[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. McDougald v. Sehlmeyer, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3927.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-3927

THE STATE EX REL. MCDOUGALD v. SEHLMEYER.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. McDougald v. Sehlmeyer, Slip Opinion No. 

2020-Ohio-3927.] 

Mandamus—Public Records Act—There is no justification for granting a writ of 

mandamus to compel a public-records custodian to allow an in-person 

inspection of requested records, especially when the public-records 

custodian has offered to make the records available by other means. 

(No. 2019-1212—Submitted April 7, 2020—Decided August 5, 2020.)

IN MANDAMUS. 

________________ 

 Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Relator, Jerone McDougald, seeks a writ of mandamus to compel 

respondent, Sonrisa Sehlmeyer, to produce documents pursuant to a public-records 

request. Also pending is McDougald’s motion to submit this case to mediation. 
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For the reasons set forth herein, we deny his motion for mediation and his requests 

for a writ of mandamus, statutory damages, and court costs. 

I. Background 

{¶ 2} On August 13, 2019, McDougald, an inmate at the Toledo 

Correctional Institution, sent a public-records request to Sehlmeyer, the warden’s 

administrative assistant. He asked to inspect the following records: 

(1) Ms. M. Manteuffel training course files. 

(2) Ms. M. Manteuffel position description. 

(3) Ms. M. Manteuffel forms documenting receipt of office 

policies, directives, etc. 

(4) Ms. M. Manteuffel forms documenting job classification 

changes. 

{¶ 3} One week later, Sehlmeyer responded to McDougald’s request with a 

handwritten notation indicating the number of pages each requested record 

consisted of and stating, “The total for this request would be $1.80.1 Please send a 

cash slip for these records.” (Footnote added.) Sehlmeyer’s response provided no 

further explanation. McDougald understood this response as a denial of his request 

to inspect the records in person. 

{¶ 4} According to Sehlmeyer’s affidavit that was submitted as evidence in 

this case, after McDougald received Sehlmeyer’s response, he “never followed-up 

this request with any indication that he was still seeking to inspect these 

documents,” as opposed to receiving copies. Nor did he ever send Sehlmeyer a 

 

1. Sehlmeyer calculated this amount by totaling the number of pages in the various requests (36) 

and multiplying that number by $.05. 
January Term, 2020 

3

cash slip. Sehlmeyer also checked McDougald’s inmate account and determined 

that he did not have sufficient funds to pay the cost of the copies. 

{¶ 5} On September 3, 2019, McDougald filed the present complaint, 

asking this court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling Sehlmeyer to allow him 

to inspect the records. He also requested an award of statutory damages in the 

amount of $1,000 plus court costs. This court denied Sehlmeyer’s motion to 

dismiss and issued an alternative writ and set a briefing schedule. 157 Ohio St.3d 

1516, 2019-Ohio-5289, 136 N.E.3d. 517. 

{¶ 6} The parties have filed merit briefs and submitted evidence. 

II. Analysis

A. The motion for mediation

{¶ 7} McDougald has filed a motion asking to submit this case to mediation. 

S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.02 authorizes a party to “file a motion to refer a case to mediation 

pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 19.01.” Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 19.01(A)(1), we may refer to 

mediation “any civil case that the Supreme Court deems appropriate.” This case is 

not appropriate for mediation. 

{¶ 8} McDougald’s motion for mediation consists of a single sentence, in 

which he asks us to refer the case to mediation “due to the circumstances and facts 

of this case.” The motion does not explain what these facts and circumstances are 

and does not identify any dispute that mediation might help to resolve. As shown 

below, this case does not involve an ambiguous or overly broad public-records 

request that a mediator could help to narrow or clarify. The issue in this case is 

whether McDougald, an inmate in a maximum-security prison, has a statutory right 

to personally inspect public records (as opposed to receiving copies of those 

records). Mediation is unlikely to help the parties resolve that disagreement. 

{¶ 9} We deny McDougald’s motion to refer this case to mediation. 

 
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B. The merits of McDougald’s public-records claim

{¶ 10} Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, requires a public office, 

upon request, to promptly make public records available for inspection or to provide 

copies of the records within a reasonable period of time, R.C. 149.43(B)(1). A 

“public record” is a record “kept by any public office.” R.C. 149.43(A)(1). 

Mandamus is an appropriate remedy by which to compel compliance with R.C. 

149.43. State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State 

Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6; 

R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(b). 

{¶ 11} To be entitled to the writ, McDougald must demonstrate that he has 

a clear legal right to the requested relief and that Sehlmeyer has a clear legal duty 

to provide that relief. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Sage, 142 Ohio St.3d 

392, 2015-Ohio-974, 31 N.E.3d 616, ¶ 10. McDougald must prove his right to 

relief by clear and convincing evidence. Id. However, Ohio’s Public Records Act 

“is construed liberally in favor of broad access, and any doubt is resolved in favor 

of disclosure of public records.” State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty., 

75 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 662 N.E.2d 334 (1996). 

{¶ 12} In his merit brief, McDougald makes three points. First, he argues 

that the requested documents are subject to inspection under R.C. 149.43. Second, 

he argues that Sehlmeyer may not condition his right to inspect the records on the 

prepayment of any fee. And third, he argues that his status as an incarcerated person 

does not restrict his rights under R.C. 149.43. 

{¶ 13} In response, Sehlmeyer does not dispute that the requested 

documents are public records. But she does deny conditioning McDougald’s right 

to inspect the records on the payment of a fee. According to Sehlmeyer, she would 

have been justified in denying McDougald’s request to inspect the records outright. 

Instead, she “offered an appropriate alternative to give [McDougald] copies of the 

documents at an appropriate cost.” 
January Term, 2020 

5

{¶ 14} “ ‘[T]he right of inspection, as opposed to the right to request copies, 

is not conditioned on the payment of any fee under R.C. 149.43.’ ” State ex rel. 

Penland v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 158 Ohio St.3d 15, 2019-Ohio-4130, 139 

N.E.3d 862, ¶ 12, quoting State ex rel. Warren Newspapers, Inc. v. Hutson, 70 Ohio 

St.3d 619, 624, 640 N.E.2d 174 (1994). However, the duty to allow inspection of 

public records “is not absolute.” State ex rel. Nelson v. Fuerst, 66 Ohio St.3d 47, 

48, 607 N.E.2d 836 (1993). For example, permitting an inmate to personally 

inspect records is not required when doing so would create security issues, 

unreasonably interfere with the officials’ discharge of their duties, and violate 

prison rules. State ex rel. Dehler v. Mohr, 129 Ohio St.3d 37, 2011-Ohio-959, 950 

N.E.2d 156, ¶ 2. Sehlmeyer suggests that that rationale for not permitting personal 

inspection of the records applies here because McDougald is an inmate in a 

maximum-security prison. 

{¶ 15} “ ‘With respect to penal institutions, prison administrators must be 

accorded deference in adopting * * * policies and practices to preserve internal 

order and to maintain institutional security.’ ” (Ellipsis in Dehler.) Id., quoting 

Briscoe v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-1109, 2003-

Ohio-3533, ¶ 16. McDougald has not identified any instance in which a court has 

overruled the decision of prison officials and ordered them to permit an inmate to 

inspect records personally. Indeed, precluding maximum-security inmates from 

conducting in-person inspections of prison records will very often be sensible. 

There is no justification for granting a writ of mandamus to compel Sehlmeyer to 

allow an in-person inspection, especially when, as here, the institution has offered 

to make the records available by other means. 

{¶ 16} We deny the request for a writ of mandamus. 

C. Statutory damages

{¶ 17} In his merit brief, McDougald demands an award of statutory 

damages in the amount of $1,000. A person requesting public records is entitled to 
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an award of statutory damages “if a court determines that the public office or the 

person responsible for [the] public records failed to comply with an obligation in 

accordance with division (B) of this section.” R.C. 149.43(C)(2). However, a 

requester will qualify for statutory damages only if he “transmits a written request 

[for the public records] by hand delivery, electronic submission, or certified mail 

* * * to the public office or person responsible for the requested public records.” 

Id. The party seeking statutory damages must prove the method of delivery by clear 

and convincing evidence. State ex rel. Martin v. Greene, 156 Ohio St.3d 482, 2019-

Ohio-1827, 129 N.E.3d 419, ¶ 9. McDougald delivered his public-records request 

through the prison kite system. We have recently held that a prison kite is not one 

of the delivery methods identified in R.C. 149.43(C)(2), and delivering a request 

by this method therefore does not allow a requester to ask for statutory damages. 

State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-3686, __ N.E.3d 

__, ¶ 15-18. We deny the request for statutory damages. 

D. Court costs

{¶ 18} In his complaint, McDougald requests an award of court costs. 

R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(a)(i) authorizes a court to award court costs when it has granted 

a writ of mandamus. Alternatively, R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(a)(ii) allows a court to award 

court costs when an official provides records for the first time after a complaint for 

a writ of mandamus is filed but before the court issues a writ and the court 

determines that the official acted in bad faith. Neither situation is applicable to the 

present set of facts, and we therefore deny McDougald’s request for an award of 

court costs. 

III. Conclusion

{¶ 19} For the reasons stated, we deny the motion for mediation and deny 

the requests for a writ of mandamus, for statutory damages, and for court costs. 

Writ denied. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, and DONNELLY, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2020 

7

STEWART, J., concurs in judgment only and would find that a one-week 

response time does not constitute an unreasonable delay and would therefore deny 

statutory damages. 

FRENCH, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion. 

KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 

_________________ 

FRENCH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

{¶ 20} I agree with the dissenting opinion’s conclusion that relator, Jerone 

McDougald, is entitled to inspect the requested records because respondent, Sonrisa 

Sehlmeyer, failed to support the denial of McDougald’s request with any reasoning 

or evidence. But I agree with the majority’s decision to deny McDougald’s request 

for statutory damages because we have concluded that delivery of a public-records 

request by a prison’s kite system does not satisfy any of the delivery requirements 

in R.C. 149.43(C)(2). State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-

Ohio-3686, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 15-18. I therefore concur in part and dissent in part. 

_________________ 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 21} I dissent because I must. Sonrisa Sehlmeyer, the warden’s 

administrative assistant at the Toledo Correctional Institution (“TCI”), may well 

have had good reasons for refusing to allow relator, Jerone McDougald, to review 

in person the records he sought to inspect. But because she failed to provide any 

reasoning to McDougald or this court regarding her refusal, I would grant a writ of 

mandamus and order Sehlmeyer to allow McDougald to inspect the records at issue 

in this case. I would also award McDougald $1,000 in statutory damages. 

Factual and procedural background 

{¶ 22} McDougald, who is incarcerated at TCI, submitted a public-records 

request to Sehlmeyer on August 13, 2019, asking to inspect specific records. 

Sehlmeyer responded on August 20, 2019. But Sehlmeyer’s response ignored 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

McDougald’s actual request—instead of addressing his desire to inspect the 

records, she responded as though he had sought copies of the records. She wrote, 

“The total for this request would be $1.80. Please send a cash slip for these 

records.” On that same day, McDougald submitted another public-records request 

that was identical to his first one. Sehlmeyer never responded to that second publicrecords request. Sehlmeyer does not suggest that her response to McDougald was 

anything other than a denial of his request to inspect the records. That denial is at 

the heart of this case. 

{¶ 23} On September 3, 2019, McDougald filed a complaint for a writ of

mandamus in this court asking that we order Sehlmeyer to allow him to inspect the 

records. Sehlmeyer filed a motion to dismiss. This court denied that motion, issued 

an alternative writ, and set a schedule for the parties to file briefs and submit 

evidence in accordance with S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.05. 157 Ohio St.3d 1516, 2019-Ohio5289, 136 N.E.3d 517. 

{¶ 24} In Sehlmeyer’s affidavit, which was filed as evidence in this case, 

she states that she sent a response to McDougald’s first public-records request 

setting forth the price for the copies of the requested documents. She does not state 

that she denied McDougald’s request to inspect the records for security reasons. 

She does state in her affidavit that she considers the following factors when 

responding to public-records requests for the inspection of records: 

While evaluating inmate record requests for inspection 

versus copies, I consider, among other factors, the inmate’s security 

classification, housing assignment, and relevant rule violations 

committed by the inmate which would pertain to their ability to view 

the documents requested. Regardless, to aid their public records 

requests, we nevertheless permit inmates to obtain copies of these 

documents of which they seek for inspection. 
January Term, 2020 

9

{¶ 25} But Sehlmeyer does not state that she considered those factors before 

she denied McDougald’s request to inspect certain documents. She does not 

mention McDougald’s security classification, housing assignment, or any rule 

violations that may have prevented him from having access to the records. Nor 

does she indicate that her response was simply a misunderstanding, that she thought 

McDougald was asking for copies of records rather than to inspect the actual 

records. Therefore, her affidavit confirms that she purposefully denied McDougald 

access to the records without stating a reason. 

Limiting an incarcerated individual’s ability to inspect an institution’s records 

{¶ 26} In other cases involving the denial of an inmate’s request to inspect 

a prison’s records, “the prison officials submitted evidence that granting that 

request might have unreasonably interfered with the discharge of their duties.” 

State ex rel. Dehler v. Spatny, 127 Ohio St.3d 312, 2010-Ohio-5711, 939 N.E.2d 

831, ¶ 5. The majority cites State ex rel. Dehler v. Mohr, 129 Ohio St.3d 37, 2011-

Ohio-959, 950 N.E.2d 156, ¶ 2, as support for the statement that “permitting an 

inmate to personally inspect records is not required when doing so would create 

security issues, unreasonably interfere with the officials’ discharge of their duties, 

and violate prison rules.” Majority opinion at ¶ 14. In Mohr, this court affirmed a 

court of appeals’ opinion that contained specific findings regarding an inmate’s 

request to review a prison’s purchase orders for peanut butter. The court of appeals 

stated: 

Apparently, some records about peanut butter purchases for 

TCI do exist, but the practical aspects of providing such records to 

Dehler made the provision of the records challenging at best. With 

Dehler’s transfer to Mansfield Correctional Institution, providing 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

the records has transitioned from challenging at best to close to 

impossible. 

While Dehler was housed at TCI, the institution could only 

provide the records requested by duplicating a large number of 

documents or by providing Dehler extended access to the original 

documents. The staffing levels at TCI were such that the warden 

there could not assign a correctional officer to full-time duty of 

watching over Dehler’s shoulder while Dehler waded through all the 

purchase orders regarding food for TCI to find the orders regarding 

peanut butter purchases. 

The cost of duplicating such a huge number of food purchase 

documents was prohibitive. 

Further, Dehler and all other inmates are only allowed to 

store a very limited number of items in their cells. TCI, with the 

overcrowding of inmates in Ohio being what it is, could not set aside 

a separate room or rooms to house the duplicated documents until 

Dehler could make a complete review. 

State ex rel. Dehler v. Collins, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-703, 2010-Ohio-5436, 

¶ 10-13. 

Sehlmeyer provides no reason to limit McDougald’s access 

to the records in this case 

{¶ 27} In contrast, in this case, Sehlmeyer offers no evidence that 

McDougald’s request was too difficult for TCI to respond to, or that allowing him 

to inspect the records caused a specific threat based upon his record in the 

institution. She determined that the records McDougald sought totaled only 36 

pages, and she submitted no evidence of how allowing McDougald to view that 
January Term, 2020 

11 

many pages in his cell or elsewhere would overly burden the institution. She merely 

denied McDougald’s request without any explanation. 

{¶ 28} Pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B)(3), when a public office denies a publicrecords request in part or in whole, “the public office or the person responsible for 

the requested public record shall provide the requester with an explanation, 

including legal authority, setting forth why the request was denied.” If a mandamus 

action is filed against the public office, the public office may rely on additional 

reasons or legal authority in defending the action. Id. Sehlmeyer, however, has 

offered no specific reason for her denial of McDougald’s request. If anything, 

setting forth the list of factors she should consider when responding to an inmate’s 

public-records request without a discussion of their relevance in this case is an 

admission that she failed to apply them to McDougald’s request. Sehlmeyer has 

not asserted that she denied McDougald’s public-records request because of 

security concerns. Accordingly, this court should grant McDougald a writ of 

mandamus and order Sehlmeyer to allow him to inspect the 36 pages of records he 

requested access to. 

Statutory damages 

{¶ 29} The majority opinion denies McDougald’s request for statutory 

damages. I would hold that McDougald meets the statutory criteria for an award 

of statutory damages. To be eligible for such an award, the requester must transmit 

the public-records request by “hand delivery, electronic submission, or certified 

mail.” R.C. 149.43(C)(2).2

 “Hand delivery” is not defined in the statute. There is 

no dispute in this case that McDougald made his public-records request through the 

prison’s “kite” system. “A ‘kite’ is written by an inmate to a member of the prison 

 

2. Public-records requests are governed by the version of R.C. 149.43 that was in effect at the time 

that the request was made. State ex rel. Cordell v. Paden, 156 Ohio St.3d 394, 2019-Ohio-1216, 

128 N.E.3d 179, ¶ 11. The version of the Public Records Act that governs McDougald’s requests, 

R.C. 149.43 as amended by 2018 Sub.H.B. No. 425, took effect in April 2019. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

staff and is ‘a means for inmates to contact staff members inside [an] institution.’ ” 

State ex rel. Martin v. Greene, 156 Ohio St.3d 482, 2019-Ohio-1827, 129 N.E.3d 

419, ¶ 3, fn. 1, quoting State v. Elmore, 5th Dist. Richland No. 16CA52, 2017-

Ohio-1472, ¶ 15. Because I would hold that a public-records request made by kite 

constitutes hand delivery, I would hold that McDougald is eligible to receive 

statutory damages. See State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene, ___ Ohio St.3d. ___, 

2020-Ohio-3686, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 60 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

{¶ 30} Pursuant to R.C. 149.43(C)(2), a person who makes a public-records 

request “shall be entitled to recover * * * statutory damages * * * if a court 

determines that the public office or the person responsible for public records failed 

to comply with an obligation in accordance with” R.C. 149.43(B). R.C. 

149.43(B)(1) states that “all public records responsive to the request shall be 

promptly prepared and made available for inspection to any person at all reasonable 

times during regular business hours.” And when a public office denies a publicrecords request, it must inform the requester of that denial and provide the reasons 

for the denial. R.C. 149.43(B)(1) and (3); see also State ex rel. Cordell v. Paden, 

156 Ohio St.3d 394, 2019-Ohio-1216, 128 N.E.3d 179, ¶ 11. 

{¶ 31} In Cordell, this court noted that even when a public office has no 

responsive records to produce, its failure to respond in a timely manner makes it 

liable for statutory damages. Whether the public office complied with its statutory 

duty to respond within a reasonable period of time “ ‘depends upon all of the 

pertinent facts and circumstances.’ ” Id. at ¶ 12, quoting State ex rel. Morgan v. 

Strickland, 121 Ohio St.3d 600, 2009-Ohio-1901, 906 N.E.2d 1105, ¶ 10. The 

requester “bears the burden of demonstrating that the [public office’s] response to 

[the] public-records requests was unreasonably delayed.” Id., citing State ex rel. 

Dispatch Printing Co. v. Johnson, 106 Ohio St.3d 160, 2005-Ohio-4384, 833 

N.E.2d 274, ¶ 44. 
January Term, 2020 

13 

{¶ 32} McDougald has proved that Sehlmeyer’s response to his publicrecords request in this case was unreasonably delayed. McDougald submitted his 

public-records request on August 13, 2019, and he has yet to learn from Sehlmeyer 

why he was denied the ability to inspect the records. 

{¶ 33} Statutory damages are calculated at the rate of $100 “for each 

business day during which the public office or person responsible for the requested 

public records failed” to comply with an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B), starting 

from the date on which the requester filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, with 

a maximum award of $1,000. R.C. 149.43(C)(2). 

{¶ 34} A court may reduce or decline to award statutory damages if it finds 

that based on the law that existed at the time of the alleged conduct that allegedly 

constitutes a failure to comply with R.C. 149.43, “a well-informed public office 

* * * reasonably would believe that the conduct * * * did not constitute a failure to 

comply * * * with [R.C. 149.43(B)], R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(a), and that “a wellinformed public office * * * reasonably would believe that the conduct * * * of the 

public office * * * would serve the public policy that underlies the authority that is 

asserted as permitting that conduct or threatened conduct,” R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b). 

Neither of those factors are relevant in this case. Without any knowledge of 

Sehlmeyer’s reasons for denying McDougald access to the records, we cannot 

know whether she legitimately withheld access from McDougald. McDougald 

sought to personally inspect various public records, and Sehlmeyer’s reply setting 

forth the cost of copies charges was nonresponsive to that request. A well-informed 

public office would not reasonably believe that a denial of a public-records request 

without an explanation of the denial would not constitute a failure to comply with 

R.C. 149.43(B). Therefore, given that the above factors do not apply here and that 

more than ten business days have passed since McDougald filed his complaint, I 

would award McDougald $1,000 in statutory damages. 

 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

The potential impact of this case is far-reaching 

{¶ 35} Sehlmeyer gives the majority so little to work with here that its 

holding is based on a series of attempted justifications rather than on the plain 

language of R.C. 149.43 and the caselaw associated with R.C. 149.43. First, the 

majority faults McDougald for not identifying “any instance in which a court has 

overruled the decision of prison officials and ordered them to permit an inmate to 

inspect records personally.” (Emphasis sic.) Majority opinion at ¶ 15. This is a 

peculiar approach. There is a dearth of cases involving prison officials’ denials of 

requests from incarcerated individuals for in-person inspection of public records. 

But in an underdeveloped area of the law, the majority decides that because this 

court has never overruled a prison official’s decision, we do not need to look into 

the particular facts of this case. The majority implies that because in cases such as 

State ex rel. Dehler v. Spatny, 127 Ohio St.3d 312, 2010-Ohio-5711, 939 N.E.2d 

831, ¶ 5, and State ex rel. Dehler v. Mohr, 129 Ohio St.3d 37, 2011-Ohio-959, 950 

N.E.2d 156, ¶ 2, the prison officials presented reasoning to support their decisions 

not to allow access, Sehlmeyer is absolved of producing similar evidence to support 

her decision not to allow access in this case. Under the majority’s reasoning, there 

will never be an instance in which an incarcerated individual will be able to 

overcome a public office’s decision to deny him the ability to inspect a public 

record because, after all, it’s never been done before. 

{¶ 36} Second, the majority makes the broad statement that “precluding

maximum-security inmates from conducting in-person inspections of prison 

records will very often be sensible.” Majority opinion at ¶ 15. But being sensible 

in the abstract is not enough. Sehlmeyer has done nothing to inform this court that 

her denial of McDougald’s inspection request was necessary in this case. The 

majority’s statement creates a presumption that a blanket refusal of any request 

from an individual who is incarcerated in a maximum-security facility to inspect a 

public record in person meets the requirements of R.C. 149.43. Does this 
January Term, 2020 

15 

presumption apply to reports documenting the excessive use of force against 

incarcerated individuals—is it sensible that an incarcerated individual may access 

such a report only if he is not classified as a maximum-security risk or he has 

enough money in his inmate account to purchase a copy? Does poverty become an 

automatic bar to a maximum-security inmate’s ability to review public records? If 

a maximum-security inmate has no money, is it sensible that he cannot review his 

records documenting incidents involving an excessive use of force against him? Or 

must the institution prove that its denial of an inmate’s request to inspect a record 

was appropriate because a grant of the request would actually have unreasonably 

interfered with the discharge of the duties of the institution, as this court stated in 

Spatny, 127 Ohio St.3d 312, 2010-Ohio-5711, 939 N.E.2d 831, at ¶ 5? 

{¶ 37} Finally, the majority says that “[t]here is no justification for granting 

a writ of mandamus to compel Sehlmeyer to allow an in-person inspection, 

especially when, as here, the institution has offered to make the records available 

by other means.” Majority opinion at ¶ 15. The justification is in R.C. 

149.43(B)(1), which allows a requester to inspect a public record in person, and 

requires a public office to facilitate such a request: “Upon request and subject to 

division (B)(8) of this section, all public records responsive to the request shall be 

promptly prepared and made available for inspection to any person at all reasonable 

times during regular business hours.” R.C. 149.43(B)(2) also justifies 

McDougald’s request to conduct an in-person inspection of the records: “To 

facilitate broader access to public records, a public office or the person responsible 

for public records shall organize and maintain public records in a manner that they 

can be made available for inspection or copying in accordance with division (B) of 

this section.” R.C. 149.43 does not provide a choice to a public office regarding 

how it responds to a request to inspect records; it provides only a duty to perform. 

But the majority holds that if a public office can make the records available to the 

requester by providing copies, it does not have to allow the requester to personally 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16 

inspect those records. The majority’s reasoning is certainly novel: it posits that if 

a public office can charge a citizen for copies of records, why should that citizen 

get to inspect those records in person for free? The majority sets a new statutory 

course, but it is not its course to set. 

{¶ 38} To sum up, in attempting to justify its result, the majority suggests 

that there will never be a “first” case in which a prison official’s decision to 

withhold an incarcerated individual’s access to records would violate R.C. 149.43. 

The majority further creates a presumption against allowing an individual who is 

incarcerated at a maximum-security institution to access public records in person. 

And finally, the majority gives a public office the choice of whether to allow a 

requester to conduct an in-person inspection of a public record or to instead charge 

the requester for a copy of the record. It is unfortunate that the majority goes to 

these lengths to keep McDougald from accessing the public records he seeks to 

inspect in this case. As a result, records of consequence will be unavailable to other 

incarcerated individuals in the future. 

Questioning the precedent 

{¶ 39} The idea that a public office may reject a public-records request if 

its production might “unreasonably interfere with the discharge of the duties of the 

officer having custody” of the records is from State ex rel. Patterson v. Ayers, 171 

Ohio St. 369, 171 N.E.2d 508 (1960), paragraph one of the syllabus, a case 

interpreting the common law regarding access to public records before the passage 

of Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. Our duty is to construe R.C. 149.43, 

and there is no provision in the statute that says a public record need not be 

produced if producing the record will inconvenience the public office. 

{¶ 40} R.C. 149.43(B)(1) provides that “[u]pon request and subject to 

division (B)(8) of this section, all public records responsive to the request shall be 

promptly prepared and made available for inspection to any person at all reasonable 

times during regular business hours.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 149.43(B)(8) 
January Term, 2020 

17 

recognizes that an incarcerated person may “inspect or * * * obtain a copy of” a 

public record as long as it does not involve a criminal investigation or prosecution. 

However, the incarcerated person may inspect a public record involving a criminal 

investigation or prosecution if “the judge who * * * made the adjudication with 

respect to the person * * * finds that the information sought in the public record is 

necessary to support what appears to be a justiciable claim of the person.” Id. 

{¶ 41} According to R.C. 149.43, an inmate who makes a public-records 

request and is not seeking a criminal file is included within “any person” whose 

public-records request seeking an inspection of public records must be honored at 

a reasonable time during regular business hours. Pursuant to a Department of 

Rehabilitation and Correction (“DRC”) policy, “[p]ublic records are to be available 

for inspection Monday through Friday between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with the 

exception of published holidays. Public records must be made available for 

inspection promptly.” DRC Policy 07-ORD-02, at 3, https://www.drc.ohio.gov/ 

Portals/0/Policies/DRC%20Policies/07-ORD-02.pdf?ver=2016-09-01-142045-

303 (accessed June 29, 2020) [https://perma.cc/3432-ZRXB]. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 42} Today, the majority unnecessarily strikes a major blow against 

incarcerated individuals’ rights to inspect public records and creates another 

collateral consequence to being an incarcerated individual. At its core, the majority 

opinion holds that a prison official’s denial of an incarcerated individual’s publicrecords request is reasonable when that incarcerated individual is categorized as a 

maximum-level security risk. 

{¶ 43} Sehlmeyer provided no reason for denying McDougald’s request to

inspect the records he asked to have access to. Although in her affidavit that she 

submitted to this court as evidence she speaks broadly of the factors she might 

consider in deciding whether to grant an incarcerated individual’s request for access 

to public records, she did not apply any of those factors to McDougald’s request. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

18 

Rather, this case simply involves a public office denying a public-records request 

without an explanation for that denial in violation of R.C. 149.43(B)(3). 

{¶ 44} I dissent and would order Sehlmeyer to allow McDougald to inspect 

the records. I would also award McDougald statutory damages in the amount of 

$1,000. 

_________________ 

Jerone McDougald, pro se. 

Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Zachary M. Holscher, Assistant Attorney 

General, for respondent. 

_________________