No. 257, June 2010 Strategic Forum 1

the TFG to engage in political deal-making that 

co-opts key subclans and elite actors, and lays 

the groundwork for effective security operations 

at a later stage.

Government Performance

In January 2009, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh 

Ahmed succeeded Abdullahi Yusuf as president of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 

Government (TFG). Sheikh Sharif took office 

following the conclusion of United Nations 

(UN)–brokered peace negotiations in Djibouti 

between a warlord-dominated TFG and moderate opposition forces that led the Union 

of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006. It was 

hoped that Sheikh Sharif would move forward with the long list of transitional tasks 

required to establish a permanent government for the country and extend control over 

areas seized by al Shabab.1

 To his credit, 

Sheikh Sharif’s appointment led to the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from the country, and eliminated al Shabab’s ability to 

use Ethiopian occupation as a rallying cry. 

TFG supporters also point to ongoing efforts 

to reinvigorate the constitutional process, 

draft a citizenship law, make senior-level 

appointments in a revived judicial system, 

establish an independent central bank, utilize 

port revenues for public service delivery, and 

Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government 

(TFG) was given a second lease on life in 

January 2009, after successful peace negotiations in Djibouti produced new TFG leadership 

and yielded substantial international backing. 

However, the TFG remains weak and has yet 

to develop new political alliances or military 

capabilities that provide traction against 

Islamist insurgent groups. The insurgents 

themselves—including al Shabab and Hizbul 

Islamia—are also weak and internally divided.

Local and international efforts to end 

the ongoing stalemate in Somalia have been 

frustrated, resulting in diverging strategic 

prescriptions for the way ahead. On the one 

hand, the TFG has proposed a military offensive 

to gain control over a larger swath of Mogadishu. On the other hand, the inability of foreign 

military and governance support to advance 

the transition have led some analysts to argue 

for a strategy of “constructive disengagement.” 

A detailed assessment of the current situation 

reveals opportunities for the TFG and its international supporters to drive additional wedges 

between the insurgent groups, degrade their capabilities, and extend TFG control in Mogadishu 

and other parts of south-central Somalia. Rather 

than disengaging or rushing toward military 

action, this requires international pressure on 

 Strategic Forum No. 257

June 2010

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

Somalia’s Endless Transition: 

Breaking the Deadlock

by Andre Le Sage

craft political cooperation deals with the 

regional administration in Puntland (northeast Somalia) and other militias opposed to 

the insurgency.

Nonetheless, most of these efforts remain 

on the drawing board and will do little to 

extend the TFG’s political base of support or 

area of territorial control. The TFG still does 

not have a functioning, cross-clan military 

force, let alone a capable police force or 

judicial system, despite continued foreign 

efforts to train and equip Somali forces.2

Poor command-and-control systems, limited pay, internal clan divisions, and a lack 

of willingness to fight continue to hamper 

TFG as a unified force. Furthermore, no civil 

service currently exists, and essential social 

services are not being provided by the TFG. 

The parliament is able to achieve quorum but 

meets infrequently, and many members have 

left Mogadishu for security reasons. In fact, 

the very survival of the TFG depends on the 

continued presence of peacekeepers from the 

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).3

In addition, the TFG is a divided 

institution. Sheikh Sharif has not emerged 

as a strong leader, and much of the power 

in Mogadishu is wielded by his subordinates, 

including the new Speaker of Parliament 

Sharif Hassan, Minister of Interior 

Abdulkadir Ali Omar, and Minister of State 
2 Strategic Forum No. 257, June 2010

for Defense Indha Adde, in their discrete 

areas of operation. These and other TFG 

officials operate independently in a manner 

reminiscent of clan-based warlords in years 

past. Squabbling between factions of the TFG 

has brought transitional efforts to a standstill.4

 The TFG also has a remarkably weak 

clan base of support. The key Hawiye subclans that dominate Mogadishu (including 

the Abgal, Habr Geidr, and Murosade) are 

all split internally between those that support the TFG, those that support the insurgency, and those (probably the majority) that 

are hedging their bets between the two and 

attempting to survive.5

In the Juba Valley, Darod subclans, primarily the Marehan and Ogadeni, are also 

split between pro– and anti–al Shabab forces, 

with a clan-based struggle for the southern 

port city of Kismayo taking primacy over TFGinsurgent struggles. The southern agricultural 

regions of Bay and Bakol are dominated by the 

Rahanweyn clans that have done little to resist 

control by al Shabab. In central Somalia, a 

series of subclan-based militias and governance 

initiatives have emerged, many using the name 

Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ).6

 However, they 

have not thrown their full weight behind the 

TFG despite recent political agreements between 

the groups. Finally, the Isaq of the northwest and Darod:Majerteen of the northeast are 

focused respectively on the internal political 

competition for control of the Somaliland and 

Puntland governments.7

Status of Insurgent Groups

Al Shabab and, to a much lesser extent, 

Hizbul Islamia control most of southern 

Somalia. However, these groups are facing 

their own challenges, and are not operating from a position of strength. Both groups 

are split internally, and they are increasingly 

competing with one another. Since the death 

of Saleh Ali Saleh “Nabhan,” the future 

of the East Africa al Qaeda cell and its 

relationship with al Shabab are uncertain.8

Given confusion surrounding the structure 

and leadership of these groups, there is a 

dangerous tendency to treat them as singular, 

monolithic actors.

Hizbul Islamia has always been an 

amalgam of four different movements, 

including the Alliance for the Re-liberation 

of Somalia (ARS)–Eritrea faction led by 

Hassan Dahir Aweis, the Somalia Islamic 

Front (SIF) led by Aweis’s military protégés, 

the Ras Kamboni group in Lower Juba, 

and the very small Anole faction led by 

Darod:Harti clan interests in Lower Juba.9

Aweis and the SIF have been marginalized 

by al Shabab’s advances in southern 

Somalia, the rise of ASWJ, and support 

for the TFG among many Habr Gedir:Ayr 

leaders. The Ras Kamboni group has come 

under control of more moderate, clanbased leaders—notably Ahmed Madobe and 

Ibrahim Shukri—since its main Islamist 

leader, Hassan al-Turki, fell ill. Beyond these 

divisions, clashes between Ras Kamboni and 

al Shabab for control of Kismayo have left 

Hizbul Islamia so weakened that it no longer 

appears to function.10

The most hardline and ideologically motivated al Shabab militias remain 

those run by Ahmed Abdi Godane and 

Fu’ad Shongole around Mogadishu, and 

Ibrahim Haji Jama “al-Afghani” around 

Kismayo.11 These individuals are seen as 

the primary leaders of al Shabab’s foreign 

fighters (including the suicide bombers), the 

strategists favoring al Shabab support for 

global jihadi agendas rather than a narrower 

focus on controlling Somalia, and those 

with the deepest ties to the East Africa al 

Qaeda cell.12 On February 1, these al Shabab 

leaders issued a statement proclaiming their 

desire “to connect the Horn of Africa jihad 

to the one led by al Qaeda and its leader 

Sheikh Osama bin Laden.”13 However, similar 

statements have been made by al Shabab 

leaders in the past without a corresponding 

response from al Qaeda’s senior leadership to 

cement a merger between the groups.

Al Shabab’s leader in the Bay and Bakol 

regions, Mukhtar Robow, has been able 

to run local affairs from Baidoa without 

substantial resistance from the Rahanweyn 

clan. Despite his vociferous jihadi rhetoric, Robow’s governance agenda appears less 

extreme than that of his al Shabab counterparts. In fact, tensions have been high 

between Robow and other al Shabab commanders for some time.14 He came into 

conflict with Godane, particularly after the 

December 2009 Shamo Hotel bombing, and 

there are rumors that Robow has reached 

out to the TFG as a potential first step away 

from al Shabab. However, in the absence of 

a formal split with Godane and others in al 

Shabab, Robow has maintained his extremist 

credentials by allowing foreign fighter 

training camps to operate in his area of 

control, appearing in al Shabab propaganda 

videos with al Qaeda operatives, and stating 

al Shabab’s support for al Qaeda in Yemen.15

Al Shabab’s rank-and-file militia and 

local clan partners evince even less loyalty 

to the group’s overall cause. Many of these 

join al Shabab for parochial reasons and 

are not otherwise supportive of its radical 

Salafist ideology. Some clans send militia 

and money to al Shabab as a political hedge 

in uncertain times. Other clans agree to join 

al Shabab as a means of gaining short-term 

primacy in long-running struggles with other 

clans for local control. Some individuals 

join al Shabab for the financial incentives 

it offers ($200 to $300 promised at the time 

of recruitment), or for offers of food and 

clothing. Other individuals are simply forced 

to join al Shabab as they impress youth into 

militia, often accompanied by threats to 

families not to resist.16

Nonetheless, some al Shabab militias 

remain on the offensive. Al Shabab units 

appear responsible for a growing number of 

recent attacks in Puntland and Somaliland. 

Both regional administrations are facing 

governance crises—due to postponed 

elections in Somaliland, and increasingly 

authoritarian rule in Puntland—and al 

Dr. Andre Le Sage is a Senior Research Fellow for Africa in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at 

the National Defense University. Comments or questions may be addressed to lesagea@ndu.edu.

squabbling between 

factions of the TFG has 

brought transitional 

efforts to a standstill
No. 257, June 2010 Strategic Forum 3

Shabab appears to be capitalizing on these to 

extend its operational reach.17

Backlash Against al Shabab

Somali public support for al Shabab and 

Hizbul Islamia has dwindled rapidly. In fact, 

the group’s political ascent was never due to 

mass public support for its violent, extremist 

ideology. Until the rise of the Islamic Courts 

Union (ICU) in 2006, al Shabab was a small, 

clandestine group engaged in destabilization 

activities against warlords and the TFG, and 

they provided protection for the East Africa 

al Qaeda cell. Its fortunes changed because 

of al Shabab’s participation as the most 

effective security force of the very popular ICU 

phenomenon, the group’s leading role against 

Ethiopian forces after the ICU fell, and its 

subsequent political/military prowess against 

the remarkably weak TFG and clan-based 

forces in southern Somalia.18

Since late 2007, al Shabab has attempted 

to gain legitimacy by “liberating” villages 

from nominal TFG control, punishing 

criminals who proliferated after the ICU 

fell, holding reconciliation ceremonies 

among local clans, and turning control 

over to local groups under the guise of 

Islamic governance. Yet where al Shabab has 

attempted to govern the territory it controls, 

local discomfort has become evident. There 

are a number of different elements at work in 

the public backlash. Somalis chafe against al 

Shabab’s draconian vice laws (for instance, 

prohibitions against playing or watching 

football or listening to music) and hudud 

corporal punishments (including conducting 

amputations on thieves or stoning adulterers). 

Attacks by al Shabab, particularly the 

December 3, 2009, bombing of the Benadir 

University graduation ceremony at the Shamo 

Hotel, are seen as atrocities committed against 

the best and brightest youth in Somali society.

Furthermore, al Shabab has disrupted 

or forced the closure of international 

humanitarian efforts, including limiting 

UN and nongovernmental organization 

presence resulting in the suspension of food 

aid. The group has promoted nonlocal clan 

influences and leaders in southern Somalia; 

this includes the dominance of northern 

Somalis from the Isaq clan, including 

YEMEN

KENYA

INDIAN 

OCEAN

El Ma’an port

Mogadishu

Merka

Kismayo

150 miles

Ras Kamboni 250 km

international boundaries

regional boundaries

city/town

Somaliland

Puntland

Disputed area

Dabaab

GEDO

LOWER

JUBA

Bardhere

El Waq

Mandera

Doolow

Luuq

BAY

BAKOL

HIRAN

Jilib

LOWER

SHABELLE

Afgoye

Baidoa

Jubba River

Balad

Jowhar

MIDDLE

SHABELLE

Beled Weyn

Shabelle River

SOMALIA

ETHIOPIA

MIDDLE

JUBA

GULF OF ADEN

DJIBOUTI

Djibouti

AWDAL

Borama

Dire Dawa

Berbera

Hargeisa

Burao

TOGDHEER

Garowe

MUDUG

NUGAL

Galkayo

Gardo

BARI

Bosaaso

SOMALIA

Erigavo

SANAAG

SOOL

Las Anod

Galgudud

Somalia
4 Strategic Forum No. 257, June 2010

cal, military, or economic circumstances to 

fight with either the TFG or the insurgency 

once the offensive begins. Without understanding and working to leverage the interests 

and capabilities of these nonaligned forces—

including subclan and business militia—

there is a real danger that military planners 

are not taking into account all forces that will 

potentially be involved in the conflict.

Third, there is a danger that building 

a strong TFG military capability will drive 

nonaligned groups (clans, subclans, and key 

elites with their own militias) into a defensive posture that opposes TFG and international interests. It is common Somali practice 

for such groups to band together across clan 

and ideological divides to “strategically balance” against any new military initiative 

of which they are not a part. After several 

decades of colonialism, military dictatorship, and civil war, the main Somali experience with any state has been predatory and 

negative. Building a strong TFG force that is 

not widely negotiated and representative from 

the start may foment more opposition to the 

TFG. At the extreme, groups that currently 

are nonaligned could join with elements of 

the insurgency.

Fourth, al Shabab and Hizbul Islamia 

are unlikely to confront TFG and AMISOM 

forces in a toe-to-toe struggle to hold ground 

in Mogadishu. Rather, the insurgents are 

likely to mount a limited resistance, but temporarily disperse their forces. Then, if the 

TFG attempts to hold the territory it has 

seized, al Shabab and Hizbul Islamia will 

be able to harass it with more hit-and-run 

attacks, leading to a period of prolonged skirmishes rather than stronger TFG control (let 

alone governance) of the contested areas.

Godane and al-Afghani in Hawiye areas of 

Mogadishu and Darod areas of Kismayo, 

respectively. Finally, al Shabab–led attacks 

against Sufist shrines and religious leaders 

and the group’s Salafist interpretations 

of Islam are viewed as the product of an 

unwelcome influence by foreigners.19

Despite this growing backlash, the 

Somali public remains politically weak 

and fragmented, and al Shabab maintains 

a monopoly on the means of violence in 

areas under its control. Moreover, Somali 

civil society groups have been intimidated 

by insurgent assassinations and remain 

disenchanted with the TFG. As a result, their 

role in mobilizing the public against al 

Shabab remains limited. In addition, neither 

the TFG nor the international aid community 

has effectively utilized Somali anger over 

either al Shabab’s recent atrocities or the 

group’s role in denying relief assistance to 

Somalis as a means of further delegitimizing 

the insurgents.

A number of new forces have emerged 

over the past year to counter al Shabab 

influence in southern and central Somalia. 

Most notably, this includes multiple clanbased ASWJ groups operating in Galgadud, 

Hiran, and Gedo.20 There are also reports 

of new groups emerging, including the 

“Galmudug” initiative linked to the Habr 

Gedir:Saad subclan and the “Himan and 

Heeb” initiative of the Suleiman subclan. 

There is also potential for the Ras Kamboni 

group under Ahmed Madobe and Ibrahim 

Shukri to defect from the insurgency into a 

position that is not a political challenge and 

that may end up supporting the TFG. These 

are all positive developments, but they remain 

fragile and local political ambitions overlap. There is serious potential for each to fall 

into the trap of “warlordism” and clan-based 

competition for control of key locations and 

resources, which would further complicate 

the quest for stability in central Somalia.

A Military Solution?

While al Shabab appears to have the 

upper hand in Somalia today, both the TFG 

and the insurgent forces are facing enormous 

challenges. To date, al Shabab’s success in 

southern Somalia is less an indicator of its 

own strength, and more a function of the 

weakness of its opponents at the TFG, clan, 

and communal level. Overall, if the TFG is 

to succeed, al Shabab’s slow advance must 

be checked by a countermobilization that 

provides Somalis with an alternative for 

which they will truly fight. This requires 

further efforts by the TFG and its potential 

Somali partners to create a unifying political 

vision and practical governance agenda, enter 

into negotiations to establish a network of key 

clan-based constituents, and show signs of 

success in order to mobilize public support.

Unfortunately, the TFG—with support from AMISOM and international partners, including the United States—has opted 

to put a military campaign ahead of political 

action. The TFG has publicly stated its intent 

to organize a military offensive in Mogadishu 

within the coming months, most likely with 

the support of AMISOM forces.21 Furthermore, 

Kenya is widely reported to be planning 

an anti–al Shabab offensive into the Juba 

regions of southern Somalia, targeting the 

capture of Kismayo.22 There is serious and 

growing concern that these offensives are 

unlikely to succeed.

First, given the TFG’s military weakness and divisions between subclans, it risks 

engaging in a battle that, if unsuccessful, 

will cost the TFG the international and local 

confidence it has been able to retain thus 

far. In Mogadishu, the insurgents are aware 

of TFG plans and are likely reinforcing their 

positions in the city with a focus on thwarting 

AMISOM’s armored vehicle capabilities.23

The Juba offensive may actually drive more 

clans into the arms of al Shabab, including 

promoting an alliance of Marehan militia 

with al Shabab to defend Kismayo against 

Ogadeni control.

Second, it is unclear if the TFG, even 

with AMISOM support, has sufficient forces 

to engage the insurgents effectively. Focusing 

on the current disposition of forces between 

the TFG and al Shabab is entirely misleading. 

The TFG and al Shabab may each be able to 

mobilize several thousand men under arms. 

However, this represents only a percentage of 

the number of armed militia in Mogadishu, 

let alone south-central Somalia. These other 

militia can be considered “nonaligned” forces 

at the moment, but may be forced by politithere is a danger that 

building a strong TFG 

military capability will 

drive nonaligned groups 

into a defensive posture 

that opposes TFG and 

international interests
No. 257, June 2010 Strategic Forum 5

Nonetheless, AMISOM, the United States, 

and European partners have tacitly supported 

the TFG’s plans for military action, possibly out of frustration with the inability of the 

TFG to gain momentum against al Shabab 

through political negotiations or the provision of good governance, social services, and 

public security. Despite speculation that the 

United States is preparing for its own military 

intervention in Somalia, U.S. officials have 

clearly stated that they are only providing 

military training, equipment, and funding 

to the TFG.24 However, in the absence of overt 

countervailing pressure to emphasize negotiations to build a stronger political base before 

resorting to force, this amounts to international approval and indirect support for the 

TFG’s military course of action.

“Constructive 

Disengagement”

The ongoing stalemate in Somalia 

has led some analysts to call for the United 

States and its partners to adopt a more radical strategy called “constructive disengagement.” According to a recent report published 

by the Council on Foreign Relations, this 

would be “a modified containment strategy” 

that includes limited and precise U.S. military strikes against al Qaeda operatives in 

Somalia; tolerance of and dialogue with al 

Shabab if that group rejects al Qaeda’s jihadi 

agenda, refrains from regional aggression, 

and allows foreign aid to flow; diplomatic 

engagement with Arab partners to support 

negotiations and with Ethiopia to limit its 

support for Somali militias; and further support for development and governance capacity-building efforts.25

On the one hand, this strategy is 

grounded in a politically realistic assessment 

of trends in Somalia, and many of its components should be taken seriously. Foremost, 

it recognizes the weakness of the TFG and its 

inability to absorb foreign assistance to build 

its capacity at this time. As stated above, the 

TFG remains deeply divided between competing leaders. It also provides no real support 

to the Somali population at this stage, and 

remains ill prepared militarily to seize and 

sustain control over territory from insurgent 

and clan militias. Hence, it is reasonable 

to develop a strategy in Somalia that goes 

beyond support for the TFG and conditions 

political and military aid to Sheikh Sharif 

on his ability to build political alliances that 

will translate successfully into security gains. 

Negotiations, even with insurgent leaders, and diplomatic support from Arab and 

African partners alike may be useful in this 

regard. On the other hand, in security terms, 

the call for constructive disengagement is 

problematic. Foremost, this concept does not 

address how the United States or neighboring 

African countries will protect their national 

security interests in Somalia. Adopting a 

wait-and-see approach in which al Shabab 

might collapse under its own weight due to 

the challenges of governance in a clan-based 

system and its own internal leadership rivalries is not sufficient. The group, along with 

the East Africa al Qaeda cell, already has 

substantial space to operate in Somalia and 

to plan for attacks on Somali, other African, 

and Western interests. Moreover, al Shabab 

has enough funds and savvy leaders that it 

may be able to harness a sufficient coalition 

in the absence of the TFG to again solidify 

control over southern Somalia.

Even if a constructive disengagement 

approach is adopted, the United States, 

European countries, and concerned African 

neighbors would still need to be involved in 

Somali affairs to build effective liaison relationships to disrupt al Shabab and al Qaeda. 

The existence of the TFG today provides a 

political framework for such engagement 

under the auspices of advancing the Djibouti 

peace process, and foreign partners will not 

be accused by the Somali public of directly 

supporting unpopular warlords—a situation that helped bring al Shabab to the fore. 

To this extent, the transitional process and its 

institutional structure—although not necessarily the individuals who currently hold seats 

in the TFG—need to be protected.

Continued support for the TFG should 

not preclude engagement with other antiinsurgency and peacebuilding constituencies in the country. A robust approach to 

countering the insurgency would see the 

United States and others simultaneously 

undertaking dialogue with the TFG, ASWJ, 

and other political, military, and economic 

actors throughout the country. Al Shabab 

and Hizbul Islamia are relatively weak and 

unpopular in Somalia today, even if they 

control more territory than the TFG. They 

are also spread thinly across the south of the 

country. With effective negotiations, it would 

be possible to forge a common platform for 

the TFG to cooperate with local actors to 

combat the insurgency. 

Leading with 

Negotiations

To build an effective political coalition 

that would increase the chances of eventual 

military success, the TFG needs to dramatically improve its outreach to key Somali subclans and clan-based elites who are either 

supporting or acquiescing to the insurgency. 

If the TFG is not to follow the example of 

its predecessor, the Transitional National 

Government, in a slow slide to oblivion, this 

requires the use of political and economic 

inducements, as well as the threat of military 

sanctions, to win new supporters, expand the 

TFG’s base of support, and enable it to extend 

influence into new areas.

Many different negotiation mechanisms 

are available to Sheikh Sharif in his current 

position, including both carrots and sticks. 

The carrots include the allocation of cabinetlevel posts in government and public-private 

sector partnerships to cooperatively manage 

port revenues, introduce new currency, and 

share out postconflict reconstruction contracts. Potential sticks would include threats 

to target “spoilers” of peace efforts and supporters of the insurgency with UN-backed 

financial and travel sanctions against key 

actors, not to mention the potential for legal 

sanctions or targeted military operations.26

Such “wheeling and dealing” may not be 

continued support for 

the TFG should not 

preclude engagement 

with other anti-insurgency 

and peacebuilding 

constituencies in 

the country
6 Strategic Forum No. 257, June 2010

appetizing to would-be peacebuilders, but is 

common in the Somali context. The point is 

to address how the material benefits of such 

deals are spread around in a strategic manner that can co-opt key subclans and elite 

interests that are required to extend the TFG’s 

base of support and undermine that base for 

the insurgency.

For instance, in North Mogadishu, the 

TFG would need to focus on key leaders 

within the Abgal:Harti community. Those 

connected with El Ma’an port (including 

Abukar Omar Adane and Abdulkadir Enow) 

are key power brokers with vested property 

and business interests that they feel are 

threatened by the TFG. Their current support 

for insurgents may be primarily driven by 

these financial interests, which the TFG could 

offer to protect and even promote in return 

for political support. Similar approaches 

could yield fruit with other key subclans, 

including the Habr Gedir and Murosade, 

whose key business and political leaders 

include individuals such as Mohamed Deilaf, 

Ahmed Nur Jumale, and others.27

Further engagement with new anti–

al Shabab militias, such as the Ahlu Sunna 

wal Jama’a groups in central Somalia, is 

also urgently required. This dialogue needs 

to focus on improving TFG–ASWJ political 

and military cooperation. Developing better 

international understanding of the groups is 

also important so diplomats can work with 

ASWJ to develop coherent political agendas 

and some degree of local representation. 

It is critical to ensure that their shortterm operations against al Shabab do not 

degenerate over time into something more 

predatory against the local population, into 

independent political ambitions that compete 

with the TFG as much as al Shabab, or into 

simple and parochial clan-based initiatives 

focused on seizing land and other assets from 

neighboring clans.

Finally, the international community 

needs to continue applying pressure on the 

political leadership and opposition in both 

Somaliland and Puntland to resolve their 

internal crises and reinvigorate their local 

political processes. This will involve sending 

clear messages of dissatisfaction with current 

performance, withholding nonessential 

assistance efforts, and encouraging dialogue 

on the future political dispensation in each 

region. Without a resolution of the immediate 

problems in northern Somalia, al Shabab will 

have an increasingly open field to penetrate 

Somaliland and Puntland, destabilize 

their security situation, ally with existing 

opposition forces, and provide leadership to 

the disenfranchised.

Strategic Security 

Planning

Once the TFG has established a sufficient base of political support, additional military support will be required. However, rather 

than focusing strictly on a short-term offensive, it should be premised on longer term 

planning to deepen clan-based alliances 

and support the country’s plan for a decentralized form of government.28 The TFG (or 

whatever Somali authority follows) will certainly require a well-trained, highly mobile, 

and effective security force controlled from 

the central level of government in Mogadishu. 

However, that is unlikely to be the only security force the country requires, and the current approach to military support for the 

TFG does not address this issue. A decentralized Somali system may include not only a 

medium-size national force, but also multiple 

smaller forces at the regional level. Designing 

and supporting such a structure today could 

help to absorb forces currently under the sway 

of warlords or other power brokers outside the 

capital city. Allowing regional leaders to keep 

their forces under local command would also 

ease clan and elite actors’ tensions about the 

emergence of an overwhelming TFG force 

that they cannot control.

In major urban areas such as Mogadishu, 

there are also opportunities to recreate some 

of the localized, sub-district level security initiatives that existed before the UIC took power. 

These were quite effective in some locations 

from 2004 to 2006. If political negotiations 

followed by a TFG offensive are successful 

in expanding a “green zone” in Mogadishu, 

working to stand up new neighborhood security groups, business security groups, and 

(moderate) shari’a courts could help govern 

any space that the TFG claws back from the 

insurgency.29 Finally, outside Mogadishu, there 

are opportunities to work with Ethiopia, Kenya, 

and others to ensure that their ongoing support for ASWJ and other Somali forces opposed 

to al Shabab falls in line with a broader, more 

coherent political agenda to build the support 

base of the TFG and ultimately transform the 

security sector in a strategic manner.

If Somalia’s Transitional Federal 

Government is too fragmented to undertake such negotiations and strategic planning, international partners—particularly 

the United States and European allies—

need to resist the TFG’s impulse to seek a 

military solution without sufficient political preparations. They should increase 

pressure on President Sheikh Sharif to 

overcome factionalism within TFG ranks, 

to engage in negotiations with key clan 

constituencies, and to broaden the TFG’s 

base of support. The TFG also needs to use 

such efforts to take advantage of schisms 

within the ranks of al Shabab and Hizbul 

Islamia. If the TFG continues on its current 

trajectory, it will have achieved little by the 

time its transitional mandate ends in 2011. It 

must be put on notice that even though the 

international community values the TFG’s 

transitional role, its leaders cannot expect 

continued international diplomatic, financial, 

and military support without tangible 

improvements in performance.

Notes

1

 Ken Menkhaus, John Prendergast, and Colin 

Thomas-Jensen, “Beyond Piracy: Next Steps to 

Stabilize Somalia,” Enough Project, May 2009, available at <www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/

SomaliaBeyondPiracy.pdf>.

2

 Thus far, training for TFG security forces has been 

provided by Djibouti, Ethiopia, France, Kenya, Sudan, and 

Uganda. The European Union has also announced plans to 

train additional Somali forces. See Amnesty International, 

“Controls on Military Assistance to Somalia Must Be 

Tightened,” January 21, 2010.

3

 Paul D. Williams, “Into the Mogadishu Maelstrom: 

The African Union Mission in Somalia,” International 

Peacekeeping 16, no. 4 (August 2009), 514–530.

4

 UN Integrated Regional Information Network, 

“Somalia: Government infighting ‘good for insurgents,’” May 

7, 2010.

5

 In summer 2009, al Shabab attempted to dislodge the 

TFG from Mogadishu and effectively fought through Sheikh 

Sharif’s own Hawiye:Abgal:Harti subclan territory until AMISOM 

forces blocked its advance. The unwillingness of that clan to 

resist al Shabab in favor of a president from its own community 

is a remarkable demonstration of the TFG’s lack of appeal.

6

 Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a has traditionally been a 

nonpolitical and nonmilitary movement uniting Sufist 
No. 257, June 2010 Strategic Forum 7

scholars and preachers in Somalia. Over the past 2 years, 

however, some leaders within this network have developed a 

militia capacity opposed to al Shabab in Central Somalia. 

The largest contingents are drawn from the Hawiye:Habr 

Gedir:Ayr and Hawiye:Abgal:Waescle subclans.

7

 Information on clan dynamics in Somalia is derived from 

the author’s field research in Nairobi, Kenya, in January 2010. 

8

 Luis Martinez, “US Launches Military Strike in 

Somalia Against al Qaeda Target,” ABC News, September 14, 

2009.

9

 United Nations, “Report of the Monitoring Group 

on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1811 

(2008),” S/2008/769, December 2008.

10 “More Troops for Mogadishu,” Africa Confidential

51, no. 6 (March 19, 2010).

11 See BBC Monitoring, “Profile: Abu-Zubayr, the 

reclusive leader of Somalia’s Al-Shabaab movement,” May 

20, 2009.

12 “Shabab’s Mixed Messages,” Jane’s Terrorism and 

Security Monitor, January 27, 2010.

13 Huma Yusuf, “Somali Militant Group Al Shabab 

Aligns with Al Qaeda,” Christian Science Monitor, February 

2, 2010.

14 United Nations, “Report of the Monitoring Group 

on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 

(2008),” S/2010/91, March 10, 2010.

15 Mohamed Ibrahim, “Somali Rebels Pledge to Send 

Fighters to Aid Yemen Jihad,” The New York Times, January 

1, 2010.

16 Sudarsan Raghavan, “Somali Refugees Recruited 

to Fight Islamist Militia,” The Washington Post, April 6, 2010.

17 See International Crisis Group, “Somalia: The 

Trouble with Puntland,” Africa Briefing, no. 64 (August 12, 

2009), and Human Rights Watch, “Hostages to Peace: Threats 

to Human Rights and Democracy in Somaliland,” July 2009.

18 On the historical emergence of al Shabab, see 

Roland Marchal, “A Tentative Assessment of the Somali 

Harakat Al-Shabaab,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 3, 

no. 3 (November 2009), 381–404.

19 See Jeffrey Gettleman, “Somali Backlash May Be 

Militants’ Worst Foe,” The New York Times, March 23, 2010.

20 VOA News, “Somali Government, Religious Group 

Forming Anti-Rebel Alliance,” February 22, 2010.

21 Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, “Mogadishu Braces for 

Imminent Somali Government Offensive,” February 24, 2010.

22 Malkhadir Muhumed, “Kenya Vetoes Somali Wish for 

Troops in Mogadishu,” The Washington Post, March 30, 2010.

23 Agence France Presse, “Al-Shabaab Reinforces 

Mogadishu as Somali Government Readies for Offensive,” 

February 10, 2010.

24 Johnnie Carson and Ertharin Cousin, “Statement 

on U.S. Policy in Somalia,” U.S. Department of State, 

Washington, DC, March 12, 2010.

25 Bronwyn E. Bruton, Somalia: A New Approach, 

Council Special Report No. 52 (Council on Foreign Relations, 

March 2010).

26 The Obama administration has already taken a first 

step in this direction with the imposition of an Executive 

Order in April 2010, seeking to block the property of individuals “contributing to the conflict in Somalia.” See Associated 

Press, “Obama Addresses Deteriorating Somalia Security,” 

April 14, 2010.

27 Many of these individuals were identified in the 

March 2010 UN Monitoring Group report cited above. For a 

history of deal-making by these individuals, see Andre Le 

Sage, “Somalia: Sovereign Disguise for a Mogadishu Mafia,” 

Review of African Political Economy 29, no. 91 (March 

2002), 132–138.

28 For a detailed analysis of this potential, see Matt 

Bryden and Jeremy Brickhill, “Disarming Somalia: Lessons 

in Stabilization from a Collapsed State,” Conflict, Security, 

and Development 10, no. 2 (May 2010), 239–262.

29 See Andre Le Sage, “Stateless Justice in Somalia: 

Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives,” Centre for 

Humanitarian Dialogue, January 2005.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Phillip C. Saunders 

Interim Director of Research

Christopher J. Lamb

Interim Director

The Strategic Forum series presents original 

research by members of NDU as well as other 

scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The 

opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 

expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect 

the views of the Department of Defense or any 

other agency of the Federal Government. Visit 

NDU Press online at www.ndupress.edu. 

The mission of the Institute for National 

Strategic Studies is to conduct strategic 

studies for the Secretary of Defense, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

the combatant commanders, to support 

the national strategic components of the 

academic programs at the National Defense 

University, and to provide outreach to other 

U.S. Government agencies and to the broader 

national security community.
8 Strategic Forum No. 257, June 2010

Prioritizing Strategic Interests in 

South Asia 

Robert B. Oakley and T.X. Hammes 

(Strategic Forum 256, June 2010) 

Africa’s Irregular Security Threats: 

Chatllenges for U.S. Engagement

Andre Le Sage

(Strategic Forum 255, May 2010)

Nuclear Politics in Iran

Judith S. Yaphe, ed.

(Middle East Strategic Perspectives 1, May 2010)

Misinterpreting Ethnic Conflicts 

in Africa

Clement Mweyang Aapengnuo

(Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief 4, April 2010)

Lessons Learned from Peace 

Operations in Africa

Paul D. Williams

(Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief 3, March 2010)

Strengthening the IAEA: How the 

Nuclear Watchdog Can Regain Its Bark

Gregory L. Schulte 

(Strategic Forum 253, March 2010)

U.S.-Mexico Homeland Defense: A 

Compatible Interface

Victor E. Renuart, Jr., and Biff Baker

(Strategic Forum 254, February 2010)

Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in the 

U.S. Nuclear Deterrent

John P. Caves, Jr.

(Strategic Forum 252, December 2009)

STAR–TIDES and Starfish Networks: 

Supporting Stressed Populations with 

Distributed Talent

Linton Wells II, Walker Hardy, Vinay Gupta, and 

Daniel Noon

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 70, 

December 2009)

Navies versus Coast Guards: Defining 

the Roles of African Maritime Security 

Forces

Augustus Vogel

(Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief 2, December 2009)

To Build Resilience: Leader Influence 

on Mental Hardiness

Paul T. Bartone, Charles L. Barry, and Robert E. 

Armstrong

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 69, 

November 2009)

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