Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Global security concerns: anticipating the twenty-first century / Karl P. Magyar. 

p. cm. 

Includes bibliographical references. 

1. War-Forecasting. 2. Security International. 3. Twenty-first centuryForecasts. I. Magyar, K. P. (Karl P.) 

U21.2.G53 1996 

355.02/0905-dc 20 96-12651 

CIP

ISBN 1-58566-006-X 

First Printing April 1999 

Second Printing July 2000 

Third Printing September 2001 

Digitize January 2003 from 2001 Third Printing NOTE: Pagination changed 

Disclaimer 

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the 

interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not reflect the 

official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States government. 

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is 

cleared for public release.

ii
Dedicated to the students of the Air Command and 

Staff College, many of whom will soon make vital 

security-related decisions concerning our future. 

iii
Contents 

Page 

DISCLAIMER .................................................................................................................... ii 

PREFACE.......................................................................................................................... vi 

HISTORY, CULTURE, AND CHANGE: FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICTS 

AND WARS ..................................................................................................................1 

RELIGION-A BANNER FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CONFLICT...................19 

NATIONAL FRAGMENTATION, ETHNICITY, AND THE NEW WORLD 

ORDER........................................................................................................................32 

POPULATION PRESSURES, MIGRATION, AND REFUGEES...................................46 

TRANSNATIONAL CRIME ITS EFFECT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 

INTERNATIONAL STABILITY ...............................................................................58 

HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS ............................................70 

ANTICIPATING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ECONOMIC SOURCES 

OF CONFLICTS..........................................................................................................82 

THE THIRD WORLD’S NONVIABLE STATES A MAJOR SOURCE OF 

CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY.................................................96 

Table 2 .......................................................................................................................101 

WHEN THE WATER RUNS OUT.................................................................................111 

TRANSNATIONAL AIR, WATER, AND LAND DEGRADATION 

PROBLEMS ..............................................................................................................124 

NUCLEAR CONFLICT AND NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES IN THE 

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY...................................................................................134 

THE OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CHEMICAL AND 

BIOLOGICAL ...........................................................................................................145 
CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS MAPPING WARFARE IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY.....................................................................................................161 

REGIONAL IMPACTS OF CIVIL WARS ....................................................................176 

THREATS FROM THIRD WORLD REGIONAL HEGEMONS..................................186 

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY .................198 

THE TRANSMILLENNIAL WORLD FROM AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE......210 

v
PREFACE 

One of the most important and intellectually fascinating areas of investigation for the

student of political affairs concerns the attempt to understand why man makes war. This 

ancient field of inquiry may be addressed at such various levels as the philosophical and 

psychological or the institutional and structural contexts of human behavior. For 

example, did the recent wars in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti result from clashing

ideologies, tribalism, poverty and class warfare, the cold war, or distant ramifications of 

colonial history, or, as has been postulated, the trees of these countries having been cut 

down? These plausible sources of conflict offer insight into various dimensions of 

explanations for wars; however, the analysts in this volume focus on just one aspect of 

the inquiry. They were charged with the task of anticipating which specific contentious 

issues likely will propel large, organized political units to choose violent means of

acquiring their sociopolitical objectives rather than attaining them peacefully. The units

on which we focus have been traditionally identified as states, but we recognize that a

host of new sub- and suprastate actors also will play major roles in such wars; hence, we 

also will allude to them. 

The specific issues identified in the text are by no means completely new sources of

contention. Indeed, we may easily argue that throughout history men have fought over

the same objects and values-only the weapons, strategies, and tactics in their acquisition

have changed. We concentrate on those issues that we believe will be prominent sources 

of contention at the dawn of the twenty-first century. We knowingly omitted some of the

most pervasive and such well-articulated causes of wars as power-balancing initiatives or 

the quest for such natural resources as oil or strategic minerals. These causes no doubt 

will prevail as sources of violent conflict, but they will not likely assume new forms as 

will those issues which ' comprise our chapter topics. 

Nor do we rank in order of importance a list of issues likely to lead to wars. We

make no assumptions about the feasibility of such rankings as too many undetermined 

variables would enter into such an equation. We do offer a brief background on each 

topic; we attempt to assess the magnitude of them; we speculate on who the antagonists

may be; and we attempt to project the disruptive potential of each topic under 

consideration and speculate on how it might impact the interests of the United States. 

We also are sensitive to assumptions that the potential disputes we portray must lead 

to war. In our analyses we offer balance by exploring the prospect that our contentious

issues also may be resolved peacefully. Currently, numerous avail- able and prominent 

analyses caution us not to be overly sanguine about the end of war, and as analysts

associated with the nation's military effort, we maintain a healthy respect for anticipating

early the emerging challenges which counsel the timely formulation of appropriate 

responses. 

vi
We do not proffer the emergence of startling new world paradigms and, we avoid the 

"gloom-and-doom" approach in drawing attention to our investigations. In fact, most of 

the sources of instability identified in this volume have manifested themselves in modemday conflicts, but we anticipate a larger role for them in the future. For example, it may 

seem innovative to identify international criminal activity as a future cause of armed 

hostilities between states, but we need only to recall our military operations in Panama 

and Haiti, which were motivated in part by our attempt to diminish the flow of narcotics

into the United States. The US also has offered military support to the governments of 

several South American countries so they might curtail illicit drug production- ultimately 

headed for the US. 

We may be struck by several observations in the following chapters. Foremost, in 

addressing prospective disruptive challenges emanating from the sources we identify, 

there will be little utility for addressing the challenges with nuclear weapons. 

Conventional military means, which address the issues while longer lasting political 

solutions are formulated, may address the host of conflicts having social and economic 

sources better than nuclear weapons. Another readily identifiable characteristic of many 

of the sources of conflict is the pervasiveness of economic bases. It may be the most 

overt reason on occasion, but many times economic foundations play an underlying role 

in support of other noneconomic causes. This requires that we analyze more than only the 

immediate, overt sources of instability but also the long-term perspective which may 

dictate a nonmilitary strategy for the ultimate resolution of those conflicts. 

Not surprising, most, if not virtually all, armed conflicts in the near term will be 

experienced in the third world, although they will engage the interests-and involvementof the developed world. While resource and ecological problems will underlie many 

conflicts as the third world attempts to come to term with its population growth in a

constrained international environment, the developed world will not escape altogether

these same concerns. That armed force has been implemented in recent years by several 

developed states to ensure access to food resources, namely in pursuit of established 

fishing rights and practices, has surprised many. Others have noted that in some regions 

of the world in the future water might be worth more than oil. And, a final suggestion 

cautions the reader to accept the complexity of causes of wars. Wars are rarely the 

product of a clearly defined object of contention between two rivals; instead, antagonists, 

as well as allied participants, pursue a combination of goals when the war allows them 

the opportunity to do so. What we present in these analyses are major, or precipitating, 

causes of potential conflicts. We do not present the myriad of underlying causes which 

ultimately will shape the passion and the final outcome of the wars. 

The analysts have been requested to make only brief comments about the 

implications of their respective analyses for the interests of the United States. An 

elaboration of this subject will be a valuable addition to the text, but it goes beyond our 

modest undertaking in this present effort. There will emerge from our presentations

several implications for adjusting the structure, capabilities, and mission of our military if

we are to prevail. However, as noted, the defense capability of our country will realize

inherent limitations in many of our projected conflicts, and often the defense 

establishment will have to augment sociopolitical initiatives, which will bear the brunt of 

conflict resolution. We offer no counsel on how to prepare our armed forces of the future; 

instead, our contribution identifies the sources of emerging security problems. 

vii
Finally, we must emphasize that we imposed no requirement on the authors, to 

present a common view of the impact of future security instability. We encouraged each 

analyst to exercise personal judgment and the preferred analytic approach. Also, we all 

write in our private analytic capacities, and our views do not represent the official 

positions of the US Department of Defense nor of any US government agency. 

As editor, I wish to thank Col John A. Warden III, USAF, Retired, who as 

commandant, Air Command and Staff College, was supportive of this undertaking. I am

also grateful to Lt Col Bradley S. Davis for providing valuable, energetic, and competent 

service as editorial assistant. Ms Yuna Braswell offered excellent computer work for usand I thank her. And, I am very pleased that my good friend, Dr Richard Bailey, with 

whom I have had the privilege of working on several earlier projects, was appointed by 

Air University Press to serve as our editor. Thank you all for a job well done. 

Karl P. Magyar, PhD Editor 

viii
PART I 

INTRODUCTION 

Anticipating the Sources of Future Conflicts 
1 

History, Culture, and Change: 

Foundations of Conflicts and Wars 

Karl P. Magyar 

A spate of cynical analytic literature has recently emerged about the “new world 

disorder.” This spate is somewhat curious as global tensions during the cold war were

certainly reason for cynicism, considering the destructive prospects of a nuclear exchange 

between the East and the West. In light of the evident cessation of tensions between the 

members of the former Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), how can we explain the prevailing concern with the' uncertainty of the postcold-war era and the apprehension about the future? 

The answer to this question is not elusive. As one of the two major powers in the 

cold war system, America realized that its entire security culture had centered on meeting

the perceived challenge of an expansionist Soviet alliance. This challenge posed a real 

and an immediate threat to America's core security interests and to that of our allies. 

Furthermore, although numerous other conflicts and wars prevailed, those wars which 

mattered most to the West were perceived within the cold war context. This context 

applied especially to Korea, Hungary, Formosa, Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Namibia, 

Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. Lurking on the other side was always the “Evil Empire”-the

Soviets, Chinese, or other communists, which, for a long time, the West saw as a 

monolithic bloc. 

However, in the midst of the cold war, much of the third world became independent,

yet the West viewed their struggles not as liberation wars or as civil wars, but as part of a 

Soviet grand design for potential global revolution. The West simply ignored most of the 

lesser conflicts. In fact, countries which had their own agendas that generally remain 

unfulfilled to this day shaped most of these conflicts in the third world. The issue is not 

that such wars in the third world today are new conflicts or that significantly more of 

them have occurred than during the cold war, but the issue is that we have begun to 

recognize them for various reasons. They are becoming disturbingly destructive and tend 

towards prolongation. 1

 These wars disrupt entire regions, potentially threaten global 

stability, and may disrupt the extensively intertwined global economic system. The 

collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has brought these conflicts to the doorstep 

of Western Europe, America's trusted traditional allies, and members of NATO-who had 

1 
banded together successfully to deter a nuclear threat only to now face the prospect of 

becoming engulfed in pre-World War II type conventional wars fueled by nationalism. 

The end of the cold war has brought a welcome reprieve from a credible nuclear

threat, but warriors and civilians dying in the steady stream of lesser conflicts have 

forged ahead unabated. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute counted 30 

major wars raging in 1991 and 34 in 1993. 2

 From the perspective of the victims, the 

distinction between the catastrophe of a nuclear or a conventional war is illusory. We also 

may make a powerful case by arguing that the absence of the cold war will enhance 

hostilities as neither of the former Great Powers is available to repress the proclivity

towards the use of force among their previous allies or among those over whom they 

previously had influence. Possibly, the Gulf War would not have occurred as it might 

have had to exact a commitment for alignment from the Soviets who might still have had 

their hands full in nearby Afghanistan. But certainly the Soviets would have taken an 

active involvement in the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia and the threatened 

interests of the Serbs-their traditional allies. Nor would Chechnya's violent secession 

have been attempted under the authoritarian regime. 

Yet another legacy of the cold war is the flood of arms which are dispersed 

throughout the world, as well as the transfer of technology for arms production. These 

weapons had been distributed liberally to allies and proxies, and today they proliferate

throughout the third world. In Africa's Horn region, such arms have on several occasions 

been more available than bread. The use of these ubiquitous arms has fueled the 

prolonged wars in Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia in that conflict-prone region. 

Such arms abound in numerous global regions and are increasingly available to private 

terrorist and criminal groups. 

The data and unfortunate impact of the post-cold war conflicts is evident, but can we 

not perceive any positive developments in the new era? The answer does offer

encouraging signs, and an overall assessment requires a balanced analysis. The most

significant accomplishment of the cold war was the fact that no nuclear war broke outeven in the face of many otherwise dire predictions. Furthermore, the nuclear control 

regimes have seen considerable progress in dampening the move towards nuclear 

proliferation. 3

 Significant also is the demise of the Marxist Soviet state whose 

disintegration has led to some severe internal conflicts, but these conflicts have not 

spilled beyond the immediately affected region. The reluctance by some Russian military 

units to fight in Chechnya in December 1994 yielded a remarkable turnabout from the 

bellicose Soviet tendencies a few years before. 4

 Czechoslovakia's “velvet revolution” led 

to the breakup of that country without an interfering Soviet Union. And, while 

Yugoslavia's disintegration has been an extremely violent affair, no Soviet Union 

intervened, and that conflict has not spilled into neighboring states. Around the world, 

numerous other conflicts ground to a halt or lost their significance in the absence of 

Soviet support. Except for the border skirmish between Peru and Ecuador in 1995, 

relatively weak internal insurgencies, and the waning stages of a few old internal 

conflicts, Latin America has rarely been as peaceful as it is now. Today, the area is

dominated almost entirely by democratic governments. Similarly, the fortunes of 

southern Africa have quickly changed, and its conflicts have ceased or lost global 

importance through the departure of the Soviet/Cuban-sponsored offensive in Angola, 

their previous support of Mozambique, and the curtailment of Soviet support to South 

2 
Africa's African National Congress, which led to a remarkably peaceful transition in that 

controversial country. 

In the 1960s and 1970s, the US had been widely criticized for its aggressive

“imperial” tendencies, but this impulse has' not resulted in any permanent acquisitions or 

imposition of controls over new areas. Under US influence, democracy, human rights, 

and free markets have become the new standard; however, the realities vary considerably 

from the ideal. But this trend is a start. The United Nations has expanded its 

peacekeeping efforts enormously, with mixed results, but certainly as a commendable 

effort and indicator of the potential of cooperation. Other countries have begun to accept 

responsibilities for regional peace efforts, which portend another positive development. 

The efforts of West Africa's Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

force in Liberia, which, while not without controversy, is being examined for possible 

emulation in other regions. Yet another major realization is that extremist and doctrinaire 

cold war ideologies have not addressed fundamental problems in the third world and that 

they may do so sooner through liberal economic approaches than through mere 

ideological posturing. 

These significant positive developments weigh heavily as a balance to the prevailing

analytic literature which portrays a generally pessimistic view of the future. This situation 

is not entirely paradoxical as it may be explained by referring to the positive

developments in much of the world. But for other substantial regions, these positive 

developments are not a reality, and continued conflicts may be a more apt 

characterization. The emerging pronounced division between two worlds is the general 

tenor of the analysis of Matthew Connelly and Paul Kennedy in their article, “Must it be 

the Rest Against the West?” 5

 They argue that life is good for areas of the world that can 

compete, but the globe's growing noncompetitive sector, -with its unmanageable 

population numbers, will soon swamp these areas. The evaluative balance must therefore

be qualified within the “two worlds” context whose widening disparities between its two 

constituent parts may be the most-important dynamic force and underlying source of 

conflicts fn the future. 

Global Perspectives 

The demise of the second world-traditionally identified as the Soviet Union and its

East European allies and characterized by their command economies-has produced the 

new two worlds division of states. The industrially developed democracies and their 

market economies comprise one world, with the rest comprising the other world. The 

latter comprises the numerous developing states, divided into several subcategories that

depict their disparate economic status. Russia, the other new republics which emerged 

from the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the former East European states remain today 

in an analytic limbo. Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky similarly recognize such a twofold division of the “real world.” They refer to its constituent parts as the zone of “peace, 

wealth, and democracy,” and the zone of “turmoil, war, and development.” 6

 Their useful 

distinction suggests that more than only traditional criteria, which focused on the 

northsouth division of the globe, must be considered and that economic status also

coincides with security conditions. 

3 
The Demographic and Economic Context 

The total global population is approaching 6 billion. Of this, fewer than 20 percent 

live in the first world, though by no means do all inhabitants of these countries live at 

typical first world standards. An analogy may be made with reference to the macro data 

for South Africa, where the country's entire economy masks the disparate distribution of 

wealth between whites and blacks. Collectively, the countries characterized as first world, 

dominate more than 80 percent of the globe's existing wealth and its economic

transactions. Connelly and Kennedy point out that 95 percent of the total global 

population growth in the future will occur in the poor countries of the world. Despite 

economic growth in the third world, in terms of absolute numbers, there will be many 

more poor people than before. These people are rapidly migrating into the swelling

shantytowns of third world cities, thus making the population numbers of these cities the 

size of some small countries. And, these populations will be predominately very young. 7

 

Growing at an annual rate of 3 percent, the population of many of these countries 

will double in 24 years. 8

 Many developing states exceed that rate today. Jessica 

Tuchman Mathews elaborates on the new concept of security which also must account 

for resource, environmental, and demographic issues and concludes, “Environmental 

decline occasionally leads directly to conflict.” 9

 However, observers must not view this 

phenomenon automatically as negative, according to Sheldon Richman. He points out 

that most of the world's population growth rate throughout history was exceeded by 

economic progress. 10 Observers must consider not only the raw aggregate data for the 

globe, but they also must identify the precise location of the growth to pinpoint the 

relationship between population growth, economic development, and conflict. 

We may paint a generally rosy prospect for the peaceful first world-whose 

democracies make no war on each other. Also, there may be encouraging signs for the 

countries emerging out of the former Soviet Union, whose transformation, though 

volatile, has not been disruptive beyond their own regions. But vast parts of the third 

world are rapidly advancing towards greater uncertainty. They are doing so under 

conditions of utter deprivation and frustration, fueled by the technological advantages of 

the information age that depict the opulent and excessive splendors of the first world even 

to the most obscure inhabitant of the third world. Where in the past, rising expectations

meant eventual ownership of a bicycle, now the standard expectation is a luxury 

automobile, house, electronic gadgetry, food, health care, education, vacations, and a 

splendid retirement. And the billions of poor demand it now. The economic strain on the 

world will be extremely great as the demand and increasingly illicit or unorthodox efforts 

to obtain such coveted lifestyles will outpace the political ability to ensure its lawful 

realization. At this matrix a new culture of conflict may explode in the world. 

Where authoritarian governments are absent, third world democratic governments 

will have few resources to contain challenges to their rule. In the absence of immediate

economic success, such frail democratic governments will lose the respect of their 

aggressive citizens or of ambitious or envious militaries, as occurred in Haiti. In the past, 

patience marked rising expectations, but since expectations tend to remain unfulfilled, the

time allowed today for governments to produce results may be getting precariously short. 

The plight of the frustrated masses in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Chechnya, Eritrea, 

Somalia, Rwanda, and Liberia shows their impatience with the governments' hollow 

promises. The governments of such failing states amount to little more than small coteries

4 
of privileged elites, ensconced in embattled medieval-like fortifications, with their 

national armies constituting little more than paid mercenaries to protect, not the nation

from neighboring predators, but the elite from the masses. Their citizens will judge such

governments to be irrelevant as subnational units emerge in the vacuum, in effect, as 

warlords. These were in great evidence in Mozambique throughout its long civil war as

its government exercised little authority outside of the capital, while the country's rebel 

force raped the scarce resources of the vast rural districts. The situation does not vary 

much in parts of Peru, Colombia, Burma, Cambodia, and Somalia and in numerous 

locations in Africa. Many who are able will flee; others will stay and fight. But the

ensuing anarchy will depress the value of life greatly. 

The economic and conflict data support such an assessment. At the crux is a question 

which has never been adequately answered: Why is it that much of the fighting in the 

world takes place in the poorest regions? At first sight, one is tempted to make a

superficial judgment about the poor attacking the rich in pursuit of justice and 

redistribution, but this, of course, is not a valid assertion. The poor tend to fight other 

poor, mostly their neighbors with whom they have lived for centuries, or they fight 

among themselves. This phenomenon is explained by as many theories as there are 

analysts. Some analysts note that poor societies tend to be traditional societies that still 

view making war as a social necessity and cultural tradition. 11 Other explanations 

identify inequitable global economic relations which allegedly underlie and exacerbate 

hostile class relationships. 12 A third category of explanations argues that at an early stage 

of their development, virtually all states experience severe turmoil associated with their 

attempt to equilibrate internal legitimation forces; that is, poor states have governments 

which have never demonstrated their relevance to the masses, but only to a restricted 

elite. 13 

Whatever the precise or ultimate cause for such massive war-induced violence, one 

must understand that large-scale war atrocities are not abating in the post-cold war world 

and that such casualties in the half century since the end of World War II are occurring in 

the third world and not among industrially developed states-which had been the case 

prior to that war. This explanation does not suggest that the mostly colonized regions of 

the world have not experienced traditional conflicts on their own. However, because of 

the lack of modern armaments, absence of modern conceptions of nationalism, and lack 

of extensively intertwined external relations, it does suggest that their traditional conflicts

were much more limited in scope-and in casualties. The existence of these factors today, 

however, suggests a much bleaker future for the third world. 

The Conflict Context 

When portraying the state of conflict of our contemporary period, a wide latitude of 

interpretation exists with regard to deducing trends or projecting future developments. 

Certainly, we may identify pessimistic and optimistic attitudes among analysts. Zbigniew 

Brzezinski offers a sober analysis of the twentieth century's record of war casualties. He 

notes that this is the century of “megadeaths.” 14 Brzezinski identifies four individuals

most directly responsible for the major war atrocities: Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and Hitlerwho, incredibly, was a relatively minor offender compared to the other three. Other wars 

in the third world extinguished millions of additional lives. These wars included those in

Paraguay, Ethiopia, India and Pakistan, Korea, Vietnam, Nigeria, and the war between 

5 
Iran and Iraq. All told, Brzezinski calculates that “during the 20th century, no less than 

167 million lives-and quite probably in excess of 175 million-were deliberately 

extinguished through politically motivated carnage.” However, despite this grim 

assessment of the present century, the post-cold war era has allowed for renewed faith. 

Two developments account for the current upbeat views regarding the cessation of

major wars in which the US may become involved or attacks which may be launched 

against the US. The first emanates from the fact that despite the prevailing tensions of the 

cold war, neither a conventional nor a nuclear war broke out between NATO and the 

Warsaw Pact alliance. The gravity of those previous tensions is only now emerging from

Soviet sources which note that it was not during the Cuban missile crisis that Soviets

were prepared to utilize nuclear weaponry, but during the early 1980s, when top Soviet 

planners witnessed the shift in the “correlation of forces” which favored the West. 15

However, rational calculations projected that the risks and consequences of waging a 

nuclear war were simply unacceptable. The second development responsible for the 

currently more optimistic strategic assessment emerges from the stable and peaceful 

relations among the industrially developed states of the West. Democracies do fight, we

are told, but not among each other. According to a report by Freedom House, this “rule” 

has held firmly in the 353 substantially sized wars fought since 1819, and from all 

appearances it promises to continue. 16 No doubt this reluctance to engage in global-level 

wars emanates from the hard lesson of twentieth century history; namely, that such wars

cost too much and risk everything, while offering no certain commensurate gains. 

Regarding the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s, both sides had spent an 

estimated $416 billion up to 1985, which had exceeded the sum of $364 billion that they

had earned from oil sales since they first started to export the mineral. 17 Accordingly, we 

have increasing reason to believe that because of the destructive potential of nuclear 

wars, and the excessive expenses associated with large-scale conventional wars, mature 

statesmanship will encourage the peaceful resolution of differences in conflicts involving 

major developed states. These statesmen will not base their decisions on great moral 

imperatives, but on pragmatic self-interests. 

Nevertheless, as noted above, most analysts project the continuation of wars, but of a

different nature, and believe that most will occur among or within third world societieswith frequent residual implications for the more peaceful world. The data regarding war 

casualties and destruction may well project exponential increases in the future, but it will 

not be generated among the developed states of the world. Since the war in Vietnam, US 

military involvements in such conflicts has been extraordinarily sensitive to body counts.

US combat deaths in Grenada (1983) were 18; in Panama (1989), 23; in Somalia (1993), 

29; and the Gulf War (1991), 182. These data contrast with the hundreds of thousands 

who lost their lives in the mostly civil wars which rage unabated especially in South and 

Southeast Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Central America. 18 In some cases casualties

approximated a million, and, indeed, the single largest killing war since World War II 

was the Biafran War in Nigeria during the late 1960s. It accounted for an estimated 2.5 

million deaths. During 1993, of the 79 listed countries experiencing major conflicts and

political violence, 65 were in the developing world. 19 Analysts widely agree that 90

percent of casualties in the third world's civil wars involved civilians caught in the battles 

from which they could not escape, or they were victims of ensuing starvation, dislocation, 

and disease. 20 

6 
Another dimension of the new profile of wars concerns their prolongation. At the 

outset modern wars among the major powers generally were short affairs, with 

continuous actions marked by a series of related battles. 21 But modern insurgency

warfare, expertly formalized in the writings of Mao Tse-tung, incorporates an element of 

protraction which deliberately capitalized on the time element as a strategic asset of the 

weaker equipped insurgents. Unfortunately, this strategy also shifted the battlefield to 

population centers, thereby diminishing the difference between combatants and civilians. 

A prolonged war by contrast becomes bogged down beyond either side's original 

intentions. During the course of such prolonged wars, fundamental transformations take 

place in the purposes, methods, composition of combatants, and external support, with 

the main combatants rarely attaining their limited original objectives. The ongoing war in 

Angola offers a classic example. In this regard, the US learned a sobering lesson at a high 

price in Vietnam, and the Soviets received theirs in Afghanistan. Hence it is likely that 

capably equipped powers will shun such potential quagmires, but this will not be avoided 

by third world states where huge casualty rates in such prolonged wars will reflect their 

civil war nature. 

The historical evidence regarding war casualties is not encouraging for the world, but

for the stable, developed, democratic powers there is reason for optimism. In the third 

world, however, a much more pessimistic expectation is in order. This expectation

reflects the volatile consolidative conditions 'of the third world and is exacerbated by the 

availability of modern arms. Analysts must also consider another dimension of third 

world conditions for a proper assessment of sociomilitary development. Dietrich Fischer 

reminds us that “the loss of lives caused by inequities in the global economy at present 

greatly exceeds that caused by wars.” 22 His startling analysis argues that in 1965, 16 

million lives might have been saved had per capita incomes been equalized across the

world. He concludes that “structural violence exceeded direct violence by more than a 

factor of 100.” His observation introduces an increasingly important element which is 

currently elevating economic well-being alongside military considerations as equally 

important measurements of security. Therefore, the true context of future security cannot 

neatly separate military from economic-and hence also political-affairs. 

Changing Perceptions of Future Conflicts 

The post-cold war era: has introduced a plethora of projected conflicts. In 1994 

President Bill Clinton introduced his administration's perception of the transformation of 

the security environment: “The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed America's 

security imperatives. The central security challenge of the past half century-the threat of

communist expansion-is gone. The dangers we face are much more diverse.” 23 Secretary 

of State Warren Christopher echoed this view: “The Soviet empire is gone. No great 

power views any other as an immediate military threat.” 24 But Christopher elaborated on 

the new threats: “Aggression, tyranny, and intolerance still undermine political stability 

and economic development in vital regions of the world.” Specifically, he singled out as 

most worrisome, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international

crime, and the relatively new problems associated with environmental degradation, 

unsustainable population growth, and mass movement of refugees. 

7 
The US Army's Special Operations Forces (SOF) Posture Statement offers another 

perception of important changes in today's complicated and unpredictable world. It 

identifies today's significant dangers as “regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction, failure of democratic reforms, economic concerns, and transnational 

threats.” 25 It recognizes the diminished threat of global war, but suggests that a “torrent 

of previously repressed nationalism and religious and factional rivalries endangers world 

stability.” These regional conflicts are “impelled by the proliferation of military 

technology, international drug trafficking, state-sponsored terrorism, subversion, 

insurgency, lawlessness, and famine... These conflicts force the US to rely on new 

security approaches overseas. This posture statement certainly recognizes fundamental 

changes taking place in the new global conflict culture and offers an excellent example of 

the departure from traditional perceptions of conventional threats which had 

characterized military thinking. 

Analysts generally concur about the anticipated general diversification of conflicts in 

terms of causes, types, combatants, locations, and consequences. Yet they agree 

specifically on only a few concerns. As previously stated, few challenge the assertions 

that the US will not likely face a credible, massive nuclear threat, that the US will

probably avoid involvement in a global-caliber conventional war, and that most of the 

fighting on a massive scale will occur in the developing states. Ingomar Hauchler and 

Paul M. Kennedy offer a concise summary of this latter third world focus in a chapter

subheading: “A Third World Venue-but all the World Takes Part.” 26 The chapter implies

that the third world will be the battleground, but for diverse global interests. Beyond 

these broad characteristics, a wide variety of specific scenarios is offered. 

Perhaps the best-known recent statement about future wars is that by Martin van 

Creveld. He argues that future wars “will not be waged by armies but by groups whom

we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit on 

more formal titles to describe themselves.” 27 Van Creveld postulates that their

organization will be based on charismatic lines and will be characterized by “fanatical,

ideologically based, loyalties.” This posture will blur traditional lines between leaders

and their organization, between a specific population and its neighbors, some degree of 

territorial control but not necessarily within traditional national boundaries, and between 

soldiers and civilians. Today, these attributes are evident in the struggle between the 

Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia-as well as in numerous other conflict zones around 

the world. Conventional wars, according to van Creveld “may be at its last gasp.” He

further suggests that “much of what has passed for strategy during the last two centuries 

will be proven useless.” Accordingly, he expects today's most advanced and powerful 

weapons systems to lose their usefulness in future wars. 

Richard Clutterbuck suggests a not-so-dissimilar view. He sees a “pattern of dissent, 

public disorder, crime and terrorism,” which is to originate from the “pattern of work and 

living in the coming ten years.” 28 Much of the disruptive activities will emerge in the 

third world with its “growing desperation and lawlessness amongst the sprawling urban 

populations” and the frustrations encountered by students in their failures to realize their 

rising expectations. The most threatening element, according to Clutterbuck, is the 

resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in its appeal to the poorer sectors of Islamic

societies. Within developed societies, he anticipates violent industrial conflict emerging 

in protest against “the sinews and symbols of the microelectronic era, notably the 

8 
computer and communications networks.” Echoing Georges Sorel of a century before, 

Clutterbuck expects an affluent workforce to lead industrial conflicts and educated 

participants in modem, affluent societies-”who prefer to reject its values for ideological 

and environmental reasons”-to lead political protests. He summarizes this disturbing 

perspective: “This rejection may take the form of disruption, sabotage, or malicious

damage, perhaps escalating to bombing, personal attack, and other forms of terrorism.” 

Paul Rogers and Malcolm Dando also advance the third world focus. They note the 

global security shift from the cold war's East-West context to the North-South axis. The 

problem stems from the North, where one-fifth of the world's population lives, but where 

a disproportionate three-quarters of the world's wealth and resources is controlled. 

Combining global environmental constraints with the expected disparities in wealth 

places obvious constraints on the elevation of the entire world's population to the-level of 

resource use, which the developed states enjoy today. 29 Rogers and Dando see the cold 

war's legacy remaining in terms of the formidable development of military technology, 

yet this technology has failed to address arms control. Also, “global environmental 

problems have proved to be peculiarly resistant to any effective international response.” 

One likely consequence will be “militant migration,” which was demonstrated in 1991, 

when thousands of Albanian men fled to Italy. However, in that instance, the emigration 

came more in response to socioeconomically induced turmoil than to environmental 

causes. 

Hauchler and Kennedy note that the number of wars since the end of World War n 

has been increasing, and transformations in the type of wars are in evidence. 30 Some

wars have atrophied due to the termination of the cold war, which had sustained them, 

while other wars were initiated because of the elimination of the cold war's dampening 

effects. These wars tend to be ethnonational, social, and religious in nature, and they 

result in civil wars. The development crisis in the third world and Eastern Europe's

transition offer fertile fields for new conflicts. Since 1945, 1.74 of 186 rated wars have 

taken place in the third world. Hauchler and Kennedy also note the general lack of active 

hostilities between Western, industrially developed states. Facing the future, the authors 

write that “hopes for a more peaceful world have increasingly been melting away.” 31

They identify as conflict sources “increasing predominance aspirations by regional 

powers,” arms buildups, and proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons. 

For Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., the post-cold-war world is “in the midst of a process of

disorderly transformation.” 32 Nationalism has dominated most of the present century as 

the defining political-ideological force, but this domination has been replaced today with 

ethnosectarian conflict-which resembles its nationalist antecedents. For the present 

decade, there exists an intensification of “ethnicity with substantial ideological,

nationalist, and religious fervor” as well as political fragmentation. Pfaltzgraff identifies a 

useful paradox represented in two coexistent trends. He notes the increasing penetration 

of civilizations by alien forces and the efforts of such civilizations to maintain their sense 

of identity. Joining other analysts, Pfaltzgraff anticipates the emergence of problems

associated with weapons proliferation and various terrorist activities. 

Writing about the overarching level of global change, Samuel P. Huntington inspires 

as many admirers as critics when he asserts: 

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be

primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and 

9 
the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. ...The principal conflicts of global

politics will occur between nations and groups of civilizations. 

33 

According to Huntington, clashes between civilizations will dominate global politics,

and “the fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.” Since the 

Peace of Westphalia, conflicts in the Western world had occurred largely between

princes, and thereafter between nations, and subsequently between ideologies. Where 

these conflict sources had characterized global politics as reflections of Western 

influences, Huntington states that non-Western civilizations will “join the West as 

movers and shapers of history.” He sees the identity of civilizations becoming 

increasingly important in the future with the most important conflicts occurring along the 

fault lines separating the seven or eight major civilizations. Each of the cultures holds

different perceptions regarding religion, state, families, rights, responsibilities, liberty, 

authority, equality, and hierarchy. Traditionally, such civilizations have remained largely 

isolated from each other, but this case no longer exists in the modem world-hence the 

emergence of adversarial contacts. 

Huntington's perspective is provocative but excessively alarming. His critics charge 

that the trend in the conflict environment weighs heavily towards civil wars which are 

fought among members within cultures. They also charge that much of the underlying 

sources of dissension is still based on economic foundations. But Huntington did well to 

identify the often-disregarded role of historically significant values and ideas as 

generators of conflict and to note the increasing complexity ensuing from the third 

world's emerging prominence in global security matters. However, Huntington's thrust 

suggests grand, conventional, and hostile encounters, which are not reflected in the 

analyses of the other writers in this survey. Many of these writers expect nonstate actors 

to initiate conflicts which will challenge the state with quasianarchic conditions. These 

divergent views buttress the contention of the anticipated diversification of actors, 

motives, and methods likely to be encountered in the future conflict environment. 

Anticipating Twenty-First Century Conflicts 

waging wars has been a historically pervasive exercise, engaged in by all but a few 

societies. Generally, motives for conducting wars have not differed fundamentally 

throughout history if we include the categories of fear, pursuit of material gain, and the 

desire for power, influence, and control over the minds and actions of others. However, 

throughout history the specific manifestations of these motives, which are shaped by 

human nature, have reflected ever-changing demographic and technological forces. 

Ancient Sparta may have feared Athenian expansion much as Israel feared Iraq's nuclear 

weapons program in our own age. Both conflicts experienced the same genesis, namely

fear, but the tactical response, and the weapons utilized, differed. Traditional societies

have fought over rights to grazing, hunting, and croplands, or over control of oases in 

deserts, while modern societies pursue colonies, fertile lands, and lebensraum or oil and 

other scarce minerals. In both eras the core object of conflict was basic physical survival 

and once that was ensured, intermediate-level motives were expanded to include the 

retention or improvement of existing welfare levels. To emphasize, throughout history 

10 
basic motives for conflict have not changed, but an evolutionary transition has occurred 

in the specific objects pursued and the weapons employed. 

This present volume does not argue that human nature has changed and that we will 

experience fundamentally new sources of conflict. Indeed, Huntington argues 

persuasively the case for historical continuity-except for the interjection of modern

demographic and technological variables. We seek to identify new manifestations of 

human desire that warrant war activities. We could identify such objects using scientific

methodologies, but others may argue that the inherently subjective nature of such social 

phenomena will not necessarily add greater precision. 

Projected conflicts in the near-term future already may be detected in nascent form 

by the attentive observer. Certainly war motives stemming from religious, economic, or 

security concerns are not new. Yet, as the various analyses in this book demonstrate, we 

may consider anticipated hostile confrontations over international criminal activities,

population migrations, human rights violations, water and food access, land degradation,

and terrorism as new conflict sources, but we have already experienced them earlier in

history. The West does not conceive of overt transnational hostilities over food, yet the 

last several years have witnessed a dozen armed confrontations over fishing disputes on 

the high seas among developed countries. We may speculate that many existing tensions 

today may intensify to the point of overt conflicts in the future, but we must be mindful

that such tensions will not represent sudden, completely unprecedented or unanticipatable 

causes of conflict. 

Another dimension in these analyses should demonstrate that sources of conflicts are 

not singular but are invariably mixtures or combinations of motives. For example, wars 

over purely religious concerns have occurred in history, but despite public perceptions to 

the contrary, few wars are fought because of that cause today. Underneath the religious

veneer, ethnic interests-or more than likely economic interests-may be in evidence. By 

way of example, one may argue that the conflict in Northern Ireland has more to do with

class than it does with religion; that the Israeli-Arab differences stem not from religion 

but ethnicity, history, and territorial claims: that the widening large-scale civil 

disturbances in Algeria stem not so much from religious doctrinal sources as from the 

failures of economic development under the republican regime; and that the prolonged 

civil war in Sudan is not simply a conflict between Muslims and Christians, as often 

reported, but the conflict concerns race, ethnicity, history, poverty, oil, and water issues.

Certainly in Bosnia, Western Christian states are not troubled by their support of the 

Muslim population against the Christian Orthodox Serbs. In this latter case, US economic

concerns do not predominate as do humanitarian sentiments. In the same vein, the World 

Commission on Environment and Development recognized that “environmental stress is

seldom the only cause of major conflicts within or among nations. Nevertheless, they can 

arise from the marginalization of sectors of the population and from ensuing violence.” 34 

The search for motives of war represents the supreme analytic challenge for students

of international relations. This search has produced historically the most engrossing 

literature on political discourse. Caution must be exercised that superficial assumptions

about such motives are not made by the policymaker. Simplistic conclusions about most 

conflicts in Africa identify “tribalism” as the source of all conflicts, but this identification 

ignores the basic fact that tribal wars have been traditionally characterized by battles in 

pursuit of nonpolitical objectives. 35 Africa's wars are modern, but just what are the 

11 
underlying motives? In Somalia clans have fought each other to the point of 

institutionalizing anarchy. Is this the legacy of history which resulted in a large 

population of Somalis residing within the borders of Ethiopia? Is it the same legacy 

which fueled war in the late 1970s and consequently led to stark poverty in the 1980s? Is 

it the consequence of the cold war which saw the US and the Soviet Union supplying vast 

quantities of arms to Somalia and Ethiopia respectively in their war-arms which feed 

today's anarchy? Or, is Somalia's devastating poverty, hunger, and civil conflict the 

product of a high population growth rate which had resulted in increased armed 

confrontations over diminishing arable lands-forcing the losers into hopeless urban 

ghettos? In a similar vein, is Haiti's problem one of corruption, military rule, lack of 

economic development, or economic ecology, wherein its-trees were cut down, its soils 

leached, and its industrial base weakened by its rapidly expanding population? 36 And is 

Rwanda's primary problem simply tribal animosity, neighboring Uganda's interference, or

the exhaustion of scarce arable lands in this impoverished country with Africa's highest 

population density? These current examples illustrate the complexity encountered when 

analyzing extant conflicts, which make the task of anticipating the future all the more

precarious. 

Huntington's observation about Western wars having encountered shifts in interests 

from princes, nations, ideologies, and now to civilizations suggests the continuity of 

predominantly political interests. Yet on close analysis, the potential-conflict sources 

identified in this book reflect a remarkable degree of underlying socioeconomic 

foundations. Direct economic sources of conflict include the pursuit of strategic and 

mineral resources, industrial and agricultural water requirements, resource degradation 

problems, and standard requirements for food, transport rights, and unimpeded trade. 

Arguably, economic concerns were the most important factor in the breakup of 

Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. Indirect economic influences are 

easily detected in such sociopolitical issues as religious conflicts, ethnicity and national 

fragmentation, population pressures, and transnational criminal activities. In addition, 

there exists a definite economic dimension to conflicts arising from human rights issues. 

Similarly, underlying economic bases may be detected in military security issues, 

especially in light of the diversification and intensification of hostilities in the third world 

being demonstrated in many poor regions. Are not hegemonial attempts, civil wars, and 

much of terrorism the product of economic ambition or dislocation? Indeed, the concept 

of security, which has traditionally implied military conceptions, has recently been 

widened to consider vital economic issues as well. The 1995 Annual Report to the 

President and the Congress by the secretary of defense expresses this dimension: 

“Economic security has become a vital issue for the Department in recognition that a 

strong military requires a robust commercial and defense industry.” 37 

Reflecting the thrust of the projections made by some of the above analysts, the 

expected sources of future conflicts will mostly concern animosities within states or

between neighboring states. This assumption implies that ensuing wars will be fought in 

unconventional style, by diverse forces, using conventional weaponry: often small arms, 

and possibly chemical and biological weapons. In the conflicts projected in this book, 

nuclear capabilities will not offer the same deterrent value as it did to the two dominant 

adversaries during the cold war. In fact, nuclear weapons will offer no decided advantage 

to adversaries in most cases. Wars arising from religious, ethnic, mass migration, or 

12 
economic dislocation will not be capable of being countered by massive conventional 

armaments. Budding regional expansionists or terrorist cadres will value nuclear devices

as novel offensive weapons. Such a regional power as Iraq may be brought to heel with 

them, but the nuclear-equipped terrorist cannot be countered by such means. To be sure, 

analysts expect the continuation of traditional conventional wars between two or more 

national actors, and preparing to meet such familiar challenges will remain a valid

defense exercise. But to meet the challenges posed by the projected diversification of 

conflict cultures, strategic planning by the major powers likewise will have to undertake

commensurate response diversification. Much as a behemoth may be devoured by a new 

species of ants, against which it has no defenses, great powers will always face new

uncertainties. 

US or international responses to the anticipated diversification of conflicts will have

to weigh the options of peaceful versus armed responses at all times. In illustrative terms,

these options position tractors against tanks. If we are correct in postulating that most of 

the expected conflicts will have economic bases, the solutions to these conflicts may lie

more often in economic formulations. And if we are correct in assuming that traditional 

forcible measures-short of indiscriminate nuclear usage-may simply offer inadequate or

inappropriate responses, tractors may hold the only available means with which to 

address them. The costs of conducting war have become expensive, making the 

utilization of that ultimate tool for conflict resolution counterproductive. However, we 

must not assume that decisions for war will be based solely on dispassionate, quantified 

calculations. 

The US Faces the Future Global Order 

James B. Seaton offers a disturbing perspective on America's attitudes towards “lowlevel conflict.” He finds American soldiers ill prepared for “missions that require them to 

work closely with people they will possibly help, and fight, simultaneously.” 38 He 

charges that Americans “lack a unified mind-set and worldview to confront the changing 

political-military realities of international politics.” America's military culture

misunderstands and delegitimizes most forms of low-level conflict and prefers to 

emphasize firepower and mass when applying overwhelming force militarily. Seaton 

observes that this approach is limiting in contemporary, nontraditional “politicalmilitary” situations. Prospects for the occurrence of conventional wars will not dissipate.

But if van Creveld's projections will be validated, Seaton's analysis points to the need for

the American military to re-think its range of strategic responses. Seaton elaborates on

most of the anticipated sources of conflicts, yet he makes it clear that our traditional 

military configurations or even our structural modernization through the application of 

the most advanced technology will not appropriately address them. The response options

will therefore encounter the demand for greater sophistication by military planners who 

in the past have been noticeably uncomfortable with nuanced political dimensions of such

third world, nontraditional conflicts in transition.

The single greatest factor which the US will face in the emerging order is its role as 

the greatest uncontested military power. Policy alternations will continuously shift 

between isolationists who will argue on behalf of a narrow, defensive posture and 

globalists, who will argue for our involvement in distant global conflicts. Essentially, that 

13 
debate will occur between those whose only security concerns are core interests, which

focus on immediate threats to our physical survival, and those who will argue that the US 

has a special responsibility in a variety of disturbing developments even if they are of 

peripheral concern to our strategic interests. This dilemma, of course, is not a new one, as

it is a continuation of contrasting thought regarding our foreign policy posture. This 

posture has been debated throughout the present century. 

However, muddying the debate are two considerations. First, responding to only 

threats to our core interests fails to recognize that the US is extensively locked into the 

expanding international economic infrastructure. The deterioration of this infrastructure 

can wreak havoc with our domestic-as well as international-stability as easily as a sizable 

war. Military involvement, accordingly, may not be avoidable on behalf of such

intermediate-level economic security interests. And, certainly our economic relationships

internationally will only become more extensive. Second, and this concern flows from the 

first consideration, the US no longer exists in isolation, hence the debate concerning our 

policy options is greatly proscribed at the outset. We cannot be extensively involved in 

the international economy, on the one hand, but isolationist in military security affairs, on 

the other. Our effective range of policy choices has, in fact, narrowed. The US will not 

design the nature of the conflict environment, instead it will respond to it. Therefore,

waiting until someone threatens only our core security interests will be strategically 

inadequate, since it will be much more advantageous to address deteriorating security

situations in their early stages. 

If we are correct in assuming the validity of this projection (i.e., that extensive 

involvements in distant conflicts will be unavoidable), we still face the options of the 

implementation of peaceful as opposed to forceful measures (tractors versus tanks). The 

US must expend analytic energies on the true estimate of underlying economic factors 

that will drive conflicts, and we must address these factors appropriately. However, we 

also need to isolate those conflicts which historical hegemonic aspirations propel, those 

which countermilitary measures can neutralize, and those which will be value-driven, for 

which neither economic nor military responses will suffice. Yet each of these three types

of conflicts could, if left unchecked, pose a resolute security challenge. Accordingly, 

peaceful diplomatic and economic measures must not be viewed only in humanitarian

contexts, but within an expanding security perspective. This conclusion calls for the

continuous development of our conventional and nuclear capabilities but also for the 

inclusion of politicoeconomic instruments in the military planning process. 

In a speech at The Johns Hopkins University, former secretary of defense Les Aspin 

asked: “Should the United States use its soldiers to protect American values?” 39 Aspin 

reiterated the debate between realists and idealists, and he could not avoid pointing out

that a nation can pursue idealistic, or humanitarian, objectives as an integral part of its 

security strategy. He also raised the prospect of US soldiers, though trained as military 

personnel, having to act in policemen's roles. 

Therein we may identify another dilemma. Scarce reason exists to question the 

capability of the US military machine which had been finely honed during the cold war. 

However, will the implementation of that machine be the appropriate response in all 

future conflicts? We might be emphasizing too much our public concerns that our 

military is adequately prepared-at a time when the US defense budget dwarfs its nearest 

competitors. Perhaps we may argue, therefore, that the real challenge in the future will 

14 
not be questions associated with military planning, but with analysis and policy

formulation. Our interventions in conflicts since the demise of the cold war have certainly 

shown no weaknesses in our confrontation with Iraq during the Gulf War, but our 

involvements in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti have raised some important 

questions about the appropriateness of military responses and about the seemingly ad hoc 

nature of our involvements. As the world's most capable power, the US will face 

increasing demands to become more involved in distant and diverse conflicts. Our 

decision to do so cannot proceed situationally without perhaps unintentionally 

exacerbating global instability. As the sole superpower in the world, and if we agree that 

isolationism is not a realistic prospect, it is incumbent on the US to articulate its

conception of a global security order encompassing, not only military, but also 

politicoeconomic security parameters. Doing so may not be an option, but a vital policy 

requirement. 

Notes 

1

 This phenomenon is elaborated in Karl P. Magyar and Constantine P. Danopoulos, 

Prolonged Wars: A Post-Nuclear Challenge (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press. 

1994). 

2

 Michael Renner, “Budgeting for Disarmament,” in Linda Starke, ed., State of the 

World, 1995 (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1995), 151. 

3

 See Thomas J. Stark, “Changing Status of Nuclear Forces,” in Karl P. Magyar, ed.,

Challenge and Response: Anticipating US Military Security Concerns (Maxwell AFB, 

Ala.: Air University Press, 1994), 387-89. 

4

 Christian Science Monitor, 20 December 1994 and 12 January 1995. 

5

 Matthew Connelly and Paul M. Kennedy, “Must It Be the Rest Against the West?”

Atlantic Monthly, December 1994. 

6

 Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order (Chatham, N.J.:

Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1993), 3. 

7

 Connelly and Kennedy, 72-76. 

8

 Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs, Spring 1989, 

164. 

9

 Ibid., 166. 

10 Sheldon Richman, “Cairo's Faulty Assumption,” Christian Science Monitor, 23 

September 1994. 

11 Adda B. Bozeman, “War and the Clash of Ideas,” Orbis 20, no. 1 (Spring 1976). 

12 G. R. Berridge identifies a list of neo-Marxists who hold this view. See G. R

Berridge, International Politics: States, Power and Conflict since 1945 (New York: 

Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 62. 

13 Karl P. Magyar elaborates on this idea. See Karl P. Magyar, “Culture and Conflict 

in Africa's History: The Transition to the Modem Era,” in Stephen J. Blank et al., 

Conflict, Culture, and History: Regional Dimensions (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University 

Press, 1993), 231-33. 

14 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st 

Century (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994), chap. 1. 

15 
Notes 

15 William T. Lee, “The nuclear brink that wasn't-and the one that was,” Washington

Times, 7 February 1995. 

16 Christian Science Monitor, 15 December 1994. 

17 Renner, 153. 

18 Ruth Leger-Sivar, World Military and Social Expenditures, 1991 (Washington,

D.C.: World Priorities, 1991), 22ff. 

19 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, 1994 

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 47. 

20 Extensive research on such data has been conducted by Bill Eckhardt of the Lentz 

Peace Research Laboratory. See Karl Vick, “Civilians often bear war's brunt,” St. 

Petersburg Times, 17 February 1981 

21 Karl P. Magyar, “Introduction: The Protraction and Prolongation of Wars,” in 

Magyar and Danopoulos. 

22 Dietrich Fischer, Nonmilitary Aspects of Security: A Systems Approach

(Brookfield USA: Dartmouth, 1993), 7. 

23 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement 

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994), i. 

24 Warren Christopher, “American Foreign Policy: Principles and Opportunities,” 

speech delivered at Harvard University, 20 January 1995. 

25 United States Special Operations Forces, Posture Statement, 1994, 15. 

26 Ingomar Hauchler and Paul M. Kennedy, Global Trends: The World Almanac of 

Development and Peace (New York: Continuum, 1994), 181. 

27 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), 

197. 

28 Richard Clutterbuck, The Future of Political Violence: Destabilization, Disorder

and Terrorism (London: Macmillan, 1986), 10-11. 

29 Paul Rogers and Malcolm Dando, A Violent Peace: Global Security After the Cold 

War (London: Brassey's, 1992), 153. 

30 Hauchler and Kennedy, 177. 

31 Ibid., 189. 

32 Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., “Dimensions of the Post-Cold War World,” in Robert L. 

Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., eds., Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: 

Implications for u.s. Policy and Army Roles and Missions (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Army

War College, n.d.), 17-19. 

33 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 

(1993): 22. 

34 The World Commission on Environment and Development. Our Common Future 

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 291. 

35 See Bozeman, “War and the Clash of Ideas.” 

36 Laurent Belsie, “Lack of Trees, Farmers' Groups Hinder Haiti,” Christian Science 

Monitor, 25 October 1994. 

37 William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington.

D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 1995), 93. 

38 James B. Seaton, “Low-Level Conflict,” Society 32, no. 1 (November 1994): 10. 

16 
Notes 

39 Lisa Dicker, Dale Keiger, and Kevin Smokler, “Civil disobedience, etc.,” The 

Johns Hopkins Magazine, April 1995, 30. 

17 
PART II

SOCIOPOLITICAL ISSUES 

18 
2 

Religion-A Banner for Twenty-First 

Century Conflict 

Paul J. Moscarelli 

Religion is currently a major conduit of political change in the international arena. In 

a world of increasing complexity, believers are turning to their faiths in ever greater 

numbers for both moral guidance and group identification. In performing these key roles 

religion finds its place as a banner for political change or stagnation, and therefore a 

potential detractor, or contributor to global security. 

Politically inspired religious movements are occurring throughout the world and are 

being initiated by groups as dissimilar as Buddhist revivalists in Thailand, Christian 

fundamentalists in America, Hindu nationalists in India, and militant Islamists in 

Tanzania. Some of these groups are pursuing their political agendas by way of peaceful,

democratic means, while others have employed violence. In trying to assess the impact 

these movements will have on global security, we must recognize that each individual 

movement is unique. Nevertheless, fundamentalist movements share certain universal 

characteristics which analysts can use to measure the impact individual movements will 

have on global security. 

This essay describes the universal political utility of religion and assesses some

major trends and misconceptions regarding the anticipated impact of religiopolitical

activism on the international environment. Finally, it offers policy responses that can 

enhance global peace in the twenty-first century. 

Religion as a Political Instrument 

Exploring religion’s transnational conflict potential requires a clear understanding of 

religion and its role in individual societies. In The Future of Religion, Rodney Stark 

defines religion as “a system of thought embodied in social organizations that posits the 

existence of an active supernatural that can be influenced by human action.” 1

 Put more

simply, he terms religion as a socially organized “belief in powers higher than man and 

an attempt to please them.” 2

 Human attempts to influence or “please” the supernatural 

are embodied somewhat in morality, that is, rules of right conduct prescribed by the 

particular religion. Morality is prescribed in some way by all major religions. 

19 
Christianity, Islam, and Judaism provide laws, stories, and traditions which identify 

morally right behavior which is “the will of God.” In Buddhism and Hinduism righteous 

behavior is considered as a step on the road to enlightenment. 3

 

Much of religion’s strength as a political rallying point comes from its moral 

foundation. Politics, in the purest sense of the word, concerns questions of power—Who 

shall have it? How shall it be applied? and Against whom shall it be applied? To these 

questions, religious and political leaders say that power should be used to promote good 

and to battle evil. Religion invariably distinguishes between good and evil. Anything that 

can be portrayed as evil can be righteously opposed and such opposition can be rationally 

defended with religious precepts. Religious concepts of justice are frequently reflected in 

local secular laws. This is as true of American laws with their Judeo-Christian grounding 

as it is of conservative Islamic legal systems in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Viewed in this

light, the line between politics and religion becomes tenuously thin and in some cases 

disappears completely. Such is the case in Islam, no formal boundary between religion 

and politics is recognized. 

As religious groups attempt to achieve a “greater good” through the acquisition of

political power, they see few barriers to the use of violence. The violent struggle between 

good and evil holds a central place in the tradition of virtually every religion. 4

 Any

dispute effectively depicted as a “religious” conflict evokes enormous emotional response 

from the faithful. Righteous indignation, if generated in sufficient intensity, creates 

acceptance of self-sacrifice and a willingness to go to war. Provision of moral 

imperatives holds a key to religion’s role as a banner for conflict. 

In addition to morality, religion provides believers with a group identity and a sense 

of community. Indoctrination takes place at an early age, with family, friends, and 

neighbors usually sharing the same religious persuasion. A place of worship often 

connects friends, leisure activities, and business contacts. For many groups, religion is a 

part of everyday life, which is understood by all members of the group. It also provides a 

focal point for common commitment. 

When religion does not function as a part of everyday life, it still serves as a source

of group identity. In these instances there is no deep, underlying belief. Religion simply

provides a basis for “us versus them.” An example is Israel, a country built on the 

religious persuasion of citizens who proudly identify themselves as Jews. They have 

great national pride and have survived cohesively against enormous odds. Yet somewhat 

fewer than 20 percent of Israeli Jews describe themselves as religious. 5

 The Protestants 

and Catholics of Northern Ireland fight not over religious values but over nationalism and 

economic matters. One needs not be an orthodox follower to rally with a group forged 

from religious identity. 

Common identity and moral righteousness provided by religion offer an ideal 

rallying point for activism, which often takes on violent forms. Students of war 

understand that group identification and moral commitment of soldiers are essential to the 

successful prosecution of violent conflict. In a religious group, the essentials of an army

are already present. The only additional requirement is a cause that can be justified 

religiously and portrayed as sufficiently important to fight for. Religion is not an “opiate 

of the masses” in the contemporary international environment. It is serving as an ideal 

rallying point for violent conflict which could be more accurately described as a 

20 
“stimulant of the masses.” This is the stimulant that is used by “fundamentalist” leaders 

to generate support for their programs. 

Fundamentalism 

Conceptions of fundamentalism are numerous. In Fundamentalisms and the State, 

Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby define fundamentalism They describe much of 

today’s religiopolitical activism: “Fundamentalism is a strategy by which believers 

attempt to preserve their group identity. It involves revival of former beliefs which are 

modified by leaders in varying degrees to achieve political goals. The strategy is often 

innovative and rejects secular politics in charismatic fashion to renew group identity and 

expand popular support.” 6

 In effect, fundamentalist leaders mold religious doctrine as 

necessary to villainize their opponents, branding them as “immoral,” while portraying 

themselves as good and doing the will of God. This battle between good and evil 

provides a sense of unity and purpose to followers and strengthens the group identity. 

Manifestations of fundamentalist groups in the contemporary international arena include 

political parties and movements, militant revolutionary groups, and established

governments. They may be domestic or transnationally based. 

A simple model of the forces influencing the changing thought processes of a group

can help clarify this definition. Stark identifies three basic directions in which religious 

thinking can move: 

• toward secularization-movement away from the spiritual and toward the temporal 

• toward revival-return to the traditional ideas 

• toward innovation-adoption of new ideas 7 

Figure 1, where extreme views on secularization, innovation, and revival are 

represented by the black circles, shows the aggregate thinking of a group of believers. A 

group which falls on the secularization circle is “religious” in name only. Secular

concerns dominate decision making, while traditional religious ideas embody the 

thinking of a group which falls on the revival circle. A group that falls on the innovation 

circle is also governed by religious thought, but it has abandoned traditional ideas for a

contemporary interpretation of a religion. Few if any religious groups take such an 

extreme attitude as to fall absolutely on one of the circles. All three factors influence

most groups. A group in which religious considerations weigh more heavily in decision 

making would be located to the right, while one where secular concerns dominate (such 

as group G) would be positioned to the left. The Israeli Jews mentioned earlier could fall 

near group G, since religious leaders have influence, but on the whole, secular concerns

dominate. 

21 
Figure 1. Continuum of Religious Thought 

Figure 2 depicts the effect of a fundamentalist movement on group G. It may move

to position C if fundamentalist leaders revive tradition, while it would move to position A 

if sweeping religious innovations are accepted by the group. A successful fundamentalist 

movement would move a group’s thinking to position B if traditional ideas were revived 

partially intact and partially with innovation. 

Figure 2. The Effect of a Fundamentalist Movement on Group B 

A good example of the impact of fundamentalist forces on a society is provided by 

Iranian Shi’ite (fig. 3). Many Iranian Shi’ite had accepted secular changes imposed by the 

Shah prior to 1979. In 1979 the fundamentalist revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini pushed 

the country hard in the direction of traditional thinking. Starting in the mid-1980s, the 

realities of trying to govern a country suffering from high unemployment, high 

population growth, and a large debt from the war with Iraq forced the fundamentalist

Iranian government to innovate and proclaim certain traditionally frowned upon practices 

to be in accordance with Islamic law. Iran’s innovative 1995 version of Islam in many 

ways contains free-market reforms that have deviated from many of the traditional 

practices of Khomeini. 

22 
Figure 3. Impact of Iranian Fundamentalism 

Major Trends in World Religious Activism 

With an understanding of fundamentalism and an appreciation for the instrumentality

of religion as a conduit for both violent and nonviolent political action, let us consider 

some of the major real-world possibilities for future religious conflict while we dispel 

some of the most popular fallacies. 

Fundamentalists as Enemies of Global Peace 

The word fundamentalist creates visions of New York World Trade Center bombers

and airline hijackers in the minds of many Westerners. These actions, which are normally 

major media events, are symptomatic of a small number of radical fundamentalist 

elements and can mislead the observer as to the true nature of fundamentalism. It may be

argued that fundamentalists are not always enemies of global peace but have in many 

cases pursued their goals peacefully and in some cases have exerted a positive influence

on global security. The Afghan Mujahidin were a fundamentalist group who used US 

military aid to contain Soviet cold war expansionism. Such Christian fundamentalist 

groups as the Moral Majority peacefully pursue their religiopolitical goals within the 

borders of, the United States. The views of the government of Saudi Arabia reflect 

fundamentalist thinking, yet it has allowed large numbers of United States military 

personnel to remain on its soil for more than four years after the Persian Gulf War to 

assure regional stability. Although religious fundamentalism is presently a conduit for 

political change in many places, it is misleading to stereotype such movements as threats

to global security. 

Fundamentalism as a Legacy of the 

Colonial and Cold War Periods 

As European powers colonized Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, they 

brought with them their secular institutions and governments. To Mark Juergensmeyer: 

secular nationalism “spread throughout the world with an almost missionary zeal and was

shipped to the newly colonized areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. ...[Colonial 

powers] provided their colonies with the political and economic infrastructures to turn

territories into nation-states.” 8

 They established boundaries between modem-day states 

23 
in these regions without regard for religious and cultural factors. A graphic example of 

this occurred in Nigeria, which the British created in 1914. The north is predominately

Muslim, while the south is generally Christian and animist. Muslims comprise 55-60

percent of the population, while Christians make up approximately 30 percent. Also, 

numerous tribal divisions abound throughout the country. When the colonial powers 

departed after World War II, they left in their wake secular governments not compatible 

with the local religions, and political boundaries not representative of local cultures. 9

Since many indigenous peoples refused to embrace these divisions, the potential for

conflict in these states was tremendous. That potential began to be realized in the late 

1960s and is only now coming to fruition. 

Jeff Haynes suggests that three events in the late 1970s signaled the birth of the 

current wave of religiopolitical activity. These included the deposing of the Shah of Iran 

in 1979, the war between the Soviets and the Afghani Mujahidin beginning in 1978, and 

the establishment of the Sandinista government in 1979. 10 These clashes were harbingers 

of the fundamentalist activity which has become endemic in the developing world. 

One factor driving the increase in fundamentalist movements since the late 1970s is 

the attempts of secular governments to modernize their societies along Western lines. 

People fought to deal with sweeping economic and technological change. Haynes points 

out that they “struggled to make sense of what was happening to them. Not infrequently, 

in ...the contemporary Third World, the explanations they came up with had a strongly 

religious form.” 11 Third world peoples have increasingly turned to religion to provide a 

buffer between modernity and their inability to deal with economic and technological 

change. 

Another factor which helps explain the acceleration of fundamentalist activity,

particularly in the 1990s, is the onset of the information age. Though they may have

bewildered the common man, information technologies aided potential fundamentalist 

leaders by providing a free flow of information and ideas. Information about a religious 

movement on one side of the world is instantly available to the potential fundamentalist 

leader on the other side courtesy of the electronic media. The Internet has facilitated a 

free exchange of ideas on the use of religion for instituting political change. 

The final major factor responsible for the rising number of fundamentalist 

movements is the end of cold war competition between the superpowers. In many cases, 

post-colonial secular governments were propped up financially and militarily by the

United States and the Soviet Union as they competed for allies in the third world. With

the end of the cold war, the support for many of these regimes disappeared. This

amplified the clarity of their failure to provide the freedoms and economic prosperity that 

had been advertised as a byproduct of secularism. A recent study offers this assessment:

“‘It is an economic, social, and moral failure’ a Muslim leader in Egypt said, speaking of 

the policies of his nation’s secular state.” 12 Corruption and inequity have made postcold-war governments of the developing world much more vulnerable to revolutionary 

activity and poured fuel on the flames of fundamentalism. 

The colonial powers planted the seeds of revolutionary change by introducing 

secular ideas and creating ill-defined states in their colonies. The factors outlined in the 

preceding paragraphs caused those seeds to gradually grow into today’s abundance of 

fundamentalist movements. The following paragraphs describe a number of current 

situations which hold promise for future religiopolitical conflict. Observers can directly

24 
or indirectly link to the current situation’s legacy of the colonial era, the end of the cold 

war, failure of secular governments, and/or the onset of the information age. 

• Secular Indian nationalists are clashing at the voting booth with the moderate 

Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata party while enduring terrorist attacks by extremist 

Hindu nationalists. Meanwhile, both Hindu and Indian nationalists continue to clash with 

Indian Muslims. Muslims in India make up approximately 11 percent of the population of 

the predominately Hindu state. 

• In Algeria, when the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) appeared to have won victory in 

the December 1991 elections, a military coup was staged to prevent them from taking 

power. The FIS was proscribed. This gave birth to a number of militant Islamic groups 

who presently operate in the country. As of this writing, over 30,000 deaths have been

reported in this struggle. 

• In Latin America, liberation theology (roughly speaking, a mix of Christianity and 

Marxism) was a strong contributor to the success of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and was

a rallying point for Peruvian Sendero Luminoso guerrillas. It is a factor in the ongoing 

peasant revolt in the Chiapas region of Mexico, and continues to win support in many 

impoverished Latin American communities. 

• In Pakistan, the Sunni fundamentalist Islamic Democratic Alliance is in power 

while the large Shi’ite minority, largely liberal and progressive, is bitterly opposed to 

fundamentalism. Violent clashes between the sects show no signs of abating. . 

• In Sudan, Lt Gen Omar Ahmed al-Bashir has declared shari’a (Islamic legal code) 

the supreme law of the land. His Islamic military regime has unified the northern Arabs

in the civil war against the black Christians and animists in the south. 

• The Sikh majority in the Indian state of Punjab view both Indian nationalists and 

Hindu nationalists as opponents of a separate Sikh state. The Indian government has

effectively suppressed violence in Punjab, but the Sikh separatist movement remains 

fervent.

• In Saudi Arabia, the Gulf War partnership with the United States has sparked 

ongoing protests by Islamists against the monarchical, authoritarian, and nominally 

Islamic government, calling for further Islamic reforms. The Saudi government has

responded by arresting large numbers of militants. 

• The long-standing tension between Buddhist monks and the government of 

Vietnam is increasing. Twenty-three monks were arrested between October 1994 and 

February 1995. The Vietnamese government is now distrustful of the Buddhists who 

helped topple the regime of South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem in the 1960s. 

• Egypt’s secular government, although attuned to Islamic concern, is challenged at 

the polls by members of the moderate Muslim Brotherhood. Such radical militant 

factions as the Gamaa al-Islamiya and the Islamic jihad are also at work. The efforts of 

the Muslim clergy in the huge Cairo slums remind observers of the situation in Iran prior 

to the downfall of the Shah. 

• After decades of conflict between Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists and Tamils 

(Hindus), the Sri Lankan government has suppressed militant factions of the Sinhalese 

Buddhist nationalist movement. Many Sri Lankan observers believe the movement will 

reappear. 

• In the Central Asian republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 

Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, Islamic movements of varying intensity have been met with 

25 
fierce repression by secular government forces (most of them former communists). This 

repressive environment has set the stage for major confrontations in this region. 

• Indonesia and Malaysia have Muslim majorities, and the governments are 

nominally Islamic. The actual tradeoff between Islam and secularism in government has

varied over the years, and fundamentalist movements are active in both countries. The

Malaysian government has banned the Al-Arqam Islamic sect, while Indonesian Muslims 

clash with Catholics on East Timor. 

• The tajdid (Muslim reawakening) is having a profound impact on politics in 

Nigeria. Southern Christian elements insist on a separation of religion and government, 

while northern Muslims call for the introduction of shari’a law throughout the country. 

• Turkey’s 70-year-old secular government, a key stabilizing influence on the Middle

East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans is experiencing increasing pressure from 

fundamentalist groups. Secularists have suffered attacks from Islamists, and the 

fundamentalist Welfare party won the March 1994 municipal elections in Turkey’s 

largest cities. 

Islam as a Global Threat 

When the cold war ended, some Western observers suggested that aggressive Islamic 

fundamentalism would replace the Soviet threat. This view posits the rise of Islamic 

governments as a threat, perhaps even monolithic, where a “nation of Islam” will rival the 

threat formerly posed by the Soviet bloc. The evidence supports this view. Islam is 

presently the most active agent of violent and nonviolent political change among world 

religions. In addition to the prevalence of conflict involving Islamic groups, Islam has 

two salient characteristics that make it an extremely effective instrument of political

transformation. The first is its overt rejection of secular government. 

The idea of a non-Islamic government is inconsistent with the Islamic faith. The 

Koran specifies that the world will be at peace only when Islam becomes the world’s 

religion. 13 Islamic tolerance is reserved for Jews and Christians only since Islam 

acknowledges the authenticity of such Jewish and Christian personages as Adam, Noah, 

Jesus, and others. This acknowledgment does not imply a right to equality or selfgovernance for these peoples. 14 The Koran allows no room for tolerance of non-Islamic 

political systems. Islamic intolerance stems from the principle that Islam represents both

the truth and the law to its followers. That is, when Muslims establish a government, they 

install the religion of Islam not just as a moral code but actually to identify laws that

restrict the populace. In some Muslim countries, the government creates laws in 

accordance with Islamic principles. In Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan shari’a has 

been proclaimed the law of the land. It is based directly on the Koran, Islam’s holy book, 

as well as Islamic traditions. It encompasses aspects of life from personal finance to table 

manners. Islamic use of religion as a legal system could be contrasted to Western 

Christianity, where biblical stories sketch a moral code that Christian fundamentalists 

promote as a guide for secular lawmakers. For secular lawmakers, religious exhortations 

are only one voice taken into account as laws are created. In Islam, religion is in theory

the only voice. 

The impact of this aspect of Islam is that the only acceptable government to a 

fundamentalist-minded Muslim is one adhering strictly to Islamic principles. In their 

most extreme form, these ideas negate the need for modem state boundaries and 

26 
governments. Since Islam is the law, what need is there for lawmakers? The ideal world 

would be one where the planet is unified as a single Islamic nation in which all peoples

adhere to Islamic principles. Whether the goal is a unified Islamic nation or a world of 

separate Islamic states, the prescribed method of attainment is known as jihad (holy war). 

The concept of jihad is the second characteristic that makes Islam an extremely

effective instrument of political transformation. Lewis B. Ware offers the following 

definition of jihad: “Conceived broadly, jihad signifies the obligation of every Muslim to 

strive for both the physical and spiritual defense of the ummah” (the ummah being the 

entire community of Muslims). 15 The practical application of jihad has changed over the 

years depending on the prevailing circumstances of the time. In the seventh and eighth 

centuries jihad was clearly interpreted as a requirement to take control of societies and 

government in accordance with principles of Islam. During this period, Islam spread from 

its roots on the Arabian peninsula to as far west as Spain and as far east as India. 

However, in the face of Western dominance during the nineteenth and early twentieth 

centuries, Sunni Muslim modernists viewed jihad as an individual act “of the heart and 

mind, which, through reflection, would defend and strengthen Islamic values under the

assault of Western belief systems and lead eventually to the West’s acceptance of the 

self-evident truth of Islam.” 16 Current Islamist movements adopt a more traditional view 

of jihad as they attempt to gain power and transform societies into ones that adhere to the 

principles of Islam. Jihad is being pursued in some areas by way of democratic means

while in others, Islamists are attempting to gain power by way of revolutionary violence. 

The evidence seems to support the view that Islam can pose a monolithic threat to 

the West. Many Muslim activists avoid speaking of national interests and prefer to call 

for the realization of a pan-Islamic vision as evidenced by Mark Juergens-meyer’s

observation: “On the wall of one of the Palestinian leaders in Gaza is a map of the world

on which is superimposed the Koran drawn as if it had hands extending from Morocco to 

Indonesia.” 17 However, despite such ominous Symbolism, no substantive signs exists 

that such a dream may come to fruition. Today, no large popular rallies occur in the 

streets calling for pan-Islam under the leadership of a new caliph, nor are secular state 

boundaries being erased between Muslim states. 

Nonetheless, several glaring reasons indicate that Islam will not soon become a 

monolithic threat: religious incongruence, secular incongruence, and pragmatism. Islam 

is rife major doctrinal divisions, the most pronounced incongruence exists between the

Sunni and Shi’ite sects. Evidence of the incompatibility between these sects could be 

seen in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-89) and the current dispute between Sunni and Shi’ite 

groups in Pakistan. Within the Sunni sect itself enormous differences exist where Islam is

practiced in various regions. Islam in Nigeria, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia has developed 

very differently, with each country influenced significantly by local cultures and local 

secular considerations. 

Although in theory there is one “nation of Islam” with no recognition of modern 

state boundaries, in reality, enormous secular barriers exist to the notion of pan-Islam. 

Revolutionaries have concerned themselves with national as well as religious causes. 

There exists an Egyptian identity, a Palestinian identity, an Iranian identity, and so on. 18

Among national leaders there is no clamoring to give up power to a modern-day 

transnational religious authority. 

27 
Finally, pragmatic considerations keep pan-Islam from becoming a reality. Although 

some Westerners view Muslims as religious fanatics, in reality the average Muslim is not 

strictly a religious individual, but rather a composite of religious and rational person. The

average Muslim has a family, a job, and holds membership in groups other than the 

ummah. If he is educated, he is familiar with the story of Islam’s Khawarij sect, which 

adopted a strict doctrine of offensive jihad and was intolerant of any established political 

authority. This sect, not well known in the West, was nearly exterminated in the eighth 

century. The fate of the Khawarij has tended to temper Islamist movements over the

centuries. Today, it is widely agreed that a conventional war—for whatever reason—with 

the militarily superior West is not a practical undertaking. Leaders of today’s Islamist

movements and Islamic countries are well aware that it would be imprudent of the 

ummah to go to war with an enemy that possesses vastly superior military technology and 

resources. For pragmatic as well as religious and secular reasons Muslims—at least as a 

unified group—will not pose a threat to global security. 

The preceding argument that Islam will not likely become a monolithic threat was 

not meant to belittle its importance to future global security. It will remain the single

most powerful agent of change in the third world and will threaten lesser interests of the 

US. Civil wars will occur, blood will spill, human rights will be violated, oil flows may 

be disrupted, and some foreign investors will lose money. Islam’s overall impact on

global security will not weigh on a collectivist movement but on the actions individual 

Islamic fundamentalists take in their attempts to gain and exercise political power. This is 

particularly true for fundamentalist governments as they face real-world problems in the 

information age. 

Fundamentalism versus Modernization 

After discussing the relationship between religion and development, Douglas Eugene

Smith concludes that “it is widely, and correctly assumed that religion is in general an

obstacle to modernization.” 19 A recent study of modernization in Pakistan, Egypt, and 

Turkey concluded that Islam impedes economic and technological advancements in those 

countries. 20 Everett Mendelsohn sums up the problem: 

Fundamentalists seek influence and control of political decisions, including the extent 

and direction of funding for scientific research....They also attempt to shape the 

discussion of science in the educational process. But fundamentalists face a vexing 

problem in this ambition. There is evidence to suggest that religious fundamentalism and

the power to govern a modern nation state effectively represent deeply conflicting 

forces....When once-radical or militant fundamentalists in the developing world find

themselves faced with the concrete problems of health care, population growth, adequate

useable water, food production, modern industries, participation in international trade, or

the requirement of securing borders and maintaining modern armed forces, then science

and technology become proximate means by which social problems may be effectively 

addressed. 21 

28 
Fundamentalists argue vehemently and effectively that progress causes moral decay; 

but when they attempt to govern, they find themselves drawn to progressive solutions 

offered by the secular world out of practical necessity. Modem-day Iran offers such an 

example. In Iran, the Islamic government has been forced to make accommodations as 

the country attempts to attract foreign trade and investment to recover from the debt 

accumulated during its war with Iraq. 

Fundamentalists in power face an interesting paradox. The more they lean toward

secular answers to social problems, the more their policies resemble those of the 

government they ousted. The more they try to resist secular solutions, the more they 

resemble their former opponents in the sense of failing to provide economic prosperity.

This no-win situation keeps the door open for new fundamentalist or secular movements

to surface and challenge the old. 

Modem-day Iran also exemplifies this paradox. 22 Adherence to religious dogma

caused the government to mismanage the economy badly. With the economy in 

shambles, the government is attempting free market reforms to alleviate the problem.

These reforms are being met with violent protest from peasant and merchant classes-the 

same groups whose support was key to the success of the revolution. 

Perhaps over time fundamentalist movements will arise and adopt religious

innovations to allow for modernization. Until that time, fundamentalist resistance to 

modernization will inhibit their ability to stabilize their countries. From an international 

perspective, in an information era where rapid change is the key to success, it will lead to

increasing first world technological/economic superiority over developing nations. 

Implications for US Policy 

Realize that when examining religious conflict in the contemporary international 

environment, we seldom see crusades; that is, situations where religious conversion is a 

primary motivating force. No significant evidence suggests that religious conflict at the 

global level is probable. A continued strong US military posture will likely help to deter 

such an eventuality. Although the prospect for large-scale transnational conventional 

religious conflict is low, the prospect for religiopolitical conflict within state boundaries 

is high and will remain so in the foreseeable future. 

Revolution in the third world will continue to affect nonvital Western interests as 

investors lose money and individual foreign citizens are placed in harm’s way. 

Nevertheless, US policy must seek restraint regarding the use of force. To oppose a 

religious movement, particularly with the use of force, is to align oneself with the “forces

of evil.” The decision to oppose and especially to intervene militarily against a 

fundamentalist movement may be to invite terrorist retaliation. In a world which features 

an increasing threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism, such a prospect is a 

grave one indeed. 

An example of the importance of nonintervention in the affairs of religious groups

can be seen in the state of current US-Iranian relations. Note that Iran’s disagreement

with the US stems not from Iran being ruled by an Islamic government while the US 

remains a secular state. Japan. Italy, Germany, and France would not be among Iran’s

major trading partners if current animosity were based simply on religion. Iranian 

animosity toward the US is grounded in historical (and they believe ongoing) US 

29 
intervention in Iranian affairs. US opposition to the Iranian revolution in the late 1970s 

has left it today at odds with a country that is known to sponsor terrorism and to develop 

weapons of mass destruction. 

If a country decides to intervene in a religious conflict. it must make the decision 

with the realization that from Northern Ireland to Lebanon to Nicaragua such a conflict 

has been fought for a variety of both religious and nonreligious motives. Policy crafted to 

bring peace to areas where religious conflict is prevalent must focus on finding and 

addressing the nonreligious motives. Since many of the underlying problems are 

economic, the answer will not rely on the use of military force. Whether diplomatic and 

economic initiatives offered by secular governments can help bring peace to areas 

suffering from religiopolitical conflict, however, is unclear in the case of fundamentalists, 

as their ideas are opposed to secular modernization. 

Perhaps the answer to increasing instability in affected regions lies in the

informational instrument of national power. If fundamentalists can agree that their 

religious movements must consider the realities of international free market competition

in the information age, they can make progress toward a more peaceful world. As noted 

in the discussion of jihad, religions have historically adapted themselves to suit the

circumstances of the age in which they exist. Out of practical necessity religions will at 

some future point be forced to alter their dogmas. They must come to accommodate 

international economics and the free flow of information and ideas which are so critical 

to success in today’s world. The question is how much destruction and loss of life will be 

required to bring about the realization.

Notes 

1

 Rodney Stark, The Future of Religion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 

1985), 3. 

2

 Ibid., 5. 

3

 Lynn G. Stephens, Seven Dilemmas in World Religions (New York: Paragon

House, 1994), 140-41. 

4

 Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the 

Secular State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 153-55. 

5

 Charles S. Liebman, “Jewish Fundamentalism and Israeli Policy,” in 

Fundamentalisms and the State, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: 

University of Chicago Press, 1993), 68. 

6

 Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms and the State 

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 3. 

7

 Stark, 2. 

8

 Juergensmeyer, 28. 

9

 Jeff Haynes, Religion in Third World Politics (Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner 

Publishers, 1994), 29. 

10 Ibid., 1. 

11 Haynes, 2. 

12 Juergensmeyer, 23. 

30 
Notes 

13 Lewis B. Ware, “An Islamic Concept of Conflict in its Historical Concept,”

Stephen Blank et al., Conflict, Culture, and History: Regional Dimensions (Maxwell 

AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1993), 62. His chapter contains a concise discussion of 

the evolution of the concept of jihad from the Sunni and the Shi’ite perspectives. 

14 Ibid., 63. 

15 Ibid., 62. 

16 Ibid., 68. 

17 Juergensmeyer, 47. 

18 Ibid. 

19 Douglas Eugene Smith, Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little,

Brown and Co., 1970), xi. 

20 Javaid Saeed, Islam and Modernization: A Comparative Analysis of Pakistan,

Egypt, and Turkey (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 197. 

21 Everett Mendelsoh, “Religious Fundamentalism and the Sciences,” in Marty and 

Appleby, 25. 

22 Lamis Andoni, “Second Revolution Brews in Iran,” Christian Science Monitor, 12 

April 1995, 6. 

31 
3 

National Fragmentation, Ethnicity, 

and the New World Order 

Vicki J. Rast 

Nationalism is anything but a thing of the past, thus, and even the newest claims to

nationalism are often rooted in a rhetoric of pre-existing ethnicity. 

—Craig Calhoun 

Nationalism and Ethnicity 

Bosnia... Chechnya... Rwanda... Sudan... Liberia... Tibet... Sri Lanka. Thoughts 

of the conflictive situations represented by these names represent but a few of the many 

ethnic conflicts raging today. While the world attempts to find solutions to these currentday manifestations of disharmony, the question of the true roots of the problem remains 

unanswered. Indeed, it may be unanswerable! Yet, analysts must determine the roots of 

ethnic conflict if we are to reduce the frequency of wars based upon this source as we 

witness the ascendancy of a more peaceful environment within a new world order. 

The dismantling of the Soviet Union presents interesting challenges to the rest of the

world. The escalating bloodshed amongst African nations continues to permeate the 

consciousness of developed societies. As newly liberated states and other states around

the world struggle to determine the complexion of their futures, one issue will emerge 

somewhat unassumingly. It will structure the nature of their very existence. Will these 

states form their sovereignties based upon nationalism or ethnicity? If they choose 

nationalism, will they sow the seeds of future conflict? If they choose ethnicity, will they 

have the ability to sustain future onslaughts of “tribal” domination as stronger clans exert 

their will upon those deemed incapable of fending off their acts of aggression? These

questions seem rhetorical in one sense, yet they hold the key to the future viability of

these infant nations and their more developed supporters around the world. 

This essay identifies the bases of nationalism and ethnicity and shows the 

inseparable relationship between them. By presenting a brief history of the relationship 

between these two concepts, this analysis shows why ethnicity may lead to future 

conflicts. It focuses on those geographic locations of critical importance and discusses the 

conditions which create an atmosphere predisposed to ethnic conflict. In looking at the 

32 
impact of both of these aspects of the problem, this essay anticipates the global impact of

these forces, the projected security implications, the prospects for peaceful resolution, 

and United States’ interests. To frame that peaceful resolution, we must first understand 

the roots of the problem. 

Nationalism and Ethnicity 

The relationship between nationalism and ethnicity is neither clearly identifiable nor 

universally distinguishable. Many scholars do however make an academic distinction

between these two concepts. These concepts are distinct, yet undeniably interrelated. 

Nationalism 

Within the historical context, the idea of nationalism is associated with flag-waving, 

popular anthems, and unquestioning allegiance to “the state.” Nationalism is that entity 

for which people are willing to die, and perhaps more importantly, for which they are 

willing to kill. While they may not have “exact” knowledge of the national disagreement

upon which their particular conflict is based, they may instead be inundated with the

images depicted by the media (in modem societies) or their communal leaders (in 

traditional societies). Nevertheless, people will go forth to conquer in the name of 

nationalism. This sense of nationalism emanated from the Renaissance and Reformation. 

1

 

The broad social and political developments during the 1500s parallel those in 

developing states today. Then, as now, education, commerce, and the “information 

superhighway” are bringing diverse peoples closer together; missionaries are traveling to 

areas never before explored by modern cultures; and the world is growing increasingly 

smaller as time progresses. As a result, indigenous populations in various countries are

being influenced in ways they never deemed imaginable. While the result of this

increased contact is multifaceted, one of the most important outcomes is the desire of 

these peoples to retain their individual, communal, historical, or ethnic identities. As 

such, their desire to retain their specific identity, and thereby prevent the elimination of 

their basic culture, has led many to stand together under the umbrella of nationalism.

Even this collective action has not gone without controversy, as debate surrounds the 

conceptualization of nationalism. Paul A. Gobel, executive director of the Carnegie 

Institute for Peace, points out ironically that the idea of nationalism presents beliefs that 

coexist as polar opposites: one is the idea that nationalism “stressed that the state had a 

responsibility to make the population homogeneous; another, stressed that the state must

reflect the culture and beliefs of the community to be legitimate.” 2

 Still another view 

asserted that nationalism is the accumulation of three ideals: “collective selfdetermination of the people, the expression of national character and individuality, and 

finally the vertical division of the world into unique nations each contributing its special 

genius to the common fund of humanity.” 3

 While both perspectives have merit, this 

present analysis uses the framework espoused by Anthony D. Smith in Nationalism in the 

Twentieth Century (1979). 

Nationalism, therefore, involves four elements: a vision, a culture, a solidarity and a 

policy. It answers the ideological, cultural, social and political aspirations and needs. Its 

33 
success over two centuries is partly attributable to the range of needs that it satisfies. But

equally important is the manner in which nationalists can adapt the vision, the culture, the 

solidarity and the programme to diverse situations and interests. It is this flexibility that

has allowed nationalism continually to reemerge and spread, at the cost of its ideological 

rivals. 4

From this latter perspective, nationalism enjoys a broad-based foundation. Its roots 

are diverse, having substance in ideology, culture, human relations, and political 

organizations. However, of these four elements, “culture” represents the entity most 

closely associated with the identity of a people. Consequently, it tends to overshadow the 

remaining factors. This determining characteristic of nationalism is closely related to, and

sometimes used as a synonym for, the concept of ethnicity. 

Ethnicity 

Not unlike the concept of nationalism, conceptions of ethnicity have taken many 

forms throughout history. Yet, most have remained a variation of Max Weber’s original 

idea that “an ethnic group is a human collectivity based on an assumption of common 

origin, real or imaginary.” 5

 Andrew H. Greeley expands this definition to include the 

notion that these groups function as conduits to carry forward the cultural traits of a

people, and further, they serve as a metric for evaluating the “self-definition” of a person.

6

 These cultural traits include language, physical appearance, religious affiliation, and

those “other” individual attributes that apply to a section of society’s population as an 

entity. This statement is not meant to suggest that these “other” traits cannot be shared by 

neighboring populations, only that they apply universally to the group ‘claiming to 

separate themselves from those people who do not exhibit the particular trait in question. 

Problems arise when the members of these ethnic groups feel threatened by external 

forces. These external forces pressure ethnic groups into adopting changes with which 

they may not agree. Recognize that these external forces take the form of three major 

actors, each with independent goals. The first actor may represent such international 

organizations as the United Nations and its subordinate agencies. They intend no harm to 

the people. Here, their goals usually seek short-term stability and long-term peace and

prosperity for the region. Closely related to this positive end, the second group of actors 

is comprised of nongovernmental or private voluntary organizations. These groups also 

wish to promote the humanitarian well-being of the people, regardless of their political 

affiliation. No governmental agency controls them, and usually they do not have a 

strategic vision for the long-term welfare of the people. Finally, the third actor that 

pressures an ethnic group is the government that controls that ethnic group as part of its 

authority. This may include a desire to conquer a weaker nation to expand the aggressor’s 

realm of influence and thus its own culture, or efforts to prevent a smaller nation from 

breaking away from the motherland. Since nations have a dominant say in the movements

of the first two actors, indigenous populations usually allow those two actors to intrude 

on their sovereignty (if only temporarily). With the third actor, however, we must be 

concerned. 

Whether trying to override the autonomy of an ethnic group or prevent it from 

seceding, government actions are likely to spark conflict and bring international attention

to the region. The first situation—attempting to override the sovereignty of an ethnic 

group—was commonly observed during the periods of imperialism and national 

34 
expansion from the 1500s until the mid-1950s. Because the government hopes to fully 

integrate new ethnic groups into its sovereignty, it will openly attempt to change the 

traditions, language, and other characteristics which have defined ethnic groups. The 

Soviets exercised this tactic extensively. If it cannot achieve this goal forcibly, the 

stronger nation will use more subtle means, including education and training, to 

indoctrinate and to convert the outlier and bring it into the fold. As acts of open 

aggression against another sovereignty are met with worldwide reproof, their occurrences 

will continue to decline. Yet, it is the second case—preventing internal secession—that is

becoming more prominent today. Separatism by way of secession presents another 

problem altogether: because societies are beginning to recognize the strength of their 

ethnic identities, they are attempting to break away from their mother countries and 

define their own systems of government. Known historically as self-determination, these 

attempts at nationhood are making quite a wave in what once was a sea of domestic 

tranquillity (and relative international stability). 

Separatism 

Separatism is not new to the international stage. It is found worldwide, and Europe 

has witnessed a historical ethnic renaissance over the past 50 years. In Nationalism,

Anthony D. Smith argues that Britain, France, Spain, Holland, and Italy and North 

America (Canada, specifically) have all faced separatist challenges. 7

 Ethnic groups have 

attempted to define their own boundaries and government institutions for centuries, but

the movement has never been stronger than at present. These movements may have 

different bases, but Smith illuminates their commonalities: “These autonomous 

movements have arisen this century in their political form, in well-established, often 

ancient states, with clear and recognized national boundaries, and with a relatively 

prosperous economy.... All these states are fairly industrialized, and much of the 

population is literate and even quite well educated.” 8

 In Nationalism, Smith concentrates

on the more modernized societies when he scripted his thoughts in 1979. A follow-on 

work published in 1983, State and Nation in the Third World, outlined his thoughts on

the five phases of African nationalism: “primary resistance movements to European 

incursion; so-called millennial protest movements against colonial rule; the period of

gestation, and ‘adaptation,’ of new local strata; the phase of nationalist agitation for selfrule; and the adoption of social programmes for the masses by nationalism.” 9

 While 

analysts may base the context of separatist feelings upon a conglomerate of motives, this 

analysis concentrates on the economic and sociocultural reasons, since they broadly 

characterize the two extremes of peaceful and conflictive separatist movements. 

Peaceful, separatist movements are becoming prominent within democracies where 

ethnic groups exhibit a strong desire to separate themselves from a confederation of 

states. One of the strongest movements in this regard is Quebec’s attempted breakaway 

from 127 years of centralized, national government control. Ongoing for decades, only in

1994 did separatists see their first real chance of seceding. While many in Quebec 

insisted they did not want to be a separate nation from Canada, voters elected hard-line

separatist Jacques Parizeau as premier. 10 Based upon economic as well as cultural issues, 

they voiced their concern about remaining under the control of a national government

who did not fully recognize or act on their desires as an ethnic people. Undoubtedly an 

important issue for the US and international trade markets, the premier made clear his

35 
desire that the American government should “stay out of the process.” 11 To date, the US 

has honored that request, even though separatist actions could have adverse economic

effects on the North American Free Trade Agreement and negatively impact the global 

economy. 

12 And while we only see economic impacts at this point, we would have to ask 

ourselves if we would sit on the sidelines if, in a violent separation, human lives were at 

risk. This scenario leads to a discussion of the second category encompassing conflictive 

separatist movements, those based upon sociocultural issues. 

Conflictive separatist movements occur when ethnic groups try to detach themselves 

legally and politically as an entity from their sovereign governments using force or being 

prepared to do so. Chechnya’s attempted secession reveals a current example. The

Russian government’s attempts to “put down the rebellion” as the West watched, waited 

pensively, and prayed for the immediate cessation of hostilities. Unfortunately for the 

Chechnyans, they were caught in a situation which allowed for only one winner. This 

zero-sum game is important for both sides, as the Chechnyans wish to govern themselves. 

The Russians, in the face of the Soviet erosion, cannot sustain yet another group’s 

disengagement: it may set a precedent which could lead to the further disintegration of 

Russia. 

Is the conflict between Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia any different from that between 

the Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi? and Southern and Northern Sudan? These 

examples are only a few of the conflicts exhibiting an ethnic dimension, yet they continue 

today. We must determine the root causes of these conflicts to anticipate their evolution

and disruptive potential. 

Toward the Twenty-First Century 

Ethnic conflict will continue well into the next century. As a result, the relationship 

between ethnicity, separatism, and nationalism becomes one of logical progression. As

people continue to look inward to retain their cultural foundations, they will work to 

separate themselves from external influences. For many, this will result in attempts to 

separate from their sovereign nation since they no longer accept as valid another culture’s 

domination. Accordingly, these ethnic groups will be fighting for their individual 

nationalism and separatism. This attempt to exercise self-determination also will serve to 

legitimize their actions on the world stage. In the words of Anthony D. Smith, 

The national ideal leads inevitably to “nationalism,” a programme of action to achieve 

and sustain the national ideal.... The homeland must be free. It cannot be ruled by others 

of a different historical culture. The nationalist therefore is drawn into politics, into the 

struggle for self-government and sovereignty in his homeland. 13 

Thus, the differences between ethnicity, separatism, and nationalism are becoming 

blurred. However, it is important to recognize that ethnicity will catalyze these factors. 

As ethnic groups look to separate themselves from their current locus of control, they will 

incite conflict within those governing nations (or clans) who have a strong desire to 

prevent their separation. 

Contemporary authors like Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky cogently identify those 

regions which have the greatest potential for future ethnic conflict. Singer and 

Wildavsky’s The Real World Order points out that only 15 percent of the world exists in 

36 
what they term “zones of peace”; the remaining 85 percent live in “zones of turmoil.” 14

We may debate their figures, but these authors highlight the reality of the world in which 

we live today and forecast the nature of the one in which we’ll reside in the future. They 

believe the nations identified as those in the zones of peace will continue to interact and

resolve differences by peaceful means. 15 Only these nations represent the new world

order; thus, their behavior will mark a distinct passage away from concentrating their 

interests on fundamental national security threats. Since the nations listed in the zones of 

peace are democracies, Singer and Wildavsky insist they will influence one another by 

means other than force and will thus work diligently to minimize internal and external 

conflict to prevent escalation. 

Conversely, the nations included in the zones of turmoil will continue to exhibit 

traditional nineteenth century behavior. 16 Forceful engagement will continue to 

characterize their actions as attempts to preempt escalation fail. These nations “can

expect not only violent and deadly turbulence but also difficulties in the processes of 

economic and political development.” 17 In part, this turbulence will be the result of 

continuing ethnic strife. For example, we may refer to the African nations of Rwanda and

Burundi. Third parties planted the seeds of ethnic conflict for these peoples in the 1800s, 

when they determined which cultural, economic, political, and religious characteristics 

would identify these peoples as distinct groups. Referring to Africa, Alex De Waal, codirector of African Rights (a newly established human rights organization) points with 

disbelief to the actions of outside groups in drawing ethnic lines throughout the continent. 

With respect to Rwanda and Burundi, he states that in the 1930s the Belgians conducted a 

census and issued identity cards for three clans: Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa. Determinants of

personal identity included the number of cows an individual owned: “Those with ten or

more were Tutsi, those with less were Hutu, in perpetuity.” 18 During the early stages of

Burundi’s civil war (April 1972-February 1973), more than 250 thousand people were 

killed because of these ethnic lines. Despite decades of United Nations intervention, the 

Tutsi and Hutu continue to fight today because of ethnic differences, and we have no 

grounds to believe this conflict will end in the near future. 

Africa, as Singer and Wildavsky point out, does not stand alone in the zones of 

turmoil. The Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict continues to take the lives of innocent civilians 

in the name of ethnicity. Many believed the Yugoslavs, including the Serbs, had 

progressed too far as a modem society to revert to wasteful, tribal hatred. The events of 

1991 through today have proven this assumption faulty. 

Regional Perspectives 

Can we be certain of the future hot spots? Aside from Singer and Wildavsky’s

“blanket statement” regarding the zones of turmoil, researchers have attempted to specify 

future regions of ethnic conflict. One source document is the 1994 ACCESS Guide to 

Ethnic Conflicts in Europe and the Former Soviet Union. This report provided a 

disturbing listing of ethnic (and religious) conflicts that are projected to continue 

throughout Europe, the former Yugoslavia region, and the lands of the former Soviet 

Union. Additionally, the media paints a vivid picture of numerous areas and peoples, for 

which bloodshed and dying continue as a part of everyday life. 

37 
Europe 

ACCESS identified 18 potential hot spots in Europe. The list began with Albania 

(Serbian repression of Albanian minority in Yugoslavia; Greek minority in southern half

of Albania believe they are being treated as “second class citizens” by Albania). 19

Divided attention between Kosovo in Yugoslavia and southern Albania could enable a 

Greek population in Albania that has been calling for greater autonomy the opportunity to 

join with Greece (i.e., change the border as it now exists to expand the national boundary

of Greece). 

Belgium presents a substantial problem as well. The country consists of two major 

ethnic groups, the Dutch-speaking Flemings in the north and the French-speaking 

Walloons in the south. While these two groups formed Belgium, the Flemings now feel

they are paying a regressive tax to aid the Walloons. Since these groups coexist more as 

neighbors than a united country (due to increased regional autonomy), they could 

separate in the near future. 20 

The European list of potential struggles continues with the nations of Basques, 

Brittany, Bulgaria, Catalonia, Corsica, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Poland, Romania, 

Saami, Scotland, Slovakia (which has already separated from the Czech Republic), South 

Tyrol, and Wales. 21 Although the reasons for continued conflict range from pure ethnic 

unrest to economic dislocation, the underlying ethnic strife which prompted these 

conflicts will not be easily mitigated. 

Former Yugoslavia Region 

While all the contests within this region do not receive wide-spread publicity, this 

area currently concerns five major conflicts: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, 

Macedonia, and Vojvodina. Most notable among these is the struggle in BosniaHerzegovina. It continues to take lives in the name of ethnic cleansing. A people steeped 

in the tradition of fighting to establish their own political identity, their Bosnian

government is acting to maintain Bosnia as a unified multiethnic state. 22 However, each 

faction among Bosnia’s three main ethnic groups—the Muslims, Croats, and Serbs—has 

a much different political arrangement in mind. 

To halt the bloodshed, the United Nations formulated a plan to redraw the 

geographic boundaries of the region,’ giving each group a region to govern 

independently. While this arrangement suited the dissident Croats and Serbs, the Bosnian 

government withheld agreement. And, while the United Nations is working to broker a 

cease-fire agreement, the future is uncertain as each group works to amass as much

territory as possible before a final peace agreement is signed. As a result, these three 

ethnic groups continue to wage war to make their individual regions of control ethnically 

homogeneous, no doubt, with a view towards joining them to Croatia and Serbia or to 

remain independent. 

Former Soviet Union 

The countries identified as potential war zones continue to encompass those areas 

where ethnic strife forms the foundation of the disputes. Georgia emerges as an area with 

excessive ethnic instability. It has many regions of conflict, including Abkhazia. Georgia 

38 
subsumed Abkhazia as part of its sovereign territory in 1921. However, when Georgia 

declared its independence from the Soviet Union in March 1990, Abkhazia followed suit, 

declaring its independence from Georgia in August. When Georgia refused to recognize 

this declaration, full-scale war erupted (summer of 1992). With this separatist movement

the future of Georgia is now in question. Analysts are concerned that this may be the first 

of many such actions, since ethnic conflict exists in other regions of Georgia as well 

(including the region of South Ossetia which has strong desires to unite with North 

Ossetia, in Russia). 23 

Another area within the bounds of the former Soviet Union that bears close watching 

is Crimea. Here, a resurgence of Crimean nationalism is serving as the basis for a future 

conflict. With population lines drawn at 66 percent ethnic Russians, 26 percent 

Ukrainians, and 8 percent Crimean Tatars, this last group may reestablish the dominance 

of their historical culture. The Crimean Tatars’ opposition to the decision to restore the 

region to an autonomous state following the transfer of Crimea from the Soviet Union to 

the Ukraine in August 1991 confirmed these fears. As its indigenous people, and in spite 

of the fact they only represent 8 percent of the total population, the Crimean Tatars alone 

feel they should decide the future of the nation. 24 

The potential for ethnic conflicts in other areas of the former Soviet Union is

widespread. The ACCESS report identifies other potential ethnic-based conflict areas: the 

Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Chechen-Ingushetia, Dniester Region, 

Gaguzia, Nagorno-Karabakh, North Ossetia-Ingushetia, South Ossetia, Tajikistan, and 

Tatarstan. 25 

Africa 

Potential war zones exist worldwide, but none is as preeminent as is Africa’s. Over 

the course of the last two decades, civil wars and protracted struggles in “Chad, Somalia,

the Saharan area, southern Africa, and elsewhere” promoted a chaotic, destabilized 

atmosphere. 26 During this period, economic progress, the strengthening of the political 

infrastructure, and the promotion of human health and welfare were brought to a halt. 

Like the regions previously discussed, Africa is not immune to separatists movements. 

Upon bringing the Ethiopian civil war to a close in 1991, another separatist action 

ensued: The government established in Eritrea as part of the cessation of hostilities 

declared that region’s independence in 1993. 27 Elsewhere, ethnic cleansing in the process 

of political competition continues on this turbulent continent. One such example is the

ongoing bloodshed between Rwanda’s and Burundi’s two major ethnic groups, the Hutu 

and the Tutsi. 

The world’s most recent experience in Somalia demonstrated that the cry for help

may indeed secure an international response. Here, while the main issue for international 

onlookers concerned feeding a hungry nation, internal struggles for political dominance 

continue along subethnic, clan lines. An endeavor lasting two years, claiming the lives of 

42 Americans and more than 100 peacekeepers from a 21-nation force and costing almost 

$2 billion, has produced little. Indeed, in the wake of the March 1995 United Nations

withdrawal, Somalia, according to one contemporary report, “has no government, and 

warring clans are preparing to battle for the city’s spoils-the air and sea ports-once the

U.N. withdrawal is complete.” 28 

39 
The former discussion highlighted a few of the conditions which may lead to future

ethnic conflict. Among them are an innate desire to preserve one’s culture, economic 

instability, religious fundamentalism, misrepresentation or corruption, and perceived 

fiscal mismanagement. While these by no means exhaust the list of potential reasons, 

they indicate that the “aims and specific context of each of [the potential conflicts] 

naturally varies as much as their scope and intensity.” 29 We must examine the global 

implications of these conditions to evaluate the potential impact on global security. 

Global Impact 

By examining the nature of the ethnic conflicts around the world today, we see that 

immediate and long-range implications for a peaceful world order are not promising. 

Most assuredly, increased ethnic nationalism which manifests itself in separatist wars will 

lead to increased instability throughout our world. Jacques Attali et al. asserts that the 

world is viewed from a backward perspective. Instead of attempting to identify 

conditions wherein more Yugoslavs will create themselves, we should be asking “[w]hy 

should they not happen?” 30 These authors declare that “the ingredients are all in place: 

the collapse of a strong central authority; economic dislocation; historical grievances; 

injustices of many types, both ancient and modem, burgeoning ethnic rivalries; 

disagreements over minority rights; border disputes; limited experience of the democratic

ordering of political questions.” 31 With the growing ability of the media to bring the

atrocities of “ethnic cleansing” and related activities into the living rooms of those in the 

“realm of peace,” pressure for interventionist activity from special interest groups will 

continue to mount. And, while the United States has held off such pressures for direct, 

unilateral intervention in Bosnia, the same cannot be said for other humanitarian 

operations where human lives are at stake, such as in Somalia. 

Perhaps more important than the adverse effects of direct intervention is the unseen 

cost these situations have on the world economy and overall global stability. If left

unchecked, these movements may slowly erode our international relationships to the 

point where we can never maintain stability. Additionally, the ever-shrinking global 

economy will make separation of economic and political convictions increasingly more 

difficult. As linkages between nations progress toward more complex interdependencies, 

the actions of one nation will influence others. This is not to say that we’ll soon reach the 

point where nations decide allegiance based upon a single issue, but the probability exists

that the connections between issues will exert additional pressures on nations to act. For

as much as Clausewitz said that war is an extension of politics, economic war has moved 

into a position of coequal status in the latter half of the twentieth century. From this point

forward, politics and economics will be inextricably linked. While we must consider the

battle before us, the economic instrument of national power certainly has the potential to

replace the military as the politician’s weapon of choice. 

Security Implications 

As the democratic nation which is intended to serve as the world leader, the United

States faces a complex future. While these ethnic conflicts, separatist movements, and 

civil wars in the third world pose no immediate or direct threat to our vital interests, they

40 
have the potential to force the United States into a position where it once again is serving

as the “world’s policeman.” Pursuit of this role’s objectives by the employment of 

military force could ultimately overextend the United States fiscally and could require us

to take a position behind the growing economic prowess of our competitors. As a result,

the United States would no longer stand out as the dominant player on the world stage. 

Does this present a real security threat? The answer lies in the freedom of the United 

States to choose whether she will become involved in one of these conflicts and whether 

she has the authority to dictate the parameters of her involvement. If the answer to either

of these questions is in the negative, the ideology upon which the United States is 

founded is at stake. 

Zones of Turmoil 

The above discussion makes clear that a vast majority of the ethnic conflicts will 

occur within the zones of turmoil. Even though actions within those regions may not be 

of vital, national importance to the United States, we must recognize them and prepare to 

react to the broader regional instabilities these conflicts may create. As with any system, 

instability emerges from change. While change can be good in some respects, it 

frequently creates a more stressful environment for international relations. 

A more serious security threat is the one being discussed throughout our armed 

forces and in Congress today. It is the drain, whether perceived or real, that humanitarian 

and peacekeeping operations are having on our forces’ ability to train, equip, and prepare 

to defend the nation against threats to its vital national interests (including allies). As

these ethnic conflicts continue to create conditions wherein our military services will 

become physically involved, our armed forces may be spread across too many borders. 

Questions regarding the armed forces’ ability to conduct wartime operations while 

continuing to feel the drain from humanitarian operations are creating concern amongst 

our nation’s leadership, both civilian and military. 

Does a Peaceful Resolution Exist? 

As a result of this potential drain, the United States and its allies should actively seek 

to develop the infrastructure of third world (or the Tofflers’ “first wave”) nations today to 

prevent another Somalia tomorrow. Implied herein is the notion of involvement on a 

proactive, as opposed to reactive, basis. While the prospect of this type of commitment 

does not seem likely, the issue rests with the fundamental position of taking the steps now 

(which obviously include a financial price tag) to avert a potential moral, economic, and 

political disaster in the future. This concern should prompt the United States (and its 

allies) to diligently seek peaceful solutions to these increasingly complex problems of 

ethnic nationalism. 

How then are we to deal with these situations? Gobel discusses the three most 

prominent options. First, he believes we should support self-determination regardless of

its implications. In the second option, conversely, he insists we should never support selfdetermination regardless of its implications. Third, Gobel insists that we support selfdetermination in almost all cases. 32 Admitting this is a “convenient out” for those nations 

who have already experienced self-determination, Gobel feels each case must be

examined on an individual basis. The consequences of such actions must be fully 

41 
considered before the United States decides to support anti nationalist actions against a 

sovereign nation. 

Gobel’s preference that we support self-determination in almost all cases is 

somewhat paralleled by the words of Graham E. Fuller. In “Neonationalism and Global 

Politics,” Fuller submits that nations may encounter ethnic strife in the form of “ethnic 

self-determination” as a normal phase of the national maturation process, especially in 

those regions where an ethnic group has historically felt oppressed. 33 In essence, Fuller 

believes that only after these diverse groups have been given an opportunity to selfidentify, both culturally and politically, will they be willing to submit themselves to the 

authority of an externally imposed authority. With this idea in mind, we must formulate a 

strategy to achieve our national goals. 

Singer and Wildavsky provide such a framework for our national strategy through 

suggestions to achieve future national goals. These analysts insist the United States must

first and foremost remain focused upon our essential foreign policy goals: the continued 

protection of American freedom and peace. First, because we exist within a zone of peace 

and because third world ethnic strife poses no direct threat to our vital national interests,

they believe we will continue to meet this superordinate goal without taking any action. 

Second, these analysts posit that our “twin goals must be to try to keep international trade

as open as possible and to protect ourselves against other countries’ efforts to give their 

citizens special advantages at the expense of our citizens.” 34 While we may continue to

keep international trade open, should we fall behind such other nations as Japan as a 

result of continuing to become involved in third world and other ethnic conflicts, we may 

become ill equipped to pursue these economic goals. Actions which provide the 

necessary flexibility to “implement sensible negotiating tactics and strategies that reflect 

our genuine national and political interests” must be pursued. 35 Therein lies the crux of 

this issue for the United States: How are “genuine national and political interests”

differentiated from those that are nonvital? Who makes this determination? The answers 

to these questions represent the focus of our nation and they will continue to define our

international involvement worldwide. 

Finally, Singer and Wildavsky indicate that the United States should, in conjunction 

with other democracies, participate in efforts to minimize violence and encourage

democracy within the zones of turmoil. Through this effort, we should gradually build an 

international set of principles regarding future interventionist activity. 36 These principles 

should guide our behavior and should ultimately lead to the advancement of stable 

democracies throughout the world. The result of which, according to these two authors, 

should be the extension of the zones of peace. In the final analysis, this strategy will 

secure the future of generations to come. 

Singer and Wildavsky cogently argue that “wealth, peace, and democracy eliminate 

what have been the biggest killers: poverty, disease, war, and government murder.” 37

The latter presents the greatest security concern for the United States and the remaining 

democracies; ethnic conflict, as evidenced in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, 

encompasses all four of these debilitating conditions. Consequently, we should construct

and implement a national strategy to minimize ethnic conflict and, in turn, minimize its 

hazards to global democracy. 

42 
Conclusion 

The concepts of nationalism and ethnicity are not new. However, in today’s 

increasingly complex and interdependent world they take on new dimensions. As a result, 

we see ethnic nationalism serving as the catalyst for emerging separatist movements. This 

trend will likely continue well into the future. While ethnic conflicts will occur primarily 

in the zones of turmoil, and as a result pose no direct threat to our national security, the

implications for the world remain severe. For the United States, a major concern is the 

potential economic drain these conflicts have on the US economy. Currently supporting 

31 percent of the United Nation’s peacekeeping tab, the US president and Congress are 

moving to decrease our support to 25 percent. The rationale is simple: Competing US 

domestic interests have prompted our national leadership to lessen its financial support 

for this international organization. Coupled with the economic drain is the fear that our 

fighting forces will not be prepared to defend an attack against what the United States

deems as its, or its allies’, vital national interests. 

As a world leader and a nation built upon the foundation of fundamental human 

rights, the US must recognize these conflicts early on and prepare to help the vanquished 

wherever possible. In the words of Singer and Wildavsky, “Unless we are able to be 

serious about our foreign policy, the practical result is likely to be that the press will 

determine when there will be intervention.” 38 While it is widely known that the press 

does not establish the fundamental beliefs of the United States, the presentation of news 

can have a significant impact on public opinion through the shaping of issues with which 

the nation must deal. If the United States must focus primarily upon self-preservation, it 

must also take steps, in accord with the other democracies, to minimize ethnic tension 

and extend the zones of peace. However, only through the development of a foreign 

policy based upon moral principles, coupled with those which promote our strategic 

interests, will our increasingly complex and interdependent world continue to grow

peacefully. 

Notes 

1

 Paul A Gobel, “A New Age of Nationalism,” in The ACCESS Guide to Ethnic 

Conflicts in Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: ACCESS, 1994), 2. 

2

 Ibid. 

3

 Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (New York: Harper and Row 

Publishers, Inc., 1971), 23. 

4

 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (New York: New York 

University Press, 1979), 4. 

5

 Andrew M. Greeley, Why Can’t They Be Like Us? (New York: E. P. Dutton and 

Co., Inc., 1971), 41. 

6

 Andrew M. Greeley and William C. McCready, Ethnicity in the United States: A 

Preliminary Reconnaissance (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1974), 91. 

7

 Smith, Nationalism. 153. 

8

 Ibid. 

43 
Notes 

9

 Anthony D. Smith, State and Nation in the Third World: The Western State and the 

African Nationalism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 39. 

10 Mark Clayton, “Separatist Party in Quebec Rolls Toward Ballot Victory,” 

Christian Science Monitor, 27 July 1994, 2. 

11 Adam Tanner, “Independence Efforts of Quebec Separatists Make Wall Street 

Jittery,” Christian Science Monitor, 14 December 1994, 3. 

12 Ibid. The US will have to help the Mexican government overcome the instability

of the pesos to the current tune of $9 billion, yet the effects of the instability which could 

occur from a separate Quebec have not yet been determined. It is enough to say at this 

point, however, that such a move could hold drastic repercussions for foreign 

investments. To date, foreigners hold almost 40 percent of Quebec’s $45.2 billion in 

direct [sic] debt. 

13 Smith, Nationalism, 3. 

14 Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones 

of Turmoil (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1993), 3. 

15 Ibid. According to Singer and Wildavsky, these nations include Western Europe, 

the United States, Canada, Japan, and the antipodes. 

16 Ibid. To Singer and Wildavsky, these nations include Eastern and Southeastern

Europe, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and most of Africa, Asia, and Latin 

America. 

17 Ibid., 7. 

18 Alex De Waal, “The genocidal state: Hutu extremism and the origins of the ‘final

solution’ in Rwanda,” Times Literary Supplement, 1 July 1994. 

19 ACCESS, 17. 

20 Ibid. 

21 For a complete discussion of the reasons for continuing and future ethnic conflict 

in this region, see ACCESS, 17-20. 

22 ACCESS, 30. 

23 Ibid. 

24 Ibid., 51. 

25 Ibid., 21-22. 

26 “Africa,” Microsoft (R) Encarta. Copyright 1994 Microsoft Corporation. 

27 Ibid. 

28 Reid G. Miller, “U.N. force pulling out of Somalia,” Montgomery Advertiser, 28 

February 1995. 

29 While Smith uses these words to discuss the nature of nationalism, the concept 

applies to the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism, the resulting effects of 

which we can no longer separate. See Smith, Nationalism, 153. 

30 Jacques Attali et al., “After the Nation-State: Rekindling Tribalism,” New 

Perspectives Quarterly, Fall 1992, 38-40. 

31 Attali et al., 38. 

32 ACCESS, 7. 33 Graham E. Fuller, “Neonationalism and Global Politics: An Era of Separatism,”

Current, July/August 1992,17-22. 

44 
Notes 

34 Singer and Wildavsky, 197. 

35 Ibid. 

36 Ibid., 198. 

37 Ibid., 203. 

38 Ibid., 199. 

45 
4 

Population Pressures, Migration, and Refugees 

Wayne D. Davidson and Bradley S. Davis 

The dawn of the twenty-first century will present us with unique security challenges.

Many of these challenges will not provide any historical precedent in dealing with them. 

The term security may well encompass a set of issues and circumstances that we simply 

do not yet understand. One of these new challenges may deal with population pressures 

and the associated disruptive problems of immigration, refugees, and conflict. The world 

is entering an era of exponential change in the number and distribution of people over the 

globe whose negative impacts we cannot anticipate today based only on our historical

and current experiences. This chapter addresses these changes, how they might impact 

international tensions, and what might be done about them, if anything, to mitigate the 

worst of the consequences. 

When anticipating the global security concerns of the early twenty-first century, one

must consider the issues of overall population pressures, migration of peoples, refugees, 

and conflict. When referring to population pressures, we mean the total number of people 

in the world at any given time. While the total number is important, a related and an 

equally important issue is the distribution of the total number of people over the planet. 

Traditionally, the migration of people between states has a primary impact on 

international politics. Local population pressures often create such situations as 

inadequate economic opportunities, which push people from an area over time. Likewise, 

other areas can pull people towards new opportunities. Migration implies a sense of 

permanency in the shift of people from one location to another. The related issue of 

refugees refers to displaced peoples who, at least initially, hope to return to their own 

homeland. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees defines refugees as 

“people who flee their homeland because of fear of political, religious, or ethnic 

persecution or of war.” 1

 While these issues and problems have always been factors in 

international life in the past, current trends indicate they will carry much more impact for 

international security and stability than before. 

46 
The Problem Defined 

To best appreciate the potential problems and concerns of population pressures for 

the future, one needs only to look briefly into the past. One way to place a perspective on 

the problem is to examine the number of years it takes to produce another one billion 

people. The one billion population mark was reached around 1830. In other words, it took 

from two to five million years for the human race to reproduce to the one billion mark. 

From 1830 it took only a mere 100 years to reach the two billion mark. It required only 

another 30 years to hit the three billion level in 1960. The four billion mark was reached 

in 1975, and in 1987 the five billion level was topped. 2

 Currently, the world population 

stands at around 5.6 billion with a fairly steady annual global population growth rate of 

1.56 percent. 3

The general migration of peoples has been prevalent throughout history. Through the 

1800s and early 1900s, many people left Europe for the New World, which was happy to 

receive them. The early 1990s saw a significant migration of peoples from the former

communist countries to Western Europe. Given this large flow of people over a relatively 

short period of time, Western Europe would like to close the flood gates somewhat to 

control the large influx of people. At one time, most of the Americas and considerable 

portions of Africa were open to immigrants, but today, only three other principal 

recipients exists besides Western Europe: the United States, Canada, and Australia. 4

These countries are now seriously rethinking their immigration policy. 

For much of the world, the problem is not one of legal or illegal immigration, it is 

one of refugees. The plight of refugees has been a steadily growing issue considering the 

increasing number of people involved. In 1960 there were about 1.4 million refugees. The 

number hit the 10 million mark in 1982 and now includes from 17 to 23 million refugees

who have crossed international borders and at least some 25 million more who are 

displaced within their own countries. 5

 Refugee numbers often serve as an imprecise 

barometer for other factors that are extremely difficult to measure including political 

stability, human rights, justice, and order. Ethnic upheavals, civil wars, or such resource 

shortages as food are quite often the root cause of refugee movements. The United 

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees coordinates relief efforts for some of the 

refugees, but it is not staffed, equipped, or funded to help in all refugee situations. Most 

refugees must rely on the generosity of neighboring countries or other tolerant states. 6

Unfortunately, as the pressures to help resettle refugees (and immigrants) have grown, the 

global willingness to accept them has declined. 

The problems of population pressure will continue for the foreseeable future.

Although the rate of population growth has actually declined over the past several years, 

it is declining at a slower rate than originally anticipated. In 1982 United Nations data 

projected the world population would continue to grow at increasingly lower rates until 

around the year 2100, when the population would stabilize around the 10.2 billion mark. 

Now the United Nations expects the world population to continue to grow until the year 

2200, with the total population mark leveling off at about 11.6 billion people. 7

 A brief 

look into some of these overall trends reveals some interesting points. 

A millennium ago the global population was a fraction of what it is today. High 

birthrates were required to offset the prevailingly high mortality rates, as well as to 

provide for a modest growth rate in total numbers of people. The mortality rates began to 

47 
decline in Europe because of initial advances in agricultural technology, sanitation, health 

care, and transportation of commodities. The decline in mortality rates was not followed 

immediately by a concomitant decline in fertility rates. For example, there was a period

of surplus births relative to deaths in most of Europe and North America. However, today 

mortality and fertility rates have essentially equaled-out in these regions as they have 

transitioned from high mortality and fertility populations to low mortality and fertility 

populations. 8

 

The non-European areas of the world have undergone a somewhat different 

demographic experience with dramatically different results. The demographic changes in 

these areas of the world did not begin until the twentieth century and were much more 

compressed and dramatic. The transfer of modern medical and associated technologies 

from Europe and North America to the non-European areas occurred much quicker than 

it took to develop in the West. The immediate result was the significant decline in 

mortality rates, certainly far more rapid than the decline experienced in Europe. Just as in 

Europe earlier, the decreased mortality rate was not immediately offset by a decrease in

fertility rates. As a result, a significant gap opened between mortality and fertility rates,

and population growth in these areas accelerated. The gap continued to widen between 

mortality and fertility rates to about 2 percent growth annually until around 1960, when 

the gap finally began to shrink. While this gap is still slowly shrinking, the non-European 

areas of the world continue to grow at a far greater rate than the European areas of the 

world, thereby creating an increasingly unequal population distribution. 9

 

Even though the world’s annual population growth rate is getting smaller, this 

growth rate is applied to an ever-increasing total population, which still means everincreasing numbers of people. The overwhelming portion of the growth is in the nonEuropean or nondeveloped areas of the world. In 1993, 94 percent of the world’s 

population growth occurred in the developing world. Currently, 4.3 billion of the 5.6 

billion of the world population (78 percent) reside in the developing world. 10 Additional 

challenges are imbedded in the age distribution in these regions. In African and Central

American countries 45 percent of the population is under the age of 15. This percent 

jumps from 47 to 49 in Iraq, Iran, and Syria. These large populations of young people

who lack employment, homes, medical attention, or even clean drinking water have 

explosive needs but dim futures. 11 In the near and medium future, these areas will be

hard pressed to lower or stabilize population growth while having an unprecedentedly

high number of people in child-bearing ages. 

With increases in population come increased demands on the environment in several 

ways. First, larger numbers of people place greater demands on the environment for food, 

energy, and other raw materials. Second, the increase in economic activity as a result of 

more people produces outputs that affect soil erosion, deforestation, air and water 

pollution, and other environmental factors. 12 In fact, every year an area of agricultural 

land almost the size of Ireland is lost to various forms of degradation. 13 With more and

more people placing greater demands on and having a greater impact on their local 

environment and that environment becoming less able to support those people, one of the 

logical results is the migration of large numbers of people from one area to another. 

Migration is, in part, a by-product of increasing population pressure. Although not

the only cause for migration, population pressures tend to balance themselves through 

migration. As of this writing, about 123 million displaced people are looking for a better

48 
life or simply trying to escape with their lives. Of these, approximately 100 million are 

living in countries in which they are not citizens, and the remaining 23 million are

displaced within their own countries. Taken together, these people represent about 2 

percent of the world’s population, and the numbers grow annually. 14 As the developing 

world continues to swell in population, and the developed world v population remains 

fairly stable or in some places is actually decreasing, migration from the developing 

world to the developed world can be expected to continue. The influx of immigrants to 

new locations, mostly urban areas, often create tinder boxes of conflict. 

So far, we have identified and discussed the problem from a macro perspective. 

We’ve offered a brief history of the current state and size of the problem. We also have 

shown that population pressures, migration, and refugee problems will be with us into the 

next century. Let us now examine the regions where these problems most likely will 

occur. 

Regional Perspectives 

Population pressures will strain most areas of the developing world. Asia, including

the Middle East, is already home to 3.4 billion people, about 60 percent of the world’s 

current population. Within Asia are the world’s two demographic giants, China and India. 

China’s 1.2 billion people, about one-fifth of the world’s total number, make it the most 

populous country in the world today. 15 While its population pressures are significant, 

current trends show that China’s fertility rate is declining. From 1991 to 1993 China’s 

total fertility rate dropped significantly from 2.3 to 1.9 percent. Government officials 

attribute the decline to the “one-couple, one-child” policy, improvements to birth control 

services, and an improved standard of living. While China has been a demographic 

concern in the past, it appears that population pressure may be “an issue that is under 

reasonable control for the near-term future. 16 

The other demographic giant is India, currently with 900 million people. Unlike

China, India has not controlled its population growth. For example, in 1993 India’s 

population increase was almost 17 million, surpassing the combined population increases 

in the United States, Europe, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union. No evidence 

supports a slow-down in the population increase in the near future. The recent “Second 

India Study” estimated that a baseline 1971 population of 548 million will double by 

2007 and that the population will double again before it levels out. The report further 

indicated that India’s environment is rapidly decaying. Extensive deforestation is further 

causing the rapid siltation of dams which has led to one million acres of land being 

waterlogged or salinized. Among other concerns, agriculture is severely affected. 17

Social problems are being magnified with nearly 40 percent of the population living 

below the official poverty level. There is a rapidly growing backlog of low-skilled, lowproductivity jobs, and the problems are mounting. 18 Someone should ask if the Indian 

government can withstand the weight of its own population, coupled with many of the

deleterious collateral environmental and social effects of its huge population growth. Is it

possible that India could collapse under the weight of its population numbers? 

A neighbor and potential rival to India is Pakistan. Currently at 130 million people, it 

is the seventh most populated country in the world. Like most developing nations, 

Pakistan’s population growth soared following World War II due to improvements in 

49 
sanitation and other health-care measures. To date Pakistan has not mounted any 

effective population control measures. Pakistani women average 6.7 children, twice the 

global average, and Pakistan’s population total is expected to double within the next 23 

years. 19 Until now, it has sustained an economic growth rate of between 5 and 6 percent 

each year, which almost matched the enviable economic performance of such Asian 

countries as Singapore and South Korea. However, the tremendous increase in population 

has more than offset the large economic strides Pakistan has made. Despite the economic 

successes, the per capita gross domestic product stands among the world’s lowest at 

around $350. 20 As with India, Pakistan has felt the problems associated with population 

strains in both the physical and social environments. Should sustained economic 

performance slow down, Pakistan could possibly buckle under the strain of its population 

numbers and associated burdens, adding more fuel to an already politically volatile 

subregion of the world. 

Of the world’s regions, Africa has the bleakest prospects in terms of population 

numbers and associated problems. Africa’s overall population growth rate is 2.9 percent, 

the highest of any region in the world. 21 There are currently 719 million people in Africa,

comprising 13 percent of the world’s total population; in 1950 it comprised only 9 

percent. By the year 2015, Africa is projected to contain 19 percent of the total

population. 22 Fertility rates are staggering in comparison to Western trends. For example, 

northern Africa’s fertility rate stands at 4.5 percent, western Africa at 6.6 percent, central 

Africa at 6.6 percent, eastern Africa at 6.5 percent, and southern Africa at 4.5 percent. By 

comparison, western Europe’s fertility rate currently stands at 1.4 percent, North 

America’s and northern Europe’s at 1.8 percent, and eastern Europe’s at 1.6 percent. 23

Of the world’s fastest growing countries in terms of population increases, three of the top 

five are located in Africa. Over the next 35 years Nigeria’s population is projected to 

increase by 198 percent, Ethiopia’s by 180 percent, and Angola’s by 175 percent. 24 

Being faced with the highest rate of population growth in the world, Africa is 

arguably the region least capable of sustaining or supporting that growth. In the past 10 

years, the world’s food production has increased by 24 percent, outpacing the world’s 

population increase. However, this is not the case in Africa. The continent’s food 

production during this same period decreased by 5 percent, while the population 

increased by 34 percent. On the entire African continent only about 7 percent of the land 

is arable. 25 Scenes of starvation and privation, reminiscent of Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, 

and other African countries, which the West has become accustomed to viewing since the 

1980s, are likely to be repeated in the near future. Africa will be the scene of terrible 

suffering in the next decade with no prospect for improvement on the horizon. Many 

governments could collapse under the sheer burden of their own human weight. The huge

population explosions will likely fuel ethnic problems already present on the continent 

and fan the flames of long-standing and current conflicts. Africa possibly could enter a 

tighter and tighter death spiral, which will require help from the rest of the world. 

Growing population pressures also exist in the Americas, primarily in Latin America. 

Although they might be serious, they are not nearly as severe as they are in Africa or 

Asia. The relative population giants in Latin America are Mexico and Brazil, with total 

populations of 83 million and 151 million, respectively. As of this writing, Mexico’s

population doubling time is 27 years, and Brazil’s is 38 years. Additionally, seven other 

Latin American countries have populations exceeding 10 million and have population 

50 
doubling times ranging from 25 to 63 years. While these statistics have implications for 

the medium and long term, they do not present the ominous near-term catastrophic 

situations that exist in other regions. 

One of the major repercussions of the growing population pressures experienced in

the developing world is migration. Population density increases place greater stress on 

the local territory to support increasing numbers of people. If a certain territory exceeds 

its natural-carrying capacity, then at least some people will have to migrate to lower the

overall population density so that the remaining inhabitants will have the bare necessities 

of life. It is incorrect to blame the problem of population growth as the only root cause

for external migration, since the cause cannot be analyzed in isolation from a country’s 

economy, environment, politics, and culture. For whatever reason or combination of 

reasons, today and for the foreseeable future, the unprecedented current rate of migration

will continue and create serious challenges for both the developing and developed world. 

The majority of migration flows first from one developing country to another more 

economically sound developing country within the same region or second to a more

distant developed country. 26 

In Asia over the last three to four years, large numbers of people have migrated from

the south and southeast areas to Japan, Hong Kong, and South Korea. Africa has three 

general migration patterns. Ivory Coast and Nigeria are the primary destinations in

western Africa. In southern Africa the flow is predominantly from such countries as 

Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland into South Africa. The flow from 

northern Africa is mainly into western Europe. In the Americas, the movement from or 

through Mexico to the United States dominates the migration pattern. Brazil and 

Venezuela also have attracted increasing numbers of migrants. Western Europe absorbed 

over eight million people between 1980 and 1992, half of them from North Africa,

Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Since 1989 a migratory surge from Eastern Europe and the

former Soviet Union has occurred. 27 Most migrants flock to the larger cities, which 

migrants have overburdened with their ever-increasing influx. High-fertility rates, 

coupled with increasing rural poverty and environmental degradation, will serve only to 

increase the flow of people into urban areas in the immediate future. The world’s six 

largest cities (or urban agglomerations) are Mexico City, Tokyo, Sao Paulo, New York, 

Shanghai, and Los Angeles. 28 Many other cities in the developing world and to a lesser 

extent in the developed world have come under the siege of migration. However, within 

the next 10 to 15 years there will occur into the developed countries and their cities an 

increased flow above the present rates. 

The problems of migration due in part by billowing population pressures is

challenging enough by themselves. However, once placed in the real-world context of 

conflicts, wars, and other human interactions, the problems become murkier. One of the 

major products of the various ethnic conflicts and civil wars raging throughout the 

developing world centers around refugees’ attempt to escape with their lives and what

little they can carry. The plight of Rwandan refugees over the past year illustrates this 

phenomenon. The deadly ethnic turmoil between the Tutsis and Hutus has killed between 

500,000 to one million people. More than 250,000 refugees currently survive in Rwanda 

and up to two million live in surrounding countries, though each of these countries are 

barely able to sustain their own populations. Even with UN humanitarian relief, much of 

51 
which is flown in by US and European military units, the overflow of these refugees 

makes their new camps ripe for conflict. 29 

With mushrooming population and emigration, Africa leads as a source of refugees. 

Of the current top 10 refugee-producing countries, nine are located in Africa: Sudan, 

Liberia, Guinea, Zaire, Angola, Rwanda, Tanzania, Somalia, and Eritrea. The countries 

taking in most of the world’s refugees are also among the world’s poorest. Ethiopia, the 

east African nation that is now home to almost 500,000 refugees, has one of the world’s 

lowest per capita annual incomes, a meager $100. Zaire, with one and one-half million 

refugees, more than 10 times the number in the US, has only 1/30 of the US’s per capita 

income. 30 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has stated that the 

United Nations is facing the most difficult and demanding refugee situation since the

organization’s inception. As long as nationalistic, ethnic, or communal conflicts and 

tensions continue to rise, so will the growing throngs of refugees. 31 

Projected Impact 

The impact of the combined aspects of overpopulation, migration, and refugees will 

continue to be felt in the developing world, most notably in Africa. As people swarm to 

the larger cities in these developing areas, the supporting infrastructures will run serious

risk of collapse. The rule of law will flounder, and the snowballing of failed states will 

gain momentum. Existence in these countries will resemble man in the Hobbesian state of 

nature, where life will become increasingly solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. 

The developed states also will feel the impact of population pressures, migration, and

refugees. People will see more and more the developed world as their only hope for 

salvation and I attempt to enter legally, illegally, or any other way they can. At the same

time, the developed countries will resist more and more the attempts of migrants and 

refugees to enter. The resistance already has started and will become more strident. The 

United States, Western Europe, northern Europe, and Japan are starting to close their

doors to this apparently endless flood of humanity seeking relief from their nightmare. 

“Given the general tenor of the times, it’s going to be a lot tougher than before for

refugees to make their way into the US,” says Joel Kotkin, a writer and a senior fellow at 

the Center for the New West in Denver. “We have become... far less likely to want to 

make exceptions for people.” A basic fact of overpopulation in the world is that 

eventually a portion of the overpopulation is pressured by economics, politics, or 

unavailable resources to migrate to what it considers a better place to live. In doing so 

they take their cultural and environmental heritage with them. In the past, the relatively

small sizes of the various immigrant groups arriving in a new homeland like the US were 

assimilated easily. Nowadays, this human flow is dramatically larger and new homelands

are simply finding it harder to assimilate the new cultures quickly. This trend has and will 

continue to lead to conflict. 

The exodus of the Mariel boat people of Cuba to the US was at first an emotional 

roller coaster for Americans. We watched in horrified fascination the pitiful collection of 

makeshift boats and floats, not fit enough to cross an Olympic-size pool, yet miraculously 

crossing the 90 miles between their old and new homes. The sheer size of the migration 

overwhelmed the Coast Guard and Florida officials. Camps were established to handle 

the huge influx. More importantly, the demographics of those arriving began a negative 

52 
whiplash within the US. Fidel Castro, in what many would consider a political 

masterstroke against the US, simply emptied his prisons and pointed the way north. 

While awaiting disposition of their pleas for asylum, fighting within the camps erupted 

into full-scale riots, necessitating the call-up of US military units. This nightmare began

once again in 1993-94 as Haitians went to sea in search of better lives and to leave behind

the repressive military-led government which had ousted President Jean Bertrand

Aristide. The reaction in the US was obviously hardened by our recent memories of the 

Cubans, and we established camps for the Haitians at our military facility at Guantanamo 

Bay, Cuba (a small irony there), and several locations in Panama. The rioting did not

occur as much this time, because the US ensured large contingents of military for guard

duty. 

Is this the portent to the future? It could be according to Jean Raspail’s haunting 

novel of the future, The Camp of the Saints. He paints a chilling scenario of one million

Indians who were so desperate to flee the inhuman conditions of Calcutta that they begin 

a startling odyssey by sea (reminiscent of the Cubans and Haitians) around the Horn of 

Africa, through the Strait of Gibraltar, and to the south of France, in search of a better 

way of life. Albeit a moving description of their travels, it is the debate within France, 

within the government, and by the common Frenchman that is so chilling. A review of 

the book highlights the “crumbling away of resolve by French sailors and soldiers when 

they are given the order to repel physically by shooting or torpedoing, the armada of 

helpless, yet menacing people. The denouement, with the French population fleeing their 

southern regions and army units deserting in droves, is especially dramatic.” 32 

A modern-day example of this is occurring in Albania. As this country emerged from 

its communist veil of secrecy, the wonders of the West flooded into this country. What 

ensued was nothing more than a human wave of over 40,000 people destined for the near 

shores of Italy. Hijacking a boat and sailing into the Italian harbor of Bari, Albanians 

jumped ship and swam ashore, only to be caught by the awaiting Italian riot squads. They 

were herded unceremoniously into the local stadium. When a helicopter attempted to 

drop food and water to the Albanians, it was attacked and flew off, and all signs of 

control left the jailed Albanians. They were eventually flown home, but the aftermath and 

horror felt by the Italians cost the mayor his job and a standing policy to return future 

Albanians to the boats on which they arrived was instituted. 33 

The prospects for a comprehensive solution to these problems is at present remote.

While some steps are planned to alleviate the worst of the problems, the vastness of them

defies a universal solution. An agenda for action was established during the Cairo 

Conference in September 1994. The plan called for nations to provide universal access to 

a full range of safe and reliable family planning methods and related reproductive health 

services by the year 2015. The conference also focused on the status of women 

worldwide. The key concern was to improve the economic status of women through 

better education so that they will have an “alterative to perpetual motherhood.” 34 While 

these goals certainly have an admirable quality, it remains to be seen if the world will be

willing to pay for these programs, which no doubt will be seen by some as a pure wealth

transfer with little or no result in the long term. The most common area of agreement is 

that if nothing is done, present tendencies eventually will result in more drastic

conditions. 

53 
The impact on the United States will be felt more and more. First, the United States

will be more active in protecting its southern border from illegal immigrants and

refugees. The borders already are being tightened, as evidenced in the 1994 California 

proposition to restrict immigration and the with-drawal of financial state support for those 

already living illegally in the state. Yet more migration can be expected. Second, there 

will be a louder cry from the United Nations and the developing world for the United 

States to do more. The problem for the US will be to choose where and when it should 

help out or intervene. Pictures of suffering will only become more commonplace, and an 

infinite number of opportunities will present themselves. The risk to America in these 

circumstances will be spreading its finite resources and national treasure too thinly. 

However, continued active United States involvement in international population, 

migration, and refugee problems is likely, and is consistent with the new national security 

strategy of engagement and enlargement. Most of its involvement will come in terms of 

humanitarian and economic assistance, with the inevitable associated peaceful military

operations involved. 

The United States military response largely will fall into nontraditional roles. Given 

its unique strategic airlift capability, the Air Force will be called on increasingly to 

deliver humanitarian relief. Peace operations will continue’ to increase in number, and 

will consume more relative shares of national and military money, resources, and 

personnel. The military also will begin to work closer with civil authorities from the

federal level on down to help monitor and tighten our borders to the south. The potential 

problem is that the military may be parceled out in the numerous variety of nontraditional 

tasks, so that it will end up being spread too thinly and become unprepared to do its 

traditional warrior roles adequately. 

Throughout the world the mass displacements of people challenge the sanctity of 

national borders and national identities, and they may be thought to impact the 

disintegration of nations. They have recently become a challenge to a nation’s traditional 

concepts of its own policies on security and foreign relations. It is quite easy to discern 

why mass movements of migrants or refugees contribute to internal or interstate conflict 

and regional and international instability. The recent and repetitive attacks in Germany by

roving gangs of skinheads upon Turkish immigrants exemplify the growing frustration, 

usually misplaced, towards the flood of immigrants. 

Migrants also have become instruments of warfare and military strategy. Numerous 

incidents on every continent show where armed exiles have been used as freedom 

fighters and guerrillas to wage war. The assistance provided by the Pakistani government

to the Afghan rebels (Mujahedin) against the Soviet invasion and the help by the 

Honduran government to the Contras in Nicaragua are clear examples. South Africa, 

Israel, and Vietnam have all been accused of making multiple attacks upon refugee 

camps in neighboring countries, claiming these camps were hotbeds of radical resistance 

fighters. 

These examples of conflicts involving population overpressures pale in comparison 

to some solutions advanced for the control of migrants and refugees, especially those 

towards the developed countries. A Finnish philosopher has become the author of a bestselling book by arguing the world can continue to be habitable only if a few billion 

human beings are eliminated; another world war therefore would be a happy occasion for 

the planet. 35 But one senior UN diplomat argues against this view (and is somewhat 

54 
reminiscent of Raspail’s story). Kishone Mahbubani feels that “superior Western military 

technology will be useless against the mass migrations from the third world. These

invading armies will arrive as poor and defenseless individuals and families, moving

without commanders or orders, and seeping slowly through porous borders.” 36 

Certain possible implications and consequences exist for international relations at the

beginning of the twenty-first century due to these population pressures. Some analysts 

have predicted an increase in interstate wars with the developing regions to acquire 

resources to support their own people. However, other analysts have argued that during 

famines and other hardships, people are too weak or preoccupied with day-to-day

survival concerns to take on military expeditions without the preparation and diversion of 

human and material resources that they require. Analysts also have hinted at a war of 

redistribution between the developed states (the “haves”) and the developing states (the 

“have-nots”), especially considering the clear numerical advantage of the developing 

world. However, this course is not a likely one since, for one, too much is made of the 

possibility that the developing states could unite and remain united for an extended 

period of time. A more likely possibility holds that some developing states, perhaps just

one, would resort to extortion by threatening to detonate a nuclear device, employing 

terrorist hijacking, or relying on kidnapping to obtain scarce survival resources. 37 While 

each of these tactics is a conceivable possibility, any of them probably would work one 

time, but would result in retaliation by the developed states. One can easily find optimists

concerning this subject. The well-respected author, Max Singer, in his book, Passage to a 

Human World, argues that “we need to be, and can be, so confident that we have enough 

space and raw materials for ten billion people that we do not need to fear twenty billion.” 

In any case, the magnitude of the problems of population, migration, and refugees is 

potentially large and will aggravate existing political, social, and economic problems as

well as potentially create new threats in a new-world environment. 

Conclusion 

This chapter addressed the growing trends and dangers of population pressure, 

migration, and refugees for the near-term future. These topics are interrelated. Also, 

while the subject was treated in relative isolation to other problems of economics and 

politics, it cannot, in reality, be separated. 

These concerns affect other pressing issues which make the future even more 

difficult to decipher. The bleakest observation holds that the regions with the fastest 

growth are the same regions that have the least natural support capacity, least 

infrastructure, and least expertise to treat the problems. As people flee to avoid their fate, 

they find they are not wanted elsewhere. The situation already may have too much 

momentum for a near- to mid-term solution, despite great interest and involvement from

the developed world. However, in the long term, the most draconian of solutions to the 

problem of overpopulation may be enforced by Mother Nature (widespread famine) or 

man himself (full-scale war) if we do not find the answers ourselves—and soon. 

55 
Notes 

1

 Hal Kane, Lester R. Brown, and David Malin Roodman, “Refugee Flows 

Swelling.” in Linda Starke, ed., Vital Signs 94: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future 

(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1994), 106. 

2

 John Spanier, Games Nations Play, 8th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 

Quarterly, Inc., 1993), 271. 

3

 Aaron Sachs, “Population Increase Drops Slightly,” in Starke, 98. 

4

 Barry B. Hughes, Continuity and Change in World Politics: A Clash of 

Perspectives, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1994), 439. 

5

 Amy Kaslow and George Moffett, “Refugees Without a Refuge: US Starts to Pull 

Up the Drawbridge,” Christian Science Monitor, 1 March 1995, 1, 10. 

6

 Hughes, 441. 

7

 Sachs, 99. 

8

 Ibid. 

9

 Hughes, 4. 

10 Ibid., 4-5. 

11 Kane, 106. 

12 Hughes, 6. 

13 Ibid., 437-38. 

14 Kane, 106. 

15 Bob Sutcliff, “The Tides of Humanity,” World Press Review, October 1994, 8. 

16 Boyce Rensberger, “Damping the World’s Population,” Washington Post National 

Weekly Edition, 12-14 September 1994, 10. 

17 Sachs, 98. 

18 Brad Knickerbocker, “Population Doubling Strains India’s Environment, People,” 

Christian Science Monitor, 11 August 1994, 11. 

19 George Moffett, “Pakistan’s Population Growth Saps Economic Prosperity,” 

Christian Science Monitor, 6 September 1994, 7. 

20 Ibid. 

21 Rensberger, 10. 

22 Guy Arnold, “Tackling the Population Explosion,” New African Market, October 

1994, 24. 

23 Ibid. 

24 Rensberger, 10. 

25 Arnold, 24. 

26 John Pomfret, “Europe’s Rio Grande Floods with Refugees,” Washington Post, 11 

July 1993, Al. 

27 Ibid. 

28 Ibid. 

29 Joyce Hackel, “Reconciliation in Tom Rwanda Set Back After Camp Massacre,” 

Christian Science Monitor, 3 May 1995, 7. 

30 Kaslow and Moffett. 

31 “Fighting the Odds,” The UN Chronicle, December 1993, 89. 

32 Matthew Connelly and Paul M. Kennedy. “Must it be the Rest Against the West?”

Atlantic Monthly, December 1994, 62. 

56 
Notes 

33 Nils Kongshaug, “A Thousand Secret Paths Lead from Albania.” Christian 

Science Monitor, 20 March 1995, 7. 

34 Arnold, 24. 

35 Connelly and Kennedy, 79. 

36 Kishore Mahbubani, “The West and the Rest,” The National Interest, Summer

1992, 3. 

37 David W. Ziegler, War, Peace, and International Politics, 6th ed. (New York: 

HarperCollins, 1993), 436. 

57 
5 

Transnational Crime 

Its Effect and Implications for International Stability 

Richard W. Chavis 

Transnational crime poisons the business climate, corrupts political leaders and 

undermines human rights. It weakens the effectiveness and credibility of institutions and 

thus undermines democratic life. 

—Boutros Boutros-Ghali 

Secretary-General, United Nations 

Crime is increasing worldwide, and all signs indicate it will continue to do so. Many 

observers consider this type of civil disorder an internal, domestic problem that must be 

solved by indigenous governments, thereby overlooking the security implications caused 

by crime involving the international community. Article 2 of the United Nations Charter

reflects this attitude which bars the organization from involvement in activities which are 

essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states. This traditional and limited 

approach fails to sufficiently explain our new international order and the possible effects 

of crime on national and international societies. For example, crime in emerging nations 

may inhibit the advancement of democratic processes and limit political and economic

development. In addition to such detrimental internal effects, organized crime creates 

direct international implications as its nature becomes more transnational and its effect 

more widespread. Regional and international organized criminal activities increasingly 

influence the stability, effectiveness, and reliability of foreign regimes and institutions 

and thereby comprise a significant challenge to international stability. 

Shifting Basis of Power 

Traditionally, most conventional discussions of international relations invariably 

focused exclusively on official relationships between states. In the past, such relatively 

simplistic discussions may have provided some insight and possibly a predictive model 

for the actions of governments in the international arena and. more importantly, the

coalitions they formed. For example, during the cold war blocs of states—and the impact, 

58 
reaction, and influence one bloc or coalition had on the other-defined international 

relations. During this same period, the only relevance of nonaligned nations centered 

around the influence the blocs had on them. 

The end of the cold war signaled a drastic revolution in the international order. As 

Professor Donald Snow relates in his book. The Shape of the Future: The Post-Cold War 

World. “Infrequently, a dramatic event or series of events occurs that results in a basic 

change in the way the international system works and that requires us to alter how we

look at that system.” 1

 Like the events following the end of World War II. Snow identifies

the events of 1989 as just such a dramatic occurrence. However, many political scientists 

believe the nature of change in the international political environment may run much 

deeper than those encountered because of the events following 1945. Instead of looking 

to the 1940s for a similar change or historical benchmark, some observers reach back 

three centuries. They contend the impact of change emanating from the cold war

compares favorably with the rise of the state system following the Peace of Westphalia. 2

This period in the seventeenth century witnessed the emergence of the dominant features 

of modern international relations. These features included the principles of territorial 

integrity and self-determination. Regardless of the specific magnitude of the current 

change, which is largely an academic debate, it suffices for this discussion to understand 

that the international order is significantly different from what it was before the fall of the 

Berlin Wall. 

Accepting the reality of things being different since the breakup of the Soviet Union, 

analysts have scrambled to redefine the world in the terms which made them comfortable

for 50 years. Generally, they have based these term on descriptive relationships between 

states. One thing remains certain, we can no longer realistically view the world in terms 

of first, second, and third world countries or even in terms of coalitions. Arguably the

world is now divided into relevant and irrelevant states. This notion postulates that the 

industrialized states of the world really matter, and they should therefore be concerned 

mostly with their economic and political security. The industrialized states have some

obvious economic incentives to encourage members of the second and third worlds to 

join them. However, the social, political, and economic problems of these less-developed 

countries are, for the most part, relatively insignificant to the industrialized states. Some

notable exceptions to this view exist. For example, ‘analysts cannot view the countries of 

the Persian Gulf as irrelevant to the industrialized nations of the world as their oil 

reserves are far too valuable, and therefore their stability is important to the industrialized 

states. This conceptualization is not dissimilar from perceptions by Max Singer and 

Aaron Wildavsky as outlined in their book, The Real World Order, where they describe 

the international arena as zones of peace and a zone of turmoil. 3

 In the past, this kind of 

grouping may have been useful when attempting to draw conclusions concerning 

similarities and differences to understand and predict behavior. 

However, in light of the radical change in the political landscape of the world, a 

more appropriate approach to grouping states views relations among peoples in the 

international community in terms of forces or power that give rise to cultural, religious, 

and economic movements. The dictionary defines power as “a person, group, or nation 

having great influence or control over others.” 4

 Through power the irrelevant becomes

relevant, or the zones of conflict affect the zones of peace. Even with the changes in

international relations, one undeniable truth exists-power dictates relationships in the 

59 
world. Historically, central institutions of the state embodied power in the international 

arena. With the decrease in the relative power of states today, such other sources of 

power as ethnic, religious, and economic factions may reveal increasingly greater power 

to influence international affairs and dictate agendas. For example, today’s multinational 

corporations often possess more power than many states. Power continues to dictate 

relation-ships in the new world order; however, some sources of power are now shifting 

to nonstate institutions and actors. One of these nonstate actors with increasing power and 

significance is organized criminal groups. These groups have undoubtedly become more 

powerful and will emerge as a major force in the new international system. 

Significance of Organized Crime 

Ample evidence abounds in contemporary literature, and sufficient quantitative data, 

to validate the spread of crime worldwide. A corresponding increase in organized crime

groups and the amount of crime attributed to them accompanies this rise in criminal 

activity. These groups are becoming very powerful and a potent force in the international 

arena. Roy Godson, of Washington’s National Strategy Information Center, estimates the 

“annual worldwide profits for all organized crime activities at $1 trillion, almost the size 

of the United States federal budget.” 5

 Organized crime, long the plague of industrialized 

societies, has begun to impact areas where it had traditionally been restricted. For 

example, organized crime as a growing enterprise now operates in Russia and throughout 

Eastern Europe, as well as in South Asia, Africa, Central and South America, and the 

countries of the Pacific rim. 

In Russia crime has spun out of control since the Soviet Union’s demise in 1991. 

According to an estimate by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, at least 100,000 

Russians are now members of mafia-style organized criminal gangs. 6

 These people 

comprise nearly 5,700 organized crime groups operating in Russia. 7

 The majority of 

them are small groups averaging around 20 members. Most of these small groups are 

involved only in local rackets like protection schemes, prostitution, and surreptitious

marketing activities. However, analysts contend that approximately 160 of these are 

powerful enough to operate internationally in more than 30 countries. 8

 The disruptive 

influences of these Russian gangs have spread throughout the countries of the former

Soviet bloc and into Western Europe. Several reports clearly show that gang activity has 

spread beyond Russian borders into various criminal enterprises ranging from drugs, 

prostitution, and money laundering. Some observers postulate that some of these Russian 

gangs have close ties with narcotraffickers in South America. 

Russian criminals are also profiting from the Balkan war. They are thriving on

smuggling and surreptitious market activities throughout the war zone. Also, observers 

believe Russian crime groups to be the prime source of the women who work the brothels 

in Zagreb and Belgrade. 9

 But the Russians are not responsible for all the crime that has

occurred in the Balkan war. Indeed. Russian crime groups operating in Belgrade must 

compete with local crime groups. The number of organized crime groups in Belgrade is 

swelling under its current conditions of war and poverty. Teenagers there have 

succumbed to organized crime in large numbers. 10 The number of crimes committed by

minors doubled in 1994 alone. Observers credit the increasing involvement of minors in 

criminal activity to the growing number of organized crime groups and their demand for

60 
assassins. Belgrade is experience “around one hundred” underworld killings a year, a 100 

percent increase from the prewar rate. 11

Around the globe, drug production and smuggling activities are two of the more

common activities of organized crime and are best characterized by the drug cartels of

Central and South America. While these are the most notorious, many similar operations, 

rivaling the cartels in various parts of the world exist. For example, Albanian mafia 

barons have created transportation networks that move illegal drugs from Turkey through 

Bulgaria. Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. 12 According to the East 

European office of the Brussels-based Customs Cooperation Council, one-quarter of the 

heroin sold in west Europe passes through east Europe. 13 Additionally, South Africa has 

experienced drug smuggling by Nigerian drug syndicates. These organizations employ 

South Africans to carry drugs from Thailand to South Africa, where drugs are 

transshipped to other major consumption countries in Europe and to the United States. 14

A US State Department report attributes almost 45 percent of the heroin seizures made at 

US ports in 1990 to Nigerian couriers. 15 

Another specific transnational crime problem holds that organized crime around the 

world is contributing to the explosion of international smuggling of humans. These 

organizations earn billions of dollars each year by violating immigration laws and feeding 

on the innocent, who only want to improve their lives. In the United States, which is a

primary destination of many smuggling operations, law enforcement officials have 

disrupted $1 million rings that attempt to smuggle Indian, Pakistani, Albanian, and

Chinese nationals into the country. These operations compound the illegal immigration 

business established by long-standing and continuing criminal operations originating in 

Central and South America and the Caribbean Basin. 

Human smuggling is not unique to the United States. Austrian officials have recently

discovered that their country was the destination for Asians smuggled through Russia and 

Eastern Europe. Spanish officials have discovered a scheme to use credentials of 

deceased citizens to smuggle Chinese nationals into their country. Further, Swedish 

officials are continuing to crack down on a Baltic Sea smuggling route that reportedly 

delivers Iranian and Iraqi immigrants through Moscow to Latvia, Estonia, or Lithuania 

before finally reaching Sweden. Finally, the Japanese recently exposed a smuggling ring 

that transports Chinese citizens through Thailand and then to Japan. This boom in 

international smuggling of humans reaps huge profits because of the effect of the changes 

in the international environment since the fall of the Soviet Union. The emergence of

weak states, the decline of civil authority, and the rise of organized crime complicate the 

problem. 16 These are only examples; analysts have found organized criminal activity 

flourishing practically everywhere in the world and, more importantly, it is becoming 

transnational in nature. 

Domestic Effects of Organized Crime 

Without the support of the coalitions of the cold war world which provided a stable 

power base, many states no longer influence events in their own country, much less their 

region. Rather than fill the vacuum of power left by the fall of the communist coalition 

and East-West disengagement, these governments have been unable to respond to the 

demands of the new international environment and therefore have given way to other 

61 
bases of power located internal and external to their borders. This vacuum is allowing 

organized crime to become a powerful force in the internal affairs of many countries. 

Crime is accelerating far beyond the ability of current institutions to deal with it. In

some societies, crime threatens to undermine the fabric of political stability. “Organized 

crime,” says Sen John Keny (D-Mass.), “is the new communism, the new monolithic 

threat.” 17 Lawlessness and organized crime, at least to some extent, can provide an 

alternative means of support and a seductive source of personal and criminal profit that 

may subvert ideological or political fervor. 18 To counter its effects, fragile governments 

will have to wage a new kind of war. They must wage this war against crime, which may 

delay progressive reforms. Eduardo Vetere, chief of the UN crime and criminal justice 

branch of the United Nations office at Vienna, stated, “Crime is undermining the 

foundation of trust upon which government is based, by eroding its authority and 

legitimacy.” 19 

The adverse effects of crime hampers the general shift of political systems from

communism, dictatorships, and other repressive regimes toward more progressive 

systems. Specifically, internal crime in Russia is trying to make the political and 

economic systems more difficult to reform. A 1994 opinion poll published in a Russian 

newspaper revealed that nearly one-third of ordinary citizens believed organized

criminals controlled the government, almost twice as many as believed Boris N. Yeltsin 

controlled the government. 20 To counter the growing crime problem, President Yeltsin 

issued a decree on 14 June 1994 to give police broad new powers to crack down on 

suspected organized crime members. The disputed decree allows police to hold suspects 

for 30 days without charge and to investigate their finances. 21 

Another example of the effect of crime on the internal, domestic processes and state 

development focuses on South Africa. Since the recent elections, which installed a

majority democratic government and led to the lifting of international sanctions, officials 

in the country have expected a return of external business investment and growth. Neither 

has been forthcoming. The most plausible explanation for this absence is the 

skyrocketing incidence of crime. Drugs are flowing into the country over South Africa’s 

borders along with Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Botswana. 22 Additionally, South 

Africa’s murder rate is three times that of the United States. Experts predict that if the 

crime rate continues, corporations in South Africa will do what corporations in Angola 

did-set up their own townships for their own employees, with sophisticated security

systems walling them off from the increasingly lawless population which is controlled by 

organized crime. 23 Crime invariably dictates the agenda for many such states and

complicates their efforts to steer their country to more pluralistic, market-oriented 

societies. 

Many may consider the current challenges to states posed by organized crime not 

unlike the historical challenges to the United States from the Italian mafioso. This 

particular crime organization originated in Italy as a subcultural phenomenon which was

borne of an intricate history of injustice and a questionable application of the law, 

misgovernment, and mismanagement. 24 Like the American experiences with the Mafia, 

other states have long had to deal with individuals or groups who violate standards of 

conduct or restrictions on personal activities which are designed to protect the states’ 

internal social structure. While the relative power of the criminal element or enterprise 

does not compete with the legitimate power of a stable state, organized criminal activity 

62 
throughout the world causes concern because many of the involved states cannot 

effectively combat it. These states do not have adequate resources or social structures to

attack and mitigate organized crime without consequential detrimental effects on their 

stability. 

Martin van Creveld cautions, “Once the legal monopoly of armed force, long 

claimed by the state, is wrested out of its hands, existing distinctions between war and 

crime will break down.” 25 Organized crime threatens “war” within the societies in which

it exists. Even though this war may be an unorthodox one, it is nonetheless a battle of 

survival among factions of a society. Van Creveld contends that the nature of war is 

transforming. He predicts that future wars will no longer be waged by states but by 

factions spurred to violence by scarcity. 26 Just as the shifting of power occurs from state 

to nonstate actors, so too does the ability to wage war shift in the same direction. If van 

Creveld’s predictions hold true, this shift will be accompanied by a propensity for violent 

conflict. Whether this shift is permanent or transitory is not yet certain. 

Robert Kaplan predicts that as crime rates continue to rise and the ability of states

and their criminal justice systems to protect their citizens diminishes, states will lose the 

power to control events within their borders. He adds that when this happens, power may 

be wrested from the state and placed into the hands of powerful private security

organizations like those we have seen jeopardize Mozambique and Angola and threaten 

parts of South Africa. Worse than these private security companies is the possibility of

mafioso, who may be better equipped to protect citizens man indigenous police forces: 

“To the average person, political values will mean less, personal security more.” 27

Organized crime has adversely affected the state, threatening political and economic

reform, undermining the very basis of the state’s legitimacy, and threatening warfare 

within the society. 

International Effects of Organized Crime 

In addition to internal, domestic effects, organized crime can influence states 

throughout a region or worldwide. States concerned with economic growth and enlarging 

markets will find that organized crime can dissuade international economic relations by

restricting entry and border requirements to reduce criminal activities across the states’ 

borders. But such rising trends as new technologies and expanding transnational aspects 

of economics are making borders meaningless, and the inabilities of existing law 

enforcement agencies to mitigate the effects on these borders are becoming abundantly

apparent. States will find it exceedingly difficult to isolate themselves from transnational

criminal activities. These activities will challenge them to respond to organized criminal 

activities that transcend international boundaries and will necessarily cause them to 

dedicate an increasing amount of their resources to combat them. 

Drugs, acts of terrorism, and problems concerning the smuggling of humans provide

a glimpse of the significance of the transnational implications of organized criminal 

activity which threaten to draw states into conflict. For example, consider the United

States’ efforts to curb the smuggling of narcotics from Central and South America. These 

experiences indicate the complexities and threat of conflict posed by transnational 

criminal activities. Recall the efforts to bring to justice the president of Panama, Manuel 

Noriega, who was indicted at the peak of the drug war hysteria and had been portrayed as

63 
a “drug lord” and “poisoner of American children.” 28 Determined to show his resolve 

against the domestic threat posed by the transnational nature of the illicit coca trade, thenPresident George Bush initiated Operation Just Cause. This military operation included

an invasion of Panama by 23,000 United States troops whose primary goal was to capture

Noriega for trial in a United States court. The ensuing guilty verdict against Noriega may 

have been the costliest criminal conviction in history, coming at a cost of $164 million 

and the lives of 23 United States soldiers. 29 

In 1992, the United States spent 93.6 percent of the $11.9 billion of its drug control 

budget on domestic enforcement, demand reduction, and border control. 30 These border 

controls have included the gradual and increasing involvement of the United States 

military. What originally began as the use of military equipment to monitor land, sea, and 

air lanes used by traffickers now involves an active counterdrug program—which 

includes United States military personnel participating in foreign counterdrug operations. 

Their participation includes training foreign personnel in counterdrug operations and 

operating bases and training facilities in foreign countries. The United States Department 

of Defense now provides nation-building assistance, training and operational support, 

technical assistance, intelligence support, and other direct and indirect support to foreign 

governments cooperating with our counterdrug effort. 31 Such high-profile operations as 

these could draw the United States into disputes with other state and nonstate actors in

the region. For example, the 1995 border war between Peru and Ecuador included an 

allegation by the Ecuadorian leadership that the Peruvian armed forces used helicopters,

provided by the United States for drug suppression operations, to ferry troops to battle 

areas in the disputed territory. 32 

Finally, consider Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar as an early prototype of the

new international gangster. He was a billionaire whose drug wealth bought him a

mansion in Miami, as well as other prime pieces of real estate around the world. More 

dangerous than his products and their ultimate damage to the individuals and societies 

around the world was the power he possessed. He was a political force, capable of 

intimidating weak governments and defying strong ones for years until his death in 1993. 

33 Media and United States Drug Enforcement Administration reports substantiate 

Escobar’s complicity with Panama’s Manuel Noriega, as well as with the Nicaraguan 

Sandinistas in the trafficking of illegal drugs. Escobar allied himself with Noriega and the

Sandinistas in exchange for transshipment locations, money laundering, and safe haven. 

34 Noriega and the Sandinistas profited monetarily from their relationship with Escobar. 

Both used the money to keep themselves in power. Then-President Ronald Reagan used

Escobar’s relationship with the Sandinistas as part of his justification for aid to their

opponents, the Contras. Also, Escobar’s illegal business arrangements with Noriega 

provided evidence that ultimately prompted United States military action against him.

These relationships portend the conflict potential of powerful criminal organizations and 

their transnational activities. 

In addition to the threat of drug traffickers, the impact of terrorism is well 

documented and commonly understood throughout the world. In terms of effect, analysts 

find it exceedingly difficult to separate criminal activity strictly for economic gain from 

criminal activity designed to support political objectives. The former is criminal, 

antisocial behavior; the latter is terrorism. For example, the daily death toll from murder

in Algeria in 1994 was around 50. 35 Analysts attribute most of these murders to Islamic 

64 
fundamentalist groups who used terrorist tactics to further their political cause. But these 

groups are not the only ones responsible for the violence in Algeria. As in any society 

where political murder is commonplace, others, including criminals, will soon become

involved for economic gain. Killing of any kind lowers the threshold for violence and 

perpetuates it. Ironically, when responding to terrorism, security or law enforcement 

forces must increase the level of violence and restrict individual liberty to thwart illegal 

violent activity. Organized crime, like its counterpart, terrorism, has a transnational 

nature that affects many nations in the international community and serves as an 

increasingly significant source of potential conflict. 

From Russia to Thailand, the export of precious raw materials is falling into the

hands of organized crime. In Central America and Asia, the political control of small 

nations or weak governments is falling into criminal hands. 36 The most obvious concern 

among the industrialized nations of the world about Russia’s organized crime involves 

the chances of nuclear components being sold surreptitiously. Some nations harbor a 

legitimate fear that nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union could fall into

terrorist hands. The arrests of several persons attempting to smuggle or sell weaponsgrade plutonium have justified these fears. In August 1994 German police arrested a man 

after he had allegedly tried to sell 70 grams of plutonium 239 to undercover police. This

was the fourth such incident in as many months. Also, a week after this arrest, Bavarian

police reportedly seized three to 10 ounces of plutonium 239 in the luggage of three men 

aboard a Lufthansa airliner arriving from Moscow. 37 These and other actual cases cause 

concern because their quality and quantity of fissile material has reached the threshold of 

what it takes to make nuclear weapons. 38 These incidents were the impetus behind the

cooperative agreement between the United States’ Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

and Russia’s interior ministry to combat organized crime. This agreement included

unprecedented mutual law enforcement cooperation as well as the opening of an FBI

office in Moscow. 

Relations between states have sometimes been strained because of the actions of 

individuals of one country who violate the law in other countries. Without culpability of 

their own governments, home nations generally hold individuals liable for their actions in 

another country, and the international community accepts the right of the host state to 

punish criminal law violators regardless of citizenship. For example, the investigation 

from the crash of Pan Am flight 103 resulted in the indictment of two Libyan intelligence 

agents but stopped short of implicating Muamrnar Kaddafi himself or the Libyan 

government. 39 Without the existence of a “smoking gun,” responsible states in the 

international community generally hold individuals personally accountable for their 

actions rather than the governments of the countries in which they hold citizenship. On 

the other hand, evidence acquired as the result of the 1987 discotheque bombing in West

Berlin clearly implicated the Libyan government in the killing of three people and 

wounding of others. The killed and injured included United States servicemen and 

German citizens. The international community generally supported the subsequent United 

States punitive military airstrikes against targets in Libya. Both incidents further

demonstrate the potential for conflict and effects of transnational criminal activity. 

Furthermore, the lack of standard, recognized “rules” for dealing with international 

criminality increases the potential for conflict. 

65 
Causes of the Rise in Crime 

Crime, like other darker aspects of human existence, thrives on hopelessness, greed, 

and despair in an environment of ineffective governmental institutions. Many places in 

the world today are mired in confusion and consumed by the change caused by the 

transition from the cold war era. Organized transnational crime takes advantage of the 

weakness of such states and their institutions. 40 The collapse of communism weakened 

the social and political institutions of the former Soviet bloc countries. Additionally,

other countries in the world are experiencing an unraveling of their social fabric and an 

erosion of their moral values because of the challenges posed to them by rapid change. 

Transnational organized crime results therefore as a natural consequence of the events of 

our time. 

Crime rates have been high in such multicultural, industrialized, democratic societies

as the United States. However, the rapid rise of crime in other locations of the world 

where previously there had been low crime reflects a much greater problem which will 

have implications for the economic and political security of the industrialized nations of 

the world. Analysts attribute rising crime rates to such conditions as increasing 

heterogeneity, greater cultural pluralism, immigration, realignment of national borders, 

economic deterioration, and the lack of accepted national social norms. Evidence of these 

conditions occur in many places throughout the world. 

Two factors—technology and the evolving nature of our economic system—spur this 

trend. Information and communications availability are enlarging the playing fields and 

opportunities for organized crime. Criminals now launder money electronically. Their 

illegal transactions use cellular phones, fax machines, and on-line communications. 

These technologies make illegal transactions easier to conduct and difficult to investigate 

and control. For example, Russian criminals swindled more than $40 million from the

Russian banking system in 1993 through modem technology and by exploiting Russia’s 

antiquated bank transfer system. 41 Also, through sham companies Russian-organized 

crime elements cheated the United States government of $14.6 million between October

1991 and December 1992. 42 They accomplished this maniacal feat by establishing

dummy companies to sell gasoline without paying taxes. The companies submitted 

records indicating that taxes had been paid and were therefore due a refund. In reality, no 

company existed nor had any taxes been paid. 

In addition to the opportunities provided by technology, part of the blame rests with 

our free market economic system. Since the fall of communism and its command 

economies, some former communist countries view capitalism as “good” and worthy of 

attainment. But misunderstanding capitalism as only the pursuit of wealth fails to 

emphasize social conduct free of crime and corruption. The revolutionary changes in our 

international system diminishes state sovereignty over many economic issues as 

multinational corporations operate increasingly outside the purview of a specific state. 

Therefore, as the economies of the industrialized world become transnational, a logical 

consequence of this action produces a similar transnational criminal activity. 

66 
Conclusion 

The post-cold-war world differs from its better understood predecessor. During the 

cold war, the world needed the United States to balance the influence of the Soviet 

Union, and other states joined blocs to protect their interests. Even with the elimination of 

this reason to remain engaged internationally, sufficient reasons to preclude isolationism

on the part of states in the international community still exists. The transnational nature

of illegal behavior, whether it is strictly criminal or conducted with some political motive 

as in the case of terrorism, adversely affects industrialized and developing states. For 

example, the United States offers an especially lucrative target and cannot isolate itself 

from transnational criminal activities. The US cannot depend on isolationism to protect 

its citizens’ interests in its political and economic development. 43 The United States, as

the remaining superpower, is too engaged and has too much at stake to withdraw from

world affairs. In addition to this fundamental reason, the United States also has displayed

a 200-year preference for showing a genuine and humane face to the world. 

No grand conspiracy is using organized crime to disrupt human society and corrupt 

international relationships. Instead organized crime is taking advantage of the failures of 

weak governmental institutions and is thriving on the change in the international system. 

As organized crime thrives, like other expanding economic enterprises, it is becoming 

transnational. 

Transnational criminal activity can adversely impact specific national interests of

states. A necessary cooperative strategy to counter the effects of organized crime requires 

a strong union of democratic alliances. This cooperative strategy must include a role for 

the United Nations and regional security alliances in cooperative international law 

enforcement efforts. However, United Nations involvement does not offer a panacea for

global problems. Standard peacekeeping measures cannot be applied to transnational

organized crime activities. A monitoring agency must apply international peacekeeping 

efforts judiciously rather than in blanket fashion. 44 

Traditional collective security arrangements do not offer adequate measures to tackle 

the global challenge of transnational criminal activity unless we broaden the functions of 

collective security arrangements to include the protection of citizens from the threat of

organized international crime. To effectively combat the problem, we must attack the 

causes. This step requires a collaborative application of peaceful and forceful 

instruments, including political, economic, military, and informational resources. Success

will depend more on cooperation than competition and reconciliation more than

retribution. Regardless of our specific response, this phenomenon has created a much 

more complex international environment which will challenge existing state structures

and relations among states around the world. 45

Notes 

1

 Donald M. Snow, The Shape of the Future: Post-Cold War World (New York: M.

E. Sharpe, 1991), 3. 

2

 James B. Steinburg, “Sources of Conflict and Tools for Stability: Planning for the 

21st Century,” Dispatch 5, issue 28 (11 July 1994): 464. 

67 
Notes 

3

 Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zone of 

Turmoil (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1993). 

4

 Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary (Boston: Riverside Publishing 

Co., 1988). 

5

 Michael Elliott and Douglas Waller et al., “Global Mafia,” Newsweek 122, issue 24 

(13 December 1993): 22. 6

 Adam Tanner et al., “Russia’s Notorious Mafia Spreads Tentacles of Crime Around 

the Globe,” Christian Science Monitor, 11 January 1995, 1. 

7

 Wendy Sloane, “FBI’s Moscow Mission: The Mob, Nuclear Theft,” Christian 

Science Monitor, 5 July 1994, 6. 

8

 Louis Freeh-Journeys, Facts on File 54, issue 2797 (7 July 1994): 479. 

9

 Tanner et al., 1. 

10 Yigal Chazan, “Baby-Faced Hitmen Add to Rising Crime in Troubled Serbia,” 

Christian Science Monitor, 22 November 1994, 4. 

11 Ibid. 

12 Yigal Chazan, “Albanian Mafias Find New Drug Routes Around Yugoslavia,” 

Christian Science Monitor, 20 October 1994, 6. 

13 Ibid. 

14 Maj Gen Julian Thompson, “Drugs and the Constraint on Commerce in a New

Democracy,” IN1ERSEC: The Journal of International Security 4, nos. 11/12 

(November/December 1994): 403. 

15 US Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, “International 

Narcotics Control Strategy Report,” March 1991, 325. 

16 Paul J. Smith, “The Rising Tide of Human Smuggling,” Christian Science 

Monitor, 30 November 1994, 19. 

17 Elliott and Waller et al., 22. 

18 Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., “The Organized Crime Dimension of Regional Conflict 

and Operations Other Than War,” in Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability (Strategic

Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, 1994), 126. 

19 Regions Prepare for 1995 Congress,” UN Chronicle, June 1994, 69. 

20 Freeh-Journeys, 479. 

21 Sloane, 6. 

22 Thompson, 403 

23 Ibid. 

24 Gaia Servadio, Mafioso: A History of the Mafia from its Origins to the Present 

Day (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1976), xvii. 

25 Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, 74. 

26 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), 

197. 

27 Kaplan, 74. 

28 Michael Isikoff, “The Case Against the General: Manuel Noriega and the Politics

of American Justice,” Washington Monthly, December 1993, 53. 

29 Bob Cohn, “Noriega: How the Feds Got Their Man,” Newsweek 119, issue 16 (20 

April 1992): 37. 

68 
Notes 

30 An Analysis of DOD Counterdrug Efforts,” unpublished Research Report 

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, April 1994), 9. 

31 Joint Publication 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, 

chapter 5. 

32 Andrew Selsky, “Helicopters Downed in Border War,” Montgomery Advertiser, 

30 January 1995, 1. 

33 Russell Watson and Peter Katel et al., “Death on the Spot,” Newsweek 122, issue 

24 (13 December 1993): 18. 

34 Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story (New York: Simon and Schuster, 

1991), 59. 

35 Maj Gen Julian Thompson. “Islamic Fundamentalism and Western Society,” 

INTERSEC: The Journal of International Security 5, no. 1 (January 1995). 

36 Elliott and Waller et al., 22. 

37 Wendy Sloane, “With Plutonium Arrests, Accusations Fly Between Russia and 

Germany,” Christian Science Monitor, 18 August 1994, 6. 

38 Peter Grier, “Nuclear Heists Show Thieves’ Sophistication.” Christian Science 

Monitor, 19 August 1994, 6. 

39 Eloise Salholz, “Who Paid for the Bullet?” Newsweek, 25 November 1991, 28. 

40 Boutros Boutros-Ghali. “Transnational Crime,” Vital Speeches of the Day 41, no. 

5 (15 December 1994): 130-32. 

41 Elliot and Waller et al., 22. 

42 Tanner et al., 2. 

43 Lincoln P. Bloomfield, “The Premature Burial of Global Law and Order: Looking 

Beyond the Three Cases from Hell,” Washington Quarterly, Summer 1994, 145-62. 

44 Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1993), 165. 

45 Ibid., 125. 

69 
6 

Human Rights and Humanitarian Concerns 

Gregory T. Frost 

The prisoners in the Government jail in Kibungo, Rwanda, will tea you how they killed

their Tutsi neighbors and burned their houses, but they deny they did it willingly. Their 

testimony has a chilling similarity: not just their repeated invocations of “orders from

above” or their matter of fact delivery, but their depiction of the massacres as a military

operation, a matter of guns and grenades. The duty of the civilian conscripts, they say,

was nettoyage, “cleaning up”—killing the survivors. 

—Andrew Jay Cohen 

Introduction 

Over the last two decades, human rights and humanitarian concerns have become an 

enduring facet of US foreign policy and have earned a permanent place on the 

international agenda. American concern for human rights and humanitarian conditions 

throughout the world is longstanding and reflects the fundamental values of our society. 

Any effort to predict and analyze future global security trends must reckon with this 

reality. As it is beyond the scope of this essay to address the broad subject of human 

rights and humanitarian concerns in its global breadth and depth, it considers human 

rights issues insofar as they provoke a US or international military response, and it also 

discusses the likely implications for US national security policy and military strategy. 

This essay further defines human rights abuses as largescale, high-profile crises and 

includes widespread massacres and other forms of ethnically, religiously, and politically

motivated violence and mistreatment directed against civilians. This essay limits 

humanitarian concerns to such major cases of general and severe material deprivation as

famine, caused principally by the activities of man, which results in wide-spread death 

and destruction. 

70 
A Whole New World 

During the cold war period, US treatment of human rights and humanitarian 

concerns was substantially determined by the larger context of the West’s global struggle 

with the Soviet Union and its allies. The enormous resources the two superpowers 

devoted to nuclear and conventional military forces tended to limit their spending on 

secondary concerns, and both were generally wary of military involvement not easily 

linked to the global struggle between them, given the ultimate risk of provoking a global 

nuclear war which both feared. The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

(USSR), the sharply decreased threat of nuclear holocaust, and the demise of the old 

bipolar power structure have combined to remove this focus. This collapse has vitiated

many of the constraints which had previously limited and circumscribed US and allied 

freedom of action in the human rights sphere. At the same time, the end of the stable twosuperpower equilibrium, which often served to check conflicts which could generate new 

humanitarian crises, seems to have removed the lid from numerous simmering conflicts, 

many of them having a distinctly humanitarian dimension. 

In contrast to the previous four decades, the immediate post-cold-war years already 

have witnessed relatively largescale US and international military interventions in direct 

response to human rights abuses and humanitarian crises, most notably in Bosnia, 

Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. A key challenge to American and allied policymakers in the 

next decade will be to determine the wisdom and necessity of further interventions of this

sort. The obvious fact of America’s unparalleled and virtually unchallenged global reach

and power will combine with instantaneous and graphic televised images of humanitarian

tragedies (the so-called Cable News Network factor) to generate pressure on the US to 

assume the role of the world’s social worker and policeman. 

Zone of Turmoil 

Most of the human rights abuses and humanitarian disasters likely to attract 

international attention, resulting in calls from some quarters for unilateral or multilateral 

military intervention, will occur in what Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky have termed 

the zone of turmoil. 1

 A vast area comprising the bulk of the third world plus the 

constituent republics of the former Soviet Union, the zone of turmoil is characterized by 

political units whose political, economic, and social development have either never risen 

above the formative or early consolidative stages of state evolution 2

 (e.g., Somalia) or 

have reverted to these levels due to the disintegration of the existing polity (e.g., former 

Yugoslavia). It seems probable that the less-than-viable first wave 3

 countries in subSaharan Africa and South Asia, still mired at the consolidative level or below after 

several decades of political independence and formal nationhood (e.g., Rwanda) in the 

foreseeable future will provide the venue for most human lights/humanitarian crises

catastrophic enough to warrant a major US or international response. While the impact of 

such crises will assuredly not be global, the prospect of a regional ripple or domino 

effect, as the problem expands and spreads to neighboring states, is much greater. This 

scenario has been the case with the refugee crisis generated by the Liberian civil war, 

which has spilled over into the contiguous countries of Sierra Leone, Guinea, and the 

Ivory Coast, with adverse consequences to the stability of the entire region. 

71 
The Coming Anarchy 

Given the shifting and uncertain post-cold-war international environment now 

commonly referred to as the “New World Disorder,” the long-term growth potential for 

humanitarian disasters can appear limitless, particularly if one accepts the pessimistic 

futurism of Robert Kaplan 4

 and Martin van Creveld. 5 It is unlikely that the immediate 

future will witness a great explosion of conflict-driven human misery. However, it does 

seem quite probable that we will confront a number of perplexing, heartrending, and 

sometimes unanticipated humanitarian tragedies which will defy easy solutions yet 

provide a persistent impetus for outside intervention. 

The ostensible causes of the humanitarian crises of the corning years will vary. They 

will include repressive or totalitarian regimes, intrastate or civil wars, internal or 

transnational ethnic conflicts, the socioeconomic collapse of states, extreme migration 

and population pressures, epidemics, and natural and ecological catastrophes. These 

factors can lead to the demise of fragile states and governments and the break-down of 

public order, creating a downward slide from mere poverty into abject deprivation. Those 

human rights abuses and humanitarian disasters, which constitute both intended and

unintended consequences of war and conflict will pose an especially difficult challenge. 

The US military is virtually the only standing organization capable of responding

quickly and successfully to major humanitarian crises and disasters worldwide. It 

possesses not only the equipment, personnel, and logistical base to under-take and sustain 

large-scale relief operations but also the all-important capability to provide security for

unilateral and bilateral humanitarian efforts through the threat or application of its combat 

power. Therefore, the simple fact is that any call for significant US or international 

assistance inevitably will imply consideration of a supporting part, and, possibly, a 

leading role, for US military forces. 

Problems and Pitfalls 

Human rights abuses and humanitarian concerns constitute a phenomenon which one 

should not view in isolation. In considering human rights abuses as a source of conflict, 

note that the humanitarian dimension is usually more effectual than causal. That is,

human rights abuses and humanitarian crises serve as symptoms or outgrowths of an 

underlying conflict which cannot, for long, be successfully treated without addressing 

their root causes. In many situations, human rights problems are natural and predictable 

consequences of ongoing or recently terminated civil or intrastate wars. In other 

scenarios, however, humanitarian tragedies represent deliberate war-fighting strategies 

and tactics employed by combat ants to achieve political or military objectives. As the 

US contemplates intervention to remedy a humanitarian crisis, it should realize that its

efforts may be short-lived, unsuccessful, or even counterproductive, absent the ability and 

willingness to address the cause of the crisis. In situations where the underlying conflict 

has yet to erupt, is momentarily quiescent, or has reached its termination phase, care must 

be taken lest the mere prospect of outside intervention upset the equilibrium and provoke 

or intensify the conflict. 

72 
Peripheral Interests, Peripheral Involvement 

The US should cautiously approach humanitarian crises which are only of peripheral

interest to our own national security and be honest with ourselves when we contemplate 

an intervention unrelated or marginal to our self-interest. When a US objective is an 

altruistic one, the commitment of resources and effort might be inadequate. This 

possibility is especially true when the parties in the underlying conflict are relentlessly 

pursuing clearly defined political and military objectives flowing directly from what they

perceive as their own core national or group interests, if not their fundamental survival. 

The parties to such conflicts perceive the human rights issues on which we focus as 

secondary concerns at best. While the combatants themselves may well regret and 

deplore the adverse humanitarian consequences of their conflict, they will, in many 

instances, be unwilling or unable to address them until the post-conflict phase has clearly 

been reached. 

The US also must realize that where the parties are still intent in making war upon 

each other, the introduction of US or other international forces in a limited noncombatant 

role is likely to motivate one or both parties to use and manipulate the intervention to

further its own objectives. The US can expect the parties to the conflict to work to 

persuade or compel intervening parties to support their respective causes, if not to enter 

the conflict on their side. The results of such machinations can range from the obstruction 

or diversion of humanitarian relief efforts to the unintended involvement of the US in 

hostilities for which we are unprepared and have no real stake. International efforts to

provide relief to the victims of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia have been plagued 

by the constant whipsawing of UN peacekeepers and of relief workers by the warring 

parties. Indeed, these parties consistently have refused to respect the international 

contingent’s neutrality. 

The Enabler Syndrome 

Where intervention does succeed in ameliorating or eliminating the human suffering 

which it is designed to remedy, outside intervention may have the unintended 

consequence of facilitating the continuance of the conflict and the subsequent carnage. A 

combatant’s civilian population being fed and cared for by others alleviates a key concern 

for him and may free up additional resources to devote to the war effort. This paradox 

recalls the “Twelve-Step” self-help movement’s concept of the enabler the friend or 

relative of the alcoholic who compassionately cares for the drunk and his affairs so he 

can function despite his addiction, yet in the process assures the latter’s eventual 

destruction. In this regard, it will be interesting to see how long the destitute clans of 

Somalia will continue their civil war once the remaining international relief efforts are 

withdrawn. 

To the extent that the US has a real or perceived national interest in the outcome of 

an underlying conflict, onlookers will question the purity of our humanitarian motives

and misunderstand our peaceful intentions. Their examination will be a continuing 

problem for the world’s only remaining super-power as long as memories of various past 

self-interested American interventions persist. Time will determine if the most recent 

benign US intervention in Haiti succeeds in supplanting local memories of the earlier 19-

73 
year occupation of that country by US Marines, let alone effacing the lingering 

hemispheric effects of a century of heavyhanded US enforcement of the Roosevelt 

Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in the Caribbean and Central America. 

The Transformation of War 

The most dangerous scenario for outside intervention occurs when human suffering, 

which the intervention seeks to relieve, becomes a deliberate, intended result of the 

strategy and tactics of one or both combatants’ waging the kind of non-Clausewitzian 

warfare postulated by Martin van Creveld in his book, The Transformation of War. 6

 In

such cases, the essence of the conflict is bound up with what our own society normally 

sees as an atrocity. In such wars, civilians may be considered legitimate, even preferred, 

targets. The large-scale human rights abuses and humanitarian tragedy which outside 

intervention purports to alleviate are apt to be the deliberate, intended results of the

strategies and tactics of a style of warfare alien to our culture. Well-intentioned attempts 

at stopping the killing by outsiders may be tantamount to disarming a combatant who is

therefore likely to direct his wrath at the intervention force. It also may draw us into a

nontraditional war in which we not only have no interest, but whose rules of engagement 

bewilder us and for which we are ill-prepared. 

It is therefore crucial that the US first carefully analyze the conflictual context of the 

human rights problems and abuses that we seek to resolve prior to giving serious 

consideration to address them. Even if we have absolutely no intention of becoming a

party to a conflict, the US needs to include a deliberate strategy for avoiding the kind of 

“mission creep” which results from our inadvertently straying beyond the often fine line 

which separates combatant from noncombatant. Otherwise, our good intentions may lead 

us to calamity. 

The recent humanitarian interventions in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti 

illustrate the importance of thoughtful consideration of the underlying conflict. A brief 

review and analysis of these important recent operations is instructive at this point, as the 

record of success and failure in the humanitarian crises of the past several years has 

established some parameters for future interventions. These episodes have also shaped 

how American and international leadership and world opinion have come to think about 

humanitarian intervention; they will inevitably color our approach to future crises. 

The Balkan Cauldron 

Most observers have come to view the ethnoreligious conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina

as an intractable struggle peripheral to US, if not European, national interests. The US 

and its allies have sought to remove the cause of the humanitarian tragedy unleashed by

the civil war through diplomatic initiatives, the interposition of a UN peacekeeping force, 

and occasional threats and limited applications of force. At the same time, the US has 

attempted to alleviate the human suffering through a substantial international relief effort. 

This conflict is noteworthy for the advent of the term, though certainly not the 

historical practice, of ethnic cleansing, in which Bosnian Serbs, as a matter of policy, 

have summarily uprooted, relocated, mistreated, and killed Muslim inhabitants in the 

territory they control or seek to dominate. While the UN peacekeeping force has been 

74 
successful in shielding some of the victims of this brutal war from the worst abuses and 

relief efforts have alleviated the suffering to a degree, note that as long as the conflict 

continues humanitarian problems will remain. 

United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization air assets have mounted a few 

small tactical strikes to intimidate the Serbs and push them back to the bargaining table. 

However, the US has studiously avoided outright involvement in the conflict, largely 

maintaining its neutrality despite widespread outrage at the Serbs’ behavior and their 

frequent depiction as aggressors. The parties to the conflict have campaigned to 

manipulate both the UN peacekeeping force and the international relief effort. The 

winning Serbs strive to remove the check on their political goals and the hindrance on 

their military objectives, which their international presence represents, while the losing 

Muslims vainly seek to compel our entry into the conflict on their side or at least cause 

the lifting of the international arms embargo. 

Meanwhile, the conflict continues unabated, although the presence of UN

peacekeepers, coupled with international relief efforts, seems to have had prolonged 

sieges and forestalled the Serbs’ capture of UN-declared civilian “safe areas” and Muslim 

pockets of resistance. Although the US has avoided involvement in the conflict, extensive 

efforts to end it have failed. While the debate on policy and alternative courses of action

continues in the US and Europe, the realization of the clear limits of an outside nation to 

address humanitarian concerns in Bosnia has grown. The only exception involves the 

willingness of a nation to take sides and mount an outright military intervention to end

the civil war. 

Feeding the Somalis 

The US intervention in Somalia and its UN follow-on are, as of this writing, reaching 

their sad conclusion. Compelled largely by vivid televised images of mass starvation, 

President George Bush decided in late 1992 to commit US military forces to a large-scale 

humanitarian intervention to provide security for and delivery of relief supplies and 

services to the afflicted civilian population of a strategically marginal country torn by 

civil war. Unlike the situation in Bosnia, the lack of any semblance of competing

governmental authority, coupled with the extremely poor organization and equipment of 

the Somali clans, made it likely that the insertion of US and allied forces would be safe

and uncontested, which turned out to be the case. 

Although relief operations subsequently proceeded smoothly enough, concurrent and

subsequent US and UN diplomatic efforts to achieve the political settlement necessary to 

end the turmoil and remove the root cause of the humanitarian crisis did not materialize. 

All went well on the ground until the unprovoked ambush of a Pakistani unit by 

Mohamed Aideed loyalists led the US commanders to undertake a manhunt for Aideed, 

effectively making US/UN forces parties to the conflict. US Rangers then suffered 18 

dead in a courageous but militarily insignificant gun battle with Aideed partisans: one of 

the victim’s body was videotaped being dragged through the streets by cheering Somalis. 

American public support of the operation quickly changed from lukewarm support to 

strong opposition. President Clinton increased the US forces and equipment, while 

announcing a timetable for their departure and eventual replacement by non-US troops 

under UN command. 

75 
Aideed and his clan thus demonstrated that the center of gravity of any UN 

contingent is likely to be its US core and that the infliction of significant casualties on US 

forces is likely to lead the American public to call for their withdrawal. The smaller and 

weaker residual UN force which remained in Somalia after US withdrawal proved less

successful at maintaining order and keeping the Somali factions from continuing their

civil war, which seems to have been Aideed’s aim. Nonetheless, the warring sides were 

bent on pursuing their internecine battles irrespective of the consequences to their own 

civilian populations. 

With the US-aided extraction of the remaining UN forces, humanitarian assistance

has been abandoned, and Somalia seems to be slipping inexorably back into chaos, 

anarchy, and starvation. While it is clear the intervention did save many lives, success 

was fleeting, and achieved at a great cost. The enduring lesson of Somalia is that, even in 

cases where humanitarian intervention appears at first glance to be militarily risk-free, it 

may not be. Moreover, outside interventions to alleviate the humanitarian consequences 

of civil strife appear futile in the long term, absent the host nation’s commitment to 

resolve the internal conflict responsible for generating them. 

The Rwandan Holocaust 

The early 1994 multilateral operation in Rwanda was much smaller in scale and less

military in nature than the Somalia episode. A plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda 

and neighboring Burundi crashed under mysterious circumstances in the Rwandan 

capital. This incident caused widespread massacres and dislocation of minority Tutsi 

tribesmen by members of the dead presidents’ tribes, the majority Hutus, who viewed the

shootdown as a Tutsi assassination plot. This view, in turn, spurred the formerly 

quiescent Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) insurgency into action.

Breaking a truce which had held since the 1990 civil war, RPF forces mounted a

successful campaign to seize the capital and overthrow the Hutu-dominated successor 

government, driving away large numbers of Hutu civilians before it went into exile in 

nearby Zaire. Vivid media images of the starving, homeless multitudes in the refugee 

camps helped to spur a nonhostile international humanitarian operation to address the 

humanitarian needs of the legions of refugees. As relief operators directed their efforts at

the termination stage of a conflict that was already quiescent, they noted that Rwanda did 

not present serious security problems. Their objectives were similar in character, if not in

scope, to earlier international assistance surges provoked by sudden refugee flows but

which did not involve US military participation. 

In any refugee scenario, the long-term solution calls for a change in conditions in the 

refugee source country so that most, if not all, of the refugees will feel safe should they 

return to their homes. As of early 1995, the situation in Rwanda seems to have stabilized, 

yet it may remain quite fluid in the long term. Soldiers from the deposed Hutu-led 

government reportedly have kept Hutu refugees in Zaire from returning to their homes in 

Rwanda to apply pressure on the Tutsi-dominated, RPF -led, successor government, 

which they oppose. The long-term future for human lights in Rwanda seems dim, and the 

prospect of continuing the age-old cycle of violence between Hutu and Tutsi seems 

likely. 

76 
Nation-Building in Haiti 

In late 1994, the US-led intervention in Haiti came in direct response to reports of

systematic human rights abuses by the military regime which had overthrown the duly 

elected government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In this case, however, there 

appears also to have been an intermediate-level US national interest at play in the form of 

a need to stop the flow of Haitian boat people proceeding across the Caribbean toward 

the US. Ostensibly fleeing the tyranny of the despotic Raoul Cedras regime, these

destitute refugees generated considerable pressure on the US to intervene to stop the

human rights abuses and restore Aristide to power, thus removing the impetus for their 

flight and obviating the need to resettle them in the US or elsewhere. A successful lastminute diplomatic mission led by former President Jimmy Carter persuaded the Cedras 

regime to let US troops land unopposed, thus permitting direct movement into the postconflict phase. American forces helped to restore the Aristide government, and public 

order was reestablished almost bloodlessly by US forces, who were welcomed quite 

warmly by the Haitian people. The operation has since evolved into a nation-building 

exercise in preparation for a smaller UN successor contingent, which will include US 

troops. Time will tell if Haiti, with no historical or cultural tradition of democracy and 

facing acute economic problems exacerbated by earlier international sanctions meant to

force the military regime from power, can stand alone as a peaceful, more prosperous, 

and stable nation which respects the human rights of its own people. 

An Uncertain Balance Sheet 

What are the key strategic-level lessons to be drawn from the experience of the 

recent past? What implications do these lessons hold? First, onlookers have reaffirmed 

that the US military indeed possesses an unsurpassed ability to provide security for, and

execute if requested, large-scale humanitarian operations. However, the magnitude of the 

resources required to accomplish these tasks has become evident; it is now clear that, in

this age of shrinking budgets, this capability to support humanitarian objectives will 

remain. The tradeoff between the resource base needed to maintain combat readiness and 

resources expended on military operations other than war has become even more 

apparent. The current debate over the funding of UN peacekeeping operations illuminates 

the resource shortfalls and difficult decisions which lie ahead. 

Second, the mixed record of success of the operations undertaken so far has 

underscored the difficulty of achieving really lasting solutions to human rights abuses and 

humanitarian crises absent the resolution of the underlying conflict. In Bosnia, the 

bitterness, intractability, and character of the civil war, where human rights violations

seem to be an integral aspect of the type of war being fought, has kept outside forces 

from putting a stop to the abuses flowing from it, let alone end the fighting. In Somaliawhere the warring factions did not seize the opportunity to resolve their differences, 

which the largely successful US/UN intervention provided—a return to an anarchic, 

violent warlord-style society seems foreordained. The case of Rwanda makes it seem

highly unlikely that the long cycle of violence between Hutus and Tutsis has been broken 

permanently. Even in Haiti, without a doubt the most successful operation to date, it 

77 
remains to be seen whether a fundamentally changed society can emerge from what has 

been, after all, a massive, if benign, occupation by an overwhelming military force. 

Unilateral or Multilateral 

A key question for the failure of humanitarian operations focuses on the extent to 

which the US intervenes unilaterally or acts with other members of the international 

community (i.e., other nations, international governmental and nongovernmental 

organizations, domestic and private voluntary organizations, regional groupings, and 

alliances). None of the operations discussed above has occurred unilaterally in a strict 

sense, and it is unlikely that any of them will. As in the recent past, several variations will 

appear, ranging from truly, multilateral efforts mirroring operations in Bosnia to 

essentially unilateral US initiatives, such as the Haiti operation, which are covered only 

by an allied “fig leaf.” It behooves the US to train and equip increasingly for combined 

humanitarian operations. The US must be prepared for the prospect, however 

uncomfortable, of operations which will lack the tighter unity of command which

unilateral operations usually achieve. As in war fighting, the US must also be prepared to 

act alone. One key factor affecting US involvement in multilateral operations will be the 

near-certain refusal of America’s political leadership to place US troops under UN or 

other non-US command. 

A common feature of several recent operations has been the initial use of 

overwhelming US force to restore order and get the relief supplies flowing, followed by a 

US withdrawal and its replacement by a smaller, truly multilateral force (possibly

including a sizable US contingent) until they have established a desired end. This strategy 

seems to reflect the American military tradition of meeting any threat with overwhelming 

force, yet quickly packing up and going home once they feel the “war” has been won. 

Other nations tend to be comfortable with this arrangement because they realize the US 

does have a major comparative advantage in the military sphere, and if we offer them a 

free ride, so much the better. However, the Somali experience and initial nation-building 

efforts in Haiti have shown that later phases may become the hard part. We may find it 

difficult to persuade less capable foreign military and civilian establishments to remain, 

particularly when the umbrella of a strong US military presence is removed. Further 

more, it may be unreasonable of us to expect other nations to put their own troops in 

harm’s way when we are not. In any case, simply “handing [affairs] over to the UN” is 

not a real answer: the UN. to a large degree in this post-cold-war world, is us, and it will 

be difficult to escape a leadership role, if we are to participate at all. Absent strong US 

political, financial, and military support, the UN and other international organizations

seem destined to remain an inefficient, and largely ineffective, vehicle for addressing the 

most difficult phases of humanitarian operations. If substantial strengthening and reform

of the UN system is to be undertaken, we will have to take the lead in achieving it. 

The Military’s Role 

Military leaders and civilian defense officials over the past decade have expressed 

understandable misgivings concerning the growing tendency to use the military for

essentially nonmilitary purposes and such tasks as humanitarian operations. Two factors

78 
account for this hesitation. First, traditionally the military has been trained and equipped 

for warfighting, not social work. While the military can easily convert some of its support 

activities to other roles and missions, it devotes the heart of its force structure to 

preparing for and, engaging in combat. Therefore, the military has a natural reluctance to 

perform functions for which its units are ill-prepared and at which they may not succeed. 

Second, even if the military considers a particular nontraditional role or mission as 

neither logical nor attainable (i.e., provision of airlift to transport relief supplies), it may 

still believe that the devotion of those assets to essentially nonmilitary purposes will 

detract from their primary mission, thereby consuming scarce resources and detracting 

from combat readiness. 

In spite of considerable opposition, a clear-cut and probably enduring trend has

emerged over the past several years concerning increased use of military assets for 

nonmilitary roles and missions. That trend will likely continue for a number of reasons. 

One reason holds that the inaccurate-yet-widespread perception that military assets are 

free or come at a marginal cost. Another centers around the strong perception of 

competence and confidence in the military’s capabilities. This view remains half a decade 

after the successful prosecution of the Gulf War, which captured the public’s 

imagination. The military’s own long-standing, can-do attitude and admirable tendency to 

want to assist with any job it is handed, along with its professional, workmanlike 

response to the humanitarian operations of recent years, also are contributing factors. 

Finally, in this current era of shrinking budgets and military and civilian downsizing, the 

military’s uniformed and civilian leadership can view the need to perform these new roles 

in missions as leverage in the bureaucracy’s resource wars and as a mean to obtain

increasingly scarce resources also needed to accomplish more traditional roles and 

missions. In the past, the armed forces have been reluctant to prepare for such

nontraditional activities as humanitarian interventions so as not to create a further 

impetus for the military’s employment in such operations. The time has now come to 

recognize reality and to discard that reluctance. The military should fully and deliberately 

integrate humanitarian roles and missions into its recruitment, training, equipment, 

planning, and doctrine. It should consider such steps as increasing manpower within such 

relevant functional categories as Army civic affairs. The leadership should also 

reconfigure its Professional Military Education (PME) curricula to include heavy doses 

of military operations other than war, something the mid-level Air Force PME curriculum 

is currently doing with the development of a new course in “war termination.” The real 

challenge will be to retain war-fighting capabilities amidst shrinking budgets and 

expanding requirements. Taking full advantage of the revolution in military affairs

(RMA), which many believe to be under way, may represent means of achieving this 

difficult resource balancing act. Notwithstanding the pitfalls discussed earlier in this

chapter, no effective alternative exists to some use of the military in major humanitarian

crises, if we are to respond in anything other than a token, and probably ineffective, way. 

Neither the civilian sector, government or private, nor the international community has 

any probability of acquiring (too cost prohibitive) the capability to respond quickly to

major humanitarian crises on anything other than an ad hoc, piecemeal basis. While, for 

the reasons stated earlier, we should enter into humanitarian crises with as much care as 

we approach actual conflict, the US military increasingly needs to stand ready to do so. 

“If not us, who?” is an appropriate clarion call. 

79 
Conclusion 

The current US national security strategy seeks, as have those of previous 

administrations, to ensure the security of the US through the coordinated application of 

the military, economic, and political instruments of power. Unlike that of the Bush 

administration, however, President Bill Clinton’s concept of engagement and 

enlargement offers an offensive rather than a defensive approach, as it seeks to extend the 

Zone of Peace rather than merely preventing the encroachment of the Zone of Turmoil. 7

While this strategy sought to forestall such future humanitarian crises as we have recently

faced in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, the obvious mismatch between means and 

ends will make its success difficult. We cannot hope, at least in the near term, to address

the roots of the conflicts which have caused human right abuses and humanitarian crises.

Nor can the US confront an unpleasant choice between situational Band-Aid solutions or

doing nothing at all. Resource constraints and compassion fatigue will be limiting factors, 

but only time and further experience will determine how extensively and capably we 

answer the world’s humanitarian “911 calls.” 

Notes 

1

 Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order (Chatham. N.J.:

Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1993), 6-7. 

2

 Karl P. Magyar. “Conflict in the Post-Containment Era,” in War and Conflict 

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1994), 51-53. 

3

 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 

1993), 18-19. 

4

 Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy,” Atlantic Monthly 273, no. 2 (February 

1994): 44-76. 

5

 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Macmillan, Inc.,

1991). 192-223. 

6

 Ibid. 

7

 Singer and Wildavsky, 32. 

80 
PART III 

ECONOMIC ISSUES 

81 
7 

Anticipating the Twenty-First Century 

Economic Sources of Conflicts 

Maris McCrabb 

Economic issues have now reached a level of parity with traditional defense 

concerns because of the virtual elimination of a common military security threat (the 

Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact) and because the traditional friends of the United States

(US) are now engaged in a wide-ranging series of conflicts with the US over such issues

as trade and resource access. This essay surveys potential areas of economic conflict in 

the twenty-first century among those traditional allies that largely comprise the developed 

world, and between the developed and developing world. 1

 

For the US in the twenty-first century and the world in general, there will be a 

lowered economic imperative for war, but while the economic rationale for war between

developed and developing nations will be of medium importance-largely confined to

increasing concerns over global environmental degradation-economic rationales for war 

between developing states will remain high. There are several reasons for this. 

Technology has reduced the natural resource composition of goods through more 

efficient production processes and the invention of man-made material substitutes that are

often more effective and cheaper than natural materials. 2

 This technology has eliminated 

the “territorial imperative” (i.e., physical capital or wealth from the land or the produce of 

the land) and has enhanced the “people imperative” (i.e., human capital or wealth arising 

from the creators, distributors, and users of knowledge 3

), thus eliminating a historic

economic cause of war. However, this technological advancement largely has been 

confined to the developed world. Territorial imperatives still loom large in the developing 

world because developing nations often still perceive territory (and the natural resources 

therein) as a means of increasing national wealth. Further more, while technology has 

reduced the dependence of the developed world on natural resources largely found in the

developing world, it has not eliminated that need in all areas. Oil is the most obvious

example of this dependence, but other natural resources, including tungsten and uranium,

are just as important, though less visibly so. 

To examine these issues, this essay first establishes the context of economic conflicts 

during the cold war era to demonstrate the centrality of that event and how it had both 

positive and negative effects on the presence and resolution of conflicts. Concurrent with 

the cold war, the economies of the developed world became more globalized, especially 

82 
with the rise of transnational corporations and highly mobile factors of production, 

especially capital and human resources. This globalization has affected and continues to 

impact both the developed and the developing world. 

Second, this essay details the current and future trends of these conflicts-given the 

end of the cold war. It also discusses the implications these trends have for global 

stability, US security policy, and potential US military requirements. 

These two sections show that while some concerns will linger over resource and 

market access issues between advanced economies, the major sources of conflict will 

arise within the developing world over territory. Between the developed and the 

developing world, the focus will center on widening income disparity and the pressure 

that it brings to migration patterns and flows, critical natural resource access, continuing

global environmental degradation, and the conflict that is perceived to occur over the

quest for development by the poorer states and the quest for cleaner environments by the 

richer states. 

Third, this essay contends that emerging trends emanating from the demise of 

bilateralism and the rise of regionalism offer both challenges and opportunities that, if

used improperly, could increase the chances for conflict to escalate to the point of war, or 

opportunities, if used wisely, to lessen conflicts. 

The Post-World War II Era 

Efforts in the closing days of World War II to create an open and a liberal trading 

system were based on a belief that economic “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies of the 

1930s—policies (for example, currency devaluation) that: while improving current 

domestic economic conditions, worsened international economic conditions that 

ultimately worsened domestic economic conditions-were substantially responsible for the 

war. 4

 The division of the world into two ideologically opposed camps in the late 1940s 

both stimulated and stifled these attempts. It stimulated more open economic relations 

between the “free world” states. Economic conflicts of interests, which in previous years 

would have spoiled the entire range of relations between these countries, were now 

purposefully glossed over or resolved precisely to maintain Western cohesion deemed 

essential in the face of a monolithic foe who, it was believed, would use force to impose a 

global economic structure antithetical to the capitalistic system. 5

 

The ideological division stifled the spread of open markets in dealings with the

“nonaligned” world, those countries not overtly identified with either communist states or 

liberal democracies. Relations between Western and nonaligned countries were 

denominated in the currency of East-West conflict, and Western governments viewed 

assertions of a “third way” (neither Soviet-style socialism nor Western-style capitalism) 

to economic development as a tilt to the Soviet orbit. 

The clearest examples where the commonly perceived threat resulted in economic

conflicts being resolved in favor of maintaining security modalities include the Marshall 

Plan, the rebuilding of Japan, the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), 

and the series of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations on 

lowering tariff levels. The US saw these agreements as a means of strengthening 

countries domestically when they were threatened with having communist governments. 

Further, such countries were viewed as a source of military forces to counter growing

83 
Soviet military power in Europe and East Asia. Finally, the transformation of large 

corporate entities from multimarket firms to transnational corporations and the role they

played as a conduit of technology diffusion between developed states further accelerated 

the rise in living standards of the developed world. 6

 

These trends resulted in the greatest rise in living standards in history. For example, 

from the devastation of war, the West German per capita gross domestic product (GDP)

rose 7.9 percent annually from 1949 to 1956 and averaged 3.2 percent per year for the 

period from 1956 to 1985. Rates for the victors exhibited similar growth: the French GDP 

rose an average 4.1 percent from 1956 to 1985, and the British rate of increase was 

somewhat lower but still historically high at 2.3 percent per year. The US data stood at

3.1 percent growth over the same period. 7

 

Unpredictably and unfortunately for the postwar planners, the ideological division of 

the cold war also impacted and enhanced conflict between the developed and developing 

states. Surprisingly, most of those charged with creating the institutions and regimes of

the new world order of the late 1940s did so from an overtly liberal perception that 

viewed increased prosperity in the developed world as the engine of economic growth for 

the developing world. Unfortunately, the conflict between the developing and developed 

world rapidly took on an ideational aspect on both sides that often clouded the mutual

gains available to each from increased economic collaboration. 

This cleavage between rich and poor is reflected in the per capita GDP disparity 

between them. By the end of the 1980s, the gap between those states the World Bank 

classifies as low-income economies and those as high-income economies was a 

staggering sixty-fold. The composition and amount of trade between rich and poor states 

explain this dynamic. In 1970 extractive materials (fuels, minerals, and metals) and 

primary commodities accounted for 72 percent of the exports from the low-income states

as compared to 27 percent for the high-income countries. Of the remaining exports for

the third world, nearly one-half were accounted for by such relatively low-value added 

goods as textiles and clothing. 8

 In other words, the poorer states export relatively lowvalue added goods such as minerals and clothing, while the richer states export higher 

value goods such as manufactured items. 

Two points emerge from this brief review of the postwar economic environment. 

First, while economic conflicts within the developed world took second place to 

maintaining Western cohesiveness, they did not go away. Particularly relevant was the 

growing breech between the US and the EEC over the proper role of government

intervention into ostensibly free markets in pursuit of other social objectives such as 

employment, lifestyle maintenance, and conflicts over perceptions of unfairness in terms 

of market access, investment rights, and government support via industrial policies. 9

 

Second, the conflict between developing and developed states began to change shape 

as calls for a new economic order ran aground. The first shoal was the failure of 

developing countries’ internal economic policies (encapsulated in the theory of import 

substitution 10 as a shortcut to modernization). The second was the developing world 

realization that, except for a very few cases, the developed world was less dependent onand increasingly becoming even less dependent on-the developing world. At the same

time, the developing world was becoming more dependent on the developed world, 

especially for markets and an almost continual need for capital. 

84 
Before examining future economic sources of conflict, it is worthwhile to present the 

big picture of the world economy in the late twentieth century. In 1991 the world’s 

combined GDP was estimated at $21.6 trillion with 79 percent of that in the 22 highincome states (as defined by the World Bank). This estimation left 105 countries to share

the rest. (These are not all the countries of the world. The World Bank lists separately 73

other nations that have sparse economic data or populations less than one million people.) 

11 The US share of the total was 26 percent (the next closest country, Japan, held 15.5 

percent). Merchandise trade exhibits a similar disparity between developed and 

developing states. In 1991 world exports totaled $3.3 trillion (15 percent of world GDP) 

and imports were $3.5 trillion (16 percent of GDP). The high-income states accounted for 

79 percent of merchandise imports and exports. 12 Another simmering issue between 

developed and developing states is the worsening trend of the ratio of export to import 

prices. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) indices show, 

over the period 1990-94, that developing countries’ export prices fell 5 percent for food 

and 10 percent for minerals, ores, and metals (groups which comprise the major exports 

of developing states) at the same time that OECD manufactures’ export prices fell less 

than 1 percent. 13 This situation-where developing states earn less for their exports but 

pay more for their imports-accounts for the large increase in external debt in developing

states. And the poorest states are hit the hardest. Forty low-income economies saw their 

total external debt as percent of exports go from 105.5 percent in 1980 to 225.7 percent in 

1991. For the middle income states, the increase was 21 percent over the same period. 14 

One final issue is the vulnerability of both developed and developing states to

vagaries in world trade flows. For developed states, this vulnerability can come from

either exposure to trade (that is, the percentage of GDP made up of imports and exports), 

or from reliance on a critical resource or market for their economy. For example, 

Austria’s trade exposure is 71 percent, with 39 percent of its exports and 43 percent of its 

imports going to or corning from Germany. 15 In other words, every time the German 

economy sneezes, Austria’s catches a cold. Likewise, Japan is highly dependent on

imported oil: it constitutes 29 percent of their domestic power consumption, 16 and it 

takes 17 percent of their merchandise export earnings to pay for their energy imports. 17 

For developing states, vulnerability arises when a country is highly dependent on a 

single commodity for export earnings. For example, Saudi Arabian oil exports comprise 

81.3 percent of all its exports, and Gabon’s export of oil accounts for 79.5 percent of its 

exports. 18 Hence, these countries are vulnerable to adverse changes in world prices for

oil. Saudi Arabia found itself in this situation during 1994 when its earnings from exports 

were insufficient to pay for its imports and when a threatened budget deficit caused it to 

reduce government spending 20 percent. 19 

Future Sources of Conflict 

The historic patterns of conflict between the developed and developing world and 

within the developed world have been profoundly affected by the end of the cold war.

This section examines those changes and assesses the likelihood that one or both might 

flare into open hostilities. 

Despite the projections of Max Singer, Aaron Wildavsky, Francis Fukuyama, 20 and

others that armed conflict between the mass-wealth industrialized nations is highly 

85 
unlikely, three issues pose at least some possibility for conflict between these countries.

The essentially unanswerable question left is whether any of these conflicts would be 

serious enough to result in open hostilities. I think not. 

The first area, and one with the lowest probability of hostile conflict, is

disagreements over resource access. Two phenomena are occurring that may cause 

resource access to become an irritant which, along with other conflicts, could generate 

enough heat to ignite a spark. One phenomenon is user-supplier agreements where firms,

through contract, attempt to secure for themselves guaranteed access to raw materials. An 

example of this is Japanese firms who, through direct foreign investment to build or 

modernize extraction facilities, secure supplies of ores for smelting plants in Japan and 

third-party countries. 21 

Another phenomenon is more direct conflict over resources. An example is the 

sporadic outbreaks of fish wars, where fishermen of one country have been fired upon by 

boats and naval craft of another country over alleged poaching on national fishing 

grounds. 22 Such conflicts have already occurred on several occasions. 

The second area that has only medium probability of conflict is over market access.

The two biggest concerns in this area are the rise of regional trading blocs and the

increasing use of nontariff trade barriers. Trading blocs raise fears of a return to the 

autarkic economic policies of the 1930s such as Germany’s grossraumwirtshaft 23 and 

Britain’s sterling area that implied discriminatory preferences for members of the bloc 

over outsiders. Nontariff barriers are means nations can use to circumvent negotiated 

market access agreements. The European ban on US beef containing growth-inducing 

hormones and the Japanese banning other US agricultural products for similar health 

concerns are but two examples of this use of administrative regulations to keep out 

foreign competition. 

The third area provides the catalyst for the previously mentioned two phenomena.

The economic slowdown of 1990-94 injected enormous stress into the liberal economic

arena that was manifested in various ways: high unemployment in Europe, stagnating 

wage growth in the US, and drastically reduced growth rates in Japan. 24 All result in 

demands for government action by the populace. Additionally, all, to one degree or

another, call into question the open trading system that has existed since the end of World 

War II. Perhaps the clearest example of this questioning is the rising protectionist 

movement in the US, especially over a belief that the large and growing trade surplus

with Japan (and China) is the result of “unfair” trading practices. 25 

Three areas of potential conflict between the developed and developing world in the 

next century focus on widening income gaps, resource issues, and environmental 

degradation. Northsouth income disparities likely will be manifested primarily through 

migration issues. Potential trouble areas range from North Africa to Western Europe, 

from Eastern Europe to Western Europe, and from Latin America and Asia to the US and 

Canada. Paul M. Kennedy places the problem squarely on the too rapidly expanding

world population—particularly in the poorer areas of the world. 26 Many countries of the 

world attempted to address this issue at the September 1994 United Nations (UN) Cairo 

Conference on Population. 27 

Economic development, environmental degradation, and population growth are all 

tied symbiotically: as per capita wealth increases, population growth falls, 28 and financial 

resources—and the political pressure—become available to tackle environmental quality 

86 
concerns. Unfortunately, as the contentiousness of the Cairo Conference demonstrated, 

population control arguments run up against deeply held cultural and religious beliefs. 

Mass media have captured the images of boat people, streams of bedraggled 

refugees, and others moving from devastated areas—whether caused by political 

instability, economic deprivation, or natural catastrophes—towards believed safe havens, 

many of them located in developed states. 29 These migrations, in turn, have generated 

backlashes bordering on nativism in some states. The rise of neo-Nazism in Germany and 

far-right National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen in France 30 and calls for repatriation of 

refugees from the US are all examples of a growing fear in developed states over 

unrestrained migration of third world people to their shores. 

It is unlikely that migration will be the casus belli between emigration states and the 

refugees’ target states. It is likely, though, that immigration issues will be a contributing 

factor to conflicts between states. First, disagreements between losing and gaining states 

over border access and treatment of the refugees once inside the receiving state will 

increase tensions and instability between the two as the developed states pressure the 

developing countries to take measures to stem the flow of people. For example, during 

1994, the US pressured Cuba and Haiti to stop their boat people from trying to get to the 

US. Likewise, the poor nations will attempt to use migration fears to wrest increased aid 

and technical assistance from the developed world. 31 

Second, migration issues will arise between developing states (e.g., the war in 

Rwanda resulted in huge numbers of refugees flowing into neighboring Zaire, putting 

pressure on an already poor state). Calls to the developed states for assistance from

nongovernmental relief agencies and the UN, even when answered, generate their own 

difficulties. In the case of Rwanda, relief workers claimed Western nations, especially the

US, after providing crucial aid to fight the cholera epidemic that broke out in the refugee 

camps, left immediately whenever the issue no longer occupied the front pages of the 

Western press, leaving unresolved the long-term relief effort and the underlying issues 

that started the crisis. These situations, then, may degenerate into huge hostilities. 

Furthermore, it is not unlikely that in times of economic stress within the developed 

world, pressures will be placed on governments to ignore some humanitarian crisesparticularly those that are not perceived as having a direct bearing on the nation (e.g., 

such as Rwanda’s alleged lack of strategic significance to the US) because of the costs 

involved, thus accelerating festering conflicts. 

Despite product and process technological improvements that have reduced the per

unit natural resource content of many of the developed world’s goods, resource access 

issues will continue to be a source of conflict between supplier and user states in the

twenty-first century. These issues will continue to breed problems in the first case due 

to—ironically—the decline of such supplier cartels as the Organization of Petroleum 

Exporting Countries (OPEC) and in the second case due to depletion issues. The

declining power of such organizations as OPEC increases instability between suppliers 

and users in two ways: first, users lose the certainty, however onerous, of a common 

bargaining agent with some control over quantity and prices; second, such organizations

provide a useful forum for producer states to iron out disagreements, without which states

often engage in beggar-thy-neighbor policies. The geopolitical closeness of many OPEC 

members, plus their deep ideological divisions, offers the prospect of overt conflict 

between: these states. The developed world has ample evidence of the disrupting effect of 

87 
previous conflict between OPEC states (for example, during the Iran-Iraq war) and will 

likely be willing to use force to secure access. 

The third potential major source of conflict is the issue of environmental 

degradation. In essence, the developed world—belatedly recognizing the fragile 

ecosystem, its interdependencies, and the adverse effect that industrialization has on the 

earth—is pressing the developing world to undertake environmental protection as a 

humanity-wide public good. 32 Specific concerns are raised over air quality in the 

emerging megacities of the third world, water quality and the common resources of the 

oceans, and development versus environmental cleanup or preservation. 

Conflict over environmental issues was the centerpiece of the UN Conference on 

Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 1992. 33 At the 

Earth Summit, industrialized states, which by and large have embraced environmental

protection as public policy, sought to tie official development aid and technology transfer 

to increased environmental protection policies and enforcement in the developing world. 

The poorer states argued that, due to their constrained resources as a result of economic

underdevelopment, such policies are counterproductive because they deny developing 

nations the tools they need to implement the policies. Tied to this argument is the third

world’s distrust of the World Bank’s Global Environment Facility. This organization 

allocates billions of dollars for global warming, biodiversity, international water quality,

and ozone regeneration projects. The bank is viewed as an unrepresentative agency that 

too often intrudes into domestic policy-making. 34 On the other hand, the developed states 

see the bank as a means to provide reliable oversight. 

If the dire predictions of the science community are true—the divergent goals of the 

developed and developing countries over this issue—environmental degradation issues 

may become the central area of conflict between these states in the twenty-first century. 

35 While it is highly unlikely that military means would be used directly to force 

environmental cooperation, nonmilitary pressure against developing states (for example, 

cutting of commerce or loans or getting transnational corporations to close plants) could 

lead to more open conflict such as state-sponsored terrorism. 

This section has briefly examined some possible future sources of economic conflict 

within the developed world and between the developed and developing world. Note that 

most of the probabilities assigned by the author to the likelihood of open hostilities were

low. But two points must be raised. First, in no case was the probability judged to be 

zero. Second, the probabilities assigned were in light of each conflict being the sole 

conflict. The author made no judgment on the possibility of several of these converging

and sparking armed hostilities between two states. 

Implications for the United States 

Given at least the possibility that the above scenarios—or some derivation thereof—

might occur, what are the implications, especially in the security arena broadly defined, 

for the US? Two phenomena of the twenty-first century—the end of bilateralism and the 

emergence of regionalism—offer both challenges and opportunities for the US. The 

challenge arises because diplomatically, militarily, and economically bilateralism is the

United States’ comparative advantage. In any possible dyad in those areas, the US is 

clearly the dominant actor. 

88 
Regionally, the challenge derives from the US being unquestionably the leading 

player in the Americas, while it is considerably less strong (and some argue growing

weaker) in other regions, especially Europe and Asia, that are predicted to at least match 

if not surpass the US in economic power in the early years of the next century, 36 

Yet these trends offer opportunities for the US and other nations to reduce the 

potential for economic conflict which might spark a more active, possibly even violent, 

situation. Broadening the negotiation regime offers an algebraic increase in linkages 

where compromise and agreement in one area may spillover into resolution in another, 

more contentious issue. Likewise, despite the global telecommunications revolution, most

states still identify closer with their region than with an amorphous world community 

concept. 

Three trends mark this movement towards regionalism. First, in the military security 

field, the Partnership for Peace program of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) promises to bring the emerging democratic and free market states of central and

eastern Europe closer to the states of western Europe. This alignment offers a clear

example of both the challenges and opportunities of regionalism. The challenges lie in a 

delicate balance of two related issues: the speed at which these states are brought into 

NATO forums and Russia’s response to these accessions. If, for example, states were 

admitted into NATO under ambiguous guidelines and timetables that resulted in certain

states gaining full membership ahead of others, this advantage could lead to instability

rather than stability. Likewise, if Russia perceives further accessions of former Warsaw 

Pact states as a threat to its interests, it could feel obligated to revert to czarist or Soviet 

imperial policies once again. 37 On the other hand, this program offers the opportunity 

that NATO institutional arrangements could be used as conflict resolution forums to 

settle long-simmering debates over borders, environmental degradation issues, access, 

and immigration. 

Closely related to this is the issue of widening and deepening of the European Union 

(EU). In 1995 Austria, Finland, and Sweden completed their accessions into the EU. 38

Such states as Turkey, Malta, Cyprus, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic hold

associate memberships in the EU and wish to become full members. Mirroring the same

concerns outlined above for widening NATO, if some of these states do gain full 

membership while others are left waiting, the possibility for conflict increases. This

concern will hold special interest if the original EU member states continue to experience 

high unemployment and stagnating economies. The lower wage states are seen as a threat 

to the jobs and living standards of the richer EU countries. Hence, pressures may arise to 

limit exports from those states and erect other nontariff barriers to limit the competition 

from the East. 

Outside of Europe, other regional economic arrangements provide the same sort of 

challenges and opportunities that might arise from increased economic ties. Though less 

an overt security implication, efforts at an expanded North American Free Trade 

Agreement (NAFTA), a more robust and unified Caribbean Common Market 

(CARICOM) and Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), and a more active 

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum may be sources of increased conflict 

or means to reduce conflict over economic issues. If these regional arrangements are seen 

as efforts to manage trade with other nonregional states or if they are perceived as means

whereby one (or a few) large economy within the region attempts to maintain dominance 

89 
over the smaller economies of the region, they may in fact foster instability. On the other 

hand, if they are used as forums to negotiate and discuss common economic concerns and 

reduce trade and investment conflicts, they will mitigate tensions. 

Note that the US holds memberships in nearly all of these just-mentioned groups. 

This revelation points to the pivotal role the US will continue to play in ensuring regional 

and global stability in both the security and the economic arenas. 39 Charles Kindleberger 

argues in his analysis of the Great Depression that there is not a viable alternative for 

continued US engagement and leadership in world affairs. 40 This pronouncement is 

never more true than in the increasing interdependent and interconnected world of the 

twenty-first century. 41 

Following the Gulf War and the breakup of the Soviet empire, many commentators 

believed the era of the UN had finally arrived. Yet, especially in the economic area, this 

assessment has proven to be overly optimistic for at least two reasons. First, the UN 

traditionally has played only a minor role in world economic affairs. Second, those UN 

forums that focused specifically on economic issues have been perceived by developed 

states as a means developing states have used to force a reordering of the world economic

order to the detriment of the developed countries. 

Indicative of this perspective is the debate among the developed states, especially the 

G-7, and between developed states (primarily the US) and developing states over two 

issues the US wants to include on the future trade agenda of the GATT: environmental 

standards and worker rights. 42 As exemplified by the debate in the US over the

ratification of the NAFTA in 1993 and the Uruguay Round in 1994, groups within the US

believe the developed states should use trade, especially market access, to induce changes 

in the internal political behavior of developing states. Because the wealthy states’ 

markets are more critical to the developing states than their market (either as consumers 

or as suppliers) is to the developed states, restricting trade is a low-cost option to force 

recalcitrant states to allow workers there to organize, collectively bargain, gain wage

increases commensurate with productivity increases, and improve working conditions 

that are admittedly deplorable by Western standards. Developing countries counter that 

such restrictions are thinly disguised attempts by the developed countries to keep the

developing world from modernizing and improving living standards and that such 

restrictions only harm the workers the developed countries seek to help. 

One final implication must be addressed. Trends in the late twentieth century point to 

the increased use and viability of embargoes and sanctions to change the behavior of

rogue states. During Desert Shield and continuing on to the Balkan wars and Haiti, the 

US has led multilateral efforts through the UN to wage economic warfare with mixed 

results. 43 In this regard, the US military establishment may play an increasing role. 

Advanced technologies and capabilities in the surveillance and reconnaissance areas and 

rapid—and precise abilities to target violations selectively with a high degree of 

confidence of success and little collateral damage—may increase the options of political

decision makers and hence increase the likelihood that US armed forces may find 

themselves as the enforcers of sanctions and embargoes. While these have been 

traditional sea power missions, the global presence and global reach of airpower may 

change the balance more towards air forces. Airpower also offers the advantages of 

relatively low visibility vis-à-vis target states. 

90 
Conclusion 

Table 1 summarizes the predicted sources of economic conflict and assesses the

probabilities they will evolve into something approaching armed hostilities between 

developed states, developed and developing states, and developing states. 

Table 1 

Summary of Possible Economic Conflict 

Between Conflict Sources Probabilities

of Armed 

Hostilities 

Developed States Raw Materials* Very Low 

Market Access Low 

Developed and 

Developing States 

Raw Materials 

Environmental 

Immigration 

Low 

Medium 

Medium

Developing States Raw Materials 

Immigration 

Borders 

Medium 

Medium 

High 

*Includes conflict between two developed states over raw 

materials from a third party, another developed state, or a 

developing state. 

Note: While border conflict is not precisely an economic conflict 

and one not argued extensively in this essay, it is included here 

for two reasons. First, border conflict often arises over resource 

issues (either ownership or access). Second, since it is rated as a 

high probability for armed hostilities, it provides a benchmark for 

the other probabilities. 

This essay has advanced two broad trends in economic conflict and implications for

the twenty-first century. First, there is a broadening in the meaning of national security in 

two senses of that phrase. One, for each nation, but more so for developed nations, 

economics is less exclusively national and more accurately portrayed as global in nature.

This trend is also becoming more true for the developing nations who seek access to 

markets, technologies, and capital in the developed world. Two, there is the merging of 

economics with defense into the concept of security because for most political decision 

makers in both the developed and the developing world, living standards, economic 

development, and quality of life concerns have become the dominant issues. Security is 

no longer exclusively measured by the size of armies or the number of combat aircraft a 

nation possesses; it is increasingly measured by the size and growth of per capita GDP 

and its distribution, wage rates, and quality of life indices. 

91 
These changes point to the second broad trend identified by this essay: because 

economic issues are becoming more important to the relations between states, conflicts 

that arise over these issues may exacerbate conflicts that arise in the traditional political 

and military arenas. Hence, while hostilities over purely economic issues will be quite 

rare, political conflicts may be farmed into violence due to the presence of unresolved 

economic conflicts; as when deteriorating economic conditions may lead to civil war.

Furthermore, the likelihood of this occurring between developed states or between a 

developed state and a developing state is quite low, but the possibility of it occurring

between two developing states is somewhat greater. 

The key implication of these two trends for the US armed forces, and the US Air 

Force in particular, is that they may be called on to support economic warfare missions in 

the form of sanction and embargo enforcement. The US will likely avoid direct 

engagement in wars between developing states but rather will attempt to apply economic 

pressure against one or both of the warring parties to stop the fighting. 44 This observation 

points to an important strategic military change where the value of heavily equipped

ground forces will be relatively low while the value of high technology and sophisticated 

air and space assets will grow in importance. 

Notes 

1

 There is no agreed upon definition of a developed or a developing state. The World 

Bank, for example, divides nations on the basis of their per capita gross national product 

(GNP). Many economists use a $5.000 per capita GNP to separate the two levels of 

development. That convention will hold in this chapter. 

2

 For one view of the implications of this, see Lester Thurow, Head-to-Head; The 

Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America (New York: William 

Morrow & Co., 1992). 

3

 A cogent analysis of the knowledge revolution implications can be found in Robert 

B. Reich, The Work of Nations (New York: Vintage, 1992). 

4

 Paul M. Kennedy argues the postwar economic system was not established for 

purely altruistic reasons. See his The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: 

Vintage, 1984), especially chapter 7. 

5

 A series of excellent articles on these issues can be found in Graham Allison and

Gregory F. Treverton, eds., Rethinking Americas Security (New York: W. W. Norton &

Co., 1992). 

6

 The role these trends played in US security policies can be found in Robert Gilpin, 

US Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct 

Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975). 

7

 See Andrew Graham with Anthony Seldon, Government and Economies in the 

Postwar World; Economic Policies and Comparative Performance 1945-85 (London and 

New York: Routledge, 1990), chapters 3, 4, 5, and 11. 

8

 See the World Bank, World Development Report 1993 (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1993). 

9

 The developed states also disagreed over the use of trade to influence the behavior 

of the Soviet Union. See Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment; CoCom and the 

Politics of East-West Trade (Ithaca, N.Y. and London: Cornell University Press, 1992). 

92 
Notes 

10 This theory suggests that developing states should close their markets to imports 

from other states to foster domestic industries that will make those goods.

11 World Development Report 1993, 305 (technical notes). Therefore, the GDP total 

should be used as a conservative estimate. Furthermore, the inequality is not solely 

confined to between developed and developing states. Within the developing world, large 

disparities exist. For example, the poorest country listed by the World Bank, 

Mozambique, has about $80 per capita while the much “richer” Gabon has almost $3,800 

in per capita wealth, almost 50 times greater than Mozambique. 

12 World Development Report 1993, tables 3 and 14. 

13 OECD Economic Outlook (Paris: OECD, December 1992), table 82. 

14 World Development Report 1993, table 24. 

15 United Nations, 1992 International Trade Statistics Yearbook. 

16 Business Week, 22 June 1992, 76. Nuclear power is second. contributing 27 

percent of domestic energy consumption, followed by gas (21 percent), hydroelectric (13 

percent), and coal (10 percent). Japan recognizes their vulnerability and has established a 

145-day emergency supply of petroleum. Platts Oilgram News, 29 October 1992, 6. 

17 World Development Report 1993, table 5. 

18 1992 International Trade Statistics Yearbook. The second largest export from

Saudi Arabia is chemicals (slightly more than 9 percent); no remaining export category 

exceeds 1 percent of the total. The vulnerabilities are lessened if the country commands

an overwhelming percentage of world trade in that commodity. Unfortunately, Saudi 

Arabia’s world market share is only 5 percent (by value) while Gabon’s is only slightly 

more than 1 percent. Ibid. 

19 See “Saudi Arabia, Its Purse Thinner, Learns How to Say ‘No’ to the US,” New

York Times, 4 November 1994, 1; and “Saudi Arabia Is Facing Debts and Defections 

That Test US Ties,” wan Street Journal. 25 October 1994, 1. 

20 See Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order (Chatham, N.J.: 

Chatham House Publishers, 1993); and Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the 

Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). However, this democratic peace thesis is the 

subject of intense scholarly debate. For opposing views see, Christopher Layne, “Kant or 

Cant; The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” International Security 19, no. 2 (Fall 1994): 5-

49; and David E. Spiro, “The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace,” ibid., 50-86. 

21 See David B. Yoffie, ed., Beyond Free Trade: Firms, Governments, and Global 

Competition (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1993). 

22 See David Rohde, “Worldwide Fish Depletion Sparks’ Gunboat Diplomacy Over 

Share of the Catch,” Christian Science Monitor, 24 August 1994, 7. 

23 Large economic area. For the economic policies of Nazi Germany and the origins

of the Second World War see, Alan S. Milward, War, Economy and Society, 1939-1945 

(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1977). 

24 See Paul Krugman, “Europe Jobless, America Penniless?” Foreign Policy 95 

(Summer 1994): 19-34. 

25 For opposing views on this issue, see Roger C. Altman, “Why Pressure Japan?” 

Foreign Affairs 73 (May/June 1994): 2-6; and Jagdish Bhagwati, “Samurais No More,” 

Foreign Affairs 73 (May/June 1994): 7-12. 

93 
Notes 

26 See Paul M. Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (New York: 

Random House, 1993). 

27 For various reports on this conference see, Victor Chen, “Crisis of a Crowded

World: Population and Development,” Audubon (July-August 1994): 50-54; Marguerite 

Holloway, “Population Summit: Women’s Health and Rights Shape Cairo Document,”

Scientific American (June 1994): 14-16; and “UN Proclaims 1996 as Poverty Eradication 

Year: Progress on Agenda for Development,” UN Chronicle (March 1994): 78-B1. 

28 In many developed countries in Europe, such as France and Germany, population 

rates have stopped growing since 1970. See World Development Report 1993, table 26. 

Another side of this issue is that as development increases, so does environmental 

degradation. For example, China-the fastest growing economy in the world-is on pace to 

become the largest source of acid rain in the world by 2010 and the third largest emitter 

of greenhouse gases by 2025. See Peter Schoettle, “Key Geostrategic Trends,” Naval 

War College Review 48, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 67. 

29 For two views on this issue see, Matthew Connelly and Paul M. Kennedy, “Must It 

Be the Rest Against the West?” Atlantic Monthly (December 1994): 61-84; and Virginia

Abernathy, “Optimism and Overpopulation,” ibid., 84-91. 

30 The National Front, at one time thought to be the second largest political force in 

France (behind the moderate-right alliance), favors strict control on immigration, along 

with reducing French participation in the EU; removing French peacekeepers from

Bosnia; and even opposed French participation in the Gulf War. See “Enough of Le Pen,” 

The Economist, 30 January 1993,48-49. 

31 An interesting analysis of migration as a form of strategic nonviolent conflict can 

be found in Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, pt. 2, Methods of Nonviolent 

Action, pt. 2 (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973). 

32 See Graciela Chichlnisky, “North-South Trade and the Global Environment,” The 

American Economic Review 84 (September 1994): 851-74. 

33 See Peter M. Haas, Marc A Levy, and Edward A Parson, “Appraising the Earth 

Summit,” Environment 34 (October 1992): 6-33. 

34 Another favorite target of the developing states is the International Monetary Fund

(IMF). At the recent fiftieth anniversary of the World Bank gathering in Madrid, Spain, a 

north-south split emerged over increasing global liquidity. See “The Fight for the Fund,” 

The Economist, 8 October 1994, 85-86. 

35 That environmental changes are not all bad, see Robert Mendlesohn, William D.

Nordhaus, and Daigee Shaw, “The Impact of Global Warming on Agriculture: A

Ricardian Analysis,” American Economic Review 84 (September 1994): 753-71. 

36 See “War of the Worlds; A Survey of the Global Economy,” The Economist, 1 

October 1994. This study forecasted that by 2020 seven of the top 15 economies (as 

measured by total GDP expressed in purchasing power parities) will be in Asia (China

will be the largest economy of all), five will be in Europe (the largest economy there, 

Germany, will only be the sixth largest in the world), and three will be in the Western 

Hemisphere (the US, number two in the world; Brazil; and Mexico). 

94 
Notes 

37 Russian Federation president Boris Yeltsin echoed these very fears at the 

Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) meeting held in Budapest, 

Hungary, on 5 December 1994. 

38 Norwegians voted down, for a second time, membership in the EU. 

39 For a more complete argument over this issue, see Robert Gilpin, The Political 

Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), 

especially chapter 10. 

40 See Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression. 1929-1939, (Berkeley. 

Calif.: University of California Press, 1973). 

41 For two authors who dispute the US decline thesis, see Henry R. Nau, The Myth of

America’s Decline (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 

Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 

1990). 

42 These countries include the US. Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain, and

Canada. 

43 For an analysis on the efficacy of economic warfare means in the 20th century, see 

Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot, Economic Sanctions

Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 2d ed. (Washington. D.C.: Institute for

International Economics, 1990). For an analysis that ascribes somewhat greater utility to 

economic warfare, see David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: 

Princeton University Press. 1985). 

44 See the discussion on where and when the US might engage militarily in A 

National Security Strategy of Engagement (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

Office, 1994), 10. 

95 
8 

The Third World’s Nonviable States 

A Major Source of Conflict in the 

Twenty-First Century 

Gary A. Storie 

Like the tectonic forces that move continents around on the surface of the earth, the 

end of the cold war and other recent developments portend massive shifts in the “historic 

tectonics” of human civilization. 1

 One such shift is in the area of global conflict. 

Introduction 

Following World War II, and to the end of the cold war, the greatest security fear 

was an all-out war between the two superpowers that would culminate in the use of 

nuclear weapons. With the end of the cold war, however, global conflicts are almost 

conclusively occurring in developing countries. During 1993, 42 countries experienced 

52 major conflicts and another 37 countries suffered from political violence. Of these 79

countries, 65 are in the developing world. 2

 While these conflicts presently do not have 

the potential to erupt into a nuclear holocaust, they do pose the threat of widespread 

regional destabilization with fearsome death tolls and massive refugee problems. 

Many of the emerging global conflicts are arising from disintegrating nation-states 

(politically unstable states lacking in socioeconomic progress). Some examples follow. 

Somalia 

Years of clan-based civil war resulted in the collapse of the central government. By 

1992, drought and conflict combined had led to 300,000 deaths. A mission that began as 

a humanitarian one had turned into a frustrating attempt at nation-building. The cost to 

the UN has been $3 billion and the lives of 130 peacekeepers, 26 of them American. 

Currently, the UN is bankrolling the activities of 15,000 UN soldiers in Somalia at a cost 

of nearly $80 million a month. 

96 
Haiti 

With a history of political instability and no strategic resources, Haiti is one of the 

most environmentally degraded countries in the world. It is the poorest country in the 

Americas; in remote villages, most houses are made of earth and have no windows. To 

restore democracy and promote human rights, the US deployed 17,500 troops in the fall 

of 1994, at a huge cost. UN plans called for a 6,000-member force to be deployed to Haiti 

in 1995, with the US supplying about half. As of January 1995, the mission (to provide 

security) was plummeting. At that time, the Christian Science Monitor reported, “Crime

has hit this Caribbean nation full force, past and present members of the military have 

clashed in violent confrontations, and the basics of running a country-from providing 

electricity to whisking away garbage have further decayed.” 3

 

Rwanda 

The genocide that took hundreds of thousands lives in Rwanda in 1994 has passed, 

but the country still desperately needs help. Real stability within Rwanda remains

elusive-indeed impossible-while more than a million Rwandans are still in exile in 

neighboring African countries. Safe repatriation of the civilians is absolutely necessary to 

prevent renewed war, but many are afraid to return to their villages because they fear 

reprisals. 

Other countries in various stages of disintegration include” Afghanistan, Angola, 

Iraq, Mozambique, Myanmar, Yugoslavia, Sudan, Zaire, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and 

Bangladesh. With armed conflicts increasing in disintegrating states, it is no wonder that 

the UN spent $4 billion on peacekeeping in 1994. As more countries disintegrate, the 

consequences will have regional and global implications. Indeed, the components of

human security are interdependent. When the security of people is endangered anywhere 

in the world, other nations are likely to become involved. Spin-offs such as famine, 

disease, pollution, drug trafficking, terrorism, ethnic dispute, and social disintegration 

will not be confined within national borders. Like it or not, developed countries must not 

ignore the disintegration of third world countries—or else face the consequences. More 

in-depth analysis is thus needed to determine the root causes of disintegration. 

The underlying reason for disintegration goes beyond ideological, economic, 

political, or cultural conflicts—it is a question of “viability.” Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, 

and Mozambique experienced numerous types of clashes, but the ultimate reason they 

disintegrated was that they were nonviable entities in the international system. As Dr Karl 

P. Magyar states in the Washington Times, “The problem is nonviable, or ‘collapsed 

states’—or put more graphically, the impending ‘Somalianization’ of a huge part of the 

Third World.” Magyar further states, “As the gulf widens between the two worlds (rich 

and poor), more states become nonviable and thus potential sources of instability.” 4

 

The thesis of this chapter is that many third world nonviable states will become

major sources of conflict across the globe, presenting serious security implications for the

United States and the world. We will review how the concept of nonviability evolved 

with the proliferation of small states in the 1960s, and how it is applicable to both small 

and larger states today. We will then examine nonviable states from economic, military, 

and political perspectives, and how the problem will be manifested and most likely will 

escalate to affect more and more international actors. Finally, we will examine the 

97 
prospects for a peaceful resolution to conflicts that emerge from the nonviability

problem. 

Microstates and the Nonviability Issue 

In the field of international relations, the “nonviability concept” began to appear in 

the literature following the emergence of small states in the 1960s. In only three decades, 

the spirit of what President John F. Kennedy called “a worldwide declaration of

independence” has transformed more than 1.25 billion people occupying nearly 14 

million square miles of territory into 109 new nations. 5

 The world currently comprises 

191 independent states and 58 dependencies. In the decades following World War II,

many states, particularly very small states, came into being when they achieved 

independence from their former colonial rulers. Most of these so-called “microstates” 

generally with small land sizes and populations of less than one million people-had, and 

continue to have, too few financial resources to ever be self-sufficient. 6

 

Microstates of this sort first attracted attention with the admissions of the Republic of

Maldives (population 143,000) and The Gambia (population 592,000) to the UN in 1965. 

Many asked, why should such microstates have an equal or even a legitimate vote in the 

United Nations? Of current interest is the Republic of Nauru, which lies in the Pacific 

Ocean, 2,480 miles northeast of Australia. This island of only 8.2 square miles and 9,400 

people has been exploited for its phosphate deposits (its only resource). Mining has left

80 percent of the island uninhabitable and uncultivatable, and the phosphate deposits are 

due to run out soon. Should this country have a legitimate vote in the UN General 

Assembly? Indeed, the very fact that small states can today participate in the activities of 

various international organizations advertises and underlines the basic and persisting 

conditions of international politics: the formal equality of sovereign states (regardless of 

size, resources, and responsibilities) and their substantive inequalities. 

The nonviability of microstates centers around the concept of dependency. Is a state 

viable if it is “overdependent” on another for jobs, electricity, resources, and protection?

For example, Lesotho, a country of 1.8 million people entirely surrounded by South 

Africa, is economically dependent on its neighbor, which provides all land transportation

links with the outside world. Financial aid, over 50 percent of which comes from the 

Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), provides 26 percent of Lesotho’s Gross 

National Product (GNP). Furthermore, about 38 percent of Lesotho’s male labor force is 

comprised of migrant workers from South Africa. 

Vulnerabilities contribute to the microstates’ nonviability. Their particular difficulty

emanates from their greater vulnerability to crises and their lower capacity to respond to 

them. Their size makes them particularly susceptible to both natural and man-made 

disasters. A coup in a small state will have a far greater chance of success, for example, 

than in a larger area where rebellious troops might be contained—and one hurricane can 

destroy the economy of a small state that is dependent on a single crop. Because of their 

strategic positions, many of these states or territories—in the Caribbean, the Indian

Ocean, and the Pacific—can easily become pawns in the game of international power 

politics. The Falkland Islands in 1982, Grenada in 1983, and Kuwait in 1991 are just 

three recent examples of small-state crises in peripheral areas that have had much wider 

repercussions. In his article, “Small is Beautiful but vulnerable,” Shridath Ramphal 

98 
argues that small states by their very nature are weak and vulnerable: “Sometimes it 

seems as if small states are like small boats pushed out into a turbulent sea, free in one 

sense to traverse it: but, without oars or provisions, without compass or sails, free also to 

perish. Or, perhaps, to be rescued and taken on board a larger vessel.” 7

 

What Constitutes Nonviability? 

Thus far, we have looked at the evolution of nonviability with the proliferation of

small states in the 1960s. However, as Magyar points out, the nonviability issue is no 

longer restricted to small states. “The second dimension of the viability problem concerns 

the consequences of the proliferation of many such small states as well as large, but 

noncompetitive, nonviable states in the international system.” 8

 One example of a large 

emerging nonviable country is Bangladesh. With a population of 119 million, Bangladesh 

depends on foreign aid for more than 90 percent of its capital spending. The country is

highly dependent on jute, which accounts for over 40 percent of its Gross Domestic 

Product (GDP). Furthermore, Bangladesh is highly vulnerable to its violent and 

unpredictable climate (a recent typhoon resulted in 144,000 deaths and wiped out 

practically an entire year’s jute and rice crops). 

Assessing a country’s nonviability is a highly subjective process. Attempts have 

been made to establish operational criteria based on quantitative analysis using 

measurable variables such as population, size, wealth, resources, and military might. But 

analysts must go beyond quantitative variables to explore qualitative aspects, such as how 

well the country is managed. What is the country’s ability to conduct international 

relations? Is it competitive? What is its ability to balance its budget? What is the

country’s ability to bring about political stability, economic development, and social 

transformation? Is the state able to maintain certain specified levels of public services, 

international representation, and a capable military establishment? To better understand 

this concept, we will first look at viability in three separate dimensions-socioeconomic, 

military, and political. Then the three will be evaluated in aggregate to establish the

degree of overall viability. 

Socioeconomic viability 

An assessment of socioeconomic viability must measure how well a country is able 

to “convert its resources into socioeconomic progress for its inhabitants in accordance 

with the more advanced standards of the international community.” 9

 Early literature that 

addressed economic viability focused on size, resources, and population. But, Magyar 

contends “viability ...has a qualitative aspect which means that more than only 

quantifiable criteria [e.g., size and population] must be considered.” 10 Singapore is a 

good example of economic viability that is not proportional to its small size or 

population. With only 2.9 million people, Singapore occupies the 47th position in world 

GNP rankings. 

Abundance of strategic resources is another physical characteristic that has little 

correlation with economic viability. Switzerland, for example, a small country of 6.8 

million people, is poor in natural resources, having no valuable minerals in commercially 

exploitable quantities. Yet, Switzerland has a GNP per capita almost 100 times that of 

resource-rich Nigeria. Japan is another example of a viable country with almost no 

99 
resources. Whereas population, land size and fertility, and resources (physical 

characteristics) once were prerequisites for economic might, we now see this isn’t 

necessarily the case today. Other characteristics may better reveal the socioeconomic 

viability of a state. 

Michael Porter, a noted economist, argues that “productivity is the prime determinant

in the long run of a nation’s standard of living.” 11 Probably the most often used statistic 

to measure a state’s productivity is to look at its GNP per capita (the value of a country’s 

final output of goods and services in a year, divided by its population). It reflects the 

value of a country’s economic activity and the income of its residents. However, GNP 

should not be the only indicator of socioeconomic progress because a country that 

appears to be wealthy and productive may be managed poorly. If so, general development

suffers. Raymond Bonner believes that the mayhem in Rwanda was not simply an 

eruption of long-simmering ethnic hatred between the Hutus and the Tutsis; it was also 

due to bad leaders and poor management. 12 

Another economic indicator is economic output per sector, which is the percentage 

of gross domestic product devoted to agricultural, industrial, and service activities. 

Generally, countries with more than 30 percent of their GDP derived from agriculture are 

still in a “first wave” 13 economy; that is, they are producing agricultural goods primarily 

for the export market and are vitally dependent upon that market (usually the richer 

countries). It is not surprising that many African and Asian countries fall into the first

wave category. 

Because national economic progress tends to be measured by GNP data alone, 

analysts have looked for a better, more comprehensive method that includes not just 

economic but social development as well. In 1990 the UN introduced a new way to 

measure human development, combining life expectancy, educational attainment, and 

income into a composite human development index (HDI). 14 The HDI offers an 

alternative to GNP for measuring socioeconomic progress. It enables people and their

governments to evaluate progress over time and to determine priorities for policy 

formulation. It also permits instructive comparisons of different countries. 

The HDI appears to have a high correlation with a country’s socioeconomic viability. 

According to the Human Development Report, countries with an HDI below 0.5 are 

considered to have a low level of human development, those between 0.5 and 0.8 a

medium level, and those above 0.8 a high level. 15 It is reasonable to conclude that 

countries with an HDI below 0.4 are currently legitimate candidates for socioeconomic

nonviable status. Table 2 lists those countries with an HDI below 0.4, most of which are 

in Africa. 

100 
Table 2 

HDI values for Least Developed Countries (LDC) 

Country HDI Country HDI

Madagascar 0.396 Rwanda 0.274 

Laos 0.393 Uganda 0.272 

Ghana 0.385 Angola 0.271 

India 0.382 Benin 0.261 

Côte d’lvoire 0.382 Malawi 0.260 

Haiti 0.370 Mauritania 0.254 

Zambia 0.354 Mozambique 0.252 

Nigeria 0.348 Central African Republic 0.249 

Zaire 0.341 Ethiopia 0.247 

Comoro Islands 0.331 Bhutan 0.226 

Yemen 0.323 Djibouti 0.226 

Senegal 0.322 Guinea-Bissau 0.224 

Liberia 0.317 Somalia 0.217 

Togo 0.311 Gambia 0.215 

Bangladesh 0.309 Mali 0.214 

Cambodia 0.307 Chad 0.212 

Tanzania 0.306 Niger 0.209 

Nepal 0.289 Sierra Leone 0.209 

Sudan 0.276 Afghanistan 0.208 

Burundi 0.276 Burkina Faso 0.203 

Equatorial Guinea 0.276 Guinea 0.191 

Source: Human Development Report (New York: Oxford University Press,

1994). 

Analysts should evaluate a country’s HDI by observing it over a period of time. 

Trend analysis will provide a better picture of a country’s viability and whether it is or is 

not declining. Figure 4 depicts some examples in HDI performance since 1960. The HDIs

of Somalia, Nepal, and Sierra Leone increased at a snail’s pace while Malaysia’s and the 

world’s HDIs grew at a much higher rate. Such comparative data highlights the 

emergence of nonviable states. 

Socioeconomic viability analysis shouldn’t be considered complete with only a quick 

look at the HDI—a much more thorough look is warranted. Breaking the HDI into its 

components—life expectancy, adult literacy, years of schooling, and GDP per capita—

yields further data on the country’s degree of socioeconomic viability. 16

101 
Source: Human Development Report (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 1994), 105. 

Figure 4. HDI values, 1960-92 

Table 3 depicts the wide disparities between Malaysia, considered to be a third world

industrializing state, and the nonviable states of Sierra Leone, Nepal, and Somalia, where 

many people are so poor they are not assured of their basic needs. 

Table 3 

Human Development Index Components 

Life expectancy at 

birth (years) 

Adult 

literacy rate 

(%) 

Mean years of 

schooling 

Real GDP per 

capita (PPP$) 

 

Country/Group 1992 1992 1992 1991

Nepal 52.7 27.0 2.1 1,130 

Somalia 46.4 27.0 0.3 759 

Sierra Leone 42.4 23.7 0.9 1,020 

Malaysia 70.4 80.0 5.6 7,400 

Industrialized 74.1 97.3 12.2 14,000 

Developing 68.0 80.4 4.8 3,420 

Least 

Developed 

55.8 47.4 2.0 1,170

Source: Human Development Report (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 105. 

An additional measure called purchasing power parity (PPP) is introduced in table 4.

PPP refers to the units of a country’s currency that are required to buy the goods in its 

domestic market that one US dollar would buy in the US market. One can further judge

socioeconomic development by looking at what the government spends on internal

102 
development programs such as education and health. For example, Malaysia spends 5.6 

percent of its GNP on education and has one doctor per 2,708 people. By contrast, 

Mozambique spends virtually nothing on education and averages one doctor per 39,500 

people. 17 

Table 4 

Comparison of Economic Aid Received to GNP in 1990 

(A) (B)

Economic Aid

Received per

capita US$ 

GNP per

capita US$ 

Aid/GNP 

per capita 

Ratio 

(A)/(B) 

Bangladesh 17 184 0.092 

Nepal 20 168 0.119 

Haiti 25 324 0.078 

Rwanda 36 279 0.129 

Sierra Leone 15 146 0.103 

South Asia 6 341 0.018 

Sub-Saharan Africa 37 327 0.113 

Latin America 11 1.618 0.007 

Source: Ruth Leger Sivard. World Military and Social

Expenditures 1993 (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1993), 42-

51. 

The HDI is a good measure for the internal analysis of a country’s socioeconomic 

development. However, when assessing economic viability, analysts must not ignore 

external linkages to the world economy. What are the external vulnerabilities that 

contribute to a country being nonviable or noncompetitive? To address this question, we 

must analyze two areas-trade and aid. 

In the area of trade, analyzing a country’s merchandise exports can indicate the 

degree of competitiveness in the world economy. Merchandise exports are the goods a 

country produces and sells to other countries. The money a country earns from these 

exports helps determine how much it can afford to spend on imports and how much it can 

borrow abroad. Developing countries pay for imports mainly with the money they earn 

by selling exports to industrial countries. 

Manufactured goods can generally be sold at a higher price than primary goods, but 

they are often more complicated and expensive to produce. Nonviable countries such as 

Nepal, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, and Haiti each export less than $300 million of 

merchandise goods annually. Malaysia, with a population about one-tenth that of 

Bangladesh, exports almost 16 times as much. 18 South Africa, with an economy

equivalent to that of Massachusetts, accounted for more merchandise exports ($18,454 

million) than 33 of the 35 remaining sub-Saharan countries combined. Since 

economically nonviable countries are primarily single-commodity producers and 

exporters (such as the small island of Nauru), they must import primary goods and energy 

103 
to sustain the population. But if they earn little from exports, what then is the source of 

their operating funds? 

One characteristic of economically nonviable countries is that they don’t have 

surplus capital with which to purchase imported goods such as food and energy. The only 

way they can survive is to borrow money and depend on aid, as is the case with

Bangladesh. In the 1960s and 1970s, many developing countries were able to import 

more than they exported because they borrowed money from overseas banks, 

international institutions, and the governments of industrialized countries. To repay the 

principal and interest on those loans, most of these developing countries had to cut

spending on imports in the 1980s, even though they were earning more from their 

exports. By 1986, developing countries were spending about 20 cents of every dollar 

earned from exports to payoff old debts. (In 1970, it was 10 cents; developing countries 

could not borrow as much in the 1980s because interest rates were higher and banks were 

less willing to make additional loans). 19 

Because borrowing had become more difficult and more expensive, many least 

developed countries (LDC) became even more dependent on aid. An economically 

nonviable country must receive external aid to survive. This aid originates from several 

sources, including international organizations, individual donor countries, and 

nongovernmental organizations. In analyzing aid dependency, comparing economic aid 

received per capita to GNP per capita proves to be highly revealing. 

Table 4 reveals that extremely poor countries are highly dependent on aid for their 

survival. We see that particularly in sub-Saharan Africa: for every $100 produced by the 

economies, approximately $11 is received in aid. Not surprisingly, that region contains 

many nonviable states. 20 

Up to this point, we have examined several characteristics that exhibit a degree of

socioeconomic viability. We have seen that many nonviable countries have in common 

the following characteristics: 

1. Greater than 30 percent of GDP derived from agriculture 

2. HDI below 0.4 

3. Life expectancy at birth around 40-55 years 

4. Adult literacy rate below 30 percent 

5. Mean years of schooling usually below three 

6. Real GDP per capita generally well below $1,200 (PPP$) 

7. Merchandise exports well below $1 billion annually 

Socioeconomic characteristics and their accompanying statistics can tell us only part of 

the story of socioeconomic viability, but they constitute an important and measurable

part. They can serve as guidelines, but many aspects of economic and social development

cannot be measured by statistics. Examples are the attitudes and feelings of people, their 

cohesiveness, their industriousness and ability to innovate, their values and ideas, their 

social and political systems, their history and culture, and the quality of their leadership. 

Military viability 

Another important measure of viability is the military dimension. What constitutes 

military nonviability? A state is militarily viable if it has the capability of “maintaining 

domestic order and at least the capacity to assert its sovereignty vis-à-vis regional 

challengers to the point of discouraging an ill-conceived external military threat to the

104 
state.” 21 If these criteria were applied to the world today, there would be arguably many 

socioeconomically viable states that could be judged militarily nonviable. A recent 

example is the country of Kuwait in 1990. Its flat, almost featureless landscape conceals 

huge oil and gas reserves, making Kuwait the world’s first ranked oil-rich state. 

Dependent on oil for over 80 percent of its export earnings, Kuwait ranks 51st in the 

world in GNP per capita and 64th in HDI. However, it failed to deter an external military

threat when its 11,000-strong, partly volunteer army was easily overrun by vastly 

superior Iraqi forces in August 1990. Kuwait has become militarily more viable since its 

externally engineered liberation, having signed defense pacts with the US, the UK, 

France, and Russia. Kuwait is now rearming rapidly with weapons purchased from major

Western suppliers. 

Another country failing to meet the test of military viability that resulted in conflict 

was Cuba. Under Jose Miguel Gomez, Cuba prospered economically from 1909 to 1925 

due to US investment in tourism, gambling, and sugar. From 1925 to 1956, two military 

dictators, first Gerardo Machado and then Fulgencio Batista, were unable to suppress 

guerrilla activities and maintain domestic order. This situation led to Fidel Castro’s rise to

power in 1959. Castro declared Cuba a Marxist Leninist state and formed political,

economic, and military linkages with the Soviet Union. Cuba had been militarily 

nonviable before these linkages were established, and its military nonviability was a key 

contributor to the US-Soviet confrontation that could have resulted in nuclear war. Now, 

with the end of the cold war, Russia continues to weaken its ties with Cuba—and Cuba is 

becoming increasingly nonviable economically and militarily. More conflict could be on

the horizon for Cuba. 

Many of today’s conflicts are occurring in third world countries that are militarily 

nonviable. Chad, Rwanda, Liberia, Angola, and Mozambique, for example, have failed to 

assert their sovereignties vis-a-vis regionally abetted internal challengers. And many 

countries’ civil wars can be traced to their inability to thwart external interference-and

once the wars were underway, anarchy followed. Hundreds of thousands have starved to 

death; others have been murdered. Still others have left their homes for refugee camps in

neighboring countries, thereby destabilizing entire regions. 

Political viability 

Political viability is another dimension of the concept. Whereas much of economic

and military viability can be measured objectively (many economists have developed

computer models or projections to measure economic development), political viability is

difficult to quantify in many third world countries. However, the inability to build a 

viable economy closely parallels a poorly developed political apparatus. Haiti, Rwanda, 

and Yugoslavia are prime examples of countries in which political instability and poor

management have led to their disintegration. But precisely what is it that constitutes 

political nonviability? 

According to widely accepted convention, a state must have these four attributes to 

be a state: (1) territory, with clear boundaries; (2) a population; (3) a government, not 

answerable to outside authorities, with control over the territory and the population; and 

(4) sovereignty, or recognition by other states as a legally equal player in the global 

environment. 22 The latter two characteristics are closely related to Magyar’s description 

of political viability: “the ability to gain international recognition but also to demonstrate

105 
the progressive development of institutions responsive to the reasonable expectations of

its citizens for social and economic peace, progress and justice.” 23 There are, of course,

many current examples of governments failing to gain international recognition or

legitimacy and not being responsive to its citizens. Since the death of Tito in 1980, 

political instability in the former Yugoslavia has led to greatly mismanaged economic 

and social reforms. Unable to settle political issues that cut across religious and ethnic 

lines, the former Yugoslavia fractured into five republics, each vying for autonomy. 

Political nonviability rendered the Yugoslavian government unable to provide social and 

economic peace and justice. The result has been civil war, economic collapse, externally

imposed sanctions, and ethnic cleansing. 

Another example of a politically nonviable country is Zaire, a classic case where the

leadership has not been able to translate its substantial advantages into sufficient 

socioeconomic development. Located in Central Africa, Zaire is one of the continent’s 

largest countries. Its population comprises approximately 40 million people. With its 

huge mineral, agricultural, and energy resources, Zaire should be rich. Instead, political

instability and 25 years of mismanagement have reduced it to one of the world’s poorest 

states. From 1990 to 1993, real GDP declined by an average of 8 percent a year; in 1993, 

it declined by more than 12 percent. Copper and cobalt output has collapsed since 1990, 

and diamond smuggling is booming. Zaire has oil reserves, and its hydro potential could 

supply much of Africa if fully exploited. Instead, lack of maintenance has shut down 

many existing power turbines and forced power cuts in most urban areas. Despite rich 

soils and the fact that 80 percent of its people are involved in fanning, Zaire is not selfsufficient in food. Political crises and economic collapse have exacerbated Zaire’s longstanding problems of corruption and human rights abuses. Politically linked “death 

squads” are prevalent, as is ethnic violence. President Sese Seko Mobutu, under 

international as well as internal pressure to resign, has lost the support of his once-closest 

allies-Belgium, France, the US, and the European Union (EU). Most countries have 

stopped all except humanitarian aid. Clearly, Zaire’s managerial incompetence is to 

blame for its nonviable status in the international arena. 

Politically nonviable countries are characterized by improperly constructed 

governments that are unable to settle political issues requiring wide domestic legitimacy. 

A strong argument can be made, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, that the major causes 

for disintegration can be traced to incapable governments, a lack of managerial talent, 

and political corruption. Since the independence era, countless deaths in Africa have been 

a direct result of governmental ineptitude and mismanagement. Despite having inherited 

economic and administrative infrastructures from colonial powers, and despite having 

access to modern technology, information, education, investment capital, and

international markets, many countries have declined (e.g., Liberia, Ethiopia, Somalia, and 

Zaire). These governments are unable to conduct international relations effectively or to 

be responsive to their citizens. Even some economically and militarily viable countries

may be doomed to disintegration because of poorly constructed governments. 

Potential Consequences of Nonviable States 

We have elaborated the socioeconomic, military, and political dimensions of

nonviability separately to help conceptualize this phenomenon. In reality, however, these 

106 
three dimensions are closely intertwined, and the so-called “collapsed states” (such as 

Haiti, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Comoro Islands, and Equatorial Guinea) exhibit 

nonviability in all three dimensions. As mentioned in the introduction, 65 of the 79 

countries involved in major conflicts and political violence are in the developing world. 

Many of them may be judged to experience some or all dimensions of nonviability. These 

conflicts have taken the lives of four to six million people in the last decade, and have 

caused millions of others to flee across their borders to avoid repression and death. The

major refugee-generating countries of the past decade were clearly nonviable: 

Afghanistan (4.3 million), former Yugoslavia (1.8 million), and Mozambique (1.7

million). 24 

These conflicts, despite having gained worldwide media attention at times, have had 

minimal effect on the US and the world. However, we must realize that these collapsed

countries have had populations of generally less than 10 million people and have had 

minimal external linkages to the international system. As we move rapidly towards the 

twenty-first century, more and more nonviable countries may fail. Many of these 

countries may have substantially greater population numbers (Zaire, Bangladesh, and 

Nigeria, for example). And since the global population increases by 93 million each year, 

the problems facing these politically unstable countries will intensify: “Even states with a

recent history of stability such as Algeria are tottering toward disintegration.” 25 

The proliferation of nonviable states could have cascading and catastrophic effects 

on the international system in the twenty-first century. Major challenges to human 

security, though originating within nonviable countries, will emanate beyond national 

frontiers. Millions of people will migrate to other countries in search of survival (Haitian 

refugees are a recent example). The rapid rate of population growth-coupled with a lack

of development opportunities-will continue to overcrowd the planet, adding to the 

enormous pressures that already exist on diminishing nonrenewable resources. Ethnic 

tensions will spill over national boundaries. International terrorism, crime, and drug 

trafficking could be major spin-offs. Clearly, it will not be possible for the community of

nations to achieve any of its major goals (peace, environmental protection, fertility

reduction, social integration) unless it seriously addresses the problem of nonviability. 

Conclusion 

There are no easy solutions to the nonviability problem. If nonviable countries are to 

survive and prosper, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, those governments must make

the necessary reforms to become more viable. They must be able to provide internal and

external security to their people. They must also be able to build infrastructures that 

promote socioeconomic development and sustainability. Finally, they must find a way to 

instill managerial competency, which nonviable states so badly lack. With the help of 

developed countries, there is still a sliver of hope left for these countries. 

Developing countries have tended in the past to argue that almost all their economic 

problems spring from an inequitable international order. There certainly are many 

changes needed in global economic affairs-including freer flows of trade, technology, 

capital and labor-but developing countries now recognize that no amount of external 

assistance can ever substitute for the fundamental reforms needed in their domestic 

economies. 26 

107 
Possibly the brightest hope for nonviable states is to become more viable by 

“sublimating their nationalistic political aspirations and to acknowledge the need for 

pooling their individual economic resources in the interest of the collective community.”

27 Most nonviable states lack all or some of the necessary political, military, and

economic ingredients to become competitive in the global economy, effective in 

international relations, and competent to provide necessary services to the people. 

Magyar, a proponent of “confederal integration” for Africa, argues: 

By forming greater regional-based economic units, they would benefit by the factor of

economies of scale, specialization, maximum use of infrastructure (ports. roads, airports. 

energy, etc.), trade, joint financial institutions, common currency, aid, development plans

and strategies, industrial decentralization, attraction of foreign investments, and above all,

the greater ability to bargain for the sale of their primary products.

28 

He goes on to say that these regional entities, specifically in Africa, could be 

managerially viable if designed properly, Magyar believes we can assist by first being 

prepared to accept possible changes in Africa’s present borders, “The process of national 

disintegration may sweep the continent, and our natural tendency will be to arrest this 

process. We should rather prepare to accept this development.” 29 After the 

disintegration, Magyar believes we can assist in reintegrating Africa’s fragments into four

or five viable regional economic units. 

Another proponent of the confederation concept is Kenichi Ohmae, In his article, 

“The Emergence of Regional States,” Ohmae states that “the nation state has become an 

unnatural, even dysfunctional unit for organizing human activity and managing economic 

endeavor in a borderless world.” 30 He believes that in today’s borderless world there are 

natural economic zones, and what matters is that each possesses, in one or another 

combination, the key ingredients for successful participation in the global economy. 

Professor Mike Faber, director of the Institute of Development Studies at the 

University of Sussex, offers a federation approach as a possible scenario for nonviable 

states. In theory, he argues “federal structures are able to provide many of the advantages 

of a larger economic unit, if factors of production, including labor, are allowed to flow 

freely within the component parts of the federation.” In practice, however, he believes 

that political strains will cause the federal structures to come apart as they did at the end 

of the colonial era. 31 

The proliferation of nonviable states, and the conflicts resulting from their 

nonviability in the international system, will present enormous challenges to the US and

the world. However, the US must resist the temptation to become engaged in conflicts 

involving nonviable states, if US involvement cannot be avoided, we must be prepared 

for these types of conflicts, which means establishing entirely different doctrine, force 

structures, and training from that which we have grown accustomed to during the cold

war, Nonviability will be at the root of many conflicts in the twenty-first century: we 

must learn to recognize it and deal with it. 

Notes 

1

 Michael T. Klare, ‘The New Challenges to Global Security,” Current History 92, 

no. 573 (April 1993): 155. 

108 
Notes 

2

 Human Development Report (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 47. 

3

 Kathie Klarreich, “Haitians’ Hooray Fades as Troubles Drag On,” Christian 

Science Monitor, 13 January 1995, 7. 

4

 Karl P. Magyar, “Dealing with the Failures of Democracy,” Washington Times, 16 

August 1994. 

5

 World Reference Atlas (London: Dorling Kindersley, 1994), 14. 

6

 G. R Berridge, International Politics: States, Power, and Conflict Since 1945, 2d ed. 

(New York: Harvester Wheatshelf, 1992), 20. Both the United Nations and the British 

Commonwealth define a microstate as “a state with under one million inhabitants,” 

though evidently the real hallmark of a microstate is the absence of anything other than a 

token defense force. 

7

 Shridath Ramphal, “Small is Beautiful but vulnerable,” The Round Table no. 292

(1984): 368. 

8

 Karl P. Magyar, ‘The Emerging Post-Cold-War International Order and Changing 

Conflict Environment,” in Karl P. Magyar, ed., Challenge and Response: Anticipating US 

Military Security Concerns (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1994), 10. 

9

 Ibid. 

10 Ibid. 

11 Michael E. Porter, Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press,

1990), 6. 

12 Raymond Bonner, “Rwanda Now Faces Painful Ordeal of Rebirth,” New York 

Times, 29 December 1994. 

13 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 

1993). First wave connotes an agrarian society. 

14 Human Development Report, 91. The HDI sets a minimum and a maximum for 

each dimension and then shows where each country stands in relation to these scalesexpressed as a value between 0 and 1. So, since the minimum adult literacy rate is 0

percent and the maximum is 100 percent, the literacy component of knowledge for a 

country where the literacy rate is 75 percent would be 0.75. Similarly, the minimum for

life expectancy is 25 years and the maximum is 85 years, so the longevity component for

a country where life expectancy is 55 years is 0.5. For income the minimum is $200 and 

the maximum is $40,000 PPP (purchasing power parity: the units of a country’s currency 

required to buy the goods in its domestic market that one US dollar would buy in the US 

market). Income above the average world income is adjusted using a progressively higher 

discount rate. The scores for the three dimensions are then averaged in an overall index. 

15 Ibid., 92. 

16 Ibid. GDP per capita in international dollars is converted at purchasing power 

parity. 

17 Human Development Report, 129-30. 

18 The Development Data Book & Teaching Guide, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: The 

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 1988), 12-15. 

Bangladesh, with a population of 119 million, exported $880 million in merchandise 

goods in 1986. Malaysia, with a population of 18.8 million, exported $13,874 million in 

1986. 

109 
Notes 

19 Ibid., 11. 

20 Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1993 (Washington. 

D.C.: World Priorities, 1993), 42-51. Figures are from 1990 or latest year available. 

Economic aid received includes estimated receipts per capita of official loans and grants

made to promote economic development. Military supporting assistance is excluded from 

these figures insofar as it is possible to do so. There is, however, a gray area of quasimilitary transactions which may appear in some national totals. 

21 Karl P. Magyar, “Managing Africa: The Strategy of Confederal Integration” 

(Unpublished paper, University of Durban-Westville, South Africa, 1985), 24. 

22 Barry B. Hughes, Continuity and Change in World Politics, 2d ed. (Englewood 

Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1994): 64. 

23 Magyar, “Managing Africa,” 24. 

24 Human Development Report, 47. 

25 Youssef M. Ibrahim, “Algeria is Edging Toward Breakup.” New York Times, 4 

April 1994. 

26 Human Development Report, 61. 

27 Magyar, “Managing Africa,” 29. 

28 Ibid., 30. 

29 Karl P. Magyar, “Sub-Saharan Africa: Political Marginalization and Strategic

Realignment,” in U.S. Foreign Policy in Transition, eds. James E. Winkates, J. Richard 

Walsh, and Joseph M. Scolnick, Jr. (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1994), 258. 

30 Kenichi Ohmae, “The Emergence of Regional States,” vital Speeches of the Day 

58, no. 16 (June 1992): 487. 

31 Mike Faber, “Island Micro States: Problems of viability,” The Round Table no. 

292 (1984): 375. 

110 
9 

When the Water Runs Out 

Jan Kinner 

By the end of the 19905, water problems in the Middle East will lead either to an

unprecedented degree of cooperation, or a combustible level of conflict. 

—Sandra Postel 

Oil has been a catalyst for conflict around the globe, from court battles over 

environmental damage to Alaskan shorelines to the US-led coalition war against Iraq. Yet

for all its influence upon humanity in recent years, oil cannot compare with the impact of 

one of our most vital resources: water. Throughout time, water has been vital to the 

development and survival of civilizations. The first great civilizations arose in the valleys 

of the great rivers: the Nile Valley of Egypt, the Indus Valley of Pakistan, the Huang He

Valley of China, and the Tigris-Euphrates Valley of ancient Mesopotamia. Fresh water is 

a prerequisite to human existence, yet its scarcity is a problem of global proportion. 

Water has been a cause of armed conflict throughout history, and if the world’s 

demographic trends continue, water will become an even greater catalyst for conflict, 

especially in the Middle East. This essay explains the critical nature of the world’s water 

shortages and reveals how these shortages have led, and will continue to lead, to conflict 

in the future. 

The Global Water Problem 

Although more than 70 percent of the earth’s surface is covered by water, precious

little of it is fresh. The total volume of water covering the globe is immense—about 1.41 

billion cubic kilometers (km3

)—but 97 percent of this total volume is salt water, which is 

difficult to use without removing the salt (an expensive and highly energy-consumptive 

process). The remaining 3 percent is fresh water, but less than 1 percent of that amount is 

readily available as surface water (lakes, rivers, and streams) and ground water (aquifers). 

The remainder is inaccessible, being in polar ice caps, glaciers, deep aquifers, and 

the atmosphere. 1

 To put fresh water in perspective, consider this: if the world’s total 

water supply were only 100 liters, the usable supply of fresh water would be only 0.003 

liter, or one-half teaspoon. 2

 

111 
The amount of fresh water available for man’s use at any one time is dependent upon 

the amount of precipitation, the rate of water use, and the quality of the available water. 

Precipitation is the source of all fresh water as it renews or recharges surface and ground 

waters (man’s primary sources of fresh water). Low levels of precipitation threaten many 

countries of the world; at least 80 arid and semiarid countries, with about 40 percent of 

the world’s population, have serious periodic droughts. 3

 On the African continent, the 

worst drought of the century continued in 1993. Many of Africa’s crops were totally 

destroyed, raising concerns that, if the drought continues, mass starvation may become as

common as the world witnessed in Somalia. Precipitation patterns directly affect the 

amount of water available in those areas. 

The second factor affecting the amount of fresh water available is the rate at which 

the water is withdrawn from its source for agricultural, industrial, and domestic uses. 

World water withdrawals have increased more than 35-fold over the past three centuries,

the majority of which have supported the world’s agricultural base. 4

 Approximately 67 

percent of the world’s water supply is used to support agricultural production. 

Agriculture uses 82 percent of the available water in Asia, 40 percent in the United 

States, and 30 percent in Europe. For some countries, the numbers are even more

revealing. In Egypt, more than 98 percent of all water used is for crop production while 

China and India use approximately 90 percent of their water supply to support 

agriculture. 5

 As the world’s population continues to increase, the demand for water to 

support food production will increase as well, thus putting a further strain on fresh water

sources. 

Water is also used extensively by industry. Almost one-quarter of the world’s fresh 

water supply is used to support manufacturing processes, electricity production, and 

mining operations. Manufacturing, like agriculture, uses large quantities of water to 

produce an end item. For example, between 7,000 and 34,000 liters of water are needed 

to produce 1,000 liters of gasoline while 8,000-10,000 liters are needed to produce a

single ton of steel. 6

 The amount of water used for industrial applications varies according 

to each nation’s level of technological development. In Canada, industry accounts for 84 

percent of all water used; in India, it takes a mere 1 percent. 7

 Water is also used 

extensively for cooling in nuclear power plants that produce electricity as well as in the 

extraction of ores and minerals in mining operations. Industrial development therefore 

impacts the amount of water available for other uses, including agricultural and domestic. 

The remaining 8 percent of the world’s fresh water supply is used for domestic 

purposes. The quantity of water used daily varies with population, standard of living, 

education, customs, and climate. It’s no surprise that industrialized nations use 

significantly more water per person than agrarian nations. Thus, the way water is used 

directly affects the amount of water available; conversely, the amount of water available 

directly impacts a country’s future economic development. 

The third factor affecting the amount of fresh water available is water pollution.

Agriculture is the leading source for water pollutants such as sediments, pesticides, and

nutrients, as farmers increase crop yields through the use of fertilizers and pesticides that 

run off into streams or percolate into ground water. 8

 The diversion of water for irrigation 

to support agriculture can also dramatically affect water quality. The Aral Sea, which 

straddles the borders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in west-central Asia, is a case in 

point. In 1960, the Aral was the fourth largest inland body of water in the world. 

112 
However, because of extensive withdrawals for irrigation over the past 30 years, the sea 

has lost 40 percent of its area and 67 percent of its volume. In addition, its salinity is now

four times that of oceans. 9

 Industry is also responsible for polluting surface and ground 

waters. Pollutants are discharged into surface and ground water sources as by-products of 

manufacturing processes or from the leaching of pollutants buried in solid-waste dumps. 

A 1980 study by the World watch Institute revealed that about 70 percent of all heavy

metals in Germany’s Ruhr River came from industrial sources. 10 In Malaysia, many of 

the major rivers were officially declared dead in 1979, the result of industrial pollution. 11

And according to the World watch Institute, “Industrial discharges, combined with 

untreated sewage and agricultural runoff, have contaminated most rivers, lakes, and 

seashores in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.” 12 Inadequately treated sewage from

domestic sources also introduces large quantities of pollutants into surface waters. In 

developing nations, more than 95 percent of urban sewage is discharged into surface

waters without treatment. An example is Bangkok, Thailand, which relies on four rivers 

and a series of canals to dispose of an estimated 10,000 metric tons of raw sewage and 

municipal waste every day—without being treated. 13 A survey by the World Health

Organization found that only 35 percent of the populations of all the developing nations 

had access to relatively safe drinking water and only 32 percent had proper sanitation. 14

Given these factors, the issue of water quality has considerable bearing on water supply. 

A source of fresh water may be readily available and able to provide reliable amounts of 

water, but when much of it is polluted, it has the same impact as if it were not available. 

The amount of fresh water ultimately available for man’s use is dependent upon the 

amount of precipitation, the rate of water use, and the extent of water pollution. Arid and 

semiarid countries, with growing populations and hoping to develop agricultural or 

industrial bases, will often find themselves lacking critically needed water. Industrialized 

and developing nations, on the other hand, often have to contend with pollution, which 

severely restricts the amount of water available for agricultural and domestic uses. The 

amount of fresh water is limited, and man’s use of this resource constrains it further. 

Water Scarcity 

Water shortages occur where the demand for water exceeds the available water 

supply. Water use is increasing at dramatic rates, the result of population growth and 

industrial/agricultural development. According to the Global 2000 study, increases of at 

least 200-300 percent in world water withdrawals are expected over the 1975-2000 

period. 15 At the global level, the average annual use (for all uses) is currently 650m3

 (650 

cubic meters) per person per day, with annual average per capita water use varying 

widely by region: 1, 700m3 in North and Central America, 725m3 in Europe, 525m3 in 

Asia, 475m3

 in South America, and 245m3 in Africa. 16 The amount available per capita 

depends in part upon a country’s population. An increasing population, in other words, 

acts as a “thumb screw” on the amount of water available for other uses. Malin 

Falkenmark, a noted Swedish hydrologist, estimated that the needs of the temperate zone 

industrialized regions can be met by between 150m3

 and 900m3 per person per year. 

Irrigated semiarid regions, by contrast, need about five times as much—between 700m3

and 3,500m3

 per person per year. And semiarid industrialized regions, such as the lower 

113 
Colorado basin of the United States, need even more—2,700m3

 to 7,000m3 per person 

per year. 17 

Falkenmark also defined what she called “water competition intervals.” Countries

having 10,000m3

 of water available per person per year (for all uses) or more have what 

she called “limited water problems” (quality and dry-season problems); those with 

1,670m3

-10,000m3 of water have “water stress” (general problems); those with 1,000m3-

1,670m3

 suffer from “chronic water scarcity”; and those with fewer than 500m3 of water 

per person per year are beyond what Falkenmark calls the “water barrier.” 18 When a

country passes the “water barrier,” the need for water exceeds the current supply. In other

words, any economic development that would increase the standard of living of the 

population becomes almost impossible to accomplish. 

Falkenmark estimated that 10 African countries, with a combined population of 1.1 

billion, will be water stressed by the year 2025, with another 15 countries beyond the 

“water barrier.” 19 Robin Clarke, another hydrologist, expanded on Falkenmark’s work. 

In his global study, he excluded waters entering the country and all nonrenewable water

sources (e.g., deep water aquifers, which can take thousands of years to renew) because 

such water was not controllable by the host country. For example, a country upstream 

could dam a river, stopping or slowing its flow. Or an upstream country could utilize a

larger share of a river’s flow for irrigation. Additionally, an adjacent country could

overdraft an aquifer, causing the water table to drop on the other side of the border. 

Clarke’s work paints a bleak picture for many parts of the world. Israel’s total 

internal water supply, according to Clarke, can only provide 370m3

 of water per person 

annually. This is 130m3

 below Falkenmark’s “water barrier” and 280m3 below the 

world’s average. Egypt’s total internal water supply can provide only 40m3

 of water per 

person annually, well below Falkenmark’s “water barrier” and 610m3

 below the world’s

average. When Egypt’s exogenous sources (e.g., Nile River) are included, Egypt extracts 

and uses 97 percent of .its total water supply to meet its agricultural, industrial, and 

domestic needs. If the Nile’s waters were dammed or significantly reduced by upstream

countries like Sudan or Ethiopia, Egypt’s agricultural base, which uses the greatest share 

of Egypt’s total water supply, would collapse. Would Egypt, or other nations dependent 

upon water originating outside their countries, allow such a scenario to occur? Or would 

the Egyptian government take some action to persuade the upstream countries to change 

their behavior? It is apparent that water shortages can lead to conflict among nations. 

Water as a Source of Conflict 

Water has been called the “fugitive” resource because it moves. As such, water has 

been the source of numerous conflicts throughout history. Where a river has been used as 

a boundary between nations, the shifting of the water has caused conflict over lines of 

political demarcation. Examples of boundary disputes include India and Bangladesh over 

the Ganges River, Mexico and the United States over the Rio Grande, and 

Czechoslovakia and Hungary over the Danube. The latest conflict involving a border 

defined by water involved the Shatt al Arab, which separates Iraq from Iran. In 

September 1980, Saddam Hussein claimed Iraqi sovereignty over the entire Shatt al Arab 

and initiated the Iran-Iraq War. Hostilities have not overcome the problems caused by the 

elusiveness of water, however. 

114 
Where water flows across political boundaries, as it does in 246 out of the 253 river 

basins in the world, conflict often results when significant changes occur in either quality 

or quantity. 20 Natural upstream erosion in one nation may endanger downstream ports, 

channels, and reservoirs in another nation. Irrigation projects upstream may deprive a 

downstream nation of adequate supplies of water for established domestic, industrial, and 

agricultural uses. Pollution from upstream users may cause downstream nations to install 

expensive purification works to prevent danger to health and industry, and to allow for

future development. An example of this occurred in 1988 when the Polish government

asked Czechoslovakia to pay damages for contamination of the Polish stretch of the Odra 

River caused by a heavy fuel leak in November 1986. 21 Other countries currently

embroiled in conflict over the pollution of multinational river basins include 

Czechoslovakia and Germany over industrial pollution in the Elbe; Hungary and 

Romania over industrial pollution in the Szamos; Bolivia and Chile over salinization of 

the Lauca; Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan over siltation of the Nile; and Mexico and the 

United States over agrochemical pollution of both the Rio Grande and the Colorado. 22 

Downstream nations, dependent upon the flow of water, often find themselves in a

weak position to negotiate formal agreements whereas nations controlling those water 

resources can wield formidable power. This precarious worldwide situation is 

intensifying as limited resources come under increasing pressure from growing 

populations, particularly in arid and semiarid downstream countries that are already short 

of water. The situation is exacerbated when the upstream country is facing its own water 

shortages. When upstream water resources have become increasingly scarce, nations have 

not hesitated to take action to ensure their own supply, even at the expense of

downstream nations. In regard to the growing demand on fresh water supplies, Dr

Mostafa Tolba, executive director of the United Nation’s environment program, said, 

“National and global security are at stake...shortages of fresh water worsen economic and 

political differences among nations and contribute to increasingly unstable perceptions of 

national security.” 23 Nowhere is this more vivid than in the Middle East, where disputes 

over water are shaping the political landscapes and economic futures of its countries. 

Middle East Water Problems 

The Middle East water problem has become a crisis because of world demographic 

trends and a scarcity of water. Falkenmark says the crisis is so acute that “in the near

future, water, not oil, will be the most sought after resource of the Middle East.” 24 The 

Middle East is a microcosm of the world, and the root causes of conflict over Middle East

water are only extreme examples of the problems facing the rest of the world: water 

scarcity caused by low levels of precipitation, the multinational nature of water supplies, 

water quality problems, and expanding populations that require and demand more water. 

Population growth rates throughout the Middle East are currently among the highest

in the world. In 1983, the World Bank reported that the population of the Middle East 

was expected to grow from 217.4 million people to 337 million by the year 2000. 25

These numbers prompted Israeli prime minister Shimon Peres to write: 

Rapid growth in population within the Region is not matched with a concomitant growth

in food production, so poverty is worsening. Available water shrinks each year, and the

quality of that water is compromised from overuse that results in salinization and

115 
desertification. All these factors have an adverse affect on public health and lower the

standard of living. Thus, we get sucked into a vicious cycle; the worse the poverty, the

more the population grows, the worse the water shortage becomes, the worse the poverty 

gets, the more the population grows. 

26 

Demographic data analysis reveals that the populations of water-hungry Iraq, Syria, 

Jordan, and Saudi Arabia are growing between 3 and 4 percent per year. This growth rate 

will result in a doubling of their populations in less than 20 years. Turkey’s, Lebanon’s, 

and Kuwait’s population growth rates are around 2 percent per year while Israel’s rate is 

approximately 1.5 percent. (Israel’s growth rate does not include an expected 1 to 2 

million immigrants from the former Soviet Union.) 27 Using the lowest available 

estimates, per capita consumption rates could increase by 20 percent, putting almost all 

Middle East countries beyond Falkenmark’s “water barrier.” Detailed demographic data 

also shows that 67 percent of all Arabic-speaking people rely upon transboundary water 

from non-Arabic-speaking areas, and that approximately 24 percent of all Arab people

live in areas with no year-round surface streams. 28 Thus, the problem of scarcity versus 

increasing need is compounded by the international nature of existing supplies within the 

Middle East. The major river basins—Tigris, Euphrates, Jordan, Orontes, and Nile—do 

not respect national boundaries. And a sixth basin, the Litani, though entirely within 

Lebanon, is a focus of interest in other nations. Over 50 percent of the Middle East’s 

population is dependent upon waters originating from these six river basins. 29 

In addition to being in short supply, much of the Middle East’s fresh water is now

polluted. This pollution is a result of the “increasing discharge of untreated or 

inadequately treated domestic wastes, emissions from agroprocessing plants and 

unregulated or misinformed agrochemical use, and hazardous and toxic industrial wastes 

into water bodies serving as a source of supply for other users,” says a representative 

from the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. 30 Also, overdrafting 

in many of the aquifers (in support of agriculture) has resulted in saline intrusions from 

the seas, which renders the water nonpotable. These and other problems in water quality 

have increased, thus magnifying the water crisis which, in the past, has been punctuated 

by armed conflict between Middle East nations—and water supply remains a source of 

increasing tension today. 

Potential Conflicts 

Today, the Jordan River basin presents the Middle East’s most intractable water 

management problem. From its headwaters in Syria and Lebanon, the Jordan River flows 

south into the Sea of Galilee and then to the Dead Sea between the West Bank and 

Jordan. Users of this 360-kilometer basin include Israel (including the occupied West 

Bank), Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Its principal tributary, the Yarmuk River, forms the 

border between Syria and Jordan and, further downstream, between Israel and Jordan. 

While the Jordan River basin is shared by four riparian nations that have a deep and longstanding enmity towards one another, most of the problems have emerged between Israel 

and Jordan. Both nations depend upon the Jordan River for fresh water and for

replenishment of their aquifers. Thomas Naff and Ruth Matson, noted Middle East 

correspondents, contend that an increase in water-related Arab-Israeli hostility was one of 

the major factors that led to the 1967 war. 31 John K. Cooley, also a noted Middle East 

116 
correspondent, asserts that Israel went to war “partly because the Arabs had 

unsuccessfully tried to divert into Arab rivers Jordan River headwaters that fed Israel.” 32 

The aftermath of the 1967 war had a direct impact on the management of the Jordan 

River basin. Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights prevented the Arab nations from 

diverting the headwaters of the Jordan, and Israeli occupation of the West Bank secured 

the Yarqon-Taninim aquifer, the source of between 20 and 40 percent of Israel’s

sustainable water supply. Israel has severely restricted the amount of water West Bank 

Arabs can pump from this aquifer, even as it continues to overdraft the aquifer for its own 

use. The measures taken to restrict pumping on the West Bank have been described by 

Israel as defensive in nature to protect its coastal wells and the integrity of the water 

system as a whole. 

The Israelis argue that unchecked Palestinian water development and pollution in the 

hills west of the watershed line will endanger both the quality of the water and the

quantity of the water sources on which the heavily populated coastal plain of Israel relies. 

But these restrictions on water access have angered the West Bank Palestinian

population. The agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization 

(PLO) may require that Israel return some of the territory it has occupied since the 1967 

Arab-Israeli war. Since many of Israel’s prime water sources are located in the disputed

areas, this would mean relinquishing control over much of its fresh water supply. A study 

by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University concluded that Israel

cannot afford to give up captured water sources unless its future supplies are guaranteed. 

Joseph Alpher, director of the center, wrote: “Water is essential. It doesn’t mean you 

can’t withdraw, but you can’t withdraw without making certain that Israel’s supply is 

secure and that there is guaranteed access to the water resources.” 33 With no water

guarantees currently forthcoming, water rights in this area will remain a source of tension 

between the PLO and Israel. 

Another portion of Israel’s water supply comes from the water catchment area for the 

Sea of Galilee. Located in the Golan Heights, this formerly Syrian area was captured by 

the Israelis in the 1967 war and annexed in 1981. The Sea of Galilee, fed by the Jordan 

River, is Israel’s largest surface water reservoir. It provides water for a pipeline and a 

canal, which transport it from the north towards the Gaza Strip. However, overpumping 

the Sea of Galilee has created salinity problems in the reservoir. To counter a potential 

water crisis, Israel has developed plans to build a canal that would pump water from the 

Mediterranean to the Dead Sea, and to construct reservoirs above the Jordan Valley. 

These plans have led to a conflict with Jordan, which fears that pumping water into the 

Dead Sea will waterlog areas of irrigated agriculture in the East Ghor Canal region. 

Control of the Golan Heights has given Israel access to the Yarmuk River, one of the 

last major undeveloped tributaries in the basin. Entering the Jordan River from the east, 

the Yarmuk is of great importance not only to Syria, its source, but also to Israel and 

Jordan. Jordan has already overreached its renewable supply, and water rationing is in 

effect there. This situation is expected to worsen as Jordan’s population doubles in size 

over the next 20 years. And Jordan depends on irrigated agriculture for much of its 

income as its underground aquifers, which have been substantial sources of water, are 

depleting rapidly. Jordan views increased use of the Yarmuk as vital to its interests, and 

wants to build, with Syria, a dam on the Yarmuk. But Israel has managed to block actual 

117 
construction, at least temporarily, claiming that the dam would reduce flows into the 

Jordan River. 

Israel’s third source of water is the coastal aquifer, which borders the Mediterranean.

Years of overdrafting have caused extensive saline intrusion in parts of this aquifer. 

Additionally, approximately 25 percent of the aquifer is polluted. In fact, water officials 

in Israel predict that a fifth of all wells may need to be closed over the next few years—

an action which will increase Israel’s dependence on the West Bank’s Yarqon-Taninim

aquifer. 34 And Cooley wrote—in 1984—that “present aquifers can scarcely meet the 

country’s current needs or greater levels of consumption much beyond 1990. Another 

major water source will be needed.” 35 Israel’s need for water has become known as the 

“hydraulic imperative,” which has been interpreted as the need for Israel to acquire—by 

military means if necessary—a larger water supply to ensure the continued growth of

Israel’s economy and population. 36 Likely losers in such a gambit include Syria, Jordan,

and Lebanon. 

Another river basin which has been a source of conflict in the Middle East is the 

Tigris-Euphrates. From headwaters located in Turkey, the Tigris and Euphrates rivers

flow through Syria into Iraq, where they join to form the Shatt al Arab. Although Turkey, 

Syria, and Iraq have engaged in intermittent discussions over the waters of these rivers

for decades, they have been unable to agree on a permanent tripartite treaty. Iii fact, the 

construction of dams in the early 1970s by Turkey and Syria precipitated a major SyriaIraq crisis that brought the two nations to the brink of war. Iraq, downstream to both 

Turkey and Syria, claimed that Syria had reduced the Euphrates flow by 75 percent, 

endangering the livelihood of Iraqi farmers who use the waters of the Euphrates to 

irrigate their farmland. 37 Syria and Iraq exchanged threats, Turkey indicated a readiness 

to take any action necessary to restore the flow of the Euphrates, and Syria claimed it was 

passing on to Iraq most of the water received from Turkey. 38 The situation was resolved

only when Syria released substantially larger amounts of water to Iraq—a result of

mediation efforts by the Saudis. 

This situation almost repeated itself when Turkey’s massive Ataturk Dam started

operating in 1990, depriving Syria of badly needed water. Instead of attacking Turkey 

directly, however, Syria and Iraq have supported Kurdish guerrilla activities in eastern 

Turkey as a means of pressuring the Turkish government into releasing more water. 39

Turkey, in response, has continually threatened to cut the flow of the Euphrates in an 

attempt to force Syria to curtail its support for Kurdish activities in the southeast Anatolia 

region. 40 

The Ataturk Dam is only one of a series of 22 dams, 25 irrigation systems, and 19 

hydropower stations that Turkey is constructing as part of a massive economic

development project called the Grand Anatolia Project (GAP). When completed, the

GAP will boost Turkey’s hydropower capacity to 7,500 megawatts and double its

irrigated area. Syria and Iraq fear the GAP will reduce the Euphrates flow into Syria by 

35 percent in normal years—substantially more in dry ones—while polluting the river

with irrigation drainage. 41 Iraq, the last downstream country, would also see a reduction, 

and the Iraqi government has continually expressed concerns about Syria’s plans to tap 

more and more of the Euphrates. 

Syria’s population, which will double in the next 18 years, will dramatically impact 

the cities of Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo, each of which is already suffering severe 

118 
water shortages. Syria depends upon the Euphrates for a large part of its energy, and the 

city of Aleppo depends upon Euphrates water for both domestic and agricultural uses. As

the Ataturk Dam starts to fill, water levels below the dam are expected to remain low for

five to eight years while existing tensions between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq are expected

to increase. 

Tensions are also running high in the Nile River basin. The Nile, the world’s longest

river, provides water for nine countries. About 85 percent of the Nile’s flow is generated 

by precipitation in Ethiopia. It flows as the Blue Nile into Sudan before it enters Egypt. 

The remaining 15 percent comes from the White Nile system, which has headwaters in 

Tanzania and which joins the Blue Nile near Khartoum. The last country in line and the

one most dependent upon the waters of the Nile is Egypt, which is already beyond the

“water barrier.” 

Egypt’s water problem is especially serious. The Aswan High Dam, built in the 

1950s, was intended to guarantee a constant source of water even in times of drought. 

However, the water levels behind the Aswan Dam are rapidly declining due in part to 

evaporation and seepage caused primarily by the extended drought that affected the entire 

northeastern region of Africa. Thus, the amount of water available to irrigate cropland is

diminishing as Egypt’s population is rapidly increasing. By the end of the current decade, 

estimates indicate that Egypt’s population will increase from 52 million to 70 million. To 

get more water, the Egyptian government is focusing more of its attention on its southern 

upstream neighbors—Sudan in particular. 

If additional water allocations cannot be gained through diplomatic means, a war 

could erupt between Egypt and Sudan. In 1958, there was a military confrontation when 

Egypt unsuccessfully attempted to reclaim disputed border territory from Sudan. The 

confrontation occurred because of differences over water allocations. An agreement was 

eventually reached in which Egypt was entitled to 55.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of 

water from the Nile each year while Sudan was allocated 18.5 bcm. Ten years later, and 

after completion of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, the situation almost repeated itself 

when the Egyptians claimed that their larger population entitled them to a larger 

allocation of water than Sudan. The Sudanese rejected this, claiming they had first rights 

to the river’s water because of their upper riparian status. Negotiations followed because 

“the positions of both parties were hardened by domestic nationalist politics.” 42 No 

agreement has been reached, and tensions remain high between the two countries. 

In 1990, Egypt’s total water supply from all sources was 63.5 bcm. Unfortunately, 

even “best case” trends show Egypt’s demand rising to 69.4 bcm by the year 2000—

about 9 percent more water than is available now. 43 The situation could worsen 

substantially if Ethiopia begins to dam the Nile’s headwaters—a move that is under 

consideration. In 1990, Egypt was reported to have temporarily blocked an African 

Development Bank loan to Ethiopia in response. Egypt feared that the project would 

reduce downstream supplies. As Egypt’s water security becomes increasingly jeopardized 

by new projects along the Nile, tensions will continue to build. The current secretary 

general of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, while serving as Egypt’s foreign 

minister, made the realities of the water situation in this region crystal clear: “The only

thing which could make Egypt ever go to war again would be an attempt by Ethiopia or 

another power to divert the Nile.” 44 

119 
While the Middle East is an obvious hotspot, there are other places in the world 

where water has been a source of conflict in the past or will be a source of conflict in the 

future. In 1947, the Indus River was used as a line of demarcation between India and 

Pakistan. A year later, the Indian province of East Punjab attempted to claim sovereign 

rights over the water within its territory by stopping the flow into two large canals that 

were the source of irrigation for some Pakistani land. East Punjab’s decision was the 

catalyst that provoked a water dispute between the two countries that almost resulted in 

war. The crisis was resolved 13 years later through ongoing diplomatic efforts when the

two parties signed the Indus Waters Treaty, which established a joint commission and 

provided equitable water allocations to both countries. 

Other conflicts have arisen in the Mekong River basin and in the Ganges River basin. 

In 1992, Thailand angered the downstream countries of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam 

when it announced plans to divert water from the Mekong River near Nong 

Khai/Vientiane to irrigate Thailand’s arid northeast region. The Vietnamese government 

fears that this project will divert enough water from the river to disrupt its flow into the

Mekong Delta in southern Vietnam. A reduction in flow would likely result in increased 

saltwater intrusion—a situation that already threatens the delta’s fertile rice fields. 

Diplomatic efforts to date have failed to provide a solution that is acceptable to all parties

involved. 

The Ganges River basin conflict is between India and Bangladesh. Bangladesh

officials contend that some of India’s upstream activities (e.g., deforestation and the 

dumping of raw sewage into the Ganges River) threaten the fertile delta region where a 

preponderance of Bangladesh’s rice crop is grown. 

As populations in the Middle East and elsewhere continue to grow, water resources

will be stretched to their limits. The result can only be increased conflict over this scarce 

resource. It is clear that riparians are willing to sound the call to arms when their source 

of water is threatened. Any resulting conflict will revolve around efforts to gain control 

of vital water-related assets. 

United States Interests 

Rising populations and increased levels of industrialization in the Middle East are 

placing enormous burdens on the limited water supplies there. As regional tensions 

increase, so will conflicts. Whether such conflicts can be resolved through diplomatic 

means remains to be seen. The closest thing to a negotiated settlement on water rights

was the Johnston Plan for the Jordan River in the 1950s. Working with functional 

experts, Eric Johnston, chairman of the US International Advisory Board of Technical 

Cooperation, was able to get the riparians (Jordan, Israel, Syria, and Lebanon), traditional 

political adversaries, to agree on water allocations for their countries. Unfortunately, the 

plan was never ratified due to the parties’ inability to overcome the political and ethnic 

barriers that divided the region. Despite this, reports indicate that Jordan and Israel are 

today still voluntarily abiding by the quotas set by the Johnston Plan. It is this type of 

“functional diplomacy” which the United States should adopt, especially as national 

military security concerns diminish and environmental and resource security issues move 

to higher importance on our foreign policy agenda. Such functional diplomacy appears to 

be our best bet to quell the brewing conflicts in the region. 

120 
Applied properly, functional diplomacy can lead to mutually beneficial functional 

projects, which help in circumventing conflicts. Projects of this nature create a social and 

economic interdependence between the rivals, making armed conflict contrary to their 

own interests. In practice, functional diplomacy creates teams of functional experts from 

specific problem areas and supplements them with specialists from ancillary areas. The

methodology involves bringing together teams from each of the rival sides. Multilateral 

negotiations led by technical experts produce workable concepts for resolving regional 

problems. The final products of negotiations are well-defined projects designed for

political approval. The US’s role as a world leader, and its expertise in hydrological 

engineering, make it ideally qualified to serve as a trusted neutral party in the Middle 

East or elsewhere. The US can offer expertise and guidance in both planning solutions 

and implementing the agreed-upon solution. This method weaves an increasing degree of 

interdependency between traditional rivals that mirrors the global characteristics of the

1990s and which functions as a foundation for overcoming traditional political hurdles. In 

short, functional diplomacy offers active engagement targeted at the root causes of 

conflict. 

Summary 

The availability of fresh water is limited, and man’s use of this vital resource

constrains it further. As populations continue to grow, there will be increasing 

competition between nations for a larger share of the available water for agricultural,

industrial, and domestic uses. The demands for larger shares of the available water will 

inevitably lead to conflicts. Nowhere is this more true than in the Middle East, which has 

one of the highest population growth rates in the world. There, the need for additional 

sources of water has reached crisis proportions—and ethnic and religious tensions

already exist. Whether this will explode into armed conflict depends upon the willingness

of the nations to seek cooperative regional solutions. The United States’ role could be one 

of facilitator under the moniker of “functional diplomacy.” The one certainty is that water 

is a necessity of life; without it, civilizations die. 

Notes 

1

 World Resources: A Report by the World Resources Institute and the International 

Institute for Environment and Development, 1990-1991 (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 1990), 23. 

2

 Michael Parfait, “Sharing the Wealth of Water,” in “Water: The Promise, and 

Turmoil of North America’s Fresh Water,” in National Geographic 184, no. 5A 

(November 1993): 24. 

3

 World Resources Institute, The 1992 Environmental Almanac (Boston: Houghton 

Mifflin, 1992), 104-6. 

4

 World Resources: A Report by the World Resources Institute and the International 

Institute for Environment and Development, 1992-1993 (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 1992), 160. 

121 
Notes 

5

 Robin Clarke, Water: The International Crisis (London: Earthscan Publications, 

1991), 28. 

6

 Julio A. Barberis, The International Groundwater Resources Law (Rome: Food and 

Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 1986). 

7

 Ibid. 

8

 World Resources, 1992-1993, 168. 

9

 World Resources, 1990-1991, 171. 

10 World Resources, 1992-1993, 168. 

11 Clarke, 25. 

12 Hilary F. French, “Restoring the East European and Soviet Environments,” in 

State of the World 1991, ed. Linda Starke (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1991), 97. 

13 World Resources, 1992-1993, 167-68. 

14 Clarke, 6. 

15 Gerald O. Barney, Global 2000: The Report to the President (Washington, D.C.: 

Seven Locks Press, 1988), 26. 

16 World Resources, 1992-1993, 161. 

17 Malin Falkenmark, “The Massive Water Scarcity Now Threatening Africa—Why 

Isn’t it Being Addressed?” Ambio 18, no. 2 (1989): 31. 

18 Ibid., 115. 

19 Ibid., 113. 

20 Systematic Index of International Water Resources Treaties, Declarations, Acts

and Cases by Basin (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN, 1978), 385. 

21 French, 97. 

22 Robert Mandel, “Sources of International River Basin Disputes,” Conflict 

Quarterly 12, no. 4 (Fall 1992): 52. 

23 Mostafa Tolba, Environment and Conflict (London: Earthscan Publications, 1984), 

quoted in Clarke, 92. 

24 Malin Falkenmark, “Middle East Hydropolitics: Water Scarcity and Conflicts in 

the Middle East,” Ambio 18, no. 6 (1989): 350. 

25 US Army Corps of Engineers, Water in the Sand: A Survey of Middle East Water 

Issues (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), 4. 

26 Shimon Peres, The New Middle East (New York: Random House, 1993), 24. 

27 US Central Intelligence Agency, Atlas of the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1993), 55-63. 

28 John Kolars, “The Course of Water in the Arab Middle East,” American Arab 

Affairs 33 (Summer 1990): 58. 

29 Systematic Index of International Water Resources Treaties, Declarations, Acts

and Cases by Basin, 385. 

30 Barberis, 42. 

31 Thomas Naff and Ruth C. Matson, Water in the Middle East (Boulder, Colo.: 

Westview Press, 1984), 44. 

32 John K. Cooley, “The War Over Water,” Foreign Policy 54 (Spring 1984): 3. 

33 Joseph Alpher, quoted in Nicholas B. Tatro, “Mideast Thirsts for Solution to 

Water Shortage,” Montgomery Advertiser, 12 December 1993, 6F. 

122 
Notes 

34 Sandra Postel, “The Politics of Water,” World Watch 6, no. 4 (July-August 1993): 

25. 

35 Cooley, 26. 

36 David Wishart, “An Economic Approach to Understanding Jordan Valley Water 

Disputes,” Middle East Review 21 (Summer 1989): 45-53. 

37 Ewan Anderson, “Water Conflict in the Middle East—A New Initiative,” Jane’s

Intelligence Review 4, no. 5 (May 1992): 227. 

38 Naff and Matson, 94. 

39 Nicholas B. Tatro, “Mideast Thirsts for Solution to Water Shortage,” Montgomery 

Advertiser, 12 December 1993, 6F. 

40 Angus Hindley, “Battle Lines Drawn for Euphrates,” Middle East Economic

Digest 34, no. 1 (19 January 1990): 5. 

41 US Army Corps of Engineers, 5. 

42 Naff and Matson, 146. 

43 Postel, 29. 

44 Cooley, 6. 

123 
10 

Transnational Air, Water, and Land Degradation Problems 

Michael J. Savana, Jr. 

You are interested, I know, in the prevention of war, not in our theories....Yet I would 

like to dwell a little...on this destructive instinct....We are led to conclude that this instinct

functions in every living being, striving to work its ruin and to reduce life to its primal

state of inert matter. 

—Sigmund Freud 

Letter to Albert Einstein 

Great minds, scholars, and lay people have tried—and they continue to try—to 

understand why people fight, and they have debated the specific causes of war. Beyond 

any normal propensity humans might have for conflict, the prospects for war in some

form, emerging over apparently diminishing quality and quantity of natural resources, 

suffer from a dearth of popular literature. But among those who do study this problem, a 

bitter conflict between optimists and transformationists has emerged. The Resourceful 

Earth by Julian Simon and Herman Kahn offers an optimistic view. 

Global problems due to physical conditions...are always possible, but are likely to be less

pressing in the future than in the past. Environmental, resource, and population stresses 

are diminishing, and with the passage of time will have less influence than now on the 

quality of human life on the planet....Because of increases in knowledge, the Earth’s 

carrying capacity has been increasing through the decades and centuries and millennia to

such an extent that the term carrying capacity has by now no useful meaning.

1

 

By contrast, ample evidence suggests that global patterns of environmental change 

are affecting renewable and nonrenewable resources so that conflicts at varying levels are 

likely to arise either directly or indirectly from those changes. The Global 2000 Report to 

the President in 1980 argued, for example: 

Environmental, resource, and population stresses are intensifying and will increasingly

determine the quality of human life on the planet.... At the same time, the Earth’s 

carrying capacity...is eroding. The trends reflected in the Global 2000 suggest strongly a

progressive degradation and impoverishment of the Earth’s natural resource base. 

2

 

124 
Without question humans will fight over diminishing natural resources. Substantial 

precedent already exists for such occurrences. The archaeological record has described

disputes over water resources when, 5,000 years ago, the Tigris River and Euphrates 

River Valley was used both as a reason for conflict and as a weapon. In one example, the 

two city-states of Umma and Lagash fought a 100-year war over fertile soils. The

contestants either destroyed or diverted the water irrigation systems to effect intended 

results. Current tensions in the same region center around the attempts of Turkey to 

harness the Euphrates to produce electric power and irrigation. 3

 Further evidence might 

easily be gleaned throughout history. 

This chapter explores the prospect for future conflicts resulting from increasing

competition for diminishing air, land, and water resources. For the US military planner, 

this question might become a critical one. Although US forces might not engage directly 

in conflicts over resources, they will most likely contend with nations who are so 

engaged. Viewed previously by many as an ephemeral problem, the United States has for

more than a decade signaled warnings of the potential problems related to resource and 

environmental issues, In 1980 the Global Report to the President, stated that “serious 

stresses involving population, resources, and the environment are clearly visible ahead. 

Despite greater material output, the world’s people will be poorer in many ways than they 

are today.” 4

 Regardless of the view one might take, one must understand the state of the 

global problematique, the interconnected matrix of resource and population problems

which might be the cause of conflict. 5

 

Scarcity and the Resource Paradigm 

This chapter also examines the interrelationships and critical issues revolving around 

what one might consider a trilogy of cause and effect comprised of population pressure, 

resource depletion and degradation, and scarcity. Each of these linkages are causal of and 

affected by each other. This trilogy represents a parasequential, deadly spiral with each

component directly impacting upon the others. 6

 Increasing population densities in a 

region can have a detrimental cascading effect and result in greater resource damage and 

depletion that make these assets more quantitatively and qualitatively scarce. 7

 The

resulting scarcity can mean maldistribution, increased competition, social unrest, 

population migration, and conflict, with the cycle beginning again in another region. This 

observation holds true because air, land, and water resources and their social effects do

not respect the cartographic boundaries human activity imposed upon the landscape and 

because each place where people live is endowed with finite resources. Regardless of the 

sequence of the interplay between the three factors, the result is always greater scarcity

and increased competition, a sure source of conflict. 8

 

Numerous models depict the interrelationships between people and resources. Three 

such models can demonstrate how relative abundance influences populations so that 

adjustments must be made either in the resources themselves or in the density of the

population for the region. In Von Liebig’s model, for example, water, food, space, heat,

energy, and nonrenewable resources (coal and minerals) represent a “resource space.” 

The resource space is the relative “areal” element necessary to sustain that population at 

its present level. When one or a combination of the resources falls below a minimum 

level, someone either must replenish or substitute the resource, or the population must 

125 
change either its consumption rate or size. From this model a fundamental “law of 

minimum” holds that the resource necessary for survival that is in shortest supply limits 

the size of a population. 9

 This law simply means that a population might have ample 

space into which it can expand, but a lack of available resources usually inhibits 

population growth and can even precipitate migration to other regions. 

William B. Wood’s “Provisional Forced Migration Model” offers a broader scope of 

the law of minimum. It captures ethnic/religious/tribal aspects, political instability, 

resource availability, and other elements. 10 This model portrays the push-and-pull 

interplay between elements which cause groups to migrate and illustrates the negative

impact upon the regions into which the migration takes place. This model is particularly 

important because people who have historically fled resource-impoverished areas have 

usually sought less-inhabited regions in which to set up new communities. Finding such 

areas today presents special challenges and therefore offers increased chances for clashes. 

Variations on a model developed by Thomas F. Homer Dixon, Jeffrey H. Boutwell, 

and George W. Rathjens also describe the cause and effect of scarcity. In their model, a 

“scarcity of renewable resources” inextricably links “political and economic factors” and 

“social conflict.” It depicts three origins of scarcity that result from the manner in which 

the two major social elements interact. The critical aspect of this theory describes first 

how, in some cases, population growth alone will set in motion social stresses, leading to 

conflict. Second, it describes how increasing population usually results in scarcity as in 

the division of a flow of water. Population pressures also can cause a shift in the 

concentration of resources into the hands of a privileged few. In combination, the 

depletion, deterioration, and maldistribution of air, land, and water resources are 

accurately described as causal processes leading to violence. 11 

Earlier in this essay, we introduced an optimistic view of the earth’s ability to sustain

the demands for resource use. However, more recent analyses show that the rate of 

deterioration of air, land, and water assets in some regions is accelerating, and that 

“sustainable development”—the ability for the earth to support economic and social 

systems’ attempts to increase the quality of life—is in a precarious state. 12 

As the world approaches the twenty-first century, war planners often conceal or 

dilute their motives for a war or armed conflict with other more apparent motives. In 

some cases groups in contention might not understand the role played by environmental 

and resource issues in their conflict. The more obvious motive might appear to be 

economic and social disputes when in fact the underlying causes have a direct link to 

hunger, deprivation, and scarcity caused by soil depletion or desertification. 13 A report 

analyzing conflicts after World War II, which itself was a war over resources, 14 has 

revealed that between 1989-1992 there occurred 82 conflicts, of which 35 were listed as 

wars resulting in 1,000 deaths or more in a single year. 15 Classic interstate conflicts

occurred in only four cases: Iraq-Kuwait, India-Pakistan, Mauritania-Senegal, and USAPanama. When analyzed relative to their levels of activity or combat, the greatest number 

of conflicts occurred in developing nations in Asia and Africa, with the Middle East, 

Central and South America, and Europe following, respectively. This study conducted by 

the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Upsala College categorized the 

motives of these conflicts into only two broad areas—government and territory. Because 

this study failed to analyze the issue of territory further, it is difficult to conclude that 

126 
resources played a role in those conflicts. Nonetheless, the issue of resource scarcity is 

real, pandemic, and frequently one of several contributing motives for conflict. 

An important aspect of the resource issue focuses on understanding whether anger 

over the state of their resource base has provoked some people to engage in some form of 

hostilities. In a global survey conducted in 24 nations representing a broad range of 

geographical regions and economies, the Health of the Planet (HOP) survey represented 

the single largest such survey ever conducted. 16 Surprisingly, observers view the 

deterioration of resources and the environment in general as serious throughout the full 

spectrum of respondents in developing and in lesser developed countries. Consequently, 

it is difficult to show a linkage in all cases, between wars in which resources were the 

principle motive for conflict, and the level of concern of the combatants over the state of

their respective environments. It is clear, however, that within such regions as Asia and 

Africa, where the preponderance of conflicts persisted, developed and developing 

countries have acknowledged the poor condition of their environments with about equal 

concern. 

The Third World Context 

From a geographical perspective, we recognize that much of the conflict over air, 

land, and water will take place in large part or at least emerge from the developing or 

third world nations. Three recurring patterns in these regions support this view: 

population growth, deteriorating environmental conditions, and economic ties to 

resources. 

Populations and Demands for Water 

The third world currently represents the greatest source of population growth.

Estimators predict that the global village will contain between eight and 10 billion people

sometime between the years 2020 and 2050. 17 Despite poor living conditions and high 

mortality rates, annual population growth rates in the third world have more than doubled 

from less than 1 percent at the first half of this century to over 2 percent since 1950. 18

Currently, 80 to 90 percent of the globe’s population growth has occurred in the third 

world, with the greatest concentration in their urban areas, at a growth rate of 3.8 percent 

or doubling every 18 years. 19 In the context of strained natural resources, it is alarming 

that although it took thousands of years to produce the first billion humans around the 

year 1800, it took only the last 13 years to gain the fifth one billion inhabitants. 

Nowhere has population growth had as great an effect on water as it did in the

Middle East. 20 In this region, ideological, religious, and geographic disputes go hand in 

hand with water related conflicts. 21 For example, 97 percent of Egypt’s water comes 

from the Nile River, with 95 percent of the Nile’s runoff coming from outside Egypt. 

Because of Egypt’s alarmingly high population growth, that country struggles to sustain a

population rapidly approaching 60 million—gaining an additional million every nine

months. So great has been the potential for conflict over the Nile’s water that Egypt and 

Sudan, from whose northern border the Nile enters Egypt, signed a treaty in 1959 to help 

reduce the risk of conflict. Note, however, that none of the other seven nations of the Nile 

basin signed that treaty. 

127 
Water continues to serve as a major focus of peace talks in the Middle East. In 1994 

Jordan won rights over land and water in a Jordan-Israel peace treaty. Second, only to the 

control of weapons in the area, the successful negotiation of shared or leased farmlands,

fresh water, and joint construction of dams and desalinization facilities was achieved.

However, no treaty has resolved the control and management of groundwater aquifers of 

the Jordan, Euphrates, and Nile river basins that serve vast territories. The path to 

peaceful resolution of conflicts concerning water resources is fraught with danger. 

Turkey, for example, still declares that it has no greater obligation to give away water 

than Saudi Arabia has to give away its oil. The future paints a pallid picture of water 

consumption. Global water use doubled between 1940 and 1980 and could double again 

by 2000. Because 80 countries with 40 percent of the world’s population already suffer

serious water shortage-related problems, competition for water for industry and domestic 

consumption will continue to grow. 22 

Deteriorating Environmental Conditions 

The third world also represents the worst state of resource consumption, 

environmental deterioration, and inadequate governmental controls. Even Russia has

been guilty of committing government-sponsored “ecocide.” Well after the collapse of 

communism, veils of pollutants still obscured vast areas. Russian fishing boats operating 

from the port of Kuril’sk into the Sea of Okhotsk bribed local governments to gain access 

to illegal waters, thus further depleting food resources; and accidental industrial 

discharges accounted for 2,000 cases of almost irreparable damage to air, land, and water 

resources. Decades of negligence in the former Soviet Union have resulted in 

contaminated soil and impure drinking water to the extent that 75 percent of the water 

currently is unfit for human consumption. 23 The Aral Sea disaster, where the diversion of 

the Anu Darya and Syr Darya rivers reduced the volume of the sea by 60 percent, has 

affected vast regions. This reduction has directly resulted in hotter summers and colder 

winters, with desertification leading to large-scale migration and social unrest. 

Additionally, the rate of tropical deforestation which directly impacts soil and water 

quality has rapidly accelerated in just the past 10 years in Central and South America,

India, Indonesia, Southeast Asia, Asia, and Africa. Despite their delicately balanced 

ecosystems and invaluable sources of revenue, tropical forests still face large-scale 

destruction, as populations seek to gain additional farming lands. Tensions between 

Rwandan and Zairian forces, for example, escalated to guerrilla war in January 1995 over 

“anarchical acts of deforestation, banditry, and pollution,” according to reports from

Kinshasa. Similarly, as a result of large-scale mechanized farming, a new dimension has 

been added to an old conflict in the Sudan, where conflicts have arisen between various 

classes of farmers who clash over cultivable or fresh grazing land. Poor Sudanese

governmental controls have resulted in schemes for land distribution or controls that go 

unmonitored, resulting in unequal distribution of highly valued agricultural assets. 24

Similarly, in the Philippines, land distribution problems contribute directly to guerrilla 

warfare. Poor land reforms by local and national governments resulted in massive

devastation of forests in a few decades, thereby producing floods, reduction of fresh 

water, soil erosion, and diminished agricultural productivity. These reforms directly 

strained political, economic, and social systems and contributed to social unrest. 25 

128 
Amidst the great interest over the US and United Nations involvement in Somalia, a 

major underlying cause of internal conflict originated in the 100-year-long migration of 

Somali clans from nomadic grazing regions that had become overpopulated and the soils 

depleted. A struggle to control the nation’s best remaining farmland could be at the heart 

of conflict in that region according to the Christian Science Monitor. One hundred 

degrees to the east, rebel forces operating in the highlands of Bougainville in the 

Solomon Islands are engaged in a war with Australia, in which a struggle for 

independence conceals anger over pollution of rivers, poisoning of fish, acid rain, and 

dead water fowl. Simultaneously, conflict festers in the region among four different 

groups following the shutdown of a highly profitable, Australian-owned copper mine by 

the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) as a direct result of the adverse impact of

years of Australian mining operations on the environment. These cases represent clear 

examples in which air, land, and water assets represent economic assets domestically and 

globally. 

Economic Factors 

In the context of current conflicts in the regions of greatest diminishing resources,

the future planner should count on committing forces for a third and instrumental reason. 

This planner views natural resources, specifically land and the things it produces, as

economic assets and sources of power. 26 Many of those resources represent substantial 

portions of trade between the United States and the third world in the forms of ores,

minerals, textiles, and agricultural products. Peter J. Schraeder states cogently, “The 

Third World is an increasingly important focal point for US trade and investment.” 27 He 

points out that the US Department of Commerce revealed that in 1988 imports from the 

third world amounted to $164.2 billion (37.2 percent) out of a total US imports of $441.3 

billion. Concurrently, US exports to the third world during that same year amounted to 

$114.5 billion (35 percent of total US exports of $320 billion). Considering also that US 

private investment in the third world exceeded $78 billion (yielding almost 32 percent of 

all US profit from overseas private investments), observers can assume that US interests 

are present at least in part in third world regions, which present the greatest potential for 

conflict over natural resources. 

Recently, overfishing has been recognized to pose serious dangers to national 

economies. Although not included in the catalogue of developing nations, Britain and 

Argentina have disputes over fishing rights in the South Pacific. Such other nations as 

Japan, South Korea, Canada, Poland, Iceland, Spain, and the United States could see 

fishery-related disputes increase as they harvest fish beyond the level of sustainable 

yields of this resource that is both a source of sustenance and financial gain. 28 Some of 

these countries already have been involved in hostilities over fishing practices. 

It might not be obvious, but the atmosphere as a resource is an economic entity. 

Although skeptics might claim that global warring is far from a proven fact, substantial 

economic costs imposed on many nations already impact the atmosphere. The wealthy 

nations, with less than one-eighth of the world’s population, produce roughly one-half of 

such emissions as carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and chlorofluorocarbons. Because 

climate models predict future deterioration of the general state of the atmosphere and the 

ozone layer, resulting in global warming and climate change, policymakers must accept 

these developments as a “clear and present danger” 29 and take drastic measures to 

129 
prevent future damage. The potential for conflict lies in the substantial economic 

implications of the corrective actions. Pressure has been applied on nations to reduce 

gasoline and energy use and also industrial fossil fuel emissions. Although most policies 

to reduce these kinds of emissions are domestic, they have important international 

implications. Increases in fuel taxes, increased electricity costs, “pollution taxes,” and 

research and development costs to search for alternative energy and innovative industrial 

production will bring with them enormous economic strains. Within the context of the 

third world, many developing countries insist that they literally cannot afford “green 

consciousness.” 30 

The environment and its resources comprise only one of several variables from 

which political, economic, and social conflicts might arise. 31 A number of alarming 

global military trends leaning towards a “deadly convergence” also exist, 32 which, when 

overlain with the third world, portend US military involvement in areas where the 

environment already is one aspect of the conflict. First, the conventional arms trade has 

greatly expanded in the third world, resulting in the import of record numbers of weapons

into the hands of those already predisposed to conflict over resources. Sudan offers an 

example. Second, almost nondeterrable proliferation of nuclear weapons technology in 

the third world challenges attempts to achieve regional stability. From these factors, the 

means exist for countries to at least attempt to achieve resource security in the near term 

where previously the opportunity did not exist. This security is important because there is 

an increased likelihood of the use of military force by third world nations to ensure 

access to diminishing resources, especially in the face of increasing environmental,

population, and economic pressures. 33 In short, an adage for the next century might be a 

revelation from Patricia M. Mische: “Ecological security is a prerequisite for peace; and

peace is a prerequisite for ecological security.” 

To summarize, we may envision the potential for conflict over resources at varying

levels. Rapidly escalating population growth will make air, land, and water resources

more scarce by either degrading or depleting them. The scarcity of life-sustaining 

resources has already resulted in a phenomenon of large-scale forced migrations or 

“environmental refugees.” 34 This real problem is represented by noting that between

1984 and 1985, for example, 10 million Africans fled their homes. Although there is a 

long history of natural nomadic movement throughout Africa, much of this modern 

transmigration emanates directly from deteriorating resources. For example, in the case in 

Somalia, members of the Gosha clan have been literally dispossessed of their arable land. 

Although wars have always compelled people to leave their homes, analysts can make the 

case that people compelled to abandon their homes to seek new resources, could, in turn, 

cause war themselves. 

Humankind has imposed upon the face of the earth lines of political demarcation that 

don’t necessarily coincide with the needs of the people who live within these regions. 

Migration across recognized borders exert social pressures that result in new conflict and 

exacerbate the cycle of the resource trilogy. 35 

Conclusion—Patterns for Cooperation 

Preliminary records show that the world is experiencing the early phases of an epoch

fostering negotiation and cooperation over environmental and resource issues. It is almost 

130 
impossible to predict how global resource changes will intensify specific social conflicts

or even spawn new forms of conflict unimaginable today. 36 Unless met head-on, the 

problems discussed in this chapter most likely will instigate significant changes in

ideologies and national interests, and increase the probability for conflict both within and 

across national borders. For the near term, however, if recent trends continue, the 

majority of conflicts arising over diminishing air, land, and water resources will take 

place mostly within developing nations and will predominate in the form of intrastate 

clashes caused by people migrating in great numbers. 

Regardless of the growing scarcity of resources in certain regions, an international 

dimension to air, land, and water usage demands accountability for the state of those 

resources on the part of nations who strive to become and remain players in global 

markets. For example, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 

(UNCED) and the agreements signed in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, created at least 

one new international institution. The result, Earth Summit 92, helped to clarify critical

issues regarding the deterioration of resources globally, helped to institutionalize a

systematic assessment of the global problematique, and built the groundwork for resource 

and conflict management and cooperation. Specifically, the agreements addressed 

atmospheric, land, and water resources and established economic aid and assistance 

mechanisms to supplement developing nations to resolve the myriad of environmental 

problems within and adjacent to their borders. 

The bottom line describes the need for exhaustive research to assess the impact of 

resource regulations and offers alternatives to regulation and national monitoring to 

understand which strategies work in which situations. 37 International legislative and

regulatory coalitions will be critical to and essential for national actors to manage 

resource damage that transcend national borders and reduce conflicts over future 

resources. Finally, in most cases, no single legislative approach will be effective unless

governments and politicians grasp the critical linkages between air, land, and water 

resources and social, economic, and political concerns. Resource damage occurs 

regionally; however, coalitions must develop diplomatic means that reflect the reality of 

the economic, political, military, and societal costs of the impact of growing populations

on the earth’s finite resources. They must enforce these means transnationally. 

Notes 

1

 Julian Simon and Herman Kahn, The Resourceful Earth: A Response to Global 

2000 (Oxfordshire, N.Y.: B. Blackwell, 1984). 

2

 Global 2000 Report to the President (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

Office, 1980), 1. 

3

 George D. Moffett III, “Downstream Fears Feed Tensions,” Christian Science 

Monitor, 13 March 1990, 4. 

4

 Dennis Pirages, Global Technopolitics: The International Politics of Technology 

and Resources (Pacific Grove, Calif.: Brooks Company Publishers, 1988), 39. 

5

 Ibid., 29. 

6

 Gro Harlem Brundtland, Our Common Future, The World Commission on 

Environment and Development (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1987), 291. 

131 
Notes 

7

 Patricia M. Mische, “Peace and Ecological Security.” Peace Review 6, no. 3 

(1994): 275-84. 

8

 Brundtland, 291. 

9

 Dennis Pirages, The New Context for International Relations, Global Ecopolitics

(Duxbury Press Series in International Studies, 1978), 15. 

10 William B. Wood, “Forced Migration: Local Conflicts and International 

Dilemmas,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 84 (4 December 1994): 

613. 

11 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Jeffrey H. Boutwell, and George W. Rathjens, 

“Environmental Change and Violent Conflict,” Scientific American (February 1993): 38. 

12 Wood, 54. 

13 Mische, 276. 

14 Ibid., 275. 

15 Ibid. 

16 Riley E. Dunlap, George H. Gallup, Jr., and Alec M. Gallup, “Of Global

Concern,” Environment (November 1993): 8. 

17 Michael S. Teitelbaum, “The Population Threat,” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1992-

93): 64. 

18 Ibid. 

19 Brad Knickerbocker, “World Bank Turns From Saving Trees to Saving Cities,”

Christian Science Monitor, 27 September 1994, 13. 

20 Gleick, 6. 

21 Ibid. 

22 Brundtland, 292. 

23 Vladimir Kotov and Elena Nikitina, “Russia in Transition, Obstacles to

Environmental Protection,” Environment 35, no. 10 (December 1993): 11. 

24 Mohamed Suliman, “Civil War in the Sudan: From Ethnic to Ecological Conflict,” 

The Ecologist 23, no. 3 (May/June 1993): 104. 

25 Mische, 277. 

26 Gleick, 7. 

27 Peter J. Schraeder, “‘It’s the Third World Stupid!’ Why the Third World Should 

Be the Priority of the Clinton Administration,” Third World Quarterly 14, no. 2 (1993): 

216. 

28 Brundtland, 294. 

29 “The Role of the United States in a Changing World, Choices for the 21st 

Century” (Providence, R.I.: Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University, 

n.d.), 100. 

30 Ibid., 103 

31 Homer-Dixon, Boutwell, and Rathjens, 38. 

32 Schraeder, 217. 

33 Mische, 281. 

34 Brundtland, 291. 

35 Homer-Dixon, Boutwell, and Rathjens, 40. 

132 
Notes 

36 Paul C. Stern, Oran R Young, and Daniel Druckmand, “Global Environmental 

Change, Understanding the Human Dimension,” Report on the Commission on the 

Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education (National Academy Press, 1992), 247. 

37 Ibid., 150. 

133 
PART IV 

MILITARY-STRATEGIC ISSUES 

133 
11 

Nuclear Conflict and Nonproliferation Issues 

in the Twenty-First Century 

Robert H. Hendricks 

Current United States national security strategy states that “a critical priority for the

United States is to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass

destruction.” 1

 Nonproliferation and the prevention of nuclear conflict will continue as a 

major security issue into the next decade. This essay examines the strengths and 

weaknesses of the nonproliferation effort, the current and projected world nuclear 

environment, possible conflict scenarios and their impact on regional and global security, 

United States interests and efforts for conflict prevention, and finally, the US military and 

nonproliferation in the twenty-first century. 

Background 

Since the invention and subsequent employment of atomic weapons in 1945, United 

States national security strategy developed a strong focus on preventing further use of 

atomic/ nuclear weapons. This strategy involved two primary components: deterrence 

and nonproliferation. Deterrence sought to prevent the use of nuclear weapons through 

the maintenance of a nuclear strike force capable of surviving an attack and carrying out 

an unacceptable nuclear reprisal upon the enemy. The most likely “enemy” was the 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Nonproliferation, on the other hand, 

attempted to deny nuclear weapons and technology to nonnuclear states, thereby 

excluding other nations from becoming potential nuclear-armed enemies. 

The Soviet response to US nuclear strategy was remarkably similar. Perceiving US

nuclear forces as a threat, the Soviet Union developed its own deterrent nuclear force 

while also actively enforcing nonproliferation. Paradoxically, the two nations competed 

in a nuclear arms race while attempting to stem the production of nuclear weapons in the 

rest of the world. While the success of deterrence as the sole factor in preventing nuclear 

war is arguable, the fact remains that nuclear weapons have not been used in battle since

World War II. Nonproliferation efforts cannot claim an equal degree of success. 

134 
The Nonproliferation Treaty 

Experts describe attempts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons

simultaneously in terms of both success and failure. The hallmark of the nonproliferation 

effort is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), concluded in 1968. It remains in force today 

with over 160 countries agreeing to its objectives and obligations. According to the US 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the NPT is “one of the great success

stories of arms control...it has prevented the spread of nuclear weapons, promoted 

technical cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and served as an essential

basis for the reduction of nuclear weapons.” 2

 The treaty recognizes five nations as 

nuclear weapons states (NWS): the US, USSR, People's Republic of China (PRC), Great 

Britain, and France. 3 Since that time, despite dire predictions to the contrary, only one

additional nation, India, has overtly joined the nuclear powers with the testing of a 

nuclear device in May 1974. 4

 In “promoting technical cooperation in the peaceful uses of 

nuclear energy,” the NPT has been extremely successful. Today, nearly 500 civil nuclear 

power plants are in operation or are near completion in 32 countries. 5

 Finally, the

number of nuclear warheads worldwide has declined since 1986. 6

 These facts provide 

the basis for arguing the success of the NPT and the overall nonproliferation effort. 7

Unfortunately, they do not tell the whole story. 

While India is the only former nonnuclear weapons state (NNWS) to explode a 

nuclear device, experts believe numerous nations throughout the world possess nuclear 

arsenals or can produce weapons within short time periods. Pakistan and Israel may 

actually have nuclear weapons. 8

 With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, three nationsBelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine-joined Russia as de facto nuclear weapons states. 9

 On 

24 March 1993 South African president F. W. de Klerk announced that his country had 

secretly developed a small nuclear arsenal (seven weapons) between 1974 and 1989 and 

subsequently had destroyed it by late 1991. 10 Experts also believe that Brazil, Argentina, 

Iran, and—despite concerted world efforts—Iraq and North Korea have almost achieved 

nuclear weapons production capability. Additionally, they view Syria, Algeria, and Libya 

as “aspiring members” of the nuclear “club.” 11 Currently, the technology exists for 

highly developed industrial states to develop nuclear weapons within a very short time, 

creating a new category of “virtual” nuclear powers. 12 This category includes Japan, 

Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Canada, South Korea, and Taiwan—all of which observers 

suspect of conducting nuclear weapons research during the cold war; even Sweden has

kept “the nuclear option open.” 13 Despite the considerable effort expended to prevent the 

spread of nuclear weapons, proliferation is rapidly becoming a reality. 

The history of the nonproliferation effort demonstrates that nations (or elements 

within nations) with nuclear weapons technology will share their secrets and equipment 

under the right circumstances or for the right price. They lack the will and/or capability to 

restrict access to nuclear weapons technologies and expertise. Additionally, because 

nations no longer require nuclear tests to ensure the reliability of a nuclear weapon, 

countries can now develop these weapons while denying their existence, copying the socalled Israeli model. Finally, the nonproliferation regime's inspection agency, the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), does not have appropriate funding or 

personnel to maintain a high degree of effectiveness. The favorable report following 

inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities prior to the Gulf War illustrates this point. Once 

135 
revealed, the total extent of Iraq's nuclear weapons development program shocked the 

world. 14 

As noted already, the NPT regime has not achieved the ideal of restricting nuclear

weapons to the” original five NWS. However, failure to attain that goal should not detract 

from what the regime has accomplished. The NPT and the nonproliferation regime, 

which it generated, restricted proliferation well below expected levels, thus reducing the 

likelihood of nuclear conflict or accidental nuclear detonation. Additionally, it established 

and spread a global majority opinion against the development and proliferation of nuclear 

weapons. This negative attitude towards nuclear weapons acquisition, some feel, 

encouraged South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Argentina, and others to abandon their weapons 

programs. 15 However, the fact of nuclear proliferation remains. Nuclear proliferation,

combined with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the sudden shift to a multipolar 

world, necessitated a US nuclear proliferation policy revision. To see where adjustments

should be made, we must first look at the world nuclear situation and the results of 

proliferation. 

A Case for Stability 

In addition to the original five NWS, observers believe that six states—Belarus, 

Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Israel, India, and Pakistan—either possess nuclear arsenals or 

possess them beyond the developmental stages and thus represent “unofficial” NWS. A 

strong case can be made that in each instance the likelihood of actual use of these 

weapons is extremely low, and that, indeed, each nation's arsenal represents a 

“stabilizing” case for proliferation. 16 In Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, retaining their

nuclear arsenals eases fears of Russian imperial aspirations. In a similar manner, Israel's

nuclear arsenal (possibly acquired after the June 1967 war) has deterred Arab aggression 

for more than 20 years, was a factor in ending the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and set the 

stage for the Camp David and follow-on Middle East Peace accords. 17 Even in India and 

Pakistan, where long-standing disputes constantly threaten to explode, the existence, or

implied existence, of nuclear weapons provides a brake to the escalation of regional 

disputes toward major war. 18 In these cases, recognition of the catastrophic results of 

nuclear conflict, both to the attacked and the attacker, provides a stabilizing influence in a

region of potential war. Therefore, when determining US proliferation policy revisions,

policymakers should recognize instances in which nuclear proliferation proves to be a 

stabilizing factor. 

The “Rogues” 

This section discusses the latest group of aspiring nuclear weapons states. These 

nations—North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya—are either developing nuclear weapons or

are attempting to acquire them. Two of them—North Korea and Iran-if not currently in 

possession of weapons, are certainly close. 19 Much of the Western world perceives these 

nations as “rogue states” or “irrational actors,” who plan to use nuclear weapons for

retribution or terror. A brief look from their perspective proves enlightening. North 

Korea, for example, has been on the edge of war with South Korea and its powerful ally,

the United States, for 40 years. North Korea maintains a huge army at the expense of its

136 
economic development in response to the perceived threat from the south. Threatened by 

US nuclear weapons, it relied on its Chinese and Soviet allies for nuclear support. Now 

the Soviet Union no longer exists, and the Chinese are trading with the South Koreans. 

North Korean leadership—confronted with an external threat from its southern enemy, an 

internal threat due to increasing economic hardship, and the knowledge of what relaxing 

communist standards meant for Soviet and Warsaw Pact leadership—may be addressing 

the problem in the only manner it sees as “rational.” 20 

Similarly, nuclear desires by Iran and Iraq can be seen in light of their regional 

aspirations for power, the security issues posed by their eight -year war with each other, 

and the more recent disaster Iraq experienced with US conventional warfighting 

capability. We can even rationalize Muammar Qaddafi's desires for nuclear weapons in 

terms of his aspirations for regional leadership and as a deterrent to US or Israeli attacks. 

Such countries as Libya and Iran, as the next nuclear weapons states, are moving toward 

nuclear armament for the same primary reasons their predecessors developed the bomb:

security and power in a nuclear-armed world. 

These states are making the nuclear decision fully aware of the political and 

economic costs involved. To classify such a decision as irrational, or a particular state as 

a rogue, is nonproductive and a demonstration of ethnocentrism. The United States' 

policy on nonproliferation must evolve to deal with the reality of additional nuclear 

weapons states. In the words of William C. Martel and William T. Pendley, “Each nation

is the best judge of its security interests and the power necessary to protect those 

interests. ...Neither the United States nor any other state is in a position to condemn

another state's decision to possess nuclear weapons.” 21 The nuclear decision is not in and

of itself irrational, nor is the addition of a nuclear state automatically destabilizing. It is 

instead reality, and it will be in the next century. 

Nonstate Actors 

The possibility that a state which professes support for terrorism might give a nuclear 

weapon to a nonstate actor such as a drug or terrorist organization does, however, 

represent a potential for destabilization. Three concerns are associated with that potential. 

22 First, once turned over to a nonstate actor, tracking a nuclear device and identifying 

who controls it present an extremely difficult problem. Second, nonstate actors are not 

governed by the constraints of physical territory, borders or “accouterments of sovereign 

statehood.” 23 Hence, fears of retaliation have less impact on their actions. Third, in their 

total dedication to a cause, some of these groups will use whatever means is at their 

disposal and may choose nuclear weapons as the ultimate weapons of terror. 

Nonproliferation policy should, therefore, target nonstate organizations primarily. That

there are no cases to date where states turned over dangerous technologies to a terrorist 

organization has mitigated somewhat the fear of proliferation to nonstate actors. 24 The

states recognize the leverage such weapons would give a nonstate actor, leverage which it 

could easily apply against the technology provider. 

The US works diligently to keep nuclear weapons from states which support terrorist 

groups. If allowed to possess, ‘ nuclear capability, such states as Algeria, Iran, and Libya 

might then disperse nuclear weapons to nonstate actors. However, the US should realize, 

in light of the examples of India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa, that there is little we 

137 
or our allies can do to prevent a determined nation from entering the ranks of the nucleararmed states. Three facts support this statement. First, nuclear technology has existed for

more than 50 years. The information on building nuclear weapons is widely available; 

especially available are large numbers of trained personnel. Second, nations determined 

to develop nuclear weapons readily circumvent IAEA controls established by the NPT to

control fissile materials. Third, the collapse of the Soviet Union has introduced the 

prospect of readily available fissile materials, nuclear scientists and technicians, and the 

possibility of selling nuclear weapons to the highest bidder. 25 These facts should provide 

the impetus for reshaping US policy in the direction of managing “the inevitable process 

of proliferation toward the creation of stability.” 26 

The Future Threat 

A new proliferation policy must anticipate possible nuclear conflict scenarios in the 

corning century. Four regions present potential for such scenarios within the next decade.

They include the Russian Federation and surrounding nations of the Commonwealth of 

Independent States (CIS), South Asia, the Middle East, and the Korean peninsula. 

The uncertain status of the Russian Federation, in possession of the world's largest 

nuclear arsenal, poses a major potential for future conflict. Recent fighting in Chechnya 

symbolizes ethnic tension throughout the country which some observers forecast as the 

precursor to all-out civil war. One report highlighted over 200 ethnoterritorial conflicts in 

the former Soviet Union from 1990 to 1993. 27 The potential for large-scale civil war in a 

country with over 9,000 strategic and 20,000 tactical nuclear weapons holds cause for

world concern. 28 A second scenario within the same region involves the organized 

criminal element in Russia and the questionable accountability and control of the former

Soviet tactical nuclear weapons inventory. FBI Director Louis Freeh called the possibility 

of a nuclear arms sale by members of the Russian mafia to a terrorist group “the greatest

long-term threat to the security of the United States.” 29 Third, ethnic tensions combined 

with a lagging economy could bring to power a political extremist like Vladimir

Zhirinovsky, who speaks of restoring Russia's imperial frontiers of 1900 through war if

necessary. 30 In his campaign speeches he has threatened nuclear retaliation against the 

US, Britain, and France; to attack Germany, Japan, and Pakistan with nuclear or other 

forces; and to blow nuclear radiation into Lithuania. 31 Unfortunately, the conditions 

which are making men like Zhirinovsky popular are not confined to Russia. 

Religious and ethnic unrest also account for political turmoil in South Asia. 

According to Robert L. Gallucci, assistant secretary of state for political and military 

affairs, “If a nuclear weapon is to be detonated in anger in the next five years... the most 

likely place would be South Asia.” 32 Since Pakistan's independence in 1947, the two 

countries have fought three wars. The latest was fought in April 1990 to contest the 

northern Indian province of Kashmir. Created from India to form an Islamic homeland, 

Pakistan suffers from a severe case of insecurity over the likelihood of an Indian attempt

to reunite the subcontinent. 33 According to one author, expressing anti-Indian sentiment 

is one of the few issues that holds Pakistan together. 34 India, on the other hand, faces 

potential nuclear threats from both Pakistan and China. A “humiliating” defeat at the 

hands of China in 1962 fueled India's interest in developing nuclear weapons. An 

invasion of Pakistan by India, which may occur despite the leadership's attempts to

138 
contain the conflict, 35 could escalate to a nuclear exchange should Pakistan feel 

overwhelmed. 36 Alternatively, India, fearing China's intervention on Pakistan's behalf, 

might feel obligated to use nuclear weapons to offset Chinese conventional superiority, to 

which China most likely would respond in kind. This is India's worst case scenario, 

which, combined with internal ethnic divisions that led to the assassination of Prime 

Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards, give credence to Gallucci's Concern 

about this region's stability. 

A third region which could erupt in a conflict involving nuclear weapons is the 

Middle East. The Gulf War demonstrated US and international resolve to secure their 

perceived vital interests in the area. Armed with nuclear weapons, would Saddam 

Hussein feel emboldened to reattempt annexation of Kuwait or determine to use a nuclear 

weapon as an ultimate solution to his difficulties with the Kurds? Should border disputes

reignite a war between Iraq and Iran? and Would one or both nations resort to nuclear 

missiles given the option? War could break out in the region over control of critical 

natural resources, specifically oil and, less publicized but even more valuable in this arid 

region, water. Finally, ideological issues dividing Islamic fundamentalist and moderate 

pro-Western Arab states could bring civil or regional war and the likelihood of 

international involvement. 

A number of events also could precipitate nuclear conflict on the Korean peninsula. 

A conceivable scenario involves North Korean leadership, in a last-gasp effort to 

maintain power, initiating an all-out war against the south. If the United States still 

maintained troops there, such an attack would demand a US response. Whether the US 

became immediately involved, the conflict certainly would demand the attention of such 

regional powers as China, Russia, and Japan. In advance of such an event, over the next 

decade South Korea and Japan may respond to North Korea's nuclear weapons 

development with their own programs and may have the means to retaliate in kind to a 

North Korean attack. A decision by either Russia or China to side with North Korea 

could ignite a global nuclear war. 

A Nonproliferation Policy for 

the Twenty-First Century 

The scenarios described above involve the currently known or currently suspected 

nuclear powers and could occur tomorrow as easily as they might 10 years from now. 

One essential factor is the certainty of exponential improvements in technology and 

informational access making nuclear weapons and technology far simpler to acquire. 37

Therefore, sometime in the next century, possibly within the next 10 years, most major 

international conflicts will include the possibility of nuclear escalation. US policymakers

must face this dichotomy in shaping nonproliferation policy for the future—nuclear 

weapons will have a stabilizing influence on world and regional conflict, yet they present 

a horrendous potential in any conflict which may take place. In light of this dichotomy, 

the following actions should modernize our nuclear proliferation policy. 

First, we should not abandon the current NPT regime. Despite the weaknesses it

presents, the current regime continues to offer an ideal goal. The United States should 

continue to pursue the goals of the NPT and aid in strengthening the nonproliferation 

effort. The US also should vote and campaign for the indefinite extension of the NPT, or 

139 
at least seek an additional 25-year extension. 38 This extension—combined with mutual 

(or in Britain's case by default, since it conducts its tests in the US) agreement by the 

NWS to an agreement on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996—would 

demonstrate a step toward NWS compliance with treaty provisions calling for 

disarmament. 39 Additionally, the United States should make a pledge of no first use of 

nuclear weapons similar to the pledges made by China and Israel. 40 This declaration 

could be made unilaterally or put forward for vote as a UN resolution banning first use of 

nuclear weapons. Additional UN action should include the development of a course of 

action to be taken in response to any nation violating the first use of nuclear weapons. 

The UN should hold personally and criminally liable civilian and military leaders who 

permit or direct the first use of a nuclear weapon. It should hold states financially liable 

for reparations. 

Second, while putting greater emphasis on the NPT, the new policy should deemphasize the importance of nuclear weapons as a measure of prestige/bargaining chip 

by recognizing the sovereign right of any nation to choose to construct or possess nuclear 

weapons. The new policy should monitor closely efforts at nuclear weapons development

or acquisition and report those efforts to UN members. The findings should prompt 

neither condemnation and military threats nor an overindulgent economic effort to “buy” 

the state back to NNWS status with economic incentives. Additionally, the new policy 

should consider admitting some NNWS, particularly those extensively involved in peace 

support efforts, to the UN Security Council. 

Third, bilateral efforts to reduce the nuclear inventories of the US and Russia should 

continue according to Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreements. The 

agreements should make every effort to aid Kazakhstan and Ukraine with the destruction 

of their weapons and safe storage of nuclear material. They should offer technical and 

financial assistance for the safe storage and dismantling of Russian weapons as well. At

the same time, US officials should ensure verification of Russian compliance with treaty 

arrangements. 

Fourth, actions being taken to counter the criminal/terrorist threat are on track and

should receive the full support of NPT members. These actions require full international 

cooperation between the police and intelligence agencies of all states producing fissile 

material. The establishment of a Moscow office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

appropriately demonstrates US commitment. 41 Additionally, research and development 

efforts directed at developing space-based sensors to detect nuclear materials represent a

first step towards a foolproof monitoring system. 42 

The US Military and Nonproliferation 

First and foremost, the United States must maintain a credible deterrent force. This 

conclusion does not mean we cannot reduce the numbers in our nuclear arsenal. The 

START II reductions still will leave 3,000-3,500 warheads in the US inventory, more 

than sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on any nuclear aggressor. Maintenance of 

the strategic triad with a highly reliable, flexible, and survivable mix of weapons will 

ensure the future credibility of the US's nuclear force. However, our deterrent posture 

may not prevent a regional conflict from “going nuclear” in the next century. 

140 
The fact of nuclear proliferation will make the possibility of nuclear conflict an

important consideration in any battle plan a commander develops in the future. Planners 

must develop contingencies which minimize the effects of a nuclear attack. If possible, 

their staging of forces should take place out of range of enemy delivery systems. Massing 

of forces will have to be avoided in favor of small, highly mobile units unless some 

agency develops extremely effective air and missile defenses. In the long term, Japan, the 

United States, and other nations should combine resources in producing a tactical 

antiballistic missile system to protect troops deployed in harm's way. 

Recently, a “new” mission is being touted for the armed forces—nuclear 

counterproliferation—the use of military force to deny nuclear weapons to a potential 

proliferator. 43 The Israeli attack on Iraq's Osiraq reactor in 1981 is the classic example of 

counterproliferation. Over the years, military planners have considered this option in 

several different circumstances. During the latest confrontation between the US and 

North Korea, former secretary of defense James Schlesinger stated in a forum on 

American defense policy that the North Korean nuclear facilities represented an “ideal set 

of targets” for airpower. 44 In the wake of the Gulf War, US Air Force airpower advocates 

quickly wave the banner praising the twin idols of stealth and precision guided munitions 

(PGM). 45 The Navy also staked a claim to the counterproliferation mission, pointing out 

their special capabilities in the nuclear arena. 46 

The warrior does not doubt American conventional military capability to project 

power almost anywhere in the world and destroy a target. The US has the most capable 

military force in the world today. Unfortunately, any attempt to destroy a modern-day 

nuclear weapons facility is likely to turn into a very complex affair, involving a number

of decisions. The first consideration must be the desired outcome versus risk. An attack 

on a sovereign nation's territory constitutes an act of war. Are we prepared to wage war to

stop the development of a nuclear weapon? The next consideration addresses the 

possibility of failure. Are we prepared for the consequences of a miss, a lost aircraft or

ship (possibly to a “lucky” shot, maintenance malfunction, or bad weather), the

possibility of collateral damage, loss of life or captured military members, and the 

attendant embarrassment in the eyes of the world? Finally, one of the lessons of the Gulf 

War was that Saddam Hussein learned from the Osiraq attack. He dispersed, disguised, 

and hardened his nuclear weapons facilities. Inspectors continue to discover segments of

the Iraqi nuclear program, nearly four years after the war. 47 Other nations intent on 

developing nuclear weapons al: most certainly will take similar protective measures. By 

choosing counterproliferation, can we accomplish our goals? These questions do not state 

flatly that there is never an instance where military counterproliferation is appropriate.

However, we must address these issues before we take this large step. 

Conclusion 

Ten years from now, we will still recognize the world of 1995. Technology will 

continue to amaze, and information will overwhelm. Given the current trends, there will 

be fewer nuclear weapons in the world, but more nations will own them. We should do 

everything we can to reduce the risk of nuclear war, but we also must step carefully to

ensure that our efforts don't produce exactly what we seek to prevent. It still will be a 

very complex world with no simple answers. 

141 
Notes 

1

 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement 

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1994), 11. 

2

 United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, NPT: The NonProliferation

Treaty (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994), 1. 

3

 Ibid. 

4

 The most famous prediction is probably President John F. Kennedy's warning in 

1962 that “fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these [nuclear] weapons by 

the middle of the 1970s.” See Bradley S. Davis, “Arms Control and Proliferation,” in 

Karl P. Magyar et al., eds., Challenge and Response: Anticipating US Military Security 

Concerns (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1994), 97. 

5

 Ibid. 

6

 Michael Renner, “Nuclear Arsenals Shrinking,” vital Signs, 1994, 114. 

7

 Including regional nonproliferation treaties, nuclear-free zones, efforts to monitor 

and control dual-use nuclear weapons and delivery technologies (e.g., the Treaties of

Tlatelolco and Rarotanga); Group of Seven; Coordinating Committee for Multilateral 

Export Controls (COCOM); IAEA Lists, Parts I and II; Export of Arms Regulation 

(EAR); Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); Strategic Arms Limitation 

Treaties (SALT I and II): and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II).

8

 Kosta Tsipis and Philip Morrison, “Arming for Peace,” Bulletin of the Atomic 

Scientists, March/April 1994, 38. 

9

 In the May 1992 Lisbon Protocol all three agreed to join the NPT as NNWS and 

return their nuclear arsenals to Russia, but compliance has been sporadic. As of

September 1994, Ukraine had nine SS-24 and 90 SS-19 ICBMs, and 19 Blackjack and 23 

Bear bombers; Kazakhstan, 60 SS-18 ICBMs; and Belarus, 36 SS-25 ICBMs. See 

“Nuclear Weapons Deactivations Continue in FSU,” Arms Control Today, November 

1994, 33. 

10 Bernhard Rabert, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons—A Defused Time Bomb?”

Aussen Politik, March 1993, 232. 

11 Davis, 89. 

12 Marc Dean Millot, “Facing New Nuclear Adversaries,” Washington Quarterly, 

Summer 1994, 56. 

13 Steve Coll, “Neutral Sweden Quietly Keeps Nuclear Option Open,” Washington

Post, 25 November 1994, 1. 

14 Franklin R Wolf, Of Carrots and Sticks, or Airpower as a Nonproliferation Tool 

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, July 1994), 16-19. 

15 Larry Presler, “Keep the Nuclear Genie Corked,” Wall Street Journal, 11 May

1994, 15. 

16 William C. Martel and William T. Pendley, Nuclear Coexistence, Rethinking U.S. 

Policy to Promote Stability in an Era of Proliferation (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War 

College, April 1994), 35-38. 

17 Martin van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict (New York: 

Free Press, 1993), 99-107. 

18 Martel and Pendley, 36. 

142 
Notes 

19 van Creveld, 115. 

20 Andrew Mack, “A Nuclear North Korea, The Choices are Narrowing,” World 

Policy Journal, Summer 1994, 27-28. 

21 Martel and Pendley, 134, 136. 

22 Ibid., 110-11. 

23 Ibid., 111. 

24 Ibid. 

25 Ibid., 139. 

26 Ibid., 147. 

27 Bogdan Szajkowski, “Will Russia Disintegrate into Bantustans?” in World Politics

94/95, Helen E. Purkitt, ed. (Guilford, Conn.: Dushkin Publishing Group, Inc., 1994), 69. 

28 The 1994 figures come from Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, “Estimated 

U.S. and Soviet/Russian Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-94, Nuclear Notebook,” Bulletin of the 

Atomic Scientists, November/December 1994, 59. 

29 “Loose Nukes,” Baltimore Sun, 31 May 1994, 8. 

30 Jacob W. Kipp, “The Zhirinovsky Threat,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 3 (May-June 

1994): 94-107. 

31 James W. Morrison, “Vladimir Zhirinovsky, An Assessment of a Russian UltraNationalist,” McNair Paper 30 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic

Studies, National Defense University, April 1994), 34. 

32 Robert L. Gallucci, “Non-Proliferation and National Security,” Arms Control 

Today, April 1994, 14. 

33 van Creveld, 88. 

34 Ibid. 

35 Ibid., 86. 

36 Mitchell Reiss, “The United States and Pakistan's Nuclear Programme,” Royal 

United Services Institute Journal, Summer 1991, 47. 

37 James J. Tritten, ed., Non-Traditional Forms of Intelligence (Monterey, Calif.: 

Naval Post Graduate School, August 1993), 2. 

38 The NPT Review and Extension Conference will be held at the UN from 17 April 

to 12 May. See William Epstein, “Give More to Get More,” Bulletin of the Atomic 

Scientists, November/December 1994, 15. 

39 Ibid., 16. Britain conducts its tests at the Nevada test site. 

40 van Creveld, 69, 102. Advocated by Paul C. Warnke, “Strategic Nuclear Policy 

and Non-Proliferation,” Arms Control Today, May 1994, 5. 

41 Gill Gertz, “FBI to Open Moscow Office with Eye on Nuke Trafficking,” 

Washington Times, 26 May 1994, 3. 

42 Wilson P. Dizard III, “Pentagon Presses for R&D in Counterproliferation.” 

Military and Aerospace Electronics, 28 November 1994, 1. 

43 Dr Gregory Vardall developed a comprehensive definition of counterproliferation: 

“Counterproliferation is the sum of all measures designed to prevent the spread of 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD).” It encompasses traditional “nonproliferation,” 

but, unlike the latter, it is “broader and includes proactive elements including military

143 
Notes 

actions such as preemption.” Unpublished paper, “Export Control and Nonproliferation,” 

15 August 1991, 2. 

44 James Schlesinger, “American Defense Policy: Crisis & Confusion from Korea to 

Cuba,” address at the Eighth Annual Report of the Secretaries of Defense Conference, 

Montgomery, Ala., 16 September 1994. 

45 Wolfs paper makes a strong case for airpower in a counterproliferation role. 

46 Ambassador Linton Brooks, “The New Nuclear Threat,” US Naval Institute 

Proceedings, May 1994, 45-49. 

47 Diana Edensword and Gary Milhollin, “Iraq's Bomb—an Update,” New York 

Times, 26 April 1993, 17. 

144 
12 

The Other Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Chemical and Biological 

Bradley S. Davis 

The end of the Cold War does not mean the end of political, ideological, diplomatic, 

economic, technological, or even military rivalry among nations. It does not mean the end 

of the struggle for power and influence. It very probably does mean increased instability,

unpredictability, and violence in international affairs. 

—Samuel Huntington 

The post-cold-war world of the early 1990s has seen dramatic and historic changes in 

the political status quo and the concurrent military threat. No longer must the rest of the 

world fearfully stand by, hoping against hope that the two superpowers do not incinerate 

themselves and everyone else in a nuclear holocaust. That particularly nasty specter has 

subsided. Unfortunately, a new—and potentially far more sinister—threat exists for 

mankind. Chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW) have emerged from the 

obscurity of the tunnel-visioned attention the world has lavished on nuclear weapons 

since World War II. Although the history of CW/BW reaches much farther back than

nuclear weapons, the world has finally recognized that CW/BW are also weapons of mass

destruction (WMD). Once let loose on an unsuspecting mankind, they are uncontrollable, 

indiscriminately affecting soldier and civilian alike. The danger that a sovereign nation, 

especially one in the third world, or a terrorist organization will manufacture or steal 

lethal CW/BW poses a potentially more significant threat to global security now and in 

the near future than does the possibility of these same actors acquiring a nuclear weapon. 

The House Armed Services Committee in February 1993 recognized that while the 

CW/BW threat had diminished with the passing of the cold war, it had actually increased 

the potential diversity and the frequency with which such weapons might be used. 1

 

Problem Defined 

In the twenty-first century, the major threats to global and American security 

interests will arise from the perceived imbalances of power and political instability 

among the world’s community of nations. Countries with too much power may be

tempted to engage in aggressive acts that threaten the world’s wavering political, 

economic, and military balances. Regional imbalances of power can provoke weaker,

insecure states to begin a military buildup, potentially including chemical and biological 

145 
weapons, to protect themselves. In this precarious, competitive environment, states and 

nonstate actors with a national identity that want to survive must acquire power and use it 

as they deem necessary to protect themselves. Terrorists wishing to boldly push their 

unique agenda into the world arena to establish their legitimacy, or to simply take 

revenge upon an uncaring global society, will revert to weapons which they might easily 

acquire and employ. Chemical and biological weapons ideally fit that description. They 

are, however, not terror weapons to be found only in the future. “The threat is real, and it

is upon us today. It is not in the future, it is here now,” stated former Secretary of 

Defense Les Aspin to the National Academy of Sciences in December 1993. 

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) defines chemical weapons as toxic 

chemicals and their precursors, munitions and devices specifically designed to cause

death or otherwise harm through its chemical action on life processes. Toxic chemicals 

include any chemicals which can kill, temporarily incapacitate, or permanently harm 

humans or animals. Precursor means any chemical reactant which takes part by whatever 

method at any stage in the production process of a toxic chemical. 2

 Chemical weapons 

are quite distinct from biological warfare agents (such as bacteria, viruses, and rickettsia).

The United Nations defines these agents as living organisms—whatever their nature—or 

infective material derivatives which cause disease or death in man, animals, or plants. 

The destructive nature of these derivatives emanates from their ability to multiply in the

person, animal, or plant attacked. 3

 

Authorities classify chemical agents by their physiological effects as either 

incapacitating or lethal. Incapacitating agents temporarily impair a person from

functioning effectively. These agents are further subdivided into physical agents that 

cause irritation and abnormal bodily behavior, or psychochemical agents that cause 

mental disorientation. Lethal agents vary considerably by effects. Lung agents irritate the 

eyes, throat, and lungs, eventually leading to death from the lack of oxygen. Blood gases 

act faster and attack the blood’s circulation of oxygen. Vesicants, like mustard gases, 

damage bodily tissues through burns, blisters, and temporary blindness. In large doses, 

they can be deadly by causing respiratory complications. 

In contrast to chemical agents, biological agents can be divided into peptides, 

genetically mutated amino acids used to affect mental processes, or toxins, which are 

chemical substances produced by living organisms. The most deadly forms though, are 

the genetically altered bacteria or viruses which can defeat immunity. Biological warfare 

agents are more potent on a weight-for-weight basis than their chemical agent 

counterparts. 4

 Both chemical and biological weapons, however, can inflict considerable 

disruptive and indiscriminate damage on civilians and military forces. 

Both sovereign states and terrorist organizations see many advantages to the 

acquisition and ownership of these types of weapons. First, compared to the huge 

multimillion dollar expense to develop and field nuclear weapons, CW/BW are far more 

inexpensive to develop, manufacture, store, and deliver—the reason they are often 

referred to as the “poor man’s nuclear weapon.” For example, one can manufacture a 

Type-A botulinal toxin, which is more deadly than some nerve gases, for approximately 

$400 per kilogram. In fact, a blue-ribbon panel of chemical and biological experts 

testified in 1969 before a United Nations panel that “for large scale operations against a

civilian population, the cost for casualties over a square kilometer using conventional 

weapons would be $2,000, using nuclear weapons the cost narrows to $800, chemical 

146 
weapons are slightly lower at $600, but the cost for using biological weapons plummets

to a mere $1.” 5

 

The second reason these weapons are attractive is the short time and relative ease 

required for their manufacture. Many of the normal agents or precursors used in chemical 

weapons are legally manufactured around the world for legitimate commercial reasons, as 

are the associated machinery, equipment, physical plants, and facilities. Manufacturers

use these chemicals in a variety of products, which are the mainstay of the world’s global 

economy. To simply ban their use would gravely perturbate or even destroy this fragile 

economic system, removing those products from legitimate use upon which the world

depends. Even in a clandestine environment, both CW or BW can be manufactured by 

individuals with only moderate technical knowledge and a minimum of tools and 

workspace. They can quite readily find formulas for manufacturing nerve agents, mustard

gas, and other deadly toxins in various scientific and governmental publications. The 

United States Department of Defense in 1971 declassified the formula for VX, one of the 

most potent nerve agents. The ease in gathering information concerning these weapons is

clearly evident in a publication entitled, “C-Agents: Properties and Protection,” produced 

by the Swedish Armed Forces Research Institute. This handy guide, a must for all those 

amateur terrorists contemplating the use of these weapons, describes in detail the process 

of launching a gas attack and includes the formulas needed for calculating wind speed

and lethal concentrations. 6

 

Compared to the massive numbers of conventional weapons required to hit a target 

effectively, producers need only a small amount of a chemical or an even smaller amount 

of a biological agent to offer a credible threat. For example, it has been estimated that 

only 50 kilograms of anthrax spores in an aerosol form is necessary to cause several 

thousand deaths if released in a large urban area. 7

 In addition, producers can use 

CW/BW to strike virtually any target, especially civilian population centers. Incredible as

it may seem, during mock CW/BW attacks, the shelter under the White House and the 

command centers in the Pentagon, which have air and water filtration systems, have

flunked. 8

 Table 5 provides a comparative estimate of the effects that attacks have upon 

unprotected population centers using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. 

Table 5 

Impact of Attacks on Population Centers 

Type of Weapon 

Criteria for 

Estimate 

Nuclear 

(1 megation) 

Chemical 

(15 tons nerve 

agent) 

Biological 

(10 tons) 

Area affected ≈ 300 km2 ≈ 600 km2 ≈ 100,000 km2

Time delay of effect Seconds Minutes Days

Structural destruction Over area of 

≈ 100 km2

None None

Time before normal use

after attack 

3-6 Months Limited during

contamination period 

After end of incubation period or

subsidence of epidemic 

Maximum effect on

man

90 percent deaths 50 percent deaths 50 percent morbidity, 25 percent

deaths without medical help

≈ = nearly equal to

Source: Neil C. Livingstone and Joseph D. Douglas, Jr., CBW: The Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb

(Washington, D.C.: Corporation Press, Inc., 1984), 57. 

147 
Historical Perspective 

Although we tend to regard CW/BW only in a modem contextual framework, the 

origins of this type of warfare are lost in the dark recesses of history. Leonardo da Vinci 

described in detail shells which could be fired over naval targets, filled with sulfur and 

arsenic dust. This is not the first recorded use of CW though. In the fifth century B.C., the

Spartans used fumes from a combination of burning wood soaked in pitch and sulfur 

when they attacked the fortified Athenian city of Plataea. 9

 The Germans in 1762 

besieged the fortress of Schweidnitz in Austria with cannon shells emitting asphyxiating 

fumes. 10 

However, World War I saw the beginning of chemical warfare in earnest. The 

British, Germans, and French all began using tear gases almost as soon as the misery of 

trench warfare broke out on the western front in 1914. The first large-scale gas attack of 

the war-hence the occasion is historically associated as the beginning of modern chemical

warfare—was delivered by the Germans just north of Ypres, Belgium, on the evening of 

22 April 1915. From over 5,700 compressed air cylinders manhandled to the front lines, 

the Germans released chlorine gas, a greenish yellow cloud. The attack instigated the

almost immediate collapse of two French divisions in the area, and as the Germans warily 

advanced into the abandoned Allied territory, they were horrified to witness the dead 

lying on their backs, fists clenched in the air, and the whole battlefield bleached to a 

yellow color. The attack devastated the Allies who suffered over 5,000 deaths. 11 The

other major combatants, not to be outdone by the Germans, ultimately combined to 

employ by war’s end over 125,000 tons of toxic chemicals, including chlorine, phosgene, 

and mustard gas. In all, 100,000 people died, and 1.3 million others were casualties of 

chemical agents used during “The Big One.” 12 

Like chemical warfare, the use of biological agents dates back over two millennia. 

As early as 600 B.C., the Greek statesman, Solon, threw the roots of a plant that caused 

diarrhea into the river his enemies used for drinking water. An early incidence of natural 

biological warfare occurred in 67 B.C., when the army of Roman general Pompey was 

lured into a valley where the honeycomb was known to be tainted with a natural 

debilitating toxin. The foraging Roman soldiers soon became ill and suffered defeat by

the local forces. 13 In 1346 plague-weakened Mongol forces attacked the Genoesecontrolled city of Caffa in the Crimea. The Mongols catapulted victims of the plague over 

the battlements, and a citywide epidemic followed soon after. The strickened Genoese 

capitulated and retreated to Italy, taking the plague back to Europe with them. Within

three years the Black Death had claimed over 30 million victims. The Russians followed 

the same tactics against the Swedes at Reval in 1710 by throwing plague victims over the 

city walls. 14 Contamination of wells and drinking water by similar means commonly 

occurred throughout the ages. In his Memoirs, Union Gen William Tecumseh Sherman 

records that Confederate forces, upon their retreat from Vicksburg, drove farm animals

into ponds and shot them, so that their ‘stinking carcasses’ would foul the water for the 

Union forces. 15 Not only did such actions have a demoralizing impact, but the 

consumption of the contaminated water probably accounted for many undocumented 

148 
epidemics of gastrointestinal disease. Sherman’s lack of any condemnatory remark, 

though, implies this was an accepted tactic on both sides. 

Although the Japanese were the only country during World War II to have verifiably

used chemical agents (on the Chinese), both the Allied and Axis powers stockpiled large 

quantities of chemical agents and instituted large BW agent research and development 

programs. One of the greatest mysteries of the war is why the warring nations did not use 

chemical agents more extensively. Most experts of the time surmised Hitler’s 

overwhelming aversion to chemical gas, having been a victim during World War I, or 

President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s early declaration of the US’ no-first-use policy made 

the difference. But later historians believe it was simply a fear held by all belligerents of

how far each side would go to retaliate which caused their inertia. The one notable, and 

infamous, example was poison gas, the German-preferred method of murdering 

thousands of Jews and other victims in their concentration camps. 

“The limitations applied to the so-called inhuman and atrocious means of war are 

nothing but international demagogic hypocrisies....Just because of its terrible efficacy, 

poison gas will be largely used in the war of the future.” 16 Giulio Douhet, an early 

airpower visionary, soon saw his prophecy become fact, and the clear military restraint 

demonstrated during the war by all but one country was not to be followed in the postwar

period. The following list reflects an increasing willingness and capability among a 

growing number of nations to employ these weapons. 

• Yemen (1963-67): Egypt used mustard bombs against Yemenese tribesmen. 17 

• Laos (1975-83): The Vietnamese used Soviet-supplied chemical and toxin 

weapons, killing 700-1,000 rebellious Hmong tribesmen. 18 

• Cambodia (1978-83): The Vietnamese used chemical agents on Cambodian 

resistance forces. 19 

• Afghanistan (1979-83): Soviets employed a variety of chemical weapons against 

the Mujahedin guerrillas. In one case, death was so sudden for three guerrillas their hands 

still gripped their weapons. 20 

One of the most notorious and publicized uses of chemical weapons happened during the 

Iraq-Iran war. United Nations’ investigation teams positively confirmed the use of sulfur

mustard, nerve (tabun), and blood (cyanide) agents during the years 1984-86. The 

casualty potential of these agents was graphically demonstrated on the village of Halabja,

where unprotected Kurdish civilians were singled out for an Iraqi airborne gas attack. 

This one assault injured some 100,000 people and may have killed several thousand. 21

Though the attack was confirmed and acknowledged by the Iraqis, there was no 

widespread global protest, only reinforcing the legitimacy of CW. 

A sad commentary to the above list of countries found to have , used CW includes 

one more—the United States. During the Vietnam conflict (1965-72) the US used a 

variety of defoliants or herbicides to clear the jungle that the guerrillas used for

concealment. One of the most effective of the applied chemicals was Agent Orange.

Without getting into the debate on the military’s prior knowledge of the medical effects

this chemical had on humans, and recognizing that the use of a herbicidal chemical was 

legal under international law, it is still painfully clear this compound has caused untold 

human suffering for both the Americans and the Vietnamese. Additionally, US military

forces extensively used the tear gas, CS, to drive the Vietcong out of their underground 

tunnels. 22 The offensive or first-use employment of these weapons by the United States 

149 
in the 1960s and 1970s, and then by the Soviet Union in the 1980s, established a critical 

precedent in the eyes of the world, especially those of the third world. These examples 

granted a legitimacy to these weapons and to their ownership and use by the very same

superpowers who vehemently asked for their banishment, making it one of the main

reasons many countries have developed and, in’ some cases, employed these agents in 

regional conflicts. 

The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons cannot be described solely as 

the possession of these weapons by an ever increasing body of nations around the world 

or even the legal or illegitimate means to produce them. Instead, proliferation resulted

from a gradual erosion of the technical, legal, moral, and political constraints which have 

in the past placed the hand of caution on many nations from producing or using them. 23

Another contributing factor is the widespread global proliferation of industrial, chemical,

and biomedical facilities, and the diffusion of the technological knowledge and reciprocal

capability to manufacture chemical and biological agents that are useful in both the

civilian and military arenas. Despite the requisite technical capability and knowledge

level of a prospective CW/BW developer and user having dramatically declined over the 

years, most countries today could not have established their programs and facilities

without some form of outside assistance. Judge William Webster, former director of the 

Central Intelligence Agency, has recounted that in the cases of the most notorious

nations—Iran, Syria, and Libya—the help of foreign companies had been critical in 

beginning their programs. These foreign industrial suppliers had provided the technical 

and operational expertise. Outside corporations built these production locations and 

provided the requisite chemicals, necessary equipment and tooling, trained the host 

country’s personnel, and even provided the parts for the munitions. Judge Webster 

concluded that over time these countries would develop their in-country expertise in the

production of chemicals and the requirements for filling, storing, and handling these 

munitions. 24 

A Global Problem 

Nations acquire CW and BW to advance their own interests. The Soviet Union and 

US both exercised considerable influence over the security policies of many nations until 

the end of the cold war. The bipolar nature of this confrontational era allowed the two 

superpowers to control, but not completely, the spread of WMD by answering the 

security concerns of many potential proliferators. The emergence of the world’s new 

multipolar international system has agitated security concerns in some regions, causing 

some nations to consider or reconsider chemical and biological weapons options. Like 

those who possess nuclear weapons, CW/BW can serve as a deterrent, offering that 

“equalizing edge” against more powerful neighbors or regional antagonists. Several of 

the more radical Arab states feel they have ample and legitimate justification for 

acquiring these weapons, rationalizing the necessity to offset their perceptions of the 

Israeli nuclear threat. Any country involved in a conflict can threaten CW/BW use to 

keep the fighting localized, inhibit outsiders who may intervene or, keep the fighting 

from spreading to other geographic areas. These countries ultimately resort to CW/BW 

when they perceive themselves in a losing situation and rely on them in one last, 

desperate gasp. In spite of the defensive characteristics of CW/BW, if any actor possesses 

150 
an offensive capability, whether used or not, this automatically confers upon the nation a 

large advantage since any adversary must now provide expensive protective 

countermeasures, which are at best cumbersome and definitely limit their combat 

effectiveness. The threat to use these weapons could cause such a public outcry and force 

the threatened country to succumb to the wishes of the bullying country without firing a

shot. 

As seen in table 6, the extent of the proliferation of CW and BW technology and/or

weapons is extensive and growing. 

The stark reality of this table is that some of these countries are undoubtedly in 

possession of an arsenal of CW or BW. The recent post-Persian Gulf War disclosure of 

Iraq’s secret, but very extensive CW/BW program by UN inspection teams, has jolted the 

world to this reality. 

The world in righteous indignation often decries the repulsive nature of these WMD 

when compared to normal conventional weapons. By contrast, the public’s view usually 

associates nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons with far more suffering, 

devastation, and cruelty. While this is true, it is only in scale. Throughout history 

conventional weapons have killed or injured far more people, animals, and plant life than 

the combined effects of all WMD. However, when we see, or even imagine, the 

horrendous effects of just one chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon, we find no 

comparison to conventional weapons. Western civilizations tend to view war and conflict 

in moralistic terms, and our cultural attitudes and expectations usually guide the decision 

and potential employment of CW/BW. Why then are we so surprised when confronted 

with an enemy who does not share these common values of right and wrong that we 

revere in the West? When a belligerent embraces a victory-at-all-cost philosophy, we 

must accept the possibility that a country or nonstate actor will use these terror weapons

when they consider the situation advantageous or for that matter hopeless. This scenario 

is especially true when led by individuals, like Saddam Hussein, who view the survival of 

their personal power and prestige through the survival of the state as synonymous

objectives. These individuals may view the use of CW/BW in a much more liberal 

manner than developed, democratic states, especially the United States. 

151 
Table 6 

CW/BW Club Membership in Developing Nations

COUNTRIES CHEMICAL WEAPONS BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 

Middle Eastern and North African 

Ethiopia Probable

Libya Probable Probable 

Egypt Probable Possible 

Iran Probable Probable 

Iraq Confirmed Confirmed 

Israel Probable Possible 

Saudi Arabia Possible 

Somalia Possible 

Syria Probable Probable 

Asia 

China Probable Probable 

India Probable 

Indonesia Possible 

Laos Possible 

North Korea Probable Probable 

South Korea Probable

Myanmar Probable 

Pakistan Probable 

Taiwan Probable Probable 

Thailand Possible 

Vietnam Probable 

Others 

Angola Possible 

South Africa Possible 

Argentina Possible 

Cuba Possible Possible 

Source: House Armed Services Committee, Countering the Chemical and Biological Threat in the Post

Soviet World, Report of the Special Inquiry into the Chemical and Biological Threat, 102d Cong., 2d sess.,

23 February 1993, 12-13. 

The global chemical trade has flourished in part due to the dual-use properties of 

many of the chemicals, equipment, and technologies involved. A myriad of the most 

basic chemical compounds are mass produced and traded around the world for 

completely legitimate civilian purposes. However, these compounds are also the basic 

ingredients for chemical weapons or the precursors in their manufacture. This reason also 

accounts for the close relationship between toxic agents and chemical products used for

many peaceful, commercial purposes that allows a producer to manufacture chemical 

weapons in plants that they can convert swiftly from commercial use to weapons 

production. These facilities have little or no outward differences with which to hint at 

their sinister internal capability. Experts have noted that with the twist of a few knobs or 

the simple change in catalyst, producers can convert a facility from producing pesticides 

to weapons in as little as 24 hours. 25 

152 
The concerns of dual-use capabilities are even more acute when discussing 

biological warfare because the technology and materials used in the legitimate 

commercial industry are in essence the same for producing a vaccine or a weapon. A 

fermentation process in a seed culture can produce anthrax bacteria within 96 hours. 

Cutting-edge technology in genetic bioengineering is now available that could lead to 

BW with agents impervious to diagnostic testing, able to defeat a body’s immunity, are 

drug-resistant, and may even be targeted at populations of certain ethnicity. 26 

One additional threat, the use of ballistic missiles, when coupled with either CW or 

BW, instills fear in the hearts of political leaders around the globe. No country today can 

defend against these missiles, including the US. The cost of one ballistic missile (about 

$1-8 million in contrast to the $20-60 million range of military aircraft) when added to

inadequate defensive capabilities explains the reasons third world nations have numerous 

ballistic missiles. It comes as no surprise then to learn that these same countries also 

possess CW and BW. Comparably, these missiles are vastly inferior to those of the US. 

They are primitive and inaccurate, but when mated with a CW or BW warhead, they 

become a credible threat. Saddam Hussein nearly proved that point during the Gulf War, 

firing many Scud intermediate-range missiles into Israel and Saudi Arabia. Fortunately, 

he did not use any of Iraq’s purported vast stores of chemical warheads, but the threat 

was there, and it was real. 

The Unknown Factor—Terrorism 

Today, and in the foreseeable future, the United States stands alone as the world’s

only superpower, a situation not seen since the height of the Roman Empire, almost two 

thousand years before. Like then, it seems ludicrous today that a state with a grievance 

would directly initiate a conventional war. It would cause a massive drain economically, 

and probably be counterproductive, as Iraq discovered in 1991 after their invasion of

Kuwait. The ease with which manufacturers can obtain and produce chemical and 

biological agents, coupled with the dramatic and devastating effects which users can 

promise by only incidental use of such weapons, also makes them ideal for terrorists or 

guerrilla organizations. Barring capture and use of a nuclear device by terrorists, no other 

weapon system can promise the havoc nor the guaranteed worldwide media attention. 

The use or threatened use of chemical or biological weapons represents one method by 

which terrorists could seek to maximize their shock impact, gain widespread publicity for 

their cause, and demoralize their chosen target by instilling fear and trepidation. The 

potentially ghastly effects of toxic weapons, the small quantities required to produce 

significant results against an unprotected community, and the vulnerability of many 

political, military, and civilian targets add to their attractiveness as terrorist weapons.

Extremist groups could use them as revenge weapons or as a means of leverage against a 

more powerful foe. The biggest advantage terrorists have in using these weapons is they 

have no sovereign territory upon which targeted countries could attempt to bring 

political, economic, or military pressure to bear. Terrorists can threaten a particular

country, but where can that country in turn apply political pressure against the terrorists, 

or, if required, retaliate? Terrorists understand they are shadows and cannot be directly 

touched. 

153 
In a Special National Intelligence Estimate the CIA asserted that “one successful 

incident involving such [lethal] agents would significantly lower the threshold of restraint 

on their application by other terrorists.” 27 Unfortunately, this prediction is in fact a 

reality, since terrorists already have been found with these weapons, and have clearly 

demonstrated the will to use them. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has discovered 

chemical and biological agents in the possession of several revolutionary groups, 

including cyanide by the Revolutionary Action Movement and the Covenant Sword in the 

Arm of the Lord; cultures of typhoid bacteria in the hands of the Order of the Rising Sun, 

a fascist group planning to contaminate Midwestern water supplies; and a nerve agent on 

an assassin who was planning to kill the US president in Washington, D.C., in 1974. 28

Israeli citrus fruit exports received serious damage when radical Palestinians injected 

Jaffa oranges with cyanide. Huk guerrillas used the same terror tactic in the Philippines 

when they poisoned pineapples due for export. In both situations, the rapid response of 

observant authorities averted these potential catastrophes. Scotland Yard foiled an 

extortion plot against the government of Cyprus, which had been threatened with 

explosions around the entire island by canisters containing dioxin. Finally, Parisian 

police, upon raiding the safe house of the German Red Army Faction terrorist group in 

1989, found a growing culture of clostridium botulinum, used in the manufacture of 

botulinum toxin. 29 

Despite these instances of successful actions by the authorities, these examples

highlight the range of problems that any terrorist organization can pose to authorities by 

using or threatening to use chemical or biological weapons. Also, apparently, fiscal 

constraints or technological complexity has not hampered this mode of terrorism. 

Terrorists neither need the support of large-scale production facilities nor the provision of 

highly reliable delivery systems. The terrorists’ aims, capacities, and circumstances

would determine the choice of using a chemical or biological weapon. The anticipated 

large number of casualties which would result from the use of only a small dose of a 

biological agent would tempt the more radical groups. Using these agents, the terrorists 

could either cause mass casualties and untold widespread panic by selectively targeting 

certain urban areas or initially demonstrating their resolve and the credibility of their

threat by releasing the agent in aerosol form within the ventilation systems of one or 

more buildings. The stability, relative controllability, and the ease of production and 

dispersal of CW would be conducive to a more cautious terrorist group, especially one 

physically close to the intended victim or some neutral territory. Although biological 

weapons could produce much larger numbers of injured or dead, chemical weapons 

would still cause the desired effects the terrorists wish to instill, as well as considerable 

panic and fear in the targeted population. 

Prospects for a Peaceful Solution 

Recognizing a need to curtail the insanity of these weapons occurred in the world not

just in the last few years, but during the first quarter of this century. The excesses and use

by all combatants in World War I spurred the United States, outside the auspices of the 

League of Nations, to insist on a new international agreement to control these weapons. 

The outcome of this push was the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits chemical and 

biological warfare by international law. While it was conceived as a means to eliminate 

154 
the conduct of such warfare, unfortunately the protocol did not prohibit the signatories 

the right to possess these weapons. This agreement simply promised that its members 

would not resort to their use. The flagrant employment of chemical weapons by Italy in 

the Italo-Abyssinian War (1935-36) only highlighted the ineffectiveness of the accord. It 

had no verification regime nor compliance enforcement procedures for violators. It was 

riddled with problems, but it was a start. 

A great deal of debate and discussion occurred throughout the world during the 

1950s and 1960s about eliminating chemical and biological weapons. Chemical weapons 

proved politically difficult for the world to grapple with, so the debate and discussion 

focused on biological weapons. In a unilateral action, President Richard Nixon in 1969 

renounced the US offensive biological weapons program: “Mankind already carries in its 

own hand too many of the seeds of its own destruction. The US shall renounce the use of 

biological agents and weapons, and all other methods of biological warfare.” 30 One year 

later he announced the dismantlement of preparations for their use, and between May 

1971 and May 1972, all existing antipersonnel BW stockpiles were destroyed. This

decision on the part of the president greatly facilitated the 1972 Biological Weapons 

Convention. , 

This follow-on agreement to the 1925 Geneva Protocol was co-signed by 103 

nations. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and 

Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 

was commonly referred to as the Biological Weapons Convention. This precedent -

setting treaty was the first multilateral arms control agreement crafted to eventually

eliminate a complete category of weaponry. The co-signers agreed, 

never to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other

biological agents or toxins, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in

quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful

purposes: and weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or 

toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

31 

The agreement took effect in March 1975 and helped to lessen global concerns over the 

development and use of BW, but it still had some serious flaws. BW continues even 

today, unconstrained by a stringent and intrusive monitoring regime equivalent to that 

found in the safeguards systems for nuclear materials enforced by the International 

Atomic Energy Agency or by the Chemical Weapons Convention. The agreement lacked 

strict verification procedures to ensure adherents abided by the provisions of the 

convention, and it assumed the United Nations would ensure compliance to its tenets by 

the current 140 signatories. 32 This assumption has not been the case. Since 1992 the 

United States and several other NATO members have strongly urged the establishment of 

just such a verification/compliance accord. Many other countries advanced immediate 

counterarguments, claiming that by their very nature, BW bans are unverifiable. The US, 

though, still argued for a separate, legally binding protocol detailing the needed 

procedures at a special conference in Geneva. The deficiency of no verification regime

was the exact problem encountered by the Geneva Protocol, and it wasn’t until the treaty 

on chemical weapons was completed that we met President Ronald Reagan’s conviction, 

“Trust, but verify.” 

155 
Before that chemical treaty became reality, the Australia Group was established in 

1984. An informal organization, it was open to any nation seeking to stem CW

proliferation through voluntary export controls on certain chemicals and equipment. 

Currently, the organization has 20 members: the 12 members of the European 

Community, and Australia, Austria, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, 

and the US. Each nation has established controls on the export of certain chemicals 

deemed useful in the production of CW. Some governments have established formal

procedures to prohibit or restrict exports, while others rely on voluntary notification from 

companies that receive export orders for chemicals on the export control list. The 

informal nature of the group and the varying abilities of nations to track and control their 

exports has hampered its effectiveness. Whereas the group today comprises primarily the 

Western industrialized nations; nevertheless, companies in these same nations have been

the source of the materials and technical assistance that have engendered CW 

proliferation. 

The first truly global disarmament treaty finally addressed chemical weapons when, 

in Paris, on 13 January 1993 member nations opened the Chemical Weapons Convention 

for signatures. To date 157 nations have signed. US officials received a pleasant surprise 

during the signing ceremony when four Arab states—Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and 

Tunisia signed despite the boycott of the Paris ceremony by the 22 member Arab League. 

Four other Arab states—Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—

signed within the next two months. 33 The treaty is a product of 24 years of negotiation, 

and it bans 

the development, production, use, transfer, retention or stockpiling of chemical weapons, 

precludes assisting, encouraging or inducing any state to engage in activity prohibited by

the treaty, and requires the destruction of production facilities and chemical weapons 

within a period of ten years (allowing an extension of five years for any country claiming

technical difficulties or extenuating circumstances). 34 

Negotiations on this agreement began during President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 

administration, but it wasn’t until after the Persian Gulf War in 1991 that the discussions 

got serious. The final document numbered 192 pages and will become law in two years or 

180 days after 65 countries ratify it—whichever is later. As of late 1994, only nine had 

done so. 35 The treaty creates the long-sought-after verification system, under the 

auspices of the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons, and a new 

monitoring and enforcement agency represented by all signers. It tasks them with 

implementing the complex agreement. This treaty includes no-right-of-refusal challenge 

inspections, potentially encompassing thousands of chemical plants around the world. 

The agreement additionally mandates the destruction of CW stockpiles by all signatories 

no later than 10 years after the treaty enters into force. Under those destruction

provisions, it will be the responsibility of each country to pay for destroying its own 

chemical weapons stocks; a cost expected to exceed $10 billion for Russia (with over 

40,000 tons of agents and weapons) and $7 billion for the US (with over 60,000 tons of 

agents and weapons). 36 

This convention is an extremely detailed and carefully crafted treaty which embodies

verification rules far more stringent than those found in any other multilateral 

disarmament agreement. To cover all contingencies, the treaty language also covers those

156 
activities which are not prohibited: industrial, agricultural, research, medical, 

pharmaceutical, or other peaceful purposes; and protective purposes related to chemical 

defense. The treaty also prohibits riot control agents as a method of warfare, but it does 

permit law enforcement to include these agents for domestic riot control (some observers 

consider the law enforcement allowance as a loophole in the treaty). The treaty protects

confidential information gathered during inspections to verify the activities at civilian and 

military locations. The verification requirements or restrictions of legitimate chemicalrelated knowledge and material among member states should not hamper the economic 

and technological development of the affected states. For most of the signatories, this 

treaty is the first foray into the complexities of an agreement with such extensive 

reporting requirements and the intrusive verification provisions that will impinge upon 

military and industrial activities alike. The effectiveness of this convention, though,

depends upon their rigor of accomplishing the verification and compliance measures, the 

number of countries involved, and their determination to strictly enforce its provisions. 

The limits imposed by this treaty in relation to the Geneva Protocol have become more

complete and intrusive, and so to have the consequences of violation and the value of 

verification increased. The issue of verification has historically suffered through a 

torturous maze in the negotiating process, for it has been the most difficult and complex 

requirement to resolve. 

Even an effective verification regime can still permit serious consequences, as 

countries continually push the envelope of the agreement’s legal boundaries. One of the 

most serious of these outcomes may be termed breakout strategy. Nations do not have to

follow the identical path of the superpowers by manufacturing and stockpiling large 

caches of chemical weapons. They could, as an alternative, accumulate enough 

precursors (quite legal under the provisions of the CWC), maintain the dual-use 

production facilities in their country, and clandestinely manufacture the unfilled 

munitions and delivery systems. They would then have the requisite pieces to fit together

at a moment’s notice for a rapid breakout of their chemical weapons should they feel the 

need to do so. This breakout would have a corollary effect on the signatories to the treaty, 

lulling them into a euphoria that the convention was effectively controlling these 

weapons and reducing the fear of other nations spending large quantities of resources on 

chemical defensive preparations. 

This breakout strategy could have even more devastating effects when considering 

biological weapons. As mentioned previously, the amount of agent required would be 

less, the dual-use facilities would correspondingly be smaller and more easily concealed 

in the labyrinth of the commercial field of medical research. In addition, any attacks by 

these weapons would be difficult to identify, far more so in areas where similar diseases 

were endemic. A nation’s biological warfare defensive program could easily conceal 

much of the basic research for an offensive breakout, all openly supported by 

dissemination trials, delivery systems tests, and exercising containment facilities under 

the guise of defense. These facilities could manufacture in short order the necessary 

biological agents using state-of-the-art production techniques. Militarily significant 

quantities of biological weapons can be produced from a seed stock quickly, as in a 

month or so. 37 

157 
Conclusion 

In a speech before the United Nations in 1993 President Bill Clinton stated, ‘The end

of the Cold War did not bring us to the millennium of peace. Indeed, it simply removed 

the lid from many cauldrons of ethnic, religious and territorial animosity....As weapons of

mass destruction fall into more hands, even small conflicts can threaten to take on 

murderous proportions.” 38 The past policies adopted by the global community, and 

specifically the United States, to confront the use of CW/BW by any nation, especially 

third world, or by terrorists, will not work today. To totally curb the use of these

weapons, nations must agree upon a plan which eliminates the incentives to acquire and 

employ them. Those countries or nonstate actors who possess CW/BW do so because

they believe these weapons have inherent strategic utility. If someone can convince the 

other nations that the cost of acquisition and employment is too great, and the anticipated 

benefits too small, then they might have no incentive to have and use them. 

Observers have noted glimmerings of hope and progress in the control of these 

weapons. The membership of the Australia group has recently become larger and

stronger with the addition of Finland and Sweden. The list of internationally controlled 

CW/BW-related materials has increased under US prodding, jumping from 11 to 50 

weapons precursors. Controls also have been introduced on chemical and biological 

weapons-related, dual-use equipment, and entire chemical plants. Regional achievements

are also in evidence. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile agreed on a CW/BW-free zone in 1991. 

East European export controls have greatly expanded; in fact, the Czech republic,

Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania are meeting the Australia Group’s standards. 

Israel, China, and India have adopted some limited export controls as well. The net result 

of the persistent efforts has been to choke off most of the traditional sources of supply for 

chemical and biological weapons programs. They cannot hope to eliminate completely 

the proliferation of these weapons. 

Although the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions have proved correct 

and adequate up to a point, member nations must continue to create a complete,

verifiable, and enforceable global ban on the development, production, stockpiling, and 

transfer of these weapons of mass destruction. Simply maintaining a credible chemical 

and biological retaliatory capability and defensive posture does not offer a panacea to an 

active global effort to achieve final elimination of CW/BW. In the end, though, 

verification will never provide complete assurance of this ban, as long as the actors

believe strongly in their utility. The world must ultimately develop incentives that

provide states positive reinforcement to abandon their proliferation interests. Regional 

security arrangements may help to build confidence and reduce tensions, addressing the

underlying security concerns that fuel the arms races. The goal embraces the total 

renunciation of these weapons by all nations of the world, and development of all

nations’ economic, political, and technical status for them to become competitive in their 

region without resorting to unconventional weapons. The goal is a worthy one. But it is

attainable only if we all want it. 

158 
Notes 

1

 Edward M. Spiers, Chemical and Biological Weapons: A Study in Proliferation 

(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 156. 

2

 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and

Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Washington, D.C.: Government 

Printing Office, January 1993). 

3

 UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary General on Chemical and

Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use, A/7575 (New 

York: United Nations, 1 July 1969), 6, 13. 

4

 G. S. Pearson, “Prospects for Chemical and Biological Arms Control: The Web of 

Deterrence,” Washington Quarterly 16, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 145-62. 

5

 Neil C. Livingstone and Joseph D. Douglas, Jr., CBW: The Poor Man’s Atomic 

Bomb (Washington, D.C.: Corporation Press, Inc., 1984), 7. 

6

 Ibid. 

7

 Ibid. 

8

 Ibid. 

9

 Christopher Centner, “The Arab View of Chemical Weapons and Its Implications 

for International Chemical Weapons Treaty Compliance,” Defense Intelligence College

Seminar Research Paper (Defense Intelligence College, undated), 3. 

10 John P. Sinnott, “It was Algerian and Canadian soldiers at Ypres who suffered 

history’s first major poison gas attack,” Military History, April 1994, 12. The Germans

first used an irritant on 27 October 1914 at Neuve Chappelle. The Germans fired 3,000 

rounds of 105-mm projectiles filled with sneezing powder at Indian troops and French

cavalry. The shells contained shrapnel embedded with the powder, and they were 

designed to grind and disperse the powder in the explosion. The barrage, however, was so 

ineffective, the British and French failed to realize that chemical munitions had been used 

until the fact was uncovered in a postwar investigation. 

11 Maj Allen Kirkman, Jr., “CBW—Are We Prepared to Combat the 

Chemical/Biological Threat,” Naval War College Research Paper, Naval War College, 8 

February 1994, 5. Interestingly enough, the first casualties were among the Germans who 

lost three soldiers to gas from the cylinders ruptured by Allied shelling. 

12 Richard McCarthy, The Ultimate Folly (New York: Alfred Knopf, Inc., 1969), 5. 

13 Robert S. Root-Bernstein, “Infectious Terrorism,” The Atlantis, July 1991, 44. 

14 Col Ernest T. Takafuji, MD, MPH, US Army, “Biological Weapons and Modem 

Warfare.” Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) Executive Research Project 

S72 (Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1991), 4. 

15 J. H. Rothschild, Tomorrow’s Weapons—Chemical and Biological (New York: 

McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), 18. 

16 Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force 

History, 1983), 181. 

17 Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Chemical Weapons Threat, 1985, 21. 

18 Charles Bay, “An Update on the Other Gas Crisis,” Parameters, December 1979,

27-35. 

19 NBC Defense and Technology International 1, no. 4 (September 1986): 6. 

159 
Notes 

20 Joseph Douglas, “Chemical Weapons: An Imbalance of Terror,” Strategic Review. 

Summer 1982,43,47.” 

21 Ibid.; and Spiers, 16. 

22 Institute for Defense Analyses, Summary Report: Chemical Warfare in the Third

World War (Bethesda, Md., IDA. 1987), 2-3. Riot control agents, like CS, were not 

considered true chemical weapons during this period, but because of America’s use in 

Vietnam, these agents can no longer be used as methods of warfare. See also note 31. 

23 Brad Roberts, ed., Chemical Warfare Policy: Beyond the Binary Production 

Decision, Significant Issues Series 9 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, 1987), 36. 

24 Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs and its Permanent Subcommittee on

Investigations. 101st Cong., 1st sess., 10 February 1989, 11-13. 

25 Jill Smo1owe, “The Search for a Poison Antidote,” Time, 6 January 1989, 22. 

26 Edward Spiers, Chemical Warfare (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 

97-100. 

27 Ibid.; and Spiers, Chemical and Biological Weapons, 172. 

28 Senate, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Technology and the Law of the 

Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 100th Cong., 2d sess., 19 May 1988, 15 

September 1988, 131. 

29 Ibid. 

30 National Security Decision Memorandum No. 35, 25 November 1969. 

31 Jane M. Orient, “Chemical and Biological Warfare: Should Defenses Be 

Researched and Deployed?” Journal of the American Medical Association 262, no. 8 

(August 1989): 644-48. The Biological Weapons Convention, signed by 74 nations on 10 

April 1972, was the first disarmament agreement since World War II to involve the actual 

destruction of weapons. The convention does not apply to such chemical agents as the 

defoliants and antipersonnel gases used by the US in Vietnam. These were subsequently

included in the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. 

32 Edward J. Lacey, “Tackling the Biological Weapons Threat: The Next 

Proliferation Challenge,” Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1994, 53. 

33 “News Briefs-Chemical Treaty Gains New Signatories,” Arms Control Today, 

March 1993, 27. 

34 Ibid.; and Spiers, Chemical and Biological Weapons, 130. 

35 Rick Maze, “Chemical Weapons Treaty is Mired in Doubts,” Air Force Times, 24 

October 1994, 36. 

36 Lee Feinstein, “Chemical Weapons Convention Signed by 130 Countries in Paris,” 

Arms Control Today, January/February 1993, 20. 

37 Douglas Feith, “Biological Weapons and the Limits of Arms Control,” The 

National Interest, no. 6 (Winter 1986/87): 80-84. 

38 Graham S. Pearson, “Forging an Effective Biological Weapons Regime,” Arms

Control Today, June 1994, 14. 

160 
13 

Conventional Armaments Mapping Warfare 

in the Twenty-First Century 

Mark Browne 

In 1995, conventional armaments abound in every corner of the world. The rapid 

acceleration of conventional weapons acquisition—by governments and by 

nongovernmental organizations—poses significant challenges to the United States and its 

allies as the next century approaches. Predicting the nature of these challenges, including 

the warfare these weapons will generate, requires a careful examination. We must 

understand the range of these conventional threats if we are to formulate a strategy for 

coping with them. The most significant challenge to global security in the conventional 

arena comes from the proliferation of major weapon systems (e.g., F-15 fighters, “smart 

weapons,” tanks) and from the largely uncontrolled commerce in small arms (e.g., 

automatic rifles, hand grenades, shoulder-operated antiaircraft weapons). The developed 

nations, led by the United States, are the foremost arms sources, although the primary 

threat of conflict due to conventional weapons proliferation is in the third world. 

This essay will identify the problem by defining and describing conventional 

weapons and by quantifying world arms transfers of these weapons. The next section will 

analyze examples of armed conflict, discuss the world’s expanding industrial base, and 

examine the potential for future conflict. The last part will look at the prospects for

peaceful solutions, including discussions on nonlethal technology, current diplomatic 

efforts, and export controls. 

Identifying the Problem 

Conventional arms are globally plentiful, and are the weapons of choice in most 

ethnic, substate, and intrastate conflicts. The evidence indicates that conventional arms

proliferation itself is destabilizing the globe and is a significant contributor to worldwide

armed conflict. Conventional weapons have been described in various ways, but most 

studies characterize them as “major” weapon systems. Richard Grimmett offers examples 

of “major” conventional arms: 

161 
Tanks and self-propelled guns, artillery, armored personnel carriers and armored cars,

major and minor surface combatants, submarines, guided missile patrol boats, supersonic

and subsonic combat aircraft, other military aircraft, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles, 

surface-to-surface missiles, and anti-shipping missiles. 1

 

The world’s leading suppliers of major conventional weapons in 1993 are displayed 

in figure 5. The values of those weapons transfers are indicated vertically at the left. 

Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 

1986-1993 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1994), 86. 

Figure 5. Suppliers of Major Conventional Arms in 1993 

As may be seen, the United States ranks first in the world in supplying conventional 

arms—-an interesting paradox as the US participates in worldwide arms control efforts. 2

US weapons from the cold war era are currently being used in conflicts such as those in 

Afghanistan and Somalia. 3

 Russia’s share has steadily declined—to third place, behind 

second-ranked United Kingdom (UK). 

The world’s leading purchasers of major conventional weapons, and the value of 

those weapons, are listed in figure 6. 

162 
Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 

1986-1993 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1994), 70. 

Figure 6. Major Conventional Arms Deliveries in the Third World in 1993 

Figures 5 and 6 provide an indication of recent trends in arms sales. 4

 They do not, 

however, illustrate the relative sophistication of these arms; nor do they give any 

indication of weapon quality. 

The fact that the United States, for example, has not delivered the largest number of

weapons in a category to a region does not necessarily mean that the weaponry it has 

transferred cannot compensate, to an important degree, for larger quantities of less

capable weapons systems delivered by Russia, the major West Europeans or other 

suppliers. 5

 

Also, there is no single worldwide database for the accounting of major versus small 

conventional weapons, a fact which causes obvious problems for any analyst attempting 

to draw conclusions. And H. St. John B. Armitage, a retired British diplomat specializing 

in Middle East affairs, observes that Grimmett’s numbers “suffer from different methods

of calculation and estimates, guesstimates and speculation, and delays in release of data 

for security reasons.” 6

 Still, these statistics provide a framework and a point of departure

for this discussion. 

The spread of “small” conventional arms is of concern because it also is a

destabilizing influence. Aaron Karp provides the following taxonomy of small arms: 

First is defining small arms by exclusion, as those weapons not covered in existing data

collections...[Second is] Small arms defined as weapons carried by ...a normal infantry

soldier. [Third is] Small arms defined as those transported by animals and light vehicles.

This standard permits extension of the definition to include heavy machine guns and

some light artillery. [Fourth is] The empirical definition of small arms....defines(s) the 

weapons of ethnic war empirically, listing all the weapons actually used in internecine

conflict. 7

 

163 
For purposes of this study, Karp’s is accepted as the most complete taxonomy. But since 

there is no comprehensive accounting of “small” conventional weapons, there has been 

no attempt to quantify the transfers of these weapons. 

The impact of small arms can be described in economic terms. For example, it costs

approximately $112,000 (fiscal year 1995 dollars) to outfit a “generic” platoon with 

everything necessary to fight, but this figure does not include support equipment such as 

spares, training, and so forth. 8

 A third world country, substate, or terrorist group could 

outfit 300 combat troops for the relatively low cost of $1 million. Where would a group 

obtain these weapons? They are easily obtained on the international arms market. For 

example, Sam Cummings, a British subject born in Philadelphia, runs Interarms, a firm 

that is over 30 years old. “Cummings sells over $80 million worth of pistols, rifles, 

submachine guns, hand grenades, and other weaponry every year to customers ranging 

from Guatemala to the People’s Republic of China.” 9

 Jane’s Infantry Weapons 1994-95 

lists over 250 manufacturers of infantry weapons. Some of the products made by firms 

listed in Jane’s are antitank ammunition, antitank grenades, antitank launchers, antitank 

systems, automatic pistols, automatic rifles, night vision systems, grenade launchers, 

hand and rifle grenades, and machine guns. 10 It is appropriate to say that “major systems 

cost millions of dollars, but millions of people are killed very cost-effectively by small 

arms.” 11 

Current and Future Armed Conflict 

Conventional warfare since the cold war has been primarily intrastate, nationalistic, 

ethnic, political, and/or religious in nature. According to the Stockholm International 

Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 1994, there were “34 major armed conflicts 

in 28 locations in 1993.” 12 The institute defines major armed conflicts as, “prolonged 

combat between the military forces of two or more governments or of one government 

and at least one organized armed group, and incurring battle-related deaths of at least 

1,000 persons during the entire conflict.” 13 Each of these conflicts features the use of

conventional arms. Conventional weapons proliferation has contributed to numerous

conflicts in the 1990s (e.g., the Gulf War, Somalia, the drug war, and Bosnia). 

Proliferation of conventional arms was a factor in the Gulf War. The Iraqi army

ballooned from 180,000 to 900,000 troops in the 1980s. Iraq’s conventional weapons

inventories also jumped dramatically: tanks increased by 211 percent (from 2,700 to 

5,700); artillery increased by 161 percent (from 2,300 to 3,700); combat aircraft 

increased by 286 percent (from 332 to 950). 14 Saddam Hussein’s armed forces were 

equipped primarily by the Soviet Union, but the French were also major suppliers. The

Soviets supplied “thousands of tanks, hundreds of aircraft, and at least 819 Scuds.” 15

Iraq’s purchases from the Soviet Union totaled approximately $23.5 billion from 1982 to 

1989. France provided technical assistance: “French technicians reputedly made guidance 

modifications to Iraqi Scuds, and married the French Thomson-CSF Tiger radar to a 

Soviet-built 11-76, creating the Iraqi Adnan AWACS.” 16 

Lebanese businessman Sarkis Soghanalian also assisted the Iraqis in their arms

buildup as a “middleman” in arms negotiations. He made his fortune by brokering arms

deals with Saddam Hussein. Soghanalian engineered a sale of 26 Hughes MD-50 

helicopters to Iraq as civilian aircraft; the helicopters were later outfitted with machine 

164 
guns. 17 Also involved in the Iraqi arms trade was Chilean arms dealer Carlos Cardoen. 

Cardoen supplied Iraq with cluster bomb technology worth $400 million. He was finally

charged in 1992 (by the US government) with “money laundering and illegal shipment of 

weapons-grade zirconium from the United States to cluster bomb facilities in Chile and

Iraq.” 18 

Also involved in Iraq’s arms buildup was James Guerin, who headed International 

Signal and Control, operating out of Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Guerin “engaged in a 

pattern of financial fraud and money laundering...[he] routinely violated the international 

arms embargo against South Africa and smuggled hundreds of thousands of critical 

electronic components to Iraqi military factories.” 19 Finally, convicted of violating US

arms export control laws in 1992, Guerin was sentenced to 15 years in prison. 

On the surface, it is obvious that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led to the Gulf War.

However, it can be argued that Iraq’s arms buildup in the 1980s contributed to Saddam’s

inflated confidence and his decision to invade. By August of 1990, Hussein possessed a 

“powerful and combat-tested military equipped with first-rate military systems, and he 

had embarked on a vigorous weapons development program.” 20 Therefore, conventional 

arms proliferation was an important factor in the Gulf War, leading, at least indirectly, to 

American and coalition involvement. 

The situation in Somalia also demonstrates the problems associated with the 

proliferation of conventional arms. American support of former Somali ruler Siad Barre 

contributed, at least in part, to weapons proliferation in Somalia. The US “supplied nearly 

$300 million in military aid [to Somalia].... When Barre was overthrown in 1991, a 

portion of his stockpile of US-supplied military trucks, armored vehicles, antitank 

weapons, rifles, and ammunition found its way into the hands of the armed gangs....” 21

Thus, the proliferation of major and small weapons contributed to anarchy as the 

warlords, including Mohamed Farah Aidid, competed for power and brought starvation 

and hardship to the Somali people. This, in turn, brought the attention of the world press, 

and ultimately the involvement of the United States in a United Nations peacekeeping 

effort. Once again, conventional weapons proliferation played a role in American military

involvement. 

The drug war is perhaps a nonpolitical example of armed conflict. Central and South

American nations, as well as the United States, are employing conventional military

forces to counter the drug threat. One reason for the use of military force is the weaponry 

possessed by the Medellin and Cali drug cartels—the two largest. Drug arrests and

information from the US Customs Service provide insight into the type of arms possessed 

by the cartels. Upon the arrest of two drug smugglers in 1988, the Customs Service 

recovered: 

100 pounds of C-4 explosive, 25 ...machine guns, 20 AR-15 rifles and five M-60

...machine guns. Agents were able to identify two previous shipments that contained the

following: 25 pounds of Tovex plastic explosives, 30 AR-15 rifles, five 50-caliber rifles, 

25 silencers for ...machine pistols, two...sniper rifles and night vision equipment.

22 

Additionally, Mexican authorities seized “360 AK-47 rifles, 145,000 rounds of 

ammunition, six US-made military rifles, metal detectors, infrared rifle scopes, [and] 92 

bayonets...[in 1988].” 23 These weapons were bound for the drug cartels in Colombia. In 

addition, US officials apprehended individuals representing the cartel who were 

165 
attempting to buy 24 Stinger surface-to-air missiles. This data indicates the types of 

weapons favored by the cartels as well as their firm resolve to defend their drug empires. 

It is also an excellent example of how nongovernmental organizations can impact the 

policies of nations. 

American and United Nations peacekeeping or peace-enforcement engagements in

the Bosnian civil war are fraught with danger because the war has the potential for 

ensnaring participating nations in a major armed conflict. Conventional weapons are 

playing a critical role in Bosnia. The Bosnians have an army of approximately 60,000 

troops with a reserve of 120,000 more, about 40 T-55 main battle tanks, 30 armored 

personnel carriers, and nearly 400 artillery pieces. The Serbians, on the other hand,

possess an army of approximately 80,000 troops. They have an estimated 330 main battle 

tanks, including the M-84 and the T-72. They also have 800 artillery pieces, various

surface-to-air-missiles, and approximately 40 aircraft. 24 Qualitatively, the Serbs have 

better leadership than the Bosnians, having inherited the Yugoslav general staff. Also, the 

Serbs have a two-to-one margin in artillery to go with their almost ten-to-one margin in 

tanks. The suffering and deaths in that region (casualties are estimated at 20,000-50,000 

through 1993), and the unrelenting ethnic nature of the war, make Bosnia highly unstable. 

25 The presence of conventional arms in great quantity exacerbates the instability.

Resolution of that conflict is not imminent; therefore, American and European 

involvement in a conventional war there must not be ruled out. 

A related area of global security concern is the military industrial base in the third

world. Approximately 40 third world countries now possess the ability to manufacture 

weapons. 26 “In 1950, defense industries in the developing world produced just $2 million 

worth of goods; in 1984, the figure was $1.1 billion. [Currently], at least 19 [countries] 

build submarines. Ten to fifteen countries are [currently] producing cruise missiles.” 27

Third world weapons producers are not going to displace the traditional Western 

suppliers, but they can fit into “niche” markets because they offer “a combination of low 

prices, good customer service, and guaranteed availability.” 28 Examples include China,

which exported missiles to the Middle East and is “now offering an advanced fuel-air 

explosive to international buyers.” 29 Other producers in the developing world ranking in 

the top 15 of world arms suppliers in 1991 include Israel, North Korea, Brazil, and 

Bulgaria. 30 In 1991, conventional arms exports of these nations amounted to: China $925 

million, Israel $380 million, North Korea $160 million, Brazil $70 million, and Bulgaria 

$70 million. 31 The primary contribution of third world arms producers is to increase the 

firepower available to states or substate groups engaged in regional conflicts, and to 

increase the cost of intervention by the developed nations. 32 

Some relevant observations about future armed conflict confronting the world 

community may now be offered. The primary threat in most of the third world concerns

either ethnic conflict, civil war, political/ideological war, or revolutionary/terrorist 

activity. The developed nations of the world may also become involved in conflict, as the 

Gulf War, Somalia, the drug war, and Bosnia indicate. In the early 1990s, 28 regions in 

the world experienced major armed conflicts. Many states in the third world have the 

capability to wage wars with weapons provided by a sponsor state, captured stockpiles of 

weapons, weapons bought on the international market, or weapons produced in their own 

country. These facts should interest the global community in pursuing more thorough 

arms control policies, especially in the third world. 

166 
Prospects for Peaceful Solutions 

Prospects for peaceful solutions to the third world’s armed conflicts, and those likely 

to arise in the near future, depend on many factors. That the world community needs 

more focus on solutions to the proliferation of conventional weapons is evident, but 

“how” is problematic. The 1994 US National Security Strategy (NSS) contains American 

policy on the proliferation of conventional weapons. This strategy document provides the 

overarching military and political objectives for our nation with respect to conventional 

arms, and offers the following: 

We will continue to seek greater transparency, responsibility and, where appropriate, 

restraint in the transfer of conventional weapons....The UN register of conventional arms

transfers is a start in promoting greater transparency of weapons transfers and buildups, 

but more needs to be done.

33 

This document is particularly important because America, as the sole remaining 

superpower, will be an integral player in negotiating worldwide arms control agreements. 

The NSS underscores this position: “The US is prepared to promote, help negotiate, 

monitor and participate in regional arms control undertakings compatible with American 

national security interests.” 34 

One area with the potential to resolve conflicts peacefully, or with minimal 

casualties, is the use of nonlethal weaponry. In fact, using nonlethal weapons to combat

the effects of conventional weapons poses an interesting paradox. The SIPRI Yearbook 

1994 defines nonlethal weapons as: “both old measures and new technological initiatives 

aimed at producing disabling effects without necessarily causing significant harm to

persons.” 35 The US Departments of Defense and Energy are currently pursuing

technologies to develop a nonlethal capability. 36 So far, the most promising uses for this 

technology appear to be in peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations. 

One of the main difficulties this program will face in the coming years is funding. In 

an era of tight budgets, with the military services fighting over a shrinking share, the 

competition for nonlethal research dollars will be ferocious. Nevertheless, the Army’s 

Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center in New Jersey has been 

working on this type of weapon for years. Other agencies involved include Sandia 

National Laboratories in New Mexico and Lawrence Livermore Laboratories in 

California. The primary value of nonlethal weapons is that they may reduce the deaths 

caused by conventional arms. Their use may be particularly effective in those third world 

nations where conflicts are limited and the armed forces are relatively small. 

Many nonlethal technologies are being developed in the United States. One is a

“sticky foam” that will quickly incapacitate a person. Others include antisensor weapons 

that temporarily disable human eyes or other sensors. 37 High-power microwave 

technologies may generate an electromagnetic pulse that stops electronic systems from 

operating and disables radar and communication devices. 38 Also being developed are 

liquid metal embrittlement agents and Teflon lubricants that will render concrete

pavements useless. Other possibilities are chemical agents that will change fuel to jelly 

and sleep-inducing chemicals that can turn an unruly mob into “sleeping babies.” 39 

These are only some of the nonlethal technologies being developed. Many are years 

away from deployment, but USA Today and CNN News reported that US troops carried 

167 
nonlethal weapons as they assisted in the “withdrawal of United Nations forces from 

Somalia.” 40 Lt Gen Anthony C. Zinni, commanding a force composed of troops from six, 

nations, selected “guns that fire tiny beanbags, rubber bullets, and two kinds of sticky 

foam.” 41 These weapons helped to avoid a situation similar to that which occurred in 

June 1993 when 24 Pakistanis and 20 Somalians were killed during an exchange of 

gunfire. “We took a look at what we could use to break up a crowd formation before they 

became dangerous to troops. The idea was if you don’t have to hurt people, don’t do it.” 

42 Officials at the Department of Defense elected not to use experimental lasers because 

they have the potential to cause serious injury. 

International Control Efforts 

Many diplomatic initiatives have addressed the problem of conventional arms. Some 

of the more important agreements include the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 

(CFE) Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Organization of 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Forum for Security Cooperation, 

Confidence and Security Building Measures, the Permanent-Five Guidelines, and the UN 

Register of Conventional Weapons. Each initiative attempts to put limits and/or controls 

on the acquisition and delivery of conventional armaments. Each is successful to a certain 

extent, but each also has limitations. These initiatives should be examined to determine

their strengths, weaknesses, and prospects for the future. 

The CFE treaty entered into force in 1992. Signed in 1990 by 22 NATO and Warsaw 

Treaty Organization (WTO) countries, it is now recognized by 30 nations. The agreement 

limits conventional armaments in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) region of Europe. 43

According to Amy Woolf, “Each group of [CFE] states (NATO countries on the one 

hand and former members of the now-defunct Warsaw Pact on the other) will be

permitted to keep in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals geographic area a maximum of 20,000 

tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 aircraft, and 2,000 

attack helicopters.” 44 Adjustments in accordance with this treaty must be carried out by

17 November 1995. 45 The CFE treaty, while containing some rough spots, is operating 

successfully. Even the fall of the Soviet Union did not cause a crisis, since many of the 

political changes in Europe are now incorporated in the agreement. The goal of the treaty

is cooperation by the member nations on matters of security, so there is a strong motive 

for compliance. 46 On the other hand, CFE has not prevented or ameliorated any conflicts, 

such as that in Azerbaijan. 

One problem currently faced by CFE has to do with the “flank zones.” 47 These flank

zones surround Russia, and the CFE agreement dictates sublimits on the equipment that

forces placed in these areas may have. Russia has objected to these sublimits for four 

reasons: 

First, the flank limits are “old think,” reflecting a cold war military balance that now 

exists only in history books. Second, ...the flank limits will force Russia to cram its

equipment in Kaliningrad—the small Russian enclave sandwiched between Poland and 

Lithuania. Third....potential conflicts in the Transcaucus require an additional deployment

of forces...Fourth....Russia would like to use existing garrisons in its northern flanks to 

house troops...from other parts of the former Soviet Union.... 48 

168 
While the Russians have some good points, the US is reluctant to agree for fear that

this type of change will “open the floodgates,” thus undermining the treaty. 49 

NATO’s primary benefit from CFE is the massive reduction in Warsaw Pact military

equipment. The treaty was “a reflection of and a contribution towards a hugely 

diminished Soviet military threat to Western Europe, and military presence in Eastern

Europe.” 50 Figure 7 shows the adjustments to treaty limited equipment that each major

“group of states” must make to reach the required goals. The “zero” (0) line represents 

the level of equipment allowed the various forces. Columns running downward from zero 

represent mandatory reductions in equipment: NATO’s upward column indicates that it 

may add 1,966 pieces of equipment (but is not required to do so). 51 

The MTCR includes 23 member nations. 52 The original agreement seeks to control 

missile delivery systems exports. Although the MTCR is not a treaty, signatories 

mutually agree to follow its guidance. (There is no enforcement mechanism). The MTCR 

classifies weapon systems into two categories. Category I includes delivery systems with 

a range greater than 300 nautical miles and a payload greater than 500 kilograms. 53

Examples of these delivery systems include intercontinental ballistic missiles, drones, 

cruise missiles, and remotely piloted vehicles. Sales and transfers of delivery systems in 

category I must overcome a “strong presumption of denial.” This means that members of 

the MTCR cannot complete a sale of category I systems unless they have an acceptable 

rationale to overcome the presumption of denial. Category II systems include guidance 

sets, propellants, and other materials used by delivery vehicles. Category II systems are 

easier to sell or transfer because there is no presumption of denial. The MTCR stems the 

flow of weapons of mass destruction; and since many of these systems deliver 

conventional munitions, the MTCR applies also to the proliferation of conventional 

weapons. 

Source: Adapted from data contained in Stuart Croft, “Negotiations, Treaty Terms 

and Implications,” in Stuart Croft, ed., The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 

Treaty (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1994), 32-

34. 

Figure 7. CFE-Required Force Structure Adjustments 

169 
Expanding the MTCR globally could provide some additional progress in

conventional arms control. The positive side to this argument is that the inclusion of all

governments increases delivery system transparency. On the negative side, there will 

always be rogue states that will never comply with any arms control initiative. These 

states could undermine a global agreement. Yet an expansion of the MTCR would be 

useful and appropriate because the benefits of transparency outweigh the negative impact 

of renegade nations. Indeed, the national security strategy states: “To combat missile

proliferation, the United States seeks prudently to broaden membership of the Missile 

Technology Control Regime (MTCR).” 54 

The Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which began in 1975 with 

the passage of the Helsinki Final Act, currently includes 53 states in Europe, along with 

Canada and the United States. 55 The membership of Serbia/Montenegro (the former 

Yugoslavia) has been suspended due to aggression in Bosnia. The primary functions of 

the OSCE relate to “early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management.” 56

Helsinki, Finland, was the site of a cardinal meeting in July 1992 to determine the future 

of OSCE. That summit produced the Helsinki Document, which was agreed to by the 

heads of state of the member nations. The document sums up the purpose of OSCE: 

The OSCE is a forum for dialogue, negotiation, and cooperation, providing direction and 

giving impulse to the shaping of the new Europe. We are determined to use it to give new

impetus to the process of arms control, disarmament, and confidence and securitybuilding. 

57 

The central question facing the OSCE is whether it will be successful in arbitrating 

future conflicts. Toward that end, the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) was formed

in 1992 to deal with OSCE security issues. Its task is, “trying to address arms control 

negotiations, security enhancement, cooperation, and conflict prevention.” 58 The FSC

has established a “Program of Immediate Action” to achieve its objectives of “preventive

diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building.” 59 The 

program has 12 items on its agenda, divided into track A and track B, Track A items 

include “arms control and Confidence and Security Building Measures, enforcement,

force generation capabilities, global exchange of military information, cooperation in

nonproliferation efforts, and regional measures,” 60 Track B items are “force planning,

cooperation in defense conversion, cooperation on nonproliferation (excluding track A 

items), military cooperation and contacts, regional security issues, and security

enhancement consultations,” 61 The FSC has promise in the area of arms control if 

consensus is achieved on the track A and track B agenda items, Expanding the FSC 

globally could provide the framework necessary for worldwide conflict resolution. 

Related to the OSCE and the FSC are confidence and security building measures 

(CSBM). Guidelines regarding CSBMs were agreed to by all the OSCE states at the 

Stockholm 1986 conference. These guidelines “increase openness and predictability 

about military activities in Europe, with the aim of reducing the risk of armed conflict in

Europe.” 62 Vienna Conferences in 1990 and 1992 revised the guidelines, which now 

include requirements for 42 days’ prior notice for exercises containing 9,000 troops and 

250 tanks. 63 Additionally, participating states must provide at least a one-year 

notification for exercises involving more than 40,000 troops. 64 The guidelines also 

provide exercise observation privileges for member states; and in 1993, four reportable 

170 
exercises were conducted. 65 CSBMs provide transparency and build confidence between 

European nations due to exercise observation and notification requirements. However, 

CSBMs do not resolve conflicts; for this the FSC has greater potential because it is

consultative and does not operate under a rigid set of guidelines. 

The first international diplomatic attempt to quantify the conventional arms trade 

resulted in the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Established by Resolution 46/36 L on 

9 December 1991, 66 the register was first published in 1993. The resolution provides for 

the voluntary reporting of arms transfers—of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, 

large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and 

missiles/missile launchers. The goal of the resolution is to increase the visibility of

conventional weapons. 

The UN register is entirely voluntary, however, and there is no adequate method for

cross-checking the submissions of member nations. Expanding the register to include 

small arms is one potential avenue of improvement. It would offer more visibility into the 

small arms trade and would be a positive, stabilizing step. 

The permanent-five nations of the UN Security Council-the United States, Britain, 

France, Russia, and China-agreed to guidelines in 1991-92 that would “restrain the flow 

of arms to other nations, particularly those in the Middle East.” 67 The principles agreed 

to are: “Increased transparency in arms sales; consultations among arms suppliers; 

implementation of existing arms control regimes; restraint in conventional arms transfers; 

and establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.” 68

An additional recommendation was to establish the UN Register on Conventional Arms, 

which was subsequently adopted and is probably the most positive result stemming from

these negotiations. Although these principles represent a positive step, consultations with

respect to conventional arms control have stalemated since China objected to the sale of

F-16s to Taiwan. 69 

These forums do not by any means control all elements of the arms trade. Significant 

gaps remain, especially with respect to small arms. Diplomatic efforts can resolve 

conflicts between developed nations, but most of the governments that belong to the 

OSCE, CFE, and MTCR are not in imminent danger of major armed conflict (exceptions 

include Bosnia and the new republics surrounding Russia). Therefore, the focus of future

arms control diplomacy should be in the third world. The emotionally intense nature of 

most third world armed conflicts almost ensures that diplomacy will be slow to resolve

them. Nevertheless, the developed nations should pursue stronger diplomatic options. 

The preceding discussion might lead one to believe that the flow of conventional 

weapons is uncontrollable; but while control will be difficult, the world community can 

make inroads into the trade. Specifically, pressure must be brought to bear on nations that 

sponsor terrorist or substate groups. Such pressure can be applied through the United 

Nations as well as through economic sanctions, most-favored nation status, judicious 

application of foreign aid, and regional alliances such as NATO. This will require 

cooperation between all involved nations, and the United States bears considerable 

responsibility as the sole remaining military superpower. However, the American 

paradox is to exercise world diplomatic leadership in arms control while continuing to 

lead the world in conventional arms deliveries. 

171 
Conclusion 

The issue of conventional arms proliferation remains highly complex. These 

weapons are the armament of choice in every major conflict, and that trend will likely 

continue. Research shows that many third world nations are engaged in armed conflict of 

one form or another. Furthermore, the likelihood of American or Western European 

involvement in third world conflicts over the next 10 years has not disappeared. To see 

this, one has only to look at the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, and the drug war. 

The bottom line is that the United States and the responsible world community must 

strengthen international diplomatic measures and expand export controls in the third 

world to prudently limit the trade in arms-at least in “major” conventional arms. Small 

arms remain extraordinarily difficult to control, since they “are readily and cheaply 

available on the international arms market.” 70 Conventional weapons proliferation may 

be likened to an enzyme in a chemical reaction; that is, conventional weapons

proliferation is the enzyme serving as the catalyst in armed conflict. Conventional arms

will not cause a war, but they may speed up the pace and intensity of an armed conflict. 

The challenge facing the international community in the next 10 years is to reduce 

the proliferation of conventional arms. The developed nations must take prudent 

measures to positively impact this important task. 

Notes 

1

 Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1986-1993 

(Washington. D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1994), 89. 

2

 Ibid., 86. I have chosen 1993 because it shows the decline in Soviet/Russian

conventional arms sales. Indeed, the Soviet Union ranked first in the world from 1986 to 

1990. For example, the Soviets delivered 45 percent of conventional arms in 1986. By 

1993 that had dropped to 10 percent. Conversely, the United States had a 16 percent 

share of arms deliveries to the third world in 1986, but their share had risen to 51 percent 

by 1993. Furthermore, Grimmett’s numbers show that there has been a dramatic decrease 

in the flow of weapons into the third world. In terms of constant 1993 dollars, the value 

of weapons transferred was $64 billion in 1986 but had declined to $22 billion in 1993. 

3

 John F. Burns, “New Afghan Force Takes Hold, Turning to Peace,” New York 

Times, 16 February 1995: William D. Hartung, And Weapons for AU (New York: 

HarperCollins, 1994), 2-4. 

4

 Grimmett, 70. Overall rankings for the period 1986-1993: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, India, 

Afghanistan, Iran, Egypt, Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Syria. 

5

 Ibid., 71. 

6

 H. St. John B. Armitage, CBE, “Trends in the Conventional Arms Market: The 

Middle East,” Royal United Services Institute Journal, February 1994, 60. 

7

 Aaron Karp, “The Arms Trade Revolution: The Major Impact of Small Arms,”

Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1994, 71. 

8

 Ibid., 69. 

9

 Hartung, 190. 

172 
Notes 

10 Ian V. Hogg, ed., Jane’s Infantry Weapons 1994-95 (Guildford and King’s Lynn, 

England: Biddles Ltd, 1994), 7-9, 697-704. 

11 Michael M. Zanoni, “The Shopping List: What’s Available,” in Peter C. Unsinger 

and Harry W. More, eds., The International Legal and Illegal Trafficking of Arms

(Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1989), 63. 

12 Peter Wallensteen and Karin Axell, “Major Armed Conflict,” in Stockholm 

International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 1994 (New York: Oxford 

University Press, Inc., 1994), 81. To put these numbers into context, the number of armed 

conflict locations in 1989 was 32; in 1990, 31; in 1991,30; and in 1992, 30. This shows

that the number of conflicts has been in slight decline since 1989. The 28 locations with 

major conflicts in 1993 were: Azerbaijan, Bosnia, United Kingdom, Croatia, Georgia, 

Iran, Iraq, Israel, Turkey, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Afghanistan, Indonesia, 

Myanmar, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Algeria, Angola, Liberia, Rwanda, 

Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru. Final numbers for major

armed conflicts in 1994 are not yet available, but one more notable conflict in 1994 

concerns Chechnya. 

13 Ibid., 81. 

14 Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington, 

D.C., and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 128. 

15 Ibid., 127. 

16 Ibid., 128. 

17 Hartung, 236. 

18 Ibid., 194. 

19 Ibid., 192. 

20 Hallion, 133. 

21 Hartung, 2. 

22 Eradio E. Uresti, “The Guns-for-Drugs Trade: Implications for US Foreign 

Policy,” (Unpublished thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., 1991), 30. 

23 Ibid. 

24 The Military Balance 1993-1994 (London: Brassey’s [UK] Ltd, 1993), 74-75. 

25 Wallensteen and Axell, 88. 

26 Brad Roberts, “From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation,” International Security 

18, no. 1 (Summer 1993): 146. 

27 Ibid. 

28 Amit Gupta, “Third World Militaries: New Suppliers, Deadlier Weapons,” Orbis

37, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 57. 

29 Ibid. 

30 David Silverberg, “Global Trends in Military Production and Conversion,” The

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, September 1994, 124-

25. 

31 World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1991-1992, US Arms Control 

and Disarmament Agency, 1994, 18. 

32 Gupta, 68. 

173 
Notes 

33 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: 

The White House, July 1994), 12. 

34 Ibid. 

35 Richard Kokoski, “Non-lethal Weapons: A Case Study of New Technology 

Developments,” SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1994), 

368. 

36 Barbara Starr, “Pentagon Maps Non-Lethal Options,” International Defense 

Review 27, no. 7 (July 1994): 30. 

37 Arthur Knoth, “Disabling Technologies, A Critical Assessment,” International 

Defense Review 27, no. 7 (July 1994): 33. 

38 Kokoski, 374. 

39 Ibid., 377. 

40 “Marines’ Mission to Somalia Non-Lethal.” USA Today, 15 February 1994. 

41 “Now to the Shores of Somalia with Beanbag Guns and Goo,” New York Times, 

15 February 1994. 

42 Ibid. Quote attributed to an unnamed senior American general. 

43 SIPRI Yearbook 1993 (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1993), xx. 

44 Amy F. Woolf, Arms Control and Disarmament Activities: A Catalog of Recent 

Efforts, Congressional Research Service, 17 January 1993, 25; Stuart Croft. 

“Negotiations, Treaty Terms and Implications.” in Stuart Croft, ed., The Conventional 

Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth Publishing Co., Ltd., 

1994), 30. 

45 The Military Balance 1993-1994, 246. 

46 Lee Feinstein, “CFE: Off the Endangered List,” Arms Control Today, 1 October 

1993, 4. 

47 Ibid., 5. 

48 Ibid. 

49 Ibid. 

50 Colin McInnes, “The CFE Treaty in Perspective,” in Stuart Croft, ed., 12. 

51 Croft, 32-34. 

52 Richard Boucher. “Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines Revised,” US

Department of State Dispatch, 18 January 1993, 41. Member nations include: Australia, 

Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece. Germany, Ireland, Iceland, 

Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 

Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. 

53 Ibid. 

54 National Security Strategy, 11. 

55 John Borawski and Bruce George, MP, “The CSCE Forum for Security 

Cooperation,” Arms Control Today 23, no. 10 (October 1993): 13. 

56 “Helsinki Document 1992,” SIPRI Yearbook 1993, 179. 

57 Ibid., 192. 

58 Borawski and George, 13. 

59 Ibid. 

60 Ibid., 14, 15. 

174 
Notes 

61 Ibid., 15. 

62 Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements (Washington. D.C.: United States 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 1990), 319. 

63 “Vienna Document 1992 of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security Building 

Measures,” SIPRI Yearbook 1993, 642. 

64 Ibid., 646. 

65 Wallensteen and Axell, 596. 

66 Ibid., 533. 

67 Woolf, 31. 

68 Ibid. 

69 Ibid., 32. 

70 Jeffrey Lefebvre, “Fueling the Fire: The Arming of the Horn of Africa After the 

Cold War” (Paper presented to African Studies Association, Toronto. Canada, 3-6 

November 1994), 2. 

175 
14 

Regional Impacts of Civil Wars 

Kurt A Stonerock 

Not long after the Gulf War, Jimmy Carter stated that of the 116 wars since World 

War II, all but the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait were civil wars. 1

 While the exact number is

subject to how one defines civil war, study after study shows that indeed the predominant 

form of warfare, both during and subsequent to the end of the cold war, has been civil 

war. Many excellent analyses have been written over the past several years on the nature 

of civil wars. Several of these writings have defined both the term and overall nature of 

civil war. Other writings have searched for explanations for the beginnings of civil wars 

and ways to end them. 

This study explores a seldom-studied aspect of civil wars. It analyzes the extent to 

which civil wars take on a regional impact, the nature of such impact, and what to expect 

in the future. This inquiry has much relevance, given both the abovementioned frequency 

of civil wars today and the potential for more civil wars as we move into the twenty-first

century. We need to understand the degree to which states get involved in the civil wars

of their neighbors. More significantly, we must appreciate the extent to which that 

involvement is involuntary. 

Civil wars are often the most ruthless types of war. They pit neighbor against 

neighbor within a state and frequently result in enormous civilian suffering. They often 

involve extreme acts of savagery, as the belligerents know that the victor will govern the 

loser. Finally, they tend to create lasting animosities among people who must then learn 

to live together after the fighting has ended. 2

 Given these attributes, post-cold war 

politicians the world over may find it desirable to stand clear of the civil wars of their 

neighbors rather than risk the lives of their own people. 

Many Americans associate a certain sensitivity with the term civil war that is rooted

in our own history. This association reinforces the desires of politicians who let other

countries sort out their internal problems without US interference. One could argue that 

this association was the dynamic at work in January 1995 when State Department

spokesman Mike McCurry discussed Washington’s position on the Chechnya revolt. The 

Washington Post reported that “the United States yesterday tempered its concerns over 

continued Russian army attacks on the breakaway region of Chechnya by citing its own 

violent experience containing secessionism during the Civil War.” McCurry was quoted 

as saying, 

176 
We have a long history as a democracy that includes an episode in the history of our own 

country where we dealt with a secessionist movement through armed conflict called the 

Civil War and so we...need to be conscious of those types of issues when we look at a

new democracy in the former Soviet Union, in Russia, dealing with what has already 

provided enormous political debate within Russia. We have to, you know, look at the full 

scope of issues that define (the relationship). 3

 

This study analyzes the degree to which prudent leaders can afford to turn a blind 

eye to civil wars in their region. It reviews the extent to which observers believe civil 

wars will affect regional or global security concerns into the next century. The study also 

analyzes the nature of several ongoing civil wars and projected regional hot spots around 

the world. The reader may contend that focusing on the here and now precludes lessons 

learned from many notable civil wars throughout history. This focus is intentional. The 

civil wars of history still offer tremendous insight into their nature, how they start, and 

how they end. But, the ready access to and the capabilities of modem conventional 

weapons throughout the world inject a level of violence and speed into the destructive 

dimension of modem civil wars which, in turn, greatly accelerate the tendencies of civil 

wars to expand to the regional level. Furthermore, the relative and global connectivity of 

even the most remote portions of the world today, particularly in terms of trade and 

communications, also has significantly escalated the regional ripple effect of civil wars. 

For these reasons, the author restricts the data to modem civil wars to attain the most 

accurate picture of the expansive nature of tomorrow’s civil wars. 

This examination also suggests that in all probability civil wars will continue to be

the most common type of war well into the next century. Finally, while this study does 

not propose means to end civil wars, it offers possible courses of action to limit the 

adverse effects of civil wars on regional neighbors. 

Civil War Defined 

Studies have defined the term civil war in various ways. This study relies on the 

definition of Roy Licklider as outlined in Stopping the Killing. Licklider defines civil war 

as “large-scale violence among geographically contiguous people concerned about 

possibly having to live with one another in the same political unit after the conflict.” His

definition incorporates two important criteria. First, there must be “multiple sovereignty” 

in that the people “pay taxes, provide men to its armies, feed its functionaries, honor its 

symbols, give time to its service, or yield other resources despite the prohibitions of a 

still-existing government they formerly obeyed,” thus differentiating civil wars from 

other types of domestic violence such as riots. 4

 Second, physical violence to people is 

involved. Licklider has used the operational definitions of the Correlates of War project: 

“a) 1,000 battle deaths or more per year and b) effective resistance” (either, at least two 

sides must have been organized for violent conflict before the war started, or the weaker 

side must have imposed casualties on its stronger opponent equal to at least 5 percent of 

the number of casualties it suffered at the hands of that opponent). This last criterion 

distinguishes civil wars from political massacres. 5

 

Under this mainstream definition then, this writer classifies such wars of secession as 

Chechnya’s war with the Russian Federation as a civil war. Similarly, this definition 

classifies wars to overthrow current governments, like the war in Algeria, as civil wars. 

177 
Hit and run guerrilla wars, acts of terrorism, and most coup attempts do not conform to 

this definition. Observers have labeled conflicts like those in Somalia as civil wars, even 

though these conflicts do not adhere completely to the definition outlined earlier in this

analysis. More specifically, in the conflict in Somalia it is difficult to identify the 

government in charge. Similarly, although President Bill Clinton’s chief of staff recently 

referred to the Serbian war of aggression as a civil war, this writer found it difficult to 

identify a government in charge. 6

 These borderline definitions of civil war are not 

critical to the focus of this study, however, since the ramifications of their internal strife 

to the neighboring countries do not vary markedly from the types and degrees of strife 

caused by more conventionally structured civil wars. 

Historical Trends 

Numerous studies have documented the growing frequency of civil wars. Figure 8 

shows the annual number of wars under way from 1816 to 1992. 

Source: Courtesy of the Correlates of War Project and J. David Singer 

Figure 8. Annual Number of Wars Under Way, 1816-1992 

The cold war witnessed the competition of the two superpowers for regional 

influence throughout the world by sponsoring either state governments or rebellious 

factions within those states. Angola and Nicaragua encompass only two examples of such 

cold-war-sponsored civil wars. More significantly, however, with the end of the cold war

the world has seen an increase in the number of civil wars. This increase occurred as 

states, perceiving themselves as unrestrained by superpower influence, began to settle 

long-festering internal scores related to race, religion, regionalism (to include imbalanced 

economic distribution between classes or regions), ethnicity, or language. 7

 The enormity 

of the human suffering illustrates the size of the problem. According to two independent 

178 
studies, civil wars constituted 14 of the 16 wars raging in 1990. These 14 wars have

accounted for more than 2.5 million deaths. Civilian casualties comprised more than 90 

percent of these deaths. 8

 Civil wars have produced a large number of the estimated 41 

million refugees in the world today. 9 Readers can visualize easily the magnitude of this

carnage by sampling a few of the countries recently involved. Observers have estimated 

that civil wars caused the deaths of 500,000 and the displacement of about 2 million 

recently in Rwanda. 10 Sudan’s II-year civil war resulted in the deaths of up to 1 million 

and the displacement of 3 million. 11 The 15-year-old civil war in Mozambique had

caused more than 650,000 deaths by the time a peace treaty was signed in 1992. 12 More 

than 150,000 deaths resulted from the civil war in Liberia, and 1 million remain

displaced. 13 Sri Lanka’s ongoing 15-year civil war has killed 40,000 and has displaced 

thousands more. 14 Unrest in Algeria in 1994 caused 25,000 to die. 15 The 34-year-old 

civil war in Guatemala has accounted for more than 100,000 deaths and the displacement

of 1 million. 16 Finally, over 20,000 have died in Afghanistan’s two and one-half-year-old 

civil war. 17 Even if one sets aside the human suffering, the treasure spent and 

productivity lost by these states are clearly enormous. This study, however, focuses 

particularly on the degree to which civil wars have crossed political boundaries, thereby 

causing regional problems. We can turn first to situations wherein leaders voluntarily 

involved their states in the affairs of neighboring civil wars. We can classify these 

situations as largely humanitarian involvement, involvement for regional stability, or

opportunities for parochial gains. Realists contend that no state involves itself in a 

humanitarian mission without expecting such gains as goodwill or future access to a 

region and its assets. Most analysts hold that America’s intervention in Somalia fell into

the category of voluntary humanitarian and goodwill participation. However, one state 

may not perceive another state’s motive as altruistic. For example, Daniel Pipes, editor of 

Middle East Quarterly, points out that “many groups and governments accused 

Washington of establishing a new colonialism in Somalia.” He cites a Beirut newspaper

that considered the United States’ involvement in the tragedy as an “excuse to intervene 

to reshape the political situation in the Horn of Africa and the entire center of Africa.” 18 

Examples abound of states involving themselves in the civil wars of other states 

primarily to maintain the stability of a region; however, states need not be neighbors in 

today’s “global community” to want to ensure the stability of a particular region. In 

today’s interconnected world, these interests often have economic implications, but they 

also may have a military nature, particularly if the waning neighbors control weapons of 

mass destruction. This search for stability motivates many states to contribute forces and 

materiel in UN, regional, or coalition peacekeeping efforts. 

Finally, states may involve themselves in the civil wars of their neighbors for less

than altruistic reasons. Declared or covert third-party sponsorship of either side in a civil 

war is still common despite the end of the cold war. For example, the Algerian 

government has accused Sudan of assisting Algerian guerrillas by permitting Iran to use 

Sudanese territory as a transit point for weapons. 19 Similarly, Nigeria contends that 

France wants to prevent Nigeria from becoming a regional power by using Sierra Leone, 

a French ally, as a conduit for weapons into civil war-torn Liberia. 20 As evidenced by

these examples, third party involvement can get complex as states seek gains at the 

expense of a state embroiled in civil war. 

179 
More significant to this study, however, is the degree to which conditions draw states 

involuntarily into conflicts. For the purposes of analysis, this study groups these forces 

into three categories: refugee problems, internal security problems, and regional 

environmental ramifications. 

Civil wars often ruthlessly “displace” large numbers of people by forcing them to 

flee their countries, thereby becoming refugees. Estimates show that up to 1.8 million

refugees escaped from Rwanda into neighboring Zaire, Burundi, and Tanzania in the 

space of just two months. 21 Depending on the course of events of a given conflict, the 

refugee problem generated by a civil war often becomes a tremendous security burden to 

neighboring countries who find themselves hosts to the flood of refugees, often on short 

notice. For example, the government of Zaire has involuntarily become deeply embroiled 

with the tragedy of the Rwandan civil war. The population of the Zairian town of Bukavu 

has swollen from 60,000 to 800,000. 22 The international media recently reported that 

Zairians were taking “brutal measures” to crack down on rampant crime in a refugee 

camp of 200,000 Rwandans that included a riot that killed 18 Rwandans and one Zairian 

soldier. 23 Several sources have reported that former Hutu government and military 

officials virtually run the Zairian refugee camps. These officials are accused of causing 

gross distribution problems with international aid sent to the camp as they funnel the food 

and supplies from the refugees to the estimated 30,000 Hutu soldiers resting, training, and 

rearming in the Zairian hills for another attack on the new Tutsi-led Rwandan 

government. 24 

A different type of internal problem has arisen from the Rwandan tragedy in 

neighboring Tanzania. There the 200,000 Rwandan refugees received far better rations

and care than the Tanzanian people themselves due to the flood of earmarked 

international aid. Fiona Terry, the coordinator for the French branch of the charity group

Doctors Without Borders, told a news conference, “The obvious way to tell the difference 

between a Rwandan and a Tanzanian is by their health.” She added that the malnutrition 

rate among Rwandan refugees ranged between 2 and 4 percent as compared to about 7 

percent for Tanzanians. 25 The disruptive effect this difference could have on the

Tanzanian people is obvious. 

Refugee problems are not necessarily short-term or restricted to less developed or 

even neighboring nations. For example, in 1990 the US government granted 200,000 

Salvadorans “temporary protected status” under legislation that allowed them to remain 

in the United States and work legally, but this legislation did not advance them toward 

permanent residency as immigrants. Many observers agree that these Salvadorans no 

longer need protection, given the stable political situation in their country since the 1992 

Salvadoran civil war truce. However, most of these refugees want to remain in the United 

States, where they have put down roots. As late as November 1994, the US government

has continued to work through the political controversy surrounding this issue. 26 

The security concerns a neighboring civil war can bring to a state has many forms.

For example, security concerns can have enormous economic effects in the form of lost 

revenues, destroyed or nationalized assets in-country, a weakened trading partner, and 

lost access to needed resources. A relatively small but clear case demonstrates this point. 

In December 1994 Indian rebels and Mexican government forces fought for 12 days.

Although not a full civil war, this limited action contributed to the Mexican peso’s plunge

180 
of 38 percent against the dollar. Foreign investors lost millions due to the crash,

according to one Latin American investment analyst. 27 

In addition to economic concerns, states also suffer physical security problems due to 

neighboring civil wars. Some observers expect Burundi, on the border with Rwanda, to 

tumble into civil war in Rwanda’s wake, given that these countries have a similar 

geography, language, and ethnic mix of Tutsis and Hutus. 28 At the hands of Islamic

fundamentalist groups, France has recently seen many of its citizens in Algeria murdered, 

one of its planes hijacked, and terrorist recruiting and training cells established on French 

soil. According to Gilles Kepel, a French expert on north African affairs, “It is clear that 

the fundamentalists are trying to create a large social base to solidify their movement in 

France. We can no longer escape the consequences of Algeria’s turmoil.” 29 

Finally, observers cannot ignore the regional environmental ramifications of civil 

wars any longer. Sources in Zaire report that Rwandan refugee camps impede a critical 

corridor between two parts of a Zairian national park. These same sources recognize the

corridor as a “critical biological link” in the ecosystem of the park because of the variety 

of animals that transit there. According to the New York Times, “The refugee camps pose 

threats to the animals in several ways. The human presence discourages the animals from 

entering the corridor. Those animals that do venture forth are at risk of catching human 

diseases. And the refugees are exploiting the forest for food and firewood,” 30 Elsewhere 

in Africa, civil wars have forced settled populations to leave the land, resulting in its 

neglect and exacerbating desertification. These wars also have frequently targeted animal 

reserves and water resources. 

Future Projections 

As we look beyond the turn of the century, we see no indication that civil wars will 

diminish either in terms of sheer numbers of conflicts or the magnitude of their 

destruction. The previously mentioned factors spurring current civil wars will remain 

obvious in a monopolar world 10 years hence. We can defend this assertion best by 

analyzing various regions of the world which either currently are or show indications of 

be coming “hot spots” for civil wars to break out. These potential civil wars would have 

significantly adverse regional and global implications. 

The 89 ethnic republics and regions of the Russian Federation can serve as a 

tinderbox of internal conflict. Given the precedent-setting dissolution of the Soviet Union 

and the substantial military action in Chechnya, a distinct possibility exists for that 

conflict to spill into neighboring republics of the North Caucasian region, which is “a 

volatile melting pot of ethnic groups that share Chechen suspicions of Kremlin 

intentions.” 31 According to a recent analysis by Leon Goure (of the” Science 

Applications International Corporation), while non-Russian ethnic elements represent 

only 18 percent of the total population and therefore lack the “critical mass” to bring 

about the disintegration of the Russian Federation, these non-Russian ethnic elements “do 

not lack for geographic concentration and potential conflicts in certain parts of Russia,

and this raises concern that secession by such areas may set in motion a widening 

movement unless effectively resisted by the central authorities.” 32 A Russian Federation

that perceives itself in a state of dissolution could conceivably return to much more 

authoritarian leadership to stem the tide. This new direction could thrust the rest of the 

181 
globe into a new cold war. At a minimum, chaos in the nuclear-armed Russian Federation

would be a significant security concern for other states. 

China also may face growing internal unrest in the near future, but for economic

rather than ethnic reasons. Futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler paint a chillingly realistic

scenario wherein the economically booming coastal provinces escalate their current 

defiance of the central government in Beijing. The Tofflers foresee the day when these 

provinces refuse to contribute the funds the central government needs to improve distant 

rural conditions or put down agrarian unrest. They state: 

Unless Beijing grants them (the coastal provinces) complete freedom of financial and 

political action, one can imagine the new elites insisting on independence or some

facsimile of it-a step that could tear China apart and trigger civil war. With enormous 

investments at stake, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and other countries might be compelled to

take sides-and thus find themselves sucked unwillingly into the conflagration that might

follow. 33 

Future regional security ramifications stemming from the blossoming Algerian civil 

war extend well beyond France. Peter Rodman (director of Middle East Studies at the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies) sees high stakes for the Mediterranean 

region. “A civil war could destabilize the region and trigger a mass exodus spilling over 

into Europe.” 34 Given their own increasingly radical Islamic movements, Egypt, Tunisia, 

Morocco, and Libya are particularly nervous when they consider the destabilizing effects 

on their own governments of a successful Islamic revolution in Algeria. 35 Along with 

France, Spain and Italy are concerned about the hundreds of thousands of immigrants 

likely to be generated by a fundamentalist Islamic government coming into power in 

Algeria. 36 Finally, an anti-Western government in Algeria could jeopardize trade, 

especially the important supplies of oil and gas Algeria currently exports to Europe. 37 

Other potential hot spots abound in the world. To C. Payne Lucas (president of

Africare, a Washington-based development and relief organization) the 1994 truce in the

civil wars of Angola and Mozambique hold vital importance to the region. He states: 

Without sustained peace, notably in Angola and Mozambique, there cannot be effective

economic integration and growth in the region. And without growth, Western democracy 

could prove too fragile and exotic to survive. That is why, beyond the humanitarian

imperative. keeping the peace in Angola is so critical. Angola is the region’s last

remaining element of destabilization. A peaceful Angola, with its enormous oil, mineral, 

and agricultural resources, becomes a keystone to regional growth. An Angola in conflict 

poisons the southern African well, encouraging foreign investors to avoid the region and

political dissidents to resort again to violence. 

38 

Prospects for Resolution 

Having analyzed the propensity of civil wars to affect their neighbors adversely in a 

variety of ways. it is appropriate to end this study with a brief look at possible ways an 

external state could employ its diplomatic, economic, informational, and military 

instruments of power to at least “contain” the regional impact of a given civil war. 

182 
Peaceful Containment 

The first consideration shows an appreciation for the uniqueness of every civil war

and thus, in true Clausewitzian fashion, emphasizes that the state needs to focus first on 

quickly attaining and correctly analyzing sufficient intelligence to allow for the

formulation of an accurate assessment of the “nature” of a particular war. Such an 

analysis provides good clues about the potential regional impact of that war in terms of 

such important areas as potential refugee management requirements, possible 

environmental effects, or potential destabilizing results from the fighting on neighboring 

states. 

To contain a civil war diplomatically a state could, either unilaterally or through an

international body, put the warring parties in the civil war on notice that it will deal with 

both sides harshly should either party allow the war to extend beyond its own borders. A 

state also could use its diplomatic machinery to assemble any coalitions it may need to 

coordinate men and materiel for refugee relief efforts. 

Economically, a state could, depending on its needs in a given conflict, assemble or 

solicit economic assistance in the form of supplies needed to care for large influxes of 

refugees and organize other forms of economic aid to help ensure the stability of regional

economies likely impacted by the warring state. This assistance, in the form of money or 

such system essentials as oil, could be particularly important to a state whose economy is 

normally heavily dependent upon trade with the warring state. 

A liberal movement of information between states concerning progress of the war, 

refugee flows, or imminent environmental impacts could be extremely helpful in the 

proactive posturing of neighboring states’ resources to mitigate the effects of a civil war’s

expansion. 

Military Containment 

If an external state decides to use military power to help contain the civil war of a 

neighboring state within its borders, the military should respond rapidly and with 

“overwhelming force.” The US did as much in Somalia and Haiti. Such actions help to

preempt new problems and ensure that adversaries understand the imprudence of 

resistance. These principles apply irrespective of whether a state uses military force 

unilaterally or as part of a coalition or regional or UN force. 

In December 1994 UN forces broke with their traditional roles as peacekeepers and

joined Zairian government troops in a sweep of one Rwandan refugee camp to remove

weapons and criminal elements. 39 Thus, precedent exists for an aggressive military

response to contain refugee problems that emanate from civil wars. The rapid and 

powerful force strategy recommended here applies particularly well to the type of activity 

found in the beginning stage of a refugee camp’s existence, thus preempting the chaos 

experienced in the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire. 

To use the military instrument to provide rapid relief supplies and personnel to 

support these refugee camps could continue as a viable mission. Similarly, accelerated 

security assistance efforts (small anus, Airborne Warning and Control System

surveillance, and Patriot missiles, etc.) to neighboring states could help to alleviate 

concerns within those states and send a message to the warring parties not to let the 

conflict spill across borders. 

183 
“Shows of force” also may be a highly effective mechanism to contain civil wars.

Such efforts might entail stationing troops on a warring state’s borders as the US is 

currently doing in Macedonia to contain the Bosnian conflict. Similarly, troops may be

stationed in nearby coastal waters as the US recently did via a “float reserve” of 2,000 

Marines off the Haitian coast. 

Clearly, irrespective of the roles it may play to prevent or terminate civil wars, the 

military power of a nation certainly can play an important role in containing these most 

disruptive of all wars. 

Notes 

1

 Roy Licklider, Stopping the Killing, How Civil Wars End (New York: New York

University Press, 1992), 7. 

2

 Robin Higham, Civil Wars in the Twentieth Century (Lexington, Ky.: The 

University Press of Kentucky, 1972), 6. 

3

 “U.S. Compares Chechnya Revolt with American Civil War Issues,” Washington 

Post, 4 January 1995. 20. 

4

 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 

1978), 192. 

5

 Licklider, 9. 6

 “A Civil War,” New Republic, 19 December 1994, 7. 

7

 John Spanier, Games Nations Play (Washington. D.C.: CQ Press, 1993), 267-70. 

8

 “Civilians Often Bear War’s Brunt,” St Petersburg Times, 17 February 1991, 7A. 

9

 “Current Policies About Refugees Leave Bosnians and Others Out in the Cold,” 

Wall Street Journal, 1 March 1993, 11. 

10 “U.N. Considers Action on Rising Violence in Rwandan Camps,” New York 

Times International, 3 November 1994, A5; and “U.S. Forces to End Rwanda Mission on 

Schedule by Oct. 1,” Boston Globe, 23 September 1994, 7. 

11 “Sudans Long Civil War Threatening to Spread,” New York Times, 22 November 

1994, 3. 

12 “Mozambique Party Quits Voting Process,” Washington Times, 28 October 1994, 

17. 

13 “U.S. Officials End Liberia Mission,” Dallas Morning News, 16 November 1994, 

26. 

14 “After the Sri Lanka Violence: A Sense of Despair,” New York Times 

International, 30 October 1994, 3. 

15 “Attention is Focused on Algeria’s Hidden War,” Financial Times of London, 28 

December 1994, 2. 

16 “U.N. Steps Up Human Rights Watch in Civil-War-Plagued Guatemala,” 

Washington Times, 28 November 1994, 18: and “Guatemala’s Plight,” Boston Globe, 26 

November 1994, 15. 

17 “Forgotten War Rages in Afghanistan,” Washington Times, 26 November 1994, 8. 

18 “The Paranoid Style in Mideast Politics,” Washington Post, 6 November 1994, C4. 

19 “Sudan Linked to Rebellion in Algeria,” New York Times, 24 December 1994, 3. 

20 “War Engulfs Liberia, Humbling the Peacekeepers,” New York Times 

International, 7 October 1994, 4. 

184 
Notes 

21 “Burundi Wants Rwandans Out,” Washington Times, 20 October 1994, 14; and 

New York Times International, 3 November 1994, A5. 

22 “Zaire’s Premier Confident About Recovery,” Washington Times, 11 October 

1994, 11. 

23 “Zaire Cracks Down on Refugee Camp,” Baltimore Sun, 29 November 1994, 12. 

24 “Refugees: Relief Effort in Rwanda Turns Nightmarish,” Los Angeles Times, 15 

November 1994, A4. 

25 “Doctors Quit Refugee Camp, Refuse to Aid Mass Killers,” Reuters News

Agency, Early Bird Supplement, 29 December 1994, A2. 

26 “U.S. to Alter Status of Salvadorans,” Washington Post, 24 November 1994, 1. 

27 “Mexican Rebels Agree to Attend Peace Talks,” Washington Times, 29 December 

1994, 13. 

28 “Efforts Under Way to ‘Change Hearts’ of Burundians,” Dallas Morning News, 13 

November 1994, 28A. 

29 “Algeria’s Problems Spilling into France,” Washington Times, 28 December 1994, 

13. 

30 “Rwanda Refugee Crisis is Threatening Gorillas in Neighboring Areas,” New

York Times, 25 October 1994, C4. 

31 “Fire in the Caucasus,” Time, 12 December 1994, 6. 

32 “The Russian Federation: Possible Disintegration Scenarios,” Comparative 

Strategy 13, no. 4 (October/December 1994): 409. 33 Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler. War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 

21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1993), 214-15. 

34 “The Time Bomb in Algeria,” Washington Post, 1 January 1995, C1. 

35 “Algeria: Islamic Militants Threaten More Than This N. African Nation,” 

Christian Science Monitor, 27 December 1994, 11; and “The Maghreb Cauldron,” Armed 

Forces Journal International, October 1994, 54. 

36 “Algeria’s Instability Has Potential to Spread,” Baltimore Sun, 29 December 1994,

1. 

37 “A Vote Nullified Becomes Terrorism,” Los Angeles Times, 29 December 1994, 

11. 

38 “Angola’s Rescuer: Angola,” Washington Post, 30 December 1994, 17. 

39 “U.N. Troops Help Rwanda to Strip Camp of Weapons,” New York Times, 15 

December 1994, 6. 

185 
15 

Threats from Third World Regional Hegemons 

James E. Overly 

The cold war paradigm that encompassed world politics from about 1945 to 1989 

was characterized most strongly by global competition between the United States and the 

former Soviet Union. A part of that rivalry involved the contest for influence among third 

world states. That contest was marked by a larger degree of intercourse between the two 

superpowers and nations of the third world than otherwise would have been the case had 

the intercourse been based strictly on classic realpolitik bilateral interests. Indeed, that 

degree of superpower involvement with third world affairs was not present previous to 

the cold war. 

In the cold war bipolar environment, the political actors of the third world came to

understand a most important unwritten rule of the game: A regional conflict could not 

lead to a direct confrontation between the two superpowers as it did during the Cuban 

missile crisis, for such a conflict had obvious dimensions of nuclear danger. This

unwritten rule served to contain or depress regional conflicts or chronic antagonisms 

among or within nation-states and to limit or moderate them when they did occur. 

It is now obvious—since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the former 

Soviet empire—that the bipolar framework for the moderation of regional conflicts has

crumbled. Moreover, the framework crumbled without replacement by a comparable new 

order. (Pundits have more accurately described the new world order proclaimed by 

President George Bush as the new world disorder.) The implosion of the former Soviet 

Union caused a precipitous decline in Russia’s subsequent influence and diminished the 

scope of her dealings with other nations. For its own reasons, the United States has 

evidenced a slower, more hesitant withdrawal from intense involvement in world affairs. 

As superpower involvement in world affairs diminished, third world powers aspiring 

to increase their influence in several areas of the world have been testing the will of the

great powers—and in some cases, neighboring countries in their own region—to draw 

lines of tolerance pertaining to regional conflicts. These conflicts have ranged from Iraq’s 

invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990, to the dissolution of countries formerly held 

together by military forces such as the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union’s

Caucasus republics, to the internal collapse of Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. Thus, many 

academics and political analysts have concluded that the world has become more 

dangerous, not less, in the wake of the collapse of the cold war order. 

186 
These post-cold-war conflicts elicited varying responses from other nations. The 

United States and its allies responded overwhelmingly to turn back Iraq’s aggression in 

Kuwait. Contrast this response to their being much more muted in their reactions to the 

wars erupting in the former Yugoslavia and the states emerging from the ruins of the

defunct Soviet Union. On the other hand, the United States deployed sizable numbers of 

military forces to address internal problems in Somalia and Haiti that represented no 

threat outside their borders. 

These situations and the reactions to them by other powers beg the question: Is there 

a systematic way to predict likely applications of military force by anyone that might give 

rise to security concerns on the part of other nations? That is, can we predict the nations 

likely to employ military forces to embark upon regional hegemony during the next five 

to 10 years? If so, then we will be able to identify likely security concerns around the 

globe more easily and use their predictions to enhance the prospects for stability. 

To begin the search for the answers to these questions, we must define hegemony 

more precisely. There is extant a variety of definitions of hegemony that must be 

winnowed, ranging from the generic to specific applications of the term as a

characteristic primarily applicable to super or great powers. Most definitions, 

nonetheless, contain elements of the useful but general definition espoused by Jack C. 

Plano and Roy Olton: “Hegemony is the extension by one state of preponderant influence 

or control over another state or region. A policy of hegemony may result in a client-state 

or satellite relationship and the creation of a sphere of influence.” 1

 David J. Myers 

defines regional hegemons as “states which possess power sufficient to dominate a 

subordinate state system.” 2

 He describes three relevant dimensions of power: the 

material, the military, and the motivational. 3

 For our purpose, we focus on the military

aspect and modify these definitions of hegemony as follows: A state establishes

hegemony (i.e., it extends preponderant influence or control) militarily over another state 

or region, normally against a neighbor or in its immediate region, through the application 

of the military instrument of power. 

A state’s mere use of the military, however, mayor may not constitute a “threat” to 

another. A clear threat exists when a state uses military force in such a way that another

state perceives its sovereignty or physical survival—its core interests—at risk. Further, if

one country’s military action should threaten another country’s important socioeconomic 

interests, the risks may be classified at the intermediate level. Interests at the intermediate 

level are not considered vital or critical to the nation’s survival as a sovereign entity, but 

they do consider them important to the way or quality of life in that nation. Finally, the 

risks may be to another nation’s peripheral interests, which concern ideological,

humanitarian, or attitudinal matters. 

Traditionally, the reaction of a nation to a perceived threat has varied directly 

according to the perceived degree of danger to the nation’s core interests. During the cold 

war, the two superpowers analyzed every third world military action according to the 

perceived effect on their strategic interests. But another unwritten rule of the cold war 

framework outlined that only in unusual, clearly defined instances did superpower

military forces intervene; elsewhere, the preferred form of superpower intervention came

through proxies or nonmilitary means. More recently, however, super and great powers 

with ability to project military force to distant corners of the world have at times 

exercised that capability when a far-removed aspiring regional hegemon employed 

187 
military force to threaten its neighbors. Thus, hegemony as a threat to world security has 

become doubly dangerous. On the one hand, restraints on aspiring regional hegemons

have been loosened; while on the other, the question of whether or how other nations may 

react has become less predictable. Michael T. Klare, professor of peace and world 

security studies at Hampshire College, sardonically describes the course of post-cold-war 

American foreign policy thinking: 

Republicans and Democrats do not agree about much, least of all in the foreign policy

area, but on one key point they seem to share the same delusion: that America’s national 

security interests are best secured by preparing for an unending series of conflicts with

“rogue states” in the Middle East and Asia. 4

 

Historical and Present State of the Problem 

Few broad studies of international affairs have focused on regional hegemony 

systematically and analytically. Instead, in some cases, observers have arbitrarily chosen

countries based on empirical observations of “likely suspects” in certain geographic 

regions and written about them as historic or potential military threats. Others have 

focused primarily on the history of great power reactions to the activities of regional 

hegemons. But let us identify the aspiring hegemons in the third world who could raise a 

military threat against another nation and thereby create a regional, if not a global, 

security concern during the next decade. The potential number of hegemons is large, for

analysts might characterize most of the approximately 180 nations in the world as still

developing their political, economic, and social institutions and infrastructures; most have

military forces; and most are not geographically isolated island nations. 

Karl P. Magyar advances an analytical methodology for analyzing hegemon-driven 

security concerns when he posits that states develop as international actors in stages. 5

First, the formative stage occurs at the inception of a state. Second, the consolidative 

stage of building legitimate political and administrative institutions develops in a long

process after a state attains independence. Indeed, the consolidative stage may be

subdivided into an early, aggressive, “forced” phase and a later, perhaps an enduring or 

mature phase. Third, the expansive stage occurs when states attempt to export their power 

into neighboring lands. Having attained internal consolidation and a dominant regional 

position, Magyar argues the states then qualify as great powers and enter the global or 

imperial stage. This stage is characterized by the projection of power and expansion of 

political influence to distant areas. Fifth, the compulsive stage accentuates a growing 

imbalance between a great power’s resources and ambitions, leading to the power’s

precipitous weakening, if not collapse. 

Magyar places the great bulk of states in the world today in the consolidative stage, 

with about half in the early phase of this stage. A number of the states in this

consolidative stage, Magyar argues, are among the most unstable states in the 

international system. Into this category he places some established but perennially

volatile Latin American states, most African states, post-cold-war Russia and the 

Confederation of Independent States (CIS), and a number of other third world states with 

greatly disproportionate arms acquisition policies, including North Korea. 

188 
Combining the phenomenon of aspiring regional hegemons with greater freedom to 

maneuver after the collapse of the cold war structure with Magyar’s state classification 

system and its attributes of states in the volatile, forced, and consolidative phase seems to 

depart from a more systematic identification of the states in each region potentially 

prepared to use military force to expand or otherwise increase their regional or global 

influence. A tour d’ horizon of each region follows. Each section discusses nations which 

have acted as hegemons in the recent past or which are aspiring hegemons. Most of these 

regions are presently in the consolidative or expansionist stages of national development. 

Latin America 

Peru and Ecuador revived an old border dispute in early 1995 when clashes broke 

out between army units on the frontier. This clash is the most recent transnational border 

confrontation on the South American continent, but many similar skirmishes from the

past could be revived. For example, Ecuador also has had border clashes with Colombia, 

and Bolivia dreams of a path to the sea. With territorial acquisition in mind, these 

conflicts also may portend expansionist ambitions. 

One must keep an eye on Cuba, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, all of whom have 

actively employed their military forces or extended military support in regional conflicts

in the past. Today Cuba’s economy continues to deteriorate and Nicaragua is deeply 

immersed in building a democracy and market economy; nonetheless, the political 

operatives in both countries are the same powers who fueled past conflicts in their 

regions. They are either still in power or have retained powerful influence over their new 

governments. The point becomes pertinent in considering allusions to ties between rebel

leaders and the Sandinistas of Nicaragua contained in early 1995 news reports of renewed 

fighting in the Chiapas region of Mexico. 

Western Europe 

Western Europe is comprised of mature states, all of whom now have democratically 

elected governments with free, integrated markets or mixed government-private sector 

economies. Thus, with a possible exception discussed later, in the main they are not 

candidates to repeat the deeds of past regional hegemons. Instead, the fundamental 

question for Western Europe throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, and 

probably into the next century, focuses on the role of the United States in European 

security affairs. That role has significantly and rapidly decreased since the demise of the

Warsaw Pact. Analysts have debated the issue under the guise of discussions about future 

roles of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). More importantly, they have 

debated it under the rubric of developing the European Union (EU) as an extensive 

political entity with its own defense capability exercised through such principally 

European security organizations as the Western European Union (WEU) and the 

Organization for the Security and Cooperation of Europe (OSCE). Thus, the EU (even 

though several of its largest and most important members are mature major powers) itself

may be considered as being in the early stages of a consolidation phase as a transnational 

political unit, with the establishment of regional hegemony as a potential objective. 

This suggestion does not imply in any way that the EU will suddenly become

aggressive. Indeed, all major European powers are currently decreasing the size of their 

189 
military forces; most of them still want the US to play a strong role in European security 

affairs; and most appear willing to join with the US to react militarily to third world 

crises when necessary. Nevertheless, to further the end of “europeanizing” regional 

security, Western European governments are likely to feel increasing political pressure to 

use their own military forces—either nationally or through their regional security

organizations—to intervene in small regional conflicts on the borders of Europe when it 

appears to Europeans’ political advantage to act independently or ahead of the United 

States. 

Greece and Turkey, two nations straddling the border between Europe and Asia, 

show no signs of definitively resolving old disagreements that have deteriorated into

conflicts. In the breakup of the former Yugoslavia into several nations, Greece has 

resurrected an old difference with the Republic of Macedonia that portends military 

conflict, and has held hostage the policy of the EU and other nations vis à vis that 

emerging nation. Turkey, on the other hand, has had to deal with a resurgence of historic 

Kurdish attempts to forge an independent nation from areas the Kurds populate in 

Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. Turkey also has found itself presented with an opportunity to 

expand its influence, albeit so far not militarily in some of the new Moslem republics 

emerging from the former Soviet Union (discussed in a later section) and in Bosnia. 

Middle East and North Africa 

A plethora of actual or aspiring regional hegemons are emerging in the volatile 

Middle East and North Africa region. As Magyar points out, Israel expanded into lands 

belonging to Jordan and Syria, and the recent Israeli-Jordan peace treaty and the IsraeliPalestine Liberation Army peace agreement have not settled the land-ownership issues. 6

One needs only to recall the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 

ensuing Gulf War, the battles between North and South Yemen, the Yemeni rivalry with 

Saudi Arabia, and Syria’s occupation of Lebanon to be aware of the aspirants for regional 

hegemony in the area. 

Closely associated with these states are the fragile states of North Africa. The most 

unpredictable state in that area has been Libya, which acted militarily against Egypt and 

Chad, supported terrorism against the US and Western Europe, and fostered insurgent 

movements in sub-Saharan Africa and in countries as distant as the Philippines. While the 

Muammar Qadhafi regime’s expansionist activities may have been less visible after the 

US raid of April 1986, there is no guarantee that the regime’s hegemonial ambitions have 

abated or that the region will remain relatively quiescent in the future. 

If Libya is the most disruptive country in the region, Algeria’s current internal

struggle with the forces of political Islam presents the most volatile situation. 7

 The 

outcome of that struggle is potentially disruptive to the region and beyond, as has been 

Algeria’s support of the Polisario Front in neighboring Western Sahara. Morocco, also, 

has demonstrated expansionist aims with its attempted absorption of Western Sahara, its 

occasional military involvement in sub-Saharan Africa, and its participation in the

liberation of Kuwait in 1991. 

A “bridge” state from the Arab world to Black Africa because of geography and its

Arab and Black African populations, Sudan remains locked in a vicious civil war. At the 

same time, the central government is harshly implementing political Islam and aligning 

190 
itself with the terrorist-supporting states of Iran and Libya to expand its influence in the 

wider region that includes Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and most notably Egypt. 

Sub-Saharan Africa 

As the continent with the greatest proportion of its states in the formative or early 

consolidative stages, Africa likely will witness more wars in its sub-Saharan region than

any other region of the globe. The mostly internal conflicts in African countries can be 

exploited now by emerging regional hegemonic neighbors who are aware of the 

traditional great powers’ declining interest in interfering on the continent. Examples of 

such emerging regional hegemons include Nigeria (acting most recently in the Liberian

civil war) and Tanzania (acting in Uganda, the Comoros, and the Seychelles). One 

example includes Uganda, where the government, despite its denials, clearly used its own 

military resources to support the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s overthrow of the Rwandan 

government. Another example includes Zaire’s military actions in Rwanda and Angola. 

President Nelson Mandela initially has directed South Africa away from the 

interventionist and hegemonic policies of the preceding white governments. 

Nevertheless, he will find it difficult for South Africa, as powerful as the country is

militarily, to avoid involvement in future southern African conflicts, even if only in

peacemaking or peacekeeping roles. 

Ranging over Africa with an eye toward the future, Magyar succinctly describes the 

continent as a major source of global security concerns: “Formative conflicts are 

underway or perhaps may be expected in Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, 

Chad, Western Sahara, Nigeria, Zaire, Tanzania, and South Africa. Africa also 

experiences several expansionist efforts initiated by Nigeria, Morocco, Sudan, Libya, 

Tanzania, Ivory Coast, and Zaire.” 8

 Such a tumultuous conflict environment offers 

ample opportunity to emerging hegemons. 

Russia, the “Near Abroad,” and Eastern Europe 

Paul Hacker sums up some of the most significant problems facing the region once 

dominated by the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact: 

These include...(1) most crucially, how to consolidate democracy in Russia and to 

promote a new set of relations with the former Soviet republics in conditions of

internecine wars, perceived threats from Islamic extremists, and economic breakdown:

(2) how to achieve the coexistence of different nationalities occupying the same territory 

in many countries in the region: and (3) how to overcome the legacy of over four decades 

of communist rule and subservience to the former USSR in Eastern Europe while

developing a new set of ties to the West that will enhance security throughout the 

Continent. 9

 

In early 1995 Russian troops quashed the Chechnyan bid for independence. As 

Hacker points out, “A major problem for the Russian military has been to restructure for 

a world of peace and to find a new mission. The prospect of fighting a war in Western

Europe or of using military force to keep control of Eastern Europe has been superseded 

by the need to protect Russian interests in the former Soviet republics.” 10 Moreover, 

other vital questions remain relating to the degree of Russian civilian control over the 

191 
military, the control of ex-Soviet nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction 

deployed in the newly independent states, and the division of ex-Soviet military assets

between Russia, the Ukraine, and other new republics—including the territorial problems

of ports. 

One could argue that prior to 1989, the former Soviet Union was, according to

Magyar’s classification system, a declining global/imperial state in the compulsive stage.

It is clear now that Russia has joined its new republics in the consolidative stage. With 

the region’s vast amount of lethal weaponry, a Russian military without a mission, and 

upheavals that have yet to run their course, many observers would argue that the situation 

in this area is of the gravest concern as the world enters a new millennium. The 

opportunities this region provides to such other would-be hegemons as Iran and 

Afghanistan, and perhaps even Turkey, are ominous. 

South Asia 

South Asia is another area of the world with bitter rivalries between competing 

regional powers, with some of them becoming more dangerous because of advanced 

efforts to develop nuclear weapons. India, the largest country and also one with the 

largest military in the region, continues its quest to dominate the region’s affairs through 

its military forces. Added to a lengthy list of past regional military interventions on 

virtually every border, the recent dispatch of military troops by India to intervene in Sri 

Lanka’s civil war amply illustrates its proclivity to enhance its regional hegemony 

through forcible means. 

In Pakistan the military remains the “power behind the throne.” The military’s

activism in pushing the government to acquire nuclear weapons and other sophisticated 

weapons systems, makes Pakistan an unsettling neighbor to India and other regional 

states. Moreover, the military’s willingness to be deployed in United Nations (UN)

peacekeeping missions in distant areas manifests its readiness to see its military

employed as an instrument of national power and influence. Pakistan also played a key

role in neighboring Afghanistan’s internal war. 

The grip of an unending civil war that keeps it in an early consolidative stage 

continues to hold Afghanistan. Nonetheless, partly because of its bent toward 

fundamentalist Islam, it seeks influence in the newly independent states of the former

Soviet Union, which might presage Afghanistan’s expansionist ambitions. 

Southeast Asia 

Events seem to be quieting in the Southeast Asian subcontinent. However, even this

geographic area has had more than its share of small but expansive powers willing to 

employ military force to gain regional influence. Vietnam, although having to 

concentrate on rectifying the wretched state of its economy, retains the historical will to 

be a regional power. Thailand, forced to develop a capable armed force because of its

defense needs, now helps to maintain its image as a regional power by offering its troops 

for international peacekeeping duty. Also in this region, the 1975 invasion by Indonesia 

and its subsequent occupation of East Timor vividly demonstrate that it will not hesitate

to employ its military to acquire additional influence and territory. 

192 
The Far East 

China remains the enigma of the Pacific rim, particularly in reference to the future. 

China’s military history, the size of the country, its population, and its military suggest 

that analysts consider the country as a classic regional hegemon. However, although 

historically China has aggressively defended its borders, it has not often sought to project 

itself beyond its historic region. China even defends its involvement in the 1950s in 

Korea, the 1960s war with India, and its incursions into Vietnam in the 1970s as 

extensions of border defense rather than outright expansive military action. Its military 

behavior and intentions in the first years of the next century likely will be, once again, 

functions of internal political struggles among powerful political factions-most of which 

would probably agree on retaining regional but not global domination. 

If China is the most enigmatic regional hegemon in the Pacific, North Korea is the

most unpredictable. Because of North Korea’s large numbers of well-equipped, highly 

trained and fanatically committed troops, and what is believed to be a nascent nuclear 

weapons development program, analysts must continue to consider it as a potential 

hegemon capable of using military power to gain influence in the region as long as its

authoritarian regime remains in power. 

Consequences 

With the end of superpower rivalry throughout the globe and the precipitous decline 

in Russian activity and influence, the United States is also (albeit more slowly) reducing 

its major global military commitments, its provision of economic development aid, and 

its diplomatic activities. Similarly, so have many other Western powers. This collective

decline in all these great powers’ international activities creates a power vacuum that 

third world regional hegemons are eager to exploit. 

In some cases, the decline in Western or international economic development aid to 

the third world could lead some countries to exercise military force to gain control of the 

resources of weak neighbors. In others, it could lead to the military’s usurping domestic

political power to protect its financing. In both situations, the military’s actions are likely 

to produce threats to existing regional security arrangements and thus become concerns to 

the immediate region, if not beyond. 

Projected Security Implications 

As useful as readers might find the preceding discussion in identifying present 

regional hegemons or hegemonic aspirants on purely historical or topical bases, the issue 

begs for a more systematic method of analyzing regional hegemony and projecting 

possible security implications. Magyar’s model provides a useful framework for 

classifying the evolutionary level of any state. Using that model to examine the

previously discussed current or potential hegemons, it becomes evident that most of the 

nations discussed heretofore as potential hegemons are states in the volatile consolidative

stage of development. This model narrows the search somewhat, but are there other tools

that analysts can use to identify the most likely states to apply military force as a national

193 
instrument of power? A useful tool developed in the United States Air Force for planning 

air campaigns can be modified to serve the purpose. 

Col John A. Warden III devised a “five ring” model to analyze a target country as a 

system and used it to develop the highly successful 1991 Gulf air war strategy. According 

to Warden, a country’s leadership is the center ring of five interrelated concentric circles, 

representing other “vital parts” of a nation-state—system essentials (e.g., oil, water, food, 

medicine, and raw materials), infrastructure (e.g., roads, electrical grid, and petroleum 

distribution), population (e.g., whether supportive of the leadership, the standard of 

living, the level of education, and homogeneity), and fielded forces (i.e., usually the 

military). 11 

For our purposes of examining third world hegemons, the elements of leadership,

system essentials, and fielded forces are arguably the most germane. For example, the 

leaders of hegemonial states, for whatever political, economic, or personal reasons, seek 

domination over their neighbors. That leadership must dominate the state governmental 

apparatus to implement those policies. The country’s economy must be capable of

supporting a strong military (even if the government policy is to devote a 

disproportionate share of gross domestic income to the task). Its military must be capable 

of projecting force. 

Thus, to identify potential hegemons, one looks for a state in the consolidative stage, 

usually but not necessarily a state with a non-democratic government (most likely one

with a charismatic dictator or otherwise strong leader or clique at the top). A potential 

hegemon is usually one with an emphasis on the military and military spending that is

disproportionate to other social sectors or economic development and social needs. 

Obviously, the military must be able to project force, but even small, underfunded

African military organizations have repeatedly demonstrated the capability of projecting 

force into neighboring countries. 

If the expansionist state has or is developing nuclear weapons, chemical and 

biological weapons, and missile delivery systems, that aspiring hegemon obviously 

becomes more dangerous and offers a greater security concern not only for its neighbors 

but other states beyond the region as well. For example, during a UN conference on 

renewing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) held in April 1995, foreign 

ministers from the “north” (i.e., the developed states) and the “south” (i.e., developing or 

consolidating states) drew “battle lines,” according to one account. 12 That report quoted 

Nigeria’s foreign minister, Tom Ikimi, as staking out the position of the “third world 

hard-liners”: “The way forward is to extend the treaty for a fixed period”—and not 

indefinitely, as sought by the United States. 

The NPT recognizes five nuclear states: the United States, Great Britain, France, 

Russia, and China. In addition to these five states recognized by the treaty, three of the 

former Soviet Union’s newly independent states—Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—

are heirs to Soviet nuclear weapons, but are obliged to return them to Russia. Three 

“undeclared” nuclear powers include India, Pakistan, and Israel. Observers suspect at 

least three other states of harboring nuclear plans—Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. They 

believe three others to have abandoned nuclear weapons programs—South Africa, 

Argentina, and Brazil. Analysts have judged another 11 states, all of whom are developed 

nations or newly industrialized countries (i.e., South Korea and Taiwan) as capable of 

building weapons. Thus, two of the recognized nuclear powers, the three newly 

194 
independent states with nuclear weapons belonging to Russia, the three undeclared 

nuclear powers, and the three others suspected of having plans to develop nuclear 

weapons are states in the consolidative stage of national development. 

This methodology, combining the Magyar and Warden analytical methods, supports 

our earlier assertion that Russia in the “near abroad” and China in the Far East will be 

two of the most important states to watch for hegemonic activity as we enter the twentyfirst century. So, too, does it identify India and Pakistan. In the case of Libya, this 

methodology would identify the North African country’s wealth and bellicosity, its 

documented support for international terrorism, and its attempts to develop or obtain 

weapons of mass destruction (both nuclear and chemical/biological) with the 

sophisticated weapons platforms to deliver them. The analysis would support the present 

conclusion that Libya is among the most destabilizing regional hegemons and is likely to 

remain so, at least as long as the current regime remains in power. 

If the analysis compares data for a country against the strengths and weaknesses of 

its neighbors, other situations portending security concerns for the immediate region and 

beyond could likely be identified. Such an analysis would identify Iran, Iraq, and Syria as 

likely hegemons at the ingress into the next century. 

The burgeoning attempts by ambitious third world rogue states to establish or

enhance regional hegemony through the application of military force presents an ultimate

irony. The demise of the cold war and the agreements to destroy sizable portions of the 

main protagonists’ nuclear arsenals should make the world feel safer and imply fewer

situations requiring a military presence. Yet the activities of present and future 

hegemonists will likely make great power military responses ever more frequent and 

necessary. This eventuality will levy unwelcome requirements on the great powers, who 

will bear the bulk of the world’s responsibility to respond militarily to hegemonic 

aggression: 

• First, and foremost, the great powers will need to maintain large standing military

forces and reserves in a high state of readiness, perhaps at higher budget levels than many 

Western political leaders are currently prepared to support. 

• Second, the great powers will need to restructure their military forces to develop 

the capability to project force rapidly to distant countries where the most basic supporting 

infrastructure may be nonexistent. That is, the military organizations of great powers 

must be prepared to bring what they need to do the job because it cannot be assumed to 

be in place. 

• Third, the political unacceptability of any great power acting alone in a regional 

conflict means that the great powers will need to develop and expand “interoperability.”

(Interoperability means military organizations arrange command, control,

communications, intelligence, and logistical issues to work together.) 

• Fourth, the military activities of regional hegemons disrupt the lives of large 

numbers of civilians, creating refugees who require immediate humanitarian assistance. 

In turn, the great powers who bear the brunt of humanitarian relief efforts must enhance 

the capability of their military forces to transport, deliver, safeguard, and distribute

humanitarian assistance. Moreover, they will need to enhance their ability to work 

together better with nongovernmental organizations and private voluntary organizations, 

the traditional agent-purveyors of humanitarian assistance. 

195 
Prospects for Peaceful Resolution 

Globally speaking, regional hegemony presents daunting, if not impossible, 

challenges to peaceful resolution of the conflicts it creates. Hegemonists who use military 

force aggressively against their neighbors often can achieve their objectives quickly, for

they can act faster than the opposition can react. The traditional choices have included 

unilateral, regional, or international organization discussion, condemnation, economic

sanctions, and diplomatic efforts at mediation in the short run, and such long-run 

measures as arms control agreements or restrictions on technology transfers. 

Paradoxically, the most successful efforts at peaceful resolution of conflicts resulting

from hegemonial ambitions have included the threat or the use of military force, either

unilaterally or collectively. How successful peaceful resolution efforts are likely to be 

later is questionable; however, a determined regional hegemon is less likely to listen to

dissuasive diplomacy when he or she knows that: 

• It is politically difficult for the US or any European great power to respond 

militarily and unilaterally, particularly since the leaderships of many of these countries

have renounced those options. It is difficult in a practical sense because of military 

reductions. 

• Analysts believe the alternative, collective action, to be unacceptable absent some

kind of international legitimization (e.g., by a regional security organization or approval

by the United Nations Security Council [UNSC]). Moreover, UN peacekeeping 

capabilities already may be overextended. 

• Hegemons know they can defy such international authorities easily, for no regional 

security organization (except for NATO) has standing forces and thus these organizations 

cannot enforce their decisions. Moreover, the UNSC requires international agreement (in 

fact, unanimous council agreement) on the establishment and authorization of 

international peacemaking or peacekeeping operations. 

Potential Impact on the US 

Other countries will continue to place special responsibilities on the US to lead 

efforts to deal with hegemons of the world. Moreover, the US has a traditional interest in

safeguarding the rights of individuals and small countries. On the doorstep of a new 

millennium, the US must choose either to accept these responsibilities openly, defer them

to others, or tolerate the consequences. 

First, whatever the choice, the US needs to develop and implement clear policies. 

This mandate means the US must first clearly redefine and establish domestic consensus 

on its core, intermediate, and peripheral interests. It must carefully demarcate those 

interests where violation will bring about a unilateral military response. Second, as Klare 

argues, the US must assess comprehensively the world security environment and discuss 

in an open-ended fashion what overall military policy best advances US interests. Should

we, he asks, continue to adopt a military posture designed to provide the US with the 

capability to fight two Iraq-like “rogue powers” simultaneously? Third, assuming such an

exercise confirms a military policy aimed at combating regional hegemonism, agencies of 

the US government involved in monitoring security issues should develop long-range 

plans for identifying and analyzing likely hegemonic activities and plan diplomatic, 

196 
political, economic, and military responses. Fourth, the US should lead regional security 

organizations of which it is a member to plan for contingencies resulting from disruptive 

hegemonic activities. 

Moreover, the US also should urge similar organizations of which it is not a member

to do the same. 

The earlier discussion implies that military responses-more often collective than 

unilateral—will remain necessary when hegemonic actions threaten regional security. 

The great powers of the world seldom will agree in advance on the kinds of threats that

would generate near-automatic military action. Thus, the United States must remain 

prepared to address a variety of force projection needs and applications. It also must 

develop humanitarian action plans that involve the military, upgrade the military’s

capabilities to perform humanitarian assistance delivery tasks, and define the rules of 

engagement for the military services to meet likely future requirements for humanitarian 

responses. 

Notes 

1

 Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary (New York: 

Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), 216. 

2

 David J. Myers, ‘Threat Perceptions and Strategic Response of the Regional 

Hegemons: A Conceptual Framework,” in Regional Hegemons, David J. Myers, ed. 

(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, Inc., 1991), 5. 

3

 Ibid. 

4

 Michael T. Klare, “US Strategy to Defend Against ‘Rogues’ Needs an Overhaul,” 

Christian Science Monitor, 25 April 1995, 19. 

5

 Karl P. Magyar, “Conflict in the Post-Containment Era,” in Associate Programs. 

Seminar and Correspondence Lesson Book, vol. 9, lessons 36-40 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: 

Air Command and Staff College, 1994), lesson 39, page 8. 

6

 Ibid. 

7

 Political Islam refers to the exploitation of Islamic tenets for political purposes.

Diplomatic observers and many analysts prefer it as a more accurate description of the 

phenomena variously described as Islamic fundamentalism or Islamism. 8

 Magyar, lesson 39, 15. 

9

 Paul Hacker, “Regional Study 2: Security Issues in the Former Warsaw Pact 

Region,” in Challenge and Response: Anticipating US Military Security Concerns, Karl 

P. Magyar, ed. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, August 1994), 63. 

10 Ibid., 64. 

11 Col John A. Warden III, “Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century,” in Challenge 

and Response, 316. 

12 Charles J. Hanley, “Battle Lines Drawn Over Nuclear Treaty,” Montgomery 

Advertiser, 19 April 1995, 3A. 

197 
16 

International Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century 

Frank L. Goldstein 

The cold war is over, but international terrorism remains a threat across the globe 

and especially to the United States and its allies. When looking at the future of 

international terrorism, several key questions need to be answered: Why won’t the 

terrorist threat go away? Is terrorism truly a serious threat or just Western paranoia to 

maintain military and police budgets? Where should terrorist actions be expected and for 

what reasons? What will be the impact of terrorism on individual nation-states and 

overall global stability? And finally, will peaceful resolution and responses to terrorism 

be possible? Or, will antiterrorism efforts merely begin another version of arms

escalation, punitive actions, and repressive governmental endeavors? This chapter 

explores the global role of terrorism in the twenty-first century, including antiterrorism 

responses, and the possible consequences to nation-states when they respond to terrorist 

acts. 

Terrorism—Present and Future 

Terrorism is defined in many ways, and in its global context no one definition has 

gained universal acceptance. However, this chapter uses the definitions found in Title 22 

of the United States Code, Section 2656(d). The US government has employed the 

following definitions since 1983: 1

 

- Terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 

noncombatant (noncombatant is interpreted to include civilians and military personnel

unarmed at the time of the incident) targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, 

usually intended to influence an audience. 

- International terrorism means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more 

than one country. 

- Terrorist groups means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that 

practice, international terrorism. 2

 

What do these definitions suggest? First, they suggest that the nature of international 

terrorism has not changed significantly in the past 10 years despite radical changes in 

world politics. In fact, changes in the recent political balance of global power have 

198 
generated increased terrorist activity. In 1982 Grant Wardlow, in Political Terrorism, 

states, “Groups with little or no direct political power have demonstrated repeatedly in 

recent years that by employing certain tactics, central to which is the use of directed 

terror, they can achieve effects on a target community which are out of all proportion to 

their numerical or political power.” 3

 With reference to the Middle East, Wardlow’s 

words have as much meaning today as they did then. Despite the peace process and as a 

direct result of it, Middle Eastern terrorism today creates unrest and widespread panic 

among the people of Israel, Egypt, and Jordan and apprehension for the people in the rest 

of the world. Yet, the world was psychologically ready to mark the end of the cold war as 

the beginning of global peace. 

The world community today is subjected to the terrorism of the inclusive Middle 

East; to African terrorism in Angola, Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Somalia; and to Asian 

terrorism in Afghanistan, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Japan, the Philippines, and South 

Korea. What many had hoped would be the end of European terrorism is now marked by 

terrorist activities in Eastern Europe and France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey, 

the United Kingdom, and the lands of the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. 

Finally, Central and South American terrorism is waged in Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, 

Peru, and Nicaragua. Thus, the decline of animosity among traditional enemies, or the 

decline of traditional/conventional war as described by Martin van Creveld in his book, 

The Transformation of War, does not mean the end of organized violence or a decline in 

terrorist activity. 4

 

Historical Perspectives 

Historically, terrorist causes have been classified into two main types, with numerous

variations and some overlap between them. 5

 One broad type is nationalist-separatist 

terrorism. This category is represented by members of “nations, national minorities, and 

ethnic or racial groups fighting for freedom from what they regard as foreign rule.” 6

Examples include the Irish Republican Army of northern Ireland, the Spanish Basque 

ETA, the Palestine Liberation Organization, HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement), 

several anti-Turkish Armenian groups, and the Puerto Rican FALN in the United States. 

A second type of terrorism is the traditional group, which bases its actions on

political ideology, and the more complicated of the two. It represents organizations of 

both the political left and the right, and newly formed environmental groups with 

ideologically mixed followers. Traditionally, these groups comprised Trotskyites, 

Maoists, Castroites, Che Guevara followers, Ho Chi Minh followers, West Germany’s 

Baader-Meinhof Gang and a new offspring, and the Red Army Faction. Also included are

Italy’s Red Brigades, Argentina’s ERP, the Japanese Red Army, and the Turkish People’s 

Liberation Army. These examples of leftist terrorist groups have typically advocated 

some form of socialism to end “evil and oppression.” But the end result of their actions 

typically has been contempt for authority and a strong leaning toward anarchism. 

The “right side” of the political spectrum represents also a terrorist threat to 

democratic nation-states. Right-wing extremists, like their leftist counterparts, aspire to

violently overthrow democratic governments in favor of ultranationalistic states. Jonathan 

Harris lists the following right-wing terrorist examples: the German Military Sports 

Group Hoffman; Italy’s Black Order, Armed Revolutionary Nuclei, and National 

199 
Advanced Guard; Croatia’s Revolutionary Brotherhood; Spain’s Youth Force and 

Warriors of Christ the King; and the United States’ Ku Klux Klan and the American Nazi 

Party. 7

 

There exists within the political ideology type a subcategory of terrorists whose 

ideology is religion-based and is usually fundamentalist in nature. The oldest such group 

is the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. Some new antiabortion groups in North 

America who take responsibility for bombings and assassinations also fit into this 

category. 

State support for terrorism inflicted by Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, South 

Yemen, and Iraq continues for many of these groups despite United Nations protests or

sanctions. 8

 Terrorism still provides a safe strategic weapon for countries with little 

chance of punishment or reprisal for their sponsorship. Additionally, the distinction

between domestic and international terrorism is diminishing, as most terrorist 

organizations have expanded their operations beyond the borders of their own countries 

to pursue political change. 9

 Operating beyond their borders, terrorists intensify the 

psychological fear equation by threatening to victimize citizens and interests of target 

countries anywhere in the world. 

Terrorist organizations often resort to major criminal activity and to terrorist actions. 

Drug and arms trafficking is the current method for raising money for terrorist activities. 

10 The recent alliances for mutual benefit between drug traffickers and terrorist 

organizations in Peru and Colombia—with considerable political impact on their own

populations and governments—show an example of this new trend. 

Finally, terrorist organizations seek to transform their images to that of more

mainstream organizations. Two classic examples include Sinn Fein’s Gerry Adams 

(political ally of the Irish Republican Army) transitioning from an outlaw barred from the 

United States to a welcomed statesman and fundraiser—a tactical change which 

enhanced his credibility and fund-raising ability. Yasser Arafat has taken the same action 

and has achieved similar results by joining the peace process and appearing more 

moderate. 

How Serious Is the Problem? 

Terrorist incidents around the world continue to increase despite the best efforts of 

security forces. The United States, long considered invincible against terrorist attacks, has 

suffered more terrorist acts in the past two years than it did during the height of terrorist 

activity in 1983, despite the massive counterterrorism effort of the late eighties. The 

takeover of the Iranian mission at the United Nations in New York in 1992 and the

bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 changed the face of terrorism for most 

Americans and other people in the world. 11 Not only did America lose its invincibility,

but the US found that small, loosely organized groups with radical agendas and insulated 

sponsorships could act with basic impunity. The bombing of a federal building in 

Oklahoma City in 1995 reinforced the severity of the problem. 

While Americans could take some comfort that the rate of attacks against United

States interests and personnel fell in 1993, still terrorists directed one-quarter of their 

attacks worldwide that year at the United States. 12 It seems that terrorists will continue to

200 
target Americans because of their international prominence and the worldwide media

coverage experienced when they targeted Americans. 

Modern terrorists have changed their tactics as the world has changed. While 

revolutionary terrorism has prevailed for several decades, the current rise in ethnic and 

religious groups willing to use terrorist tactics to achieve their ends threatens global 

security and individual nation-states. The modern developed nation-state, with its 

sophisticated infrastructure and its advanced technology systems, finds itself completely 

vulnerable to disruption and terrorist action. 

Regardless of terrorist motivation, support, or organizational structure, terrorist 

behavior should be understood for what it represents. Terrorist acts should be perceived 

as “war.” 13 It is a war built on a strategy of intimidation and fear. Fear is a key to the

strategy because it accomplishes the required dissemination of the terrorist’s 

communication. In its simplest form, the terrorist provides a “fear-producing event,” 

which is followed by media distribution of that event to the greatest extent possible.

Manipulation of populations and media resources is crucial to the overall impact of the 

message. The reaction of the Japanese population to the 1995 Tokyo subway chemical 

attack allegedly by the Aum Shinrikyo religious sect, with plans for additional nerve gas 

attacks, offers a perfect example of the “war of fear” at work. 14 

Future Areas of Concern 

Future terrorism will focus on four specific areas. Each area may impact others, but 

for the purposes of this paper, each should be considered self-contained and a primary 

focus for future terrorist acts. Additionally, most experts agree that no one typical 

terrorist threat will destroy a nation’s sovereignty or will destabilize the world. However, 

the extent or scope of individual terrorist acts is unlimited, and as shown in Japan, the 

self-imposed boundaries of terrorist groups can change quickly. The heretofore avoidance

of chemical, biological, and nuclear terrorist acts has been broken now. Depending on the 

event a violent act of mass destruction could cause such world reaction as national 

boycotts, suspension of civil rights within countries, or international condemnation of a

racial or ethnic group in a manner not previously experienced. 

The first area of future terrorism will take place in the economic sphere. As nations 

become more interdependent in trade blocks, and the gap between prosperous and nonprosperous nation-states widens, the opportunities for economic terrorism will expand.

Groups using terrorist tactics will interfere with economies for both financial or political 

gain. The Chilean Grape Incident of 1989 provides an excellent example: 

In March 1989, at the waterfront in Philadelphia, inspectors of the US Food and Drug

Administration, acting on an anonymous tip, examined crates of grapes arriving from 

Chile and discovered two cyanide-laced grapes. The evidence was that the Chilean fruit 

had been poisoned. No citizen anywhere reported eating the tainted grapes. However, the 

world reacted. Chilean fruit was temporarily banned, triggering severe economic and 

political turmoil. 15 

The Chilean grape incident illustrates an example of traditional revolutionary 

terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, or political terrorism. Yet, the underlying motivation 

for the act appears to have been economic. Economic terrorism is a new action in a world 

201 
where trading between competing economies can include protectionism, dominating 

markets, and economic ruin. For example, the rise of an insurgent Indian group within 

Mexico, just prior to the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement between 

Mexico and the United States, may be viewed as an issue of economic force and control. 

Although the group described itself as an economic insurgent movement, some of its 

actions also were called terrorist in nature. 

The second area of future terrorism will emanate from religious fundamentalism. 

The threat is worldwide and concentrated in the Muslim states, but it is by no means 

inclusive to those states. Much of the Muslim terrorist movement is supported and 

motivated by Iran, which, along with Sudan and Syria, considers terrorism a primary 

instrument of state policy. 16 Iran’s support for terrorism can be better understood by 

looking at Iran’s organizing struggle between its secular and religious factions, which 

have limited its interaction with other nation-states and contributed to its isolation. 17 The

ascendancy of the religious extremists has expanded Iran’s economic problems. Thus, it 

may appear logical for the leading mullahs to declare a jihad against the West 

(particularly the United States, the “Great Satan”) to shift away from internal problems, 

to support Islam in a growing secular world, and to restore the Islamic revolutionary 

spirit both at home and abroad. 18 

Iran has led the world for the past four years as the most active state sponsor of 

terrorism. That country has been implicated in terrorist attacks in Italy, Turkey, and 

Pakistan. Their intelligence services support terrorist acts, either directly or indirectly 

through extremist groups. Iranian intelligence agents are under arrest in Germany and 

France for their links to murders of Iranian dissidents abroad. Iran also is the preeminent 

sponsor of extremist Islamic and Palestinian groups. The country provides funds, 

weapons, and training to “the terrorist organizations known as Hizballah, the Pakistanian 

Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command 

(PLP-GC) and HAMAS.” 19 

The premise of Iran leading a worldwide terrorist campaign against the West, 

especially the United States, fulfills two major requirements for the leaders of the Tehran

government. First, it provides both a moral and symbolic attack against forces that 

represent evil to Islam (including the United States). Second, it sends a clear message of 

fear to both the Iranian people and neighboring nations that no individual or nation stands

above the wrath of Iran. 

The Iranian leadership may feel confident in this behavior based on earlier terrorist 

action. Yossef Bodansky illustrates the point: 

Tehran has reason to be confident...two major terrorist strikes against the United States: 

the mid-air explosion of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 

1988: and, in San Diego, California, on March 10, 1989, the fire-bombing of a van driven

by Sharon Lee Rodgers, wife of the captain of the USS Vincennes, who had mistakenly

shot down the Iranian Airbus commercial flight in July 1988. 

20 

Additionally, Iran is a main source of support for the fundamentalist regime in Sudan and 

for the Kurdistan Workers party (PKK) which has been held responsible for hundreds of 

terrorist acts in Turkey. 

21 Iranian fundamentalists currently are the most active 

supporters of terrorist activity worldwide. 

202 
Religious ideologies have long been associated with terrorism and the support of 

violence for religious purposes. The doctrines of Christian (Catholic and Protestant), 

Muslim (Shi’a and Sunni), Jewish, Hindu, and Sikh religions have all been used to justify 

terrorism. 22 Religious fundamentalism and dogma have provided individuals the support 

to carry out their fanatical or terrorist activities. However, it should be clearly understood 

that the vast majority of those who support fundamentalist religious movements do not 

become terrorists or even support their violent activities. 

The intensity of a fundamentalist terrorist differs little from a political, ethnic, or 

national terrorist. The added concept of having “God on your side” and the promise of 

life after death adds a divine variable to the terrorist equation. Some of these groups 

recently have been called “superterrorists” because of their access to nuclear, chemical, 

biological, and conventional weapons and computer technology. 23 The true global threat 

from these terrorists is their willingness to use their new weapons. Since these terrorist 

targets represent “the unholy or unclean,” the traditional terrorist objective of political

control is substituted with destruction of “evil,” As a result, the terrorists’ potential use of 

nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons is considered ideal. 24 

The terrorism of these fundamentalist groups is ideology and religion driven. It is 

critical for the leadership of these groups to present in a constant and conclusive way, the 

rightness of their views to their followers. The leaders of these organizations will take

unilateral and arbitrary actions. However, these same leaders will attempt to legitimize 

their actions, their support, and the reactions of the world to them by addressing their 

own populations. The bombing of the World Trade Center should then be viewed as 

having had a primary target audience made up of Islamic fundamentalists worldwide 

instead of only Americans. 

When the causes of nontraditional religious groups or cults are added to the aims of 

fundamentalist terrorist groups, the behavior of terrorists becomes even more confusing 

and unpredictable. An example of this is the 1995 Japanese subway cult attack, which 

should be considered a peek into the future instead of as a nonrepeatable event. 

The third area of future terrorism will be technology terror. The information and 

computer highway of our future also will include a fast lane for terrorists. Modem 

technology makes it possible for smaller, more radical groups to access sophisticated 

means of destruction without significant support systems or funding. As computer 

systems become more powerful and cheaper, terrorists will develop a greater capability to

impact resources, intelligence, and terror operations with little or no risk, depending on 

advances yet to be made by the antiterrorist forces. 

Using information warfare tools will give terrorists access to the vast amounts of 

financial resources that travel the information highways. By using and attacking these 

financial conduits, terrorists not only can transfer funding from outside sponsors, but they 

can illegally tap these vulnerable conduits to obtain the required informational resources

to sustain their activities. They can cripple the financial markets either by direct attacks 

or by instilling a credibility gap in the electronic financial world. 25 As Winn Schwartau 

notes in information Warfare, “Money is the network that comprises hundreds of 

thousands of computers of every type, wired together in places as lofty as the Federal 

Reserve...and as mundane as the thousands of gas pumps around the world outfitted to 

take credit and debit cards.” 26 

203 
In addition to being a possible funding conduit, information warfare techniques also 

can provide the terrorist with an invaluable source of intelligence, ranging from sharing 

information on bomb making with other organizations, to targeting individual travelers

through the airline reservation system, to stealing military secrets through the everexpanding Internet presence in military organizations. Information warfare provides an

invaluable aid to the intelligence-gathering ability of the modern-day, high-tech terrorist. 

The information highway not only allows access to this wealth of information but allows 

access to this information from places safely within the borders of terrorists’ safe havens. 

Using the information highway also can enable the terrorist to coordinate remote 

multiple-cell activity with little probability of discovery, and provide the terrorist with a 

method for attracting worldwide attention to their acts of violence almost as the events 

are unfolding. This information highway can make the command, control, and 

intelligence techniques used on the military battlefield available to terrorist groups 

worldwide. 

Besides the support functions of managing resources, gathering intelligence, and 

disseminating information, information warfare techniques is to create terror or chaos and 

wreak havoc against a target. When considering the use of information warfare 

techniques by terrorists, give the first consideration to the most vulnerable target to 

information warfare attacks. By its very nature, information warfare attacks are most 

effective where the information highway has made the greatest inroads into people’s

everyday lives, business and governmental functions, and defense. Thus, the modern 

westernized societies are more vulnerable to information warfare than are third world 

nations. This vulnerability also corresponds to the nations most frequently targeted by 

terrorists. 

The types of terror that can be created by astute information warfare terrorists range 

from targeting key individuals to influencing decisions favorable to terrorist causes to

attacks that cause massive destruction and loss of life. The following examples illustrate 

these purposes. 

On the personal level, terrorists could use the information highway to gather 

incriminating information on key decision-makers. Whether it is bad check-writing 

activity, subscribing to pornographic magazines, belonging to nonpolitically correct 

groups, or having a medical condition that has remained a secret, people in positions of 

influence sometime have material in their past that might make them vulnerable to 

coercion. However, if their past is not tainted, the terrorist could begin sowing the seeds 

of doubt along the electronic highway by altering credit history databases, banking 

records, mailing lists, and medical records in enough detail to compromise the 

individuals. 

Schwartau recounts one incident about an individual being bombarded with hate mail 

and police inquiries due to a computer request for pedophilia information. Someone else 

had requested the information using his identification. 27 Thus, information warfare tools 

in the hands of the terrorist has the potential to either influence or discredit influential 

individuals. 

On the corporate level, terrorists could use information warfare techniques to cripple

corporations physically or economically. Using such computer techniques as trojan 

horses, viruses, or spoofing terrorist attacks could bring corporate information systems—

including corporate research and development, financial data management, personnel 

204 
information, and shipping and receiving—to a grinding halt. The cost to corporations 

could be millions of dollars. Even without physically crippling these systems, enough 

doubt could be instilled in the operators of the systems to render the systems worthless. 

Examples include faulty bookkeeping software, inventory control systems that generate

random numbers, and shipping and invoicing systems that become so unreliable that they 

can no longer be trusted. With these unreliable systems, vast quantities of manpower 

have to be expended to ensure accuracy in the data that has become the life blood of the 

corporation. 

Other examples of terrorism against corporations include industrial espionage, 

modifying tests results to give inaccurate data, and release of data that would discredit the 

corporation or individuals within the corporation. Thus, besides being able to hold 

individuals hostage, terrorists also could hold corporations hostage by using their own 

information systems. 

On a global level, nations become vulnerable to terrorist attacks through the use of 

information warfare techniques. Such national infrastructure as banks switched telephone

systems, power grids, and air traffic control systems are but a few examples of targets

that could cause massive disruption in a developed state if attacked. Nuclear power plants 

with bad controller chips, jamming aircraft transponders, and theft of national security 

information from military networks are other examples that could cause massive

destruction and loss of life. 

In addition to computers, terrorist groups have moved into the technology and 

missile age with hardware and human intelligence. For example, in 1973 it was rare for

terrorists to use missile attacks. 28 Today missile attacks are commonplace. However, the 

future wave of technological terrorism will include more than missiles. These new 

technology terrorists will be intelligent and creative, and will have learned from past 

terrorist activities worldwide. 

In Final Warning, Robert Kupperman and Jeff Kamen discuss a scenario in which a 

Middle East terrorist group obtained nerve agents for a strike. 29 In 1995 a quasireligious 

cult used a similar attack in a Tokyo subway to kill 16 people and to injure over 5,000. 30

The police investigation revealed a terrorist plot aimed at international mass destruction 

(for as-yet-undetermined religious reasons) by members of the Aum Shinrikyo, also 

known as Supreme Truth Organization. Included among the cult membership are 30 

chemists who worked for the cult’s science and technology ministry. Police sources 

suspected the 30 chemists of preparing the chemical, sarin, that was used in the subway 

attack. A terrorist organization with a science and technology ministry may not be typical 

of past terrorist organizations; however, this high-technology, computer-based 

organization is more mainstream than the world would expect. 

The fourth area of future terrorism will be what Donald Hanle refers to as “apolitical

terrorism,” or terrorism for nonpolitical ends. 31 This category has stirred some

controversy because some experts feel all terrorist acts have a political or social 

foundation and therefore should fall under the political umbrella. However, recent 

terrorist events around the world clearly indicate that some terrorist activities do fall 

under the apolitical category. 

The apolitical terrorist should be considered the most dangerous type. The 

availability of modem technology and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 

combined with someone with a criminal or unbalanced psychological mind-set—makes 

205 
for an ominous concern. An individual or small group of terrorists with personal motives 

could carry out an event of mass destruction with relative ease and success. Additionally,

such an individual or group will probably be available for hire on a national or global 

market. Modem technology, computers, and information resources all tend to facilitate 

the interaction and communication of both individuals and groups. 

The recent 19 April 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City of the federal building which 

left 168 people dead could be considered apolitical under certain conditions. If the two 

indicted bombers (11 counts each with death the maximum penalty for each count), 32

Terry Nichols and Timothy McVeigh, do not represent a particular group, organization, 

or movement, 33 but were acting out their own antisocial and antigovernment views (both 

men believe they are patriots protecting the Constitution from a misguided evil 

government), 34 the terrorist act would not be considered exclusively politically 

motivated. The act could then be described as the abnormal behavior of two individuals 

based on either psychotic thinking in the gravest sense or criminal behavior in the 

narrowest sense. The psychotic thinking scenario is adequately described by Hanle when 

“estranged and fragmented individuals...lose self-identity and [seem] doomed by a 

soulless bureaucracy....” 35 

Another example of apolitical terrorism is the “Unabomber” in the United States.

During the Unabomber’s 17-year reign of terror, three victims have been killed and 

twenty-three have been injured. The latest victim, a lobbyist for the timber industry, was 

killed by a package bomb that went off in his Sacramento, California, office. The victims

represent varied backgrounds, and their particular selection for motive or orientation to 

the terrorist is unknown. Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local law 

enforcement agencies believe the Unabomber is brazen, typically cool, and 

psychologically unstable. 

However, the Unabomber fully understands the value of media, fear, and 

intimidation. That he or she demands that two of the nation’s leading newspapers print a 

35,000-word manifesto against the industrial and technology complex is a classic terrorist 

shakedown attempt. Unlike most political terrorist groups or state-sponsored groups, the

apolitical terrorist has little concern for political or economic repercussions. 

What Can Be Done? 

As terrorism enters the twenty-first century and impacts the global community, a 

limited number of options will be available to counter the new threats. One option which 

attained some success after the World Trade Center bombing is the utilization of 

economic incentives or bounties. After that World Trade Center attack, the United States 

government offered a reward of several million dollars for the identification of persons 

responsible for the attack. An informant in Pakistan provided the information that led to 

the arrest of Ramzi Yousef as the mastermind of the act. Yousef was arrested in

Islamabad, Pakistan, and was immediately extradited to the United States (New York 

City), where he awaits trial. However, an unfortunate follow-up to the arrest was the

speculation that the subsequent killing in Pakistan of two American embassy personnel 

was revenge for the Yousef extradition. 

The reward program can be complicated, as in the case of Pakistan. That country is 

in the middle of sectarian violence between Sunni and Shiite Muslim groups. These

206 
groups are engaged not only in terrorist activity, but are involved with the country’s 

powerful drug Mafia and the militant Muslim groups. 36 This ongoing terrorist activity 

complicates the bounty program but does not negate it. Thus, the United States 

government, to repeat the success of its original “reward program,” offered two million 

dollars in bounty for the killers of the two United States government workers. 

A second option for global nation-states against terrorism is “national resolve.” It 

should be acknowledged that a fool-proof system against terrorism in democratic 

societies does not exist. In the words of terrorism expert Stephen Sloan, “There can never 

be a totally effective program to deter or prevent a determined adversary from seeking 

softer targets of opportunity in what he perceives to be a justified war against all.” 37

Such simple procedures as better intelligence and improved physical security of critical 

sites will, in most cases, deter a particular terrorist group. However, a: terrorist group 

deprived of a particular target typically will seek a more accessible alternative target. 

A traditional limiting factor to national resolve now and in the future will be cost and

politics. Using the United States as an example, 100 days after the Oklahoma City 

bombing, the two-billion-dollar antiterrorism bill had stalled in political debate because 

of opposition to the bill from both liberal and conservative lawmakers. 

The key point of any nation attempting to combat terrorism, now as in the future, is

that terrorist activity will take place and that casualties will occur. As was evident after

the Oklahoma City bombing, additional funding and legislation will harden some targets 

and drive some terrorist organizations underground. The realization for a global society is 

that technology attacks and conventional or unconventional attacks, including hostage 

taking, will continue. The terrorist’s requirement for media coverage typically will 

exceed a democratic society’s inclination to control the media or the public’s demand for 

news. 

Thus, in the future our global society may expect more rather than less terrorism. 

Much of that terrorism will be based on religion and ethnicity. Economics, technology, 

and the whims of both criminal and psychotics will ensure ongoing and, at times, 

spectacular incidences. Terrorism has reached American interests both domestically and 

internationally; hence, we will see more public and political efforts to counter terrorism. 

Unfortunately, terrorism in the developing countries will continue almost unabated. 

Notes 

1

 Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1993, April 1994, IV. 

2

 Ibid. 

3

 Grant Wardlow, Political Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University Press,

1982), 3. 

4

 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), 

225. 

5

 Jonathan Harris, The New Terrorism: Politics of Violence (New York: Julian 

Messaer Press, 1983), 33-37. 

6

 Ibid. 

7

 Ibid., 36, 

8

 David E. Long, The Anatomy of Terrorism (New York: Free Press, 1990), 9. 

9

 Ibid., 10, 

207 
Notes 

10 Ibid., 4. 

11 Department of Justice, Terrorism In the United States (Washington, D.C.: Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, 1993), 26-27. 

12 Department of State, 22. 

13 Donald J. Hanle, Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare (Washington, D.C. and

Elmsford, New York: Pergammon-Brassey’s, 1989), 14. 

14 “Police Seeking Cult’s Chemist,” Montgomery Advertiser, 14A. 

15 Robert Kupperman and Jeff Kamen, Final Warning: Averting Disaster in the New

Age of Terrorism (New York: Doubleday Press, 19891, ix. 

16 Yossef Bodansky, Terror: The Inside Story of the Terrorist Conspiracy in America 

(New York: Shapelsky Publishers, Inc., 1984), 29. 

17 Trevor N. Duprey, Future Wars (New York: Warner Books, 1992), 158-59. 

18 Bodansky, 29. 

19 Department of State, 23. 

20 Bodansky, 31. 

21 Department of State, 22. 

22 Long, 65. 

23 Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 22 February 1995, 4. 

24 Marvin J. Cetron, Terror 2000: The Future Face of Terrorism, Prepared for Office 

of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Unpublished report, 1995. 

25 Greg Smith, computer consultant to research coordinator, Air University, Maxwell 

AFB, Ala., personal notes. 

26 Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare (New York: Thunder Mouth Press, 1994), 

61. 

27 Ibid. 

28 Long, 92. 

29 Kupperman and Kamen, 87. 

30 “Police Seeking Cult’s Chemist.” 

31 Hanle, 121. 

32 Sally Burbee, “Nichols Charged,” Associated Press, 10 May 1995, 1; and Kevin 

Johnson, “In Shadows of Oklahoma,” USA Today, 16 August 1995, 5. 

33 Pete Copeland, “Prosecutors In Bombing Case,” Scripps Howard News, 10 August 

1995, 8. 

34 Hanle, 124. 

35 Greg Myre, Montgomery Advertiser, 10 March 1995, 13A 

36 Stephen Sloan. Beating International Terrorism: An Action for Preemption and 

Punishment (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press, 1986). 49. 

37 David Espo, Montgomery Advertiser, 30 June 1995, 5A 

208 
PART V 

CONCLUSION 

209 
17 

The Transmillennial World from an American Perspective 

John A. Warden III 

You have just completed a fascinating tour d’horizon of the world and the problems

likely to plague it. This final chapter gives an integrated view of the world and a set of 

prescriptions for American success in it. Many ideas are at odds with some of the

preceding chapters; when you find this to be true, use your judgment to decide which

view or interpretation makes the most sense and holds something with which you can 

work. 

We are experiencing the most revolutionary period in human history. Three 

revolutions of incredible magnitude and import confront us: a geopolitical revolution 

seeing a single power dominating the world for the first time since the height of the

Roman Empire; an information revolution fostering an explosion of knowledge and 

giving birth to a second industrial revolution with the potential to exceed its predecessor; 

and a military technological revolution ushering in the first-ever conceptual change in

warfare. Any one of these revolutions would be exciting on its own; when combined,

however, the excitement is unparalleled. 

The monumental change the world is experiencing is filled with paradoxes. We are 

living in the most revolutionary of times, but there is more order in the international 

system than the world has seen in two millennia; military weapon systems cost far more 

than ever, but the best of them make war extraordinarily inexpensive to execute. Rapid 

economic growth spurred by the information revolution is seeing more and more people 

able to afford houses and automobiles, and prices for raw materials are falling while their 

availability increases. In other words, our basic assumptions about how things work in 

the commercial, political, and economic spheres are undergoing as radical a change as the 

change from Newtonian to quantum physics. Let us now focus on the next 10 to 15 years 

by suggesting the general environment in which the United States will operate. 

The accelerating dispersion of information will define the next decades. Far more

people will be connected to each other and to sources of information than ever before. To 

a certain extent, information is a metaphor for wealth, and the explosion of information 

will be matched by a proportionate increase in world wealth. Contrary to many 

commentators, most areas of the world will become noticeably richer. The disparity

between the richest nation—the United States—and one near the middle of a per capita 

wealth chart will be just as great or even greater. But the disparity will be irrelevant; what 

210 
is relevant will be the realization of poorer countries that it is possible to become richer 

without stealing; that is, that men create wealth. It is not disparity of wealth that causes 

problems, but legal or physical bars to attaining it which will cause internal and even 

external conflict. Simply stated, much of the world finally will realize that wealth is not 

finite but infinite. As this realization grows, people around the world will devote

increasing energies to working and building wealth and decrease their interests in war

and violence accordingly. 

Accompanying and spurring a world increase in the standard of living will be a 

decline in the cost of raw materials and an increase in their availability. They will have 

less and less relevance to standard of living and will become significantly less likely to be

a cause of war. The reasons are many: technology which finds substitutes for old staples;

new exploration techniques driven by the information revolution; and more efficient use 

and distribution. With a rapidly rising standard of living worldwide, the demand for 

foodstuffs beyond subsistence will increase; thus, producers of luxury items like coffee

and fruits should see excellent market opportunities. The likelihood of violent conflict 

over natural resources will decrease because the things themselves are less valuable and 

seizure of them is by far the most expensive and least rewarding way to secure access.

Overall, removing a traditional cause of war ought to be positive; adjustment, however,

will be necessary for many. As an example, resource-rich states have been able to 

exchange their resources for money and political influence worldwide. As the value of 

raw materials recedes, some violent adaptation likely will occur. 

Water is a special case in natural resources. As earlier chapters stated, many believe 

that water will be a source of serious conflict, especially in the Middle East. The 

possibility is there, but the Middle East also may have some market and technology 

solutions at hand. One of the primary problems with water everywhere is the way it is 

priced and sold. For the most part, the cost to users is a small fraction of the real costs—

monetary and political. Since the user pays so little for an important product, he has 

virtually no incentive to find more efficient ways to use it. If water were priced at marketestablished rates, we can predict with certainty that usage rates per acre of agriculture, ton 

of steel, or merely per capita would fall quickly without decreases in the production it 

enables. In other words, if water-use efficiency improved by a factor of two or more, 

locales that now experience a critical or deficit situation suddenly would be comfortable. 

The United States can help to eliminate this predicament by developing the technology 

needed to increase water productivity and by leading the way in developing market-rate 

approaches to water sales. 

The last few paragraphs have painted a rosy economic picture. In fact, this picture is 

but part of a larger mosaic (or system) which is even more optimistic. When we look at 

the world from a top-down perspective—where we only allow ourselves to see the first 

level of the world system—we are struck by how peaceful it is. For the first time in

historical memory, we see a world without serious great-power competitions. Currently 

(at the end of the twentieth century) no significant power has extraterritorial designs for 

which it would go to war with another significant power. (We are deliberately excluding 

a handful of irredentist claims—because irredentism is simply different from the 

conquest and imperialism that dominated the world since at least the days of the ancient 

Egyptians. In addition, relatively little of the irredentist emotion extant is strong enough 

211 
to propel its holders into open warfare nor does it generally pit one important power 

against another.) 

The world at the first order of analysis is uniquely peaceful; an understanding and 

acceptance of this fact is essential. Failure to grasp it means that all of our decisions will 

be based on erroneous data. At this point, many readers will be inclined to reject this

hypothesis out of hand; they will point to the many wars and conflicts currently 

underway, to the number of people dying as a result, and to the nightly television recaps. 

Everyone of these unfortunate conflicts, however, are second order and normally have no 

direct effect on the world system which is in a very ordered state. 

Thinking about weather systems helps us to understand this unusual situation. In the 

United States, we frequently see long periods (days and sometimes weeks) when no big

fronts move across the country and when no hurricanes strike. We then talk rightly about 

what great weather we are enjoying. At the same time, however, the probability is high 

that someplace in the nation, a thunderstorm developed, and a neighborhood experienced 

lightning strikes and wind damage to trees. In other words, we had a local disturbance in 

a system which was otherwise in a very orderly state. It is the same with the world today: 

the world political weather is excellent, but local disturbances exist, nonetheless. 

As we know from daily and historical experience, the overwhelming majority of 

local disturbances—be they weather, economic, or political—remain localized.

Occasionally, however, one will start to behave somewhat like a rapidly multiplying 

cancer cell and drive the parent system into chaotic, or disorderly, behavior. 

Unfortunately, we don’t yet have the ability to predict which disturbances are linear and 

will dampen out quickly and which ones are nonlinear and will drive the parent system to 

chaos. 

So how do we operationalize these ideas for the United States? First, we understand 

that the world is generally peaceful and that we can make political and economic 

decisions based on its continued tranquillity. To return to our weather analogy, we can 

plan to make a trip anywhere in the country without the need to equip ourselves with foul 

weather gear and emergency rations. If we get caught in a local storm, we know it will be 

short-lived; the low probability of getting caught justifies our decision not to spend 

money and effort on preparation for worst-case weather problems. Americans in business 

can plan on world ventures with high probability that global conditions will not change 

appreciably—although they must keep a weather eye out for occasional local storms. 

Second, from operationalizing stability concepts, we understand that the 

overwhelming majority of local wars resemble local thunderstorms which pass without

creating large system instabilities. Thus, we can treat each one of these events strictly on 

its own merits; we need not be concerned about extraterritorial consequences—because 

the world as a whole is stable and small disturbances will not drive it into chaos. By 

contrast, when the world has been unstable—that is, in most of human history-small 

disturbances had a high probability of creating global chaos. Consider the effects of the

assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in 1914. That same event today would do 

little more than make a small splash in the world news media. 

We are driving to the idea that the United States need not worry much about small

disturbances without a specific reason for doing so; on the other hand, as the dominant 

power in the world—and as the richest power in the world—she has an enormous interest 

in seeing that worldwide stability continues. Note that the majority of the remainder of

212 
the world shares the American interest because stability is good for almost everyone 

almost all the time. 

The reasons for worldwide stability today are many and complex; the most important 

of these reasons, however, focuses on American dominance. In a certain sense, stability 

flowed to the rest of the world because of American stability and because there was no 

large force to resist it. Since we are forced to presume that a substantial diminution of 

American dominance would remove the most important underpinning of world stability, 

maintenance of dominance ought to become America’s grand strategic goal. Success in 

this realm will cover a host of localized errors, whereas failure leads to global instability 

which is by definition highly unpredictable and dangerous. 

In the past, a state wanting to maintain even local dominance felt that it needed to

reduce the power of its neighbors. This was certainly a key element of Prussian and 

German grand strategy for nearly two hundred years (and the consequences were 

predictably disastrous). This kind of policy, of course, guarantees robust opposition 

because the neighbors cannot share either the goal or the means to it. 

For the United States, there is another way, one without much precedent: maintain 

dominance by progressing faster than anyone else in military, economic, and political 

endeavors—and, simultaneously, by avoiding actions which might cause other states to 

form anti-American coalitions. In the military sphere, this means dominating the military 

technological revolution by staying one revolution ahead of all contenders. Given our 

current huge lead in almost every relevant military field, staying ahead need not be 

costly. In the economic sphere, it means aggressive pursuit of growth policies and the 

creation of real wealth. In the political sphere, it means accepting—humbly—the mantle 

of power and exercising it rarely, but always decisively and successfully. American 

military and political forays must be successful, because failure reduces the aura of 

dominance and contributes to instability. 

We are now at a point in our analysis where we can move from theory to specifics

and layout some general rules for American grand strategy and operations. In the grand 

strategy arena, after ensuring American dominance by out-accelerating everyone else, our 

primary concern becomes one of quelling disturbances that portend large instabilities. 

Our working assumption can be that almost all internal conflicts are unlikely to have 

global significance and can be ignored. What can’t be ignored are those conflicts which 

the perpetrator has undertaken to force change on a neighbor. When one state crosses a

border forcefully—or threatens the use of force against a neighbor—risk to global 

stability goes up exponentially. Therefore, the working assumption here is that American 

intervention is probably justified and demanded. On further reflection, there may be 

something special about the situation that makes intervention unnecessary. But if we start 

out with the assumption that it will be needed, we are likely to be better prepared, and our 

potential enemies are less likely to do something out of ignorance. 

Our emphasis here concerns American intervention. This does not mean that others 

may not help—but we must understand that as the dominant power, our interest demands

that we act and to do it right and quickly. To the extent that we abdicate our 

responsibilities to lesser powers and groups, we reduce greatly the chance of decisive and 

quick action, and we raise dangerous questions about our will and capability. 

Our other general rule for intervention is more traditional: if someone breaches 

contractual arrangements forcefully or destroys American property or kills American 

213 
citizens, we must act. Why? Because we have a real interest in encouraging others to

reject stealing and killing to seize power or treasure, and second, because a key function 

of government is protection of its citizens’ lives and property. One might suggest that this 

is more properly a role for the United Nations or some other group. It isn’t. It is 

quintessentially the responsibility of he world’s dominant power. Failure to act when

provoked in this manner is dangerous. 

Likewise, asking others (North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations) 

to do the job reduces American prestige and America’s ability to control the situation. 

Doing so contributes to potential world instability because it reduces America’s aura of

dominance. It also raises the specter of competing coalitions—something not in the 

dominant power’s interest. Some would say that the dominant power has a moral 

obligation to intervene for humanitarian reasons to stop suffering, to stop killing, or to 

accomplish other worthy goals. To the contrary, America does not have any such 

obligation and should not accept a blanket responsibility for the affairs of the rest of the 

world. The reasons are many: first, unless the situation meets criteria stated earlier, we 

have no business intruding into other people’s fights. We will rarely understand what 

they are about, and rarely will we find one side with a preponderance of right on its side. 

Second, the number of these local disturbances is theoretically unlimited (like the lumber 

of thunderstorms that take place even when the world’s weather is generally nice). An 

unlimited number imposes an unlimited burden, which in turn is certain to lead quickly to 

fiscal and political distress if not outright bankruptcy. Third, the likely absence of a world 

consensus that one side or the other is right or wrong means that American intervention 

against one party is certain to arouse considerable resentment in other parts of the 

world—resentment which stresses world stability—America’s number one imperative. 

We live in a political world and America is ruled by politics. Consequently, it is 

inevitable that America’s leaders will insist on interventions which are strategically 

dangerous and unwarranted. When this happens (as wrong as it may be) the worst way, 

and, unfortunately, the most likely way to address the problem is through serial, 

escalatory steps. Serial, escalating operations reduce the predictability of the outcome, 

and each one creates anew, different situation—a situation that may lead to inadvertent 

creations of nonlinearities, which could affect the broader system. Interventions must be 

fast and successful. To a certain extent, fast and successful are far more important 

strategically than choosing the right side. 

The last few paragraphs have suggested broad operating principles to achieve 

important strategic objectives. The question now is how to carry out military campaigns

to satisfy domestic, political, world, and local conditions in the conflict area. In general, 

our campaigns need to do or be the following: very fast—hours or days from decision to 

action until success is assured; free of unintended casualties on either side; geared to the 

postwar situation regarding what should or should not be functioning or easily restorable 

after the war; and appropriate to the desired postwar political situation. These criteria

then define in broad terms the appropriate force structure for the United States for

offensive purposes. Of course, defense is important, something we will come to shortly. 

Before addressing either offense or defense issues, however, let us first define war. 

In the last 40 years, and especially in the last several, we have come close to 

confusing ourselves hopelessly by trying to classify military activity into a whole range 

of categories as though each one had its own logic and by establishing a need for a 

214 
different set of theories, doctrines, and weapons. At the most important level, application 

of force has no boundaries. This is true at the operational and strategic levels, for only at 

a tactical level might we begin to see any differences from one situation to the next. We

can remove much of our confusion if we simply define war as "the use of force or threat 

to use force to change an inimical environment to an environment which satisfies the

combatant’s objectives." This definition applies equally to disaster relief (changing an 

inimical environment created by wind or water) and to total war (colonizing the loser’s 

territory). This definition of war relieves us of the need to invent strange terms like

military operations other than war, peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peace enforcement. 

The next level of analysis introduces us to the characteristics of weapon systems 

appropriate to American war requirements in the next 25 to 50 years. They must have the 

capability to: 

• allow the United States to conduct parallel war—that is, to bring under attack 

almost simultaneously the centers of gravity needed to attain political objectives and to

preclude organized repair or reaction; 

• operate from strategic depths in the United States directly—without the need for 

intermediate basing—against the center of any opponent; 

• reach any point on the globe from the United States in about an hour and return in 

the same time frame; 

• impact to within inches or less of the desired impact point; 

• destroy or affect only what they are supposed to destroy or affect; 

• hit desired targets quickly enough to assure at least strategic and operational 

paralysis; 

• do what is necessary without imposing any unintended casualties or property 

damage; 

• allow the United States to operate with few or no casualties; 

• penetrate defenses (most likely through some combination of very high speeds, 

radio and visual spectrum stealth, and very high altitudes, including space from near earth 

to deep space); 

• loiter literally or figuratively for long periods (weeks or more) above the enemy for

some combination of observation and lethal attack; 

• and deliver any type of energy—whether lethal or nonlethal (even in the form of

food)—and systems which are highly productive in terms of manning and support. 

Some might call this force structure prohibitively expensive; on the contrary,’ it is 

designed to leverage the output of the information revolution. The force structure needed 

to carry the operations just discussed will offer far more productivity than our current 

force structure and will rely on fewer platforms and far fewer people for support. We saw 

a three-to-four order of magnitude increase in the productivity of the bomber pilot from 

the World War II B-17 to the Gulf War F-117 aircrafts. That increase occurred within a 

50-year period only one-half of which was during the age of the doubling of computer 

power every 18 months or so. We can gain another similar improvement in productivity 

in a fraction of the time because of current technology. Smaller numbers, fewer people,

and little or no requirement for en route support and refueling spell huge savings-savings 

sufficiently high to pay for what must be a real capital intensification of airpower

providers. 

215 
Before overviewing needed defensive systems, let us examine particular threats

which exist in the world, namely chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear 

weapons, and terror weapons. Chemical weapons are much overrated and are of little 

value beyond a tactical level. They are difficult to deploy and employ, have uncertain and 

unpredictable effects, are dangerous for the user as well as the target, and are easy for 

well-trained and equipped military forces to negate. They may have some terror value

when used against civilians, but the probability of terror attacks provoking the attacked 

state to sue for peace quickly is small. Since a cross-border attack probably would lead

the United States to intervene (if it follows the rules proposed above), any attack which 

does not lead to almost instant victory has little value. 

Is it worthwhile to spend much time in trying to prevent countries or groups from 

acquiring chemical weapons? The answer is probably "no" because weapons can be

easily produced with the same processes used in legitimate nonweapons manufacture. 

Our best counter is to advertise the problems associated with chemical war and then make 

clear the United States will not tolerate chemical use against extraterritorial civilians. 

Paradoxically, our official, public paranoia about chemical—and nuclear—weapons gives 

them an underserved cachet which makes it more likely that someone will use one or the 

other. After all, if an American administration expresses great fear about possible North 

Korean nuclear weapons and then agrees to negotiations previously rejected, one must

assume that others will see special weapons as providing leverage against the United 

States. Or to use another analogy: the poker player who always folds in the face of a 

robust bet is begging to be bluffed. We should make clear that the United States feels 

fully capable of thwarting the use of chemical and nuclear weapons and imposing longlasting paralysis on the using state. 

From an American standpoint, nuclear weapons are interesting but have little utility. 

The United States can accomplish any military objective with nonnuclear weapons; 

therefore, their use embodies extreme political risk. They may have some use to 

opponents of the United States, but their advantage is likely to be solely in the threat of 

use against the United States or one of its allies or friends. The threat should be 

emphasized because it is highly unlikely that any state or group will employ sufficient 

weapons to defeat the United States. Anything less than a quick defeat would give the 

United States time to retaliate and shut down the nuclear user. We have a paradoxical

situation: weapons that we find useless can cause us problems. A nuclear-free world (or 

close to it) would be ideal, and we should probably drive as far as possible in that 

direction with a combination of arms control initiatives, incentives for others to turn over

or destroy current stockpiles, and vigorous, active measures to foil nascent plans of 

preemptive attack on nuclear facilities. If we fail to produce a nuclear-free world—and 

zero is nuclear-free—and clearly a dream—we must have the best possible defenses. 

Terrorism is another unclear area to which the United States must respond; it does 

not constitute a real strategic threat directly to the United States, but it can destroy an

already weak or unstable government. And, it can certainly be painful even if it is 

strategically ineffective. Our best counter to terrorism embodies a clear-cut policy which 

says that any sponsoring government and its people may be denied modem conveniences 

like electricity, gasoline, and telephones until such time the government and people agree 

to stop using terrorism. Finding and attacking nonstate groups can be quite difficult, but

the same general policy should apply. We can do something defensively, but not much 

216 
because terrorists frequently try deliberately to goad the target state to deploy defenses

which the defended people will find intolerable. As in war, the best defense is a good 

offense. 

Our final special concern focuses on biological weapons. These weapons may be the

most troubling because of their capacity to damage. Chapter 12 detailed how small 

quantities can devastate an area. Unlike chemicals which are so difficult to deliver, 

biological weapons are far easier to deliver either by air platform or by infiltrator. In 

addition, they are ideal offensive weapons because of the difficulty of developing 

vaccines or antidotes in advance. A good biological weapon does its dirty work before 

the attacked party realizes that it is suffering from a man-made ailment. Defenses against 

air platforms are necessary to reduce or eliminate an attacker’s ability to deliver such 

weapons. Defense against infiltrators is difficult and requires superb police work. Finally, 

the penalty for use must be swift and severe. Despite our best efforts and our strongest 

threats against users, our chances of total success are small. This area urgently needs a lot 

more thought and innovative proposals. 

Although we have not mentioned information as either a weapon or war concept, let 

us say that it may be both and may be extraordinarily effective, because information is

vital to organizational existence. Destruction, manipulation, and injection of information 

may be sufficient to wage and win wars. A military machine cannot function at 

operational or higher levels without enormous quantities of fresh information moving 

into, around, and out of the organization. A nation cannot function defensively or

offensively without a reliable stream of information. A criminal cartel needs to move

great quantities of information to remain intact. The field is fertile. Offensive information 

weapons range from radio and television broadcasts (the longer range and more powerful

the better) to computer viruses to holograph projectors. Information weapons will playa 

key role in defensive and offensive operations for the foreseeable future. 

We left a discussion of defenses until now, because defense is something you do

because you failed to do something else right. Allowing yourself to be attacked is 

dangerous and something you should avoid. If proactive measures fail to prevent an 

attack, however, do everything possible to ensure the attack does not impose strategically 

or operationally significant burdens. The United States needs a good worldwide defense 

against ballistic missiles which almost certainly dictates a spacebased system as opposed 

to a limited area coverage ground system, a defense against cruise missiles, and a defense 

against remotely piloted vehicles. These systems, and a system to detect terrorist 

infiltrators, should give the United States ample flexibility to conduct the only kind of 

operations which solve problems—offensive operations. No one has long survived with 

defense alone—and the rapid pace of technological development shows offense 

remaining dominant for the foreseeable future. 

The future is brighter than ever, and the prospects for a century or more of global 

peace are good. America, however, must participate actively—but circumspectly—to

make this future a reality. Pursuing aggressive growth and technology development

policies and staying a revolution ahead of all competitors in the military sphere will allow

the United States to go far to ensure the kind of stability in the world which will redound

to everyone’s benefit and which will allow for an unprecedented leap in the world’s

standard of living. The opportunity is there, but the United States must assume the mantle 

first donned two millennia ago and lying unworn for almost as long. 

217 
Contributors 

Lt Col Mark Browne currently serves on the faculty at the Air Command and Staff 

College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, where he is attached to the War and 

Theater-Level Studies Department. He holds a BS degree in business administration from 

William Jewell College and an MS in operations management from the University of 

Arkansas. He has completed Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff 

College. Lieutenant Colonel Browne has been a missile instructor and an AFROTC and 

airborne missile operations instructor, and chief of the standardization/evaluation section. 

His most recent assignment was at Headquarters United States Air Force as budget and 

programming branch chief in the Force Programming Division. 

Lt Col Richard W. Chavis is the director, Distance Learning Department at the Air

Command and Staff College. Lieutenant Colonel Chavis received a BS degree in criminal 

justice administration from Middle Tennessee State University, an MA in public 

administration from Central Michigan University, and a MS in criminal justice from

Tennessee State University. A doctoral candidate at the University of Alabama and a 

career security police officer, he has held various jobs at several levels of command and 

has joint and combined experience, including extensive duty in Southwest Asia. 

Lieutenant Colonel Chavis is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command 

and Staff College. He is also a graduate of the FBI National Academy. 

Lt Cot Wayne D. Davidson currently serves as the United States Air Force 

representative to the Royal Air Force (RAF) Command and Staff College, RAF 

Bracknell, United Kingdom. He formerly worked on the faculty of Air Command and 

Staff College and has served as a C-130 navigator with worldwide flying experience. He 

earned an MA degree in international relations in 1989 and is a graduate of Squadron 

Officer School and Air Command and Staff College. 

Lt Col Bradley S. Davis is the chairman of the Command and Strategic Studies 

Department at the Air Command and Staff College. He holds a BA degree in history from 

the University of California. Los Angeles, and an MS in organizational behavior and 

human resource management from Chapman University. He has completed Squadron 

Officer School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Air Command and Staff 

College, and Air War College. A career missileer, Lieutenant Colonel Davis has been an 

ICBM missile instructor, a joint strategic target planning staff weapons targeting 

specialist, missile squadron operations officer, and chief, wing standardization/evaluation 

division. His most recent assignment was at Headquarters USAF, with the responsibility 

for the policy and implementation of arms control treaties for the Air Force. He has 

written numerous articles on proliferation and the perils of weapons of mass destruction. 

Mr. Gregory T. Frost is a State Department Foreign Service officer detailed for the 

1994-95 academic year as an advisor/instructor at the Air Command and Staff College. 

He has served 20 years with the State Department, including seven tours of duty at 

various overseas diplomatic and consular posts, mainly in Africa and Latin America. Mr. 

218 
Frost's last assignment was as principal officer of the US Consulate in Hermosillo, 

Mexico. He holds a BA from the University of Kansas, an MA from Washington 

University in St. Louis, and is a graduate of the Air War College. 

Col Frank L. Goldstein, PhD, is the dean of education and research at the Air 

Command and Staff College. He is the author of several works on psychological 

operations and on terrorism. He formerly worked at the US Special Operations Command 

and is the author of the Air Force Secretary's Gulf War Air Power Survey. 

Maj Robert H. Hendricks is a faculty member at the Air Command and Staff College. 

He holds a BS in international affairs and history from the Air Force Academy and an 

MS in human relations and management from Abilene Christian University. A senior 

navigator, he flew in and offered instructions on the B-52 and the B-1B. He is a graduate 

of Squadron Officer School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Air

Command and Staff College. 

Maj Jan Kinner is a faculty member at the Air Command and Staff College. He holds 

an MBA from the University of Wyoming; a MUA from Wright State University; and is

currently working on his doctorate in public administration from the University of 

Alabama. He is an acquisition officer with numerous manufacturing, contracting, and 

program assignments in AFMC and DLA, his latest at HQ AFMC. 

Dr Karl P. Magyar is professor of National Security Affairs at the Air Command and 

Staff College. He holds a BA in philosophy from Michigan State University and a PhD in 

political science from The Johns Hopkins University. Dr Magyar has taught at 

universities in the US, Japan, and South Africa. He has also served as an international 

trade specialist in the US Department of Commerce in Washington, D.C., and Nigeria. 

He was economic development advisor to an African government. His academic areas of 

interest include international relations, US foreign policy, third world strategic 

developments, and an Africa area focus. 

Lt Col Maris McCrabb is professor of Politics and Economics at Air University's

School of Advanced Airpower Studies. He has held department chairmanships at the Air 

Command and Staff College and the College for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and 

Education. He earned his doctorate in public administration from the University of 

Alabama. He is a command pilot with 3,100 hours in F-4 and F-16 aircraft and saw 

combat during the Gulf War. 

Maj Paul J. Moscarelli is currently chief of the Operational Structures Division at Air

Command and Staff College. He holds a BS in accounting from the State University of 

New York at Buffalo, an MBA from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and a master of 

political science from Auburn University at Montgomery. He received his commission in 

the United States Air Force through Officer Training School in 1981 and has completed 

Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College in-residence. He has 

logged 3,100 hours in the B-52 and flew 27 combat missions during the Gulf War. 

219 
220 

Mr. James E. Overly is a State Department Foreign Service officer detailed for the 

1994-95 academic year as an advisor and visiting instructor to the Air Command and 

Staff College. His 20-year career in the US Foreign Service has emphasized politicalmilitary and African and European affairs. His last assignment was as deputy political 

counselor at the US Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal. 

Capt Vicki J. Rast is currently an academic instructor at the Air Command and Staff 

College. She holds a BS in history from the United States Air Force Academy, an MPA 

degree from Troy State University, and is currently a doctoral candidate at the University 

of Alabama. She has completed Squadron Officer School as a distinguished graduate. An 

aircraft maintenance and munitions officer, she served in the United Arab Emirates 

during the Gulf War and in Saudi Arabia during Operation Southern Watch. 

Lt Col Michael J. Savana, Jr., currently serves as chairman of the Wargaming 

Department at the Air Command and Staff College. He holds an undergraduate degree in 

remote sensing and cartography from Southwest Texas State University, and an MS in 

systems management from the University of Southern California. He is a career 

command control officer and has completed Squadron Officer School, Air Command and 

Staff College, and Air War College. He is also an acquisition officer and his previous 

assignment was as the director of an Air Force Material Command C4

I research and 

development facility. 

Maj Kurt A. Stonerock received his commission from the United States Air Force 

Academy in 1982. He has a BS degree in management and an MS in procurement and 

acquisition management. Major Stonerock is currently pursuing a doctorate in public 

administration. He has had one tour in program management of space systems and three 

tours in contracting to include a four-year tour as the commander of a contracting office 

in the Republic of Singapore. He is currently on the faculty of the Air Command and 

Staff College. 

Lt Cot Gary A. Storie is the chief, Strategic Studies Division, at the Air Command and 

Staff College. He holds a BS in engineering sciences from the Air Force Academy, an 

MA in business administration from Webster University and is working on a doctorate in 

public administration from the University of Alabama. He is a command pilot with 

approximately 3,000 hours in T-37 and T-38 aircraft. 

Col John A. Warden III, USAF, Retired, is the former commandant, Air Command and 

Staff College. He is the author of Air Campaign, was a major Gulf War planner, and has 

been a fighter wing commander and special assistant to the vice president of the United 

States. In June 1995 Colonel Warden retired after a distinguished 30-year career in the 

service of his country.