alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §1401. Establishment of agency Chief Human Capital Officers

The head of each agency referred to under paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 901(b) of title 31 shall appoint or designate a Chief Human Capital Officer, who shall—

(1) advise and assist the head of the agency and other agency officials in carrying out the agency's responsibilities for selecting, developing, training, and managing a high-quality, productive workforce in accordance with merit system principles;

(2) implement the rules and regulations of the President and the Office of Personnel Management and the laws governing the civil service within the agency; and

(3) carry out such functions as the primary duty of the Chief Human Capital Officer.

(Added Pub. L. 107–296, title XIII, §1302(a), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2287.)

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Chapter effective 180 days after Nov. 25, 2002, see section 1305 of Pub. L. 107–296, set out as an Effective Date of 2002 Amendment note under section 1103 of this title.

#### Chief Human Capital Officers Council

Pub. L. 107–296, title XIII, §1303, Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2288, as amended by Pub. L. 117–81, div. F, title LXVI, §6604, Dec. 27, 2021, 135 Stat. 2441, provided that:

"(a) Establishment.—There is established a Chief Human Capital Officers Council, consisting of—

"(1) the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, who shall act as chairperson of the Council;

"(2) the Deputy Director for Management of the Office of Management and Budget, who shall act as vice chairperson of the Council; and

"(3) the Chief Human Capital Officers of Executive departments and any other members who are designated by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management.

"(b) Functions.—The Chief Human Capital Officers Council shall meet periodically to advise and coordinate the activities of the agencies of its members on such matters as modernization of human resources systems, improved quality of human resources information, and legislation affecting human resources operations and organizations.

"(c) Employee Labor Organizations at Meetings.—The Chief Human Capital Officers Council shall ensure that representatives of Federal employee labor organizations are present at a minimum of 1 meeting of the Council each year. Such representatives shall not be members of the Council.

"(d) Annual Reports.—

"(1) In general.—Each year, the Chief Human Capital Officers Council shall submit to Congress a report that includes the following:

"(A) A description of the activities of the Council.

"(B) A description of employment barriers that prevent the agencies of its members from hiring qualified applicants, including those for digital talent positions, and recommendations for addressing the barriers that would allow such agencies to more effectively hire qualified applicants.

"(2) Public availability.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Council submits a report under paragraph (1), the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall make the report publicly available on the website of the Office of Personnel Management."
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Samuel Kimmel, Appellant, v. Edward M. Fay, as Warden of Green Haven Prison, Respondent.

On the call of the calendar, on motion by respondent, appeal dismissed. Appellant failed to comply with an order of this court, dated December 4, 1961, requiring him to perfect his appeal for the April 1962 Term. Ughetta, Acting P. J., Kleinfeld, Christ, Brennan and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
§ 260.1 Purpose. This part: ( a ) Assigns responsibilities in compliance with 20 U.S.C. 107 *et seq.* and 34 CFR part 395 and establishes the following policies within the Department of Defense: ( 1 ) Uniform policies for application of priority accorded the blind to operate vending facilities;
( 2 ) Requirements for satisfactory vending facility sites on DoD-controlled property; and
( 3 ) Vending machine income-sharing requirements on DoD-controlled property
( b ) Prescribes requirements and operating procedures for the vending facility program for the blind on DoD-controlled property.
( c ) Does NOT apply to full food services, mess attendant services, or services supporting the operation of a military dining facility.
"EXHIBIT 23"

                              ACCOUNTANTS' CONSENT

The Board of Directors
International Bancshares Corporation:

We consent to incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No. 33-11689
on Form S-8 of International Bancshares Corporation of our report dated March
15, 2000 relating to the consolidated statements of condition of International
Bancshares Corporation and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1999 and 1998, and
the related consolidated statements of income, comprehensive income,
shareholders' equity and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year
period ended December 31, 1999, which report is incorporated by reference in the
December 31, 1999 annual report on Form 10-K of International Bancshares
Corporation.

/s/ KPMG LLP




San Antonio, Texas
March 27, 2000
### §2009cc–4. Debentures

#### (a) In general

The Secretary may guarantee the timely payment of principal and interest, as scheduled, on debentures issued by any rural business investment company.

#### (b) Terms and conditions

The Secretary may make guarantees under this section on such terms and conditions as the Secretary considers appropriate, except that the term of any debenture guaranteed under this section shall not exceed 15 years.

#### (c) Full faith and credit of the United States

Section 2009g(i) of this title shall apply to any guarantee under this section.

#### (d) Maximum guarantee

Under this section, the Secretary may—

(1) guarantee the debentures issued by a rural business investment company only to the extent that the total face amount of outstanding guaranteed debentures of the rural business investment company does not exceed the lesser of—

(A) 300 percent of the private capital of the rural business investment company; or

(B) $105,000,000; and

(2) provide for the use of discounted debentures.

(Pub. L. 87–128, title III, §384E, as added Pub. L. 107–171, title VI, §6029, May 13, 2002, 116 Stat. 393.)
§ 536.4 Designation of claims attorneys. ( a ) *Who may designate.* The Commander USARCS, the senior JA of a command having a command claims service, the chief of a command claims service, the head of an ACO, or the Chief Counsel of a COE District, may designate a qualified attorney other than a JA as a claims attorney. The head of an ACO may designate a claims attorney to act as a CPO with approval authority.
( b ) *Eligibility.* To qualify as a claims attorney, an individual must be a civilian employee of the Department of the Army (DA) or DOD, a member of the bar of a state, the District of Columbia, or a jurisdiction where U.S. federal law applies, serving in the grade of GS-11 or above, and performing primary duties as a legal adviser.
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Dennis Villetto, Respondent.

Appeal, as limited by the People’s brief, from so much of an order of the County Court, Westchester County, dated June 1, 1978, as granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the first count of the indictment, accusing him of conspiracy in the first degree (Penal Law, § 105.15). Order reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, count one of the indictment is reinstated, and the case is remitted to the County Court for further proceedings consistent herewith. The County Court dismissed the first count of the indictment, charging conspiracy in the first degree, on the sole ground that the only other participant in the alleged conspiracy besides the defendant was an undercover State trooper who concededly never intended to conspire or to commit the object crime. Since the facte of the instant case are in all material respects identical to those in *People v Schwimmer*(66 AD2d 91), we reverse for the reasons stated therein. Martuscello, J. P., Hawkins and O’Connor, JJ., concur.

Titone, J., concurs in the result on constraint of the decision in *People v Schwimmer*(66 AD2d 91).
### SUBCHAPTER II—FEDERAL CYBERSECURITY ENHANCEMENT
EXHIBIT 23.1


CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statement on Form S-8 (File No. 333-51200, 333-85321, 33-21092, 33-41509,
33-41515, 33-50510, 33-80838, 33-39091 and 333-103310) of CyberOptics
Corporation of our report dated January 30, 2004 relating to the consolidated
financial statements, which appears in this Annual Report on Form 10-K. We also
consent to the incorporation by reference of our report dated January 30, 2004
relating to the financial statement schedules, which appears in this Form 10-K.



PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Minneapolis, Minnesota
March 26, 2004
§ 3.5 Appropriate use. In accordance with statute, this authority may be used only when: ( a ) At least one nontraditional Defense contractor is participating to a significant extent in the prototype project; or
( b ) No nontraditional Defense contractor is participating to a significant extent in the prototype project, but at least one of the following circumstances exists: ( 1 ) At least one third of the total cost of the prototype project is to be paid out of funds provided by non-Federal parties to the transaction.
( 2 ) The Senior Procurement Executive for the agency determines in writing that exceptional circumstances justify the use of a transaction that provides for innovative business arrangements or structures that would not be feasible or appropriate under a procurement contract.
[67 FR 54956, Aug. 27, 2002]
### §608. Prioritization

#### (a) In general

In allocating funds among States and high-risk urban areas applying for grants under section 604 or 605 of this title, the Administrator shall consider, for each State or high-risk urban area—

(1) its relative threat, vulnerability, and consequences from acts of terrorism, including consideration of—

(A) its population, including appropriate consideration of military, tourist, and commuter populations;

(B) its population density;

(C) its history of threats, including whether it has been the target of a prior act of terrorism;

(D) its degree of threat, vulnerability, and consequences related to critical infrastructure (for all critical infrastructure sectors) or key resources identified by the Administrator or the State homeland security plan, including threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences related to critical infrastructure or key resources in nearby jurisdictions;

(E) the most current threat assessments available to the Department;

(F) whether the State has, or the high-risk urban area is located at or near, an international border;

(G) whether it has a coastline bordering an ocean (including the Gulf of Mexico) or international waters;

(H) its likely need to respond to acts of terrorism occurring in nearby jurisdictions;

(I) the extent to which it has unmet target capabilities;

(J) in the case of a high-risk urban area, the extent to which that high-risk urban area includes—

(i) those incorporated municipalities, counties, parishes, and Indian tribes within the relevant eligible metropolitan area, the inclusion of which will enhance regional efforts to prevent, prepare for, protect against, and respond to acts of terrorism; and

(ii) other local and tribal governments in the surrounding area that are likely to be called upon to respond to acts of terrorism within the high-risk urban area; and

(K) such other factors as are specified in writing by the Administrator; and

(2) the anticipated effectiveness of the proposed use of the grant by the State or high-risk urban area in increasing the ability of that State or high-risk urban area to prevent, prepare for, protect against, and respond to acts of terrorism, to meet its target capabilities, and to otherwise reduce the overall risk to the high-risk urban area, the State, or the Nation.

#### (b) Types of threat

In assessing threat under this section, the Administrator shall consider the following types of threat to critical infrastructure sectors and to populations in all areas of the United States, urban and rural:

(1) Biological.

(2) Chemical.

(3) Cyber.

(4) Explosives.

(5) Incendiary.

(6) Nuclear.

(7) Radiological.

(8) Suicide bombers.

(9) Such other types of threat determined relevant by the Administrator.

(Pub. L. 107–296, title XX, §2007, as added Pub. L. 110–53, title I, §101, Aug. 3, 2007, 121 Stat. 282.)
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ARON LUNA,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-2584

[February 28, 2019]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for 

the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County; Dan L. Vaughn, Judge; 

L.T. Case Nos. 2008CF001915A and 2008CF001938A.

David M. Lamos, Fort Pierce, for appellant.

No appearance required for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

DAMOORGIAN, CIKLIN and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
§ 552.73 Minimum requirements for automobile insurance policies. Policies sold on installations by both accepted and accredited insurers will meet all statutory and regulatory requirements of the State or host nation in which the installation is located. Policies will not be issued in amounts lower than the minimum limits prescribed by these authorities. In addition, policies will— ( a ) Clearly identify the name of the insurer and the full address. ( 1 ) Applications without the name and address of the insurer underwriting the insurance may be used; the names of sales or underwriting agents alone is not sufficient.
( 2 ) Post office box addresses are not an acceptable address.
( b ) Provide bodily injury and property damage liability coverage for all drivers authorized by the named insured to operate the vehicle. Military indorsements, excluding persons other than the named insured, whether in the military or not, are not acceptable.
( c ) Not contain unusual limitations or restrictions, including, but not limited to, the following: ( 1 ) Limitations specifying that coverage is afforded only when the insured vehicle is operated in the designated geographic areas in the United States (e.g., coverage applicable only on a military reservation). If the installation is located within the United States, the standard provision limiting coverage to the United States and Canada is acceptable.
( 2 ) Coverage limited to exclude liability for bodily injury to passengers and guests if such a liability exists as a matter of law.
#### STATE v. ELLIS

No. 588P97

Case below: 127 N.C.App. 562

Notice of appeal by defendant pursuant to G.S. 7A-30 (substantial constitutional question) dismissed 5 February 1998. Petition by defendant for discretionary review pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 denied 5 February 1998.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-10958

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel; PHI-NGA JEANNIE LE,

Plaintiffs-Appellees

v.

STANLEY THAW; MICHAEL KINCAID,

Defendants-Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:09-CV-2482

Before DAVIS, JONES, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Relator Phi-Nga Jeannie Le filed a qui tam complaint on behalf of herself 

and the United States against, among other defendants, Stanley Thaw and 

Michael Kincaid. She alleged three claims under the False Claims Act, 31 

U.S.C. § 3729, et seq. The district court granted Le’s motion for partial 

summary judgment on claims one and three of her complaint and her motion 

for entry of judgment and entered judgment against Thaw and Kincaid in the 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 13, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-10958 Document: 00513462891 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/13/2016
No. 15-10958

2

amount of $2,106,838.92 and for reasonable attorneys’ fees, expenses, and 

costs.

The district court dismissed some but not all claims; we must sua sponte 

examine whether we have jurisdiction to consider the appeal. See Martin v. 

Halliburton, 618 F.3d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 2010). We have jurisdiction over 

appeals from (1) final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291; (2) orders that are 

deemed final due to a jurisprudential exception, such as the collateral order 

doctrine; (3) interlocutory orders specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a); and 

(4) interlocutory orders that are properly certified for appeal by the district 

court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) or § 1292(b). Dardar 

v. Lafourche Realty Co., 849 F.2d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1988); Save the Bay, Inc. 

v. U.S. Army, 639 F.2d 1100, 1102 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1981). The order from which 

Thaw and Kincaid appeal does not fall within any of these categories, so we 

lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal, and the appeal is DISMISSED.

Thaw and Kincaid’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on 

appeal is DENIED. Their motion for appointment of counsel is also DENIED. 

See Schwander v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 494, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1985).

 Case: 15-10958 Document: 00513462891 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/13/2016
#### POMPILJ v. MANHATTAN DELIVERY CO.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

June 22, 1903.)

1. Carriers—Limitation oe Liability—Receipt—Contracts.

Where plaintiff directed a delivery company to transport his baggage from a certain place, and paid the charges, a receipt given by an employs of the company when he subsequently called for the baggage to a person who pointed it out to him did not constitute the contract, so as to limit the company’s liability for the loss of the baggage to the amount stipulated therein.

Appeal from City Court of New York.

Action by Eugenio Pompilj against the Manhattan Delivery Company. From a judgment "for plaintiff and an order denying its motion for a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before FREEDMAN, P. J., and GILDERSLEEVE and MacLEAN, JJ.

Guthrie, Cravath & Henderson, for appellant.

R. Maggio, for respondent.

FREEDMAN, P., J.

In this case the provision of the receipt limiting defendant’s liability, and the receipt itself, constitute no contract between the parties, within the rule laid down and enforced in Bernstein v. Weir (decided by the April term of this court) 83 N. Y. Supp. 48. The plaintiff called at defendant’s- office, and ordered to have his baggage, consisting of a valise, transported from No. 11 Oliver street to No. 181 Second avenue, in the city of New York, for which service the defendant requested him to pay, and he did pay, at that time and place, 35 or 40 cents. No question was asked, nor was any receipt or paper of any kind then given to him. Subsequently defendant’s -driver called at the Oliver street house during the absence of the plaintiff therefrom, saw a Mrs. Reagan, and asked her for plaintiff’s valise. She pointed it out to him, with the remark, “Here it is.” No more conversation passed between them, and no question was asked, according to- her testimony, and the *231driver simply handed her a receipt. This receipt, it now appears, contained a limitation of the liability of the defendant to the sum of $50 in case of loss, at which the property to be forwarded was valued. Mrs. Reagan could neither read nor write, and, according to the finding of the jury, to whom this question was submitted as one of fact," her attention was not called to this clause, and she did not know the contents of the receipt. Upon this state of facts it is idle to contend that the previous oral contract, made and paid for at defendant’s office, became merged into the so-called “contract” contained in the receipt. The case discloses no reversible error, and the defendant admitted that the valise and its contents were never delivered to the plaintiff, and that they were stolen from its wagon. No reason appears why the defendant should be relieved from making compensation as found by the jury. Indeed, the verdict only allowed a part of plaintiff’s claim.

The judgment and order should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.
<PAGE>
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.74

                              CKE RESTAURANTS, INC.

                                 AMENDMENT NO. 1
                                       TO
                              EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

      This Amendment No. 1 (the "Amendment") to Employment Agreement is made
effective as of December 6, 2005, by and between CKE Restaurants, Inc. (the
"Company") and Brad R. Haley (the "Employee").

                                R E C I T A L S:

      A. The Company and the Employee entered into an Employment Agreement,
dated as of January 2004 (the "Agreement").

      B. The Company and Employee now desire to amend the Agreement as set forth
below.


                                    AGREEMENT

      1. Term. Section 2 of the Agreement shall read in its entirety as follows:


             "2. Term. The term of this Agreement (the "Term") shall commence on
       the Effective Date and, subject to prior termination as set forth in
       Section 7 below, shall terminate three (3) years following the date on
       which notice of non-renewal or termination of this Agreement is given by
       either party to the other. Thus, the Term shall be renewed automatically
       on a daily basis so that the outstanding Term is always three (3) years
       following the date on which notice of non-renewal or termination is given
       by either party to the other. The Term may be extended at any time upon
       mutual written agreement of the parties."

      2. Definitions. Terms used but not defined in this Amendment shall have
the respective meanings assigned to them in the Agreement.

      3. Counterparts. This Amendment may be executed in multiple counterparts,
each of which shall be deemed an original, and all of which shall constitute one
Amendment.

      4. Terms and Conditions of Agreement. Except as specifically amended by
this Amendment, all terms and conditions of the Agreement shall remain in full
force and effect.


                            [SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS]
<PAGE>
      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment is executed by the undersigned as of
the date first written above.

                                /s/ BRAD R. HALEY

                                ------------------------------------------------
                                Brad R. Haley


                                CKE Restaurants, Inc.

                                       /s/ PETER CHURM
                                By:
                                       -----------------------------------------
                                       Peter Churm
                                       Director and Chairman of the Compensation
                                       Committee of the Board of Directors

                                       2