79–010 

Calendar No. 410 

115TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! SENATE 2d Session 115–246 

SECURING ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE ACT 

MAY 10, 2018.—Ordered to be printed 

Ms. MURKOWSKI, from the Committee on Energy and Natural 

Resources, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany S. 79] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, to which was 

referred the bill (S. 79) to provide for the establishment of a pilot 

program to identify security vulnerabilities of certain entities in 

the energy sector, having considered the same, reports favorably 

thereon with an amendment in the nature of a substitute and recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass. 

The amendment is as follows: 

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Securing Energy Infrastructure Act’’. 

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

In this Act: 

(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS.—THE TERM ‘‘APPROPRIATE COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS’’’ MEANS— 

(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and 

(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 

Homeland Security, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 

House of Representatives. 

(2) COVERED ENTITY.—The term ‘‘covered entity’’ means an entity identified 

pursuant to section 9(a) of Executive Order 13636 of February 12, 2013 (78 Fed. 

Reg. 11742), relating to identification of critical infrastructure where a cybersecurity incident could reasonably result in catastrophic regional or national effects on public health or safety, economic security, or national security. 

(3) EXPLOIT.—The term ‘‘exploit’’ means software tool designed to take advantage of a security vulnerability. 

(4) INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM.— 

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(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘industrial control system’’ means an operational technology used to measure, control, or manage industrial functions. 

(B) INCLUSIONS.—The term ‘‘industrial control system’’ includes supervisory control and data acquisition systems, distributed control systems, 

and programmable logic or embedded controllers. 

(5) NATIONAL LABORATORY.—The term ‘‘National Laboratory’’ has the meaning 

given the term in section 2 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801). 

(6) PROGRAM.—The term ‘‘Program’’ means the pilot program established 

under section 3. 

(7) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means the Secretary of Energy. 

(8) SECURITY VULNERABILITY.—The term ‘‘security vulnerability’’ means any 

attribute of hardware, software, process, or procedure that could enable or facilitate the defeat of a security control. 

SEC. 3. PILOT PROGRAM FOR SECURING ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE. 

Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

shall establish a 2-year control systems implementation pilot program within the 

National Laboratories for the purposes of— 

(1) partnering with covered entities in the energy sector (including critical 

component manufacturers in the supply chain) that voluntarily participate in 

the Program to identify new classes of security vulnerabilities of the covered entities; and 

(2) evaluating technology and standards, in partnership with covered entities, 

to isolate and defend industrial control systems of covered entities from security 

vulnerabilities and exploits in the most critical systems of the covered entities, 

including 

(A) analog and nondigital control systems; 

(B) purpose-built control systems; and 

(C) physical controls. 

SEC. 4. WORKING GROUP TO EVALUATE PROGRAM STANDARDS AND DEVELOP STRATEGY. 

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary shall establish a working group— 

(1) to evaluate the technology and standards used in the Program under section 3(2); and 

(2) to develop a national cyber-informed engineering strategy to isolate and 

defend covered entities from security vulnerabilities and exploits in the most 

critical systems of the covered entities. 

(b) MEMBERSHIP.—The working group established under subsection (a) shall be 

composed of not fewer than members, to be appointed by the Secretary, at least 1 

member of which shall represent each of the following: 

(1) The Department of Energy. 

(2) The energy industry, including electric utilities and manufacturers recommended by the Energy Sector coordinating councils. 

(3)(A) The Department of Homeland Security; or 

(B) the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team 

(4) The North American Electric Reliability Corporation. 

(5) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

(6)(A) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence; or 

(B) the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)). 

(7)(A) The Department of Defense; or 

(B) the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security and America’s 

Security Affairs. 

(8) A State or regional energy agency. 

(9) A national research body or academic institution. 

(10) The National Laboratories. 

SEC. 5. REPORTS ON THE PROGRAM. 

(a) INTERIM REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date on which funds are 

first disbursed under the Program, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate 

committees of Congress an interim report that— 

(1) describes the results of the Program; 

(2) includes an analysis of the feasibility of each method studied under the 

Program; and 

(3) describes the results of the evaluations conducted by the working group 

established under section 4(a). 

(b) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than 2 years after the date on which funds are first 

disbursed under the Program, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a final report that— 

(1) describes the results of the Program; 

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(2) includes an analysis of the feasibility of each method studied under the 

Program; and 

(3) describes the results of the evaluations conducted by the working group 

established under section 4(a). 

SEC. 6. EXEMPTION FROM DISCLOSURE. 

Information shared by or with the Federal Government or a State, Tribal, or local 

government under this Act shall be— 

(1) deemed to be voluntarily shared information; 

(2) exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, 

or any provision of any State, Tribal, or local freedom of information law, open 

government law, open meetings law, open records law, sunshine law, or similar 

law requiring the disclosure of information or records; and 

(3) withheld from the public, without discretion, under section 552(b)(3) of 

title 5, United States Code, or any provision of a State, Tribal, or local law requiring the disclosure of information or records. 

SEC. 7. PROTECTION FROM LIABILITY. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—A cause of action against a covered entity for engaging in the 

voluntary activities authorized under section 3— 

(1) shall not lie or be maintained in any court; and 

(2) shall be promptly dismissed by the applicable court. 

(b) VOLUNTARY ACTIVITIES.—Nothing in this Act subjects any covered entity to liability for not engaging in the voluntary activities authorized under section 3. 

SEC. 8. NO NEW REGULATORY AUTHORITY FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES. 

Nothing in this Act authorizes the Secretary or the head of any other department 

or agency of the Federal Government to issue new regulations. 

SEC. 9. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

(a) PILOT PROGRAM.—There is authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 to carry 

out section 3. 

(b) WORKING GROUP AND REPORT.—There is authorized to be appropriated 

$1,500,000 to carry out sections 4 and 5. 

(c) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts made available under subsections (a) and (b) shall remain available until expended. 

PURPOSE

The purpose of S. 79 is to provide for the establishment of a pilot 

program to identify security vulnerabilities of certain entities in 

the energy sector. 

BACKGROUND AND NEED

Critical infrastructures within the United States are enticing targets to malicious actors. Notably, these include industrial control 

systems, which are operational technologies used to measure, control, or manage industrial functions (e.g., supervisory control and 

data acquisition systems). Industrial control systems are used in oil 

and gas pipelines, in electric power generation, transmission, and 

distribution, in the energy sector, and across other sectors such as 

water management and mass transit. Top officials within the intelligence, defense, and power communities have warned that the 

United States remains vulnerable to cyber attacks on these systems, which could result in catastrophic damage to public health 

and safety, economic security, and national security. 

In December 2015, a cyber attack on Ukraine’s power grid that 

featured sophisticated cyber attack techniques, plunged more than 

225,000 people into darkness. According to the Department of 

Homeland Security, that cyber attack was coordinated to target the 

Ukrainian power grid’s industrial control systems. Those systems 

act as the intermediary between computers and the switches that 

control the distribution of electricity. The 2015 attack could well 

have been worse. However, Ukraine still relies on manual techVerDate Sep 11 2014 23:30 May 11, 2018 Jkt 079010 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR246.XXX SR246
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nology to operate its grid to a greater extent than most American 

utility operators. The Ukraine event brought to even greater public 

attention grid-related cybersecurity risks and highlighted a need 

for prudent action to protect other critical infrastructure as well. 

Experts have warned of the need to understand security 

vulnerabilities, particularly as they relate to industrial control systems. The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources has held 

several hearings in which the topic of the vulnerability of the energy sector to cyber attack. 

As it has become increasingly clear that industrial control systems are vulnerable to attack, it has also become apparent that 

there is insufficient information available to the Department of Energy, the National Laboratories, electric utilities, manufacturers of 

grid-related equipment, and other interested entities about the security vulnerabilities of these systems. Also lacking is a sufficient 

evaluation of technology and standards to isolate and defend industrial control systems from security vulnerabilities in the most critical systems. Finally, as identifying cyber vulnerabilities and defending against them is a responsibility shared by multiple government agencies and private sector institutions including asset owners, further opportunities for working-level collaboration by these 

entities are necessary. 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

On January 10, 2017, Senator Angus King, for himself and Senators Risch, Heinrich, Collins, and Crapo, introduced, S. 79, the Securing Energy Infrastructure Act. The Subcommittee on Energy 

held a hearing on S. 79 on March 28, 2017. 

In the 114th Congress, Senators King, Risch, Collins, and Heinrich introduced a similar bill, S. 3018. The Subcommittee on Energy, held a hearing on S. 3018 on July 12, 2016. 

The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources met in open 

business session on March 8, 2018, and ordered S. 79 favorably reported, as amended. 

COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION

The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, in 

open business session on March 8, 2018, by a majority voice vote 

of a quorum present, recommends that the Senate pass S. 79, if 

amended as described herein. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 1. Short title 

Section 1 sets forth a short title. 

Section 2. Definitions 

Section 2 provides a list of definitions. 

Section 3. Pilot program for securing energy infrastructure 

Section 3 requires the Secretary to establish a two-year pilot program within the National Laboratories for the purpose of 

partnering with covered entities in the energy sector that voluntarily participate in the program and evaluating technology and 

standards to isolate and defend. 

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Section 4. Working group to evaluate program standards and develop strategy 

Section 4(a) requires the Secretary to establish a working group 

to evaluate the technology and the standards to be used in the program established under section 3 and to develop a cyber-informed 

engineering strategy. 

Subsection (b) sets forth requirements for membership to the 

working group. 

Section 5. Reports on the program 

Section 5(a) requires the Secretary to submit an interim report 

to appropriate committees of Congress not later than 180 days 

after funds are first disbursed for the program. 

Subsection (b) requires the Secretary to submit a final report to 

appropriate committees of Congress not later than 2 years after 

funds are first disbursed for the program. 

Section 6. Exemption from disclosure 

Section 6 exempts from disclosure under Federal or State freedom of information laws information shared by or with the Federal 

Government or a State, Tribal, or local government. 

Section 7. Protection from liability 

Section 7(a) protects covered entities from a cause of action for 

engaging in voluntary activities authorized by this Act. 

Subsection (b) provides liability protections for covered entities 

for engaging in voluntary activities authorized by this Act. 

Section 8. No new regulatory authority for federal agencies 

Section 8 provides that nothing in the Act authorizes the Secretary or the head of any other federal department or agency to 

issue new regulations. 

Section 9. Authorization for appropriations 

Section 9(a) authorizes $10,000,000 to carry out section 3. 

Subsection (b) authorizes $1,500,000 to carry out sections 4 and 

5. 

Subsection (c) makes the funds authorized under (a) and (b) 

available until expended. 

COST AND BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS

The following estimate of the costs of this measure has been provided by the Congressional Budget Office: 

S. 79 would authorize the appropriation of $10 million for the 

Department of Energy (DOE) to carry out a pilot program to identify security weaknesses in critical infrastructure (for example, 

power generation, transmission, and distribution systems) that 

could result in a debilitating effect on national security, economic 

security, public health, or safety. DOE, in partnership with participating owners and operators of such infrastructure, would evaluate 

technologies and standards that could be used to defend those assets. 

The bill also would authorize the appropriation of $1.5 million for 

DOE to establish a working group to evaluate the technologies and 

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standards examined in the pilot program. The working group also 

would be required to develop a national engineering strategy to be 

used to defend the nation’s critical infrastructure from security 

vulnerabilities. 

Based on historical spending patterns, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost $11.5 million over the 2019–2023 period, assuming appropriation of the specified amounts. 

Enacting S. 79 would not affect direct spending or revenues; 

therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. 

CBO estimates that enacting S. 79 would not increase net direct 

spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10- 

year periods beginning in 2029. 

S. 79 would impose an intergovernmental mandate, as defined in 

the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), on state, local, and 

tribal governments. The bill would preempt state and local laws 

that would otherwise require governmental agencies participating 

in the pilot program to disclose information about their activities, 

such as the sharing of cybersecurity information. Although the preemption would limit the application of state and local laws, CBO 

estimates that it would impose no duty on state or local governments that would result in additional spending or a loss of revenues. S. 79 contains no private-sector mandates as defined in 

UMRA. 

On September 21, 2017, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for S. 

1761, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, as reported by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on August 

18, 2017. Title V of that bill is similar to S. 79, and CBO’s estimates of the cost of implementing the two bills are the same. 

REGULATORY IMPACT EVALUATION

In compliance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, the Committee makes the following evaluation 

of the regulatory impact which would be incurred in carrying out 

the bill. 

The bill is not a regulatory measure in the sense of imposing 

Government-established standards or significant economic responsibilities on private individuals and businesses. 

No personal information would be collected in administering the 

program. Therefore, there would be no impact on personal privacy. 

Little, if any, additional paperwork would result from enactment 

of the bill, as ordered reported. 

CONGRESSIONALLY DIRECTED SPENDING

S. 79, as ordered reported, does not contain any congressionally 

directed spending items, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate. 

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS

The testimony provided by the Department of Energy at the 

March 28, 2017, hearing on S. 79 follows: 

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WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY PATRICIA HOFFMAN, OFFICE OF ELECTRICITY DELIVERY AND

ENERGY RELIABILITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Chairman Gardner and Ranking Member Manchin, and 

Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for continuing to 

highlight the importance of a resilient electric power grid 

and for the opportunity to provide the initial views of the 

Department of Energy (DOE) on S. 79, the Securing Energy Infrastructure Act. DOE supports the goals of S. 79, 

which are consistent with the Department’s ongoing role in 

helping to ensure a resilient, reliable, and flexible electricity system in an increasingly challenging environment. 

DOE would like to work with the sponsor and this Committee to offer additional input on the bill as discussed 

later in this testimony. 

Our economy, national security, and even the well-being 

of our citizens depend on the reliable delivery of electricity. 

I know the Secretary is personally engaged in the cybersecurity issues facing the energy sector. Under his leadership, the Department’s role in cybersecurity is a very high 

priority. The mission of the Office of Electricity Delivery 

and Energy Reliability (DOE–OE) is to strengthen, transform, and improve energy infrastructure to ensure access 

to reliable and secure sources of energy. We are committed 

to working with our public and private sector partners to 

protect the Nation’s critical energy infrastructure, including the electric power grid, from physical security events, 

natural and man-made disasters, and cybersecurity 

breaches. 

Over the past decade, the Nation’s energy infrastructure 

has become a major target of cyberattacks. The frequency, 

scale, and sophistication of cyber threats have increased 

and attacks have become easier to launch. Cyber incidents 

have the potential to interrupt energy services, damage 

highly specialized equipment, and threaten human health 

and safety. As a result, energy cybersecurity and resilience 

has emerged as one of the Nation’s most important security challenges and fostering partnerships with public and 

private stakeholders will be of utmost importance in this 

work. 

IMPORTANCE OF CYBERSECURITY FOR ENERGY SYSTEMS

Initial thoughts of cybersecurity often turn to computer 

servers and desktops, information technology (IT). Hackers 

target computing technology and business applications to 

cause disruptions—obtaining access to email accounts and 

personal information, data exfiltration to be released to 

the world at large. The energy sector is not immune to 

such attacks. 

In the 2012 Shamoon attack, weaponized malware hit 15 

state bodies and private companies in Saudi Arabia, wiping more than 35,000 hard drives of Saudi Aramco, from 

which the company took more than two weeks to recover. 

And again in January of this year, Shamoon 2 hit three 

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state agencies and four private sector companies in Saudi 

Arabia, leaving them offline for at least 48 hours. 

These cyberattacks affect not only business systems, but 

can also target the operating technology of energy delivery 

systems and other critical infrastructure as well. Electric 

utilities, oil and natural gas providers, hydro and nuclear 

facilities, along with financial, water, communications, 

transportation, and healthcare sectors are prime targets 

for cyber-attacks. The disruption of any one of these is not 

only inherently problematic, it also hampers the ability to 

respond to any type of emergency event. 

In December 2015, the first known successful cyber-attack on a power grid took place in Ukraine. Over 225,000 

residents were left without power for several hours in the 

coordinated attack, and a second attack occurred in December 2016 that left portions of Kiev without electricity. 

Domestically, the 2013 cyber-attack on the Bowman Dam 

in Rye, New York illustrated the multitude of targets 

available to and being surveilled by hackers. 

THE ECOSYSTEM OF RESILIENCE

To address these challenges, it is critical for us to be 

proactive and cultivate what I call an ecosystem of resilience: a network of producers, distributors, regulators, vendors, and public partners, acting together to strengthen 

our ability to prepare, respond, and recover. We continue 

to partner with industry, Federal agencies, local governments, and other stakeholders to quickly identify threats, 

develop in-depth strategies to mitigate those threats, and 

rapidly respond to any disruptions. The DOE National 

Laboratories have been the keystone in many endeavors to 

address new and existing cybersecurity concerns. 

IMPORTANCE OF PARTNERSHIPS

The U.S. Department of Energy has collaborated with 

the energy sector for nearly two decades in voluntary public-private partnerships that engage energy owners and operators at all levels—technical, operational, and executive, 

along with state and local governments—to identify and 

mitigate physical and cyber risks to energy systems. 

These partnerships are built on a foundation of earned 

trust that promotes the mutual exchange of information 

and resources to improve the security and resilience of 

critical energy infrastructures. These relationships acknowledge the special security challenges of energy delivery systems and leverage the distinct technical expertise 

within industry and government to develop solutions. 

The security and integrity of energy infrastructure is 

both a state and Federal government concern because energy underpins the operations of every other type of critical infrastructure; the economy; and public health and 

safety. The owners and operators of energy infrastructure, 

however, have the primary responsibility for the full spectrum of cybersecurity risk management: identify assets, 

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protect critical systems, detect incidents, respond to incidents, and recover to normal operations. 

The first responder when the lights go out or gasoline 

stops flowing in the pipelines is not immediately the state 

or Federal Government; rather, it is industry. This is why 

public-private partnerships regarding cybersecurity are 

paramount—they recognize the distinct roles and capabilities of industry and government in managing our critical 

energy infrastructure risks. 

Two of those partnerships are the Electricity Subsector 

Coordinating Council and the Oil and Natural Gas Subsector Coordinating Council, extremely strong partnerships 

in which DOE–OE is engaged. Each serves as a primary 

conduit between industry and the government to prepare 

for, and respond to, national-level disasters or threats to 

critical infrastructure. Through these relationships, cybersecurity issues can be addressed more completely and with 

multiple stakeholder input. 

DOE AUTHORITY IN CYBERSECURITY

DOE’s role in energy sector cybersecurity is established 

in statute and executive action. In 2015, through the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act), Congress assigned DOE as the lead Sector-Specific Agency 

(SSA) for cybersecurity for the energy sector, building upon 

previous Presidential Policy Directives (PPD). PPD–41 

issued in July 2016, further clarified the role of DOE as 

a SSA during a significant cyber incident. 

The FAST Act also gave the Secretary of Energy new authority, upon declaration of a Grid Security Emergency by 

the President, to issue emergency orders to protect or restore critical electric infrastructure or defense critical electric infrastructure. This authority allows DOE to respond 

as needed to the threat of cyber and physical attacks on 

the grid. DOE is developing a proposed rule of procedure 

regarding this new authority. 

While the private sector is responsible for all aspects of 

cybersecurity risk management of their energy systems, 

DOE and the Federal government play critical roles in 

supporting industry functions in several ways: providing 

partnership mechanisms that support collaboration and 

trust; developing supportive policies that encourage voluntary cybersecurity in the energy sector; developing tools 

and capabilities to conduct risk analysis; leveraging government capabilities to gather intelligence on threats and 

vulnerabilities, and share actionable intelligence with energy owners and operators in a timely manner; supporting 

energy sector incident coordination and response; facilitating the development of cybersecurity standards; and, 

promoting and supporting innovation and R&D for nextgeneration physical-cyber systems. 

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DOE’S RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSECURITY AND RESILIENCE THROUGH THE NATIONAL LABORATORIES

Intentional, malicious challenges to our energy systems 

are on the rise and we are seeing threats continually increase in number and sophistication. This evolution has 

profound impacts on the energy sector. 

Cybersecurity for energy control systems is much different than typical IT systems. Power systems must operate continuously with high reliability and availability. Upgrades and patches can be difficult and time consuming, 

with components dispersed over wide geographic regions. 

Further, many assets are in publicly accessible areas 

where they can be subject to physical tampering. Real time 

operations are imperative and latency is unacceptable for 

many applications. Immediate emergency response capability is mandatory and active scanning of the network can 

be difficult. As a result, our National Laboratories conduct 

cybersecurity R&D taking into account these systemic 

characteristics. 

DOE–OE’s Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems 

(CEDS) R&D program aligns activities with Federal and 

private sector priorities, envisioning resilient energy delivery control systems designed, installed, operated, and 

maintained to survive a cyber incident while sustaining 

critical functions. 

The CEDS R&D program is designed to assist the energy sector asset owners by developing cybersecurity solutions for energy delivery systems through a focused research and development effort. DOE–OE co-funds projects 

with industry partners to make advances in cybersecurity 

capabilities for energy delivery systems. These research 

partnerships are helping to detect, prevent, and mitigate 

the consequences of a cyber-incident for our present and 

future energy delivery systems. 

Since 2010, DOE–OE has invested more than $210 million in cybersecurity research, development, and demonstration projects that are led by industry, universities, 

and the National Laboratories. These investments have resulted in more than 35 new tools and technologies that are 

now being used to further advance the resilience of the Nation’s energy delivery systems. 

Through all of these R&D efforts, our National Laboratories have been—and continue to be—heavily engaged in 

their own efforts and in partnerships with academia and 

industry stakeholders. The following are examples of the 

types of cybersecurity advancements currently pursued at 

our National Laboratories, building off of successful cybersecurity tools and technologies already developed: • Argonne National Laboratory is currently working 

on a resilient self-healing cybersecurity framework for 

the power grid that will leverage Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control to prevent and mitigate 

cyber-attacks. The project will develop tools to prevent 

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and mitigate cyber-attacks and enhance the resilience 

of the bulk power system. 

• Argonne is also working on a cloud and outsourcing security framework for power grid applications as 

well as cybersecurity for distributed energy resources 

(DER). This project will help ensure that implementation of cloud-based architecture and DER in the energy sector are deployed with security built-in to 

maintain resilience during cyber-attacks. 

• An online tool being developed by Brookhaven National Laboratory will help utilities to detect, mitigate, 

and evaluate the potential impact of various 

cyberattack scenarios to reduce the risk that malicious 

compromise of essential forecasting data used for grid 

scheduling and operation might result in disruption of 

energy delivery. 

• The Validation and Measuring Automated Response Project led by the Idaho National Laboratory is 

providing a cyber-incident response comparison capability and enabling industry to work towards an automated response capability to a cyber-incident and 

measuring the efficacy of automated response to drive 

future improvements. 

• Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory has an effort underway utilizing real-time micro-synchrophasor 

measurements and other telemetry in the distribution 

system to enhance identification and detection of current and future cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the 

power distribution grid to provide a more reliable, robust, scalable, and cost-effective means of detecting 

cyber-attack scenarios compared to traditional approaches. 

• Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is developing visualizations that power system operators and/ 

or cybersecurity professionals can use to make fast, accurate assessments of situations, enabling them to 

maintain situation awareness during unfolding events. 

The visualization tool will reduce the burden on the 

operators and enable them to make faster decisions 

and maintain cybersecurity situational awareness. 

• Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is also 

working on a project evaluating existing Live Analysis 

monitoring and detection tools for energy delivery systems use. The research seeks to develop a tool that 

could provide evidence of anomalous cyber behavior on 

a live energy delivery system without interrupting energy delivery. 

• The Artificial Diversity and Defense Security 

(ADDSec) project at Sandia National Laboratory is developing defensive technologies that randomly and 

automatically reconfigure energy delivery operational 

network parameters moment-by-moment to impede reconnaissance and cyber-attack planning. ADDSec will 

increase the security of both legacy and modern enVerDate Sep 11 2014 23:30 May 11, 2018 Jkt 079010 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6969 E:\HR\OC\SR246.XXX SR246
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ergy delivery systems by converting these traditionally 

static systems into moving targets. • ‘‘Sophia’’ is a tool researched and developed by the 

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) that enhances continuous situational awareness of energy delivery control system communications and helps detect potential 

cybersecurity concerns. The technology helps strengthen the cybersecurity of our Nation’s energy infrastructure today and of note is the fact INL successfully 

transitioned this technology to commercial use 

through a licensing agreement. • Similarly, Oak Ridge National Laboratory licensed 

the developed ‘‘Hyperion’’ software technology. This 

software can quickly recognize malicious code even if 

the specific program has not been previously identified 

as a threat and before it has a chance to execute. • Also in the process of transitioning to commercialization is Sandia National Laboratory’s ‘‘CodeSeal.’’ 

CodeSeal is a cryptographically secure code obfuscation technology that prevents reverse engineering, or 

malicious modification of energy delivery system code, 

even if that code is executed on a compromised system. 

S. 79

The U.S. Department of Energy is tremendously proud 

of the role our National Laboratories have played in the 

advancement of cybersecurity technologies for our Nation’s 

energy infrastructure. We also appreciate the opportunity 

to provide technical assistance on S. 79. It appears that 

the intent of the legislation is to strengthen our cybersecurity posture by directing the National Laboratories to undertake a study of the systems most critical to national security and to the grid. 

In considering the legislation, DOE notes that many energy sector entities already conduct such assessments to 

comply with mandatory Critical Infrastructure Protection 

standards set by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation or as part of their due diligence in ensuring their system is reliable and capable of providing uninterrupted 

service in the face of today’s evolving cyber threat landscape. 

CONCLUSION

Cyber threats to the energy sector continue to evolve, 

and DOE is working diligently to stay ahead of the curve. 

The solution is an ecosystem of resilience that works in 

partnership with local, state, and industry stakeholders to 

help provide the methods, strategies, and tools needed to 

help protect the Nation’s energy infrastructure through increased resilience and flexibility. 

One of the cornerstones to this ecosystem of resilience is 

the DOE National Laboratories and the significant contributions they provide through their cybersecurity techVerDate Sep 11 2014 23:30 May 11, 2018 Jkt 079010 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6969 E:\HR\OC\SR246.XXX SR246
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nology advancements. Building an ecosystem of resilience 

is—by definition—a shared endeavor, and keeping a focus 

on partnerships remains an imperative. DOE will continue 

its years of work fostering these relationships and investing in technologies to enhance resilience and security, ensuring the electric power grid continues to be able to withstand and recover quickly from disasters and attacks. 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, the Committee notes that no changes in existing law are made by the bill S. 79 as ordered reported. 

Æ