AIR UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

AIR MOBILITY

The Key to the United States

National Security Strategy

RICHARD J. HAZDRA

Major, USAF

Fairchild Paper

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615

August 2001
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Hazdra, Richard J., 1961-

Air mobility : the key to the United States national security / Richard J. Hazdra.

p. cm. –– ISSN 1528-2325

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 1-58566-095-7

1. Airlift, Military––United States. 2. United States. Air Mobility Command. 3.

National security––United States. 4. United States––Military policy/ I. Title.

UC333.H39 2001

358.4'4'0973––dc21 2001046249

ii

This Fairchild Paper and others in the series are available

electronically at the Air University Research Web site

http://research.au.af.mil under “Research Papers” then

“Special Collections.”

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of

the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air

Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Key to National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Three Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2 THE MOBILITY SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

US Transportation Command . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Strategic Mobility Triad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Air Mobility Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Air Mobility Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Air Mobility Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Airlift Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Demands on Airlift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3 FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . 23

Planning Deployments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

A Model for Two Major Theater Wars . . . . . . . 24

Incongruity of TPFDD Planning . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Air Mobility Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Requirements of Four Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . 33

Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Halt Phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Airlift Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

iii
Chapter Page

Changing TPFDD Schedules . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Risks to Friendly Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Two Important Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

4 CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Cargo Classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Mobility Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

En Route Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Inability to Achieve Current Requirements . . . 56

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

5 NEED FOR A NEW FORCE STRUCTURE . . . . . 59

Quadrennial Defense Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Steady-State Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Smaller-Scale Contingency Operations . . . . . 61

Requirements Imposed on Mobility

Air Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

6 TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION

REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Air Mobility: Key to National Security . . . . . . 77

Policy Affects Air Force Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Military Technological Innovations . . . . . . . . . 83

Pursue New Air Mobility Aircraft Designs . . . . 86

Update the Force Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

7 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Air Mobility Shortfall: Two Major 

Theater Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Continued US Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Price of Reduced US Intervention . . . . . . . . . 93

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Bottom Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

iv
Appendix Page

A Emergency Relief Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

B Humanitarian Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

C Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

D Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

E Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Illustrations

Figure

1 En Route Force Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

2 C-141 Drawdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

3 49.7 Million Ton Miles Per Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

4 Airlift Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

v
Foreword

Maj Richard J. Hazdra’s Air Mobility: The Key to the United

States National Security is an examination of the force structure of Air Mobility Command (AMC) based on a model for two

major theater wars. His study examines this organization’s

current force structure. Air mobility is the key that unlocks

the national security strategy (NSS). AMC’s force structure is

crucial for the United States to implement its NSS. His study

centers on the question: Can a force structure based on the

possibility of fighting two major theater wars satisfy the requirements for steady-state operations? Major Hazdra examines three corollary issues: air mobility as a form of airpower

that enables the military instrument of power in two basic

ways, requirements placed on mobility air forces, and the

structure of mobility air forces and the effectiveness of that

structure.

Air Mobility: The Key to the United States National Security

was written as a master’s thesis for Air University’s School of

Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Air University Press is pleased to present his essay as a

Fairchild Paper.

SHIRLEY BROOKS LASETER

Director

Air University (AU) Library/AU Press

vii
Maj Richard J. Hazdra (BA, Benedictine University; MAS,

Embry–Riddle Aeronautical University); and MAAS, School of

Advanced Airpower Studies) is joint transportation plans officer in the Operations and Logistics Directorate, assigned to

United States Transportation Command headquarters at Scott

Air Force Base (AFB), Illinois. He is a senior navigator with

more than 2,000 hours of flying time and a Persian Gulf War

veteran with more than 300 combat and support flight hours

during Operation Desert Storm. Major Hazdra received his

commission through the Air Force Officer Training School at

Lackland AFB, Texas, in 1986. He graduated from

Undergraduate Navigator Training (UNT) School at Mather

AFB, California, in 1987. From 1987 until 1990, he performed

KC-135A navigator duties while assigned to the 410th

Bombardment Wing at K. I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan. During his

assignment at K. I. Sawyer, he was the youngest navigator to

fly in Strategic Air Command’s Bombing and Navigation

Competition in 1987. From 1990 until 1996—while assigned

to the 19th Air Refueling Wing at Robins AFB, Georgia—he

was an instructor navigator, a standardization and evaluation

navigator, chief of ground and tanker scheduling, an executive

officer, and chief of Strategic Combat Plans. From 1996 until

1998—while assigned to the 12th Flying Training Wing at

Randolph AFB, Texas—he performed the duties of instructor

ix

Maj Richard J. Hazdra

About the

Author
navigator, chief of joint UNT student control, and executive officer. Major Hazdra is a graduate of Air Command and Staff

College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He is married to the former

Susan L. Thalmann of Oakbrook Terrace, Illinois, and they

have one daughter, Jacqueline.

x
Acknowledgments

I thank my wife Sue and our daughter Jacqueline, whose

time and patience allowed me to be a parent in absentia. I

thank Dr. James S. Corum for his outstanding advice and

guidance and Dr. Forrest E. Morgan, whose advice and guidance helped me present a clear picture of the Air Mobility

Command (AMC) force structure issues. A special thanks to

the assistant dean of the School of Advanced Airpower

Studies, Professor Dennis M. Drew, for teaching me to get my

ideas on paper effectively. After talking on radio as a navigator

for 12 years, I became accustomed to very short, even curt,

sentences. Also from AMC, I thank Col Mike Fricano, Col

Robert Owen, and Col John Brower (the AMC chair at Air

University) for clarifying much of the data required on this

project.

xi
Abstract

Since airlift was first used as a tool of national security during

the Berlin airlift, it has grown to deliver passengers, cargo, and

fuel to operations worldwide in support of national security.

However, Air Mobility Command (AMC) is the single organization

that performs for air mobility for the United States (US).

Currently, the US Air Force (USAF) has structured AMC for war;

yet this command performs operations during times when the

United States is at peace. AMC performs missions to support US

military operations in hostile environments as well as humanitarian operations in nonhostile environments. The number of operations requiring mobility air forces has been on the rise since

the Cold War ended. These steady-state operations seem to overtask mobility air forces. This study centers on the question: Can

AMC’s force structure, organized for two major theater wars, fulfill that requirement and perform the steady-state operations in

today’s strategic environment? This study finds that AMC’s force

structure cannot meet its requirements for two major theater

wars and that the current force structure is inefficient in meeting the requirements for steady-state operations. First, this

study presents a primer to acclimate the reader to the complex

environment and multifaceted requirements of mobility air

forces. Second, it examines AMC’s current force structure as determined by Department of Defense (DOD) requirements for war.

Third, this study describes the various types of missions that

AMC performs on a steady-state basis and evaluates the importance of these operations in fulfilling US national security strategy. Fourth, this study recommends action that the USAF and

the DOD should investigate in order to improve their air mobility capabilities in support of the national security strategy.

xiii
Chapter 1

Introduction

If we do not build a transportation system that can meet the

needs of tomorrow, then it doesn’t matter much what kind

of force we have because it won’t be able to get there.

—Gen John M. Shalikashvili, US Army

Air mobility is the key to unlocking the strength of United

States (US) airpower because it performs rapid global mobility.

US military forces have relied on this capability since World

War II, and it has always been there. Combatant commanders

increasingly rely on air mobility to transport forces quickly

into their theaters to head off potential crises, and Air Mobility Command (AMC) always responds enthusiastically with the

necessary assets. When the National Command Authorities

(NCA) task the Department of Defense (DOD) to achieve any

objective, it relies on AMC to achieve rapid global mobility requirements. Consequently, mobility air forces have a remarkable reputation for getting the job done for DOD and combatant commanders. Since AMC has always achieved its

objectives, neither the US Air Force (USAF) nor DOD has conducted a thorough examination to determine if air mobility capabilities will suffice in the future. However, the time has come

to review the force structure of AMC to determine if it can realistically continue to meet national security requirements. 

Key to National Security

Air mobility is the key that unlocks the national security

strategy (NSS); and, consequently, AMC’s force structure is

crucial for the United States to implement its NSS. This study

examines the force structure of AMC, which is based on a

model for two major theater wars. However, the NSS requires

US military forces to perform duties over a range of operations

worldwide; and, in fact, DOD has increasingly deployed military forces toward those ends. This study asks the question:

1
Can a force structure based on the possibility of fighting two

major theater wars satisfy the requirements for steady-state

operations? AMC’s force structure is the key to the NSS because it ultimately determines how far and how fast the USAF

can achieve its vision of global engagement. Air mobility provides the quickest mode of transportation to move military

forces into an area where US interests are at stake, whether

for peaceful engagement or for combat operations. 

For more than 50 years, the United States has employed air

mobility assets to advance US interests and policies—often

without employing combat operations. The Berlin airlift—

where aircraft supplied an entire city from June 1948 to August 1949—is probably the most famous example of airpower

used in a peaceful context. In contrast, airlift over The Himalayas to supply US Army Air Forces operations in China

during World War II demonstrates the use of air mobility to

supply combat operations. 

Air mobility is a flexible, nondestructive form of airpower.

Yet, mobility air forces are also designed to support joint operations in two major theater wars. Since the end of the Cold

War, the US NSS that has emphasized “presence” and “engagement” has placed unprecedented demands on air mobility

forces. The practical question to ask is the following: Should

AMC continue to design its force structure on a two major theater wars model? 

Three Issues

This author examines three corollary issues. The first issue

concerns air mobility as a form of airpower that enables the

military instrument of power in two basic ways. First, mobility

air forces can rapidly transport combat air units to any point

on the planet in order to execute operations directed by NCA.

Second, mobility air forces support peace operations that reinforce national-political objectives. These peacetime operations display US commitment to its interests and allies while

building goodwill among nonallied nations.1 In evaluating the

effectiveness of these peacetime operations, it is important to

ask the question: Do they deter potential adversaries? 

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FAIRCHILD PAPER
The second issue addresses the requirements placed on mobility air forces. During the 1990s, the NCA employed mobility

air forces as a political-military tool. However, while downsizing, DOD did not anticipate the increased requirement for mobility air forces as a political-military tool. A review of the employment of mobility air forces in the 1990s will look at the

missions they performed.

The third issue is the structure of mobility air forces and the

effectiveness of that structure. AMC is emerging as a primary

military instrument of power within the USAF. Thus, three

questions are important:

• Is the force structure of AMC adequate to meet the demands of two major theater wars? 

• Can mobility air forces meet the increased demands

placed on them by the NCA? 

• Has the Air Force correctly prioritized air mobility in its

overall force modernization plan? 

Literature Review

Some strategic documents, studies, and articles have already addressed these issues, although the studies have been

limited in scope. The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Transforming Defense: National Security in the

21st Century, the National Defense Panel (NDP) report, are just

two of those studies. The authors of these documents and

studies wrote for specific purposes other than examining the

structure of mobility air forces; and, consequently, they do not

address the issues pertinent to the structure of mobility air

forces.* It is important to take a more comprehensive look to

understand the strengths and weaknesses of air mobility. Understanding mobility air forces provides a foundation from

which the Air Force can employ these forces to achieve the objectives set forth in the national security documents mentioned in this study. 

3

HAZDRA

*Please refer to the bibliography to ascertain those strategic documents titled

“Works That Exclude Mobility Force Structure.” 
The Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update

(MRS BURU) evaluated the requirements to support two major

theater wars beginning within 30 days of each other.2 In that

context, air mobility forces would support friendly forces in

halting the adversary in the first theater while building up

equipment and supplies for the counteroffensive within 30

days. Once the adversary stopped his offensive, a reduced

number of air force mobility assets would sustain operations,

while the preponderance of mobility air forces would transfer

to a second theater to support friendly forces in halting another adversary. This scenario raises numerous questions

about the current state of mobility air forces. 

• Can AMC provide enough support to friendly forces for

them to halt an enemy in the first theater of operations? 

• Does AMC possess enough assets to sustain one theater

of operations while building up friendly forces in a second

theater of operations? 

• Can AMC’s force structure meet the requirements to build

up and support friendly forces if two major theater wars

break out in less than 30 days? 

AMC’s long-range plans address the requirements imposed

on mobility air forces that the MRS BURU determined.3 In addition, AMC’s long-range plans deal with the requirements to

upgrade the current fleet of strategic aircraft to comply with

the new aviation regulations in both the United States and Europe. This author analyzes these long-range plans to examine

the feasibility of AMC meeting the requirements for two major

theater wars.

Several congressional studies address the requirements to

acquire the C-17 and upgrade existing airframes such as the

C-5 and C-130. All of these studies base their recommendations for air mobility requirements on the model for two major

theater wars rather than the current operations tempo of

these airframes. Thus, the following question: Can a force

structure oriented toward the possibility of two major theater

wars meet the requirements of today’s current steady-state

operations? 

4

FAIRCHILD PAPER
The QDR examined the US defense strategy and dealt with

the strategic environment for US military operations. The

worst-case threat scenario in the QDR is two major theater

wars. The QDR acknowledges the role that air mobility will

play when units respond to crises more quickly and have less

time to prepare.4 The QDR cites the C-17 program as a solution for these challenges in meeting the requirements for airlift.5 The QDR, however, stops short of specifically addressing

what force structure AMC will require to perform rapid global

mobility. The QDR only says “Across the services, changes in

force structure and personnel end strength will be made to reflect improvements in operational concepts and organizational

arrangements and to protect the full spectrum of combat capability to the maximum extent possible.” Should DOD examine the force structure of AMC to meet the requirements set

forth in the QDR?

The NDP examined the requirements to transform the US military force structure into one that could meet the needs of future

national security. This panel considered the two major theater

wars model to be a force-sizing function rather than a strategy.

According to the NDP, the force structure must have the ability

to respond to new challenges from information attacks, weapons

of mass destruction (WMD), space operations, the absence of forward bases, deep inland operations, and mass refugee and disease problems. Of these, the latter two challenges raise questions

about the current force structure of mobility air forces. Can

today’s AMC force structure provide the support needed to conduct deep inland operations with reduced access to forward

bases? Can today’s airlift assets provide necessary relief supplies

to mass refugees or epidemic inflicted populations? This study

examines AMC’s current force structure and looks at its capability to perform these operations.

Methodology

Several questions are relevant: 

• Where does AMC fit into the defense transportation structure? 

5

HAZDRA
• What is the basis of AMC’s force structure? 

• What requirements are placed on mobility air forces? 

• How are these requirements calculated? 

• Can mobility air achieve these requirements? 

• How has US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)

employed mobility air forces to accommodate the growth

of steady-state operations during the last decade of the

twentieth century? 

• Are there any technologies that could facilitate AMC’s

growth of steady-state operations? 

• Can mobility air forces become more efficient? 

To answer these questions, this study first looks at USTRANSCOM’s organization. It also looks at the history of the

operational employment of mobility air forces since 1990 to include Operation Desert Storm, the largest major theater war of

the 1990s. This study examines ways in which DOD and the

USAF can make mobility air more efficient and examines the

current AMC force structure. Aspects of the force structure

that this study examines include the USTRANSCOM, AMC,

the two major theater wars model, military operations that

have taken place around the world during the 1990s, and the

NSS.

This study first defines and explains the complex networks

that make up the defense transportation system (DTS). Second, it examines when and why AMC employs specific air

transport systems and distinguishes between commercial versus military air transportation. The next step will be to analyze how best to employ both commercial and military air

transportation and look at their respective strengths and

weaknesses. Major regional contingencies and the steadystate operations imposed by the William J. “Bill” Clinton administration present a dynamic set of circumstances. This

study examines reports from past AMC commanders, air mobility experts, reports submitted to Congress, and historical

data pertaining to the use of airlift assets. In introducing this

evidence, this study analyzes whether AMC’s force structure—

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FAIRCHILD PAPER
currently based on a two major theater wars model—is suited

for either that model or for steady-state operations. 

This work organizes the research into three sections and further divides into seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides the background from which to understand the air mobility system.

Chapter 2 examines the complexities of the DTS and the role

that AMC fulfills in USTRANSCOM. It explains where and how

AMC fits into this complex system. Chapter 3 analyzes the force

structure requirements of AMC based on the two major theater

wars model and explains the metric used to determine those requirements. This chapter also examines time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) requirements and explains their incongruities. Chapter 4 examines the current force structure that

includes both the aircraft and personnel that perform the air

mobility mission. This chapter looks at how well that force

structure can meet the requirements defined in chapter 2.

Chapter 5 examines the requirements for a force structure

based on AMC’s current steady-state operations that mobility

air forces perform daily around the world. This chapter analyzes

the mobility air forces’ role in the different types of operations

implemented during the 1990s. Chapter 6 also critically examines the implied requirement for air mobility forces and the implications arising from military intervention that emanate from

the NSS. This chapter also looks at some technological innovations that could better facilitate the employment of air mobility

forces for these military interventions. 

Importance 

The USAF and DOD exploit air mobility as a form of airpower because of the positive political gains from noncombat

operations, deterrence, and combat when necessary. The

structure of mobility air forces determines their efficiency

when performing their missions. In answering the questions

set forth, this study sheds light on the issues surrounding

AMC’s force structure.

7

HAZDRA
Notes

1. Keith A. Hutcheson and Charles T. Robertson, Air Mobility: The Evolution of Global Reach (Vienna, Va.: Point One, September 1999), 139.

2. Department of Defense, Logistics Directorate, Mobility Requirements

Study Bottom-Up Review Update (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28

March 1995). It is commonly referred to as MRS BURU.

3. Air Mobility Command (AMC), 1998 Air Mobility Master Plan: Rapid

Global Mobility (Scott Air Force Base [AFB], Ill.: AMC, Directorate of Plans

and Programs, October 1997); and Air Mobility Strategic 2000 (Scott AFB,

Ill.: AMC, Directorate of Plans and Programs, November 1999).

4. William S. Cohen, secretary of defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1997,

sec. 6, 3.

5. Ibid., sec. 7, 2.

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FAIRCHILD PAPER
Chapter 2

The Mobility System

Supply and Transport stand together or fall apart; history

depends on both.

—Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill 

Air mobility is both a complex system and a part of an interrelated transportation system. Many people perceive ambiguity when discussing air mobility issues or they fail to comprehend aspects of the DTS. This chapter is a primer for those

who have questions about what air mobility is and how it fits

into DOD.

To understand AMC’s force structure it is important to outline how it fits into USTRANSCOM, a command that integrates

a vast array of commercial and military organizations employing different modes of transportation into a mobility force. To

understand the DTS one must first identify the responsibilities

of USTRANSCOM and its component commands. Numerous

missions and airlift programs of AMC combine to form a complex air mobility system. 

US Transportation Command

USTRANSCOM evolved quickly under the auspices of the

Goldwater–Nichols Act, as DOD’s single manager for DOD

transportation requirements.1 Originally consigned to manage

only wartime transportation requirements, a memorandum in

February 1992 from the Office of the Secretary of Defense designated USTRANSCOM as the single management organization for defense transportation in both peace and war following the Persian Gulf War. DOD Directive 5158.4 formalized

this decision on 8 January 1993 and transferred command

authority of AMC, Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) along with all military transportation assets to USTRANSCOM.

9
USTRANSCOM executes its mission through three component commands as well as the component command’s respective Reserve, National Guard, and commercial counterparts.

MSC—the US Navy (USN) component—provides sea-lift services and executes the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement

contracts for chartered ships. MTMC—the Army component of

Transportation Command—provides traffic management services and traffic engineering, administers the contingency response program, and serves as the single port manager. AMC,

the airlift component of USTRANSCOM, provides airlift, aerial

refueling, medical evacuation transportation services, and aerial port management services. AMC is also the single point of

contact with the commercial airline industry for procurement

of defense airlift services and mobilizing the Civil Reserve Air

Fleet (CRAF). 

Approximately one-third of USTRANSCOM’s capability relies

on Reserve and National Guard forces. Reserve forces comprise 46 percent of AMC’s airlift capability, 88 percent of

MSC’s capability, and 56 percent of MTMC’s capability.2 The

Reserve forces and National Guard work with their active duty

colleagues on a daily basis to execute USTRANSCOM’s peacetime mission.

Transport of Military Forces 

During peacetime, the services and Defense Logistics Agency

(DLA) determine which forces require movement and collect information on force requirements for troops, materials, and

equipment. Subsequently, the services and DLA submit transportation requests for military forces movement to USTRANSCOM, who then plans the movement. USTRANSCOM,

through its traffic management function, allocates transportation resources for those movements and executes them. 

In preparation for potential crisis or war and when directed

by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) or the NCA, theater commanders plan operations within their own area of responsibility (AOR). In doing so, they identify their specific requirements and recommend the TPFDD of forces to arrive

in-theater for specific operations.3 The theater commander’s

TPFDD identifies the units that will support the operation,

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FAIRCHILD PAPER
along with the priority and sequence of arrival in-theater of

those units to include their route, type of transportation, and

port of debarkation. USTRANSCOM determines the feasibility

of the theater commander’s TPFDD based on an assessment of

strategic and theater lift assets available, the requested transportation infrastructures, and the apportioned transportation

resources. Next, USTRANSCOM works in conjunction with the

theater commander to adjust the TPFDD in order to make it

feasible. When a theater commander subsequently certifies

the TPFDD, USTRANSCOM loads the appropriate TPFDD into

the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).4

This system provides subordinate commanders and planners

with mobilization information and the time-phased deployment schedule of the military forces tasked to support the executed military operation. JOPES also provides them with the

transportation information required to sustain the military operation. This process can occur over several months.

Strategic Mobility Triad

USTRANSCOM combines the attributes of sea lift, prepositioning, and airlift into a synergistic force multiplier to meet

the transportation requirements set forth in JOPES for any

planned operation. DTS provides transportation for military

forces along with the necessary support material and equipment needed both to initiate an operation and to sustain it.

Military operations require the deployment of troops and

equipment within days because of global interests and the tendency for political and military situations around the world to

change rapidly. Theater commanders rely on USTRANSCOM

to fill the transportation requirements of a reaction force. In

achieving those requirements, the mobility triad strategy

meets three basic criteria: 

• It rapidly deploys military forces.

• It sustains them until the combatant commander

achieves the military objectives.

• It redeploys these forces either back to the United States

or to another theater of operations.5

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The strategic mobility triad combines the attributes of sea lift,

prepositioning, and airlift into a synergistic force multiplier to

meet the transportation requirements of military operations. 

Sea Lift

Simply by virtue of the size of heavy cargo ships, sea lift provides the best means to move the largest quantity of equipment,

materials, and supplies at the lowest cost. Sea lift is especially

useful in meeting the demand to transport outsized cargo such

as tanks and other large pieces of equipment necessary to sustain forces. AMC categorizes an item as outsized if it is too large

to fit on either a typical commercial air transport or a C-141, its

core airlifter. However, the capabilities to transport large

amounts of oversized and outsized equipment by sea lift has a

drawback in taking more time to transport. Ships operate in

terms of days and weeks, and aircraft operate in terms of hours.

Yet, without the capability of sea-lift assets to transport in great

quantities, the US military would be severely limited.

Prepositioning

Prepositioning provides deployed forces with the equipment

and supplies they need to conduct operations without USTRANSCOM having to move those supplies. Prepositioning reduces the time needed to place the necessary military forces into

the theater of operations. Prepositioning may consist of cargo

ships afloat near the theater of operations.6 These ships contain

equipment and materials for forces required for the operation as

set forth in JOPES. Prepositioning may also consist of shorebased storage facilities. Both prepositioning strategies reduce the

response time of US armed forces. Prepositioning is critical to the

success of USTRANSCOM during war because it reduces the

transportation requirements for operations. In addition, without

prepositioning, airlift assets would be unable to achieve rapid

global mobility for all the forces required in an operation. 

Airlift

Time-sensitive lift requirements—short notice transportation requirements due to changing tactical situations or other

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developments that require a rapid response—depend on airlift

capabilities.7 The determination of unplanned movement requirements depends on whether or not the president has directed the execution of the operations plan. Before the execution of an operations plan, combatant commanders can

request to use special assignment airlift missions. However,

due to the limited availability of airlift assets, USTRANSCOM

controls these special assignment airlift missions to ensure

airlift availability for the execution of the operations plan.

Once the president directs an operations plan, unexpected

transportation requirements invariably occur. However, since

allocated airlift assets are already committed, USTRANSCOM—in coordination with the combatant commander—will attempt to perform the airlift requirement in one

of three ways: use airlift assets from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or allied nations, defer movement of lower

priority requirements to sea lift, or request airlift reallocation

from the chairman of the JCS through the Joint Transportation Board.8 Airlift, because of its rapid global mobility burden,

is often the most restrictive factor in conducting operations. 

Air Mobility Command

On 1 June 1992 the Air Force activated AMC to replace Military Airlift Command (MAC).9 Gen Hansford T. Johnson, formerly commander in chief (CINC), MAC, became the commander

of AMC and retained his position as CINC of USTRANSCOM.

The Air Force designated AMC as the lead command for air mobility issues in October 1996.10 In this capacity, AMC develops

weapon system standards and integrates command and control

(C2) processes for forces. To comply with these responsibilities,

AMC standardizes global air mobility processes and functions.

Furthermore, AMC is present around the world with fixed operating sites, deployable support teams, liaison teams, and air mobility forces continuously operating. As noted, AMC controls several air mobility components to execute its mobility missions that,

in turn, encompass a multitude of airlift programs.

To handle this complex system of programs and assets, the

tanker airlift control center (TACC) tasks units to schedule, task,

13

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manage, coordinate, control, and execute AMC missions and requirements. The TACC provides centralized control of air mobility assets as the single point of contact for the worldwide air mobility missions. This system includes fixed and deployable en

route mission support forces. Through the Global Transportation Network (GTN), the TACC is able to track the status and location of personnel and cargo, which USTRANSCOM and AMC

commonly refer to as in-transit visibility.

Air Mobility Components

The air mobility system is comprised of four main components: the active duty forces, the Air Force Reserve (AFRes)

forces, the Air National Guard (ANG) forces, and the CRAF commercial air carriers. Together these elements meet airlift requirements by providing the crews, aircraft, and support forces for

strategic air mobility operations, in-theater air mobility operations, and operational support airlift. Unfortunately, the air mobility system has a limited surge capability to meet any Joint

Task Force (JTF) requirement during a crisis.

Active Duty

Military personnel on active duty comprise the core of the

staff personnel at AMC headquarters, where they perform the

staff duties to execute the airlift programs and orders. Active

duty forces also conduct the core day-to-day airlift missions

and most of those missions requiring special training and

equipment. They provide accessible and flexible airlift, immediately available, for worldwide duty. While active duty airlift

forces offer a great advantage in terms of availability on a fulltime basis, airlift demand consistently outpaces availability.

Consequently, AMC relies on both the ANG and the AFRes to

help meet the daily demands of the airlift system.

Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard 

During peacetime, the AFRes and ANG provide significant

volunteer forces and assets to augment active duty manpower

and equipment. AFRes and ANG forces maintain the same

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mission-ready status as their active duty counterparts. They

both provide strategic air mobility forces to the USTRANSCOM

and in-theater, air mobility forces to theater commanders.

These forces also perform unique missions such as aerial fire

fighting, hurricane hunting, aerial spray operations, and psychological operations. ANG forces are also available to their

state governors. These volunteer forces maintain a delicate

balance between their peacetime mission requirements and

the needs of their civilian employers. When mobilized by the

president, however, AFRes and ANG units are placed on active

duty status and may be used in the same manner as active

duty units. 

Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

The CRAF provides increased airlift capacity to USTRANSCOM during contingency and wartime operations. It

provides commercial aircraft and aircrew to augment active

duty, ANG, and AFRes forces. In the CRAF program, commercial air carriers voluntarily commit aircraft to augment airlift

requirements that exceed the capabilities of AMC’s military

fleet. Commercial air carriers pledge their aircraft through one

or more of three stages: stage one, committed expansion; stage

two, defense airlift emergency; and stage three, national emergency. The CRAF program provides a sizable portion of strategic airlift capability without the government having to purchase additional aircraft, pay personnel costs, or fly and

maintain the aircraft. Airlines, however, get generous subsidies to conduct these sorties. As the demand for airlift increases in a conflict, the commander of USTRANSCOM, upon

approval of the secretary of defense, may incrementally activate the CRAF in stages based on the urgency of airlift requirements. According to a recent RAND study, replacing the

CRAF capability with military aircraft would have cost DOD

about $1 billion to $3 billion annually over the past 30 years.11

DOD rewards commercial air carriers for CRAF participation

with DTS business during peacetime through a variety of subsidy programs.12

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Air Mobility Missions

The above air mobility components integrate to perform the

triad of missions that AMC is responsible for providing to

DOD: air mobility support, aerial refueling, and airlift. This air

mobility triad integrates into an air mobility force. Air mobility

support provides the foundation of the triad because airlift

and air refueling can operate independently, but neither can

operate without air mobility support. The aerial refueling mission encompasses 11 separate tasks, and the airlift mission

encompasses five separate tasks—all 16 of these tasks are

critically important to DOD. 

Air Mobility Support

All AMC bases, both domestic and overseas, provide services

for C2, aerial port operations, aircraft maintenance, operating

airport facilities, weather, fire protection, life support, and intelligence to air mobility assets. At overseas locations, if the

host nation is unable to provide any of these services, AMC

augments those units as needed. 

Each air mobility support squadron operates an air mobility

control center, which serves as the C2 conduit to the TACC in

order for them to track air mobility sorties. The GTN links the

various C2 systems to provide theater and subordinate commanders with the transportation status of personnel and cargo. 

Two air mobility support groups and their subordinate air mobility support squadrons—12 in all—provide en route support at

12 different overseas locations. These units provide worldwide

support to air mobility operations at fixed en route locations

along established channel structures. Whereas an air mobility

wing retains operational control of most air mobility support

units within the United States, the TACC holds operational control over the air mobility support groups along with their subordinate squadrons.13 Administrative control for these units conversely falls to their respective numbered air forces (fig. 1).

At overseas locations, air mobility support units—depending

on requirements—provide maintenance and airhead operations. Maintenance regenerates aircraft versus providing sustained maintenance and also aircraft marshaling, parking, re16

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fueling, and limited aircraft troubleshooting and repair capability. If specific aircraft repair capability is required, an additional maintenance recovery team will deploy with specialists,

equipment, and parts to accomplish the repair. Airheads onload and offload a set number of aircraft based on forecast requirements. Aerial port specialists establish a marshaling yard

and traffic routing for cargo, aircraft servicing, passenger

manifesting, and air terminal operations. They also coordinate

intertheater and intratheater air mobility operations by coordinating numerous activities: airbridge operations, channel

route operations, international airfield surveys, and host-nation support. Air mobility support units tailor services to meet

the requirements of specific operations. 

Aerial Refueling

Tankers perform strategic missions between the continental

United States (CONUS) and theaters of operation as well as

operational and tactical missions within a theater of opera17

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Figure 1. En Route Force Structure

TACC

Scott AFB, Ill.

Fifteenth

Air Force

Travis AFB, Calif.

615 AMSG

Hickam AFB, Hawaii

630 AMSS

Yokota AB, Japan

631 AMSS

Osan AB, Korea

623 AMSS

Ramstein AB,

Germany

627 AMSS

RAF Mildenhall, 

United Kingdom

626 AMSS

Rhein–Main AB,

Germany

625 AMSS

Rota Naval Air

Station, Spain

628 AMSS

Incirlik AB,

Turkey

629 AMSS

Lajes Field,

Portugal

634 AMSS

Andersen AFB,

Guam

635 AMSS

Hickam AFB,

Hawaii

633 AMSS

Kadena AB,

Japan

632 AMSS

Elmendorf AFB,

Alaska

621 AMSG

Ramstein AB, Germany

Twenty-first

Air Force

McGuire AFB, N. J.

Legend:

AMSG––Air Mobility Support Group

AMSS––Air Mobility Support Squadron

TACC––Tanker Airlift Control Center
tion. Tankers perform seven strategic missions: single integrated operation plan (SIOP) execution, global attack support,

airbridge support, coronets, airlift, force extension, and dual

role.14 Tankers enable aircraft to fly nonstop from the United

States to any location on the globe and return. The benefits

are threefold. First, tankers eliminate requirements for landing rights in foreign countries. Second, they reduce the need

for intermediate basing to refuel and maintain aircraft. Third,

they maximize aircraft payloads, either airlifters or combat aircraft, without sacrificing range. 

Tankers also perform four operational and tactical missions:

theater support, special operations support, search and rescue

support, and emergency refueling.15 Tankers provide military

aircraft with a longer airborne endurance, both operationally and

tactically, which results in reducing their regeneration time.

The Air Force acknowledged the critical importance of these

tasks in the following statement: 

Faced with the potential of reduced overseas bases for all US forces,

the concept of global reach becomes increasingly important and highlights the aerial tanker as a critical asset in meeting future needs. Air

Force tankers refuel Air Force, USCENTCOM, Marine and many allied

aircraft, leveraging all service capabilities on land, sea, and in the air.

Aerial refueling increases the range, on station times, and ordnance

capabilities of receiving aircraft—true force multiplication . . . The increased emphasis on rapid response and global reach will only enhance the value of our tanker force.16 

In short, aerial refueling provides the NCA with a wider range

of military options.

Airlift

Air mobility components perform airlift missions in support of

strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Strategic lift transports cargo and passengers between the United States and theaters of operation, as well as between theaters of operation, a

function referred to as intertheater airlift. Tactical airlift transports cargo and passengers within a theater of operations, a task

referred to as intratheater airlift. Airlifters perform five missions:

routine passenger and cargo movement, exercise and contingency operations, special air missions, aeromedical evacuation,

and special operations support.17

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Airlift Programs

In addition to meeting the need to transport military forces,

DOD relies on airlift for the daily requirements of defense

business during peacetime. As in any global organization or

business, the demands for airlift have increased due to the nature of aerial lines of communication (ALOC), which can transport material and people around the world in a matter of

hours. AMC is the primary command responsible for airlift

within the DTS. To meet the increasing demand, numerous

types of missions work synergistically to provide defense planners and commanders with the capabilities to move rapidly

anything, anywhere over the planet. The Air Force acknowledges the importance of airlift as noted in its doctrine:

Airlift is an important national resource and plays a key role in any US

response to counter threats to its national security. More than just airframes and aircrews, it is a seamless and responsive system providing

the NCA and combatant commanders the airlift necessary to move personnel and cargo anywhere, any time. Capable of responding to any

tasking across the spectrum of operations and under a variety of conditions, airlift is a vital component of rapid global mobility.18

AMC administers numerous airlift programs to meet the challenge of a growing demand for airlift with reduced airlift assets. Commercial carriers under AMC contract and execute

many of these programs.

Routine airlift sorties meet the transportation requirements

to deploy, sustain, and redeploy military forces. In nonroutine

situations, AMC first validates the request and then, based on

the requirements, satisfies the request through one of the

many programs that it administers. Below are descriptions of

eight airlift programs that enhance AMC’s mission management of airlift missions.

Channel Missions 

A hub-and-spoke system, similar to the airline system,

maintains more than 500 routes worldwide to routinely transport passengers and cargo internationally and within a theater. AMC schedules both military aircraft and contracted

commercial aircraft for these missions. Channel missions op19

HAZDRA
erate daily, but the frequency of individual routes depends on

the volume of cargo and passengers. 

Special Assignment Airlift Missions 

AMC operates special assignment airlift missions to satisfy

unique requirements for pickup and delivery at locations other

than those established within AMC’s channel structure. Assignment of these missions considers the number of passengers, urgency or sensitivity of the mission, weight and size of

the cargo, special characteristics of the cargo, and any other

special characteristics of the mission. Special assignment airlift missions to transport nuclear weapons receive prioritization through the JCS priority system.

Air Mobility Express

The majority of equipment and materials will move on channel missions. However, at the request of a combatant commander, often during contingency operations, USTRANSCOM

may establish an express service called “air mobility express”

to move equipment and materials directly to a combatant commander’s AOR. Air mobility express uses new routes to transport materials and equipment directly to a new distribution

center, which the theater commander must first establish.

Commercial Carrier Contract Programs

AMC contracts with commercial carriers to perform the majority of passenger and bulk cargo deliveries. The contracts execute five airlift programs: worldwide express, domestic small

package, city pairs, tenders, and category contracts.19 AMC

executes 18 different categories of airlift through contracted

commercial carriers.20 USTRANSCOM employs these programs to transport most of the US Army’s Class IX supplies—

spare parts—which is the Army’s top airlift priority. 

Demands on Airlift

The daily demands for mobility air forces are vast. This chapter has outlined the background to understand the complexities

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and intricacies of the Air Force’s largest and most diverse command, AMC. USTRANSCOM meets the needs of the DTS, with

AMC as a vital component of that system. AMC’s air mobility system comes into focus as a force multiplier for DOD. AMC performs 11 tanker missions and five airlift missions through the

execution of eight airlift programs in order to manage its growing

airlift requirements. The rapid global response provided by airlift

and the versatility and flexibility that tankers provide place many

demands on AMC’s force structure.

Notes

1. Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,

Public Law 433, 99th Cong., 2d sess., H.R. 2181.

2. USTRANSCOM Handbook 24-2, Understanding the Defense Transportation System, 1 October 1998, 3.

3. Joint Publication (JP) 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, 7 September 1999, I-6.

4. JP 5-03.1, Joint Operational Planning and Execution System, vol. 1,

Planning Policies and Procedures, 4 August 1993, N-5 to N-10.

5. JP 3-35, I-8.

6. Ibid., I-9.

7. JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System, 17 June

1997, IV-5.

8. Ibid., IV-5.

9. History, Air Mobility Command (AMC), Air Mobility Command 1992

Historical Highlights, Scott Air Force Base (AFB), Ill.: AMC History Office,

1993, 1–5.

10. Ibid.

11. Jean R. Gebman, Lois J. Batchelder, and Katherine M. Peohlmann,

Finding the Right Mix of Military and Civil Airlift, vol. 2, Issues and Implications, Report no. MR-406/2-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994), 40–43.

12. Peter Grier, “The Comeback of CRAF,” Air Force Magazine, July 1995,

3. CRAF subsidies from the US government are estimated to exceed $2 billion dollars a year based on information compiled from the USTRANSCOM

Handbook 24-2. CRAF carriers receive preference when applying for nondefense business from the US government, and they can conduct commercial

business at military bases. 

13. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-6.1, Airlift Operations, 13 November 1999, 62.

14. AFDD 2-6.2, Air Refueling, 19 July 1999. 

15. Ibid.

16. Global Reach—Global Power: The Air Force and US National Security,

White Paper (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1990); and

AFDD 2-6.1, 3.

17. AFDD 2-6.1 details these missions.

18. Ibid., 16–17.

19. USTRANCOM Handbook 24-2 details these missions.

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20. AMC, Air Mobility Command, Command Data Book (Scott AFB, Ill.:

Quality and Management Innovation Flight, November 1999), 105–6.

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Chapter 3

Force Structure Requirements

The ability to move our forces rapidly and in the right configuration is key to their effectiveness. Most importantly, the

greater their mobility, the greater their protection.

—National Defense Panel Report 

— December 1997

The force structure requirements for mobility air forces depend on many questions that emanate from a decision to deploy military forces to a theater of operations. The first four

questions revolve around the nature of the conflict: Who are

the aggressors? What does the NCA want the military to accomplish? How much warning will the military have? Will military forces work in coalition, alliance, or alone? The fifth

question asks which military forces would deploy first. The

final set of questions revolves around transportation. For example, will military and commercial transportation be available when needed, and will the modes of transportation perform as expected? This last set of questions raises debates

about how much lift is enough.

Planning Deployments

When planning deployments for potential operations,

TPFDD planners decide how to allocate resources for lift because acquiring enough mobility forces to cover all possible

contingency operations would be too costly. However, airlift requirements established by TPFDD planners during the Cold

War provide an example. During President Ronald W. Reagan’s

administration, DOD set a goal to acquire enough airlift assets

to transport 66 million ton miles per day (MTM/D), which was

more than twice the capacity at the time. In trying to achieve

that goal, Congress authorized funds to acquire both C-5Bs

and KC-10s as well as develop the C-17.1 In 1979 AMC

planned to acquire 210 C-17s, but in April 1990 it reduced

23
that number to 120 because of the change in the threat.2 According to DOD the 66 MTM/D would provide insufficient airlift capacity to meet mobility requirements for a conflict with

the Soviet Union, but they lowered the airlift requirement

anyway to comply with financial restrictions.3 During Operation Desert Storm, US Central Command (USCENTCOM) estimated that it would employ airlift at the average rate of 33

MTM/D in transporting only 17 percent of the US military

forces.4

A Model for Two Major Theater Wars 

The questions revolving around strategic mobility are more

prevalent today than during the Cold War because of the numerous operations that mobility air forces currently perform

around the globe. During the Cold War, conversely, strategic

mobility focused on the needs for a conflict against the Soviet

Union.

The MRS BURU is the most recent study on mobility requirements. It focused on two major theater wars because military planners believe that this model would place the greatest

demands on strategic mobility. In contrast to the MRS BURU,

this study proposes to determine future lift requirements

based on AMC’s steady-state operations because the pace of

these operations overlap each other, and seldom does that

pace slow down. This study recognizes that should a single

major theater war occur, these steady-state operations would

have to cease in order for AMC to perform the required airlift

into the theater of operations. 

The MRS BURU developed scenarios where rapid global mobility first halts each enemy air advance before friendly forces

initiate a counteroffensive.5 MRS BURU analyzed the benefits

of transporting combat forces by estimating the risk to friendly

forces when airlifting them into theater versus slower means

of deployment. There are many uncertainties in any analysis

of mobility requirements, and some mobility experts believe

that analysis alone cannot determine the requirement for airlift because operations are seldom executed as planned.6 For

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example, during the deployment for Operation Joint Endeavor,

the TPFDD changed an average of 14 times a day.7

Under the model for the two major theater wars espoused in

the MRS BURU, the NCA should decide how much the United

States will pay to lower the risks incurred with deploying

forces abroad. The Congressional Budget Office suggested that

TPFDD planners focus on the minimum number of forces that

they believe will meet the needs of two major theater wars

without weighing the risks and costs of alternative levels of

airlift capacity.8

In 1995 the Clinton administration recommended acquiring

120 C-17s for strategic airlift.9 AMC compared costs and capabilities of the C-17, the C-5D, and the C-33, which is a military

airlift version of the Boeing 747-400.10 In addition AMC conducted the Strategic Airlift Forces Mix Analysis to compare the

relative performance of a fleet of 120 C-17s against a mix of

C-5D fleets and C-33 fleets in combination with fewer C-17s.11

That study determined that certain combinations of C-17s and a

mix of other airlift fleets could transport almost as much cargo

to major regional conflicts as a fleet of 120 C-17s. However, the

study also determined that although some mixed fleet combinations were less expensive—when they considered the constrained maximum-on-ground time conditions prevalent during

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm—the study favored

the maneuverability of the C-17.12 Furthermore, the mixed fleet

combinations could not transport as much outsized cargo as the

fleet of C-17s.13 Additionally, the mixed fleets with C-33s would

require special aircraft loaders that could reach the height of the

cargo floor of a 747. 

Incongruity of TPFDD Planning

One challenge in establishing the requirements for strategic

mobility is the difference in approaches among TPFDD planners.

Combatant planners seek to minimize risk, whereas mobility

planners seek to optimize all mobility assets: air, land, and sea.14

Drawing from lessons learned, combat planners seek to minimize risk by planning to flow forces with all their equipment into

theater faster by using airlift. In preparation for Operation Desert

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Storm, Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf requested and received additional military forces before initiating an offensive.15 During

that same time period Gen Charles A. Horner, as the air component commander, had to get air forces to their bases in-theater

as soon as possible to defend the peninsula against an Iraqi offense while the ground force buildup continued.16 In contrast

mobility planners seek to move as much outsized and oversized

equipment on sea lift because of the shortage of outsized and

oversized airlift capability. During Operation Desert Shield the

Army coded 65 percent of its equipment for airlift, yet this requirement exceeded AMC’s capability by 300 tons per day.17

Thus, USTRANSCOM planners rerouted some oversized and outsized cargo by sea, but a backlog of more than 10,000 tons of

bulk cargo still accumulated.

Combatant Planners 

In a conflict the lives of American troops are at risk. Consequently, combatant commanders seek to minimize risk that

their personnel may face on the battlefield. They can achieve

this by possessing enough strategic air mobility assets to airlift military forces into theater quickly in order to overwhelm

or overpower the enemy. Unfortunately, mobility air forces are

scarce, which places regional combatant commanders in an

uncomfortable position. Further complicating the planning

process, DOD separates the responsibilities of minimizing risk

and the responsibilities of employing military forces. Albeit

combatant commanders are responsible for minimizing risks

to military forces, they are not responsible for the cost of

equipping their forces or the cost to transport them. The military services and the secretary of defense control funding for

new weapon systems and mobility requirements. So, combatant commanders—when developing their TPFDDs—plan for

conflicts assuming that airlift is at no cost and is continually

available.18

Mobility Planners 

How quickly can strategic mobility forces transport the military forces required by the combatant commander? Mobility

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plans seek to optimize mobility assets and in doing so make a

number of operational assumptions. The MRS BURU held the

six operational assumptions in establishing air mobility requirements for the two major theater war construct. The six

assumptions are a rapid decision process, National Guard and

Reserve activation, CRAF activation, open ports and en route

bases, zero attrition during deployment, and two nonsimultaneous wars.19

Rapid Decision Process. As learned from the Gulf War, the

keys to rapid deployments are clear warning orders from the

NCA and adequate warning time to deploy. Less warning time

translates to a greater need for both airlift and prepositioning

in order to transport military forces into theater and halt an

enemy offensive. Longer warning time enables USTRANSCOM

to employ more sea-lift forces.20 If clear intelligence identifies

an enemy force preparing an offensive and the US NCA issue

a warning order based on that information, then USTRANSCOM can begin the deployment process. Unfortunately,

neither a clear warning order nor quick decisions were forthcoming before 4 August 1990 when Iraq was threatening

Kuwait, which may challenge the reality of this assumption.

Intelligence before 2 August 1990 correctly identified Iraqi

troops massing on the Kuwaiti border, but this analysis

viewed this as an Iraqi attempt to intimidate Kuwait into lowering its oil production.21 As in most cases in the twentieth

century, political tension preceded the invasion force; yet the

Kuwaiti invasion surprised political leaders.22 Before 4 August

1990 combatant commanders did not initiate steps for a deployment, presumably because the State Department was still

seeking cooperation from the Gulf states to allow US military

forces to operate in the Gulf. 

Since 1990 USTRANSCOM through prepositioning has prepared combatant commanders to respond more rapidly. They

activated prepositioned equipment near the Persian Gulf in

several incidents in which Iraqi forces appeared to be on the

move.23 After Operation Vigilant Warrior in October 1994, the

United Nations (UN) designated the 32d parallel as a no-drive

zone, reinforcing the existing no-fly zone (NFZ). Thus, any in27

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cursion by Iraqi forces south of the 32d parallel would serve

as a sign of an offensive. 

Guard and Reserve Activation. As noted, the ANG and Reserve provide 46 percent of the military airlift capability. AMC

also relies on a significant number of personnel to conduct aircraft maintenance and perform aerial port duties. The Army,

too, depends on reservists to perform transportation duties,

initiate port operations, and load and unload ships. For sea

lift, the USN relies predominantly on the merchant marines to

man the Ready Reserve Force. 

USTRANSCOM relies on volunteers from the Guard and Reserve even before the president activates them. To maximize

the use of mobility forces, the president must activate guardsmen and reservists quickly as well as activate the merchant

marines as soon as possible to get sea-lift ships under way.

History shows that these forces activate too slowly to deploy

and sustain forces over the first two to three weeks of a major

theater war. During Operation Desert Shield the president did

not activate the first Reserve airlifter units until 23 August

1990, which was 16 days after deployments were initiated.24

In 1994, however, the president authorized a limited call-up of

Reserve units for Operation Uphold Democracy within 24

hours of DOD’s request. During Desert Shield, personnel

shortages prevented MSC from filling some of its sea-lift crews

within required times.25 The declining number of merchant

sailors raises concerns that USTRANSCOM may experience

crew shortages when needed, thus delaying deployments. Furthermore, if activation occurs too slowly or too late, problems

with loading and unloading could thwart the deployment into

theater. 

CRAF. As previously noted, the CRAF provides AMC with 50

percent of its wartime airlift capability. During Operation

Desert Shield, the commander of USTRANSCOM activated

stage one of the CRAF within 10 days following initial deployments. However, he was unable to persuade the secretary of

defense to activate stage two until five months later; and he

never requested stage three initiation. MRS BURU, however,

assumed that AMC would employ stage two airlifters much

earlier in the first war of a two-war scenario. At the beginning

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of a second war, the MRS BURU assumed activation of CRAF

stage three, which may have been optimistic in light of historical precedence. 

Activating CRAF stage two upon the initiation of the first operation would increase the amount of cargo delivered. During

Operation Desert Storm, CRAF cargo deliveries increased approximately 650 tons per day when the secretary of defense

activated stage two.26 During the 1990s AMC encouraged airlines to place more aircraft in both stages one and two. Based

on current CRAF enrollment, activating stage two would provide 76 more passenger liners and 57 more cargo aircraft

added to the numbers employed through stage one activation.

Open Ports and En Route Bases. In the MRS BURU, mobility planners assumed that mobility forces would incur no

attrition at either airports or seaports of debarkation because

those ports would operate in an environment where friendly

combatant forces held naval and air superiority.27 AMC employs foreign nation support to refuel airlifters and change aircrews en route because of the distances to either theater of operations. During Operations Desert Shield and Storm,

Zaragoza Air Base (AB), Spain, and Torrejon AB, Spain, in conjunction with Rhein–Main AB, Germany, handled 61 percent

of US airlift traffic.28 AMC’s en route structure decreased from

39 locations in 1991 to 12 locations in 1999.29 The air mobility system operates better when airlifters can land at en route

bases because aircrews can rest while replacement crews deliver the cargo to theater and then return the aircraft to the

original crew for a follow-on mission. When the number of aircrews is limited, the lack of en route bases reduces strategic

airlift capacity by 20 to 25 percent30 because aircrews are limited as to how many hours they can fly during a given period.31

Thus, the en route infrastructure examined in chapter 4 is a

critical element of force structure requirements; and constraints on access to aerial ports, seaports, or the air mobility

en route infrastructure will delay TPFDD execution. 

Zero Attrition. This assumption lies in the belief that

friendly forces will gain and maintain air and sea superiority

during the buildup phase of hostilities. The combat assets

needed to perform air superiority, however, require mobility

29

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assets to put them in place. During Operation Desert Shield,

Iraqi forces remained inactive during the coalition forces

buildup. The MRS BURU assumes that future adversaries will

allow the same buildup. Yet, rarely does an adversary permit

an uninterrupted buildup of aggressive forces against itself.

Nonsimultaneous Wars. For the United States to prosecute

two wars, they would have to begin between one and three

months apart.32 Shortfalls in tanker support and in airlifters

would prevent the United States from prosecuting a second

war successfully if the second occurred within three weeks of

the first.33 Sea-lift requirements would also be insufficient if

USTRANSCOM had to move equipment to two major theater

wars simultaneously.34 Without enough time between the two

wars, USTRANSCOM might not be able to regenerate and

transfer prepositioned equipment. Thus, simultaneous wars

would have a significantly negative implication for mobility requirements.

To maintain a moderate risk for military forces, AMC must

transport 60 to 70 percent more cargo during the first three

weeks of a second war than it transported during the first

month of Operation Desert Shield. This proposition emanates

from one of the most demanding scenarios depicted in MRS

BURU: sustaining operations in Korea while transporting

equipment to halt an invasion in the Persian Gulf region.

The MRS BURU estimated the transportation of 5,000 tons

daily to an initial operation in Korea during the first 30 days and

5,000 tons daily during the first 15 days to the second operation

in the Persian Gulf. These estimates are based on the immediate

use of CRAF stage two aircraft. In comparison to Operation

Desert Shield, USTRANSCOM transported 1,700 tons daily during the first month and 3,600 tons daily during its peak, which

was January 1991. The two major theater wars scenario, assumed to be nonsimultaneous, requires far more airlift than was

available during Operation Desert Shield. 

Air Mobility Planning

Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base

(AFB), Alabama, excludes mobility planning from its curricu30

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lum, which centers on planning air campaigns and target selection.35 One explanation of this exclusion is the fact that airlift and sea-lift crews often provide transportation for Army

troops rather than supporting their own military service. Both

airlift and sea lift have become the orphans of military planning within the Air Force and USN, where mobility advocates

of both services continually lose institutional battles for funding.36 Note that service education emphasizes the cutting edge

and gives logistics fairly short shrift.

Consensus Planning 

Mobility coordination incorporates views from the JCS, the

military services, the secretary of defense, USTRANSCOM, and

the regional CINCs. These organizations look at the different

modes of lift and decide how to allocate resources. These organizations produce decisions through a committee process,

which is a consensus that provides something to each organization.37

Airlift Options 

The MRS BURU developed scenarios based on the assumptions above. That raises questions because of evidence raised

in chapters 2 and 3.38 The MRS BURU developed scenarios to

achieve rapid global mobility to sequentially halt each enemy

advance and then initiate the respective counteroffensives.39

Some analysts believe that the MRS BURU ignores the question: How can the risk faced by military forces that arrive intheater first be reduced?40 The MRS BURU, however, identified

operational effects and the increased risk assumed under different air mobility options.41

The cost of airlift options centered on the number of C-17s

in a given fleet, which demonstrated correlation between an

increase in MTM/D with the increase in the number of C17s.42 Thus, the MRS BURU seemingly proceeded along the assumption that more airlift available to transport military

forces translates into reduced risk incurred by those forces.

The result recommended the modernization of mobility air

forces with the C-17. The option recommended by the admin31

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istration was to acquire the smallest possible number of C-17s.

Congress funded this recommendation. In an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in this option, USTRANSCOM increased

the amount of prepositioned equipment within USCENTCOM’s

theater, which carries a smaller price tag than an increased

fleet of C-17s. 

En Route Infrastructure 

Both the MRS BURU and the Strategic Airlift Forces Mix

Analysis examine acquisition of the C-17. Neither the C-17

alone nor the C-17 in combination with prepositioning equipment can achieve the rapid global mobility necessitated in

DOD mobility requirements. En route infrastructure also facilitates mobility, both domestically to bring military forces to

ports of debarkation within the United States and at ports of

embarkation within each theater, in order to bring forces in

smoothly. During Operation Desert Storm, both airports and

seaports in Saudi Arabia had backlogs because there were too

few trucks—25,000-pound and 40,000-pound loaders—to unload cargo and passengers.43 These bottlenecks caused an accumulation of huge amounts of equipment and troops that

provided the enemy with an attractive target.44 Thus, it is important to have the necessary loading and unloading equipment to move passengers and cargo within a theater and ensure that mobility forces that operate seaports and airports

arrive first. 

Intelligence Is Critical

Knowing the characteristics of ports and airfields worldwide

enables planners to consider how many passengers and how

much materials and equipment can transit through a given

port each day. Knowing the capabilities of the enemy as well

as the capabilities of any groups that might desire to thwart

US mobility operations—to include threats such as chemical

or biological weapons—also provides planners with risk estimates. 

Improved intelligence gathering in support of USTRANSCOM would have helped to smooth mobility operations.

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During Operation Desert Shield the electronic management

system used by theater commanders to coordinate their deployment priorities experienced frequent gridlock.45 Some of

the system’s users were unfamiliar with it; others found it so

cumbersome that they circumvented it by sending messages

for airlift missions direct to AMC. As combatant commanders

changed deployment schedules, many airlifters took off before

units were ready to deploy; and aircraft took off in response to

a combatant commander’s calls for specific aircraft that were

the wrong type of airlifter for the cargo load.46

Further compounding the problem was USTRANSCOM’s

poor means of tracking cargo loads and passengers. Without

that information, combatant commanders reordered equipment and supplies, thus placing even greater demands on the

mobility system.47 Additionally, many containers were without

labels; and as port operators held them until they could verify

the contents, a backlog grew. 

USTRANSCOM modernized its information systems with its

GTN that is easy to use for both mobility forces and combatant forces. Part of this system includes bar codes on all

equipment and containers while in transit. Nevertheless, experts still believe that USTRANSCOM’s system for managing

information could better facilitate adjustments to mobility

plans more quickly as tactical conditions changed.48

Requirements of Four Scenarios

The MRS BURU published in 1995 had a dual focus. On one

hand, it used computer simulations of combat and deployments to estimate the number of airlifters, ships, and prepositioning sites that USTRANSCOM needed to meet specific deployment timelines. On the other hand, it had to constrain its

analysis to be affordable.49 Thus, the MRS BURU tried to quantify how much risk military forces would incur while achieving

military objectives and constraining the cost.

The MRS BURU proposed four scenarios. The first scenario

was a single operation in Korea. The second scenario was a

single operation in the Persian Gulf. The third scenario was a

war in Korea followed by a war in the Persian Gulf. The fourth

33

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scenario was a war in the Persian Gulf followed by a war in

Korea. The MRS BURU identified the heaviest mobility requirements in the second and third scenarios. In the first situation,

the MRS BURU foresaw a shortfall in the lift requirement to

transport enough forces to halt an offensive and maintain a

moderate risk. The study recommended resolution of the

shortfall either by purchasing additional airlift planes or by

prepositioning additional cargo in the region. The total tonnage of cargo required is classified, but according to unclassified accounts that shortfall is small enough to fall within the

margin of error of the models used to estimate those requirements.50

Prepositioning 

The MRS BURU recommended prepositioning more heavy

Army equipment and materials to make up for the shortfall

that would exist in a single major theater war. In the third and

fourth scenarios, however, the MRS BURU cites a challenge to

prepositioning. If the Army uses the prepositioned equipment

for the halt phase in the first war, that equipment would be

unavailable for the halt phase of the second war. USTRANSCOM must preposition enough equipment in both theaters or regenerate the prepositioned ships after unloading the

equipment in the first theater of operations. In the latter circumstance, USTRANSCOM would have to regenerate the

prepositioned ships and send them back to the United States

to pick up a new set of equipment for the halt phase of the second war. 

Airlift

The MRS BURU recommended the acquisition of enough airlifters to transport between 49.4 and 51.8 MTM/D. The exact

amount of MTM/D depends on the amount of prepositioned

equipment. If USTRANSCOM can preposition enough equipment, 49.4 MTM/D would suffice to airlift the remaining cargo

required for the halt phases of two major theater wars with an

acceptable risk. However, if USTRANSCOM cannot preposition

more forces or if the Army’s afloat prepositioning is not held in

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reserve for a conflict in the Persian Gulf, this study’s author believes more airlift is advisable. According to the MRS BURU, the

acquisition of 120 C-17s would provide USTRANSCOM with the

49.4 MTM/D of airlift capability required. In addition, that study

suggested that to achieve a higher level of airlift capability, the

Air Force would have to acquire more C-17s. Based on the MRS

BURU, the Army examined what additional equipment to preposition. Consequently, from the Army’s examination, USTRANSCOM increased the requirement for airlift capability to

49.7 MTM/D, of which the CRAF would produce 23.2 MTM/D.51

Sea Lift 

The MRS BURU concurred with a 1992 mobility requirements

study that recommended two acquisitions to modernize sea-lift

capabilities. The first acquisition was for 19 large medium-speed

roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) ships, some of which USTRANSCOM

could use to preposition equipment. The second acquisition was

to establish a fleet of 36 smaller roll-on/roll-off ships for the

Ready Reserve Force. Once the USN acquired these, they could

remove several older break bulk ships from the Ready Reserve

Force. The MRS BURU also recommended relying on the commercial shipping contracts to sustain supplies in both theaters,

estimating a requirement for 6,000 to 6,500 20-foot-equivalent

containers per week to carry cargo, plus 13 to 16 containerships

to deliver ammunition.

Cost

Airlift is the most expensive of the three options but provides the most rapid means for global mobility. Consequently,

the decision is twofold. The first question: What forces must

move rapidly for immediate use versus what military forces

can follow on later? The second question refers to those military forces that must move rapidly: What equipment must USTRANSCOM preposition versus what they must airlift? Concerning the first question, a decision that requires fewer

rapid-reaction forces and more follow-on forces increases the

cost to the USN and reduces the cost to the USAF. Concerning the second question, a decision that requires more prepo35

HAZDRA
sitioned Army equipment and fewer airlifters raises the cost to

the Army and lowers the cost to the Air Force. 

From this line of thinking, additional questions are raised as

to what options the services support. For example, the Air

Force may support the prepositioning of equipment because it

reduces its cost; and if it has other priority aircraft to acquire,

the Air Force can pursue them rather than acquiring more airlifters.

Halt Phases

How quickly can mobility forces transport cargo in each scenario? Sea lift would transport the first military forces within

three weeks to halt an enemy attack in the Persian Gulf.52 The

halt phase places the greatest demands on airlift and prepositioning. The halt phase of a second theater war, if overlapping

the first theater war, would challenge USTRANSCOM’s airlift

capacity beyond its capability. USTRANSCOM would have to

transport heavy units to the second theater while transporting

cargo to sustain operations in the first theater. The director of

operations and logistics for USTRANSCOM, then Maj Gen

Charles Coolidge, stated, “We have a one-major-theater-war

force to fight a two-major-theater-war strategy.”53

Airlift Capability

Another important measure of capability is the amount of

outsized cargo that the operations of two major theaters require in wartime. The current airlift capacity is 11 percent

short of the minimum requirement of 49.7 MTM/D established by MRS BURU.54 AMC’s actual total capacity is 43.9

MTM/D, which is a 5.8 MTM/D shortfall.55 CINCTRANSCOM,

Gen Charles T. “Tony” Robertson Jr., cited three major causes

for the shortfall. First was the C-5 reliability, where 2.7

MTM/D of this shortfall is due to the low C-5 mission capable

(MC) rate, which equates to about 50 percent of the total

shortfall.56

The second reason for the airlift capacity shortfall was the

C-141 drawdown. The MRS BURU made its 49.7 MTM/D rec36

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ommendation based on the number of aircraft in the C-141

fleet remaining the same. When AMC accomplished this study

in 1994, all C-141s were undergoing repairs to lengthen the

fleet’s service life.57 Since then, AMC accelerated the retirement of the C-141 fleet due to airframe fatigue that the depot

cannot repair. Consequently, the number of C-141s in the fleet

decreased from 249 following Operation Desert Storm to 74 as

of 18 October 1999 (fig. 2).58

37

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300

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

250

200

150

100

50

0

The third reason for the shortfall was the fact that the increasing operations tempo of the mobility air forces outpaces

the C-17 acquisition program. During fiscal year 1994, when

the JCS accomplished the MRS BURU, the operations tempo of

the mobility air forces rose approximately 20 percent.59

Changing TPFDD Schedules

The planning of the Gulf War provides an example. In the

fall of 1989, General Schwarzkopf, then CINCCENTCOM,

began revising military plans to prepare against a possible

Iraqi offensive into Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia.60 His TPFDD

Figure 2. C-141 Drawdown
was incomplete when Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on 4 August

1990. USCENTCOM planners drew up an operational plan

amidst a rapidly changing situation.

Today, combatant planners develop operational plans for

several possible contingencies in order to be prepared when an

enemy initiates an offensive. This lengthy process can take

more than a year to complete. Unfortunately, planners are unable to anticipate every contingency; and armed conflicts usually follow a script other than planned. Combatant commanders might prefer that the Air Force acquire enough mobility air

forces to give them flexibility in changing their TPFDD schedules to stay ahead of changing situations. 

Prepositioning and sea-lift options constrict a combatant

commander’s flexibility because he needs to select which units

to preposition long before any armed conflict occurs—whereas

a larger mobility air force would provide more flexibility to

make last minute changes that would enable a combatant

commander to stay ahead of the enemy. Thus, mobility air

forces provide the flexibility that a combatant commander

needs to improve his chances of halting an enemy offensive

while incurring less risk to friendly military forces.

Risks to Friendly Forces

The MRS BURU assumed that deployments would occur in a

secure environment. Since USTRANSCOM would move so

many forces to a theater after an enemy attack, that enemy

would have a strong incentive to slow deployments by targeting seaports and airports. An enemy could also mine ports; destroy runways; hit airport and seaport facilities, planes, and

ships; and employ special operations forces. As more countries continue to develop longer-range missiles, an enemy

could target airports and seaports with chemical, biological, or

nuclear weapons as well.

Mobility forces would be more vulnerable using sea lift than

airlift. Prepositioned ships and sites, as well as LMSRs, carry

more equipment and materials than does an airlifter. If the

enemy destroyed a prepositioned ship or site or an LMSR, a

greater percentage of war-fighting material would be lost than

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if the enemy destroyed an airlifter. Additionally, if the enemy

destroyed a runway or airport, the flow of cargo would simply

divert to an alternate airport. Seaports provide lucrative targets versus airports because of the large volume of cargo that

a ship unloads. A lack of suitable ports could complicate a deployment dependent on sea lift. During Operations Desert

Shield and Desert Storm, USTRANSCOM transported 96 percent of sea-lift cargo to just two ports; and five airports across

the Arabian Peninsula received 78 percent of airlifted cargo.61

Sea lines of communication and choke points are more vulnerable than ALOCs and en route airports. If sea-lift ships deploying to the Persian Gulf were unable to transit the Suez

Canal, the trip around Africa would add a week to TPFDD

schedules. Conversely, airlifters can divert around a hostile

area, if needed, in a matter of minutes or hours. However, if

friendly naval forces control the sea in those areas needed for

sea-lift transit, sea lift becomes the most cost-advantageous

means of cargo deployment. The current CINCTRANSCOM

identifies the risk level of forces flowing into a major theater

war as medium to high, whereas the MRS BURU sought to establish a low risk level.62

Two Important Factors

In examining the force structure requirements for AMC, two

important factors emerged. First, this evaluation of the two

major theater wars scenario identified shortfalls in the required airlift capability. The minimum requirement for airlift is

not currently available in accordance with force structure requirements established. Second, this chapter pointed out that

the risk to friendly forces during the deployment to two theaters of operation is higher than combatant commanders

would like, and increasing airlift could reduce that risk. Due

to reduced airlift capacity, DOD estimates the current level of

risk at medium to high.

Notes

1. US Congress, Moving US Forces: Options for Strategic Mobility (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, February 1997), 46.

39

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2. US Congress, Military Airlift: Options Exist for Meeting Requirements

While Acquiring Fewer C-17s (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office,

February 1997), 59.

3. US Congress, Moving US Forces, 46.

4. Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 3, Logistics and

Support (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993, 75.

5. Department of Defense (DOD), Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up

Review Update (MRS BURU) (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS],

28 March 1995), Introduction, I-2.

6. David Kassing, “Strategic Mobility in the Post-Cold War Era,” in New

Challenges for Defense Planning, Paul K. Davis, ed., MR-400-RC (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994), 671.

7. Joint Publication 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, 7 September 1999, III-30.

8. US Congress, Moving US Forces, 46.

9. Ibid., 16.

10. DOD, MRS BURU, Annex C, c-1.

11. Ibid.

12. US Congress, Military Airlift, 19.

13. Ibid., 20.

14. DOD, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Mobility (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, August 1996), 11.

15. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power

in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 4.

16. Ibid., 3.

17. James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So

Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for

Operation Desert Shield/Storm (Washington, D.C.: JCS, May 1996), 84–87.

18. Kassing, 679–80.

19. DOD, MRS BURU, 2–3.

20. “U.S. at ‘High Risk’ of Being Unable to Carry Out Two-War Strategy

until 2006,” Inside the Pentagon, 22 September 1994, 1–6.

21. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: The

Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1995),

14–20, 26.

22. Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning

(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), 18.

23. David Kassing, Army and Marine Corps Prepositioning Programs: Size

and Responsiveness Issues, PM-378-CRMAF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND,

April 1995), 25.

24. John Lund, Ruth Berg, and Corinne Replogle, Project AIR FORCE

Analysis of the Air War in the Gulf: An Assessment of Strategic Airlift Operational Efficiency, Report no. R-4269/4-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND,

1993), 30–31.

25. Thomas McCaffery, Ready Reserve Force Contingency Crewing Requirements Study (Alexandria, Va.: McCaffery and Whitener, 15 December

1995), ES-1.

26. Lund, Berg, and Replogle, 13.

27. DOD, MRS BURU, 3.

28. Lund, Berg, and Replogle, 81–82.

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29. Air Mobility Command (AMC), Air Mobility Strategic Plan 2000, Infrastructure (Scott Air Force Base [AFB], Ill.: Directorate of Plans and Programs, November 1999).

30. Lund, Berg, and Replogle, 31–35.

31. Aircrews are limited to flying a maximum of 16 hours per day, 125

hours per 30 days, and 330 hours over 90 days. During Desert Shield those

limits were raised to 18 hours per day, 150 hours per month, and 400 hours

per 90-day period due to aircrew shortages in air mobility aircraft to include

both tankers and airlifters.

32. Michael E. O’Hanlon, Defense Planning for the Late 1990s: Beyond

the Desert Storm Framework (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,

1995), 7.

33. Christopher Bowie, The New Calculus: Analyzing Airpower’s Changing Role in Joint Theater Campaigns, Report no. MR-149-AF (Santa Monica,

Calif.: RAND, 1993), ix.

34. DOD, MRS BURU, I-2.

35. Several Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) curriculum sources

show no course on mobility. In all courses and exercises, mobility is assumed to be available in sufficient quantity to perform the operation.

Sources include the 1999 ACSC in-residence curriculum, the ACSC 1999

Cyberbook, and the 1997 ACSC Distance Learning curriculum.

36. US Congress, Moving US Forces, 49.

37. Kassing, “Strategic Mobility in the Post-Cold War Era,” 688.

38. DOD, MRS BURU, 2–3.

39. Ibid., I-2.

40. Owen Coté Jr., Strategic Mobility and the Limits of Jointness, Center

for Science and International Affairs monograph (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 4–11.

41. DOD, MRS BURU, 3.

42. Ibid., sec. 5, table V-1.

43. Lt Gen William G. Pagonis, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership

and Logistics from the Gulf War (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School

Press, 1992), 46–47.

44. DOD, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Mobility, 56.

45. Matthews and Holt, 21–22.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., 27.

48. James K. Matthews, General Kross, Commander in Chief United

States TRANSCOM and Commander Air Mobility Command: An Oral History

(Scott AFB, Ill.: US Transportation Command [USTRANSCOM], October

1999), 67–71.

49. DOD, MRS BURU, 2.

50. Elaine M. Grossman, “OSD Debates How to Explain Military’s Difficulty with Two-War Strategy,” Inside the Pentagon, 26 January 1995, 1–10.

51. US Congress, Moving US Forces, 52.

52. Ibid.

53. Bryant Jordan, “Overloaded; Can the Airfleet Handle Two Wars at

Once? By All Forecasts, No,” Air Force Times, 30 August 1999, 14.

54. Defense Transportation Journal, June 1999, 26. During the US Senate Strategic Lift Hearing in March 1999, commander in chief of US41

HAZDRA
TRANSCOM, Gen Charles T. “Tony” Robertson Jr., responded to committee

chairman, Sen. James M. Inhofe’s (R-Okla.) question by noting an 11-percent shortfall in meeting the 49.7 MTM/D. 

55. Col Michael Fricano, “Future Directions of Air Mobility,” Mobility Requirements Study 05. Slide presentation at the December meeting of the

Maxwell chapter of the Airlift Tanker Association, 13 December 1999, 5.

56. Ibid.

57. AMC, 1998 Air Mobility Master Plan: Rapid Global Mobility (Scott AFB,

Ill.: Directorate of Plans and Programs, October 1997), 5-18–5-22.

58. Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force Statistical Digest,

Fiscal Year 1996 (Washington, D.C.: Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for

Financial Management and Comptroller, 1997), 94; and Air Mobility Command, Command Data Book (Scott AFB, Ill.: AMC, Quality and Management

Innovation Flight, November 1999), 11.

59. James Kitfield, “Airlift at High Tempo,” Air Force Magazine, January

1995, 59.

60. Matthews and Holt, 19.

61. DOD, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Mobility, 56.

62. Jordan, 14.

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Chapter 4

Current Force Structure

We have learned and must not forget that from now on air

transport is an essential element of airpower, in fact, of all

national power. We must have an air transport organization

in being capable of tremendous expansion.

—Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, 1945 

AMC’s actual total capacity is 43.9 MTM/D, which is a 5.8

MTM/D shortfall of the two major theaters wars construct.1 To

understand how the force structure translates into airlift capability, it is important to know the factors involved in determining the MTM/D measurement to include aircraft utilization rates and cargo classifications. Next, it is important to

understand the MC rates of the major AMC airlift and tanker

airframes in order to explain why the force structure of AMC

achieves only 43.9 MTM/D. Finally, an examination of AMC’s

en route infrastructure will identify additional force structure

limits in the throughput of passengers and cargo. 

AMC measures airlift capacity as MTM/D, which allows for

quick comparisons. The formula for determining MTM/D is

the mathematical product of four factors: objective utilization

rate, blockspeed, payload, and productivity.2 The first factor,

the objective utilization rate, is the average flight hours per

day flown by aircraft in primary aircraft authorization (PAA) in

service assigned to flying squadrons. The second factor, blockspeed, is the average ground speed in nautical miles (NM) per

hour from takeoff to a block distance of 2,500 NM. AMC bases

the third factor, payload, on the average payload per aircraft

as experienced during both Operations Desert Shield and

Desert Storm. The fourth factor, productivity, takes into account the aircraft returning from its offloading location to its

next onloading location, which varies depending on the distances to these locations.

Unfortunately, several factors are too circumstantial to consider when determining MTM/D calculations. These wide43
ranging factors include timing restrictions, unit integrity for

air mobility flying squadrons, system interactions, infrastructure constraints, and the differences between cargo classifications. The most important factors in understanding the limits

of airlift capability are aircraft objective utilization rates and

cargo classifications.

Calculations for objective utilization rates encompass many

characteristics. Each aircraft has two objective utilization

rates: surge and sustained. Surge is the first 45 days of an operation, and sustained is the time period from when surge

ends until operation termination.3 After the surge rate ends,

the flying rate decreases to the sustained rate in order for

maintenance personnel to perform repairs and conduct aircraft inspections. 

Other characteristics also define objective utilization rates.

AMC assigns each type of airframe an objective utilization rate

based on the fleet characteristics of that aircraft and aircrew employment per aircraft. To determine fleet characteristics, AMC

calculates reliability, maintainability, performance, ground handling, and loading characteristics of each type of airframe. To

compute aircrew employment per type of airframe, AMC uses

only 86 percent of the total number of aircrews trained and qualified for flying duty because 14 percent of aircrews are on temporary duty (TDY) assignments, ill, or on leave.4 Further restricting aircrew use, Air Force regulations limit aircrew flying hours

to only 150 hours in a 30-day period and 400 hours in a 90-day

period. Aircrew employment factors also assume a 25 percent

volunteer rate among ANG and AFRes components. Furthermore, objective utilization rates depend on several characteristics to include location, en route support capabilities, air traffic

control restrictions, ramp space, crew ratio, and component

makeup of the force structure. 

Cargo Classifications

AMC employs three classifications due to size characteristics of loads, which limits the choice of airframes available to

transport classifications of cargo as the size increases. The

first classification, bulk cargo, is general cargo loaded onto

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standard size pallets (108 inches by 8 inches) or into containers. A number of different airframes, including both military

and commercial aircraft, commonly transport bulk cargo. The

second classification, oversized cargo, is larger than bulk but

less than outsized cargo. Two criteria define oversized cargo:

palletized with an extended height of 96 inches or cargo with

maximum dimensions of 105 inches in height, 109 inches in

length, and 117 inches in width.5 Currently, the only aircraft

capable of carrying oversize cargo are the C-5, C-17, C-141,

KC-10, and C-130.6 The third classification, outsize cargo, exceeds the dimensions of oversized cargo and requires either a

C-5 or C-17 for transportation. Due to aircraft availability restrictions on larger cargo classifications, they play an essential

role in determining whether AMC meets its mobility objectives. 

Two cargo classifications make up the 5.8 MTM/D shortfall:

33 percent outsize and 67 percent oversize (fig. 3). This situation occurs because of the restricted cargo capabilities of the

airframes at AMC’s disposal and limited number of airframes

45

HAZDRA

C-5

7.1 MTM/D

C-141

5.6 MTM/D

CRAF

23.2 MTM/D

C-17

4.9 MTM/D

KC-10

3.1 MTM/D

Shortfall

5.8 MTM/D

33% outsize

67% oversize

Figure 3. 49.7 Million Ton Miles Per Day

Source: AMC/XP
capable of transporting outsize and oversize cargo. The director of plans and programs for AMC airlifters has divided the

airlift fleet into three categories. The first category includes

both the C-17 and the C-5 because they are capable of carrying bulk, outsize, and oversize cargo. The second category includes both the C-141 and KC-10 because they are capable of

carrying bulk and oversize cargo. The third category includes

commercial aircraft because they can only carry bulk cargo

due to their low wings, high bodies, and small doors.7

Mobility Aircraft

Total airlift capability at the 43.9 MTM/D level requires all

components to perform, where CRAF members provide 50 percent of airlift capability through contracts. The ANG and the

AFRes conduct an additional 23 percent of airlift capability,

and active duty forces perform the remaining 27 percent of

airlift capability.8

As noted in chapter 2, AMC’s capability to achieve the MRS

BURU objective of transporting 49.7 MTM/D falls short. The

main reason for this shortfall boils down to a lack of mobility

airframes. AMC expects a decrease in the number of airlifters

in service. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,

USTRANSCOM relied on nearly 350 military airlifters; and as

of 18 October 1999, AMC’s PAA for airlifters was only 273.9

AMC also experienced a reduction of tankers in service. In

1991 Strategic Air Command (SAC), who owned all tankers at

that time, had a PAA of 648 tankers.10 In 1992 all tankers were

subsequently transferred to AMC, and by 1999 the PAA for

tankers was down to 474 tankers, of which 50 percent transferred to the AFRes. Aircraft MC rates are a primary factor in

calculating MTM/D. In fiscal year 1997, the MC rate for AMC

was 66 percent; and for the first quarter of fiscal year 1998,

logistics data shows an MC rate of about 63.5 percent.11 A

closer examination of each fleet brings this concept into focus.

C-141 Fleet

The C-141 fleet is the backbone of strategic airlift, yet it only

contributes 5.6 MTM/D of the MRS BURU objective of 49.7

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MTM/D. A fleet of 266 C-141 airlifters transported cargo during

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.12 The C-141 can

transport 13 pallets a distance of 3,130 NM; and when aerially

refueled, it can fly anywhere in the world.13 Unfortunately, the C141 has reached the end of service; and the fleet’s retirement is

in progress and scheduled for completion by 2006.14

C-5 Fleet

In a fully loaded configuration, the C-5 can transport 36 pallets and 73 passengers but requires aerial refueling to go beyond

its fully loaded range of only 830 NM.15 However, with aerial refueling the C-5 should transport 13.2 MTM/D at the required 75

percent MC rate. However, the fleet’s MC rate declined from 71

percent in 1992 to 59.4 percent, which results in a 7.07 MTM/D

average.16 Thus, MC rates of a fleet of airframes directly affects

MTM/D capability. Nearly 50 percent of the previously mentioned MTM/D shortfall, 2.7 MTM/D, resulted from the C-5’s

poor MC rate. Unfortunately, because of the declining C-5 MC

rate, this shortfall will continue to exist if AMC does nothing. 

To improve the performance of the C-5 fleet, AMC proposed a

C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengineering Program that

includes—among numerous other items—engine replacement.

The new high-pressure turbine engines will work to 2,500 hours,

which is more than twice the current engine life of 1,200 hours.

In addition, the enhancement program would increase the MC

rate to 75 percent. A C-5 review team—consisting of members

from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the

Federal Aviation Administration, and the Air Force—concluded

that due to the structural integrity of the C-5 airframe, its service life could last until 2040 with proper fleet management.17

AMC projects that the cost savings of the C-5 enhancement program, as compared to the purchase of a new airframe, will be

$4.4 billion when spread over the projected life cycle of the

fleet.18

C-17 Fleet

The growing C-17 fleet will become the new backbone of airlift for AMC.19 The C-17 contributes 4.9 MTM/D to the total

47

HAZDRA
airlift capability.20 The MRS BURU relied on the Strategic Airlift Forces Mix Analysis, conducted by AMC, for its recommendation of 120 C-17s to meet air mobility requirements.21

Unfortunately, this recommendation excluded consideration

of the airlift requirements for special operations that calls for

15 additional C-17s.22 Also noteworthy is the fact that AMC

originally sought 210 C-17s.23

The C-17 has a 90 percent MC rate, with the capacity for 18

pallets or 102 passengers that will eventually provide approximately 14 MTM/D once all 120 are in service.24 As additional

C-17s enter service in PAA billets among different squadrons,

the outsized and oversized cargo shortfall should subside. 

The C-17 has range limitations because development was a

compromise. By building an aircraft with a footprint of the

C-141 that could carry outsized cargo, the USAF sacrificed

range. Thus, the C-17 has short range for a strategic airlifter,

which makes it very tanker intensive when fully loaded. To resolve this situation, AMC proposed adding extended range

tanks that would provide an additional 67,000 pounds of fuel

in an added center-wing fuel tank. This new tank will add

range to the C-17, which in turn will reduce the C-17’s dependency on tanker support or en route refueling stops. The

C-17 system program director feels that current program

funds can absorb the modification cost. If the program director is correct, deliveries of aircraft with the new tanks could

have begun in July 2001. The additional fuel tank will consequently reduce the C-17’s need for tanker assets which, as explained later, relieves the overburdened tanker fleet.

Another C-17 limitation is its inability to perform direct delivery on a continuous basis on a dirt runway. C-17s can direct deliver to a concrete runway on a continuous basis, but

can deliver cargo to a dirt runway only once, maybe twice, because of the physical properties of dirt.25 After the first landing, the landing wheels of the aircraft cut into the surface of

the airstrip. The next aircraft landing cuts more ruts into the

surface and so on until the airstrip is finally too torn up to

land on. However, the C-17 can provide continuous flow using

concrete-capped runways, which the Army Corps of Engineers

can build within days and at little cost.26

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A proposal by the Boeing Company seeks to increase the

total number of C-17s from 120 to 180. This proposal would

incur a new multiyear procurement contract that would give

longevity to the production line of C-17s. This increased production would reduce the manufacturing cost of the C-17s

purchased under the proposed new contract to approximately

75 percent of the C-17’s current 80 aircraft acquisition program.27 The lower price of $149 million per aircraft hinges on

a 15 aircraft per year production rate. The acquisition program does not take advantage of lowest cost per aircraft production, which is 15 aircraft per year.

C-130

The C-130 is AMC’s core intratheater airlifter and comprises

the Air Force’s most variant fleet with 21 different models and

variants within the fleet, which creates several problems.28

First, the Air Force must provide funding to support what totals 45 different configurations among the 21 variants of the

fleet. Second, AMC relies on Air Education and Training Command to provide basic C-130 training to its crews in C-130Es.

Following C-130 basic training, specific units must conduct

excessive in-unit training in order to account for all the differences between the aircraft, which creates an abnormally large

training bill for those units. 

The third problem is a lack of interoperability. For example,

a crew member that flies a C-130E cannot fly a C-130H3 because they are different aircraft. Sixty-three percent of the

fleet is in the ANG and the AFRes. When a mix of active duty,

Guard, and Reserve forces support an operation, they form

rainbow units at their deployed location, which results in

manning and scheduling problems. Differences in equipment

types cause crew qualification differences that create a situation where C-130 crews are not interchangeable. Thus, the differences influence operational effectiveness of the force, which

constrains the theater commander’s operation. Furthermore,

each type of aircraft requires unique maintenance, unique mobility readiness spares package kit construction, and unique

support equipment. 

49

HAZDRA
The C-130 fleet is also an older fleet that requires upgrading. Ninety-three percent of the active duty aircraft were built

before 1978, 69 percent of the ANG aircraft were built after

1978, and 74 percent of the AFRes aircraft were built after

1982. Support for this aging fleet is increasing at 17 percent

annually. In addition, mandated navigation and safety requirements drive the need to update avionics. 

AMC is seeking procurement of two additional models—the

C-130X and the C-130J. Large-scale production of the C-130X

would reduce the number of variants in service. Production of

the new J-model will provide improved C-130 performance,

which will provide improved capabilities over the current C130E model. The J-model will have the option to carry two

more pallets, 23 more medical litters, 36 more combat troops,

or 28 more paratroopers than the C-130E model. By 2013

AMC desires only two primary avionics configurations: the

C-130X and the C-130J. Special operations aircraft may share

common avionics with the C-130X and have additional equipment for their specialized missions.

KC-10 Fleet 

The KC-10 is AMC’s newest fleet of aircraft, where the average age of the fleet is 16 years.29 The KC-10 is a modified DC10 commercial aircraft, which can carry a maximum cargo

weight of 55 tons on 27 pallets; and its maximum load carrying capability is 170 tons, which could be all fuel or fuel and

cargo combined.30 As is the case with commercial aircraft, the

KC-10 requires special loading equipment to lift cargo high

enough to reach the floor of the aircraft. Out of 54 KC-10 aircraft, AMC plans to augment its airlift fleet with 37 of them

during a single theater war, contributing 3.1 MTM/D to the

total airlift capacity.31 Thus, only 17 KC-10s will be available

as tankers during a major theater war, where the operations

tempo would dictate a need for more tankers.

KC-135 Fleet

The KC-135’s primary mission during the Cold War was the

aerial refueling of SAC’s armada of nuclear bombers, and it is

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still the backbone of aerial refueling. At the end of the Cold

War, a 1991 SAC study showed the projected reduction in requirements for aerial refueling. The study acknowledged the

reduction in the number of bomber and fighter aircraft due to

the projected drawdown.32 However, because the United States

has the only substantial aerial refueling capability, the study

did not address the need for aerial refueling for airlifters nor

the increasing requirement for aerial refueling for NATO aircraft. Unfortunately, the 1991 SAC study led to two decisions

about the KC-135 fleet. First, the Air Force withdrew 100

tankers from service and sent them to the aircraft boneyard at

Davis–Monthan AFB, Arizona. Second, the Air Force divided

the remaining fleet between the AFRes and AMC. Under this

arrangement, the total active inventory fell from 413 aircraft in

1991 to 168 aircraft as of 18 October 1999.33

The KC-135 also requires upgrades to meet mandated requirements in the aerospace environment. The avionics replacement program currently under way to achieve this is

called PACER CRAG, which performs a number of avionics upgrades to the aircraft. It provides reduced vertical separation

minimums that have been required for operations over the

North Atlantic since March 1997. It also installs avionics to

comply with the Global Air Traffic Management requirements.

It installs color radar to detect weather, computerized data

loading capability, and embedded Global Positioning Systems,

among other avionics. In combination, these upgrades enable

the fleet to reduce the number (213) of KC-135 navigators,

which will provide savings to the Air Force through a reduced

manning cost. However, this implies that installation, maintenance, and repair costs for the new equipment will be less

than the manning costs of a navigator per aircraft for future

years. AMC’s plan is to reduce the number of KC-135 navigators through normal attrition and by reducing the number of

navigators trained.34 Installations began in January 1998, and

the fleet will be complete by 2002.

An insufficient crew ratio has occurred in every operation

from Desert Shield to Allied Force. During Operations Desert

Shield and Desert Storm, USCENTCOM required a KC-135

crew ratio of 2:0, but the manning level set at 1:27—coupled

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HAZDRA
with the high number of tankers required in theater and for air

bridge support—created an impossible situation.35 Consequently, USCENTCOM had to settle for a 1:5 crew ratio in its

KC-135s. Concurrently, SAC’s SIOP suffered from a lack of

tanker support. This KC-135 crew ratio problem resulted in an

increase in the crews’ flying hour limit from 125 to 150 hours

per month, creating fatigue among KC-135 crews.36 The increased number of KC-135 sorties required during Operation

Allied Force finally resulted in the reexamination of the KC135’s low crew ratio of 1:27 and the renewed call for a 1:56

crew ratio.37 During the operation, the joint force commander,

Gen Wesley Clark, insisted on a KC-135 crew ratio of 1:8; but

because of the large numbers of KC-135s involved, additional

crews could not be mustered.38 Even before Operation Allied

Force, the Tanker Requirements Study of December 1996

identified shortages in both aircraft and aircrews. Unfortunately, this information was not included in the Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 2001 to 2005.39

The KC-135 is one of the Air Force’s oldest in-service aircraft, with an average fleet age of 39 years; and it has been the

backbone of aerial refueling for 45 years.40 AMC projects the

phaseout of the KC-135 fleet beginning in 2013 and continuing through 2040.41 AMC will analyze the MRS BURU 2005 for

aerial refueling alternatives that will precede KC-135 retirement.42

En Route Infrastructure

When AMC stood up in June 1992, the air mobility en route

infrastructure included 39 locations with a total of 5,287 manpower authorizations; yet, as of 1 November 1999, there were

only 12 locations with only 3,933 manpower authorizations.43

A smaller worldwide en route basing system must support the

strategic flow of airlifters transporting passengers and cargo to

two theaters of operation. The challenge lies in determining

the best means to airlift passengers and cargo to the combatant commanders in each theater. AMC must choose which facilities it will recapitalize, improve, or remove. This decision is

subject to airlift fleet composition, transportation of equip52

FAIRCHILD PAPER
ment and passengers, fuel availability, aircraft parking availability, and delivery schedules.

European Structure

In analyzing the Southwest Asian theater of operations,

Western Europe is strategically located to support operations

in this region. Five of the six en route locations fall between

3,500 and 4,000 NM from both the United States and the Arabian Peninsula: RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom; Rhein–Main

and Ramstein Air Bases in Germany; Rota Naval Air Station in

Spain; and Lajes Field in Portugal. The sixth location, Incirlik

AB in Turkey, lies near the theater of operations. 

The throughput of passengers and cargo depends on five

factors at each en route location. The weather factor includes

icing conditions and low visibility in Central Europe and Germany, which slowed the delivery of equipment and forces to

Bosnia substantially. Weather in Germany can easily close

down operations for some period of time in winter months. A

second factor is route vulnerability. An example is the denial

of French and Spanish overflights during Operation Eldorado

Canyon in 1986, which presented a significant dilemma to

mission planners. Future denial of foreign airspace by Austria,

Switzerland, Eastern bloc nations, or France can introduce

substantial delays to an already difficult scenario. A third factor is political support because AMC often contends with constraints such as quiet hours, daylight operation only, holidays, clearance delays, landing rights, and noise abatement in

order to comply with foreign regulations. Such anticipated delays add risk to mobility air forces 24-hours-a-day, sevendays-a-week operations. A fourth factor is airfield suitability.

Most of air mobility operations overseas occur at bases with

single runways. The only multirunway base is Rhein–Main. A

closed runway would severely limit air mobility operations. In

addition, mobility air forces require bases with high-capacity

fuel systems, large ramps, large weight-bearing capacities,

and wide clearances from obstacles near runways, taxiways,

and ramps. The fifth factor is presence, as it is easier to carry

out air mobility operations at locations with an active, day-today presence. The uncertainty of access rights, fuel amounts,

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HAZDRA
obstacles, ramp availability, and other restrictions increases

unless there is daily presence to ensure smooth operations. 

Pacific Structure

AMC routes most requirements through Alaska, weather

conditions permitting, because this route is geographically

shorter and only requires one stop to get into theater.

Whereas, the mid-Pacific route requires fuel stops at both

Hickam AFB, Hawaii, and Andersen AFB, Guam. Fortunately,

weather along this route is usually better during the winter

months, despite strong seasonal headwinds en route to Guam.

Political support comes into play when we reach the Far East

due to the need to transit and recover large numbers of airlift

and tanker aircraft in Japan. In addition to US military bases,

the United States is dependent upon the use of civilian infrastructure to process the passengers and cargo. Unlike the European aerospace infrastructure, which has many alternate

civil and military fields to increase flexibility, the Pacific is far

more limited.

Constrained Throughput

The current en route infrastructure is unable to support national security objectives for the major theater war model.44

Weakness in the en route structure constrains mobility air

forces current throughput by approximately 20 to 30 percent.45 The MRS BURU used the standard maximum time on

ground to calculate airlift capability, which excluded time requirements for required aircraft inspections and proper servicing of aircraft.46 The use of standard maximum time on

ground underestimated the average aircraft’s time on ground,

resulting in an overestimation of the accuracy of the TPFDD

flow by 12 to 13 percent.47

At each of the en route airports in Europe, three factors constrain the en route structure: aircraft servicing, fuel, and ramp

space. These three factors, which are available in a limited capacity at the en route infrastructure locations, combine to create an “airlift capacity” shortfall of the requirement set by MRS

BURU.48 The configuration of these three factors at each of the

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en route airports affects each airlifter differently. For example,

ramp space in England and Germany can better accommodate

C-141s than C-5s. Spain has the ramp space to accommodate

the C-5 fleet but cannot meet their fuel requirements. Therefore, the location chosen for the different airlifters to refuel

changes the total throughput because the constraining factors

vary depending upon both the airport location and the airlifters using it. Consequently, a hierarchy of airlift capacity exists for each fleet depending upon requirements (fig. 4). 

55

HAZDRA

Servicing

C-5 Fleet Spain

Germany England

England England

England

Germany

Germany

Spain Germany

Spain

Spain

C-17 Fleet

C-141 Fleet

KC-10 Fleet

Ramp Space 

and Servicing

Fuel, Ramp

Space, and

Servicing

Source: James P. Stucker, Analyzing the Effects of Airfield Resources on Airlift Capacity (Santa

Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999).

Figure 4. Airlift Capacity

Improper use or less effective use of the en route structure

can decrease an already constrained system. Conversely, a

best route profile would reduce the constraints inherent in the

structure and increase throughput.49 Unfortunately, when

employing this best route, throughput stills falls short of the

MRS BURU requirement. Although it is possible to increase

throughput using a best route profile, airlift capacity is still

constrained by the en route infrastructure. 

The average 30-day throughput requirement, based on the

airlift capability of 43.9 MTM/D, falls short. The en route infrastructure is a bottleneck because all 12 overseas locations

as well as locations within the United States require some type
of major repairs and upgrades to their aging facilities.50 For example, fuel storage systems are both in need of repair and require upgrading for greater capacity. To correct en route structure weaknesses, the DLA has earmarked $1.5 billion over the

next 20 years for 20 different military construction projects at

AMC’s overseas locations. AMC earmarked an additional $127

million and established a nine-year plan to improve the living

and working conditions of people assigned to these overseas

en route locations.51

Inability to Achieve Current Requirements

An analysis of MTM/D capacity calculated through objective

utilization rates and cargo classifications identifies how the

airlift capability shortfall occurs. This study’s analysis of the

force structure of AMC examined both the airlift fleet and the

tanker fleet. This examination revealed C-5 reliability problems, C-141 retirement, and C-17 acquisition as contributing

factors to reduced airlift capability. The airlift shortfall occurs

in the transportation of both outsize and oversize cargo. In examining KC-135 fleet capabilities, this study identified requirements to increase both the KC-135 aircrew ratio and the

number of tankers in order to meet the demands placed on

aerial refueling. Next, this study analyzed AMC’s en route infrastructure and, in doing so, identified the factors involved

with throughput constraints and cited the fixes under way to

overcome them over the next 20 years. 

Combined shortfalls in airlift capability, tanker capabilities,

and en route infrastructure capability present a serious challenge to AMC’s achieving its 49.7 MTM/D requirements in accordance with MRS BURU. What this study has so far identified is a force structure shortfall in meeting the requirements

of a model for two major theater wars. Next, this study will analyze AMC’s steady-state operations to determine if a force

structure based on two major theater wars can handle those

operations.

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Notes

1. Col Michael Fricano, “Future Directions of Air Mobility,” Mobility Requirements Study 05. Slide presentation at the December meeting of the

Maxwell chapter of the Airlift/Tanker Association, 13 December 1999, 5.

2. Air Mobility Command (AMC), 1998 Air Mobility Master Plan: Rapid

Global Mobility (Scott Air Force Base [AFB], Ill.: Directorate of Plans and Programs, October 1997), 2–26.

3. Ibid., 2–27.

4. AMC, Air Mobility Strategic Plan 2000, Infrastructure (Scott AFB, Ill.:

Directorate of Plans and Programs, November 1999), 2.4.1.

5. Ibid., 2.3.1.1.

6. Fricano, 6.

7. James P. Stucker, Analyzing the Effects of Airfield Resources on Airlift

Capacity (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), 55.

8. USTRANCOM Handbook 24-2, Understanding the Defense Transportation System, 1 October 1998, 5.

9. AMC, Air Mobility Command, Command Data Book (Scott AFB, Ill.:

Quality and Innovation Flight, November 1999), 12.

10. Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force Statistical Digest,

Fiscal Year 1996 (Washington, D.C.: Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for

Financial Management and Comptroller, 1997), 95–98.

11. Fricano, 57.

12. Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force Statistical Digest,

95–97.

13. AMC, Air Mobility Command, Command Data Book, 5.

14. AMC, Air Mobility Strategic Plan 2000, 2–29.

15. AMC, Air Mobility Command, Command Data Book, 5.

16. Fricano, 57.

17. Ibid., 62.

18. Ibid., 66.

19. Department of Defense, Logistics Directorate, Mobility Requirements

Study Bottom-Up Review Update (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28

March 1995), C-1.

20. Fricano, 6.

21. US Congress, Military Airlift: Options Exist for Meeting Requirements

While Acquiring Fewer C-17s, General Accounting Office (GAO)/NSIAD-97-

38 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, February 1997), 4.

22. AMC, Air Mobility Strategic Plan 2000, 2.4.1.1.

23. James K. Matthews, General Kross, Commander in Chief United

States Transportation Command and Commander Air Mobility Command: An

Oral History (Scott AFB, Ill.: United States Transportation Command, October 1999), 62.

24. AMC, Air Mobility Command, Command Data Book, 6; and Ficano, 21.

25. Matthews, 63.

26. Ibid., 64.

27. Fricano, 39.

28. Ibid., 84.

29. Tamar A. Mehuron, “USAF Almanac 1998: The Air Force in Facts and

Figures,” Air Force Magazine, May 1998, 53.

30. AMC, Air Mobility Command, Command Data Book, 7.

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HAZDRA
31. Fricano, 6.

32. Juliane K. Smith, Lt Col Steve Cheavens, and Maj Michael Zenk,

1991 Tanker Study (Offutt AFB, Nebr.: Strategic Air Command, 1 March

1991), 4–8.

33. Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force Statistical Digest,

95; and AMC, Air Mobility Command, Command Data Book, 12.

34. Fricano, 66. This is AMC’s official position on navigator reduction

due to PACER CRAG. 

35. Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 3, Logistics and

Support (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 204.

36. Ibid.

37. Gen Charles T. Robertson, keynote speech to the Airlift/Tanker Association, Dallas, Texas, 6 November 1999.

38. John A. Tirpak, “Airlift Reality Check,” Air Force Magazine, December

1999, 36.

39. AMC, Air Mobility Strategic Plan 2000, 2.4.2.

40. Mehuron, 53. The KC-135 fleet and the B-52 fleet together are the

two oldest fleets in the Air Force; both have an average fleet age of 39. As of

30 September 1997, Mehuron cites that both fleets are each 36. Consequently, in the fall of 2000, both fleets were 39. 

41. Fricano, 81.

42. Ibid., 81.

43. Ibid., 40–41.

44. Matthews, 57.

45. Fricano, 46.

46. James P. Stucker et al., Understanding Airfield Capacity for Airlift Operations, Report no. MR-700-AF/OSD (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1998).

47. James P. Stucker, Analyzing the Effects of Airfield Resources on Airlift

Capacity (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), vi, 10. Stucker calculated

ground times of each of AMC’s airlifters by estimating the duration of all the

functions that an airlifter processes through during each sortie. He included

required inspections and servicing, which the MRS BURU failed to incorporate into its calculations. 

48. Ibid., 73–76.

49. Ibid., 63–70.

50. Matthews, 57.

51. AMC, 1998 Air Mobility Master Plan, Objective 2b2: Upgrade En

Route Facilities to Meet Command Standards.

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Chapter 5

Need For a New Force Structure

The burden placed on U.S. strategic mobility forces will not become less demanding in the future. To the contrary, the potential demands of peacetime engagement, reduced infrastructure at overseas bases needed to support airlift enroute to a

crisis, the likelihood of smaller-scale contingencies worldwide,

and the increased possibility of confronting nuclear, biological,

and chemical threats all pose challenges for mobility forces

that were not accounted for in the mobility update.

—Quadrennial Defense Review

—November 1997

Current US defense strategy calls for military forces to fight

two major theater wars at the same time.1 The magnitude of

equipment and materials needed to fight two major theater

wars prompted USTRANSCOM to assess its requirements for

airlift, sea lift, and prepositioning—which resulted in the MRS

BURU. AMC established its force structure requirements

based on its portion to airlift military forces in support of the

two major theater wars construct. 

The force structure of AMC currently performs many

steady-state operations that include air mobility operations for

small-scale contingencies, noncombatant evacuations, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, domestic and international emergency relief, and special airlift operations.2 The number of steady-state operations has risen

significantly since the end of the Cold War. The secretary of defense in his QDR says to expect an increase in mobility, yet

numbers of both air mobility personnel and airframes continue to decline without authorizations to replace them. 

This study examines the current use of mobility air forces by

citing the needs set by the QDR and then examining the

growth of steady-state operations performed by AMC. Next,

this study examines the various types of small-scale contingency

operations, humanitarian and peace operations, and special

airlift operations.

59
Quadrennial Defense Review

In 1997 the military force structure designed to meet the requirements to fight two major theater wars received criticism

when the administration of President Clinton reassessed the

nation’s military force structure in its Bottom-Up Review. Congress posed three main questions concerning the planned

force structure for two regional wars.3 What are the underlying assumptions of the planning strategy? Are military force

levels that are recommended to carry out that strategy sufficient? What is the funding proposed for such recommended

force levels? 

To answer these questions, Congress passed the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 in which Congress tried to grasp the force structure requirements when

they stipulated the following:

In order to ensure that the force structure of the armed forces is adequate to meet the challenges to the national security interests of the

United States in the twenty-first century, to assist the secretary of defense in conducting the review referred to in paragraph (5), and to assess the appropriate force structure of the armed forces through the

year 2010 and beyond (if practicable), it is important to provide for the

conduct of an independent, nonpartisan review of the force structure

that is more comprehensive than prior assessments of the force structure, extends beyond the Quadrennial Defense Review, and explores

innovative and forward-thinking ways of meeting such challenges.4

This law also authorized the secretary of defense to conduct

the first QDR, which would include an examination of the military force structure. In compliance with this directive, the

secretary of defense produced the QDR, which examined mobility requirements from a viewpoint of several scenarios to include small-scale contingency operations, two major theater

wars, and regional conflicts against hostile governments.

To meet mobility objectives, the QDR cited the 1995 MRS

BURU, which recommended an airlift capability to transport

49.7 MTM/D.5 This figure has been the benchmark ever since

AMC released the MRS BURU. The secretary of defense in his

QDR, however, also acknowledged the growing need for mobility assets. He stated, 

The burdens placed on US strategic mobility forces will not become

less demanding in the future. To the contrary, the potential demands

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of peacetime engagement, reduced infrastructure at overseas bases

needed to support airlift en route to a crisis, the likelihood of smallerscale contingencies worldwide, and the increased possibility of confronting nuclear, biological, and chemical threats all pose challenges

for mobility forces that were not accounted for in the mobility update.

These and other key issues will be evaluated and will receive increased

emphasis as DOD formulates upcoming budget requests for strategic

mobility programs.6

While mobility requirements rose, air mobility capacity declined

during the next five years. By 1997 AMC could no longer achieve

the 49.7 MTM/D recommended for two major theater wars. 

Steady-State Operations

Since the end of the Cold War and the stand up of AMC, the

world political situation has prompted a growth in the need for

mobility air forces. In fiscal year 1994, AMC transported

237,000 tons of cargo and 850,000 passengers and participated in 80 JCS exercises as well.7 Thus, the monthly average

of passengers and cargo transported in 1994 approaches the

monthly average of those transported during the Gulf War and

has not significantly decreased since. 

This increase in air mobility operations is due to the United

States intervention in international political situations before

they boil into a crisis. The United States has increased its involvement in UN missions because the United States is the

only country with an air mobility system capable of transporting military troops and equipment around the globe.8 The

United States policy aims to achieve three things. First, the

United States seeks to enhance its security by securing its interests worldwide. Second, the United States seeks to bolster

its economic prosperity by keeping open the markets of nations who trade with the United States. Third, the United

States seeks to promote democracy abroad, which includes

assisting fledgling democracies.

Smaller-Scale Contingency Operations

The number of smaller-scale contingencies rose from 11

percent of AMC’s operations during the 1980s to 32 percent in

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the 1990s. These may pose different challenges for strategic

lift and more airlifters. For example, USTRANSCOM transports

supplies to places that are landlocked—such as Afghanistan,

Angola, Belarus, Tajikistan, and Mongolia. In another example, USTRANSCOM transports military forces directly to their

final destination—such as Sarajevo—rather than to a point en

route to their final destination. Furthermore, many regions of

the world lack modern airport facilities, long enough runways,

or proper unloading equipment. Planning for such situations

increases USTRANSCOM’s requirement for C-130s and C-17s

due to their maneuverability and ability to land at austere locations. Thus, three questions arise. Do mobility air forces

have enough airlifters to transport cargo for smaller operations? Will mobility air forces meet the timelines set by the

TPFDD? Will the NCA accept a slower TPFDD, which also

means a riskier deployment schedule? 

A 1995 analysis by the General Accounting Office concluded

that 40 C-17s could deliver cargo to any one of three smallscale contingency operations under a small risk, which included a peacekeeping mission, a humanitarian operation,

and a noncombatants evacuation. Unfortunately, this analysis

did not evaluate how many C-17s USTRANSCOM would require to conduct these operations simultaneously.9

During Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia from 4 December 1995 to January 1996, 1,535 airlift sorties transported

10,933 passengers and 20,791 tons of cargo. Before Operation

Allied Force in Kosovo began, AMC initiated Operation Phoenix

Duke I, in which 150 tankers deployed to locations in Europe

to establish an airbridge. Along with them, AMC sent tanker

airlift control elements (TALCE) to provide the required air mobility support for both the airbridge and the new channel

structure. First put in place on 11 October 1998, AMC redeployed them in early November because the Yugoslav government agreed to NATO’s terms. When the Yugoslav government

again sought to dispute NATO demands, President Clinton announced the execution of Operation Allied Force. Immediately,

AMC initiated Operation Phoenix Duke II by again deploying

150 tankers and TALCE teams on 18 February 1999.

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Global Attack Operations 

To reduce limitations of time and range, combat aircraft depend on aerial refueling. Bombers in the CONUS prepared to hit

targets in a specific theater of operations and launch on nonstop

bombing missions from the CONUS. The feasibility of these missions requires air mobility support in the form of both tankers

and TALCEs. The TALCEs deploy to the deployed locations of the

tankers, which perform the aerial refueling required by the

bombers. In addition, these same TALCEs provide the bombers

with an en route infrastructure of emergency airfields. 

Mobility air forces deploy fighters to locations in-theater.

Tankers move the fighters from CONUS to the theater of operations, where the fighters arrive ready to perform their missions.

While working in the theater, fighters also rely on tankers to sustain them with fuel while airborne so that they can continually

engage any airborne adversary without flying back to their base

of operations to refuel and rearm their aircraft. 

Sustaining combat air forces with materials and equipment

once they are deployed in-theater requires ALOCs. Strategic

airlifters require aerial refueling because they transit from the

CONUS to operations in different theaters around the globe.

Strategic airlifters using channels transport cargo to aerial

ports where air mobility support units transfer the cargo from

the strategic airlifters to tactical airlifters. The tactical airlifters, in turn, transport the cargo to combat forces at their

concentration points. Requirements for aerial refueling will increase with the Air Force’s objective for achieving agile logistic

support and the focused logistics concept identified in Joint Vision 2010. Agile means flexible, which requires airpower.

ALOCs are the means by which the United States supports its

operations in theaters around the world because ALOCs provide the avenue for rapid global response.

Deterrence Operations 

The United States often seeks to deter other states from

taking action against US interests. The threat of increasing a

government’s civilian costs will deter that government from

exerting its political will through military aggression.10 With

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increasing civilian costs in mind, if the United States wants to

prevent a country from exerting its political will through military means, the United States could build up military forces in

a neighboring country. The potentially aggressive country

would interpret the buildup as a threat to its people if it acted

militarily to exert its political will. Thus, this perceived threat

raises the cost to that country if it decides to exert its political

will through military force. 

This argument requires a tremendous amount of airlift to

deploy the coercive airpower assets into theater rapidly. Airlift

is the prime mode of transportation because coercive airpower

assets can only move into theater by employing air mobility

assets. Fighter aircraft deploy by employing tankers for coronet support, and their maintenance support must deploy by

air because those fighters will require maintenance for reconstitution after the initial deployment flight. Reconstitution is

also required if the fighter aircraft are going to fly combat patrol sorties once they arrive in-theater as espoused in Air

Force doctrine.11

Prepositioning of these assets is moot because advanced notice is required to build a TPFDD, which would determine both

the deployment schedule and the preposition structure. Furthermore, the United States does not possess enough assets to

do both. The United States cannot preposition coercive airpower assets at every possible crisis spot in the world. However, the United States also employs coercive airpower assets

in the numerous operations under way at any given time

around the world. Unfortunately, US forces cannot employ

prepositioned assets for operations currently in progress.

Supporting the deterrence argument are NFZ operations.

Upon the termination of the humanitarian operation—Provide

Comfort, which preceded Operation Northern Watch—the

Turkish government approved continuing the air operation

from Incirlik AB, Turkey, as the new military operation, Northern Watch, which began on 1 January 1997.12 A JTF charged

with conducting air operations over northern Iraq, Operation

Northern Watch enforces the NFZ established by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 678, 687, and 688, which

has no termination date and which continues today. A com64

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bined JTF, Operation Northern Watch employs forces from the

United States, the United Kingdom, and Turkey, where the

combined forces total approximately 45 aircraft and 1,100

personnel. The joint forces from the United States include Air

Force, Army, Navy, and Marines. The joint forces from the

United Kingdom include Royal Air Force and Royal Army. The

joint Turkish force includes army, navy, and air force. 

Operation Southern Watch also sought to deter Iraqi aggression. The atrocities committed by Iraqi military forces

against Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq prompted an action

similar to Operation Northern Watch. Beginning on 18 August

1992, Operation Southern Watch also continues today with an

unspecified termination date. In support of this operation,

AMC deploys, sustains, and redeploys US military forces to

and from Saudi Arabia to enforce the ban on Iraqi flights below

the 32d parallel.13 This NFZ operation also requires deployed

tankers to refuel the allied combat air patrols performing the

military occupation of Iraqi airspace.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 

Operation Assured Response, the evacuation of noncombatant Americans from Liberia in April of 1996, provides an example of the removal of hundreds of noncombatants from the

threat of war by air mobility. During Assured Response, 94

sorties evacuated 2,153 passengers and 2,148 tons of cargo.14

Airdrop Operations 

To seize some airfields, the Army would deploy brigade-size

forces anywhere in the world within a short time frame. To accomplish that, USTRANSCOM would air-drop a ground force

of 2,500 troops with their equipment from the United States or

from a staging area in either Europe or the Pacific Rim. After

the initial airdrop, airlifters would deliver additional equipment to reinforce those units. USTRANSCOM conducted large

airdrops into Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989, and it

was prepared to conduct one into Haiti in 1994.

Once the C-141 fleet retires, USTRANSCOM will need at

least 100 C-17s to conduct a large airdrop at a moderate level

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of risk. With a smaller number of C-17s, the United States

could not insert its forces as rapidly, creating a higher risk. A

fleet with 120 C-17s could transport the brigade-size force

within the necessary timelines with low to moderate risk. 

Direct Delivery Operations

The Army would like USTRANSCOM to transport cargo directly from the United States to sites near the battlefield. The

C-17 can perform this mission but, as discussed in chapter 3,

will be restricted depending on the terrain. However, if some

C-17s conduct airdrop missions, how many will be available to

perform airlift in accordance with the TPFDD. In other words,

the pace of deployments from the United States would slow

down significantly.

Intratheater Transport Missions 

Rather than devoting all C-17s to strategic airlift, regional

CINCs may want to devote one or two squadrons for intratheater airlift. If USTRANSCOM assigns some C-17s for intratheater airlift, they would experience a shortfall in strategic airlift.

Again, as with direct deliveries, the pace of deployments from

the United States would slow down significantly. USTRANSCOM

would consequently need to buy more airlifters to make up for

the shortfall in strategic airlift for outsized and oversized

cargo. The CRAF could add strategic airlift capability for transporting passengers and bulk cargo. Conversely, with fewer

strategic airlifters USTRANSCOM would rely on trains and

trucks to transport outsize cargo intratheater, which would be

far slower than by air. 

Humanitarian and Peace Operations

Humanitarian operations and peace operations are on the

rise. The United States spent more than two billion dollars in

1990 on humanitarian and peace operations, whereas in 1995

those operations cost more than nine billion dollars.15 Mobility air forces participated in 167 humanitarian operations assisting 74 countries from 1990 to 1996, which comprised 12

percent of US military operations.16 A quick examination of

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several humanitarian operations shows the varied capabilities

of mobility air forces required to perform them. These operations often task air mobility assets to the limits of their current force structure, as an examination of several operations

will demonstrate. 

Long-term humanitarian operations require air mobility to

establish TALCEs on the newly created channels, whereas

smaller operations rely on the TALCEs on existing channels.

The TACC deployed TALCEs to support numerous air mobility

unusual operations. A few examples demonstrate the need for

air mobility support. During Operation Provide Transition—

from 12 August 1992 to 7 October 1992—with Angolan elections pending, US airlifters transported demobilized Angolan

soldiers to their homes following negotiations to end the 16-

year-old civil war. AMC, through 326 sorties, transported

8,805 passengers and 295 tons of cargo. During Operation

Provide Relief—from 21 August 1992 to 28 February 1993—

AMC deployed to Mombasa, Kenya, to transport food to the

drought-ridden population of Somalia, where more than 3,100

sorties delivered 34,400 tons of cargo. During Operation Impressive Lift—from 13 September to 29 September 1992—AMC

transported UN peacekeeping forces from Pakistan to Somalia.

Ninety-four sorties delivered 74 passengers and 1,168 tons of

cargo.

Humanitarian operations began following the Gulf War

when several popular uprisings erupted in Iraq. Many nations

hoped that any one of these might be successful. Unfortunately, Saddam Hussein promptly moved his remaining military forces to crush the uprisings, which occurred in the Shiite south and the Kurdish north. During the war, President

George Bush called upon the people of Iraq to remove Saddam

from power but probably did not expect to provide military

support to prevent Saddam from killing masses of his own

people.17 Unfortunately, both the Kurds and the Shiites succumbed to the genocidal wrath of Saddam, and the United

States felt obliged to prevent these killings; thus, a month

after Desert Storm ended Operation Provide Comfort began.

From April 1991 until 31 December 1996, Operation Provide

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Comfort required 33,381 sorties to transport 29,555 passengers and 118,340 tons of cargo.

Humanitarian operations began following the involvement of

nongovernmental agencies in Somalia where civil war and disease killed many Somalis. To alleviate Somali suffering, numerous relief organizations began to provide food and clean

water. However, the tumultuous effort included international

agencies that worked in an uncoordinated fashion and with

insufficient equipment to deliver food across Somalia. The

United States, without much notice, decided to help by initiating Operation Restore Hope. Therefore, from 9 December

1992 to 10 May 1993, AMC flew 1,182 sorties in Operation Restore Hope to transport 51,431 passengers from 22 allied nations and 41,243 short tons of cargo. The UN sanctioned this

military intervention into Somalia in order to safeguard the delivery of food to the starving Somali population. Furthermore,

tankers flew 1,170 sorties that transferred 82 million pounds

of fuel. On 13 January 1993, a commercial air carrier redeployed 244 marines. 

During Operation Restore Hope, as in many humanitarian

operations, TALCEs were critical because Somalia had virtually no trained airport personnel capable of handling the huge

amount of air traffic. The airfields inside Somalia had deteriorated from the years of disrepair and war. The first TALCE in

Somalia was set up at the Mogadishu airport and controlled all

intratheater airlift operations. It performed surveys to examine

the extent of damage and coordinated with Navy Seabees to

scrape the thick foliage from the airfield’s runways, taxiways,

and aircraft parking aprons.18 In addition, TALCE personnel

billeted themselves in an abandoned hangar until portable

shelters arrived. As operations increased, the Mogadishu

TALCE detached personnel to establish another TALCE at

Kismayu and then at Bardera and again until the total number of TALCEs in Somalia reached seven.19

Peacekeeping. In 1994 US forces changed their plans from

an invasion of Haiti to a peace operation. The United States

decided to install the elected president by force if the ruling

junta failed to step aside peacefully. The deadline passed and,

with time running out, US forces massed to invade Haiti. How68

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ever, the US envoys Colin L. Powell and former President

James Earl “Jimmy” Carter Jr., negotiated the general’s compliance. Mobility and combat aircraft were airborne and on their

way to commence Operation Restore Democracy, although the

US envoys had not yet left Haiti. The execution hour came and

went while the military aircraft remained airborne awaiting

orders. The envoys emerged with the junta leaders in agreement to restore President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to Haiti. The

operation was instantly renamed Uphold Democracy, and military forces entered Haiti unopposed. Aircraft in Haiti—from

September 1994 to April 1995—conducted 2,651 airlift sorties,

transporting 24,152 passengers and 22,274 tons of cargo. 

Peace Enforcement. When ordered by the NCA, USTRANSCOM deploys military forces to enforce a peace between

factions, such as in the operations in Kosovo. Peace enforcement operations adhere to more rigid schedules than a peacekeeping deployment and usually involve a much greater number of military forces with their heavy equipment. Thus, peace

enforcement operations place greater demands on mobility air

forces than do peacekeeping operations.

Emergency Relief. The NCA relies on AMC to airlift supplies and passengers for relief of natural disaster victims

worldwide both inside and outside of the CONUS. Domestically, AMC led relief efforts during the July 1998 everglade

fires in Florida, providing 740 tons of firefighting equipment

from the northwestern United States. The oversized firefighting equipment required the use of C-5s and C-141s. Internationally, AMC is the lead organization to respond to emergencies. For example, following the American Embassy bombings

in August 1998, mobility air forces flew more than 100 sorties

to evacuate embassy employees, wounded, and deceased. Mobility air forces also provided transportation to the State Department, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and

other governmental agencies.20 These emergencies overlap the

timelines and requirements of other operations while daily

routine sorties must continue, thus taxing the air mobility

system to its limit.

Helping Former Adversaries. The creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States gave the United States a perfect op69

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portunity to assist these new governments with the hope that

they would become democratic nations. During Operation Provide Hope—from 14 June 1992 to May 1993—AMC operated 109

sorties, including 25 by commercial aircraft, to transport 2,438

tons of cargo. By 17 June 1997 AMC had flown more than 500

missions to the states of the former Soviet Union. 

Requirements Imposed on Mobility Air Forces

The above operations exemplify the varied requirements

placed on air mobility forces. The number of missions and

sorties per year required to transport passengers and cargo

has exceeded the capabilities of AMC’s fleet of military aircraft.21

What is common about all these different operations is that

they all required unplanned air mobility support. Most required execution before the theater commander and USTRANSCOM could build a TPFDD. With such last minute requirements for movement, the default means of transportation

is by airlift. For some other operations, the theater commanders validated TPFDDs to move military forces in place for their

operation. However, once the NCA executed the theater commander’s plan, either the military circumstances changed or

the political objective changed. Thus, the TPFDD requirements

changed because the theater command needed military forces

in-theater sooner than the TPFDD scheduled them. Airlift provides the quickest means to move forces into theater. Smallscale contingency operations and humanitarian operations

have become AMC’s steady-state operations. 

The NCA seek action at the most appropriate time, often immediately when a situation arises which requires rapid global

mobility. The rapid global response capability of airpower puts

AMC at the threshold of every operation. Unfortunately, world

situations can occur simultaneously and so does air mobility’s

response, which causes operations to occur cumulatively. In

other words, one operation overlaps another operation. Thus,

the cumulative effect of these steady-state operations tasks

mobility air forces beyond their daily limit.

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Strategic Airlift

In 1997 Gen Walter Kross, then CINCTRANSCOM, addressed the requirements for an airlift force structure. He

said, “We need about 260 T-tails to do our global work every

day for training, maintenance, depot, testing, and our daily

worldwide missions.”22 In referring to T-tails, General Kross

means strategic airlifters in AMC’s authorized aircraft inventory, which includes the C-141, the C-17, and the C-5. As of

18 October 1999, AMC possessed only 180 T-tails to perform

AMC’s steady-state operations.23 Consequently, AMC is 60 Ttails short of its requirements to perform strategic airlift effectively in support of its steady-state operations. 

Aerial Refueling 

In 2000 the KC-135 crew force was scheduled to deploy to

support steady-state operations. These operations included

task forces at Gielenkirchen AB, Germany, and Naval Air Station, Keflavik, Iceland, business efforts, mission employments,

flags exercises, JCS exercises, and coronets—as well as operations Joint Forge, Northern Watch, and Southern Watch,

which require 18,880 TDY days from the KC-135 crew force.24

However, this misleads analysts because it excludes time in

transit and the overlap time required to swap out crews.25 Dividing the total TDY days required by an active duty crew for

231 crews averages out to 81.73; and when Guard and Reserve crews are calculated in, the average drops to 51.45 days

per crew.26 This figure also misleads analysts for four reasons.27 First, the 51.45-day TDY rate includes authorized staff

personnel at the squadron, wing, and headquarters levels who

cannot deploy because of their required staff duties. Second,

the 51.45-day TDY rate assumes that the Guard and Reserve

assume an equal share of the deployments based on the total

number of Guard and Reserve crews. Unfortunately, Guard

and Reserve crews are only part-time and can only assume a

fraction of the tanker deployments. Furthermore, these

steady-state operations exclude unplanned contingencies that

could involve the entire 231 crew active duty tanker force. For

example, Operation Allied Force involved 238 KC-135 crews

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during the 78 days of global attack.28 Fortunately, the president activated the KC-135 Guard and Reserve units to augment the active duty. However, during Operation Allied Force,

the tanker force left many steady-state requirements unfulfilled due to insufficient assets. 

Expeditionary En Route Structures 

When mobility air forces operate at deployed locations with

a limited infrastructure, they require an expeditionary en

route support system. AMC’s global reach laydown (GRL) concept provides the flexibility to establish these en route stations

around the globe. Under GRL, resources from various CONUSbased organizations are brought together to form the required

expeditionary units to achieve the objectives of any air mobility operations.29 The GRL concept allows AMC to siphon off

assets from permanent mobility air force units to create deployable en route force structure units. The TACC maintains

operational control of this deployable force structure.

GRL provides deployable forces to augment fixed en route

locations and establish en route locations where none existed

before. These air mobility support units, stationed both in the

CONUS and at overseas locations, expand and contract according to the requirements for support. 

Different sizes and configurations meet the flexible demands

of expeditionary en route support. First, a TALCE is a mobile

unit organized to provide on-site management of mobility airfield operations. Commanded by a commissioned officer, a

TALCE is a temporary unit composed of various mission support elements that deploys to provide mission support when

theater C2, mission reporting, or required mission support

functions are insufficient.30 TALCEs also provide aerial port,

logistics, maintenance, security, weather, medical, and intelligence services for aircraft when needed. 

The second type of unit is a mission support team (MST),

which is smaller than a TALCE but provides similar support

on a smaller scale.31 Commanded by a noncommissioned officer, MSTs provide lower level of C2, aerial port, and maintenance services for one aircraft. The third unit is a mission

support element (MSE), which is a unit of specific personnel

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and equipment that supports specific airfield operations. For

example, an intelligence shop or weather shop could be an

MSE. These units may be an element of a TALCE, an MST, or

a stand alone unit.

The TACC tailors the size and configuration of each GRL unit

by selecting the appropriate personnel and equipment to form

deployable TALCEs, MSTs, or MSEs for each required location.32

Each GRL unit will fit the specific contingency concept of operations and will begin functioning at its deployed location in three

to five days with follow-on sustainment after 30 days.33

One air mobility support squadron under each air mobility

support group contains an air mobility control flight capable

of providing an immediate initial response TALCE, MST, or

MSE. These units provide the core functions of air mobility

support: C2, aerial port operations, and aircraft maintenance.

They also provide additional support capabilities, such as

weather or intelligence operations, as necessary. Air mobility

operations groups, airlift control squadrons, and airlift control

flights from the Guard and Reserve provide the assets to deploy for these operations. Thus, the permanent air mobility

force structure provides the personnel, equipment, training,

and procedures for deployed operations. It is from these

units—collectively referred to as air mobility control units—

that C2, aircraft maintenance, and aerial port personnel deploy to conduct air mobility support operations. Additional

personnel and equipment required to deploy for any additional

support capabilities beyond these core functions come from

out of hide. That is air mobility wings, AMC headquarters, and

anywhere from which the Air Force personnel center can steal

an asset.34 Thus, when the personnel center takes a body from

an organization, that organization must meet its own requirements with fewer personnel. The deployed structure of air mobility support units is consequently ad hoc. 

The TACC provides GRL units to several simultaneous contingency operations worldwide. AMC must ensure that it has

enough assets to deploy and meet these GRL requirements.

Consequently, the force structure should include requirements to perform the contingency duties.

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Dedicated Training Sorties 

As noted, maintaining ALOCs in hostile environments requires special tactics and procedures. In order for these tactics and procedures to work, aircrews must train and practice.

Unfortunately, crews cannot practice many of these tactics

and procedures during routine airlift sorties for several reasons. First, classified equipment may be required. If a crew is

going to remain overnight at an overseas location, as is nearly

always the case, the crew cannot secure the classified equipment. Second, many of these combat procedures do not correspond to normal flight rules and regulation and, therefore, are

restricted to special use areas. Third, other procedures require

a dedicated airfield because in order for the airlifter to practice

its special training, the airlifter requires the airfield to perform

certain special nonstandard procedures incongruent with normal airfield operations. These three broad areas explain the

need for dedicated training sorties. Unfortunately, air mobility

assets would have to reduce the number of operational sorties

they perform in order to conduct the type of specialized training sorties they need to perform efficiently during operations

in hostile environments.

Air mobility assets require special sorties dedicated solely

for training in order to become proficient at maintaining

ALOCs when operating in a hostile environment. A lack of proficiency in combat tactics and procedures can result in an aircrew losing their lives along with the aircraft they fly. Unfortunately, mobility air forces are unable to proficiently achieve

these training requirements due to the high operations tempo

set by the above-mentioned steady-state operations.

Notes

1. Air Mobility Command (AMC), 1998 Air Mobility Master Plan: Rapid

Global Mobility (Scott AFB, Ill.: Directorate of Plans and Programs, October

1997).

2. National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the

21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December

1997), 25.

3. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Public Law

104-201, 104th Cong., 2d sess., H.R. 3230, subtitle B—Force Structure Review, sec. 922.

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4. Ibid., para. 7.

5. Department of Defense (DOD), Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up

Review Update (MRS BURU) (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28

March 1995), 8.

6. Ibid., 8.

7. History, Air Mobility Command, AMC 1995 Historical Highlights, Scott

AFB, Ill.: AMC History Office, 1996, 1–5.

8. Keith A. Hutcheson and Charles T. Robertson, Air Mobility: The Evolution of Global Reach (Vienna, Va.: Point One, September 1999), 32.

9. US Congress, Moving US Forces: Options for Strategic Mobility (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, February 1997), 54.

10. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale

University Press), 1966, 91. Schelling refers to this as the creation of risk,

which is brinkmanship. 

11. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-6.2, Air Refueling, 19 July

1999, 18.

12. SSgt John DeShetler, Command Task Force (CTF) historian, History

of Operation Northern Watch (Incirlik AB, Turkey: CTF, September 1999), 1.

13. History, Air Mobility Command 1992 Historical Highlights (Scott AFB,

Ill.: AMC History Office, 1993), 1–5.

14. AMC, Air Mobility Strategic Plan 2000 (Scott AFB, Ill.: Directorate of

Plans and Programs, November 1999), 2–25.

15. Hutcheson and Robertson, 83.

16. Ibid.

17. Michael Sullivan, The Gulf War (Frontline: WGBH Educational Foundation, 1996), two videocassettes.

18. John L. Cirafici, Airhead Operations—Where AMC Delivers: The Linchpin of Rapid Force Projection (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, March

1995), 41.

19. Ibid., 54.

20. Hutcheson and Robertson, 93–97.

21. Alan Vick et al., Preparing the U.S. Air Force for Military Operations

other Than War (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1997), 141–60.

22. Gen Walter Kross, keynote speech to the 1997 Airlift/Tanker Association convention, Anaheim, Calif., 25 October 1997.

23. AMC, Air Mobility Command, Command Data Book (Scott AFB, Ill.:

Quality and Management Innovation Flight, November 1999), 12.

24. Ibid., 9. Business efforts are TDY assignments where tankers and

their crews deploy at numerous overseas locations worldwide to conduct

aerial refueling training operations for US and allies’ aircraft. 

25. David E. Thaler and Daniel M. Norton, Air Force Operations Overseas

in Peacetime: OPTEMPO and Force Structure Implications, Project Air Force

documented briefing (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1998), vi. Tanker temporary duty rates for crews are well below the Air Force goal of 120 days. 

26. AMC, Air Mobility Command, Command Data Book, 9.

27. Thaler and Norton.

28. Lt Gen William J. Begert, “Kosovo and Theater Air Mobility,” Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 1999, 11–12.

29. AMC, 1998 Air Mobility Master Plan, 4–28.

30. AFDD 2-6, Air Mobility Operations, 25 June 1999, 60.

31. Ibid.

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32. Col John Brower, AMC chair to Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala., interviewed by author, 22 January 2000.

33. AMC, 1998 Air Mobility Master Plan, 4–22.

34. AFDD 2-6, 62.

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Chapter 6

Technological Innovation Requirements

At this moment in history, the United States is called upon

to lead—to organize the forces of freedom and progress; to

channel the unruly energies of the global economy into positive avenues; and to advance our prosperity, reinforce our

democratic ideals and values, and enhance our security.

—President William J. Clinton

A relationship exists between technological innovation and

the NSS that affects the nation’s military air mobility strategy.

Influences on air mobility strategy include the international

security environment where threats to US interests affect the

NSS. This, in turn, directs the defense transportation strategy

and, subsequently, air mobility strategy. DOD, in building a

better defense transportation strategy and operational vision,

needs to provide the resources for technological innovations

applicable to air mobility forces in order to achieve the vision

set forth in the NSS.

An examination of the NSS identifies the requirements for

air mobility. An examination of the US policy of intervention to

achieve the NSS reveals the requirements uniquely suited to

air mobility. The US intervention policy affects the AMC issues

of operations tempo, personnel tempo, doctrine, and air mobility organizations. Existing technological innovations could

improve these issues, and the initiation of new technological

innovation could further improve air mobility operations.

Air Mobility: Key to National Security

World politics reflect the international strategic environment, which in turn influences our nation’s security strategy.

DOD uses several guideline documents or tools to prepare and

execute our nation’s security strategy. Those tools include A

National Security Strategy for a New Century, published by the

White House; the Quadrennial Defense Review, published by

77
the secretary of defense; the corresponding NDP publication,

Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century;

and Joint Vision 2010.

The NSS addresses the need for air mobility in its first core

objective: enhancing US security. The strategy for enhancing

our security abroad is threefold: shape the international environment, respond to crises, and prepare for an uncertain future.1 The QDR reiterates this “shape, respond, and prepare”

trio-strategy as does the national military strategy. Air mobility is an essential element in all three strategies. 

In shaping the international environment, the United States

must possess a credible military force where military activities

include overseas presence and peacetime engagement and the

will to use military force.2 According to the NDP, overseas

presence is the key to a stable international environment.3

Peacetime engagement includes rotational deployments that

help sustain regional stability by deterring aggression and exercises with foreign nations that solidify relations with those

nations.4 Deployments and exercises both require air mobility

in the form of both airlift and air refueling in order to transport the necessary troops and equipment. Peacetime engagement also includes other programs such as the Nunn–Lugar

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program where the United

States assists members of the Commonwealth of Independent

States in dismantling and storing WMD.5 Here, air mobility is

the lead component by transporting nuclear weapons to the

United States from compliant nations.

Airlift also plays a crucial role in responding to threats and

crises by enhancing our war-fighting capability.6 The United

States may move some forces nearer to a theater in crisis and

rapidly deploy other forces into that theater. Depending on the

crisis, forces from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, or any

combination of military personnel and equipment could comprise the force structure required. Consequently, the United

States must airlift these forces along with the needed logistics

support. In addition, the focused logistics concept of Joint Vision 2010 requires the transportation of supplies and materials to support these forces within hours or days rather than

weeks, a mission solely suited to air mobility.

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In responding to crises, forces may deploy in support of

smaller-scale contingencies which include humanitarian assistance, peace operations, enforcing NFZs, evacuating US citizens, reinforcing key allies, limited strikes, and interventions.7 Today, US forces find themselves globally engaged in

responding to these contingencies more frequently and maintain longer-term commitments to support these contingencies.

In these situations, many deployments occur in the absence of

forward basing.8 The loss of forward basing has reduced

AMC’s worldwide infrastructure from 39 locations in 1992 to

12 in 1999.9 Thus, the United States must again use air mobility to deploy forces overseas in a minimum amount of time

for an operation to be successful. 

Policy Affects Air Force Issues

A policy of intervention has wide-ranging effects on Air

Force issues that AMC exemplifies. First of all, the number of

military interventions is on the rise. Second, this increase in

military interventions has resulted in increased operations for

the USAF and AMC that has reduced its force structure. Third,

doctrine has not kept pace with USAF and AMC requirements

that make adequate use of AMC’s flexibility for rapid global

mobility. The consequence of this lag is that a reduced force

structure attempts to meet the growing requirements of an increased number of military interventions. 

The requirement for air mobility will increase during this

century for three reasons. First, the pace of interventions and

consequent use of air mobility forces increased during the

1990s, and that pace is likely to remain high due to the large

number of crises.10 The limits of intervention imposed on us in

a bilateral world, where the Soviet Union objected to many of

our intended interventions, collapsed with the Soviet Union.

Second, the end of the Cold War caused the rise of numerous

ethnic groups and factions desiring authoritarian and ethnically pure states. In this century, enemies will be more varied

and unpredictable. This makes a policy of prepositioning military equipment less effective. In order to deal with several

possible enemies, the United States currently prepositions

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equipment among several potential theaters. Thus, our military equipment is spread thinly. Third, only a limited number

of forward bases is available to US military forces.11 These factors require a change in our intervention strategy in future

contingencies, and the most obvious solution is a need for

greater air mobility capability.12 To handle this increase, a capable air mobility strategy is crucial. 

In addressing Air Force issues such as operations tempo,

personnel tempo, and retention—as well as doctrine and organization—a capable air mobility strategy is also crucial. In

compliance with the QDR, AMC bases its force structure on

the requirement to prepare for two major theater wars.13 Yet,

it currently stretches its force structure to execute an increasing number of smaller-scale contingencies that support the

NSS. This stretched force structure, working at an extremely

high operations tempo, has created a dangerously high personnel tempo. Thus, the officers and enlisted personnel of

AMC—whose duties require flexibility, accuracy, and commitment—perform their duties with inadequate personnel. In addition to the increased number of smaller-scale contingencies,

the number of potential crises points worldwide has doubled

since the Gulf War to approximately 70.14 Further defining this

dangerously high personnel tempo, the secretary of defense

stated, “The United States intends to remain a political and

military world leader.”15 These new requirements have imposed upon AMC a steady state of operations that requires unprecedented employment of its force structure. 

A corollary issue is that the force structure has declined by

nearly 50 percent while the number of peacetime commitments has increased.16 Operational personnel work longer

hours and experience much longer TDY assignments, many

far beyond the 180-day average, to achieve the high operations

tempo. In order to perform at this high operations tempo, AMC

needs to reduce its personnel tempo by leveraging technology.

This high personnel tempo is a primary cause of low retention rates among operational personnel as exemplified in the

pilot retention rate. Shortly after AMC’s steady-state operations rose, their pilot retention rates declined. During the

1990s, air mobility forces experienced an escalation of all

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types of smaller-scale contingencies by 32 percent.17 The percentage of pilots accepting the pilot bonus reflects an alarming downward trend: 66 percent of the command’s pilots accepted the pilot bonus in 1995; 49 percent in 1996; 24 percent

in 1997; and 19 percent in 1998.18 To increase pilot retention,

the Air Force increased the pilot bonus from $12,000 to

$22,000 in 1997, yet pilot retention continued to decline the

following year.19 AMC needs to research the reasons that its

pilot retention is so low to determine if the decreasing pilot retention trend results from the extremely high personnel tempo

as suggested by many pilots.20

A policy of intervention also affects doctrine and organizations within AMC.21 The NSS relies on a strong military capability to deter conflicts before they arise in order to stop the escalation of confrontations or to deescalate military conflicts

worldwide. In most instances, the NCA call upon air mobility

to deploy forces, deliver supplies, and retrieve weapons to

achieve the required deescalation. They do so because air mobility forces possess the unique capability to accomplish the

lift requirements quickly—within hours when necessary. This

capability of rapid global mobility empowers air mobility forces

with the flexibility to change requirements as the crisis at

hand changes. For example, the TACC at AMC headquarters

often tasks aircraft—while already airborne in the performance of their mission—with a new destination or follow-on

mission.

Joint doctrine does not deal extensively with air mobility’s

flexibility. For example, joint doctrine still requires four phases

to deploy: predeployment activities; movement to and activities

at port of embarkation; movement to port of debarkation; and

joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

activities.22 However, all too often a contingency deployment

does not follow the preplanned TPFDD, whose purpose is to

execute the deployment, because of last minute strategy

changes imposed by the NCA. In numerous instances,

smaller-scale contingencies require a different configuration of

military forces than previously planned. Operation Allied

Force exemplifies this situation because of its unique requirement to exclude ground forces at the last minute. Therefore,

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air mobility doctrine must reflect a unique flexibility to tailor—

at the last moment—the deployment schedules of specific operations. Thus, air mobility is a critical tool of flexibility that

the NCA often rely on.

The US policy of intervention also highlights the need for organizational changes within air mobility units. For example,

the increased number of KC-135 sorties required during Operation Allied Force resulted in the reexamination of the KC135’s low crew ratio of 1:27 and the renewed call for a 1:56

crew ratio.23 During the operation, the joint force commander,

General Clark, insisted on a KC-135 crew ratio of 1:8; but because of the large numbers of KC-135s involved, additional

crews could not be mustered.24 Other organizational changes

resulting from Operation Allied Force occurred when the director of mobility forces created a special duty assignment, director of tanker forces, in the combined air operations center

at Vicenza, Italy.25 However, both of these issues have reoccurred in nearly every operation during the 1990s and as such

should be included into joint doctrine.26 The Air Force Doctrine Center is researching these issues for incorporation into

air mobility doctrine.27

An additional implication of a policy of intervention is the

limited number of air mobility assets availability to transport

the required equipment to a major theater war should one

occur. With the call-up of both the ANG and AFRes tanker and

airlift forces for Operation Allied Force, the availability of the

required air mobility support for a nearly simultaneous major

theater war would have been unattainable.28 In addition, AMC

experiences a shortfall on a daily basis in its requirement to

transport outsized and oversized cargo, which only C-5s or C-17s

are capable of performing.29 To address these issues, the

United States must leverage technology if it desires rapid

global mobility to support the nation’s military interventions

and a capability to transition to a major theater war.

The increased number of military interventions coupled with

the decrease in force structure create many challenges for the

Air Force. To meet the challenges, the Air Force should first research the effects of increased intervention upon its force

structure. Second, the Air Force should update its doctrine to

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fully use the flexible capabilities of AMC versus the wasteful

concept of prepositioning material that leaves another theater

of operations needing more equipment. Third, the Air Force

should build an AMC that can meet the needs of rapid global

mobility, which transports required military equipment immediately, when needed, to the theater of operations, where

needed. The most efficient means to achieve these seemingly

simple, yet previously insurmountable, tasks is by exploiting

military technological innovations. 

Many technologies are applicable to mobility air forces. One

such application would employ existing technology to build a

strategic airlifter with intercontinental range that can fly nonstop without aerial refueling. This would eliminate strategic

airlift reliance on the already overburdened tanker force and

curtail the requirements imposed on the overburdened air mobility en route infrastructure. A second application of existing

technologies would be to replace the half-century-old KC-135

with an aircraft that would double the KC-135’s fuel offload

capability and transport outsized and oversized cargo within

the confines of a KC-135 footprint.30 This would increase the

tanker’s dual-role capability and, again, curtail the reliance on

the mobility en route infrastructure. 

Military Technological Innovations

The US policy of intervention requires that it prepare

against a wide range of threats by using various combinations

of technology at different levels of intensity.31 For instance, the

need for rapid global mobility requires better communication

and coordination in order to improve C2 of the various operations required. To meet this challenge, AMC has implemented

a couple of programs. First, in order to coordinate access to increasingly congested airways worldwide, the command must

upgrade its aircraft with automatic dependence surveillance.32

This surveillance system—already prevalent in the commercial

airline industry—automatically reports an aircraft’s location,

heading, and speed through satellite to the receiving air traffic control center, which enables aircraft to fly closer together.

Noncompliant aircraft are restricted from prime routes, creat83

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ing longer missions that consume more fuel. In response to

this requirement, AMC is installing avionics upgrades and a

global air traffic management system to its aircraft. Second,

the GTN enables the USTRANSCOM to maintain a high operations tempo while reducing the personnel tempo of its expediters. This information network—established in 1998—provides universal tracking to each item, crew member, and

vehicle in the DTS whether en route or scheduled to depart.

Any individual with a log-in name and password can access

this network through the Internet and no longer needs to contact an expediter for information. 

Technological innovations have also created newer, more efficient engines that can replace aging engines onboard AMC’s

fleet of C-5 aircraft. To achieve this, Lockheed Martin proposed a C-5 modernization program that includes new engines

and the global air traffic management system that will extend

the useful life of the C-5 beyond the year 2015.33 However,

these modifications fall short of addressing some of AMC’s

major issues. First, even with an upgraded C-5 fleet, AMC

faces a shortfall in the requirement for transporting outsized

and oversized cargo. Second, even with the projected increase

in the C-5’s range, it would still require air refueling for overseas sorties. Thus, upgrading the C-5 fleet ignores the high

personnel tempo issue.

Technological innovations can also improve mobility operations by providing operational personnel with the needed technological leverage to perform the increased number of steadystate operations while reducing their personnel tempo. In

achieving this goal, several aircraft manufacturers have plans

to create larger and longer-range air transports and tankers

because they perceive AMC as needing that capability. For example, planners at Lockheed Martin studied 30 different aircraft designs and sifted out four basic concepts.34 All four of

Lockheed’s concepts provide more efficient operating costs to

include 15 percent greater fuel economy, 30 percent improved

lift-to-drag ratios, and 25 percent lighter airframes.35 The

largest of Lockheed’s concepts estimates a 12,000 NM range,

which would eliminate the need to air refuel an airlifter on

global missions. 

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As noted earlier, range is important in relieving the bottlenecks imposed by a smaller en route infrastructure. The C-17,

currently employed as a strategic airlifter, has a shorter range

than either the C-141 or the C-5. Thus, the C-17 is dependent

on either aerial refueling or the en route infrastructure. One

congressional study identifies the C-17 as a replacement for

the C-141, and another congressional study cites it as the replacement for the C-5.36 Yet, the current acquisition program

provides neither enough C-17s to replace the C-141 fleet nor

enough C-17s to replace the C-5 fleet. AMC needs a new

strategic airlifter capable of transporting outsized and oversized cargo that is independent of aerial refueling and requires

less support from the mobility en route infrastructure. 

If AMC can eliminate the need to air refuel its transports on

global missions, it can meet the need for tanker support to

combat aircraft while reducing the tanker fleet’s personnel

tempo. Combat aircraft use smaller fuel tanks in order to attain greater maneuverability, but smaller tanks translate to

shorter range. Air refueling is a powerful force multiplier that

produces tremendous operational and tactical flexibility far

and above simple range extension.37 Another one of Lockheed’s concepts, the joined-wing design, provides innovative

solutions to the tanker fleet by refueling two combat aircraft at

once.

Both Congress and the USAF itself have delayed desperately

needed technological advances for AMC. Congress is forcing

AMC’s pursuit of technological advance to remain at a snail’s

pace due to the congressional agreements limiting the DOD

budget. However, Congress will have to provide funding to obtain new air mobility designs if the armed forces are to have

the rapid global mobility capability that the NSS requires. Despite the requirement to improve air transport capability, the

Air Force seems narrowly focused on development and procurement of the F-22 at the expense of other critically important air mobility technological requirements. The Air Force has

repeatedly emphasized the F-22 program in public and before

Congress.38 In contrast, the CINCTRANSCOM seems to go it

alone with little congressional or service support, when requesting technological advancements for AMC.

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Pursue New Air Mobility Aircraft Designs

Peacetime military innovation occurs when respected senior

military officers formulate a strategy for innovation.39 Albeit

the concept of air mobility is not new, Gen Ronald R. Fogleman

became an advocate in 1992 while assigned as the CINCTRANSCOM and then subsequently Air Force chief of staff. A

change in the strategic security environment resulting from

the collapse of the Soviet Union may have been the catalyst for

his advocacy.40 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the security environment became more uncertain because the

United States is no longer in a bipolar world. Uncertainty in

the security environment arose from questions about the national interests that the United States would face in a multipolar world or in a world where the United States would face

asymmetric threats from weaker enemies. The concept of

rapid global mobility provides the United States with the

means to project its military capabilities around the world to

either punish an act of aggression, preempt an act of aggression, or deter an act of aggression. It is important to develop

air mobility into a rapid global mobility force that has the flexibility to transition from the steady-state operations to a major

theater war.

Now is the time to pursue innovations in air transport design,

rather than waiting for a major theater war. Once built and employed during peacetime, analysis on the new designs can accrue

and errors can be recognized and corrected before their use in

war.41 This environment encompasses a vast array of potential

crisis spots on the globe, which requires a greater reliance on

rapid global mobility, whose reduced force structure and worldwide infrastructure currently limit our capabilities. 

According to Stephen Peter Rosen, the United States can best

face the issues associated with choosing new technologies by

managing uncertainty.42 Looking through his lens, air mobility

becomes a priority for force structure modernization because if

the proper configurations of equipment cannot arrive in-theater

when required, the ability of the United States to intervene in a

crisis greatly diminishes. The United States needs to emphasize

mobility forces now because the most opportune time for technological advancements occurs during peacetime.43

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Update the Force Structure

The NSS defines national interests that extend beyond the

US borders; and in doing so, it establishes a requirement for

military intervention to secure those interests. In citing the requirement for intervention, the secretary of defense––through

the QDR––identifies several different types of interventions

that the United States must prepare for. This policy of intervention, which the United States has employed numerous

times since the end of the Cold War, affects several force structure issues to include an increased operations tempo and an

increased personnel tempo. In addition, the concept of rapid

global mobility has become the means to achieve effective military intervention and, as such, has become the backbone of

both military and peacetime operations. The resulting increase

in the need for air mobility operations has occurred alongside

the decline of both the air mobility force structure and the

worldwide air mobility infrastructure. In order to meet the

challenges created in the new strategic environment, AMC

must continue its pursuit of technological innovations to include new aircraft designs. New airlift designs should include

intercontinental range without aerial refueling, and new

tanker designs should provide for greater cargo capacity combined with greater offload capability. AMC can modernize most

of its aging fleet of aircraft in order to address some issues.

However, only a fleet of larger and longer-range air transports

will reduce the personnel tempo while maintaining a high operations tempo. If the United States fails to meet this challenge, it limits its ability to intervene in crises and, consequently, degrades its leadership position in the world.

Notes

1. A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office [GPO], October 1998), 6.

2. Ibid., 8–12.

3. National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the

21st Century ( Washington, D.C.: GPO, December 1997), ii.

4. Chief of Staff, Air Force, A 21st Century Air Force (Washington, D.C.:

DFI International, 1997), 3.

5. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 11.

6. Ibid., 15.

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7. Ibid., 21.

8. National Defense Panel, 33.

9. Col Michael Fricano, “Future Directions of Air Mobility,” Mobility Requirements Study 05, 42. Slide presentation at the December meeting of the

Maxwell chapter of the Airlift/Tanker Association, 13 December 1999.

10. Ibid., 21.

11. William S. Cohen, secretary of defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: GPO, May 1997), 6–7.

12. John M. Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Office of

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), 14–15.

13. National Defense Panel, 21–24.

14. US Senate Armed Services Committee, Prepared Statement of Gen

Robert Rutherford, Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM, 104th Cong., 1st

sess., 23 February 1995.

15. Linda D. Kozaryn, “America Won’t Shrink from Global Role, Cohen

Says,” American Forces Press Service, 18 November 1999, 1; on-line, Internet, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov1999/n11191999_

9911191.html.

16. Chief of Staff, Air Force, A 21st Century Air Force, 5.

17. Chief of Staff, Air Force, Merits of Air Mobility, Enduring Value to the

Nation and the World (Vienna, Va.: Point One, 1999), 41.

18. Headquarters AMC/DPXPA.

19. Fricano.

20. Casual conversations with scores of air mobility pilots over the last

seven years revealed a common belief among them that the high personnel

tempo is driving air mobility pilots out of the Air Force.

21. Charles E. Miller, Airlift Doctrine (Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], Ala.:

Air University Press, March 1988), 474.

22. Joint Publication 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, 7 September 1999, III-1.

23. Gen Charles T. Robertson, keynote speech to the Airlift/Tanker Association, Dallas, Tex., 6 November 1999.

24. John A. Tirpak, “Airlift Reality Check,” Air Force Magazine, December

1999, 36.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Maj Gary Potter, director of Air Mobility Doctrine, Air Force Doctrine

Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala., interviewed by author, 5 November 1999.

28. Tirpak, 32.

29. Fricano, 68.

30. Footprint refers to the physical size of an aircraft both in wingspan

and fuselage length, as well as the pounds per square inch of the landing

gear.

31. Shalikashvili, 11.

32. Bill Sweetman, “A Rising Imperative: More Demands for Airlift,”

Jane’s International Defense Review, 2 January 1998, 22.

33. Fricano, 66.

34. David A. Fulghum, “Future Airlifters Promise Global Range,” Aviation

Week and Space Technology, 20 January 1997, 51.

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35. Bill Gregory, “Tanker-Transports: Future Airlifters Are Likely to Be

Versatile Multimission Aircraft,” Armed Forces Journal International, December 1997, 18.

36. AMC, Strategic Airlift: Improvements in C-5 Mission Capability Can

Help Meet Airlift Requirements, General Accounting Office (GAO)/NSIAD-96-

43 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, November 1995); and AMC, Military Airlift: Options Exist for Meeting Requirements While Acquiring Fewer C-17s,

GAO/NSIAD-97-38 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, February 1997).

37. Lloyd Matthews, Challenging the United States Symmetrically and

Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated? (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US

Strategic Studies Institute, July 1998), 29.

38. Robert Wall, “Pace of F-22 Testing Puts USAF Under Fire,” Aviation

Week and Space Technology, 27 March 2000, 36.

39. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 21.

40. Ibid., 251.

41. Ibid., 182.

42. Ibid., 251.

43. US Congress, Moving US Forces: Options for Strategic Mobility (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, February 1997), 4.

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Chapter 7

Conclusions

Obtaining additional air transport mobility—and obtaining it

now—will better assure the ability of our conventional forces

to respond, with discrimination and speed, to any problem

at any spot on the globe at a moment’s notice.

—President John F. Kennedy

I began this study by examining the force structure complexities of the Air Force’s largest and most diverse command, Air Mobility Command. I next examined the mobility force structure requirements and challenges in air mobility planning. Force

structure developed from the two major theater wars model established by the MRS BURU, where rapid mobility conducted by

mobility air forces would reduce the risk to friendly forces. 

An analysis of combatant planning and mobility planning reveals incongruities involved with developing a TPFDD. Air mobility planning succumbs to consensus planning, where compromises can take priority over expediency. The planning process

assumes air and sea superiority to protect both air and sea lines

of communication. The MRS BURU analyzed four scenarios to

identify the challenges with prepositioning, sea lift, and airlift. An

examination of the two major theater wars model identified the

reasons for designing the current force structure for AMC.

The study then analyzed current force structure capabilities. An examination of current force structure included an

analysis of the different airframes’ capabilities and limitations,

which identified exactly where the airlift shortfall occurs. A

corollary examination of the en route force structure further

revealed additional shortfalls in throughput. The study consequently revealed that the current force structure is unable to

meet the demands imposed by a two major theater wars

model. An examination of the tanker fleet revealed a third

shortfall in the air mobility system. The proposed upgrades to

these areas will take 20 years to complete but do not address

the need for more airframes.

91
Finally, this study examined the growing number of steadystate operations that mobility air forces have been conducting

throughout the 1990s and will continue to conduct during this

century. In addition, these steady-state operations occur at the

last minute, which circumvents the TPFDD planning process.

The force structure requirements that stem from the growing

number of contingency operations require a flexible and rapid

global mobility system that only AMC can provide. Mobility air

forces work to support steady-state operations. Contingency operations require GRL units comprised of ad hoc personnel who

deploy away from their permanent duties, thus leaving a shortfall in their organization. Furthermore, a number of contingencies overlap at any given time. It becomes clear that USTRANSCOM requires a force structure comprised of airlifters

able to perform numerous missions and personnel to work the

expeditionary en route infrastructure of the GRL concept.

Air Mobility Shortfall: Two Major Theater Wars

This study sought an answer to the question: Can AMC’s

force structure—based on the possibility of fighting two major

theater wars—satisfy those requirements and the requirements for steady-state operations? What this study found was

that the current force structure can neither meet the requirements imposed by the MRS BURU for two major theater wars

nor meet the requirement for steady-state operations. AMC is

finding it difficult to prepare for two major theater wars while

maintaining the increased number of steady-state operations

that are both diverse in their objectives and their transportation requirements. Yet, the need for air mobility is increasing

due to several factors, such as overseas basing reductions and

the decreasing number of military airlifters in service. These

dynamic influences create a tremendous challenge for the

force structure of AMC.

AMC’s current force structure creates a type of identity crisis

that results in funding problems as well as other challenges associated with a constrained force structure. This study tried to

bring into focus the inadequacy of the current force structure of

AMC. A compromise force structure—such as one that may

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occur, due in part to the C-17 acquisition program—is likely to

reduce AMC capabilities. The currently proposed fleet of C-17s

will face insurmountable challenges in attempting to satisfy the

requirements of today’s steady-state operations. Furthermore,

the cost of a compromise will occur in the form of higher risks to

military forces and US interests abroad. 

Continued US Intervention

Air mobility is a form of airpower that should be exploited to

its fullest because of the positive political gains from noncombat operations, deterrence, and combat when necessary. However, steady-state operations in support of the NSS have created an unprecedented use of AMC forces and resources that

are currently targeted for wartime use.

The United States is likely to continue a policy of intervention. The concept of rapid global mobility has become the

means to achieve military intervention and, as such, has become the backbone of both military and peacetime operations.

The force structure of AMC is straining to execute these

steady-state operations. Further growth in these operations is

beyond the capability of AMC’s current force structure. 

This policy affects the force structure of AMC in many ways.

The resultant increased operations tempo and personnel

tempo occurred alongside the declination of AMC’s force structure. If AMC is to achieve the objectives of the NSS, it must

continue its pursuit of technological innovations to include

new aircraft designs. AMC can modernize most of its aging

fleet of aircraft in order to address some issues, but only more

airframes with a healthy crew ratio can maintain the high operations tempo required by the NSS. AMC, as with any organization, must have a force structure to maintain or reduce its

operations. AMC is already looking for ways to reduce the demands on its system.1

Price of Reduced US Intervention

If AMC reduces its operations, the United States will pay a

price. If the United States is unable to achieve the objectives

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of its NSS, then it will degrade its international leadership position. It is important to continue conducting US interventions

to achieve the national security objectives. Rapid global mobility is the concept that makes these operations a success.

AMC, as the lead component for rapid global mobility, requires

a force structure capable of conducting these operations. 

Recommendations

This study examined the force structure of AMC and identified

several challenges for AMC if it is to achieve the objectives set

forth in the NSS. The current force structure falls short of the

targeted strategic environment that it sought to fulfill. In addition, the current force structure is incongruent with the vast diversity of requirements in today’s strategic environment, which

range from coercive military operations to humanitarian relief

operations. The following five recommendations aim to outline

how AMC’s force structure can be redirected to more effectively

perform its missions to achieve the objectives of the NSS and to

operate in the strategic environment. 

Force Structure Based on Steady-State Operations

Most importantly, the Air Force should investigate the need

to build a force structure for AMC based on the current

steady-state operations. Since the Gulf War, steady-state operations have employed mobility air forces in numerous different operations that require flexibility (appendices A through

E).2 Consequently, AMC should determine how it employed

mobility air forces engaged in steady-state operations. Perhaps

the next MRS BURU, scheduled for completion in 2005, should

examine the MTM/D for each operation that AMC executed

during the 1990s, of which there were scores. In constructing

a force structure based on steady-state operations, several

subsequent recommendations follow.

Employ Commercial Carriers

The first tenet of airlift policy is that the core of national airlift capability is the commercial air carrier.3 Continued re94

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liance on the commercial air carrier industry to supplement

AMC by transporting passengers and bulk cargo helps alleviate the expense of mobility air operations. In addition to using

their own aircraft, commercial air carriers use civilian infrastructures worldwide to transport passengers and cargo. Military airlift requirements, in both aircraft and en route infrastructure, exceed the capability that DOD can afford to buy.

AMC can operate a smaller than required en route infrastructure because of its reliance on the commercial sectors. AMC

already maximizes its employment of commercial air carriers.

This study recommends continuing this partnership where

AMC employs commercial carriers during peacetime through

contracts and uses them during wartime as the CRAF.

Longer-Range Airlifter

AMC should increase its strategic airlift capability with a

new strategic airlifter that can operate without refueling at intercontinental range and can transport both outsized and

oversized cargo. The second tenet of airlift policy states, “The

role of the military airlift fleet is to do what commercial transport aircraft or civilian aircrews cannot or won’t do.”4 Commercial aircraft designs are inadequate for outsized and oversized cargo. Consequently, AMC relies on its organic airlifters.

The third tenet of airlift states that AMC should design military airlifters for their role.5 A strategic airlifter should have

an intercontinental range to alleviate both aerial refueling and

en route refueling. A reduced requirement for aerial refueling

of airlifters will free up tanker assets for other missions already in demand. A reduced requirement for en route refueling will alleviate the bottlenecks already prevalent in AMC’s en

route infrastructure. AMC should examine these requirements

as part of the program requirements for a new strategic airlifter. The C-17 falls short of these necessary requirements. 

To transport required amounts of outsized and oversized

cargo, AMC must increase its organic airlift capability because

commercial carriers are too small and require additional onloading and off-loading equipment to transport outsized and

oversized cargo. A new strategic airlifter, if properly programmed, can achieve the requirements imposed by national

95

HAZDRA
strategic objectives while at the same time operate with reduced support. Thus, AMC could airlift more cargo with less

of its assets. 

AMC should also examine the feasibility of employing hypersonic technology because of the long time frame involved

with the acquisition of a new airlifter. As hypersonic technology advances, perhaps AMC could employ the technology in a

new strategic airlifter. A hypersonic airlifter acquisition program could offset hypersonic research. So long as a hypersonic design would employ a small en route infrastructure and

negate the need for aerial refueling, this idea conforms to this

study’s recommendation for a strategic airlifter.

New Tanker Force Structure

SAC designed the current tanker force to perform its SIOP.

Today, tanker forces require greater flexibility to meet the demands of the steady-state operations that they perform daily.

Of the two overarching requirements, the immediate requirement is to increase the tanker’s crew ratio. As noted earlier,

the tanker force has been overextended for 10 years, which

has resulted in low crew retention. Second, AMC needs to examine its requirement for a new tanker aircraft because the

SIOP is only one of many missions that the tanker now performs. AMC is standing up the KC-XX branch in its Plans Division to examine the requirements for a new tanker.6 This

branch should examine tanker usage during the past 10 years

to gain insight into how the tanker has become the critical

asset in today’s steady-state operations. The Plans Division

also needs to examine the unfulfilled requirements of tanker

forces—that is, those requests for tanker support that were

denied due to the inadequate size of the tanker fleet.

Continue Upgrade Programs

The current upgrade programs aim to bring mobility air

forces “up to code.” These programs enable yesterday’s aircraft

to conform to aviation regulations and operate in today’s aviation environment. These upgrade programs address the

short-term requirements of maintaining AMC’s capability to

96

FAIRCHILD PAPER
operate in the skies of nations worldwide. In addition, these

upgrades will help to lengthen the lifespan on the C-5 and KC135 in order to facilitate the necessary examinations of both

strategic airlift and aerial refueling requirements by AMC.

Bottom Line

The situation for air mobility has changed. Today’s strategic

environment differs from the one prophesied when the Cold

War ended 10 years ago. To achieve diverse objectives, the NSS

seeks to employ mobility air forces for a range of operations

more so than in the past. In achieving these objectives, both

airlifters and tankers perform a variety of missions, some of

which are incongruent with past missions. Consequently,

AMC’s force structure should reflect these new requirements.

Finally, the Air Force should allocate resources to create a

force structure for AMC that can achieve national objectives.

Notes

1. The newest request for research, proposed by US Transportation Command, is to find ways to reduce the demands on the air mobility system. Information obtained by E-mail that was sent from the Air Mobility Command

(AMC) Chair at Air University, Col John Brower, to all Air University students in January 2000.

2. See the appendices of this study for a list of operations the AMC has

performed during the 1990s.

3. Lt Col Robert C. Owen, “The Airlift System: A Primer,” Air Power Journal, Fall 1995, 1–12, 6.

4. Ibid., 8.

5. Ibid., 9.

6. Gen Charles T. Robertson, speech to the Maxwell chapter of the Airlift/Tanker Association, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 2 March 2000.

97

HAZDRA
Appendix A

Emergency Relief Operations

Total

Airlift Tons of Refuel Fuel in

Event Dates Sorties Passengers Cargo Sorties Millions Remarks Source

Hurricane 25 Aug 724 13,500 21,500.0 AMC/HO

Andrew 28 Oct 92

Byelorussian 31 Aug 92 70 13,501 AMC/HO

Children

Typhoon 1 Sep 59 13,750 2,000.0 AMC/HO

Omar 25 Sep 92

Liberia 12 Oct 92 1 13,521 AMC/HO

Evacuation

Armenia Flour 4 Nov 5 ,236.0 AMC/HO

Delivery 11 Nov 92

Pakistan Flood 6 Dec 6 ,415.0 Outsized AMC/HO 

Relief 20 Dec 92 cargo

Bosnian War 3 Feb 93 1 13,508 AMC/HO 

Victims

UN Support 17 May 24 13,254 ,326.0 11 0.14 AMC/HO

in Cambodia 29 May 93

UN Protection 5 Jul 20 13,334 ,850.0 AMC/HO

in Macedonia 12 Jul 93

Midwest Flood 11 Jul 20 13,141 ,797.0 Used ANG AMC/HO

1 Aug 93 & AFRes

Nepal Flood 11 Aug 3 AMC/HO

15 Aug 93

Support UN 25 Aug 5 13,400 AMC/HO

in Somalia 27 Aug 93

26 Aug 8 ,147.0 AMC/HO

19 Dec 93

1994 6 ,191.9 AMC/HO

Indian 4 Oct 93 2 AMC/HO

Earthquake

Marine Support 5 Oct 56 1,300 3,000.0 169 13.4 Outsized AMC/HO

in Somalia 13 Oct 93 cargo

Nepal Support 24 Oct 5 , 350 ,250.0 AMC/HO

in Somalia 30 Oct 93

99
Total

Airlift Tons of Refuel Fuel in

Event Dates Sorties Passengers Cargo Sorties Millions Remarks Source

Los Angeles 17 Jan 10 13,510 ,170.0 Outsized AMC/HO

Earthquake 25 Jan 94 cargo

Somalia 25 Mar 94 1 AMC/HO

Redeploy

Rwanda 10 Apr 2 13,342 AMC/HO

Evacuation 14 Apr 94

Belgian 10 Apr 12 Outsized AMC/HO

support to 14 Apr 94 cargo

Rwanda

Tanzania 11 May 13 ,239.0 AMC/HO

support 17 May 94

Uganda 22 Jun 72 TALCE ,150.0 Outsized AMC/HO

support 30 Jun 94 cargo *est.

tons & sorties

MRI system 26 Jun 94 1 ,134.3 AMC/HO

to Ukraine

Hurricane 14 Aug 9 1,107 3 AMC/HO

John 25 Aug 94 Commercial

evacuation

Vladivostok 30 Oct 94 1 ,120.0 AMC/HO

Flood

Nepal 3 Feb 8 13,410 AMC/HO

support to 10 Feb 95

Haiti

Mongolia 1991 12 ,300.0 *Estimate AMC/HO

support 11 Apr 95 25 tons

average

OK Fed 19 Apr 25 1,359 3,864.0 Outsized AMC/HO

building 4 May 95 cargo

bombing

Zaire 11 May 95 1 ,151.0 Ongoing AMC/HO

medical effort

support

Hump 23 May 2 2 AMC/HO

Anniversary 30 May 95

Haitian 8 Jun 95 3 13,350 First of AMC/HO

police 5,200 police

support

NASA 7 Jul 95 1 13,413 AMC/HO

support

Croatia 13 Aug 95 1 ,175.0 AMC/HO

support

Tadzhikistan 17 Aug 95 1 ,138.0 Contracted AMC/HO

support DC-8

100
101

Total

Airlift Tons of Refuel Fuel in

Event Dates Sorties Passengers Cargo Sorties Millions Remarks Source

Rwanda 6 Sep 95 1 ,168.0 Contracted AMC/HO

support 747

*42 pallets

x 2 ton ea.

Croatia 6 Sep 95 1 ,236.0 Contracted AMC/HO

support DC-8

*18 pallet

x 2 ton ea.

Kurdish 7 Sep 95 2 2 AMC/HO

support Generators

outsize cargo

Hurricane 16 Sep 212 12,348 13,5 3,617.0 AMC/HO

Marilyn 10 Oct 95

Vietnam 3 Oct 95 1 ,228.0 AMC/HO

medical

support

Mine field 2 Feb 96 3 ,240.0 6 AMC/HO

markers

Israel 5 Mar 96 1 ,221.4 1 0.09 Explosive- AMC/HO

support detection

Retrieve 27 Mar 96 1 Remains AMC/HO

remains from Laos

Laos 25 yrs ago

Retrieve 6 Apr 1 12 bodies AMC/HO

remains of total

SecCom

Uphold 17 Apr 96 1 12,384 Commercial AMC/HO

Democracy carrier

redeploy

Khobar 27 Jun 96 1 19 bodies AMC/HO

Towers

retrieve remains

AEF III 30 Jun 96 4 Augment AMC/HO

Southern Watch

Mongolia 2 Aug 96 1 ,224.0 2 stowaway AMC/HO

support fatalities

Burundi 4 Sep 96 1 12,330 ,221.0 AMC/HO

support

Northern 11 Sep 96 2 Outsized AMC/HO

Watch cargo

support

Pacific 17 Sep 2 12,344 AMC/HO

Haven 18 Sep 96
Total

Airlift Tons of Refuel Fuel in

Event Dates Sorties Passengers Cargo Sorties Millions Remarks Source

Guardian 14 Nov 96 5 13,5 Deployed AMC/HO

Assistance standby for

relief operations

Christmas 16 Dec AMC/HO

airdrop 21 Dec 96

Retrieve 16 Jan 97 1 5 aircrew AMC/HO

remains from B-24

WW II Liberator

Sioux relief 19 Jan 97 1 ,120.0 AFRes crew AMC/HO

Last Deep 2 Mar 97 Supplying AMC/HO

Freeze Antarctica

sortie for 40 years

Bolivia 2 Apr 97 1 Diocese of AMC/HO

support Joliet medical

supplies

Grand Forks 18 Apr 13 13,143 ,146.0.3 AMC/HO

flood 8 Aug 97

Korean crash 5 Aug 5 13,331 NTSB, AMC/HO

support 9 Aug 97 +FBI, +FAA,

+medical

personnel

NASA 22 Aug 97 1 2 Satellite AMC/HO

support

Bulgaria 3 Oct 97 1 1175 AMC/HO

support

Typhoon 18 Dec 97 Some AMC/HO

Paka 4 Jan 98 commercial

New Mexico 30 Dec 97 5 ,125.0 AMC/HO

blizzard relief 4 Jan 98

Operation 10 Jan 4 13,181.0 Quebec AMC/HO

Recuperation 14 Jan 98 winter storm

NE winter 15 Jan 18 AMC/HO

storm 18 Jan 98

China 16 Jan 98 1 13,340.0 40 tons on AMC/HO

earthquake 18 pallets

Ecuador 2 Mar 98 1 13,336 AMC/HO

support

Presidential 9 Mar 104 100 Trip to AMC/HO

support 9 Apr 98 Africa

102
Airlift Tons of Refuel Fuel in

Event Dates Sorties Passengers Cargo Sorties Millions Remarks Source

OP 12 Mar 1 13,150 AMC/HO

Homecoming

silver

anniversary

Presidential 10 Jun 35 7 Trip to AMC/HO

support 8 Jul 98 China

Search & 19 Jun 98 2 1 AFRes AMC/HO

Rescue Support crews

Operation 2–7 Jul 98 12 13,300 8,740.0 Everglades AMC/HO

Phoenix Flame fires

Transport 10 Jul 98 1 AMC/HO

remains of

unknown soldier

Kenya 7–9 Aug 98 2 13,115 15 AMC/HO

embassy patients––1

bombing sortie 10

support remains––1

sortie

Hurricane 21 Sep 190 13,450 8,500.0 AMC/HO

Georges 12 Oct 98

Hurricane 1 Nov 98 200 AMC/HO

Mitch 19 Mar 99

Christmas 9–10 Jan 99 1 13,141 AMC/HO

Island

support

Presidential 22 Jun 99 1 13,143 AMC/HO

support

Antarctica 11 Jul 99 1 8,712.0 1 *6 pallets AMC/HO

support airdrop

estimate 12

tons

Turkish 18 Aug 20 13,170 2 First sortie AMC/HO

earthquake 10 Sep 99 refueled

KC-97 14 Oct 99 1 From Beale AMC/HO

transport to Scott

Antarctica 16 Oct 99 1 Chemo- AMC/HO

support therapy

drugs

103

Totals 468 13,889 9,252.0 11 0
Appendix B

Humanitarian Operations

Total

Airlift Tons of Refuel Fuel

Operation Dates Sorties Passengers Cargo Sorties Transfer Remarks Source

Nuclear Sep 91 AMC/HO

Forces Jun 92

Initiative

Provide Jun 92 ,109 2,438 25 AMC/HO

Hope May 93 commercial

sorties

thru ,300 AMC/HO

7 Apr 95

thru ,500 AMC/HO

17 Jun 97

Provide 3 Jul 1,694 35,035 6,515 Used ANG AMC/HO

Promise Sep 93 & AFRes

Provide Aug 92 326 18,805 2,265.0 AMC/HO

Transition Oct 93

Provide Aug 92 3,100 13,520 34,400 AMC/HO

Relief Feb 93

NATO to AMC/HO

Minister 25 Sep 92

Agreement

Impressive 13 Sep 94 13,974 1,168 AMC/HO 

Lift 29 Sep 92

Provide 13 Feb 4 13,812 6,149 3 AMC/HO 

Refuge 9 Mar 93 commercial

sorties

Provide 8 May 382 7,000 AMC/HO

Promise 26 Jul 94

Support 22 Jul 700 11,000 23,000 448 President–– AMC/HO

Hope 11 Sep 94 immediate

massive increase

Deny Flight 23 Aug 94 AMC/HO

Project 21 Nov 2 23,001 4 Enriched AMC/HO

Sapphire 23 Nov 94 uranium

Safe 1 Feb 95 161 27,000 Contract - AMC/HO

Passage 31 Jan 96 Miami Air

Quick 30 Jun 27 4,742 1,504 AMC/HO

Lift 10 Aug 95

Joint 4 Dec 95 8,000 AMC/HO

Endeavor 16 Sep 97

105
Total

Airlift Tons of Refuel Fuel

Operation Dates Sorties Passengers Cargo Sorties Transfer Remarks Source

Provide 3 Jul 93 13,000 160,000 AMC/HO

Promise 9 Jan 96

(update)

Assured 7 Apr 13,103 12,153 2,148 AMC/HO

Response 6 May 96

Desert 18 Aug 96 ,1 18,300 Contract AMC/HO

Focus 747

Noah’s Ark 17 Aug 97 ,1 90 dogs & AMC/HO

cats

Guardian 21 Mar ,115 11,200 2,400 AMC/HO

Retrieval 17 Apr 97

Baltic 8 Jul ,2 AFRes AMC/HO

Challenge 20 Jul 98

98

Kieko Lift 9 Sep ,1 18,312 3 AMC/HO

10 Sep 98

Shining 4 Apr ,124 12,913 5,939 AMC/HO

Hope 8 Jul 99

Provide 5 May 99 13,000 Contracted AMC/HO

Refuge Carrier

106

Totals 13,347 17,57813, 170,487 3
Appendix C

Military Operations

Total

Airlift Tons of Refuel Fuel in

Operation Dates Sorties Passengers Cargo Sorties Millions Remarks Source

Southern 18 Aug 92– AMC/HO

Watch ongoing

Restore Dec 92– 1,182 51,431 41,243 1,170 82.4 AMC/HO

Hope May 93

Uphold 8 Sep–31 1,528 15,000 ,92 AMC/HO

Democracy Dec 94

Vigilant 10–13 35,400 AMC/HO

Warrior Oct 94

Somalia II 7 Jan 59 11,400.0 1,400 Used AMC/HO

24 Mar 95 commercial

carriers

Desert 2 Sep 1 13,575 AMC/HO

Strike 3 Sep 96

Phoenix 19 Nov 51 3,000 208 7.4 Air bridge AMC/HO

Scorpion I 25 Nov 97 to augment 

Southern Watch

Phoenix 8 Feb 300 10,000 11,000 200 4.7 Deployment AMC/HO 

Scorpion II 3 Mar 98 phase

Phoenix 11 Oct Never used AMC/HO

Duke I Nov 98 deployed

assets

Phoenix 18 Feb Allied Force AMC/HO

Duke II 24 Mar 99 buildup with

150 tankers

107

Totals 3,347 78,30613, 56,643 1,670 94.5
Appendix D

Exercises

Airlift Tons of Refuel Fuel in

Exercise Dates Sorties Passengers Cargo Sorties Millions Remarks Source

Intrinsic 2–20 53 1,000 3,767 AMC/HO

Action Aug 92

Ocean Apr– 493 16,000 6,700 137 4.3 Some AMC/HO

Venture May 93 commercial

Peacekeeper 30 Aug– 52 15,320 6,610 AMC/HO

94 12 Sep 94

Peacekeeper 19 May– 50 35,300 6,430 AMC/HO

95 1 Jun 95

Coronet Bat 2–3 Jun 95 . 6 AMC/HO

Paratroop 27 Jun 95 6 13,204 ,,55.0 AMC/HO

Drop

Cooperative 5–29 Aug 14 AMC/HO

Nugget

Intrinsic 17 Aug 95 100 2,200 1,300 Some AMC/HO 

Action commercial

Big Drop 15 May 96 136 3,700 AMC/HO

III

Cornerstone 28 May 96 1 , 16 Romania–– AMC/HO

96 4 pallets 4

trucks-est. tons

Centrazbat 14 Sep 97 8 ,500 24 Paratroopers AMC/HO

97 to Kazakhstan

Purple 28–29 60 AMC/HO

Dragon Jan 98

109

Totals 3, 913 24,22413, 12,878 1, 167 4.3
Appendix E

Totals

Airlift Tons of Refuel Fuel in

Exercise Dates Sorties Passengers Cargo Sorties Millions Remarks Source

1 Jun 92–

Totals 29 Oct 99 34,830 222,691 364,806 2,598 112

111
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118
———. Speech to the Maxwell chapter of the Airlift/Tanker

Association, Maxwell AFB, Ala.: 2 March 2000.

Sullivan, Michael. The Gulf War. Frontline: WGBH Educational Foundation, 1996. Two videocassettes.

Works That Exclude Mobility Force Structure

Bowie, Christopher. The New Calculus: Analyzing Airpower’s

Changing Role in Joint Theater Campaigns. Report no. MR149-AF, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993. 

Department of Defense, Logistics Directorate. Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update. Washington, D.C.:

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 March 1995.

———. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on

Strategic Mobility. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology,

August 1996.

Gebman, Jean R., Lois J. Batchelder, and Katherine M.

Peohlmann. Finding the Right Mix of Military and Civil Airlift. Vol. 2, Issues and Implications. Report no. MR-406/2-

AF. Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 1994.

Kassing, David. Army and Marine Corps Prepositioning Programs: Size and Responsiveness Issues. Report no. PM378-CRMAF. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, April 1995. 

———. “Strategic Mobility in the Post-Cold War Era.” In New

Challenges for Defense Planning. Edited by Paul K. Davis.

Report no. MR-400-RC. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND,

1994.

Lund, John, Ruth Berg, and Corinne Replogle. Project AIR

FORCE Analysis of the Air War in the Gulf: An Assessment

of Strategic Airlift Operational Efficiency. Report no. R4269/4-AF. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993.

McCaffery, Thomas. Ready Reserve Force Contingency Crewing Requirements Study. Alexandria, Va.: McCaffery &

Whitener, 15 December 1995.

Smith, Juliane K., Lt Col Steve Cheavens, and Maj Michael

Zenk. 1991 Tanker Study. Offutt AFB, Nebr.: Strategic Air

Command, 1 March 1991.

119
Stucker, James P. Analyzing the Effects of Airfield Resources

on Airlift Capacity. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999.

Stucker, James P., et al. Understanding Airfield Capacity for

Airlift Operations. Report no. MR-700-AF/OSD. Santa

Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1998.

US Congress. Military Airlift: Options Exist for Meeting Requirements While Acquiring Fewer C-17s. GAO/NSIAD-97-38.

Washington, D.C.: GAO, February 1997.

———. Moving US Forces: Options for Strategic Mobility. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, February

1997.

———. Strategic Airlift: Improvements in C-5 Mission Capability

Can Help Meet Airlift Requirements. GAO/NSIAD-96-43.

Washington, D.C.: GAO, November 1995.

Vick, Alan, et al. Preparing the U.S. Air Force for Military Operations other Than War. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1997.

120
aerial lines of communication (ALOC):

19, 39, 63, 74, 91

Afghanistan: 62

Air bases

Gielenkirchen AB, Germany: 71 

Incirlik AB, Turkey: 53, 64

Ramstein AB, Germany: 53

Rhein–Main AB, Germany: 29, 53

Torrejon AB, Spain: 29

Zaragoza AB, Spain: 29 

Air Command and Staff College: 30

aircraft: 2, 4, 7, 12, 14–15, 17–19,

29–30, 33, 36, 43–46, 48–51, 63–65,

68–74, 81, 83–87, 93, 95–96

Boeing 747-400: 25

cargo: 29

combat: 63, 69, 85

commercial: 15, 19, 45–46, 50, 70,

95

fighter: 64

in Haiti: 69

military: 15, 19, 69–70

NATO: 51

strategic: 4

C-5: 4, 23, 25, 36, 45–47, 55–56,

69, 71, 82, 84–85, 97

C-17: 4–5, 23, 25, 31–32, 35, 37,

45–49, 56, 62, 65–66, 71, 82, 85,

93, 95

C-33: 25

C-130: 4, 45, 49–50, 62

C-141: 12, 36–37, 45–48, 55–56,

65, 69, 71, 85

DC-10: 50

F-22: 85

KC-10: 23, 45–46, 50

KC-135: 50–52, 56, 71–72, 82–83,

97

Air Education and Training Command:

49

Air Force bases

Andersen AFB, Guam: 54

Davis–Monthan AFB, Arizona: 51

Hickam AFB, Hawaii: 54

Maxwell AFB, Alabama: 30

Air Force Doctrine Center: 82

Air Force Reserve (AFRes): 14–15, 44,

46, 49–51, 82

Air National Guard (ANG): 14–15, 28,

44, 46, 49–50, 82

air superiority: 29, 91

Alaska: 54

American Embassy: 69

Angola: 62, 67

Arabian Peninsula: 39, 53

area of responsibility (AOR): 10, 20

Aristide, Jean-Bertrand: 69

Army Corps of Engineers: 48

Bardera: 68

Belarus: 62

Berlin airlift: 2

Boeing Company: 49

Bosnia: 53, 62

Bottom-Up Review: 60

Bush, George: 67

Carter, James Earl “Jimmy,” Jr.: 69

China: 2

Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF): 10,

14–15, 27–30, 35, 46, 66, 95

Clark, Wesley: 52, 82

Clinton, William J.: 6, 25, 60, 62

Cold War: 2, 23–24, 50–51, 59, 61, 79,

87, 97

combatant commander: 1, 11, 13,

19–20, 26–27, 33, 38–39, 52

command and control (C2): 16, 72–73,

83

commander in chief (CINC): 13, 36–37,

39, 46, 66, 71, 85–86

Commonwealth of Independent States:

70, 78

component commander: 26

Congress: 6, 23, 32, 60, 85

Congressional Budget Office (CBO): 25

continental United States (CONUS): 17,

63, 69, 72

Coolidge, Charles: 36

Defense

Department of (DOD): 1, 3, 5–7, 9,

15–16, 19, 21, 23,

Logistics Agency (DLA): 10

Planning Guidance: 52

transportation system (DTS): 6–7, 9,

11, 15, 19, 21, 84

121

Index
doctrine: 19, 24, 26, 28, 32, 39, 61,

77, 79–82, 85, 95

Air Force: 64

air mobility: 82

joint: 81–82

DOD Directive 5158.4: 9

England: 55

Europe: 4, 53–54, 62, 65

Federal

Aviation Administration: 47

Emergency Management Agency: 69

Fogleman, Ronald R.: 86

France: 53

General Accounting Office: 62

Global

Air Traffic Management: 51, 84

Positioning System: 51

reach laydown (GRL): 72–73, 92

Transportation Network (GTN): 14,

16, 33, 84

Grenada: 65

Gulf War: 27, 37, 61, 67, 80, 94

Haiti: 65, 68–69

Himalayas, The: 2

Horner, Charles A.: 26

Hussein, Saddam: 67

in-transit visibility: 14

Iraq: 26–28, 30, 37–38, 64–65, 67 

Japan: 54

Johnson, Hansford T.: 13

Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS): 10, 13, 20, 37,

61, 71

Operation Planning and Execution

System (JOPES): 11–12

Task Force (JTF): 14, 64–65

Transportation Board: 13

Joint Vision 2010: 63, 78

Kenya. See Mombasa

Kismayu: 68

Korea: 30, 33, 34

Kosovo: 62, 69

Kross, Walter: 71

Kurds: 67

Kuwait: 27, 37, 38

Lajes Field, Portugal: 53

large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off

(LMSR): 35, 38

Liberia: 65

Lockheed Martin: 84

major regional contingencies: 6

Military

Airlift Command (MAC): 13

Sealift Command (MSC): 9–10, 28

Traffic Management Command

(MTMC): 9

million ton miles per day (MTM/D):

23–24, 31, 34–36, 43–48, 50, 55–56,

60–61, 94

mission

support element (MSE): 73

support team (MST): 72–73

mobility readiness spares package: 49

Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up

Review Update. See MRS BURU 

Mogadishu: 68

Mombasa, Kenya: 67

Mongolia: 62

MRS BURU: 4, 24–25, 27–39, 46, 48,

52, 54–56, 59–60, 91–92, 94

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration: 47

National Command Authorities (NCA):

1–3, 10, 18–19, 23, 25, 27, 62,

69–70, 81–82

National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 1997: 60

National Defense Panel (NDP): 3, 5, 78

national security strategy (NSS): 1–2,

6–7, 77–78, 80–81, 85, 87, 93–94,

97

A National Security Strategy for a New

Century: 77

nautical miles (NM): 43, 47, 53, 84

Naval Air Station, Keflavik, Iceland: 71

Navy Seabees: 68

no-drive zone: 27

no-fly zone (NFZ): 27, 64–65, 79

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO): 13, 51, 62

122
Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat

Reduction Program: 78

operations

Allied Force: 25, 51–52, 62, 71–72,

81–82

Assured Response: 65

Desert Shield: 25–26, 28–30, 32,

39, 43, 46–47, 51

Desert Storm: 6, 24–25, 29, 32, 37,

39, 43, 46–47, 51, 67

Eldorado Canyon: 53

Impressive Lift: 67

Joint Endeavor: 25, 62

Joint Forge: 71 

Northern Watch: 64–65, 71

Phoenix Duke I: 62

Phoenix Duke II: 62

Provide Comfort: 64, 67

Provide Hope: 70

Provide Relief: 67

Provide Transition: 67

Restore Democracy: 69

Restore Hope: 68

Southern Watch: 65, 71

Uphold Democracy: 28, 69

Vigilant Warrior: 27

PACER CRAG: 51

Pacific Rim: 65

Pakistan: 67

Panama: 65

Persian Gulf War: 9

policy: 61, 77, 79, 81–83, 87, 93–95

Powell, Colin L.: 69

primary aircraft authorization (PAA):

43, 46, 48

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): 5,

59–60, 77–78, 80, 87

RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom: 53

RAND: 15, 55

Ready Reserve Force: 28, 35

Reagan, Ronald W.: 23

Reliability Enhancement and

Reengineering Program: 47

Report of the Quadrennial Defense

Review (QDR): 3. See also

Quadrennial Defense Review

Robertson, Charles T. “Tony,” Jr.: 36

Rosen, Stephen Peter: 86

Rota Naval Air Station, Spain: 53

Royal Air Force: 65

Royal Army: 65

Saddam: 67

Sarajevo: 62

Saudi Arabia: 32, 37, 65

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman: 26, 37

sea lines of communication: 39, 91

secretary of defense: 15, 26, 28–29, 31,

59–60, 78, 80, 87

Shiites: 67

single integrated operation plan (SIOP):

18, 52, 96

smaller-scale contingencies: 59, 61,

79–81

Somalia: 67–68

Soviet Union: 24, 70, 79, 86

State Department: 27, 69

strategic: 18, 29, 52, 59–63, 66, 77,

83, 85–87, 95, 97 

Air Command (SAC): 50–52, 96

aircraft: 4

airlift: 71

Airlift Forces Mix Analysis: 25, 32,

48

air mobility: 14–15, 26

assets: 11

documents: 3

environment: 5, 97

strategy: 78

air mobility: 77, 80 

defense: 5, 59

national military intervention: 80

national security: 1, 77

Tajikistan: 62

tanker airlift control center (TACC):

13–14, 16, 67, 72–73, 81

tanker airlift control elements (TALCE):

62–63, 67–68, 72–73 

Tanker Requirements Study: 52

technology: 80, 82–83

hypersonic: 96

temporary duty (TDY): 44, 71, 80

theater commanders: 10–11, 15, 33,

70

time-phased force deployment data

(TPFDD): 7, 10–11, 23, 25–26, 29,

37–39, 54, 62, 64, 66, 70, 81, 91–92

123
United Kingdom: 53, 65

United Nations (UN): 27, 61, 67, 68

Security Council Resolutions: 64,

67, 68, and 68,

US Air Force (USAF): 1–3, 6–7, 35,

48, 79, 85

US Army Air Forces: 2

US Central Command (USCENTCOM):

18, 24, 32, 38, 51, 52

US Navy (USN): 10, 28, 31, 35

US Transportation Command

(USTRANSCOM): 6–7, 9–15, 20–21,

26–28, 30–36, 38–39, 46, 59, 62,

65–66, 69–70, 84, 92

CINCTRANSCOM: 46, 86

Vicenza, Italy: 82

Voluntary Intermodal Sealift

Agreement: 10

weapons of mass destruction (WMD):

5, 78

World War II: 1–2

Yugoslav government: 62

zero attrition: 27, 29

124
Air Mobility

The Key to the United States

National Security Strategy

Air University (AU) Library/AU Press Team

Chief Editor

Hattie D. Minter

Copy Editor

Rita B. Mathis

Book Design and Cover Art

Daniel M. Armstrong

Composition and

Prepress Production

Mary P. Ferguson