A popular Government, 

without popular information or the mea

acquiring it, 

is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Trag

perhaps both. 

Knowledge will forever govern ignoran

And a people who mean to be their o

Governors, 

must arm themselves with the power w

knowledge gives. 

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY 

August 4, 1822 
JEFFREY SIMON 

McNair Paper 39 

April 1995 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC S

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

Washington, DC 
[] Director: Frederick Kiley [] Chief, Publications Branch: George 

I"1 Editors: Jonathan W. Pierce, Mary A. Sommerville 

[] Editor for ttu's volume: Jonathan W. Pierce 

r'l Secretary: Laura Hall [] Circulation Manager: Myma Morgan 

Jeffrey Simon is a Senior Fellow in the Institute for National ,Stra

National Defense University. Previously, he was Chief, National Mil

Branch and Soviet Threat Analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute, U

College. He has taught at Georgelown University and has held researc

the Systems Planning Corporation, the RAND Corporation, and t

Enterprise Institute. 

INSS publishes McNair Papers to provoke thought and reform discussio

U.S. national security in the post-Cold War era. These monographs present 

related to national security strategy and policy, defense resource managemen

affairs, civil-military relations, military technology, and joint, combined, 

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Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations, expressed or implie

of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Natio

University, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Governm

Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. 

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For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, D.C. 20

ISSN 1071-7552 
Germany: 

One People, One State, One Army 

Republic of Poland 

Hungary 

Czechoslovakia: 

From Unity to Federation and Divorce 

The Czech Republic 

Slovakia 

Prologue as Future: 

What Central Europe Needs To Do 
"Countries with oppressive politic

systems, countries with designs on 

neighbors, countries with militarie

unchecked by civilian control, or w

closed economic systems...need n

apply." 

President Bill C
NATO EXPANSION 

The Central European revolutions of 1989 (annus mira

been truly of historic proportions. They not only ca

attention and imagination of the world, but they have 

challenged five states in the extreme---Germany

Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Re

Slovakia). 

In historical terms, the continuing transformation

more encompassing and complex than the mere disint

communism. The aftershocks of World War I, whi

disintegration of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, an

empires, continue to haunt Central European succe

Not only do the 1989-90 Central European revolutio

deal with historical unfinished business, 1 they also test 

assumptions about civil-military relations in contempo

democratic polities. And most important, the revo

likely to provide serious future challenges to U.S. and 

security. History has been in fast-forward over th

years. Already four distinct periods are evident since 

European revolutions of 1989-90. The present period 

that may prove to be the most critical for Central Euro

The first geo-strategic shift, which occurred durin

was marked by Central European euphoria resulting 

revolutions themselves, optimism about a "Return to E

joining NATO and the European Community (

European Union (EU). The period witnessed NATO's 
through the end of 1991, witnessed the disintegratio

Warsaw Pact, withdrawal of Soviet Groups of For

ttungary and Czechoslovakia, mad a failed coup in t

Union. During 1991 NATO convened ministerial me

CtJpe~flmgen (June), which sanctioned developing milita

the east, and in Rome (November), which resulted 

strategic concept (to replace NATO's Flexible Response

creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (N

engage the East. Central Europe's initial euphoria abou

Europe's embrace of their "retum" turned to more cau

realistic) optimism. 

State disintegration marked the third period which 

January 1992 and continued through 1993. The y

witnessed the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugos

Czechoslovakia marking the emergence of more tha

states. It also witnessed the continued withdrawal of So

Russian) troops from Germany and Poland in Central E

NATO demonstrated willingness to engage in peac

operations under either CSCE (May) or United 

(December) auspices; and in June 1993 in Athens, th

expressed its willingness to support the Alliance in U

CSCE-mandated peacekeeping operations. The same pe

witnessed Boris Yeltsin's initial support for, and chang

about NATO's expansion to Central Europe. NATO 

hesitancy toward Central Europe coupled with Russia's 

a Near Abroad policy and another failed coup 

contributed to increasing Central European pessimi

Russia's prospects for democratic political developmen

to the East, and skepticism about support from the We

The fourth period opened with NATO's Janua

Brussels Summit, which adopted the Combined Joint T

(CJTF), Partnership For Peace (PFP), and committed the 
regard, and with little doubt, the January 1994 Summ

a watershed for NATO, but only time will tell whether 

Alliance will prove to be "hollow" or remain relevant t

eastern security problems. 

What NATO Has Done 

NATO's responses to developments in the East f

former Warsaw Pact members of Central and Eastem E

second, to the new states emerging from the disintegra

Union--have been both extraordinary and insufficient

institutional responses have been extraordinary in tha

new initiatives have been taken in such a short perio

Yet they have been insufficient in that events have mov

a fast pace that NATO's responses have not kep

expectations in the region. 

London Declaration, July 1990. Only month

revolutions of November-December 1989, NATO ex

first "hand of friendship" at the London Summit o

1990. NATO invited the six (now former) Wa

members (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria

and the Soviet Union) to visit Brussels to address 

Atlantic Council (NAC) and invited these gover

establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO to sha

and deliberations and to intensify military contacts 

period of historic change. 2 During the summer, n

ambassadors from the Warsaw Pact participated in b

NATO headquarters. 

East German Absorption. East Germany's tran

from a key Warsaw Pact member in November 198

member of NATO on 3 October 1990 was unexpected 

The Soviet position underwent unlbreseen and mercu
stabilize the domestic situation as a reform communis

November 1989; de facto unification had occurred o

1990 with economic and monetary union of the two 

states. The Soviets also decoupled political unification 

security issue when they conceded that all-German 

could occur irrespective of the Four-plus-Two agreeme

was signed on 12 September 1990. 3 

When formal unification occurred on 3 Octob

Germany's five new eastern Laender (states created 

former GDR) assumed the protection of NATO's Articl

armed attack against one...shall be considered an attac

them all." NATO's eastward expansion occurred wi

need to sign a new protocol of association as employed 

accessions of Greece and Turkey in 1951, Germany in 1

Spain in 1982. 

Copenhagen NAC, June 1991. On 6-7 June NATO 

next step at the Copenhagen NAC session by agr

implement a broad set of further initiativ

intensify...[NATO's] program of military contacts at 

levels ''4 with Central and East European (CEE) state

military contacts would be intensified with NATO head

SHAPE, and other major NATO commands, and NAT

invite CEE military officers to NATO training faci

special programs concerning civilian oversight of 

Meetings of experts would be held to discuss securi

issues, military strategy and doctrine, arms control, and 

industrial conversion to civilian purposes. NATO invi

experts to participate in NATO's "Third Dimension" 

and environmental programs and to exchange views on 

such as airspace management. Also NATO information p

expanded to the CEE region. 

NAC Ministerial, 21 August 1991. Until August
ppg

security of all states in Europe. As a token of so

with the new democracies of Central and Eastern E

we will develop ways of further strengtheni

contribution toward the political and economic 

process within these countries. Our diplomatic 

arrangements with the Central and Eastern Eu

democracies now take on added significance. 5 

Rome Summit, November 1991: Genesis o

Political and Military Transformation. At the 7-8 

1991 Rome NAC summit, NATO approved the Rome D

which broadened NATO's activities with the Soviet 

Central and East Europe to include annual meeting

NAC at ministerial level in what would be called 

Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC); periodic me

the NAC at ambassadorial level; additional m

circumstances warrant; and regular meetings with NAT

nate committees, including the Political and 

Committees; and the Military Committee and oth

military authorities. 6 In addition to creating the N

November 1991 Rome summit initiated another ma

when it adopted a New Strategic Concept to replac

strategy of "Flexible Response." The new strate

NATO's military emphasis away from massive m

toward enhanced crisis management capabilities and pe

operations. It also established the groundwork fo

military transformation. 

North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)

December 1991 the foreign ministers of all th

adversaries" (including the newly independent Latvia

and Estonia) met at the inaugural NACC to adopt a 
On 26 February, the NACC met at the ambassadoria

discuss and adopt a "Work Plan for Dialogue, Partner

Cooperation." The 10 March 1992 Extraordinary NACC 

which convened to broaden membership to 35 (to in

former Soviet republics except Georgia), endorsed the W

which covered a wide set of activities including defense 

issues, defense conversion, economic issues, science, c

of modem society, dissemination of information, policy 

consultations, axed air traffic management. 8 

While the NACC had laudable goals and its activi

mushroomed, its limitations immediately became appare

the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 199

decision to include all its successor states as new 

members meant that rather than the originally conce

non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members and the USSR, th

would include more than twenty new members. The 

diversity among NACC partners (e.g., between Po

Uzbekistan) led to Central European demands for diffe

and increasing demands for membership in the Alliance

despite well-intended goals, the cooperation partner's de

the NACC made it quite apparent how ill-prepared an

the organization really was. NATO's recognition 

inadequacy came in January 1994 when in lieu of e

membership, the North Atlantic Council adopted the Pa

For Peace (PFP) program. 

NATO and NACC as "Out-Of-Area" 

Peacekeeper 

Oslo NAC/NACC, June 1992. On 4 June 1992 t

Atlantic Council (NAC) Foreign Ministers session in Os

"to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with 
"particular importance to enhancing the CSCE's opera

institutional capacity to contribute to conflict preven

management, and the peaceful settlement of disp

expressed willingness] to contribute. ''1° 

In December 1992 the NATO NAC Ministerial e

parallel offer to the United Nations; it noted the 

readiness "to support peacekeeping operations under th

of the UN Security Council. ''n The NACC then fo

agreeing that NATO and cooperation partners wo

experience with one another and with other CSCE st

planning and preparation of peacekeeping missions 

consider possible joint peacekeeping training and exer

same NACC also approved a 1993 Work Plan wi

provisions on peacekeeping and created a NACC Ad H

on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, to discuss general po

conceptual principles and practical measures for coop

Closer cooperation and confidence among NAC

became evident in February 1993 when the Military C

met for the first time in cooperation session. Wh

defense ministers met at the end of March 1993, they 

the importance "of the ability to act in a cooperative fr

in peacekeeping tasks and "ensure(d) that a high priorit

this work. ''12 

On 12 April 1993, under authority of UN Resol

NATO started the no-fly zone enforcement-oper

Bosnia-Herzegovina. In late April, the Military Comm

met in cooperation with Chiefs of Defense Staff to d

possibility of NATO intervention in Bosnia should 

solution fail. 

Athens NAC/NACC, June 1993. The 10 June 

ministerial communique noted the development of a 

understanding on conceptual approaches to peacekee
NACC seminar on peacekeeping from 30 June to 2 

discuss conceptual and doctrinal issues of peacekeeping

In sum, it is evident that NATO has been quite resp

a very short period of time. But has it been enough? T

countries clearly believe that more than meetings 

necessary, if NATO is to serve an essential role in the p

of European peace and stability. Particularly as the N

broadened its membership so rapidly, it suffers the d

becoming "neutralized" as a credible security institu

concrete terms what will be NATO's and NACC's ro

event of a real crisis? These are the questions that are c

the forefront particularly from the so-called 

states--Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slova

have expressed the desire for a differentiated rol

NATO/NACC. They want criteria and time-lines to bec

members of NATO and have agreed to accept responsib

NATO's security concems. 

NATO's January 1994 Brussels Summit: A Wa

Although it took NATO twenty-four years to adop

Strategic Concept in November 1991 to replace its 

Response strategy, one might argue that with Yugosla

the Soviet Union's disintegration, Russia's recent e

reassert influence over the Commonwealth of Independe

(CIS), and resulting insecurities in Central Europe, tha

now needs a "new" Strategic Concept. 

Whether the January 1994 NATO Brussels Summit 

will prove to be a such a watershed remains to be se

Summit did attempt to fuse together the more flexib

structure packages for peacekeeping requirements (the 

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)) with NATO's new 

stabilize the East by adopting the Partnership For Pea

plan. 
eas to actate cotgecy opeatos, 

peacekeeping operations with participating nations 

Alliance. 

Though the Summit did not accede to Central Euro

for immediate membership, the Parmership for P

proposal did establish NATO's long-term commitmen

leaving vague both the criteria and time-lines for e

Operating under the authority of the NAC, active part

PFP is seen as a necessary (though not sufficient) c

joining NATO. Parmer states will participate in p

military bodies at NATO headquarters and in 

Parmership Coordination Cell (PCC) at Mons that w

• . .work in concrete ways towards transpare

defense budgeting, promoting democratic con

defense ministries, joint planning, joint military ex

and creating an ability to operate with NATO fo

such fields as peacekeeping, search and resc

humanitarian operations..J 9 

While the goals of NATO's CJTF and PFP are e

can be seen as a hedging against possible future prob

East, their implementation might have some more 

unwitting, and unwanted regional implications. If 

careful, PFP could undermine: (1) Central East Eu

regional cooperation by turning local actors into com

domestic support for the region's democratic reform

region's fragile civil-military relations; and (4) s

security by attracting scarce defense resources fr

Europe's real defense requirements. 
European defense ministers (except the Czech Repub

sent First Deputy Secretary Jiri Pospisil) met in W

prepare for the forthcoming meeting with President 

After the session, the defense ministers declared they 

the PFP program to open the way to permanent cont

NATO and lead to full membership in the Alliance. 2° 

Poland. Following a 10 January 1994 cabinet sessio

Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski appraised PFP 

small a step in the right direction" and President Wal

that NATO is committing a "serious error" in bowing to 

objections. Waiesa also harshly criticized the Czechs f

to support a coordinated Visegrad strategy toward 

Although Polish Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk adde

understood the West's difficulty to put forward a precis

integration, he noted "we expect NATO to come up w

criteria in the short term for NATO membership. ''22 

After the NATO summit, Walesa went to Prague 

with the other Visegrad presidents and President Clinto

January). Because the Czech Republic wanted 

conducted on a bilateral basis, Walesa expressed anger 

Czech's course of action: "They are making a mistake 

cost us all something. ''23 After the session with Presiden

Foreign Minister Olechowski noted: "[W]e have many p

political declarations, but we lack specific prospects. ''~ 

Though Poland had initially exhibited reserve, it r

rapidly. One of the immediate requirements of the Pa

for Peace program was the need to Find funding. Kolo

estimated that the Army would need an additional 50

zlotys ($23 million) to participate. (The overall 199

defense budget was only 47.8 trillion zlotys ($4.2 billio

percent of GDP). z5 On 2 February 1994 Prime Ministe

was the third to sign documents in Brussels stating tha
Poland became the first partner to hand over a p

document to NATO outlining the spheres of it

cooperation with the AUiance. At the 25 May 1994 

PFP defense ministers meeting in Brussels, Ko

continued to voice concern that "something is lackin

program fails to define clearly how to move from pa

membership. 2s 

Then on 5 July Poland became the first partner 

Individual Pa_rmership Program (IPP). In a

peacekeeping missions and joint exercises, Poland i

additional amendments to its IPP to include a

convergence of command, control, and communicatio

and democratic control of the armed forces. 29 Th

document contained 60 specific measures coverin

exercises, and information exchanges which would 

250 billion zlotys for 1994. 30 

When President Clinton visited Warsaw and ad

Polish Sejm on 7 July 1994, he noted that NATO e

"no longer a question of whether, but when and how

$100 million he pledged in U.S. support of the o

program, Clinton committed $25 million to Poland. 

Polish contacts with NATO began to mushroom

May 1994 a 96-soldier company from the British ar

small bilateral peacekeeping exercise with Polish troo

(Poland), that was billed as being "in the spirit of N

plan. ''32 The first real PFP grouild forces exercise, "

Bridge-94" took place 12-16 September at Bied

Poznan, Poland. Some 920 soldiers (of which 280 w

from 13 countries were divided into five mu

companies under Polish-American command. 33 

Polish military contacts with Germany also began 

particularly after 1 September 1994 when the last Ru
Henning von Ondarza began to act as an adviser to th

defense minister. 37 Culminating the 1994 training yea

September), Polish ground forces, a Danish mechanized 

and German air-landing company held a peacekeeping o

"Tatra-94" in the Krakow Military District. 38 

Hungary. Though Partnership for Peace had only 

an official NATO policy on 10 January 1994, Csaba Ki

Hungarian defense ministry noted (on 13 January) that 

officials had been working on Hungary's plan since 

1993. Kiss noted that PFP would require Hungarian 

planning and spending to be more open and in line with 

standards, and under more civilian control. He ad

Hungarian soldiers would participate in fiature peac

operations, that Hungary's air defense and airspace man

needed to be converted to NATO formats (with IFF and 

radars overhauled to communicate with NATO aircraft), 

two military planners would go to Brussels. 39 

On 8 February Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky 

Hungary's PFP presentation document, making it the f

to join; and on 15 November 1994 Hungary subm

Individual Partnership Program in Brussels. 4° 

The Hungarian Parliament authorized holding a joint 

Hungarian PFP military exercise "Hungarian Venture" fr

September 1994 on Hungarian soil. The exercise invo

British troops and 228 Hungarian soldiers, inclu

peacekeeping company. 4~ One lesson Ilungary learned 

exercise was that differences in staff-level work and l

problems rather than incompatibility of weapons h

cooperation. 42 Because of the shortage of funds, this 

only exercise Hungary held during 1994; Hungary 

participate in the first large-scale PFP exercise "Coo

Bridge-94" in Poland. 43 
Czech Republic. With NATOs introduction of 

For Peace (PFP) Defense Minister Antonin Baudys n

exercises tmdertaken by the Czech Army would be su

consent of parliament. On 29 April 1994, the 

approved the goverrunent proposal to permit short-te

training and exercises on Czech soil (5,000 foreign tr

to 21 days) and for Czech units to participate abroad 

for up to 30 days)¢ 5 

On 10 March 1994 when Vaclav Klaus signe

general agreement making the Czech Republic the 1 

to join the project, Defense Minister Baudys not

program "is the maximum possible and the minimum 

The Czech's first joint exercise under PFP on Czec

place 15-25 March 1994, when 32 Dutch marines 

with 120 troops of the Czech Rapid Deployment Batta

during 29 May-10 June, 130 French troops part

exercises in the Czech Republic with 120 members of 

of the 23rd Czech Mechanized Battalion. Again d

September, a platoon of 40 soldiers of the Czech 4th M

Regiment participated in "Cooperative Bridge-94. ''47 

training year concluded with the first joint Cze

military exercise of 400 troops, which took place d

November on both sides of the common border. 48 

The new Czech Defense Minister Wilem Hola

reference to NATO membership, that: "it is possible t

that the conditions for NATO membership will be cle

in the near future--that is, certain standards will 

up...[adding the warning that] the 'cheap' phase of ou

is coming to an end, and the phase that will cost us s

beginning. ,,49 

Slovakia. The fundamental orientation of Slo

obtain full NATO membership. The starting po
successors (Pavol Kanis) changes to the PFP pre

document as too expensive; Andrejcak argued that the 

ministry would be required to spend 4.5 percent of its b

PFP, rather than the one percent originally envisaged. 5

NATO Brussels Summit, 1 December 

When the NAC met in Brussels on 1 December 

countries had so-far joined the Parmership (Belarus an

became the 24th and 25th in early 1995 and 10 IPP's 

signed), the Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons had 

fully operational (11 Partners had already appointe

officers to the Cell), and three PFP exercises had been h

Autumn of 1994. 

The Brussels Summit communique reaffirmed 

Alliance: 

remains open to membership... [and] expects and w

welcome NATO enlargement that would reac

democratic states to our east. [Accordingly, they m

decision to begin an extensive study] to determine 

NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this pr

and the implications of membership. 52 

The study to determine the principles for NATO expan

be discussed at the May 1995 NATO meeting in the Ne

and will then be presented to the Partners prior to the n

mee~ng in Brussels in the Fall of 1995. 

On 2 December 1994 the NACC foreign ministers c

(along with those members who had joined PFP but we

NACC) and were informed about the NAC decision to in

study to determine the modalities for NATO expansion. 
performance of democratic political institutions, a f

economy, and respect for human rights. It is also 

effective civilian control of the military as well as som

degree of military capability and NATO interoperabi

necessary conditions. 

NATO's challenge, though, will be how to 

determine what constitutes "effective" civilian con

military recognizing that each state has its own histo

and unique set of institutions. 

The purpose of this study is to assess the curre

civil-military relations among those Central European 

states frequently referred to as the most likely to first j

The study posits the following four conditions as being 

for "effective" civilian oversight of the military: 

(1) It is necessary either through Constitut

Amendments to establish a clearly-defined division o

between the president and government (prime m

defense minister). The law must be clear for peacetim

(e.g., command and control of the military, promotion

military officers, and appointment of civilian defense 

and for crisis (e.g., emergency powers), to include tr

war. 

(2) It is necessary that Parliament exert overs

military by exercising effective control of the defense b

also its role in deploying armed forces must b

emergency and war. 

(3) Government control of the military (Genera

military commanders) must be exercised through 

defense ministry to include effective peacetime over

defense budget, intelligence, strategic planning, forc

and deployments, arms acquisitions, and military pro

(4) Military prestige must be restored in order for 
effective civilian control of the military, then most 

Visegrad states would not currently qualify. Though 

Europe has already made enormous progress in civil

relations since the 1989 revolutions, it is clear that mu

s011 remains to be done! 

Notes 

1. This is a point made by Shlomo Avineri, "The R

History: The Breakup of the Soviet Union," The Brooking

(Spring 1992), pp. 30-33. 

2. London Declaration On a Transformed North Atlantic 

(Brussels: NATO Information Service, 5-6 July 1990), Artic

8. 

3. See Stephen F. Szabo, "Fedcral Republic of Germ

Bundeswehr," in Jeffrey Simon (ed.), European Security Policy 

Revolutions of 1989 (Washington, DC: National Defense U

Press, 1991), pp. 189-206. 

4. Statement Issued By the North Atlantic Council M

Ministerial Session, Copenhagen, 6-7 June 1991 in NATO Com

1991 (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1992

23. 

5. North Atlantic Council Statement, 21 August 1991 

Communiques 1991, pp. 24-25. 

6. Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, NAT

Communique S-1(91)86, 8 November 1991, Article 11, pp. 4

7. For a thorough overview, see Stephen J. Flanagan, "N

Central and Eastern Europe: From Liaison to Security Partnersh

Washington Quarterly (Spring 1992). 

8. "Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation,

Press Communique M-NACC-1 (92)21, 10 March 1992. 

9. "Final Communique issued by the North Atlantic C

Ministerial Session," NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1 (

June 1992, p. 4. 
13. "Final Communique issued by the North Atlantic 

Ministerial Session," NATO Press Communique M-NAC

June 1993, pp. 2-3. 

14. "Report to Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc 

Cooperation in Peacekeeping," NATO Press Release M-NA

11 June 1993, pp. 8-11. 

15. "Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Coopera

in Ministerial Session," NATO Press Communique M-NA

11 June 1993, p. 1. 

16. "NACC High Level Seminar on Peacekeeping," N

Release (93)45, 25 June 1993. 

17. "Declaration of the Heads of State and Governme

the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, Belgium," N

Communique M-1(94)3, 11 January 1994, pp. 2-3. The 

stressed the development of separable but not separate cap

18. NATO's 11 January 1994 Declaration noted: "W

welcome NATO expansion that would reach democratic 

East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into acco

and security developments in the whole of Europe." Ibid., 

19. Ibid., p. 5. 

20. Warsaw PAP, 7 January 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-O06 

1994), p. 1. 

21. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 6 (11 January 1994), 

22. Defense minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk intervie

Quotidien de Paris, 10 January 1994, p. 14. FBIS-EEU-

January 1994), p. 25. 

23. Lech Walesa interview, Prague Lidove Noviny, 

1994, pp. 1,5. FBIS-EEU-94-O08 (12 January 1994), p. 2

24. Prague CTK, 12 January 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-010 

1994), p. 1. 

25. Warsaw Rzeczpospolita, 19 January 1994, p. 2. FB

012 (19 January 1994), p. 20. The Polish Army compri

225,000 soldiers; 87,000 professionals, 138,000 conscripts

civilians. Warsaw Rzeczpospolita, 26 January 1994, p. 2. 
30. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 6 July 1994, p. 8. FBIS

130 (7 July 1994), pp. 17-19. 

31. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 128 (8 July 1994), p. 3. 

32. London Financial Times, 16 May 1994, p. 3. 

33. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 173 (12 September 1994)

34. Hamburg DPA, 28 July 1994. FBIS-WEU-94-150 (

1994), p. 15. 

35. Berlin DDP/ADN, 1 September 1994. FBIS-WEU-9

September 1994), p. 16. 

36. They met in Warsaw in July, and for the fourth 

Bamberg in September. 

37. General Henning von Ondarza interview. Warsaw 

Wyborcza, 9 August 1994, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-94-153 (9 August 

20-21. 

38. Warsaw Polska Zbrojna, 12 September 1994, pp. 1

EEU-94-177 (13 September 1994), p. 19. 

39. Budapest MTI, 13 January 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-OlO (1

1994), pp. 9-10. 

40. On 5 December the Hungarian Parliament accepted t

a vote of 236 for, and one abstention. 

41. Budapest MTI, 1 September 1994. FBIS-EEU-9

September 1994), p. 10. 

42. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview, Magyar N

October 1994, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-94-201 (18 October 1994), pp

43. Instead, Hungary sent two observers. 

44. Gyorgy Keleti interview, Budapest Dana TV, 20 N

1994. FBIS-EEU-94-225 (22 November 1994), p. 18. 

committed 400 million forints ($3.5 million) for the PFP pro

1995. OMRI Daily Digest, 4 January 1995, pp. 4-5. 

45. FBIS-EEU-94-117 (17 June 1994), p. 13. 

46. Prague CTK, 7 March 1994. FB1S-EEU-94-049 (

1994), p. 8. 

47. Prague CTK, 3 August 1994. 
51. Prague CTK, 1 June 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-106 (2 

p. 14. 

52. Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, 1 Dec

Press Communique M-NAC-2(94)116, p. 3. 

53. Chairman's Summary of North Atlantic Cooperat

2 December 1994. Pres Communique M-NACC-2(94)117 (

1994), p. 1. 

54. Budapest MTI, 2 December 1994. FBIS-EEU

December 1994), p. 11. 
different locations. Perhaps because of these historic ex

Central European nations have become accustom

extreme; they have demonstrated remarkable resil

capacity to reassert national will. 

During the eighteenth century, Germany comprised 

350 independent duchies and principalities. By the e

Napoleonic era, Germany comprised roughly forty state

be f'mally unified by Otto von Bismarck after the Franc

war in 1871. Defeat in World War I and the Treaty of 

mandated Germany's loss of the Alsace-Lorraine t

Poznan West Prussia to Poland, the Hultchin d

Czechoslovakia, and Memel to Lithuania. Danzig bec

city. 

Hitler's attempt to resurrect the Third Reich led 

War II and Germany's defeat again, which resulted i

power occupation of Germany's capital Berlin, the los

of its eastem territory, and the division of the rem

Germany into two states; the Federal Republic of 

(FRG) and German Democratic Republic (GDR). 

The German Democratic Republic's brief ltistory 

one of dramatic changes. After Germany was physica

125 miles westward to make room for the "new" P

GDR emerged under communist rule. Because of the c

Socialist Unity Party's (SED) complete loss of co

legitimacy in the Fall of 1989, the GDR was "unified" 

absorbed) on October 3, 1990 to become five "eastem

in a united Germany and NATO. The GDR simply dis

In Orwellian fashion, the former comerstone of the Wa

now f'mds itself in NATO; an organization that had be

21 
p, , 

civil/human rights, acquire civil control of its militar

the European Union and NATO. At the same 

successfully negotiated the withdrawal of Soviet (now 

forces from their soil, contributed to the collapse of th

Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic 

(CEMA)--structures that provided some semblance of 

and political-military order to the region--and 

Germany's unification to the west and the Sovie

disintegration to the east. 

Poland's history has also been a study in poli

extreme. After experiencing three partitions durin

century which ended in Poland's total absorption b

Russia, and the Hapsburg Empire, the Polish state d

from the European stage in 1795. Statehood w

resurrected for the Polish nation only at the end of W

by the Treaty of Versailles when the Russian part 

aligned itself with Polish areas under German and Au

to establish the independent Polish Republic. 

Poland's experience with democratic rule was bri

1926 it ended with Marshall Pilsudski's coup an

dictatorship. This was followed by the Molotov-Ribbe

resulting in the German and Soviet attack on P

September 1, 1939. With Germany's impending colla

military forces entered Poland in 1944 and "te

occupied the country with its Northem Group 

Communist rule followed. Despite popular cha

communist rule in 1956, 1970, 1976, and 1980-

democratization did not begin until 1988-89. 

Hungary remained an isolated linguistic and cult

within the Hapsburg empire and managed to gain a sem

autonomy from Hapsburg rule after the 1867 ausgle
democratic institutions in the interwar period also met 

fate as the rest of Central Europe, ending in Admiral 

dictatorship. 

During World War II, Hungary participated on the s

Axis powers; hence, its Trianon-mandated borders 

unchanged. After the war Communist takeover 

terminated Hungary's newly acquired independence. H

effort to revolt in 1956 was thwarted by Soviet inv

resulted in "temporary" occupation by the Soviet Southe

of Forces. With its revolution in 1989, Hungary, too, 

upon a liberal democratic experiment for the third 

century. 

Czechs lost their statehood after the Battle 

Mountain in 1620, when they were absorbed under 

rule. After the 1867 ausgleich, the Czechs remain

Austrian influence and Slovakia under Greater 

Czechoslovakia, also recreated after World War I by t

of Versailles, was the only Central European state d

inter-war period to maintain democratic rule under Th

Masaryk and Edvard Benes. Hitler's demands for the 

lands at Munich in September 1938 interrupted Czecho

brief twenty-year democratic interlude. In March 1939 

Reich totally absorbed Czechoslovakia; though they per

independent fascist state to exist in Slovakia between 

1945. 

When Czechoslovakia once again set out to establi

democratic political rule after World War II, a commu

in February 1948 interrupted the experiment. Czecho

efforts to create "socialism with a human face" in 1

thwarted by a Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion and r

the "temporary" stationing of the Soviet Central Group 

in the country. The November 1989 Velvet Revolutio
and 10.6 million Hungarians) to retum to Europe. 

this popular will, the new Central European governm

adopted policies designed to join West European 

economic, and military institutions; the European 

NATO. And it is in Europe's and the United States' i

this process succeed! 

Another consequence of the 1989 revolutions ha

unleashing of tribal and ethnic instincts and aspiratio

been contained for forty-five years by Soviet-imposed i

of order and control. Likewise, it is in Europe's and 

States' interest that Central Europe's return to histor

flow in anti-democratic directions or result in intra- or 

conflicts. 

Central Europe faced new challenges during late 

when post-World War I state-disintegration extended t

east and south. After the failed 18-19 August 1991 S

the USSR disintegrated. At the end of 1991, 

disintegrated. As a result, Europe witnessed the creati

"new" independent states: from Latvia, Lithuania, and 

the Baltic; to Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzego

Macedonia in the Balkans; to Russia, Ukraine, Be

Moldova in Eastem Europe. The Commonwealth of In

States (CIS) also emerged. The future complexion of 

states' govenunents and alliance orientations also w

profound impact on the security of Central and Weste

European institutions are important to Central Euro

they legitimize the programs of their political leaders 

But NATO is especially important because it anchors 

States to Europe and provides additional psychologic

to these states which have been so tossed about b

NATO, with its trans-Atlantic ties, is seen not just as 

5 guarantee against aggression but as a stabilizing instr
a modela roadmatyto the other Eastern and 

European nations and states such as Romania, Bulg

Albania; Yugoslavia's and the USSR's successor sta

also seek a retum to Europe. 

Indeed, one might argue that if the liberal d

experiments fail in Central Europe--in united Germany

Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia--that the l

of, and opportunities for those other Eastem or 

European states wanting to re-enter Europe will beco

bleak, if not impossible. If such a denouement were 

then from the vantage point of the twenty-first cen

revolutions of 1989, rather than representing e

momentous historic proportions, will come to symboliz

more than a manifestation of the West's ability to sei

from the jaws of Cold War "victory." And twenty-fir

European history will be doomed to revisit the twentiet
ppg 

leading to dissolution; and the Federal Republic of Germ

later the USSR, the U.S., Britain, and France) cr

conditions for Germany's ultimate unification within th

security umbrella. 

Erich Honecker, as party and state leader of the 

Democratic Republic (GDR) from 1971-1989, was respo

shaping the GDR of the late 1980s. With the help of t

Wall, erected in 1961, he set the GDR on a stable 

political and economic development. During the 1970s

the GDR's domestic policy could be seen as an attemp

the standard of living (consumer communism) in retum 

East Germans were expected to accept stricter co

Western contacts and make efforts to neutralize s

opposition. The end of the GDR's self-imposed 

commenced when Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik led to the o

diplomatic relations with Bonn. Honecker's more ope

policy transformed the GDR from an international ou

legitimate member of the intemational community. 

In 1985 all of this changed when Mikhail Go

reforms in the Soviet Union and socialist community dra

altered the environment in which the GDR had been 

When Hungary and Poland began reforms, the Eas

Govemment became an even more staunch defender of 

quo. In the end, Honecker's unrelenting resistance to 

reforms undermined his domestic support and 

legitimacy) 

In May 1989 Hungary dismantled its barbed-wire b

Austria and then announced on 10 September that its b

27 
formed--the most notable among them, New Forum

needed to overcome their divisions and to work 

alternatives. 

The riots kept spreading. On 16 October whe

protesters rallied in Leipzig, the Socialist Unity P

Erich Honecker. Two days later Egon Krenz replace

as head of state, SED General Secretary, and Chair

Defense Council. 4 Despite the leadership change

continued. Only after 300,000 protesters had marched 

on 23 October, did one member of the SED politb

meet (on 26 October) with New Forum for the first t

only led to new protests demanding free elections, th

the secret police, and the legalization of New Forum

Though Egon Krenz attempted to associate hims

reform by meeting with Gorbachev and Lech W

promising far-reaching change, he could not 

revolutionary tide. When thousands of East Germans 

FRG embassy in Prague to seek asylum, Krenz anno

November 1989 that they could travel to West Germ

November, 50,000 East German citizens had c

Czechoslovak border to the FRG (bringing the GD

emigration to more than 200,000) and the entire 4

Council of Ministers, 6 led by premier Willi Stoph, a

the SED politburo had resigned] 

On 9 November the GDR lifted its travel ban m

Berlin Wall superfluous. ~ On 13 November, 477 o

member People's Chamber (Volkskammer) elected Ha

the new prime minister. 9 The Socialist Unity Party 

an "Action Program" outlining a number of politic

including round-table discussions with political parti

call for free elections which were held on 18 March 
y py

authority were unclear so the NPA was not always un

control. In addition, the GDR had the added compli

uncertainty resulting from the enormous (roughly 

division) Soviet Western Group of Forces (WGF) troop

During the domestic unrest leading to the revoluti

Germany, Defense Minister Heinz Kessler signed O

105/89 on 27 September 1989 which increased th

combat readiness along the borders, around Berlin, an

zig. I° During protest demonstrations in early October, 

ordered (on 7 October) that rubber truncheons 

ammunition be distributed to National People's Army s

support the People's Police and State Security Police 

sary. u Violence was averted only when Egon Krenz, 

politburo member in charge of security, flew to Leip

October) and unilaterally canceled Honecker's orde

allowing protesters to march unmolested. Egon K

replaced Erich Honecker as SED secretary on 18 Octob

During renewed tension, the SED politburo on 7 

1989 rejected by only one vote a proposal to put the N

streets. Despite the politburo vote, a group of hard

officers allegedly put troops and tanks on maximum 

situation relaxed only when moderates prevailed and 

government announced the opening of its borders and 

Wall on 9 November. x3 

Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann has alleged 

former Defense Minister Heinz Kessler ordered the 1st 

Infantry Division in Potsdam to "close" the wall on 11 

1989, the NPA General Staff withdrew the order. 

Kessler rejected Eppelmarm's allegation as false. ~5 

Theodur Hoffmann supported Kessler noting that d

"always revolved around support for the police in the se

but never around the deployment of the NPA against d
that is happening there is the sole concem of each 

country."lS 

When the People's Chamber replaced Willi Stoph 

Modrow as prime minister on 13 November 1989, 

elected Guenter Maleuda, of the small Democratic 

Party, to replace Horst Sindermann as People's 

president and replaced 27 members of the old P

Admiral Theodor Hoffmann replaced Heinz Kessler 

minister on 15 November and immediately made it q

that: "I am only accountable to my prime minister 

People's Chamber" (see Table 1 below)J 9 

On 18 November the People's Chamber confir

Modrow's new 28-member Cabinet which inc

communists and 11 members from four parties closel

the SED. The People's Chamber also establishe

commissions to consider constitutional changes, work 

for democratic elections, and investigate abuses and cor

former communist officials. The main consideratio

change Article 1 of the Constitution which assigned t

role to the Communist Party. 2° Despite these concessio

wave of popular anger at the abuses under Erich Honec

the Communist Party was thrown into disarray, and its 

collapsed on 3 December. 

Between mid-November and early December 1989

over the Government, the civil service, the police, and 

officially shifted away from the Communist Party to Pr

ster Hans Modrow and his Cabinet. In early Decemb

Gysi replaced Egon Krenz as SED secretary and Man

lach, of the Liberal Democratic Party, became head of 

thus head of the Defense Council. 21 As a result, contro

NPA now resided solely with the new Govemment an

Minister (Theodur Hoffmarm). In mid-December fi
() 

i 

I 

I NPA & 

BORDER GUARD 

(

I PEOPLE'S I COUNCIL OF 

CHAMBER MINISTERS 

' I 

Elections 

18 March 1990 

(H. Kessler) T. Hoffmann (11/89); 

R. Eppelmann (4/90) civilian 

• Accountable to PM and People's Chamber (11/

• Commission for Mil. Reform (11/89) 

National People's Army 

CoS (H.-W. Deim); T. Hoffmann (4/90

The issue of German unification was broached earl

one hand, in East Germany free elections were increas

as a prelude to some form of national plebiscite for reu

with the FRG. On the other hand, Chancellor Hel

presented a 10-point outline to the FRG Parliame

November 1989 for creating a German federation th

eventually lead to the reunification of the two Germa

The Soviet Union issued a harsh critique of the plan 

it as "fraught with dangerous consequences [and] bor

outright diktat. ''~ When East Germany's battered C

Party held its "first" round-table discussions with new 

political groupings led by New Forum on 7 December

agreed to adopt a new Constitution, hold free elections 

1990, and seek a formula for unifying the two Germa

When Kohl and Modrow met for the first time on 19 D
called for its dissolution claiming that the party had not 

itself radically enough and continued to pose a threa

Germany's stability, the SED-Party of Democratic 

(PDS) executive committee convened an emergency s

21 January 1990. Though SED leader Gregor Gysi m

prevent disbandment, he admitted that the SED had be

cessful in making the transition from Stalinism to d

socialism; and the SED expelled fourteen party leaders 

Krenz. 26 

With the SED's collapse, the East German Govern

experienced crisis. Prime Minister Modrow claime

could only maintain stability if the opposition jo

Communist-led coalition. On 29 January the oppositi

agreed to create a "grand coalition" on the condition tha

and all cabinet members renounced their party affilia

after the elections (which were moved up to 18 Marc

May), that the opposition get key cabinet posts, and 

round-table approve all legislation. 27 

At the 17 March 1990 Warsaw Pact Foreign 

session in Prague, all seven members of the Warsaw Pa

to Germany's right to unify, but they disputed the fo

tmification. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardna

against NATO membership for a united Germany, but 

Poland, and Czechoslovakia argued that a united Ge

NATO would benefit European stability! 

The 18 March 1990 democratic elections to the 

People's Chamber produced a resounding call for quick 

unification and a market economy by electing a co

conservative parties allied with the FRG's ruling 

Democrats. Of the 24 political parties in the People's 

the conservative three-party Alliance for 

co',dition-----comprising the Christian Democratic Unio
On 11 April 1990 he created a broad coalition gove

change the Constitution (which according to Article 6

two-thirds majority in the People's Chamber) 3° an

unification. De Maiziere named Rainer Eppelmann, 

who headed Democratic Awakening, minister of disarm

defense (Eppelmann accepted the position only on con

"disaralament" be in his title), 31 and appointed the form

minister, Admiral Theodur Hoffmann, to be the new N

of Staff. 

The drive toward German unification accelerated

March 1990 the FRG and GDR agreed in principl

economic and monetary union plans by the end of Ap

implement them on 1 July. The strategy was to sign 

which East Germany would adopt the FRG's tax laws, 

price subsidies for consumer goods, and give Bonn's Bu

authority over monetary affairs. 32 De Maiziere's 

unification involved invoking Article 29 of the FRG Co

that allowed East Germany's five separate states (la

apply directly to Bonn for admission to the FRG. 33 

required a change in the GDR Constitution because th

which were abolished by the Communists, had to be 

In July the People's Chamber recreated the laender stat

to facilitate unification. 34 

Though Lothar de Maiziere supported a unified G

the European Community (now Union) and NATO, a

with the FRG position that no NATO troops should be 

on East German territory, the Soviets still differed on th

for a united Germany. On 12 April the People's Cham

to approve NATO membership for a united Germany

if NATO were to change its strategy. 3s On 3 June 1

Gorbachev met with President Bush in Washington, the 

still unable to agree on Germany's role in NATO. IJl
unification within NATO formula, his concession to He

in July illustrated that he really had little choice in the m

reality, Soviet control had been ceded in November 1

the GDR failed to stabilize the domestic situation as a 

communist state; de facto unification occurred on 1 Jul

economic and monetary union of the two German s

addition, the Soviets had to decouple political unifica

the security issue when they conceded that all-German 

could occur irrespective of the Two-Plus-Four 

Germanies, plus the U.S., USSR, U.K., and France) a

which was signed on 12 September 1990. 37 

On 20 September the GDR People's Chamber vot

and the FRG Bundestag voted 442-47 to ratify a t

which the GDR would discard its Constitution and ad

all the FRG's laws when official unification occur

October 1990. When the People's Chamber diss

unification, 144 of its 400 members joined the FRG's 

Bundestag 39 until the new all-German parliamentary 

were held on 2 December 1990. Those elections retume

Kohl to power; Kohl's Christian Democratic Union coa

Hans Dietrich Genscher's Free Democrats controlled 3

Bundestag's 656 seats. 4° 

Armed Forces Reform 

East German armed forces reforms never had a 

fully develop between the initial riots in October 

unification. The Warsaw Pact's May 1987 so-called 

doctrine and Gorbachev's 7 December 1988 announ

unilateral reductions initially drove the National Peop

restructuring and reductions during 1988-1989. During 

June 1990, the collapse of SED control, free electio
Notes 

1. Barbara Donovan and Ronald Asmus, "Erich Honecke

and His Era," RFER, RAD Background Report/195 (19 Octo

2. On 29 September Hungarian foreign minister Gyula 

that the treaty with the GDR on returning refugees would be 

as long as there were East Germans in Hungary who did not 

back. 

3. Serge Schmemann, "Security Forces Storm Protest

Germany," The New York Times, 9 October 1989, pp. A1,6

4. Serge Schmemann, "East Germany Removes Hone

New York Times, 19 October 1989, pp. A1,8. 

5. Henry Kamm, "300,000 Reported To March," The 

Times, 24 October 1989, p. A14; Serge Schmemann, "A 

German Meets Two Leaders of the Opposition," The New Y

27 October 1989, pp. AI,11. 

6. For the role of the Council of Ministers, see Chap

Constitution of the German Democratic Republic (Berlin: In

113-114. 

7. Serge Schmemann, "East Germany's Cabinet Resigns

York Times, 9 November 1989, pp. Al,12. 

8. Barbara Donovan, "The Berlin Wall Comes Tumbl

RFER, RAD Background Report/205 (20 November 1989)

9. Craig R. Whimey, "Premier Is Chosen," The New Yor

November 1989, pp. AI,ll. 

10. Die Welt, 20 December 1990, p. 6. FBIS-WEU-

January 1991), pp. 20-21. 

11. Die Welt, 20 January 1990, p. 7. JPRS-EER-90-038 

1990), p. 23. 

12. Vienna Die Presse, 24 November 1989, p. 4. FBIS-E

(4 December 1989), p. 45. 

13. London Observer, 10 December 1989, p. 1. 
January 1990), p. 41. 

19. Theodor Hoffmann interview, National-Zeitung, 22 

1989, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-89-230 (1 December 1989), p. 66. On 

1990 Heinz Kessler was arrested for abusing his official p

using his office to commit crimin',d acts. 

20. Craig R. Whitney, "East German Assembly Accept

The New York Times, 19 November 1989, p. 1. 

21. Serge Schmemann, "East German Out As Chief of 

New York Times, 7 December 1989, pp. A1,20. 

22. Craig R. Whitney, "Berlin Communists Outline Plat

New York Times, 18 December 1989, pp. Al,14. 

23. Ferdinand Protzman, "Kohl Offers An Outline to Crea

eration," The New York Times, 29 November 1989, p. A1. 

24. Francis X. Clines, "Kohl's German Unity Plan Is 'D

Soviets Say," The New York Times, 6 December 1989, p. 1

25. Serge Schmemann, "Communists and Foes Agree 

East German Vote," The New York Times, 8 December 1989, 

26. "East German Party Expels 14 Leaders," The Washin

22 January 1990, p. 15. 

27. Marc Fisher, "E. Germany Broadens Rule, Moves 

The Washington Post, 29 January 1990, p. A1. 

28. East Berlin ADN, 23 March 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-057 

1990), p. 29. 

29. Report On Eastern Europe, 13 April 1990, p. 32. 

30. The Constitution of the German Democratic Republi

p. 110; Marc Fisher, "E. German Coalition Is Sought," The W

Post, 20 March 1990, pp, A 1,24. 

31. East Berlin Neue Zeit, 12 April 1990, p. 1. FBIS-EE

(18 April 1990), p. 22. 

32. Marc Fisher, "First Free Assembly Meets In E. B

Washington Post, 6 April 1990, pp. A1,30. 

33. Article 29 (New delimitation of Laender boundaries), 

For the Federal Republic of Germany (Bonn: Press and In

Office of the Federal Government, 1991), pp. 19-21. 
Press, 1991), pp. 189-206. 

38. Marc Fisher, "Germanies Approve Unity Pact," The 

Post, 21 September 1990, p. A18. 

39. Marc Fisher, "Two Germanies Merge Into 

Washington Post, 3 October 1990, pp. A1,28. 

40. The Social Democrats won 239 seats; the East Germ

nists, 17; and Alliance '90, 8 seats. Marc Fisher, "Gratef

Vote To Keep Kohi," The Washington Post, 3 Decembe

A1,21. 

41. The 12 September 1990 Kohl-Gorbachev agreem

ground rules for the new military posture and the details of 

wehr-NPA merger agreement. The all-German armed force

reduced to 370,000 by 31 December 1994, when the Sovie

would have withdrawn from Germany. On 30 June 

Bundeswehr Command East disbanded, the personnel stre

Bundeswehr in eastern Germany was 56,000 soldiers. Of 

32,000 NPA officers in September 1990, only 9,500 were 

in June 1991. Of these, 6,000 were granted two-year p

contracts. Only 4,000 would ultimately become permanen

to the Bundeswehr. 
gpp

table talks. The Polish United Worker's Party's 

recognized political and trade union pluralism in retu

creation of a powerful new office of president. The se

began with the communist party's overwhelming def

the June 1989 general parliamentary elections, in 

percent of the Sejm seals were contested and which al

in the 24 August 1989 election of Tadeusz Mazo

Poland's first non-communist prime minister. The t

commenced with the 9 December 1990 presidentia

which brought Lech Walesa to the presidency 

appointment of Jan Bielecki as the second non-commu

minister in January 1991. The fourth stage commence

full Sejm and Senate democratic elections held on 2

1991, which resulted in the rule of Jan Olszewski a

Suchochka as Poland's third and fourth non-commu

ministers. The fifth stage started after the fall 1993 

Senate elections, with the return of the socialists, the ap

of Waldemar Pawlak as prime minister, and constituti

in Poland. 

During the same period, Poland initiated an 

domestic defense reform--to ensure civilian com

control and extensive restructuring of the military an

the armed forces to the people. As it did so, Poland a

grapple with a rapidly changing threat environmen

1989, Polish military doctrine viewed the West, s

NATO, as the primary threat. Until the 14 Novem

Polish-German border treaty, Poland viewed Germany 

Then until the August 1991 failed coup and resulting 

tion of the USSR in December, Poland viewed the So

39 
To achieve democratic civil-military relations, Pol

establish consensus and law on civilian (president, gov

and Parliament) command and control of the defense 

and military, the former Polish People's Army (PPA). 

reform has included amending the Constitution to form

round-table agreements to create a new office of the pre

office which for a long period lacked a constitution

Poland still must clarify the lines of authority betw

president and government (prime minister and civilian 

minister) and of the govemment's control of the m

peacetime and war. So far, this effort has failed. 

In addition, the Polish reform had to refurbish the 

the military and retum the armed forces to Polish 

Because of the extensive use of Polish armed force

Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 

suppressing strikers on the Baltic coast in December 19

planning and implementing martial law in 1980-81,1 the m

reputation was tarnished in the population's estimation a

in its own eyes. 2 To refurbish its image, the reform 

remove Polish United Worker's Party (PUWP) hffluence 

defense establishment and ensure that Polish military f

sufficient to guarantee the integrity and sovereignty o

In this part of reform, Poland has been somewh

successful. 

First stage of constitutional reform (1988-June 19

unlike 1918, Poland's new leadership inherited empty 

'traditions.' As Andrzej Korbonski has argued, whe

reappeared after World War I (Poland disappeared from 

of Europe in 1795), Poland's political leadership inherit

political traditions. Having been formed from three 

empires-----German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian--an

no more than 60 percent of its population as Polish, Po
fights, as Norman Davies has noted: all chance o

democracy was nullified by the extra-constitutional 'le

of the Party and its National Front as the 'guard

state'...the People's 'Democracy' was a legal fiction. 

lay in the Party's dictatorship over the people. ''a 

When Poland began serious reform, it became im

apparent how hopelessly outdated was its 1952 Consti

example, Chapter 5, entitled "Supreme Organs of Stat

tration," gave Parliament the power to appoint the 

Ministers the prime minister, vice-premiers, and min

did not provide for a president. 5 Only in April 1989

months of round-table negotiations, did the Mieczyslaw 

government (which was formed in September 1988) an

Walesa-led Solidarity Union agree to restore Polan

chamber of Parliament--the Senate--which had been 

in 1946---with 100 members chosen in open and fre

and to liberalize voting regulations for 35 percent of t

Sejm. In retum, Solidarity agreed to institute an of

president with broad powers for foreign and security p

Table 2 below). 

According to the round-table agreement, 299 of 

460 seats were reserved for the PUWP and subserv

and 161 seats (35 percent) for the opposition. The ne

100-seat Senate was to serve as a higher deliberative 

veto power over the Sejm (though a two-thirds vote o

could override the Senate's veto) and, together with t

elect the president for a six-year term] 

During the communist period, the Polish Defen

(KOK) had been responsible for shaping the general 

of Polaud's defense capabilities but Poland had a pre-

history with such an organ of government. After the 

coup Marshal Pilsudski signed an executive order ap
I OFFICEOF I SEJM (460) 

PRESI DENT SENATE (100) 

I 

I OEPENSE COONC. I'- --I 

(4/89) sub to Sejm 

NAT. SEC. COUNCIL 

(1/91) sub to Pres 

I 

Elec

6/89 

12/9

10/9

(F. Siwicki) P. Kolodziejczyk (7/90); Jan Parys (12/91) 

2 dep civ MONs; Education (Komorowski) & Int Aft. 

(Onyszkiewicz} 4/90 

• Home Def Comm. (15); Pres, PM, MOI, MON, Finance 

• Sejm Comm. 1or Defense (20); Legis superv PPA 

• MON Soc. Consult. Council (PPA); inspec pol act. 

• Political Advisory Comm. (PM oversight) 

F ~P)A'~ Polish Armed Forces 

CoS (Joze~ Uzycki}; Zdzislaw Stelmaszuk (10/90) 

Committee for the Defense of the State to streamline hi

ment. In fact, the ultimate supragovemmental agency t

Poland's defense against Hitler's Germany was the 

Committee of the Republic (KOK) created by Presidenti

of 12 May 1936. 

Established in 1958 by a Council of Ministers' R

and accorded increased powers after 1967, the KOK sub

the defense and interior ministries to the PUWP. 8 D

Martial Law period, the KOK flexed its power 
principles of national defense, including defense doctr

KOK was now chaired by the President of the Republi

prime minister and the ministers of defense and foreig

deputies. It also includes the head of the President's 

minister of finance, intemal affairs, chief of the gener

minister heading the office of the Council of Ministe

The 21 February 1990 Polish defense doctrine, no

because of the Warsaw Pact's demise, emphasized tha

president and Parliament control Poland's Armed For

(T)he Superior of the Armed Forces is the Pr

of the Polish Republic. The Supreme Commande

Armed Forces...in wartime is appointed by the Se

In the event of war an appropriate oper

grouping remaining under national command and 

as part of the Combined Armed Forces...of the W

Pact, is isolated from within the Armed Forces 

Polish Republic. The authorities of the 

Republic...retain their influence on decisions affect

use of that grouping in consonance with n

interests. ~2 

Since 8 April 1989 Poland's president, not PUWP sec

acted as the de jure National Command Authority (N

chaired the Defense Council which became a collegial 

subordinate to the parliament. Although the A

arrangement initially did not change the de facto 

situation because PUWP leader Wojciech Jaruzels

Poland's president, the PUWP's power on the Defen

was curtailed. (De facto control did change in Dece

with Lech Walesa's election as president.) In sum, 

witnessed a number of amendments to the 1952 C
minimum number of votes in the Parliament to be electe

the appointment of Tadeusz Mazowiecki as Poland's f

communist prime minister in August, Poland's Parliame

to exert greater political influence and authority 

communist party began to disintegrate. 

During December 1989 the new Sejm and Senat

separate constitutional committees to draft new versio

entire charter. They also adopted on 29 December 1989 

Amendments to the Polish Constitution which restored 

"Republic of Poland" to the state and replaced the de

phrase "socialist state" with one describing Poland as 

cratic state." Many provisions of the 1952 Constitut

deleted; mnong them were those calling for protec

achievements of socialism, concerning alliances and f

and cooperation with the USSR, and the leading ro

PUWP. 14 

Concerned about oversight of the military, Solidarit

thizers also created a number of ad hoc oversight b

remove the communist party's influence and ensure gov

control over the defense ministry during 1989-1990. F

created a 15-person Home Defense Committee to ov

defense ministry. Chaired by the president, it included t

minister, the ministers of interior, finance, and defense

speakers of the Sejm and Senate/5 

Second, they created a Sejm Commission for Defen

supervised legislation pertinent to the military. Each o

Sejm Commission members, including many non-com

had the right to enter any military installation on dema

Third, in September 1989 the Poles created a mi

national defense (MON) Social Consultative Council, c

of all the political forces represented in the Sejm. The 

maintained advisory capacity and inspection autho
The Political Advisory Committee examined issues an

opinions and consultations on questions coming w

defense ministry's power. It was an advisory body w

authority to contradict the hierarchical command of th

Finally, on 3 April 1990 another significant step 

when Bronislaw Komorowski and Janusz Onyszkie

Solidarity intellectuals--became Poland's first civili

defense ministers, responsible for educational (formerl

training within tl~e maned forces and international milit

respectively. This extremely important reform r

Poland's first attempt to provide direct civilian over

two sensitive areas of defense policy. 18 

Between December 1989 and April 1990, M

dismantled the Main Political Administration (MPA) a

a Central Education Board, which was to depoli

military. Deputy Defense Minister Komorowski too

Central Education Board (renamed Department of Edu

April 1990, and assumed responsibility to depoli

supervise educational activities within the Polish Arm

Onyszkiewicz retained responsibility for all defense m

with the Warsaw Pact, which had maintained direct 

Polish forces through the then top secret Statute. H

responsibility for all other developing internationa

bilateral and multilateral ties, including those with 

NGF in Poland, Visegrad neighbors Hungary and 

slovakia, the WEU, and NATO. 

Then on 7 July 1990 Prime Minister Mazowieck

Defense Minister Fiorian Siwicki with Vice-Admiral Pi

ziejczyk, an officer rumored to be unsympathetic to t

Another important change occurred in October whe

Zdzsislaw Stelmaszuk was appointed Chief of the Gen

Stelmaszuk was the first Polish officer since World 
The third stage (December 1990-October 1991). 

stage in Poland's reform commenced with the 9 Decem

presidential elections which brought Solidarity lead

Walesa to power. Walesa immediately launched a new 

reform to strengthen the position of the executive by tra

powers from the still predominantly communist Sejm 

president. Hence this stage was marked riot just with in

tensions between President Walesa and Jan Bielecki, wh

Poland's second non-communist prime minister in Janu

but also between both houses of Parliament. During th

conflicts between the constitutional committees 

communist-dominated Sejm and Solidarity-dominate

grew to the point that they broke off all contacts with ea

First, Waiesa announced he would replace the 

Council (KOK) with a new organ, the National Security 

(NSC), which the Sejm finally accepted at the end o

Strikingly similar to the KOK, the president would 

Council's chairman, the prime minister his first deputy

foreign affairs and defense ministers would act as dep

addition, the ministers of interior and finance and hea

president's chancellery and office of prime minister we

bers. 22 To enhance Walesa's control, the President's Of

financed the NSC rather than the defense ministry. 23 

The 13 February 1991 inaugural NSC session asse

security needs of interior and defense and discussed Poli

relations, focusing on the Soviet troop withdrawal from 

On 22 May 1991, then NSC director Lech Kaczynski n

Walesa aimed to expand presidential and NSC powePs b

tive means. Walesa sought the powers to appoint a co

in chief of the Armed Forces in times of war and t

Poland's Armed Forces not just during periods pos

foreign threat. 25 
gp

these areas. Also to provide expert advice, Walesa 

advisory body under the NSC Secretary that included 

Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of the Office for State 

the commander of the Border Guard, and the under 

from the foreign affairs and finance ministries. 27 

Third, with the apparent intention of enhancing 

dent's role in state affairs, Walesa reorganized the 

employed in the Office of the President into four secr

expanded its political department. 28 

Tensions were also increasingly evident betwee

and Senate. In April 1991, the (Solidarity-domina

constitution committee presented its own draft c

outlining an essentially presidential form of gove

September the Sejm committee presented its dr

envisaged a parliamentary system with the President a

arbiter rather than as a chief executive. 29 Increasingl

with the Sejm, which the communists still controll

percent of the seats, Walesa wanted to acquire a non-

Parliamentary mandate for change and called for Sej

to be held two and a half years earlier than originally 

Though Walesa's efforts initially met resistance, he pr

Poland finally held elections on 27 October 1991. 

During the failed Soviet coup in August 1991 Po

its emergency machinery. Though Walesa saw n

convene the NSC during the crisis, 31 Jan Bielecki crea

cell to provide accurate information about unfold

increase cooperation between the govemment and 

Walesa, and prepare responses to all possible cont

Because Poland was the only Central European count

hosting Soviet troops within its borders, Poland 

relatively mild censure. 
restructure the armed forces; (3) rationalize the defense 

and (4) establish parliamentary oversight organi

According to Prime Minister Bielecki, the reform's aim

improve the army's image and credibility, to put the 

ministry under civilian control, and to make the armed 

separate, apolitical organization. 35 

On 11 March 1991 Deputy Defense Minister Onys

outlined the defense reform concept to the inter-m

commission. To make the defense ministry into a civil

of state administration, a civilian needed to head the 

three civilian deputy ministers would handle admi

matters, and the Armed Forces would concentrate on 

readiness. 

The president would appoint the military 

Inspector/Chief of the General Staff (COS) who report

to the defense minister. One intended result of the ref

that the separate administrative and command function

stabilize the defense ministry, because the CoS w

necessarily change with each new government as w

defense minister. Another reform intention was to re

3,000 career servicemen employed in headquarters to 1,5

and redistribute the excess to military units, thereby in

the percentage of professionals in the forces. 36 

The 22 April 1991 session of the inter-ministerial com

for reforms agreed that the Polish CoS General Inspec

Armed Forces--would become the supreme command

armed forces in wartime. In early June CoS St

announced the new organization of the general st

peacetime, the Polish CoS would have three deputie

deputy CoS for Strategic and Orga~fizational Plamfing, 

CoS of the Inspectorate for Training, and a deputy Co

Inspectorate of Logistics. The General Staff consisted 
cultural policy within the armed forces and for o

cooperation with the military chaplains' service; (2) a 

defense policy and planning, responsible for developin

policy and a long-range concept for developing the arm

to deal with Poland's extemal threats; and (3) a deput

for armaments and military infrastructure, responsib

defense industry and for delivery, repair, and upg

weaponry and material. 39 

The end of the third stage witnessed Walesa and 

locked in a struggle over election procedures for Pol

totally-free Parliamentary elections scheduled for Octo

Part of the bitter dispute involved designating the party 

of candidates; Walesa wanted Parliamentary candidates 

by name and pa~y while Sejm communists objected 

identification. On 21 June 1991 the communist-contro

rejected the Solidarity-dominated Senate's amendme

electoral procedures bill. When Walesa vetoed th

version, the Sejm overturned Walesa's veto one week 

sum, the communist-controlled Sejm dug in its heel

exerted influence. 

In reality the legislative-executive confrontation in

balance of power between the Sejm and president. T

46-member Extraordinary Constitutional Committee h

a new Polish Constitution to be considered by the new

Parliament. Article 49 of its draft Constitution cons

Sejm the "supreme organ [empowered] to make laws, 

other State organs and to control their activities. "4° T

elected Senate draft Constitution supported a presidenti

govemment. Walesa saw the communist-dominated S

impediment to his power and wanted its members rem

The fourth reform-stage (October 1991-Septemb

The fourth stage in Poland's reform commenced wi
Center Alliance, 44; Liberal Democratic Congress, 37

Accord, 28; Solidarity Trade Union, 27; and Polish F

Beer Party, 16. Eleven parties won one seat each. 41 

Now fully democratically elected, the new Par

coalition government led by Prime Minister Jan O

brought new legitimate tensions between presidential a

ministerial authority. These tensions were exacer

ambiguities resulting from the absence of a valid Constit

by the new, fully legitimate, but heavily fragmented 

coalition govemment seeking to exercise its authority (

3 below). 

The two draft constitutions prepared by the cons

committees of the former Sejm and Senate were set asid

new parliament was mandated to start the drafting pr

over again. The crucial factor in adopting an interim co

was the difficulty of constructing a working majority co

a parliament fragmented by 29 different parties with the 

a two-thirds majority of both houses of parliament for a

In the absence of a new constitution, Walesa con

press his executive powers to the limit. On 31 Decem

Walesa published a decree that outlined the compos

functions of the National Security Council (NSC), whic

the forum for exerting presidential control over def

security policy. Chaired by President Walesa, the NS

deputy chairman was Prime Minister Olszewski, and tw

chairmen being Defense Minister Jan Parys and Nationa

Bureau (BBN) Chief Jerzy Milewski. Other NSC 

included the Sejm and Senate speakers, the foreign, int

f'mance ministers, the chief of staff, and one of the secr

state in the president's chancellery. While the NSC 

consider matters relating to national security including 

public security and order, and security of citizens; the 
y g g 

Piotr Kolodziejczyk rather than make him the new 

Table 30lszewski Defense Reform, 1992 

PRESIDENT 

L. Walesa (12/90) 

PRIME MINI

J. Olszewsk

W. Pawlak (6

IOFFICEOF I I SEJM(460) 

PR ESIDENT SENATE (100) 

DEFENSE COUNCIL [J 

(4/89) sub Sejm 

NAT. SEC. COUNCIL 

(1/91) sub to Pres 

I 

CHIEFOF 

GEN. STAFF 

Stelmaszuk 

(10/90) 

COUNCIL O

MINISTERS 

I DEFENSE 

MINISTER 

J. Parys 

(12/91) 

DEP. MIN. 

INT. AFFAIRS 

Sikorski 

(2/92) 

E

10

Se

I 

DEP. MIN. 

EDUCATIO

Szeremieti

(2/92) 
As 1992 opened, it was clear that presidential auth

defense and security affairs was running on collision co

the govemment. Taking the offensive in January 19

director Jerzy Milewski argued that the president's auth

defense and security matters had to be expanded be

president was constitutionally responsible for these 

Milewski added that while the civilian defense minister 

concerned with nmning the army, the president needed

greater authority at the army command level...d

peacetime...[to include] the shape of the armed f

whether they are to be divisions or corps, how the

to be deployed, and what their combat parameters s

be... [and] to expand the range of general officer pos

directly appointed by the president. 48 

These different views rapidly came to a head. T

arose over different interpretations of presidential an

ministerial authority as well as over policy and p

differences. It ended with the resignation of the new 

civilian defense minister, exacerbated Polish civil-mili

ions, and brought the collapse of the new, thoug

government coalition. Though personality and policy d

existed between the president and government, the 

Poland lacked a valid constitution significantly contribu

crisis. The powers of the president, prime minister, an

ment need to be clarified and until such a constitution 

adopted, Polish defense reform can not be achieved. 

Between 19-24 March 1992 the Sejm deliberated on 

and means of preparing and adopting a new constitut

finally decided that the Parliament's Constitutional Co

would first adopt the constitution which would then be r
debate on relations between the Sejm and Senate, pres

prime minister, and Sejm and president erupted into a 

crisis when Defense Minister Parys alleged on 6 April 

the president's office had been planning new ma

contingencies 5~ and had illegally intervened in defense 

affairs, and that President Waiesa had sought the s

Silesian Military District Conu'nander, General Tadeus

by offering him General Stelmaszuk's position as Chief 

On 7 April Prime Minister Olszewski placed 

extended leave; and Romuald Szeremietiew becam

defense minister. On 25 April the Sejm established 

member commission to examine Jan Parys' allegation

the Sejm commission concluded that Parys' allegatio

politicians involving the Army in party games were "u

and detrimental to the state's interests, ''~ Parys 

President Walesa then asked Parliament to replace Olsz

26 May) and the Olszewski govemment fell. 

On 5 June 1992 the Sejm voted 273 to 119 f

Minister Olszewski's resignation and 263 to 149 for W

Pawlak to form a government. When Janusz Ony

became acting defense minister, he replaced Radek S

deputy defense minister and pledged to "restore good co

with the presidential office and the foreign ministry

cooperation was made evident when Onyszkiewicz a

Milewski announced on 26 June that they would impl

1991 defense ministry reform, which included the creat

post of General Inspector of the Armed Forces. 56 

After one lnonth of failed attempts by Pawlak t

coalition govemment, Hanna Suchocka became prime m

10 July. Suchocka retained Onyszkiewicz as defense mi

announced that the defense reform would continue; 

military command would be separated from the 
PRESIDENT 

L. Walesa (12/90) 

PRIME MINIST

J. Olszewski 12

W. Pawlak (6/92

H. Suchocka (7/

OFFICE OF 

PRESIDENT 

J. Milewski (1/91) 

NSC/NatDefCoun. '1 

(1/91) sub to Pres 

SEJM (460) 

SENATE (100) 

COUNCIL O

MINISTERS 

Electi

10/91 

Sena

I 

CHIEF OF 

GEN. STAFF 

T. Wilecki 

(8/92) 

I 

I DEP. MIN. 

STRATEGY 

P. Grudzinski 

(9/92) 

DEFENSE 

MINISTER 

J. Onyszkiewicz 

(6/92) 

I 

I 

DEP. MIN. 

TRAINING 

B. Komorowski 

(7/92) 

DE

LO

J. 
MD, MG Julian Lewinski to the Warsaw MD, M

Omatowski to the Silesian MD, and MG Zenon Bryk t

Krakow MD. 6° 

On 22 October 1992 Onyszkiewicz signed an o

restricted his activities to political management of th

ministry and put the general staff in charge of strictl

matters. The defense ministry now had three departmen

by deputy ministers; training (Bronislaw Komorowski

(Przemyslaw Grudzinski), and military infrastruc

Kuriata). Military intelligence and military courts 

directly to the defense minister. 61 Though for the mo

new govemment seemed to resolve the civil-milita

Onyszkiewicz' predecessor Romuald Szeremetiew crit

22 October 1992 reform, arguing that the Polish 

"enormous powers...[adding the CoS] has been granted 

powers by the president, so that he can now effective

the defense minister in military matters. ''62 

During this period, significant advances also occur

Constitutional front. On 1 August the Sejm mustered a t

vote to adopt a Small Constitution that introduced a p

presidential-parliamentary system defining relations be

legislative and executive branches of govemment. 

September the Senate voted not to reject the Small Co

and on 17 November 1992 Walesa signed the "Constitu

on Mutual Relations Between the Legislative and the 

of the Republic of Poland." 

The so-called Small Constitution voided the often

1952 Stalinist Constitution. The basic law set up a f

similar in many respects to the parliamentary model of 

although it gave the president many more powers. E

general elections (Article 29.2), the president has a veto 

a two-thirds Sejm vote for override, has the right to a
cannot recall the govemment and the prime minister m

with the president on the choice of foreign, interior, a

ministers. The Cabinet is responsible only to the Sej

the Sejm can dismiss it. 65 In sum, Poland's adoption o

Constitution created new rules for dividing power b

legislative and executive, enhanced the powers of th

and symbolically abrogated the 1952 Constitution. 66 

When the Small Constitution came into effect on 

8, 1992, it was designed as a provisional measure 

constitution could be written and then be enact

Parliament and ratified in a national referendum. The 

Senate held elections in October 1992 to the joint Co

Committee of the Parliament comprising 46-Sejm depu

Senators representing all the major parties and began w

constitution. Because of broad ideological differences 

committee, its leaders decided not to draft a new c

themselves, but wait six months for drafts to be su

them. In December Walesa also submitted to the Sejm 

a 49-article Bill of Rights and Freedoms to be p

constitutional law. 

By the Constitutional Committee's 30 April 199

seven draft constitutions had been submitted. 67 The t

synthesize them into a coherent whole. Unfortunate

significant progress could be made on the Consti

Suchocka govemment lost a parliamentary vote of no c

On 28 May, President Walesa dissolved the parli

empowered the govemment to act as caretaker until ne

could be held. As a result, all constitutional drafts 

submitted to the new Constitutional Committee after th

which were called for on 19 September. 68 

During this period, civil-military issues continued 

On 26 February 1993 President Walesa asked th
Security Council, which will be the presidents advis

and sanctioned the division of the defense ministry in

and military department. Tile Sejm Defense Comm

earlier objected to the National Guard claiming that it 

control it. 69 The deep-seated issue, though, was th

president's authority versus the government's authority 

armed forces. 

On 26 March 1993 Defense Minister Onyszkiewic

Sejm Defense Committee that the restructuring of t

Army and the General Staff was complete and now 

talking about adjusting the structure of troops deployme

strategic concepts. ''7° Elaborating, Onyszkiewicz said th

planned to redeploy its forces so 55 percent (rathe

percent) are in westem Poland and 45 percent in the e

end of 1995 despite the absence of suitable infrastructu

Onyszkiewicz also noted that during the next few 

Polish Army would be restructured along NATO lines

outdated army-division structure would be replaced by a 

brigade structure. Each division would compri

brigades----4wo of them "empty" (filled only on mobiliz

the third fully manned capable of entering combat 

hours. Each brigade would consist of 2,000 to 5,000 

would be equipped with the most modem equipment 

manufacture] 1 The pilot district for the structural refo

newly created Krakow Military District (MD), which 

two assault-landing brigades; each of the other three M

have one rapid-response unit. The Krakow MD's Sixt

Commando Brigade would become the embryo of the 

Rapid Deployment Forces. 

During the first three months of 1993 the defens

and General Staff reorganization was completed. 

financial and personnel services within the defense mi
research and development, arms procurement, and m

of infrastructure, rather quickly. Kuriata noted it was 

set up this department and separate jurisdictions with t

Staff's Inspectorate for Logistics because "we were cr

structures not known to the defense ministry before. '

NATO relations. Shortly after the second meeting 

Onyszkiewicz noted that Poland's "participation in pe

operations is of fundamental importance for bringin

integration closer. ''74 (Poland has maintained a 

peacekeeping battalion in Croatia since March 1992

May 1993 interview on Poland's prospects for joini

Onyszkiewicz noted: "I believe that there are no do

that. The question is only when and what kind of p

would be. ''75 

The issue of Poland's joining NATO became a m

when Boris Yeltsin visited Warsaw on 25-26 August 

joint declaration agreed that the last Russian troops w

Poland on 1 October (not 31 December) 1994. In fact, 

ceremony, which bid farewell to the last Russian s

occurred on 17 September, 76 coincided with the ann

the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 and was two d

the Polish elections. In addition, at a press conference 

of his visit, Yeltsin said that he understood Poland'

join NATO, that it was Poland's sovereign decision

taking part in the pan-European integration was not 

Russian interest. 77 Onyszkiewicz publicly noted that 

Poland's admission to NATO "that the case is almo

ble. ''78 Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka added that "[A

on membership and a timetable for Poland's acceptan

be taken at the Winter NATO meeting [January 199

Summit]...[adding that] if NATO fails to respond 

calls...this would be a failure of the effectiveness of th
military ann]. 8 

In letters to the heads of Western states (France, G

United Kingdom, and the United States), Yeltsin e

anxiety over plans for NATO's expansion. This led t

debate within the Alliance and to the 21 October m

NATO defense ministers at Travemunde, Germany w

issue of membership was deferred and the Parmership F

(PFP) program was endorsed for the forthcoming Janu

NATO summit. Central Europeans initially interpreted 

NATO effort to placate Russia. 

During the October 1993 crisis in Russia, 

interagency team was set up; Defense Minister Ony

claimed that "the situation is different now. ''81 He com

present situation to 1991, when Poland shared a comm

with the Soviet Union, Soviet troops were on Polish 

Poland was threatened with a wave of refugees. In re

fragmentary accounts of Russia's new defense doctri

claimed that Poland was bolstering its eastern border wi

Onyszkiewicz denied that "Poland is reinforcing its easte

by concentrating troops there" adding that evenly d

forces made good sense defensively. ~ 

In referring to the forthcoming elections, Ony

stressed that the Army was apolitical; that every servic

the right to run in the elections on the ticket of any pa

outside of areas administered by the Army. 84 As the 

heated up, there were numerous allegations that soldier

the election rules against campaigning in military u

garrisons. When Onyszkiewicz threatened to start di

action, the Army backed downJ 5 

The fifth reform stage. Poland's most recent sta

with the 19 September 1993 Parliamentary electio

brought a bitter setback for the parties that descen
Jacek Korun, and Hanna Suchocka ran a diant third 

percent of the vote and 74 Sejm seats. 86 On 26 

coalition of the SDP-PPA parties, with 36 percent of t

303 (66 percent) of the Sejm seats, chose Waldemar 

the PPA as prime minister. 8v 

One of the significant differences in Poland's 199

elections was the change in proportional representatio

1991 electoral system, with its low electoral threshol

electoral districts, produced no less than 29 differen

the Polish Sejm; none received more than 13 percent 

In contrast, Poland's new 15 April 1993 electoral law 

thresholds of 5 percent for single parties and 8 p

coalitions. Hence, the new electoral law succeeded in 

a less politically fragmented Sejm in 1993, since only 

or coalitions managed to win seats. 

Poland's extreme proportional representation did 

rapid succession of cabinets from December 1991 to 

1993; it had four premiers and goveming coalitions. 

parliamentary infighting and prolonged executive vaca

the rule, spelling institutional uncertainty. In contras

elections produced a coalition government of two 

parties. But the new electoral system also facilitated th

former communists to power and left almost 35 per

voters (mostly right-of-center) with no represe

parliament. The new electoral system also further poli

complicated the constitution-making process. 

Soon after the election, the Parliament form

Constitutional Committee. It again consisted of 46 de

ten senators, the majority of whom had entered Parliam

first time. At its first meeting the Constitutional 

elected as chairman Aleksander Kwasniewski, one of 

negotiators during the round-table talks in February-
In January 1994, the Constitutional Committee d

invite members of political parties, churches, unions, 

organizations to express their opinions. The selectio

continued through February and the major parties of 

announced that they would not participate. On 31 Janua

proposed that any group of 100,000 citizens should b

submit a draft constitution and have a representati

Constitutional Commission, but without voting righ

unprecedented act, the Sejm rejected Walesa's propos

February) on first reading. Insulted Walesa left the P

and withdrew his draft constitution and representative 

Constitutional Committee. Kwasniewski claimed that 

actions marked the opening of the presidential campai

To moderate the charged political atmosphere, on 

the Sejm changed the Constitutional Committee's m

endorsed the idea that any group of 500,000 could 

constitutional draft and directed the Constitutional Com

consider all seven drafts submitted to the 1989-1991 P

When the Senate accepted these changes in early Ap

the President. Then Kwasniewski announced his intenti

the Parliament adopt the Constitution and submit it 

referendum by the end of Spring 1995, so that the 

presidential elections could be held under the new law

By 20-21 June 1994 six draft constitutions were pr

the Constitutional Committee. On 5 September, the "

labor union submitted its own draft signed by nearly o

citizens. On 21-23 September the combined Sejm a

preliminarily accepted all seven drafts and sent th

Constitutional Committee, which is to prepare a con

debate and then write a unified draft for Pa

consideration. But problems immediately develo

Solidarity and with the Catholic Church. The p
PRESIDENT 

L. Walesa (12/90) 

PRIME MINIST

W. Pawlak (9/93

I OFFICE OF 

PRESIDENT 

I SEJM (460) 

SENATE (100) 

J. Milewski (1/91) 

H. Goryszewski (6/94) 

NAT. SEC. COUNCIL/ 

NAT. DEF. CTE KOK 

I COUNCIL O

MINISTERS 

I 

DEF. AF. CTE 

KSORM) 

Electio

9/93 S

Senat

I 

CHIEF OF 

GEN. STAFF 

T. Wilecki 

(8/92) 

1ST DEP MIN 

DEF & SOC AF 

J. Milewski 

(11/93) 

DEFENSE 

MINISTER 

P. Kolodziejczyk 

(10/93) 

I 

I 

DEP. MIN. 

LOGISTICS 

J. Kuriata 

(9/92) 

DEP

LEG. 

D. W

(4/
affairs and interior were slated to be assigned to candid

to President Walesa. Defense went to Admiral Piot

ziejczyk, who had already served as defense minister in 

first two Solidarity govemments before civilians Jan P

Janusz Onyszkiewicz took over in December 1991 a

Upon assuming office, Kolodziejczyk noted he was a 

minister and would...set an example of how a civilian m

national defense should work. ''89 He noted that the mo

issue that the Sejm would have to deal with was the ne

general defense duties, which would result in a 

distribution of powers in controlling the state's defense 

Kolodziejczyk added that before he accepted his present 

Waldemar Pawlak committed to back him on this pro

condition of accepting the job. 

On 8-9 November the entire national security l

attended a meeting dealing with security and defense. 

Staff Tadeusz Wilecki noted that there was an urgen

define the powers of the bodies that control the Arm

distinguish between the powers of the defense ministr

General Staff. Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk noted 

was an urgent need to define by law the functionin

defense ministry and create a clear demarcation bet

powers of the General Staff and civilian components. 

that the Armed Forces could not be restructured w

guarantee of necessary resources, nor could Poland joi

without adequate outlays to cover the costs to mode

Army. 91 In testimony to the Sejm Defense Committee K

czyk noted that because relocating troops to the ea

require "colossal expenses," it would be better to 

mobile forces. 92 

At a 17 November press conference Kolodziejczyk a

three defense ministry changes: (1) Jerzy Milewski, he
duplicate functions in the Army and National Securit

(2) He would reduce the size of the defense ministry 

more efficient. (3) He would transfer to the General S

areas of responsibility that have a bearing on the func

the armed forces. Not only would the General Staff no

of four inspectorates: training, logistics, strategic plan

organizatio~t/mobilization, it also would include specia

(intelligence and counterintelligence). 96 

Public concern about civilian control of the military 

evident when Jerzy Milewski defended the changes in th

ministry claiming they would preserve civilian contro

armed forces. Milewski argued that the notion that th

ministry was ceding control to the General Staff was u

the changes were "corrections in the organizational 

designed to more precisely define tasks and re

excessively large administration. He also added that t

civilian experts meant that the defense ministry de

would have to employ the military. 97 

On the same day, Walesa, Pawlak, Kolodziejczyk

and Milewski met to discuss coordinating actions be

president, prime minister, National Security Committe

Council of Ministers and defense ministry. 98 The proble

need to clarify problems created by existing laws. W

Small Constitution (Article 34) claims the president 

general leadership in Poland's intemal and external se

defines the National Security Council (RBN) as his 

body in security and defense, it does not define how he 

nor how the RBN relates to the KOK. In addition, th

the Popular Defense Obligation continues to include the 

Defense Committee (KOK), a legacy of the communi

Though the law states the KOK is the appropriate 

discuss defense and security, it does not explain how 
woud be esposbe to eecute te Ns decsos. 

would require legislative changes, including constitution

ions, the KOK asked the govemment to start the proc

By the end of January Kolodziejczyk was e

frustration with "new problems which I can not und

all ''1°° regarding the evolution of security institutions. 

that the Sejm needed to adopt appropriate constitutiona

provisions to define the scope of the president's a

minister's authority. Kolodziejczyk believed that it 

earlier agreed that the National Security Council wou

instrument where the president could influence the gov

activities in the area of defense; and that the prim

should form a Committee of Defense Affairs 

government's representatives in the Security Council) 

proposals to the Council of Ministers and develop legi

the Parliament. In addition, it was necessary to amend 

Constitution and the Law on General Duty of Defe

Republic to very precisely divide powers between th

defense minister and the General Staff. Kolodziejczyk 

that the prepared bills would be submitted to the Sejm i

but the reform stalled. 

One of the issues that also tested presidential ver

ministerial power was Pawlak's desire to introdu

ministers from the Polish Peasant Alliance and t

Democratic Party to the three presidential minis

coalition government saw Kolodziejczyk's expa

Milewski's duties as an attempt to prevent the coal

gaining access and influence in the defense ministry. 1

Initially Kolodziejczyk threatened to resign if th

introduced a political deputy minister in his mini

pressure increased, Kolodziejczyk noted that he was "o

coalition's choice of vice ininister [but] not a political c
defense budget, the Parliament instead decreased defen

and mandated the ministry to spend 300 billion zlotys 

Irydia aircraft for the Army. The defense minister note

defense minister is supposed to bear constitutional resp

for the Armed Forces' readiness....one must not tie his h

decisions on where and how money should be spent be

way one will not succeed ill making anything that wo

sense...Under the situation that has emerged, I will 

complaint before the Constitutional Tribunal. ''1°5 

Finally on 12 April 1994 the govemment decided 

a Committee for Defense Affairs, chaired by the prim

with defense minister as deputy, attached to the C

Ministers (KSORM). Kolodziejczyk hoped that the c

would reform the Army command structures to bring th

to European standards and to put in order the legal fo

for the functioning of the ministry and the Army. 1°6 

To a closed cabinet session on 4 May, Kolo

presented a document--"Defense Problems and Militar

of the Polish Republic's Security Policies"--that descr

to create a military post of Supreme Commander who w

constitutional responsibility for strictly military issue

training, mobilization and operational planning (which 

under the defense minister's purview). The document 

two supervision options for consideration: either the co

would report to the president or the defense minister. 

also envisioned creating a National Guard, but subordin

defense minister and not the president) °7 

On 19 May Prime Minister Pawlak presided ove

session of the Council of Ministers Defense Affairs C

(KSORM) to review Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk's 

on basic defense problems. First, on the issue of orga

changes in the Army, it proposed that the three 
concentration in the Kaliningrad salient. Third, Kolo

presented a report that assessed the technical conditi

Army as "dangerous" and called for greater budget 

ments. 10s 

When the government cabinet began to debate the 

to the military command structure on 24 May, Preside

insisted successfully that the govemment first submit t

plan to the National Defense Committee (KOK)--which 

and sees as the chief body for defense matters--befo

action. Walesa opposed subordinating the General In

the Armed Forces to the defense minister, placing him 

conflict with Kolodziejczyk. ~°9 The issue was so frac

when the KOK met on 7 June, it was unable to reach a

on which govemmental body had constitutional authorit

chief of the General Staff. "° 

A few days later, civil-military relations wer

tarnished when defense ministry spokesman Colonel 

Rozbicki wrote in Gazeta Wyborcza that Poland should 

signed CFE because it weakened the country and that sh

military information service WSI (intelligence and coun

gence) from the ministry's civilian structures to the Gen

was good, because it was "better for national security if 

minister does not have full information provided by 

Kolodziejczyk fired Rozbicki. 

In mid-June 1994 Jerzy Milewski resigned his p

head of the National Security Bureau (BBN), though h

his first deputy defense ministry portfolio, and Preside

named Henryk Goryszewski to the post. H2 When the 

on 22 June, it recommended the document "Fun

Problems of the Polish Defense System" to the C

Ministers. This document was similar to Kolodziejczy

document with one significant exception; it om
training ground and President Walesa polled the gener

on Kolodziejczyk's competence. 

When the issue was investigated by the Sejm 

committee, General Wilecki, when asked about car

orders of the civilian defense minister, said: "I always 

will continue to do so." Kolodziejczyk countered, "I 

statement. I will present to a special commission thos

which General Wilecki did not carry out my orders." In 

to the question whether President Walesa asked the g

Drawsko to vote for or against Kolodziejczyk, Wilecki 

not thir& there was a vote." Kolodziejczyk counte

president ordered a vote [on the question should th

minister be dismissed]. All hands except two went up

in a letter, Walesa admitted that after he asked the gene

reforms within the army at Drawsko, he decided 

personnel changes and ask Kolodziejczyk to resign. 

In an interview after the incident, former Defense 

Janusz Onyszkiewicz noted that the General Staff 

presidential control; that after the 1993 elections and p

had been dissolved, that various orders that he issued 

minister were "either blocked or slowed [by the Gene

It was stalling for time. ''n6 On the issue of Kolod

possible resignation, Onyszkiewicz noted that the prim

should reject it; if he did not, it would indicate that 

forces had successfully exerted influence on the appoi

the defense minister and thus were politicized. ~17 In oth

at Drawsko the Army appropriated the powers of p

when they voted to recall the minister. 

When Walesa asked Kolodziejczyk to tender his re

the defense minister, after talking with Prime Ministe

and Sejm defense committee members, initially refused

October Kolodziejczyk noted the importance of the issu
ppj

clarify the conflict. According to the bill, the presid

exercise authority through the defense minister in pe

political and administrative matters, but through the g

on command matters in peacetime and through the co

in-chief during war. TM 

On 4 November the Sejm Defense Committee 

Jerzy Szmajdzinski armounced that the Committee a

report on the Drawsko affair (by a vote of 18 to 6) tha

all of the sides involved in the dispute. It concluded t

discrepancies in individual accounts, the generals at Dr

not disobeyed Koiodziejczyk, but they did criticize h

ministry. Though the report also criticized some asp

functioning of the defense ministry and expressed con

"autonomy of the military command structures," it d

sufficient grounds for Kolodziejczyk's resignation. 122 

criticized President Walesa for "violating civilian and 

control over the military ''~23 adding he should exerc

through the govemment and the defense minister. For

defense minister and Sejm deputy Bronlslaw Komoro

that the Drawsko affair "was very disquieting. It has n

the nature of a military coup, but this does not 

seriousness should be underestimated. ''~ 

During the next month the tug of war contin

November the president refused to meet with the defen

claiming he had lost confidence in Kolodziejczyk. 12s T

Kolodziejczyk proposed a list of candidates fo

promotion (only the defense minister has the right 

candidates), Walesa rejected six of the candidates w

the civilian defense ministry. Finally, on 10 Novemb

acting on a request from Prime Minister Pawlak 

Kolodziejczyk for falling to "implement KOK 
y

billion more for implementing the program. 127 

Tension between the president and parliament con

escalate over budgetary issues and the evolving pr

campaign for elections in the fall of 1995. Tensions b

severe that Walesa began to threaten to dissolve the P

In an effort to head this off, the PPA-SDP coalition att

seek a truce with the president (to get him to accept t

in exchange for defense minister appointment) until 

presidential elections are heldJ 28 

The 21 December 1994 meeting brought no a

because just before the session Walesa vetoed the la

budget. The coalition, feeling betrayed, then proposed 

the Small Constitution in order to restrict the presiden

appointing ministersJ 29 With 284 votes, the Sejm o

Walesa's veto on wages; and then Walesa placed an app

Constitutional Tribunal. 13° 

As 1995 opened, in what some saw as the openi

presidential campaign, the presidential-governmental feu

to bring the country to total crisis. When Foreign 

Olechowski resigned, Walesa demanded that Pawlak 

resignation and that he accept Walesa's nomination of 

Okonski to be defense minister. The coalition had pu

Longin Pastusiak, who had been a PUWP (commun

deputy during the Martial Law period. The coaiition th

to unravel when SDP leader Kwasniewski announc

January that it was necessary to restructure the go

because of ineffectiveness of some ministers. When Pa

with Walesa on 16 January, the president agreed 

Olechowski's resignation, but refused to accept Past

defense. Walesa expressed his view that the vacancie

ministries were undermining state stability. 
defense ministry. 

On the same day in a Sejm speech, acting defens

Milewski discussed two major defense requiremen

establish legal regulations for the defense ministry; 

establish a model for drafting annual defense budgets 

create rational planning for Armed Forces development

presented three funding variants to the Sejm: (1) If 

guaranteed 3.5 percent of GDP, the defense mini

develop a force of 234,000; (2) If defense got 3 percen

manpower would be reduced to 200,000; and (3) if 

was similar to 1995 (about 2.5 percent) the force 

160,000. Milewski proposed gradually increasing the b

2.5 percent to 3 percent in the year 2000, which woul

Army of 180,000 in times of peace and adequate re

mobilization if necessaryJ 32 

Anticipating Walesa's move, on 20 January the Se

a constitutional amendment that, in the event of a p

dissolution order, would keep the Parliament in session 

new elections. (Poland had no sitting Parliament f

months following the 1993 no-confidence vote 

Suchocka's government). Walesa then demanded th

appoint new defense and foreign ministers and warn

would take "decisive steps to prevent the pa

government" if the new deadline were not met. t33 Wh

relentlessly kept up the attack now claiming that h

confidence in Pawlak, the prime minister resigned. 

government collapse, the SDP-PPA coalition began 

form a new govemment. 

The civil-military crisis resulted from Poland's 

delegate authority between the president and governm

the Sejm Defense (Commission and Committee's) i

exercise effective oversight. TM It also demonstrated th
pypp

brought the military an independence not found anywh

Central Europe. In fact, even though the Sejm co

criticized Walesa for Drawsko, it remained silent when

Drawsko affair Walesa awarded bonuses to the three to

who participated; Chief of Staff Wilecki, Deputy Chie

Leon Komomicki, and Zdzislaw Omatowski, comman

Silesian MD. 136 True, parliament has exercised some 

the military through constrained defense budgets; b

demonstrated little other supervision over its admi

particularly in failing to reform the law. 

It is clear that a constitution, which effectively li

institutions in existing law, is the necessary condition to 

proper control of the military in Poland. Also it is cle

Polish military does not yet effectively cooperate with th

defense ministry and that the military is politicized. 

Polish Constitution must effectively define the apolitic

the Army. None of this can be achieved until Poland 

new constitution, which is unlikely to occur before t

1995. 

Notes 

1. For a good discussion, see Les Griggs, "The Polis

Army," in Jeffrey Simon (ed.), NATO-Warsaw Pact Force M

(Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1988), pp. 

2. See Ryszard Kuklinski, "The War Against The Nation 

The Inside," Kultura (Paris), No. 4 (April 1987). 

3. Andrzej Korbonski, "Civil-Military Relations In Polan

the Wars: 1918-1939." Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 

(Winter 1988), pp. 173-176. 

4. Norman Davies, God's Playground: A History of Pola

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 580-581
9. l"ygodnik Solidarnosc, 16 February 1990, p. 17. FBI

070 (11 April 1990), p. 40. 

10. Gen. Zenon Poznanski interview, Trybuna, 28 Mar

2. JPRS-EER-90-086 (18 June 1990), p. 22. 

11. Polish Army: Facts and Figures (In the Transit

(Warsaw: Ministry of National Defense, 1991), pp. 9-12. 

12. "Defense Doctrine of the Polish Republic," Zolnier

26 February 1990, pp. 1-8. JPRS-EER-90-038 (26 March 1

13. Polish Army: Facts and Figures (Warsaw: Ministry 

Defense, 1990), p. 9. 

14. Republic of Poland~Constitutional Changes (Mim

Embassy Washington DC). 

15. Polish Army: Facts and Figures, (1990), pp. 11-12

16. MOND Florian Siwicki 18 September 1989 speec

Wolnosci, 26 September 1989, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-89-188 (29 

1989), p. 50. 

17. Warsaw PAP, 13 December 1989. FBIS-EEU

January 1990), p. 70. 

18. For a discussion of the significance of these appoin

Thomas S. Szayna, The Military in a Post-Communist Pola

N-3309-USDP, 1991, p. 26. 

19. See Szayna, The Military in a Postcommunist Pola

pp. 33-34. 

20. John Tagliabue, "Poland's President To Step Down

York Times, 20 September 1990, p. A8. 

21. Jerzy Milewski interview, Warsaw Glob, 24-26 Ja

p. 2. JPRS-EER-92-023 (2 March 1992), p. 13. 

22. Warsaw PAP, 24 January 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-016 

1991), p. 48. 

23. Warsaw PAP, 3 January 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-O03 

1991), p. 18. 

24. Warsaw PAP, 13 February 1991. FBIS-EEU-9

February 1991), p. 38. 
1992), p. 2. 

30. Warsaw Domestic Service, 22 February 1991. FBIS

037 (25 February 1991), p. 43. 

31. Warsaw PAP, 20 August 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-162 (

1991), p. 20. 

32. Jan Bielecki interview, Le Figaro, 22 August 1991, p

EEU-91-165 (26 August 1991), pp. 23-24. 

33. Lech Walesa interview, Polska Zbrojna, 1-3 February 

1,2. FBIS-EEU-91-024 (5 February 1991), p. 36. Walesa rece

approval in July 1991. 

34. Warsaw TVP Television, 25 February 1991. FBIS-EE

(26 February 1991), p. 27. 

35. Report On Eastern Europe, 8 March 1991, p. 50. 

36. Janusz Onyszldewicz interview, Polska Zbrojna, 2

1991, pp. 1,3. JPRS-EER-91-065 (14 May 1991), p. 43. 

37. Zdzislaw Stelmaszuk interview, Polska Zbrojna, 7-9 

pp. 1,5. JPRS-EER-91-104 (15 July 1991), pp. 37-38; 40-41

38. Warsaw PAP, 8 July 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-131 (9 J

p. 31. 

39. Stelmaszuk interview, 7-9 June 1991, op. cit., pp. 4

40. Walter J. Oleszek, "Parliamentary Developments i

CRS Review (August 1991), p. 32. 

41. Warsaw TVP, 31 October 1991. FBIS-EEU-9

November 1991), p. 8. 

42. Warsaw PAP, 10 January 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-O09 (

1992), p. 27. 

43. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 3 January 1992, p. 1. FBIS

006 (9 January 1992), pp. 24-25. 

44. Warsaw Rzeczpospolita (8-9 February 1992), p. 1. F

92-029 (12 February 1992), p. 21. 

45. Warsaw TVP, 13 February 1992. FBIS-EEU-92

February 1992), p. 23. 

46. Warsaw Radio, 12 February 1992. FBIS-EEU-92

February 1992), p. 11. 
51. "A New Martial Law?", Nowy Swiat, 9 April 1

General Stelmaszuk later verified the text in an interview

Swiat, 11-12 April 1992, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-92-075 (17 April 

52. Warsaw TVP Television, 9 April 1992. FBIS-EEU

April 1992), p. 20. General Tadeusz Wilecki noted that M

him that his candidacy was being considered but den

political support was demanded in return. Warsaw PAP, 16 

FBIS-EEU-92-075 (17 April 1992), p. 21. Milewski support

side. See Jerzy Milewski interview, Rzeczpospolita, 11-12 

pp. 1,3. JPRS-EER-92-048 (20 April 1992), pp. 38-39. 

53. Warsaw PAP, 25 April 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-08

1992), p. 20. 

54. Warsaw PAP, 15 May 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-09

1992), p. 10. 

55. Warsaw PAP, 8 June 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-112 (10 

p. 26. 

56. Warsaw PAP, 29 June 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-125 (29 

p. 3O. 

57. Warsaw Third Program Radio, 15 July 1992. FBIS-

(16 July 1992), p. 30. 

58. Warsaw TVP, 22 July 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-142 (23 

p. 21. 

59. Polska Zbrojna, 6 August 1992, pp. 1,2. FBIS-EEU

August 1992), p. 24. 

60. Slowo Polskie, 28 September 1992, p. 3. FBIS-EEU

October 1992), p. 17. 

61. Warsaw TVP, 22 October 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-206 

1992), p. 23. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 206 (26 October 

On 30 June 1992 Janusz Onyszkiewicz replaced Gen

Sobolewski with Colonel Boleslaw Izydorczyk as head 

intelligence. Warsaw PAP, 30 June 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-

1992), p. 20. For a good review of the various reforms 

intelligence, see Warsaw PAP, 2 January 1993. FBIS-EE

January 1993), p. 49. 
66. "A Little Constitution in Poland," East European Con

Review, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Fall 1992), pp. 12-13. 

67. Warsaw PAP, 30 April 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-083 (3 M

p. 33. 

68. When the parliament was dissolved in May 199

member Sejm extraordinary commission had only adopted se

49 articles. See Andrzej Rzeplinski, "The Polish Bill of R

Freedoms," East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 

(Summer 193), p. 26. 

69. Warsaw PAP, 26 February 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-038 

1993), p. 28; and Gazeta Wyborcza, 27-28 February 1993, 

EEU-93-040 (3 March 1993), p. 30. 

70. Warsaw PAP, 26 March 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-059 (

1993), p. 20. 

71. Gazeta Wyborcza, 27-28 March 1993, p. 2. FBIS-EE

(31 March 1993), p. 20. 

72. Janusz B. Grochowski, "The Military Is Getting Rest

Polska Zbrojna, 29 March 1993, pp. 1,5. 

73. Deputy defense minister Jan Kuriata interview, Polska 

27 April 1993, pp. 1-2. Kuriata noted that his department w

from the Main Technology Institute and the Old Quartermaste

Some of these were integrated into the defense ministr

dissolved resulting in a reduction of 450 positions. JPRS-EE

(10 June 1993), p. 16. An added problem was the scarcity of 

arms acquisition. In 1993 the defense ministry had funds fo

new tanks from Labedy Mechanical Factories. Polska Zbroj

1993, p. 3. JPRS-EER-93-083 (13 August 1993), p. 19. 

74. Defense Minister Janusz Onyszldewicz, Trybuna, 

1993, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-93-067 (9 April 1993), p. 17. 

75. Janusz Onyszkiewicz interview, Warsaw Radio Zet

1993, FBIS-EEU-93-105 (3 June 193), p. 20. 

76. Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network, 18 September 19

EEU-93-180 (20 September 1993), p. 30. During the previ

years, about 60,000 servicemen and civilians of the Northern 
80. Warsaw PAP, 15 September 1993. FBIS-EEU-9

September 1993), p. 20. 

81. Warsaw TVP, 5 October 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-192 

1993), p. 15. 

82. Warsaw PAP, 18 October 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-201 

1993), p. 25. 

83. Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz press conference, W

12 July 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-132 (13 July 1993), p. 16. 

officers and two conscripts ran for Sejm and Senate seat

officers ran on the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms (B

officer and one soldier for the Coalition for the Republ

Democratic Left Alliance, and the rest for Polish Peasan

others. Warsaw TVP, 25 August 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-164 

1993), p. 14. 

84. Poznan Wprost, No. 30 (25 July 1993), p. 18. 

85. Warsaw PAP, 13 August 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-156 

1993), p. 18; also Zbigniew Skoczylas interview, Gazeta W

October 1994, pp. 10-11. FBIS-EEU-94-200 (17 October 1

86. The Union of Labor (UP) won 7.3 percent of the v

Sejm seats. Not counting the German minority with 0.7 per

has a handful of 4 guaranteed seats, only two other parties e

5 percent threshold and 8 percent for coalitions---the Confe

an Independent Poland (KPN) 5.8 percent and 22 seats an

Party Bloc in Support of Reforms (BBWR) 5.4 percent an

endorsed by Lech Walesa. For an excellent assessment of t

see Aleksander Smolar, "The Dissolution of Solidarity," 

Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January 1994), especially pp. 7

87. In the 100-seat Senate the SDP won 37 seats and t

88. For a good discussion, see Wiktor Osiatynski, "Pola

tutional Ordeal," East European Constitutional Review, V

(Spring 1994), pp. 29-38. 

89. Warsaw Rzeczpospolita, 27 October 1993, p. 2. FB

207 (28 October 1993), p. 21. 
September 1993, p. 2. 

91. Polska Zbrojna, 9 November 1993, pp. 1,2. FBIS-E

(12 November 1993), pp. 20-24; and Kolodziejczyk press 

Rzeczpospolita, 18 November 1993., pp. 1,2. FBIS-EEU-

November 1993), pp. 25-26. Kolodziejczyk's position 

suggested continuity with the previous government. He n

not a skeptic as far as our road to NATO is concerned; I wa

am a realist. We must strive to achieve that goal because 

alternative." Polska Zbrojna, 2 September 1993, p. 2. 

92. Rzeczpospolita, 10-11 November 1993, p. 3. FBIS-E

(10 November 1993), pp. 37-38. 

93. On the same day both deputy defense ministers P

Grudzinski and Bronislaw Komorowski resigned. 

94. Warsaw Polska Zbrojna, 18 November 1993, pp. 

EEU-93-227 (29 November 1993), pp. 19-20. 

95. Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk interview, W

Television, 23 January 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-018 (27 Januar

28. 

96. Poznan Wprost, No. 16 (17 April 1994), p. 34. FBI

120 (22 June 1994), p. 14. 

97. Warsaw PAP, 17 January 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-014 

1994), p. 6. 

98. Warsaw PAP, 17 November 1993. FBIS-EEU-9

November 1993), p. 15. 

99. Warsaw PAP, 26 November 1993. FBIS-EEU-9

November 1993), p. 18. The goal was to amend the Small C

to grant executive, not just advisory, powers to the RBN w

replace the KOK. National Security Bureau chief Jerzy 

interview, Warsaw TVP, 14 February 1994. FBIS-EEU-9

February 1994), pp. 36-37. 

100. Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk interview, Rz

ira, 26 January 1994, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94-O04 (1 February 1

101. Poznan Prost, 13 February 1994, p. 6. JPRS-EER-9

March 1994), p. 18. 
preferred to spend the 300 billion zlotys for Huzar helicop

restructured armed forces. See, Warsaw PAP, 15 June 1

EEU-94-116 (16 June 1994), pp. 16-17. 

106. Warsaw Radio Warsawa Network, 12 April 1994. 

94-071 (13 April 1994), p. 25. 

107. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 3 May 1994, p. 2. FBI

088 (6 May 1994), p. 27. 

108. Warsaw Polska Zbrojna, 20-22 May 1994, pp. 1,2. 

94-099 (23 May 1994), p. 21. 

109. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 98 (25 May 1994), p. 

PAP, 24 May 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-101 (25 May 1994), p. 

110. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 107 (8 June 1994), p. 

111. Colonel Wieslaw Rozbicki, "We Have Disarmed O

Our Own," Gazeta Wyborcza, 9 June 1994, pp. 12-13. FB

116 (16 June 1994), p. 16. 

112. Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network, 14 June 1994. 

94-114 (14 June 1994), p. 22. 

113. According to BBN chief Henryk Goryszewski. War

Wyborcza, 23 June 1994, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-94-122 (24 June 

17-18. 

114. It should be remembered that during Jan Pary

defense minister, in March 1992 Walesa had met with Gene

who was commander of the Silesian Military District, and, 

defense minister's knowledge, offered Wilecki the CoS 

Zbigniew Skoczylas interview, Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 

1994, pp. 10-11. FBIS-EEU-94-200 (17 October 1994), p. 

115. Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 11 October 1994. 

94-197 (12 October 1994), p. 27; and Warsaw Zycie W

October 1994, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94-198 (13 October 1994), 

116. Janusz Onyszkiewicz interview, Warsaw Zycie 

October 1994, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94-195 (7 October 1994), p

117. Ibid., p. 38. 
listunent of a special inspection team on the general staff (to r

defense ministry Control Department) without his consent; t

staff's refusal to turn over the Conference Center in Wars

ministry; excluding civilian defense ministry officials from 

ceremonies in military units, etc. Warsaw Zycie Warszawy, 1

1994), p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94-201 (18 October 1994), pp. 27-28

120. Warsaw PAP, 27 October 1994. FBIS-EEU-94

October 1994), p. 11. 

121. Warsaw PAP, 27 October 1994. FBIS-EEU-94

October 1994), pp. 10-11. 

122. Ibid. 

123. Warsaw PAP, 4 November 1994. FBIS-EEU-9

November 1994), p. 11. 

124. Bronislaw Komorowski interview, Poznan Gazeta P

26 October 1994, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-94-214 (4 November 199

125. Warsaw TV Polonia, 7 November 1994. FBIS-EEU-

November 1994), p. 25. 

126. Warsaw PAP, 10 November 1994. FBIS-EEU-94

November 1994), p. 20. 

127. Interview with Grzegorz Kolodko, finance ministe

Polska Zbrojna, 25-27 November 1994, pp. 1-2. FBIS-EEU-

December 1994), pp. 17-18. 

128. Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 12 December 1994, p

EEU-94-238 (12 December 1994), p. 22. 

129. Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 21 December 1994. F

94-246 (22 December 1994), pp. 21-22; and Warsaw TV 

Network, 22 December 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-247 (23 Decem

p. 19. 

130. Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 23 December 1994. F

94-248 (27 December 1994), p. 14; and Warsaw Radio 

Network, 28 December 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-249 (28 Decem

p. 12. 

131. Lech Walesa address to Sejm, Warsaw Radio 

Network, 19 January 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-013 (20 January 19
Kolodziejczyk interview Warsaw Gazeta Wyborcza, 28 Dece

p. 13. FBIS-EEU-95-O03 (5 January 1995), p. 15. 

135. One area involved the transfer of some elements 

intelligence (WSI) to the General Staff from the civili

ministry. Another involved transfer of the powers of th

Department of Education to the military under the con

civilians would control educational activities (through t

minister) in early 1994. But as Drawsko demonstrated, t

Staff was supported by the president, and circumvented 

minister. Zycie Warsawy, 10 January 1995, p. 2. FBIS-E

(11 January 1995), p. 13. 

136. Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 11 January 1995. FBI

008 (12 January 1995), p. 19. 
y gg y

led by Lech Walesa and indigenous institutions--the C

Solidarity--from the outside with the effective cooper

corrupt party apparatus) 

In Hungary, with thc Hungarian Socialist Work

(HSWP) influence waning as a result of years of deepe

within the party apparatus and economic degenerat

country, communist reformers inside the system e

Hungary's reform in league with outside opposition. 

previously disunited Hungarian opposition reconciled 

ences, the HSWP reform leadership committed itself to 

transition to a democratic multi-party system. 

A major step toward coming to grips with 

communist past occurred on 16 June 1989 when ove

people took part in public funeral services for Imre 

had been executed three decades earlier. Over th

Hungary began to dismantle the "iron curtain" on i

border, and in September opened the border for Eas

refugees to travel to the Federal Republic of Germany

above, this action sparked the exodus of East Germ

West, and ignited the revolution in East Germany 

domino effect in Czechoslovakia. 

During the summer and early fail the HSWP's r

negotiations with eight opposition parties resulted 

September accord which cleared the way for m

elections. At the 6-9 October 1989 HSWP Congress 

wing of the HSWP led by Imre Pozsgay transfo

discredited HSWP by changing its name to the 

Socialist Party (HSP) and adopting a progressive pro

embraced multi-party parliamentary democracy, respe

83 
y , gg 

command. 

After the first free Parliamentary elections were 

March 1990, 2 the two major winners--the Hungarian D

Forum (MDF) with 165 of the Parliament's 386 

Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD) with 92 seats--form

in late April and a new non-communist government w

into power on 23 May 1990. Under terms of the a

Jozsef Antall, a member of the MDF, became prime 

The first stage of Hungary's revolution was completed 

1990, when Parliament elected Arpad Goncz, of t

president. 

The second stage of Hmigary's revolution comm

relations between the two parties worsened during th

1990 and through 1991. Significant MDF-AFD d

developed over spheres of authority between the prime 

and president; these were challenged and resolve

Constitutional Court. 

The third stage commenced after the government's s

Constitutional Court challenge at the end of 1991. In 19

defense reform was then implemented to redress the effe

1 December 1989 reform, and the MDF significantly tig

political control over the defense ministly and other ke

ment institutions. 

The fourth stage began with the May 1994 parli

elections which returned the Hungarian Socialist Party 

power. The new challenge became to write a constitutio

the Hungarian electorate would consider legitimate. 

Step-by-Step Defense Reform 

As in Poland, the purpose of Hungary's defense reform 

to establish civilian [parliament and government] comm
sufficient to guarantee the integrity of Hungary, and to 

armed forces to Hungarian society. 

Under the old system, Hungarian national security 

in Poland) was formulated by a small group heade

HSWP First Secretary in his capacity as president of th

Council, and in the HSWP Central Committee by the s

charge of national defense, with perhaps the additi

commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the defens

In July 1989 Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth n

Hungary's new national defense policy must make cle

national armed forces were in the hands of democra

under appropriate and strict control. When asked at the 

was commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Nemeth 

that "it is not possible at present to give an unequivoc

this. ,,3 

During 1989 the communist-dominated Ministry 

drafted an entirely new Hungarian Constitution (to su

1949 communist Constitution), based upon the 

articulated at the round-table talks which took place in 

The parliament which passed that constitution in Oct

was still dominated by members of the communist pa

According to constitutional changes in Octob

National Assembly representatives are elected for four-y

as is the president, who is elected by the National Ass

is commander-in-chief of the armed forces/ Only Par

entitled to make decisions concerning the use of t

forces/ According to Article 19 of the Constitution, th

Assembly has the power to declare the state of 

conclusion of peace. In the event of war, it declares 

emergency and sets up the Defense Council. If the 

Assembly is unable to convene, the president assu

powers. 
defense ministry into two separate entities; a defens

subordinate to the prime minister, and a Comman

Hungarian Army (HA) subordinate to the president (se

below). 9 When the defense reform was announced, th

government's intention was to take the armed forces, w

then were under direct party command, and remove t

the direct influence of the future noncommunist go

which was expected to exercise power following the th

pated March 1990 multiparty elections. 

The new reform was clearly intended to put the arm

under communist control by removing the core of 

cadres from the defense ministry and placing them 

Commander of the Hungarian Army subordinate to the 

As a result of the reform, the president--who at the 

assumed would be communist-reformer Imre Pozsgay

the commander-in-chief of the army. Whereas in m

Parliamentary systems a clear line of authority exists fr

minister to defense minister to chief of staff, after the 

1989 Hungarian defense reform the line of authority we

from the president to Commander of the Hungarian Ar

chief of staff, with the govemment basically out of th

command. 

One unfortunate result of the reform was increase

between the president and the govemment (prime mi

defense minister). Subordinate to the prime ministe

elections Miklos Nemeth, Jozsef Antall of the MDF 

Council of Ministers is the defense minister (then Feren

after May 1990 an MDF civilian Lajos Fur) who m

relatively small staff and is responsible for state adm

tasks and military policy. After the 1989 defense r

defense ministry de'tit more with social and political 

matters which Parliament normally dealt with. ~° 
F ;A i q ASSEMBLY (386) i ioou cMINISTER

I 

DEFENSE COUNCIL 

(10/89) NA majority 

needed to operate 

(6/90) 2/3 majority 

MIL Electio

OFFICE (3/90) 

(8/9o) 

I 

HA COMMANDER (12/89) I ---(9/90) Re-thinking---I, MOND l, 

I I 

(LTG K. Lorincz) (3/90) (F. Karpati) 

L. Fur (5/90)---civilian 

Hungarian Defenders of the Homeland (2/90) 

CoS (L. Borsits), J. Deak 

After the 1989 defense reform, the Army remained 

ate to the president (then Matyas Szuros, since Aug

Arpad Goncz of the AFD), and control over the Army 

exercised by a new (as of March 1990) Command of t

arian Army (LTG Kalman Lorincz) who, as commande

of the armed forces, supervises actual military tasks. 11 U
 On the operationaltactical level of command 

brigade, and battalion staffs perform th

leadership. ~3 

Hungarian concems about control of Hungarian force

emergency and authority to make the transition to 

evident in the October 1989 Natioual Assembly deba

new draft constitution. At the time, only a "qualified m

the National Assembly ''14 could declare a state of em

war, which brings into being the Defense Council 

exert extraordinary measures. 

Subsequent National Assembly Defense Committ

focused on the issue of Soviet control of Hungarian arm

Sensitivity was evident in discussions about the illeg

1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and in the pr

Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (HSWP) contro

army. Hungary's participation in the 1968 Warsaw Pa

focused attention on the issue of command and contro

forces. Bela Biszku, who had been HSWP Central 

secretary between 1962-1978, told the National A

Defense Committee on 3 January 1990 that the related 

for intervention in 1968 was "most certainly" giv

Hungarian defense minister by the Warsaw Pact's 

Armed Forces Commander in Chief. 15 In response, th

Assembly amended the defense law during February 

to grant itself the authority to decide on the deploymen

forces abroad or in Hungary. x6 After the Defense 

blamed the HSWP for the illegal 1968 invasion, it co

2 March 1990 "that party direction of the army must i

be abolished. ''17 

After the March 1990 elections, the governing MD

mid opposition Alliance of Free Democrats agreed 
thereby ensuring parliamentary control over them. 18 

Another significant defense reform involved intellig

Council of Ministers established four offices (two civ

two military) to deal with intelligence: The National 

Office (NBH) under MG Kalman Kocsis and the Inf

Office (IH) under MG Sandor Simon have na

responsibility, are under independent jurisdiction, and 

by civilian minister without portfolio Andras Galsze

receives directions through the Office of the Prime Min

third and fourth, the Military Security Office (KBH) u

Karoly Gyaraki and Military Intelligence Office (KFH) u

Janos Kovacs are part of the Hungarian Defense Force

through the defense budget, and overseen by Defense 

Lajos Fur. 19 

On 14 February 1990, the military intelligence fun

transferred to the Hungarian Defense Forces from th

Ministry II/IV group command and became an ind

organization commanded by a professional officer. Its 

are to protect against foreign intelligence activities, prev

rections and danger to military preparedness, provide 

security for military facilities, and protect persons pe

confidential functions. 2° Both the Military Intelligence O

the civilian Information Office have responsibility to 

globally wlfile the National Security Office and Military 

Office are confined to operating only in Hungary. 

Essentially the goal of the general defense reform a

to the reassumption of national control of the Hungarian 

from the Soviet Union. But the defense reform also cre

problems between presidential and governmental author

August 1990 parliament elected Arpad Goncz (AFD) pr

In order to fulfill his constitutional duties to approve H

armed forces defense plan and to declare an emer
period between peace and war. 22 

Although the December 1989 reform was successf

mented, intervening events during 1990---such as par

elections resulting in a six-party coalition government 

a prime minister and president from different political p

the collapse of the Warsaw Pact---created new civ

problems for Hungary. In fact one might argue that 

defense reform created more problems than it solved. 

The 1989 defense reform contributed to confusion 

ences of opinion over span of authority between the C

of the Hungarian Army and the defense minister. Tho

Fur replaced Ferenc Karpati on 23 May 1990 an

Hungary's first civilian defense minister, by Septemb

expressing concern about limits to his authority. Defen

Fur apparently felt that officer training institutes, the I

Military History, and the management of all cultural a

were under military sphere of authority should be 

authority. 23 

In other words, although Hungary was the fir

European state to have a civilian defense minister, no 

civilian exercised effective control over Hungaria

matters (as was nominally exercised by civilian Depu

Ministers Rasek since December 1989 in Czechoslo

Komorowski since April 1990 in Poland). 

These differences escalated into a major civil-mil

causing a constitutional dispute and problems within t

leadership. The constitutional debate involved question

sphere of authority between the Commander of the 

Army and the defense minister, and ultimately be

president arid the prime minister. An October 1990 

strike brought these different views about presidential 

ministerial authority to a test. When Defense Ministe
between the [defense] ministry and the 

commanders. The unclarified questions emerge n

much in the relationship between the command

chief, the ministry, and the Army, but rather i

relationship between the Army and the ministryY 

Soon after the blockade the govenunent questi

president's authority to command the army and initiated 

of the issue in the Constitutional Court. 

During the spring of 1991, though, President Arp

(Alliance of Free Democrats) and Prime Minister A

Defense Minister Fur (Hungarian Democratic Forum) 

differences of opinion over control of the armed forces. 

argued that the leadership of the army was oversized, t

unnecessary for the Hungarian Army Command and th

staff to function in parallel, and therefore it would be 

to adopt a leadership structure consistent with other 

democraciesY 

President Goncz countered in an interview that "att

being made to transform the Army by abolishing the 

system, which I do not agree with ...[adding that] the 

is not yet closed. ''26 Tension reached such a pitch 

Kalman Lorincz, Commander of the Hungarian arme

submitted his resignation to Goncz on 29 March 1991

neither Goncz, Antall, nor Fur accepted Lorincz's resi

they recognized this civil-military issue to be a serious 

and mandated a new defense reform that was develop

end of 1991. 

National Assembly Parliamentary Defense C

member Bela Kiraly argued that the president is cl

commander-in-chief and the constitution places two re

on his command. First, it authorizes the National Ass
its responsibilities be transferred to the Hungarian ch

and that the chief of staff be unconditionally subordin

defense minister. 28 

During 1991 two further tests brought the issue 

command to public attention; the failed August Sovie

increasing problems along the Yugoslav border. The fa

coup in August 1991 only partially tested Hungary's 

in part because the last Soviet troops had already lef

(Iil contrast, Poland still had Soviet troops on its soil)

National Security Cabinet met on 19 August to ex

situation, it noted that the borders were calm and con

Hungary was in no immediate danger. Antall met wit

of the six legislative parties, who expressed full uni

approach taken by the Cabinet that Hungary should 

strained and moderate approach to the affair. 29 Hence, 

orders or special measures, which would have required 

Assembly vote, were issued. 3° 

The second test involved the constant overflights o

aircraft. Hungary's response also evidenced restraint. 

fact that no military mobilization measures had been 

heightened alert of Border Guard and Hungarian Defe

had been handled normally, on 18 September 1991 Ch

MG Janos Deak expressed concem to the National 

Defense Committee. MG Deak argued that if an 

arose--for example if Hungarian barracks were attac

Kalman Lorincz lacked the authority to react rap

argued that while Lorincz had mobilization authori

constitutional stipulations presupposed that the deci

would be obstructed by the National Assembly (whi

a two-thirds vote) or would be made only very slowl

Due to these external tests as well as increasing in

sions between President Goncz and Prime Minis
the authority of the branch that exercised executive po

the prime minister and defense minister)) 2 

In response to the Constitutional Court's decision, 

of 1991 the defense ministry began a reorganization (

7 below) to redress the problems created by the Decem

defense reform. The new 1992 defense reform, which a

personnel changes in the defense ministry, had the dua

of subordinating the military command to the defense m

accordance with the Constitutional Court decision and 

career military officers with civilians in order to 

Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) control over the 

The new appointments increased civilian represen

reducing the concentration of staff officers who 

communist party members in the defense ministry, repla

in important mid-management positions with 

sympathetic to the MDF. 

The president of the Republic remains the comm

chief of the armed forces with specific duties and respon

Though these have been defined by the Constitutional C

remain untested in practice. Commander ColGen Lorinc

subordinate to President Goncz when the president is a

to exercise his emergency powers during crisis and wa

peacetime Defense Minister Fur provides direction to 

who exercises command and control of the armed fo

subordinate to Fur is a political state secretary 

administrative state secretary, who supervises three de

secretaries. 

By early December 1991, apart from Political State 

Raffay and Deputy State Secretary Rudolf Joo, m

civilians were appointed to mid-management positio

defense ministry. Dr. Csaba Hende (MDF) became the m

parliamentary secretary, Dr. Zoltan Bansagi (MDF) h
transition to war and during wartime remained untested

Hungarian views continue to exist as to whether th

will exert real (as against symbolic) powers during wa

debate is exacerbated by the untested role of th

Council, which is chaired by the president, but whos

also include the Speaker, leaders of the political partie

National Assembly and the prime minister, the minist

Table 7 Hungarian Defense Reform, 1992 

PRESIDENT 

A. Goncz 

I 

I 

I 

MIL 

OFFICE 

I 

I 

' ! I 

HDF COMMANDER 

ColGen K. Lorincz 

COS, I 1ST DEP. CDR 

LTG J. Deak 

MILITARY 

AFFAIRS 

MG I.Keleman 

I 

ADMINISTRATIVE 

STATE SECY 

LTG A Annus 

R. Joo 3/93 

I 

I 

I ECONOMIC 

& BUD. 

S. rurjan 

I PRIME MINIS

J. Antall 

P. Boross 12/9

I DEFENSE MI

L. Fu

I 

PO

STA

E. R

L. S

I INT

DEF

R. do
Hungary's locus of adjudication. Jozsef Antall asked th

tutional Court on 25 May 1992 to rule on the presiden

of authority in firing govemment officials. The issue 

President Goncz's refusal to countersign Antall's order 

director of Hungarian Radio, Elemer Hankiss. Antall 

Constitutional Court to declare Goncz's obstructionism 

tutional and, indeed, on 8 June 1992, the Court, in a 

three decision, ruled that the president could only block 

minister's appointments and dismissals if legal proced

not followed, the candidates were incompetent, or if in 

the govemment's decisions Hungarian democracy w

threatenedY 

In August 1992 a proposed draft national def

attempted to eliminate "management duplications" by e

the govemment's management authority. The National 

(or, in case of declared emergency, the Defense Counc

be responsible for approving the basic principles of 

defense, directions of military development, and th

During peacetime, all other decisions related 

mobilization, location, leading, and training of troops---

partial deployment in case of extemal threat and until p

can decide--would come under government autho

president would continue to have the title of commande

with no authority to command the armed forces. In pea

authority would be limited to approval of defense pla

appoint and release high-ranking commanders in accor

responsible minister's recommendation. 36 

In September 1992 Defense Minister Fur asked th

he could fuse the Commander of the Hungarian Arm

with the Chief of the General Staff without a con

amendment. 37 In February 1993, Fur submitted two rel
,; p,,(

were NCOs); and civilian employees from 33,300 to 

During 1992 Hungarian Defense Forces were reorgan

brigades of a new type were created and the organ

forming of mobile Air Force units began. 39 In addition

center for peacekeeping forces was designed to trai

Hungarian peacekeeping company. 4° 

The second phase in the Army's development woul

1995, during which the forces were stabilized and 

established for modernization after 1995 when fun

become available. The 1993 defense budget of 64 billi

which was increased to 66.5 billion forints in 1994, lef

room for modemization as 91.2 percent of the budget w

for day-to-day operations. 4~ Immediate aid for Hungaria

Forces came from Germany in April 1993, with its d

supply spare parts, as well as electronic and training ai

stocks of the former East German army. n2 Assistance 

from Russia, with the decision to supply 28 MiG-29s i

November 1993 to cover $800 million of its $1.6 bill

Hungary. 43 As a compensation, the National Assembly 

1.1 billion forints in 1993 to install 113 electronic Iden

or Foe OFF) systems to the Hungarian Air Force whi

be installed during 1994. 44 

Two new laws were adopted. The first law, whic

an April 1991 Constitutional Court decision 45 (adds Ar

to the Hungarian Constitution), provides a new pow

executive. Under the new law, the government may

limited cases (invasion of Hungarian airspace, surprise 

or surprise invasion), order immediate military action o

than two Army brigades (5,000 troops) withou

agreement from the president and without decl

emergency by parliamentJ 6 The govemment, however, 
then they would be under the executive, or minister o

In the bill, the border guard falls under the police, ex

state of war, and is subject to executive control. Both 

enacted by overwhelming parliamentary majority as am

to the constitution on 7 December 1993. 47 

On 23 February 1993 Laszlo Szendrei (a H

Democratic Forum MP) replaced Emo Raffay as poli

secretary of defense. 48 On 31 March 1993 Rudolf Joo

civilian, replaced LTG Antal Annus as administra

secretary, thus placing the defense ministry's top thre

civilian hands. ~9 On 14 April 1993 the National 

unanimously approved Resolution No. 27 concerning 

National Defense Principles of the Hungarian Republic. 

7 December the National Assembly adopted (with 277 

for, one vote against, and one abstention) a new defen

come into effect on 1 January 1994. According to 

civilian service in the military would be 18 months an

service would be 12 months. 51 

In October 1993, when Yeltsin survived a coup 

Moscow, Lajos Fur noted that he survived in large pa

"the Army, with its neutrality...unambiguously commi

to support Yeltsin. ''52 President Goncz noted that "I ca

one thing: I will never give the order to shoot on the H

Parliament...[adding that] the struggle in Russia 

Hungary to work harder than ever for membership in th

NATO. ,,53 

In October 1993 the 88th Airborne Infantry Batt

established as part of the Hungarian Defense Forces rest

LTG Bela Gyuricza noted that its function was to make 

to the military leadership a rapid deployment unit c

preventing and managing armed conflicts and suitable t

UN peacekeeping functions. 54 
On 14 January 1994, the Government armounc

would merge the defense ministry and army com

accordance with the 7 December 1993 Defense Law

placing the armed forces under civilian control in peac

war. This was scheduled to occur when General Kalm

reached the mandatory retirement age of 55 in Februa

Janos Deak, the chief of staff, assumed the post of C

of the Hungarian Army on 1 March and was promoted 

on 15 March. According to Lajos Fur, as of 1 March 

defense ministry would have three state secretaries

administrative, and CoS. 5~ 

Post-communist Return and a New Constitu

On 30 June 1993, the Hungarian cabinet submitted a 

aimed at modifying the Electoral Law of 1989. It 

electoral threshold from 4 percent to 5 percent and mo

procedure for by-elections. Now all by-elections wou

on the same day once every year, and never during th

general election. 

Hungary's May 8 and 29, 1994 parliamentary elec

those in Poland in September 1993) brought the 

Socialist Party (HSP) back to power;, of the 386-seat P

the HSP gained 209 (or 54 percent) of the seats for 33 

the vote. The second place Alliance of Free Democr

received 70 (or 18 percent) of the seats on a popular 

percent; followed by the former Hungarian Democra

(MDF) with 9.6 percent of the vote and 37 seats. Alt

socialists had secured a Parliamentary majority, they 

enter into negotiations and form a coalition govemme

AFD. Thus with 51 percent of the popular vote, the 

AFD coalition parties had the necessary two-thirds par
national compensation list. 58 

Similar to Poland, one of the consequences of the H

electoral system is that while disproportionality inagt

strength of the winning parties and enhances govemabi

wholly ill-suited when it comes to the needs of cons

politics. The constitution's amending formula, which all

thirds of the Parliament to revise the constitution, cann

as it is! Theoretically, the new socialist-liberal (H

coalition could unilaterally act under the inherited a

formula to change the constitution along with the cur

thirds electoral law and permanently undermine the ch

the weak opposition. 

Both the electoral law and the constitution's a

formula present dangers to Hungary's parliamentary de

and constitutional stability. One indication of this danger 

on 30 September 1994 when all four opposition partie

out when voting began on a constitutional amendment 

procedures for local elections. But the HSP-AFD coalit

two-thirds majority, voted to change the constitution to 

procedures for local election and improve the chance

incumbent left-of-center majority. This led to charg

constitutional dictatorship. 59 

In addition, the procedures for amending the con

need to be challged to bring the past five-year transitio

to a legal close. Though Hungary needs a new proc

prevent ceaseless parliamentary tinkering with the con

the new socialist-liberal coalition is not in a good po

initiate a new phase of constitution making. First, al

holds 72 percent of the seats, its 51 percent electoral ba

narrow to establish anything but a winner's constitution

neither the HSP (whose forerunner HSWP imposed a 

constitution on the country) nor the AFD is well-si
mentary committee (HSP will have 10; AFD 5, and 

parties 10) to draft the new document, working under th

of justice. They plan to present the new constitution f

ratification by 20 August 1995, when new presidentia

are required. 6° Several items on the constitutional agen

presidential powers, guaranteeing judicial independ

National Judiciary Council, redefining the role of 

prosecutor, reforming local government, and trimming 

tutional Court's functions. 6~ A new constitutional 

formula will be proposed, requiring a second par

session to ratify amendments made by a previous one. 

new electoral law will be proposed, abolishing the sec

oral round, keeping a mixed system but taking the p

proportionality into account. 

When the new government was formed after th

HSP leader Gyula Horn became prime minister (se

below). On 24 June the HSP-AFD coalition signed a g

agreement; the AFD would take over three ministries

transportation, and education---and the HSP would tak

remaining 12. Gyula Horn appointed retired Colon

Keleti as new defense minister. 

Keleti, former press spokesman for the ministry 

had left under a cloud in 1992. Keleti noted that he w

on Fur "because the conditions prevailing in the min

it impossible to work normally with the minister and 

his employees. ''62 

Upon Keleti's return on 15 July 1994, he began to 

the MDF personnel mostly with former colleagues 

armed forces; Reserve Colonel Joszef Feher was pr

Brigadier General on 15 July and appointed administr

secretary; 63 retired LTG and former Chief of Staff Lasz

and MG Karoly Janza became deputy administra
civilian sociologist Laszlo Dobos as head of Depa

Social Relations and Culture. 64 

Table 8 Hungarian Defense Reform, 1994 

IPRESIDENT I I PRIME MINIST

A. Goncz G. Horn 

I 

I 

I 

MIL t OFFICE 

I 

I HDF CDR/COS I ColGen J. Deak 

I 

MILITARY AFFAIRS 

LTG (Ret) L. Borsits 

I 

ADMINISTRATIVE 

STATE SECY 

BG J. Feher 

I 

I 

ECONOMIC 

& BUDGET 

MG Janza 

I 

I DEFENSE MI

Col (ret) G. Ke

I 

POL

STAT

A. Tot

I. Fod

INTE

DEF. 

T. Tot

One civilian, Andras Toth became political state 

and in November, Dr. Istvan Fodor replaced An

(whomoved to head the prime minister's office) a

political state secretary at the defense ministry. The 

high-ranking civilian was Tibor Toth (an expert on di

from the foreign ministry) as one of the three de

secretaries. Keleti also began an intemal reorganiza
staff. ''65 

In an early interview Keleti noted that he was sur

would have harmonious relations with the generals an

intended to act as a civil politician and not a "former 

He also indicated that intended to abolish the governm

that provides deadlines for the organizational fusion of t

headquarters with the defense ministry and after furth

decide whether or not the proposed fusion was really 

since "the Army leadership should receive sufficient 

dence to plan and lead their professional activity. ''66 

noted that he met with President Goncz and agreed to m

him once a month to inform him about the Army's 

Keleti also invited Robert Pick, head of the president's 

office, to attend all cabinet sessions of the ministry. 67 

Then in early September, Defense Minister Kelet

mended to the National Assembly Defense Committee 

defense ministry and Amy headquarters not be merged. 6

of 1 November Keleti once again divided the two to

positions when he appointed LTG Sandor Nemeth to 

chief of staff, while retaining Janos Deak as Command

Hungarian Defense Forces. 69 Keleti noted that his major 

was retention of professionals in the armed forces. Bec

Army cannot be financed from the budget with its 

structure, Keleti proposed reducing persormel by calling 

conscripts; some 2,000 less in August 1994, with repeate

tions ix~ February 1995 and 1996 reducing the Army b

overall. In addition he suggested beginning Februa

reducing the length of military service to ten months wit

intensive training program. 7° 

Keleti noted that the ministry calculates that it ne

billion forints in 1994, of which 7.2 billion was not co

revenue; and that efforts by defense managers could onl
size of the defense ministry as a costsaving measure, 

that he would retain the Army Command size as 

intermediate command levels were to be eliminate

military zones were to report directly to the General 

In response to the economic shortfall, Keleti a

further from his predecessor's policy. After th

acquisition from Russia, Lajos Fur had indicated th

would like to get the S-300 missile air defense 

exchange for the remaining $800 million debt. Tho

rejected this policy, he did make efforts to acquire mi

parts and armored vehicles from the Ukraine in 

Hungarian goods. TM Keleti also stressed that he wante

modernization in the Air Force, particularly rad

modemization (ground-based radar). 75 

When Army Commander Janos Deak presented 

reform concept to the National Assembly, he not

program was motivated by the fact that budgetary 

were inadequate to maintain existing military structu

the need to modify the military to integrate into NAT

promised that he would continue to reduce the 

conscripts and beginning in 1996 would reduce th

service time to nine months. 77 In addition, the ref

reduce Hungary's four military districts to two, res

reduction of staff. 7s 

Based upon the PFP exercise experience an

exercises with NATO states, Imre Mecs noted that 

long way to go to catch up in the fields of telecom

organization, and cooperation, including the kno

languages. [Nevertheless, he concluded that] the Hung

would be suitable for NATO membership around 199

during 1995 a German-British-Hungarian PFP 

planned, with plans to invite one sub-unit from 
October 1989 Constitution and 1 December 1989 

Reform; and, its decisions have been respected. The mil

evidenced significant reform; it has been restruc

accommodate NATO, but force modernization continu

greatly restrained by scarce resources. 

But Hungary still has a number of tasks to achieve 

civilian oversight of the military. Hungary's main tas

adopt a new constitution that has broad-based national c

and clarifies some outstanding issues such as the pr

wartime authority. In addition it is necessary to ensure 

defense ministry maintains real civilian oversight of the 

Finally, military training and force modernization needs 

and development to meet NATO standards. 

Notes 

1. According to Janos Kis, the founder and leader of the 

of Free Democrats, this makes it more difficult for Hungaria

to establish their legitimacy. Hence, the new Governm

demonstrate economic success in order to be accepted. See, J

"Postcommunist Politics In Hungary," Journal of Democrac

No. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 4-5. 

2. For discussion of the election and party positions, see 

Racz, "Political Pluralism in Hungary: the 1990 Election

Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1 (1991), pp. 107-136; John R. Hib

Samuel C. Patterson, "A Democratic Legislature in the Mak

Historic Hungarian Elections of 1990," Comparative Politica

Vol. 24, No. 4 (January 1992), pp. 430-454. 

3. Radio Budapest, I July 1989, cited in Zoltan D. Bara

European Forces In Transitions and Beyond," East European Q

Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (March 1992), p. 18. 
parties in the National Assembly, the prime minister, the m

well as the Commander of the Hungarian Army and the Ch

7. Article 19, The Constitution of the Republic of Hunga

8. Article 35.(1)h, The Constitution of the Republic of 

8. 

9. Zoltan D. Barany, "Major Reorganization Of Hungar

Establishment," RFER (7 December 1989). 

10. MG Jozsef Biro interview, Zagreb DANAS, 9 Janua

58-59. JPRS-EER-90-045 (4 April 1990), p. 8. 

11. Budapest Domestic Service, 1 December 1989. FB

231 (4 December 1989), pp. 57-58. On 1 March 1

amendments to this process were discussed and supporte

Karpati in the National Assembly. Budapest Domestic Serv

1990. FBIS-EEU-90-042 (2 March 1990), pp. 50-51. 

12. Ferenc Karpati, Budapest MTI, 22 March 1990. FB

057 (23 March 1990), p. 48. 

13. LTG Laszlo Borsits, Statement to Vienna Milita

Seminar, 19 January 1990, p. 8 (emphasis in original). 

14. 18 October 1989 National Assembly session

Domestic Service. FB1S-EEU-89-201 (19 October 1989), p

15. Budapest MTI, 3 January 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-O06 

1990), p. 47. 

16. 20 February 1990 Parliament Defense Commi

amending Defense Law. FBIS-EEU-90-036 (22 February 

17. Budapest Domestic Service 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-04

1990), p. 41. 

18. Article 40/A (1), The Constitution of the Republic 

p. 9. Also see Magyar Kozlony, No. 59, 25 June 1990, pp. 

JPRS-EER-90-125 (31 August 1990), especially p. 14. 

19. Gabor Juhasz, "Proposed Rules for Secret Ser

Vilaggazdasag, 8 February 1992, pp. 76-78. JPRS-EER-

March 1992), pp. 21-22. 
authority should be defined by Goncz." Tallozo, No. 33, 1

1990. Ibid., p. 26. 

23. Lajos Fur interview, Nepszabadsag, 10 September 199

FBIS-EEU-90-178 (13 September 1990), p. 36. 

24. Lajos Fur interview, Tallozo, No 4 (25 January 1991)

163. JPRS-EER-91-039 (28 March 1991), p. 4. 

25. Ferenc Mernyo, "Army Crisis: Self-Centered," Heti Vi

sag, 13 April 1991, pp. 77-79.JPRS-EER-91-083 (14 June 199

26. Budapest Domestic Service, 24 March 1991. FBIS-EE

(26 March 1991), p. 35. 

27. Budapest Domestic Service, 2 April 1991. FBIS-EEU-

April 1991), p. 22. 

28. Bela Kiraly, "Military Reform: What Should Be 

Nepszabadsag, 13 April 1991, p. 6. JPRS-EER-083 (14 June 

33-34. 

29. Budapest MTI, 19 August 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-161 (2

1991), p. 21. 

30. Budapest Kossuth Radio, 19 August 1991. FBIS-EE

(20 August 1991), p. 21. 

31. MG Janos Deak interview, Budapest Kossuth Radio, 1

ber 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-182 (19 September 1991), p. 20. 

32. Magyar Kozlony, No. 103 (26 September 1991), p

3,125. JPRS-EER-Ol-168 (13 November 1991), pp. 14-16. It 

that the president is obligated to endorse candidates for state 

put forward by the government unless "the democratic operati

institution in question is seriously threatened." Ibid. 

33. Nepszava, 3 December 1991, p. 5. FBIS-EEU-9

December 1991), p. 17. 

34. Article 19/B.(2), The Constitution of the Republic of 

p. 3. 

35. Budapest MTI, 25 May 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-103 

1992), p. 12. 

36. "National Defense Draft Bill," Heti Vilaggazdasag, 

1992, p. 15. JPRS-EER-92-128 (14 September 1992), p. 39. 
41. Lajos Fur statement. Budapest MTI, 26 November 

EEU-93-228 (30 November 1993), p. 30. 

42. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 67 (7 April 1993), p. 4

1994, Germany had supplied 150 million DM worth of mi

parts. On 9 March Germany agreed to provide suppl

Hungary's helicopters free of charge. RFE/RL Daily Report

March 1994), p. 5. 

43. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 2 June 1993. FB

105 (3 June 1993), p. 15. 

44. According to defense ministry spokesman Colonel 

yi, the equipment would be installed oil 28 MiG-29s, nine M

MiG-21s, and 11 Su-22s. Budapest Nepszabadzag, 27 Dec

p. 4. FBIS-EEU-93-O02 (2 January 1994), p. 9. 

45. The Constitutional Court held that these powers, wh

assigned explicitly either to Parliament nor the president

assigned by default to the government. See East 

Constitutional Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 1

46. Amendment to the Constitution of the Hungari

passed by the National Assembly on 7 December 19

Kozlony, No. 186, 24 December 1993, pp. 11129-11130. JP

009 (16 March 1994), p. 87. 

47. Budapest MTI, 7 December 1993. FBIS-EEU-

December 1993), p. 26. 

48. Budapest MTI, 16 February 1993. FBIS-EEU-

February 1993), pp. 18-19. 

49. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 49 (12 March 1993), 

50. Budapest MTI, 14 April 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-07

1993), p. 22. For text, see Magyar Kozlony, No. 48 (23 Apr

2701-2705. JPRS-EER-93-061 (1 July 1993), pp. 28-32. 

51. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 7 December 

EEU-93-234 (8 December 1993), p. 23; and Lasz

interview,Uj Magyarorszag, 9 December 1993, p. 4. FBIS-E

(15 December 1993), pp. 25-26. 
56. Lajos Fur interview, Pesti Hirlap, 15 January 1994, p

EEU-94-015 (24 January 1994), p. 24. 

57. Hungarian Review, Newsletter of the Embassy of Hu

June 1994), p. 2. 

58. In 1990, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) ga

percent of the Parliamentary seats on the basis of 24.7 perce

vote. For a discussion of Hungary's reelection law, see Andre

"Elections, Coalitions and Constitutionalism in Hungar

European Constitutional Review, Vol. 3, Nos. 3&4 (Summer/F

pp. 26-32. 

59. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 188 (4 October 1994), pp

Budapest MTI, 5 October 1994. FB1S-EEU-94-195 (7 Octob

p. 8. 

60. Budapest Magyarorszag, 19 August 1994, p. 4. FBIS-

178 (14 September 1994), p. 11. 

61. Jan Zielonka perceptively observed that one of the rea

parliaments and executives have agreed to delegate so much 

to small groups of jurists is because these courts represent fo

political elites a guarantee that their constitutional rights wi

protected even if they find themselves on the losing side of 

conflicts. See Jan Zielonka, "New Institutions in the Old Ea

Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 1994), pp. 94-95

62. Defense Minister-designate Gyorgy Keleti interview. 

Nemzet, 13 July 1994, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-94-135 (14 July 199

63. Colonel Joszef Feher acted as head of the defense m

Administrative and Legal Department until 1992 and then 

member of the Institute of Military History. 

64. Heti Vilaggazdasag, 12 November 1994, pp. 103-10

EEU-94-222 (17 November 1994), p. 22. 

65. Heti Vilaggazdasag, 12 November 1994, pp. 103-10

EEU-94-222 (17 November 1994), pp. 21-22. 

66. Defense Minister-designate Gyorgy Keleti interview. 

Nepszabadsag, 30 June 1994, pp.l,4. FBIS-EEU-94-127 (1 Ju

p. 15. 
FBIS-EEU-94-162 (22 August 1994), p. 15. 

71. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 27 July 1994. FB

145 (28 July 1994), p. 8. 

72. BudapestNepszabadsag, 3 August 1994, pp. 1,4. FB

150 (4 August 1994), p. 11. 

73. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti interview. Nepsz

September 1994, p. 6. FBIS-EEU-94-175 (9 September 1

74. Budapest MTV Television Network, 29 August 

EEU-94-168 (30 August 1994), p. 18. Keleti cleverly p

Ukraine that Hungary would be willing to destroy some of th

vehicles prescribed to Ukraine by CFE. Ukraine would 

vehicles to Hungary which, in exchange, would destroy its 

vehicles. Budapest Magyar Nemzet, 5 January 1995, p. 6. 

95-006 (10 January 1995), p. 15. 

75. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 9 November 

EEU-94-218 (10 November 1994), p. 18. 

76. Budapest MTI, 6 January 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-O05 

1995), p. 22. 

77. Budapest Kossuth Radio Network, 21 January 1995. 

95-014 (23 January 1995), p. 27. 

78. Budapest MTI, 2 January 1995. FBIS-EEU-95-O01 

1995), p. 9. 

79. Imre Mecs interview, BudapestNepszabadsag, 21 Ja

pp. 1,7. FBIS-EEU-95-015 (24 January 1995), p. 36. 
movement like the one that toppled the seemingly i

Honecker and the Wall in East Germany. Despite 

because of population expectations and lack of supp

Communist Party, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Revolu

extremely swift. Peaceful demonstrations and revo

erupted suddenly on 17 November 1989, ended the C

Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS)'s dominance, Presid

Husak's rule, and led to the naming of a federal g

dominated by non-communists on 10 December 1989

After the Communist government used security 

suppress a large public demonstration in Prague on 17 N

within days Vaclav Havel united opposition groups to 

umbrella organization, Civic Forum, to press their dema

five days of strikes, the Communist govemment led 

Minister Ladislaw Adamec held its first meeting w

Forum representatives. 1 Then after only one week 

demonstrations, Communist reformer Karel Urbane

Milos Jakes as CPCS leader on 25 November 1989 and 

13 members of the Communist Party presidium resign

On the following day Civic Forum issued a politica

entitled "What We Want." Citing the deep moral

ecological, social, economic, and political crisis resu

the ineffectiveness of Czechoslovakia's then existing po

economic system, the Civic Forum political program 

number of objectives. Regarding the political system, i

all political parties to have an equal opportunity to par

free elections and for the CPCS to abandon its const

guaranteed leading role within society. Regarding th

program called for a new constitution, to be adopted b

111 
Adamec over the formation of a new government, wh

include Civic Forum representatives, Adamec re

frustration on 7 December to be replaced by Maria

Slovak. 5 When the new government was finally for

December, for the first time since 1948 the Communis

a minority, holding only ten of 21 Cabinet posts. The m

interior post was left vacant. Slovak dissident Jan Ca

recently released from prison, became deputy prime m

headed a new commission overseeing the secret p

Dienstbier, a dissident who had been imprisoned wi

Havel, became foreign minister. Vaclav Klaus, a Civ

strategist, became finance minister. 6 

When President Gustav Husak resigned on 9 Decem

Forum and its Slovak counterpart Public Against Vi

nounced that Forum leader Havel was their candidate 

dent, which according to the Constitution, the Federal 

had to elect within two weeks upon a vacancy] On 29 

1989, the Federal Assembly elected Vaclav Havel, a dis

playwright and essayist and one of the spiritual lead

opposition to Communist rule, President of the Repub

such, took over as commander in chief of the armed 

In his new year's address to the Czechoslovak peo

dent Havel set the tone for Czechoslovakia, when he 

My dear fellow citizens. For the past 40 years o

day you have heard my predecessors utter variatio

the same theme: how our country is prospering

country is not prospering...We have become morally 

mean all of us, because we all had become accus

to the totalitarian system...None of us is merely a 

of it, because all of us helped to create it. A
gp

the Czechoslovak Federal Republic (CSFR). Und

pressure the name of the state was again changed on 2

the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR). C

vakia's free elections on 8-9 June 1990 resulted in Ci

majorities to both parliamentary houses. In the 150-sea

the People, the Civic Forum/Public Against Violence 

received 88 seats; the Communist Party, 22; and the 

Democratic Union (CDU), 21. In the 150-seat House o

Civic Forum received 82 seats; the Communist Party, 2

CDU, 24. 9 Hence, by June 1990 full democratic mand

in Czechoslovakia completing a revolutionary proces

started only seven months earlier. 

Hastily Concluded Defense Reform 

The purpose of Czechoslovakia's defense reform was t

federal presidential, governmental and parliamentary 

and control over the defense ministry and the Cze

People's Army (CSPA). In addition, the reform had 

Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCS) influence 

establish civil control over the defense establishment 

forces and to ensure that the forces were sufficient to 

the integrity and sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. Fi

defense reform had to restore the armed forces' prestig

society. In contrast to Poland, Czechoslovak soc

Hungary) held the military in low esteem because 

forces had remained passive during the Munich crisis in 

February 1948 Communist coup, the 1968 Warsaw Pac

of Czechoslovakia, and apparently played a role in 

counter-revolutionary activities during November 198

Constitutional Development. Czechoslovaki

Stalinist Constitution, which replaced the 1948 Nin
obligations. 

The Constitution names the president of the republi

of State and Article 62 grants him the power to: ap

promote generals; act as commander-in-chief of the arm

and proclaim a state of war on the recommendati

government (premier, the vice-ministers, and ministers) 

war in pursuance of a National Assembly d

Czechoslovakia is attacked. 

Because of the concentration of communist gov

authority in Prague, there had been growing disc

Slovakia. As a result, on 27 October 1968, a new Con

Law of Federation amended 58 of the 1960 Constitu

Articles that mainly concemed Slovak autonomy. 

Constitutional Law federalized the government and de

Czechoslovak State to be composed of "two equal 

nations. ''~3 It replaced the unicameral National Assem

bicameral Federal Assembly (see Table 9 below). 

bodies--the Chamber of the People based on pr

representation and the Chamber of the Nations, which 

an equal number of Czechs and Slovaks--shared equal 

Despite the 1968 Constitutional Law of Federation

power remained highly centralized in the hand

Communist Party after the Warsaw Pact invasion. In 

further Constitutional amendments in July 1971 auth

federal government to interfere with and invalidate m

the national govemments. In other words, although 

reform had remained intact through the 1989-90 revo

reality federalism remained little more than a facade 

1971 constitutional amendments and under unitary C

Pa~ly rule. As a result, after the 1989 revolution th

Assembly passed a series of amendments to addr

problems. In December 1990 it passed an act on d
PRESIDENT ASSEMBLY 

• Expand emerg 

pwr (1/91) 

--[changes composition 

(12/89) 

STATE DEFENSE COUNCIL 

MINIS

E

(

I MC 

M. Vaclavik; M. Vacek (12/89); L. Dobrovsky (10/90) civ

• dep civ MOND Education (A. Rasek) (12/89) 

• 3 dep civ MONDs; plus CoS (4/91) 

No I • Central Rehabilitation Committee (6k plus)(12/89

• Assoc. of Mil. Renewal (part of Civic Form) 

democratize CSPA (12/89) (1 lk 4/90) 

• Union of Professional Soldiers (assist 

renewal)(1/90) (17k; join "Euromir') (2/91) 

• Free Legion (9/90) 

• Inspectorate General (IG) Parliament 

oversight (12_/90) 

• Restructuring completed (4/91) 

I CS(P)A I Czechoslovak Army (CSA) (4/90) 

CoS (M. Vacek); A. Slimak (12/90); K. Pezl (4/91

competencies between the two republics; and in J

debated a law giving the federal and republican parlia

right to declare a referendum on the form of the state. 
Concerns over Czechoslovak Peoples Army 

subordination to the CPCS were clearly evident during 

of revolutionary change in Czechoslovakia. On 23 

1989 Defense Minister Milan Vaclavik gave orders f

use of force and urged the CPCS leadership to put the 

CSPA on alert ~6 and the CSPA published a strong

statement asserting that the CSPA would "defend C

[and the] achievements of socialism. ''~7 On 24 Novem

Husak resigned as CPCS le~er and the order 

issued. ~s 

In response to the question to whom the C

subordinated, Defense Minister Vaclavik armounc

Federal Assembly on 29 November 1989 that: 

"We identify ourselves, above all, with those who 

well of socialism and who are not misusing emot

exert pressure to de-stabilize the political and eco

situation in our society. 'd9 

Apparently the ambiguity in Vaclavik's statem

enough parliamentary concem to name Miroslav Vac

defense minister on 3 December 1989. When the sam

Assembly asked Vacek the same question on 12 Decem

he responded: "...from the very inception of the Cze

Republic...the CSPA has always been subordinated in 

with the constitution, above all, to file preside

republic... [who] has been the commander in chief. I a

esteemed deputies, that the CSPA will not be misused 

process which is taking place in our Republic. ''2° T

December 1989, Prime Minister Calla appointed M

Slimak (who was promoted to LTG on 3 May 1990) 

new Czechoslovak Army (CSA) chief of staff. 
during the December 1989 revolution the CSFR ch

composition of the State Defense Council, which was r

for exercising the general guidelines of the CSFR

capabilities. Rather than being chaired by the commu

secretary, the federal president (Vaclav Havel) be

Defense Council chairman, and the prime minister, m

the two national govemments, the foreign, defense an

ministers, and the chairman of the State Planning Co

became its members. 2~ 

On 29 December 1989, Civic Forum civilian Anto

became deputy defense minister for education and cu

responsibility for abolishing the CSPA's political app

March 1990, outside experts proposed that the Federal 

create a General Inspectorate of the Czechoslov

independent of the defense ministry. At first nothing 

because the defense ministry opposed the concept cla

it already had its own inspectorate. Later the defens

capitulated and accepted the creation of a General In

with the proviso that it be created from the reinforc

ministry inspectorate. 

During August 1990 new pressures developed to cr

Inspector General (IG) chosen by parliament 

observation of laws and to monitor control of Army. 22 T

effort took on new life on 18 October 1990 wh

Dobrovsky, a civilian, became defense minister. On 6 

1990, the Federal Assembly finally enacted the proposa

an Inspector General who oversees the armed forces

inspections, and prepares parliamentary reports on imple

of constitutional provisions, expenditures, level of pre

and implementation of military strategy. 23 

During 1989-1990 the CSFR also established a 

oversight bodies to ensure military renewal and defens
pace of military democratization and restructuring. 25 

Second, on 19 January 1990 a Union of Professiona

was founded. 16 Its purpose was to defend the social w

servicemen and to participate in cadre issues. Third

September 1990 the fotmding Congress of the Fre

[Svoboda Legie] convened in Prague. In opposition to 

leadership, the Free Legion promoted the goals to red

enrollment, professionalize the force, and promote 

military service. The Free Legion had also demanded 

Minister Vacek's resignation because of his role in the N

1989 counterrevolutionJ 7 Both the Union and Fre

played less important roles by 1992. 

Concerned about the Army's role during the 17-24 N

1989 revolutionary period, on 18 September 1990 

Havel set up an investigation commission comprise

members from the Federal Assembly Defense and 

Committee, two from SVO, two from the defense 

Inspectorate, two from the President's Office, and one 

Military Office of the PresidentJ 8 On 16 October 19

received the commission's report which proved that V

the Army Command had made preparations--under 

word operation "Wave"--for actions against demonstrat

aim of the later abandoned operation had been to ins

specialists in radio and television and gain control ov

casts. 3° On the same day that Havel received the co

report, he recalled Miroslav Vacek and then (on 18 

named a civilian, Lubos Dobrovsky to be defense min

In the immediate aflemaath of the revolution, a seri

military issue in Czechoslovakia had been the question o

of military affairs. Because of previous secret polic

military counterintelligence, which had been under 

subordination of the defense and interior ministries, w
was to be completed at the end of 1990, 33 on 1 Octob

reported to the Federal Assembly that military counterin

was now subordinated to him; and that as of 1 Januar

"army security service" of 40-50 percent of the C

military counterintelligence nlembers would be in ope

One of Lubos Dobrovsky's first actions was to su

activity of the military defense intelligence servic

October 1990), placing all 827 employees on coerce

Dobrovsky did this because he felt Vacek had not been 

enough since 72 percent of the former members of th

counterintelligence service subjected to evaluations 

deemed fit for further service. Dobrovsky justified his 

noting that: "I believe that the staff of th

counterintelligence service ought to be subj

screening...identical with those undergone by the staff o

Security Corps...[adding that] Even people who p

screening should not work in the military defense in

service in the future. ''35 Deputy Defense Minister Anto

added that in the future military defense intelligen

function with only about one-fifth of the present staff 

also take over military police tasks, including those of 

squad. 36 

In December 1990 Dobrovsky was quite forthcom

views. Following the dissolution of military defense in

he intended to create a new unit subordinate to th

minister to "protect the Army against any kind of destr

on the part of anyone." In early December this unit had 

80 people, and was envisaged to grow to 180 (compa

original 827 on coerced leave). An all-professional 

military police force charged to deal with Army crimin

and traffic control 37 began operating in April 1991. 38 In 

Dobrovsky greatly eased secrecy laws so that publicatio
screening laws and campaigns. 

President Vaclav Havel in December 1990 

expansion of his emergency authority during periods 

social unrest, natural disasters, and international incid

sought the state of emergency bill because t

Constitution--which had been changed after the Nove

revolution to prevent interference in intemal affai

presidential authority and because of concerns abo

Hussein's threats of terrorism and the Soviet crackd

Baltic. 4° Havel sought powers to employ the 

circumstances warranted, to secure basic food 

telecommunications to prevent state collapse. 4~ 

During Spring 1991 the restructuring of the Cz

federal ministry of defense--as the supreme bo

Army--was completed (see Table 10 below). Th

administration section controlled by Defense Minister 

was separated from the direct command of the troops, 

chief of the general staff. Directly subordinate to Dobr

a secretariat and four organizations--the minister's in

health administration, personnel administration, and th

The reformed defense ministry comprised four el

(1) A deputy defense minister for social and hu

questions, led by a civilian Antonin Rase

directorates on social man~ement, legal serv

educational institutions, and military inst

Sociological Research, History of the Army, an

(2) A deputy defense minister for strategic manag

development headed by Gen. Imrich Andrejc
I STATE DEFENSE 

COUNCIL 

I 

I CHIEF OF 

GEN. STAFF 

LTG K. Pezl 

I 

DEP. MIN. 

SOC. & HUM. 

A. Rasek 

I. Urban 

Elections 

(6/92) 

I 

DEP. MIN. 

STRATEGY 

I. Andrejcak 

J. Pospisil 

DEFENSE MINI

L. Dobrovsk

I. Andrejcak 7

I 

I 

I DEP. M

ECON

I. Bala

(3) A deputy minister for economic management h

Ivan Balaz, dealing with budgetary issues, eco

private enterprise. This deputy minister had 

great political importance since the CSFR's 

industrial base was disproportionately posi

Slovakia where 80,000 people were emplo

CSFR's depressed military industry meant high

unemployment rates, contributing to state ten

disintegration). 

On 25 April 1991 Balaz announced that he w

present a plan to alleviate the consequences o

industrial unemployment, especially in Slov

only did Balaz mention the need to get the Cze

Army (CSA)'s special facilities--the 12,000-

Military Engineering Works and 28,000-
(4) 

(), py

cost and "which the Army does not have. ''45 

The CSA's Chief of General Staff heading 

forces. Czechoslovakia was able to gain con

General Staff through different means than Hu

Poland. Many former military officers, 

sympathized with the 1968 Prague Spring re

been cashiered after the Soviet invasion of C

vakia. They provided a pool of former militar

who were politically reliable, and available for 

such officer was MG Karel Pezl, an SVO m

adviser to Lubos Dobrovsky, who replaced L

Slimak as CSA chief of staff on 29 April 199

May, Pezl noted that his most important task

"[C]hange the whole image of the Czechoslova

a short period of time and change it from an 

into a defensive army. ''47 Further military 

occurred on 1 June 1991, when Dobrovsky re

deputy commander of the General Staff, com

the Main Logistical Support Branch, and he

Main Administration of Ground Forces. 48 

During the failed Soviet coup in August 19

Czechoslovakia tested its emergency machinery, it (like 

felt less threatened than Poland because Soviet troops h

vacated its territory. On 19 August 1991 the feder

ministry set up a special security staff, comprising repre

from foreign affairs, defense, transport, the federal in

service, and from the republican ministries. The staff m

the clock, issued orders to carry out certain measur

borders, evaluated incoming information, and prepared 

for the Defense Council. 49 On 20 August the Defens
and Slovaks, and boded ill for Central European securit

the next six months, the federal govemment began t

while the two republican governments began to assume 

more authority with the impending 1 January 1993 spl

Czechoslovakia's Velvet Divorce 

Constitutional Divorce. When the new Federal 

was elected in June 1990 as a constituent assembly, it 

self-imposed mandate to complete a new constitution 

two-year term. By far the most contentious issue f

constitutional drafters was the structure of the federal 

the respective competencies of the two member republi

1992 elections approached, talks stalled as all parties aw

results of the elections. 

On 11 May, well before the 5-6 June 1992 

Vladimir Meciar, head of the Movement for a D

Slovakia, met with Vaclav Havel and noted that fo

declaration of sovereignty, Slovakia would adopt 

constitution for itself, and then hold a referendum to 

Slovakia should remain in the federation. 51 

h~ the elections for the Federal Assembly there w

percent tumout in the Czech Republic and 84 percent in 

The 5 percent threshold to win representation 

Czechoslovakia to avoid the Polish 1991-fragmentation 

and reduced the number of political parties from more t

six from each republic to the Federal Assembly, wit

Klaus' Civic Democratic Party (ODS) getting 34 perc

vote in the Czech Republic and Vladimir Meciar's Mov

Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) getting 34 percent of th

Slovakia. 52 On 7 June Vaclav Havel charged Klaus wit

a new federal govemment. 
with weaker links to Prague; Klaus favored a strong fe

split. After two weeks of discussion, Meciar and Klau

negotiate a division of Czechoslovakia into two st

September. When the Slovak parliament convened o

Meciar pushed it to declare sovereignty in July a

Slovak Constitution in August. 54 

On 26 June the CSFR Prime Minister Marian 

government resigned to make way for a new interi

which would have only ten members; five Czech

Slovaks. 55 When Jan Strasky (ODS) became the 

minister instead of Klaus it was clear the split was 

Slovaks took over the ministries of foreign affairs, i

defense. 56 CSFR President Havel and Vaclav Klaus, l

Czech Civic Democratic Party wanted the next fede

minister to be a civilian while Meciar's Movem

Democratic Slovakia wanted a professional soldier. 57 

Klaus prevailed and LTG Imrich Andrejcak, an i

Slovak, became the new CSFR defense minister after 

the reserve. Jiri Pospisil assumed Andrejcak's positio

defense minister for strategy, and Antonin Rasek w

and replaced by Igor Urban as deputy defense ministe

and humanitarian affairs. 58 

When the Slovak National Council adopted a dec

sovereignty with a margin of 113 to 24 (with ten abst

three deputies absent) on 17 July, 59 Vaclav Havel an

would resign as president. When Havel resigned on 20 

Jan Strasky, the CSFR prime minister, assumed the 

powers (except the power to appoint and recall t

Govemment). Chief of Staff Karel Pezl confirmed th

when he noted that file federal prime minister had no

the duties of commander-in-chief of the armed forces

It was decided that the property of the CSA would 
ecessay teets vote, te costtutoabe

CSFR. 62 The Constitutional Law On the Terminatio

CSFR, which became effective immediately, vested pow

two republics' legislatures, governments, and courts. 63 

New Constitutions. At the end of July both the S

Czech National Councils began preparations to d

constitutions. Though constitutional development of 

had been remarkably advanced, the disintegration 

federation would create new and different problems fo

the successor states. In some ways, particularly for Slov

returned to the 1989-90 stage of development. 

Notes 

1. Mary Battiata and Blaine Harden, "Premier Holds 

With Czech Opposition," The Washington Post, 22 Novemb

A1. As late as 1 November 1989 Communist Party leader M

had categorically refused to engage in dialogue with oppositi

2. Blaine Harden "Prague Ousts Leaders," The Washingt

November 1989, pp. A1, A17. 

3. For the Civic Forum Program, see Journal of Democ

1, No. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 125-127. 

4. Blaine Harden, "Shame, Regret Pervade Legislature 

The Washington Post, 30 November 1989, p. A54. 

5. Dan Morgan, "Czechoslovak Premier Steps Do

Washington Post, 8 December 1989, p. A1. 

6. Dan Morgan and Stuart Auerbach, "Czechoslova

Installed With Communists In Minority," The Washingto

December 1989, pp. A1, A28. 

7. On 19 December the Federal Assembly extended the d

40 days. Mary Battiata, "Communists Back Havel Candi

Washington Post, 20 December 1989, p..4,27. 

8. Vaclav Havel, "People, Your Government Has Return

Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 99
11. Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic (11 

(Prague: Orbis, 1964). 

12. On 28 December 1989 the Federal Assembly vot

the Constitution to allow the appointment of the 23 new 

replace the 23 hard-lh~e Communists who resigned. On 2

the Federal Assembly elected Vaclav Havel president. Sy

"Ousted Reformer Dubcek Heads Prague's Assembly," The 

Post, 29 December 1989, p. A1. 

13. Czechoslovakia: A Country Study (Washington, DC

Congress, 1989), p.193. 

14. East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 1, No

1992), p. 3. 

15. Sections 4 & 5, Constitutional Act of 9 January 1

Embassy Mimeo), pp. 1-2. 

16. CTK, 6 November 1990. 

17. The London Times, 24 November 1989. 

18. Zoltan D. Barany, "East European Armed Forces In 

and Beyond," East European Quarterly, Vol. XXVI, No

1992), p. 13. 

19. Prague Domestic Service, 12 December 1989. FB

239 (14 December 1989), p. 27. 

20. Ibid., p. 28. 

21. ColGen Miroslav Vacek 15 December 1989 inter

Pravo, 16 December 1989, p. 1. FBIS-EEU-90-O02 (3 Jan

p. 33. 

22. Respekt, 14 August 1990, pp. 4-5. JPRS-EER-

October 1990), pp. 18-19. 

23. Prague CTK, 6 December 1990. FBIS-EEU-9

December 1990), p. 16. 

24. Bratislava Pravda, 29 December 1989, p. 2. FBIS-E

(3 January 1990), p. 31. Also, Rude Pravo, 11 January 

FBIS-EEU-90-010 (16 January 1990), p. 38. 

25. Prague CTK, 20 September 1990. FBIS-EEU-

September 1990), p. 28. 
1990. FBIS-EEU-90-203 (19 October 1990), pp. 15-16. 

30. Mlada Fronta Dnes, 19 October 1990. FBIS-EE

October 1990), p. 15. 

31. Prague CTK, 16 October 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-201 (1

1990), p. 8. In his first order Dobrovsky banned the Free L

it could be investigated. On 30 October Dobrovsky lifted 

suspending the Free Legion's activities. 

32. ColGen Miroslav Vacek interview, 9 February 1990. F

90-029 (12 February 1990), p. 18. 

33. Prague Svobodne Slovo, 12 July 1990, p. 1. FBIS-EE

(19 July 1990), p. 17. 

34. Prague CTK, 1 October 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-193 

1990), p. 20. 

35. Lubos Dobrovsky interview, Mlada Fronta Dnes, 3

1990, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-90-215 (6 November 1990), p. 11. 

36. Prague Domestic Service, 28 November 1990. FBIS

230 (29 November 1990), p. 21. 

37. Lubos Dobrovsky interview, Mlada Fronta Dnes, 13 

1990, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-90-245 (20 December 1990), p. 23. 

38. Prague CTK, 17 April 1991. JPRS-EER-91-053 (25 A

p. 2. 

39. Col.Eng. Josef Ocenas interview, Prace, 24 March 

1,2. FBIS-EEU-90-064 (3 April 1990), pp. 23-24. 

40. Prague Domestic Service, 22 January 1991. FBIS-EE

(23 January 1991), p. 15. 

41. Vaclav Havel 15 December 1990 interview, Prague 

Service, 16 December 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-242 (17 Decem

p. 29. 

42. Antonin Rasek interview, Narodna Obroda, 2 April 

FBIS-EEU-91-066 (5 April 1991), p. 18. 

43. Krasnaya Zvezda, 6 April 1991, p. 2. JPRS-UMA-9

April 1991), p. 51. 

44. Hospodarske Noviny, 25 April 1991, p. 3. FBIS-EEU

May 1991), p. 9. 
49. Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas, 19 August 1991. F

91-161 (20 August 1991), p. 16. 

Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas, 20 August 1991. F

(21 August 1991), pp. 11-12. 

Prague CSTK, 11 May 1992.FBIS-EEU-92-092 (12 M

50. 

91-162 

51. 

p. 8. 

52. 

53. 

p. 14. 

54. 

p. 9. 

FBIS-EEU-92-110 (8 June 1992), pp. 14-18. 

Prague CSTK, 9 June 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-111 (9 J

Prague CSTK, 23 June 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-124 (26 J

55. On 16 July 1992 the Federal Assembly approved 

Government Policy Statement" that outlined the new reduc

Government structure and stated how powers would be d

National Councils which were to reach agreements by t

September. For text, see Hospodarske Noviny, 22 July 1993, 

EEU-92-144 (27 July 1992), pp. 10-14. 

56. Vaclav Havel news conference, Prague Stanice Cesk

Radio, 1 July 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-128 (2 July 1992), p. 8. 

57. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 122 (30 June 1992), p. 4

58. Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio, 17 Septem

FBIS-EEU-92-182 (18 September 1992), p. 7. 

59. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 136 (20 July 1992), p. 8

60. Prague CSTK, 20 July 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-140 (21 

p. 5. 

61. Treaty text, Hospodarske Noviny, 8 December 1992, 

EEU-92-240 (14 December 1992), pp. 20-23. 

62. In the Chamber of the People, 92 voted in favor, 16 a

28 abstained. In the Czech part of the Chamber of Nations, 4

favor, 7 against, and 11 abstained. In the Slovak part, 46 vote

7 against, and 16 abstained. Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko 

November 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-228 (25 November 1992), p

63. Text, Mlada Fronta Dnes, 26 November 1992, p. 6. F

92-232 (2 December 1992), pp. 8-9. 
pp

Legislative power is vested in a bicameral parliament

member Chamber of Deputies with four-year terms an

member Senate elected for a six-year term (one-third ev

years). Since the Czech Parliament rejected the prop

federal deputies be transferred to the Senate, it r

unoccupied through 1994. Constitutional amendments r

three-fifths majority of all deputies of the Chamber of 

and of all members of the Senate present. 1 

The president, as commander-in-chief, is elected b

majority of both chambers of parliament for a five-year t

powers of the Czech president, in contrast to the stron

president, are more like the German-model; the p

represents symbolic and moral authority. The govemme

supreme executive power. Although the president 

members of government, it is at the suggestion of th

minister, who determines the government's composit

Table 11 below). The president appoints the Constitution

of 15 judges for ten-year terms with Senate a

Constitutional amendments require three-fifths of all d

On 26 January 1993, 109 (of 200) Parliamentary deputie

Vaclav Havel the Czech Republic's first president. 3 

Vaclav Havel's actual powers as president of th

Republic are much more limited than those he held u

former CSFR Constitution in that he no longer has the 

put forth legislative initiatives. Article 62 outlines his ind

powers, which on close examination are quite limited, an

63 outlines those powers limited by prime ministerial s

One potential problem is Article 63(c) which decl

president "supreme commander of the armed forces" 

129 
Table 11 Czech Reform, 1993 

PRESIDENT I 

V. Havel 

STATE DEFENSE 

COUNCIL(ROS) 

I 

CHIEF OF 

GEN. STAFF 

LTG K. Pezl 

MG J. Nekvasil 

CHAMBER 

DEPUTIES 

(200) 

SENATE 

(81) 

PRIME MINIST

V. Klaus 

Elections 

(6/92) 

I 

I 1 ST DEP. 

DEF. MIN. 

J. Pospisil 

I 

I DIR. FOR. 

AFFAIRS 

J. Novotny 

A. Baudys (1/

V. Holan (9/9

I 

DEFENSE MIN

I 

DEP. M

MANAG

M. Kalo

These include the prime minister, ministers of finan

affairs, defense, interior, industry and trade, environ

military officers from the Office of the President, Go

and General Staff. President Havel noted that: "Ac

Article 63 of the Constitution, the President has th
costtutoapotcs ave beeeatvey ca. s 

part, due to the ongoing strength of the ruling Civic De

Party (ODS) led by Prime Minister Vaclav Klau

controlled 105 seats of the 200-seat Chamber of 

(Deputies from the June 1992 Czech National Coun

reassigned to the Chamber of Deputies). The Senate, tho

not filled, because of a difference of opinion as to 

Senators from the CSFR Senate should be coopted t

body (opposed by the Civic Democratic Alliance (C

failed a vote because it required a two-thirds Cha

Deputies majority), or abolish the Senate (which was re

March 24, 1993). The Chamber of Deputies therefore f

duties of the Senate until that body will be elected (Ar

Secs. 2-3). 7 

During the first months of 1994 the Senate remained 

The opposition Social Democrats and the Communists 

abolish the Senate. Vaclav Klaus' ODS wanted th

elections to take place in 81 single-member districts; th

well as two Christian parties [Christian Democratic Part

and Christian Democratic Union (CDU)] wanted to or

electoral districts, with the top three vote-getters in eac

becoming senators. Despite these differences, the OD

ChDP-CDU coalition remained stable. On 27 September 

Parliament rejected a constitutional amendment aboli

Senate. 

Military. On 4 January 1993 Antonin Baudys 

Christian Democratic Union) became the Czech Repub

defense minister. He immediately announced that "

changes have been made in the Army since 1989 ''8 and 

radical steps would be needed to adjust the structure an

the defense ministry and Army to meet needs of integr

the European defense system. Baudys also retained form
Baudys wanted to delineate responsibility be

General Staff, which needs to be concemed with com

the civilian defense ministry, which is concerned with 

allocation and supply, management of production ente

foreign contacts. Also noting that many qualifie

officers had been leaving the military, Baudys ch

Deputy Defense Minister Jiri Pospisil to establi

personnel system within the Army. 1° 

The defense mi~fister envisaged, with P

participation, that "screening" or interviews and tests 

would be necessary for service in the new Czech Arm

May 1993 the defense ministry issued the orde

screening of 28,000 professional soldiers by the end o

Baudys indicated that officers who participated in th

the armed forces after 1968 or in the clamp 

demonstrations in 1989 would be fired. In addition

reductions would require 8,000 to 10,000 professiona

the armed forces or retire. 12 Though the Parliament D

Security Committee criticized the process and results

screening had been completed, it concluded that the 

the Army's officers would defend the sovereignty of 

Republic. 13 

On 1 January 1993, the Czech Republic Army 

106,447 (69,488 in the Army and 36,959 in Air For

Defense). 14 In his first meeting with the Czech 

Defense and Security Committee, Baudys argued that 

Army's weapons must be replaced to approach Westem 

and noted that the ministry was drafting a c

reequipping the Army. 15 At its first (29 April 1993) 

State Defense Council (ROS) recommended that the g

approve (which it did on 9 June) a draft of the new C

structure. The goal was to build down those forces 
addition, there will be an Air Force and Air Defense tr

Czech forces will have different equipment than Hun

Slovakia, which acquired MiG-29s from Russia as par

debt consolidation. The Czechs made a conscious decis

buy MiG-29s nor to re-equip their Army with R

Ukrainian equipment. In fact, during 1994 they decided 

their MiG-29s and, instead, to use MiG-23s until 19

modernize their 36 MiG-21s. 18 The Czech Army also 

buy 72 Czech-made L-159 interceptors (to replace it

and MiG-23s) produced by Aero Vodochody betwe

2004.19 

On 1 July 1993 MG Jiri Nekvasil replaced Kare

chief of staff of the Czech Army. In contrast to all oth

European general staffs, the Czech General Staff had 

transformed that Nekvasil noted in a July interview t

are none of the original principal officers anymore.'a° In 

to retum the Army to the people, on 19 August 1993 

apologized to the citizens of the Czech Republic fo

played by the Army in suppressing demonstrations i

1969; he openly conceded that the Army had been use

the people by the former Communist Party and that 

declassify secret documents on 20 August. n 

During September 1993 when Yeltsin dissolved th

Parliament, Defense Minister Baudys argued that the 

should not be dramatized or exaggerated. Baudys argu

normal development could be expected, as long as arm

do not intervene. At a 23 September news confer

Nekvasil announced that he had ordered the intensif

military intelligence. 22 As the Russian situation degen

early October, Havel, Klaus, and Baudys all went 

record that Russia posed no direct threat to the Czech 

With NATO's introduction of Partnership For Pe
term military training and exercises on Czech soil (5,0

troops for up to 21 days) and for Czech units to 

abroad (700 troops for up to 30 days). ~ 

On 10 March 1994 Vaclav Klaus signed the PF

agreement making the Czech Republic the 1 lth coun

the project. Defense Minister Baudys noted of the pro

"it is the maximum possible and the minimum desire

first joint exercise with a Western Army under PFP 

15-25 March 1994 when 32 Dutch marines participate

members of the Czech Rapid Deployment Battalion 

soil. In 29 May-10 June, 130 French troops parti

exercises in the Czech Republic with 120 members of 

of the 23rd Czech Mechanized Battalion. 26 Du

September, a platoon of 40 soldiers of the Czech 4th M

Regiment participated in "Cooperative Bridge-94" in 

The first joint Czech-German military exercise of 400 t

place during 7-11 November on both sides of the 

border. 28 On 9 May, the Czech Republic signed its 

partnership agreement with the WEU. 

The Rapid Deployment Brigade, which has some 

and became operational on 1 July 1994, represents the 

the Czech Republic's future forces. The equipment of th

will be compatible with NATO and its units will par

NATO exercises. Though the Czech Parliament reduce

defense budget to 27 billion korunas (Kc), it reoriented 

and included new line-item expenditures of Kc800 m

creating the Rapid Deployment Force, Kc50 m

restructuring the logistics system, and Kc300 m

modemizing communications. 29 

By spring 1994 the former six-tier organization of 

began merging into three levels--General Staff, army 

brigades. General Nekvasii noted that the Rapid D
y y g 

Force, where almost all costs are expenditures on the 

of the aging fleet, the Air Force would gradually 

extinct. ''31 

On 22 September 1994 Vilem Holan succeeded 

Baudys as defense minister. Shortly after assuming offi

criticized the Army vetting that occurred under Baudys

that only sixty people did not pass the screening. 31 Hol

that his priorities would be military education and to c

structure of the officers corps because "there are too m

ranking officers. ''33 After a few months in office, H

defense ministry challenges in the following two areas

continued to see the need to change the personnel ma

system. He noted that he had set up personnel board to 

criteria and guidelines tbr career paths for military p

Second, he wanted to break through the "imped

legislation" and adopt a Law on the Army, a Law 

Conditions of Service, and a new Defense Law. ~ 

In reference to NATO membership Defense Minis

noted that "it is possible to anticipate that the cond

NATO membership will be clearly defined in 

future--that is, certain standards will be drawn up...[ad

'cheap' phase of our decisions is coming to an end, and 

that will cost us something is beginning. ''35 Indeed, 

costs of modernization were as high as 120 billion kor

($4.4 billion) beginning 1995 to the year 2005; to incl

billion for small arms and anti-tank weapons, Kc33.

Force acquisitions (to include 72 L-159 aircraft fr

Vodochody for Kcl5 billion), 36 Air Defense spending 

Kcl0 billion, and Kcl0 billion for radars and 

equipment. 37 

Deputies of the Parliament's Defense and Security C
system that would be capable of communicating with N

which it earmarked Kc6 billion for 1995. 39 

In mid-December 1994, the govemment approved a 

entitled "Military Strategy of the Czech Republic" wh

that the Army must be able to face danger on its own, 

small Army has its limits. Thus, the Czech Repub

membership in alliances, specifically NATO. The docu

described the structure of the Armed Forces; that the ar

be nonpartisan, semi-professional, and subject to p

parliamentary control. 4° 

President Vaclav Havel in his New Year's address 

the Czech Parliament to pass a law that would finally 

Senate to be created in the Czech Republic. Later in t

after an informal meeting with senior Czech Army offic

noted that: "I realize that, after all these complicated ch

Army is led by a relatively good team of younger gen

are willing to build the democratic army of a democrat

Notes 

1. Pavel Mates, "The Czech Constitution," RFE/RL 

Report, Vol. 2, No. 10 (5 March 1993), pp. 53-57. 

2. Pavel Mates, "The Czech Constitution," RFE/RL 

Report, Vol. 2, No. 10 (5 March 1993), pp. 53-57. 

3. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 17 (27 January 1993), p. 

4. Vojtech Cepl and Mark Gillis, "Czech Republic," Eas

Constitutional Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 66

5. Prague CTK, 10 March 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-046 

1993), p. 13. 

6. Mlada Fronta Dnes, 13 March 1993, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-

March 1993), p. 12. 
January 1993), p. 9. 

11. In a March 1993 interview, Defense Minister Baud

for screening. Citing examples of past screening failure

mentioned that former Defense Minister Miroslav Vacek 

Anton Slimak had destroyed files on the anny's prepa

November 1989. Prague Telegraf, 23 March 1993, pp. 1,9. F

93-057 (26 March 1993), pp. 11- 13. 

12. Prague CTK, 17 May 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-096 

1993), pp. 6-7. During 1993, 6,594 individuals left the Army

113 NCOs, 1,856 warrant officers, 4,607 officers, and 18 ge

the same time, 1,821 individuals joined the Army, including 

who joined UNPROFOR. General Jiri Nekvasil press con

Report, 22 February 1994, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-94-084 (2 May 

8-9. 

13. Chairman of Parliamentary Defense and Security C

Vladimir Suman interview, Cesky Denik, 11 April 1994, pp. 

EEU-94-074 (18 April 1994), pp. 15-16. 

14. Prague Report, 3 January 1993, p. 3. 

15. Prague Lidove Noviny, 12 February 1993, p. 3. FBIS

031 (18 February 1993), p. 23. 

16. Prague CTK, 29 April 1993. FBIS-EEU-93-083 (3 M

p. 18. 

17. Defense Minister Baudys interview, Lidove Prace

1993, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-93-079 (27 April 1993), p. 19. Some 

mechanized brigades were transformed from divisions by e

During the first week of 1995, the 6th and 7th Mechanized B

Brno and Kromeriz. The last one, the 8th, is scheduled to 

July 1995, rather than the end of the year. Hospodarske 

January 1995, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-95-O07 (11 January 1995), 

18. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 121 (28 June 1994), pp

19. Prague CTK, 10 July 1994. 

20. MG Jiri Nekvasil interview, A Report, 27 July 199

21. Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes, 12 August 1993, p. 2. F

93-163 (25 August 1993), p. 14. 
94-104 (31 May 1994), p. 18. 

27. Prague CTK, 3 August 1994. 

28. Prague CTK, 12 October 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-199 (

1994), p. 5. 

29. Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network, 5 April 1994. F

94-065 (5 April 1994), p. 4. 

30. General Jiri Nekvasil interview, Denni Telegraf, 6 A

pp. 1,3. FBIS-EEU-94-072 (14 April 1994), pp. 9-10. 

31. Prague Lidove Prace, 20 October 1994, p. 9. FBIS-

(26 October 1994), p. 5. Colonel Frantisek Padek, the deputy 

chief, noted that the result of the cut was to move up from "

50 flying hours annually to 90 hours." Ibid. 

32. Though he may have had some initial reservation

few months Holan's assessment had changed. In a Dece

interview, he noted: "I believe that the officer corps is 

members are soldiers through and through." Prague Lidove 

December 1994, p. 3. FBIS-EEU-94-239 (13 December 19

33. Prague CTK, 10 October 1994. 

34. Defense Minister Wilem Holan interview, Prag

Fronta, 21 November 1994, p. 7. FBIS-EEU-94-228 (28 

1994), p. 11. 

35. Vilem Holan, Prague Lidove Noviny, 19 November 

FBIS-EEU-94-226 (23 November 1994), p. 2. 

36. Rockwell International won the contract for supplyin

electronics for the L-159. Prague Lidove Noviny, 22 Novemb

1 FBIS-EEU-95-O03 (5 January 1995), p. 6. 

37. Prague Rude Pravo, 23 November 1994, p. 3. FBI

229 (29 November 1994), pp. 8-9. 

38. Prague Mlada Fronta, 30 November 1994, p. 2. FBI

239 (13 December 1994), p. 4. 

39. PragueRespekt, 12-18 December 1994, p. 5. FBIS-E

(16 December 1994), p. 5. 

155-article Slovak Constitution stresses national rathe

aspects of citizenship 2 and outlines the Slovak govem

unicameral National Council has 150 delegates electe

year terms (see Table 12 below). The president, electe

fifths of the deputies, serves for a five-year term 

national command authority. The govemment--prim

deputies, and ministers--is appointed and recall

president, who also appoints judges to the Constituti

for a seven-year term. 3 

In contrast to the Czech Republic which elected Va

on the first ballot, it took the Slovaks weeks to cast a 

ballots. (Alexander Dubcek, the leading presidential 

had been fatally injured in an automobile accident.) 

15 February, 106 deputies elected Michal Kovac, 

Movement for Democratic Slovakia's (HZDS) c

Slovakia's first president; he was inaugurated on 2 M

On 16 December 1992 the Slovak National Counc

the creation of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Rep

about 43,000 troops, and a new defense ministry. T

Constitution binds the armed forces to maintain all t

agreements made by the Czechoslovak Federal Republ

All Slovaks (including those previously servin

Czechoslovak Army) had to swear allegiance of 

Slovakia by 31 January 1993, to be allowed to serve 

Slovak Army. 

Ahnost immediately, disputes within the 

Movement for a Democratic Slovakia erupted and 

constitutional politics. In January a personal dis

between two of the movement's founders--Prim

141 
qpp

confidence) Kovac announced on 10 March that he woul

Table 12 Slovak Defense Reform, 1993 

PRESIDENT I 

M. Kovac 

I 

STATE DEFENSE 

COUNCIL / NSC 

NATIONAL 

COUNCIL 

(150) 

Elections 

(6/92) 

V. Meciar (1/9

J. Moravcik (3

I PRIME MINIS

I 

LTG J. Humaj 

I 

CDR. OF ] 

ARMY 

I. Andrejcak (3/9

P. Kanis (3/94) 

I 

DEFENSE MIN

I 

I 

I. Urban 3/9

MG A. Sab

I 

I STATE SE

OF DEF
no duty to accept a prime ministerial motion of dism

minister. Though Kovac had already fired Knazko, th

did serve as a final interpretation of the vague co

article. 

Knazko, stealing away 7 of the HZDS's 74 mem

150-seat Council, then formed a parliamentary caucus 

a new Alliance of Slovak Democrats (ADS). Then on 

Ludovit Cemak, Chairman of the Slovak National Pa

allegedly in protest over Imrich Andrejcak's appo

defense minister, also bolted the HZDS coalition. A

Meciar was now in minority with 66 seats. Throug

attempted to create a new alliance with the SNP (wh

bring his total to 81 seats), but the discussions broke 

failure of coalition talks threatened early elections. 

On 19 October 1993 Meciar finally formed a coa

Ludovit Cernak, leader of the SNP; the HZDS-SNP co

80 of the 150 parliament seats. After two weeks of n

Meciar submitted a list of seven ministers to Michal K

November. President Kovac accepted the nomination 

refusing the name of Ivan Lexa as privatization minis

withdrew the list of seven, then on 9 November re-s

list of only six. 

Military. The challenge of constructing a ne

ministry in Bratislava, the army command in Trencin, 

army was daunting. On 16 March 1993, Presid

appointed Imrich Andrejcak, former CSFR defense m

Slovakia's new defense minister. At the end of 

government approved a bill that created a Nationa

Council to replace the State Defense Council. 5 

The Army's most urgent task was to create an A

Slovak Republic. This meant redeploying troops wh

required the construction of apartments for officers an
secondSlovak Republics Defense Doctrineco

Slovakia to international agreements limiting forces a

emphasized maintaining good neighbor relations, and e

interest in joining NATO and the WEU. 6 

Ethnic issues. Disputes with its Hungarian minor

negative impact on Slovakia's international image. In J

Hungarian deputies to the Slovak National Council boyc

vote on the new constitution because they felt it failed t

the rights of etlmic minorities; and in December th

numerous violations of Hungarian rights in Slovak

strained relations with neighboring Hungary. By Ap

Meciar, wanting to enter the Council of Europe, indi

willingness to amend the constitution if necessary and 

independent watchdog commission on human rights. Slo

Hungary also agreed on 7 April 1993 to refer the proble

Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam on the Danube to the Inte

Court of Justice in the Hague for arbitration. 

The ethnic issue continued to fester. Hungarians con

lodge accusations of minority discrimination when the tr

tion minister removed Hungarian language road signs. 

that their pleas for dialogue had been ignored, on Januar

about 4,000 local mayors and politicians gathered in K

and decided to declare a self-governing province in the 

significant Hungarian ethnic minority. 7 

Continuing political instability. Despite the tent

October coalition agreement, the last months of 1993 a

1994 were characterized by further turmoil. Finally, aft

of no-confidence in March 1994, Vladimir Meciar's gov

was ousted, and a new government was formed. 

Tension in the coalition escalated in December whe

delivered a highly controversial speech behind closed 

HZDS party followers. He called for early elections 
Kovac and Moravcik from the HZDS and their resign

the cabinet. 

As a result Meciar now led a minority govemm

began to push for elections in June. Though the 

rejected the idea as impractical, Meciar then began 

350,000 signatures (under Article 95 of the Constitut

a referendum for early elections and to dismiss tho

who had switched party affiliation after the last elect

President Michal Kovac decided that he could 

referendum on dismissing deputies who had changed 

affiliation and in a 9 March speech to Parliament Kova

Meciar and his govemment as inefficient and incomp

two days of stormy debate, Parliament toppled the pri

in a vote of no-confidence on 11 March 1994. 8 On 

Kovac announced that Meciar's petition for earl

submitted 2 March, was invalid. In a unanimous vote, 

(including Meciar) voted to hold elections on 30 Sep

1 October 1994. 

On 16 March 1994 President Kovac named Joze

as prime minister who called for restoring public co

the new state; and Pavol Kanis (of the Party of the 

Left) became the first civilian defense minister (with 

Sabol as defense state secretary later in March). By 

one major issue was to eliminate tensions between 

ministry in Bratislava and the Army Command in Tre

had resulted, in part, because the Army Command 

established first. It was also necessary to clarify th

political and military responsibilities between t

ministry and Army Command. 9 

The new Moravcik govemment initiated significan

Slovakia's defense and security policy. The draft Slov
program 1 and clearly stated that the fundamental orien

Slovakia was to obtain full NATO membership. Partici

NATO's NACC and Partnership For Peace (Slovakia s

Presentation Document on 25 May 1994) was the m

achieve this objectiveJ 2 Former Defense Minister 

Andrejcak criticized Kanis' changes to Slovakia

Presentation Document as being too expensive, arguing 

defense ministry would now have to spend 4.5 perce

budget rather than the one percent originally envisaged

Another change was the recognition that the creat

separate Army Command from the CSFR Comma

facilities was not a workable solution. In early June Slov

Connnander General Julius Humaj announced that the c

was to be transformed into a General Staff along the 

Westem European Armies. 14 Then Defense Ministe

announced that the defense ministry and the Arm

Command (to be renamed the General Staff) w

restructured and significantly reduced in size to preven

and inefficiency. ~ 

On 26 August the Slovak National Council a

amendments to the Law on the Army to create a Gener

whose chief is subordinate to the defense minister, but a

(and recalled) by the president at the defense m

recommendation. On 1 September, ColGen Jozef T

adviser to the defense minister and former interior 

became the new Chief of General Staff, and Genera

became his deputy. 16 

Building a new Army would be very expensive. Dur

Slovakia (like Hungary, but in marked contrast to th

Republic) had acquired 6 addition Russian MiG-29s (wo

million) as part of the Russian debt to Slovakia. In a 26 

press conference Chief of Staff Jozef Tuchyna argued 
General Staff. 18 Defense Minister Pavol Kanis added th

also be necessary to develop a modem system of m

and command within the headquarters and Slovak A

1995.19 

The new Moravcik-coalition government also at

moderate outstanding ethnic tensions. In Parliament, t

one bill on women's surnames (Hungarian women 

have to add the Slovak suffix "ova" to their last nam

and another that requires bilingual road signs in town

least 20 percent of the residents are ethnic minority i

Preparation for the new elections also required cha

electoral law to prevent debilitating fragmentation (at 

political parties). The electoral law set a 5 percent th

political parties; 7 percent for coalitions of two or th

and 10 percent for coalitions of four or more parties. 

When the elections were held on 30 September

1994 seven parties returned to Parliament. Meciar's 

for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) in coalition with 

Farmers' Party gained the largest number of votes 

percent (61 seats); second was the Common Choic

(composed of four left-wing parties) with 10.41 p

seats); third was the Hungarian coalition with 10.18 

seats); fourth, the Christian Democrats with 10.08 p

seats); fifth, Moravcik's Democratic Union with 8.57 

Association of Workers with 7.34 (13 seats); and Slov

Party with 5.4 percent (9 seats). 2° 

Before the election, the Moravcik-coalition gover

Hungarian parties had 85 seats in Parliament; and aft

only have 68. Therefore President Michal Kovac, w

met with Meciar since February, asked Meciar (whose 

61 seats) to try to form a government on 27 Octob

Prime Minister Moravcik submitted his resignation t
agreement with the extremeright Slovak National Part

and the left-wing Association of Slovak Workers (AS

Slovak Agrarian Party, an HZDS-satellite, also joi

coalition. Together the four parties would hold 83 sea

150-seat Parliament. zz When Meciar announced t

government on 13 December, it included Jan Sitek (

defense minister (see Table 13 below). 

As 1995 opened, the old feud between Meciar and P

Kovac erupted again. Meciar opened his offensive by sla

president's budget by 50 percent, z3 criticizing the Consti

being unclear in its division of powers, and claiming 

Parliament and people lacked proper supervision o

president. Therefore Meciar indicated that he would li

the government's powers to be increased or the adopt

presidential model whereby the citizens would directly 

president. Michael Kovacs, on the other hand, was op

changing the Constitution. 

It appears that Meciar is embarking Slovakia on 

fraught with dangers. Whether Slovakia will end in a 

similar to the current Polish problems is unclear. One in

of potential concern emerged from Defense Minister Si

noted shortly after taking office that he had plans to 

Slovak militia, which would be staffed by forme

members, and subordinate to the chief of staff. Sitek, no

"It will be employed for the protection of objects and in 

mobilization."24 

In summary, Slovakia's reform has been hamp

political instability which resulted in three government

years. Its defense reform differs from the other Central E

states in that Slovakia had to create defense institutions 

beginning. The Moravcik coalition-government 

significant defense and military reforms, but it remains to 
PRESIDENT I 

M. Kovac 

I 

I STATE DEFENSE 

COUNCIL 

NATIONAL 

COUNCIL 

(150) 

I I 

Elections 

(10/94) 

I 

CoSJ. Tuchyna 

DepOoS J. Hum~ 

I 

GENERAL I 

STAFFS/94 

(

PRIME MIN

P. Kanis (3/

J. Sitek (12/

I 

DEFENSE MI

I 

J. Gajd

(12/94

STATE 

OF D

Notes 

1. Prague CSTK, 1 September 1992. FBIS-EEU-

September 1992), p. 4. 

2. For example, Article 34.3 exemplifies that what app

group does not apply to mlother. According to it, if a 

homogenous territory is formed, its right of self-deter

constitutionally outlawed. See, Pavol Hollander, "The N

Constitution: A Critique," East European Constitutional R
6. For text, see Bratislava Informacny Bulletin, No. 35/94

FBIS-EEU-94-053 (18 March 1994), pp. 9-13. 

7. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 8 January 1994. FBIS

007 (11 January 1994), pp. 10-11. 

8. With many deputies absent, and 56 HZDS-SNP 

members abstaining, 78 of 150 supported the ouster. Prague 

March 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-049 (14 March 1994), pp. 11-12

9. Pavol Kanis 31 March 1994 speech, Trencin. Bratislav

2 April 1994, p. 2. 

10. Parliament approved the new Defense Doctrine on 

1994. 

11. As of 9 May 1994 Slovakia began to participate on 

Council and working group. 

12. Pavol Kanis 24 May 1994 interview, Bratislava R

Stanic~ FBIS-EEU-94-101 (25 May 1994), p. 6; and Defens

of the Slovak Republic text, Bratislava Slovenska Republika, 

1994, p. 10. FBIS-EEU-94-200 (17 October 1994), p. 8. 

13. Prague CTK, 1 June 1994. FBIS-EEU-94-106 (2 June 

14. 

14. Bratislava Pravda, 3 June 1994, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-94-1

1994), p. 12. 

15. The new defense ministry would have 20 general

colonels as against 31 and 354; its total work force would 

which 441 were civilians. The Army Headquarters would re

31 generals and 359 colonels to a General Staff of 14 genera

colonels; its total number of employees would be 1,059. RFE

Report, No. 156 (18 August 1994), p. 4; also Bratislava O

August 1994, p. 3. The new defense ministry, in addition to 

Ministry Office and Inspectorate, would comprise five section

Policy ,and Army Development, Logistics (MG Leopold), 

Policy (Col. JozefZadzora), Foreign Relations, Social and Hum

Affairs (Col. Petr Bartak). Bratislava Obrana, 17 September 

FBIS-EEU-94-181 (19 September 1994), p. 8. 
18. Bratislava SME, 27 October 1994, pp. 1-2. FBIS-E

(8 November 1994), p. 18. 

19. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 22 November 1994. F

94-226 (23 November 1994), p. 12. 

20. Bratislava Narodna Obroda, 3 October 1994, p. 2. F

94-193 (5 October 1994), pp. 10-11. 

21. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 27 October 1994. FBI

209 (28 October 1994), p. 10. 

22. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 11 December 1994. F

94-238 (12 December 1994), p. 11. 

23. Meciar defended the 50 percent cut forcing the 

Office staff to be cut from 127 to 60 people by noting that t

Defense Council had a total of 120 staff members. Prim

Vladimir Meciar interview, Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica, 30 

1994. FBIS-EEU-945-O01 (3 January 1995), pp. 9-10. 

24. Vienna Kurier, 27 January 1995, p. 4. FBIS-EEU-9

January 1995), p. 11. 
the five years since the 1989-90 revolutions, Central E

have made enormous progress. 

If NATO follows its December 1994 mandate, it w

study that will establish criteria for expansion of the 

While it is assumed that active participation in NACC 

and some reasonable demonstration of the successful pe

of democratic political institutions, privatized econo

respect for human rights will be among the necessary c

for NATO membership, it is also likely that effectiv

control of the military as well as some minimal degre

tary capability and NATO compatibility will be 

conditions. 

Though NATO will find it difficult to define the

because each state has its own history, culture, and uni

institutions, it will be especially difficult to define an

consensus on what constitutes "effective" democratic 

the military. This study suggests the following four cond

consideration as being necessary for a state to exert 

civilian oversight of the military: 

(1) The constitution and/or its amendments and l

establish a clear division of authority between the pres

government (prime minister and defense minister). 

should be clear for peacetime authority (e.g., who comm

controls the military and promotes military officers)

crisis (e.g., emergency powers) and transition to war. 

(2) Parliament must exert oversight of the m

exercising control of the defense budget; also it's rol

clear in deploying armed forces in emergency and war

(3) The civilian defense ministry should exercise 

153 
military was often used as an instrument of extemal o

oppression--must perceive the armed forces to be under 

national control. Military training levels and equipm

also be sufficient to protect the state. 

If NATO comes to define these four conditions as n

for exercising "effective" democratic control of the milit

Central European states would not meet these standard

examining Central Europe's civil-military progress since 

revolutions, it is clear that much has already been achie

equally clear that much remains to be done[ 

What Needs to Be Done? 

Poland: Government crises and lack of effectiv

oversight of the military will continue until Poland has 

a new Constitution. Poland's civil-military crisis must be 

because Polish society holds the military in very high est

because the military has been often used for internal and 

purposes historically. The absence of any clear c

authority and of civilian control over the military is a r

disaster. 

Poland has come a long way in restoring prestig

military; and Parliament has reassumed effective oversig

defense budget, if it did twice equivocate on whe

president or defense minister controls the military an

reform the law. Onyszkiewicz began to restructure th

forces to be compatible with NATO. Though Kolod

continued this process and stemmed the defense bud

(since 1986), the military still has a way to go to achiev

compatibility. Poland, though, has not yet fulfilled what 

to be defined as necessary conditions for effective civilia
Hungarys 1949 Constitution, was written by reform co

and established authority between the president, govem

National Assembly, which only by majority could decl

of emergency or war. Most important, the Hungarian 

Assembly amended the defense law in February 1990 

authority (from the Defense Council) to deploy Hungar

forces at home or abroad. This power effectively term

Soviet Statute system, which, as in Poland, had pro

USSR direct access to Hungarian armed forces. The H

Parliament had reassumed national control of Hungar

forces. 

Hungary also needs a new Constitution, but Hung

thirds Parliamentary majority may not be adequate to d

broad-based consensus necessary for a Constitution. Am

things, the Constitution needs to clarify the role of the 

during war (symbolic or real) and establish a new Con

(presently two-thirds) amending formula. 

On the military side, the armed forces have been sig

cut from 120,000 to 65,000 and are being restructured f

integration. But financial resources have greatly co

Hungary's armed forces restructuring, modernization, 

exercise participation. 

Parliament has been effective in exerting contr

defense budget and deploying Hungarian armed fo

Constitutional Court's decisions have been respected an

to major defense reforms allowing the governme

minister and defense minister) to take control of the m

peacetime and emergency. However, Hungary still 

Constitution (that is not a two-thirds majority victor's 

to define the president's wartime powers. Also in ligh

defense ministry and General Staff changes, Hungary 

reassert effective "civilian" defense ministry oversig
apooged ots pevous teeeces Cecso

Czech Republic though still faces two constitutional ta

what to do with the Senate, the upper house of its p

second, and most important, correct a significant con

ambiguity. The (German-model) president, as 

commander of the armed forces," must get the prime 

approval for employing forces and to commission and 

generals. Since the president's emergency powers 

confusion during a crisis, this needs to be rectified. 

Slovakia: In contrast to the Czech Republic, 

instability has characterized Slovakia, which is now o

government in less than two years, and has hampered 

daunting military tasks and reform efforts. In ma

Slovakia's January 1993 independence has thrown th

back in time. Slovakia must build its institutions from 

new defense ministry, an Army command (now Gene

and armed forces. 

Whether or not Slovakia is able to advance its initi

reform efforts, it does need to fix its Constitution, whic

national rather than civil rights. This exacerbates ethni

within Slovakia as well as with neighboring Hungary

question will be whether the Meciar-coalition govemme

able to provide enough stability so that Slovakia can 

along the defense reform path established by the M

coalition government. The first indications are disc

particularly if Meciar pursues his efforts to remove the 

Conclusion 

If NATO does determine that "effective" democra

of the military is a necessary condition for Alliance me
fundamental civil-military problems that still exist

presidential and governmental powers in peacetime and 

be clarified. The Czech Republic needs to amend its co

to clarify the president's role for employing forc

emergency, and Slovakia needs to amend its co

regarding civil rights. Only with this constitutional cla

can real governmental (civilian defense ministry) con

military occur in Poland. Hungary must face the questi

to assert "effective" civilian defense ministry contro

armed forces, and Slovakia must actually jump-start i

reform. 
"['he ybllowing is a complete listing of published McNai

For information on availability of specific titles, contact the C

Manager, Publications Directorate & NDU Press, Fort 

McNair, Washington, DC 20319-6000 (telephone: commercial 

1913; DSN 335-1913). 

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, Febru

2. John E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Reg

1989. 

3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Cons

Monarch?, October 1989. 

4. Howard G. DeWolf, SDI and Arms Control, November 1

5. Martin C. Libicki, What Makes Industries Strategic, Novem

6. Melvin A. Goodman, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in 

World, February 1990. 

7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Sovie

Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Diplo

Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990. 

8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic 

Insurgencies: Insights from El Salvador, May 1990. 

9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense Indu

PEPCON and Avtex Cases, June 1990. 

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless Na

Nationless States, September 1990. 

11. Ralph A. Cossa, lran." Soviet Interests, US Concerns. Ju

12. Ewan Jamieson, Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zeal

1991. 

13. Richard J. Dunn III, From Gettysburg to the Gulf and 

Cophzg with Revolutionary. Technological Change in Land 

March 1992 
18. Sterling D. Sessions and Carl R. Jones, lnteroperabilit

Storm Case Study, July 1993. 

19. Eugene V. Rostow, Should Article 43 of the Uni

Charter Be Raised From the Dead? July 1993 

20. William T. Johnsen and Thomas Durell-Young; Jef

Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, and James McCarthy

Security Toward the Year 2000, August 1993. 

21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed., Developing Battlefield Technol

1990s, August 1993. 

22. Patrick Clawson, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived

Sanctions, 1990-93, August 1993. 

23. Jeffrey Simon, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce,

Cohesion, attd European Fault Lines, October 1993. 

24. Eugene V. Rostow, The Future of Palestine, Novembe

25. William H. Lewis, John Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, an

Urquhart, Peacekeeping- The Way Ahead? November 1993

26. Edward Marks and William Lewis, Triage for Fai

January 1994. 

27. Gregory D. Foster, In Search of a Post-Cold W

Structure, February 1994. 

28. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculation

Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, March 1994. 

29. Patrick Clawson, ed., Iran's Strategic Intentions and C

April 1994. 

30. James W. Morrison, Vladimir ZhirinovskLv: An Asses

Russian Ultra-Nationaffst, April 1994. 

31. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the 

Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program, November 1

32. Scott W. Conrad, Moving the Force: Desert Storm a

December 1994. 

33. John N. Petrie, American Neutrality in the 20th C

Impossible Dream, January 1995. 
38. Robbin Laird, French Security Policy in Transition: Dy

Continuity and Change, March 1995. 

39. Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Rela

NATO Expansion, April 1995. 

40. James W. Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternativ

Security Alignments in Europe, April 1995. 
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