AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

US-Led Cooperative

Theater Missile Defense in

Northeast Asia

Challenges and Issues

REX R. KIZIAH

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 21

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

July 2000

AIR UNI V ERSITY
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views o

University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any o

US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii

This Maxwell Paper, and others in the series, is availab

electronically at the Air University Research web si

http://research.maxwell.af.mil under “Research Paper

then “Special Collections.”
Foreword

In this paper, Lt Col Rex R. Kiziah, USAF, examines c

rent US efforts to cooperatively develop and deploy w

Japan and South Korea a theater missile defense (TMD) fa

ily of systems (FoS) in Northeast Asia. First, the author su

marizes the US security strategy for the East Asia-Pac

region with emphasis on the importance of regional mis

defense. Second, he characterizes the ballistic missile ca

bilities of North Korea and China, which constitute the 

mary threat in the region and have spurred increased 

and allied pursuit of advanced TMD systems. Third, the 

thor discusses the advantages, country-specific issues a

status of cooperative US, Japanese, and South Kore

TMD developmental activities. Finally, Colonel Kiziah 

tails some of the complex regional security issues asso

ated with US, Japanese, and South Korean missile defe

activities vis-à-vis China and Taiwan; the challenges 

ameliorating Chinese concerns; and the prospects of lo

term partnering and fielding of a tri-country, integrated 

gional TMD system.

Responding to increasing North Korean and Chinese b

listic missile threats, the United States has placed a h

priority on developing and deploying a Northeast Asian 

gional TMD FoS by the 2010 time frame. Motivated by 

benefits of burden and technology sharing, increased s

tem effectiveness, and strengthened US-allied security 

lationships, US officials have worked extensively with 

Japanese and South Koreans for more than a decade to 

tablish a cooperative TMD acquisition program. 

The August 1998 North Korean launch of a Taepo Do

1 across the Japanese archipelago helped to secure 

success with Japan, at least for the short term. Colo

Kiziah discusses the recently negotiated US-Japan coop

ative, three-year research and development program a

identifies the many challenges in long-term continued 

operation through TMD deployment. By contrast, So

Korean leadership has increasingly resisted partner

with the United States and Japan on TMD development 

tivities and, at odds with US regional nonproliferat

iii
goals, has been pursuing development of an indigeno

offensive missile deterrence against Pyongyang.

The author argues that US success with Japan in p

suing a regional TMD capability has increased the tensi

between the United States and China and between Ch

and Japan. Although these heightened tensions sho

not yet be construed as seriously increasing the secu

risks within the region, Chinese concerns regarding a 

and allied regional TMD FoS need to be addressed soo

rather than later. The Chinese concerns are many 

their principal one seems to be that an effective TMD s

tem significantly mitigates China’s principal means of 

ercing Taiwan into reintegration with the mainland o

the next 15- to 20-year time frame. Colonel Kiziah c

cludes that, since the Chinese have never wavered in th

public goal of eventually regaining Taiwan, the US a

Japanese leadership must seriously address Chinese c

cerns. Concerted efforts to engage the Chinese leaders

and build mutually trusting relationships are requi

over the next 10- to 15-year period as a Northeast As

regional TMD system becomes operational.

The Air War College encourages discussion and deb

on Colonel Kiziah’s examination of Northeast Asian 

gional TMD issues and challenges.

DAVID F. MacGHEE, JR.

Major General, USAF

Commandant, Air War Colle

iv
About the Author

Lt Col Rex R. Kiziah (BS, US Air Force Acade

[USAFA]; PhD, The University of Texas at Austin) is c

rently the deputy chief, Theater Air Defense Division in 

Air Staff’s Directorate of Global Power Programs. Previo

assignments include serving as the Air Force Resea

Laboratory commander’s representative to the Natio

Reconnaissance Office; deputy program manager of the 

fice of the Secretary of Defense Counterproliferation S

port Program; special assistant for research and techn

ogy for the assistant to the Secretary of Defense 

Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs; as

ciate professor of physics at the USAFA; and section ch

and neutral particle beam research officer at the Air Fo

Weapons Laboratory. He is a graduate of Squadron Offi

School, Air Command and Staff College, a 1998 gradu

of the Defense Systems Management College and a 20

graduate of the Air War College.

v
US-Led Cooperative

Theater Missile Defense in

Northeast Asia

On 31 August 1998, North Korea flight-tested a n

three-stage, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)/sp

launch vehicle (SLV) referred to by Western analysts a

reporters as the Taepo Dong-1. The Taepo Dong-1 t

versed a range of approximately 1,000 miles on a traject

consistent with a satellite launch, which took it across 

Japanese archipelago. Its first stage fell into the Sea 

Japan, the second stage landed in the Pacific Ocean off 

Sanriku coast of northeastern Honshu, and the third st

failed during powered flight.1 After maintaining four d

of silence, North Korean officials stated that the Weste

labeled MRBM flight test was not the test firing of a bal

tic missile but was a three-stage rocket launch of a sm

satellite, Kwangmyongsong (Bright Star), into a low-ea

orbit with a period of approximately three hours. The 

Space Command’s extensive space surveillance netw

detected no satellite entering orbit or subsequently 

orbit. Whether the 31 August 1998 North Korean ev

was an attempted satellite launch, or an MRBM test-flig

will perhaps never be decided conclusively,2 nonethele

the event was pivotal in that it was a very unpleasant s

prise to US, Japanese, and South Korean officials and 

alysts. The US intelligence community had predicted 

launch of the missile, but the existence of the third st

was completely unknown. Experts had assessed that 

North Koreans could not master staging technologies—

least not yet.3 Analysis of a video of the test flight revea

that the first stage of the Taepo Dong-1 was a No Do

and the second stage was a Scud-C. Cyrillic number

covered portions of the missile, suggesting possible Ru

ian involvement—both materials and technical expertis

in the Taepo Dong-1’s construction.4

The aftermath of this sputnik-like event has been s

nificant, yet different for the United States, Japan, a

South Korea. Within the United States, the Taepo Don

missile test intensified nonproliferation, counterprolife

1
tion, and confidence and security building measures a

activities. Government leaders immediately placed 

creased emphasis on developing and deploying a natio

missile defense (NMD) to defend the US homeland fr

rogue nations’ intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICB

and regional theater missile defense (TMD) systems 

protection of US troops and facilities abroad. For Jap

with whom the United States has been discussing coop

ative acquisition of a regional TMD system since the 

ception of the national Strategic Defense Initiative in 19

to no substantive avail, other than a myriad of studies, 

Taepo Dong-1 test flight enraged both the public and 

reaucrats, propelling them from their customary gla

political pace into warp drive.5 After years of indecision

August 1999 the Japanese decided to join the United Sta

in a cooperative TMD research and development (R&

program. Unlike the Japanese, and much to the dismay 

US officials, the South Korean leadership responded to 

Taepo Dong incident with renewed vigor in its efforts to 

digenously develop ballistic missiles, exacerbating the 

ficulties the United States faces in its efforts to eventu

forge a single, integrated TMD regional system for Nor

east Asia and at glaring odds with the US top foreign p

icy priority of nonproliferation.

In this paper, I discuss in some detail the US-led effo

to develop and deploy a TMD system within Northe

Asia, highlighting many of the regional security issues a

challenges associated with these efforts and providing 

formation that may aid in understanding the US, Jap

ese, and South Korean responses to the North Kore

Taepo Dong incident. First, I summarize the US policy a

strategy on TMD in general and with respect to Northe

Asia. I then briefly characterize the Northeast Asian 

gional security threats as perceived by the United Stat

Japan, and South Korea. Next, I discuss the advantage

cooperative TMD development and deployment, follow

by a description of the recently initiated US-Japan coop

ative TMD R&D program and an analysis of South Kore

stance on TMD. Lastly, I discuss the complex security 

sues (focused on China and Taiwan) associated with 

veloping a US-Japan-South Korea regional TMD syst

and the prospects for successful deployment.
United States Theater Missile

Defense Policy and Strategy

The 1999 US National Security Strategy for a New C

tury and, more specifically, the 1998 United States Secu

Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (or East Asia Str

egy Report [EASR]) define the engagement strategy and 

jectives for promoting US interests in the Asia-Pacific 

gion. A salient point of these documents is that 

strategy of engagement is aimed at promoting “a stable, 

cure, prosperous and peaceful Asia-Pacific community 

which the United States is an active partner and benef

ary [one benefit being approximately $500 billion a yea

trans-Pacific trade].”6 Playing a key role in executing t

strategy is the US military, which not only deters poten

aggressors but also shapes the security environment 

prevent regional security challenges from emergi

Thomas Christensen, of the Massachusetts Institute 

Technology, in a 1999 International Security article on 

East Asia security dilemma, notes that “most scholars 

seem to agree with U.S. officials and local leaders tha

major factor in containing potential tensions in East A

is the continuing presence of the U.S. military, particula

in Japan.”7 Christensen further asserts that, because 

the intense, historically based mistrust among the Nor

east Asian leaders, maintaining a US military presence 

Japan is critically important for regional stabil

Nonetheless, he persuasively supports the view that “

United States faces tough challenges in maintaining 

US-Japan alliance in a form that reassures both Jap

and its neighbors.”8

One of the key components of the US’s Northeast As

engagement strategy to which Christensen’s view applie

the extremely challenging US effort to cooperatively 

quire with Japan and South Korea an integrated, regio

TMD system. With a national commitment to maintain 

proximately 100,000 military personnel along with 

necessary infrastructure in Japan and South Korea, a 

US defense priority is deterring the use of ballistic missi

and if used the protection of US and allied troops a

bases from ballistic missiles armed with conventional, 

clear, biological, or chemical warheads. In fact, due to 
widespread proliferation and threat of the use of balli

missile-delivered weapons of mass destruction (WM

against US forward-deployed personnel, TMD has emer

as the Department of Defense’s (DOD) number one mis

defense priority.9 This sense of urgency and moment

has permeated US security relationships in Northe

Asia, especially since the regional shock of the Aug

1998 Taepo Dong 1 test-firing. Although the US views a 

gional TMD system as a purely defensive system, comp

menting its offensive forces and bolstering its ability 

deter potential aggression and coercion throughout the 

gion, Christensen highlights and provides compelling 

guments that key actors in the region, especially Chi

may nonetheless perceive this supposedly defensive-o

system as very provocative. I discuss some of these ar

ments, and others, in the last part of this paper, but fir

describe the perceived threats to regional security and s

bility in the region, emphasizing theater ballistic missil

Northeast Asian Regional Security Threat

The two key players in Northeast Asia whose military 

pabilities and actions are perceived by the United Stat

Japan, and South Korea as threatening to the security a

stability of the region are North Korea and China. T

North Korean threat is probably best and most succin

described in the 1998 EASR: “Its August 1998 mis

launch, which overflew Japan, underscored for the en

region that North Korea, despite its domestic hardsh

continues to pose a threat not only on the Peninsula bu

common regional security.”10

Of most concern to South Korea and to the US pers

nel stationed in the country, the North Koreans have s

eral hundred indigenously produced (with technical as

tance from China) short-range ballistic miss

(SRBM)—the road-mobile Scud-Bs (300-kilometer [k

maximum range, 1,000-kilogram [kg] maximum paylo

and Scud-Cs (600-km, 500-kg)—deployed for strate

“terror” and tactical strikes against logistical nodes a

urban areas in the event of a conflict. The Scud-C’s ra

encompasses all of South Korea.
North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities

Posing a threat to both Japan and South Korea, 

North Koreans have also deployed an undetermined nu

ber of MRBMs—the No Dong single-stage missile with 

maximum range of 1,300 km—giving them the capabi

to strike much of Japan from Okinawa to Hokkaido, wh

includes all US bases on the archipelago. As highligh

earlier, Pyongyang has developed and recently tested 

three-stage MRBM/SLV, the Taepo Dong-1, with a ma

mum range of more than 2,000 km and a payload cap

ity of several hundred kilograms, bringing the entire gro

of Japanese islands within its strike capabilities. Lastly

part of its ongoing and ambitious ballistic missile devel

ment programs, North Korea is developing the Ta

Dong-2 ICBM, the two-stage version having an estima

maximum range of 6,000 km or more, thus placing 

western part of Alaska, the far western portions of 

Hawaiian Island chain, East Asia, and major parts 

Southeast Asia within its reach. A three-stage vers

could reach the western portion of the continental Uni

States. The Taepo Dong-2 has not yet been flight tested

is interesting, but not surprising, to note that the No

Korean leadership asserts that its ballistic missiles 

needed for self-defense, particularly against the Uni

States, and that satellite development is a sovere

right.11 Apparently, emerging on the world scene as 

space-faring nation is a national priority for Kim Jong 

even as his nation is collapsing from economic distr

and mass starvation.

All of North Korea’s ballistic missiles are assessed 

be capable of carrying its panoply of conventional hi

explosive, biological, or chemical warheads (and possibly n

clear). The Japanese Defense Agency Chief, Hosei Noro

recently stated that there were several factories in No

Korea that were producing “toxic gas and germs” t

could be weaponized.12 A US Central Intelligence Age

document released in early February 2000 reported t

“North Korea produces and is capable of using a wide 

riety of chemical and possibly biological agents, as well 

their delivery means.”13 There is also concern in the Uni

States, Japan, and South Korea that the North Korea
have the material to develop, or have already secretly 

veloped, one or more nuclear devices, particularly si

they appear to have violated the 1994 Agreed Framew

by maintaining a covert nuclear capability.14

North Korean Leadership Intentions

Exacerbating the threat perceived by the United Stat

Japan, and South Korea because of its ballistic missile a

WMD capabilities is the cloak of secrecy enveloping No

Korean leadership actions and the apparent irrationality 

the majority of Kim Jong Il’s actions, resulting in the 

ability to even remotely gauge his intentions. A prime 

ample is the August 1998 Taepo Dong-1 flight test. As T

woo Kim, Policy Research Office director for the Uni

Liberal Democratic Party, Republic of Korea, discusses 

his May–June 1999 Asian Survey article, Kim Jong Il’s 

cision and timing of the launch of the Taepo Dong-1 

pear to be a completely irrational act to outsiders.15 H

ever, Mr. Kim argues that Kim Jong Il is not irrational 

is “dangerously calculative,” and his actions are aimed 

regime survival and coping with his nation’s severe e

nomic crisis. Reaching basically the same conclusion, 

referring to Kim Jong Il’s actions as missile blackmail a

extortion, Richard Fisher of the Heritage Foundation 

gues that the Taepo Dong missile test was an effort to 

tort money from the United States. Specifically, the test 

ing quickly followed a June 1998 North Korean Cen

News Agency announcement and August 1998 North 

rean officials’ discussions with congressional staff me

bers demanding US compensation of $500M per year 

North Korea to halt its missile exports as well as forego

reinitiation of its nuclear weapons program.16 Whet

these views of Kim Jong Il’s actions and intentions are c

rect is debatable, but it is apparent that assessing 

North Korean threat to regional security and stability 

necessarily be replete with uncertainties.

Chinese Leadership Intentions

Like North Korea, the secretive barrier behind wh

leadership actions occur complicates assessment of 
true threat that China poses to Northeast Asian regio

security and, therefore, necessarily frustrates outside 

tempts to understand Chinese intentions. Whether or 

China has regional hegemonic aspirations is uncle

Stephen Cambone of the Center for Strategic and Inter

tional Studies in Washington, D.C., notes: “Observers h

yet to agree on China’s intentions beyond recognizing t

it will no longer allow itself to be treated as anything ot

than a great power.”17 Furthermore, China views its bal

tic missile forces as an essential element of great-pow

status as demonstrated by its firing of nuclear-capa

SRBMs across the Taiwan Strait to intimidate Taiwan

leadership in 1995 and 1996, veiled threats to use 

ICBMs against the United States if the United States s

ports Taiwan in a conflict with China, and its vocifero

condemnation of US-planned NMD development and 

ployment as destabilizing to the US-Chinese strategic re

tionship. Thus, there is both an international and regio

focus on China’s growing military power.

China’s Ballistic Missile Forces and

Military Modernization

For at least a decade, China has increased its defe

expenditures annually (estimated at around 10 percent 

year) and, in a savvy, methodical fashion, has been m

ernizing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) across 

board—acquisition of advanced fighter aircraft and a ra

of power-projection platforms along with programs to 

velop advanced surface-to-air missiles, land-attack a

antiship cruise missiles and mobile ballistic missiles. A

according to Fisher, the PLA places the highest mode

ization priority on its missile forces for the following r

sons: (1) the PLA desires a variety of nuclear and non

clear ballistic missiles to deter US support for Taiwan a

to project power throughout Asia; (2) China cannot m

ernize its air force and navy without significant outside 

sistance, but can itself develop a variety of modern bal

tic missiles (with foreign missile technologies which Ch

has demonstrated adeptness at obtaining via cooperati

purchase, and espionage); and (3) ballistic missiles prov

an asymmetric form of attack against the United Sta
and potential adversaries which currently, and for at le

10 years into the future, have no effective theater balli

missile defenses.18

China’s SRBMs are its cheapest and most effective 

tion for neutralizing Taiwan’s technologically superior 

force and air defenses. It is estimated that 100 to 150 

the nuclear-capable, but currently conventionally arm

600-km range DF-15 and 300-km-range DF-11 miss

are now deployed for potential strikes against Taiwan

airbases, ports, command and control centers, and ea

warning systems.19 The PLA is improving the accuracy 

these missiles with integrated, enhanced guidance a

satellite navigation technologies, possibly increasing 

DF-15’s circular error probable (CEP) by an order of m

nitude from 300 to 30 meters (m).20 Additionally, in one 

two years, the PLA will complete development of man

verable versions of these missiles, thus providing the 

pability to reach targets previously geographically 

scured.21 According to Fisher, the US intellige

community has estimated that China could deploy up 

650 of the DF-11s and DF-15s by 2005.22 Although p

sumably directed at preventing Taiwan from declaring p

manent independence from the Chinese nation, th

SRBMs are also of concern to Japan because they could 

used against the sea and air lines of communication in 

East China Sea.

In addition to a robust force of SRBMs, China posses

a significant number of MRBMs and intermediate ra

ballistic missiles (IRBM) that can be armed with conv

tional or nuclear warheads, and new ones are under 

velopment. Japan is well within range of all the MRB

and IRBMs. The current inventory consists of the nucle

tipped, 2,800-km range DF-3/3As and 1,800+-km ra

DF-21/21As.23 The PLA may have more than 80 of 

road- and rail-mobile DF-21s deployed. It has also been 

ported that China recently fielded an advanced version 

the DF-21, referred to as the DF-21X, with a range 

2,900 km and significantly improved accuracy, perhaps 

small as 50-m CEP.

China also possesses a sizable force of ICBMs, curren

assessed to be relatively inaccurate and armed with o

one nuclear warhead per missile. US intelligence estima
range from 18 to 26 DF-5/5A 13,000-km range ICBM

However, the Chinese have intensely pursued multiple 

dependently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabili

for many years. Having obtained information on the Uni

States’s smallest and most modern nuclear warhe

China could combine such a warhead with smaller reen

vehicles and reconfigure its multisatellite bus develop

for launching Motorola Iridium satellites and convert 

DF-5 into an eight-warhead MIRVed ICBM.25 Two Chin

ICBM development programs are underway—the 8,000-

range DF-31 and 12,000-km range DF-41—both of wh

are mobile ICBMs and are expected to be MIRVed. The D

31 and DF-41 ICBMs are estimated to be operational 

2003 and 2010, respectively.

Realizing that its ballistic missile forces may be more 

fective in accomplishing regional and strategic objective

some of them are equipped with extremely powerful, hig

accurate, nonnuclear warheads as opposed to nuclear, 

Chinese have substantial efforts devoted to develop

radio-frequency (RF) weapons and cluster munition

With significant reduction for the likelihood of US nuclear 

taliation, the PLA could use RF-armed or cluster munitio

filled ballistic missiles to strike command and control n

works, power grids, carrier battle groups, airbases, po

and other infrastructure targets throughout Northeast As

The bottom line is that China is well on its way to p

sessing formidable regional (and beyond) force-project

capabilities via its ballistic missiles by 2010, a time per

that allows for development and deployment of a regio

TMD system, if pursued aggressively. Further heighten

US and Japanese concern about the need for regional T

is China’s evolving security policy. The PLA appears to 

shifting from a “minimum” to a “limited” nuclear det

rence strategy—not just developing a minimal capability 

target a few key cities in the United States or Russia, 

developing the capability to strike targets regionally or o

side the region in such a manner as to gain a strategic 

vantage but control escalation and minimize nuclear re

iation. Additionally, PLA missile doctrine has increasin

emphasized the use of nonnuclear armed ballistic miss

for a variety of military actions at the regional level. T
such a strategy may work to China’s strategic advant

was clearly demonstrated in July 1995 when the PL

Second Artillery fired six DF-15s north to an East Ch

Sea impact area 90 miles north of Taipei and again 

March 1996 with four DF-11s impacting at ocean poi

bracketing the island. As David Wiencek, a Washingt

D.C.-based international security analyst, noted, “Th

tests were one of the most striking uses of ballistic miss

for the purposes of political intimidation ever seen

Adding to the threat, Chinese officials also issued wa

ings in both 1995 and 1996 that the PLA could attack T

wan without fearing substantive US military intervent

because US leaders “care more about Los Angeles th

they do about Taiwan.”28 These euphemistically term

“missile tests” clearly indicated that China was a serio

power and would have an impact on the regional secu

environment.

Theater Missile Defense Description and

Cooperative Development and Deploymen

Both the North Korean and Chinese ballistic missile a

WMD capabilities are credible and growing threats to 

interests of the United States, Japan, and South Kor

Both North Korean and Chinese leadership have not h

tated to demonstrate their willingness to use their balli

missile arsenals in a threatening manner against ot

countries in the region. To deter and counter these 

creasingly sophisticated and destructive ballistic mis

threats, the United States is pursuing several TMD dev

opment programs as part of a time-phased acquisition 

multitiered, interoperable land-, sea-, and air-based s

tems that will provide defense in-depth against a wide 

riety of theater ballistic missiles. This integrated combi

tion of systems is called the TMD Family of Systems (Fo

The FoS approach provides multitiered defenses—termi

defense (low tier systems), endo- and exo-atmospheric 

tercepts (upper tier systems) and boost-phase intercep

which increase overall system robustness, that is, 

probability and efficiency.
Lower-tier systems such as the Patriot Advanced Ca

bility-3 (PAC-3) and the Navy Area Defense system are 

signed to defeat SRBMs. The PAC-3 will provide air defe

of ground combat forces and high-value assets. The p

jected date for the first equipped unit is FY 2001. Likew

the Navy Area Defense will provide a capability to prot

US and allied forces and important assets at sea and 

coastal regions. The goal for the first unit equipped for t

system is FY 2003. Upper-tier systems under developm

are the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) a

Navy Theater Wide (NTW) systems. They are designed 

defeat MRBMs and IRBMs by intercepting the missiles 

high altitudes, thus providing effective protection of bro

areas, dispersed assets, and population centers. The 

objective is to field an upper-tier system capability 

2007. Lastly, the United States is developing the Airbo

Laser system for boost-phase intercept of theater balli

missiles. A demonstration to lethally shoot down a rea

tic target is planned for late 2003. By developing and 

ploying a regional TMD FoS, the United States hopes 

deter countries such as North Korea and China from us

ballistic missiles in an attempt to achieve political and m

itary objectives, and if missiles are used, to protect US m

itary personnel deployed abroad, defend military insta

tions such as ports and airfields, and protect US allies a

friends.

Cooperative Theater Missile Defense Development

and Fielding

The United States desires to cooperatively develop a

deploy an integrated regional TMD system with Japan a

South Korea. As delineated by Secretary Cohen in his 19

Annual Report to the President and the Congress, the g

eral objectives of US TMD cooperation with allies are to 

strengthen US security relationships, (2) enhance the U

counterproliferation efforts, (3) share the burden of dev

oping and fielding defenses, (4) enhance interoperabi

between US forces and those of allies and friends, and 

share knowledge for the mutual benefit of both the Uni

States and its partners.29 Probably the biggest motivat

for the US’s desire to cooperate is cost sharing. Bruce B
nett, a RAND Corporation researcher specializing in cou

terproliferation and force improvement issues, estima

the development and deployment costs for an East As

regional TMD system could be $10 billion or more.30 In 

era of declining defense budgets, cooperation with al

may be the only way to affordably develop and field su

expensive weapon systems. Dr. Paul G. Kaminski, th

under secretary of defense for acquisition and technolo

stated in a February 1995 speech: “That means increa

emphasis on cooperation with our allies in acquisition 

defense equipment.”31 Adding to this Department of 

fense policy, especially for Japan, was the increasing 

sistence of many government officials, driven by the gr

ing trade tensions between the United States and Jap

during the 1980s and 1990s, that Japan should get 

more free rides and must play a central role in the fu

ing, research, and procurement of a regional TMD syste

Attempting to capitalize on this Pentagon atmosphere of 

lied cooperation for large defense acquisitions and mak

Japan pay its fair share, the Navy strongly advocated 

operative TMD to procure additional dollars for its und

funded NTW development program.

Another important reason for cooperating on an in

grated, multicountry, regional TMD system is that suc

system would be more effective at locating, tracking, a

intercepting ballistic missiles than would be a syst

fielded by a single country—multiple, dispersed, ea

warning radars can locate and track the target more ac

rately than can a single radar or multiple radars located 

the same general area. Closely related is that single-cou

try deployment of a regional TMD system would likely 

dermine the interoperability and defense cooperation 

tween US, Japanese, and South Korean forces. And, fr

a pragmatic viewpoint, the United States intends to 

velop and deploy TMD to protect its forward-deployed p

sonnel and assets; not protecting supporting allied for

and local populations would most likely destroy coalit

efforts.

If the United States and its allies did not cooperate i

missile defense system, allied confidence in US defe

commitments could erode and lead to Japan and So

Korea developing and deploying offensive missiles (perh
including nuclear warheads) to deter China. Coopera

TMD would supplement and enhance the effectiveness 

the US nuclear umbrella, providing a much broader a

more flexible deterrent to coercion and aggression in 

region. Countries’ susceptibility to nuclear blackmail 

rogue nations such as North Korea should be reduced, a

China may become less apt to flex its “missile muscles

Additionally, Fisher believes that cooperative TMD co

create incentives, especially for the Chinese, to negotiat

reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons and balli

missiles, arguing that the reduced utility of ballistic m

siles resulting from deployment of an effective regio

TMD system would enhance mutual confidence. Also, 

operative deployment of regional TMD would provide 

United States and its allies the credibility to approa

China on the issue of shared missile defense.33

Given the North Korean and Chinese ballistic mis

and WMD capabilities and their propensity to use th

capabilities in antagonistic ways against their neighbors 

the region and the United States, and given the myriad 

seemingly beneficial reasons to work “hand-in-glove” w

each other, one would think there would be a comm

strategic interest and strong motivations for the Uni

States, Japan, and South Korea to cooperatively deve

and deploy a Northeast Asian regional TMD system. H

ever, the complex security issues associated with deploy

TMD in Northeast Asia and the diversely perceived impa

on stability and country-to-country relationships com

cate the decisions to cooperate and the extent of that 

operation.

US-Japan Cooperative Theater Missile

Defense Activities

Ironically, North Korea, the threatening nation wh

ballistic missiles a Northeast Asian regional TMD syst

would ostensibly be designed to thwart, managed to ju

start substantive cooperation between the United Sta

and Japan with its August 1998 Taepo Dong-1 flight t

On 16 August 1999, US DOD Under Secretary of Defe

for Acquisition and Technology Jacques Gansler, a

Japan Defense Agency Director General of the Bureau 
Equipment Kozo Oikawa, signed a memorandum of und

standing (MOU) detailing a three-year, cooperative T

R&D program.34 The United States will spend around $

million (M) on the cooperative program; the Japanese 

committed to spending an equitable, but unspecif

amount. Their government’s fiscal 1999 (April 1999–Ma

2000) budget included approximately $8M for the R&D 

fort; future years budget amounts were still under cons

eration at the time the MOU was signed.35 The regio

TMD architecture that the cooperative effort supports i

sea-based missile defense system, specifically a syst

such as the Navy’s NTW which would be deployed wit

approximately 12 years and provide an antiballistic mis

shield with a radius of about 3,000 km. Previous stud

both bilateral US-Japan feasibility studies and unilate

analyses, had indicated that an NTW-like system provid

the most cost-effective missile defense for the Japanese 

chipelago and was the most fruitful for collaboration. T

foundation of the NTW system is the Aegis radar-equipp

warships. Japan already operates four Aegis destroy

that could be modified to serve as TMD platforms and 

considering procuring two additional Aegis ships.36

More specifically, the MOU is an agreement that 

United States and Japan will cooperatively conduc

three-year preliminary design and analysis effort, incl

ing risk mitigation and developmental activities, on evo

ing the Standard Missile-3 Block I into a Block II varian

Four areas of R&D were identified: the missile’s lightwei

nose cone, advanced kinetic warhead, infrared seeker s

sor, and second-stage propulsion. The goal of this coop

ative requirements analysis and design (RA&D) effort is 

specify the design and select the technologies for th

four missile subcomponents. Although the United Sta

clearly intends to move into the next acquisition pha

demonstration and validation, at the conclusion of a s

cessful cooperative RA&D effort, there is no commitm

by either side to cooperate beyond the R&D activities. 

the conclusion of the three-year effort, both sides may e

the partnership with full rights to the commonly develop

technologies.38 Nevertheless, US Embassy Mutual Defe

Assistance Office personnel in Japan have noted t

Japanese political consensus for the demonstration a
validation phase currently exists, and both the Uni

States and Japanese developed the cooperative TMD p

gram with the intent of joint production and deploymen

an NTW Block II system in 2012.39 Authors of a House 

ternational Relations Committee report surmised that

the jointly developed technologies are validated, Jap

could ultimately spend $300–$500M on the shared dev

opment of a regional TMD system. However, as Ke

Takemi, the Japanese secretary for foreign affairs, cl

fied, the Japanese participation in a TMD system is n

only at a cooperative research stage.40

If the Japanese were to continue to cooperate with 

United States after the three-year preliminary design a

analysis effort, a new MOU would be required along w

Japanese legislation to address the use of space for sa

lite-based sensors that would locate and calculate the t

jectories of theater ballistic missiles. Previously institu

Japanese Diet resolutions expressly prohibit the mil

rization of outer space. Changing this legislation co

prove to be a formidable task given the inordinate amo

of time and negotiation required to conclude the agreem

for the current, relatively benign, cooperative effort. A

future acquisition phases of a TMD system will be mu

more costly than the roughly $70M set of R&D activi

and, if the ongoing Japanese recession and banking cr

continues, a decision to continue will be extremely diffic

to make. Additionally, journeying further down the path 

joint TMD development and deployment will certainly 

counter even more bellicose rhetoric and missile depl

ments by Beijing. In discussing the US-Japan TMD co

eration, Takemi stated “We are always very careful 

conduct our defence policies to avoid unnecessary misu

derstandings among neighbouring countries.”41 Rec

discussions with officials of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign 

fairs and Air Staff College confirmed Takemi’s inference 

the reality that Japanese decision making is clearly in

enced by anticipated Chinese reactions. Given that 

Japanese governmental system operates in a slow and 

date manner with politicians and bureaucrats all too of

relying on tactics of delay as opposed to tough decis

making, Japan’s long-term participation with the Uni

States in fielding a regional TMD system is far from c
tain. As the authors of a July 1999 Far Eastern Econo

Review article on TMD pessimistically state, “bring

Northeast Asia under a missile-defense umbrella rema

a distant American dream at best, and a chimera 

worst.”42

South Korea and Theater Missile Defense

Whereas the United States has had some significant 

cent successes in gaining Japanese cooperation on a 

gional TMD system, the South Korean government h

continued to shun US efforts to gain its cooperation. So

Korea’s Minister of Defense Chun Yong Tack, clearly in

cated in March 1999 that his country would not part

pate with the United States or Japan in any regional T

programs, citing the following rationale: “Pursuing 

TMD is not an effective countermeasure against North 

rean missiles. It can also arouse concern from neighbor

countries.”43 Unfortunately, given the nature and prox

ity of the North Korean threat, developing a regional 

tiballistic missile shield that is sufficiently protective 

South Korea is complicated and costly, and perhaps inf

sible. The central military threat to South Korea cons

of North Korea’s short-range Scud missiles and mass

amounts of artillery and multiple-rocket launchers loca

just 50 km from Seoul. South Korean military analy

have concluded that none of the TMD systems can eff

tively counter them. Even though the US government h

repeatedly tried to convince the South Korean officials t

it believes there are viable TMD architectures, the So

Korean officials are unconvinced. They have made it cl

that they view the US-proposed TMD options such 

THAAD, PAC-3, or sea-based systems as unproved, cos

and inadequate for deterring North Korean missile atta

against their country.44 Additionally, given the magnitu

of the threat they face, the South Koreans have indica

that concern about Chinese and North Korean balli

missiles/WMD capable of striking Japan or the Uni

States is not their highest priority. And perhaps most 

portantly, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung is kee

aware that his country’s participation in a US-Jap

South Korea regional TMD program could anger China—
needs China’s assistance in persuading North Korea to 

more responsive to his “sunshine policy” peace ini

tives.45 Recent discussions with US embassy personn

Republic of Korea, clearly highlighted that South Kore

officials were indeed concerned with Chinese reactions 

the current US-Japan cooperative TMD program and 

those Chinese actions that may arise in response to a

potential South Korean involvement in a cooperative, 

gional TMD program. Specifically, one embassy offi

pointed out that the United States and Japan are alre

confronting real and potentially serious issues with 

Chinese over their joint TMD venture, and the South 

reans are avoiding any involvement.

The South Korean military’s preferred method for de

ing with the North Korean threat is a deterrent force c

sisting of indigenously produced MRBMs capable of str

ing critical targets throughout North Korea. In early 19

a South Korean National Security Council official tol

Defense News reporter, “We need to have a deterrent ca

bility. Our government wants a missile capable of reach

Pyongyang and beyond. . . . If North Korea attacks, 

want to initiate a counter-offensive action as quickly 

possible.”46 Although South Korea has been developin

medium-range missile since 1989—the Hyonmu projec

their efforts have been constrained by a 1990 US-So

Korean agreement restricting Seoul’s domestically p

duced missiles to a maximum range of 180 km.47 These 

strictions are part of the US’s nonproliferation efforts a

are currently contentious with the South Koreans. No

Korea’s August 1998 test firing of the Taepo Dong-1 r

talized and strengthened their resolve to persuade 

United States to remove the restrictions. On 10 April 19

South Korea test fired the Hyonmu (NHK-2). Although 

only covered a range of 40 km, the United States det

mined that the South Korean military had only parti

fueled the missile, and that its true range was closer to 3

km, exceeding the 180-km restriction.48

Trying to adhere to its nonproliferation goals, the Uni

States expressed a willingness to accept South Korean 

velopment of 300-km range missiles, but only with 

conditions of transparency in their R&D programs a

their membership in the Missile Technology Con
Regime (MTCR).49 A senior official of South Korea’s M

istry of National Defense aptly expresses South Kore

view on these conditions: “As a matter of national pride, 

cannot agree to transparency conditions. Our people 

view this as an infringement of sovereignty.”50 Additiona

many South Korean officials are hesitant about joining 

MTCR, concerned that membership would limit their m

sile development options. Thus, they are advocating acq

sition of missile technologies from other countries such 

Russia, France, and Israel, and circumventing the Uni

States and its nonproliferation demands. On 1 Febru

2000, South Korea’s Samsung Electronics Company a

the French group Thomson-CSF launched a joint vent

defense firm that will manufacture components for indi

nous South Korean air-to-ground missiles. This is a w

tershed event for South Korea’s missile development p

gram and is the first-ever transfer of non-US missile-rela

technologies to the country.51 Fundamentally, US a

South Korean leadership appear to have different stra

gies to deal with the North Korean ballistic missile/W

threat. Obtaining Seoul’s participation in a coopera

TMD development and deployment effort makes deal

with Japan appear to be a “walk in the park.”

The Chinese Factor

As if the United States did not have its hands full in s

ply trying to forge a cooperative US-Japan-South Ko

TMD venture, the associated issues with China seem to 

crease daily at an exponential rate. Not surprisingly, e

though China is clearly intent on modernizing and 

proving the capabilities of its ballistic missiles, which se

as a principal component of its military forces, and is it

pursuing missile defenses, the Chinese leadership is fierc

opposed to, and is vigorously campaigning throughout 

international community against any activities by 

United States, Japan, and South Korea on a Northe

Asian regional TMD. As a 1999 Nixon Center panel (on

the members was Adm David Jeremiah, Retired, form

vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and comman

in chief of the Pacific Fleet) on TMD highlighted, the Uni
States must ultimately act in its own interests to protect 

self and key allies from ballistic missiles/WMD, but sho

be sensitive to the concerns of China and other nation

In the remainder of this paper I discuss some of the 

differences between the views of the United States, Jap

and China with regard to fielding a Northeast Asian 

gional TMD FoS (South Korea is not included since it is 

cooperating with the United States and Japan and d

not share the same view on the efficacy of a TMD syst

for the region).

A fundamental difference exists between the Uni

States and China on their views of the role of a TMD s

tem in enhancing regional security and stability. US o

cials and analysts argue that a US-Japan regional T

system and strengthened alliance serve as a defensive 

terrence to aggressive actions in the region and thus p

motes security and stability. Diametrically opposed to t

view, the Chinese assert that missile defenses, especial

cooperative US-Japan TMD system, do not contribute 

East Asian security and are destabilizing. They insist t

deployment of a TMD system would fuel an offense-defe

arms race—a spiraling competition of ballistic missiles a

antimissile defenses.

China’s strongly divergent view is to some degree a m

ifestation of the intense, historically based distrust a

animosity between the Chinese and Japanese. Because 

Japan’s brutal occupation of China before and dur

World War II and its refusal to officially acknowledge a

apologize for its imperial past, the Chinese government 

over 50 years has consistently conducted a campaign 

anti-Japanese media programming for its citizens. Con

quently, the Chinese people—across the full spectr

from oldest to youngest—collectively have a firmly inc

cated, negative and suspicious view of Japan and its p

ple.53 Therefore, Chinese officials regard any Japanese m

itary development, even defensive systems, as dangero

They fear that any greater military role assumed by 

Japanese in the US-Japan alliance, as cooperative T

would necessarily entail, could erode Japan’s military s

restraint and serve as a stepping stone for Japan’s retu

to militarism and emergence once again as a great milit

power, perhaps within the first quarter of the twenty-f
century. To respond to this growing Japanese milit

power, China feels that it would have to continue to 

crease and strengthen its offensive forces. Additiona

Chinese analysts have argued that the so-called defens

TMD technologies can be used by Japan to build offens

missiles to threaten China’s interests in the region.

Chinese, US and Japanese officials and analysts a

hold different views of the regional threats and the rati

ale for deploying a TMD system. Citing North Korea’s A

gust 1998 test firing of the Taepo Dong-1 over Japan

territory, the United States and Japan contend that th

is a growing missile threat from rogue nations and a thr

of accidental or unauthorized nuclear launches, especi

from China, which together more than justify the need 

deploy a regional TMD umbrella to protect Japan, US p

sonnel deployed in Northeast Asia, other allies and frien

and facilities. The Chinese believe the US and Japanese 

ficial views of the North Korean threat are merely a ruse 

develop and deploy a regional TMD system aimed at cou

tering China’s growing power and influence in the regi

After all, the phrase “regional TMD” implies protect

against ballistic missiles fired from any country in the 

gion. Statements such as Seizaburo Sato’s, a security s

cialist at the Institute for International Policy Stud

Tokyo, validate China’s suspicions: “North Korea provi

a good excuse, but as a matter of fact the primary targe

China.”54 The Chinese assert that if the threat is so

North Korean, then Japan’s existing TMD systems prov

sufficient protection. Countering, US analysts argue t

Japan’s current land-based TMD systems, the PAC

Pluses, are insufficient to protect against North Kore

missile attacks and are deployed in an air-defense vice 

antimissile mode.55 Additionally, the Chinese note that 

regional TMD system currently being cooperatively 

plored by the United States and Japan is, in effect, 

NMD for Japan.

Perhaps the most important complicating issue betw

the United States, China, and Japan with respect to 

current US-Japanese plans for cooperative TMD devel

ment is China’s view of this effort with respect to Taiw

Ultimately, the Chinese leadership would like to reg

control of what it considers to be a renegade province. 
China, unification with Taiwan is a cherished natio

goal. In the past China’s leaders have threatened the 

of force if Taiwan formally declared independence, a C

nese government white paper released in February 20

broadened the reasons that Beijing considered would j

tify the use of military force—specifically, “if Taiwan’s 

thorities refused indefinitely ‘the peaceful settlement 

cross-Straits reunification through negotiations.’”56 

lieving that a US-Japan TMD system will also be clearly 

signed to counter China’s ballistic missiles, then it wo

eliminate Beijing’s only credible military option to br

Taipei to the negotiating table on China’s terms. Reinfo

ing this belief is the joint US-Japanese decision to pur

R&D on an upper-tier, NTW-like TMD system. Such 

ship-based system would have wide-area defensive cov

age and be highly mobile; it could therefore be mo

quickly to thwart Chinese actions against Taiwan. T

Chinese argue that, even if there is no US or Japanese 

tent at the present time to use a missile defense system 

protect Taiwan in the event of a cross-strait crisis, a sh

based TMD system will clearly provide the United Sta

and Japan such a capability which they may then cho

to use. Furthermore, based on extensive interviews c

ducted in 1996 and 1998 with military and civilian a

lysts in Chinese government think tanks and acade

cians at leading Chinese institutions, Christens

concludes that Chinese officials view the Japanese as m

likely than the United States to oppose Taiwan’s reinteg

tion with the mainland. Christensen supports his conc

sion with the following:

Taiwan is a former Japanese colony (1895–1945). It is near inter

national sea-lanes that are important to Japan. In addition, . . 

Japan has a strategic interest in preventing Taiwan’s high-technol

ogy and capital-rich economy from linking politically with the main

land. Moreover, some Chinese analysts view Taiwan as havin

geostrategic significance for Japan as a potential ally because of it

location near the Chinese mainland.57

Perhaps of even greater concern to Beijing than the 

of missile defenses by the United States or Japan in a p

sible future China-Taiwan contingency is that defens

weapons, such as a TMD system, deployed by Taiwan’s 

lies and friends may bolster Taiwanese leadership’s co
dence to declare permanent independence from Chin

Preventing Taiwan from legitimizing the current territo

status quo, that is, de facto independence, is a high-prio

Chinese security goal as evidenced by their ever increas

coastal ballistic missile deployments near Taiwan a

their frequent veiled threats indicating a willingness to r

war to prevent others from intervening in their internal 

fairs. And Beijing’s concerns and rhetoric do not appea

be diminished by the US’s “three no’s” policy that inclu

no support for Taiwan’s independence.59

Summary and Conclusions

As emphasized in the Secretary of Defense’s 1998 

nual Report to the President and the Congress, ballistic m

siles and the WMD and advanced conventional warhe

North Korea and China can deliver already pose a serio

threat for US deployed armed forces, allies and frien

and US overseas facilities. Despite the US’s extensive n

and counterproliferation efforts, this threat is continu

increasing. Responding to the urgency of this immedi

threat, the DOD places its highest priority for ballistic m

sile defenses on developing and deploying regional T

systems. The DOD’s policy and acquisition strategy are 

research, develop, and field TMD systems cooperativ

with its allies for the benefits of burden sharing and 

creased system effectiveness, strengthened US-allied se

rity relationships, enhanced US international counterp

liferation efforts, and system interoperability between 

United States and its allies. Nonetheless, because of 

seriousness of the theater ballistic missile threat, e

without allied cooperation, the United States intends 

field regional TMD systems, especially in Northeast Asi

For the last 10 years, US officials have worked diligen

with the Japanese and South Koreans to establish a co

erative acquisition program that would lead to deploym

of a single, integrated Northeast Asian regional TMD F

to counter the ballistic missile/WMD threats of No

Korea and China. Both countries have clearly dem

strated the strategic importance they place on their mis

arsenals, the national priorities and commensurate 
sources for improving and increasing their capabilit

and the willingness to use them in threatening w

against the United States, Japan, South Korea, and T

wan. The United States has succeeded for the short te

in securing a cooperative TMD R&D program with Jap

It is far too early to predict whether or not this coopera

venture will continue through all acquisition phases a

result in deployment of some joint, regional TMD FoS. 

sound reasons from their perspective, South Korea’s le

ers are adamantly refusing to partner with the Uni

States and Japan in developing and fielding a regio

TMD system and, instead, are pursuing development of 

indigenous, offensive missile deterrent capability agai

Pyongyang.

The US’s success with Japan has come at the cost of 

creasing the tensions between itself and China and 

tween Japan and China. The Center for Nonproliferat

Studies Conference Report of the Second US-China Con

ence on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferati

held in 1999, concludes that “the current controversy [o

TMD] has escalated to the point at which it represent

serious threat to international security.”60 Although I wo

not categorize the TMD-heightened tensions as a serio

international security threat, Chinese officials are boist

ously appealing to the international community to opp

the United States led cooperative development of a T

system because of their perception of the dangerous des

bilizing effects it would generate if deployed in the Nor

east Asian region. Heightening China’s concerns and fu

ing its rhetoric is the US-Japanese choice of TMD syste

for their three-year R&D effort—a sea-based and mob

NTW-like system. Although ostensibly chosen as the m

cost-effective TMD system to counter the North Kore

threat, this system would also be extremely effective a

easily positioned to counter Chinese ballistic missi

thus mitigating China’s only means of coercing Taiw

over the next 15 to 20 year period until China has acqui

more robust air and naval forces. To indicate their serio

concerns about the impact a future US-Japan TMD ca

bility may have on their ability to reintegrate Taiwan, 

Chinese have issued numerous veiled threats about th

willingness to risk war over Taiwan.
Given that the US-Japan cooperative TMD program 

merely a three-year R&D effort at this point in time, w

continued US-Japan cooperation beyond the R&D ph

tenuous and uncertain, dealing with the Chinese conce

in a low-level fashion is probably sufficient. However, a

cooperative US-Japan (or US only) deployment of a Nor

east Asian regional TMD begins to realistically material

the United States and Japan will need to seriously eng

the Chinese and address their concerns. Although Chin

intentions will probably never be clear, reintegration of T

wan into China has been and still is a repeatedly and e

phatically declared Chinese national priority. Thus, a p

sibility the United States and Japan need to consider 

that continued pursuit of a regional TMD capability w

out sincerely addressing Chinese concerns could push 

Chinese to move forcefully against the Taiwanese well 

fore a TMD system is deployed and the threat of their b

listic missile arsenal is diminished—a move that the C

nese would perhaps never make otherwise. Althoug

personally think that the probability of Beijing using fo

against Taiwan is extremely low,61 with or without T

deployment, it is not an impossibility. According to a 

cent Washington Times article, a Pentagon study of so

600 Chinese strategic writings by 200 Chinese milit

and party leaders revealed an extreme distrust of 

United States.62 Some of the military writings referred 

the United States as a hegemon on par with Nazi Germa

And although stating that they wished to avoid a head

confrontation with the United States until around 20

Chinese military strategists noted that a war between 

United States and China could erupt over Taiwan. Ad

tionally, David Lampton, Nixon Center Director of Chin

Studies, recently testified before the US Senate Commit

on Foreign Relations: “Beijing, I believe, currently is will

to lose a conflict with the United States [rather] than i

sit by and watch its long-term aspirations regarding T

wan be ignored or jettisoned.”63

Obviously, while proceeding forward with developm

of a regional TMD system, the United States and Jap

need to increase their efforts in engaging Beijing and bu

ing mutual trust between political and military leaders. 

newed military-to-military talks and forums such as 
April 1999 Second US-China Conference on Arms Cont

Disarmament and Nonproliferation sponsored by the M

terey Institute for International Studies are excellent 

proaches for building trust and resolving the real dif

ences between the United States, Japan, and China 

China’s ballistic missile modernization and deployme

and US-Japanese TMD activities. Building the necess

trust and resolving differences will be a long-term eff

but time is one resource that all three have in commo

2012 is the earliest that the United States and Japan 

be able to deploy a regional TMD system, and Chin

leaders have consistently shown that they are willing 

allow time for the peaceful reunification of Taiwan i

China as long as they perceive that they are progress

towards this cherished national goal. Although I am o

mistic that the United States unilaterally or in cooperat

with Japan (and other friends and allies) could deploy a 

gional TMD in Northeast Asia without provoking war w

China, a historical example that may bear some releva

to the current situation repeatedly surfaces in 

thoughts: During October 1950, the Truman administ

tion chose to ignore repeated warnings from the Chine

convinced that since the United States did not intend 

move offensively against China and could communic

this clearly to Beijing, the Chinese would not intervene m

itarily in response to American forces crossing the 38th p

allel into northern Korea. As we know, the Chinese ultima

moved from merely warning to acting, with extremely 

pleasant and enduring consequences for all involved.

Notes

1. CIA Report on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Thro

2015, September 1999, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 11 January 2000, avail

from http://www.usconsulate.org.hk/uscn/others/1999/0909.htm. 

Taepo Dong-1 MRBM derives its name from the North Korean eas

coastal town of Taepo Dong which is about 10 kilometers from a facility u

for test firing ballistic missiles.

2. National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Rev

1998–1999 (Tokyo, Japan: Defense Agency, 1999), 64–65. Although 

country could verify that North Korea had orbited a small satellite, 

United States and South Korea publicly stated that North Korea 

failed in its attempt to orbit a small satellite with the Taepo Dong mis

Countering the US and South Korean statements, the Japanese Defe

Agency concluded that “although the theoretical possibility of puttin
extremely small object into orbit by the launch method (employed 

North Korea) cannot be ruled out entirely, the possibility that the ba

tic missile carried a satellite capable of performing some significant fu

tion including communications and Earth observations is small. And 

highly likely that North Korea had launched the ballistic missile prim

for the purpose of testing various technology with a view to extending 

range of its ballistic missiles.“

3. Written Statement of Adm Dennis C. Blair, commander in chief

Pacific Command, in House, House Armed Services Committee on Fi

Year 2000 Posture Statement, 3 March 1999.

4. Evan Medeiros, Second US-China Conference on Arms Con

Disarmament and Nonproliferation: Missiles, Missile Defenses and 

gional Stability, Conference Report, April 1999, n.p.; on-line, Inter

21 January 2000, available from

http://www.cns.miis.edu/cns/ projects/eanp/conf/uschina2/report.h

5. Richard D. Fisher Jr., “Building a More Secure Asia Through 

sile Defense,” The Heritage Foundation Asian Studies Center B

grounder, no. 138, 24 October 1995, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 10 Janu

2000, available from http://www.heritage.org/library/archives/a

asc_138.pdf. In 1985, then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger 

vited Australia, Japan, and South Korea to participate in the Strat

Defense Initiative Program. Of the three invitees, only Japan respon

positively. Beginning in 1987, Japan allowed its relevant private com

nies to participate in missile defense architecture studies with the US 

partment of Defense.

6. The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Cen

(Washington, D.C., December 1999), 34-37; and Department of Defe

The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (W

ington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Office of In

national Security Affairs], November 1998), 7-8.

7. Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the US-Japan Alliance, and 

Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security 23, no. 4 (Sp

1999): 50.

8. Ibid., 51.

9. Statement of The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler, under secretar

defense for acquisition and technology, in House, House Armed Serv

Subcommittees on Research and Development and Procurement, FY 2

Budget for Ballistic Missile Defense, 25 February 1999, n.p.; on-line, In

net, 10 January 2000, available from http://www.acq.osd.mil/ousda/t

monies/bmd_testimony_final.htm. The Honorable Gansler stated, “In 

of the widespread deployment of theater ballistic missiles today, the Dep

ment’s immediate missile defense priority is to develop, procure, and de

Theater Defense systems to protect forward-deployed elements of the 

armed forces, as well as allies and friends, against cruise and ballistic 

siles (as well as aircraft).”

10. The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific 

gion, 24.

11. “North Korea, US to Meet on Missile Issues,” Arms Control To

July/August 1999, 29.

12. “Japan Concerned Over N. Korea Biochemical Warheads,” 14 S

tember 1999, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 12 January 2000, available f

http://tmd.ggwdp.net/tmd25.htm#Japan Concerned Over N. Korea 

chemical Warheads.

13. “US Official Concerned on N. Korea Nuke Potential, China Li

Supplier,” Inside China Today, 5 February 2000, n.p.; on-line, Intern
February 2000, available from http://www.insidechina.c

news.php3?id=132214.

14. Stephen A. Cambone, “The United States and Theatre Missile 

fence in Northeast Asia,” Survival 39, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 66–84. 

also Michael Jonathan Green and Nagashima Akihisa, “Key Area

Watch in Japan-US Security Relations,” Japan Quarterly, January-Ma

1999, 17–22 and “US Official Concerned on N. Korea Nuke Poten

China Likely Supplier.” In the CIA report released in February 2000, 

stated that the US intelligence community assesses that North Korea 

produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuc

weapons.

15. Taewoo Kim, “South Korea’s Missile Dilemmas,” Asian Survey 

no. 3 (May–June 1999): 486–503.

16. Richard D. Fisher Jr., “Time to Stop North Korea’s Missile Bl

mail,” The Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum, no. 550, 8 S

tember 1998, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 12 January 2000, available f

http://www.heritage.org/library/execmemo/pdf/em_550.pdf.

17. Cambone, 67.

18. Richard D. Fisher Jr., “China Increases Its Missile Forces While 

posing US Missile Defense,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 

1268, 7 April 1999, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 12 January 2000, available f

http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bg1268es.html.

19. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, National Air Intelligence C

ter NAIC-1031-0985-99, April 1999, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 10 Septem

1999, available from http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/n

index.html. The DF-15 is alternately referred to as the M-9 or CS

Likewise, the DF-11 is also designated as the M-11 or CSS-7. See 

David G. Wiencek, Dangerous Arsenals: Missile Threats In and From A

Bailrigg Memorandum 22 (Lancaster, United Kingdom: Centre for Defe

and International Security Studies, 1997), 11–20.

20. Fisher, “China Increases Its Missile Forces While Opposing 

Missile Defense.”

21. Gary Klintworth, “To TMD or Not to TMD,” Free China Rev

September 1999, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 21 January 2000, available f

http://www.fas.org/news/taiwan/1999/R9909p42.htm.

22. Fisher, “China Increases Its Missile Forces While Opposing 

Missile Defense.”

23. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat.

24. Ibid.

25. Fisher, “China Increases Its Missile Forces While Opposing 

Missile Defense.” Fisher provides convincing evidence that the Chin

are probably pursuing MIRVing of the DF-5. He obtained possible 

dence that China is developing new, smaller reentry vehicles when 

tending the 1998 Zhuhai Air Show. Also, the Chinese Long March 

2C/SC SLV used to place 10 (as of April 1999) Iridium communicat

satellites on orbit is a slightly modified version of the DF-5 ICBM. 

both government and industry sources have stated that the Irid

launch bus could be quickly converted for small nuclear warheads.

26. Ibid.

27. Wiencek, 8.

28. Ibid.

29. “Chapter 6: Missile Defenses,” 1998 Secretary of Defense Annua

port to the President and the Congress, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 21 Janu

2000, available from http://www.fas.org/man/docs/adr_99/chap6.htm
30. Stephanie Mann, “Missile Defense: US & Asia,” 18 March 1999, n

on-line, Internet, 21 January 2000, available from http://www.fas.

news/japan/990318-japan-tmd.htm.

31. The Honorable Paul G. Kaminski, under secretary of defense 

acquisition and technology, “Cooperating in a Competitive Environme

remarks, Center for Strategic and International Studies Inaugural C

ference on From Shadows to Substance: Defining an Action Plan 

Transatlantic Defense Cooperation, 27 February 1995, n.p.; on-line

ternet, 21 January 2000, available from http://www.acq.osd.mil/ous

speech/competitive_env.html.

32. Green and Akihisa, 21.

33. Fisher, “Building a More Secure Asia Through Missile Defens

34. Michael C. Sirak, “United States, Japan Finalize Deal on N

Theater Wide Cooperation,” Inside Missile Defense 5, no. 17 (25 Au

1999): 12.

35. Robert Wall, “US, Japan Agree on Cooperative Missile Defen

Aviation Week & Space Technology 151, no. 8 (23 August 1999): 46.

36. Michael C. Sirak, “US-Japan Cooperation on TMD Resea

Awaits Diet Budget Process,” Inside Missile Defense, 27 January 1999

37. “Standard Missile,” n.p.; on-line, Internet, 12 January 2000, a

able from http://www.flthlpdsk.chinalake.navy.mil/help2/weapo

surflaunch/standard.htm,

See also “Navy Theater-Wide Missile Defense (NTWMD),” n.p.; on-

Internet, 12 January 2000, available from http://www.boeing.com

fense-space/missiles/ntwmd/index.htm. The Standard Missile is an 

weather, ship-launched, medium- to long-range, fleet air defense mi

system family that provides advanced air defense for an entire fleet a

On 24 January 1997, the Navy successfully demonstrated a TMD ca

bility when a modified Standard Missile-2 Block IV destroyed an in-fl

Lance theater ballistic missile. The NTW system will use a new mi

designated the Standard Missile-3. The Standard Missile-3 will be de

oped from the Standard Missile-2 Block IV by removing the warhead 

radar seeker from the nose and replacing it with a third-stage kick m

plus kinetic kill vehicle and modifying the associated software.

38. Sirak, “United States, Japan Finalize Deal on Navy Theater W

Cooperation,”12.

39. Information is derived from personal discussions with emb

personnel in March 2000 during an Air War College Regional Studies 

to Japan and South Korea.

40. Shawn W. Crispin and Susan V. Lawrence, “In Self-Defence,” 

Eastern Economic Review 162, no. 26 (1 July 1999): 24.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. “S. Korea Refuses Participation in TMD,” Jane’s Defence We

31, no. 11 (17 March 1999): 16.

44. Barbara Opall-Rome, “Seoul Seeks Medium-Range Missile Fo

Defense News 14, no. 9 (8 March 1999): 1. These same points were mad

US embassy personnel in Seoul, Republic of Korea, when I asked them 

March 2000 about prospective South Korean participation in a US-Jap

South Korea cooperative TMD development and deployment program.

45. Shim Jae Hoon and Shawn W. Crispin, “Different Drummer,” 

Eastern Economic Review 162, no. 26 (1 July 1999): 26.

46. Opall-Rome, 1.

47. Capt George A. Hutchinson and Craig M. Brandt, “Internati

Armament Cooperation and Theater Missile Defense: Why South Kore
Reluctant to Join the Club,” Air Force Journal of Logistics 23, no. 3 

1999): 24. See also “South Korea,” n.p.; on-line, Internet, 21 Janu

2000, available from http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/skorea.h

Through reverse engineering and modifications of US-supplied Nike 

cules surface-to-air missiles, South Korea has produced two version

a two-stage, solid-fuel surface-to-surface missile. They are design

NHK-1 and NHK-2 with ranges of 180 and 260 km and payloads of 

and 450 kg, respectively.

48. Hoon and Crispin, 26.

49. “The Missile Technology Control Regime,” The Arms Control A

ciation Background Paper, July 1999, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 21 Janu

2000, available from http://www.armscontrol.org/FACTS/mtcr.h

The Missile Technology Control Regime is an informal export con

arrangement among 32 nations, including some of the world’s most 

vanced suppliers of ballistic missiles and missile-related materials 

equipment. The regime is designed to stem the spread of ballistic 

cruise missiles capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload 300 km 

more, by establishing a common export control policy (the guidelines) 

a shared list of controlled items (the annex) that each country implem

with its own national legislation. The MTCR is neither an internati

treaty nor a legally binding agreement. MTCR members voluntarily ple

to adopt the regime’s export guidelines and to restrict the export of it

contained in the regime’s annex. While all nations have been encoura

to abide by the MTCR’s terms, not all states have been invited to bec

formal regime members. A number of nonmember states have made p

lic and legislative commitments to adhere unilaterally to the MTCR Gu

lines and Annex. South Korea is one of these nonmember adherents.

50. Opall-Rome, 1.

51. Jun Kwan-Woo, “Korean and French Firms Plan Missile Ventu

Space Daily, 7 February 2000, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 8 February 2

available from http://www.spacer.com/spacecast/news/korea-00c.htm

52. Greg May, “Thinking About TMD: Relations with China and A

Stability,” Nixon Center Program Brief 5, no. 2 (6 January 1999): n.p.; 

line, Internet, 28 December 1999, available from http://www.nixon

ter.org/publications/Program%20Briefs/vol5no2TMD.htm.

53. Christensen, 54.

54. Cameron W. Barr, “The Concept: An Asian Missile Shield,” C

tian Science Monitor 91, no. 92 (8 April 1999): 12.

55. Medeiros. The PAC-2 Plus is a subconfiguration of the PAC-2 

triot missile defense system. It does not have the enhancements of 

PAC-3 system that is currently under development and which will 

significant advance over the PAC-2. The PAC-3 will incorporate signifi

radar improvements, software enhancements, advanced rem

launch/communications capabilities, and joint interoperability 

other TMD systems like the THAAD system. Additionally, the PAC-3 

use a new interceptor armed with a kinetic kill vehicle rather than f

mentation warheads. See also Report to Congress on Theater Missile 

fense Architecture Options for the Asia-Pacific Region, 8. A comprehen

analysis of the architecture requirements for the defense of Japan f

limited theater ballistic missile attacks by North Korea only (China 

not included) resulted in a requirement of more than one hundred P

3-like TMD systems for countrywide defense. The PAC-3-like config

tion analyzed consisted of remotely linked PAC-3 systems (for exten

battlespace) integrated with THAAD-like radars for enhanced cueing 

formation.
56. Steven Mufson and Helen Dewar, “Pentagon Issues Warnin

China: US Officials Criticize Beijing White Paper Backing Use of F

Against Taiwan,” Washington Post, 23 February 2000, 16.

57. Christensen, 63.

58. “China Opposes Inclusion of Taiwan in TMD,” Beijing Review 

no. 36 (6 September 1999): 7.

59. The “three no’s” policy was stated by President William Jeffer

Clinton in Shanghai during the June 1998 Sino-United States sum

no United States support for Taiwan’s independence; no support for 

Chinas or one China, one Taiwan; and no support for Taiwanese entra

into international organizations for which statehood is a prerequisite

60. Medeiros. This three-day conference was attended by over s

US and Chinese government officials and nongovernmental experts 

discussions of China’s increasing ballistic missile deployments and 

bilateral disputes of the US’s plans to deploy a NMD system and T

technology sharing with Japan and Taiwan. The main goals of the 

ference were to (1) identify the nature and scope of the key differences 

lated to ballistic missile deployments, missile defenses, and regional 

bility; (2) develop a range of possible solutions to address US defe

requirements and Chinese security concerns; (3) enhance US and 

nese understanding of the policy trends and key people and institut

involved in internal discussions about missile deployments, missile 

fenses, and regional security; and (4) promote interactions between 

and Chinese arms control officials and experts to exchange informa

and insights, coordinate activities, and open new lines of communicat

61. This personal opinion is based on my research for this paper 

discussions with a retired US Navy admiral who served on the US Pa

Command’s staff. The Chinese do not currently have the capability, 

will they obtain the capability within the next 15 to 30 years, to pre

the United States from responding should they decide to use mili

force to repatriate Taiwan. And if the United States decided to opp

China, the Chinese could not prevail. Additionally, China has too m

compelling reasons not to wage war against Taiwan. Around 40,000 

wanese businesses have invested approximately $40 billion within 

Chinese mainland, contributing substantially to the Chinese leadersh

current, top-priority goal of economic modernization. One-third of 

total output of Taiwan’s information industry is produced by main

Chinese plants. China is Taiwan’s largest consumer market, and Tai

is China’s first-ranking supplier. A war against Taiwan would likely re

in China being treated by the international community as a pariah 

tion, rapidly ensuring derailment of this foremost national goal. La

war against Taiwan could lead to the military rearmament of Jap

something China wants to avoid at all costs.

62. Bill Gertz, “Pentagon Study Finds China Preparing for War 

US,” Washington Times, 2 February 2000, 4.

63. David M. Lampton, “Enhancing Global, Regional, and Taiwan S

rity for the Twenty-First Century,” testimony before the US Senate Com

tee on Foreign Relations Hearings on S. 693, The Taiwan Security 

hancement Act, 4 August 1999, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 20 March 2

available from http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/testimo

8_4_99tsea.htm.