Africa Security Brie

a publication of the africa center for strategic studies

No. 38 | December 2020

Africa Security Brief No. 38 1

Violent events linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel—

Burkina Faso, Mali, and western Niger—have surged nearly 

sevenfold since 2017. With more than 1,000 violent episodes 

reported in the past year, the Sahel experienced the largest 

increase in violent extremist activity of any region in Africa 

during this period.1 With nearly 8,000 fatalities, millions of people 

displaced, government officials and traditional leaders targeted, 

thousands of schools closed, and economic activity severely 

curtailed, the Sahel is staggering from the surge of attacks. 

Stretching from northern Mali to southeastern Burkina Faso, 

violent events attributed to Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal 

Muslimeen (JNIM) comprise more than 64 percent of all episodes 

linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel since 2017. The 

Macina Liberation Front (FLM) has been by far the most active 

of JNIM’s component groups, operating from its stronghold in 

central Mali and expanding into northern and other parts of 

Burkina Faso. 

JNIM’s structure functions as a business association on behalf of 

its membership, giving the impression that it is omnipresent and 

inexorably expanding its reach. The characterization of JNIM as a 

single operational entity, however, feeds the inaccurate perception 

of a unified command and control structure. It also obscures the 

local realities that have fueled militant Islamist activity in the Sahel. 

Treating JNIM as a unitary organization plays into the hands of 

the insurgents by muddying their motivations and activities, and 

concealing their vulnerabilities. JNIM does not necessarily have 

a single headquarters, operational hierarchy, or group of fighters 

that can be directly targeted by government security forces. Yet, 

with nearly two-thirds of the violence in the Sahel attributed to it, 

targeting JNIM is the equivalent of shadow boxing.

WHO IS JNIM?

The JNIM coalition originally comprised four al Qaeda-linked 

militant Islamist groups in the Sahel—Ansar Dine, FLM, al 

The Puzzle of JNIM and Militant 

Islamist Groups in the Sahel 

By Daniel Eizenga and Wendy Willi

HIGHLIGHTS

•While frequently seen as a singular operational entity, Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen 

(JNIM) is, in fact, a coalition of distinct militant Islamist groups with different organizational 

structures, leaders, and objectives. 

•An estimated 75 percent of violent events attributed to JNIM are likely undertaken by the Macina 

Liberation Front (FLM) in central Mali and northern Burkina Faso.

•The groups comprising JNIM do not enjoy wide popular support. Rather, these groups have 

increasingly tapped into local criminal networks and, in the case of FLM, mounted attacks on civilian 

populations. 
2 Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Mourabitoun, and the Sahara Emirate of al Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM Sahara). The composition of the groups is 

noteworthy in that the respective leaders represented Tuareg, 

Fulani, and Arab jihadists from the Sahel and Maghreb. This 

breadth of ethnic and geographic representation has created 

the illusion of a united group with expanding influence. 

In reality, each of these component groups have their own 

shifting interests, territorial influence, and motivations.2

Presently, JNIM is effectively represented by leaders of just 

two of the original groups—Ansar Dine’s Iyad Ag Ghali and 

FLM’s Amadou Koufa—and a less active FLM-offshoot, Katiba 

Serma, led by Abu Jalil al Fulani.

Iyad Ag Ghali, the founder of Ansar Dine, is considered the 

leader, or emir, of JNIM. He established Ansar Dine in 2011 

when the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 

(MNLA), a Tuareg separatist movement based in northern 

Mali, refused to appoint him as its head. Ag Ghali, an Ifoghas 

Kel Adagh Tuareg, hails from the Kidal Region of northern 

Mali from where he participated in Tuareg rebellions beginning 

in the 1990s. As the leader of Ansar Dine, he formed an alliance 

with AQIM and the MNLA in 2012, proclaiming northern Mali 

an Islamic state in May of that year. By July 2012, Ansar Dine 

and AQIM Sahara had sidelined the Tuareg separatists, taking 

control of Kidal and Timbuktu, respectively.

During most of 2012, the militant Islamist groups occupied 

northern Mali before pushing southward toward the more 

populated central regions. At the request of the Malian 

government, a French and African military intervention 

(Operational Serval), launched in January 2013, succeeded in 

dispersing the militants to the countryside where they took refuge 

in northern Mali’s rugged and vast terrain. Ag Ghali has since 

used Ansar Dine’s fighters to establish an enclave of political 

influence in northern Mali and among its various armed groups.

Amadou Koufa originally fought within the ranks of Ansar 

Dine in 2012 and 2013. After Ansar Dine’s dispersal following 

Operation Serval, Koufa began preaching extremism 

throughout central Mali. Born in Niafunké, Mali, and a 

member of the Fulani community, Koufa is believed to have 

been radicalized via contacts with Pakistani preachers from 

the Dawa sect in the 2000s.3

 To rally support, Koufa tapped 

into local grievances harbored by Fulani pastoralists as he 

simultaneously called for the establishment of an Islamic 

theocracy. By 2015, with the help of local kinsmen, Koufa had 

successfully established a following in central Mali.

As the leader of FLM, Amadou Koufa has waged the deadliest 

insurgency of any JNIM group, attempting to topple existing 

traditional authorities and to promulgate his view of Sharia 

over central Mali. FLM’s activities and influence extended to 

northern Burkina Faso through connections with Ansaroul 

Islam, a Burkinabè militant Islamist group started by one of 

Koufa’s protegés, Ibrahim Dicko. 

In the wake of Dicko’s death in 2017, groups of militant 

Islamist fighters spread their operations along the Burkina 

Faso-Niger border tapping into existing criminal networks. 

Other remnants of Ansaroul Islam reintegrated with FLM 

as it pushed farther south from central Mali into northern 

and northcentral Burkina Faso. With increasingly violent 

tactics, FLM has made rapid progress in these more densely 

populated areas, reaping from a larger pool for recruitment 

and revenue generation. 

Experts believe that JNIM-affiliated groups jointly earn 

between $18 and $35 million annually, mostly through 

extortion of the transit routes under their control, communities 

engaged in artisanal mining, and to a lesser extent kidnapping 

for ransom.4

Even though JNIM is linked to AQIM, AQIM never 

developed a significant base of local support in the Sahel. 

Furthermore, its regional influence, even in Algeria where 

it first emerged, is waning.5 The deaths of al Qaeda-linked 

leaders Abdekmalek Droukdel (AQIM), Djamel Okcha and 

Ali Maychou (AQIM Sahara), and Mohamed Ould Nouini 

(al Mourabitoun), have likely hastened the erosion of any 

direct influence the global al Qaeda network could claim over 

JNIM-affiliated fighters. Ambiguity over the current status of 

AQIM Sahara and al Mourabitoun, meanwhile, underscores a 

key function of JNIM. By presenting a united front, the JNIM 

coalition obscures the many setbacks that each of these groups 

has experienced, providing the illusion of cohesion, command 

and control, and unassailability.

This illusion has been driven by the near doubling of violent 

activities and associated fatalities in the Sahel each year since 

Dr. Daniel Eizenga is a Research Fellow at the Africa Center 

for Strategic Studies.

Wendy Williams is an Associate Research Fellow at the 

Africa Center for Strategic Studies. 
Africa Security Brief No. 38 3

2016. This, however, is almost exclusively a result of FLM. 

FLM’s affiliation with the JNIM coalition masks its rising 

profile and limits the attention that international and regional 

forces pay to the group. 

DIFFERING OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND 

TERRITORIES

Although JNIM presents itself as a united front for Salafist 

jihad in the Sahel, there are four distinct areas of operation, 

driven by local dynamics, shaping the actions of JNIM’s 

component groups. 

Northern Mali. Since its creation, Ansar Dine has competed 

with other Tuareg separatist groups to become a key player 

in northern Mali and southern Algeria. Ag Ghali has proven 

to be a deft political actor in northern Mali, maintaining links 

to secular leaders in the Tuareg community and using these 

connections to maintain his own safety as well as political 

influence. While Ag Ghali and Ansar Dine may not be 

directly engaged in drug trafficking or illicit smuggling, it is 

well established that they extort members of transnational 

organized crime networks in northern Mali by taxing the 

routes that drug traffickers rely on to move their products.6

Ag Ghali’s history of collaboration with the leadership of AQIM 

Sahara and al Mourabitoun connected him to networks ranging 

across the Sahel and Maghreb. Less locally embedded, AQIM 

Sahara and al Mourabitoun provided access to well-established 

smuggling operations across these regions, generating 

significant revenue for their organizations. Following the 

deaths of AQIM Sahara’s and al Mourabitoun’s leaders, these 

FIGURE 1. JAMA’AT NUSRAT AL ISLAM WAL MUSLIMEEN COALITION

Photo credits (clockwise from top left): Iyad Ag Ghali, Amadou Koufa, Djamel Okcha, Ali Maychou (JNIM video images via SITE Intelligence), Abu Jalil 

al Fulani (Menastream), Souleymane Keïta (police photo via AFP.com-STR), Mokhtar Belmokhtar (video image via CNN), Mohamed Ould Nouini 

(JNIM video image via SITE Intelligence)

Ansar Dine • Leader: Iyad Ag 

Ghali (officially 

leader of JNIM)

• Nationality: 

Malian Tuareg

• HQ: Kidal, Mali; 

thought to have 

safe haven in 

southern Algeria.

• High-Profile Attacks

 • January 2019: Suicide car 

bomb and armed assault on 

MINUSMA positions in 

Aguelhok, Mali; 11 Chadian 

peacekeepers killed.

 • January 2016: Assault on 

MINUSMA base; 7 Guinean 

UN peacekeepers killed.

 • January 2012: Assault on 

military training institute in 

Aguelhok, Mali; 153 soldiers 

held hostage, 84 killed.

Macina Liberation Front 

• Leader: 

Amadou 

Koufa

• Nationality: 

Malian Fulani

• HQ: Mopti, 

Mali; 

active in 

Central Mali and northern 

Burkina Faso.

• High-Profile Attacks

 • June 2020: Complex 

ambush against a Malian 

army convoy in Niono 

Cercle; 24 soldiers killed.

 • March 2019: Assault on 

Malian army camp in 

Dioura; 26 soldiers killed.

 • November 2015: Radisson 

Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali 

(with al Mourabitoun); 170 

held hostage, 20 killed.

The Sahara Emirate of AQIM

• Leader: Ali Maychou (aka Abu Abdul 

Rahman Ali al Sanhaji/al Maghrebi)

• Nationality: Moroccan (deceased, 

November 2019). Succeeded Djamel Okcha 

(aka Yahya Abu al Hammam), Algerian 

(deceased, February 2019), officially second 

in command of JNIM.

• Hammam fought with the GSPC, the 

Algerian predecessor to AQIM, and was 

AQIM governor of Timbuktu with 

Maychou as Sharia judge during the 2012 

occupation.

• HQ: Timbuktu, Mali; previously active in 

Mauritania to Libya, connecting northern 

Mali to Maghreb.

• High-Profile Attacks

 • January 2017: Suicide car bomb and 

assault on military camp outside Gao, 

Mali (with al Mourabitoun); 60 killed.

 • January 2016: Attack on Splendid Hotel in 

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso (with al 

Mourabitoun); 200 held hostage, 29 killed.

 • September 2013: Suicide bomb in 

Timbuktu, Mali; 16 Malian soldiers killed.

Al Mourabitoun

• Leader: Mohamed Ould Nouini (aka 

Hassan al Ansari)

• Nationality: Malian Lemhar Arab 

(deceased, February 2018). Succeeded 

Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Algerian (fate 

unknown).

• Belmokhtar fought with the Salafist 

Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), 

the Algerian predecessor to AQIM.

• HQ: Gao, Mali; previously active 

throughout Sahel.

• High-Profile Attacks

 • January 2017: Suicide car bombing and 

assault on military base outside Gao, 

Mali (with AQIM Sahara); 60 killed.

 • March 2016: Attack on beach town 

Grand Bassam, Côte d’Ivoire; 19 people 

killed, including 16 civilians and 3 

soldiers.

 • January 2016: Attack on Splendid Hotel 

in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso (with 

AQIM Sahara); 200 held hostage, 29 

killed.

 • November 2015: Attack on Radisson 

Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali (With FLM); 

170 held hostage, 20 killed.

Ansar Dine Sud

• Leader: Souleymane 

Keïta (incarcerated)

• Nationality: Malian 

Malinké

• Past Areas of Activity: 

Sikasso region, Mali

Katiba al Mansour 

• Leader: Al Mansour 

Ag al Kassam

• Nationality: Malian 

Tuareg (deceased, 

November 2018)

• Past Areas of 

Activity: 

Gourma-Rharous 

Cercle, Mali

• Significance: 

Kassam was 

previously a 

member of MUJAO 

and an important 

liaison between 

Ansar Dine and 

Ansaroul Islam.

Katiba Serma

• Leader: Abu 

Jalil al Fulani

• Nationality: 

Malian Fulani

• HQ: Sèrma, Mali; 

active in central 

Mali along Burkina 

Faso border.

 = Group currently active

 = Group is degraded or disbanded
4 Africa Center for Strategic Studies

operations have likely been assumed by Ansar Dine, further 

strengthening Ag Ghali’s influence in northern Mali. 

Central Mali and Northern Burkina Faso. Amadou Koufa, 

FLM, and its affiliates (including Katiba Serma) have promoted 

violent extremism to stoke inter- and intracommunal tensions 

within Malian society. The Macina Liberation Front is a direct 

reference to the 19th century Fulani Macina kingdom that 

roughly covered an area from central Mali to northern Burkina 

Faso. While Fulani make up a disproportionate number of 

militant Islamist fighters in the Sahel, FLM is not an exclusively 

Fulani group.7

 Nor do a majority of Fulani adhere to Koufa’s 

views. Nevertheless, the perception of FLM as a Fulani group 

has fueled stigmatization and ethnically based reprisals, which 

Koufa has exploited for recruitment. 

Koufa’s attack on traditional leaders has taken place under the 

guise of his religious authority as an imam. FLM has imposed 

a harsh version of Sharia to solve disputes, instituted a new 

tax (zakat), and imposed strict behavior rules (especially on 

women) over dozens of villages in central Mali. In many of 

these areas, FLM militants have effectively pushed out Malian 

authorities allowing them to coerce communities under their 

oppressive form of Islamic law. FLM has pursued a similar 

modus operandi across northern Burkina Faso. 

In recent years, over three-quarters of the violent events and 

associated fatalities attributed to JNIM took place in FLMdominated areas. FLM has also targeted civilians more than 

any other JNIM group. For every eight JNIM-linked militant 

events that targeted civilian populations, seven have taken 

place in central Mali and northern Burkina Faso. As FLM’s 

influence in these areas expanded from 2018 to 2020, Koufa’s 

fighters targeted civilians in roughly one out of every three of 

their attacks. 

The alliance of Koufa and Ag Ghali has advanced the 

individual ambitions of both leaders and has helped to stave 

off conflict between the two groups by effectively delineating 

their areas of influence and communities of interest. The aims 

and methods of the two groups differ, however. While Ag 

Ghali’s objectives seem primarily political, Koufa’s goals are 

clearly linked to the violent promulgation of his interpretation 

of Islam and, through it, social change. Indeed, members of 

FLM have publicly killed local imams and traditional leaders 

in central Mali and northern Burkina Faso who have disagreed 

with Koufa’s beliefs, something that has been far less common 

in Ansar Dine’s enclave. In northern Mali, civilians have been 

targeted in less than 2 percent of events attributed to JNIM 

member groups.

Eastern Burkina Faso and Niger Borderlands. Starting in 

2019, there was a surge of violent activity attributed to JNIM 

in eastern Burkina Faso along the border with Niger, eventually 

extending to areas near the borders with Benin and Togo. 

These attacks are outside of FLM’s or Ansar Dine’s historical 

areas of operation and it is unclear which component groups 

are responsible. Rather than being ideologically or politically 

motivated, these events seem aimed at controlling artisanal 

gold mining and commercial routes. These revenues represent 

a potentially lucrative source of income. Estimates are that 

artisanal sites in the area have the capacity to produce upwards 

of 725 kg of gold, valued at $34 million, per year.8

 Expansive 

conservation and nature reserves in this area, moreover, 

provide cover for militant Islamist groups seeking to avoid 

detection. Such links to criminal, smuggling, and poaching 

groups in this border area have advanced JNIM’s reputation 

as an ever-expanding security threat. 

Southwestern Burkina Faso. The tri-border area between 

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Côte d’Ivoire is characterized by illicit 

smuggling and small arms trafficking that accompany goods 

being transported through Côte d’Ivoire to commercial hubs in 

Mali and Burkina Faso. This area is also developing into a new 

hub of artisanal gold mining. A string of FLM attacks starting 

in 2020, combined with prospects for gold exploitation, have 

heightened the risk of insecurity in this region.9 As in eastern 

Burkina Faso, FLM fighters may be seeking to establish a 

presence in southwestern Burkina Faso to capture some of the 

illicit funds generated from these activities. 

STRENGTHS OF THE JNIM STRUCTURE

JNIM’s coalition structure provides it a number of advantages. 

These primarily revolve around its ambiguity. The failure 

to disaggregate JNIM and analyze its various entities, their 

objectives, and their functions within the larger coalition, 

leads to misperceptions about their organizational strength, 

“

over three-quarters of the violent 

events and associated fatalities 

attributed to JNIM took place in 

FLM-dominated areas
Africa Security Brief No. 38 5

capacity, and local support. It also overlooks potential 

vulnerabilities of the specific insurgencies. 

The failure to designate attacks beyond a generic JNIM entity 

lowers the international and regional profiles of each group. 

This ambiguity reduces the scrutiny given to each component 

group making it more challenging to track specific groups’ 

operations and methods. This, in turn, inhibits a targeted 

response to confront each JNIM member. By treating all 

incidents as from a single organizational structure, security 

forces have found themselves using a blunt response that has 

at times worsened relations between communities and the 

security sector, all to the benefit of the JNIM groups.

Casting JNIM as a singular actor that operates throughout the 

region—and pointing to a constant stream of reported violent 

events as proof—promotes a perception of activity, support, 

and influence that far exceeds JNIM’s actual standing. The 

majority of events attributed to JNIM go unclaimed, making 

it harder to assign responsibility for attacks to specific groups 

and therefore respond appropriately. In fact, as Figures 2 and 

3 show, the violent activities attributed to JNIM largely mirror 

the historical areas of influence of the component groups. This 

indicates a high degree of consistency and that the perceived 

expansiveness of JNIM is, in fact, from the composite groups.

The notion of a uniform JNIM, likewise, disguises the churn 

of leaders and fighters in their component parts. For example, 

following the deaths of al Mourabitoun’s and AQIM Sahara’s 

leaders, no identifiable new leadership has stepped forward. 

Similarly, it is unclear what happened to the rank and file 

fighters. They may have been integrated into other militant 

Islamist contingents in the region—or they may have simply 

blended into local communities. Given the extensive ties to 

criminal enterprises throughout the Sahel, they could also 

have joined the networks of transnational organized crime in 

northern Mali or smuggling and artisanal gold mining outfits 

in Burkina Faso. Consequently, while al Mourabitoun and 

AQIM Sahara may now be seriously degraded or even defunct, 

the ambiguity of JNIM’s structure masks their setbacks and 

makes the campaign to counter them more difficult. 

WEAKNESSES OF THE JNIM ORGANIZATIONAL 

STRUCTURE

While Ag Ghali and Koufa are the sole figureheads of the 

coalition, it is unclear how much sway either actually holds over 

the different JNIM elements dispersed across the region. They 

are also likely unable to stop bands of insurgents from devolving 

into criminality or even defecting to competing groups.

FLM, for example, has experienced internal dissension 

over fighters’ ability to levy taxes on grazing lands and the 

distribution of loot taken in battle.10 Fighters often defect, 

realign, or strike out on their own when at odds with their 

leaders contributing to a fluid exchange of combatants between 

militant Islamist groups and other armed groups operating in 

the wider region.11

FIGURE 2. VIOLENT EVENTS LINKED TO 

COMPONENT GROUPS, 2015-2019

FIGURE 3. VIOLENT EVENTS LINKED TO JNIM, 

2020

Timbuktu

Gao

Bamako Ouagadougou

Niamey

ALGERIA

MALI

NIGER

NIGERIA

GUINEA

SENEGAL

GUINEABISSAU

THE GAMBIA

GHANA CÔTE D’IVOIRE

TOGO BENIN

MAURITANIA

BURKINA

FASO

Jama’at Nusrat al 

Islam wal Muslimeen 

(JNIM)

Ansar Dine

Macina Liberation 

Front (FLM)

Katiba Serma

AQIM Sahara

Al Mourabitoun

Ansaroul Islam

Timbuktu

Gao

Bamako Ouagadougou

Niamey

ALGERIA

MALI

NIGER

NIGERIA

GUINEA

SENEGAL

GUINEABISSAU

THE GAMBIA

GHANA CÔTE D’IVOIRE

TOGO BENIN

MAURITANIA

BURKINA

FASO

Jama’at Nusrat al 

Islam wal Muslimeen 

(JNIM)

Ansar Dine

Macina Liberation 

Front (FLM)

Katiba Serma

AQIM Sahara

Al Mourabitoun

Ansaroul Islam

Shaded swaths show historical areas of influence for Ansar Dine, Ansaroul Islam, FLM, and Katiba Serma

Note: Data points represent violent events involving the designated groups from 2015 through September 30, 2020. Areas of influence are illustrative 

and not to be interpreted as precise or constant delineations. 

Data Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
6 Africa Center for Strategic Studies

The JNIM structure also likely masks strains between Ansar 

Dine and FLM. The brutality with which FLM has coerced 

communities in central Mali and northern Burkina Faso 

suggests a commitment to force Koufa’s extremist version of 

Islam onto these communities. This may ultimately pit him 

against a more pragmatic Ag Ghali, who appears satisfied with 

increasing his influence over northern Mali, as demonstrated 

by his 2020 exchange of four foreign hostages for the release of 

some 200 prisoners. As Koufa seeks to expand the theatre of 

FLM’s operations, he may desire to break away from JNIM’s 

less ideologically motivated contingents. So far, the coalitional 

structure has helped to ease tensions, but it seems likely the 

rivalries between the leaders and their lieutenants will grow.

Tensions and infighting between militant Islamist groups are 

not new across the Sahel and have historically defined much of 

their activities. Disputes over territory and resources may have 

reignited tensions between the JNIM groups and the Islamic 

State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), which also operates in the 

region, despite their shared origins and recent history of fighting 

alongside one another.12 Reports of potential negotiations 

between Ag Ghali and the Malian government may have 

further deteriorated relations with ISGS. Additional negotiations 

with the government may also isolate Ag Ghali from more 

ideologically motivated jihadists within JNIM’s ranks.13

To sustain themselves, insurgencies need a degree of popular 

support. That the growing percentage of attacks against 

civilians has increased as FLM has expanded its reach from 

central Mali, suggests a lack of such support. Since October 

2018, FLM has been responsible for 78 percent of militant 

Islamist group attacks against civilians attributed to JNIM. This 

presents a stark contrast to JNIM’s other groups and areas of 

operations, suggesting continued popular resistance in central 

Mali and northern Burkina Faso.14

RECOMMENDATIONS

The surge of militant Islamist group violence in the Sahel has 

alarmed communities and governments across the region. 

Groups aligned with JNIM, primarily FLM and Ansar Dine, 

are linked to the bulk of this violence. Security actors need to 

resist the image of JNIM as a single entity and undertake the 

difficult analytic work to deconstruct JNIM into its component 

parts to counter their destabilizing actions. 

Stop treating JNIM as a singular operational entity. Dealing 

with a coalition of insurgents requires a multitiered approach. 

It is important to identify and isolate the main operational 

groups against which action can be taken to degrade the 

JNIM coalition. This primarily means raising the profile of 

FLM and Ansar Dine. It also demands better identifying those 

elements operating in northern and eastern Burkina Faso. This 

will require enhanced intelligence gathering and sharing by 

governments in the region to generate information, analysis, 

and education about where and how the different component 

groups operate. Scrutinizing and targeting distinct entities 

provides a more tangible enemy, revealing their differences 

and weaknesses. Doing so can also demystify JNIM and expose 

the lack of local support the component groups receive.

Strengthen counterinsurgency operations in Central Mali 

and Northern Burkina Faso. Targeting FLM will require 

more robust counterinsurgency tactics. Sustaining a security 

presence in key locations to apply pressure on FLM’s fighters 

and to disrupt their ability to move freely between central Mali 

and northern Burkina Faso will strain their ability to organize 

and launch attacks.15 Similarly, actions to counter FLM’s efforts 

to expand into southwestern Burkina Faso should aim to cut 

off fighters in this area from FLM’s base of operations in central 

Mali. Because this appears to be a relatively new theatre of 

operations for FLM’s activities, fighters in southwestern 

Burkina Faso are unlikely to be self-sustaining. Thus, targeting 

these groups and their movements and connections to Koufa 

may prove particularly disruptive.

Target illicit networks allied with Ansar Dine. Ansar 

Dine and Ag Ghali are well entrenched in northern Malian 

politics and its different separatist armed groups. In addition 

to counterinsurgency operations, law enforcement efforts 

targeting the illicit networks that Ansar Dine facilitates 

would disrupt Ag Ghali’s operations. If smugglers and 

local authorities allied with Ansar Dine determine that 

their collaboration brings a higher degree of scrutiny and 

probability of arrest, then Ag Ghali may lose the political clout 

he has sought to cultivate. Undermining Ag Ghali’s political 

standing, as well as depriving him of his sources of financing 

and allies, may help accelerate the dismantling of Ansar Dine.

“

FLM has been responsible for 78 

percent of militant Islamist group 

attacks against civilians
Africa Security Brief No. 38 7

Protect contested communities. Counterinsurgency forces 

should recognize that the vast majority of local populations 

reject and fear JNIM-affiliated militant Islamist groups, 

especially FLM, and these communities desire help and support 

from security forces. Government representatives and security 

forces must place a premium on building strong relationships 

with local communities in the affected areas. This will require 

a discriminating response lest it damage relations between 

the security forces and local communities. The metric should 

not be how many militants have been killed but how much 

government presence can be sustained in these communities.

Working alongside community leaders and civil society to 

devise plans to protect communities will help undo the efforts 

of FLM and its affiliated groups to intimidate communities 

through violence against civilians. This will require increased 

and continuous security for those communities in contested 

areas. It also demands that local leaders receive protection, 

as they are more likely to be targeted by militant Islamist 

groups if they are perceived to be collaborating with the 

government.16 The voices of nonviolent communal leaders 

resisting intimidation from militant Islamist groups require 

amplification and protection. 

In other contexts, communities may need to be reassured that 

after being forced to work with militant Islamist groups they 

will not face a heavy-handed response from security forces. 

Communities engaged in artisanal mining or along popular 

smuggling routes may be leery of the increased presence of 

security forces. Consequently, national and local governments 

should devise programs and policies that help to legitimize 

the economies of these communities. Collaborating closely 

with local leaders to better regulate artisanal mining and 

transportation will help to restore security and safety to 

ordinary citizens. Security, in turn will expand economic 

opportunities for these communities. This approach will 

also disrupt the ability of militant Islamist groups to capture 

revenues from illicit activities without seriously disrupting 

local economies.

Continue to pursue political settlements. Ag Ghali and 

Koufa have reportedly engaged in negotiations with the 

Malian government and at times local authorities, showing at 

least the willingness to consider a cessation in fighting. Often 

their demands are inconceivable, such as the full withdrawal 

of French troops from the region or the public enactment of 

an extreme interpretation of Sharia. Nevertheless, continuing 

this dialogue is valuable for exploring political avenues for 

resolving the conflict.

Negotiations also require the respective leaders to take 

positions on key issues. This is important for understanding 

the objectives of the leaders as well as educating the public 

on what is at stake in the conflict. Dialogue may also reveal 

key differences between the various militant Islamist group 

factions. Disparities between Ag Ghali and Koufa’s goals, such 

as how to interpret and implement Sharia, may further weaken 

the cohesion of their coalition. The willingness of Ag Ghali and 

Koufa to engage in settlements with national authorities may 

also split fighters seeking a political agreement from hardline 

factions within their ranks.

Devise policies of reintegration for lower level fighters. 

National and local governments can capitalize on internal 

tensions and the constant churn of commanders by providing 

clear pathways out of militant Islamist groups for combatants. 

Lower level fighters have varying levels of commitment. By 

engaging in dialogue with mid- and lower level commanders, 

national and local governments may tease out these fighters’ 

motivations and reveal opportunities for disarmament, which 

would further erode a key asset perpetuating FLM and Ansar 

Dine.

Reintegration policies should target these lower level fighters. 

This will require enhanced practices to encourage defections 

while conveying messages from governments and local 

leaders that these fighters have other options. Experience from 

other reintegration contexts has highlighted the importance 

of working with communities to facilitate this transition lest 

fighters revert to their jihadist networks. As these fighters are 

likely to know one another, the motivations of Ag Ghali or 

Koufa may not matter as much to the fighters as their personal 

connections and opportunities. Amnesty and reintegration 

programs played a significant role in weakening the Salafist 

Group for Preaching and Combat insurgency in Algeria and 

similar policies have debilitated militant Islamist insurgencies 

elsewhere. If national governments can offer assurances of 

safety and eventually opportunities beyond being a hired 

gun, that may persuade lower level fighters to surrender in 

the Sahel as well.
NOTES

1 All violent event and fatality data attributed to the JNIM component 

groups come from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 

database. 

2 Alex Thurston, Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel: Local Politics and Rebel 

Groups (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

3 Pauline Le Roux, “Confronting Central Mali’s Extremist Threat,” Spotlight, 

Africa Center for Strategic Studies, February 22, 2019.

4 Christian Nellemann, R. Henriksen, Riccardo Pravettoni, D. Stewart, M. 

Kotsovou, M.A.J. Schlingemann, Mark Shaw, and Tuesday Reitano, eds., 

“World Atlas of Illicit Flows: A RHIPTO-INTERPOL-GI Assessment” 

(Oslo: RHIPTO Norwegian Center for Global Analyses, 2018), 8.

5 Geoff D. Porter, “AQIM Pleads for Relevance in Algeria,” CTC Sentinel 

12, no. 3 (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, 2019).

6 Peter Tinti, “Drug Trafficking in Northern Mali: A Tenuous Criminal 

Equilibrium,” ENACT Research Paper No. 14, September 2020.

7 Modibo Ghaly Cissé, “Understanding Fulani Perspectives on the Sahel 

Crisis,” Spotlight, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, April 22, 2020.

8 David Lewis and Ryan McNeil, “How Jihadists Struck Gold in Africa’s 

Sahel,” Reuters, November 22, 2019.

9 Roberto Sollazzo and Matthias Nowak, “Tri-Border Transit: Trafficking 

and Smuggling in the Burkina Faso-Côte d’Ivoire-Mali Region,” Security 

Assessment in North Africa, Small Arms Survey, October 2020.

10 Héni Nsaibia and Caleb Weiss, “The End of the Sahelian Anomaly: How 

the Global Conflict between the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida Finally Came 

to West Africa,” CTC Sentinel 13, no. 7 (West Point: Combating Terrorism 

Center, 2020), 11.

11 Andrew Lebovich, “Mapping Armed Groups in Mali and in the Sahel,” 

European Council on Foreign Relations (2019).

12 Pauline Le Roux, “Exploiting Borders in the Sahel: The Islamic State in 

the Greater Sahara,” Spotlight, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, June 

10, 2019.

13 Alex Thurston, “Political Settlements with Jihadists in Algeria and the 

Sahel,” West African Papers No. 18 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018).

14 Anouar Boukhars, “The Logic of Violence in Africa’s Extremist 

Insurgencies,” Perspectives on Terrorism 14, no. 5 (2020).

15 Pauline Le Roux, “Responding to the Rise in Violent Extremism in the 

Sahel,” Africa Security Brief No. 36 (Washington, DC: Africa Center for 

Strategic Studies, 2019).

16 Fransje Molenaar, Jonathan Tossell, Anna Schmauder, Rahmane Idrissa, 

and Rida Lyammouri, “The Status Quo Defied: The Legitimacy of 

Traditional Authorities in Areas of Limited Statehood in Mali, Niger 

and Libya,” CRU Report (The Hague: Clingendael Netherlands Institute 

of International Relations, 2019).

Kate Almquist Knopf, Director

National Defense University

Fort Lesley J. McNair

Washington, DC 20319-5066

+1 202-685-7300

www.africacenter.org

Africa Security Briefs

Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Director of Research

sieglej@ndu.edu

+1 202-685-6808

ISSN 2164-4047

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies is an academic institution established by the U.S. Department of Defense as an objective

forum for research, academic programs, and the exchange of ideas. The Africa Security Brief series presents research and

analysis with the aim of advancing understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 

expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Africa Center.