MCWP 3-22.2

SUPPRESSION OF 

ENEMY AIR DEFENSES 

(SEAD)

U.S. Marine Corps 

PCN 143 000096 00 

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Headquarters United States Marine Corps 

Washington, DC 20380-1775

18 May 2001

FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-22.2,

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) provides the

information needed by Marines to understand, plan, and execute

SEAD missions in support of Marine air-ground task force

(MAGTF), joint, and combined operations. The focus of MCWP 3-

22.2 is for the MAGTF commander, his staff, and other personnel

involved in planning and executing operations to understand the

requirements to plan successful SEAD missions during an operation.

This publication:

● Defines SEAD.

● Assesses the threat.

● Highlights capabilities and limitations of SEAD.

● Discusses SEAD planning.

● Discusses critical aspects of SEAD mission execution.

MCWP 3-22.2 supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 

5-45, Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, dated 30 September 1994. 

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

B. B. KNUTSON, JR.

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding General

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

DISTRIBUTION: 143 000096 00
Suppression of 

Enemy Air Defenses 

Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Fundamentals

Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

Preplanned SEAD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

Reactive SEAD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

SEAD Missions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

Concurrent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

Sequential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

Courses of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

Destructive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

Disruptive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

Relationship Between MAGTF and Joint SEAD . . . . . . . . . 1-9

Joint Operations Area/Area of Responsibility . . . . . . . . . 1-10

Localized. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

Opportune . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

A Tactical Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11

The Need for SEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13

The Means of SEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15

Chapter 2. The Threat

Assessing the Enemy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

Integrated Air Defense System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Command Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
MCWP 3-22.2

iv

Weapons Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

C2 Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

Engagement Sequence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

Detect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5

Identify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5

Correlate/Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5

Target Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Weapons Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Concept of Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Centralized IADS Engagement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

Autonomous Engagement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9

Territorial IADS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10

Tactical IADS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11

Centralized Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13

Decentralized Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14

Autonomous Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14

Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15

Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15

Weapons Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15

C2 Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16

Redundancy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16

Surprise, Mobility, and Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17

Aggressive Action, Initiative, and Originality . . . . . . . . . 2-17

Coordinated Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17

All-Around Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18

Radio Electronic Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18

Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-19

Centralized Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-19

Autonomous Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-19

Misemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20

Logistic Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21

Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

v

Chapter 3. Planning

Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

Command Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

Aviation Combat Element. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 

Ground Combat Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

Planning Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

Detection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

Identification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

Correlation/Tracking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

Target Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6

Weapons Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6

SEAD in Support of a Mission to Destroy an IADS. . . . . . . 3-8

Command Posts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8

Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9

Weapons Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9

C2 Network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9

SEAD in Support of a Mission Conducted Within

an IADS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9

Command Posts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10

Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10

Weapons Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10

C2 Network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11

RSEAD Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11

SEAD Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11

ACE Commander’s Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13

Coordinating a Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16

RSEAD Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16

Adjusting the Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-20
MCWP 3-22.2

vi

Chapter 4. Execution

Intelligence Collection and Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

Collection/Dissemination of Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

Target Location Accuracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Damage Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

Requesting SEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

Preplanned SEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

Reactive SEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

Timing and Delivery of Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

Coordination with Ground Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

Airspace Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

Separation Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

Lateral Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

Altitude Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

Altitude and Lateral Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

Time Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8

Combined Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8

Appendices

A. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

B. References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1
Chapter 1

Fundamentals

The Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commander uses

ground based and airborne fires to suppress enemy air defense

systems allowing friendly aircraft to conduct missions within the

airspace protected by these defenses. This is known as suppression

of enemy air defenses (SEAD). SEAD increases the effectiveness

and flexibility of MAGTF operations.

SEAD supports MAGTF, joint, and combined aviation operations

across the spectrum of warfare—from peacekeeping to military

operations other than war (MOOTW), and low-intensity through

high-intensity conflicts. SEAD is a tactical mission. It may support

one or more levels of warfare (tactical, operational, and strategic)

depending on the mission and the threat systems encountered. See

figure 1-1 on page 1-2.

Definitions

Prohibitive interference is that degree of influence introduced by

the enemy that prevents the accomplishment of the MAGTF’s

mission. Prohibitive interference is subjective. Factors influencing

prohibitive interference are asset attrition (the inability to achieve

the MAGTF mission due to destruction of MAGTF assets) and

mission aborts (inability to achieve the MAGTF mission due to

enemy forced aborts or likelihood of destruction).

Antiair warfare’s (AAW’s) primary function is to gain and maintain

the degree of air superiority required for the MAGTF to conduct

operations. AAW prevents the enemy from restricting MAGTF air,

land, and naval operations at a given time and place.
MCWP 3-22.2

1-2

Figure 1-1. Antiair Warfare Diagram.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

1-3

The enemy’s air, surface-to-air, surface-to-surface, and air-to-surface

threat to the MAGTF includes aircraft, surface-to-air weapons,

tactical missiles (TMs), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Tactical missiles include theater and tactical ballistic missiles

(TBMs) and cruise missiles. Employing the AAW principles of

destruction-in-depth, mutual support, and centralized command and

decentralized control, the MAGTF uses air defense and/or offensive

antiair warfare (OAAW) to reduce or eliminate this threat.

The objective of OAAW is to destroy or neutralize the enemy’s

air, surface-to-air, surface-to-surface, and air-to-surface threat

before it launches or assumes an attacking role. Preemptive

measures, SEAD, and local air superiority measures achieve the

objectives of OAAW. 

Preemptive measures weaken the enemy’s air, surface-to-air, surface-to-surface, and air-to-surface threat before the enemy can

prevent the attainment of the MAGTF’s objectives. If preemptive

measures are successful, they allow current/future air and ground

operations to continue without prohibitive interference. Preemptive measures include the following:

l Air strikes on enemy airfields that destroy or damage aircraft,

facilities, or logistic support. 

l Attacks on enemy command, control, and communications (C3)

facilities, surveillance systems, and surface-to-air weapons.

l Airstrikes on the enemy’s means of aircraft supply and

support (e.g., railroads, convoys).

l Offensive antiair sweeps to destroy enemy aircraft.

l Airstrikes on TBM sites.

SEAD neutralizes, destroys or temporarily degrades surfacebased enemy air defenses by destructive or disruptive means.
MCWP 3-22.2

1-4

SEAD operations allow friendly aircraft to operate in airspace

defended by enemy air defense systems. SEAD supports all air

operations, including preemptive measures and local air

superiority. Although SEAD is a task of OAAW, SEAD also

supports functions of Marine aviation other than AAW, such as

offensive air support (OAS), aerial reconnaissance, and assault

support. SEAD is the application of sufficient, expedient force to

facilitate achieving other missions or objectives. This force may

be a part of a large-scale effort to suppress surface-based threats

for the duration of a military operation. It also seeks to provide a

window of opportunity—free from prohibitive interference,

lasting a few minutes, hours or days—to conduct other missions. 

Residual enemy air threats can exist after the application of

preemptive measures and SEAD. Local air superiority measures

prevent any residual enemy air threat from introducing

prohibitive interference into MAGTF operations. Local air

superiority measures include the use of offensive combat air

patrols (CAPs) and pre-strike sweeps, escort and self-escort

tactics or aircraft countermeasures and maneuvers. All levels of

the aviation combat element (ACE) can plan and execute local air

superiority measures. 

Categories

SEAD is divided into two primary categories: preplanned SEAD,

and reactive SEAD (RSEAD). 
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

1-5

Preplanned SEAD

Preplanned SEAD is primarily an exercise in fire support

planning. Fire support planning channels process requests for

preplanned SEAD. Higher echelons generally plan and coordinate these requests. Normally, any SEAD mission allocated or

apportioned through the normal air tasking order (ATO) cycle for

an operation is preplanned SEAD. Preplanned SEAD targets

permanent and semi-permanent targets such as strategic surfaceto-air missiles (SAMs), early warning (EW) and ground control

intercept (GCI) radar sites, C3 nodes, and passive detection

systems. These systems can be located more easily with enough

time to conduct mission planning. Preplanned SEAD may also

target moveable or mobile threat systems.

Reactive SEAD

RSEAD suppresses or destroys “pop-up” surface-to-air threats.

RSEAD missions are time sensitive and rely on standing operating

procedures (SOPs) and training. RSEAD is primarily a fire support

coordination issue, generally coordinated at lower echelons.

RSEAD is any SEAD mission too urgent to wait for the next ATO

cycle (i.e., requires execution within the next 24 hours). Depending

on the nature of the supported mission, the presence of enemy air

defense assets may require a SEAD effort in the next few minutes

or hours. RSEAD targets typically include mobile antiaircraft

artillery (AAA) and mobile or tactical SAMs, as well as smaller,

more mobile EW, GCI, and local target acquisition radars. The

enemy is likely to move these systems about the battlefield as a

means of deception and to optimize the defense of critical sites and/

or areas. Reactive SEAD is further subdivided into three types:

immediate, deliberate, and alert RSEAD.
MCWP 3-22.2

1-6

Immediate RSEAD

Immediate RSEAD occurs when a MAGTF platform or weapon

system locates enemy air defense assets and targets them while it

is in the process of conducting another mission. An example

would be an AV-8B pilot who locates, identifies, and targets a

surface-to-air threat while conducting armed reconnaissance

against other targets. Immediate RSEAD affords the timeliest

response to “pop-up” enemy air defense assets. If conducted

successfully, there is no future requirement to locate or destroy

the targeted threat system. Disadvantages include the following:

l The execution of a hasty, unplanned, and possibly uncoordinated

attack.

l Lack of use of combined arms.

l Possible requirement for attackers to enter or continue operating

in threat engagement envelopes. 

Deliberate RSEAD

Deliberate RSEAD is a coordinated response with assets diverted

from other missions against enemy air defense assets located with

enough time to organize such a response. An example would be

an enemy SA-X located and identified by an F/A-18 pilot while

conducting close air support (CAS). This location information

passes through the Marine air command and control system

(MACCS). The tactical air commander may then order a

deliberate RSEAD mission using assets available to the direct air

support center (DASC). Deliberate RSEAD affords a timely

response to a “pop-up” enemy air defense asset. Deliberate

RSEAD also allows for a preplanned response. The deliberate

RSEAD mission allows for a coordinated, combined arms attack.

Disadvantages include the possible employment of less than
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

1-7

optimum ordnance and the potential requirement for attackers to

enter threat engagement envelopes. Deliberate RSEAD is the

response when an immediate RSEAD strike is neither feasible

(e.g., lack of ordnance, immediate location data unavailable, etc.)

nor sufficient (e.g., threat requires a coordinated response).

Alert RSEAD

Alert RSEAD responds to threats requiring dedicated RSEAD

planning. Planners may use alert RSEAD against a particular

surface-to-air system, when requiring a multi-axis attack, or after

having discovered multiple previously unprosecuted air defense

assets. If aircraft are used, they may be airborne or strip alert

assets. Advantages include: dedicated planning, proper

weaponeering, and using dedicated platforms or weapon systems

(no assets diverted from other missions). Disadvantages include

the lack of a timely response, timely threat locations, and

available dedicated SEAD assets.

SEAD Missions

Concurrent

Concurrent SEAD implies that destructive or disruptive efforts

occur simultaneously with other missions such as air interdiction

(AI), armed reconnaissance (AR) or CAS, in a combined arms

approach. If the enemy engages the targets entering his defended

space, his weapons systems become vulnerable to the disruptive

and destructive efforts of our SEAD assets. If the enemy does not

respond, the supported mission may likely destroy his defended

target(s) or otherwise accomplish the mission. 
MCWP 3-22.2

1-8

Sequential

Sequential SEAD implies that destructive or disruptive efforts are

preemptive. These efforts must precede other mission(s) to

introduce a window of opportunity during which MAGTF

operations will be free from prohibitive interference. Sequential

SEAD is often associated with an operation intended to

systematically degrade an enemy integrated air defense system

(IADS) as was done in Operation Desert Storm and Operation

Allied Force.

Courses of Action

Destructive

Destructive (lethal) SEAD is classified as those actions taken to

suppress enemy air defenses by destroying the targeted system.

Mission objectives, threat system capabilities, and friendly asset

capabilities influence these courses of action (COAs). Destructive

SEAD includes surface delivered fires (ground or naval based),

stand-off air-to-surface weapons, conventional air-to-ground

munitions or electronic attack (EA) in the form of antiradiation

missiles (ARMs).

Disruptive

Disruptive (nonlethal) SEAD includes EA (jamming or bulk

chaff) to temporarily deny, degrade, deceive, delay or neutralize

the targeted system. While intended to be destructive, high-speed

antiradiation missile (HARM) can also be disruptive. Disruptive

SEAD’s intent is not necessarily to destroy a system, but rather to
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

1-9

reduce its capability to a level that allows the accomplishment of

MAGTF objectives. 

Relationship Between MAGTF and Joint SEAD

Joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD) is a broad term

that encompasses all SEAD activities provided by components of

a joint force. The MAGTF can provide or receive J-SEAD.

J-SEAD creates conditions where friendly aircraft can conduct

operations in enemy airspace minimizing the surface to air threat.

It is part of a joint force’s attempt to gain control of enemy airspace by minimizing or eliminating the threat presented by IADS. 

In a joint environment, MAGTF assets may support joint task

force (JTF) SEAD objectives. It is important to be familiar with

J-SEAD terminology, and how MAGTF SEAD missions relate to

the J-SEAD. Joint Publication (JP) 3-01.2, Joint Doctrine for

Offensive Operations Countering Air and Missile Threats,

separates J-SEAD into three categories: joint operations area

(JOA)/area of responsibility (AOR); localized and opportune.

To summarize the relationship between MAGTF and J-SEAD,

J-SEAD generally relates to missions concerning both

geography and time. MAGTF SEAD types, preplanned and

reactive, depend primarily on time. MAGTF SEAD types

follow the MAGTF targeting cycle. MAGTF SEAD efforts are

normally localized or opportune. The ACE may participate in

the JOA/AOR SEAD effort by conducting an AI strike as part

of the J-SEAD plan. MAGTF aviation missions flown in

support of the MAGTF normally have more confined

objectives, either by duration or area of effect (i.e., localized).

If, while conducting CAS, AR, or AI missions, undetected
MCWP 3-22.2

1-10

threat systems ‘pop-up’ and prevent the accomplishment of the

MAGTF mission, aircrews may need to take immediate (i.e.,

opportune) disruptive or destructive COAs to accomplish their

missions. 

Joint Operations Area/Area of Responsibility

JOA/AOR SEAD creates increasingly favorable conditions for

friendly operations by disabling specific enemy air defense

system(s) (or major capabilities of those systems). JOA/AOR

SEAD usually supports campaign level operations and targets

high payoff air defense assets that will result in the greatest

degradation of the enemy’s total IADS. The immediate objective

is to permit effective friendly air operations by protecting friendly

airborne systems, interrupting selected elements of enemy air

defenses, and establishing flexibility for friendly operation on

both sides of the forward line of own troops (FLOT).

Localized

Localized SEAD normally has specified time and space limitations

and supports specific operations or missions. It also contributes to

local air superiority, facilitating joint operations in the area.

Opportune

Opportune SEAD is usually unplanned because of a lack of

timely air defense threat identification information that would

facilitate planned suppression. Opportune SEAD includes aircrew

self-defense, targets of opportunity, targets acquired by observers

or controllers, and targets acquired by aircrews. It is a continuous

operation involving immediate response to acquired air defense

targets of opportunity.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

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The joint force operation plan contains specific request procedures.

JP 3-01.2 and the Air, Land, Sea Application (ALSA) Multiservice

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Suppression of Enemy

Air Defenses, contain more information on J-SEAD. 

A Tactical Mission

SEAD is a tactical mission that supports other aviation missions.

Rather than having an operational focus, SEAD is a supporting

mission. All attacks on enemy air defenses are not SEAD.

Likewise, SEAD is more than artillery-delivered suppression of

known enemy air defense weapons during air operations. 

To successfully conduct SEAD, the same requirements for

targeting and planning exist as for deep air support (DAS), CAS,

and other tactical missions. Targets are selected based on the

commander’s guidance and mission assessment. Once specific

targets are decided, they are prioritized and known targets are

plotted for attack. Detailed mission planning will determine the

number of sorties, types of munitions used, and other factors

required to achieve the desired effects on the target. 

For example, the Marine expeditionary force (MEF) commander

receives his mission from the joint force commander (JFC). He

begins the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) by

conducting mission analysis. A product of mission analysis is a

warning order. The ACE will receive the warning order and will

begin parallel planning. Information will be passed back and

forth between the ACE planners and the ACE liaison officers on

the MEF operational planning team. The ACE would also use the

MCPP to formulate its plans for the upcoming operation. A

warning order would go from the wing to its groups. In this
MCWP 3-22.2

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manner, tactical level planning is conducted at all levels of

command in the MAGTF.

Whether SEAD is preplanned or reactive, the battle damage

assessment (BDA) will reveal the level of success of the

missions. A decision to readdress targets will be made. The

decision may have to occur airborne while the supported aircraft

are enroute to their target. An example: part of the go/no-go

criteria for an AI mission is that the SAMs defending an airfield

be suppressed before the strike aircraft deliver ordnance. A

combination of EA (jamming and antiradiation missiles [ARMs])

and decoys presents a deceptive strike feint, disrupts the SAMs’

communications network, and destroys their targeting radars

before strike aircraft reach the initial point (IP). As the strike

aircraft near the IP, the mission commander’s radar warning

receiver (RWR) indicates that SAMs are still active in the target

area. The mission commander must rapidly assess the threat and

SEAD effectiveness and decide whether to—

l Continue the mission as briefed;

l ‘Strip’ a portion of the strike’s aircraft to make their way to

the SAM site(s) and destroy the launchers; or 

l Abort the strike (based on go/no-go criteria).

Refer to MCWP 3-16, Tactics techniques and Procedures for Fire

Support Coordination, MCWP 3-23, Offensive Air Support,

MCWP 3-23.2, Deep Air Support, and MCRP 3-16.B, The Joint

Targeting Process and Procedures for Targeting Time-Critical

Taragets for more information on the joint targeting cycle and the

MAGTF targeting cycle. 
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

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The Need for SEAD

The proliferation of inexpensive, reliable, lethal, ground-based air

systems promises to increasingly complicate the MAGTF’s

ability to conduct its assigned mission. This applies to developed,

emerging, and developing countries around the globe. These

systems provide the capability to quickly deploy redundant,

multispectral systems coordinated through robust command and

control (C2) networks. As information technology continues to

improve, software will become a more significant factor in the

functionality of these weapons systems. Upgrades will be easier

to incorporate, nearly impossible to detect, and thus much harder

to counter. The trends also include a migration toward mobile and

moveable or semi-permanent air defense systems, vice the larger,

fixed systems of the past. This will make it harder to detect,

locate, and subsequently target these systems.

The MAGTF commander must consider the need for SEAD and

provide SEAD guidance for MAGTF operations. The decision to

conduct SEAD depends on the following:

l MAGTF’s mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and

support available, time available (METT-T).

l Acceptable risk.

l Capabilities and complexity of enemy air defenses. Air

defense effectiveness depends on the quality and quantity of

weapons, integration, mutual support, and the skill level of the

operator. The MAGTF commander, subordinate element commanders, and their staffs evaluate the enemy’s capability to

influence the MAGTF’s use of aviation.
MCWP 3-22.2

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l Ability of friendly aircrews to evade enemy air defenses and

of aircraft survivability equipment to deny or negate the threat

weapons systems’ engagements.

l Capabilities and availability of friendly systems to provide

SEAD. If MAGTF air operations expose friendly aircraft to

enemy air defenses, planners consider the capabilities and

availability of SEAD-capable systems. Planners evaluate the

impact on other MAGTF operations by the use of these systems

to conduct SEAD. Enemy air defense effectiveness and the relative importance of MAGTF air operations may cause SEAD to

be a high priority fire support mission for the MAGTF.

The MAGTF conducts SEAD planning, coordination, and execution continuously. SEAD requires close coordination between

intelligence, fire support, and mission planners at each MAGTF

echelon. Planners must—

l Determine the time available.

l Review the SEAD requirement and determine the MAGTF’s

capability to meet the requirement.

l Determine targets to attack and target location, the effects desired, and the need and means to conduct damage assessment.

l Identify SEAD assets available.

l Issue taskings or requests for additional support to meet the

MAGTF SEAD requirement.

l Conduct liaison and coordination with other MAGTF elements.

l Evaluate SEAD effectiveness and determine the need for

additional SEAD.
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The Means of SEAD

Aviation and ground forces conduct SEAD to protect specific air

missions. Effective SEAD requires unity of effort to achieve a

combined arms effect. This requires extensive training,

integration at every level, and detailed planning. A combined

arms approach enhances the results against enemy air defenses

while reducing the risk to friendly aircraft. The MAGTF performs

SEAD by integrating air, ground, and naval combat power. The

MAGTF uses the following means, optimally in combination, to

conduct SEAD:

l Fixed-wing attack—Destructively strike targets with general

purpose or precision-guided bombs, rockets, ARMs, and guns.

l Attack helicopters—Destructively strike targets with precision-guided munitions (PGM), rockets, and guns.

l UAVs—Used to facilitate SEAD with their ability to detect,

identify, locate, and track SEAD targets; assess the effect of

SEAD efforts; and relay this information in (near) real-time to

cognizant C2 agencies within the MACCS as well as the JTF.

l Electronic warfare—EA-6Bs disrupt critical C2 information

flow within an IADS, conduct EA against radars, and target

air defense sites with ARMs.

l Tanks, antitank weapons, and machine guns—Destructively target individual vehicles and sites with precision/nonprecision munitions.

l Mortars and artillery—Destroy and disrupt air defense

assets with both guided and unguided munitions; range, accuracy, and responsiveness make artillery the most common

indirect fire SEAD asset. 
MCWP 3-22.2

1-16

l Naval surface fire support—Destroy and disrupt air defense

assets with both guided and unguided munitions, including

cruise missiles.
Chapter 2

The Threat

“If you know the enemy and yourself, you need not fear the

result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the

enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If

you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in

every battle.” —Sun-Tzu

Assessing the Enemy

Combat staff planners at every level of the MAGTF must

consider the threat’s expected nature, composition, and ability to

affect our aviation missions. The threat’s nature and intensity

influence the tactics and techniques selected during mission

planning, and will help define what type(s) of SEAD assets must

be dedicated to effectively suppress the threat. The same

considerations identified with other MAGTF missions apply to

SEAD operations; the mnemonic METT-T helps to identify the

key components to be considered.

Sun-Tzu’s statement remains valid today. To ensure victory, a great

deal of effort must be exerted in assessing the enemy and

identifying unique capabilities and limitations. With respect to

SEAD, that analysis focuses on the specifics of the enemy’s air

defense organizational structure, weapon systems capabilities,

physical deployment, C2 doctrine, and operator training and

proficiency. MAGTF planners must analyze air defense capabilities, identify vulnerabilities, and exploit these weaknesses

through SEAD efforts. This includes target area tactics, ordinance

delivery profiles, and the integration of onboard aircraft
MCWP 3-22.2

2-2

survivability equipment (ASE) with dedicated disruptive and

destructive attack platforms. 

The majority of this chapter will address the most potent threat to

MAGTF aviation—IADS. The methodology used to analyze an

IADS remains valid for all other air defense structures. It is

beyond the scope of this manual to provide specific data on air

defense and C2 equipment, and control strategies. Classified

publications such as the AFTTP 3-1, Vol. II, Threat Reference

Guide and Countertactics (U) and the Missile & Space

Intelligence Center’s World Wide Threat Handbook (U) are

excellent resources for such specifics. Open-source references

include books such as the Jane’s Information Group series.

Integrated Air Defense System

The most significant threat to MAGTF aircraft is an organized,

proficient IADS capable of correlating information from a host of

long range, active and passive detection and cueing sources that

employ systems capable of multiple engagements. The MAGTF

will probably not be able nor required to suppress an entire IADS.

It will focus on some portion of the IADS to open an avenue to

conduct its mission. Whether conducting SEAD against an IADS,

a locally integrated air defense system or an autonomous air

defense unit, the MAGTF mission planner must organize his

SEAD to subdue the threat and ensure the supported mission’s

success. IADS, regardless of complexity, equipment or type,

consists of four components: the command element (CE),

sensors, weapons systems, and C2 network.
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Command Element

The CE exercises control over all other IADS components.

Responsibility for the defense of a designated vital area rests with

this organization. It possesses the authority to identify contacts

and commit weapons against air targets in its AOR. 

Sensors

Active and/or passive sensors allow the CE to detect, identify,

and correlate/track aircraft and airborne weapons within its

AOR. Sensors are normally positioned to detect hostile targets

at as great a distance from the defended vital area as possible,

and present the information in a usable manner to the IADS.

The primary purpose of these sensors is to provide data for the

IADS to establish a recognized air picture for the CE, via the

C2 network. 

Weapons Systems

The IADS will have some combination of interceptor aircraft,

SAM systems, antiaircraft artillery (AAA), and jammers

available to harass and destroy inbound aircraft and missiles.

Actual composition ratios between different weapons system

types vary greatly from country to country, and even within a

single country depending on the criticality of specific vital areas.

The IADS aims to overwhelm attacking aircraft with these

complementary systems. Weapons systems are located in such a

manner as to ensure mutual support is attained. 
MCWP 3-22.2

2-4

C2 Network

The command post, sensors, and weapons systems must be

linked, providing the controlling agency with the ability to see

detected aircraft, and effectively coordinate an economic yet

sufficient response with available weapons. The effectiveness of

an IADS hinges on the C2 network’s speed and reliability for

components to receive, evaluate, and forward information. In the

most developed IADS, individual sensors and weapon systems

are capable of autonomous operations, should they lose

connectivity with adjacent and higher components. The C2

network is the critical element of an IADS. It is the means by

which sensors, weapons, and the CE are integrated. Without the

C2 network, there exists only an air defense, which is neither

integrated nor a system.

Engagement Sequence

Every IADS should in most cases accomplish the following five

tasks to engage enemy aircraft:

l Detect.

l Identify.

l Correlate/track.

l Target assignment.

l Weapons control.

If operating autonomously, these tasks may be completed

organically, which may or may not increase air defense reaction

time. If integrated into an IADS network, many of these tasks
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

2-5

may be performed by designated agencies, resulting in

dissemination to other parts of the IADS. This process of

integrating and correlating IADS is designed to have a synergistic

effect, thus reducing the time required to complete the

engagement sequence. This in theory makes the capability of a

truly integrated air defense system much greater than the

capability of the sum of its components. The rules of engagement

(ROE) and C2 architecture are key to ensuring an IADS provides

more efficient and responsive air defense coverage.

Detect

This is the first task completed in the engagement sequence.

Without detection information, the engagement sequence cannot

proceed. Target detection may be accomplished by a variety of

different sensors, including EW radars, passive detection devices,

signals intelligence (SIGINT), aircraft, and visual observation

human intelligence (HUMINT). 

Identify

Once a target has been detected, its identity must be established.

The primary objective of identification is to definitively

determine whether an aircraft is friendly or hostile. Detection

sensors can help correlate air tracks with identification, friend or

foe (IFF) responses, electronics intelligence (ELINT) analysis or

visual observations. 

Correlate/Track

Correlation involves the fusion of detection data from various

sensors to establish the three-dimensional position of an
MCWP 3-22.2

2-6

inbound target (range, azimuth, altitude). Correlation is

required to focus weapons control systems in a particular area,

minimizing the amount of time required to bring weapons to

bear on the target.

Target Assignment

The target assignment is the handoff or designation of identified

target(s) to a specific weapons system.

Weapons Control

Once a target is designated to an individual fire control/weapons

system, the target must continue to be tracked for the duration of

the engagement to guide munitions to impact. 

Concept of Employment

The enemy deploys sensors and weapons to provide the earliest

possible detection and engagement of attacking aircraft. The

enemy organizes and conducts comprehensive radar, visual, and

electronic surveillance of surrounding airspace. Coverage is

emphasized across major avenues of aerial approach, and focuses

on the protection of critical targets. Air defense weapons are

specifically placed to achieve surprise, optimize individual

strengths, and offset weaknesses. To protect critical assets, the

enemy places air defense weapons to maintain mutual,

overlapping fire support and employ multiple engagement zones.

The enemy’s objective is to interfere with attacking aircraft to the

extent that it will prohibit the MAGTF in accomplishing its
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

2-7

mission. The two most important concepts in enemy air defense

employment are:

l Mutual support or the ability to engage high priority targets

with multiple weapons systems.

l Economy of force or the ability to avoid multiple, unwanted

engagements on the same target. 

The enemy uses his air defense weapons to protect his forces by

denying the MAGTF the ability to conduct effective air operations.

This does not require the enemy to destroy every aircraft. The

enemy air defense system can achieve this by—

l Adversely influencing friendly aircrews’ ability to conduct

their mission effectively (causing mission aborts).

l Destroying aircraft when they come within effective range of

enemy air defense weapons.

Achieving these goals permit the enemy to continue to protect

designated vital areas. There are two types of air defense

operations the MAGTF can expect to encounter: centralized and

autonomous. Each threat environment is unique and requires a

different level of effort to either disrupt or destroy.

Centralized IADS Engagement 

In an IADS, the engagement sequence is carried out through its

CE, sensors, weapons systems, and C2 network physically spread

across the defended area. The following text illustrates how an

IADS processes information using its four components through

the five tasks of the engagement sequence.
MCWP 3-22.2

2-8

An IADS must develop and maintain a recognized air picture

reflecting all aircraft operating within or approaching its area of

responsibility. Each sensor may only be able to detect and

identify aircraft in a small portion of the airspace for which the

IADS is responsible. Each sensor provides only a portion of the

information required to develop a complete aircraft track. Filter

centers within the IADS process track data from the various

detection assets, correlate the data, and resolve multiple inputs of

a single aircraft into a track. These filter centers distribute this

correlated data throughout the IADS. 

Identification results are forwarded up to the (senior) controlling

agency. Accurate identification of all air targets within the

defended airspace is critical if friendly air operations are being

conducted simultaneously, to preclude fratricide. Data correlation

and identification provides the air defense commander and his

staff with the recognized air picture requisite to effective air

defense. Dissemination of this data provides all elements of the

IADS the current recognized air picture, increasing their

situational awareness.

Target assignment is the decisionmaking process employed by

the air defense commander. Basically, this is how and when the

air defense commander decides which aircraft are to be engaged

with particular air defense assets. In an IADS, filter centers feed

their consolidated air pictures into a centralized command post

(CCP), also known as the controlling agency, where authority

exists to commit air defense weapon systems. It is through this

task of the engagement sequence that the air defense commander

ensures that the principles of mutual support and economy of

force are applied. Air defense weapons continually provide their

status, weapons state, and functionality to the CCP. With this

information, augmented with standard operating responses and

rules of engagement, the air defense commander determines
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

2-9

which aircraft pose the greatest threat to vital areas and how that

threat is to be neutralized. It is critical that the air defense

commander have continual access to an accurate, recognized air

picture and constant access to subordinate weapons status.

Once targets are designated for engagement, the controlling

agency issues appropriate orders to fire control units. Normally

targets are assigned by the CCP to a specific fighter/interceptor,

SAM or AAA headquarters unit. This headquarters coordinates

target engagement within its individual fire units, and returns

engagement results and updated equipment status to the CCP. In

centralized control operations, the CCP may assign specific target

tracks to a particular fire unit or weapon.

Autonomous Engagement 

Forcing the components of an IADS to operate without cuing

from centralized command and control stations will have the

following effects: 

l Individual weapons must detect air targets with organic sensors.

Most visual and IR systems are denied the benefit of radar cueing

information. Weapons systems with integrated organic radars

must emit radar energy, making them vulnerable to detection,

location, and attack by ARMs or other weapons. Additionally this

radiation provides advanced warning to ingressing aircraft.

l When an antiaircraft weapon is operating autonomously,

tracking data from outside sources is not available to it. Track

information would have enabled the weapon system to

employ its weapon much sooner than if the individual weapon

system had to create a track on its own.
MCWP 3-22.2

2-10

l Individual weapons rely on organic means for aircraft identification. Because this increases the chance of fratricide and greatly

limits the ability of friendly aircraft to operate in the vicinity, it

can force operators into restrictive firing conditions, such as the

requirement to visually identify targets before engaging. Every

delay increases the probability of MAGTF aircraft survival.

l Economy of force is nearly impossible to achieve. Targets may be

engaged by many individual weapon systems within the local area.

Missiles and aircraft may engage lower priority threats, depleting

supplies available for higher threats to the vital area. An IADS can

be classified as either territorial or tactical, depending on the type of

areas they are designed to protect. Each will have unique equipment, command structures, capabilities, and limitations.

Territorial IADS

Territorial IADS are designed to protect large, fixed airspace such as

defined borders or coastlines. They also defend vital areas within a

country such as critical military, industrial, and population centers.

Territorial IADS are widely used, and most likely encountered when

conducting air operations within the boundaries of a hostile nation.

Territorial IADS have the following characteristics:

l SAM and AAA sites are well prepared, and protected with

both physical structures (bunkers, revetments, decoys) and

other point defense SAM and AAA systems.

l SAMs and AAA pieces are normally longer range, fixed sites.

Their relatively static nature is due to the size and extensive

power requirements of associated equipment, and the volume

of information required to/from supporting C2 network(s).
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

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l Territorial IADS normally employ air-to-air interceptors to

complement both strategic and tactical surface-to-air weapons, and extend the destructive engagement zones as far from

defended vital areas as possible.

l Because component sites are normally fixed, C2 functions are

primarily conducted via rigid media (e.g., telephone lines,

fiber-optic cables, and land line data links). These media will

be protected through burying and/or “hardening” to prevent

disruption or damage. Such C2 networks are generally impervious to all but the most direct, destructive means of attack.

Primary networks may have redundant connectivity, including

laser and RF data links and voice communications. 

l Territorial IADS normally have rigid, centralized command

structures, including air defense districts (geographically designated areas of responsibilities), air defense zones, and CCPs

to control each functional area.

Tactical IADS

Tactical air defense systems are designed to protect maneuvering

forces, major headquarters, and logistic areas, etc., from air attack.

Linked, local area defenses (i.e., an integrated threat) may also be

considered a tactical IADS. Tactical IADS are most likely encountered

when conducting MAGTF operations against maneuvering forces in

the field. Tactical IADS have the following characteristics: 

l Often employ mobile SAMs/AAA. Other air defense assets

(other than small arms) do not normally defend these.

l SAMs/AAA pieces are normally short to medium range. A

wide variety of aircraft may be employed to augment surfacebased weapons. Examples include fixed-wing fighters, ground

attack aircraft, and rotary-wing aircraft.
MCWP 3-22.2

2-12

l C2 functions are normally conducted via less rigid media

including RF voice communications, data link, and cellular

telephone. Mobile systems will endeavor to hardwire their C2

work if given the opportunity (ground forces have paused

momentarily to regroup or are in a defensive posture).

l Tactical IADS normally have less rigid, more decentralized

command structures.

MAGTF air operations may face both types of IADS, either

sequentially (flying over engaged ground forces to strike an

industrial complex deeper within a hostile country’s borders) or

simultaneously (striking a maneuver force headquarters that is

defended not only by its organic air defenses but falls within the

coverage of the country’s territorial defenses). The underlying

tenet of successful SEAD against an IADS is to deny or delay the

engagement sequence for as long as possible, allowing MAGTF

aircraft the greatest opportunity to complete their mission. 

Air defense command posts are the heart of the IADS. Their

destruction or disruption provides the best chance of

catastrophically affecting the IADS. Degrading the enemy’s air

defense C2 system will limit effective air defense coverage and

reduce EW. Loss of these command posts breaks an IADS into

individual components and destroys system integration. Loss of

integration allows the MAGTF to attack and defeat individual

components in detail.

An IADS as a whole uses three types of control—centralized,

decentralized, and autonomous—to maximize its ability to rapidly engage hostile aircraft. The type of control exercised determines an IADS’ flexibility in dealing with late-breaking or “popup” targets. The type of control implemented is dependent on the

country’s political-military relationship, equipment sophistication, the vital area to be defended, and personnel training levels.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

2-13

Centralized Control

Also known as “top-down” control, the senior controlling agency

directs target engagement. Before a firing unit can engage other

targets, it must request permission from the controlling agency.

Centralized control is used to minimize the likelihood of

engaging friendly aircraft.

Advantages

l Minimizes the likelihood of engaging friendly aircraft.

l Individual operators focus on a single or a few actions with

each target before advancing to the next.

l Individual radar and fire control operators require only basic

training in specific system operations to fulfill their mission.

Disadvantages

l Senior controlling agency is susceptible to over-tasking,

resulting in a failure of the entire system. 

l Susceptible to slow decision processing, information overloading,

and a lack of independent capability.

l Requires a high degree of training and operator proficiency at

higher echelons of the IADS

l Difficult for operators accustomed to working within centralized

control structure to perform well in an autonomous role.

l Centralized control relies on consistent, reliable information

both to and from the senior controlling agency on which to

base engagement decisions.
MCWP 3-22.2

2-14

Decentralized Control

To prevent over-tasking critical elements within the IADS,

decentralized control can be used by an IADS. This is the

preferred control method within the MACCS. Controlling

agencies monitor unit actions and make direct target assignments

to units only when necessary to ensure proper fire distribution,

prevent engagement of friendly aircraft or prevent simultaneous

engagements of hostile targets. Decentralized control is only

possible if intermediate echelon command posts are prepared and

capable to operate without the direction of senior commanders.

Today, technology advances have made decentralized control

more feasible because of hardware component reliability and

software simplicity. With such advances, operators with a more

basic level of proficiency are capable of conducting complex and

detailed engagements. However, decentralized control requires a

high level of confidence in subordinate element commanders, and

a great deal of individual operator training and proficiency at

every level within the IADS. Relative advantages of centralized

control become the ‘friction areas’ of decentralized control

architectures; the vulnerabilities of centralized control become

the strengths of decentralized control.

Autonomous Control

Individual air defense elements operate without direction from

higher authority. Autonomous control is normally utilized only

when communication links are disrupted, saturated or destroyed.

Aircraft, SAM or AAA unit commanders assume full

responsibility for the entire engagement sequence, without

information from the rest of the IADS.
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Capabilities

Enemy air defense capabilities greatly influence the timing and

duration of SEAD, MAGTF tactics, and airspace coordination.

SEAD delivered at the wrong time or for an inadequate duration

will be ineffective. Aircrews may be able to fly over, under or

around the air defense coverage to reduce the SEAD requirement.

Planners consider the threat engagement envelope and aircraft

maneuverability when designing airspace control measures. From

the previous discussions, MAGTF SEAD mission planners can

expect air defenses to incorporate the following capabilities.

Sensors

A wide variety of redundant, multispectral sensors will be

employed by an IADS, to include the use of electro-optical (EO),

infrared (IR), laser, and radio frequency (RF) systems. Both

active sensors (radars) and passive sensors (electronic warfare

support (ES) assets) will be employed. Aircraft will be used to

extend the range of sensor systems. Acquisition and tracking

sources will be capable of “handing off” data to guidance

mechanisms in another spectrum (e.g., night vision goggle

(NVG) acquisition to an IR or imaging guidance).

Weapons Systems

A variety of weapons systems (i.e., SAMs, AAA, aircraft) use

multispectral guidance—including EO, IR, RF, millimeter

wave, lasers, and radio electronic combat (REC) assets—that

targets MAGTF radars, communications, and global positioning

system (GPS) receivers with EA. In the near future, destructive
MCWP 3-22.2

2-16

firepower will include advanced explosives, directed energy

(such as RF and laser), and electromagnetic pulse weapons.

These advances complicate our ability to effectively counter

and suppress such threats.

C2 Network

Technological advances have increased the efficiency of C2

networks, which makes them increasingly more difficult to disrupt

and destroy and rapidly decreases network reaction time. C2

networks often use buried hard wire links to ensure connectivity.

Redundancy

Redundancy allows commanders to use the most effective sensors,

weapons systems, and C2 networks to conduct the engagement

sequence. Redundancy provides multiple opportunities for successful completion of the five tasks of the IADS engagement

sequence and guarantees continued effectiveness as IADS components are degraded or destroyed. Multiple sensors (e.g., ground

based and airborne radars) may be used to cover the same sector of

airspace. Several weapons systems may be able to target aircraft in

a likely avenue of approach (SAMs and AAA). A C2 network may

employ a hard wire data link, a hard wire voice link (telephone),

radio voice communication, radio data link communication, and

cellular telephone communication to pass the same information to

various components of the IADS. Technological advances allow

redundancy to be built into current and future IADS components,

as well as within existing systems. This greatly complicates the

SEAD effort required to suppress the variety of alternative sensor,

weapons system, and C2 network resources.
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Surprise, Mobility, and Deception

Surprise allows commanders to optimize air defense strengths

and offset weaknesses. Using the precepts of mobility and

deception, commanders can conduct coordinated, concentrated

air defense at critical places and times in the battle. Commanders

can provide air defense coverage at critical terrain features such

as barriers or river crossing sites. Since the enemy cannot be

strong everywhere, economy of force must apply. Therefore the

enemy can certainly be expected to employ surprise tactics, using

a combination of stationary and mobile systems and an effective

deception plan to surprise our aircrews, maximizing destructive

capability and negating MAGTF SEAD efforts. Advanced,

mobile air defense systems greatly complicate the MAGTF’s

ability to detect, track, and destroy these elements with existing

SEAD weapons, complementing both the enemy’s deception and

surprise plans.

Aggressive Action, Initiative, and Originality

Like all effective military leaders, air defense unit commanders

employ aggressive action, initiative, and originality to exploit

inherent capabilities of their equipment. They must be responsive

to changes in the tactical situation as well. When the supported

unit’s mission changes, the air defense commander must

reevaluate his unit’s deployment. He must be aware of changes in

the tactics and weapons employed by opposing aircrews.

Coordinated Action

Coordinated action between supported and supporting units and

among air defense units emphasizes combined arms. Air defense
MCWP 3-22.2

2-18

operations are not a series of separate and distinct actions unrelated to each other or to the conduct of the supported mission. 

All-Around Security

An air defense system must provide all-around security not only

for forward combat units but also to logistics units, lines of

communications, and reserves. An air defense unit must provide

security from attacks in any direction.

Radio Electronic Combat

The enemy uses REC to complement his ground-based air defense

capability. REC integrates EW, physical destruction, SIGINT,

and radio electronic concealment and deception. REC expands the

IADS’ detection, identification, and tracking abilities.

The enemy integrates the REC effort with other tactical actions.

The enemy uses REC at critical moments to disrupt the C2,

coordination, and execution of SEAD missions. If REC activities

succeed, the attack on an IADS may degenerate from a

coordinated operation to individual, ineffective attacks. The

enemy will most likely use REC to—

l Provide an IADS with attack warning. This information

allows air defense units to set the proper emission control posture to prevent SEAD targeting.

l Jam or deceive navigation equipment, air control, air-to-air

and air-to-ground radars, and communications.

l Direct supporting arms against targets located by radio

direction finding to suppress direct and indirect fire weapons

performing SEAD.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

2-19

Vulnerabilities

An enemy air defense system may be a complex, mutually supporting

system with overlapping coverage. While it is a formidable system, it

has vulnerabilities that the MAGTF can exploit.

Centralized Control

The complex nature of an enemy air defense system operating

under centralized control is potentially its greatest weakness. While

centralized control allows individual components to support each

other, it may increase reaction time and information processing

requirements of the engagement sequence for many of its air

defense units. The mobility of air defense components also creates

problems with centralized control. Fixed air defense systems

usually have unchanging areas of responsibility and a reliable,

redundant C2 network. When air defense systems move,

surveillance and engagement zones can become confused, sectors

of responsibility can vary, and C2 functions can become unreliable. 

Autonomous Control

Autonomous control can present significant difficulties to an

IADS. Individual weapons must detect air targets with organic

sensors. Visual and IR systems are denied the benefit of radar

cueing information. Organic radar/weapon systems must radiate

sensors, making them vulnerable to detection, location, and

hostile ARMs. This additional radiation provides advanced

warning to ingressing aircraft.
MCWP 3-22.2

2-20

Tracking data from outside sources is not available. Track

information would have enabled the weapon system component

to employ its weapon much sooner than if the individual weapon

system component had to create a track on its own. 

Individual weapons rely on organic means for aircraft

identification. This increases the chance of fratricide and greatly

limits the ability of friendly aircraft to operate in the vicinity. This

may force operators into restrictive firing conditions, such as the

requirement to visually identify targets before engaging. Every

delay increases the probability of MAGTF aircraft survival. 

Economy of force is nearly impossible to achieve. Targets may

be engaged by many individual weapon systems within the local

area. Missiles and aircraft may engage lower priority threats,

depleting supplies available for greater threats to the vital area.

Misemployment

Enemy commanders sometimes fail to use air defense weapons as

an integral part of combined arms operations. They may not

recognize the full capability of the air threat. They may not

correctly anticipate likely enemy COAs, opening gaps in the air

defense coverage that the MAGTF can exploit.

Even the most sophisticated IADS is vulnerable to misemployment because of lack of operator training, skill or experience.

Unfamiliarity with system operation can significantly reduce air

defense system effectiveness.

Unfamiliarity with SOPs and rules of engagement can lead to

fratricide or failure to engage a hostile aircraft. 
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

2-21

Logistic Support

Sustainment of an IADS depends on logistics support. Surface-toair weapons are particularly logistics dependent. Sensors, weapons

systems, and C2 networks often require large amounts of electrical

power over long periods of time to ensure around the clock

coverage. All IADS components require frequent maintenance to

ensure full mission capability. Weapons systems have a high rate

of fire and limited stores of ammunition. If logistical support is

denied, IADS operations will quickly degrade. 

Trends

From World War I through Operations Desert Storm and

Decisive Edge, air defense systems have continually influenced

aviation employment. 

Enemy sensors and weapons systems are becoming more lethal

and capable as they make greater use of the electromagnetic spectrum. “Smart” weapons that utilize RF, IR or laser energy for targeting continue to become more prevalent. In addition to surfaceto-air weapon systems, new technology is being applied to surface-to-surface, air-to-surface, air-to-air, and command, control,

communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I). These air

defense systems continue to be produced in large numbers and are

often mobile, and thus harder to locate and destroy. Additionally,

older weapon systems, once easily countered with onboard selfprotection equipment, are being upgraded with new technologies

to increase their lethality. Recent technology updates include

modifications to tracking and guidance radars to prevent and delay

RWR cueing, and the use of multiple guidance methods (RF and

IR) that reduce the effectiveness of aircraft countermeasures. 
MCWP 3-22.2

2-22

These trends indicate that—regardless of the spectrum of conflict

(low, medium or high)—any potential adversary may be armed

with relatively inexpensive, easily obtainable, and extremely

lethal, surface-to-air, air-to-air, air-to-surface, and surface-tosurface weapons systems. These weapons could be integrated into

C2 networks and take advantage of advancing technology.

These trends, left unchallenged, are particularly threatening to the

MAGTF. It is therefore imperative that the MAGTF be able to

conduct effective SEAD operations. 
Chapter 3

Planning

Responsibilities

The MAGTF commander publishes the MAGTF SEAD plan. The

MAGTF SEAD plan ensures unity of effort by outlining important

information, guidance, and procedures necessary to perform SEAD.

The MAGTF SEAD plan is the basis for SEAD in the operation

orders of the ACE and the ground combat element (GCE). The

MAGTF CE coordinates the detailed planning of the ACE and

GCE. The MAGTF SEAD plan, combined with the ACE and GCE

operation orders, provides an integrated air-ground SEAD concept

that increases MAGTF SEAD effectiveness.

Command Element

The MAGTF commander is responsible for the SEAD plan. This

plan may require all MAGTF elements to execute SEAD at one

time or another. The ACE, in close coordination with the GCE,

conducts most of the detailed SEAD planning. Planning begins

with receipt of the mission and continues throughout MAGTF

operations. Specific CE planning responsibilities include but are

not limited to—

l Providing an initial assessment of the enemy air defense threat

to the ACE and GCE.

l Setting or changing SEAD priorities in accordance with the

ACE commander’s intent and planning guidance. These priorities determine resource allocation for conducting SEAD.
MCWP 3-22.2

3-2

l Collecting the results of the detailed SEAD planning and

publishing the MAGTF SEAD plan.

l Resolving conflicts between MAGTF elements supporting the

MAGTF SEAD plan.

l Requesting external support (aircraft, supporting arms,

EW) for SEAD requirements that are beyond the MAGTF’s

organic capability.

l Determining and updating the enemy air defense threat order

of battle and passing the information to the ACE and GCE.

l Participating in J-SEAD planning and providing appropriate

tasking to the ACE and GCE for J-SEAD requirements.

Aviation Combat Element

Specific ACE planning responsibilities include—

l Creating detailed plans for execution of MAGTF SEAD goals

in close coordination with the GCE.

l Submitting SEAD requirements exceeding ACE capability to

the GCE or MAGTF commander. Examples include intelligence gathering, processing and analysis support, fire support

liaison personnel for the Marine tactical air command center

(TACC) or indirect fire support.

l Recommending SEAD target priorities to the MAGTF commander.

l Issuing detailed SEAD mission planning and execution tasks

to subordinate aviation commanders and control agencies.

l Determining detailed SEAD internal requirements such as

types/quantities of ordnance, types of aircraft, and sortie

allocation.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

3-3

l Setting procedures for rapid attack of enemy air defense targets.

l Setting procedures for assessing and reporting battle damage.

l In coordination with the MAGTF intelligence officer, continuously estimating the enemy air defense threat, updating the

enemy air defense order of battle, and determining enemy

ability to influence air operations.

l Responding to the command element tasking for planning and

executing J-SEAD.

Ground Combat Element

The enemy air defense threat can reduce the capability of the

GCE to integrate air-ground operations and achieve a combinedarms effect. Within the GCE, the fire support coordination center

(FSCC) has the lead role in SEAD planning. Specific GCE

planning responsibilities include but are not limited to— 

l Conducting SEAD planning in coordination with the ACE and

consistent with the MAGTF commander’s planning guidance.

l Requesting nonorganic intelligence assets to support continuous enemy air defense threat evaluation.

l Setting procedures for rapid reporting and dissemination of

information about the enemy air defense system. This information includes all known, suspected or likely enemy air

defense targets and the effectiveness of SEAD.

l Setting procedures for assessing and reporting battle damage.
MCWP 3-22.2

3-4

l Developing detailed plans for attacking enemy air defense targets with GCE assets in accordance with the MAGTF SEAD

plan. The GCE attacks SEAD targets with maneuver assets or

by integrating them into the overall fire support plan.

l Coordinating GCE attacks of SEAD targets with higher, subordinate, and adjacent units as required.

l Submitting requirements for SEAD support that exceed the

capabilities of the GCE or that are more suited for attack by

another means.

l Responding to the command element tasking for planning and

executing J-SEAD.

Planning Goals

The basic principle associated with conducting successful

operations against an IADS is to force the various weapon systems

to function autonomously. Any air defense weapon forced to

operate in an autonomous role must perform the five mandatory

functions of the IADS on its own. This breaks down the synergy of

the IADS and limits the overall capability of the air defense

commander to provide effective and efficient air defense.

Attacking aircraft now need only be concerned with individual

weapon systems if they pose an immediate threat. Forcing the

components of an IADS to operate autonomously will have the

following effects upon the five functions of an IADS.

Detection

Individual weapons must detect air targets with organic sensors.

Depending upon the weapon system, this can be very difficult to

accomplish in a timely manner. Visual systems are denied the
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

3-5

benefit of radar information. As radars/weapons systems radiate

organic sensors, they are made vulnerable to detection and

location, enhancing the capability of MAGTF ARMs and

providing advanced warning to MAGTF aircraft.

Identification

Individual weapons systems must rely on organic means for

aircraft identification. This increases the chance of fratricide and

reduces the effectiveness of the enemy’s aircraft operating in the

presence of their own air defense systems. Identification

difficulties can also force weapons systems into restrictive firing

conditions (for example, visual identification). The delays caused

by disrupting this function serve to increase the likelihood of

MAGTF aircraft survival.

Correlation/Tracking

Correlation/tracking becomes much more difficult for IADS

components to accomplish in the autonomous mode. Targeting

data from higher sources cannot be passed to individual weapons

systems, once again forcing these systems to accomplish this task

on their own. Under normal circumstances, an aircraft approaching an IADS weapon system component would already have had

a track (azimuth, elevation, range, course, airspeed, etc.) established in the “system,” and that data would have been passed to

the weapon system component(s). Established track information

would enable weapon system component(s) to consummate a target engagement much more quickly.
MCWP 3-22.2

3-6

Target Assignment

Target assignment or the decisionmaking process by which an air

defense commander employs a particular weapon is now

completely disrupted. Economy of force is now more difficult to

achieve, as individual targets may be engaged by more than one

weapon system within the IADS and some targets may not be

engaged at all. The senior air defense commander cannot make

these decisions because he lacks a clear picture of the battlespace. 

Weapons Control

Weapons may be committed against targets that are already being

engaged by other weapon systems. Without adequate weapons

control, assets may be expended against lower priority threats,

making these weapons unavailable for higher threats against the

vital area. Table 3-1 describes the assets/means available to the

MAGTF SEAD mission planner to target the five IADS

functions.

Table 3-1. MAGTF SEAD Assets/Means. 

IADS 

FUNCTION MAGTF COUNTER JTF COUNTER

DETECTION

Radars ARTY, VMAQ, VMFA, 

VMA, Recon, HMLA, 

Terrain Mask, Deception

VAQ, EC-130, USN/USAF 

Fixed-wing and Helicopter 

Hardkill, USA Indirect Fire 

Weapons, NGFS, Special 

Operations Forces 

Aircraft VMFA, VMA, LADD, 

Terrain Mask, Deception

USN/USAF Fixed-wing, USA 

SAM, USN DDG/CG
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

3-7

Table 3-1. MAGTF SEAD Assets/Means (Continued).

IADS 

FUNCTION MAGTF COUNTER JTF COUNTER

REC EMCON, Terrain Mask, 

VMAQ, VMFA, VMA, 

HMLA, RADBN, 

Deception

VAQ, EC-130, Various Hardkill, 

Special Operations Forces

Visual 

Observer

Terrain Mask, ARTY, 

Recon, VMFA, VMA, 

HMLA, RADBN, 

Deception

Various Hardkill, Special 

Operations Forces

IDENTIFICATION

EID VMAQ, EMCON VAQ, EC-130

VID Same as Visual 

Observation 

Same as Visual Observation

MRR INTEL INTEL

CORRELATION/TRACKING

Radar VMAQ, VMFA, VMA, 

HMLA, Recon, ARTY, 

Terrain Mask, Deception

VAQ, USN/USAF Fixed-wing, 

Helicopter Hardkill

Hard Wire Recon, VMFA, VMA Various Hardkill

RF Link VMAQ, RADBN VAQ, EC-130

Computer NA FIWC, AFIWC, Other IW 

Agencies

Fusion Node VMFA, VMA, ARTY Various Hardkill, C2W

TARGET ASSIGNMENT

Commander VMFA, VMA, ARTY, 

Deception (TALD)

Various Hardkill
MCWP 3-22.2

3-8

SEAD in Support of a Mission to Destroy an IADS

During operations commanders determine an enemy’s center of

gravity (COG). In certain situations, the COG may be identified

within a major city of the enemy’s country and consequently the

city is heavily defended by the IADS. In this case, planners may

decide that the first phase of the operation should be to destroy the

enemy’s air defense capability. This would allow attacking the

COG in subsequent phases with less risk to friendly aircrews. This

plan requires parts of the IADS to be designated as primary targets.

Therefore, MAGTF SEAD mission planners should consider the

following actions against the four components of an IADS.

Command Posts

If the CCP is destroyed, control for that sector will default to a

subordinate unit. This subordinate unit will generally have less

cueing from higher-level sensors, and will thus be less able to

complete the five functions of the IADS. Unfortunately, CCPs are

Table 3-1. MAGTF SEAD Assets/Means (Continued).

IADS 

FUNCTION MAGTF COUNTER JTF COUNTER

WEAPONS CONTROL

Hard Wire RECON, VMFA, VMA Various Hardkill

RF Link VMAQ, RADBN VAQ, EC-130

Computer NA FIWD, AFIWC

Control Node VMFA, VMA, ARTY Various Hardkill, C2W
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

3-9

normally deeper within enemy territory and are usually very

heavily defended.

Sensors

A determination of which sensors are critical to the entire IADS

for cueing information is necessary. Nearly all weapons systems

have organic sensors, which cannot be attacked. Of the sensors

common to the entire IADS, the sensors that should be targeted

first are those that cannot be degraded or disrupted by more

traditional means (such as EA).

Weapons Systems

The most lethal/longest range threats that are not susceptible to

EA or HARM should be destroyed.

C2 Network

The C2 network ties everything together to make the air defense

system truly integrated. Oftentimes the C2 network can be

severely disrupted by attacking the command posts, as these are

the receivers of sensor information. Additionally, any C2 nodes/

relay stations/filter centers should be targeted. Targeting C2

nodes may offer the best chance of driving the IADS into an

autonomous mode. 

SEAD in Support of a Mission Conducted Within an IADS

When conducting a mission within airspace defended by an

IADS, the MAGTF SEAD mission planner’s goal is to suppress

the air defense threat for a period of time, creating a sanctuary
MCWP 3-22.2

3-10

within which the MAGTF mission can be conducted free from

prohibitive interference.

Command Posts

Centralized command posts can not always be targeted in this

scenario. If they can, only those CCPs that directly affect the

MAGTF mission should be targeted. 

Sensors

Sensors will normally be targeted with EA to the maximum

extent possible. Sensors that are not susceptible to EA may have

to be targeted. Only those sensors that can detect and pass

targeting information to enemy air defense weapons interfering

with the MAGTF mission should be targeted. In other words, if

an enemy EW radar from a neighboring air defense sector is

radiating, but cannot detect MAGTF aircraft because of terrain

masking or extended range, assets should not be wasted targeting

that sensor. Enemy aircraft should be targeted to the extent to

which they can effect MAGTF operations.

Weapons Systems

Only those weapons systems interfering with the MAGTF

mission should be targeted. For example, a strike package should

ingress to the target area and avoid any SA-X AD system by

terrain mastering techniques if the destruction of that system is

not critical or will not interfere with the mission. Those AD

systems which are unavoidable will obviously have to be targeted

as part of the SEAD mission. In this scenario, ordnance should be

allocated for the designated SEAD targets and the particular
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

3-11

nodes of the IADS that may prevent the accomplishment of the

MAGTF SEAD mission.

C2 Network 

The C2 network within the sector in which MAGTF aircraft are

operating should be attacked as needed to complete the mission.

The link from a distant EW radar that cannot detect MAGTF

aircraft should not be attacked. After we have attacked the IADS,

it is important to assess the damage that has been wrought upon

the enemy. The mission planner should work closely with

intelligence counterparts to receive an accurate assessment of

damage to the IADS. Without this assessment, future operations

cannot be properly planned.

RSEAD Planning

RSEAD planning is difficult because threat disposition, location,

and type may not be known while planning is being conducted.

The following fire support coordination measures will assist the

mission planner.

SEAD Zones

SEAD zones are used to quickly correlate threat location with the

TACC, FSCC, and DASC. See figure 3-1. Except for short of the

fire support coordination line (FSCL), the appropriate land or

amphibious force commander controls all air-to-surface and

surface-to-surface attacks. This control is exercised through the

operations staff or with pre-designated procedures.
MCWP 3-22.2

3-12

SEAD zone 1 is the area from the FLOT to the coordinated fire

line (CFL). The primary response for a “pop-up threat” in SEAD

zone 1 is surface-delivered fires (ground and/or naval); the

secondary response is airstrikes.

SEAD zone 2 is the area from the CFL to the FSCL. The primary

response for a “pop-up” threat in SEAD zone 2 is surface fires.

The secondary response is airstrikes. The area beyond the FSCL is

identified as zone 3. Forces attacking targets beyond the FSCL

must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow

necessary reaction to avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the

ground. The establishment of an FSCL does not create a “free-fire

area” beyond the FSCL. When targets are attacked beyond an

FSCL, supporting element attacks must not produce adverse

effects on or to the rear of the line. Attacks beyond the FSCL must

be consistent with the establishing commander’s priorities, timing,

and desired effects, and deconflicted whenever possible with the

supported headquarters. In exceptional circumstances, the inabilFigure 3-1. SEAD Zones.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

3-13

ity to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. Failure to coordinate, however, may

increase the risk of fratricide and waste limited resources. When

CFLs are not established, zone 1 and 2 become zone 1.

ACE Commander’s Guidance

Prior to conducting RSEAD mission planning, the following

considerations should be addressed to the ACE commander for

appropriate guidance: 

l What is considered prohibitive interference? Prohibitive interference may be the loss of a certain number of aircraft, mission aborts, the presence of a particular threat, etc. Remember

that prohibitive interference is subjective. It will depend upon

the MAGTF mission, MAGTF asset capabilities, and allowable friendly attrition, etc. To ensure the MAGTF Commander

can employ the principle of economy of force, the definition

of prohibitive interference must be determined. 

l Which threats warrant an RSEAD strike? Many threats can be

effectively suppressed by organic MAGTF and/or J-SEAD

assets (e.g., EA-6B) without dedicating other assets (e.g., artillery tubes, fixed and rotary-wing OAS aircraft) that may be

needed to accomplish other, higher priority MAGTF missions. 

l Who can authorize an RSEAD Strike? If a prohibitive threat

that warrants an RSEAD strike has been located, it should be

destroyed as soon as possible. Many air defense threats are

mobile and therefore may not remain static for longer than several minutes or even seconds. Allowing airborne mission commanders to conduct RSEAD strikes will minimize response

time and therefore increase the likelihood of RSEAD strike

mission success. However, this delegated flexibility may not
MCWP 3-22.2

3-14

allow the ACE commander the control needed to ensure that

MAGTF assets are supporting other mission objectives.

l What assets will be allocated to conduct RSEAD? The MAGTF

commander can choose either surface delivered or aviation fires

to conduct RSEAD. The asset that can best accomplish the mission should be selected.

l If a dedicated RSEAD strike is required, which fixed wing/

rotary wing aircraft will be assigned the mission? The ACE

commander will have to select assets that are available. If

there are no available aircraft, he will have to divert aircraft

from other missions to conduct the RSEAD mission. 

l Will the threat permit the conduct of Immediate SEAD? The

mission commander will have to decide if the aircraft on scene

can conduct immediate SEAD through analysis of the air

defense threat and the aircraft’s capability to disrupt or

destroy it without attrition. 

l If a Deliberate RSEAD mission is required, will the ordnance

on airborne assets be adequate to destroy the enemy air defense

threat? The mission commander will have to decide if the aircraft assigned to his mission has the required ordnance to kill

the threat and continue his assigned mission. If he delays his

assigned mission to address the current threat, he will have to

decide if that will alter the timing of his assigned mission and

disrupt the MAGTF commander’s overall mission.

l If an Alert RSEAD mission is required, what ordnance will be

allocated to maximize the likelihood of target destruction?

The TACC will have to decide if the alert aircraft are loaded

with adequate munitions to kill the detected threat. If not, a

decision must be made determining if there will be enough

time to rearm the standby aircraft, destroy the threat, and

accomplish the assigned mission.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

3-15

l What assets are available to assist with the location of prohibitive threats? The MAGTF commander has unmanned aerial

vehicles (UAVs), fixed wing/rotary wing aircraft, and joint

assets available to him to aid in intelligence collection, planning, and targeting threats.

l Who has the authority to authorize the employment of ARMs

from inside the FSCL? The TACC, Air Mission Commander,

DASC or FSCC may all be given the authority to employ

ARMs from inside the FSCL. The MAGTF commander will

retain or grant (delegate) this authority as appropriate for the

operation. His primary concern in determining this criteria

will be flexibility and sustainment of operations.

l What probability of destruction is required to resume the

MAGTF mission in that area (Sequential SEAD)? Will the

supported MAGTF mission continue while RSEAD is being

conducted (Concurrent SEAD)? If the threat is so severe that

the entire MAGTF mission must be put on hold then the

SEAD effort will be sequential SEAD. If the threat will allow

the MAGTF mission to continue while it is attacked, then the

SEAD effort will be concurrent.

l What Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs)

will be passed to the TACC before and after an RSEAD strike?

Prior to the RSEAD strike, real time air defense system threat

information is critical to SEAD mission planners to ensure

effective execution of the sorties. Battle damage assessment

information is critical immediately following a reactive SEAD

strike. The ACE commander will pass all critical information

to the MAGTF commander as real time as possible. This information is critical to the MAGTF commander for making a

determination to resume or postpone the MAGTF mission. All

members of the ACE from the individual aircrew to the TACC
MCWP 3-22.2

3-16

must be aware of the MAGTF commander’s information

requirements and be able to pass them up the chain quickly.

Coordinating a Response

RSEAD is primarily a fire support coordination issue and is

generally coordinated at lower echelons. In addition to the

planning considerations already discussed, RSEAD planning

must address threat location. 

If threat location is known, the MAGTF SEAD mission planner

should execute the decision aid in figure 3-2.

If the threat location is unknown, the MAGTF SEAD mission

planner should be prepared to execute the decision matrix in

figure 3-3, page 3-18. 

RSEAD Manager

The RSEAD manager coordinates individual RSEAD strikes by—

l Correlating location information (mission reports, in-flight

reports, etc.).

l Diverting aircraft and coordinating the strike via the DASC/

DASC(A), TACC or FSCC.

l Coordinating jamming and HARM employment (designating

shooter(s) and times of impact(s)).

l Ensuring forward air controllers (FACs) or forward air controllers (airborne) (FAC [A]s) provide terminal control when

necessary. Terminal control is required when the target is in

close proximity to friendly forces (i.e., CAS). The RSEAD

manager provides a threat brief.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

3-17

Figure 3-2. Located Threat Decision Aid.
MCWP 3-22.2

3-18

Figure 3-3. Unlocated Threat Decision Aid.

Typical RSEAD Mangers are FAC(A)s [FA-18D, AH-1W, UH-1N],

and EA-6B (normally when no FAC(A) is present). Figure 3-4 on

page 3-19 is a suggested checklist for RSEAD managers.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

3-19

TARGET LOCATION

UAV

RWR

SAM Launch Observed

ES Confirmation

SEAD ZONE

1

2

Coordination Accomplished?

Pass information to appropriate authority via DASC/TAOC.

RSEAD PACKAGE COMPOSITION

FAC(A)/Escort /

Strike A/C: /

/

Package Check-in (TAD) Primary Secondary

THREAT BRIEF

Type

Location

Ingress CP/IP

Egress CP/IP

TOT

COORDINATE

Package Composition

Ordnance Available

HARM Shooter(s)

Target Mark WP/Rocket/HARM/Laser Code

CODEWORDS

Harm Shot

Continue

 Abort

Figure 3-4. RSEAD Manager Checklist.
MCWP 3-22.2

3-20

Adjusting the Plan

The MAGTF SEAD mission planner and the ACE must

continually adjust the MAGTF SEAD Plan. A continual

assessment of SEAD effectiveness allows planners to select

and update appropriate targets.
Chapter 4

Execution

The goal of MAGTF SEAD execution is the accomplishment of

the supported MAGTF mission. Each MAGTF element must

understand its role to guarantee the suppression of appropriate

targets, prevent duplication of effort, and prevent friendly

interference or fratricide.

Intelligence Collection and Dissemination

Effective SEAD requires aggressive, continuous intelligence

collection and responsive dissemination of target data. Timely and

accurate threat assessment permits decisive attacks by the MAGTF.

The collection plan for SEAD targets must use all ground and

aviation assets available. The MAGTF links its collection effort to

joint, theater, and national-level collection resources. Table 4-1

identifies sources of collection to include in the collection effort.

Table 4-1. Sources of Collection/Dissemination.

JTF ACE GCE

National Theater 

Collection Assets

TERPES Radio Battalion

Adjacent Units Aerial Recon Aircraft 

(FA-18D, UAV)

Forward Observers

HUMINT EA-6B Electronic 

Warfare Support Aircrew Mission Reports 

Forward Air Controllers 

(Airborne)

Forward Air Controllers

NGFS Spotters

Combat/Recon Units
MCWP 3-22.2

4-2

Collection/Dissemination of Targets

Collection/dissemination of targets is critical to effective SEAD

planning and execution. The MAGTF ACE and GCE G-2

maintain liaison with the JTF J-2. The MAGTF ACE can receive

imagery intelligence (IMINT) through the use of aerial

reconnaissance assets (FA-18D ATARS, UAVs); ELINT from

VMAQ squadrons (in the form of EA-6B ES, national systems

data from the Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and

Evaluation System [TERPES]); and HUMINT from aircrew

mission reports and FAC(A)s. The MACCS agencies collect,

maintain, and exchange information on enemy air defenses,

including damage assessment and targeting information from all

of these sources. The GCE can receive HUMINT from forward

observers, FACs, naval gunfire spotters, and various combat/

reconnaissance units. The GCE can receive ELINT from the radio

battalion. Intelligence information must be compiled on the four

components of the enemy IADS: command posts, sensors,

weapons systems, and C2 networks.

Command Posts

Where are enemy IADS command posts located? Are they

critical? Are they vulnerable? Do they control enemy air defenses

in the area where MAGTF operations will be conducted? 

Sensors

Where are enemy sensors located, to include ground-based

radars, likely fighter and airborne early warning (AEW) CAPS,

radio-electronic combat assets, and visual observers? Are they

critical? Are they vulnerable? What frequencies are enemy radars
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

4-3

and AEW assets using? What friendly systems are enemy passive

REC assets searching for? 

Weapons Systems

Where are enemy SAM/AAA systems located? Are they critical?

Are they vulnerable? What are the electromagnetic parametrics of

enemy weapons systems radars? Do enemy weapons systems

have an IR/EO/laser capability? What friendly systems are enemy

REC assets attempting to conduct EA against?

C2 Networks

Where are enemy IADS C2 nodes? Are they critical? Are they

vulnerable? Do they control enemy air defenses in the area where

MAGTF operations will be conducted? How are IADS command

posts, sensors, and weapons systems connected? 

Target Location Accuracy

Target locations must be determined as accurately as possible.

Intelligence sections provide target location and the accuracy

and reliability of their source to appropriate agencies. These

agencies use this information to confirm preplanned SEAD

targets and determine attack means for RSEAD targets.

Required location data accuracy will depend on the friendly

weapon system in use. The employment of EA (jamming,

HARM, bulk chaff) will require different threat locations data

accuracy than the employment of CBUs, laser-guided bombs

(LGBs), PGMs or artillery. 
MCWP 3-22.2

4-4

Damage Assessment

Intelligence collection must determine damage assessment. The

assets delineated in table 4-1 can be used to determine damage

assessment. If the MAGTF mission cannot be continued until

SEAD (preplanned or reactive) has destroyed and/or suppressed a

target(s), it is absolutely essential that timely damage assessment

is passed to the MAGTF commander. 

Requesting SEAD

Preplanned SEAD

Preplanned SEAD is primarily a fire support planning issue. The

unit requesting an air mission begins by identifying known or

suspected enemy air defenses affecting the supported air mission.

Requesters list threats in the remarks block of the joint tactical air

strike request (JTAR), CAS briefing form or assault support

request (ASR) form along with organic SEAD assets available.

The FSCC assesses SEAD requirements and assigns appropriate

and available SEAD assets. When the preplanned air request

reaches the Marine TACC, the ACE decides if more SEAD

support is necessary. The ACE may assign a SEAD package to

support the mission. It may request additional SEAD support

from the GCE, ground unit support or indirect fire support. If the

GCE or combat service support element (CSSE) cannot support

ACE SEAD requirements because of higher priorities or limited

assets, the ACE passes the SEAD requirement to the MAGTF

commander. The MAGTF commander may reorder priorities or

re-quest external SEAD support.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

4-5

Reactive SEAD

Reactive SEAD is primarily a fire support coordination issue.

The chance of duplicating efforts are highest for RSEAD. Rapid

coordination is essential to execute RSEAD while threat location

is known. Standardized procedures, such as RSEAD strike cards,

simplify rapid coordination and execution. 

Coordination

Timing and Delivery of Fires

MCWP 3-16.6, Supporting Arms Observer, Spotter, and Controller,

describes three techniques for timing the delivery of fires:

synchronized clock, elapsed time, and event-oriented. One technique

at a time must be selected. All units and agencies providing or

coordinating SEAD must know and understand this technique. SOPs

and operation orders identify their preferred order of use.

Coordination with Ground Forces

Coordination with ground forces may be necessary because of

target location in relation to friendly forces, the presence of fire

support coordination measures such as the FSCL or fire support

restrictions. Examples include coordination of EW to prevent

interference from friendly operations and coordination of SEAD

fires to prevent fratricide.
MCWP 3-22.2

4-6

Airspace Coordination

Airspace coordination integrates aviation with surface-delivered

fires and other combat forces without restricting fires or

unnecessarily delaying ground operations. Airspace coordination

offers a reasonable measure of protection to aircrews from

friendly fires.

Airspace coordination methods include formal airspace

coordination areas (ACAs) and separation techniques (informal

ACAs). Formal and informal ACAs should be designed to allow

the greatest freedom of action for air missions and surface fire

support. Airspace coordination methods also depend on the

aircraft delivery profile.

Airspace coordination requirements and methods are different for

preplanned and RSEAD because of time available. Preplanned SEAD

allows enough time for planners to conduct detailed airspace

coordination, to include changing aircraft routing and artillery fire

mission assignments, and establishing formal ACAs. The lack of time

available for RSEAD usually means the use of more informal airspace

coordination, the use of already existing airspace coordination

measures, or rapid coordination through the DASC or FSCC.

MCWP 3-25, Control of Aircraft and Missiles, and MCWP 3-16,

Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support Coordination

(under development), contain detailed discussions of methods,

techniques, and procedures for airspace coordination.

Separation Techniques

Aircraft and SEAD fires may be separated by distance (lateral,

altitude or a combination of altitude and lateral) or by time.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

4-7

Separation by distance is preferred because it may permit the

continuous attack of SEAD targets and require less detailed

coordination. If distance separation is too restrictive on aircrews,

time separation may be used to provide protection from friendly

fires. Time separation requires the most detailed coordination.

Select the separation technique that requires the least

coordination but still provides adequate flexibility and protection

to aircrews.

Lateral Separation

Lateral separation is effective for coordinating SEAD against

targets that are safely separated from flight routes. This technique

is used when aircraft can be routed away from SEAD trajectories

and targets and when they will not cross gun-target lines. Terminal

controllers must know the gun-target line so they can restrict

aircrews from crossing trajectories. Establishing a temporary,

informal ACA is one method of maintaining lateral separation.

Altitude Separation

Altitude separation is effective when aircrews can safely remain

above or below direct or indirect fire trajectories, i.e., gun-target

line. Altitude separation can be limited to a specific area to give

aircrews more freedom to maneuver. Establishing a temporary

ACA is one method of maintaining altitude separation.

Altitude and Lateral Separation

This technique requires aircrews to remain laterally displaced and

above or below direct or indirect fire trajectories, i.e., gun-target

line. Aircraft maneuvering requirements may dictate that firing
MCWP 3-22.2

4-8

units deliver SEAD by high angle or reduced charge. A

temporary ACA is one method of maintaining altitude and lateral

separation.

Time Separation

Time separation requires the most detailed coordination and may

be required when aircraft cannot be routed away from indirect

fire trajectories or SEAD targets. This technique requires the

timing of SEAD fires to be coordinated with the routing of

aircraft so that even though aircrews and SEAD fires may occupy

the same space, they do not do so at the same time. Timing for

SEAD fires is based on a specific aircraft event time; e.g., timeon-target/time-to-target, L-hour, or UAV mission area arrival

time. In immediate SEAD missions, the aircraft event time

becomes the “zero hour” for scheduling. The preferred method

for coordinating timing is to use a previously established

synchronized clock. If a synchronized clock is not available, an

elapsed time may be used to coordinate timing.

Combined Arms

The MAGTF achieves a combined-arms effect by using all its

combat capabilities. As part of this combined-arms team, aviation

can have a decisive role in assuring success in battle. To use

aviation in combined-arms operations, the MAGTF—

l Defines aviation goals and SEAD requirements. Planners set

SEAD requirements that increase friendly capabilities and

exploit threat weaknesses.

l Develops an aggressive targeting plan.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

4-9

l Identifies and attacks high-payoff enemy air defense targets

early and continuously.

l Identifies and reports all elements of the enemy air defense

system upon detection.

Enemy air defenses can influence aviation’s ability to contribute

to the combined-arms effort. Effective SEAD can reduce or

eliminate enemy interference with MAGTF air operations, thus

allowing the MAGTF commander to accomplish his mission. 
Appendix A. Glossary

Section I. Acronyms

AAA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . antiaircraft artillery

AAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .antiair warfare

ACA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . airspace coordination area

ACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .aviation combat element

AEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . airborne early warning

AI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . air interdiction

ALSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Air Land Sea Application

AOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . area of responsibility

AR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .armed reconnaissance

ARM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . antiradiation missile

ASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aircraft survivability equipment

ASR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . assault support request

ATO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . air tasking order

BDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battle damage assessment

C2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . command and control

C3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . command, control, and communications

C4I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . command, control, communications,

computers, and intelligence

CAP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .combat air patrol

CAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . close air support

CBU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . cluster bomb unit

CCIR . . . . . . . . . commander’s critical information requirements

CCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . centralized command post

CE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .command element

CFL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . coordinated fire line

COA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .course of action
MCWP 3-22.2

A-2

COG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . center of gravity

CSSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat service support element

DAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . deep air support

DASC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . direct air support center

DASC(A). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .direct air support center (airborne)

EA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . electronic attack

ELINT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .electronics intelligence

EO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .electro-optical

ES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . electronic warfare support

EW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . early warning

FAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . forward air controller

FAC(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . forward air controller (airborne)

FLOT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .forward line of own troops

FMFM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fleet Marine Force Manual

FSCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fire support coordination center

FSCL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .fire support coordination line

GBU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . guided bomb unit

GCI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ground control intercept

GCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ground combat element

GPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .global positioning system

HARM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . high-speed antiradiation missile

HUMINT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . human intelligence

IADS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . integrated air defense system

IFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .identification, friend or foe

IMINT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .imagery intelligence

IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . initial point

IR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . infrared

JDAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint direct attack munition
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

A-3

JFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint force commander

JOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint operations area

J-SEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . joint suppression of enemy air defenses

JSOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint standoff weapon

JTAR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint tactical air strike request

JTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint task force

LGB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . laser-guided bomb

MACCS. . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine air command and control system

MAGTF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine air-ground task force

MCPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps Planning Process

MCWP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps warfighting publication

MEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary force

METT-T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mission, enemy, terrain and weather,

troops and support available time available

MOOTW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . military operations other than war

NVG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . night vision goggle

OAAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .offensive antiair warfare

OAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . offensive air support

PGM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . precision-guided munitions

REC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . radio electronic combat

RF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .radio frequency

ROE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rules of engagement

RSEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . reactive SEAD

RWR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . radar warning receiver

SAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . surface-to-air missile

SEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . suppression of enemy air defenses
MCWP 3-22.2

A-4

SIGINT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .signals intelligence

SLAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .stand-off land attack missile

SOP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .standing operating procedure

TAC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . theater air commander

TACC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical air command center (USMC);

tactical air control center (USN)

TBM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical ballistic missile

TERPES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance

Processing and Evaluation System

TM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tactical missile

UAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .unmanned aerial vehicle
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

A-5

Section II. Definitions

air contingency MAGTF—An on-call, combat-ready MAGTF

that deploys by airlift. Air contingency MAGTFs vary in size

based on mission requirements and the availability of airlift

Because they deploy by air, they generally have a limited organic

logistics capability, and require an arrival airfield. Air contingency MAGTFs usually are activated to respond to developing

crises, and may deploy independently or in conjunction with

other expeditionary forces. Also called ACM. See also aviation

combat element; combat service support element; ground combat

element; Marine air-ground task force; Marine expeditionary

force; Marine expeditionary force (forward); Marine expeditionary unit; special purpose Marine air-ground task force; task force.

(Proposed change to JP 1-02)

air defense—All defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in the Earth’s envelope of atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack.

(JP 1-02)

air interdiction—Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s military potential before it can be

brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance

from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission

with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.

(JP 1-02)

air reconnaissance—The acquisition of intelligence information

by employing visual observation and/or sensors in air vehicles.

(JP 1-02)
MCWP 3-22.2

A-6

air superiority—That degree of dominance in the air battle of

one force over another which permits the conduct of operations

by the former and its related land, sea and air forces at a given

time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing

force. (JP 1-02)

air threat levels—The conditions which relate to the enemy’s air

defense capability against airborne friendly aircraft. There are

three levels of air threat: a. low—An air threat environment

which permits combat operations and support to proceed without

prohibitive interference. Associated tactics and techniques do not

normally require extraordinary measures for preplanned or immediate support. b. medium—An air threat environment in which

the specific aircraft performance and weapons system capability

allow acceptable exposure time to enemy air defenses. This air

threat environment restricts the flexibility of tactics in the immediate target/objective area. It is an environment in which the

enemy may have limited radar and/or electro-optical acquisition

capability at medium ranges, but the air defense system is not

supported by fully integrated fire control systems. c. high—An

air threat environment created by an opposing force possessing

air defense combat power including integrated fire control systems and electronic warfare capabilities which would seriously

diminish the ability of friendly forces to provide necessary air

support. This air threat environment might preclude missions

such as immediate close air support, as the requirement for effective radio communications and coordination may not be possible.

(MCRP 5-12C)

antiair warfare—A U.S. Navy/U.S. Marine Corps term used to

indicate that action required to destroy or reduce to an acceptable

level the enemy air and missile threat. It includes such measures

as the use of interceptors, bombers, antiaircraft guns, surface-toair and air-to-air missiles, electronic attack, and destruction of the
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

A-7

air or missile threat both before and after it is launched. Other

measures which are taken to minimize the effects of hostile air

action are cover, concealment, dispersion, deception (including

electronic), and mobility. (JP 1-02)

armed reconnaissance—A mission with the primary purpose of

locating and attacking targets of opportunity, i.e., enemy materiel,

personnel, and facilities, in assigned general areas or along

assigned ground communications routes, and not for the purpose

of attacking specific briefed targets. (JP 1-02)

aviation combat element—The core element of a Marine airground task force that is task-organized to conduct aviation operations. The aviation combat element provides all or a portion of

the six functions of Marine aviation necessary to accomplish the

Marine air-ground task force’s mission. These functions are antiair warfare, offensive air support, assault support, electronic warfare, air reconnaissance, and control of aircraft and missiles. The

aviation combat element is usually composed of an aviation unit

headquarters and various other aviation units or their detachments. It can vary in size from a small aviation detachment of

specifically required aircraft to one or more Marine aircraft

wings. The aviation combat element may contain other Service or

foreign military forces assigned or attached to the Marine airground task force. The aviation combat element itself is not a formal command. Also called ACE. See also combat service support

element; command element; ground combat element; Marine airground task force; Marine expeditionary force; Marine expeditionary force (Forward); Marine expeditionary unit; special

purpose Marine air-ground task force; task force.

close air support—Air action by fixed and rotary-wing aircraft

against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly

forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission
MCWP 3-22.2

A-8

with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS.

(JP 1-02)

combat service support element—The core element of a Marine

air-ground task force that is task-organized to provide the combat

service support necessary to accomplish the Marine air-ground

task force mission. The combat service support element varies in

size from a small detachment to one or more force service support

groups. It provides supply, maintenance, transportation, general

engineering, health services, and a variety of other services to the

Marine air-ground task force. It may also contain other Service or

foreign military forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. The

combat service support element itself is not a formal command.

Also called CSSE. See also aviation combat element; command

element; ground combat element; Marine air-ground task force;

Marine expeditionary force; Marine expeditionary force (Forward); Marine expeditionary unit; special purpose Marine airground task force; task force.

combined arms—The full integration of combat arms in such a

way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another. (MCRP 5-12C)

command element—The core element of a Marine air-ground

task force that is the headquarters. The command element is composed of the commander, general or executive and special staff

sections, headquarters section, and requisite communications

support, intelligence and reconnaissance forces, necessary to

accomplish the MAGTF’s mission. The command element provides command and control, intelligence, and other support

essential for effective planning and execution of operations by the

other elements of the Marine air-ground task force. The command

element varies in size and composition and may contain other

Service or foreign military forces assigned or attached to the
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

A-9

MAGTF. Also called CE. See also aviation combat element;

combat service support element; ground combat element; Marine

air-ground task force; Marine expeditionary force; Marine expeditionary force (Forward); Marine expeditionary unit; special

purpose Marine air-ground task force; task force.

communications intelligence—See electronic warfare.

concept of operations—A verbal or graphic statement, in broad

outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an

operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in

the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the

operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander’s concept. (JP 1-02)

deception—Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by

manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce

him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (JP 1-02)

deep air support—Air action against enemy targets at such a

distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each

mission with fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.

Deep air support missions are flown on either side of the fire support coordination line; the lack of a requirement for close coordination with the fire and movement of friendly forces is the

qualifying factor. (MCRP 5-12C)

direct air support center—The principal air control agency of

the U.S. Marine air command and control system responsible for

the direction and control of air operations directly supporting the

ground combat element. It processes and coordinates requests for
MCWP 3-22.2

A-10

immediate air support and coordinates air missions requiring integration with ground forces and other supporting arms. It normally

collocates with the senior fire support coordination center within

the ground combat element and is subordinate to the tactical air

command center. Also called DASC. (JP 1-02)

direct support—A mission requiring a force to support another

specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported

force’s request for assistance. (JP 1-02)

electronic warfare—Any military action involving the use of

electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three

major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic

attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. a.

electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving

the use of electromagnetic, directed energy, or antiradiation

weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the

intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat

capability. Also called EA. EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic

spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and 2)

employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or

directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers,

radio frequency weapons, particle beams). b. electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken

to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of

friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade,

neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Also called EP.

c. electronic warfare support. That division of electronic warfare

involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate

sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic

energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus,
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

A-11

electronic warfare support provides information required for

immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and

other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and

homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be

used to produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), both communications intelligence (COMINT), and electronics intelligence

(ELINT). (JP 1-02)

fire support—Fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational

objectives. (JP 1-02). In Marine Corps usage, assistance to elements of the Marine air-ground task force engaged with the

enemy rendered by other firing units, including (but not limited

to) artillery, mortars, naval surface fire support, and offensive air

support (MCRP 5-12C).

fire support coordination center—A single location in which

are centralized communications facilities and personnel incident

to the coordination of all forms of fire support. (JP 1-02)

fire support coordination line—A fire support coordination

measure that is established and adjusted by appropriate land or

amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. Fire support coordination lines (FSCLs) facilitate the

expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity beyond the

coordinating measure. An FSCL does not divide an area of operations by defining a boundary between close and deep operations

or a zone for close air support. The FSCL applies to all fires of

air, land, and sea-based weapon systems using any type of ammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all

affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements attacking targets
MCWP 3-22.2

A-12

beyond the FSCL must ensure that the attack will not produce

adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line. Short of an FSCL, all

air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander.

The FSCL should follow well defined terrain features. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. In exceptional

circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not

preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure

to do so may increase the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources. Also called FSCL. (JP 1-02)

forward air controller—An officer (aviator/pilot) member of

the tactical air control party who, from a forward ground or airborne position, controls aircraft in close air support of ground

troops. (JP 1-02)

forward air controller (airborne)—A specifically trained and

qualified aviation officer who exercises control from the air of

aircraft engaged in close air support of ground troops. The forward air controller (airborne) is normally an airborne extension of

the tactical air control party. Also called FAC(A). (JP 1-02)

forward looking infrared—An airborne, electro-optical thermal

imaging device that detects far-infrared energy, converts the

energy into an electronic signal, and provides a visible image for

day or night viewing. Also called FLIR. (JP 1-02)

forward operating base—An airfield used to support tactical

operations without establishing full support facilities. The base

may be used for an extended time period. Support by a main

operating base will be required to provide backup support for a

forward operating base. Also called FOB. (JP 1-02)
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general support—That support which is given to the supported

force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof.

(JP 1-02)

ground combat element—The core element of a Marine airground task force that is task-organized to conduct ground operations. It is usually constructed around an infantry organization but

can vary in size from a small ground unit of any type, to one or

more Marine divisions that can be independently maneuvered

under the direction of the MAGTF commander. It includes appropriate ground combat and combat support forces and may contain

other Service or foreign military forces assigned or attached to

the Marine air-ground task force. The ground combat element

itself is not a formal command. Also called GCE. See also aviation combat element; combat service support element; command

element; Marine air-ground task force; Marine expeditionary

force; Marine expeditionary force (Forward); Marine expeditionary unit; special purpose Marine air-ground task force; task force.

immediate air support—Air support to meet specific requests

which arise during the course of a battle and which by their nature

cannot be planned in advance. (JP 1-02)

maneuver warfare—A warfighting philosophy that seeks to

shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused,

and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. 

(MCRP 5-12C)

Marine air command and control system—A system which

provides the aviation combat element commander with the means

to command, coordinate, and control all air operations within an

assigned sector and to coordinate air operations with other Services. It is composed of command and control agencies with
MCWP 3-22.2

A-14

communications-electronics equipment that incorporates a capability from manual through semiautomatic control. Also called

MACCS. (JP 1-02)

Marine air-ground task force—The Marine Corps principal

organization for all missions across the range of military operations, composed of forces task-organized under a single commander capable of responding rapidly to a contingency anywhere

in the world. The types of forces in the MAGTF are functionally

grouped into four core elements: a command element, an aviation

combat element, a ground combat element, and a combat service

support element. The four core elements are categories of forces,

not formal commands. The basic structure of the Marine airground task force never varies, though the number, size, and type

of Marine Corps units comprising each of its four elements will

always be mission dependent. The flexibility of the organizational structure allows for one or more subordinate MAGTFs,

other Service and/or foreign military forces, to be assigned or

attached. Also called MAGTF. See also aviation combat element;

combat service support element; command element; ground combat element; Marine expeditionary force; Marine expeditionary

force (Forward); Marine expeditionary unit; special purpose

Marine air-ground task force; task force.

Marine expeditionary brigade—A Marine air-ground task force

that is constructed around a reinforced infantry regiment, a composite Marine aircraft group, and a brigade service support group.

The Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB), commanded by a general officer, is task-organized to meet the requirements of a specific situation. It can function as part of a joint task force, or as

the lead echelon of the Marine expeditionary force (MEF), or

alone. It varies in size and composition, and is larger than a

Marine expeditionary unit but smaller than a MEF. The MEB is
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

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capable of conducting missions across the full range of military

operations. Also called MEB.

Marine expeditionary force—The largest Marine air-ground

task force and the Marine Corps principal warfighting organization, particularly for larger crises or contingencies. It is task-organized around a permanent command element and normally

contains one or more Marine divisions, Marine aircraft wings,

and Marine force service support groups. The Marine expeditionary force is capable of missions across the range of military operations, including amphibious assault and sustained operations

ashore in any environment. It can operate from a sea base, a land

base, or both. Also called MEF.

Marine expeditionary force (Forward)—A designated lead

echelon of a Marine expeditionary force, task-organized to meet

the requirements of a specific situation. A Marine expeditionary

force (Forward) varies in size and composition, and may be commanded by the Marine expeditionary force commander personally or by another designated commander. It may be tasked with

preparing for the subsequent arrival of the rest of the MEF/joint/

combined forces, and/or the conduct of other specified tasks, at

the discretion of the MEF commander. A Marine expeditionary

force (Forward) may also be a stand-alone MAGTF, task-organized for a mission in which a MEF is not required. Also called

MEF (Fwd).

Marine expeditionary unit—A Marine air-ground task force

that is constructed around an infantry battalion reinforced, a helicopter squadron reinforced, and a task-organized combat service

support element. It normally fulfills Marine Corps forward seabased deployment requirements. The Marine expeditionary unit

provides an immediate reaction capability for crisis response and

is capable of limited combat operations. It may contain other Ser-
MCWP 3-22.2

A-16

vice or foreign military forces assigned or attached. Also called

MEU. See also aviation combat element; combat service support

element; command element; ground combat element; Marine airground task force; Marine expeditionary force; Marine expeditionary force (Forward); Marine expeditionary unit (special

operations capable); special purpose Marine air-ground task

force; task force.

Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)—The

Marine Corps standard, forward-deployed, sea-based expeditionary organization. The MEU(SOC) is a MEU, augmented with

selected personnel and equipment, that is trained and equipped

with an enhanced capability to conduct amphibious operations

and a variety of specialized missions, of limited scope and duration. These capabilities include specialized demolition, clandestine reconnaissance and surveillance, raids, in-extremis hostage

recovery, and enabling operations for follow-on forces. The

Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) is not a

special operations force but, when directed by the National Command Authorities, the combatant commander in chief, and/or

other operational commander, may conduct limited special operations in extremis, when other forces are inappropriate or unavailable. It may also contain other Service or foreign military forces

assigned or attached to the Marine air-ground task force. Also

called MEU (SOC). See also aviation combat element; combat

service support element; command element; ground combat element; Marine air-ground task force; Marine expeditionary force;

Marine expeditionary force (Forward); Marine expeditionary

unit; special purpose Marine air-ground task force; task force.

offensive air support—Those air operations conducted against

enemy installations, facilities, and personnel to directly assist the

attainment of MAGTF objectives by the destruction of enemy
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

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resources or the isolation of the enemy’s military forces. Also

called OAS. (MCRP 5-12C)

operations security—A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. Identify those actions

that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that

could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the

vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also

called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

preplanned air support—Air support in accordance with a program, planned in advance of operations. (JP 1-02)

rules of engagement—Directives issued by competent military

authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under

which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)

special purpose Marine air-ground task force—A Marine airground task force organized, trained and equipped with narrowly

focused capabilities. It is designed to accomplish a specific mission, often of limited scope and duration. It may be any size, but

normally it is a relatively small force—the size of a Marine expeditionary unit or smaller. It may contain other Service or foreign

military forces assigned or attached to the Marine air-ground task

force. Also called SPMAGTF. See also aviation combat element;

combat service support element; command element; ground combat element; Marine air-ground task force; Marine expeditionary

force; Marine expeditionary force (Forward); Marine expeditionary unit; task force.
MCWP 3-22.2

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suppression of enemy air defenses—That activity which neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy

air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. Also called

SEAD. (JP 1-02)

surface-to-air weapon—A surface-launched weapon for use

against airborne targets. Future developments in air defense systems may lead to the employment of weapons other than missiles.

Examples include rockets, directed-energy weapons, and air

defense guns. (JP 1-02)

tactical air command center—The principal U.S. Marine Corps

air command and control agency from which air operations and

air defense warning functions are directed. It is the senior agency

of the U. S. Marine air command and control system which serves

as the operational command post of the aviation combat element

commander. It provides the facility from which the aviation combat element commander and his battle staff plan, supervise, coordinate, and execute all current and future air operations in support

of the Marine air-ground task force. The tactical air command

center can provide integration, coordination, and direction of

joint and combined air operations. Also called Marine TACC.

(JP 1-02)

tactical air control center—The principal air operations installation (ship-based) from which all aircraft and air warning functions of tactical air operations are controlled. Also called Navy

TACC. (JP 1-02)

tactical air coordinator (airborne)—An officer who coordinates, from an aircraft, the action of combat aircraft engaged in

close support of ground or sea forces. (JP 1-02)
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tactical air direction center—An air operations installation

under the overall control of the tactical air control center (afloat)/

tactical air command center, from which aircraft and air warning

service functions of tactical air operations in an area of responsibility are directed. (JP 1-02)

tactical air operation—An air operation involving the employment of air power in coordination with ground or naval forces to:

a. gain and maintain air superiority; b. prevent movement of

enemy forces into and within the objective area and to seek out

and destroy these forces and their supporting installations; c. join

with ground or naval forces in operations within the objective

area, in order to assist directly in attainment of their immediate

objective. (JP 1-02)

tactical air operations center—The principal air control agency

of the U.S. Marine air command and control system responsible

for airspace control and management. It provides real time surveillance, direction, positive control, and navigational assistance

for friendly aircraft. It performs real time direction and control of

all antiair warfare operations, to include manned interceptors and

surface-to-air weapons. It is subordinate to the tactical air command center. Also called TAOC. (JP 1-02)

time on station—The time that an aircraft can actually spend

performing its assigned mission. It does not include the time

transiting to and from the operating site. Also called TOS.

(MCRP 5-12C)
Appendix B

References

Joint Publications (JPs)

0-2 Unified Action Armed Forced (UNAAF)

1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

3-01.2 Joint Doctrine for Offensive Operations Countering Air and Missile 

Threats 

3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone

3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

1 Warfighting

1-1 Strategy

1-2 Campaigning

1-3 Tactics

2 Intelligence

3 Expeditionary Operations

4 Logistics

5 Planning

6 Command and Control

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

2-1 Intelligence Operations

3-2 Aviation Operations

3-22 Antiair Warfare

3-23 Offensive Air Support

3-23.1 Close Air Support

3-23.2 Deep Air Support

3-25 Control of Aircraft and Missiles

3-41.1 Rear Area Operations

5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process
MCWP 3-22.2

B-2

Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)

3-16B The Joint Targeting Process and Procedures for Targeting 

Time-Critical Elements

5-12C Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary 

of Military and Associated Terms

5-12D Organization of Marine Corps Forces

Fleet Marine Force Manuals (FMFMs)

5-70 MAGTF Aviation Planning

5-71 Aviation Planning Documents

Miscellaneous

Air, Land, Sea Application (ALSA) Publication, Multiservice Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for the Suppression of Enemy Air 

Defenses