Edited by Andrew Scobell, Arthur S. Ding, 

Phillip C. Saunders, and Scott W. Harold

THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

AND

CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN CHINA
THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

AND

CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN CHINA

Edited by

Andrew Scobell, Arthur S. Ding, 

Phillip C. Saunders, and Scott W. Harold

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

2015

THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

AND

CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN CHINA
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within 

are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views 

of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. 

Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this book may be quoted or reprinted without permission, 

provided that a standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would 

appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints or reviews.

Published in the United States by National Defense University Press

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Scobell, Andrew, editor of compilation.

Title: The People’s Liberation Army and contingency planning in China /

 edited by Andrew Scobell, Arthur S. Ding, Phillip C. Saunders, and Scott

W. Harold.

Description: Washington, D.C. : National Defense University Press, [2015] |

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2015038587 | ISBN 9780996824903 (pbk. : alk. paper)

Subjects: LCSH: Military planning—China. | China. Zhongguo ren min jie fang

 jun. | National security—China. | Internal security—China. |

 China—Military policy. | Sea-power—China—History—21st century. |

 China—Strategic aspects.

Classification: LCC UA835 .P3773 2015 | DDC 355/.033551—dc23

LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015038587

Book design by Jamie Harvey, U.S. Government Publishing Office
List of Illustrations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

INTRODUCTION

The PLA and Contingency Planning in China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Phillip C. Saunders

I. Thinking and Planning for Contingencies

CHAPTER 1

The PLA and Contingency Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Mark Cozad

CHAPTER 2

PLA Observations of U.S. Contingency Planning: 

What Has It Learned?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Marcelyn L. Thompson 

CHAPTER 3

China Plans for Internal Unrest: People’s Armed Police 

and Public Security Approaches to “Mass Incidents”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Jonathan Walton

CHAPTER 4

Civilian Authorities and Contingency Planning in China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Catherine Welch

CONTENTS
vi

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 5

Converting the Potential to the Actual: 

Chinese Mobilization Policies and Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Dean Cheng

CHAPTER 6

Employment of National-Level PLA Assets in a Contingency: 

A Cross-Strait Conflict as Case Study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Mark A. Stokes

II. Domestic Contingencies

CHAPTER 7

China’s Armed Forces Respond to Internal Disaster Relief: 

Assessing Mobilization and Effort. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Jeffrey Engstrom and Lyle Morris 

CHAPTER 8

PLA Response to Widespread Internal Unrest 

in the Han Homeland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

Ma Chengkun

III. Border Contingencies

CHAPTER 9

The PLA and Cross-Border Contingencies in North Korea and Burma. . . . . 205

Thomas Woodrow 

CHAPTER 10

PLA Contingency Planning and the Case of India. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

Larry M. Wortzel 

CHAPTER 11

Like a Good Neighbor: Chinese Intervention 

Through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

Ben Lowsen 
vii

CONTENTS

IV. Maritime Contingencies

CHAPTER 12

The PLA and Near Seas Maritime Sovereignty Disputes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang

CHAPTER 13

The PLA and Far Seas Contingencies: 

Chinese Capabilities for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. . . . . . . . . . . 301

Michael S. Chase

CHAPTER 14

PLA Navy Planning for Out of Area Deployments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321

Kristen Gunness and Samuel K. Berkowitz

About the Contributors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349

Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
viii

Illustrations

Figures

6.1. General Staff Department Organizational Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

7.1. Demonstrated Mobilization Capacity of the Four Case Studies. . . . . . . . .170

7.2. Manpower Effort of the Four Case Studies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

7.3. Number of Chinese Armed Forces Personnel Engaged 

in Disaster Relief Efforts Over Time by Disaster. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

7.4. Demonstrated Mobilization Capacity and Mobilization 

Capacity Curve of Select Disaster and Warfighting Contingencies. . . . . . . . . 173

7.5. Manpower Effort of Select Disaster and 

Warfighting Contingencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

11.1. Security Domains. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

Tables

2.1. Key Terms Related to “Contingency Planning”

 in Chinese and English. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

4.1. Committees of the State Council Emergency Management Office. . . . . . 90

4.2. Organizational Chart of the China National Commission 

for Disaster Reduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

4.3. Contingency Support Requirements of the National Emergency 

Response Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

7.1. Instances of Disasters by Persons Affected in China, 

August 1985–October 2012. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

7.2. Types of Disasters and Affected Military Regions, 

August 1985–October 2012. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

7.3. China’s Armed Forces Disaster Mobilization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

7.4. Armed Forces Disaster and Warfighting Mobilization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

7.5. 2008 Winter Storms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

7.6. 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .179

7.7. 2010 Yushu Earthquake. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

7.8. 2010 Zhouqu Mudslides. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

11.1. Shanghai Cooperation Organization Exercises. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262

12.1. PLAN Activity in Times of Near Seas Sovereignty Disputes. . . . . . . . . . . 286

12.2. PRC Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies (prior to 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . 291

CONTENTS
ix

This volume grew out of a conference on “Contingency Planning, PLA style” 

co-sponsored by Taiwan’s Council of Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS), RAND, 

the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), and National Defense 

University (NDU). RAND hosted the conference at its Arlington, Virginia, office. 

The editors gratefully acknowledge the intellectual contribution of Michael 

Swaine (CEIP) in shaping the agenda and recruiting paper writers, discussants, 

and panelists, and the financial support of the four sponsoring organizations. 

The editors also thank the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office 

for hosting a dinner in honor of the conference participants.

Yi-su Yang and Polly Shen (CAPS), Cortez Cooper, Lyle Morris, and Heather 

McLendon (RAND), and Christopher D. Yung, Michael Glosny, Terry Min Jie 

Zeng, and Deborah Jefferson (NDU) all provided support in organizing the 

original conference. Dr. Saunders also thanks Gerald Faber, Donald Mosser, 

Mollie Murphy, Jeanette Tolbert, and Christopher D. Yung (NDU) and Martha 

Robinson and Patrick Shaw (Joint Staff J7) for their assistance in obtaining permission for NDU’s Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs to co-sponsor 

the conference.

In addition to the chapter authors and editors, Ken Allen, Tai Ming Cheung, 

Bernard Cole, Cortez Cooper, John Corbett, T.X. Hammes, Lonnie Henley, 

Frank G. Hoffman, John Landry, Oriana Skylar Mastro, Shen Ming-Shih, Yitzak 

Shichor, Paul Stares, Michael Swaine, Christopher D. Yung, and Yen Tiehlin all 

provided comments or participated in discussions that improved the chapters 

in this book. Terry Min Jie Zeng and Adam Jankowski drafted summaries of the 

chapters for the introduction. Mr. Jankowski also provided additional research 

to help update Dr. Ma Chengkun’s chapter. Drew Casey provided invaluable 

assistance in reformatting the chapters, tracking down stray references, and 

standardizing English and Chinese language references.

The editors thank NDU Press Director Dr. William Eliason and Executive 

Editor Dr. Jeffrey Smotherman for their creativity in squeezing this book into 

a narrow publication window, Lisa Yambrick and Jane Floyd for copyediting 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
x

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

the manuscript, and Erin L. Sindle, Lisa Yambrick, Julia Bowie, and Capt Adam 

Greer, USAF, for proofreading. Brianna Cappelletti compiled the index. Jamie 

Harvey at the Government Publishing Office designed the book.

The editors gratefully acknowledge financial support for publication of 

this book from NDU’s Program on Irregular Warfare and Special Operations 

Studies.
1

All militaries have a responsibility to plan for contingencies, and China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is no exception. PLA contingency planning takes place primarily within the General 

Staff Department’s (GSD’s) First Department, also known as the GSD Operations Department. China’s seven military regions participate in drafting and 

reviewing the plans relevant to their areas of responsibility, albeit under heavy 

supervision from the GSD.1

U.S. joint doctrine defines a contingency as “a situation that likely would 

involve military forces in response to natural and manmade disasters, terrorists, subversives, military operations by foreign powers, or other situations.” 

U.S. doctrine distinguishes between deliberate planning (advance preparation 

of campaign2 and contingency plans in noncrisis situations) and crisis action 

planning (rapid planning in response to a developing incident or situation). 

Deliberate planning is typically used to develop campaign and contingency 

plans for a broad range of activities based on requirements identified in strategic guidance for military commanders. Crisis action planning is conducted 

with less advance warning (hours, days, or up to 12 months) and focuses on 

developing alternative courses of action or refining existing campaign or contingency plans to adapt to current circumstances.3

Chinese military planning appears to be mostly deliberate planning 

focused on specific contingencies. Mark Cozad argues that since about 1995, 

a Taiwan contingency has been the dominant PLA planning scenario, but 

the PLA also plans for other potential contingencies.4

 The GSD Operations 

Department also has a contingency planning bureau that works with civilian 

ministries and agencies on emergency plans for various situations.5 Chinese 

documents typically use the same phrase, yingji jihua [应急计划], to refer to 

INTRODUCTION

The PLA and Contingency Planning in China

Phillip C. Saunders
2

SAUNDERS

both military contingency plans and civilian emergency response plans, 

although other terms are also used.6 The GSD Operations Department is also 

responsible for military crisis action planning, although the PLA appears to 

devote less attention and fewer resources to crisis planning than to deliberate 

planning. This may be because the PLA rarely deploys outside China’s territory in response to crises other than to conduct humanitarian assistance 

and disaster-relief operations. The few recent exceptions include PLA Navy 

(PLAN) counterpiracy deployments in the Gulf of Aden (since December 

2008), the March 2011 evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya, and the 

March 2014 deployment of PLA Air Force, Navy, and Chinese Coast Guard 

assets to search for the missing Malaysian Airlines flight MH-370.7

Some contingencies, such as deployments for disaster relief operations, 

occur frequently, providing the chance to try out plans and modify them to 

incorporate lessons learned and correct deficiencies revealed during execution. 

Others, such as plans to fight major wars, usually sit on the shelf for decades and 

are reviewed and revised regularly but never executed. In such cases, there is 

no feedback loop between contingency planning, execution, and revision, so 

incorrect planning assumptions and faulty operational concepts may go unnoticed and uncorrected. The best that militaries can do is to rely on exercises, 

wargames, and related operational deployments and make revisions to their 

war plans based on the results.

A potential fight to prevent Taiwan independence or compel unification 

clearly represents a high-end contingency that absorbs much attention from 

PLA planners, especially given the likelihood of U.S. military intervention. 

Since the Taiwan Strait crisis of March 1996, when President William Clinton 

deployed two carriers near Taiwan in response to Chinese ballistic missile tests, 

PLA senior generals have been focused on building the doctrine, trained personnel, and military equipment necessary to have a chance to prevail against 

a technologically superior and battle-tested U.S. military. Cozad observes that 

PLA Taiwan contingency planning is a large-scale data- and labor-intensive 

effort.8

However, the PLA must also plan for other contingencies that require 

different capabilities and are not simply “lesser included cases” that can be 

adapted from the plans, doctrine, and forces developed for Taiwan contingencies.9

 This is not only a prudent measure, but it also reflects political guidance 

from Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders, including the “new historic 
3

INTRODUCTION

missions” [xin de lishi shiming, 新的历史使命] that then–General Secretary Hu 

Jintao gave the PLA in 2004. These give the PLA new responsibilities beyond 

its traditional role of supporting the CCP, including protecting China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic security in order to continue national 

development, safeguarding China’s expanding national interests, and helping 

to ensure world peace.10 The new historic missions broadened PLA functional 

roles to increase the emphasis on “diversified military tasks” [duoyanghua junshi renwu, 多样化军事任务] and “military operations other than war” [feizhanzheng junshi xingdong, 非战争军事行动] and expanded the geographic scope of 

the PLA’s responsibility to safeguard Chinese national interests. 

Reflecting this shift in Chinese emphasis, the organizers of the conference 

that yielded this book considered a wide range of contingencies where PLA 

involvement is likely or possible. Chapters in this book address domestic contingencies such as disaster response and suppressing internal unrest, border 

contingencies involving India, Burma, North Korea, Afghanistan, and Central 

Asia, and maritime contingencies in both the near and the far seas. Although 

Taiwan is not addressed in detail, it is used to illustrate the range of PLA national-level assets that might be brought to bear in a high-end military contingency.

Given that the PLA does not provide outsiders access to its contingency 

plans, a major challenge is finding enough information. The authors have used 

a variety of approaches to overcome this challenge, including examining PLA 

doctrine, reviewing military writings that discuss particular contingencies, 

looking at lessons learned from previous Chinese conflicts, reviewing how more 

accessible Chinese state organs conduct emergency planning, and gleaning lessons from PLA operations where more information about planning and capabilities is available. Some authors have even attempted to “reverse engineer” what 

PLA plans might look like based on their own military planning experience and 

open-source information about available local forces and national-level assets.

The effort to examine how the PLA might respond to particular contingencies in particular places produces some interesting insights unavailable from 

studying doctrine or evaluating new weapons systems. One important insight 

is the PLA’s dependence on mobilizing civilian infrastructure, resources, and 

personnel to respond to both domestic and international contingencies. A 

second is how Chinese civil investments in transportation infrastructure—

including a national highway system and high-speed rail networks—have given 

the PLA greater mobility and a new ability to marshal resources from multiple 
4

SAUNDERS

military regions. This new transportation infrastructure even extends to some 

remote parts of China bordering India, Burma, and Central Asia, increasing 

the PLA’s capability to conduct cross-border operations. 

A third insight is that expanded PLA capabilities—which now include 

space assets and counterspace weapons, cyberattack capabilities, conventional 

ballistic and cruise missiles, naval power projection capabilities, and a much 

more capable air force—may make it harder for the PLA to control escalation 

risks in the event of a crisis or conflict. A fourth, noted in many of the chapters, 

is that many examples of PLA deployments and contingency responses include 

explicit efforts to capture lessons learned and to incorporate them into planning and training for subsequent operations. This effort to close the feedback 

loop and learn from experience is designed to compensate for the PLA’s lack 

of warfighting experience.

A fifth insight derived from observing the PLAN experience in conducting 

counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and noncombatant evacuation 

operations in Libya is that in certain low-intensity scenarios Chinese leaders 

are now confident enough to deploy PLA forces even if some important planning, training, and logistics support questions are not fully resolved. This 

suggests that the PLA is becoming a somewhat more flexible political and 

diplomatic instrument, at least in low-threat environments. A final question 

posed by several authors—but not fully answered—is whether the PLA’s planning processes and command and control system, which have been focused 

heavily on a Taiwan contingency, will prove flexible and adaptable enough to 

respond to a more functionally and geographically diverse set of contingencies 

and operations. 

This book is organized into four sections, beginning with an overview of 

Chinese contingency planning and then considering domestic, border, and 

maritime contingencies. The first section focuses on contingency planning 

within the PLA, the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and Public Security forces, 

and the parallel civilian system of “emergency plans” to cover a range of situations. Chapters also consider the role of the Chinese mobilization system in 

contingency response and how PLA national-level assets might be employed 

in a contingency.

In “The PLA and Contingency Planning,” Mark Cozad of the RAND Corporation examines the PLA’s operational planning processes. He begins by 

reviewing the diverse set of security challenges China faces and the expansion 
5

INTRODUCTION

of PLA missions under Hu Jintao’s “new historic missions.” Cozad details the 

intellectual framework the PLA uses to identify national interests, military 

missions, and key threats, focusing on the role of the Military Strategic Guidelines [junshi zhanlüe fangzhen, 军事战略方针] and the main strategic direction 

[zhuyao zhanlüe fangxiang, 主要战略方向]. He examines how these strategic 

concepts influence operational planning at the campaign level, the focus of 

PLA doctrinal innovation, and he illustrates how doctrine for specific campaigns is translated into the force and functional requirements necessary for 

operational plans. Cozad concludes by considering whether the PLA’s comprehensive but data-intensive and highly centralized planning system, which is 

heavily focused on planning for a Taiwan contingency, can be adapted to allow 

planners the flexibility to address the growing range of potential missions and 

scenarios the PLA may be asked to support in the future.

In PLA Observations of U.S. Contingency Planning: What Has It Learned?” 

Marcelyn Thompson (U.S. Government) examines what the PLA admires 

about U.S. contingency planning and how it has influenced their own planning efforts. Reviewing Chinese writings on U.S. operations in Grenada, Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Kosovo, she finds that Chinese analysts do not focus on the 

steps in the U.S. contingency planning process, but they give high praise to 

the U.S. military’s ability to develop, revise, and implement plans quickly. The 

PLA admires three aspects of U.S. contingency planning in particular: the 

command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities that enable the United States to assess 

the state of potential threats against which it should plan, the speed at which 

civilian and military leaders coordinate on the design and approval of contingency plans, and the numerous logistic support options in place around 

the globe to assist the United States in its contingency operations. Thompson 

argues that three aspects of the PLA’s modernization program—national 

defense mobilization, logistics, and C4ISR—are likely to improve the PLA’s 

ability to coordinate contingency plans and enable planning for a broad range 

of scenarios. However, she also suggests that automated decision aids and better C4ISR may deny PLA commanders the autonomy necessary to successfully 

implement their plans.

In “China Plans for Internal Unrest: People’s Armed Police and Public 

Security Approaches to ‘Mass Incidents,’” Jonathan Walton of the University 

of California, San Diego examines Chinese contingency plans for coping with 
6

SAUNDERS

social unrest. He reviews the nature and scope of unrest in China and then 

examines available information on the planning to mobilize domestic security forces to respond to unrest and the regulations that guide their responses. 

Walton describes the legislation that governs PAP and Public Security force 

responses to unrest and examines two specific contingency plans (the 2010 

Xi’an municipal plan and 2006 Ningxia provincial plan) for large-scale mass 

incidents. He notes that political leaders have choices in how to respond to 

social unrest, including making concessions, arresting protest ringleaders, 

hoping unrest will die down, and using repression. Chinese laws and contingency plans focus on larger scale unrest, including provisions for reinforcing public security forces when they cannot handle a local protest, but also 

requiring higher level authorization for the use of PAP forces and the military. 

Walton argues that despite significant domestic security challenges, public 

security forces have been successful thus far in maintaining stability, although 

challenges may increase as the economy slows down, political reform remains 

unlikely, and systemic problems go unaddressed. 

Catherine Welch of the CNA Corporation introduces China’s civilian 

bureaucratic system of emergency response plans, describes China’s approach 

to emergency response planning, and examines a number of these emergency 

responses plans in “Civilian Authorities and Contingency Planning in China.” 

She argues that the emergency response planning system is an innovation in 

response to poor government performance in the avian influenza and severe 

acute respiratory syndrome crises in 2002–2003. The 2006 National Emergency 

Response Plan provides insight into the Chinese approach to emergency 

response planning since the document was approved at a high level, sets 

requirements and offers guidelines for other emergency plans, and categorizes 

emergencies by type and level of severity. Welch finds that there are six different types of emergency response plans (including the National Emergency 

Response Plan itself), that responsibility for emergency response planning is 

decentralized, that a whole-of-government effort is required to plan and prepare for both moderate and severe emergencies, and that provinces, ministries, 

and localities have all responded to the requirement to produce emergency 

plans. She uses China’s response to a September 2012 earthquake in Yunnan 

province to illustrate how emergency plans affect actual crisis response, noting that emergency plans have particular value in specifying who is in charge 

of response to a particular type of crisis and which other actors have roles to 
7

INTRODUCTION

play. Welch argues that studying civilian emergency response plans not only 

illuminates the PLA’s role in particular emergencies, but also may provide 

insights into PLA planning.

 “Converting the Potential to the Actual: Chinese Mobilization Policies 

and Planning” by Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation provides comprehensive information on Chinese defense mobilization policies and planning, 

which are focused on allowing maximum peacetime development of human, 

material, and financial power while having in place the mechanisms and 

plans to exploit them in the event of conflict. He highlights the role of the 2010 

National Defense Mobilization Law in establishing peacetime mobilization 

preparations, guiding wartime mobilization implementation, and defining 

the coordination structures used at all levels to plan, coordinate, and implement mobilization. In general, Cheng concludes, “The military determines 

requirements, the National Defense Mobilization Committee implements 

coordination, and the government fulfills requirements.” He notes that it is 

difficult to assess the performance of this elaborate apparatus because China 

has not engaged in a full mobilization for war. However, the structure does also 

provide for partial mobilizations that allow the PLA to mobilize civilian assets 

for smaller conflicts or contingencies.

In “Employment of National-Level PLA Assets in a Contingency: A CrossStrait Conflict as Case Study,” Mark Stokes of the Project 2049 Institute discusses the role of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the PLA General 

Staff Department, and the other three general departments in determining 

how national-level assets would be employed in a contingency. Stokes suggests 

that national-level PLA assets would likely be employed by a joint campaign 

command consisting of members from the four general departments, Air Force, 

Navy, and Second Artillery and reporting to the CMC. Stokes notes that the 

CMC would issue a “campaign decision” outlining the specific national PLA 

assets that would be assigned to and employed by a joint campaign command 

during a contingency. Such assets might include communications systems, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, electronic countermeasures, political warfare assets, counterspace systems, and long-range 

precision strike assets.

The second section of the book considers PLA responses to domestic 

contingencies. In “China’s Armed Forces Respond to Internal Disaster Relief: 

Assessing Mobilization and Effort,” Jeffrey Engstrom and Lyle Morris of the 
8

SAUNDERS

RAND Corporation argue that PLA participation in internal disaster relief 

operations provides important evidence about mobilization capacity and manpower effort that can inform understanding of Chinese contingency response 

capacity across the spectrum of conflict. They begin by reviewing the internal 

disaster “threat environment” that China’s armed forces face, focusing on 

which types of disasters are most frequent, where they occur, and how much 

damage they cause. Engstrom and Morris then examine PLA responses to four 

natural disasters (the 2008 winter storms, the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, 

the 2010 Yushu earthquake, and the 2010 Zhouqu mudslides) and determine 

how much manpower was allocated to each operation, the distance covered 

to reach the disaster areas, and the amount of time it took PLA forces to arrive. 

They compare this data to mobilization efforts during the Korean War and 

1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and conclude that Chinese mobilization capacity 

improved three to four times from the 1950s to the 1970s and has improved even 

more dramatically since then to reach the level of performance demonstrated 

in responses to the four disasters they examine. 

Ma Chengkun of Taiwan’s National Defense University details the evolution 

of the PLA’s role in suppressing dissent and protest in his chapter, “PLA Response 

to Widespread Internal Unrest in the Han Homeland.” During the Mao Zedong 

era, mass riots and protests were seen as counterrevolutionary actions, and the 

PLA was used to suppress them. Deng Xiaoping had a different view of protests 

but remained willing to use the PLA if available police forces were insufficient to 

suppress dissent. After the PLA was employed to suppress the 1989 Tiananmen 

protests, Jiang Zemin began to build PAP capabilities and made the organization 

the primary instrument to deal with significant social unrest. Hu Jintao further 

solidified the PAP’s leading role with legislation that called it the “state’s backbone and shock force in handling public emergencies.” The PLA retains a role in 

suppressing widespread dissent, and Ma reviews the psychological impact on 

PLA troops who provided transportation and logistics support to PAP operations 

and the efforts of PLA political commissars to use political education and control 

of information to ensure that the PLA remains willing to follow party orders.

Thomas Woodrow, a retired Defense Intelligence Agency and U.S. Pacific 

Command analyst, argues in his chapter “PLA and Cross-Border Contingencies 

in North Korea and Burma” that both countries represent special interests for 

China, the former due to its historical alliance and role as a buffer state and the 

latter because of resources, longstanding economic and military cooperation, 
9

INTRODUCTION

and its position as a strategic gateway to the Indian Ocean. Woodrow suggests 

that current Chinese plans for cross-border contingencies in North Korea and 

Burma probably focus on protecting stability and preventing refugee flows, 

although the PLA must also be ready to deal with issues involving North Korean 

weapons of mass destruction and potential military intervention by the United 

States or South Korea in the event of a North Korean collapse. He reviews the 

available forces and transportation infrastructure that the PLA could employ 

in the event of a contingency. Woodrow concludes that by the end of the current 

decade, existing contingency plans will likely be modified to reflect expanding 

Chinese economic and security interests and a greater Chinese willingness to 

act unilaterally to protect its interests.

In “PLA Contingency Planning and the Case of India,” Larry Wortzel of Asia 

Strategies and Risks argues that the most likely source of Sino-India conflict 

is the continuing dispute about the border. He considers the lessons India and 

China learned from the 1962 border war and how these might affect a future 

border conflict. The PLA concluded that it is preferable to resolve a border 

conflict through diplomatic means but that if diplomacy fails, the PLA must 

be prepared to fight in high altitudes and extremely cold conditions. Given 

the terrain and conditions, the PLA must conduct independent operations 

in different areas and directions while also taking advantage of engineers, 

camouflage units, communications units, weather organizations, artillery 

and missiles, and specialized reserve forces. Wortzel suggests that unlike the 

1962 war, a contemporary conflict would likely expand into the cyber and air 

domains. He argues that the threat of nuclear weapons use would likely limit 

escalation but highlights the potential for conventional ballistic missile strikes 

deep into adversary territory as a potentially destabilizing action.

In “Like a Good Neighbor: Chinese Intervention through the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization,” Ben Lowsen of the U.S. Army examines how China 

might use the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to intervene in Central 

Asia or Afghanistan in response to separatist and terrorist threats to its control 

of Xinjiang. Chinese decisions about whether and how to intervene would be 

tied to an assessment of China’s interests, perceived threats, means available to 

ameliorate the situation, and political feasibility. Lowsen argues that China has 

an array of means and approaches it might use, including leveraging multilateral 

frameworks such as the SCO, supporting regional partners with economic and 

security assistance or with communications, intelligence, and space-based 
10

SAUNDERS

support, conducting military operations other than war such as training local 

military forces and participating in peacekeeping operations, and intervening 

across the border with conventional forces. He concludes that China is likely to 

seek to minimize its involvement, using indirect means before considering more 

difficult and risky direct methods such as military intervention. 

In “The PLA and Near Seas Maritime Sovereignty Disputes,” Alexander 

Chieh-cheng Huang of Tamkang University describes five types of potential 

near seas contingencies and reviews three recent examples where People’s 

Liberation Army naval forces have been involved. He examines China’s naval 

strategy and the evolution of PLAN operational thinking and force modernization. Huang describes the role of Chinese maritime paramilitary forces in near 

seas contingencies and reviews Beijing’s efforts to consolidate five separate 

maritime forces into a new China Coast Guard. He considers the PLAN role in 

near seas contingencies, noting that the Coast Guard appears to have the leading role in the most likely contingencies, with the PLAN playing a supporting 

role. Huang concludes that this situation is likely to change in the future, with 

the PLAN increasing its presence and roles in the near seas.

Michael Chase of the RAND Corporation examines the 2011 Chinese 

evacuation operation in Libya in “The PLA and Far Seas Contingencies: Chinese Capabilities for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.” The large and 

growing presence of PRC citizens overseas (often in unstable places) and 

public expectations that the Chinese government should protect them will 

generate increasing demand for the PLA to evacuate citizens in danger. Chase 

notes that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs played the lead role in the Libya 

operation and that 90 percent of the 36,000 Chinese citizens were evacuated before the first PLAN ships and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Il-76 transports 

arrived. He judges the operation as successful but notes that it demonstrated 

the limited airlift and sealift capabilities of the PLA. Chase notes that the PLA 

is developing and deploying a number of new capabilities useful for future 

evacuation missions, such as large amphibious ships, aircraft carriers, and 

transport aircraft. However, he concludes that it is unclear whether the PLA 

has developed doctrine to cover evacuation operations and that limitations in 

lift capability and interagency coordination could prove problematic in more 

demanding evacuation scenarios.

Kristen Gunness and Samuel Berkowitz of the RAND Corporation discuss 

naval deployment planning efforts in their chapter, “PLA Navy Planning for 
11

INTRODUCTION

Out of Area Deployments.” They argue that changes in doctrine, increased 

emphasis on at-sea training, efforts to improve political education for long 

deployments, and a more flexible logistics system all laid the groundwork for 

the PLAN’s successful counterpiracy deployments in the Gulf of Aden. Their 

case study of how the navy planned for these missions and the challenges it 

encountered addresses the areas of logistics and replenishment, equipment 

and maintenance, training, care for personnel, and communications. Gunness 

and Berkowitz note that the initial group of ships began their deployment in 

December 2008 without completing all necessary crew training and without 

having finalized logistics support arrangements, and they describe PLAN 

efforts to incorporate lessons learned from each deployment into predeployment training for future crews. They argue that the PLAN has improved its 

expeditionary capabilities and ability to plan for long-term deployments but 

that substantial logistics and communications challenges remain.

When taken as a whole, the chapters in this volume help illuminate how 

the PLA conducts deliberate and crisis planning for contingencies, highlight 

the importance of “whole-of-government” military and civilian responses 

to both domestic and international contingencies, and examine a wide and 

expanding range of contingencies where PLA involvement is possible. The 

chapters document that improving PLA capabilities are giving Chinese leaders 

new options in responding to domestic and international crises, while noting 

that the PLA still has significant limitations in projecting and sustaining power, 

especially at longer distances and in contested environments.

Although China has an expanding array of interests around the world to 

protect, self-imposed constraints such as no alliances and no overseas bases 

continue to limit Beijing’s ability to employ military power in response to crises 

and contingencies.11 There are ongoing debates within China about whether 

those constraints and China’s longstanding foreign policy principles of “nonintervention” and “noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries” 

still make sense for an emerging global power.12 Although the chapters in this 

book focus on the potential for the PLA to become actively involved in a range 

of contingencies, Chinese leaders remain cautious and wary of taking on 

responsibility for international problems. The extent to which the PLA becomes 

more involved in responding to contingencies as opposed to simply planning 

for them will depend on the extent to which domestic and international developments affect Chinese and CCP interests and on whether Chinese leaders 
12

SAUNDERS

become more willing to employ military power to protect those interests and 

to shape China’s external security environment.

Notes

1 Mark A. Stokes and Ian Easton, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army General 

Staff Department: Evolving Organization and Missions,” in The PLA as Organization, 

2nd ed. (Vienna, VA: DGI, Inc., 2015).

2 PLA use of the term campaign differs from U.S. military use. U.S. doctrine 

defines a campaign plan as “a joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and 

space.” Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011). In contrast, PLA campaign doctrine focuses on how to 

employ particular types of forces to achieve narrower operational objectives; several 

different types of campaigns might need to be executed simultaneously in a conflict.

3 Ibid.

4 Mark Cozad, “The PLA and Contingency Planning,” in this volume.

5 Stokes and Easton; and Catherine Welch, “Civilian Authorities and Contingency 

Planning in China,” in this volume.

6 Marcelyn Thompson, “PLA Observations of U.S. Contingency Planning: What 

Has It Learned?” in this volume.

7 The Gulf of Aden counterpiracy deployment is discussed extensively by Kristen 

Gunness and Sam Berkowitz, while the March 2011 Libya evacuation is covered by 

Michael Chase in their respective chapters in this volume. Details on PLA participation in the search for the missing Malaysian airliner are at “PLA in Rescue Mission of 

Malaysia Missing Jet,” China Military Online Special Report, March 2014, available at 

<http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/special-reports/node_68043.htm>.

8 Cozad.

9 For an earlier look at potential contingencies, see Paul B. Stares et al., Managing 

Instability on China’s Periphery (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011).

10 See Daniel Hartnett, Towards a Globally Focused Chinese Military: The Historic 

Missions of the Chinese Armed Forces, Project Asia (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, June 2008).

11 For a comprehensive overview of China’s global interests and the means available to protect them, see David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New 

York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

12 See Mathieu Duchâtel, Oliver Bräuner, and Zhou Hang, Protecting China’s 

Overseas Interests: The Slow Shift away from Non-interference, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 

41 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014).
THINKING AND PLANNING 

FOR CONTINGENCIES

I

15

Arguably the most significant and pervasive trend during Hu Jintao’s 

term (2004–2012) as chairman of the Central Military Commission 

(CMC) has been the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) expanding 

emphasis on planning and force structure requirements to address what 

leaders view as an increasingly complex, interconnected, and challenging 

international security environment. The characteristics and general direction 

outlined for the PLA are captured in the Military Strategic Guidelines and 

more specifically detailed in the concept of the New Historic Missions [xin de 

lishi shiming, 新的历史使命].1

 This new direction has generated considerable 

analysis within PLA strategy and planning circles about future PLA roles 

and missions, the new requirements necessitated by expanding operational 

environments and domains, and the increasing importance of nontraditional, 

nonwar threats. The overall impact on PLA strategic planning remains to some 

extent uncertain, particularly in the realm of force structure requirements. PLA 

leaders continue to debate and analyze future scenarios and the related operational requirements. For operational planners, however, these new challenges 

present both immediate concerns—most notably in the realm of what the PLA 

terms “diversified military tasks” [duoyanghua junshi renwu, 多样化军事任

务]—and a host of potential future planning requirements to support China’s 

increasing global presence and continued territorial disputes.2 

This chapter examines the PLA’s operational planning processes and the 

considerations that have driven planning, particularly since the major doctrinal 

revisions that took place in the 1990s.3 It begins by reviewing the diverse set of 

CHAPTER 1

The PLA and Contingency Planning

Mark Cozad
16

COZAD

security challenges China faces and the expansion of PLA missions under the new 

historic missions. Next, the chapter describes the intellectual framework the PLA 

uses to identify national interests, military missions, and key threats, focusing 

on the role of the Military Strategic Guidelines and the main strategic direction. 

It then examines how these strategic concepts influence operational planning 

at the campaign level, the focus of PLA doctrinal innovation. The chapter then 

illustrates how doctrine for specific campaigns is translated into the force and 

functional requirements necessary for operational plans. The conclusion considers whether the PLA’s comprehensive but data-intensive and highly centralized 

planning system can be adapted to allow planners to address the growing range 

of potential missions and scenarios the PLA may be asked to support in the future.

The PLA doctrinal revision process yielded numerous publications for both 

reference and instructional purposes that were largely derived from observations of modern conflicts and foreign planning systems.4

 While universally 

applicable, this body of work focuses heavily on large-scale conventional 

conflict of the type reflected in the PLA’s Taiwan planning. These doctrinal 

materials provide insight into PLA strategic and operational thinking on a wide 

range of emerging security challenges, but they also reveal that PLA planners 

have not grappled with new challenges in the same detail as they have for Taiwan-centric scenarios. The 2006 edition of The Science of Campaigns attempted 

to incorporate new security issues such as counterterrorism, but it remains 

heavily focused on conventional conflicts.5

The key issue is whether the PLA operational planning system developed 

over the past 20 years will prove flexible and adaptable enough as China’s 

leaders press the PLA to develop capabilities and operational plans to protect 

the country’s growing interests. The PLA probably will not need to overhaul its 

entire model to address the new planning problems associated with numerous 

new requirements. Superficial workarounds, however, are unlikely to alleviate 

the need for more adaptable processes and for planners with new skills necessary to plan for dynamic situations falling short of major conventional war. The 

PLA’s ability to adapt its planning will be a major determinant of its success in 

dealing with new operating environments and contingencies.

New Challenges Driving Plans 

Over the past decade, the PLA’s most important planning scenario centered on 

Taiwan and fears that Taiwan’s political leaders would take actions that would 
17

CHAPTER 1

require significant military responses to either reverse pro-independence 

trends or force unification with the mainland.6 The defeat of the Democratic 

Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan’s 2008 legislative and presidential elections 

eased Chinese fears and stabilized cross-strait relations. Despite reduced 

tensions, Taiwan remains the PLA’s most significant planning concern and 

primary operational focus. This emphasis is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, especially given the DPP’s renewed success in 2014 local elections. 

However, future PLA planning efforts and force requirements cannot neglect 

the multitude of new security threats and operational requirements that must 

be considered alongside heavy resource commitments to operational planning 

for Taiwan. The PLA will have to deal with a much more complex, dynamic set 

of strategic and operational planning scenarios rather than the Taiwan-focused 

challenges that dominated PLA thinking from the early 1990s through 2008. 

Several recent crises have brought the new dimensions of China’s security 

concerns into focus. Maritime confrontations in 2012 with the Philippines over 

Scarborough Shoal and with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands highlighted how disputes over maritime and territorial boundaries could present 

PLA planners with urgent new planning requirements to defend China’s claims. 

Concerns about instability on the Korean Peninsula have also presented PLA 

planners with another multifaceted problem: maintaining border security and 

territorial integrity in the midst of a potential crisis with the United States and 

South Korea over a nuclear-armed neighbor. New diversified military tasks in 

nontraditional and nonwar areas have also received significant attention from 

senior PLA leaders.7

 Natural disaster response, internal instability, terrorism, 

piracy, and energy and resource security have occupied considerable space in 

the debate about how China should shape its military.8 There is little evidence 

that PLA planners are currently devoting significant time and resources to 

developing comprehensive operational plans for these new scenarios. The level 

of effort future PLA planners place on developing operational plans for these 

problems will depend on the degree to which China’s leaders perceive these 

trends as persistent and important threats. Greater emphasis on nontraditional 

missions and contingencies will challenge PLA planners to be more flexible 

and force PLA leaders to accept trade-offs between the ability to respond to 

traditional and nontraditional contingencies.

Most recently, the 2013 version of The Science of Military Strategy, an 

authoritative Academy of Military Science publication, has identified four 
18

COZAD

potential types of conflict the People’s Republic of China (PRC) might face in 

the future: large-scale, high-intensity wars, “relatively large-scale, relatively 

high-intensity” wars to counter separatism, “small- to medium-scale, low- to 

medium-intensity” operations for self-defense, and small-scale, low-intensity 

operations to counter terrorism, maintain stability, and defend territorial 

rights.9

 This list of potential future conflicts encapsulates the range of security 

concerns discussed above. The first category is viewed as an unlikely but highly 

dangerous situation in which the United States seeks to militarily counter 

China’s rise or escalate conflict if it faces losing in a smaller-scale military operation.10 The remaining three options cover a full range of scenarios that might 

include Taiwan, North Korea (or other potential instability on China’s borders), 

the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the protection of Chinese citizens 

overseas.11 Though this list provides a broad range of potential future conflict 

scenarios, this publication does not identify those scenarios for which PLA 

planners have been directed to develop operational plans. 

Central Planning Guidance 

The Military Strategic Guidelines (MSG) [junshi zhanlüe fangzhen, 军事战略方

针] set the PLA’s operational planning parameters.12 This document provides 

overarching guidance on a wide range of issues that dictate the PLA’s future 

missions and force structure as well as the operational scenarios for which the 

PLA must plan. It defines the core strategic tasks the PLA must undertake to 

achieve China’s strategic objectives. The guidelines define general trends in 

the international security situation, current and future trends in warfare, and 

the critical military capabilities required to meet the challenges presented by 

modern adversaries and new domains. Its comprehensive guidance defines 

the PLA’s strategic objectives, strategic military tasks, main strategic direction, 

and other imperatives that give focus to operational planning and development 

timelines within the PLA.13 Four areas within the MSG have particular importance for PLA operational planning: the strategic objective, the main strategic 

direction, strategic deployment, and the patterns of strategic action. 

The MSG’s strategic objectives [zhanlüe mudi, 战略目的] set the direction 

for PLA planning and development by outlining China’s national interests and 

the PLA’s role in securing national objectives. China’s general strategic objective is to “ensure the peaceful, stable and good development of the strategic 

environment at home and abroad” to guarantee national reform and continued 
19

CHAPTER 1

modernization.14 The PLA’s role in supporting this objective is to strengthen 

China’s comprehensive national power, promote a peaceful and stable environment, ensure that China’s interests will not be encroached upon, prevent 

invasion by foreign powers, and win future wars and armed conflicts.15 These 

strategic objectives set the primary requirements driving PLA strategic and 

operational planning and are tied to the new historic missions concept promulgated by Hu Jintao.16 The concept consists of four components: “providing an 

important guarantee of strength for the party to consolidate its ruling position; 

providing a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of important 

strategic opportunity for national development; providing a powerful strategic 

support for safeguarding national interests; and playing an important role in 

safeguarding world peace and promoting common development.”17 The new 

historic missions are broad, general statements of strategic intent that provide 

PLA planners few specifics on future force structure and particular operational 

scenarios. For outside observers, the new historic missions provide only limited insights for understanding PLA current and future operational planning. 

The PLA’s specific operational planning efforts rest on the MSG’s determination of the main strategic direction [zhuyao zhanlüe fangxiang, 主要战

略方向], which is the key to realizing strategic objectives and accomplishing 

strategic tasks.18 The main strategic direction is determined by the direction 

and severity of primary threats and is based on the nature and priority of 

competing interests, the relative strengths of forces, geography, and the overall strategic situation in the region. The delineation between the primary and 

secondary strategic directions is largely based on the weighting of one threat 

against others in their respective directions. Multiple simultaneous threats 

require coordinated planning and deconfliction of resources and efforts among 

a potentially dispersed set of geographic boundaries. As a concept that applies 

to both the strategic and campaign levels of warfare, the strategic direction 

is a crucial link between objectives and warfighting.19 Understanding which 

threats are strategic directions—a designation that corresponds to a specific 

geographical orientation or a particular domain—provides critical information 

about the focus of PLA operational planning efforts. 

PLA operational planning has benefitted from stability in China’s strategic focus. As one PLA strategist highlighted, China’s main strategic direction 

has only shifted four times since 1949. Previous strategic directions included 

a focus against the United States in the early 1950s to early 1960s, toward the 
20

COZAD

Soviet Union and United States in the mid-1960s and early 1970s, and against 

the Soviet Union from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s.20 China’s current direction is focused on “improving the strategic situation on the southern front, 

strengthening the development of border and maritime defense, managing 

and maneuvering on the high seas, and maintaining our maritime rights and 

interests.”21 Taiwan has remained the PLA’s main strategic direction and the 

focus of its planning and modernization efforts since the promulgation of the 

Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Era in 1993.22 While the PLA has 

almost certainly planned for other contingencies such as territorial disputes 

in the South and East China seas and for disaster relief, counterpiracy, and 

counterterrorism efforts, the weight of these scenarios in PLA planning and 

modernization is uncertain.23 Expanding PLA missions, many of which will 

likely be outside the familiar setting of East Asia, will force PLA planners to 

adapt to a much more diverse and dynamic set of scenarios and requirements.

The strategic deployment of forces [zhanlüe bushu, 战略部署] and the 

patterns of strategic action [zhanlüe xingdong yangshi, 战略行动样式] are two 

essential concepts derived from the determination of the main strategic direction.24 Both are meant to place PLA forces in strategically important locations 

according to the functions key units will be expected to perform in wartime settings. In this context, strategic deployment is the organization and disposition 

of forces in all directions based on geographic requirements and the relative 

balance of forces between the PLA and the opposing side. Strategic deployment 

considerations are designed to bolster both wartime and peacetime strength 

and disposition in a way that maximizes offensive and defensive capabilities 

and allows for the most flexible reaction to numerous different strategic challenges and contingencies. 

The impact the main strategic direction has on planning and force disposition is clearly demonstrated by the shift in PLA strategic direction in the late 

1980s. During the second half of the Cold War, the PLA’s main strategic direction was the Soviet threat in the north, and the bulk of the PLA’s forces and its 

most significant capabilities were located in the military regions in northern 

China. With the shift in main strategic direction to Taiwan in the early 1990s, 

PLA resources and planning efforts shifted to southeastern China.25 This 

example demonstrates two key issues central to PLA planning over the past 60 

years. First, the main strategic direction’s relative stability allowed PLA planners to place forces in strategically and operationally advantageous locations 
21

CHAPTER 1

to respond to one primary threat. PLA forces in these areas were able to focus 

on their key assigned task without having to address a diverse range of mission 

requirements. Second, the forward deployment of PLA forces reduced demands 

on the PLA’s logistical capacity and deemphasized the need for long-distance, 

rapid mobility. These issues highlight a critical tension in the PLA’s planning 

process that may lead to future difficulties. A PLA capable of addressing the 

traditional and nontraditional security threats China will face as a globally 

engaged power will require major changes away from a static, continental 

approach to planning.

Patterns of strategic action accompany the main strategic direction as 

a link between the strategic and campaign levels of war. Where the main 

strategic direction is tied to a concrete geographic focus and threat, patterns 

of strategic action are a manifestation of the PLA’s understanding of the key 

trends in warfare. These trends include emerging and dominant operational 

concepts—such as noncontact warfare—that the PLA may be required to execute or counter in future conflicts and the specific operational capabilities and 

technologies supporting these concepts.26 The PLA’s patterns of strategic action 

address a wide range of characteristics that influence the specific nature of 

conflicts, including the domains in which they reside, lines of communication 

and defense, and the types of operations most prevalent in modern warfare. 

These patterns are tied closely to PLA operational-level thinking, which is built 

around military campaigns designed as the centerpiece of modern warfare 

and the primary operational means for achieving China’s wartime strategic 

objectives.

Doctrinal Development for Future Wars 

One of the PLA’s most significant achievements in the past 20 years has been the 

development of a broad body of authoritative doctrine to guide operations and 

planning. This process provides a means for comprehensively studying warfare, developing new operational concepts based on these studies, conducting 

experimentation, and then codifying the results into operational doctrine.27

As a system, it captures the most significant components of PLA operational 

thinking and provides important insights into the types of conflicts for which 

PLA planners likely spend the most time preparing. The most significant of 

these documents focus on both the strategic and campaign levels and have 

been written by teams assembled from the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) 
22

COZAD

and the National Defense University (NDU). The most noteworthy contribution 

to the PLA’s guiding doctrine on operational planning to come out of AMS is 

The Science of Military Strategy, published in Chinese in 2000 and in an English 

version in 2006; a revised version was published in 2013. NDU published an 

analogous document detailing military strategic considerations in 1999 titled 

The Science of Strategy.

28 These documents provide valuable insight into the 

strategic considerations and decisions that guide PLA operational planning, 

particularly the strategic assessment of the situation and determination of 

the main strategic direction. They also provide insight into the national-level 

requirements essential to the PLA’s overall wartime planning such as mobilization, psychological operations, strategic defense, information operations, 

political work, and deterrence.29 

The PLA’s doctrinal development at the operational level has produced 

an even more significant body of work. The most authoritative publication for 

operational art in the PLA remains The Science of Campaigns, first published 

by NDU in 2000 and then updated and revised in 2006.30 These documents, 

along with another large volume from NDU entitled Campaign Theory Study 

Guide, capture PLA thinking across the entire campaign level of war and reflect 

the fusion of the PLA’s long process of observation, research, and experience 

in its own wars and those of others.31 Campaign studies reflect an essential 

component in PLA doctrinal development and operational planning derived 

from a methodology that covers key technical developments, the status of 

operational art among opponents, historical observations, lessons learned 

from foreign militaries, and modeling and simulation.32 This analysis provides 

a detailed explanation of the joint and single-service (“combined” in PLA terminology) campaigns that are the centerpiece of PLA operational planning 

and employment.

The principles and campaigns outlined in these texts are viewed by PLA 

strategists as the most significant operational issues the PLA is likely to confront 

under the conditions outlined in the MSG. When the earliest version of The 

Science of Campaigns was published in 2000, this condition was understood 

as “Local Wars Under High-Tech Conditions” [gaojishu tiaojian xia jubu zhanzheng, 高技术条件下局部战争].33 In recognition of the increasing importance of 

information technology in modern warfare, this statement was later amended 

to address local wars under conditions of “informationization” [xinxihua, 信息

化].34 The relationship between the MSG conditions and the campaigns out-
23

CHAPTER 1

lined in these publications demonstrates the degree to which PLA operational 

thinking and planning are shaped by strategic considerations regarding the 

international security environment and current trends in warfare. The stability 

in PLA strategic thinking is reflected in its approach to campaigns. Although 

The Science of Campaigns was updated between 2000 and 2006, there were 

relatively few major changes to the PLA’s overarching campaign structure; 

the most significant change in the 2006 edition was the addition of the counterterrorism campaign.35

The consistency and stability in PLA campaign doctrine should not be 

viewed as evidence of stagnation. The PLA has demonstrated over the past two 

decades that it is capable of making substantial changes in both technology 

and operations. As PLA campaigns remain relatively consistent over the long 

term, the most significant changes in operational capability occur through the 

development of new operational concepts and experimentation.36 New ideas 

and ways to implement them are performed in a manner consistent with the 

PLA’s understanding of the strategic trends in warfare and their applicability 

to the campaigns they believe will predominate in modern local wars. 

Two examples of critical operational concepts are the development of the 

“three attacks, three defenses” [san da san fang, 三打三防] and “noncontact 

warfare” [bujiechu zhan, 不接触战] concepts following U.S. air operations over 

Yugoslavia.37 Both identified key trends based on observations of U.S. capabilities and operations that the PLA viewed as significant new imperatives guiding 

modern warfare. U.S. advances in airpower; intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR); command and control; and precision guided munitions 

(PGM) led PLA observers to conclude that fundamental shifts in the nature of 

warfare had taken place. As a result, the PLA envisioned new concepts of operation that would enable it to “attack” stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, PGMs, 

and attack helicopters (“three attacks”), and defend against electronic warfare, 

ISR, and precision attack capabilities (“three defenses”) while minimizing 

direct confrontation between armies (noncontact warfare). Chinese military 

researchers viewed these new concepts as necessary for success in future wars, 

particularly against modern adversaries, with the U.S. military identified as 

the standard. In both cases, PLA strategists performed detailed study of these 

trends and concepts that culminated in experimentation efforts to operationalize them across the military. The PLA has experimented in a range of areas its 

leaders view as essential for success in future campaigns, including long-range 
24

COZAD

maneuver, logistics, and joint operations.38 Understanding the context within 

these concepts and the specific areas in which experimentation is taking place 

is essential for analyzing PLA operational planning. Campaigns set the broad 

parameters for PLA planning, but new operational concepts reflect specific 

practices and imperatives for conducting the operations necessary to obtain 

the overall objectives behind the planning.

Diversified military tasks and military operations other than war 

(MOOTW) [feizhanzheng junshi xingdong, 非战争军事行动] have become significant themes in PLA doctrinal discussions due to the new historic missions. 

The PLA’s expanding role in supporting nontraditional military requirements 

and threats has taken on considerable significance, particularly in countering 

terrorism and piracy. The PLA will also be expected to provide increasing support to China’s foreign policy and domestic stability objectives by increasing 

military diplomacy and PLA readiness to support disaster relief. The extent to 

which these new missions will absorb planning resources remains unclear, 

but the PLA’s role in these diversified military tasks is likely to increase with 

the PRC’s expanding global presence. The PLA’s success in adapting will rely 

ultimately on the nature and flexibility of its planning system. The current 

process is highly centralized and devotes the majority of planning resources 

to addressing various aspects and campaigns associated with the Taiwan 

problem. Expanding future missions could generate major challenges for this 

system if the current process remains highly centralized while the number 

of these missions expands considerably. However, at this point, there is little 

evidence to suggest that the PLA is contemplating any significant changes to 

its planning processes.

Force Requirements, Organization, and Disposition 

The forces required to support the PLA’s expanding missions depend heavily 

on two factors: the categories of forces required for campaign operations, and 

the system-of-systems construct central to PLA thinking about the functional 

employment of forces. PLA operational art is centered on campaigns. In terms 

of organization, the type of campaign will dictate operational objectives and 

the types of forces required to meet those objectives. Campaigns also prescribe 

the principal structure for command and control and headquarters functions 

overseeing service forces arrayed in the various operations groups assigned 

to a specific campaign.39 Based on the type of joint campaign (island landing, 
25

CHAPTER 1

blockade, border counterattack, and so forth), operations groups will provide a 

hybrid service-functional structure for commanding and controlling the units 

assigned to them. Geographically, campaign forces will perform their functions 

within a given strategic direction based on an assigned task. 

PLA doctrinal publications outline several categories of forces required 

for success in modern campaigns including:40

• information operations

• firepower

• mobility

• support

• ISR

• precision strike 

• electronic warfare

• command and control

• operational support

• logistics and equipment support

• protection.

Based on the specific objectives and types of campaigns, PLA planners 

can draw on the mix of capabilities best suited to the campaign objectives and 

geography. PLA modernization efforts over the past two decades have focused 

on developing the technological and operational capabilities required for each 

of these specific categories. Experimentation, particularly in the realm of joint 

operations, has been an essential component of modernization and provides a 

more detailed understanding of how specific forces are being linked together 

in operational scenarios.

The other critical employment consideration for PLA forces is the system-of-systems [tixi, 体系] approach embedded in the PLA’s campaign construct. While campaigns serve as the primary organizing mechanism for PLA 

forces at the operational level, combat systems are the main method for functionally grouping capabilities. According to the Campaign Theory Study Guide, 

in this dual construct “modern campaigns are the confrontation between 

combat systems,” and “paralyzing the enemy’s combat system has become an 

important means of winning a war.”41 The difference between the forces and 

systems considerations becomes more apparent when examining a specific 
26

COZAD

campaign such as the joint anti–air raid campaign. From the campaign organizational perspective, service and functional capabilities are brought together 

and organized within air, ground, naval, and missile operations groups along 

with associated functional operations groups such as information operations, 

denial and deception, and special operations added depending on the scope of 

the campaign’s objectives and missions.42 In terms of a joint anti–air raid combat system, the key capabilities are viewed in terms of the following functions: 

intelligence early warning, information operations, resistance operations, 

counterattack operations, and protection operations.43 Understanding these 

two characteristics of how campaign forces are arrayed is essential to understanding the types of forces involved in a campaign and how they will fight. 

These two concepts also highlight the functions PLA planners will emphasize 

in planning and coordinating the various parts of the campaign and combat 

system. Coordination among the service operations groups is essential for 

synchronizing the resources and activities composing the combat system.

Specific force requirements will be determined by the nature of the campaign and the combat systems supporting that campaign, the scale of the 

conflict, and the adversary’s capability and level of technology. In the overall 

framework of PLA force planning and thinking about future contingencies, 

U.S. military actions are the most challenging threat planners must confront. 

In central planning efforts focused on Taiwan, the potential for U.S. involvement has weighed heavily in force modernization and the development of 

operational concepts designed to counter key U.S. technological advantages. 

Similar concerns about U.S. intervention are probably factored into planning 

scenarios for the Korean Peninsula and for maritime disputes in the South and 

East China seas. The U.S. Air-Sea Battle concept has been a particular focus 

and concern for PLA observers since the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. 

Developing counters to it will likely serve as the centerpiece for many PLA 

regional planning scenarios.44 Other regional powers such as Japan, Vietnam, 

and India could drive future contingency planning efforts; however, at this 

point there is limited evidence suggesting that PLA planners have conducted 

in-depth planning to address these specific operational scenarios.

A critical factor underpinning PLA planning is the requirement for modern logistics and mobility to ensure flexibility in responding to the new 

security challenges facing China and the PLA.45 In recent years, the PLA has 

put extensive effort into improving these two areas based on its perceived 
27

CHAPTER 1

shortcomings. When the PLA’s planning predominantly focused on the Soviet 

Union, its overall manpower was considerably greater and geographically 

focused. Logistics and mobility were important, but positioning and numbers 

could compensate for many shortcomings. Analyzing the U.S. victory in the 

first Gulf War and observing military operations in a variety of other theaters, 

PLA strategists have come to realize that modern wars require improved 

flexibility and rely more heavily on logistics and maintenance support than 

at any time in history. Advances in command and control and information 

technologies now provide military planners significantly greater capability 

to plan and track the force movements required to fight on an increasingly 

dynamic battlefield that includes new domains. Joint operations also present 

opportunities for consolidating logistics and mobility capabilities that were 

previously service-specific and frequently duplicative. Exploiting these new 

possibilities is essential in light of PLA efforts to consolidate and streamline 

forces while meeting an expanded array of challenges such as defending 

national unity (that is, preventing Taiwan independence), protecting territorial claims in border disputes (against India and claimants along the PRC’s 

southeastern and northeastern borders), defending maritime claims (vis-àvis Japan and Southeast Asian claimants), and combatting nontraditional 

threats (piracy, terrorism, and disaster relief). 

Conclusion 

This chapter has described the intellectual framework that guides PLA planners, integrating strategic factors such as PRC national interests, PLA missions, and geographically oriented threat assessments with operational- and 

campaign-level factors. Unfortunately, the output of this planning process 

remains opaque given the lack of access to specific plans and limited information on which contingencies are the primary focus for PLA planners. The 

process itself, as outlined in PLA doctrinal publications, is comprehensive 

but also data-intensive and highly centralized. The most pressing analytical 

question at this time is whether the PLA can adapt its planning system to allow 

planners to address the growing range of potential missions and scenarios 

the PLA may be asked to support. The current military strategic framework 

outlined in The Science of Military Strategy and the campaign framework outlined in the two versions of The Science of Campaigns demonstrate that while 

some modifications have been made, PLA leaders appear to still be focused on 
28

COZAD

relatively large-scale conventional operations. In some cases—such as disaster 

relief and humanitarian operations—PLA planning processes for large-scale 

movements of forces and equipment appear to translate readily. In other cases, 

it is unclear whether PLA planners would be able to adapt quickly, particularly 

to unexpected crises. 

PLA doctrine addresses a large range of potential contingencies through 

discussions on campaigns and on the requirements for the operational level 

of war. Taiwan scenarios have played a dominant role in PLA thinking about 

campaigns, and PLA doctrine reflects this focus. Other scenarios involving 

disputes along China’s land borders and maritime disputes in the South and 

East China seas also fit well into the overall construct that allows for wars of 

various scales, different levels of enemy capability, and third-party intervention. Within this construct, PLA planners have been exposed to a large body 

of coherent doctrine over an extended period of time. This thought has guided 

many aspects of PLA training, exercises, and experimentation and is deeply 

rooted in a generation of PLA officers. 

If Chinese leaders pursue a more globally oriented military posture, a key 

determinant of PLA success in meeting new requirements will be whether 

the PLA can modify its doctrine and planning process to address new types 

of conflicts outside of China’s traditional regional confines and adopt a more 

flexible, and perhaps more decentralized, approach. A long-term, deliberate 

shift in focus would allow the PLA to adapt to address these issues gradually 

and comprehensively. However, if China’s interests in other areas are under 

immediate threat, the PLA may be asked to respond with a planning system 

not suited to the task. The current system has worked reasonably well because 

China is a central player in regional dynamics—the threats and disputes are 

well understood, even if not entirely predictable or controllable. A more global 

posture, which the new historic missions imply, could challenge PLA planners 

by forcing them to deal with a wide variety of new problems and uncertainties 

for which they have little historic experience or preparation. Such a posture 

would also present new logistics and command and control challenges that 

would need to be incorporated into operational planning. This would test 

the PLA’s operational planning assumptions and the process they underpin. 

Nontraditional security threats and the diversified military tasks that stem 

from them could also stress the PLA planning system if not managed adroitly 

by China’s military and political leaders. 
29

CHAPTER 1

Critical questions remain about the suitability of the PLA’s planning process 

for a more diverse and geographically distributed set of challenges. First, if presented with simultaneous crises, will PLA planners be able to adequately plan 

and provide options for China’s senior leaders? The most difficult challenge is not 

a single crisis with two or three stressing scenarios, but a steady stream of new 

threats and scenarios that China’s leaders feel compelled to address. Second, 

what effect will these new operational requirements have on the PLA’s planning 

capability across a range of scenarios? Planning for less intense, nontraditional 

scenarios requires different skill sets in ISR, targeting, and command and control, 

as well as expertise in subjects such as counterterrorism and international law. 

A sustained commitment to this type of contingency planning could adversely 

affect the PLA capability to plan for the large-scale conflicts that it regards as 

its primary missions. Currently, this prospect appears to be extremely limited. 

However, future security threats stemming from China’s expanding interests 

and increased global engagement could place the PLA into a situation where its 

planners are forced to divert resources from the task of in-depth planning for 

major conventional war to respond to unexpected immediate crises.

Notes

1 David Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy: An Overview of 

the ‘Military Strategic Guidelines,’” in Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: 

Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, eds. Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2007), 82–87; and James Mulvenon, 

“Chairman Hu and the PLA’s ‘New Historic Missions,’” China Leadership Monitor, 

no. 27 (Winter 2009).

2 Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, China’s 

National Defense in 2006 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, December 

29, 2006). Continued discussion of diversified military tasks is present in all subsequent iterations of China’s National Defense. In addition, this subject is discussed at 

length in Andrew Scobell and Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Overstretched Military,” 

The Washington Quarterly 25, no.4 (Fall 2012), 135–148. 

3 This chapter will not address the entire body of texts but will instead focus 

on the most significant foundational documents. In-depth studies from various 

institutions have provided detailed analysis of the specific capabilities and operations outlined in the documents cited in this paper. An in-depth discussion of their 

findings is beyond the scope of this paper.

4 See Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen, eds., Chinese Lessons 

from Other Peoples’ Wars (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011).
30

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5 Zhang Yuliang [张玉良], ed., The Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing: 

National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2006). 

6 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2012, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: OSD, May 2012), iv.

7 Wu Tianmin and Ding Haiming [武天敏, 丁海明], “Key Lies in Building Core 

Military Capabilities” [关键是打造核心军事能力], PLA Daily [解放军报], June 9, 2008.

8 Shan Xiufa [单秀法], “The People’s Armed Forces That Are Marching Toward 

Modernization” [迈向现代化的人民军队], Liaowang [瞭望], no. 32 (August 6, 2012), 40–41.

9 Shou Xiaosong [寿晓松], ed., The Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2013), 99–100. 

10 Ibid., 99.

11 Ibid., 99–100.

12 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi [彭光谦,姚有志], eds., The Science of Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House [军事科学出版社], 

2005), 167.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Mulvenon, 1–3. 

17 Jia Yong, Cao Zhi, and Li Xuanliang [贾永, 曹智, 李宣良], “Advancing in Big 

Strides from a New Historical Starting Point—Record of Events on How the Party 

Central Committee and the Central Military Commission Promote Scientific Development in National Defense and Army Building” [中国军队打赢信息化条件下局部战争

能力不断提升], Xinhua [新华], August 7, 2007. 

18 Peng and Yao, 168.

19 Finkelstein, 91.

20 Ibid., 93.

21 Ibid.

22 OSD, 6.

23 Ibid., 21.

24 Peng and Yao, 169–170. 

25 OSD, 6.

26 Yun Shan [云杉], “Facing the New Military Transformation Squarely” 

[直面新军事], Liaowang, no. 28 (July 4, 2003), 10–20; and Yang Fan [楊帆], “People’s 
31

CHAPTER 1

Liberation Army Rousing Itself to Overtake Others With Major Reforms” [解放軍急

起直追大變革], Wen Wei Po [文匯報], August 23, 2003.

27 Wu Changde, Wu Guifu, and Yang Chunchang [吴昌德, 武桂馥, 杨春长], 

“Respond to the New World Revolution in Military Affairs, Walk the Path of Elite 

Troops with Chinese Characteristics (Experts Weigh In)” [应对世界新军事变革 走中

国特色精兵之路(专家议专题)], People’s Daily [人民日报], July 29, 2003.

28 Wang Wenrong [王文荣], ed., The Science of Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: 

National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 1999).

29 Peng and Yao, chaps. 9–18. These chapters cover a range of strategic topics 

central to PLA war planning efforts.

30 Wang Houqing and Zhang Xingye [王厚卿, 张兴业], eds., The Science of 

Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2000); and Zhang 

Yuliang, The Science of Campaigns. 

31 Xue Xinglin [薛兴林], ed., Campaign Theory Study Guide [战役理论学习指南] 

(Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2001). 

32 Wang and Zhang, 1. 

33 Ibid., 16–17. 

34 Ibid.; Jia, Cao, and Li. 

35 Wang and Zhang. 

36 Wang Shenghuai, “Making Innovations in Theory and Practice of the Interaction of ‘Fighting, Building, and Training,’” PLA Daily, April 7, 2004. 

37 Sun Kaixiang and Su Ruozhou [孫開香, 蘇若舟], “The PLA General Staff 

Headquarters Have Worked Out Plans for This Year’s Military Training” [總參部署

新年度軍事訓練工作], PLA Daily, January 17, 2003; and Wang Shenghuai, “Making 

Innovations in Theory and Practice.” 

38 Sun Daifang and Chen Xiaojun [孙代方, 陈小军], “A New Model of Building 

Modularized Support in the Fujian Provincial Military District” [福建省军区构建模块

化融合保障新模式], PLA Daily, September 25, 2010; and Wang, “Making Innovations 

in Theory and Practice.”

39 Wang and Zhang, eds., 19–21.

40 Ibid., 4–5.

41 Xue, ed., 66.

42 Ibid., 409.

43 Peng and Yao, eds., 329–332.

44 Dou Chao [窦超], “Big Stick Being Wielded at China—Interpreting the New 

‘Air-Sea Battle’ Operational Concept of the U.S. Military (Part 2)” [挥向中国的大棒 解
32

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析美军新作战概念”空海一体战”(下)], Modern Weaponry [现代兵器], no. 8 (August 2, 

2011), 46–51.

45 Tang Xiangdong and Fan Juwei [唐向东, 范炬炜], “At the All-PLA Logistic 

Support Capability Inspection and Evaluation and Warehouse Storage Work Conference, Liao Xilong Calls for Effectively Enhancing the Capability of Logistic Support 

for Fulfilling Diversified Military Tasks” [廖锡龙在全军后勤保障能力检验评估暨仓库

储备工作会议上要求力实提高完成多样化军事任务后勤保障能], PLA Daily, September 

22, 2012.
33

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has had generations to observe 

the U.S. military plan for and go to war, from engagements in China’s 

backyard like the Korean and Vietnam wars to U.S. operations half a 

world away in Grenada, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. As the PLA modernizes to fulfill Hu Jintao’s New Historic Missions,1

 what lessons has the PLA 

drawn from U.S. involvement in these operations? Specifically, has the PLA 

learned anything about contingency planning from the United States that has 

influenced how the PLA is designing its own contingency plans for use with 

its modernizing military?

The easiest way to answer this question would be through a review of Chinese contingency plans—a problematic endeavor from a research standpoint, 

as any such plans are likely very highly guarded within China. An additional 

challenge is that despite the PLA’s well-established history of analyzing U.S. 

military operations, there exists a noticeable dearth of PLA research into U.S. 

contingency planning procedures. Therefore, this chapter focuses on repeated 

references in Chinese writings to hallmarks of U.S. contingency planning that 

have piqued the PLA’s interest. Notably, these hallmarks are reflected in several steps the PLA is taking to modernize, particularly in the areas of national 

defense mobilization, logistics, and command, control, communications, 

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). The author 

believes the PLA is aware that these developments can serve as a framework for 

emulating key components of the U.S. contingency planning process that the 

PLA admires and perceives as facilitators for the rapid creation, implementation, and revision of contingency plans. 

This chapter addresses these hallmarks in detail, focusing first on the 

different vocabulary Chinese and U.S. practitioners use when discussing 

CHAPTER 2

PLA Observations of U.S. Contingency Planning: What Has It Learned?

Marcelyn L. Thompson
34

THOMPSON

contingency planning, and then reviewing Chinese views of U.S. contingency 

operations since Grenada, with additional insights from recent Chinese contingency operations and the potential influence of the Syria crisis. Finally, 

a discussion of modernization in China’s mobilization, C4ISR, and logistics 

systems will highlight developments that could serve to build China’s contingency planning capabilities. 

A Note on Terminology 

The primary Chinese term for contingency, in the context of military contingency operations, is yingji [应急]. Unfortunately, this is also the word the 

Chinese government often uses for emergency, as in emergency management.2

Therefore, when distinguishing the body of research on China’s views on 

contingency planning, it is often necessary to rely upon context to determine 

whether the sources addressed plans and operations for domestic issues such 

as social unrest and natural disasters, for which emergency is often the best 

understanding of yingji, or externally focused or externally caused events, in 

which case contingency is a more appropriate interpretation. Finally, the phrase 

contingency plans, often termed yingji jihua [应急计划], yingji yu’an [应急预案], 

or yuxian jihua [预先计划], is also sometimes referred to as zhanqian cehua [

战前策划]

3

 or zhanqian chouhua [战前筹划].4 The lack of standard terminology 

indicates that the concept of contingency planning is not as systemic and 

therefore likely less well-developed in China than in the United States.

However, this lack of standardized terminology may have a different 

cause. It is unclear if the PLA distinguishes either linguistically or conceptually between the U.S. practices of crisis action and contingency planning. The 

book Contingency Operations [Yingji Zuozhan, 应急作战], published in 2004 

by China’s National Defense Industrial Press, does not seem to distinguish 

between the two, including a study of the U.S operations in Grenada, a crisis 

action planning-based operation, along with later U.S. operations in Iraq, based 

on U.S. contingency planning procedures. Therefore, the author has decided to 

include China’s study of Grenada in this chapter, bearing in mind that China’s 

concept of contingency planning may not be limited to the standard U.S. Joint 

Forces’ definition of contingency planning—that is, deliberate planning.

Table 2.1 describes the key Chinese terms used for researching this chapter, 

and how, depending upon the context in which they have been used in the documents cited herein, they are best interpreted in English. None of these terms 
35

CHAPTER 2

convey a clear concept of the timelines used in developing the plans to which 

they refer. If these phrases are tied to specific steps and timelines for either a 

Chinese version of what the U.S. Joint Staff would term crisis action or deliberate planning,5

 this is not clear from how they are used in the available sources. 

Table 2.1. Key Terms Related to “Contingency Planning” 

in Chinese and English

Chinese Term Approximate English Definition

应急

yingji

• emergency

• contingency

应急计划 

yingji jihua

• emergency (response) plan

• contingency plan

• crisis action plan

应急预案

yingji yu’an

• emergency (preparations) plan

• contingency plan

预先计划 

yuxian jihua

• preplan

• deliberate planning

战前策划

zhanqian cehua

• war plan (perhaps one that is thrown together quickly, more 

akin to crisis action planning than contingency planning)

战前筹划

zhanqian chouhua

• war plan

Insights from U.S. Contingency Operations 

In general, Chinese writings that relate to contingency planning do not appear 

to focus extensively on the specific steps of the U.S. contingency planning 

process as outlined in the U.S. Government’s Joint Operations Planning and 

Execution System. However, when they do, a consistent theme in these writings 

on the U.S. ability to conduct contingency planning is awe at how often the 

United States can pull a contingency plan out of seemingly thin air or quickly 

adjust and approve the use of contingency plans for real-world operations.6

 For 

example, in a review of U.S. operations in Grenada, the PLA author believes 

that the United States was a “sledge-hammer” and Grenada a “gnat,”7 but he 

is nonetheless impressed with not only the U.S. military’s execution of the 

Grenada operation but also the rapid and comprehensive means by which the 

United States planned for it. As one PLA publication notes: “The United States 

was able to respond and succeed quickly with regard to Grenada because its 

highest levels of strategic policymakers and the supreme command had the 
36

THOMPSON

capability to respond quickly and decisively to the current state of affairs.”8 This 

capability refers not only to the ability of America’s strategic policymakers and 

supreme command to arrive at decisions on contingency operations quickly, 

but also to the country’s ability to use strategic reconnaissance to update the 

Grenada plans swiftly9 and back these plans up with highly trained and skilled 

rapid response forces, such as the 82d

 Airborne Division.10

On the topic of the U.S. performance in Operation Desert Storm, the PLA 

gives high praise to the level of planning and coordination the United States 

leveraged in its successes in that conflict,11 including the use of running multiple scenarios to help in the planning process.12 This praise also singles out 

the expansive command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) 

technology the United States employed when coordinating and revising its 

contingency plans for Iraq, noting that such technology becomes all the more 

critical in later stages of operationalizing a contingency plan as the fog of war 

and threats to forces increase, complicating commanders’ abilities to make 

decisions based on reliable data.13

Another aspect of U.S. contingency planning for Operation Desert Storm

that impressed China is the use of prepositioned supplies as well as the largescale mobilization of commercial transport assets.14 Chinese commentary 

on the Gulf War states that the use of prepositioned supplies, particularly 

petroleum, oils, and lubricants, as well as transport ships already in the region 

helped the United States save significant time in mobilizing and deploying 

forces, notably the Marines. The U.S. ability to rapidly mobilize commercial 

airliners and merchant ships for this effort is also noted, indicating a Chinese 

belief that massive civil mobilization is something a military should have a plan 

to do ahead of any potential conflict. This belief was no doubt underscored by 

China’s use of commercial air and maritime transportation during its 2011 noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) of its citizens from Libya15 (discussed 

below in further detail).

The PLA adds further emphasis on the civilian role in preparing for war 

when reviewing U.S. planning for post-9/11 Iraq operations, stating that the 

“civilianization” of war preparations is the way of the future.16 Bringing civilians into the fold from the very beginning of generating contingency plans, 

adhering to uniform combat theory that is in line with the strategic guidance, 

and exercising the plans and revising them accordingly are viewed as the vital 

components of U.S.-style contingency planning for informationized warfare.17
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In terms of lessons learned from how the United States planned for Afghanistan, PLA analysts again focus on the importance of logistics, notably the 

integration of all elements of U.S. logistics needs. The PLA notes the top-down 

scrutiny of and support for logistics requirements, from the Joint Staff addressing logistics as part of revising plans for multiple contingencies to implementation of these plans by the Defense Logistics Agency and logistics departments 

across the Armed Services.18

The U.S. experience in Afghanistan also helped PLA analysts realize China 

has many steps it needs to undertake when it comes to contingency planning, 

at least for counterterrorism contingencies: intelligence collection, planning, 

scenario writing, and exercising against these scenarios.19

The one instance in which Chinese writings find clear fault with U.S. contingency planning capabilities is, unsurprisingly, Operation Allied Force, due 

to the mistaken U.S. targeting of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade based on the 

use of an outdated map. In an article published under the sponsorship of China’s 

National Defense Science, Technology, and Information Center, Chinese authors 

state that it is not enough simply to conduct intensive intelligence collection; one 

also has to validate the authenticity and thereby the utility of the intelligence. 

However, these authors do give the United States some credit for apparently 

learning from Allied Force, referencing significant investments in surveying and 

mapping local terrain for U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.20

Insights from PLA Contingency Operations 

In 2011, the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) conducted a NEO of 

Chinese citizens in Libya due to ongoing unrest there. These two services, in conjunction with chartered flights and merchant ships, successfully evacuated over 

35,000 people from Libya.21 To the extent that China’s contingency planning for 

and use of its military in the Libya NEO mirrors any kind of U.S.-style planning, 

it most closely approximates crisis action planning, similar to what the United 

States exercised in coordinating between Department of Defense, U.S. Agency 

for International Development, and Department of State entities located in the 

Asia-Pacific in response to the 2004 tsunami.22 For China, coordination during 

the Libya crisis involved emergency meetings led by the State Council, in addition to emergency communications with the PLAN, PLAAF, and state organs 

including the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Commerce, and Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs under the oversight of the State Council.23
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On the civilian side, the State Council’s State-Owned Assets Supervision 

and Administration Commission (SASAC) oversaw the enacting of emergency 

plans to protect the physical assets and nearly 5,000 Chinese citizen employees 

of the China Communication Construction Group’s (CCCG’s) projects in Libya. 

The CCCG office in Benghazi began emergency preparations on February 

8, 2011, after local police notified them of large-scale demonstrations; these 

preparations included reserving a one-month stockpile of emergency supplies, 

purchasing a maritime satellite phone, and beginning to draft contingency 

plans. These plans included monitoring reserves of oil and water, procuring 

materials and teams to establish roadblocks, and assigning CCCG employees 

to security teams and propaganda and morale duties.24 CCCG reported that all 

their employees were successfully evacuated by February 28, 2011.25

While this successful NEO, so far from China’s borders, was an operational 

coup for the PLA and by extension for China’s civilian leadership, it is unclear 

what specific impact this event has had on China’s contingency planning 

process. At the very least, the Libya NEO has probably highlighted for China 

how helpful it is to have a military presence nearby when responding to a 

crisis; the PLAN frigate used for the NEO was already in the area to conduct 

escort patrols in the Gulf of Aden.26 Another lesson it likely provided is the 

value of relationships with parties nearby that one can leverage in a crisis. In 

this instance, China’s relationship with Greece provided critical supporting 

infrastructure. Chartered Greek ships helped evacuate at least 2,000 Chinese 

from Libya, and Greek hotels reserved 6,500 beds for Chinese evacuees.27 This 

arrangement may have benefitted from shipbuilding and construction deals 

that China and Greece agreed to in 2010 whereby China encouraged its businesses to seek investment opportunities in Greece to help that nation overcome 

its financial problems.28

The Libya NEO demonstrated that even though China may have lacked 

a detailed NEO plan, it still managed to take advantage of nearby resources 

and regional relationships to coordinate a functional plan in short order. In 

the wake of the Libya NEO, China created the Strategic Planning Department 

(SPD) under the General Staff Department in late 2011. Designed to integrate 

planning and force allocation across all PLA services as well as to improve PLA 

coordination with civilian entities,29 the SPD will likely be integral to shaping 

China’s contingency planning process in the future. How the SPD will coordinate with China’s nascent National Security Commission (NSC), created late 
39

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in 2013, and the role the NSC itself will play in drafting and approving future 

Chinese contingency plans remain unclear.30

China has also followed with great interest recent discussions involving 

U.S. and international experts about how to handle the ongoing unrest in 

Syria. Observing the United States take time to meet with Turkey to discuss 

contingency options for improving the situation in Syria31 likely leaves China 

wondering if contingency planning always requires extensive diplomatic 

efforts to coordinate with key regional actors. U.S. advance focus on resolving 

key issues (such as what will happen to Syria’s chemical weapons if the regime 

falls) may also convince China that mere awareness alone of the possible locations and potential nature of a crisis is insufficient for effective contingency 

planning. Instead, developing specific scenarios for future possibilities must 

be a requirement for contingency planning.32

Relevant Developments in PLA Modernization 

Three areas of the PLA’s current modernization, while not necessarily directly 

linked to contingency planning capabilities, will likely improve the PLA’s ability to coordinate contingency plans and enable planning for a broad range of 

scenarios. The first two areas, national defense mobilization and logistics, are 

intricately tied to one another, and strengthening each of these capabilities 

is a priority for China. However, it is in the third area, C4ISR, where the PLA 

hopes to provide the infrastructure for the type of objective and continuous 

coordination that enables the kind of U.S.-style planning it admires.

National Defense Mobilization 

China’s national defense mobilization process was codified in the 2010 National 

Defense Mobilization Law (NDML), which authorizes Beijing to requisition, 

with an unspecified amount of compensation, a host of civilian assets, from 

telecommunications to factories to transportation means, in times of national 

crisis.33 The NDML also calls for the military and relevant civilian entities to 

conduct national defense mobilization training in peacetime, which, if conducted with rigor on a regular basis, would likely provide the PLA an even 

greater level of mobilization support from the commercial sector than the 

United States enjoyed during the Gulf War. 

China plans for and enforces national defense measures through National 

Defense Mobilization Committees, which exist from the county level across 
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THOMPSON

the country up to the highest levels of government. These committees act upon 

orders from the president (who is usually also the Chinese Communist Party 

general secretary) for full or partial mobilization, drawn from a Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress decision in response to perceived threats 

to China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, or security. The State Council 

and Central Military Commission then undertake joint efforts to create relevant 

policies and organize the implementation of national defense mobilization work, 

in keeping with the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress decision on full or partial mobilization and the president’s accompanying order.34

Recent high-profile civil-military joint exercises in China highlight practicing national defense mobilization, largely for transportation purposes. In exercise Stride [Kuayue, 跨越] 2009, the PLA moved a division each from the Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan, and Chengdu Military Regions (MRs)—approximately 

50,000 troops—across the country to test its strategic projection capabilities for 

responding to unspecified contingencies.35 The troops relied upon commercial 

airliners and high-speed trains to provide strategic projection for part of the 

exercise, the mobilization of which was coordinated by the PLA headquarters 

for the event.36 The PLA also used its Beidou [北斗] satellite navigation system 

to facilitate the PLA’s long-distance transit,37 suggesting that civilian transportation organizations, along with the PLA, are linked into Beidou, which 

could assist rapid mobilization of their resources for contingency operations. 

Although Stride occurred prior to the passage of the NDML, it clearly aligned 

with Article 53 (D) of the NDML, which says that “providing various means of 

transportation for the armed forces is a priority” once the state has commenced 

national defense mobilization.38 The exercise’s focus on military use of civilian 

transport also likely built off the “Regulation on National Defense Mobilization 

of Civilian Means of Transportation,” issued jointly by the State Council and 

the Central Military Commission in 2003.39

Stride also tested other elements of national defense mobilization. For 

example, the National Defense Mobilization Committee of Luohe Military 

Sub-District mobilized a local emergency [yingji] militia unit to stand guard 

over nearby freeways in support of the transit for participating Jinan MR 

troops.40 In Zhengzhou, not only were local traffic and transportation personnel 

mobilized, but so were civil affairs, public security, and telecommunications 

staff along with local militia, for the express intent of practicing civil-military 

coordination for national defense mobilization purposes.41
41

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With the high-profile Mission Action [shiming xingdong, 使命行动] 2010 

exercise, the PLA again relied upon civilian transportation, using commercial 

airliners to help move group army–level units from across MRs.42 Additionally, 

the movement of forces from Beijing to the Shenyang MR and between the 

Chengdu and Lanzhou MRs during the exercise indicates Mission Action 2010, 

in addition to providing additional practice with national defense mobilization, 

was designed to train the PLA for rapid mobilization in response to specific 

border contingencies—for example, with North Korea and India.43 

The extent to which the PLA has used Mission Action 2010—or any of its 

other exercises, for that matter—to practice specific components of contingency plans is unclear. One PLA training guide notes that designing training 

based upon operational missions can be handled one of two ways: training 

programs can either be designed for very specific topics that do not indicate key 

aspects of operational plans, or they can be designed specifically to align with 

operational plans. The critical difference between the two methods from an 

outsider’s perspective is that training is usually aligned to operational plans just 

prior to a war, a tendency that could prove useful for indications and warning 

of a pending PLA operation. The exception would be following major changes 

in the world order—possibly including events like the Arab Spring—that merit 

reviewing and possibly revising a nation’s strategies and operational plans.44

Whatever the nature of the training program, the PLA does recognize the 

value of training for contingency planning.45 In particular, the PLA highlights 

the lengths to which the United States went to practice elements of contingency 

plans for operations in Iraq, including exercising units in Israel to acclimate 

them to the desert conditions they would be fighting in during a war with Iraq, 

using actors playing Iraqis to provide a realistic opposition during the training, 

and employing simulators to make training more realistic.46 Noticeably absent, 

however, is any indication of the kind of national defense mobilization training 

China conducts.

Logistics 

China is decidedly attuned to the global networks of U.S. troops and military 

supplies emplaced around the world that enable the United States to respond 

quickly to contingencies, particularly after observing how such prepositioning 

benefitted U.S. forces in Iraq.47 Yet the PLA still lacks the advantage of having its 

own supplies prepositioned globally, or even regionally, for use in contingency 
42

THOMPSON

operations. The exception would be its few destroyers dedicated to counterpiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden, which proved advantageous to China’s NEO 

of its citizens from Libya in 2011, as previously discussed. The PLA may have 

plans to mobilize these ships for contingencies it may confront in that region, 

including but not limited to piracy. While the PLA has admitted to considering 

creating a supply base in the Horn of Africa,48 as of this writing, the conversation 

has not moved toward any concrete action.49

Regardless, the PLA is changing how it addresses logistics management 

to create a force that is more prepared to fulfill logistics requirements on short 

notice and across great distances. In 2011, the General Logistics Department 

(GLD) issued a framework for the comprehensive building of logistics target 

tasks, with the aim of establishing a modernized logistics system by 2020.50 A 

key focus for this effort is developing logistics commanders who can make the 

most of newer technological systems that help track and automatically update 

the status of materiel. This capability is seen as invaluable in an era where information technology causes the battlefield situation to change rapidly, creating 

chaos that intensifies the need for up-to-date, accurate information about the 

units being resupplied and the location of materiel.51

Additionally, this GLD framework is designed with the understanding that 

increased civil-military coordination is necessary to develop a logistics capability that can support responses to any contingency on a moment’s notice.52

This fact is what makes the PLA’s logistics processes so intricately linked with 

those of its national defense mobilization. From China’s perspective, this is due 

to a perceived trend of informationized (that is, high-tech and network-dependent) local wars, in which boundaries between military and civilian technology 

are rapidly collapsing, enabling a much broader population to “support the 

front” instead of just members of PLA logistics units.53

Two items from a June 2012 Small Working Group’s work report on civil-military integration of weapons production system construction highlight 

specific steps China is taking to strengthen the civil-military support relationship. First, the General Armaments Department, in conjunction with Guangdong Province, recently inaugurated a project to demonstrate the applications 

of Beidou for civilian purposes, termed the “1-2-3 Project.” This name is derived 

from one city—Zhongshan—that will serve as a “Beidou demonstration city,” 

emphasizing the launch of this system for emergency [yingji] management, 

intelligent communications, integration of the city with the administration of 
43

CHAPTER 2

law enforcement, and personal security support; two information platforms 

upon which it will run; and three industries in which it will be demonstrated—

including Guangdong’s civilian transportation national defense mobilization 

administration system.54

Second, this work report notes the recent establishment, with the support 

of the GLD, of a civil-military packaging construction work committee. This 

committee’s purpose is to help create a military packaging service that is wholly 

adaptable to manufacturing products for both peacetime and wartime use, 

ensuring a rapid response system to the military’s needs in wartime.55

This expansion of support resources will be best utilized if both the civilian 

and military sides have a common information system for communicating 

and coordinating and similar planning and operational procedures to follow. These measures will not be realized overnight but instead are occurring 

through exercises such as Stride and Mission Action and the above-mentioned 

information technology training for commanders. If the PLA and their civilian 

counterparts master all these steps, the PLA will likely be able to plan for the 

logistics requirements of contingency plans somewhat faster than before and 

with a far greater array of resources—both physical and intellectual—around 

the country to support operations of all kinds. 

C4ISR 

At least since the U.S. invasion of Grenada, the PLA has envied the U.S. ability 

to coordinate contingency plans swiftly across civilian and military leadership.56 A key element in this process of contingency plans coordination, which 

the PLA is acutely aware it lacks, is the presence of full-time, widespread joint 

operations staff officers. The PLA would like to expand the number of personnel 

it can place in this role and dedicate them to reviewing available intelligence 

and devising initial courses of action for the joint operations command to 

study and approve.57

In terms of the scope of intelligence that the PLA needs for devising contingency plans, at least one author views this as problematic, estimating the PLA 

would require 5 to 10 years to amass enough information to plan successfully 

for a possible war.58 This estimate indicates a strong belief that a well-constructed plan requires a breadth of intelligence data and detailed analysis.

The PLA’s need to obtain ever more intelligence to strengthen contingency 

plans is moderated as the PLA informationizes, a process at the center of PLA 
44

THOMPSON

modernization. Informationization entails upgrading the information technology capabilities and systems of the force to enable all the military services 

to exercise the C3I required to function as a joint force that can successfully 

wage informationized wars. Simply put, informationized wars need “operational systems that can ‘see clearly, react quickly, and hit precisely.’”59 Planning 

to react quickly and hit precisely during informationized wars requires first 

and foremost the ability to see clearly and to do so long before the war occurs. 

The PLA became especially sensitive to this after observing how quickly the 

United States developed its plan for Grenada, which benefitted from the use 

of strategic reconnaissance systems to help with planning and targeting for 

a joint operation.60 Observations of the U.S. performance in both Operation 

Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom only increased the importance of 

strategic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and automated command systems for the PLA.61 

China’s belief in the advantage of strategic ISR for planning is reflected in 

recent investments it has made in its Beidou satellite coverage, which China 

expects will provide it global coverage by 2020, improving its mapping and telecommunications abilities.62 In early 2012, China also launched its Ziyuan-III 

satellite, designed to provide high-resolution imagery to civilian agencies in 

China for mapping purposes.63 China states it has already used the Ziyuan-III to 

image islands in the South China Sea,64 and it has also recently begun using its 

Skynet satellite system to monitor both the South China Sea and the disputed 

Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.65

Using the NDML, China could easily commandeer both civilian and 

national satellites to assist in providing intelligence for contingency planning in response to a potential or actual crisis. Additionally, China’s role in 

designing and launching communications satellites for Nigeria, Venezuela, 

Pakistan, Laos, and Bolivia could theoretically provide China additional 

satellite coverage for any contingency operations it may pursue in those 

areas of the world.66

Once the necessary intelligence is obtained, China still needs a comprehensive C4ISR infrastructure to facilitate dissemination of and coordination 

on actions in response to the intelligence. In a 2005 discussion on the C4ISR 

requirements for contemporary special operations, Chinese academics judged 

that while the overall equipping, training on, and research into China’s C4ISR 

systems have been progressing well, these systems would still fall short of ful-
45

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filling the requirements for future contingency operations unless the following 

issues were addressed:

• weakness in the system architecture and generally low levels of knowhow for using the system

• little integration of functions between the applications provided as part 

of existing equipment, limiting how often the functionality of the whole 

system can be brought to bear

• vagaries in relationships between modular control operations and 

weakness in the control capability.67

These statements indicate not only a role for the PLA’s special operations forces 

in established PLA contingency plans, but also that these plans rely extensively 

on C4ISR systems that, at least as of 2005, the PLA had neither fully developed 

nor mastered.

As of 2010, when the PLA held its Mission Action exercise, the force was 

still pursuing mastery of high-tech capabilities. In Mission Action, this effort 

was very noticeable through continued references to the Integrated Command 

Platform (ICP). Based upon PLA descriptions from Mission Action, the ICP is 

an information technology system that comprises real-time location tracking, 

data collection and dissemination, as well as decisionmaking, coordination, 

and communication tools.68 In Mission Action, the ICP was used throughout 

the exercise, where its primary initial task was to facilitate the integration of 

command staff from all participating units into an automated decisionmaking 

process to determine which existing operational plan should be followed and 

which relevant command decisions should be issued.69

In a 2011 exercise in Shenyang MR, a PLA division used the ICP to build a 

three-dimensional map of the battlefields in under 3 minutes and also used 

it to sift through and identify critical information from the combat scenario 

as well as previously collected data on weather and terrain, according to PLA 

Daily [解放军报].70 Having all these capabilities available for rapid use would be 

very helpful to any unit or command element for creating, coordinating, and 

revising contingency plans. 

However, while the PLA will likely continue training intensively with the 

ICP and similar technologies to provide improved C3I and C4ISR capabilities 

comparable to what the United States uses in wartime, this does not necessarily 

equate to a direct improvement in or standardization of the PLA’s contingency 
46

THOMPSON

planning process. The PLA does value contingency planning, noting that in the 

integrated operations it hopes to fight in the future, winning on the battlefield is 

not as good as winning via preplanning.71 Yet as the PLA evolves rapidly from a 

mechanized force to an informationized one, the PLA’s traditional approach to 

contingency planning may be perceived as a relic of mechanization, in which 

the PLA is limited to a few very select, rigid options, deviation from which only 

causes chaos.72 Informationization, however, is discussed as providing the PLA 

a truly cohesive joint operations capability, in which contingency planning 

will not become extinct but will take on a more dynamic, rapidly self-adjusting 

nature, based upon systems and processes that enable nimbly reorganizing 

operational units and actions to address a variety of operational goals.73 Essentially, the PLA’s contingency planning process, informed to some extent by the 

goal of developing C4ISR capabilities similar to those of the United States, may 

become less of a process and more of an experiment in how the PLA can use 

modern communications systems to integrate forces to respond to current, 

not potential, crises. 

Conclusion 

Broadly speaking, the PLA seems to admire three aspects of U.S. contingency 

planning: the C4ISR capabilities that enable the United States to assess the state 

of potential threats against which it should plan, the speed at which civilian and 

military leaders coordinate on the design and approval of contingency plans, 

and the numerous logistic support options in place around the globe to assist 

the United States in its contingency operations. 

While the PLA may want to replicate all these contingency planning 

strengths itself, global prepositioned logistics resources will likely remain 

aspirational for the near term. The specific impact of the ICP on contingency 

planning is unclear at this time, although PLA employment of it to aid in 

planning and mobilization of forces for a real-world situation, such as a 

noncombatant evacuation operation, would help the force better understand 

what specific contingency planning benefits it provides, as well as help ameliorate any undiscovered issues with the software and the command staff’s 

ability to operate it.

The PLA’s reliance on national defense mobilization appears to be an asset 

for China’s contingency planning process, forcing civilian and military institutions across China to think through the transportation and C4ISR requirements 
47

CHAPTER 2

of any number of sectors for any number of scenarios. The PLA itself values 

the role of civilians in the process very highly and would actually characterize their role in contingency planning as the foundation of a successful war, 

perhaps second only to high-technology communications systems that allow 

for ongoing coordination and revision of contingency plans. What remains 

less clear at this point is how much emphasis either the PLA or China’s civilian 

leadership places on developing decisionmaking procedures between civilian 

and military elements that can move as quickly as the new communications 

and C4ISR systems emerging throughout the country. 

Analysts seeking to learn more about the extent to which the PLA’s 

approach to contingency planning mirrors aspects of U.S. planning methods 

should pay close attention to the role of civilian elements and how well they 

coordinate with the PLA through National Defense Mobilization Committees 

and other means. Tracking progress in integrating civil-military technologies 

and processes in peacetime that also have wartime applications, such as Beidou and logistics supply chains, will also elucidate how the PLA’s contingency 

planning process is modernizing and the extent to which it is evolving into or 

away from one like that of the United States. 

Finally, PLA advances in recent years in adopting automated decisionmaking software across the force suggest that PLA leaders recognize that the 

military will not always have the luxury of long lead times for contingency planning but instead will need the ability to react quickly to crises as they emerge. 

To the extent that the PLA has derived lessons about contingency planning 

from the United States, the question now is which aspects of the U.S. system it 

seeks to emulate, and especially whether it seeks to develop what the United 

States would term a crisis action planning process. An emphasis on the latter 

would require greater realism and command autonomy in PLA exercises. This 

leads to a critical contradiction: commanders need autonomy in a crisis, but 

automated decisionmaking aids such as the ICP can deny PLA commanders 

that autonomy even as it seeks to enable them to make better decisions and 

exercise command over their forces. Therefore, even as the PLA’s contingency 

planning process seeks to better support crisis action planning, this does not 

guarantee that the PLA will develop commanders who can help see their forces 

through a crisis amidst potential failures with the ICP or other components of 

China’s C4ISR architecture and planning procedures. 
48

THOMPSON

Notes

1 Jian Cheng, Mo Jun, and Lan Li Qing [程坚, 莫军, 蓝立青], “An Important 

Discussion on the Value and Meaning of the Historic Missions of the New Era and 

New Century for the PLA” [新世纪新阶段我军历史使命重要论述的价值和意义], Xinhua 

Online [新华网], September 27, 2009, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/

mil/2005-09/27/content_3548905.htm>. This article states, “Chairman Hu told the 

military earnestly that it should serve as a powerful guarantee to consolidate the 

Party’s rule, provide a strong security guarantee to protect the nation’s development 

during the period of strategic opportunity, serve as a strong means of strategic support to provide the country’s benefits, and play an important role in protecting global 

peace and advancing mutual development” [胡主席向安全郑重提出, 军队要为党巩

固折证地位提供重要的力量保证, 为维护国家发展的重要战略机遇期提供坚强的安全

保障,为维护国家利益提供有力的战略支撑,为维护世界和平与促进共同发展发挥重要

作用]. 

2 “Emergency Management” [应急管理], Central People’s Government of the 

People’s Republic of China, official web portal, October 28, 2012, available at <www.

gov.cn/yjgl/index.htm>.

3 Yang Qingchuan and Fan Yunzhao [杨晴川, 潘云召], “Bush Admits the U.S. 

Made Errors in Assessing the Situation in Iraq” [布什承认美国对伊拉克形势的判断出

现过失误], Xinhua Online, April 25, 2006, available at <www.annian.net/show.aspx-

?id=18304&cid=5>; and Wang Jianfen [王建芬], “New Information on the Iraq Attacks: 

Saddam Drew Up Attack Plans Before the War” [伊拉克袭击新说: 萨达姆在战前制

定游击战计划], Sohu News Channel [搜狐新闻频道], October 30, 2003, available at 

<http://news.sohu.com/30/51/news215005130.shtml>.

4 “The U.S. Military Disestablishes Joint Forces Command, Indicating the 

Difficult Cost-Saving Measures It Needs to Achieve” [美军撤销联合部队司令部 被指

省钱目标难达成], Phoenix Online [鳳凰網], August 13, 2010, available at <http://news.

ifeng.com/mil/4/detail_2010_08/13/1947152_0.shtml>. 

5 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April 13, 1995), ix, available at <www.bits.de/

NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp5_0(95).pdf>.

6 Wang Wenrong [王文荣], ed., The Science of Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: 

National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 1999), 285–286; Huang Bin [黄

彬], Army, Navy, and Air Force Operational Command under High-Tech Conditions [陆

海空军高技术条件下作战指挥] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1993), 228, 

235; and Li Houmin [李厚敏], High Technology—Local War and Battle Tactics [高技术

局部战争与战役战法] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1993), 131, available 

at <www.doc88.com/p-494079297.html>.

7 Ning Ling [宁凌], ed., Contingency Operations [应急作战] (Beijing: National 

Defense Industrial Press [国防工业出版社], 2005), 29. 
49

CHAPTER 2

8 Ibid., 28.

9 Ibid.

10 “The 82nd Airborne Division” [第82空降师], Knowfar Institute for Strategic 

and Defence Studies [知远战略与防务研究所], November 6, 2003, available at <www.

defence.org.cn/article-1-42009.html>; and “Airborne Troops in the U.S. Military’s 

History” [美军历史上的空降部队], August 28, 2008, accessed at <www.chinamil.com.

cn/site1/2008b/2008-08/28/content_1446589.htm>. 

11 Huang, 235. 

12 Wang, 285.

13 Huang, 235; Li, 219–220.

14 Huang Zhijie [黄治茂], ed., “The Gulf War 20 Years On: The Military Transportation of Truly and Falsely Strong Countries—Part 2” [海湾战争20年启示录:真伪

强国的军事运输,第2期], NetEase News [网易新闻], available at <http://war.163.com/

special/gulfwar1/>. Although the publication date is unavailable, the fact that this is 

a 20-year retrospective of the Gulf War likely places it sometime in 2001.

15 “The Motherland Helps Me Return Home” [祖国援我回家], People’s Daily [人民日报], February 24, 2011, available at <world.people.com.cn/

GB/8212/191606/214871/index.html>.

16 Liu Jianggui [刘江桂], “The Iraq War—the ‘Invariable’ and the ‘Variable’” [伊

拉克战争的“不变”与“变”], China Military Science [中国军事科学], no. 4 (2003), 16–21.

17 Ibid., 6–7.

18 He Mingyuan [何明远], ed., The War in Afghanistan [阿富汗战争] (Beijing: 

PLA Press [中国人民解放军出版社], 2004), 172. 

19 Ibid., 203–204.

20 Hao Yuqing, Cai Renzhao, and Cai Shichuan [郝玉庆, 蔡仁照, 蔡世川], 

“Military Surveying and Mapping is the Precursor to Building an Informationized 

Military” [军事测绘是军队信息化建设的先导], Conmilit [现代军事], no. 6 (2003). Conmilit Magazine Publication Bureau is sponsored by China National Defense Science, 

Technology, and Information Center.

21 “The Motherland Helps Me Return Home.”

22 Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Office of the President, “Fact Sheet: 

Continuing Support for Tsunami Relief,” February 9, 2005, available at <http://

georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050209-20.html>.

23 Ibid.; Gabe Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Implications of China’s Military Evacuation of Citizens from Libya,” China Brief 11, no. 4 (March 10, 2011).

24 “On-the-spot Report of China Communications Construction Group’s 

Protection and Rescue of its Suluq, Libya Project” [中交集团利比亚苏卢格项目自保自救
50

THOMPSON

纪实], State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 

Council, People’s Republic of China, March 2, 2011, available at <www.sasac.gov.cn/

n1180/n12534878/n13079015/n13079383/13079521.html#>.

25 Ibid.

26 Royston Chan and Tom Miles, “CORRECTED—China evacuates 12,000 

from Libya, sends frigate to help,” Reuters, February 25, 2011, available at <www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/25/libya-china-evacuations-idAFTOE71O00420110225?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true>.

27 “Vessels with Chinese Evacuees from Libya Aboard Due in Greece’s Crete 

Thursday Afternoon,” CCTV Online, February 24 2011, available at <http://english.

cntv.cn/20110224/109819.shtml>.

28 “China, Greece Sign Deals, Want Stronger Business Ties,” Reuters, June 15, 

2010, available at <uk.reuters.com/article/2010/06/15/greece-china-business-idUKLDE65E0MU20100615/>.

29 Peter Mattis, “Chinese Military Creates Strategic Planning Department,” 

China Brief 11, no. 22, (November 30, 2011).

30 “Deciphering the ‘National Security Committee’” [解读“国家安全委员会”], 

Communist Youth Online [中青在线], November 21, 2013, available at <http://news.

cyol.com/content/2013-11/21/content_9335509_2.htm>.

31 “The U.S. and Turkey Consult over an Operational Plan to Oust Bashar” 

[土美商议 推翻巴沙尔 ‘行动计划’], Wen Wei Po [文匯報], August 25, 2012, available at 

<http://roll.sohu.com/20120825/n351497526.shtml>. 

32 Jiao Xiangshe [焦翔摄], “U.S. Already Researching Contingency Plans, 

Non-Military Intervention for Downfall of Syrian Regime” [美国已研究叙政府台应

急预案或不军事干预], People’s Daily, August 7, 2012, available at <www.chinanews.

com/gj/2012/08-07/4087999.shtml>.

33 National Defense Mobilization Law of the People’s Republic of China [中

华人民共和国国防动员法], February 27, 2010, available at <www.mod.gov.cn/policy/2010-02/27/content_4127067.htm>.

34 “How Is the National Defense Mobilization Guiding Structure for the 

‘National Defense Mobilization Law’ Regulated?” [对国防动员的组织领导体制是如何

规定的?], Ministry of Defense Network, February 27, 2010, available at <www.mod.

gov.cn/reports/201002/gfdyf/2010-02/27/content_4126697.htm>. Also see Article 9 of 

“The People’s Republic of China’s National Defense Mobilization Law (Full Text)” 

[中华人民共和国国防动员法(全文)], February 26, 2010, available at <www.chinanews.

com/gn/news/2010/02-26/2141912.shtml>.

35 “‘Kuayue-2009’ Military Exercise Raises the PLA’s Contingency Operations’ 

Capability” [‘跨越-2009’军演提升我军应急作战能力], China Broadcasting Online 
51

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[中国广播网], August 12, 2009, available at <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2009-08-

12/2251562320.html>; and “The Beidou Communications System Goes into Battle for 

the Kuayue ’09 Military Exercise; It Can Defend Against Leaks” [跨越09军演北斗系统

上阵可防通信 ‘泄密’], Sichuan News Network [四川新闻网], August 13, 2009, available 

at <http://mil.huanqiu.com/china/2009-08/545720.html>.

36 “The Beidou Communications System Goes into Battle.” 

37 Ibid.

38 National Defense Mobilization Law.

39 The State Council and Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China, “Regulation on National Defense Mobilization of Civilian Means of 

Transportation” [民用运力国防动员条例], September 13, 2003, available at <www.gov.

cn/zwgk/2005-05/23/content_178.htm>.

40 Hua Xinding and Wei Zhiqiang [华新定, 魏志强], “Luohe Militia Company 

Supports ‘Kuayue-2009’ Military Exercise” [漯河民兵应急连保障‘跨越-2009’军演], 

China Military Online [中国军网], August 24, 2009, available at <www.gfdy.gov.cn/

arm_m/2009-08/24/content_4916695.htm>.

41 “In Zhengzhou City, Both Civilians and Military Enter Battle Together; 

Ensuring ‘Kuayue-2009’ Unfolds Smoothly” [郑州市军民齐上阵 保障 ‘跨越-2009演

习’顺利进行], Xilu Online [西陆网], August 18, 2010, available at <http://junshi.xilu.

com/2009/0818/news_56_10268.html>.

42 “’Mission-Action-2010’ Chengdu Military Region Units Launch Long-Distance Three-Dimensional Delivery” [“使命行动-2010”成都军区部队展开远程立

体投送], “Examining the Future Trends in PLA Modernization Based on ‘Mission Action-2010’” [从 ‘使命行动-2010’ 军演审视解放军未来发展趋势], October 15, 2010, Xinhua Online, available at <http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/

detail_2010_10/15/2798520_0.shtml>; and Li Jing [李靖], ed., “’Mission Action-2010’ 

Cross-Region Mobility Exercise Ends Satisfactorily” [‘使命行动-2010’ 跨区机

动演习圆满结束], PLA Pictorial [解放军画报], no. 813, November 2010, available 

at <http://web.archive.org/web/20120726003232/http://www.plapic.com.cn/

txt/201011b/20101107-3B.htm>.

43 Ibid.

44 Zhu Rongbang [朱荣榜], ed., The Science of Campaign Training [战役训练学] 

(Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1997), 60–62. 

45 Ning, 28; Liu, 6–7. 

46 “Deciphering Integrated Operations” [解读一体化作战], PLA Daily [解放军

报], May 3, 2004, available at <www.china.com.cn/chinese/junshi/557013.htm>.

47 Wang Xuhe [汪徐和], “Comments on the Readjustment of U.S. Military 

Strategy” [美国军事战略调整评析], American Studies [美国研究], no. 2 (1994), available 
52

THOMPSON

at <http://ias.cass.cn/show/show_mgyj.asp?id=628&table=mgyj>; and Han Xudong 

[韩旭东], “The ‘Globalized Battlefield’ is Drawing Near, Internet War Sounds the 

Bugle” [‘全球化战场’逼近 网络战吹响号角], Liaowang [瞭望], July 12, 2010, available at 

<www.chinanews.com/gj/2010/07-12/2396546.shtml>.

48 Lucy Hornby, “Talks of a PLAN Overseas Naval Base,” China Defense Blog, 

December 30, 2009, available at <http://china-defense.blogspot.sg/2009/12/talks-ofplan-overseas-naval-base.html>.

49 Daniel J. Kostecka, “Places and Bases: The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 1 (Winter 2011), 

61, 64, available at <www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a536636.pdf>; and Christopher 

D. Yung and Ross Rustici with Scott Devary and Jenny Lin, “Not an Idea We Have 

to Shun”: Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century, China Strategic 

Perspectives 7 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2014).

50 “Building Modern Logistics—Four Successes in National Defense and Military Construction” [全面建设现代后勤-国防和军队建设成就综述之四], Xinhua [新

华], September 11, 2012, available at <www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-09/11/content_2222135.

htm>.

51 Li Wenlong, Guo Yijun, and Wang Gencheng [李文龙, 郭义军, 王根成], 

“Study the Technical Ability of the Integrated Command Platform: With a New 

‘Gun’ You Can Break a Few ‘Links’” [学用一体化指挥平台技能:用新 ‘枪’ 你能打击 ‘

环’], April 13, 2012, available at <www.gxnews.com.cn/staticpages/20120413/newgx4f87cd95-5061060.shtml>.

52 “Building Modern Logistics.”

53 Ren Min [任民], Science of National Defense Mobilization [国防动员学] (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House [军事科学出版社], 2008), 468. 

54 “General Armaments Department and Guangdong Province Together 

Promote the First Engineering Construction of the Beidou Navigation System 

Application Demonstration” [总装备部和广东省政府共同推进首个北斗导航示范应用

工程建设], Civil-Military Integration Civil and Military Weapons Armament Scientific 

Research Production System Construction Department Small Working Group Work 

Briefing 3 (June 29, 2012), 8, Civil-Military Promotion Headquarters of the Industrial 

and Informationization Department, Internal Materials, June 2012, available at 

<http://jmjhs.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11295193/n13373876/n14805156/n14806597.

files/n14845597.pdf>.

55 “The Civil Military Fusion Packing Development Construction Work 

Committee is Established in Beijing” [军民融合包装发展建设工作委员会在京成立], 

Civil-Military Integration Civil and Military Weapons Armament Scientific Research 

Production System Construction Department Small Working Group Work Briefing

3 (June 29, 2012), 8, Civil-Military Promotion Headquarters of the Industrial and 
53

CHAPTER 2

Informationization Department, Internal Materials, June 2012, available at <http://

jmjhs.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11295193/n13373876/n14805156/n14806597.files/

n14845597.pdf>.

56 Ning, 23, 28. 

57 Dang Chongmin [党崇民], ed., Joint Operations Staff Officer Work [联合作战

参谋工作] (Beijing: PLA Press, 2006), 2.

58 Li Jijun [李际均], Military Strategic Thinking [军事战略思维] (Beijing: Military 

Science Publishing House [军事科学出版社], 1998), 93–94. 

59 Liu Jian [刘建], “Wireless Technologies: Military Applications of Wireless 

Sensor Networks” [无线技术:无线传感器网络在军事的应用], Chinabyte.com [比特网], 

January 31, 2010, available at <http://network.chinabyte.com/248/11119248.shtml>.

60 Ning, 28. 

61 Li, 220; Yao Wang and Wang Xiangjiang [姚旺,王湘江], “From Stalingrad to 

Fallujah—the Development and Transformation of Urban Operations” [从斯大林格

勒到费卢杰:市作战的发展和变化], International Military Art [外国军事学术] (2005), 

55–59, available at <www.360doc.com/content/14/0403/11/10106911_366043813.

shtml>.

62 “China’s Satellite Navigation System is Online,” Agence France-Presse, 

December 27, 2011, available at <http://news.discovery.com/space/china-navigation-satellite-system-111227.html>.

63 “Hi-res Mapping Satellite Expands Coverage,” ChinaDaily.com.cn, May 24, 

2012, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-05/24/content_15372204.

htm>.

64 Ibid.

65 “China’s Satellite is Already Conducting Surveillance on the Diaoyutai and 

South China Sea” [中国卫星已开始动态临视钓鱼岛和南海海域], Phoenix Satellite Television [凤凰卫视], September 4, 2012, available at <http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/

special/diaoyudaozhengduan/content-3/detail_2012_09/04/17327444_0.shtml>.

66 Stephen Clark, “Chinese Rocket Launches Powerful Nigerian Satellite into Orbit,” Spaceflight Now, December 19, 2011, available at <www.space.

com/13975-china-rocket-launching-huge-nigeria-satellite.html>.

67 Wang Jianhong, Zhang Yaohong, and Li Xin [王建宏, 张耀鸿, 李新], 

“Research into C4ISR Systems for Special Operations” [特种作战 C4ISR系统], Fire Control and Command Control [火力与指挥控制] 30, no. 4 (August 2005), 48–50, available 

at <www.defence.org.cn/aspnet/vip-usa/uploadfiles/2006-6/20066114449161.pdf>.

68 Li Jing, ed., “‘Mission Action-2010’ Cross-Region Mobility Exercise Ends Satisfactorily,” and Joe McReynolds and James Mulvenon, “The Role of Informatization 

in the People’s Liberation Army Under Hu Jintao,” in Assessing the People’s Liberation 
54

THOMPSON

Army in the Hu Jintao Era, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2014).

69 Liu Yonghua and Cai Pengcheng [刘永华, 蔡鹏程], “The PLA’s Cross-Region 

Exercise Achieves Full Visualization and Real-time Dynamic Monitoring” [我军跨域

演习实现全程可视化及实时动态监控], Xinhua Online, October 13, 2010, available at 

<http://mil.huanqiu.com/china/2010-10/1166308.html>.

70 Liu Jianwei and Chang Xiexue [刘建伟, 杨勤学], “Shenyang Military Region’s 

Integrated Command Platform Spawns 8 Functions in the Command Personnel” [沈

阳军区部队一体化指挥平台催生指挥员8种能力], PLA Daily, March 28, 2011, available 

at <http://mil.sohu.com/20110328/n280022801.shtml>.

71 “Deciphering Integrated Operations.”

72 Zhang Lingjun [张领军], ed., “Integrated Joint Operation: Theory Development and Practical Exploration” [一体化联合作战理论发展与实践探索] (Beijing: 

Military Friendship Literary Press [军事谊文出版社], 2006), 4.

73 Ibid.
55

The domestic security forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—

primarily the national police force managed by the Ministry of Public 

Security and the paramilitary People’s Armed Police (PAP)—have 

a broad mandate to uphold the stability of the country and the continued 

rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).1 Under this mandate, they have 

been specifically assigned a number of tasks and areas of responsibility, 

which cover such diverse duties as maintaining public order, investigating 

crimes, securing borders, handling customs, fighting fires, combating drug 

and human trafficking, conducting counterterrorism activities, guarding 

important leaders and locations, monitoring the Internet, operating certain 

prisons and detention centers, directing traffic, and so forth.2 All of these 

responsibilities are generally viewed as part of the larger goal of preserving social stability in China as it attempts to transition toward becoming a 

developed country.

While the majority of Chinese domestic security personnel have day-today responsibilities in monitoring or administrative work, Public Security and 

PAP units are also regularly mobilized in response to certain contingencies, 

including natural disasters, violent crimes, and other emergency situations. 

Over the last decade or more, handling mass incidents [quntixing shijian, 群体

性事件] has become an increasingly common task facing security personnel 

activated for such emergencies. Mass incident in Chinese security jargon refers 

to a protest, riot, or other gathering of a large number of people without prior 

approval from the appropriate government organs.3

 Such incidents reportedly 

occurred approximately 74,000 times in 2004 and 87,000 in 2005 (the last years 

for which official numbers were released), which averages to 238 mass incidents 

per day, or roughly 30 incidents per year for every county-level subdivision in 

CHAPTER 3

China Plans for Internal Unrest: 

People’s Armed Police and Public Security Approaches to “Mass Incidents”

Jonathan Walton
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China. Current annual estimates vary widely due to the lack of official numbers, 

but nearly all proposed figures are upwards of 100,000.4

In 2005, then–Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang indicated that 

“actively preventing and properly handling” mass incidents was the main task 

facing his office.5 That same year, the central government issued the National 

Contingency Plan for Large-scale Mass Incidents, a landmark document 

that local governments at the provincial, prefectural, and county levels were 

required to use as a model for their own contingency plans regarding unrest.6 

This focus by the PRC government on the core task of stability preservation 

[weiwen, 维稳]—another increasingly ubiquitous term in Chinese security 

jargon—is not particularly new, at least not by itself. Indeed, the majority of 

the contemporary PAP is composed of forces officially designated as internal 

security [neiwei, 内维], which are primarily meant to respond to mass incidents 

and other disturbances. The more novel aspect, beginning in the mid-2000s, 

has been the convergence of two major trends: the advent of robust emergency 

planning and crisis-response capabilities within various parts of the state 

bureaucracy and the strengthening of heretofore inconsistent attempts to 

provide a legal basis for Chinese police work.

Following the poorly coordinated response to the 2002–2003 severe acute 

respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak, the PRC government made extensive 

efforts to develop a more effective crisis-response system, including mandatory 

contingency planning throughout all levels of government. Many of these plans 

propose a whole-of-government approach that involves domestic security 

organs and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in addition to civilian government offices. For example, the 2005 General Contingency Plan for National 

Public Emergencies asserted that “the PLA and the PAP are the backbone and 

shock forces for managing public emergencies and participate in emergency 

response work according to the relevant regulations.”7

These efforts to create contingency plans that include Public Security and 

PAP personnel have drawn on and benefited from reformist efforts to standardize and regulate Chinese policing, which have—among other things—

generated more explicit guidelines for how police should respond to various 

contingencies, beginning with the 1995 Police Law. Spurred on by preparations 

for the 2008 Olympics and the 60th anniversary of the PRC in 2009, as well as 

the 2008–2009 large-scale unrest in China’s western regions, the central government released the 2008 Regulations on the Handling of Mass Incidents 
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by Public Security Organs and the 2009 People’s Armed Police Law, the latter 

representing the first time that extensive regulations for paramilitary activities 

had been publicly released.8 The availability of these and other relatively recent 

planning and regulatory documents means that outside observers of Chinese 

policing have a much better understanding of how domestic security forces 

are expected to operate in crisis situations.

This chapter outlines how Chinese domestic security institutions think 

about, plan for, and attempt to respond to incidents of social unrest. Where possible, this examination identifies the government and party leaders responsible 

for many major policing concepts, plans, and decisions, since Public Security 

and PAP forces are supposed to be subservient to civilian political leaders. 

It also leverages analyses by scholars based outside of China in an effort to 

overcome ideological or political concerns that may hamper Chinese security 

personnel and PRC-based scholars from accurately perceiving or publicly 

describing certain aspects of the problems China confronts in the domestic 

security domain. 

The chapter opens with a discussion of the nature and scope of unrest in 

China. This is followed by an examination of the publicly available information on the planning for mobilization of domestic security forces to respond 

to unrest and the regulations that guide their responses. The chapter then 

explores a number of the most commonly discussed issues facing domestic 

security forces in responding to unrest. It closes with a few thoughts on the 

importance of studying mass incidents, given their regular occurrence and 

persistent importance in the minds of China’s highest-ranking leaders.9

The Nature and Scope of Unrest in China 

The authoritarian government of the world’s most populous country is attempting to manage an astonishingly rapid but still lengthy and complex transition 

to developed country status. While the PRC has many advantages as a late 

developer—notably the opportunity to learn from the experiences, development models, technological advances, and institutional innovations of other, 

more developed countries—it also faces many challenges that are the product 

of its own unique history and context, including substantial challenges in the 

area of domestic security. 

The reforms promoted by Deng Xiaoping have inspired dramatic changes 

in the structures and incentives in Chinese society, leading to a breakdown of 
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village and family relations in rural areas due to labor migration, a huge influx 

of people into the cities, the decline of the state’s former systems of monitoring 

and social control, the empowerment of social institutions outside of government, and a number of other developments that have increased what the CCP 

calls “contradictions among the people” (social tensions and increasing disparity). In addition, the state’s encouragement of unbridled economic growth and 

its limited efforts to strengthen popular political participation have contributed 

to increased tensions between local populations and local government, as 

citizens feel aggrieved by land seizures, widespread official corruption, corporate poisoning of the environment, abuses of power, and—in some cases—

suppression of basic human rights and lack of adherence to China’s own laws. 

Such suppression happens throughout the country but appears to be more 

extreme in the minority regions of Tibet and Xinjiang, where semi-colonial 

government policies promote Han in-migration and restrict the religious and 

cultural practices of native ethnic groups. Paired with the absence of clear, 

effective channels for political participation and redress, all these complaints 

have contributed to an immense and apparently steady increase in the number of mass incidents whereby citizens seek to air their grievances and create 

enough trouble for local, regional, or even national government officials that 

some intervention and/or compromise is made.

According to PRC guidelines on bringing complaints to government 

offices, it is improper to petition with a group of more than five people. In practice, however, petitioners find that much larger groups—known as “collective 

petitions”—obtain better results. A common saying is that “a small disturbance 

leads to a small solution, a large disturbance leads to a big solution, [and] no disturbance leads to no solution.”10 Given the complexities of managing a crowd or 

mob, distinctions between collective petitions, protests, riots, and other mass 

incidents are often unclear. Chinese security writings recognize that mass 

incidents can take a variety of different forms, including collective petitions, 

demonstrations, marches, strikes, surrounding or obstructing government 

offices or transportation routes, blocking construction work, holding officials 

hostage, and so on.11 The scale of mass actions and degree of premeditation also 

vary significantly, as does the level of unruliness exhibited by participants and 

the level of experience with past incidents. 

Motivations for organizing or participating in a mass incident are likewise 

diverse. However, China’s domestic security literature and policing regulations 
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typically only recognize a few broad categories of motivations, as their main 

goals are to create a typology of participant motivations and assist security 

personnel in analyzing situations and rationalizing differential treatment of 

participants. Such simplified models typically discuss:

• legitimate motivations, such as seeking redress of specific grievances or 

expressing frustration with circumstances or the actions of local leaders, though having good intentions does not necessarily absolve such 

participants of the crime of organizing an illegal protest

• illegitimate, criminal, or political motivations, such as the desire to 

commit violence, create chaos, or sabotage China’s aspirations for a 

“harmonious society,” making such participants significantly more 

dangerous and guilty of major crimes

• no particular motivations, but simply being caught up in things, misled 

by protest organizers, or excited to be an onlooker, which in most cases 

is assumed to apply to the majority of participants, who will likely face 

only mild consequences for their involvement.

The officially reported number of 87,000 mass incidents for 2005 generated 

a significant buzz in the international press, and some scholars think that 

China’s central leaders have attempted to artificially lower (that is, underreport) the number of protests since then. Sun Liping of Tsinghua University, for 

example, estimates that China may have experienced 180,000 mass incidents 

in 2011, rather than the roughly 100,000 estimated in other accounts, which 

would indicate that protests are growing exponentially rather than linearly.12

Even 100,000 mass incidents a year would be the equivalent of roughly three 

incidents per month for every county-level subdivision in China, though the 

occurrence is spread heterogeneously rather than evenly.

Under the administration of former President Hu Jintao and former Premier Wen Jiabao, the central government increasingly acknowledged that 

many if not most instances of unrest are inspired by legitimate grievances on 

the part of local citizens, rather than the desire for political subversion or general opposition to the CCP regime, a theme that has so far continued under Xi 

Jinping. As a recent example, in February 2012, Wen visited the site of a major 

2011 protest by farmers and said, “What is the widespread problem now? It’s 

the arbitrary seizure of farmers’ fields, and the farmers have complaints about 

this, and it’s even sparking mass incidents. . . .The root of the problem is that 
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the land is the property of the farmers, but this right has not been protected in 

the way it should be.”13 While this shift in policy toward acknowledging popular 

grievances is a positive development, it also appears to be partially tactical, 

an attempt to preserve the legitimacy of the central government by throwing 

local leaders under the bus for carrying out extractive or development-first 

policies that in many instances were required or encouraged by the center. For 

example, following an explosive 2008 incident in Guizhou’s Weng’an county, 

the provincial party secretary argued that the situation was exacerbated by the 

mishandling of previous incidents:

In the development of local mineral resources, resettlement, building 

demolition and other such work, situations frequently occurred that 

infringed upon the interests of the masses. In the process of disposing 

of these contradictions, disputes, and mass incidents, some cadres 

used a brash style, simple methods, and were cavalier about calling 

on police suppression. In this regard, the Weng’an party secretary, 

county government, county public security bureau, and the leading 

cadres of the relevant departments cannot avoid responsibility [for 

the 2008 incident].14

As illustrated in this example, the responsibilities placed on local leaders 

by the central government are often both contradictory (pursue rapid economic development but preserve social harmony) and underfunded (in effect, 

encouraging local leaders to use improper fundraising methods such as seizing 

agricultural lands and selling them to developers). Facing such pressures, many 

local leaders have chosen to serve the center’s goals (and the cause of their own 

enrichment) over the interests of their local constituents. That is the surest path 

to promotion or transfer and officials typically have few ties to the locale over 

which they are appointed, limiting potential qualms about using their financial 

and administrative authority over security forces to suppress any local dissent. 

But while both the center and local protesters often frame all problems as the 

responsibility of local leaders, the systemic nature of such problems means that 

the central PRC government cannot avoid responsibility either.

Meanwhile, Public Security and PAP leaders tend to be less sympathetic to 

popular grievances in their own writings. This is particularly true of high-level 

domestic security leaders, who do not fear the consequences of using too much 

force in suppressing a local incident as much as they fear domestic security 
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forces refusing to obey orders or, worse, choosing to side with a group of protesters. The failure of police organs to effectively handle the 1989 Tian’anmen 

protests still casts a shadow over such thinking,15 and as China enters what may 

be a more difficult stage of its development—where it can no longer count on 10 

percent annual economic growth rates—there have been frequent speeches by 

central leaders that emphasize the necessity of ensuring the police (and PLA) 

remain loyal and obedient to the CCP above all else. This is accomplished in 

part by demonizing potential targets of suppression, obscuring many of the 

legitimate motivations of protesters and dissenters, and claiming that they are 

active or unwitting pawns of foreign or domestic enemies that desire China’s 

downfall. For example, the director of the Sichuan Provincial Public Security 

Department wrote an article in 2011 for the PRC’s leading journal of policing, 

Public Security Studies, claiming that:

hostile foreign and domestic forces manipulate, incite speculation 

about, and directly provoke contradictions within our people in 

increasingly prominent ways. . . . Taking advantage of our instabilities to stir up trouble. The economic transition and social transformation that have accompanied our country’s reform and development 

have brought about a profound adjustment of the pattern of interests 

and, objectively speaking, have provided the conditions for hostile 

elements to meddle. They seize on some controversial and sensitive domestic issue, “rights protection” incident, or judicial case and 

openly meddle, wantonly speculate, and attempt to instigate the 

ignorant against the party and the state, damaging our excellent situation of prosperity and stability. . . . Meddling in our mass incidents to 

intensify contradictions. This specific stage of our country’s economic 

and social development exhibits a wide range of social contradictions 

and major disputes; if these are improperly handled, they can easily 

lead to mass incidents. Hostile forces do everything in their power to 

meddle in our country’s internal mass incidents in a vain attempt to 

exacerbate the situation, scale, destruction, and impact; the incidents 

in Guizhou’s Weng’an County and Yunnan’s Menglian County are typical examples. . . . Seeking every opportunity to directly create chaos. An 

increasingly powerful China creates great uneasiness for the hostile 

forces both inside and outside its borders. They directly rouse their 
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domestic forces into action and take advantage of the portion of the 

masses that do not know the truth; increasingly common incidents 

of vandalism, arson, and other destructive activities—such as the 

March 14 incident in Lhasa, the March 16 incident in Aba, the July 5 

incident in Xinjiang, and others—are certainly [the responsibility] of 

Western anti-China forces and hostile foreign and domestic forces.16

While it is tempting to speculate on the extent to which China’s leading 

domestic security leaders believe such convenient fictions about the omnipresence of foreign saboteurs promoting unrest—something that dramatically 

exaggerates the reach of U.S. intelligence services, for one, even if they were 

interested in local events such as the 2008 Weng’an crisis—it may be presumptive to dismiss all of this as intentional misinformation. To draw a comparative 

example, when protest leader Wael Ghonim met with high-level Egyptian 

officials at the height of the Arab Spring, just before President Hosni Mubarak 

agreed to stepped down, he was stunned by the extent to which government and 

security leaders believed their own propaganda about the Tahrir Square protests 

being caused by foreign subversion and people with ulterior motives, rather than 

recognizing the many reasons citizens had to denounce the regime.17 Similar 

messages are repeated so often in PRC security circles that even top leaders may 

find it difficult to fully appreciate that China’s unrest is overwhelmingly caused 

by systemic domestic problems and not foreign subversion.

The desensitization of security forces to the legitimate demands of Chinese 

citizens is also aided by the relatively recent trend of periodic violent outbreaks, 

such as mass knifing attacks. Knives have long been a weapon associated 

with ethnic minorities from the Western regions of Tibet and Xinjiang, male 

members of which traditionally carry knives, and the gangland violence of 

organized crime, as they have often been the weapon of choice for gang members due partially to the relative difficulty of obtaining firearms in China and 

Hong Kong. However, knife attacks seem to have spread beyond those limited 

demographics, such as in a number of disturbing attacks on school children 

between 2010 and 2012. In 2010, in the midst of those attacks, the drunken and 

enraged Li Xianliang used a tractor to kill 17 people in Hebei province. There 

was also the case of Yang Jia, who in 2008 directly attacked a police station in 

suburban Shanghai with gasoline bombs and a knife, murdering multiple officers (and receiving a surprising amount of popular sympathy for his actions). 
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In 2013–2014, there were multiple attacks outside of Xinjiang—in Beijing, 

Kunming, Urumqi, and Guangzhou—that apparently involved ethnic Uighurs, 

perhaps indicating an intensification of ethnic tensions related to Xinjiang.

Such attacks are not mass incidents but can easily become linked with 

them in the minds of Chinese security forces, since in official accounts they 

are often associated with similar motivations to those that are supposedly held 

by protest leaders. Particularly in the case of Xinjiang and Tibet, there is not 

often a clear distinction drawn between the dynamics behind the 2008 and 

2009 outbreaks of mass unrest in those regions and violent crimes or terrorist 

attacks that involve ethnic Uighurs and Tibetans. Instead, a strong sense of 

confirmation bias appears to be in play; violent and destructive actions by 

individuals or groups—be they ethnic minorities, the religious fringe,18 the 

mentally ill, violent criminals, or mobs of protesters—fuel the widespread belief 

that China is under siege from foreign and domestic opponents.

In summation, the sheer number of mass incidents in China is enormous, 

and while each one has its own idiosyncratic causes and situation, they are 

collectively driven by systemic problems related to the immense changes that 

China is undergoing and the limitations of the social and political institutions 

that are supposed to manage these changes. Additionally, the conspiratorial 

ideology incessantly repeated in political and domestic security circles focuses 

blame on largely imaginary foreign forces that are incapable of being reasoned 

with, which frames these problems as being insolvable except by tougher and 

better police work. Hence, the already difficult task of managing China’s unruly 

transition toward being a developed country is made more difficult by institutional inertia and inaccurate views of the problems at hand.

Mobilizing Security Forces in Response to Unrest 

During the Hu-Wen administration, local officials were encouraged—both 

through public pronouncements and by revisions to the cadre evaluation 

system—to address the concerns of citizens before they led to mass incidents 

that had to be dealt with by the police. Local party leaders were supposed to get 

ahead of a problem, be responsive to local needs, control the “spin” of a particular issue in the local media, and otherwise handle problems in a much more 

sophisticated way than in the past. Hand in hand with this, Hu and Wen placed 

greater emphasis on the need for a multifaceted and whole-of-government 

approach to unrest. After all, local party and government leaders have many 
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other tools to draw on other than just local Public Security and PAP units. The 

media control and propaganda system, petitioning system, mediation system, 

legal system, household registration system (for tracking people), state-owned 

enterprises, state-run labor unions, a number of different detention systems, 

and a wide variety of other bureaucratic mechanisms and offices can all play 

important roles in monitoring and redirecting aggrieved citizens in such a way 

that social order is maintained, either before, during, or after a mass incident. 

While coordinating all these offices is a logistical nightmare, this process is 

made easier in China by the pervasive nature of the CCP. While it may sometimes be difficult to convince different government offices to work together, 

especially if both are on the same level and there is no clear hierarchy, the 

hierarchical relationships of officials within the CCP are much clearer. Furthermore, many party officials wear multiple “hats” on the government side, 

so the head of one office may also be the head or a member of several other 

offices, knitting the government together and enabling coordination across 

the various bureaucracies. 

In addition to individual party leaders, the center also mandates coordination through a number of “leading groups” established directly by the Politburo, 

many of which have offices down to the local level. Such groups hold semi-regular 

local meetings to discuss issues and incidents and include members from a variety of local government offices. In terms of domestic security, the most important 

of such groups are probably the Central Leading Group on Stability Preservation 

and the Central Leading Group on Dealing with Evil Cults (originally established 

in 1999 for the campaign against Falun Gong and popularly known as the “6-10 

Office” due to the date of its establishment), as well as the Public Security System’s secretive Domestic Security Department, which reportedly works closely 

with the two mentioned leading groups. The Domestic Security Department, 

according to leaked documents, conducts “regularly scheduled domestic security report meetings, serious incident analysis meetings, and specialized work 

coordination meetings; these meetings ensure the timely communication of 

intelligence and the coordination of command mechanisms.”19 Such meetings 

involve both civilian government and security leaders.

While central directives encourage local leaders and security committees 

to prevent mass incidents by practicing good governance and conducting 

strong “grassroots work,” getting close to their constituents and earning their 

trust, local leaders have not proven to be successful at reducing the annual 
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number of mass incidents in the PRC. Consequently, many are confronted with 

what to do about a mass protest or other large-scale event once it occurs, with 

the main options being making concessions to at least partially appease the 

protesters, making some concessions but also disciplining or imprisoning the 

ringleaders, tolerating and managing the unrest for a while without responding directly to see if it loses steam, and repressing the unrest using formal or 

informal methods, whether by employing hired local thugs or calling upon the 

police. Hong Kong–based scholar Yongshun Cai has observed that local governments evaluate the costs of these various options in a semi-rational fashion, 

weighing such issues as the economic and political costs of concessions, the 

possible risks associated with showing weakness and losing/gaining legitimacy 

through compromise, the uncertainties of repression, the presence or absence 

of violence, media exposure, the number of protesters involved, and the history 

of previous problems with this group of protesters or this particular issue.20

In recent years, when making decisions about repression, local governments have also been able to draw on a number of widely available laws and 

regulations on deploying Public Security and PAP forces to handle mass incidents, in addition to a large body of internal documents that are not public. 

Several of the most important are discussed below.

2008 Regulations on the Handling of Mass Incidents 

The most pertinent portions of the 2008 Regulations on the Handling of Mass 

Incidents are articles 6, 7, and 8, which describe when Public Security personnel should become involved in managing an incident of social unrest and what 

authorization is needed for responses of varying scope.21 Article 6 describes 

mass incidents that Public Security organs should not confront directly but 

rather should leave to local government authorities to manage (unless things 

become violent or destabilized). Such incidents include assemblies, processions, and demonstrations that occur within school campuses or places of 

employment; collective petitions; protests related to legitimate concerns such 

as land acquisitions, layoffs, unpaid wages or pensions, pollution, or corruption; and other public disturbances that have not yet become destructive 

or challenged the social order by blocking major roads or the entrances to 

important buildings. However, even in cases such as these, the regulations 

instruct Public Security organs to “dispatch plainclothes police or a small number of uniformed police to the site to grasp the situation, maintain order, and 
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promptly report the dynamics on the ground; work with local Party committees, government offices, and relevant departments to resolve contradictions; 

and prepare to quickly mobilize police to manage the situation.” In contrast, 

Article 7 describes incidents that are much more immediately pressing, such 

as protests or collective petitions that disrupt the social order in a serious way 

or endanger public safety; incidents organized by “evil cults or other illegal 

organizations”; and those that: 

impact Party and government organs, judicial organs, military organs, 

important guarded targets [such as facilities or high-level officials], 

radio and television stations, communications hubs, foreign embassies or consulates, as well as other vital parts or offices; and those that 

involve mass blocking of public transport hubs, traffic routes, and 

ports . . . or illegally occupying public places.

Under these more dangerous conditions, the regulations state that “public 

security organs should—in accordance with the decisions of local party committees and governments, and under their unified leadership—rapidly mobilize police personnel, rush them to the scene, and take measures to properly 

dispose of the incident according to the law.”

Article 8 describes the authorization needed for mobilizing different 

numbers of police personnel to respond to a mass incident. Mobilizing fewer 

than 100 personnel can be approved at the county level, mobilizing between 

100 and 300 personnel must be submitted for approval at the prefecture level, 

mobilizing more than 300 personnel must be submitted for approval at the provincial level and reported to the Ministry of Public Security so it can be officially 

recorded, and cross-regional mobilization must be approved by a higher-level 

public security organ with authority over all the regions involved. In addition 

to limiting mobilization numbers without higher-level authorization, Article 

8 offers the following guidance:

The application for and approval of police force mobilization should 

be submitted and authorized in writing in the name of the public 

security organ at the same level [that is, the same level as the party 

organ required to approve the mobilization]. In especially urgent circumstances, oral submission and approval can be done, with written 

authorization later being obtained and applied retroactively.
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The existence of the oral authorization clause raises more questions about 

the inability of domestic security forces to respond in a timely fashion to the 

2008 and 2009 outbreaks of unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, though the clause may 

not have been fully in use at the time of those riots. It is also possible that party 

and public security leaders may be hesitant to give even oral authorization for 

police actions that may come back to haunt them later, since applications for 

retroactive authorization would seem either to lay the blame for any mismanagement at their feet if they sign them or to require them to throw their subordinates under the bus if they later claim not to have given oral authorization.

2009 People’s Armed Police Law 

In terms of involving paramilitary forces rather than just increasing the numbers of Public Security personnel responding to an emergency, the 2008 Regulations on the Handling of Mass Incidents unhelpfully state that “mobilization 

involving the use of the PAP to handle mass incidents must be in accord with 

the relevant regulations.” Until 2009, this would have meant considering a 

number of different regulations that touch on the PAP in passing and extensive 

internal regulations unavailable to open-source researchers. Luckily, while 

secret internal regulations likely provide much more detail, the public release 

of the 2009 People’s Armed Police Law dramatically improves the transparency 

of this process. An interview with then–PAP commander Wu Shuangzhan on 

the day the law was released confirmed that it was based at least partially on 

unifying existing guidelines and transforming classified internal regulations 

into something that could be made public.22

In early drafts of this law, the PAP were described as potentially intervening 

in any “incident which threatens social stability,” a very vague and amorphous 

description that some lawmakers suggested might make it easy to abuse the use 

of armed force. Consequently, in the final draft, this language was tightened up 

to limit PAP involvement to “riots, turbulence, severe violent crimes, terrorist 

attacks, and other social security incidents.”23 While the last term is something 

of a catch-all, its comparability to the previous terms indicates that only severe 

or highly disruptive situations require intervention by the PAP.

If the law is still somewhat vague on when it is appropriate to deploy paramilitary forces, it is much clearer than previous regulations about who needs to 

authorize deployment and the relationship between PAP and Public Security 

personnel when cooperating to handle an incident. First, Chapter II, Article 
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10, notes that the PAP can be “deployed to perform security tasks according to 

the Public Security organs of People’s Governments above the county level.”24

Essentially, the latter part of this means that party and government leaders at 

or below the county level cannot call upon the PAP without higher-level authorization, limiting abuse of paramilitary force—at least in theory—to the prefectural level and higher, where it is apparently hoped that ambitious leaders will 

consider the broader policy effects of such a course of action, beyond their own 

parochial interests. However, it is unclear if this actually puts a brake on the 

use of the PAP in situations where less violent methods could be more effective.

Perhaps more interestingly, in the course of conducting policing tasks—

such as “taking necessary measures to stop or disperse a mob that is attempting to harm the social order or the safety of your assigned target [that is, an 

important person or location]”—the PAP must operate according to the will of 

the Public Security organs supervising the situation (who will of necessity be 

prefecture level or higher if the PAP has been called in). This theme of treating 

the PAP in a manner similar to normal Public Security officers is repeated elsewhere in the law, with PAP personnel being required to turn over all detainees 

to Public Security or State Security officers (Article 11) and also, surprisingly, 

the PAP being told to follow the same weapons and equipment procedures as 

Public Security organs (Article 15).25

Previously—and even after the passage of this law—one of the main things 

that differentiated the PAP from Public Security officers had been their access 

to military-grade weapons and equipment (hence the “armed” in “People’s 

Armed Police”). This was especially noticeable in decades past, when Public 

Security officers were hardly ever authorized to carry guns in the course of their 

normal duties. This lack of firearms was standard practice until very recently, 

but beginning in 2014, several cities have experimented with allowing police 

to carry guns while on patrol, a practice that seems likely to spread.26 The PAP 

was originally intended to be reserved for rare situations where armed force 

might be necessary. However, in recent years, due to the arming of Public Security officers, first as part of fast-response SWAT-style teams, the distinctions 

between Public Security and PAP are less cut and dried than they once were.

Contingency Plans for Large-scale Mass Incidents 

While the 2005 National Contingency Plan for Large-scale Mass Incidents is 

no longer publicly available, the 2010 Xi’an Municipal Public Security Bureau 
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Contingency Plan for Large-scale Mass Incidents and the 2006 Ningxia Hui 

Autonomous Region Contingency Plan for Large-scale Mass Incidents27 are 

examples of local contingency plans written up in response to the national 

plan. The Xi’an plan includes both an Emergency Command [yingji zhihui,

应急指挥], led by the Party Secretary of Xi’an (who is also head of the Political 

and Legal Affairs Committee, which oversees security issues), and an Office of 

Emergency Response [yingji xiangying bangongshi, 应急响应办公室], led by the 

Deputy Secretary of the Municipal Public Security Bureau. During a crisis, the 

headquarters of the Emergency Command is set up in the command center of 

the Municipal Public Security Bureau, where it coordinates efforts by the Office 

of Emergency Response to implement its directives. There is also an Emergency 

Response Working Group composed of all the county- or district-level Public 

Security sub-bureaus, all Bureaus of Education (which oversee students), all 

Bureaus of Letters and Visits (which oversee petitioning), and all Ethnic Affairs 

Commissions (which oversee minority affairs). The working group is described 

as being specifically responsible for responding to a large-scale mass incident.

In terms of tailoring an appropriate response, the Xi’an plan identifies 

three general categories of mass incidents: Grade Three (general) [yiban, 一

般], Grade Two (large) [jiaoda, 较大], and Grade One (significant) [zhongda, 

重大]. This plan reflects a rating scale for emergencies similar to those seen in 

contingency plans for natural disasters and other types of situations:

• Grade Three events include small gatherings of Falun Gong practitioners, other cult members, or members of illegal organizations; unregistered assemblies or protests; blocking traffic; or large-scale gatherings 

involving sporting events, commercial activities, or entertainment. 

During such events, the police are instructed to use caution when using 

coercive measures, announce the relevant laws and regulations, issue 

verbal warnings to the leaders of the gatherings, and dissuade people 

from causing trouble.

• Grade Two events include large gatherings of cult or illegal organization 

members; large illegal assemblies with more political purposes, such 

as processions, demonstrations, and rallies; strikes and similar events 

that “harm society”; the blocking of major traffic hubs; and mobs that 

become violent. If such events require cooperation across districts or 

regions, a field command should be set up to coordinate the response. 

During such incidents, the police are instructed to quickly and resolutely 
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break up the event and restore social order, moving people away from 

the scene (especially the core troublemakers), stop the distributions of 

“reactionary propaganda” materials [fandong xuanchuan, 反动宣传] and 

record the incident using photos and video to identify the individuals 

involved.

• Grade One events, following the established pattern, are not different in 

type, just in scope: larger assemblies that cause greater social harm or 

are more violent. In order to manage multiple incidents across the city 

and prevent the situation from escalating out of control, the city will be 

divided into six emergency districts, each with its own District Working 

Group, which will cooperate with the Emergency Response Working 

Group in managing the situation. The municipal Working Group is 

supposed to inform the municipal Office of Emergency Response when 

the situation has expanded beyond its control, and then the office will 

mobilize the District Working Groups to assist in management.

Notably, the Xi’an plan is silent on what happens if the municipal and 

district working groups prove unable to handle the situation (presumably 

there is an internal document that specifies what happens at that point, or 

the situation is then bumped up to the provincial level, since Xi’an is a prefecture-level city). After the incident is resolved, the plan tells Public Security 

forces to use the criminal law and mass incident mediation system, prosecuting some leaders but releasing the rest and also working to resolve the 

problems facing the masses. In addition, the Emergency Response Working 

Group is supposed to submit a full report of the incident that includes lessons 

learned and areas that need improvement to provide the basis of an improved 

response in the future.

In comparison to the municipal plan, the Ningxia provincial-level plan also 

includes establishing an emergency command structure but suggests doing so 

at the level of the entire province, the city where the disturbance originated, 

and the site of each individual incident. Similar to the municipal plan, each of 

these commands is given coordinating responsibility over their jurisdiction and 

is composed of representatives of government organs at each level, including 

not just party leadership and Public Security organs but also—especially at the 

provincial level—the local wings of various ministries that might be involved 

(development, investment, education, religious affairs, minority affairs, labor, 

public health, and media, as well as PAP and PLA representatives).
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In terms of categorizing incidents, the Ningxia plan uses the same three 

grades as the Xi’an plan, though they are described somewhat differently: Grade 

One (extremely serious incidents or those of over 1,000 people), Grade Two 

(serious incidents or those of between 500 and 1,000 people), and Grade Three 

(incidents of between 100 and 500 people), since, presumably, incidents of fewer 

than 100 people are not considered serious enough to demand the involvement 

of the provincial government. Noticeable in this section are the characteristics 

that can push an incident up to a higher grade without requiring higher numbers 

of people: causing deaths or directly attacking party, government, or military 

interests; incidents that involve religious or ethnic issues; prison riots; those that 

take over college campuses; those obstructing major transport thoroughfares; 

and those being publicized by information technology.

The Ningxia plan provides extensive guidelines only for Grade One incidents, presumably because those are the ones that are most likely to involve 

the provincial government directly. Notably, the response guidelines for 

Grade One incidents specifically mention mobilizing the PAP, though they 

simply say this should be done “strictly according to the relevant procedures.” 

Because this plan was written for the provincial government, rather than for 

the Public Security organs (as the Xi’an plan was), much of the plan involves 

information control, both in terms of coordinating among various state units 

involved in emergency response and also in terms of controlling the message 

about what is happening in news media reports. Since the Ningxia plan dates 

to 2006, this information control aspect may have become even stronger in 

more recent plans, as there have been notable initiatives in recent years to 

promote this aspect of incident management among local governments and 

Public Security departments.

Bringing in Security Forces from Neighboring Regions 

One issue worth noting in discussions of contingency planning is the guidelines for mobilizing units from other regions in response to incidents, which 

includes the PAP, militia/reserve units, and PLA support units. For example, 

PAP units from Jiangsu, Fujian, and Henan were dispatched to assist with the 

2009 unrest in Xinjiang.28 According to the regulations examined above, it is 

likely that the decision to move these forces across provincial boundaries was 

taken at the level of the Ministry of Public Security, the Central Military Commission, or even higher (such as the Politburo Standing Committee) because 
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no lower level has authority over both the eastern provinces and Xinjiang. 

Requiring such high-level approval for cross-provincial transfers of security 

forces may be partially to blame for the lack of a rapid and adequate response by 

the PAP to the original disturbance and for Hu Jintao pulling out of the Group of 

Eight summit to return to China to attend to the matter. While the PLA was also 

mobilized to provide support in Xinjiang, most authoritative sources suggest 

it is unlikely that they were directly involved, though there were reports to the 

contrary, as there were in Tibet in 2008.29

Intervention by the PLA 

Notably absent from any publicly available regulations, laws, or plans is any 

notion of when the PLA might have to step in to resolve an incident of domestic unrest or, more likely, a series of linked incidents or a general lawlessness 

engulfing a city or region. While China’s military has avoided direct involvement 

in domestic security activities since the period immediately following their 

intervention in the 1989 Tian’anmen Square protests, the PLA still provides the 

ultimate guarantee for the continued rule of the CCP and could conceivably be 

called on if domestic security forces proved insufficient, were unable to respond, 

or proved disloyal. PLA responsibilities in the event of massive, uncontrolled 

unrest may be detailed in internal documents, but it is also possible that PLA and 

civilian authorities both wish to avoid making concrete promises about military 

intervention, leaving that instead as a special mission to be invoked only if circumstances require. Certainly, Lin Biao’s invocation of emergency powers and 

use of the PLA in internal CCP politics near the end of the Cultural Revolution, 

including his purported failed attempt to execute a coup against Mao Zedong, 

still cast some shadow over creating any formal method for one or more highlevel political leaders to call in the PLA for a domestic crisis.

China’s Security Forces Discuss Difficulties and Challenges in 

Responding to Mass Incidents 

The writings of Chinese domestic security personnel on the handling of mass 

incidents emphasize a number of areas in which responses could be strengthened. These include: 

• acting quickly and decisively

• acting with the appropriate authorization
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• acting with appropriate strength

• being deliberate in the use of force

• targeting the leadership as opposed to the masses

• controlling the narrative

• working to resolve problems in the aftermath

• conducting post-incident “grassroots” work to avoid future problems.

The first two issues are complicated, since they are largely dependent on 

the decisions of civilian government actors, not those of security personnel. 

Public Security, PAP, and militia and reserve forces are essentially under local 

party and government administration—though they also have to answer to 

higher-level authorities in their own institutions. This can lead to delays in 

response time, since local leaders can be reluctant to step up and take responsibility for a crisis lest they get blamed for it, though eventually the same leaders 

will earn the attention of higher-level CCP officials if the problem gets worse 

and they are not seen as responding appropriately or effectively.

Particular emphasis has also been placed on handling incidents correctly 

the first time, rather than suppressing protests too harshly and thereby radicalizing protesters and perhaps creating future problems. A separate problem 

that Chinese security writers identify is using insufficient numbers of security 

personnel at the outset and allowing a clash with protesters to escalate to 

lethal force or an uncontained riot. These concerns are reflected in the efforts 

of recent regulations to more clearly specify the number of police needed for 

particular kinds of circumstances, though this may make it more difficult for 

security forces to respond dynamically to the situation at hand, particularly if 

they need authorization to bring in more personnel. 

In terms of managing the use of violence, central authorities are also 

clearly worried about local leaders using the PAP haphazardly to enforce their 

will in situations where the deployment of Chinese security forces may not 

actually be required. Ultimately, to encourage local officials to use the other 

means at their disposal rather than just calling in security forces at the first 

sign of trouble and wielding force indiscriminately, the central government has 

attempted to place tighter restrictions on the ability of local officials to bring in 

the PAP in particular and security forces more broadly. This has led to newer 

developments such as control over PAP deployment being restricted to local 

governments above the county level. 
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A stickier problem may be that suppression in general is not a viable longterm solution in instances where the real problem is lack of good governance 

and poor relations between local officials and their constituents. In the aftermath of the 2008 Weng’an incident, Shen Guirong, the former head of the local 

Public Security Bureau, suggested in an interview that the police had been 

unable to solve serious crimes due to collusion between the police and local 

criminal organizations. In addition:

Shen blamed the non-police uses to which public security forces had 

been put over the years for causing deep social discontent. There had 

been five mass incidents “in recent years” in which more than 100 

public security personnel had been dispatched. The instances were 

occasioned by conflicts over mine rights, migration and relocation, 

and the demolition of houses. “We have infuriated almost everyone.”30

The persistence of mistreatment, torture, and even mysterious unexplained deaths in police custody also exacerbates current and future conflicts 

with protesters long after the initial response to a mass incident has been completed.31 If citizens lack even the basic confidence that they can be detained by 

police without being murdered, trust in the system becomes virtually impossible and protesters may increasingly radicalize or escalate their own efforts 

to match the new threat level (death) posed by the state.

Beyond inappropriate levels of violence, Chinese domestic security 

scholars and personnel note the importance of targeting repressive measures against the “backbone” organizers of a particular incident of unrest 

[gugan fenzi, 骨干分子] rather than the broader mass of people who may just 

be upset about a variety of problems, misled by the protest leaders, or caught 

up in events. Broad or poorly targeted violence or other forms of suppression 

tends to produce popular resentment and a decrease in the legitimacy of the 

local government, party leaders, and Public Security personnel in the eyes 

of citizens. However, identifying, isolating, detaining, and punishing protest 

leaders are often easier said than done. In urban areas, police sometimes 

cultivate informants from within unruly groups of citizens or even dispatch 

plainclothes officers to observe and report, though this is more difficult in 

rural communities where everyone knows each other. Additionally, the 

removal of key protest leaders does not always succeed in dispersing and 

minimizing unrest, particularly if new leaders step up to take their places and 
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perhaps take the movement in a new direction or battle with other potential 

challengers for authority.

Two other challenges commonly mentioned in the literature are controlling the narrative of a particular incident, especially in the media, and 

conducting good “grassroots” work in the aftermath to prevent recurrence. 

Discussions of the former often focus on weaknesses in early identification and 

response to problems, which makes it more difficult to control the information 

that gets out about it. Often, by the time local party leaders are mobilizing 

resources and personnel to respond to a problem, it is already being discussed 

in online forums and more traditional media outlets such as newspapers and 

television. Efforts to address this lack of control of the portrayal of an incident 

often suggest that local leaders get in front of an issue, releasing extensive 

information through government offices and using media controls to shape 

the way the incident “plays” and the information that is available on it. Under 

Xi Jinping’s presidency, there have already been a number of new regulations 

released that further restrict news reporting on negative or sensitive topics, 

often requiring higher-level permission to do so or holding publications responsible for the release of anything that might harm social stability—at least in the 

eyes of the party. Other efforts involve new restrictive measures for information 

technology, an area that deserves a more extensive discussion.

The PRC—along with other authoritarian and democratic regimes all over 

the world—is still struggling with how to respond to the growing use of information technology and the increasing ease with which disaffected persons can 

communicate and organize collective action, whether protests or terrorism. 

While Chinese government sources blamed the Arab Spring largely on the 

failure of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa to institute 

reforms and provide tangible benefits to the majority of their populations, PRC 

leaders did not miss the critical role played by cell phones and the Internet in 

enabling activists and dissidents to connect with a broad range of people across 

different walks of life. In addition, as with China’s domestic unrest, bogeyman 

claims of Western masterminds being behind these movements were often 

repeated. Consequently, senior Public Security and PAP officials are increasingly worried about “hostile foreign and domestic forces [that] increasingly 

use the Internet and other emerging media as important tools and channels 

for various strategies to promote a color revolution against us, forming various 

parties and groups to compete for the battlefield of public opinion, the people’s 
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hearts and minds, and the support of the international community.”32 Prior to 

the Arab Spring, the PRC already possessed perhaps the most sophisticated 

control system for information technology in the world, but Chinese leaders 

have since doubled down on strengthening these capabilities to avoid a recurrence of the “Beijing Spring” social atmosphere that spawned the Tian’anmen 

protests in 1989, an atmosphere that was partially driven by improved access 

to cultural products and information sources from the West.

Prior to the Arab Spring, domestic security forces were concerned about 

the Internet, but mostly as a site for “online mass incidents” where thousands of 

posters could rant about their political concerns on message boards or in online 

games before state-backed censors were able to silence them, potentially even 

allowing this anger to lead to a protest in the real world. However, beginning 

in the late 2000s and further validated by the Arab Spring, more sophisticated 

ideas began to be developed about the potential interconnectedness of online 

and real-life activities. In 2011, police analysts argued that “online and offline 

activities related to mass incidents are synergistic and intertwined. In the information age, Internet media can cause mass incidents by gaining the attention 

of a vast number of Internet users.”33 The analysts added that:

First, online mass incidents are a significant trend. . . . On active 

forums, communities, blogs, and other sites, a few posts are reproduced 

repeatedly or spread by instant messaging, email, and other methods, 

quickly forming a network of public opinion. . . . Internet users draw 

on the large-scale dissemination power of the Internet to release and 

spread certain kinds of information, venting their discontent and relying on networked IT [information technology] to communicate with 

each other in a long chain, planning, organizing, and liaising, easily 

evolving into a mass incident based around specific demands. 

Second, Internet media can accelerate the development of mass incidents. Currently, stories involving the wealthy, corruption, police 

cases (or incidents), or other subjects can easily become hot topics 

for Internet public opinion, and some have even been used to create 

massive crises.34 

Finally, in terms of “grassroots” work to prevent future incidents, the 

domestic security literature frequently suggests that this, like many of the 
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other measures listed here, is the responsibility of local party leaders and 

state organs, though Public Security forces also have a role to play. The idea 

of grassroots work is an older communist concept that essentially means that 

party and state leaders and personnel need to build strong ties with their local 

communities, understanding their desires and concerns, gaining their trust 

and obedience, cultivating informants and a general spirit of cooperation with 

the state, and doing other things to make sure problems are solved—or at least 

brought to the party’s attention—before they blow up into major incidents. 

Unfortunately, this is often discussed in instrumental terms: party leaders 

must conduct good grassroots work in order to gain cooperation and compliance from citizens, not because it actually informs or alters what party and 

government leaders were already planning to do. It is essentially more a matter 

of proper marketing and relationship-building than learning how local leaders 

can actually address citizens’ concerns.

Overall, it is fascinating that the security literature often sees problems 

on the side of the party-state rather than with Public Security organs themselves, though this may indicate a bias in these sources. Non-police sources, 

for example, are more prone to complain about how the police often fail to 

follow proper procedures and legal regulations. However, as China continues 

to seek reform of both local government (particularly on the financial side) and 

the domestic security apparatus, hopefully the decisionmakers will remain 

aware of how intertwined these issues are. It is difficult to imagine significant 

improvements to China’s domestic security situation without improvements 

to both local government and how the local police and other security forces 

conduct their activities.

Conclusion 

Despite its significant domestic security challenges, China has not been debilitated by sustained internal insurgencies that render large portions of the 

country ungovernable or result in areas of relative impunity and independence. Even in light of the principal-agent problems noted above, provincial 

or regional leaders are not able to ignore central mandates and operate as they 

please (a point emphasized by the recent downfall of Bo Xilai), and there have 

been no popular revolutions that threaten to overthrow the current regime, 

nor have there been serious threats of a coup, direct intervention by the military or, worst of all, the prospect of civil war. In this sense, despite its various 
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weaknesses and problems, the CCP has been significantly more successful 

than many regimes in charge of managing the progress of a developing country. 

Remarkably, the central government continues to enjoy a robust level of domestic legitimacy in the eyes of the general populace, at least as measured by multiple national-level surveys designed by U.S. scholars.35 This sustained legitimacy 

most likely derives from the CCP’s historical dominance, pervasive ideological 

influence through strict media controls and the education system, systematic 

elimination of all political alternatives, and—not insignificantly—the ability to 

deliver on economic development, a better quality of life for many people, the 

promise of a stable and prosperous future, and China’s rapid increase in status 

and capabilities on the international stage. However, whether this legitimacy 

can be maintained in future decades is an open question.

This question is especially important now because of additional changes 

appearing on the horizon. Among the most critical of these changes, both economists and political leaders have signaled that China is rapidly approaching or 

has already reached the point beyond which its recent decades of 10 percent 

annual growth can no longer be sustained by a booming low-skilled manufacturing sector powered by labor migration from the countryside and foreign 

direct investment (including a sizable portion “round-tripped” through Hong 

Kong). The Chinese economy will have to shift to higher-end manufacturing 

and services as its advantages in cheap labor diminish in relation to markets in 

Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Such a transformation will not be easy and may 

include significant increases in unemployed or underemployed young people, 

a near-universal recipe for increased crime and unrest, as well as greater economic uncertainty for Chinese citizens at a time when the state needs them to 

consume more and save less.

The PRC’s national police and paramilitary institutions have undergone 

numerous reforms since the death of Mao Zedong, many of them aimed 

at “professionalizing” these forces—making them better educated, better 

trained, and more sophisticated in the use of tactics and equipment. However, 

as much as China’s domestic security forces have attempted to change, Chinese society has changed and will continue to change even faster and more 

dramatically, challenging the ability of domestic security forces to adapt to 

new conditions.

As domestic unrest continues to grow, the economy slows down, political 

reform remains unlikely, systemic problems go unaddressed, and the long-
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avoided costs of unrestrained development come due, mass unrest in China 

appears likely to remain a major concern for decades to come. While multiple 

scholars have noted that political revolutions occur when “the impossible 

becomes possible” through a confluence of factors that is nearly impossible to 

predict beforehand, popular disaffection in China is not entirely dissimilar to 

that in Egypt or other countries involved in the Arab Spring, despite the greater 

confidence Chinese citizens seem to have in the PRC’s central leadership. Mass 

incidents in China are at present almost universally framed around specific 

grievances rather than broader opposition to CCP rule, though this may be a 

tactical choice on the part of protesters as much as a reflection of true feelings. 

Certainly, Chinese leaders are concerned about domestic security, as recently 

indicated by ongoing reforms to this sector following the removal of Zhou 

Yongkang and by the decision by Xi Jinping to chair the new national security 

commission himself.

Focusing on mass incidents is the easiest way to see China’s domestic 

security forces in action. In terms of contingency planning, this allows outside 

observers to examine how domestic security forces and their civilian superiors 

attempt to implement plans in the event of a crisis and later adapt plans based 

on lessons learned from China’s near-constant experience of unrest. Unlike 

many other contingency plans that are on the books or perhaps even trained 

for through exercises, China’s contingency plans for mass incidents have the 

potential to be put into practice upwards of 100,000 times a year. Moreover, 

aside from a handful of international missions, such as contributing to United 

Nations peacekeeping, conducting antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, 

and policing drug trafficking on the Mekong River,36 domestic security incidents provide one of the few opportunities to observe Chinese security units 

(including the PLA, in supporting roles) actually execute the missions for 

which they have trained and prepared, including their interaction with real 

opposition, albeit civilian and typically unarmed.

While China has gradually improved its counterterrorism capabilities, fighting terrorism remains a secondary mission with a much lower priority. Multiple 

recent attacks outside of Xinjiang that apparently involved ethnic Uighurs may 

motivate China to devote more resources to this mission, as may the potential 

for radicalism among contemporary Tibetan youth. However, the fact remains 

that the vast majority of unrest in China occurs among the Han majority living 

in the more heavily populated eastern and central provinces. Even if Chinese 
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policing, ethnic suppression, and counterterrorism in minority regions increase 

dramatically, the bulk of Public Security and PAP work will still be focused on 

Han populations and more highly assimilated ethnic minorities.

Notes

1 The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) is a national bureaucratic organ 

under the State Council that oversees all of China’s police and co-administers 

the PAP with China’s highest military decisionmaking body, the Central Military Commission. The national Public Security bureaucracy is broken down into 

various subdivisions at the provincial level and below, each of which is responsible to both the party committee on the same level and the Public Security body at 

the level above. As Harold M. Tanner describes, “within the government of each 

province, autonomous region, and centrally administered city [is] a department 

of public security [gong’an ting, 公安厅], while each city or county government 

include[s] a bureau of public security [gong’an ju, 公安局] and each city district 

[qu, 区] a public security sub-bureau [gong’an fenju, 公安分局]. At the base level—

town, street, busy urban areas—[are] the public security stations [gong’an paichusuo, 公安派出所].” See Harold M. Tanner, Strike Hard! Anti-Crime Campaigns and 

Chinese Criminal Justice, 1979–1985 (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program, 

1999), 33. All lower level Public Security offices—and the police in general—are 

colloquially known as Public Security Bureaus [gong’an ju, 公安局], regardless of 

their scope. Local PAP units are also in theory subject to local party committees 

and Public Security offices, but only those at the county level and above. The local 

party committees that oversee local police organs, called Political and Legal 

Affairs Committees (PLACs), are all subject to the Central PLAC that is, in turn, 

responsible to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Local 

PLACs are typically headed by one of the highest-ranking local party leaders, 

often the party chief. The head of the Central PLAC was in years past a member of 

the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee, though this changed when the 

Standing Committee was reduced from nine to seven members at the 18th Party 

Congress in November 2012. The previous and current heads of the Central PLAC 

(Zhou Yongkang and Meng Jianzhu, respectively) previously held the position of 

Minister of Public Security, so there does seem to be a direct route from heading 

the MPS to heading the Central PLAC. However, the purge of and ongoing criminal proceedings against Zhou Yongkang and the establishment of a new national 

security commission headed by Xi Jinping may alter the manner in which China’s 

leading domestic security organs operate.

2 Note that some of these missions are shared with other bureaucratic ministries and administrations under the State Council.

3 Obtaining official approval to hold a protest is incredibly difficult. The act 

of applying mostly serves to earn the applicant attention from the government and 
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police. Notable exceptions are anti-Japan and sometimes anti-U.S. protests, which 

are often passively or actively supported by the state.

4 For data on protest numbers, see Jae Ho Chung, “Assessing the Odds 

Against the Mandate of Heaven: Do the Numbers (on Instability) Really Matter?” 

in Charting China’s Future: Political, Social, and International Dimensions, ed. Jae 

Ho Chung (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 112; “China’s Spending on 

Internal Police Force in 2010 Outstrips Defense Budget,” Bloomberg, March 5, 2011; 

and Xuezhi Guo, China’s Security State: Philosophy, Evolution, and Politics (New York: 

Cambridge University Press, 2012), 246–247.

5 “Protests in China: The Cauldron Boils,” Economist, September 29, 2005. 

Zhou Yongkang was later promoted to head of the Central Political and Legal Affairs 

Commission—the “security czar” position on the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee—before that position was demoted during the contraction of the 

Standing Committee from nine to seven members in 2012. Since late 2013, Zhou and 

some of his associates have been under investigation for corruption and other abuses 

of power, due at least in part to Zhou having been formerly supportive of purged 

Chongqing party chief Bo Xilai.

6 State Council of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国国务院], 

“National Contingency Plan for Large-Scale Mass Incidents” [国家大规模群体性事件

应急预案] (2005). This document is unfortunately no longer available, but its contents 

can be extrapolated from the various provincial, municipal, and county-level plans 

that were required to propagate its core concepts.

7 Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, “General 

Contingency Plan for National Public Emergencies” [国家突发公共事件总体应急预案], 

August 7, 2005, available at <www.gov.cn/yjgl/2005-08/07/content_21048.htm>.

8 Ministry of Public Security, “Regulations on the Handling of Mass Incidents by Public Security Organs” [公安机关处置群体性事件规定], Public Security 

Document, no. 56 (2008); and “People’s Armed Police Law of the People’s Republic of 

China” [中华人民共和国人民武装警察法] August 2, 2009, available at <www.gov.cn/

flfg/2009-08/27/content_1403324.htm>. 

9 The author would specifically like to thank several of the “deans” of Chinese 

policing studies in the United States—Murray Scot Tanner, Harold M. Tanner, Kam 

Wong, George Xuezhi Guo, and Ivan Sun—whose scholarship has strongly influenced this chapter, even in instances where their work is not directly cited.

10 Elizabeth Rosenthal, “Workers’ Plight Brings New Militancy in China,” New 

York Times, March 10, 2003.

11 Wang Xianlin [王先琳], “Methods, Planning, and Exercises Regarding the 

Handling of Mass Incidents” [群体性事件处置方法与预案制定及演练], Police Practical 

Combat Training [警察实战训练研究], no. 2 (2008).
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12 See “Protests in China: The Cauldron Boils,” Economist, September 29, 2005; 

and “China’s Spending on Internal Police Force in 2010 Outstrips Defense Budget.”

13 Chris Buckley, “China’s Wen Says Farmers’ Rights Flouted by Land Grabs,” 

Reuters, February 5, 2012.

14 “Weng’an Party Secretary and County Head Are Removed from Office” [贵

州瓮安县委书记和县长被免职], Xinhua, July 4, 2008.

15 See, for example, Murray Scot Tanner, “The Institutional Lessons of Disaster: Reorganizing China’s People’s Armed Police After Tian’anmen,” in The People’s 

Liberation Army as Organization, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang 

(Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2002).

16 Zeng Shengquan [曾省权], “Inquiry into the Ability of Public Security 

Organs to Enhance the Safeguarding of National Security and Social Stability in the 

New Era” [新时期公安机关提升维护国家安全和社会稳定能力探究], Public Security 

Studies [公安研究] 196 (2011), 12.

17 Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People is Greater Than the 

People in Power—A Memoir (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012), 267, 271.

18 For an introduction to accusations of violence among fringe Christian sects 

in China, see Joseph Kahn, “Violence Taints Religion’s Solace for China’s Poor,” New 

York Times, November 25, 2004. The PRC executed the main leader of Three Ranks of 

Servants, Xu Wenku, in 2006, along with several of his followers. They were convicted 

of supposedly murdering 20 members of the Eastern Lightning sect.

19 Yang Guangwei [杨光伟], “Follow the Path of Staying Close to the Masses, 

Strengthen the Foundation of the Domestic Security Department” [走群众路线 实国

保根基], translated in “Internal Document of the Domestic Security Department of 

the Public Security Bureau (Part I),” China Digital Times, January 26, 2010, available 

at <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2010/01/internal-document-of-the-domestic-security-department-of-the-public-security-bureau-part-i>.

20 Yongshun Cai, Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed 

or Fail (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 5, 6, 12, 50.

21 “Regulations on the Handling of Mass Incidents by Public Security Organs.”

22 An Interview with PAP Commander Wu Shuangzhan on the Promulgation 

Day of the ‘People’s Armed Police Law’” [《武装警察法》颁布之日专访武警部队司

令员吴双战], Xinhua, August 28, 2009, available at <www.china.com.cn/military/

txt/2009-08/28/content_18419479.htm>.

23 Yuning Wu, Ivan Y. Sun, and Aaron Fichtelberg, “Formalizing China’s 

Armed Police: The 2009 PAP Law,” Crime, Law, and Social Change 56, no. 3 (2011), 250.

24 Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, “People’s 

Armed Police Law of the PRC” [中华人民共和国人民武装警察法], Eleventh National 
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People’s Congress Standing Committee, 10th Meeting, August 27, 2009.

25 “People’s Armed Police Law;” and Wu, Sun, and Fichtelberg, 252–253.

26 James T. Areddy, “Shanghai Police Officers to Begin Carrying Guns, Move 

Illustrates Perception Violence from Crime and Terrorism are Growing in Expanding 

Urban Areas,” Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2014.

27 See Xi’an Municipal Public Security Bureau, “Xi’an Municipal Public Security Bureau Contingency Plan for Handling Large-Scale Mass Incidents” [西安市公安

局处置较大规模群体性治安事件应急预案], March 23, 2010; and People’s Government 

of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, “Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region Contingency 

Plan for Large-Scale Mass Incidents” [宁夏回族自治区大规模群体性事件应急预案], 

July 24, 2006.

28 “Map of People’s Armed Police Troops Dispatched to Xinjiang,” China 

Digital Times, July 10, 2009, available at <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/07/mapof-peoples-armed-police-troops-dispatched-to-xinjiang/>.

29 For a serious examination of whether PLA forces were involved in suppressing the 2008 unrest in Tibet, see Murray Scot Tanner, “How China Manages Internal 

Security Challenges and Its Impact on PLA Missions,” in Beyond the Strait: PLA 

Missions Other Than Taiwan (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009).

30 Joseph Fewsmith, “An ‘Anger-Venting’ Mass Incident Catches the Attention 

of China’s Leadership,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 26 (Fall 2008), 7.

31 See, for example, Cai, 42.

32 Zeng, 10–11.

33 Jia Dongjun [贾东军], “The Impact of the Rapid Development of Internet 

Media on Social Stability and Some Brief Comments on Responsive Measures” [网络

媒体迅猛发展对社会稳定的影响及应对措施略论], Public Security Studies [公安研究] 

199 (2011), 6.

34 Ibid.

35 See, for example, Martin King Whyte, Myth of the Social Volcano: Perceptions of Inequality and Distributive Injustice in China (Stanford: Stanford University 

Press, 2010); and Teresa Wright, Accepting Authoritarianism: State-Society Relations 

in China’s Reform Era (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2010).

36 For an overview of the latter two missions, see Andrew S. Erickson and Austin 

M. Strange, “Ripples of Change in Chinese Foreign Policy? Evidence from Recent 

Approaches to Nontraditional Waterborne Security,” Asia Policy, no. 17 (January 2014).

85

This chapter introduces the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) civilian emergency response planning system, reviews some plans in this system with an eye toward understanding the PRC’s approach to emergency response planning, and examines one recent instance in which emergency response plans were activated. In doing so, the chapter illustrates a 

few of the ways that these plans can be examined and highlights the value of 

analyzing their content.

Insights into China’s civilian emergency response planning system are of 

value in understanding Chinese military contingency planning for two reasons. First, it is reasonable to expect similarities between Chinese civilian and 

military approaches to certain kinds of emergency or contingency planning 

because many of the problems the government may face, such as injuries and 

displacements, will be similar whether the government is preparing for a natural 

disaster or a domestic military contingency. For that reason, information on the 

civilian system of emergency plans should be viewed as useful background for 

understanding the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) contingency planning.

Second, there is evidence that civilian emergency response planning and 

military and national defense mobilization planning are linked. The PRC’s 

National Defense Mobilization Law states that “the national defense mobilization plan(s) should be linked together with the sudden incident emergency 

response and management plan(s) in aspects of command, the use of force, 

information, and support, etc.”1

 Additionally, articles released in 2006 at the 

time of the Central Military Commission’s promulgation of the Comprehensive 

Emergency Response Plan for the Military’s Handling of Sudden Incidents 

noted that the military’s plans for such events are related to the corresponding 

civilian plans.2

 One article states that the military’s emergency plans are an 

CHAPTER 4

Civilian Authorities and 

Contingency Planning in China

Catherine Welch
86

WELCH

important component of China’s civilian system of emergency response plans, 

and that these documents provide a legal basis for the military to be involved 

in local disasters.3

This evidence, which suggests linkages between civilian and military contingency planning and national defense mobilization, reinforces the value of 

understanding China’s civilian emergency planning in the context of military 

contingency planning and highlights an area worthy of future research. 

This chapter draws on a range of primary and secondary sources. Official 

Chinese government Web sites have detailed information about emergency 

management including plans, news about emergencies, and information 

on emergency training and exercises.4

 Another source is a paper by Chinese 

researchers posted on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Web site that provides an overview of China’s emergency response 

planning system and gives details on how the system is intended to improve 

China’s response to emergencies.5 Articles posted on Xinhua Online, the 

People’s Daily Online, and the China Daily Online that include background 

information on China’s efforts to improve its management of emergencies supplement information on the release of emergency response plans and provide 

insight into recent activations of plans.

China’s Emergency Response Planning System 

In the wake of the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak, 

the Chinese government launched efforts to improve its crisis management 

capabilities.6 Development of an emergency response planning system was 

a central part of broader government efforts to improve the management of 

emergencies.7 The system is designed to improve China’s ability to handle 

myriad emergencies and institutionalize a management approach that is 

integrated vertically (national to local), horizontally (multi-ministerial and 

departmental), and institutionally (with other laws and regulations).8

China’s emergency response planning system is described in a broad 

national plan, released in January 2006, called the National Comprehensive 

Emergency Response Plan for Sudden Public Incidents, hereafter referred to as 

the “National Emergency Response Plan.”9

 The plan identifies six key types of 

PRC emergency response plans, develops a taxonomy for categorizing emergencies by type of crisis and level of severity, and provides a national template 

for emergency response plans, including key sections that should be included 
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and issues that ought to be addressed. The six types of emergency response 

plans include:10

• The National Emergency Response Plan. This plan is the State Council’s 

“guiding document for addressing extraordinary emergencies.”11 These 

include emergencies that cross provincial boundaries.

• Emergency response plans for specific contingencies. The State Council 

and its related departments (ministries, commissions, and so forth) 

draw these up to address a given type of emergency. These plans typically address an emergency that requires a multi-institutional response, 

such as an earthquake. (Note: In the rest of this document, these are 

referred to as contingency plans.)

• State Council departmental emergency response plans for sudden public 

incidents. State Council departments draw up these plans based on the 

National Emergency Response Plan, relevant contingency plans, and 

departmental duties (that is, those of a particular ministry or commission) in addressing an emergency. They typically address emergencies 

that fall exclusively, or almost exclusively, within the domain of a particular ministry (for example, the Ministry of Health’s avian flu plan). 

• Local emergency response plans for sudden public incidents. These 

include provincial-level equivalents of the National Emergency 

Response Plan, contingency plans, and departmental plans as well as 

city, prefecture, and county emergency response plans drawn up by 

local people’s governments and related departments.

• Enterprise, institution, and work unit emergency response plans. The 

National Emergency Response Plan does not describe these, but they 

appear to include plans developed by individual companies and nongovernmental institutions such as hospitals.12

• Emergency response plans drawn up by units holding large-scale exhibitions and cultural, sports, or other events. Recent examples where such 

plans appear to have been in place include the 2008 Beijing Olympics 

and the 2010 Shanghai Expo.13

Exactly how many plans fall into these six key types is unclear. Early news 

reporting on the national-level plans described the inclusion of the National 

Emergency Response Plan, 25 contingency emergency response plans, and 80 

departmental emergency response plans.14 One academic paper stated that as 

of March 15, 2006, China had developed 24,293 emergency response plans.15
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The paper indicated that these included a single National Emergency Response 

Plan, 25 contingency and 80 departmental emergency response plans, 971 

plans from various “sectors in the State Council,”16 158 plans from “central 

enterprises,”17 and 23,058 regional or local plans.18 Given that the National 

Emergency Response Plan calls for plans to be continuously updated and 

refined, these numbers have likely changed since then.

The National Emergency Response Plan defines an emergency as “an 

incident that occurs suddenly and causes or has the potential to cause enormous casualties or fatalities, loss of property, and environmental or ecological 

damage; and to pose a severe threat to society or endanger public security.”19 It 

divides emergencies into four main categories and classifies them according 

to severity. The four categories of emergencies are: 

• natural disasters, which include floods, droughts, other weather hazards, earthquakes, and forest and grassland fires

• accidents, which include safety incidents at industrial, mining, commercial, or trading enterprises, traffic or transportation incidents, incidents at 

public facilities or installations, environmental pollution, and damage to 

the environment

• public health incidents, which include epidemics, food safety and occupational hazards, animal diseases, and incidents that seriously affect 

public health and safety 

• public security incidents, which include terrorist attacks and emergencies involving economic security and/or foreign countries.20

The National Emergency Response Plan also establishes a four-level, color-coded warning system to convey the severity of an emergency, including 

“a very serious emergency” (Level I), “a serious emergency” (Level II), “a relatively serious emergency” (Level III), and “a general emergency” (Level IV).21

It provides no more details on the criteria for determining the severity of 

an emergency.22 However, a Chinese paper on emergency management 

states that as the severity of an emergency increases, the level of the national 

authority with oversight of the emergency’s management also increases. 

Level I natural disaster emergencies are overseen by the vice premier of the 

State Council (and director of the National Commission for Disaster Reduction); Level II emergencies are overseen by the minister of civil affairs; Level 

III emergencies are overseen by the vice minister of civil affairs; and Level IV 
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emergencies are overseen by the Department of Disaster and Social Relief, 

Ministry of Civil Affairs.23

Much of the National Emergency Response Plan is dedicated to providing 

a template for use in other emergency response plans. The template includes: 

• a description of the organizational structure of the PRC civilian emergency management system

• an outline of the basic steps in any PRC civilian emergency response

• identification of the kinds of support that may be needed

• recommendations on training, raising public awareness about emergency response, and ensuring accountability in an emergency. 

Most of the plans examined address these elements of emergency response. 

Organizational Structure of the Civilian Emergency Management System 

The National Emergency Response Plan divides the organizational structure of 

the emergency management authorities into five layers. The first layer is the State 

Council as a whole, which the plan states is the highest leading authority in emergency management. Under State Council leadership, the State Council Standing 

Committee and “National Related Sudden Incident Command Organizations” 

(not further described in the plan) are responsible for handling emergencies.24

The second layer is the State Council Emergency Management Office.25 This 

office, established in 2006, is described as playing a pivotal role in emergency 

response. (Because of its importance, a detailed description is provided below.) 

The third layer includes State Council ministries and departments, which are 

responsible for developing plans for, and actually handling, emergencies that fall 

within their areas of responsibility. The fourth layer is local authorities at each 

successive administrative level (province, municipality, county, and so forth), 

which are responsible for handling emergencies within their administrative 

areas. Only when emergencies exceed a certain level or cross administrative 

areas does a higher authority get involved. The fifth and final layer is expert or 

specialist groups. Authorities are permitted to hire specialists and experts to 

assist in decisionmaking and handling emergencies if necessary. 26

One of the most important players in PRC civilian emergency response 

planning, the State Council Emergency Management Office, appears to be 

composed of one office and four committees.27 Each committee is responsible 

for managing one of the four categories of emergencies in the PRC emergency 
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response system (natural, accidental, public health, and public security emergencies), as illustrated in table 4.1.28 Each committee consists of a director, a 

vice director or administration vice director, and committee members. The 

people occupying these positions come from different government institutions.29 This enables various institutions to better coordinate their response 

to emergencies.

Table 4.1. Committees of the State Council Emergency 

Management Office

Committee Responsibility

National Commission for 

Disaster Reduction

Natural disasters

National Committee on Work Safety Accidental disasters

National Committee for Patriotic Health Public health disasters

Central Committee for Comprehensive 

Management of Public Security

Public security disasters*

* The Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security is a Chinese Communist Party body. The same article also refers to this body as the National Committee for Integrated 

Management. See Peijun Shi et al., “Integrated Disaster Risk Management,” 7–8.

The National Commission for Disaster Reduction’s Web site provides an 

organizational chart illustrating broad institutional membership in the committee (see table 4.2).30 More than 30 institutions participate in this particular 

committee, illustrating the multi-institutional nature of emergency response 

in China. 

Basic Steps of Any Civilian Emergency Response 

The National Emergency Response Plan describes four basic steps involved 

in any PRC civilian response to an emergency: forecasting and early warning, 

emergency response, recovery and reconstruction, and releasing information.31

All regional and departmental authorities are responsible for creating 

forecasting and early warning systems. These systems enable authorities 

to identify an emergency early on and to report and act on the emergency. 

One example of the actions that may follow identification of an emergency 

is announcing it to the public. For example, the plan says that warning 

announcements can be made, updated, or lifted via radio, television, newspapers, mail, information networks, alarms, propaganda vans, and door-todoor notifications.32 
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Table 4.2. Organizational Chart of the China National Commission 

for Disaster Reduction

国家减灾委员会

China National Commission 

for Disaster Reduction

办公室

General Office

专家委员会

Board of Experts

中央宣传部

The Communist Party of 

China Central 

Committee Propaganda 

Department

国务院办公厅

General Office of the 

State Council

外交部

The Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs

发展改革委

The National 

Development and 

Reform Commission

教育部

The Ministry of 

Education

科技部

The Ministry of Science 

and Technology

工业和信息化部

The Ministry of Industry 

and Information Technology

公安部

The Ministry of 

Public Security

民政部

The Ministry of Civil 

Affairs

财政部

The Ministry of Finance

国土资源部

The Ministry of Land 

and Resources

环境保护部

Environmental 

Protection Department

住房城乡建设部

Housing and 

Urban-Rural 

Development

交通运输部

The Ministry of 

Transport

水利部

The Ministry of Water 

Resources

农业部

The Ministry of 

Agriculture

商务部

The Ministry of 

Commerce

卫生计生委

The National Health 

and Family Planning 

Commission

国资委

The State-Owned 

Assets Supervision and 

Administration Commission

新闻出版广电总局

The State General 

Administration of Press 

and Publication, Radio 

and Television

安全监管总局

The State Supervision 

and Administration 

of Production Safety 

Administration

统计局

The National Bureau 

of Statistics

林业局

The State Forestry 

Administration

中科院

The Chinese 

Academy of Sciences

地震局

Seismological Bureau

气象局

The Meteorological 

Administration

保监会

The Insurance 

Regulatory 

Commission

自然科学基金会

The National Natural 

Science Fund 

Committee

海洋局

The State Oceanic 

Administration

测绘地信局

The National Geographic 

Information Bureau of 

Surveying and Mapping

总参谋部

The Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army General 

Staff Department

武警总部

Headquarters of the 

Chinese People’s Armed 

Police Force

中国科协

China Association for 

Science and Technology

中国红十字总会

Red Cross Society of 

China

中国铁路总公司

China Railway 

Corporation
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The next step is emergency response, comprised of four main stages. When 

a Level I or Level II emergency occurs, regional authorities and departments 

must report it within 4 hours (the plan suggests that these authorities must 

report to the next higher level, though this is not specified) and notify other 

localities and departments affected by the emergency. Second, authorities are 

to take measures such as activating their emergency response plan and making 

preliminary efforts to address the emergency (at this point, the response may 

involve only one, or a limited number of, departments or authorities). If such 

measures are insufficient to control the emergency, other emergency response 

plans may be activated and higher level authorities, such as the relevant State 

Council–related emergency command organization or a State Council task 

force, may become involved.33 Departments that specialize in handling a 

particular type of emergency (for example, the Ministry of Health in a public 

health incident) lead the response and other departments provide assistance. 

This stage continues until the emergency concludes and the on-site emergency 

command organization is discontinued.34

The third step is the recovery and reconstruction period. This is marked 

by actions to remedy or ameliorate the conditions of individuals and work 

units that suffered losses. It can include provision of psychological, legal, and 

financial support. An investigative effort is also launched to assess the causes, 

nature, impact, and lessons learned during the emergency. Reconstruction 

efforts may also begin.35

The final step addressed in the plan is the release of information. Authorities are advised to release information in a timely, accurate, objective, and 

comprehensive manner. They are to do so throughout the emergency management process, with an emphasis on announcing the emergency soon after it has 

occurred and including information on authorities’ assessment of it, measures 

adopted by authorities to handle it, and any preventative measures individuals 

should take in light of the occurrence.36

The National Emergency Response Plan addresses a number of types of 

support that may be necessary in an emergency and stipulates that relevant 

departments must be prepared to provide support if called on to do so. These 

areas of support are fairly comprehensive in the tasks described and are rarely 

associated with specific bureaucracies. There is overlap between some of the 

categories. Table 4.3 lists them as they appear in the National Emergency 

Response Plan.37
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Table 4.3. Contingency Support Requirements of the National 

Emergency Response Plan

Human resource support Providing emergency response personnel 

(the PLA and the People’s Armed Police are 

the only two specific institutions mentioned)

Financial support Providing funds for preparation and relief for 

emergencies as well as providing compensation to victims after an emergency occurs

Material support Establishing an emergency material monitoring network, an advance-warning system, 

and systems for material production, storage, allocation, and delivery

Support of essential needs Ensuring that victims have food, water, 

clothing, shelter, and medical care

Medical and health support Enabling the deployment of medical teams 

that can rush to emergencies to provide 

first aid, disease prevention and control, 

and other medical services (public health 

departments are specified as responsible 

for these tasks)

Traffic and transportation support Prioritizing emergency-related traffic and 

transportation needs, including access to 

supplies and roadways as well as imposing 

traffic control measures on areas affected by 

the emergency, if necessary

Maintaining public order Strengthening security for certain areas, 

premises, groups of people, materials, and 

installations; deterring criminal activities

Protecting victims and emergency response 

personnel

Constructing emergency refuge centers, 

overseeing evacuations or relocations, and 

protecting emergency response personnel

Communications support Refining emergency communications, television, broadcasting, and public communications networks as well as setting up an 

emergency communications system

Provision of critical supplies and services Maintaining adequate supplies of water, 

coal, electricity, oil, and gas and continuing 

to dispose of waste materials

Technological support Developing better technologies and 

equipment for emergency monitoring, 

forecasting, early warning, prevention, and 

emergency management
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These areas of support provide an outline for the kinds of responsibilities 

identified in what is designed to be an inter-institutional approach to emergency 

management. However, in any given emergency, not all of these kinds of support 

would necessarily be required. 

Finally, the National Emergency Response Plan encourages rehearsals of 

the plans, propaganda, and training efforts and the use of rewards and disciplinary measures. Regional authorities and departments are to rehearse or 

train for carrying out their emergency response plans. Propaganda, education, 

culture, broadcasting, news, and publication departments are to raise awareness about and increase public knowledge of emergency response prevention, 

mitigation, and preparedness. “Relevant authorities” are to train emergency 

rescue forces. Individuals who make contributions should be recognized, and 

those responsible for negligence or dereliction of duty should be punished.38

Examining PRC Emergency Response Plans 

The PRC government has released the full text of a small number of national-level 

emergency response plans (18 contingency and 2 departmental).39 While this 

sample is not necessarily representative of the entire PRC system of civilian 

emergency response plans, it can still reveal useful information about Chinese 

emergency response plans, including variance in the specificity of certain kinds 

of plans, insights on the simultaneous activation of multiple emergency response 

plans, and identification of important players in emergency response. 

PRC civilian emergency response plans vary widely in how specific they 

are. Some plans appear to be written to address broadly defined contingencies 

(for example, the National Emergency Response Plan on Sudden Public Health 

Incidents). Other plans appear tailored to a fairly unique range of events (for 

example, the Emergency Response Plan on People Infected with Avian Influenza) or to a particular ministry or commission (for example, the Ministry of 

Railways’ Emergency Response Plan on Destructive Earthquakes). 

More than one emergency response plan may be activated for the same 

emergency. This is noted in the National Emergency Response Plan, but looking at 

other emergency response plans or their titles provides insight into which types of 

emergencies may require the activation of multiple emergency response plans. If, 

for instance, there was a health incident on a train, the Ministry of Railways could 

activate its emergency response plan on health incidents. If this failed to control 

the incident, presumably the Ministry of Health would activate its emergency 
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response plan on public health incidents. One example of an emergency where 

more than one emergency plan was activated is in the response to an earthquake 

in Yiliang County, Yunnan, which is discussed in the final section of this chapter. 

Identification of Important Players in Emergency Response Plans 

Several types of groups appear to play important roles in leading the management of emergencies, providing expertise, and ensuring coordination 

within or between ministries. Most plans describe groups that have important responsibilities associated with leading and coordinating the management of emergency response.40 These groups are sometimes formal bodies, 

such as the State Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters (located 

in the Ministry of Water Resources). At other times, the groups appear to be 

informal bodies convened on an as-needed basis, such as the Leading Small 

Group for Urban Subway Accidents and Disaster Emergency Response. 

Some plans or articles provide insight into the institutions represented 

in these leading groups. The composition of these groups suggests that the 

government can reach across civil-military and state-enterprise boundaries 

to coordinate emergency responses. The National Emergency Response Plan 

on Communication Support, for example, states that the Ministry of Industry 

and Information Technology (MIIT) is responsible for setting up a National 

Leading Small Group for Emergency Communication Support.41 This group is 

to be responsible for leading, organizing, and coordinating the protection and 

restoration of communications during emergencies in China. An article posted 

on the PRC government Web site notes that leaders from the following institutions comprise the National Leading Small Group for Communication Support:

• the ministries of Civil Affairs, Finance, Transport, and Railways

• the National Development and Reform Commission

• the General Administration of Customs

• the Administration of Work Safety

• the Civil Aviation Authority

• the State Council Information Office

• the PLA General Staff Department’s Operations Department and its 

Informationization Department [zongcan xinxihua bu, 总参信息化部]

• three state-owned telecommunications companies (China Telecom, 

China Mobile, and China Unicom).42
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The composition of this group and the responsibilities associated with 

it in the National Emergency Response Plan on Communication Support 

suggest that both communication emergency response operations and decisionmaking about communication emergencies will be multi-institutional 

in nature.

Some plans describe groups that are primarily responsible for providing 

expertise in emergencies, illustrating how the PRC government might tap the 

knowledge of nongovernmental experts. The National Emergency Response 

Plan on Maritime Search and Rescue, for instance, calls for a National Maritime 

Search and Rescue Expert Group to be made up of experts in shipping, maritime affairs, aviation, firefighting, medical services, environmental protection, 

petrochemical engineering, maritime engineering, maritime geography, meteorology, security management, and other areas to provide maritime search and 

rescue–related technical consulting.43

A smaller number of plans refer to inter- or intra-ministerial working 

groups. The former appear to be bodies set up to encourage horizontal communication and coordination of emergency response, which is probably not a 

surprise given how many institutions may be involved. The latter appear to be 

formed within a particular ministry (for example, the Ministry of Civil Affairs) 

and to sometimes deploy to the site of an emergency to provide on-the-ground 

support and an on-site, national-level presence for a ministry.

Recent Activation of Emergency Response Plans 

Chinese civilian authorities have invested a great deal of effort in the PRC 

system of emergency response planning, but actual bureaucratic response in 

a real-world emergency situation is a different matter. In order to gain some 

sense of how plans play out in practice, it is instructive to look at the response 

to the earthquakes in Yunnan and Guizhou in September 2012.44

Beginning on September 7, 2012, multiple earthquakes and aftershocks, 

ranging in magnitude from 4.8 to 5.6, hit the Yiliang County and Zhaotong City 

areas in Yunnan and the Bijie City area in Guizhou. As a result of the quakes, 81 

people died, more than 800 were injured, and over 200,000 had to be relocated.45

More than 6,600 homes were destroyed and approximately 430,000 buildings 

sustained damage.46 Direct economic losses incurred from the quakes were 

estimated to be equal to U.S. $552 million.47 While the quakes did not cause 

nearly as many casualties or as much damage as the 7.9-magnitude earthquake 
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that struck Sichuan province in May 2008, they were severe enough to require 

national-level response.

National-, provincial-, and local-level authorities activated emergency 

response plans,48 as did institutions including the China Earthquake Administration, the Yunnan Bureau of Agriculture, the Bureau of Public Security’s 

Fire Prevention Team, the PLA’s Chengdu Military Region, a power company, 

and others.49

Articles about the emergency response to the earthquake show the ways 

that high-level party, state, and military officials were involved and give details 

about the many departments that responded. Then-President Hu Jintao and 

then-Premier Wen Jiabao were among the high-level officials who got involved 

in the response, with Wen even visiting the site of the quake.50

PLA leaders, including then–Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xu Caihou, met to discuss how to handle the emergency and to provide instructions on response. The General Staff Department and the General 

Political Department assisted in rescue and relief-related tasks, and the General 

Logistics Department and the General Armament Department assisted with 

earthquake supply and logistics support.51 The PLA’s Chengdu Military Region 

provided air support, sending 13 tons of quake-relief materials and transferring 

a number of severely wounded people.52

Then–Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu issued instructions on 

handling the emergency response. The ministry mobilized fire and rescue 

equipment, dispatched police and search and rescue teams, and supplied 

equipment such as generators and other relief supplies.53

Other ministries and government agencies also contributed to the 

response. The Ministry of Civil Affairs facilitated the distribution of supplies 

such as tents, blankets, and coats. The China Earthquake Administration 

dispatched a working group to the area. The Ministry of Land and Resources 

sent experts to assist in rescue and relief and to investigate the prevention 

and early warning of aftershocks. The Ministry of Health sent experts in 

intensive care, epidemiology, food safety, and mental health. The China Civil 

Aviation Administration helped charter flights to transport rescue workers 

and supplies.54

State telecommunications providers China Unicom, China Mobile, and 

China Telecom provided telecommunications support. Various local power 

departments organized teams to repair damaged power grids.55
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Looking at PRC emergency response to this particular disaster provides 

more details about the specific responses that government officials, individual 

ministries, and parts of the PLA carried out. The array of institutions and levels 

of government involved demonstrate how widely emergency management 

responsibilities are distributed in China and why high-level groups are needed 

to lead and coordinate the many institutions involved. In this case, because the 

National Emergency Response Plan for Earthquakes was activated, national-level 

coordination between these bureaucracies may have taken place via the State 

Council Headquarters for Earthquake Relief and possibly the National Commission for Disaster Reduction. 

The case study suggests that the planning requirements levied in China’s 

National Emergency Response Plan have translated into concrete emergency 

plans at the local, provincial, and national levels of government and within 

specific ministries, military regions, and companies. Many of these plans 

were activated as part of the emergency response effort. Although a full 

assessment of the effectiveness of the response is beyond the scope of this 

chapter, the existence of an emergency response mechanism and emergency 

response plans likely facilitated the involvement and coordination of a wide 

range of government, military, and business actors in responding to the 

crisis. This is notable given bureaucratic stovepipes and the difficulty the 

Chinese government has in coordinating across bureaucratic boundaries. 

It demonstrates progress in the PRC’s efforts to institutionalize a vertically 

and horizontally integrated approach to emergency management since the 

SARs epidemic in 2003.56

Conclusion 

China’s National Emergency Response Plan, other Chinese emergency 

response plans, and news coverage of Chinese responses to disasters are 

valuable resources for understanding PRC civilian government approaches to 

emergency response planning. There are several reasons for this.

First, the National Emergency Response Plan is an authoritative document 

issued by the State Council. It describes a system of emergency response plans 

designed to improve China’s abilities in handling myriad emergencies and 

to institutionalize an approach to emergency management that is vertically 

(national to local), horizontally (multi-ministerial and departmental), and 

institutionally (with other laws and regulations) integrated.57
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Second, the National Emergency Response Plan articulates requirements 

for other plans to be created. A careful reading of the plan indicates that there 

are six different types of plans: the National Emergency Response Plan itself, 

contingency plans, departmental plans, local plans, enterprise and work unit 

plans, and plans for large-scale events. The real take-away from this broad 

range of required plans is that responsibility for emergency response planning 

is not centralized but is instead widely shared. This distribution of responsibilities is evident in other Chinese emergency plans as well as in news coverage 

of disasters. Not every type of emergency requires a whole-of-government 

response, but there does appear to be a whole-of-government effort to plan 

and prepare for disasters. It is unclear whether the distribution of emergency 

planning responsibilities produces a dearth or a proliferation of functional 

expertise in emergency management.

Third, the National Emergency Response Plan provides a taxonomy for 

categorizing emergencies by type and level of severity. Other emergency plans 

and news coverage of disasters provide more granular insight into how this 

taxonomy is applied for specific kinds of emergencies. Such data can be used 

to adopt a common frame of reference when speaking with counterparts about 

the commonalities and differences in U.S. and Chinese approaches to emergency response planning. 

During the conference that produced this volume, a number of speakers 

and panelists touched on the involvement of the PLA in broader governmental 

response to certain domestic disasters and on civil-military cooperation in preparing for and carrying out other disaster response missions. Many remarked 

on how little information is available with regard to the PLA’s contingency planning. By contrast, the Chinese government has made information about civilian 

bureaucracies’ emergency planning available. Understanding how Chinese 

ministries and commissions respond to emergencies provides a civilian-sector 

complement to the limited knowledge of how the PLA responds to emergencies. 

A better understanding of China’s approach to civilian emergency response planning may contribute to a better understanding of the Chinese military’s approach 

to contingency planning for disaster response and other domestic operations.

The author would like to acknowledge the following individuals for their 

assistance with this chapter: Maryanne Kivlehan-Wise, Ian M. Easton, and 

James A. Bellacqua.
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Notes

1 Ministry of National Defense, People’s Republic of China, People’s Republic 

of China National Defense Mobilization Law [中华人民共和国国防动员法], February 

26, 2010, available at <www.mod.gov.cn/policy/2010-02/27/content_4127067.htm>. 

See Part Three, Article 16.0.

2 See Li Yun [黎云], “Explanation of the ‘Comprehensive Emergency Plan 

for the Military’s Handling of Sudden Incidents’” [《军队处置突发事件总体应急预

案》解读], Xinhua Online [新华网], November 14, 2006, available at <http://news.

xinhuanet.com/mil/2006-11/14/content_5329033.htm>; “The Promulgation and 

Implementation of the ‘Comprehensive Emergency Plan for the Military’s Handling 

of Sudden Incidents’” [《军队处置突发事件总体应急预案》颁布实施], Xinhua Online, 

November 14, 2006, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2006-11/14/

content_5328431.htm>; “‘The Comprehensive Emergency Plan for the Military’s 

Handling of Sudden Incidents’ Reflects a People-Oriented Approach” [《军队处置突

发事件总体应急预案》体现以人为本], Xinhua Online, November 14, 2006, available at 

<http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2006-11/14/content_5328890.htm>.

3 “‘The Comprehensive Emergency Plan for the Military’s Handling of Sudden Incidents’ Reflects a People-Oriented Approach.”

4 This section of the Web site is available at <www.gov.cn/yjgl>.

5 Peijun Shi et al., “Integrated Disaster Risk Management,” Organisation for 

Economic Co-operation and Development, Session III: Financial Management: Role 

of Insurance Industry, Financial Markets, and Governments, Part B: Developing 

Country Perspective, Hyderabad, India, February 26–27, 2007, available at <www.

oecd.org/finance/insurance/38120232.pdf>.

6 While the SARS outbreak was not the sole emergency that sparked these 

efforts, it was a culminating event and is frequently cited in articles highlighting 

the need to improve China’s crisis management capabilities. Other examples of 

emergencies that occurred in China in the early and mid-2000s that got domestic or 

international attention include: the Nanchang nursery fire in 2001, the Nandan mine 

accident in 2001, food poisoning in Nanjing in 2002, an avian flu outbreak in 2004–

2005, and the Songhua River benzene spill in 2005. For articles discussing the significance of the SARS outbreak specifically, see “Sudden Public Incident Emergency 

Management” [突发公共事件应急管理], Xinhua Online, January 17, 2006, available 

at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2006-01/17/content_4062615.htm>; “Xinhua 

Viewpoint: Perspective on Sudden Public Emergency Plan Framework System” [新华

视点: 突发公共事件应急预案框架体系透视], People’s Daily Online [人民网], February 

25, 2005, available at <www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/28320/44506/44513/3207170.

html>; Gao Xiaoping [高小平], “Achievement and Development of the Emergency 

Management System Construction with Chinese Characteristics” [中国特色应急管理
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体系建设的成就和发展], People’s Daily Online, December 2, 2008, available at <http://

theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49152/8448741.html>; and Peijun Shi et al., 3.

7 China’s system of emergency response plans is known formally as the 

National Sudden Public Incident Emergency Response System [quanguo tufa gonggong shijian yingji yu’an tixi, 全国突发公共事件应急预案体系]. A Xinhua article documents a series of important dates in the evolution of this system of emergency planning. In December 2003, the Office of the State Council established an emergency 

response plan working group [yingji yu’an gongzuo xiaozu, 应急预案工作小组]. In 

January 2004, a work conference was called to draw up a plan for public emergencies for all State Council departments and units. In January 2005, the Politburo 

Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party approved, in principle, the 

State Council’s report on the formulation of a national plan for emergency response. 

In February 2005, the State Council reported on the status of the national plan for 

emergency response to the National People’s Congress. In April 2005, the State 

Council decided to adopt and implement the National Comprehensive Emergency 

Response Plan for Sudden Incidents. In May-June 2005, the State Council published 

and distributed 25 special contingency plans and 80 departmental emergency 

response plans and provincial-level plans began to be released. See “Sudden Public 

Incident Emergency Management.”

8 Peijun Shi et al., 3, 7, 13–15. An example of a law with which any PRC 

emergency response would need to be institutionally integrated is the Emergency 

Response Law of the People’s Republic of China. Emergency Response Law of the 

People’s Republic of China, Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China, 

no. 69, August 30, 2007, National Peoples’ Congress Web site, available at <www.npc.

gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471589.htm>.

9 In Chinese, guojia tufa gonggong shijian zongti yingji yu’an, 国家突发公共事

件总体应急预案.

10 The descriptions are primarily excerpts from section 1.6 in the National 

Comprehensive Emergency Response Plan for Sudden Public Incidents.

11 Ibid.

12 News coverage of the activation of emergency plans in early October 

2012 documents the activation of emergency plans by a private bus company, 

the Hangzhou Changyun Group, and a hospital, the Tianjin Wuqing District 

People’s Hospital. See “Four Big Hangzhou Bus Stations Grant Over 200,000 

Passengers Free Ticket Exchanges or Refunds Within a Three Day Period” [杭州

四大汽车站发送旅客20万余人次 三天内可免费退换票], Zhejiang Online News [浙

江在线新闻], September 30, 2012, available at <http://zjnews.zjol.com.cn/system/2012/09/30/018849364.shtml>; and “6 Dead and 14 Injured in Car Accident 

of a Delegation of German Doctors to Tianjin; Passengers Had to Smash Windows 

to Escape” [德国医生代表团天津遇车祸6死14伤 乘客砸窗逃], People’s Daily Online, 
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October 2, 2012, available at <http://ah.people.com.cn/n/2012/1002/c227130-

17545417.html>.

13 See “Meteorological Emergency Plans Activated for the Start of the Beijing 

Olympic Games Closing Ceremony” [北京奥运会闭幕式气象应急预案启动], Xinhua Online, August 23, 2008, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-08/23/content_9639947.htm>; and “Shanghai Municipal Vice Mayor: The 

World Expo is to Pay Close Attention to the Preparation and Implementation of Medical, Security, and Other Emergency Plans” [上海市常务副市长:世博会正抓紧编制和

实施医疗、安保等应急预案], Xinhua Online, September 29, 2009, available at <http://

news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-09/29/content_12127618.htm>.

14 The existence of 25 contingency emergency plans and 80 departmental 

emergency plans is documented in “Sudden Public Incident Emergency Management;” and “16 Big Recent Administrative Reform System Achievements, Inspirations, and the System’s Deficiencies” [16大以来行政体制改革成就、启示和现行体制

的不足], Xinhua Online, July 16, 2012, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/

legal/2012-07/16/c_123416297.htm>.

15 See Peijun Shi et al., 11. All of the authors are Chinese researchers affiliated 

with disaster management research institutes or authorities in China.

16 This total does not include the 80 departmental plans.

17 This was the English term the authors used. Presumably this term refers to 

state-owned enterprises.

18 Peijun Shi et al., 11.

19 National Comprehensive Emergency Response Plan for Sudden Public 

Incidents, section 1.3.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., section 3.1.

22 Some individual plans do provide more insight. For example, the National 

Emergency Plan on Flood Control and Drought Relief differentiates between the 

types of floods and droughts that qualify as a Level I, II, III, and IV incident. See section 4.2, “National Emergency Plan on Flood Control and Drought Relief (Full Text)” 

[国家防汛抗旱应急预案(全文)], People’s Daily Online, January 12, 2006, available at 

<http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/4021376.html>.

23 Peijun Shi et al., 11.

24 The Chinese term for State Council Standing Committee is guowuyuan 

changwu huiyi, 国务院常务会议. It could also be translated as State Council Executive Meeting, or Executive Meeting of the State Council. Regardless, the participants 

appear to be the same. They include the premier, four vice premiers, five state councilors, and the secretary general of the State Council. The sudden incident command 
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organizations are not described in this plan; however, pages 89–90 of this chapter 

provide an example of what such groups might look like.

25 The Chinese term for this office is yingji guanli bangongshi, 应急管理办公室.

26 National Comprehensive Emergency Response Plan for Sudden Public 

Incidents, section 2.

27 Peijun Shi et al., 7.

28 A diagram of these institutions is provided at Peijun Shi et al., 8.

29 Ibid., 7.

30 China National Commission for Disaster Reduction, People’s Republic of 

China, “Organizational Structure,” available at <www.jianzai.gov.cn//DRpublish/

jggl/00010008-1.html>. 

31 The plan calls these steps “operations mechanisms” [yunxing jizhi, 运行

机制]. See National Comprehensive Emergency Response Plan for Sudden Public 

Incidents, section 3.

32 Ibid., section 3.1.

33 The Chinese term for “State Council-related emergency command organization” is guowuyuan xiangguan yingji zhihui jigou, 国务院相关应急指挥机构, and 

“State Council task force” is guowuyuan gongzuozutong, 国务院工作组统.

34 National Comprehensive Emergency Response Plan for Sudden Public 

Incidents, section 3.2.

35 Ibid., section 3.3.

36 Ibid., section 3.4.

37 Ibid., section 4.0.

38 Ibid., section 5.0.

39 See the emergency management section of the PRC government Web 

site with lists of contingency plans available at <www.gov.cn/yjgl/2006-01/11/content_21049.htm> and departmental plans available at <www.gov.cn/yjgl/2005-08/07/

content_21051.htm>. See also “National System of Plans for Sudden Public Incidents, 

Full Text” [国家突发公共事件预案体系全文], People’s Daily Online, January 12, 2006, 

available at <http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/57347/57350/4021527.html>. 

40 Broadly speaking, leading small groups are important mechanisms for 

the Chinese Communist Party to make decisions and maintain control over various 

parts of the government. See Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution 

to Reform (New York: Norton and Company, 1995), 209, 213.

41 The Chinese term for this group is guojia tongxin baozhang yingji lingdao 

xiaozu, 国家通信保障应急领导小组. The plan was issued in 2006, when MIIT had 
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not yet been created. The reference in the plan is to the Ministry of Information and 

Industry, the predecessor to MIIT. See National Emergency Response Plan on Communication Support [国家通信保障应急预案], People’s Daily Online, January 24, 2006, 

at <http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/4059051.html>.

42 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, People’s Republic of 

China, “Ministry of Industry and Information Technology Holds 2012 National 

Inter-Provincial Emergency Communication Drill” [工业和信息化部举行2012年国家

应急通信跨省演练], September 4, 2012, available at <www.gov.cn/gzdt/2012-09/04/

content_2216401.htm>.

43 National Emergency Response Plan on Maritime Search and Rescue [国家

海上搜救应急预案], People’s Daily Online, January 23, 2006, available at <http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/4055359.html>.

44 This is just one of many examples of the Chinese government activating 

emergency plans in response to a disaster. Also, given the scale of the disaster, it may 

have attracted a higher level of participation from, and scrutiny by, national-level 

officials. Additional research comparing how the response to this disaster was 

handled in comparison to other larger and smaller scale disasters would provide 

more insight into the regularity with which these plans are activated, how the plans 

may actually affect emergency response, and how frequently higher level officials are 

involved in responding to local-level emergencies.

45 Zhao Yinan, “Donations Pour in for Yiliang Quake Victims,” China Daily 

Online, September 11, 2012, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-

09/11/content_15748654.htm>, and Chen Zhi, ed., “Earthquake Aftermath in Yiliang 

Yunnan,” Xinhua Online, September 8, 2012, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.

com/english/photo/2012-09/08/c_131837014.htm>.

46 Chen Zhi.

47 Ibid.

48 For the national level for example, see “Rolling Broadcast: 5.7 Level Earthquake 

Occurs in Yiliang, Yunnan, with 16 Aftershocks” [滚动播报:云南彝良发生5.7级地震 发

生余震16次], China Daily Online, September 7, 2012, available at <www.chinadaily.com.

cn/dfpd/dfshehui/2012-09-07/content_6946786.html>. At the provincial level, for example, see “Yunnan Province Earthquake Bureau: Yunnan Province Earthquake Bureau 

Activates Level IV Emergency Response” [云南省地震局:云南省地震局启动IV级应急响

应], September 7, 2012, available at <www.gov.cn/gzdt/2012-09/07/content_2219140.

htm>. At the local level, for example, see “Yiliang County, Yunnan Province Earthquake 

Kills 64 and Injures 715” [云南省彝良县地震已造成64人遇难 715人受伤], September 7, 

2012, available at <www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-09/07/content_2219201.htm>.

49 For the China Earthquake Administration, see “Rolling Broadcast: 5.7 Level 

Earthquake Occurs in Yiliang, Yunnan, with 16 Aftershocks;” for the Yunnan Bureau 
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of Agriculture, see “Yiliang Agriculture Seriously Affected by Disaster: Yunnan 

Activates Agricultural Disaster Prevention Emergency Plan” [彝良农业受灾严重 云南

启动农业减灾防灾应急预案], September 8, 2012, available at <www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-

09/08/content_2219581.htm>; for the Public Security Bureau Fire Prevention Team, 

see “Yunnan Province Public Security Fire Prevention Team to Mobilize Many Local 

Fire Team’s Rescue Forces to Rush to the Area of the Earthquake” [云南公安消防总

队调集多地消防支队地震应急救援力量赶赴震区], People’s Daily Online, September 

7, 2012, available at <http://society.people.com.cn/n/2012/0907/c223276-18949820.

html>; for the Chengdu Military Region, see the summary of “Chengdu Military 

Region: More than 1,000 Soldiers Rush to the Rescue at the Sichuan-Yunnan Border 

to Assist with Earthquake Relief” [成都军区千余兵力驰援川滇交界抗震救灾], provided 

in “Hu Jintao and Others’ Instructions: Rapidly Organize for Earthquake Relief and 

Ensure the Safety of People’s Lives and Property” [胡锦涛等指示:迅速组织力量抗震

救灾确保人民生命财产安全], China Daily Online, available at <www.chinadaily.com.

cn/micro-reading/mfeed/hotwords/20120907963_3.html>; and for the power company, see summary of “Yunnan Power Rapidly Activates Emergency Plan to Restore 

Power” [云南电网迅速启动预案响应全力组织抢险复电], provided in “Hu Jintao and 

Others’ Instructions: Rapidly Organize for Earthquake Relief and Ensure the Safety 

of People’s Lives and Property.”

50 “The Power of a Cohesive Rescue Effort—Every Locality and Every Department Rushes to the Area of the Earthquake” [力量在救援集结号下凝聚——各地各

部门驰援震区], September 8, 2012, available at <www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-09/08/content_2219925.htm>.

51 “Armed Forces and Armed Police Devote Their Full Effort to Doing Yunnan 

Earthquake Relief Work” [全军和武警部队全力以赴投入云南抗震救灾工作], September 8, 2012, available at <www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-09/08/content_2219883.htm>.

52 “Rescuers Make an All-Out Effort in Yiliang, Yunnan,” Sina English, September 9, 2012, available at <http://english.sina.com/china/p/2012/0909/504807.

html>.

53 “Ministry of Public Security and Related Organizations Begin Earthquake 

Relief Work in Yunnan and Guizhou” [公安部部署组织开展云南贵州地震抗震救灾工作], 

September 8, 2012, available at <www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-09/08/content_2219837.htm>.

54 Ministry of Civil Affairs, People’s Republic of China, “Ministry of Civil 

Affairs Dispatches 10,000 Tents to Earthquake Stricken Areas in Yunnan” [民政部向云

南地震灾区紧急调运1万顶救灾帐篷等], September 8, 2012, available at <www.gov.cn/

gzdt/2012-09/08/content_2219813.htm>.

55 Ibid.

56 Peijun Shi et al., 3, 7, 13–15.

57 Ibid.

107

For the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA), the nature of modern war has evolved as a result of major shifts 

in the larger global political and technological context. Consequently, 

Chinese concepts of mobilization have also been refined and taken on greater 

importance as a means of reconciling military and national economic modernization efforts. Where mobilization once focused on maximizing the amount of 

human, material, and financial power that could be brought to bear in a major 

conflict, the PRC now views mobilization as an essential means of allowing 

maximum peacetime development of those same resources while having in 

place the mechanisms and plans to exploit them in the event of conflict.

This chapter examines current Chinese policies on mobilization in the era 

of “Local Wars Under High-Tech Conditions” [gaojishu tiaojian xia jubu zhanzheng, 高技术条件下局部战争] and “Local Wars Under Informationized Conditions” [xinxihua tiaojian xia jubu zhanzheng, 信息化条件下局部战争]. It reviews 

the 2010 law governing national defense mobilization and the organizational 

structures that have been put in place to manage any mobilization effort. 

Evolving Concepts of Modern Warfare 

Since the early 1990s and the Gulf War, the PLA has been reforming its conception 

of how modern wars will be fought. At the same time, it has also had to deal with 

the ongoing process of economic reform, which has altered its relationship with 

the larger economy and polity. This has involved a revision of not only doctrine 

and operational concepts, but also of the PLA’s approach to “army-building.”

From a focus under Mao Zedong on preparing for “early [imminent] war, 

major war, nuclear war” [zaoda, dada, dahe zhanzheng, 早打, 大打, 打核战

CHAPTER 5

Converting the Potential to the Actual: 

Chinese Mobilization Policies and Planning

Dean Cheng
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争], the PRC has shifted to an assumption that major wars are unlikely in 

an international system that is largely peaceful. Consequently, there is less 

need to concentrate all national resources on military purposes, but there is a 

corresponding increase in emphasis on national defense mobilization [guofang dongyuan, 国防动员], also known as wartime mobilization [zhanzheng 

dongyuan, 战争动员]. National defense mobilization (hereafter simply referred 

to as mobilization) entails “the set of actions undertaken to shift from a peacetime stance into a wartime stance, for the unified activation of manpower, 

material power, and financial power.”1

Under Deng Xiaoping, civil-military integration became an essential 

part of both national defense and national development efforts. Deng created 

the 16-character formulation of civil-military integration that still underpins 

much of the Chinese thinking on mobilization: the military and the people 

are united; wartime and peacetime (functions) are united; military goods are 

given preference; civilian resources are used to support the military [junmin 

jiehe, pingzhan jiehe, junpin youxian, yi min yang jun, 军民结合, 平战结合, 军

品优先, 以民养军]. 

In the course of the 1980s and 1990s, the PRC revised its outlook on both 

future wars and economic development. According to PLA theorists, the previous assessment of conflicts had been that they would be “Local Wars” and 

“Local Wars Under Modern Conditions.” By the late 1990s, this had shifted to 

“Local Wars Under High-Technology Conditions,” and in 2004 it evolved into 

“Local Wars Under Informationized Conditions.” These shifts required the PLA 

to prepare not only for mechanized warfare [jixiehua zhanzheng, 机械化战争], 

but also for warfare involving information technology (or informationized) 

warfare [xinxihua zhanzheng, 信息化战争]. This, in turn, placed a higher premium on the incorporation of science and technology into both weapons and 

training, in order to field both advanced weapons and a force whose personnel 

could handle the new weapons.

Providing trained personnel and advanced weapons could not come at 

the expense of economic modernization, however. Indeed, national development [guojia jianshe, 国家建设] continues to be accorded higher priority than 

purely military development or “army-building” [jundui jianshe, 军队建设]. 

Consequently, the PLA and the overall Chinese leadership also began to pay 

renewed attention to the issue of mobilization. 
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Growing Role for Mobilization 

Mobilization is the means by which the full array of comprehensive national 

power, including economic and financial wherewithal as well as scientific 

talent and technological capacity, can be brought to bear on an enemy after 

some period of mobilization. Given the priority accorded national economic 

development, the PLA must rely upon mobilization to gain maximum military 

power from China’s national potential. 

The short notice and decisive nature of “Local Wars Under Informationized Conditions” place a premium on being able to mobilize promptly and 

effectively. This is further complicated by the emphasis on advanced weaponry 

and technical capability in fighting “Local Wars Under Informationized Conditions,” which makes mobilization much more complex than simply arming 

the masses with basic weapons. Proper mobilization for such conflicts requires 

mobilizing not only industrial plants but also transportation assets. In order 

to deal with high-tech wars, mobilization also entails exploiting science and 

technology. There must also be adequate mobilization planning and training 

in order to fully convert the disparate elements of comprehensive national 

power into effective military capability. These considerations also require, 

in turn, that national construction efforts should incorporate mobilization 

elements in order to improve mobilization response, should it be necessary.2

This also extends to the financial realm; mobilization is not simply a command 

system for acquiring civilian facilities and assets but also involves mobilizing 

the wherewithal to pay for wars. 

For all of these reasons, PLA analyses note that mobilization is not something that can be improvised, but instead requires extensive advance peacetime 

preparations. In order to undertake proper mobilization, the PRC leadership 

created a separate bureaucracy, in the form of the National Defense Mobilization 

Committees, and a set of supporting laws, including the Reserve Officers Law 

(1995), the People’s Air Defense Law (1996), the National Defense Law (1997), 

and the National Defense Education Law (2001), culminating in the Defense 

Mobilization Law of 2010. These laws, and the attendant mobilization organization, are essential elements for mobilization planning and implementation. 

Components of Mobilization3

For the PLA, mobilization involves the conversion of several broad categories of 

resources from potential sources of national strength to actual military power. 
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These include armed forces mobilization, People’s Air Defense (PAD) mobilization, political mobilization, information mobilization, national economic 

mobilization, transportation combat preparations mobilization, equipment 

mobilization, and mobilization of science and technology (S&T).

Armed forces mobilization [wuzhuang liliang dongyuan, 武装力量动员] 

refers to the shift of military and other armed organizations from a peacetime 

structure [pingshi tizhi, 平时体质] toward a wartime structure [zhanshi tizhi, 

战时体制] and is considered the core of national defense mobilization. Once 

mobilization is ordered, the first task associated with armed forces mobilization 

is the rapid expansion of active-duty PLA units and the transition of reserve 

forces to active duty. At the same time, other elements of the armed forces (for 

example, the People’s Armed Police) should shift to a wartime footing, with 

corresponding mobilization of military equipment and resources, so that forces 

are at their notional table of organization and equipment. 

PLA writings indicate that armed forces mobilization comprises three 

separate strands: troop mobilization [bingyuan dongyuan, 兵员动员], weapons 

and equipment mobilization [wuqi zhuangbei dongyuan, 武器装备动员], and 

logistics and material mobilization [houqin wuzi dongyuan, 后勤物资动员]. 

This last aspect involves mobilization of suitable petroleum, oil, and lubricants 

(POL), transport, and medical assets to support military expansion and sustain 

operations.4

People’s Air Defense mobilization [renmin fangkong dongyuan, 人民防空动

员], also termed “mass-style defensive mobilization” [qunzhongxing fangwei 

dongyuan, 群众性防卫动员] or “civil defense mobilization” [minfang dongyuan, 

民防动员], refers to the national organization of defensive preparations for the 

civilian population against enemy air attack. Key components of PAD include: 

• protective measures for the population at large. This includes not only 

construction of shelters, dispersal sites, and decontamination facilities, 

as well as stockpiling necessary equipment for repairs, but also propaganda and education regarding air defense measures and knowledge. 

• creation of specialized air defense units for rescue operations, damage 

repair, firefighting, road clearance, and preservation of public safety 

• establishment of an early warning network and safeguarding capacity.5

Political mobilization [zhengzhi dongyuan, 政治动员] refers to those organizational measures and broader activities that will create a good political 
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environment for conducting a conflict or responding to a crisis or emergency. 

Successful political mobilization will help safeguard and ensure the smooth 

implementation of all the other elements of mobilization. The goal is to ignite 

patriotic fervor among the broad military and civilian populations, inspire the 

military to greater heroism and sacrifice, and mobilize the population toward 

greater support for national efforts.6

It is important to note that political mobilization includes efforts not only 

to enhance domestic support but also to attract foreign support, and therefore 

includes diplomatic mobilization. Political mobilization measures include:

• adjusting national political structures to accommodate wartime 

requirements

• orchestrating broad patriotic support, conducting national defense 

education, and strengthening national spirit and will

• activating various social organizations to provide support for the war 

effort

• engaging in diplomatic activities and foreign propaganda, so as to 

strengthen and broaden international support from both foreign nations 

and populations. 

Information mobilization [xinxi dongyuan, 信息动员] refers to those activities and organizational measures undertaken to ensure that there are sufficient information resources, facilities, technology, and talent to meet military 

requirements. It involves mobilizing manpower and material assets involved 

with the collection, transmission, storage, and/or management of information, 

as well as management of the electromagnetic spectrum.7

 Information mobilization measures include not only wartime conversion of civilian and commercial assets, but also incorporating considerations of wartime requirements into 

peacetime development of national information industries and infrastructure, 

at both the national and local levels.8

Because of the increasingly central role of information and information 

technology, especially in the context of informationized warfare, information 

mobilization has correspondingly assumed greater importance. Aspects of 

information mobilization include: 

• expanding information equipment production capacity

• organizing information personnel and facilities and adjusting communications networks to support front-line military requirements
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• ensuring that communications and information networks are secure 

and functional through the creation of safeguarding, repair, and construction units

• employing civilian information resources [shehui xinxi liliang, 社会信

息力量], including personnel and equipment, in electronic combat and 

network offense and defense.9

National economic mobilization [guomin jingji dongyuan, 国民经济动

员] refers to the transition of economic resources from peacetime to wartime 

production and the attendant shift of economic departments and their corresponding structures from a peacetime stance to a wartime stance. Economic 

mobilization is considered a special form of economic activity, distinguished by 

the fact that it affects almost all aspects of the nation’s economy and is intended 

to promote national security.10 Successful economic mobilization requires a 

unified national leadership to oversee plans for the coordinated mobilization 

of industry, agriculture, natural resources, transportation, finance, communications, science and technology, and other such material areas. 

Transportation combat preparations mobilization [jiaotong zhanbei 

dongyuan, 交通战备动员] involves mobilization of all forms of national transportation, including railways, highways, waterways, and airways. Transportation mobilization is essential for redeploying military forces, personnel, and 

equipment and for ensuring that vital industries are sustained, that industrial 

production reaches its intended consumers, and that personnel and equipment 

can be dispersed and moved as necessary. 

As with other forms of mobilization, Chinese concepts of transportation 

mobilization include organizational components as well as mobilization 

measures and activities. Thus, they include shifting government ministries 

associated with transportation from a peacetime to a wartime footing, as well 

as organizing safeguarding units that can repair and defend key transportation 

assets and lines. Transportation mobilization measures also include, at the 

order of higher levels, cutting off [zheduan, 折断] certain regions.11

Equipment mobilization [zhuangbei dongyuan, 装备动员] refers to the 

incorporation of civilian and commercial equipment, associated facilities, and 

other assets to support wartime requirements. It includes the organization and 

activation of stockpiles of equipment and raw materials; the drafting of civilian 

equipment; and the redirection of both production and research capabilities 

toward wartime ends. It also includes the mobilization of relevant technical 
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personnel to provide maintenance, support, and other safeguarding functions 

for these assets. Equipment mobilization, like national economic mobilization, 

allows for maximum peacetime reliance on the market for efficient allocation 

of resources, while also meeting those national requirements that arise in 

wartime or in event of crisis or emergency.12

Science and technology (S&T) mobilization [keji dongyuan, 科技动员] refers 

to organizing and adjusting civilian, commercial, and governmental scientific 

research departments to undertake military research and development, while 

incorporating specialists, scholars, engineers, and technical personnel to 

support such research and to supplement military technical operations. The 

purpose of S&T mobilization is to concentrate available scientific research 

capabilities to apply extant scientific advances to military operations and 

wartime production, while also accelerating research and development so as 

to create new advantages in weapons, equipment, and technology. 

According to PLA assessments, the mobilization of science and technology 

effectively acts as a force multiplier for human and material power, substantially increasing the ability to generate real military power.13 They highlight S&T 

mobilization as a major factor in the development of the atomic bomb and the 

V-1 and V-2 rockets, as well as more recent developments such as the Patriot 

surface-to-air missile and the F-117 stealth fighter.14

Guiding Thoughts and Principles of Mobilization 

PLA analyses note that mobilization is no different from other aspects of 

military science, insofar as there are scientific abstractions that constitute 

the foundation for national defense mobilization. These abstractions take 

the form of guiding thoughts and principles that, once derived, should guide 

mobilization activities. 

As noted earlier, the guiding thought for PLA mobilization thinking 

remains rooted in Deng Xiaoping’s 16-character general guideline [zongfangzhen, 总方针], which calls for the shifting of technological and industrial 

resources from the defense sector to the civilian side, in order to facilitate 

national economic construction.15 Under Jiang Zemin, this general guideline 

was modified to “link the military and civilian, link peacetime and wartime, 

embed the military in the civilian” [junmin jiehe, pingzhan jiehe, yu bing yu 

min, 军民结合, 平战结合, 寓兵于民].16 The modification would seem to reflect a 

further shift toward emphasizing national economic construction, with the 
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military’s needs embedded within it. Hu Jintao, in turn, further emphasized 

the integrated nature of the civilian and military economies by adding “melded-style development” [ronghe shi fazhan, 融合式发展] to Jiang’s formulation.17

Under this evolving set of broad general guidelines, the PLA sought to 

develop a set of principles [yuanze, 原则] to govern mobilization planning and 

organization consistent with the broader PLA approach to military science, 

which involves determining guidelines and principles to help guide policy. In 

line with the passage of the National Defense Mobilization Law, it would appear 

that the following constitute consensus principles regarding mobilization.18

Unified leadership [tongyi lingdao, 统一领导]. Given the complexities associated with mobilization, it is essential that there be a streamlined, unified 

leadership structure for planning and implementing mobilization. According 

to Chapter 2, Section 9 of the National Defense Mobilization Law, as well as the 

Chinese constitution and National Defense Law, the State Council and Central 

Military Commission (CMC) will together exercise unified leadership over all 

aspects of mobilization work, including planning, preparation, and implementation. The State Council is responsible for leading and managing national 

defense construction (as well as national economic construction), while the 

CMC is responsible for managing the nation’s armed forces. The two together 

will lead mobilization preparation and implementation work.19

As specified in the National Defense Mobilization Law, however, between 

the national and county levels (that is, at the provincial and prefectural levels), 

mobilization activities are the responsibility of the state, consistent with legal 

authorities and higher-level directives, and not the Chinese Communist Party 

(CCP) or the military.20 This is consistent with the earlier National Defense Law, 

which specified the same allocation of authority.21

Population-wide participation [quanmin canyu, 全民参与]. From the Chinese perspective, despite the growing importance of information technology, 

the support of the population remains a vital factor in determining wartime 

victory. It is therefore still necessary to mobilize the populace. This involves 

two aspects. 

First, it is essential to actively integrate the broad civilian populace and 

associated resources into the planning and implementation of mobilization 

efforts. Successfully linking civilian resources (including manpower) with 

military requirements combines the sustainment of fewer military forces in 

peacetime with the ability to field more forces in time of war.22 Thus, national 
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defense mobilization work includes not only military forces, but also political, 

economic, S&T, education, culture, health, and many other resources. 

Second, it is vital to ensure popular support for a conflict, especially in the 

face of potential enemy attacks. Thus, Chinese mobilization writings also note 

the need for engaging in political mobilization, including such measures as 

political propaganda and encouragement of patriotic fervor and sentiment.23

National defense education [guofang jiaoyu, 国防教育] and specifically national 

defense mobilization education [guofang dongyuan jiaoyu, 国防动员教育] are 

considered essential parts of mobilization efforts. Such efforts are intended to 

establish a firm foundation of national defense theory within the entire populace, so that every person, no matter their position or occupation, will feel a 

personal sense of responsibility and a stake in defending the nation and thus 

will support mobilization activities.24

Importance of planning and oversight [tongchou jiangu, 统筹兼顾]. PLA writings emphasize that army building [jundui jianshe, 军队建设] remains subordinate to national economic construction. Equally important is the idea that only by 

expanding all of the facets of comprehensive national power can the military enjoy 

sustainable, long-term growth. Consequently, planning for long-term military 

security requires concomitant, coordinated planning for economic development, 

including the forging, in turn, of a strong scientific and technological base. 

As the hallmark of the times remains “peace and development,” there 

must be a focus on developing the broad national economy without neglecting 

defense modernization. Mobilization work occurs within this context, consistent with both economic and military construction. Mobilization preparations 

will increase comprehensive national power, but only if they are organically 

integrated into both economic and military construction in a coordinated 

manner. Thus, only by firmly holding to the principle of undertaking planning 

and oversight of both elements can mutual support between national defense 

mobilization work and economic construction be realized. Interestingly, over 

the last several years, there has also been additional emphasis placed on linking mobilization planning and implementation structures to crisis response 

and disaster relief. 

Long-term development [changqi fazhan, 长期发展]. According to Chinese 

assessments, because it includes manpower, material, and financial aspects, 

mobilization is a major piece of systems engineering, requiring the coordination of a disparate range of capabilities and efforts. Mobilization can be 
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CHENG

successfully implemented only if national economic construction [guojia jingji 

jianshe, 国家经济建设], national defense construction [guofang jianshe, 国防建

设], and armed forces construction [wuzhuang liliang jianshe, 武装力量建设] 

are linked from the outset. 

To this end, mobilization preparations encompass a wide range of measures that must be integrated into the earliest stages of project planning and 

budgeting. Many aspects of mobilization require either sustained commitment 

of resources, such as the creation and maintenance of strategic stockpiles, or 

else regular refreshing, such as mobilization planning, calculating mobilization potential, and mobilization training.25

Key point construction [zhongdian jianshe, 重点建设]. The complement 

to long-term planning is key point construction. Long-term planning can 

succeed only when there is a persistent focus on the essentials. Thus, according to PLA writings, successful mobilization requires focusing efforts on key 

points. The starting key point for all mobilization preparations is supporting 

the ability to fight and win “Local Wars Under Informationized Conditions.” 

Another key point is mobilization of armed forces strength [wuzhuang liliang, 

武装力量], which is considered the core of national defense mobilization. 

The extent and level of armed forces construction will directly affect the 

likelihood of victory. 

Another key point for mobilization construction is developing national S&T 

levels. The rapid development of science and technology has deeply influenced 

modern warfare; the concept of “Local Wars Under Informationized Conditions” has further increased its impact.26 Consequently, the ability to mobilize 

scientific and technological assets, facilities, and personnel will directly affect a 

nation’s ability to fight and win modern conflicts—which are seen, at one level, 

as a contest between respective arrays of high technology. 

According to this principle, then, effective national mobilization efforts 

must establish priorities. These include the provision of immediate mobilization support to the armed forces and support of the mobilization of scientific 

and technical assets and talent. 

Sequencing and effectiveness [youxu gaoxiao, 有序高效]. This principle 

calls for improving the effectiveness of mobilization planning and implementation. Sequencing refers to the idea that mobilization preparations, 

planning, and demobilization must be carefully coordinated, so as to minimize mutual interference. One aspect of sequencing is ensuring that mobili-
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zation occurs first along the key point strategic direction [zhongdian zhanlüe 

fangxiang, 重点战略方向]. That is, mobilization should begin where conflict or 

crisis is most likely so that mobilized resources are promptly at hand while 

national disruption is minimized. Another aspect of sequencing is that there 

must be proper coordination among the disparate elements of mobilization, 

so that there is minimal mutual interference as the various components of 

mobilization are activated. High effectiveness refers to shifting the focus of 

mobilization from sheer mass to quality and from numbers of people to levels 

of science and technology.27

Legal Structures of Mobilization 

The enactment of the National Defense Mobilization Law in 2010 put in place 

a long-missing piece of China’s legal structure governing mobilization. In the 

PLA’s conception, mobilization laws and regulations [dongyuan falü yu fagui, 

动员法律与法规], often shortened to dongyuan fagui [动员法规] provide the 

framework for peacetime mobilization preparations as well as wartime mobilization implementation.28

The key point of mobilization laws and regulations is to lay out explicitly 

what missions need to be accomplished for successful wartime mobilization 

and what lines of authority exist to fulfill those missions [zhanzheng dongyuan 

zhong de quanli he yiwu, 战争动员中的权力和义务]. Mobilization laws and 

regulations serve to inform the populace as a whole, as well as all levels of 

government, the military, and relevant organizations, of these missions and 

lines of authority. Furthermore, mobilization laws and regulations codify and 

institutionalize the means for implementing wartime mobilization [dongyuan 

gongzuo tiaolihua he zhiduhua, 动员工作条例化和制度化].29

Thus, according to PLA writings, the body of mobilization laws and regulations should include the range of guidelines, policies, missions, mechanisms, 

processes, timing, and organizational structures governing mobilization. It 

should also clearly delineate organizations’ and masses’ assignments and 

duties as well as the people’s rights and responsibilities.30 By creating a single, 

coherent, consistent body of mobilization laws and regulations, and thoroughly 

inculcating this throughout the mobilization structure and apparatus, it is 

hoped that mobilization, if called for, can proceed smoothly.31

According to Chinese analyses, a comprehensive, formal system of laws 

and regulations to govern mobilization nationwide is essential in order to cre-
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ate consistency across provinces, across different levels of government, and 

across different components of mobilization. Moreover, the system of laws and 

regulations helps ensure that each level of government and military command 

understands its missions and responsibilities. Furthermore, the National 

Defense Mobilization Law also allows for the imposition of penalties and the 

awarding of bonuses, depending on the level of compliance with mobilization 

mandates and directives. 

In this context, the longstanding absence of a National Mobilization Law 

constituted a serious problem for Chinese mobilization planners. As one Chinese general observed, without a National Mobilization Law it was extremely 

difficult to adopt an overall perspective or develop principles upon which to 

ground mobilization work. It also made it very difficult to formulate more 

specialized mobilization laws for such areas as armed forces mobilization or 

economic mobilization.32

The 2010 National Defense Mobilization Law remedied many of these 

problems. According to one Chinese account:

The National Defense Mobilization Law has 14 sections and 72 parts, 

and encompasses overall principles; organization and leadership 

structures and their authority; national defense mobilization planning; methods for implementing solutions and potential strength 

calculations and investigations; as well as how to link national defense 

construction areas and vital products. It also includes reference to 

reserve personnel call-up and registration; strategic resource stockpiles and use; military item R&D, production, and maintenance 

safeguarding. In addition, there is wartime disaster preparation and 

rescue, national defense logistics, civil-use resource call-up and compensation, propaganda and education, special measures, and legal 

responsibilities.33

Not surprisingly, given its broad purview, the National Defense Mobilization 

Law did not come about easily. Chinese accounts suggest that, despite being 

considered a priority and placed on a fast track for development, the law took 

perhaps 12 years from when it was first conceived (in 1998) until it was finally 

approved. This time period included convening various study groups to analyze 

specific aspects of the law, soliciting views from disparate parts of the Chinese 

bureaucracy, including such elements as the Guangzhou Military Region and 
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the Ministry of Finance, and the apparent submission of a draft in 2005, which 

was not accepted by the State Council and the Central Military Commission.34

Organizational Structures of Mobilization 

One of the most significant aspects of the National Defense Mobilization Law 

was its specification of the lines of authority vested in the various organizations 

that manage China’s mobilization activities.35 While these had been implicitly 

understood and even explicitly discussed (for example, in the PLA’s Mobilization Encyclopedia) prior to the law’s passage, PLA analyses had emphasized 

the need for a formal, definitive clarification. This was provided in the National 

Defense Mobilization Law. 

Chinese analysts view national defense mobilization as a two-part process. In peacetime, the PLA lays out its requirements; the state, in cooperation 

with the commercial sector, will develop plans and policies to meet those 

requirements and incorporate them into defense construction and economic 

construction plans. There should be steady deconfliction of any competing 

demands and requirements that emerge.36 In wartime, those plans are then 

implemented so that, ideally, only the inevitable exigencies of war have to 

be addressed. 

To achieve these aims, PLA analyses conclude that the mobilization structure is comprised of three essential elements:

• mobilization decisionmaking—the formulation of mobilization plans 

in peacetime and the decision to implement them in wartime

• mobilization coordination—the coordination of various mobilizationrelated activities across the various levels of government and among 

the various organizations and bureaucracies involved in both the planning and implementation phases, so as to resolve any contradictions 

that arise

• mobilization implementation—the actual execution of mobilization 

policy.37

Each of these tasks, in turn, has its own structure: there is an organization responsible for the decisionmaking associated with mobilization, an 

organization charged with coordinating the various parts of the state, party, 

military, and economy, and finally, a structure for executing or implementing 

mobilization. 
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Mobilization Decisionmaking Structure 

China’s mobilization decisionmaking structure [dongyuan juece jigou, 动员决策

机构] governs mobilization planning and implementation. PLA writings describe 

the mobilization decisionmaking structure as the basic nervous system of the 

mobilization system. This structure has several fundamental responsibilities: 

• to assess the strategic environment and to undertake mobilization 

preparations and implementation based on that assessment

• to create and promulgate the guidelines, principles, and policies to govern peacetime mobilization preparations and wartime implementation 

• to monitor the development of mobilization guidelines and plans and 

ensure that they provide enough time for the national leadership to 

undertake mobilization 

• to issue the directives for peacetime mobilization preparation and wartime mobilization implementation as well as to ensure that mobilization 

will be regularized [guifanhua, 规范化] and orderly

• to inspire the nation to improve production and to be ready to convert 

latent power to combat power.38

According to PLA writings, the decisionmaking structure for Chinese 

mobilization is primarily vested in the state, in the form of the National People’s 

Congress (NPC) and State Council, and in the military, in the form of the PLA’s 

Central Military Commission (CMC). Both bodies, of course, are comprised of 

members of the CCP, so all mobilization (or, for that matter, defense) decisions 

ultimately occur under the aegis of the CCP. Nevertheless, within the legal 

framework, it is primarily the state and the military that are responsible for 

key decisions. This was formally codified in the 1982 PRC constitution and the 

1997 National Defense Law, which state that the State Council and the CMC 

together are charged with undertaking mobilization preparations and mobilization implementation.39 These laws, as well as the National Defense Mobilization Law, “specify that the [mobilization] decisionmaking structure resides 

within the National People’s Congress, and the highest leadership structures 

are the State Council and the Central Military Commission.”40 Specifically, for 

peacetime mobilization planning, decisionmaking rests primarily with the 

State Council, which is responsible for decisions regarding national economic 

construction (including provisions for economic mobilization), and the CMC, 
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which is responsible for decisions regarding military construction (including 

provisions for military mobilization).41 In wartime, the mobilization decisionmaking structure is responsible for concluding that mobilization is necessary 

and then issuing the requisite orders.

Once mobilization is determined to be a necessity, a mobilization order 

or proclamation [dongyuan ling, 动员令] must be issued. In line with Article 

X of the National Defense Law, the NPC (or its Standing Committee if it is not 

in session) is responsible for determining whether to proclaim mobilization 

and whether such mobilization should be local or national. Article XI of the 

National Defense Law states that the premier, based on the NPC’s (or Standing 

Committee’s) determination that mobilization is necessary or that a state of war 

exists, will proclaim a state of war and issue the mobilization proclamation. 

He will then have conferred upon him additional authority, as specified by the 

Chinese constitution.42

Chinese writings note that the decision to undertake mobilization can 

be made only by senior, national-level officials. There are several reasons for 

this. First, the decision to undertake mobilization [jinxing dongyuan juece, 

进行动员决策] is momentous, with repercussions for politics, military affairs, 

the economy, and diplomacy. Moreover, it must be properly timed. If the 

proclamation is issued too early, it will disrupt overall national economic 

affairs and affect societal order. On the other hand, if it is issued too late, the 

nation might be forced into a passive, reactive position in a crisis or conflict.43

In addition, the proclamation is highly complex; it must indicate the timing 

and scale of mobilization as well as respond to likely military requirements. 

For all of these reasons, Chinese writings emphasize, such a decision requires 

national-level authority and the involvement of the most senior officials. It 

cannot be made by local authorities (even those at the military region level). 

Mobilization-related activities cannot commence without the explicit order 

of national-level decisionmakers.44

Mobilization Coordination Structure 

Chinese writings suggest that the PLA considers coordination of activities in 

both the planning and implementation phases to be a vital part of the mobilization process. It is important in peacetime, when mobilization must be planned 

and conflicts between various goals and among various bureaucracies must be 

resolved. It is even more essential in wartime, when problems will inevitably 
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arise; thus, the mobilization coordination structure [dongyuan xietiao jigou, 动

员协调机构] is required. Chinese writings have noted that defense mobilization 

requires multiple forms of coordination. 

Consistent with the overall guideline, for example, there must be coordination between peacetime and wartime needs—specifically, between the 

demands of defense mobilization and those of economic construction. This 

includes both material requirements and financial resourcing. Such coordination, moreover, is necessary not only at the national level, but also at the 

local level, between local officials and their military counterparts. There must 

also be coordination between levels—that is, between the national and local 

authorities (both military and civilian).45

In order to effect this coordination, in November 1994 the PRC replaced 

the unwieldy agglomeration of various commissions, including the National 

People’s Air Defense Commission, the CMC Militia Commission, and the State 

Council and CMC Transportation Combat Preparations Leading Small Group, 

with the system of National Defense Mobilization Committees (NDMCs) [guofang dongyuan weiyuanhui, 国防动员委员会].46 This system of committies is 

responsible for coordinating and implementing mobilization-related activities. 

The purpose of the system is to provide a single, unified leadership structure 

for coordinating mobilization efforts of the relevant agencies, departments, 

and key positions of the military and the state, in conjunction with the party.47 

For each layer of party, state, and military authority, there is a corresponding 

layer within the NDMC structure. 

The overall system serves to provide an institutional basis for senior 

leaders at each level of authority to meet their counterparts from the party, 

the state, and the military. By instituting a mobilization-related set of regular 

meetings, the system is expected to coordinate everyone’s needs and resolve 

issues. The implication of creating an institutional basis for cross-bureaucratic discussions seems to be that the cross-staffing that already occurs 

(especially between the party and the state) is insufficient for the purposes 

of mobilization. 

National-level NDMC. At the apex of the system is the national-level 

National Defense Mobilization Committee, which reports to the CCP Central 

Committee, the CMC, and the State Council. It is headed by the premier of the 

State Council, while its vice chairmen are the vice premier of the State Council 

and one of the vice chairmen of the CMC. Its membership includes represen-
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tatives from the ministries of State Security, Finance, Commerce, Railways, 

Transportation, Health, and Posts and Telecommunications, as well as the 

Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), and other national ministries 

(most of which are also part of the State Council), as well as officers from the 

relevant departments of the General Staff Department (GSD) (the Mobilization 

Department), the General Political Department (the Mass Work Department), 

and the General Logistics Department (GLD).

Finally, the NDMC includes a specialized national defense education element. In 2002, the State Council and the CMC formally created the National 

Defense Education Office within the General Political Department (GPD), to 

help lead nationwide national defense education work. This was seen as an 

important move to smoothly link national defense mobilization and national 

defense education.48

At the national level, the NDMC is responsible for the following tasks: 

• providing guidance to lower levels on relevant matters of mobilization 

work, including setting forth policies and promulgating directives, 

based on the decisions of the party’s Central Committee, NPC, and CMC 

• organizing and setting down laws, regulations, and methods for mobilization work

• organizing mobilization planning

• overseeing compliance with defense mobilization laws, including 

undertaking inspections

• coordinating military, economic, and societal aspects of mobilization 

work

• organizing and leading preparations for armed forces mobilization, 

economic mobilization, political mobilization, People’s Air Defense 

work, and defense transportation work

• implementing other relevant directives set forth by the party’s Central 

Committee, NPC, and/or CMC.49

Military Region–level Defense Mobilization Committee.

50 Military region 

defense mobilization committees (MRDMCs) are the organizing and coordinating structures for national defense mobilization work within the PLA’s 

various military regions, responsible for the regions’ mobilization work. Under 

the leadership of the military region’s party committee and commander, and 

within the national-level NDMC’s guidance, this layer coordinates the stra-
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tegic regions, including the defense mobilization committees (DMCs) of the 

various component provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities, in 

their national defense mobilization work. The MRDMC’s chair is the military 

region commander. The vice chairman of the MRDMC frequently is a military 

region deputy commander responsible for mobilization work. 

The rest of the MRDMC membership will include relevant provincial, 

autonomous region, and municipality senior leaders, including commanders 

from the MR headquarters, as well as its political department, joint logistics 

department, equipment department, and provincial military district commanders. An MRDMC will also include relevant personnel from the provincial, 

autonomous region, and municipality leadership, as well as leaders from those 

services and branches stationed in the region. The secretary of the MRDMC 

will be the deputy chief of staff for the MR. The MRDMC’s organization will 

include a general office [zonghe bangongshi, 综合办公室], People’s Armed Forces 

mobilization office, national economic mobilization office, PAD office, transportation combat preparations office, and national defense education office. 

Some MRDMCs have apparently also created an information mobilization 

office and equipment mobilization office. 

The tasks of the MRDMC are essentially identical to those of the NDMC, 

adjusted for the lower level of responsibility. Thus, like the NDMCs, the MRDMCs are responsible for incorporating national-level guidance into their mobilization activities. They are also responsible for implementing national laws in 

mobilization, while also creating suitable laws and regulations adapted to the 

conditions of their specific military region. 

Service and branch DMCs. Each service and branch has DMCs that serve 

as the organizational coordinating structures for their respective mobilization activities. The ground forces’ defense mobilization committee was 

created in 1998.51 These service- and branch-based defense mobilization 

committees are often chaired by key leaders of the respective service and 

branch or by deputy commanders, while the vice chairman is usually the 

service or branch deputy commander or in some cases the service or branch 

headquarters, political department, logistics department, or armaments 

department leader. Service and branch DMCs contain a general office, the 

People’s Armed Forces mobilization office, the national economic mobilization office, transportation combat preparations mobilization office, equipment and technology mobilization office, and political mobilization office. 
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These DMCs are responsible for developing mobilization-related activities 

by their respective service or branch. 

DMCs at various local levels. Local government DMCs are the organizational 

coordination structures between the provincial level and the county level, with 

their main role being to administer provincial-, prefectural-, and county-level 

defense mobilization work. Beginning in 1995, provinces, regions, and counties 

all established DMCs. These lower levels of the defense mobilization committee 

system are considered essential because mobilization cannot simply be ordered 

in a top-down manner based on the assumption that instructions and plans will 

be blindly obeyed. While the higher levels need to make clear what is required 

of lower levels, mobilization plans must also incorporate local realities into their 

formulation and execution. Moreover, lower levels of government are more likely 

to have a grasp of the actual resources potentially available for mobilization. 

Consequently, the national defense mobilization structure must have a 

strong presence at these lower levels, to ensure that coordination is sufficient 

to bring about smooth mobilization planning and implementation. One PLA 

article notes, for example, that the efficacy of provincial-level defense mobilization will directly impact the effectiveness of national-level mobilization.52

The overall NDMC structure therefore serves to link not only the party, the 

state, and the military at the national level, horizontally, but also national to 

local authorities, vertically.

Meetings at the provincial DMC level and below are apparently headed by 

the corresponding government-level leader, and the vice chairs are from the 

respective state levels’ deputy leaders and equivalent-level military leaders.53

Thus, the provincial DMC is usually headed by the governor as chair, with the 

provincial party secretary as first chairman and the provincial military district 

commander and first party secretary (formerly the “first political commissar”) 

as vice chairs. To support their work, local DMCs rely on the corresponding 

People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs) [renmin wuzhuang bu, 人民武

装部] to help implement plans and policies.54 These include: 

• organizing and (when necessary) implementing regional and local 

mobilization laws

• establishing the mobilization laws, plans, and programs, based on 

higher-level determinations

• overseeing the implementation of national and local defense mobilization plans within their area of responsibility
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• coordinating military, economic, and social work with defense mobilization requirements

• organizing and leading People’s Armed Forces mobilization, national 

economic mobilization, People’s Air Defense work, and transportation 

and communications preparedness.55

Each of these lower levels of defense mobilization committees includes an 

office structure, with assigned personnel typically drawn from other governmental departments and agencies, giving them a dual-hatted role. The various 

levels of local government DMCs and their counterpart party People’s Armed 

Force committees therefore typically operate under a “one structure, two 

nameplate” system. There is usually a general office, People’s Armed Forces 

mobilization office, national economic mobilization office, PAD office, transportation combat preparations office, and national defense education office. 

Some lower level DMCs have also created political mobilization offices, S&T 

mobilization offices, and information mobilization offices.56

Mobilization Implementation Structure 

While the NDMC structure is expected to coordinate defense mobilization 

efforts, mobilization implementation structures [dongyuan zhixing jigou, 动

员执行机构] mostly rely on the government, and its bureaucratic structure, 

to execute and fulfill mobilization decisions. This allocation of authority is 

described as “the military determines requirements, the NDMC implements 

coordination, the government fulfills requirements.”57

The mobilization implementation structure comprises those governmental ministries, offices, departments, and so forth, as well as corresponding military commands and relevant businesses whose functions are 

integral to the implementation of mobilization decisions.58 For each layer 

within the bureaucracy, the mobilization implementation departments are 

responsible for implementing decisions issued by the next higher level, while 

simultaneously leading their own layer’s enterprises and governmental 

departments. Thus, each layer of the mobilization implementation structure is charged with planning for subordinate units within its “stovepipe” 

(in peacetime) and executing its portion of the overall mobilization plan 

(in wartime), while ensuring that those plans and activities are compatible 

with higher-level intent. 
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In general, the PLA seems to have four categories of mobilization leadership and implementation structures: government, military, nongovernmental 

(or social) groups, and mass defense. 

The government mobilization implementation structure is the main 

body responsible for mobilization. It builds upon the government’s various 

bureaucracies, which exist at every level of governance and which have 

extensive reach into the economic, educational, administrative, and other 

aspects of the nation as a whole. There are two components to the governmental portion of the mobilization implementation structure. One is at the 

national level, wherein various government ministries and departments have 

mobilization implementation offices. The other portion is at the local levels of 

government. Operating under national-level guidance and directives, local 

government structures organize the implementation of their specific area’s 

defense mobilization work.59

As one PLA assessment notes, it is the task of each level of government 

to set mobilization policy, oversee mobilization work, sensibly reconcile 

peacetime and wartime construction requirements, maintain a focus on the 

overall situation, and incorporate defense mobilization work into national 

economic construction efforts as well as developments in broader society. It 

is also the responsibility of the government to reconcile mobilization work 

with regional party-government leadership tasks, as well as relations with 

the corresponding military organizations.60 Thus, each local government is 

expected to cooperate with local military forces in coordinating responses 

to any friction that might arise in mobilization planning (and, presumably, 

in other areas of civil-military disagreement). 

The military mobilization leadership and implementation structure is the 

military structure responsible for mobilizing active-duty, reserve, and militia 

forces.61 According to PLA writings, troop mobilization [bingyuan dongyuan, 

兵员动员] is overseen and directed by the State Council and the CMC but relies 

on the local/regional governments and associated military structures [difang 

zhengfu he junshi jiguan, 地方政府和军事机关] for actually mobilizing troops. 

The GSD is responsible for the overall troop mobilization structure, mostly 

in terms of planning and management of the overall process and laying out 

broad targets. The military regions’ mobilization departments, as well as the 

provincial military districts and county-level PAFDs, then work to achieve 

these GSD-administered goals for troop mobilization. 
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Each level has the following responsibilities: 

• following the next higher level’s guidance, policies, laws, and directives 

[fangzhen, zhengce, fagui, zhiling, 方针, 政策, 法规, 指令] 

• ensuring that its own level is following the troop mobilization plans for 

that level 

• monitoring the next lower level’s implementation of troop mobilization 

plans

• managing troop mobilization work in peacetime.62

Thus, each military region, service, provincial MD, military subdistrict, and so 

forth is responsible for raising troops within its own purview. This includes not 

only the active-duty armed forces, but also the reserves and militia.63

A key part of the troop mobilization structure is the system of PAFDs, 

also referred to as the People’s Armed Forces Work Organizational Structure 

[renmin wuzhuang gongzuo zuzhi jigou, 人民武装工作组织机构], as well as by 

the contraction renwu bu [人武部]. At the provincial military region, military 

sub-district, and county level, the PAFD is also the corresponding level’s 

party committee military department, as well as the government’s military 

service office.64

All levels of the PAFD are supposed to help organize reserve and militia 

support in such areas as air defense and chemical defense (both of which are 

also part of the People’s Air Defense mission) in the event of attacks. They are 

also responsible, at the local level, for national defense education, military 

training, and some teaching and research in military theory in peacetime, 

and for support to the frontlines and drafting of additional troops in wartime.65

The PRC has several categories of reserve forces. Reserve units were established for all its services in 1983. These forces are organized as divisions [shi, 

师], brigades [lü, 旅], and regiments [tuan, 团]. The objective was to enable the 

PLA to field more units for the same given expenditures.66

In addition, there are reserve personnel (both reserve officers and reserve 

enlisted personnel). According to the 1995 Law of the PRC on Reserve Service 

Officers [zhonghua renmin gongheguo yubeiyijunguan fa, 中华人民共和国预备

役军官法], there are four kinds of reserve officers, based on their roles: 

• military affairs officers [junshi junguan, 军事军官]

• political officers [zhengzhi junguan, 政治军官]
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• logistics officers [houqin junguan, 后勤军官]

• specialized technical officers [zhuanye jishu junguan, 专业技术军官].67

Finally, there is also militia mobilization [minbing dongyuan, 民兵动员]. 

Although this follows the same chain of command as active-duty and reserve 

mobilization, militia mobilization above the county level is under the dual 

control of the party and the state, requiring cooperation between the local 

PAFDs and DMCs.68

There appear to be a variety of militia organizations that can be mobilized, 

depending upon the exigencies and requirements of the situation.69 There are 

specialized militia units, including artillery, missile, communications, engineering, chemical defense, and other capabilities, available in time of war or in 

response to crises. There are also “corresponding” [duikou, 对口] militia units, 

first established in 1997 and expanded since 2004. These appear to organize 

civilian specialists into units that take advantage of their unique knowledge, 

such as information and communications units, medical and health units, and 

petroleum product safeguarding units. Another type of militia unit is the crisis 

response unit, which supports the People’s Armed Police, Ministry of Public 

Security, and the PLA in maintaining public order. Finally, there are frontline 

support militia forces, which may undertake combat, combat support, and 

combat service support tasks, allowing the reallocation of active-duty units. 

Social groupings are considered a necessary part of the mobilization 

structure as well. Interestingly, they are accorded importance in PLA writings 

because it is noted that the state can only apply so much authority in order to 

compel support from the population in the course of mobilization. By contrast, 

social organizations, because they are essentially voluntary, by their very 

nature organize and command support to a far greater degree than is possible 

from compelled mobilization.70

There are three broad elements of the social groupings portion of the 

mobilization implementation structure. The first are those based on social 

entities and civilian organizations, such as youth leagues, student committees, and religious organizations. Second are those centered on enterprises 

and businesses. These are often based upon contractual relations between 

these companies and the military and include not only production of goods 

and services, but also the provision of vital scientific research. Finally, there 

are grassroots level mobilization implementation structures, such as rural 
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CHENG

villager committees, which can undertake mobilization implementation at 

their level of activity.71

Finally, there is the civil defense mobilization system [renmin dongyuan, 

人民动员] or People’s Air Defense mobilization system [renmin fangkong 

dongyuan xitong, 人民防空动员系统]. The core organization for implementing 

PAD mobilization in wartime is the People’s Air Defense Committee (PADC) 

[renmin fangkong weiyuanhui, 人民防空委员会]. There is apparently a PADC 

at the national level, at the military region level, in the provinces (including 

autonomous regions and autonomous cities), and in certain key cities and 

sub-districts.72 The PADC operates under the State Council and the CMC, which 

are responsible for national civil air defense work [renmin fangkong gongzuo, 

人民防空工作]. 

Assessing Chinese Mobilization 

This chapter has reviewed China’s mobilization structure and theoretical 

underpinnings, but it cannot assess the likely performance of that structure. 

Indeed, whereas the Chinese military last saw combat in 1979, it has arguably 

not engaged in mobilization since even before the rise of Deng Xiaoping—and 

China’s economy and society have changed radically since then. China has 

conducted some mobilization exercises, but while this allows the various organizations to meet and review practices, it remains unclear how well the system 

would actually function in time of crisis. It may require a national emergency 

(for example, a major natural catastrophe) to gain real insight into how well the 

system can and will respond. The chapter by Jeffrey Engstrom and Lyle Morris 

in this volume provides some insights into Chinese mobilization capacity, 

albeit within a peacetime disaster response context.

What seems clear, however, is that the Chinese leadership has gone to 

great effort to establish a mobilization structure, including a legal foundation, 

in recognition that it cannot simply demand compliance and access to materials, people, or facilities. Indeed, the fundamental shifts in Chinese society 

and economics since 1979 have compelled the CCP to accommodate them, if 

it wishes to access the fruits of those changes in time of crisis. 

At the same time, it would appear that there has been a systematic attempt 

to plan for mobilization, integrating it into physical, societal, and legal aspects 

of economic development. This spans the Chinese economy and polity from 

the national to the local level. Consequently, in the event of a more protracted 
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or extensive conflict, it is likely that the PLA would be able to call upon a substantial mobilization base—and do so more smoothly, precisely for having 

spent time thinking about possible pitfalls and shortcomings. 

Notes

1 Hu Tianjiang and Huang Gang [胡田疆, 黄刚], PRC National Defense Mobilization Law Study Questions and Answers [《中华人民共和国国防动员法》学习问答] 

(Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2010), 1. 

2 Wang Wenrong [王文荣], ed., The Science of Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: 

National Defense University Press, 1999), 405.

3 Unless otherwise noted, this section is based upon Hu Tianjiang and 

Huang Gang, 12–16. 

4 Ren Min [任民], The Science of National Defense Mobilization [国防动员学] 

(Beijing: Military Science Publishing House [军事科学出版社], 2008), 42. 

5 Hu Guangzheng [胡光正], ed., Chinese Military Encyclopedia [中国大百科 

军事], 2nd edition, v. 26, Wartime Mobilization [战争动员] (Beijing: Encyclopedia of 

China Publishing House [中国百科全书出版社], 2007), 186. 

6 National Defense Mobilization Knowledge Supplemental Material Editorial 

Group [国防动员知识辅导材料编写组], 500 Questions about National Defense Mobilization Knowledge [国防动员知识500问] (Beijing: Long March Press [长征出版社], 2002), 6; 

and Ren, 58. 

7 Hu, ed., 44. 

8 Ren, 253. 

9 Hu, ed., 44. 

10 Zhu Qingling and Li Haijun [朱庆林, 李海军] et al., Research on Chinese 

National Economic Mobilization Studies [中国国民经济动员学研究] (Beijing: Military 

Science Publishing House, 2005), 3. 

11 Hu and Huang, 15. 

12 Ren, 359. 

13 500 Questions about National Defense Mobilization Knowledge, 57. 

14 Hu, ed., 41, 42–43. 

15 Mobilization Encyclopedia Editorial Committee [中国战争动员百科全书本

书编委会], China Mobilization Encyclopedia [中国战争动员百科全书] (Beijing: Military 

Science Publishing House, January 2003), 38. 

16 Jiang Zemin [江泽民], “Regarding the Historical Experience of Twenty Years 

of Army Building” [关于二十年来军队建设的历史经验], speech to an enlarged session 
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CHENG

of the Central Military Commission, Beijing, December 25, 1998, available at <www.

wxyjs.org.cn/GB/186508/186515/231588/16912321.html>; and Hu Tianjiang and 

Huang Gang, 24–26.

17 Hu and Huang, 24–25. 

18 The following, except where otherwise noted, is drawn from Hu Tianjiang 

and Huang Gang, 26–29. 

19 Ren, 22.

20 The following, except where otherwise noted, is drawn from Hu Tianjiang 

and Huang Gang, chap. II, sec. 10–11. 

21 National Defense Law of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国国防

法], August 2009, art. II, sec. 15. 

22 Ren, 24. 

23 Ibid., 58. 

24 Hu and Huang, 221. 

25 Ren, 168. 

26 Ibid., 466. 

27 Ibid., 24. 

28 Wu Ziyong [吴子勇], Wartime Mobilization Studies Course Materials [战争动

员学教程] (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2001), 93. 

29 China Mobilization Encyclopedia, 50. 

30 Ibid., 320. 

31 Wu, 93. 

32 General Qian Guoliang [钱国梁], “On Innovation and Development of the 

National Defense Mobilization System” [试论国防动员体系的创新与发展], China Military Science [中国军事科学] 16, no. 4 (2003), 78. 

33 Liu Wanping and Chen Xiaoqing [刘万平, 陈小菁], “National People’s Congress Standing Committee Passes National Defense Mobilization Law” [全国人大常

委会审议通过国防动员法], PLA Daily [解放军报], February 27, 2010. 

34 “National People’s Congress Legal Work Committee Introduces National 

Defense Mobilization Law and Provides Detailed Explanations” [全国人大常委会法

工委介绍国防动员法制定细节], People’s Daily Online [人民网], February 26, 2010, available at <http://npc.people.com.cn/GB/11038758.html>. 

35 “What Effects Will the ‘National Defense Mobilization Law’ Have on 

Mobilization Organization and Leadership Structures?” [《国防动员法》对国防动员的

组织领导体制是如何规定的?], Ministry of Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 

February 27, 2010, available at <www.mod.gov.cn/reports/201002/gfdyf/2010-02/27/
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content_4126697.htm>.

36 Wei Yuxiang [魏玉祥], “Several Issues Regarding Strengthening National 

Economic Mobilization Preparations” [加强国民经济动员准备的几个问题], National 

Defense [国防], no. 8 (2003), 60. 

37 Wu, 82–92. 

38 Ibid., 85–86; and Hu and Huang, 31. 

39 Wu, 85. 

40 Hu and Huang, 34. 

41 Wu, 85. 

42 Gao Hongchun [高鸿春], ed., Defense Education Teaching Materials [国防

教育教材], vol. 3, Defense Knowledge [国防知识] (Beijing: Military Science Publishing 

House, 2003), 81. 

43 China Mobilization Encyclopedia, 322. 

44 Gao, 80.

45 Qian.

46 To avoid confusion, only the national-level entity will be called the 

National Defense Mobilization Committee (NDMC). The lower level commissions 

will be referred to as defense mobilization committees or DMCs. Where possible, 

they will be more specifically referred to as provincial defense mobilization committees (PDMCs), local defense mobilization committees (LDMCs), and so forth. 

47 Major General Fan Xiaoguang [范晓光], “Theoretical Discussion of 

Strengthening National Defense Mobilization Policy; Push Forward the Building, 

Creation, and Development of National Defense Mobilization” [加强国防动员政策理

论研究 推进国防动员建设创新发展], National Defense [国防], no. 2 (2003), 10–15. 

48 Hu and Huang, 35. 

49 Ibid., 37; China Mobilization Encyclopedia, 258. 

50 This section is drawn from Hu and Huang, 35–38. 

51 Ibid., 36. 

52 Yang Guodong [杨国栋], “An Initial Discussion of Issues Regarding Provincial Level Mobilization Structure Commencement” [省级国防动员机构启动问题初探], 

National Defense, no.1 (2003), 32. 

53 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2002 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2002), 31. 

54 China Mobilization Encyclopedia, 299; Hu and Huang, 36. 

55 China Mobilization Encyclopedia, 298–299. 
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56 Hu and Huang, 36. 

57 Ibid., 38. 

58 Ren, 420. 

59 Ibid., 420–421. 

60 Hu and Huang, 41. 

61 Wu, 88. 

62 China Mobilization Encyclopedia, 212. 

63 Ibid. 

64 Hu and Huang, 41. 

65 Wu, 60. 

66 Hu and Huang, 101, 102. 

67 Fang Ning [方宁], ed., Defense Education Teaching Materials [国防教育教材], 

vol. 9, National Defense Laws [国防法规] (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 

2002), 222.

68 China Mobilization Encyclopedia, 212. 

69 Ren, 269–271. 

70 Wu, 89. 

71 Ren, 421–422. 

72 China Mobilization Encyclopedia, 258–259. 
135

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is transforming into a modern military force capable of responding to an increasingly diverse set of contingencies. In the wake of the Third Plenum of the 18th Central 

Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 2013, official 

press releases indicated an intent to adjust the PLA’s organizational structure in 

a manner that would enhance its jointness and ability to respond to contingencies, while at the same time reducing the relative size of noncombat forces.1

 The 

General Staff Department (GSD), guided by the CCP and its Central Military 

Commission (CMC), remains the principal PLA organization responsible for 

employing national-level PLA assets in contingencies. National-level assets 

include those assigned to GSD, as well as those managed by three other firstlevel PLA General Departments and units subordinate to the PLA Navy, Air 

Force, and Second Artillery Force.

What would it look like if the CMC directed the PLA to mobilize for a 

major contingency in the Taiwan Strait? How would command and control be 

exercised, and what national-level capabilities could be allocated to a theater 

command in a major crisis? This chapter begins by outlining a notional organizational structure for national-level contingency planning and provides a 

preliminary assessment of command and control of assets at the strategic and 

operational levels. After a brief review of GSD’s peacetime contingency planning organization, the chapter addresses a possible PLA joint operational-level 

command structure. Discussion then turns to national PLA assets that could 

be assigned to and employed by a joint campaign command. As a baseline for 

assessing how the PLA could operate increasingly farther from Chinese shores 

over time, the discussion focuses on an illustrative scenario involving PLA 

coercive use of force against Taiwan. 

CHAPTER 6

Employment of National-Level PLA 

Assets in a Contingency: A Cross-Strait Conflict as Case Study 

Mark A. Stokes
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STOKES

Contingency Planning Organization and Management 

The CCP Central Committee Political Bureau (Politburo) exercises control over 

PLA through the CMC.2 The CCP general secretary is usually dual-hatted as 

CMC chairman. The CMC chairman and the two military CMC vice chairmen 

serve as Politburo members. The chairman, vice chairmen, and CMC members 

exercise authority over the PLA through four first-level departments—the GSD, 

General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics Department (GLD), 

and General Armaments Department (GAD)—and through the Ministry of 

National Defense, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Force. As a CMC member, the GSD director, also known as the chief of the General Staff (COGS), has 

a grade equal to the minister of defense, directors of the other three General 

Departments, and commanders of the PLA Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Force (see appendix for table providing information about the grades and 

ranks for organizations and personnel discussed within this chapter). The CMC 

chairman, under advisement from the Politburo and the CMC, functions as the 

national command authority for PLA employment, including nuclear weapons.

The CMC relies heavily on a dedicated staff for day-to-day management 

of its affairs. The staff is centered upon the General Office, which wields considerable influence as the administrative window of the CMC. It also provides 

for the personal security of national leaders. Within the CMC General Office, 

the Comprehensive Investigation and Research Bureau coordinates policy 

studies and analysis. Broad, long-range force building plans most likely are 

coordinated on behalf of the CMC by the PLA Strategic Planning Department (SPD).3

 The department conducts long-term analysis of the international 

security environment, including net assessment of evolving national security 

challenges, force balances, and capabilities required to meet future challenges. 

The department could have a role in developing defense planning and policy 

guidance, including illustrative scenarios as a basis for contingency planning, 

programming, and budgeting. SPD’s role, if any, in coordinating nuclear force 

modernization is unknown at the current time.4

Under CMC guidance, and in coordination with the three other General 

Departments, GSD likely would determine how national-level assets are to 

be employed in a contingency operation.5

 GSD encompasses a large, complex bureaucracy consisting of a General Office and at least 12 second-level 

departments (see figure 6.1).6 GSD departments are responsible for contingency 
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planning, real-time emergency management, and control of a wide range of 

national-level PLA assets.

The GSD First Department (Operations) manages the National Joint Operational Command Center and oversees a specialized contingency office that 

appears responsible for coordination with civilian authorities during emergencies.7

 The Operations Department also controls the national navigation 

and positioning system, meteorological and hydrological assets, and dual-use 

airfields. The Operations Department’s Readiness and Force Development 

Bureau is responsible for a range of planning and security functions, including 

coordination of dual-use airfields.8

Figure 6.1. General Staff Department Organizational Structure

GSD’s nationwide joint command and control communications system, 

managed by the GSD Informationization Department, comprises at least two 

communications commands that support GSD leaders in Beijing and link 

authorities there with military regions and GSD units throughout China.9

 Each 

command oversees a number of communications regiments.10 In addition to 

fiber optic, microwave, and satellite communications networks, the GSD Informationization Department reportedly leverages long-range unmanned aerial 

Operations 

Department

(First Department)

Intelligence 

Department

(Second Department)

Tech Recon 

Department

(Third Department)

Informationization 

Department

Strategic

Planning

Department

Training

Department

Mobilization

Department

Radar/ECM 

Department

(Fourth Department)

Army Aviation

Department

Management

Support

Department

Military Affairs

Department

Political

Department

General Staff Department

• Chief of General Staff

• Deputy Chiefs of the 

 General Staff

• Assistant to the Chief of 

 General Staff

Foreign Affairs

Office 

General Office

• Secretariat Bureau

• Security Bureau

• Confidential Office 

• Military Work 

 Research Office
138

STOKES

vehicles (UAVs) and helicopter assets for radio relay.11 The PLA is enhancing 

interoperability of GSD’s national-level backbone network and operational-level networks managed by the PLA Navy, Air Force, and the seven military 

regions. Based on a “system of systems” approach, a newly fielded integrated 

command platform is intended to facilitate interoperability between nationaland operational-level commands.12

National-level assets subordinate to the GSD Radar and Electronic 

Countermeasures (ECM) Department (the GSD Fourth Department) likely 

would be allocated to a theater command in the event of a contingency. In 

addition, GSD Army Aviation Department rotary wing assets may also be 

made available to theater commanders. The GSD Mobilization Department 

presumably would coordinate with civilian authorities for mobilization of 

reserve and militia assets.13

In addition to the General Staff Department, GPD, GLD, and GAD have 

peacetime management authority over other national-level PLA assets that 

could be employed in a contingency.14 As the operational command responsible 

for space launch, tracking, and control, GAD identifies and monitors foreign 

space assets that could affect PLA operations.15 The GAD space surveillance 

system, under Base 26 headquartered in Weinan (Shaanxi Province), probably fuses space tracking data from sensors managed by the GSD Technical 

Reconnaissance Department, PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and civilian authorities 

such as the China Academy of Science Space Target and Debris Observation 

and Research Center. The lead organization within the PLA for counterspace 

operations remains an open question. However, command and control of space 

operations appears to reside outside of the GSD system. Likewise, command 

and control of nuclear forces likely is separate and distinct from the GSD 

system. The Second Artillery functions as the central custodian for nuclear 

weapons under direct CMC command and control.

Finally, the PLA’s national-level intelligence system that could be leveraged 

in a contingency situation consists of three departments. Each department 

carries equal status as a corps leader–level organization. First, the GSD Intelligence Department (also known as the GSD Second Department) carries out 

human intelligence collection operations, provides indications and warning 

and other analysis to the CMC leadership, and manages intelligence produced 

by dedicated PLA space reconnaissance assets. Secondly, the GSD Technical 

Reconnaissance Department (also known as GSD Third Department), roughly 
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analogous to the U.S. National Security Agency, has control over a vast signals 

intelligence (SIGINT) and computer network operations (CNO) infrastructure. 

SIGINT and cyber assets target foreign satellite, line of sight, and over-the-horizon communications, as well as computer networks. 

The GPD Liaison Department (GPD/LD) comprises the third component of 

the PLA’s national-level intelligence system. As the principal PLA organization 

responsible for political warfare, GPD/LD collects and analyzes intelligence 

information regarding senior-level officers from the United States, Taiwan, 

Japan, and other defense establishments of interest. The PLA Navy, Air Force, 

Second Artillery, and the seven military regions all oversee independent 

departments with similar responsibilities.

In short, the CMC, under advisement from GSD, likely would play a major 

role in determining how national-level assets would be employed in a contingency operation. The GSD develops policies, plans, and programs, establishes 

requirements, and allocates resources to support the PLA mission. The GSD 

is responsible for day-to-day joint operations, intelligence, strategic planning 

and operational requirements, training, and mobilization. Assets that are 

subordinate to GSD during peacetime (and possibly those subordinate to 

other general departments such as GAD) could be made available to a theater 

command in the event of a crisis. 

Contingency Command and Control 

Employment of national-level PLA contingency assets would most likely be 

exercised through a Joint Campaign Command (JCC).16 National and military 

region assets assigned to a JCC likely would be specified in a CMC directive 

outlining strategic intent. These directives might be in the form of campaign 

principles [zhanyi fangzhen, 战役方针] and a campaign decision [zhanyi juece, 

战役决策]. The campaign decision would include a campaign resolution [zhanyi 

juece, 战役决心], which would identify national PLA assets available to the JCC, 

define the campaign phases, delineate responsibilities, and establish timelines 

for achievement of operational objectives.17

The JCC would execute contingency plans and exercise authority over 

national-level PLA assets and corps-level component commands within a 

defined theater of operations. The seven military regions have established geographical boundaries. In the event of a contingency, the theater of operations 

could transcend peacetime military region boundaries and PLA forces could 
140

STOKES

deploy from other military regions to the combat theater as needed. A JCC staff 

could consist of CMC representatives and personnel from the four General 

Departments, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Force. Direct CMC oversight of, and integration with, the JCC ensures an orchestrated political-military 

strategy with access to government resources.18

Administrative organs under a JCC would probably include a Headquarters 

Department, Political Department, Logistics Department, and Equipment 

Department. The CMC chairman, in consultation with the Politburo Standing 

Committee, may assign a CMC vice chairman, the COGS, or a Deputy Chief of 

the General Staff (DCOGS) to command the JCC. Other CMC members or their 

organizational representatives could serve as JCC deputy commanders and the 

chief of staff, who presumably would oversee the JCC command and control 

system.19 A second CMC vice chairman, GPD director, or GPD deputy director 

probably would be designated as JCC political commissar and secretary of the 

JCC party committee. In a Taiwan scenario, a JCC Headquarters Department 

staff may consist of officers from the GSD Operations Department and the 

Nanjing Military Region Operations Department.20

Employment of national assets probably would be directed through the 

JCC’s primary command post, which might be supported by reserve and rear 

command posts and, if necessary, a forward command post. The forward and 

rear command posts, which would be responsible for logistics support, likely 

would report to the primary command post. The reserve post would assume 

duties as the primary command post in the event the latter was neutralized.

A primary command post may consist of a communications center, firepower coordination center, intelligence information center, ECM command 

center, and a weather center. The primary JCC command post might specify 

the levels of command that have skip echelon authority and include representatives from corps-level Navy, Air Force, and conventional Second Artillery 

component commands. JCC communications authorities, most likely assigned 

from the GSD Informationization Department, would leverage dedicated PLA 

assets and the civilian telecommunications infrastructure as needed to establish a joint operational command communications network.21

The GSD Operations Department may assign officers to a firepower coordination center, which notionally could be directed by a JCC deputy chief of staff. 

Air Force, Second Artillery, special operations, and ground force representatives may also be attached to carry out necessary liaison with their respective 
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corps-level headquarters. In addition to cells responsible for coordinating with 

corps-level component commands, the firepower coordination center may 

consist of operational planning, targeting, and airspace coordination cells.22

A targeting intelligence cell may coordinate with the JCC intelligence information center, maintain target folders, carry out battle damage assessment, 

and develop a target sequence schedule for the operational planning cell. An 

airspace coordination cell, perhaps directed by a career Air Force officer from 

the GSD Operations Department’s Air Traffic Control or Air Force Bureau, 

would coordinate with the operational planning cell on airspace management 

issues and resolve conflicts in air operations with the Second Artillery and 

other service operations. Possibly directed by a DCOGS, an intelligence information center would probably integrate sensor information from strategic- and 

operational-level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. A 

firepower coordination center presumably would work closely with the intelligence and ECM centers, as well as political warfare entities, in developing a 

general firepower plan.

Leaders and staff officers from the GSD Radar and ECM Department (also 

known as the GSD Fourth Department), subordinate brigade/regiments, military region headquarters ECM staff and units, and assets under component 

commands would likely man the ECM Center. ECM Center responsibilities may 

include collection management and analysis of electronic intelligence, development of an ECM concept of operations and electronic attack plan, assignment of responsibilities and targets, transmission of orders to ECM units, and 

coordination with the JCC leadership and other centers. An ECM Center may 

be subsumed into a broader information operations center that could consist 

of three sub-centers: an ECM sub-center, a network warfare sub-center, and a 

physical destruction sub-center.

The CMC may direct formation of PLA Navy, Air Force, and conventional 

Second Artillery corps-level component commands. Navy and Air Force 

component staff positions likely would be filled by representatives from their 

respective general headquarters in Beijing and military regions/fleets (for 

example, the Nanjing Military Region Air Force and East Sea Fleet). The JCC’s 

primary command post would direct operations through component-level 

command centers. Division-level Navy and Air Force units (and conventional 

Second Artillery brigades) from throughout China may be resubordinated 

to a JCC component command in the event of a contingency. In a Taiwan 
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STOKES

scenario, as many as four communications commands that are subordinate to the Nanjing Military Region Informationization Department during 

peacetime presumably would form the backbone network linking a JCC with 

component-level command centers.23

The Air Force component command likely would bear primary responsibility for integrated air defense, one of the most complex JCC tasks. The operational-level air defense command center would rely upon national-, operational-, 

and tactical-level assets for air and space surveillance. An air surveillance 

command structure may be divided into sectors, presumably along the lines 

of peacetime Air Force command posts (or bases).24 Radar tracking data could 

be transmitted to air and/or fighter units that may engage aircraft flying within 

a defined air defense identification zone (ADIZ).25

Selected conventionally capable ballistic and land attack cruise missile 

brigades and support regiments, which are under direct authority of the Second Artillery during peacetime (rather than military regions), may be apportioned to a JCC’s Second Artillery component command in a contingency. 

However, the CMC chairman can be expected to retain exclusive control over 

the allocation of nuclear warheads through the PLA’s central warhead storage 

and handling complex (known as Base 22), which is headquartered deep in 

Shaanxi’s Qinling Mountains. The nuclear command and control system most 

likely would be separate and distinct from that of the JCC.26

Assigned Forces 

Any assessment of the national-level PLA assets or units that could be mobilized and apportioned to a JCC is a speculative endeavor. However, the following discussion offers a tentative baseline that could be refined over time. 

National-level PLA assets most likely would include selected GSD, GPD, GLD, 

and GAD units, conventional brigades and support regiments subordinate 

to the Second Artillery Force, as well as Air Force and Navy units that report 

directly to headquarters in Beijing.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Assets 

In addition to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets subordinate to the Nanjing and perhaps the Guangzhou military regions, selected 

units under the GSD Second and Third Departments could be apportioned to 

a JCC intelligence information center in a contingency situation. For example, 
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the GSD Second Department oversees a network of satellite remote-sensing 

ground stations that could provide direct support to a JCC. The GSD Second 

Department oversees at least one UAV regiment that could be apportioned 

to the JCC intelligence information center. GSD UAVs would augment assets 

organic to Air Force, Navy, and Second Artillery component commands.27

Selected offices subordinate to GSD Third Department technical reconnaissance bureaus could be resubordinated to a JCC for signals intelligence and cyber 

reconnaissance support. Candidates could include selected offices under GSD 

Third Department 2nd and 12th Bureaus in Shanghai, 3rd Bureau in Beijing, and 4th 

Bureau in Qingdao. The Third Department 1st Bureau and/or a subordinate division of the Beijing North Computing Center may support a JCC’s network information center with threat assessment and computer network defense.28 These 

units likely would augment technical reconnaissance bureaus that are under 

military regions during peacetime. For example, the Nanjing Military Region 

oversees two technical reconnaissance bureaus, one of which focuses exclusively 

on Taiwan. The PLAAF likely would assign selected assets subordinate to its three 

technical reconnaissance bureaus to the theater air force component as well.29

GSD units responsible for navigation, surveying, mapping, and weather 

could provide other forms of operational support. The GSD Navigation and 

Positioning Command likely would provide valuable operational support. 

During peacetime, survey and mapping groups are garrisoned in the Beijing 

and Xi’an areas.30 GSD Survey Bureau Survey Information Center could be 

allocated to the JCC for military geographic information systems support.31

The Xi’an Institute of Survey and Mapping may be equipped with mobile laser 

range-finding systems, which could be tasked with responsibility for satellite 

dazzling. The GSD Meteorological Center likely would provide weather support 

for joint contingency operations.32

ECM Forces 

Forces subordinate to the GSD Fourth Department during peacetime could 

be allocated to the JCC ECM command center. The Fourth Department Air 

Defense ECM Brigade may be assigned for jamming support to strategic air 

defense.33 Dedicated satellite jammers subordinate to the GSD Satellite ECM 

Command, including a subordinate element on Hainan Island, also likely 

would be apportioned to the JCC in a major contingency. GSD’s Spectrum 

Management Center would ensure minimal red-on-red electronic fratricide. 
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STOKES

Battalions subordinate to the Fourth Department ECM brigade at Qinhuangdao in Hebei Province could be allocated as well.34

Political Warfare Assets 

In a notional Taiwan scenario, GPD/LD psychological warfare units such as 

Base 311 in Fujian Province could provide political support for a contingency 

operation. Among other missions, Base 311 manages broadcasting stations, 

such as the Voice of the Taiwan Strait.35 Specialized units for concealment, 

camouflage, and deception could also be assigned, such as the GSD Camouflage Engineering regiment.36

Counterspace Assets 

Assuming the capability is operationally available, the CMC may grant the JCC 

authority over kinetic counterspace systems. The PLA has demonstrated an 

ability to engage targets in space as part of a broader effort to field a national 

aerospace security system.37 The lead organization within the PLA for counterspace operations remains an open question. Chinese writings tend to link 

counterspace with the ability to track and engage all flight vehicles transiting 

space, including ballistic missiles.38 Some Chinese analysts have advocated 

in favor of an independent space force that would centralize space operations 

under a unified command.39 The GAD Headquarters Department, or China 

Launch and Tracking Control, oversees China’s space launch, tracking, and 

control network. PLAAF and Second Artillery representatives have also argued 

in favor of adopting the counterspace mission. Theoretically, existing medium, 

intermediate, and intercontinental ballistic missiles could be adapted for a 

space intercept role by reprogramming missile guidance and fusing.40 Should 

former PLAAF commander Xu Qiliang’s concept of integrated air and space 

(aerospace) operations bear fruit, a future Air Force component command 

might oversee an evolving aerospace defense system under a JCC.41

Long-range Precision Strike 

National PLA assets subordinate to the Second Artillery would constitute the 

centerpiece of the JCC and its Firepower Coordination Center. In enforcing 

sovereignty claims in the Taiwan Strait over the last 20 years, conventional 

ballistic missiles have been one of the most effective tools of CCP political and 

military coercion. As a symbolic metric of intent, the PLA’s expanding arsenal 
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of conventional ballistic missiles across the Taiwan Strait is intended to deter 

political support in Taiwan for formal independence and coerce the island’s 

population to support unification on Beijing’s terms.

In the event of a crisis, selected brigades, support regiments, and staff elements under Second Artillery general headquarters and one or more missile 

bases would comprise a corps-level Second Artillery conventional missile 

component under a JCC. The JCC’s conventional Second Artillery component 

command likely would be comprised largely of officers from Second Artillery’s 

Base 52, a corps-level organization that ensures the peacetime readiness of 

missile brigades and support regiments under its purview. 

Under the authority of the Second Artillery chief of staff or Base 52 commander, key Headquarters Department staff, selected support regiments, Base 

52 staff, and Base 52 support regiments may be assigned to form the Second 

Artillery corps-level component. Base 52’s six conventional missile brigades 

could notionally also be assigned to the Second Artillery component command. The command could be augmented by an anti-ship ballistic missile 

(ASBM) brigade that appears to be subordinate to Base 53 during peacetime, as 

well as by a land attack cruise missile (LACM) brigade subordinate to Base 55.42

Units reporting directly to Second Artillery headquarters during peacetime 

also could be apportioned to the component command. For example, a regiment-sized unit north of Beijing specializes in imagery and all-source intelligence and would likely be deployed as the command intelligence cell.43 At least 

one and probably two ECM regiments would support the JCC Second Artillery 

corps-level component commander.44 The Second Artillery Technical Reconnaissance Bureau would likely be the service-level cryptologic authority and could 

engage in computer network operations.45 A separate nuclear corps–level group, 

reporting directly to the CMC, could be comprised of Base 22 and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) brigades subordinate to Bases 54, 55, and 56.46

In sum, the employment of national-level PLA contingency assets would 

most likely be exercised through a JCC. The JCC would execute contingency 

plans and exercise authority over national-level PLA assets and corps-level 

component commands (Navy, Air Force, and conventional Second Artillery) 

within a defined theater of operations. National and military region assets to be 

assigned to a JCC likely would be specified in a CMC directive outlining strategic intent. A JCC staff may consist of CMC representatives and personnel from 

the four General Departments, particularly the GSD. Integration of CMC and 
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STOKES

GSD staff elements with the JCC would ensure an orchestrated political-military strategy with access to national-level resources.

Conclusion 

The PLA is transforming into a modern military force capable of responding 

to an increasingly diverse set of contingencies farther from its shores. Guided 

by the CMC, GSD would be the principal organization responsible for commanding and employing national-level PLA assets in a contingency situation. 

National-level assets include those assigned to GSD, GPD, GLD, as well as the 

Second Artillery and units directly subordinate to the PLA Air Force and Navy.

The GSD Operations Department manages peacetime contingency planning and operations and would likely form the basis of a JCC, the leading 

authority for a military contingency. Under command by a CMC and/or GSD 

leader, JCC staff elements (for example, Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and 

Equipment Departments) would be drawn from the four General Departments, 

relevant military region(s), and representatives from the Air Force, Navy, and 

Second Artillery. The JCC’s primary Command and Control Center would 

include a subordinate Communications Center, Firepower Coordination 

Center, Intelligence Information Center, Information Operations or ECM 

Command Center, and a Weather Center. An Intelligence Information Center 

theoretically would access sensor data, navigation, survey, mapping, and 

weather information through the Integrated Command Platform developed by 

the GSD Informationization Department. Second Artillery, Air Force, and Navy 

component commands under the JCC would coordinate long-range precision 

strike operations through the JCC Firepower Coordination Center.

In its campaign decision, the CMC would outline specific national PLA 

assets that would be assigned to and employed by a JCC during a contingency. 

In a notional Taiwan scenario, national PLA assets apportioned to a JCC would 

include a range of GSD elements, including units subordinate to the GSD First, 

Second, Third, Fourth, and Informationization Departments. Selected Second 

Artillery brigades and support regiments would be assigned to a Second Artillery component command. Conventional missile operations would be integrated with Air Force, Navy, and Military Region ground force strike elements 

through a JCC Firepower Coordination Center. This sampling of national-level 

PLA assets that could be employed in a contingency is speculative in nature 

but offers a tentative baseline that could be refined over time.
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Appendix

PLA Grade and Rank Structure

Grade Positions (Ranks)

CMC Member 

[junwei weiyuan, 军委委员]

Minister of Defense; Chief of the General 

Staff; General Political Department (GPD) 

director; General Logistics Department 

(GLD) director; General Armaments 

Department (GAD) director; Navy, Air 

Force, and Second Artillery commanders 

(General [GEN])

Military Region (MR) Leader 

[zheng dajunqu zhi, 正大军区职]

Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff (GEN/

Lieutenant General [LTG]); GPD deputy 

directors; Navy, Air Force, and Second 

Artillery political commissars; MR commanders/political commissars (GEN/LTG)

MR Deputy Leader 

[fu dajunqu zhi, 副大军区职]

MR deputy commanders, political commissars, chiefs of staff, and MR Political 

Department directors; MR Air Force; Navy 

Fleets; Assistants to the Chief of the General Staff (LTG/Major General [MG])

Corps Leader 

[zhengjunzhi, 正军职]

MR deputy chiefs of staff; GSD, GPD, GLD, 

and GAD Second-level Department Directors; Second Artillery Force Base 52, 54, 

and 55 commanders/political commissars 

(MG/LTG); military district commanders/

political commissars (MG/LTG)

Corps Deputy Leader 

[fujunzhi, 副军职]

GSD, GPD, GLD, and GAD Second-level 

Department directors and some Third-level 

Bureaus and Directors (MG/Senior Colonel 

[SCOL])

Division Leader 

[zhengshizhi, 正师职]

Third-level Departments/Bureaus and 

Directors and some Third-level Bureau 

Deputies (SCOL/MG)

Division Deputy Leader 

[fushizhi, 副师职]

Third-level Department/Bureau Deputies

Source: Directory of PRC Military Personalities, March 2013.

Notes

1 “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on 

Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform,” Xinhua 

[新华], November 12, 2013, English translation available at <www.china.org.cn/
148

STOKES

china/third_plenary_session>; and “Decision Directive: Deepen the Military System’s Organizational Adjustment and Reform” [《决定》指出:深化军队体制编制调整改

革], Xinhua Online [新华网], November 15, 2013.

2 Tai Ming Cheung, “The Riddle in the Middle: China’s Central Military Commission in the Twenty-first Century,” in PLA Influence on China’s National Security 

Policymaking, eds. Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (Stanford: Stanford 

University Press, 2015), 84–119.

3 This new second-level department was founded on the basis of the GSD 

Operation Department’s Strategic Planning Bureau until its conversion to a corps 

leader–grade organization nominally under GSD. For example, see Yao Yijiang, Lü 

Zhengtao, and Zhang Xuege [姚忆江, 吕正韬, 张雪歌], “Think Tank Construction: A 

New Center of Gravity in China’s Military Reform” [智库建设:中国军改新重心], Southern Weekend [南方周末], January 4, 2012. 

4 The Strategic Planning Department may be linked with the CMC Strategic 

Committee [zhanlüe weiyuanhui, 战略委员会] or Strategy Small Working Group 

[zhanlüe xiaozu, 战略小组]. The department reportedly has five subordinate bureaus 

and two directly subordinate research centers. A review of available information 

indicates that the subordinate bureaus include Development Planning, Strategic 

Resources, Strategic Research, and Statistical Assessment. The Strategic Planning 

Department could oversee a GSD International Situation Study Group [zongcan guoji 

xingshi yanjiu xiaozu, 总参国际形势研究小组], although little is known about the 

organization. Major General Chen Shoumin [陈守民] was identified as deputy director in March 2012. See Zhou Feng [周峰], “The Formation of the Strategic Planning 

Department Moves Our Military to Adapt to the New Revolution in Military Affairs” 

[组建战略规划部是我军适应新军事变革之举], PLA Daily [解放军报], December 1, 2011; 

Xue Litai [薛理泰], “PLA Increasing Focus on Strategic Planning” [解放军愈益重视

战略规划], Phoenix Net [凤凰网首页], November 24, 2011, available at <http://news.

ifeng.com/opinion/zhuanlan/xuelitai/detail_2011_11/24/10873044_0.shtml>; and 

Xue Litai, “Xue Litai: CMC Set Up Strategic Planning Department to Avoid War” [薛

理泰:中央军委设战略规划部以避免打仗], 21ccom.net, November 30, 2011, available at 

<www.21ccom.net/articles/qqsw/zlwj/article_2011113049577.html>.

5 Among various sources, see Liu Feng’an [刘逢安], “Strive to create a 

‘national army’ with responsive strength” [全力打造应急力量“国家队”], PLA Daily, 

September 6, 2012.

6 See GSD chapter in The People’s Liberation Army as Organization: Reference 

Volume v 2.0 (Vienna, VA: DGI, Inc., 2015).

7 The Contingency Response Office [yingji bangongshi, 应急办公室], which 

is a corps deputy leader organization, may have an association with Unit 61683. For 

example, Tian Yixiang [田义祥] was identified as director of Unit 61683 and director 

of the Contingency Response Office in the 2008 timeframe. For reference to Tian as 
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director of Unit 61683, see “Authorized release: List of Nationwide Model Earthquake 

Responders” [授权发布:全国抗震救灾模范名单], Xinhua, October 8, 2008, available 

at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-10/08/content_10167205_1.htm>. 

More recently, Unit 61683, directed by Dai Cunbing [戴存兵] in the 2013 timeframe, 

has been affiliated with analyzing weapons effects, bomb damage assessment, and 

civil engineering. See “Defense Engineering Branch Weapons Effects and Damage 

Assessment Experts’ Committee 2013 Annual Academic Conference convenes in 

Beijing” [防护工程分会武器效应与毁伤评估专业委员会2013年学术年会在北京召开], 

China Civil Engineering Society [中国土木工程学会], September 27, 2013, available at 

<www.cces.net.cn/guild/sites/tmxh/detail.asp?i=xshdxshy&id=39182>. Until 2013, 

the Emergency Response Office was directed by Major General Li Haiyang 

[李海洋]. Li formerly directed the Lanzhou Military Region Operations Department. See, for example, “China Earthquake Administration Vice Bureau Chief Zhao 

Heping, General Staff Operations Department Contingency Response Office Director Li Haiyang arrive at Lanzhou National Land Search and Rescue Base to Inspect 

and Direct Work” [中国地震局副局长赵和平、总参作战部应急办主任李海洋到兰州国

家陆地搜寻与救护基地检查指导工作], China Earthquake Administration [中国地震局

兰州地震研究所], April 1, 2012. Contingency Response Office deputy director, Senior 

Colonel Wu Xihua [吴喜铧], may have filled the position.

8 As of March 2014, the Readiness Bureau [zhanbei jianshe ju, 战备建设局] 

director was Ma Yifei [马翼飞]. See, for example, “Ma Yifei leads Joint Military Installation Protection Law Enforcement Evaluation Team to Luoyang for an Inspection” 

[马翼飞率国家军事设施保护联合执法检查组来洛检查], Luoyang Online [洛阳网], June 

21, 2011, available at <http://news.lyd.com.cn/content/2011/6/21/941331.shtml>. 

9 Major General Wang Kebin [王克斌], born in 1961, was assigned as GSD 

Informationization Department director in 2013. He replaced Chen Dong [陈东]. 

Before his current assignment, Wang Kebin directed the GSD Joint Operations 

Command Center [zongcan moubu zuozhan bu lianhe zuozhan zhihui zhongxin, 

总参谋部作战部联合作战指挥中心] and was subsequently promoted as GSD Operations Department deputy director. He was also dual hatted as deputy director of 

the State Civil Defense Office [guojia renfang ban, 国家人防办]. Communications 

Departments of services and military regions were also renamed Informationization Departments. Among various sources, see Guo Yuandong [郭媛丹], “PLA 

Sets up Four New Departments in One Month” [解放军1 月内成立4 个新部门], Legal 

System Evening Post [法制晚报], December 22, 2011, available at <www.fawan.com/

Item/140667.aspx>. 

10 The First Communications Command [zongcan diyi tongxin zongzhan, 总

参第一通信总站] (Unit 61623) is headquartered in Beijing and consists of at least six 

regiments that are primarily concentrated in the Beijing area. Regiments possibly 

subordinate to the First Communications Command include: Unit 61035 (First Regiment, Beijing’s Changping District, Yangfang Village); Unit 61416 (Third Regiment, 
150

STOKES

Beijing Wanshou Road); Unit 61932 (Fifth Regiment, Beijing Wanshou Road); Unit 

61468 (Sixth Regiment, Xinzhou City, Dingxiang County); Unit 61516 (11th Regiment, 

Lengquan Village in the Beijing suburb of Xibeiwang); and Unit 61593 (possibly the 

10th Regiment, although indications exist it has been closed). The Second Communications Command (Unit 61068) is headquartered in Xi’an and appears to manage 

satellite communications (SATCOM). Regiments under the Second Communications Command [zongcan di’er tongxin zongzhan, 总参第二通信总站] (Unit 61068) 

that appear to support the SATCOM mission include: Unit 61345 (Second Regiment 

in Shaanxi’s Ankang City); Unit 61655 (Fourth Regiment in Chongqing, previously 

Unit 61256); Unit 61413 in Wolong Village, near Hubei’s Xiangfan City); and a SATCOM engineering regiment near Henan’s Xuchang City. Both commands appear to 

be division leader–level organizations. 

11 At least one source asserts that the GSD Informationization Department 

also leverages UAVs. See, for example, Andrei Chang, “Application of Strategic 

Reconnaissance UAVs in Chinese Armed Forces,” Kanwa Asian Defense Review, no. 

86 (December 1, 2011), 6–7. 

12 Among various sources, see Cortez A. Cooper, “Joint Anti-Access Operations: China’s ‘System-of-Systems’ Approach,” testimony presented before the 

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 27, 2011, available 

at <www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2011/RAND_CT356.pdf>; 

Larry M . Wortzel, “PLA Command, Control, and Targeting Architectures: Theory, 

Doctrine, and Warfighting Applications,” in Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation 

Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, eds. Roy Kamphausen and Andrew 

Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007), 191–234. For 

discussion of the Integrated Command Platform [yitihua zhihui pingtai, 一体化指挥

平台], see “Army implements comprehensive visualization and real-time trend monitoring in exercise spanning multiple military districts” [我军跨区演习实现全程可视

化及实时动态监控], Xinhua, October 13, 2010, available at <http://mil.huanqiu.com/

china/2010-10/1166308.html>.

13 The director of the GSD Mobilization Department is dual-hatted as director, 

National Defense Mobilization Committee Office [guojia guofang dongyuan weiyuanhui zonghe bangongshi, 国家国防动员委员会综合办公室]. 

14 For overviews of the GLD logistics system, see Lonnie D. Henley, “PLA 

Logistics and Doctrine Reform, 1999–2009,” in People’s Liberation Army After Next, 

ed. Susan M. Puska (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 55–77; and 

Dennis J. Blasko, “Chinese Military Logistics: The GLD System,” China Brief 4, no. 19 

(September 29, 2004), available at <www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_

ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3678>.

15 Base 26 (63750 Unit) likely functions as a space and missile surveillance 

center. In years past, the Base 26 network included the 7010 space and missile radar 
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CHAPTER 6

system mounted on the side of Huangyang Mountain in Xuanhua County, north of 

Beijing. The PLA Air Force originally operated the system when first entering initial 

operational capability in 1976, but it later was resubordinated to Base 26 (old military 

unit cover designator of Unit 89851). The system was dismantled in the late 1980s/

early 1990s. For an excellent overview of Base 26, see “The Leaker: Overview of Xian 

Measurement and Control Center” [漏斗子:西安测控中心概览], Wangchao Online

[王朝网络], October 10, 2005, available at <www.1n0.net/Article/Print.asp?ArticleID=6279>. 

16 For reference to an initial exercise on transitioning to a JCC [lianhe zhanyi 

zhihui bu, 联合战役指挥部] in 2009, see Feng Chunmei, Wei Guo, Yang Jilong, and Ding 

Feng [冯春梅, 魏国, 杨继龙, 丁峰], “Spotlight on the First War Zone-Level Joint Campaign Training” [聚焦我军首次战区级联合战役训练], Xinhua Online, August 18, 2009, 

available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2009-08/18/content_11901638.htm>.

17 For a brief discussion of the campaign resolution in the context of a combined exercise with Russia, see “Shanghai Cooperation Organization Exercises 

Carried Out to Set Resolute Practice of Campaign Action” [上合军演进行定下战役行动

决心演练], Xinhua, August 13, 2007, available at <http://military.china.com/zh_cn/

dljl/sh2007/01/11062721/20070813/14273408.html>. 

18 For further discussion of various operational-level organizational structures, see Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation 

for the 21st Century (New York: Routledge Press, 2012), 115–138.

19 If organized along similar lines as in peacetime, deputy commanders would 

manage individual portfolios, such as operations, logistics, and equipment.

20 Among various sources addressing a JCC, see Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving 

Campaign Doctrine and Strategies,” in The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, eds. James Mulvenon and Richard Yang (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 

available at <www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF145/CF145.chap8.pdf>; 

Jianxiang Bi, “Joint Operations: Developing a New Paradigm,” in China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, eds. James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein (Arlington, VA: 

CNA Corporation, 2005), 47–55; Dean Cheng, “Zhanyixue and Joint Campaigns,” in 

China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs, 101–117; Mark A. Stokes, “The Chinese Joint 

Aerospace Campaign: Strategy, Doctrine, and Force Modernization,” in China’s 

Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs, 221–306; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University 

Press, 2006); and Kevin Pollpeter, “Towards an Integrative C4ISR System: Informatization and Joint Operations in the People’s Liberation Army,” in The PLA at 

Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, eds. 

Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2009), 193–236.
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STOKES

21 Among various sources, see Zhang Yuliang [张玉良], ed., The Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2006), 124.

22 Within traditional PLA operational lexicon, an integrated joint firepower 

campaign would consist of strike aviation, theater missile assets, and/or longrange artillery. PLA analysts view an air campaign as an integral component of

joint firepower warfare operations involving the coordinated use of PLA Air Force 

strike aviation assets and Second Artillery conventional theater missiles. Officers 

from the GSD Operations Department Joint Command Operations Bureau Targeting Control Center [mubiao kongzhi zhongxin, 目标控制中心] most likely would play 

a prominent role.

23 For further discussion, see Stokes, “The Chinese Joint Aerospace Campaign: 

Strategy, Doctrine, and Force Modernization.” The Nanjing Military Region communications commands, probably division deputy leader organizations, are based 

in Nanjing, Fuzhou, Xiamen, and Nanchang. Command automation and network 

control hypothetically would be provided by the Nanjing Military Region Computer 

Network Information Center [jisuanji wangluo xinxi zhongxin, 计算机网络信息中心] 

(73685 Unit).

24 See Zhang Yuliang, ed., 312–330. Existing Air Force command posts 

(bases) affiliated with the Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions are headquartered in Shanghai, Fuzhou, Zhangzhou, and Nanning. Air Force radar brigades 

and regiments subordinate to these command posts/bases may represent air 

surveillance sectors. However, East Sea Fleet and South Sea Fleet Naval Aviation 

radar brigades appear responsible for air surveillance sectors around Ningbo and 

Hainan Island. 

25 For example, the East China Sea air defense identification zone appears to 

consist of two air surveillance sectors. The PLA Air Force Third Radar Brigade (Unit 

94969) likely is responsible for flight tracking in the northern sector and PLA Navy 

Second Radar Brigade (Unit 92602) for the southern sector. 

26 See organizational charts in Yu Jixun [于际训], ed., Second Artillery Campaign Science [第二炮兵战役学] (Beijing: PLA Press [中国人民解放军出版社], 2003), 

149–151. For another perspective, see John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, “Making China’s 

Nuclear War Plan,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68, no. 5 (September/October 

2012), 45–65.

27 The GSD Second Department’s Space Reconnaissance Bureau [zongcan 

hangtian zhencha ju, 总参航天侦察局] (Unit 61646) may oversee the remote sensing 

network. The unit may also be designated as the GSD Second Department Technical Bureau [zongcan er bu jishu ju, 总参二部技术局] and/or the Beijing Institute of 

Remote Sensing Information [Beijing yaogan xinxi yanjiusuo, 北京遥感信息研究所]. 

The UAV regiment (Unit 61135) appears to be garrisoned in the northern Beijing 

suburb of Shahe.
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CHAPTER 6

28 For example, Nanjing MR’s Network Information Center [wangluo xinxi 

zhongixin, 网络信息中心] (Unit 73685) could become a JCC’s network information 

center during a crisis.

29 The three PLA Air Force technical reconnaissance bureaus are headquartered in Beijing (Unit 95830), Nanjing (Unit 95851), and Chengdu (Unit 95879). Each 

oversees 8 to 12 subordinate offices/workstations. 

30 The GSD Navigation and Positioning Command [zongcan dingwei daohang 

zongzhan, 总参定位导航总站] carries a cover designation of Unit 61081.

31 The GSD Survey Bureau Survey Information Center [cehui xinxi zhongxin, 

测绘信息中心] carries a cover designation of Unit 61512.

32 The Weather Center [qixiang zhonxin, 气象中心] carries a cover designation 

of Unit 61741.

33 The Air Defense ECM Brigade [fangkong dianzi duikang lü, 防空电子对抗

旅] (Unit 61906 or former Unit 58046) hosts elements in Langfang (Hebei Province), 

the northern Miyun County township of Beizhuang, Huaibei (Anhui Province), and 

Yingtan (Jiangxi Province). 

34 The Satellite ECM Command [dianzi duikang weixing zongzhan, 电子对抗卫

星总站] carries a cover designation of Unit 61276. The element on Hainan Island carries a cover designation of Unit 61764. Unit 61251 appears to be a Fourth Department 

brigade based in the Qinhuangdao area. The unit’s Second Battalion appears to be in 

Funing County.

35 The GPD unit, including the Voice of the Taiwan Strait [haixia zhi sheng, 海

峡之声], carries a GSD military cover designation of Unit 61716. Another element unit 

affiliated with Base 311 is Unit 61275, in Fujian’s Ningde City.

36 The GSD Camouflage Engineering Regiment carries a cover designation of 

Unit 61606.

37 “Establishing a National Aerospace Security System” [建立我国的空天安

全体系], Science Times [科学时报], February 24, 2002, available at <www.cas.cn/xw/

zjsd/200202/t20020224_1683499.shtml>.

38 See, for example, “Present and Future of Foreign Air and Space Defense 

Equipment” [国外防空防天装备发展现状与趋势], Aerospace Electronic Warfare [航天

电子对抗] 26, no. 3 (2010), available at <http://d.wanfangdata.com.cn/periodical_

htdzdk201003002.aspx>. Also see “PLA Air Defense Unit Has Anti-Missile Capabilities, Changing Air Defense” [解放军防空部队具备反导能力,将向防天转变], Liexun 

Military Intelligence Online [猎讯军情网], June 8, 2011, accessed November 2012 at 

<www.1n0.net/Article/zhjs/114708.html>. 

39 For a comprehensive discussion of PLA operational space theory, see Larry 

C. Wortzel, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Space Warfare: Emerging 
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STOKES

United States-China Military Competition,” AEI Online, October 17, 2007, available at 

<www.aei.org/papers/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/asia/the-chinese-peoples-liberation-army-and-space-warfare/>.

40 For one discussion of use of ballistic missiles, see Paul B. Stares, Space and 

National Security (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), 97–99. One analysis 

explains that the aerospace defense domain would be divided along the Karman Line: 

the PLA Air Force would assume the air defense mission for threats below 100 kilometers, while Second Artillery would be responsible for threats above 100 kilometers.

41 Xu Qiliang now serves as CMC Vice Chairman. For an overview, see Kevin 

Pollpeter, “The PLAAF and the Integration of Air and Space Power,” in The Chinese 

Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities, eds. Richard P. Hallion, Roger 

Cliff, and Phillip C. Saunders (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2011), 165–190. Also 

see “Establishing a National Aerospace Security System” [建立我国的空天安全体

系], Science Times, February 24, 2002, available at <www.cas.cn/xw/zjsd/200202/

t20020224_1683499.shtml>; “Xu Qiliang: The Chinese Air Force Must Have an 

Aerospace Security Perspective” [许其亮:中国空军必须树立空天安全观], Xinhua 

Online, November 1, 2009, available at <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2009-11-

01/1424572155.html>; “General Xu Qiliang: The PLA Air Force Will Develop an 

Integrated Air and Space Operational Capability” [许其亮上将:中国空军将发展空天

一体作战能力], Xinhua, November 11, 2009; Zhu Hui [朱晖], “China’s Aerospace Security Facing Threat of Full Range of Stealthy Unmanned Vehicles and Other Weapon 

Systems” [我国空天安全面临隐形战机无人机等武器威胁], PLA Daily, December 3, 

2009, available at <http://mil.eastday.com/m/20091203/u1a4853820.html>; “PLAAF 

Deputy Commander Chen Xiaogong Calls for Attention to Aerospace Security” [解放

军空军副司令员陈小工呼吁关注空天安全], China News Online [中国新闻网], March 9, 

2010, available at <www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2010/03-09/2160134.shtml>; and 

Zhong Shan [钟山], “Discussion of Information Age of the Aerospace Century” 

[论信息时代的空天世纪], China Space News [中国航天报], February 4, 2010, available 

at <www.china-spacenews.com/n435777/n435778/n674308/65983.html>. 

42 Base 53 is headquartered in Kunming, Yunnan Province. The anti-ship 

ballistic missile brigade may be Unit 96219, headquartered in Qingyuan (Guangdong 

Province). Base 55 is headquartered in Huaihua (Hunan Province).

43 According to a former engineer, Unit 96637 is located in Kangzhuang. Formerly known as the 80809 Imagery Group, the unit shifted its mission toward operations support in 2002. In addition to providing imagery for land attack cruise missile 

brigades, the unit is also is said to carry out electronic reconnaissance, translation, 

and, in a crisis, battle damage assessment in direct support of strike operations. See, 

for example, Liu Feng and Wang Bingjun [刘峰, 王炳君], “Second Artillery 96637 

Unit Establishes ‘Warrior Culture’”[第二炮兵96637部队营造“尚武”文化], Worker’s 

Daily [工人日报], August 3, 2006, available at <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-08-

03/01009640261s.shtml>. 
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44 The primary Second Artillery ECM Regiment is Unit 96620, home-based in 

Dingxing and commanded by Colonel Li Changwei [李长伟]. A newer regiment (Unit 

96634) appears to have been formed in Nanchang.

45 Li Yanjie [李燕杰], “Live out the core values of the modern revolutionary 

soldier” [用生命践行当代革命军人核心价值观], People’s Daily [人民日报], October 

31, 2009, available at <http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2009-10/31/content_372115.htm>; “Speech by a representative of the ‘Study Comrade Liu Yiquan 

and Advance His Achievements Symposium’” [学习刘义权同志先进事迹座谈会代表

发言], China File News [中国档案报], May 14, 2011, available at <http://www.qstheory.

cn/tbzt/gzzg/lyq/shfxlyq/201105/t20110514_80668.htm>. 

46 See Mark A. Stokes, “China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System,” Project 2049 Institute, March 12, 2010, available at <https://project2049.net/

documents/chinas_nuclear_warhead_storage_and_handling_system.pdf>; also see 

Second Artillery Campaign Science.

DOMESTIC CONTINGENCIES

II

159

Responding to internal crises is among the most important day-to-day 

challenges that confront the Chinese armed forces—the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Armed Police (PAP), and the militia. What 

does the involvement of these organizations in internal disaster relief operations 

reveal about broader military contingency response capacity?1 This chapter argues 

that Chinese military participation in internal disaster relief provides important 

evidence about mobilization capacity and manpower effort that can inform an 

understanding of contingency response capacity across the spectrum of conflict. 

Larger scale and more violent contingencies are either infrequent (for example, 

border conflict) or do not generate useful public data (for example, internal unrest), 

but military responses to internal disaster relief occur regularly and are generally 

well publicized. With some important caveats, military participation in internal 

disaster relief provides a valuable and available means of quantifying the growing 

capacities and capabilities of China’s armed forces to respond to contingencies. 

Participation of the armed forces in internal disaster relief operations 

remains understudied. The few existing studies tend to focus on a single natural disaster, such as the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake.2

 There are no systematic comparisons across multiple cases.3

 Furthermore, without common 

metrics, cross-case comparisons are difficult to make between disasters, let 

alone across different types of contingencies. This chapter demonstrates the 

value of examining Chinese military internal disaster responses as a means of 

understanding China’s overall contingency response capability. It also aims to 

provide a general approach on how to collect and categorize data from disaster 

relief contingencies that may be applied to future studies. 

It is important to note that while internal disaster relief fits into broader 

conceptions of military operations other than war and diversified military 

CHAPTER 7

China’s Armed Forces Respond to Internal Disaster Relief: 

Assessing Mobilization and Effort

Jeffrey Engstrom and Lyle Morris
160

ENGSTROM AND MORRIS

tasks, Chinese armed forces have been participating in domestic disaster relief 

since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.4 While 

recent doctrinally informed writings highlight the PLA’s role in such tasks, 

it is so far unclear whether they fundamentally change it.5 A general understanding of the legal underpinnings of military participation in disaster relief 

is nonetheless important for understanding how Chinese leaders conceive of 

their military forces as an increasingly important contributor to contingencies 

other than war. (Appendix A highlights several of these documents.) 

This chapter is organized into three main sections. The first reviews the 

internal disaster “threat environment” that China’s armed forces face. What 

types of disasters are most frequent, and how much damage do they cause? 

In which military regions do disasters occur most regularly? Next, by looking 

at empirical data, the chapter delves into both the mobilization capacity and 

total manpower effort in four disasters in which China’s armed forces were 

deployed: the 2008 winter storms, the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, the 2010 

Yushu earthquake, and the 2010 Zhouqu mudslides. In particular, the analysis 

seeks to answer how quickly China’s military was able to respond to the disasters, the size of forces projected, and the total manpower effort expended. The 

chapter concludes by exploring how these disaster relief contingency responses 

compare with actual warfighting by looking at mobilization capacity and manpower effort in the Korean War (1950–1953) and the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979). 

While the findings are preliminary in nature and further research is needed 

to track the evolution of China’s armed forces’ capacity to mobilize, data on 

various contingencies can be grouped by time to show mobilization levels at 

various historical periods. Data from future contingencies will aid empirical 

assessments of how Chinese mobilization capacity is developing. 

Disaster Threat Environment for China’s Armed Forces 

This section briefly examines the scope and scale of natural and manmade 

disasters in China. This threat environment defines the context within which 

China’s armed forces must plan, train, deploy, and operate to counteract the 

effects of disasters, while simultaneously fulfilling other tasks vital to China’s 

national security. Not only do such disasters exact a serious toll in terms of 

human lives and suffering, but they also have the potential to become the 

source of social discord if not responded to in a timely and effective manner. Disaster response is one of the many ways that China’s armed forces 
161

CHAPTER 7

contribute to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control and management of 

social stability. 

Level of Impact of Natural and Manmade Disasters 

China regularly suffers from large-scale natural and manmade disasters (see 

table 7.1). Based on data covering 27 years, China has faced a new natural or 

manmade disaster about every 2 months. Nearly 40 percent of such disasters 

have affected one million or more individuals (such as the Zhouqu mudslides or 

the Wenchuan earthquake).6

 Slightly over 16 percent of disasters have affected 

10 million or more individuals (such as the Sichuan earthquake). In six cases 

(4 percent), disasters have affected at least 100 million persons: the 2010 floods 

(400 million persons), the 1998 floods (240 million persons), the 1991 floods (206 

million persons), the 2003 floods (113 million persons), and the 1995 and 1999 

floods (100 million persons each).7

Table 7.1. Instances of Disasters by Persons Affected in China, August 1985–October 2012

Number of 

Persons Affected

Number of 

Disaster Instances

Percent of 

Disaster Instances

<10,000 3 2

10,000–99,999 12 8.1

100,000–999,999 38 25.5

1,000,000–9,999,999 35 23.5

10,000,000–99,999,999 18 12.1

100,000,000–999,999,999 6 4

No Data/Unknown 37 24.8

Totals 149 100.0

Source: Data derived from Relief Web database, available at <http://reliefweb.int/country/chn>.

Location, Type, and Frequency of Disasters 

Since late 1985, 75 percent of the disasters that have struck China have affected 

the Chengdu, Nanjing, and Guangzhou Military Regions (see table 7.2). If the 

Lanzhou Military Region is included, the total jumps to approximately 85 percent. As a result, China’s armed forces likely focus the majority of their disaster 

relief preparations and efforts on these areas, which cover over 70 percent of 

China’s geographic area. The Jinan, Beijing, and Shenyang Military Regions are 
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ENGSTROM AND MORRIS

comparatively less affected by disasters, accounting for only about 15 percent 

of the locations where disasters have struck. 

Table 7.2. Types of Disasters and Affected Military Regions, August 1985–October 2012

Military 

Region

Various 

Manmade 

Disasters*

Various 

Natural 

Disasters **

Mudslide/

Landslide

Snow Earthquake Typhoon/

Tropical 

Storm

Floods Total (%) Total (#)

Chengdu 1% 2% 2% 3% 12% 1% 6% 26 52

Nanjing 0% 2% 0% 1% 1% 13% 9% 26 21

Guangzhou 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 13% 8% 23 46

Lanzhou 1% 1% 1% 2% 5% 0% 3% 11 51

Jinan 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 2% 3% 6 12

Beijing 0% 1% 0% 1% 3% 0% 1% 5 9

Shenyang 1% 2% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 5 9

Totals (%) 2 9 3 7 20 29 31

Totals (#) 3 17 6 14 40 58 62 200

* Chemical spills, burst dams, and gas explosions.

** Droughts, local storms, tornados, fires, rainstorms, and hailstorms.

Source: Data derived from the Relief Web database, available at <http://reliefweb.int/country/chn>.

Floods constitute the most frequent natural disaster type (31 percent) 

and affect the greatest number of civilians. Instances of flooding are fairly 

evenly distributed over the various military regions, although they occur 

somewhat more regularly in the Chengdu, Nanjing, and Guangzhou Military 

Regions. Typhoons and tropical storms collectively constitute the second 

most frequent disaster type and occur most regularly in the Nanjing and 

Guangzhou Military Regions. Earthquakes are highly concentrated in the 

Chengdu Military Region and occur to a lesser extent in the Lanzhou and 

Beijing Military Regions. However, earthquakes rarely take the top spots in 

numbers of persons affected. The 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, which affected 

over 46 million people, is only the twelfth worst disaster in total number of 

affected individuals within the time period studied. Snowfalls constitute 

roughly 7 percent of natural disasters. The 2008 winter storms that affected 

roughly 78 million people were the most devastating non-flood disasters 

during this time period. 
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Disaster Contingency Case Studies: Mobilization Capacity and 

Manpower Effort 

This section provides an overview of four case studies and then applies an 

approach to track and compare mobilization capacity and manpower effort 

across cases. The two large-scale and two smaller scale military responses 

presented below were chosen in a nonrandomized manner to highlight and 

compare the manpower and mobilization efforts at both ends of the disaster 

relief spectrum and focus on recent disaster events. The results, therefore, only 

offer a snapshot view. Future studies may build on the results of this initial 

exploration and further advance our understanding of Chinese armed forces 

participation in disaster relief.

2008 Winter Storms 

China was hit by unusually cold weather and severe ice conditions from 

mid-January through February 2008, affecting large swaths of southern China. 

Heavy snow, ice, freezing rain, and subzero temperatures affected 14 provinces. 

Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hunan, and Guangzhou provinces were hit 

the hardest. The severe weather and accumulations of ice on power lines cut off 

electricity, paralyzing civilian transportation and stopping the shipment of coal 

to power plants. The effects of the storms and cold weather on the transportation 

system were magnified by the fact that the crisis coincided with the Lunar New 

Year festival, one of the peak periods for domestic road, rail, and air travel. Millions of seasonal or migrant workers who were taking their annual trips home 

to the countryside became stuck in the major transportation hubs of southern 

China. Most notable was the Guangzhou railway station, which at one point saw 

600,000 passengers stranded on trains and in waiting areas.8

 Twenty-four people 

died during the storms, and over 77 million persons were affected.9

On January 29, the CCP Central Committee Politburo held a meeting on 

deploying civilian and armed forces personnel for disaster relief. Immediately following the meeting, President Hu Jintao instructed units from all military regions 

to mobilize in support of disaster relief efforts. By February 10, 635,000 officers 

and 1.86 million militia and reservists were deployed, constituting the largest 

disaster relief effort since the Yangtze River floods of 1998.10 However, the crisis 

differed from most other natural disasters in China in that rescue efforts were not 

concentrated on a single area. Dozens of crises spanned several provinces across 

thousands of kilometers, severely challenging rescue and coordination efforts.
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ENGSTROM AND MORRIS

2008 Wenchuan Earthquake 

On May 12, 2008, a massive earthquake measuring 8.0 on the Richter scale 

struck Wenchuan County in Sichuan Province. More than 120 million people in Sichuan and the adjoining provinces of Gansu, Shaanxi, Yunnan, and 

Chongqing were exposed to the moderate to severe shaking effects of the 

earthquake. The quake left 88,000 people dead or missing and nearly 400,000 

injured, damaging or destroying millions of homes and leaving 5 million 

people homeless. The earthquake also caused extensive damage to basic 

infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, roads, and water systems.

In just two days, China’s armed forces had reportedly dispatched more 

than 100,000 soldiers and armed police to help with rescue operations in 

earthquake-hit areas, dividing their units into three geographical rescue zones. 

Chinese official media asserted that military transport aircraft and helicopters 

made 1,069 flights during the first week of operations, supplemented by 92 military trains and about 110,000 military vehicles, cranes, rubber boats, portable 

communication devices, and power generators.11

By the end of rescue operations on June 17, 140,000 PLA soldiers and 

reserves had been mobilized to the disaster areas by air and land from five of 

the seven military regions. Units from the army and armed police mobilized 

4,696 helicopters, employed 340,000 pieces of various equipment, dispatched 

96,800 medical personnel, and delivered over 940,000 tons of disaster relief 

materials. They dug out 3,338 survivors from the debris and rescued over 1.4 

million trapped people.12

2010 Yushu Earthquake 

The 2010 Yushu earthquake struck on April 14, 2010, registering 7.1 on the Richter scale. The epicenter was Shanglaxiu Township, about 800 kilometers from 

Xining, the capital of Gansu Province. The quake toppled houses and basic 

infrastructure, damaged roads, cut off power supplies, and disrupted basic telecommunications. A reported 2,698 people died in the quake, with 270 missing 

and 12,135 injured. 13 Over the following weeks, combat and engineering units 

from all of China’s military regions joined the effort; a total of 16,000 PLA, PAP, 

and reserve troops were mobilized. Compared with rescue efforts during the 

Wenchuan earthquake, the location of the epicenter—on the Qinghai-Tibet 

plateau—proved especially challenging. Yushu has no railway and only one 
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airport, making transportation of rescuers and supplies to the disaster zone 

difficult. Furthermore, the altitude of the Yushu quake zone averaged 4,400 

meters above sea level, inducing high-altitude sickness among many troops.14

2010 Zhouqu Mudslides 

The Zhouqu mudslides occurred in Zhouqu County, Gansu Province, on 

August 7, 2010. The mudslides occurred after the region had experienced heavy 

rainfall and flooding. It was the deadliest individual disaster among the series 

of incidents surrounding the 2010 floods. Following heavy rains, a buildup of 

water occurred behind a dam of debris blocking a small river to the north of 

the city of Zhouqu. When the dam broke, around 1.8 million cubic meters of 

mud and rocks swept through the town, creating a surge reportedly five stories 

high that covered more than 300 low-rise homes.15 The mudslides killed more 

than 1,471 people; 1,243 others were rescued; in total, over 4.7 million civilians 

were affected.16 A total of 6,281 PLA, PAP, and reserve troops from the Lanzhou, 

Chengdu, and Beijing Military Regions participated in rescue efforts, deploying 17 helicopters, 4 transport planes, 35 assault boats, and 140 sets of large 

machinery. They successfully treated more than 12,000 civilians.17

Disaster Contingency Mobilization Capacity 

How can the mobilization of China’s armed forces be compared across a 

number of seemingly disparate disaster responses? In order to make crosscase comparisons, this section defines mobilization capacity, develops and 

describes a simple model to assess it, and uses empirical data with the model 

to compare the cases and analyze the results.

Mobilization is “the act of assembling and organizing national resources 

to support objectives” whether “in a time of war or other emergencies.”18

Mobilization is a process, not an end state. The process begins once national 

command authorities recognize a need to use the armed forces and continues 

until those forces are employed to conduct the operation. Full mobilization, 

the ultimate goal of the process, occurs when the necessary means (various 

national resources) have been made available at the proper location (through 

organization and assembly) to carry out the policy ends. In other words, a 

fully mobilized force is one that is in place and ready to conduct the operation. The “mobilization clock” begins once the units involved in an operation 

receive orders or warning to prepare and continues ticking until the units 
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ENGSTROM AND MORRIS

and their equipment arrive at their operational locations and are ready to 

conduct the operation. 

Mobilization involves a number of implicit tasks. Forces being mobilized either are or are in the process of being constituted, trained, organized, 

equipped, transported, and so forth, so as to be ready to commence operations 

at the proper locations. For internal disaster relief operations, the mobilization timeline is the time required to assemble and move necessary forces to 

the disaster area so they can commence relief operations. In a disaster, the 

mobilization clock starts almost immediately after the initial occurrence of 

the disaster, often with little to no warning. Assessments of the mobilization 

process and measures of mobilization capacity focus not on the quality or 

effectiveness of the operation itself but rather on the assembling and transport 

of forces and their equipment to operational areas.19

Mobilization capacity measures the speed with which a given quantity of 

forces can be mobilized—that is, ready to commence operations at a specific 

location. A highly efficient system can mobilize large numbers of trained and 

equipped forces in a short amount of time. This chapter develops a simple 

model to measure mobilization capacity. In our model, mobilization capacity 

is determined by two independent variables: throughput capacity, to measure 

number of forces in a certain time period, and speed capacity, to measure the 

movement of those forces in the same time period. Tradeoffs exist between 

force size and the distances those forces must travel. At one extreme, a large 

number of forces can be mobilized quickly if the distances to be traversed are 

short. At another extreme, only a small number of forces can travel long distances over the same time period.

The first independent variable is throughput capacity. Measured in days, 

this continuous variable measures the average number of military forces that 

are fully mobilized during an operation.20 This simple model does this by taking 

the total number of troops ultimately mobilized (our proxy for military forces) 

and dividing it by the average time (in days) it takes those troops to arrive at the 

area or areas of operation. For example, if a unit consisting of 100 troops took 

4 days to mobilize, the capacity of throughput demonstrated would equal 25 

troops per day. Conversely, if the same unit of 100 troops were mobilized in half 

a day, demonstrated throughput capacity would equal 200 troops per day. Of 

course, in real contingencies, numerous units from multiple locations converge 

on a particular area. In these cases, the various times it takes different units 
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to mobilize are averaged. Although troops often require contingency-specific 

equipment to operate, our simple model assumes that the units deploying take 

their equipment with them and does not attempt to separately capture the 

varying quantities of vehicles or supplies.21 However, leaving out this explicit 

measure in our proxy does not mean that the model’s outputs are necessarily 

unaffected by the amount of heavy equipment used in a particular contingency. 

Indeed, such aspects are implicitly captured by the proxy of troops themselves 

as, all things being equal, a unit traveling light will attain a higher throughput 

capacity rate than the same unit traveling with heavy equipment. 

The second independent variable of the mobilization process is speed 

capacity. Also measured in days, this continuous variable seeks to capture how 

quickly mobilizing forces traverse distances to become fully mobilized. The 

model does this by taking the distance and dividing it by the average time (in 

days) it takes those forces to travel that distance. For example, if a unit takes 4 

days to travel 100 kilometers, its demonstrated average capacity for speed is 25 

kilometers per day. If a unit traveled 100 kilometers in 6 hours, its demonstrated 

capacity for speed is 400 kilometers per day. Similar to throughput capacity, 

numerous units from multiple locations will travel at different speeds to arrive 

at a particular area. In these cases, the various times it takes different units to 

mobilize in our simple model are averaged. 

These variables allow measuring demonstrated mobilization capacity 

across a number of disaster relief operations that vary in scale and type and 

involve different force sizes and distances traveled. This simple model does not 

explicitly incorporate different or evolving mobilization plans or structures that 

might play a role in mobilization capacity. Similarly, it does not incorporate 

different levels of public interest or pressure brought to bear on Chinese authorities. These factors, to the extent they play a role, are also captured implicitly 

in the mobilization capacity demonstrated. This chapter highlights a number 

of these additional factors where relevant. 

It also bears repeating that the analysis focuses solely on mobilization 

capacity. The model cannot shed light on how effective the Chinese armed 

forces are in relieving suffering or restoring public well-being. The data only 

presents a picture of how quickly Chinese armed forces responded and the 

total level of effort demonstrated. Both measures are necessary but not sufficient conditions for an effective response to a disaster. China’s armed forces, 

or any military for that matter, could hypothetically arrive at a disaster scene 
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ENGSTROM AND MORRIS

quickly and with sufficient forces, only to botch the ensuing recovery and 

rescue efforts. 

Table 7.3 summarizes the findings of the available empirical data from the 

four case studies. The calculations are based on data from Chinese press reports 

that specifically mention troop deployment departure and arrival times and 

location of departure.22 This data was quantified into average distance traveled 

(in kilometers [km]), travel time (in days), average distance traveled per day (in 

km/day), and average total throughput (total number of troops deployed/day). 

For all four case studies, estimates are based on a subset of known data (shown 

in the last column of table 7.3). For example, of the 6,281 total troops known 

to be involved in the 2010 Zhouqu mudslides, mobilization data was available 

for 5,344 troops, or 85 percent, thus producing the highest confidence data of 

the four cases.

Table 7.3. China’s Armed Forces Disaster Mobilization

Contingency Total Number 

of Troops 

Mobilized

Average 

Distance 

Traveled (km)

Average Time 

of Travel (days)

Speed 

Capacity 

(km/day)

Throughput 

Capacity 

(troops/day)

Percent of 

Data Set 

Known

2008 winter 

storms

2,495,000 850 4.5 189 554,444 30

2008 Wenchuan 

earthquake

140,000 566 0.7 836 206,769 45

2010 Yushu 

earthquake

16,000 1,273 1.3 1,006 12,642 54

2010 Zhouqu 

mudslides

6,281 347 1.0 351 6,337 85

Sources: The following sources were exploited in calculating the data in this table as well as for all 

calculations involving troop mobilization and total man-days for the four case studies. For the 2010 

Zhouqu Mudslides: “Zhouqu mudslides kill 1,364 people, rescue efforts wrap up” [舟曲泥石流灾害

死亡1364人 搜救工作基本结束], Tencent News [腾讯新闻], August 19, 2010, available at <http://news.

qq.com/a/20100819/001962.htm>; “PLA and PAP deploy 6,281 troops to Zhouqu mudslide disaster” 

[解放军及武警共6281人投入甘肃舟曲泥石流救援], Phoenix Satellite Television [凤凰卫视], August 16, 

2010, available at <http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2010_08/16/1961155_0.shtml>; “Lanzhou 

military region mobilizes a certain anti-chemical brigade, supports Zhouqu relief efforts after 6 

hours” [兰州军区某防化团迅速行动 灾害发生6小时抵舟曲], China National Radio [中国广播网], August 

20, 2010, available at <http://news.sohu.com/20100820/n274343763.shtml>; “Support, unfolding 

from midnight—Gansu PAP document relief efforts in Zhouqu” [救援, 从子夜展开——武警甘肃总队舟

曲救灾纪实], Guangming Daily [光明日报], August 12, 2010, available at <http://military.people.com.

cn/GB/12417424.html>; “A documentation of PLA and PAP relief efforts during the great mudslide of 

Zhouqu” [解放军武警部队舟曲特大山洪泥石流灾害救援纪实], Xinhua Online [新华网], August 11, 2010, 

available at <www.china.com.cn/military/txt/2010-08/11/content_20689382.htm>. For the 2008 

Wenchuan Earthquake: Li Daguang [李大光], “PLA: The main force behind disaster relief efforts in 

mainland China” [解放军:大陆抢险救灾行动的主力军], Life and Disaster [生命与灾害] 9, (September 
169

CHAPTER 7

2009), 15–17; “Chinese military operations other than war since 2008,” PLA Daily, September 5, 2011, 

available at <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2011-09/05/content_4295580_2.htm>; Li Shiming 

and Zhang Haiyang, “Vivid Earthquake Rescue Efforts Illustrate PLA’s Ability to Complete Diversified 

Military Missions.” For the 2010 Yushu Earthquake: Dong Qiang [董强], “Chinese military operations 

other than war since 2008,” PLA Daily; “PLA and PAP achieve new stage of results in earthquake relief 

efforts” [解放军和武警部队抗震救灾获阶段性成果], PLA Daily, April 21, 2010; “Quake-Relief Troops 

Rescue 1,000-Odd People From Ruins” PLA Daily, April 16, 2010; “PLA Air Force Realizes Zero-Fault 

Air Rescue in Quake-Jolted Yushu,” PLA Daily, April 20, 2010; “Documenting Yushu relief efforts 

by the reserves and militia of the PLA” [民兵预备役部队玉树抗震救灾实录], PLA Daily, April 25, 2010, 

available at <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/67481/187376/187506/11448209.html>; “Chinese armed 

forces provide quick response, quake relief to Yushu,” Xinhua, April 20, 2010. For the 2008 Winter 

Storms: “Memorandum on relief efforts by the PLA and PAP during the 2008 Winter Storms” [2008

全军和武警部队抗灾救灾备忘录], PLA Daily, February 13, 2008, available at <www.chinamil.com.cn/

site1/2008a/2008-02/15/content_1125040_3.htm>; “The Armed Forces Started a General Mobilization to Engage in a Fierce Battle with the World of Ice and Snow,” Xinhua, February 3, 2008; “Composing epoch chapter of listening to the Party’s command to serve the people while fighting against 

the snow and ice” [在抗击冰雪斗争中谱写听党指挥服务人民英勇善战的时代篇章], PLA Daily, February 25, 

2008, available at <www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/zbxl/2008-02/25/content_1136127.htm>.

Figure 7.1plots mobilization capacity and speed capacity for the four cases. 

The results of the scatterplot offer an important indicator of overall efficiency, as 

plots in the upper right-hand corner would signify high mobilization capacity, 

whereas plots in the lower right-hand corner would suggest the opposite. As 

the chart indicates, the 2008 winter storms were by far the highest in terms 

of throughput, with the PLA mobilizing an average of 554,444 troops per day, 

but moving them at the slowest average speed of 189 km per day (or 7.9 km 

per hour). For the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, China’s armed forces mobilized an average of 206,769 troops per day and traveled at an average speed of 

approximately 836 km per day. The other two case studies—the 2010 Yushu 

earthquake and 2010 Zhouqu mudslides—indicate that the Chinese armed 

forces mobilized an average of 12,642 and 6,337 troops per day, traveling at an 

average speed of 1,006 and 351 km per day, respectively. In other words, speaking in relative terms, the Chinese armed forces moved a large number of troops 

very slowly during the 2008 winter storms; moved a moderately large number 

of troops fairly quickly during the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake; moved a small 

number of troops very quickly during the 2010 Yushu earthquake; and moved 

a small number of troops fairly slowly during the 2010 Zhouqu mudslides. Of 

course, many of these discrepancies may be due to various factors (such as how 

widespread the damage was and whether the supporting infrastructure that 

China’s armed forces might have relied on was affected).
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ENGSTROM AND MORRIS

Disaster Contingency Manpower Effort 

Total man-days is another metric that is useful in quantifying and comparing 

the total manpower effort of the Chinese armed forces in disaster relief. Mandays allows comparisons to be made between contingencies that may be very 

dissimilar in terms of numbers of soldiers participating and the amount of time 

they are active. This variable is calculated by taking the sum of the number of 

troops active each day of an ongoing relief effort.23As figure 7.2 illustrates, the 

2008 winter storms constituted by far the largest number of total man-days put 

forth by China’s armed forces amongst the four case studies, at nearly 37 million. This is followed by the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake at around 4.9 million, 

the 2010 Yushu earthquake at around 114,000, and the 2010 Zhouqu mudslides 

at approximately 73,000. 

Figure 7.3 superimposes the man-day timelines of each case study to 

provide a comparative analysis of mobilization across the different natural 

disasters. As the figure shows, although the 2008 winter storms represented 

the largest effort in terms of total man-days, the Chinese armed forces did not 

achieve peak troop levels with the same speed as the other three case studies, 

only doing so 12 days after initiation of relief operations. On the other end of 

the spectrum, the Chinese armed forces mobilized 100,000 troops on just the 

third day after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake and achieved a peak level on the 

sixth day. Similarly, it took just 4 days to achieve a peak level of troops mobilized 

during the 2010 Zhouqu mudslides operations. Finally, it took 7 days to achieve 

peak mobilization for the 2010 Yushu earthquake. Figure 7.3 also illustrates not 

only the scale of troop involvement, but how sustained the effort was as well. 

Figure 7.1. Demonstrated Mobilization Capacity of the Four Case Studies

Speed Capacity (distance traveled by troop per day, km)

Throughput Capacity 

(troops per day)

600,000

500,000

400,000

300,000

200,000

100,000

0

0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200

2008 Winter Storms

2010 Zhouqu Mudslides

2008 Wenchuan Earthquakes

2010 Yushu Earthquake
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The two notable results are the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, representing the 

largest sustained effort among the four disasters, lasting approximately 37 days, 

and the 2008 winter storms relief operation, which lasted 19 days but required 

a far greater number of troops.24

One key qualitative factor differentiates the 2008 winter storms from the 

other case studies, however. While the 2008 winter storms presented a major 

infrastructure and transportation restoration challenge for the Chinese armed 

forces, it did not require urgent life-saving measures like the other three natural 

disasters. This might have influenced the speed and efficiency of mobilization 

during this event.

The results of the aforementioned tables and figures of the four case studies offer a rough analytic basis for examining Chinese armed forces effort and 

efficiency. If we define total effort using the metrics of average distance, time, 

Figure 7.2. Manpower Effort of the Four Case Studies

Disaster

Total Man-Days

40,000,000

35,000,000

30,000,000

25,000,000

20,000,000

15,000,000

10,000,000

5,000,000

0 2010 Zhouqu 

Mudslide

2010 Yushu Earthquake 2008 Wenchuan 

Earthquake

2008 Winter Storms

72,888 114,143

4,899,110

36,859,998

Figure 7.3. Number of Chinese Armed Forces Personnel Engaged in Disaster 

 Relief Efforts Over Time by Disaster

Days

Manpower Levels

(# of Troops Engaged)

3,000,000

2,500,000

2,000,000

1,500,000

1,000,000

500,000

0

2010 Zhouqu Mudslide

2010 Yushu Earthquake 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake

2008 Winter Storms

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
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ENGSTROM AND MORRIS

speed, throughput, and man-days, the Chinese armed forces exhibited varying 

degrees of overall mobilization capacity across all examined case studies.25

The data suggest that the Chinese armed forces were actually quite successful 

in mobilizing troops across long distances in a relatively short amount of time 

to the disaster areas. This conclusion contrasts with one article on the 2008 

Wenchuan earthquake that noted, “PLA efforts . . . were overwhelmed in many 

ways by the devastated roads and ground-based access routes.”26

Comparing Disaster Contingencies to Warfighting 

This chapter has sought to demonstrate the usefulness of studying mobilization 

capacity and military effort as a way to both improve understanding of internal 

disaster relief response and track the evolution of the armed forces’ capacity 

for broader contingencies. The chapter concludes by employing this approach 

to compare the four disaster relief case studies with two past warfighting 

contingencies: the 1950–1953 Korean War and the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. 

These two wars were chosen because they highlight both extensive amounts 

of mobilization and significant manpower levels. 

Mobilization for warfare has many similarities to mobilization for disaster 

relief. Both types of contingencies require assembling a significant task-organized military force and sending it to a zone of operations. Of course, warfare 

mobilization can differ, especially under circumstances where the need for 

secrecy is high and the sense of emergency or need for immediate response 

is low. Given that disasters typically have little advance warning, they should 

stress the mobilization system much more than a hypothetical war of choice. 

On the other hand, military forces require significant amounts of equipment 

and supplies to conduct combat operations, increasing demands on the mobilization system.

In both the warfighting contingencies, Beijing tried to preserve a modicum of secrecy and conducted planned, rather than emergency, responses. 

To be sure, Beijing was seeking to react in a timely fashion against the United 

States and Vietnam, but there was leeway in exactly when operations would 

commence. Data on various contingencies can be grouped by time, producing 

curves showing levels of mobilization capacity at various historical periods. 

As can be seen from table 7.4, China’s armed forces initially mobilized more 

troops during the 2008 winter storms than it did for either the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War or the 1950–1953 Korean War. Of course, natural disasters differ 
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CHAPTER 7

from warfighting in that they occur without warning, forcing China to respond 

quickly. In this way, instances of large-scale disaster relief present a highly significant and possibly even superior test of China’s armed forces mobilization 

capacity. In terms of mobilization demands, internal disaster relief operations 

are more like responding to a theoretical surprise attack than conducting a 

deliberate, planned buildup toward war. 

Table 7.4. Armed Forces Disaster and Warfighting Mobilization

Contingency Total 

Number 

of Troops 

Mobilized

Average 

Distance 

Traveled 

(km)

Average 

Time of 

Travel (days)

Speed 

Capacity 

(km/day)

Throughput 

Capacity 

(troops/

day)

Percent of 

Data Set 

Known

2008 Winter 

Storms

 2,495,000 850 4.5 189 554,444 30

1950–1953 

Korean War

 840,000* 1,897 74.8 25 11,226 33

1979 

Sino-Vietnamese 

War

 473,000* 1,304 13.1 100 36,207 45

2008 Wenchuan 

earthquake

 140,000 566 0.7 836 206,769 45

2010 Yushu 

earthquake

 16,000 1,273 1.3 1,006 12,642 54

2010 Zhouqu 

mudslides

 6,281 347 1.0 351 6,337 85

* Denotes estimate of troops initially mobilized, not level of total troop participation

Note: Total troop numbers mobilized for the 1950–1953 Korean and 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War are 

derived from the number of group armies multiplied by the estimated number of troops in each group 

army. As a result, the number listed is very different than the total number of individuals that participated in the wars. This is specifically so for the Korean War, as it lasted over a period of years; attrition 

and reinforcements ballooned the total numbers of individuals who actually participated. See table 7.3 

sources for earlier data on disaster mobilization.

Sources: Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: The 

Macmillan Company, 1960), 64–67, 118–124; “PLA Armies in Korea 1950–1958: Dates of Service,” Orbat.

com, June 16, 2002, available at <www.orbat.com/site/history/historical/china/plakorea.html>; King 

C. Chen, China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications (Stanford, CA: Stanford 

University Press, 1986), 102–112; Edward C. O’Dowd, Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina 

War (London: Routledge, 2007), 48, 50–55; China’s Military Policy and General Purpose Forces, National 

Intelligence Estimate, NIE 13-3-72 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1972), 64–66, available at <www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0001093704/DOC_0001093704.pdf>.
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ENGSTROM AND MORRIS

From these three cases, a mobilization capacity curve can be drawn (see 

figure 7.4), depicting a potential theoretical maximum or frontier of China’s 

armed forces’ present ability to mobilize. The dashed lines in the figure represent the tentative nature of our knowledge about China’s mobilization efficiency from the limited set of nonrandomized cases examined. 

How can we compare the evolution of capacity to mobilize from earlier historical contingencies? In the 1950–1953 Korean War and 1979 Sino-Vietnamese 

War, China’s armed forces amassed significant forces yet were relatively slow 

moving those forces to their initial fighting positions, averaging an estimated 

25 km and 100 km per day, respectively (see table 7.4). Figure 7.4 depicts these 

plots and draws highly approximated curves through them. While more data 

points, and more complete data for the existing data points, would be needed to 

increase confidence about the exact shape of such curves, the general trend is 

clear. The demonstrated mobilization capacity of China’s armed forces to deal 

with internal and peripheral contingencies evolved significantly from the early 

1950s to the late 1970s, increasing roughly three to four times. This capacity has 

taken an even more massive leap since that time to reach present levels. Combining data from other historical examples of Chinese mobilization, such as 

the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War or the various Taiwan Strait crises (1954–1955, 

1958, and 1995–1996), would provide further evidence and more nuance about 

the evolution of conflict mobilization capacity over time. 

While the findings presented here are preliminary in nature and further 

research is needed, we have demonstrated that data on disaster relief contingencies can be grouped by time to develop mobilization capacity curves 

showing levels of mobilization efficiency at various historical periods. Data 

from future contingencies could be used to track further developments of 

mobilization capacity. If the mobilization capacity curve continues to expand 

outward in the future, this would indicate that the PLA, PAP, and the militia 

are increasing their mobilization capacity. Lastly, if additional data about 

the disasters studied here becomes available (see table 7.4), we would have 

increased confidence in the actual shape of the mobilization curve.

One further note of caution: not every contingency will fully stress the 

Chinese mobilization system. With smaller or slower responses, the resulting 

data plot will be below the mobilization capacity curve. The 2010 Zhouqu 

mudslide is an example of such an event, as it is well inside the mobilization 

capacity curve (see figure 7.4). 
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CHAPTER 7

Note: Gaps in available data are estimated. Numbers for the Korean War only capture the period 

between the official entry of Chinese forces (October 25, 1950) and their continued presence through 

the ceasefire armistice on July 27, 1953. It does not include the prior mobilization or the period after the 

ceasefire (July 28, 1953, to October 31, 1958) in which a number of Chinese forces remained in North 

Korea. Similarly, numbers for the Sino-Vietnamese War only capture the period in which Chinese forces 

operated within Vietnam, spanning from the conflict’s official start date of February 17, 1979, to March 

16, 1979. See table 7.3 for sources.

We can also assess manpower effort across the cases to make similar comparisons about overall effort and sustainment across very different contingencies 

(see figure 7.5). The 2008 winter storms are a good example of this. Indeed, as 

the figure demonstrates, more manpower effort was expended for this disaster 

than the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Other large-scale, long-duration disaster 

responses will likely also demonstrate responses approaching or even exceeding 

efforts of certain military conflicts. As a result, with the abovementioned caveats, disaster relief is also an important indicator of the PLA’s capacity to sustain 

military operations. 

Conclusion 

This chapter has depicted the enormity and importance of the internal disaster relief mission for China’s armed forces, detailing the location and frequency of certain types of disasters. It also demonstrated an approach that 

enhances our understanding of mobilization capacity and manpower effort 

in China’s disaster relief operations by conducting cross-case comparisons 

on the number of forces mobilized and length of time required to deliver 

forces to the point of operations. This approach can also be used to compare 

disaster relief contingencies to other contingencies China’s armed forces 

Figure 7.4. Demonstrated Mobilization Capacity and Mobilization Capacity Curve 

 of Select Disaster and Warfighting Contingencies

Average Distance (km) Traveled per Day

Average Numbers of Troops

Projected Per Day

600,000

500,000

400,000

300,000

200,000

100,000

0 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200

2010 Zhouqu Mudslide

2008 Wenchuan Earthquake

1979 Sino-Vietnamese War

2010 Yushu 

Earthquake

“Mobilization Capacity Curve”

1950–1953 Korean War

2008 Winter Storms
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ENGSTROM AND MORRIS

face. In terms of mobilization and manpower, disaster relief contingencies, 

with certain caveats, are comparable to a broad range of contingencies, 

including warfighting. The approach put forth here provides a useful means 

of tracking China’s evolving capacities to respond to internal or peripheral 

contingencies over time. 

Appendix A

Recent Chinese Government Documents Relating to Disaster Relief

The People’s Liberation Army (the Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force, Armed 

Police, Second Artillery, and Reserve), the People’s Armed Police, and the 

militia have regularly engaged in internal disaster relief contingencies for 

decades, if not since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).27

However, Chinese armed forces’ participation in domestic disaster relief was 

only formally codified in the last decade in two PRC legal documents. 

The first, “Regulations on the Army’s Participation in Emergency Rescue 

and Disaster Relief” [jundui canjia qiangxianjiuzai tiaoli, 军队参加抢险救灾

条例], passed on July 1, 2005, outlined in broad terms the legal authority as 

well as the principles, tasks, command, and support for the armed forces’ 

participation in emergency rescue and disaster relief.28 The regulations define 

responsibilities as:

rescuing, transferring, or dispersing victims; protecting the safety of 

important targets; rescuing and transporting important materials; 

participating in specialized tasks including repair of roads, bridges, 

and tunnels, rescue at sea, nuclear, chemical, and biological rescue, 

Figure 7.5. Manpower Effort of Select Disaster and Warfighting Contingencies

Disaster/Conflict

Total Man-Days 700,000,000

600,000,000

500,000,000

400,000,000

300,000,000

200,000,000

100,000,000

0 2010 Zhouqu 

Mudslide

2008 Wenchuan 

Earthquake

1979 SinoVietnamese War2010 Yushu 

Earthquake

1950–1953 

Korean War

2008 Winter 

Storms

72,888 114,143 4,899,110 13,244,000 36,859,998

649,606,354
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control of infectious disease, preventing or controlling other serious 

dangers or disasters, and when necessary, assisting local government 

in reconstruction.29

The second document, the “Contingency Response Law of the People’s 

Republic of China” [zhonghua renmin gongheguo tufa shijian yingdui fa, 中华人

民共和国突发事件应对法], passed by the National People’s Congress Standing 

Committee on August 30, 2007, sought to streamline intraservice responses to 

sudden incidents [tufa shijian, 突发事件] across the different armed services 

and bureaucracies. The law states the military’s role in quite flexible terms: 

“The Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the Chinese People’s Armed Police 

Force, and militia join in emergency response, rescue, and management in 

accordance with this law and other relevant laws, administrative regulations, 

and military laws and the commands of the State Council and the Central 

Military Commission.”30

Finally, on May 12, 2009, on the anniversary of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, the State Council Information Office released its first white paper on 

disaster relief entitled China’s Actions for Disaster Prevention and Reduction. 

The white paper reviews government policies related to disaster relief work and 

lays out broad policy objectives in alleviating the human and economic costs 

of natural disasters. The paper summarizes the effort in this way: “Given that 

many kinds of wide-ranging disasters frequently hit China and caused huge 

losses, China’s main tasks were to strengthen its ability to manage potential 

risks of natural disasters, to monitor and forecast natural disasters, to prevent 

them, and conduct rescue and relief.”31

Appendix B

Data on Troop Movement32

The four tables (7.5–7.8) represent the calculations based on Chinese reporting 

of the four case studies examined in the chapter. In the majority of cases, the 

Chinese reporting identified data points, such as units within various military regions, their time of departure and arrival at the disaster area, and the 

size of the unit involved, which allowed the authors to accurately calculate 

estimates of mobilization capacity. In some instances, only fragmentary information was revealed, such as the time of departure and the number of troops 

involved, without identifying the specific location of departure or arrival. In 
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ENGSTROM AND MORRIS

those instances, the authors undertook a subjective analysis of the proximate 

location that a given unit might have departed from based on the context of 

the article. In instances where the arrival location was not given, the authors 

assumed that the location was at or near the disaster zone.33

Table 7.5. 2008 Winter Storms

Unit Name Unit Size Unit Military 

Region (MR)

Within

Disaster Area 

MRa

Distance 

traveled (km)

Length of time 

to reach 

disaster area 

(hours)

Efficiency of 

mobilization 

(distance/

time)

Chengdu MR 499,000 Chengdu Yes 700 120 5.83

Various PAP Branches 243,000 Unidentified Yes 1,000 96 10.42

Total accounted 742,000

Peak troop level 2,495,000

Total % accounted 30

Disaster date January 

25, 2008

Order to mobilize came from Hu Jintao on January 29, 2008

a

 Disaster area spanned Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hunan, and Guangzhou 

provinces
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Table 7.6. 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake

Unit Name Unit Size Unit Military 

Region (MR)

Within

Disaster Area 

MR

Distance 

traveled (km)

Length of time 

to reach 

disaster area 

(hours)

Efficiency of 

mobilization 

(distance/

time)

Chengdu MR units 

(various)

20,000 Chengdu Yes 132 10 13.20

Chengdu MR 

reserves

15,600 Chengdu Yes 132 40 3.30

Jinan MR units 

(various)

18,000 Jinan No 1,000 12 83.33

4th or 3rd army aviation

9,000 Lanzhou or 

Jinan

No 1,000 3 333.33

Total accounted 62,600

Peak troop level 140,000

Total percentage 

accounted

45

Disaster date May 12, 2008

Table 7.7. 2010 Yushu Earthquake

Unit Name Unit Size Unit Military 

Region (MR)

Within 

Disaster Area 

MR

Distance 

traveled (km)

Length of time 

to reach 

disaster area 

(hours)

Efficiency of 

mobilization 

(distance/

time)

Unidentified 218 Beijing No 2,500 60.07a 41.62a

Unidentified 5,211 Lanzhou Yes 1,028 24.70a 41.62a

Unidentified 283 Jinan No 2,511 60.33a 41.62a

Unidentified 583 Chengdu No 1,152 27.68a 41.62a

Unidentified 861 Second 

Artillery

No 1,273 30.60a 41.62a

Qinghai regiment 

(unspecified)

1,030 Lanzhou Yes 800 19.00 42.11

Reserve engineer regi- ment (unspecified)300 Chengdu No 1,152 20.00 57.60

Second artillery unit 

(unspecified)

180 Lanzhou Yes 814 24.00 33.92

Qumalai reserve corps 50 Lanzhou Yes 230 7.00 32.86

Total accounted 8,716

Peak troop level 16,000

Total percentage 

accounted

54

Disaster date and time 0749 on April 14, 2010

a

 Extrapolated from data on other units responding to this disaster.
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ENGSTROM AND MORRIS

Table 7.8. 2010 Zhouqu Mudslides

Unit Name Unit Size Unit Military 

Region (MR)

Within 

Disaster Area 

MR

Distance 

traveled (km)

Length of time 

to reach 

disaster area 

(hours)

Efficiency of 

mobilization 

(distance/

time)

Longnan 

detachment

200 Lanzhou Yes 77.30 2.35 32.89

Lanzhou 

anti-chemical corps

300 Lanzhou Yes 387.00 5.80 66.72

Chengdu disaster 

relief corps

300 Chengdu No 578.00 39.00 14.82

Various units 4,544 Various Yes 347.43 48.00 7.24

Total accounted 5,344

Peak troop level 6,281

Total percentage 

accounted 

85

Disaster date and 

time

2300 on August 7, 2010
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Notes

1 Unless otherwise specified, the term People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

encompasses the PLA Ground Force, PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, Second Artillery, and 

Reserve. Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, China’s 

National Defense in 2002 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2002).

2 For example, Kamlesh K. Agnihotri, “2008 Sichuan Earthquake and the 

Role of the Chinese Defence Forces in Disaster Relief,” Journal of Defence Studies 6, 

no. 1 (2012), 30–43; James Mulvenon, “The Chinese Military’s Earthquake Response 

Leadership Team,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 25 (Winter 2008); Nirav Patel, “Chinese Disaster Relief Operations: Identifying Critical Capability Gaps,” Joint Force 

Quarterly 51 (1st Quarter, 2009), 111–117. 

3 Ding Dou’s article on PLA participation in internal disaster relief presents 

four disaster relief case studies, but they are not systematically compared or analyzed. Ding Dou, “PLA’s Disaster Relief Works: Review and Reform,” East Asian Policy

2, no. 3 (July/September 2010). 

4 Ibid.

5 For more on military operations other than war, see Harold M. Tanner, “The 

People’s Liberation Army and China’s Internal Security Challenges,” in The PLA at 

Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, ed. Roy 

Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2010), 237–294. 

6 This percentage is possibly greater based on the 24.8 percent of data that is 

unknown. 

7 “Over 100 Dead or Missing After Floods Devastate NE China Province,” 

Xinhua, August 1, 2010; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), China—Floods, Situation Report no. 6 (August 7, 1998); World 

Vision, Update on China Flood (August 27, 1998); United Nations Disaster Relief 

Organization, China—Floods, Situation Reports 1–9 (June 25, 1991); International 

Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), China: Floods Information Bulletin No. 1 (May 

21, 2003); IFRC, China: Floods Information Bulletin No. 4 (July 9, 2003); Robert J. 

Saiget, “Death Toll in China Floods Hits 569,” Agence France-Presse, July 11, 2003; 

OCHA, China—Floods, Situation Report no. 4 (September 24, 1999); United Nations 

Department of Humanitarian Affairs, China—Floods, Information Report no. 1 

(July 7, 1995).

8 Howard W. French, “Snowstorms in China Kill at Least 24,” New York 

Times, January 29, 2008, available at <www.nytimes.com/2008/01/29/world/

asia/29china.html>. 

9 “Heavy snow affects 77 mln people in 14 provinces,” Xinhua, January 29, 

2008, available at <www.china.org.cn/english/China/241079.htm>.
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10 “Memorandum on relief efforts by the PLA and PAP during the 2008 Winter Storms” [2008全军和武警部队抗灾救灾备忘录], PLA Daily [解放军报], February 

13, 2008.

11 “China Focus: China Deploys 113,080 Armed Forces for Earthquake Rescue,” Xinhua, May 18, 2008.

12 Li Shiming and Zhang Haiyang [李世明, 张海阳], “Vivid Earthquake Rescue 

Efforts Illustrate PLA’s Ability To Complete Diversified Military Missions” [抗震救灾

斗争生动展示了我军完成多样化军事任务的能力], Seeking Truth [求是], no. 13 (July 1, 

2008), 2, available at <www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2008/200813/200906/t20090609_1338.

htm>; Patel, 3.

13 “China Focus: At Least 67 Dead After 7.1-Magnitude Quake Hits China’s 

Qinghai,” Xinhua, April 14, 2010.

14 “Chinese armed forces provide quick response, quake relief to Yushu,” Xinhua, 

April 20, 2010, available at <www.gov.cn/english/2010-04/20/content_1587929.htm>.

15 “Litany of Warnings Preceded Mudslide,” South China Morning Post, August 

10, 2010, available at <www.scmp.com/article/721756/litany-warnings-preceded-mudslides>.

16 “Zhouqu mudslide disaster anniversary: Zhouqu’s past and present,” CCTV.

com, August 8, 2011, available at <http://english.cntv.cn/20110808/104160.shtml>.

17 “PLA and PAP deploy 6,281 troops to Zhouqu mudslide disaster” 

[解放军及武警共6281人投入甘肃舟曲泥石流救援], Phoenix Satellite Television [凤凰卫视], August 16, 2010, available at <http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/

detail_2010_08/16/1961155_0.shtml>.

18 Though this definition is U.S.-centric and somewhat vague, it suits the 

purposes of this chapter. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: The Joint 

Staff, February 2014), 175.

19 The efficacy of mobilization certainly has a large role to play in ultimate 

operational successes or failures. Likewise, inefficient or ineffective operations often 

require further mobilization to accommodate operational weaknesses.

20 Unlike the quantity of heavy equipment present (helicopters or cranes), 

troops are highly comparable over time and are a good barometer of a relief operation’s scope and scale, as well as significantly easier to count in the open source 

literature. A more complex model might seek to incorporate quantities of heavy 

equipment though this metric may be more suited to another variable, explicitly not 

explored here, relating to relief operation efficacy. 

21 One such example is an episode during the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake 

in which the PLA’s lack of heavy-lift helicopters prevented vital equipment such 
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as excavators and cranes from being delivered. See Jake Hooker, “Quake Revealed 

Deficiencies of China’s Military,” New York Times, July 2, 2008, available at <www.

nytimes.com/2008/07/02/world/asia/02china.html?pagewanted=all>.

22 Certain estimates were made if reporting did not mention specific locations. 

For example, some reports mentioned troops departing from the Chengdu Military 

Region without specifying the individual unit locations. In those instances, we used the 

Chengdu group army headquarters as the default point of departure. Likewise, certain 

assumptions had to be made when the exact time of departure or arrival was unclear. In 

instances when the reporting mentioned a unit leaving “in the early hours” on a certain 

date, for example, we estimated this time to be around 0300 hours, and so on. 

23 Note the cut-off date of disaster relief operations is defined as the date the 

PLA concluded rescue efforts—extraction of victims from harm, delivery of life-sustaining supplies (blankets and food), and so forth. This does not include postdisaster 

construction efforts, which the PLA was also involved in but which continued well 

beyond the initial search and rescue phase of relief efforts.

24 The sudden drop-off in operations for this as well as for other case studies is 

due to the fact that we were unable to locate data on demobilization of troops from 

the disaster zone. 

25 As noted earlier, a more complex model might take into account the political impact of effective and timely responses in mobilization capacity. This is a topic 

left for future research.

26 Patel, 116. 

27 PLA participation is known to have occurred in the Tangshan earthquake of 

1976 in which a 7.5 magnitude earthquake struck Heibei Province. 

28 State Council and the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China, “Regulation on army participation in disaster rescue and relief” [军队

参加抢险救灾条例], June 7, 2005, available at <www.gov.cn/yjgl/2005-10/09/content_75376.htm>.

29 Ibid., art. 3.

30 “Contingency response law of the People’s Republic of China” [中华人民共

和国突发事件应对法], passed by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee 

on August 30, 2007, available at <www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-08/30/content_732593.htm>. 

31 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 

China’s Actions for Disaster Prevention and Reduction (Beijing: Information 

Office of the State Council, May 11, 2009), available at <www.gov.cn/english/official/2009-05/11/content_1310629.htm>.

32 See table 7.3 for sources.

33 Estimates were made if reporting did not mention specific locations.

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I

f China were to experience widespread internal unrest, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might be called upon to help restore order. However, 

an evolution in how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) thinks about 

maintaining order has changed the PLA’s responsibility from a frontline role 

in suppressing counterrevolutionaries to a secondary and supporting role in 

maintaining stability. This chapter begins by reviewing the evolution in Chinese leadership thinking about responding to unrest from Mao Zedong to Jiang 

Zemin. The second section considers PRC efforts to implement a reduction in 

the PLA’s internal security role by constructing a legislative and regulatory 

framework defining the roles of the armed forces in emergencies and building the capabilities of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) to respond to internal 

unrest. It also briefly reviews recent responses to internal unrest, noting that, 

in practice, Chinese authorities have relied on public security forces and the 

PAP and have avoided employing the PLA in internal security roles. The final 

section considers the impact of this shift, noting the use of political education 

and military “love the people” activities to try to ensure that the PLA will be a 

loyal tool if called upon by the Chinese Communist Party. However, the PLA 

does not relish an active role in stability maintenance. Few articles by military scholars discuss PLA participation in such operations, with most authors 

stressing that the PAP has the main responsibility to deal with internal unrest.

Evolution of the PLA Role in Responding to Internal Unrest 

The evolution of the PLA’s role in responding to internal unrest can be divided 

into three periods as Chinese leadership shifted from Mao Zedong to Deng 

Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin. In Mao’s era, mass riots were viewed as the conspiracies of counterrevolutionary forces and suppression by the PLA was the 

CHAPTER 8

PLA Response to Widespread Internal 

Unrest in the Han Homeland

Ma Chengkun 
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only solution. Deng Xiaoping took a more pragmatic approach. He did not 

necessarily view all riots or protests as counterrevolutionary activities but still 

insisted that the PLA was the main force if it became necessary to suppress 

riots. Jiang Zemin viewed most unrest as people safeguarding their rights on 

the street. Accordingly, the PAP was a more proper and legitimate means to 

cope with these incidents, with the PLA role in riot suppression being reduced 

or eliminated. 

Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries under Mao

After the founding of the PRC in 1949, responding to internal unrest was one 

of the PLA’s principal missions. In 1950, when the CCP leadership started 

a nationwide land reform campaign, local riots arose along with sporadic 

armed conflicts between the PLA and residual Kuomintang (KMT) armed 

forces. Chairman Mao Zedong admitted that the situation had become severe 

because implementation of the CCP’s land reform policy had been delayed by 

the civil war. After the PRC was founded, the negative impact of land reform 

became more notable because the civil war had ended and people could return 

their attention to the safety of their property.1

 To ensure the success of the land 

reform campaign, Mao decided to suppress the riots by initiating a policy of 

“Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries.” The CCP regime issued the “Direction 

Concerning the Suppression of Counterrevolutionary Activities” in October 

1950, declaring that the success of land reform and economic development 

required suppression of all the activities of counterrevolutionaries.2 The PLA 

3rd and 4th Armies were designated as the main forces to suppress land reform 

riots in eastern and southern China.3 Party cadres went to the countryside, 

accompanied by PLA units, and entered villages to overcome opposition of 

landowners to the land reform policy.4 During the revolutionary era, CCP leaders viewed the PLA as an effective tool for suppressing internal unrest, riots, and 

protests. The PLA was the only reliable coercive tool the party had in the initial 

period after the founding of the PRC when police forces were under military 

command. As a revolutionary force, the PLA could easily turn its guns against 

the Chinese people without hesitation, since the core mission of the PLA was 

to assure the security of the CCP regime rather than to protect the motherland.

The PLA used even more brutal means to suppress riots in Tibet and Xinjiang during the revolutionary era. During the Xunhua [循化] incident in the 

Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau in April 1958, CCP leaders mobilized the PLA 163rd
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and 165th Infantry Corps, the 306th Artillery Corps, and the 55th Engineer Division to suppress counterrevolutionaries gathered at a temple. After soldiers 

surrounded and rushed into the temple, they faced thousands of unarmed 

Tibetans. The PLA killed more than 700 and arrested the others.5

During the Cultural Revolution, when the power struggle between the 

conservatives and the radicals escalated from quarrel to armed conflict despite 

Chairman Mao’s warning, Mao eventually decided to use the military to rein in 

the anarchical situation. He ordered the elite security guard force, the famous 

Unit 8341 troops, to be stationed at Tsinghua University to show his determination to regain control.6

 Under Mao’s orders, the PLA suppressed workers and 

students cruelly. When student Red Guard groups refused to dissolve following 

a military ultimatum, PLA troops attacked them using regular combat tactics. 

The majority of the 500,000 victims of the Cultural Revolution were killed by 

the PLA’s bloody suppression in 1968.7

Main Force of Riot Suppression under Deng 

Two decades later, in June 1989, China’s political leader, Deng Xiaoping, faced 

a severe situation in Tiananmen Square. Thousands of students protested 

and demanded political reform. The students refused to leave even after CCP 

Secretary General Zhao Ziyang went to the square and showed his sincerity in 

speaking to them. Like his predecessor Mao, Deng Xiaoping decided to use military forces to suppress the protests and restore social order. But because Deng 

was a pragmatist, he did not view all of the protesters as counterrevolutionaries. 

Deng mobilized military troops only after he concluded that the Beijing police 

were unable to restore social order in the capital.8

 Although Deng ultimately 

decided to suppress the protest by force, the first PLA troops, which received 

mobilization orders in mid-May, were ordered not to shoot even if they were 

provoked by protesters. Thus, many soldiers did not carry their weapons when 

they moved to Beijing.9 At the beginning of the Tiananmen suppression, the 

PLA 38th Group Army attempted to use tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse 

the protesters. When these efforts failed, soldiers began to shoot people with 

AK-47 machine guns and to crush obstacles in the streets with tanks and 

armored vehicles.10

Deng Xiaoping eventually concluded that the essence of the protest was 

a threat to political and social stability that had to be suppressed as soon as 

possible to prevent it from escalating into an open challenge to the regime.11
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However, the PLA was the last option, after the police and the PAP failed to 

suppress internal unrest. This contrasts with Mao Zedong, who viewed the PLA 

as an effective way to attack counterrevolutionaries and mobilized troops to 

suppress internal unrest without hesitation.

Secondary Force in Stability Maintenance under Jiang 

Since this experience under Mao and Deng, the PLA has gradually moved from 

the frontline in suppressing internal unrest. The Tiananmen incident was a 

watershed moment in reducing the PLA’s role in maintaining social stability. 

The PAP gradually replaced the PLA as the main coercive tool the regime could 

employ when challenges of social unrest arose. 

In the Jiang Zemin era, internal unrest increased dramatically due to 

dislocations caused by rapid economic development. However, Jiang insisted 

that PLA troops should not be the frontline forces in suppressing riots. He 

emphasized the importance of the PAP in maintaining social stability and 

ordered the PAP to establish a contingency response capability.12 In October 

1999, 10 years after the Tiananmen incident, a robbery incident in Panzhihua 

City (攀枝花市) in Sichuan Province caused large-scale riots. People marched 

in the streets protesting collusion between local police and criminals. Chinese 

authorities mobilized 500 PAP troops to suppress the riots with tear gas instead 

of mobilizing PLA troops to shoot people.13 According to official statistics, there 

were more than 100,000 mass riots in mainland China in 1999, a level that could 

have exhausted PAP forces. Considering the urgency of the situation, CCP leaders could have mobilized PLA troops to suppress riots and protests. However, 

the PLA continued to play a secondary role, backing up frontline PAP forces. 

Implementing the Shift in the PLA’s Role in Maintaining 

Social Order

Partly due to the traumatic impact of the Tiananmen incident on CCP leaders 

and on Chinese society, the PLA role in suppressing riots and maintaining 

internal stability has continued to decline over the last decade. The CCP regime 

has tried hard to rehabilitate its international and domestic image by civilizing its internal stability maintenance mechanisms. In this context, the PAP 

has gradually replaced the PLA as the main force responsible for coping with 

social unrest. 
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Legislative Framework 

According to China’s National Defense Law, the PLA’s main mission is to conduct national defense operations. The PAP has direct responsibility for maintaining social order, though the PLA can offer assistance in this if necessary 

and authorized by law.14 China has also used defense white papers to clarify the 

difference in the PLA and PAP missions. According to the 2013 Defense White 

Paper, China’s armed forces assist the public security forces in maintaining 

social order and ensuring that the people live and work in peace and stability.15

The white paper emphasizes that PAP forces, instead of the PLA, are the state’s 

backbone and shock force in handling public emergencies. From 2011-2012 PAP 

forces handled 68 acts of serious violence and crime, including dealing with 

terrorist attacks and rescuing 62 hostages. The PAP also deployed a total of 1.6 

million people to provide security during the 26th Summer Universiade and 

the China-Eurasia Expo in 2011 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

Beijing Summit in 2012.16

The PLA has participated in emergency rescue and disaster relief operations, part of what the PLA calls military operations other than war (MOOTW) 

[feizhanzheng junshi xingdong, 非战争军事行动]. The 2013 defense white paper 

notes that China formed nine state-level professional emergency response 

units, boasting a total of 50,000 personnel, specializing in “flood relief, earthquake rescue, nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense, emergency 

airlift, quick repair of transportation and power facilities, maritime search and 

rescue, mobile communications support, medical aid and epidemic prevention, and meteorological support.”17 These units have been founded under the 

“Military MOOTW Capacity-Building Program” [jundui feizhanzheng junshi 

xingdong nengli jianshe guihua, 军队非战争军事行动能力建设规划] approved 

by the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 2008. These units include designated corps of engineers, nuclear-biological-chemical protection, pontoon 

bridge construction, hydropower, transport, communication, and medical 

service troops. Most are units from different services of the PLA, with only the 

hydropower unit drawn from the PAP. All of the units were operational by the 

end of 2010.18

The CMC approved and promulgated the “Regulations on Emergency 

Command in Handling Emergencies by the Armed Forces” in 2010 to establish 

the organization, command, force deployment, integrated support, and civil-military coordination of armed forces during their missions of maintaining 
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social stability and handling emergencies.19 The regulations make clear that 

China has separated armed force contingency responses into social stability 

and emergency rescue and disaster relief missions, with the PLA playing a 

much greater role in emergency rescue and disaster relief. This indicates that 

China has developed a mature division of labor for contingency response 

operations in different scenarios. 

The relative importance of these missions is indicated by the increase in 

the annual budget for stability maintenance. The CCP regime has publicized 

the 2012 public security budget for central and local governments. Compared 

with 629.3 billion renminbi (RMB) in 2011, the total public security budget rose 

11.5 percent to 701.8 billion RMB (U.S. $111.4 billion). Meanwhile, the defense 

budget rose 11.2 percent to 670.3 billion RMB (U.S. $106.4 billion).20 This was 

the first time that the public security budget exceeded the defense budget. 

This trend continued in 2013 with the defense budget increasing 10.7 percent 

to 740.6 billion RMB (U.S. $119 billion) and public security spending increasing 

by 8.7 percent to 769.1 billion RMB (U.S. $123.5 billion).21 Interestingly, when 

the 2014 budget was released, local budgets, which are used to calculate public 

security budgets, were not released. Because of this, only the central government’s spending on public security is available, which was 205 billion RMB 

(U.S. $33 billion), while total defense spending was 808 billion RMB (U.S. $132 

billion).22 One consequence of the division of labor between the PLA and the 

PAP is that most of the funding for stability maintenance missions is carried in 

the PAP budget. This allows the PLA to use the defense budget to concentrate 

on building traditional military capabilities.

Buildup of PAP Forces and Capabilities 

In addition to the legislation and official policies cited above, the expanded 

capabilities of the PAP have allowed the PLA to reduce its role in stability maintenance missions. Since Deng Xiaoping announced a cut of one million troops 

in the PLA and the formation of the PAP forces in 1985, some PLA infantry 

divisions have been transferred into the PAP. Most of these were reorganized 

into PAP Mobile Divisions responsible for counterterrorism, contingency 

response, and stability maintenance missions. PAP forces currently have 14 

mobile divisions deployed nationwide, totaling 170,000 personnel. The PAP 

also has 31 corps in the Internal Security Force, which total more than 350,000 

troops. At least one corps (averaging 6,000 soldiers, but varying in strength from 
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3,000 to 15,000) is stationed in each of China’s 31 provinces, municipalities, 

and autonomous regions. An additional 80,000 troops are directly subordinate 

to PAP Headquarters and in charge of guarding official buildings, hospitals, 

airports, and other important transportation facilities. The 14 PAP Mobile 

Divisions, with an average of 12,000 soldiers each, can offer sufficient back-up 

troops to suppress mass riots within 24 hours. 

The rapid increase in internal stability budgets has also allowed the PAP to 

purchase modern equipment necessary to suppress mass riots. This modern 

equipment includes Z-9 helicopters and ZSL92 wheeled armored vehicles.23

The growth and maturation of the PAP contingency response capability has 

allowed the PLA to decrease its emphasis on stability maintenance missions.24

The Division of Labor in Practice 

In practice, recent responses to internal unrest and operations to restore social 

order have been conducted mainly by the PAP. During the Wukan Village [乌坎

村] incident from September to December 2011, the CCP contingency response 

working group in Guangdong included Public Security, PAP, and PLA Military 

District representatives. However, the authorities mobilized only police and 

PAP forces to block the village from the outside world.25

Compared to other mass riots in recent years, the Wukan incident was not 

large in scale; the largest street protest involved fewer than 5,000 people. But 

the scale is not the key element in CCP decisions about whether to deploy the 

PLA in suppressing riots. While Guangdong officials were negotiating with 

Wukan Village residents, another riot broke out in Haimen Town [海门镇], also 

in Guangdong Province. More than 30,000 people protested in the streets to 

oppose the construction of a power plant proposed by the local government. 

A third village, Daimei Village [岱美村], also experienced rioting, with more 

than 1,000 residents in the streets protesting against corrupt local officials. 

Guangdong CCP officials faced a severe situation, since most of the local PAP 

assets had already been mobilized to Wukan Village. After riots broke out in 

Haimen Town, Guangdong authorities mobilized the remainder of the local 

PAP forces to Haimen Town to maintain social order. Then the third riot 

occurred in Daimei Village. Even in these circumstances, Guangdong officials 

continued to rely on PAP forces to maintain order rather than calling on PLA 

forces stationed nearby. In Haimen, after residents occupied the town hall and 

blocked the highway in the morning, PAP forces did not arrive until evening. 
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MA

In Daimei, when residents protested on the street and walked to the town hall, 

there were no riot police or PAP forces to confront them. The protesters were 

therefore able to blockade local officials inside the town hall.26

In October 2012, another large-scale mass riot occurred in Ningbo City 

[宁波市], Zhejiang Province. Ningbo residents took to the streets to protest the 

expansion of the PX Petrochemical plant located in the suburbs. Serious physical confrontations occurred between the protesters and the riot police, who 

dispersed the protesters with tear gas and made at least 10 arrests.27 The riot 

happened only 10 days before the opening of the 18th CCP National Congress, 

a very sensitive political moment. Both the central and the local authorities 

wanted to stop the protest as soon as possible. Even then, local authorities did 

not use the PLA to restore order. Riot police took the leading role in suppressing 

the protest, with the PAP playing a backup role. 

The only recent case involving social order in which the PLA participated 

was in hunting a criminal in Chongqing who had shot and killed 10 people in 

different provinces over the course of 8 years. The CMC authorized the Chengdu 

Military Region to mobilize 5,000 troops, including soldiers of the 37th Division 

of the 13th Army and the Special Forces Unit, to conduct joint operations with 

the local police and the PAP to round up this major criminal suspect.28 The role 

the PLA played in this case was to protect people from a dangerous criminal, a 

very different operation than suppressing mass protests. In this case, residents 

welcomed the appearance of the PLA. 

Analyzing the PLA’s Residual Role in Responding to Internal Unrest

Internal unrest in the PRC is usually caused by violations of the rights and 

interests of the people. In most cases, collusion between local government and 

private enterprise and the accompanying official corruption are key factors.29

Thus, when protests begin on the street, local officials usually seek to suppress 

them and restore social order quickly to prevent escalation. This response often 

makes protesters angry at local officials. For protesters motivated by violations 

of their legitimate rights and interests by local government policies and officials, 

the appearance of military forces to suppress demonstrations produces hostility 

toward the military forces, since they are viewed as thugs of corrupt officials 

and businessmen. Mobilizing troops to restore social order has the potential to 

provoke fierce reactions from the people and turn protests into riots.
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Psychological Impact on Soldiers 

Although the PLA has not played a frontline role in suppressing unrest in 

recent years, it plays a secondary role by providing transportation, communications, and logistic support to PAP forces suppressing mass protests and 

riots.30 The negative reaction of the people thus extends to the PLA troops 

performing even such support missions. This reaction has caused a negative 

impact on PLA morale. Most of the soldiers participating in these missions 

do not know the real situation motivating the protesters because PLA troops 

are usually isolated from broader outside information sources and are legally 

restricted to obtaining their information through official media. Consequently, the protesters can affect soldiers by giving them information about 

their grievances that differs from official accounts. Such communication can 

potentially change the soldiers’ attitude from confrontation to sympathy with 

the protesters.31 Such sympathy could challenge the authority of military command and gradually undercut the principle of the party’s absolute leadership 

over the military.

Exposure to contrary and conflicting information from the public can 

increase psychological pressure on soldiers tremendously. According to the 

“core values of contemporary revolutionary soldiers” [dangdai geming junren 

hexin jiazhiguan, 当代革命军人核心价值观] advocated by Hu Jintao, the PLA 

soldiers should love and serve the people as well as ensure that the people live 

and work in peace and stability. CCP mobilization of troops to suppress street 

protests creates contradictions between soldiers and the people. Investigation reports from the PLA’s military medical system reveal that soldiers who 

participate in stability maintenance missions often suffer from psychological 

disorders ranging from anxiety to depression.32 Although these PLA reports 

blame the psychological disorders on threats to the personal safety of soldiers 

and the effect of confrontations with the masses,33 the contradiction between 

the messages received through propaganda channels and what soldiers learn 

from the people and personally see can also cause psychological stress.

Reinforcement of Political Education 

The PLA seeks to provide political and psychological education to its troops, 

promoting loyalty to the party, preventing pollution of their minds by people 

with selfish intentions, and developing a clear understanding of the right way 

to increase the welfare of the people.34
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Reiteration of the Core Values of Contemporary Revolutionary Soldiers. 

The number of mass riots occurring in China was roughly 90,000 in 2005 and 

increased to nearly 200,000 in 2010, according to Chinese sociologist Sun 

Liping of Tsinghua University.35 The situation has forced the CCP to reinforce 

political education to ensure the loyalty of the military forces to the party. The 

PLA General Political Department (GPD) issued the document “Opinions on 

Widely Carrying Out Educational Activities on the Subject of Educating the 

Core Values of Contemporary Revolutionary Soldier in the Military” in January 

2009, which increased political education in order to consolidate the loyalty of 

military members to the party and to prevent the emergence of psychological 

disorders.36 In August 2009, the CMC held a “Forum on Psychological Service 

Work in the Military” in Beijing. One of the issues discussed was psychological 

counseling for soldiers who have symptoms of anxiety, gloom, or depression 

after participating in contingency response missions. In January 2010 and 

January 2011, the PLA GPD issued additional circulars on how to educate PLA 

soldiers on “the core values of the contemporary revolutionary soldier.”37 This 

repeated emphasis on political education indicates the desire of CCP leaders 

to ensure that the party still enjoys absolute loyalty from the armed forces.

“Love the People” Measures. CCP officials fully understand the negative 

impact of sending PLA troops to suppress mass protests. Such actions not only 

produce hostility between the people and the troops, but also brew suspicion 

among soldiers about the correctness of the party’s orders to suppress protests. 

In addition to stressing the importance of political and psychological education of the troops, the PLA GPD has also sought to improve the social image 

of the PLA by conducting “love the people” measures. Such measures include 

military hospitals holding free clinics for local residents, military personnel 

donating blood regularly, donating money to victims of natural disasters or 

other emergency incidents, adopting children from poor families, and even 

having locally stationed troops adopt entire poor villages.38 These measures 

differ from older PLA activities, which included helping people with manual 

labor, from barbering to filling potholes to repairing shoes. Today, the Chinese 

people appear to value cash donations and medical services more than labor 

from PLA troops.

In addition to these measures, the PLA and PAP have contributed substantially to poverty alleviation initiatives with the hope of developing rural 

areas as well as preparing for emergency rescue and disaster relief missions. 
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Over 20,000 small projects, such as the construction of irrigation and water 

conservation facilities, have been undertaken by joint PLA/PAP efforts. Roads 

have been constructed in rural areas and more than 1,000 industries have been 

developed. These projects, just in terms of poverty alleviation, have helped over 

400,000 people escape from poverty.39

PLA and PAP forces have also undertaken emergency rescue and disaster 

relief missions. Based on the “Regulations on the PLA’s Participation in Disaster 

Rescue,” the PLA and PAP are assigned the tasks of rescuing and evacuating 

affected citizens, transporting disaster relief materials, quickly repairing roads, 

bridges, and tunnels, as well as assisting local governments in post-disaster 

reconstruction and other facets of disaster relief.40 During the harsh winter in 

2008, 1.26 million military and PAP personnel were sent to assist in relief efforts. 

Another 221,000 personnel were sent to assist in disaster relief and emergency 

rescue efforts after an earthquake in Wenchuan County, Sichuan. Since 2011, 

the PLA and PAP have contributed nearly 400,000 troops and mobilized nearly 

900,000 militia and reservists to assist in disaster relief efforts ranging from 

floods to forest fires.41 Both poverty alleviation and emergency rescue and 

disaster relief efforts have shown the PLA’s and PAP’s commitment to engage 

the populace and, in a way, win the hearts and minds of the people.

PLA Reluctance to Play a Stability Maintenance Role 

The negative psychological impact of PLA participation in riot suppression has 

had a positive side effect. It has reinforced the viewpoint of Chinese military 

academics that the PLA should reduce its involvement in stability maintenance 

and leave this mission to the PAP. Most publications discussing contingency 

responses emphasize that the PAP is the main force to implement the stability 

maintenance mission. Only a few publications mention the PLA role in such 

missions. In these discussions, the PAP is described as the main force to face 

the people, with the PLA coordinating and cooperating with the PAP, while 

the police and CCP local officials play a supporting role.42 Although a few PLA 

publications discuss countermeasures for suppressing mass riots, these articles 

cannot be viewed as evidence of PLA direct participation in riot suppression 

missions since PLA forces also need training and preparation to protect military barracks and facilities from attacks during mass riots.

These academic studies highlight the division of labor between the PLA 

and the PAP on contingency response missions. As a result, the legitimacy of 
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mobilizing the PLA to suppress mass riots is declining. The PLA hides its reluctance to participate in riot suppression missions by asserting that the PAP forces 

are properly trained and better equipped to confront protestors and rioters. 

This division of labor helps the CCP improve management of social unrest by 

preventing the escalation of riots that might result from the appearance of PLA 

troops on the street. 

Conclusion 

Images from the Tiananmen incident have been deeply etched in people’s 

minds since June 1989. The picture of a young man standing at East Chang’an 

Avenue to stop PLA tanks from entering Tiananmen Square inspired the world. 

The PLA has borne the bloody stigma of its actions since then. 

The CCP regime is aware of this negative image of its armed forces and 

has sought to reverse this perception through a variety of means. In the mid1990s, Jiang Zemin asked the PLA to respond to the Yangzi River flooding and 

resultant rescue mission, no matter the cost. Dozens of soldiers died fighting 

the flood. The CMC did not review the errors made by commanders during the 

mission but repeatedly praised the sacrifice of these soldiers and the contribution of the PLA in safeguarding the people. 

After Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang, he worked to improve the PLA’s image 

by implementing a division of labor between the PLA and the PAP through 

legislation and the buildup of PAP capabilities. The legislation was part of Hu’s 

broader effort to institutionalize roles and responsibilities for the party and government. Throughout Hu’s time in office, he strictly limited the mobilization of 

PLA troops for riot suppression missions. Despite some challenges, PAP forces 

have been capable enough to implement these missions. 

Some observers suspect the CCP continues to rely on the PLA as the main 

force to suppress mass protests. This skepticism is a hangover from the Tiananmen incident. However, the PLA has been reborn as a modern and professional 

armed force focusing on safeguarding China’s security, national sovereignty, 

and territorial integrity, leaving the riot suppression mission to the PAP.43

Although the PAP has taken charge of maintaining social order, the possibility of brutal suppression by military force still exists, since the PAP Mobilized 

Division Forces are equipped with the standard weapons of regular infantry 

divisions, including machineguns, artillery, rockets, armored vehicles, and 

helicopters. All of these weapons can be used to engage in traditional battlefield 
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combat operations. Even though CCP leaders have moved the PLA away from 

the street, the PAP retains forces capable of treating the Chinese people as if 

they were enemies on the battlefield. The division of labor between the PLA and 

the PAP in stability maintenance missions has clarified which organization 

will play what role. However, there is still no clear justification for why the CCP 

needs heavily armed paramilitary forces to maintain social order. 

The author would like to acknowledge Adam Jankowski and Phillip C. 

Saunders for their assistance in updating and editing this chapter.

Notes

1 The CCP Central Chairman Mao Zedong Articles Editing and Publication 

Committee, Selected Works of Mao Zedong [毛泽东选集], vol. 5 (Beijing: People’s Press 

[人民出版社], 1977), 13.

2 “The CCP Central Authority Direction concerning Suppression of Counterrevolutionary Activities” [中共中央关于镇压反革命活动的指示], Selected Important 

Documents Since the PRC Founding [建国以来重要文献选编], vol. I (Beijing: Central 

Literature Publishing House, 1991), 420–423. 

3 Qi Dexue [齐德学], History of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea

[抗美援朝战争史] (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House [军事科学出版社], 

2000), 185.

4 Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, eds., The Cambridge History 

of China, volume XIV: The People’s Republic of China 1949–1965 [剑桥中国史: 中华人

民共和国史] (Beijing: Social Science Press [中国社会科学出版社], 1998), 85–89.

5 Li Jianglin [李江琳], When the Iron Bird Flies in the Sky [当铁鸟在天空飞翔] 

(Taipei: Lianjing Press [联经出版社], 2012), 177. 

6 MacFarquhar and Fairbank, 188.

7 Maurice Meisner, Mao Zedong: A Political and Intellectual Portrait [毛澤東之

政治與知識的圖像] (Taipei: Citadel Press [衛城出版社], 2012), 280.

8 Zhang Li Qun [张黎群], ed., Yearning Yaobang [怀念耀邦], vol. IV (Hong 

Kong: Asia-Pacific International Press [亞太國際出版公司], 2001), 277–278. 

9 Ezra F. Vogel [傅高义], Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China [鄧小

平改變中國], trans. Feng Keli [馮克利] (Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing Company 

[天下文化出版社], 2012), 817.

10 Ibid., 830.

11 Li Peng [李鹏], Li Peng Tiananmen Incident Diary [李鹏六四日记] (Hong 

Kong: New Century Press [新世纪出版社], 2010), referring to April 23, 1989. 
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MA

12 Jiang Zemin [江泽民], “Speech in the Inspection of the PAP Force Training 

Outcome Report” [在视察武警部队训练成果汇报时的讲话], in On National Defense 

and Military Building [论国防和军队建设] (Beijing: PLA Press [中国人民解放军出版社], 

2003), 103–105. 

13 Gordon G. Chang, The Coming Collapse of China [中國即將崩潰] (Taipei: 

Valued Advice Publishing Corporation [雅言文化出版股份有限公司], 2002), 67.

14 PRC National Defense Law (中华人民共和国国防法), August 2009, Article 22. 

15 PRC Information Office of the State Council, The Diversified Employment of 

China’s Armed Forces, Beijing, April 2013, 6.

16 Ibid., 12.

17 Ibid.

18 See “Fully Establish National Team of Contingency Response Force” [全力打

造应急力量国家队],” PLA Daily [解放军报], September 6, 2012.

19 The “Regulations on Emergency Command in Handling Emergencies by the 

Armed Forces” [军队处置突发事件应急指挥规定] are cited in PRC Information Office 

of the State Council, China’s National Defense in 2010, Beijing, March 2011, 24.

20 “China’s Stability Maintenance Budget Exceeds Defense Budget” [陆维稳

经费超过国防预算], udn.com, March 6, 2012, available at <http://udn.com./NEWS/

MAINLAND/MAI1/6942695.shtml>.

21 Ben Blanchard and John Ruwitch, “China Hikes Defense Budget, to Spend 

More on Internal Security,” Reuters, March 5, 2013, available at <www.reuters.com/

article/2013/03/05/us-china-parliament-defence-idUSBRE92403620130305?_ga=1.5

6494827.1308442095.1407506011>.

22 Edward Wong, “Beijing Goes Quiet on Rise of Local Security Budgets,” 

New York Times, March 6, 2014, available at <http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.

com/2014/03/06/beijing-goes-quiet-on-rise-of-local-security-budgets/?_

php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.

23 PAP Mobile Divisions are equipped with the standard equipment of a 

former PLA infantry division. In recent years, they have added more ZSL92 wheeled 

armored vehicles and Z-9 helicopters. See Dennis J. Blasko, “Politics and the PLA: 

Security Social Stability,” China Brief 12, no. 7 (March 30, 2012). 

24 The PAP has fewer than 700,000 troops, subordinated to 10 different forces 

including the PAP Headquarters and its directly subordinate forces, the Internal 

Security Force, the Mobilized Division Force, the Hydropower Facilities Force, the 

Traffic Policing Force, the Gold Mining Force, and the Forest Guarding Force. Eightyfive percent of PAP Forces, mainly the Internal Security Force and the Mobilized 

Division Force, can conduct contingency response missions involving maintenance 

of social stability immediately after a riot emerges. 
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25 After the residents of Wukan Village swore that they would break the blockade, Guangdong officials held an emergency meeting, with PLA and PAP participation, to find a solution. See “Wukan Village Residents Break Out Tomorrow” [乌坎村

民明突围], udn.com, December 20, 2011, available at <http://udn.com/NEWS/MAINLAND/MAI1/6792569.shtml>.

26 Ibid.

27 See “The Protest in Ningbo Works” [宁波抗争奏功], China Times, 

October 29, 2012, available at <http://news.chinatimes.com/mainland/11050506/112012102900144.html>.

28 See “The First Time of Public Security History to Mobilize Ten Thousands Military and Police in the Mainland” [陆治安史首见动员上万军警], China 

Times, August 15, 2012, available at <http://news.chinatimes.com/mainland/11050506/112012081500177.html>.

29 See Murray Scot Tanner, “China’s Social Unrest Problem,” Testimony 

before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 15, 2014, 

available at <www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Tanner_Written%20Testimony.pdf>; 

and Carl Minzner, “Social Instability in China: Causes, Consequences, and Implication,” in The China Balance Sheet in 2007 and Beyond, ed. C. Fred Bergsten et al. 

(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Peterson 

Institute for International Economics, 2007), 55–77, available at <http://csis.org/files/

media/csis/pubs/070502_cbs_in_2007_and_beyond.pdf>. 

30 Even during the serious riot in Lhasa in March 2008, the PLA troops 

stationed there only provided transportation and security guard support after the 

PAP quelled the riot. See Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and 

Transformation for the 21st Century, 2d

 ed. (London: Routledge, 2012), 217–218.

31 In the 1989 Tiananmen incident, when the PLA troops entered Beijing in 

May, students and local residents surrounded them and offered soldiers information 

on the appeals of the students. Since this information obviously differed from the 

official statements they received, the soldiers were confused and became hesitant 

to suppress the protests. This forced Deng Xiaoping to withdraw the troops to a suburban area of Beijing and mobilize other PLA troops, which were not sympathetic to 

students, from the Jinan Military Region. 

32 Several investigative reports produced by the PLA military medical 

department or related academic institutes have revealed the psychological conditions of soldiers who had participated in stability maintenance missions. See Wang 

Yin Hu [王引虎], “Investigation of the health conditions and prevention measures of 

one armed forces unit soldiers during the implementation of stability maintenance 

mission” [某部执行维稳任务期间官兵健康状况调查与防治对策], Southwest National 

Defense Medicine [西南国防医药] 21, no. 2 (February 2011), 222–223.
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MA

33 See Wang Xiaobo, Yu Xiaohua, and Liu Weiping [王晓波, 于晓华, 刘卫平], 

“Investigation of Incidence Situation at an Emergency Response Troop Depot during 

the Field Training in Fall” [某应急兵站秋季野外驻训期间发病情况调查], Southeast 

National Defense Medicine 10, no. 2 (April 20, 2008), 157–158. 

34 Zhang Yang [张阳], “Always Insisting the Party’s Absolute Leadership over 

the Military” [始终不渝坚持党对军队绝对领导], People’s Daily [人民日报], June 6, 2012. 

35 According to official statistics published by the PRC National Statistics 

Bureau, the total number of mass riots in the PRC was 90,000 in 2005. This is the last 

time China published such statistics on its social unrest. According to academic estimates, the number of mass riots in 2010 had doubled over 2005 levels. Thus, the situation of social unrest has deteriorated. See Damien Ma, “Before and After Hu,” Foreign 

Affairs, November 7, 2012, available at <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138419/

damien-ma/before-and-after-hu>; Andrew Jacobs, “Village Revolts Over Inequities 

of Chinese Life,” New York Times, December 14, 2011, available at <www.nytimes.

com/2011/12/15/world/asia/chinese-village-locked-in-rebellion-against-authorities.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; “China’s Spending on Internal Police Force in 

2010 Outstrips Defense Budget,” Bloomberg, March 6, 2011, available at <www.

bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-06/china-s-spending-on-internal-police-force-in2010-outstrips-defense-budget.html>.

36 PLA General Political Department, “Opinions on widely carrying out 

educational activities on the subject of educating the core values of contemporary 

revolutionary soldier in the military” [关于在全军广泛开展培育当代革命军人核心价

值观主题教育活动的意见], January 2009.

37 PLA General Political Department, “Opinions on thoroughly carrying out 

educational activities on the subject of educating the core values of the contemporary revolutionary soldier” [关于深入开展培育当代革命军人核心价值观主题教育活动

的意见], January 2010; PLA General Political Department, “Opinions on surrounding 

firm-ideal belief and loyally fulfilling mission to thoroughly carrying out educational 

activities on the subject of educating the core values of the contemporary revolutionary soldier” [关于围绕坚定理想信念、忠实履行使命深入开展培育当代革命军人核心价值

观主题教育活动的意见], January 2011.

38 For example, the PLA troops stationed in Zhangjiakou City, Hebei Province, 

donated to 53 poor villages. See “Zhangjiakou Military Sub-District Coordinated Station Troops to Support Poor Villages” [张家口军分区协调驻军对口支持贫困村], China’s 

National Defense Press [中国国防报], March 22, 2012, 1.

39 PRC Information Office of the State Council, The Diversified Employment of 

China’s Armed Forces, Beijing, April 2013, 11.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., 12.
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42 Some of these few articles distinguish between suppression of mass riots 

and management of mass collective incidents. PLA forces can operate independently 

during riot suppression missions that have the potential to escalate into large-scale 

social unrest or rebellion. See Liu Xiaoli [刘小力], ed., Studies of MOOTW on the 

Response of Army to Major Emergencies and Crises [军队应对重大突发事件和危机非战

争军事行动研究] (Beijing: National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2009), 

119–131. 

43 Even in the serious Lhasa incident, in March 2008, the PLA troops only 

played transportation and communication roles; they did not participate in direct 

suppression of riots in the street. See Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions other than Taiwan (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2009), 64–98.

BORDER CONTINGENCIES

III

205

Addressing the potential for Chinese cross-border contingencies should 

begin with a clear assessment of China’s current interests, the basis 

for those interests, and how they might change over the course of the 

next decade as China’s economic presence expands and its diplomatic and 

military leverage increases. With respect to the Democratic People’s Republic 

of Korea (DPRK) and Burma, as with all neighboring countries on China’s land 

borders, Beijing desires stability and seeks to avoid crises that could threaten 

its economic development and internal stability. This is especially true now as 

Beijing attempts to transition to a demand-growth economy and the Chinese 

Communist Party (CCP) emerges from a difficult transfer of power. 

The foundation of China’s strength lies in its economy; CCP leaders continue to follow the model laid down by former leader Deng Xiaoping of focusing 

on economic development as the means to strengthen the state. Maintaining 

stability along China’s periphery serves this interest, and the current focus on 

economic development is likely to continue for at least the next decade. However, as Chinese power grows, this will embolden nationalist tendencies to see 

the periphery as an extension of a greater China, particularly along its littoral, 

and to see a “return” to past imperial economic and military preponderance 

as a natural and positive development. Under such circumstances, China’s 

current emphasis on nonintervention and noninterference in the internal 

affairs of other countries might change.

The trend toward a more active policy is evident in new leader Xi Jinping’s 

signature “China Dream” vision of “the great rejuvenation of the nation.”1

 The 

manifestation of the China Dream in foreign policy is already causing greater 

friction with some neighbors as Beijing embraces a more aggressive policy in 

disputed maritime areas. Since 2012, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has 

CHAPTER 9

The PLA and Cross-Border Contingencies in North Korea and Burma

Thomas Woodrow
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WOODROW

greatly expanded its military and civil maritime presence in the East China 

Sea near the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands and in the South China 

Sea near the Scarborough Shoal (in dispute with the Philippines), the Spratly 

Islands (in dispute with multiple nations, including Vietnam), and the Luconia 

Shoals (in dispute with Malaysia).2 China’s announcement of an East China 

Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in November 2013 that included 

the Senkaku Islands caught the region by surprise; in testimony to the U.S. 

House Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2014, Director of National 

Intelligence James Clapper stated China was becoming “quite aggressive about 

asserting what they believe is their manifest destiny.”3

 The unprecedented 

dispatch of a Chinese submarine to the Indian Ocean in January 2014 and 

subsequent deployment of a three-ship People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy 

task force to the Indian Ocean via the Sunda Strait startled Australia and India.4

These actions reflect China’s ambitions to project power along its borders, littoral, and beyond to protect economic and security interests. 

In its 2012 report to Congress, the U.S. Department of Defense described 

China’s leaders as currently perceiving a “generally favorable external environment” with a “low threat of major power war.”5

 Chinese leaders describe 

national strategic priorities as “core interests.” Based on a 2010 foreign policy 

overview by then–State Councilor Dai Bingguo, China’s core interests include 

“the political stability of China” and the “sovereignty and security, territorial 

integrity, and national unity of China.”6 These core interests can also be viewed 

as red lines indicating a Chinese threshold for the potential use of military 

force. Even in a period defined by a generally favorable external environment, 

threats to sovereignty, territorial integrity, security, and political stability would 

be triggers for potential military action by the PLA, the People’s Armed Police 

(PAP), or both. China’s civilian maritime patrol and law enforcement entities, 

recently consolidated into the China Coast Guard, are also increasingly being 

integrated into a comprehensive strategy with the PLA in the East China and 

South China seas.7

 The border regions adjoining North Korea and Burma clearly 

qualify as areas where China’s core interests could be threatened and thus are 

likely to generate requirements for PLA and PAP contingency planning.

North Korea and Burma both represent special interests for China, the 

former due to its historical alliance and role as a buffer state and the latter 

because of resources, longstanding economic and military cooperation, and its 

position as a strategic gateway to the Indian Ocean for Chinese-built oil and gas 
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pipelines. Current Chinese plans for cross-border contingencies in North Korea 

and Burma probably focus on protecting stability and preventing refugee flows, 

although the PLA must also be ready to deal with issues involving North Korean 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and potential military intervention by 

the United States or South Korea in the event of a North Korean collapse. By the 

end of the current decade, however, existing contingency plans will likely be 

modified to reflect expanding Chinese economic and security interests and a 

greater Chinese willingness to act unilaterally to protect its national interests.8

North Korea 

The PLA has prepared contingency plans to respond to a crisis on the Korean 

Peninsula. According to 2007 interviews with PLA officers and Chinese academics, the PLA has at least three contingency plans for North Korea: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; peacekeeping; and “environmental control” missions to secure “loose nukes” and deal with contamination following 

presumed U.S. strikes on North Korean nuclear facilities.9 In addition, the 1961 

Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between China 

and North Korea, which calls for military assistance in the event of an attack 

leading to war, remains in effect. China therefore likely also plans for a range 

of other military contingencies in the event of a full-scale war involving U.S., 

South Korean, and/or United Nations forces.

China’s perceptions of North Korea appear to have changed in recent 

years. Following North Korean missile and nuclear tests, China voted for 

United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), 

which imposed sanctions against the North Korean regime.10 During this 

period, Chinese authorities allowed sharp debate over North Korea to appear 

in authoritative journals and newspapers.11 A series of interviews with PLA 

officers and Chinese scholars in 2007 reflected a variety of opinions on China’s relationship with North Korea, with some respondents arguing for the 

continuing strategic importance of a “buffer zone,” while others opined that 

the fundamental nature of the relationship had changed to the extent that the 

mutual defense treaty should be scrapped.12 U.S. experts believed the variety 

of Chinese views expressed may have reflected debates and policy differences 

at senior levels of the Chinese government, PLA, and CCP.13 However, following 

the sinking of the South Korean naval ship Cheon’an and the subsequent North 

Korean shelling of South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, China refrained 
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WOODROW

from criticizing North Korea and appeared to side with Pyongyang’s version 

of events, exacerbating relations with Seoul.14 If there was a policy debate over 

North Korea in Beijing during this period, it appears to have been settled by the 

spring of 2010 in favor of maintaining the status quo and upholding the North’s 

value as a buffer zone against potential U.S. and South Korean encroachment. 

China’s North Korean policy appeared unlikely to undergo major changes 

and instead remain focused on maintaining close governmental, party, and 

military relations with Pyongyang and promoting economic development 

and reform in North Korea. However, the relationship has frayed due to North 

Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s December 2013 execution of his uncle Jang Song 

Taek in what may have been a power struggle over economic issues.15 Jang was 

North Korea’s point man in dealing with China on cross-border economic 

relations, including the Rason Economic and Trade Zone and port complex in 

the northeastern DPRK being co-developed by China and Russia. Rason was 

specifically mentioned in official charges against Jang; he was accused of an 

“act of treachery” for “selling off the land of the Rason economic and trade zone 

to a foreign country for a period of five decades.”16 According to foreign businessmen, as of February 2014, all construction activity had stopped at the port 

following Jang’s purge, and many Chinese and Russians are afraid to return.17

The dispatch of Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin to Pyongyang in 

late February 2014 likely included discussions on economic issues and Rason.18

China’s long-term strategy for the peninsula appears to center on convincing 

Pyongyang to engage in meaningful economic reform along the lines of Deng’s 

reforms for China. However, the execution of Jang Song Taek threatens the few 

economic initiatives that have been allowed in North Korea and could put the 

Rason port development at risk.

China has revealed few details about its contingency plans. However, the 

locations and dispositions of PLA and PAP troops and comments by PRC officials on potential crisis scenarios offer clues. Beijing’s primary focus appears to 

be on securing the border area to prevent a mass flow of North Korean refugees 

into heavily Korean ethnic areas on the PRC side of the border, which could 

potentially destabilize the delicate balance in a region that has historically 

been Korean rather than Chinese. Chinese officials have been relatively open 

about their concerns about refugee flows in the event of an economic, political, or military crisis within North Korea. The first responders in the event 

of a border crisis would be the PAP, which was established in 1982 and later 
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reinforced with downsized and redundant PLA units. While falling under the 

peacetime authority of the Ministry of Public Security and primarily devoted 

to internal security, the PAP also has ancillary missions of counterterrorism, 

rapid response, and border control. The Snow Leopard commando unit highlighted during the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games is perhaps the best known PAP 

outfit. The Ministry of Public Security and the PLA General Staff apparently 

share command and control over PAP border units.19 During wartime, most 

PAP units ostensibly would shift to PLA control. 

There are at least four PAP Border Defense Regiments along the SinoDPRK border in the general areas of Dandong, Tumen (where there are two), 

and Linjiang.20 These units are strategically located to respond to incidents 

near the two main border crossings at Dandong and Tumen. The area of 

China’s northern border in Liaoning and Jilin Provinces is ethnically Korean, 

especially in the Tumen region, and North Korean refugees who successfully 

cross into China often find refuge with and receive support from their ethnic 

brethren.21 In light of continuing tensions with South Korea (and probably 

North Korea) over Chinese control in an area that historically has been 

Korean (the ancient regimes of Goguryeo and Balhae), Beijing likely would 

be concerned that large numbers of North Korean refugees seeking shelter 

near the northern border could cause instability and potentially undermine 

Chinese authority.

PAP and PLA troops could potentially cross the border into North Korea to 

set up a “buffer zone” to contain and prevent Korean refugee flows into China 

and to provide humanitarian assistance to keep potential refugees in place 

inside North Korea. A Chinese presence on North Korean territory would be a 

necessary part of a peacekeeping operation there. China might also intervene 

across the border for other contingencies, such as controlling DPRK WMD 

stocks or protecting Chinese security interests in the event of U.S. or South 

Korean intervention. Beijing would almost certainly worry that South Korea 

and the United States could seek to take advantage of a regime collapse to 

change the status quo on the peninsula in ways that do not serve Chinese interests.22 The trial of South Korean spy Park Chae-seo revealed the existence of a 

so-called PLA “Chick Plan” (as in a hen protecting its chick) in which PLA troops 

would cross the border if the situation in North Korea “deteriorated beyond 

repair.”23 The South Korean press has also reported that the PLA Academy of 

Military Sciences (AMS) examined various contingency scenarios in 2007, 
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resulting in an AMS report that stated PLA troops could reach Pyongyang “in 

two hours” in the event of a disaster.24

The PLA is well positioned to respond to a variety of cross-border contingencies involving North Korea. The Shenyang Military Region (MR) contains 

the 39th Group Army (GA), which has its headquarters at Liaoyang. The U.S. 

Department of Defense assesses that the 39th GA has the primary PLA missions 

for regional rapid reaction and mobile offensive operations.25 The 16th and 40th

Group Armies, at Changchun and Jinzhou, respectively, would also probably 

have major roles in responding to any North Korea contingency.26 PLA Air 

Force (PLAAF) assets in the Shenyang MR include three fighter divisions and 

one ground-attack division.27 In total, roughly a quarter-million PLA troops 

could be rapidly mobilized in the Shenyang MR for a Korean contingency. 

In addition to these forces, the PLA Navy North Sea Fleet has at its disposal 

3 nuclear attack submarines, 18 diesel attack submarines, 10 destroyers, 9 

frigates, 2 amphibious ships, 5 medium landing ships and 19 missile patrol 

boats.28 China’s new aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, is also located in the North 

Sea Fleet. The North Sea Fleet PLA Navy Air Force provides an additional two 

fighter and fighter-bomber divisions.29

Other PLA units from the Beijing MR or elsewhere could be rapidly 

deployed into a Korean operational theater. The 2010 PLA Mission Action exercise involved group army–level units from multiple MRs in an unprecedented 

long-distance force mobilization using military and civilian transit means; 

the theme of a border conflict was the likely exercise scenario.30 Smaller PLA 

river-crossing exercises with pontoon bridges occur annually in the summer 

along the Yalu River near Dandong.31

An environmental control contingency to secure “loose nukes” in North 

Korea or to decontaminate North Korean facilities offers another potential 

scenario in which China might seek to insert PLA troops into North Korea. 

PAP forces are not known to have decontamination units, whereas the PLA 

has practiced with them for decades (stemming from the belief from the 1960s 

through the 1980s that a nuclear strike would be a component of an attack 

from the Soviet Union). The PLA would face two challenges in executing plans 

for this contingency: first, knowing where North Korean nuclear facilities and 

weapons are located, and second, obtaining acquiescence from Pyongyang to 

enter DPRK sovereign territory and take control of its nuclear weapons. Any 

PLA incursion into North Korea that came uninvited would likely face stiff 
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resistance from the highly nationalistic North Korean military, even given longstanding lip service to the “lips and teeth” relationship between the two sides. 

The PLA likely also has a variety of contingency plans for a potential war on 

the Korean Peninsula. How the PLA would respond to a war would depend on 

the specific conditions of how the war started, whether Pyongyang requested 

activation of the Mutual Defense Treaty (which calls for military assistance in 

the event of an attack leading to war), and the level of involvement by the United 

States. China would almost certainly seek to prevent tensions from escalating 

to war but might misjudge the trajectory of a particular crisis or the danger of a 

crisis rapidly escalating out of control. The reactions of Beijing, Pyongyang, and 

Seoul to the sinking of the Cheon’an and the subsequent North Korean shelling 

of South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 offer a case in point.

If the scenario involved potential regime collapse in North Korea, Beijing would probably be very suspicious that South Korea would seek to take 

advantage of the situation to change the status quo and/or unify the peninsula. 

China might institute a range of actions to support Pyongyang; direct military 

support would be heavily influenced by the response of Seoul and Washington to instability in the north and the status of South Korean and U.S. forces 

along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Any crossing of the DMZ, even under 

the rubric of humanitarian assistance, would probably be seen by China as 

a threat to its interests unless understandings are reached in advance. Given 

increased economic and diplomatic China–Republic of Korea interaction over 

the past decade, any major instability in North Korea would surely precipitate 

high-level discussions between Beijing and Seoul. A likely Chinese demand 

under any crisis scenario would be the exclusion of U.S. troops from any role 

north of the DMZ.

In contrast, if Beijing were unable to prevent a war initiated by North 

Korea, either by Pyongyang acting against China’s wishes or through lack 

of foreknowledge, there is no guarantee Beijing would activate the Mutual 

Defense Treaty, which stipulates in Article II that “in the event of one of the 

Contracting Parties being subjected to the armed attack by any state or several 

states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting 

Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its 

disposal.”32 Thus, a conflict initiated by North Korea (or one assessed by Beijing 

to have been initiated by the North) probably would not automatically result 

in activation of the treaty. The Article II clause likely would be used by China 
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as a lever of influence over Pyongyang’s actions during rapidly rising tensions 

if Beijing had serious concerns over provocations by North Korea potentially 

dragging China into a war on the peninsula against its wishes.

In the event of a war initiated by South Korea (which China would almost 

certainly see as having at least tacit U.S. support), Beijing would begin to 

implement various operational contingencies, at least some of which would 

probably involve PLA troops crossing into North Korea and establishing positions to support Pyongyang and potentially repel South Korean/U.S. advances. 

Under this hypothetical scenario, China would see the conflict as an attempt to 

change the status quo and eliminate or reduce North Korea’s role as a “buffer 

zone” protecting the PRC. Beijing’s control over ethnic Korean areas in China 

could also be seen as under threat; Beijing’s claims to legitimate control could 

be threatened under a scenario in which millions of Koreans flooded across 

the border. Thus, a military conflict would directly threaten several Chinese 

core interests (including security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity). Under 

such circumstances, the PLA would almost certainly initiate Korea-related 

operational contingency plans to protect Chinese interests.

A major unanswered question is whether a conflict on the peninsula could 

escalate into a situation where PLA and U.S. troops would face each other in a 

reprise of the Korean War. Such a scenario, while seemingly unlikely, should 

not be automatically discounted in the event of a rapidly escalating crisis. History books are littered with lessons on the unintended consequences of war.

Outlook for North Korea Contingencies

Over the course of the next decade, as China’s economic, diplomatic, and 

military leverage increases and comprehensive Chinese power grows, it will 

probably embolden nationalist tendencies to see the periphery as an extension 

of a greater China. Growing Chinese economic development in North Korea 

likely will change the equation used to determine when to activate the PLA’s 

plans for cross-border contingencies. The establishment in 2010 of the Hwanggumpyong and Wiwha Islands Joint Free Trade Area on the Yalu River estuary 

near Dandong and the Rason Economic and Trade Zone in North Korea’s far 

northeast, if allowed to continue by Kim Jong Un, could greatly expand Chinese 

economic stakes in the DPRK.

While the Hwanggumpyong and Wiwha Islands Joint Free Trade Area has 

apparently received a lukewarm response from Chinese businessmen due to 
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the unsuitability of the location for a trade center, China appears willing to 

embark on some level of development to keep Pyongyang happy.33 A series of 

high-level PRC-DPRK meetings and steering group sessions in 2012 continued 

to lay the foundations for development of both economic zones.34

The Rajin Port and Rason Economic and Trade Zone is by far the more 

important of the two, for it will provide access to ice-free ports on the Sea of 

Japan and trade links with China’s Jilin Province. An initial 2008 agreement 

with the Dalian-based Chuangli Group allowed this PRC firm to expand port 

facilities in Rajin and Sonbong (that is, Rason) and provided for a minimum 

10-year lease.35 A subsequent series of agreements in 2011 extended the Chinese 

lease to 50 years and paved the way for large-scale investment in railway and 

road links to China, an airport, additional port facilities, and a power plant.36

Rason also has some Russian investment, but will be used by China to extend 

direct trade access for northeastern areas of the PRC. Beijing also hopes these 

investments will prod the Kim Jung Un regime into opening the North Korean 

economy for further development. 

Within a few years, Rason is likely to become a strategic gateway and port 

facility, absent a major falling out between Beijing and Pyongyang. This would 

in effect create an economic extension of China and could prompt Beijing to 

include this area in any cross-border contingency planning. Improvements 

in rail and road access from China could improve China’s capability to deploy 

and support PLA units in North Korea. Over time, the PLA could even be 

granted access to or use of the port facilities. An evolving PRC-DPRK economic 

dynamic and expanding Chinese investment inside North Korea will inevitably result in a concomitant expansion in PRC security concerns regarding 

the Korean Peninsula.

By the end of the current decade, Chinese cross-border contingency plans 

for North Korea, which currently are focused primarily on maintaining stability 

and preventing refugee flows, are likely to be modified to reflect expanding 

Chinese economic and security interests and Beijing’s greater self-confidence 

to act unilaterally to protect and project its own interests.

Burma 

Burma shares some commonalities with North Korea in terms of potential PLA 

contingency planning, especially China’s focus on concerns about stability and 

cross-border refugee flows. Like North Korea, Burma has a history of extensive 
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military and political ties with China. However, unlike North Korea, Burma 

does not have a mutual defense treaty or an alliance with the PRC. Recent 

leadership changes in both countries have increased tensions in relations 

with China and prompted Burma’s leaders to try to move away from near-total 

dependence on Beijing.37

China currently has much more extensive economic interests in Burma than 

in North Korea. These interests (a massive Chinese economic presence and largescale construction of dams, roads, pipelines, and ports linking the southwestern 

province of Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal through Burma) will over time make 

the northern portion of Burma, where the pipeline and road corridor connect 

southern China to the Indian Ocean, a vital strategic interest to China. This will 

give China incentives to try to draw Burma ever more tightly into the Chinese 

economic orbit. Many recent refugee issues stem directly from the massive 

Chinese economic presence and large-scale construction projects in Burma.

Concern over refugees flowing into China is another area where similarities 

exist. In both countries, non-Han ethnic groups are divided by a border, and 

instability south of the border has at times sent refugees fleeing into China. Concern about the impact on domestic stability of a long-term presence of displaced 

ethnic minorities in China is a driver for PLA planning for border contingencies 

in Burma. Unlike the China–North Korea border, where a single trans-border 

ethnic Korean community exists, the border between China and Burma divides 

multiple ethnic groups, including Christian Kachins, ethnic Chinese Kokangs, 

Buddhist Tibetans, Muslim Rohingya, Austroasiatic Blang, De’ang, and Va, 

Achang, Nu, and Zaiwa and a hodgepodge of at least a dozen other minorities, 

all of whom can be found on both sides of the border.38Disputes between any of 

these groups and the central government—or between different ethnic groups—

could produce significant refugee flows into China. The maintenance of PRC 

authority in areas of Yunnan, where Chinese culture historically has not been 

dominant, is Beijing’s overriding security concern in this region. 

Unlike on the Korean Peninsula, China faces no serious threat of intervention from foreign military forces in the event of instability in Burma. In 

contrast with areas to the west and east, where the existence of large opposing 

Indian and Vietnamese military forces shape PLA security concerns, PLA and 

PAP forces along the border with Burma are focused on maintaining border 

security, preventing internal instability, and managing refugee flows. The PLA 

likely does not currently devote significant effort to planning for larger scale 
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military contingencies in this area. However, this could change in the future 

as vital land trade and energy routes through Burma become more important 

as alternatives to the Malacca Strait. 

There are two key challenges emerging from the complex situation along 

China’s border with Burma: ethnic Kachins seeking refuge in China due to 

increased military pressure from the Burma Army in the far north, where major 

Chinese dam projects have exacerbated tensions, and ethnic Chinese Kokangs 

further south who have sought refuge in China due to fighting between the 

Burma Army and the semi-autonomous Shan State. In addition, although not 

a border issue, recent conflict between ethnic Buddhists and Muslims in the 

Rakhine area is also a concern for China, as the terminus of the huge road-railpipeline network linking Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal lies there. 

The PAP currently has two Border Defense Regiments (BDRs) on the border 

with Burma: the 11th BDR located at Cangyuan, and the 12th BDR at Luxi.39 An 

additional three BDRs are located within the Chengdu Military Region, and 

could be used for border or cross-border Burma contingencies: the 9th BDR at 

Diqing, the 10th BDR at Lincang, and the 8th BDR located near the border with 

Laos at Mengla.40 PLA units within the Chengdu MR that would probably play a 

role in any expanded border contingency are located within the 14th Group Army, 

headquartered at Kunming.41 The 13th Group Army is located farther north in the 

Chengdu MR but could be deployed south if needed.42 The assessed missions of 

the 13th and 14th GA are defensive and offensive operations in complex terrain, 

and thus these group armies routinely train for mountain operations.43

PLAAF assets within the Chengdu MR include two fighter divisions and 

one transport division.44 As noted, the PLA has in recent years focused on rapid 

mobility training to respond to border contingencies, as highlighted by the Mission Action group army–level exercises in 2010 and 2013.45 Thus, the PLA could 

even today mobilize and deploy large numbers of troops to support a Burma 

contingency if required. The new Chinese superhighway 320 runs from Shanghai to the border with Burma at Ruili and will eventually be extended through 

Burma, all the way to Mandalay and down to the port city of Kyaukpyu.46 The 

new rail and road networks would improve the PLA’s ability to deploy forces 

into Burma and provide the logistics support necessary for them to operate.

Periodic offensives by Burmese government forces against ethnic minority 

militias and the displacements connected to Chinese economic development 

are both root causes of refugees crossing into China, facilitated by large-scale 
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Chinese development of road, rail, and pipeline links through northern Burma. 

Increased military pressure from the Burmese army in the far north where the 

Kachin reside has resulted in thousands of refugees fleeing into China to seek 

shelter with Kachin groups north of the border. Some 120,000 Kachin reside in 

China as PRC citizens, and at least 50,000 live in the Shan State region of Burma. 

The Kachin minority in Burma has fought for greater autonomy for decades, and 

the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has waged a series of on-and-off battles 

over the years with Burma’s military. The recent initiation of major dam projects 

along upper tributaries of the Irrawaddy River in northern Burma (in particular, 

the now-stalled Myitsone Dam) has exacerbated tensions with the Kachin and 

contributed to an increase in fighting between the KIA and central government 

forces. At least seven large dams are planned or in construction in the middle of 

Kachin territory to provide hydroelectric energy to China. Most of these projects 

are under Chinese control; construction has resulted in the forced dislocation of 

thousands of Kachin and stimulated anti-Chinese sentiment. This, together with 

Burma’s attempts to force all ethnic separatist groups to give up their arms and 

submit to central authority, is responsible for ending a 17-year peace agreement 

between the KIA and the central government authorities in Naypyidaw in June 

2011 and a major uptick in fighting and increased refugee flows into China.47

Up to 10,000 Kachin refugees crossed the border in 2011–2012 and currently 

remain in squalid camps on the PRC side of the border.48 Beijing, however, refuses 

to acknowledge the status of these Kachin as refugees to avoid having to abide by 

sanctuary provisions contained in the 1951 United Nations (UN) Refugee Convention Agreement, of which China is a signatory. Instead, Chinese authorities, 

using the PAP and other internal security forces, regularly force Kachin refugees 

back across the border into Burma, where they face extreme hardship and even 

death at the hands of the Burma armed forces.49 Human Rights Watch and Christian refugee support organizations have accused Beijing of systematic human 

rights violations against these Kachin minorities.50 Following an expulsion of 

5,000 Kachin in September 2012 by PAP and local militia, the UN Refugee Agency 

called on Beijing to abide by its commitments to protect and shelter displaced 

refugees.51 Yunnan provincial authorities have stated that at least some of the 

PAP expulsions of Kachin came under direct orders from Beijing.52 PRC leaders 

who ordered the expulsions likely became concerned over the presence of large 

numbers of ethnic Kachin in sensitive border areas; there may have also been an 

agreement with Burma to send the refugees back across the border.
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A separate ethnic conflict further south on the China-Burma border 

involves the ethnic Chinese Kokangs and their armed resistance to the entry 

of central government forces into the semi-autonomous Shan State. An increase 

in fighting occurred in 2009 when the Burmese military attempted to bring the 

region under central control, which resulted in at least 50,000 Kokang fleeing 

across the border into China. Unlike the Kachin, the ethnic Chinese Kokang 

were treated well by Yunnan provincial authorities. Some Chinese claimed 

the offensive against the Kokang was driven in part by discrimination against 

Chinese businessmen in Burma and a reaction against the rapid penetration of 

Burma by PRC firms.53 The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement 

in August 2009 calling on Burma to “properly handle domestic problems and 

maintain stability in the China-Burma border region” and urging Burma to 

“protect the security and legal rights of Chinese citizens in Burma.”54 Subsequently, Beijing sent PAP and possibly PLA forces to the border area and 

dispatched a senior emissary to Burma for talks. Burmese authorities later 

“apologized” for causing instability along China’s border.55

China’s close relationships with the Kokang and the United Wa State Army 

located to the south of Kokang areas in Burma have important implications for 

potential future contingencies involving the border region. Burma’s stepped-up 

military efforts since 2009 to bring the long-autonomous ethnic regions in northern and eastern Burma under central control have displaced tens of thousands of 

refugees who have crossed the border into China. Offensives against the Kokang 

and United Wa State Army appear designed in part to sever the close relationships 

these two ethnically Chinese minority groups have had with the PRC. 

Outlook for Burma Contingencies 

The network of highways, railroad, and gas and oil pipelines that China is 

constructing through Burma to link Yunnan to the port at Kyaukpyu will open 

the southern region of China to rapid economic expansion and serve as a vital 

gateway to African and Middle Eastern markets as well as a transit corridor for 

energy imports. The gas pipeline, capable of carrying 12 billion cubic meters of 

gas a year, became operational in 2013. Construction of an oil pipeline capable 

of carrying up to 440,000 barrels per day to China was completed in August 2014 

and was expected to become operational by the end of 2014.56

The rapidly growing strategic importance of the trade network through 

Burma linking China to the Bay of Bengal, which will allow for an alternate 
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transit route bypassing the Strait of Malacca, will change the dynamic of 

Beijing’s strategic interests over the next decade and likely result in additional 

cross-border contingency planning for PLA forces stationed in the Chengdu 

Military Region bordering Burma. These contingencies, which now likely 

encompass border and internal security, will probably be expanded to address 

China’s growing economic and strategic interests in Burma. 

These road and rail networks will facilitate expanded Chinese economic 

penetration into Burma. The transit corridor that links Kunming to Kyaukpyu 

cuts through the heart of ethnic minority areas on the Burma side of the border. Beijing likely views the Kokang and Wa as natural allies for future security in an area that will assume increasing strategic importance for China. 

Although not strictly a border issue, recent conflict in the Rakhine area of 

Burma between ethnic Buddhists and Muslims is also a concern for China, 

as the terminus of the huge road-rail-pipeline network linking Yunnan to the 

Bay of Bengal lies at Kyaukpyu in Rakhine. The nearby offshore A-1 Shwe gas 

field is being exploited by the Chinese firm PetroChina and will be linked 

into the trans-Burma gas pipeline. 

The recognition by the Burma central government of the dynamics of 

increasing Chinese influence likely precipitated the October 2011 suspension 

of the China Power Investment Corporation’s $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam project 

and Burma’s decision to engage in a limited democratic opening of the political 

system that resulted in a rapprochement with the international community 

and an end to many international sanctions.

Burma’s military may also be having second thoughts about its relationship with the PLA, especially as alternative weapons suppliers become 

available. Army officers reportedly recently told a visiting academic from the 

London School of Economics that PLA-supplied hardware and weapons were 

of very low quality, with one officer stating, “The Chinese cheated us. They’ve 

given us all this crap and taken our resources.”57

While Burma is unlikely to embark on an explicit strategic tilt toward the 

United States and against China, the visit of U.S. President Barack Obama to 

Burma in 2014 has compelled Beijing to regard its relations with Burma in a 

new light. The decision by Burma to reposition itself to shed its pariah image 

and balance Chinese and outside influence raises the stakes for Beijing. Given 

the long history of anti-China sentiment in Burma, the Chinese leadership 

cannot guarantee that huge Chinese investments in Burma will remain safe 
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or that strategic transport links between Kunming and the Bay of Bengal will 

remain open in the event of a regional crisis. Thus, it is almost certain that the 

PLA will be tasked to plan for future cross-border contingencies to secure PRC 

strategic and economic interests in Burma.

Conclusion 

In both North Korea and Burma, current PLA and PAP operations and contingency plans appear to focus primarily on maintaining border security and 

guarding against political or military developments that might send additional 

refugees across the border into China. Nearby PLA and PAP units assigned 

to these missions appear to have well-equipped forces; improvements in 

cross-border road and rail networks and in the PLA ability to transport and 

provide logistics support for deployed forces would probably be sufficient to 

support limited cross-border operations to contain refugee flows if greater 

instability breaks out inside North Korea or Burma. PLA units deployed near 

North Korea must also be prepared to cross the border to secure WMD in the 

event of a regime collapse and to prepare for potential higher end contingencies, such as peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance operations throughout 

the DPRK or (potentially) combat with U.S. or South Korean forces attempting 

to unilaterally reunify the two Koreas. These would be much more demanding 

missions. Although such higher end contingencies appear unlikely at present, 

the situation inside North Korea could change quickly. That is why contingency 

planning exists and why the PLA units with responsibility for Korean contingencies follow the situation in Korea closely.

Over the longer term, Chinese political relations with North Korea and 

Burma may deteriorate even as Chinese economic and security interests deepen. 

Chinese economic interests in North Korea are less critical than those in Burma, 

and strains in relations with Pyongyang may limit deepening of economic ties. 

However, if Kim Jong Un’s international behavior and pursuit of WMD capabilities threaten to destabilize the region and damage China’s burgeoning economic 

and political relationship with Seoul, there may come a point at which Beijing 

feels compelled to take action. In Burma, Chinese economic interests within 

the country and the strategic value of an alternative transit route for goods, oil, 

and natural gas that connects China and the Indian Ocean will only continue 

to increase. Burma’s strategic value to Beijing will grow. If bilateral political ties 

remain strained and the central government appears unable or unwilling to 
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protect the oil and gas pipelines and transit routes, a stronger China may relax 

its policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries in order to 

protect its interests. Under such circumstances, the PLA may need to plan for 

and potentially execute a broader range of missions inside Burma, ranging from 

security assistance and counterinsurgency training up to deployments inside 

Burma to protect the pipelines and other Chinese interests. This would be a significant shift from today’s more limited operations and contingency planning.

Notes

1 Xi Jinping’s first expanded explanation of his China Dream vision was promulgated in March 2013. It remains a point of debate among scholars whether Xi’s 

China Dream was influenced more by Thomas Friedman’s October 2012 New York 

Times article or the nationalistic 2010 anti-U.S. book China Dream: The Great Power 

Thinking and Strategic Positioning of China in the Post-American Age [中国梦:后美国

时代的大国思维与战略定位] by PLA Col. Liu Mingfu [刘明福]. The PLA clearly interprets the China Dream as more aligned with Liu’s prediction of an eventual power 

struggle with the United States for global supremacy.

2 Carl Thayer, “Tensions Set to Rise in the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, 

February 19, 2014, available at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/tensions-set-torise-in-the-south-china-sea/>.

3 Ibid.

4 Henry Lawton, “Australia Startled by Chinese Naval Excursion,” The Diplomat, February 15, 2014, available at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/australia-startled-by-chinese-naval-excursion/>.

5 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China, Annual Report to Congress, 2012 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2012), 2.

6 OSD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 

China, Annual Report to Congress, 2011 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, 2011), 13.

7 See Linda Jakobson, “The PLA and Maritime Security Actors,” in PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking, ed. Phillip C. Saunders and Andrew 

Scobell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 300–323.

8 Mathieu Duchâtel, Oliver Bräuner, and Zhou Hang, Protecting China’s 

Overseas Interests: The Slow Shift away from Non-interference, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 

41 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014).

9 Bonnie Glaser, Scott Snyder, and John S. Park, Keeping an Eye on an 

Unruly Neighbor: Chinese Views of Economic Reform and Stability in North Korea 
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(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies and the U.S. Institute of Peace, 2008), 5.

10 Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin, China-North Korea Relations, CRS Report 

for Congress R41043 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 3.

11 Ibid., 3.

12 Glaser, Snyder, and Park, 8–9.

13 Ibid., 7.

14 Nanto and Manyin, 3–5.

15 Barbara Demick, “Purge of Kim Jong Un’s Uncle Unsettles North Korean 

Businesspeople,” Los Angeles Times, February 15, 2014; and Jayshree Bajoria and 

Beina Xu, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, 

February 18, 2014, available at <www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/

p11097>.

16 Demick.

17 Ibid.

18 “China sends top envoy to N. Korea after purge, says official,” Agence 

France-Press, February 17, 2014, available at <www.themalaymailonline.com/

world/article/china-sends-top-envoy-to-n.korea-after-purge-says-official>.

19 Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Ground Force Modernization and Mission Diversification: Underway in all Military Regions,” in Right Sizing the People’s Liberation 

Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, ed. Andrew Scobell and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 360–373.

20 Ibid.

21 National Geographic Atlas of China (Washington, DC: National Geographic 

Society, 2010), 53.

22 Glaser, Snyder, and Park, 15, 19.

23 Kim Jong-dae, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the Taedonggang 

North Occupation,” Defence 21, May 25, 2011, available at <http://defence21.hani.

co.kr/9875>.

24 “China Can Enter P’yang in 2 Hours in Case of Contingency,” Dong-A Ilbo, 

January 25, 2012.

25 OSD, Military and Security Developments (2012), 30.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., 32.

28 Ibid., 31.
222

WOODROW

29 Ibid., 32.

30 OSD, Military and Security Developments (2011), 5.

31 “China Conducts River Crossing Drill at North Korean Border,” Chosun 

Ilbo, June 14, 2012, available at <http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_

dir/2012/06/14/2012061401080.html>.

32 “Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance Between the 

People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” Peking 

Review 4, no. 28 (1961), 5.

33 Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, “China-Korea Relations: Managing Relations Amidst Power Transitions,” Comparative Connections 14, no. 2 (September 2012).

34 Ibid.

35 “China’s Jilin Wins Use of N. Korean Sea Port,” Chosun Ilbo, 

March 9, 2010, available at <http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_

dir/2010/03/09/2010030900360.html>.

36 “China Agrees to Invest $3 Bln in N. Korea Trade Zone,” Agence FrancePresse, February 14, 2012.

37 See Yun Sun, “China and the Changing Myanmar,” Journal of Current 

Southeast Asian Affairs 31, no. 4 (2012), 51–77.

38 National Geographic Atlas of China, 53.

39 Blasko.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 OSD, Military and Security Developments (2012), 30.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., 32.

45 OSD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 

China, Annual Report to Congress, 2014 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, May 2014), 5, 20.

46 Patrick Boehler, “China’s Gateway to Myanmar Booming,” The Irrawaddy, 

January 31, 2012.

47 Human Rights Watch, Myanmar: Isolated in Yunnan (New York: Human 

Rights Watch, June 2012), available at <www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/

china0612_forinsertForUpload_0.pdf>.

48 James Humphries, “Kachin/China Relationships,” Kachin Wilderness 

Trumpeters blog, July 13, 2012, available at <www.kachinwildernesstrumpeters.

com/2012/07/kachin-china-relationships.html>.
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49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 “China Chastised for Sending Kachin People Back to Myanmar,” Los Angeles 

Times, September 7, 2012, available at <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_

now/2012/09/china-chastised-for-sending-kachin-people-back-to-myanmar.html>.

52 Human Rights Watch.

53 Larry Jagan, “Border war rattles China-Myanmar ties,” Asia Times, September 1, 2009, available at <www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KI01Ae04.html>.

54 “Kokang Fighters Flee to China,” Radio Free Asia, August 31, 2009, available 

at <www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a9fcd58c.html>.

55 Jagan.

56 Ilyas Sumar, “Oil News: Pipelines from Myanmar to China,” HEFFX Live 

Trading News, February 7, 2014, available at <http://www.livetradingnews.com/oilnews-pipelines-from-myanmar-to-china-30232.htm#>; and “China-Myanmar joint 

pipeline starts delivering gas,” CCTV, August 6, 2014, available at <http://english.

cntv.cn/2014/08/06/VIDE1407301800241634.shtml>. 

57 Evan Osnos, “The Burmese Spring,” The New Yorker, August 6, 2012, 58.

225

Fifty years ago, China and India fought a brief but fierce war over disputed 

territorial claims in two major areas along their mutual border.1 Today, 

despite decades of diplomacy and confidence-building measures, the 

basic conditions that led to war in 1962 have not changed. Each side refuses to 

yield on its basic territorial claims and mutual distrust remains high, although 

the intensity of concerns over the potential for conflict is probably higher in 

India than in China. Both the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Indian 

armed forces train for border conflict, and each force ensures that lessons 

the respective militaries drew from the 1962 war are applied to planning for 

future contingencies. 

Neither country had nuclear weapons when the Sino-Indian border war 

was fought. Cyber warfare did not exist; satellite communications and spacebased surveillance were not yet part of normal military functions. There was 

no maritime involvement in 1962, and neither India nor China had a strong 

navy. Although air forces were moved near the border for contingency use in 

1962, there was no conflict in the air. Today, although the likelihood of another 

border war is low, should one occur, the conflict would likely be wider than 

the ground battles fought in 1962. Air engagement, the use of ballistic missile 

forces, attacks in space, and cyber warfare would be part of any future conflict. 

Indeed, both sides plan for such contingencies. Both China and India would 

likely try to avoid the use of nuclear weapons, but both have nuclear arsenals. 

This study briefly examines the flashpoints that could lead to conflict as well 

as the domains of war where conflict may occur. Notwithstanding recent hype 

about maritime rivalry in the Indian Ocean, the most likely location for conflict between China and India is along the extended land-locked high-altitude 

border the two countries share. 

CHAPTER 10

PLA Contingency Planning and 

the Case of India

Larry M. Wortzel
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This chapter first reviews the potential flashpoints and explains why a 

contingency between China and India is far more likely to involve land power 

than sea power. The chapter then examines five factors that will help determine 

the likelihood, nature, scope, and escalation potential of any future conflict 

between China and India. These factors are the deep mutual mistrust and 

enduring land border dispute between Beijing and New Delhi, civil-military 

relations, economic relations, nuclear postures, and lessons of Sino-Indian 

warfighting, notably those learned by China during the 1962 border war.

Potential Flashpoints: Maritime Hype and Himalayan Hotspots 

China and India are both engaged in an increasing amount of naval activity 

in the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, and the South China Sea.2 At least 

on the Indian side, there seems to be a lot of bluster about the possibility of 

hostile encounters with the PLA Navy.3 In real-life encounters, however, the 

Indian side seems to understand that the closer they get to China, the more the 

PLA has the upper hand, a realization that keeps encounters from becoming 

conflicts.4 Indian naval officers probably understand that as a relatively small 

navy without extensive force projection capabilities or experience, their ships 

would be outgunned and would be operating without strong logistics support 

on the eastern side of the Malacca Strait. Political leaders in New Delhi are 

likely to exercise restraint in the maritime domain, while not conceding India’s 

economic interests or the right to conduct ship visits and transit the open seas.

Two recent Chinese military activities drew attention from India and 

demonstrate that there is some potential for conflict in the Indian Ocean. 

First, in late 2013, a Chinese Shang-class nuclear attack submarine conducted 

a 2-month patrol in the Indian Ocean, returning to its base on Hainan Island on 

February 20, 2014.5

 In addition, the PLA Navy conducted exercises in the South 

China Sea and then in the eastern Indian Ocean with a three-ship task force 

in February 2014.6 During the course of a 23-day deployment, the amphibious 

ship Changbaishan and two destroyers, the Wuhan and the Haikou, operating 

as what the United States would call a surface action group or expeditionary 

strike group, passed through the Sunda Strait, conducted an antipiracy exercise 

near Bali, and then passed though the Lombok Strait back into the Western 

Pacific.7

 Chinese officials said the deployment was part of normal antipiracy 

patrols, but one retired Indian rear admiral saw it as “a reconnaissance probe, 

the prelude to a full-scale deployment.”8
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In the Indian Ocean, China is increasing its own naval presence, seeking 

places to refuel, reprovision, repair, and rest, and backing up its interests with 

investments.9 China has deployed 20 small navy task forces to conduct counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. In the Persian Gulf, China has backed up 

its close relationship with Pakistan with investment in ports, increased trade, 

and ship visits.10 Both the Chinese and Indian navies eye each other warily over 

China’s investments in Myanmar and Sri Lanka and the potential for the PLA 

Navy to use ports there.11 Moreover, as both China and India begin to operate 

aircraft carrier battle groups and perhaps start intermittent submarine patrols, 

there is always the possibility of maritime or air conflict. 

However, when questioned about the potential for misunderstanding or 

conflict as China increases its expeditionary deployments and operations in 

the Indian Ocean, a senior PLA officer brushed off any concerns.12 The officer 

opined that as long as China’s naval forces operate in international waters and 

stay out of India’s exclusive economic zone, exercises or deployments in or 

through the Indian Ocean would not be a matter of concern.

Neither China nor India will be capable of sustained air or naval operations at long distances from their homelands for some time, and certainly not 

before 2020. Both navies and air forces would have to operate on extended lines 

of communication in any conflict, and both would face logistics constraints. 

Leaders in New Delhi and Beijing are aware of these limitations. Over this 

period, there is a chance for some conflict, although not a high likelihood. 

Beijing is sensitive to the fact that Japan and Vietnam would like to see a greater 

Indian naval presence in the Pacific; New Delhi is sensitive to the growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. However, the likelihood is low that 

China and India would engage in a major maritime or air conflict that would 

impede international shipping and aviation. 

The Sino-Indian frontier, however, is another matter. Both countries are 

extremely sensitive to sovereignty issues along the border. China’s support for 

Pakistan and the roads it has built are real irritants to India, while refuge for 

the Dalai Lama and India’s support for the Tibetan exile government annoy 

China. China’s border with India is some 3,380 kilometers long. China has two 

major claims and one smaller claim on what India considers its territory. In the 

western sector of the border, in the Ladakh District of Jammu and Kashmir, 

China claims the Aksai Chin.13 In this western sector, the People’s Republic of 

China (PRC) holds some 43,180 square kilometers of what India claims as its 
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territory, including some 5,180 square kilometers of territory ceded to China by 

Pakistan in March 1963, through which China built the Karakorum Highway. 

Indo-Pakistani tensions have a strong influence on India’s attitudes toward 

these conflicting claims, as do China’s close strategic relations with Pakistan. 

In the middle sector of the border, southeast of the Aksai Chin, along the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and extending into Tibet, China claims some 

2,000 square kilometers of what India considers its territory.14 The middle sector 

borders the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. In the eastern 

sector of the border, China claims some 90,000 square kilometers of the Indian 

state of Arunachal Pradesh, virtually the entire state. 

The Aksai Chin area is strategically important to Beijing because it has 

a highway built by China connecting Xinjiang to Tibet. The middle sector is 

an area that has some key mountain passes between Tibet and India, on the 

western side of Nepal. The eastern sector is the most sensitive because it has a 

large Tibetan population.15 China refuses to issue visas in passports to residents 

of Arunachal Pradesh, instead stapling them on pieces of paper, as a way to 

show that Beijing does not recognize India’s claim.16 The Dalai Lama fled to 

India in 1959, and India still gives the Tibetan government-in-exile sanctuary 

in Dharamsala, India. 

The conflicting claims in the eastern sector are along the McMahon Line, 

a demarcation drawn by British Foreign Secretary Henry McMahon during the 

Simla Conference held in Northern India from October 13, 1913, through July 

3, 1914.17 In the western and middle sectors, the conflicting claims stem from 

a survey by British officials in 1846–1847 and another survey by W.H. Johnson, 

an officer of the British Survey of India, who traversed the Aksai Chin and 

Karakorum area in 1865.18

Successive British envoys to China between 1913 and 1947 continued to 

argue the border demarcation with China. When Great Britain relinquished its 

claim to the Indian empire in 1947, the British tried to translate these surveys 

into maps. However, the work was never completed and never agreed to by 

China, and the new Indian government began its own policy of completing 

this work while also moving forces forward.19

Factors Affecting Potential Conflict

To appreciate the likelihood, nature, scope, and escalation potential of a future 

conflict between China and India, five factors are examined in turn. Some of 
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these factors make conflict more likely, some shape the nature and scope of the 

contingency, while others affect the potential for escalation. 

Sino-Indian Mistrust and Border Dispute 

Mutual mistrust and the territorial disputes increase the potential for conflict 

and ensure that the militaries of both countries continue to plan for border 

war contingencies. Each side anticipates hostile action from the other and possesses a heightened sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis the other. Moreover, when 

an incident or border violation occurs, the tendency is to assume malicious or 

nefarious intent on the part of the actor. 

In 1960, India formulated its “forward policy,” designed to place continuous pressure by Indian forces on Chinese troops along the disputed border.20 

Neville Maxwell cites an October 1959 editorial in the Times of India to explain 

the policy: “New Delhi must assert its rights by dispatching properly equipped 

patrols into the areas currently occupied by the Chinese, since any prolonged 

failure to do so will imply a tacit acceptance of Chinese occupation.”21 In China, 

Mao Zedong instructed the PLA in July 1962 to counter what he termed India’s 

“nibbling policy” [canshi zhengce, 蚕食政策]. China’s “anti-nibbling rules” 

instructed PLA troops to “never make a concession, but try to avert bleeding; 

form a jagged, interlocking pattern [of positions] to secure the border; and 

prepare for long-term, armed co-existence.”22

For China, maintaining and defending definable borders is one of the most 

important missions of the PLA.23 China’s sovereignty over Tibet is tied up in 

Beijing’s sensitivity over the border.24 Further, the intensity of China’s concerns 

over border security is exacerbated by the Tibetan presence harbored in Dharamsala, India.25 This area is south of the middle sector of the disputed border. 

Chinese sensitivities also are heightened by the fact that the United States 

mounted a covert war to assist Tibetans in evicting the PLA and establishing 

an independent Tibet during the 1950s and early 1960s.26

In India, there is still political sensitivity to the losses of the 1962 war. The 

Indian Defense Ministry finally released casualty figures in 1965, acknowledging 1,383 troops killed, 1,696 personnel missing in action, and 3,968 personnel 

captured by Chinese forces.27 Chinese casualties were considerably lower, with 

722 Chinese soldiers killed, 1,697 wounded, and none captured.28 In fact, the 

PLA captured three Indian brigades, including one brigade commander. China’s close relations with and support for Pakistan as well as China’s stance on 
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Kashmir, disputed between India and Pakistan, make relations between India 

and China particularly sensitive.29 Indian military officers still characterize 

the 1962 conflict with China as a “serious debacle and ignominy suffered by 

the nation.”30

These sensitivities make any settlement of the border dispute more difficult 

for both countries. That said, many articles in Indian newspapers and journals 

highlight the threat from China, whereas on the Chinese side, most commentaries focus on how the two sides can increase economic cooperation. On the 

Indian side, memories of the defeat in 1962 linger. According to one military 

analyst, the Indian Army assesses four levels of threat from China: “non-contact war (coercion and intimidation), low, medium and high.”31

Some Chinese specialists on the border areas believe that further economic development in Tibet will strengthen China’s control over the region 

and bind minorities to the PRC.32 At the same time, these specialists advise 

that united front work [tongzhan gongzuo, 统战工作] is an important key to 

assimilating the Tibetan minority population.33 That formulation implies that 

there is some enemy to unite against, suggesting that the Chinese Communist 

Party (CCP) and the PLA have strong motivation to continue to maintain some 

pressure on India over the shared border. There also are periodic propaganda 

reminders of the 1962 war and its justification aimed at the general populace, 

suggesting that the CCP is using the border dispute as a means to maintain a 

level of readiness to respond. One series reminds the populace about the reasons for the “self-defensive counterattack” and of Mao Zedong’s goals in the 

1962 Sino-Indian war, which Mao established in consultation with the Central 

Military Commission.34

In the wake of the 1986 Sumdurong Chu incident when the PLA seized a 

seasonal India observation post in the eastern sector, the Indian Army sent 

some 200,000 troops north of Tawang to respond to what it saw as an increased 

presence of Chinese infantry near the border and the construction by China 

of four helicopter landing areas.35 Jonathan Holslag argues that even though 

China and India reached agreement to withdraw troops by 200 meters on 

each side of the border in 1996, the potential for conflict remains.36 There also 

were arrests of an Indian intelligence team in Arunachal Pradesh by Chinese 

troops in July 2004, and some Indo-Tibetan border police were wounded by 

Chinese forces in 2009.37 In April 2013, approximately 30 PLA troops crossed 

the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and pitched tents in the Depsang Plain of the 
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Western Section; a confrontation ensued for 3 weeks until both sides withdrew 

their forces. Another Chinese incursion took place in September 2014, prior to 

President Xi Jinping’s visit to India; the incident escalated to involve more than 

1,000 troops on each side.38

Further, in India, there is still a perceived sense of strategic vulnerability, 

even as there are plans to strengthen Indian capabilities on the border.39 There 

have not been any Sino-Indian confidence-building military exercises since 

2008, with the exception of some aerial acrobatics displays.40 Even the last 

Sino-Indian exercise was a small-scale counterterrorism training exercise in 

Kunming. Many Indian analysts believe that Beijing intends to keep India on 

edge and unsure of the future. Arun Sahgal, joint director of net assessment, 

technology, and simulation at New Delhi’s Institute of National Security Studies, opined that the 228 cases of “territorial intrusions” by Chinese troops in 

2010 and the 213 cases in 2011 (by Indian count) are “Chinese pinpricks to keep 

India on tenterhooks.”41

Observers in India are unhappy about the wave of infrastructure development along the Sino-Indian border. China did extensive construction in the 

early 2000s to improve the road network on its side of the border. India experts 

believe that India needs all-weather roads in order to ensure forces can reach 

the contested border, but only 15 of 73 planned roads were completed on time.42

One estimate claimed that China had stationed some 300,000 PLA troops in 

Tibet and put six rapid reaction force units in Chengdu to respond to border 

crises.43 On the Indian side, however, there are only some 120,000 troops in the 

eastern sector of the border.

The Indian side believes that in the event of a new border conflict, the PLA 

could move as many as 30 infantry division equivalents into the border area, 

overwhelming Indian forces.44 At the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, Gurmeet 

Kanwal argues that “patrol face-offs are common as both sides patrol up to their 

perceptions of the LAC.”45 He believes a small incident is possible and, given 

the postures on both sides of the border, could escalate in scale. 

Time does not heal all wounds, and some Chinese actions have opened 

deeper wounds. When the Panchen Lama, the second highest ranking Lama 

in Tibetan Buddhism, died in 1989, a controversy arose. The Tibetans and the 

Dalai Lama chose Gedhun Choekyi Nyima as the reincarnated Panchen Lama. 

However, in 1990 Beijing announced that a different Tibetan, Gyancain Norbu, 

was the Panchen Lama, and the Dalai Lama’s choice disappeared from public 
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view. When the current Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, eventually dies, Beijing 

is certain to pick its own candidate, while Tibetan monks in Dharamsala will 

carry out their own search for the new reincarnation. This will without question 

lead to closures of the Sino-Indian border and increased security in China.

Effect of Civil-Military Relations on Potential Conflict 

Civil-military dynamics in China and India increase the possibility of conflict 

while mitigating the potential for escalation. Stovepiping in Beijing and New 

Delhi makes for poor bureaucratic coordination, thus increasing the likelihood of the two countries stumbling into war. Moreover, should a border crisis 

materialize, top political leaders such as President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, with strong nationalist credentials and reputations for 

being decisive and hardline, may feel it necessary to response with muscular 

assertiveness. However, once engaged in conflict, these insular institutional 

structures may tend to serve as brakes on horizontal or vertical escalation. 

Arguably, civil-military relations in India affected the way in which the 

Indian Army prosecuted the 1962 border war. In 1961–1962, the civilian leadership pushed the Indian Army to pursue the “Forward Policy” aggressively 

when the military seemed to believe that the force balance was not in India’s 

favor. The military wanted to use air forces in support of ground operations, but 

the civilian leadership was unwilling, fearing an escalation of the war.

Today, the Indian Army likely would still be constrained politically. The 

Indian government remains mired in bureaucratic silos and does not coordinate effectively across agencies. This is not a new problem. One restricted review 

of Indian actions before and during the 1962 Sino-Indian War complained of 

“the people’s ignorance of military matters” and “total secrecy, unmindful of 

the needs of national security” of Indian government departments.46 Based on 

the author’s 30 years of experience, the diplomatic, intelligence, and military 

elements of the Indian security establishment have a great deal of difficulty in 

coordinating activities at both the national and the embassy levels. For example, members of India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), report independently and seldom coordinate or share their 

reporting with foreign ministry officers and defense attachés at the embassy.47

One Indian military official, Major General Mrinal Susman, has described 

the military procurement process as “a national shame,” with no holistic 

regime and confusion among defense, space, and atomic energy agencies.48
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Other Indian security analysts have called for a comprehensive strategic 

defense review because elected representatives in Parliament, government 

ministries, and the military often have different geostrategic and geopolitical objectives.49 In such circumstances, clear statements of policy and mission-type instructions from the highest levels of the Indian government are 

unlikely. In the event of a new border conflict, the Indian Army could well be 

in a position similar to the one in which it found itself in 1962.

China also faces huge bureaucratic coordination problems. The need to 

forge consensus among Central Military Commission (CMC) and Politburo 

Standing Committee (PBSC) members for major actions often delays decisionmaking.50 That said, once the CMC conveys a set of combat orders to a 

theater command or military region, the commander seems to know the 

limitations on the scope of his action. Based on how the 1962 Sino-Indian 

War and the 1979 attack on Vietnam were orchestrated, the CMC defines 

timelines and the scope of action for an operation in advance. Finally, as slow 

as the consensus process may be in China, once senior political and military 

leaders make a decision, there is not much room for the PLA to misunderstand 

party instructions. From the standpoint of how civil-military relations may 

affect any future border conflict, the PLA may be in a better position than 

the Indian armed forces once hostilities commence and contingency plans 

enter the execution phase.

Economic Considerations and Potential Conflict 

Burgeoning economic relations between China and India are unlikely to 

diminish mutual distrust, at least in the short to medium term. Moreover, these 

growing economic ties will not necessarily spill over into progress on resolving 

territorial disputes, nor even prevent the two countries from fighting a border 

war. However, these economic relations may be sufficiently consequential to 

serve as a factor limiting horizontal escalation. Both Beijing and New Delhi 

are likely to seek to contain hostilities to their respective frontier regions and 

avoid expanding the conflict to their heartlands.

Robert Abboud and Newton Minow, in a 2002 article in Foreign Affairs, made 

the argument that economic interaction leads to political adhesion, reducing the 

need for and likelihood of conflict.51 Both China and India have made efforts to 

improve political relations and deepen economic interaction, but that does not 

seem to have reduced mutual mistrust or preparations for conflict.
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Bilateral investment between the two countries is not vigorous. Chinese 

cumulative investment in India to December 2011 was $575.7 million, while 

Indian cumulative investment in China to the same time was $441.7 million. At 

a little more than a billion dollars, that economic interaction pales compared to, 

for instance, the $253.7 billion Japan has invested in the United States. Bilateral 

trade between China and India was $73.9 billion in 2011, with $23.41 billion 

in Indian exports to China and $50.49 billion in Chinese exports to India. In 

terms of content, the majority of trade is in electrical machinery, nuclear reactor 

equipment, boilers, machinery, ores, and organic chemicals.52

These economic interactions probably do not have the weight to affect political and security considerations between the two countries. Indeed, Yasheng 

Huang, writing in the Journal of International Affairs, argues that there is only 

a “groping for stability” between China and India based on forms of economic 

complementarity and investment flows.53 Huang believes “that these economic 

interactions are not sufficient to solve the other tensions between the two countries.”54 Even if some of the trade is in civil nuclear materials and technology, 

there remains a shadow of nuclear conflict hanging over the disputed border.

The Nuclear Shadow 

The fact that both China and India are nuclear powers might make conflict 

more conceivable but escalation less likely. Some research suggests that countries with nuclear arsenals may be more willing to engage in conventional conflict with each other, including proxy wars, because they rationalize escalation 

to use of nuclear weapons is all but unthinkable—what scholars Glenn Snyder 

and Robert Jervis dubbed the stability-instability paradox. Indeed, both Beijing 

and New Delhi are likely to be quite reluctant to cross the threshold to nuclear 

war. China has long maintained a “no first use” policy, with Chinese leaders 

insisting they will not use nuclear weapons except in the event that another 

state launches nuclear strikes on China. India, meanwhile, is well aware of the 

daunting nuclear imbalance it faces with China and cognizant of the need to 

maintain parity with its other nuclear neighbor, Pakistan. 

In 1962, neither India nor China had nuclear weapons and neither had 

allies who could provide a nuclear umbrella. Beijing feared nuclear attack by 

both the United States and the Soviet Union, but both of those nations kept 

out of the Sino-Indian border war. Today, both China and India have nuclear 

arsenals. Even during a 1986 Sino-Indian confrontation in the Sumdorong Chu 
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valley in the eastern sector of the border, Moscow remained silent about any 

nuclear umbrella for India.55

China has some seven brigades of intercontinental ballistic missiles, one 

brigade of intermediate-range missiles (which will soon be taken out of the inventory, if they have not been deactivated already), ten brigades of medium-range 

missiles, eight short-range ballistic missile brigades, and two brigades of land-attack cruise missiles.56 India has a much smaller nuclear-capable missile force, 

with four groups of missiles (two medium-range groups and two short-range 

groups) but plenty of shorter range missiles that would be useful in a conflict.57

Most of the shorter range Indian missiles are capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads, as are most Chinese shorter range missiles. 

Both countries have a declaratory policy that they will not be the first to use 

nuclear weapons in a conflict, although New Delhi has stated it may retaliate 

with nuclear weapons in the event of a biological or chemical weapons attack.58

The Indian military and intelligence services are acutely aware of any shifts 

in the deployment of China’s Second Artillery Corps missile forces and track 

them closely.59 Such shifts might be interpreted by New Delhi as indications 

of impending conflict. 

On the Chinese side, Second Artillery Corps forces have been integrated 

into exercises and operational plans in China’s military regions, which may 

become war theaters in a conflict.60 The integration of Second Artillery Corps 

missile units into a theater commander’s operational forces is a natural evolution in military doctrine, but it increases the chances of miscalculation or escalation in a conflict.61 The Indian armed forces believe that for nuclear-armed 

missiles, the chain of command in China runs from the overall authority of the 

CMC through the Operations Department of the General Staff Department to 

the Second Artillery Corps.62 For conventional ballistic missile forces, however, 

the commander of the war theater has the authority to employ those missiles 

as part of a theater campaign.63 What is not clear from Indian military sources 

or Chinese doctrinal publications, however, is whether the theater or war commander may employ those missiles outside of China’s territory, where the use 

of even conventional ballistic missiles could be highly escalatory. 

India probably does not have tactical nuclear weapons, although China 

might. A latent fear in Indian defense circles is that “if the PLA does not get a 

quick breakthrough [in any border conflict] against a determined Indian Army 

deployed with defenses in depth, what stops the PLA from threatening to use 
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TNW [tactical nuclear weapons] in the high altitude terrain with little collateral 

damage?”64 Still, large-scale conventional ballistic missile strikes on the adversary’s territory are the action most likely to escalate a conflict. 

Indian concerns run deep, particularly because China has far more ballistic missiles and a much larger nuclear arsenal. Those concerns aside, Beijing is unlikely to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a border conflict. 

However, there are contingencies for counterdeterrence nuclear operations 

in “high plateau frigid border regions” by the PLA. Chinese military writings 

discuss the need to “place a great emphasis on joint counternuclear intimidation operations” when conducting “informationized joint operations” in 

terrain that sounds a lot like Tibet.65 The PLA expects enemy airstrikes in any 

future conflict in that area but also thinks it necessary to “actively deter enemy 

nuclear deterrence and conduct the right level of reasonable and constrained 

counternuclear intimidation operations to thwart enemy nuclear blackmail.”66

This kind of thinking raises the stakes in any conflict. When the PLA discusses 

counterdeterrence, the types of operations involved include unmasking weapons and moving them in ways the enemy can observe, conducting nuclear 

weapons exercises, and conducting conventional ballistic missile strikes—all 

potentially escalatory operational concepts.67

Lessons from the 1962 Conflict and Contemporary Doctrine 

China appears to have learned the lessons of the 1962 war better than India. 

Nevertheless, this may tend to breed overconfidence in the victor’s abilities 

five decades later and a tendency to underestimate the adversary. Indeed, 

one perceived lesson of the PLA’s record of limited and contained conflicts 

around China’s periphery since 1950 may be the predisposition to assume 

that the Chinese have mastered the art of escalation management—what the 

PLA dubs war control.

68 Meanwhile, the vanquished may be far less confident 

in its ability and prone to exaggerate the capabilities of its adversary. In terms 

of doctrine, the PLA’s overarching concept of operations for decades has 

been that of limited or local war and an operational and tactical preference 

for seizing the initiative and engaging in proactive offensive actions even 

while ostensibly engaged in a strategically defensive posture under the flexible principle of active defense. These elements may on the one hand make 

Sino-Indian conflict more likely, while on the other hand serve to tamp down 

pressure for escalation. 
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Based on its analysis of operations in the 1962 Sino-Indian Self-Defense 

Counterattack Campaign, the PLA came away with a number of major lessons.69 

Most importantly, the PLA concluded that the best approach was to attempt to 

use peaceful means to settle boundary and border disputes through political 

discussions and diplomacy. The General Political Department also concluded 

that a good approach was to institute a propaganda campaign designed to 

educate opposing forces about the status of the border. But it was clear that 

the most critical area, according to PLA analysis at the time, was the eastern 

portion, which was the main direction of operations in the counterattack.70

One reason was the Indian disposition of troops. The CMC also decided that 

the first order of business was to deal a “painful blow” to Indian forces that had 

intruded into China.71 Surprise and speed in the counterattack were deemed 

to be extremely important to PLA success, and in both sections of the border, 

east and west, the PLA emphasized swiftness of operations. The PLA sought 

to follow up on combat successes and to pursue Indian forces that had abandoned border positions.72 Establishing and maintaining good logistics bases 

and lines of transportation were deemed critical to the PLA’s success. PLA 

analysis argues that a good policy toward minorities (Tibetan rural laborers 

and manual laborers) was important to operations. Finally, the PLA concluded 

that use of frontier troops and militia units around the border areas were keys 

to successful operations. 

Other PLA officers argue that one of the most valuable lessons from the 

1962 Sino-Indian war was about operating under conditions of high altitude 

and extreme cold.73 Troops had to be acclimatized to these harsh conditions 

and properly equipped. Furthermore, in a discussion of how the self-defensive 

counterattack campaign contributed to PLA campaign thinking, the PLA’s 

experience in the Sino-Indian war is given credit for planting the ideas that led 

to the development of combined arms campaigns.74 Ultimately, however, the 

PLA did not seriously experiment with or implement combined arms operations until after the 1979 attack on Vietnam.75

None of these conclusions is a surprise. They constitute standard PLA 

campaign doctrine. However, these approaches have been updated and 

modernized to apply in 21st-century operations in border conflicts.76 For its 

own operational planning, PLA doctrine seems to accept that “in times of 

peace (or lower tension), it is not necessary to deploy large forces along the 

border.”77 Further, PLA authors advise that when repelling intruding forces or 
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defending against an enemy attack, the initial response is defensive. However, 

if an intrusion is in a limited area, defensive operations may be inadequate. 

In such circumstances, the best response is to use mobile units operating in 

depth as the main force responding to an enemy incursion and to “annihilate 

[jianmie, 歼灭] the enemy.”78

The PLA text, The Study of Ground Force [Army] Campaigns, emphasizes 

that because of difficult terrain and special conditions in border areas [zhanchang huanjing teshu, 战场环境特殊], independent operations often have to be 

undertaken in different directions and areas. Border areas are characterized 

by limited mobility, limited lines of communication, and few transportation 

routes. Defensive operations are only the initial phase of border self-defense 

and are intended to prepare the contested area for offensive operations—the 

self-defensive counterattack.79 The basic formula for contingency planning 

is defined as “impede the enemy while building the situation for one’s own 

forces, conduct key point counterattacks, simultaneously annihilate and expel 

the enemy” [zukang zao shi, zhongdian fanji, jian qu bing ju, 阻抗造势, 重点反

击, 歼驱并举].80 In “key point counterattacks,” the text notes the importance of 

concentrating “crack” or hand-picked troops at key points and that the main 

defensive orientation should be where the enemy’s main force is concentrated.81

Most important for future contingency planning, the book advises that 

self-defensive counterattack campaigns should take full advantage of other 

arms and services, such as engineers, camouflage units, communications 

units, weather organizations, artillery and missiles, and specialized reserve 

forces.82 A fully integrated force structure is important in coordinating border 

self-defensive counterattack campaigns. Commanders can maximize coordination by organizing forces into special forces groups, surface combat groups, 

surface warfare firepower groups, and air defense firepower groups.83 The latter 

suggests that in future contingencies, the PLA expects its principal adversary 

(probably India) to use air forces and that the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) would 

be part of any campaign. Electronic reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, 

information operations, and electronic deception measures would be important parts of any campaign, which also implies the use of cyber operations 

against enemy forces.84

The PLA expects that border self-defense will involve operations in very 

cold high-altitude areas where troops would be deprived of oxygen. To be ready 

for these contingencies, commanders should prepare for combat early, move 
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forces into potential combat areas early, and prepare the battlefield for combat 

early.85 With respect to terrain, The Study of Ground Force Campaigns advises 

that the PLA should control valleys and movement corridors using defensive 

fires and offensive electronic measures. It also is imperative for the PLA to 

control plateaus to facilitate offensive operations and use them for aircraft and 

helicopter operations. Finally, the text warns commanders to prepare troops 

to operate in extremely cold environments. 

Cyber warfare would likely be employed by both Indian and Chinese 

forces. In the electronic and cyber realm, both China and India are developing 

robust capabilities to support military operations and intelligence gathering 

with computers and satellite surveillance. Both Beijing and New Delhi have 

space-based assets that could be targets in a conflict. 

Neither side used combat aircraft in the 1962 war. Indian Air Force doctrine provides for close air support, but as one Indian assessment states, even 

though the army expected close air support, the air force was not ready to 

provide it.86 An article on close air support in the 1962 war argues that even 

today, despite a doctrine calling for close air support, the Indian Air Force is 

still inept at providing it.87 One senior Indian Air Force official, in discussions 

with a U.S. researcher, argued that a political decision by civilian authorities 

restricted the Indian Air Force from using airpower.88 Several PLA officers have 

translated the restricted Indian history of the war, History of the Conflict with 

China, 1962,

89 which makes clear that political restrictions were placed on the 

Indian Air Force.90 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru apparently feared that 

China would widen the war if India used airstrikes. The Indian side did make 

extensive use of transport aircraft for troop movements and logistics.

The PLA tends to rely on massed indirect fire (artillery and mortar) along 

with preplanned airstrikes to support offensive operations. In the Chinese 

view, as a principle of war, mass not only means massing forces at critical 

points on the battlefield, but also massing fires to annihilate the enemy.91

The PLAAF has at least three divisions of ground attack aircraft, including 

the Qiang-5, a variant of the F-6 updated with Italian help; the Xi’an FB-7, a 

fighter-bomber developed at home; and the Su-27.92 There are two combat air 

divisions in the Chengdu Military Region. Some analysts note that although 

the PLAAF has provisions for close air firepower support for other services 

on the battlefield, it is not practiced much.93 The PLAAF mostly conducts 

preplanned or on-call ground interdiction. Roger Cliff and his co-authors 
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note in Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth that doctrinal provisions 

call for a “target guidance small group” from the PLAAF to be sent to assist 

ground or other supported units, but Dennis Blasko has argued in The Chinese 

Army Today that such air support is still limited to cooperative planning at a 

headquarters level, which is a far cry from sending forward air controllers or 

air-naval gunfire coordinators into ground units the way the U.S. Air Force 

and Navy do with the Army and Marine Corps.94 Even in descriptions of close 

air support by the PLAAF during an exercise on the Tibetan Plateau, it is not 

clear whether the “target guidance group” [mubiao yindao zu, 目标引导组] was 

operating at a headquarters or embedded in ground force units.95 It is clear, 

however, that the PLA has begun employing army aviation units in direct 

ground attack support for infantry units.96

The Chinese military has learned that it must employ airpower in a future 

conflict, even if its effectiveness is limited. However, the PLA seems to prefer 

the use of artillery over air forces given the limitations of operations at high 

altitude.97 This permits a more controlled and reliable massing of fires.98 Also, 

PLA military doctrine makes it clear that missile strikes will be integrated with 

other forms of firepower. The PLA has exercised its conventional missile forces 

with ground forces under the control of the theater of operations commander.99

The PLA learned that operations at high altitude require special attention 

to acclimatizing personnel. While PLA forces have a number of personnel who 

were better acclimated because of longer service at high altitude, there still is 

a serious effort in China to study the effects of altitude on military operations 

at the General Hospital of the Tibet Military District.100

The PLA may have an advantage over Indian units in that its forces are 

deployed at high altitude for longer periods and train for operations on a regular 

basis.101 China has three mechanized infantry brigades deployed in Tibet, two 

of them trained for mountain operations. There is also a reserve forces brigade 

and a People’s Armed Police division in Tibet. There are six garrisons around 

Tibet, each of which probably is about brigade strength (approximately 4,000 

men). Thus, there are probably several brigades of troops in Tibet and a division 

in Chengdu Military Region who are well acclimatized. PLA commanders seem 

to believe that it really takes about 6 months to get a unit fully acclimatized to 

operations in high altitude areas. This practical view comes from extended 

periods of training in Tibet.102
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Preparing for Future Conflict: Exercises and Contingency Plans 

China and India are both modernizing their armed forces and preparing 

for future conflicts in the information age. The PLA characterizes itself as 

modernizing in a number of ways in order to respond to Hu Jintao’s 2004 

charge to undertake “new historic missions” designed to provide strategic 

support for safeguarding national interests.103 Part of this modernization is 

“informationizing” the armed forces, or ensuring that command, control, 

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(C4ISR) systems can operate across the domains of war and exchange data and 

targeting information.104 Logistics, notably transportation, is a second area 

of interest. Over the last 4 years, the PLA has conducted a series of opposing 

force exercises around China that involved moving large numbers of troops 

from multiple military regions around the country to concentrate forces near 

potential conflict areas.

One indication that the PLA takes the potential for renewed conflict on 

the Sino-Indian border seriously is the attention it pays to Indian armed forces 

operational concepts. In a book that identifies and analyzes the concepts 

behind Indian military operations, the PLA Academy of Sciences has provided 

a detailed analysis of Indian military tactics, the organizational structure of 

the Indian armed forces, and Indian military exercises.105 This detailed analysis 

covers everything from the strengths and weaknesses of the Indian military 

command and control system to how the Indian army constructs defensive 

positions. Books like this likely help frame PLA exercises in Tibet.

In autumn 2009, the PLA ran exercise Stride 2009 [Kuayue 2009] in four 

areas of China—northeast, northwest, central, and southeast. A year later, 

Mission Action 2010 [Shiming 2010] exercised corps-level strategic force projection in a joint campaign. In March 2011, an all-PLA training conference 

was run involving a cyber-networked exercise. In 2012, the PLA ran a live-fire, 

land-air integrated exercise in the Tibet Military District and Chengdu Military 

Region.106 The PLA sought to orchestrate joint and integrated operations in the 

ground, air, space, maritime, and electromagnetic domains of war (the latter 

includes cyber warfare and electronic warfare). The 2012 exercise in Tibet 

is particularly important for this study because it focused on high-altitude 

operations in difficult terrain and cold areas, factors that characterize the 

Sino-Indian border. 
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Conclusion 

Sensitivities are probably higher in India over the disputed border than in 

China, but the military forces on both sides of the border are watchful and stay 

on the ready. One reason for heightened Indian sensitivities is the sting that 

is still felt over the results of the 1962 conflict. A second reason is that the government has yet to make public its own internal review of the outcome of that 

war. The Indian press and analytic community spend a lot of effort analyzing 

every move by the PLA, but military journals and the press in China do not 

dwell nearly so much on the Indian army. Part of the reason is India’s feeling 

that it lost the 1962 war. Indian military analysts seem to think that Chinese 

leaders believe that the preemptive use of force pays off when foreign leaders 

ignore warnings.107 Chinese military doctrine may call the Chinese interventions in the Korean War, the Sino-Indian War, and the 1979 attack on Vietnam 

“self-defensive counterattacks,” but to others they were each a massive use of 

force to preempt the other side in a growing conflict.

The likelihood of a border conflict is still low. Both New Delhi and Beijing 

regularly undertake diplomatic initiatives and military confidence-building 

measures to help maintain peace, even if it is an uncomfortable peace. With 

mutual distrust high in each country, civil-military relations serve on the 

one hand to increase the potential for unintended conflict, while on the other 

hand to limit or at least slow the horizontal or vertical escalatory potential 

once the two militaries are engaged in a contingency. Both sides also pursue economic links, and these help keep the potential of escalation lower, 

even if those ties are not deep. Should a conflict break out, it would probably 

expand beyond the land domain: cyber, airpower, and perhaps attacks on 

satellites are very likely to be part of any future conflict, but maritime conflict is less likely. If conflict crosses into one or more of these domains, then 

this increases the chance that a border clash may spread deeper into both 

countries and that the level of violence in combat operations may escalate. 

Although the specter of a nuclear exchange is likely to keep any conventional 

clash limited, the potential risk of nuclear escalation is always there if conflict 

should occur.

Notes

1 The seminal analysis of the Sino-Indian border war is Neville Maxwell, 

India’s China War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970). From the PLA’s perspective, 
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perhaps the most complete assessment of the war is History of Operations in the 

China-India Self Defensive Counterattack [中印边境自卫反击作战史] (Beijing: Military 

Science Publishing House [军事科学出版社], 1994). From an Indian perspective, there 

are many studies and personal assessments. See, for instance, Shanti Prasad Varma, 

Struggle for the Himalayas: A Study in Sino-Indian Relations (New Delhi: Sterling 

Publishers, 1971); Lieutenant General B.M. Kaul, The Untold Story (New Delhi: Allied 

Publishers, 1967); Major General D. K. Palit, War in the High Himalaya: The Indian 

Army in Crisis, 1962 (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1991). 

2 “Gunboat Diplomacy: Indian Navy Ready to Set Sail to South China Sea,” RT 

News, December 4, 2012, available at <http://rt.com/news/india-china-navy-oil-221/>.

3 Rajit Pandit, “Ready to Tackle China Sea Threat: Navy Chief,” Times of 

India, December 4, 2012, available at <http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.

com/2012-12-04/india/35594081_1_south-china-sea-accordance-with-international-laws-vietnam-coast>.

4 Ben Bland and Girjia Shivakumar, “China Confronts Indian Navy Vessel,” 

Financial Times, August 3, 2011, available at <www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/883003ecd3f6-11e0-b7eb-00144feab49a.html#axzz2I9e0dTD6>.

5 Sandip Unnithon, “Hidden Dragon on the High Seas,” India Today, March 

21, 2014, available at <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-nuclear-powered-attack-submarine-south-china-sea/1/350573.html>.

6 Ankit Panda, “Chinese Naval Exercise in Eastern Indian Ocean Sends Mixed 

Signals,” The Diplomat, February 7, 2014, available at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/

chinese-naval-exercise-in-eastern-indian-ocean-sends-mixed-signals/>.

7 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), Staff 

Report, China’s Navy Extends its Combat Reach to the Indian Ocean (Washington, 

DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 14, 2014), 

available at <http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20

Report_China’s%20Navy%20Extends%20its%20Combat%20Reach%20to%20the%20

Indian%20Ocean.pdf>.

8 Ibid.

9 Jeremy Page and Tom Wright, “China’s Military Considers New Indian 

Ocean Presence,” The Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2011, available at <http://

online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203518404577096261061550538.html>; 

Andrew Miller, “Sri Lanka Defends China’s Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean,” 

TheTrumpet.com, December 28, 2012, available at <www.thetrumpet.com/article/10224.19.0.0/economy/trade/sri-lanka-defends-chinas-naval-presence-in-theindian-ocean>.

10 Farhan Bokhari and Kathrin Hille, “Pakistan Turns to China for Naval 

Base,” Financial Times, May 22, 2011; for background see Tarique Niazi, “Gwadar: 
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China’s Naval Outpost on the Indian Ocean,” China Brief 5, no. 4 (February 14, 2005), 

available at <www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3718>.

11 Saibal Dasgupta, “Eye on India? China Plans Naval Expansion, Woos Myanmar,” The Times of India, May 28, 2011, available at <http://articles.timesofindia.

indiatimes.com/2011-05-28/china/29594269_1_thein-sein-chinese-navy-myanmararea>.

12 Bilateral seminar between the PLA and the United States, Carlisle, PA, 

March 17–18, 2014.

13 A good map can be found in Cheng Feng and Larry M. Wortzel, “PLA 

Operational Principles and Limited War: The Sino-Indian War of 1962,” in Chinese 

Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949, eds. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael McDevitt (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 175.

14 Sheo Nandan Pandey, and Hem Kusun, “Sino-Indian Border Talks and the 

Shifting Chinese Stance,” USI Journal Online 142, no. 587 (March 31, 2012), 30–39, 

available at <www.usiofindia.org/Article/?pub=Journal&pubno=587&ano=891>. 

Also see Colonel Ravi Tuteja, “China-India Territorial Dispute: Moving towards 

Resolution,” Article 1097, Center for Land Warfare Studies (India), May 22, 2008, 

available at <www.claws.in/index.php?action+details&m_id=88&u_id+5>.

15 See Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New 

York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 160–161.

16 “India and China: Unsettled for a Long Time Yet,” The Economist, October 

20, 2012, 37.

17 See Cheng Feng and Wortzel, 174–176. 

18 Maxwell, 26–27.

19 Ibid., 61–62.

20 Cheng Feng and Wortzel, 178–179.

21 Cited in Maxwell, 22.

22 Xu Yan [徐焰], The Historic Truth of the Sino-Indian Border War [中印边界之

战历史真相] (Hong Kong: Tian Di Books [文物天地], 1993), 87 as cited in Cheng Feng 

and Wortzel, 180, 196 (note).

23 Mao Zhenfa [毛振发], On Frontier Defense (边防论) (Beijing: Military Science 

Publishing House, 1996), 1. This point is forcefully made in Hu Jintao’s December 

24, 2004, speech on the “Historic Missions of the People’s Liberation Army.” See 

Hu Jintao, “See Clearly Our Armed Forces’ Historic Missions in the New Period of 

the New Century” [认清新世纪新阶段我军历史使命], December 24, 2004, available 

at <http://gfjy.jxnews.com.cn/system/2010/04/16/011353408.shtml>. Also see an 

analysis of the speech in Daniel Hartnett, Towards a Globally Focused Chinese 

Military: The Historic Missions of the Chinese Armed Forces, Project Asia (Alexandria, 
245

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VA: CNA Corporation, June 2008), available at <www.cna.org/sites/default/files/9.

pdf>; and testimony by Hartnett to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission, March 4, 2009, available at <www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/

written_testimonies/09_03_04_wrts/09_03_04_hartnett_statement.pdf>.

24 See “Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 

to the Indian Embassy in China,” December 26, 1959, in The Sino-Indian Border 

Question (Enlarged Edition) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1962), 51–92; also, 

in the same volume, see “Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of 

China,” October 24, 1962, 1–5. 

25 “Tibetan govt in exile to give fresh push to talks with China,” Times of India, 

September 2, 2012, available at <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Tibetangovt-in-exile-to-give-fresh-push-to-talks-with-China/articleshow/16225103.cms>.

26 Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002), 120–145; also see Pete Takeda, An Eye at the 

Top of the World: The Terrifying Legacy of the Cold War’s Most Daring CIA Operation 

(New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2006).

27 Maxwell, 424. 

28 Cheng Feng and Wortzel, 188. 

29 Santosh Singh, “China’s Kashmir Policy,” World Affairs, The Journal of International Issues 16, no. 2 (April-June 2012), 100–112.

30 Lieutenant General Kamal Davar, “India Needs a Chief of Defence Staff,” 

The Tribune Online Edition, August 21, 2012, available at <www.tribuneindia.

com/2012/20120821/edit.htm#6>.

31 Pravin Sawhney, “Unrestricted War: India is Far More Vulnerable than is 

Generally Accepted,” Force 9, no. 12 (August 2012), 42.

32 Zhang Hongnian [孙宏年], “Research Center for Chinese Borderland History 

and Geography Opens Research and Discussion Conference” [中国疆史地研究中心问

题学术研讨会召开], Chinese Academy of Social Sciences [中国社会学院], December 2, 

2010, available at <http://bjzx.cass.cn/news/133768.htm>.

33 Ibid.

34 Yi Ming [佚名], “Declassified: Behind the curtain on Mao Zedong’s decisions 

in the Sino-Indian Self-Defensive Counterattack” [解密: 毛泽东决策中印边界自卫反

击战内幕], Dajunshi.com, December 11, 2009, available at <www.dajunshi.com/Mildata/MilHistory/India/200912/36586_3.html>. 

35 Jonathan Holslag, China and India: Prospects for Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 120–121.

36 Ibid., 121–123.
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37 Nitya Singh, “How to Tame Your Dragon: An Evaluation of India’s Foreign 

Policy Toward China,” India Review 11, no. 3 (2012), 150.

38 Ashok Malik, “Xi, Modi and the Chumar hijack,” Deccan Chronicle, September 21, 2014, available at <www.deccanchronicle.com/print/140921/commentary-columnists/article/xi-modi-and-chumar-hijack>. 

39 Ibid. 

40 “Chinese, Indian Defense Ministers Hold Wary Meetings,” Los Angeles 

Times, September 4, 2012, available at <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_

now/2012/09/chinese-and-indian-defense-ministers-meet-warily.html>.

41 Naomi McMillin, Fiftieth Anniversary of the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War: 

An Interview with Arun Sahgal, October 30, 2012, National Bureau of Asian Research, 

6, available at <http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=290>.

42 V.K. Saxena, “House Panel Raps MoD for Slack Border Road Works,” Political 

and Defense Weekly 11, no. 35 (June 12–18, 2012), 16–18.

43 Ibid.

44 Gurmeet Kanwal, “Military Threat from China,” Article 2188, Centre 

for Land Warfare Studies, available at <www.claws.in/print_article.php?recNo-1189&su_id=7>. 

45 Ibid.

46 P.B. Sinha, A.A. Athale, and S.N. Prasad, eds., History of the Conflict with 

China, 1962 (New Delhi: History Division, Ministry of National Defense, 1962), 

available at <www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/

PDF/1962Main.pdf>.

47 Author’s experiences based on extensive contacts with Indian defense 

attaches, intelligence officers, and diplomats.

48 Mrinal Suman, “Held to Ransom,” Force 9, no. 12 (August 2012), 81.

49 Pravin Sawhney, “The Way Forward,” Force 9, no. 12 (August 2012), 49–52.

50 Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, Chinese National Security Decisionmaking Under Stress (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), 1–13, 56, 

79, 110, 141–147; also see Ning Lu, The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking 

in China (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 79; Alice Miller, “The CCP Central 

Committee’s Leading Small Groups,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 26 (Fall 2008), 

available at <www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/CLM26AM.

pdf>; and Sun Yun, “Chinese National Security Decisionmaking: Processes and 

Challenges” (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, May 2014), available at 

<www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/05/chinese-national-securitydecision-making-sun>. 
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51 Robert Abboud and Newton N. Minow, “Advancing Peace in the Middle 

East: The Economic Path out of Conflict,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5 (September/October 2002), 14–16.

52 The trade figures are from the Web site of the Indian Embassy in Beijing, 

available at <www.indianembassy.org.cn/DynamicContent.aspx?MenuId=3&SubMenuId=0>.

53 Yasheng Huang, “The Myth of Economic Complementarity in Sino-Indian 

Relations,” Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 2 (Spring-Summer 2011), 111–124.

54 Ibid.

55 Andrew B. Kennedy, “India’s Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb,” International Security 36, no. 2 (Fall 2011), 

142–143.

56 The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 

2012 (London: IISS, 2012), 233–234.

57 Ibid., 243. Also see Dinesh Kumar, “India Militarily Take on China Today?” 

The Tribune Online Edition, October 20, 2012, available at <www.tribuneindia.

com/2012/20121020/edit.htm#10>. This article has an excellent force comparison 

and documents the Indian short-range missile force.

58 Scott D. Sagan, “The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” 

in Inside Nuclear South Asia, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 

2009), 245–246. 

59 The author’s experience dealing with Indian diplomats and military 

attaches in Beijing and Washington.

60 Jiang Ning and Guo Fengkuan [姜宁, 郭丰宽], “A ‘Live Show’ of Integrated 

Air-Land Operations Performed 4,500 Meters Above Sea Level” [海拔4500米上, 演空

地一体战“活剧”], PLA Daily [解放军报], August 15, 2012.

61 See Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control and Campaign Planning (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2007), 8–12.

62 Pravin Sawhney, “The Iron Structure: China’s Higher Defence Management,” Force 9, no. 12 (August 2012), 36.

63 Ibid.

64 Sawhney, “Unrestricted War: India is Far More Vulnerable than is Generally 

Accepted,” 45–46.

65 Cao Zhangrong, Wu Renbo and Sun Jianjun [曹正荣, 吴润波, 孙建军], Informationized Joint Operations [信息化联合作战] (Beijing: PLA Press [中国人民解放军出

版社], 2006), 255–257.
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66 Ibid.

67 Jingdong Yuan, Chinese Perceptions of the Utility of Nuclear Weapons (Paris: 

Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, May 2010), 14–15; see also “Conference on U.S.-China Joint Nuclear Dynamics,” Conference Report, Beijing, June 

20–21, 2006, organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the 

Institute for Defense Analyses, the RAND Corporation, and the China Foundation 

for International Strategic Studies, available at <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/

events/060620_china_nuclear_report.pdf>. 

68 Lonnie D. Henley, “War Control: Chinese Concepts of Escalation Management,” in Shaping China’s Security Environment: The Role of the People’s Liberation 

Army, ed. Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

2006), 81–104.

69 This section is drawn from a discussion of the lessons of the Sino-Indian 

campaign in A History of Operations in the China-India Self Defensive Counterattack, 

391–423. 

70 Ibid., 394.

71 Ibid., 397.

72 Ibid., 402–404.

73 Zhang Xingye and Wang Chaotian [张兴业, 王朝天], A History of the Development of Campaign Thinking [战役思想发展史] (Beijing: National Defense University 

Press [国防大学出版社], 1997), 327. 

74 Ibid.

75 Larry M. Wortzel, The Dragon Extends its Reach: Chinese Military Power 

Goes Global (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013), 83–98; and Li Jijun [李际均], 

Military Theory and War Practice [军事理论与争实践] (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 1994), 172, 194.

76 Chen Yong, Xu Guocheng, and Geng Weidong [陈勇, 徐国成, 耿卫东], eds., 

The Study of Ground Force Campaigns Under High Technology Conditions [高技术条件

下陆军战役学] (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2003), 303–322.

77 Ibid., 303.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid., 304.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid., 305.

82 Ibid., 308.

83 Ibid.
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84 Ibid., 310.

85 Ibid., 321–322.

86 Group Captain A.G. Bewoor, “Close Air Support in the 1962 War,”

Bharat Rakshak, July 1, 2009, available at <www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1962War/1019-Bewoor.html>. Bharat Rakshak is an unofficial Web site devoted to 

the Indian military.

87 Ibid.

88 Exchange between the author and Jeff Smith, American Foreign Policy 

Council, November 7, 2012.

89 Sinha, Athale, and Prasad.

90 Yao Yunzhu [姚云竹] et al., trans., History of the Sino-Indian Conflict, 1962 

[印度:1962年与中国冲突的历史] (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2010), 

280–301.

91 Wortzel, The Dragon Extends its Reach, 90–97.

92 See Roger Cliff et al., Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth: Chinese 

Air Force Employment Concepts in the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), 20, 76–78; “Qiang-5 Ground Attack Aircraft,” Sinodefence.com, available at <www.sinodefence.com/airforce/groundattack/q5.asp>; also see “Xian JH-7 

‘Flying Leopard,’” available at <http://sinodefence.com/chinese-military-aircraft/

bomber-ground-attack-aircraft/#JH7>. 

93 Cliff et al., 76; Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and 

Transformation for the 21st Century (New York: Routledge, 2006), 189–190.

94 Cliff et al., 76–77; Blasko, 190. Blasko reaffirmed this point in a discussion 

with the author on PLA air-ground support doctrine on October 20, 2012.

95 Jiang and Guo.

96 Ibid. In one description of the exercise, the target guidance group requested 

both air to ground attack from the air force and army aviation fire support.

97 Marcus P. Acosta, “High Altitude Warfare: The Kargil Conflict and the 

Future” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2003), available at <www.

nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/Research/StudentTheses/Acosta03.pdf>.

98 Even if sufficient airpower can be brought to bear on a target, it is far more 

susceptible to the effects of weather than indirect artillery fire. 

99 Ibid.

100 Yongjun Luo et al., “High Altitude Medicine Education in China: Exploring a New Medical Education Reform,” High Altitude Medicine and Biology 13, no. 

1 (March 19, 2012), available at <http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/

ham.2011.1090>. 
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WORTZEL

101 One example of this is “Various Branches of the Military Cooperate to Fight 

in Cold, High-Altitude, Mountainous Exercise in the Chengdu Military Region” [成

都军区演练高寒山地夜间诸军兵种协同作战], People’s Daily [人民日报], August 31, 

2012, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2012-08/31/c_123653552.htm>; 

there are dozens of articles in Chinese newspapers about high-altitude training and 

operations in Xinjiang and Tibet.

102 The author has approached former regimental commanders, military 

district commanders, and a Xizang Military District political commissar with questions about their views on how long it takes to acclimatize troops at high altitudes. 

Between 1988 and 2008, there have been no variations from this time frame. While 

there is probably a lot of scientific research in China on ideal and minimum times for 

acclimation, unit leaders think it takes 6 months.

103 Xu Zhuangzhi [徐壮志], “Combat power leaps through transformation—

Achievements of building national defense and military forces” [战斗力,在变革中

跃升—国防和军队建设成就综述], Xinhua Online [新华网], available at <http://news.

xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-06/12/c_112201245.htm>. On the PLA’s historic missions, see Hartnett, Towards a Globally Focused Chinese Military, and testimony by 

Hartnett to the USCC.

104 See Wortzel, The Dragon Extends its Reach. Chapters 2 and 8 address this 

matter. Also see Larry M. Wortzel, “PLA Command, Control, and Targeting Architectures: Theory, Doctrine and Warfighting Applications,” in Right-Sizing the People’s 

Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, eds. Roy Kamphausen 

and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 191–234.

105 Zou Hao and Qu Guixi [邹浩, 曲贵溪], Analysis of Indian Military Operations 

[印军作战透析] (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2013).

106 See Xu; Jiang and Guo. 

107 McMillin. 
251

Central Asia and Afghanistan are not the primary focus of China’s security 

concerns. However, both rank high in one important area: they have the 

potential to nurture religious extremists, terrorists, and ethnic separatists whose activities might inflame separatism in Xinjiang. As the United States 

reduces its presence in Afghanistan, with unpredictable consequences, Beijing 

sees an increased risk of instability there that might spill into Central Asia and 

China. Under such circumstances, China may consider using some form of 

national power outside of its borders to ease the threat. This chapter examines 

how Beijing might intervene in Central Asia or Afghanistan to protect its interests. It begins by laying out Chinese interests, examining potential threats to 

those interests, and then analyzing China’s potential use of strategic and tactical 

capabilities to protect them. Decisions about whether and how to intervene in 

Central Asia or Afghanistan would be tied to an assessment of China’s interests, 

perceived threats, means available to ameliorate the situation, and political 

feasibility.1

 China has an array of means and approaches it might use: leveraging multilateral frameworks such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

(SCO); supporting regional partners with economic and security assistance 

or with communications, intelligence, or space-based support; conducting 

military operations other than war such as training local military forces and 

participating in peacekeeping operations; and even intervening across its border 

with conventional forces. China is likely to seek to minimize its involvement, 

using indirect means before considering more direct methods. The difficulty 

and risks of military operations, along with Russia’s special role in Central Asia, 

will temper China’s willingness to intervene militarily.

Andrew Scobell and Andrew J. Nathan argue that “[l]imited interventions 

in countries around China’s periphery are conceivable if vital interests such 

CHAPTER 11

Like a Good Neighbor: 

Chinese Intervention Through the 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Ben Lowsen
252

LOWSEN

as the safety of Chinese citizens or access to energy resources come under 

threat.”2 China’s interests in Central Asia and Afghanistan include both factors. 

However, Beijing’s larger fear is that separatists, extremists, and terrorists (the 

“three evil forces”) based in Central Asia and Afghanistan will support radical 

Uighurs inside China, destabilizing the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 

or helping Uighurs there to secede. Chinese leaders worry that such a threat to 

territorial integrity could potentially cause a collapse of Chinese Communist 

Party (CCP) rule. Beijing also views the potential for Western incitement of Arab 

Spring–style “colored revolutions” with similar concern. 

To prevent such scenarios and to promote domestic and regional stability, 

China has worked with Russia to create regional organizations in Central Asia 

to combat these threats, beginning with the Shanghai Five (China, Russia, 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) in 1996, which evolved into the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 (adding Uzbekistan). Should China 

see acute threats to its interests in Central Asia or Afghanistan—particularly 

threats that might topple the government of one of the SCO members—it might 

be tempted to act, even if this violated Beijing’s longstanding principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries.3

China is more likely to intervene in Afghanistan than in Central Asia. The 

larger Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and non-SCO member 

Turkmenistan) have remained relatively stable since the Soviet Union’s dissolution and are unlikely to require extensive outside support to maintain 

stability. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are less stable (according to the World Bank 

stability index), but their special relationship with Russia, which maintains 

military bases in both countries, means Beijing is unlikely to feel the need to 

intervene, although it may support or supplement Russian assistance should it 

become necessary. The combination of religious extremism, terrorism, and a 

shrinking U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) presence makes 

Afghanistan the place where Beijing is most likely to perceive a sufficiently serious threat to consider a cross-border intervention. This chapter, therefore, uses 

Afghanistan to examine Chinese threat perceptions and potential intervention 

through the SCO, of which Afghanistan became an observer state in 2012.4

China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has historically fought 

border wars using large, manpower-intensive forces, as it did in Korea, India, 

and Vietnam.5 Today, it is building a force to fight and win “local wars under 

conditions of informationization [comprehensive digitization and networking]” 
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with the operational concept of active defense.

6

 The idea of fighting limited border 

wars has not changed, nor has the notion that these will be defensive in nature, 

even when Chinese forces cross the border. 

What is changing is the dictate for the PLA to conduct “New Historic 

Missions” to meet an array of challenges, including protecting CCP rule and 

defending China’s expanding national interests.7

 China’s military is also shifting from its traditional reliance on quantitative superiority to a more balanced 

mix of numbers and qualitative improvements that can pressure even technically sophisticated militaries, especially if the fight is relatively close to China.8

PLA capabilities are no longer limited to the traditional military domains of 

land, sea, and air but now cover a broad spectrum including space, communications, electromagnetic warfare, influence operations, and nuclear capabilities. China’s capabilities in these areas are not uniformly state-of-the-art but 

are becoming more flexible and better able to respond to challenges to China’s 

interests overseas. Despite these advances, there are questions about Beijing’s 

logistical ability to sustain deployed forces, particularly at longer distances 

from China and in a combat environment. 

Beyond military means, Beijing is linked into a network of likeminded 

states in the region. The SCO’s framework established habitual collaborative 

bodies and cemented relationships to counter nontraditional security threats 

in Central Asia. The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) provides an 

information-sharing outlet to enhance cooperation in dealing with these 

threats. The SCO has also conducted a range of partnership exercises, most 

notably its Peace Mission series, which have developed a degree of comfort and 

interoperability between participating SCO members along with structures 

and experience that might come into play in future contingencies. Despite their 

prominent displays of traditional air and mechanized ground forces, the focus 

of these exercises has been counterterrorism, which to the SCO means fighting 

any nongovernment group threatening a member government. A group of 

scholars from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences described the SCO’s genesis and purpose in these terms: “Beginning with border talks among China, 

Russia, Uzbekistan, and other countries, the SCO has had the continuous goal 

of countering terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Counterterrorism has 

become the most important of all: member countries have since its foundation 

in 2001 conducted annual joint counterterrorism exercises.”9
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Interests, Threats, and Cooperation 

Then–State Councilor Dai Bingguo gave a succinct account of China’s “core 

interests” at a 2009 session of the U.S.-China Security and Economic Dialogue, 

defining them as “preserving China’s basic state system and national security, 

national sovereignty and territorial integrity; and China’s sustained, stable 

socio-economic development.”10 The U.S. Defense Department describes 

China’s “overriding strategic objectives” as “preserving Communist Party rule, 

sustaining economic growth and development, defending national sovereignty 

and territorial integrity, achieving national unification, maintaining internal 

stability, and securing China’s status as a great power.”11

Concerning Central Asia and Afghanistan, there is broad agreement that 

Beijing’s primary interests are domestic social stability and territorial integrity, 

in particular preventing ethnic separatist, religious extremist, and terrorist 

groups from coalescing to incite the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to 

break away from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).12 China’s 2011 Defense 

White Paper characterizes the task of the armed forces as follows:

. . .to guard against and resist aggression, defend the security of China’s 

lands, inland waters, territorial waters and airspace, safeguard its maritime rights and interests, and maintain its security interests in space, 

electromagnetic space and cyber space. It is also tasked to oppose and 

contain the separatist forces for “Taiwan independence,” crack down 

on separatist forces for “East Turkistan independence” and “Tibet independence,” and defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.13

Although Beijing’s primary focus remains to its east, Chinese leaders also 

devote significant attention to western China, seeing separatism as an existential threat common to both areas.

Beijing insists that terrorism, ethnic separatism, and religious extremism 

(which it labels the three evil forces or three evils) combine into a single movement that seeks to carve up China, a Chinese equivalent of the “axis of evil.”14

Beijing believes Xinjiang’s Uyghur minority has produced a host of terrorist/

extremist organizations said to be responsible for over 200 “bombings and 

assassinations,” 15 killing at least 164 people and wounding 440, although 

there is some doubt as to the accuracy of these claims.16 Chinese Academy of 

Social Sciences scholar Wang Haiyun describes common concerns about these 

threats as one factor holding the SCO together, and they are enshrined in the 
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SCO charter.17 Emphasizing the threat posed by the three evils has also allowed 

the PRC to make common cause with the U.S. war on terror. However, Chinese 

official statements and writing make clear that Beijing’s concerns are real and 

not just a pretense to gain U.S. support. Indeed, the SCO was formed to combat 

the three evils prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001.

China’s and the SCO’s conflation of terrorism, extremism, and separatism 

provides flexibility in justifying either individual or collective action; together 

they form a category broad enough to cover practically any hostile activity any 

of the governments might wish to suppress.18 There is no theoretical obstacle 

to the SCO aiding its members in most any situation, although such support 

in Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) states would likely require 

some form of CSTO mandate. The main issue would be mustering collective 

support or acquiescence for intervention.

China, Russia, and the other SCO members also have shared concerns 

about the entrance of a third great power into Central Asia: the United States 

after 9/11. China has a reflexive fear of U.S. encirclement along its Western border as a possible springboard for surveillance or efforts to destabilize Xinjiang. 

Beijing took the U.S. presence in Central Asia as proof of a unilateralist bent and 

as a possible military threat.19 Beijing also fears a fourth evil: U.S. support for 

the “fifth modernization” of democracy and the potential to press for regime 

change. The United States has supported emerging democracies in Mongolia 

and Kyrgyzstan, as well as investing much capital in sweeping away the Taliban and attempting to install a more liberal government in Afghanistan. The 

Arab Spring and associated “colored revolutions” have intensified China’s fears 

about the U.S. role in Central Asia. Beijing suspects itself to be the primary 

target for U.S. “peaceful evolution” and fights against this perceived political 

threat, including cooperating with Russia to form election monitoring groups 

that offer positive appraisals of “democratic” elections throughout the region.20

The SCO provides a forum and framework for mutual cooperation against 

the “three evil forces” (and by extension the fourth), in particular through its 

Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. Because China focuses more on political 

and nontraditional security threats like terrorism in Central Asia and not on 

threats from other states, Beijing seeks to band together with SCO members 

against common enemies, which might be called “anti-state forces.” Beyond 

fighting these forces, Beijing hopes that contact with Central Asian economies 

will actually help to stabilize Xinjiang.21
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The SCO’s principle of nonalliance reflects a longstanding Chinese preference, but it is also aimed at reducing Western and Russian perceptions of a 

potential threat of a Chinese bloc.22 Russia lost direct control of the region when 

the five Central Asian Soviet republics broke away from the collapsing Soviet 

Union.23 However, this did not alter Russia’s significant connections throughout the region or its belief that it is entitled to a special regional role. The SCO’s 

nonalliance principle thus avoids provoking Moscow’s ire and helps Beijing 

avoid entanglement in an anti-NATO pact with Russia. Given that both China 

and Russia have primary concerns in other directions (Asia and Taiwan versus 

Europe and NATO, respectively), there is utility in an agreement that helps to 

preserve the status quo in each country’s backyard.

For the Central Asian states themselves, having both Moscow and Beijing 

vie for their attention is advantageous.24 In that regard, Russia’s CSTO, a more 

traditional treaty alliance to which China does not belong, has existed in Central Asia since 1992. The Shanghai Five and later the SCO have provided Central 

Asian governments with additional support, while reminding Russia that it is 

not the only game in town. However, Central Asian states rely more on Russia 

and the CSTO for security assistance. Evidence includes a 2007 Memorandum 

of Understanding between the SCO and CSTO that nudged the SCO away from 

its nonalliance stance,25 and a 2009 CSTO agreement establishing Collective 

Rapid Reaction Forces, a substantial joint force designated to combat both 

traditional and nontraditional threats. Thus, the five former Soviet republics 

now enjoy a strong, multilateral, and institutionalized stability enhancement 

mechanism, led by Russia. While this will not protect Central Asian rulers 

against all threats (it did not prevent two revolutions in Kyrgyzstan), it will 

probably help enhance overall stability.

The entry of the United States into Afghanistan and Central Asia after 

September 11, 2001, provided a third suitor to, and further support for, Central 

Asian governments. Because no one great power has sought absolute primacy 

or a radical change to the post-Soviet strategic landscape, all three great powers 

and the Central Asian governments have cooperated to protect their regional 

interests and share in the benefits. As the U.S. role and presence in Afghanistan decrease, the other players are working to maintain stability there—for 

example, by granting Afghanistan SCO observer status in June 2012.26 Despite 

extensive U.S. security assistance, Afghanistan is still arguably the least stable state bordering China. Scholar Zhao Huasheng emphasizes that China’s 
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primary interest there mirrors its concerns for the other Central Asian states: 

“domestic concerns about the security and stability of the largely Muslim 

region of Xinjiang overwhelm all other [Chinese interests in Afghanistan].”27

Despite all its concerns about U.S. activities, China looks on the impending 

reduction of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan with a certain sense of trepidation. India, the European Union, and Iran may each lend some support to 

stabilize the country in their own way. China’s future role may mirror its relationship with Pakistan, in which Beijing provides a modicum of support to its 

needy neighbor in return for it remaining a key security partner. Afghanistan’s 

deep ethnic divides, complicated tribal politics, and entrenched disputes will 

give Beijing pause as it considers what sort of commitments, if any, it might 

make there.

Compared with Afghanistan, the Central Asian states hold only minor 

security issues for China. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, although authoritarian, have been relatively stable and prosperous. Uzbekistan appears to have 

settled its own domestic stability issues with a brutal crackdown at Andijan 

in 2005. Tajikistan, bolstered by a substantial Russian troop presence, has 

remained stable, in spite of tensions since the settlement of its civil war in 1997. 

Kyrgyzstan, also with Russian assistance, has managed to contain tensions that 

produced two forceful changes in government in 2005 and 2010. These are all 

CSTO countries, so any aid from China would likely be in coordination with 

the CSTO.28 Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan both have substantial oil reserves, 

which provide resources to help their governments maintain stability.29

Given Beijing’s emphasis on stability, the most salient threat involves a 

state collapse that gives Chinese extremists and/or separatists a foothold. The 

most prominent factors that might threaten collapse include an uncontrolled 

internal disturbance threatening China’s interests, such as disorder or rebellion, likely along ethnic, religious, or national lines; the potential for lateral 

escalation or spread of conflict, especially into China; refugee issues; democratic uprisings; and threats to Chinese citizens or vital resources.

Finally, it is worth mentioning Beijing’s longstanding articulation of the 

Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (in particular, mutual noninterference). In theory, noninterference prevents intervention in other countries’ 

affairs except in self-defense. However, if Beijing can convince itself that it 

is threatened, it can disregard noninterference. Conversely, when Beijing 

does not want to act, noninterference provides a convenient rationale. China 
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would prefer to keep a low profile in order to maintain the trade and economic 

development necessary for it to survive, but if Chinese leaders perceive direct 

threats to China’s stability emanating from Central Asia or Afghanistan, they 

are likely to act.30

Strategic Options 

China currently possesses the means to carry out a broad range of campaigns 

in support of Central Asian contingencies, including providing logistical, 

technical, political, and even moral support in any campaign against antigovernment or terrorist forces. This includes deploying traditional military 

forces, although the PLA’s ability to conduct and sustain such campaigns under 

adverse conditions is not clear. However, with the support of regional and/or 

international organizations and facing the right combination of threats and a 

manageable situation, Beijing might be willing to deploy a peacekeeping force. 

Deploying a peacekeeping force outside the United Nations (UN) framework 

would mark a significant advance in China’s willingness to use force outside 

its own borders to defend its interests.

During his tenure as paramount leader, Hu Jintao made a concerted effort 

to get the PLA to broaden its mission set beyond Taiwan, multiplying and 

improving Beijing’s options to protect its interests. Beijing can now apply 

varying levels of effort flexibly across multiple domains to mitigate perceived 

threats to stability. Because of the high material and political costs of using 

conventional military forces, China would likely first make every attempt to 

mitigate threats by less costly nontraditional means and other elements of 

national power.

Potential examples include the DIME grouping, which adds diplomatic, 

informational, and economic power to traditional military power; Qiao 

Liang’s and Wang Xiangsui’s magnum opus Unrestricted Warfare, which 

elaborated on lawfare, economic warfare, network warfare, and terrorism;31

and the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency manual, which cites governance, 

combat and civil security operations, essential services, information operations, economic development, and host-nation security forces as areas critical to mission accomplishment in counterinsurgency.32 Combining similar 

concepts and placing them alongside traditional domains of warfare yields 

the operational environment as shown in figure 11.1. While the traditional 

domains of land, sea, air, and intelligence remain prominent, the figure 
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highlights the emerging importance of newer domains like space, communications and cyberspace, and weapons of mass destruction and the rediscovered importance of domains such as the environment, public opinion, 

and government, economy, and law.33 China’s government and military have 

numerous ways to affect events across all of these domains.

In keeping with this expanded operational environment and Beijing’s 

broadening view of its own interests, Scobell and Nathan point out the PLA’s 

expansion of its primary mission set to include non-warfighting tasks, for 

which it has adopted the U.S. military term “military operations other than 

war” (MOOTW).34 Hu Jintao raised the profile of this new era for the PLA with 

his 2004 exhortation to take on new historic missions to protect expanding 

interests including “counterpiracy and counterterrorism operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, UN peacekeeping, sea lanes protection, 

and securing space-based assets.”35

The March 2011 evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya by “commercial aircraft, ships, and buses, the guided missile frigate Xuzhou and four Il-76 

transport aircraft” provides a practical example of Beijing’s ability to combine 

civilian and military assets to safeguard its interests.36 Similar evacuation missions would be possible throughout Central Asia. Humanitarian and security 

assistance could also lend critical support to a faltering neighbor in need. Such 

capabilities provide more customizable, scalable options that take advantage 

of emerging security domains to address security concerns.

Scobell and Nathan note that the PLA could be used in border control missions,37 which might include China’s borders with Central Asia and Afghanistan. 

Figure 11.1. Security Domains

Human 

Domains

Technical 

Domains

Intelligence

Public

Opinion

Governance,

Economy

and Law

Communications

and Cyberspace

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Environment

Sea

Land

Air

Space

Physical Domains
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However, China’s internal security force, the People’s Armed Police (PAP), is 

more oriented toward quelling civil unrest, suggesting its greater usefulness in a 

Central Asian contingency. The PAP’s organization and experience make it better 

suited to working with civil authorities. The Chinese government, however, might 

be reluctant to deploy significant numbers of PAP troops—its first line of defense 

against social disorder—outside Chinese territory.38 Moreover, PAP units have 

no experience operating in a foreign environment. That said, their knowledge 

about maintaining social order might prove useful to a Central Asian government 

under threat of collapse. PAP cadres might be used inside or even outside China 

to provide training to increase the capabilities of indigenous constabulary forces.

China has several relevant laws that direct the state and military to perform a range of activities that might be useful in a Central Asian scenario, such 

as the 2010 National Defense Mobilization Law.39 China’s 2011 Defense White 

Paper also discusses the special PLA role in border defense:

China practices an administration system of sharing responsibilities 

between the military and the local authorities in border and coastal 

defense. . . . The main responsibilities of the border public security 

force are as follows: border, coastal and maritime public security 

administration, entry-exit frontier inspection at ports; prevention and 

crackdown on illegal and criminal acts in border and coastal areas, 

such as illegal border crossing, drug trafficking and smuggling; and 

organization of and participation in counterterrorist and emergencymanagement operations in border and coastal areas.40

Thus, Beijing’s capabilities are not necessarily limited to the PLA and PAP, but 

can be augmented with civilian assets. A certain amount of ambiguity is built 

into Chinese statements about border operations that might allow for operations across the frontier.

Even modest quantities of political and material support could be important to a government in difficult circumstances. China has been able to keep 

its ally in Pyongyang afloat relatively cheaply and with minimal blowback. 

Moreover, there is flexibility to modulate the level of support to gain leverage. 

Of course, Pyongyang’s own actions have generated a significant backlash 

for Beijing, most notably following the sinking of the Republic of Korea Navy 

corvette Cheon’an. But Central Asia’s governments are far less likely to provoke 

their neighbors. Countries in Central Asia and Afghanistan that are in crisis 
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should be promising recipients for targeted political and economic support 

from China, although such support would be more effective for Kyrgyzstan and 

Tajikistan, with their smaller, less diverse populations, than for Afghanistan.

The SCO, the “cornerstone of Beijing’s approach in Central Asia,”41 provides 

a potential vehicle for Chinese intervention in Central Asia or Afghanistan. 

The SCO’s most important institutionalized framework for military cooperation is the Peace Mission exercise series, although this is not the only military 

exercise conducted under SCO auspices, and its participants and activities 

vary from year to year. Table 11.1 lays out the participants and activities of 

major SCO military exercises. John Garver notes that 2002 marked the PLA’s 

first ever exercise with foreign military forces: an antiterrorism exercise with 

Kyrgyzstan at their shared border under SCO auspices.42 Contrary to common 

understandings of counterterrorism, some of these exercises have featured 

large displays of conventional heavy and air forces, suggesting a heavy-handed 

approach to maintaining government stability in the face of unrest, although it 

is unclear how closely such exercises correspond to what states would do in a 

real contingency.43 China in 2012 promised a “fully fledged strategic development plan” at the SCO Heads of State Council in Beijing, including developing 

partnership networks with the UN, Commonwealth of Independent States, and 

CSTO.44 Such networks could improve interoperability between China, Russia, 

and other Central Asian powers, allowing for more flexible joint employment 

of a broad range of capabilities.

Richard Weitz of the Hudson Institute has argued that the exercises:

enhance the ability of the members’ armed forces to deter and suppress regional terrorism as well as another popular rebellion . . .reassure Central Asian leaders that China and Russia will help them manage their security challenges . . . help the SCO militaries learn more 

about each other’s evolving capabilities . . . [and] affirm to the U.S. and 

other extra-regional countries that Russia and China consider Central 

Asia as lying within their overlapping zones of security responsibility.45

The SCO thus includes a comprehensive stability guarantee, a joint commitment to cooperation and interoperability, and an assurance by China and Russia 

to negotiate their interests in the region and not come into direct opposition.
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Table 11.1. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Exercises

Cooperation 2003

• More than 1,000 troops in eastern Kazakhstan and China’s Xinjiang region

• Several counterterrorism scenarios

Peace Mission 2005

• 8,000 Chinese troops, 2,000 Russian troops, and observers from all members

• Land maneuvers in Vladivostok

• Amphibious maneuvers in Shandong

• Russian Tu-160 and Tu-95 strategic bombers and some 140 warships

Peace Mission 2007

• 2,000 Russian troops, 1,600 Chinese troops, almost 6,500 troops and 80 aircraft 

• Suppressing a major Islamist insurgency or popular rebellion in Urumqi

• Live-fire exercise at the Russian military training range near Chelyabinsk

Peace Mission 2009

• About 1,300 military personnel from each country

• Three days jointly planning and organizing for a combined antiterrorist campaign in northeast China

• Held at Taonan training base in China’s Shenyang Military Region

Peace Mission 2010

• 5,000 troops, 300 major combat pieces, and over 50 combat planes and helicopters

• All full members of the SCO contributed at least one military unit to the exercise (except Uzbekistan, 

which pulled out at the last minute)

• PLA demonstration of network-centric capabilities

• PLA mid-air refueling of fighter aircraft during a rehearsal of precision strikes

• Exercise of various capabilities, including preparatory fire, mobilizing reserves, besieging residential 

areas, conducting breakouts, suppressing fire at night, intensive drill, live fire drills, and combat 

equipment display

Peace Mission 2012

• 2,000 personnel from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan 

• “New methods” of blocking and destroying “illegal armed groups”

• Coordination and interaction in combat missions in mountain areas

• Uzbekistan did not attend

Peace Mission 2013

• 646 Chinese and 600 Russian participants in Chelyabinsk, Russia

• Coordinating joint commanding organs and troop units of the two militaries to carry out military 

operations

• Antiterrorism exercise that included force planning and deployment, campaign planning, and 

campaign execution

• PLA and Russian air force participation

Peace Mission 2014

• 4,800 Chinese participants and 2,200 foreign participants in Inner Mongolia, China

• Multilateral antiterrorism exercise with all SCO full members except Uzbekistan

• Scenario involved an extremist or separatist group from abroad inciting people to join a terrorist 

insurgency in an SCO nation. The nation asked the SCO for assistance in suppressing the insurgency

• Chinese participation included infantry, aviation, airborne troops, and special forces, including 

fighter aircraft, airborne early warning aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles
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Sources: Roger McDermott, “The Rising Dragon: SCO Peace Mission 2007,” Occasional Paper (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, October 19, 2007), available at <Document2www.jamestown.org/

single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32>; Stephen Blank, “Peace-Mission 2009: A Military 

Scenario Beyond Central Asia,” China Brief 9, no. 17 (August 20, 2009), available at <Document2www.

jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35433&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=201d76e87b>; Richard Weitz, “Military Exercises Underscore the SCO’s 

Character,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst (May 25, 2011), available at <www.cacianalyst.

org/?q=node/5565>; Roger McDermott, “China Showcases Expeditionary Military Power in Peace 

Mission 2010,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 7, no. 174 (September 28, 2010), available at <www.jamestown.org/

single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36955#.U2vbivmSwa8>; Zhang Zhichong, “On Shaping the Image of Our Military through Cooperation in Nontraditional Security Fields,” News World, no. 

11 (2011); Wang Dong; Medvedev; McDermott, “China Leads SCO Peace Mission 2012 in Central Asia;” 

“Peace Mission 2013: China-Russia Joint Anti-Terrorism Exercise,” China Military Online Special Report, 

undated, available at <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/special-reports/node_60757.htm>; and “Peace Mission 2014: SCO Joint Anti-Terrorism Exercise,” China Military Online Special Report, undated, available 

at <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/special-reports/node_72113.htm>.

As suggested by China’s broad definition of terrorists, extremists, and 

separatists, the SCO’s focus on counterterrorism is equivalent to support for 

government stability. The SCO’s most basic function is to maintain five relatively stable Central Asian governments alongside their great power neighbors. 

Afghanistan’s ethno-religious extremist movements have been a source of 

regional concern, particularly for China, as evidenced by the enshrinement 

of the three evils in the SCO’s Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, 

Separatism, and Extremism46 andin theRATS agreement. In addition to setting 

up a permanent body headquartered in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, RATS specifically 

envisions multilateral coordination, government-to-government assistance, 

intelligence sharing (including a dedicated database), antiterrorism exercise 

coordination, antiterrorism operational assistance, and specialist, legal, and 

academic support.47 Beijing could leverage any or all of these mechanisms, 

either bilaterally or with an SCO mandate, to support its neighbors’ stability.

Another tool Beijing has used in the past is to offer political mediation, 

especially to reduce international pressure for U.S. or UN intervention. Because 

China maintains cordial relations with governments where the United States 

does not, it often finds itself in a position to mediate disputes. One example 

involves Syria, where the United States has been pushing for a UN Security 

Council resolution, while China has consistently refused to accept a resolution 

and offered to lead mediation efforts instead (proposing a four-point plan).48

Beijing similarly lent its good offices to mediation efforts between factions in 

the Sudanese and Libyan civil wars.49 Although reluctant to interfere in internal affairs, Beijing has built ties with some rebel factions that have become 
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influential political forces. Beijing has already demonstrated some willingness 

to work with the Taliban in Afghanistan.50 With its Central Asian neighbors, 

Beijing would be likely to support the government against threatening rebel 

groups, although mediation would remain an available tool.

China could also provide direct military assistance for threatened governments, via training, logistical support, technical support, or even by deploying 

PLA forces. China has been willing to use force internally when it sees its interests 

threatened. In the past 5 years, China has used PAP forces backed up by regular 

PLA units to suppress unrest in both Tibet and Xinjiang.51 Such forces could 

potentially be used abroad, as discussed above. Even a relatively small force 

package, if well supported, might have a stabilizing effect in a particular area—for 

example, a capital city such as Kabul. Significant questions remain about China’s 

ability to coordinate and support such an operation.52 Furthermore, the presence 

of a foreign force might exacerbate the situation, particularly if it were operating 

without relevant training or adequate combat or logistical support.

Regular PLA ground forces have also performed their share of riot control 

missions. On multiple occasions (most recently and spectacularly in 1989), 

Beijing has called on the PLA to disperse large demonstrations. Since 1989, 

however, this has been the option of last resort due to the possibility of extensive 

bloodshed and international blowback. Beijing might be more willing to use 

a blunt instrument outside its own borders, but the potential for unintended 

consequences, damage, backlash, and mounting costs would almost certainly 

stay Beijing’s hand.

Where its interests are involved, China has shown itself to be a willing 

and able partner in peacekeeping operations—for example, between Sudan 

and South Sudan and in Darfur.53 Its interests in Central Asia and Afghanistan 

might make this an attractive option should other efforts fail. Several hurdles 

exist. First, a formal peacekeeping mission would mean recognizing the legitimacy of competing factions, which would make good sense in Afghanistan 

but not in other countries with more unified governments. Second, it would 

mean securing a mandate. The Western powers might be hesitant to support a 

UN authorization that gives China significant leeway, to say nothing of Russia. 

China could seek a mandate under the SCO, but the necessary consensus may 

be elusive. Finally, Beijing could seek to build its own “coalition of the willing” 

among nearby states, or else simply negotiate bilaterally or claim it intervened 

by invitation by some domestic actor in the neighboring state. Beijing has been 
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known to obfuscate the boundary between sanctioned SCO activities and bior multi-lateral activities that happen to include SCO members.54 Claiming a 

mandate outside the UN peacekeeping framework would mark a significant 

step forward in China’s willingness to use force outside its borders. However, 

labeling an intervention as a peacekeeping operation would provide a moral 

high ground that might mitigate the less savory aspects of such an intervention.

Border missions such as interdiction and refugee management could likewise play a part in any scenario. China’s border area forces, perhaps with reinforcements, would be able to prevent most antigovernment forces from crossing 

into China from Central Asia or Afghanistan, particularly considering the dearth 

of lines of communication, often impassable terrain, and security fences in place 

along the border. However, large refugee inflows might compromise border 

integrity and become a drain on the economy, as well as providing cover for 

infiltration of hostile elements. In certain situations, resettlement across a border 

might ease tensions on the other side, as with the Hoa migration from Vietnam 

into China in the late 1970s. But immigration by a non-Han minority would not 

evoke the same sense of fraternal responsibility in Beijing. It seems unlikely 

that large numbers of Central Asians would seek refuge in China or that China’s 

border forces would have much difficulty holding them back if they did.

Beijing has long been able to conduct military campaigns to defend its 

borders. Some have been quite successful, as in India in 1962; others less so, as 

against the Soviet Union in 1969. Given that the last major instance of a Chinese 

cross-border conflict was the 1979 punitive expedition into Vietnam, these can 

hardly be taken as models, except that their scope and location defines what Beijing means by local wars. Several factors militate against China attempting such a 

campaign in Central Asia or Afghanistan: the possibility of unnecessary tensions 

or escalation with another power, especially Russia; the likely greater demand 

for and efficacy of support and stabilization forces; and the expense of sending a 

large force to do a small force’s job. In Afghanistan’s case, this sort of campaign 

would be a particularly poor fit and unlikely to accomplish much of value.

Tactical Capabilities 

China possesses a broad range of options it could use in support of the SCO 

throughout Central Asia. These include traditional military force missions, 

peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, police 

support to civil authorities, as well as a spectrum of other nontraditional 
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capabilities such as cyber and communications operations, network support 

(including space assets), and focused economic engagement. Although China’s legal framework for defense envisions domestic contingencies and not 

deployment abroad, the view that foreign turmoil generates domestic unrest 

may make the government more flexible about the distinction between foreign 

and domestic security threats. Any measure that involves putting “boots on 

the ground,” however, would be difficult and potentially quite expensive due 

to longstanding problems with logistical coordination and joint operations, 

aside from potential political problems. Beijing’s preferred option would be 

to offer support to enable partner governments to maintain stability on their 

own. Existing cooperative frameworks, such as the Peace Mission exercises, 

would provide a starting point for such enabling operations.

The PRC’s legal framework designates specific tasks that may be performed 

in emergencies that it might apply to Central Asian or Afghan contingencies. 

The PRC’s 2007 Emergency Response Law defines emergencies broadly enough 

to include not only events such as natural disasters but also threats to social 

stability, authorizing the PLA as necessary to set up security cordons and 

checkpoints, control traffic, guard key installations, control fuel, power, and 

water supplies, and use force to quell resistance.55 There have been multiple 

opportunities to exercise most or all of these functions, most notably during the 

2008 Wenchuan earthquake.56 Other ground-level options the PLA might offer 

include facility security, impartial observers, riot control, logistical support, 

and presence patrolling. More advanced options might include base operations, leadership protection, staff support, and low-level mediation.

The 2009 People’s Armed Police Law lays out both general and specific 

tasks for the PAP: “The PAP carries the national trust for the responsibilities 

of security protection as well as defensive operations, disaster and relief work, 

joining in national economic construction, etc.”57 Some of these tasks might be 

useful outside of China: area security and access control, civil patrolling and 

law enforcement, route security, social order and crowd control, and incident 

management. Woven into the law are multiple references to the authority of the 

“incident commander” [xianchang zhihuiyuan, 现场指挥员] to make on-thespot calls, suggesting the desire of the government to empower subordinates 

to make the important decisions necessary for carrying out a civil-military 

campaign. That said, China faces significant institutional and cultural obstacles to delegating authority to subordinates.58
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One of the biggest factors for any PLA deployment to Central Asia would 

be its ability to support a deployed force. This would be particularly difficult if 

the PLA were opposed and could not guarantee secure supply lines.59 The PLA 

at present probably lacks sufficient lift assets to sustain opposed operations 

abroad indefinitely. Nonmilitary assets could help, as suggested by China’s 

principle of civilian support to the military.60 Setting up secure supply lines 

would be costly in the long run, likely causing Beijing to reassess the true 

threat of Uyghur terrorists and the means to deal with them. In an Afghanistan contingency, for instance, it might be simpler to contain the threat by 

partnering with neighboring countries rather than attempting to solve the 

problem unilaterally.

There are numerous roads between Xinjiang, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan 

that might enable the flow of military and supporting traffic.61 There is likewise 

a road from Xinjiang into Tajikistan’s Pamir Mountains and Afghanistan’s 

Wakhan Corridor. Google Earth imagery and travel to the region suggest that 

all of these have trafficability and seasonal limitations. The “land bridge” and 

rail line between Urumqi, Xinjiang and Aqtoghay, Kazakhstan might enable 

robust, economical force projection capabilities into Kazakhstan62 but would 

be of little use for most of Central Asia.

There are significant questions about the PLA’s ability to conduct effective 

joint operations.63 Bureaucratic interests and PLA culture might combine to 

hinder coordination, both within the PLA and among partner states. There is 

also some doubt about how well the PLA could tailor a combat force package. 

The PLA deployed a platoon of dedicated ground combat troops in support 

of UN peacekeeping operations for the first time in 2011.64 Coordinating the 

activities of supporting arms (for example, cyber, space) is within Beijing’s 

capability,65 but organizing a viable package of deploying forces for operations 

abroad, along with a command structure and support plan, is more difficult. 

The PLA’s emerging concept of brigade modularity might provide for a more 

tailorable force, although these forces seem to be optimized for diverse terrain, 

not necessarily diverse situations.66

The Peace Mission exercises, RATS, and the Collective Rapid Reaction 

Forces would provide convenient bases for China to support regional powers. 

Using these frameworks, Beijing could tailor support packages for partners 

in need. For example, using the experience in moving personnel and materiel into Kyrgyzstan via ground motorized maneuvers during Peace Mission 
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2012,67 China might repeat such a maneuver during a crisis, especially with the 

agreement and support of the Kyrgyz government and perhaps in coordination 

with Russian forces or the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces. The 2013 and 2014 

Peace Mission exercises also tested PLA planning and deployment capabilities 

within an SCO context. Information collected by RATS would be useful to any 

of the countries listed, including nonmember Afghanistan.

For SCO members, any collective deployment to Afghanistan would be 

limited. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan might look to provide limited support to 

the relatively peaceful enclaves where Tajiks and Uzbeks reside. Non-SCO 

member Turkmenistan might provide similar support. Russia’s consent to the 

Northern Supply Route to support U.S. operations in Afghanistan shows both 

a concern for the security situation there as well as a willingness to provide 

indirect support. Russia might opt to use the Central Asian Five as a buffer 

instead of (again) moving forces into Afghanistan.

China would probably offer to negotiate a peaceful resolution68 but would 

be extremely cautious about jumping into the fray with military forces. As 

long as its interests could be served through negotiation between subnational 

factions and the government in Kabul, Beijing would be unlikely to risk involvement in Kandahar or along the Pakistan border. While experience gained 

taking on “illegal armed groups” in the Peace Mission exercises might prove 

useful if applied tactically, Afghanistan’s terrain and human environment 

would make operations challenging. The skills the PLA is gaining working with 

SCO members and Russia would not transfer directly into the more contentious 

environment in Afghanistan; China would require a significant investment to 

create forces able to operate effectively there. An assessment of the costs and 

possible outcomes might make Beijing reassess whether the threat of Uyghur 

separatists operating from Afghanistan justifies intervention.

China possesses numerous manned and unmanned aerial capabilities it 

could apply to a Central Asian or Afghan scenario. Airborne lift assets could evacuate Chinese citizens and perhaps be used to support threatened governments. 

The PLA Air Force and Army Aviation could conduct air presence missions such 

as reconnaissance, loitering, and flyovers. If antistate forces were present at or 

associated with a particular location, these forces could perform aerial interdiction, although this would require a good deal of intelligence support from 

RATS or another ad hoc intelligence sharing mechanism. Fighters, bombers, 

and helicopters equipped with precision strike munitions could conduct combat 
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operations, although coordination challenges between air and ground forces 

would likely make joint air-ground operations unacceptably risky.

China could employ national-level space-based capabilities to support 

PLA operations and aid partners, including “space based surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, meteorological, and communications satellite constellations.” It also possesses counterspace assets such as “jamming, laser, 

microwave, and cyber weapons.” 69 Despite reliability problems, these systems 

form what China sees as the basis for digital, “informationized” operations and 

as such may be of significant use to partners.

The Chinese government also possesses an array of communications 

and cyber capabilities. Jamming broadcasts, monitoring and blocking Web 

traffic, and undertaking computer network operations could allow Beijing to 

collect intelligence, deceive opponents, and disrupt antigovernment operations.70 This might be particularly useful in shutting down social media and 

cell phone communications to prevent opponents from using these to spread 

their message. China has also previously conducted intelligence exchanges, 

arrests, extraditions, suppression of unfriendly groups, and internal security 

training, all of which could be useful in supporting a Central Asian government.71 The habitual intelligence sharing structures within the SCO, namely 

under RATS, would provide a conduit to share information and coordinate 

with partners. Establishing a headquarters with authority similar to the PLA’s 

“incident commander” could remove the information stovepipe and allow a 

low-level exchange of actionable intelligence. However, governments may be 

uncomfortable delegating authority in this way.

Beijing could also support partners by providing direct medical, water, 

and other material aid during critical periods. It would also be likely to look 

the other way were its partner to distribute these items with political aims 

in mind, as in North Korea.72 Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 

destruction would not be particularly effective and would produce extreme 

international opprobrium.

Conclusion

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is more than a marriage of convenience. 

Its principal benefactors, China and Russia, each have reasons to want a peaceful, friendly, and stable Central Asia. The Central Asian Five have been relatively 

stable and do not appear to be moving toward either religious extremism or Arab 
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Spring–style uprisings. This is a boon for China because it lessens the threat of 

such an upheaval engulfing Xinjiang. Moreover, China has willing security 

partners in Central Asia. As long as Beijing respects Russia’s special position 

in the region, it is free to invest in and work cooperatively with those powers. 

Maintaining the political status quo and pursuing shared economic development 

are commonly shared goals. Only a strategic reassessment of Central Asia might 

trigger one of the benefactors to reject this arrangement.

The ability of the Afghan government to work out a stable modus vivendi 

with its various ethnic groups and the Taliban is cause for some concern. China 

and the other powers are beginning to work through the SCO to see if Central 

Asia’s relative stability can be extended there. Russia already maintains a 

sizeable footprint and extensive military relations throughout Central Asia, 

but it would probably avoid getting involved militarily in Afghanistan if at all 

possible. China will also proceed with great caution, concerned that the results 

of any Central Asian or Afghan adventure would not justify the costs in money 

and political capital. If necessary, however, Beijing would be able to supply 

support across a broad spectrum of domains and capabilities. In intangible 

domains such as cyberspace, economics, and public opinion, as well as in 

space, Beijing could provide a robust response if required. But logistical weaknesses and difficulties in executing joint operations would make an opposed 

ground force operation difficult, particularly in coordination with partners. 

Furthermore, the costs and political liabilities would make any such operation 

deeply unattractive. The nominally better-suited PAP forces are also unlikely 

to deploy outside China, although some sort of advisory role is imaginable. 

A relatively unopposed operation with some form of international mandate 

would also be possible, assuming the PLA could assemble a force package 

with skill sets matching the problem. In general, Beijing would prefer to help 

friendly governments build their capabilities and provide support rather than 

intervening with its own forces.

In pursuing stability, each of the Central Asian nations and Afghanistan 

would seek the help of its neighbors, great powers such as China, as well as 

organizations like the SCO. Although Beijing would feel some pressure to 

pursue its interests in neighboring countries through the SCO, it is likely to 

proceed cautiously, sensing a multiplication of dangers and few rewards for 

deeper involvement.
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Notes

1 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow allude to this formula in Essence of 

Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Longman, 1999).

2 Andrew Scobell and Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Overstretched Military,” 

The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 4 (Fall 2012), 138.

3 Mathieu Duchâtel, Oliver Bräuner, and Zhou Hang, Protecting China’s 

Overseas Interests: The Slow Shift away from Non-interference, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 

41 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014).

4 “China- and Russia-led Shanghai bloc eyes Afghan role,” BBC News, June 7, 

2012, available at <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-18349607>.

5 Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and 

the Long March (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

6 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012, Annual Report to Congress 

(Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2012), iv, 3–4, available at 

<www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_CMPR_Final.pdf>.

7 “The Military’s Historic Missions in the New Period of the New Century” 

[xin shiji xin jieduan wo jun lishi shiming, 新世纪新阶段我军历史使命], shortened to 

“New Historic Missions.” 

8 James Hackett, ed., The Military Balance: 2012 (London: Routledge, 2012), 213.

9 Gao Zugui, Wei Zonglei, and Liu Yu [高祖贵, 魏宗雷, 刘钰], “The Rise of 

the New Economic System and Its Influence” [新兴经济体的崛起及其影响], International Data News [国际资料信息], no. 8 (2009), available at <http://niis.cass.cn/

upload/2012/12/d20121208101733441.pdf>. 

10 Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior, Part One: On ‘Core Interests,’” China Leadership Monitor, no. 34 (Winter 2011), 4; State Councilor Dai Bingguo 

in “Closing Remarks for U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,” U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, July 28, 2009.

11 OSD, Military and Security Developments.

12 Wang Haiyun [王海运], “SCO Development Exceeds Western Expectations” [上合组织发展出乎西方预料], Global Times [环球时报], June 6, 2012, available 

at <http://euroasia.cass.cn/news/2012/06/494570.html>; Zhao Huasheng, China 

and Afghanistan: China’s Interests, Stances, and Perspectives (Washington, DC: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), 1; Alexander Cooley, Great 

Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 2012), Kindle edition, 74; John W. Garver, “China’s Influence in 

Central and South Asia,” in Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David 

Shambaugh (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 211; 
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and Liu Yuejin [刘跃进], National Security Studies [国家安全学] (Beijing: China 

University of Political Science and Law Press [中国政法大学出版社], 2004), 75.

13 Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, China’s 

National Defense in 2010 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, March 2011).

14 “What Are the ‘Three Evil Forces’?” [何为 “三股势力”?], Xinhua Online [新华

网], July 13, 2009, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-07/13/content_11698031.htm>.

15 Cooley, 76; Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of 

China, “East Turkistan Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” January 21, 2002, 

available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-01/21/content_247082.htm>.

16 Sean Roberts, “Imaginary Terrorism? The Global War on Terror and the 

Narrative of the Uyghur Terrorist Threat” (working paper, PONARS Eurasia, Elliot 

School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC, 

March 2012), available at <www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/

RobertsWP.pdf>.

17 Wang Haiyun; Cooley, 76–77.

18 The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and 

Extremism, June 2001, art. 1, sec. 1, available at <https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/

Uzbekistan/Ratification_of_the_Shanghai_Convention_on_Combating_Terrorism_By_Uzbekistan.pdf>.

19 Cooley, 81; Bates Gill, Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2010, revised); and David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: 

Reshaping the International Order,” International Security 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004–

2005), 64–99.

20 Cooley, 8.

21 Ibid., 78.

22 Wang Dong [王东], “Interpreting the ‘Peace Mission’ Counterterrorism Exercise” [解读 ‘和平使命’ 反恐军演], Observation and Ponderation [观察与

思考] (October 8, 2010), 48–49; Marcin Kaczmarski, “Russia Attempts to Limit 

Chinese Influence by Promoting CSTO-SCO Cooperation,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, October 17, 2007, available at <http://cacianalyst.

org/?q=node/4716>.

23 Ross H. Munro, “Central Asia and China,” in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, 

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and the World, ed. Michael Mandelbaum (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), 228–229; Garver, 209–211.

24 Garver, 205–206.

25 Kaczmarski.
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26 “China- and Russia-led Shanghai bloc eyes Afghan role,” BBC News.

27 Zhao Huasheng, 1.

28 Cooley, 10, 74.

29 Central Intelligence Agency, “Crude Oil—Proved Reserves,” CIA World 

Factbook, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2244.html#tx>.

30 See Duchâtel, Bräuner, and Hang.

31 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui [乔良, 王湘穗], Unrestricted Warfare [超限

战] (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House [解放军文艺出版社], February 

1999).

32 Field Manual 2–24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Department of 

the Army, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Department of the Navy, 

2006), 4–5. 

33 Environment refers to issues including water, food, and medical security, 

among others. It is distinct from the other physical domains in that, although it is 

not the domain of a specific military force, it significantly affects the overall security 

calculus. Weapons of mass destruction include all chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear weapons. It is because of their destructive and disruptive potential and 

the resulting emphasis governments place upon them that they constitute their 

own domain.

34 Scobell and Nathan, 142.

35 OSD, Military and Security Developments, 4.

36 Ibid., 4.

37 Ibid., 3.

38 People’s Armed Police Law of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和

国人民武装警察法], August 2, 2009, art. 1, sec. 2, available at <www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-

08/27/content_1403324.htm>; and National Defense Mobilization Law of the People’s 

Republic of China [中华人民共和国国防法], February 26, 2010, available at <www.gov.

cn/flfg/2010-02/26/content_1544415.htm>.

39 National Defense Mobilization Law of the People’s Republic of China.

40 China’s National Defense in 2010, sec. IV.

41 Larry M. Wortzel, “PLA ‘Joint’ Operational Contingencies in South Asia, 

Central Asia, and Korea,” in Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, eds. 

Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2009), 343–344.

42 Garver, 213.
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43 Sergey Medvedev, “On the Road to ‘Peace Mission 2012,’” Moscow Krasnaya 

Zvezda, May 24, 2012.

44 Roger McDermott, “China Leads SCO Peace Mission 2012 in Central Asia,” 

Eurasia Daily Monitor 9, no. 121 (June 26, 2012), available at <www.jamestown.org/

single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39538#.U2vRNfmSwa8>. McDermott cited Krasnaya Zvezda, June 18.

45 Weitz.

46 Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism.

47 Agreement between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, June 7, 2002, art. 6.

48 Neil MacFarquhar, “China Presents a Four-Point Proposal for Resolving the 

Civil War in Syria,” New York Times, November 1, 2012.

49 Teddy Ng, “Beijing playing both sides in Libya,” South China Morning Post, 

June 8, 2011; Daniel Large, “South Sudan Looks East: Between the CPA and Independence,” Association of Concerned Africa Scholars, November 2011, available at 

<http://concernedafricascholars.org/bulletin/issue86/large/>.

50 Andrew Small, “China’s Afghan Moment,” The Nation, October 6, 2012.

51 Scobell and Nathan, “China’s Overstretched Military,” 137–138.

52 Hackett, 213.

53 Daniel M. Hartnett, staff memo, “China’s First Deployment of Combat 

Forces to a UN Peacekeeping Mission—South Sudan” (Washington, DC: U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission, March 13, 2012).

54 Cooley, 79.

55 People’s Armed Police Law of the People’s Republic of China.

56 Jake Hooker, “Quake Revealed Deficiencies of China’s Military,” New York 

Times, July 2, 2008.

57 People’s Armed Police Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 1, sec. 2.

58 Alison A. Kaufman and Peter W. Mackenzie, Field Guide: The Culture of the 

Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Alexandria, VA: CNA China Studies, 2009), 25.

59 Hackett, 213.

60 China’s National Defense in 2010, section IV.

61 Garver, 206–208.

62 Ibid., 206.

63 Kaufman and Mackenzie; Jane Perlez, “Corruption in Military Poses a Test 

for China,” New York Times, November 15, 2012.
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64 Hartnett.

65 For example, apparent Chinese “hacktivist” computer network attacks at 

the height of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. If loosely organized hackers can 

pose a threat to another government, it is reasonable to believe that governments 

themselves can organize attacks that are at least as effective; see also “Chinese cyber 

attacks hit Japan over islands dispute,” Agence France-Presse, September 19, 2012, 

available at <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/chinese-cyber-attackshit-japan-over-islands-dispute/article4553048/>.

66 Jiang Daohong [姜道洪], “Targeting the ‘Five Transformations’: Opening Up 

the Pace of Military Transformation” [瞄准‘五化’: 迈开陆军建设转型步伐], PLA Daily 

[解放军报], July 14, 2011.

67 “Chinese troops participating in ‘Peace Mission 2012’ exercise arrive in 

Tajikistan,” PLA Daily, June 7, 2012, available at <http://english.peopledaily.com.

cn/90786/7838414.html>.

68 Small.

69 OSD, Military and Security Developments, 8–9.

70 Ibid., 9.

71 Garver, 211.

72 “UN to Resume Food Aid to North Korea,” RTT News, August 4, 2012.

MARITIME CONTINGENCIES

IV

279

The “near seas” [jinhai, 近海] of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are 

the vast maritime areas between China’s coastline and the first island 

chain, which runs from the Sea of Okhotsk in the northeast to the Strait 

of Malacca in the southwest. They include the Bohai Gulf [bohai wan, 渤海湾], 

the Yellow Sea [huanghai, 黃海], the East China Sea [donghai, 东海], the Taiwan 

Strait [taihai, 台海], and the South China Sea [nanhai, 南海]. Each of the five 

near seas areas is the subject of disputes involving different countries, with a 

different balance of naval and air power, and with different characteristics that 

would affect military contingencies.

The Chinese government considers the Bohai Gulf as an inner lake and 

the gateway to Beijing—China’s political-military center of gravity. Adjacent to 

the Bohai, the Yellow Sea lies between the Chinese mainland and the Korean 

Peninsula and has historically been a contested area in the Sino-Japanese 

competition for influence over Korea. The East China Sea, between China and 

the Japanese archipelago, serves as an important sea lane for shipping to China, 

Japan, and Korea, and is where China confronts the U.S.-Japan security alliance. The Taiwan Strait has served as a barrier dividing the Chinese mainland 

and Taiwan since the late 1940s, but in recent decades, it has connected the two 

sides via flourishing bilateral economic relations and cultural activities. The 

South China Sea is not only a battleground for disputes over sovereignty and 

maritime resources, but is also a critical sea line of communication for global 

maritime commerce.

These five contiguous segments of sea areas that constitute the PRC’s 

near seas each have distinctive diplomatic, economic, and security features. 

To the Chinese, the near seas areas share some important commonalities. 

These five areas comprise all of China’s claimed sovereign waters. Chinese 

CHAPTER 12

The PLA and Near Seas Maritime 

Sovereignty Disputes

Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang
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HUANG

thinkers view the near seas as the point of origin of more than 170 years of 

historical humiliation inflicted by foreign maritime powers. These areas 

are the subject of the inherited historical concept of “maritime defense” 

[haifang, 海防].

After more than 30 years of economic reform and opening up to the outside 

world, China’s maritime interests have expanded along with its international 

influence, rapid economic growth, and military modernization. The expansion 

of these interests was formally recognized in November 2012, when Chinese 

Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Hu Jintao stated in his work report 

that “we should enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resources, resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests, and build China into 

a maritime power.”1

 Even though China has interests around the globe, the 

maritime contingencies that pose the most direct threats to China’s national 

security remain concentrated in the near seas areas.

This chapter describes five types of potential near seas contingencies 

and reviews three recent examples in which People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

naval forces have been involved. It then examines PRC naval strategy and the 

evolution of PLA Navy (PLAN) operational thinking and force modernization. 

Next, it describes the role of Chinese maritime paramilitary forces in near 

seas contingencies, reviewing Beijing’s efforts to consolidate five separate 

maritime forces into a new China Coast Guard. The fourth section reviews the 

PLAN role in near seas contingencies, noting that the Coast Guard appears to 

have the leading role in the most likely contingencies, with the PLAN playing 

a supporting role. The chapter concludes with some thoughts on the PLAN’s 

future role. 

China’s Near Seas Contingencies

Due to its relatively weak naval power projection capabilities, throughout the 

past century China’s maritime contingencies have been entirely limited to the 

near seas areas. In its warfighting history, the PLAN has never engaged in a war 

with any modern Western navy. Until the end of the 20th century, the PLAN had 

encountered only two navies in combat—those of Taiwan and Vietnam, both 

small and weak forces. 

The PLAN’s warfighting experience has been conducted primarily in two 

geographic contingencies. From 1949 to 1965, the PLAN engaged in battles 

with Taiwan naval forces in gaining control of several dozen offshore islands 
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located along the coast of Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong. From 1974 to 1988, 

the PLAN engaged in several sporadic, small-scale skirmishes with Vietnamese 

naval forces in the Paracels [xisha, 西沙] and the Spratlys [nansha, 南沙] in the 

South China Sea. The PLAN has never fought a large-scale battle at sea with 

any strong maritime power.2

Past near seas contingencies involved mainly China’s defense of its coastlines and maritime sovereignty claims. Today, however, with China’s rapidly 

growing maritime commerce and military capabilities, the near seas areas 

have become venues of both prosperity and potential conflict. In these contested spaces, Chinese military maritime power may pivot from purely defensive roles to exhibit both defensive and offensive capabilities.

In reviewing recent Chinese maritime events and incidents, five types of 

near seas contingencies seem most likely:

• Encounters with foreign naval and air forces. With the large increase in 

China’s defense expenditures and improved force projection capability, 

PLA forces now routinely fly and sail farther away from China’s coasts to 

conduct training and exercises. This increases the probabilities of contact, including unplanned or even unfriendly encounters, with foreign 

forces operating in the near seas. The contact between the PLAN’s Hanclass submarine and the U.S. Navy’s Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier battle 

group in the Yellow Sea in October 1994 and a near-collision between 

a PLAN vessel and the USS Cowpens in November 2013 illustrate the 

potential for such encounters. 

• Freedom of navigation and the Chinese exclusive economic zones 

(EEZs). Different understandings and interpretations of the United 

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) have led to quarrels between China and the United States on whether U.S. ocean surveillance ships and reconnaissance aircraft have the right to conduct 

operations within China’s exclusive economic zones as defined by the 

UNCLOS. U.S. ocean surveillance ships equipped with low frequency 

active sonar systems operating in China’s EEZs have raised suspicions and anxieties in China, which views their activities as worrying 

instances of sensitive military intelligence collection. The most notable 

naval incident occurred in March 2009 when Chinese PLAN ships and 

airplanes, law enforcement vessels, and some fishing boats tried to 

chase the USNS Impeccable away from China’s EEZ.3

 Another major 

incident involved the collision of a PLA Navy Air Force J-8II fighter with 
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a U.S. Navy EP-3 maritime reconnaissance aircraft in the South China 

Sea in April 2001.

• Maritime resources competition. Potential energy and mineral resources 

lying on or under the seabed in the near seas have caused or heightened maritime disputes in the region. Except for the territorial seas and 

adjacent areas, rival claimants have engaged in fierce competition in 

claiming islands and isles, defining the demarcation of EEZ lines, and 

attracting foreign energy companies for exploitation. China has disputes 

in numerous sea areas with its neighbors, especially with Japan over the 

Chunxiao gas field in the East China Sea where the Chinese and Japanese 

EEZ claims overlap, and with Vietnam and the Philippines over several 

offshore blocks opened for bidding by foreign companies.

• Disputed maritime claims. Since the end of the Cold War, China has 

engaged in negotiations with countries sharing land borders and has been 

able to settle most borderline demarcation and land border disputes.4

In the case of maritime boundaries, however, overlapping claims over 

islands and waters are mostly unresolved due to conflicting national 

and maritime interests and interpretations of international law. These 

disputed claims have occasionally generated sporadic bilateral and multilateral conflicts among rival claimants.

• Disasters and crime at sea. Natural and manmade disasters at sea have 

been getting more attention in recent years. Ship collisions, oil spills, 

piracy, severe weather, and many other natural disasters have challenged the security of coastal states. As its international profile rises, 

China in recent years has been actively involved in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) exercises in the near seas areas both 

individually and in tandem with its neighbors. Between 2002 and 2012, 

China participated in 54 nontraditional security joint exercises with foreign countries, including 22 joint HA/DR exercises with foreign navies 

at sea. Most were conducted as part of the PLAN’s port call visits to other 

countries beyond the near seas areas.5

Four recent incidents illustrate the PLAN’s actual or potential involvement 

in near seas contingencies involving maritime sovereignty disputes.

2010 Diaoyu/Senkaku Ship Collision 

On September 7, 2010, the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) ship Mizuki encountered 

the Chinese fishing boat Minjinyu 5179 sailing in undisputed Japanese territorial 

waters. The Chinese fishing boat defied orders to stop and be inspected and 
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attempted to flee from the scene. During the chase and interception, Minjinyu

5179 collided with two JCG ships. On September 8, 2010, the JCG boarded the 

Chinese trawler and arrested its captain, Zhan Qixiong, for obstruction of 

performance of public duty and illegal fishing. The trawler, the captain, and 14 

crew members were transported to the island of Ishigaki, Japan, for detention. 

In response to the arrest, the Chinese government made a series of diplomatic protests demanding the immediate release of the trawler and all its crew. 

China summoned the Japanese ambassador to China six times. The trawler 

and 14 crew members (but not Captain Zhan) were released after the sixth 

summons on September 13, 2010. The captain remained in Japanese detention 

and was finally released on September 24, 2010.6

In this high-profile episode, there was little room for China to react militarily. However, the PLAN’s North Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet conducted 

a series of naval exercises during and immediately after the dispute that may 

have been intended to support China’s diplomatic protest by pressuring Japan. 

The exercises included ship maneuvers, missile firing, and combined arms 

training with the PLAN Air Force. The most noteworthy capability demonstrated was an amphibious landing “island seizure” [duodao, 夺岛] conducted 

by the East Sea Fleet on September 29, 2010.7

2012 Scarborough Shoal Standoff 

On April 8, 2012, a Philippine Navy surveillance plane spotted eight Chinese 

fishing vessels docked at Scarborough Shoal. The Philippine Navy frigate BRP 

Gregorio del Pilar (former USCGC Hamilton) was sent on the same day to survey the vicinity of the shoal and confirmed the presence of the fishing vessels 

and monitored their activities. On April 10, the BRP Gregorio del Pilar came 

to inspect the catch of the fishing vessels. The inspection team discovered 

illegally collected corals, giant clams, and live sharks inside the first vessel 

boarded by the team. BRP Gregorio del Pilar reported that they attempted 

to arrest the Chinese fishermen but were blocked by two PRC maritime law 

enforcement vessels cruising in nearby waters. Following this initial confrontation, tensions continued for several months. During the course of the 

dispute, China mostly relied on its maritime law enforcement ships. However, 

according to Japanese sources, on May 2, the PLAN sent a large formation of 

combatants southward without a clear destination. The flotilla included five 

warships: two type 052B destroyers, the Guangzhou (168) and Wuhan (169); 
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two escort vessels, the Yulin (569) and Chaohu (568); and a type 071 landing 

ship, the Kunlunshan (998).8

2012 Japanese Nationalization of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 

The most recent dispute on sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands9 was 

ignited by a speech at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, DC, on April 16, 

2012, by then-Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara, a right-wing politician advocating a more proactive Japanese role in international affairs and a tough China 

policy. China and Taiwan were surprised when Governor Ishihara announced 

his intention to buy three of the disputed islands from their Japanese private landowner.10 Intending to curtail Ishihara’s political maneuver and prevent a crisis, 

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda initiated a process of nationalization, 

by which the central government would purchase the three islands. Citizen activists across China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong organized public protests of varying 

sizes; some activists leased fishing boats to land on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 

and were arrested (but soon released) by the Japanese Coast Guard. Taiwan’s 

Yilan County Fishermen’s Union orchestrated a massive boat formation to protest 

Japan’s infringement of their fishing rights near the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.11

The Japanese government signed a 2.05 billion yen contract on September 

11, 2012, with the so-called owner of three of the five Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 

in the East China Sea, effectively nationalizing the territory. This action immediately drew a strong protest from Beijing, which sent surveillance ships to the 

waters around the islands.12 In addition to strong diplomatic protests, China 

began regularly sending maritime law enforcement ships to the vicinity of the 

islands and periodically entering the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea around 

them to assert Chinese sovereignty. There has been no direct evidence that the 

PLAN was employed to handle the situation. However, according to Japan’s Joint 

Staff Office, between April and September 2012, Chinese military aircraft flew 

near Japan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) 69 times, 54 of which were 

between July and September when tensions over the issue were at their peak.13

In addition, the PLAN also conducted distant water patrol and training 

exercises after the annual Sino-Russian Joint Sea 2012 exercise in the Yellow 

Sea. Though this may be routine activity, by passing through the Japan archipelagos into the Western Pacific, these actions did send strong messages to 

Tokyo over the dispute.14 (See table 12.1 for a list of PLAN exercises and training 

that occurred while sovereignty disputes were heating up.)
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Furthermore, on September 23, 2012, China’s State Oceanic Administration (SOA) announced that it had approved a pilot program of using drones to 

undertake remote-sensing marine surveillance in Lianyungang, a coastal city 

in eastern Jiangsu Province. Using experience learned from the pilot program, 

the SOA intended to form a managerial system and issue technical regulations 

to set up unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) surveillance and monitoring bases in 

provinces along China’s coastline by 2015. The SOA also announced stepped-up 

efforts to enhance its surveillance of various islands and islets, including the 

Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and Huangyan (Scarborough) Island.15

2013 PLAN South China Sea Deployment 

From March 19 to April 3, 2013, a four-ship PLAN flotilla (including the 

amphibious transport dock Jinggangshan, destroyer Lanzhou, and frigates 

Yulin and Hengshui) deployed to the far waters in the South China Sea near 

the James Shoal, 80 kilometers from the Malaysian coast.16 One of the highlights was a televised “oath-taking” ceremony by Chinese marines and sailors 

pledging “to defend the South China Sea, maintain national sovereignty, and 

strive toward the dream of a strong China.” Rear Admiral Yin Zhou stated 

that the deployment was a “regular military exercise and not targeted at other 

countries” but noted that it was also intended to declare “China’s determination to safeguard its sovereignty over the southernmost part of China’s 

territory.”17 The fact that this deployment was approved by the civilian leadership was reinforced when Chinese President Xi Jinping subsequently visited 

Sanya on April 12 to inspect some of the ships involved in the deployment.18
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Table 12.1. PLAN Activity in Times of Near Seas Sovereignty Disputes

Date Exercise/Training 

Location/Area

PLAN Forces Key Events

February 3, 2012 PLAN training 

East China Sea (ECS)/Japan, 130 

kilometers (km) northeast of Miyako 

Island

054A x1 

053H2G x1 

053H3 x1

April 22–27, 2012 Sino-Russian Joint Sea 2012 Yellow 

Sea/ECS

052 x1

054A x2

April 10, 2012: 

Scarborough Shoal/

Huangyanjiao dispute 

begins 

April 16, 2012: Senkaku/

Diaoyu dispute begins

June 21, 2012: Sansha 

City established

April 30, 2012 After Joint Sea 2012 ECS/Japan, 

430km west of Yaku Island

054A x2

Intel ship x1

May 8, 2012 After Joint Sea 2012 ECS/Japan, 

650km southwest of Okinawa

052B x2

054A x2

071 LSD x 1

May 14, 2012 After Joint Sea 2012 ECS/Japan, 

110km northeast of Miyako Island

054A x 2

Intel ship x 1

October 18–21, 2012 Donghai Collaboration 2012 military 

and civilian joint maritime rights 

exercise in East China Sea

053H2G X1

053H3 x1

054 x1

054A x1

HH x1

MS+YZ x 6

September 11, 2012: 

Japan nationalizes 

Senkaku/Diaoyu islands

November 27–December 11, 2012 PLAN training ECS/Japan, near 

Miyako Island

DDG x 2

FFG x 2

AOR x 5

January 29–February 14, 2013 PLAN training in Western Pacific North Sea Fleet

March 19–April 3, 2013 PLAN training

1 to north: ECS-Diaoyu-Bashi 

Channel

1 to south: South China Sea (SCS)-

James Shoal-Bashi Channel

071 LSD x 1

052C x1

054 x1

054A x1

March 10, 2013: 

Reorganization and integration of maritime law 

enforcement agencies 

and forces

May 6–24, 2013 PLAN training 

W. Pacific/SCS

All 3 Fleets

June 10, 2013 PLAN training

W. Pacific

052 x1

054A x1

AOR x 1

July 12–28, 2013 Sino-Russian Joint Sea 2013

ECS/Japan–pass through Soya Strait

051C x 2

054A x 2

AOR x 1

October 8–November 1, 2013 Maneuver 5 joint exercise

W. Pacific-SCS

051C x2

052A x1

052B x1

054A x5

AOR x 2

November 23, 2013: 

China announces East 

China Sea Air Defense 

Identification Zone

November 29, 2013: 

China announces new 

maritime and fishery 

regulations for Hainan

November 26, 2013–January 1, 2014 Aircraft carrier training through 

Taiwan Strait-Hainan-SCS

CV x 1

051C x 2

054A x 2

December 5, 2013: PLAN 

ship almost collides with 

USS (CG 63) Cowpens
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Table 12.1. PLAN Activity in Times of Near Seas Sovereignty Disputes

Date Exercise/Training 

Location/Area

PLAN Forces Key Events

December 19, 2013 PLAN training

W. Pacific/SCS

054A x 2

AOR x 1

January 20–February 11, 2014 PLAN training

SCS-Lombok Strait-Indian 

Ocean-Makassar Strait

071 LSD x 1

052C x 1

052B x 1

February 28–March 12, 2014 PLAN training

W. Pacific-Bashi Channel-SCS

052C x1

054A x2

AOR x 1

March 2, 2014 Aircraft carrier training ECS CV x 1

May 20–24, 2014 Sino-Russian Joint Sea 2014

ECS/Japan

Sovremenny x 1

051C x 1

054A x 2

AOR x 1

Chinese Naval Strategy and Near Seas Contingencies 

Maritime sovereignty disputes are not China’s only potential contingencies 

in the near seas area. Even though the PLAN has not taken the leading role to 

date, its fundamental roles and missions cannot be forgotten, and its growing 

warfighting and force projection capabilities cannot be overlooked.

In considering potential near seas contingencies today, it is helpful to 

review the basic assumptions underlying the PLA naval strategy adopted in 

1985 and consider whether they remain true today. The PLAN’s modern strategy was formulated under the leadership of Admiral Liu Huaqing during his 

tenure as navy commander during the 1980s. The PLAN’s strategic concept 

of “active defense, near seas operations” [jiji fangyu, jinhai zuozhan, 积极防

御, 近海作战] was first articulated in Liu’s October 1983 speech “On Several 

Issues Related to the Navy’s Implementation of the Strategic Guideline of 

Active Defense.”19 After consultations with his staff and the General Staff 

Department, he formally rolled out the new naval strategy of near seas defense 

[jinhai fangyu, 近海防御] at a PLAN tabletop exercise on December 20, 1985.20 

The strategy is sometimes translated as offshore defense, but Liu clearly distinguishes it from coastal defense [jin’an fangyu, 近岸防御] or distant ocean 

offense [yuanyang jingong, 远洋进攻] alternatives. 

The strategy defined four strategic objectives [zhanlüe mudi, 战略目的] 

for the PLAN: to safeguard national unification and territorial integrity, to 

fight local war at sea [haishang jubu zhanzheng, 海上局部战争], to deter and 

defend against invasion from the sea by imperialists and hegemonies, and 

(continued)
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to maintain peace in the Asia-Pacific region. The PLAN’s strategic missions 

[zhanlüe renwu, 战略任务] are divided into peacetime and wartime missions. 

Its peacetime missions are to realize and safeguard national unification 

including Taiwan, to serve the purposes of China’s foreign policy, to deter 

invasion from the sea by potential enemies, to conduct potential local war 

at sea, and to support the state’s socialist construction. The PLAN’s wartime 

missions are to conduct operations independently or in coordination with 

the army and the air force, to protect China’s own sea lanes of communication, and to participate in strategic nuclear counterstrike under high 

command orders.21

The PLAN’s sea area of operations [zuozhan haiqu, 作战海区]

22 was defined 

in the 1985 naval strategy, with the understanding that it would expand with 

time and increasing PLAN capability. The strategy stated that:

from today [believed to mean the mid-1980s] to a relatively long 

period, the sea areas of operations would be the first island chain, 

its periphery, and the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South 

China Sea areas within the island chain. The extension of the area of 

operations from “coastal defense” to “near seas defense” would favor 

China in terms of conducting defense operations at sea [haishang 

fangyu zuozhan, 海上防御作战] in the “main operational directions” 

[zhuyao zuozhan fangxiang, 主要作战方向]. In the future, with a 

stronger economy and level of technology: gradually extend to the 

north Pacific and the second island chain.

From the promulgation of PLAN’s near seas active defense strategy to 

today’s maritime disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, 

PLAN objectives, missions, and especially areas of operations remain largely 

the same—focused on near seas contingencies.

Advances in PLAN Operational Doctrine and Capabilities

The PLAN has been a major beneficiary of changes in China’s military doctrine. 

To fight and win a local war under high-tech and informationized conditions, 

the PLAN has been given higher priority in resources and procurement to fulfill 

its expanded missions. Under the PLA’s overall military strategic guidelines, 

the PLAN has engaged in massive efforts for more than a decade to adapt to 

new security environments and mission requirements and to develop new 
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operational concepts to enrich and refine PLA doctrine. Key advances are 

described below.

Primacy of Technology 

Since the promulgation of the new military strategic guidelines in 2004, the 

PLAN has emphasized the importance of being able to fight and win a local 

war at sea under modern, especially under high-tech, conditions.23 In the new 

century, informationization has been identified as the core of modern naval 

warfare theory.24 In parallel with the emphasis on “strengthening the army with 

science and technology” [keji qiangjun, 科技强军], the PLAN has advocated 

the importance of developing technologies and capabilities in electronic, electro-magnetic, and precision munitions and in advanced command, control, 

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, 

all of which aim to field new capabilities for future naval operations farther 

away from the Chinese coast. 

Advocacy of Offensive 

The PLAN continues to identify its strategy as defensive in nature, but many 

officers have advocated that offensive operations are necessary at the campaign 

and battle levels.25 To fight a joint campaign at sea under informationized conditions, one PLA writer argues that the PLAN should establish an operational 

doctrine of “integration of offensive and defensive, but with offensive as the 

focus” [gongfang jiehe, yi gong wei zhu, 攻防结合, 以攻为主], insisting that the 

initiative [zhudong quan, 主动权] can only be obtained through preemptive 

and offensive actions in informationized operations at sea.26

Emphasis on Jointness 

The PLAN recognizes that local war under informationized conditions can no 

longer rely on a single service but instead requires joint operations. Modern 

naval operations have to combine information, platforms, intelligence, communications, firepower, and logistics and must be conducted in the form of 

integrated joint operations.27 Establishing an “information operations coordination and command center for joint campaign at sea” [haishang lianhe zhanyi 

xinxi zuozhan xietiao yu zhihui zhongxin, 海上联合战役信息作战协调与指挥中

心] and numerous related recommendations have been put forth for fighting a 

better coordinated local war at sea.28
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HUANG

Expanded Area of Responsibilities 

The PLAN sees the threats to China’s maritime interests as growing in the new 

century, including maritime territorial disputes and demarcations, piracy and 

terrorist activities at sea, security of sea lines of communication, and threats 

to seaborne transportation of oil and natural gas.29 Some analysts argue that 

China has been pursuing a “string of pearls” strategy, seeking to secure cooperation and gain access to ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma, 

Thailand, and Cambodia, along the energy sea lines of communication for 

East Asian countries.30 Regardless of whether China truly has a string of pearls 

strategic concept, the PLAN has already begun sailing beyond the near seas 

areas of operations defined by Admiral Liu Huaqing.31

Strive for Access Denial 

As the PLAN’s offshore active defense strategy was being introduced, the depth 

of China’s defense at sea was beginning to expand from China’s coastal waters to 

the first island chain. Between 1995 and 2008, as China’s fear of Taiwan moving 

toward de jure independence increased, discussions in the PLAN over strengthening antiaccess and area denial capabilities began to gain in prominence. Many 

argued that China should increase its long-range precision strike capability to 

dissuade possible third-party intervention in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and 

to deny access to enemy forces seeking to project force against China.32

Robust Modernization Programs 

Since the early 1990s, the PLAN has engaged in a robust modernization program, building large tonnage surface combatants equipped with modern 

sensors and weapons systems at an impressive pace, expanding its submarine 

fleet with better warfighting capabilities, improving antisubmarine warfare 

and fleet air defense capabilities, and acquiring aerial refueling and expanded 

underway replenishment capabilities.33 All these increased assets and new 

capabilities have enabled Chinese strategists and war planners to develop and 

expand new strategic concepts and operational doctrines of the PLAN.

Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies 

Although the PLAN would have a leading role in military contingencies involving 

major combat operations, since 2005 China’s maritime law enforcement agencies 
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began to serve as the first-response frontline units for maritime sovereignty disputes and contingencies. The Chinese government appears to have realized that 

using nonmilitary vessels is more acceptable to international public opinion and 

can help avoid escalation of maritime conflicts. During the 2004–2005 disputes 

over the Chunxiao gas field with Japan in the East China Sea, China sent PLAN 

ships to the area, about 290 nautical miles northwest of Kume Island, Okinawa 

Prefecture. The group consisted of a new Sovremennyy-class destroyer Number 

137, two older Jianghu-class frigates, the new replenishment ship Number 886, 

and a new electronic/signals intelligence and space tracking ship Number 851.34

Japan sent only Coast Guard ships, gaining a public relations advantage. Since 

then, China has rarely employed naval assets as its frontline response to maritime territorial disputes, preferring to keep PLAN forces in background roles. 

Unlike in the United States, China did not have a unified institution to 

oversee and implement maritime affairs and law enforcement until 2013. 

For decades, the PRC had five major maritime law enforcement agencies (see 

table 12.2). The five agencies were under different ministries with diverse and 

complicated chains of command, funding resources, areas of responsibility, and 

personnel systems. Maritime law enforcement efforts were divided among rival 

bureaucracies and were so poorly coordinated that even in the official media, 

they have been derided as “nine dragons managing the sea” [jiulong zhihai, 

九龙治海], a reference to the offspring of the Dragon King in Chinese legend.35

Table 12.2. PRC Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies (prior to 2013)

Agency Ministry/

Department

Primary Missions/Ships

China Marine Surveillance

[zhongguo haijian,中国海监]

State Oceanic Administration 

(SOA)

Law enforcement within PRC’s territorial waters, 

exclusive economic zones (EEZ), and shores; 

protecting maritime environment, natural resources, 

navigation aids and other facilities, and carrying out 

maritime surveys.

Ship names: Haijian, HJ [海监]

1,000 tons: 38

36 1,000-ton ships to be built in 12th Five-Year 

Program

Total: 400

Maritime Safety Administration

[zhongguo haishiju,中国海事局]

Ministry of Transportation Maritime traffic safety, coordinating maritime search 

and rescue in territorial waters.

Ship names: Haishi, HS [海事] or Haixun, HX [海巡]

1,000 tons: 4

Total: 800+
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Table 12.2. PRC Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies (prior to 2013)

Agency Ministry/

Department

Primary Missions/Ships

Fisheries Law 

Enforcement Command

[zhongguo yuzheng, 中国渔政]

Ministry of Agriculture 

Fisheries Management 

Administration

Law enforcement concerning fishing and maritime 

resources in PRC territorial waters and EEZ. Protecting Chinese fishing vessels and personnel, resolving 

disputes in fishing activities, preventing illegal 

fishing, and protecting maritime resources.

Ship names: Yuzheng, YZ [渔政]

1,000 tons: 11

Under construction: 13 1,000-ton ships and 12 

3,000-ton ships 

Total: 150+

China Public Security Border 

Control Maritime Police 

(or Coast Guard)

[zhongguo gong’an bianfang 

haijing, 中国公安边防海警]

Ministry of Public Security 

People’s Armed Police

Maritime security and fighting crime at sea.

Ship names: Haijing, CG [海警]

1,000 tons: 3

Total: 480

China Custom Anti-Smuggling 

Police

[zhongguo haiguan jisi jingcha, 中

国海关缉私警察]

General Administration of 

Customs

Maritime antismuggling

Ship names: Haiguan, HG [海关]

1,000 tons: 3

Total: 212+

Sources: Gao Zhiguo [高之国] et al., eds., “China’s Maritime Law Enforcement,” China Maritime Development Report [中國海洋發展報告] (Beijing: Ocean Press [海洋出版社], 2010), 441–456; National Institute for Defense Studies, China Security Strategy Report 2012, Japan Ministry of Defense; Yu Jianbin 

[余建斌], “Protection of Maritime Rights is Our Responsibility” [维护海洋权益 我们责无旁贷], People’s 

Daily [人民日报], September 17, 2012. In 2013, 10 more 1,000-ton ships were built. “China to Build 

36 Large- and Medium-sized Marine Surveillance ships” [中国将建36艘大中型海监船], SIMIC, January 

3, 2013, available at <www.simic.net.cn/news_show.php?id=119321>;“China Marine Surveillance,” 

available at <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Marine_Surveillance>; Maritime Safety Administration, available at <www.msa.gov.cn/Static/zbjs>; National Institute for Defense Studies, China Security 

Report 2011 [中国安全保障レポート2011], Japan Ministry of Defense, February 10, 2012, 6; “Building 

World’s No. 1 Law Enforcement Fleet” [中国打造世界第一海上执法团队 辗压日本海保], January 24, 

2014, available at <http://mil.huanqiu.com/mlitaryvision/2014-01/2725266.html>; Su Wanming, 

Wang Jun, Sun Honglei, and Li Junyi [蘇萬明, 王軍, 孫洪磊, 李俊義], “Fishermen Disputes over Fishing 

Zoning, Mismanagement by Multiple Agencies Unsustainable” [渔民网地争端上升 多头管理弊端愈显

不可持续], People’s Daily Online [人民网], March 16, 2012, available at <http://politics.people.com.cn/

BIG5/70731/17402446.html>; “Scholar: Coast Guard Integration with Mixed Blessing” [学者:中国海警

整合令外界喜忧参半], Xinhua Online [新华网], August 9, 2013, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/

world/2013-08/09/c_125139644.htm>; “Institute 708 Won Bid to Build Custom Anti-Smuggling Shipbuilding Project” [708所中标海关缉私舰艇设计建造项目], cnss.com.cn [中国海事服务网], January 5, 2013, 

available at <www.cnss.com.cn/html/2013/orders_and_cancellation_0105/89358.html>; “Ministry of 

Public Security Press Briefing Reports Custom Police Work Conditions,” March 27, 2007, available at 

<www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n1237/n1432/n1567/136809.html>.

In terms of responsibilities, the Maritime Safety Administration, the Coast 

Guard, and the Customs Police primarily cover inner waters, territorial seas, and 

contiguous zones. The Marine Surveillance [haijian, 海监] and the Fisheries Law 

(continued)
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Enforcement Command [yuzheng, 渔政] cover waters in China’s EEZ and continental shelf. These two agencies were designated to manage China’s maritime 

sovereignty disputes and respond to peacetime contingencies in the near seas.36

To address problems of overlapping functions, wasted resources, and diplomatic misunderstandings, on March 10, 2013, the National People’s Congress 

passed the State Council Institutional Reform and Functional Transformation 

Plan [guowuyuan jigou gaige he zhineng zhuanbian fang’an, 国务院机构改革和

职能转变方案]. According to the plan, four of the five maritime law enforcement 

agencies are to be integrated into a new China Coast Guard [Zhongguo haijing, 

中国海警] under the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) [guojia haiyang ju, 国

家海洋局].37 The plan also established the State Oceanic Commission [guojia 

haiyang weiyuanhui, 国家海洋委员会] as a new high-level consultative and 

coordinating body on maritime affairs. 

The revamped SOA carries out missions defined by the State Oceanic 

Commission, reports to the Ministry of Land and Resources [guotu ziyuan bu, 

国土资源部], and executes maritime law enforcement duties under the operational guidance of the Ministry of Public Security. Since the promulgation of 

the State Council Institutional Reform and Functional Transformation Plan on 

March 28, 2013, maritime law enforcement ships were given new designations 

as part of the China Coast Guard.38

PLA and Near Seas Contingency Planning 

Despite the view that the PLA always favors a hard line on sovereignty disputes, 

the PLAN appears to have accepted the strategic logic of giving the Coast 

Guard the lead role in maritime sovereignty disputes, and it obeys CCP orders 

when leaders decide to resolve disputes through dialogue rather than force. 

For example, in the midst of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal dispute, the deputy 

director of the contingency office in the PLA’s General Staff Department publicly stated that “China is opposed to the use or threat of use of force” to resolve 

disputes, and Ministry of National Defense spokesman Geng Yansheng stated 

that the South China Sea issue should be resolved through bilateral negotiations between the parties concerned.39

On the other hand, when the CCP leadership wants to emphasize the seriousness of a crisis, the PLA supports the party line with both words and deeds. 

For example, in the early stages of the Diaoyu/Senkaku nationalization crisis, 

Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie told U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon 
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HUANG

Panetta that Japan’s stated intention to “nationalize” the Diaoyu Islands was to 

blame for heating up the dispute and said that China “firmly opposes the U.S. 

position that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies to the Diaoyu Islands.”40

Similarly, the declaration of a Chinese ADIZ in the East China Sea in November 

2013 was the product of a PLA Air Force proposal to increase pressure on Japan 

over the Diaoyu/Senkaku confrontation.

Retired officers are freer to express their views. For example, former chief 

of the PLAN’s equipment and technology department, Rear Admiral Zheng 

Ming [郑明], used an interview to raise five critical questions for further study 

by Chinese experts:41 Should China deploy troops on strategically important 

but currently uninhabited islets and shoals? Should China build up a “production and logistics base” on the Spratly Islands to support fishing and maritime scientific research activities? What support infrastructure is necessary 

in order to maintain regular patrols of PLAN and maritime surveillance and 

law enforcement ships in the South China Sea? What are the most effective 

ways to create a fait accompli against the other claimants to South China Sea 

islands or to prevent those states from annexing China’s claimed maritime 

features piece by piece? Should diplomatic measures and negotiations always 

be the first priority in dealing with future maritime disputes? Admiral Zheng’s 

views suggest that some PLAN officers may sometimes favor a more assertive 

approach than civilian leaders are willing to endorse in China’s South China 

Sea contingency planning.

Analyzing China’s management of maritime sovereignty disputes can 

provide useful insights into Chinese civil-military relations between the PLAN 

and the civilian maritime affairs agencies. Though the PLAN may not be in the 

lead on handling maritime disputes, it nonetheless definitely maintains a close 

operational relationship with its civilian partners in at least three areas. First, 

the PLAN is the ultimate guarantor for civilian maritime operations at sea and 

can serve as a deterrent as well as the back-up force. Second, the PLAN can 

provide logistical support for civilian agencies, transfer decommissioned navy 

ships to maritime law enforcement agencies, facilitate professional education 

and training, and supply materials and munitions.42 Third, civilian maritime 

agencies can be advocates for PLAN modernization, with the SOA, for example, 

having voiced support for acquisition of an aircraft carrier for over 20 years.

Immediately after Japan “nationalized” the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands on 

September 11, 2012, the PLAN collaborated with its civilian counterparts in 
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October 2012 to conduct the first joint civil-military maritime exercise in China’s history—Donghai Collaboration 2012 [东海协作 2012], simulating scenarios 

of protecting China’s maritime rights against adversaries in the East China 

Sea.43 According to reports, a total of 11 vessels, 8 aircraft, and more than 1,000 

personnel from the PLAN’s East Sea Fleet, China’s fishery administration, and 

marine surveillance agency took part in the exercise. The exercise was commanded by Rear Admiral Shen Hao [沈浩], the deputy chief of staff of the East 

Sea Fleet, with two deputy commanders—Zhou Tong [周彤], inspector of East 

Sea Fishery Bureau, and Liu Zhendong [刘振东], deputy chief of SOA’s East Sea 

Bureau.44 This “military-local joint maritime rights protection exercise” [jun-di 

haishang lianhe weiquan yanxi, 军地海上联合维权演习] may serve as a reference point for near seas contingency planning and as evidence of the PLAN’s 

key role in the maritime law enforcement and rights protection.

Similarly, when the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 

deployed the HD-981 oil exploration platform into waters claimed by both 

Vietnam and China in May 2014, the oil platform was reportedly accompanied by both China Coast Guard and PLAN ships to defend against possible 

Vietnamese interference or attack.45 The operation required extensive coordination across multiple ministries, the Coast Guard, and the Chinese military, 

something that would have been unlikely in the previous stovepiped system. 

Conclusion

China’s near seas can be the venue for economic prosperity, regional cooperation, sovereignty disputes, and even military conflict. In recent years, China 

has significantly strengthened its comprehensive capabilities to deal with near 

seas contingencies in military, administrative, legal, law enforcement, and 

diplomatic areas to defend and protect its maritime interests.

As stated in China’s 2013 Defense White Paper, the PLAN “provides security support for China’s maritime law enforcement, fisheries, and oil and gas 

exploitation. It has established mechanisms to coordinate and cooperate with 

law enforcement organs of marine surveillance and fishery administration, as 

well as a joint military-police-civilian defense mechanism.”46 Given growing 

Chinese maritime interests, the roles, missions, and areas of responsibility of the 

PLA, and especially the PLAN, have expanded considerably. Though not usually 

taking a frontline role in dealing with maritime sovereignty disputes, the PLAN 

is very likely to increase its presence and roles in the near seas in the future.
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HUANG

Notes

1 “Hu calls for efforts to build China into maritime power,” Xinhua [新华], 

November 8, 2012.

2 Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “The PLA Navy at War, 1949–1999: From 

Coastal Defense to Distant Operations,” in Chinese War-fighting: The PLA Experience 

Since 1949, ed. Mark Ryan and Michael A. McDevitt (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 

2003), 241–269.

3 Mark Valencia, “The Impeccable Incident: Truth and Consequences,” China 

Security 5, no. 7 (2009), 26–32.

4 See M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

5 Tang Cheng, “PLA and Foreign Military Joint Exercise: non-traditional 

security cooperation,” Chinese Communist Studies [中共研究] 45, no. 7 (July 2011), 85.

6 Justin McCurry, “Japan-China row escalates over fishing boat collision,” 

The Guardian, September 9, 2010, available at <www.theguardian.com/world/2010/

sep/09/japan-china-fishing-boat-collision>. Also see Wikipedia, available at <http://

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Senkaku_boat_collision_incident>. 

7 Chinese Communist Yearbook 2011 [2011年中共年報] (Taipei: Chinese Communist Studies Magazine Press [中共研究雜誌社], 2011), 3-110– 3-112.

8 “China sends five warships to the disputed Scarborough Shoal,” What’s on 

Shenzhen, May 10, 2012, available at <www.whatsonshenzhen.com/news-2423-china-sends-five-warships-to-the-disputed-scarborough-shoal.html>.

9 Taiwan uses the name Diaoyutai to refer to the islands.

10 “Ishihara thumbs his nose at the central government,” The Asahi Shimbun, 

April 18, 2012, available at <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/

AJ201204180054>.

11 “Chinese activists land on Senkaku islet; Japan arrests 14,” Japan Times, 

August 16, 2012, available at <www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/08/16/national/

chinese-activists-land-on-senkaku-islet-japan-arrests-14/#.U1UYO_mSx6M>. Also, 

“Japanese water cannon attack on Taiwanese fishing boats over Senkaku dispute,” 

The Telegraph, September 25, 2012, available at <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/taiwan/9564421/Japanese-water-cannon-attack-on-Taiwanese-fishing-boats-over-Senkaku-dispute.html>. 

12 Masami Ito,“China enraged, sends ships: ¥2 billion deal nationalizes the 

Senkakus,” Japan Times, September 12, 2012.

13 “Chinese military aircraft frequently appear in Diaoyu Islands airspace” 

[中国军机频繁出现钓鱼岛空域], Japan News Networks, October 19, 2012, available at 

<www.ribenxinwen.com/html/g/201210/19-14526.html>. 
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14 A Chinese PLA Navy fleet passed through Yaku Islands, Okinawa Islands, 

and Miyako Islands during the tension over Diaoyu/Senkaku. See table 12.1.

15 “China to promote drones for marine surveillance,” Xinhua, September 23, 2012, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/23/c_123750476.htm>. 

16 Bai Ruixue, Gao Yi, and Gan Jun [白瑞雪, 高毅, 甘俊], “From South China 

Sea to West Pacific: Complete Record of Navy Task Force’s Distant Sea Training of 

Combat-Readiness Patrol” [从南海到西太平洋:海军编队战备巡逻远海训练全记录], 

Xinhua, April 3, 2013.

17 CCTV-4 “Focus Today” [今日关注] program, March 28, 2013.

18 Teddy Ng, “Xi Jinping Calls on Navy To Be Prepared for Struggle,” South 

China Morning Post, April 12, 2013.

19 Liu Huaqing [刘华清], The Memoirs of Liu Huaqing [刘华清回忆录] (Beijing: 

PLA Press [中国人民解放军出版社], 2004), 434.

20 Ibid., 435.

21 Ibid., 437–438.

22 The term sea area of operations here can be understood as parallel to the 

concept of area of responsibility (AOR) in the West.

23 “PLA Navy Commander Shi Yunsheng on Naval Development Strategy” [解

放軍海軍司令員石雲生:縱論海軍發展戰略], Zijing Monthly [紫荊月刊], no. 130 (August 

2001), 6–9.

24 Liu Shengru, Liu Zheng, and Wang Lei [刘胜如, 刘政, 王磊], “Innovation and 

Development of Naval Operations Doctrine under Informationized Conditions” [信

息化条件下海军作战理论的创新与发展], National Defense University Journal [国防大学

学报], no. 11 (2004), 44.

25 Quan Jinfu [全金富], “Innovative Development of Our Naval Strategic 

Theory in the New Century” [新世纪我国海军战略理论的创新发展], Journal of Nanjing 

Institute of Politics [南京政治学院学报] 20, no. 3 (2004), 82–83.

26 Wang Zheng [王政], “Some Issues Concerning Information Operations 

in the Joint Naval Campaign” [海上联合战役信息作战的几个问题], National Defense 

University Journal, no. 10 (2004), 44.

27 Liu Shengru, Liu Zheng, and Wang Lei, 44.

28 Wang Zheng, 45.

29 Wu Shengli and Hu Yanlin [吴胜利, 胡彦林], “Forge a Powerful People’s 

Navy that Can Adapt to Its Historical Mission” [锻造适应我军历史使命要求的强大人

民海军], Seeking Truth [求是], no. 14 (2007), 32. This issue of Seeking Truth is a special 

edition in commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the PLA.
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HUANG

30 For discussion and analysis of the concept of a string of pearls strategy, see 

Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici with Scott Devary and Jenny Lin, “Not an Idea 

We Have to Shun”: Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century, China Strategic Perspectives 7 (Washington, DC: National Defense University [NDU] Press, 2014).

31 See Christopher H. Sharman, China Moves Out: Stepping Stones Toward 

a New Maritime Strategy, China Strategic Perspectives 9 (Washington, DC: NDU 

Press, 2015).

32 Du Chaoping [杜朝平], “The Island Chain and Its Impact on Chinese Navy” 

[岛链-对中国海军的影响有多大], China’s Navy Today [舰载武器] (May 2004), 40.

33 For the analyses of the massive modernization of the PLAN’s platforms and 

systems in the past decade, see Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in 

the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010). Also, Ronald 

O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities, CRS 

Report for Congress RL33153 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

December 23, 2014).

34 Richard Fisher, Jr., “Growing Asymmetries in the China-Japan Naval Balance,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, November 22, 2005, available 

at <www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.83/pub_detail.asp>.

35 “Dragons unite: To protect its maritime interests, China is setting up a 

civilian coastguard,” The Economist, March 16, 2013, available at <www.economist.

com/news/china/21573607-protect-its-maritime-interests-china-setting-up-civilian-coastguard-dragons-unite#sthash.yPwuLSjm.dpbs>.

36 State Oceanic Administration, Institute of Oceanic Development Strategy, 

China’s Ocean Development Report, 2013 [中国海洋发展报告, 2013] (Beijing: Ocean 

Press, 2013), 261–262. Measuring the capacity of China’s maritime law enforcement 

agencies would require numerous sets of studies on their operational doctrines and 

tactics, professional education, training, promotion, and logistics, as well as operating sequence, duration, shifts, and operational coordination.

37 “China will reorganize State Oceanic Administration and execute maritime law enforcement under the name of Coast Guard” [我国将重组国家海洋局 以

海警局名义海上执法], Tencent News [腾讯新闻], March 10, 2013, available at <http://

news.qq.com/a/20130310/000281.htm>. In the reorganization of the five maritime 

law enforcement agencies in 2013, the Maritime Safety Administration [海事局] of 

Ministry of Transport [交通运输部] was not integrated into the State Oceanic Administration, due in part because one of its functions is international shipping management. See “State Oceanic Administration Insiders Talks About the Birth of China 

Coast Guard: It’s Not Just a Uniform Issue” [海洋局内部人士谈海警局诞生:不只是统

一服装的问题], available at <http://big5.china.com.cn/gate/big5/ocean.china.com.

cn/2013-04/07/content_28464179.htm>.
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38 Additional details on “China Maritime Law Enforcement Activities During 

Near Seas Sovereignty Disputes” and on “Hull number changes of China’s law 

enforcement ships since reorganization under State Oceanic Administration 2013” 

are available for download from the NDU Press Web site at <ndupress.ndu.edu/

huang.pdf>.

39 Chi Le-yi [亓樂義], “PLA Opposes Resolving South and East China Sea Disputes by Force” [共軍:反對動武解決南、東海爭議], China Times [中國時報], May 10, 

2012. 

40 “Liang Guanglie: Japan is fully responsible in the Diaoyu Island dispute” [梁光烈:釣魚島問題升溫責任完全在日方], China Review News Online [中

國評論新聞網], September 19, 2012, available at <www.chinareviewnews.com/

doc/1022/4/0/0/102240076.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=102240076>. 

41 Zheng Ming [郑明], “Diaoyudao and Huangyandao Incidents Might Be 

the Cut-in Point for the Formation and Implementation of Maritime Development 

Strategy” [钓鱼岛、黄岩岛事件或可成为我国制定和实施海洋发展战略的一个切入点], 

Modern Ships [现代舰船], no. 10 (2012), 16–17.

42 For details, see Linda Jakobson, “The PLA and Maritime Security Actors,” in 

PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking, ed. Phillip C. Saunders and 

Andrew Scobell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 300–323.

43 “Air-Sea Cooperation, Witnessing ‘East Sea Collaboration–2012’ Exercise” 

[海空协同 直击“东海协作—2012”演习], Xinhua Online [新华网], October 21, 2012, 

available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2012-10/21/c_123849340_2.htm>. 

44 “Exercise in East China Sea, Protecting Rights with Strength” [東海練兵實

力維權], Ta Kung Pao [大公報], available at <http://paper.takungpao.com/html/2012-

10/20/content_2_1.htm>. 

45 See Carl Thayer, “China’s Oil Rig Gambit: South China Sea GameChanger?” The Diplomat, May 12, 2014, available at <http://thediplomat.

com/2014/05/chinas-oil-rig-gambit-south-china-sea-game-changer/>.

46 Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, “The 

Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” Xinhua, April 16, 2013, available 

at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681.htm>. 

301

This chapter assesses the Chinese military’s perspectives on evacuation 

operations, the capabilities required to perform them, the challenges 

the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is likely to face in conducting such 

operations, and the broader policy implications of these developments. The 

chapter first provides background and context to frame the discussion of PLA 

preparations for far seas contingencies. Next, a case study is presented that 

examines the evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya. Future evacuation 

operations may differ from this one in important respects, but as the largest, 

most recent, and highest-profile evacuation China has conducted to date, it is 

worthy of close examination. Then, PLA assessments of the nature and likelihood of future evacuation contingencies are considered. This is followed by an 

examination of relevant PLA capabilities, which could include China’s large 

amphibious ships, the newly commissioned aircraft carrier of the PLA Navy 

(PLAN), and the large transport aircraft of the PLA Air Force. This section also 

covers doctrine, training, and coordination challenges involved in evacuating 

large numbers of People’s Republic of China (PRC) citizens from a distant location. Finally, conclusions and broader policy implications are offered.

Background and Context 

China’s rapidly growing overseas interests create a number of new challenges 

for leaders in Beijing. This is an unavoidable consequence of China’s “going 

out” strategy and its increasingly global economic and political profile. Over 

the past few years, however, the challenges have been growing, as political 

upheavals in a number of foreign countries have increased the risks associated 

with China’s expanding overseas interests. This has been especially true in 

North Africa, including Egypt, Libya, and Sudan, where, as Chinese scholars 

CHAPTER 13

The PLA and Far Seas Contingencies: 

Chinese Capabilities for Noncombatant 

Evacuation Operations

Michael S. Chase
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CHASE

point out, recent violence and turmoil have threatened the interests of Chinese 

companies and the safety of Chinese citizens, raising calls for China to do more 

to protect its overseas interests.1 Within this context, as Mathieu Duchâtel and 

Bates Gill point out, the problem of “overseas citizen protection” [haiwai gongmin baohu, 海外公民保护] is not entirely new for Chinese leaders and officials, 

but it is emerging as an increasingly serious concern.2

 One important way in 

which China may need to address this problem is by evacuating its citizens 

from foreign countries in times of turmoil. As PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

official Yue Yucheng noted in a November 2011 review of recent events in Chinese foreign affairs, “The three overseas evacuations from Egypt, Libya, and 

Japan evacuated a total of 48,000 Chinese citizens—five times the number of 

Chinese personnel evacuated from overseas over the last 30 years.”3 

Two trends are contributing to the increasing likelihood that China will 

need to execute such evacuation missions in the future. First, Chinese workers 

are going abroad in growing numbers, with many concentrated in potentially 

dangerous and unstable areas of the globe. Second, the Chinese government 

faces rising domestic pressure to protect its citizens overseas, and Beijing wants 

the Chinese public to see it as willing and able to meet these rising expectations.4

 Consequently, not only is the frequency of evacuation operations likely 

to grow, but their domestic political importance also seems set to increase. As 

one Chinese writer puts it:

Protecting the safety and security of the lives and property of Chinese 

overseas and other such interests has become a practical issue facing 

China’s government. If protection is effective, it will be conducive to 

strengthening the centripetal force, cohesiveness, and sense of identity of the state and the people, but if protection is ineffective, it may 

not only result in harm to the stability of the state and the unity of the 

people, it may also have an influence on China’s international status 

and international image.5

This has important implications for the Chinese military. According to 

Gu Weijun, a researcher with the PLA Academy of Military Sciences (AMS), 

“Economic ‘going global’ requires military ‘going global’ as escorts, and in the 

future, it will be inevitable for China to use its troops overseas.”6

Within this context, one important trend concerns the role of the PLA in 

evacuation operations. A broad range of Chinese institutions is involved in the 
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protection of Chinese citizens overseas in general and in evacuation operations 

in particular. The lead role in many respects belongs to the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs (MFA). For example, when China decided to evacuate its citizens from 

the Solomon Islands in April 2006 following rioting that led to the destruction 

of numerous Chinese businesses, leaders in Beijing turned to the MFA. The 

Chinese embassy in Papua New Guinea arranged for chartered aircraft to withdraw 325 people as the security situation in the Solomon Islands deteriorated.7

Yet the prominence of the PLA in such activities appears to be growing. 

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are among the diversified military tasks [duoyanghua junshi renwu, 多样化军事任务] the PLA is expected to 

be able to perform in support of the Communist Party leadership’s domestic 

and international objectives. Indeed, China’s 2013 Defense White Paper highlights evacuation of Chinese nationals as one of the ways in which the PLA is 

responsible for protecting China’s growing overseas interests.8 Such operations 

are likely to become an increasingly high-profile mission as well, as suggested 

by the extensive coverage of the Libya evacuation in Chinese media. The PLA’s 

unprecedented involvement in the Libya evacuation, which included the 

deployment of a PLAN frigate and four PLAAF Il-76 transport aircraft to the 

region, may foreshadow an even larger role in future evacuation operations. As 

PLAN researcher Li Jie writes, as more and more Chinese go abroad, “providing 

maximum protective measures” for them when they are in danger, including 

by evacuating them when necessary, is becoming an increasingly critical 

mission that the PLA is duty-bound to perform.9

 Methods such as chartering 

civilian aircraft to evacuate citizens have been adequate in many cases, but 

some PLA scholars clearly expect the military to play a more central role in 

future operations. As Gu Weijun of AMS puts it, “During recent riots in southern 

Kyrgyzstan, the Chinese government dispatched chartered planes to withdraw 

our citizens who were living there. But the protection of overseas citizens and 

expatriates cannot do without military measures. China can refer to the methods of foreign nations and employ armed protection and evacuation measures 

when its overseas citizens and expatriates face large-scale attacks.”10 Indeed, 

Chinese publications are replete with general discussions of the importance of 

protecting citizens overseas and conducting NEOs when necessary. 

China’s accomplishments in evacuating its citizens have been impressive 

in some respects. By most accounts, for example, the PLA performed its limited 

role in the Libya evacuation quite effectively. The PLA is also developing and 
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deploying a number of capabilities that could prove useful for future evacuation missions. At the same time, however, it is less clear that the PLA’s doctrine, 

training, and ability to coordinate effectively with the MFA and other organizations are equally advanced. Moreover, in future NEOs, the degree of difficulty 

may be higher than was the case in the Libya example. As Andrew Scobell and 

Andrew Nathan point out, all of the evacuation missions China has conducted 

to date “were modest in scope, involved no fighting, and sought only to protect 

economic interests and personnel. But as China’s investments increase outside 

of Asia, there may be more locations where such missions become necessary, 

and these missions may require force.”11 This raises some questions about how 

effectively China could respond to the challenges that would likely be involved 

in more taxing evacuation scenarios.

Case Study: PLA Involvement in Libya Evacuation 

As the security situation deteriorated in Libya early in 2011, imperiling the 

interests of Chinese companies with investments in the country and the 

safety of tens of thousands of Chinese nationals working there, Beijing prepared to launch an unprecedented evacuation operation to bring them home 

safely.12 PRC official media described the ensuing late February and early 

March 2011 evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya as the “largest and 

the most complicated overseas evacuation ever conducted by the Chinese 

government.”13 In about 10 days, according to official media reports, China 

evacuated almost 36,000 of its own citizens and about 2,100 citizens of 12 

other countries.14

According to one official media report, as soon as it became clear that the 

situation in Libya would require the evacuation of Chinese citizens, the PRC 

government established a task force led by Vice Premier Zhang Dejiang. Its 

mission was “to ensure effective evacuation of all the stranded Chinese, including those from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.”15 Following establishment of 

this task force, Beijing made what official media reports describe as “an all-out 

effort” to extract its citizens from Libya.16 In all, according to one official media 

report, “From February 22 to March 5, the Chinese government organized an 

overseas evacuation of citizens by air, land and sea—its largest since 1949, 

involving 91 domestic chartered flights, 12 flights by military airplanes, 5 cargo 

ferries, 1 escort ship, as well as 35 rented foreign chartered flights, 11 voyages 

by foreign passenger liners, and some 100 bus runs.”17
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As for the specific mechanisms used to evacuate Chinese citizens, the 

PRC government relied heavily on chartered aircraft and ships.18 For example, the Chinese embassy in Malta chartered four ships to help evacuate 

Chinese nationals to Malta, where they waited for chartered flights to take 

them back to the PRC.19 In contrast to some past evacuations, however, China 

did not rely exclusively on such assets. Beijing also directed the PLAAF and 

PLAN to participate in the evacuation. On February 28, China dispatched 

four PLAAF Il-76 transport aircraft to Libya via Khartoum. China also sent 

the Jiangkai II–class frigate Xuzhou to the area to provide support and protection for the evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya. The frigate had 

been participating in counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and 

waters off of Somalia.20

The MFA played a crucial role in organizing the evacuation and obtaining 

international assistance,21 but this was clearly an important operation for 

the Chinese military as well. Although more than 90 percent of the Chinese 

citizens withdrawn from Libya had already been evacuated on chartered 

aircraft and ferries before the PLAN and PLAAF arrived on the scene,22 their 

participation was an important development in that it was the first time the 

PLA has deployed military assets to support a NEO. As Gabe Collins and 

Andrew Erickson point out, the dispatch of the four PLAAF transport aircraft 

was particularly significant in that it marked “the first use of long-range 

military transport aircraft to rescue Chinese citizens from a foreign conflict 

zone,” while the participation of the Xuzhou in the evacuation of Chinese 

citizens from Libya set “a major precedent because it marked the first time 

China has sent military assets to a distant part of the world to protect its citizens there.”23 Accordingly, the PLA Daily has highlighted the significance 

of the Libya evacuation as “the first time for China to utilize military force 

to evacuate Chinese personnel overseas” and named it as one of the “top ten 

firsts in Chinese military diplomacy from 2002 to 2012.”24 The evacuation 

mission is clearly seen as important from a service perspective as well. For 

example, PLAN researcher Li Jie highlights the PLAN’s role in particular: 

“China’s dispatch of a navy ship to provide support and protection for the 

citizen evacuation operation is not only a major breakthrough in terms of 

execution of an overseas action, but also a major breakthrough in terms of 

the military’s execution of non-war military operations overseas and the PLA 

Navy’s concepts for execution of diversified military tasks.”25
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Given that the evacuation involved withdrawing Chinese nationals on 

chartered vessels, chartered aircraft, military aircraft, and buses, it required 

a considerable amount of interagency coordination and cooperation with a 

number of other organizations. Accordingly, PRC Foreign Ministry officials 

highlighted the importance of coordination between related ministries, local 

authorities, the PLA, and Chinese enterprises, as well as cooperation with a 

number of other countries in successfully completing the evacuation of Chinese nationals.26 Indeed, as Collins and Erickson point out, “The NEO operation 

involved an intricate level of interagency coordination, with the Ministries of 

Commerce, Foreign Affairs, and Public Security working closely with the Civil 

Aviation Administration of China and consular officials. In addition, Chinese 

companies operating in Libya, including the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China Rail Construction and shippers like COSCO who 

helped evacuate Chinese citizens from Libya, coordinated closely with the 

government agencies listed above.”27

Chinese media accounts suggest that leaders in Beijing viewed the operation 

as successful in practically all respects. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Chinese media 

reports tended to portray the evacuation as highly successful. Official media 

reporting highlighted several aspects of the story, including the role of the PLA and 

cooperation with international partners. In addition, a number of reports characterized it as indicative of the importance the Chinese government attaches to 

protecting its citizens abroad, suggesting that addressing domestic political concerns was among the most important considerations for party leaders in Beijing.28

Nonetheless, other Chinese assessments of the Libya evacuation were 

more critical. For example, even as Wang Yizhou praised the MFA for arranging charter flights, renting a Greek ferry, and obtaining international assistance, he indicated that this approach “also revealed that China has some 

weaknesses.”29 For instance, according to Wang, “the PLAAF used Russian-made transport planes, not the domestically produced large aircraft the 

Chinese public hopes to see.” In addition, Wang notes, the situation encountered in Libya reflected another problem that has emerged as Chinese businesses have expanded internationally: “the assessment of and response to 

security risks by Chinese companies as they go global has been insufficient.”30

Other observers pointed out that the PLA’s involvement was relatively limited 

and suggested that China should not have to rely on international help when 

evacuating its citizens from dangerous areas.31
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Looking ahead, the Libya evacuation underscored some key questions Beijing will need to address over the next few years. As Collins and Erickson point 

out, these issues include “how to manage the growing Chinese expatriate presence in Africa and other volatile regions where security problems are almost 

certain to arise and how to handle popular nationalist pressures for intervening 

when Chinese citizens abroad are threatened.”32 China’s experience in Libya 

also suggests that the PLA will play a major part in addressing those questions, 

even though its contribution to the Libya NEO was rather modest as a result of 

its limited capabilities. The Libya NEO underscores the importance of studying 

how the PLA is likely to approach future evacuation missions.

PLA Assessments of Future Evacuation Contingencies

For Chinese analysts, the need to protect or evacuate Chinese living overseas 

is a function of growing threats to their security. According to Gu Weijun, “For 

reasons such as political struggles, terrorist attacks, labor disputes, and natural 

disasters, Chinese citizens and expatriates living abroad have encountered 

more and more attacks in recent years.”33 It is also consistent with demands 

for the PLA to handle nontraditional security threats. Indeed, Chinese military 

publications on diversified military tasks and military operations other than 

war (MOOTW) [feizhanzheng junshi xingdong, 非战争军事行动] highlight the 

importance of a number of types of such operations for the PLA, including 

noncombatant evacuation operations [cheli feizhandou renyuan, 撤离非战斗人

员]. Foreshadowing the PLA’s participation in the 2011 evacuation of Chinese 

citizens from Libya, one book published in 2009 indicated that such operations 

would involve dispatching military aircraft or ships to rescue Chinese citizens 

and overseas Chinese from countries where the security situation was deteriorating rapidly or major incidents of anti-Chinese violence or turmoil were 

taking place.34 As a result of China’s expanding overseas interests, according 

to PLAN researcher Li Jie, “Undoubtedly, evacuation and escort incidents like 

the one in Libya will continue to occur in the future, and will be an increasing 

trend . . . and the duty of the people’s army to provide emergency rescue and 

protection of the masses will clearly grow larger.”35

Relevant PLA Capabilities 

This section provides a brief overview of the specific assets most likely to be 

involved in future noncombatant evacuation operations. Chinese military 
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authors suggest that the PLAN and PLAAF probably will play particularly 

important roles in future evacuation operations.36 Chinese writers highlight a 

number of naval and air capabilities—including large amphibious ships, aircraft carriers, and transport aircraft—as particularly important assets that will 

be required to ensure the successful execution of future evacuations of Chinese 

citizens. In addition, PLAN marines, airborne troops, or special operations 

forces could be required to provide security, especially in environments less 

permissive than the ones China has confronted in its previous NEOs, such as 

the evacuation of its citizens from Libya. PLA capabilities are clearly improving 

in many of these areas but are still limited in some important respects. Some 

Chinese authors tend to focus on past accomplishments and the PLA’s recent 

capability improvements, but others acknowledge the limitations and constraints the PLA will still face in performing future NEOs. 

Large Amphibious Ships 

Large amphibious ships may be designed primarily for combat operations, but 

they can also be useful for missions such as NEOs. Indeed, notwithstanding the 

prominent role of the Xuzhou in the Libya evacuation, one of the naval capabilities that Chinese authors highlight as most directly relevant to future evacuation 

operations is large amphibious ships. Chinese authors indicate that evacuation 

operations are one of several potential military operations other than war that 

could be carried out by the PLAN’s large amphibious ships. As one article in 

Modern Navy points outs, large amphibious ships are an “excellent choice” for 

operations such as international assistance, evacuation of citizens, and escort 

missions.37 Similarly, in an article highlighting the accelerated development of 

new dock landing ships, Li Jie suggests that the PLAN’s Yuzhao-class amphibious 

transport docks (LPDs) are relevant to a number of potential scenarios, including 

protection of Chinese citizens overseas, arguing that: 

In future struggles to safeguard our nation’s territorial sovereignty 

and maritime rights and interests in the near seas, the security of our 

international strategic channels in the intermediate or far seas areas, 

and even in non-war military actions, which will gradually increase, 

including protection of the interests of overseas Chinese nationals and 

international humanitarian assistance, dock landing ships . . . will 

have an impressive performance.38
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China currently has three Type 071 Yuzhao-class LPDs. Beijing launched 

the PLAN’s first Yuzhao-class LPD, the Kunlunshan, in 2006. According to the 

Office of Naval Intelligence, it was commissioned in 2007, “signaling a developing capability for expeditionary warfare and over-the-horizon amphibious 

assault.”39 The second Yuzhao-class LPD, the Jinggangshan, was launched in 

July 2011.40 The third was launched in September 2011.41 The PLAN’s Yuzhaoclass LPDs can carry troops, amphibious vehicles, helicopters, and Yuyi-class 

air-cushioned landing craft.42

Aircraft Carrier and Other PLAN Capabilities 

The PLAN’s newly commissioned aircraft carrier also figures prominently 

in some Chinese discussions of capabilities relevant for executing noncombatant evacuations in distant waters. In particular, Li Jie highlights the role 

the aircraft carrier could play in future non-war military actions far from 

China’s shores, including “fighting terrorists and pirates, maintaining the 

security of maritime transportation lines, and evacuating overseas citizens.”43

More broadly, some Chinese military writers argue that planning for future 

evacuation operations should influence naval equipment development and 

procurement. PLAN informationization expert and strategist Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo suggests that missions such as protection and evacuation of 

overseas Chinese should be taken into account in equipment planning by 

ensuring adequate accommodation aboard large amphibious ships, supply 

ships, and hospital ships.44

PLAAF Large Transport Aircraft 

Large transport aircraft can be a critical capability for NEOs instead of or in 

addition to chartered commercial flights. Accordingly, the PLAAF is also an 

important player with significant capabilities relevant to noncombatant evacuation operations. For example, a PLAAF assessment of Hu Jintao’s direction 

to build a “powerful people’s air force” lists evacuation of Chinese citizens 

from global hotspots as one of the tasks the PLAAF must be prepared to carry 

out as it becomes a more globally capable force.45 Other Chinese authors also 

highlight the importance of transport aircraft for future evacuation missions. 

This is one of several missions for large transport aircraft, which are seen as 

crucial to enhancing the “strategic projection” capabilities China needs in 

order to protect its increasingly far-flung interests. 
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The PLAAF currently relies on imported Il-76 transport aircraft for its strategic airlift capabilities. China, however, is not content with its limited strategic 

airlift capabilities. Indeed, according to the U.S. Department of Defense, “In 

response to the new historic missions’ requirements to protect China’s global 

interests, the PLA Air Force is attempting to increase its long-range transportation and logistics capabilities, to achieve greater strategic projection.”46

Specifically, Beijing is working to enhance the PLAAF’s strategic airlift capabilities with a domestically produced large transport aircraft, the Y-20 strategic 

transport, which conducted its first flight test in January 2013 and currently 

remains under development.47

Interservice Rivalry? 

There appears to be some dispute about which service is most capable of 

withdrawing Chinese citizens from global hotspots. According to Li Jie, the 

PLAN is uniquely well suited to participate in evacuation missions. Moreover, 

Li writes, the PLAN enjoys several inherent advantages when compared to the 

PLAAF. Although this judgment presumably reflects bureaucratic interests 

and interservice competition more than anything else, Li’s reasoning is worth 

highlighting. Specifically, according to Li, the Libya withdrawal highlighted 

the PLAN’s advantages relative to the PLAAF because:

In this evacuation action, the air force also dispatched four Il-76 military transport aircraft, which flew over five countries and made a 

number of important breakthroughs. By comparison, however, the 

overseas actions of air force troops are rather limited. For example, this 

time the air force flew across five countries and crossed six time zones, 

so they had to discuss and negotiate with these countries and had to 

fly in accordance with stipulated flight paths, altitudes, times, and so 

on. But the navy’s ships navigated on the high seas and in international waters for the most part, so they faced fewer constraints. . . .The 

navy’s ships are also less susceptible to the effects of weather and sea 

conditions, which is not so for the air force’s aircraft. Specifically, the 

aircraft cross a relatively large area, and in adverse weather they are 

susceptible to having trouble or even serious problems. There is one 

more important point, which is that the navy’s ships, and especially 

the medium and large surface ship formations, can sail to the waters 
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facing the location where an incident is taking place, producing real 

deterrence and effects, and giving the other side a powerful demonstration of deterrence, and this is something the aircraft are unable 

to accomplish.48

The PLAAF would undoubtedly beg to differ with Li’s less than generous 

assessment of its relevance in such scenarios, as its transport aircraft actually 

evacuated Chinese citizens from Libya, whereas the PLAN frigate appears to 

have been present mainly to show the flag and to offer some level of protection if 

needed.49 Indeed, the PLAAF has consistently highlighted the important role of 

its transport aircraft in evacuating Chinese citizens from Libya. PLAAF officers 

have pointed out that the deployment was unprecedented in many respects, 

including setting a record for the longest distance flown by the PLAAF’s large 

transport aircraft. Moreover, according to one PLAAF officer, although civilian 

aircraft can be chartered to evacuate citizens from dangerous areas, China 

sent military transport planes not only due to the large number of people that 

needed to be withdrawn from Libya, but also because as military aircraft they 

have an attribute that civilian planes cannot replicate—notably, their power 

as a symbol of the Chinese government’s determination to protect its citizens 

overseas.50 This thinking about the strategic symbolism of global airlift capabilities appears to reflect a growing “air mindedness” in China.51 In addition, 

the PLAAF could certainly point out that however limited its strategic airlift 

capabilities may be, aircraft can arrive on the scene much more quickly than 

ships. In addition, the PLAAF’s capabilities would be much more relevant than 

those of the PLAN in a scenario involving evacuation of Chinese citizens from 

one of any number of landlocked countries where China has people, investments, and related interests to protect.52

Relevant Doctrine and Training Activities 

Doctrine that covers noncombatant evacuation operations and realistic training that focuses on the challenges involved in conducting such operations are 

crucial to ensuring that the PLA is properly prepared to carry out these kinds 

of operations when called upon to do so by China’s leaders. The U.S. military 

provides a useful example in this regard; it has published joint doctrine specifically focused on planning and conducting joint noncombatant evacuation 

operations.53 The United States has a detailed planning process for NEOs that 
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takes into account many factors, such as security considerations and coordination between the military and the Department of State. In addition, the U.S. 

Marine Corps has a compressed version of its normal planning process, known 

as the rapid response planning process (R2P2). When an urgent situation 

does not permit employment of the standard planning process, a U.S. Marine 

Expeditionary Unit (MEU) can use the R2P2 approach to begin planning and 

executing operations in a matter of hours.54

Moreover, the U.S. military regularly conducts training for NEO operations 

to make sure troops are ready to evacuate U.S. citizens, and in some cases 

nationals of other countries, when the need arises. For example, in October 

2012, U.S. Marines took part in a NEO exercise that simulated the evacuation 

of a U.S. Embassy. The training, which took place in Yuma, Arizona, and at the 

Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twenty-Nine Palms, California, 

focused not only on tactical activities such as establishing a security perimeter 

and flight operations, but also on the type of interagency coordination required 

to successfully execute a NEO in the real world. To that end, a State Department 

consular affairs officer took part in the exercise to help the Marines learn to 

work as a “unified U.S. military and State Department team.”55 It is unclear how 

well prepared the PLA is in these respects. Not only is it uncertain whether the 

PLA has promulgated doctrine that covers evacuation operations, but it is also 

difficult to judge, based on Chinese publications, the extent to which the PLA 

conducts training focused specifically on such operations.

Interagency Coordination 

As Collins and Erickson have observed, evacuation missions present significant 

operational challenges for the PLA, as NEOs can be “very demanding in terms 

of coordinating air and sea platforms operating far from their home bases and 

in potentially hostile areas.”56 Coordination with the MFA and other organizations is another potential challenge. Indeed, interagency coordination is 

especially critical in overseas evacuation operations, as is emphasized in U.S. 

joint doctrine and training. This is no different for China. The PLA must be prepared to communicate and coordinate with the MFA and other governmental 

and nongovernmental organizations.

The involvement of a large and likely growing number of actors in evacuation operations makes coordination very challenging for China. How well 

the PLA prepares to carry out such operations in cooperation with the MFA 
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and other organizations is difficult to assess in much detail based on available Chinese publications. For this reason, Duchâtel and Gill conclude that 

“coordination between government ministries, the armed forces, state-owned 

enterprises and private businesses—problematic under most circumstances—

remains unclear when it comes to protecting citizens abroad.”57 This is apparently a work in progress for the PLA.

Conclusion 

The evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya likely signals a growing requirement for Chinese government and military involvement in the protection of 

Chinese nationals abroad, quite possibly to include future evacuation operations. Indeed, because of the increasing number of Chinese working overseas, 

many of whom are located in politically volatile and potentially dangerous 

areas, and because of the need to appear responsive to domestic concerns 

about China’s ability to protect its citizens overseas, Beijing must ensure that 

it is capable of handling similar crises in the future.58

All of this suggests that Beijing will need to find ways to more actively 

ensure the protection of Chinese citizens residing abroad. Exactly how Beijing 

will approach this problem remains to be seen. When the security situation 

is relatively permissive, the United States generally prefers to rely on civilian 

assets for NEOs because it is less expensive than using the military. Will China 

follow suit, or will Beijing conclude that using PLA assets to show the flag is 

important enough to justify the extra expense even when it is not really necessary? China’s evacuation of its citizens from Libya could be instructive in this 

regard. A key question is why the Communist Party leadership ordered the 

PLAN and PLAAF to participate in the evacuation. It is difficult to judge with 

certainty whether military involvement was motivated primarily by a desire to 

ensure the successful evacuation of Chinese citizens. It could also have been 

a function of other considerations, such as a perceived need to satisfy domestic concerns about China’s ability to protect its citizens or a desire to burnish 

China’s international image. These possibilities are not mutually exclusive, of 

course, and China’s overall approach to the Libya evacuation suggests one possibility is that such situations are likely to remain primarily the responsibility 

of the MFA but may increasingly involve at least limited participation by the 

PLA as well. If so, this will require the PLA to work in cooperation with the MFA 

and other organizations to plan and carry out future evacuation operations.
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From an institutional perspective, the PLA benefits from its growing role 

in protecting China’s overseas interests in general and from its role in evacuations in particular. For example, the success of the Libya evacuation and the 

perceived need to be prepared to rescue Chinese nationals from other crisis-torn areas afford the PLA an opportunity to display its growing capabilities 

to domestic and international audiences. At home, it allows the PLA to show 

its value by protecting Chinese citizens overseas. Abroad, it enables the PLA to 

portray its growing capabilities as ones that China can employ constructively 

and responsibly. The PLA’s participation in evacuation operations may also further strengthen its position in terms of internal arguments over the allocation 

of resources by showcasing its ability to contribute to China’s desired image 

as a responsible global power. 

Yet there are risks for the PLA as well, especially given the domestic 

requirement of being seen as capable of protecting Chinese citizens overseas 

and the importance the party leadership appears to attach to China’s international image. One possibility is that planning and doctrine exist primarily 

in internal channels; another is that they may not be fully developed at this 

point. Moreover, in future evacuation missions, the PLA may have to face more 

difficult challenges than those it has handled thus far. However, it is unclear 

how much attention the PLA has devoted to the myriad factors that would be 

involved in preparing for less benign situations, including the intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements for NEOs under such circumstances. Whether PLA capabilities, doctrine, training, and ability to coordinate 

with the MFA and other organizations will be adequate to handle more taxing 

scenarios is unclear. 

Notes

1 See, for example, Liu Linzhi [刘林智], “Turbulence in North Africa and China’s Overseas Interests Protection” [北非地区动荡化与中国海外利益维护], Contemporary International Relations [现代国际关系], no. 5 (May 2012), 46–51; and Tang Hao [唐

昊], “Strategic Thought on Protection of China’s Overseas Interests” [关于中国海外利

益保护的战略思考], Contemporary International Relations, no. 6 (June 2011), 1–8.

2 Mathieu Duchâtel and Bates Gill, “Overseas citizen protection: a growing 

challenge for China,” SIPRI Newsletter, February 2012, available at <www.sipri.org/

media/newsletter/essay/february12>. According to the authors, “Between 2006 and 

2010, a total of 6,000 Chinese citizens were evacuated from upheavals in Chad, Haiti, 

Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Tonga,” and in 
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2011, China not only withdrew almost 36,000 PRC citizens from Libya but also evacuated a substantial number of its nationals from Egypt and Japan.

3 Yue Yucheng [乐玉成], “Chinese Diplomacy in the Context of World Change” 

[世界大变局中的中国外交], Foreign Affairs Review [外交评论] (November 2011), 1–6.

4 On growing domestic pressure to protect Chinese abroad, see Jacob Zenn, 

“Chinese, Overseas and Insecure,” Asia Times, September 6, 2012, available at 

<www.atimes.com/atimes/China/NI06Ad02.html>. For an example of an attempt to 

assure its domestic audience and Chinese living overseas that the Chinese government is responding effectively, see Nie Chuanqing, “China Makes Great Efforts to 

Protect Overseas Citizens,” People’s Daily Overseas Edition, April 24, 2012.

5 Wang Tao [王涛], “Viewing the Protection of China’s Overseas Interests 

from the Perspective of the Civil War in Cote d’Ivoire” [由科特迪瓦内战看中国的海外

利益保护], Conmilit [现代军事], no. 6 (June 5, 2011), 26–29.

6 “Gu Weijun: China Should Research Ways to Use its Troops Overseas” [古伟

俊:中国要研究海外用兵之道], Global Times [环球时报], June 29, 2010.

7 See, for example, Qin Jize and Liang Qiwen, “310 Chinese Back Home 

from Solomons,” China Daily, April 25, 2006, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/

china/2006-04/25/content_575798.htm>. 

8 Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, The 

Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, 2013 defense white paper (Beijing: 

Information Office of the State Council, April 2013). 

9 Li Jie [李杰], “In the Overseas Evacuation Operation, the Navy Is as Impressive as Before!” [海外撤侨行动,海军依然给力!], Modern Ships [现代舰船] (April 1, 

2011), 54. 

10 “Gu Weijun: China Should Research Ways to Use its Troops Overseas.” 

11 Andrew Scobell and Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Overstretched Military,” 

Washington Quarterly 35, no. 4 (Fall 2012), 143.

12 On the threat to Chinese companies and workers, see, for example, Leslie 

Hook and Geoff Dyer, “Chinese Oil Interests Attacked in Libya,” Financial Times, 

February 24, 2011. 

13 “35,860 Chinese nationals in Libya evacuated: FM,” Xinhua, March 3, 2011, 

available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/03/c_13758221.

htm>.

14 Ibid.; “35,860 Chinese evacuated from unrest-torn Libya,” Xinhua, 

March 3, 2011, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/03/c_13759456.htm>; Li Xiaokun, “Chinese nationals set to be evacuated from Libya,” China Daily, February 23, 2011, available at <www.chinadaily.

com.cn/china/2011-02/23/content_12061077.htm>; “China’s successful evacuation 
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from Libya completed,” Xinhua, March 4, 2011, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/video/2011-03/04/c_13761456.htm>; “China’s evacuation 

of citizens from Libya is impressive: U.S. observer,” People’s Daily, March 5, 2011, 

available at <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7308976.html>; 

and “China evacuates 12,000 from Libya, sends frigate to help,” China Daily, February 25, 2011, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-02/25/

content_12075249.htm>.

15 “35,860 Chinese nationals in Libya evacuated: FM.” Xinhua.

16 Ibid.

17 “China’s miraculous evacuation from Libya widely applauded,” 

People’s Daily, March 7, 2011, available at <http://english.peopledaily.com.

cn/90001/90776/90883/7310717.html>.

18 “Chartered planes take off to evacuate Chinese from Libya,” People’s Daily, February 25, 2011, available at <http://english.people.com.

cn/90001/90776/90883/7301087.html>. 

19 “Four Vessels on Libya Evacuation Mission for Chinese Nationals,” 

People’s Daily, February 26, 2011, available at <http://english.people.com.

cn/90001/90776/90883/7300925.html>.

20 For brief discussions of the frigate’s participation in the evacuation operations as one of the highlights of the PLAN’s involvement in responding to “multiple 

types of security threats” and completing “diversified military tasks,” see Wu Chao, 

Cai Nianchi, Yu Zhangcai, and Qian Xiaohu [吴超, 蔡年迟, 虞章才, 钱晓虎], “Braving 

the Wind and Waves: On the Spot Report on How the PLAN has Accelerated the 

Promotion of Unit Transformation, Construction, and Development During the 

11th Five Year Program” [长风破浪正当时:海军“十一五”时期加快推进部队转型建设

发展纪实], PLA Daily [解放军报], December 5, 2011; and Li Tang and Qian Xiaohu 

[李唐, 钱晓虎], “Chinese Navy Makes Contributions to Peaceful Development on 

Oceans” [中国海军为和平发展建功大洋], PLA Daily, September 3, 2012.

21 For a brief discussion, see Yue Yucheng, 1–6.

22 See Daniel J. Kostecka, “From the Sea: PLA Doctrine and the Employment 

of Sea-Based Airpower,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 3 (Summer 2011), 25–26.

23 Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “Implications of China’s Military Evacuation of Citizens from Libya,” China Brief 11, no. 4 (March 10, 2011). See also Gabe 

Collins and Andrew Erickson, “China dispatches warship to protect Libya evacuation mission: Marks the PRC’s first use of frontline military assets to protect an 

evacuation mission,” China SignPost, no. 25 (February 24, 2011), available at <www.

chinasignpost.com/2011/02/24/china-dispatches-warship-to-protect-libya-evacuation-mission-marks-the-prcs-first-use-of-frontline-military-assets-to-protectan-evacuation-mission/>.
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24 “Top ten firsts of Chinese military diplomacy from 2002 to 2012,” PLA Daily, 

September 26, 2012, available at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/7960693.

html>. 

25 Li, 54. 

26 “35,860 Chinese nationals in Libya evacuated: FM.” Xinhua. This report 

mentions offers of assistance from Greece, Malta, Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, and Jordan 

and commends two Chinese companies that were operating in Libya—China Communications Construction Group and China Railway Construction Corporation—for 

their contributions to the organization of the withdrawal of Chinese citizens. 

27 Collins and Erickson, “Implications of China’s Military Evacuation of Citizens from Libya.”

28 “China’s Libya evacuation highlights People-First nature of government,” 

Xinhua, March 3, 2011, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/

indepth/2011-03/03/c_13759953.htm>. According to this report, “The massive, 

orderly and extraordinarily efficient evacuation is widely regarded as a vivid reflection of the Chinese government’s motto of ‘putting people first and running the 

government in the interest of the people.’” Moreover, “the swift evacuation also benefited from China’s growing national power and equally important, the advantage 

of the socialist system enabling the whole country to mobilize all of the necessary 

resources needed for an arduous mission.”

29 Xu Ming [徐明], “Wang Yizhou: China should be ‘Creatively Involved’ in 

World Affairs” [王逸舟:中国应‘创造性介入’国际事物], International Herald Leader [国

际先驱导报], December 20, 2011.

30 Ibid.

31 Shen Fan, Ma Dongfeng, and Cui Dong [沈凡, 马东锋, 崔冬], “Analysis of 

Materials Support for Our Army’s Overseas Rescue” [我军海外救援物资保障分析], 

Logistics Sci-Tech [物流科技], no. 10 (2011), 94–96. 

32 Collins and Erickson, “Implications of China’s Military Evacuation of Citizens from Libya.”

33 “Gu Weijun: China Should Research Ways to Use its Troops Overseas.” 

34 Gai Shijin and Zhang Peizhong [盖世金, 张培忠], On Diversified Military 

Tasks [多样化军事任务论] (Beijing: Long March Press [长征出版社], 2009), 68.

35 Li, “In the Overseas Evacuation Operation,” 54. 

36 Gai and Zhang, 157–158. According to the authors, in these types of 

operations, the air force and navy may need to work jointly to establish air safety 

corridors [kongzhong anquan zoulang, 空中安全走廊] and set up safety zones 

[anquan qu, 安全区], as part of the overall effort to withdraw Chinese citizens from 

the threatened areas.
318

CHASE

37 Ye Qi [叶颀], “A Brief Discussion of the Future of China’s Large Amphibious 

Warfare Ships” [浅谈中国大型两栖作战舰艇的未来], Modern Navy [当代海军], no. 11 

(November 2011), 42–44.

38 Li Jie, “China’s Accelerated Development of New-Model Dock Landing 

Ships Follows Overall Trends” [中国加速发展新型船坞登陆舰乃是大势所趋], Modern 

Ships (May 2012), 54. According to Li, the advantages of the Kunlunshan-class dock 

landing ships include “advanced design, outstanding performance, and extensive 

applications.” They can be employed to conduct amphibious operations, to provide 

command, control, and communications support, or to function as a mobile command post for an amphibious task force.

39 Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A 

Modernizing Navy with Chinese Characteristics (Suitland, MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2009), 20.

40 See “China launches largest dock landing ship,” United Press International, July 22, 2011, available at <http://www.upi.com/Business_News/

Security-Industry/2011/07/22/China-launches-largest-dock-landingship/64291311369476/>.

41 For photos, see “071 YUZHAO Class Amphibious Transport Dock LPD 

Number Three Launched,” China Defense Blog, September 26, 2011, available at 

<www.china-defense.blogspot.com/2011/09/071-yuzhao-class-amphibious-transport.html>. 

42 See Wendell Minnick, “China Bolsters Lift as Regional Tensions 

Increase,” Defense News, October 18, 2012; and Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “China’s 

Gathering Amphibious and Airborne Expeditionary Capabilities,” presentation 

for Institute for Defense and Government Advancement’s Amphibious Operations 

Summit, May 21, 2012.

43 Li discusses the potential missions of China’s aircraft carrier in “Naval 

Expert: Aircraft Carrier Will Play a Major Role in Settlement of Islands Disputes,” 

People’s Daily, September 24, 2012, available at <http://english.peopledaily.com.

cn/90786/7957606.html>. For more on his views, see Li Jie, “If China has an Aircraft 

Carrier Formation, what will it be able to do?” [倘若中国有航母编队,将能干啥?], Modern Ships (June 2011), 54.

44 See Zhu Mengqin and Yuan Zhenjun [朱梦勤, 袁珍军], “Dialogue with Yin 

Zhuo: Escort Mission is an Epoch-Making Symbolic Event” [对话尹卓:护航是划时代

标志性事件], Modern Navy, no. 12 (2011), 22–25. 

45 Shang Jinsuo, Li Zhen, Li Liguang, and Ye Haiyuan [尚金锁, 李振, 李黎光, 

叶海源], “A Study of Hu Jintao’s Thinking on Building a Powerful People’s Air Force” 

[胡锦涛关于建设强大的人民空军思想研究], China Military Science [中国军事科学], no. 

5 (2011), 13–17.
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46 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2012, Annual Report to Congress 

(Washington, DC: OSD, May 2012), 6.

47 “Test flight frequency of Y-20 heavy-duty transport aircraft sets new 

record,” China Military Online, March 5, 2014, available at <http://eng.chinamil.com.

cn/special-reports/2014-03/05/content_5796131.htm>.

48 Li Jie, “In the Overseas Evacuation Operation,” 54. 

49 I would like to thank Dan Kostecka for raising this point.

50 Dong Ruifeng and Guo Hongbo [董瑞丰, 郭洪波], “Sharp Weapons of a Great 

Power: Visiting the Air Force’s Strategic Transport Aircraft Unit” [大国利器:探访空军

战略运输机部队], Outlook [瞭望], no. 34 (August 20, 2012), 48–49.

51 I would like to thank Dan Kostecka for raising this point and for highlighting an instructive quote from former U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald 

Fogleman: “as our big ‘T’ tail aircraft, with the American flag painted on them, fly 

around the world, they not only represent America, but they are America.” See Ronald R. Fogleman, “Core Competencies—New Missions: The Air Force in Operations 

Other Than War,” Airman, no. 39 (April 1995), 2–9.

52 I would like to thank Dan Kostecka for raising this point.

53 Joint Publication 3-68 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, December 23, 2010), available at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/

new_pubs/jp3_68.pdf>. 

54 Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process 

(Washington, DC: U.S .Marine Corps, August 24, 2010).

55 For a brief account of the exercise, see Sean Dennison, “Marines Simulate 

U.S. Embassy Evacuation in Yuma, Twenty-nine Palms,” October 25, 2012, available 

at <www.dvidshub.net/news/96708/marines-simulate-us-embassy-evacuation-yuma-twentynine-palms>.

56 Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “Looking After China’s Own: Pressure to Protect PRC Citizens Working Overseas Likely to Rise,” China SignPost, no. 2 

(November 7, 2010). 

57 Duchâtel and Gill.

58 See, for example, Erickson and Collins, “Looking After China’s Own.” 

321

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a power with global interests. 

Those interests have led the Chinese defense establishment to invest 

in a range of military capabilities that will enable its military reach 

to extend far beyond China’s borders. Recognition of China’s expanding 

national interests and the need to protect those interests was first articulated in Hu Jintao’s “New Historic Missions” speech in 2004.1

 As these global 

interests face various threats, requirements to secure them primarily fall 

on China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and in many cases 

specifically on the PLA Navy (PLAN). Chinese naval developments in the 

years since the New Historic Missions speech have laid the foundation for an 

increasing range of “expeditionary” roles that have taken the PLAN farther 

abroad more frequently and on lengthier deployments. The longest and best 

observed of these expeditionary missions began in 2008, when the PLAN 

embarked on its first major long-term out of area operation off the coast of 

Somalia to counter piracy in cooperation with a multinational task force.

Preparing for the counterpiracy mission and for a more diverse mission 

set far beyond China’s borders has required extensive planning by China’s 

defense bureaucracy. This chapter discusses the PLAN’s deployment planning 

efforts. First, it describes some of the broader Chinese military doctrinal and 

operational changes that laid the groundwork for the PLAN’s ability to conduct 

longer deployments. Next, it outlines the key missions that take the PLAN 

beyond China’s periphery to the far seas. It then uses counterpiracy operations 

as a case study of PLAN deployment challenges and solutions, and, finally, it 

discusses the implications for future PLAN deployments.

CH APTER 14

PLA Navy Planning for Out of 

Area Deployments

Kristen Gunness and Samuel K. Berkowitz
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Laying the Foundation for Longer Deployments: PLA Doctrinal 

and Operational Changes 

Before the PLAN’s first deployment to the Gulf of Aden, the PLA leadership 

paved the way by making several modifications in PLA doctrine and operations, including changes to doctrine, training, personnel, and logistics. 

Preparing for Diverse Military Tasks

The concepts that the PLA needed to perform “diversified military tasks” and 

to prepare for “military operations other than war” (MOOTW) were raised 

in importance in PRC and PLA official speeches and documents from the 

mid-2000s onward. For example, MOOTW was emphasized as an important 

component of China’s national defense policy in official PRC documents such 

as the 2006 and 2008 white papers on China’s national defense.2

 The 2008 

Defense White Paper in particular contained more detail than past editions 

on PLA training efforts with regard to MOOTW. The official recognition of the 

importance of developing the capability to deploy abroad allowed the PLA and 

PLAN to engage in serious planning for such missions. 

Revising Training Methods and Regulations 

The PLA has also embarked on a comprehensive program to enhance the 

quality of military training. While not tied solely to the PLA’s preparations for 

deploying abroad—better training is an important aspect of the PLA’s overall 

military transformation—it has been a critical contributor to successful longer 

PLAN deployments and is an area of continuing focus for the PLA and PLAN. 

The 2008 Defense White Paper emphasized the need for better training to 

prepare for modern warfare, which included the need to train under informationized conditions, conduct more realistic training that mirrors combat 

conditions, train in complex electromagnetic environments, conduct joint 

training, and better evaluate the results of exercises.3

In addition to the Defense White Paper, the PLA issued a new version of its 

Outline for Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE) [junshi xunlian yu kaohe 

dagang, 军事训练与考核大纲], a set of authoritative long-term training instructions. The 2009 document reflected the training priorities listed above and also 

emphasized “stepping up research and training on non-war military actions,” 

training for a variety of security threats, diverse military tasks, and MOOTW.4

 In 

September 2011 the PLA’s General Staff Department (GSD) released an “Overall 
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Plan for Military Training Reform during the 12th Five Year Program,” which discussed reforms to increase force integration, establish better multi-service (joint) 

training, integrate a “system of systems” approach, and develop new training 

mechanisms to increase combined arms and multi-service competencies. A 

revised OMTE and these new training methods, according to PLA open source 

writings, should be in place by 2015, though at the time of publication of this book 

an official revision had not yet appeared.5

Very little is discussed in open sources about specific PLAN training of ships 

for deployments abroad. PRC and PLA leaders have called for increased PLAN 

far seas training in the past several years, though specific distances are generally 

not given. For example, East Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Du Jingchen stated 

in 2010 that “you can’t exercise a fine horse in a courtyard,” and called for:

regular training far out on the ocean. . . . In every one of the recent 

years, the Navy has arranged for units to go far out to sea and onto the 

oceans to train sailors. Surface ships going to the tactical setting of 

the island chain to train in tactical subjects, submarines training on 

long voyages, groups of aircraft making long-distance raids in complex weather conditions, surface ships, submarines, and aircraft in 

joint confrontational training, etc., have tempered Navy units, tested 

equipment, made crews familiar with environments, and boosted 

units’ all-round operational capabilities.6

Given the PLA’s overall emphasis on training for MOOTW and out of 

area operations, it can be assumed that specific guidelines exist for training 

PLAN ships for particular missions abroad. Recent work by Bernard Cole on 

PLAN training and exercises indicates that the PLAN follows a “building-block 

approach, with [individual ship] training progressing in both complexity and 

scope until a unit is qualified to join fleet-level operations. Such building-block 

events include training in small-craft maneuvering, sea-lane interdiction, reconnaissance, submarine positioning and navigation, landing ship formation steaming, weapons and sensor systems exercises, and aviation unit familiarization 

with new equipment.”7

 It is plausible that the PLAN follows a similar model 

when preparing certain flotillas for deployment abroad, particularly when they 

will work with foreign navies (as in the Gulf of Aden counterpiracy missions). 

In addition to domestic exercises, the PLAN has gained some of the skills 

it needs for longer deployments by working and exercising abroad with foreign 
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navies. While the PLAN has conducted search and rescue and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) exercises with various countries, the 

counterpiracy operations and subsequent exercises have provided the most 

benefit in terms of increasing PLAN knowledge of capabilities of ships operating at sea for sustained periods of time, logistics management, and development of personnel who know how to interact with foreign navies and operate 

independently far from home.8

 In September 2012, the U.S. Navy and PLAN 

conducted their first bilateral counterpiracy exercise, including a combined 

visit, board, search, and seizure. The focus of the exercise was on “bilateral 

interoperability in detecting, boarding and searching suspected vessels as 

well as the ability of both Chinese and American naval assets to respond to 

pirated vessels.”9 The PLAN also participated in the 2014 multinational Rim of 

the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, including conducting a gunnery exercise with 

U.S. Navy ships. More Chinese lessons learned from the counterpiracy mission 

will be discussed in the case study below.

Searching for Better Educated, More Professional Personnel 

The third area the PLA has sought to reform is its professional military education (PME) system.10 Like training, PME reform has been part of the PLA’s overall military modernization program over the past decade and has implications 

for the success of its deployments abroad. The PLA’s most recent efforts to educate and recruit the “right” type of officer can be traced back to the “Strategic 

Project for Talented People” implemented by the Central Military Commission 

(CMC) in 2003. The project was broadly aimed at recruiting and educating a 

technologically savvy contingent of officers capable of directing informationized wars and of building informationized armed forces in one to two decades; 

later versions added the requirement for officers who can command and take 

part in joint operations (essential for winning future wars, in the PLA’s view).11

In addition to education, the PLA has sought to develop a more “professional” force to send abroad that could interact with foreign officers as well 

as a force that could mentally withstand longer deployments. This involves 

political work to ensure loyalty to the party and cultural training, with the 

PLAN receiving particular attention as the main service to bear the brunt of 

deployments abroad. For example, in October 2012, then–Vice CMC Chairman 

Xu Caihou toured the Dalian Naval Academy and emphasized the importance 

of the cultural training center located on its grounds.12 In April 2012, the PLAN’s 
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training ship, the Zheng He, embarked from Dalian on a round-the-world voyage to teach naval cadets “professional sailing theories, methods and skills, and 

cultivate good nautical working styles” in addition to expanding the maritime, 

cultural, and diplomatic awareness of the PLA naval cadets on board.13

The importance of political work in longer deployments and far seas training is a continuous theme in PLA writings. For example, in January 2012, People’s Navy [人民海军] published a lengthy article that described the importance 

of political work during long voyages, using the PLAN East Sea Fleet Submarine 

Flotilla’s multiple long-voyage training as an example. The article described the 

use of political work in maintaining unit cohesiveness and a “positive fighting 

spirit” during a long voyage, the role of political cadres on board, the decisionmaking process of the “submarine interim party committee” during a weather 

emergency, and the role of self-criticism in ensuring that equipment and operations work properly.14 Another article states that because far seas tasks are 

so complex and the environment subject to change, political work is a major 

component of ensuring PLAN forces are able to complete missions abroad.15

Developing a More Sustainable Logistics System 

Finally, the PLA must be able to sustain a long-term operation abroad logistically. This has required some revamping of the logistics system, though the 

changes thus far have not been as wholesale as with training and PME. The 

PLA realizes that in order to carry out an increasingly diverse set of military 

missions, it must have a logistics system that is flexible, far-reaching, and able 

to respond quickly to natural disasters or emergencies abroad. The PLAN has 

already had to confront many of these issues to sustain its operations in the 

Gulf of Aden: logistical challenges cited include lack of reliable access to port 

facilities, lack of adequate food preparation (absence of fresh food), lack of crew 

time in port, procurement issues, lack of continuous communications, and 

various maintenance issues.16

Some of the solutions the PLAN has employed for maintenance, personnel, 

and procurement challenges include negotiating more regular access to ports 

to resupply and provide leave for crew members and decreasing red tape and 

procurement/shipping times through increased cooperation with civilian 

companies such as the Chinese Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) Logistics 

and Shipping. In addition, the United States and China have considered an 

agreement to share logistical resources such as fuel, food, supplies, and vessel 
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parts to support joint operations in counterpiracy and HA/DR missions.17 While 

the agreement has not yet been fully adopted, in 2013 the United States and 

China conducted joint counterpiracy exercises in the Gulf of Aden, paving the 

way for potentially broader cooperation.18

Communications issues have been somewhat remedied by providing continuous satellite communications for all out of area deployments.19 On this last 

point, China has been working on building a network of modern communications and navigation satellites that will help support future out of area missions. 

Various analysts have pointed out that the PLAN’s logistical capabilities 

will be limited as long as it lacks significant numbers of oilers and resupply ships 

capable of operating at great distances. These capabilities will likely take some 

time for the PLAN to build. In addition, the PLA’s logistical network is limited by 

its lack of overseas bases and inability to preposition equipment abroad.20

Sailing the Far Seas: PLA Navy Roles and Missions Abroad 

To better understand how the PLAN plans for deployment, it is instructive 

to look at where it deploys and what missions it seeks to accomplish. Beyond 

goodwill cruises and port calls around the world, which mainly serve to wave 

the flag and promote exchanges with foreign navies, three primary missions 

have taken the PLAN on longer deployments to execute specific tasks.

The first such mission is humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/

DR). As of the end of 2014, the PLAN had completed five humanitarian voyages 

with its hospital ship, the Peace Ark.

21 During the Harmonious Mission 2010 

deployment, the ship sailed through the Malacca Strait and into the Indian 

Ocean to make port calls in Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, the Seychelles, and 

Bangladesh.22 For the second deployment, Harmonious Mission 2011, the 

hospital ship journeyed through the Panama Canal and conducted port calls 

in Jamaica, Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago, and Costa Rica.23 During both of these 

voyages, the medical staff aboard the ship provided examinations portside. In 

November 2013, after international criticism over China’s slow response to a 

natural disaster in its region, the Peace Ark sailed to the Philippines to assist 

in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan.24 In 2014, the Peace Ark participated in 

RIMPAC in June and then visited Tonga, Fiji, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea 

for the medical service mission Harmonious Mission 2014.25

The second mission that will take the PLAN farther abroad is noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). The PLAN conducted its first NEO in Libya 
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in February 2011. The Libya NEO was primarily managed by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and most of the 35,000 Chinese nationals were evacuated 

by sea on chartered merchant vessels, chartered and military aircraft (PLAAF 

Il-76 transports), and buses. However, the PLAN directly participated by sending four military transports and a navy frigate, the Xuzhou, which had been 

part of the 7th Flotilla in the Gulf of Aden, to the Mediterranean Sea to escort 

and provide overwatch for the chartered shipping.26 In all, the PLA directly 

provided or assisted in the evacuation of almost 3,000 Chinese citizens.27 The 

deployment of the Xuzhou set a major precedent because it marked the first 

time China has sent military assets to a distant part of the world to protect its 

citizens there and demonstrated Beijing’s growing capability to conduct longrange operations that it had been incapable of performing only a decade ago. 

Finally, the missions of counterpiracy and protection of sea lines of 

communication (SLOCs) will require longer deployments. The Chinese 

consider piracy to be an increasing threat to their shipping. A number of 

SLOCs important to China run through areas affected by piracy, including 

routes in the South China Seas and the Malacca Strait, West Africa, and more 

recently the Gulf of Aden. The PLAN sent its first flotilla to the Gulf of Aden in 

December 2008 to counter piracy as part of a multinational task force. As of 

April 2015, the PLAN had sent 20 task forces to the Gulf of Aden. The Chinese 

ships are mainly focused on protecting their respective merchant shipping 

vessels transiting the area, though some coordination is occurring among the 

various navies. The counterpiracy case study discussed later in this chapter 

provides further details. 

Developing Capabilities to Support the Missions

While in-depth analysis of PLAN capabilities is beyond the scope of this chapter, 

it is worth briefly discussing the capabilities that the PLAN, in coordination with 

other PLA services, has developed or is in the process of developing to support 

the above missions. These include investing in aircraft carrier(s), which could 

support HA/DR and SLOC protection operations (in addition to playing a role in 

regional combat operations), expeditionary airlift and sealift, and at-sea replenishment capability. In addition, space-based assets such as communications 

satellites are necessary for PLAN ships operating far from home as they enable 

instantaneous communication for command and control from higher echelons. 

China already has a number of communications satellites in geostationary orbit 
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that allow both voice and data transfer to moving units. Navigation satellites 

are a crucial component of overseas operations, and China currently has at 

least 11 of these satellites in both geostationary and geosynchronous orbits.28

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites provide maritime 

surveillance for the PLA.29

Finally, the PRC government and the PLA have continued to successfully 

negotiate port access to support operations around the world. The prospect of 

Chinese “bases” abroad is the subject of much speculation. Locations in the 

Indian Ocean such as Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Gwadar (Pakistan), and most 

recently the Seychelles have been mentioned as possible future ports where 

the PLAN could negotiate access. Even without official bases, the PLAN has 

already effectively used a network of commercial ports in the Gulf of Aden to 

support its counterpiracy mission, providing a remarkably footprint-free way 

for China to conduct such operations far from home.30 As will be discussed 

in the case study below, the PLAN is already making regular use of Aden in 

Yemen, Djibouti Port in Djibouti, and Salalah in Oman for rest and replenishment of its flotillas. Local ports have provided fuel, food, and water to the at-sea 

replenishment ship dispatched with each flotilla.31

Case Study: PLAN Deployment Planning for Gulf of Aden 

Counterpiracy Missions 

The PLAN’s deployment to the Gulf of Aden is the longest and best documented 

of the Chinese navy’s expeditionary missions and thus provides a window 

through which to observe deployment planning efforts. This section will look 

at specific preparations the PLAN undertook prior to the Gulf of Aden deployments, as well as some of the issues they encountered throughout the missions 

and lessons learned for future deployments. For this case study, we examined 

several hundred PLA open source articles and analyses from 2008 to 2012 to 

determine how the PLAN went about preparing for these missions and the 

challenges they encountered along the way. Findings are divided into several 

areas: logistics and replenishment, equipment and maintenance, training, 

care for personnel, and communications.

It is worth noting that because the PLA announced that it would be carrying out counterpiracy missions in the Gulf of Aden less than 2 weeks before the 

first deployment, the amount of open source information on the earliest stages 

of planning for this endeavor is fairly limited. However, some assumptions can 
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be made based on the capabilities that the PLAN has shown over its first dozen 

missions off the coast of Somalia.

Logistics and Replenishment 

Deployment planning related to food and fuel issues evolved considerably over 

the course of the first few deployments to the Gulf of Aden. On the eve of the 

first naval escort task force’s departure, PLAN leaders expressed pride about 

the rations that they had procured for their sailors. In an interview with Xinhua, 

Captain Long Juan, commander of the missile destroyer Wuhan, said that the 

soldiers aboard his ship would be enjoying “self-service meals, eggs and milk 

at breakfast, fruit at all three meals, [and] beverages with the evening meal.” 

Moreover, he boasted, they would be able to eat sea cucumber or abalone, 

both highly nutritious delicacies, once a week while at sea.32 This was no doubt 

possible due to special refrigeration equipment aboard the ships capable of preserving leafy green vegetables for a full month and melons and other fruits for 

several months. 33 Additionally, the supply ship Weishanhu that accompanied 

the two destroyers on the first task force carried a total of 680 tons of dry goods 

and ammunition, a large part of which was presumably nonperishable food, 

as well as 250 tons of drinking water.34 The Chinese authorities estimated that 

these supplies would be sufficient for a “few months’ consumption.”

The Weishanhu berthed in Aden, Yemen, on February 21, 2009, to procure 

more food and water just under 2 months into the mission. This could indicate 

that initial estimates of how long the food supply would last may have been 

overly optimistic, or Aden might simply have been a convenient stopping point 

for replenishment.35 Replenishment at sea using merchant ships appears to have 

become standard procedure fairly quickly. In a September 2009 interview with 

state media, Yu Chang, deputy director of the materiel and fuel department of 

an unspecified support base for the South Sea Fleet, indicated that Chinese merchant ships were highly reliable, more likely to provide sailors with food that they 

enjoy eating, and offered cheaper prices than local alternatives.36 By the time the 

fifth naval escort task force deployed to the Gulf of Aden, Chinese merchant vessels like the Guyuhe were delivering up to 20 tons of fruits, vegetables, seasoning, 

staple foods, and other replenishment materials at a time.37

Fuel was also a major deployment planning priority for PLAN leaders 

during the initial task force deployments. When the Weishanhu departed from 

Hainan with the first task force on December 26, 2008, it took 10,500 tons of oil 
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to refuel the missile destroyers Wuhan and Haikou.

38 This supply was presumably dwindling by the time the Weishanhu docked in Aden to resupply in late 

February of 2009.

It is also clear that the PLAN was still very much in the process of refining its at-sea refueling procedures during the first several naval escort task 

forces. On the first task force, PRC media eagerly reported that the destroyers 

Wuhan and Haikou were refueled by the supply ship Weishanhu in the Strait 

of Malacca on December 30, 2008, only 5 days after they had left China for the 

Gulf of Aden.39 Similarly, Chinese papers reported that the Weishanhu, which 

stayed on after the first task force returned to Hainan, rendezvoused with 

the destroyer Shenzhen and the frigate Huangshan of the second task force 

for refueling on April 11, 2009, 2 days before the two new warships arrived in 

the Gulf of Aden.40 By the time of the fourth task force deployment, however, 

the PLAN had clearly refined its overseas fuel management capabilities to the 

point where the Chinese military press no longer felt the need to report every 

refueling. Subsequent reporting on refueling seems to have depended largely 

on if the task force fleet made friendly port calls or participated in international 

joint exercises on the way to its patrol area first.41

Port access is an undeniably critical issue for navies hoping to replenish 

their ships far from home. There has been substantial discussion in Chinese 

policy circles about the need for overseas bases, or at least supply points, in 

recent years. Interestingly, however, it appears as though China sent its first 

naval escort task force out to sea before it had finalized agreements to ensure 

access to onshore resupply points in the countries near the Gulf of Aden. At a 

Ministry of National Defense press conference on the eve of the first deployment to Somalia’s coastal waters, Rear Admiral Xiao Xinnian, deputy chief 

of staff of the navy, touched on the port access as he described the PLAN’s 

replenishment strategy for the upcoming mission:

The replenishment of their supplies . . . will be dominated by self-support and self-supply. When the ships are on duty in the region over a long 

period of time, we need to approach some ports in the nearby countries 

and territories to replenish their supplies. This issue is being negotiated 

with the coastal countries through relevant channels. Our military 

will send advance men to liaise and negotiate. Communication with 

relevant ports over some specific details is needed.42
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That the Chinese were willing to send two large warships and a replenishment vessel to Somalia prior to finalizing port access agreements with nearby 

nations suggests a certain level of confidence that Chinese military leaders 

and diplomats would be able to get these deals done in time, but it also shows 

that the priority for the PLAN in this case was to start conducting naval escort 

operations as soon as possible without getting bogged down in the specifics of 

predeployment planning for on-shore replenishment.

Eventually, ships in the naval escort task forces did begin to stop at foreign 

ports. The first such port call was when the replenishment ship Weishanhu 

of the first naval escort fleet docked in Aden, Yemen, in late February 2009 

to resupply. Before the ship arrived in Aden, an advance group made up of 

Chinese representatives from the Naval Headquarters, the Political and Logistics Departments, the Foreign Affairs Department, and the Transportation 

Department worked with employees of COSCO to procure locally the necessary 

goods for the replenishment operation.43 Subsequent task forces continued to 

use to the model of PRC government coordination with Chinese enterprises 

to coordinate on-shore resupply efforts as the PLAN established port access 

agreements with additional countries such as Oman (during the second task 

force), Djibouti (during the fourth task force), and Singapore (after the fifth task 

force’s mission concluded).44

Though the warships of the first naval escort task force remained at sea 

while the Weishanhu resupplied in Yemen, beginning with the second task 

force, Chinese destroyers and frigates also began to conduct port visits, presumably to provide weary sailors with shore leave.45 Though not directly related 

to the issue of deployment planning, it is also worth noting that beginning with 

the second task force, the fleets began making friendly and official military 

visits to other countries en route back to China after having completed their 

missions in the Gulf of Aden. Countries visited include Algeria, Australia, 

Bulgaria, France, Italy, Portugal, Turkey, Israel, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, the 

Philippines, Vietnam, Djibouti, Sri Lanka, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, 

Greece, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Morocco, Tanzania, South 

Africa, and the Seychelles.46 While the purpose of these visits has been largely 

to encourage friendly relations with the host countries, some of the port calls, 

notably those to the Seychelles, presumably were carried out in order to explore 

the possibility of establishing permanent supply points or even formal military 

bases abroad.47
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Equipment and Maintenance Issues 

Given that China did not announce its intention to send ships to patrol the 

Gulf of Aden until shortly before the deployment of the first naval escort task 

force, there is not a great deal of open source information about how equipment 

decisions factored into predeployment planning for the first counterpiracy 

missions. A March 2010 interview with China People’s Political Consultative 

Conference member retired Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo, however, sheds some light 

into the PLAN’s early discussion about which ships to deploy. Explaining the 

naval leadership’s thought process, Yin explained that:

we sent out two destroyers in the first batch for the escort mission, we 

sent out one destroyer and one frigate in the second batch, and we sent 

out all frigates in the third batch and the fourth batch. Why did we do 

things like this? We did that from the military economy perspective. 

When we went to the Gulf of Aden the first time, we were not familiar 

with that sea area, and we were not familiar with the wind and wave 

situation there either. However, the escort operations in the Gulf of 

Aden mainly relied on helicopters. Therefore, we sent out destroyers to 

go there in the beginning. They were large destroyers. One was 5,000 

tons to 6,000 tons, while the other one was 6,000 tons to 7,000 tons. 

Also, they brought one to two helicopters with them. At that time, we 

did not know much about the sea area there, so we would rather send 

bigger ships there first. 

During the second time, we sent out the second formation, with one 

large ship, one destroyer and one frigate. We wanted to see whether 

a frigate would work there or not. Therefore, we sent it there to have 

a try, and we found out that it did not have a great difference with a 

destroyer. During the third and fourth batches, we sent all frigates 

there. Frigates burn diesel oil, while destroyers use gas turbines, with 

a relatively large amount of oil consumption. Both kinds burn RMB 

[renminbi], and it is the money of our taxpayers. Of course, for the 

same task, the less money we spend, the better.48

Yin’s explanation illustrates that the Chinese leadership approached 

predeployment ship selection as a performance maximization problem that 
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required a careful balancing of firepower and costs. Over the course of the first 

few task force deployments, the PLAN gradually realized that it could achieve 

the same results with smaller, less expensive vessels, so it ultimately shifted 

toward including at least one frigate on every task force beginning with the 

second deployment.49 The one exception to this trend was the sixth task force, 

during which a destroyer accompanied a Yuzhao-class large landing vessel to 

the Gulf of Aden.50 Given that this was the first time such a landing vessel had 

been deployed to the area, however, this decision largely fits the trend of initially using maximal firepower to ensure operational success before whittling 

fleets down to smaller, more cost-efficient sizes.

Chinese naval officers and experts do not tend to discuss maintenance issues 

in great detail in the open source literature, but as some Western PLA analysts 

point out, capabilities in this area seem to have improved substantially. On the 

eve of the inaugural deployment to the Gulf of Aden, Rear Admiral Du Jingchen, 

commander of the first task force, stated: “To ensure reliability, all of the formation’s equipment has undergone thorough inspection, repair, and maintenance, 

and backup equipment is available for key items such as motive power, communication, and navigation equipment.”51 Not only did the PLAN leadership take 

predeployment measures to ensure the reliability of equipment, but it also made 

preparations to carry out repairs under way if necessary. Indeed, a September 

2009 article on the replenishment ship Weishanhu, which had just returned from 

servicing the first two task forces, reported: “In the course of performing its escort 

mission, the Weishanhu ship not only accomplished a large number of tasks for 

replenishment, but also played the role of a ‘hospital ship’ and ‘repair workshop.’ 

It carried out duties to treat the injured, make emergency equipment repair, and 

so on.”52 This report seems to confirm speculation of increased self-sufficiency 

with regard to repairs and maintenance.

This is not to say, however, that the predeployment plan to carry out repairs 

using replenishment ships as workshops has always been sufficient. During the 

first few missions, the task force fleets used port calls as opportunities to carry 

out maintenance and overhaul in Oman, Djibouti, and Yemen.53

Training 

Developing a comprehensive understanding of predeployment planning with 

regard to training is difficult using only the open source literature. Having said 

that, these sources do allow several important observations.
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First, much of what the PLAN has done in terms of training over the past 

decade prepared the members of the first few task forces for their missions to 

the Gulf of Aden. In a predeployment interview, Rear Admiral Du Jingchen 

emphasized this point. A December 2008 Xinhua article summarized his 

argument: 

Du Jingchen said the components of the formation are well trained 

and have strong and comprehensive capabilities. They have played 

important roles in preparation for military struggle and in exercises 

in recent years. Also, since the Chinese Navy’s first circumnavigation of the earth in 2002, its presence has been seen on the five great 

continents and the four great oceans. That has not only tempered the 

Navy’s long-distance sailing capabilities, it has also boosted its ability 

to carry out diversified military tasks. So the Navy certainly has the 

experience to carry out missions.54

In addition to the general training alluded to by Admiral Du, members of 

the first task force also underwent specialized counterpiracy and escort training prior to their deployment, though the specifics of this training are somewhat unclear. In his Xinhua interview, Du mentioned that the training focused 

on “characteristics such as the small size of pirate targets, their strong ability 

to conceal themselves, their determination to commit these crimes, and the 

flexible tactics.”55 At a Ministry of National Defense press conference around 

the same time, Rear Admiral Xiao Xinnian also emphasized that the men of 

the first task force had received “necessary preoperational training in light 

of this mission” without getting into specifics. He also expressed confidence 

that the mission would pose “no problem” for the well-trained PLAN sailors.56

Perhaps the most notable thing about PLAN training for the first few task 

force deployments is that a great deal of it (or at least of the training that was 

reported in the state media) took place either in or on the way to the Gulf of 

Aden. A December 29, 2008, PLA Daily article describing the first task force’s 

voyage to the coast of Somalia stated: “Two days into the mission, antipiracy 

training is already a daily occurrence aboard the ships.” Noting that the sailors 

only got the order to deploy 2 weeks before leaving China, the article mentioned 

that many of the troops had been getting seasick, perhaps a sign that they had 

not undergone extensive training in simulated realistic conditions before 

leaving for the Gulf of Aden.57
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Part of the reason for this is presumably that some types of operations are 

difficult to simulate in normal conditions. Several state media outlets carried 

stories about special forces troops practicing rappelling from helicopters at sea 

for the first time ever during the voyage to the first task force’s patrol area.58 It 

is interesting, however, that this seemingly last-minute training continued 

to be part of PLAN deployment planning long after the first handful of task 

forces concluded their missions. As part of the sixth task force, the Kunlunshan

amphibious transport dock carried out numerous exercises on its way to the 

Gulf of Aden. Reporting on this ship’s training regimen, one article noted: 

“This is the first time a PLA Naval amphibious transport dock conducted floatation-immersion drills in the open sea, making up for the lack of such abilities 

in relevant fields.”59 Given that the deployment of naval escort task forces had 

become fairly routine by this point, it is unclear why the crew of the Kunlunshan

did not find time to conduct this training well before deploying. There are other 

examples of soldiers attempting complex operations for the first time on the 

way to the Gulf of Aden on later task forces, including a February 2011 Xinhua 

story about an eighth task force helicopter pilot, for the first time ever, landing 

at sea during the night on a ship that was under way.60

One aspect of training that the PLAN leadership certainly considered 

carefully during deployment planning was how to help newly arrived task force 

fleets learn from their predecessors. According to PLAN officers, the PLAN 

Command College in Nanjing held meetings to capture lessons learned from 

officers leading counterpiracy deployments and incorporated this material in 

predeployment training for subsequent task forces.61 This concern manifested 

itself in the form of joint escort missions carried out by overlapping task forces. 

In general, the model was that the two task forces would carry out two joint 

escort missions, the first led by the outgoing task force and the second headed 

by the newly arrived fleet.62 At least during the earliest missions, some members 

of the outgoing task force would stay on for a period of time to help the new 

fleet get accustomed to its tasks. A March 2009 China Daily article featuring 

an interview with Rear Admiral Zhang Deshun mentions that some personnel 

from the first naval escort task force would stay on after the rest of the fleet 

departed in order to ensure the “consistency and effectiveness of the mission.”63

In addition to emphasizing training on technical military capabilities, 

PLAN leaders in charge of the naval escort task forces also included soft skills 

like legal expertise and foreign language proficiency in their early training 
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plans. Each of the 800 members of the first counterpiracy fleet received four 

handbooks emphasizing psychological knowledge, security knowledge, knowledge of international law, and instructions on how to apply international law 

in military situations.64 Additionally, a number of state media articles have 

pointed out that even early in the history of the PLAN’s counterpiracy missions, 

the task forces often incorporated spoken English into their training regimen.65

Likely as a result of successful training, the PLAN gradually began to 

entrust command of the task forces to less experienced officers after the initial 

missions. The commander of the first task force was then–Commander of the 

South Sea Fleet Rear Admiral Du Jingchen. Du’s previous experience included 

stints as deputy commander at the North Sea Fleet’s Lüshun Naval Base in 

Dalian and assistant chief of staff of the PLAN.66 The PLAN’s selection of such 

an experienced leader as the first task force commander probably indicates 

the importance that the military leadership placed on a successful outcome 

for the first mission.

By the seventh Gulf of Aden mission, slightly lower ranking officers were 

leading the task force. Rear Admiral Zhang Huachen, at the time the deputy 

commander of the East Sea Fleet, led the mission.67 Zhang’s previous major 

roles had included an assignment as the commander of the East Sea Fleet’s 

Fuzhou Naval Base.68 While Zhang held the same rank as Du at the time of his 

deployment to the Gulf of Aden, unlike Du, he had never held the most senior 

command position in a PLAN fleet. The PLAN’s willingness to deploy a less 

experienced commander on the seventh task force suggests a high level of 

leadership confidence in its commanders’ capabilities as well as an increased 

routinization of this particular mission.

Care for Personnel 

The well-being of personnel was a priority for the PLAN leadership during the 

deployment planning processes for the first task forces. The ships featured 

recreation facilities for sailors including libraries, computer study rooms, 

and gymnasiums, and the vessels were equipped with local area networks.69

By the time of the third task force, a protocol had been established to allow 

sailors to have relaxation time onshore while their ships made port calls for 

replenishment.70 For the fifth task force, concerns about sailors’ mental health 

led to the inclusion of staff psychiatrists aboard the ships for the first time.71

Efforts were also made to ensure that the men had access to email as well as 
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the ability to phone home twice a month.72 Beyond these quality of life issues, 

access to trained medical staff and the ability to execute emergency medical 

evacuations were concerns. For example, in 2010, an ill sailor ended up being 

flown to hospitals in Salalah and Muscat before finally being flown back to 

China for medical treatment.73

Communications 

Communications have steadily improved between the first and current counterpiracy task forces. In December 2008, while discussing how merchant vessels in the Gulf of Aden should contact the naval escort task force fleet on the eve 

of the inaugural counterpiracy deployment, Rear Admiral Xiao Xinnian said:

Chinese vessels should go through the notification channel first. 

This is more reliable. They can notify the Ministry of Transport and 

the Maritime Safety Administration of the time and location of their 

upcoming passage through the dangerous waters. The Ministry of 

Transport should be informed of the relevant factors, so that there 

will be a channel available for distress calls even in emergency. For 

distress calls in emergency, they can either make a direct call via the 

international channel, Channel 16, which we will keep open, as the 

position of our ships will be disclosed; or make their call via satellite 

communication or other relevant means of communication. The same 

method applies to foreign vessels that require emergency help and 

convoy cover.74

This top-down approach to communications, whereby the ships needed 

to first inform the Ministry of Transport before having a channel open to them, 

proved problematic, particularly when trying to coordinate and communicate 

with other navies in the same area. As a result, continuous satellite communications have been provided to the counterpiracy task forces, as well as an 

improved network of modern communications and navigation satellites that 

China has steadily deployed over the past several years. Finally, while the utility 

of centralizing versus decentralizing the task forces’ command and communications systems still appears to be up for debate, there is some evidence that 

current PLAN task force commanders do carry out more autonomous decisionmaking than their counterparts from the earlier task forces.75
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Length of Deployment 

Though length of deployment was certainly an issue that the PLAN decisionmakers considered during predeployment planning, fleet commanders and 

their superiors appear to have taken a wait-and-see approach to the exact 

number of days that the earliest task forces spent at sea. A Xinhua article 

announcing the departure of the first naval escort task force fleet reported: 

“The first phase of the mission will last for three months and the Navy will send 

new ships to relieve the fleet at an appropriate time, depending on the situation 

and the UN [United Nations] Security Council.”76 Even as the first task force 

was winding down operations, the exact timeframe for its return remained 

unclear. Interviewed for a March 9, 2009, China Daily article, Rear Admiral 

Zhang Deshun was unable to give an exact date for when the first round of 

ships would be replaced, stating only that it would probably be sometime in late 

April or early May. He did, however, indicate the level of detail of Chinese naval 

planning when he mentioned that the leadership was considering emergencies 

such as the potential failure of a warship and an upcoming monsoon in the 

Indian Ocean as it tried to pinpoint ideal replacement dates.77

Chinese aversion to scripting exact dates for the fleets to deploy and return 

continued into the second task force. In an early April 2009 interview with the 

PLA Daily, second naval escort task force fleet commander Rear Admiral Yao 

Zhilou said that it was not yet set how long the mission would last. The PLA Daily 

interview noted: “China will act strictly in accordance with the international 

laws and the related resolutions of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 

and make the decision according to the actual condition in escort waters off 

Somalia.”78 While Chinese leaders cited international law and the “actual condition” of the waters off the coast of Somalia, it is clear that as the PLAN gained 

more experience in counterpiracy naval escort and expanded the network of 

overseas ports that it could use for replenishment, the length of the early task 

force deployments increased gradually, though only slightly.

Challenges Encountered, Lessons Learned, and Changes Made 

for Future Deployments 

Evaluations of China’s counterpiracy missions in the open source literature 

tend to be very positive and rarely discuss setbacks or failures, so it is difficult 

to paint a completely representative picture of the challenges that the PLAN has 

encountered and the changes that it has made as it expanded its reach to include 
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the Gulf of Aden. There are, however, several issues that the Chinese have 

publicly identified as being challenges. These are issues that would affect any 

long-term deployment, so the solutions made or proposed to these challenges 

would probably pertain to future PLAN deployments to other parts of the world.

Well-Being of Personnel 

A major concern for PLAN planners has been the health, both physical and 

mental, of the sailors deployed on the naval escort task forces. An April 2009 

PLA Daily article discussing the performance of the first task force as it prepared to return home emphasized just how grueling the mission had been for 

the first cohort of Chinese sailors to patrol the Gulf of Aden: “During the last 

period of the escort mission, the sailors, worn out both physically and mentally, 

are apt to slack off. . . . But all the servicemen of the escort task force are making 

all-out efforts to fulfill every escorting task successfully.”79 Despite the paper’s 

praise of the sailors’ efforts to work through their exhaustion, it is clear that 

the 3 1⁄2-month deployment had taken quite a toll on the men. Later that year, 

after the third task force had deployed to the Gulf of Aden, Li Jie of the Chinese 

Naval Research Institute commented: “Some measures should also be taken to 

help naval servicemen stay in good physical and psychological shape.”80 These 

statements hint at how the first escort missions proved surprisingly physically 

and mentally taxing for the hundreds of sailors onboard.

The PLAN leadership has been fairly quick to respond to these calls for 

better conditions for escort personnel. While the destroyers of the first task 

force fleet stayed at sea for the duration of their deployment, by the second 

deployment, Chinese naval planners had realized the importance of rest in 

ensuring the health of personnel. In late June 2009, roughly 7 weeks into the 

second task force’s deployment, personnel aboard the fleet’s three ships were 

given brief shore leave in Oman, a practice that PLAN has continued to carry 

out on subsequent task forces.81 Chinese naval planners have also attempted to 

keep troops physically and mentally fit in a variety of other, more subtle ways 

discussed in previous sections, including stationing psychiatrists on task force 

ships, improving entertainment facilities onboard, and increasing access to 

communications with sailors’ families. In a particularly creative show of innovation, the PLAN provided each member of the tenth naval escort task force 

with special “heat-proof” (lightweight) clothing after acknowledging persistent 

complaints about the hot, humid climate in the Gulf of Aden.82
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Ongoing Logistics Challenges

The PLAN was also quick to recognize deficiencies in its logistics planning, 

particularly with regard to replenishment and food storage issues. Issues with 

the quality of goods procured during the first on-shore replenishment of the 

first naval escort task force seem to have been largely solved by the time the 

Weishanhu returned to China following the second task force. Additionally, 

initial struggles with food preservation seem to have been mitigated by the 

development and refinement of advanced refrigeration techniques in coordination with several PLAN departments. Finally, as mentioned earlier, more 

frequent access to a greater number of ports in the region have contributed to 

smoother logistics and replenishment during long deployments.

More Permanent Bases or Places 

Despite improved access to ports around the world, the chorus of calls for 

permanent overseas supply points (or perhaps even bases) has only grown 

louder over the past few years, indicating that replenishment (and logistics 

more generally) remains an issue in the eyes of a substantial part of the PLAN 

leadership. Indeed, the PLAN’s reliance on access to friendly ports—and a 

stable political and security environment to support that access—severely 

limits what it can count on in both peacetime and during conflict. A less stable 

or friendly environment would limit China’s reach and thus its capabilities to 

perform various expeditionary tasks.

Better Communications 

While not discussed nearly as much as other issues related to counterpiracy 

operations, there is clearly still room for improvement in communications, 

particularly communications with foreign navies. As mentioned earlier, 

China has increased the number of communications and navigation satellites 

substantially over the past decade. In terms of communications with foreign 

navies, there are indications that the PLAN is willing to work with others. In 

January 2012, China entered into an agreement with India and Japan to share 

their naval assets in the counterpiracy operations. This includes exchanging 

piracy-related information over the Internet, as well as sharing information 

about warship movements and escort schedules.83 Nevertheless, a senior 

PLAN officer has cited the PLAN’s command, control, and communications 
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system as an obstacle to cooperation with other navies conducting counterpiracy operations.84

Conclusion 

Although the PLAN has made remarkable strides in its expeditionary capabilities and its ability to plan for long-term deployments over the past 10 years, 

outstanding issues and challenges remain, particularly with logistics and 

communications. The PLAN will undoubtedly continue to use the Gulf of Aden 

counterpiracy deployments to hone its skills and refine the solutions to these 

challenges for use in deployments in the future. However, questions remain 

as to how well the lessons learned from the Gulf of Aden deployments will 

translate to other deployments elsewhere in the world. Depending on the mission and task, it is likely that many of the challenges mentioned above would 

persist or even worsen if the PLAN were to attempt a long-term deployment to 

another part of the world. How the PLAN will grapple with these challenges in 

the future remains to be seen.

Notes

1 The New Historic Missions as stated by Hu Jintao include ensuring military 

support for continued Chinese Communist Party rule; defending China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security; protecting China’s expanding 

national interests; and helping to ensure a peaceful global environment and promote 

mutual development. 

2 Michael Chase and Kristen Gunness, “The PLA’s Multiple Military Tasks: 

Prioritizing Combat Operations and Developing MOOTW Capabilities,” China Brief 

10, no. 2 (January 21, 2010). 

3 Bernard D. Cole, “China’s Navy Prepares: Domestic Exercises, 2000–2010,” 

in Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad, ed. Roy Kamphausen, 

David Lai, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 

2012), 19–80.

4 Ibid. See also Wu Dilun and Liu Feng’an [吴弟伦, 刘逢安], “Highlights of 

Military Training in First Half of 2009” [上半年全军军事训练亮点纷呈], PLA Daily [解

放军报], July 9, 2009; and Wu Dilun and Liu Feng’an, “General Staff Department Lays 

out Plan for Military Training Throughout the Armed Forces in the New Year” [总参部

署全军新年度军事训练工作], PLA Daily, January 7, 2009.

5 Liu Feng’an and Hu Junhua [刘逢安, 胡君华], “Describing the ‘12th Five-Year 

Program’ Period Military Training Scientific Development Blueprint” [描绘“十二五”

时期军事训练科学发展蓝图], PLA Daily, September 23, 2011.
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6 Du Jingchen [杜景臣], “Regard the Distant Seas and Oceans as Training 

Areas” [把远海大洋当作「练兵场」], People’s Navy [人民海军], May 18, 2010.

7 Cole; also see Christopher D. Sharman, China Moves Out: Stepping Stones 

Toward A New Maritime Strategy, China Strategic Perspectives 9 (Washington, DC: 

NDU Press, April 2015).

8 Michael McDevitt, “PLA Naval Exercises with International Partners,” 

in Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad, ed. Roy Kamphausen, 

David Lai, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 

2012), 81–126.

9 U.S. Navy Public Affairs Office, USS Winston S. Churchill, “US and China 

Team Up for Counter Piracy Exercise,” September 18, 2012, available at <www.navy.

mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=69643>.

10 The PLA does not use the term professional military education, referring 

instead to military education.

11 “Chinese Military Steps Up Training for Talented Soldiers,” Xinhua, December 27, 2004, available at <http://english.sina.com/china/1/2004/1227/15352.html>. 

For an in-depth description of personnel reform in the PLA, see Roy Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, and Travis Tanner, eds., The People in the PLA: Recruitment, 

Training, and Education in China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

September 2008).

12 “Xu Caihou Tours Troop Units in Dalian and Qingdao,” PLA Daily, October 

16, 2012, available at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/7978019.html>.

13 Li Qinwei and Cao Jinping [李秦卫, 曹金平], “Zheng He Training Ship’s 

Round-the-World Navigation Boasts Four Features” [郑和舰环球航行有四大特点], 

PLA Daily, April 18, 2012.

14 Wu Hanyue and Cao Jieyu [吴寒月, 曹结余], “Strong Guarantee for Moving 

Out Into the Deep Blue Sea—Record of a Certain Submarine Flotilla of the East Sea 

Fleet Using the Main Theme and the Main Line to Guide Ideological and Political 

Work During Long Voyages” [走向深蓝的坚强保证:东海舰队某潜艇支队用主题主线引

领远航中思想政治工作纪实], People’s Navy, January 9, 2012.

15 Zheng Lei [郑雷], “Exploration of Political Work in Distant-Sea Tasks” [远海

任务中政治工作探索], People’s Navy, November 9, 2011.

16 Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici with Isaac Kardon and Joshua Wiseman, China’s Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles, and 

Potential Solutions, China Strategic Perspectives 3 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 

December 2010).

17 Donna Miles, “U.S., China to Consider Sharing Resources During Joint 

Missions,” American Forces Press Service, October 12, 2012.
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18 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Annual Report to Congress, 2014 (Washington, DC: 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014), available at <www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_

DoD_China_Report.pdf>.

19 Yung and Rustici with Kardon and Wiseman.

20 Abraham M. Denmark, “PLA Logistics 2004–2011: Lessons Learned in the 

Field” in Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 

2012), 297–336; and Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici with Scott Devary and Jenny 

Lin, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun”: Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st

Century, China Strategic Perspectives 7 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, October 2014).

21 For an excellent description of the Peace Ark and its missions, see Peter 

Mackenzie, Red Crosses, Blue Water: Hospital Ships and China’s Expanding Naval 

Presence (Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, September 2011), available at <www.

cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Red%20Crosses,%20Blue%20Water%20

D0025784%20A1%20(2).pdf>.

22 Ju Zhenhua and Wang Lingshuo, “PLA Navy ‘Peace Ark’ Hospital Ship 

Leaves Kenya,” PLA Daily, October 19, 2010; Joy Nabukewa, “Jubilations as Chinese 

Medical Ship Docks at Kenyan Port,” Xinhua [新华], October 13, 2010.

23 Wang Zhenjiang and Dai Zongfeng, “Peace Ark Hospital Ship to Visit 

Latin America,” PLA Daily, September 16, 2011, available at <www.china.org.cn/

world/2010-10/14/content_21122285.htm>.

24 Jane Perlez, “China Offers Hospital Ship to the Philippines,” New 

York Times, November 19, 2013, available at <http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.

com/2013/11/19/china-offers-hospital-ship-to-the-philippines/?_php=true&_

type=blogs&_r=0>.

25 Zhang Tao, ed., “Chinese navy sails out for 2014 RIMPAC,” Xinhua, June 

9, 2014, available at <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2014-06/09/content_5948932.htm>; “‘Peace Ark’ hospital ship arrives 

in Papua New Guinea,” China Military Online, September 12, 2014, available at 

<http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2014-09/12/content_6134725.htm>.

26 Gabe Collins and Andrew S. Erickson, “Implications of China’s Military 

Evacuation of Citizens from Libya,” China Brief 11, no. 4 (March 10, 2011).

27 Embassy of China in South Africa, “Chinese Naval Warships Visit Durban 

on 4 April 2011,” March 29, 2011, available at <www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/

sgxw/t810585.htm>. 

28 For a comprehensive overview of China’s space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, see Mark A. Stokes and Dean Cheng, China’s 
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Evolving Space Capabilities: Implications for U.S. Interests, paper prepared for the 

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 

Institute, April 26, 2012), available at <http://project2049.net/documents/uscc_china-space-program-report_april-2012.pdf>.

29 Andrew S. Erickson, “Satellites Support Growing PLA Maritime Monitoring 

and Targeting Capabilities,” China Brief 11, no. 3 (2011), 13–19.

30 Daniel J. Kostecka, “The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the 

Indian Ocean,” China Brief 10, no. 15 (July 22, 2010), 5; “Seychelles Invites China to 

Set Up Anti-Piracy Base,” Agence France-Presse, December 2, 2011; Jeremy Page and 

Tom Wright, “Chinese Military Considers New Indian Ocean Presence,” Wall Street 

Journal, December 14, 2011; Li Xiaokun and Li Lianxing, “Navy Looks at Offer From 

Seychelles,” China Daily, December 12, 2011.

31 Yung and Rustici, 30.

32 Bai Ruixue [白瑞雪], “Chinese Navy’s Ship Protection Formation All Set for 

Departure” [中国海军护航编队准备就绪], Xinhua, December 25, 2008. 

33 Ibid.

34 Liu Yanxun, Chen Xiaoshu, Wang Jing, He Jing, Li Haoran, and Yao Yijiang [刘炎迅, 陈晓舒, 王婧, 何婧, 李赫然, 姚忆江], “Background of Expedition to 

Somalia—Chinese Push Forward to Dark Blue,” China News Magazine [远征索马里

背后—中国海军挺进“深蓝”], January 5, 2009, 20–26. 

35 Tian Yuan and Qian Xiaohu, “‘Weishanhu’ Ship Accomplishes First Replenishment at Foreign Port,” PLA Daily, February 25, 2009.

36 Sun Zifa [孙自法], “Chinese Navy’s ‘Weishanhu’ Supply Ship Sets New 

Records in Maritime Support” [“微山湖”舰护航:创造中国海军远洋保障新纪录], China 

News Agency [中国新闻社], September 13, 2009.

37 Li Jianhong and Zhang Qi [李建红, 张旗], “Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce 

Entrusts Merchant Ship with Replenishment for First Time” [海军第五批护航编队首次

依托商船进行补给], PLA Daily, May 31, 2010.

38 Liu Yanxun et al. 

39 “Chinese naval fleet completes first at-sea replenishment,” Xinhua, December 30, 2008.

40 Xia Hongping and Cao Haihua, “Second Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce 

Meets Supply Ship Weishanhu,” PLA Daily, April 13, 2009.

41 Yin Hang and Yu Huangwei, “6th Chinese naval escort taskforce arrives in 

Gulf of Aden,” PLA Daily, July 14, 2010; Li Jianwen and Fang Lihua, “Seventh Chinese 

naval escort taskforce arrives in Gulf of Aden,” PLA Daily, November 18, 2010; Liu 

Yiwei and Hou Rui, “8th Chinese naval escort taskforce leaves Pakistan for Gulf of 

Aden,” PLA Daily, March 14, 2011.
345

CHAPTER 14

42 Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, “Ministry 

of National Defense Briefing on Navy’s Deployment to Gulf of Aden/Somali Waters to 

Provide Convoy Cover and Other Information” [国防部介绍海军赴亚丁湾, 索马里海域

护航情况等], December 23, 2008. 

43 “Our Naval Escort Ship Docked at a Foreign Port for Necessary Daily Support for the First Time” [我海军护航军舰首次停靠外港补给生活用品], Xinhua Online 

[新华网], February 24, 2009. 

44 Kostecka.

45 Ibid.

46 “Chinese missile frigate ‘Xuzhou’ visits Malaysia,” Xinhua, December 

7, 2009; “Chinese Naval fleet makes port call in Manila,” Xinhua, April 13, 2010; 

Andrew S. Erickson, statement before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission, Panel III: “China’s Political and Security Challenges in the Middle 

East,” “China and the Middle East” hearing, Washington, DC, June 6, 2013; Andrew 

S. Erickson and Austin Strange, “China’s Blue Soft Power,” Naval War College Review

68, no. 1 (Winter 2015), 81–82; “China proud of her role in ensuring maritime safety,” 

Seychelles Nation, April 18, 2011; and Li Jianwen and Fang Lihua, “Chinese warships 

visit South Africa,” PLA Daily, April 6, 2011.

47 Peter Simpson and Dean Nelson, “China considers Seychelles military 

base plan,” The Telegraph, December 13, 2011, available at <www.telegraph.co.uk/

news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/seychelles/8953319/China-considers-Seychelles-military-base-plan.html>.

48 “Yin Zhuo: Maritime Hegemony of the United States Threatens China’s 

Security” [尹卓:美国海上霸权威胁中国安全], China Online [中国网], March 8, 2010. 

49 NIDS China Security Report 2011 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense 

Studies, February 2012), 32. 

50 Ibid., 32.

51 Bai Ruixue. 

52 Sun Zifa.

53 Kostecka. 

54 Bai Ruixue.

55 Ibid.

56 “Ministry of National Defense Briefing on Navy’s Deployment to Gulf of 

Aden/Somali Waters to Provide Convoy Cover and Other Information.”

57 Qian Xiaohu and Tian Yuan, “Anti-Piracy Training Becomes Required Daily 

Training Subject,” PLA Daily, December 29, 2008. 

58 Li Tang [李唐], “Escort is carrying out anti-piracy exercise” [海军护航编队边
346

GUNNESS AND BERKOWITZ

航行边进行反海盗演练], China Youth Daily [中国青年报], January 3, 2009.

59 Hai Tao and Liang Jiawen [海韬, 梁嘉文], “The ‘birth’ record of China’s first 

aircraft carrier” [中国首艘航母“诞生”记], International Herald Leader [国际先驱导报],

July 9, 2010. 

60 Qiu Junsong and Tang Shifeng [邱俊松, 唐诗风], “Chinese Navy Eighth 

Escort Formation Conducts First Comprehensive Anti-Piracy Drill” [中国海军第八批

护航编队首次举行反海盗综合演练], Xinhua Online [新华网], February 25, 2011. It is 

important to note, however, that PRC media often publicize events for propaganda 

purposes; in this case, it seems unlikely that such training had never been conducted 

before, given the routine nature of the deployments. 

61 Thanks to Phillip C. Saunders for this information, derived from 2013 and 

2014 meetings with PLAN officers.

62 See, for example: “Two Fleets of Chinese Naval Escort Ships Meet in Gulf 

of Aden,” China View, April 13, 2009, available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/

english/2009-04/13/content_11180769.htm>; “Commander of USCTF 151 Visits 

‘Zhoushan’ Frigate,” China Defense Mashup, November 4, 2009, available at <www.

china-defense-mashup.com/commander-of-usctf-151-visits-zhoushan-frigate.

html>; Li Jianwen and Liu Yiwei,“Chinese Navy Fights Pirates,” China Military 

Online, March 17, 2011, available at<http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/special-reports/2008hjdjhd/2011-03/17/content_4407525.htm>. 

63 Cui Xiaohuo, “Somali mission fleet to be replaced, navy official says,” China 

Daily, March 9, 2003, available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-03/09/content_7552551.htm>.

64 Liu Yanxun, Chen Xiaoshu, Wang Jing, He Jing, Li Haoran and Yao Yijiang.

65 Qian Xiaohu and Cao Haihua [钱晓虎, 曹海华], “‘Chaohu’ Warship Sets Multiple Ocean-Going Escort Records” [‘巢湖’舰 创我战斗舰艇远洋护航多项纪录], PLA 

Daily, December 15, 2010. 

66 “In adjustment of high-level Navy officers, Di Jingchen to become commander of the East Sea Fleet” [海军高级将领调整杜景臣出任东海舰队司令员], People’s 

Daily Online [人民网], December 29, 2009, available at <http://news.xichu.net/

folder111/folder209/2009/12/2009-12-2963853.html>;“China begins anti-piracy 

mission,” BBC News, December 26, 2008, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

africa/7799899.stm>

67 “Chinese escort taskforce commander meets EU counterpart,” PLA Daily, 

February 16, 2011, available at <http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2011-02/16/content_4385740.htm>.

68 “Zhang Huachen comes to tour Zhucheng” [张华臣来诸城参观], People’s 

Daily Online [人民网], February 17, 2007.
347

CHAPTER 14

69 Bai Ruixue.

70 Zhang Qingbao [张庆宝], “Resolutely protect the safety of the nation’s strategic corridor—interview with Rear Admiral Wang Zhiguo, Commander of the Third 

Naval Escort Taskforce bound for Gulf of Aden, Somalian waters” [坚决维护国家战略

通道的安全-访第三批赴亚丁湾索马里海域护航编队指挥员王志国少将], People’s Navy 

[人民海军], August 5, 2009.

71 Ai Yang, “Navy beefs up anti-piracy effort,” China Daily, March 4, 2010, 

available at <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-03/04/content_9534852.htm>. 

72 Ibid.

73 Michael McDevitt, “PLA Naval Exercises with International Partners.” 

74 “Ministry of National Defense Briefing on Navy’s Deployment to Gulf of 

Aden/Somali Waters To Provide Convoy Cover and Other Information.”

75 Yung and Rustici with Kardon and Wiseman, 22.

76 “Chinese Navy Sets Sail for Anti-Piracy Mission off Somalia,” Xinhua, 

December 26, 2008. 

77 Cui Xiaohuo. 

78 Xia Hongpin and Cao Haihua [夏洪平, 曹海华], “The coherence and effectiveness of protective ship escort operations” [确保护航行动的连贯性和有效性], PLA 

Daily, April 2, 2009.

79 “First Chinese naval escort taskforce keeps good performance before leaving,” PLA Daily, April 9, 2009. 

80 Li Jie, “China’s Navy Still Has Far to Go,” China Daily, August 14, 2009.

81 Huang Shubo and Su Yincheng, “Chinese naval escort taskforce berths in 

Port Salalah for rest,” PLA Daily, July 2, 2009.

82 Gao Fei and Yang Kai, “Chinese naval escort taskforce sees heat-proof clothing introduced,” PLA Daily, November 16, 2011. 

83 Nitin Gohkale, “India, China, and the Pirates,” The Diplomat, March 6, 2012, 

available at <http://thediplomat.com/2012/03/06/india-china-and-the-pirates/>.

84 2014 comments by a senior PLAN officer who has deployed on counterpiracy missions. Thanks to Phillip C. Saunders for providing this information.

349

Andrew Scobell is a Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. 

He was previously an Associate Professor of international affairs at the George 

H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. 

He is the author of China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and 

the Long March (Cambridge University Press, 2003) and co-authored China’s 

Search for Security (Columbia University Press, 2012). In addition to editing or 

co-editing 12 books, Dr. Scobell has written dozens of reports, monographs, 

journal articles, and book chapters. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from 

Columbia University.

Arthur S. Ding is a Distinguished Research Fellow and Director of the 

Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University in Taipei. His research focuses on China’s security and defense policy, including 

civil-military relations, defense strategy, defense industry, and arms control. 

His publications include China’s Changing Military Theory, 1979–1991, PRC’s 

Defense Industry Conversion, and numerous journal articles and chapters in 

edited books. He received his BA in anthropology from the National Taiwan 

University and his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Notre Dame.

Phillip C. Saunders is Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic 

Research, both part of National Defense University’s Institute for National 

Strategic Studies. Dr. Saunders previously worked at the Monterey Institute of 

International Studies, where he was Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation 

Program from 1999 to 2003, and served as an officer in the U.S. Air Force from 

1989–1994. He is co-author of The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic 

Restraint in an Era of Vulnerability (NDU Press, 2011) and co-editor of books 

on PLA influence on Chinese national security decisionmaking, China-Taiwan 

CONTRIBUTORS
350

CONTRIBUTORS

relations, the Chinese navy, and the Chinese air force. Dr. Saunders attended 

Harvard College and received his MPA and Ph.D. in international relations 

from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University.

Scott W. Harold is a Full Political Scientist and Deputy Director of the 

Center for Asia-Pacific Policy at the RAND Corporation, where he specializes 

in Chinese foreign policy, East Asian security, and international affairs. In 

addition to his work at RAND, Dr. Harold is an Adjunct Associate Professor of 

Security Studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, where he has taught since 2006. Prior to joining RAND in August 

2008, Dr. Harold worked at the Brookings Institution from 2006 to 2008. 

Samuel K. Berkowitz is a Research Assistant at the RAND Corporation. 

He holds a BA in economics with a minor in East Asian Languages and Civilizations from the University of Chicago. Prior to joining RAND, he studied in 

Beijing at Tsinghua University with the Inter-University Program for Chinese 

Languages Studies.

Michael S. Chase is a Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation 

and an Adjunct Professor in the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at The Johns Hopkins University. He was previously an Associate 

Professor at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Prior to 

joining the faculty there, he was a Research Analyst at Defense Group, Inc., 

and an Associate International Policy Analyst at RAND. He is the author of the 

book Taiwan’s Security Policy: External Threats and Domestic Politics (Lynne 

Rienner, 2008) and numerous chapters and articles on China and Asia-Pacific 

security issues. He holds a Ph.D. in international affairs and an MA in China 

studies from SAIS.

Dean Cheng is the Senior Research Fellow for Chinese political and security affairs in the Asia Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation. He specializes 

in Chinese military and foreign policy and has written extensively on Chinese 

military doctrine, technological implications of its space program, and “dual 

use” issues associated with China’s industrial and scientific infrastructure. 

Before joining the Heritage Foundation, he was a Senior Analyst with the Center 

for Naval Analyses, a Federally funded research and development center, and 

a Senior Analyst with Science Applications International Corporation (now 

Leidos). He has testified before Congress, spoken at the U.S. National Defense 

University, U.S. Air Force Academy, and National Space Symposium, and has 

been published in the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post.
351

CONTRIBUTORS

Mark Cozad is a Senior Defense Analyst at the RAND Corporation. He has 

written on Chinese military planning and strategy, intelligence analysis, and 

global strategic warning issues. Before joining RAND, he served in both the 

military and Intelligence Community at the strategic, operational, and tactical 

levels as well as in a variety of functional areas including intelligence analysis, targeting, operational planning, and strategy development. In his final 

assignment in the Intelligence Community, he served as the Assistant Deputy 

Director of National Intelligence for the President’s Daily Brief. Immediately 

preceding his assignment to the Office of Director of National Intelligence, Mr. 

Cozad was the Defense Intelligence Officer for East Asia, the senior intelligence 

officer on that issue within the Department of Defense.

Jeffrey Engstrom is a Senior Project Associate at the RAND Corporation. He 

was previously a Defense Policy Analyst at Science Applications International 

Corporation. He is a co-lead author of China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (RAND, 2015) 

and is the author or co-author of numerous reports and articles focused on 

Chinese military capabilities, disaster relief, power projection, and partnership capacity-building. Mr. Engstrom received his BA in political science and 

international studies from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and an MPP 

from the University of Chicago.

Kristen Gunness is Adjunct Senior International Policy Analyst at the 

RAND Corporation, where she specializes in Chinese military and foreign 

policy issues. Formerly, Ms. Gunness served as the Director of the Navy Asia 

Pacific Advisory Group at the Pentagon, where she advised the Chief of Naval 

Operations on security and foreign policy trends in East Asia. Ms. Gunness has 

written extensively on Chinese security affairs and is the co-editor of Civil-Military Relations in Today’s China: Swimming in a New Sea (M.E. Sharpe, 2006). 

She holds an MA in security studies from Georgetown University’s Edmund 

A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.

Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang is a Professor at Tamkang University’s Institute of Strategic Studies, Chairman of the Council on Strategic and Wargaming 

Studies, and Secretary-General of the Council of Advanced Policy Studies in 

Taiwan. He is also a Nonresident Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies in Washington, DC. Dr. Huang previously served in 

the Taiwan government as Deputy Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, 

and has been working closely with consecutive governments on foreign and 
352

CONTRIBUTORS

security policy matters. He specializes in Asian and Chinese foreign and 

security affairs. His recent publications include “Taiwan in an Asian ‘Game of 

Thrones’” in Asia Policy and “East China Sea Peace Initiative: From Principle 

to Practice” in A Bridge over Troubled Waters: Prospects for Peace in the South 

and East China Seas (Prospect Foundation, 2014).

Ben Lowsen is an Assistant Army Attaché in the U.S. Defense Attaché Office 

in Beijing. He has been an Active-duty officer since 1998, serving as a Field 

Artilleryman in Germany, South Korea, and Qatar and as a China Foreign Area 

Officer on the Army Staff in Beijing. He received an MA in East Asian regional 

studies from Harvard University.

Ma Chengkun is Professor and Director of the Division of PLA Studies 

at Taiwan’s National Defense University. Professor Ma received his Ph.D. in 

China’s war behavior study from National Taiwan University and specializes 

in People’s Liberation Army affairs. His articles include “China’s security strategy and military development” and “China’s three warfares against Taiwan.” 

Professor Ma is currently researching China’s military strategic thinking and 

military transformation and participates in international academic exchanges 

about China’s military modernization with various countries.

Lyle Morris is a Project Associate at the RAND Corporation with over 5 years 

of experience researching issues and leading projects related to Asia-Pacific 

security, Chinese defense and foreign policy, and U.S.-China relations. Prior 

to joining RAND, Mr. Morris was the 2010–2011 Next Generation Fellow at the 

National Bureau of Asian Research and a Research Intern with the Freeman 

Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

From 2004 to 2008, Morris lived in Beijing, where he studied Mandarin Chinese 

at Peking and Tsinghua universities and later worked at Dentsu Advertising and 

the China Economist Journal. Mr. Morris received an MA in international affairs 

from the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs and a 

BA in international business from Western Washington University.

Lieutenant Colonel Mark A. Stokes, USAF (Ret.), is Executive Director of 

the Project 2049 Institute. During 20 years of Air Force service, Mr. Stokes was 

assigned to a variety of electronic warfare, intelligence, planning, and policy 

positions. In 1989, Mr. Stokes entered the Air Force’s foreign area officer training 

program, and from 1992 to 1995, he served as the Assistant Air Attaché in the 

U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Beijing. Mr. Stokes subsequently was assigned 

to Headquarters U.S. Air Force’s Plans and Operations Directorate, where he 
353

CONTRIBUTORS

was responsible for operational and strategic planning for the Asia-Pacific 

region. Between 1997 and 2004, he served as Senior Country Director for the 

People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, and Mongolia in the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, with responsibility for 

developing, coordinating, and managing U.S. defense policy with respect to 

China. Mr. Stokes holds a BA in history from Texas A&M University, an MA in 

Asian studies from the Naval Postgraduate School, and an MA in international 

relations and strategic studies from Boston University.

Marcelyn L. Thompson is a Federal employee with a BA in Sino-Russian 

Studies from Vanderbilt University and MPA from the Monterey Institute of 

International Studies. She holds a Certificate in Chinese Studies from the 

Hopkins-Nanjing Center and was an Asia-Pacific Leadership Fellow at the 

East-West Center. Using a Fulbright Scholarship and Freeman Foundation 

grant, she conducted postgraduate research on labor migration and human 

trafficking in Northeast Asia. She is also a graduate of the Joint and Combined 

Warfighting Course at the Joint Forces Staff College.

Jonathan Walton is a Ph.D. student and Katzin Scholar at the University of 

California, San Diego. His research focuses on state-society relations, social 

control, and religious policy in China, combined with a longstanding interest 

in analog simulations and game design as methods for modeling and exploring 

complex issues. He previously worked for 7 years in the policy world with the 

National Bureau of Asian Research and Long Term Strategy Group. Mr. Walton 

has an MA in China studies from the University of Washington and a BA in East 

Asian studies from Oberlin College.

Catherine Welch is an Asia Analyst at the CNA Corporation. Before joining CNA, Ms. Welch worked at the Greater Cincinnati Chinese Chamber of 

Commerce and at an energy consulting firm in Washington, DC. Her research 

interests include China’s approaches to crisis management, U.S.-China cyber 

security cooperation, China’s political and military cooperation in Asia, and 

U.S.-China relations. Ms. Welch is the author or editor of a number of publications about China and the People’s Liberation Army including China’s New 

Media Milieu: Commercialization, Continuity, and Reform (CNA, 2010). Ms. 

Welch holds an MA in global affairs from George Mason University and a BA 

in Asian and Middle Eastern studies from the University of Pennsylvania.

Thomas Woodrow served at U.S. Pacific Command in Honolulu, Hawaii, 

from 2003–2014, where he was most recently the Senior Intelligence Analyst for 
354

CONTRIBUTORS

the Joint Intelligence Operations Center China Division. Mr. Woodrow previously worked at the Defense Intelligence Agency as a Senior Expert in Chinese 

and Russian military, and nuclear forces. He is the author of numerous studies 

on Chinese political, military, and economic policies. Mr. Woodrow received 

an MS in national security strategy from the National War College and an MA 

in international public policy from the Paul H. Nitze School of International 

Studies at The Johns Hopkins University.

Colonel Larry M. Wortzel, USA (Ret.), served two tours of duty as a Military 

Attaché in China. He was a faculty member and Director of the Strategic Studies 

Institute at the U.S. Army War College. After retirement, he was Asian Studies 

Director and Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy at the Heritage 

Foundation. Dr. Wortzel served for seven terms on the U.S.-China Economic 

and Security Review Commission. He has written or edited 10 books and 

numerous articles about China and East Asia. His latest book is The Dragon 

Extends its Reach: Chinese Military Power Goes Global (Potomac, 2013). A graduate of the U.S. Army War College, Dr. Wortzel earned his Ph.D. in political 

science from the University of Hawaii-Manoa.
355

1-2-3 Project, 42–43

Academy of Military Sciences (AMS), 302

Afghanistan

potential Chinese intervention in, 9

relations with China, 254, 256, 264

relations with Russia, 270

U.S. operations in, 37, 252, 255–257

aircraft carriers, 10

see also PLAN: Fleet 

Liaoning, 210

anti-air raid combat system, 26

Arab Spring, 41, 62, 75–76, 79, 252, 270

avian influenza crisis, 6, 87, 94

Beidou satellite, 40, 42–43, 44

bingyuan dongyuan (troop mobilization), 110 

border missions, see also contingency planning, territorial disputes, People’s Liberation Army

types of, 265

Burma (Myanmar)

Chinese economic interest in, 214, 216

Kachin Independence Army (KIA), 216

PLA contingency planning for, 9, 213–220

Relations with China, 8–9, 214

U.S. relations with, 219

C3

I (command, control, communications, and intelligence), 44

in China, 45

in the United States, 36

C4

ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance)

in China, 5, 33, 43–47, 142–143, 241

INDEX
356

INDEX

in the United States, 5

campaign theory of the PLA, 22, 24, 27–29, 46

Campaign Theory Study Guide, 22, 25

consistency of, 19, 23, 24, 27–29 

Science of Campaigns,The, 22, 27

Science of Military Strategy, The, 22

Science of Strategy, The, 22

System-of-systems (tixi) concept, 25

Central Asia

Chinese relations with, 252, 261, 263–257

potential Chinese intervention in, 8, 251–252, 258

U.S. intervention in, 252, 255–257

central leading groups

on dealing with evil cults, 64

role in emergency response, 95

on stability preservation, 64

Central Military Commission (CMC), 7, 15, 85, 114, 120, 189–190, 233, 

expansion of PLA by, 15, 324

structure of, 15, 136–139

changqi fazhan (long-term development of mobilization), 115–116

China Coast Guard 

formation of, 10, 280

interaction with PLAN, 10, 280

near seas operations, 10, 206, 280–282

China Communications Construction Group (CCCG)

in Libya, 38

“China Dream,” 205

China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), 294

China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), 306

Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 11, 55

interagency coordination, 64, 89–90, 94, 95–96, 98, 121–122, 306, 312–313

political mediation, 263

Chinese domestic security, see People’s Armed Police, Public Security, 64

Chinese evacuation of Libya, 2011

PLAAF actions, 10, 37–39, 303

PLAN actions, 10, 37–39, 303, 326–327

Chinese media

in emergency response, 64,87, 94,98, 306

in social unrest, 71, 74–75, 78, 303

Chinese Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), 306, 325

Chinese supply base in Horn of Africa, 34

civilian emergency response planning, 4, 6–8, 36, 38, 85–86, 89–94
357

INDEX

basic steps, 90–94

civilian

civil-military coordination, 37–38, 42–43, 46, 46–47, 64–66, 85–86, 96–99, 108, 113, 

233, 260–261, 304–307, 312–313, 325–326, 331

 infrastructure, 42–43, 306

 in joint exercises, 40, 294–295

 leadership relations, 121–122, 233, 285, 294,

 whole-of-government approach, 11

evacuation, 36–38, 42–43, 301–314

mobilization, 113–114

national defense education (guofang jiaoyu), 115

overseas, 302, 304

Cold War, PLA actions in, 20–21

Collective Rapid Reaction Forces, 268

Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 255–257

command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3

I) , 44

in China, 45

in the United States, 36

command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (C4

ISR)

in China, 5, 33, 43–46, 142–143, 241

in the United States, 5

comparison of disaster relief and warfighting, 159–160, 172–176

constraints on Chinese military expansion, 11

contingency planning

against Russia (Soviet Union), 19–20

against the United States, 17, 19–20, 26, 255

Chinese assessments of U.S. planning, 5, 23, 26–27, 33–34, 35–37, 41, 46–47, 99, 

311–312

 in Afghanistan, 37, 252, 255–257

 in Desert Storm, 36, 44

 in Grenada, 34–36, 43–44

 in Gulf War, 27, 36, 39, 44

 in Iraq, 34, 36–37, 41, 44

for border conflict, 3, 8–9, 265,

 with Afghanistan, 3

 with Burma (Myanmar), 3, 8–9, 205–207, 213–220

 with Central Asia, 3, 265

 with India, 3

 with North Korea, 3, 8–9, 205–213

for counterpiracy, see also PLAN: counterpiracy operations, 20, 42

for counterterrorism, see also social unrest 20, 23–24, 24, 253, 263
358

INDEX

development of quick response capabilities, 47

for disaster relief, 2, 3, 20, 157, 159–172, 282

definitions of, 34–35

 Chinese terminology

 yingji, 34–35

 yingji jihua, 1, 34–35

 yingji yu’an, 34–35

 zhanqian cehua, 34–35

 zhanqian chouhua, 34–35

 differences between U.S. and Chinese definitions, 1–2

 for domestic security, 79

 for evacuation operations, 301–314

 flexibility of planning process, 4, 24, 27–28

 geographically oriented threat assessments and, 27

 in the United States, see also United States, 1, 5, 35–37, 311–312

 for internal stability, 55–56, 205, 263–264

 “lesser included cases,” 3 

 for Near Seas operations, 2, 17, 27, 44, 206

 Ningxia Provincial Plan 2006, 6, 70–71, 28

 operational level factors, 28

 peacetime, 142

 for regional stability, 16, 251–270

 role of civilians in, 36, 46–47, 260–261

 sources for studying Chinese policies, 3, 16, 22, 57, 61–62, 64–74, 85–86, 94, 

 159–160, 175–178, 208, 238, 328

 standardization of the PLA’s, 46

 for Taiwan, 1, 2, 4, 16–17, 20, 28, 141–142, 174

 use of training programs to create, 4, 41, 322–324

 Xi’an Municipal Planning 2010, 6, 68–70

crisis action planning, 1–2, 34–35, 37, 47

cyberwarfare, 9, 238–239

Dai Bingguo, State Councilor, 253

defense mobilization committees

 service and branch, 124

 Military Region level

 responsibilities, 123–124

 structure, 123–124

national level, 7, 39–40, 109, 120–122

 responsibilities, 123

 structure, 122, 125, 126

People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs) (renmin wuzhuang bu), 124, 127

defense white papers, China
359

INDEX

2008, 322

2011, 260

2013, 295

deliberate planning, 1–2, 34–35, 

Democratic Progressive Party, 17

Deng Xiaoping

 guidelines for mobilization (zongfangzhen), 113

 preparations for war, 108

 reforms, 57–58

Desert Storm, 36, 44

DIME concept, 258–259

diversified military tasks (duoyanghua junshi renwu), see also MOOTW, 303

domestic incidents, see natural disasters, social unrest

Domestic Security Department, 64

duoyanghua jinshi renwu (diversified military tasks), see also MOOTW, 3, 15, 303

economy

 and contingency plans, 6, 9, 108, 112, 113, 205, 212–213, 230, 234, 257–258

 and social unrest 58, 78

 and mobilization, 113–115

emergencies see, Avian Influenza, Severe Acute Repertory Syndrome, social unrest, 

natural disasters

 government response to

 moderate, 6

 severe, 6

emergency rating scales, 69–71, 86–89

using to determine type of support, 92–94

Emergency Response Law 2007, 266

emergency response plans

 Beijing Olympics, 2008, 87

 categories of, 86–89, 94

 examples of, 94

 implementation of 94–95

 number of, 87–88

evacuation operations, see also noncombatant evacuations operations

 instances of, 302–303

 PLA and, 113

 PLAAF and, 10, 37–39, 303

 PLAN and, 10, 37–39, 303, 326–327

 PRC and, 302

feizhanzheng junshi xingdong (MOOTW), 3

Fisheries Law Enforcement (yuzhang), 292

Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 257–258
360

INDEX

gaojishu tiaojian xia jubu zhanzheng (Local Wars Under High-Tech Conditions), 

107–108

General Armaments Department (GAD), 136

General Logistics Department (GLD), 42, 136

General Political Department (GPD), 136, 237

 Base 311, 144

General Staff Department (GSD) 1, 136–139, 322–323, Figure 6.1

Intelligence Department, 138–139

Operations Department, 1–2, 97, 137

Greece

relations with China, 38

Grenada, 34–36, 43–44

Gulf of Aden, 259

counterpiracy in, 42

evacuation of Libya 2011, 11, 37–39, 301–306, 310–314

Gulf War, 27, 36, 39, 44

guofang jiaoyu (national defense education), see also mobilization, 115

guojia haiyang weiyuanhui (State Oceanic Commission SOC), 292

guomin jingji dongyuan (national economic mobilization), 112

haijian (Marine Surveillance), 292 

Hu Jintao

New Historic Missions, 2–3, 15, 18, 28, 258–259

on maritime expansion, 280

on mobilization, 113

on social unrest, 193

human rights, in China, see also Tibet, Xinjiang, social unrest, 216–217

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), 323–324, 326

huoqin wuzi dongyuan (material mobilization), 110

India

contingency planning against China, 229, 232

exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 227

McMahon Line, 228

military capabilities of, 231, 232–233, 235–236, 239

naval capabilities of, 226

PLA action against , 9, 225, 229

relations with China

 border dispute 9, 225–226, 229–232

 effect of civil-military structure on, 232–234

 effect of economy on, 234, 242

 effect of nuclear capabilities on, 234–236, 242

Sino-Indian joint exercise, 231

Sino-Indian War 1962, 9, 225, 230, 237–240, 265 
361

INDEX

Sumdurong Chu incident 1986, 230

Tibet government-in-exile, 228, 229 

informationization 22–23, 36, 42, 46, 111–112, 288

of the PLA, 43–48

Integrated Command Platform (ICP), 45, 46–47

intelligence capabilities, Chinese, 138–139, 141

internal crisis, 159

internal unrest, see social unrest

intervention 

by China

 in Afghanistan, 9

 in Central Asia, 9, 261, 266

methods of, 9–10, 268

via Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 9, 253–256, 270

Iraq, U.S. operations in, 34, 36–37, 41, 44

Japan

Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), 284

debate over Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, 17, 44, 282–283

military

 JCG Mizuki, 282

relations with United States 

 economic, 234

jiaotong zhanbei dongyuan (transportation combat preparations), see mobilization

jiji fangyu, jinhai zuozhan (active defense, near seas operations), 287

jin’an fangyu (coastal defense), 287

Joint Campaign Command, 139–146

“campaign decision,” 7

members of, 7

joint exercises

Rim of the Pacific 2014 (RIMPAC), 324, 326

Sino-Indian joint exercise, 231

joint operations, 27, 256, 261, 282, 284, 289

junshi xunlian yu kaohe dagang (Outline for Military Training and Evaluation 

(OMTE)), 323

junshi zhanlüe fangzhen (Military Strategic Guidelines), 5

Korean war 1950-53, 8, 160, 172–175

kuayue (Stride military exercise), 40

Kyrgyzstan, 252 

capabilities of, 267–268

China relations to, 303

PRC Law on Reserve Service Officers 1995, 128

local authorities
362

INDEX

role in emergency response plans, 87, 89–92, 97–98

role in mobilization efforts, 121, 124–125, 126–129

role in social unrest, 57, 60, 63–65, 73–77, 192

Local Wars Under High-Tech Conditions (gaojishu tiaojian xia jubu zhanzheng), 

107–108, 288

Local Wars Under Informationized Conditions (xinxihua tiaojian xia jubu zhanzheng), 107–108, 252–253

Liu Huaqing, Admiral, 287

logistics

in China, 41–73, 270, 329–331, 340

in the United States, 37

main strategic direction (zhuyao zhanlüe fangxian), 5

effect on operation planning, 5 

Mao Zedong, 

preparations for war, 107–108

reaction to social unrest, 8, 76, 185–188

Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies, see China Coast Guard, Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, Marine Surveillance, People’s Liberation Army Navy, 290–292, 

Table 12.2

Malaysian Flight MH-370, 2

Marine Surveillance (haijian), 292

mass incidents see social unrest

military exercises

Mission Action (shiming xingdong) 2010, 41, 45, 210, 241

Stride (kuayue) 2009, 40,241

Military Options Other than War (MOOTW) (Feizhanzheng junshi xingdong), see also 

New Historic Missions, 9–10, 24, 27, 189, 259, 307, 321–324 

Military Region

Shenyang, 40–41

Lanshou, 40

Jinan, 40

Chengdu, 40, 210

military strategic guidelines (junshi zhanlüe fangzhen), 5, 16, 19–20

connection to New Historic Missions, 19

effect on operation planning, 5, 17

Local Wars Under High-Tech Conditions, 22, 107–108, 288

Main Strategic Direction and, 19

strategic objectives (zhanlüe mudi), 17

mingfang dongyuan (civil defense mobilization), see Mobilization

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 303–314, 327

and the PLA, 312–313

Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), 95
363

INDEX

Ministry of Public Security, 55

mobilization, 39–41, 109

of armed forces, 110, 115–116

 equipment mobilization, 110, 112–113

 material mobilization, 110

 troop mobilization , 110

capacity, 8–9, 27, 40–41, 109, 129–130, 163–169

civilian, 36, 39–40

definition, 165

diplomatic, see mobilization: political

during peacetime, 107–108, 109–110, 120, 126

during wartime, 108, 120, 126

economy and, 108, 109, 112, 113, 

implementation, 7, 22, 40, 66–67, 71, 96–98, 119–121, 126–129, 

 structure, 126–129

information, 111–112

during the Korean War, 8, 160, 172–175

legal structures of, see also National Defense Mobilization Law, 117–118

manpower effort, 160, 170–176

national defense education, 115

national economic, 112

organizational structures of, 118–129

of the PAP, 55

People’s Air Defense (renmin fangkong dongyuan), 110

 civil defense mobilization, 110

 mass-style defensive mobilization, 110

People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs), 127

of the PLA, 110, 143

political (zhengzhi dongyuan) 110–111

preparation, 4, 7, 109, 114–117, 239

principles of

 sequencing and effectiveness, 116–117

 key point construction, 116

 long-term development (changqi fazhan), 115–116

 population-wide participation, 114

 unified leadership, 114

role of civilian infrastructure in, 40, 108, 109, 111–113, 114–115, 260–261

science and technology, 116, 113

speed capacity, 113

during the Sino-Vietnamese War 1979, 8, 172–175

throughput capacity, 166–176

transportation combat preparations, 112
364

INDEX

under high-tech conditions, 107–108

under informationized conditions, 109, 111–112, 116

in the United States, 36

modern warfare, 21–22

preparation for , 39–47

modernization of the PLA

C4

ISR, 5, 43–46, 142–143

logistics, 5, 41–43

mobilization, 5, 39–41, 107–108, 109–113

National Contingency Plan for Mass Incidents 2005, 56

National Defense Law 1997, 120–121, 189

National Defense Mobilization Law 2010, 7, 39–40, 44, 85, 108, 109, 114, 117–119, 260

formation, 118

National Emergency Response Plan 2006, 6, 86–99, 

structure of, 89–90

National People’s Congress (NPC), 120–121

National Security Commission (NSC), 38–39

natural disasters, 161–165

examples of, 96–97

Wenchuan earthquake 2008, 8, 164, 170

Winter storms 2008, 8, 163, 170, Table 7.5

Yunnan earthquake 2012, 6, 95, 96

Yushu earthquake 2010, 8, 164–165, 170

Zhouqu mudslides 2010, 8, 165, 170

Near Seas 

areas of 

 Bohai Gulf (bohai wan) 279

 East China Sea (donghai) 279

 South China Sea (nanhai) 279

 Taiwan Straight (taihai) 279

 Yellow Sea (huanghai) 279

China Coast Guard efforts in, 10, 206, 280–282

Chinese exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 281

disaster and crime at sea, 282

disputed maritime claims in, 282

encounters with foreign forces in, 281

freedom of navigation in, 281

maritime resources competition in, 281–282

PLAN efforts in, 10, 226–227, 280–282, 282–288

New Historic Missions (xinde lishi shiming), 2–3, 15, 18, 28, 258–259

diversified military tasks (duoyanghua junshi renwu), see also MOOTW, 15, 24 

Hu Jintao and the, 19, 321
365

INDEX

protecting China’s sovereignty, 3

territorial integrity, 3

world peace, 3 

Ningxia Provincial Plan 2006, 6, 70–71, 28

noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), 36–38, 42–43, 301–314

nonintervention

Chinese policy of, 11, 205

North Korea

internal politics of, 207–208

military intervention in 

 by South Korea, 9, 212

 by the United States, 9, 207

PLA contingency plans for, 3, 9, 207–213

refugee crisis, potential for, 9, 209

relations with China, 8–9, 213, 260

relations with South Korea 

 Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), 211

 sinking of Cheon’an, 207, 207, 260

and weapons of mass destruction, 8–9, 209–210

nuclear weapons 

capabilities of

 China, 225, 234–236

 India, 225, 234–236

 North Korea 8–9, 207, 209–210

command and control of, 138, 142, 145

modernization, 136

nuclear deterrence, 9 

operational concepts, 

problems with the PLA’s, 20–21

Olympics, Beijing 2008, 87

Outline for Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE) (junshi xunlian yu kaohe 

dagang) 2009, 323

Pakistan

relations with China, 227–228, 257

Patterns of Strategic Action (zhanlüe xingdong yangshi), 20

Peacekeeping

and the PRC, 9–10, 79

force, 258

problems with operations, 264–265

People’s Armed Police (PAP), 4, 6

and border contingencies, 208–209, 215

capabilities of, 8, 190–191, 196–197
366

INDEX

interactions with the PLA, 9, 56, 185–186, 188–197, 209–209, 270

international deployment, 270

response to social unrest, 8, 55–57, 60–61, 65, 65–79, 185–186, 188–197, 260

responsibilities of, 55,110, 209, 264, 266

People’s Armed Police Law 1995, 56

People’s Armed Police Law 2009, 56–57, 67–68, 266, 267

People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

assets of, 4, 7, 142

autonomy of commanders, 47 

border conflict and, 205–220, 225–226, 231, 236–242, 252–253, 259–260

campaign operations of, 24

capabilities of, 4, 44, 144–146, 225, 231, 267, 268–269, 307–313

combined arms campaigns, 237 

diversified military tasks, see also MOOTW, 15–18

education of, 193–195, 324–325

expansion of, 6

grade and rank structures, 147 

interaction with PAP, 9, 56, 185–186, 188–189, 208–209, 207

international deployment of, 2, 253, 264–265, 267–268 

limitations of, 11, 325–326

mobilizing of, 110, 143

modernization of, 5, 25, 27–29, 33, 39–46, 135, 146, 196, 235, 241–242

morale of, 193

noncombatant evacuation, 303–304

operational concepts

 issues of, 20 

 noncontact warfare, 23

 three attacks, three defenses, 23

operations level thinking, 21

personnel in the, 193–196

planning system, 5, 20–21 

 link to civilian systems, 85, 99

relations with civilians, 194

 civil infrastructure and the, 3, 4, 39–40, 127, 129 

response to social unrest, 8, 56, 67, 71–72, 185–197, 264

responsibilities of, 3, 24,

 debate on, 17

shift to global engagement, 21, 28

training programs of, 4, 322–324

 building-blocks approach, 323

 Outline for Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE) (junshi xunlian yu 

 kaohe dagang) 2009, 323
367

INDEX

War Control, 236

People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), 141-142, 239–240

capabilities of, 164, 268, 305–307, 309–310

evacuation of Libya 2011, 10, 37–39, 303

fleet

 F-117 Stealth Fighter, 113

 Il-76, 310

 Qiang-5, 239

 Su-17, 239

 Xi’an fighter-bomber, 239

 Y-20 strategic transport, 310

interaction with PLAN, 310–311

People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), 295

capabilities of, 10, 210, 308–309, 327–328, 405–406

communications in the, 326, 337, 340–341, 

counterpiracy operations, 4, 11, 226, 321, 324, 327–328, 341

deployment of, 284, 290, 294, 327–341, 338

 long-term deployments, 11, 305–311, 321

evacuation of Libya 2011, 10, 37–39, 303, 326–327

expeditionary capabilities of, 11, 206, 226–227, 321, 327–341

fleet, Table 12.1

 aircraft carriers, 210

 Chaohu, 283

 Guangzhou, 283

 Haikou, 226, 330

 Han-class submarine, 281

 Jingganshan, 285, 309

 Kunlunshan, 283, 309

 Lanzhou, 285

 Liaoning, 210

 Shang-class nuclear submarine, 226

 Weishanhu, 329–330, 331, 333

 Xinhua, 329

 Xuzhou, 305, 308

 Yulin, 285

 Yuzhao-class LPD, 309

in the Gulf of Aden, 2, 4, 11, 37–39, 325, 327–338

interaction with PLAAF, 310–311

logistics, 329–331, 340

modernization of, 280–281, 288–290

noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), 4, 10, 326–327

out of area operations, 323
368

INDEX

peacetime missions, 324, 326–327,

personnel of the, 336–337, 339

protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), 327

strategic concepts, 287

 “active defense, near seas operations” (jiji fangyu, jinhai zuozhan), 287

 coastal defense (jin’an fangyu), 287 

 distant ocean offense (yuanyang jingong), 287

 “near seas defense” (jinhai fangyu), 287–288

and the U.S. Navy, 324

wartime missions, 280–281

People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery, 8, 141–142, 144–145, 235

People’s Republic of China (PRC)

foreign policy, 11, 111, 205, 257–258

global presence, 24, 28

maritime interests, see also territorial disputes, near seas operations, 289

mechanisms of control, 63–64

overseas citizen protection, 302

stability preservation, 56, 78–79, 205, 230, 268,

Philippines

BRP Gregorio del Pilar, 283

territorial dispute with China, 206

Public Security forces, 4, 6, 60–61

desensitization of, 62

access to weapons, 68

and the People’s Armed Police, 67–68

Quadrennial Defense Review, 2010, 26

quntixing shijian (mass incidents), see social unrest

Regulations on Handling Mass Incidents 2008, 65–67

renmin fangkong dongyuan (People’s Air Defense), 110

renmin wuzhuang bu (PAFDs), 127

requisition of civilian infrastructure, 9, 39–41, 112, 140

Russia

relations with Central Asia, 256

relations with China, 252

Scarborough Shoal, 17

Science of Military Strategy, The, 17

Science of Strategy, The, 17

Study of Ground Force Campaigns, The, 17–18

2012 standoff, 283, 292

Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, 17, 44

2010 Ship Collision, 282–283

Chinese actions in, 283–285
369

INDEX

Japanese actions in, 283–285, 293–294

Severe Acute Repertory Syndrome (SARS) crisis, 6, 56, 86, 98

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 9, 253–256, 270

Afghanistan, 256

 potential Chinese intervention in, 9 

Central Asia

 potential Chinese intervention in, 9, 261, 266

mandate of, 255–256, 263

Peace Mission exercise series, 253, 267–268, Table 11.1

Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), 253, 263, 267–269

Russia and the, 255–256

Shanghai Five, 252, 256

shiming xingdong (Mission Action) exercise, 41

Sino-Vietnamese War 1979, 8, 172–175, 265

social unrest in China, 6, 55–79

causes of, 57–58, 65, 73–74, 78, 186

CCP reaction to, 64–65, 72–73, 77–79, 185, 289–190, 191, 196–197

challenges of security response, 72–79

collective petitions, 58

Deng Xiaoping, reaction to, 8, 186, 187–188

forms of, 57–63

grassroots prevention of, 64–65, 73, 74, 76–77

Hu Jintao, reaction to, 59–60, 63–64, 71–72, 196

incidents of, 55–56, 59, 62–63, 73–74, 187, 188, 191–192, 194

Jiang Zemin, reaction to, 188

Mao Zedong, reaction to, 8, 76, 185–188

motivations for, 58–59

 “backbone” organizers of an incident, 74

regulations on handling of, 6, 56–57, 188–197

role of foreign power in, 61–62, 63, 75–77

role of technology in, 75-77

Tiananmen Square protests 1989, 8, 61, 72, 187, 196, 264

in Tibet, 58, 63, 79, 186–187

treatment of protesters, 74

Xi Jinping, reaction to, 56–60, 75

in Xinjiang, 9, 58, 63, 71–72, 79, 251

Zhou Yongkang, reaction to, 56

Soloman Islands

Evacuation 2006, 303

South China Sea 

disputes in, see territorial disputes

mapping of, 44
370

INDEX

space capabilities of China

see Beidou satellite

Skynet satellite, 44

Ziyuan III satellite, 44

stability-instability paradox, 234

stability preservation (weiwen), 56

State Council Emergency Management Office, 89

State Oceanic Administration (SOA), 284–285, 292

State Oceanic Commission (SOC) (guojia haiyang weiyuanhui), 292

State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), 38

strategic deployment of forces (zhanlüe bushu), 20–21

strategic direction (zhanlüe fangxiang), 19–21

Strategic Planning Department (SPD), 38

“string of pearls,” 289

Taiwan, 2, 17

contingency planning for, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 16–17, 20, 26, 28, 141–142, 174, 290

 psychological warfare, 144, 

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 17

independence, PLA response to, 2, 27, 254

and PLA main strategic direction, 20–21

and the PLAN, 280, 290, Table 12.1

relations with the United States, 2

Strait, 144–145, 279

Strait Crisis, 1996, 2, 174, 279

unification with mainland China, 2, 17, 145, 287

Tajikistan, 252

capabilities of, 267–268

territorial disputes

Chunxiao gas fields 2004–2005, 290

East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), 206, 293

Line of Actual Control (LAC), India, 230–231

Luconia Shoals, 206

Scarborough Shoal, 206

Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, 282–283

Spratly Islands, 206

with Japan, 279, 282–285, 294

with the Philippines, 206

types of future conflict, 17–18

Three Evil Forces, 252, 254–255, 263 

Tiananmen Square protests, 8, 61, 72, 187, 196, 264 

Tibet

effect on Sino-Indian relations, 228, 237
371

INDEX

social unrest in, see social unrest

tixi (system-of-systems) concept, 25

types of warfare, 108

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 281

United States

military operations

 in Afghanistan, 37, 252, 255–257, 

 in Grenada, 34–36, 43–44

 in Gulf War, 27, 36, 39, 44

 in Iraq, 34, 36–37, 41, 44

Naval ships

 USNS Impeccable, 281

 USS Cowpens, 281

 USS Kitty Hawk, 281

relations with China, 254, 281, 324

Unrestricted Warfare, 258–259

weiwen (stability preservation), 56

Xi Jinping

“China Dream,” 205

reaction to social unrest, 56–60, 75

Xi’an Municipal Plan 2010, 6, 68–70

xinde lishi shiming (New Historic Missions), 2–3

Xinjiang, 254–255, 297

Yin Zhou, Rear Admiral, 285

yingji jihua (contingency planning), 34–35 

yuanyang jingong (distant ocean offense), 287

zhanlüe bushu (strategic deployment of forces), 20–21

zhanlüe mudi (strategic objectives), 17

zhanlüe xingdong yangshi (patterns of strategic action), 20

Zheng Ming, Rear Admiral, 293–294

zhengzhi dongyuan (political mobilization), 110–111

zhuyao zhanlüe fangxian (main strategic direction), 5

zongfangzhen (reforms), 57–58



How will China use its increasing military capabilities in the 

future? China faces a complicated security environment 

with a wide range of internal and external threats. Rapidly 

expanding international interests are creating demands for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to conduct new missions ranging from 

protecting Chinese shipping from Somali pirates to evacuating citizens from Libya. The most recent Chinese defense white paper states 

that the armed forces must “make serious preparations to cope with 

the most complex and difficult scenarios . . . so as to ensure proper 

responses . . . at any time and under any circumstances.”

Based on a conference co-sponsored by Taiwan’s Council of 

Advanced Policy Studies, RAND, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and National Defense University, The People’s Liberation 

Army and Contingency Planning in China brings together leading 

experts from the United States and Taiwan to examine how the PLA 

prepares for a range of domestic, border, and maritime contingencies. 

The book includes chapters on how the PLA, domestic security forces, 

and the civilian government conduct contingency planning and how 

military commanders can draw upon national level military assets 

and mobilize civilian resources to execute their plans. Substantive 

chapters assess PLA planning for potential domestic contingencies 

such as suppressing internal unrest, border contingencies involving 

India, Myanmar, North Korea, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, and 

maritime contingencies in both the near and the far seas. Authors 

also examine PLA preparations and performance in disaster relief, 

counterpiracy, and noncombatant evacuation operations.

Improving PLA capabilities are giving Chinese leaders new 

options to respond to domestic and international crises, but the PLA 

still has significant limitations in projecting and sustaining power, 

especially in contested environments.