Discussion Paper Number Twelve

JOINT MILITARY

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LLIGENCE COLLEGE

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The Joint Military Intelligence College supports and encourages 

on intelligence issues that distills lessons and improves suppo

policy-level and operational consumers

This series of Discussion Papers will present the work of faculty, students, and others whos

on intelligence issues is supported or otherwise encouraged by the Joint Military Intelligen

through its Office of Applied Research. Discussion Papers are used in instruction and resea

ties of the College, and undergo prepublication review by College Faculty.

Proposed manuscripts for these papers are submitted for consideration to the Applied Res

torial Board. Manuscripts or requests for additional copies of Discussion Papers should be 

to Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Military Intelligence College, Center for Strategic In

Research, MC-X, Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C. 20340-5100.

 Russell.Swenson@dia.mil, 
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Discussion Paper Number Twelve

EXPERIENCES TO GO: TEACHING WIT

INTELLIGENCE CASE STUDIES

By Thomas W. Shreeve, Col (USMCR)

JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE

WASHINGTON, DC

September 2004

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author

and do not reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of Defense or the U.S. Government
iii

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Case Research and Casewriting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

How to Write an Effective Teaching Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Evacuating the Americans from Rwanda Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Teaching Note for Use with Rwanda Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut Case Study . . . . . . 

The Bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut: The Long Commi

Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Teaching Note for Use with Lebanon Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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INTELLIGENCE CASE STUDIES

FOREWORD

Colonel Thomas W. Shreeve, USMCR, is a former faculty member o

Program for Reserves at the Joint Military Intelligence College. For 

Colonel Shreeve, in CIA’s Office of Training and Education, developed a

case-study method of teaching intelligence principles and procedure

including some used at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of 

are realistic and historically accurate. The validity of intelligence case s

poses the existence of academic theory or, alternatively, worldly practic

tutes “theory-in-action.” The National Foreign Intelligence Communi

offers a quintessential example of the latter, making the case studies descr

valid and reliable for a variety of instructional environments. Colonel Sh

and examples for writing a teaching note can guide a novice case-met

toward an effective classroom analysis of cases.

Readers should recognize that a good deal of difference exists between 

oriented case studies in this paper, on the one hand, and research papers 

study design wherein sources are explicitly identified, the event conte

explored, and the research questions carefully related to a theoretical 

through pertinent conclusions. Case studies generate important questio

consideration, using the broad range of evidence derived from empirical o

respective authors and other contributors to each case.

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited and should be forwarde

Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, Joint Military Intelligence C

Bolling AFB, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

Dr. Russell G. Swenson, Director, Center for Strategic Intellig
1

INTELLIGENCE CASE STUDIES

INTRODUCTION

Long associated with teaching at the graduate level in business and pu

tration, the case method represents a structured approach to learning from 

method relies on the use of historically accurate, written descriptions 

dilemmas that students read, analyze, and meet to discuss under the g

instructor. Instructors use questions to guide the discussion toward a pa

gogical destination rather than declarative statements that tell students h

think about a complex issue. Learning by the case method is active rathe

as students are explicitly made partners in the reduction of ambiguity surr

plex, realistic issues.

Students who learn by the case method improve their analytic skills wh

ask them to identify the problems at hand and they fortify their decision

when instructors ask them to propose a plan of action to resolve the probl

identified. Driven by the constructive conflict that typically results from a 

ination of a complex issue, case-based discussions frequently also resul

student ability to express individual convictions in the face of criticism fro

Any description that provokes thoughtful reflection and is historically 

be considered for use in a case-based class. The term “case” refers to a d

dilemma that stops short of the outcome. The term “case study” refers to a 

a past event that has an outcome included in the document and thus is kno

dents. Both vehicles are equally useful; case studies tend to be longer, mor

more historical in tone.

The use of case studies as a basis for teaching in the intelligence profes

body of well-crafted cases and case studies that are relevant to the needs o

faculty. There are a number of prospective sources for such material. Ex

include civilian academic institutions such as the John F. Kennedy School o

at Harvard. The JFK School’s catalog includes several dozen cases and ca

may be appropriate for classroom use. This is particularly true for courses t

relationship between intelligence and national security policy; about a doze

cases examine this relationship in detail. Most of this material was created 

tract between the JFK School and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)’s 

Study of Intelligence. JFK School cases and case studies explore strategic i

CIA material addresses the tactical or operational levels of war, where ma

JMIC graduates will spend their intelligence careers.

Another external source is the Intelligence Community Case Method P

has about 200 cases and case studies, many of which may also be approp

room use. Almost all of these are classified and cover a wide variety of 
2

the Armed Forces, and other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Se

case studies focus exclusively on military intelligence and counterintellige

chiefly at the tactical and operational levels of war.

Other sources offer long-term value as they can be tailored specifically fo

needs. One possibility is to convert selected existing master’s theses into case 

careful editing and revision. The theses are available immediately and at no 

ever, a considerable investment of time and effort is required to convert them 

of a case study. Another internal source is through faculty and student research 

cation. Research by students supervised by faculty is probably the best long-t

of prospective cases and case studies.

Instructors who are unfamiliar with the case method or who need to refine 

may benefit from attending an instructor workshop on the technique. Two wo

conducted by Harvard University faculty, one in Cambridge meeting one af

week for nine weeks and the other conducted sporadically at conferences of th

Society for Training and Development. The third is the CIA’s three-and-a-ha

Method Teaching Workshop (CMTW), which can be conducted onsite.1

Advantages of the CMTW include its low cost and the speed with whic

used to familiarize a sizable number of interested instructors; it is also tailo

cally to the U.S. Intelligence Community. More than 250 Community 

including several from the Armed Forces, have attended the CMTW. Specia

have been conducted for the U.S. Naval War College, the Armed Forces Sta

the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the Navy and Marine Co

gence Training Center. Experience at several military educational institutio

that the use of cases and case studies can result in successful, engaging discu

CASE RESEARCH AND CASEWRITING

Teaching by the case method requires a supply of relevant, well-crafted cas

studies. These are a unique literary form: part history, part drama, part researc

Fitting the Case Into a Course

The first requirement for a successful case is to understand how it will fit int

course. The instructor and the casewriter (these may be the same person) must 

teaching points are to be communicated to the students by their exploration of 

courses in which several cases will be used, instructors need to examine carefu

concepts that students will derive from each one will fit together, so that the s

apply what they have learned to new and increasingly difficult material.

1 For further information on the Case Method Teaching Workshop, contact Tom 

(703) 237-4624 or at tomshreeve@aol.com, and visit the website at http://www.intelcase
3

Once an instructor/casewriter has a clear idea of the teaching points, he o

find a situation that will serve as an appropriate context for the case or cas

nately, the diverse and often intrinsically exciting operations of the Centr

Agency make this part of the task fairly easy. Sources for good leads inclu

in various parts of the organization, former students, and sometimes sp

components. For example, the Office of Personnel, Special Activities Staf

lent source for cases dealing with “problem employees,” while the Office 

Counsel or the Inspector General Staff are natural places to look for cases i

or ethical conflict.

Recruiting Sources

Once on the trail of a potential case, the instructor/casewriter needs to co

ple who were involved in it and persuade them to cooperate. This is not alw

cially in cases in which people have made mistakes—something we all do 

don’t especially want untold numbers of future students to examine in exh

The process of persuading the sources of a case to reveal what happened 

little like recruiting sources of foreign intelligence. The sources—espec

characters in the drama—must trust the casewriter, or they will not be ca

that trust requires absolute fidelity, in my experience, to a few simple rules:

■ Never reveal to anyone else what a source has told you without the so

sion. Moreover, you must be sure that the more substantial sources of 

your drafts before the material is used in the classroom, and that they h

tunity to change material that is inaccurate, offensive, or embarrassing

do this, you will not succeed as a casewriter—it’s as simple as that.

■ Don’t quote one source to another. Frequently sources in a case will not 

about events and their meaning. This is normal, because we often tend 

differently, but encouraging conflict among sources by highlighting 

diminishes your chances of using your case in class.

■ Listen carefully to what is said and to what is not said. It is fair to challe

provoke them to be more specific or more forthcoming, but do it with 

respect. You are not trying to prove anything with your case—you are 

story from which people can learn to make better judgments and decisio

Research

While recruiting the sources and winning their trust, the instructor/cas

gather background material about the situation that will help him or her un

is going on. Often, written material is available that will provide useful in

history and culture of the organization in which the action occurs, and som

be helpful to students, too. Other times there is only anecdotal evidence, w

than nothing.
4

quantitative data, it may be necessary to include a good deal of background 

orient readers to the dilemma under study. This is particularly true of case stu

are typically richer in historical detail than cases. Where appropriate, one can 

titative and some other types of material in “exhibits” at the end of a basic doc

Writing and Editing the Case

Good cases require room for disagreement among equally well-informed 

gent readers as to what the main characters should do in the dilemma describ

constructive conflict is the engine that drives this method of teaching. The re

have all the basic data that the protagonist had when the need for decision or a

but if it is obvious what the protagonist should do, the discussion is not likely 

productive.

Write the case in a story-telling style. Students can more readily identi

characters in the case if the characters have personal names and some descrip

if they can be accepted as real people. Further, students can identify better wi

decisionmaker in the case if they have something in common with that charac

age, experience, type of assignment, and so on. This isn’t absolutely nec

sometimes it doesn’t matter at all, but it’s something to keep in mind, espec

audience that is very narrowly focused.

Cases should be clear and concise. This does NOT mean that the dilemma d

the case should be unambiguous (indeed, requiring students to untangle ambig

of the point to this method), but that the students should have no difficulty un

what was ambiguous about the problem, and why. It is very helpful to have ot

including colleagues, supervisors, or editors review your material. Also, 

method teachers like to “pilot” a new case with colleagues before trying it i

room. This is a good way to identify gaps and errors, and to get an idea of the 

dynamics that the case is likely to create.

Getting the Case Released

The casewriter should have cases formally “released” by the sponsoring o

before using them in class. Usually, though not always, this should be done 

with a note or a letter from a responsible officer in the sponsoring organ

explicitly allows the use of the case. (This is a separate step from assurin

sources that they have the right to edit the material.) Sometimes, getting a ca

may require that it be moderated or “watered down” in some way. This is u

but it is better than not using the case at all. Infrequently, the sponsoring o

will get cold feet after the case is completed, and will insist that it be dilut

point of usefulness. This may test your powers of persuasion, or your patien

No easy answer exists for this problem.

It is almost always possible to disguise the characters in a drama with p

and one can, if appropriate, even make up fictitious components in order to 
5

comfortable with any disguises used. In the users note at the bottom of 

one may tell the reader what has been done in this light. When characters 

nent that they cannot possibly be disguised (Rick Ames, for example), ther

not to use true names. It is better to use pseudonyms, however, even for pe

resigned or retired, simply out of respect for their privacy.

Credibility

Some OTE cases have been made up, and some of these have been use

for years. However, hypothetical cases subvert one of the strongest featur

method: a grounding in reality. Cases have much greater credibility with 

students understand that what they are discussing actually happened, a

thing very similar could happen personally to them, and soon. Cases c

which appear as real as those that are really real, but at the Central Intellig

good cases are so plentiful that finding them is easy.

A Final Word

Cases are not meant to illustrate either the effective or the ineffectiv

administrative, operational, logistic, ethical, or other problems, and the 

cases should not be portrayed either as paragons of virtue or as archvillain

tor/casewriter must be careful not to tell the students what to think—they 

vessels waiting to be filled with wisdom. With this method of teaching, a 

the responsibility for thinking critically about the issues under discussion i

students, where it belongs.

Below is a “casewriter’s template” that includes questions casewriters w

as a point of departure when writing an Intelligence Community case or cas

writers do not necessarily need to answer all of the questions on the temp

least considering each one, the writer will be more likely to head in the 

from the beginning.

A Casewriter’s Template

Who is the client for this case? What does the client need?

In one sentence, what is the overall purpose of this case?

What are the teaching objectives? (List no more than four, each express

than three sentences.)

What is the subject-matter knowledge level of the students who will 

(The answer to this question will influence the amount of background mater

the case and its level of conceptual difficulty.)

Where does the action in the case occur? Is permission secured from a s

in this component to proceed with research and writing?
6

Who must be interviewed? How can they be contacted?

How much time will be required to complete the research and writing ph

case?

What graphics can be used? (Getting these identified and produced earl

time; these tasks can occur in parallel with research.)

Have those individuals or components who have a substantial stake in the 

opportunity to review the material that is based on their cooperation or in whi

prominently mentioned? Has permission for quotes attributed to them been se

Who will release the case? Does he or she understand its purpose?

HOW TO WRITE AN EFFECTIVE TEACHING NOT

A teaching note is the map for the intellectual journey that a case-based disc

resents. A strong teaching note significantly increases the probability that a

will arrive successfully and on time at the pedagogical objectives of a case or 

This is particularly true when the instructor is using material that he or she did 

ally research and write. Effective teaching notes tend to evolve as instructors ac

rience with a case or case study, and instructors should be prepared to revise th

notes substantially in the early stages of the normal lifespan of a case or case s

Effective teaching notes include a brief summary of the story, the teaching 

a suggested teaching plan that includes discussion questions that will move the 

from one block of analysis to the next, and some guidance concerning the tim

questions. If appropriate, a teaching note may also include a suggested “boa

an outline of what a classroom chalk or marker board should look like in or

emphasis and structure to the instructor’s summary at the end of the discussio

A teaching note should begin with a brief summary of the case in one o

graphs, highlighting the central issues of the case. A description of the intended 

context may also be included, with reference to the professional discipline of th

and the level of experience or skill that may be required before students are ab

fully from a detailed discussion of the material. For their academic value, tea

may also include a reference to the research techniques that the casewriter em

to the details of coordination, if appropriate.

A teaching plan—the most important part of the teaching note—begins wi

tification of the objectives. These should be stated briefly, and should 

number—I suggest no more than four. Instructors should keep these in mind; 

“destination” of the journey. The objectives are simply those concepts that 

want students to internalize—the central lessons of the discussion. It is imp

the objectives be stated simply, and instructors should not be concerned with 

dents to “parrot” the objectives as written in the teaching note.
7

headed in the most productive direction. Strongly recommended as a lead

one that is fairly easy to answer and that requires little analysis. It is helpf

the norm of student participation early in the discussion, and a difficult q

that requires extensive analysis is unlikely to accomplish this goal. A 

should include reference to the range of probable responses that the lead-

likely to provoke, so that instructors are well-prepared to keep the discussi

its early stages.

The teaching plan should clearly identify the “blocks of analysis” tha

milestones in the journey. These are the main ideas or concepts that studen

on their progress toward the objectives. At each milestone, instructors s

pared with “probing questions,” designed to push students to inquire into 

the case in greater depth or with increased sophistication as they wre

block. “Bridging questions” are those that are designed to move from one 

ysis to the next as the discussion evolves. It is helpful to include a rough se

so that instructors have a sense of how much time should be spent in disc

block of analysis.

A useful teaching note may also include a board plan, and experience su

best board plans are very general. To the extent possible, instructors should 

as a general structure for their summary at the end of the discussion, highl

tions of teaching and learning objectives as they have emerged from student 

Ideally, instructors will refer to individual contributions that moved the d

productive direction to its ultimate intellectual destination. For example, po

dent contribution on the board, an instructor might say, “As John observed 

ning of our discussion, the incentive system in the Directorate of Operatio

premium on recruitment at the expense of counterintelligence concerns.”

If the case or case study is part of an overall plan to reinforce theoretical 

vided to students through other pedagogical techniques, a teaching note s

ways in which instructors can link the discussion to knowledge, principles

the students have acquired. A strong teaching note reinforces the central 

based teaching: that the instructor’s job is to guide the group toward 

through the use of questions rather than declarative statements. When stu

the objectives through their own efforts and articulate them in their own w

will have reached the paramount expression of case-based teaching.
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On Wednesday, 6 April 1994, second-tour Foreign Service Officer Pamela 

the State Department Duty Officer for the U.S. Embassy in Kigali, Rwanda. Th

old, Pamela sought the assignment to Kigali because she hoped that in a sma

she would acquire experience at a wider range of Department functions and h

autonomy than as a member of a larger staff. Pamela and her husband Jack 

Rwanda in August 1993.

The Embassy staff consisted of seven other officers, including the Amba

Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), an administrative officer, a General Servi

(GSO), two communicators, and a secretary. Pamela was the consular offic

served as the econ/commercial officer and military security assistance o

Embassy community also included 10 personnel from the Agency for Internati

opment (AID) and a public affairs specialist from the U.S. Information Serv

There was no Marine Security Guard detachment. The Regional Security Of

was based in Bujumbura, Burundi, and visited the post in Kigali periodically. T

attache—U.S. Army Lt. Col. Mike Kalinowski—visited Kigali three times an

his post in Yaounde, Cameroon. After his arrival in Kigali, Jack Smith was hire

contract as the assistant GSO.

At this time there were 258 Americans in Rwanda, including representative

firms, nongovernmental organizations, and missionary groups. Some 60 Am

dren attended the Kigali International School. In April 1994, the admin offi

leave, and the AID director had recently departed the post. Colonel Kalinow

arrived for a one-week visit.

Pamela and the other Americans had grown accustomed to the occasional 

marked the longstanding conflict between Rwanda’s two major ethnic groups

and the Tutsis. In October 1993, UN forces had arrived to enforce a fragile p

ment, according to which the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front 

allowed to position a 600-man battalion on the grounds of the Rwandan Parlia

ing. Uprisings had continued in February 1994, with some 200 killed in ethn

prompting Ambassador David Rawson’s order to revise and expand the Emba

gency action plan. As the junior member of the Emergency Action Committee

headed by Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) Joyce Leader, Pamela was deeply 

the details of this planning.

2 This case study is based on open sources and on interviews with State Department 

were directly involved in the events described. The case study was written in February 

instructor Tom Shreeve and Foreign Service Institute instructor Dana Dee Carragher. “Pa

“Jack Smith,” “Mike Kalinowski,” “Andrew O’Dwyer,” and “Lew Giordano” are pseu

photographs were taken by Pamela Smith. This, and all cases and case studies may be u

permission of Tom Shreeve. He is available at (703) 237-4624 or at tomshreeve@aol.com
9

Rwanda and Burundi.
10

Americans residing in Rwanda, even those in outlying areas. She set up a sche

ular meetings with all of them, 15 or 20 at a time. She collected information 

individual and kept it in two identical files, one at the Embassy and one in h

addition to the name of each person, the files included date and place of bir

number and issue date, next-of-kin in the United States, telephone number or 

sign, and a list of dependents, if any. For those in remote areas of Rwanda, P

included a photograph of each American citizen.

On that Wednesday evening, Pamela and Jack were joined at dinner in the

Colonel Kalinowski. Other Americans also were present. At around 2100 hou

and the others heard a muffled explosion from the direction of the airport, so

meters away. Jack Smith, who was a former U.S. Marine, looked at Colonel K

“Colonel, that didn’t sound like a grenade. It was something bigger.”

Colonel Kalinowski nodded his agreement. “Let’s see what we can find o

began to call a number of contacts she had developed in the Rwandan military 

UN commanders.

The Americans did not yet know it, but the sound they heard was made b

crash of a French-built aircraft carrying Presidents Juvenal Habyarimana of R

Cyprien Ntaryamira of neighboring Burundi and eight others returning fr

Salaam, Tanzania, where they and other African leaders had met in an attemp

ethnic warfare that plagued Rwanda and Burundi. All aboard the aircraft wer

a variety of statements soon issued in Kigali and at UN headquarters in 

Rwandan Government officials claimed the aircraft had been brought down b

a missile of some kind on its approach to the airport.

The crash of the Presidents’ aircraft triggered a nightmare of ethnic vi

resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans. Over the next se

Pamela’s duty would be to coordinate the evacuation of the American citizen

them members of missionary groups or commercial contractors—residing 

who faced grave danger. The Emergency Action Committee’s planning wo

tested.

A Tradition of Tribal Violence

Conflict between Rwanda’s two major ethnic groups, whose members spok

language and shared similar religions, had a history dating back to the 15

when the nomadic Tutsi moved south from Ethiopia to dominate the agricultu

Bantu people. The area that eventually became the nations of Rwanda and B

populated by about 85 percent Hutus and about 14 percent Tutsis. Europe

powers—at first Germany and later Belgium—allied themselves mainly with 

nant Tutsi. Shortly before granting independence to their former colony in 

1962, the Belgians turned political, economic, and military power over ma

Tutsi. The majority Hutus objected violently and lashed out in a 1959 uprisin
11

and Uganda. The two groups had fought each other savagely since then 

bloody reprisals.

In October 1990, a group of about 2,000 Rwandan exiles belonging to 

Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded northeastern Rwanda from their bases in U

ening President Habyarimana’s regime and raising the specter of renew

lence. This group—mainly but not exclusively Tutsi—soon was joined b

and disaffected Hutus, bringing the exiles’ strength to around 20,000

rebellion dragged on for the next several years. After nearly a year of ne

Hutu-dominated Rwandan Government and the Tutsi-dominated RPF rea

agreement in August 1993, with both sides agreeing to the deployment of 

help ensure peace.

Efforts to form a transitional government acceptable to both groups qui

an atmosphere of mutual distrust. The two slain presidents had agreed to m

Salaam to continue the talks, hoping to avert full-scale civil war in R

hopes were dashed by the attack on the returning aircraft as extremists 

sought revenge or political advantage. Within a few hours of the crash, me

yarimana’s Presidential Guard—joined by bands of Hutu extremists know

hamwae, a ragtag militia armed mainly with clubs and machetes and with 

reputation for viciousness—went on a rampage, killing dozens and perhap

their opponents, chiefly Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

The Warden System

Within an hour of the attack on the Presidents’ aircraft, U.S. Ambassado

son telephoned Joyce Leader to relay the news of the fatal crash. Leader 

reports soon after on a Rwandan radio station. Together, Rawson and Lead

message to relay to the U.S. community through the “warden system,” a 

selected members of the American community, known as wardens, who 

maintain communications between the Embassy and other U.S. citizens d

The wardens also served as observers, reporting critical information back to 

Each warden had a specific list of individuals for whom he or she was r

news was passed to the warden, he or she would send it on by telephone, 

person. If an evacuation were to become necessary, the Ambassador plann

system to convey the Embassy’s instructions and assemble personnel.

The DCM immediately contacted Pamela Smith, who relayed the 

message by radio and telephone, telling the members of the American 

hold fast and wait for further word at 0700 the next morning.

Colonel Kalinowski returned to his nearby hotel. Throughout the nigh

Jack could hear the sound of mortars and both light and heavy machinegun 

of wardens called in, reporting that the road to the airport, which ran past 

building where the RPF battalion was headquartered, was under heavy fire.
12

Thursday, 7 April

In his 0700 hours radio message, the Ambassador confirmed the Preside

and instructed all the Americans to remain inside their homes. Pamela and 

most of Thursday on the telephone, reassuring the Americans—many of th

the edge of panic—who called in. At around 1045 hours, while on the pho

DCM, Pamela could hear Rwandan soldiers break into her residence and lou

her of hiding Rwanda’s interim Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who 

to Joyce and had developed a friendship with her. Unable to escape into the D

pound, Uwilingiyimana sought refuge in the nearby UN Development Program 

but was quickly discovered there by Rwandan soldiers and shot to death. Othe

of the Rwandan Cabinet and their families also were killed. Also on Thursday 
13

murdered by the rampaging gangs as the city gave way to anarchy.

From her home, Pamela began to call contacts she had developed am

officials and members of other embassies. Earlier, whenever she had reaso

Rwandans on either side of the ethnic conflict, Pamela had made a point of 

of her neutrality in the fight between the Tutsi-dominated RPF and the H

Rwandan Government. Now that neutrality began to pay off, as Rwandan 

cials stated that the mainly Hutu Rwandan Army would not fire on America

not, they added, speak for the RPF.

Pamela relayed news of her contacts to the Ambassador, but on Thurs

telephone lines to the neighborhood where the Ambassador lived were cu

Ambassador lived in an area that was directly between the centers of th

factions, and there was heavy fighting around his home. It was clear tha

not going to be able to get to the Embassy any time soon. The high-frequ

kept at his residence enabled the Ambassador to stay in contact with Nai

and through that route he could communicate with senior State Departm

Washington.

Friday, 8 April

Hoping soon to be able to move to the Embassy where they could bette

evacuation, Jack had packed camping gear and personal firearms for himse

(As a former Marine Security Guard, Jack was skilled with firearms and h

Pamela to practice shooting. They owned two 9 mm pistols, a 12-gauge s

hunting rifle.) On Friday morning, Colonel Kalinowski called from his 

there in five minutes,” he said. “Be ready to get in your car immediately a

the Embassy.”

Right on schedule, Colonel Kalinowski showed up with a Rwandan 

accompanied by Peace Corps volunteer Andrew O’Dwyer, who happened t

the same hotel as Colonel Kalinowski. Pamela, Jack, Andrew, and Colon

entered the Embassy without incident around 1100 hours on Friday.

Using their contacts among Rwandan Government officials and in the 

Kalinowski and Pamela began negotiating the details of an evacuation 

Americans. In their negotiations, they relied on occasion on a group of 

darmes led by an able commander who was evidently not caught up in the t

The gendarmes assisted the Americans by providing escorts for movement a

The emergency evacuation plan called for a departure either from the a

land by road to Burundi. Pamela telephoned the U.S. Embassy in Burund

the RSO there. He volunteered to drive north toward the border to check 

outside Kigali. Meanwhile, Pamela established an open line with the Sta

and Colonel Kalinowski did the same with U.S. military officials at the U

Command (USEUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany. They also discussed eva
14
15

and assembled the radios that the Americans would need. Andrew ODwye

security clearance of any kind, went to work destroying classified files. A

possibility of an overland escape, Jack and Andrew also filled the Embassy 

gasoline as best they could.

Both Colonel Kalinowski and Pamela were able to leave the Embassy 

Rwandan Government officials on Friday, seeking assurances that U.S. c

not be fired on. At one point they met also with Canadian General Dalla

UN officer in Kigali, who offered his assistance in the evacuation. Pamela 

developments to the Ambassador by radio.

In their discussions with Colonel Kalinowski, USEUCOM officials off

reinforced company of U.S. Marines to help get the Americans out of Kig

the airport. The Marines also could provide helicopter gunship cover fo

route, EUCOM officials added. A third option was to leave overland witho

tary escort. The four Americans reviewed the options for the Ambassad

afternoon radio call.

“Sir,” Colonel Kalinowski told Rawson. “I think trying to get to the a

idea. Even though it’s a short distance, we’d have to pass through som

fighting and there is no way to guarantee that our convoys will not be fire

Kalinowski pointed out also that the Marines were not familiar with Kiga

unlikely that any spoke the local dialect and few if any were likely to be flu

If either of the warring factions mistook their attempts to evacuate the A

assistance to one side or the other, the situation might become worse. Final

bura RSO’s reconnaissance revealed no signs of unrest between the Burun

the southern outskirts of Kigali.

“We’ll go overland,” the Ambassador told Colonel Kalinowski and Pa

EUCOM for their offer, but tell them we don’t need the Marines to com

We’ll link up with them in Bujumbura.”

The overland option in the evacuation plan called for the Americans 

Kigali to gather at previously designated assembly points—depending o

lived—and leave in three convoys, heading west out of Kigali and tur

Burundi. Those located outside the Kigali area would take other overl

Burundi, Zaire, or Tanzania.

The Ambassador reached his decision around 1500 hours on Friday, t

assembly and departure that day. He told Colonel Kalinowski and Pamela 

the evacuation plan beginning on Saturday morning. By this point, Am

calling into the Embassy from locations all over the city, seeking hel

Pamela passed the word through the warden system. She learned that one 

in a missionary group was now in labor and began searching for a quali

to help.
16

On Saturday morning, Americans from different parts of the city began to 

their assigned areas. Lew Giordano, a State Department communicator wh

able to join the others at the Embassy, drove an Embassy van into parts of the c

by heavy fighting to help bring the Americans to safety. At times, Rwandan 

were able to escort Giordano. At other times he went alone. General Dallai

contacts to get RPF assurance that U.S. convoys would not be attacked.

Pamela and Colonel Kalinowski passed the word for the Americans to p

flag or a white flag on their vehicles as a sign of neutrality. They wanted to av

the three convoys bunch up at the roadblocks, which now dotted all of the ro

Kigali, so they timed the departure of each one to phase the evacuation. The fi

left its assembly point at 1230 hours on Saturday. Citizens from several oth

nations, including Canada, Germany, and Switzerland, joined the Americans a

the size of the convoys. Once out of Kigali, the Americans saw no sign of the c

marked the fighting inside the city. As they crossed the border with Burund

cials were able to check off their names using Pamela’s list of U.S. personnel.

The last convoy, led by Ambassador Rawson (who spoke the local diale

and the DCM, left Kigali around 1300 hours on Saturday. This convoy consi
17

vehicles carrying more than 600 people, only nine of them Americans. A

cans residing in Rwanda either left on one of the convoys or were accoun

choosing to remain behind and leave with the Belgian and French evacuat

Site of US Embassy, Kigali. The Embassy compound consists of a two-story concr

building and a USIA cultural center adjoining it.
18

“EVACUATING THE AMERICANS FROM RWANDA

A Summary of the Case

“Evacuating the Americans From Rwanda” describes efforts by U.S. Em

officers to respond to the dramatic collapse of civil order in Kigali, Rwan

1994. The small U.S. Embassy faced the task of evacuating or otherwise acc

some 258 U.S. citizens at a time when extremist Hutu gunmen and soldiers w

ing in a murderous slaughter of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The main protag

case—a young female foreign service officer given the name “Pamela S

introduced in the first paragraph, followed by a brief description of the Em

that included a Defense Attache (a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, here nam

Kalinowski.”) These two officers—supported by several others—later pro

mental in carrying out the evacuation.

The opening paragraphs describe how Smith carried out her assignment to 

expand the Embassy’s emergency action plan and sets up the early stages 

collapse that followed the apparent destruction of an aircraft carrying the pr

Rwanda and Burundi, along with other African political leaders, returning f

ference held to find a solution to the tribal violence plaguing Rwandan soci

followed by a brief historical overview of the conflict between the Hutus and 

The early paragraphs also include a description of the Embassy’s “warde

designed to maintain communications between the Embassy and the wides

munity of Americans, most of them missionaries, throughout the country.

The rest of the case study is a day-by-day description of the evolving crisis 

Smith, Kalinowski, and others responded to the extreme danger it posed for the 

munity, resulting within a few days in a successful evacuation without any U

Photographs taken by Smith are sprinkled through the case, lending a sense of 

The research for “Rwanda” consisted almost entirely of interviews of St

ment personnel who were directly involved in the actual situation. Several of 

viduals are referred to by pseudonyms; others, such as Ambassador R

described in true name. Finished intelligence from the CIA’s Directorate of I

provided the background for the historical parts of the case study. The case w

nated within the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) and with Ambassador Ra

offered several useful suggestions.

Intended Context

Rwanda was written for a State Department Foreign Service Institute (F

entitled “The Security Overseas Seminar,” and is intended to support a 60-min

sion. The purpose of this case is to capture the value of the Rwandan 

describing the preparations that Smith and others took before the crisis exp

how they responded once the rampaging mobs took control of Kigali. Instru
19

issues, particularly in view of the unusually dramatic nature of the events 

addition to the “nuts-and-bolts” details of Smith’s preparations, the case 

used to draw students’ attention to broader issues, including the leadersh

tics that Smith demonstrated during the crisis, including foresight, persona

acceptance of responsibility for the safety of those in her care.

Teaching Objectives

Students who discuss this case study should be able to:

■ Describe in detail specific steps that State Department personnel 

anticipation of the possibility that an emergency evacuation may be 

description should include noting the importance of planning, coo

system testing; an awareness of where all of the prospective evacue

and how to contact them; how to coordinate with prospective sources 

such as U.S. military forces; and how to keep State Department hea

sonnel informed.

■ Describe in detail how to respond effectively to the outbreak of civil 

it begins. An effective response to crisis would include the establishm

munications center; keeping an accurate record of events as they occu

local or other authority; the destruction of classified material; and o

mined by the instructor.

■ Identify those elements of leadership that comprise an effective respo

ically dangerous crisis.

A Suggested Teaching Plan

It is often helpful to begin a class by asking for a volunteer to describe 

This is an easy question to answer and gets the group accustomed to speaki

to questions rather than waiting for the lecture that most students invariably 

more than five minutes should be devoted to discussing Smith; keeping t

terms on a flipchart or on a side-board if one is available. This part of the 

mostly a “warm-up;” instructors are unlikely to need to refer to it in detail l

The first block of analysis—which should require about 20 minutes

Smith’s preparations before the crisis occurred. In this block, students s

trate on her initiative and planning skills. Perceptive students will note th

well beyond what was required in terms of detail in her emergency action p

concerted effort to contact each individual personally and keeping a r

whereabouts, passport numbers, dates of birth, next of kin, their photogra

personal data in a file held at Smith’s home. Some students have criticize

as potentially dangerous; terrorists looking for a list of Americans to u

would easily be able to exploit such data.
20

specific step of preparation helped Smith once the slaughter began. For e

answer to the general question regarding preparations, a student typically will 

work of contacts that Pamela built up in the months before the crisis. Probin

might include, “How exactly did that pay off for her? What attitudes did she p

these contacts? How did the various Rwandan factions respond to her when 

assurances of their neutrality? Why did they respond this way?”

One specific step students often cite is the establishment of the warden s

practice with its functioning. “What are the pros and cons of such a system?” a

might ask. “Were there other ways in which communication could have be

plished, or rumors corrected?” In Rwanda, the warden system relied on high

radios, as the telephone system was unreliable and undeveloped. In fact, th

system broke down during the crisis, and the Ambassador could not communi

by radio. A probing question during consideration of the warden system w

explore how such a system would work in a country in which there were th

U.S. evacuees, not just a few hundred.

When using this case study with FSI students, it has proved helpful to as

describe their own experience with emergency action plans, warden systems, 

Many have interesting and colorful stories to relate.

As a second block of analysis, one may focus the discussion on Smith’s con

and during the crisis. A bridging question to this block might be something 

does [that step of preparation] tell us about her?” During this part of the di

which should take about 20 minutes—students have an opportunity to ex

Smith’s conduct reflects some basic characteristics of leadership. At numerous 

ing this crisis, Smith could easily have retreated to the comparative safety of he

and kept out of sight. Her conduct amply demonstrated exceptional courage a

sense of personal responsibility, both hallmarks of a leader. Further, in calmly 

the increasingly terrified Americans who called in to her for information, Smit

onstrated the ability to mask her own fear—which was certainly present—o

others. Smith was not alone in this, of course. Kalinowski, Giordano, and 

behaved courageously. After the crisis was resolved, Smith was awarded the St

ment’s highest decoration for courage.

Turning for a moment to the role of “devil’s advocate,” instructors may wi

the students think Smith took on too much responsibility, making decision

narily would have been made by the Ambassador. Some students may inde

this view, while others will counter that Smith was carrying out the Ambassa

at a time when the Ambassador himself could not safely leave his compound t

mand of the situation; therefore the authority that Smith asserted was consiste

emergency. (Rawson himself shares the latter view.) About 10 minutes on th

should be enough.
21

tions that Smith took in anticipation of the crisis. As the junior member of 

action committee, she could easily have satisfied the requirements of h

with less attention to detail. (Many FSI students can cite examples of th

emergency action planning.) She chose, however, to tackle an unpopular j

siasm and skill, and when the plan was tested by the dramatic events de

case, her efforts paid off handsomely.
22

23 OCTOBER 19833

At 0622 hours on Sunday, 23 October 1983, an unidentified young man dro

Mercedes Benz stakebed truck into a parking lot of the Beirut Internation

Accelerating toward the four-story concrete building that housed the headq

ments of a U.S. Marine Corps Battalion Landing Team (BLT), the man drov

barbed wire and concertina fence and passed between two Marine guard po

being engaged by fire. The truck then passed through an open gate and ar

sewer pipe barriers, flattened the Sergeant of the Guard’s sandbagged booth, 

the lobby of the building. The driver then detonated a bomb loaded on the truc

The explosion—roughly equivalent to that of some 12,000 lbs of TNT—

building from its concrete pillar foundation. The building then collapsed, killin

estimated 350 occupants. It was the largest single-day loss of life in the Ma

since the Battle of Iwo Jima.

Lebanon: A Troubled History

The modern state of Lebanon was created after World War I, when France 

territories seized from the defeated Ottoman Empire with land the French a

in the eastern Mediterranean region known as the Levant. The population 

state included several groups of different religions, including Maronite 

Greek Orthodox Christians, Druze, Sunni and Shiite Muslims, and others

Maronite groups in particular were opposed to integration into the new s

French colonial forces retreated during World War II, the Maronites and the S

lims struck a bargain that evidently was acceptable to most Lebanese. Kn

“National Pact of 1943,” the bargain allocated political power on the basis of 

ian balance reflected in the census of 1932. According to this agreement, th

and commander of the armed forces would always be Maronites; the prim

would be a Sunni Muslim; the speaker of the chamber of deputies would be a 

for every five non-Christian deputies there would be six Christians.

In addition to divisions based on religious faith, Lebanese politics was mark

plex local associations based on sectarian and clan relationships. Nearly const

among local chieftains frequently paralyzed the weak central government; priv

3 This case study is based mainly on the “Report of the DoD Commission on Be

tional Airport Terrorist Act, 23 October 1983;” an unpublished doctoral dissertatio

Dr. Jack Matthews (Lt.Col., USMC, Ret.); and on interviews with Marines who w

involved in the events described. The case study was written in September 1997 by Col

Shreeve, USMCR. Photos are courtesy of USMC combat camera teams. This, and a

case studies, may be used with the permission of Tom Shreeve. He is available at (70

or at tomshreeve@aol.com.
23

Beirut, 1983.
24

National Pact became increasingly unrepresentative of the population as t

groups grew significantly faster than the Christian groups. To cloud the pict

more than 100,000 Palestinian refugees arrived in 1948, after the establishme

these were followed in 1971 by another wave of Palestinian immigration that i

leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from Jordan.

The Palestinians formed alliances with dissident groups in Lebanon and 

bases in southern Lebanon for sporadic raids into Israel. From about the 

Lebanese society became increasingly polarized, with Maronite Christi

opposing the Palestinians’ activities and Muslims generally supporting them

for some years favored the Maronites, and after the arrival of the PLO, Isr

gence and security services forged closer links to the various Maronite m

other power centers.

In 1975, civil disunity in Lebanon broke into war among the competing 

the central government of Lebanon essentially ceased to exist. Fearing that 

attacks on Israel would provoke an unwanted war between Syria and Israel, in 

Syria intervened in the Lebanese conflict on the side of the Maronite Christia

Syria’s record of support to the PLO. Active fighting subsided and a stalema

leaving the basic issues of the Lebanese conflict unresolved.

Operation “Peace for Galilee”

Determined to deprive the PLO of its bases in southern Lebanon an

Maronite government that would be consistent with its interests in the reg

invaded Lebanon with 70,000 troops on 6 June 1982. The invasion—ref

Operation “Peace for Galilee”—brought the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in

conflict with Syrian Army units stationed in Lebanon and risked a wider M

war, an outcome the United States was eager to avoid. Despite the risk, the I

its attack and within a few days linked up with a Christian force known as th

led by Bashir Gemayel.

The IDF quickly accomplished its military objectives: PLO Chairman Y

and his forces were surrounded in Beirut, and the Syrian air defense capab

Shouf Mountains and Bekaa Valley was crippled. Throughout the summer o

IDF continued to tighten the noose around Beirut. Members of the news medi

the beleaguered city and began daily coverage of Israeli attacks against PLO 

in West Beirut. Graphic images of destruction reached media audiences in 

States and elsewhere as Israeli air and artillery units pounded targets in he

lated portions of the city.

The Governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan publicly blamed 

States for failing to restrain the Israeli attacks. European governments soon ec

claims and threatened to apply economic sanctions against Israel. In the Un
25

the USSRs longtime Syrian ally.

A U.S. Plan

Frustrated by mounting foreign and domestic objections to Israeli attac

tion centers in West Beirut, President Reagan in August 1982 accepted a L

ernment proposal to lead a multinational force that would extract the PLO fr

oversee the return to Syria of Syrian Army units. Other stakeholders, includ

and the PLO, communicated their acceptance of an “intercession force” as 

led by the United States. On 20 August, Reagan announced that agreem

reached among the governments of the United States, Lebanon, France, It

and with the PLO to plan for the safe departure from Beirut of PLO leade

tive offices, and combatants as well as certain remaining elements of the Sy

On 25 August 1982, some 800 Marines and sailors of the 32nd Marin

Unit (MAU) landed in Beirut as part of a multinational peacekeeping for

oversee the evacuation of the PLO and the Syrian Army units that remai

The multinational force consisted of 400 French and 800 Italian troops in 

U.S. contingent. (A limited number of British troops later joined the effort.

Palestinians and Syrians were quickly and safely evacuated from Beirut b

the Shouf Mountains. The operation—led by Marine Col. James M. Mead

regarded as a success.

One of the keys to the speedy evacuation was PLO acceptance of 

detailed in the so-called “Departure Plan” that protected Palestinian nonc

behind in the PLO camps:

■ Law-abiding Palestinian noncombatants left behind in Beirut, includin

of those of who have departed, will be subject to Lebanese laws and re

Governments of Lebanon and the United States will provide appropriate 

the following ways:

❏ The Lebanese Government will provide its guarantees on the ba

secured assurances from armed groups with which it has been in touc

❏ The United States will provide its assurances received from the G

Israel and the leadership of certain Lebanese groups with which 

touch.

On 10 September, its mission apparently accomplished, the U.S. contin

Its departure evidently came as a surprise to the French and Italian forces, w

prepared to leave. U.S. Special Envoy Philip Habib—who led the U.S. tea

ated the ceasefire and the PLO withdrawal—did not inform Marine comm

guarantee he had made to the PLO assuring the safety of the Palestinian n

who remained behind in Beirut.
26
27

On 14 September, President-elect Bashir Gemayel was assassinated b

assailants who detonated a car bomb outside his Phalange headquarters. T

diately redeployed into positions surrounding Beirut. On the night of 

members of the Christian Phalange militia group entered two Palestinian 

at Shabra and Shatilla near the Beirut International Airport. Inside the c

next day and a half, Phalange forces slaughtered an estimated 800 Pales

children, and men over military age.

The U.S. public reacted with shock and outrage, particularly as eviden

Israeli complicity in the atrocity. On 20 September, President Reagan direc

man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide a contingent to participate in a 

tional peacekeeping force. The Governments of France and Italy quickly 

part in a renewed effort. “The participation of the American forces in 

again be for a limited period,” Reagan stated. “But I have concluded th

alternative to their returning to Lebanon if that country is to have a chance 

own two feet.”

The second U.S. involvement was again assigned to the Marine Corp

morning of 29 September, Colonel Mead and his Marines arrived in Beiru

new mission. This was: to establish an environment which will permit 

Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area. W

USCINCEUR will introduce U.S. forces as a part of a multinational force p

Beirut area to occupy and secure positions along a designated section of th

the Beirut International Airport to a position in the vicinity of the presiden

prepared to protect U.S. forces; and, on order, conduct retrograde operation

To this mission President Reagan on 28 October added National Sec

Directive (NSDD) 64, which established as a U.S. objective the withdra

eign forces from Lebanon by not later than the end of calendar year 198

also suggested that the U.S. Multinational Force (USMNF) might not 

until the Government of Lebanon could once again control, administer, 

sovereign territory.

Command Relationships: Strong Chain or Tangled Web?

By the 1980s, Lebanon was under the operational jurisdiction of the U

Command, known as EUCOM, led by U.S. Army Gen. Bernard W. Roge

USCINCEUR) and headquartered in Stuttgart. The EUCOM commander 

egated amphibious operations to his naval subordinate, known as CINC

who in September 1982 was U.S. Navy Vice Adm. Ronald J. Hays, hea

London. From Admiral Hays, command authority was delegated accordi

to the commander of the Navy’s Sixth Fleet (COMSIXTHFLT), Vice Ad

Rowden, USN.
28

Group (MARG) that was continuously available for regional assignments. T

consisted of a naval squadron of between three and five ships and an 1800-m

Amphibious Unit (MAU) embarked aboard the ships. The MARG was com

U.S. Navy Capt. Richard F. White. (In accordance with naval custom, Captain 

referred to as Commodore for the purposes of this assignment.)

Commodore White became Commander of Task Force 61 (CTF 61) and com

the amphibious task force (CATF) for the purposes of the U.S. mission in Leb

nel Mead, as commander of the MAU, became commander of the landing fo

subordinate to Commodore White. Colonel Mead was also designated Com

Task Force 62 (CTF 62) and Commander, U.S. Forces Ashore, Lebanon. Colo

communications capability enabled him to communicate with CTF 61 but n

with COMSIXTHFLT.

These command relationships were based on longstanding amphibious d

were thoroughly understood by the naval, Marine, and other commanders invo

operation. The apparent clarity of these relationships soon became clouded, h

various commands outside the immediate area became increasingly eager 

active role in the U.S. effort and advanced a variety of interests.

On 21 September, about a week before Colonel Mead’s return as comma

MAU, a 14-member U.S. military liaison team arrived in Beirut to assess the 

of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and recommend ways to improve its ef
29

Report resulted in the creation of the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation 

U.S. Army Col. Thomas Fintel. Colonel Fintel arrived in Lebanon with an o

of Reference” from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that designate

senior U.S. military representative in Lebanon. In an interview conducted 

operation, Colonel Fintel stated that at the time of his assignment he cons

senior to the MAU commander.

The continued high intensity of U.S. media attention to the peace

appeared to provoke corresponding levels of interest in various U.S. comm

ceeded to exercise considerable influence on operational matters in Beirut

in October 1982 the MAU began patrolling portions of East Beirut in respon

from the Government of Lebanon and approved by the U.S. Secretary of 

MAU commander by this time was Col. Thomas M. Stokes. (See exhibit 1 

of the MAU commanders’ respective tenures). Colonel Stokes developed a p

ling and—convinced that the environment had become reasonably benign

men not to wear their helmets and flak jackets out of concern for their im

keepers. When a photograph of a Marine patrol appeared in the Washingto

November, the MAU received a message from Fleet Marine Force Atlanti

in Norfolk, Virginia, directing the Marines to wear their full combat equipm

Senior commands soon felt a need to establish their own presence 

example, over the course of the peacekeeping mission a number of dif

officers were assigned as EUCOM liaison officers. While in Lebanon, thes

stationed at the U.S. Embassy and had secure-voice satellite communicati

that enabled them to communicate directly to Stuttgart, London, or Wa

Soon after the return of the MAU in late September, the EUCOM liaison 

attending daily meetings of the so-called Military Coordinating Committ

the chief of staff of the LAF and including the commanders of the multin

present in Lebanon. The MAU executive officer attended these meetings, 

by common consent was regarded as a junior partner. Meetings of a simila

the Political Coordinating Committee were attended by the ambassad

nations represented in the multinational force. CINCEUR’s military 

attended the meetings of this committee as the senior U.S. military voice. A

detailed report on U.S. involvement in Lebanon, the MAU commander wa

to attend the meetings of this committee.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S. Army Gen. John 

assigned his own liaison officer to Beirut. By the summer of 1983, this of

Army Gen. Carl W. Steiner, who was equipped with an independent satellit

tions capability that enabled him to speak directly to General Vessey in 

something Steiner did regularly. Queried years later as to the need for thi

communication, General Steiner said:

Now the reason for this is there was a perception in Washington that th

through the chain of command...was constipated, and [senior com
30

dence, the facts upon which to make appropriate decisions. And many t

Joint Chiefs would make a decision and send it through appropriate c

through [CINCEUR] and on down, and I would get a call [from Wash

“You tell me how it comes out at the other end and how long it takes to ge

The Mission of “Presence”

Marine and Navy commanders and staff officers were aware that the 

“presence” cited in the initiating directive was novel and difficult to define

MAU returned to Beirut in late September 1982, however, the population 

evidently exhausted by the civil conflict and the rigors of Operation Peace f

appeared to welcome the Marines’ return as a respite. The apparent va

“presence” went unchallenged at all levels of command involved in the oper

Before the Marines went ashore in late September, a U.S. team made up o

dor Morris Draper and Lt.Col. Charles R. Smith, the executive officer of the 3

met with members of the Lebanese Government and senior IDF commanders 

the exact location of the Marines’ headquarters in the Beirut area. According t

agreement reached between Ambassador Draper and Israeli Defense Min

Sharon, the Marines were given control of the Beirut International Airport (BIA

IDF continued to exercise control of the Old Sidon Road, which passed east 

and then north, eventually intersecting with the Beirut-Damascus Highway. I

insisted that they needed the Old Sidon Road in order to supply their units in 

Mountains, east of the airport. Colonel Mead reportedly accepted this arrangem

because he believed that Marine control of the road risked the perception—

among Muslim factions—that the MAU was protecting an important IDF supp

Draper and Smith agreed to house the 32nd MAU’s commander and his sm

what had once been the fire-fighting school at the BIA. The BLT headquarter

ther agreed, would be the much larger building that had been the headquarters 

anese Civil Aviation Authority. Smith reported to Mead that the building select

the BLT was structurally sound—it had been successfully used by the PLO, 

Army, and finally the IDF. Mead accepted Smith’s evaluation, and the BLT 

the building. When Colonel Stokes relieved Mead in early November, Stokes, 

ing the 24th MAU, did not see a reason to change the location of the BLT head

Pursuing what he regarded as the mission of “presence,” MAU comman

ordered his Marines to develop a patrol plan, and on 4 November 1982, the M

its first motorized patrols. Initially the patrols appeared to be welcomed in th

hoods of East and West Beirut and Stokes quickly expanded their scope, send

well into the outlying suburbs. The success of these patrols led Stokes to consi

ing them further, and on 5 December—despite the original agreement with th

Marines began patrolling the Old Sidon Road. Although they encountered 

tions, within a week CINCEUR ordered patrolling on the Old Sidon Road to c

concerns that it could give the impression that the MAU was assisting the IDF
31

The Marines on Liberty

Almost as soon as they arrived, the Marines began expanding their soc

Beirut, organizing “liberty runs,” for example, to and from the Christian 

Juniyah, just north of Beirut. (These were terminated in November out of c

impression they might cause among Muslims.) With permission from the 

on 10 November the Marines celebrated their Corps’ birthday at an upscal

East Beirut. According to a Marine lieutenant colonel who was present, no

had been invited. In early December, a group of about 50 Marines were t

group of prominent Lebanese at another East Beirut restaurant. Again, th

and received U.S. Embassy permission to attend the function, which was a 

oring wounded veterans of the LAF. Fadi Frem, the leader of the Christian 

the guest of honor. Photographs of the Marines attending the banquet wer

a local newspaper. At Christmas, many Christian Lebanese families host

private homes, while a Christian Lebanese arms dealer named Joseph 

party for about 100 Marine officers at the exclusive Tabarhja Hotel.

Signs of Growing Hostility

In late 1982, Marine Capt. Charles Johnson commanded a company of Ma

to a sector around the Lebanese Riehan College complex. He attended a daily 

conference at the BLT headquarters building, and to get from the Riehan 

BIA he had to travel through a Shiite enclave known as Hayy es Salaam, a 
32

reported that around midDecember 1982 he began to notice a subtle but unmist

in the mood of the local population while on his daily excursion to and from t

noticed the presence of more young men; then he and his driver began to receive 

glares, and then verbal taunts. Soon he began to be followed as he drove through 

streets. He caught glimpses of weapons and began to see posters that featured Ir

lah Khomeini.

In mid-January 1983, intense fighting erupted between the Druze and mem

Christian militia, and Israeli casualties mounted among troops assigned to pa

Sidon Road. In mid-February 1983, Colonel Mead returned again to Beirut as c

of a unit now designated the 22nd MAU; by this point the Old Sidon Road a

immediately to the east had been reduced to rubble. Within a few days, five 

Marines were wounded in the first direct attack on the U.S. peacekeepers a

patrol passed through the southern suburb of Ouzai. A group calling itself “Isla

claimed credit for the attack, according to media reports. On 16 March, a

Marines were wounded in a grenade attack while patrolling in the city.

On 18 April, a large car-bomb exploded outside the U.S. Embassy in Beiru

persons including 17 Americans. Islamic Jihad again claimed credit for the att

Ambassador Sir David Roberts immediately offered working spaces in 

Embassy for the U.S. political, military, and consular sections, an offer the 

accepted. Other U.S. Embassy functions moved into a building known as th

Building in Beirut. U.S.CINCEUR General Rogers promptly directed Mead 

security for the British Embassy, the Durafour Building, and for U.S. Ambassa

Dillon at his residence.

The security duties assigned to the MAU resulted in a change to the Rules 

ment (ROE) issued to the Marines in Beirut. While guarding the British Em

Durafour Building, or the Ambassador’s residence, Marines were provided wit

were significantly more permissive than those that prevailed at the BLT he

Those on duty at BIA were not permitted to have a magazine inserted into 

apparently out of concern for the possibility of accidental discharges that mig

Lebanese or other casualties. In numerous cases, the same individuals were so

guard duty at the secured locations and sometimes at BIA.

In spite of these signs of rising hostility to the U.S. efforts in Beirut, there wa

to the basic “presence” mission of the Marines. U.S. Army Col. Ralph Hallenb

chief of current operations in the J-3 section of CINCEUR headquarters in Stut

assigned the duty of monitoring daily activities in Lebanon for General Rogers. 

General Rogers did not amend the MAU’s mission in light of the U.S. Embass

Hallenbeck stated, “CINCEUR’s headquarters staff viewed the attack as an is

dent [directed] against the United States; it was seen as a peripheral event no

local or popular opposition; and finally, it was not seen as related to the basic 

peacekeeping.”
33
34

Mead. Geraghtys BLT commander was Lt. Col. Larry Gerlach. On 8 June, a

interviews conducted later, IDF tanks fired some 100 rounds of 105mm ammu

Hayy es Salaam, the Muslim neighborhood near the Marine positions aroun

Confronted by a Marine officer, the IDF tank commander claimed that he 

tanks to fire because someone in the enclave had fired a rocket at the Israeli

commander added, “We are firing at the village because we have no respect f

anese. We like to see them run.”

On 15 July, Lieutenant Colonel Gerlach modified the ROE for Marines on g

BIA. Those who manned “external posts” were now allowed to keep a loaded m

their rifles but could not chamber a round. Those who manned “internal posts

under the original ROE and were required to keep their magazines in pouches t

on their belts. The ROE for the Marines guarding the British Embassy, th

Building, and the Ambassador’s residence remained the least restrictive.

On 10 and 11 August, an estimated 35 rounds of mortar and rocket fire fell 

positions, wounding one Marine. On 28 August, the Marines returned fire 

time. On 29 August, Marine artillery silenced Druze guns after two Marines 

in a mortar attack. The same day, Marines of Company A engaged in a fou

battle with a militia group from inside Hayy es Salaam, an area they had on

as friendly and under their protection. Two Marines were killed and 14 wer

There was no change to the mission of the MAU and no fundamental shift in 

sition or defensive posture.

In early September, a Druze force reportedly reinforced by PLO fighters rou

tian element of the LAF in the high ground overlooking the BIA. Marine pos

subjected to sporadic indirect fire over the next few weeks. On 16 September, 

employed naval gunfire in response to shelling of the U.S. Ambassador’s res

Marine positions at the airport. On 19 September, as LAF troops fought with D

over the hamlet of Suq al Garb in the Shouf Mountains, the U.S.S John Rog

U.S.S Virginia fired their guns in support of the LAF. According to several obs

were present when Colonel Geraghty received orders to adjust the naval gunfir

futilely opposed this action. “Sir, I can’t do that,” Geraghty was quoted as repl

will cost us our neutrality. Do you realize if you do that, we’ll get slaughtered d

Security of the BLT Headquarters

In 1983 the BIA was an active international airport servicing an average o

and 2,400 passengers every day. The airport employed around 1,000 civilians, 

traffic to and from the area was estimated at about 3,000 vehicles a day. Man

including large trucks like the one used in the barracks bombing, routinely r

the airport overnight.

The building chosen as the BLT headquarters was a bombed-out, fire-dam

ture constructed of steel and reinforced concrete. All of the windows on the 
35

sheeting. The ground floor was an open area enclosed with sandbags and b

The building provided excellent protection from the indirect fire that fell 

positions with increasing frequency through the late summer of 1983. Ma

throughout the peacekeeping operation were light, and until 23 October, no 

killed or wounded in the BLT headquarters building. The roof also provide

observation of the surrounding area, and was ideal as a platform for the w

communications devices employed during the U.S. mission.

When the Marines acquired the building, its apparent caretaker—an 

nese man the Marines nicknamed “Shuffles” because of his distinctive lim

employed in the structure. Shuffles often stayed in the building after no

hours, sleeping in his office on a cot. After some weeks, he opened a small 

convenience items to the Marines. According to a number of reports, Shu

sumed to have died in the explosion, but there was no evidence to estab

Subsequent reports suggested that the Marines knew very little about Shu

his real name.

Throughout the time they used the building, the Marines sought to impro

using an estimated 500,000 sandbags and some 10,000 feet of concertina w

of the compound and the bomber’s route into the central courtyard, see e

building enabled the various MAUs to centralize logistic support. Accordin

of the Long Commission—a group of distinguished senior officers conven

retary of Defense to investigate the bombing—the building was an ideal l

command post of a battalion actively engaged in fulfilling a peacekeeping 

mission. The building housed up to 350 personnel, about a fourth of the t

strength. (For more details on the members of the Long Commission, see e

The Marines of the 24th MAU had four “Alert Conditions,” with Ale

representing the highest state of alert. The level of alert was determined b

Operations Center. According to the Long Commission Report, “The secur

23 October at the MAU/BLT compound, as described by surviving witnes

compliance with published directives for Alert Conditions II or III.”

The Marines’ ROE prohibited them from inserting magazines into their 

interior posts during Alert Conditions II, III, and IV. According to the Long 

The MAU commander explained that he made a conscious decision not to 

tion of magazines in weapons on interior posts to preclude accidental discha

ble injury to innocent civilians. The threat to the MAU/BLT compound wa

be direct and indirect fire, ground attack by personnel, stationary vehicul

hand grenade/RPG attack. Hostile penetration of the perimeter by cars or 

addressed in the instructions provided the BLT guards.

According to the Long Commission, Colonel Geraghty was “delug

threat information [but] received no specific warning of the time, place, o
36

Marines received reports suggesting an imminent carbomb attack that w

involve a white Mercedes automobile. Marine CI personnel alerted the MA

reports and searched for a car fitting that description.

Colonel Geraghty was not briefed on the details of the bomb that badly d

U.S. Embassy the previous April, despite a thorough investigation of the incid

officials including FBI forensic experts. Further, despite a prolonged series 

senior U.S. military and other officials extending up to the eve of the bombing

no evidence of any expression of concern over the BLT’s security postu

recorded suggestion that it be enhanced.

The Morning of 23 October

The Long Commission interviewed many of the Marines who witnessed th

Their reports were corroborative. At around 0500 on 23 October, the sentry 

post 6 observed a yellow Mercedes Benz truck entering the parking lot south 

Headquarters building. The truck circled once, then exited to the south. The se

report the truck because it did not stop or appear to be suspicious in any way.

About an hour and 20 minutes later, the same sentry observed a similar tru

ating westward and parallel to the wire barricade. The truck then turned abru

ran over the wire barricade, and accelerated north between posts 6 and 7. Th

post 7 heard the truck as it ran over the wire, then observed it and immediatel

that it was a vehicle bomb. He inserted a magazine into his M-16 rifle, chambe

and shouldered his weapon. He did not fire, he stated, because by that time th

inside the building.

The sentry at post 5 also saw the truck and reported his immediate conclu

was a vehicle bomb. He did not have time to react in any way.

The Sergeant of the Guard was facing north or inward and heard the 

approached the interior of the building. He later reported that he, too, immed

ized that it was hostile. He ran out of his post across the lobby and yelled, “H

Hit the deck!” He saw the truck breach the entrance and come to a halt near th

the lobby. There was a delay of perhaps one or two seconds, he reported, befor

detonation. (This Marine was badly wounded in the blast.)

When the truck exploded, it created an oblong crater about 30 by 40 feet 

nine feet deep. The structure of the building—with a large covered courtyard 

from the lobby floor to the roof—converged the force vectors and greatly int

explosion. FBI forensic analysts later described the explosion as the largest c

blast they had ever seen.
37

Study questions:

1. What is your analysis of the reasons for the outcome described in this ca

2. Do you think the effects of the attack could have been prevented or mi

Be specific.

3. How do you think responsibility for this event should be allocated?
38

THE LONG COMMISSION REPORT

In its conclusions, the Long Commission reported that:

■ The combination of a large volume of specific threat warnings that nev

ized, and perceived and real pressure to accomplish a unique and diffic

contributed significantly to the decisions of the MAU and BLT command

ing the security of their force. Nevertheless, the Commission conclud

security measures in effect in the MAU compound were neither commen

the increasing level of threat confronting the USMNF nor sufficient to p

astrophic losses such as those that were suffered on the morning of 23 Oc

The Commission further concludes that while it may have appeared to b

priate response to the indirect fire being received, the decision to bill

mately one-quarter of the BLT in a single structure contributed to the c

loss of life.

■ The Commission concludes that the BLT Commander must take respon

the concentration of approximately 350 members of his command in th

Headquarters building, thereby providing a lucrative target for attack. F

BLT Commander modified prescribed alert procedures, degrading sec

compound.

■ The Commission also concludes that the MAU Commander shares the r

ity for the catastrophic losses in that he condoned the concentration of p

the BLT Headquarters building, concurred in modification of prescribed 

dures, and emphasized safety over security in directing that sentries on P

and 7 would not load their weapons.

■ The Commission further concludes that although it finds the BLT and M

manders to be at fault, it also finds that there was a series of circumstan

their control that influenced their judgment and their actions relating to 

of the USMNF.

Exhibit 1: Periods of Assignment of MAU Commanders in 

Col. James M. Mead, 32nd MAU, 16 August to 10 September 1982 for the 

of the PLO and certain units of the Syrian Army.

Col. James M. Mead, 32nd MAU, 29 September to 1 November 1982 du

stages of the peacekeeping operation.

Col. Thomas M. Stokes, 24th MAU, from 1 November 1982 to 15 February 

Col. James M. Mead, 22nd MAU, from 15 February to 29 May 1983.

Col. Timothy J. Geraghty, 24th MAU, 30 May to 18 November 1983.

Brig. Gen. James R. Joy, 22nd MAU, 19 November 1983 to 9 April 1984.
39
40

Exhibit 2.
41

The five-member “DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport 

23 October 1983” was established by the Secretary of Defense on 7 Nove

conduct a thorough and independent inquiry into all of the facts and circu

rounding the 23 October 1983 terrorist attack on the Marine Battalion L

Headquarters at the Beirut International Airport. The Commission was co

following five members:

Adm. Robert L. J. Long, USN (Ret.), Chairman

Admiral Long retired as the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific in July 

years of commissioned service that included combat duty in World W

Vietnam War. He served in numerous command and staff billets and at 

retirement was Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

Honorable Robert J. Murray

Mr. Murray was on the faculty at Harvard University. He was a form

retary of the Navy and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense fo

Security Affairs.

Lt. Gen. Joseph T. Palastra, Jr., USA

General Palastra was the Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Chief 

Pacific Command. He had served in numerous command and staff bill

that spanned 29 years of commissioned service.

Lt. Gen. Lawrence F. Snowden, USMC (Ret.)

General Snowden retired as the Chief of Staff, Headquarters, U.S. M

May 1979 after 37 years of active service that included combat duty in 

Korea, and Vietnam. He served as a regimental commander in Vietnam

the Marine Corps Development Center; Chief of Staff of U.S. Force

Operations Deputy of the Marine Corps with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Lt. Gen. Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF (Ret.)

General Tighe retired from the U.S. Air Force as Director of the D

gence Agency on 1 September 1981 after 39 years of active and reserve 

Army duty.
42

“THE BOMBING OF THE MARINE BARRACKS IN BE

23 OCTOBER 1983”

The Bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut, 23 October 1983 is intend

minute discussion in military training and education courses focused on force 

counterintelligence, and preparation for command responsibility. The case stu

proved effective for civilian groups, but civilians may need some help un

some of the terms and relationships unique to the naval service.

A Summary of the Case

This case study is a detailed historical account of a terrorist attack on 

Amphibious Unit (MAU) assigned to Beirut, Lebanon in the early 1980s. The 

with a brief reference to the destructive power of the explosion, which resu

deaths of 241 of the estimated 350 occupants of the building that served as t

for the MAU. The introductory paragraphs are followed by a brief historical o

the Lebanese civil war and the political events that provoked U.S. intervention 

in August 1982. The case describes how U.S. policymakers defined their initi

objectives in Lebanon, and how these objectives expanded following the wi

cized massacre of Palestinian refugees in mid-September.

The next major section of the case describes the command relationship

vailed early in the intervention, and how these relationships shifted during th

year. This section is followed by a description of how the Marines interpret

sion they had been given, and some of their activities—exclusively with th

factions of Lebanese society—while not on duty. The case reviews the signs 

hostility to the Marines’ presence, particularly among Muslim factions, as fig

lated among various segments of Lebanon’s fractious population. This section 

reference to the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut on 18 April 1983, a

reportedly carried out by the terrorist group known as the Islamic Jihad—th

people including 17 Americans.

Noted in this section is the fact that there was no change to the mission of t

during this period, and no fundamental shift in the MAU’s composition or def

ture, even though the events that constituted a shift in the operational environ

benign to hostile—such as the Embassy bombing in April—were well known 

ious MAU commanders. The section subtitled “Security of the Battalion Lan

Headquarters” reviews the security conditions that prevailed in the MAU h

compound located at the Beirut International Airport. This section includes a r

the Rules of Engagement (ROE) that the MAU commander defined for the Ma

his command.

The case ends with a brief description of the actual attack, which occurr

the morning of 23 October 1983.
43

The Bombing of the Marine Barracks is a powerful case and has prov

two distinct levels of military education.

For junior personnel, especially those involved in counterintelligence du

ligence advisers to a commander, the case provides a stark lesson of wh

when the fundamentals of force protection are overlooked. Courses at 

Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center, for example, or in the Marine 

gence Teams are ideal venues for this use of the case study.

For more senior personnel, especially officers destined for command a

level or higher, or in staff positions at Unified Commands, the case highl

for consistency between a force’s defensive posture—including its ROE—

tional environment. Students at this level are more likely to be encountere

War College, the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, or at the JMI

Sources

The chief sources for this case included an unpublished doctoral disse

Jack Matthews, a retired Marine lieutenant colonel who served in one 

assigned to Beirut; the report of the Long Commission, noted in the case st

views with Marines—chiefly counterintelligence personnel—who were dir

in the events described. The JFK School of Government case study entit

Marines in Lebanon,” added little to understanding of the event, possib

author did not have access to direct participants. Col. Timothy Geraghty, 

the commander of the MAU that suffered the attack, reviewed the case in 

not a source in its creation.

Teaching Objectives

There are four teaching objectives for a discussion of this case. Instruc

their emphasis on these, depending on the level of instruction at which th

used.

At junior levels, students who discuss this case study should learn that:

Intelligence officers have an obligation to inform the commander clearly 

on changes in the operational environment that require a shift in the defen

the force.

Intelligence officers have an obligation to develop a detailed unders

social and political environments in which a military force operates, and 

commander on the probable sociopolitical impact of the force’s behavio

tudes of the local population; this is particularly important in military op

than war.
44

case study:

The commander has an obligation to assure reasonable consistency betwe

mission and its operational environment; when these become inconsistent

mander should ask for clarification or modification to the mission.

The commander has a responsibility to direct a defensive posture for a f

consistent with the operational environment. If higher headquarters is reluc

vide the resources that the commander decides are necessary, he has an ob

insist that the resources be made available. Like all command responsibilities, 

be delegated.

A Teaching Plan

Military personnel at all levels are characteristically mission-oriented, so 

discussion of this case study one may ask, “What was the mission of this fo

question quickly reveals the sharp distinction between the mission of the fir

charged with an orderly evacuation of the PLO and certain elements of 

Army—with the second mission, quoted in the section “The Plan Unravels

are likely to observe that the first was limited and clear, while the second was 

tious and hazy. “What led to the expression of the second mission?” instru

ask. Students will observe that the second or “nation-building” mission wa

immediately following the Christian Phalange slaughter of the Palestinian ref

Palestinian and international outrage aggravated by U.S. Ambassador Phi

commitment to the PLO leadership to prevent precisely the sort of atrocity tha

(Many students find it hard to believe that Habib did not inform the Marine c

of this commitment; nevertheless, this is true.) A general understanding of 

mission and its distinction from the first should take about 10 minutes to defin

As a second question, an instructor may ask, “How would you describe 

environment that prevailed when the MAU arrived in late September 1982 to 

mission?” As students address this question, they may be pressed for evidence 

their evaluations. In discussing the environment when the force arrived, studen

disagree, with some observing that it was benign and others that it merel

benign, when in fact it was not. If students insist that the environment was 

benign, the question may be shifted to focus on the Marines’ early operations 

sive measures; these suggest that whatever the true nature of the operational en

the various MAU commanders apparently believed that their force was percei

tral and generally welcome. A discussion of the tactical environment at the b

the intervention should take about 10 minutes.

At this point, students can describe how the environment changed over th

the next 13 months, with evidence of the changes they describe. This part of 

sion will reveal increasingly obvious signs of hostility during early 1983. The

the shift in “atmospherics” reported by Captain Johnson, the increased lev
45

the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in April. A general understanding of t

tactical environment should require about 10 minutes to develop.

An appropriate question at this point is “How did the behavior of the M

attitudes of the local population?” This question will reveal how the M

ence for socializing exclusively with Christians (who were more likely to 

than the Muslim groups in Beirut) created an impression that the Marines 

neutral. For example, the social gathering featuring as guest of honor the 

Christian Phalange—the group that had carried out the gruesome massac

gee camps only eight weeks earlier—appears in retrospect to be a gross m

Instructors should be able to return to this topic during their summary to 

teaching objective concerning the responsibilities of intelligence personn

to a commander. A discussion of this question should require about five m

When using this case for mid-level officers destined for command or se

tions, instructors during this part of the discussion may wish to use a qu

students’ attention to the reaction of higher headquarters—in this case 

Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart—to the emerging evidence that signale

benign to hostile. As noted in the case, a EUCOM officer described the Em

ing as “a peripheral event not reflecting local or popular opposition [and] 

the basic mission of peacekeeping.” Students typically express shock at t

an event as violent and destructive as the Embassy bombing, and instructor

to point out the gap between the actual tactical environment and EUCOM

ing of the situation. Instructors may wish to explore the implications of 

commander concerned about the safety of his forces. This exploration s

about five minutes.

Shifting to the next block of analysis, students should ponder “What di

in response to the emerging evidence that the tactical environment had ch

than a change in the Rules of Engagement at the British Embassy, the Dura

and the Ambassador’s residence, the answer is, “Nothing.”

“What were the options open to the MAU commander?” is a useful pro

as at this point the class may explore what Col. Geraghty could have do

Students typically observe that there were numerous ways in which the MA

could have improved his force protection posture. Some of these (such as 

force by shifting some of the troops back aboard the ships, where they wo

relatively safe) would not have required permission from higher headqu

such as moving the MAU out of the airport entirely, erecting solid barriers a

racks, or changing the ROE would have required permission or at least ext

nation. This part of the discussion should require about 10 minutes.

At this point, instructors may wish to draw students’ attention to exhib

the barracks compound, and ask, “Against what types of threat is this defen

Students typically observe that the defensive posture of the MAU revealed 
46

vehicular bomb. Exhibit 2 suggests that the MAU commanderand his force 

advisers—either could not conceive of the threat that in the end destroyed the 

led to the U.S. decision to end the intervention or they did not take defensiv

consistent with their understanding.

If students observe that the commander and his staff simply could not imag

sibility of a suicide bomber in a vehicle, one may ask, “Why not?” The embas

destroyed only six months previously, and even though the vehicle in that in

parked and not moving, it certainly should have been obvious that terrorist gro

ing in Lebanon had the capability to create and use large bombs loaded in car

Moreover, on the last page of the case, corroborative reports from Marine se

cate that the guards on duty immediately concluded that the vehicle represent

attack; if they could reach that conclusion so quickly, why was the possibility 

range of the commander’s vision, and that of his staff?

This part of the discussion represents the heart of the objectives, and shou

explored, requiring about 15 minutes.

As a final exercise, students should consider how responsibility for the outc

be assigned. (This question may not be necessary for relatively junior group

case it can be disregarded.) Most students probably will conclude that Col. Gera

marily responsible, but that he shares this responsibility with his senior sta

higher headquarters; both levels failed in their obligation to provide him time

intelligence and command guidance. After about 10 minutes of discussion of th

instructors may distribute the (B) case, which is a short excerpt from the report 

Commission. I suggest leaving a few minutes for a summary, during which inst

use what they have put up on the board to reinforce the basic objectives of the d
47

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Tom Shreeve is the creator of the Community’s Case Method Progra

director for several years. He learned the craft of case method teaching fir

student at Harvard Business School from 1981 to 1983, and later as a rese

and casewriter. Tom has taught throughout the Intelligence Community us

is the author of about one-third of the current catalog of cases and case stu

a Marine Corps Reserve officer, a member of the Master’s Program for Re

of the Joint Military Intelligence College, and of the Adjunct Faculty 

Corps Command and Staff College in Quantico, Virginia. He maintains a 

Intelligence Community Case Method Program at http://www.intelcasest

he may be contacted at tomshreeve@aol.com.
Discussion Paper Number Twelve

JOINT MILITARY

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