Anticipating Strategic Surprise

on the Korean Peninsula

by James J. Przystup

Strategic Forum

T

he June 2000 summit between South

Korean President, Kim Dae Jung, 

and his North Korean counterpart, 

Kim Jong Il, raised hopes for reconciliation

on the Korean Peninsula. South Korean officials anticipated a return summit in Seoul

and considered a declaration of peace within

reach. Today, stagnation is the likely prospect for inter-Korean relations, which could

make U.S. policy a scapegoat during the

South Korean election year.

Kim Jong Il can influence the pace, if

not the substance, of diplomacy on the peninsula, and diplomatic surprise cannot be ruled

out. Pyongyang almost certainly would seek

to exploit a second summit to drive carefully

crafted wedges between Washington and

Seoul on key security issues.

Despite a rapidly contracting economy,

Kim Jong Il has continued to commit scarce

resources to strengthening North Korean

positions along the DMZ. While observing 

a self-imposed freeze on missile testing,

Pyongyang continues to export missiles and

missile-related technologies to areas of

strategic interest to the United States. Yet 

to be resolved is the record of North Korea’s

own attempt to develop nuclear weapons. 

To protect U.S. interests during this

election year, the Bush administration should

pursue an activist diplomatic and security

strategy informed by the principles of transparency, reciprocity, and verification. The

objective should be to move North Korea

toward an economic and political opening.

Despite the current stagnation in SouthNorth dialogue, relations between the Koreas

have been subject to sudden shifts. In the warm

afterglow of the historic June 2000 South-North

Summit in Pyongyang, South Korean President

Kim Dae Jung’s engagement policy appeared to

have created a self-sustaining dynamic. Policymakers in Washington and Seoul scrambled to

manage the potential diplomatic and security

consequences of a rapid breakthrough in bilateral relations driven by presidential summitry.

Yet the spirit of the summit was shortlived; inter-Korean relations stagnated during

the first half of 2001. In Seoul, a no-confidence

vote on President Kim’s policy toward North

Korea resulted in the resignation of Unification

Minister Lim Dong Won, the architect of the

Sunshine Policy, and presidential election

campaigning was visible on the political horizon. Meanwhile, Pyongyang declined Secretary

of State Colin Powell’s offer to “meet anywhere,

anytime, with no preconditions.”

However, in mid-September 2001, the

political pendulum suddenly swung back

toward guarded optimism. Shortly after Kim

Jong Il’s August meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President

Jiang Zemin’s visit to North Korea, Pyongyang

called for a resumption of South-North dialogue after a 9-month hiatus. The Fifth NorthSouth Ministerial meeting, held in Seoul September 16–18, resulted in agreement to resume

family exchanges, restart restoration of road

and rail links through the demilitarized zone

(DMZ), undertake flood control measures

along the Imjin River border, and hold a sixth

round of ministerial talks. Prospects for a

return summit again became a matter of

political speculation. Less than 2 months later,

at the Sixth Ministerial, Pyongyang made clear

that it had little interest in expanding SouthNorth contacts. 

Developments over the past year underscore the mercurial nature of South-North

relations. They also highlight the discomforting extent to which Kim Jong Il and North

Korea control at least the tempo, if not the

substance, of the reconciliation process. A

return summit, though now nowhere on the

horizon, could launch peninsular relations

into new dimensions, with new policy challenges for the United States and the Republic of

Korea (ROK). As Kim demonstrated by agreeing

to the first summit, he is capable of doing the

unexpected.

At the same time, North Korea remains a

threat to American interests on the Korean

peninsula and beyond. The conventional threat

posed by North Korean forces on the peninsula

is long-standing. Even as its economy has

continued to contract over the past decade,

Pyongyang has committed scarce resources to

the military, strengthening its position along

the DMZ. Pyongyang has also continued to

develop weapons of mass destruction. Although

it has imposed a ban on missile testing, the

export of missiles and missile technologies has

earned North Korea inclusion on President

George W. Bush’s “axis of evil.” Finally, issues

related to North Korea’s nuclear past, its efforts

to develop nuclear weapons, and the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework must

be addressed.

Approaching the North

To address critical security issues with

North Korea, the Bush administration should

pursue an activist diplomatic and security

No. 190

March 2002

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points

No. 190, March 2002 Strategic Forum 1
strategy toward Pyongyang. Doing so will also

position the United States to deal effectively

with the consequences of either dramatic

movement or stagnation in South-North relations. Pyongyang would almost certainly

attempt to exploit an opening to the South to

divide Seoul and Washington on key economic

and security issues. Conversely, stagnation in

South-North relations could make U.S. policy a

scapegoat during the ROK election cycle, with

increasing strains on the alliance and the U.S.

forward-deployed presence. Each of these

contingencies will affect the Korean Peninsula;

managing their dynamics will test the

U.S.–ROK alliance.

For the Bush administration to be successful in its dealings with North Korea, a comprehensive negotiating strategy is essential. That

strategy should embrace both internal and

external factors, ends as well as means.

A necessary precondition for any successful diplomatic strategy is political support at

home. With respect to Pyongyang, the administration benefits from the fact that North Korea

is not an object of political affection. At the

same time, however, the political sustainability

of the administration’s approach to the North

will depend on producing results that are

reciprocal and verifiable. Three principles,

transparency, reciprocity, and verification,

should shape U.S. strategy.

The mantra for this strategy should 

be “trust but verify”—a hard-headed, 

Reaganesque willingness to test Pyongyang’s

intentions and judge by the results of actions

taken. The initial Bush administration policy

review has served to reverse the diplomatic

dynamic of the recent past. Now is the time for

the consistent application of “meet anywhere,

anytime, with no preconditions” diplomacy.

Should the North prove reluctant, administration willingness to address issues will

demonstrate its bona fides to Congress and to

our allies alike, while at the same time highlighting the real obstacle to progress. The fact

remains that no matter how well constructed a

strategy or how well intentioned an approach,

it may not be able to sustain forward movement because the North may have little interest

in what is being offered. Nevertheless, diplomacy can make clear where the real source of

intransigence rests.

North Korean Drift

The regime in Pyongyang is focused on

political survival, and this preoccupation

drives its national strategies. The military

remains the top North Korean priority. Despite

massive famine and food shortages, the

Korean People’s Army (KPA) has been absorbing more of the North’s diminishing

resources. Pyongyang’s military priorities are

reflected in new deployments of artillery along

the DMZ, in the hardening of command and

control, and in the staging of large-scale,

complex military exercises.

Despite hints of change—for instance,

Kim Jong Il’s 2001 New Year’s call for “New

Thinking,” his visit, with high-ranking KPA

generals, to high-tech Shanghai, and the evolution of farmers’ markets—there is little evidence that North Korea is on the road to economic revival and recovery. In the face of

economic failure, Kim Jong Il has demonstrated

a determined resistance to reform. A real opening of the North Korean economy and society

would put at risk the control mechanisms of the

regime and, in turn, the regime itself.

Rather than following Beijing’s suggestions for a controlled opening, Kim has opted

to turn North Korea into an aid-based, aiddependent economy. Recent diplomatic success

with the European Union and other Western

countries has only enlarged his donor base.

However, Kim’s increasing dependence has

come at a cost: a narrowing of the field for bad

behavior. Kim will likely have great difficulty in

embracing real reciprocity, verification, and

transparency, but dependence on the outside

world will serve to limit threats to the realm of

rhetoric. Truly bad behavior would put at risk

the regime’s external support structure. This

translates into greater leverage for U.S. policy.

The historic June 2000 summit demonstrated that Kim is capable of surprise, but his

decision to participate appears to have been

more tactical than strategic, an attempt to

open more widely the resource tap from the

South. The agreements of the Fifth NorthSouth Ministerial meetings to resume family

exchanges and restart work on transportation

links through the DMZ stalled out less than 2

months later and have yet to be implemented.

Despite Kim Dae Jung’s commitment to SouthNorth reconciliation, a second return summit

now seems unlikely in 2002.

Regional Dynamics

For years, American analysts have

assumed that Beijing’s central interest in North

Korea was twofold: to maintain it as a buffer

state to protect China’s borders from the spread

of democratic values that would accompany

reunification under the South and to ensure

that American forces remained at a distance,

below the DMZ.

However, a recent study by Eric McVadon,

based on interviews with Chinese scholars and

officials, suggests that the buffer concept with

respect to North Korea may no longer be as

prevalent in Chinese strategic thinking. He

argues that this shift is partly the result of

changes in the China-ROK relationship—

specifically, in China’s understanding that,

although South Korea is an alliance partner of

the United States, it is not part of an alliance

structure aimed at containing China. Seoul’s

decision not to participate with the United

States in the development of missile defenses

has reassured Beijing. In part, it is also attributable to a confidence that the North has stabilized and that the status quo on the peninsula

is sustainable for an indeterminate future.1

McVadon, however, does argue that, for

China, the buffer concept has validity with

respect to the peninsula as a whole and to the

influence of external powers, in particular

Japan and the United States. In this context,

the United States should assume that Beijing

sees the limiting of external influences on the

peninsula as being in its national interest.

Historically, Japanese strategists have viewed

the Korean Peninsula as “a dagger pointed at

2 Strategic Forum No. 190, March 2002

James J. Przystup is a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National

Defense University. Dr. Przystup may be reached by phone at (202) 685–2359 or by e-mail at

przystupj@ndu.edu.

the Bush administration

should pursue an activist

diplomatic and security

strategy toward

Pyongyang
the heart of Japan.” Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that their counterparts in Beijing today may see the peninsula through a

similar but reverse optic.

Tokyo’s increasing diplomatic activism, its

participation in the U.S.–ROK–Japan trilateral

coordinating mechanism, and its proposals for

a 2+4 structure to discuss Korean PeninsulaNortheast Asian security issues all underscore

Japan’s traditional interest in developments on

the peninsula. Almost all unification scenarios

posit a major Japanese economic and financial

role—giving Tokyo political leverage. For

China, the limiting of Japanese influence on the

peninsula continues to have policy relevance.

While Beijing has supported the American 2+2

initiative and South-North dialogue, it has

consistently opposed Japan’s 2+4 proposals.

Over the long term, Beijing will continue

to work against the development of a strong

ROK-Japan relationship. Since Kim Dae Jung’s

historic 1998 visit to Japan, relations between

the two countries have been on the mend, led

by their respective defense establishments.

However, as demonstrated by recent controversies over Japanese history textbooks and Prime

Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to the

Yasukuni Shrine, Japanese-Korean relations

remain politically volatile. Minimizing Japanese

influence on the peninsula represents a likely

shared Chinese and Korean long-term goal.

Despite the current correspondence of

American and Chinese interests in stability on

the peninsula, Washington should expect that

Beijing also would work to lessen its influence

in a reconciled or united Korean Peninsula.

The future of the U.S.–ROK alliance and the

U.S. interest in continuing a military presence

on the peninsula after reunification will be

issues on which American and Chinese

national interests likely will diverge.

Administration Policy

The Bush administration has inherited

and utilized a well-functioning U.S.–ROK–

Japan trilateral coordinating mechanism on

policy toward North Korea. Both Seoul and

Tokyo support efforts to engage North Korea, as

does Beijing. Meanwhile, the administration

has made clear its commitment to strengthening and adapting alliances with the Republic of

Korea and Japan. The two U.S. objectives—

dealing with North Korea and strengthening

the alliance structure—are mutually reinforcing. As diplomacy moves ahead, deterrence also

should be strengthened, and the administration, as well as allies, should be comfortable

standing on deterrence if diplomacy stalls.

Successive administrations in Washington

have aimed at promoting a direct South-North

dialogue, based on the conviction that such

dialogue is key to reconciliation and peaceful

reunification. American policy should allow

Seoul to take the lead on engaging the North

and should make clear this priority to

Pyongyang; in fact, this policy should remain

central even as the Bush administration develops its own approach to North Korea. Careful

coordination with Seoul will be critical, and it

will require dedication and persistence as the

South enters its election cycle.

On June 6, 2001, the White House released

a Presidential statement on policy toward North

Korea. The statement refers to a “broad

agenda” and mentions specifically the Agreed

Framework, the North Korean missile program,

and its conventional force posture.2 Over the

long term, U.S. willingness to negotiate on the

basis of the June 6 agenda, based squarely on

principles of transparency, reciprocity, and

verification, can contribute to a dynamic that

will result in a fundamental structural change

in North Korea’s economic and political system.

Agreed Framework

The United States should clarify that it

will both honor its commitments under the

Agreed Framework and oppose any unilateral

change in the instrument.3 At the same time,

the United States should express its willingness

to accelerate implementation of the agreement,

given the energy shortage now affecting North

Korea. To this end, the administration should

propose early International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) inspections. Verification of the

history of North Korea’s nuclear program is

central to the conclusion of a U.S.-North Korea

Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which is a

legal prerequisite to the installation of the

light-water reactors specified in the Agreed

Framework. North Korean agreement to accelerate implementation would help both to

advance its economy and suggest a willingness

to work constructively with the United States.

The administration also should be prepared to address recent North Korean requests

for conventional energy. In early 2001,

Pyongyang asked Seoul to provide 2 million

kilowatts of conventional power, the equivalent

of the energy to be provided by the Agreed

Framework’s light-water reactors. The original

target date for completion of the light-water

reactor project, approximately 2003–2004, will

not be met and is likely to slip to the end of the

decade, thus complicating North Korea’s energy

future. Today, the North’s energy capacity (18.6

billion kilowatts) is approximately 50 percent

of total demand, and its energy infrastructure

is both outmoded and inefficient.

Any substitution of conventional energy

should be tied to an accelerated implementation of the Agreed Framework—in this

instance, a willingness to advance IAEA inspections and to begin the transfer from North

Korea of the fuel rods from the Yongbyon

reactor complex. (The fuel rods are estimated

to contain enough plutonium for 4–5 nuclear

weapons.) In addition, supplemental conventional energy should be supplied through the

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, not on a bilateral basis. This tradeoff

would meet Pyongyang’s interim energy needs

and satisfy American interests in verifying the

status of the North Korean nuclear program.

Missile Program

Since former Secretary of Defense William

Perry’s review of Clinton administration policy

toward North Korea (1998–1999), reining in

the North Korean missile program has been a

priority for American policy. President Bush

underscored long-standing U.S. concerns with

North Korea’s proliferation of missiles and

missile technologies in his 2002 State of the

Union address.

During the last months of the Clinton

administration, a series of negotiations aimed

at concluding a missile deal with Pyongyang

took place. However, time ran out on the effort.

The deal on the table at the end of the Clinton

administration reportedly included an agreement by Pyongyang not to produce, test, or

deploy missiles with a range of more than 300

miles; an offer to suspend the sale of missiles,

No. 190, March 2002 Strategic Forum 3

U.S. objectives—dealing

with North Korea and

strengthening the

alliance structure—are

mutually reinforcing
4 Strategic Forum No. 190, March 2002

missile components, missile technologies, and

training; a commitment to suspend export of

missiles now under contract; and an agreement

to accept in-kind payments of approximately

$1 billion in lieu of cash compensation.

Unresolved issues, however, included the

deployment of existing missiles and verification

of North Korean commitments. Capturing

missiles presently capable of striking Japan is

critical for Tokyo and central to the effective

continuation of trilateral coordination. Any

deal leaving Japan at risk while protecting the

United States is one that the Bush administration should advance with great caution. While

a comprehensive, verifiable missile pact will

not resolve all of Tokyo’s outstanding issues

with Pyongyang, it should allow Japan to

provide in-kind support for North Korea.

This leads to verification. While the

administration could contemplate a spectrum

of outcomes, the bottom line must be a verification regime that satisfies Congress. Without

it, there simply is no deal. This reality must be

communicated to the leadership in Pyongyang

by making the point that the United States is

prepared to be forthcoming in terms of needed

in-kind support and assistance in reforming—

not simply propping up—the North Korean

economy, but verification is critical.

Conventional Forces

Two perennial problems for South-North

reconciliation—military confidence-building

measures and conventional force reductions—

must also be addressed as part of a comprehensive strategy.

For close to a decade, an extensive list of

transparency-enhancing measures, outlined in

the Basic Agreement of 1992, has been on the

table. These steps include the establishment of

a South-North Joint Military Commission to

discuss and take steps: 

to build up military confidence and realize

arms reduction, in particular, the mutual notification and control of large-scale movements of

military units and major military exercises, the

peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone,

exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reductions in armaments, including elimination of weapons of mass destruction

and attack capabilities, and verification thereof.

That the North has refused to move ahead

with such measures reflects its obsessive preoccupation with the military instruments of

security and regime survival. Without moderation in this mindset, little progress should be

expected in this area.

On June 8, 2001, in response to Secretary

Powell’s statement of concern about the North’s

buildup along the DMZ and the consequent

need to discuss its military posture, Pyongyang

charged that the focus on North Korean forces

was simply an excuse to keep American forces

on the peninsula. This reflects the North’s

approach to inter-Korean arms control. Conceptually, it operates in three sequential steps:

■ realignment of the external security environment, involving the withdrawal of American forces

and cessation of U.S.–ROK exercises

■ inter-Korean arms reduction and limitation

■ confidence-building measures, facilitated by

implementing the above steps.4

This North Korean approach means that

the administration should seek to address the

issue of conventional force reductions with

North Korea—but with only minimal expectations at best. But it also means that an opportunity to make progress on other security issues,

such as missile proliferation, should not be held

hostage to conventional force reductions.

If the Bush administration does raise the

issue of a KPA pullback from the DMZ, it

should expect Pyongyang to insist that the U.S.

presence be put on the table. If Pyongyang ever

seriously engages on force reduction, thin-out,

or pullback from the DMZ, the United States

should be prepared to deal with issues related

to American presence and deployments. These

are issues that the United States and South

Korea should be addressing now in policy

planning discussions.

However, the Korean People’s Army

remains the praetorian guard of the regime,

and the leadership, given its focus on internal

stability, is not prepared to put itself at risk.

North Korea will approach all military-related

talks with the view that the outcome should

ensure the security of the regime and its military life-support system—an outcome that the

United States cannot assure. 

Given Pyongyang’s preoccupation with its

own survival, attempting to address conventional military issues directly may be too much

to ask. Instead, the Bush administration should

consider the possibility of a more indirect,

asymmetrical approach. It should use

Pyongyang’s primary concerns with regime

survival and a failed economy to induce transparency and verifiable change in its military

posture in exchange for real economic benefits

aimed at economic reform. In other words,

force reductions or changes in threatening

deployment patterns along the DMZ could yield

economic benefits, such as in-kind resource

transfers or technical support for a North

Korean economic reform program.

Again, principles of reciprocity and verification should inform administration strategy.

This is potentially a diplomatic trifecta. If the

North plays, real threat reduction may ensue

and could lead to an opening of the North’s

closed economy. If Pyongyang refuses, the

administration would have demonstrated its

commitment to diplomacy, assumed the moral

high ground, and strengthened its standing

with key allies. In terms of public diplomacy,

this commitment is particularly important in

managing relations with Seoul and Tokyo if, as

expected, South-North relations are in for a

period of protracted stagnation.

Humanitarian Assistance

North Korea remains incapable of meeting its food requirements. The World Food

Program estimated a food shortfall of 1.5

million tons for 2001, and even with less severe

weather, North Korea will face food shortages

for an indefinite future. In recent years,

humanitarian groups, such as CARE, and

Doctors without Borders, suspended activities in

North Korea because of restrictions placed on

their work by Pyongyang.

North Korea’s food shortage and the need

to verify that any assistance provided by the

United States goes to the intended recipients are

key issues that the administration must

address. Proof of humanitarian relief distribution is central to sustain political support for

any long-term commitment to an assistance

program. This is another instance where Washington should make clear to Pyongyang that it

is prepared to help, but that something is

the Bush administration

should use Pyongyang’s

primary concerns with

regime survival and a

failed economy to 

induce transparency 

and verifiable change
expected in return—that, as a starting point,

verification is a sine qua non.

The administration also should be prepared to address the fundamental challenge at

the core of the current approach to Pyongyang:

to the extent that assistance comes without

strings, it serves only to reinforce the status quo

in the North’s economic and agricultural

system. It amounts to international welfare,

which serves only to reinforce North Korea’s

aid-dependent status and cushions it from the

necessity of addressing longer-term needs.

American policy should be aimed at

moving North Korea from welfare to workfare.

The approach of the Bush administration must

emphasize that the United States is prepared to

help but that the North also must move to

address its economically distressing problems.

In the first instance, this should entail the

marketization of the North Korean agricultural

sector with technical and environmental assistance from the United States. The administration should be prepared to build international

support for this approach.

The administration should recognize that

unreciprocated humanitarian assistance not

only serves to reinforce the status quo in the

North but also is fungible with respect to North

Korean budget outlays. That is, money saved

on food can be spent to advance its “military

first” policy, allowing Pyongyang to have a

“guns and butter” policy. In 2001, the North

Korean Defense Minister visited Moscow looking for military equipment while Seoul was

announcing a new aid package of food and

fertilizer for the North. In democracies, it will

be difficult to sustain a policy that allows the

North to have its cake and eat it, too.

First Principles

The United States should pursue an

activist diplomacy in anticipation of continued

uncertainty and volatility in South-North

relations over the next 12 to 18 months. Secretary Powell’s meet-anywhere-anytime approach

allows the United States to claim the moral

high ground—a particularly important stance

as South Korea enters its election cycle. If little

is accomplished in the coming period, the

United States should not be seen as the reason

for stagnation in South-North relations. By the

same token, bad behavior by Pyongyang

should not be rewarded. Threats should not be

met with invitations to meetings, with food as

the payoff for attendance.

Policy toward North Korea should be

shaped by willingness to discuss outstanding

issues and informed by the principles of transparency, reciprocity, and verification. At the

same time, the administration should be prepared to say no to Pyongyang if it perceives

that the North is not prepared to negotiate

constructively. The administration should act

with confidence in its negotiating position and

the strength of deterrence.

South Korea should be recognized as

having the lead in South-North relations. This

principle has been a central tenet of U.S. diplomacy, and efforts should be aimed at promoting direct South-North contact. There should

be no summit meeting with the North until

Kim Jong Il honors his commitment to visit the

South for a return summit.

Close coordination with South Korea and

Japan is central. As President Kim Dae Jung’s

historic presidency draws to a close, legacy

diplomacy could put U.S. strategic interests at

risk. Last year, when a return summit was

anticipated for the spring, there was much

talk in Seoul about a South-North peace

declaration to replace the armistice. However,

coordination between Washington and Seoul

was lacking over the contents of such a statement. A peace declaration that fails to alter

the threat posed by the North but simply

evokes a mood of reconciliation is one that

could jeopardize the continuing presence of

U.S. forces on the peninsula.

In this regard, President Kim Dae Jung,

following the June 2000 summit, announced

that Kim Jong Il had told him that North Korea

would accept a continuing American presence

on the peninsula even as the reconciliation

process advanced. Kim Jong Il, however, has

never put this attributed statement on record.

During his visit to Russia, Kim explained to

President Putin the North Korean position that

U.S. forces should be withdrawn from the

peninsula. Should a second summit take place

and yield a peace declaration, Kim Jong Il

should be asked to put his commitment on a

continuing U.S. presence in writing.

At the close of 2001, South-North relations

had not developed in the way that many

thought possible following the historic June

2000 summit in Pyongyang. Moreover, the road

ahead, weaving as it does through the South

Korean election cycle, probably will be marked

by slow going and even stagnation in relations

between Seoul and Pyongyang. Concurrently,

administration diplomacy must be prepared to

deal with the possibility of strategic surprise in

South-North relations.

Given these uncertainties, the Bush

administration should pursue an activist diplomacy toward North Korea. President Bush

should miss no opportunity to reaffirm his

support for South-North dialogue and the

willingness of his administration to undertake

wide-ranging discussions with North Korea. In

this regard, transparency, reciprocity, and

verification should define the parameters of

U.S. policy with respect to security as well as

economic issues. Overall, the objective of American policy should be to move North Korea

toward an economic and political opening.

Should Pyongyang prove reluctant to respond

to Washington’s call for talks, the administration should be prepared to stand firm on deterrence, having demonstrated where the obstacle

to progress lies.

Notes1

Eric A. McVadon, “China’s Goals and Strategies for the

Korean Peninsula,” in Planning for a Peaceful Korea, Henry D.

Sokolski, ed. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic

Studies Institute, 2001). 2

In each of these specific areas and beyond in the broader

agenda, the Bush administration should focus on ways of

inducing change in North Korea—to make the North externally

less threatening to the United States and its allies and internally

a more open economy and society. 3

Under the Terms of the Agreed Framework, signed by the

United States and North Korea on October 21, 1994, North Korea

agreed to freeze and eventually dismantle its graphite-moderated

reactors and related facilities in exchange for the construction

and financing of light-water reactor power plants. In the interim,

pending completion of the first light-water reactor, the United

States agreed to supply 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually for

heating and electric power generation. 4

Taeho Kim, unpublished paper, Korean Institute for

Defense Analysis—Institute for National Strategic Studies

Workshop, June 2001.

No. 190, March 2002 Strategic Forum 5

policy toward North 

Korea should be shaped 

by willingness to discuss

outstanding issues and

informed by the principles

of transparency, reciprocity, and verification
6 Strategic Forum No. 190, March 2002

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by

members of the National Defense University as well as

other scholars and specialists in national security affairs

from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions,

and recommendations expressed or implied within are

those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect

the views of the Department of Defense or any other

agency of the Federal Government.

PUBLICATION DIRECTORATE

Robert A. Silano William R. Bode

Director of Publications General Editor

The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes

books, monographs, and reports on national security

strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy.

For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at:

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/ndup2.html. INSS also

produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at:

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear

Director Director of Research

Post-9/11 Critical Issues Series

How have the attacks of September 11 reshaped America’s security priorities? What key issues,

choices, and opportunities do policymakers face as they prosecute the war on global terrorism

and strengthen security at home? In its Post-9/11 Critical Issues Series, the Institute for National

Strategic Studies explores a range of issues that loom large on the post-9/11 strategic landscape.

These essays are being published as Strategic Forums but are distinguished by a color banner in

the lower right-hand corner of the cover page. Published so far are: 

Steven J. Tomisek

Homeland Security: The New Role for Defense

(No. 189, February 2002)

Judith S. Yaphe

U.S.-Iran Relations: Normalization in the Future?

(No. 188, January 2002)

Joseph McMillan

U.S.-Saudi Relations: Rebuilding the Strategic Consensus

(No. 186, November 2001)

Future Post-9/11 Critical Issues will examine the financing of global terrorism, Central Asia’s 

new geostrategic significance, deterrence and terrorism, and America’s changing defense 

spending priorities, among other topics. 

For on-line access to Strategic Forum, go to: 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/h6.html Post 9/11 Critical

Issues Series