French concern about the slow arrival of MDAP equipment culminated in General

de Lattre's complaints to American officials during his visit in September.

Their dissatisfaction had a reasonable basis. MDAP shipments had been lagging behind schedule, and not only those slated for Indochina but those programmed for other nations as well. In October Secretary Lovett listed for President

Truman the reasons why deliveries had been sluggish during the preceding eight

months. "One important factor," he wrote, "has been the indefinite extent and

nature of the total program which the Defense Department was to undertake when

related to the amount of funds that would be available for its implementation." In

addition, there was a shortage of machine tools, "spot shortages" of some critical

materials, strikes in important industries, some shortage of production capacity

and of skilled personnel, and a lack of experience in producing newly developed

items of equipment.4

" Efforts were being made to correct this situation with the

result that equipment shortages in Indochina were considerably lessened in 1952.

The French admitted, among themselves, that in 1952, owing to United States aid,

"the supply situation became virtually sound and the services could ... claim to

function normally."4 9 Yet the French continued to complain about deficiencies in

the aid program.

The extraordinary measures taken by the Defense Department to speed deliveries after the de Lattre visit caused the shipments to Indochina to increase greatly.

In November 25,200 measurement tons of cargo were shipped and during December 30,050 measurement tons. This tempo was maintained generally throughout the

following year.5

"

The magnitude of the United States contribution is indicated by the MDAP Status Report for December, which contained a resume of the shipments of items listed as critical by General de Lattre in September. As of 31 December, of 4,500 general purpose vehicles requested, 2,977 trucks and 854 trailers had been shipped or

were in port awaiting shipment; of 300 combat vehicles, 40 had left port and 205

were at port awaiting shipment; 600 radio sets had been shipped; and of 8,900

machine guns, 4,172 had been shipped and 4,743 were in port awaiting shipment. A

total of 30 LCMs, 36 LCVPs, 26 Coast Guard Patrol Craft, and 1 LST had left the

United States for Indochina. In January 1952 FECOM stocks were levied upon for

622 additional trucks; by the end of the month the bulk of the items on General de

Lattre's list had been shipped.5

"

As of the end of 1951, since the beginning of the MDAP program for Indochina,

260,045 measurement tons of supplies, valued at $163.6 million, had been shipped.

A total of $320.1 million had been programmed, and this figure was to rise in January 1952 to $460 million. 52

By mid-1951 the economic aid (ECA) program administered by the United

States STEM in Saigon was making itself felt in support of the military effort.

Funds were provided for road construction and improvement (over $3 million); for

the purchase of earthmoving equipment and asphalt for the improvement of

84
The De Lattre Episode, 1951

airstrips; and for the procurement of medical supplies, marine engines and ferries,

tin plate used in canning army rations, and many other items directly or indirectly

aiding the armed services. In addition, STEM was taking care of civilian needs,

such as housing and medical facilities, important to civilian, and to army, morale.

In fighting disease and social unrest the ECA program was contributing to the battle against communism in the Associated States.5 3

The year had begun auspiciously for Franco-American relations in Indochina.

MDAP materiel had furnished the substance for General de Lattre's defensive victories and the High Commissioner had proven grateful. But as the ECA program

developed there was a resurgence of French suspicion and jealousy of Americans

in Indochina. Noting the reappearance of French distrust, the legation in Saigon

attributed it to an upsurge of old colonial phobias, to the professional jealousy of

military men, to fear of losing prestige, and to exaggerated fears that American participation in the military effort might stimulate Communist Chinese retaliation. 54

While these feelings were directed much less toward MDAP and MAAG than

toward STEM, they limited the freedom of action afforded General Brink's group.

There was no question, however, of a return to the antagonistic attitude toward

MAAG of the pre-de Lattre days.

The chief target of French suspicions was STEM since this agency dealt directly with the governments of the Associated States and not through the French. Also,

the publicity given STEM's work had resulted in a growth of American prestige in

Indochina. An event symptomatic of the French state of mind occurred in June,

when a United States-Vietnamese Economic Assistance Agreement was scheduled

for signing. The French interposed some rather artificial objections at the last

minute delaying completion of the agreement until September. When an American

news story ascribed the delay to the French, General de Lattre responded with a

"rather irritated" press release.55 During his visit to Washington, the High Commissioner indicated he had not been happy, early in 1951, about "a number of young

men with a 'missionary zeal' [who] were dispensing economic aid with the result

that there was a feeling on the part of some that they were using this aid to extend

American influence." He added, however, that his relations with the economic mission had since become much better.56 But French suspicion persisted.

As the year ended another disquieting note was introduced into Franco-American relations as they concerned MDAP in Indochina. In its report for December the

legation in Saigon informed the State Department:

As the difficulties of the military situation here increased [as a result of

the Hoa Binh offensive], the Legation has noted the disturbing tendency of

both the French high officials and medium-level bureaucrats to misrepresent

the volume and timing of American military aid deliveries. The theme has been

"too little and too late." Mr. MASSOT and M. DUPONT, who are members of

Parliament and shortly to visit Viet Nam, have made statements in the French

Assembly to this effect. The Minister for the AS, M. LETOURNEAU, is himself

85
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

responsible for the statement that by the end of the year only 43 shiploads of

war material had been delivered to IC amounting to some 70,000 tons and valued at somewhere about 60 million francs. Actually, some 93 ships had

offloaded in the ports of IC with a total tonnage approximately 90,000 tons

with a value many times that cited by the French.

Appropriate steps were taken at MAAG conferences with the French General Staff to induce these officers, who very well know the actual amount of

deliveries, to correct misstatements and prevent further publication of tendentious and erroneous articles.57

The implications of this report were made explicit in the report for the following month:

there was an intensification of the trend noticed last month for the French to

exculpate themselves in advance of a deteriorating military situation by criticizing the amount and timeliness of American aid.58

There was no justification for the misrepresentations described in the legation

reports. These pronouncements affected the atmosphere in which the assistance

program was conducted.Despite the vastly increased rate of MDAP deliveries in

the last two months of 1951, the aid program for the year was not entirely successful. During a considerable part of the period the flow of materiel was behind schedule. Although the history of the Indochina war indicates that the delay in activation

of some National Army battalions did not affect the final outcome, those battalions

might have done more in 1952 and 1953 had they received the lost months of training. On the whole, however, the United States had done fairly well and it must be

remembered that in 1951 the men fighting in Korea had first call on American

equipment. The "limited war" was also a limiting war.

Aside from the impact on morale of de Lattre's death, the situation in Indochina seemed to have changed little. There was a tradition in the French armed forces

of giving great emphasis to morale. Had de Lattre lived some of the operations of

the French Union Forces in Indochina would have been carried out with more

drive and might have had a better chance of success. But the failure of the National

Army to take form was but one more symptom of the underlying weakness of the

French position. Undoubtedly American aid had made a difference. But unless the

French could find more troops, or invigorate the Vietnamese and win over the

peasants, it was difficult to see how they could end the war.

86

A4 d

-e 0 a)

0

46 0

I
6

The Truman Administration's

Struggle, 1952

A conference of the Chiefs of Staff of France, the United Kingdom, and the

United States convened at Washington on 11 January 1952, the day of de Lattre's

death in France. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had hoped to avoid the meeting, but the

issue of how to deal with the Chinese communist threat to Indochina was clearly

stated. The Americans were reluctant to use their forces in defending the ground

anywhere in Southeast Asia. The JCS could not foresee that truce talks in Korea

would not produce a cease-fire for another year and a half; they were concerned

that the fighting might move to Indochina. Then in February 1952 the NATO meeting at Lisbon, Portugal, committed the allies to the buildup in Europe, to include

arming the West Germans. Neither the French nor the Americans could envision

sending more men to fight in Indochina.

American policy turned to deterring the Chinese from intervening in the Indochina war; if deterrence failed, the Joint Chiefs favored action directly against Communist China. NSC 124/2, adopted in June 1952, authorized planning for such operations. The British and French feared provoking the Communists and consensus

proved impossible. But even without overt Chinese intervention, the prospects for

French success in Indochina seemed slim. Neither the military nor the political situation was much improved, and the French public was showing signs of losing faith in

the war. However, American aid had eased the war's burden on France's economy.

The Military Situation in Indochina

T ime was on the side of the communists. But the Viet Minh forces were not

growing so fast that they would soon be able to crush the French. French and

89
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Vietnamese regular troops outnumbered the Viet Minh regulars. They had superior

equipment and were supported by air and naval forces to which the rebels could

offer little active opposition. In addition, they held well-fortified positions that

could not be easily overrun. But in France the people and the government were

becoming weary of a war that seemed without end. If the war could not be won

quickly in Indochina, it might be lost in France.

De Lattre's successor was General Raoul Salan. Conservative, and defensiveminded, Salan conducted the war with a "barbed-wire strategy" reminiscent of the

First World War. His concept of operations seems to have been to fortify strong

points and wait for the enemy to attack them in the hope of inflicting many more

casualties on the attackers than his own forces suffered. In 1952, he had enough

success to keep his strategy from being discredited. But the Viet Minh usually held

the initiative.

Unlike General de Lattre, General Salan was not the High Commissioner. The

duties of that office were given to Jean Letourneau, who as Minister Resident also

retained his position in the French Cabinet as Minister for the Associated States.

The French Government returned to the system that had worked so poorly prior to

1951, dividing responsibility in Indochina between a civil administrator and a military commander.'

The new French Commander entered under distressing circumstances. He had

to contend with a decline in morale following the death of de Lattre, whom many

had regarded as the one man who could bring the war to a successful end. Salan

had to give up Hoa Binh and acknowledge failure of the one strategically offensive

operation undertaken by the French since the autumn of 1950. In addition, he had

to fight in the shadow of what the French were convinced was a growing threat of

Chinese Communist intervention. According to a US intelligence estimate of

August 1952, "The French [were] apprehensive that substantial French victories

would bring about such intervention, with which the French, because of their limited capabilities, would be unable to cope."2

Viet Minh attacks against the French position at Hoa Binh had been accompanied by extensive infiltration of the Tonkin Delta area. In February, when the

French evacuated Hoa Binh, this infiltration grew to serious proportions and occasioned the heaviest fighting since 1950. The French employed mobile units against

the Viet Minh forces within the delta perimeter and by July had restored the area to

a relatively calm condition. Reportedly, they had crippled one Viet Minh division

and inflicted severe losses on other units.3

During the late summer the French undertook two limited operations south of

the delta against an isolated enemy regiment that produced a large number of Viet

Minh casualties but did not annihilate the regiment. In the meantime Ho Chi Minh's

main forces reportedly were being reorganized and put through a course of training, including combined maneuvers, in preparation for the fall campaign. 4

90
The Truman Administration's Struggle, 1952

When dry weather appeared at the end of September, General Salan was in a

position to attack, and possibly to defeat, the Viet Minh regular forces. He had a

substantial numerical superiority (about 26,000). He could dispose of superior

equipment, firepower, mobility, and air support. He could operate on interior lines,

backed by the fortifications of the delta perimeter. He knew, in general, the

strength and disposition of his enemy. But he did not take the initiative.

Early in October the communist forces began attacking French outposts in the

Tai country west and north of the delta. The area was of secondary importance,

and the French believed that these attacks were diversions to draw friendly forces

outside the perimeter. Between 10 and 15 October, however, concerted attacks

drove in the outposts of the fortified position at Nghia Lo, which fell to the Viet

Minh on 18 October. The French Command decided to fortify a strong position in

the path of the enemy advance and await attack. It concentrated its forces at Na

San and flew in reinforcements from the delta. After fighting a delaying action

along the Black River, the French completed their concentration on 20 November.

Meanwhile, opportunity knocked for the second time on the French door. On

29 October, General Salan had launched a column from the delta northwest along

the east side of the Red River. This force cut across the Viet Minh lines of communication, destroying about five hundred tons of supplies. But once astride the

enemy lines of communication, the French column withdrew, burdened by a long

supply line under constant harassment.

The attack on Na San began on 24 November and ended nine days later when

the Viet Minh withdrew, having suffered severe casualties (over 1,500 counted

dead). From the French point of view this was a successful battle. But the CINCPAC staff concluded that the battle had contributed little toward ending the war

and that the defense-minded French Command had thrown away a chance to fight

a decisive battle under favorable circumstances. 5 Except for the region around Na

San, the Viet Minh remained in possession of the territory that was- a psychological

and political victory for the communists.

The autumn campaign in Tonkin convinced many American officials that

unless some fairly drastic change was made in the French conduct of the war there

would be a prolonged period of stalemate in Indochina during which the

French-Vietnamese situation might well deteriorate. Two solutions were put forward. The first was to persuade the French to adopt and carry out an aggressive

plan of campaign aimed at a decisive defeat of Viet Minh forces. The second was to

persuade them to give their commanders sufficient forces, preferably by raising the

number of Vietnamese regular units, so that Salan might be enticed to strike a massive blow at the enemy. During the following year both solutions were tried.

By the end of 1952, the military outlook in Indochina was dreary, and the political scene was no brighter. The government of Bao Dai had little more popular support than it had enjoyed in January and had few prospects for gaining support. Its

appeal was not strengthened by the appointment in April of Letourneau as Minister

91
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Resident; Letourneau regarded the independence of Viet Nam as already complete

and opposed any major revision of the 8 March Accords.6

On 2 June, in an effort to obtain a government with a broader base of popular

and regional representation, the cabinet of Tran Van Huu was replaced by one under

Nguyen Van Tarn. Unfortunately, Tam was a French citizen and an ardent French

supporter, more closely identified with French policies than Huu. The new Premier's

many promises were received with skepticism. He installed the Provisional National

Council, ostensibly a representative assembly, but he handpicked the members. The

council played no important role in Vietnamese affairs and never gained popular

support. Tam did neither the Bao Dai government nor the French any good.7

The state of affairs in Vietnam is illustrated by the April MDAP report from Saigon.

Vietnamese Deputy Minister of Defense declared that Government has

decided not to call up the fourth increment of conscripts in order that funds

and present cadres could be used in accelerating the formation of two additional regular VN divisions to make a total of six by the end of 1952. He added

that the draft is in any case not a primary source of manpower for the Army in

view of the fact that there are sufficient volunteers and enlistees to create a

regular army of any size required, provided sufficient funds and material are

provided. He referred significantly to the uselessness of training conscripts

only to have them defect to, or be kidnapped by, the Viet Minh.... 8

In the opinion of the Vietnamese government the national mobilization had not

succeeded.

The situation in Indochina did not seem hopeless to the American Government, but the word "stalemate" appeared more frequently in reports from Saigon,

in intelligence estimates, and in conversations among United States officials. American planners sought to prevent the entry of Communist China, and to strengthen

friendly forces so that the stalemate could be broken.

Development of American Policy toward Indochina

T his period witnessed the development of four important trends in the Indochinese war as it affected United States policy. First, Washington together with

Paris and Saigon became a center of political and military strategic planning for the

war. The vital military aid program was determined in the US capital and numerous

consultations between American, British, and French officials were held there.

Second, the United States was drawn into closer cooperation with the British and

French on the problems of the area. Fearing that this might lead to a combined

command or to increased American responsibility in the Indochinese conflict, the

JCS protested with little success. Third, the threat of Communist Chinese intervention began to dwarf other factors in the Southeast Asian picture; the French

92
The Truman Administration's Struggle, 1952

seemed obsessed with this danger. Finally, French resolve began to crack under

the triple burden of the Indochinese war, European rearmament, and the chronic

instability of its government. By no means ignored in United States planning, rapid

progress of this trend was not generally foreseen.

These trends were operating on United States policy as the tripartite Chiefs of

Staff conference met in Washington on 11 January. The Joint Chiefs of Staff went

into it ready to discuss implementing the recommendations of the Singapore Report

and to exchange views with the British and French on ways to fight the extension of

communism in Southeast Asia. However, the problem that received the most attention was deterring Chinese Communist aggression, particularly in Indochina.

General Juin, the spokesman for the French delegation, assured the conferees

that the French could hold their present positions in Vietnam against the Viet Minh;

he was, however, alarmed about the possibility of a Communist Chinese invasion

of Tonkin. He was joined by the British, who feared for Burma and Malaya should

Tonkin fall. Despite intelligence reports about extensive construction and repair

work on Chinese lines of communication leading into Indochina, the Joint Intelligence Committee had advised the JCS that such an invasion did not seem imminent.9 The Joint Chiefs, however, felt that the possibility justified consideration of

deterrent measures.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff took the view that Chinese Communist aggression

was coordinated, and Indochina was linked to Korea. The United States Government had already been discussing with other participants in the Korean conflict a

statement, to be issued on the signing of a Korean armistice, warning Peiping that a

renewal of aggression in Korea would bring a United Nations reaction not necessarily confined to the peninsula. When the idea of issuing a similar warning against

aggression in Southeast Asia was broached, the JCS agreed with the British and

French to recommend this measure to their governments.10

The conference then considered what to do if such a warning was issued and

then ignored by the Chinese Communists. Use of atomic bombs was mentioned,

and the Joint Chiefs raised the possibilities of naval blockade of the China coast

and employment of Chinese Nationalist forces. The delegates turned the problem

of determining the form of retaliation over to an ad hoc committee representing

the three powers, plus Australia, and New Zealand, who since September 1951 had

been allied with the United States in the Tripartite Security Pact (ANZUS). The ad

hoc committee was to:

a. Determine the collective capabilities of the nations represented on the

committee that could be made available for retaliation;

b. Make recommendations for eventual transmission to Governments

through the respective Chiefs of Staff as to what specific military measures

might be taken as a collective effort against the Chinese Communists not only

in threatened areas but also directly against China."

93
JCS and the First Indochina War, 194 7-1954

General Juin was not satisfied; he wanted a commitment for air and naval support in the event the Chinese Communists should invade Tonkin before the warning

was issued. General Bradley replied that this was a government decision that the

United States had not yet made, altough it was evaluating the situation in Southeast

Asia. The Chiefs of Staff turned to implementing the report of the Singapore Conference. The agreements reached during the remainder of the discussions may be summarized briefly. The United States delegates to the Tripartite Intelligence Conferences on Southeast Asia would attend as participating members rather than as

observers. Further the United States would exchange information with the British

concerning shipping and contraband bound for the communists in Southeast Asia

and China. The United States refused, however, to participate in establishing a supply base for the French at Singapore or to alter the machinery of the MAAG. 12

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department realized that it would be

some time before the warning contemplated at the Washington Conference could

be issued. They had to wait for the ad hoc committee to complete its work, and

political decision would require lengthy government consideration. They did agree

that the earlier a warning was issued, the better.13

If, pending a political agreement, the United States Government was not free unilaterally to threaten retaliation, a less drastic warning could be given. Thus, on 28

January, Mr. John Sherman Cooper, United States delegate to the UN General Assembly, solemnly announced to the Assembly's Committee I (Political and Security):

At this time I must, on instructions of my Government, state clearly that

any... Communist aggression in Southeast Asia would, in the view of my Government, be a matter of direct and grave concern which would require the

most urgent and earnest consideration by the United Nations. 14

This statement did not commit the United States to an armed reaction against a

Chinese Communist attack in Indochina. It did imply that such an attack might

meet a United Nations effort similar to the defense of Korea.

On 5 February the United States representative on the ad hoc committee, Vice

Admiral A. C. Davis, submitted the report of the committee to the JCS. His analysis

of the report and of the discussions in the committee revealed more about the individual national positions than the report. The British and French had been unwilling to "meet the terms of reference," which required recommendations on retaliatory action against a Chinese Communist aggression by the governments of the five

powers. Instead, they decided that decisive retaliatory action should not be taken

and that military measures should be aimed at defending the area attacked. Both

the British and French opposed the blockade of the Chinese coast advocated by

the United States. Both had opposed bombing China except in direct support of

operations close to that part of the border over which the Communist Chinese

armies were attacking. Their opposition reflected their assumptions that blockade

and bombing would be impractical and ineffectual.

94
The Truman Administration's Struggle, 1952

The French position was based on a desire to prevent forces from being diverted outside Indochina; the French wanted all the aid and commitments they could

get to deal with their immediate problem in Tonkin. The British position indicated

an intention to avoid any measures that might unduly irritate Peiping or Moscow.

The British wished to defend Hong Kong and Indochina, but not to take any drastic

action against Communist China itself.15 In the report of the ad hoc committee the

British member said that blockade would ruin Hong Kong economically if it did not

lead to its fail, while there was little doubt that bombing China would cause retaliatory action against the colony. All delegates agreed to reject "the use of Chinese

Nationalist Forces in their present state of training and equipment... [as] inadvisable and unlikely to cause the Chinese Communists to desist from their aggressive

action." The use of atomic weapons was not mentioned; Admiral Davis had been

instructed by the JCS not to consider them.

Despite their knowledge of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's aversion to a combined

command for Southeast Asia, the British and French members inserted in the

report a plea for the joint implementation of agreed military measures. The United

States member registered his opposition. In his analysis Admiral'Davis remarked,

... the British and French are determined to persist in their desire to set up a

form of combined command in the Southeast Asia area. In the Ad Hoc Committee report this intention is toned down... but the original draft on this

point as proposed by the British, together with attendant discussion, indicates

that they think any direct support operations by us should come under the

French in Indochina and under the British in Hong Kong.... it seems to me

that... they would like not only to determine what we shall do with our own

forces in the event of our taking military action with respect to the Southeast

Asia problem, but also to command our forces while these limited actions are

being taken.16

In Admiral Davis' opinion the committee had accomplished little. He was convinced that the British and French had expressed themselves on the basis of firm

national positions, and that their governments would not support the views of the

United States. The time had come to "firm up some sort of Defense-State position

before engaging in further argument on the strictly military level."' The work of the

ad hoc committee had put the British, French, and American Chiefs of Staff no

nearer to agreement on the form of retaliation against Chinese Communist aggression; their basic differences would have to be resolved before the contemplated

warning could be issued. The JCS did not need to be reminded that the United

States required a new policy toward Southeast Asia as a basis for negotiations. The

subject of study by the NSC staff since late in 1951, such a policy was about to

emerge and the Joint Chiefs decided to wait for a decision on it before further military talks with the British and French on Southeast Asia.

The initial draft of the new policy toward Southeast Asia, NSC 124, was submitted by the NSC staff on 13 February. As it applied to Indochina, it was directed

95
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

more toward countering a possible invasion by the Chinese Communists than

toward helping the French and Vietnamese to win their struggle in Tonkin. The

measures recommended for use in the event of overt communist aggression were

tied either to the framework of the United Nations or to joint action with the

British and French."7

In their comments on the NSC draft the JCS pointed out that the British and

French had opposed the concept of military action against China other than in an

area of aggression. Without military measures directed against China the local

defense of Indochina would have, in the JCS' opinion, no reasonable chance of success. Unless the National Security Council could give assurance that at least the

British and French would agree to such measures, the new policy should provide for

unilateral action by the United States to save Southeast Asia; on this basis the Joint

Chiefs could make reasonable plans and determine their costs and requirements.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted a political decision by the National Security

Council on whether or not the United States Government, in order to save Southeast

Asia from communism, was willing to take military actions that would, in effect, constitute war against Communist China. If the answer was yes the Joint Chiefs could

estimate the costs of specific courses of action and the National Security Council

could make decisions concerning them. The JCS alerted the National Security Council to the fact that preparations for measures in Southeast Asia could be made only at

the expense of other programs, such as that for NATO, unless United States military

production was stepped up and "forces in being" were increased.18

Several months of discussion and negotiations between the Departments of

State and Defense and the NSC staff ensued. The National Security Council decided that the new statement of policy would give more attention to what the United

States should do for Indochina in the current situation. On 25 June President Truman approved a revision of NSC 124 that, as NSC 124/2, included the first comprehensive United States policy toward Indochina.

In NSC 124/2 the United States Government defined the primary threat to

Southeast Asia as deterioration of the situation in Indochina due to weakening of

the French and Associated States Governments resolve or capability to continue

opposing the Viet Minh rebellion. It recognized that defense of Tonkin was "critical" to the retention of Southeast Asia.

The administration's policy toward the whole of Southeast Asia envisioned

propaganda, economic assistance, and trade as the means of winning the support

of the peoples of the region. An allied warning to China against aggression in the

region would depend on agreement on a common course of action. The nations in

the region should be encouraged to join in their common defense; in Indochina,

the French should be encouraged to remain in the fight. The United States should

influence France and the Associated States with aid and encouragement while

promoting the economic, political, and military development of the Associated

States. The French should prepare for possible Chinese Communist intervention;

96
The Truman Administration's Struggle, 1952

if that happened, the allies should seek help from the United Nations and seek an

international response. The United States could provide air and naval support to

the French in opposing the Chinese, as well as interdicting lines of communication. British assistance would be sought as well. If the British and French agreed,

a blockade of China would begin together with hitting key Chinese targets (avoiding provoking the Soviet Union). If necessary, the United States would assist the

British in evacuating Hong Kong and the French in evacuating Indochina. If no

agreement could be reached, the NSC Council agreed that the United States

should consider unilateral action."1

With presidential approval of NSC 124/2 the Joint Chiefs had a firm policy for'

planning which included consideration of unilateral action against a Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. On 29 August, they directed CINCPAC to

make unilateral plans, which, in addition to preparing for unilateral action, would

develop a United States position in the event of an agreement for allied combined

planning. CINCPAC had been instructed to plan for a naval blockade of Communist

China, for supporting participation of Chinese Nationalist forces in hostilities, for

assisting in evacuation of the Tonkin Delta, and for military action against selected

targets held by Communist China. He was now instructed:

In order to be prepared to assist our Allies in war in defense of Indochina

and approaches thereto, prepare plan for Air and Naval action against Communist Forces and for action against Chi Communist communications lines and

facilities operating in support of Communist Forces.

He was to plan under three different conditions: first, that the Korean conflict

was continuing and no FECOM naval forces would be available; second, that conditions in Korea would permit him to have limited naval forces from FECOM; and

third, that there was an armistice in Korea and FECOM naval forces above minimum FECOM requirements could be used in Southeast Asia.20 The plans called for

in the instructions were capabilities plans, based on the forces available in the

Pacific and Far Eastern areas. CINCPAC requested authority to make plans based

on the requirements for the task. On 22 December the JCS instructed him to make

both capabilities and requirements plans.2

"

The Five-Power Military Conference on

Southeast Asia

A few days after the promulgation of NSC 124/2, United States representatives at

a Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference in London tentatively agreed to

another five-power military meeting on the problem of Communist Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia. Mindful that the Five-Power Ad Hoc Committee had failed

97
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

due to the lack of agreed political assumptions, the working committee drew up a

set of "provisional conclusions" which, if approved by the governments concerned,

would permit the military representatives to produce a useful report. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff found, however, that the "provisional conclusions" expressed chiefly

British and French opposition to action against China outside the area of aggression

and their desire for a combined command organization. Further, the conclusions did

not fit the provisions of NSC 124/2. The JCS therefore recommended a tripartite

conference of heads of state, or their representatives, and Chiefs of Staff, which

could settle political and military disagreements. As a prelude, the Joint Chiefs recommended a meeting of military representatives, but only after preliminary agreement had been reached on terms of reference conforming to NSC 124/2.22

Once again Joint Chiefs of Staff resistance to a military meeting without agreed

political guidance was overcome. At a Defense-State conference on 16 July, State

Department representatives argued that a five-power military representatives conference would serve as "a step toward bringing the other powers to an acceptance

of the United States concept of the solution to the problems incident to Southeast

Asia" and that the terms of reference proposed by the JCS could not be made

acceptable to the other four powers. The Joint Chiefs softened their position and

agreed to more general terms of reference that assumed that the five powers had

jointly decided to take action against Communist China in the event of further Chinese Communist aggression and that a joint warning had been issued to Peiping.

The conferees were to determine the collective military capabilities that might be

made available and to recommend feasible courses of action to force the Chinese

Communists to cease their aggression. 23

On 6 October, the military representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand met with the United States delegation, headed by Major

General J. S. Bradley, USA, in Washington. The conferees submitted a report whose

overall conclusions conformed generally to long-standing JCS positions. The representatives agreed that:

Air, ground and naval action limited only to the areas of aggression and

contiguous areas of China offers little prospect of causing Communist China to

cease its aggression.

The imposition of a total sea blockade, in conjunction with [such

action]... might have a significant cumulative effect. This course of action

offers little assurance of forcing the Chinese Communists to cease aggression.

A combination of all coercive measures including the defense of the areas

of aggression, interdiction of the lines of communication, a full sea blockade

and air attacks on all suitable targets of military significance in China, insofar

as they are within the Allied capabilities, plus such reinforcements in time and

scale as may be practicable in the immediate area, offers the best prospect of

causing Communist China to cease an aggression.24

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The Truman Administration's Struggle, 1952

Major General Bradley believed that these conclusions represented a step forward from positions established in the February ad hoc committee meetings, but it

was apparent that agreement had been forced by the terms of reference. When the

representatives had attempted to settle on the strategy against Communist China

that could be undertaken with the forces available the British and French had displayed the same interests, attitudes, and fears described by Admiral Davis in February. Australia and New Zealand adhered in general to the United Kingdom position. Without agreement at a high political level, or a decided change in United

States policy, further five-power military talks on Southeast Asia would serve no

useful purpose.25

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with Bradley's opinion that further five-power

military meetings were useless without agreed political guidance; they were

encouraged, however, by the conference report. They recommended amending

NSC 124/2 to provide for securing assent "under the auspices of the United Nations

or in conjunction with France and the United Kingdom and any other friendly government" for undertaking the "combination of all coercive actions" in the report to

stop Chinese Communist aggression and that the report be used to secure international agreement on those actions.

Tuning to another item in the conference report, the Joint Chiefs told Secretary Lovett that the French should be encouraged to increase and speed the development of native armies and supporting facilities in Indochina. The five-power military representatives had concluded that the forces in Tonkin could not halt a

massive Chinese attack. Under existing circumstances large-scale reinforcements

that could arrive in time to stop an invading army would have to come from United

States forces in the Pacific and Far East. Basing facilities for United States air and

ground forces were lacking in Indochina, and commitment of these forces in that

area would reduce capabilities for direct action against Communist China. The JCS

solution was to build up indigenous combat forces to meet the threat; the French

should be assisted and encouraged in carrying out this course of action.26

Like the Ad Hoc Committee Report, the Five-Power Conference Report

expressed British and French desire for a staff agency to coordinate the planning

of the five powers in Southeast Asia. It also contained the position of the United

States delegation that CINCPAC had sufficient staff to fulfill the United States obligation to cooperate in the area. The Joint Chiefs let the issue rest until French and

State Department pressure revived it.27

Early in December the French Government urged the United States participation in a liaison group drawn from the staffs of the British, French, and American

commanders in Southeast Asia. The French projected liaison, rather than planning

or operating, functions for the group. In passing the French proposal to the JCS,

the State Department expressed the view that "it would be advantageous to

increase the effectiveness of military liaison arrangements among the countries

which have military interests or commitments in Southeast Asia."2

" The Joint

99
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Chiefs agreed to the establishment of liaison machinery in Southeast Asia with

three conditions. First, it should permit participation "on an on-call and need to

know basis," not only by each of the five powers but by additional Southeast Asian

countries. Second, it should allow representatives of participating nations to communicate with representatives of one or more other nations in person or through

liaison officers. Coordination should be accomplished on a bilateral basis whenever possible. Finally, it should not establish a formal body; there would be no regular meetings or a permanent chair.29 On 27 February 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff

instructed CINCPAC to invite the principal local military commanders of the other

four powers to send representatives to a meeting to discuss liaison arrangements,

including coordinating national plans.30 The Five Power Military Representatives

Conference was held at Pearl Harbor in April.

The promulgation of NSC 124/2 was the most important development in United

States policy toward Indochina in 1952; pursuing that policy the United States Government would become more involved in the Southeast Asian struggle against communism. However, the United States kept responsibility for the war in the hands of

the French; it refused to be drawn into a combined military command in Southeast

Asia; and it sidestepped participation in a purely local defense of Indochina. American representatives backed the French position on Indochina in the United Nations

and in international conferences; and they assured the French Government of continued American support for France's war efforts. Furthermore, the Truman administration expanded the military aid program for Indochina and publicized its contribution to the war. When President Eisenhower entered the White House some of

America's prestige rested upon French and Vietnamese success in Tonkin.

One provision of NSC 124/2, the obligation to educate the American people

concerning the importance of Southeast Asia to United States security to prepare

them for the courses of action contemplated by the National Security Council, was

neglected during 1952. Government officials made statements on the subject; but

these occasions were few in number. Study of the New York Times and other news

media reveals no concerted effort to arouse public opinion. It may be that in an

election year, with the unpopular Korean conflict at issue, the administration

feared presenting the public with the prospect of another armed action. Nevertheless, the failure was important; a progress report on NSC 124/2, prepared in August

1953, noted no indication that public opinion would support a contribution to the

Indochina war other than the current aid program. United States military participation would not be acceptable to the public.3

'

Development of the Aid Program during 1952

T hroughoUt 1952 United States equipment passed in a steady stream over the

docks of Saigon and Haiphong. A monthly average of approximately 21,300

100
The Truman Administration's Struggle, 1952

measurement tons of end items were shipped, exclusive of aircraft and vessels delivered under their own power. The monetary value of this materiel was approximately

$171.1 million. These deliveries brought the total of end items shipped to Indochina

between June 1950 and 31 December 1952 to 539,847 measurement tons with a value

of $334.7 million. As of the end of 1952 the total value of MDAP material programmed under the budgets for Fiscal Years 1950-1953 had risen to $775.7 million.3 2

No breakdown of statistics on major items of equipment shipped during 1952 is available. By the end of June 1953, however, the United States had shipped to Indochina

under the MDAP 1,224 tanks and combat vehicles, 20,274 transport vehicles,. 120,792

small arms and machine guns, 2,847 artillery pieces, over 220 million rounds of small

arms ammunition, and more than 5 million rounds of artillery ammunition. Also, 302

naval vessels and 304 naval and Air Force aircraft had been delivered.u

In addition to the regular MDAP end item shipments, early in 1952 the United

States Government undertook a program for giving direct support to the French

military budget. In the autumn of 1951 the French announced that their financial

difficulties would entail a cut in dollar imports injuring their defense program and

heavy industry.3 4 The United States Government decided to support the French

budget with $200 million by letting contracts in France, chiefly for end items to be

used in Indochina; on 25 February 1952 a "memorandum of understanding" was

drawn up by French and United States officials at the Lisbon meeting of the NATO

Council. Under this program Indochina was to receive materiel worth $126 million,

the remaining $74 million to be used in France itself; this permitted the release for

Indochina of an equivalent sum from the French military budget, so that, in the

French view, the entire $200 million went for the support of the war.3

By 31 December 1952, $127.1 million worth of Lisbon-type aid had been programmed, and $47.1 million worth had been delivered. In July the United States

Government agreed to support the French Fiscal Year 1953 budget to the extent of

$525 million, over half of which was MDAP funds. It is not clear what part of this

sum was used for Indochina and what part for French requirements in Europe.3 6

In early March the French Government intimated that it was not satisfied with

the $200 million promised at Lisbon. Without additional aid, France would have to

cancel military production. In May, the Defense Minister submitted a list of heavy

items that he proposed the United States finance; the cost was estimated at $623

million. The United States Government was reluctant to expend so large a sum, but

did promise $186 million for the procurement of jet aircraft and ammunition.

According to the MDAP Status Report for July 1952:

The official reaction of the French to the U.S. position [was] extremely

unfavorable. President Auriol... expressed on two occasions to the U.S. Special Representative in Europe (Ambassador William H. Draper, Jr.) his personal

disappointment and said that the U.S. decision promised to create grave difficulties for France.... Mr. Pleven has stated that, as a result of the U.S. decision,

he may have no alternative but to resign.37

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

In June 1953 French officers in Indochina admitted that because of United States

aid the French taxpayer was carrying less of the burden of the war in 1953 than he

had in 1952.38

French complaints about lagging MDAP deliveries subsided after the first

few months of 1952; during a visit to Washington in June, Letourneau

expressed satisfaction with the program except in the categories of aircraft

and spare parts.39 Throughout the year these items were in short supply in

Indochina, and Air Force deliveries were behind schedule; ammunition, too,

was sometimes a problem.

With French complaints about shortages less strident, General Brink, and his

successor, Brigadier General T. J. H. Trapnell, USA, took up the chorus. As the

autumn fighting season approached, MAAG Indochina bombarded the Pentagon

with requests to speed overdue deliveries. On 9 August General Trapnell sent a

message to the Chief of Staff, Air Force, saying:

Successful accomplishment of French Air Force mission of air superiority,

interdiction, log opr of grd forces in Indochina is being threatened and jeopardized by lack of implementation of existing Air Force MDA programs. Generally, some C 47 maint Equip and sprares [sic] have not been dlvr under FT 50

program, 35% of line items of FY 51 consisting primarily of comm equip; acft

spares and acft maint equip, 30 of 70 acft programmed under FY 52 program

remain undlvr as well as the initial RG of acft spares.... The Army spt program

curr contains no shortage items of critical nature however the Air Force program contains all above listed item.4

"

As the year wore on such messages became more frequent, and CINCPAC

added his support for General Trapnell. On 27 September Secretary Lovett

approved a recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff placing combat requirements for Indochina alongside requirements for Korea in first priority for allocation of equipment. In late December, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William C.

Foster, admonished the Service Secretaries:

It has been brought to my attention, both as a result of my recent inspection trip to the Far East and by numerous communications from Department

of Defense representatives and others, that the MDA Program for Indochina

may not be receiving proper emphasis. Specific instances of lack of support

for this Program have generally been in the area of items to support maintenance activities, spare parts and depot equipment, and in the delivery of some

types of ammunition....

Because of the high priority assigned to the supply of materiel to Indochina, I consider that all requirements for this Program should be met on an

urgent basis and that no delay in the delivery of major items of equipment,

spare parts to support this equipment, and ammunition should be permitted by

any of the Military Departments.... 4

1

102
The Truman Administration's Struggle, 1952

General Trapnell reported that, as of 1 January 1953, Army and Navy deliveries

were generally in good order, but the Air Force MDAP stood as follows: 42

Program % Complete

FY 50 97

FY 51 67

FY 52 22

FY 53 0

The lag in deliveries was attributed in part to improper planning by the French and

the MAAG in Indochina, but a good share of the responsibility was the Military

Departments' for not emphasizing the program.43 French inefficiency contributed

to the constant shortage of spare parts. Poor organization, poor training, lack of

personnel, lack of an inspection system, no stock control system for spare parts,

and lack of an aggressive attitude in correcting malpractices hampered French

,maintenance activities. These factors raised the French usage of spare parts to

much-too-high a level according to American standards.44

During his June visit, Letourneau asked for immediate shipment of aircraft

already programmed and for additional aircraft, including transport, fighter, and

light bomber types. Air Force officers, however, believed that the greatest French

need was to improve the utilization rate of those aircraft they already had. The

French were using their C-47s only thirty-five hours per month, whereas the United States standard was one hundred hours monthly; French rates for fighters and

bombers were similarly low. The Air Force declined to furnish more than ten out of

sixty-nine B-26s requested by the French for Fiscal Year 1953. It refused to supply

ten additional C-47s until the French had justified them. It turned down a request

for a squadron of C-119s because Air Force officers thought the French were not

prepared to maintain them. Finally, a request for jet fighters was refused on the

grounds that the French Air Forces were unopposed in Indochinese skies. The

United States representatives did agree to maintain four French fighter squadrons

by replacing worn-out F-6Fs with F-8Fs and by providing attrition aircraft.45

But these decisions were not final, even for 1952. On 14 August General Trapnell cabled that the French High Command was planning offensive operations for

the fall campaign that required dropping three paratroop battalions in each operation. To carry out their plan, the French would require additional transport planes.

The Department of Defense decided that the French could use fifty additional

C-47s. These aircraft were in short supply in the United States, but a solution was

worked out in a conference among Army, Air Force, Department of State, and

Department of Defense officials. Nine C-47s were provided from France, twenty

were diverted from the MDAP allotment to Belgium, and twenty-one were lent by

the US Air Force for about four months on Memorandum Receipt. 46 When these

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

transfers were accomplished, the French were short of C-47s for crew training in

France; the Department of Defense lent them four additional planes.47

The planned offensive in Indochina was cancelled and the fifty C-47s provided airlift in support of the Na San defense. They were used so frequently that the

limited French ground crews were unable to maintain them. The French asked

that 150 US Air Force mechanics be sent to Indochina for one month to perform

fifty and one hundred hour checks on C-47s; both General Trapnell and Ambassador Heath backed the request. The United States sent a mobile maintenance

team of about twenty-eight men from the Far East Air Force (FEAF) to perform

direct maintenance on C-47s being used by the French forces. It told "all concerned" that it was only a temporary augmentation of the MAAG to train French

ground crews and ensure the early return of the C-47s on loan; the men were to

be withdrawn at the earliest possible date.48

United States participation in training of the Associated States armies was considered seriously for the first time. On 8 April the Service Secretaries recommended to Secretary Lovett a program "whereby an expanded MAAG would undertake

the training and equiping of a national army capable at least of preserving internal

security."49 An offer of assistance in training was made; but as Secretary of State

Acheson remarked:

the French, always skittish over what they might regard as undue American

interference, [did not take] up this offer. Certainly it is not up to the Americans

to press on the French assistance along these lines.50

Although the MDA Program left something to be desired, the United States, by

the end of 1952, had given the French in Indochina equipment for ground, naval,

and air forces far superior to that in the hands of the Viet Minh. Despite the hampering of air operations by shortages of planes and spare parts, the French forces

would probably not have done much better had those shortages not existed. Wedded to his barbed-wire entanglements, General Salan often used his air force as a

defensive arm. More French aircraft would have meant more Viet Minh casualties

at Na San and the Black River. But it is doubtful that the French could have broken

the communist forces in a defensive operation.

The French Home Front Begins to Crack

T hroughout 1952 France's allies were disturbed by hints of weakening in French

determination to carry on the war that appeared in expressions of public opinion, in parliamentary debates, and in statements by government officials. The

Frenchmen, including politicians who opposed the war, based their position chiefly

on four arguments. First, they pointed to the drain on the French treasury and the

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The Truman Administration's Struggle, 1952

effect on France's economic condition. Second, they held that France could not

afford the losses represented by the casualties in her armed forces (the French

claimed 90,000, excluding Vietnamese, between 1945 and 1 October 1952).51 Third,

maintaining the bulk of the French Army in Indochina delayed both the development

of French forces for NATO and the establishment of an adequate defense organization in Europe. Finally, after the conclusion of the European Defense Community

(EDC) Treaty in May, they argued that the prospect of German rearmament demanded the recall to France of the forces in Indochina; otherwise Germany would become

militarily strong while France remained weak in Europe. These arguments appealed

to opinion on the right and on the left, to conservatives who supported the war as

well as to socialists who had opposed it. Most of all, they appealed to the almost universal French fear of Germany.52

French socialists and communists had long urged negotiations with the Viet

Minh; public opinion had given them little support. By 1952, an important part of

the Radical Socialist Party favored a political agreement with Ho Chi Minh; this faction was led by a former cabinet minister, Pierre Mendes-France, who as early as

1950 had expressed his opposition to continuing the war.53 At the Radical Socialist

Congress in Bordeaux in October 1952, former Premier Edouard Daladier proclaimed that instead of wasting men and arms in Indochina, France should be

defending the French Union in North Africa, an area far more important for her

future.54 The defection of a large group of Radical Socialists from the ranks of

those who favored continuing the war was significant, for the Radical Socialists

had participated in the several center-right coalition governments that had carried

the burden of the struggle in Indochina. Their support was based in the middle

class, particularly in the intellectual professions, an important factor in French

public opinion. The growth of Mendes-France's following weakened the coalition

governments and indicated that France's will to fight was beginning to deteriorate.

Early in 1952 the British began to regard the French internal situation as serious in its possible effects on Southeast Asia. In March the British embassy in Washington sent an unofficial aide-memoire to the State Department calling attention to

recent statements of the Minister for the Associated States. Letourneau said, in

reply to a question whether or not the French were prepared to enter into discussions with the Viet Minh, that France could not on principle reject any opportunity

to end hostilities. He also indicated that France would not reinforce its troops in

Indochina. This had followed a statement by Foreign Minister Schuman that

France "would not refuse an accord which would put an end to the conflict under

conditions which would be honorable for France."'5 The British felt there was reason to believe that French representatives had been in contact with the Viet Minh

and might be seeking Russian mediation.

The United States Government was not alarmed. The Joint Intelligence Committee advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that while there was a possibility of an eventual

French withdrawal, the British estimate that it might be imminent was exaggerated.

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Reported French approaches to the communists could not be confirmed. Furthermore, the factors disturbing the British had been considered in the preparation of a

National Intelligence Estimate on 3 March in which United States intelligence

experts had concluded that the French effort in Indochina would continue through

mid-1952; this conclusion was extended through mid-1953 in another National Intelligence Estimate of 29 August.56

The United States continued to accept official assurances that France would

fight on in Indochina. As late as June 1953 a National Intelligence Estimate

expressed the belief that the French would maintain their current troop strength

(and by implication their position) in Indochina through mid-1954, albeit "without

enthusiasm."5 7 The French Union Forces were the bulwarks holding Southeast Asia

against the communists. The Republican Party had won an electoral victory in

November 1952, securing the Presidency for Dwight D. Eisenhower. The Presidentelect had promised to seek an end to the fighting in Korea. What changes he might

propose to American policy toward Indochina were not certain, but as allied commander in Europe at the beginning of the military buildup he had dealt with the

problems the war had posed for the French.

106
7

The Eisenhower Administration

and the Navarre Plan, 1953

The Eisenhower administration made little change in American policy toward

Indochina. The end of the war in Korea removed the main competitor for increased

aid funds for that area. At the same time, the new administration brought in new

faces. The Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, advocated exploiting American

atomic power as a deterrent to communist aggression. The Secretary of Defense,

Charles E. Wilson, reassessed the defense budget. The President also had the

opportunity to make new appointments to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Completed by

the end of the summer, this reorganization brought in Admiral Arthur W. Radford

as Chairman; General Matthew B. Ridgway as Chief of Staff, US Army; Admiral

Robert B. Carney as Chief of Naval Operations (succeeding Admiral William M.

Fechteler, who had succeeded Admiral Forrest P. Sherman on his death in 1951);

and General Nathan F Twining as Chief of Staff, USAF.

Despite American doubts, the meetings of President Dwight D. Eisenhower

with French Prime Minister Andre Mayer late in March produced a plan that came

close to justifying the large amounts of money the United States was being asked

to invest in it. Presented by the Minister for the Associated States, Jean

Letourneau, this plan called for a major expansion of the Vietnamese National

Army and a concept for its use to enable the French Union to achieve victory over

the Viet Minh. Mayer's government also decided to send a new commander, General Henri Navarre, to Indochina. The Letourneau-Navarre plan, known as the

Navarre Plan, embodied an aggressive effort to regain the initiative from the

enemy. When a new government, under Joseph Laniel, took office in June, it

appeared to be making France's last attempt to win the Indochina war.

For the United States the struggle for Southeast Asia appeared as a continuation of the fight against Communist Chinese aggression waged in Korea. With this

107
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

in mind Secretary Dulles had conveyed veiled warnings to the Chinese during the

truce talks. With the armistice at the end of July, the American leaders feared that

the enemy might shift efforts to Southeast Asia. Accordingly, the government

intended to give major financial support to the Letourneau-Navarre plan; it sought

to deter outside intervention and considered what to do should deterrence fail.

The Main Course of United States Policy

D edicated to a fresh and comprehensive approach to America's problems

abroad, the Eisenhower administration faced the fact that the aims of the

United States in Southeast Asia were not susceptible to fundamental revision.

Their reassessment highlighted the national interests and purposes set forth in the

NSC papers that awaited the incoming officials. Indochina must be defended

against Viet Minh domination. Unless the United States assumed the task, its leaders must continue to work with and through the French.

Premier Mayer came to office in January 1953 pledged to lessen the burdens of

France in Indochina by seeking greater help from the Atlantic allies. The French

were intent on wringing advantage from a resolution recently adopted by the North

Atlantic Council. On 17 December 1952 that body had recognized that French

resistance to aggression in Indochina made an essential contribution to the security of the free world and hence deserved "continuing support from the NATO governments." Arriving in Paris early in February, Secretary Dulles met a request for

greater assistance "in order that France may carry out the mission devolving upon

her in the common interests of the free world."' The Secretary of State had at hand

one telling and quite legitimate reply. The American people had just installed an

administration pledged to government economy; that administration had to deal

with a Congress even more disposed to reduce expenditures abroad. To win

authorization for additional American aid, French requests must be backed by

cogent justification and convincing performance in the field.

The French could claim little military progress in Indochina. The Viet Minh initiative in October 1952 had set the pattern; the French did little more than react to

each new attack. The C-47 aircraft, gathered to permit aggressive operations

involving a three-battalion drop, were fully employed in supplying isolated strong

points, particularly Na San.

While the French made much of the heavy losses their entrenched defenders

had inflicted on the enemy, April 1953 brought dramatic evidence that the Viet

Minh held the initiative. Enemy forces invaded Laos. Overrunning the two northeast provinces and surging to within ten miles of the royal Laotian capital, they

posed a threat to Thailand's border. By a major exertion the French command

established strong points at the Plaine des Jarres and elsewhere in the path of the

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The Eisenhower Administration and the Navarre Plan, 1953

invaders. Logistical difficulties and the approach of the rainy season forced the Viet

Minh to withdraw during May.

The military situation during the first part of 1953 underscored the need for

new measures. At the year's beginning officials in Washington and Saigon were

considering enlarging the forces in Indochina. Unalterable political conditions

denied an increase in the French manpower contribution; the troops would have to

be Vietnamese. On 24 February 1953, the Franco-Vietnamese Military High Committee approved placing forty thousand additional Vietnamese under arms. After

training and organization into light battalions, the new forces would free veteran

French and Vietnamese army units for an offensive role by replacing them in static

defense posts. American officials saw a further advantage in that every increase in

the Vietnamese forces deepened the identification of the native population with

resistance to the Viet Minh and hastened the time when the National Army might

take over the defense of its country.

Surveys conducted in Washington and by General Trapnell's MAAG organization in Saigon indicated that the United States could readily find MDAP resources

to provide arms, ammunition, and unit equipment for the additional battalions.2 The

Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the augmentation of the Vietnamese National Army,

but listed other necessary measures. Pentagon officials were on guard against any

French disposition to view the creation of more forces as the sole requirement for

winning the war. They emphasized that aggressive use of the new battalions must

be part of an integrated program using all military, political, economic, and psychological warfare resources. Trapnell warned that augmentation would be worth little

unless coupled with a revitalized French training system and a shift from defensive

to offensive attitudes among French military planners and commanders.3

United States material support for the Vietnamese Army augmentation project

began during March. 4 If the French took the steps that appeared necessary,

requests for additional aid were to be anticipated. American leaders were prepared

to consider such requests sympathetically, but insistence that the French present a

comprehensive plan for ending the Indochinese hostilities within an acceptable

time period had grown. French spokesmen would have their opportunity later in

March when Premier Mayer arrived in Washington. Secretary Dulles had pointedly

informed the French officials of the American attitude; continued stalemate in

Indochina was unacceptable. The situation required increased effort under a plan

envisioning liquidation of the regular enemy forces within something like twentyfour months. Stressing the legislative limitations on United States executive action,

the Secretary declared that administration spokesmen could forcefully present the

need for appropriations to Congress only if they were convinced that a sound

strategic plan for Indochina existed and would be energetically carried out.'

President Eisenhower was no less explicit during his first interview with Premier Mayer aboard the presidential yacht, USS Williamsburg, on 26 March. While

he paid tribute to the valiant French defenders and reiterated American recognition

109
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

that Indochina was of prime significance in the free world's resistance to aggressive

communism, the President demanded a plan. 6 Jean Letourneau, Minister in Charge

of Relations with the Associated States, sketched at least the military portion of the

French program. A rough cost estimate was submitted in writing; the Minister

offered only his oral presentation of the strategic outline.

The Letourneau Plan relidd on an expansion of the Vietnamese National Army

during 1954 and 1955 to add some eighty thousand to the forty thousand personnel

augmentation scheduled for the current year. This program would raise the Vietnamese ground forces to at least 250,000 in 1955. Operations would unfold in three

successive steps. While the recruits were being trained, regular French and native

forces would pacify the regions outside the Tonkin Delta, working generally from

south to north. Later the newly formed light battalions would begin occupying the

cleared areas, releasing regular units for assembly as a striking force in the delta.

The last stage of the plan would see a powerful French Union army engaging and

destroying the Viet Minh battle corps, compressed by the previous operations into

northern Tonkin. This final drive might culminate in the spring of 1955.

The accompanying cost data displayed important gaps, but Letourneau's figures indicated that American aid was expected in providing equipment for the

expanding Vietnamese armies. In addition, for 1954 and 1955 the fiscal account

contained expenditures totalling more than $500 million not covered by the French

or Associated States budgets. While the French did not request that the United

States assume these deficits, their intentions were clear.7

At his final session with Premier Mayer on 28 March the President did not

mask American disappointment with the Letourneau Plan, particularly the slowness of its timetable. But Mr. Eisenhower emphasized that the United States

remained eager to help and would give the plan thorough study. Premier Mayer

suggested that consultations between military technicians would be helpful, particularly in establishing more precisely material requirements. He invited a United

States military mission to Saigon for this purpose.8

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to accept the Letourneau Plan as the

best that could be hoped for. While they termed it "workable," the Joint Chiefs considered the plan deficient in aggressive spirit. The effort to clear rear areas before

concentrating for decisive blows against the main Viet Minh forces and supply lines

in the north seemed like trying to mop up the water without turning off the faucet.

Early pressure against communications with Red China would be more useful than

chasing guerrillas into the hills in central Annam. Further, French reliance on operations by units of battalion-size precluded the concentration of power that American military authorities wished to see. Finally, the Letourneau Plan did not match

the expansion of the Vietnamese Army with an equal emphasis on training native

military leaders and the prompt transfer of responsibility to their hands.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded, however, that the enlistment of larger

Vietnamese forces was vital to any plan for a successful end to the Indochinese

110
The Eisenhower Administration and the Navarre Plan, 1953

hostilities; they found the troop augmentation phase of the program deserving of

United States material support. But the JCS demanded substantial improvement in

the French strategic plan. They recommended that political pressure be placed on

the French to obtain clearcut commitment to modernize training methods, to

expedite the transfer of responsibility to qualified native military leaders, and to

seize the initiative and execute the plan with vigor, organizing where possible on a

regimental and divisional basis and giving special attention to cutting the enemy

supply lines.9

Secretary Dulles and other United States authorities disregarded the particulars but followed the spirit of the JCS recommendations. During late April conversations in Paris, the Secretary of State reemphasized the difficulties the Eisenhower administration would face in making an effective appeal to the American

Congress on the basis of the Letourneau program. If the French offered a plan for

an additional effort in Indochina that Eisenhower's military advisors could

endorse, the prospect of gaining a sizeable appropriation would brighten. It was up

to the French. "You help us to help you" was the Secretary's charge. Meanwhile, in

view of critical requirements arising from the enemy invasion of Laos the United

States would immediately advance $60 million in aid from appropriations anticipated for Fiscal Year 1954.10

Soon a new Commander in Chief for Indochina, Lieutenant General Henri

Navarre, was appointed. The French pictured the relief of General Salan as a routine rotation, but it had a decidedly favorable import for the United States desire to

see the Letourneau Plan recast as a more aggressive concept. Navarre arrived in

Saigon during the latter half of May breathing a spirit of vigor and determination

reminiscent of Marshal de Lattre.

With this encouraging sign officials in Washington readied the United States

military mission to Indochina suggested by Premier Mayer in March. Heading the

mission was Lieutenant General John W. "Iron Mike" O'Daniel, USA, Commander in

Chief, United States Army, Pacific, named on the recommendation of CINCPAC,

Admiral Arthur W. Radford. General O'Daniel's task was more than gathering information. By "thorough discussion" the mission members were to influence Navarre

and his subordinates to revise the Letourneau Plan along more aggressive lines.

The result of its efforts would govern the mission's assessment of the adequacy of

French plans and the justification for further American aid.'"

Following intensive inspections, surveys, and discussions in Indochina from 2.0

June through 10 July 1953, the United States group repaired to Hawaii to write its

report. The prime result of the visit was the Navarre Plan that General O'Daniel

described as "a new aggressive concept for the conduct of operations in Indochina."12 The Navarre Plan called for an immediate shift to the offensive. For the

remainder of the rainy season it listed a series of local operations and increasing

guerrilla warfare. Next, General Navarre planned to anticipate and disrupt the Viet

Minh fall campaign by loosing an offensive in Tonkin as early as 15 September

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

'1953. During the remainder of the fighting season he intended to operate aggressively, emphasizing attacks on the flanks and rear of the enemy and drawing support by recovering units from areas not directly involved in the battle. The High

Command would also incorporate battalions into regiments and regiments into

divisions, creating new supporting units as needed. Further, General Navarre

pledged to develop the native armies and to transfer responsibility for the conduct

of operations to their leaders.

General O'Daniel hailed the new plan as a design that would accomplish the

decisive defeat of the Viet Minh by 1955. A still more favorable outlook would result

if General Navarre succeeded in his quest for additional French forces that now

found him in Paris. General Navarre's personal qualities and the air of confidence

and energy that appeared to surround the new high command had impressed General O'Daniel greatly. Agreements providing for additional United States intelligence

activity in Indochina, timely sharing of French operational plans with Trapnell's

MAAG organization, and a modest beginning at American participation in improvement of the French training system deepened the impression of cooperation and

receptiveness to advice. The mission chief noted that Navarre and other high officers had repeatedly invited him to return in a few months "to witness the progress

we will have made." O'Daniel recommended that he lead a follow-up mission.13

General Navarre and his plan inspired confidence and conviction in Paris. During his July visit he induced the home authorities to adopt his concept as official

policy. The Laniel government was committed to active pursuit of victory in'

Indochina; it backed this commitment with willingness to send out additional

forces from Metropolitan France, nine infantry battalions plus supporting units.

Everything depended on increased assistance from the United States. The

Laniel government could not face the political hazards of such a course without

very substantial American support of the French budget. When Premier Laniel first

broached the matter to Washington late in July he mentioned a figure in the neighborhood of $400 million. The sum reflected the heightened cost of the war owing to

the Navarre Plan and the fact that the French military budget must be reduced.

France would commit more men, but less money. Before objections could be

voiced the Premier sketched the unpalatable alternative. Unless the additional

funds were forthcoming, the only alternative was eventual French withdrawal from

Indochina with only the method and date unsettled.14

The United States faced a crucial decision, yet the statement of the problem

virtually dictated the answer. The Laniel government was the first in seven years

that seemed prepared to make the exertion necessary to bring victory in Indochina.

American officials concluded that the Laniel regime was almost certainly the last

French government from which a positive approach to the Indochinese conflict

could be expected. If Laniel's effort failed, mounting popular and parliamentary

sentiment favoring a negotiated peace would find expression in the policy of the

next cabinet. Any settlement negotiated under such conditions would spell the

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The Eisenhower Administration and the Navarre Plan, 1953

eventual loss of Indochina to communism and confront United States policymakers

with the decision of whether to intervene with force in Southeast Asia.15

Full support of the Laniel-Navarre program seemed the only course compatible

with the interests of the United States. The National Security Council on 6 August

1953 agreed to recommend such a policy, providing the Department of State, the

Foreign Operations Administration, and the Joint Chiefs affirmed that the French

program held promise of success and could be implemented effectively.16 Five days

later the JCS advised the Secretary of Defense that "if vigorously pursued militarily

in Indochina and supported politically in France" the Navarre Plan did offer sufficient promise of success to warrant American aid. But the record of French performance suggested caution in accepting declarations of intention at full value. The

Joint Chiefs urged that American material and financial support be conditioned on

French adherence to the plan and willingness to act upon US military advice.17

The new Joint Chiefs of Staff headed off Secretary Wilson's transmittal to the

State Department of the views of their predecessors. Reports from General Trapnell and the service attach6s in Saigon outlining the slow pace of Navarre Plan

implementation convinced the new military leaders that the qualified endorsement

given by the previous JCS had been too favorable. Their assessment of the plan's

promise of success would no longer allow them to say, "Accordingly, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff believe... that the necessary support should be provided ..... " The

word would have to be "Nevertheless."''8

General Trapnell expressed profound doubt that the French had the intention

or the capability of mounting a major offensive on 15 September. Most successful

of the well-publicized operations General Navarre had carried out so far had been

the two-battalion paratroop raid on the enemy supply center at Lang Son in July.

The MAAG Chief believed that this strike and operations in the Quan Tri and Phan

Thiet areas had improved morale and helped instill an aggressive spirit; the results

in terms of destroying enemy potential and wresting initiative from the Viet Minh

were negligible. All three attach6s concurred in the statement that the French

appeared to have no plans for a general fall offensive.19

These views were confirmed on 1 September when General Navarre submitted

a new timetable that did not support his previous vows to seize the initiative and

operate aggressively. If the enemy attacked in late September or early October, the

French and Associated States forces would counterattack. If no Viet Minh drive

developed, the French command would launch a diversionary operation. The general offensive against the enemy battle corps was now scheduled for October 1954.

It appeared that General Navarre intended to limit the 1953-1954 fighting season to

limited-objective offensives to keep the enemy off balance while waiting for

French reinforcements and the activation of newly trained Vietnamese units.20

The Joint Chiefs expressed concern over the modest progress and apparently

waning enthusiasm of the French command in meetings in September 1953. But

the Laniel-Navarre program offered the last chance of putting the Indochinese war

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

on the right track. It was hoped that the wholehearted support from the United

States would overcome Navarre's hesitation in carrying forward his plan.21

On 1 September the French Government submitted its formal statement of the

Indochina program and the request for the US assistance on which it depended.

The total figure now stood at $385 million. The National Security Council on 9 September recommended that the United States grant additional assistance to France

in an amount not exceeding $385 million. However, the French Government must

give assurances that it would put the Navarre Plan into effect promptly and pursue

it vigorously, without retreating from its NATO commitments. The French must

provide a record of aid expenditures and agree to take into account the advice of

American military authorities on campaign plans in Indochina. Assurance was

demanded that the French would press forward with their program for granting

entire independence to the three Associated States. The French must regard the

$385 million as the final dollar contribution during 1954 and must recognize the

right of the United States to end its aid if these understandings were not met.22

Presidential approval followed, and by 29 September a formal agreement incorporating these points had been worked out between French officials and the American Ambassador in Paris.23 In giving particular attention to accounting safeguards

surrounding the actual transfer of funds from one government to the other, the

agreement's terms reflected American determination not to become involved again

in anything resembling the Lisbon aid grant of 1952. Considerable congressional

criticism had followed that earlier venture, because in making an unconditional

lump sum contribution to the support of the French budget US officials had no

means of checking the money's final disposition. This time the US representatives

took pains to make clear they were agreeing to finance a specific action programthe Navarre Plan-up to an agreed dollar figure. Payment would proceed in installments reimbursing the French Treasury for certified expenditures as they

occurred. It took until early March 1954 to work out the detailed accounting procedures the United States required. 24

Before the Paris agreement was completed Washington officials began the

exacting series of surveys, adjustments, and negotiations needed to produce the

$385 million. Congress had adjourned; the job must be done by reassignment of

funds in hand. Fortunately a previous decision had set aside $100 million from the

current MDAP appropriation for a contingency. Large sums could be recovered by

screening of the foreign assistance program, relying on a liberal interpretation of

the President's authority to shift funds under the Mutual Security Act.25

Congressional leaders had to be told of the new commitments to France. Presidential acceptance of the NSC recommendations made an important change in the

foreign assistance program that had been presented to Congress during the recent

session; the program would generate large requests for appropriations during the

coming year. Consultation now might assure future support, and careful explanation might lessen discontent over the difference between congressional intent and

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The Eisenhower Administration and the Navarre Plan, 1953

the purposes for which some of the funds were being spent. A very large portion of

the present grant was earmarked for the payment and rationing of Vietnamese

troops; legislative leaders had insisted that aid dollars be spent primarily for "shot

and shell." Administration spokesmen would also explain that concern for proper

accounting of the funds led them to channel all the additional assistance for the

Indochinese forces through the French Government. Congressional opinion had

strongly favored awarding more aid directly to the three Associated States. 26

While preparations and adjustments continued in Washington, the October

reports of American observers in Indochina were mixed. Transfer of military

responsibility to Vietnamese authorities had received a serious setback. Having

taken over the occupation of the Bui Chu sector in the Tonkin Delta, light Vietnamese battalions experienced a severe defeat in September. Control was returned

to the French command, the morale of the new national army suffered, and recriminations over the affair left considerable bitterness between the French and Vietnamese. Also General Navarre disclaimed any agreement with General O'Daniel to

establish a small US intelligence team in Hanoi.27

In most other respects observers reported modest progress. Activation of Vietnamese units was ahead of schedule, and elements of the promised French reinforcement had begun to arrive, including one battalion transferred from Korea.

Unhampered by enemy activity at the start of the fighting season, General Navarre

launched Operation MOUETTE, an excursion in force southward from the delta in

the direction of Thanh Hoa. While General Trapnell discounted the French claim

that MOUETTE had inflicted serious loss on the enemy, he saw signs that an offensive attitude was gaining impetus at all levels of the French command. 28 Halting

and deficient in spots, the Navarre Plan was in operation in October 1953.

The JCS were closely involved in the months-long US endeavor to gain French

committment to an Indochina plan that held reasonable promise of success.

Besides making numerous detailed decisions regarding the aid program their

responsibility included planning for contingencies other than the successful conclusion to the war. Late in January 1953, the Joint Chiefs initiated a study of possible US military action to prevent the seizure of Indochina by communist forces if

the French withdrew.29

During early April 1953, the Five-Power Conference of military commanders

with responsibilities in Southeast Asia took place at Pearl Harbor. The conference

report recommended establishing a formal and continuous relationship among military representatives of the five nations to coordinate the plans for the defense of

Southeast Asia. With the approval of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the JCS,

late in May, authorized American participation and named Admiral Radford, Commander in Chief, Pacific, as the US Military Representative. 30 The new arrangement

added a further dimension to the planning responsibilities assigned to CINCPAC.

Completing the series of CINCPAC Operation Plans called for by the JCS directive

of the previous December, Radford gave close attention to developments in

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Indochina.3 1 Admiral Radford had told the JCS the Viet Minh invasion of Laos made

an immediate start on coordinated Southeast Asia planning imperative.3 2

Aware of Admiral Radford's grim estimates, the Chief of Naval Operations,

Admiral W. M. Fechteler, asked for a study of what action the United States could

take to prevent the spread of communist control over the area.u The study presented a catalogue of measures, ranged freely over possibilities, to include: US armed

intervention and listed measures to improve French capabilities in Indochina. The

latter included transferring at least two French divisions to Indochina, expediting

revision and aggressive implementation of present campaign plans, following US

suggestions for expanding and modernizing training, and improving the low rate of

aircraft utilization by assigning more French Air Force personnel to Indochina and

hiring civilian flight and maintenance crews. Further, the United States might insist

on direct participation in training and operational planning. The JCS paper suggested speeding and increasing the American aid program and a political announcement stressing US interest in Southeast Asia and indicating concern over communist moves in the area.3 4

Plans for US military action should the French withdraw were taken up by the

JCS a few weeks later.3 5 Believing that the Viet Minh were not capable of driving

the French out, the Joint Chiefs postulated two situations in which withdrawal

might take place. Intervention by the Communist Chinese might force an evacuation, or political deterioration in France could bring a government decision to

abandon the Indochina struggle. Several courses of action were identified. The

United States might deploy its own and available Allied forces to Indochina to take

over the French objective of "reducing Communist activity to the status of scattered guerrilla bands." Or the United States might employ enough ground forces to

hold critical strong points, while providing air and naval support for operations by

the Vietnamese National Army. In either case, development of the native forces

would continue under strong American tutelage; the second alternative relied on

the Vietnamese Army to destroy the Viet Minh. French withdrawal might not occur

until the expansion of native forces had reached an advanced stage. In that event,

the United States might forego the commitment of ground troops and provide air

and naval support, or logistic support, for the Vietnamese operations.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that if Red Chinese aggression drove the

French out there was no feasible course of military action that the United States

could take in Indochina to prevent communist forces from overrunning the country.

Furthermore, extension of full US and Allied counteraction to the portion of China

contiguous to the Tonkin border would not halt the aggression. To succeed, the

United States must apply all available coercive measures against the Chinese mainland, including naval blockade and air attack on all targets of military significance.36

Preventing the Far Eastern situation from reaching such a state was a prime

objective of American policy. The French and British were reluctant to subscribe to

a joint declaration advising Red China that further acts of aggression would lead to

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The Eisenhower Administration and the Navarre Plan, 1953

retaliation that might not observe geographic limitations. Secretary Dulles found

general warnings easier to arrange. Both the Franco-American communique at the

close of Premier Mayer's visit in March 1953 and the public declarations of the July

conference of British, French, and US Foreign Ministers cautioned the Chinese

Communists not to use a Korean armistice as an opportunity for adventure in

Asia.3 On 2 September at the American Legion Convention in St. Louis Secretary

Dulles delivered a pointed admonition. Repeating President Eisenhower's statement that "any armistice in Korea that merely released aggressive armies to attack

elsewhere would be a fraud," the Secretary turned to the risk that "as in Korea, Red

China might send its own army into Indochina."

The Chinese Communist regime should realize that such a second aggression

could not occur without grave consequences that might not be confined to

Indochina. I say this soberly in the interest of peace and in hope of preventing

another aggressor miscalculation. 38

Dulles gave the Chinese rulers an oblique view of American military strategy.

Where the Secretary suggested that retaliatory action might not be limited to

Indochina, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that such action could not be

so confined.

The French and Indochinese Political Scenes

n January 1953, the election of village councils in the pacified areas of Vietnam

.marked a first step toward the establishment of democratic institutions. Participation by eighty percent of the eligible voters indicated a high level of political

interest and a clear rejection of the communist call for an election boycott. But the

results showed no striking gain in popular support for the Vietnamese government

sponsored by the French.3 9

In Cambodia, King Norodom Sihanouk dissolved the National Assembly, arrested "obstructionist" delegates, and assumed personal direction of the government.

The monarch then plunged into a year-long course of unpredictable behavior

including explosive press conference statements in New York, a week of selfimposed exile in Thailand, and filing numerous demands and protests in Paris-all

designed to win Cambodia independence within the French Union equal to that of

India within the British Commonwealth. 40

The French continued halting progress toward meeting native demands for freedom and sovereignty. In February, the French command and Minister Letourneau

entered agreements with Bao Dai that provided for development of the Vietnamese

National Army in a status distinct from the French forces. 41 In May, the Mayer government gave pledges to the Cambodians aimed at the transfer of control of the

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

native army, relaxation of economic restrictions, and French acknowledgment of

the judicial integrity of the local courts. A few weeks earlier the Paris authorities

had revised French political representation in Indochina in a way that indicated

more regard for the dignity and separate autonomy of the three Associated States.42

Any positive reaction these moves may have gained was sacrificed when the

French decreed a devaluation of the Indochinese currency on 10 May 1953. Intended to end both the government scandals and the financial drain resulting from the

extensive traffic in piastres, devaluation was long overdue. But French officials set

the new rate of exchange with a few hours notice to local governments, disregarding pledges of prior consultation given in 1949. Monetary devaluation demonstrated how little sovereignty the French had accorded the Associated States. On 21

May the Mayer government fell; France entered a protracted cabinet crisis. 43

In June under Joseph Laniel, the French Government turned a new face toward

Indochina. Laniel declared that it was essential to end the malaise in the relations

between France and the Associated States. The new Premier began a wholesale

replacement of the colonial administrators who were symbols of French arrogance

and repression. His ouster of Letourneau ended the curious arrangement in which

the French Commissioner-General in Saigon was a member of the Paris cabinet as

Minister for Relations with the Associated States."

On 3 July 1953, the Laniel government invited the three Indochinese states to

enter new consultations to "perfect" their independence and their sovereignty.46

Native leaders approached with skepticism, but Foreign Minister Bidault told Secretary Dulles that the statements were in earnest. France was prepared to accept

virtually any terms the native states demanded, so long as Laos, Cambodia, and

Vietnam agreed to continued membership in the French Union. 46 For the Secretary

of State the 3 July declaration removed all basis for criticism of French policy.

Since that date, he told the United Nations, "the Communist-dominated armies in

Indochina have no shadow of a claim to be regarded as the champions of an independence movement."47 This turn in French policy, coupled with the support of

General Navarre evidenced by the decision to send nine battalions to Indochina,

convinced Washington that the Laniel government deserved additional American

aid. The sincerity of the French declaration was borne out during long and ultimately successful negotiations with the refractory Cambodians concerning the

transfer of control over fiscal matters and the police, army, and judiciary. A less difficult series of exchanges with Laotian representatives culminated in October in a

treaty of friendship and association that recognized Laos as "a fully independent

and sovereign state" while reaffirming its membership in the French Union.48

In Vietnam the announcement that Bao Dai and Premier Nguyen Van Tam were

departing for Paris to open negotiations with the French touched off an outburst of

nationalist agitation. Early in September an unofficial "Congress of National Unity

and Peace" demanded unconditional independence, domestic reforms, and the

immediate election of a National Assembly. Bao Dal countered by summoning his

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The Eisenhower Administration and the Navarre Plan, 1953

own National Congress, which he expected would endorse a more moderate set of

terms for the Vietnamese negotiators. When it met on 12 October, Bao Dai's convention demanded that France annul the 1949 agreements and grant complete independence. Swept on by nationalist ardor, the delegates passed a declaration that Vietnam

would not participate in the French Union. By nightfall Bao Dai's lieutenants had succeeded in restoring only enough control to induce the congress to add "in its present

form." The resolution that the final treaty with France must be ratified by a Vietnamese National Assembly elected by universal suffrage remained. 49

The Vietnamese resolutions aroused outrage in Paris. Even spokesmen of the

political factions that most actively supported the war demanded to know what

France was fighting for if not the preservation, in some form, of her empire overseas. If France was to be repaid in ingratitude and disdain by the people she sought

to defend, her sacrifices in Indochina must end.50 No disavowal issued by Bao Dai

or Premier Tam could entirely repair the damage done to French popular and parliamentary support for the war. Large areas of that support had given way under

war weariness. Sentiment for a negotiated settlement in Indochina had grown

steadily. By October 1953 an influential portion of the Radical Socialist Party had

concluded that a military solution was impossible without an unthinkably large

commitment of resources; political negotiations seemed the only way out.51

Pierre Mendes-France emerged as the leading spokesman for this faction

among the Radicals. Seeking the premiership during the five-week cabinet crisis in

mid-1953, he fell 13 votes short of the necessary 314. Of the 6 candidates who presented themselves to the National Assembly, only Mendes-France received the 105

ballots of the Socialists. But the Assembly was not ready to entrust the future of

the French Empire to his care. Besides the automatic opposition of the one hundred Communists and the negative votes of various factions on the right, MendesFrance encountered the massive abstentions of more than two hundred delegates

of the right and center parties.52

The following week Georges Bidault missed the premiership by only one vote.

He spoke for a large body of opinion in the Assembly when he said that the security of the Associated States must be assured "by victory if necessary, by negotiation

if possible." "The only thing we cannot envisage is a retreat which would be inconsistent with the respect due to our dead, with the support we owe to our allies, and

with the spirit of the achievements we have accomplished in Indochina in the

past."55 Later in June Premier Laniel came to office pledged to examine every possibility of ending the Indochinese war, including negotiation on any basis acceptable

to France's allies and the Associated States.M

The argument for settlement by negotiation was greatly strengthened when on

27 July the United Nations command completed the armistice agreement in Korea.

With pardonable exaggeration, Time reported that a great cry swelled across France:

"Finish la sale guerre by negotiation-like the clever Americans in Korea."55 Deputies

cited the Korean example during the October debates in which they expressed

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

bitterness over the Vietnamese Congress resolutions. Edouard Daladier favored a

simple declaration to the Viet Minh: "We offer you peace; will you accept it?" He

could see no dishonor in this course after seven years of war, considering that the

Americans had done the same thing in Korea after only three years of fighting.5 6

Premier Laniel emphasized that there was no basis for pessimism over the military prospect in Indochina and no reason to seek peace out of despair. Yet his government stood ready to undertake negotiations, with the Soviet Union, Red China,

or the Viet Minh, on any basis that did not abandon Vietnam's freedom. "It is true

that the war in Indochina is unpopular," said the Premier. "There is, however,

something which is still more unpopular in France-namely, to betray one's friends

and to fail in one's duty."57 On 28 October the Assembly endorsed a set of resolutions that instructed the government to seek negotiations and to encourage the

Associated States to take over a greater share of the military responsibility while

gaining their independence within the framework of the French Union. The resolutions called for a more equitable division of the burdens of the Indochinese war

among the free nations.58

A new attitude toward foreign assistance was apparent. American contributions

had been welcomed, as lifting burdens from the French taxpayer; now there was

fear that the acceptance of more aid committed France to continuing the war indefinitely. When the $385 million grant was announced late in September, Le Monde

reviewed the prospect in an article titled "Should We Take the Money?"59

At the same time the French continued to reject recourse to the United

Nations. During April 1953 Secretary Dulles had urged France to bring the Laotian

invasion before the UN Security Council, giving the Indochinese conflict an international standing that would make it more readily subject to negotiation and settlement between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union. Refusing to take the

action, French authorities were "emphatic almost to the point of hysteria" in

opposing a similar move by Thailand. They feared that United Nations debate

might extend to other aspects of French colonial administration, particularly in

North Africa. Pride in the French military tradition blocked internationalization of

the war on the Korean pattern that would transfer control of operations to a United

Nations command.60

As agreement on a Korean armistice drew near, Foreign Minister Bidault had

insisted that, the political conference following the truce must extend its attention

to Indochina. The Korean conference must be used as an opportunity for broader

discussions aimed at achieving a general Far Eastern settlement. If this UN sponsored conference could not consider a matter that France had refused to submit to

the United Nations, then the French would demand that settlement of the Indochinese war be discussed with the Communist Chinese representatives outside the

formal sessions. 6

'

Secretary Dulles responded to the French. If the atmosphere was favorable,

the conference, with a different slate of participants, might consider Indochina. In

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The Eisenhower Administration and the Navarre Plan, 1953

early September the Secretary declared that the United States wanted peace in

Indochina as well as in Korea.

... The political conference about to be held relates in the first instance to

Korea. But growing out of that conference could come, if Red China wants it,

an end of aggression and restoration of peace in Indochina. The United States

would welcome such a development.62

Returning to the question of negotiation two weeks after the October debates,

Premier Laniel announced "in the clearest and most categorical fashion" that the

French Government did not consider that Indochina required a military solution.

No more than the United States does France make war for the sake of war, and

if an honorable solution were in view, either on the local level or on the international level, France, I repeat, like the United States in Korea, would be

happy to welcome a diplomatic solution of the conflict."

American authorities hoped that emphasis of the perils of negotiating from

weakness registered with the French. If so, a vigorous implementation of the

Navarre Plan would strengthen the French bargaining position.

Main Features of the US Aid Program

D uring 1953 the United States increased deliveries of arms, ammunition, and

equipment to French and native forces in Indochina. Scheduled deliveries of

ground force and naval materials were made with increasing regularity, and the

persistent shortages of aircraft spare parts and maintenance equipment began to

decline. In January 1953 the French stated that no ground unit had failed to meet

its activation date because of lack of MDAP equipment. By that date, the US aid

program had transformed the French Air Force in Indochina from an assortment of

World War II German, French, and American aircraft into a reasonably standardized organization with modem propeller-driven planes.6 Congressional appropriations in 1953 allowed the assignment of $312.3 million for end-item assistance to

Indochina during Fiscal Year 1954, plus $30 million to be expended under the Military Support Program. In addition, Congress appropriated an unprecedented $400

million for direct financial assistance to France.65 Special requests and accelerated

procurements generated by the vicissitudes of war and the changing requirements

of French military planners in Indochina did demand unusual exertion and adjustment by American officials. One of these exercises during 1953 resulted from the

French request for an additional aircraft carrier.

During the March conversations in Washington, Minister Letourneau asked

whether a loan of US naval vessels could be arranged. Navy Department officials

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

agreed to explore the possibility.6 In May the French embassy requested loan of an

aircraft carrier of the same CVL type as the Lafayette (formerly the USS Langley)

and the Arromanches (formerly HMS Colossus) the French already possessed. The

supporting argument was persuasive; normally, the French committed one vessel

to the Indochinese operations and maintained the other in home waters, where it

provided training for replacement air units. During the current year the need to

send the Arromanches and the Lafayette to Toulon for overhaul would disrupt this

arrangement. Training, refitting, and combat operations could proceed without

interruption only if France received a third CVL by the last quarter of the year.6 7 A

hint that President Eisenhower was interested in the request smoothed its passage.

The JCS on 11 June endorsed the loan, and Secretary Wilson instructed the Navy

Department to seek enabling legislation from Congress. On 5 September the USS

Belleau Wood was formally transferred to French authorities at San Francisco.68

In retrospect, the carrier transfer appears unusual in two respects. First, the

loan was justified by recognizable need and by a demonstrated French capability to

man and maintain the carrier; second, the request did not involve aircraft. Far more

typical was the January interview of General Salan with the US Ambassador at

Saigon, Donald R. Heath. The French commander said it would be ideal to have

another squadron each of F-84s, B-26s, and C-47s, as well as more carrier-based

aircraft. At the moment, his only specific request was for extension of the loan of

the twenty-one C-47s the United States had provided in the fall of 1952. Delaying

the return of these planes to the US Far East Air Force by two months or so would

allow them to serve out the remaining good weather in Indochina. 69 American

authorities complied by extending the loan at least until 1 April 1953, and continued the temporary duty of the US Air Force personnel assigned in December 1952

as a mobile maintenance team to service the American-owned C-47s in Indochina. 7

°As the 1 April date approached, General Mark W. Clark, the US Far East Commander, reported that an urgent French requirement for C-47 aircraft would continue until mid-May; he recommended that only eight of the twenty-one planes be

returned to the Far East Air Force as scheduled, leaving thirteen C-47s on loan to

the French for another two months. 71 His recommendation was approved.

The Joint Chiefs did not accept Clark's suggestion that at least two C-119 aircraft be sent to Indochina. While a survey team reported that the condition of forward airstrips in Indochina would not permit C-119 aircraft to be employed in their

prime role as movers of tanks and other heavy equipment, the Far East Commander

saw important alternative uses for their lift capacity; he recommended that a full

complement of US personnel accompany the planes to provide aircrews and maintenance support. The JCS replied on 21 April that the policy of noninvolvement of

American personnel in combat operations in Indochina barred the venture.72

General Clark had made his recommendation in response to rising concern

over the Viet Minh invasion of Laos. Within a few days the Joint Chiefs received a

call from Admiral Radford; depicting the seriousness of the situation in the

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The Eisenhower Administration and the Navarre Plan, 1953

strongest terms, the French were in a dispersed defensive position, open to defeat

in detail and almost entirely dependent on air transportation for supplies. Admiral

Radford reported that General Salan now said that he could arrange for pay on a

contract basis if civilian pilots, crews, and mechanics could be recruited to operate

the C-119 aircraft he desired. Radford urged that at least six of the transports be

delivered immediately.7 3

Secretaries Dulles and Wilson were meeting with the French in Paris when the

Laos crisis arose to dominate the discussions. Premier Mayer asked for several

C-119 aircraft and suggested that US military personnel might operate them under

the cover of civilian dress and credentials; the Americans offered to qualify three

French crews by giving them fifteen days of training at US air bases in Germany. In

Indochina the French flight personnel would man three C-119s loaned from General Clark's command with American ground crews.74 Secretary Wilson authorized

this arrangement on 28 April; the JCS raised the number of C-119s to six. State,

Defense, and CIA officials sought civilian pilots and flight personnel in the Far East

who could operate the planes under contract with the French Government. 75

With NSC approval, orders went out on 1 May to train six French aircrews in

C-119 procedures. The Far East Air Force would loan six aircraft with spare parts

and maintenance crews to be flown initially by civilian contract pilots. French airmen from Europe would replace the civilian aircrews. Return of the thirteen C-47

aircraft on loan to the French was postponed.76

Between 6 May and 1 June 1953, the C-119s logged 517 combat flying hours,

made 176 sorties, and carried 883 tons, an estimated one-third of the supply support

given by the French Air Force to the northern operations during the period. American observers emphasized that the big planes had delivered nothing that could not

have been lifted more economically by C-47s, which required one-quarter the maintenance effort. The experience confirmed that the heavy C-119s should be operated

only from all-weather airstrips; their operations had brought on the collapse of the

runway at Gia Lam, putting Hanoi's main airport out of commission.77

The French desired to retain the six C-1 19 aircraft indefinitely. In early July the

O'Daniel mission convinced the French that the operations in Indochina did not justify the use of C-119s except in an emergency requiring the airdrop of heavy equipment. By agreement the six planes and their US maintenance crews were withdrawn to the Philippines, ready to return when a heavy drop became necessary.78

The arrival of replacement aircraft from rehabilitation centers in Europe allowed a

phasing out of the thirteen C-47s and their American ground crews. The last of the

C-47s left in mid-August 1953, after almost a year of service in Indochina.79

The Laos emergency provided evidence of tlhe French Air Force leaders unrealistic view of their capabilities. When French sources released publicity to the effect

that all would turn right if only the United States would deliver an armada of transport planes to the eagerly waiting French pilots in Indochina, General Trapnell sent

a long dispatch to his Washington superiors. The MAAG Chief had told French

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

authorities that their supply and maintenance facilities were inadequate to support

the aircraft they had.

The French Air Ministry had set a limit of 10,000 on the personnel assigned to

Indochina, a figure that included 2,500 guards and ordinary laborers. French technicians were to maintain the existing planes at an average monthly utilization rate

of approximately forty hours-less than half the USAF standard. A desperation

effort during the Laos emergency yielded a higher figure, but virtually abandoned

maintenance and overhaul at echelons above the tactical level. Local French officials acknowledged the critical shortage of skilled mechanics, deplored the arbitrary ceiling imposed by the home authorities, and then made an urgent request for

more aircraft.80

The Joint Chiefs told Secretary Wilson on 20 May that the shortage of airlift

capacity in Indochina was due to the inadequate manning of the French supply,

maintenance, and operating organizations that prevented maximum utilization of

the aircraft already on hand. The French had failed to correct the deficiency. The

JCS recommended that Wilson urge Secretary Dulles to stress to the French Government the need to remedy the situation. The State Department complied, but as

its instructions reached the Paris embassy the cabinet of Premier Mayer resigned

and France entered a five-week interregnum.8 '

There were French Air Force deficiencies that a major increase in personnel

would not cure. The French supply system suffered from faulty organization, poor

location of facilities, lack of periodic inspections, and the absence of modern stock

control records and procedures that would allow effective planning. The US Military Assistance Advisory Group did what it could to remedy these shortcomings; in

July fifty-five US Air Force specialists in supply, maintenance, armament, communications, and other logistic functions arrived. Assigned on temporary duty to

French units to the squadron level, they provided instruction in American procedures in subjects ranging from corrosion control to depot organization.8 2

In August General Trapnell reported that French Air Force officials saw a

solution to the French logistic support and maintenance difficulties. The French

proposed that the United States ship spare parts and other materials in such massive quantities that maldistribution in Indochina would pass unnoticed; used

equipment would simply be returned in exchange for new models. These proposals were rejected as too costly and because they contravened a basic purpose of

US aid, which was to assist recipients in developing the ability to sustain their

own military establishments.8 3 General Trapnell also relayed a request that twentyfive C-47 aircraft and auxiliary equipment be provided within the next thirty days

to permit the activation of a fourth transport squadron in Indochina. For logistical

support the local command planned to transfer 1,000 unskilled native troops to

the French Air Force, and it had the promise that 650 technicians would be sent

from Metropolitan France.

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The Eisenhower Administration and the Navarre Plan, 1953

The MAAG Chief did not support the French request, but he appreciated the

French desire to have sufficient aircraft to mount operations involving a simultaneous drop of three paratroop battalions. The poor billeting facilities, health hazards,

and other difficulties encountered by the US Air Force personnel assigned to service C-47s in Indochina led him to advise against long-term loans of planes and

maintenance crews.8

Washington authorities accepted expansion of the C-119 arrangement worked

out with the French Air Force; when the French planned an operation requiring

more airlift than their own forces could provide they could call on the MAAG for

assistance. On 72-hour notice from General Trapnell the Far East Air Force would

loan up to twenty-two C-1 19 aircraft for a period not to exceed five days for each

operation. The planes would be operated by French crews but maintained by

American ground personnel.85 By 1 October detailed arrangements were in place.

Twelve French aircrews stationed in Indochina were undergoing C-119 refresher

training. But before October had passed, the French wanted C-47s and more B-26

bombers. Trapnell nonconcurred because the shortage of technical personnel

resulted in substandard maintenance and low utilization rates for the types of aircraft requested; adding more planes would compound French logistical

difficulties.8 6 In November the arrangement for short-term loan of C-1 19 transports

was activated, a US officer on the scene commented that General Navarre would

"use any foul up as excuse to eliminate C-119 solution in lieu of additional

squadron of C-47s."87

During 1953 no real opportunity to influence the French training system presented itself. Early in the year a high-level committee recommended against direct

American participation in the Vietnamese training program. Noting that the French

would oppose any such suggestion, the committee stressed the language problem

that American instructors would encounter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the

same view to the Secretary of Defense in March, noting that an exchange of missions between Indochina and Korea should familiarize French officers with the

methods used by the United States in training Republic of Korea (ROK) forces.88

The results of the exchange were disappointing. French observers returned from

Korea with little but a list of reasons why US training procedures could not be effectively applied in Indochina. General Trapnell labeled these findings "completely fallacious" and asserted that French authorities had simply fabricated an argument "to

justify resistance to any change or modernization of 'traditional' French methods."89

Secretaries Dulles and Wilson reopened the subject during their visit to Paris

later in April. Getting the French to observe and adopt the instructional methods

successfully applied in Korea had been an objective of Mr. Dulles when he assumed

office. It did not come as a surprise that the initial French reaction had been negative, but the Secretary counseled French leaders not to undervalue the results that

could be achieved with proper effort. Secretary Wilson pointed to the new faith,

confidence, and unity that had flowered in the ROK Army when given training and

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

responsibility.9° The response was not encouraging; Minister Letourneau termed

the Korean visits "very useful," but asserted that Indochina and Korea posed different problems and conditions.

During July, the O'Daniel mission surveyed the French training system and

facilities; its lack of centralized control and uniform standards stood out. Many

training centers were operating far under capacity at a time when greatly expanded

instruction of Vietnamese recruits, officer candidates, and higher commanders was

needed. The Americans recommended reorganization to impose real command

supervision on the French training effort.

General Navarre agreed to follow the American MAAG concept and create a

similar French organization to oversee training of the native forces. Moreover, he

welcomed the assignment of three US officers to the agency; General O'Daniel

declared this provided an excellent opportunity for continued American influence

short of direct participation in the training program. While French officials continued to minimize the usefulness and applicability of American methods, he found a

growing interest among senior commanders in visiting the Korean training

centers."1 Like other features of the Indochinese military situation, training seemed

headed for improvement and expansion under the direction of General Navarre.

Conclusion

C ommitted to supporting Navarre's strategy, American officials and agencies

faced a period of decision and increased activity as the fall campaign opened

in 1953. More than one observer suggested that in Indochina the aid program needed greater flexibility than the legal and institutional structure of MDAP allowed to

meet the urgent and rapidly changing requirements of an active theater of war.92

The American aid program appeared in good order. By 31 October 1953 obligation of the funds provided for Fiscal Year 1954 had begun and just short of seventyfive percent of the material programmed under the MDAP budgets for Fiscal Years

1950-1953 had been shipped. The monetary value of all items delivered to Indochina

stood at $674 million; deliveries during the first ten months of 1953 had accounted

for nearly forty-four percent of the total.93 There were still occasional failures, such

as the deficiencies in Air Force procurement, but in many lines the French received

not only more material than they could effectively use but more than they could

properly store. 4 The contribution of military equipment as a means of encouraging

and supporting the French was being fully exploited. In September 1953 the foremost French request was not for more direct material aid but for $385 million in

cash. As the campaigning season in Indochina opened late in 1953, American planners anticipated that Navarre's operations would call for increased assistance.

126
Qf)

A-IN
8

Dien Bien Phu, Bermuda, and

Berlin, November 1953-

March 1954

General Navarre's decision to occupy Dien Bien Phu achieved surprise in

French and American circles as well as against the enemy. As one historian has

noted: "The precise reasons behind the French decision to occupy and hold Dien

Bien Phu remain obscure."' Whether Navarre's objective was merely to block the

invasion route to Laos or to lure the Viet Minh into a decisive battle, the miscalculation of Viet Minh firepower worsened the basic weakness of the French position.

.President Eisenhower was far from the only observer to question placing France's

best troops, the mobile reserve built up with such effort, so far from the decisive

area of the war. Indeed, NaVarre seems to have been unaware that a decision had

been made in Paris that peripheral areas such as the Laotian frontier were not to

be defended.2

In fact, Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap achieved a surprise of their own.

Rather than leave the powerful French striking force to sit in its remote position,

the Viet Minh chose to bring massive artillery to bear. Not only could the communists deploy their battteries on the heights above the French position but they were

also able to protect them from air attack with antiaircraft weapons. The result was

a spectacular victory that proved the decisive one of the war.3

Operation CASTOR, the seizure of the Dien Bien Phu position, was a new and

decisive phase of France's war in Indochina, but this was not entirely clear at the

time. With the French showing an interest in talks with the communist powers,

pressure was building for an international conference. Secretary Dulles tried to

postpone such talks, and the French needed to achieve some measurable success in

combat that would give the West a stronger negotiating position. American planners

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

had to give thought to what would happen if the French were unable to continue the

fight or if the Communist Chinese intervened directly. President Eisenhower met

with Laniel and Churchill in Bermuda during December to explore these issues as

well as the creation of a European army in which French strength would offset the

arming of the West Germans. Early in 1954 the allied foreign ministers met with the

Soviets to address such issues as a peace conference for Asia. Momentum was

building for a major public airing of the Indochina problem.

The O'Daniel Report and Dien Bien Phu

B y the end of 1953 the United States conditioned its aid to French Indochina on

three requirements: (1) perfection of the political and economic independence

of the Associated States, (2) adoption of a plan for dynamic military action, and (3)

expansion and training of indigenous armies. While the first was primarily a State

Department concern, the other two were of direct interest to the Department of

Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sent

General O'Daniel back to Indochina with a small joint mission. After a two-week

visit, O'Daniel submitted his report on 19 November 1953, the day before the first

French parachute units descended on Dien Bien Phu.

O'Daniel's report optimistically announced that "clear indications of real military progress by French Union Forces since our previous visit to Indochina [in

July] are evident." If General Navarre had not succeeded in wresting the initiative

from the Viet Minh, he had kept the enemy off balance and established a better

military situation than existed during the 1952-1953 campaign. The French command had recovered sufficient forces from static positions to establish a mobile

combat reserve in the Tonkin Delta and had activated native light infantry battalions as scheduled. But there were some dark spots. The French continued to be

over-cautious in the conduct of the war and less effective in using available

means; progress in training native units remained unsatisfactory. Insufficient

naval materiel and inadequate maintenance and logistic support for air units in

Indochina were other deficiencies.

General O'Daniel concluded that "we should fully support General Navarre,

in whose success we have such a large stake." However, O'Daniel's recommendations for American action to remedy French deficiencies were limited to measures acceptable to the French; they fell short of introducing large-scale American

influence in the planning of operations and in the training of Vietnamese forces.

Specifically, the general suggested the assignment of a small number of officers

to MAAG Indochina for liaison with French headquarters and for duty with the

French command training native armies. He also recommended continuing existing arrangements by which the United States provided C-119 support to the

French. Later, when the French command developed sufficient maintenance

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Dien Bien Phu, Bermuda, and Berlin November 1953-March 1954

capability, the United States might furnish C-47s on a permanent basis. Finally,

more naval craft could be put to good use.4

Not all were as sanguine as General O'Daniel about the Indochina situation.

Commenting on the mission's report, Admiral Felix Stump, USN, Commander in

Chief, Pacific, agreed that considerable military progress had been made, but he

pointed out additional flaws. Political and psychological factors remained intertwined with the purely military aspects of the problem. Not enough had been done

to turn these vital factors to the advantage of the West. CINCPAC thought it very

important that the highest levels of the French and United States Governments

reaffirm their intention of prosecuting the war to a satisfactory conclusion. Admiral Stump also stated that complete victory was unlikely until there were sufficient

native troops to garrison captured areas and until the Indochinese had been won

over by anticommunist psychological warfare. 5

The objective of Operation CASTOR was to set up a blocking position from

which to interdict supply routes when the Viet Minh made their next incursion

into Laos. The Dien Bien Phu basin in western Tonkin was in the region of Tai

tribespeople presumed friendly to the French. Selection of the actual site was dictated by the need for an airstrip. The Japanese had created a pierced-steel-planked

runway at Dien Bien Phu during their occupation. The requirements for air support received first consideration; other requirements for a well-defended position

were sacrificed.6

Dropping by parachute, the first waves of French troops easily overcame the

surprised Viet Minh garrison. Runway repair was delayed when a heavy bulldozer

crashed to the ground. Succeeding waves of troops had to drop rather than land.

Another bulldozer was located and dropped, and the French began organizing a

strong defensive fortress to be manned by twelve battalions.7

More active operations led the French High Command to increase its pressure for American material support. High on General Navarre's list were the

twenty-five additional C-47s. In October Major General Thomas J. H. Trapnell,

USA, Chief of the US Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina, had advised

against providing these planes until the French had demonstrated the capability

to support and use them efficiently. However, during the November visits of General O'Daniel and Vice President Richard M. Nixon, General Navarre renewed his

requests. Trapnell withdrew his objections when the American Ambassador

pointed out that the planes might provide just the psychological lift needed to

encourage French initiative. 8 The Vice President also saw the question as a political matter and carried it to President Eisenhower, who decided that political

advantages outweighted military objections. Secretary of State Dulles informed

Paris of the decision to provide twenty-five C-47s while Admiral Radford passed

the word to Lieutenant General Jean E. Valluy, French representative on the

NATO Standing Group.9

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

The Bermuda Conference

T he President and Mr. Dulles discussed Indochina with the French Premier and

Foreign Minister when the tripartite French-UK-US conference convened in

Tuckers Town, Bermuda, 4-8 December 1953. The principal topics on the agenda

were European security and the Soviet proposal for a four-power conference in

Berlin, but the Big Three did find time for one session on the Far East.

In preparation for the conference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Joint

Intelligence Committee to evaluate French reports indicating that Communist

China might support the Viet Minh with jet aircraft. The committee could not find

corroboration for French fears. It reported that although the Chinese were capable

of furnishing jet or conventional aircraft support for the Viet Minh, US intelligence

did not indicate an increase in this capability or an intent by the Chinese to intervene with jets in Indochina.'0

When the conference turned to Far Eastern matters, Premier Joseph Laniel

was indisposed; the French position was sketched by Foreign Minister Georges

Bidault. He briefed on the military situation, acknowledging American aid and

emphasizing French Union sacrifices. Although they were making every effort to

establish the Associated States as truly independent nations, the French were

handicapped by the lack of native leaders capable of governing the people. When

the French had asked Bao Dai whether the transfer of all authority with real independence was enough, this question "had brought him to the Riviera like Galatea to

the willow."

The most significant of Bidault's remarks dealt with the prospects for negotiations. France, he asserted, would not make peace except under conditions that

would respect the individual liberty of the Indochinese people. However, a fivepower conference, including China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States,

and the Soviet Union, called in a specific framework for a discussion of Southeast

Asian problems, might be acceptable to France, provided the Associated States

could be present. In reply Mr. Churchill praised the French efforts. President Eisenhower seconded his praise but added that the United States viewed a five-power

conference "with a jaundiced eye.""

A major accomplishment of the Bermuda talks was drafting a reply to the Soviet Union agreeing to a four-power foreign ministers meeting at Berlin in early January 1954. Noting a Soviet proposal that the foreign ministers should discuss a fivepower conference including Red China, the West agreed only that the participating

governments could state their views on this topic at Berlin.12 Bidault had made it

clear that France could not turn its back on an opportunity to negotiate a settlement of the Indochinese war.

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Dien Bien Phu, Bermuda, and Berlin November 1953-March 1954

Support for the Navarre Plan

T he Bermuda conversations did not resolve questions about the provision of

additional American aid to Indochina. The twenty-five planes approved for

transfer in late November represented a portion of total French needs. General

Navarre had to produce military success in very little time, and he saw the

prospect of success threatened by material shortages. He had gained the impression from highly placed American military and civilian visitors to Indochina that

the United States was determined to undertake an extensive effort in providing

material aid. Yet MAAG and stateside agencies were not providing the cornucopia

of resources General Navarre visualized.

In mid-December General Navarre dispatched a strong letter to MAAG contrasting promise and performance. Not only had MAAG screened French requests

but Washington agencies had further reduced agreed programs. The French Commander stated that the discrepancy between means in personnel and means in

material threatened to necessitate a complete reexamination of his 1954 operational plan. He wanted Washington to speed deliveries of material programmed in

earlier years and to inform him when he could expect 1954 items. In addition, he

asked for reconsideration of the reductions applied to the 1954 program.13

Since the Office of Military Assistance suspected that Navarre's complaint was

an attempt to establish an alibi for failure to achieve military success, it provided

General Trapnell with the information for a polite but firm protest against delaying

operations. End-items programmed in earlier years were on the way, and within

budgetary limitations the 1954 program was being met. 14 Trapnell's answer opened

the door for American consideration of French battle needs on an ad hoc, emergency basis. On 18 December the Chief of MAAG wrote General Navarre:

I have been advised that the military requirements for Indochina have the

highest MDAP priority, and that although the military departments did not

expect to make deliveries of FY 54 programmed items in time for use during

the current dry season, urgent action had been taken to provide items critically

in need during this season.

He invited the French Staff to work with MAAG in readying lists of critical items;

these lists would be sent to Washington and delivery expedited to meet operational

requirements.15 Requests went forward on this basis, and General Trapnell assured

Admiral Radford during their Christmas conference in Manila that no deficiencies

in the American aid program or deliveries would cause embarrassment or change

in French plans in the immediate future. 16

Perhaps one of General Navarre's concerns had been a new political crisis in

Vietnam. The world learned on 27 November 1953 that Ho Chi Minh had informed

the Stockholm newspaper Expressen of Viet Minh willingness to negotiate with

France for an armistice. His terms were cessation of hostilities and real respect for

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

the independence of Vietnam."7 Coincidentally, President Auriol of France

announced on 27 November a liberal formula by which the Associated States could

be independent, yet remain members of the French Union. By this announcement

France moved to carry out the 3 July declaration and to satisfy American pressure

for granting Indochina its independence.' 8 The Ho interview and President Auriol's

statement stirred nationalistic feelings in Vietnam. In early December Premier

Nguyen Van Tam tried to capitalize on nationalistic sentiments by demanding that

Bao Dai establish an anticommunist coalition government to negotiate peace with

the Viet Minh and work out the terms of association with France. Having failed to

win popular support, on 17 December Van Tam handed his government's resignation to the Chief of State. The resignation did not improve the situation.19

Against the background of more vigorous French military and political action

and a Vietnamese domestic crisis, the Joint Chiefs gave considerable attention to

Indochinese affairs in December 1953; they had to decide what to do about General

O'Daniel's recommendations. In addition, the National Security Council Planning

Board was rewriting the statement of American policy toward Southeast Asia and

the JCS provided military advice on this subject.20

First on the agenda was a report by the Joint Strategic and Logistic Plans Committees on General O'Daniel's mission. The committees' conclusions paralleled

those of the joint mission. On the asset side of the ledger they found that there was

no indication of French or Vietnamese disposition to negotiate with the enemy and

that there was evidence of real military progress in the implementation of the

Navarre Plan. As liabilities, the committees listed four deficiencies: lack of sufficient naval small craft, and inadequacies in the training of native forces, in the

operation of the joint amphibious command, and in the maintenance and supply of

the French air arm.

The committees recommended the O'Daniel report as the basis for planning

and seconded its principal suggestions including the assignment of two Army officers to MAAG for duty with the French training command and the assignment of

four officers, one from each Service, for liaison between MAAG and the French

headquarters. The committees also endorsed General O'Daniel's recommendation

to continue arrangements for French use of up to twenty-two C-119s from the Far

East Air Command. Finally, they suggested expedited delivery of naval craft programmed for 1954 and lending the French four LSMs (landing ship, medium) or

their equivalent.2'

The Joint Chiefs amended the committees' conclusions and recommendations to

reflect Admiral Stump's comments. Qualifying remarks were added to the two more

optimistic conclusions. The amended report indicated that although the French had

made limited progress in carrying out the Navarre concept, the military situation had

not altered significantly in their favor. To O'Daniel's opinion that the French or Vietnamese did not contemplate negotiations with the enemy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

added the thought that a seemingly plausible offer from the Viet Minh might lead to a

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Dien Bien Phu, Bermuda, and Berlin November 1953-March 1954

parley, especially in the absence of real French Union military progress. The JCS

added a new conclusion: "Primary military requirements for a French Union victory

in Indochina include the development of large and effective indigenous forces and

the effective utilization of psychological warfare among the natives."

The JCS accepted the committees' recommendations for action and added

O'Daniel's suggestion that French Union officers be invited to inspect US training

methods in the Republic of Korea. The amended report became a basis for planning, and the recommendations became directives to Service Chiefs on 31

December 1953.22

General O'Daniel in Honolulu urged early implementation of the amended

report. The French Government had authorized General Navarre to accept a few

American officers for intelligence work, duty with the training command, and liaison with French services; this action offered an opportunity for the United States

to influence French planning and training. Two days later O'Daniel suggested that

the invitation for French Union officers to inspect Korean training installations be

held until the end of the fighting season. Implementation of the recommendations

went forward based on these amplifying comments.23

NSC 177 and Crisis Planning

W hile the Joint Chiefs dealt with the O'Daniel report, the Planning Board of the

National Security Council revised the 18-month old statement of American

objectives and courses of action in Southeast Asia to reflect the fact that in the

interim the French situation in Indochina had deteriorated. 24 A major problem was

assessment of the consequences of a French defeat in Indochina. In June 1952 the

National Security Council had agreed that the loss of any Southeast Asian country

would probably lead to the relatively swift communist domination of the whole

area. But in November 1953 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would only say:

"A Viet Minh victory in Indochina would remove a significant military barrier to a

Communist sweep through Southeast Asia, expose the remainder of that region to

greatly increased external Communist pressures, and probably increase the capabilities of local Communists ..... " The Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Joint

Staff registered a dissenting view: "The establishment of Communist control over

Indochina by military or other means would almost certainly result in the Communization of all of Southeast Asia .... "125

In Planning Board sessions Major General J. K. Gerhart, Special Assistant to

the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Security Council Affairs, argued convincingly

in support of the Joint Staff estimates. 26 When the Planning Board submitted its

redraft at the end of December 1953, the principal change was increased emphasis

on the dangers present in the Indochinese situation. The starting point was the

statement that had appeared in NSC 124/2: "Communist domination, by whatever

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

means, of all Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term, United States security interests." The redraft

pointed out that the loss of Indochina would have "the most serious repercussions

on US and Free World interests in Europe and elsewhere." The loss of a single

country might lead to loss of the entire area, with grave economic consequences; it

might seriously jeopardize US security interest in the Far East, and subject Japan

to severe economic and political pressures, making it difficult for the United States

to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to communism.

Two agents could transform these threats into reality. First, there was the new,

stronger, hostile, aggressive China. Chinese attack on Southeast Asia would require

the diversion of American strength from other areas. However, the Chinese Communists were more likely to continue their efforts to dominate the region covertly

through subversion and armed rebellion. Second was France itself. Although the

Laniel government was committed to seeking the destruction of the Viet Minh

forces, the Planning Board warned that a successor government might accept an

improvement in the military situation short of V'iet Minh defeat as the basis for serious negotiation. If the Laniel-Navarre Plan should fail, or appear doomed to failure,

the French might seek to negotiate for the best possible terms, irrespective of

whether these offered any assurance of preserving Indochina for the free world.

In coping with communist expansion in Asia the United States had issued its

warning to China, participated with interested nations in military talks on measures which might be taken in the event of open aggression, and increased the flow

of military and economic aid to France and the Associated States. The board cautioned that the United States Government should bear in mind that it was necessary to coordinate actions affecting one country with actions for the region as a

whole and to accommodate those actions to the sensibilities of the governments,

social classes, and minorities of Southeast Asia.

The Planning Board rephrased the general objective of the United States: "To

prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the communist orbit; to

persuade them that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the free world; and to assist them to develop toward stable,

free governments with the will and ability to resist communism from within and

without and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world."

Following the format of the June 1952 statement, the Planning Board recommended courses of action for the area as a whole. Both words and acts-in the

form of technical assistance, economic aid, and the encouragement of economic

cooperation-should be employed to persuade indigenous governments to cooperate with the free world. Further, it was essential that the United States encourage

and support the spirit of resistance among southeast Asians to Communist Chinese

aggression. The United States should continue its actions to make China aware of

the grave consequences of aggression. It was necessary to promote the coordinated defense of Southeast Asia, "recognizing that the initiative in regional defense

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Dien Bien Phu, Bermuda, and Berlin November 1953-March 1954

measures must come from the governments of the area." Finally, the American people should be made aware of the importance of the region so that they would support the proposed courses of action.

The Planning Board then took up the individual countries of Southeast Asia.

Actions toward Indochina were grouped under the assumptions that Communist

China would not overtly intervene in the war or that it would. Should China remain

a silent partner of the Viet Minh, the main targets for US action would continue to

be the French and the Indochinese. The United States had to build up the independence of Indochina at the short-range expense of France while inducing the

French to fight vigorously for the longer-range interests of the free world.

In the military field, the Planning Board proposed that the United States should

expedite, even increase, its aid to French Union Forces to foster an aggressive military, political, and psychological offensive designed to eliminate organized Viet

Minh forces by mid-1955. At the same time, American aid would help develop

native forces that could eventually maintain internal security. On the diplomatic

and political front the United States would assure the French that America appreciated its sacrifices and encourage and support steps by France and the Associated

States in the development of a relationship based on equal sovereignty within the

French Union.

Proposed actions also dealt with the possibility that France might sue for peace.

To offset this contingency, the United States should influence the French Government and people against ending the war on terms inconsistent with American objectives. France should be allowed no illusions about obtaining acceptable terms

before achieving a marked improvement in the military situation. It would be equally illusory to consider establishing a coalition Vietnam government with Ho Chi

Minh. Drawing upon Korean experience, the Planning Board recommended that the

United States flatly oppose accepting a cease-fire before opening negotiations

because of the probable result-irretrievable deterioration in the French Union military position. The United States could block undesirable negotiations by insisting

that the French obtain Vietnamese approval of all actions taken in response to any

Viet Minh offers. If the French persisted in opening talks with Ho Chi Minh, the

American Government should demand that France consult with US officials.

Turning to the assumption of Chinese intervention, the board rephrased those

paragraphs of NSC 124/2 that dealt with China's entering the war; it did not significantly alter their substance. First, an appeal should be made for United Nations

action against aggression; at the same time the United States would seek international support in whatever military action might be taken. America should furnish

naval and air assistance to French Union ground troops, provide forces for interdicting Chinese Communist communication lines, and supply logistic support.

Other military action might include a blockade of China, providing the French and

British concurred; covert operations to aid guerrillas in China; utilization of Chinese Nationalist forces; assistance to the British in Hong Kong; and evacuation of

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

French Union personnel from the Tonkin Delta. Finally, if expanded action against

China was needed, the three powers should take naval and air action against military targets in China that directly contributed to the Chinese effort in Indochina;

targets near the Soviet border would not be attacked unless absolutely necessary.

The United States might consider taking action against China unilaterally.27

The courses of action recommended by the Planning Board in NSC 177

assumed that France would continue to fight. However, the board recognized that a

successor government might sue for peace. General Gerhart proposed that the

board draft courses of action in the event that France gave up the struggle; the

board concurred.28 To provide the Planning Board with military advice, the Joint

Strategic and Logistic Plans Committees reviewed another study of this contingency

done in July 1953.29 The committees accepted basic assumptions that: (1) the United

States could take over French responsibilities at the invitation of the Associated

States; (2) Korea would remain quiet so that two American divisions could be withdrawn; (3) elsewhere US commitments would remain undisturbed unless the return

of French forces permitted American withdrawals from Europe; and (4) Communist

China would not overtly intervene in the war. The committees reaffirmed that the

successful defense of Indochina was essential. The course of action offering the

greatest assurance of success was to step up the development of native troops and

to deploy American and Allied forces to Indochina to reduce communist strength to

scattered guerrilla bands. A second course acceptable as a temporary measure was

developing native forces and deploying sufficient strength to hold critical strong

points evacuated by the French. Such holding operations would require air and

naval support until the native armies could conduct effective operations against the

communists. The committees rejected two additional courses, requiring less extensive American intervention, as likely to result in military defeat.3

,

The Services were in general agreement with the report's conclusions. General

Gerhart and the Planning Board drew upon it in drafting courses of action in the

event of French withdrawal from Indochina. The board saw that French withdrawal

might take two forms. First, France might seek peace unless America offered to participate in the war with military forces; two choices would be open to the United

States. The American Government might do nothing or it might provide forces to

keep France in the war. Even more ominous the French Government might refuse

to continue the struggle even if the United States did agree to commit troops. Under

these circumstances America might write off Indochina. On the other hand, it could

consider the four alternative courses just evaluated by the Joint Staff. The board

submitted this study in December 1953 as the Special Annex to NSC 177.31

Meanwhile, the military situation in Indochina had not improved. On Christmas

Day 1953, the Viet Minh launched an invasion of Laos, which compelled the French

to divert troops for its defense. In early January General Trapnell reported that the

situation was similar to last year's campaign in which French Union Forces were

widely dispersed and in defensive attitudes. The French had been surprised to find

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Dien Bien Phu, Bermuda, and Berlin November 1953-March 1954

that the Viet Minh units surrounding Dien Bien Phu were supplied with antiaircraft

artillery. Only light bombers (B-26s) could be used, and Trapnell warned Washington to expect requests for additional aircraft of this type and for US personnel to

maintain the C-47s, B-26s, and C-119s and to fly C-119s on missions to noncombat areas. Admiral Stump had thought General O'Daniel too optimistic, he now

believed Trapnell was unduly pessimistic. He believed that "timely assistance by

the US in this critical period through which General Navarre and the French Union

Forces are now passing will be instrumental in bringing about ultimate victory."32

These reports arrived in Washington at about the time the Joint Chiefs of Staff

were asked to review the two Planning Board studies, NSC 177 and the Special

Annex. CINCPAC's comments pointed to the need for early action as outlined in

NSC 177, which assumed the French would fight if America continued its aid programs; on 6 January 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the Secretary of Defense

that they agreed with the Planning Board draft.33

General Trapnell's message emphasized planning for the possibility of French

failure and withdrawal. Such plans were incorporated in the Special Annex to NSC

177, but the Joint Strategic Survey Committee had reported that this Planning Board

study was not sufficiently explicit. The United States would suffer critical consequences if Indochina fell; therefore, the United States should not write off the area if

the French proposed to quit in the absence of American military participation. The

committee recommended that the Joint Chiefs press for a decision on whether the

United States should intervene, if necessary, to preserve Indochina which would

provide definitive policy as the basis for diplomatic and military plans.

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee recognized that if the French withdrew,

the worldwide situation might oblige the United States to accept the loss of

Indochina. Nevertheless, the American Government should be prepared to offset

such a development. Therefore, the committee recommended that the Special

Annex be revised to reflect the following views:

Should the French make an arbitrary decision to withdraw from the conflict in Indochina despite all offers of United States assistance, the United

States should in any event, and as a minimum urge the French to phase their

withdrawal over a protracted period and to take all practicable measures to

prepare the indigenous forces better to assume the responsibilities of their

own defense. Additionally, the United States, preferably in conjunction with its

Allies, should provide such military assistance to the indigenous forces of

Indochina as is determined to be advisable and feasible in the light of conditions then prevailing, and as is consistent with United States objectives both

with respect to Southeast Asia and world-wide. The level of military assistance

which might be advisable and feasible cannot be predetermined, but might

encompass anything from a continuation of materiel aid as a minimum to

Alternative A (vigorous intervention) as a maximum.4

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

The Chief of Naval Operations wished to add the thought that if US forces

were to participate in the war, they should do so in sufficient strength to insure an

early and lasting military victory. Admiral Carney also sought to strengthen arguments in favor of supporting native troops while deploying American and Allied

forces for operations to reduce the communists to scattered guerrilla bands. He

recommended one qualification: "precautionary reservations are necessary by reason of the fact that circumstances under which the French forces withdraw, and

other related strategic circumstances cannot be accurately predicted."'35

At their meeting on 6 January 1954 the JCS considered the JSSC report and

Admiral Carney's amendments but did not reach a final decision.36 On the following

day, at a meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council, Admiral Radford indicated

that the Joint Chiefs had prepared comments on the Special Annex to NSC 177, but

needed more time to study the paper. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roger M.

Kyes, attacked the accuracy of the logistical requirements of the alternative courses for American intervention. He did not address the principal problem of being

prepared for a French request for US intervention that the Joint Chiefs of Staff

believed should be examined. Secretary Wilson supported Kyes and requested that

the Special Annex be withdrawn. In addition, the Department of Defense suggested

to the National Security Council that requests for military advice should be

addressed to the Secretary of Defense, not to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.37

When the National Security Council met on 8 January, President Eisenhower

ordered the withdrawal and destruction of the Special Annex to NSC 177. The

Council did touch upon the question of how far the United States would go to stave

off French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Admiral Radford suggested that US pilots

trained to suppress antiaircraft guns could do much even in one afternoon's operations to save the situation at Dien Bien Phu. President Eisenhower did not rule out

US air and naval intervention; he did oppose committing US ground troops. He

favored maximum aid short of intervention, including even volunteer air operations such as the Flying Tigers had provided in China.

At Admiral Radford's suggestion, the council decided that General O'Daniel

should be stationed in Indochina with sufficient authority "to expedite the flexible

provision of US assistance to the French Union forces." O'Daniel would not concern himself with the Military Assistance Advisory Group, but he would be the

instrument through which the United States might exercise more influence on military strategy and the training of native troops. The Council requested the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to report on all feasible steps,

short of the overt use of American forces in combat, which the United States might

take to enhance the chances for success of the Laniel-Navarre Plan.38

Six days later the National Security Council adopted the Planning Board statement of policy toward Southeast Asia, NSC 177; it was circulated as NSC 5405 and

referred to the Operations Coordinating Board for implementation.39 It was the charter for American action in the months to come; however, the Secretary of Defense

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Dien Bien Phu, Bermuda, and Berlin November 1953-March 1954

and the Council had sidestepped the question of what the United States would do if

France gave up the struggle. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked what actions were

needed to improve France's position in Indochina. Their reply on 15 January repeated many of the suggestions from General O'Daniel and Admiral Stump.

Several JCS recommendations affirmed courses of action to which the United

States was committed. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that

the United States Government should emphasize vigorous French prosecution of

the Navarre Plan and American measures to support French efforts. Specifically,

the Services should expedite delivery of items programmed for Indochina and

revise programs to meet combat needs to include additional funds for the 1954

MDAP. They also recommended reexamining national strategy toward Indochina to

develop a unified effort in Southeast Asia to counter communism on a regional

basis. Further, the United States might consider scaling down French commitments

to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to permit deployment of additional forces

to the Orient. The JCS also recommended that France and the United States

increase their political warfare activities. The Joint Chiefs responded to French

requests for additional airpower by proposing that the United States provide material and financial support while France augmented her air -force in Indochina with

available maintenance and aircrew personnel. America should restrict its manpower contribution to certain specialists and should examine establishing unofficial

volunteer air units composed of United States personnel.40

The Deepening Crisis

B efore the Secretary of Defense acted on the JCS recommendations, the issue

of assisting France again moved to the highest governmental levels. At a White

House meeting on 16 January the President, Secretary Dulles, and Under Secretary

W. B. Smith of the State Department; Deputy Secretary Kyes and the Director of the

Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Vice Admiral A. C. Davis, USN, of the Department of Defense; and Mr. C. D. Jackson, White House adviser on Cold War strategy,

discussed what the United States should do about Indochina. Under Secretary

Smith opened by stating that he believed that a comprehensive plan for dealing

with Southeast Asia was necessary. Deputy Secretary Kyes protested that planning

for comprehensive assistance to the entire area could lead to a relaxation of the

belief that Indochina should be saved at almost any cost. Siding with Mr. Kyes,

President Eisenhower indicated that the United States would continue to gamble

that present efforts would be effective, and emphasized that everything possible

should be done to improve the situation.

The group recognized French reluctance to accept American assistance in

training native soldiers and in improving the conduct of operations. To combat this

reluctance, the President suggested the appointment of an American officer, such

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

as General James A. Van Fleet, USA, as Ambassador to the Associated States or as

a member of the Ambassador's staff. After the discussion, President Eisenhower

appointed the Special Committee on Indochina to develop a detailed program for

securing military and political victory without United States overt participation in

the war. This committee was composed of Allen Dulles, the Director of Central

Intelligence, Under Secretary Smith, Mr. Kyes, Admiral Radford, and Mr. Jackson.41

While the Special Committee on Indochina began its work, events were moving. During the middle of January Premier Laniel formally requested additional

material and United States maintenance personnel for the French air force in

Indochina. This request was substantially the same as General Trapnell had forecast; the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already recommended that the United States provide aircraft but not personnel.42 Specifically, the Premier asked for eighteen B-26s

to equip the two light bomber squadrons in Indochina with twenty-five planes each.

Advice from Saigon and Paris, however, indicated the French would need only ten

additional B-26s to bring the two squadrons up to a total strength of fifty planes. In

addition, the Premier requested twenty-five more B-26s for a third squadron. The

French also wanted to continue to use the twelve US C-119s for long-distance

transportation to allow the four C-47 squadrons to concentrate on operational support. France asked that the United States supply spare parts for the C-47s, B-26s

and C-119s. The French Government also requested that the United States ship

four hundred maintenance specialists to Indochina to service US-provided aircraft.

Premier Laniel emphasized the temporary nature of this assignment and promised

to replace Americans with Frenchmen.0

The French request underlined Washington's need for more information; Admiral Radford urged CINCPAC to speed General O'Daniel's arrival in Indochina. The

general was to win the French High Command's consent to his remaining in Saigon

indefinitely, and to evaluate the adequacy of the American assistance program and

tabulate additional requirements. Because of French sensitivity, CINCPAC was

asked to provide General O'Daniel with cover by ordering him to make an inspection tour of all MAAGs in Southeast Asia."

On 21 January the National Security Council considered the French request

for aid and the JCS recommendations for improving the French position. Admiral

Radford observed that while some of the recommendations might be referred to

the Special Committee for study; others should be put into effect immediately.

The United States should expedite the shipment of undelivered items programmed during 1950-1954; change the current program as requested by MAAG

Indochina; make deliveries in accordance with the changes; and, if necessary, do

all this without prior approval of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, funds should be found to satisfy the additional training and material requirements submitted by MAAG. The Department of Defense was already acting on

these recommendations.

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Dien Bien Phu, Bermuda, and Berlin November 1953-March 1954

Admiral Radford favored the French request for B-26s, but he felt that the

French could find the necessary flight and maintenance personnel for an expanded air force. If necessary, United States Air Force personnel in NATO units could

temporarily replace and release French ground, maintenance, and supply personnel for service in the Far East. The United States could also train French personnel in Europe.45

The National Security Council agreed that Admiral Radford explore with Lieutenant General Jean E. Valluy, French representative to the NATO Standing Group

in Washington, the provision of immediate aid to the French air forces. After discussing the matter with Air Force and OSD officials, Admiral Radford informed

General Valluy that ten B-26s would soon be sent to Indochina and that the United

States would consider providing aircraft for the third B-26 squadron when the

French could furnish flight and maintenance personnel. While he assured General

Valluy that spare parts would arrive as needed; it did not seem feasible for the United States to provide maintenance crews. Problems of language and accommodations, unfamiliarity with French methods, and the time factor worked against using

Americans.46 While these matters were under discussion, the French command in

Saigon needed immediate help. Viet Minh forces surrounding Dien Bien Phu were

expected to attack soon or to move against Luang Prabang in Laos; the High Command needed aircraft and personnel.47 Paris instructed its military representative in

Washington to seek American help again.

General Valluy announced that France had been able to locate and ship only

ninety maintenance specialists. Drawing French personnel from NATO wings

would not solve the immediate problem, for these technicians would still need

training on American-type craft. He renewed the request that the United States provide four hundred ground crewmen. To provide additional flight crews the French

Government was arranging with General Alfred M. Gruenther, USA, Commander in

Chief, US European Command, for USAF units on the Continent to train French

aviators in the use of B-26s.48

The French reported, however, that twelve B-26s would only take care of the

past year's attrition; they needed ten more to bring squadron strength up to twentyfive. Admiral Radford ascertained that ten more B-26s might be transferred from

the Far East Air Force to Indochina. Admiral Radford asked for assurances that

Americans sent to Indochina would not be exposed to capture, General Valluy gave

a categorical statement to this effect; he further stated that United States personnel

could be brought home at the end of the fighting season, about 15 June.49

Admiral Radford brought the French request for B-26s and United States personnel to the Special Committee on Indochina. Since France apparently had no

more trained mechanics for the Orient, Under Secretary Smith favored sending two

hundred USAF crewmen to Indochina. According to Mr. Kyes, this action would

commit the United States to such an extent that it would have to prepare for complete intervention. In reply, General Smith distinguished between mechanics and

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

combat troops; he did not think the United States was committed to providing the

latter. He believed, however, that Indochina was so important that America should

intervene with naval and air forces if necessary.

Confronted with Mr. Kyes' reservations, the Special Committee agreed that final

decision should be left to the President. However, the committee did recommend

that the United States should provide the ten additional B-26s (making a total of

twenty-two) and could send two hundred USAF maintenance personnel to Indochina. They felt the government should defer a decision on the third light bomber

squadron and on the second contingent of two hundred ground crewmen pending

General O'Daniel's talks with General Navarre and French efforts to provide the

additional mechanics. President Eisenhower accepted all three recommendations.5

"

The fact that the United States had agreed to send maintenance personnel to

Indochina was leaked by Joseph and Stewart Alsop and that caused considerable

furor in France and the United States.6 1 President Eisenhower intervened personally to calm the uproar. At his press conference on 3 February, he acknowledged that

USAF technicians were on their way to Indochina but implied that they would be

part of the MAAG group training the French in the use of American equipment.52

A week later he informed newspaper correspondents that "no one could be

more bitterly opposed to ever getting the United States involved in a hot war in

that region than I am. Consequently,... every move that I authorize is calculated,

so far as humans can do it, to make certain that that does not happen." He told the

correspondents of French guarantees that Americans would not be exposed to capture, and the French Government repeated the guarantees. When Republican and

Democratic Senators endorsed the President's remarks, officials in the Executive

Branch breathed a sign of relief.53

In Indochina the Viet Minh divisions surrounding Dien Bien Phu had not yet

attacked. Instead, General Giap withdrew some of his forces and at the end of January moved toward Luang Prabang, Laos. Further depleting their combat reserves

in the Tonkin Delta, the French moved to counter the Viet Minh.54

The new indication that the initiative lay with the Viet Minh brought a somber

report from Saigon. Indicting General Navarre's defensive concepts, the United

States military attach6 to Vietnam likened Dien Bien Phu to another Na San. He

reported that the Viet Minh command had concentrated its battle corps in western

Tonkin, but the French, with their forces dispersed throughout Indochina, were not

in position to take offensive operations to destroy the enemy. Although the French

Union Forces outnumbered the Viet Minh two to one and had overwhelming firepower and air transport capability, they remained on the defensive. Patrolling was

the exception for French units; French Union Forces did not maintain contact with

the Viet Minh army, but waited to be attacked.

In Laos, the French had failed to take the tactical initiative; instead, six Viet

Minh battalions had tied down twenty French Union battalions. The attache's opinion was that Navarre had been directed to conduct a minimum-casualty holding

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operation looking to eventual negotiations. The Viet Minh seemed to be fighting a

clever war of attrition with time in their favor. In conclusion, the attach6 reported

that "informed United States military opinion here" considered the greatest impediments to successful French action to be lack of energetic support from Paris, inadequate training of combat units and staffs, and a defensive philosophy. These

defects could not be remedied by the unlimited provision of modem United States

military equipment. 55

Secretary Dulles and Mr. Nash in Berlin asked General Trapnell for his comments; he replied that Navarre had a tendency to seek "miracle" solutions instead

of taking forthright and energetic action according to "universally accepted principles of war." Trapnell considered that the French had adequate supplies and equipment for large scale sustained operations, but that they had little intention of moving decisively toward the defeat of the Viet Minh battle corps.56

General Trapnell's comments contrasted with those of General O'Daniel, who

pointed out that, bound by treaty to protect Laos, the French had to counter the

Viet Minh invasion and commit their reserves. He was confident that General

Navarre would carry out his planned offensive and achieve military success during

the 1954-1955 season. O'Daniel arranged for the assignment of five United States

liaison officers to General Navarre's headquarters to help correct French weaknesses.57 His comments reflected General O'Daniel's satisfaction with the results of

his third visit to Indochina. General Navarre had consented to short visits from

O'Daniel every four to six weeks. The agreement to station the five liaison officers

in Saigon was a step toward increasing American influence in French councils.

Navarre had stressed his needs for supplies and equipment, but he did agree to

consider United States help in psychological warfare and in training native troops.

General O'Daniel's inspection of Dien Bien Phu and the Tonkin Delta caused

him to be optimistic about the immediate military situation. Although he recognized that the Viet Minh forces could make Dien Bien Phu untenable if they had

medium artillery, he estimated that the French Union Forces could withstand any

attack the Viet Minh was capable of launching there. The French were receiving

reinforcements, and native troops were being raised and trained. General

O'Daniel was confident that these additional units would permit the French

Union to dominate all areas and bring the Viet Minh army to battle by the fall of

1954. One step the United States might take, provided the French and Vietnamese

agreed, was to assign American reserve officers to train the natives. For O'Daniel,

the future looked bright.58

Admiral Stump again sounded a note of caution. He did not believe the five liaison officers and occasional short visits by General O'Daniel were an adequate substitute for the continuous assignment of a high-ranking American to Indochina.

While he agreed with O'Daniel that there was no immediate danger of the French

Union suffering a major military reverse, he viewed the French failure to launch an

offensive with grave concern.5 9 Admiral Radford shared CINCPAC's concern and

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

was anxious to have General O'Daniel permanently assigned to Indochina. The

French agreed to accept O'Daniel as head of MAAG if he would surrender one star

so that he would not be senior to General Navarre, and provided that he would

have the same authority and responsibility as had General Trapnell. 6°

General Navarre's terms meant that General O'Daniel would not exercise substantial influence upon French strategy and training. General Ridgway protested

that a distinguished senior officer was being demoted and the United States was

losing prestige in the Far East without gaining compensating advantages. At JCS

instigation, France was again asked to consider increasing the scope of MAAG's

authority. When France refused, the Department of Defense on 12 March

announced General O'Daniel's new assignment and his change in rank.61

Washington was also considering another piece of the Indochinese puzzle. In

December, when the Viet Minh forces invaded Laos, the Laotian Government had

called for help. This appeal created a new issue for consideration by the National

Security Council. On 2 February President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea

informed General John E. Hull, USA, Commander in Chief, Far East, that, if the

United States desired, his country would send one division to fight the Viet Minh

invaders in Laos. President Rhee felt that this act would encourage many anticommunist elements in Southeast Asia and also make manifest Korean appreciation for

the aid that the United Nations had been providing since 1950. General Hull promised to take the offer up with Washington, and he advised that it be kept secret

until the United States Government had replied. In spite of his advice, Korea

announced its offer before Washington acted.62 General Ridgway forwarded the

Korean offer to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 February. He suggested that the JCS

obtain approval for advising President Rhee that the United States interposed no

objection to sending the division to Laos if the French approved, and that United

States commitments to support ROK troops would remain unchanged.6

While the National Security Council did not reject the offer and the Joint

Strategic Survey Committee tended to favor it, General Ridgway had second

thoughts; he was concerned that the presence of ROK troops in Laos could provide

the Chinese Communists with an excuse for active intervention. A similar consideration led Admiral Carney to point out that the ROK intervention would appear to

the world as a manifestation of American policy.64 Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs

informed the Secretary of Defense that the United States should commend President Rhee, but tell him that the offer did not appear to be in the best interest of the

free world. They reasoned that President Rhee might hope that renewed hostilities

in Korea would ensue, and that it would be difficult to justify keeping American

and Allied contingents in Korea while ROK troops were fighting communists in

Indochina. Furthermore, it was unlikely that the French would risk courting Chinese intervention by accepting the offer. On 4 March, the National Security Council

agreed that the offer should be declined. The President felt that the greatest objection was the fact that American public opinion would not stand for having United

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Dien Bien Phu, Bermuda, and Berlin November 1953-March 1954

States troops tied up in Korea while the ROK forces were fighting in Laos. His concern was stressed in the American reply rejecting the offer.6 5

On 2 March the President's Special Committee on Indochina submitted its recommendations for United States action. While it had originally considered steps

short of military intervention, the group recognized that the United States might

consider taking direct military action if the situation drastically deteriorated or if

the French rejected a broad program of American advice and aid. But such military

action had to be evaluated in relation to American Southeast Asia policy as a whole.

The Special Committee repeated the conclusions of NSC 5405 that Indochina

was the keystone of the Southeast Asian arch and that the Associated States must

not be allowed to fall under communist domination. To. prevent such a debacle, the

French had to defeat communist military and quasi-military forces and to develop

native resistance to communism. The United States should help the French consistent with the United States and allied programs for the Far East. The committee

felt that the United States had already taken all feasible actions to assist the French

in the coming battle at Dien Bien Phu. By March 1954 the Defense Department had

expended $123.6 million beyond the funds allocated in 1950-1954 appropriations

for aid to Indochina; it appeared that at least another $100 million would be needed

to meet French Union requirements.16

Little could be done to affect the tactical situation. The French staff had

acknowledged that there was more American equipment in Indochina than could be

put to immediate use. The Special Committee concluded that delivered and programmed American aid to Indochina plus the potential manpower of the French

Union was sufficient to defeat the communists. However, the French would have to

use their resources properly and stabilize the military situation to gain time to develop native resistance to communism and to organize and train effective fighting

units. To date the French had not utilized Indochinese manpower effectively; the

United States should persuade France and Vietnam to overcome this deficiency.

The Special Committee on Indochina incorporated in its report three JCS recommendations that had not yet been fully implemented:

1. France should augment its air force in Indochina with flight and groundcrew personnel drawn from military and/or civilian resources already available.

The United States should help the French accomplish this task, explore the possibilities for establishing a volunteer air group, and make arrangements for

relieving USAF technicians temporarily assigned to Indochina.

2. The United States should arrange with France for the assignment of

additional Central Intelligence agents to Indochina.

3. The Department of Defense should find funds to replace the $124 million taken from other programs to meet Indochinese MDA needs.

The committee recommended that the United States obtain French acceptance

of an increase in the strength of MAAG Indochina to aid French operational planning and training of native troops. The French should use more American help in

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

unconventional warfare, and be encouraged and assisted to increase the Foreign

Legion in Indochina. The United States goal of helping the Indochinese to achieve

independence should be stressed. Bao Dai and possibly the King of Cambodia

should be encouraged to take a more active role in leading their countries.

Once the French agreed to increase his authority, the Special Committee recommended that the chief of the advisory group get the French High Command to

develop and carry out a sound operational plan for intensified operations to win a

tactical victory which could be exploited politically. Native defense groups and

local civilian administrators should be used to pacify French-Vietnamese occupied

areas. The French Command needed to improve its intelligence and security agencies and to expand unconventional warfare activities.

The Special Committee concluded that if these political and military reforms

were carried out, the unfavorable situation in Indochina would be reversed. However, the committee also suggested that the Department of Defense be asked to

develop a "concept of operations and considerations involved in the use of US

armed forces in Indochina should such involvement be determined upon." A week

later the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) directed the implementation of

these recommendations. The Special Committee began to study military intervention and to examine the position the United States should take at the forthcoming

Geneva Conference that would meet in less than two months. 67

The Berlin Conference

W hile the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrestled with

contingencies, keeping France in the fight required resolving the dilemma

facing the United States in the conference at Berlin; on 25 January Secretary Dulles

met with his French, British, and Soviet counterparts. His task was to counter the

expected Soviet demand for a five-power conference including Communist China

"to consider measures for the relaxation of international tension." Admission of

Communist China to a conference would be a long step toward its recognition,

which the United States was anxious to avoid. The stated purpose of the Berlin

Conference was to settle the German and Austrian questions; there was no reason

to touch upon the Far East. Korea and Indochina were the major sources of tension in the Orient, and Communist China had shown no disposition to accept a settlement in either area that would preserve the interests of the free world.6

'

The United States Government also had to persuade France that it would be disastrous to negotiate with the communists before improving her military position in

Indochina. The new statement of policy toward Southeast Asia, NSC 5405, had reaffirmed that the United States would furnish the French all aid short of actual military participation and would even consider direct military support if the Communist

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Dien Bien Phu, Bermuda, and Berlin November 1953-March 1954

Chinese intervened. America had to strengthen France's hand so that she would

hold out for a settlement that protected American security interests in the Far East.

The conference began as anticipated. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M.

Molotov utilized his first chance to speak to propose that "a conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the USSR, and the Chinese People's Republic should be called in May-June

1954 for the purpose of considering urgent measures for easing the tension in international relations."6 9 Dulles succeeded in postponing discussion for some days. 70

But the conference took up the question, for the French Government had to at

least appear willing to negotiate peace for Indochina. The French had an unassailable argument: the United States had agreed to an armistice in Korea and had met

with the Chinese to negotiate a political settlement. Moreover, Mr. Dulles had stated that if the Korean political talks went well and "the Chinese Communists show a

disposition to settle in a reasonable way such a question as Indochina, we would

not just on technical grounds say no we won't talk about that."7' Since the French

seemed determined to open negotiations, the United States had to decide whether

to let the French go their own way, or to attend the conference and seek to influence the terms of settlement. The latter course seemed preferable. Nevertheless,

the United States wanted to avoid any implication that it recognized the People's

Republic as the de jure government of China.

With these considerations in mind Secretary Dulles opposed the conference

with Communist China the Soviets had proposed. Instead, he worked for an agreement that the five-power conference would be limited to settlement of the Korean

and Indochinese wars, and that other powers participating in the two conflicts

might be invited to attend. French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault proposed two

conferences, one for each war, but the Soviet Union held out for a single meeting.

The Foreign Ministers agreed to a conference that would consider the Korean

problem and that Indochina would be discussed.

Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov sought to eliminate Mr. Dulles' proposed statement that no power would be recognizing Communist China by meeting with Chinese representatives, but the West supported the United States. The American language in the final communique was allowed to stand.72 The final communique,

released on 18 February 1954, announced that the five powers and other countries

that had participated in Korean hostilities would meet in Geneva on 26 April to

reach a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The four Foreign Ministers

agreed "that the problem of restoring peace in Indochina will also be discussed at

the conference, to which representatives of the United States, France, the United

Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic,

and other interested states will be invited."73

American officials expressed satisfaction with the results of the conference.

Under Secretary Smith congratulated the French for resisting pressure to settle

the Indochinese war on communist terms. Secretary Dulles emphasized that the

149
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

United States would not be recognizing China by sitting down with its representatives at Geneva. He told the American people of the agreement to discuss peace

in Indochina at Geneva, and added that the United States had a vital interest in

Indochina and would continue helping the French Union Forces counter communist aggression there. 74

In private discussions with the Joint Chiefs, State Department officials emphasized the achievements of the United States at Berlin. They ignored the possible

consequences of the Indochinese phase of Geneva and stressed that the Korean

phase would be conducted as desired by the United States. The agreement to discuss Indochina was needed by the French Government to satisfy public clamor for

peace. 75 Within the National Security Council, Dulles admitted that the United

States had little to gain at Geneva. It was unlikely that the conference would reach

an agreement for a free and united Korea. There was a danger that the French

might accept a settlement in Indochina contrary to United States interests. French

domestic political difficulties were so great that the United States could not dissuade the Laniel government from agreeing to the Geneva meeting.76

The prospects of going to Geneva to negotiate a settlement were welcomed by

the French National Assembly when it debated Indochina on 5 March 1954. Some

members of the opposition called on the government to accept India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's proposal for an immediate cease-fire and negotiations, but

both the opposition and the government seemed pleased that the Berlin Conference had opened the door for peace. Premier Laniel, however, ruled out an early

cease-fire by proposing conditions that were unacceptable to the Viet Minh. Before

concluding a cease-fire, France would require: (1) total Viet Minh evacuation of

Laos and Cambodia; (2) creation of a no-man's land around the Tonkin Delta and

withdrawal of Viet Minh units from the delta under a controlled evacuation; (3)

withdrawal of Viet Minh forces in central Vietnam to delimited zones; and (4) withdrawal or disarmament of Viet Minh troops in southern Vietnam. The Premier stated that the French Union Forces could not relax their military efforts because successful French military operations had obliged the Viet Minh to negotiate in the

first place. 77

The French wanted a forum for negotiations about Indochina; the United

States had acceded to the French desire. The only method likely to bolster the

French at the bargaining table was to strengthen the French Union's military position in Indochina; this would not be easy. During February the Viet Minh occupied

the high ground near the French position at Dien Bien Phu. While General Navarre

continued to promise a vigorous counteroffensive, the French were hemmed in by

superior forces.78

150
9

Prelude to Geneva,

March-May 1954

By March 1954, the situation at Dien Bien Phu began to grow desperate, and

French doubts about the outcome were growing. Could American help save Dien

Bien Phu? The question of intervention was large and far from simple. For the United States even to consider intervening, a host of questions had to be addressed:

When and where should the United States intervene? With what? Against whom?

Should nuclear weapons be employed? The question of nuclear weapons was especially sensitive, and much of the discussion took place outside of normal channels,

which made it difficult in later years to determine what actually happened.' In any

event, the French never asked for anything more than an air attack to support the

garrison at Dien Bien Phu. But would that be enough, not just to save the position

but to win the war? What if the Chinese Communists intervened? If they did, what

action was called for? And what were the costs and benefits of using nuclear

weapons in any situation? It was the job of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to address these

matters. The Chiefs' discussions proved illuminating. Admiral Radford, the Chairman, worked on his own, through the Joint Staff and in personal contacts, to present arguments in favor of intervention. He was not supported by the other Chiefs.

The tinming of intervention was governed by the situation at Dien Bien Phu and

the plans for the Geneva Conference. Ho and Giap intended to make a strong

impression at Geneva, and they timed the final assault on the fortress accordingly.

The French High Command soon learned of these plans.2 By the same token, the

Americans and French feared being faced with a fait accompli at the conference.

Laniel and his government expected that their nation's will to continue would be

shattered by the fall of Dien Bien Phu. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not alone in

fearing the effect of French defeat on all of Southeast Asia.

151
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

The Radford-Ely Conversations

P resident Eisenhower's reluctance to intervene, especially with ground troops,

was public knowledge. This could be seen as an invitation to consider use of

airpower and nuclear weapons to avoid the fight on the ground. But the issue was

more complicated. The President assured Congress that it would have a say in any

action. A study by the Army Staff estimated that ground operations in Indochina

would require an increase in the Army of five hundred thousand men.3 The Eisenhower defense budget did not envision such an expense. The administration recognized the increased risk of a war with Communist China or the Soviet Union.

Eisenhower discounted the danger, but he would not act without the support of

NATO allies, who might take a more cautious view.

The administration's policy had been to view nuclear weapons as usable in local

situations as an alternative to ground forces. Secretary Dulles believed in the value

of the American nuclear deterrent. He also sensed that the West's nuclear superiority was a wasting asset, and its deterrent effect needed to be used while it lasted.4

But the 1954 crisis highlighted the problems inherent in use of the weapons. The

service staffs had studied the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina, especially in

defense of Dien Bien Phu. A study prepared by the Joint Advanced Study Committee concluded that three atomic weapons could defeat the Viet Minh forces threatening the fortress.5 However, all planners did not agree that nuclear weapons would

be effective. They would increase the risk of war with the major communist powers.

Disassociating the United States from their use (by using planes with French markings, for example) was unlikely to work. Use of nuclear weapons would probably

create an unfavorable reaction among European allies and would alienate the Asian

nations the United States was rallying to resist communism.6

As the Geneva Conference approached, General Giap's forces struck vital communications lines between Hanoi and Haiphong, the main French airfields in the

Tonkin Delta, and the Savannakhet-Quang Tri highway in Laos. Viet Minh irregulars

in southern Vietnam stepped up guerrilla operations.7 During the night of 13-14

March the Viet Minh launched the assault on Dien Bien Phu. Concentrating on one

sector at a time, General Giap sent two regiments against the northern and northeastern French positions, each held by one French Union battalion. Employing

mass tactics, the Viet Minh overran the first French battalion outpost shortly after

midnight; two days later the Viet Minh captured the second position. Although the

French dropped two battalions of paratroops to replace personnel losses, they

could not recover the two redoubts. From these positions the Viet Minh forces

directly threatened the airfield upon which the fortress depended.8

General Paul Ely, chief of the French armed forces staff, visited Washington

beginning on 20 March. General Ely had recently visited Indochina and had seen

the desperate situation there. He began meeting with key officials in Washington

and explaining the seriousness of the situation.9 Admiral Radford presented the

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Prelude To Geneva, March-May 1954

arguments for increasing American help proposed recently by the JCS and the

President's Special Committee on Indochina. The Chairman suggested forming an

international volunteer air group and improving French maintenance practices. He

invited the French to accept American participation in unconventional warfare

activities and offered to send additional American officers to assist the French in

training the Vietnamese. Admitting the need for improvements, Ely agreed to consider the American offers but declared that increasing the US personnel in Indochina would jeopardize French prestige in Indochinese eyes. 10

General Ely was not shy about accepting American materiel; he had come with

a long list of emergency requests for airplanes, naval craft, guns, small arms,

ammunition, and other supplies. He asked for the third squadron of 25 B-26s and

entered a new request for 12 F-8-Fs, 14 C-47s, and 24 L-20s to replace combat

losses, and for 20 helicopters to evacuate wounded at Dien Bien Phu. Ely also

asked for eighty US maintenance personnel to service the helicopters. While the

United States believed that the real problem was French failure to make efficient

use of the aircraft they had, President Eisenhower did not want to deny aid critically needed in Indochina. The Department of Defense loaned a third light bomber

squadron to the French and gave them all the other aircraft requested except the

C-47s and the helicopters, which were not available. Admiral Radford obtained

General Ely's consent for the US Air Force to send a team to Indochina to investigate French aircraft-utilization rates. The Department of Defense also found twenty LSMs, parachutes and drop containers, arms and ammunition, and the other

equipment requested by General Ely. The United States even agreed to the use of

French-manned C-1 19s to drop napalm on Dien Bien Phu."

Ely acknowledged that the Viet Minh's objective was to obtain a military victory at Dien Bien Phu that could be exploited at Geneva; he gave the French Union

only a fifty-fifty chance of staving off defeat. Yet he shrugged off American suggestions that a relief column be sent overland to the besieged fortress. If the French

lost, only five percent of their troops in Indochina would be captured, whereas the

Viet Minh would have suffered far heavier casualties. Nevertheless, Ely admitted

that a defeat at Dien Bien Phu would be a serious blow to morale in the field and at

home. If the fortress fell, Foreign Minister Bidault might not hold out at Geneva for

terms acceptable to the United States.12 Apprehensive about the outcome at Dien

Bien Phu and about the possibility of Chinese Communist intervention, the French

Government instructed General Ely to ask what the United States would do if Chinese planes appeared over Indochina. General Ely raised this question with Secretary of State Dulles; Mr. Dulles indicated that American reaction would depend

upon the circumstances. The United States certainly would not participate in the

war except with the cooperation' of the Indochinese.13

General Ely asked Admiral Radford whether American aircraft would intervene to counter Chinese planes and how American intervention might occur. He

suggested that staff agreements be concluded between CINCPAC and the French

153
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

command in Indochina "with a view to limiting the air risk which characterizes the

present situation."' Radford assured General Ely that considerable planning for

limited US participation in the war had been completed and to include procedures

for employing carrier aircraft in Indochina. Before the United States would commit

these forces, it must have firm agreements on command and organizational

arrangements, the duration of American support, and basing facilities in Indochina.

Admiral Radford asked if the French Government would request American air support if the Chinese Communists intervened or if the French needed more airpower.

The admiral pointed out that if such a request was likely, then "prudence dictated

that the matter should be explored on a higher level in order to be ready for such

emergency." Ely replied that it was obvious that France contemplated such a

request to prevent defeat.

General Ely asked about American constitutional processes governing the

commitment of aircraft, and he told Radford that the French Parliament would

have to consent to the request for help. Radford replied that the President was

committed to taking such a request up with Congress.1 5 It would take time to

arrange for American intervention, and it would be done at the governmental level.

Next Ely asked what would America do to help the French avert a disaster at Dien

Bien Phu. The Chairman stressed that the United States would have to consider the

whole Far Eastern situation and the probable Communist Chinese reaction before

deciding to commit its planes; he did tell the general that as many as 350 fighters

operating from carriers could be brought into action within two days. It would be

more difficult to bring medium bombers into the fight. General Ely concluded by

saying that he was certain his government would ask for American air support if

the Chinese intervened. However, Paris so feared provoking the Chinese that he

would not speculate whether his government would ask for American help to save

Dien Bien Phu.'6

General Ely obtained Admiral Radford's signature on the following minute of

their discussion:

In respect to General Ely's memorandum of 23 March 1954, it was decided

that it was advisable that military authorities push their planning work as far

as possible so that there would be no time wasted when and if our governments decided to oppose enemy air intervention over Indo-China if it took

place, and to check all planning arrangements already made under previous

agreements between CINCPAC and the CINC Indo-China and send instructions

to those authorities to this effect. 17

Informed of this agreement, Admiral Stump was told that General Ely's aide was on

the way to Indochina to tell General Navarre of the Ely-Radford conversations. The

aide's arrival would provide CINCPAC with an opportunity to renew liaison with

General Navarre.'8

154
Prelude To Geneva, March-AMay 1954

This minute was less than General Ely had hoped for. He had given Radford a

version that included this paragraph: "There was complete agreement on the terms

of General Ely's memorandum, dated 23 March, dealing with intervention by US

aircraft in Indochina in case of an emergency, it being understood that this intervention could be either by Naval or Air Force units as the need arises, depending

on the development of the situation."19 Radford refused to initial this statement;

however, General Ely left Washington believing that a request for American intervention would receive a prompt and affirmative reply.

The talks with Ely confirmed Admiral Radford's opinion that the United States

faced a critical situation. The Admiral told President Eisenhower of his fear

that the measures being taken by the French will prove to be inadequate and

initiated too late to prevent a progressive deterioration of the situation. The

consequences can well lead to the loss of all of S.E. Asia to Communist domination. If this is to be avoided, I consider that the U.S. must be prepared to act

promptly and in force possibly to a frantic and belated request by the French

for U.S. intervention. 20

Ely returned to France apparently believing that an American air operation

with B-29 medium bombers and conventional weapons to aid the garrison at Dien

Bien Phu was likely as a one-time emergency measure to stave off disaster in

Indochina. The Americans were preparing for such an operation, and Radford

favored it. But the Chairman made it clear to the President that the air attack on

the Viet Minh should be the first step in an increasing American role in the war."1

On 7 April Radford sent Secretary Dulles the conclusions of the Joint Advanced

Study Committee's report proposing the use of three nuclear weapons at Dien Bien

Phu. On his way to Paris to confer with the allies, Dulles indicated no interest in

the nuclear option.22

Conditions of Intervention

he Berlin communiqu6 had triggered military action by the Viet Minh to

strengthen its hand for Geneva; the agreement also moved the United States to

evaluate how much the French could lose to the Viet Minh without losing the war.

In early March 1954 the Secretary of Defense asked the Joint Chiefs for their advice

on this and other issues that would arise at the Geneva Conference.23 The Chief of

Naval Operations pointed out that considering minimum positions was not enough;

the French might accept terms which looked reasonable but which would let the

Viet Minh subvert Indochina. It was essential that the French Government stand by

Premier Laniel's call for evacuation of the Viet Minh forces to delimited zones prior

to a cease-fire.24 The United States should insist that France attain a strong military

situation before negotiating seriously with the Viet Minh.25

155
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with Admiral Carney and rejected the following possible settlements: (1) the status quo, (2) a cease-fire, (3) a coalition government, (4) partition, and (5) self-determination through a plebiscite. The only

acceptable alternative was military victory. It would be expensive to commit the

resources that victory would cost, but it would be far more costly to roll back the

communist tide once it had gained momentum in Southeast Asia. The JCS recommended urging France not to abandon "aggressive prosecution of military operations until a satisfactory settlement has been achieved." The Chiefs recognized that

France might accept a negotiated settlement in spite of American pressure. They

believed that, if this occurred, the United States should refuse to associate itself

with the terms and should seek to continue the struggle together with the Associated States and other allies. They further recommended that the National Security

Council immediately consider the extent to which the United States would be willing to commit its military resources in Indochina in concert with the French, or, if

the French withdrew, in concert with other allies or unilaterally.26 These JCS views

were confirmed by a subcommittee of the President's Special Committee on

Indochina. The subcommittee stated that the National Security Council should

examine what political pressures the United States could apply to bolster French

resolve; it should study actual intervention with American "air, naval and ultimately

ground forces"; and it should determine whether it was possible to develop another

base of operations in Southeast Asia as a substitute for Indochina.27

These recommendations were punctuated by the Viet Minh capture of the two

French redoubts at Dien Bien Phu on 15 March. The deteriorating military situation

emphasized how much had to be done before the Geneva Conference began on 26

April. In December 1953, when the Joint Chiefs tried to place possible American

intervention before the National Security Council, Deputy Secretary Kyes had

quashed the Chiefs' recommendations on the grounds of logistical inaccuracies. In

March, however, Mr. Wilson approved the JCS and the subcommittee recommendations and forwarded them to the Secretary of State.28

Secretary Dulles recognized the seriousness of the situation. Both the French

military position and the political climate within France boded ill for preserving

Indochina at Geneva. On 9 March Radical-Socialist Deputy Pierre Mendes-France

called for stopping the Indochinese war immediately by negotiating directly with

the Viet Minh; the French Government should not wait for an international conference that would prolong for some months "the massacre and'anguish of [the]

entire nation."29 Although this statement represented the views of the noncommunist left, Mr. Dulles had reason to be concerned about the attitude of the French

Government. The French hoped that the United States would recognize Red China

or lighten the trade embargo as a quid pro quo for settlement of the wars in Korea

and Indochina. Premier Laniel expected his government to fall if it returned emptyhanded from Geneva. Ambassador Dillon in Paris put the question bluntly: How far

156
Prelude To Geneva, March-May 1954

was America prepared to go to prevent further communist expansion in Southeast

Asia, either by fighting or by making the concessions sought by China?30

Confronted by the Ambassador's question, Mr. Dulles raised the issue with the

National Security Council on 25 March when he addressed the Department of

Defense recommendation that the United States immediately study military intervention. Dulles pointed out that before the Geneva Conference the United States

must have answers to some fundamental questions; specifically: What would the

United States do if the French attempted to sacrifice the position of the free world

in Indochina by accepting terms unacceptable to the United States? and What would

the United States do if the French decided to get out of Indochina? The Secretary

then stated that the United States had to be prepared to write off its interests in

Indochina or to assume responsibility there if the French relinquished their hold.

In reply President Eisenhower listed four conditions to be met before US military intervention might take place: The Associated States would have to request

assistance; the United Nations should sanction the response; other nations would

have to join the United States in answering; and congressional assent must be

given. Dulles thought that the United Nations might sanction assistance, but more

work would have to be done before the Executive Branch presented the case for

intervention to the Congress. After discussing using the Australia-New ZealandUnited States pact as an instrument for united action, the National Security Council directed the Planning Board to make recommendations on "the extent to which

and the circumstances and conditions under which the United States would be

willing to commit its resources in support of the Associated States in the effort to

prevent the loss of Indochina to the Communists, in concert with the French or in

concert with others or, if necessary, unilaterally."31

On 31 March Admiral Radford sought the advice of the Joint Chiefs on plans

for air operations to aid the French at Dien Bien Phu; they opposed such assistance. Drawing on the results of previous planning by his staff, General Ridgway

emphatically warned of the increased risk of general war. General Twining noted

the conditions President Eisenhower placed on any American intervention.3 2

Secretary Dulles began to prepare the American people and world opinion

for possible US intervention in Indochina. After listing the ways in which the

Chinese Communists were aiding the Viet Minh, the Secretary clarified the

American position:

Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asia of the

political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United

States feels that that possibility should not be passively accepted but should be

met by united action. This might involve serious risks. But these risks are far

less than those that will face us a few years from now if we dare not be resolute

today.3

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Supported by Admiral Radford and Mr. Kyes, Dulles sounded out congressional

leaders on the conditions to be met before Congress would sanction American participation in the war. Above all else the congressmen stipulated that the United

States should intervene only as a member of an international coalition. In addition,

Congress would want assurances that France was granting full independence to

the Associated States, that it had developed an effective training program for

native troops, and that it would not withdraw its forces but would prosecute an

aggressive plan for military action.34

Secretary Dulles' call for united action did not deter the Viet Minh from pressing their advantage at Dien Bien Phu. At the end of March, General Giap's troops

assaulted the main bastions of the fortress. By 3 April they had reduced the French

stronghold to a triangle with sides of about 2,500 yards and had captured the northern side of the airfield, making it extremely difficult for the French to reinforce and

supply the fortress.35

The critical situation brought emergency requests for American help. Could

the United States airlift two battalions of paratroopers from North Africa to

Indochina? Would the United States provide some carrier planes to be flown by

French naval aviators? Could the United States furnish eighteen C-47s to transport a reserve paratroop battalion from Hanoi to Dien Bien Phu? And could six

more C-119s be loaned to the French Air Force? These requests were met after

President Eisenhower stressed the need to give the French all possible assistance

short of outright intervention. 36

In Paris, General Ely had been coordinating possible American intervention; he

dispatched an aide to Navarre in Indochina. The operation was now called VAUTOUR (VULTURE). Navarre informed General Earle E. Partridge, USAF, commanding Far East Air Forces, of the plan. Partridge sent Brigadier General Joseph D. C.

Caldera, head of FEAF Bomber Command, to Indochina Caldera had about one hundred B-29s and envisioned launching a mission from Clark Air Base in the Philippines to hit targets around Dien Bien Phu. Due to the possibility of bad weather and

the nearness of the targets to the French lines, the fact that the French had no equipment to support short-range navigation (shoran) posed problems. Therefore, Caldera

thought that carrier-based fighter-bombers would be better suited for the mission.3

Y

The French Make Their Request

L ate on 4 April, Prime Minister Laniel and Foreign Minister Bidault told Ambassador Dillon that "immediate armed intervention of US carrier aircraft at Dien

Bien Phu is now necessary to save the situation." Two considerations spurred the

French request. First, fresh Viet Minh troops were entering the battle faster than

the French could reinforce the garrison with paratroops. Second, General Ely had

told his government that Admiral Radford had promised to do his best to obtain

158
Prelude To Geneva, March-May 1954

American help if Dien Bien Phu required US naval air support. According to the

French leaders the Chinese Communists had, in all but name, already intervened

in the battle. Admitting that American naval air support might bring Chinese Communist air attacks against the Tonkin Delta, Laniel said that his government was

ready to accept the risk. Emphasizing that speedy American intervention was

essential, Bidault observed that the Geneva Conference would be won or lost at

Dien Bien Phu.38

After conferring with the President, Secretary Dulles told the French Government that the United States could not commit belligerent acts in Indochina before

reaching a full political understanding on the formation of a coalition with France

and other countries, particularly the British Commonwealth. He pointed out again

that the President must consult with Congress before going to war. The United

States was presently giving all aid short of active belligerency and was preparing

the public and Congress for intervention. 39 The French Cabinet received the American reply with good grace but continued to believe that a relatively small commitment of airpower would save the day. Therefore, the French asked the United

States to provide ten to twenty B-29s to be flown by French pilots from US bases

in the Philippines. Ambassador Dillon seconded the request, pointing out that if

America failed to help and Dien Bien Phu were lost, the disaster would strengthen

the ministers in the Government who wished for peace at any price. 40 Yet both

political and military logic ran counter to using B-29s at Dien Bien Phu. It would

take time and finesse to obtain Philippine consent for using their territory as a

base for French operations against Asians. It would take more time than was

available to train experienced pilots to operate B-29s; moreover, medium

bombers were not suitable for use against troops in foxholes. Informing General

Valluy of the reasons for not loaning the B-29s, Admiral Radford offered additional fighter-bombers, which the French gratefully accepted. Later, General Ely

claimed that the request for B-29s had been generated by politicians, not by soldiers and airmen.41

The French Govermuent requested B-29s on the same day that the National

Security Council met to consider a Planning Board report recommendating that "the

United States should now reach a decision whether or not to intervene with combat

forces, if that is necessary to save Indochina from Communist control, and, tentatively, [on] the form and conditions of any such intervention," and that "the timing

for communication to the French of such [a] decision, or for its implementation,

should be decided in the light of future developments." If the United States planned

to intervene, the board suggested these actions: (1) obtain congressional approval

for intervention, (2) initiate military and mobilization planning, (3) make and publicize moves to ready US air and naval forces for action on short notice, (4) make it

clear that no acceptable settlement could be reached without far greater communist

concessions, (5) explore with the British Commonwealth and with Asian nations the

formation of a regional coalition, and (6) exert maximum diplomatic pressure on

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

France and the Associated States to resolve the question of the future status of

Indochina and prepare the French and Indochinese for inviting the United States

and other nations to participate in the war.4 2

The National Security Council discussed the report, but it "postponed decision

on the recommendation" that the United States should determine now whether or

not to intervene. President Eisenhower reiterated his opposition to unilateral

American intervention and stated that congressional approval would have to be

won and, as a minimum, the Associated States would have to request American

participation in the struggle.

Secretary Dulles reported his conversations with congressional leaders, and

indicated that discussions with ambassadors of major US allies indicated that

there was little disposition among the allies to take a strong stand on Indochina.

The Secretary rejected the recommendation that the United States decide

whether to intervene; instead discussion focused on the tangential issue of the

Southeast Asian coalition. Some, including the President, believed that bringing

the coalition into existence would strengthen the bargaining position of the West

at Geneva and make intervention unnecessary. Such a coalition could bolster the

ability of other countries in Southeast Asia to resist communism and prevent the

loss of the entire area should Indochina fall. Both Secretary of Defense Wilson

and Admiral Radford opposed the partition of Indochina and pointed out the likely psychological impact on France of the loss of Dien Bien Phu, but the National

Security Council decided to direct US efforts prior to the Geneva Conference

toward organizing an alliance composed initially of ten nations: the United

States, the United Kingdom, France, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Australia, New

Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippine Islands. In addition, the National Security

Council agreed to attempt to win British support for American objectives in the

Far East and to press the French to accelerate granting independence to the

Associated States. President Eisenhower directed the Department of Defense to

obtain congressional approval for increasing the number of US maintenance

technicians in Indochina and for extending the tour of duty of personnel already

there. If Congress approved these steps, the United States could send the French

additional aircraft for use against the Viet Minh.43

The National Security Council's action allowed the Department of Defense to

intensify its efforts in assisting the French to save Dien Bien Phu by providing material aid, yet there was little more material aid that would help. The Air Force inspection team and General Trapnell both reported that French utilization of American

aircraft was limited by lack of flight crews and inadequate base facilities, not shortage of aircraft or maintenance deficiencies. Maintenance problems had largely been

solved by the effective work of US Air Force technicians. Trapnell found the B-26

situation the most critical. The French had thirty-four flight crews to fly forty-three

operational aircraft; additional B-26s would hardly alleviate this imbalance. The

French Air Force did have crews for the naval Corsairs that the United States had

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Prelude To Geneva, March-May 1954

agreed to provide, and it could use American maintenance personnel to keep these

planes flying. The Navy ordered a few of its ratings to Indochina to service the twenty-five carrier planes.4

The critical situation in Indochina induced General Navarre to agree to use the

American officers on his staff and to accept some twenty-five to fifty US personnel

to help train native forces.45 However, some actions by French military authorities

did little to improve Franco-American relations. Admiral Radford had stayed up all

night to obtain approval for airlifting paratroops from North Africa to Indochina,

but after the arrangements were completed, the French announced that the troops

would not be ready to leave for almost two weeks. In addition, the French navy

sent the aircraft carrier Belleau Wood, which had been loaned to France, to the Far

East with a cargo of planes for sale to the Indian Government. The carrier would

arrive off Indochina at a crucial time without aircraft. Finally, General Ely persisted

in misinterpreting his March conversations with Admiral Radford. On 7 April he

complained that:

The diplomatic exchanges of views stemming from the conditional answer

made by the US Government to our request for emergency intervention of the US

Air Forces [sic] in support of our forces at Dien Bien Phu cause me to fear that

this intervention would be subject to time lag which would be too long.

... I ... wish that requested emergency intervention should not remain subordinated to political exchanges of views which will not fail to take a lot of time, in

view of the fact that they must be conducted with several other governments.46

Admiral Radford replied that he and the Secretary of State had made it

absolutely clear

the decision to employ U.S. forces in combat was one that could only be

made at the highest governmental level and in the light of constitutional

processes and congressional action. I did state that no such participation by

U.S. forces was possible without a formal request by the French Government,

and that I was certain that such a request, if made, would receive prompt and

thorough consideration by the United States Government.

Events connected with the request have proved my prediction to be true.

The Secretary of State is moving with great urgency to cope with the situation.

It is receiving the continuing attention at the highest levels of the United States

Government. Meanwhile, every possible effort is being made to take all action,

short of actual intervention by US armed forces, to assist in the defense of

Dien Bien Phu until international arrangements involving the nations who are

so directly affected, can be completed. 47

The Secretary of State attempted to bolster sagging French morale by pointing

out to Foreign Minister Bidault that if Dien Bien Phu were lost, France would not

have lost the war. He again explained that the United States could not become a belligerent until the American people had been prepared for such a step. Dulles' efforts

were only partially successful. Recognizing the realities of American politics, the

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

French Government could not overlook French political considerations. Bidault

replied that if Dien Bien Phu fell "it would be most unlikely that either [the] Associated States or France would be willing to continue [the] war even with full American military support."48

Secretary Dulles was also laboring to build the ten-nation Southeast Asian

security coalition. The French were in sympathy with the idea, but they did not

agree that such an alliance would induce the communists to lighten their terms for

settling the war. They saw that the coalition would not be formed in time to save

Dien Bien-Phu.45 Dulles resorted to personal diplomacy; he flew to Europe on 10

April "to consult with the British and French Governments about some of the very

real problems that are involved in creating the obviously desirable united front to

resist Communist aggression in Southeast Asia." His purpose was not to extend the

fighting, but to end it. Dulles would not prevent the Geneva Conference from arriving at a peaceful settlement; he wanted to create the unity needed to assure a

peaceful settlement. 5°

The Secretary's trip was reasonably successful. From London Dulles and

British Foreign Minister Eden announced that "we are ready to take part, with

the other countries principally concerned, in an examination of the possibility of

establishing a collective defense, within the framework of the Charter of the

United Nations, to assure the peace, security and freedom of Southeast Asia and

the Western Pacific." A day later the Secretary and Foreign Minister Bidault

issued a similar joint declaration. During early April the Department of State

obtained Thai and Philippine acceptance in principle of the idea of a regional

defense organization.5 1

Shortly after Mr. Dulles returned to Washington, however, the British reneged

on their agreement to form the regional defense organization before Geneva.

Eden later explained that Commonwealth politics dictated the change in British

policy. The Colombo Powers, including three Commonwealth members (India,

Pakistan, and Ceylon), were to convene on 26 April. Mr. Eden believed it "most

undesirable" for Britain to give any public indication of membership in a program

for united action until the Colombo Conference had ended. The establishment of

the working group of ten nations, which did not include the three Asian Commonwealth members, would produce criticism that Mr. Eden felt would be "most

unhelpful" at Geneva. Privately Dulles attributed the British reversal to fear that

intervention would bring overt Chinese participation in Indochina and lead to

World War III.52

Although the State Department could not arrange united action, the first prerequisite for American intervention, the Department of Defense continued planning

and preparations. CINCPAC's representative arrived in Saigon to confer with General Navarre on plans for American air support. A few days later the Department of

Defense moved a carrier task force, including the Essex and the Boxer, into the

South China Sea between Indochina and the Philippines. The JCS planning

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Prelude To Geneva, March-May 1954

machinery recommended policies for guiding CINCPAC, CINCFE, and COMSAC

(Commander, Strategic Air Command) in preparing operational plans for meeting

possible Chinese Communist aggression in Indochina or Korea. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff on 23 April accepted the outline plan for Indochina that assumed that the

French Union would continue to supply ground troops while the United States furnished air and naval support."3

Although the Joint Chiefs had repeatedly approved limited American intervention in Indochina if circumstances required, in early April 1954 General Ridgway

suggested a broader course of action. Returning to a 1952 position of the Joint

Chiefs, he recommended that the United States concentrate its strength against

Communist China, the source of Viet Minh military power. If the United States

decided to use armed force to hold Indochina, it should line up allied support and

warn the communists that it would neutralize the sources of Viet Minh strength. It

should initiate mobilization and other supporting measures after enlisting allied

military support. Ridgway pointed out that there were few decisive targets in

Indochina. American intervention might result in local successes, but it would

"constitute a dangerous diversion of limited US military capabilities, and could

commit our armed forces in a non-decisive theater to the attainment of non-decisive local objectives."

The other Chiefs of Staff did not immediately accept General Ridgway's analysis; the JCS noted Ridgway's views and forwarded them to the Secretary of

Defense. After the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the deterioration of the French position at Geneva, the Joint Chiefs came back to General Ridgway's proposal. 54

Supporters of intervention needed to gauge the degree of public support for

such a step. Vice President Richard M. Nixon took action. Asked what the country

should do if the French withdrew from Indochina, Mr. Nixon replied:

that there was no reason why the French could not stay on and win, but on the

assumption they did withdraw-an assumption he did not accept-Indochina

would become Communist in a month.

The United States as a leader of the free world cannot afford further

retreat in Asia. It was hoped that the United States would not have to send

troops there, but if this Government could not avoid it, the Administration

must face up to the situation and dispatch forces.

Public reaction to Nixon's statement was unfavorable. Mr. Nixon had to counter the impression that the administration was bent on war. He said, "The aim of the

United States is to hold Indochina without war involving the United States, if we

can," and "The purpose of our policy is to avoid sending our boys to Indochina or

anywhere else to fight."55

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Mr. Dulles and Admiral Radford Go to Paris

W ith public opinion and the Congress unready for unilateral American action

and the British unwilling to internationalize the war, the only course was to

use moral suasion to keep the French from giving in at Geneva. There was still

hope that the situation could be saved since the Viet Minh had adopted "nibbling"

tactics at Dien Bien Phu, progressively reducing the perimeter, but not overwhelming the defenders.56

Hoping to salvage the Southeast Asian coalition and establish a French bargaining position, Secretary Dulles left for Paris and Geneva on 20 April. Three days

later Admiral Radford journeyed to Paris and London to discuss the military situation with the French and British. Before he left, Radford met .with members of the

Joint Chiefs and the State Department. He warned of what could follow the fall of

Dien Bien Phu. It would be difficult to evacuate French civilians; the French would

abandon their Vietnamese allies.57

The French Government believed it would have to negotiate when the enemy

took Dien Bien Phu. According to Bidault and Ely the situation at the fortress was

hopeless short of "massive air intervention, which the US would have to supply."

Recalling that Mr. Dulles thought US participation impracticable without British

cooperation, Bidault belittled the help that the United Kingdom would give and

urged that the American Government give the "most serious consideration to

armed intervention promptly as the only way to save the situation." Turning to the

idea of a Southeast Asia defense coalition, the Secretary of State argued "that this

was essential to give some cards to work with at Geneva so as to have a chance of

obtaining acceptable peace." If Dien Bien Phu were lost, Bidault answered, the

French people would regard the coalition as a trick to keep them fighting; they

would probably want to pull out of Southeast Asia.58

Growing more distraught, Navarre told the American charg6 d'affaires in

Saigon that he needed airpower and US ground forces.5 9 He informed his government that if American air intervention did not arrive promptly he would have to

conclude a cease-fire throughout Indochina. Bidault passed General Navarre's

warning to Secretary Dulles. Admitting that US help might come too late to save

Dien Bien Phu, the Foreign Minister pleaded for intervention; with Americans at

their side the French would feel honor-bound to go on fighting. In a formal reply

Mr. Dulles reminded the French that the required congressional authorization

would be predicated on a coalition. As things stood, B-29 operations were "out of

the question." Dulles told Eisenhower that "Bidault gives the impression of a man

close to the breaking point.., obviously exhausted and is confused and rambling

in his talk." Dulles' military advisers told him that air intervention would no

longer save Dien Bien Phu; the real question was what to do next. He advised the

French to "react vigorously to temporary setbacks and to surmount them. That

can be done in relation to the present situation if our nations and people have the

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Prelude To Geneva, March-May 1954

resolution and the will. We believe that you can count upon us, and we hope that

we can count on you."6

" General Ely renewed the discussion of America's role

with Admiral Radford; the general asked for intervention. Admitting that American airpower could have no direct bearing on the outcome at Dien Bien Phu, Ely

said its effect would be psychological; it would keep the Laniel government in

office and France in the war. Radford replied that the Secretary of State had stated the US position. Reporting the Eiy-Radford talk, Ambassador Dillon commented that American failure to intervene would prompt the dissolution of the Laniel

government. Its replacement would be a cabinet pledged both to negotiate with

Ho Chi Minh and to withdraw from Indochina; it would probably not accept

US intervention. 6

'

Ambassador Dillon did not persuade the Secretary of State of the need for intervention. Since the security of the United States was not directly threatened, Dulles

opposed the President committing forces by executive action. He believed that

intervention was not in the long-range interests of the country. Since a successor

French government might repudiate American help, he advised against taking a step

that would gravely strain relations with the British, Australians, and New Zealanders. He preferred dealing with a successor government to intervening unilaterally.62

The Americans were not successful in winning British agreement to establish

the Southeast Asia coalition in time to affect the Geneva negotiations. Mr. Eden

repeated that Britain could not work to draft terms of reference until the Colombo

Conference had met. If the coalition were formed, he doubted that Britain would

agree to fight to save Indochina. Eden did recognize that if the French lost Indochina, the communists would threaten Burma and Malaya. He was prepared to recommend that a secret group composed of American, British, Australian, New Zealand,

and Thai military representatives consider actions for strengthening Thailand.

Dulles suggested that this idea be held in abeyance until a clearer picture of French

actions emerged and persuaded Eden to consult further with the British Cabinet.6

"

The British would only agree to hold secret military talks with the United

States. They remained opposed to intervening in Indochina or to establishing a

coalition for intervention. Her Majesty's Government based its position on an estimate by the British Chiefs of Staff that airpower alone would not save Dien Bien

Phu and that the only way to cope with the situation was to commit a strong force

in the Tonkin Delta to "work outward concentrically consolidating their position as

they go with loyal natives." Such an operation would involve lots of time and considerable forces.64 Admiral Radford discussed this estimate with the British Chiefs

of Staff and with Prime Minister Churchill. British military leaders agreed with the

American view of the probable serious consequences that would follow the loss of

Indochina. After hearing the admiral's views, the British Chiefs continued to be

apprehensive of Chinese entry if the allies intervened. Moreover, they were thinking of large-scale ground operations. Their principal concern was holding Malaya.

The Prime Minister also concentrated on British interests. Britain had given India

165
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

independence, how could the English people be asked to save Indochina for the

French Empire?65

Following his conversation with Admiral Radford, the Prime Minister stated

the British position in the House of Commons.

Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to give any undertakings

about United Kingdom military action in Indochina in advance of the results of

Geneva. Her Majesty's Government have not entered into any new political or

military commitments. My Right Honorable friend [Eden] has, of course, made

it clear to his colleagues at Geneva that if settlements are reached at Geneva,

Her Majesty's Government will be ready to play their full part in supporting

them in order to promote a stable peace in the Far East.66

Meeting with Eden and Dulles on 26 April, Radford said that he doubted that

an air intervention could save Dien Bien Phu; Dulles considered it impossible constitutionally. In Radford's view, however, an announcement of American intervention could prevent French collapse. The Communist Chinese would not resort to

war, and in any case "acceptance of risk is necessary in order to avoid being nibbled to death."67

Confronted with the British statement, Mr. Dulles and the National Security

Council turned to establishing a regional coalition without the United Kingdom.66

The Secretary of State conferred with the Foreign Ministers of Australia and New

Zealand under the terms of the ANZUS pact. He stressed the necessity for a common stand by all countries in Southeast Asia. While they did not make any commitments, the Australians were willing to hold talks immediately; they preferred that

the discussions take place within the Five-Power Staff Agency, of which Britain

was a member. New Zealand was also willing to begin the talks immediately. Neither country objected to including Thailand. 6

9

With the Americans preparing for talks with the Dominions, the British Foreign

Minister reversed his field. Eden told Mr. Dulles that he was ready to recommend

that "Her Majesty's Government should take part at once with the United States,

France, Australia, and New Zealand in an examination by the Five Power staff

agency of the Indochina and Southeast Asia situation, both now and subsequent to

the Geneva conference,... including the implications of any Geneva settlement."

The British, however, would remain opposed to intervention. Dulles believed the

staff talks were an avenue of hope and that they would have a good effect at the

conference and on public opinion.76

On 29 April the National Security Council discussed plans for a regional security organization for Southeast Asia and reviewed with the Planning Board the

possible use of nuclear weapons in Indochina. The meeting was inconclusive; it

remained uncertain whether one weapon would be enough to save Dien Bien

Phu. Also uncertain was whether the French could use a nuclear weapon if it

were turned over to them, and whether such action would be legal. President

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Prelude To Geneva, March-May 1954

Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon privately agreed that naval fighter-bombers

using napalm and high explosive would probably work better. Eisenhower finally

concluded that nuclear weapons could not be used and that the public would not

support the use of American troops.71

Staff talks, air strikes, threats, all became irrelevant when the French Union

defenders of Dien Bien Phu surrendered on 7 May. The Indochina phase of the

Geneva Conference began the next day. The French had said for weeks that the fall

of the fortress would make negotiations inevitable and the British were prepared to

accept a cease-fire. President Eisenhower's conditions for intervention had not

been met. Radford had made his case for intervention but other views, including

those of the rest of the Chiefs, were the ones that finally prevailed.

167
10

Geneva and the End

of Intervention

Dulles had helped to persuade Laniel that the loss of Dien Bien Phu did not

mean the end of the war. But the Prime Minister judged that the survival of his government depended on negotiating an end to the fighting. If Laniel were to fall,

according to Dulles, "the government will be taken over by defeatists."' Radford

spoke for those who were convinced that the United States needed to be prepared

to fight to prevent all of Southeast Asia from falling to the communists. While viewing the matter seriously, the other Joint Chiefs did not challenge President Eisenhower's unwillingness to commit troops. Now that the situation was critical, the

Chiefs offered proposals concerning strategy; in particular, how to save what was

left. A regional security organization for Southeast Asia would provide a context

for military intervention by the United States and a means of saving the situation

after a cease-fire. Eisenhower shared the Joint Chiefs' concern based on experience in Korea, that cease-fire talks with the communists carried great danger, but

at Geneva, the French made their first offer.

French Armistice Proposal and US Reaction

M eeting on 8 May, the National Security Council decided that the United

States ought not to support any proposal for a cease-fire in advance of an

acceptable armistice agreement under international controls. Although the council felt that the United States could agree to the initiation of negotiations for an

armistice, it urged France and the Associated States to continue to oppose the

Viet Minh. To strengthen the position of France and the Associated States during

the negotiations, the United States would continue its aid program and its efforts

169
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

to organize a Southeast Asian regional grouping to prevent further communist

expansion in that area. 2

Secretary Dulles told the National Security Council that he intended to indicate

to the French Government the United States' willingness to discuss the conditions

under which the Indochinese conflict might be internationalized. The French knew

that American intervention depended upon fulfilling three conditions: real independence for the Associated States, an aggressive military plan, and an effective

program for the training of native troops. In explaining the administration's position on intervention to leading members of Congress on 5 May, Dulles stated that

these prerequisites had not been met; therefore, conditions did not exist for a successful conclusion of the war. Intervention was not advisable; the United States

would not intervene unless other interested nations joined.3

American intervention was the only ace the two partners had. The original

French armistice proposals at Geneva were conditioned by uncertainty about

American intentions, while American support depended upon the nature of the proposals. Four days before the conference, M. de Margerie, of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, told Under Secretary of State Smith that the French had not advised the

United States of their ideas about possible armistice proposals because they had

not been able to agree among themselves. He said that the French Government

realized the near impossibility of preventing the communists from profiting by a

cease-fire or armistice arrangement, but that it was necessary to seek the course

with fewest bad consequences. De Margerie hoped that the French proposals

would receive American support, but Under Secretary Smith replied that United

States policy still was that anything short of prosecution of the Navarre Plan to victory was not good enough. De Margerie observed that was a "large order" but the

United States would not be "too unhappy" over the French proposals. He added

that, in any case, the United States was not in a good position to object unless prepared to intervene militarily.4

The French proposals, not yet authorized by the Cabinet, were better than

expected. The Laniel government took the line that the problem of Vietnam was

purely Vietnamese, with no question of partition, and that it was a military struggle

for control of the government. Laos and Cambodia were categorized as victims of

external aggression. According to the Berlin Agreement, the Geneva Conference

was to establish peace in all three countries. To this end, there should be a supervised cease-fire, guaranteed by military and administrative controls, which would

take effect only when such guarantees had been embodied in armistice conventions, which might be different for all three states, and when control machinery

was in place. Controls would be based upon Premier Laniel's March 5 conditions.

When the cease-fire occurred, regular troops would regroup in delimited areas and

all other forces would be disarmed. The international control machinery would

require a considerable number of personnel. After peace had been established,

political and economic problems could be examined. 5

170
Geneva and the End of Intervention

According to the French delegate, the French assumed the Soviets would propose an immediate cease-fire, to be followed by a political settlement based on

coalition and immediate elections. Such a proposal would force the West into

opposing the cease-fire. In spite of the strong desire of the French public for a

cease-fire, the government would defend its proposal on the ground that its conditions were essential for the safety of the troops. Achieving those conditions would

delay any cease-fire for a long time, if not indefinitely. The French delegate stated

there was no firm position on the issue of "United Nations" supervision. Subsequent

discussion, however, indicated that the French opposed the use of UN machinery

fearing that it would establish a precedent that could be used against them in North

Africa and elsewhere. The British shared this view.6 One of the proponents of a

cease-fire was General Navarre. High Commissioner De Jean vigorously opposed a

cease-fire and recommended that Foreign Minister Bidault ignore Navarre. The

American charg6 d'affaires in Saigon observed that it was the irony of war that the

general wished to surrender, while the diplomat wished to forge ahead.7

The draft French terms were not an outright request for a cease-fire, but the

United States delegate cabled that "unless or until we have firm support in the

United States for some other solution we are not in a position in Geneva to prevent

the French from making such a proposal, which is far below a successful prosecution of the Navarre plan." He doubted that the French would remain firm in negotiations for satisfactory controls and believed that they would slide rapidly toward a

communist counter-proposal of immediate cease-fire without controls. Important

in blocking French capitulation would be the degree to which the United States

could increase communist uncertainty about the possibility of American intervention. Success in organizing some form of Southeast Asian coalition would also bolster the French.'

The Joint Chiefs thought the French proposal would be regarded by the people of Asia as a communist victory, particularly in the light of the military situation. In their view, an armistice under the proposed conditions would lead to a

political stalemate and progressive deterioration of the French-Vietnamese military position resulting in the loss of Indochina. Even if the communists agreed to

undertake negotiations pursuant to the French proposals, the negotiations could

be expected to result either in rapid capitulation of the French to obtain a ceasefire or in a protracted debate characterized by communist adherence to an inflexible position on important issues and by substantial French concessions. Experience in Korea indicated that the communists would flagrantly evade, circumvent,

and violate any agreement in order to subjugate all of Indochina regardless of the

military and administrative controls embodied in the armistice. If the communists

agreed to international control, their practices would render it impotent, as in

Korea. The JCS were skeptical that the communists would agree to refrain from

new military operations during the course of negotiations. It was likely that they

171
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

would intensify operations to improve their bargaining position; the French would

seek to avoid casualties.

If the United States associated itself with the initial French terms, it would

likely be confronted later with the alternative of supporting the French in weakened positions or of extricating itself. The Chiefs agreed that it was no longer realistic to insist that the French continue to prosecute the Navarre Plan, but they

adhered to the view that a satisfactory settlement was impossible without substantial improvement in the French military situation. Without a settlement that would

assure the political and territorial integrity of the Associated States, any armistice

would lead to eventual loss of the area to the communists. In light of the current

situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed the United States should adopt this minimum position:

... The United States will not associate itself with any French proposal directed

toward cease-fire in advance of a satisfactory political settlement. The United

States urges the French Government to propose that negotiations for a political

settlement be initiated at once. During the course of such negotiations, French

Union Forces should continue to oppose the forces of the Viet Minh with all

means at their disposal in order to reinforce the French negotiating position. In

the meantime, as a means of strengthening the French hand, the United States

will intensify its efforts to organize and promptly activate a Southeast Asian

coalition for the purpose of preventing further expansion of Communist power

in Southeast Asia. If the French Government persists in its intention of entering

armistice negotiations or accedes to immediate cease-fire negotiations, the

United States will disassociate itself from such negotiations in order to maintain maximum freedom of action in taking whatever measures may be feasible

for opposing extension of Communist control into Southeast Asia.9

To clarify the United States' refusal to associate itself with a cease-fire in

advance of a political settlement, the President inserted the phrase "because of the

proof given in Korea that the Communists will not be bound militarily by the terms

of an armistice." He added a clause stating that the United States would continue

its aid program to the French.10 The Joint Chiefs' recommendations were at the

heart of the National Security Council position taken on 8 May.

The uncompromising JCS position contained internal contradictions that carried over into the National Security Council position. While, as General Ridgway

pointed out, the United States had to support some French proposal, no position

was acceptable that would lead to the loss of Indochina. But it was almost

inevitable that a settlement based on either partition or coalition government

could have no other result. An agreement assuring the political and territorial

integrity of the Associated States would be highly desirable, but no such settlement had been proposed. Ridgway believed that the French would reject an

American attempt to force them to propose a political settlement that did not

take into account the realities of the military situation. In that event, the Joint

172
Geneva and the End of Intervention

Chiefs' position, if followed, would oblige the United States to disassociate itself

from France prior to any discussions on Indochina which would jeopardize the

Franco-American alliance, accelerate French settlement for a cease-fire, and

open the way for new aggression in Southeast Asia.

General Ridgway thought that the United States should support a proposal similar to Premier Laniel's conditions because they held out the greatest hope of

France continuing the war. Laniel's conditions were: (a) total evacuation of Laos

and Cambodia by the Viet Minh; (b) evacuation of the Tonkin Delta by the Viet

Minh, and creation of a no-man's land around the periphery; (c) withdrawal of Viet

Minh troops from central Vietnam to specified and restricted areas; (d) disarmament or evacuation of Viet Minh forces in south Vietnam; and (e) measures of security and control to prevent buildup of enemy forces during armistice discussions. If

the French began to negotiate without these guarantees, the United States should

not be a party to the talks. Ridgway was convinced that the French would endorse

continuing the struggle only after it had been demonstrated that an honorable settlement was impossible."

The American attitude did not help the French Government, which was fighting desperately to negotiate at Geneva, instead of trying to reach an agreement

with the Viet Minh immediately. Wits in Paris prognosticated that the Assembly

would allow the government "to keep its head above water but not show its neck."

According to the embassy, "its neck emerged" when it won a vote of confidence by

a better margin than expected. But the government's victory was subject to an

implicit caveat: should it fail to find a solution at Geneva along the lines indicated

by Laniel on 5 March, it would face almost insurmountable pressure to reach an

immediate settlement with the Viet Minh on terms presumably considerably less

than Laniel's conditions.12

The French tabled their proposal on the opening day of the Indochinese conference:

I-For Viet Nam:

1. The grouping of regular units in zones of assembly, to be determined by

the conference on the basis of proposals from the commanders-in-chief.

2. The disarmament of elements which do not belong either to the Army

or to forces in charge of maintaining order.

3. The immediate liberation of war prisoners and civilian internees.

4. The control of the execution of these clauses by international commissions.

5. Cessation of hostilities with the signing of this agreement.

The re-assembly of troops and the disarmament cited above, provided for in

the five points, would begin, at the latest, [number of days] after the signing of

the accord.

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

II-For Cambodia and Laos:

1. Evacuation of all regular and irregular Viet Minh forces which have

invaded the countries.

2. The disarmament of elements which do not belong either to the Army

or to forces in charge of maintaining order.

3. The immediate liberation of war prisoners and civilian internees.

4. The control of the execution of these clauses by international commissions.

III

These agreements shall be guaranteed by the States participating in the Geneva

Conference. Any violation would call for immediate consultation among these

States with a view to taking appropriate measures individually or collectively.1'

The American delegate pointed out that the proposal was an armistice, not a

cease-fire, because it provided for cessation of hostilities only after the first four

conditions of Section I had been complied with. He drew attention to a major loophole: as assembly and disarming of troops would follow, rather than precede, cessation of hostilities, it was possible to make a simple cease-fire out of a paper

armistice agreement. He noted that the French had retained the good bargaining

position offered by the distinction between Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia.

Under Secretary Smith reported that the French had not thought through their proposal. Their thinking on regrouping, for instance, was that the framework would be

established by the conference, and that commanders in the field would work out

the details, which would then be submitted to the conference for approval. "There

was no answer to Allen's remark that Eden did not wish to spend the next two

years in Geneva," stated the Under Secretary. Even more serious was the possibility that on-the-spot technical conversations between the combatants could substitute for formal agreements and circumvent the conference.

The French had no definite idea on the composition of control commissions,

other than their not necessarily having to be of the same nationalities as the guarantors mentioned in paragraph III. But the Laniel government did appear to show

less opposition to United Nations' control and selection of commissions. On the

question of guarantees, the American delegate showed the most reservation. He

stressed the need for clarification and for careful consideration of this point lest

it oblige the United States to underwrite a settlement that, at best, would be highly unstable. But the American response to this part of the proposal would have

an important bearing on French firmness in negotiating the other conditions of

an armistice.

Recognizing the amorphous state of the proposals, and their risks to the United

States, the Under Secretary of State felt there was more to lose than gain by not

supporting them at this stage of the negotiations. Among other things, the United

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Geneva and the End of Intervention

States would probably be in a better position to win Britain, Australia, and New

Zealand over to a more active role in a Southeast Asian defense.14

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee observed that there were no provisions

or safeguards for United States security interests involved in the acceptance of any

armistice with the communists that were not preceded by a satisfactory political

settlement. In the absence of strong and positive action by the Western Powers, an

armistice would almost certainly lead to the subjugation of Indochina and, eventually, to the loss of all Southeast Asia to the communists. In view of the decision of

the United States to concur in the initiation of negotiations, the committee interposed no further objections, providing the French incorporated provisions for

international control machinery, to be established, in place, and ready to function

prior to actual cease-fire, and a provision that representatives of the international

control commission be guaranteed unrestricted movement in, and free access to,

all Indochina."1

The recommendations of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee headed the list

of principles furnished the American delegate to guide him in evaluating proposals

offered to the conference. These principles were considered basic to an acceptable

settlement of the Indochinese question:

1. The establishment of international control machinery in place and

ready to function prior to an actual cease-fire.

2. Representatives of the international control commission should be

guaranteed unrestricted movement in, and free access to, all of Indochina. S3. Such a commnission should have sufficient military personnel and logistic

support to discharge its responsibilities in connection with the armistice terms.

4. Provision for UN assumption of responsibility for supervision of the

international control commission. (Some other form of effective international

control might well be a satisfactory substitute for UN supervision.)

5. Measures to provide for the security of troops and populations, and

guarantees against abuses of the cease-fire by either party.

6. Provisions for the humane and orderly liberation of prisoners of war

and internees.

7. Evacuation of Viet Minh forces from Laos and Cambodia.

8. Provision for the examination of political and economic problems following an armistice agreement.

9. No provisions in the armistice of a political nature, such as for early

elections or for troop withdrawals that would clearly lead to a communist

take-over. 16

By acquiescing in armistice negotiations, the United States abandoned the

demand for a political settlement first; it was a self-inflicted defeat. The United

States had taken an extreme stand by insisting that the French hold out for a political settlement before considering an armistice. On 6 May, Admiral Davis had

cabled, "General Smith requests I make clear to you his conviction that it is now

certain French will not take any negotiating position, even initially, as strong as

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persistence in Navarre plan.""7 Since the Berlin Conference, it had become apparent that the French people would not support an all-out effort to win the war if

negotiations failed.

In addition to the specific principles governing armistice negotiations, the

Under Secretary of State, as head of the United States delegation, was provided

with a set of basic instructions, approved by the President. Under Secretary Smith

was instructed to deal with delegates of the Chinese Communist regime, or any

other regime not recognized diplomatically by the United States, only as a regime

with which it was necessary to deal on a de facto basis to end aggression and to

obtain peace. The position of the United States in the Indochinese phase of the

conference was that of an interested nation, neither a belligerent nor a principal in

the negotiation. The United States was to assist in arriving at decisions that would

help the nations of that area to enjoy territorial integrity and political independence under stable and free governments, with the opportunity to expand their

economies, to realize their legitimate national aspirations, and to develop security

through individual and collective defense against aggression.

The United States was not prepared to give its approval to any cease-fire,

armistice, or other settlement that would subvert the existing lawful governments

of the three Associated States, permanently impair their territorial integrity or

place in jeopardy the forces of the French Union in Indochina. If continued participation in the conference appeared likely to involve the United States in a result

inconsistent with this policy, the American delegate was instructed to recommend

withdrawal or limitation of the United States' role to that of observer.'8 These

instructions had been cleared with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and

the House Foreign Affairs Committee.19

The United States delegate was "to support in general terms French initiative

looking toward an armistice agreement incorporating effective and adequate safeguards and under international supervision." He was to remind the French of the

American objective of assuring the independence and freedom of the Associated

States. Finally, he was to make it clear that the United States would reserve its

position until more was known about the nature of the settlement and the obligations of its guarantors."0

Conditions for American Intervention

U nited action would be essential to the success of any American intervention.

Secretary Dulles was attempting to bring together the powers with an interest

in Southeast Asia in a regional security group. Military talks with the British and

French as well as Australians and New Zealanders were the first step, but the

British and French were showing extreme reluctance to support any such effort.

Laniel now insisted that French requests for American air intervention at Dien Bien

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Phu had been strictly informal. Dulles described Churchill as "scared to death" of

Soviet nuclear weapons and the British as unwilling to risk a larger war brought on

by American intervention. Radford continued to argue that Southeast Asia could not

be held after the fall of Indochina, as the countries in the region were vulnerable to

subversion as well as invasion. Under the circumstances, a general war was worth

the risk and Radford doubted that war would result from a stronger American

stand. Eisenhower was "strongly opposed to any assumption that it was necessary

to have a war with China."I

Token intervention seemed unlikely to be effective, but the National Security

Council continued to consider options. Meeting on 6 May, it explored an American

volunteer group for Indochina, possibly equipped with three squadrons of F-86

Sabrejets. Eisenhower suggested that they include multi-engine pilots so that

bombers could be made available to the force. The council did agree that the United States should take part in the five-power military talks as a step toward a

regional security organization in Southeast Asia. 22

Dulles feared that a proposal to internationalize the war would be rejected if it

was raised before the French were convinced that their only choice was between

intervention and what amounted to surrender. Moreover, the British would be

more likely to support, or acquiesce in, intervention once Geneva had offered no

solution. The Australian Government would almost certainly not take a position

until after the elections at the end of May. Nevertheless, it appeared desirable for

Premier Laniel to know the American conditions because of their influence on

French military decisions in Indochina and political decisions in Geneva. Accordingly, Mr. Dulles told Ambassador Dillon that the President would ask Congress for

authority to use the armed forces of the United States in the Indochinese area to

support friendly and recognized governments against aggression or armed subversion fomented from without, providing he could state that the following conditions

had been, or would be, met:

(a) That US military participation had been formally requested by France

and three Associated States;

(b) That Thailand, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and United Kingdom also had received similar invitations and that we were satisfied that first

two would also accept at once; that next two would probably accept following

Australian elections, if US invokes ANZUS Treaty; and that UK would either

participate or be acquiescent;

(c) That some aspect of matter would be presented to UN promptly,

such as by request from Laos, Cambodia, or Thailand for peace observation commission;

(d) That France guarantees to Associated States complete independence,

including an unqualified option to withdraw from French Union at any time;

(e) France would undertake not to withdraw its forces from Indochina

during period of united action so that forces from the US-principally air and

sea-and others would be supplementary and not in substitution;

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(f) That agreement was reached on training of native troops and on command structure for united action.

Because of the uncertain tenure of any French government, the United States

required that all of these conditions be accepted by the French Cabinet and authorized or endorsed by the French National Assembly. Once it had agreed to intervene,

the United States would be committed and would rely upon any successor French

Government to adhere to the conditions. The conditions were "absolutely indispensable as a basis for our [United States] action."23 Dulles authorized the oral communication of these views to Premier Laniel unless, in the opinion of the Ambassador,

it would result in the immediate resignation of the French Government or hasten

its capitulation at Geneva.24

Premier Laniel and Maurice Schumann appeared pleased by clarification of the

United States position, according to the Ambassador. They were particularly

impressed and gratified by the indication that participation by the United Kingdom

was no longer a prerequisite to action by the United States. They pointed out that

France had no control over compliance by Thailand, Australia, or any other country, with the conditions stipulated for them, and asked to be kept informed of United States progress.

The one serious French objection was to the condition that France publicly

accord to the Associated States the right to withdraw from the French Union; they

stressed that even the Viet Minh looked toward the possibility of joining the French

Union.25 When Dillon reported that this point might discourage even the strongest

supporters of continued French action, Dulles replied:

... [I] firmly believe that it is essential [to] remove any taint of colonialism in

order to attract vital Asian support and forestall opposition by other Asian and

Middle Eastern countries.., you should emphasize this concern of ours and

our belief that the only way to achieve these results would be through provision of this right of withdrawal.26

Laniel and Schumann observed that French public opinion would never understand why such a statement was necessary when it had never been requested by

any of the three Associated States.27 The French were concerned that North Africa

might see the French Union as something to be left easily.

For Ambassador Dillon the matter of independence had been taken care of by

the pending treaties between France and Vietnam, but the situation was obscured

and complicated by a state of war. Much of the difficulty was caused by the presence of a large French expeditionary corps in Vietnam, by a French supreme military commander, and by the absence of a powerful Vietnamese national army. Solution of the problem appeared to be the creation of a real national army. The

Ambassador recalled that Korea had become a demonstrably free and independent

nation as its own army was built up. Therefore, the United States should press for a

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publicized agreement with France giving the United States prime responsibility for

training and equipping the Vietnamese army. There were many advantages: Vietnamese independence would no longer be questioned; doubts about the ability of

the French military command to accomplish the task would be circumvented; and

the French would be able to withdraw the Expeditionary Corps after the end of

hostilities. The French withdrawal would also probably have a salutary effect upon

the Chinese Communists.28

Recognizing the virtues of Dillon's solution, Mr. Dulles rejoined that, "We cannot wait for the abolition of all deep-rooted abuses and extra-territorial privileges

in times like these." He continued to explore obtaining a public, preferably international, declaration on the subject of Vietnamese independence, and to press for

prompt signature of the draft treaties between France and Vietnam.29 Both Ambassador Dillon and Under Secretary Smith were anxious to see the basic treaties

signed. Until then they occupied an uncomfortable position at Geneva. Moreover, it

was probable that, following signature, Bao Dai would return promptly to Vietnam

and attempt to assume national leadership.30

Premier Laniel and Buu Loc initialled the Franco-Vietnamese treaties of independence and association on 4 June.31 Mr. Dulles cabled the American Ambassador

to inform the French that "initialling" the treaties did not meet the United States

condition concerning independence. 32 Schumann explained that this initialling was

far more important than the usual initialling of a treaty. Schumann gave assurances

that the French were ready to sign, but the Americans learned from the Vietnamese

charg6 d'affaires that conclusion and signature of the related convention, to which

treaty signature was subordinated, had bogged down.33 The treaties had not been

signed by the end of the Geneva Conference, and Bao Dai remained in France.

If the French wanted to use the possibility of United States intervention primarily as a card to play at Geneva, it was to their advantage to not reach a firm decision until the conference had run its course. While the United States was anxious

to bolster the French position, the impression was growing that Laniel might be

using the US conditions to create an alibi for himself or his successor. Capitulation

could be blamed on the United States for having presented unacceptable terms.

This suspicion was shared by American representatives at the conference but there

was good reason to believe the French were as confused about the intentions of

the United States as the Americans were about France's. 34

French Attempts to Secure Unconditional

Intervention

T he French turned immediately to a detailed consideration of the military support they would receive following intervention, instead of first complying with

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the political prerequisites upon which intervention depended. Their action created

the impression that they were attempting to maneuver the United States into a

position where it could be accused of haggling over minutiae instead of coming to

their aid. Once in that position, the United States would have had to enter the war

under conditions more suitable to the French or bear the blame for capitulation.

On the other hand, it was evident that the French military thought there had

already been an agreement to the US conditions and they could not understand

why the United States did not proceed with its commitments. For instance, based

on the statement of the United States that it would commit principally air and sea

forces if it intervened, the French asked for twenty thousand Marines, and then

raised the request to six divisions. When Ambassador Bonnet reported there were

not six Marine divisions in existence, Paris replied that there had to be some kind

of contribution. And "then they piled it on," commented a State Department representative.35 Schumann was "excited and dismayed" when told that Admiral Radford

had said there was no question of using Marines in Indochina which, according to

the French Ambassador, conflicted with what the French Government had understood to be the intentions of the United States.

This incident that coincided with other cases of serious misunderstanding

underlined General Smith's cable from Geneva that "the US position is not understood here."36 The Secretary of State told the French Ambassador that the US position had been clear from the start, and that the United States was not willing to

make an advance commitment the French could use for political maneuvering or

for negotiating at Geneva since it would represent a permanent option on United

States intervention. The American stand was "all or nothing." Ambassador Bonnet

expressed surprise that the United States thought the French Government had not

made up its mind to internationalize the war as he considered the request had

already been made.37 At the same time, Under Secretary Smith was explaining to

Bidault and Chauvel that the President could not ask Congress to sanction intervention until the basic conditions had been fulfilled by France.38

In apprising Premier Laniel of the US conditions a month earlier, Ambassador

Dillon had made it clear that they represented high-level thinking in Washington

and did not constitute a commitment by the United States Government. Nevertheless, Laniel requested definite assurance, preferably in writing, that American aviation would immediately come to the aid of French forces in the delta if they were

attacked by MIGs. 39 In March, General Ely and Admiral Radford had arranged the

preparation of plans to cover the eventuality of Chinese air attack, so as to waste

no time if an attack came and the United States decided to intervene. Apparently

on the basis of those arrangements, Premier Laniel, Maurice Schumann, General

Ely, and other high French officials began to speak as though the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff had made a commitment of immediate United States retaliation in the event of overt Communist Chinese aggression. The French leaders did

seem to realize that any action would require political approval, but they wanted to

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be sure that assistance would come rapidly. On 1 June their inquiries were brought

to President Eisenhower, who expressed himself very strongly on the subject. He

said that the United States would not intervene in China on any basis except united

action. Eisenhower would not be responsible for going into China alone unless a

joint congressional resolution ordered him to do so. United action was a condition

for both a regional grouping for the defense of Southeast Asia and intervention in.

response to overt Chinese aggression. 40

On the day after the President had stated his position General Valluy asked

Admiral Radford if the President could obtain some sort of "blank check" from the

Congress, so that US aid could be provided in a minimum of time. He also asked if

the French could count on US assistance, which might involve the landing of

Marines, if the French were forced to evacuate Hanoi and withdraw to the

Haiphong redoubt. Admiral Radford did not directly answer either question. He

stated that US intelligence did not indicate the Chinese Communists were making

any preparations for air intervention and repeated the US policy of united action.

Valluy was not satisfied. He likened the French situation to that of a man on a sinking ship. Seven or eight destroyers at a distance were little help; what he needed

was an airplane to come and rescue him.

Admiral Radford replied that the matter was beyond his control, as it involved

a political decision of grave importance. Concerning the Marines, he reminded

General Valluy that any landing could only be pursuant to a political decision to

intervene, which in turn depended upon fulfillment of the conditions already sent

to the French Government. In the event of intervention, the United States force

contribution would consist of "principally sea and air forces," although that would

not necessarily rule out the use of Marines.

Turning to a survey of other resources, Admiral Radford broached the question

of possible use of Korean or Nationalist Chinese troops. General Valluy was sure the

latter would be highly unwelcome in Indochina, where the Chinese occupation had

not yet been forgotten.41 The Joint Chiefs believed that the introduction of Chinese

Nationalist troops would be inadvisable because it would provide excellent justification for Communist Chinese intervention. Despite their final recommendation that

President Rhee's offer of three divisions and essential corps troops be held in

abeyance, the JCS gave serious consideration to the employment of Korean troops.

In addition to their fighting qualities, American equipment, organization and training,

and relative proximity to Indochina, there were the psychological advantages deriving from the use of Asian troops in an Asian war. However, Korean troops would

have to be accompanied by American advisers. The presence of Americans, no matter how few in number, could be construed as an act of overt intervention. 42 Toward

the end of June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff further studied Rhee's offer; they again recommended that no action be taken on it. Their views were influenced by the fall of

the Laniel government, the election of Mendes-France on a peace platform, and the

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progress of the Geneva Conference. Furthermore, the reaction of the French Government to the suggestion had been adverse. 3

When Radford first brought Rhee's offer up with General Valluy, the General

said the French had never thought of using Korean troops and that he would have

to think it over. He reported to General Ely, however, that Admiral Radford had

insisted on the utility of Korean troops and that he claimed the United States could

transport all three divisions from Korea to Indochina in one week.44

The discussions between Admiral Radford and General Valluy were preliminary conversations in anticipation of bilateral staff talks under cover of the FivePower Military Conference in session in Washington. General Valluy briefed Admiral Radford on the military situation in Indochina following the fall of Dien Bien

Phu. He based his gloomy report on the observations of Generals Ely and Salan

after their visit to the theater of operations in May. Dien Bien Phu had left its mark

on both civilians and military, particularly in the Tonkin Delta. The troops were

tired and their morale low. Effectiveness of the military commands had markedly

decreased; there was controversy between Generals Navarre and Cogny and

between their staffs; there was no close agreement between higher headquarters

and commanders of the mobile groups; there was conflict between General

Navarre and the French Air Force; there were differences among the Air Force

commanders and their staffs. French and Vietnamese troops had lost confidence in

one another. Mobilization measures instituted by Bao Dai were a failure. The Vietnamese Government was discredited. In Cochinchina there was conflict between

the Vietnamese troops and the population of the area.

General Valluy admitted that Viet Minh losses at Dien Bien Phu had been considerably less than the French had hoped. The Viet Minh battle corps was still

effective; within ten days their divisions would reach attack positions around the

Tonkin Delta. There were prospects of a hard battle for Hanoi toward the end of

June. Extraordinary measures were required. The French were regrouping their

forces to place the Vietnamese in the static defense of the perimeter, while using

French troops as mobile groups. The Viet Minh were capitalizing on the delicacy of

the regrouping operation to deal hard blows at some of the Vietnamese units.

The mobile forces were being positioned to hold the area of the delta along the

Hanoi-Haiphong axis; there were six "task forces" available in the area. The French

hoped to build this force to nine or ten mobile groups. While each group theoretically

consisted of five thousand men, it was actually maintained at a strength of between

three and four thousand. Each group corresponded roughly to a US regimental combat team with less service and signal support. Although the French intended to hold

the Tonkin redoubt at all costs, they were not assured of success. General Valluy

claimed the enemy was building to a strength of one hundred battalions with high

morale, and with the civilian population leaning more and more in their favor. The

French also feared possible intervention by the Chinese Communist Air Force.

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General Ely had returned to Paris to beg for reinforcements. France planned to

send two more parachute battalions to Indochina during the summer, and a mobile

group of Algerian troops was being prepared for shipment. Four additional battalions of colonial troops in North Africa had been alerted for movement in July, September, and October. Three new divisions were being activated in France. Each

division, of twelve to thirteen thousand men, would be composed of conscripts and

cadres from "couverture" divisions then in Germany. General Valluy did not hide

the fact that provision of the cadres would "shatter" the NATO divisions, nor that

sending conscripts to Indochina would present the French Government with a

severe political problem.45

Admiral Radford had been advised by General Gruenther of the plan to form

the new divisions.46 What General Valluy did not mention was that the United

States was going to be asked to equip them. Later, at a meeting between the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State, it was agreed that the United States

ought to do everything possible to help the French, but that the initial cost of $310

million plus $250 million annually for maintenance, and the effect on NATO, called

for a careful examination of the idea before any commitment should be made.47

The State Department was anxious to give the French an agreement in principle, to maintain their will to continue the struggle in Indochina. Moreover, creation

of the new divisions would bear on the forthcoming European Defense Community

(EDC) debates, as an example of the flexibility of the European situation and by

demonstrating the ability of the French to withdraw troops to cope with urgent situations in the French Union.48 The JCS recommended that, if a formal request were

entered by the French, the United States should agree in principle to equip the three

additional divisions. The Joint Chiefs believed that the French should exhibit determination to implement the plan in time to deploy experienced French Union troops

from elsewhere in Indochina to the Tonkin Delta to prevent its loss. The French also

ought to implement their conscription decree immediately and accelerate the training of conscripts. The Joint Chiefs wanted the United States to establish an emergency fund to assure reimbursement to the service concerned of the cost of the

initial equipment, the cost of a year's maintenance in combat, and the cost of a

year's ammunition. The same fund would also be used for the replacement of critical major items taken from US Army mobilization reserves and stocks earmarked

Sfor other programs. The rate of production of ammunition would have to be

increased immediately. Fiscal Year 1955 Army and/or MDAP funding programs

would have to be increased for replacement of equipment and ammunition of the

divisions in combat and for establishing a production rate to support the units.4

9

Records do not reveal the receipt of a formal French request of the type specified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The United States did concur in a request by the

French Minister of Defense to permit movement of the llth French Infantry Division to Indochina with Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). 50 The issue

became academic with the settlement arranged at the Geneva Conference. French

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

military desire for American participation was the real topic of interest behind the

Radford-Valluy talks. On 4 June, three days before his last talk with Admiral Radford, General Valluy gave the Five-Power Military Conference his evaluation of the

situation in Indochina.

General Valluy stated that if the Tonkin were lost, the military line would not

be reestablished anywhere. The Laos bottleneck or the eighteenth parallel had the

tactical characteristics that should permit reestablishment of a line, but there

would be no forces to man that line. Valluy meant that there were no southern

Vietnamese who could oppose northern Vietnamese. Ho Chi Minh's objective was

to secure Tonkin either by negotiation at Geneva or by assault on Hanoi. And his

chances of success were good.

"It has been said at this Conference," recalled General Valluy, "that if Tonkin is

lost, we will fight in the south." "However," he asserted, "the French will not fight

nor will Viet Nam." The decisive point was this: if the other conferees did not underwrite the battle for Tonkin, they would in the future fight in Saigon and Bangkok

without French assistance. If Tonkin were lost, no Vietnamese would fight against

another Vietnamese, and the whole of Vietnam would become communist.5 1

Charg6 McClintock in Saigon cabled that "General Valluy's appreciation of the

situation.., is exceedingly good-in fact almost too good." It was McClintock's

impression that Valluy had made his statement under instructions; he was probably

looking as much at the French Parliament as at the Tonkin Delta. General Ely had

twice, in McClintock's presence, stated that it was his keenest desire for the United

States to enter the war. McClintock believed that the purpose of General Valluy's

statement was either to bring the United States into the conflict or, to prepare an

excuse for an armistice the French would then request of the Viet Minh.5 2

General Valluy's presentation of the French plight in Indochina was one of a

series of incidents around 9 June that led to emphatic restatement of the United

States basic position; the answer was the same: fulfill the preliminary conditions

and the United States will intervene. The Joint Chiefs had already drawn up or

were finishing plans to cover almost every contingency.

US Military Plans for Intervention

On 20 May, in discussions with the French, the Department of State had specified that, if intervention were to be undertaken, France would have to agree

not to withdraw its forces from Indochina during the period of united action. The

US forces, principally air and sea and other, would be supplementary and not substitutes. Agreements would also have to be reached on the training of native troops

and on the command structure for united action. In formulating a Department of

Defense position on command structure and on the size and composition of United

States force contributions, the JCS were guided by: the limited availability of US

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forces for military action in Indochina; the current numerical advantage of French

Union forces over the enemy (approximately 5 to 3); the undesirability of basing

large numbers of US troops in Indochina; the need for an expanded and intensified

training program; the difficulty of superimposing US air forces upon existing facilities in Indochina; the implications of a Communist Chinese reaction to United

States intervention; and, finally, the fact that atomic weapons would be used when

it was to military advantage.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff the command structure must permit the United

States to influence future strategy in Indochina; they suggested a Military Representatives Committee, with a steering group along the lines of NATO. The group

would be patterned after the US Joint Staff and would be composed primarily of

American and French officers. The committee would draw its membership from

those nations contributing the principal forces of the coalition.

The Joint Chiefs believed that the Allied Commander in Chief should be French

with an American deputy and a US air adviser. The deputy should provide liaison

with the French and would coordinate US activities with the overall operations. The

Joint Chiefs knew of the complete subordination of the French Air Force to the

Army; the air adviser would see that United States air power was not misused. The

JCS were convinced that the best military course for victory in Indochina lay in the

development of effective native armed forces. A commitment by the French, and

firm requests from the governments of the Associated States for the training and

development of those forces were prerequisites for United States participation.

Recommended United States force contributions would be limited to a fast carrier task force and supporting elements and to US Air Force units operating from

existing bases outside Indochina. Committing larger naval forces or basing substantial air forces in Indochina would reduce readiness to meet Communist Chinese reaction elsewhere in the Far East. From the point of view of the United

States, Indochina was devoid of decisive military objectives and the allocation of

more than token armed forces to that area would be a diversion of United States

capabilities. This observation coincided with the Joint Chiefs' belief-that the real

solution lay in the neutralization of Communist China. The principal sources of Viet

Minh support were "outside Indochina," and the destruction or neutralization of

those outside sources would reduce French military problems in Indochina."

If the Chinese Communists intervened overtly in the Indochinese struggle, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff's strategic concept and plan of operations called for destroying

effective communist forces and their means of support in the Indochinese action,

as well as reducing Communist China's capability for further aggression, to create

conditions for the forces of the Associated States to assume responsibility for the

defense of Indochina. This meant offensive air operations, employing atomic

weapons, as well as other weapons, against military targets in China proper,

Hainan, and other islands being used by the Communists in direct support of their

operations or to threaten the security of the Allied forces. Simultaneously, French

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Union forces, augmented by US naval and air units, would exploit whatever success had been achieved by the massive air operations. If this did not suffice to

assure victory, the attack against China would have to be stepped up to an

enlarged, highly selective, atomic offensive, in addition to attacks with other

weapons. These attacks would be accompanied by a blockade of the China coast.

The Joint Chiefs also considered establishing a blockade from the start, and

increasing it as required. Hainan would be seized or neutralized, and Chinese

Nationalist operations against the Chinese mainland would begin.

American forces engaged in these operations would be under the command of

the Commander in Chief, Pacific, who would insure the coordination of operations

in Southeast Asia, including ground-air coordination between French Union Forces

and US naval and air forces. He would also conduct air operations against military

targets in Indochina and against those in China that directly supported Communist

Chinese aggression. The Commander, Strategic Air Command, would support

CINCPAC and would conduct air operations as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

to reduce the Communist Chinese war-making capability.

The Joint Chiefs recommended that their strategy be accompanied by an

appropriate degree of mobilization to provide for the greater risk of a general war.

Action would have to be taken to strengthen America's allies. However, due to the

mobilization requirements of US forces, such aid would be limited to allies who

could directly support the United States strategic concept of a general war. Initially, there would be no requirement for materiel and equipment above current MDAP

for France and allied forces in Indochina. Within six months, MDAP would be

increased to take care of three new ROK-type native divisions, and further expanded as new divisions were developed.5 4

If the Communist Chinese did not enter the war openly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

recommended a restricted plan of operations that assumed that the USSR would not

enter the conflict openly, but that it would defend Soviet-controlled areas and might

covertly supply air and naval forces. The plan further assumed that hostilities in

Korea would not resume; that French Union Forces would resist in Indochina with

US military assistance; and that atomic weapons might be used by both sides.

Granted those assumptions, the JCS believed that, regardless of the nationality

of the forces engaged, the major courses of action in Indochina would remain relatively unchanged. Enemy supply lines would be interdicted, while friendly forces

regrouped in the north to conduct coordinated offensive operations. Territory

taken from the enemy would be pacified. Coordinated ground, air, and naval operations would be undertaken in central Vietnam and north Laos to destroy the enemy

forces there. Finally, operations in South Vietnam and Cambodia would complete

destruction of the enemy. Psychological and unconventional warfare operations

would be carried out. Basic to all these activities were recruiting, training, and

equipping regular and guerrilla indigenous forces.

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Initial operations would defend vital areas until forces were available for an

attack out of Tonkin to destroy the Viet Minh military forces. Viet Minh lines of

communications would be interdicted, supply depots destroyed, and their troops

prevented from escaping across the Chinese, Thai, and Burmese borders.

Increased Vietnamese support would be developed to assure internal security and

effective local leadership in liberated areas.55

The JCS offered a concrete course of action should the United States intervene, but the plan had other implications. In the State Department there were

doubts that use of nuclear weapons would compensate for the lack of ground

forces, while the negative effects of their use on opinion among the allies and in

Southeast Asia were considerable. 56 Dulles was more concerned that the implication that no defensive line in Southeast Asia could be held would torpedo any

effort at unified action. The British envisioned trying to hold such a line, and the

Asian nations would react unfavorably to being abandoned. In talks on regional

defense, the JCS position would have to be kept out of the discussion.57

After a careful estimate of the military situation in the Tonkin Delta, the Joint

Chiefs concluded that the French probably would not be able to hold Hanoi; but it

was within their military capabilities to hold along the Sept Pagodes-Hai DuongNinh Giang line for at least sixty days. The Chiefs could see no reason why the

French could not hold the Haiphong redoubt for the foreseeable future, except for

deterioration of their will to fight.

In the face of the rapidly crumbling military situation, support by United States

air and naval forces limited to action within the boundaries of Indochina, would

not in the JCS view insure decisive military results. Benefit to the French would be

mainly psychological. For the United States it would probably mean that involvement would continue and expand ultimately requiring additional naval and air

forces and extensive ground forces to prevent the loss of Indochina. Eventually,

this could lead to full United States responsibility for the war.

Again the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that involvement in Indochina

increased the risk of a general war. If the United States Government decided to

intervene, the armed forces should be placed in a state of readiness to meet such

an eventuality. Decisions would have to be made on mobilization and logistic, fiscal, and other supporting measures. Although there were no logistic problems

that would prevent commitment of the forces envisaged, large-scale diversion of

forces, equipment, and supplies from the Far East or the United States would

necessitate replacement of units and personnel and increases in production. For

a time, there would be a drain on logistic reserves. Construction of air bases, port

and storage facilities, roads, railroads, and communications systems in Indochina

would be required. A major supply base in south Indochina and at least one

advanced base near Haiphong would be needed to support United States ground

forces. Lift capabilities of Military Air Transport Service (MATS) and Military Sea

Transport Service (MSTS) would have to be expanded and logistical pipelines,

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

separate from Korea's, would have to be established. A major increase in the

armed forces would be required including an expanded draft and recall of some

National Guard and Reserve units.58

Training of Native Troops

E very American plan for intervention stressed the importance of building up

native armies. Training of indigenous forces appeared in the basic political, as

well as military, conditions for intervention presented to France by the United

States. Originally, the United States did not intend to conduct the training itself.

The language barrier alone would have sufficed to stifle the idea. But the French

displayed no more ability than desire to produce an efficient native fighting force;

the Americans became impatient. As early as April 1952, the Service Secretaries

suggested, in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, that an expanded MAAG

train and equip a national army capable at least of preserving internal security,

while developing Indochinese political self-reliance and independence.5 9 Nevertheless, almost a year later the Joint Chiefs said that "in view of their experience and

the language difficulties involved,.., the French are better qualified to conduct the

training of the indigenous forces than United States personnel would be." They did

suggest that the French might learn from American experience in Korea. 60 More

time passed without results. Reluctantly the Americans concluded they would have

to do the job themselves. They sounded the French out about increased United

States assistance in training the Vietnamese army, but they did not expect the

French to receive the suggestion favorably.

Less than two months before the fall of Dien Bien Phu, General Ely admitted to

Admiral Radford that he had been embarrassed by press reports that he was

amenable to such assistance. The reason for his opposition was that increased

numbers of Americans in Indochina would jeopardize French prestige and would

undermine native confidence in the French High Command. In spite of arguments

to the contrary, General Ely would only agree to consider the matter very informally.61 General Navarre threatened to "turn in his suit" if the Americans gained an

active part in the training of native troops.6 2 Ho Chi Minh would prove more persuasive than the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The harder the Viet Minh

surged against the Tonkin perimeter, the more virtue General Ely began to see in

American offers of instructor personnel. By July, he had changed his original opinion and complained that "the United States was late once more."63

General O'Daniel's permanent assignment to Indochina in April 1954 marked the

beginning of intensive attempts to persuade the French to request American assistance in training native forces. As their military situation worsened, the French gave

ground before American concepts. Effective assistance, however, meant assuming

responsibility for all phases of training. Committed on that scale, the United States

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would share the blame if the war turned out badly. Responsibility without some control over combat employment of native troops and a voice in strategy and operational planning would be unacceptable. The French anticipated this eventuality

which accounted for much of their reluctance to ask for American help. By the time

American arguments and the military situation led the French to request assistance,

the United States was no longer willing to provide it unless the French complied with

the other conditions upon which full intervention was contingent.

General O'Daniel tackled his job with enthusiasm and optimism. By the middle

of May, General Ely said that he accepted the concept of American training for the

Vietnamese army and agreed that United States advisers should be placed in Vietnamese units-"The sooner you get into this war, the better we will like it." On the

other hand, he did not agree to General O'Daniel's insistence on creating light divisions (rather than battalions), and he emphasized §trongly that command would

remain in French hands with no US participation in operational planning.M O'Daniel

indicated that he thought it possible to create nine Vietnamese and three Cambodian divisions by October. The American charg6 d'affaires sounded a note of caution:

I have the greatest admiration for General O'Daniel's faith, tenacity, and

bull-dog courage. I fear, however, he may be over sanguine as to possibilities of

making an effective Vietnamese fighting force in 6 months time. Irrespective of

General O'Daniel's abundant military virtues, there are many obstacles in his

path. Not least of these is complete apathy of Vietnamese populace coupled

with increasing tendency of fence-sitters to go over to enemy, absolute breakdown of mobilization plan, internecine rivalries between few men capable of

showing leadership, and lack of leadership from Bao Dai and his Ministers. I

do not say the job cannot be done but that we should take a close look at its

dimensions before we come in.65

The assistant military attach6 in Saigon also had reservations. General Ely

insisted that there be French officers in the training groups. It was doubtful that

these officers would be much more than roadblocks. The attach6 suggested that

French agreement to the training proposal might get the United States into a position where it would share more of the blame, as the French had apparently decided

to give up Indochina.66

Undaunted, General O'Daniel pushed on with his mission, and by 24 May he was

able to present Secretary Wilson with a revised training plan. The plan called for

readying nine divisions in the south and two in the north by 1 December. The divisions would be reduced strength (approximately twelve thousand men), less heavy

equipment. They would be under overall French command but the United States

would have a major voice in their employment and would have staff representation

similar to the Van Fleet solution in Greece. The plan was feasible only if the United

States were given a free hand with full Vietnamese support.67 Concurring with the

plan the Commander in Chief, Pacific, pointed out that O'Daniel's hands would be

tied if he attempted to arrive at other than preliminary arrangements before firm

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

agreements had been concluded at the governmental level. The programs for Laos,

Cambodia, and Vietnam would have to be completely under US control (although

under French overall command) to ensure full support of the indigenous authorities. Admiral Stump added "Nor will present French apathy toward these forces be

improved should control of training remain in French hands."68

General Ely now favored forming native troops into divisional units, although

he still felt an American division was not the answer. He also agreed that American

advisers should be placed at various levels within a division. On the question of

United States participation in operational planning, he felt the need for clarification. At that time, the United States could not share responsibility for planning

operations; the commander must be a Frenchman. Providing an agreement was

reached on intervention, US officers would be integrated into French planning

staffs. General Ely was prepared to discuss the details involved in such integration.

His basic position was that questions relating to training were only one part of an

overall plan to fix the conditions and nature of United States intervention. They

would become pertinent once an agreement to intervene had been achieved which

would only take place if the Geneva Conference failed.69

General Ely's position was diametrically opposite to that of the United States

Government. Nevertheless, he summoned General O'Daniel and requested the

United States to organize and supervise the training of Vietnamese divisions, and to

do the same for all other Vietnamese training. This request was transmitted to

Washington by O'Daniel on 9 June. 70 On the same day there arrived in Washington a

cable from Ely which said:

I have not yet made a survey of the military situation, especially in Tonkin.

However, it seems to me that the decisions I will have to take regarding the

operations will rest on the US intentions, in the present situation, as well as

those they anticipate in the future.

Therefore, I would very much like to have, either in Paris, where I expect

to be possibly on the 19th June, or here in Saigon, as soon as possible, an

exchange of view with a qualified representative of Adm RADFORD, in order

to know what I can expect on the part of the USA.71

These two messages, the mix-up over the use of Marines, and other incidents

indicating the French were ignoring the manner in which the United States had conditioned its offer of intervention precipitated the crisis of 9 June. Both the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the State Department felt it was time to call a halt until the French

realized it was "all or nothing." While Mr. Dulles spoke with Ambassador Bonnet,

Admiral Radford told General Valluy that he could not respond to General Ely's

request. The official position communicated to Ambassador Dillon in Paris was:

Prior to French decision to request internationalization, we consider undesirable to start yet another series conversations which would inevitably provoke on French side all kinds hopes and interpretations with regard basic

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Geneva and the End of Intervention

issue US intervention which would only cause further confusion. In other

words, it is our feeling that we should not be eased into a series of piecemeal

commitments resulting from collateral military conversations in the absence of

an understanding with the Fr Gov based on our general proposal /Paris 4023/

described in TEDUL 54.

With regard to US training Vietnam troops, we feel that situation VN has

degenerated to point where any commitments at this time to send over US

instructors in near future might expose us to being faced with situation in

which it would be contrary to our interests to have to fulfill such commitment.

Our position accordingly is that we do not (repeat not) wish to consider US

training mission or program separately from over-all operational plans on

assumption conditions fulfilled for US participation was Indochina.72

General O'Daniel was informed that any agreement on training would have to

be made at a governmental level.73 However, General Ely had already promised to

give him the request for aid in writing. But when it arrived, it turned out to be a

statement of agreed principles, not a request for aid, and it came by way of Buu

Loc, Vietnamese Prime Minister. Commenting on the unexpected channel of communication, O'Daniel said:

Ely gave Bu Loc the copy of the ltr knowing that I had no authority to act.

He either misunderstood what I wanted, which is possible, or he may in disappointment failure obtain tng assistance desire show Vietnamese he is trying

obtain aid for them and undesiring be placed in asking position himself had

suggested Bu Loc ask for tng assistance by US.74

The decision to defer the training program was a drastic one. General O'Daniel

protested: "To walt for a package agreement is sound theoretically but time is running out and no matter what the package deal may be, if action here is delayed any

longer nothing short of actual UN-US troop intervention will have a chance of saving the situation."7

15 Under Secretary Smith pointed out that negotiations at Geneva

were reaching a stage where any indication of US support strengthened the French

position. French military discussions with the Viet Minh at Geneva had made no

progress, and Smith thought commitment of a training mission might lend the

French negotiators some support. As it looked as though a settlement would result

in partition, a national army would be needed to protect what was left of Vietnam;

a training mission would be needed.76

Ambassador Dillon remarked that the French had always considered training a

separate problem. Therefore, if the United States was no longer interested in helping with the training of the Vietnamese army except within the framework of united action in Indochina, the Ambassador felt that the French should be informed.

He also assumed that the State Department had considered the fundamental psychological importance of the decision. The French Government would probably

consider that it meant the definite and final write-off of Indochina by the United

States and might use it as an excuse for accepting the Viet Minh's terms. Opponents

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

of the United States in France might describe the decision as a forceful attempt to

influence the French to request internationalization of the war. Last, but not least,

there was the question of Vietnamese morale.77

In replying to Dillon, Secretary of State Dulles noted that the Ambassador

had reported that General Ely had stated that the question of United States training of native forces was but one part of an overall plan for intervention. But in

protesting the dropping of training, the Ambassador had asserted the French had

always considered training as a problem separate from possible united action.

Mr. Dulles continued:

At the same time, Ely's position seems clear that the French have been

opposed to giving US responsibility for training unless US agreed to intervention.

It may be that in effort to draw US into conflict without having US conditions on

intervention met, French military may now seek US training in advance of US

commitment to intervene with own combat forces.... we are resolved not to get

drawn into training program when due to deteriorating conditions and lack of

overall program to reverse situation training program has virtually no chance of

success. If French are not going to agree to only kind of armistice which now

seems possible at Geneva, but are going to fight for more than protection of

expeditionary corps, possibility may exist for development of some program to

reverse present downhill trend. But this seems unfortunately most unlikely to us.

Under present circumstances, and particularly in view of three points you

make in Emtel 4812, believe you should clarify US position only if you are

forced to do so and should in interim reply to French that we are in agreement

with Ely's position expressed in Emtel 4462.78

Mr. Dulles' opinion was that the United States should at that time try to

avoid either a formal refusal to train the Vietnamese or a massive commitment of some two to three thousand MAAG personnel. Such a commitment

would carry strong political overtones and might raise congressional complications. The French "want and in effect have an option on our intervention," said Mr. Dulles, "but they do not want to exercise it and the date of

expiry of our option is fast running out."'79

Time was running out in Indochina. General O'Daniel entered plea after plea for

a reversal of the decision on training. While the Army Chief of Staff told General

O'Daniel he must comply with his orders not to negotiate a training agreement, General Ridgway absolved the armed forces of blame for the delay. In Washington it was

apparent that the French military were laboring under the misapprehension that governmental agreements had been reached and that the United States military were

responsible for the delay. Ridgway wanted O'Daniel to make it clear to the French in

Indochina that the delays did not indicate that the United States was pulling back.80

General O'Daniel on 26 June appealed directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for

permission to go ahead with the training of six divisions. He sketched his outline

plan for accomplishing the task and asked that it be passed along to "the highest

authority."8' The Chairman informed him that positive action was not practical at

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Geneva and the End of Intervention

that time in view of the obscure situation, but his message had been passed to the

highest authority. Thus, at least temporarily, the effort of the United States to

build up the indigenous forces of the Associated States came to an end. As a

cease-fire became increasingly likely, attention began to turn defending the rest of

Southeast Asia after the end of fighting in Indochina.

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11

Toward a New Alliance

As the talks at Geneva took their course, American planners continued to look

toward intervention. Far East Command envisioned strikes in Manchuria and

North China in the event of communist aggression in Korea, while CINCPAC would

attack targets in South China if the Communist Chinese intervened in Indochina.

The Strategic Air Command would hit targets in China if war spread. Radford continued to doubt that a line could be held in Southeast Asia; Dulles's proposal to

strengthen Thailand seemed questionable to him.1 But the National Security Council had given the green light to the military talks at Singapore involving the United

States, United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand. Admiral Carney was

to represent the United States in these discussions.

At the same time, the Viet Minh terms had failed to arouse the French public to

determined resistance. On 12 June, after staving off previous hostile resolutions in

the Assembly, Laniel's government fell. Within a week Pierre Mendes-France

assumed leadership, pledged to obtain a ceasefire in a month. Long a critic of the

war effort, the new Prime Minister was barely able to win a majority of the noncommunist votes, but he had more support than the numbers revealed.2 American

plans for a longer-term strategy were now essential.

United States Strategy in the Far East

Tn the strategy of the United States for developing military strength in the Far

East, fostering the growth of the military forces of the Associated States and

other noncommunist countries was second only to building up the military potential

of Japan, Korea, and Nationalist China. America's objective in the East was to develop the purpose and capability of the noncommunist countries to act collectively and

effectively in opposing the threat of communism. Once this objective had been

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

achieved, the United States might bring about the establishment of a comprehensive

regional security arrangement of these countries associated with the United States,

the United Kingdom, and possibly France. The united action of the coalition could

reduce the power and influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East, primarily

through the containment and curtailment of Communist China's power.

This strategy had not existed in April when the National Security Council

called upon the Department of Defense to determine means for strengthening the

military position of the United States in the Far East; the Joint Chiefs of Staff

replied that:

Since the United States military objectives and programs with respect to a

specific country or region stem from approved United States policy as it

affects such country or region, the development of United States military

objectives toward the Far East should, in the usual course, be within the context of an overall United States policy respecting that area. Although the United States policy toward Communist China does set forth certain general objectives to be sought in the Far East vis-a-vis that country, the United States has

not formulated a comprehensive policy in which the Far East is reviewed as

a strategic entity and which would provide definitive direction for the development of a position of military strength in the Far East. Rather, our present

policy addresses itself to the individual countries within the area or, a, in the

case of Southeast Asia, to a segment of the area .... Taken in the aggregate,

expressions of policy [toward individual countries] make it clear that the United States, from the standpoint of its security interests, attaches major importance to the Far East area and would be prepared to react with military force

against an armed aggression by the USSR or Communist China in that region.3

The JCS proceeded from the premise that the Far East was one area requiring

one strategy; in this they drew upon the experience of World War II. The Cold War

and decolonization, however, had created a completely different set of conditions.

Time would show that Far Eastern policy could not fit into a single mold. The Viet

Minh's appeal lay in the power of nationalism, not communism.

The policy of the Joint Chiefs was political and psychological. Development of

native armies was a means to join the entire noncommunist Orient into a solid

bloc, based upon the economic interdependence of the various regions within the

area. Recognizing the magnitude of the undertaking, the JCS advocated forming a

grand coalition out of units that the United States would be able to knit together by

bilateral and multilateral treaties.

The security treaties with Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Australia, and

New Zealand fit the pattern, but this was only a beginning. The impending crisis in

Indochina sharpened the desire to hasten the process. Secretary Dulles hoped that

the knowledge that multilateral talks on mutual defense were being pursued might

moderate communist demands at Geneva. Stressing the necessity for a common

stand by the countries in the area, Dulles reminded the Foreign Ministers of Australia

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and New Zealand that no agreement on the Indochinese phase of the conference

existed among the Western Powers.4

Great Britain had indicated willingness to participate in a five-power discussion of the subject. There was, however, serious disagreement over the manner in

which the talks should be conducted. The British wished to use the Five-Power

Staff Agency and widen the discussions to include political and economic problems. Moreover, the British proposal was couched in terms that involved underwriting the Geneva settlement before it was arrived at.5

The United States had no intention of committing itself to defending a settlement that might be against its own national interests. The Five-Power Staff Agency

was not a satisfactory substitute for a broad political coalition that included the

Southeast Asian nations to be defended. The Staff Agency was composed entirely

of Western nations, and the United States could not agree to a "white man's party"

to determine the problems of Asian nations.6

Accordingly, the United States announced that it would participate in an examination of the military situation in Southeast Asia to explore, through secret and

existing channels in Washington, how the United States, Great Britain, France,

New Zealand, and Australia might assist the countries of Southeast Asia to defend

themselves. The United States stressed that this examination was supplementary

to efforts to organize a regional grouping; it was neither a substitute for, nor the

nucleus of, such a grouping. 7

The British accepted the American view that their two countries should move

on parallel lines; they were prepared to start immediately with the military staff

talks.8 There were valid reasons for British reluctance: Her Majesty's Government

was being pressured by Nehru to back his neutralist proposal for Geneva; the

British public was alarmed by the H-bomb; and there was a widespread feeling in

Britain that the Geneva Conference was going to settle all the problems of Asia.

Staff examinations by a constituted agency was common prudence, according to

Under-Secretary of State Smith. If Geneva succeeded, the talks would not be

important but, if Geneva failed, there would be criticism that staff examinations

and long-range planning should have been under way.9

The United States faced its own dilemmas. On the one hand, there was the

desire to establish a collective defense for Southeast Asia as quickly as possible.

On the other hand, there was the desire to avoid planning during the Geneva Conference, because it would imply that the Associated States had been written off.

The United States needed to move rapidly toward the creation of a coalition to

cover the possible loss of Indochina, while avoiding the impression that the Associated States had been given up as lost."1

Secretary Dulles thought of forming a Southeast Asian security community

that probably would not include Vietnam but that might embrace Laos and Cambodia. Charg6 d'Affaires McClintock, in Saigon, firmly dissented. "Most regrettably," he wrote, "there is no human resource in Cambodia nor Laos on which to

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

build a bulwark against Communist infiltration or aggression. Furthermore in the

case of Cambodia, there is no geographic barrier against such aggression. Furthermore, once the communists have possession of the complex of modem airfields in

Vietnam, there is no barrier to the successful use of airpower against all of Southeast Asia.""

In discussing regional grouping with Mr. Dulles, the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff discovered that the Secretary envisaged making Thailand a position

that the communists could not take either by military action or subversion without

triggering coalition action against Communist China. He was even considering putting token US military forces into Thailand to make any incident of communist

aggression absolutely clear. By coincidence, the United States Ambassador to Thailand on the same day cabled a suggestion to deploy one F-84G wing to that country

to strengthen its defenses. The Joint Chiefs rejected the suggestion as a fruitless

dispersion of air power. One of the molders of American strategy had referred to

Thailand as "the last place in the world" where the United States wanted to become

involved with a military operation.'" Admiral Radford remarked that the Thais

could not be depended upon. He observed that the Chinese Communists already

had a nucleus for a Thai government, that Thai leadership was at best uncertain,

that their recent history showed they would jump to the other side quickly, and that

Ambassador Donovan had no confidence in their ability to hold Thailand if

Indochina fell.

Admiral Radford believed that there was not much likelihood of an incident in

Thailand; it was more probable that Thailand, Malaya, and Indonesia would be

undermined by subversion. Such would probably be the fate of Laos and Cambodia. The Chairman believed that, once Indochina was settled, there would be no

opportunity to cope with another Chinese military adventure until the communists

were ready for the "big show." Radford pointed out that the United States had not

decided what to do about countries that the communists took over by legal means.

The possibility of legal assumption of power by the Communist Party existed in

many lands; the United States position versus the communists in the Far East

would become worse with the passage of time. From the military standpoint, there

were advantages in carrying the action to Communist China itself, but everyone

recognized the political disadvantages of such a solution. 13

Mr. Dulles faced political disadvantages of a different sort in trying to unite

Asian and European powers for concerted action. The issue of colonialism and fear

of Communist China deterred most of the Colombo nations. While Nehru failed to

dominate the conference of Prime Ministers at Colombo in early May, he succeeded in vitiating any support the conference might have had for the stand of the Western Powers at Geneva. The Colombo conferees recommended that, if Geneva

stopped the war, the United Kingdom, USSR, China, and the United States should

agree to prevent resumption of hostilities. Notably, the Colombo conference gave

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Toward A New Alliance

no indication of the intentions of the five South Asian powers as a group or individually concerning future policy toward the Indochinese crisis.14

The Colombo powers and other countries in South and Southeast Asia were

apprehensive that western attempts to solve the Indochinese problem might lead

to World War III. They showed increasing resentment and frustration that such at

development might be thrust upon them without an opportunity to express themselves or take collective action. Therefore, they indicated their willingness to help

in carrying out an agreed settlement; Dulles was eager to enlist their services. As

the nations most immediately threatened, he believed they should make their contribution to a settlement. Their participation would mitigate their fears, nurture

their self-confidence, increase their prestige, educate them about communist intentions, and eventually make them receptive to cooperation with the United States

and other western nations. The Secretary hoped for a more reasonable Chinese

attitude at Geneva if the Colombo powers could be organized.15 But by the end of

the Geneva Conference, Dulles had discovered otherwise; nor was there any indication that the Five-Power Staff Agency talks in Washington had affected the tactics or demands of the communists at Geneva.

The five-power military conference lasted from 3 June to 11 June. The conferees agreed that the situation in Indochina was critical, that retention of the Tonkin

Delta was of the greatest importance to the defense of Southeast Asia and that stabilization of the situation in the Delta would require outside assistance on the

order of three divisions and three hundred aircraft. The French representative indicated that "the psychological impact of those reinforcements would be enhanced if

they were drawn from the Western Powers." All five representatives concluded that

"the arrival of reinforcements from the Free Nations, other than France, would be

an important factor in the restoration of Vietnamese confidence." The conclusions

of the conferees did not imply a commitment of the governments; none of the governments moved to provide the reinforcements that their military representatives

concluded were necessary.

The conference also studied what would occur should the Tonkin Delta be

lost to the Viet Minh. The conferees recognized: (a) the n1ecessity of considering

the establishment of a recovery line in the south; (b) the fact that land forces

immediately available would not be sufficient to hold a Chinese advance and that

defensive positions in Thailand and Burma should be considered as well as the

recovery line in Indochina; and (c) the fact that internal security in Southeast Asia

depended upon the support of the people there. The final conclusion related to a

possible cease-fire and called for a guarantee by nations other than those directly

involved that they would intervene if the agreement were broken."6 The United

States later ignored this conclusion by refusing to do more than "respect" the

cease-fire agreement. Following United States military thinking the conference

concluded that overall Allied strategy in Southeast Asia should be defensive in the

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

event of a global war and that nuclear attacks and blockade should be employed

in any war against China."7

After studying the conclusions of the military representatives at the conference, the Army Chief of Staff recommended that the Joint Chiefs not accept these

conclusions because they did not conform precisely, in either language or scope,

with approved positions of the JCS. His recommendation was not accepted."1

Consistent with their thinking over a long period of time, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, on 21 May, informed the Secretary of Defense that they considered a static

defense for Southeast Asia unsound from a military viewpoint. There were two

basic concepts for defense of the area: the static, or Korea, type; or an offensive

against the source of communist military power being applied in Southeast Asia.

So long as Burma and Thailand were not under communist control, the geography

of the area rendered Malaya secure from external threat. Should Burma and Thailand be lost prior to an Allied decision to hold a line in Southeast Asia, the defensive position would have to be established in Malaya. A study of the force requirements and logistic implications of this concept revealed extensive and damaging

weaknesses; it was estimated that it would take a minimum of twelve months to

build up the base complex and facilities required to support the forces involved.

Those forces would remain for an extended period, and the commitment of manpower and material to maintain them would be unacceptable in terms of the overall strategic situation. The presence of large numbers of United States, Commonwealth, and French troops would provide the communists with excellent material

for anti-Western propaganda. Finally, execution of a static defense plan would

result in maldeployment and loss of flexibility in the employment of US forces. The

capability of supporting existing war plans logistically would be seriously jeopardized. The United States should, therefore, adopt the concept of offensive action

against Communist China, rather than that of reacting at the point of attack.19

Movement toward Agreement at Geneva

O n 11 May the Viet Minh presented a victor's terms for a cease-fire in Indochina.

They called for French recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

(DRV) and its Laotian and Cambodian allies. French troops should withdraw from

Indochina under a separate agreement. Free elections would follow. The DRV

would consider joining the French Union. Assurances were offered to protect

French nationals and interests in the region. Mixed commissions would supervise

implementation of the actual cease-fire.2 0 When asked whether the Viet Minh

armistice proposal was acceptable to the United States, Mr. Dulles replied that it

was unacceptable in its totality. It followed the pattern applied to Germany, Austria, and Korea: to compel withdrawal of the forces that sustain free society and to

set up a system under which the communists could take the whole area.2"

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Toward A New Alliance

Under Secretary Smith believed that the proposals would result in a rapid

turnover to the communists. Linking the cease-fire to the other measures was tantamount to rejecting the French proposal, yet because the Viet Minh proposal mentioned conclusion of an agreement on general political questions prior to cessation

of hostilities, they-could not be accused of demanding an immediate, unconditional

cease-fire. There was no provision for international control; elections "without

interference" followed the pattern in Korea. The Viet Minh proposals were

designed to appeal to the French public; references to the French Union and

arrangements for retention of French economic and cultural interests were obviously designed to win French support. In fact, the communists might seriously

envisage a communist state within the French Union. The entire proposal made it

clear that the DRV would determine the question of association with the French

Union. It was obvious that the Viet Minh would organize the elections, win them

quickly, and convert Vietnam into a communist state. 22

Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos tabled armistice proposals of their own, to

which very little serious attention was paid. The Vietnamese proposed that the Viet

Minh dissolvre their government and army under terms of a general amnesty. Viet

Minh soldiers could be integrated into the Vietnamese army and internationally

supervised elections, at an unspecified date in the future, would solve the political

questions. The Vietnamese were concerned primarily with avoiding loss of territory

or any settlement endangering their position as the legal and effective government

of Vietnam. The French objective was to terminate hostilities with more or less satisfactory guarantees.2

Despite the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the French public's growing awareness of

the general deterioration of the position in Indochina, a political crisis took another month to develop.2 Mendes-France continued to attack the Laniel government. 2

5

By the time Mendes-France assumed the leadership, Ambassador Dillon felt that

the French bargaining position was so weak that the fall of the Laniel government

would not make much difference.26 Pierre Mendes-France accepted the premiership under a four-week "contract" to bring about an honorable settlement of the

Indochinese war. In spite of assertions that he would not accept a peace that was a

surrender to the Viet Minh, nor accept a disguised capitulation, Mendes-France

was, from the start, identified with peace-at-any-price.

The change in government cannot be regarded as advantageous to the United

States. It was a foregone conclusion that the new government would not take as

strong a stand at Geneva as had Bidault. Moreover, the new government opposed

ex-High Commissioner de Jean's coming to Geneva as an adviser. De Jean's

removal in Indochina was depicted by Mr. McClintock as a serious blow to US policy in that area. "Not only has he been the most courageous French official here,"

said Mr. McClintock, "but also the only one with a clear-eyed view of what stakes

we are fighting for, not only in Southeast Asia but likewise in Europe against international Communism." The new Minister of Associated States was reported to be

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

new to the problem; Mendes-France was poorly informed. Finally, the composition

of the new Cabinet showed an even more far-reaching break in continuity of

French governments since the war than had been expected as it lacked "continuity

men" such as Bidault, Pleven, and Marie. New ministers, such as Koenig in

Defense, boded trouble for the United States. Koenig was expected to support

army opposition to EDC, which Pleven had suppressed."

However, there was little that any French government could do at Geneva. It

quickly became evident that the negotiators were edging closer and closer toward

a partitioning of Vietnam. While the Viet Minh paid lip service to international

supervision of the armistice, the French were in no position to secure controls that

would guarantee effective supervision.

Final US Position toward Settlement

O n 26 June the United States and the United Kingdom received the following

aide-memoire from the French Government:

... Following his conversation with Mr. Chou En-Lai, the head of the

French Government has instructed M. Chauvel to approach M. Pham Van Dong

with a view to carrying on with him directly negotiations to ascertain whether a

basis can be found, in his opinion, for a territorial settlement in Vietnam or not.

The objective of the French Government is to arrive at a regrouping which

will assure the State of Vietnam a territory as solid as possible.

It is difficult to predict the result of this negotiation in which the French

authorities must face two sorts of difficulties: on the one hand it will be most

difficult to obtain concessions from the Viet Minh in the north; and on the

other hand the negotiations risk causing, if the agreement is concluded, dangerous reactions by the Vietnamese Government whose citizens are serving at

the present time under the orders of the French command, comprising a major

portion thereof.

The message noted that the communists were afraid of the conflict spreading.

The French Government felt it would be very useful if the British and American

Governments were to issue a final communique, which stated that a serious aggravation of international relations would result if a reasonable settlement were not

reached at Geneva. The French also hoped they could count on the United States

to dissuade the Vietnamese from refusing an agreement. The United States was not

to do anything that might encourage a Vietnamese outburst.28

The British and American Governments drafted an answer hoping to stiffen the

French position. The two governments informed the French that they would be

willing to respect an agreement that:

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1. preserves the integrity and independence of Laos and Cambodia and

assures the withdrawal of Vietminh forces therefrom;

2. preserves at least the southern half of Vietnam, and if possible an

enclave in the Delta; in this connection we would be unwilling to see the line

of division of responsibility drawn further south than a line running generally

west from Dong Hoi;

3. does not impose on Laos, Cambodia or retained Vietnam any restrictions materially impairing their capacity to maintain stable non-Communist

regimes; and especially restrictions impairing their right to maintain adequate

forces for internal security, to import arms and to employ foreign advisers;

4. does not contain political provisions which would risk loss of the

retained area to Communist control;

5. does not exclude the possibility of the ultimate unification of Vietnam

by peaceful means;

6. provides for the peaceful and humane transfer, under international

supervision, of those people desiring to be moved from one zone to another of

Vietnam; and

7. provides effective machinery for international supervision of

the agreement.2 9

Besides pointing out that the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the joint statement

seemed to contradict each other, the French inquired about the meaning of

"respect," which struck them as a very weak and unclear word.30 Secretary Dulles

explained that even an agreement that met all seven points could not guarantee

that Indochina would not one day pass into communist hands. The apparent contradiction was an attempt to get the best conditions possible. "Respecting" the

agreement meant that the United States would not oppose a settlement that conformed to the seven points; it did not mean that the settlement would be guaranteed or supported in public. "Respect" also meant that the United States would not

seek to upset the settlement by force.31 Dulles added that Mendes-France should

not believe that merely observing the seven points would elicit a statement that the

United States would respect the agreement, unless the Associated States agreed to

the settlement.32

In a personal message to Mendes-France, Secretary Dulles gave an analysis of

the United States position, and of the Geneva Conference:

... We doubt very much that the Communists Will in fact accept this sevenpoint position unless they realize that the alternative is some common action

upon which we have all agreed. So far, there is no such alternative.

Under these circumstances, we greatly fear that the seven-points which

constitute a minimum as far as the US is concerned will constitute merely an

optimum solution so far as your Government and perhaps the US are concerned, and that an armistice might be concluded on terms substantially less

favorable than those we could respect.

We gather that there is already considerable French thinking in terms of

the acceptability of departures from certain of the seven-points. For example:

Allowing Communist forces to remain in Northern Laos; accepting a Vietnam

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

line of military demarcation considerably south of Donghoi; neutralizing and

demilitarizing Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam so as to impair their capacity to

maintain stable, non-Communist regimes; accepting elections so early and so

ill-prepared and ill supervised as to risk the loss of the entire area to Communism; accepting international supervision by a body which cannot be effective

because it includes a Communist state which has veto power.

These are but illustrations of a whittling-away process, each stroke of

which may in itself seem unessential, but which cumulatively could produce a

result quite different from that envisaged by the seven-points.... 3

The possibility of the United States disassociating itself from the final stages

of the conference deeply disturbed Mendes-France; Secretary Dulles found it necessary to confer with him in Paris on 13 July. The immediate problem for the

French Premier was the United States' refusal to renew its representation at the

conference on the ministerial level. The five Foreign Ministers had recessed on 19

June to leave working out of armistice details to the military negotiators. Reduced

in size and concept, the American delegation assumed an advisory or observer

role; with its basic instructions withdrawn, it functioned on an ad hoc basis, to be

more responsive to "realities as we see them, not only at Geneva but also in US

and Indochina."13

Mendes-France pointed out that this would be the first time since the war that

the United States had not been represented at a level equal to that of other powers

at an important conference. He felt certain it would have catastrophic effects in the

Far East and Europe. Since there would be no one to take a strong personal position with Molotov, the communists would increase pressure to deepen the rift

between the Western Powers. If the Secretary were present, the United States

would in effect have a veto on the decisions of the conference.3 5 Dulles was more

impressed by the probably disastrous effect of a dramatic last moment exit from

the conference. After consulting with President Eisenhower, he met with MendesFrance in Paris and reached an agreed Franco-American position on Indochina:

1. France and the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are

recognized to be those which, on the non-Communist side, are primarily interested in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference. The United States is

interested primarily as a friendly nation which desires to assist, where desired,

in arriving at a just settlement, but who will not seek, or be expected, to

impose its views in any way upon those primarily interested.

2. The attached seven-points constitute a result which France believes to

be obtainable by negotiation at Geneva and which would be acceptable to

France and, France believes, to the Associated States. The United States, while

recognizing the right of those primarily interested to accept different terms,

will itself be prepared to respect terms conforming to the attached. The United

States will not be asked or expected by France to respect terms which in its

opinion differ materially from the attached and it may publicly disassociate

itself from such differing terms.

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3. If the settlement is one which the United States is prepared to

"respect," its position will be expressed unilaterally or in association only with

non-Communist states in terms which apply to the situation the principles of

non-use of forces which are embodied in Article 2 (4) & (6) of the Charter of

the United Nations.

4. The United States is prepared to seek, with other interested nations, a

collective defense association designed to preserve, against direct and indirect

aggression, the integrity of the non-Communist areas of Southeast Asia following any settlement.

5. If there is no settlement, the United States and French Governments

will consult together on the measures to be taken. This will not preclude the

United States, if it so desires, bringing the matter before the United Nations as

involving a threat to peace as dealt with by Chapter VII of the Charter of the

United Nations.

6. France reaffirms the principle of independence for the Associated

States in equal and voluntary association as members of the French Union.3 6

The seven points were those of the British-American reply to the French aidememoire. Following the position paper, Dulles and Mendes-France exchanged letters; the French Premier refuted the pro-abstention arguments. "In a situation as

difficult as this," he wrote, "only the unity of the western diplomatic front, supported by the immense potential which we have in common, can bring about the very

military and strategic unity which we should seek eventually to establish in that

part of the world. It is in this spirit that the French Government envisages, aside

from the assurances which the conference itself could furnish, the establishment of

a collective guarantee by virtue of which the signatories would declare themselves

prepared to intervene if, in Indochina, one of the three states was a victim of

aggression."37 Whether or not Mendes-France changed Mr. Dulles' mind, the decision to participate at the ministerial level was made following talks with Britain's

Anthony Eden and consultation with President Eisenhower.3

Y Under Secretary of

State Smith left for Geneva on 16 July.

The United States performed another service for France. On 7 July a new Vietnamese government was formed in Saigon. Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem, an

uncompromising nationalist, had not held office since resigning from Bao Dai's

service in 1933. Living in Europe, he had accepted Bao Dai's call to go to Saigon.3 9

Ambassador Heath was to tell Diem of the planned partition of Vietnam and of the

futility of resisting the settlement. Heath was to inform the Premier that President

Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles, in conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Mr.

Eden, had made clear their strong opposition to a settlement leading to permanent

division of Vietnam and advise Diem of the seven-point British-American note to

France. Speaking in Mr. Dulles' name, he was to state that "while we recognize that

settlement along these lines imposes hardships on Vietnam, we fear that deteriorating military situation and separate negotiations in progress with Vietminh and Chinese Communists could lead to something still worse."4

" The United States had

established that the French were not keeping the Vietnamese informed. Besides

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 194 7-1954

averting a violent reaction by the disappointed Vietnamese, the United States

sought to place its relations with Diem on a more realistic and confidential basis. 4 1

The 26 June aide-memoire from the French asked that the final communiqu6

from the British-American conversations in Washington state that the issuing governments would take a serious view of unacceptable communist demands at Geneva. President Eisenhower and Sir Winston Churchill obliged by inserting a statement that, "We are both convinced that if at Geneva the French Government is

confronted with demands which prevent an acceptable agreement regarding

Indochina, the international situation will be seriously aggravated."42

Anglo-American Discussions

T he Anglo-American discussions in Washington from 25 to 29 June between

President Eisenhower, Mr. Dulles, Prime Minister Churchill, and Mr. Eden covered Indochina and the Geneva Conference. Preoccupied with the need to establish

a firm front in Southeast Asia, Churchill favored a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and a Middle East Treaty Organization to match NATO.4

" The Americans were

less convinced that the answer was a NATO-type entente. The main reason for

these high-level talks was that divergence between American and British policies in

a number of spheres was reaching serious proportions. "Sometimes it is awfully

difficult," said Mr. Attlee, "to understand what the American line is, as between

what members of the Government say and what Senators say, and sometimes what

generals and admirals say."44

As a follow-up to the Eisenhower-Churchill meeting, a United States-United

Kingdom Study Group on Southeast Asia was established. By 16 July some of the

main points were beginning to emerge. The British view was that a collective security arrangement for Southeast Asia should be considered in two contexts: (1) on

the basis of a settlement in Indochina, and (2) on the basis of no settlement. In the

event of a settlement that posed no immediate military problem, the British preferred an arrangement designed to bring in as many states as possible, including

the Colombo powers. If there were no settlement at Geneva, the British agreed to

the immediate establishment of an organization to meet the military threat. The

British had no intention of pressing forward with any security organization until

the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference had ended. The United Kingdom

believed that the principal issue in dealing with Southeast Asia after an Indochinese settlement would be large-scale economic assistance; there was little doubt

who the chief contributor would be.

On a number of occasions, the British representative referred to military force

to repel overt communist aggression, but his attitude about countering subversion

and infiltration remained vague. The Americans pointed out that the principal danger in the future would probably be infiltration and subversion, and that the security

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Toward A New Alliance

organization should be in a position to deal with the situation. The organization

should be established immediately, to deal with the adverse military and political

consequences of an unsatisfactory settlement at Geneva. 45 If a pact was signed,

there would be a time lag of six to twelve months for ratification by the various

countries; therefore, the need for some kind of interim machinery. The Americans

believed that it was too early to set up machinery like NATO. Instead, they were

considering the idea of an interim council. By making the American Ambassador the

US representative and supplementing his staff with political and military advisers,

day-to-day business could be conducted without large staffs. The biggest problem

remained deciding the nature of the basic treaty organization.

Bedell Smith, echoing the Joint Chiefs of Staff position, argued strongly for

viewing the matter in the light of the whole Far East, not just Southeast Asia. Any

organization sponsored by the United States should include Japan, the Philippines,

and other Asian allies. The United States military was skeptical about including

India believing that India, would wreck more military plans than she aided.

Obstructionism could be especially effective in the organization the British

favored: a council including all participants; an economic and political council,

with as many members as possible; and a military organization.46

On the military organization the British were reported to be thinking of proposing that the entire command structure in the Pacific, including Southeast Asia,

be American. When the British asked the Colombo powers about their attitude

toward the proposed organization, Indonesia replied that its position was one of

strict neutrality. Burma also protested neutrality, but let it be known that it was

not adverse to the idea. Ceylon took a similar stand. The Indian attitude was

assumed to be negative.

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had pressed hard for a Southeast Asian security organization that could be tied to other Far Eastern alliances with the United

States, the military sounded a note of caution after the signing of the Geneva settlement. The situation had changed radically. In April, it had been assumed that the

power of Vietnam would be a factor. But now it appeared that there was talk of a

military defensive arrangement for which there were no military forces. Except for

the British police in Malaya, and negligible Thai and Burmese forces, the only military power available was in Korea and Formosa.

The armed forces wished to subject the undertaking to very close scrutiny.

With limited funds for MDAP and defense programs, commitment of huge sums of

money in Southeast Asia would mean cutting somewhere else, without generating

any real strength. Thailand planned for an eighty-one thousand man force, which

would cost the United States $400 million. Adequate for internal security, this force

would contribute nothing to mutual defense. The Burmese had a similar plan. Military aggression would not be counteracted by the United States in Thailand; it

would be cut off in China. Aid and materiel sent to Thailand would weaken the

places where the United States might have to fight.

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

Consideration had to be given to the type of defense the countries of Southeast

Asia would be asked to support. A NATO-type of defense was out of the question;

each country could not be guaranteed one hundred percent protection, which

would require building up the armed forces of each country, a task of dubious military value. Military aid programs were a heavy expense for the United States and

were beginning to get out of hand.47

One of the hazards of aiding weak or indefensible nations was the possibility of

aiding the enemy instead. Indochina was a case in point. In April, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff advised the National Security Council that shipments of military materiel

should be suspended if fighting halted before a controlled armistice could be put

into effect and that an attempt should be made to recover or destroy equipment

already in Indochina.4s They pointed out that the United States would be justified,

despite the fact that the French held title to the equipment, in insisting upon its

return if no longer employed in the defense of Indochina. They recommended that

in the event of partition units suited to guerrilla operations should not be

disarmed.49 Directed to plan for salvaging or destroying American materiel, CINCPAC assigned the operation to MAAG Indochina.60

When the diplomats at Geneva formally agreed on 21 July to partition Vietnam,

the Defense Department suspended shipments of materiel to Indochina and diverted shipments en route to Indochina to Japan and Title III countries. 5

' Within two

days France gave her assurance that American equipment would be evacuated to

South Vietnam, but CINCPAC and the MAAG continued to work on measures to

safeguard the materiel. The MAAG was directed not to press plans for recovery and

destruction until France had determined her course of action in Indochina.52 Since

the French were evacuating equipment and personnel to South Vietnam, American

concern focused on US Air Force personnel and B-26 and C-119 aircraft on loan to

the French Air Force.

The Commander, Far East Air Force (COMFEAF), had been concerned about

the safety of the American Air Force mechanics in Indochina. Early in July he stated that the French C-47 capability could meet operational requirements and recommended that sixteen C-119s and support personnel be withdrawn by 10 July; General O'Daniel recommended that half of the C-119s and Air Force mechanics be

withdrawn on 10 July and the remainder later. The Joint Chiefs supported O'Daniel,

and eight C-119s with maintenance crews were retained in Indochina. 53

General Ely protested that C-119s were needed for the redeployment from the

delta to South Vietnam. O'Daniel reported that General Ely interpreted the United

States action as an expression of displeasure with French agreement to a ceasefire. To dispel this impression, General O'Daniel advised that the B-26s be withdrawn on 11 August and the C-119s within thirty days thereafter to permit the

French to use the planes during the peak of the redeployment." COMFEAF was

directed to withdraw the B-26s on 11 August and the C-119s on 1 September. The

American maintenance personnel were to be withdrawn when no longer needed. 55

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After Geneva, the United States adopted an interim policy on aid to the Associated States and to the French in Indochina. Only common-use items directly alleviating suffering, preventing disease, and assisting in the evacuation of military

forces and refugees from North Vietnam were programmed for Indochina. Each

case was to be considered on its own merits.56

The Americans intended to use the materiel rescued from northern Vietnam to

help equip the native forces of the Associated States. Those states, along with the

other noncommunist nations in the area, were to build up their forces for internal

security leaving the main fighting to the United States and its more powerful allies.

Corollary to that idea was the concept that the significant fighting would take place

elsewhere. United States strategists wished to avoid becoming deeply involved in

Southeast Asia. They opposed the British, who preferred a NATO type of security

organization with its implications of limited area defense. Such an organization

was greatly to the benefit of the British, if the United States paid for it.

US Unilateral Declaration on Geneva

T he Anglo-American study group accomplished its second purpose more quickly. It had been charged with preparing recommendations on "the terms on

which our two countries [Great Britain and the United States] might be willing to

be associated with an agreement which might be reached in Geneva."57 The task of

the study group was to find a satisfactory solution to the question of a declaration

in the event of a settlement. The policy of Great Britain was much more flexible

than that of the United States in this respect. Although both countries had subscribed to the seven criteria for an acceptable settlement, the United Kingdom had

been willing to associate itself with terms falling considerably short of these criteria. Moreover, Great Britain preferred a multilateral declaration including Australia,

New Zealand, and, if possible, India and other interested nations. Nor did Britain

exclude the possibility of the declaration bearing communist signatures. The United States made it plain that it would not participate in any declaration that included Communist China and that it would not compromise with the seven-point statement.58 President Eisenhower announced that the United States had not been a

party to, nor was it bound by, the decisions taken by the conference, and that the

United States was issuing a statement that it was not prepared to join in the conference declaration. 59 Instead, Under Secretary Smith presented the following unilateral declaration on 21 July:

The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its efforts to

the strengthening of peace in accordance with the principles and purposes of

the United Nations takes note of the agreements concluded at Geneva on July

20 and 21, 1954 between (a) the Franco-Laotian Command and the Command of

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the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (b) the Royal Khmer Army Command and the

Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (c) Franco-Vietnamese Command

and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam and of paragraphs 1 to 12

inclusive of the declaration presented to the Geneva Conference on July 21,

1954 declares with regard to the aforesaid agreements and paragraphs that (i) it

will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance

with Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use

of force; and (ii) it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the

aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning free elections in Viet-Nam my Government wishes to make clear its position which it has

expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows:

"In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to

seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations

to insure that they are conducted fairly."

With respect to the statement made by the representative of the State of

Viet-Nam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are

entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended

to or does indicate any departure from this traditional position.

We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, Laos and

Viet-Nam to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples of that area to determine

their own future. 60

Secretary Dulles, in a statement two days after the conference, maintaiped that

one of the lessons of Geneva was that resistance to communism needs popular

support, and that this meant the people should feel they are defending their own

national institutions. One of the good aspects of Geneva, claimed Mr. Dulles, was

that it advanced the independent status of the Associated States. The President of

France assured him that French representatives in Vietnam had been instructed to

complete by 30 July projects for the transfer of authority that would give the independence France had promised. 61 Both Mr. Dulles and President Eisenhower

admitted that the Geneva settlement contained undesirable features. The President

observed that a great deal would depend upon how they worked out.62 It was not

long before the Planning Board produced an estimate of how they probably would

work out, and what it would mean to the United States.

The board pointed out that, regardless of the fate of South Vietnam, Laos, and

Cambodia, the communists had secured possession of a position from which military

and nonmilitary pressures could be mounted against adjacent noncommunist areas.

The board predicted that the loss of prestige in Asia suffered by the United States, as

backer of France and the Bao Dai government, would raise doubts about United

States leadership and about the ability of the United States to check future communist expansion in Asia. United States prestige would be associated with subsequent

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developments in Southeast Asia. The communists had increased their military and

political prestige and their capacity for extending communist influence without

resorting to armed attack. They were in a better position to exploit the instability of

the free countries of Asia.

The Planning Board also noted that the communists were in a better position

for propaganda attacks on the United States. Having adopted an appearance of

moderation at Geneva, and having taken credit for the end of hostilities in Indochina, they could accuse the United States of extremism, belligerency, and opposition

to co-existence, thus accentuating their peace propaganda and peace program in

Asia to allay fears of communist expansionist policies. The communists had an

opportunity to alienate the United States from its Asian friends and allies, while

establishing closer ties with the free nations of Asia.

One very alarming feature of the loss of Southeast Asia, the board warned, was

that it would imperil the retention of Japan. High Commissioner de Jean of

Indochina, once the French Ambassador to Tokyo, had predicted in May that a

communist victory would so enhance the prestige of Communist China that the

whole balance of power in the Pacific would be affected, and that the Japanese

would tend toward rapprochement with a new and powerful Peiping.6

The situation was serious, yet, in the words of the Department of Defense

representative at Geneva, it was no better or no worse than could be expected

"under existing circumstances wherein French unable and/or unwilling pursue

war to military conclusion, and in light of United States decision apparently made

some time ago that it would not intervene militarily to save Indochina from Communist encroachment.... "64

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12

Conclusion

By the time the Geneva agreements ended France's war against the Viet Minh,

the outlines of the United States political and military commitment to Indochina

were set. The Truman and then the Eisenhower administrations had decided that

stopping Communism in Indochina, especially in Vietnam, was essential to the success of containment in the Far East. Occupied during much of the period with the

war in Korea, the United States relied on France to hold the line in Indochina. It

sought to keep the French in the fight through a rapidly expanding program of military and financial- assistance. At the same time, American officials pressed the

French to adopt a more aggressive battlefield strategy and to organize and equip

effective indigenous armed forces to aid in the struggle against the Viet Minh. To the

latter end, the Americans, believing that the French could not defeat Communism

with old-fashioned colonialism, urged their ally to create genuinely independent

national governments capable of rallying the Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians

to the anti-communist cause. Strongly wedded by economic, bureaucratic, and emotional ties to its colonial regime, France repeatedly pressed the United States for

more assistance while putting off real political change. Consequently, while the

assistance programs enhanced French military capabilities, the French moved too

little and too late to establish non-communist national governments and armies.

As France's situation in Vietnam deteriorated during 1953 and 1954, the Eisenhower administration was forced to consider direct military intervention to save

the beleaguered garrison of Dien Bien Phu and possibly to take a larger general

role in the fighting. Contingency plans for Dien Bien Phu contemplated American

air strikes, not a serious possibility, against the Viet Minh forces. President Eisenhower, however, set stringent political and military conditions for intervention. He

demanded that the French allow the United States an authoritative voice in planning and directing military operations and grant unqualified independence to the

associated Indochinese states. Eisenhower would intervene only with support of

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

the American Congress and in association with Great Britain and France. None of

these conditions was met. In the end, Dien Bien Phu fell and the United States reconciled itself to partition of Vietnam under the Geneva agreements. Following the

Geneva accords, the United States turned to building a collective defense organization for Southeast Asia. It also took a direct hand in training and equipping the

armed forces of the new anti-communist state of South Vietnam, gradually supplanting France as South Vietnam's principal foreign sponsor.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff subscribed to the view that a Communist takeover of

Vietnam would undermine the US strategic position in the Far East. They regularly

endorsed military aid to the French and sought to assist in the training and equipping of indigenous armed forces. Yet they approached with caution direct American military engagement in the Indochina conflict. Any such engagement, especially of ground troops, would divert scarce resources from higher priority tasks, such

as the war in Korea and the NATO buildup in Europe, to a costly and likely indecisive campaign. In the context of planning for a general war with the Soviet bloc,

the Joint Chiefs considered Indochina to be without significant strategic objectives

and urged that the United States avoid any commitment to fight there. In their

view, defense of Indochina, whether in a limited or general war, should be the

responsibility of America's allies and of indigenous forces.

When they did discuss American military intervention, the JCS consistently

emphasized themes that would recur as US involvement in Indochina deepened.

The Joint Chiefs preferred to leave the ground fighting to other nations. At various

times, they considered employing Chinese Nationalist and South Korean divisions

to reinforce or replace the French. Consistently, they advocated building up local

Indochinese anti-communist military strength. In their rare discussions of American ground intervention, they envisioned a campaign against the Viet Minh battle

corps, aimed at breaking the large units up into guerrilla bands that presumably

could be dealt with by allied troops.

The Joint Chiefs clearly preferred to counter Communist aggression in

Indochina with American sea and air power. Besides strikes in direct support of

allied troops in combat, they advocated air attacks on enemy bases and lines of

communication in the People's Republic of China, the ultimate source of Communist strength. Their contingency plans for defeating an overt Chinese attack on

Southeast Asia-a possibility always in their minds-called for an extensive air

atomic assault on Chinese targets combined with a naval blockade of the mainland

and perhaps a Chinese Nationalist invasion from Taiwan. As the Vietnam situation

unfolded after 1954, discussion of nuclear weapons, the Nationalists, and attacking

China would fade away; but the Chiefs' preference for decisive air and naval pressure on the source of aggression over indecisive local ground operations would

remain a constant in the policy debate.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, like other US officials, believed that they understood

the reasons for France's defeat in Indochina. They considered French military

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Conclusion

strategy to have been overly defensive, lacking in the dash and determination

required to press home perceived advantages in numbers, mobility, and firepower.

On the political side, the French had refused until too late to take the actions that

would have given Bao Dai's regime credibility as a rallying point for non-communist Vietnamese nationalists. Without a strong indigenous government, the French

had failed to develop effective local armed forces to control and pacify the country.

If these errors could be rectified and a workable collective Southeast Asia defense

organization established, American officials were confident that they could preserve South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos for the free world.

They would have their chance to try. On 8 September 1954 at Manila, the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and

Pakistan signed the treaty creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

(SEATO). The three states of former French Indochina-South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos - were barred from joining by the Geneva agreement, but they were

included under SEATO's protection. Secretary Dulles had his regional security

agreement. At the same time, the Americans believed that they had found their

Vietnamese anti-communist leader in Ngo Dinh Diem, Bao Dai's premier. With

American support, Diem consolidated his control over South Vietnam. Bao Dai

faded from the scene and Diem became President of the Republic of Vietnam

(RVN), bolstered by American economic and military aid. Except for North Vietnam, Southeast Asia remained outside the communist orbit. The worst fears of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff did not materialize.

By the early 1960s, however, the North Vietnamese were actively seeking to

complete the task of unifying Vietnam under communist rule. As the threat to the

RVN grew, the United States engaged ever more deeply in the struggle, initially with

an expanding program of military advice and support and ultimately with direct

commitment of ground, air, and naval forces. American military leaders would have

the chance to apply the lessons the French supposedly had failed to learn.

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Appendix 1

Summary of the Aid Program

B etween the outbreak of the Indochinese war in 1946 and the close of the Geneva Conference in the summer of 1954, France spent a total of $7 billion to prosecute the war. The American contribution to the French war effort, begun in the

spring of 1950 with an allocation of $15 million, had mounted to a total of $2.7 billion by July 1954. Almost half of this amount was spent in Fiscal Year 1954 alone.

After the Pau Conference in December 1950 the Associated States began providing

financial support to the extent of their abilities, and by the end of the fighting had

expended $250 million. Thus the financial cost of the Indochinese war from 1946 to

1954 amounted to almost $10 billion.'

Throughout the course of the war the United States administered several types

of aid programs that contributed directly or indirectly to combating the Viet Minh.

The most important in terms of results was the program of military assistance.

French Union Forces fighting in Indochina received under MDAP large quantities

of military end-items, components, and spare parts. The Defense Department programmed this material for Indochina, and the United States bore the cost not only

of the equipment itself but also of delivery and distribution. The cumulative program for Fiscal Years 1950-1953 amounted to $773 million. The Fiscal Year 1954

program, with its supplemental allocations necessitated by the Dien Bien Phu crisis, totaled $535 million. Thus under the Fiscal Years 1950-1954 MDAP's Material

Program an aggregate of $1.3 billion was made available to the Defense Department to program equipment for Indochina.2

Closely approaching the military assistance expenditure was the total of $1.29

billion made available to France in financial support (Direct Forces Support

Program). This program began with the grant of $200 million made to France at Lisbon in February 1952, and hence it has generally been defined as Lisbon-type aid.

The main vehicle for expenditure in financial support was the Offshore Procurement

Program (OSP). By purchasing items in France for Indochina the United States

helped alleviate the French dollar shortage, underwrote military expenditures that

otherwise would have seriously damaged the French budget, and enabled France to

meet her NATO obligations more readily. The United States appropriated $500 million in Lisbon-type grants in Fiscal Years 1952-1953 and subsequently agreed to support the French budget to the extent of $785 million in Fiscal Year 1954.

The Fiscal Year 1954 program, however, was interrupted by the Geneva settlement. Processing of OSP contracts was suspended in August until the problem

217
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

could be reexamined. At this point $200 million had already been covered by contract, $300 million was in the pipeline, and an unencumbered balance of $285 million remained. 3

In 1953 the Military Support Program (MSP or Milsup) was initiated. Funds allocated to this account were used to provide so-called "common-use" items inadmissible under MDAP screening criteria. Examples of this kind of aid were roads, transport facilities, communications centers, water supply systems, and machine tools

that contributed directly to the war effort but could not be classified as military

equipment. An initial sum of $30 million was set aside for use in Fiscal Year 1953,

and the total Fiscal Year 1953-1954 MSP expenditure amounted to $75 million.

Under the Defense Support Program (DSP) almost the same purposes were

accomplished. Funds appropriated for economic aid to the Associated States were

administered under DSP and in Fiscal Years 1951-1954 totaled $95 million. Expenditure of DSP funds was supervised by the Military Support Activity (MSA), and its

.successor the Foreign Operations Activity (FOA), through STEM in Indochina. DSP

was designed to help stabilize the economies of the Associated States, but in so

doing it assisted greatly in supporting the military effort. Examples of STEM projects were power developments, introduction of advanced agricultural techniques,

and expansion and improvement of transportation networks.

The monetary contribution of the United States to the war against the Viet

Minh over the four-year period aggregated $2.753 billion and may be summarized

as follows:

Military Assistance: $1,308 million

Financial Support of French Budget: $1,285 million

Military Support Program: $75 million

Defense Support Program: $95 million

Total Cost to US of Indochina War: $2,763 million

Perhaps a better conception of the magnitude of American help to France and

the Associated States can be obtained from a survey of equipment actually delivered in the four years during which MDAP operated in Indochina. When the United

States entered the picture in 1950 French Union Forces were indifferently armed

with largely obsolescent World War II equipment. Long and hard usage in the

humid climate of Indochina, together with improper and inadequate maintenance,

had made much of this equipment nearly unserviceable. Between 1950 and 1954

the French and native troops were almost completely reequipped with modern

weapons and vehicles.

During this period French Union ground troops received under MDAP 1,880

tanks and combat vehicles, 30,887 motor transport vehicles, 361,522 small arms and

machine guns, and 5,045 artillery pieces. Spare parts and maintenance apparatus for

these items were likewise supplied. The United States also furnished a continuing

supply of ammunition and during the four-year period shipped over 500 million

218
Appendix 1

rounds of small arms ammunition and over 10 million artillery shells. The French

Navy received 438 vessels, mostly small patrol craft and landing ships, together with

70 naval aircraft. Two World War II aircraft carriers (CVI) were transferred to the

French Navy for Indochina service. The French air force, flying a few worn-out

World War II planes in 1950, was developed into a comparatively strong, modem air

force. A total of 394 Hellcat fighters, B-26 bombers, and C-47 cargo planes were

transported to the French Air Force in Indochina. By July 1954 over one and a half

million measurement tons of military end-items had been dispatched to Indochina,

not including aircraft and vessels delivered under their own power. Seventy-two

percent of the material was lifted by American commercial shipping.4

The Fiscal Years 1950-1952 programs alone provided equipment for three

French infantry divisions, six Vietnamese divisions, and four Laotian and five Cambodian infantry battalions. By the middle of 1952 the French Air Force had made

important gains in the process of expansion and modernization. It already operated

four fighter squadrons equipped with F8F and F6F naval fighter planes, two light

bombardment squadrons flying B-26 bombers, and three squadrons of transport

planes. The latter as yet had not been completely modernized and consisted of

mixed C-47 and German JU-52 transports. 5

By the spring of 1954, however, the French Army in Indochina consisted of fifty

infantry battalions, eighteen antiaircraft artillery (AAA) battalions, and four armored

battalions largely equipped by the United States. The new and growing Vietnamese

native army had twenty-nine infantry battalions, twenty-seven light infantry battalions, and two AAA battalions almost entirely equipped through MDAP. The French

Air Force now possessed 140 F8F fighters, fifty-five B-26 bombers, 106 C-47 cargo

planes, and 164 M0500 light liaison planes for observation and medical evacuation,

all furnished through American aid. The French naval air arm operated sixteen F8F

fighters, twelve SB2C Helldivers, twenty-five Corsair fighters, eight Privateers for

reconnaissance work, and nine Grumman Goose scout planes. Added to this were

twenty-four C-119 cargo planes and twenty-five B-26 bombers loaned by the American Far East Air Force (FEAF) during the defense of Dien Bien Phu. Almost three

hundred USAF maintenance personnel were temporarily assigned to Indochina to

provide maintenance support for the C-119s, C-47s, and B-26s.6

Conclusions on Aid Program

Despite the great quantity of arms the United States provided from 1950

through 1954, the aid program never functioned entirely to the satisfaction of

either France or the United States. Defense Department officials recognized a basic

fallacy in the use of MDAP to support an active war. Combat operations require a

smooth flow of material and the immediate availability of equipment to meet

uhforeseen contingencies. MDAP simply could not meet these requirements. It had

219
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

been designed to build up the defensive forces of free world nations over a long

period of time and was never intended to supply armies engaged in actual fighting.

Supply procedures called for the French to submit requisitions to MAAG for

screening. MAAG officials eliminated all items not meeting JCS screening criteria

and considered the remainder in light of their own knowledge of whether the

French actually needed the items, whether they could employ them efficiently, and

whether they could maintain them properly. MAAG then forwarded the revised list

to Washington for screening by the military services. The services further revised

the list on the basis of funds available for Indochina support. By the time the material had been programmed, procured, and delivered to Indochina, the need may

have passed and some other type of equipment might be in urgent demand to meet

the current situation.

Defense authorities concerned with the Indochina program recognized this

fault. In presenting the Fiscal Year 1955 Indochina program to Congress, OMA officials repeatedly stressed the fact that MDAP was being used to support a war, a

purpose for which it was never intended.7 The Joint Chiefs of Staff studied the

problem in January 1954 and concluded: "The furnishing of material and other

types of aid to France through the medium of MDAP has proved to be too timeconsuming and cumbersome because of all the criteria and administrative procedures involved. Experience indicates that MDAP is not adaptable to or effective in

providing support to our Allies during an active war." The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that a special fund for Indochina be placed under the direct supervision

of the Secretary of Defense. Within this framework, they declared, "criteria and

procedures can be developed to satisfy the particular needs involved in supporting

the French effort in the war."8 Sentiment in favor of a solution of this type was

growing, but the Geneva settlement in July made further discussion pointless.

Despite the drawbacks inherent in employment of MDAP in wartime, the program undoubtedly would have operated more smoothly had the French command

and staff functioned efficiently. The High Command, however, was burdened by

pre-World War II staff thinking and a cumbersome logistics apparatus that resulted in waste of material and unrealistic equipment requests. MAAG officers found

that the French supply organization lacked an efficient and centralized stock control system and hence had no provision for lateral redistribution. The French

would submit requisitions for a given item on the basis of a shortage existing at

one installation. Investigation would reveal an oversupply of the same item at

another installation. These operating procedures placed a heavy burden on the

American logistics system.9

The whole problem was concisely summarized in February 1954 by the Army

attach6 in Saigon:

Fact possibly not apparent to those who do not have daily contact with

French military here is that their staff thinking and procedure is vintage

1935-1939. Although Navarre demands that his requirements (for United States

220
Appendix 1

logistical support) be filled without further screening fact that his staff not

capable of accurately generating and evaluating these requirements. Acceptance these requests without detailed screening by United States military supply agencies would result waste millions of dollars.

Staff action are often uncoordinated and there is no rpt no evidence of

detailed long range planning. Striking example of this is the continuing request

for additional aircraft without making a coordinated effort to obtain maximum

utilization of those already available. French seem to unconsciously feel that

the arrival of large quantities of new type equipment... will somehow allow

them to conduct operations without commitment of manpower. In their planning they completely overlook requirements for operation, maintenance and

storage of these items.10

Often MAAG's refusal to approve certain French requests was based upon the

fact, known to MAAG but rarely recognized by the French, that the desired items

could not be properly maintained or utilized with existing facilities and personnel.

The French were wasteful and haphazard in their maintenance practices and were

sensitive to criticism and offers of technical advice. Although MAAG was charged

with insuring proper care of equipment supplied by the United States, French commanders barely concealed their reluctance to accept MAAG inspection, and they

carefully controlled the conditions under which MAAG officers were permitted to

examine their units. The French Air Force was a particularly consistent offender.

Rarely did American inspectors find proper maintenance of aircraft or utilization

rates approaching those of the USAF. As an OMA official told Congressmen, "The

problem of supporting French units in Indochina with U.S. equipment is not concerned so much with procurement and delivery of equipment as it is with the ability of the French to support it after it is placed in their hands .... ,

Further. complicating the situation was a lack of coordination between the

French High Command in Indochina and the General Staff in Paris. Never throughout the war did Paris support the armies in Indochina properly, and successive

French commanders found it impossible to get personnel from Metropolitan

France in sufficient numbers to maintain American material received. Further,

authorities in Paris frequently submitted requests through diplomatic channels or

the Paris MAAG for material that French Union Forces could not use or support

and, indeed, did not want.

The use of MDAP to support a war, together with inefficient French staff and

supply practices, inevitably resulted in what came to be known as "crash basis supply," a type of operation that reached its peak during the Dien Bien Phu crisis. Equipment vitally needed for projected combat operations became the subject of urgent

requests for immediate delivery. American programming, procurement, and shipping

agencies were consequently placed under an intolerable strain, and it was frequently

necessary to divert funds from the programs of other countries to the Indochina program in order to meet the increased financial demands. The occasional inability of

221
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

the United States to comply with these requests led to criticism by the French that

the United States was not properly supporting the war effort.

Another problem that developed, partly from American difficulty in meeting

recurring crash basis requests, was that of out-of-channel communications. When

the United States did not produce needed equipment promptly, or when MAAG

eliminated items particularly desired, the French resorted to channels other than

MAAG to obtain results. The situation was aggravated by high American officials

leading the French to expect more than MAAG or the Defense Department felt

could be efficiently used. When an item deemed essential was deleted from a program, the French protested through diplomatic channels. These agencies were

entirely unacquainted with the merits of the argument and basis for the MAAG

decision, but they generally transmitted the protest anyhow. The United States

repeatedly asked France to confine MDAP business to liaison with MAAG, but the

French discovered that they normally got what they wanted by using improper

channels and continued to do so throughout the war.

These various factors combined to interfere with an expeditious flow of material throughout the four years during which the French received American aid in

Indochina. The demands for American aid arising from the Dien Bien Phu battle

brought the whole problem into focus. It demonstrated the need for a thorough

modernization of French supply organization, a more cooperative and understanding French attitude toward MAAG, and an American aid structure geared to the

specific situation in Indochina. The Geneva Accords in July 1954, however, obviated the need for such a reappraisal.

222
Appendix 2

Text of NSC 64/1, 21 December 1950

The proposal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff listed both short-term and long-term

objectives for the United States in Indochina, of which the short-term aims were

the most significant for this history, These objectives were the following:

Short-term Objectives

a. The United States should take action, as a matter of urgency, by all means

practicable short of the actual employment of United States military forces, to

deny Indochina to communism.

b. As long as the present situation exists, the United States should continue to

insure that the primary responsibility for the restoration of peace and security in

Indochina rests with the French.

c. The United States should seek to develop its military assistance program for

Indochina based on an over-all military plan prepared by the French, concurred in

by the Associated States of Indochina, and acceptable to the United States.

(1) Both the plan and the program should be developed and implemented

as a matter of urgency. It should be clearly understood, however, that United

States acceptance of the plan is limited to the logistical support which the

United States may agree to furnish. The aid provided under the program should

be furnished to the French in Indochina and to the Associated States. The allocation of United States military assistance as between the French and the

national armies of Indochina should be approved by the French and United

States authorities in Indochina.

(2) Popular support of the Government by the Indochinese people is essential to a favorable settlement of the security problem of Indochina. Therefore, as

a condition to the provision of those further increases in military assistance to

Indochina necessary for the implementation of an agreed over-all military plan,

the United States Government should obtain assurances from the French Government that:

(a) A program providing for the eventual self-government of Indochina

either within or outside of the French Union will be developed, made public, and implementation initiated at once in order to strengthen the national spirit of the Indochinese in opposition to communism.

(b) National armies of the Associated States of Indochina will be

organized as a matter of urgency. While it is doubtful that the build-up of

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

these armies can be accomplished in time to contribute significantly to the

present military situation, the direct political and psychological benefits to

be derived from this course would be great and would thus result in immediate, although indirect, military benefits.

(c) Pending the formation and training of Indochinese national armies

as effective units, and as an interim emergency measure, France will dispatch sufficient additional armed forces to Indochina to insure that the

restoration of peace and internal security in that country will be accomplished in accordance with the timetable of the over-all military plan for

Indochina.

(d) France will change its political and military concepts in Indochina

to:

i. Eliminate its policy of "colonialism."

ii. Provide proper tutelage to the Associated States.

iii. Insure that a suitable military command structure, unhampered by

political interference, is established to conduct effective and appropriate military operations. The effective implementation of these changes

will require competent and efficient political and military leaders who

will be able to cope with the conditions in that country.

(3) At an appropriate time the United States should institute checks to satisfy itself that the conditions set forth in subparagraph c-(2) above are being

fulfilled.

d. The United States should exert all practicable political and diplomatic measures required to obtain the recognition of the Associated States by the other noncommunist states of Southeast and South Asia.

e. In the event of overt attack by organized Chinese Communist forces against

Indochina, the United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China but should, in concert with the United Kingdom, support France and the Associated States by all means short of the actual employment

of United States military forces. This support should include appropriate expansion of the present military assistance program and endeavors to induce States in

the neighborhood of Indochina to commit armed forces to resist the aggression.

f. The United States should immediately reconsider its policy toward Indochina

whenever it appears that the French Government may abandon its military position

in that country or plans to refer the problem of Indochina to the United Nations.

Unless the situation throughout the world generally, and Indochina specifically,

changes materially, the United States should seek to dissuade the French from

referring the Indochina question to the United Nations.

g. Inasmuch as the United States-sponsored resolution, "Uniting for Peace,"

has been adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, and should a situation develop in Indochina in a manner similar to that in Korea in which United

Nations forces were required, the United States would then probably be morally

224
Appendix 2

obligated to contribute its armed forces designated for service on behalf of the

United Nations. It is, therefore, in the interests of the United States to take such

action in Indochina as would forestall the need for the General Assembly to invoke

the provisions of the resolution, "Uniting for Peace."

Long-term Objectives

a. United States security interests demand that this government, by all means

short of the actual employment of United States military forces, seek to prevent the

further spread of communism in Southeast Asia generally and, in particular, in

French Indochina.

b. The United States should seek to insure the establishment of such conditions in Indochina that no foreign armed forces will be required for the maintenance of internal security.

c. The United States should continue to press the French to carry out in letter and in spirit the program referred to in paragraph 4-c-(2)-(a) above, providing for the eventual self-government of Indochina either within or outside of the

French Union.

d. The United States should continue to favor the entry of the three Associated

States of Indochina into the United Nations.

e. The United States should encourage the establishment of an appropriate

form of regional security arrangement embracing Indochina and the other countries of Southeast Asia under Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter.1

225
Appendix 3

Text of NSC 124/2, 25 June 1952

(partial)

7. With respect to Southeast Asia, the United States should:

a. Strengthen propaganda and cultural activities, as appropriate, in relation

to the area to foster increased alignment of the people with the free world.

b. Continue, as appropriate, programs of economic and technical assistance designed to strengthen the indigenous noncommunist governments of

the area.

c. Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to restore and expand their

commerce with each other and with the rest of the free world, and stimulate

the flow of the raw material resources of the area to the free world.

d. Seek agreement with other nations, including at least France, the UK,

Australia and New Zealand, for a joint warning to Communist China regarding

the grave consequences of Chinese aggression against Southeast Asia, the

issuance of such a warning to be contingent upon the prior agreement of

France and the UK to participate in the courses of action set forth in paragraphs 10 c, 12,... and such others as are determined as a result of prior trilateral consultation, in the event such a warning is ignored.

e. Seek UK and French agreement in principle that a naval blockade of

Communist China should be included in the minimum courses of action set

forth in paragraph 10 c below.

f. Continue to encourage and support closer cooperation among the countries of Southeast Asia, and between those countries and the United States,

Great Britain, France, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, South Asia and

Japan.

g. Strengthen, as appropriate, covert operations designed to assist in the

achievement of US objectives in Southeast Asia.

h. Continue activities and operations designed to encourage the overseas

Chinese communities in Southeast Asia to organize and activate anti-communist groups and activities within their own communities....

i. Take measures to promote the coordinated defense of the area, and

encourage and support the spirit of resistance among the peoples of Southeast

Asia to Chinese Communist aggression and to the encroachments of local communists.

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

j. Make clear to the American people the importance of Southeast Asia to

the security of the United States so that they may be prepared for any of the

courses of action proposed herein.

8. With respect to Indochina the United States should:

a. Continue to promote international support for the three Associated

States.

b. Continue to assure the French that the US regards the French effort in

Indochina as one of great strategic importance in the general international

interest rather than in the purely French interest, and as essential to the security of the free world, not only in the Far East but in the Middle East and Europe

as well.

c. Continue to assure the French that we are cognizant of the sacrifices

entailed for France in carrying out her effort in Indochina and that, without

overlooking the principle that France has the primary responsibility in Indochina, we will recommend to the Congress appropriate military, economic and

financial aid to France and the Associated States

d. Continue to cultivate friendly and increasingly cooperative relations

with the Governments of France and the Associated States at all levels with a

view to maintaining and, if possible, increasing the degree of influence the US

can bring to bear on the policies and actions of the French and Indochinese

authorities to the end of directing the course of events toward the objectives

we seek. Our influence with the French and Associated States should be

designed to further those constructive political, economic and social measures

which will tend to increase the stability of the Associated States and thus make

it possible for the French to reduce the degree of their participation in the military, economic and political affairs of the Associated States.

e. Specifically we should use our influence with France and the Associated

States to promote positive political, military, economic and social policies,

among which the following are considered essential elements:

(1) Continued recognition and carrying out by France of its primary

responsibility for the defense of Indochina.

(2) Further steps by France and the Associated States toward the evolutionary development of the Associated States.

(3) Such reorganization of French administration and representation in

Indochina as will be conducive to an increased feeling of responsibility on the

part of the Associated States.

(4) Intensive efforts to develop the armies of the Associated States, including independent logistical and administrative services.

(5) The development of more effective and stable Governments in the

Associated States.

(6) Land reform, agrarian and industrial credit, sound rice marketing systems, labor development, foreign trade and capital formation.

(7) An aggressive military, political, and psychological program to defeat

or seriously reduce the Viet Minh forces.

228
Appendix 3

(8) US-French cooperation in publicizing progressive developments in the

foregoing policies in Indochina.

9. In the absence of large-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina,

the United States should:

a. Provide increased aid on a high priority basis for the French Union

forces without relieving French authorities of their basic military responsibility

for the defense of the Associated States in order to:

(1) Assist in developing indigenous armed forces which will eventually be

capable of maintaining internal security without assistance from French units.

(2) Assist the French Union forces to maintain progress in the restoration

of internal security against the Viet Minh.

(3) Assist the forces of France and the Associated States to defend

Indochina against Chinese Communist aggression.

b. In view of the immediate urgency of the situation, involving possible

large-scale Chinese Communist intervention, and in order that the United

States may be prepared to take whatever action may be appropriate in such

circumstances, make the plans necessary to carry out the courses of action

indicated in paragraph 10 below.

c. In the event that information and circumstances point to the conclusion

that France is no longer prepared to carry the burden in Indochina, or if France

presses for an increased sharing of the responsibility for Indochina, whether in

the UN or directly with the US Government, oppose a French withdrawal and

consult with the French and British concerning further measures to be taken

to safeguard the area from communist domination.

10. In the event that it is determined, in consultation with France, that Chinese

Communist forces (including volunteers) have overtly intervened in the conflict in

Indochina, or are covertly participating to such an extent as to jeopardize retention

of the Tonkin Delta area by French Union forces, the United States should take the

following measures to assist these forces in preventing the loss of Indochina, to

repel the aggression and to restore peace and security in Indochina:

a. Support a request by France or the Associated States for immediate

action by the United Nations which would include a UN resolution declaring

that Communist China has committed an aggression, recommending that member states take whatever action may be necessary, without geographic limitation, to assist France and the Associated States in meeting the aggression.

b. Whether or not UN action is immediately forthcoming, seek the maximum possible international support for, and participation in, the minimum

courses of military action agreed upon by the parties to the joint warning. These

minimum courses of action are set forth in subparagraph c immediately below.

c. Carry out the following minimum courses of military action, either

under the auspices of the UN or in conjunction with France and the United

Kingdom and any other friendly governments:

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

(1) A resolute defense of Indochina itself to which the United States would

provide such air and naval assistance as might be practicable.

(2) Interdiction of Chinese Communist communication lines including

those in China.

(3) The United States would expect to provide the major forces for task

(2) above; but would expect the UK and France to provide at least token

forces therefor and to render such other assistance as is normal between

allies, and France to carry the burden of providing, in conjunction with the

Associated States, the ground forces for the defense of Indochina.

11. In addition to the courses of action set forth in paragraph 10 above, the United States should take the following military actions as appropriate to the situation:

a. If agreement is reached pursuant to paragraph 7-e, establishment in conjunction with the UK and France of a naval blockade of Communist China.

b. Intensification of covert operations to aid anti-communist guerrilla

forces operating against Communist China and to interfere with and disrupt

Chinese Communist lines of communication and military supply areas.

c. Utilization, as desirable and feasible, of anti-communist Chinese forces,

including Chinese Nationalist forces in military operations in Southeast Asia,

Korea, or China proper.

d. Assistance to the British to cover an evacuation from Hong Kong, if

required.

e. Evacuation of French Union civil and military personnel from the

Tonkin Delta, if required.

12. If, subsequent to aggression against Indochina and execution of the minimum necessary courses of action listed in paragraph 10-c above, the United States

determines jointly with the UK and France that expanded military action against

Communist China is rendered necessary by the situation, the United States should

take air and naval action in conjunction with at least France and the UK against all

suitable military targets in China, avoiding insofar as practicable those targets in

areas near the boundaries of the USSR in order not to increase the risk of direct

Soviet involvement.

13. In the event the concurrence of the United Kingdom and France to expanded military action against Communist China is not obtained, the United State

should consider taking unilateral action.

230
Appendix 4

The Initial Viet Minh Terms at Geneva

1. Recognition by France of the sovereignty and independence of Vietnam

throughout the territory of Vietnam and also of the sovereignty and independence

of Chmer and Pathet Lao.

2. Conclusion of an agreement on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the

territory of Vietnam, Chmer and Pathet Lao within the time-limits to be agreed

upon between the belligerents. Pending the withdrawal of troops the dislocation of

French troops in Vietnam shall be agreed upon, particular attention being paid to

limit to the minimum the number of their dislocation points. Provision shall be

made that the French troops should not interfere in the affairs of local administration in the areas of their dislocation.

3. Holding of free general elections in Vietnam, Chmer and Pathet Lao. Convening of advisory conferences of the representatives of the governments of both sides

in Vietnam, Chmer and Pathet Lao, in each of the states separately and under conditions securing freedom of activity for patriotic parties, groups and social organizations in the preparation and the holding of free general elections to establish a

unified government in each country; while interference from outside should not be

permitted. Local commissions will be set up to supervise the preparation for and

the carrying out of the elections.

Prior to the establishment of unified governments in each of the above-mentioned states, the governments of both sides will respectively carry out their

administrative functions in the districts which will be under their administration

after the settlement has been carried out in accordance with the agreement on the

termination of hostilities.

4. The statement by the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on

the readiness of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to examine the question of the entry of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam into the

French Union in conformity with the principle of free will and on the conditions of

this entry. Corresponding statements should be made by the governments of

Chmer and Pathet Lao.

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JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

5. The recognition by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as well as by

Chmer and Pathet Lao of the economic and cultural interests of France existing in

these countries.

After the establishment of unified governments in Vietnam, Chmer, Pathet Lao

.the economic and cultural relations of these states with France should be subject

to the settlement in conformity with the principles of equality and mutual interests.

Pending the establishment of the unified governments in the three states the economic and cultural relations of Indochina with France will temporarily remain

without a change such as they exist now. However in the areas where communications and trade ties have been broken off they can be reestablished on the basis of

understanding between both sides.

The citizens of both sides will enjoy the privileged status to be determined

later, in matters pertaining to domicile, movement and business activities on the

territory of the other side.

6. The belligerent sides undertake not to prosecute persons who collaborated

with the other side during the war.

7. Carrying out mutual exchange of prisoners of war.

8. Implementation of measures referred to in paragraphs 1-7, should be preceded by the cessation of hostilities in Indochina and by the conclusion to this end of

appropriate agreements between France and each of the three states which should

provide for:

a. Complete and simultaneous cease-fire throughout the whole of the Indochina territory by all armed forces of the belligerent sides:

Ground, naval and air. Both sides in each of the three states of Indochina for

the purpose of strengthening the armistice will carry out a necessary settlement of

territories and of the areas occupied by them, and it should also be provided that

both sides should not hinder each other during the passage, for the purpose of the

above mentioned settlement, by the troops of the other side over the territory

occupied by the other side.

b. Complete termination of transportation into Indochina from abroad of new

ground, naval and air units or personnel, or any kind of arms and ammunition;

c. To set up control over the implementation of the terms of agreement on the

cessation of hostilities and to establish for this purpose in each of the three states

mixed commissions composed of the representatives of the belligerent sides.

232
Appendix 5

Text of Final Declaration-Geneva Conference

(unofficial translation)

Final declaration, dated July 21, 1954, of the Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indochina, in which the representatives of Cambodia, the

Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, France, Laos, the People's Republic of China,

the State of Viet-Nam, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom,

and the United States of America took part.

1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilities in Cambodia,

Laos, and Viet-Nam and organizing international control and the supervision of the

execution of the provisions of these agreements.

2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreements on

the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam henceforth

to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community

of nations.

3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of

Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all citizens

to take their place in the national community, in particular by participating in the

next general elections, which, in conformity with the constitution of each of these

countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in

conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms.

4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of

hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign troops

and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference

also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos

of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel,

or in instructors except for the purpose of effective defense of their territory and, in

the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.

233
JCS and the First Indochina War, 1947-1954

5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation

of hostilities in Viet-Nam to the effect that no military base at the disposition of a

foreign state may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute

part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference also takes note of the

declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will

not join in any agreement with other states if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the

charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the

agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not

threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for

the military forces of foreign powers.

6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Viet-Nam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and

that the military demarcation line should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its conviction

that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the

agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the

achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Viet-Nam.

7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of

independence, unity, and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to

enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot.

In order to insure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been

made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the

national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of

an international commission composed of representatives of the member states of

the International Supervisory Commission referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from April 20, 1955, onwards.

8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to

insure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied

and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely in which zone

he wishes to live.

9. The competent representative authorities of the northern and southern zones

of Viet-Nam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any

individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way

with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons' families.

234
Appendix 5

10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to

the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos,

and Viet-Nam, at the request of the governments concerned and within a period

which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in the cases where, by

agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain

at specified points and for a specified time.

11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to

the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the reestablishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam, the French

Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and

sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam.

12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam, each member of the

Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the

unity, and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states, and to refrain

from any interference in the internal affairs.

13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission, in

order to study such measures as may prove necessary to insure that the agreements

on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam are respected.

235
Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAA antiaircraft artillery

ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States

CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific Command

CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff

CIA Central Intelligence Committee

Comintern (Communist International)

COMFEAF Commander, Far East Air Force

COMSAC Commander, Strategic Air Command

CVI aircraft carriers

DIC Colonial Infantry Division

DRV Democratic Republic of Viet Nam

DSP Defense Support Program

ECA Economic Cooperation Administration

EDC European Defense Community

FEAF Far East Air Force

FECOM Far East Command

FMACC Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee

FOA Foreign Operations Activity

ICP Indochinese Communist Party

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JIC Joint Intelligence Committee

JSP Joint Staff Planners

JSSC Joint Strategic Survey Committee

JWPC Joint War Plans Committee

LCM landing craft, mechanized

LCVP landing craft, vehicle, personnel

LSM landing ship, medium

LST landing ship, tank

LSSL Landing Ship, Support, Large

237
MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group

MATS Military Air Transport Service

MDAP Mutual Defense Assistance Program

Milsup Military Support Program

MRP Mouvement Populaire Republicaine

MSA Military Support Activity

MSP Military Support Program

MSTS Military Sea Transport Service

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSC National Security Council

OCB Operations Coordinating Board

OMA Office of Military Assistance

OSP Offshore Procurement Program

OSS Office of Strategic Services

ROK Republic of Korea

RVN Republic of Vietnam

SEAAPC Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee

SEAC Southeast Asia Command

SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

shoran short-range navigation

STEM Special Technical and Economic Mission

SWNCC State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee

TO&E Tables of Organization & Equipment

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VNQDD Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang

238
Principal Civilian and Military Officers

President and Commander in Chief

Harry S. Truman 12 Apr 45-20 Jan 53

Dwight D. Eisenhower 20 Jan 53-20 Jan 61

Secretary of State

George C. Marshall 21 Jan 47-20 Jan 49

Dean G. Acheson 21 Jan 49-20 Jan 53

John F Dulles 21 Jan 53-22 Apr 59

Secretary of Defense

James V. Forrestal 17 Sep 47-28 Mar 49

Louis A. Johnson 28 Mar 49-19 Sep 50

George C. Marshall 21 Sep 50-12 Sep 51

Robert A. Lovett 17 Sep 51-20 Jan 53

Charles E. Wilson 28 Jan 53-08 Oct 57

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Stephen T. Early 02 May 49-30 Sep 50

Robert A. Lovett 04 Oct 50-16 Sep 51

William C. Foster 24 Sep 51-20 Jan 53

Roger M. Keyes 04 Feb 53-01 May 54

Robert B. Anderson 03 May 54-04 Aug 55

Secretary of the Army

Kenneth C. Royall 18 Sep 47-27 Apr 49

Gordon Gray 20 Jun 49-12 Apr 50

Frank Pace, Jr. 12 Apr 50-20 Jan 53

Robert T. Stevens 04 Feb 53-20 Jul 55

Secretary of the Navy

John L. Sullivan 18 Sep 47-24 May 49

Francis P. Mathews 25 May 49-30 Jul 51

Dan A. Kimball 31 Jul 51-03 Feb 53

Robert B. Anderson 04 Feb 53-02 May 54

Charles S. Thomas 03 May 54-31 Mar 57

Secretary of the Air Force

W. Stuart Symington 18 Sep 47-24 Apr 50

Thomas K. Finletter 24 Apr 50-20 Jan 53

Harold E. Talbott 04 Feb 53-13 Aug 55

239
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief

Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy 20 Jul 42-21 Mar 49

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley 16 Aug 49-15 Aug 53

Admiral Arthur W. Radford 15 Aug 53-15 Aug 57

Chief of Staff, US Army

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower 19 Nov 45-07 Feb 48

General Omar N. Bradley 07 Feb 48-16 Aug 49

General J. Lawton Collins 16 Aug 49-15 Aug 53

General Matthew B. Ridgway 15 Aug 53-30 Jun 55

Chief of Naval Operations

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz 15 Dec 45-15 Dec 47

Admiral Louis E. Denfeld 15 Dec 47-02 Nov 49

Admiral Forrest R Sherman 02 Nov 49-22 Jul 51

Admiral William M. Fechteler 16 Aug 51-16 Aug 53

Admiral Robert B. Carney 17 Aug 53-17 Aug 55

Chief of Staff, US Air Force

General Carl Spaatz 26 Sep 47-29 Apr 48

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg 30 Apr 48-29 Jun 53

General Nathan F. Twining 30 Jun 53-30 Jun 57

Commandant, US Marine Corps

General Alexander A. Vandegrift 01 Jan 44-31 Dec 47

General Clifton B. Cates 01 Jan 48-31 Dec 51

General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. 01 Jan 52-31 Dec 55

Commander in Chief, Far East Command

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur 01 Jan47-11 Apr 51

General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA 11 Apr 51- 09 May 52

General Mark W. Clark, USA 09 May 52-05 Oct 53

General John E. Hull, USA 05 Oct 53 -01 Apr 55

Commander in Chief, Pacific Command

Admiral John H. Towers 01 Jan 47-28 Feb 47

Admiral Louis E. Denfeld 28 Feb 47-12 Jan 48

Admiral DeWitt C. Ramsey 12 Jan 48-30 Apr 49

Admiral Arthur W. Radford 30 Apr 49-10 Jul 53

Admiral Felix B. Stump 10 Jul 53-31 Jul 58

240
Chief, US Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Indochina

Brigadier General Francis G. Brink, USA Oct 50-Aug 52

Major General Thomas J. H. Trapnell, USA Aug 52-Apr 54

Lieutenant General John W. O'Daniel, USA Apr 54-Nov 55

241
Notes to Pages 1-7

Notes

Chapter 1. World War II and the Coming of the Indochina War

1. S. H. Steinberg, ed., The Statesman's Yearbook, 1951 (London: Macmillan, 1951), pp.

1038-1046.

2. Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960, in United

States Army in Vietnam (Washington: Center of Military History, 1985), pp. 3-17; William J.

Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 2d ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,

1996), pp. 5-14.

3. Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina (1954), p. 15; Virginia Thompson,

French Indochina (New York: Macmillan, 1937), pp. 154-155, 162-164, 184-191. The first significant contact between ordinary Americans and Vietnamese came when US forces arrived

in the French Pacific islands during the Second World War, contacts recorded in James

Michener's Tales of the South Pacific and the subsequent Broadway musical South Pacific.

4. Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, pp. 72-74.

5. Duiker, Communist Road to Power, pp. 8-14.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., pp. 14-17.

9. Ibid., pp. 33-52.

10. Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 7-10, 14-17; Thompson, French Indochina, pp.

489-490.

11. Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War H (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 167-168.

12. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940-1941 (1953), p. 9.

13. Doc A-1, Msg, Dunn to USecState, 6 Aug 40, in State Dept., Hist Div, Documentary

History of United States Policy Toward Indochina, 1940-1953, Research Project No. 354,

April 1954 (hereinafter: Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina); Langer & Gleason, Undeclared War, pp. 12-15; Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, pp. 21, 25; State Dept., Div of

Research on Far East (DRF), SEA Br., "Chronological History of Events in Indochina since

1940 (Background Paper for Indochina Phase of Geneva Conference, April 1954)," 1 Apr 54

(hereinafter: Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology), pp. 18-19; CCS 092

Asia (6-25-48) sec. 60 BP 10.

14. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (1948), Vol I, pp. 904-907; Weinberg, World

at Arms, pp. 168-170, 182.

15. Hull, Memoirs, Vol I, pp. 907-908.

16. Weinberg, World at Arms, pp. 248-260.

17. Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, pp. 21ff; William D. Leahy, I Was There

(1940), p. 44.

18. Department of State Bulletin, 18 April 1942; William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble

(New York: Harper, 1966), p. 33; Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 21-22.

19. Duiker, Communist Road to Power, pp. 67-70.

20. Ibid., pp. 70-75.

21. Ibid., pp. 79-85.

22. Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 23-24, 46; Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller, eds.,

Combat Chronology, 1941-1945, in The Army Air Forces in World War H (Montgomery,

AL: Air University, 1973), p. 32 and passim.

23. "French Committee's Statement on Indochina," The United Nations Review, Vol. IV,

15 January 1944, p. 16.

243
Notes to Pages 7-12

24. Spector, Advice and Support, p. 22n.

25. Elliot Roosevelt, As He Saw It (1946), pp. 114-116.

26. Ibid.

27. JCS 547, 25 Oct 43; JCS 561, 2 Nov 43; JCS 547/2, 8 Nov 43; Memo, Leahy to Pres,

"Rearmament of French Forces," 9 Nov 43, all in CCS 370 France (10-6-43) sec. 1; Mns, JCS

121st Mtg, 2 Nov 43, item 11; Mns, JCS 122d Mtg, 9 Nov 43, item 1; Mns, Mtg, JCS w/Presi 15

Nov 43, item 3; Vigneras.

28. The committee structure of the Joint Staff had several components. These included

the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), the senior advisory body to the JCS; the Joint

Staff Planners (JSP), charged with preparing war plans; the permanent working staff of the

JSP, called the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC); and the Joint Intelligence Committee

(JIC).

29. See note above.

30. Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 23-28.

31. CCS 644, 5 Aug 44; Rpt by CadC, "French Participation in the War against Japan," 17

Dec 44; CCS 644/8, 5 Jan 44; JCS 1013, 22 Aug 44; JCS 1013/1, 28 Aug 44; CCS 644/1, 30 Aug

44; Msg, CG USAFCT (Wedemeyer) to Marshall, CFBX 26367, CM-IN-14501, 15 Nov 44; Msg,

JCS to Sultan & Wedemeyer, WARX 66178, CM-OUT-66178, 21 Nov 44; Memo, Pres to Leahy,

17 Nov 44, all in CCS 370 France (8-5-44), sec. 1; Mns, JCS 170th Mtg, 29 Aug 44, item 4;

Hull, Memoirs, Vol II, pp. 1598.

32. Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 24-28.

33. Ibid., pp. 30, 46-47.

34. JPS 599/D, 19 Jan 45, CCS 370 France (8-5-44) sec. 2; JCS 1200/6, 15 Feb 45; Memo,

JCS Secy to SecWar & SecNav, 22 Feb 45; SWNCC 35/4, 15 Mar 45; SWNCC 35/2/D, 14 Mar

45; CCS 644/16, 13 Mar 45, all in CCS 370 France (8-5-44) sec. 3.

35. Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 46-49.

36. Duiker, Communist Road to Power, pp. 85-87; Philippe DeVillers, Histoire du VietNam de 1940-1952 (Paris, 1952), p. 121; Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 29-30.

37. Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 31-34; Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, pp. 46-49;

DeVillers, Histoire du Viet-Nam, pp. 125-128.

38. SWNCC 35/4, 15 Mar 45; SWNCC 35/2/D, 14 Mar 45; CCS 644/16, 13 Mar 45, all in CCS

370 France (8-5-44) sec. 3.

39. Memo, McFarland to Marshall, King, Arnold, "French liaison in Southeast Asia," 13

Mar 45; Memo, Leahy to Marshall, King, Arnold, McFarland, 15 Mar 45; Memo, Col. McCarthy

to Leahy, 16 Mar 45, in ibid.; Msg, Wedemeyer to Chennault, WARX 55402, MAPLE 52, 19 Mar

45, Msg File "MAPLE" 06104-2-E, Vol. III, DRB AGO.

40. Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 31-34, 46-47.

41. Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p. 21.

42. Duiker, Communist Road to Power, pp. 87-90.

43. Quoted in Spector, Advice and Support, p. 41; see also pp. 39-40.

44. Ibid., pp. 41-43.

45. Jean Sainteny, Histoire d'une paix manquee (Paris: Fayard, 1967), p. 57.

46. Duiker, Communist Road to Power, pp. 95ff.

47. Ibid, p. 104; Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 55-56.

48. Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 42-43.

49. Ibid., pp. 43-45; Mns, SWNCC 16th Mtg, 13 Apr 45, item 3; JCS 1200/13, 27 Apr 45;

1200/14, 28 Apr 45, dec atchd; Memo, SWNCC Secy to Mr. Bard & Mr. Lovett, 4 May 45;

SWNCC 35/11, 25 May 45, all in CCS 370 France (8-5-44) sec. 5; Doc B-1, Msg, Stettinius to

Grew, EOC-1608, 8 May 45, in Doc Hist of US Policy Toward Indochina.

S50. Quoted in Spector, Advice and Support, p. 45.

244
Notes to Pages 12-17

51. Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 48-50.

52. JCS 1013/6, 2 Jun 45; Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, C-17621, CM-IN-1646, 2 Jun 45;

JCS 1013/7, 4 Jul 45, all in CCS 370 France (8-5-44) sec. 5; Mns, JCS 195th mtg, 16 Jul 45,

item 4; CCS 895, 16 Jul 45; CCS 895/1, 18 Jul 45; CCS 895/2, 19 Jul 45; Memo, CCS Secys to

Ch. Fr. MR. Miss., 19 Jul 45; CCS 895/3, 6 Aug 45; Memo, CCS Species to Ch. Fr. MR. Miss. in

US, 13 Sep 45, all in CCS 370 France (8-5-44) sec. 6. This same plan made the 38th parallel

the line between Soviet and American occupation forces in Korea.

53. Doc B-3, Msg, Acheson to AmEmb Chungking, 1622, 5 Oct 45, in Doc Hist of US Pol

Toward Indochina; JCS 1475, 17 Aug 45, CCS 387 Japan (2-7-45) sec. 2: CCS 903, Memo

from Ch. Fr. Naval Miss. in US, "French Participation in Surrender of Japanese Forces in

Indochina," 16 Aug 45; CCS 903/1, 19 Aug 45; CCS 903/2, 6 Sep 45; Memo, CCS Species to Ch.

Fr. Mil. Miss. in US, 7 Sep 45, all in CCS 370 (4-25-45); CCS 644/35, 28 Aug 45; CCS 644/36, 11

Sep 45; Memo, Cornwallis-Jones to McFarland, "Transportation of French Forces from

China to Tonkin," 13 Sep 45, all in" CCS 370 France (8-5-44) sec. 6.

54. Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 67-68; Jacques-Philippe de Hautecloque was a

French officer who rallied to de Gaulle under the assumed name of Leclerc. He commanded

the Fighting French division that entered Paris with the Americans in August 1944.

55. Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 51-54, 56-58.

56. Ibid., pp. 53-64, 69-72.

57. Ibid., p. 61; see also pp. 62-64.

58. Ibid., pp. 71-72.

59. Ibid., pp. 64-68; Duiker, Communist Road to Power, pp. 117-121. Dewey was promoted posthumously to lieutenant colonel.

60. Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, pp. 29-30; Spector, Advice

and Support, pp. 67-68; Duiker, Communist Road to Power, pp. 118-122.

61. CCS 930, 15 Oct 45; Memo, Cornwall-Jones to McFarland, 19 Nov 45; SM-4593, 5 Dec

45; CCS 930/2, 12 Mar 46; Msg, CGIBC to War Dept, CRA 6078, CM-IN-3751, 17 Mar 45, all in

CDCS 323.361 (6-19-43) sec. 2. SWNCC 177, 23 Aug 45; JCS 1494, 29 Aug 45, both in CCS 092

Thailand (1-4-45) sec. 1. JCS 1494/1, 4 Sep 45; JCS 1494/2, 14 Sep 45; JCS 1494/3, 17 Oct 45,

same file sec. 2.

62. See note above.

63. CCS 644/38, 21 Dec 45; JCS 1200/16, 17 Jan 46; SWNCC 35/13/D, 29 Jan 46, all in CCS

370 France (8-5-44) sec. 6. CCS 644/39, 1 Feb 46; CCS 644/40, 22 Feb 46; JCS 1200/17, 26 Feb

46; CCS 644/41, 27 Feb 46, same file, sec. 7.

64. Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 52-53; Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina

Chronology, p. 33; Duiker, Communist Road to Power, pp. 116-117.

65. SWN-4017, Memo SWNCC Secy to JCS Secy, "Relief of Chinese Forces in Northern

Indo-China by French Forces," 14 Mar 46, w/encls; JCS 1200/18, 21 Mar 46; CCS 951/1, 3 Apr

46; Memo, CCS Species to French MA, "Relief by French Forces of Chinese Troops Occupying North Indo-China," 3 Apr 46; CCS 951/3, Memo by RECCS, "Transfer of Responsibility to

the French Authorities for Disarmament and Repatriation of Japanese from French IndoChina," 8 May 46, all in CCS 370 France (8-5-44) sec. 7. Spector, Advice and Support, p. 52.

66. Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 42-43, 72; Sainteny, Histoire d'une paix manquee.

67. Statesman's Yearbook, 1951, pp. 978-979.

68. Duiker, Communist Road to Power, pp. 122-125; Spector, Advice and Support, pp.

78-80.

69. Duiker, Communist Road to Power, pp. 125-127; Spector, Advice and Support, pp.

78-81.

70. Duiker, Communist Road to Power, pp. 127-134; Spector, Advice and Support, pp.

80-83; Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p. 40; Hammer, Struggle for

Indochina, pp. 180-182.

245
Notes to Pages 20-28

Chapter 2. Stalemate and US Noninvolvement

1. SD OIR No. 3708, pp. 86-89.

2. (S) SD OIR No. 4303, pp. 10-11.

3. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

4. (S) War Dept, Intel Div, WDGS, Intelligence Review, No. 65, 15 May 47, pp. 51, 54-56.

5. New York Times, 8 Feb 47, p. 6.

6. New York Herald-Tribune, 10 Mar 47, p. 3.

7. Ramadier's government fell in November 1947, to be succeeded by one headed by

Robert Schumann. Succeeding Prime Ministers were Andre Marie, July 1948; Henri Queille,

September 1948; and Georges Bidault, who headed the government from October 1949 to

July 1950.

8. Journal Officiel, Assem Nat, pp. 869-871.

9. Ibid., p. 905.

10. Ibid., p. 29 (translated by author).

11. Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, pp. 199-200.

12. Ibid., p. 209.

13. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, pp. 43-44.

14. Ibid., p. 44.

15. New York Times, 27 Feb 47, p. 4.

16. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p. 43.

17. DeVillers, Histoire du Viet-Nam, pp. 389-390 (translated by author).

18. Journal Officiel, Assem Nat, p. 1569.

19. Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, pp. 209-211.

20. Ibid., pp. 209, 217.

21. DeVillers, Histoire du Viet-Nam, p. 399 (translated by author).

22. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, pp. 44-45.

23. Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, p. 214.

24. Ibid., pp. 212-213.

25. (S) War Dept, Intel Div, WDGS, Intelligence Review, No. 83, 18 Sep 47, pp. 13-15.

26. Ibid.

27. Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, p. 207.

28. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p. 47.

29. Ibid.

30. William C. Bullitt, "The Saddest War," Life Magazine, 29 Dec 47, pp. 64-66.

31. (S) Dept Army, Intel Div, GSUSA, Intelligence Review, No. 97, 1 Jan 48, p. 26.

32. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p. 47.

33. Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, p. 215.

34. Ibid., p. 216.

35. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p. 49.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p. 50.

38. State Dept, "Outline of Basic Treaty Relationships Between France and the Associated

States of Indochina," IR No. 5758, 9 Jan 52, pp. 1-2.

39. Journal Officiel, Assem Nat, 14 Mar 53 (translated by author).

40. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p. 51.

41. Ibid.

246
Notes to Pages 29-38

42. DeVillers, Histoire du Viet-Nam, p. 422.

43. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p. 51.

44. Ibid., p. 52.

45. Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, pp. 222, 224, 228-230.

46. Ibid., p. 223.

47. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, pp. 52-53.

48. (S) Dept Army, Intel Div, GSUSA, Intelligence Review, No. 155, 17 Feb 49, pp. 85-86.

49. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p. 53.

50. (S) Dept Army, Intel Div, GSUSA, Intelligence Review, No. 155, 17 Feb 49, pp. 85-86.

51. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p. 53.

52. Ibid., p. 54; Accords Franco-Vietnamians du 8-Mars 1949 (Imprimerie Francaisa

d'Outre-Mar, Saigon), in Dept State Library.

53. W. L. Briggs, "Vietnam Wims Independence," New Republic, 4 Jul 49, p. 13.

54. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p. 54.

55. (S) Doc B-24, Msg, Marshall to AmEmb Paris, 431, 3 Feb 47, in (TS) Doc Hist of US

Pol Toward Indochina; (TS) SWNCC 360/3, Note by Secys, "Policies, Procedures and Costs

of Assistance by the United States to Foreign Countries," 3 Oct 47, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 7.

56. (C) Doc B-19, Msg, Byrnes to AmEmb Paris, 6586, 24 Dec 46; (UNK) Doc B-23,

Memo, John C. Vincent to Acheson, "French Indochina," 8 Jan 47. Both in (TS) Doc Hist of

Pol Toward Indochina.

57. (S) Doc B-20, Msg, Byrnes to AmCon Hanoi (IC), 25, 31 Dec 46; (S) Doc B-21, Msg,

Byrnes to AmEmb Paris, 75, 8 Jan 47; (S) Doc B-22, Msg, Byrnes to AmEmb Paris, 74, 8 Jan

47; (UNK) Doc B-23, Memo, John C. Vincent to Acheson, "French Indochina," 8 Jan 47; (5)

Doc B-24, Msg, Marshall to AmEmb Paris, 431, 3 Feb 47; (S) Doc B-25, Msg, Marshall to

AmEmb Paris, 1737, 13 May 47; (UNK) Doc B-26, Msg, Marshall to AmEmb Paris, 3433, 11

Sep 47; (S) Doc B-27, Msg, Caffery to SecState, 3715, 12 Sep 47. All in (TS) Doc Hist of US

Pol Toward Indochina. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p. 47.

58. (TS) Doc B-28, Msg, Caffery to SecState, 3621, 10 Jul 48; (TS) Doc B-29, Msg, Marshall to AmEmb Paris, 2637, 14 Jul 48; (S) Doc B-30, Caffery to SecState, 5129, 1 Oct 48. All

in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina.

59. (S) Doc B-32, Acheson to AmCon Saigon (IC), 77, 10 May 49, in (TS) Doc Hist of US

Pol Toward Indochina.

Chapter 3. Origins of American Involvement, June 1949-1950

1. NSC 51, State Dept, "United States Policy Toward Southeast Asia," 29 Mar 49, CCS 092

Asia (6-25-48), sec. 1.

2. It was Dwight D. Eisenhower, with his gift for the homely metaphor, who made the

same argument in terms of a row of dominos that would fall in sequence once started, hence

the "domino theory."

3. (TS) JIC 529/1, 16 Aug 50, same file, sec. 5.

4. Ibid.

5. (TS) Memo by State Dept, "Military Information re Indochina, Thailand and Indonesia," 12 Apr 50, same file, sec. 3.

6. Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, pp. 247-250.

7. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p. 58.

8. (S) NIS 43, Indochina, chap. 5, "Political," sec. 51, "The Constitutional System," pp.

51-15-51-21.

9. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p. 57.

247
Notes to Pages 38-46

S10. Ibid., pp. 55-57; (S) NIS 43, Indochina, chap. V, "Political," sec. 51, "The Constitutional System," pp. 51-6---51-15.

11. (S) Doc B-32, Msg, Acheson to AmConsul Saigon, 77, 10 May 49; (S) Doc B-33, Msg,

Acheson to AmConsul Saigon, 112, 29 Jun 49. Both in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward

Indochina.

12. (S) Doc B-34, Memo of Cony, "Discussion of Various Far Eastern Problems," 14 Sep

49; (TS) Doc-B-35, Msg, J. E. Webb, Actg SecState, to AmConsul Saigon, 162, 28 Sep 49.

Both in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina.

13. (S) Doc B-38, Msg, J. W. Butterworth, Asst SecState (FEA) to Philip Jessup, USAmbat-Large, Saigon, 25, 20 Jan 50, in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina.

14. State Dept Bulletin, 13 Feb 50, p. 244.

15. (U) Doc B-41, State Dept Press Rel No. 104, 1 Feb 50, in (TS) Doe Hist of US Pol

Toward Indochina.

16. (TS) NSC 48, 10 Jun 49, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec. 1.

17. New York Times, 25 Aug 49, 9 Sep 49, 11 Sep 49, 13 Sep 49; State Dept Bulletin, 24 Oct

49, p. 605.

18. (TS) JCS 1721/42, 17 Dec 49, CCS 452 China (4-3-45) see. 7, pt. 6.

19. (TS) NSC 48/1, 23 Dec 49, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec. 2.

20. (TS) JCS 1992/7, 29 Dec 49, same file.

21. (TS) Encl B, NSC 48/2, 30 Dec 49, to (TS) JCS 1992/8, 5 Jan 50, same file, sec. 3.

22. (U) State Dept Bulletin, 23 Jan 50, pp. 111-118, and 27 Mar 50, pp. 467-472.

23. (TS) JCS 1721/43, 16 Jan 50, CCS 452 China (4-3-45) sec. 7, pt. 7.

24. (TS) NSC 64, 27 Feb 50, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec. 3. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy NSC to

NSC, "The position of the United States with respect to Indochina," 24 Apr 50, same file, sec.

4.

25. (S) App B, Aide-Memoire, Washington, 15 Feb 50, to (TS) JCS 1992/10, 10 Mar 50,

same file.

26. (S) Doc B-44, Msg, USAmb Paris to SecState, 837, 22 Feb 50, in (TS) Doc Hist of US

Pol Toward Indochina.

27. (TS) App A, Memo for Pres, "Allocation of Funds to Provide Military Assistance to

Thailand and Indochina under Section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act," 9 Mar 50,

(TS) Ann B to App A, "Military Assistance for Indochina," 9 Mar 50, and (TS) App B, Ltr, Pres

to SecState, 10 Mar 50, to (TS) JCS 1721/48, 29 Mar 50, CCS 452 China (4-3-45) sec. 7, pt. 8.

28. New York Times, 19 Feb 50; "Matters Considered by Regional Conference of US

Envoys in Bangkok," State Dept Bulletin, 27 Mar 50, p. 502.

29. (TS) "Oral Report of Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup upon his Return from the

Far East," 23 Mar 50, in State Dept files; "Administration of Economic Aid to Southeast

Asia," State Dept Bulletin, 29 May 50, p. 869.

30. "Economic Aid Program for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia," State Dept Bulletin, 12

Jun 50, pp. 977-978.

31. New York Times, 4 May 50.

32. (S) Doc B-45, Msg, Acheson to AmEmb Paris, 1363, 29 Mar 50, in (TS) Doc Hist of US

Pol Toward Indochina.

33. (S) App C, State Dept, Memo of Conv, "Indochina," 16 Feb 50, to (TS) JCS 1992/10, 10

Mar 50, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec. 3.

34. (S) Memo, Dean Rusk, Asst SecState (FEA), to Maj Gen J. H. Burns, Asst to SecDef

(FMA&MA), 20 Mar 50, same file.

35. (S) Msg, Gullion to Acheson, 190, 18 Mar 50, CM-IN-14886, 21 Mar 50, same file.

36. (S) Msg, Gullion to Acheson, 204, 25 Mar 50, CM-IN-15891, 27 Mar 50, same file.

248
Notes to Pages 47-57

37. (S) Informal Trans [Fr], Aide-Memoire, 11 Apr 50, same file, sec. 4.

38. (TS) JCS 1992/11, 29 Mar 50, same file, sec. 3; (TS) JCS 1721/49, 7 Apr 50, CCS 452

China (4-3-45) sec. 7, pt. 8.

39. (TS) Msg, Gullion to Acheson, UNN 3 May 50, CM-IN-1262, 5 May 50, CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48) sec. 4.

40. (S) Msg, SecState to USAmb Paris, 1800, 24 Apr 50, CM-IN-19886, 25 Apr 50, same

Mfie.

41. (TS) FM D A-2/4a, State Dept Position Paper, "May Foreign Ministers Meeting, Southern Asia," 5 May 50; (S) Encl B, FM D C-3a, State Dept Position Paper, "May Foreign Ministers Meeting, Indochina," 25 Apr 50, to (S) JCS 1992/16, 30 Apr 50. Both in same file.

42. (TS) Encl A, Dft Memo, JCS to SecDef, to (TS) JCS 1992/15, 30 Apr 50; (S) Encl B, FM

D C-3a, State Dept, "May Foreign Ministers Meeting, Indochina," 25 Apr 50, to (S) JCS

1992/16, 30 Apr 50. Both in same ifie. (TS) JCS 1992/11, 29 Mar 50, same file, sec. 3.

43. (S) Doc B-47, Mns (FR), Acheson-Schuman Conversations, 8 May 50, in (TS) Doc Hist

of US Pol Toward Indochina.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. (TS) Encl, Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Mutual Defense Assistance Program Implementation for Southeast Asia," 6 Jun 50, to (TS) JCS 1992/18, 8 Jun 50, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec. 4.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. (S) Memo, SecDef to JCS, "MDAP Implementation for Southeast Asia," 14 Jun 50,

same file, sec. 5.

50. (TS) Encl, Dft Memo, JCS to SecDef, to (TS) JCS 1721/55, 12 Jun 50, CCS 452 China

(4-3-45) sec. 7, pt. 10.

51. (TS) JIC 529/1, 16 Aug 50, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48).

52. Ibid.

Chapter 4. Impact of War in Korea, June 1950-January 1951

1. State Dept Bulletin, 3 Jul 50, p. 5.

2. (S) Memo, Lemnitzer to Burns, "Monthly Status Report-Mutual Defense Assistance

Program (to include 31 July 1950)," 5 Aug 50 (hereinafter: MDAP Status Rpt for month of), in

Records and Control Office, OASD (ISA).

3. (S) MDAP Status Rpt for month of July 1950, 5 Aug 50; (S) Geneva Conf Background

Paper, Indochina Chronology.

4. (S) MDAP Status Rpt for month of October 1950, 31 Oct 50; (TS) JCS 1992/44, 26 Dec

50, CCS 452 China (4-3-45) sec 7 pt 12.

5. (TS) FMACC D-33/6, "Report on Indochina," 24 Aug 50 (hereinafter: Erskine Rpt),

CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) BP.

6. It is a commonplace among historians of the Third Republic that while cabinets and

legislatures may come and go, the French Government, embodied in the corps of permanent

civil servants, remains the same. The power of the army in French Government, and even its

ability to operate in opposition to the government, is illustrated by r'affaire Boulanger, l'affaire Dreyfus, and the activities of General Mangin in the Rhineland after World War I. It

must also be remembered that in regard to colonial affairs the traditions of such men as

Marshal Lyautey are still strong in the army.

7. (TS) Erskine Rpt.

8. (TS) JCS 1992/22, 25 Aug 50, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 5.

249
Notes to Pages 57-65

9. (TS) Memo, Col Kenneth R. Kreps, USAF, Actg Exec-Secy OSD to JCS, "Military Assistance to Indo-China," 6 Sep 50; (TS) JCS 1992/32, 16 Oct 50; same ifie, sec 6.

10. (S) Memo, Kreps to JCS, "Mutual Defense Assistance to Indochina," 12 Oct 50; (TS)

Memo, Dir, JS to SecDef, same subj, 13 Oct 50; (TS) Memo, Lemnitzer to John H. Ohly, Actg

Dir MDA, State Dept, "Military Assistance to Indo-China," 16 Oct 50; same file.

11. (TS) JCS 1992/32, 16 Oct 50, same file.

12. (S) Memo, Lemnitzer to MG R. E. Duff, USA, DepAsst CS, G-3 Army, Capt Howard

Orem, USN, Dir Int Aft, DepNav, and Col M. W Brewster, USAF, P&O Div, DepAF, "Military

Assistance to Indo-China," 23 Oct 50, same file, sec 7; (S) MDAP Status Rpt for month of

October 1950, 31 Oct 50.

13. (S) Msg, CSA, WAR-95099, to CINCFE, CM-OUT-95099, 26 Oct 50, CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48) sec 7; (S) MDAP Status Rpt for month of November 1950, 7 Dec 50; (S) MDAP Status Rpt for month of December 1950, 12 Jan 51.

14. (U) Note handed to State Dept by FrEmb, 14 Oct 50, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 6;

(TS) Memo by CSA, "Possible Future Action in Indochina," 18 Oct 50, same file, sec 7.

15. Journal officiel de la Republique francaise, Debats Parlementairess Assemblee

nationale, 22 Nov 50, pp. 7998-8050.

16. Notes et Etudes, "Conventions inter-etats," No. 1,425, 24 Jan 51; Hammer, Struggle for

Indochina, pp. 274-281.

17. (S) Msg, Edmund A. Gullion, SpecAsst, MDAP, Saigon, to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly

Report No. 3 (October 1950)," 1 Dec 50, G-3 091 Indo China, sec II A, bk I, Case 31; (S) CIA,

NIE-5, 29 Dec 50, p. 2.

18. (S) Msg, Donald Heath, NIACT-1157, to SecState, 1 Jan 51, DA-IN-6870, 4 Jan 51,

CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 9.

19. (S) Msg, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report No. 1 (August 1950)," 20 Sep

50; (S) Msg, Gullion to SecState, "MDAP Monthly Report No. 2 (September 1950)," 6 Nov 50;

(S) Msg, Gullion to SecState, "MDAP Monthly Report No. 3 (October 1950)," 1 Dec 50. All in

G-3 091 China, sec II A, bk I, Case 31.

20. (S) Msg, Gullion to SecState, "MDAP Monthly Report No. 3 (October 1950)," 1 Dec 50,

same file.

21. (C) Lt Col S. Fred Cummings, USA (Logistics Officer, Army Sec, MAAG Indochina

from Nov 51 to Nov 52), interviewed by Capt W. W. Hoare, Jr., USA, Hist Div, 1 Nov 54, Memo

in JCS HS files.

22. Ibid.; (C) Maj H. L. St.-Onge, USA, and Maj Edwin J. Nelson, USA, both at various

times adjutants of MAAG Indochina and aides to Brig Gen Francis G. Brink (first CG of

MAAG Indochina), interviewed by Capt W. W. Hoare, Jr., USA, Hist Div, 27 Oct 54, Memo on

file in JCS HS.

23. (S) Msg, Heath to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly General Report for the Month of January 1951," 23 May 51, G-3 091 Indo China, sec II A, bk I, Case 31.

24. (TS) Memo, Marshal of the Royal Air Force the Lord Tedder to Gen Omar N. Bradley,

9 Nov 50, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 8.

25. State Dept, "Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina-Agreement between the United

States of America and Cambodia, France, Laos, and Viet Nam," Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2447 (GPO, Washington, DC), p. 4.

26. (TS) JCS 1924/14, 5 Jul 50, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec 45.

27. (TS) JCS 1924/26, 14 Aug 50, same file, sec 48; (TS) NSC 73/4, 25 Aug 50, same file,

sec 49.

28. (S) State Dept SFM D-7/lc, "September Foreign Ministers Meeting-Indochina," 28

Aug 50, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 6.

29. (S) Memo, Bradley to Louis Johnson, "Indochina," 7 Sep 50, same file.

250
Notes to Pages 65-74

30. (S) FMN Min-4, "Minutes of the Fourth Meeting held in the Waldorf-Astoria," 14 Sep

50; (TS) Memo of Cony, New York, bet Robert Schuman, Foreign Minister of France, and

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, (12 Sep 50). Both in State Dept flies.

31. (TS) JCS 1992/29, 7 Oct 50, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 6.

32. (TS) Memo by CSA, "Possible Future Action in Indochina," 18 Oct 50, same file, sec 7.

33. (TS) SEAAPC, SEAC D-21, Rev 1, "Proposed Statement of US Policy on Indo-China

for NSC Consideration," 11 Oct 50, same Mfie, sec 6.

34. Ibid.

Chapter 5. The De Lattre Episode, 1951

1. NSC 48/5, 17 May 51, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48), sec 14.

2. Rene Pleven, who had succeeded Bidault in July 1950, and who was himself to be

replaced by Henri Queuille in March 1951. Pleven would return as Prime Minister in

August 1951.

3. (S) Rpt, Heath to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly General Report for the Month of January 1951," 23 May 51, G-3 091 Indo China, sec II-A, bk I, DRB AGO.

4. Ibid.; (S) Rpt, Heath to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly General Report for the Month of

February 1951," 23 May 51, same file; New York Times, 23 Jan 51.

5. (S) Rpt, Heath to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly General Report for the Month of January 1951," 23 May 51, G-3 091 Indo China, sec II-A, bk I, DRB AGO. New York Times, 15 Feb,

7 Apr, 24 Apr, 5 Jun, 7 Jun, 8 Jun, 10 Jun 51.

6. (S) Msg, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report No. 14 (November 1951)," 8

Jan 52; (S) Msg, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report No. 15 (December 1951)," 21

Mar 52. Both in G-3 091 Indo China, sec I-A, bk I, DRB AGO.

7. (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report for Indo-China for the Month

of March 1951," 19 May 51, same file, sec II-A, bk I.

8. (TS) State Dept, Pleven D-1/l, "Negotiating Papers for Truman-Pleven Talks-Jan

29-30-U. S. Aid to Indochina," CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 10.

9. (TS) SM-143-51, 16 Jan 51, same fie; (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina

Chronology, pp. 64-65.

10. (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report for Indochina for the Month of

March 1951," 19 May 51, G-3 091 Indo China, sec II-A, bk I, DRB AGO.

11. Ibid.; (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report for May 1951," 22 Jun 51,

same file.

12. (S) Rpt, Heath to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly General Report for the Month of February 1951," 23 May 51, same file.

13. (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report for April 1951," 21 May 51,

same file, bk 11.

14. Ibid.

15. (S) JIC 529/10, 10 Jan 52, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 22 BP pt 3; (TS) JIC 529/9, 2 Jan

52, same fie, sec 22; (TS) JIC 529/4, 20 Jun 51, same fie, sec 15; (TS) Navarre Briefing Doc,

Jun 53, in OMA files.

16. (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report for August 1951," 13 Nov 51,

G-3 092 Indo China, sec II-A, bk III, DRB AGO.

17. Ibid.; (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report No. 16 (January 1952),"

24 Mar 52, same file, sec I-A, bk I; (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report

No. 19 (April 1952)," 23 May 52, same fie.

18. Ibid., (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report for October, 1951," 11

Dec 51, same file, sec I.

251
Notes to Pages 74-83

19. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p. 65.

20. (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report No. 14 (November 1951)," 8

Jan 52; (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report No. 15 (December 1951)," 21

Mar 52. Both in G-3 091 Indo China, sec I-A, bk I, DRB AGO.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, pp. 67-68.

24. Foreign Report, 6 Sep 51, pp. 7-8, Economist Newspaper Ltd., London.

25. (S) Memo, RAdm A. C. Davis, Dir JS, to SecDef, "Proposed Military Talks Regarding

Defense of Indochina," 10 Jan 51, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 10; (S) Memo, Bradley to

SecDef, same subj, 8 Dec 50, same file, sec 9.

26. Ibid.; (S) Memo, Marshall to JCS, 9 Feb 51, same file, sec 11.

27. (TS) JCS 1992/77, 10 May 51, same file, sec 13.

28. (TS) Rpt of Singapore Conf, 19 May 51, same file, BP pt 2.

29. (S) NSC 105, 23 Feb 51, CCS 337 (1-19-51); (TS) Doc C-24, Msg, Acheson to AmLegation Saigon, 30 Jan 51, in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. (S) Ltr, Juin to Marshall, 26 Dec 50, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 10; (S) CIA NIE-5,

"Indochina: Current Situation and Probable Developments," 29 Dec 50.

33. (TS) JCS 1992/49, 15 Jan 51, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 10; (TS) Msg, JCS 86957 to

CINCPAC, 28 Mar 51, same file, sec 12.

34. (TS) Memo, Bradley to SecDef, "United States Policy Toward Indochina," 14 Sep 51,

same file, sec 17.

35. (TS) JCS 1992/93, 11 Sep 51, same file.

36. (S) Memo of Conv bet French delegation headed by Gen de Lattre and Defense officials headed by SecDef Robert A. Lovett and Gen Collins, 20 Sep 51, in OMA files.

37. Ibid.; (S) Doc C-33, "Extracts from memorandum of conversation among Acheson,

Schuman, and de Lattre, Sept 14, 1951," in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pot Toward Indochina; (TS)

Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Combat Operations in Indochina," 19 Nov 51, CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48) sec 19.

38. (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report for October 1951," 11 Dec 51,

G-3 091 Indo China, sec I, DRB AGO.

39. (TS) Memo, Bradley to SecDef, "Tripartite Military Staff Talks on Southeast Asia Held

at Singapore 15-18 May 1951 (Action on Conference Report)," 30 Aug 51, CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48) sec 17. (S) Ltr, Brit Jt Services Mission to Secy JCS, "Military Staff Talks on South

East Asia," 24 Sep 51; (TS) JCS 1992/102, 9 Oct 51; (S) Ltr, Brit Jt Services Mission to Secy

JCS, "Tripartite Military Staff Talks on South East Asia," 15 Oct 51; (TS) JCS 1992/105, 24 Oct

51; (TS) Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, JCS 85523, 30 Oct 51. All in same ifie, sec 18.

40. (TS) Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, "Tripartite Intelligence Conference held at Saigon, 9 and 10

November 1951," 15 Jan 52, same file, sec 23; (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly

Report for October, 1951," 11 Dec 51, G-3 091 Indo China, sec I, DRB AGO.

41. (TS) Memo, Kreps to JCS, "Proposed Tripartite Discussions on the Defense of Southeast Asia," 8 Nov 51, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 19.

42. (TS) Memo, Bradley to SecDef, "Proposed Tripartite Discussions on the Defense of

Southeast Asia," 12 Nov 51, same file.

43. (TS) Memo, Bradley to Maj Gen C. P. Cabell, USAF, Dir JS, 6 Dec 51, same file.

44. (TS) Memo, Bradley to SecDef, "Conference with French and British on Southeast

Asia," 28 Dec 51, same file, sec 21. See chap. 10, below, for the account of the Washington

Conference.

252
Notes to Pages 83-92

45. Ibid.

46. (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report for June 1951," 24 Jul 51, G-3

091 Indo China, sec II-A, bk II, DRB AGO; (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly

Report for October, 1951," 11 Dec 51, same file, sec I. The figures given in this study relative

to the amounts and value of MDAP material delivered to Indochina are only approximate

and not always trustworthy. They are obtained from summaries and the periodic reports of

various agencies concerned with the administration of the program, and the data given by

one office sometimes differ from those of another. Furthermore, discrepancies are to be

found within single reports, so that at the present a true, detailed account of the aid program

is unavailable.

47. (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report for May 1951," 22 Jun 51, same

file, sec I-A, bk I; (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report for June 1951," 24

Jul 51, same file, bk II.

48. (TS) JCS 2099/138, 30 Oct 51, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 61.

49. (TS) Navarre Briefing Doc, Jun 53, p. 48, in OMA files.

50. Ibid.; (S) MDAP StatusReports for Months of November and December 1951.

51. (TS) Navarre Briefing Doc, Jun 53, p. 48, in OMA files; (S) MDAP Status Report for

Month of January 1952.

52. (TS) Navarre Briefing Doc, Jun 53, p. 48, in OMA files; (S) MDAP Status Report for

Month of February 1952.

53. (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report for April 1951," 21 May 51, G-3

091 Indo China, sec I, DRB AGO; (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report for

June 1951," 24 Jul 51, same file, sec II-A, bk II.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. (TS) Doc C-34, Mns, 2nd Mtg, Dep State with de Lattre, 17 Sep 51, in (TS) Doc Hist of

US Pol Toward Indochina.

57. (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report No. 15 (December 1951)," 21

Mar 52. G-3 091 Indo China, sec I-A, bk I.

58. (S) Rpt, Gullion to State Dept, "MDAP Monthly Report No. 16 (January 1952)," 24 Mar

52, same file.

Chapter 6. The Truman Administration's Struggle, 1952

1. (S) Rpt, Gullion to State, "MDAP Monthly Report No. 19 (April 1952)," 23 May 52, G-3

091 Indo China sec I-A, bk I, DRB AGO.

2. (S) CIA NIE-35/2, "Probable Developments in Indochina Through Mid-1953," 29 Aug

52, p. 3; (S) Rpt, Gullion to State, "MDAP Monthly Report No. 16 (January 1952)," 24 Mar 52,

G-3 091 Indo China, sec I-A, bk I, DRB AGO.

3. (TS) Navarre Briefing Doc, Jun 53, in OMA files; (TS) Ann B to CINCPAC Staff Study,

"Evaluation of Military Operations in Indochina," 18 Apr 53, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) BP pt 9.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. (S) CIA NIE 35/2, "Probably Developments in Indochina Through Mid-1953," 29 Aug

52. (S) Rpt, Gullion to State, "MDAP Monthly Report No. 19 (April 1952)," 23 May 52, G-3

091 Indo China, sec I-A, bk I, DRB AGO.

7. (S) Rpt, Gullion to State, "MDAP Monthly Report No. 21 (June 1952)," 31 Jul 52, same

file; (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, pp. 70-71; Hammer, Straggle for Indochina, pp. 281-291.

8. (S) Rpt, Gullion to State, "MDAP Monthly Report No. 19 (April 1952)," 23 May 52, G-3

091 Indo China, sec I-A, bk I, DRB AGO.

253
Notes to Pages 93-103

9. (S) JIC 529/10, 9 Jan 52, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) BP pt 3.

10. (TS) Notes recorded by Secy and DepSecy JCS at the US-UK-FR CsofS Tri Talks on

Southeast Asia (hereinafter: Notes on the Washington Con]), 11 Jan 52, same Mfie, sec 22.

11. (TS) "Terms of Reference to the Ad Hoc Committee," 11 Jan 52, same file.

12. (TS) Notes on the Washington Conf.

13. (TS) Summary of notes recorded by DepSecy JCS at State-Defense Meeting held on 16

and 23 Jan 52, in DepSecy, JCS files.

14. State Dept Bulletin, No. 659, 11 Feb 52, p. 224.

15. (TS) Memo, Davis to JCS, "Report of the Five Power Ad Hoc Committee on Southeast

Asia," 5 Feb 52, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 24.

16. Ibid.; (TS) Rpt by Ad Hoc Cmte on South East Asia, 5 Feb 52, same file.

17. (TS) NSC 124, 13 Feb 52, same file.

18. (TS) Memo, Vandenberg to SecDef, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action

with Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia," 3 Mar 52, same file, sec 25.

19. (TS) NSC 124/2, 25 Jun 52, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 31. See Appendix 3.

20. (TS) Msg, JCS 917321 to CINCPAC, 29 Aug 52, same file, sec 34.

21. (TS) JCS 1992/188, 31 Oct 52, same file, sec 35; (TS) Msg, JCS 927061 to CINCPAC, 22

Dec 52, same file, sec 370.

22. (TS) JCS 1992/171, 10 Jul 52, same file, sec 32.

23. (TS) JCS 1992/174, 26 Jul 52, same file, sec 33.

24. (TS) Rpt ofthe Five Power Mil Conf on South East Asia, 17 Oct 52, same fie, sec 34.

25. (TS) Memo, Maj Gen J.S. Bradley to JCS, "Report of the Five Power Military Representatives Conference on Southeast Asia," 23 Oct 52, same file.

26. (TS) JCS 1992/191, 13 Nov 52, same file, sec 35.

27. Ibid.

28. (TS) Ltr, Matthews to Cabell, 9 Dec 52, same file, sec 36.

29. (TS) Memo, Cabell to SecDef, "Machinery for Implementing Five-Power Coordinations

of Plans," 11 Dec 52, same file.

30. (TS) Msg, JCS 932447 to CINCPAC, 27 Feb 53, same ifie, sec 38.

31. (TS) Memo, Actg SecState and Actg SecDef to Exec Secy NSC, "Progress Report on

NSC 124/2-United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast

Asia," 5 Aug 53, same file, sec 44.

32. (S) MDAP Status Report for the Month of January 1953.

33. (S) MDAP Status Report for the Month of July 1953.

34. (TS) JCS 2099/171, 13 Feb 52, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec 68.

35. (S) MDAP Status Report for the Month of March 1952; (C) Msg, USEmb Paris to SecState, 3697, 29 Dec 52, in OMA files, Indochina 2a (1952). Of the $126 million for Indochina,

$23 million was spent in the United States for items that France could not supply.

36. (S) MDAP Monthly Status Reports for the Months of November 1952 and January 1953.

37. (S) MDAP Status Report for the Month of July 1952.

38. (TS) Navarre Briefing Doc, Jun 53, in OMA files.

39. (S) Memo for Rec by Ch, Liaison Div, OMA, "Conferences with Minister Letourneau

and Members of His Staff, 16-17 June 1952," nd, in OMA files, Indochina 2a (1952).

40. (S) Msg, Trapnell MG 3824 A, to CSUSAF, DA-IN170843, 9 Aug 52, same file.

41. (S) Memo, Foster to SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, "Indochina Mutual Defense Assistance

Program," nd, same file.

42. (S) Memo, Trapnell to Dir OMA, "Field Estimate of current and future effectiveness of

the French Union Forces in Indochina," 22 Jan 53; same file, sec 2 (1953).

254
Notes to Pages 103-109

43. (S) Memo, DepAsst to SecDef for ISA to DepSecDef, "Indochina MDA Program," 16

Dec 52, same file, sec 2a (1952).

44. (S) Memo, Trapnell to Dir OMA, "Field Estimate of current and future effectiveness

of the French Union Forces in Indochina," 22 Jan 53, same file, sec 2 (1953); (S) Memo for

Rec by Ch, Liaison Div, OMA, "Conferences with Minister Letourneau and Members of His

Staff, 16-17 June 1952," nd, same file, sec 2a (1952), (C) Interview Cummings, 1 Nov 54, in

JCS HS files.

45. (S) Memo for Rec by Ch, Liaison Div, OMA, "Conferences with Minister Letourneau

and Members of His Staff, 16-17 June 1952," nd, in OMA files, Indochina 2a (1952).

46. (TS) Memo, Foster to JCS, "Requirement for Additional Transport Aircraft in IndoChina," 12 Sep 52, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 34.

47. (TS) Msg, AFOMS-OP to Ch MAAG, France, AF-OUT9100, 25 Nov 52, in OMA files,

Indochina 2a (1952).

48. (TS) Doc C-54, Msg, Heath, 1149 to SecState, 5 Dec 52, in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol

Toward Indochina; (TS) Memo, SecAF to SecDef, 7 Jan 53, in OMA file "Indochina Maintenance Support Exercise"; (TS) Msg, OSD to Ch MAAG Indochina, DEF 927097, 22 Dec 52, in

OMA files, Indochina 2a(1952).

49. (TS) Memo, SecA, SecNav, and Actg SecAF to SecDef, "Draft State Department Paper

on Indochina dated 27 March 1952," 8 Apr 52, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 28.

50. (TS) Doc C-52, Summary Mns, "Ministerial Talks in London, June 1952," 14 Jul 52, in

(TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina.

51. (NATO S) Summary Record of NATO Council Mtg, Paris, 16 Dec 52, in JCS records.

52. The Economist (London), 5 Jan 52, p. 30; 5 Apr 52, pp. 4-6; 21 Jun 52, pp. 821-822.

New York Times, 2 Jul 52, p. 4; 31 Jul 52, p. 1; 19 Oct 52, p. 2.

53. Journal Officiel, Assem Nat, 18 Oct 50, pp. 7003-7004.

54. L'Information Radicale-Socialiste, quoted in Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, p. 309.

55. (TS) Copy of Unofficial Aide Memoire on "Indochina" handed by member of Brit Emb

to Asst SecState for Far Eastern Affairs, 15 Mar 52, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 26; New York

Times, 7 Jan 52, p. 4.

56. (TS) Encl B to SM-762-52, Memo, Lalor to JCS, "Indochina," 22 Mar 52, CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48) sec 26; (S) NIE 35/1, "Probable Developments in Indochina through mid-1952," 3

Mar 52; (S) NIE 35/2, "Probable Developments in Indochina through mid-1953," 29 Aug 52.

57. NIE 91, "Probable Developments in Indochina through Mid-1954," 4 Jun 53.

Chapter 7. The Eisenhower Administration and the Navarre Plan, 1953

1. (U) Doc C-55, "Resolution on Indo-China Adopted by the North Atlantic Council on

17th December, 1952," and (TS) Doc D-4, Account of SecState Conversations in Paris, 2 Feb

53, sent Saigon as A-117, 5 Mar 53. Both in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina,

1940-1953. For quotation from French Gov't Communique, 2 Feb 53, see Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London), vol. IX, 1952-1954, p. 12740A (hereinafter: Keesing). For Mayer

statement on assuming office, see ibid., p. 12674A.

2. (TS) "Report by the Ad Hoc Committee [Farrell Cmte] to the Assistant to the Secretary for International Security Affairs on Forty Additional Vietnam Battalions," nd, Encl to

(TS) Memo, Kyes, Actg SecDef, to SecArmy, Navy, and Air Force, "Forty Additional Vietnam

Battalions," 19 Feb 53, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 37. App A to the Farrell Cmte Rpt was

(TS) Ltr, Trapnell to Collins, 20 Dec 52, which had precipitated the study.

3. (TS) Memo, Collins to SecDef, "Broadening the Participation of the United States in

the Indochina Operation," 13 Mar 53," CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 38. (TS) "French Strategic

Concept of Operations in Indochina with General Discussion of Current and Long-Range

Plans," Tab A to (TS) OSD ISA staff study, "Conversations with M. Letourneau, 1000, 27

March 1953, nd, "Washington Talks March '53, Indochina-Letoumeau," Alden files, OMA.

255
Notes to Pages 109-114

(TS) Msg, Ch MAAG IC to DEPTAR for DJS MG 4482A, 17 Dec 52, DA-IN-218456, CCS 092

Asia (6-25-40) sec 36.

4. (TS) Memo, Maj Gen G. C. Stewart, Dir OMA, to Asst SecDef ISA, "Augmentation of

Vietnam Army," 23 Mar 53, "Indochina 1953," Alden files, OMA.

5. (S) Doe D-5, Msg, Dulles to AmEmb Paris, 4907, 19 Mar 53, in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol

Toward Indochina, 1940-1953.

6. (S) "Notes made by Assistant Secretary Frank C. Nash of Initial Meeting with the

French (Mayer) Delegation," nd, "Indochina 1953," Alden files, OMA. (TS) Doc D-7, Msg,

Dulles to AmEmb Paris, 4992, 26 Mar 53, in (TS) Doc Hist US Pol Toward Indochina,

1940-1953.

7. (TS) JCS 1992/214, 10 Apr 53, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 39. (TS) "Rough Cost Estimates submitted by Letourneau Group in Washington on 30 March 1953 for Indo-China

Effort 1953-55," nd, "Indochina 1953," Alden files, OMA. (TS) Doc D-12 Msg, Dulles to

AmEmb Saigon, 1967, 7 Apr 53, in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina, 1940-1953.

8. (S) Doc D-10, Msg, Duiles to AmEmb Paris, 5040, 30 Mar 53, in same file.

9. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed French Strategic Plan for the Successful Conclusion of the War in Indochina," 21 Apr 53, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 40.

10. (S) Doc D-13, "Bipartite U. S.-French Conversations, First Session-April 22, 1953," in

(TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina, 1940-1953. Meanwhile the Joint Chiefs restated their reservations about the Letourneau Plan with new emphasis at a meeting with USecState W. B. Smith, who relayed their expressions to Paris; (TS) Doc D-14, Msg, Smith to

AmEmb Paris, TOPSEC 9, 24 Apr 53, same file. For account of the second bipartite session

in Paris, 26 Apr 53, see (S) Msgs, Amb Dillon, Paris 5672 to SecState, 26 Apr 53, "Indochinese

Problems (Fall Offensive 1953-54)," Alden files, OMA.

11. (TS) Memo for Rec, Col E. H. J. Carnes, DSecy JCS, "Joint Political-Military Mission to

Indochina," 29 May 53. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Terms of Reference for Military Mission

to Indo-China," 10 Jun 53. Both in CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 42. (TS) Memo, SecDef to

JCS, "Terms of Reference for Military Mission to Indochina," 12 Jun 53, same file, sec 43.

12. (TS) Msg, Ch MAAG IC sgd O'Daniel to CINCPAC, 301148Z Jun 53, readdressed by

CINCPAC to CNO as 030401Z Jul 53, same file. (TS) "Report of the U. S. Joint Military Mission to Indochina, 15 July 1953," same file, BP pt 9.

13. (TS) "Report of U. S. Joint Military Mission to Indochina, 15 July 1953," same file.

14. (TS) Doc D-36, Msg, Amb Dillon, Paris, 370 to Sec State, 29 Jul 53, in (TS) Doc Hist of

US Pol Toward Indochina, 1940-1953.

15. (TS) Rpt by State Dept, "Further United States Support for France and the Associated

States of Indochina," Encl to (TS) Memo, Exec Secy NSC to NSC, same subj, 5 Aug 53, CCS

092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 44.

16. NSC Action No. 874, set forth in (TS) "Record of Actions by the National Security

Council at its One Hundred and Fifty Eighth Meeting, August 6, 1953," CCS 334 NSC

(9-25-47) sec 11.

17. (TS) Memo, Bradley to SecDef, "The Navarre Concept for Operations in Indochina,"

11 Aug 53, CCS 092 (6-25-48) sec 44.

18. (TS) Memo, Radford to SecDef, "The Navarre Concept for Operations in Indochina."

28 Aug 53, same file sec 45.

19. (TS) Msg, Ch MAAG IC, MG 1442A to CINCPAC, 24 Aug 53, DA-IN-299535, "Navarre

Letter-Actions Taken," vol I, Alden files, OMA.

20. (TS) Msg, Ch MAAG IC, MG 1488A to CINCPAC, 1 Sep 53, DA-IN-1796 (2 Sep 53),

"Indochinese Problems (Fall Offensive 1953-54)," Alden files, OMA.

21. (TS) Notes, State-JCS Mtg, 4 Sep 53, files D Secy JCS. (TS) State Dept Memo, R. B.

Knight to MacArthur, "Comments on Supplementary French Material on the Navarre Plan,"

256
Notes to Pages 114-116

3 Sep 53, Encl to (TS) Memo, Secy JCS to Twining, Ridgway, and Carney, 3 Sep 53, CCS

092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 45.

22. (TS) Rpt by State Dept, "Assistance for Indochina," Encl to (TS) Memo, Exec Secy

NSC to NSC, "Further United States Support for France and the Associated States of

Indochina 8 Sep 53, same file. NSC Action No. 897, set forth in (TS) "Record of Actions by

the National Security Council at its One Hundred and Sixty First Meeting, September 9,

1953," CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47) sec 12.

23. (S) Doc D-46, "US-French Supplementary Aid Agreement on Indochina," and (U) Doc

D-47, State Dept Press Release No. 529, "Joint Communique Issued by the Governments of

the United States and France," 30 Sep 53, both in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina, 1940-1953.

24. (TS) Doc D-42, Msg, Dulles to AmEmb Paris, 868, 9 Sep 53, in same file. Some of the

sharpest criticism of Lisbon type aid appeared in the report of a survey team, sponsored by

Senator Styles Bridges, that the Senate Appropriations Cmte had sent to Paris. News

accounts of the report carried the heading "Senate Study Asserts France is Substituting Aid

for Taxes"; New York Times, 13 Jul 53, pp. 1, 18. After a strong attempt during 1953,

OMA/OSD officials gave up the attempt to identify and account for end-items purchased

with Lisbon funds and shipped to Indochina by the French; (C) MR by R. N. Lind, nd [Jan

54?], "Indochinese Problems (Fall Offensive 1953-54)," Alden files, OMA.

25. (TS) MR by Col J. G. Anding, "Indochinese Special Program," 4 Sep 53, "Indochinese

Problems (Fail Offensive 1953-54)," Alden files, OMA. Means of financing the grant and the

need for clearing with congressional leaders were discussed in Ann B to (TS) Rpt by State

Dept, "Assistance for Indochina," Encl to (TS) Memo, Exec Secy NSC to NSC, "Further United States Support for France and the Associated States of Indochina," 8 Sep 53, CCS 092

Asia (6-25-48) sec 45.

26. Ibid. (C) Memo, N. E. Halaby, DepAsst SecDef (ISA) to Stassen, Dir FOA, "Consultations with Senator Homer Ferguson in Detroit," 14 Sep 53, "Indochina Problems (Fall Offensive, 1953-54)," Alden files, OMA.

27. (TS) Msg, CH MAAG IC, MG 1766A, to CINCPAC, DA-IN17890, 31 Oct 53. (C) Msg,

USARMA Saigon, OAEMA MC 299-53, to CSUSA for G-2 DA-IN-16870, 23 Oct 53. Both in

"Indochina 1953," Alden files, OMA. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, pp. 80-81.

28. (TS) Msg, CH MAAG IC, MG 1609A, to CINCPAC, DA-IN9615, 1 Oct 53, CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48) sec 46. (TS) Msg, CH MAAG IC, MG 1766A, to CINCPAC, DA-IN-17890, 31 Oct 53,

"Indochina 1953," Alden files, OMA.

29. (TS) Memo, Secy JCS to JSPC, "Possible Military Courses of Action in Indochina," 23

Jan 53, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 37.

30. (S) JCS 1992/218, 29 Apr 53. (S) Rpt, "Conference of Representatives from the Principal Military Authorities Representing Australia, France, New Zealand, United Kingdom and

the United States in the Southeast Asia Area, Pearl Harbor, 6-10 April 1953," nd. Both in

same file, sec 40. (TS) Memo, Fechteler to SecDef, "Implementation of Measures for Coordination of Five-Power Southeast Asia Plans," 6 May 53; (TS) Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, JCS

939436, 21 May 53. Both in same file sec 41.

31. (TS) Msg, NCS 927061 to CINCPAC, 22 Dec 52, same fMie, sec 37. For CINCPAC Operation Plan Nos. 40-53, 4053A, and 44-53, all issued during Jun 53, see CCS 381 (4-16-49) BP

pt 2.

32. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to CNO and JCS, 032130Z May 53, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 41.

33. (TS) Memo, Fechteler to JCS, "Current Situation Southeast Asia," 5 May 53, same file.

(TS) Msg, CINCPAC to CNO, 271130Z Apr 53, same ifie, sec 40. ADM Radford had just completed a visit to Indochina.

34. (TS) JCS 1992/220, 8 May 53, same file, sec 41.

35. (TS) JCS 1992/227, 22 Jun 53, amended by Dec On, 2 Jul 53, same file, sec 43.

257
Notes to Pages 116-120

36. Ibid. (TS) JCS 1992/187, 28 Oct 52, same file, sec 34.

37. (U) Doc D-9, State Dept Press Release No. 160, "Communique on United StatesFrance Talks," 28 Mar 53, and (TS) Doc D-32, Msg, Dulles to AmEmb Paris, 158, 14 Jul 53.

Both in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina, 1940-1953. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p.79.

38. (U) Doc D-39, State Dept Press Release No. 469, "Address by the Honorable John

Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, Before the American Legion..., September 2, 1953," 1 Sep

53, in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina, 1940-1953.

39. Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, pp. 289-291. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper,

Indochina Chronology, p. 74.

40. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p. 74. New York Times, 19

Apr 53, p. 1; 15 Jun 53, p. 1; 21 Jun 53, p. 1.

41. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology. p. 75. New York Times, 26

Feb 53, p. 3.

42. New York Times, 10 May 53, p. 1; 23 Apr 53, p. 4. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper,

Indochina Chronology, pp. 77-78.

43. Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, pp. 300-301. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper,

Indochina Chronology, p. 78.

44. Keesing, p. 12995B. New York Times, 2 Jul 53, p. 3.

45. New York Times, 4 Jul 53, p. 3. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina

Chronology, p. 79.

46. (TS) Doc D-33, Msg, Dulles to AmEmb Paris, 180, 15 Jul 53, in (TS) Doc Hist of US

Pol Toward Indochina, 1940-1953.

47. (U) Doc D-44, State Dept Press Release No. 505, "Address by the Honorable John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, Made in General Debate of the United Nations Assembly...

September 17, 1953," 17 Sep 53; (U) Doc D-35, State Dept Press Release No. 387, "Report to

the Nation by the Honorable John Foster Dulles... , July 17, 1953," 17 Jul 53. Immediately following the declaration, the US Government sent an expression of its "great pleasure and satisfaction at realistic and forwvard-looking steps by new French Government in approach to

Indochina problem"; (S) Doc D-30, Msg, Smith to AmEmb Paris, 64, 4 Jul 53. All in (TS) Doc

Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina, 1940-1953.

48. New York Times, 18 Oct 53, p. 1; 23 Oct 53, p. 1. For text of the Franco-Laotian treaty

see Keesing, pp. 13230B-13231A.

49. Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, pp. 304-305. Keesing, p. 13229AB.

50. Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, pp. 305-306. New York Times, 21 Oct 53, p. 2; 22 Oct

53, p. 3.

51. Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, pp. 307-309.

52. New York Times, 5 Jun 53, p. 1. Keesing, pp. 12933AB, 12994AB.

53. Keesing, p. 12994B.

54. Ibid., pp. 12995B-12996A.

55. Time, 15 Mar 54, p. 25.

56. Keesing, p. 13231B. New York Times, 24 Oct 53, p. 3.

57. Keesing, pp. 13231B-13232A.

58. New York Times, 28 Oct 53, p. 2.

59. Ibid., 1 Oct 53, p. 9.

60. (S) Doc D-21, Dulles, Memo of Conv [with Mayer and Bidault], 27 Apr 53; (S) Doc

D-24, Msg, Amb Dillon, Paris 5766, to SecState, 3 May 53; (S) Doc D-27, Memo of Conv

[between State Dept officials and Amb Bonnet], "Thailand Appeal to SC regarding Threat to

Thailand from Vietminh Invasion," 22 May 53; (S) Doc D-28, Msg, Dulles 2297, to AmEmb

Bangkok, 1 Jun 53. All in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina, 1940-1953.

258
Notes to Pages 120-123

61. (TS) Doc D-33, Msg, Dulles to AmEmb Paris, 180, 15 Jul 53; (C) Doc D-34, "Text of

the French Memorandum," nd; [14 Jul 53]; (C) Doc D-37, French Emb, "Aide-Memoire," 31

Jul 53. All in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina 1940-1953.

62. (U) Doc D-39, State Dept Press Release No. 469, "Address by the Honorable John

Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, Before the American Legion..., September 2, 1953," 1 Sep

53. SecState amplified his remarks at a press conference the next day; (U) Doc D-41, State

Dept Press Release No. 475, "Restoration of Peace in Indochina," 3 Sep 53. Both in (TS) Doc

Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina, 1940-1953.

63. Laniel address before the Council of the Republic, 12 Nov 53, translation quoted in

Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, p. 312. A less polished translation of the same remarks

appeared in New York Times, 13 Nov 53, p. 1.

64. (S) Hq MAAG IC, "Field Estimate of Effectiveness of French Union Forces," 23 Jan 53,

"Indochina 1953," Alden files OMA.

65. (S) "Implementation of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program for Indochina

(Jan-June 1954)," Ann B to (TS) OCB "Progress Report on NSC 5405," 14 Jul 54, CCS 092

Asia (6-25-48) sec 75.

66. (C) MR by Cdr W. C. Wells, "Temporary Loan of an Aircraft Carrier to France," 7 Jun

53, "Indochina 1953," Alden files, OMA.

67. (C) Fr Emb Note No. 307 to State Dept, 23 May 53, Ann to (C) JCS 1992/225, Memo by

SecDef, "Temporary Loan of an Aircraft Carrier to France," 10 Jun 53, CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48) sec 42.

68. (C) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Temporary Loan of an Aircraft Carrier to France," 11 Jun

53, same file. (C) Memo, SecDef to SecNav, same subj, 19 Jun 53. In a telephone call to SeeNav on 29 May 53, Actg SecState W. B. Smith "indicated to him that the President desired

favorable action on the French request"; (C) MR by Cdr W. C. Wells, same subj, 7 Jun 53.

Both in "Indochina 1953," Alden files, OMA. New York Times, 6 Sep 53, p. 18.

69. (S) Msg, Amb Heath, Saigon 1511, to SecState, 29 Jan 53, DA-IN-232451 (30 Jan 53),

CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 37.

70. (UNK) OMA staff study, "Supply Action-French Forces Indochina," 28 Apr 54,

"Navarre Letter-Actions Taken," vol II, Alden files, OMA. (TS) Memo, SecAF to SecDef, 7

Jan 53, "Indochina Maintenance Support Exercise," Alden files, OMA.

71. (TS) Msg, CINCFE C61640, to DEPTAR for Collins, DA-IN-251110, 26 Mar 53, and

(TS) Msg, CINCFE C61719, to DEPTAR for G-3, DA-IN-253811, 3 Apr 53, Ann C and D to

(TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed French Strategic Plan for the Successful Conclusion

of the War in Indochina," 21 Apr 53, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 40. The disposition of C-47s

suggested by Gen Clark coincided with a plan already submitted by the French; (S) Dept of

French Air Force paper, "Reinforcement of Transport Aircraft in Indo-China," 27 Mar 53,

encl to (TS) Memo, Maj Gen Thomas E. De Shazo, Ch MAAG France to Nash, 23 Apr 53,

"Indochina 1953," Alden files, OMA.

72. (TS) Msg, CINCFE C61640, to DEPTAR for Collins, DA-IN-251110, 26 Mar 53, and

(TS) Msg, CINCFE C61982, to DEPTAR for G-3, DA-IN-258870, 18 Apr 53, Ann C and E to

(TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed French Strategic Plan for the Successful Conclusion

ofthe War in Indochina," 21 Apr 53. (TS) Dft Msg, CSUSA to CINCFE, encl to (TS) Memo for

Rec, Secy JCS, 21 Apr 53. Both in CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 40. (TS) MR by Lt Col V. W.

Alden, 6 Apr 53, "Indochina 1953," Alden files, OMA.

73. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to CNO, 2711R0Z Apr 53, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 40.

74. (TS) Doc D-19, Memo of Cony, "Secretary's Meeting with M. Mayer, French Prime

Minister...," 26 Apr 53, in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina, 1940-1953. (TS)

Msg, Amb Dillon, Paris, 5708, to SecState, 28 Apr 53, "Additional Transport A/C for French

Indochina (C-119)," Alden files, OMA.

75. (TS) Msg, SecDef to ADMINO SECDEF (Wilson to Kyes), 282012Z Apr 53, CCS 092

Asia (6-25-48) sec 40. (S) Doc D-23, Memo, Walter S. Robertson to SecState, "Flying

259
Notes to Pages 123-126

Boxcars (C-119's) for Indochina," 28 Apr 53, in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina, 1940-1953.

76. (TS) Memo, DepAsst SecDef (ISA) to Dir OMA, "Situation iin Indo-China," 1 May 53.

(TS) Msg, CSAF TS 2938, to CINCUSAFE, 1 May 53. (TS) Msg, CSAF TS 2937, to CGFEAF, 1

May 53. All in "Additional Transport A/C for French Indochina (C-119)," Alden files, OMA.

(TS) Msg, OSD to CH MAAG IC, DEF 937911, 1 May 53, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 41.

77. (S) Msg, Sturm, Hanoi, 802, to SecState, 3 Jun 53; (S) Msg, CH MAAG IC, MG 1014A, to

DEPTAR for G-3, 11 Jun 53, DA-IN-276684 (12 Jun 53). Both in "Additional Transport A/C

for French Indochina (C-119)," Alden files, OMA. (TS) "Report of U. S. Joint Military Mission

to Indochina, 15 July 1953," CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) BP pt 9.

78. (TS) Msg, COMFEAF TS 4054, to HQ USAF for AFOOP, VC 0433 D/O, 30 Jun 53; (TS)

Msg, COMFEAF TS 417S, to HQ USAF for AFOOP, VC 0453 D/O, 9 Jul53. Both in "Additional

Transport A/C for French Indochina (C-1 19)," Alden files, OMA.

79. (S) Msg, CH MAAG IC, MG 1452D, to CSAF and COMFEAF, CAF-IN-97794, 26 Aug 53,

"Indochina 1953," Alden files, OMA.

80. (S) Msg, CH MAAG IC, MG 72MA, to OSD for Stewart, 1 May 53, DA-IN-263746 (2

May 53). See also (S) Msg, USAIRA Saigon AFC-31-53, to CSAF, CAF-IN-98999, 29 Apr 53.

Both in "Additional Transport A/C for French Indochina (C-119)," Alden files, OMA. Gen

Trapnell used the same arguments when opposing a French plan for creating a separate Vietnamese Air Force; (S) Msg, CH MAAG IC, MG 910D, to OSD for Stewart, DA-IN-271079, 25

May 53, "Indochina 1953," Alden files OMA.

81. (TS) Memo, Bradley to SecDef, "Aid to French Airlift Capability in Indochina," 20 May'

53, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 41. (S) Doc D-26, Msg, Smith to AmEmb Paris, 5693, 21 May

53, in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina, 1940-1953.

82. (TS) "Report of U. S. Joint Military Mission to Indochina, 15 July 1953," CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48) BP pt 9. New York Times, 18 Jul 53, p. 2. (S) "Air Force Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indo-China, Briefing (classified) for 14 November 1953," in "Indochina Background Book," Alden files, OMA.

83. (S) Msg, CH MAAG IC, MG 1463A, to OSD/OMA, CSUSAF, and CNO, 27 Aug 53,

DA-IN-593 C (28 Aug 53), CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 45.

84. Ibid. Concurrently the French advanced the same request in Washington; (TS) MR by

Lt Col V. W. Alden, "French Request for Twenty-Five C-47 Aircraft for Indochina," 28 Aug 53,

"Indochina 1953," Alden files, OMA.

85. (S) Msg, HQ USAF AFOOP-OC-T 55078, to CH MAAG IC and COMFEAF, 17 Sep 53,

CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 46.

86. (TS) Msg, CH MAAG IC, MG 1609A to CINCPAC, DA-IN9615, 1 Oct 53, same file. (S)

Msg, CH MAAG IC, MG 1713D, to CSUSAF, DA-IN-15700, 23 Oct 53, "Indochina 1953," Alden

files OMA.

87. (TS) Msg, CH MAAG IC MG 1823A, sgd McCarty to COMFEAF, DA-IN-21074, 13 Nov

53, same file.

88. (TS) "Report by the Ad Hoc Committee to the Assistant to the Secretary for International Security Affairs on Forty Additional Vietnam Battalions," nd, Encl to (TS) Memo,

Kyes, Actg SecDef to SecA, SecNav, and SecAF, "Forty Additional Vietnam Battalions," 19

Feb 53, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 37. (TS) Memo, Collins to SecDef, "Broadening the Participation of the United States in the Indochina Operation," 13 March 53, same file, sec 38.

89. (S) Msg, CH MAAG IC MG 619A, to ACofS G-3 and CINCFE, DA-IN-257701, 15 Apr

53, Ann A to (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed French Strategic Plan for the Successful

Conclusion of the War in Indochina," 21 Apr 53, same file, sec 40.

90. (S) Doc D-13, "Bipartite U. S.-French Conversations, First Session-April 22, 1953."

For previous indications of SecState interest in getting the French to study and adopt Korean training methods see (TS) Doc D-2, Msg, Dulles to AmEmb Saigon, 1644, 10 Feb 53, and

260
Notes to Pages 126-133

(TS) Doc D-4, Account of SecState conversations in London, 4 Feb 53, sent Saigon as A-117,

5 Mar 53. All in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina, 1940-1953.

91. (TS) "Report of U. S. Joint Military Mission to Indochina, 15 July 1953," CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48) BP pt. 9.

92. (S) HQ MAAG IC "Field Estimate of Effectiveness of French Union Forces," 23 Jan 53,

"Indochina 1953," Alden files, OMA.

93. (S) MDAP Status Report for the Month of November 1953.

94. (S) Msg, CH MAAG IC MG 1755A, to OSD for Stewart, 30 Oct 53, DA-IN-17762 (31 Oct

53), "Indochina Operating Files," Alden files, OMA. (TS) "Summary of the French Situation

Report Prepared by the Staff of French Expeditionary Forces, Far East, for General Navarre

(30 Jun 53)," in "Navarre Letter-Actions Taken," vol I, Alden files, OMA.

Chapter 8. Dien Bien Phu, Bermuda, and Berlin November 1953-March 1954

1. Spector, Advice & Support, p. 182.

2. Ibid.; Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change,

1953-1956 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 350-351, also 339; Duiker, Communist

Road to Power, pp. 165-166.

3. Duiker, Communist Road to Power, pp. 169-170; Spector, Advice & Support, pp.

186-190.

4. (TS) O'Daniel, "Progress Report on Military Situation in Indochina as of 19 November

1953," CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 50 BP pt 10. For a r~sum6 of the report see (TS) Msg,

CGUSARPAC, O'Daniel to JCS, RJ 68496, 190707Z Nov 53, DA-IN-22712, same file, sec 50,

and (TS) App to Encl A to (TS) JCS 1992/260, Rpt by JSPC, "Report of U. S. Joint Military

Mission to Indochina," 17 Dec 53, same file, sec 52.

5. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to CNO, 020135Z Dec 53, DA-IN25651, same file, sec 51.

6. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 350-351, also 339; Duiker, Communist Road to

Power, pp. 169-170; Spector, Advice & Support, pp. 186-190.

7. Ibid. See also (S dg C) Msg, USARMA Saigon to CSA for G-2, OARMA MC 319-53,

231330Z Nov 53, DA-IN-23791 (24 Nov 53), CCS 092 Asia (2-25-48) sec 50, and (S) Mns,

QUINTEL Mtg, 1 Dec 53, App to Encl to (S) JCS 1992/276, Memo by CNO, "Report on the

Sixth QUINPART Intelligence Meeting," 11 Feb 54, same file, sec 57.

8. (S) Msg, Heath to SecState, OSD, 846, 132250Z Nov 53, DA-IN-21426 (14 Nov 53),

same file, sec 49.

9. (S) Doc D-50, Msg, SecState to AmEmb Paris, 1930, Saigon, 920, 6:17 p.m., 23 Nov 53,

in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol Toward Indochina. (S) CM-40-53, Memo by CJCS to JCS, "Additional C-47 Aircraft for French Forces Indo-China," 25 Nov 53.

10. (TS) JCS 1992/254, 25 Nov 53, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 50. (TS) Memo, CJCS for

JCS to SecDef, "Support of Viet Minh Forces in Indochina by Chinese Communist Jet Aircraft," 1 Dec 53, same file, sec 51.

11. (S) Mns, 5th Plen Tri Mtg of Heads of Government, Bermuda, 5:30 p.m., 7 Dec 53, CCS

337 (4-19-50) BP pt 2.

12. (U) Tri US-UK-Fr Note to USSR, 8 Dec 53, State Dept Bulletin, 21 Dec 53, pp.

852-853.

13. (S) Msg, Ch MAAG IC to OSD for OMA for Stewart, MG 1988-B, 091500Z Dec 53,

DA-IN-27610 (10 Dec 53), "Navarre Letter, Actions Taken," vol I, Alden files, OMA.

14. (S) Memo, Col J. G. Anding, Actg Dir OMA, to Asst SecDef (ISA), "Indochina FY 1954

M3AP," c. 11 Dec 54; (s) Msg, OSD sgd Ruffner to Ch MAAG IC, DEF 954347, 142329Z Dec

53; (S) Msg, OSD sgd Nash to Ch MAAG IC, DEF 954441, 162145Z Dec 53. All in "Navarre

Letter, Actions Taken," vol I, Alden files, OMA.

261
Notes to Pages 133-140

15. (S) Msg, Ch MAAG IC to SecDef for OMA for Nash, MG 2057 B, 180907Z Dec 53,

DA-IN-29482 (18 Dec 53), same file.

16. (S) Msg, CJCS to OSD for Nash, 250935Z Dec 53, DA-IN-31007 (29 Dec 53), same file.

17. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p. 83.

18. (U) "Summary of statement of President Auriol on Free Association of States within

the French Union," Tab D to State Dept (S) Bermuda Conf preparation paper, BM D-10d,

"Indochina," 2 Dec 53, CCS 337 (4-19-50) sec 10.

19. New York Times, 17 Dec 53, pp. 1 and 3; Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, p. 306. The

crisis was not resolved until 11 Jan 54 when Bao Dai appointed his cousin, Prince Buu Loc,

Prime Minister.

20. (TS) JCS 1992/256, 3 Dec 53, (TS) Memo, Maj Gen J. K. Gerhart to DJS, Lt Gen F. F.

Everest, "Review of U. S. Policy Toward Southeast Asia," 9 Dec 53; (TS) DM-72-53, to JCS,

14 Dec 53. All in CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 51.

21. (TS) JCS 1992/260, 17 Dec 53, same file, sec 52.

22. (TS) Memo by CSA, "Report of U. S. Joint Military Mission to Indochina," [Army

ditto], c. 30 Dec 53, same file. (TS) JCS 1992/264, 30 Dec 53, same file, sec 53. (TS) JCS

1992/260, Dec On, 31 Dec 53, same file, sec 52.

23. (S) Msg, CGUSARPAC O'Daniel to CSA, RJ 68589, 262125Z Dec 53, DA-IN-30757 (26

Dec 53); (S) Msg, CGUSARPAC to SecDef for Nash, RJ 68591, 262242Z Dec 53, DA-IN-30971

(29 Dec 53). Both in same file, sec 53.

24. (TS) NSC 124/2, 25 Jun 52 (circ to JCS as Encl to (TS) JCS 1992/168, 2 Jul 52), same

file, sec 32.

25. (TS) SE-52, CIA Sp Est, "Probable Consequences in Non-Communist Asia of Certain

Possible Developments in Indochina Before Mid-1954," 10 Nov 53, p. 1, JIG files.

26. (TS) Lt Col J1 W. Vogt, Office of the Spec Asst to JCS for NSC Affairs, 4 Jan 55, memo

in JCS HS files. (TS) "An Account of the Events and Decisions Leading to the Loss of North

Indochina," prepared for the record by the Office of the SpecAsst to JCS for NSC Affairs,

interviewed by Samuel A. Tucker, 1st Draft, 25 Oct 54, pp. 26-27. (Hereinafter cited as Gerhart "Account.")

27. (TS) NSC 177, 30 Dec 53, Encl to (TS) JCS 1992/265, 4 Jan 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)

sec 53.

28. (TS) Vogt, interviewed by Samuel A. Tucker, 4 Jan 55, memo in JCS HS files. (TS) Gerhart "Account," p. 31.

29. (TS) Memo, Gerhart to DJC, "Review of U. S. Policy Toward Southeast Asia," 9 Dec

53; (TS) DM-72-53, to JCS, same subj, 14 Dec 53. Both in CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 51.

(TS) JCS 1992/227, 22 Jun 53, amended by Dec On, 2 Jul 53, same file, sec 43.

30. (TS) JCS 1992/262, 24 Dec 53, same file, sec

31. Since the Special Annex was subsequently withdrawn and destroyed, no copy exists

in JCS files. The above material was drawn from the author's interview with Lt Col Vogt, 4

Jan 55, JCS HS files, and from (TS) JCS 1992/267 4 Jan 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 53.

See also (TS) Gerhart "Account," p. 33.

32. (S) Geneva-Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology, p. 84. (TS) Msg, Ch

MAAG IC to CINCPAC, MG 8 A, 020730Z Jan 54, DA-IN-31633 (2 Jan 54); (TS) Msg, Ch

MAAG IC to DA, MG 9 A, 020926Z Jan 54, DA-IN-31639 (2 Jan 54); (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to

CNO, 040139Z Jan 54. All in CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 53.

33. (TS) Memo, CJCS for JCS to SecDef, "NSC 177 United States Courses of Action with

Respect to Southeast Asia," 6 Jan 54, same file, sec 54.

34. (TS) JCS 1992/267, 4 Jan 54, same file, sec 53.

35. (TS) JCS 1992/268, 5 Jan 54, same file, sec 54.

36. The (TS) Gerhart "Account," p. 34, indicates that the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 6 January

1954 approved a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense calling for immediate decision on

262
Notes to Pages 140-144

whether or not the United States would intervene in Indochina if necessary to prevent the

French from seeking to conclude the struggle on terms likely to result in the loss of the area

to the communists. Furthermore, this memorandum rejected as an unacceptable course of

action the alternative of refusing to commit US forces to the French military effort. However, official records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff available to the Historical Section do not indicate that this memorandum was formally adopted.

37. (TS) AFPC Advice of Action, "U. S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to

Southeast Asia (NSC 177)," 11 Jan 54. (TS) Vogt, Interview 4 Jan 55, memo in JCS HS files.

(TS) Gerhart "Account," p. 35.

38. (TS) NSC Action 1005, 8 Jan 54, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47) sec 13. (TS) Msg, JCS to

CINCPAC, JCS 955317, 082226Z Jan 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 54. (TS) Gerhart

"Account," pp. 36-38.

39. (TS) NSC Action 1011-a, 14 Jan 54.

40. (TS) Memo, DJS for JCS to SecDef, "Steps which the United States Might Take to

Assist in Achieving Success of the Navarre Plan," 15 Jan 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 54.

41. (TS) Memo, C. D. Jackson to A. Dulles, Kyes, Radford, & Smith, "Indo-China and

Southeast Asia," 18 Jan 54; (TS) Uniden Memo (Gen G. B. Erskine to Radford), "Proposed

Procedure for Implementation of the President's Decision Regarding Indo-China," 18 Jan 54.

(TS) Uniden Memo for Rec, "Meeting at White House-16 January 1954," nd, "Navarre Letter, Actions Taken," vol I, Alden file, OMA.

42. See above p. 125.

43. (TS) Msg, Achilles (AmEmb Paris) to SecState, 2668, 2 p.m., 19 Jan 54, CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48) sec 55. (TS) Msg, Achilles to SecState, 2663, 11 a.m., 19 Jan 54. See also: (S) Msg,

Heath (Saigon) to SecState, 5151, 9 a.m., 3 Jan 54, DA-IN-31713 (3 Jan 54); (TS) Msg,

Achilles to SecState, 2629, 2 p.m., 15 Jan 54; (TS) Msg, Achilles to SecState, 2642, 1 p.m., 16

Jan 54.

44. (TS) Msg, CJCS to CINCPAC, JCS 955862, 202345Z Jan 54.

45. (TS) Dft Statement by Radford to NSC, "Report on 'steps which the U. S. might take to

assist in achieving the success of the Navarre Plan' in Indochina," 20 Jan 54. (TS)Vogt Interview, 14 Jan 55, memo in JCS HS files.

46. (TS) Memo for Rec, Capt G. W. Anderson, 21 Jan 54.

47. (TS) Msg, Ch MAAG IC to OSD/OMA, MG 146 A, 210350Z Jan 54, DA-IN-34719-C,

CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 55. (TS) Msg, USAmb Saigon to SecState, NIACT 1307, 4 p.m., 23

Jan 54, same file, sec 56.

48. (TS) Memo, Valluy to Radford, "U. S. Military Aid to Indochina," DFM(54) 16, 26 Jan

54. (TS) Msg, USNMR Paris sgd Gruenther to CSA, ALO 189, 011610Z Feb 54, DA-IN-36621,

CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 56.

49. (TS) Memo for Rec, Anderson, 26 Jan 54; (TS) Memo for Rec, Anderson, 27 Jan 54.

50. (TS) Memo for Rec, Brig Gen C. H. Bonesteel, III, OSD, "Meeting of the President's

Special Committee on Indochina, 29 January 1954," 30 Jan 54. (S) Memo, DepSecDef to

SecAF, 29 Jan 54, circ as Encl B to (TS) JCS 1992/340, 21 Jun 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec

72. (TS) Msg, Hq USAP to COMFEAF & Ch MAAG IC, AFOOP-OC-C TS 7323, 302339Z Jan

54; "Navarre Letter, Actions Taken," vol I, Alden files, OMA.

51. Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "Where is Dien Bien Phu?" Washington Post and Times

Herald, 27 Jan 54. (S) Msg, Achilles (Paris) to SecState, 2758, 1 p.m., 27 Jan 54. (TS) Memo

for Rec, Anderson, 27 Jan 54; (U) Ltr, Sen John Stennis to Radford, 1 Feb 54.

52. Unofficial Transcript of Eisenhower News Conference, 3 Feb 54, New York Times, 4

Feb 54. Congressional Record, vol 100, no. 3, p. 1470. (UNK) Memo for File, Radford, 27

May 54.

53. New York Times, 10 Feb 54, p. 2; 11 Feb 54, pp. 1, 6, 16; 4 May 54, p. 4.

263
Notes to Pages 144-149

54. (S) Msg, Heath (Saigon) to SecState, 1360, 31 Jan 54, DA-IN-36566, CCS 383.21 Korea

(3-19-54) sec 145. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology. (S) D/A, G-2,

Background Paper GI-D-33 "History of Indochina War," 7 Apr 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-405)

sec 62.

55. (S) Msg, USARMA VN to CSUSA for G-2, MC 39-54, 032355Z Feb 54, DA-IN-37222 (4

Feb 54), same file, sec 57.

56. (S) Msg, Ch MAAG IC to DA, MG 318A, 090950Z Feb 54, DA-IN-38234 (10 Feb 54),

same file.

57. (S) Gen O'Daniel's comments on cable MC 39-54.

58. (TS) Msg, ALUSNA Saigon [O'Daniel] to CINCPAC, readdressed CINCPAC to CNO,

280815Z Jan 54; (TS) Msg, Ch MAAG IC [O'Daniel] to CINCPAC readdressed CINCPAC to

CNO/JCS, MG 250A, 020130Z Feb 54. Both in CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 56. (TS) Rpt of US

Sp Mission to IndoChina, 5 Feb 54, same fle/ BP pt 10. (TS) Encl C to (TS) JCS 1992/300, 27

Apr 54, same file, sec 64.

59. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to CNO/JCS, 042114Z Feb 54; (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to CNO/JCS,

072308Z Feb 54. Both in same file, sec 57.

60. (TS) Mns Mtg of Sp Cmte (Indochina), 9 Feb 54. (C) Memo, Ely to Radford, 13 Feb 54.

(S) Msg, Heath (Saigon) to SecState, 1501, 5 p.m., 21 Feb 54, CCS 092 Asia.

61. (TS) JCS 1992/284, Memo, CSA to JCS, 4 Mar 54; (TS) Memo, CJCS for JCS to SecDef,

"Reappraisal of General O'Daniel's Status with Respect to Indochina," 5 Mar 54; (C) Msg,

OSD sgd Davis to CINCPAC DEF 958261, 122158Z Mar 54. All in same file, sec 59. New York

Times, 13 Mar 54.

62. (TS) Msg, CINCFE to JCS & CSA, C66980, 021000Z Feb 54, DA-IN-6799 (2 Feb 54);

(S) Msg, CINCFE to JCS & CSA, KCG 2-4, 05100Z Feb 54, DA-IN-37583 (6 Feb 54); (S) Msg,

Amb Briggs (Seoul) to SecState, 759, 101045Z Feb 54, DA-IN-38292 (10 Feb 54). All in CCS

383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 145. New York Times, 12 Feb 54, p. 1.

63. (TS) JCS 1776/432, 16 Feb 54, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 145.

64. (TS) NSC Rec of Action 1043 a, 17 Feb 54. (TS) JCS 1776/433, 17 Feb 54; (TS) JCS

1776/434, 19 Feb 54; (TS) JCS 1776/435, 19 Feb 54. All in CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 145.

65. (TS) JCS 1776/437, 24 Feb 54; (TS) Memo, CJCS for JCS to SecDef, "Consideration of

the ROK Offer to Send a Division to Indochina," 1 Mar 54. Both in same file, sec 146. (TS)

JCS 1776/444, 5 Mar 54, same file, sec 147; (TS) NSC Rec of Action 1054 b, 4 Mar 54.

66. (S) Memo, Asst SecDef (ISA) to DepSecDef, "Developments in U. S. Military Assistance for the French and Associated State [sic] Forces in Indochina," 8 Jan 54, 1-10134. (C)

Memo, Dir OFMA Davis for AsstSecDef (ISA) to DepSecDef, "Implementation of Indochina

MDA Programs to Assist in Achieving Success of the Navarre Plan," 2 Mar 54.

67. (TS) JCS 1992/290; 24 Mar 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 60. (TS) Memo for Rec, Gen

G. B. Erskine, Dir of Sp Opns, OSD, "Terms of Reference for Subcommittee on Indo-China,

Related Southeast Asian Matters, and the Geneva Conference," 4 Mar 54.

68. (U) Unofficial Trans of Soviet Note, 26 Dec 53; (U) Tri US-UK-Fr Note to USSR, 1 Jan

54; (U) Unofficial Trans of Soviet Note, 4 Jan 54 All atchd to State Dept Background Paper

BER D-8/50, 12 Jan 54, CCS 337 (4-19-50) BP pt 2A. (S) State Dept Paper, PREP D-1/2,

"Revision of Tactics Section (pages 1 and 2) of Report of Tri-partite Working Group, Paris,

October 21-November 2," 12 Dec 53; (S) State Dept Psn Paper, BER D-1/2, "Tripartite Draft

Re Anticipated Soviet Request for Five-Power Conference Including Communist China," 15

Jan 54. Both in CCS 337 (4-19-50) BP pt 2. (S) State Dept Rebuttal Paper, D-8/17a, "Indochina," 11 Jan 54, same file, BP pt 2A. (S) State Dept Talking Paper, PTB D-3/2, "Bilateral Discussion in Berlin with the French, Indochina," 19 Jan 54, same file, BP pt 3.

69. State Dept. Foreign Ministers Meeting (Washington, GPO, 1954), pp. 13-24, 220.

70. Ibid., pp. 24-54.

264
Notes to Pages 149-153

71. (U) DOC D-41, State Dept Press Release No. 475, 3 Sep 53, in (TS) Doc Hist of US Pol

Toward Indochina, 1940-1963. (UNK) Dept, 177, 18 Feb 54, as summarized in App to (TS)

JCS 1992/286, 11 Mar 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 59. Article IV of the Korean Armistice

Agreement, signed 27 Jul 53, read as follows: "In order to insure the peaceful settlement of

the Korean question the military commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the

armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level

of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation

the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of

the Korean question, etc." State Dept Bulletin, 3 Aug 53, p. 139.

72. (TS) Mns lst-6th Restricted Sessions of Foreign Ministers Mtg, 8-18 Feb 54, in State

Dept HD files.

73. "Quadripartite Communique, Issued at Berlin, February 18 [1954]," State Dept, Foreign Ministers Meeting, p. 217.

74. Smith, "Progress Toward Solving Current International Problems," (Address before

Chicago World Trade Conference, 23 Feb 54), State Dept Bulletin, 8 Mar 54, pp. 358-360.

Dulles, "Report on Berlin," (Radio-TV Address, 24 Feb 54), ibid., pp. 343-347.

75. (TS) Summary of Notes Recorded by DepSecy, JCS at JCS-State Mtg, 26 Feb

54.

76. (TS) Vogt Interview, 14 Jan 55, memo in JCS HS files. (TS) "An Account of the Events

and Decisions Leading to the Loss of North Indochina," prepared for the record by the

Office of the SpecAsst to JCS for NSC Affairs, 1st dft, 25 Oct 54, p. 44.

77. (S) Msg, Amb Dillon (Paris) to SecState, 3238, 6 p.m., 6 Mar 54. (U) Msg, Dillon to SecState, 3240, 6 Mar 54, DA-IN-868537, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 59.

78. Spector, Advice & Support, pp. 186-189; Duiker, Communist Road to Power, pp.

168-169.

Chapter 9. Prelude to Geneva, March-May 1954

1. Much more research is necessary on this question. In particular, the story of Operation

VAUTOUR (VULTURE) remains unclear. The account here draws on Spector, Advice & Support, as well as the documentation in the Foreign Relations of the United States (hereinafter

referred to as FRUS), but these leave some questions unanswered.

2. Duiker, Communist Road to Power, p. 169.

3. Spector, Advice & Support, p. 195.

4. Spector, Advice & Support, pp. 194-195; Memorandum of Conversation, Deputy FE

(Drunright), 2 Apr 54, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIII, pp 1215-1217.

5. Memo, MacArthur to SecState, 7 Apr 54, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIII, pp 1270-1272.

6. Memo, MacArthur to SecState, 7 Apr 54, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIII, pp 1270-1272;

Spector, Advice & Support, pp. 200-201.

7. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology.

8. (S) Geneva Conf Background Paper, Indochina Chronology; Harrison, "Dien Bien Phu,"

pp. 270-286; (S) Uniden Intel Briefing, "Current Military Situation, 21 March 1954."

9. Spector, Advice & Support, pp. 191-194. Spector dates Ely's arrival on 1 March. This is

clearly an error.

10. (TS) Aide Memoire, Radford to Ely, 8 Nov 54. (TS) Memo for Rec, Anderson, "Conversation with General Ely, Chairman, French Chiefs of Staff, on 22 March," 22 Mar 54. (TS) Memo

for Rec, Anderson, "Discussions with General Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff on

Indo-China in the Afternoon of 24 March," 24 Mar 54. (TS) Memo of Cony, Dir CI Cabell, Ely, et

al., 23 Mar 54. (TS) Notes of JCS-State Mtg, 26 Mar 54.

265
Notes to Pages 153-158

11. (TS) Memo, Ely to Radford, 22 Mar 54; (TS) Memo, Ely to Radford 24 Mar 54; (TS)

Memo, Anderson to Col Brohon [Gen Ely's aide], "French requests for equipment for French

forces in Indo-China," 24 Mar 54; (S) Memo, SecDef to SecAF, "Transfer of Additional B-26 Aircraft to Indo-China," 25 Mar 54; (TS) CM-74-54, Memo, Radford to President's Special Committee on Indochina, "Discussions with General Paul Ely," 29 Mar 54. (TS) Notes of JCS-State

Mtg, 26 Mar 54.

12. (TS) Memo for Rec, Anderson, "Conversation with General Valluy, French Military Mission to the U. S., on 19 March," 19 Mar 54; (TS) Memo for Rec, Anderson, "Conversations with

General Paul Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, on the subject of Indo-China," 21

Mar 54; (TS) Memo for Rec, Anderson, "Discussions with General Ely, Chairman of the

French Chiefs of Staff, on Indo-China in the afternoon of 24 March," 24 Mar 54. (TS)

CM-74-54, CJCS to President's Special Committee on Indochina; "Discussions with General

Paul Ely," 29 Mar 54.

13. (TS) Memo of Conv, SecState, Radford, Ely, et al., 23 Mar 54.

14. (TS) Memo, Ely to Radford, 23 Mar 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 60.

15. On 10 March 1954 President Eisenhower had replied to a question about American

activities in Indochina as follows: "There is going to be no involvement of America in war

unless it is a result of the Constitutional process that is placed upon Congress to declare it."

New York Times, 11 Mar 54, p. 14; 4 May 54, p. 4.

16. (TS) Memo for Rec, Anderson, "Discussions with General Ely, Chairman of the French

Chiefs of Staff, on Indo-China in the afternoon of 24 March," 24 Mar 54.

17. (TS) Mns of Mtg between Radford and Ely, Friday, 25 Mar 54, sgd "Arthur Radford" and

"P. Ely."

18. (TS) Msg, CNO to CINCPAC, 312313Z Mar 54.

19. (UNK) Dft Mns, Mtg of Radford and Ely, 26 Mar 54.

20. (TS) Memo, Radford to Pres, "Discussions with General Ely Relative to the Situation in

Indo-China," 24 Mar 54, CCS 092 Asia-(6-25-48) sec 60.

21. Spector, Advice & Support, p. 194.

22. Memo, MacArthur to SecState, 7 Apr 54, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIII, pp 1270-1272.

23. (TS) JCS 1992/285, Memo by SecDef, "Preparation of Department of Defense Views

Regarding Negotiations on Indochina for the Forthcoming Geneva Conference," 8 Mar 54, CCS

092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 59.

24. See chap. 8, p. 135-136.

25. (TS) JCS 1992/286, 11 Mar 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 60.

26. (TS) JCS 1992/287, 11 Mar 54 (as amended by Dec On, 12 Mar 54), same file, sec 59.

27. (TS) Memo, Gen G. B. Erskine to Sp Cmte, "Military Implications of the U. S. Position

on Indo-China in Geneva," w/encl, same subj, 17 Mar 54, OSD 092.31, Adnmin Secy, OSD files.

28. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 23 Mar 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 60.

29. (U) Msg, Amb Dillon (Paris) to SecState, 3312, 11 Mar 54.

30. (TS) Msg, Dillon to SecState, 3294, 9 p.m. 10 Mar 54; (S) Msg, Dillon to SecState, 3313, 7

p.m., 11 Mar 54; (S) Msg, Dillon to SecState, 3315, 8 p.m., 11 Mar 54.

31. (TS) NSC Rec of Action 1074-a, 25 Mar 54. (TS) Gerhart "Account," pp. 44-46.

32. Robert J. Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. V, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

and National Policy, 1953-1954 (Washington: Office of Joint History, 1998), p. 253.

33. (U) J. F. Dulles, "The Threat of a Red Asia" (address to Overseas Press Club, 29 Mar 54),

State Dept Bulletin, 12 Apr 54, p. 540.

34. (TS) Msg, SecState to USecState (Geneva), TEDUL 37, 9:35 p.m., 6 May 54. (TS) Vogt

Interview, 26 Jan 55, memo in JCS HS files. (TS) Gerhart "Account," pp. 51-52.

266
Notes to Pages 158-163

35. (S dg C) Msg, USARMA Saigon to CSUSA for G-2, MC 106-54, 291030Z Mar 54,

DA-IN-48138 (30 Mar 54), CCS 0.92 Asia (6-25-48) sec 61. Harrison, "Dien Bien Phu," pp.

270-286.

36. (TS) Msg, Dillon (Paris) to SecState, NIACT 3692, 030002Z Apr 54, DA-IN-49168, CCS

092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 61. (TS) Msg, Dillon to SecState, 3693, 8 p.m., 2 Apr 54. (UNK) Memo,

CJCS to Pres, 2 Apr 54. (S) Msg, CINCFE to JCS CX67593, 020300Z Apr 54, DA-IN-48943 (2

Apr 54), CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 61. (S) Msg, CINCFE to JCS, CS 67604, 030319Z Apr 54,

DA-IN-49215 (3 Apr 54); (S) Msg, CNO to CINCPACFLT, 051951Z-Apr 54. Both in same file,

sec 62. (TS) Msg, CJCS to CHMAAG IC (Trapnell), JCS 959547, 071700 Apr 54.

37. Robert F Futrell, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years

to 1965 (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1981), pp. 22-25; Spector, Advice & Support,

pp. 204-206; Billings-Yun, Decision Against War, pp. 165-166n. As VULTURE appears to have

been the name adopted in Saigon for the plan, Radford's later assertions that he was unaware

of the name can be understood.

38. (TS) Msg, Dillon to SecState, NIACT 3710, 1 am., 5 Apr 54.

39. (TS) Msg, SecState to Dillon, 3482, 9:29 a.m., 5 Apr 54.

40. (TS) Msg, Dillon to SecState, NIACT 3729, 8 p.m., 5 Apr 54; (TS) Msg, Dillon to SecState,

NIACT 373S, 1 p.m., 6 Apr 54; (TS) Msg, Dillon to SecState, NIACT 3740 4 p.m., 6 Apr 54.

41. (TS) Memo for Rec, Anderson, [Conv with Gen Valluy, 7 Apr 54], 7 Apr 54; (TS) Memo

for Rec, Anderson, [Conversation with Col Brohon, 9 Apr 54], 9 Apr 54. (TS) Msg, CJCS to CH

MAAG IC, JCS 959547, 071700 Apr 54. (TS) Msg CNO to CINCPACFLT, 071709Z Apr 54, CCS

092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 62. (TS) Msg, SecState to AmAmb Paris, 3534, 8:25 p.m., 7 Apr 54.

42. (TS) NSC Ping Bd Rpt, "NSC Action No. 1074-a," 5 Apr 54, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47) sec 14.

43. (TS) NSC Rec of Action 1086, 6 Apr 54. (TS) Vogt Interview, 26 Jan 55, memo in JCS HS

files. (TS) Gerhart "Account," pp. 51-54.

44. (TS) Msg, Ch MAAG IC to CJCS, MG 968A, 091015Z Apr 54, DA IN-50634 (9 Apr 54);

(TS) Msg, COMFEAF to CSUSAF V-VC0173, 120721Z Apr 54, TS: 8374 (12 Apr); (TS)

CM-84-54, Memo, CJCS to SecDef, 12 Apr 54.

45. (TS) Memo, CJCS to SecState, "Conversations with Col Brohon, Assistant to General

Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff," 10 Apr 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 62. (TS)

Msg, CJCS to CINCPAC for Gen O'Daniel, JCS 959753, 101700Z Apr 54.

46. (S) Msg, SecState to Paris, 3541, to Saigon, 1886, 1:35 p.m., 8 Apr 54. (TS) Msg, Ely to

Valluy for Radford, c. 7 Apr 54, incorporated in (TS) Memo for Rec, Anderson, 7 Apr 54.

47. Ltr, Radford to Ely, 12 Apr 54. Eisenhower was critical of Radford's apparently unauthorized statements to Ely, which encouraged him to expect an American intervention, but Ely

does not appear to have needed much encouragement. Billings-Yun, Decision Against War,

pp. 106-107.

48. (TS) Msg, SecState to Amb Paris, NIACT 3512, 7 p.m., 6 Apr 54; (TS) Msg, Dillon to SecState, NIACT 3756, 11 a.m., 7 Apr 54.

49. (TS) Msg, Dillon to SecState, 3774, 7 p.m., 7 Apr 54.

50. Dulles, "Consultations with United Kingdom, France regarding Southeast Asia," White

House press release, 10 Apr 54, State Dept Bulletin, 19 Apr 54, p. 590.

51. "US-UK-French Discussions on Indochina and Southeast Asia," State Dept press releases 194, 197, and Statement by Secy Dulles at Syracuse, 15 Apr 54, State Dept Bulletin, 26 Apr

54, pp. 622-623.

52. (TS) Msg, SecState (Paris) to ActgSecState, DULTE 3, 8 p.m., 22 Apr 54; (TS) Msg, SecState (Geneva) to ActgSecState, DULTE 7, 2 p.m., 26 Apr 54; (TS) Msg, SecState to USecState

(Geneva), TEDUL 37, 9:35 p.m., 6 May 54.

53. (TS) Msg, CINCPACFLT to CNO, 020202Z Apr 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 61. New

York Times, 16 Apr 54 p. 2. (TS) JCS 1776/462, 22 Apr 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 63.

267
Notes to Pages 163-167

54. (TS) JCS 1992/296, 26 Apr 54, and Dec On, 26 Apr 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 62.

(TS) Memo, CJCS for JCS to SecDef, "Indochina," 22 Apr 54, same file, sec 63. For a discussion

of later development of General Ridgway's ideas, see chap. 10.

55. New York Times, 4 May 54, p. 4. J. Parker (State Dept press officer), "U. S. Policy

Toward Indochina," 17 Apr 54, State Dept Bulletin, 26 Apr 54, pp. 623-624.

56. Harrison, "Dien Bien Phu," pp. 270-286.

57. Substance of Discussions, State-JCS Mtg, 23 Apr 54, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIII/1, pp.

1367-1369.

58. (TS) Msg, SecState to ActgSecState, DULTE 2, 2 p.m, 22 Apr 54.

59. (TS) Msg, McClintock to SecState, 2098, 241200Z Apr 54, DA-IN-53702 (24 Apr 54), CCS

092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 63.

60. SecState to DeptState, 23 Apr 54, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIIII1, p 1374; Msgs, SecState to

ActSecState, DULTE 9, 6 p.m., 23 Apr 54; DULTE 10, 2400, 23 Apr 54; DULTE 1, 2400, 24 Apr

54. Bidault was later to assert that Dulles offered the French atomic weapons, but Dulles

forcefully denied this. See Msgs, Amb France (Dillon) to SecState, 9 Aug 54; SecState to

AmEmb France, 9 Aug 54; Amb France (Dillon) to DeptState, 10 Aug 54, all in FRUS,

1952-1954, Vol. XIII, pp. 1927-1928. Radford stated that he indicated to Pleven at about this

time that he was unfamiliar with the name VULTURE. Memo for File, Radford, 24 Apr 54,

FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIII, pp 1396-1397.

61. (TS) "Resume of Conversations with French and British Representatives by Admiral

Radford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Paris and London, 24-26 April 1954 on the Subject

of Indochina," 28 Apr 54. (TS) Msg, Dillon to SecState, NIACT 4060, 251600Z Apr 54,

DA-IN-53954 (25 Apr 54), CCS 210.482 (3-18-48) sec 4.

62. (TS) Msg, SecState to ActgSecState, DULTE 3, 8 p.m., 25 Apr 54.

63. (TS) Msg, SecState to ActgSecState, DULTE 3, 8 p.m., 22 Apr 54; (S) Msg, SecState to

ActgSecState, SECTO 6, 11 a.m., 23 Apr 54; (TS) Msg, SecState to Actg SecState, DULTE 10,

2400, 23 Apr 54.

64. (TS) Msgs, SecState to ActgSecState, DULTE 18, 11 p.m., 24 Apr 54; DULTE 5, 2400, 25

Apr 54; DULTE 7,2 p.m., 26 Apr 54.

65. (TS) "Resume of Conversations with French and British Representatives by Admiral

Radford, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Paris and London, 24-26 April on the Subject of

Indochina," 28 Apr 54; (UNK) Memo for [Adm Radford], 27 Apr 54; (TS) COS(54) 47th Mtg,

Mns of mtg of BCOS and CJCS [with additions and amendments by Capt Anderson], 26 Apr 54.

66. Quoted in (TS) Msg, SecState DULTE 51, to ActgSec State, 7 p.m., 5 May 54.

67. Memcon, AsstSecStateEur (Merchant), 26 Apr 54, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIII, pp.

1386-1391.

68. (TS) Msg, SecState DULTE 21, to ActgSecState, 10 a.m., 29 Apr 54. (TS) NSC Rec of

Action 1104 b, 29 Apr 54.

69. (S) Msg, SecState SECTO 73 to Actg SecState, 10 a.m., 3 May 54.

70. (TS) Msg, SecState to DULTE 51 to Actg SecState, 7 p.m., 5 May 54.

71. Memo, Cutler (NSC) to Smith UnderSecState, 30 Apr 54, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIII, pp.

1445-1448. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 153-154. Congress had armended the Atomic

Energy Act in 1952 to set severe limits on sharing nuclear technology with foreign countries.

268
Notes to Pages 169-179

Chapter 10. Geneva and the End of Intervention

1. Msg, SecState to DeptState, 23 Apr 54, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIII, pp 1374-1375.

2. (TS) Rec of Act, NSC, 196th Mtg, 8 May 54, 1110, "Position of the US with Regard to

the French-Proposal for Negotiating an Armistice in Indochina."

3. (TS) Msg, Dulles TEDUL 37 to Smith, 6 May 54.

4. (S) Msg, Smith SECTO 89 to SecState, 4 May 54.

5. (S) Msg, Smith SECTO 106 to SecState, 5 May 54; SECTO 132, 7 May 54.

6. (S) Msg, Smith SECTO 106 to SecState, 5 May 54.

7. (TS) Msg, McClintock NIACT 2242 to SecState, 6 May 54.

8. (S) Msg, Smith SECTO 110 to Sec State, 5 May 54.

9. (TS) JCS 1992/308, 6 May 54 (as amended by Dec On, 7 May 54), CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-40) sec 64.

10. (TS) JCS 1992/323, 24 May 54, same file, sec 68.

11. (TS) Memo, CSUSA to JCS, "Minimum French Negotiating Position for Indochina

Which French Will Support," (8 May 54?), same file, sec 65. For Laniel Conditions, also (U)

Msg, Dillon 3240 to SecState, 6 Mar 54.

12. (C) Msg, Dillon to SecState, 4248, 6 May 54, DA-IN-58003 (13 May 54). (S) Msg, Dillon

to SecState, 4258, 7 May 54, DA-IN-56901 (8 May 54).

13. State Dept Bulletin, 24 May 54, "French Proposal of 8 May" (unofficial translation),

p. 784.

14. (S) Msg, Smith SECTO 155 to SecState, 9 May 54. (S) Msg, Smith SECTO 157 to SecState, 9 May 54.

15. (TS) Memo, Col Thackston for JSSC to JCS, "Negotiations with Respect to Indochina," 8 May 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 65. Official records do not indicate that JCS

approved these JSSC recommendations. However, their substance seems to have been provided to, and accepted by, the Department of State.

16. (S) Msg, SecState TOSEC-152 to AmCon (Geneva), 13 May 54, DA-IN-58225 (14

May 54).

17. (TS) Msg, Adm Davis (Geneva) to OASD(ISA), 060905Z May 54, DA-IN 56296 (6 May

54), CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 64.

18. (C) Msg, SecState TOSEC 138 to USecState, 12 May 54.

19. (C) Msg, Dulles TOSEC 137 to USecState, 12 May 54, DA-IN-57085 (13 May 54).

20. (S) Msg, SecState TEDUL 49 to USecState, 9 May 54.

21. Memo of Conversation with President, by SecState, 25 May 54, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol.

XII, pp. 512-513; Memo of Conf at White House, 5 May 54, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIII, pp.

1466-1470.

22. Memorandum of Discussion, 195th Mtg NSC, 6 May 54, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XII, pp.

452-459.

23. (TS) Msg, SecState to Paris, rptd Geneva as TEDUL 54 (approved by Pres), 11 May 54.

24. (TS) Msg, SecState 4071 to Dillon, 14 May 54.

25. (TS) Msg, Dillon NIACT 4383 to SecState, 14 May 54.

26. (TS) Msg, SecState NIACT 4064 to AmEmb (Paris), 13 day 54.

27. (TS) Msg, Dillon NIACT 4383 to SecState, 14 May 54.

28. (TS) Dillon 4402 to SecState, 17 May 54.

29. (TS) Msg, SecState 4272 to Dillon, 26 May 54.

30. (TS) Msg, Smith DULTE 109 to SecState, 25 May 54.

31. (C) Msg, Dillon 4723 to SecState, 4 Jun 54.

32. (TS) Msg, SecState 4398 to Dillon, 4 Jun 54.

269
Notes to Pages 179-189

33. (TS) Msg, Joyce, Paris 4765, to SecState, 9 Jun 54.

34. (TS) Msg, SecState to Amb, Paris, and USecState, 4117, TEDUL 78, 17 May 54; (TS)

Msg, Smith DULTE 162 to SecState, 9 Jun 54.

35. (TS) Notes of JCS-State Mtg, 9 Jun 54.

36. (TS) Msg, Dillon 4343 to SecState, 13 May 54.

37. (TS) Msg, SecState TEDUL 178 to USecState, 9 Jun 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 71.

38. (TS) Msg, Smith DULTE 165 to SecState, 10 Jun 54.

39. (TS) Msg, Dillon NIACT 4383 to SecState, 14 May 54.

40. (TS) Memo of Cony, Pres with SpAsst Cutler, 1 Jun 54.

41. (TS) Memo for Rec, Anderson, 3 Jun 54.

42. (TS) JCS 1992/339, 15 Jun 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 72.

43. (TS) Memo, CJCS to JCS to SecDef, "ROK Forces for Employment in Indochina," 1 Jul

54, same file, sec 73.

44. (TS) Msg, McClintock 2770 to SecState, 14 Jun 54. (TS) Memo for Rec, RADM G. W

Anderson, Exec to CJCS, 3 Jun 54.

45. (TS) Memo for Rec, RADM G. W. Anderson, Exec to CJCS, 2 Jun 54.

46. (TS) Msg, Gruenther exclv for Radford, ALO 481, 011715Z Jun 54, DA-IN-62357.

47. (TS) Notes of JCS-State Dept Mtg, 11 Jun 54.

48. (TS) Ltr, Dep USecState Murphy to Dep SecDef Anderson, 8 Jun 54, App B to Encl to

JCS 1992/341, 21 Jun 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 72.

49. (TS) JCS 1992/345, 22 Jun 54, as amended by Dec On, 24 Jun 54, same file.

50. (TS) Memo for COL Forney, NATO Standing Gp, by LTC C. F Heasty, 12 Jul 54; (TS)

Msg, Jt SD/DD to AmEmb, Paris, MAAG and CINCEUR (note on msg: msg essentially as this

dispatched 16 Jun 54). Both in Alden file, OMA.

51. (TS) Msg, SecState TEDUL 171 to AmCon, Geneva, 7 Jun 54.

52. (TS) Msg, Smith DULTE 161 to SecState, 9 Jun 54. (TS) Msg, McClintock 2714 to SecState, 10 Jun 54.

53. (TS) Memo for SecDef, CJCS for JCS, 20 May 54, Encl to JCS 1992/316, 18 May 54,

CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 66.

54. (TS) JCS 1992/321, 20 May 54, as amended by Dec On, 26 May 54, same file, sec 67.

55. (TS) JCS 1992/325, 24 May 54, as amended by Dec On, 2 Jun 54, same file, sec 68.

56. Memo, Dir PPS (Bowie) to SecState, 27 May 54, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIII, pp.

1624-1627.

57. Memo, Drumright to, MacArthur, 24 May 54, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XIII, pp.

1606-1607; Memo of Conversation with the President, by SecState, 25 May 54, FRUS,

1952-1954, Vol. XII, pp. 512-513; Memo of Conversation, Cutler, 28 May 54, FRUS,

1952-1954, Vol. XII, pp 521-528.

58. (TS) JCS 1992/334, 7 Jun 54 (as amended by Dec On, 23 Jun 54), same file, sec 71.

59. (TS) Memo, Secys Pace, Kimball, Gilpatric to SecDef, "Draft State Department Paper

on Indochina dated 27 March 1952," 8 Apr 54, same file, sec 23.

60. (TS) Dec On JCS 1992/202, 3 Mar 53, same file, sec 38.

61. (TS) Memo for Rec, Anderson, "Discussions with General Ely, Chairman of the

French Chiefs of Staff on IndoChina in the afternoon of 24 March," 24 Mar 54.

62. (TS) Msg, Lacy (Manila) 2670 to SecState, 25 May 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 68.

63. (S) Msg, Ch MAAG IC MG 1566A to CSUSA, 010205Z Jun 54, DA-IN-62459 (2 Jun 54),

same file, sec 69.

64. (S) Msg, Ch MAAG IC MG 1447A to CSUSA, 191201Z May 54, DA-IN-59456 (19 May

54), same file, sec 67; (S) Msg, McClintock 2468 to SecState, 19 May 54.

270
Notes to Pages 189-200

65. (TS) Msg, McClintock 2299 to SecState, 9 May 54.

66. (TS) Msg, Asst USARMA Saigon NR 1788 to G-2, 20 Jun 54.

67. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to CNO, 230909Z May 54; (TS) Msg, Lacy, Manila 2670 to SecState,

25 May 54. Both in CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 68.

68. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to CMO, 022358Z Jun 54, same file, sec 70.

69. (TS) Msg, Dillon and Trapnell 4613 to SecState and JCS, 312000Z May 54, DA-IN-62247

(31 May 54), CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 69. (TS) Msg, Dillon 4662 to SecState, 2 Jun 54.

70. (S) Msg, Ch MAAG IC MG 1651 DA to CSUSA, 091515Z Jun 54, DA-IN-64188 (9 Jun

54), CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 71.

70. (TS) Msg, Ely to [Valluy?], Saigon, 9 Jun 54.

71. (TS) Msg, Murphy TCSEC 392 to AmEmb (Paris), 10 Jun 54.

72. (TS) Notes of JCS-State Mtg, 11 Jun 54.

73. (TS) Msg, Ch MAAG IC MG 1951A to DA, 200915Z Jun 54, DA-IN-66760, CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48) sec 72.

74. (TS) Msg, Ch MAAG IC MG 1691 to CSUSA, 130601Z Jun 54. DA-IN-65099 (13 Jun),

CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 71.

75. (TS) Msg, Smith DULTE 17 to SecState, 12 Jun 54.

76. (TS) Msg, Dillon 4812 to SecState, 11 Jun 54.

77. (TS) Msg, SecState 4551, TEDUL 191, to Amb (Paris), 12 Jun 54.

78. (TS) Msg, SecState TEDUL 197 to AmCon (Geneva), 14 Jun 54.

79. (TS) Msg, CSUSA to Ch MAAG IC, DA-IN-963165, 162246Z Jun 54, CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48) sec 72.

80. (TS) Msg, Ch MAAG IC MG 1824A to JCS, 260930Z Jun 54, DA-IM-68393 (26 Jun),

CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 73; (TS) Msg, CJCS JCS 963796 to Ch MAAG IC, 302300Z Jun 54.

Chapter 11. Toward a New Alliance

1. Memo of Cony, Cutler, 28 May 54, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XII, pp 521-528.

2. Alexander Werth, France, 1940-1955 (New York: Henry Holt, 1956), pp. 674-677.

3. (TS) JCS 1776/452, 9 Apr 54, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 149. Underlining added.

4. (S) Msg, Dulles, Geneva SECTO 73 to Actg SecState, 3 May 54.

5. (TS) Msg, DULTE 51 to SecState, 5 May 54.

6. (TS) JCS 1992/324, with Encl, Memo from SpecAsst to Pres Cutler, 7 May, 24 May 54,

CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 68.

7. (TS) Rec of Acts by NSC at 196th Mtg, 8 May 54. (TS) Gerhart "Account," pp. 63-64.

8. (TS) Msg, Smith DULTE 66 to SecState, 13 May 54.

9. (TS) Msg, Smith DULTE 53 to SecState, 7 May 54.

10. (TS) Msg, Dulles TEDUL 48 to Smith, 9 May 54.

11. (TS) Msg, McClintock 2374 to SecState, 13 May 54.

12. (TS) Memo for Rec, CJCS, 10 May 54. (TS) Msg, Donovan (Bangkok) 2242 to SecState,

10 May 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 65; (TS) Notes on JCS-State Mtg, 23 Jul 54.

13. (TS) Memo for Rec, CJCS, 10 May 54.

14. (S) Msg, SecState TOSEC 79 to AmCon Geneva, 5 May 54, DA-IN-56239 (6 May).

15. (S) Msg, Dulles (Murphy) TOSEC 240 to AmCon Geneva, 22 May 54.

16. (TS) Rpt of the Five Power Military Conference, 11 Jun 54, Encl to (TS) JCS 1992/337,

14 Jun 54, CCS 092 Asia (5-25-58) BP pt 11.

17. (TS) Encl B to (TS) JCS 1992/350, 3 Jul 54, same file, sec 74.

271
Notes to Pages 200-208

18. (TS) Memo, CSUSA to JCS, "Final Report of the Five Power Military Representatives

Conference of June 1954," c. 9 Jul 54, same file, sec 75. Actually, it was not necessary to

approve or disapprove, because the conclusions of the representatives did not imply commitment by their respective governments.

19. (TS) Dec On JCS 1992/312, 21 May 54, same file, sec 65.

20. (U) Msg, Smith SECTO 162 to SecState, 110525Z May 54, DA-IN-894542 (11 May). See

Appendix 4.

21. (U) "US Policy in Southeast Asia," news conference statements by Dulles, press

releases 241, 244, 245, 11 May 54, State Dept Bulletin, 24 May 54, pp 781-782.

22. (S) Msg, Smith SECTO 174 to SecState, 120830Z May 54, DA-IM-57072 (12 May).

23. (U) Msg, Smith SECTO 190 to SecState, 130530Z May 54, DA-IM-895604 (12 May); (S)

Msg, Smith SECTO 163 to SecState, 111030Z May 54, DA-IM-57368 (11 May); (S) Msg, Smith

SECTO 197 to SecState, 132350Z May 54, DA-IM-58186 (14 May).

24. (TS) Msg, Dillon to SecState, 13 May 54.

25. (S) Msg, Dillon 4735 to SecState, 5 Jun 54.

26. (C) Msg, Dillon 4833 to SecState, 14 Jun 54.

27. (S) Msg, Johnson SECTO 498 to SecState, 21 Jun 54; (C) Msg, Dillon 4972 to SecState,

21 Jun 54 DA-IN-67069 (22 Jun); (TS) Msg, Johnson SECTO 534 to SecState, 26 Jun 54; (TS)

Msg, McClintock 2676 to SecState, 6 Jun 54; (C) Msg, Dillon 4909 to SecState, 18 Jun 54.

28. (TS) Msg, Dulles 4852 to Amb (Paris), 29 Jun 54.

29. (S) Msg, Dulles 4853 to Amb (Paris), 28 Jun 54.

30. (S) Msg, Dillon 50 to SecState, 6 Jul 54.

31. (S) Msg, Dulles 77 to Amb (Paris), 7 Jul 54.

32. (S) Msg, Dulles to Amb (Paris), no. unk, 8 Jul 54.

33. (TS) Msg, Dulles 127 to Amb (Paris), 10 Jul 54.

34. (TS) Msg, SecState, TOSEC 480 to AmCon (Geneva), 25 Jun 54.

35. (TS) Msg, Dillon 134 to SecState, 11 Jul 54.

36. (S) Agreed Fr-US position paper on IC, following mtg Sec Dulles and Mendes-France,

included in (S) Msg, Dulles (Paris) 179 to SecState, 14 July 54.

37. (S) Ltr, Mendes-France to Dulles, in (S) Msg, Dulles (Paris) 179 to SecState, 14 Jul 54;

(S) Ltr, Dulles to Mendes-France, in (S) Msg, Dulles (Paris) 179 to SecState.

38. Speech of Mendes-France to Nat Assem, 22 Jul 54, in Journal Officiel, Assem Nat,

p. 3536.

38. Spector, Advice & Support, p. 224.

39. (S) Msg, SecState TOSEC 529 to AmCon (Geneva), 10 Jul 54.

40. Ibid.

41. Eisenhower & Churchill, "Anglo-American Discussions on International Situation,"

White House press release of 28 Jun 54, State Dept Bulletin, 12 Jul 54, p. 49.

42. (TS) Notes of JCS-State Mtg, 25 Jun 54.

43. (C) Msg, Butterworth (London) 5939 to SecState, 24 Jun 54.

44. (TS) JCS 1992/358, 16 Jul 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 75.

45. (TS) Notes of JCS-State Mtg, 23 Jul 54, (TS) JCS 1992/358, 16 Jul 54, CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48) sec 75; (TS) Notes of JCS-SD Mtg, 9 Jul 54. (TS) Ann "Policy with Respect to the

Colombo Powers," to Memo, CSUSA, "JCS Positions in Connection with the Meeting

between President Eisenhower & Prime Minister Churchill, CCS 337 (7-23-48) sec 5.

46. (TS) Notes of JCS-SD Mtg, 23 Jul 54.

47. (TS) JCS 1992/301, 28 Apr 54 [as amended by Dec On, 30 Apr 54], CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48) sec 64; (TS) JCS 1992/302, 29 Apr 54, same file; (TS) Note to Holder of JCS

1992/301, 17 May 54, same file.

272
Notes to Pages 208-217

48. (TS) JCS 1992/336, 8 Jun 54 [as amended by Dec On, 16 Jun 54], same file, sec 71.

49. (TS) Msg, JCS 963958 to CINCPAC, 021338Z Jul 54, same Mfie, sec 74; (TS) Msg, AMINO,

CINCPAC 6871 to MATS Andrews AFB, COMSTS, CINCFE, 070255Z Jul 54, same file.

50. (C) Msg, Dulles 261 to AmAmb (Paris), 21 Jul 54.

51. (S) Encl, Memo, Asst SecDef, ISA to USecys Army, Navy, AF, "Suspension of Shipments of Military Aid to Indochina," 2 Aug 54, to (S) JCS 1992/373, 6 Aug 54, CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48) sec 77A.

52. (S) JCS 1992/352, 7 Jul 54, same file, sec 74.

53. (TS) Msg, Ch MAAG Indochina MG 2079A to CINCPAC, 200835Z Jul 54, DA-IM-75488,

same file, sec 76.

54. (TS) JCS 1992/337, 6 Aug 54, same file, sec 77A.

55. (S) Memo, AsstSecDef, ISA to USecys Army, Navy, AF, "Suspension of Shipments of

Military Aid to Indochina," 2 Aug 54, Encl to (S) JCS 1992/373, 6 Aug 54, CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48) sec 77A.

56. (S) Msg, Dulles 125 to Paris, Geneva 530, 10 Jul 54.

57. (TS) JCS 1992/358, 16 Jul 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 75.

58. Statement by President, White House Press Release, 21 Jul 54, State Dept Bulletin, 2

Aug 54, p. 163.

59. "US Declaration on Indochina," USecState W. B. Smith, 21 Jul 54, State Dept Bulletin,

2 Aug 54, pp. 162-163.

60. Statement by Secy Dulles, 23 Jul 54, Press Release 400, State Dept Bulletin, 2 Aug 54,

p. 163.

61. Statement by President, White House press release, 21 Jul 54, State Dept Bulletin, 2

Aug 54, p. 163.

62. (TS) NSC 5429, "Review of US Policy in the Far East, 4 Aug 54, CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48) sec 77A; (S) Msg, McClintock 2356 to SecState, 12 May 54.

63. (TS) Msg, Lt. Col. J. E. Dwan to OSD, c. 21 Jul 54, quoted in (TS) Gerhart "Account,"

p. 71.

Appendix 1. Summary of the Aid Program

1. (TS) "Congressional Presentation FY 1955 Indochina MDA Material Program," sec,

"Questions and Answers," Alden Files, OMA.

2. The summary figures used in this section are based primarily upon (TS) "Congressional Presentation FY 1955 Indochina MDA Material Program," sec, "Questions and Answers,"

Alden Files, OMA. Since the "Congressional Presentation" was prepared early in 1954, some

of the figures for that year are only tentative; others are rounded off in such a manner that

the cumulative effect is not in the interest of close accuracy. The sums given in the present

study are computed from several sources but do not differ materially from the summary figures given in the Alden Files. Throughout the course of the aid story, the figures given by

various sources reveal serious conflict. Great difficulty was encountered in attempting to

reconcile these differing views to obtain an accurate year-by-year record of allocations, as

distinct from general summaries. Other sources used in arriving at the totals in this study

follow: (TS) Encl, Memo, SecDef to Secys Army, AF, Nav, "Adjustment of FY 1953 Programs

for Indochina, Formosa, and France," 7 Mar 52, to (TS) JCS 2099/179, 11 Mar 52, CCS 092 (8-

22-46) sec 70; (TS) NSC 148, 6 Apr 53, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 40; (C) App, "Estimated

Expenditures in Connection with U. S. Courses of Action in Southeast Asia," to (TS) NSC

5405, 16 Jan 54, same file, sec 55; (C) JCS 2099/369, 21 Apr 54, CCS 092 (8-2246) sec 110; (S)

GI D-30a, "Geneva Conference, April 1954, Indochinese Phase - Background Paper, Summary

of US Aid Program for Indochina," 25 Mar 54 CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 60.

273
Notes to Pages 218-225

3. (S) Memo, MG G. C. Stewart, Dir OMA, to Radford, "Status of the $705 million FY 1954

Direct Forces Support Program for Indochina," 24 Sep 54.

4. (S) MDAP Status Report for the Month of July 1954.

5. (S) Memo for Rec, "Status of Major Items as of 31 December 1951 Based on Preliminary Data. Indo-China," nd (c. Feb 52), Indo-China 2a (1952), Alden Files, OMA; (TS) Encl,

Ltr, Col J. S. Driscol, USAF, to LTG L. C. Craigie, DCS/D, USAF, 9 Oct 52, same file.

6. (TS) Encl B, Intel Data, "The Current French Capability of Holding Hanoi and the

Tonkin Delta with Forces Available to Them," to (TS) JCS 1992/334, 7 Jun 54, CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48) sec 71.

7. (TS) "Congressional Presentation FY 1955 Indochina MDA Material Program," Sec,

"Questions and Answers," Alden Files, OMA.

8. (TS) Encl B to (TS) JCS 1992/270, 12 Jan 54, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 54.

9. (TS) Congressional Presentation FY 1955 Indochina MDA Material Program," Sec,

"Questions and Answers," Alden Files, OMA.

10. (S) Msg, USARMA Saigon Vietnam MG 39-54, to CSUSA for G-2, 032355Z Feb 54, DAIN-37222 (4 Feb 54), CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 57.

11. (TS) Congressional Presentation FY 1955 Indochina MDA Material Program," Sec,

"Questions and Answers," Alden Files, OMA.

Appendix 2

1. (TS) NSC 64/1, 21 Dec 50, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec 9.

274
Index

8 March Accords. See Elysee Accords. right to withdraw from the French Union: 177,

178-79

Acheson, Dean: 31-32, 33, 39, 40, 42-43, 44, US support for the independence of: 170, 176,

45-46,48-49, 54, 64-65, 67, 76, 78, 104 177, 178

Ad Hoc Committee of Programs for Military Atomic bombs, proposed use of: 93, 107, 151,

Assistance: 57 152, 155, 166-67, 185-86, 187, 199-200

"Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Auriol, Vincent: 79, 101, 134

Indochina" (1950): 63 Australia: 93, 98-100, 160, 165, 166, 174-75,

Air Force, Fourteenth US: 6, 8, 9 176-77, 195, 196-97, 209

Aircraft: 101, 102

B-26s: 54, 57, 58, 103, 122, 125, 142, 143, 144,

153, 160-61, 208 Bao Dai: 9, 11, 16, 24-27, 46-47, 61, 179

B-29s: 159, 164 and charges of being a French puppet: 38, 40,

C-47s: 102, 103-04, 108, 122, 123, 124-25, 71

130-31, 142, 153, 158, 208 demands for Vietnamese independence: 24-25,

C-119s: 103, 122-23, 125, 130-31, 134, 142, 153, 26-27

158, 208 French overtures to: 19-20, 24-31

F-6Fs: 103 lack of support for among the Vietnamese peoF-8Fs: 57,58,103,153 ple: 38-39, 40, 46, 51, 71, 72, 75, 91-92, 117,

F-84s: 122182

French requests for: 142-44, 153, 158 recognition of by Asian nations: 39-40,46 French utilization of: 103, 108, 116, 124, 125, relationship with the French: 38,40, 71, 72,

131, 153, 160-61 117-19

helicopters: 153 role as Chief of State: 37-38, 60-61, 148

L-20s: 153 US State Department support for: 33,45-46

loaned to France by the US Air Force: 103-04, Belgium: 103

122-23, 125, 142, 153, 208 Belgium: 103

maintenance of: 103, 104, 122-24, 125, 130-31

maintenance personnel for: 104, 122-23, Bermuda Conference: 130, 132, 133

124-25, 142, 143-44, 147, 153, 160-61,208 Bevin, Ernest: 39

shortages of: 103-04 Bidault, Georges: 12, 16, 29, 32, 118, 119, 120, 132,

spare parts for: 102, 123, 124, 142, 143 149, 153, 158-59, 161-62, 164, 171, 180

Aircraft carriers: 78, 121-22 Blum, Leon: 17, 21

Airstrips: 131 Blum, Robert: 45

Alessandri, General Marcel: 9, 10, 13 Bohlen, Charles: 44

Alsop, Joseph: 144 Bollaert, Emile: 22-23, 24, 25, 26-27, 28-29

Alsop, Stewart: 144 Bonnet, Henri: 44, 180, 190

American-British-French Foreign Ministers Con- Boxer, USS: 162-63

ferences: 48-49, 64-65, 76, 97-98, 132, 133 Bradley, Maj. Gen. J. S.: 98-99

Ammunition: 57,58, 101,102, 153, 183 Bradley, General Omar: 79, 83, 94

Anti-communist propaganda: 131, 135, 136 Brink, Brig. Gen. Francis G.: 65, 70, 76, 85, 102

Armed Forces Policy Council: 140 British Chiefs of Staff: 6, 8, 15, 165

Army Air Forces Air Ground Aid Service: 10 Bruce, David: 44

Associated States Burma: 93, 165, 199, 200, 207

agreement on a customs union: 59-60 Buu Loc: 179, 191

agreement on monetary union: 59-60

buildup of strong native forces in: 195-96

US requirement that France move toward Caffery, Jefferson: 32, 33

granting full independence to: 114, 134 Caldera, Brig. Gen. Joseph D. C.: 158

275
Index

Cambodia: 4, 23, 38, 40, 48, 60, 73, 117-18, 160, and need for anti-communist psychological

177, 186, 197-98, 200 warfare: 131

armistice proposal: 201 and plans to evacuate the French from Tonkin:

and Geneva Conference: 170, 173-74, 175, 69, 78-79

203-04, 209-10 and plans for unilateral response to Chinese

Cao Bang, Vietnam: 58-59, 62, 65 intervention in Indochina: 97,99

Cao Dai: 24, 28, 74, 75 and proposed response to possible Chinese

Carney, Admiral Robert B.: 107, 140, 146, 155-56, intervention in Indochina: 186, 195

195 and sharing of military intelligence: 81

Carpentier, General Marcel: 47-48, 61, 63, 76 and training of native forces: 189-90

Cease-fire in Vietnam Committee of the South: 11, 14

French conditions for: 150, 155, 170-71, 172-74 Communism, containment of: 35-36, 38-39, 41,

and Great Britain: 167 43, 44, 63, 65, 66, 93, 135-36, 194-200,

NSC position regarding: 169-70 210-11,213-15

US position regarding: 176, 199, 200-201 Communist Party, Soviet Union: 2-3

Viet Minh terms: 195, 200-201 Connally Amendment: 41

Central Intelligence Agency: 135, 140, 147 Cooper, John Sherman: 94

Chauvel, Jean: 180, 202 Cot, Pierre: 22

Chennault, Maj. Gen. Claire L.: 8

Chiang Kai-shek: 5, 6-7, 13, 41

China: 1, 3-6, 9, 15, 24, 35, 51, 196-97 Dai Viet: 75

ascendancy of Communist control in: 30, 32-33 Daladier, Edouard: 105, 120

and the Korean'War: 63-66, 80, 107-08 D'Along Bay Agreement: 26-27,28, 29, 32-33

military aid to the Viet Minh forces: 50-51, D'Argenlieu, Adm. Georges Thierry: 14, 15,

56-57, 63-64 16-17, 22

nonrecognition of by the United States: 149-50 Davis, Vice Adm. A. C.: 94, 95, 99, 141,175-76

possible blockade of: 79, 93-97, 98, 186, Defense, US Department of

199-200 and aircraft for French forces: 57, 103-04

possible responses to intervention of in and efforts to save Bien Dien Phu: 160-61

Indochina: 137-38, 180-81, 185-86, 199-200 efforts to speed MDAP deliveries: 84

proposed warning regarding intervention in and military advice on US role in Indochina:

Indochina: 93-94,96-97, 98 140-41

supply routes to Viet Minh: 50-51, 53, 58-59, Office of Military Assistance: 49-50, 54

93, 187 and possible responses to Chinese intervention

threat of invasion of Indochina by: 56, 63-64, in Indochina: 96, 98

77, 78-79, 80, 82-83, 89, 90, 92-93, 97-100, and priority of aid for the French: 102

107-08, 116-17 de Gaulle, Charles: 5, 7, 8, 12, 16, 28

warnings to regarding aggression in Southeast de Jean, Maurice: 201, 211

Asia: 136 de Lattre de Tassigny, General Jean: 59, 61, 67,

and World War II: 3-4, 6-7, 8-9 69-70, 71-72,74-75, 76-77; 79-82, 83, 84, 85,

China Theater of Operations: 6-7, 8, 12 86, 90

Chinese Nationalist Forces, possible use of de Margerie, Emmanuel: 170

against China: 79, 93, 95, 97 Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV): 15, 20,

Churchill, Winston S.: 7, 8, 10, 130, 132, 165-66, 29

177, 205-06 Chinese recognition of : 35, 40, 44

Clark, General Mark W.: 122-23 declaration of independence: 11

Cochin China: 1, 5, 11, 14, 30-31 possible membership in the French Union:

Cogny, General: 182 200-201

Cold War: 19, 20, 40-41, 50-51, 63, 65 Soviet recognition of: 40, 44

Collins, General J. Lawton: 65, 80 as unifier of opposition to France: 20

Colombo nations: 198-99, 207 Dewey, Maj. A. Peter: 14

Combined Chiefs of Staff: 6,9-10, 12, 15 Diem, Ngo Dinh: 205-06, 215

Commander-in-Chief, Pacific: 76 Dien Bien Phu: 129, 130, 131, 138-39, 140, 143,

and assessment of French position and perfor- 145, 147, 151-67, 182, 213-14

mance: 91 Dillon, Douglas: 156-57, 158-59, 165, 177-79, 180,

and cooperation with other nations in Indochi- 190-92, 201

na: 99, 100, 115 Dong, Pham Van: 5-6, 202

and liaison with Navarre: 154 Dong Khe, Vietnam: 37,58

and military aid for the French: 102, 162-63,208 Dong Minh Hoi: 15, 24

276
Index

Donovan, William: 198 European Defense Community Treaty: 105

Draper, William H., Jr.: 101 Expressen: 133-34

Dulles, Allen: 142

Dulles, John Foster: 107-08, 109, 111, 117,118,

120-21,125-26, 141, 145, 153, 155 Famine, and the Viet Minh: 10, 11, 15

and aircraft for the French: 123, 124, 131 Far East Air Force: 57, 81, 104, 122-23, 125, 134,

and the Berlin Conference: 148-50 143, 158, 208

and conditions for possible US intervention in Far East Command: 70, 84, 195

Indochina: 156-58, 159, 160, 161-62, 164-66, Fechteler, Admiral W. M.: 107, 116

170, 177-78, 179, 187, 190-93 Five-Power Ad Hoc Committee: 93-95, 97-98, 99

and containment of communism: 197-99 Five-Power Military Conferences on Southeast

and the Geneva Conference: 162, 196-97, 200, Asia: 97-100, 115, 182, 183

203-05,206, 210 Five-Power Staff Agency: 197, 199-200

and international conference on Indochina: Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Com129-30, 132 mittee: 49, 55

and proposed alliance in Southeast Asia: 162, Formosa: 41

164, 176-77, 196-99, 215 Foster, William C.: 102

and proposed use of nuclear weapons: 152, France

155 and 8 March Accords. See Elysee Accords.

and support for full Vietnamese indepen- Air Ministry: 124

dence: 176-79 appeals for economic assistance to the AssociDunn, James C.: 4 ated States in Indochina: 44, 78

appeals for military assistance in Indochina:

44,45-46,48-49,57, 78, 80

Economic aid programs: 44, 45, 84-85 armistice proposals: 170-76

Economic Cooperation Administration: 47,49-50 attempt to secure unconditional US intervenEden, Anthony: 162, 165, 166, 174, 205, 206 tion: 179-84

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 67, 106, 107, 109-10, 122 and Bao Dai: 19-20, 24-31, 37-38, 40, 71, 72,

and air personnel for the French: 144, 160 117-19

and aircraft for the French: 131, 158, 160 cabinet crises: 118, 119

and the Bermuda Conference: 130, 132 complaints about deficiencies in the aid proand cease-fire in Indochina: 172 gram: 84, 101-02

and comprehensive plan for Southeast Asia: and concessions on economic unity of the

141-42 Associated States: 59-60, 71-72

and conditions for US intervention in Indochi- conditions on US aid to: 130

na: 152, 157, 159, 160, 164-65, 166-67, 169, cost of war in Indochina: 21,26,36, 89, 112

177,180-81 desire for allied strategy in Southeast Asia:

and Dien Bien Phu: 129, 140, 158, 159, 164, 69-70, 76-79,80, 82-83, 98-100

166-67, 213-14 and desire for combined command for Southand the Geneva Conference: 169, 176, 204-06, east Asia: 80, 95, 98, 99-100

209, 210 desire for supply base in Singapore: 94

and Laos: 146-47 determination to regain French colonies in

and the Letourneau Plan: 111 Indochina after World War II: 10, 19-20

and the Navarre Plan: 107 and Dien Bien Phu: 129, 130, 131, 138-39, 140,

and NSC 177:140 143, 144, 151-67

and support for the French in Indochina: 141, direct US assistance to military budget of: 101,

153, 154, 155 112, 114, 121

and warnings to China: 117 and early colonial control of Indochina: 1-5

Eisenhower administration, and aims of the and establishment of democratic institutions

United States in Southeast Asia: 108, 213-15 in Vietnam: 117-18

Ely, General Paul: 152-55, 158-59, 161, 164, 165, and forces for Indochina: 112

180-81, 182, 183, 184, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, and the Geneva Conference: 148-50, 164, 167,

208 169-76, 202-06

Elysee Accords: 30-31, 37, 38-40, 46-47, 51, inability to gain cooperation of the Viet59-60, 64, 91-92 namese: 55-56

Engineer equipment: 57 misunderstandings regarding US intentions:

Erskine, Maj. Gen. Graves B.: 50, 54-58 179-84, 190-93

Erskine Report: 54-58 NATO obligations: 36, 101,105, 114, 141, 143,

Essex, USS: 162-63 183

277
Index

offers to the DRV: 16-17, 19-21, 22-23, 25-26 French Air Forces: 104, 116, 121, 122-25, 160-61,

opposition to US proposal that Associated 182, 208

States be allowed to withdraw from the French Committee of National Liberation: 7, 8

French Union: 178-79 French Communist Party: 16, 21-22

portrayal of role in the Associated States: French Expeditionary Corps: 36-37

80-81 French Foreign Legion: 58

position on independence for Vietnam: 24-31 French High Command

position on unity of Vietnam: 28, 30-31, 32-33 and distribution of US military equipment

and possibility of negotiations to end the war in sent to Vietnam: 47-48, 53, 54, 57-58

Indochina: 119-21,132,136, 137, 148-50, 169 expectations of US intervention: 180

and possibility of US military intervention in failure to provide adequate force information

Indochina: 177-78, 195 for aid programs: 62-63

and possible use of Korean or Nationalist Chi- and plans for offensive operations: 103, 107,

nese troops in Indochina: 181-82 111-17, 130

and powers of Vietnamese government: 37-38, relationship with MAAG Indochina: 61-63, 70,

49, 117-18, 132 112, 130-31,133, 134, 135, 142, 145

prestige and Indochina: 36-37,55-56, 119, 120, relationship with the Vietnamese National

153, 188 Army: 61, 73, 115, 130-31, 182, 188, 189-90

and proposed alliance for Southeast Asia: 160, strategy for ending the war: 107, 109, 110-11,

162, 165, 166, 176-77, 196, 215 113

reluctance to accept US assistance in improv- and supplies for the Vietnamese Army: 62-63

ing operations: 141-42, 153, 161, 190 and training of native forces: 188

reluctance to accept US help in training native French General Staff, requests for military equipsoldiers: 141-42, 153, 188-89 ment: 46-47, 56, 80

reluctance to grant more independence to Viet- French Indochina, by Virginia Thompson: 3

nam: 49, 59-60, 64, 69-76, 117-18, 119 French National Assembly

request for direct budgetary support for the criticisms of US aid program: 85-86

National Army of Vietnam: 78-79 debates on Indochina: 22, 30-31

request for US Marine divisions: 180, 181 and Elysee Agreement (8 March Accords):

and requests for air support: 158 38-39,40

requests for aircraft: 103-04, 122, 131, 142, 143, and the Geneva talks: 150

158 and military reforms: 59

requests for an aircraft carrier for service in and negotiations to end the war in Indochina:

Indochina: 78, 121-22 20

requests for financial aid: 101, 112, 114, 183 French Union: 10, 16, 24, 38, 75, 117-19, 134, 177,

and requests for immediate US air support 178, 200-201

operations: 158-59, 161, 164 French Union Forces

requests for tactical air support: 65 area controlled by: 29-30

requests for US Air Force personnel: 142 assessments of the capabilities of: 64-66,

and resistance to the Japanese in Indochina: 89-90, 113, 116, 130-31, 134-35

4-5, 7, 8-10 casualties: 21, 26, 29-30, 36-37, 105

retention of significant control over economy Colonial Infantry Division: 12

of Indochina: 59-60, 71-72, 118, 213 and defense of Laos: 138-39, 144-45

and threat of Chinese intervention in Indochi- effects of MDAP aid on performance: 70

na: 90, 92-97, 98-100, 153, 154 failure to take initiative: 91, 144-45

threats to abandon Indochina: 112 and guerrilla warfare: 111-12

and training of native forces: 188-93 Hoa Binh offensive: 71

treaty with China, 1946:15 inability to stop flow of supplies to the Viet

US fear that it would abandon Indochina: Minh: 53

48-49, 50, 112 inefficient use of spare parts: 103

and US military assistance to the Associated morale: 59, 67, 71, 86, 90, 113, 131, 153, 182

States: 45-48 organization of: 110, 112

and US military equipment for Vietnamese outposts in Tonkin: 37, 58-61, 90-92

forces: 46-47, 57-58, 78 planned offensives: 26, 29-30, 56-57

and US support for Vietnamese independence and recruitment of Vietnamese: 73

from France: 44-45, 49 reinforcements: 112, 113, 115, 116, 124, 147-48,

and utilization of native forces: 147 183

Vichy government and Indochina: 4-5, 6, 8 strategy: 59, 90-91,108, 109, 110-11

Franco-Vietnamese Military High Committee: 109 strength: 26, 29-30, 36, 91

278
Index

supply system: 124 possibility of France opening talks with:

training for: 104, 109, 111,112, 116, 122,123, 133-34, 137

125-26, 143 terms for negotiation with the French: 133-34

US assistance to: 140 Hoa Binh, Vietnam: 71,90

Hoa Hao: 24, 28

Hoach, Le Van: 28

Gallagher, Brig. Gen. Philip E.: 13-14, 16 Hong Kong: 95,97

Geneva Conference: 183-84 Hull, Cordell: 4

and Dien Bien Phu: 155, 157, 159 Hull, General John E.: 146

French proposals: 169, 170, 171, 173-76 Hurley, Patrick: 8, 12

US position regarding: 155, 157, 160, 162, 164, Huu, Tran Van: 72-73, 74-75, 92

165, 171,173-76, 202-06, 209-11

Viet Minh terms: 195

Gerhart, Maj. Gen. J. K.: 135, 138 India: 39, 40, 207, 209

Germany: 105 Indochinese Communist Party: 3,5-6

Giap, Vo Nguyen: 5-6, 10, 17, 21,129, 144, 152, Indochinese Federation: 10

158 Indonesia: 198, 207

Giau, Tron Van: 11

Gouin, Felix: 16

Gracey, Maj. Gen. Douglas: 14 Jackson, C. D.: 141, 142

Great Britain: 39, 40, 49 Japan: 3-4, 6-11,13,14,136,195-96, 207,211

and the defense of Southeast Asia: 174-75, Jessup, Philip C.: 40,44,45,46

196-97 Johnson, Louis: 41, 42

and desire for a combined command for Joint Advanced Study Committee: 152,155

Southeast Asia: 95, 98, 99-100 Joint Chiefs of Staff

and desire for an allied strategy in Southeast and aircraft maintenance personnel assigned

Asia: 69-70, 76-77, 80, 82-83,98-100 to French forces in Indochina: 142, 143, 147

and fear of Chinese intervention in Indochina: assessments of capabilities of the French:

162, 165-66 64-66, 89-90, 113, 116, 130-31, 134-35, 141,

and fear that French would withdraw from 155, 187, 214-15

Indochina: 105-06 and calls for integrated policy on Southeast

and Geneva Conference: 197,202-03, 205-09 Asia: 35,42, 66, 141, 196

and possible US intervention in Indochina: and cease-fire proposals: 172, 175

159, 160, 165, 177, 178, 187, 195 composition of: 107

and proposed alliance for Southeast Asia: 160, and containment of communist movements:

162, 165, 166, 176-77, 196-97,205-09, 215 41-42, 79-81,116-17, 135-36, 141,196,

proposed intervention in Indochina: 164, 198-200, 214-15

165-66 and conditions on aid to the French: 62,130

and sharing of military intelligence: 81 and defense of Thailand: 198

and threat of Chinese intervention in South- and draft of NSC 124: 96

east Asia: 93-97, 98-100 and effects of Korean War on policy in

Griffin, Robert Allen: 44,45 Indochina: 63-66, 80, 93, 107-08

Gruenther, General Alfred M.: 143, 183 and fear that France would withdraw from

Gullion, Edmund: 40,46,48, 61, 71-72 Indochina: 105-06, 116-17

and intelligence operations in Indochina: 147

and involvement in Indochina immediately

Haiphong, Vietnam: 17, 100-101,181, 187 after World War II: 13, 14

Han, Lt. Gen. Lu: 13-14, 15 and Korean offer to send troops to Laos:

Hanoi: 11, 13, 17, 37, 71, 181, 182, 187 146-47

Harding, General John: 76-77 and the Letourneau Plan: 110-11

Heath, Donald R.: 40, 60-61, 63, 70, 72, 104, 122, and military aid for the Vietnamese National

205 Army: 109, 208

Ho Chi Minh: 3, 5-6, 10-11, 16, 36, 37 and military aid mission to Indochina: 48, 54

desire to secure Tonkin: 184 and military assistance for the French in

and Dien Bien Phu: 129 Indochina: 35-36, 41, 44, 47, 50, 54, 102, 134

efforts to compromise with France: 16-17, and the Navarre Plan: 113, 134-35, 141, 172

19-21,22-23, 25-26 and need for an independent Indochina with a

and famine in Tonkin: 10, 11, 15 national army: 53-54

279
Index

and need for improvement in the French and proposed warning to China: 93-94,96-97,

strategic plan: 111 116-17

and need for native military leaders for the response to August 1950 State Department

National Army: 110-11 position paper on Indochina: 64

and need for the French to act on US military and risk of a general war: 187-88

advice: 113 and sharing of intelligence: 81-82

and need for use of psychological warfare: 135 and the Singapore Conference: 76-77

and need to build up the national armies in and strategy for winning the war in Indochina

Indochina: 99, 138, 195-96, 214-15 with US intervention: 184-88

and opposition to a combined command for and supervision of military aid to the French

Southeast Asia: 69-70, 76-77, 80, 82-83, in Indochina: 58

92-93,95,98, 99-100 and support for anticommunist forces in

and opposition to commitment to an allied Southeast Asia: 41-42, 43

strategy in Southeast Asia: 69-70, 76-77, 80, and support for French forces in Indochina in

82-83, 92-93 World War Ih: 6, 7-8

and planning for contingencies other than and support for French units going to IndochiFrench success in Indochina: 115-17, na: 12, 13, 183

135-41, 155, 156 and threat of Chinese intervention on Indochiand planning for US response to Chinese inter- na: 89, 92-97, 98

vention in Indochina: 132, 153-54, 162-63, and training for native forces: 188-90, 192-93,

184-88,214-15 214

position regarding the Geneva Conference: and US air assistance for France at Dien Bien

156, 171-76 Phu: 157

and possible blockade of China: 79, 93-97, 98, and US policy on return of the French to

186, 214 Indochina: 12

and possible commitment of US troops to and use of US Air Force personnel to support

Indochina: 139-41, 214-15 the French in Indochina: 122-23, 142, 143

and possible French withdrawal from Indochi- Joint Intelligence Committee: 56-57, 58, 93, .na: 116, 138, 139-41 Joint I 32

and possible need to evacuate the French from 105-06, 132

Tonkin: 69, 78-79, 96-97 joint Staff Planners: 9

and possible negotiations between the French Joint State-Defense MDAP Survey Mission for

and the Viet Minh to end the war: 134-35, Southeast Asia: 54-58

136 Joint Strategic Survey Committee: 7, 8, 66,

and possible US attacks on targets in China: 139-41,146, 175

79, 89,94-97, 98, 185-86, 214 Joint Survey Team: 50

and possible US participation in French train- Juin, General Alphonse-Pierre: 59, 65, 76, 78, 93,

ing and operational planning: 116, 130-31, 94

134, 135, 140, 146, 147-48, 152-53

and possible use of atomic bombs against

China: 93, 95, 155, 185-86, 214 Knowland, William: 41

and possible use of Korean forces in Indochi- Korea, Republic of. See also Republic of Korea

na: 181-82 Army.

and possible use of Nationalist Chinese forces offer to send troops to Laos: 146-47

in Indochina: 79, 93, 97, 181 buildup of troops in: 195-96

and possible use of US Air Forces in Indochi- treaties with: 196

na: 153-55 Korean armistice: 120-21

and aircraft for the French in Indochina: 54, 57, Korean War: 53, 56-57, 63-66, 80, 93, 97, 107-08

122-23, 124, 142 Kuomintang: 13, 30

and priority of aid for the French: 102 Kyes, Roger M.: 140, 141, 142, 143-44, 156, 158

-and proposed alliance for Southeast Asia: 169,

172, 207

and proposed command structure for united Lacoste, Robert: 32

action in Indochina: 184-85, 186 Lafayette, USS: 122

and proposed commitment of US forces to Lang Son, Vietnam: 113

Indochina: 65-66, 69-70, 78-81, 89, 99, 116, Langley, USS, CVL: 78, 122

140-41, 184-88, 214 Laniel, Joseph: 107, 112, 118, 119, 120, 121, 130,

and proposed response to increased Chinese 132, 136, 142, 181-82, 195, 201

aid to Viet Minh forces: 63-64, 65 and Dien Bien Phu: 150, 151, 155, 156-57, 165

280
Index

and Franco-Vietnamese treaties of indepen- pressure from regarding MDAP shipments:

dence: 179 102

and the Geneva Conference: 169, 170, 173, 174 and recommendations regarding French

and possible US intervention in Indochina: . requests for aid: 142

178, 180 relationship with the French High Command:

and request for immediate US intervention: 61-63, 70, 85, 94, 112, 147-48

158-59, 176-77 role in approving military equipment lists for

Lao Dong Party: 75 France: 56, 58, 62, 133

Laos, Associated State of: 23,38,40, 48,60, 73, and supplies for the Vietnamese Army: 62-63,

108-09, 111, 118, 160, 177, 186, 197-98, 200 208

armistice proposal: 201 and training for French ground crews: 104

French defense of: 129-30, 131, 138-39, 144-45 and training of Vietnamese forces: 125-26,

and Geneva Conference: 170, 173-74, 175, 130-31, 134, 135, 188-90, 191, 192-93

203-04, 209-10 and US intelligence operations in Vietnam:

invaded by the Viet Minh: 122-23, 131, 138-39, 115, 135

143, 144-45, 146 Military intelligence, sharing of among French,

request for US aid: 146 American, and British staffs: 8, 10, 77, 81,

Layton, Capt. E. T.: 81 112

Leahy, William D.: 5 Military Support Program: 121

Leclerc, General Philippe: 13, 14 Military tripartite conferences

Letourneau, Jean: 59, 70, 85-86, 90, 91-92,102, JCS opposition to: 69-70, 76-77, 80, 82-83, 89

103, 105, 107, 110; 117-18, 121-22, 126 Singapore, 1951: 76-77, 81, 82, 83, 94

Letourneau Plan: 110-11 Washington, 1952: 89, 93-94

Long, Nguyen Phan: 47 Moch, Jules: 57

Lovett, Robert A.: 70, 80, 84, 99, 102, 104 Molotov, Vyacheslav M.: 149, 204

Luang Probang, Laos: 143, 144 Moncay, Vietnam: 58

Monde, Le: 120

MacArthur, General Douglas: 12, 58, 70 Montagnards: 1, 8

Malaya: 93, 165, 198, 200 Mountbatten, Admiral Louis: 6-7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13,

Mao Tse-tung: 5, 35, 36, 37 15

March 6 Accords: 16, 20-21, 22, 32 Moutet, Marius: 17

Marshall, General George C.: 12, 32-33, 54, 57, Mouvement Populaire Republicaine (MRP): 25,

76, 78 29

Marshall Plan: 20, 36 Murphy, Robert: 7

Mayer, Andre: 107, 108, 109-10, 111, 117-18, 123, Mus, Paul: 23, 24

124 Mutual Defense Assistance Act (1949), Section

McClintock, Robert: 184, 197-98, 201-02 303: 41,42, 43, 44, 45

Mekong River: 60 Mutual Defense Assistance Program aid for

Melby, John E: 54-55 Indochina

Mendes-France, Pierre: 105, 119,156, 181-82, 195, amounts: 54, 83-84, 85-86, 100-101

201-02, 203-05 assignment of funds to the Navarre Plan:

Military aid to the French. See also Mutual 114-15, 126, 147

Defense Assistance Program. and cooperation between MAAG and the

accounting requirements: 114-15 French: 62

priority of: 57, 58 dependence on aggressive French strategy:

US stipulations regarding direct financial aid: 107-17

114 effects of aid on performance of French forces:

US suspension of programs: 208-09 70

Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina: French misrepresentations of: 85-86

49-50, 51, 61-63 funding for: 84

and assessments of French capabilities: 113 lack of items needed for the program: 84

and deficiencies of the French supply system: and possible US intervention in Indochina: 186

124 and priority of requirements for Indochina:

and distribution and use of US-provided 102, 133, 147

equipment: 62-63 procedures for administering the program: 56,

and liaison with French High Command: 58, 62-63, 80-81

130-31, 133, 134, 135, 145 and support for Vietnamese Army: 61, 62-63,

personnel: 62, 144, 146, 147-48 73, 74, 83, 109

281
Index

Na San, Vietnam: 91, 104, 108 NSC 177:138-41

Nash, Frank: 145 NSC 5405: 140-41, 147, 148-49

National Intelligence Estimates: 78, 90, 106 Nuclear weapons, proposed use of: 93, 107, 151,

National Security Council 152, 155, 166-67, 185-86, 187, 199-200

and assessment of American interests in Asia:

35, 41, 42, 51, 63-64, 65, 95-96, 135-41

and decision not to commit US forces to O'Daniel, Lt. Gen. John W.: 111-12, 115, 123, 126,

Indonesia: 66-67, 69 130-31,134-35, 139, 140-41,142, 144,

and financial aid for France: 114 145-46, 188-90, 191,192-93, 208

and five-power military talks at Singapore: 195 Office of Military Assistance: 133

and French requests for aid: 142, 143 Office of Strategic Services: 8, 10-11, 13, 14

and the Geneva Conference: 157, 160, 169-7'0, Operation CASTOR: 129-30, 131

172 Operation MOUETTE: 115

and Laos: 146-47 Operation VAUTOUR (VULTURE): 158

and the Navarre Plan: 113, 114, 136

and need to press France to grant full independence to Vietnam: 160 Pacific War Council: 7

and possibility of a coalition Vietnam govern- Palewski, Gaston: 28

ment: 137 Parodi, Alexandre: 44

and possibility of US intervention in Indochi- Partridge, General Earle E.: 158

na: 138-41,148, 157, 159-60, 170, 177 Patti, Maj. Archimedes L. A.: 11, 13-14, 16

and possible negotiations between France and Pau accords: 59-60, 64, 71-72, 75

the Viet Minh: 137 Peace conference for Asia: 130

and possible responses to Chinese aggression People's Liberation Committee: 11

in Indochina: 63-64, 136, 137-38 Petain, Philippe: 4

and possible use of nuclear weapons at Dien Philippine Islands: 123, 159, 160, 162, 177, 196,

Bien Phu: 166-67 207, 215

and proposed alliance in Southeast Asia: 160, Pignon, Leon: 29, 39, 47, 61

166-67, 169-70, 177 Pilots and flight personnel: 122-24, 125

National Security Council Planning Board: 134, Pleven, Rene: 77-79, 101

135-41,,157, 159, 166-67, 210-11 "Position and Actions of the United States with

National Union Front: 24 Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in

Nationalist China: 41, 195-96 the Light of the Korean Situation, The,"

Nationalist movements, US desire to encourage: 63-64

35-36, 38-39 Provisional Central Government of Viet Nam:

Navarre, General Henri: 107, 111-12, 113-14, 115, 27-28

118, 125, 126, 130, 135, 144, 154, 182, 188 Psychological warfare: 131, 135, 136, 141, 145, 186

and acceptance of US advisors on his staff: 161, Public opinion

162-63 in France: 56, 61, 89-90, 92-93, 104-06, 112-13,

and cease-fire proposal: 171 119-20, 144, 150, 151, 153, 156, 160, 161-62,

and defensive strategy: 144-45 164, 171,176, 178, 195, 201

and Dien Bien Phu: 129, 131,164 lack of public support for the Bao Dai governand relationship with MAAG Indochina: 133 ment: 38-39, 40, 46, 51, 71, 72, 75, 91-92, 117

Navarre Plan: 107, 111-17, 121, 133-35, 141, 172 lack of support among the Vietnamese people

Nehru, Jawaharlal: 150, 197, 198-99 for the struggle against the Viet Minh: 71,

New Zealand: 93, 98-100, 160, 165, 166, 174-75, 73-74

176-77, 195, 196-97, 209, 215 in the United States: 80, 100, 136-37, 144,

Nghia Lo, Vietnam: 91 146-47, 157, 159, 161-62, 163, 164, 167

Nixon, Richard M.: 131, 163, 166-67 world: 152, 157, 187

North Atlantic Council: 108

North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 101, 105,

108, 114, 141,143, 183 Quat, Phan Huy: 46

NSC 48/2: 42, 43, 63, 69 Queuille, Henri: 73

NSC 48/5:69 Quoc, Nguyen A.: 5-6. See also Ho Chi Minh.

NSC 64 (1950): 35, 43, 53-54, 63, 65, 66-67, 69, 80

NSC 64/1:66

NSC 68 (1950): 51, 53 Radford, Admiral Arthur W.: 81,107, 111,115-16,

NSC 124:95-96 122-23, 131,133, 140, 142-43, 145-46, 151,

NSC 124/2: 89, 96-97, 98, 99, 100, 135-36,137-38 183-84, 198

282
Index

and Dien Bien Phu: 151, 152-55, 157, 161, 164, fear that France would abandon Indochina to

165-66, 167 the communists: 48-49

and possible US intervention in Indochina: and Franco-Vietnamese conflict over control of

158-59, 160, 177, 180, 181-82, 190 US aid program: 47-48

Radical Socialist Party: 105, 119 and French interpretation of 8 March Accords:

Ramadier, Paul: 21-22,30 39

Regional security organization for Southeast and Japanese occupation of Indochina: 4

Asia: 160, 162, 164, 165, 166, 169-70, 171, and the Pau accords: 71

172, 176-77, 195-200, 205,206-09, 214, 215 and planning for the Geneva talks: 148-50

Republic of Korea Army, US training for: 125-26, and possible responses to Chinese intervention

134, 135 in Indochina: 96,98,99

Rhee, Syngman: 146, 181 and proposed use of nuclear weapons: 187

Ridgway, General Matthew B.: 107, 146, 157, 163, refusal to support Chiang Kai-shek: 41

172-73, 192 and the Singapore Conference: 76

Road construction: 84-85 and support for French forces in Indochina: 7,

Roosevelt, Elliot: 7 57, 183

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 16 and support for Vietnamese independence

from France: 44-45

and US policy on the return of the French to

Sabattier, General Gabriel: 9, 10 Indochina: 12

Saigon: 14, 60, 100-101 State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee

Sainteny, Maj. Jean: 11, 15 (SWNCC): 9, 12,31

Salon, General Raoul: 70, 90, 91, 104, 111, 122, Stettinius, Edward R., Jr.: 12

123,182 Struble, Vice Adm. A. D.: 76-77

Schuman, Robert: 39, 45-46, 48-49, 79, 105 Stump, Admiral Felix: 131, 134-35, 139, 141, 145,

Schumann, Maurice: 178, 179, 180 154, 190

Ships for French in Indochina: 54,57,58, 78, 84,

101, 121-22,134

Sihanouk, Norodom: 117 Thai Nguyen, Vietnam: 10-11

Signal equipment: 57, 80, 84 Thailand: 40, 44, 160, 162, 165, 166, 177, 198, 199,

Singapore: 94, 195 200,207,215

Singapore Conference: 76-77, 81, 82, 83,94 Thatkhe, Vietnam: 58

Smith, Bedell: 207 Third (Communist) International (Comintern):

Smith, W. B.: 141, 142, 143-44, 149-50, 170, 2-3

174-76, 179, 180,191, 197, 201,205, 209-10 Thomas, Maj. Allison K.: 10-11

Southeast Asia Aid Committee: 47, 49 Thompson, Virginia: 3

Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee: 49, 65-66 Thorez, Marcel: 22

Southeast Asia Command: 6-7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15 Tonkin Delta: 4, 5-6, 10-11, 15

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization: 215 French outposts in: 37, 51, 58-61, 70-71, 90-92

Soviet Union: 132, 148-50, 171, 196 French plans for offensive operations in: 111-12

Spare parts, shortages of: 102, 103, 121, 124 importance of preventing the loss of: 199-200

Special Committee on Indochina: 142,143-44, threat of a Chinese invasion of: 56, 63-64, 77,

147-48, 153, 156 78-79,93-97,99

Special Technical and Economic Mission to the US plans for evacuating the French from: 69, 97

Associated States: 45, 49-50, 84-85 Viet Minh infiltration in: 90

Stalin, Josef: 16, 35 Viet Minh victory in: 183-84

State, US Department of Trapnell, Maj. Gen. T. J. H.: 102, 103, 104, 109,

August 1950 position paper on Indochina: 64 113, 115, 123-24, 125, 131,133, 138-39, 142,

and Bao Dai: 33, 38-39, 40, 43, 46 145, 160-61

and conditions on aid to the French: 130 Tripartite Intelligence Conferences on Southeast

and conditions for US intervention in Indochi- Asia: 94

na: 184, 190-93 Truman, Harry S.: 12, 20, 35, 43, 44, 53, 54, 69,

and containment of communism: 35-36, 38-39 77-79,96,97

and decision to aid the French in Indochina; Truman Doctrine: 20

35-36, 42-43 Twining, General Nathan F.: 107, 157

and efforts to persuade France to grant more

autonomy to Vietnam: 31-33

and encouragement of nationalist movements: United National Front: 11

35-36, 38-39 United Nations: 75, 118,119-20

283
Index

and proposed supervision of cease-fire in fear of Chinese support for: 36

Indochina: 171,174, 175 guerrilla activities: 21, 29, 71, 152

and response to possible Chinese intervention intelligence regarding: 58, 90

in Indochina: 94, 96-97, 99, 100, 137 invasion of Laos by: 108-09, 111, 122-23, 131,

US Air Force 138-39, 143, 144-45, 146, 152

aircraft loaned to France: 103-04, 122, 208 military actions taken to strengthen their posiequipment for Indochina: 54, 58, 102-03 tion at the Geneva Conference: 152, 153,

mechanics: 104, 122-23 155, 158-59

personnel assigned to French forces in military capabilities: 56-57, 58, 182

Indochina: 104, 122-23, 124-25, 208 organized into regular combat units: 37

US Army, equipment for Indochina: 54, 57, 58, prestige among Indochinese people: 59

103 strength: 21, 90

US Congress supply routes from China: 50-51, 53, 58-59, 93,

appropriations for military aid: 41, 54, 114-15, 187

121 training: 90

and the Geneva Conference: 176 training camps in China: 51

and possible US intervention in Indochina: weapons for: 11-12,21, 29, 51, 138-39

157, 158, 159, 160, 164, 170, 177, 180-81 Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh (Viet Nam IndeUS Marine Corps, French request for units: 180, pendence League). See Viet Minh.

181 Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (Nationalist Party): 2,

US military aid mission: 47-48 3, 6, 24

US Navy Vietnam

equipment for Indochina: 54, 58, 103 partition of: 202-06, 208-11, 214

personnel assigned to French forces: 161 pation of 220 208-11, 214 ship fo Inochna:54, 8, 21-2, 31,134 resistance to occupation by the Japanese: 4-5,

ships for Indochina: 54, 58, 121-22, 131, 134 6-7, 10 United States-United Kingdom Study Group on Vietnam, Associated State of: 35

Southeast Asia: 206, 209 establishment of democratic institutions in:

United States-Vietnamese Economic Assistance 117-19

Agreement: 85 lack of public support for the struggle against

the Viet Minh: 71, 73-74

Valluy, Lt. Gen. Jean E.: 17, 131, 143, 181-82, limitations on right to engage in international

183-84, 190 relations: 38, 49

Van Fleet, General James A.: 141-42 National Congress: 118-19

Van Tam, Nguyen: 92, 118-19, 134 Provisional National Council: 92

Vehicles provided under MDAP: 54, 84, 101 US military assistance to: 45. See also VietViet Bac: 6, 10 namese National Army.

Viet Minh US recognition of: 40

and Bao Dai: 24, 29 Vietnamese Consultative National Council:

consolidation of Communist control of: 75-76 37-38

demands for independence: 11 Vietnamese High Military Committee: 48

driven from Saigon: 14 Vietnamese National Army

and DRV national assembly: 15 capabilities of: 184

financial setbacks: 75-76 establishment of: 60-61, 72-73

formation of: 5-6 morale: 115

intelligence regarding planned operations: organization of: 189-90

56-57 plans for the expansion of: 107, 109, 110-11,

lack of public support for the struggle against: 115

71, 73-74 recruitment efforts: 73-74, 92, 115, 182, 189

and resistence to the Japanese: 6, 9, 10-11 relationship with the French High Command:

terms for the cease-fire: 195, 200-202 115, 117-18, 182, 188, 189-90

as unifier of opponents to France: 20 requests for US support of: 46-47, 78, 79,

US cooperation with: 10-11 108-10

Viet Minh forces role of: 109, 110, 115, 117-18, 184, 189-90

areas controlled by: 21, 29 strength: 73, 110

campaigns: 58-59, 90-92, 108 supplies for: 61, 62-63, 73, 74, 83, 86, 109, 110

casualties: 70-71, 90, 91, 108, 153, 182 and training of native military leaders for:

Chinese aid to: 50-51, 58-59, 63-64, 132, 182 110-11, 112, 125-26

and Dien Bien Phu: 129, 130, 131, 138-39, 143, training for: 73-74, 86, 92, 104, 110, 125-26, 130,

145, 152, 153, 156, 158-59, 164, 182 145, 161, 178-79, 184, 185, 188-93

284
Index

US advisers with units: 190

US funding for: 115

Vietnamese people, demands for independence:

72, 75, 118-19, 133-34

Vinh Yen, battle of: 70-71, 72

Weapons

French requests for: 80

provided under MDAP: 84, 101

Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C.: 8-9, 10, 12, 13, 14

Wilson, Charles E.: 107, 113, 122, 123, 124,

125-26, 140, 156, 160, 189

World War II, and Indochina: 3-5

Xuan, General Nguyen Van: 27-28, 29, 31, 37

Yun, Lung: 13, 15

285
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