Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

Wanat

The Staff of the US Army Combat Studies Institute

Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008
Front Cover: Aerial View of the Wanat Battlefield, 2008

(Courtesy, Colonel William Ostlund)
Wanat

Combat Action in Afghanistan, 

2008

The Staff of the US Army

Combat Studies Institute

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Wanat: Combat Action In Afghanistan, 2008

The Staff of the US Army Combat Studies Institute, 2010.

DS371.4123.W36W36 2010

958.104’742--dc22

 2010039932

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover a 

wide variety of military history topics. The views 

expressed in this CSI Press publication are those 

of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the 

Department of the Army or the Department of 

Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications, many 

of them available for downloading, can be found at 

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/index.asp.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an 

official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal on any 

republication without the express written permission of the Director of CSI.
iii

Foreword

On 13 July 2008, nine American Soldiers perished while fighting a 

pitched battle in the village of Wanat in Afghanistan’s Waygal Valley. On 

that day, the men of Company C, 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry 

Regiment, endured four hours of intense close quarters combat and 

mounting casualties. The contingent of 49 United States and 24 Afghan 

National Army Soldiers valiantly defended their small outpost against 

a coordinated attack by a determined insurgent force armed with rocket 

propelled grenades and automatic weapons. Despite the initial advantage 

of tactical surprise and numerical superiority, it was the insurgents who 

ultimately broke contact and withdrew from Combat Outpost Kahler.

Army historians recognized the need to better understand the Battle of 

Wanat and ensure those who followed learned from the experiences of the 

courageous Soldiers who defended their outpost with such tenacity. As 

initial reports from the battle were received, the Combat Studies Institute 

at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas began to prepare a historical analysis of the 

circumstances of the Battle of Wanat, launching an exhaustive research 

effort that produced a comprehensive and compelling example of 

contemporary history. 

This study offers an objective narrative of the events surrounding the 

Battle of Wanat. It does not seek to draw final conclusions or to second 

guess decisions made before or during the heat of battle. Rather, it is an 

implement of learning, allowing the reader to see the events of that day 

through the eyes of the leaders and Soldiers of Task Force Rock. It is 

meant to provide context to the chaos and complexity of modern conflict, 

and to help the reader better understand and appreciate the nature of 

operations in an era of persistent conflict. Finally, this study serves to 

honor and preserve the memories of the nine brave men who gave their 

lives at Combat Outpost Kahler.

Sean B. MacFarland

BG, US Army

Deputy Commandant, CGSC 

v

Acknowledgments

Many people played significant roles in the development of this study 

from its inception to its completion. Contract historian Matt Matthews 

proposed the topic, conceptualized the study, initiated the research plan, 

and executed a number of key oral interviews with participants. When 

Mr. Matthews transferred to a different project, contract historian Douglas 

Cubbison took up the Wanat case study. After performing additional 

research and oral interviews, Cubbison created a working paper upon which 

later revisions could build. Contract historian Gary Linhart and contract 

technician Dale Cordes contributed several visual representations of the 

terrain. Research historian John McGrath of the Combat Studies Institute 

served as the primary researcher and writer on the final manuscript, revising 

both text and citations, creating the final graphics, and incorporating new 

information derived from the documentary record of more recent inquiries. 

Dr. Donald Wright, CSI’s Research and Publications Chief, shared in the 

writing duties for the final product and provided continuity and direction 

through various versions of the manuscript. Dr. William G. Robertson, 

Director of the Combat Studies Institute, provided overall guidance and 

quality control to the manuscript development process. Editor Carl Fischer 

worked diligently to see the final manuscript through the editing, layout 

and publication process.

CSI is indebted to the many officers and Soldiers who sat for interviews 

and contributed documents in support of this study. These Soldiers include 

the paratroopers of 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry (“The Rock”), as well as 

members of the 62d Engineer Battalion, USMC ETT 5-3, and the staffs 

of the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team and 101st Airborne Division 

(Air Assault), who participated in operations in Afghanistan in 2008. 

In preparing this study, the staff at CSI have been constantly reminded 

of the courage and sacrifice of all those who have served in Afghanistan in 

difficult circumstances. These thoughts have guided our work in producing 

what we hope is both a testament to the valor of those who served and a 

vehicle for learning in the future. 

vii

Contents

Page

Foreword ................................................................................................iii

Acknowledgements ................................................................................. v

List of Figures.......................................................................................viii

Symbols Key ........................................................................................... ix

Chapter 1. Historic and Campaign Background of the Waygal 

Valley ............................................................................................... 1

Nuristan Province and the Waygal Valley ............................. 1

The Insurgents....................................................................... 8

The Coalition Campaign in Afghanistan, 2001-2008.......... 10

US Operations in Nuristan and Konar, 2001-2007 ............. 15

The Deployment of the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat

Team (ABCT) to Afghanistan, 2007 ................................... 23

Chosen Company and the Waygal Valley ........................... 39

The 4 July Attack on Bella .................................................. 50

The Decision to Execute Operation ROCK MOVE ........... 53

Chapter 2. The Establishment of COP Kahler, 8-12 July 2008 ........ 69

ROCK MOVE—The Plan................................................... 70

Planning and Preparation in Chosen Company................... 83

The Establishment of COP Kahler, 8-12 July ..................... 86

The Terrain at Wanat and the Configuration of the COP .... 92

The Configuration of OP Topside ..................................... 100

Operations and Events at COP Kahler, 9-12 July ............. 104

The Enemy, 9-12 July.........................................................115

The Eve of the Attack.........................................................118

Chapter 3. The Fight at Wanat, 13 July 2008................................... 141

The Attack on COP Kahler................................................ 141

The Initial Defense of OP Topside .................................... 152

Reinforcing OP Topside .................................................... 157

Arrival of Attack Helicopter Support ............................... 163

Arrival of 1st Platoon Quick Reaction Force .................... 167

The MEDEVACs at Wanat ............................................... 172

The Consolidation at COP Kahler..................................... 176

The Withdrawal from the Waygal Valley .......................... 180

Aftermath .......................................................................... 182
viii

Chapter 4. Conclusions....................................................................... 195

Overview ........................................................................... 195

Counterinsurgency in Northeast Afghanistan,

2007-2008.......................................................................... 200

Enemy Disposition and Intent: Situational Awareness in

the Wanat Area .................................................................. 203

The Delays in Construction of COP Kahler...................... 212

The Timing of Operation ROCK MOVE: The Relief by

TF Duke ............................................................................ 214

Defensive Positioning ....................................................... 215

Summary ........................................................................... 223

Closing Thoughts .............................................................. 230

Glossary ........................................................................................... 239

Bibliography ........................................................................................ 243

List of Figures

1. The Waygal Valley ............................................................................... xi

2. Theater Organization, Afghanistan 2008 .............................................11

3. Array of Forces, Regional Command-East, July 2008 ....................... 17

4. AO Bayonet, July 2008....................................................................... 27

5. AO ROCK, July 2008 ......................................................................... 29

6. Troops in Contact Incidents by Company, TF Rock, 2007-8.............. 31

7. COP Bella ........................................................................................... 43

8. ROCK MOVE OPLAN 8-9 July 2008 ............................................... 71

9. Wanat, Proposed COP......................................................................... 81

10. View of Wanat COP looking west from mortar position with 2d

Squad position, the bazaar, and OP Topside’s later location in the 

background, 9 July 2008......................................................................... 93

11. COP Kahler, 13 July 2008................................................................. 99

12. COP Kahler: Looking northwest..................................................... 100

13. OP Topside, 13 July 2008 ............................................................... 101

14. The Wanat Garrison, 13 July 2008.................................................. 107

15. The Course of the Fight .................................................................. 143

16. OP Topside from the east following the engagement ..................... 155
ix
x

UNIT SIZE 

corps division brigade battalion

company platoon section squad

task force (with size symbol)

Elmts

Elements–part of a unit

(+) reinforced (-) reduced unit

individual paratrooper

SYMBOLS KEY (continued)

XXX

●●●

XX X II

I ●● ●

BOUNDARIES

regional commands

brigade

battalion

company

provincial

NOTE: Unless otherwise indicated, 

provincial boundaries are 

also AO boundaries 

X 

I I 

I 

ABBREVIATIONS

(as seen on figures)

ANA Afghan National Army

BSB brigade support battalion

CJTF Combined Joint Task Force

COP combat outpost

FOB forward operating base

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

LRAS3 type of optical surveillance equipment

LZ landing zone

M240 type of medium machine gun

RC Regional Command

RC-E Regional Command–East

STB special troops battalion

TCP traffic control point

TOW type of antiarmor missile

UNIT SIZE 

corps division brigade battalion

company platoon section squad

task force (with size symbol)

Elmts

Elements–part of a unit

(+) reinforced (-) reduced unit

individual paratrooper

SYMBOLS KEY (continued)

XXX

●●●

XX X II

I ●● ●

BOUNDARIES

regional commands

brigade

battalion

company

provincial

NOTE: Unless otherwise indicated, 

provincial boundaries are 

also AO boundaries 

X 

I I 

I 

ABBREVIATIONS

(as seen on figures)

ANA Afghan National Army

BSB brigade support battalion

CJTF Combined Joint Task Force

COP combat outpost

FOB forward operating base

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

LRAS3 type of optical surveillance equipment

LZ landing zone

M240 type of medium machine gun

RC Regional Command

RC-E Regional Command–East

STB special troops battalion

TCP traffic control point

TOW type of antiarmor missile
xi

Figure 1. The Waygal Valley.

Major Darin Gaub, US Army

1

Chapter 1

Historic and Campaign Background of the Waygal Valley

Afghanistan’s history is one of strife and conflict. The people who 

have lived in what is today Afghanistan have seen a succession of foreign 

and domestic rulers and conquerors. The first Western invader to enter 

the region was Alexander the Great who overthrew the previous rulers 

of the Afghanistan region, the Achaemenid Persian Empire. Alexander 

continued east from Persia, entering the area from the southeast in 329 BC 

and operating throughout the region for three years. After passing through 

the current site of Kandahar (the Pashto equivalent of “Alexandria”), a 

city he founded, the Macedonian king wintered at “Alexandria in the 

Caucasus,” near the current site of Bagram Air Base. During the next 

campaigning season, Alexander crossed the Hindu Kush range through the 

Khawak Pass and conquered the Persian province of Bactria, establishing 

a Macedonian colony there and marrying Roxana, the daughter of a local 

noble. The Macedonian then re-crossed the Hindu Kush in 327 BC, and, 

with part of his army, followed the Kabul River Valley to the Konar River 

Valley where he came into conflict with local fighters who were probably 

the ancestors of the modern Nuristanis. Alexander defeated these people 

but was wounded in the shoulder in the process. He then turned east, 

crossed through the Nawa Pass into what today is Pakistan and rejoined 

the rest of his army in the Indus River Valley. There he fought his next 

series of battles. Although Nuristani folklore often portrays them as being 

the descendents of Alexander’s soldiers, modern scholarship and linguistic 

evidence indicates a far earlier origin of the Nuristanis. Still, the genes of 

Alexander’s warriors remain alive in Afghanistan.1

Nuristan Province and the Waygal Valley2

Located in northeastern Afghanistan, Nuristan Province is just south 

of the highest peaks of the Hindu Kush range, with its modest population 

of farmers found almost exclusively in steep valleys cut by small river 

courses between the mountains. This terrain and a lack of all but the 

most rudimentary infrastructure has historically marked the province as 

remote and primitive even by Afghanistan’s standards. Within Nuristan 

and Konar provinces, the Waygal River flows south from the Hindu Kush 

Mountains for 20 miles until it joins the Pech River at Nangalam. The 

Pech River, in turn, flows into the larger Konar River at Asadabad. The 

region is spectacularly rugged and divided into numerous small river 

valleys separated by steep mountain ridges, many in excess of 10,000 

feet. The Waygal Valley is located primarily in Nuristan Province but the 
2

southernmost five miles are in Konar Province. The provincial boundary 

which also marks the ethnic boundary between Nuristanis to the north 

and Safi Pashtuns to the south is located one half mile south of Wanat. All 

of the valleys of Nuristan and Konar, to include the Waygal Valley, are 

rocky, deep, narrow, and steep-sided, most of them are classic examples 

of geological V-shaped valleys. One international observer simply stated, 

“The terrain is mountainous indeed. This is one of the most topographically 

forbidding operating environments in the world.”3

 Nine Nuristani villages 

are located in the northern and central Waygal Valley.4

While located on the Indian border, during its era of rule in India, 

the British colonial government rarely became involved with Konar and 

Nuristan, although the British played a role in the appointment of the Amir 

of Pashat, the ruler of the eastern Konar region in the 1840s. Individual 

English explorers sometimes penetrated into the area. One such expedition 

into eastern Nuristan (then called Kafiristan) became the basis for Rudyard 

Kipling’s 1888 short story The Man Who Would Be King. In 1896, after 

the demarcation of the Durand Line solidified the political borders of his 

realm, the Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman Khan moved into Kafiristan and 

subdued the population. As a price for his future protection, he required the 

Kafiristanis to accept Islam and rechristened them Nuristanis, as they had 

seen the light of Islam, nur being the Arabic word for light. This was part 

of the process by which Abdur Rahman, a grandson of renowned Afghan 

leader Dost Muhammad, who ruled in Kabul for 21 years, introduced a 

stable central government to Afghanistan for the first time in its history.5

The next great external intervention in the northeast of Afghanistan 

occurred in December of 1979 when the Soviet Union sent troops to 

Afghanistan to rescue and buttress a weak Marxist government that 

had assumed power the previous year in Kabul. Even before the Soviet 

intervention, Konar had been the scene of several early rebellions against 

the Marxist forces. After two successful early offensives along the Pech 

Valley in the spring of 1980, the Soviets restricted their operations in 

Konar and eastern Nuristan to the placing of garrisons along the Konar 

River at major population centers. Soviet successes and brutality in the 

Pech and Waygal region were such that many mujahedeen families and 

most of the leadership fled to Pakistan, not to return until the later years 

of the Soviet war. With that area pacified, most significant heavy fighting 

was centered along the corridor of the Konar River connecting Jalalabad 

to Asadabad and Barikowt on the Pakistani border. The Soviets focused on 

restricting the flow of anti Soviet insurgents and their arms and supplies 

from Pakistan into Afghanistan through the Konar Valley. The mujahedeen 
3

returned to the Pech-Waygal valleys in the mid 1980s. The Soviets and 

Afghan Marxists executed a brief campaign in the Pech Valley that even 

penetrated to the Waygal Valley. During this period, Nuristan and Konar 

saw other fighting between Communist proxies, local landowners and 

communities, and organized criminal organizations attempting to gain 

control of the lucrative Kamdesh timber and gemstone interests within the 

region.6

During the civil war in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal 

and the ensuing Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban maintained 

only a token presence in the Pech and Waygal Valleys. Nuristan’s remote 

location, its rugged, severely constrained terrain, limited road network, 

and proximity to the Northern Alliance power center in the Panjshir Valley 

made a large presence unpalatable to the Taliban. The Nuristanis were also 

able to play the Taliban off against the Northern Alliance. Neither side 

attempted to lay a heavy hand on the region out of fear of driving the local 

population into the arms of its enemies.

Central government influence within the Waygal Valley has historically 

been limited although this has recently been changing. Similar to other 

remote areas, there was no permanent governmental administrative 

presence in the Waygal Valley until the post Soviet era (1993) when a 

separate Nuristan Province was established and the Waygal Valley became 

designated as a district within that province. Eventually a district center 

was established at Wanat which had been a traditional meeting place for 

the Waygal Valley Nuristanis and the rough road linking the Pech Valley 

to Wanat was improved sufficiently to allow motor vehicles to reach the 

administrative center for the first time.7

As previously mentioned, two ethnic population groups are 

predominant in the Waygal Valley: the Nuristanis in the north and Safi 

Pashtuns in the south. Because of the rugged terrain and steep ridgelines 

throughout northeastern Afghanistan, the majority of the communities are 

isolated and relationships between and within the various ethnic groups 

are extremely complex. The Safi Pashtuns and Nuristanis speak distinctive 

languages and there are particular dialects within these languages. The 

Nuristanis especially have a large number of dialects, some of which 

are so divergent as to constitute separate languages. For centuries, the 

Nuristanis practiced their own polytheistic religion in a region otherwise 

dominated by followers of Islam. As previously mentioned, this cultural 

distinctiveness changed only in the late nineteenth century when Nuristan 

finally embraced Islam at the forcible demand of the Afghan ruler Abdur 

Rahman. Nuristan was only established as an independent province in 
4

1993 when it was created from the northern parts of Konar and Laghman 

provinces.8

The Nuristani people in the Waygal Valley differentiate themselves 

from other Nuristanis by referring to themselves as Kalasha. Although 

the Kalasha speak their own distinctive language, the people of the four 

southernmost villages further identify themselves as Chimi-nishey, while 

the dwellers of the northern villages call themselves Wai. The Nuristani 

population of the Waygal Valley also differentiates itself between Amurshkara and Kila-kara. This refers to the type of cheese they make. This is not 

the minor point that it appears. The type of cheese produced significantly 

influences how a family organizes its pastoral and dairy activities and 

this, in turn, reflects the differences between the amount and quality of 

summer pastures that the people of the northern half of the valley possess 

compared to the southern half of the valley. Such complicated distinctions 

validate the convoluted human terrain of the region. It must be noted that 

even within the same ethnic group, tensions of various types and severity 

abound between adjacent villages, the majority of whose families are 

often related. As Sami Nuristani, a resident of the Waygal Valley who is 

currently a college student in the United States noted, “Be prepared to hear 

contradicting requests. Also, be open to see some sort of rivalry between 

the inhabitants of different villages in the valley. You might hear one thing 

from one village and may hear completely the opposite from another 

village. It has been there as long as Nuristan existed.”9

Historically, the small population of Nuristan has depended on the 

isolation of their compact settlements for military defense. Vast tracts 

of trackless mountainous terrain surround their villages. These tracts 

served as effective buffer zones for their communities and could only 

be exploited by well armed herders who could take their animals there 

under protection. The Nuristanis controlled the highlands along with the 

attendant forests, pastures, gem-rich mountains, and water for irrigation 

that can turn a semi arid land into valuable agricultural fields. After Abdur 

Rahman imposed peace on the region, the Nuristani population gingerly 

moved into these buffer areas on the periphery of their settlements. 

They constructed irrigation systems and agricultural terraces and built 

rudimentary shelters to use while tending their fields. Given population 

growth and sustained security, over time these rudimentary shelters were 

gradually improved and became permanent hamlets. To the south, the 

Safi Pashtuns had expanded across the lowlands of the Pech and Konar 

Valleys in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries at the expense of the 

previous Dardic speaking inhabitants. The Safis were unable to expand 
5

their agriculturally based livelihood into the highland areas adjacent to 

Nuristani settlements. Accordingly, the lower Waygal Valley became 

a buffer zone between the Safis and the Nuristanis that saw periods of 

both cooperation and confrontation. In the early twentieth century when 

the central Afghan Government unilaterally settled a group of nonSafi Pashtuns from the eastern frontier area of Konar onto traditionally 

Nuristani land on the west side of the Waygal Valley, the Safi Pashtuns 

and the Kalasha Nuristanis cooperated to eject the newcomers. The area 

remains Nuristani to the present day. In 1945-1946 when the Pech Safi 

Pashtuns revolted against the Afghan Government, the central government 

successfully played the Nuristanis off against the Safis. However, in the 

jihad against the Marxists and Soviets, both groups cooperated successfully. 

Nevertheless considerable animosity exists within the valley and localized 

struggles both between the two ethnic groups and among several Nuristani 

communities are common today.10

In Nuristan, the largest unit that has significance is what anthropologists 

refer to as the corporate community, a process in which a closely 

interrelated geographic community with common economic interests 

shares in management and decision-making for the use and disposition of 

scarce and valuable natural resources. Waygal Village, for example, the 

northernmost and largest population concentration in the valley, actually 

is comprised of two different corporate communities, Beremdesh and 

Waremdesh. Conflicts, usually over resources such as pasture, forests, or 

water, were frequent between and within the corporate communities of the 

Waygal Valley and elsewhere in Nuristan. The potential for such conflicts 

between these distinct corporate communities was one reason why the 

Nuristanis had an extremely strong exogamy rule. French Anthropologist 

Claude Lévi-Strauss developed the “Alliance Theory” of exogamy, the 

practice of marrying outside a local entity such as a family, clan, tribe, or 

community to build alliances with other groups. According to Lévi-Strauss’ 

theory, such practices result in enhanced opportunities for cultural and 

economic exchanges and unite diverse organizations that would otherwise 

engage in conflicts (either military or economic). Nuristani community 

leaders recognized the need to create at least some bonds between other 

communities to have social and cultural links to resolve conflicts that might 

arise, to engage in trade between craftsmen who specialized in products 

in different communities, and to call on one another for mutual assistance 

when necessary. Within Nuristan, efforts to act in unity above the level of 

the corporate community have proven to be difficult and fragile. Some of 

the current conflict in the region can be traced to the recent dissipation of 

solidarity within the corporate communities.11
6

In general terms, Nuristani ethnic groups live in homes traditionally 

constructed into the sides of mountains to conserve limited arable land. 

The homes are constructed with wooden supports and bracketed in such 

a manner that they are generally resistant to the frequent earthquakes 

that plague the region. Families tend to use their first floor for storage 

and reside on the second floor. Walkways, terraces, and ladders connect 

families and neighborhoods. Access to the ground or first floor is usually 

restricted and the ladders that connect residences can be readily removed to 

enhance security. Structures tend to be clustered or concentrated, literally 

stacked atop each other, with an extended family living with other such 

families within a tightly knit community. The Nuristanis’ practice what 

anthropologists refer to as mixed mountain agriculture, where their pastoral 

activities are a key element that is integrated with their crop cultivation. 

Essentially, the Nuristanis are subsistence farmers of agricultural land 

constructed as terraces cut into the hillsides that dominate the region, 

while livestock is raised on slopes that are too steep to be converted to 

farmland.12

The Safi Pashtuns of the Pech Valley typically reside in compounds. 

These compounds are enclosed by sturdy walls, sun dried over decades to 

assume the consistency and strength of concrete and with firing platforms 

and observation towers incorporated into their design. Each compound 

houses an extended family. Because the lowland Safi Pashtuns do not have 

access to the summer pastures of the highlands, they could not maintain 

economically viable herds of goats or sheep. As a result, the Safi Pashtuns’ 

economy is centered on agricultural cultivation, and the location and 

maintenance of irrigation canals are extremely important.

Ironically, while Nuristanis generally live in mountainside villages 

such as Kamdesh and Aranas and Safi Pashtuns live in fortified settlements, 

in the case of Wanat the opposite is the case. Wanat is located on relatively 

low land at the junction of two streams and is surrounded by numerous 

fortified compounds. Meanwhile, the nearest sizeable Safi Pashtun town 

of Nangalam outside of Camp Blessing, was built on a hillside in a pattern 

similar to that of Kamdesh and Aranas. This juxtaposition seems to reflect 

geographical considerations rather than cultural ones in the building styles 

of settlements.

Nuristan is heavily forested with considerable timber of commercial 

value. Gem mining is now also a major source of commercial prosperity 

within both provinces. Criminal cartels control both industries and have 

frequently exploited these resources to garner individual wealth. The 

people of Konar and Nuristan have derived little benefit from either 
7

product. Within recent years, Konar and Nuristan provinces have seen the 

introduction of opium poppies as a financially lucrative crop.13

Both the Safi Pashtuns and Nuristanis have reputations as warriors. One 

study noted, “Feuds are an important part of [the] culture and many cultural 

values are reflected in the feud. For example, masculinity and honor are 

strong values and provide themes for many stories and songs. Men strive 

to be fierce warriors who are loyal to their kin, dangerous to their enemies, 

and ready to fight whenever necessary.”14 However, other anthropologists 

assert that this reputation is exaggerated and reflects a misinterpretation 

of the recognition that those who successfully defend their families and 

communities are afforded. Communities have a tradition of being entirely 

autonomous and independent, based on the isolation of individual valleys 

imposed by the rugged terrain. Controversies have traditionally been 

resolved by the intervention of elders from the corporate community. 

Individual leaders who can peacefully resolve the inevitable conflicts that 

arise over access to and the use of constrained resources are considerably 

respected within their communities. Still, given the poor and unsettled 

security situation of recent decades, it is uncommon for a household not 

to have access to weapons for self defense. Although an overly simplistic 

generalization, it remains valid that Afghan traditional cultures, such as 

those found in Nuristan, accept the simple physical premise of rule by the 

strongest, either through rule of force, skill of negotiations, or fulfillment 

of economic advantages. One anthropological study summarized the 

Parun Valley as a subsidiary of the Pech River located to the north of the 

Waygal Valley, “The Parun Valley offers the picture of an encapsulated 

Kafir culture enclosed by high mountains and an invisible cultural wall, 

both of which shielded it somewhat against powerful political enemies 

surrounding the valley.”15 This assessment holds true for Wanat and the 

Waygal Valley.16

Within these remote societies and communities, traditional processes 

for problem resolution (shuras) and respect for individual and family 

honor are strong, and these two concepts are crucial to comprehending 

the human terrain in northeastern Afghanistan. A shura is an Arabic word 

for consultation or council. It is a long established process by which 

households, extended families, and community representatives make 

corporate decisions. The shura system allows Afghan communities and 

family groups to discuss circumstances and conduct conflict resolution. 

The system is flexible, and relatively informal. The shura is, in essence, 

a process of negotiation, with the process and its discussions being as 

significant as the resulting consensus.
8

In addition to the shura, there are a series of informal codes of 

behavior, referred to as “kalasha char” (Kalasha custom) among the 

Waygali Nuristanis and “Pashtunwali” among the Pashtuns, which 

guides both groups. Although informal, these codes of conduct possess 

complex expectations of behavior and ethics, which stress honor, selfrespect, independence, justice, hospitality, conflict resolution, personal 

improvement, personal responsibility, charity, forgiveness, worship, and 

revenge.17

The Insurgents

The armed groups that have opposed Coalition operations in 

Afghanistan are a diverse collection of organizations many of which are tied 

to specific regions of the country. Konar and Nuristan provinces lie within 

the sphere of influence of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami, now 

known as Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG). The HiG was a fundamentalist 

organization founded by Hekmatyar originally to fight the Soviets and was 

known to have received considerable support and recognition from the 

Pakistani military intelligence agency, the Directorate for Inter Services 

Intelligence (ISI). Although the HiG retained considerable strength and 

influence in Konar and Nuristan, it was not the only anti Coalition entity 

influencing events in 2008. There were various Islamic organizations, some 

of which have their roots in 1980s anti Soviet mujahedeen organizations, 

others that were closely tied to the Taliban movement and still others that 

were influenced by the more recent al-Qaeda successes. A number of 

more radical entities were linked to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, a Pakistan based 

terrorist organization infamous for its recent attacks in India. In addition to 

these radical organizations, there were powerful timber, gem mining, and 

drug (opium) interests that vigorously resisted the establishment of central 

government control and the trade restrictions, government regulations, 

and taxation that accompanied it.18 

Within northeastern Afghanistan, there are three general types of anti 

Afghanistan forces (AAF): local fighters; dedicated core fighters of the 

HiG, other fundamentalist groups, and organized criminal factions that are 

generally Afghan-centric; and the hardcore radical Islamic fundamentalists 

such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda that can be considered to be transnational. 

Local fighters are typically recruits from Nuristan and Konar provinces 

or young men solicited from madrassas and Afghan refugee populations 

located in Pakistan. They are generally young, unemployed, and poorly 

educated and are either used as laborers or have received rudimentary 

training in weapon employment. Economic or material concerns motivate 
9

the majority of the local fighters. Their rewards can be a direct cash 

payment or something as simple as new clothing. Like many young men 

in Afghanistan, some of these local fighters join strictly for the excitement 

and to gain a reputation among their peers and within their communities. 

The local fighters are generally not ideologically motivated and can be 

recruited away from the AAF simply through regular employment and 

financial opportunities. More dedicated AAF insurgents will have their 

operations degraded by the loss of these local fighters, principally because 

of the absence of transportation and heavy labor and the dilution of their 

potential recruiting pool.19

The core Afghanistan-centric fighters were members of the HiG, other 

fundamentalist entities, or members of the various drug and lumber cartels. 

These fighters are generally experienced, highly skilled, well trained, and 

equipped with state of the art military equipment which is often captured 

from Coalition forces. These combatants were strongly motivated either by 

religious ideology or by significant economic or financial interests. Some 

of them might have been inspired by blood feuds or previous conflicts 

with American Forces. These fighters tend to be from local districts or 

provinces or had grown up within regional communities and spoke local 

dialects. Their predominant sphere of focus and motivation was within 

northeastern Afghanistan or their immediate home community, district, or 

province.

The final groups of AAF insurgents in Konar and Nuristan in 2008 

were dedicated Islamic fundamentalists or members of the Taliban or 

al-Qaeda who were often foreign fighters and who frequently operated 

across international borders and generally espoused a global Islamic 

caliphate. These foreigners came from a range of Arab nations such as 

Saudi Arabia or Yemen or from Islamic regions with relatively large, 

disaffected populations, such as Chechnya or western China. Most of the 

fundamentalist fighters were based in Pakistan. They were exceptionally 

dedicated and fanatic and possessed considerable operational experience. 

They were highly skilled, well trained and armed, and often equipped 

with state of the art military equipment. Although they possessed fervent 

and similar religious beliefs to some of the Afghans, they were usually 

from foreign nations, having come from different cultures and societies 

and speaking different languages and dialects. They generally had 

considerable financial and material resources with which to influence both 

dedicated and local fighters. These fighters were totally dedicated to their 

cause and unwilling to compromise. Foreign fighters were documented to 

have been operating in Nuristan as early as 2002 and by 2006 there were 
10

an estimated 200 Taliban fighters active there. Small infiltration teams of 

Taliban, HiG, and al-Qaeda fighters were all in Nuristan in 2007. A recent 

study of Afghanistan noted that there may have been at any time various 

AAF or insurgent organizations operating concurrently and entirely 

autonomously within the same geographic location. This phenomenon of 

informal competition between different AAF organizations is similar to 

what occurred within the mujahedeen during the Soviet conflict.20

The Coalition Campaign in Afghanistan, 2001–2008

By 2008, the United States and its international partners had been 

conducting a range of military operations in Afghanistan for seven years. 

The original mission in October of 2001 was the destruction of al-Qaeda 

forces responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the overthrow of the 

Taliban regime that had given al-Qaeda a safe haven. Those goals had 

been met rather quickly and by the spring of 2002, Afghanistan had a 

new government and was seemingly proceeding down the path toward 

democracy. Coalition forces remained in Afghanistan but in the latter half 

of 2002 and through 2003, United States units largely resided in a small 

number of bases from which they mounted periodic security missions.

Opposition to this new political path and the very presence of western 

military forces in Afghan affairs did not disappear, however. By 2004, 

there were clear signs that a variety of insurgent and terrorist groups, 

loosely connected through Taliban leaders and based in Pakistan, were 

beginning to mount a more focused military effort against the new Afghan 

Government and the Coalition. The American Government responded by 

initiating a new counterinsurgency campaign that featured Coalition units 

taking responsibility for large areas in eastern and southern Afghanistan. 

In these areas of operations, US commanders, working with the Afghan 

security forces that the Coalition was training, attempted to win the 

support of the population by providing security from insurgent groups and 

using the new Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to improve living 

standards.

Despite the Coalition’s introduction of a counterinsurgency approach in 

2004, the number of troops and other resources committed to the campaign 

in Afghanistan remained low when compared to the size of the concurrent 

effort in Iraq that had begun in March of 2003. Although the territory of 

Afghanistan was larger than that of Iraq and the Afghan population larger 

than the Iraqi populace, Coalition troop levels remained below 25,000 

through 2004. The majority of these troops belonged to the US Army, 

which in 2005 had approximately 19,000 Soldiers in Afghanistan. In that 
11Figure 2. Theater Organization, Afghanistan, 2008.
12

same year, the US Army deployed more than 140,000 troops to Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).21

This strategic allocation of forces reflected the belief among senior 

Coalition political and military officials that the situation in Iraq in 2005 

was more important and dire than that in Afghanistan. Coalition force levels 

in Afghanistan did increase over the next three years, almost doubling 

between 2005 and 2008 with 31,000 of the total number coming from the 

United States. Still, the resources committed to Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM (OEF) in this period remained significantly less than those 

focused on Iraq, especially after the Bush administration initiated a new 

campaign approach in January of 2007 that featured a surge in troops in 

Iraq. The American policy toward Afghanistan between 2002 and 2008 

led some US senior military officials to think of OEF as “an economy 

of force” campaign in the larger Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), 

suggesting clearly that the main effort of the nation was directed to Iraq. 

In fact, in December of 2007, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated publicly that the effort in Afghanistan was “by 

design and necessity, an economy of force operation. There is no getting 

around that. Our main focus, militarily, in the region and in the world right 

now is rightly and firmly in Iraq.”22

Because Afghanistan was treated as an economy of force campaign, 

there was only a sparse distribution of Coalition military forces across 

Afghan territory. Even after the Coalition Command Authority focused 

American forces solely on the restive areas of the south (Regional 

Command-South [RC-South]) and the east (Regional Command-East 

[RC-East]), American units were widely dispersed. After 2004, US 

battalion sized task forces of approximately 1,000 Soldiers routinely 

became responsible for areas of operation (AOs) that were the size of 

small New England States. These units were attempting to create stability 

and generally win the support of the population in sprawling territories 

with a very limited amount of troops and other resources.

As the Coalition campaign evolved between 2001 and 2008, the 

command structure and overall approach of the US effort changed greatly. 

By 2007, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command, a 

NATO-led security mission, served as the senior headquarters for military 

operations in Afghanistan. Combined Joint Task Force-82 (CJTF-82), 

an organization based on the division headquarters of the 82d Airborne 

Division and augmented to perform a joint task force role, provided a 

significant portion of ISAF’s forces. Major General David M. Rodriguez, 

the commander of CJTF-82, had authority for ISAF operations in RC-East. 
13

However, Rodriguez had a second role as commander of forces that were 

part of CJTF-82 but not formally assigned to the ISAF mission. Many of 

these forces operated outside RC-East.

In his campaign plan, Major General Rodriguez articulated his mission 

in the following way:

In conjunction with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 

joint, interagency, and multinational partners, CJTF conducts 

full spectrum operations to disrupt insurgent forces in the 

combined joint operations area, develops Afghanistan national 

security capability, and supports the growth of governance 

and development in order to build a stable Afghanistan.23

The “full spectrum operations” noted in this statement was a doctrinal term 

defined as a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations 

that units executed simultaneously. To do so, CJTF-82 conducted missions 

along four lines of operation (LOOs): security, governance, development, 

and strategic communications or information operations. CJTF-82 

stated its purpose as building capacity for governance and development, 

degrading destabilizing forces, and strengthening the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan. The command described its strategic goal as the creation of 

a “self reliant” Afghanistan that “provides effective governance; is self 

securing, committed to representative government, economically viable, 

and rejects narco-production.”24

To achieve this goal at the tactical level, battalion sized maneuver 

forces conducted the bulk of the security or combat operations, often termed 

lethal or kinetic operations. The PRTs, which were ideally manned by both 

military civil affairs specialists and civilian experts in reconstruction and 

governmental affairs, owned the lion’s share of the development line of 

operations in a specific province. Concurrently, both the PRTs and the 

tactical units performed information operations and strived to extend 

and improve the reach of the democratically elected Government of 

Afghanistan throughout the region.

In 2007 CJTF-82’s forces consisted of only two maneuver brigades 

located primarily in RC-East, an area roughly the size of Florida. Above 

the regional command level was the NATO-led International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) which supported the Government of the Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) and had authority over both operational 

units and the civil affairs-oriented PRTs. NATO was the theater strategic 

headquarters for Afghanistan and directly ran operations in the rest of the 

country, including RC-South. CJTF-82’s major maneuver forces were the 
14

4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 82d Airborne Division, known as 

Task Force (TF) Fury, which had a large area of operations in the southern 

portion of RC-East; and the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 

known as TF Bayonet, which operated in the northern portion of RCEast. In addition to these elements, Major General Rodriguez controlled 

aviation, logistics, and other combat support and service support units as 

well as various Coalition partner forces. CJTF-82 had its headquarters at 

Bagram Air Base north of Kabul and its forces were distributed across RCEast on 24 forward operating bases (FOBs) and many additional combat 

outposts (COPs).25

On 10 April 2008, the Headquarters 101st Airborne Division, under the 

command of Major General Jeffrey Schloesser, replaced the 82d Airborne 

Division as the senior American operational headquarters in Afghanistan. 

Schloesser assumed command of CJTF-101 and simultaneously began 

serving as commander of Regional Command-East for ISAF, like his 

predecessor Rodriguez. The 101st Airborne Division had recent combat 

and counterinsurgency experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq and had 

nearly two full years to train for this deployment. Its senior commanders 

and staff were well prepared for the mission in Afghanistan.26

Like CJTF-82, CJTF-101 operated out of Bagram Air Base and 

directly controlled operations in the RC-E area. Several of its subordinate 

commands, including the 101st Sustainment Brigade and the 101st 

Aviation Brigade, also based at Bagram, supported operations throughout 

Afghanistan. Within RC-E, in addition to the 173d Airborne BCT, the 

4th BCT, 101st Airborne Division (augmented by the 1st Battalion, 503d 

Infantry, from the 173d) became known as TF Currahee and operated 

in eastern Afghanistan in Khowst, Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, Paktika, and 

Paktia provinces. CJTF-101 considered TF Currahee as its main effort.27

CJTF-101’s campaign plan built on the basic concepts adopted by CJTF82 and its subordinate units. Schloesser stated that in 2007 he had visited 

with US forces in northeastern Afghanistan and sought to “embrace” their 

approach, an effort he described as a sophisticated campaign to separate 

the enemy from the people, improve living conditions for the population, 

and connect Afghans to the institutions of their central government. The 

commander of CJTF-101 had roughly the same amount of troops and 

other resources as those available to his predecessor which meant that US 

forces, especially in the 11 provinces that made up RC-East, continued 

to be stretched thin across their AOs. To disrupt the insurgents and 

bring development to local areas, tactical commanders chose to position 

small units in a large number of FOBs and COPs across sprawling AOs. 
15

Brigadier General Mark Milley, CJTF-101 Deputy Commanding General 

for Operations, emphasized this salient point, noting, “We had 120 or so 

combat outposts in Regional Command-East. We had approximately 50 

rifle companies or maneuver companies [the equivalent of] about 150 

platoons and . . . a lot of these guys were engaging in daily firefights.”28

Thus, by 2007-2008 the standard US practice in RC-East was to man the 

large number of COPs with platoon sized elements that normally had 

between 30 and 40 Soldiers. In general, neither Rodriguez nor Schloesser 

could afford to dedicate more than a single US platoon to any outpost 

regardless of the local conditions or threat. For this reason, throughout 

their tenures, the commanders of CJTF-82 and CJTF-101 continuously 

shifted combat power and the placement of COPs to respond to changing 

tactical situations and the routine transition of units into and out of the 

country.29

US Operations in Nuristan and Konar, 2001-2007

In a 2007 briefing, the CJTF-82 commander offered an analysis of 

the security situation in Afghanistan to military and civilian officials. 

The briefing clearly identified Konar as the only province in RC-East 

considered a “dangerous environment.”30 Nuristan, the province to the 

immediate north of Konar, was classified as facing “frequent threats.” As 

noted earlier, these two provinces were home to a fiercely independent 

population that had historically resisted outsiders encroaching on their 

authority and customs. 

During the first four years of its campaign in Afghanistan, the 

Coalition chose not to maintain a continuous presence in this isolated 

and intransigent region. American operations were generally restricted 

to small commando style raids performed by special operations units 

attempting to kill or capture high value targets (HVTs) or larger operations 

by conventional forces that were of limited duration. In 2003 and 2004 

some special operations units did establish small bases in the area that 

were well received by the local communities. However, only in 2005 did 

the Coalition bring a more permanent presence to the area when a US 

Marine company began operating in the Pech, Korengal, and Chawkay 

Valleys in Konar province.

The gradual increase of Coalition military presence in Nuristan and 

Konar was the result of Coalition realization that the region served as a 

sanctuary for insurgent and terrorist organizations. A US Special Forces 

(SF) sergeant major who operated in northeast Afghanistan during this 

time described Nuristan as “Absolutely an al-Qaeda stronghold because 
16

of its remoteness, access to Pakistan, and nearby refugee camps.”31

Further, he stated that the Korengal Valley, a small area south of the Pech 

River and southeast of the Waygal Valley, specifically had become a 

terrorist sanctuary that harbored foreign fighters, particularly Arabs. The 

truth of this comment was reflected in the results of one of the earliest 

Coalition operations in the area, Operation RED WINGS in June 2005. 

RED WINGS was a combined conventional and special operations forces 

(SOF) operation in which US Navy SEALS would support the actions 

of the Marines recently deployed into Konar by exercising a preliminary 

reconnaissance mission focused on killing or capturing a powerful local 

insurgent leader in the Korengal Valley. Accordingly, a four man SEAL 

Team was inserted onto Sawarto Sar, a high mountain overlooking the 

Korengal Valley in order to neutralize Ahmad Shah, the local Taliban 

leader, in advance of operations to be conducted by the Marines. The 

SEALs were soon compromised by a chance encounter with Afghan goat 

herders and the team was destroyed in a heavy firefight with a large force 

of insurgents led by Shah. A rocket propelled grenade (RPG) then shot 

down a Special Operations helicopter hurrying to the relief of the SEAL 

Team and 16 SEALs and Army SOF personnel died in the subsequent 

crash. Of the SEAL Team, only Hospital Corpsman 2d Class (SEAL) 

Marcus Luttrell survived, being rescued by a local resident who adhered 

to the Pashtun hospitality code of Pashtunwali. The SEAL commander, 

Navy Lieutenant Michael Murphy, was posthumously awarded the Medal 

of Honor for his heroism during the firefight, the first such recognition 

given during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.32

By 2006, the need for more troops in northeastern Afghanistan was 

apparent. To augment and later replace the small Marine contingent, in 

April 2006, the 3d BCT, 10th Mountain Division known as TF Spartan, 

mounted Operation MOUNTAIN LION which deployed troops into 

Konar and Nuristan. The brigade’s 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry (1-32d 

IN) established COPs throughout the Pech River Valley, which runs eastwest through the center of Konar Province and was an area of sizeable 

population. The battalion also set up outposts in two of the capillary valleys 

off the Pech: the Korengal to the south and the Waygal to the north. Both of 

these areas were considered potential insurgent sanctuaries and a Coalition 

presence in these valleys was deemed important in order to prevent them 

from becoming or continuing to be insurgent sanctuary areas.33

The establishment of these outposts (FOBs and COPs) was central to 

TF Spartan’s approach to counterinsurgency in eastern Afghanistan. The 

brigade had adopted an approach that emphasized three critical actions: 
17

Figure 3. Array of forces, Regional Command East, July 2008.
18

separating the enemy from the population; securing the population and 

winning their support by meeting their needs with reconstruction and better 

governance; and transforming the environment with roads, commerce, 

and the extension of the Afghan central government so the enemy could 

no longer survive. Colonel John Nicholson, TF Spartan commander, 

recognized that his AO was so large that he could not ensure that these 

actions occurred uniformly throughout northeast Afghanistan. Thus, 

Nicholson focused the Coalition effort on district centers and communities 

connected by roads to the larger population centers. In these centers and 

communities, he hoped to create “security bubbles” where his Soldiers 

could begin their efforts. TF Spartan sought to partner closely with the 

ANA units in the region to magnify its effects and create greater legitimacy 

for Afghanistan’s central government, formally known as the GIROA.34

The COPs, usually manned by platoons of 30 to 40 Soldiers and located 

next to Afghan communities and government entities, played a major role 

in achieving all three of TF Spartan’s critical actions. In its 16 months of 

operations in the region, TF Spartan increased the number of FOBs and 

COPs from seven to 22 in the provinces of Nangarhar, Nuristan, Konar, and 

Laghman. The new FOBs and COPs enabled the 10th Mountain Division 

to provide enhanced security to considerable portions of Afghanistan and 

facilitated GIROA efforts as it attempted to provide services to a larger 

portion of Afghanistan than it had previously been able to reach. The 

TF Spartan leadership believed that the small bases and outposts were 

critical for success. Major Paul Garcia, the 1-32d IN operations officer, 

contended, “The key to our successes in Konar and Nuristan are simple . . .

get off the large FOBs and establish outposts located in and among the 

population. . . . A unit must live with the population day in and day out in 

order to be effective.”35

Expansion of these bases enabled TF Spartan to employ what has been 

called the “ink line” counterinsurgency strategy. By constructing new roads 

and significantly improving existing routes, the counterinsurgents would 

begin to connect the rural population of eastern Afghanistan to the central 

government along these “ink lines.” However, such a strategy required an 

extensive logistics support system to supply the significant increase in the 

number of small positions. Many of the new sites were in extremely rural 

and isolated locations surrounded by rugged ridgelines and high mountain 

peaks. The existing road infrastructure was initially either absent or in 

extremely poor condition and was vulnerable to ambush and improvised 

explosive device (IED) attack. Thus, in many cases US forces were limited 

to using helicopters to travel to and supply the bases. Rotary wing assets 
19

were scarce and subject to frequent interference by weather conditions, 

particularly in the winter months.36

The 1-32d IN occupied Camp Blessing, an existing installation in the 

Pech Valley that had been previously used by the Marines, earlier Army 

units briefly in the area, and SOF elements. Blessing was near the district 

center for the Pech District of Konar Province and the relatively large 

town of Nangalam where the Waygal River flowed into the Pech. This post 

became the major base for operations in the Pech, Waygal, and Korengal 

valleys. The 1-32d IN’s successor unit, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 503d 

Infantry (2-503d IN) established its battalion headquarters there. Camp 

Blessing was named for Sergeant Jay A. Blessing, a US Army Ranger 

killed in an IED attack in 2003 along the Pech River Road. 

With Camp Blessing as a major base camp, the battalion commander, 

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Cavoli, constructed two new COPs 

directly in the Waygal Valley: COP Ranch House near the village of 

Aranas and COP Bella on the Waygal River next to the tiny hamlet of 

Bella. These positions, each manned by half of an infantry platoon, were 

pushed into the remote valley in order to place a Coalition presence there. 

In addition, Aranas, located roughly 12 miles north of Camp Blessing, 

had a reputation as an insurgent stronghold. Aranas was one of the largest 

communities in the Waygal Valley and considerable traffic (north/south and 

east/west) routinely passed through the town. Captain Douglas E. Sloan, 

the commander of B Company, 1-32d IN, inadvertently named the Ranch 

House COP. When initially establishing the outpost, Cavoli remembered 

that Sloan quipped, “It’s pretty big, got a great view. It’s clean and well 

kept. Neighborhood’s good. It’s one story, a nice ranch house style. I like 

it.”37 The name stuck.38

Cavoli chose the village of Bella as the location of the second COP 

because the International Medical Corps, a nongovernmental organization 

(NGO), operated a medical clinic with several doctors and health care 

professionals there. The clinic was the primary medical facility in the 

Waygal Valley. Bella was located on the Waygal River, two miles southwest 

of Aranas and approximately five miles north of Wanat, the district center, 

and 10 miles north of Camp Blessing. The village of Bella consisted 

of a few houses, several stores, a restaurant, and a hotel. The COPs at 

Bella and Ranch House offered reinforced walls for protection, sleeping 

quarters, and austere living conditions, while Camp Blessing contained 

more amenities, such as showers, a 24 hour mess hall, a regular weight 

room, and a dedicated morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) facility.39
20

Throughout 2006 and 2007, the 1-32d IN performed counterinsurgency 

operations in the Pech, Waygal, and Korengal Valleys as it attempted to 

prevent the enemy from using the area as a sanctuary and extend the 

influence of the GIROA into remote areas. The new Coalition outposts at 

Bella and Ranch House severely pressured AAF infiltration and exfiltration 

lines in the valley. This progress was critical because of the considerable 

AAF presence in the Waygal Valley, including various former mujahedeen 

entities; al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, HiG, and criminal cartels from the 

timber trade. During 1-32d IN’s tenure in the Waygal Valley, the AAF did 

not mount direct attacks on US Soldiers, preferring to use mortars, rockets, 

and occasional distant small arms assaults. The single exception to this 

occurred on 11 August 2006 when, in an intensive firefight, the AAF killed 

three Soldiers from B Company, 1-32d IN, while their unit was on patrol 

between Aranas and Bella.40

The 1-32d IN benefited from the 10th Mountain Division’s Operation 

MOUNTAIN LAMB, which specifically focused on the distribution 

of humanitarian supplies to the population of northeast Afghanistan. 

Operation MOUNTAIN LAMB was distinctive in that the operation was 

actually run directly from Fort Drum, NY. This was entirely a non kinetic 

(non combat) humanitarian operation that entailed the collection and 

shipment of a large quantity of humanitarian supplies to Afghanistan. Civil 

affairs operations in northeast Afghanistan had significantly expanded 

under the 10th Mountain Division’s tutelage and the need for humanitarian 

supplies exceeded the ability of the US Army supply system to provide 

such specialized nonmilitary items.

In September of 2006, Cavoli decided to replace a decrepit bridge 

over the Waygal River at Wanat in order to improve ground transportation 

in the valley. For this mission, the battalion sent a composite force to 

Wanat that consisted of a platoon of combat engineers from A Company, 

27th Engineer Battalion, a theater level engineer unit in direct support 

of the battalion, a small security contingent from B Company, 1-32d IN, 

that over time varied in size from a fire team to an entire platoon, and 

an ANA Company. Once at Wanat, First Lieutenant Andrew Glenn’s 

engineer platoon promptly met with the local elders and hired 50 local 

laborers to help build the bridge. Glenn provided all of the necessary tools 

and construction materials. He also purchased bread from the bazaar, 

and every two or three days, larger purchases of food were made from 

the local economy. The force informally contracted for laundry services 

from citizens in Wanat. The ANA Company provided security for the 

engineers through the establishment of three observation posts (OPs) on 
21

the high ground surrounding the bridge site, two to the north and one to 

the southwest, while US infantrymen supported the OPs. The Afghan and 

American units in Wanat manned these three OPs with fire teams of about 

seven ANA or American Soldiers at each location. Another platoon from 

the same engineer company intermittently performed route clearance 

missions to locate and eliminate IEDs on the road between Camp Blessing 

and Wanat and remained overnight at Wanat during these patrols to assist 

with security.41

There were some minor skirmishes as AAF insurgents probed the 

activities in Wanat but these proved to be ineffective at disrupting the 

building of the bridge. The engineers established a temporary base in an 

open field that was essentially inside the environs of the village of Wanat. 

The field was adjacent to the community bazaar and the mosque and near 

the Waygal River and Wayskawdi Creek. This comparatively large field 

provided the engineers with a flat, open staging area necessary to conduct 

their operations. Glenn’s engineers eventually used two segments of World 

War II surplus Bailey Bridges to construct a major span over the Waygal 

River and a smaller bridge over the Wayskawdi Creek just to the east. The 

work took approximately 45 days to complete.42

The construction of these two bridges was popular with the community 

because of the obvious improvements to commerce and transportation 

that would certainly enhance the town’s economic and political status. 

The project was also popular because it brought jobs directly to the 

community. Throughout this period, Glenn remembered that relationships 

with the people of Wanat were positive and beneficial and he felt that 

the population and community leaders of Wanat were favorably disposed 

toward the Coalition. When Glenn and his engineers departed Wanat in 

early November, they left behind an improved infrastructure in the form 

of two relatively modern bridges. Moreover, in Glenn’s mind, he and his 

engineers had built strong support for and favorable perceptions of the US 

Army and the Afghan central government.43

Despite these newly created ties, 1-32d IN did not establish a permanent 

presence in Wanat. After the completion of the bridge project in late 

October of 2006, the battalion’s Soldiers pulled out to conduct operations 

in other parts of the sprawling brigade AO. After October, the GIROA 

did maintain a small detachment of Afghan National Police (ANP) at the 

district center in the town. However, Coalition troops appeared in Wanat 

only intermittently when patrols from the 1-32d IN, and subsequently the 

2-503d IN, visited the town.
22

While the engineer project had brought Coalition goodwill to the 

Wanat community, the Waygal Valley continued to be a dangerous place 

for the Americans in 2006. Cavoli’s Soldiers found themselves in small 

skirmishes and suffered indirect fire attacks launched by the AAF in the 

valley. The 1-32d IN sustained a serious loss in the Waygal Valley on 31 

October 2006 when an IED killed three Soldiers, including Sloan, the B 

Company commander, on the Waygal Valley Road south of Bella. Sloan 

and the other members of his party, including his replacement as company 

commander, were driving down the valley after meeting with elders and 

community leaders to coordinate a range of civil affairs and economic 

development projects including schools, micro hydroelectric sources, 

bridges, and roads. His death was greatly mourned by traditional elders 

and leaders within the valley. Although AAF resistance to the Americans 

continued into 2007, it decreased in the winter as the heavy snows and 

cold temperatures reduced combat operations.44

As 1-32d IN prepared to redeploy back to Fort Drum in the spring of 

2007, its Soldiers believed they had made progress in Konar and Nuristan. 

Cavoli viewed the success in Wanat as an excellent example of this 

progress, emphasizing the relationships that his Soldiers fostered in the 

town:

I like Wanat quite a bit. The people were always good to us. 

They always gave us tips when trouble was coming. I felt very 

confident moving about without my armor on, and spent some 

memorable days drinking chai in the little chaikhana there. 

The key thing was the relationship that [First Lieutenant] Andy 

Glenn and his engineers had established there when they were 

building the bridge. Glenn was great with the people, and they 

took him in like a brother. This made the place pretty safe, 

comparatively speaking.45

First Sergeant Jamie Nakano, of the battalion’s B Company, asserted 

that similar ties had been forged between Soldiers and Afghans elsewhere 

in the Waygal Valley, “The most defining moment for me was making 

friends with the Afghans that lived in Aranas. They had a distrust of 

[Americans] because they had not seen Americans for over three years. 

We were able to build relationships and a remote camp that denied a safe 

haven for the AAF.”46 Major Scott Himes, the S3 Operations Officer for 

2-503d IN, attested to the fact that the Soldiers of 1-32d IN had made 

inroads in the Waygal Valley, recalling that after his unit deployed to the 

Waygal Valley in May 2007, Wanat appeared to be amenable to close 

relations with US Army and Afghan Government troops. Himes viewed 
23

Wanat as “a village that showed the desire to partner with the United 

States and Coalition forces, including the Afghan National Army.”47 For 

the Soldiers of Cavoli’s battalion, the Waygal Valley had proven to be 

difficult terrain where the population contained both potential allies and 

implacable enemies.

The Deployment of the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team 

(ABCT) to Afghanistan, 2007

In May of 2007, TF Spartan departed from Afghanistan. Including 

an unexpected three month extension, the battalion had spent 15 months 

in Afghanistan. The 173d ABCT replaced the Spartans in northeastern 

Afghanistan. This unit, the only separate airborne brigade in the Army’s 

force structure, has a relatively short but illustrious history. The unit 

was established in 1963 on Okinawa as the quick reaction force for the 

Pacific Command. Under Brigadier General Ellis S. Williamson, the unit 

specialized in making mass parachute jumps and as a result, its paratroopers 

earned the nickname “Tien Bien” or “Sky Soldiers” from the Nationalist 

Chinese paratroopers with whom they trained.

The brigade deployed to Vietnam in May of 1965 as the first major 

US Army ground combat unit to serve there. Theater commander 

General William Westmoreland initially used the paratroopers as a fire 

brigade until other major combat units could be deployed. Thereafter, the 

brigade shifted to several key areas in South Vietnam over the next six 

years. On 22 February 1967, during Operation JUNCTION CITY, 800 

paratroopers from the brigade’s 2-503d IN jumped into the rice paddies 

near Katum in the only combat parachute drop in the Vietnam War. During 

World War II the 2-503d IN, then part of the 11th Airborne Division, had 

made a noteworthy parachute drop onto the Island of Corregidor in the 

Philippines. It was the only large unit combat jump in the Pacific Theater. 

That operation earned the unit the nickname of “The Rock” in honor of the 

Rock of Corregidor. 

The Sky Soldiers of the 173d fought in the booby trap infested Iron 

Triangle, blocked North Vietnamese Army (NVA) incursions at Dak To in 

the Central Highlands, and were the first into the Ho Bo Woods where they 

discovered the Tunnels of Cu Chi. The brigade engaged in some of the 

bloodiest fighting of the war in the summer and fall of 1967, culminating 

in the capture of Hill 875. At its peak in Vietnam, the 173d Airborne 

Brigade had nearly 3,000 Soldiers assigned. During more than six years 

of continuous combat, the brigade earned 14 campaign streamers and four 

unit citations. Sky Soldiers who served in Vietnam received 13 Medals 
24

of Honor, 46 Distinguished Service Crosses, 1,736 Silver Stars, and over 

6,000 Purple Hearts. There are over 1,790 Sky Soldiers’ names on the 

Vietnam Memorial Wall in Washington, DC. Although relatively new 

to the US Army, the 173d Airborne Brigade quickly earned an enviable 

reputation during its extended term of service in the Republic of Vietnam.48

The brigade was inactivated on 14 January 1972 at Fort Campbell, 

Kentucky. In June of 2000, the US Army reactivated the unit as part of an 

expansion of the paratrooper battalion stationed at Vicenza, Italy, to a full 

brigade. As such, the 173d served as the US Army Southern European Task 

Force, the only European based conventional airborne strategic response 

force. On 26 March 2003 the brigade conducted the largest mass jump 

since World War II when its paratroopers jumped onto the Bashur Drop 

Zone in Kurdistan, Iraq, effectively opening a northern front in support of 

OIF. Nine Sky Soldiers lost their lives during operations in Iraq in 2003 

and 2004. Following service in Iraq, the 173d deployed to Afghanistan 

from March 2005 to February 2006. The brigade headquarters served as 

the core staff of CJTF-76 in Bagram. Seventeen Sky Soldiers were killed 

in action during this deployment. After transferring authority to the 10th 

Mountain Division in February 2006, the 173d returned to Italy. Between 

February and September 2006, the brigade reorganized into the US Army’s 

new modular brigade combat team configuration and officially became the 

173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT).

When it completed the transformation process, the Army planned to 

deploy the 173d ABCT to Iraq in 2007. The brigade began to train for 

that mission but when the US Department of Defense (DOD) decided 

in February 2007 to deploy an additional BCT to Afghanistan, the 173d 

was diverted to that assignment. At the time, the brigade was conducting 

live fire training at the Grafenwöhr and Hohenfels training centers in 

Germany. As Specialist Tyler Stafford, a machine gunner with 2d Platoon, 

C Company, 2-503d IN, later recalled, “We had been working a lot on 

convoys and urban tactics, and then when we found out we were going to 

Afghanistan, we had to switch it over to mountainous warfare.”49

Unfortunately, the comparatively late change of mission did not 

permit the brigade staff sufficient time to prepare a formal plan for 

operations in Afghanistan. However, there was time for the unit’s leaders 

to see the terrain on which they would soon be operating. While most of 

the brigade continued with its mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) at the 

Joint Multi-National Readiness Center (JMRC) at Hohenfels, the unit’s 

senior leadership performed the pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) 

in Afghanistan. While the 173d ABCT leadership was not present for 
25

the majority of the MRE and could not benefit from the exercise, their 

absence provided an enhanced training opportunity for subordinates and 

junior officers. Because of the late notice of the 173d’s deployment to 

Afghanistan, the JMRC staff made efforts to adjust the MRE from Iraq 

focused to Afghanistan focused training but the result was a hybrid that 

contained elements of both.

The 173d ABCT then redeployed from the training sites in Germany 

to unit garrison sites in Germany and Italy, a time consuming process. 

As Colonel Charles Preysler, the 173d ABCT commander, remembered, 

“Immediately upon completion of the MRE, we rolled home as fast as 

we could because it was Easter weekend and we went on block leave. We 

came back from leave and eight days later we deployed.”50 The shortened 

timeline meant that the 173d ABCT did not have opportunities to perform 

a command post exercise or conduct detailed intelligence analysis of the 

region of Afghanistan in which they would soon be operating.

Despite the change in deployment, the brigade was able to make 

some adjustments to individual and small unit level training as noted by 

Specialist Stafford above. However, because many senior leaders in the 

brigade prioritized combat and medical skills, there was far less time for 

any comprehensive cultural familiarization with Nuristan or Konar or 

for any dedicated language instruction and no time for detailed technical 

or physical preparation for mountain warfare. In Preysler’s view, the 

switch in deployment destinations had made the 173d ABCT’s arrival in 

Afghanistan a “pretty tough way to come into combat.”51

During the PDSS in early 2007, the 173d ABCT leadership worked 

closely with that of TF Spartan and came away impressed with the 

counterinsurgency approach of Colonel John Nicholson and his 

subordinates. Preysler essentially adopted the objectives and methodology 

used by CJTF-82 at the operational level and TF Spartan at the tactical 

level. Lieutenant Colonel William Ostlund, who deployed with the 173d 

ABCT in 2007 as commander of 2-503d IN, stressed the continuity 

between TF Spartan and the Sky Soldiers. With the Soldiers of 2-503d 

IN taking over the parts of the provinces of Nuristan and Konar in which 

the 1-32d IN had operated, Ostlund noted that he heavily relied on the 

approach devised by Cavoli and his staff.52

This continuity of approach also applied at the theater level when in 

April of 2008, 11 months after the deployment of the 173d, CJTF-101 

took command from CJTF-82 and adopted its predecessor’s campaign 

framework. According to CJTF-101 deputy Milley, “We took the 82d 
26

campaign plan, modified it slightly and then executed [it].”53 In this way, 

the Coalition approach in Afghanistan maintained stability throughout 

2007 and into 2008. For units like the 173d ABCT therefore, the arrival 

of the new higher headquarters did not signal a major shift in operational 

practices in northeast Afghanistan.

However, while the leaders of the 173d ABCT had confidence in the 

general framework of the TF Spartan approach, they held some reservations 

about some of its details, particularly the extreme dispersal of troops on 

small and distant COPs. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Jimmy Hinton, 

the 173d’s intelligence officer, felt that their predecessors had “gone too 

far, too fast” and established bases in the steep isolated valleys of northeast 

Afghanistan that were too difficult to supply and secure. Accordingly, as 

early as the summer of 2007, leaders in the 2-503d IN and 173d ABCT 

contemplated the closing of some of these bases, including the two in the 

Waygal Valley that could only be supported by helicopters.54

When the 173d ABCT arrived in northeast Afghanistan in the spring 

of 2007, CJTF-82 augmented it with additional forces and the organization 

became known as TF Bayonet. During its tour of duty, TF Bayonet

maintained its headquarters at FOB Fenty at the Jalalabad Airfield. One 

of its two organic infantry battalions, the 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne 

Infantry, was detached to TF Fury (the 4th BCT, 82d Airborne Division) 

and later to its follow on unit, TF Currahee (the 4th BCT, 101st Airborne 

Division) for the duration of the deployment. This detachment left TF 

Bayonet with five battalions of all types. Three of these formations were 

configured as combat elements: 2-503d IN; the 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry, 

organized as a reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) 

squadron; and the 4th Battalion, 319th Field Artillery (FA), partially 

reorganized as an infantry unit. The two other battalion sized elements 

in the task force were support units that were based at FOB Fenty: the 

173d Special Troops Battalion and the 173d Support Battalion. These 

two battalions supported operations throughout TF Bayonet’s AO. During 

2008, the 173d ABCT received aviation support from TF Out Front based 

on the 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry (Air Cavalry) from the 101st Airborne 

Division that deployed to FOB Fenty in January of 2008. Additionally the 

PRTs, which operated in each of the four provinces in the AO, provided the 

bulk of the funds and management for the construction of roads, schools, 

and other projects as well as expertise in governance, medical operations, 

and other noncombat affairs. The PRTs became key assets in TF Bayonet’s

campaign and worked closely with Colonel Preysler as well as with the 

individual battalion commanders who had responsibility for the smaller 
27Figure 4. AO Bayonet, July 2008.
28

AOs in the provinces. Finally, in March of 2008, the 3d Battalion, 103d 

Armor (Pennsylvania Army National Guard) arrived in Afghanistan and 

was attached to TF Bayonet to conduct operations in Laghman Province.55

This relatively small set of units was responsible for a large AO 

consisting of Nuristan, Nangarhar, Konar, and Laghman provinces, an 

area of 15,058 square miles and with an Afghan population of two million. 

The latter were divided into 20 ethno linguistic groups, most of which 

extended across provincial boundaries. The TF Bayonet AO was about 

half the geographic size of the State of Maine and included the important 

cities of Jalalabad and Asadabad, 125 miles of border with Pakistan, the 

infamous Tora Bora Mountains where Coalition forces almost caught 

Osama bin Laden in December of 2001, the Afghan side of the renowned 

Khyber Pass, and numerous other passes from Pakistan into Nuristan and 

Konar provinces. Running through this AO on a north-south axis was the 

Konar River, which was one of the major insurgent infiltration routes from 

Pakistan into Afghanistan. To provide security and stability, TF Bayonet

had approximately 3,000 US Soldiers spread across its five battalions 

excluding TF Out Front.

56

Colonel Charles Preysler, the commander of TF Bayonet, was a 1982 

Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) graduate of Michigan State 

University and a career infantryman with extensive service in the 75th 

Ranger Regiment. Preysler had previously commanded the 2d Battalion, 

187th Infantry, of the 101st Airborne Division, in Operation ANACONDA 

in Afghanistan in March, 2002, and in the invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. 

He later returned to Afghanistan with the US Southern European Task 

Force (Airborne) in 2005, serving as the J3 Operations Officer for CJTF76 in 2005-2006. Accordingly, Preysler had considerable experience in 

Afghanistan, although his prior service had not been in the northeastern 

part of the country. 

Preysler, like his predecessors, faced multiple challenges with limited 

resources. His plan can be seen as a careful balance between the need to 

secure the major population centers where economic growth and Afghan 

Government legitimacy could be cultivated and the expansion of the 

Coalition presence into less populated areas. For Preysler, the two major 

populated areas that held the most promise were Nangarhar Province and 

the Pech River Valley in Konar Province. As noted earlier, the Pech Valley 

runs east-west and thus serves as a major line of communication in the 

region. In Nangarhar, the most heavily populated of the four provinces in 

his AO, Preysler initiated a major economic program called “Nangarhar 

Inc.,” which sought to develop local businesses and attract investments 
29Figure 5. AO Rock, July 2008.
30

from both inside and outside the country as a way of providing stability 

and security to northeast Afghanistan.57

To augment the developmental projects in these two regions, TF 

Bayonet sought to expand security and economic development into less 

populated areas and thus continued to man the small bases and outposts 

where development was more challenging. In 2007 and 2008, the Soldiers 

of the task force often found themselves in small COPs in the Konar, Pech, 

and Korengal Valleys, all of which were somewhat isolated and located 

near insurgent forces keen on driving them away.

TF Bayonet depended heavily on its maneuver elements, and 

particularly on its sole remaining infantry battalion, 2-503d IN. Preysler 

tasked that unit with responsibility for most of Konar Province and the 

central portion of Nuristan Province. In general, the battalion’s mission 

was to secure the Pech Valley while fostering security and development in 

the adjacent Watapor, Korengal, Waygal, and subsidiary valleys that ran 

like smaller capillary veins from the main artery of the Pech Valley. This 

was a daunting mission for the battalion sized force that became known 

as TF Rock.

The TF Rock AO was mountainous and large, consisting of 2,300 

square miles, roughly half the size of the State of Connecticut. The AO 

had a population of approximately 525,000 Afghans divided into 10 ethno 

linguistic groups that were in competition with each other, and had been 

for thousands of years, although the Pashtuns were the dominant and 

largest of these groups. While it was obviously impossible for a single 

battalion to have a significant presence everywhere in such an extensive 

territory, the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel William Ostlund, 

divided his AO into four individual company AOs focused on the Pech 

Valley and the most important of the capillary valleys. In each company 

AO, the paratroopers manned small bases from which they conducted 

security, reconstruction, and other counterinsurgency related missions. By 

13 July 2008, there were 14 of these broadly dispersed bases, including 

one site, COP Fiaz, which was manned principally by an Afghan police 

unit. (See figure 5.)58

Command and control in areas of operation like AO Rock was 

difficult. Because of the rugged terrain, distances between bases, and the 

constant threat of IEDs and ambushes, commanders at the company and 

battalion levels had to take a decentralized approach. This meant making 

daily choices about which units to visit, which Afghan leader to meet, 

and which school or community center opening to attend. The practice 
31Figure 6. Troops in Contact Incidents by Company, TF Rock, 2007-8.
32

of battlefield circulation in northeast Afghanistan in 2008 meant that a 

battalion commander could not expect to meet with each of his company 

commanders on a daily basis. Moreover, when crises erupted, transportation 

shortages and security concerns almost always prevented battalion 

and company commanders from traveling expeditiously to personally 

supervise the actions of subordinate units. In many cases, commanders 

led by communicating through radio and digital systems. This type of 

decentralized command and control was not optimal but it was integral to 

a counterinsurgency campaign in which the relatively limited troops were 

spread broadly across large areas of operations.

Given the need to spread its forces, TF Rock focused on two areas 

during its deployment. The first of these was the Pech River Valley. 

Able Company, with three platoons, had primary responsibility for the 

valley, inheriting from the 10th Mountain Division a series of outposts 

connecting Camp Blessing at Nangalam with the provincial capital at 

Asadabad where the Pech and Konar Rivers met. During TF Rock’s tour, 

A Company consolidated several of its smaller bases into a single new 

base called Honaker-Miracle located next to the Watapor District Center 

in the Pech Valley. The Watapor Valley, a capillary valley that ran north 

from its junction with the Pech Valley, proved to be a chronic problem 

for the company. The battalion’s first major combat action took place 

there in July of 2007 and resulted in the deaths of the two paratroopers for 

whom the later COP Honaker-Miracle was named. Apart from securing 

the Watapor, the construction and security of the Pech Valley road was the 

main mission of Able Company. The road, located on the north bank of the 

Pech River, was the lifeline for both Coalition forces and commerce and 

reconstruction in the valley. Coalition authorities had long tried to widen 

and pave the road through the valley from Asadabad to Camp Blessing. 

After many delays and abortive starts, engineers began a final effort to 

complete the road’s construction in April of 2007 during the 1-32d IN’s 

tenure. Construction continued under the 2-503d IN and was completed 

in early 2008. Able Company provided security for the road both during 

and after its construction. Although enemy activity in the nearby Watapor 

Valley remained relatively high throughout the TF Rock period, the Able 

Company paratroopers focused on countering the enemy’s campaign to 

disrupt the construction and traffic on the Pech River road.59

If developing the Pech Valley was TF Rock’s primary mission, the 

security of the six mile long Korengal Valley was very close in importance. 

The Korengal was a capillary valley running south from its junction with 

the Pech Valley several miles east of Nangalam. The area was relatively 
33

small but its population, as previously discussed, was restive. The high 

rate of enemy activity forced TF Rock, as it had its predecessor, to place 

an entire infantry company in the valley. That unit, Battle Company, took 

over several combat outposts from the 1-32d IN and built another one 

(Restrepo) with each occupied by a platoon sometimes reinforced with 

additional elements. This allocation of forces was understandable. As has 

already been discussed, despite its compact nature, the Korengal had been 

an enemy stronghold since local insurgents wiped out a SEAL team and 

shot down a Chinook helicopter killing 16 special operations troops in 

June of 2005 on the slopes of Sawtalo Sar Mountain just to the east of the 

Korengal. In 2007 and 2008, the Korengal was by far the most active area 

in AO Rock. The TF staff tracked and compared combat activities in its 

company sectors throughout its tour and found that almost 40 percent of all 

enemy contacts (troops in contact or TICs) took place in the Korengal (see 

figure 6). Enemy action in the Korengal was highest for TF Rock during 

the 2007 summer campaigning season but insurgent activity remained 

elevated throughout the battalion’s tour of duty there. By comparison, the 

Pech Valley had the next highest rate of enemy contact with slightly less 

than 30 percent of all TICs.60

The remaining third of TF Rock’s incidents was divided between the 

Waygal Valley, where Chosen Company operated and other areas in Konar 

province. The TF Rock staff and tactical operations center were located 

at Camp Blessing. Other elements of the Headquarters and Headquarters 

Company (HHC) secured the military facility at the provincial capital 

of Asadabad and conducted various other functions along the provincial 

roads. Destined Company, the weapons company with its three remaining 

platoons, and a rifle platoon attached from Chosen Company, operated in a 

sector along the Konar River, which included the volatile Chawkay Valley 

extending northwest from the Konar River toward the Korengal Valley.

By July of 2008, Chosen Company had responsibility for a sector 

that included the Waygal Valley, an area extending 30 miles north from 

Nangalam into central Nuristan; the Chapa Dara District which formed the 

extreme western portion of both the Pech Valley and Konar Province; the 

central Pech Valley area around Camp Blessing; and the Shuryak Valley 

extending south from the Pech east of the Korengal Valley. To cover 

this area the company had three platoons; a small antitank platoon from 

Company D, which manned a small base called Michigan on the Pech 

River at the northern end of the Korengal Valley and its remaining two rifle 

platoons. Operationally one of Chosen Company’s rifle platoons normally 

served as the TF Rock quick reaction force (QRF) at Camp Blessing while 
34

the other platoon garrisoned the posts in the Waygal Valley. The two rifle 

platoons rotated between these missions. The unit did not permanently 

station troops in Chapa Dara and the Shuryak Valley. In the Waygal Valley, 

the Chosen Company commander had to disperse his one available platoon 

between two combat outposts during much of TF Rock’s deployment. The 

paratroopers in the Waygal Valley did indeed come into contact with the 

enemy and some of the actions were intense. The combat incidents in the 

valley, however, paled in comparison to those in the Korengal or Pech, 

representing only about a tenth of TF Rock’s total combat activities during 

its tour in northeast Afghanistan.61

Augmenting the approximately 1,000 members of TF Rock were an 

additional 400 Americans that included US Marine embedded training 

teams (ETTs) who advised the Afghan forces as well as other US Soldiers 

who provided combat support functions. A further 2,500 Afghan security 

personnel from the ANA, the ANP, the Afghan Security Guards (ASG), 

and the Afghanistan Border Police operated in the area and conducted 

a variety of missions with TF Rock. Yet this total force was still quite 

small given both the size of the AO and the size of the population in the 

area. The 1,400 US troops in the AO represented the entire Coalition force 

available to conduct counterinsurgency operations in an area populated 

by 525,000 Afghans. This fact meant that there were two US Soldiers per 

1,000 Afghan citizens. When the Afghan security forces are added to this 

total, the ratio of all security forces—both Afghan and US—increases to 

approximately six security personnel per 1,000 Afghans.62

A ratio of six security personnel per 1,000 residents is far below the 

normal threshold for effective troop density as suggested by various studies 

of successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency and other contingency 

operations. One study proposed a force structure of one brigade 

(approximately 5,000 Soldiers) per 483,141 inhabitants. This figure was 

derived from the comparison of troop density ratios in successful historic 

stability and contingency operations. The study suggested that a minimum 

force density for police operations of 4.1 security personnel per 1,000 

inhabitants is necessary in these operations and an overall troop density of 

13.26 Soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants is the minimum necessary for success. 

TF Rock’s strength was far below this threshold, not even amounting to the 

necessary force structure to perform routine police protection in a stable 

secure environment which Nuristan and Konar were certainly not.63

Faced with this imposing challenge, Ostlund and his paratroopers 

arrived and began operating in northeast Afghanistan in May of 2007. 

Ostlund was a former enlisted Ranger who received an infantry commission 
35

through the University of Nebraska Army ROTC program in 1989. Like 

Preysler, Ostlund had extensive infantry and Ranger experience. He had 

also earned an advanced degree in international relations from Tufts 

University.

Ostlund would later state that his unit benefited from the lessons of his 

predecessors in TF Spartan. He recalled the role that the commander of 

1-32d IN played during TF Rock’s deployment:

Colonel Chris[topher] Cavoli, the battalion commander, 

subsequently went to [George C. Marshall European Center 

for Security Studies] Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany

and taught COIN. He and I stayed in continuous contact 

and sought continuity of thought and action. He remained as 

a friend and mentor who understood the fight, had a strong 

mind, and time to think and offer advice as he reflected on his 

actions in Konar.64

In developing TF Rock’s campaign plan, Ostlund took guidance from 

TF Bayonet while adopting much from the approach taken by Cavoli and 

1-32d IN. Like Cavoli, Ostlund contended that “gaining and maintaining 

the support of the Afghan population” was the decisive effort in his 

campaign.65 Still, he concluded that in view of the terrain in his AO and 

his limited number of troops, TF Rock would never be able to clear enemy 

forces from the AO; hold or secure those areas that were cleared; and build 

infrastructure, governance, and gradually improve the capacity of the ASF. 

The TF Rock commander contended that he “didn’t have enough forces to 

‘clear, hold, and build’ in one of my valleys, much less the 10 or 15 that 

we were responsible for.”66

Instead of “clear, hold, and build”, Ostlund believed he had the right 

resources to “separate, stabilize, and engage.” “Separate” entailed clearly 

identifying the AAF as detriments to local security and progress by using 

information operations, negotiations, and relationship building with local 

Afghan leaders known as “key leader engagements.” “Stabilize” involved 

United States and Afghan units pushing the enemy away from population 

centers using lethal (i.e. combat) and nonlethal (i.e. noncombat) operations. 

In this stage of the campaign, Coalition forces would become close allies 

with local leaders. Once these alliances fostered stability, the unit would 

inject money in the form of reconstruction projects to create the prosperity 

that would assist in the retention of popular support. The final part of this 

approach, “engage”, included increasing stability and the fostering of 

healthy connections between local populations and national institutions 

such as the representatives of the GIROA and the ANP.67
36

Like most American tactical level leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

the TF Rock commander and his company commanders sought the 

right balance of combat and noncombat operations to create stability 

and progress in their areas of responsibility. If their campaigns began to 

lean too heavily on lethal operations, they might cause casualties among 

noncombatants or damage civilian property, both outcomes that would 

alienate the population from the Coalition cause. However, reluctance to 

use lethal operations especially in response to direct attacks on Coalition 

forces, Afghan security elements, or the population, would likely cause 

local populations to doubt the ability or will of the Coalition to engage 

the AAF and create a secure environment. Likewise, if combat operations 

were not accompanied by the right type of reconstruction and governance 

efforts, Afghan communities might not see the tangible benefits offered 

by the GIROA and remain essentially neutral in the larger conflict as they 

waited to see whether the AAF or the Coalition and its Afghan allies won 

decisively.

In its efforts to diminish the significant influence of the AAF in Konar 

and Nuristan, TF Rock certainly conducted combat operations. In an article 

for the US Army’s Military Review in the summer of 2009, Ostlund stated 

that his TF had become involved in 1,100 engagements with the AAF in 

its 14 month deployment. In support of these firefights, his unit had called 

in 5,400 fire missions (36,500 howitzer/mortar rounds) and 3,800 bomb or 

gun runs from fixed or rotary wing aircraft. Additionally, his troops fired 

131 Javelin and tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) 

antitank missiles. As a result of these combat actions, 26 Soldiers in the 

TF lost their lives and another 143 were wounded.68

As a result of collateral noncombatant casualties, or the enemy fueled 

perception of such, the Coalition use of indirect fire and close air support 

(CAS) became controversial. As early as July of 2002 for example, 

US Army Special Forces in Oruzgan Province in southern Afghanistan 

directed the bombing of what they believed was a concentration of Taliban. 

The attack allegedly caused dozens of casualties, including women and 

children. The Afghan Government believed the Americans had mistakenly 

targeted a wedding party, formally protested to the Coalition, and forced 

the US military headquarters to begin an investigation.69

The Coalition continued its airstrikes against enemy targets in 

Afghanistan between 2003 and 2005 but in 2006, according to a Human 

Rights Watch study, the number of civilian deaths attributed to Coalition 

bombs made a sudden leap to 116. In 2007, the study claimed that the 

deaths more than tripled to 321. In one of the 2007 incidents, US forces in 
37

Kapisa Province in central Afghanistan used indirect mortar fire and CAS 

against a house at which they had observed two armed insurgents enter 

after having fired a rocket at an American base. According to a US military 

spokesperson, the bombs destroyed the house. Afghan sources asserted 

that the attack killed five women, three children, and an elderly man. The 

attention generated by this incident and others like it that led to a growing 

number of civilian casualties induced US Army General Dan K. McNeill, 

the NATO military commander in Afghanistan, to institute stricter revised 

rules of engagement (ROE) in May of 2007 for the use of CAS in cases 

where civilians might be endangered. The revised ROE emphasized the 

use of proportional attacks only when an imminent threat to Coalition 

forces was clearly identified and only after positive identification of enemy 

combatants at the targeted location. TF Bayonet units disseminated and 

enforced the new ROE.70

The new rules of engagement were based on Coalition forces having 

a complete understanding of a situation that was often hard to come by in 

the chaotic violent engagements in which they became involved. Making 

the task far more difficult was the enemy’s blending with the population 

and their documented practice of using civilians as shields. Despite the 

most careful adherence to the 2007 rules of engagement and the strong 

commitment to win the support of the population, troops in the heat of battle 

could direct attacks against positively identified enemy that inadvertently 

led to civilian casualties.71

In Konar province in October of 2007, for example, TF Rock’s Battle 

Company, operating in the Korengal Valley, called in fire from an AC130 gunship on a residential compound in the village of Yaka China into 

which they had seen armed insurgents run. The company commander 

on the scene felt that his Soldiers were in imminent danger from the 

insurgents and coordinated for CAS. Ostlund, watching video feed of 

the situation from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), concurred with 

the decision and authorized the attack. While the CAS killed insurgents, 

Battle Company Soldiers quickly discovered that the attack had also killed 

five and wounded 11 others, all of whom were women or children. US 

Army helicopters immediately evacuated the wounded to the medical aid 

station. However, despite immediate mediation with the village elders by 

the Battle Company’s commander and a promise to bring an $11 million 

road project to the area, the elders ultimately chose to continue to support 

the insurgents against the Coalition.72

As noted earlier, the insurgent enemy in the Korengal Valley generated 

the most attacks or troops in contact (TIC) incidents for the Soldiers of TF 
38

Rock. The Pech Valley saw a significant number of TICs. Leaders in these 

regions of TF Rock’s AO used indirect fire as well as direct engagements 

in response to enemy actions. In the Waygal Valley the insurgents mounted 

lesser resistance to TF Rock than did the enemy elements in the Korengal 

or the Pech. There the battalion’s Chosen Company had responsibility for 

stabilizing the security situation and extending the influence of the GIROA. 

However, as will be shown below, the local population in this valley proved 

to be particularly resistant to Coalition efforts, and the Soldiers of Chosen 

Company found themselves in a number of minor firefights some of which 

required the use of CAS and artillery strikes. Captain Matthew Myer, the 

Chosen Company commander, recalled that his subordinate leaders did 

request and receive indirect fire support and directed those missions against 

a variety of targets including civilian buildings but Myer contended that 

his paratroopers, like those of Battle Company in the Korengal, followed 

the 2007 rules of engagement. This meant that they requested indirect fire 

against structures from which enemy fire was coming or against buildings 

that they confirmed had been abandoned by the local population and used 

by insurgent groups. Myer also noted that whenever possible, his men 

attempted to work with local leaders and use other intelligence means 

before targeting any structure in the valley.73

Throughout the campaign in the TF Rock AO, Ostlund, Myer, and 

other leaders in the battalion made a concerted effort to win over local 

populations with the reconstruction and governance projects that offered 

both employment and a better quality of life. These nonlethal operations 

had the potential to undermine the power of the insurgents in the AO, thus 

making actions such as the attack at Yaka China far less likely. The TF Rock

commander viewed nonlethal actions, such as reconstruction projects, as 

the most effective “weapons” in his unit’s campaign but acknowledged 

that they were often far more difficult to use because of the involvement of 

various organizations including higher headquarters that closely monitored 

how money was spent and how projects progressed. Ostlund expressed his 

frustrations with the slowness of the reconstruction effort by comparing 

it with the relatively free hand he and his leaders had in using indirect 

fire and CAS against enemy targets. In a briefing completed in 2008 after 

they returned from Afghanistan, the leaders of TF Rock wrote, “Millions 

[of dollars] in ordnance = no questions asked – thousands in non lethal 

effects = many questions over many days/weeks.”74

To help with the complex reconstruction effort, Ostlund relied heavily 

on the Konar PRT which was based in the provincial capital of Asadabad. 

The PRT’s focus in 2007 and 2008 was on the construction of roads and 
39

bridges, especially in the Konar and Pech River Valleys, as well as clinics 

and other government buildings throughout the valleys of the AO.75

US Navy Commander Larry LeGree, who led the Konar PRT in 2007, 

contended: 

We’ve seen it everywhere else, where once we’ve built roads 

through some of these valleys and we built bridges that 

connect population areas, the economics just go through the 

roof and now you get people above bare subsistence living 

where they’re susceptible to enemy influences, get them to 

where they care about starting a small business, selling excess 

commodities, and getting to secondary and tertiary markets.76

A study completed by the US Army Strategic Studies Institute 

reinforced LeGree’s assertion arguing that the road building campaign 

launched by the Konar PRT in 2007 had done a great deal to win popular 

support and create greater stability. The study noted that IED attacks 

along the main valley road dropped precipitously between 2006 and early 

2008. Further, a survey conducted by the US Agency for International 

Development (USAID) documented the link between the Pech road 

construction and the growing stability and new economic opportunities.77

By the end of 2008, the PRT reported spending $43 million on 

infrastructure projects that affected all 14 districts of Konar province 

and several adjoining districts in Nuristan. TF Rock contributed to the 

reconstruction effort by sponsoring $2.2 million of additional projects 

funded by the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). 

One of the key targets for the infrastructure building effort was the 

Waygal Valley. The local communities of that valley were only tenuously 

connected to the rest of Konar and Nuristan provinces and were heavily 

influenced by the AAF. The TF Rock and the Konar PRT commanders 

sponsored the construction of a new district center in Wanat, which was 

completed in June of 2008. Further, they hoped to build a modern road 

through the valley so that the Waygal population might benefit from the 

greater stability and economic progress seen in the Pech Valley and other 

regions of the province.78

Chosen Company and the Waygal Valley

Chosen Company had held responsibility for the Waygal Valley since 

TF Rock’s arrival in northeast Afghanistan in mid 2007. The company had 

established a strong reputation during earlier combat deployments and 

the Soldiers had adopted as their informal mascot, the popular Marvel 

Comics hero “The Punisher,” a “lone soldier standing between evil and 
40

the community, willing to do the job that nobody else will, taking out the 

bad guys.” The Chosen paratroopers privately purchased and universally 

wore “punisher skull” patches embroidered with the proud words “Chosen 

Few.”

Captain Matthew Myer, whose father had served 27 years in the 

Infantry, commanded the company. Myer was a 2001 graduate of the 

US Military Academy and had previously deployed to Iraq with the 4th 

Infantry Division in 2003. Within the battalion, Myer was a well regarded 

company commander, known for possessing a calm contemplative 

leadership style which was balanced by the aggressive, dynamic approach 

of the company’s first sergeant, First Sergeant Scott Beeson. As already 

briefly mentioned, although Chosen Company organizationally contained 

three platoons, throughout the Afghanistan deployment one platoon (3d 

Platoon) was detached to Destined Company. Thus, Myer only had two 

platoons (his 1st and 2d Platoons) to operate within the Waygal Valley. 

Although Myer gained a third platoon from D Company early in 2008, 

this platoon spent its period under Myer’s control as the garrison for COP 

Michigan in the Pech Valley and was not available for operations in the 

Waygal area.

Typically, one rifle platoon provided the garrison for the two isolated 

COPs in the valley. Thus, half the platoon or approximately 20 Soldiers 

manned COP Ranch House near the town of Aranas and the other half 

served at COP Bella in the village of Bella. Augmenting the US Soldiers 

at these COPs were Afghans assigned to local ASG units and those ANA 

elements that operated in the valley. Usually an ANA infantry platoon was 

stationed wherever a US infantry platoon was. After the closure of Ranch 

House in October of 2007, the garrison at COP Bella was expanded to a 

full US platoon and an ANA platoon. The platoon not serving at the COPs 

remained at Camp Blessing as the TF Rock quick reaction force (QRF), 

frequently performing operations throughout TF Rock’s AO. Periodically, 

the two platoons rotated between these two duties. 

Chosen Company was the economy of force effort within TF Rock

and a lack of combat power constrained Myer throughout the entire 

deployment. In essence, Chosen Company’s main mission was to secure 

COP Ranch House and COP Bella, using them to separate the AAF from 

local communities while beginning to stabilize the security situation in the 

Waygal Valley to the extent possible.79

In July of 2008, the leader of Chosen Company’s 2d Platoon was 

First Lieutenant Jonathan P. Brostrom, 24. Brostrom was a 2006 Army 
41

ROTC graduate of the University of Hawaii. While a cadet, he had earned 

the Air Assault, Airborne, and US Navy Scuba Diver badges. Following 

graduation from Ranger School, Brostrom was assigned to Italy and then 

deployed to Afghanistan in June of 2007. Brostrom planned to make the 

Army a career and hoped to eventually become a Special Forces officer. 

He had initially served as TF Rock’s Assistant Operations Officer and by 

July of 2008 he had been the 2d Platoon leader for eight months with 

considerable combat experience, mostly at COP Bella.80

The first several months of Chosen Company’s tour of duty in the 

Waygal Valley had been relatively peaceful with little enemy contact. 

That changed however, in August of 2007 after Myer publicly fired the 

incompetent and corrupt local ASG chief at COP Ranch House. Shortly 

thereafter, at dawn on 22 August 2007, 60 or more insurgents attacked the 

Ranch House in an attempt to overrun the outpost. At the time, the garrison 

consisted of approximately 25 paratroopers, half of the company’s 1st 

Platoon, augmented with small detachments of ASG and ANA.

The ASG proved to be the outpost’s Achilles heel. Unlike the regular 

ANA combat formations, the ASG were locally recruited, low quality 

security personnel responsible for serving as gate guards and providing 

static defense from guard towers. They had minimal training, limited 

responsibilities, and were only equipped with small arms for individual 

defense. The ASG were not organized or expected to participate in 

sustained combat. ASG weakness gave the insurgents a chance for success. 

When the early morning attack began with a heavy barrage of RPGs, the 

ASGs promptly withdrew, creating a gap in the perimeter that allowed a 

number of insurgents to penetrate the defenses of the outpost. Hand to 

hand combat followed. Ultimately, CAS strikes directly on the Ranch 

House assisted the paratroopers in repulsing the AAF. In the action eleven 

paratroopers were wounded, some with life threatening injuries. The ASG 

and ANA each sustained one member killed in action.81

Throughout the fall of 2007, the paratroopers at COP Ranch House 

continued to receive indirect and small arms fire. Because of the outpost’s 

vulnerability, its relative isolation from the Aranas community and its 

dependency on helicopters for resupply, TF Rock decided to abandon the 

Ranch House position on 2 October 2007. While this certainly reduced 

the Coalition presence in the valley, the decision made sense to those who 

feared another large attack especially in the coming winter months when 

the weather would be far worse and support would be more difficult to 

provide. Equally important was the fact that the decision was not a sudden 

one. As early as the PDSS, TF Bayonet and TF Rock leaders had been 
42

concerned about the isolation of the Waygal COPs and had discussed the 

possibilities of closing some of the outposts.

Predictably, the Taliban and HiG presented the decision to abandon COP 

Ranch House as a victory, claiming that they had driven the Americans out. 

They made a lengthy propaganda video that depicted insurgents seizing and 

occupying Ranch House in a deliberate attack. Notwithstanding the fact 

that Coalition forces had clearly abandoned Ranch House before the video 

was made, this tape demonstrated a formidable psychological operations 

and information operations (IO) effort on the part of the insurgents and, 

according to one Afghan source, constituted an AAF propaganda success.82

Following the closure of the Ranch House, TF Rock leaders obtained 

agreements from elders in the Waygal Valley to provide security, both 

in the northern portion of the valley near Aranas and in the south closer 

to Nangalam. However, on 9 November 2007, violence again erupted 

when the AAF ambushed a Chosen Company 1st Platoon patrol moving 

to COP Bella following a shura in Aranas. The casualties were heavy. 

First Lieutenant Matthew C. Ferrara, the platoon leader who had won 

the Silver Star in the Ranch House battle, was killed along with four of 

his paratroopers, one Marine NCO serving as an ANA advisor and two 

Afghan soldiers. An additional eight American and three ANA Soldiers 

were wounded in the ambush.83

From the fall of 2007 through the spring of 2008, implacable enemy 

forces and an ambivalent population in the Waygal Valley continued to 

hinder TF Rock’s efforts there. Direct engagements with the enemy that 

required artillery or CAS were relatively rare, numbering from three to 

10 per month between September 2007 and February 2008. However, 

as the weather improved in March 2008, the number of attacks of this 

sort increased.84 Still, as Captain Benjamin Pry, the TF Rock Intelligence 

officer, stated; the enemy “wasn’t always effective but the threat was 

always there.”85 Further, Pry asserted that intercepts of insurgent 

communications confirmed that COP Bella was almost always under 

surveillance. The Soldiers manning COP Bella focused on securing their 

site and consequently only made contact with the local population when 

they were on patrol. One machine gunner from Chosen Company recalled, 

“We also didn’t go off the FOB unless there was a patrol.”86 Most of 

the meetings with local authorities were conducted by the senior NCOs 

and officers who attended shuras periodically. However, those meetings 

produced limited results. 
43

Pry and other senior officers in TF Rock understood the vulnerability 

of COP Bella. However, as Pry explained, the lack of troops meant there 

were few options as long as the command needed to maintain a presence 

in the valley. He contended:

[Bella] was definitely a high threat area but there was little the 

Coalition forces were able to do about it because of limited 

mobility and lack of assets. . . . We didn’t have the right 

amount of intelligence collection assets, rotary wing assets, 

or close air support. We just had a limited number of assets to 

put against that problem but that was happening everywhere 

in theater. Everyone was starving for assets and to do stuff up 

in that area, you need more than most.87

Battalion Commander Ostlund later contended that during TF Rock’s

deployment, the Waygal Valley presented the single greatest challenge. 

He called it the one area “that no matter what we did we were just 

not effective.”88 TF Rock had attempted to develop relations with the 

population in the valley and had supported the Konar PRT’s construction 

of the new district center in Wanat as one way of showing the Coalition’s 

good will. The overall situation in the valley, however, did not significantly 

improve. Ostlund explained that in his estimation, the lack of a road 

connecting Camp Blessing to Bella, Aranas, Wanat, and many other valley Colonel William Ostlund

Figure 7. COP Bella looking westerly.
44

communities was the critical factor in the failure to foster support from 

the population in the Waygal. The battalion commander argued that roads 

connecting his bases to outposts were critical to the success enjoyed by 

TF Rock elsewhere in the AO, contending, “I attribute that to having a 

trafficable road everywhere else all the way to our forces so that we could 

have persistent presence, connect with the population, and wear down 

their resistance. We could wear down the enemy’s desire to hang out with 

the population and be at risk of being killed or captured.”89 Utmost in 

Ostlund’s mind was the vulnerability of COPs Ranch House and Bella 

which could only be supported by dangerous helicopter resupply missions. 

That weakness, Ostlund believed, forced the Soldiers to focus heavily on 

securing their bases. As early as the fall of 2007, the TF Rock commander 

considered these two outposts to be symbolic of the Coalition presence but 

incapable of serving as platforms for the “separate, stabilize, and engage” 

approach.90

The lack of progress and the ability of the AAF to retain influence in the 

Waygal Valley frustrated the Soldiers of TF Rock and Chosen Company. 

After the attack on COP Ranch House, one member of Chosen Company 

told an Army historian that he was offended by the lack of gratitude from 

some of the residents in the Waygal Valley, “We built them a school and 

gave them money for roads. A lot of times, I gave the workers clothes for 

their kids and shoes for their kids. I gave them blankets. We’d give them 

food and they complained that we didn’t do enough for them.”91

Ostlund too felt this frustration. After the 9 November 2007 ambush, 

he attempted to influence the population of Aranas and nearby villages by 

freezing all reconstruction projects planned for the Aranas area until the 

local leaders could assist the Coalition in fostering security in the Waygal. 

Ostlund announced this policy at shuras with Aranas officials on 21 and 24 

November 2007. At the latter meeting, which took place in Nangalam, he 

was joined by Captain Myer, the Pech River district police chief, and the 

local ANA battalion commander. The TF Rock commander made it clear 

that unless the leaders of Aranas assisted the Coalition in driving out the 

AAF, they would not get support in the form of reconstruction projects. A 

summary of the meeting stated that both Ostlund and Myer told the Aranas 

elders that “if they want money, projects, and support, then they need to be 

part of the process instead of being part of the problem.”92 Both US officers 

hoped that as the officials from Aranas saw Bella, Wanat, and other valley 

communities receive the benefits of the Coalition reconstruction efforts, 

they would swing their support away from the AAF and to the side of the 

GIROA and TF Rock.

93
45

It is important to note that TF Rock Soldiers continued to engage 

the Aranas officials in the winter of 2007. On 15 December, Lieutenant 

Brostrom, whose platoon was at the time manning COP Bella, met in Bella 

with the men of the Aranas shura. Brostrom emphasized the TF Rock

position about the need for security in the Aranas area before US Soldiers 

could return to implement projects. Unfortunately, despite assurances 

to TF Rock leaders, the Aranas officials did not have the inclination or 

the ability to assist the Coalition in identifying and eliminating the AAF 

influence in their area.94

In January 2008, Chosen Company lost another key leader. At COP 

Bella, in the early morning of 26 January 2008, the platoon sergeant for 2d 

Platoon, Sergeant First Class Matthew Ryan Kahler, led a predawn patrol 

to visit guard stations manned by the ASG to monitor alertness. There had 

been previous problems with the ASG falling asleep or leaving their sentry 

stations to warm themselves at stoves inside the buildings. As Kahler and 

his patrol reached one guard post, which had not responded to their radio 

calls, he stepped to the front, warning one of the paratroopers, “This could 

be dangerous.”95 As he moved forward, calling out to the silent bunker, 

an ASG member suddenly leaned out, shot, and killed Kahler. Although 

a subsequent Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 investigation ruled that it 

had been an accidental discharge, the paratroopers in Kahler’s platoon 

believed the guard had deliberately shot their platoon sergeant. From that 

moment, relationships between the ASG, ANA, and Chosen Company 

became increasingly tense. Sergeant Erik Aass, company radio-telephone 

operator (RTO), recalled that after the incident, many of the Soldiers 

became “very suspicious of the ASG.”96 In contradiction of Islamic and 

regional traditions, the Chosen Company leadership received no regrets 

or condolences from local families, communities, or government officials, 

further affecting the already weak relationships between Americans and 

Afghans. After the November ambush and this shooting, there were 

indications that many Soldiers in 2d Platoon no longer fully trusted the 

people of the Waygal Valley or the ASG. To replace Kahler, Staff Sergeant 

(later Sergeant First Class) David Dzwik transferred from a squad leader 

position in the 1st Platoon to become the 2d Platoon’s platoon sergeant.97

In its recalcitrance, the population of the valley was not merely 

expressing traditional xenophobia and a desire for isolation. Facing 

legitimate threats and dangers from the insurgents active in Nuristan, the 

residents of Bella, Wanat, and other communities could not be seen as 

supporting the Coalition unless they were being adequately protected by 

the American paratroopers and ASF, including the ANA and ANP. Without 
46

adequate security, or improvements to their quality of life that were worth 

risking their lives for, the residents of the Waygal Valley remained at best 

uncommitted. Dr. David Katz, an anthropologist and expert on Nuristani 

culture, has argued that the population’s reluctance to work more closely 

with central authorities was simply a self defense measure taken to protect 

itself against local fighters who were opposed to any outside influences. 

Counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen has argued that this attitude 

affects the larger Afghan population as well, suggesting, “The majority 

of Afghans simply want security, peace, and prosperity and will swing 

to support the side that appears most likely to prevail and to meet these 

needs.”98 In 2007, Chosen Company was attempting to show the population 

of the valley that the Coalition did intend to prevail. 

Throughout the late fall and winter, the slow campaigning season in 

Afghanistan, the paratroopers at COP Bella received harassing fire, and 

efforts to resupply the position remained difficult. TF Rock had considered 

transferring operations of the COP from Bella to Wanat as early as their 

PDSS to Afghanistan in February 2007. However, in late 2007, neither 

CJTF-82 nor TF Bayonet made that decision despite the concerns of Major 

General Rodriguez, the commander of CJTF-82, that Bella would face 

an overwhelming attack or that a cargo helicopter would be shot down 

while resupplying the COP. Rodriguez’s successor, CJTF-101 commander 

Schloesser visited COP Bella and along with his deputy, Brigadier General 

Mark Milley, shared this apprehension. Schloesser commented later, “I 

was concerned, to be quite frank, first and foremost about Bella. It’s where 

we had the indicators that there was some massing of insurgents.”99

In the early spring of 2008, TF Bayonet moved closer to the final 

decision to evacuate Bella and to construct a new COP at Wanat. The TF 

Bayonet Executive Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Benchoff, recalled 

that on 7 March 2008, Colonel Preysler directed his staff to begin work on 

this operation. Hines recollection is that Major Jack Rich, the TF Bayonet

operations officer, told Ostlund and the TF Rock operations officer, “‘We 

really want you to look at moving to Wanat. Come up with a course of 

action. I’m going to send our brigade engineer to go recon and we’ll get this 

thing moving.’”100 At the same time, Milley recalled ongoing discussions 

between Preysler, the TF Bayonet commander, and the CJTF-101 staff 

about the closure of COP Bella and its replacement with a new outpost at 

Wanat.101

Planning for the actual construction of the combat outpost began 

in the TF Bayonet staff. The engineer site reconnaissance conducted 

in March allowed the TF Bayonet logistics section to develop a list of 
47

requirements for the new COP at Wanat. By May, Colonel Preysler then 

sent an Operational Needs Statement (ONS) to the CJTF engineer section, 

a document that requested “design support and construction” of the new 

COP. The construction of that outpost was set to begin in early June. That 

statement became part of the Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB) 

process that determined priorities, funding, and other requirements for 

construction in Afghanistan. When it became clear in May that all critical 

assets for the operation would not be available until after June, the start 

date for construction of the new base at Wanat was shifted to 1 July 2008. 

Finally, in early June, the JFUB approved the design and build plan for the 

COP at Wanat.102

The design for the COP was very detailed. In early May, the 420th 

Engineer Brigade had finalized plans for an outpost that had an inner 

perimeter surrounded by seven foot high walls and triple strand concertina 

wire. The facility would also have guard towers, hardened barracks, 

showers, and a latrine. Construction would involve both US military 

engineers and local Afghan construction contractors. The original design 

package included a detailed construction schedule that included key 

milestones and required 17 weeks for the completion of the COP. In 

June, a modified schedule was issued that reduced the schedule to eight 

weeks. While the TF Rock executive officer, engineer officer, contracting 

officer, logistics officer, and other staff members would become involved 

in coordinating construction contractors and gathering materials, the 

battalion relied on the engineer design and timeline as the overall plan for 

the construction of the new COP at Wanat.103

For leaders in TF Rock, the move to Wanat promised not only to 

solve the problems related to COP Bella but also to breathe new life into 

their effort in the Waygal Valley. The town was the Nuristani community 

located farthest south in the valley and thus was the closest to the American 

military and Afghan government facilities in the Pech Valley. The Waygal 

District Center and the ANP District Headquarters were located at Wanat, 

and a relatively modern road extended the five miles from Camp Blessing 

near Nangalam in the Pech River Valley to within one mile of Wanat. 

The final mile was unimproved but with a minimal construction effort, 

this road could be completed to provide excellent ground trafficability to 

Wanat. Ostlund later contended that he had hoped to move to the town 

since TF Rock’s arrival in 2007:

We targeted Wanat for over a year as a place where we could 

effectively progress along the lines of operation (LOOs) 

of security, governance, economic development, and IO. 
48

Wanat would position a base that was in close proximity to 

a new district center, a new police station, a market, and a 

population center and was accessible by air and ground [lines 

of communication].104

By the spring of 2008, Ostlund considered Wanat to be the right site to 

begin a series of reconstruction projects worth $1.4 million. The funding 

came from previously allocated resources which were to be used at Aranas. 

TF Rock had frozen all projects there after the Ranch House attack. Captain 

Devin George, the Chosen Company executive officer (XO), emphasized 

another benefit of an American move to Wanat which was the potential 

the town presented for the development of the ASF in the valley. George 

noted, “We would be co-located with the district government so we could 

mentor them so they could police themselves up. We wanted to help them 

develop their government so they could do something other than just 

guard the district center and not really affect anything outside of their one 

kilometer [security] bubble.”105

In conjunction with the TF Bayonet decision to begin planning the 

move, TF Rock initiated negotiations with Afghan leaders in Wanat 

beginning in April to obtain permission to use land within or adjacent 

to the village for a COP. The discussions between TF Rock and Wanat 

community leaders regarding where and when such an outpost would 

be established made the planning of the operation a protracted affair. 

Previously, the Coalition had carried out land use negotiations through the 

Afghan Ministry of Defense, which typically resulted in no payment to 

the actual landowner for the Coalition’s use of his property. This created 

considerable ill will. 

In an attempt to prevent such heavy handedness, the Army established 

Contingency Real Estate Support Teams (CREST), small groups of real 

estate specialists operating at the division/CJTF level under the staff 

engineer. These teams researched land ownership and negotiated directly 

with the landowners to ensure they received equitable and direct payments 

for use of their property. Standard procedures required that these land 

arrangements be formalized with the community and landowner prior to 

Coalition occupation.106

Appropriate for locations where security was well established, the use 

of the CREST process at Wanat was problematic. Discussions between 

TF Rock and the Wanat district leaders were formally held on 20 April, 

out of which came a document signed by the Afghans, authorizing use 

of land in the town for a new combat outpost. By this time, however, 
49

the AAF were actively operating in close proximity to the community 

and the Afghan elders and community leaders had made it clear to TF 

Rock leaders that formal arrangements would leave them exposed to the 

insurgent repercussions. The AAF would perceive the elders as having 

actively cooperated with the Coalition forces and central government of 

Afghanistan. At a shura on 26 May, these local leaders expressed a desire 

that the Coalition forces simply occupy the land and then pay for its use 

after the fact in order to provide them with political cover and deniability 

against insurgent threats. Such an approach would have provided the 

Wanat elders with a lever that they could use against the insurgents as they 

could then complain that the insurgents had not “protected” them against 

the American occupiers.107

The shura on 26 May did not go well. Both Ostlund and Myer felt 

they were being “put off” by the elders and that the meeting was being 

deliberately drawn out. The shura was not, in any measure, positive. In 

fact, in a gross violation of well established cultural traditions, the elders 

did not eat lunch with the TF Rock officers. During the return from Wanat to 

Camp Blessing, the convoy was involved in a large ambush that seriously 

wounded two paratroopers. The American officers felt that the elders had 

specifically delayed the shura so that the ambush could be established. 

A follow up shura on 8 June went no better and the American officers 

believed that only their pointed declaration of “spy planes and bombers” 

over the valley deterred another ambush. Clearly, there were elements 

within the population of Wanat and the valley that did not want Coalition 

forces to establish a base in their town.Yet the difficulties of maintaining 

COP Bella persisted and TF Rock continued to plan for the move to Wanat. 

Myer recalled that he had designated his 2d Platoon as the unit to establish 

the COP and that he and Brostrom discussed the operation frequently in 

late spring and early summer. Myer noted that on visits to Wanat for the 

shuras during this period, he and Brostrom carefully considered where to 

construct the COP and how Brostrom would position his vehicles. Their 

planning included discussions about which town officials needed to be 

engaged in the early days of the construction of the COP and how the ANP 

stationed in Wanat could be integrated into COP operations.108

Pressure to execute the move to Wanat grew in early July as the 

paratroopers of TF Bayonet approached the end of their deployment and 

began meeting the advance teams of the brigade that would replace them. 

That unit, 3d BCT, 1st Infantry Division (ID), known as TF Duke, was 

preparing to take full responsibility for the AO by the end of July 2008. 

However, TF Duke had fewer Soldiers and resources than TF Bayonet. 
50

The connection between TF Duke’s deployment and the Bella/Wanat 

operation had been on the minds of the CJTF senior staff since April 

2008. Original concerns at the CJTF level focused on the need for Colonel 

Preysler to remove the COP at Bella and establish the COP at Wanat 

before TF Bayonet departed Afghanistan. Simply put, senior Coalition 

leaders concurred with the need for the mission but did not want to give 

TF Duke, which was smaller and essentially unfamiliar with the terrain 

and population, the mission of conducting that complex operation in the 

hostile environment of the Waygal Valley. Instead, they chose to have the 

experienced units of TF Bayonet and TF Rock execute the operation in 

Bella and Wanat even if it meant that the paratroopers involved were in 

the final weeks of their extended deployment and would quickly relinquish 

the COP to their replacements. General Schloesser asserted that he chose 

TF Bayonet for the mission because the command was “the best prepared 

unit at that point, my most experienced unit in Afghanistan, and there was 

no one who knows Konar and Nuristan like them.”109 Colonel Preysler, 

the TF Bayonet commander, contended that the need to position TF Duke

for success was the overwhelming reason for his decision to launch the 

operation in Wanat in the final weeks of TF Bayonet’s tour in northeast 

Afghanistan. Agreeing with Preysler were Battalion Commander Ostlund 

and Company Commander Myer.110

The 4 July Attack on Bella

While TF Rock prepared to evacuate COP Bella, the battalion’s 

intelligence officers expected an insurgent attack on the outpost. This 

belief seemed to be realized on 3 July when an insurgent mortar round 

severely wounded Specialist Gabriel Green at Bella. When the AAF 

launched yet another mortar attack the next day, Myer directed a team of 

two AH-64 Apache gunships to fire on a pair of pickup trucks believed to 

be fleeing from the AAF mortar firing position. The Apaches destroyed 

the trucks and the mortar fires on Bella, which had been increasing for 

several weeks, ceased. In the remaining four days of Bella’s occupation, 

the AAF initiated no further attacks on the closing outpost. Seemingly, the 

air strikes had broken the back of the pending enemy attack and, in fact, 

signals intelligence which was later confirmed by Schloesser, indicated 

that the insurgent leader in the Waygal District, Mullah Osman, had in fact, 

been wounded in the counterstrikes and several insurgents were killed. 

Thus the Apache attack disrupted the insurgent command and control at a 

critical time.111

Despite this, and predictably, AAF propaganda portrayed the Apache 

attack as yet another instance of a callous and indiscriminate American 
51

attack on innocent civilians, since the attack had apparently killed 

and injured several civilians who were also in the targeted trucks. The 

insurgents claimed that the Apaches arbitrarily attacked the members of 

the staff of the Bella Medical Clinic, who were simply fleeing the area in 

response to a Coalition warning to evacuate in advance of the closure of 

the Bella COP. The insurgents were supported in their claims by both the 

Nuristani provincial governor, Tamin Nuristani, and the Waygal District 

Chief, Ziaul Rahman. When Nuristani appeared on the Al-Jazeera Arabic 

television network with his claims three days before the attack on Wanat, 

Afghan President Hamid Karzai summarily removed him as provincial 

governor.112

TF Rock and TF Bayonet officers unhesitatingly contend that UAV 

coverage clearly revealed that the engaged vehicles were fleeing from 

confirmed indirect fire attack sites that were actively harassing COP Bella. 

To support the assertion that enemy mortar crews had been inside the trucks, 

TF Rock noted a cessation of insurgent indirect fire attacks following the 4 

July helicopter strike. Ostlund stated that forensic examinations conducted 

on some of those killed disclosed the presence of gunpowder, that weapons 

were found within the vehicles, and that TF Rock believed some of the 

dead to be known insurgents. However, because the vehicles allegedly 

contained at least one identified guard from the Bella Medical Clinic, the 

presence of gunpowder and weapons could be explained otherwise. Pry, 

the TF Rock Intelligence Officer, asserted that the pickup trucks initially 

contained civilians departing from Bella but that insurgents forced their 

way on board to provide them with “human shields” to facilitate their 

escape from the attack site and in effect launched their attack to lure the 

Americans into causing civilian casualties. The CJTF-101 commander 

recognized, however, that in striking at the insurgents in the pickup trucks, 

the helicopter gunships had killed civilians.113

The relationship of the 4 July incident to the later action at Wanat is 

a matter of some dispute. The AR 15-6 investigation conducted by TF 

Bayonet ultimately concluded that there was “insufficient evidence” to 

prove that there were non combatant civilians among the casualties in the 

pickup trucks but the investigation did keep Myer away from Wanat for 

several days.114

Despite the controversy and TF Bayonet’s attempt to address the 

issues raised by some local Afghan leaders, Pry thought the incident had 

minimal impact: 

The amazing thing was the lack of outcry. Yes, some people 

were mad because some civilians were hurt. No one disputes 
52

the fact that there were some civilians there. What was 

amazing is that almost everyone that was hurt was brought 

back to Blessing. They conducted first aid on most of them 

and I think one or two of them were MEDEVAC’d [medically 

evacuated] through US means. They found vehicles for the 

rest through the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and 

drove them out to Asadabad. We tried to question everyone 

who was there and one of the common themes was that they 

were made to do it. They said, “They hopped in our vehicles. 

They shot at you guys and then they ran back in the vehicles.” 

As the helicopters flew by, I think someone even shot at one of 

them. It became clear pretty quick that civilians were involved 

but they were unwilling participants with the AAF that were 

conducting an attack. They were put in harm’s way and almost 

used as shields.... When we were talking to everybody, they 

told us how many people were in the vehicles and there were 

four males aged 20 to 30 who we couldn’t account for. No one 

would say who they were because they were all scared to talk 

about it. It wasn’t like the valley turned against us after that.115 

Despite Pry’s view, one Afghan media source claimed that the incident 

enraged other provincial officials who threatened to shut down the 

local government in protest. A former Wanat resident told an American 

journalist, “The [US] air attack on 4 July opened a way among the people 

for the militants to preach against US forces.”116

From afar, former Waygal Valley resident Sami Nuristani contended 

that there was a direct correlation between the event at COP Bella and the 

subsequent attack on Wanat:

I think July 4 was a disaster both for the people of Waygal 

Valley and the Coalition forces. The aftermath of the Bella 

incident led to the [Wanat] attack, the link is very obvious[ly] 

mostly caused by the anger over the death of innocent civilians 

in Bella. I have known two of the deceased in that incident. 

Most people believe that the locals were so angered by the 

Bella incident that they even cooperated (or simply did not 

report to the Americans) with those who attacked the [Wanat] 

outpost. The attack certainly changed people’s support for the 

US Army given the fact that they killed the very people who 

had helped them or were very cooperative to them.117
53

There is some circumstantial evidence supporting this assertion. When 

Brostrom arrived at Wanat on 8 July 2008, one of the first acts by the local 

Afghan elders was to hand him a list of the casualties from the helicopter 

attack. The platoon leader forwarded the names to Myer. Clearly, the 

attack was very much on the minds of Wanat leaders.118

TF Rock did try to mitigate any tensions caused by the attack by 

arranging for a meeting between unit leaders and the local ANP chief, the 

district governor, and the local ANA battalion commander. The Afghan 

officials reviewed the forensic evidence confirming the gunpowder 

residue on some of the victims and then went on local radio to offer the 

Coalition version of the events surrounding the attack. Neither TF Rock

nor TF Bayonet leaders, however, offered formal apologies. To complicate 

matters for TF Bayonet, another Coalition air attack on what was later 

determined to be a wedding party in adjacent Nangarhar Province on 6 

July resulted in numerous civilian casualties.119

The 4 July attack took place in the midst of the final preparations for 

ROCK MOVE, the operation to close Bella and occupy a position at Wanat. 

Originally projected for execution on 1 July, the operation was delayed 

because of illumination conditions. This meant that the paratroopers of 

2-503d IN would have to execute the operation even closer to the end of 

their tour of duty in Afghanistan.120

The Decision to Execute Operation ROCK MOVE

In early July 2008, the first Soldiers of TF Duke began arriving in 

Konar Province and started the formal transition process with TF Rock. 

Against this background, the TF Rock leaders and staff officers put the 

finishing touches on the plan to disestablish the COP at Bella and establish 

a new COP at Wanat. TF Rock assigned this operation—ROCK MOVE—

to Chosen Company. ROCK MOVE was classified as a Level One 

Contingency Operation, one which required resources from outside TF 

Bayonet such as UAV and other intelligence collection support, as well 

as higher level coordination to integrate those assets. Such operations 

required approval from the CJTF-101 commander, Schloesser. On 3 July 

2008, Schloesser approved the general concept of the operation.121

However, the details of the operation required the approval of 

Schloesser’s Deputy, Milley. Ostlund briefed the ROCK MOVE plan first 

to his brigade commander, Preysler, on 6 July 2008 and then to Milley 

the next day. Myer attended the latter briefing remotely as he was still 

acting as the on site commander at Bella. Ostlund recalled questions about 

the weather and the support that would be available to Brostrom and his 
54

men if they were attacked while establishing the new COP at Wanat. In 

the briefing, Ostlund explained that he and his staff had mitigated those 

concerns by reinforcing the US platoon with a platoon of 24 Afghan 

soldiers. For local fire support, the TF Rock commander planned to attach 

a mortar section equipped with a 120-mm mortar and a 60-mm mortar, 

and a vehicle-mounted TOW missile launcher to Brostrom’s command. 

Additionally, Ostlund intended that Myer’s company headquarters would 

co-locate with the platoon at Wanat, which would also have the priority of 

fires during the operation from the two 155-mm howitzers located at Camp 

Blessing and two at Asadabad. A Predator UAV and other intelligence 

platforms would provide the platoon information about the Wanat area and 

offer early warning of any impending attack. Convinced that the plan was 

complete and comprehensive, Milley approved it and ordered TF Rock to 

execute ROCK MOVE beginning the next day, 8 July 2008.122

In terms of the enemy threat, the ROCK MOVE planners considered 

the greatest threat to the operation to be an attack on Bella while it was 

being evacuated that either disrupted the operation or shot down one of 

the transport helicopters moving supplies and troops. Considered equally 

dangerous was an ambush of the 2d Platoon while it moved by road 

to Wanat or immediately after it arrived there. On the other hand, the 

intelligence specialists and combat commanders felt that the most likely 

enemy activity during the course of the operation would be possible mortar 

and small arms sniping at ground personnel and aircraft at both Bella 

and Wanat and possible ambushes and IED attacks on the road between 

Camp Blessing and Wanat. TF Rock expected to have sufficient available 

manpower and firepower to repulse or neutralize these likely insurgent 

efforts at disrupting the execution of ROCK MOVE.123

By this time, Chosen Company’s tour of duty in the Waygal Valley 

was down to about two weeks. All of the paratroopers’ personal gear with 

the exception of their weapons, rucksacks, and combat equipment, had 

been shipped home. Chosen Company and TF Rock had spent over 14 

months conducting complex and intensive counterinsurgency operations 

in the Waygal Valley. By the summer of 2008, the Soldiers of Chosen 

Company and TF Rock were more than familiar with the AAF that they 

fought against. Indeed, TF Rock reported that the company had fought 

48 engagements with the enemy in the Waygal Valley during those 14 

months. Only eight of those actions had been initiated by the Coalition. 

The Soldiers of TF Rock knew how the insurgents fought, they understood 

their tactics and how they preferred to employ their weapons, and they 

respected the AAF as tough, determined, committed, and skilled fighters. 
55

However, as noted earlier, actual interaction between the population and 

the paratroopers had been limited. Generally, Chosen Company’s time in 

the Waygal Valley had proven to be frustrating, and after 14 months of 

operations, progress was difficult to measure.124

Viewed from beyond the confines of the Waygal Valley, TF Rock had 

experienced considerable success with a counterinsurgency approach in 

its AO, much of that based on road construction and expansion in the 

Pech and Konar Valleys. The paratroopers of TF Rock had achieved some 

progress in the considerably more volatile Korengal Valley, one of the 

task force’s main efforts. However, concomitant success was not achieved 

within the Waygal Valley, where the Soldiers of Chosen Company found 

themselves devoting a great amount of effort to their own security. The 

actions of the enemy and the reactions of the US Soldiers in the valley led 

to more than a modicum of mutual distrust between the Soldiers and the 

Waygal Valley population. Against this background, the withdrawal from 

COP Bella and the occupation of COP Kahler in Wanat moved forward.
56

Notes

 1. Frank L. Holt, Into the Land of Bones, Alexander the Great in Afghanistan

(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005); John Prevas, Envy of the 

Gods, Alexander the Great’s Ill-Fated Journey Across Asia (Cambridge, MA: Da 

Capo Press, 2004); Shaista Wahab and Barry Youngerman, A Brief History of 

Afghanistan (New York, NY: Facts on File, 2007), 43.

 2. Information on Nuristan predominantly comes from three sources: Max 

Klimburg, “The Situation in Nuristan,” Central Asian Survey 20, no. 3 (2001): 

383–390; Richard V. Weekes, ed., “Nuristani,” in Muslim Peoples, A World 

Ethnographic Survey (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 292–297; and 

Richard F. Strand, “The Current Political Situation in Nuristan,” http://users.

sedona.net/~strand/Current.html (accessed 12 February 2009).

 3. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst 

of a Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 107.

 4. Dr. David Katz of the Naval War College, an expert on Nuristan, reviewed 

this chapter. Also see David J. Katz, Kafir to Afghan: Religious Conversion, 

Political Incorporation and Ethnicity in the Väygal Valley, Nuristan (Ph.D. 

Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1982); Schuyler Jones, Men of 

Influence in Nuristan: A Study of Social Control and Dispute Settlement in Waygal 

Valley, Afghanistan (New York: Seminar Press, 1974), 25. The village of Wanat 

itself is located at a height of 3773 feet. See Katz, 74. The boundary between 

Nuristan and Konar in the Waygal Valley has been controversial. On some maps 

the boundary appears north of Wanat, making the village a part of the Pech 

district of Konar Province. The Nuristanis consider the ethnic boundary to be the 

provincial boundary. The central government tacitly agreed to this interpretation 

as the district capital for the Waygal District of Nuristan is now considered to 

be Wanat and a new district center was built there in 2007. The Nuristanis claim 

any place where Nuristanis live to be de facto parts of Nuristan including large 

areas of northeastern Kunar Province. Ironically, large parts of western Nuristan 

contain Pashai-speaking inhabitants.

5. Christine Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan: The 

Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan (1826-1863) (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 

2004), 37. The British and Russians drew up the Durand Line in 1894 to mark 

the western border of British India with Afghanistan and effectively make an 

indsependent Afghanistan into a buffer state between the two great powers.

 6. Combat actions in the Konar Valley region are documented in Colonel 

Lester W. Grau, ed., The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics 

in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996); 

Colonel Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: 

Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (Quantico, VA: US Marine Corps, 

1995); Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great 

to the Fall of the Taliban (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002), 245–246. 
57

For more on the timber criminal interests in Nuristan, see Antonio Giustozzi, 

Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan

(New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 64–65. The destruction of the 

Nuristan forests and looting of the timber to finance the mujahedeen during the 

Soviet-Afghanistan War is briefly discussed in Rob Chultheis, Night Letters, 

Inside Wartime Afghanistan (New York: Orion Books, 1992), 124–126. The 

current use by the Taliban of gemstones and timber to finance their operations 

has been recently discussed in Animesh Roul, “Gems, Timber, and Jiziya: 

Pakistan’s Taliban Harness Resources to Fund Jihad,” Terrorism Monitor 7, 

no. 11 (30 April 2009), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ 

ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34928&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=4d18

a44d9a (accessed 13 October 2009). For a good first person account of the Pech 

uprising against the Marxists and Soviets, see David B. Edwards, Before Taliban: 

Geneologies of the Afghan Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 

132-166.

 7. Katz, 77.

8. Wahab and Youngerman, A Brief History of Afghanistan, 16–17. 

9. Sami Nuristani, e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 March 2009. Dr. David Katz has carefully reviewed the 

discussion of these ethnic groups. The Pashai, who live in the Korengal Valley, 

in parts of the Pech Valley west of Nangalam and in western Nuristan, speak 

a separate Indic (Dardic) language (Pashai). For the purposes of this study, the 

Pashai and Safi Pashtun are discussed together. For a detailed discussion of the 

Nuristani people of the Waygal Valley, see Katz, Kafir to Afghan. 

10. Katz, 133, 155-6, 176-7.

11. This anthropological discussion is provided for background information, 

but has no direct bearing on the Battle of Wanat.

 12. Lennart Edelberg, “The Nuristani House,” in Cultures of the HinduKush, Selected Papers from the Hindu-Kush Cultural Conference Held at 

Moesgard 1970, edited by Karl Jettmar (Wiesbaden, Germany: Franz Steiner 

Verlag, 1974), 120.

13. First Lieutenant Erik Jorgensen, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, 

2007.

14. “Pashai,” World Culture Encyclopedia, http://www.everyculture.com/

Africa-Middle-East/Pashai.html (accessed 12 February 2009).

15. Max Klimburg, “The Enclaved Culture of Parun in Former Kafiristan,” 

Asien 104 (July 2007): 70.

16. George H. Wittman, “Afghan Proving Ground,” The American Spectator, 

6 March 2009, http://spectator.org/archives/2009/03/06/afghan-proving-ground/

print (accessed 6 March 2009).
58

17. Katz, 135, 174, 213, 246-250, 256; Marcus Luttrell, Lone Survivor: The 

Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10

(New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2007), 285-6.

18. Mohammad Yousaf, Afghanistan, The Bear Trap (Havertown, PA: 

Casemate, 2001), 40–41, 105, 119, 208; Seth G. Jones, In The Graveyard of 

Empires, America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 

2009), 30–34; Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, xviii–xix. The same term is 

used by Jones, 77–79.

19. Captain Benjamin Pry, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 May 2009, 6; For discussions of local 

fighters, see Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, 41.

20. Note that this assessment is an expansion of that promulgated by Giustozzi, 

Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, 33–43, and supported by the insightful analysis 

provided by Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 83–87; Giustozzi, Koran, 

Kalashnikov, and Laptop, 35, 68, 101; Jones, In The Graveyard of Empires, 228. 

21. Senate Committee, Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, 

Senate Armed Services Committee, Tuesday, September 23, 2008, 6; Department 

of the Army G3, US Army Troop Levels in OEF Spreadsheet, 2008.

22. Robert Burns, “Mullen: Afghanistan Isn’t Top Priority,” USA Today, 

11 December 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-12-11-

3963072919_x.htm (accessed 6 November 2009).

23. CJTF-82, “CJTF-82 Command Brief,” 14 February 2008, slide 7.

24. CJTF-82, “CJTF-82 Command Brief,” 14 February 2008, slides 9, 23; 

Brigadier General Mark Milley, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison and Dr. 

William G. Robertson, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 and 

20 August 2009, 33.

25. CJTF 82, “Tier I OPD AAR” Briefing, undated, RC-East Geometry slide.

26. Major General Jeffrey Schloesser, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison and 

Robert Ramsey, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 August 2009, 

1–3; Milley, interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 4–5.

27. The 1-503d Infantry had previously served under TF Fury (4th BCT, 

82d Airborne Division). When TF Currahee (4th BCT, 101st Airborne Division) 

replaced TF Fury in April 2008, the paratrooper battalion continued to serve under 

the new brigade until it redeployed in July 2008.

28. Milley, interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 33.

29. Schloesser, interview, 5 August 2009, 3.

30. CJTF-82, “CJTF-82 Command Brief,” 14 February 2008, slide 16.

31. Sergeant Major D. Utley, “Konar Valley,” Long Hard Road, NCO 

Experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq (Fort Bliss, TX: US Army Sergeants Major 

Academy, October 2007), 53–56.
59

32. For Luttrell’s experience see Marcus Luttrell, Lone Survivor: The

Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10

(New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2007).

 33. Colonel Michael A. Coss, “Operation Mountain Lion: CJTF-76 in 

Afghanistan, Spring 2006,” Military Review (January–February 2008): 26.

34. 3d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Spartan Review, 

After Action Report, Afghanistan 06–07, Fort Drum, NY, May 2007, 5-4, 6-24.

35. 3d BCT, 10th Mountain Division, Spartan Review, page 5-16. A FOB is 

formally defined by the US Army as any secured forward position that is used to 

support tactical operations. The term “combat outpost” is not formally defined 

by the US Army, but is generally used to describe any post that is smaller or less 

permanent than a FOB. In practice, Soldiers of all ranks tend to use the two terms 

interchangeably.

36. The “ink line” strategy is fully articulated in Kilcullen, Accidental 

Guerrilla, 87–95; and in Douglas R. Cubbison, “The Crossed Swords Tribe of 

Afghanistan: The 10th Mountain Division and Counterinsurgency Excellent in 

Afghanistan, 2006,” 57–62 (unpublished manuscript).

37. Colonel Christopher Cavoli, e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 March 2009. 

38. Captain Matthew Myer and and First Lieutenant Matthew Ferrera, 

interview by Major David Hanson, 305th Military History Detachment, Camp 

Blessing, Afghanistan, c. August-Septembetr 2007, 5. As early as November 2003 

US Army Rangers and troops from the 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, had 

first visited Aranas at the same time that Camp Blessing (originally called Camp 

Catamount) was first established. 

39. The area of Bella was also familiar to US forces prior to the 

establishment of a COP there. In October 2003, the US Air Force bombed 

a house in the village of Tazagul Kala, just south of Bella. The house was 

presumed to be occupied by HiG leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In November 

2003, US Army troops from the 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, surveyed 

the site of the bombing. While close associates of Hekmatyar had been killed 

in the airstrike, the HiG leader himself had not been present. See “Uphill 

Pursuit for Afghan Warlord,’ Christian Science Monitor, 22 December 2003, 

http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1222/p06s01-wosc.html/(page)/CSM-PhotoGalleries/In-Pictures/Space-Photos-of-the-Day/Space-photos-of-the-day-06-22 

(accessed 17 July 2010); Kevin Dougherty, “10th Mountain Division Improves 

Base for Incoming Unit,” Stars and Stripes, May 15, 2007, http://www.stripes.

com/news/10th-mountain-division-improves-base-for-incoming-unit-1.64019 

(accessed 17 August 2010). 

40. The three soldiers were Specialist Rogelio R. Garza, Jr., Private First 

Class Andrew R. Small, and Private First Class. James P. White, Jr. See “Three 

Soldiers Killed in Enemy Attack,” DiversityinBusiness.com,
60

http://www.diversityinbusiness.com/Military/Casualties/2006/Mil_Cas_20608.

htm (accessed on 16 August 2010).

41. Captain Andrew Glenn, e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 August 2009; Cavoli, e-mail, 15 March 2009.

42. Glenn email, 20 August 2009.

43. Captain Andrew Glenn, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 April 2009, 1–4. When Wanat was 

searched following the 13 July 2008 engagement, they discovered memorabilia 

from this project including a 27th Engineer Battalion commemorative coin. See 

Major Scott Himes, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 April 2009, 4.

 44. Cavoli, e-mail, 15 March 2009. Typically insurgent activity in Afghanistan 

was greatly reduced in the winter.

45. Cavoli, e-mail.

46. First Sergeant Jamie Nakano, “1SG Jamie Nakano, Infantry,” in Afghan 

Company Commander After Action Review Book, Operation Enduring Freedom 

VII, ed. Lieutenant Colonel Tony Burgess, 64 (West Point, NY: US Army Center 

for Company Level Leaders, US Military Academy, 2007). 

47. Himes, interview, 25 April 2009, 2.

48. Edward F. Murphy, Dak To, The 173d Airborne Brigade in South 

Vietnam’s Central Highlands, June–November 1967 (Novata, CA: Presidio Press, 

1993); Bob Breen, First To Fight, Australian Diggers, New Zealand Kiwis and 

US Paratroopers in Vietnam, 1965–1966 (Nashville: The Battery Press, 1988). 

49. Corporal Tyler M. Stafford, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 February 2009.

50. Colonel Charles Preysler, interview by Major Kevin Ellson, Center for 

Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Theater Observation Detachment Liaison Officer 

to Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 101, 3 September 2008, https://call2.army.

mil/toc.asp?document=4655 (accessed 18 February 2009). 

51. Preysler, interview, 3 September 2008.

52. Colonel William Ostlund, interview by Contemporary Operations Study 

Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19–20 March 2009, 4.

53. Milley, interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 13.

54. Lieutenant Colonel Jimmy Hinton, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 March 2009, 10; Schloesser, 

interview, 5 August 2009, 5; Milley, interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 15–16; 

Himes, interview, 25 April 2009, 2; Major Brian T. Beckno, interview by Douglas 

R. Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 July 2009, 4–5; 

Exhibit 6a (Operations Officer, 2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal 

District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 9.
61

55. The 3-103 AR replaced a previous ARNG organization with the same 

mission, 1-158th IN, from Arizona, which had deployed in March 2007 and also 

been attached to TF Bayonet. The 1-158th IN had, in turn, replaced a Connecticut 

ARNG unit, 1-102d IN, which had originated the Laghman mission in December 

2006. 

56. The population figures are from Afghanistan Research and Evaluation 

Unit, “Updated Population Estimates for Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Research 

Newsletter, http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_frontpage& 

Itemid=25 (accessed 13 August 2009). There is no census for Afghanistan so 

these numbers are approximate. 

57. Colonel Charles Preysler, interview by Major Kevin Ellson, 

3 September 2008, US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 8 September 2008.

58. 2-503d IN, “Thoughts on COIN/OEF VIII” Briefing, slide 16; “Updated 

Population Estimates for Afghanistan;” TF Rock, “NTC Observer Controller” 

Briefing, 12 December 2007, slide 17; TF Rock, TF Rock RIP/TOA Back Brief,” 

16 June 2008, slide entitled “TF Rock Pre-RIP.”

59. Ostlund, interview, 19–20 March 2009, 8, 15; Michael Moore and 

James Fussell, Afghanistan Report 1: Kunar and Nuristan: Rethinking US 

Counterinsurgency Operations (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 

2009), 21, 31, http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Afghanistan_Report_1.pdf 

(accessed 5 April 2010).

60. TF Rock, “TIC Asset Tracker” Spreadsheet, 22 July 2008.

61. TF Rock, “TIC Asset Tracker” Spreadsheet, 22 July 2008; Exhibit 16a 

(Captain, Company Commander, 2d Platoon, C Company, 2-503d IN, interview) 

to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action 

at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 36-7; TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE,” PowerPoint Presentation, 

7 July 2008, slide 9; Chosen Company’s sector was expanded to include COP 

Michigan about halfway through its tour when TF Saber, the unit to the right 

(northeast) of TF Rock transferred one of its troops to TF Raptor (the Brigade 

Special Troops Battalion) in Nangarhar Province and TF Rock then assumed 

responsibility for two districts in Kunar Province formerly in AO Saber. Able 

Company’s boundaries were adjusted to include these new districts and Chosen 

company assumed responsibility for COP Michigan and received the 1st Platoon, 

Destined Company, formerly attached to Able Company, to garrison the COP. See 

Exhibit 30b (COL, Deputy Brigade Commander, 173d ABCT, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 65.

62. Major Brian Beckno, e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 29 July 2009.
62

63. John J. McGrath, Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency 

Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 148.

64. Colonel William Ostlund, e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 February 2009. 

65. 2-503d IN, “Thoughts on COIN” Briefing, slide 15.

66. Ostlund, interview, 19–20 March 2009, 4, 5.

67. Ostlund, 5.

68. Colonel William B. Ostlund, “Tactical Leader Lessons Learned in 

Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom VIII,” Military Review (July–August 

2009): 9.

69. Linda D. Kozaryn, “New Weapons Cache Found: Oruzgan Deaths 

Investigated,” Defend America, 8 July 2002, http://www.defendamerica.mil/

archive/2002-07/20020708.html (accessed 19 November 2009). Every US action 

in Nuristan resulted in an enemy claim of massive civilian casualties. A prime 

example is the 6 April 2008 raid against an insurgent stronghold in the town of 

Shok in Doab District in western Nuristan by US SF and Afghan Commandos. The 

six hour firefight was so intense that ten SF soldiers were later awarded the Silver 

Star Medal for the action. Yet articles appearing in Islamic and European news 

sources soon claimed the US forces had “massacred” civilians indiscriminately. In 

reality, the insurgents had no reservations about using civilians as human shields. 

This situation reoccurred during the 4 July 2008 Bella action, which is discussed 

later in this work. See “Narrative from Shok Valley Battle in Afghanistan,” Army 

Times, 15 December 2008, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/12/army_

battlenarrative_121508w/ (accessed on 19 July 2010); and “The Massacre in 

the Do’ab District, Nuristan,” RAWA News, 29 April 2008, http://www.rawa.org/

temp/runews/2008/04/29/the-massacre-in-the-do-8217-ab-district-nuristan.html 

(accessed on 19 July 2010).

70. Human Rights Watch, “Troops In Contact”: Airstrikes and Civilian 

Deaths in Afghanistan (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2008), 13; Carlotta 

Gall and Abdul Waheed Wafa, “9 From One Family Die in U.S. Strike Near Kabul,” 

New York Times, 6 March 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/06/world/

asia/06afghan.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=march%206%202007%20gall&st=cse 

(accessed 20 November 2009); Gall and Wafa, “9 From One Family Die in U.S. 

Strike Near Kabul;” The briefing used by TF Bayonet to explain the 2007 Rules 

of Engagement was titled “TF Bayonet CDRs ROE Refresher” and was dated 15 

May 2007.

71. The Taliban practice of shielding has been documented in Human Rights 

Watch, “Troops In Contact”: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan, 25–

28.

72. Elizabeth Rubin, “Battle Company is Out There,” New York Times, 24 

February 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/magazine/24afghanistan-t.

html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 (accessed 20 November 2009); Rubin, “Battle 
63

Company is Out There.” In a recent work, Sebastian Junger, a reporter then 

embedded with Battle Company, presents this incident more sharply. Yaka China 

was an insurgent stronghold and US airstrikes were ordered only after surveillance 

sources directly saw enemy groups moving in and around specific locations in the 

village. See Sebastian Junger, War (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2010), 

94-100.

73. Captain Matthew Myer, e-mail to Donald P. Wright, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 December 2009.

74. 2-503d IN, “Thoughts on COIN” Briefing, slide 25.

75. 2-503d IN, “2d Battalion (ABN), 503d IN, 173d ABCT, AO Rock 

Overview, 26 July 2008” Briefing, slide 93.

76. Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, “Westerners Play Pivotal Role in Afghan 

Rebuilding,” National Public Radio Morning Edition transcript, 20 May 2008, 

http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=90599416 

(accessed 20 November 2009). 

77. Carter Malkasian and Gerald Meyerle, Provincial Reconstruction Teams: 

How Do We Know They Work? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

2009), 19. 

78. 2-503d IN, “2d Battalion (ABN), 503d IN, 173d ABCT, AO Rock 

Overview, 26 July 2008” Briefing, slide 92; “TF Rock/ PRT Nuristan,” June 2008, 

PowerPoint briefing, slides 4, 7. Although Wanat is in Nuristan Province, the 

Konar PRT supervised this project based on geographical expediency. 

79. Captain Matthew Myer, interview by Matt Matthews, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 December 2008, 1; Sergeant First Class 

David Dzwik, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 2 April 2009, 11; 2-503d IN, “Thoughts on COIN” Briefing, 

slide 9; Exhibit 33b (Platoon Sergeant, 2d Platoon, C Company, 2-503d IN, 

interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 21-2.

80. 1LT Jonathan Brostrom and SSG David Dzwik, interview with Major 

David Hanson and Sergeant Wickham, 305th Military History Detachment, 

Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 2 May 2008.

81. Sergeant Brandon Aird, “Medic Recognized for Actions During Insurgent 

Assault,” Outlook 41, no. 15 (15 April 2008): 1; Sergeant Brandon Aird, “Sky 

Soldier Awarded Distinguished Service Cross,” Army.mil/news, http://www.army.

mil/-news/2008/09/17/12493-sky-soldier-awarded-distinguished-service-cross/ 

(accessed 19 February 2009).

82. Video of the Taliban “attacking” the vacant Ranch House position 

is available at http://theunjustmedia.com/clips/afgha/July08/noor/noor.htm 

(accessed January 2010).
64

Conversations between Douglas R. Cubbison and Sami Nuristani in summer 2009 

noted that the video remains widely popular and frequently viewed in Afghanistan. 

83. Major David S. Hanselman. “The Bella Ambush 9-10 November 2007: 

Bravery Under Fire,” unpublished paper presented at the Conference of Army 

Historians, Arlington, VA, 30 July 2009. 

84. TF Rock, “TIC Asset Tracker” Spreadsheet, 22 July 2008.

85. Pry, interview, 6 May 2009, 4.

86. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 3.

87. Pry, interview, 6 May 2009, 4.

88. Ostlund, interview, 19–20 March 2009, 10.

89. Ostlund, interview.

90. 2-503d IN, “2d Battalion (ABN), 503d IN, 173d ABCT, AO Rock 

Overview, 26 July 2008” Briefing; “1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment” Web 

site, http://www.drum.army.mil/sites/tenants/division/3BCT/1-32INF/afghan.asp 

(accessed 22 September 2009). 

91. Staff Sergeant Erich Phillips and Specialist Jason Baldwin, interview by 

Master Sergeant Richard Gribenas, 305th Military History Detachment, 7 October 

2007, 13.

92. TF Rock, 07 11 24 Aranus Shura, Posted, 2 December 2007, 1.

93. TF Rock, 07 11 24 Aranus Shura.

94. TF Rock, 07 12 15 Aranus Shura 15DEC07, 16 December 2007.

95. Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation on SFC Kahler KIA, contained 

within CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat 

(Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, 21 October 

2008).

96. Sergeant Erik Aass, interview by Matt Matthews, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 January 2009, 4. 

97. AR 15-6 Investigation on SFC Kahler KIA, 21 October 2008; Aass, 

interview, 13 January 2009, 4; Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009. 3.

98. Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 66. Kilcullen’s entire second chapter 

on Afghanistan, 2006–2008, comprehensively addresses this topic, so crucial to 

comprehending events in the Waygal Valley in June and July 2008; Katz, Kafir to 

Afghan, passim. 

99. Schloesser, interview, 5 August 2009, 5, 6.

 100. Himes, interview, 25 April 2009, 3. 

101. Milley, interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 17; Exhibit 21b, (LTC, 

Brigade XO, 173d ABCT, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), 

“Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, 

Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 5.
65

102. Exhibit 18 (Operational Needs Statement) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal 

District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted); Exhibit 

22a (Major, Brigade Engineer, 173d ABCT, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal 

District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), l0-12; 

Exhibit 26 (Summary of the Construction of the US Portion of COP Wanat) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted). 9-11; Colonel William Ostlund, email to Donald P. Wright, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 September 2010.

103. Exhibit 6a (Major, Operations Officer, 2-503d IN, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action 

at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 

2008 (Redacted), 15; Exhibit 14b (Major, Battalion XO, 2-503d IN) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 10-11, 23-25; Exhibit 27a (CPT, Battalion S4, 2-503d IN, interview) 

to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action 

at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 7-9; Exhibit 26 (Summary of the Construction of the US Portion of 

COP Wanat) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted). 19; Exhibit 51b (CPT, Contracting Coordinator, 

HHC/ 2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Reinvestigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan 

Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted). Passim; 

104. Lieutenant Colonel William Ostlund and Captain Matthew Myer, joint 

e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

23 March 2009. 

105. Captain Devin George, interview by Matt Matthews, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 October 2008, 5; Lieutenant Colonel William 

Ostlund and Captain Matthew Myer, joint e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 March 2009.

106. Lieutenant Colonel Julian Smith, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 June 2009, 5–6. 

107. Lieutenant Colonel William Ostlund, “Battle of Wanat Storyboard and 

Brief” Briefing, 16 July 2008, slide 3; Exhibit 61 (LTC, 2-503d IN, statement), 

CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, 

Unclassified Version)” (Camp Blessing Afghanistan, 17 July 2008), 1; Exhibit 

23 (Authorization from Wanat District Leadership to Build a Coalition Combat 

Outpost, 20 April 2008) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation 

into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, 

Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted).
66

108. Ostlund, “Battle of Wanat Storyboard and Brief” Briefing, 16 July 2008, 

slide 3; 108. Myer, e-mail, 18 November 2009.

109. Schloesser, interview, 5 August 2009, 7.

110. Schloesser; Milley, interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 17; Colonel 

Charles Preysler, e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 5 May 2009, 5.

111. Ostlund, “Battle of Wanat Storyboard and Brief” Briefing, 16 July 

2008, slide 4; Schloesser, interview, 5 August 2009, 6; Ostlund, e-mails, 24 

February 2009 and 8 May 2009; Exhibit 106 (“AR 15-6 Investigation (Findings 

and Recommendations)—COP Bella Allegation of Non-Combatant Casualties, 

4 July 2008”), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of 

Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (FOB Fenty, Afghanistan, 26 July 

2008).

112. “Karzai Axes Leader for US Rebuke,” Al Jezeera.

net, 10 July 2008, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/

Karzai+’axes+leader+for+US+rebuke’.-a0181341406 (accessed on 19 July 

2010); for the anti-American view of the incident, see “The Massacre at Aranas 

on the Waygal River, Nuristan Province,” RAWA News, 16 July 2008, http://

www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2008/07/16/the-massacre-at-aranas-on-the-waygalriver-nuristan-province.html?e=http:/amyru.h18.ru/images/cs.txt? (accessed 

19 February 2009). The International Medical Corps, which operated the Bella 

Medical Clinic, stated in a news release dated 8 July 2008 that “three of its staff 

members were killed, and another severely injured” and that “the International 

Medical Corps personnel were killed while leaving their village following 

warnings of an imminent attack.” This press release claimed that the dead were 

Dr. Nemetalluh, Nurse Naeem, and Dr. Najeebullah and that one of the seriously 

wounded was a Dr. Zainab.See International Medical Corps Press Release, 

“International Medical Corps Mourns the Loss of Three Humanitarian Workers 

in Afghanistan; Another Injured,” http://www.imcworldwide.org.uk/news.asp? 

pageid=5&nid=2 (accessed 14 August 2009).

113. Exhibit 106, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into 

Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (FOB Fenty, Afghanistan, 26 

July 2008). Ostlund, e-mails, 24 February 2009 and 8 May 2009; Pry, interview, 

6 May 2009, 4-5.

114. Myer, interview, 1 December 2008, 6; Exhibit 106, CJTF-101, “Army 

Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified 

Version)” (FOB Fenty, Afghanistan, 26 July 2008), 7.

115. Pry Interview, 6 May 2009, 5.

116. David Tate, “US Had Warning of Attack in Nuristan,” A Battlefield 

Tourist, 28 July 2008, http://www.battlefieldtourist.com/content/2008/07/ 

(accessed 2 April 2009); Omer Sami, Moeed Hashimi, and Wali Salarzai, 

“NATO Airstrike Kills 22 Civilians in Nuristan,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 5 July 
67

2008, http://www.pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=57969 (accessed 16 

November 2009).

117. Nuristani, e-mail, 2 March 2009.

118. Aass, interview, 13 January 2009, 4.

119. Ostlund and Myer, e-mail, 23 March 2009; “US Planes Hit Afghan 

Wedding Party, Killing 27,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 7 July 2008, 

http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/us-planes-hit-afghan-wedding-party-ki

lling-27/2008/07/07/1215282687896.html (accessed 8 September 2009); 

“Afghanistan Says U.S. Airstrike Hit Wedding Party,” New York Times, 6 July 

2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/06/world/asia/06iht-afghan.4.14278415.

html (accessed 8 September 2009).

120. Exhibit 6a (Operations Officer, 2-503d IN, interview) to US Central 

Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat 

Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 19-20.

121. Milley, interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 18.

122. Milley, interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 22; Myer, e-mail, 15 

October 2009; Ostlund, e-mails, 24 February 2009 and 8 May 2009. 

123. TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE,” PowerPoint Presentation, 7 July 

2008, slides 5, 7.

124. Ostlund, “Battle of Wanat Storyboard and Brief” Briefing, 16 July 2008, 

slide 2.

69

Chapter 2

The Establishment of COP Kahler, 8-12 July 2008

Operation ROCK MOVE called for the establishment of a new tactical 

base in an area that was known to be dangerous. The American experience 

in Afghanistan and Iraq had demonstrated that a new base, such as a forward 

operating base (FOB) or a combat outpost (COP), was most vulnerable to 

attack in the first few days of its inception. At this time, Soldiers as well as 

civilian contractors, if they were present, were busy constructing protective 

barriers, guard towers, and stone walls. Often, units emplaced defensive 

obstacles, such as concertina wire and antivehicle ditches while clearing 

fields of fire, establishing the best possible positions for heavy weapons 

systems, and setting up permanent and redundant communications. A 

certain amount of disruption was attendant as heavy construction was 

underway and different contractors and workers circulated through the 

new post.

From an insurgent’s perspective, outposts like the Wanat COP 

represented a number of threats. First, the Coalition used them to launch 

regular patrols and interact with the local population, degrading the 

ability of the insurgents to operate freely. Secondly, once the base was 

established, any insurgent attack might engender hostility from the 

adjacent community, risking its alienation from the insurgent’s cause. 

Further, the base represented more than just the threat of a larger Coalition 

force providing greater security in the immediate area. The US troops 

and local security forces introduced jobs to a community, often hiring 

local workers to help operate dining facilities and perform other menial 

tasks. Local National (LN) trucks rolled in and out and required fuel and 

servicing. Construction workers and local materials of various types, such 

as concrete and wood, were needed. Once in place, the outpost extended 

the Coalition’s presence and authority and held the potential to convert the 

adjacent community from neutrality or hostility to benevolence toward the 

central government.

The new COP at Wanat, which 2d Platoon of Chosen Company named 

unofficially after its slain platoon sergeant, Sergeant First Class Matthew 

Ryan Kahler, represented all of these threats to the insurgent groups in the 

Waygal Valley. While COP Kahler was at its most vulnerable in its initial 

occupation, the outpost remained at risk until the exterior stone wall planned 

to encircle the base was completed. Against all previous experience and 

expectations, the insurgent force actively operating in the Waygal Valley 

chose to exploit this window of opportunity and attack the position in this 
70

period after initial occupation but before all the fortifications had been 

completed. This chapter describes Task Force (TF) Rock’s plan to emplace 

the COP and the actions taken to establish the outpost in the first five days 

before the enemy attack.

ROCK MOVE – The Plan

Between March and June 2008, as recounted in the previous chapter, 

TF Rock made plans for ROCK MOVE, the operation that would 

disestablish the COP at Bella and establish COP Kahler in Wanat. One of 

the most critical components of the planning process was the finalization 

of the physical layout of the new COP. The theater level 420th Engineer 

Brigade, supported by elements of the brigade’s Company C, 62d Engineer 

Battalion, TF Bayonet’s main construction engineer asset, prepared a 

surveyed engineering design for a complex and formidable base. That 

design included an exterior stone wall; an interior barrier wall; a formal 

entrance control point; guard towers; permanent barracks; a potable water 

system with pump house, shower, and laundry facilities; and a waste water 

system complete with a leach field. The interior wall and guard towers 

would be fashioned from products manufactured by the HESCO Barrier 

Company and in wide use in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The barriers were 

woven metal baskets made of steel mesh lined with heavy fabric; were 

easily erected and filled with sand, dirt, or other materials by Soldiers 

on the construction site; were installed rapidly; and provided excellent 

protection against direct and indirect fire attacks. 

While the engineers developed the construction plan, the TF Rock

staff prepared the plan for the operation. At the same time, Chosen 

Company Commander Myer and 2d Platoon Leader Brostrom did their 

own planning. They reconnoitered the proposed COP location during the 

shuras in Wanat in the spring of 2008. The end result was the detailed 

battalion level plan for ROCK MOVE that was, as previously discussed, 

briefed to and approved by General Milley on 7 July 2008.1

Under ROCK MOVE, Chosen Company’s mission was to use both 

ground and air movement to “realign US and ANA [Afghan National 

Army] forces in Nuristan province [in order to] deny freedom of movement 

[to the enemy] and consolidate US forces for upcoming [relief in place] 

with 1-26 IN.”2 The realignment was the evacuation of COP Bella and the 

establishment of a new COP at Wanat. The creation of an outpost at Wanat 

was the initial step in setting conditions that would allow for “improved 

security, governance, and economic development” in the valley. ROCK 

MOVE defined ultimate operational success as the safe removal of the 
71

paratroopers and equipment from COP Bella, the establishment of COP 

Kahler, the disruption of AAF in the valley, and the local acceptance of a 

Coalition base in Wanat.3

The operation itself consisted of a series of concurrent and consecutive 

maneuvers. First, there was the withdrawal from COP Bella, currently 

manned by C Company’s 1st Platoon, augmented with two squads from B 

Company. This realignment was a two day long operation to be conducted 

on 8 and 9 July. On the first day, two Chinook helicopters from TF Out 

Front would move equipment from Bella to Camp Blessing after dusk. 

On the second day, again after dusk, the Chinooks would withdraw the 

personnel at Bella, moving the 1st Platoon to Camp Blessing and the two B 

Company squads, which had augmented the Bella garrison in its last days, 

directly to their home base in the Korengal Valley. Since Wanat would 

Nuristan

Konar

Bella 

Ranch 

House

5 

MILES

Aranas

Michigan 

Waygal District Center

Blessing Nangalam



Evening of 8 July

Supplies and 

Equipment Airlifted out 

of Bella





Night of 8–9 July

1st Platoon/C Company 

Conducts Ground 

Assault Convoy to 

Wanat

Morning of 9 July

Wanat Reinforced from 

Blessing by Air with 

Equipment and 

Personnel (ANA/ 

Engineers/Mortars)















Evening of 9 July

Bella Evacuated by Air; 

Co CP and ANA to 

Wanat; 1st Platoon/C 

Company to Blessing; 

B Company 

Reinforcements return 

to Korengal Valley

10–11 July

Wanat Resupplied by 

Air/Ground from 

Blessing 

13 July

Civilian Contractors 

Arrive at Wanat with 

Construction 

Equipment

attached to C/2-503d





Pech River

Wanat

Waygal

River

I

C 2-503

1 C/2-503 (+)

●●●

2 C/2-503 (+)

●●●

II

2-503

TF Rock

1 D/2-503 (-)

●●●

x

Nuristan

Konar

Bella 

Ranch 

House

5 

MILES

Aranas

Michigan 

Waygal District Center

Blessing Nangalam



Evening of 8 July

Supplies and 

Equipment Airlifted out 

of Bella





Night of 8–9 July

1st Platoon/C Company 

Conducts Ground 

Assault Convoy to 

Wanat

Morning of 9 July

Wanat Reinforced from 

Blessing by Air with 

Equipment and 

Personnel (ANA/ 

Engineers/Mortars)















Evening of 9 July

Bella Evacuated by Air; 

Co CP and ANA to 

Wanat; 1st Platoon/C 

Company to Blessing; 

B Company 

Reinforcements return 

to Korengal Valley

10–11 July

Wanat Resupplied by 

Air/Ground from 

Blessing 

13 July

Civilian Contractors 

Arrive at Wanat with 

Construction 

Equipment

attached to C/2-503d





Pech River

Wanat

Waygal

River

I

C 2-503

1 C/2-503 (+)

●●●

2 C/2-503 (+)

●●●

II

2-503

TF Rock

1 D/2-503 (-)

●●●

x

Figure 8. ROCK MOVE OPLAN, 8-9 July 2008.
72

have been occupied during the previous night, some of the equipment and 

personnel, notably part of a platoon of ANA soldiers and Chosen Company 

Commander Myer, would move directly from Bella to Wanat.4

The second maneuver was the establishment of the position at Wanat. 

During the night of 8/9 July, C Company’s 2d Platoon, augmented with 

attached elements, would move by ground convoy in high-mobility 

multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) from Camp Blessing to 

Wanat and establish a hasty position there on the site of the proposed COP. 

Ostlund and Myer felt that it was important that the initial occupation of 

the COP site occur in darkness to retain tactical surprise. By dawn on 9 

July, the residents would find 2d Platoon already in place securing the site 

at which the new COP would be constructed.5

Accordingly, for a brief period on 9 July, both Bella and Wanat would 

coexist. On the morning of the 9th, TF Rock would use the Bagram based 

helicopters of the two-Chinook Pech Resupply run to bring additional 

personnel and supplies from Camp Blessing to the new Wanat position. 

These additions included the bulk of the mortar section and its equipment, 

part of the ANA platoon, the supporting engineers and their equipment, 

and additional ammunition and barrier materials. As stated above, after 

dark, as the final act in the withdrawal from Bella, the Chinooks would 

transfer the ANA platoon and Captain Myer from Bella to Wanat.6

Ostlund assumed some risk when he decided, upon a recommendation 

from Myer, to execute ROCK MOVE on 8 July. Prior to the initiation 

of the operation, the officers discovered that although the construction 

materials were already staged at Camp Blessing, the Afghan company 

contracted to bring heavy construction equipment to the Wanat COP and 

then assist in constructing its defenses would not arrive until 13 July, 

later than anticipated. Ostlund, Myer, and the battalion operations officer, 

Major Scott Himes, agreed that soldier labor and the augmentation of the 

platoon with an engineer squad and a Bobcat front end loader (then at 

Bella) could adequately prepare the COP defense in the six days until the 

civilian equipment operators arrived with their machinery.7

One of the reasons that Ostlund chose to continue with ROCK MOVE 

on 8 July was the lunar illumination cycle. The AN/AVS-6 night vision 

goggles (NOG) used by the pilots of the CH-47D Chinook cargo helicopters 

that would be used in ROCK MOVE had certain safety limitations. The 

NOGs required at least 25 percent lunar illumination and a 30 percent or 

better lunar elevation angle above the horizon. Because the moon rises and 

falls during the course of the night, TF Bayonet codified 30 minute blocks 
73

of darkness based on the amount of risk involved inherent in the lunar 

illumination cycle. If both conditions were met, an hour was considered 

green, or optimum for the use of Chinooks. If only the illumination 

percentage condition was met, the period of time was classified yellow, 

or cautious. With an illumination angle of less than 30 percent, the pilots 

could still see but less clearly, requiring them to proceed more slowly than 

under the green conditions. A 30 minute block was considered red or high 

risk, when both conditions were not met.8

Given the estimate of the enemy situation, TF Bayonet Commander 

Preysler and TF Rock Commander Ostlund considered a night evacuation 

to be essential to ROCK MOVE’s success, with Chinook vulnerability 

reduced in the darkness. The initial projected date for the operation was 

1 July but the first seven nights of the month were completely in the red 

cycle. Accordingly, Ostlund delayed the execution of ROCK MOVE until 

the evening of 8 July, the earliest green and yellow time blocks available. 

On 8 July, conditions were green from 1930 to 2000 hours, yellow from 

2000 to 2330 hours, and red thereafter. On 9 July the green period increased 

to an hour, from 1930 to 2030, with the yellow condition lasting from 2030 

to 2230, with red conditions the rest of the night. Green conditions lasted 

only in the early evening hours from 8 to 12 July. Yellow and red periods 

dominated for most of the rest of the month. While the delay of civilian 

construction contractors was inconvenient, to wait for their arrival to start 

the operation would put the helicopters at greater risk in night operations. 

The commanders chose to proceed with ROCK MOVE while the moon 

provided the optimum illumination for Chinook operations.9

To provide a measure of operational security, the Americans did not 

tell the residents of either Bella or Wanat that the realignment would begin 

on 8 July. Key leaders from CJTF-101 down to the TF Rock level were 

concerned about the vulnerability of TF Out Front’s helicopters as they 

flew through the deep valley and approached Bella for the evacuation of 

the men and material at that COP. In the days following the arrival of 2d 

Platoon, TF Out Front would deliver heavy equipment and supplies to the 

paratroopers at Wanat. After six days, members of the Afghan construction 

company would arrive and provide the heavy construction support that 

would build the walls and other facilities of the base. At this point, Ostlund 

commented that the infantrymen of the 2d Platoon would be there to 

provide security for the contractors as they built the COP.10

The increasingly dangerous enemy situation around Bella played a 

key role in Ostlund’s decision to execute ROCK MOVE in the battalion’s 

waning days in Afghanistan. The TF Rock intelligence section assessed 
74

the insurgent forces in the Bella and Wanat areas to number between 130 

and 150 experienced fighters under the leadership of Mullah Osman, a 

Nuristani from the northern Waygal Valley village of Waygal. Osman was 

not a formal member of the Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) or any specific 

insurgent group. He worked, however, with a wide range of AAF elements 

in Nuristan and Konar provinces, using intimidation and, if necessary, 

overt force to retain influence over the local leaders in the Waygal Valley. 

Since Osman was reportedly wounded at Bella on 4 July, the leadership 

in any possible insurgent operations against Wanat shifted to a younger 

local AAF leader, Mawlawi Sadiq Manibullah. Manibullah was the son 

of an Aranas elder who had had previous connections to HiG elements in 

northeast Afghanistan and was influential in Wanat. In an insurgent video 

released some months after the attack, Manibullah identified himself as 

the leader of the assault on Coalition forces at Wanat.11

Because of the shortage of Coalition troops, Osman’s forces enjoyed 

freedom of maneuver in much of the valley, particularly in the villages 

east of Bella and Wanat. These AAF elements had been responsible for 

the attacks on COP Bella in June and July 2008. When necessary, Osman 

had shown that he could bring in insurgent groups from the Korengal and 

Watapor valleys to launch larger attacks on Coalition forces. Coalition 

intelligence also believed that fighters from other Islamic countries, 

including terrorists associated with al-Qaeda, had been active in northeast 

Afghanistan and at times had traveled through the Waygal Valley and 

worked with the local insurgents.12

Pry, Task Force Rock’s intelligence officer, believed that Osman had 

become “absolutely furious” when he discovered that the Coalition planned 

to establish a base in Wanat. Pry’s assessment in the ROCK MOVE plan 

was that Osman had focused his anger and his forces primarily on the 

US Soldiers stationed at COP Bella. In Pry’s opinion, the insurgent leader 

would most likely place mortars and other heavy weapons in positions 

to overlook COP Bella to attack any Coalition force – especially aircraft 

– that might come to support or evacuate the outpost. The intelligence 

officer thought that the insurgents might also launch direct attacks on 

the observation posts (OPs) located on the high ground above Bella and 

perhaps on the COP itself.13

For Osman, however, any Coalition attempt to establish a base at 

Wanat was totally unacceptable. Pry had indications that in early July, 

the insurgents who lived near Wanat had moved north to participate in 

operations against COP Bella. However, Pry also believed that these 

elements had established weapons caches in the high ground surrounding 
75

Wanat. According to the assessment in the ROCK MOVE plan, the 

insurgents planned to move from Bella back to the Wanat area within 24 

to 48 hours of the Coalition’s move into Wanat. Osman’s local forces, with 

the support of any neighboring insurgent groups and foreign fighters he 

might recruit, would launch any attack that would follow. Pry did have 

reports that contingents of foreign fighters had entered the Watapor Valley, 

one ridgeline to the east of the Waygal Valley, in May or June 2008.14

One of the main reasons Ostlund and Myer were willing to set up 

the Wanat COP immediately and then risk waiting for the arrival of the 

civilian construction crew was the TF Rock officers’ appreciation of the 

enemy’s probable actions. While the Americans thought it was possible 

for the enemy to attack the new COP at Wanat during its construction, 

Pry believed that this was not the most likely insurgent course of action. 

Instead, in the ROCK MOVE plan, the intelligence officer thought that 

the most likely enemy move would be a gradual escalation of activity in 

the Wanat area, occupying OPs around Wanat, and emplacing improvised 

explosive devices (IEDs) on the road leading from Camp Blessing north 

to Wanat.15

Myer, the Chosen Company commander, shared the view of a 

gradual enemy response. Based on patterns established in attacks on COP 

Ranch House and other actions, Myer believed that the insurgents would 

gradually move major weapons into positions around Wanat and then fire 

both rockets and mortar rounds into the COP to “dial in” the proper range. 

According to Myer, “We thought if they were going to do a large scale 

attack, they’re going to first refine all the assets they wanted to utilize to do 

that and then after something like 90 days, then they’re going to try to do 

a large scale attack like they did at the Ranch House.”16 Platoon Sergeant 

Dzwik concurred with this assessment, “I was expecting an attack. I 

thought the enemy would make their presence known. I was expecting 

harassing fire from any one of the high ground in every direction. I did not 

think the village itself would let the AAF [Anti-Afghan Force] turn their 

village into a battle zone.”17

US commanders and staffs at higher levels, including Ostlund and 

the CJTF-101 intelligence officer, had seen this pattern across northeast 

Afghanistan and assumed that the AAF would follow suit at Wanat. CJTF101’s commander, Schloesser, certainly shared this belief. He described 

the enemy’s general pattern of scattered indirect and small arms fire against 

small Coalition bases as “almost a routine way for the enemy to measure 

what we were doing in any new established outpost or vehicle patrol 

base . . . to try to understand what our tactics, techniques, and procedures 
76

were going to be and assess us for about a week or two before actually 

trying to pressure that respective outpost...That’s exactly what I believed 

we were going to see there at Wanat.”18

As noted in the previous chapter, Ostlund had reinforced the platoon 

with a number of assets. Organizationally, out of a table of organization 

and equipment (TOE) strength of 39, Brostrom had 29 paratroopers 

available in his platoon at Wanat, divided into three rifle squads, a weapons 

squad, and a headquarters element. The weapons squad, which by TOE 

consisted of nine members divided into two three-man machine gun 

crews and two two-man close combat antiarmor teams equipped with the 

Javelin antiarmor missile system, manned only the two three-man M240 

machine gun teams at Wanat. Although the platoon did not man its Javelin 

teams, it did bring the weapons system to Wanat. The platoon headquarters 

consisted of the platoon leader, the platoon sergeant, the medic, the radiotelephone operator (RTO), and the forward observer.19

On paper, the three rifle squads each contained nine paratroopers 

including a staff sergeant squad leader, two sergeant team leaders, and six 

junior enlisted men. The squad was divided into two four-man fireteams, 

each armed with two M4 assault rifles, an M203 40-mm grenade launcher 

and an M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW). The three squads of the 

2d Platoon at Wanat maintained strengths of between five and seven 

squad members. The platoon contained a designated marksman, a soldier 

specially trained and equipped with an M21 sniper rifle. This individual was 

not a sniper but was trained to “improve a squad’s precision engagement 

capabilities at short and medium ranges.”20

Although organizationally a paratrooper rifle platoon normally has 

no vehicles, for service in Afghanistan, Brostrom’s platoon received an 

M114 armored HMMWV for each rifle squad and one for the platoon 

headquarters. Because these HMMWVs mounted heavy weapons in their 

cupolas, their presence greatly enhanced not only the platoon’s mobility, 

but also its firepower. Two of the HMMWVs mounted M2 .50-caliber 

heavy machine guns. The other two vehicles carried Mk-19 40-mm 

automatic grenade launchers. The initial occupation and defense of COP 

Kahler would be based on these vehicular weapons. As the COP matured, 

the defense would be built around the heavy weapons. 

For ROCK MOVE, Ostlund reinforced the 2d Platoon with a platoon 

of 24 soldiers from the ANA’s 2d Company, 3d Kandak (Battalion), 

2d Brigade, 201st Corps. This force included three US Marines of an 

embedded training team (ETT) which advised the ANA platoon. The 
77

Afghans were armed with AK-47s and RPGs. The Marines brought with 

them an M240 machine gun. Half the ANAs would arrive at Wanat via 

Chinook from Camp Blessing on the morning of 9 July. This group would 

set up a traffic control point on the Waygal Valley road just south of the 

COP site. The other half would arrive that night by Chinook directly from 

Bella.21

To provide immediate fire support, the 2d Platoon would bring two 

mortars and a tube-launched, optically tracked, wire guided (TOW) missile 

launcher system mounted on an M114 HMMWV to Wanat. The TOW 

launcher and its squad of three paratroopers would provide responsive and 

highly accurate direct fire against distant targets. The TOW had proven 

extremely valuable in the mountainous terrain of Konar and Nuristan 

provinces. As the TF Rock’s executive officer (XO), Major Brian Beckno 

recalled, “We fired that TOW in direct fire mode on any Taliban we saw in 

our sights that we considered a threat. The locals called that one weapon 

system the ‘Finger of God.’ We had confirmed kills with that weapon 

system.”22 The six-man mortar section would provide indirect fire support 

using a 120-mm mortar and a 60-mm mortar. Both the mortars and the 

TOW launcher would be placed within the new COP. Myer considered the 

TOW and mortar systems to be essential. He would have recommended 

canceling ROCK MOVE if he had not received these assets.23

Once COP Bella was evacuated, the 2d Platoon would have the priority 

of fires from both a section of 155-mm howitzers based at Camp Blessing 

and a similar section based at Asadabad. The platoon would also be able to 

call for fire support from the AH-64 Apache attack helicopters of TF Out 

Front. However, because helicopters were a limited asset in Afghanistan, 

the Apaches would not be permanently placed on station above the Waygal 

Valley. If the 2d Platoon needed attack helicopter support, TF Out Front

would divert Apaches flying other missions to Wanat or dispatch aircraft 

being held on standby as a quick reaction force (QRF) at the Jalalabad 

Airfield. Reaction time differed depending on the situation but according 

to Lieutenant Colonel John Lynch, the TF Out Front commander, once his 

Apache pilots received the alert, it would take approximately 30 minutes 

to fly from Jalalabad to Wanat by the most direct route.24

TF Rock had arranged for the attachment of an engineer squad from 

C Company, 62d Engineer Battalion (Heavy), to support ROCK MOVE. 

The squad, consisting of six Army engineers, would arrive in Wanat with a 

small Bobcat front loader to help the infantry by filling HESCO containers 

but also by helping the platoon improve its position in Wanat. Brostrom 

and Dzwik would make broad use of HESCOs within the COP.25
78

In total, including all of these assets at Wanat, the strength of the 

force at the outpost would be 44 US Soldiers, three US Marines, and 24 

Afghan soldiers. TF Rock had thus made 71 personnel available for the 

initial establishment of the base. Myer himself and two members of his 

headquarters staff were to join the 2d Platoon on the evening of the 9th, 

flying in directly from Bella. Ultimately, TF Rock planned for a garrison of 

74 American and Afghan military personnel at the new COP.

For Milley, the CJTF-101 deputy commander, the size of the force at 

the new COP was significant. He had approved the operation because of 

the relatively large force assigned to the Wanat portion of the operation. 

Milley recalled that he viewed ROCK MOVE as a “company-minus” 

operation because of the two infantry platoons and the planned presence 

of the company headquarters. In his opinion, given the enemy situation 

briefed to him by TF Rock, Ostlund had allocated the right amount of 

troops to the mission. Reacting to the relative dearth of manpower for 

operations in Regional Command–East (RC-East) in 2007 and 2008, 

Milley had commented:

In terms of combat power, that’s a significant amount of 

combat power for what I had previously seen, what I had 

studied, and what I had observed and over the course of the 

15 months, 75 is still a significant amount of combat power 

anywhere in Afghanistan . . . 75 guys is a lot of guys and if 

properly used and employed, then that’s a significant amount 

of combat power.26

As previously mentioned, the long range plan for the construction of 

COP Kahler relied on the use of civilian contractors. TF Rock had issued 

several contracts to Afghan construction companies to build the camp. 

The major contract went to a construction firm based in Jalalabad which 

would provide heavy equipment and operators. The period of the contract 

was from 1 July to 25 December 2008, with the actual start date being 

contingent on the date of occupation of the site by Chosen Company. In 

contracts approved before ROCK MOVE but not finalized until 11 July, 

a construction company from Asadabad was slated to provide an earth 

fill service for fighting positions and the HESCO barriers, and the laying 

of gravel. The contracts were awarded to the nearest local businesses 

with the capability to perform the job. This project was scheduled for 

completion by 28 July. A contract bid to build a stone wall around the 

COP, which was posted in late June, was still pending. There was also a 

contract for laborers at Wanat with a labor management company based 

in Kabul that was carried over from Bella. Accordingly, TF Rock intended 
79

that civilians would do the bulk of the construction work at Wanat. This 

was the procedure that the unit followed when it constructed several 

other COPs in the Korengal and Pech valleys. However, as mentioned 

above, the company from Jalalabad was unable to assemble and move 

its equipment to Wanat before 13 July. According to Myer, this delay 

happened because the construction company initially anticipated a start 

date of 3 July but when ROCK MOVE’s start date was moved back, the 

company returned its equipment to Jalalabad. When the Afghans were told 

of the new required date, 9 July, the construction company was unable to 

reassemble its equipment and move it to Wanat before 13 July. Therefore, 

by necessity, the 2d Platoon’s paratroopers and their attached engineers 

would do the early work on the COP’s defenses.27

In addition to providing the Wanat garrison with fire support and 

engineers, Ostlund also ensured that the 2d Platoon was equipped with 

or supported by various intelligence assets. In its inventory, TF Rock had 

two Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance Systems (LRAS3). The 

LRAS3 is a ground-mounted thermal system allowing around the clock 

surveillance. Ostlund gave one of the devices to Brostrom. The battalion 

commander believed this piece of equipment was critical to the 2d 

Platoon’s successful accomplishment of its mission. Moreover, the TOW 

missile launcher attached to the platoon was not only an excellent direct 

fire weapon but it came equipped with an Improved Target Acquisition 

System (ITAS). The ITAS also provided 24 hour long range surveillance 

capability. Detailed technical specifications of these two systems are 

classified but the two systems, although limited to line of sight views, 

provided Brostrom’s troops with formidable night vision and long range 

surveillance capabilities. Myer regarded these two systems highly.28

CJTF-101 had also agreed to support ROCK MOVE with other 

powerful intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. These 

resources, which included aerial signals intelligence (SIGINT) platforms 

that monitored radio and telephone communications and unmanned aerial 

vehicles (UAVs) that provided real time and full motion video (FMV) 

observation of terrain and events, were highly valuable and scarce. In RCEast, CJTF-101’s primary FMV assets were a single Predator UAV and 

one MQ-12 Warrior-Alpha UAV. The other Predator UAV under CJTF101’s control was permanently committed to Regional Command-South 

(RC-South) and thus unavailable to TF Rock. The primary theater level 

SIGINT asset was “Red Ridge,” a fixed wing, medium altitude SIGINT 

platform. Because of a dedicated translator, the Red Ridge intercepts were 

almost immediately available to the supported units.29
80

The UAVs with their full motion capabilities were powerful systems 

but could not be counted on to detect enemy fighters on all occasions. In 

fact, in the mountainous and forested terrain of northeastern Afghanistan, 

using UAVs to find small groups of insurgents was exceptionally difficult. 

Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Gervais, the CJTF-101 Intelligence Officer, 

described using the optics on a UAV to search for insurgents as “looking 

through a soda straw...it’s hit or miss.”30 However, when SIGINT or 

HUMINT reports suggested the location of suspected insurgent groups; 

UAVs could be directed to precise spots to make positive identification 

and to gather greater information. Coalition forces used this method of 

coordinating or “cross cueing”; imagery, human, and signals intelligence 

across Afghanistan in 2008.

Predator and Warrior-Alpha were not the only UAV assets operating in 

RC-East. In fact, TF Bayonet deployed to Afghanistan with two types of 

organic UAV systems: the RQ-7 Shadow and RQ-11 Raven. TF Out Front

also deployed to Afghanistan with the MQ-5B Hunter UAV, a system 

similar to the Shadow. TF Bayonet had four Shadow platforms comprising 

one complete system. A system includes a launcher, recovery equipment, 

maintenance equipment, and two radio control vans. The Shadow had 

to be operated out of Jalalabad Airfield because it required a regular 

landing strip, a rare commodity in northeastern Afghanistan, in order to 

be recovered. During its 14 month deployment, TF Bayonet considered 

constructing an alternate location at Camp Blessing to extend the reach of 

the Shadow but there were terrain and space limitations at the camp and 

Jalalabad was more central to the brigade’s overall area of operation (AO). 

In any event, the Shadow could not be operated within the Waygal Valley 

because of the rugged terrain in the valley that blocked the radio signals 

needed to guide the UAV. For all of these reasons, TF Bayonet’s Shadow 

and Hunter systems could not reach Wanat and support TF Rock during 

ROCK MOVE.31

TF Bayonet had also deployed with a number of Raven UAV systems. 

The Raven was a smaller, highly portable system that required only 

a single operator, could be carried in a rucksack, and recharged from a 

HMMWV. The drone had a six nautical mile radius of operation and a 

90 minute single flight endurance. The Raven mounted an infrared (IR) 

camera system that provided an “over the hill” capability, was fully night 

capable, and was “launched” by literally being thrown into the air by 

hand. In Afghanistan in 2007 and 2008, TF Bayonet distributed the Raven 

systems to its subordinate battalions.
81Figure 9. Wanat, Proposed COP.
82

Unfortunately, the Raven also possessed reduced capabilities and 

numerous vulnerabilities which restricted and degraded its optimal 

employment throughout this period. Within the difficult terrain dominated 

by the precipitous ridges and valleys, the Raven had to be carefully 

employed due to cross winds and variable drafts that severely constrained 

its utility. The mountains also had an adverse effect on the radio signals 

that operators used to control the UAV. TF Rock had not enjoyed much 

success with the Raven system during its year in Afghanistan and the Raven 

clearly had limited applications. TF Rock could easily have deployed a 

single Raven to COP Kahler and perhaps used it as a deterrent at night 

over Wanat when the winds in the Waygal Valley decreased. However, the 

possibility of losing a Raven and the subsequent requirement to mount a 

patrol to find the aircraft meant that TF Rock did not consider its use to 

be a worthwhile risk in ROCK MOVE or in many of the operations that 

preceded it.32

Given the limitations of the Shadow and Raven systems, TF Rock relied 

heavily on the FMV and SIGINT assets controlled at the CJTF level. To 

manage these systems, CJTF-101 held a daily intelligence synchronization 

meeting which was attended by Deputy Commander Milley; the CJTF 

intelligence officer, Lieutenant Colonel Gervais; and the CJTF operations 

officer, Colonel Christopher Pease. Through this meeting, CJTF-101 

managed ISR assets 96 hours forward. Assets were initially apportioned 

to a particular brigade sized command for planning purposes and then 

72 hours out, they were formally committed. The brigade would then be 

responsible for planning the use of these assets in accordance with its 

priorities and operations. The theater command subsequently adjusted the 

actual allocations that a brigade received based on a variety of factors. 

During daily operations, the true hours flown varied based on weather, 

maintenance issues, or higher priority events intervening such as a report 

of Coalition troops in contact (TIC) with the enemy.33 

Working with the TF Bayonet staff, Captain Pry requested FMV and 

SIGINT coverage for ROCK MOVE from 8 through 17 July. Pry hoped 

for ten days of ISR coverage because in his estimation, the paratroopers 

would need that amount of time before they emplaced and filled all the 

HESCO barrier walls at the COP. He sought 12 hours of SIGINT and 24 

hours of FMV per day but realized that TF Rock was unlikely to receive 

this amount of coverage given the demands on the ISR systems. Indeed, 

there were a number of operations and events in Afghanistan in the second 

week of July 2008 that demanded attention from the CJTF headquarters 

and its ISR resources. In mid June, a number of insurgents had escaped 
83

from the ANA-run Sarposa Prison in Kandahar and the investigation into 

that event was still ongoing. On 26 June, insurgents ambushed a Coalition 

convoy in the Tangi Valley of Wardak province and tortured, killed, and 

mutilated three American National Guardsmen. The Coalition responded 

with an offensive operation to find the insurgent group that committed the 

brutal attack. During ROCK MOVE, the operations in the Tangi valley 

were still ongoing and would require ISR support. In the two weeks before 

the Wanat attack and the two weeks following that assault, there were 

over 60 insurgent attacks in southern Paktika and Khowst provinces and 

an additional 20 attacks along the Konar and Nangarhar provincial border 

areas.34

Despite these concurrent operations and crises, when ROCK MOVE 

began on 8 July, Pry had received confirmation from the CJTF that 

adequate ISR would be available for the first 72 hours of the operation. 

Thus, while TF Rock had requested ISR coverage for a full ten days, Pry 

was unsure how much coverage would actually be apportioned after 10 

July. Changing priorities, weather, and other factors would likely affect 

ISR coverage over Wanat. So, in addition to the LRAS3 and ITAS systems 

noted above, TF Rock planned to supplement this higher level ISR support 

with its own internal SIGINT assets.

The battalion had available a number of commercially produced 

integrated communications (ICOM) radio scanners which were able 

to intercept insurgent radio communications. Chosen Company had 

an interpreter who typically listened into insurgent broadcasts on these 

scanners. More importantly, TF Rock enjoyed direct support from two 

low level voice intercept (LLVI) teams equipped with the state of the art 

AN/MLQ-40(V)3 Prophet system from TF Bayonet’s military intelligence 

company.35

Planning and Preparation in Chosen Company

As noted earlier, the planning for ROCK MOVE at the company and 

platoon levels began long before July 2008. Myer and Brostrom knew that 

the move to Wanat was likely before their departure from Afghanistan 

and had been thinking about the operation throughout the spring and 

early summer. Myer and Brostrom had visited Wanat several times for 

shuras and had discussed the operation generally and the layout of the 

COP specifically. Brostrom’s platoon sergeant, Sergeant First Class David 

Dzwik, recalled being with Myer at Wanat in the spring when the company 

commander was designating key positions, including OPs. Dzwik stated 

that in the months leading up to ROCK MOVE, the platoon leadership 
84

had a good understanding of where they would go and what they had to 

do in Wanat. He stated, “The [company] commander had set up where he 

was envisioning the positions which was pretty much where we set up. 

We knew the area so we knew from pictures we took and from visiting the 

positions, where we were going to go.”36

In the first week of July, Myer and Brostrom attended TF Rock briefings 

of the ROCK MOVE plan to higher headquarters. Dzwik recalled that he 

was also present at one of these briefings. Thus, the company and platoon 

leadership were very familiar with the plan for the operation, including 

the attachments and support that the 2d Platoon would receive. By 6 July, 

Brostrom and Dzwik understood that ROCK MOVE was likely to be 

approved and they began making final preparations for the operation.37

The TF Rock staff did not issue a formal operations order to Myer 

or Brostrom before ROCK MOVE. According to Myer, this was not an 

oversight but standard TF practice after 14 months in Afghanistan. Instead 

of issuing traditional written operation orders, the experienced TF Rock staff 

and its company level leaders often used fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) 

and officers like Myer and Brostrom used troop leading procedures to 

ensure that platoons and squads had a clear understanding of missions and 

tasks. In the case of ROCK MOVE, Chosen Company and the 2d Platoon 

had been arguably preparing, albeit sporadically, for months. The details 

of the operation were contained in the briefing slides for the 7 July 2008 

briefing to Milley, although most of these details had been worked out 

before that date. In addition to this briefing, on 7 July, Lieutenant Colonel 

Ostlund met privately with Brostrom to review the mission and the assets 

that had been attached to 2d Platoon for ROCK MOVE.38

The 2d Platoon paratroopers took a number of steps to plan and 

prepare for the mission in Wanat. While the platoon did not mount 

a formal rehearsal of concept, Dzwik later remembered that his troops 

conducted precombat checks on 7 and 8 July. At the same time Myer and 

Brostrom received briefings from the squad leaders about the mission and 

their specific tasks. Dzwik considered these backbriefs as tantamount to 

an informal rehearsal.39

One of Brostrom’s squad leaders remembered these pre-operation 

preparations. Staff Sergeant Jonathan Benton, the platoon’s 2d Squad 

leader, recalled that Brostrom did not conduct a formal rehearsal or create 

a sand table model of the COP to use in briefing his subordinates. The 

process was a bit less formal:
85

What we were briefed and what we were told was that we 

were going to go there and establish a forward operating base 

and we would be there until 1st Infantry Division came out 

to [relieve] us. Our impression was that we were going out 

there to establish a stationary position, to build up walls and 

defensive positions, and establish relations with the local 

populace in order to stay there in a permanent situation.40

Benton asserted, “We knew what was out there and what we had to work 

with. . . . Lieutenant Brostrom did the best he could. He did an awesome 

job with what time he had and was able to put us in positions to try to 

support one another.”41

Understandably with the end of their deployment within sight, some 

members of the 2d Platoon felt some anxiety about the move to Wanat. 

With only 13 days of duty in Afghanistan remaining after over 14 months 

of continuous operations, many of the men were looking forward to 

returning home. All of them had already shipped their personal items back 

to Italy and only retained a single rucksack with immediate living gear, 

their combat equipment, and weapons. Stafford remembered, “None of 

us wanted to go [to Wanat]. We had about 13 days left before we were 

scheduled to get out of there on the choppers and we were all really pissed 

off that we had to go. We knew the intel[ligence] reports of massing enemy 

attacks and very high risk missions, so not a lot of us wanted to go.”42

Some of the paratroopers expected the worst to happen as they began 

establishing the new COP. Sergeant Jesse Queck, one of the mortarmen, 

recalled, “No one [his emphasis] in the company wanted to do this Wanat 

thing. We all knew something bad was going to happen. I mean, guys 

were writing on their facebook pages to pray for them, they felt like this 

mission was the one they weren’t coming back from.”43 Dzwik stated 

that he also expressed concerns about ROCK MOVE to the Chosen 

Company first sergeant. The platoon sergeant feared that there would be 

a lack of assets to reinforce the COP and foresaw potential problems with 

logistical support while the incoming forces from the 1st Infantry Division 

(ID) relieved the paratroopers. He thought those issues would become 

especially problematic if the plan’s assumptions about the enemy and local 

population proved incorrect. However, Dzwik also noted that he believed 

the plan for ROCK MOVE was essentially sound and acknowledged that 

some amount of risk is inherent in all combat operations.44

Brostrom shared some of these uncertainties about the mission to 

establish COP Kahler. Before ROCK MOVE was approved, Brostrom 
86

spoke privately with his peers about his concerns. He talked at Camp 

Blessing with First Lieutenant Brandon Kennedy, an officer in Able 

Company and Brostrom’s best friend, who remembered that Brostrom’s 

doubts centered on the pro insurgent stance of the population in the Wanat 

area, “The topic came up about the Wanat mission. He told me he did not 

like it. He said he thought it was a bad idea and he knew he was going to get 

[messed] up because the last four times he had gone up there, he had been 

ambushed or IED’ed every time, often with very good effects.”45 Brostrom 

told another officer in Afghanistan, that based on the intelligence he had 

seen, any Coalition base established in Wanat was almost certainly going 

to be attacked by significant enemy forces.46

Kennedy recalled that Brostrom was also worried about the assets he 

would have for the mission. According to Kennedy, the 2d Platoon leader 

“expressed concerns to me about the number of men he was taking with 

him for the mission (I think he told me it would be around 23–24 plus 

some ANA, who he felt didn’t really count toward combat power anyway) 

and that he was also concerned about the terrain surrounding the area.”47

Around 1 July, a week before ROCK MOVE would begin, Brostrom 

discussed these issues with his boss, Captain Myer. Myer recalled that 

his 2d Platoon leader did not request specific resources but was seeking 

ways to mitigate the risks associated with the operation. As the company 

commander remembered, “That is when we decided to make sure he had 

a 120-mm mortar tube and attach a weapons truck (up-armored HMMWV 

with TOW missile and ITAS) as well as additional ISR (LRAS3).”48

Brostrom mentioned to Kennedy that Captain Myer had addressed his 

concerns by arranging for the direct and indirect fire support. Despite this 

fire support, Kennedy felt that Brostrom retained some anxiety about his 

platoon’s role in ROCK MOVE.49

Regardless of these personal doubts and concerns, the burden of 

keeping the platoon focused on the mission and motivated to accomplish 

it fell primarily on Brostrom and Dzwik. The platoon sergeant stated that 

he did not change the routine of combat checks and drills in preparation 

for the operation, and he simply told the Soldiers that they had come here 

to do 15 months of a job, not 14 months. In his opinion, by July 2008, the 

platoon was a tightly knit highly efficient organization and that its focus 

on mission accomplishment never slipped.50

The Establishment of COP Kahler, 8-12 July

ROCK MOVE began on schedule and was executed with few glitches. 

Suprisingly, the enemy did not interfere with any of the air movements. 
87

Bella was evacuated after dusk on the second day (9 July) with Myer on 

the last helicopter out of the site. At Myer’s request, the garrison there 

had been reinforced four days earlier with two squads from B Company 

in the Korengal Valley. Myer feared an attack from the relatively large 

AAF force known to be in the vicinity. He also wanted to use the extra 

manpower to help expeditiously load supplies because of his concern that 

the insurgents intended to shoot down a helicopter during the evacuation. 

The faster the uploading, the less the time the Chinooks would be in the 

enemy’s crosshairs. Myer recalled, “I had a feeling that the enemy was 

trying to do a large scale attack on Bella because they knew we were going 

to vacate it. They could do a large attack and then say they forced us out of 

Bella.”51 The TF Rock officers were also concerned because in early June, 

the insurgents fired upon and disabled a civilian contracted Mi-8 “Hip” 

helicopter on a routine run delivering food to Bella. The landing zone at 

Bella was closed for three days until the helicopter could be recovered, 

leaving the garrison stranded without a means of resupply or medical 

evacuation. This incident clearly showed Ostlund the vulnerability of 

the Bella position. In any event, after the 4 July Apache attack, the AAF 

near Bella remained dormant. Aircraft had been routinely fired upon for 

some weeks before the Apache attack. After that event, the Chinooks were 

unmolested as they came and went at Bella.52

Sergeant Erik Aass, Myer’s RTO, recalled that the company 

commander:

decided that we should leave it standing and just make an 

announcement that we were donating the buildings to the 

villagers. Either way, the Taliban were going to claim that 

they drove us off. This way, we could twist the argument and 

say we were giving something to the villagers. If the Taliban 

then chose to take it over, then we could say they stole it from 

the villagers.53

With all the controversy concerning the 4 July Apache strike, he 

decided, on his own initiative, to go first to Blessing in order to facilitate 

the completion of the pending AR 15-6 investigation of the attack. Because 

of the Coalition’s sensitivity concerning possible civilian casualties, this 

investigation had become a priority for TF Bayonet. Since Myer was the 

officer who directed the air strike, he was obviously a key witness in any 

investigation. His participation in that process meant that Myer remained 

at Camp Blessing on 10 July to be interviewed and to coordinate the 

interviews of other members of Chosen Company who had been involved 

in the 4 July action at Bella. Myer participated in the investigation on 10 
88

July. On 11 July, RCP and aircraft availability issues prevented him from 

moving to Wanat. However, on the 12th, he was able to catch a CH-47 

flight to the new COP.54

With COP Bella safely closed, many senior officers such as Colonel 

Preysler, and even Myer, felt that the most dangerous portion of ROCK 

MOVE was over. TF Rock transferred all materials and all American 

personnel to Camp Blessing and some of the Class IV (construction 

materials) and Class V (ammunition) were subsequently moved to COP 

Kahler on 9 July. Myer had chosen to personally oversee the actions at 

Bella in early July, an effort that contributed to the COP’s successful 

evacuation without any casualties. While Myer did not personally 

supervise the planning and preparation of the establishment of the COP at 

Wanat, he was aware of the details and had a team of experienced officers 

and NCOs in the company doing the preparations.55

On the evening of 8 July, 2d Platoon, Chosen Company, departed from 

Camp Blessing after sunset in a ground assault convoy for the 90 minute 

long drive to Wanat. The convoy contained five HMMWVs; one for each 

of the three rifle squads, each reinforced with elements of the weapons 

squad, a fourth vehicle carrying Brostrom and his platoon headquarters, 

and the last vehicle containing the TOW missile squad. Sergeant Brian 

Hissong remembered the HMMWVs being loaded “with as much food, 

water, ammo, and people as they could hold.”56 Staff Sergeant Benton 

recalled loading up his squad’s HMMWV:

A lot of the room was taken up by extra ammo and whatever 

defensive equipment we could find, sandbags and shovels, 

anything we could conjure up or snag that was just lying 

around. We also tried to pack as much water and food for 

two days. I don’t remember the exact numbers but we kind 

of eyeballed it and were like “This is good.” We’d done this 

before so we knew we could live off this much food and water 

for the next two days while doing hard work. We were prepared 

for at least two days of food and water. We had ammo out the 

ass and anything we could bring to defend our positions.57

The convoy arrived at Wanat before midnight.

Immediately the platoon established a vehicle laager in the open field 

just south of the mosque and hotel and west of the bazaar. The open field 

was the exact site identified by TF Rock for the proposed Wanat COP since 

June 2007. It was also the same location that First Lieutenant Andrew 

Glenn’s engineers from the 3d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, had used 
89

as a base in the fall of 2006 while they constructed bridges on the outskirts 

of the village. Shortly after they arrived, a drenching rainfall began and 

continued to fall for the remainder of the night. Hissong remembered it was 

“pitch black” and the rain flooded the northern part of the field. Stafford 

recalled, “We pulled in there, circled the HMMWVs, and then about that 

time it started dumping rain and a big thunderstorm.”58 With the heavy 

rain and darkness, little could be done except to establish local security 

until morning. Specialist Jeffrey Scantlin, manning the machine gun in the 

gunner’s turret of Benton’s HMMWV, recalled being absolutely drenched 

by the heavy rain, as he had packed his rain gear in his rucksack. At first 

light, the field was swept for mines and IEDs, the platoon leaders identified 

fighting positions, and entrenchment began. Lieutenant Brostrom and 

Sergeant Ryan Pitts, the platoon’s forward observer (FO), began looking 

for the proper site for an OP on a ridge to the east.59

On the afternoon of 9 July, several Chinook helicopter flights delivered 

to Wanat the 2d Platoon Soldiers who had not been able to fit into the 

HMMWVs the night before. Other helicopter flights carried the mortars 

and crew to the site along with construction materials, such as HESCOs, 

hand excavation tools (shovels and picks), sandbags, and concertina wire. 

Most of this material along with supplementary ammunition, had been 

previously positioned at COP Bella and was transferred to Wanat.60

The 9 July Chinook sorties also inserted the 24 Afghan soldiers from 

the attached ANA platoon along with the three US Marine ETT members. 

Half came from Blessing in the morning, the remainder directly from 

Bella after dusk. The ANA company that provided the platoon to COP 

Kahler was a new ANA organization formed in January and February 

2008. It had received initial unit training at Kabul and then been moved 

to the Pech/Korengal/Waygal Valley region in March 2008. The majority 

of the enlisted men were relatively young inexperienced recruits from 

northeastern Afghanistan, although operating out of the battalion’s 

headquarters at Camp Blessing and not at Wanat. The kandak’s operations 

sergeant major was an extremely experienced Safi Pashtun from the lower 

Waygal Valley and provided considerable local knowledge and familiarity. 

Three Marine ETT members, two of whom, the noncommissioned officer 

in charge (NCOIC) Staff Sergeant Luis Repreza and Corporal Jason Jones, 

had been in their positions since March 2008, advised the ANA platoon. 

Corporal Jason Oakes, who formerly had been performing administrative 

duties based on his finance military occupational specialty, joined the 

team and was slated to temporarily replace Repreza during his routine 

morale leave scheduled to begin 13 July. Oakes joined the ANA platoon 
90

on the ground at Camp Blessing on 9 July, just in time for the helicopter 

ride to Wanat. Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Anderson, a Marine reservist 

and the commander of the ETT, noted that the ANA company had been 

undergoing intensive training and had made considerable progress. 

Anderson specifically recalled that their level of training enabled the ANA 

to perform effective and independent dismounted local security patrols. 

The ANA’s weaknesses were in logistics and communications and the 

Marine team provided the majority of these services. Unfortunately, the 

Afghan soldiers had not participated in 2d Platoon’s planning for ROCK 

MOVE or precombat preparations before they arrived in Wanat.61

The six man engineer squad, led by Staff Sergeant Thomas Hodge, 

from C Company, 62d Engineer Battalion (Heavy), a unit that had just 

recently deployed to Afghanistan from Fort Hood, Texas, also arrived by 

Chinook helicopter on the morning of 9 July. Accompanying them was 

the Bobcat loader and a small CONEX shipping container filled with 

specialized engineer equipment. The engineers set up a large rubber fuel 

blivet for the Bobcat next to this CONEX, roughly located in the center 

of the field.62

Because five heavily laden HMMWVs could not transport the entirety 

of the platoon’s needs, and to augment the air resupply shipments, TF Rock

planned to send a convoy of civilian “jingle” trucks, large civilian cargo 

vehicles capable of navigating through the rutted roads of northeastern 

Afghanistan, with construction supplies and water. Since there were 

problems with the safety of movement of civilian vehicles on the road 

between Camp Blessing and Wanat, this convoy was slated to follow the 

TF Bayonet Route Clearance Package 8 (RCP 8) up the road on 9 July. RCP 

8 was a special task organized force from the brigade engineer company 

designed to remove IEDs and clear ambushes from important routes in AO 

Rock. However, the RCP never cleared the road between Camp Blessing 

and Wanat after the execution of ROCK MOVE. On 8 July, while RCP 

8 was clearing the main road through the Chawkay Valley (Destined 

Company sector), an operation which included members of the new RCP 

element from the relieving 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, 

the combined unit was involved in a TIC incident. The RCP convoy struck 

a command wire IED which destroyed a vehicle, killed one member of the 

new unit and wounded four other engineers. Due to a combination of the 

catastrophic effects of the detonation and the freshness of the unit which 

suffered the casualties, the RCP element’s operations were disrupted for 

several days. This hindered both routine ground resupply to Wanat and 

Ostlund’s scheduled visit to the new outpost on 10 July. Accordingly the 
91

jingle trucks never made it to the 2d Platoon’s position. Myer later recalled 

that communication problems with the contractors further hampered the 

synchronization of the contractors’ arrival in the first several days of 

operations at COP Kahler.63

However, as a backup and to provide routine resupply, Chosen 

Company had contracted five Afghan Toyota Hilux trucks from a local 

national in Nangalam. In the past, these small trucks had made numerous 

runs to COP Bella, merely requiring 24 hours notice to execute a mission. 

Consequently, after realizing that the jingle trucks would not make their 

scheduled delivery and after reprioritizing resupply requirements with 

Sergeant First Class Dzwik at Wanat, Company Executive Officer Captain 

Devin George arranged for the Hiluxes to deliver additional water and 

construction materials to COP Kahler. While these trucks also had security 

problems reaching Wanat, two did arrive at the outpost on 11 July, bringing 

about 15 cases of water.64

The Afghan civilians providing services to the Americans were 

naturally apprehensive. The AAF targeted anyone cooperating with the 

Coalition forces. In 2006, the insurgents destroyed some of the equipment 

of a Jalalabad construction company that was improving the road between 

Wanat and Bella. This incident would have been well known to Afghan 

firms in the region. Glenn suspected that local contractors may have 

even been “warned off” by other Afghans from going to Wanat. Therefore, 

traveling to Wanat without RCP protection was problematic. Nevertheless, 

the resourceful Nangalamis still managed to get several Hiluxes through 

to COP Kahler.65

With the arrival of the 120-mm mortar by helicopter on 9 July, all of 

the heavy weapons dedicated to support the new COP were in place. The 

mortar, smeared with mud, was immediately emplaced to fire. The mortar 

section was a combination of one of the company’s two 60-mm mortar 

squads and a 120-mm mortar squad from the battalion mortar platoon. 

Staff Sergeant Erich Phillips led this ad hoc mortar section. Phillips was a 

very experienced NCO who had won the Distinguished Service Cross for 

valor during the Ranch House fight. The mortar section, engineers, and 

Afghan soldiers were the last reinforcements that would arrive at Wanat 

until the afternoon of 12 July when Myer finally arrived with Aass, his 

RTO, via Chinook helicopter. Myer brought supplies of water, rations, 

and replacement parts with him. Accordingly, on 13 July, there were 49 

Americans and 24 Afghan soldiers at COP Kahler. In the plan for ROCK 

MOVE, Myer’s company fire support officer (FSO), 1LT Erik Gonzalez, 

was supposed to accompany him to Wanat. However, Myer left him behind 
92

at Camp Blessing to conduct other duties as he felt that Sergeant Pitts, the 

2d Platoon FO, was well able to supervise fire support activities for the 

unit there.66

The Terrain at Wanat and the Configuration of the COP

For COP Kahler to be effective, it had to be in close proximity to 

Wanat to allow the Americans to foster relations with the town’s population 

and facilitate regular coordination with the district center and Afghan 

National Police (ANP). The site also had to be near the road from Camp 

Blessing to ease resupply. Of course, the COP had to be positioned and 

constructed so that its garrison could provide security for the community 

against the AAF that might seek to punish any within the community that 

cooperated with Coalition and Government of the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan (GIROA) forces.

To meet those criteria, COP Kahler had to be placed near the town. As 

with nearly every community in Konar and Nuristan, Wanat was located 

within a valley whose steep walls overlooked the settlement. Wanat was 

specifically located at the junction of the Wayskawdi Creek, which flowed 

generally from the east, and the larger Waygal River, which flowed south 

from the Hindu Kush through the valley and into the Pech River. The 

two bridges constructed by local labor and Glenn’s engineers in the fall 

of 2006 had greatly improved the ability of Waygal Valley residents to 

travel to the Wanat area which in turn enhanced the town’s standing as a 

commercial and political center in the valley. COP Kahler also had to be 

positioned to protect these two bridges as they were key terrain within the 

Waygal Valley.

In 2008, Wanat was a community of approximately 50 families (roughly 

200 people) and it contained a mosque, hotel/restaurant, a large bazaar 

(market), and a district government center which included the district 

police headquarters from which a force of ANP operated. A local resident, 

“Ahmad” (not his real name), noted that the community had initially 

enjoyed good relationships with the US Army, “People were treated very 

good by US and Afghan Forces [in 2006] while building two bridges by 

US Forces. A lot of people were hired from Wanat and nearby villages and 

people from Wanat Village were and still are nice with US forces.”67 This 

statement referred to the fall 2006 project mounted by First Lieutenant 

Glenn. Ahmad further suggested that the town’s population opposed the 

construction of an American base in their community primarily because 

it would be certain to attract attacks from the insurgents as the COPs at 

Ranch House and Bella had done. Ahmad noted, “The most important 
93

reason I think, was that Wanat Villagers did not want their village to be 

a battlefield. They knew that if US Army build base there, militant will 

attack or fire rocket and villagers will be the most victim of fighting. That 

is why they were against the base. It was mentioned by villagers to the US 

Army in meetings.”68 Ahmad was referring to the dialogues between the 

Wanat elders and TF Rock officers during the two shuras held at Wanat 

on 26 May and 8 June 2008. American officers attending these meetings 

confirmed his statement.69

The location of COP Kahler was a large open field, which the Chosen 

Company troopers described as roughly the size of a football field, aligned 

lengthwise from north to south, and located generally south of and directly 

adjacent to the village of Wanat. The field was generally flat and level, 

declining slightly from north to south, with low terraces running east to 

west that were relatively easily negotiated. The center of the field was at 

an elevation of 3,350 feet and generally devoid of vegetation but contained 

numerous small rocks. As Wanat is surrounded by 10,000 foot ridges on 

all sides, the town is dominated by the high ground. For this reason, during 

the earlier brief American occupation of Wanat in 2006, the engineers 

attached to the 10th Mountain Division had established three OPs on high 

ground to provide overwatch for the American position.70

Staff Sergeant Jesse Queck

Figure 10. View of Wanat COP looking east from mortar position with 

2d Squad position, the bazaar and OP Topside’s later location in the 

background, 9 July 2008.
94

The Waygal River ran through a deep ravine on the immediate 

western side of the COP. The road from Camp Blessing to Wanat ran from 

south to north and defined the eastern periphery of COP Kahler. A large 

building with a prominent blue roof was located to the west of the COP 

and surrounded by a high stone wall. Due north was a smaller single story 

building that served as the Wanat mosque. The large district center was 

farther to the northwest of the mosque and located on a narrow isthmus 

between the river and the creek, immediately adjacent to and west of the 

road to Camp Blessing. It was relatively close to the COP, approximately 

200 yards, but was located at a considerably lower elevation and could not 

be viewed from COP Kahler. A cluster of buildings existed to the northeast 

and east of the American position in the open field just across the road. 

This grouping included several multistory buildings that served as a hotel/

restaurant/tea cafe and a long single story building to the east that served 

as the community bazaar or market.71

On the morning of 9 July, Brostrom established an OP on a ridge to the 

east of the main position, east of both the bazaar and the hotel/restaurant 

complex. In the spring, during visits to Wanat, Myer had directed Brostrom 

and Dzwik to place the OP on the high ground to the east of the bazaar. 

Myer had originally envisioned the OP to be located several hundred yards 

away from the COP. Once the platoon arrived, however, Brostrom chose 

a closer location among a group of large boulders and trees. Myer later 

recalled that after his arrival at Wanat, Brostrom explained to him that 

the protection afforded by the boulders made the OP site preferable to all 

others.72

This spot was on a prominent ridge located east of the Blessing-Wanat 

Road and southeast of the junction of Wayskawdi Creek and the Waygal 

River. This ridge was oblong and consisted of a large number of flattened 

agricultural terraces. The terrace walls were constructed of stone and were 

probably about 100 years old. The Americans noted that the terraces varied 

from waist to mid-chest in height. Overall, the ridge was of sufficient 

elevation to block completely all observation and fields of fire from the 

COP to the northeast and southeast. It also blocked visibility or control 

of the lower ground along the Wayskawdi Creek, which flowed through a 

large ravine to the north, northeast, and east of the ridge. 

Thus placing an OP there provided some visibility of the terrain to 

the east that could serve as an AAF avenue of approach into Wanat and 

would otherwise have been masked from view of those at the COP. Also 

important was that the OP’s location provided the paratroopers with 

visibility of the two bridges just north of the town. Specifically, the OP site 
95

was located on the western side of the ridge, approximately 60 yards east 

of the 2d Squad’s position on the COP’s perimeter. It was located below 

the topographical crest of the ridge, six terraces up (approximately 20 feet 

in elevation above the road and COP). The OP was separated by the long, 

single story market from the road and COP Kahler. It was relatively close 

to the COP but the climb up the terraces was steep and difficult, particularly 

given the weight of the individual body armor (IBA) and helmet that the 

paratroopers continually wore at Wanat.73

Pitts, the forward observer, noted that Brostrom had specifically 

positioned the OP with proximity to the COP in mind. Pitts recalled 

Brostrom saying “he didn’t want the observation post to be too far out 

because we didn’t really have a lot of people.”74 The platoon leader clearly 

wanted to be able to react to any problems at the OP quickly and was 

concerned about placing it in a position that was too far away from the 

COP. Any QRF required to assist the paratroopers at the OP had to be able 

to move on a route that was short and as safe as possible.

The OP site had one serious disadvantage. It offered poor to nonexistent 

lines of sight to the north because only ten yards to its north, the ground 

fell steeply into a tree filled ravine that contained the Wayskawdi Creek. 

Thus, to the immediate north, the OP site had considerable nearby dead 

space, an area that could not be seen or covered by direct fire weapons. 

That ravine could potentially serve as a covered and concealed route for 

an enemy intent on attacking the OP. In fact, careful use of this route could 

allow an insurgent force to approach within hand grenade range of the OP, 

as well as enter unobserved the hotel/restaurant complex of buildings.

The platoon called the OP “Topside” after a topographical feature 

on the island of Corregidor which the battalion had used as a drop zone 

on 16 February 1945 during the Battle of the Philippines in World War 

II. Topside was the most important drop zone in the history of the 503d 

Infantry. Albeit on a smaller scale, the ridge to the east of COP Kahler 

dominated the position just as Topside had dominated the topography of 

Corregidor.

There was a gap between the bazaar and the hotel/restaurant complex 

such that Soldiers could walk to the north of the bazaar from the COP 

to the OP. Just to the south of the bazaar, was a small separate building 

that served as the local public latrine for the market. To the south of this 

building, the 1st Squad set up a traffic control point (TCP) along the road to 

Camp Blessing. Although the troops could walk directly from the COP to 

the OP by taking a path north of the bazaar, they most frequently followed 
96

a less direct path that had been created through the 1st Squad’s TCP. The 

TCP was located approximately 50 yards from the OP, although a number 

of vertical terraces had to be ascended to reach the OP.75

Within the open field was an unfinished (walls only) “C-shaped” 

building on the eastern side of the field with the open portion of the “C” 

facing to the northeast. The Americans did not occupy it. Dzwik recalled 

that they were not permitted to use the building which was an unfinished 

new bazaar. The building plans for the completed COP did not include 

this building within its limits. The road from Camp Blessing to Wanat ran 

between the existing bazaar and the C-shaped building.76

Agricultural terraces extended for a considerable distance to the south 

where the concertina wire perimeter fence was the only definition for the 

southern edge of the COP. Civilian compounds, consisting of multiple 

buildings, lookout towers, and potential enemy firing positions, were 

located on higher ground to the southwest and southeast of the COP and 

to the southeast and northeast of the OP. On the western side, COP Kahler 

abutted several Afghan compounds, behind which ran the Waygal River. 

On the other side of the river, the ground began to rise precipitously to 

form the valley wall.

Work on the COP had begun on 9 July with the rifle squads, mortar 

section, and TOW squad establishing their fighting positions. The engineers 

began surveying the field so that when the Afghan contractors arrived, they 

could assist with building the HESCO barriers. Dzwik recalled, “They 

were tracking that they were going to start building the FOB right away. 

They had marked off the guard towers and where the walls were going to 

go.”77

The COP began to take shape over the next three days. The engineers 

used the Bobcat to fill a number of HESCO barriers around the three squad 

positions and to create a firing pit for the 120-mm mortar. The ANA platoon 

likewise established several squad positions. That platoon and its threeMarine ETT occupied the very northern tip of the COP, just a few yards 

from the mosque and the hotel complex. Slightly behind the ANA and 

oriented to the north, Brostrom set up his 3d Squad, led by Sergeant Israel 

Garcia, whose three-man fighting position consisted of several HESCOs 

and its HMMWV, equipped with a Mk-19 grenade launcher. On the eastern 

side of the COP, Brostrom placed his 2d Squad in a position reinforced 

with HESCOs. Staff Sergeant Benton and the six squad members oriented 

their HMMWV, mounting one Mk-19 grenade launcher, toward the east 

looking at the bazaar. The platoon command post; consisting of Brostrom, 

Dzwik, the RTO, and the medic, was protected by the platoon leader’s 

HMMWV and several HESCOs and sat against the northwest wall of the 
97

C-shaped building in the middle of the COP. As previously mentioned, 

the platoon’s 1st Squad established a TCP just south of the bazaar on the 

Wanat-Camp Blessing Road. That control point roughly 30 yards to the 

southeast from 2d Platoon’s position, consisted of the squad’s HMMWV 

with its M2 .50-caliber machine gun oriented down the road to the south, 

several HESCO barriers, and a single strand of concertina wire stretched 

across the road as an obstacle. Squad leader Staff Sergeant Sean Samaroo 

had five paratroopers to man the TCP.78

The ANA platoon also established a TCP position along the road from 

Camp Blessing some yards south of the 1st Squad’s TCP near the Wanat 

medical clinic. The double echeloning of TCPs was a security measure 

designed to minimize the effect of any vehicle borne IEDs. However, this 

redundancy could be construed as a luxury when viewed in the context of 

the lack of observation posts on higher ground around the COP. 

To the south of the CP, Brostrom placed the three-man TOW missile 

squad and their HMMWV. Sergeant Justin Grimm, the squad leader, 

oriented the missile system to the south and west and used the ITAS to 

scan in those directions. Between 9 and 12 July, Grimm periodically 

moved the TOW HMMWV to other spots on the southern half of the COP. 

However, by 12 July the engineers had used the Bobcat to construct a 

ramp for the HMMWV to enhance its ability to observe and fire. The TOW 

HMMWV occupied this position just before dark on 12 July. The mortar 

crew set up the 60-mm mortar in the middle of the COP, approximately 

midway between the mortar pit and the command post. The crew did not 

regularly man that mortar and installed it in an incomplete firing position 

that offered virtually no protection.79

The platoon constructed specific positions within the COP using 

different configurations based on the terrain, resources, and time available. 

Dzwik specifically recalled that the soil at the COP was hard with a lot of 

rocks and that it was very difficult digging given the limited hand tools 

and entrenching tools that the platoon had. In his opinion, excavating more 

than a couple of feet down was not feasible. Scantlin called the excavation 

process “a labor intensive project to get nowhere.”80 Thus the positions 

were a mix of sandbags, vehicles, HESCOs, and other materials. The field 

latrine, for example, was a simple plywood structure constructed by the 

engineers and protected by approximately half a dozen HESCOs partially 

filled with dirt. The 120-mm mortar position was a C-shaped bunker 

of HESCOs with the opening to the east (the interior of the COP). The 

bottom layer of HESCOs at this position was filled with dirt. On top of 

this layer, the mortarmen positioned a second tier of HESCOs. On both 

ends of the horseshoe-shaped wall of barriers, the mortarmen filled the 
98

HESCOs with dirt excavated by the Bobcat. Because of a depression in 

the ground, the Bobcat could not reach the upper tier of HESCOs in the 

center of the mortar position Phillips filled these sections by hand, with a 

combination of dirt, empty ammo cans and miscellaneous debris located at 

the site. A weakness of the mortar position was its placement without any 

infantry security between it and the perimeter of the COP. Phillips did not 

anticipate enemy occupation of the nearby houses without some kind of 

warning. Ultimately the mortarmen depended on the HESCOS and barbed 

wire to protect themselves rather than the usual screen of infantry fighting 

positions.81

The infantry squads used HESCOs and other materials in the 

construction of their positions. The three ANA positions were excavated 

between 18 and 36 inches deep and had another two to three feet of 

double layered sandbags placed above the ground surface. Garcia’s 3d 

Squad position was initially similar to the nearby ANA positions. The 

more experienced 2d Squad leader, Staff Sergeant Benton, looked at the 

position at Garcia’s request and recommended that it be strengthened. 

Accordingly, by the evening of 12 July, Garcia’s squad had improved it 

with six HESCOs in an “L” configuration to the north and west of the 

position with a strong sandbagged wall to the south. The HMMWV was 

positioned to the right (east) of the fighting position. Benton established a 

strong position for his 2d Squad that was approximately eight yards long 

and five yards wide, with a sandbag wall covering the north about five feet 

high, a three foot high rock wall on the east, the HMMWV serving as the 

western wall, and a three foot sandbag wall on the south side. Benton then 

created a smaller position made out of several four foot HESCOs to the 

north of his main squad position.82

The other positions on the main COP took shape as well. By 12 July, 

the 1st Squad’s TCP was a substantial fighting position. Samaroo had 

improved the position with a three foot high triple wall of sandbags and 

two interlocked four foot HESCOs. To the east and at the control point’s 

rear, there was a seven foot high terrace wall. The HMMWV was set up 

on the western side of the position. Finally, the squad hung camouflage 

netting over the position. The CP position too, was built up over the 

course of the position’s occupation. Its site directly abutted the unfinished 

C-shaped building. Brostrom parked his HMMWV to the west. The CP 

position was excavated as a pair of long slit trenches with a sandbag wall 

to the north, a single HESCO to the south, and the building’s wall to the 

east. The 60-mm mortar firing position was roughly in the center of the 

COP. It was excavated and the base plate had been settled but it was only 

protected by a few sandbags.83
99Figure 11. COP Kahler, 13 July 2008.
100

Because of the lack of available construction material, none of the 

positions had overhead cover. Such cover would protect against AAF 

mortar and rocket fires as well as from fragments from RPG rounds that 

could disintegrate in nearby foliage. Dzwik later noted that he had located 

some large wooden beams that could have been used for this purpose but 

they were piled by the unfinished bazaar and he did not want to take the 

wood without gaining the owner’s permission and properly paying for it. 

Finally, by 12 July the paratroopers added an extra layer of protection to 

the COP by stringing a double layer of concertina wire around its periphery 

and partially anchoring that fence to the ground with the limited number 

of stakes they had brought. They made a small entryway in the wire on the 

eastern side of the COP, to the north of the 1st Squad’s TCP and just south 

of the 2d Squad’s position. This gap served as the entrance for any vehicles 

arriving from Camp Blessing.84

The Configuration of OP Topside

By 12 July, the OP had become a complex of three interconnected 

fighting positions anchored by several large boulders that afforded an extra 

measure of protection. Brostrom emplaced the OP west of and several 

terraces below the top terrace at the pinnacle of the ridge. There was rising 

ground to the south and east and descending ground to the north and west. 

A large civilian compound stood about 100 yards to the southeast on

Courtesy Colonel William Ostlund

Figure 12. COP Kahler: Looking west towards the mortar pit after the battle.
101Figure 13. OP Topside, 13 July 2008.
102

higher ground. Following the 13 July engagement, reinforcing US troops 

would place an OP at this compound, as it was clearly key terrain. However, 

Brostrom did not feel that he had enough men available to defend a 

more remote and isolated OP location. The platoon leader considered a 

third position that provided better observation and fields of fire into the 

deep ravine to the north and east but this spot, east of where Topside 

was established, was much farther away from the COP and the ground 

between was particularly exposed to enemy observation and potential fire. 

Brostrom and Dzwik also considered establishing the OP in the two story 

hotel that dominated the mosque/hotel/bazaar complex of buildings within 

Wanat. However, an OP in the hotel would not have improved observation 

or obtained fields of fire to the east and would have required the Afghan 

residents of the hotel to be dislocated, thus potentially creating friction 

with the population.85

When Myer arrived on the afternoon of 12 July, he was not particularly 

enthusiastic about the location of OP Topside. He remembered, “I 

suggested moving it higher on the hill but all the paratroopers and the 

[platoon] leader said it would be more exposed on the hilltop and they 

would rather have the force protection of the rocks. I agreed we would 

move it when we had more force protection.”86 thus the OP stayed on the 

ridge just to the east of the COP. Perhaps its greatest advantage was that 

it was close to the COP. By placing it on the western military crest of the 

ridge, Brostrom assured access to the OP would be somewhat protected by 

the COP and TCP, although this location relinquished the ability to see into 

the nearby ravine to its north.

Brostrom and Dzwik created an ad hoc force to man OP Topside. They 

placed Sergeant Ryan Pitts, the platoon forward observer, in charge and 

gave him eight paratroopers. Two M240 machine gun teams, totaling five 

men from the platoon’s weapons squad, occupied the OP along with the 

unit’s dedicated marksman, a rifleman from 1st Squad, and a rifleman from 

3d Squad. Brostrom also gave Pitts the LRAS3 to enable the observers at 

the OP to watch the high ground to their north, east, and southeast.87

As elsewhere on the COP, the Soldiers at OP Topside excavated and 

used sandbags to improve the natural protection afforded by the boulders. 

No HESCOs were used at OP Topside because the Bobcat could not ascend 

the terraces to fill them. OP Topside included a north facing fire team sized 

fighting position occupied by one of the M240 machine gun teams, an 

east facing fire team sized fighting position occupied by the second M240 

team, and a southern facing fire team sized position with an M249 Squad 

Automatic Weapon (SAW) and an M203 40-mm grenade launcher. Both 
103

the north and south positions were rectangular and anchored on large 

boulders. The OP garrison constructed the southernmost fighting position 

at Specialist Jason Bogar’s specific recommendation that the OP required 

more protection. The east facing fighting position was semicircular and 

dug into the next higher terrace to the east. Probably because it was the 

highest position at COP Kahler, it became known as the “Crow’s Nest.” 

The troops built a long strong sandbag wall along the western side of 

the OP which afforded protection for three individual fighting positions. 

They also constructed several short segments of sandbag walls within the 

interior of the position to prevent enfilading fire from sweeping the OP. 

Benton referred to the OP as a “little maze of sandbags” because of the 

various sandbag wall segments.88 The paratroopers encircled the OP with 

a single strand of concertina wire. By 12 July, they had not staked down 

the concertina wire or otherwise secured it to the ground because the 2d 

Platoon had used all the available stakes and posts to install the double 

concertina fence around the main COP. At the OP, this barbed wire obstacle 

generally ran along the periphery of the agricultural terraces where the 

dead ground began roughly ten yards from the OP’s fighting positions.89

Several large trees on the western periphery of the OP provided shade 

and some limited concealment. There was an area of dense brush and 

foliage immediately to the northwest. This vegetation partially obstructed 

fields of fire. The paratroopers did not possess adequate equipment such 

as axes or chain saws, to enable them to cut down the trees and brush, 

although the engineers had a limited capability to clear fields of fire. 

Brostrom decided to wait until adequate equipment and personnel arrived 

to clear the large trees to the west and this small copse of brush. Until 

this vegetation was cleared, it would limit the fields of fire and partially 

obscured the OP from the main COP below.90

To offer greater protection from close threats, the paratroopers 

at Topside emplaced four M18A1 Claymore command-detonated 

antipersonnel mines at the periphery of the dead ground to the east and the 

north where the tree filled ravine offered a particularly dangerous enemy 

avenue of approach. The operators positioned the mines after dark and 

recovered them at first light. The Claymores at OP Topside were not dug 

into the ground but simply placed on the ground inside the concertina 

wire and concealed with dirt and other debris. Stafford, who manned the 

machine gun in the northern part of the OP, specifically recalled testing 

the Claymores every night when he emplaced them and knew they were 

in working order. The paratroopers at the OP carried a large number of 

hand grenades up to the OP along with an M-203 40-mm grenade launcher 
104

mounted underneath an M16 5.56-mm rifle to assist in controlling the dead 

space. Pitts also established several target reference points in this dead 

ground to help defend the OP. On 12 July, Pitts registered 155-mm artillery 

fire on one of these targets and the mortar section fired both the 60-mm and 

120-mm mortars to settle their base plates.91

The troopers at the OP used the terrace immediately to the west of (and 

below) the OP as their sleeping position with their individual tents located 

there. There were no fighting positions at the sleeping terrace because it 

was not intended to be defended. During hours of likely attack, such as 

dawn and dusk, the garrison was always awake and alert in the fighting 

positions at the OP. The Chosen paratroopers at the OP had constructed a 

short stretch of sandbags running east to west across the northern portion of 

the sleeping terrace to provide protection from the dead space to the north. 

The intention was eventually to extend this wall to provide protection to 

the entire sleeping terrace but by dusk on 12 July, only a short stretch of 

the north facing sandbag wall had been completed.92

Operations and Events at COP Kahler, 9-12 July

Between 8 and 12 July, the leaders of TF Rock were focused on a 

number of different actions. Ostlund was very busy during this period. 

From 8 to 10 July, he attended numerous previously scheduled shuras

and meetings with key local leaders. As mentioned previously, the TF 

Rock commander had planned to visit Wanat on 10 July, a move that 

was cancelled due to the disruption of the RCP by an IED on 8 July. In 

addition, on 10 July, TF Rock suffered several enemy attacks, one each on 

the Pech River road and in the Korengal Valley. These attacks necessitated 

Ostlund’s attention. In addition, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(CJCS), Admiral Michael Mullen, was scheduled to visit the Korengal 

area the next day. On 11 July, the 2-503d IN commander escorted Admiral 

Mullen on a tour of the TF Rock positions in that valley. Because of a 

variety of factors related to this visit, Ostlund ended up stranded overnight 

in the Korengal and did not return to Camp Blessing until early on 12 

July. While Ostlund’s staff was involved with the preliminary stages of the 

relief in place with the 1-26th IN, there was also additional enemy activity 

away from Wanat in the TF Rock AO that garnered their attention. In the 

Korengal Valley, seven separate incidents were recorded for this four day 

period. TF Rock Soldiers in the Pech Valley also came under enemy fire 

in four separate cases during the same period, including an instance of 

indirect fire aimed at Camp Blessing. D Company in the lower Konar and 

Chawkay Valleys reported four incidents.93
105

In the Waygal Valley, in contrast, the situation was relatively peaceful. 

Between 9 and 12 July, the 2d Platoon conducted a number of routine 

activities without any enemy interference. The US and Afghan Soldiers 

maintained local security, including the manning of the major weapon 

systems such as the TOW and the 120-mm mortar. Security operations 

also included the conduct of “stand-to” just before dusk and dawn on each 

day. Stand-to requires all unit Soldiers to be awake, alert, and ready to 

repel an enemy attack. It usually begins an hour before dawn at begin 

morning nautical twilight (BMNT) and an hour before dusk at end evening 

nautical twilight (EENT). The practice of stand-to was especially important 

in Afghanistan because insurgents in various parts of the country had 

displayed a tendency to attack Coalition forces before dawn.94

Brostrom and Dzwik carefully ensured that all weapons and 

supplementary weapons systems were positioned in overlapping fields of 

fire with formal range cards. Dzwik and Myer both recalled that Brostrom 

had drawn a detailed tactical diagram of the platoon defensive positions 

on a meal, ready to eat (MRE) box but this diagram could not be located 

following the 13 July battle. Pitts, the forward observer, pre-plotted target 

reference points for indirect fire (mortar and field artillery) all around the 

COP perimeter, paying particular attention to covering the dead space to 

the north and east of the OP. On 10 July, he forwarded an updated target 

plan to the battalion tactical operations center (TOC).95

In the opening days of ROCK MOVE, the force at Wanat also enjoyed 

a significant amount of ISR coverage. The operation had high priority at 

both CJTF and TF Bayonet levels. Thus, Wanat was to receive 24 hours of 

UAV and eight hours of SIGINT support in the 24 hour period beginning 

at 0730 on 8 July. In this period, the paratroopers at COP Kahler did get 

eight hours of SIGINT coverage but an imminent threat to Coalition troops 

elsewhere in RC-East directed the UAV away from Wanat, reducing the 

quantity of FMV coverage from 24 to 16.5 hours. In the next 24 hour 

period (9-10 July), Wanat again was to receive 24 hours of UAV and eight 

hours of SIGINT support. Another combat action outside of the TF Rock

AO pulled the UAV away from Wanat, decreasing planned coverage to 

16.5 hours. Other priorities also affected ISR support to Wanat in the next 

24 hour period (10-11 July). TF Bayonet had apportioned 22 hours of 

UAV and seven hours of SIGINT coverage to COP Kahler. However, 

other combat operations in RC-East pulled the systems away from Wanat, 

resulting in 13 hours of FMV and seven and a half hours of SIGINT 

support over COP Kahler.96
106

Despite the reductions in ISR coverage, the Task Force Rock staff 

was satisfied with the support provided to COP Kahler. The staff directed 

the UAVs to look for insurgent movement on the hillsides surrounding 

Wanant as well as into the known insurgent “safehavens” in the area. First 

Lieutenant Matthew Colley, the assistant intelligence officer, recalled, 

“We were monitoring the area and everything was working great.” 

According to a number of intelligence officers involved, including Colley 

and Lieutenant Colonel Gervais, the CJTF intelligence officer, none of 

these ISR systems detected any indications of a large number of insurgents 

gathering around Wanat in the period between 8 and 11 July.97

COP Kahler retained priority of fires within the battalion, meaning it 

had first call on the howitzers located at Camp Blessing and Asadabad. 

Manning these guns were a platoon from C Battery, 321st Field Artillery 

(the Cobras), 18th Fires [i.e. Field Artillery] Brigade, deployed out of Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina. Despite the relatively short straight line distance 

(8,750 yards or 4.97 miles) between Blessing and Wanat, because of the 

elevation of the intervening terrain, artillery had to be fired in a high angle 

trajectory. Due to the laws of physics and ballistics, the conditions within 

the Waygal Valley required a considerable probable error of range (PER), 

meaning that each round had a significant ballistic variation that could 

not be corrected by gunnery techniques. In other words, terrain conditions 

made field artillery (FA) fire less precise. At Wanat, because of the relatively 

short range, a reduced propellant charge had to be used, which meant that 

the PER or accuracy of FA fire at COP Kahler was between 32 and 65 

yards, a still large but manageable variation. Accordingly, this required 

that field artillery fire had to be carefully observed and controlled by 

experienced forward observers such as Pitts. Without such careful control, 

it was dangerous to drop rounds near friendly troops. The firing conditions 

increased the possibility of fratricide if the gunners and observers did not 

use caution.98

As the platoon leadership focused on placing and adjusting weapon 

systems, the paratroopers continued to improve their positions. On 11 July, 

as noted earlier, the Bobcat ran out of fuel and could not refuel until the 

broken blivet pump was repaired. This mechanical failure, however, did 

not really affect construction, particularly the filling of HESCO barriers. 

The platoon used and filled all available sandbags and emplaced all the 

concertina wire on hand, using every picket available to partially secure 

the barbed wire around the COP.99
107Figure 14. The Wanat garrison, 13 July 2008.
108

The hot weather hindered the platoon’s efforts at constructing its 

defenses. At times, the heat rose to over 100 degrees Fahrenheit. Working 

or providing security in such weather increased water usage. As early as 9 

July, the platoon leadership projected a water shortage. The ROCK MOVE 

plan called for a buildup of five days of water supply for the operation. At 

the operations briefing on 7 July, General Milley inquired about the ways 

in which the 2d Platoon would be supported logistically. He specifically 

recalled, “I would always ask up questions [on logistics] and I was briefed 

that [TF] Rock had plenty of it and that they had five days of supply and 

that there were no issues.”100 Accordingly, the 2d Platoon brought as 

much bottled water with them as they could carry. However, the Army’s 

doctrinal manual for water supply posited a planning factor for troop water 

consumption in an arid climate of 5.9 gallons per man per day. For the 

49 Americans at Wanat, this meant a total of 289.1 gallons a day for the 

Americans. Five days of supply would, therefore, total 1,445.5 gallons or 

the contents of four 400 gallon M149 water trailers or the equivalent of 

5,472 one liter containers of bottled water. The troops could not carry such 

a large amount of water with them on their HMMWVs. In actuality the 

platoon brought what Dzwik, the platoon sergeant, estimated to be a two 

day supply with them. He felt that this was adequate until the first resupply 

missions arrived. The supply buildup for ROCK MOVE included water 

stockpiled at Camp Blessing. The battalion and company logisticians 

projected that these additional allocations would be brought forward via 

Chinook helicopters with vehicle shipment by an Afghan contractor as a 

backup plan. After the initial action of the operation, standard procedure 

was that resupply would be pushed forward based on unit requests. 

Accordingly, there was no fixed long term resupply schedule. The 

schedule constantly changed based on the tactical situation and the supply 

requirements of the supported unit.101

With resupply expected on the first day, Dzwik initially thought he 

had brought enough water to Wanat. Although he knew in advance that 

troop labor would be used to construct the first phase of the COP defenses, 

the unexpectedly high temperatures caused water to be consumed at a 

higher rate than Dzwik had originally estimated. He remembered, “The 

first couple days was just nothing but digging in hard ground, [in] which 

you could only get maybe a foot or two down. It was still the dead heat 

of Afghanistan, so during the hottest parts of the day in the afternoon, 

there was a lot less being done just because even working for 10 minutes, 

you’re using up a lot of water.”102 On the first day at Wanat, Dzwik quickly 

realized that the platoon would need more water and recalled coordinating 
109

for a resupply. In the short term, however, Brostrom and his platoon 

sergeant decided to limit the hardest labor to cooler periods of the day to 

conserve water. Dzwik noted, “We tried to do as much as we could from 

first light at four o’clock in the morning [0400] until it got just too hot. 

Then we would rest up and then try to get some more stuff done when it 

started cooling down a little bit toward sundown.”103 Squad leader Benton 

recalled that the platoon leaders actually began discussing the rationing of 

water in the first few days of operations at Wanat.104

The 2d Platoon did have some alternatives to the strict rationing of 

their water supply and/or reduced labor. Local water sources in Wanat 

included the Waygal River and Wayskawdi Creek, both of which were 

flowing high because of recent rains, and a well located near the hotel just 

outside the perimeter of the COP. Dzwik stated that the platoon had water 

filtration equipment with them at Wanat but he felt that the labor required 

to create an adequate water supply from this equipment ruled out its use 

in the early days at Wanat. Additionally, the platoon medic carried several 

bottles of iodine tablets that could produce potable water. However, the 

iodine tablets took an hour to activate and a large number of tablets (40, 

practically an entire bottle) were required to decontaminate five gallons 

of water. In any event, Dzwik shied away from using the iodine tablets 

because he felt their use caused diarrhea among the Americans which 

would lead to additional dehydration. Platoon members did use the well on 

one occasion on 11 July to fill up a five gallon can which was then purified 

with iodine tablets. In contrast, the Marines had no qualms about using the 

iodine tablets and did so early.105

A helicopter shortage limited water resupply. This was initially 

considered not to be a problem since the troops had brought water with 

them. However, with the consumption rate higher than expected, water 

soon became an issue. A pallet of water arrived by Chinook on the 9th 

but this resupply only provided about three gallons (12 liters) per man, 

below the minimum daily requirement of 5.9 gallons. From the evening 

of the 9th on, Captain George, the company executive officer (XO) began 

coordination to push the contracted force of civilian Toyota Hi-Lux 

pickup trucks with water to Wanat. Since such an action required a 24 

hour lead time, the earliest the trucks could go to Wanat was on the 11th. 

As previously recounted, several of these vehicles did, in fact, reach the 

outpost on that day, bringing about a day’s supply of water. According 

to Sergeant Pitts this shipment contained approximately 15 cases of 

water. At this point, Dzwik later commented that, “By the 11th, water 

was no longer an issue.”106 The delivery was welcomed but the platoon 
110

leadership’s decision to limit manual labor because of the limited supply 

of bottled water had already affected operations. To augment previous 

stockpiles, Captain Myer arrived by Chinook on the 12th with three or 

four additional pallets. During the days after the initial occupation of the 

Wanat site, through neither command nor logistical channels was the 

garrison there reported as being critically short (“black” in contemporary 

Army parlance) of water.107

 Postbattle, some soldiers perceived the lack of heavy equipment (not 

organic to the infantry unit) and projected shortages of bottled water to be 

limiting factors in the development of the defense. One of the engineers 

stated, “We couldn’t do much manual labor that day [10 July] because 

we ran out of water, or close to it, that morning.”108 An infantry sergeant 

noted the relative lack of unit equipment that allowed the men to dig and 

improve their own positions, “When we first started digging our foxhole 

we had to wait on shovels and pick axes not being used at the time. . . . I 

remember on the 10th, 11th we [were] down to less than a liter of [bottled] 

water per person and subsequently we did not dig or work to conserve our 

energy and water supply.”109 The additional barrier material that arrived on 

11 July, however, included pickets that allowed the Soldiers to complete 

staking down the concertina wire around the COP.110

Despite these later misgivings, after four days of operations the 2d 

Platoon and its attached elements had made great progress towards the 

preparation of the defenses at the Wanat position. The OP, squad positions 

and the mortar area were virtually completed by the 12th. One squad 

leader was so impressed with his squad’s work that he believed that his 

unit’s position could withstand direct hits from the enemy’s most lethal 

weapons. Similarly, the senior NCO at the OP felt that his men had 

“accomplished...a lot” in the short time they had been at Wanat.111 Mortar 

section chief Phillips also felt satisfied with the position he and his men 

had constructed. When he arrived on the 12th, Myer noted that “they had 

a good amount built up.”112

However, there were the untapped manpower assets available at Wanat 

of the ANA troops. The Marines advising the ANA platoon believed that 

the Afghan soldiers were fully competent and capable of performing 

dismounted local security patrols. In their opinion, the Afghans could have 

been utilized as additional manpower other than just manning three fighting 

positions in the COP and running a redundant TCP along the main road. 

However, only on 12 July did Brostrom plan the first patrol which was to 

depart on the morning of 13 July and include both US and ANA Soldiers. 

Some of the noncommissioned officers at the site were displeased with the 
111

decision to dispatch even this patrol. Sergeant Hissong noted, “I remember 

arguing with Staff Sergeant Samaroo about having to build a base and still 

do patrols with such a small amount of people.”113 The insurgent attack 

prevented this patrol from leaving the COP.114

Until Myer arrived, neither the ANA unit nor the 2d Platoon conducted 

shuras or meetings with the local elders, the district governor, or ANP 

officers. Brostrom did attempt to organize such meetings and the single 

patrol to the district center was to coordinate such gatherings but the local 

and district leadership in Wanat rebuffed his efforts. Scantlin remembered, 

“Lieutenant Brostrom tried to talk to people but never got anywhere.”115

The 2d Platoon did talk to some residents and, as noted below, these 

encounters did provide information. Nevertheless, in the first four days of 

operations at COP Kahler, interaction between the Wanat population and 

the US and Afghan Soldiers was minimal.

Because of Chosen Company’s prior visits to Wanat, the AAF was 

well aware that the Americans intended to establish a COP in the large 

field immediately south of the village. As 2d Squad leader Benton, noted, 

“Every time we would set up any kind of base of operations once we got 

into Wanat, it was right where we ended up setting up [COP] Kahler.”116

This knowledge and their close relationship with at least some of the 

population in Wanat meant that the insurgents could make good use of the 

town and its people in preparing any attack on the Coalition base.

Many of the Americans at COP Kahler picked up indicators of the 

enemy’s presence in Wanat before the attack. Corporal Oakes, a member 

of the Marine ETT, remembered the young Afghan men in civilian clothes 

who observed intently the paratroopers’ activities:

There were civilians who were watching us all through the day. 

There was nothing we could do to tell them, “You can’t watch 

us digging in the ground here.” They knew exactly where we 

were. You could do eye judgment 30, 40, 50 feet and then be 

in the city just walking around doing a pace count and there 

was nothing we could do. . . . You can’t shoot somebody for 

walking around slowly.117

Stafford supported Oakes’ comments, “A lot of guys would sit at the 

bazaar and just watch us really closely. They watched everything we did . 

. . military age males . . . we all kind of knew they were bad dudes but you 

can’t do anything about it.”118 Hissong also noticed that they were under 

observation:
112

As it got later in the morning [9 July] we started to notice that 

there was a group of about 15 to 20 local men gathering in 

the bazaar. We later learned that the locals had told Captain 

Myer that they didn’t want us there. As we built our fighting 

position, we noticed that small groups of men were gathering 

in the bazaar and appeared to be watching us work and talking 

about our base.119

Another platoon member echoed Hissong’s comments, “The bazaar 

across the street from our fighting position had locals outside, around it 

everyday until the 13th. They all sat outside and watched us all day. Other 

than that, they really did not do much.” 120

Benton also believed he and his men were under close observation. 

He remembered, “We were a zoo. We were literally a caged in zoo. It was 

ridiculous and I was so nervous the entire time.”121 Benton was unnerved 

by the openness of this observation, “There was one shop that had at least 

five guys at a time every day just sitting there drinking chai tea. . . . They 

were distinctly and obviously watching us. It’s not like they were facing 

each other having a conversation. They were just quiet, looking at us and 

watching us.”122 For Benton, the general absence of women and children 

in Wanat added to a growing sense of anxiety. He recalled, “Children were 

there [in Wanat] but not as prevalent as we’d seen before when we’d been 

to Wanat. There had been times when we went to Wanat and that bazaar 

was just full of people; men, women, and children. We knew the habits 

and we knew what it looked like before. It looked like a ghost town [after 

9 July].”123

From these numerous accounts, it is clear that from the start the 

Americans were likely under continuous AAF observation. Photographs 

taken of COP Kahler from a helicopter landing at the landing zone at mid 

day on 9 July support the accounts that there were numerous military 

age males present in the town at the mosque, hotel, and bazaar watching 

the Americans. These observers would have been able to easily notice 

where each American and ANA fighting position was. Queck recalled that 

when the fighting began early on the morning of 13 July, “It’s almost like 

they knew where everything was.”124 However, the location of the COP 

in lower ground and the minimal available concealment meant that the 

Coalition positions were all within plain eyesight of possible direct fire 

weapons positions and in the subsequent firefight, the AAF did not use 

indirect fire weapons, whose targeting would have been facilitated by exact 

measurements of locations on the COP. Direct fire weapons used at short 

and medium range would have been able to easily target the Coalition 

positions without the need for any specialized targeting equipment. 
113

Another incident in this period heightened the paratroopers’ concerns. 

When Myer arrived on the afternoon of 12 July, he went into the town to 

speak to the few local men who were standing around the bazaar. Sergeant 

Aass recalled that as Myer talked with these men, “One of our Soldiers, 

Specialist Denton, recognized one of the civilians hanging around as a 

former member of the Bella Afghan Security Guards (ASG). When 

confronted, he admitted freely that he was.”125 Aass further noted that by 

July 2008, many of the platoon members had become suspicious of the 

ASG, partly because of the fatal shooting of Sergeant Kahler at COP Bella 

in January 2008.

However, while Brostrom reported the local scrutiny to Myer, his 

company commander felt that such keen observation was par for the 

course. Myer later commented that, “The platoon was being observed, 

just as we expected them to be.”126 Since the activities of the local people 

around the new outpost were familiar to the experienced officers and had 

never previously resulted in a large attack, they were not viewed as an 

exceptional pattern of behavior. 

Although it garnered minimal attention at the time, there was another 

possible indicator of impending enemy action revealed when, on the 

morning of 12 July, an irrigation ditch directly north of OP Topside 

suddenly began to fill with water. Although there had been considerable 

rainfall during the early morning hours of 9 July, both Sergeant Pitts and 

Specialist Stafford at the OP thought it was odd that an irrigation ditch 

would suddenly fill with rushing water. Pitts, who had spent most of the 

time at Wanat occupying the OP, believed the flooding of the irrigation ditch 

was very suspicious, contending the water flow “stopped halfway through 

the day and then it started again after only not flowing for approximately 

two hours. In hindsight it may have been done to help add noise allowing 

the AAF to sneak closer to our positions without being heard.”127 Stafford 

echoed Pitts’ thought: 

The fields weren’t being used and there were irrigation ditches 

that ran right in front of my position, on the other side of the 

sandbags, touching the sandbags. They had turned it on. At 

first Phillips had dug a ditch to divert it, a couple meters [two 

yards] in front of the OP but then it just kept running so we 

didn’t think anything of it, really, other than we were all kind 

of joking like, “Wow, if somebody sneaks up on us, we can’t 

hear them.”128
114

Another event caught 2d Platoon by surprise. Early in the afternoon 

of 12 July, Brostrom heard that a shura was then taking place within 

the town between the community elders, the district governor, and the 

leaders of the district ANP. Brostrom was extremely angry that he had 

not been invited to this meeting because he had been trying to organize 

just such a meeting since the platoon’s arrival at Wanat. Dzwik recalled, 

“The Wanat shura gathered at the Wanat District Center without inviting 

any Coalition Forces. . . I was digging my fighting position when First 

Lieutenant Brostrom came over, quite upset and said they had a shura

going. He was upset because we had spent the whole time trying to get a 

shura together.”129

In response to this news, Brostrom, Benton, the interpreter, and five 

other platoon members went immediately to the district center on the 

northeastern edge of the town. The ANA commander and a squad of ANA 

soldiers accompanied them. Under local cultural traditions, Brostrom had 

every right to be angry. As the senior American, he could be considered 

the elder or leader of the tribe of Americans that had just arrived in town. 

Deliberately excluding him (and thus the Americans) from a community or 

district shura could be interpreted as a considerable insult. Benton asserted 

that the Afghans at the district center were not happy to see the Americans 

and the ANA soldiers, recalling, “The reception was not warm at all. The 

ANP did not respond to any of our greetings and seemed very nervous that 

we were there.”130 Some of the platoon’s Soldiers have speculated that the 

attack was actually being planned at this meeting. Dzwik was adamant 

about this suspicion, “It is my belief, due to the cold welcome and the 

events of the 13th that they were discussing an attack [on the COP].”131 By 

inserting himself into this shura and expressing his displeasure, Brostrom 

was behaving appropriately within the local culture and he immediately 

reported the shura and his reception by the Wanat leaders up the chain of 

command, gaining the attention of both officers in the TF Rock intelligence 

section.132

Shortly after Brostrom’s unsuccessful visit to the district center, a 

helicopter with Myer and his RTO, Sergeant Aass, landed at the COP. Myer 

and Aass had ridden on a resupply helicopter bringing the replacement 

pump for the fuel blivet so that the Bobcat could be refueled, along with 

water and MREs. The Chosen Company paratroopers were particularly 

pleased to receive the additional supplies onboard the helicopter. As 

previously noted, the plan for ROCK MOVE directed the Chosen Company 

commander’s presence at the COP earlier but Myer had gone to Camp 

Blessing to participate in the investigation of the 4 July Apache attack. He 

also conducted various actions related to the impending relief by TF Duke.
115

After his arrival, Myer walked around the position and greeted his 

men. Then Brostrom briefed him on the defensive arrangements and fire 

support plan. They then conducted a joint inspection of the defenses. At 

some point, Myer walked past the bazaar and attempted to make contact 

with the local Afghans gathered there and in the process briefly spoke 

with Ibrahim, a Wanat elder well known to the Americans. Myer knew 

that Ibrahim was a strong advocate of the Afghan central government and 

the US forces. Also present was Ibrahim’s son, Ishmael, who spoke fluent 

English and served as an interpreter with US forces at Jalalabad. Ibrahim 

invited Myer to dinner, although he specified it must be after dark.133

After nightfall, Myer and a small party walked to Ibrahim’s house 

for the meal. Myer, Brostrom, Aass, and platoon RTO Specialist John 

Hayes attended from the American group, along with Ibrahim and one 

other senior member of the community. Ishmael translated throughout the 

dinner, according to Aass. Ibrahim told the Chosen Company leadership 

“if they saw any people up in the hills, we should shoot at them because 

they’re bad. He pretty much said that everybody up in the hills was bad 

and that we should shoot at them . . . he said that there were bad people 

around.”134

Despite the many warnings and the paratroopers’ feeling of 

apprehension, Myer did not feel an attack was imminent. He fully expected 

the Americans to be under keen observation from the start. He and 

Brostrom had seen the absence of women and children before without an 

imminent attack. The officers had also routinely received attack warnings 

from Afghan civilians which did not pan out. In Myer’s opinion, “The 

enemy was very deliberate and I expected them to recon, plan, and then 

use indirect fire or probing attacks to attack the position at Wanat. Nothing 

Lieutenant Brostrom communicated or that I saw led me to believe that 

a large attack was imminent.”135 Myer’s greatest fear was an indirect fire 

or rocket attack on the troops at Wanat before their defenses, particularly 

overhead cover, were in place to provide adequate protection. 

The Enemy, 9-12 July

As described earlier, TF Rock was well aware of significant enemy 

forces in the Waygal Valley and believed the leaders of these forces, 

especially Mullah Osman, intended to attack Coalition bases at both Bella 

and Wanat. However, enemy actions and decisions between 8 and 12 July 

are not clear. Osman himself was probably wounded during the Apache 

strike at Bella on 4 July. There is no precise indication of the size of the 

force that attacked on 13 July or its composition. Nor is there precise 
116

understanding of who planned and led the attack, although as noted earlier, 

an insurgent video of the assault on COP Kahler did identify another local 

insurgent leader, Mawlawi Sadiq Manibullah, as the actual leader of the 

attack. Pry, the TF Rock intelligence officer, had estimated enemy forces 

in the Waygal Valley to number between 130 and 150 but recognized that 

Mullah Osman had shown the ability to bring in other fighters for major 

operations. Pry and other American intelligence officers also knew that 

there was the possibility that foreign fighters associated with international 

terrorist groups could be operating in Konar and Nuristan. In fact, he had 

received reports in June 2008 of foreign fighters arriving in the Watapor 

Valley, located to the east of Waygal Valley. After the 13 July battle, 

one media report reinforced the idea that foreign fighters had played a 

significant role in the 13 July attack, claiming that the attacking force had 

an al-Qaeda combat element known as Lashkar al Zil or “the Shadow 

Army,” at its core. Following the attack on COP Kahler, estimates of the 

insurgent force that may have included foreign fighters varied from 120 

to 300.136

Given the nature of the subsequent assault on the COP, the leadership 

of the insurgent force and at least the core of the fighting force were most 

likely professional and experienced. The attack displayed considerable 

planning, effective intelligence, and accurate knowledge regarding 

the capabilities and effectiveness of American weapons systems and 

observation equipment. Benton’s assessment was that the 13 July assault, 

“was not an uncoordinated attack by any means. You could tell rehearsals 

had been done, sand tables had been done, and planning had been done on 

this. They knew a year before we had even come out there that eventually 

we were going to come out there. They knew we wanted to do it. They 

knew we were planning to do it.”137 The significant amount of firepower 

employed for roughly two hours suggests that at least the core of the force 

was local fighters. That local connection would have been necessary to 

simply transport and supply the quantities of ammunition expended and 

successfully evacuate the casualties from the battlefield.

While the details of the enemy plan and intent are not available for this 

study, based on the actions of the enemy on 13 July, Pry was convinced 

that the enemy objective was to drive all Coalition forces out of Wanat. 

To do that, it is reasonable to assume that they intended to overrun COP 

Kahler and OP Topside. Chosen Company post battle accounts and 

reports consistently state that the entire COP and OP were surrounded by 

AAF who infiltrated into firing positions at extremely close range to the 

Americans. When the assault began early on 13 July, enemy fire came 
117

from the mosque, the hotel complex, and the bazaar, which were almost 

on top of the COP. Some paratroopers later reported receiving machine 

gun fire from the vicinity of the hotel or near the bazaar. US Soldiers also 

observed at least one RPG fired from an unfinished stall in the center of 

the bazaar.138

How did the insurgents move into their attack positions without alerting 

the Coalition forces at COP Kahler? It seems clear that at least some of 

the force had infiltrated the town between 9 and 12 July and constituted 

some of those who were closely watching operations at the COP. Other 

insurgents may have been among the town residents. Still, the large force 

that attacked COP Kahler on 13 July had to be partly composed of fighters 

from outside Wanat. Many likely began moving from nearby villages 

under cover of darkness on the nights leading up to the attack. The lack 

of Coalition radio message intercepts suggest that these insurgents were 

moving in small groups to avoid detection and were most likely practicing 

radio silence. To initiate their attack, the AAF leaders employed machine 

gun fire rather than depending on their radios. After regularly contesting 

ground with the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, and then TF Rock since April 

2006, the AAF were well aware that their radio communications were 

monitored. Additionally, radios were typically a scarce commodity. On 

13 July, indications are that the AAF avoided the use of radios before 

launching the attack. 139

While the majority of the Americans except for the sentries, slept, those 

enemy insurgents who had not already infiltrated into the area began their 

movement from nearby villages into assault and fire support positions. In 

the aftermath of the battle, Pry determined, “They used the low ground with 

the water coming in from the east [the Wayskawdi Creek] as well as the 

[Waygal] river running north-south to conceal their movement, both visual 

and for sound as they walked over the shale and rocks in the area. We do 

know they had OPs up on the west.”140 TF Rock also later determined that 

the insurgents had established command and control positions on at least 

one of the mountain tops that offered excellent vantage points of Wanat.141

Whatever infiltration routes the insurgents took into Wanat the 

night before the battle, they employed a high degree of stealth and noise 

discipline. The Americans on guard that night detected nothing amiss. 

The sentinels were alert and active, one paratrooper even documented 

the 14 shooting stars he had observed in the early morning hours. Pitts 

specifically recalled walking to the edges of the terraces around OP 

Topside to monitor the dead space adjacent to them during his guard shift. 

Yet, not a single trooper reported seeing or hearing anything suspicious. 
118

Specialist Christopher McKaig recalled, “It was very quiet just before we 

got attacked . . . no movement in our area.”142 The insurgents’ ability to 

infiltrate without detection, although impressive, was a quality common 

among Afghan warriors. Attacks on a 10th Mountain patrol in Nuristan on 

21 June 2006 and on TF Rock Soldiers at COP Ranch House on 22 August 

2007 had demonstrated precisely the same capabilities.143

The Eve of the Attack

By 12 July, the Soldiers at COP Kahler had picked up some indications 

that they were not welcome in Wanat. Not only had they become aware 

of the observation by the many military age males inside the village but 

the ANP chief had directly told them they were not welcome in Wanat 

and openly failed to cooperate with them. A few Afghan citizens directly 

intimated to the US Soldiers or informed them indirectly through the 

ANA, that an attack was imminent. However, such warnings were routine 

and often proved to be false or exaggerated. After a year of operations in 

Afghanistan, the Chosen Soldiers were relatively inured to such reports. 

Still, the TF Rock staff had documented the presence of a relatively 

large insurgent force of at least several scores of fighters operating in the 

Waygal Valley and Pry had determined that many of these fighters would 

concentrate around Wanat once TF Rock had established the new COP in 

that town.

Still, the sum of these observations and concerns did not equate to a 

general fear of an immediate attack on the COP. The TF Rock S2 staff did 

receive reports of many of these indicators. Pry recalled that he received 

multiple reports from the 2d Platoon of young Afghan men in civilian garb 

watching the COP as well as the report of the nighttime observation of 

the five person group above Wanat just before the attack. Pry passed these 

reports up to TF Bayonet which Lieutenant Colonel Jimmy Hinton, the 

Bayonet S2, acknowledged. Hinton believed that the flow of intelligence 

from TF Rock was good.144

However, the intelligence reporting system that connected the brigade 

with the CJTF was based on requests for resources. Hinton would not 

normally have passed up the specific information about the reconnaissance 

of COP Kahler or the small groups of possible infiltrators. Instead, if he 

had thought that they constituted a major threat, he would have sent a 

request for more intelligence assets to collect information about the 

threat. Gervais, the CJTF intelligence officer, did not recall receiving 

any requests for resources to support COP Kahler. In the four days of the 

Wanat occupation when there was ISR support, neither the Predator UAV 
119

nor the aerial SIGINT collection platform detected any signs of imminent 

enemy action against the COP. Thus, the CJTF J2 saw no indicators of an 

impending attack at Wanat. Further, Milley, the CJTF-101 Deputy, recalled 

the information that reached his level about the operations at COP Kahler 

between 9 and 12 July unequivocally stated there was no enemy activity 

that would require further action or resources.145

The lack of indications that insurgent forces were massing and 

preparing to attack COP Kahler directly affected the amount of ISR support 

available to TF Rock. The amount of FMV and SIGINT available across 

Afghanistan decreased significantly after 10 July. In the 24 hour period 

beginning at 0730 on 11 July, the CJTF had only 12 hours of FMV and four 

hours of SIGINT support available for all of its units. In this environment 

of reduced assets, a small site like COP Kahler, which did not appear to be 

at risk, was not the focus of the CJTF’s ISR effort. TF Bayonet received 

6.5 hours of FMV and zero hours of SIGINT in this period. Wanat was 

supposed to receive some of this FMV support but after major combat 

actions near the city of Khowst and in the Tangi Valley became the CJTF 

priorities, COP Kahler received no ISR assets. In the following 24 hour 

period which ended on the morning of 13 July, the availability of ISR 

across Afghanistan decreased further as bad weather grounded most of 

the systems. TF Bayonet did receive four hours of SIGINT and this was 

allocated to Wanat. However, that support ended at 1630 on the afternoon 

of 12 July.146

Milley, the CJTF deputy commanding general, emphasized that the 

combat action near Khowst that pulled the Predator away from ROCK 

MOVE on 11 July was part of a larger operation in the Tangi Valley in 

eastern Afghanistan in early July 2008 that had become the top priority for 

the Coalition. During that operation, insurgents had launched a number of 

large attacks against Coalition convoys and briefly kidnapped an American 

Soldier. CJTF-101 accordingly attempted to focus as many ISR assets as 

possible in that region of the country.147

First Lieutenant Matthew Colley, the TF Rock assistant S2, recalled 

that he and Pry fiercely resisted the redirection of the ISR away from 

Wanat, stating, “We fought with [TF Bayonet] and [TF Bayonet] tried to get 

the assets reassigned to us but [CJTF-101] did not reallocate the assets to 

us.”148 Pry was furious. At the two ROCK MOVE briefings to TF Bayonet

and CJTF-101, he believed CJTF-101 had given him a commitment that 

adequate ISR assets would be available to support ROCK MOVE. Nearly 

a full year after the engagement he recalled:
120

This was a major point of contention . . . between me and 

Colonel Hinton. I even got unprofessional with him the day 

before the attack happened because we were losing so many 

assets and had so little support. He was doing the best he 

could and in turn was doing the same thing to division. He 

was demanding the support we weren’t getting but we weren’t 

the priority anymore.149

Pry further remarked on the heated conversation he had with Hinton, 

“I think there were six people in the office and about once a minute one 

person was getting up and walking out because they didn’t want to be 

witnessing the conversation.” By the evening of 12 July, he fumed, “We 

had no support from brigade, division, or theater level assets at the time.”150

Brigade S-2 Hinton was similarly frustrated with the problems related 

to managing a very limited number of ISR resources, especially in the 

case of ROCK MOVE. Hinton’s thoughts on this issue are worth quoting 

at length:

The challenge for me and our headquarters was with collection 

assets. There were so many competing priorities for collection. 

CJTF-101 had a priority for intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance (ISR) and those were approved by the assistant 

division commander for operations. We essentially did the 

same thing for ISR. There just wasn’t enough collection to 

meet all the demands that were out there. At the same time 

we were getting this reporting at Wanat, we had daily mortar 

attacks against a position that, terrain wise, was even worse 

than Wanat and Bella up in northeast Nuristan. Our Shadows 

couldn’t reach it either, so we were relying on Predator for 

full motion video support. It was an issue for us to provide 

adequate support and I kind of referenced that earlier when 

I said the battalion S2 was upset that he wasn’t getting the 

level of support he thought he needed. He had guys that were 

building force protection on the ground and he didn’t think 

they had the adequate overhead collection to mitigate that 

limited force protection. It was really challenging to provide 

ISR because there wasn’t enough to go around to meet all the 

requirements that units had.151

Hinton concluded that the hard decisions that CJTF-101 and TF Bayonet

made about the allocation of the scarce ISR assets that day, “will burn in 

me forever.”152
121

As of the evening of 12 July, the 2d Platoon had not received any 

enemy fire. This fact is relevant because the key leaders in the 2d Platoon, 

Chosen Company, TF Rock, TF Bayonet, and CJTF-101, held certain 

assumptions about the way the enemy operated. As recounted earlier in 

this chapter, leaders at all of these levels believed that the insurgents would 

react with a series of increasingly escalating attacks that would begin with 

harassing small arms and indirect fire and perhaps culminate in a large 

scale assault like the attack on the Ranch House COP. Repetitive use of this 

pattern by the insurgents had convinced US Soldiers in Afghanistan that 

it had become an accepted and proven enemy tactic. Thus, these leaders 

expected the insurgents to initiate hostilities against COP Kahler with a 

few mortar rounds or sniper shots and only slowly escalate the attacks over 

days or weeks. This did not make the paratroopers of 2d Platoon, Chosen 

Company, and TF Rock complacent but it did have an effect on how they 

understood the evolving situation at COP Kahler.153

In the early hours of 13 July, the morning after the SIGINT and FMV 

assets had left the Waygal Valley, the COP and OP were coming to life. 

As do most US Army infantry units in combat, the 2d Platoon rigorously 

enforced a daily stand-to routine. The troops at COP Kahler and OP 

Topside were awakened for reveille between 0345 and 0350 and were at 

one hundred percent alert in their fighting positions at least one hour before 

dawn. Soldiers were dressed in “full battle rattle.” Dzwik rigidly enforced 

stand-to. He had experiences that reinforced the value of the procedure: 

I was in the Ranch House attack back in August 2007 when 

they hit us at five o’clock in the morning, so I knew that was 

a time that they liked to hit. I’m a huge believer and a huge 

enforcer of stand-to. Everybody was ready, even a half hour 

before it got light. Everybody was up and in their armor, 100 

percent security and not a lot of movement around. It’s one 

thing I preach, you’re down in your position scanning in your 

sector.154

The ANA and ETTs similarly participated in stand-to and COP Kahler 

and OP Topside were fully alert and ready for action at 0400 local time.155

While the platoon conducted stand-to, First Lieutenant Brostrom 

was organizing the joint US-ANA patrol of 13 Soldiers intended to find 

a potential OP site located on prominent high ground to the south. If the 

location proved to be acceptable, the ANA would subsequently occupy the 

site and TF Rock would airlift in CONEX containers with the necessary 
122

prepackaged materials to establish an OP. Brostrom’s patrol assembled 

by the 2d Squad position and was scheduled to depart the COP at 0430.156

The Bobcat and the two engineers responsible for operating it were 

also busy at the mortar pit in the predawn darkness. Sometime during the 

night, a natural spring had opened up and poured water into the mortar pit. 

One of the engineers who had just completed his tour of nighttime guard 

duty discovered the flood when he dropped his body armor to the ground 

to get some sleep and it landed with a prominent splash. He awakened 

his fellow engineer and they began using the Bobcat to excavate a ditch 

around the mortar pit to divert the water. At the southern portion of the 

mortar pit, the water was boot-top to mid-shin deep. The water was only 

a couple of inches deep in the center and it was just wet and muddy to the 

north.157

Just before and during stand-to, several Soldiers inside the COP began 

to notice shadowy groups maneuvering in the hills around Wanat. On 

the previous day, random sightings of individuals in the high ground had 

occurred but they had not seemed threatening and thus were not engaged. 

For example, Sergeant Justin Grimm, the leader of the TOW squad recalled, 

“At dusk on the 12th we spotted one person to the west near a suspected 

fighting position 1,500 meters [1,600 yards] away high on the mountain . . 

. we were told not to engage.”158 The sightings during the early morning of 

the 13th were different. Sergeant Samaroo, the 1st Squad Leader, recalled 

that just before stand-to began, he received a report that the TOW section 

had identified a group of 7 to 10 individuals, possibly wearing packs and 

moving on the hillside south of Samaroo’s TCP. At 0408, just after standto began, the TOW section spotted another small group of individuals 

on the hillside west of Wanat. In retrospect, these sightings were almost 

certainly members of the AAF assault force moving into position.159

 After receiving the report of the group to the west, Captain Myer 

immediately recognized those individuals as a threat to the COP. Myer 

remembered that moment, stating, “Five shepherds aren’t going to be 

together. Based on the terrorist videos that we’ve seen and things like that, a 

group of five to 10 guys in the mountains is commonly enemy personnel.”160

Myer immediately began to coordinate an integrated attack using the TOW 

missile and the 120-mm mortar. At OP Topside, Sergeant Pitts shifted the 

LRAS3 towards the group on the hillside in order to obtain precise grid 

coordinates on the location. He was preparing to radio the coordinates to the 

command post when the action started. Staff Sergeant Phillips, the mortar 

squad leader, had his crew lay the mortar on the target, and Sergeant Grimm 

at the TOW recalled, “We had the back of the turret dropped ready to fire.”161
123

It was just over an hour before dawn and the ground remained entirely 

dark, although dark blue light was beginning to streak the sky. Twelve 

minutes passed as the platoon prepared to launch the TOW and fire the mortar 

rounds. Just to the southeast at the 1st Squad’s TCP, Sergeant Hissong was 

talking to Staff Sergeant Samaroo regarding the TOW team’s observation 

of personnel moving around them in the hills. Concerned with the delay in 

launching the strike, Hissong growled, “We better...kill these guys before 

we get hit.”162 Samaroo’s reply was interrupted by two bursts from an 

insurgent’s RPD machine gun and then, “about a thousand RPGs at once.”163
124

Notes

1. Captain Matthew Myer, e-mail to Dr. Donald P. Wright, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 November 2009; Brigadier General Mark 

Milley, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison and Dr. William G. Robertson, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 and 20 August 2009, 18.

2. TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE, 2/3 ANA, C/2-503 IN (ABN) and 

2-17 CAV, Level 1 CONOP, 8–9 July 2008” Briefing, slide 11.

3. TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE”, Briefing, slide 12. 

4. “CONOP ROCK MOVE”, Briefing, slides 9, 10, 14, 18, 23; TF 

Bayonet only had four Chinooks normally available for operations and these 

were generally divided into day and night shifts, although additional CH-47s 

associated with regularly scheduled supply runs and redeployment activities were 

often used by the brigade out of division assets based at Bagram Air Base. See 

Exhibit 21b (LTC, Brigade XO, 173d ABCT, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal 

District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 8, 9; and 

Exhibit 28b (CPT, Assistant S-3, 2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal 

District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 13, 23-4.

5. “CONOP ROCK MOVE”., Briefing, slides 9, 14.

6. “CONOP ROCK MOVE”, Briefing slides 14, 22, 23; Exhibit 21b (LTC, 

Brigade XO, 173d ABCT, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Reinvestigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan 

Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 9; Exhibit 14b (MAJ, BN XO, 

2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation 

into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, 

Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 18; Exhibit 12a (COL, Commander, 

101st Aviation Brigade, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Reinvestigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan 

Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 67.

7. Colonel William Ostlund, e-mail to Donald P. Wright, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 December 2009; Captain Matthew Myer, 

e-mail to Dr. Donald P. Wright, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

5 December 2009; Exhibit 6a (Operations Officer, 2-503d IN, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 16; Exhibit 6b (Operations Officer, 2-503d IN, statement) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 3; Exhibit 22b (Brigade Engineer, 173d Airborne Brigade Combat 

Team, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation 

into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, 
125

Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 13; Exhibit 27b (Battalion S4, 2-503d 

IN, statement) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 1; Exhibit 50a (Forward Support Company 

Commander, F Company, 2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal 

District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 2-3.

8. TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE” Briefing, slide 3; Daniel D. Desjardins 

and James C. Byrd, “Air Vehicle Displays in the Operational Environment, 

PowerPoint briefing, Air Force Research Laboratory, Aeronautical Systems 

Center, 19 August 2007, slide 14, www.sidchapters.org/greaterdayton/Desjardins_

Byrd_SPIE07.pdf (accessed on 17 August 2010); Exhibit 12a (COL, Commander, 

101st Aviation Brigade, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “ReInvestigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan 

Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 8-9.

9. Exhibit 6b (Operations Officer, 2-503d IN, statement) to US Central 

Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat 

Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 2; TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE” Briefing, slide 3; Exhibit 11a 

(COL, Brigade Commander, 173d ABCT, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal 

District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 9, 12; 

Colonel William Ostlund, email to Donald P. Wright, Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 September 2010.

10. Ostlund, e-mail, 3 December 2009; Myer, e-mail, 5 December 2009.

11. TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE” Briefing, slides 4–6; For video, 

see Jim Sciutto, “‘Relax, Brother’: Exclusive Video Shows Taliban Attack That 

Killed 9 U.S. Soldiers at Afghan Post July 2008 Incident Shown From Taliban 

Viewpoint: ‘We Attacked From 4 Sides,’” 12 November 2009, http://abcnews.

go.com/WN/Afghanistan/exclusive-video-shows-taliban-attack-killed-ussoldiers/story?id=9068156 (accessed 7 December 2009).

12. Pry, interview, 6 May 2009, 6.

13. TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE” Briefing, slides 4 and 5.

14. TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE” Briefing, slide 6; Pry, interview, 6 

May 2009, 6.

15. TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE” Briefing, slide 7.

16. Captain Matthew Myer, interview by Matt Matthews, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 December 2008, 8.

17. Sergeant First Class David Dzwik Statement, CJTF-101, “Army 

Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified 

Version)” (Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, 21 October 2008).
126

18. Schloesser, interview, 5 August 2009, 6, 9; Colonel William Ostlund, 

e-mail to Dr. Donald P. Wright, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 19 November 2009; Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Gervais, the CJTF-101 G2 

emphasizes the role of this pattern in assessing enemy courses of action at Wanat 

in July 2008. See Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Gervais, interview by Douglas R. 

Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 June 2009, 3.

19. The discussion of rifle platoon organization is based on Department of the 

Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-21.8 (Fm 7-8), The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad 

(Headquarters, Department of the Army: Washington, DC: 2007), 1-11 to 1-21; 

For mention of the Javelin, see Specialist Tyler M. Stafford, interview by Douglas 

R. Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 February 2009, 

16. The 2d Platoon was short of its TOE strength because it had about a squad’s 

worth of men to reinforce COP Michigan.

20. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-21.8, page 1-18.

21. TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE” Briefing, slides 22, 23; Exhibit 38a 

(Sergeant, USMC, ETT 5-3, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), 

“Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, 

Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 25. In The ROCK 

MOVE plan, the ANA force, including ETT members, was projected to be 30. 

When the plan was executed, however, the number was actually 27.

22. Major Brian T. Beckno, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 July 2009, 6.

23. Myer, e-mail, 18 November 2009. For operations in northeastern 

Afghanistan, the battalion mortar platoon and company mortar sections had 

been consolidated then broken up into smaller sections to provide support for 

each of the platoon-size outposts in the TF Rock area of operations. Although by 

organizational structure the battalion mortar platoon was equipped with both 81-

mm and 120-mm mortars, the battalion only used the 120-mm tubes in Afghanistan. 

The mortarmen received additional 120-mm mortars from theater stocks upon 

deployment and each company in the battalion provided augmentees to reinforce 

the platoon. For a discussion of TF Rock mortar operations in Afghanistan in 

2008 see Sergeant First Class Jason Levy, “Battalion Mortar Platoon Operations 

in Afghanistan,” Infantry (July 2009): 23-32.

24. Lieutenant Colonel John Lynch, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 12 May 2009, 11; Exhibit 

7b (Battalion Commander, 2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal 

District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 4.

25. Sergeant First Class David Dzwik, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 April 2009, 3. Two of the six 

engineers were slated to supervise the Afghan equipment operators.
127

26. Milley, interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 24.

27. Major Scott Himes, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 April 2009, 6, 11; Exhibit 27a (Battalion S4, 

2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation 

into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, 

Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 9; Exhibit 77 (Contracts) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted). Exhibit 16a (Company Commander, C Co, 2-503d IN, interview) 

to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat 

Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 

July 2008 (Redacted), 43-4; The stone wall contract was still pending because 

the chain of command initially rejected it. But Ostlund pushed for it and it was 

approved eventually. See Exhibit 27a (Battalion S4, 2-503d IN, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 6-7; and Exhibit 27b (Battalion S4, 2-503d IN, statement) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 2. Myer recollected that the stone wall contract had been awarded to 

a local national in the Wanat area. See Exhibit 16a, 45.

28. The two LRAS3s were not TOE items in the airborne infantry battalion, 

but rather an augmentation equipment item given to the unit in theater. Exhibit 16a 

(Company Commander, C Co, 2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal 

District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 32-3. 

29. TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE” Briefing, slides 8, 9; Exhibit 16a 

(Company Commander, C Co, 2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, 

Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 

36; Exhibit 20a (First Lieutenant, Assistant BN S2, 2-503d IN, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 4.

30. Exhibit 59a (LTC, G2 Officer, RC-East, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal 

District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 24.

31. Chief Warrant Officer 3 Chuck Whitbeck, e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 February 2009; Exhibit 8a 

(Captain, Battalion S2 Officer, 2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal 

District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 12; TF 

Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE” Briefing, slide 8. 
128

32. First Lieutenant Matthew A. Colley, e-mail interview by Douglas R. 

Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 March 2009, 

4; Exhibit 39 (First Lieutenant, Assistant S2, 2-503d IN, statement) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 4; Sergeant Erick J. Rodas, e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 February 2009; and Himes, interview, 

25 April 2009, 6. A dual failure of Raven UAVs is documented to have occurred 

at the Battle of Fallujah, Iraq, in 2004. Matt M. Matthews, Operation AL FAJR: 

A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 42.

33. Milley, interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 28; TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK 

MOVE” Briefing, slide 8; Exhibit 8a (Captain, S2 Officer, 2-503d IN, statement) 

to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat 

Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 

July 2008 (Redacted), 13.

34. Exhibit 8a (Captain, S2 Officer, 2-503d IN, statement) to US Central 

Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat 

Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 13; Brigadier General Mark Milley, interview by Douglas Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 August 2009, 42-44.

35. TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE” Briefing, slides 8, 9; Exhibit 16a 

(Company Commander, C Co, 2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, 

Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 

36; Exhibit 20a (First Lieutenant, Assistant BN S2, 2-503d IN, interview) to 

US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action 

at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 

2008 (Redacted), 4; Milley, interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 46-48; TF Rock, 

“CONOP ROCK MOVE” Briefing, slide 8; Exhibit 8a (Captain, S2 Officer, 

2-503d IN, statement) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation 

into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, 

Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 11-14, 16, 32-3; Exhibit 62a (Sergeant, 

Brigade Collections Manager, HHC, 173d Airborne BCT, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 18-19, 21.

36. Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 1-2.

37. Dzwik, interview.

38. Myer, e-mail, 18 November 2009; Major Himes, the TF Rock S3 

operations officer, also recognized that after a year in Afghanistan, the orders 

process in the TF was not always formal. See Himes, interview, 25 April 2009, 

7; See also TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE” Briefing, 7 July 2008; Exhibit 
129

7a (LTC, Battalion Commander, 2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal 

District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 82. 

39. Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 1-3.

40. Staff Sergeant Jonathan Benton, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 August 2009, 5.

41. Benton, 4.

42. Stafford interview, 10 February 2009, 5. 

43. Sergeant Jesse L. Queck, e-mail to Matt Matthews, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 February 2009. 

44. Sergeant First Class David Dzwik, e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 June 2009.

45. Exhibit 110 (1LT, A/2-503d IN, statement) “Army Regulation 15-6 

Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Vincenza, 

Italy, 4 August 2008), 1.

46. Captain Amanda Wilson, “Personal Statement re: 1LT Jonathan 

Brostrom,” Memorandum, 25 November 2008.

47. “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, 

Unclassified Version), 1. 

48. Captain Matthew Myer, e-mail to Dr. Donald P. Wright, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 December 2009.

49. “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, 

Unclassified Version), 1. 

50. Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 2–3.

51. Myer, interview, 1 December 2008, 4–5; Exhibit 16a (Company 

Commander, C Co, 2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), 

“Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, 

Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 87

52. Exhibit 16a (Company Commander, C Co, 2-503d IN, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 25-7, 31, 87. In his statements, Myer both claimed to have left Bella 

on 8 July and to be on the last helicopter out of Bella. However, it is clear from the 

ROCK MOVE Operations Order Briefing and statements from the ETT personnel 

and Myer’s RTO that this had to have been 9 July as the ETTs and half of the ANA 

platoon left Bella and flew directly to the newly established Wanat outpost after 

dark on the evening of 9 July. The two outposts briefly coexisted on 8-9 July. See 

TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE” Briefing, slide 23; Exhibit 16a (Company 

Commander, C Co, 2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), 

“Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, 
130

Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 31-2; Exhibit 41a 

(ETT OIC, ETT 5-3, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Reinvestigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan 

Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 1; Exhibit 41b (ETT OIC, ETT 

5-3, statement) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 15; Sergeant Erik Aass, interview by Matt Matthews, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 January 2009, 1-3; Exhibit 

7a (LTC, Battalion Commander, 2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal 

District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 7.

53. Aass interview, 2.

54. Exhibit 16a (Company Commander, C Co, 2-503d IN, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 31.

55. Colonel Charles Preysler, e-mails to Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 May 2009, 8 May 2009, and 19 May 

2009; Beckno, interview, 2 July 2009, 7, 11–12; Myer, interview, 1 December 

2008, 5-6; Exhibit 16a (Company Commander, C Co, 2-503d IN, interview) to 

US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 25. 

56. Sergeant Brian C. Hissong, personal statement, “Combat Outpost Kahler, 

July 8–15,” (not dated), 1. The final garrison figures for Wanat were, therefore 

44 US Army personnel from 2d Platoon, and the mortar, TOW and engineer 

elements, 2 members of Myer’s party, 3 US Marine ETT advisors, and 24 ANA 

troops. This total of 73 was one less that ROCK MOVE’s projection of 74 because 

Myer left his FSO behind.

57. Benton, interview, 4 August 2009, 5. 

58. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 6.

59. Stafford, interview, 4; Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 1–3; Glenn, 3–4; 

Hissong, personal statement, 1; Sergeant Jeffrey Scantlin, interview by Douglas 

R. Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 August 2009, 

2.

60. Sergeant Hector Chavez, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 March 2009, 4; Dzwik, interview, 2 

April 2009, 3; Aass, interview, 13 January 2009, 3–4.

61. Lieutenant Colonel Kevin J. Anderson, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 April 2009, 3–4; Exhibit 41b 

(ETT OIC, ETT 5-3, statement) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Reinvestigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan 
131

Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 12; Exhibit 38a (ETT NCO, 

ETT 5-3, statement) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation 

into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, 

Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 2. The name of the ANA operations 

sergeant major was Qiamudin Safi.

62. Exhibit 42, (SSG, C/62d Eng Bn, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp 

Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 1.

63. Captain Devin George, e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 April 2009; Beckno, interview, 2 July 2009, 

8; Myer, e-mail, 17 December 2009; Exhibit 17a (CPT, Company XO, C/2-503d 

IN, statement) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 3-4; Exhibit 17b (CPT, Company XO, C/2-503d 

IN, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 9-10; TF Bayonet, “09 July 2008 Bayonet CUB 

[Combat Update Brief] to CJTF-101,” 9 July 2008; TF Rock, “Rock Daily 

Snapshot-Thursday, July 10, 2008;” TF Rock, “TIC Asset Tracker” Spreadsheet, 

22 July 2008. The engineer killed on 8 July 2008 was Sergeant Douglas J. Bull, 

Company A, Special Troops Battalion, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry 

Division. Prior to the transition, RCP 8 was composed of members of Company 

A, Special Troops Battalion, 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team.

64. Exhibit 17a (CPT, Company XO, C/2-503d IN, statement) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 3-4; Exhibit 63 (SGT, C / 2-503d IN), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” 

(Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, 17 July 2008), 3. George remarked 

that “the AAF were watching the road. See George, e-mail, 22 April 2009.

65. Glenn, interview, 2 April 2009, 5.

66. Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 3-4; TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE” 

Briefing, 7 July 2008, slide 23. The FO assigned to Chosen Company’s 1st Platoon 

had been wounded at the Bella OP on 2 July 2008. This factor may have been one 

of Myer’s considerations in leaving Gonzalez behind at Blessing, where the 1st 

Platoon was then stationed. See Task Force Bayonet, “Memorandum, Subject: AR 

15-6 Investigation (Findings and Recommendations) __COP Bella Allegation of 

Non-Combatant Casualties, 4 July 2008,” 26 July 2008, 4.

67. “Ahmad,” e-mail to Matt Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 13 November 2008; “Ahmad,” e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 March 2009. Note: Because 

of security considerations, “Ahmad” has requested that his true name not be 

revealed. 
132

68. “Ahmad,” e-mails, 13 November 2008 and 2 March 2009.

69. Himes, interview, 25 April 2009, 4-5; Lieutenant Colonel William 

Ostlund, “Battle of Wanat Storyboard and Brief” Briefing, 16 July 2008, slides 

1 and 2.

70. Captain Andrew Glenn, e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 August 2009.

71. Sergeant First Class David Dzwik, e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 August 2009. 

72. Exhibit 25, (SFC, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” 

(Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, 25 July 2008), 1; Exhibit 63 (SGT, C / 2-503 

IN), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat ,” 2; 

Myer, e-mail, 17 December 2009; Exhibit 55 (CPT, C/2-503d IN, statement), 

CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, 

Unclassified Version)”(Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 1. TF Rock 

planners had long looked to this ridge to the east of the main position for an OP 

location, although its general site was farther to the south and the east at a higher 

point along the ridge. See Task Force Pacemaker, “Recon Results Brief, Proposed 

Wanat COP,” 10 April 2008.

73. Dzwik, e-mail, 24 August 2009.

74. Sergeant Ryan Pitts, interview by Matt Matthews, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 January 2009, 4.

75. Dzwik, e-mail, 24 August 2009. 

76. Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009. 4.

77. Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 4. 

78. Exhibit 42, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat, 1; Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 8.

79. Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 8; Exhibit 34 (SSG, 1st Plt, D/2-503d IN, 

statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat 

(Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 October 

2008), 1.

80. Scantlin, interview, 20 August 2009, 2.

81. Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 6; Exhibit 43a (SSG, Mortar Section 

Leader, C/2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “ReInvestigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan 

Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 5-6.

82. Benton, interview, 4 August 2009, 4-6; Exhibit 13 (SSG, C/2-503d IN, 

statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat 

(Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 

1-2.
133

83. Exhibit 17 (SGT, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp 

Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 2.

84. Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 4. 

85. Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 2–5; Pitts, interview, 14 January 2009, 

3–4.

86. Exhibit 55, CJTF-101, “AR 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat,” 1. 

87. Pitts, interview, 14 January 2009, 4-7; Stafford, interview, 10 February 

2009, 10. The designated marksman was a squad member who received special 

training and was equipped with an optically-enhanced personal weapon. His 

mission was “to improve the squad’s precision engagement capabilities at short 

and medium ranges.” See Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-21.8 

(FM 7-8), The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad (Washington, DC: Department of 

the Army, 2007), p. 1-18.

88. Pitts, interview, 14 January 2009, 13; Benton, interview, 4 August 2009, 

12. 

89. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 7; Pitts, interview, 14 January 

2009, 6; Specialist Chris McKaig, interview by Matt Matthews, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 November 2008, 2; Exhibit 38a (Sergeant, 

USMC ETT Team 5-3, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Reinvestigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan 

Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 16.

90. Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 6.

91. US forces have been under an antipersonnel mine moratorium since 

1997. For more information see Landmine Monitor Report 2009 (Ottawa: 

International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 2009), 101, 206, 1130-1138. This 

report is available online at http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/

display?url=lm/2009/(accessed on 25 July 2010); Stafford, interview, 10 

February 2009, 12; Captain James Fisher and Captain (P) Ryan Berdiner, 

interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 16 July 2009, 2; Chavez, interview, 19 March 2009, 5; Dzwik, interview, 2 

April 2009, 11.

92. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 7; Pitts, interview, 14 January 

2009, 6-7.

93. TF Rock, “TIC Asset Tracker” Spreadsheet, 22 July 2008; General 

Charles Campbell, “Memorandum, Subject: Army Action on the Re-Investigation 

into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, 

Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008, 13 May 2010, 8-9, 11; TF Rock, “Rock Daily 

Snapshot-Thursday, July 10, 2008.” 

94. TF Rock, “TIC Asset Tracker” Spreadsheet, 22 July 2008.
134

95. Exhibit 25, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat,” 2-3; Exhibit 58, (CPT, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army 

Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified 

Version)”(Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 23 July 2008), 1.

96. US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat 

Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 

July 2008 (Redacted), 43-45. 

97. Exhibit 20c (CPT, Assistant S2, 2-503d IN, statement) to US Central 

Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat 

Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 2; Exhibit 59a (LTC, RC-East G2 Officer, interview) to US Central 

Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat 

Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 26; Exhibit 20c (1LT, Assistant S2, 2-503d IN, statement) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted).”

98. Fisher and Berdiner, interview, 16 July 2009, 1–3; Lieutenant Colonel 

Stephen J. Maranian, “Field Artillery Fires in the Mountains of Afghanistan,” 

Fires (July–September 2008): 35–36. Captain Berdiner noted, “Every fire mission 

during our 14 months was shot at high angle.” 

99. Exhibit 18 (SPC, C/62d Eng Bn, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)”(Camp 

Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 1-3; Exhibit 43a (SSG, Mortar Section 

Leader, C/2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “ReInvestigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan 

Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 10.

100. Milley, interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 25.

101. Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 6; Exhibit 33b (SFC, Platoon Sergeant, 

2d Platoon, C/2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “ReInvestigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan 

Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 39-40; Captain Devin George, 

e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 23 April 2009; TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE” Briefing, 7 July 2008, 

slide 33; Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 10-52, Water Supply in 

Theaters of Operation (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990), p. 

3-5; TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE” Briefing, 7 July 2008, slide 33. Exhibit 

17b (CPT, Company XO, C/2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, 

Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 22; 

Exhibit 28b (CPT, BN S-3 Air, 2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal 

District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 26, 28; 
135

Exhibit 27a (CPT, Battalion S4, 2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal 

District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 3, 22. The 

ANA platoon used the local sources for their water needs. 

102. Sergeant First Class David Dzwik, interview by Matt Matthews, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 October 2008, 2.

103. Dzwik, interview, 21 October 2008, 2.

104. Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 6–7; Benton, interview, 4 August 2009, 

8; Exhibit 33b (SFC, Platoon Sergeant, 2d Platoon, C/2-503d IN, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 39-40-1 .

105. Dzwik’s comment regarding filters made to Colonel William Ostlund. 

Ostlund, e-mail, 19 November 2009; Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 6–7; 

Exhibit 33b (SFC, Platoon Sergeant, 2d Platoon, C/2-503d IN, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 43-44; Exhibit 16a (CPT, Company Commander, C/2-503d IN, 

interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 39-40; Exhibit 7a (LTC, Battalion Commander, 2-503d 

IN, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 50-2, 99; Exhibit 25b (1SG, First Sergeant, C/2-503d 

IN, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 8; Exhibit 17b (CPT, Company XO, C/2-503d IN, 

interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted),46, 53-4; Exhibit 27a (CPT, Battalion S4, 2-503d 

IN, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 14; Exhibit 33a (SFC, Platoon Sergeant, 2d 

Platoon, C/2-503d IN, statement) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “ReInvestigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan 

Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 4.

106. Exhibit 33b (SFC, Platoon Sergeant, 2d Platoon, C/2-503d IN, interview) 

to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat 

Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 

July 2008 (Redacted), 46. 

107. Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 6; Beckno, interview, 2 July 2009, 5; 

Exhibit 17a (CPT, Company XO, C/2-503d IN, statement) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, 
136

Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 

5; Exhibit 33a (SFC, Platoon Sergeant, 2d Platoon, C/2-503d IN, statement) 

to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat 

Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 

July 2008 (Redacted), 4; Exhibit 33b (SFC, Platoon Sergeant, 2d Platoon, C/2-

503d IN, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation 

into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, 

Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 42-4; Exhibit 17b (CPT, Company 

XO, C/2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “ReInvestigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan 

Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted),45-6; Exhibit 33a (SFC, 

Platoon Sergeant, 2d Platoon, C/2-503d IN, statement) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal 

District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 4. SFC 

Dwzik states that he “let [the company XO] know [that the platoon] was black 

on water.” See Exhibit 33b (SFC, Platoon Sergeant, 2d Platoon, C/2-503d IN, 

interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 43. However this statement is disputed by multiple 

witnesses. See Exhibit 17b (CPT, Company XO, C/2-503d IN, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 11-12); Exhibit 28b (CPT, BN S-3 Air, 2-503d IN, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 26, 28; Exhibit 27a (CPT, BN S-4, 2-503d IN, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 14, 30; and Exhibit 16a (CPT, Company Commander, C/2-503d IN, 

statement) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 2; Exhibit 63, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 

Investigation into Battle of Wanat, “ 3.

108. Exhibit 15 (SPC, C/62 Eng Bn, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)”(Camp 

Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 1. 

109. Exhibit 69 (SGT, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp 

Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 1-2.

110. Exhibit 64 (SSG, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” 

(Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, 17 July 2008), 3.
137

111. Exhibit 67 (SSG, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” 

(Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, 17 July 2008), 2.

112. Myer, interview, 1 December 2008, 7; Exhibit 43a (SSG, Mortar Section 

Leader, C/2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “ReInvestigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan 

Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 24.

113. Hissong, personal statement, 3.

114. Staff Sergeant Luis Repreza, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 February 2009. 14. See also,

Anderson, interview, 2 April 2009, 3–4; Scantlin, interview, 20 August 2009, 2; 

Sergeant Jason T. Oakes, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 February 2009, 6.

115. Scantlin, interview, 20 August 2009, 2.

116. Benton, interview, 4 August 2009, 16.

117. Oakes, interview, 18 February 2009, 6.

118. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 5.

119. Hissong, personal statement, 1.

120. Exhibit 15, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat,” 1-2. 

Redacted Soldier Statements, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 

Investigation into Battle of Wanat.”

121. Benton, interview, 4 August 2009, 7.

122. Benton, interview.

123. Benton, interview.

124. Kate Wiltrout, “Soldier from Eastern Shore Recounts Deadly Battle 

in Afghanistan, SSG Jesse L. Queck,” Hampton Roads Virginian-Pilot, 19 July 

2008, http://hamptonroads.com/2008/07/soldier-eastern-shore-recounts-deadlybattle-afghanistan (accessed 2 February 2009).

125. Aass, interview, 13 January 2009, 4.

126. Exhibit 16b (CPT, Company Commander, C/2-503d IN, statement) to 

US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action 

at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 

2008 (Redacted), 3; Exhibit 16a (CPT, Company Commander, C/2-503d IN, 

interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 62-4. 
138

127. Exhibit 63, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat, “ 3.

128. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 9.

129. Exhibit 23 (SFC, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Bagram 

Air Base, Afghanistan, 25 July 2008), 1; 

130. Exhibit 13, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat,” 2.

131. Exhibit 23, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat,” 1.

132. First Lieutenant Matthew Colley, e-mail to Douglas Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 14 May 2009; Pry, interview, 6 May 2009, 

8–9.

133. Aass, interview, 13 January 2009, 3; Myer, interview, 1 December 

2008, 6. 

134. Aass, interview, 13 January 2009, 4; Exhibit 16a (CPT, Company 

Commander, C/2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), 

“Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, 

Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 60-62.

135. Exhibit 16b (CPT, Company Commander, C/2-503d IN, statement) to 

US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action 

at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 

2008 (Redacted), 3. 

136. See Sciutto, “‘Relax, Brother’: Exclusive Video Shows Taliban Attack 

That Killed 9 U.S. Soldiers at Afghan Post July 2008 Incident Shown From Taliban 

Viewpoint: ‘We Attacked From 4 Sides,’” 12 November 2009; Pry, interview, 

6 May 2009, 6; Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda’s Paramilitary ‘Shadow Army,’” (9 

February 2009), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/al_qaedas_

paramilita.php (accessed 9 March 2009); The official TF Rock briefing completed 

after the battle in July 2008 estimated 300 insurgents in the attacking force. See 

Ostlund, “Battle of Wanat Storyboard and Brief,” 16 July 2008. After the battle, 

Captain Pry stated that the initial attack element contained about 120 fighters, and 

reinforcements from local Nuristan villages that poured into the engagement area 

the day of the battle increased the size of the attacking force to 200 fighters.

137. Benton, interview, 4 August 2009, 16.

138. Pry, interview, 6 May 2009, 10; Oakes, interview, 18 February 2009, 8.

139 Gervais, interview, 19 June 2009, 5; Milley, interview, 18 and 20 August 

2009, 29.

140. Pry, interview, 6 May 2009, 10.

141. Pry, interview.
139

142. Specialist Chris McKaig, e-mail to Matt Matthews, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 January 2009. 

143. Exhibit 18, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat,” 2; Pitts, interview, 14 January 2009, 8.

144. Lieutenant Colonel Pierre Gervais, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 9 June 2009, 6; Milley, 

interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 30–32; Pry, interview, 6 May 2009, 8-9; 

Lieutenant Colonel Jimmy Hinton, interview by Douglas Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 March 2009, 8-9.

145. US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat 

Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 

July 2008 (Redacted), 44-5.

146. Gervais, interview, 19 June 2009, 5; Milley, interview, 18 and 20 August 

2009, 36–37.

147. Milley, interview, 18 August 2009, 42-44.

148. Pry, interview, 6 May 2009, 12; Colley e-mail interview, 25 March 2008, 

8.

149. Pry, interview, 12.

150. Pry, interview, 12.

151. Hinton, interview, 18 March 2009, 9.

152. Exhibit 16a (CPT, Company Commander, C/2-503d IN, interview) to 

US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action 

at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 60-3, 68-9; Exhibit 11a (COL, Brigade Commander, 173d ABCT, 

interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 17-19; Exhibit 7a (LTC, Battalion Commander, 

2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation 

into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, 

Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 23, 50-1, 54-5; Exhibit 9a (MG, CJTF101 Commander, 101st Airborne Division, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal 

District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 26, 29-30; 

Milley interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 22-3.

153. Dzwik, interview, 21 October 2008, 3–4.

154. Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 12, 167.

155. Benton, interview, 4 August 2009, 9; Scantlin, interview, 20 August 

2009, 2; Sergeant John Hayes, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 April 2009, 9. All three Soldiers were 

scheduled to participate in this patrol.
140

156. Chavez, interview, 19 March 2009, 8; Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 

12–13.

157. Exhibit 18, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into 

Battle of Wanat,” 2.

158. Exhibit 34, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into 

Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)”, 1.

159. Exhibit 36 (Timeline to Battle of Wanat Army Regulation 15-6 

Investigation Storyboard) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “ReInvestigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan 

Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted); Exhibit 67 (SSG, C/2-503d 

IN, interview), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of 

Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, 

Germany, 17 July 2008), 3-4.

160. Myer, interview, 1 December 2008, 8–9.

161. Exhibit 34, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into 

Battle of Wanat,” 1-2; Exhibit 37b (SGT, Team Leader, C/2-503d IN, statement) 

to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat 

Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 

July 2008 (Redacted), 2.

162. Sergeant Brian Hissong, “Combat Outpost Kahler, July 8-15,” 

Unpublished manuscript, 3.

163. Specialist Tyler Hanson, interview by Matt Matthews, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 November 2008, 3. Several Chosen 

Company members, including Queck and Samaroo related that they heard that 

the gunner on the ITAS had sighted a moving force of unknown individuals 

to the south of the main COP prior to the attack. See Exhibit 64 (SSG, 

Mortar Section, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 

Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Landstuhl 

Regional Medical Center, Germany, 16 July 2008), 3-4; and Exhibit 67 (SSG 

C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into 

Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Landstuhl Regional Medical 

Center, Germany, 17 October 2008), 3.
141

Chapter 3

The Fight at Wanat, 13 July 2008

The Attack on COP Kahler

At 0420 local time, two long bursts of RPD machine gun fire echoed 

through the valley at Wanat. Immediately after this signal, insurgents 

opened up with intense and continuous volleys of machine gun and rocketpropelled grenade (RPG) fire from hidden locations on all sides of the 

American/ANA position. This initial volley started an intense firefight that 

lasted for over three and a half hours. For the most part, the battle of Wanat 

was primarily a contest to obtain and maintain fire superiority with each 

side laying down intense fire. The AAF fire, particularly the opening salvo, 

was accurate and came equally from nearby positions within the village of 

Wanat and the surrounding hillsides. Firing locations in the village itself 

included the mosque, hotel, and bazaar buildings, all of which were within 

several yards of the American perimeter.1

The AAF fire was not only intense but also almost continuous. Grimm, 

the TOW missile squad leader, noted that the RPG fire that day was very 

rapid, in quick and methodic succession and relatively accurate. Specialist 

John Hayes, the 2d Platoon radio operator, found the number of RPGs 

fired at the Americans staggering, “The enemy engaged with RPGs. Lots 

and lots and lots of RPGs. It seemed like they went on forever. They must 

have had someone running resupply or a major cache of RPGs.”2

 Sergeant 

First Class David Barbaret, the platoon sergeant from the quick reaction 

force (QRF) platoon that arrived late in the battle, observed the results of 

enemy fire after the engagement, noting that a post battle analysis “showed 

that the AAF had made use of all available dead space and buildings 

surrounding the area where COP Kahler was established and the high 

ground on all sides.”3

 The insurgent fire, a deadly combination of machine 

gun rounds and RPG rockets, seemed endless, without lulls for resupply.4

The proximity of the enemy positions made OP Topside particularly 

vulnerable. Barbaret stated, “the OP was open to fires from the high ground 

on its north and west sides which was evident by the RPG tail fins found 

inside of the position on the south and east walls.”5

 The crescendo of fire 

from positions within the village itself, including the bazaar and the hotel 

complex, effectively isolated the OP from the main position. Aside from 

gaining fire superiority, reinforcing and maintaining contact with the OP 

became Myer and Brostrom’s main priority during the fight.
142

The AAF opening volley was particularly devastating as it targeted 

the crew-served weapons at both the OP and on the main COP. These 

included the truck mounted TOW missile system, the ground mounted 

machine guns at the OP, the ground mounted mortars at the main position, 

and the vehicle mounted heavy machine guns and automatic grenade 

launchers. Initial enemy success included the destruction of the TOW 

and the suppression of the mortars and one of the machine guns at the 

OP. The vehicle mounted machine guns and grenade launchers, although 

under intense fire, survived the initial volley and provided the basis for the 

American defense in the early phases of the battle.

As previously mentioned, to the enemy the most dangerous of the 

American weapons was the TOW antitank missile launcher. The TOW was 

mounted on a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) 

located in the middle of the main COP in a position between the command 

post (CP) and the 120-mm mortar pit. At the start of the fight, a crossfire 

of three RPG rounds, fired from nearby positions on both sides of the 

COP, struck the TOW HMMWV, destroying the vehicle and setting it on 

fire. Although the TOW squad had been preparing to fire its weapon at the 

five insurgents seen on high ground to the west, the eruption of enemy 

fire interrupted their action. While the RPG rounds did not hurt any of 

the squad members, the destruction of their vehicle forced squad leader 

Grimm to evacuate his men to the CP area. The TOW vehicle burned 

throughout the remainder of the action.6

At the time of the initial enemy volley, Phillips’ six man mortar section 

was manning its single 120-mm mortar at its firing position just west of the 

TOW HMMWV. The mortarmen were about to fire at the five insurgents 

on the high ground to the west when the enemy struck. The section was 

also responsible for the single 60-mm mortar, which was left unmanned 

in a partially completed sandbagged firing position in the center of the 

COP. As previously noted, an eight foot HESCO barrier surrounded the 

120-mm mortar facing to the west. Beyond this barrier were the perimeter 

concertina fence and a row of trees that separated the open area of the COP 

from houses in the southern end of the village of Wanat. The trees loomed 

over the mortar position.7

When the AAF opened fire, the mortar pit became a prime target. 

Insurgents were firing from the roofs of nearby buildings and from the 

trees adjacent to the perimeter wire. The mortarmen responded with 

grenades and small arms fire. One of them, Sergeant Hector Chavez, fired 

at the insurgents high up in the trees, possibly killing three or four of the 

attackers. While the rest of his men engaged the enemy with small arms 
143Figure 15. The Course of the Fight.
144

and grenades, Phillips and Private First Class Scott Stenoski managed 

to fire four high-explosive (HE) mortar rounds using the settings aimed 

at the individuals on the hillside to the west. After this, enemy fire was 

too intense to permit further firing and a close RPG hit forced Phillips 

and Stenoski away from the weapon. Then machine gun rounds began 

ricocheting off the mortar tube and the RPG fire became more accurate. 

An insurgent managed to aim an RPG round through an opening in the 

HESCO barrier at its southwest corner. The rocket flew between Phillips 

and Stenoski and continued across the COP to strike the bazaar, which at 

the time was being used by the AAF as a firing position. The impact of the 

round set a section of the bazaar structure on fire, a blaze that continued to 

burn throughout the firefight. One of the defenders recalled that, “during 

the firing, RPGs and rounds were hitting the [mortar] pit constantly.”8

When the action began, the two engineers who were operating the 

Bobcat next to the mortar area reinforced Phillips’ men in the mortar pit. 

There, the defenders used whatever weapons were available to them, 

firing personal weapons furiously into the nearby trees and aiming 40-

mm grenades at more distant enemy positions. Without any machine 

guns of their own, the mortarmen had to use M4 assault rifles firing at the 

maximum rate of fire simply to suppress the enemy in order to survive. 

In this way, Phillips burned out a series of three M4s. He then picked up 

an M249 SAW belonging to the engineers and tried to fire it but it failed 

to shoot. Mortarman Queck had previously tried to fire the SAW but it 

was jammed. Another trooper later fired it successfully after changing its 

barrel. Queck instead fired an AT-4 rocket launcher he found at one of the 

buildings from which enemy fire was coming. Soldiers nearby followed 

up Queck’s effort with hand grenades.9

Despite the heavy enemy fire, no one in the mortar pit had been 

wounded yet. Platoon sergeant Dzwik commented on the paradox of 

enemy fire:

There was a lot of small arms, a lot of AK, definitely a lot of 

PKM [light machine gun] and RPK [a 7.62-mm Soviet model 

light machine gun, essentially a light machine gun version of 

the AK rifle] [fire] from their fire support positions. There was 

a lot of that raining in. The RPGs were pretty heavy. When I 

was down at that mortar pit, there was a guy shooting either 

in a tree or from behind a tree and luckily enough he wasn’t 

smart enough to realize that when he shot the RPG, it would 

come out, the fins would pop out, they’d catch the branches 

and it would send that RPG off in a different direction. He did 
145

that multiple times and he had a good eyes-on into the center 

of the pit, so it was pretty fortunate that he wasn’t intelligent 

enough to figure out that he had to move to a better position.10

Eventually such fire had to hit something and shrapnel from an RPG 

impact seriously wounded Specialist Sergio Abad, one of the mortarmen, 

in the legs and shoulders. After he received first aid, Abad’s condition did 

not at first seem critical because he was still able to hand ammunition to 

Chavez.11

During this firefight, Phillips, Stenoski, Chavez, and Queck 

periodically tried to reach the 60-mm mortar position to put that weapon 

into action. Enemy fire sweeping through the interior of the COP made 

it suicidal to remain in open areas for any extended period of time. The 

mortar crewmen simply could not reach the mortar. The 60-mm mortar 

would not be fired during the entire engagement.12

After an RPG round exploded near the ammunition supply point (ASP) 

containing a stockpile of mortar rounds in the corner of the mortar pit, 

Phillips realized the mortar pit had to be evacuated. One of the engineers 

recalled, “An RPG hit in the east corner of the ASP and hit the stack of 

120-mm mortar rounds. Staff Sergeant [Phillips] fell over because of the 

concussion and when he got back up, I looked around, the cases were 

sparking and he yelled to all of us, ‘get the [hell ]out of here.’”13

In response to Phillips’ order, the mortarmen and engineers left the 

shelter of the HESCOs and ran across the short but open distance to the CP 

area. Chavez and engineer Specialist Joshua Morse dragged Abad across 

this space through heavy enemy fire. During this evacuation, Chavez 

was shot through both legs, collapsing to the ground. Able only to crawl, 

he nevertheless attempted to pull Abad along. Luckily, other Soldiers, 

including company radio-telephone operator Aass and Queck came to 

Morse’s aid and succeeded in getting both wounded men into the shelter 

of the CP position.14

At the CP, the 2d Platoon’s medic, Private First Class William Hewitt, 

had been wounded in the arm and taken out of action when he attempted 

to accompany the first reinforcements headed for OP Topside. However, 

Specialist Jeffrey Scantlin, a SAW gunner from the 2d Squad, was trained 

as a combat lifesaver. Scantlin handed off his SAW and filled in for Hewitt. 

Throughout the action, Scantlin skillfully treated the casualties on the main 

COP, including Abad and Chavez. Ultimately, all the wounded on the COP 

were successfully evacuated except Abad, whose situation soon began to 

deteriorate. His wounds were more serious than they originally appeared 
146

to be and Scantlin went to work desperately trying to save Abad’s life, as 

a medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) at the time was impossible given the 

tactical situation. Nevertheless, after repeated attempts at decompressing 

Abad’s chest and CPR, the mortarman died from the effects of his wounds. 

In the midst of the battle, Abad’s death was a shock to the men at the CP. 

He was the only fatality within the main COP during the battle of Wanat.15

There could be no pause for mourning as the action continued at a 

furious pace. Shortly after the evacuation of the mortar pit, the burning 

TOW vehicle finally exploded, scattering flames and smoldering TOW 

missiles in all directions. The fireball caught and severely burned one 

unfortunate ANA soldier. Two of the Marine ETT members, Corporal 

Jason Jones and Corporal Jason Oakes, sprinted from their position to 

assist the ANA soldier, moved him to cover, and began medical treatment. 

The explosion knocked out the tactical satellite (TACSAT) radio antenna 

and with it all TACSAT radio backup communications. Two unexpended 

TOW missile rounds landed directly in the CP, with one having its missile 

motor running.

Phillips, arriving at the CP from the mortar pit, responded with 

characteristic energy, grabbing the hot missile using a pair of empty 

sandbags as expedient gloves, then carrying the round out of the CP 

into the middle of the open area through heavy enemy small arms fire. 

Miraculously, Phillips returned to safety unhurt. Myer, the company 

commander, also responded rapidly to the threat of the missiles, scooping 

up the other missile and heaving it over the side of the sandbag wall. To add 

to the confusion, a small pile of fabric debris remaining from the HESCOs 

that had been cut down and piled by the engineer CONEX container caught 

fire from the TOW explosion. The HESCO fabric smoldered, adding to the 

considerable quantities of thick black smoke emanating from the burning 

HMMWV and bazaar that slightly hindered the arrival of the medical 

evacuation helicopters later in the fight.16

Myer was otherwise busy trying to manage fire support assets and 

dispatching reinforcements. When the enemy opened fire, he immediately 

reported the contact to the battalion tactical operations center (TOC) at 

Camp Blessing. Myer announced the first volley of RPGs to the battalion in 

unmistakable terms, “This is a Ranch House style attack.”17 The battalion 

staff listening at the TOC could clearly hear the sounds of machine gun fire 

and RPGs exploding in the background of the radio transmission. Myer 

had two FM radios with him, one on the 2d Platoon’s internal network and 

the other on the TF Rock battalion command net. He also had TACSAT 

as a backup until the TOW explosion destroyed the antenna. Hayes, the 
147

2d Platoon RTO, and Aass assisted Myer with his radio coordination until 

Aass later departed to reinforce OP Topside. Having unfortunately left his 

fire support officer (FSO) at Camp Blessing, as he had done on 4 July at 

Bella, Myer focused his efforts on obtaining and coordinating fire support.

The TF Rock TOC recorded the initial contact report from Wanat at 

0423, the time the first field artillery fire mission was executed. This was 

an immediate suppression mission aimed at a target approximately 550 

yards to the northwest of the COP, danger close (less than 650 yards from 

friendly positions) for 155-mm field artillery, and about as close to friendly 

positions as high angle artillery could be safely fired in the mountainous 

terrain. TF Rock commander Ostlund briefly delayed the execution of the 

fires while he confirmed with Myer that all the Chosen Company defenders 

were within the perimeter, as he knew that a patrol was scheduled to depart 

the COP at around the same time. Within six minutes of the start of the 

action, the first rounds impacted. Myer initially focused the artillery on 

the southern and western sides of the COP. However, since most of the 

insurgent positions were much closer than 650 yards to friendly positions, 

the field artillery fire could not be directed against many enemy positions. 

The two gun trucks equipped with the Mk-19 grenade launcher had similar 

restrictions. The grenades fired by these weapon systems had a minimum 

arming distance and the insurgents were so close to the Coalition positions 

that if fired by the launchers at these most threatening targets, the projectiles 

would not be effective.18

While Myer had left his company FSO behind at Camp Blessing, the 

2d Platoon’s forward observer, Sergeant Ryan Pitts, was also unavailable. 

When the battle started, Pitts had been at OP Topside and was soon 

wounded and isolated there. This left Myer and the 2d Platoon leader, First 

Lieutenant Brostrom, with no trained field artillery fire support personnel 

at the CP. Making things more difficult were the communications 

difficulties caused by the mountainous terrain which was exacerbated by 

the destruction of the TACSAT antenna. To support their comrades, the 

artillerymen at Camp Blessing were forced to fire from a preplanned target 

list, engaging each target with four rounds of HE, armed with a “delay” 

fuse. Although using fuse delay reduced the effectiveness of the rounds, 

the howitzer crews at Camp Blessing deliberately employed the technique 

because it provided increased safety for friendly forces in the event that a 

shell inadvertently fell short.19

For the first half hour of the engagement, the only fire support that COP 

Kahler received was this relatively ineffectual and distant field artillery 

fire. Between 0429 and 0505, the 155-mm platoon at Camp Blessing fired 
148

five missions, a total of 52 HE projectiles. This rate of fire, less than two 

rounds per minute per cannon, was far below the standard sustained rate 

of fire of four rounds per minute. The time consuming need to elevate 

the gun tubes to a nearly vertical position to fire and then lower them 

to reload greatly slowed the gunners’ work. Because the missions were 

danger close, the artillerymen also had to visually recheck the gun sights 

before each round was shot. Given the conditions, the artillerymen were 

firing the guns as rapidly as possible.20

Apart from the field artillery, Myer expected support from various 

fixed and rotary wing aircraft, although these assets by their nature were 

less immediately responsive than the artillery. Generally, close air support 

in the initial stage of the engagement was not used to provide direct support 

to the troops under fire. Rather, practice in Afghanistan had developed to 

the point where these powerful aerial weapons were used to limit access 

to the battlefield and to prevent AAF insurgents from transiting to and 

from the battlefield (referred to by the aviators as “air interdiction”). 

Accordingly, the first CAS mission to arrive on station over Wanat at 

0458, a B-1 bomber, callsign “Bone”, dropped two bombs to the north to 

isolate the battlefield. The absence of qualified air control personnel on 

the ground at Wanat also served as an obstacle to the use of CAS against 

enemy positions near the COP.21

As Myer and his radio operators worked feverishly to get support, the 

enemy maintained heavy fire on the CP area and the rest of the COP. The 

Americans marveled at the insurgents’ ability to sustain this pressure. RTO 

Aass remembered that the “RPG fire was like machine gun fire.”22 Queck, 

now fighting from the CP, recalled, “Every time, it seemed, I would poke 

my head up from behind the sand bags, I would hear bullets whizzing by 

my head.”23

With the TOW HMMWV now destroyed, there were three vehicles 

with heavy weapons still available to fire from the main COP position. 

These included the two squad HMMWVs on the northern segment of the 

perimeter, both armed with Mk-19 automatic grenade launchers, and the 

platoon headquarters HMMWV, mounting an M2 .50-caliber machine gun 

at the CP. On the ground, the Marine ETT also had an M240 7.62-mm 

medium machine gun manned by Corporal Jones. This gun’s importance 

increased because both of the 2d Platoon’s organic M240 machine guns 

were at OP Topside and therefore, unable to support the main position. 

The AAF fire was so devastating that the 3d Squad’s grenade launcher 

was quickly disabled when struck with a bullet through its feed tray. 

The 2d Squad’s Mk-19 initially jammed, a common malfunction, but 
149

later was brought back into operation. Thus, as the initial AAF onslaught 

continued, the American and Afghan defenders at the main COP had only 

the .50-caliber machine gun at the CP, the Marine M240 machine gun, 

and their own small arms to repel the assault. It is to the credit of the C 

Company paratroopers that they maintained at least fire parity with the 

insurgents at COP Kahler.24

To achieve this effect with the available weapons, the 2d Platoon 

paratroopers were forced to fire their small arms at the maximum cyclic 

rate. The initial fight at the mortar pit, described earlier in this chapter, 

illustrated this. In other positions as well, the SAWs and, in particular, 

the M4s, experienced difficulty maintaining such a rate after the barrels 

got excessively hot. When that occurred, the weapons would jam, as 

happened to Phillips. Without heavier weapons, the enemy fire forced the 

Americans to return an equal volume of fire or risk the enemy overrunning 

the position. One young platoon member later complained, “I ran through 

my ammo ‘til my SAW would not work anymore despite the ‘Febreze’ 

bottle of CLP [lubricant] I dumped into it.”25

Soldiers were, on occasion, able to bring back into action previously 

jammed weapons. As mentioned above, the engineers’ SAW that failed to 

work in the mortar pit fight was later used in another location after its barrel 

was replaced. In the midst of intense enemy fire, one paratrooper described 

how he “grabbed the engineer’s weapon that was left at our position and 

which was a SAW and . . . started laying down about 800-1,000 rounds at 

the bazaar and wood line around the mosque.”26 The .50-caliber machine 

gun mounted on the platoon headquarters HMMWV also remained in 

action. Its gunner was Private William Krupa, who was detached from the 

3d Squad for this duty and had joined the platoon only two months earlier. 

Krupa acquitted himself well in his first firefight. Aass later commented 

in admiration, “Private Krupa . . . was up in the turret, taking direct fire 

from multiple locations and he was literally standing ankle deep in .50-cal 

casings from all the rounds that he’d fired. I was worried that after he shot 

off his first can of ammo he wasn’t going to know what to do next but 

under fire he changed maybe a dozen cans of ammo.”27 Krupa recounted:

RPGs were coming in constantly from the west. I remember 

at one point I had to slow my fire down because the barrel 

was red hot and there was a debate on how much ammo was 

left. By this time I had shot about ten .50-cal 100 round ammo 

cans. . .I would wait for the tree leaves to kick up so I knew 

where the enemy were at. Immediately after they would fire, I 

would fire at their positions.28
150

The insurgents did not spare the 1st Squad’s traffic control point (TCP) 

position, located south of the CP across the road from the main COP. The 

TCP’s main weapon was an M2 .50-caliber machine gun mounted in 

the turret of the squad HMMWV. One of the squad’s fire team leaders, 

Sergeant Brian Hissong, watched Specialist Adam Hamby firing the M2 

to the south, “The truck was taking very heavy fire, I’ve never seen a truck 

take so many hits as it was right then.”29 Hamby fired a 100 round belt of 

ammunition at the enemy position from which an RPG had been fired, 

recalling, “an RPG came sailing [in]. . . . It left a very definitive trail from 

the point of origin. I then dumped what was left [of my ammunition] in 

that location.”30 Incredibly, the volume of insurgent fire actually increased. 

Hamby continued, “I went down into the truck and grabbed a can of 

.50-cal ammo to reload. As I was reloading, the turret I was in became 

overwhelmed with gunfire.”31 Hissong was alarmed, “When he ducked 

down to reload, it was like the turret of the truck exploded from all of the 

bullets hitting it and RPG’s impacting around it.”32 As Hamby attempted 

to get the machine gun back into action under this heavy fire, an enemy 

7.62-mm round struck the gun directly in the top of its feed tray cover, 

which Hamby had raised for reloading. This hit permanently disabled the 

gun. Hamby’s squad leader, Staff Sergeant Sean Samaroo, believed that 

the .50-caliber was knocked out within five minutes of the start of the 

engagement. The 1st Squad fought on without its heavy machine gun. 

To combat the incessant AAF fire, Hissong fired an AT-4 rocket against 

the large house on a high hill to the southeast of the TCP. Although the 

rocket destroyed the position, insurgent fire from other positions remained 

ferocious.33

To most Americans in Afghanistan, the enemy remained a shadowy 

figure who fired mortar rounds, emplaced improvised explosive devices 

(IEDs), or sprung small arms ambushes at a distance but for C Company, 

2-503d IN, the experience was different. At both the Ranch House fight 

and the Bella ambush, the enemy was nearby. So it was at Wanat on 13 

July 2008. The insurgents were so close and so aggressive in pushing 

their attack that the Americans regularly observed and engaged them as 

individuals. Many of the defenders recalled the appearance of the AAF. 

While some individual fighters wore masks over their faces, other wore 

on their heads. For uniforms they wore a combination of camouflaged 

BDUs [battle dress uniforms] and traditional shalwar kameez, the latter 

often referred to by the American troops as “man jammies”.34

The ANA platoon defended its portion of the perimeter from its 

fighting positions in the northern sector. For the most part, the Afghan 
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troops remained in their three fighting positions along the northern 

perimeter of the COP and at the TCP from which they directed fire against 

the insurgents. Numerous Chosen Company paratroopers complained of 

their inactivity. Dzwik was ambivalent about their performance:

They never got out of their holes. They only had four 

wounded, which tells me that the enemy directed their fire 

at the Americans, not the Afghans. The Afghans sprayed and 

prayed. That’s about it. To be honest, though, it was more than 

I expected. The other numerous occasions I’ve been on with 

Afghan soldiers as our backup, they ran.35

Sergeant Hissong summed up what most of the 2d Platoon Soldiers felt 

about the Afghan soldiers, “They were still pretty much totally useless.”36

These sentiments, however, do not reflect actual ANA performance at 

Wanat. The ANA platoon did contribute to the defense of the COP to the 

best of its abilities. No ANA areas were overrun, occupied, or seized. The 

Marines who were directly responsible for observing the ANA platoon felt 

that the Afghan soldiers covered their assigned sectors responsibly and 

effectively while controlling their rates of fire. Such fire control was a step 

forward for the ANA, whose prior reputation was that of shooting blindly 

in the general direction of the enemy until all ammunition was expended. 

Four ANA troops were wounded and required evacuation in the action, a 

figure which matches almost exactly the American casualties on the main 

COP (one killed in action [KIA], four wounded), even though the ANA 

element was half the size of the American contingent.37

The major difference in overall casualties was that no ANA troops 

fought at OP Topside or were sent to reinforce it. Most of the American 

casualties and all but one of the KIAs would be inflicted at OP Topside. 

Neither the Marine advisors nor the Army officers shifted the Afghans 

around during the heat of battle because of language difficulties and a 

fear of fratricide. While troops of the 2d Platoon may have looked at the 

ANA with a jaundiced eye based on previous experience with the less well 

trained and unprofessional Afghan Security Guard (ASG) at the Ranch 

House and Bella, at Wanat the ANA seemed to have pulled their own 

weight.38
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The Initial Defense of OP Topside39

Enemy intentions at Wanat are unknown and any analysis is thus 

speculative. Pry, the TF Rock S2 officer, believed that the AAF objective 

was the ejection of American forces from the area by overrunning the new 

outpost. Whatever the insurgents’ goal was prior to the start of the battle, 

it was soon evident that American firepower on the main COP precluded 

a successful direct assault there. Things were, however, different at the 

isolated OP position:40

The TOW squad leader, Grimm, reflected on the insurgents’ objectives:

They [the enemy] infiltrated a couple of days before. Fire 

[was] initiated from multiple locations at once, from covered 

and concealed positions, engaging heavy weapons first. They 

fired on the [COP] to keep us pinned down in the low ground 

so that they could isolate and overwhelm the OP. It felt like 

they were not trying to come inside the perimeter at the low 

ground, only at the OP.41

Grimm recalled, “There was a heavy volume of fire on us but I did not see 

AAF attempting to enter the main COP perimeter.”42

The OP’s position in the overall defensive scheme made its location 

especially vulnerable. The insurgents had infiltrated the bazaar which lay 

between the main American forces and the observation post. This hindered 

communication with Topside once the firefight started and made movement 

from the main position to the OP difficult. Nevertheless, American fire kept 

the enemy at bay to such an extent that Myer and Brostrom retained the 

freedom to maneuver and shift their forces around the defensive perimeter. 

This ability proved to be decisive as it allowed the company and platoon 

leaders to periodically reinforce the OP at critical times. Still, throughout 

the action, the defenders of OP Topside found themselves under great 

enemy pressure.

At the start of the fight, nine C Company paratroopers manned the 

three connected fighting positions at OP Topside. Specialist Tyler Stafford 

(gunner) and Specialist Gunnar Zwilling (assistant gunner) fought out of 

the northern M240 machine gun position. The platoon forward observer, 

Pitts, was also in this position with his radio. Corporal Jonathan R. Ayers, 

Specialist Christopher McKaig, and Specialist Pruitt Rainey were in the 

other M240 machine gun position in the middle fighting position called 

the Crow’s Nest. There were three men in the southernmost fighting 

position, Specialists Jason Bogar and Mathew Phillips and Sergeant 

Matthew Gobble. Phillips was the platoon’s designated marksman and 
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had a designated fighting position on the sleeping terrace behind the 

short stretch of the double sandbagged wall facing the north. He was not 

manning this position when the attack started. As previously mentioned, 

Brostrom had placed the LRAS3 at the OP. It was located in the northern 

fighting position. FO Pitts usually operated the system.43

At 0420 on the morning of the attack, Stafford had been manning the 

LRAS3. He began moving the short distance back to his machine gun 

position for stand-to when the enemy opened fire. A wave of RPG rounds 

almost immediately engulfed the OP. This first round of explosions was 

devastatingly accurate. Everybody in the OP was immediately killed, 

wounded, or stunned. Stafford remembered:

I yelled to Zwilling, then we got hit and I got blown out of 

that position back into the middle of the OP. I could feel all 

the shrapnel. It was burning pretty badly in my legs and my 

stomach was burning really bad and my arm. I thought I was 

on fire because it burned so bad, so I started rolling around 

screaming that I was on fire and then I just woke up from that. 

I regained my senses from that and sat up looking back toward 

the west. I could see Zwilling, who was just a couple feet from 

me, and he had the same look I would have on my face after 

getting hit in the face by Mike Tyson, probably. Then there 

was another explosion that happened right behind me. I’m not 

sure if it was a hand grenade or an RPG but that threw me 

down onto the terrace where we slept.44

Surprisingly, Stafford remained conscious, recalling that the grenade 

had “blown my helmet off but that one really didn’t hurt me because I think 

my interceptor body armor caught most of that.”45 Still, he recognized he 

was badly hurt.

Stafford looked around to assess the damage. Zwilling had disappeared. 

Pitts lay in the bottom of the position wounded. Nearby, Phillips appeared 

unhurt. Stafford described what happened next: 

I looked up and saw Phillips and he was kind of hunkered 

down on his knees below that sandbag position. He was just 

popping his head up over the sandbags. I called to him, “Hey, 

Phillips, man, I’m hit, I’m hit. I need help.” He just looked at 

me and nodded his head yes and just gave me a Phillips smile 

like he was saying, “I’ll get you, man. Hold on but I need to 

kill these guys first.” He had a grenade so he pulled the pin on 

his grenade and he stood up and threw it. Right as he threw 
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it, an RPG either hit the sandbags right in front of me or the 

boulder that was right behind me that was protecting us from 

the west. The RPG, once it exploded, the tail [fins] ricocheted 

and hit me in the helmet. I put my head down and it smacked 

me right on the top of my helmet. There was a big imprint in 

my helmet and everything . . . I looked up after that, after the 

dust settled, and I could see Phillips who was slumped over 

like he was sitting on his knees. He was slumped over with 

his chest on his knees and his hands all awkwardly beside 

him, turned backwards. I screamed at him four or five times, 

“Phillips! Phillips!”46

Pitts told a similar story, “The next thing I knew, things just started 

exploding inside our fighting positions. Multiple RPGs were shot at us, 

along with hand grenades. . . I was shell-shocked for a couple of seconds 

and I had been hit immediately.”47 Zwilling and Phillips had been killed 

almost immediately. Gobble was wounded so badly that he was effectively 

knocked out of the fight and every one of the remaining six Soldiers in the 

OP had sustained wounds of varying degrees and severity.

Stafford crawled back to the protection of the southern part of the 

OP. There he watched Bogar single handedly put up a heroic defense. 

Although badly wounded and at times barely conscious, Stafford recalled, 

“Bogar had just set his SAW on top of the sandbags and he was just kind 

of spraying, going through SAW rounds pretty quick. I remember him 

loading and spraying, loading and spraying.”48 Stafford noted Bogar had 

fired about 600 rounds at the cyclic rate of fire when his “SAW jammed, 

basically it just got way overheated because he opened the feed tray cover 

and I remember him trying to get it open and it just looked like the bolt had 

welded itself inside the chamber. His barrel was just white hot.”49

Above Bogar in the Crow’s Nest, Ayers was firing complete bursts with 

the M240 machine gun. Stafford was impressed with his volume of fire, 

“I could also hear the 240 going off above me in the Crow’s Nest because 

Ayers was just ripping them apart. I could hear Rainey screaming at Ayers 

not to melt the barrel on the 240 and to control his fires.”50 Eventually, 

Ayers ran out of machine gun ammunition. In the heat of battle, he did not 

realize that ammunition for Stafford’s now unmanned M240 lay nearby.

McKaig remembered the continuing action from his perspective in the 

middle position, “We had to fire constantly just to get the upper hand . . . 

they were coming from the southeast about 50 to 75 meters [82 yards] 
155

away. They were all different ranges coming from all different directions. 

We had to stay low because the fire they were putting down on us was 

extremely effective.”51 At least one of the RPG rockets that exploded at the 

OP also set aflame material located around the fighting positions. McKaig 

was appalled, “Me and Ayers also had a fire from an explosion that caught 

some of our equipment on fire. I remember engaging the enemy and trying 

to kick out the fire at the same time. I remember telling myself ‘The Army 

never trained me for this kind of situation.’”52

With their M240 effectively out of action, Ayers and McKaig continued 

the fight at the Crow’s Nest with two M4 carbines. Their technique was to 

pop up together at intervals, fire six to nine rounds at the muzzle flashes 

ringing the OP, then drop down before the enemy could respond. Although 

scared, the pair continued this maneuver until enemy return fire struck and 

killed Ayers, who collapsed over his weapon. Now alone in the position, 

McKaig began to experience problems with his M4. “My weapon was 

overheating. I had shot about 12 magazines by this point already and it 

had only been about a half hour or so into the fight. I couldn’t charge my 

weapon and put another round in because it was too hot, so I got mad and 

threw my weapon down.”53 When he tried to use Ayers’ rifle, he discovered 

that an AK-47 round had disabled it in the same volley that had killed his 

squad mate.

Staff Sergeant Erik Aass

Figure 16. OP Topside from the east following the engagement, providing the 

enemy perspective of the position.
156

Out of weapons, McKaig remembered that he still had two Claymore 

antipersonnel mines emplaced just outside the OP. A quick glance revealed 

that at least one insurgent had exploited the lapse in gunfire and emerged 

from the dead ground to the southeast to breach the concertina obstacle 

and assault the OP. Without hesitation, McKaig detonated both mines, 

remembering, “The first one killed an insurgent that was in our wire. 

Sparks flew out of him, I don’t know if he had ammo or whatever on 

him, and it killed him instantly.”54 Now also in the southern position as 

the result of the concussive effects of numerous RPG blasts, Pitts was 

virtually incapacitated by multiple wounds to his arms and legs. He looked 

so bad that Bogar had paused briefly during his fight to put a tourniquet on 

the FO’s right leg.

Meanwhile, a badly wounded Stafford crawled back into the northern 

firing position and emptied the magazine of his 9-mm pistol over the 

sandbag wall. Then Stafford reached for his two Claymores, recalling, 

“I grabbed one clacker and I brought it down, took the safety off, and I 

started clacking and there was nothing. I clacked it probably 10 times and 

nothing went off.” The Claymore’s wires lay on top of the ground and 

almost certainly one of the many RPG blasts had severed them. Stafford 

continued, “Then I saw the other one and so I grabbed it and clacked it. I 

don’t know, the reports say [the] insurgents had turned them around and 

stuff like that, so I don’t know if they had come in and turned them around, 

if they were that ballsy, or if all the RPG blasts had made them fall down 

but when I clacked, it blew up and back at us.”55 Startled, Stafford grabbed 

an M4 carbine that was in the position (either Pitts or Zwilling’s) and began 

firing it. However, he recalled being hit almost immediately by enemy fire, 

“I probably got off four or five rounds before another RPG hit right in 

front of that wall and tore my hands up really bad. So I dropped the rifle 

and I was hurting really bad at this point . . . I’m bleeding out of both legs, 

arms, hands, stomach.”56 Stafford crawled back to the southern position 

where the other OP survivors had at this moment clustered. Bogar’s earlier 

suggestion that the troops at the OP build the southern position had almost 

certainly saved the lives of those who remained at Topside.57

Stafford told Pitts that Phillips was dead and that he thought Zwilling 

was likely gone as well.58 Despite his wounds, Pitts became furious on 

hearing this and returned to the now vacant northern firing position to 

reenter the fight. Pitts remembered, “I threw six or seven hand grenades 

into the dead space into the riverbed . . . I was cooking them off for 

about three or four seconds so they would blow up as soon as they got 

over the concertina wire and landed on the other side.”59 In between 
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lobbing grenades, he radioed the CP, described the situation at the OP, 

and requested urgent help. While he waited for assistance, Pitts tried to 

fire Stafford’s M240. His severe wounds, however, prevented him from 

aiming the machine gun effectively.60

Reinforcing OP Topside

Pitts did not have to wait long for help to arrive. The first reinforcements 

soon appeared from the main COP. This party consisted of the platoon 

leader, Brostrom and Specialist Jason Hovater. Recognizing that the OP 

had become the critical sector of the defense, and with Myer present to run 

the fight from the CP, Brostrom felt his place was at Topside. He told Myer, 

“We need to get up there.” Myer responded, “Okay, go ahead.”61 Although 

vegetation obscured a direct view of the OP from the CP area, the salvos 

of RPGs bursting around Topside were clearly visible from the main COP. 

With heavy fire also sweeping the open fields of the main position, Myer 

feared weakening the COP until he knew what was going on at the OP. 

Accordingly, he allowed Brostrom to move out with a small party. The 

platoon leader then ran to the nearby 2d Squad position to gather a force 

to accompany him. Following a short conversation with the squad leader, 

Staff Sergeant Jonathan Benton, Brostrom took the platoon medic, Hewitt, 

and Hovater with him. Hewitt was to treat the wounded known to be at 

the OP.62

The three paratroopers stepped out of the shelter of the 2d Squad 

fighting position to move to the OP but, as previously recounted, Hewitt 

only took a few steps before he was shot through the arm, receiving a 

wound serious enough that it knocked him out of the rest of the battle. 

Undaunted, Brostrom and Hovater continued forward, sprinting together 

through intense fire, moving between the bazaar and the hotel complex, 

and then scrambling up the terraces to the OP. Standing on the sleeping 

terrace, Brostrom shouted urgently to Pitts in the northern position to hand 

over the machine gun and ammunition, formerly manned by Zwilling and 

Stafford, which Pitts himself was too badly wounded to fire. Rainey then 

joined Brostrom and Hovater on the sleeping terrace. Pitts was the last to 

see any of them alive. Although it remains unclear exactly what happened 

next and what Brostrom’s intentions were, it appears that he wanted to 

place Rainey and Hovater with the M240 machine gun on the sleeping 

terrace at the sandbag wall where Phillips position had been. However, 

this position had no view of the bazaar/hotel area. Presumably, such a 

position could cover the movement of reinforcements to the OP and the 

evacuation of the wounded by suppressing the enemy in the bazaar and 

hotel areas.63
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However, insurgent activity interrupted Brostrom’s plans. Stafford 

distinctly recalled the ensuing engagement on the sleeping terrace:

I heard First Lieutenant Brostrom up at the OP talking. He was 

screaming at Rainey and I could hear them shouting back and 

forth together and I don’t remember who said it, but they said, 

“They’re inside the wire” and then I heard a bunch of gunfire 

and Rainey screaming, “He’s right behind the...sandbag! 

He’s right behind the...sandbag!” I don’t know if they were 

grenades or RPGs but there was a whole bunch of fire down 

on the sleeping terrace where we slept. Then all fire from the 

OP went quiet like there was no outgoing fire anymore.64

McKaig remembered the incident in nearly identical terms, stating, 

“There was an insurgent right on the other side of a rock near our sleeping 

area. I remember hearing people screaming and yelling that he was right 

over there. I don’t know if it was that insurgent or another insurgent that 

killed Brostrom and Hovater but shortly afterwards I couldn’t hear them 

anymore and they were probably killed.”65

While exactly what happened may never be known, Brostrom and 

Rainey were likely placing the M240 into action, while Hovater provided 

security, when they were surprised by insurgent small arms fire from near 

the large rock on Topside’s northwest corner. Brostrom was shot from the 

front as was Hovater, who was apparently reloading his weapon. Hovater 

had stayed and fought with Brostrom to the very end. Rainey was probably 

also killed at this time.66

The destruction of Brostrom’s team showed how close the enemy 

was to overrunning the OP. Immediately afterwards, Gobble, although 

seriously wounded, was still able to fight. He saw an enemy soldier 

“inside the wire. I quickly shot at him but he dove behind a large rock.”67

At the same time, several RPG rounds exploded nearly on top of Stafford. 

Meanwhile, Bogar was firing hundreds of rounds from his SAW directly 

above Stafford’s head. The insurgents were so close that Stafford could 

hear the recoil and cycling of their weapons as they were being fired. He 

would recall, “It sounded to me like they were right up on top of the hill, on 

top of the hill from the OP. That’s how close they sounded to me.”68 Enemy 

logistical difficulties may have saved the OP survivors. The AAF attackers 

may have run out of ammunition. McKaig recalled, “The insurgents then 

started throwing a whole bunch of rocks at us. They apparently mixed 

some fragmentary grenades in with them as well. As soon as it fell into 

my hole, my first reaction was to grab it and throw it out, or to jump out. 
159

Once I saw that they were rocks, though, I started yelling, “They’re rocks! 

They’re rocks!” They were trying to get us to jump out.”69 Whether this 

was a ruse to force the paratroopers out into the open or a desperate enemy 

attempt to keep fighting without grenades or ammunition is unclear. What 

is clear is that a new wave of fully armed attackers was soon present near 

the OP.

In addition to the threat posed by the insurgents literally yards away, 

the men at OP Topside were receiving fire from the buildings near their 

position. Specialist Bogar, known in the platoon as being utterly fearless, 

apparently attempted to suppress this incoming fire and began to engage 

insurgents in the bazaar and the hotel. McKaig and Pitts, aware of his 

courage, were not surprised to see him jump up and leave the OP to get 

closer to his targets. Although they did not know it at the time, Bogar was 

soon after killed by enemy fire outside the OP position.70

The situation at the OP remained perilous. Pitts had an M203 grenade 

launcher and an M4 carbine with him in his northern fighting position. 

Stafford’s M240 machine gun now lay on the sleeping terrace with no one 

to fire it. Phillips’ M21 sniper rifle lay twisted into a pretzel by his side 

on the sleeping terrace. At the Crow’s Nest, Ayers’ M240 was thought to 

be out of ammunition, Bogar’s SAW was jammed and needed a barrel 

change. One M4 carbine was destroyed and another irreparably jammed. 

With Gobble, Stafford, and Pitts badly wounded, only McKaig, armed 

with an M4, remained able to fight. He recalled: 

I only had two magazines left and I knew I needed to save 

them in case the insurgents jumped over the sandbags. We 

could hear their voices and they were still throwing rocks at 

us. I had hand grenades up in my position so I went back up 

there and threw two hand grenades to the southeast, then I 

threw another two to the northeast into the dead space where 

we were taking fire from.71

He then made a timely discovery:

I slid back down to where Sergeant Gobble and Stafford 

were, and by some miracle there was a LAW [light antitank 

weapon] rocket hanging in a tree nearby. We were taking fire 

about 40 meters [43 yards] to our southeast from these little 

mud huts that were there. I saw a bunch of muzzle flashes and 

movement over there, so I opened up the LAW and tried to 

fire it. It wouldn’t fire. Sergeant Gobble came to and told me 

to pull harder on the safety, so I pulled as hard as I could on 
160

the safety and then leaned out and fired the LAW rocket. I hit 

dead center where those guys were.72

This shot had an immediate effect on the enemy. McKaig remembered, 

“The shooting stopped after that for what seemed like an eternity but it 

was only about six seconds.”73

Gobble and McKaig decided that they had no choice but to abandon 

the OP. When Pitts did not respond to their shouts, they believed he had 

died of his wounds. Stafford had lost a lot of blood and desperately needed 

evacuation. Gobble pushed the rear (west) double wall of sandbags over 

and the three paratroopers began working their way through this gap and 

down to the sleeping terrace. Gobble checked on the three men lying still 

on the sleeping terrace but quickly realized they were dead. While doing 

this, an insurgent shot him at close range from behind a large rock inside the 

OP perimeter. Weaponless he was unable to return fire. Despite the wound, 

Gobble was able to move with the group that was evacuating the OP. 

Rather than follow the direct route that would take them close to insurgent 

positions in the bazaar, the three survivors veered to the southwest toward 

the 1st Squad’s TCP. This movement was not easy for the wounded men. 

Stafford, in particular, had a difficult time getting through the concertina, 

briefly becoming entangled in the wire. Exhausted, he thought, “I was 

pretty sure I was going to die right there.”74 Stafford finally got through 

the obstacle and descended, rolling down the terraces, and practically fell 

into Samaroo’s arms. “Sergeant Sam shouted, ‘What the hell’s going on in 

the OP?’” Specialist Stafford gasped out, “They’re all dead, Sergeant.”75

Samaroo moved the wounded men back to the protection of the TCP and 

began treating their wounds.76

What the OP survivors at the TCP did not realize was that Pitts was still 

alive at the position. Rainey had left his M203 grenade launcher with Pitts 

when he took the M240. Despite his wounds, Pitts immediately brought 

this weapon into action, recalling, “I started shooting [40-mm grenades] 

straight up into the air so they’d drop in as close as they could on one 

side. I was putting them right where I put the grenades and hoped the arc 

would bring them down into the riverbed.”77 After he threw all his hand 

grenades and fired all 40-mm rounds he had, Pitts noticed “It was quiet and 

nobody was shooting but me.”78 He soon realized he was alone at the OP. 

Fortunately as the FO, he had a radio and it still worked. Pitts remembered 

that he “got on the radio and told them that everybody was either dead or 

gone except for me and that if they didn’t send anyone up here, the position 

was going to fall. I let them know that the enemy was really close.”79 The 

insurgents were, in fact, so close that Pitts could plainly hear them talking 

outside the OP perimeter. From his squad’s position, Benton remembered 
161

hearing Pitts’ call over the platoon radio net, “Sergeant [Pitts] said in a 

hushed tone that he was hit, laying down behind cover, and could hear 

[insurgents] walking within 10 meters (11 yards) of his position.”80 Pitts 

prepared to make a last stand with an M4 carbine.

The 2d Platoon, by standard operating procedure, routinely designated 

a platoon QRF to reinforce whatever position required assistance in the 

event of an attack. With the OP situation unclear and the problems at the 

mortar pit and TOW position, Myer and Dzwik had not yet activated the 

QRF when the OP went quiet. However, when Samaroo noticed the lack 

of firing at the OP from his position, he decided on his own initiative to 

send reinforcements to the OP. Taking two squad members with him, 

Specialist Tyler Hanson and Specialist Adam Hamby, he began moving 

towards Topside. However, he almost immediately encountered the three 

evacuees from the OP: Gobble, McKaig, and Stafford who he promptly 

brought back down to the TCP position.81

With the wounded trio being treated, Samaroo then organized a new 

force from paratroopers who had begun assembling at the TCP to assist 

the OP. The new group consisted of Samaroo himself, Specialist Michael 

Denton from his 1st Squad, Sergeant Israel Garcia of the 3d Squad, and 

Private First Class Jacob Sones from the 2d Squad. The latter two had 

sprinted from the main position to the TCP when they heard about the 

desperate situation of the OP. Before moving across the open terraces to 

the OP, Samaroo carefully scanned the hillside where the OP was located 

for any enemy activity. He recalled, “That’s when I engaged a man, shot 

him, he was directly on top of the OP shooting over a large boulder into the 

OP.”82 Samaroo and his three men then ascended the hill. Their vigorous 

counterattack drove away the AAF who had entered OP Topside’s 

perimeter, regained control of the position, and permanently secured it in 

American hands.

For a brief period, Pitts had been alone at the OP. At this time, 

except where Pitts remained in the northern fighting position requesting 

assistance, the AAF controlled the OP but this control was tenuous at 

best. Throughout, Pitts remained capable of fighting. Nearby lay two 

M240 machine guns, the LRAS3, a number of rifles, a radio antenna, and 

considerable personal gear. When Samaroo’s force arrived, those weapons 

remained undisturbed on the ground of the position, suggesting that any 

enemy occupation of the OP had been temporary at best.

The scene that Samaroo’s group found at Topside was “chaotic”. The 

1st Squad leader reacted quickly, finding Pitts and putting Ayers’ M240 

back into action at the Crow’s Nest. Samaroo’s men quickly determined 
162

that, other than Pitts, the five casualties present at the OP (Phillips, Rainey, 

Ayers, Hovater, and Brostrom), were all killed in action. Samaroo’s 

force had arrived just in time. The enemy had regrouped and apparently, 

rearmed. The AAF once again began to place heavy fire on the OP. One 

of Samaroo’s paratroopers remembered being engaged “from all four 

cardinal directions. They used mortars, recoilless rifles, RPGs, RPKs, 

PKMs, AKs, and anything they could get a hold of. I can’t even tell you 

how many RPGs hit, there were so many of them.”83 Soon, another wave 

of RPG rockets struck. Denton recalled:

That’s when my position was hit by, I believe, two RPGs with 

a third hitting inside the actual OP. . . . The blast blew me 

outside of my bunker, causing me to land on my head and neck, 

then the rest of my body hit the ground. I lost my weapon in 

the process. After that, I started crawling to get away from the 

position by a few feet and I could hear everyone screaming, 

including my squad leader [Staff Sergeant Samaroo], that he 

had been hit.84

Pitts remembered the exact moment when the renewed attack began:

[Sergeant] Garcia was pulling security in the middle area and 

keeping a lookout. Sones was treating me against the north 

wall. I was sitting down and he was bandaging me up. That’s 

when another volley of RPGs and hand grenades came in. I 

was hit again, as was Sones. That’s when Garcia took a direct 

hit from an RPG. I thought he was dead from his wounds. I 

knew Samaroo and Denton were wounded and I could hear 

Samaroo screaming that he was hit. I don’t remember much 

after that. I do know that I crawled over to Garcia and talked 

to him some. Sones and I crawled into the southern position 

and Samaroo and Denton jumped in as well. I told them that 

Garcia was messed up. I don’t remember who did it but one 

of them dragged Garcia into our position. Samaroo needed a 

radio so I got a multiband inter/intra team radio (MBITR) up 

so we could talk [to the COP]. He told them we needed more 

people and that they were wounded.85

Pitts, saw that, despite the arrival of reinforcements, the state of affairs 

at the OP was still dire. All the defenders who were still able to fight were 

now wounded. He observed that, “Denton started pulling security to the 

east, despite being hurt and Samaroo was doing the same toward the north 

and west. Sones was pretty shell-shocked and Denton’s hand was pretty 

messed up.”86
163

The situation became even worse. The wounded Denton recalled, “I 

started looking for a weapon for myself and found one. I couldn’t fire 

with my right hand, it was hard to stand because both my legs had been 

hit, but I could stand to pull security to the east where we were still taking 

fire from the most, where they had snuck up on us, and tried to run us 

over from.”87 As Pitts had observed, an RPG had struck Garcia directly in 

the abdomen, below his body armor. His wounds were fatal, although he 

remained conscious for a few moments. Pitts crawled over to him and held 

his hand until Garcia died.88

When Garcia was hit, he fell onto his radio mike, fixing it in the on 

position and accidentally jamming the platoon frequency. This caused a 

“hot mike” situation which hindered platoon communications for a few 

minutes until the problem rectified itself. At the CP, Dzwik was confused by 

the jamming of the radio signal during such a critical time and recognized 

that he did not have an accurate picture of where his men were located. He 

quickly decided personally to lead a fourth force to the OP, first gathering 

Phillips (the mortar section chief) and Benton (the 2d Squad leader) as his 

subordinate leaders. To this force he quickly added Aass (the company 

RTO), Queck (mortars), Scantlin (2d Squad, acting as the platoon medic), 

Grimm (TOW squad), and Specialist Aaron Davis (TOW squad), and 

Marines Oakes and Jones, who brought along their M240 machine gun.89

Dzwik’s force took the less direct route through the 1st Squad’s TCP 

that provided greater cover and concealment from enemy fire. From the 

TCP, Specialist Reid Grapes, knowledgeable of the exact enemy situation 

at the time, guided Dzwik the rest of the way to the OP, avoiding known 

enemy positions and fields of fire. To obscure enemy observation, Grapes 

threw a yellow smoke grenade into the open area near the hotel that had 

to be crossed. As this group ascended the terraces toward the OP, Apache 

attack helicopters appeared overhead.

Arrival of Attack Helicopter Support

About an hour into the fight, two AH-64 Apache attack helicopters 

arrived over Wanat and immediately went into action under Myer’s 

direction. The Apache with the callsign “Hedgerow 50” executed its 

first 30-mm gun run at 0523 against the north side of the brushy area 

immediately adjoining OP Topside. As the gunships approached the OP, 

the gunner in the lead Apache remarked, “There is a guy right on the other 

side of the trees.”90 The aviators immediately fired their cannon at the 

insurgent. Although he was concealed from normal view, the Apache’s 

thermal sights clearly saw him within the brush.91 This attack was very 
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close to the OP. First Lieutenant Michael Moad, who would arrive at the 

OP later in the day as part of a larger QRF, remarked on the proximity 

of this fire to the 2d Platoon members at the OP, “I observed the 30-mm 

cannon strafe marks in the ground just one-two meters outside the OP 

itself just in front of the sandbag defensive wall, which was ultimately 

inside the wire about 10 meters from the sandbags.”92 The trailing AH64, “Hedgerow 53,” followed its leader and oriented on a green smoke 

grenade thrown by Samaroo’s force, placed about 50 HE cannon rounds 

into the dead ground 50 yards to the east of the OP, an area from which 

Denton remembered most of the enemy firing coming at the time. These 

initial gun runs against the enemy positions around OP Topside came just 

over one hour after Captain Myer’s first radio call to the TF Rock TOC 

requesting support.93

Hedgerow 50 and Hedgerow 53 were assigned to 2d Squadron, 17th 

Cavalry (2-17th Cav), part of TF Out Front based out of Forward Operating 

Base (FOB) Fenty at Jalalabad. The squadron provided aviation support 

to TF Bayonet. Squadron commander Lieutenant Colonel John Lynch, a 

highly experienced OH-58 pilot, commented:

My task force at that time consisted of 14 Kiowa Warriors, 

which was one of my organic troops, as well as a platoon out 

of 2d Troop. I had an Apache company-minus with six AH64s [Apache Attack helicopters]. I had a Chinook platoon with 

four CH-47s, a MEDEVAC detachment with three forward 

support medical teams, three UH-60 air ambulances, a Black 

Hawk assault platoon with six UH-60L, and an unmanned 

aerial vehicle detachment with four Hunter UAVs. I also had 

a Pathfinder detachment.94

Similar to many other Army units in Afghanistan, TF Out Front was 

stretched thin. The squadron had to cover the entire TF Bayonet battle 

space that consisted of four provinces. The rugged terrain of northeast 

Afghanistan also constrained operations. The OH-58D Kiowa Warriors 

could only operate below 6,000 feet, which severely limited their use 

in Nuristan. To support TF Rock, they were primarily used in the river 

valleys in Konar Province. For contingencies, the six AH-64 Apaches 

provided a continuous 24 hour QRF of two gunships, to which Hedgerows 

50 and 53 belonged on the morning of 13 July. The Apache company also 

provided a two gunship escort for any cargo helicopters flying into certain 

areas, including the Waygal and Korengal Valleys. Battle damage and the 

inevitable mechanical breakdowns exacerbated the limitations derived 

from operating only six gunships over an immense geographic area. When 
165

mission, maintenance, and flight crew constraints permitted, the Apaches 

were employed on deterrence and direct attack missions.

As mentioned above, on the night of 12-13 July, 2-17th Cav had a two 

helicopter Apache QRF ready at Jalalabad. This QRF was in direct support 

of TF Bayonet and the positioning of the Apaches at Jalalabad was routine 

and reflected the general situation as perceived by both the TF Bayonet

and TF Rock chains of command. There were two UH-60 Blackhawks also 

on call as MEDEVACs. Accordingly, at the time of the attack on Wanat, 

the closest AH-64 helicopters to Wanat—in the air or on the ground—were 

at FOB Fenty in Jalalabad, approximately 40 miles away, or roughly 30 

minutes flight time under normal conditions.95

At 0430, 2-17th Cav was performing a routine QRF shift change at 

FOB Fenty when the alert for the Wanat support mission was received. 

This alert came only five minutes after Myer’s first call to the TF Rock

TOC. The Apache shift change was normally scheduled so that the 

helicopters would be ready to respond to any incidents at dawn, the most 

common time of day for the AAF to launch an attack. Within 23 minutes 

after receiving the alert, the two Apaches were warmed up and in the air. 

During that time interval, TF Rock reported that the force at Wanat had 

sustained three wounded, and TF Out Front immediately alerted the two 

MEDEVAC helicopters. At 0453, the flight surgeon recorded the departure 

of the MEDEVAC helicopters with the Apaches. The shift change caused 

no delay in response by the Apaches. In fact, two sets of aircrew were 

available for the mission. The Apaches, however, required time to warm 

up their engines and prepare for the mission. The attack helicopters also 

had to escort the MEDEVAC Blackhawks to the Camp Blessing area.96

Once they departed the Jalalabad area, the helicopters made the flight 

to the Waygal Valley in 29 minutes, close to the usual flight time of 30 

minutes. However, the attack helicopters had to wait for the completion on 

an ongoing field artillery mission in the same airspace before proceeding 

to Wanat. The tight confines of the Waygal Valley forced approaching 

helicopters to fly directly over Camp Blessing from where the artillery 

was firing. Once the airspace was clear, the Apaches flew directly to 

the battlefield, while the two MEDEVAC helicopters remained at Camp 

Blessing until the Apaches cleared the way.97

The arrival of the Apaches had an immediate and decisive impact on 

the situation at OP Topside. Their cannon fire into the dead space to the 

north and east of the OP suppressed or destroyed insurgent forces there. 

The pressure on Samaroo’s defenders quickly slackened. Still, the fight 
166

continued with the stubborn enemy. Insurgent fire now came from a greater 

distance and became, accordingly, far less accurate. Because of this, the 

AAF adopted the tactic of aiming their RPGs at the trees near the OP from 

their firing positions several hundred yards away. Aass noted, “I remember 

somebody saying they were shooting the RPGs up into the trees. I think 

they were trying to have the RPGs explode over us and rain down shrapnel 

on top of us.”98 Despite the effectiveness of the Apache gun runs, the OP 

position remained a dangerous place for the troops fighting there. RPG 

shrapnel badly wounded Davis. Dzwik received a minor wound in his arm 

from another RPG. Marine Oakes also received a shrapnel wound. The 

AAF gunners were determined and would remain in their firing positions 

for at least two hours after the beginning of the attack, until intense attack 

helicopter and CAS strikes finally drove them away.99

Shortly after the appearance of the Apaches, Myer went to the OP, 

running up past the bazaar. He wanted to get a firsthand look at the situation 

at the OP, particularly the number of casualties requiring evacuation. 

Communications between the OP and the CP was still poor. When he 

arrived with one of the QRFs, Aass had found multiple hand mikes out of 

operation, all riddled with bullet holes. At the OP, Myer quickly grasped 

the urgency of the situation and requested the immediate dispatch of the 

MEDEVAC flights. While at Topside, the company commander realized 

how close the fighting there had been when he came across a grenade 

that hadn’t exploded. He recalled, “I reached down and threw it about 20 

meters out of the pit. I remember seeing the spoon sticking out of it.”100

Indirect fires, CAS, and Apache gun runs had now effectively 

suppressed the insurgent fire at the main position, freeing more troops to 

help at the OP. Specialist Scantlin, the substitute medic, made the climb 

and began treating the wounded. McKaig also got back into the fight and 

began carrying boxes of machine gun ammunition up to the OP. The most 

desperate fighting at Topside had ended by 0630, a little over two hours 

after the opening shots and one hour after the arrival of the Apaches.101

By this time, the bodies of the nine paratroopers killed in action had been 

recovered. One of the Apache helicopter pilots expressed the sentiments 

of every American on the ground and in the air when the grim call came 

over the radio frequency, “We will have additional fallen hero missions 

to follow. I have a total of nine KIA.”102 The pilot then swore, “GODDAMN-IT!!!”103
167

Arrival of the 1st Platoon Quick Reaction Force 

On 13 July 2008 Chosen Company’s 1st Platoon at Camp Blessing 

was the designated TF Rock QRF, the unit selected to react to any tactical 

situation in the Rock area of operations that required reinforcement. At 

0430, the TF Rock TOC alerted the platoon for immediate movement 

to Wanat. Led by First Lieutenant Aaron R. Thurman and his platoon 

sergeant, Sergeant First Class William S. Stockard, the platoon left Camp 

Blessing at 0515 in four HMMWVs. One vehicle was armed with an M2 

.50-caliber machine gun, two others had Mk-19 grenade launchers, and 

the fourth an M240 machine gun. First Sergeant Scott Beeson, the senior 

noncommissioned officer (NCO) in Chosen Company, accompanied the 

QRF. The platoon’s departure was delayed by the need to load additional 

ammunition into the HMMWVs. Stockard noted, “The sun was starting to 

come up so it wasn’t too dark. We didn’t have NODs (night observation 

devices) mounted or anything. We could see fine.”104 The QRF moved 

up the road from Camp Blessing as quickly as was prudent, expecting 

ambushes and IEDs along the way. The platoon used its heavy weapons 

systems to fire into every ravine and draw along the way, as well as other 

known or suspected ambush positions. There was no enemy contact and 

the platoon made it to Wanat in about 45 minutes, arriving at the American 

perimeter at 0601. They had made it in half the usual time required to get 

from Camp Blessing to Wanat.105

Upon arrival the 1st Platoon found an extremely confused situation. 

Fires burned at the site of the TOW HMMWV, the HESCO pile, and in the 

stall in the bazaar. The smoke from these various fires drifted to the east 

and pooled over the COP and road, obscuring visibility. OP Topside was 

still under heavy fire and the Apache helicopter pilots observed weapons 

flashes all around the valley.106 Communications between the QRF and 

Myer at COP Kahler were spotty at best, obscured by both the terrain 

and the combat action that the main COP was still experiencing. Heavy 

enemy fire continued to pour into the COP from the bazaar, hotel complex, 

and mosque. As the QRF approached the COP, only a few paratroopers 

remained at the 1st Squad TCP as most of them had moved to reinforce OP 

Topside. The four HMMWVs stopped briefly at the TCP. A wave of small 

arms and RPG fire welcomed the lead QRF truck to Wanat.107

In response to this fire, the QRF went immediately into action. Staff 

Sergeant Kyle Silvernale, one of the 1st Platoon squad leaders, asked 

for a situation update from Hissong who was manning the TCP. Hissong 

recalled that his report was less than helpful:
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When they arrived, I ran from my position to link up with 

them. The first person I saw was Staff Sergeant Silvernale. 

I don’t remember the conversation but he later told me that 

when I got to him, he asked me where the enemies were. He 

said I just looked around and didn’t really answer him so he 

asked me again and I said, “I didn’t know.” He said “What do 

you mean you don’t know” and my response was “. . . they’re 

everywhere man.”108

The 1st Squad’s HMMWV blocked the road and had to be moved for 

the convoy to proceed. To augment the depleted manpower at the TCP, 1st 

Platoon dropped two men there. Additionally, the 1st Platoon medic who 

had accompanied the QRF climbed out of his HMMWV and immediately 

ran to the casualty collection point (CCP) located at the CP to assist with 

the casualties being evacuated to that site. Beeson, accompanied by an 

RTO, also exited his HMMWV and went to the CP to check in with Myer 

to ascertain where his services were most needed. After a quick shouted 

conversation, Beeson, his RTO, and the medic immediately turned around 

and sprinted toward OP Topside.109

Back on the road, the platoon leader, Thurman, in his first combat 

action, acted quickly. He split his small force into two squads, one under 

his personal direction that he immediately led toward the bazaar, and 

a second ad hoc squad under Stockard that followed Beeson up to OP 

Topside. Two of the HMMWVs remained at the TCP as a reserve, while 

the other two, under Thurman’s personal leadership, advanced up to the 

center of Wanat. By this time, the firing at the TCP was nowhere near as 

severe as it had been just a few minutes earlier but several times it swelled 

and the fighting again became furious. One of the new arrivals at the TCP 

described receiving fire from a compound on the west side of the town and 

the reaction of the ANA troops:

As I was pulling security . . . I heard incoming small arms 

whizzing by. Specialist [not identified] yelled to me that the 

fire was coming from the compound to the west. He informed 

me of tracers coming out of the compound, so I traversed my 

turret and returned fire once I recognized the source of the 

fire. Ten meters to our north on the west side of the road was 

an ANA bunker. Four ANA were inside. They were shooting 

and taking fire from the same compound. As I fired into the 

windows, the ANA would fire an RPG into that same spot. 

Contact [enemy fire] with the compound was over in roughly 

10 minutes.110
169

The other 1st Platoon member at the TCP related a nearly identical 

story about the soldiers at the ANA TCP, “We began taking small arms 

fire from a compound to the west. Corporal [not identified] returned fire 

with the M240B into the compound. Four ANA soldiers were also at the 

checkpoint and began firing with RPGs and PKM[s] into the compound. 

After about 10 minutes of continuous fire into the compound, we stopped 

receiving small arms [fire].”111

The other two HMMWVs drove aggressively forward, stopping just 

north of the bazaar close to the mosque and hotel/restaurant complex. 

While passing through the area on the way to the OP, Beeson noticed that 

the forceful movement by the two heavily armed HMMWVs caught the 

insurgents in the nearby buildings off guard. To capitalize on the enemy 

confusion, Thurman ordered an immediate assault. Supported by the 

firepower of the trucks, he led a dismounted charge into the bazaar. The 

driver of the lead truck, which mounted a Mk-19, described what occurred 

as he drove his vehicle past the bazaar:

I drove my truck through the bazaar on the road to the north, 

past the hotel and mosque. I parked the truck using a rock 

wall as cover and blocked the road with the truck. Specialist 

[unknown] shot a round with his M4 at the building to 

northeast doing a recon by fire. Immediately after his shot 

the truck came under PKM fire, Specialist [unknown] shot 

the Mk-19 at the house and then a LAW when the ammo 

can was empty . . . I opened up with my M249 at the house 

and received effective SAF [small arms fire] from the house. 

Sergeant [unknown] handed me an AT-4 [antiarmor weapon] 

to shoot and took my M249 [SAW]. I got down off the road 

onto a lower terrace and shot the AT-4 at the house and hit the 

bottom floor. Specialist [unknown] then handed me another 

AT-4 he had in the turret for me to shoot, I went to the side 

of the truck and shot again at the house and knocked out a 

bottom floor window, at that point we stopped taking fire from 

the house.112

Despite this heavy fire suppression, the squad continued to receive 

sporadic fire from other insurgent locations near the hotel and on the 

eastern outskirts of the town. The HMMWVs were highly effective in 

supporting the assault. Dismounted enemy infantry could not stand up 

to the American firepower. As one Soldier recalled, “We engaged [the 

enemy] heavily with [the vehicle-mounted] M240 and .50-cal. After about 

30 to 40 rounds I [could] no longer see any [enemy] trying to maneuver 
170

in the alley.”113 At first, the enemy tried to mount a defense with volleys 

of RPG rockets. Hissong at the TCP observed Thurman’s assault, “1st 

Platoon returned [the enemy fire] with a massive amount of fire from their 

machine guns. It seemed like they drove the enemy out of the bazaar by 

the COP.”114 Thurman’s assault was a huge success. Aass watched the fight 

from the OP, “I remember [Staff] Sergeant Silvernale from 1st Platoon 

getting on the radio and announcing that he was going to clear the hotel. I 

made sure nobody was firing at the hotel and he went in there with two or 

three other guys and cleared the hotel.”115

Silvernale participated in the clearing operations as part of Thurman’s 

assault force. While waiting to move into the bazaar, he was wounded by 

an RPG explosion. Nevertheless he still led his men into the bazaar and 

the hotel:

Moving to the northern end of the bazaar behind the second 

truck, I noticed a fresh blood trail leading through an 

overhang between the hotel and the building just north of 

the hotel. Pushing past the building just north of the hotel 

my element came into heavy enemy contact once again. We 

started taking effective direct small arms fire from the north 

and east. Multiple enemy positions to the east of our position, 

one directly behind the hotel. . . . I moved into the bazaar and 

started clearance operations throughout the bazaar. Starting at 

the 2d floor northeast corner of the hotel, clearing a foot hold, 

I moved through the northeastern most room to the window 

in order to throw [fragmentary grenades] down on the enemy 

position in a flanking maneuver.116

Silvernale remembered that while moving through the hotel, he and 

his squad came across an ax. They used it and a shotgun they had brought 

to break down doors. This group successfully cleared the building of 

insurgents.117

While the fight in the bazaar and hotel was going on, Stockard led the 

other half of the QRF up to reinforce OP Topside. By this time the OP was 

still receiving heavy enemy fire from a distance but was no longer under 

the threat of a direct ground assault. The insurgents continued to place 

small arms and RPG fire in the vicinity of the American position from 

at least three overlooking hilltops. Closer to the OP, additional enemy 

forces remained in various hidden folds of terrain surrounding the site. 

The nearest such hilltop was a house approximately 100 to 150 yards to 

the southeast and above the OP, the next closest one was a large compound 
171

across the Wayskawdi Creek ravine 300 yards to the northeast, and a third 

was a large compound to the south of the TCP and COP. Beeson was now 

at OP Topside:

We just continued to hold our position under fire. We then 

took an RPG right above my head that hit the rock and a tree 

and forced me to the ground. Right after that, either an RPG 

or a grenade landed in the CP area and blew up cutting the 

LRAS3 in two pieces and wounding [three men].118

To help eliminate the insurgents that remained close by, Stockard 

threw a number of fragmentation grenades to his front. The enemy fire at 

the OP died down shortly thereafter. 

While the insurgents kept pressure on the OP, Thurman’s group 

continued to fight a determined enemy. The driver of one of the HMMWVs 

remembered:

I was going to turn the truck around in case we needed to 

move quickly. As soon as I turned the truck around a volley 

of RPGs started hitting inside the wire [just to the west of the 

road]. First Lieutenant Thurman jumped back in the truck. I 

looked to my left and saw an RPG explode about five meters 

from my truck. I told First Lieutenant Thurman, “Sir, those 

RPGs are RIGHT here!” He said, “I know, drive!”119

The driver had vivid memories of the intensity of the enemy fire, “A 

bunch of RPGs started blowing up to our 9 o’clock. Maybe 10 to 15 RPGs. 

I’ve never seen that many RPGs hit at once before. It literally took my 

breath away to see.”120 In addition to the RPG rockets, enemy small arms 

fire also remained intense. One of the vehicle gunners called out that he had 

identified insurgents between the TCP and OP Topside. The vehicle driver 

remembered, “We engaged that area with small arms, frags [fragmentation 

hand grenades], and Mk-19. We just couldn’t seem to kill all of them.”121

After Silvernale’s squad had cleared the hotel and bazaar complex, the 

remaining insurgents were out in the open. Thurman directed Silvernale 

to throw yellow smoke grenades onto identified enemy positions to mark 

them for attacks by the Apaches. The attack helicopters responded quickly 

with multiple gun runs, which came within several yards of the friendly 

positions. However, the Apache gunners took advantage of the targeting 

capabilities of their cannon system to provide precision fires that avoided 

hitting the Americans. The attack helicopters followed up the effects of 

this fire by shooting Hellfire missiles into the buildings within the village 

of Wanat from which the insurgents had been firing. Then they shifted their 
172

fires towards the enemy positions that had been threatening OP Topside. At 

0639 the Apaches fired their first Hellfire missile into the large compound 

to the northeast of the COP across the stream valley. Although fire poured 

out of the building, the insurgents continued to use it. Accordingly, at 0820 

in response to the terse exasperated command from the ground, “level 

the buildings,” an Apache fired a second Hellfire into the ruined structure 

which finished the job.122

The wave of nearly continuous Apache gun and missile runs began to 

slowly but perceptibly weaken the insurgent resistance. Within four hours 

of the battle’s start, the insurgents began to disengage. The balance in the 

fight had initially been tipped in favor of the beleaguered 2d Platoon when 

the two Hedgerow Apaches had arrived one hour after the battle began. 

By 0830, after the arrival of the 1st Platoon QRF, the Coalition forces had 

clearly regained the initiative.

The MEDEVACs at Wanat

The first of the two MEDEVAC helicopters, which had been waiting at 

Camp Blessing, landed at Wanat between 0552 and 0605. The MEDEVACs 

used two landing zones (LZs) at Wanat. The first was the designated 

LZ at the southern end of the open field at COP Kahler, the second was 

an impromptu LZ set up on a terrace to the south of OP Topside. The 

Blackhawk with the callsign Dustoff 35 went to the LZ at COP Kahler and 

Dustoff 36 landed near the OP.123

Dustoffs 35 and 36 were from the 1st Platoon, C Company, 6th 

Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment, stationed at FOB Fenty at Jalalabad 

Airfield. Chief Warrant Officer 3 Christopher Hill commanded Dustoff 

35 and Chief Warrant Officer 2 Wayne McDonald commanded Dustoff 

36. A flight surgeon, Captain Justin Madill, was also on Dustoff 36. As 

previously mentioned, the two Blackhawks accompanied the Apaches 

from Jalalabad as far as Camp Blessing. After the situation stabilized a 

little at Wanat, the two aircraft proceeded up the Waygal Valley to the 

battlefield.

Normally a flight surgeon would not be onboard a MEDEVAC flight 

but Madill stated, “I knew that when both MEDEVACs are needed there 

may be multiple patients. I also knew that 0437 local was an unlikely 

time to receive a routine MEDEVAC call.”124 Heavy firing still ringed 

COP Kahler as the MEDEVAC flights headed in. Madill remembered 

he “heard our pilots communicating with the Apache crews who were 

engaging a large enemy force on the east side of the valley.”125 This was 

the enemy force that was located to the east of the OP and still attacking 
173

OP Topside. He also recalled, “En route to the COP Kahler OP I heard the 

ground element (Chosen 6 [Myer]) guiding our pilots to their location. I 

heard machine gun fire during the ground elements’ radio transmissions 

and saw plumes of smoke on the ground in the area of COP Kahler from 

explosions.”126

Both MEDEVAC helicopters reported observing AAF on the ground 

in close proximity to the LZs as they arrived over Wanat. The ground 

troops marked the LZs with violet smoke and VS-17 ground recognition 

panels. McDonald, in Dustoff 36, recalled the dramatic sights and smells 

he witnessed once he landed, stating, “The perimeter of the LZ was on fire 

to the north. There was yelling and screaming coming from the back of the 

aircraft. I could smell the gunpowder that was spent from rounds expended 

in the firefight.”127

As Dustoff 35 came in to land at the LZ south of COP Kahler, its 

pilots had trouble identifying the landing site because heavy smoke from 

the nearby TOW fire obscured it. The smoke and dust was so thick that 

Dustoff 35 needed two passes before it could safely put down. The aircraft 

received ground fire on its approach and landing, to include one noticeable 

“boom” that rattled the helicopter frame. Staff Sergeant Atwon Thompkins, 

part of the aircraft crew, remembered that he had seen an insurgent within 

“three yards” of the southern concertina wire perimeter.128

After Dustoff 35 loaded five wounded men and departed, the second 

MEDEVAC helicopter, Dustoff 36, came forward. Because of airspace 

management issues, only one MEDEVAC aircraft at a time could operate 

at Wanat. Dustoff 36 approached the OP where it had been directed to 

perform a hoist evacuation. This entailed the use of a heavy anchor shaped 

piece of equipment that could be winched down from the helicopter. The 

hoist could only retrieve one man at a time and required the helicopter 

to hover over the scene while the equipment was operated. Although the 

paratroopers at the OP threw a smoke grenade, the pilots were unable to 

identify it, and the helicopter had to turn to the east and attempt another 

landing. On their second approach, the crewmembers were able to observe 

another smoke grenade and the pilots took the initiative to land instead on 

a single terrace to the south of the OP that was just large and flat enough. 

This eliminated the need for the hoist and the dangerous stationary hover.129

Dustoff 36 landed and the crew began the arduous task of loading 

the wounded while crossing uneven terrain. Staff Sergeant Matthew S. 

Kinney (the flight medic) and Staff Sergeant William R. Helfrich (the crew 

chief) were the first crewmembers off the helicopter and had to traverse 
174

a series of “four to six foot tall terraces” with the wounded to return to 

the helicopter. Kinney remembered simply stepping through the single 

strand of concertina wire around the OP. One man pushed and the other 

one pulled and it was exhausting work in body armor. The flight medic 

further recalled that by the end of the day, “I was smoked.”130

Madill followed the two NCOs, taking in the scene of the battlefield 

near the OP. Stopping at a machine gun position he observed Garcia lying 

on the ground and realized that he could do nothing for him. On the terrace 

below lay three other dead men from the 2d Platoon. Madill recalled, “A 

US Soldier approached me and I asked him if there were any other patients. 

He responded, ‘No.’ I pointed to the KIA and asked ‘are they dead?’ He 

looked at me and stated, ‘they’re gone.’”131 However, there were other 

wounded to be evacuated from the OP area. Dustoff 36 ultimately departed 

with four wounded men from the OP location, including Pitts, the only 

remaining member of the original garrison who was still at the OP.132

Of the dead who had fought at OP Topside, two Soldiers were found 

away from the OP. Specialist Gunnar Zwilling was found two terraces 

down about 15 yards from the center of the OP. Myer found Specialist 

Jason Bogar beyond the sleeping terrace to the northwest of the OP in the 

direction of the nearest buildings.133

Both MEDEVAC helicopters took their patients to the medical facility 

at Camp Wright in Asadabad, less than 15 miles away. Following these 

first flights, two additional MEDEVAC helicopters, Dustoff 34 and Profit 

71, joined them for subsequent medical evacuations. All four helicopters 

repeatedly returned to Wanat. Chief Warrant Officer 4 Joseph Callaway 

was the pilot-in-charge of Dustoff 34 with Chief Warrant Officer 2 

Nicholas Dance as co-pilot. When the Asadabad medical station reached 

capacity, these Blackhawks took casualties from Wanat to a larger facility 

at Jalalabad.134

After the first two MEDEVAC flights departed Wanat, Profit 71 

arrived. Captain Kevin King, the physician’s assistant onboard, recalled, 

“As we came in for a landing, I heard the pilot ask someone on the ground 

where we should land the helicopter, the shaky voice on the other end 

said, ‘Don’t care, just land.’”135 The crew was able to take advantage 

of a momentary lapse in the fighting and landed at the LZ to the south 

of the main COP. They quickly loaded five wounded men including the 

badly burned ANA soldier. Initially intended for Asadabad, the flight was 

diverted to Jalalabad because King became seriously concerned with the 

condition of the Afghan. Chief Warrant Officer 2 Isaac Smith, one of the 

pilots, remembered:
175

That was when Captain King said, “How long is it going to 

take us to get back to Jalalabad Airfield?” I informed him of an 

approximate time, 20 minutes or so, and he said, “It needs to 

be as fast as possible because this guy in the back isn’t looking 

very good at all.” Our escorts were the close combat elements 

so they couldn’t keep up with us at this point. I instructed 

Captain Minnie to go to 100 percent torque on both engines 

and fly as fast as possible. I then informed [the Apaches] that 

if we didn’t get back now, there’s a heavy possibility that 

one of the Soldiers would die. So, we flew back, single ship, 

through the Konar, back into JAF.136

King simply noted of his patient’s deteriorating condition, “I needed to 

get him out of there, so I told the pilot to put his foot down and he did.”137

Throughout the day, additional MEDEVAC helicopters rotated 

through Wanat, first evacuating the wounded, and then the bodies of those 

who had died on the battlefield. Prophet 71, Dustoff 35, and Dustoff 36 

all returned at least twice to Wanat. Stockard remembered, “There was so 

many MEDEVAC birds that came in, I lost count how many birds actually 

came in that day.”138 Soldiers on the ground loading their wounded 

comrades, continuously changing priorities as more seriously wounded 

troopers were shifted to be placed sooner on the aircraft. Aboard the 

helicopters, the medics were far too absorbed in the effort to save the badly 

wounded men, who were covered in blood and dirt, to even learn their 

identities. Additional UH-60 utility helicopters were later pressed into 

service as impromptu MEDEVACs. All this resulted in a certain amount 

of administrative confusion concerning the order of evacuation but all the 

wounded were evacuated according to the severity of their condition. No 

more paratroopers died at Wanat after the arrival of the first MEDEVAC 

helicopter.139

In total, MEDEVAC crews evacuated 16 American and 4 ANA Soldiers 

from the battlefield. The professionalism of the MEDEVAC crews and 

their courage in flying into the smoke of burning vehicles and buildings 

and the heavy ground fire undoubtedly saved many lives.140 That courage 

impressed the badly wounded Pitts:

I’ve seen a lot of MEDEVACs but I’ve never seen anything 

like what they did. It was one of the most amazing things 

I’ve ever seen. I actually wrote the crew chief of the bird I 

was on [Staff Sergeant Kinney]. I couldn’t believe the pilots 

landed where they did, that exposed. I couldn’t believe it. The 

Apaches were doing gun runs about 30 meters away.141
176

Hissong echoed Pitts’ opinion:

We were still taking fire when I saw the MEDEVAC birds 

come in. What they did next was the single greatest thing I 

have ever seen a pilot do. Instead of landing down at the COP, 

they landed on an extremely small flat spot next to OP Topside. 

They were taking heavy fire the whole time but managed to 

get our critical casualties evacuated. They landed in that same 

spot about 10 more times before the end of the day.142

The Consolidation at COP Kahler

TF Rock responded aggressively to the situation at Wanat by sending 

additional units as QRFs as transportation assets became available. The 

second QRF that TF Rock dispatched consisted of the 3d Platoon of A 

Company, that company’s tactical command post (TAC), and a section 

from the battalion scout platoon. The commander of Able Company, 

Captain David Nelson, commanded the forces that arrived at Wanat in six 

HMMWVs at 0820 after a drive from an outpost on the Pech River beyond 

Camp Blessing. Nelson then assumed command of the defense of the COP. 

Elsewhere in the battalion, Battle Company Commander Captain Daniel 

Kearney, alerted his entire unit in the Korengal Valley for an impending 

move to Wanat. However, Kearney only had to dispatch his 3d Platoon, led 

by First Lieutenant Michael Moad, to COP Kahler. Moad’s platoon moved 

via CH-47 Chinook helicopters, arriving at approximately 1330. Nelson 

gave Moad specific responsibility for the OP Topside area.143

Moad and his platoon sergeant, David Barbaret, were extremely 

displeased with the location of OP Topside. As Barbaret observed, “My 

initial perception on the battlefield was why are we in the low ground, 

where are the fortifications, and why don’t we own any high ground?”144

Moad and Barbaret felt that the dead ground to the north and east could 

not be adequately covered from the OP and they immediately scouted for 

a better location. Moad recalled:

I took the remainder of my platoon to the large compound 

about 150 meters to the east of OP Topside in the high ground. 

The compound offered dominating observation above the 

village of Wanat and a good majority of avenues of approach 

into the proposed combat outpost. Moreover, this position was 

previously used as an attack position against Chosen Company 

evident by the large amount of expended AK-47 brass. Lastly, 

we were not actually first to this location; however, one squad 

from the Able Company QRF had occupied and maintained 

this position until we relieved them in the mid afternoon.145
177

The platoon then began to improve the position in the compound and 

gather information:

Once in position, I had my platoon re-clear the compound and 

then selected positions for my Soldiers to man while offering 

them the best cover and concealment. We used the compound 

as our defensive position and then sent out reconnaissance 

and surveillance teams to search the nearby area [for any 

intelligence information]. We set out claymores in all likely 

avenues of approach and began to use surrounding rocks and 

sandbags we had carried into Wanat to build up defendable 

positions. Once in position, my platoon forward observer and 

I conducted terrain denial operations by using the 120-mm, 

which was still in operation around the Chosen command 

post.146

By the time the sun went down on 13 July, Moad and his platoon 

had completely evacuated OP Topside, established the new OP in the 

compound, and integrated the scout section into the position.147

Using a helicopter provided by Deputy CJTF-101 Commander 

Brigadier General Milley, Ostlund flew to Wanat from Camp Blessing 

on the afternoon of 13 July. Both Ostlund and Colonel Charles Preysler, 

the TF Bayonet commander, later visited Wanat several times but neither 

remained on site. However, as previously mentioned, Ostlund did dispatch 

his S3, Major Scott Himes, and the battalion TAC, to take overall command 

at Wanat. Milley had arrived at Blessing earlier in the day at the urging 

of his boss, Major General Schloesser, after a stop at the TF Bayonet

headquarters at Jalalabad. Once there, he recalled that after lending his 

helicopter to Ostlund he “operated from the TF Rock [TOC] since it had 

sufficient radios so that I could exercise effective [command and control] 

back to the CJTF.”148

Additional assets continued to flow into Wanat throughout the day. New 

arrivals included a large force of ANA commandos and a small US Special 

Forces element that advised the ANA unit. The Afghan commandos were 

highly experienced and extremely well trained special operations soldiers. 

Their arrival swelled the force at Wanat to over 200. On the next day, 14 

July, a platoon of pathfinders from the 101st Airborne Division deployed 

to assist in the clearance of the high ground around the COP.149

At first light on 14 July, the ANA commandos conducted a meticulous 

house-to-house search of Wanat, gathering considerable intelligence 

information, and performing a careful analysis of battle damage. The 
178

Wanat District Center, the hub of local government, provided the biggest 

surprise. The district center, which also served as the headquarters for 

a 20 man local police force, contained a large arsenal of weapons. The 

majority of these weapons had been recently fired. Also present were a 

large quantity of 7.62-mm ammunition and RPGs.150

Even though their police station was located nearby, the Wanat 

contingent of the Afghan National Police (ANP) played no significant role 

in the battle, and the ANP did not in any way support the defense of Wanat. 

One Chosen Company sergeant specifically recalled that during the later 

stages of the engagement on 13 July, “We pushed past COP Kahler down 

the road and received fire from alleyways and a house on the other side 

of the draw and we returned fire. The ANP compound was in the vicinity 

to my left about 200 meters. There was no fire coming from there. They 

were not engaging the enemy though they could have. After the fight, I 

saw ANP walking around like nothing had happened. Their uniforms were 

all clean.”151

TOW squad leader Grimm had a chance to visit the district center after 

the battle. Grimm recalled:

In the Wanat ANP compound I saw it was untouched [his 

emphasis], though it was on the ingress/egress route of the 

AAF [anti-Afghan force] that attacked from the mosque and 

bazaar. I saw a lot of expended brass inside their perimeter, 

southwest side (facing us). ANA commandoes found a lot 

of bloody uniforms. All the ANP were in fresh brand new 

uniforms, which is unusual since they are only issued one 

uniform and usually they are dirty. They also appeared freshly 

shaven with razor nicks on their faces. There were also over 

100 weapons, including AKs, PKMs, PRKs, RPGs, pistols, 

and shotguns. They were dirty and had recently been fired.152

The discovery of such an arsenal provided very strong evidence of 

ANP collusion with the insurgents. In short order the Afghan Government 

relieved the district police chief of his duties and arrested him, while 

disarming and dissolving the local police detachment. The Afghans also 

arrested the district governor after replacing him, although he was later 

released.153

The commandos searched over 100 structures in Wanat. All were 

vacant the day after the battle. Inside one house there was a large cache 

of medical supplies along with used BDUs. Another building yielded four 

AK-47 automatic rifles, two Realistic© model TRC-222 40-channel hand 
179

held radios, floodlights, blasting caps hidden inside a first aid kit, detonator 

cord, and a video camcorder with the tape still inside it. Grimm noted that 

in one house, “I saw about six ANP ID cards, a four inch stack of laminate, 

loose photos, everything to make ID cards. There was a camcorder and 

weapons.”154 The search of Wanat provided overwhelming evidence that 

the town had been completely infiltrated by the insurgents and used as a 

base from which to launch the attack.155

Skirmishes between the Coalition and insurgent forces in the Waygal 

region continued throughout the remainder of 13-14 July. Indeed, several 

times during that night, small enemy groups probed the American perimeter 

looking for gaps in the defenses. The vigorous application of overwhelming 

American firepower, including fire from an AC-130 gunship on station 

overhead quickly ended these probes. Other attacks involved small 

parties of insurgents who were in hiding or were attempting to exfiltrate 

the area. By the evening of 13 July, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance) assets, including a Predator UAV, were scouring the 

countryside adjacent to COP Kahler, and rapidly identifying AAF forces 

that the Americans then engaged with mortars, field artillery, and CAS. 

The Coalition forces implemented careful fire support controls and made 

optimal use of field artillery, helicopter gunships, and CAS.156

By the afternoon of 15 July, the Americans had expended a large 

amount of munitions in and around Wanat, including almost 100 155-

mm artillery rounds; numerous bombs from various types of airplanes 

including A-10 and F-15 attack jets and AC-130 gunships; hundreds of 

30-mm cannon rounds; several score of 2.75-inch rockets; two Hellfire 

missiles delivered by the Apaches; and additional Hellfires delivered by 

other assets including UAVs. However, with the exception of a number 

of artillery projectiles and the majority of the Apache strikes, nearly all of 

this ordnance had been expended after 0630 on 13 July.157

By 15 July, there was also a considerable amount of combat power and 

command presence in the Wanat area. Himes, the TF Rock S3, commanded 

this force which included elements from three TF Rock companies plus 

additional Afghan and American special operations forces. Upon his arrival 

on the afternoon of 13 July, Himes stated that he “found the [US Special 

Forces] team leader and discussed the way ahead. The [Special Forces 

officer’s] initial desire was to conduct an approach march to the northeast 

along the valley floor with a march objective of Qalay-e-gal [Kegal] [four 

miles] to the east.”158 The Special Forces (SF) commander wanted to 

aggressively maneuver to seal off the major route of enemy egress, an exit 

route that ran down the deep defile of the Wayskawdi Creek, by seizing 
180

the small village of Qualay-e-gal which entirely commanded every route 

through the creek valley. If adopted, this tactical approach was certainly 

risky, although the massive quantity of American firepower and ISR assets 

would have mitigated such risks. Still, there was the potential to inflict 

a significant, if not crushing defeat on the insurgents. Himes, however, 

worried that there were insufficient Coalition forces to secure their 

northern flank in the region and did not support the SF team leader’s plan. 

Instead the American and Afghan Special Forces created a 40 man QRF 

within Wanat and pushed out other elements after dark in all directions to 

occupy high ground to the northwest, northeast, and southeast. With an 

AC-130 gunship now also on station at night, Wanat was relatively secure. 

Certainly, in the aftermath of the 13 July attack, this approach was the 

prudent course of action.159

The Withdrawal from the Waygal Valley

Ostlund gave Himes a pair of alternatives at 1700 on 14 July: either 

continue with the construction of a permanent COP in Wanat or withdraw 

from the town. The officers on the ground began to plan for both options. 

Several hours later, the senior American commanders made the decision 

to withdraw.

Just as a variety of factors had influenced the decision to establish COP 

Kahler at Wanat, a range of factors influenced the decision to evacuate. 

Myer made the original recommendation for withdrawal, stating that the 

following considerations led him to that judgment:

After the fight on July 13th in Wanat, the situation for 

occupation was drastically changed. No matter how much 

Coalition forces conducted [information operations] to 

explain/battle the circumstances for occupation of Wanat, it 

would be viewed as hostile. The population in and around 

Wanat had clearly supported the enemy and did not maintain 

the conditions for Coalition force support and projects. Wanat 

is ideal because of the ground LOC [line of communication] 

open to the rest of the BN [battalion] but that would take 

significant manpower to keep open.160

Ostlund explained that after 13 July, the situation in Wanat was not 

favorable for success:

Working [the lines of operation] was going to take an incredible 

influx of resources for security. The district governor was 

going to need to be replaced, the market was shot up [in 

fact one section of the bazaar was burned to the ground] and 
181

we were not going to reward the area with $1.4 million in 

projects. The conditions radically changed on the morning of 

13 July 2008 and the Wanat population priced themselves out 

of our desire to assist them at that time.161

Ostlund recommended that the Coalition pull out of the area, finish 

paving the road between Nangalam and Wanat, replace the local Afghan 

leadership, retrain the ANP, and then re-engage the population. The TF 

Rock commander noted that TF Duke, the unit deploying into northeast 

Afghanistan to replace TF Bayonet, had reservations about manning COP 

Kahler. Downplaying objections to a withdrawal based on casualty lists, 

Ostlund commented that, “I thought the argument, ‘we paid too much to 

abandon this place’ was a DUMB emotional versus logical, tactical, and 

supportable argument.”162

On 14 July, Colonel Preysler and the CJTF-101 staff presented Major 

General Schloesser with four options: attack, withdraw, hold, or battle 

hand-off to TF Duke. Schloesser described the process he used to reach 

the final decision:

The next day, the 14th, I had a staff recommendation from 

my staff at the CJTF level. When Preysler briefed me, he had 

Ostlund’s as well as Captain Myer’s recommendations, and 

they were all to evacuate. . . . This is Myer’s recommendation 

to me; “After 13 July, the tactical problem set reference, 

geography and human terrain changed. The land is no longer 

technically tenable. We need more defensible land, which 

would displace the population and require a much larger 

force to hold and build. The population proved corrupted 

or intimidated. The land and human terrain are no longer 

tenable.” He states it tactically but operationally, when I took 

that thought process – and again, Ostlund felt the same way, so 

did Preysler. They weighed it against what we were actually 

able to achieve with the people there in the Waygal Valley and 

it didn’t make good tactical or operational sense to maintain 

that presence.163

Schloesser thought that his overall lack of resources severely 

constrained what his command could achieve in the Waygal Valley:

The truth is I also did not have the resources to be able to go 

in and do what I knew was necessary which was to relocate to 

higher ground. In other words, we would be moving away from 

the people so we could have enough force there that we could 
182

not only defend the base, which would be required, but also 

so we could be dismounted and be able to patrol and through 

those patrols actually influence the people. Frankly, my staff 

was divided. The ops, I believe, was basically of the same 

mind that we did not have the resources and it didn’t make a 

cost-benefit ratio, didn’t make sense for counterinsurgency. 

We were not going to achieve the effects we needed. We were 

obviously not separating the people from the enemy. We were 

not achieving any transformational types of things with the 

economy nor was there much promise. We could not link the 

people to a totally corrupt ANP, and the ANA were not wanted 

there. They were outsiders just like we were.164

Although the CJTF commander acknowledged that his intelligence 

section recommended a Coalition presence in the Waygal Valley to prevent 

insurgent movement into the Pech Valley, the CJTF-101 commander 

decided to withdraw all forces from Wanat and the valley.165

Early on the morning of 15 July, instructions came down from CJTF101 through TF Bayonet to TF Rock to evacuate Wanat. The American 

force there immediately began the process of withdrawal. Helicopters 

began arriving and trucks began pouring in from Camp Blessing. The 

retrograde movement was executed as rapidly as transportation assets could 

be moved to Wanat and supplies could be loaded. Unlike the limitations 

during the establishment of COP Kahler, there were plentiful resources 

available for the withdrawal. The final helicopter flight, which departed in 

the early morning of 15 July, contained the seven remaining C Company 

mortarmen and their mortars. With all of the Americans having returned 

safely to their respective original bases, only a few partially destroyed 

fighting positions remained at the former site of COP Kahler.166

Aftermath

At dusk on 13 July, both sides at Wanat had sustained heavy losses. 

American casualties were nine killed and 27 wounded, with 16 of the 

latter requiring evacuation. Five ANA soldiers were wounded, with four 

evacuated. This total represents the highest casualty rate in any American 

battle in the Afghan War to date. All of the American deaths were sustained 

in the first two hours of combat (between 0420 and 0630). AAF casualties 

are, of course speculative but, based on the effects of American firepower, 

had to be significantly higher. The insurgents were highly skilled at 

evacuating their wounded and dead from the battlefield and recovering 

their casualties is an extremely high priority. It was rare that Coalition 

forces ever found more than a few scattered blood trails.167
183

Only a single enemy corpse was recovered from the battlefield. An 

American found the body of this insurgent in the concertina wire at the 

OP where he had become entangled. This is almost certainly the insurgent 

that McKaig killed with his claymore. The paratrooper who recovered this 

corpse later recalled, “I seen an enemy KIA in the wire . . . we pulled him 

out of the wire he was wearing a chest rig and off white clothing and a 

BDU coat under his top after getting him out of the wire. We pulled him 

down over near the OP and searched him. The enemy KIA had three AK47 mag[azine]s on him, all were empty. No AK-47 was found. Nothing 

else was on the enemy KIA.”168 Later the Afghan commandos identified 

the dead insurgent as being Arab rather than Afghan, strongly intimating 

that he was a foreign fighter. Based on various intelligence sources, 

US estimates of enemy fatalities ranged from 21 to 52, with another 45 

believed to have been wounded.169

Since 2006, the Coalition had attempted to gain control of the Waygal 

Valley by asserting military power and using reconstruction and other 

programs to win the support of the population. For many reasons, by mid 

2008 those efforts had not borne fruit. Some would argue that the battle 

at Wanat on 13 July 2008 was the most direct evidence of that failure. 

Moreover, that action had convinced senior US military leaders that the 

price for success in the Waygal Valley was too dear and would hinder more 

successful efforts elsewhere. The choice to withdraw was difficult and 

serves as an excellent example of the tough decisions that US commanders 

had to make on a regular basis in Afghanistan in 2007-2008.
184

Notes

1. Sergeant John Hayes, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 April 2009, 9; Corporal Tyler M. Stafford, 

interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 10 February 2009, 9–10; Sergeant Jason Oakes, interview by Douglas R. 

Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 February 2009, 6.

2. Exhibit 38 (SPC, 2d Plt, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army 

Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified 

Version)” (Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 October 2008), 2; Exhibit 34 (SSG, 

1st Plt, D/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation 

into the Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version) (Camp Blessing, 

Afghanistan, 16 October 2008), 1.

3. Exhibit 10 (SFC, 1st Plt, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army 

Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified 

Version)” (Korengal Outpost, Afghanistan, 16 October 2008), 1.

4. Exhibit 34, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of 

Wanat, 5-6.

5. Exhibit 10, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of 

Wanat, 1.” 

6. Exhibit 49 (SPC, 1st Plt, D/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army 

Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified 

Version)” (Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 October 2008), 1-2; Exhibit 34, 

CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, 

Unclassified Version), “2.

7. Phillips’ section consisted of himself, Sergeant Hector Chavez, Sergeant 

Jared Gilmore, Staff Sergeant Jesse Queck, Specialist Sergio Abad, and Private 

First Class Scott Stenoski.

8. Exhibit 17 (SGT, Mortar Section, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, 

Unclassified Version)”(Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, 17 July 

2008),” 2-3; Sergeant Hector Chavez, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 March 2009, 6, 12; Kate 

Wiltrout, “Soldier from Eastern Shore Recounts Deadly Battle in Afghanistan, 

SSG Jesse L. Queck,” Hampton Roads Virginian–Pilot, 19 July 2008, http://

hamptonroads.com/2008/07/soldier-eastern-shore-recounts-deadly-battleafghanistan (accessed 2 February 2009); Private First Class Scott Stenoski, 

interview by Matt Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 

November 2008, 2.

9. Exhibit 17, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version),” 3-4. Chavez, interview, 6–7, 12; 

Exhibit 64 (SSG, Mortar Section, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army 

Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified 

Version)” (Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, 16 July 2008), 4-5.

10. Sergeant First Class David Dzwik, interview by Matt Matthews, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 October 2008, 6.
185

11. Exhibit 17, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of 

Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version),” 3-4; ; Exhibit 62 (SSG, Mortar Section, 

C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into 

Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 

16 July 2008), 1, 5; Sergeant First Class David Dzwik, interview by Douglas R. 

Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 April 2009, 12; 

Chavez , interview, 19 March 2008, 6–7, 12; Exhibit 64 (SSG, Mortar Section, 

C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into 

Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Landstuhl Regional Medical 

Center, Germany, 16 July 2008), 4-5.

12. Exhibit 64, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version),” 6; Stenoski, interview, 4 November 

2008, 1, 5; Exhibit 62, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into 

Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version),” 4.

13. Exhibit 18 (SPC, C/62d Eng Bn, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp 

Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 3. 

14. Sergeant Erik Aass, interview by Matt Matthews, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 January 2009, 6.

15. Exhibit 70, (Specialist, 2d Squad, 2d Platoon, C/2-503d IN, statement), 

CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, 

Unclassified Version)” (Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 2-3; 

Sergeant Jeffrey Scantlin, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 August 2009, 2–3.

16. Aass onterview, 13 January 2009, 7; Chief Warrant Officer 2 Isaac Smith, 

interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 19 May 2009, 4. The intensity of the fabric fire was confirmed by Sergeant 

Nicholas Ehler, UH-60 crew chief. Sergeant Nicholas Ehler, interview by Douglas 

R. Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 July 2009, 5.

17. Captain Matthew Myer, interview by Matt Matthews, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 December 2008, 10. 

18. Captain James Fisher and Captain (P) Ryan Berdiner, interview by 

Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 July 

2009, 1–2; Colonel William Ostlund, e-mails to Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 February 2009 and 8 May 2009. 

19. Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Maranian, “Field Artillery Fires in the 

Mountains of Afghanistan,” Fires (July–September 2008): 36.

20. Fisher and Berdiner, interview, 16 July 2009, 1–2.

21. Exhibit 36, CENTCOM, “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village,” 128. Qualified US Air Force forward air controllers (FACs) were 

not routinely assigned to infantry companies or platoons in Afghanistan.

22. Aass, interview, 13 January 2009, 6.
186

23. Exhibit 64, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version),” 7.

24. Staff Sergeant Jonathan Benton, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 August 2009, 8–9. The 

available sources dispute the presence of an ANA DShK heavy machine gun at 

Wanat. While one ETT member claims the gun was present, the more experienced 

and senior ETT NCOIC (noncommissioned officer in charge) states that the unit’s 

DShK, which had been previously used at Bella, was down for maintenance at 

Camp Blessing during the Wanat fight. See Exhibit 38a (Sergeant, USMC, ETT 

5-3, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 28; See Exhibit 42b (Staff Sergeant, USMC, ETT 

5-3, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 27.

25. Exhibit 32 (SPC, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp 

Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 2. CLP refers to Break-Free brand CLP—

cleaner, lubricant, and preservative, the standard and tactical weapons cleaner and 

lubricant.

26. Exhibit 64, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version),” 5.

27. Aass, interview, 13 January 2009, 11.

28. Exhibit 47 (PFC, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army 

Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified 

Version)” (Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 4.

29. Sergeant Brian C. Hissong, personal statement, “Combat Outpost Kahler, 

July 8–15,” (not dated).

30. Exhibit 36 (SPC, 2/C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp 

Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 2.

31. Exhibit 36 (SPC, 2/C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101.

32. Hissong, personal statement.

33. Exhibit 36, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat,” 2-3; Exhibit 67 (SSG, 2/C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army 

Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified 

Version)” (Landstuhl Region Medical Center, Germany, 17 July 2008), 4; 

Exhibit 41 (SGT, 2/C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 

Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp 

Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 2.

34. Chavez, interview, 19 March 2008, 11.

35. Dzwik, interview, 21 October 2008, 7.

36. Hissong, personal statement.
187

37. Staff Sergeant Luis Repreza, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 February 2009, 8. According to at 

least one of the Marine ETT members, the ANA did have certain limitations and 

problems, however. Their fire was inaccurate and erratic. The Afghan who was 

badly burned by the TOW explosion had left his fighting position. And it seemed 

to the Marine that the insurgents were not targeting the ANAs, shooting over 

them at Americans. See Exhibit 38a (Sergeant, USMC, ETT 5-3, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 11, 21. 

38. Exhibit 42b (Staff Sergeant, USMC, ETT 5-3, interview) to US Central 

Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat 

Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 38-42. 

39. The defense of OP Topside is described in the following sources: 

Sergeant Ryan Pitts, interview by Matt Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 14 January 2009; Specialist Chris McKaig, interview by Matt 

Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 November 2008; 

Stafford, interview; and Exhibits 27, 50, 63, and 77(C/2-503d IN, statements), 

CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat.”

40. Captain Benjamin Pry, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 May 2009, 10.

41. Exhibit 34, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat, 5-6.

42. Exhibit 34, CJTF-101, 6.

43. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 10.

44. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 10–11.

45. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 11.

46. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 11.

47. Pitts, interview, 14 January 2009, 9.

48. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 13.

49. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 13.

50. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 13. 

51. McKaig, interview, 19 November 2008, 3; Specialist Chris McKaig, 

“Stand to at Wanat,” e-mail to Matt Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 22 January 2009. It should be remembered that all time 

estimates provided by the Soldiers involved in intense combat are relative and 

generally inaccurate. 

52. McKaig, interview, 19 November 2008, 3.
188

53. McKaig, e-mail, 22 January 2009.

54. McKaig, interview, 19 November 2008, 4.

55. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 10–12.

56. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 10–12.

57. Pitts, interview, 14 January 2009, 13.

58. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 12.

59. Exhibit 63 (SGT C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” 

(Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, 17 October 2008), 6.

60. Pitts, interview, 14 January 2009, 10.

61. Myer, interview, 1 December 2008, 11.

62. Benton, interview, 4 August 2009, 11.

63. Exhibit 39 (SPC HHC/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army 

Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified 

Version)” (Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, 18 October 2008), 2; 

Pitts interview, 14 January 2009, 10-11.

64. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 14.

65. McKaig, e-mail, 22 January 2009; McKaig, interview, 19 November 

2008, 5.

66. Exhibits 118, 119, 120, 121 (Autopsy Reports), CJTF-101, “Army 

Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified 

Version)” (22 July 2008). 

67. Exhibit 27 (SGT C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” 

(Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, 18 October 2008), 3.

68. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 13; Exhibit 77 (SPC C/2-503d 

IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of 

Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, 

Germany, 17 October 2008), 2.

69. McKaig, interview, 19 November 2008, 4.

70. McKaig, e-mail, 22 January 2009; McKaig, interview, 19 November 

2008, 4.

71. McKaig, interview, 19 November 2008, 5.

72. McKaig, interview. 

73. McKaig, interview.

74. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 14–15.

75. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 13–15.

76. Stafford, interview, 10 February 2009, 14–15; Exhibit 27, CJTF-101, 

“Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat”, 4.
189

77. Pitts, interview, 14 January 2009, 11; Exhibit 63, CJTF-101, “Army 

Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat”, 6.

78. Pitts, interview, 14 January 2009, 11.

79. Pitts, interview, 14 January 2009, 11.

80. Exhibit 13 (SSG C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp 

Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 October 2008), 4.

81. Exhibit 67 (SSG C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” 

(Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, 17 October 2008), 4-5.

82. Exhibit 67 (SSG C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat, 4.

83. Exhibit 21, (SPC, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” 

(Landstuhl Region Medical Center, Germany, 17 July 2008), 2. The reference to 

mortar fire is only mentioned in passing. If the AAF used mortars at Wanat, it was 

sparingly. Almost all AAF fires were via direct, line-of-sight weapons.

84. Exhibit 21, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat”, 2.

85. Pitts, interview, 14 January 2009, 12.

86. Pitts, interview, 14 January 2009, 12.

87. Exhibit 21, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat”, 3.

88. Pitts, interview, 14 January 2009, 12.

89. Dzwik, interview, 2 April 2009, 14; Exhibit 24 (SFC C/2-503d IN, 

statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat 

(Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Bagram AB, Afghanistan, 25 July 2008), 1; 

Benton, interview, 4 August 2009, 10–12.

90. AH-64 Guntapes of Engagement at Wanat, 13 July 2008.

91. AH-64 Guntapes of Engagement at Wanat, 13 July 2008.

92. First Lieutenant Michael Moad, e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 March 2009.

93. AH-64 Guntapes of Engagement at Wanat, 13 July 2008.

94. Lieutenant Colonel John Lynch, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 12 May 2009, 1; Exhibit 

46a (WO1, Brigade Airspace Manager, HHC, 173d ABCT, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 4. 

95. Lynch, interview, 12 May 2009, 12. 

96. Chief Warrant Officer 3 Brian Townsend, interview by Douglas R. 

Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 June 2009, 4–5. 
190

97. Townsend, interview, 24 June 2009, 5; Chief Warrant Officer 3 John 

Gauvreau, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 2 July 2009.

98. Aass, interview, 13 January 2009, 9.

99. First Lieutenant Matthew A. Colley, e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 March 2009; Exhibit 

38a (WO1, Brigade Airspace Manager, HHC, 173d ABCT, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 17-18.

100. Exhibit 55 (CPT C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp 

Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 2; Myer, interview, 1 December 2008, 10, 

13; Aass, interview, 13 January 2009, 9. 

101. Exhibit 50 (SPC C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Wanat, 

Afghanistan, 13 July 2008), 1; Exhibit 70, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 

Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version),” 2-3.

102. AH-64 Guntapes of Engagement at Wanat, 13 July 2008.

103. AH-64 Guntapes of Engagement at Wanat, 13 July 2008.

104. Sergeant First Class William Stockard interview by Matt Matthews, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 October 2008, 3.

105. Myer, interview, 1 December 2008, 10; AH-64 Guntapes of Engagement 

at Wanat, 13 July 2008.

106. AH-64 Guntapes of Engagement at Wanat, 13 July 2008.

107. Hissong, personal statement; Exhibit 16 (SPC, 1st Plt, C/2-503d IN, 

statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat 

(Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 1; 

Exhibit 30 (SGT, 1st Plt, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp 

Blessing, Afghanistan, 18 July 2008), 1; Exhibit 33 (SPC, 1st Plt, C/2-503d IN, 

statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat 

(Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 1; 

Exhibit 35 (SPC, 1st Plt, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp 

Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 1; Exhibit 48 (SPC, 1st Plt, C/2-503d IN, 

statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat 

(Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 1; 

Exhibit 53 (SPC, 1st Plt, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp 

Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 1; Exhibit 59 (SPC, 1st Plt, C/2-503d IN, 

statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat 

(Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 

1; Exhibit 79, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of 

Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version),” 1. 

108. Hissong, personal statement.
191

109. Exhibit 11 (1SG C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Wanat, 

Afghanistan, 13 July 2008), 1.

110. Exhibit 35, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat”, 1. 

111. Exhibit 16 (SPC, 1st Plt, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army 

Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified 

Version)” (Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 1.

112. Exhibit 83 (SPC, 1st Plt, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army 

Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified 

Version)” (Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 1.

113. Exhibit 14, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat”, 1.

114. Hissong, personal statement.

115. Aass, interview, 13 January 2009, 10.

116. Exhibit 73 (SSG, 1st Plt, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army 

Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified 

Version)” (Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 1.

117. Exhibit 73 (SSG, 1st Plt, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, 1-2.

118. Exhibit 11, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat”, 1.

119. Exhibit 53, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat”, 1.

120. Exhibit 53, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat”, 1.

121. Exhibit 53, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat”, 1.

122. AH-64 Guntapes of Engagement at Wanat, 13 July 2008.

123. Captain Justin J. Madill, Sworn Statement, FOB Fenty, Jalalabad 

Airfield, Afghanistan, 17 July 2008; Captain Justin J. Madill, “Battle of Wanat,” 

e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

19 May 2009; Chief Warrant Officer 2 Wayne A. McDonald, Sworn Statement, 

FOB Fenty, Jalalabad Airfield, Afghanistan, 14 July 2008.

124. Madill, Sworn Statement, 17 July 2008.

125. Madill.

126. Madill.

127. McDonald, Sworn Statement, 14 July 2008.

128. Staff Sergeant Atwon Thompkins, Sworn Statement, FOB Fenty, 

Jalalabad Airfield, Afghanistan, 14 July 2008.

129. Staff Sergeant Matthew Kinney, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 May 2009, 1; Chief Warrant 
192

Officer 3 Christopher Hill, Sworn Statement on Wanat, FOB Fenty, Afghanistan, 

13 July 2008.

130. Kinney, interview, 20 May 2009, 2.

131. Madill, Sworn Statement, 17 July 2008.

132. Kinney, interview, 20 May 2009, 2; Pitts, interview, 14 January 2009, 

12–13.

133. Dzwik interview, 2 April 2009, 15; Myer interview, 1 December 2008, 

14, 16.

134. Captain Ben Seipel, Sworn Statement on Wanat, FOB Fenty, Afghanistan, 

14 July 2008. The rest of the crew of Dustoff 34 consisted of crew chief Sergeant 

Aaron Tuten, and flight medic Sergeant Adam Cannaughton. 

135. Captain Kevin King, “Wanat” e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 May 2009.

136. Smith, interview, 19 May 2009, 5. 

137. King, e-mail, 14 May 2009.

138. Exhibit 79, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into 

Battle of Wanat”, 1. 

139. Kinney, interview, 20 May 2009, 1–2. 

140. Madill, Sworn Statement, 17 July 2008; Kinney, interview, 20 May 

2009, 1–2.

141. Pitts, interview, 14 January 2009, 12–13.

142. Hissong, personal statement. 

143. Captain Dan Kearny, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3–4 March 2009, 7–8; Moad, e-mail, 17 

March 2009.

144. Exhibit 10, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into 

Battle of Wanat”, 1.

145. Moad, e-mail, 17 March 2009.

146. Moad e-mail.

147. Moad e-mail.

148. Brigadier General Mark Milley, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison and 

Dr. William G. Robertson, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 

and 20 August 2009, 45; Himes, interview, 25 April 2009, 10–11.

149. Major Scott Himes, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 April 2009, 10. 

150. The weapons found at the ANP post in Wanat included 76 AK-47 

automatic rifles, 11 RPK 7.62-mm light machine guns, 3 PKM 7.62-mm general 

purpose machine guns, 6 RPG launchers, 3 12-gauge shotguns, 1 grenade 
193

launcher, and 6 9-mm pistols. See Exhibit 4 (Search Summary), CJTF-101, 

“Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat”. 

151. Exhibit 30, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat”, 1-2. 

152. Exhibit 34, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat”, 6.

153. Colonel William Ostlund and Captain Matthew Myer, joint e-mail to 

Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 March 

2009.

154. Exhibit 34, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat”, 6.

155. Exhibit 10, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat”, 1.

156. Exhibit 52 (1LT, B/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” 

(Korengal Outpost, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 1.

157. 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team, “Presentation of Collateral 

Investigation Results to the Family of First Lieutenant Jonathan P. Brostrom” 

Briefing (not dated).

158. Exhibit 40 (MAJ 2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp 

Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 1.

159. Exhibit 40 (MAJ 2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101.

160. Ostlund and Myer, joint e-mail, 23 March 2009.

161. Ostlund Ibid.; Major General Jeffrey Schloesser, interview by Douglas 

R. Cubbison and Robert Ramsey, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 5 August 2009, 4–5.

162. Milley, interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 46; Ostlund and Myer, joint 

e-mail, 23 March 2009.

163. Schloesser, interview, 5 August 2009, 13.

164. Schloesser interview.

165. Schloesser interview.

166. Exhibit 40, CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle 

of Wanat”, 1-2.

167. Matthew Cole, “Watching Afghanistan Fall,” Salon Magazine, 27 

February 2007, http://www.salon.com/ news/feature/2007/02/27/afghanistan/ 

(accessed 17 July 2008).

168. Exhibit 43(SGT, 1st Plt, C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army 

Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified 

Version)” (Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 18 July 2008), 1.

169. Exhibit 4 (Search Summary), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 

Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version);” 173d ABCT, 
194

“Presentation of Collateral Investigation Results” Briefing; Pry interview, 6 May 

2009, 9-10.
195

Chapter 4

Conclusions

Overview

The engagement at Wanat on 13 July 2008 has generated a great deal 

of interest and scrutiny among military professionals and from outside 

observers. The primary force behind this interest was the significant 

number of Coalition casualties that resulted from the engagement. During 

the battle, insurgent action killed nine American Soldiers and wounded 

27, with 16 of the wounded requiring immediate evacuation. Additionally, 

four of the 24 ANA (Afghan National Army) soldiers at the combat outpost 

(COP) were wounded. Discounting helicopter crashes, the nine US deaths 

at Wanat represented the highest American fatality total to date from any 

single engagement since US operations began in the country in 2001.

As illustrated throughout this work, the events and conditions that led 

to the engagement and the course of the battle itself are very complicated. 

At the strategic level, by 2008 Afghanistan had become an economy of 

force theater in the larger Global War on Terrorism. At the operational 

level, this meant that the Coalition forces and the security forces of the 

Afghan Government were dispersed widely across the country in an 

attempt to secure and win support from the population. As a result, small 

platoon sized contingents, normally numbering under 75 Soldiers, manned 

most Coalition bases. Under the right circumstances, the insurgents were 

able to mass numerically superior forces against the smaller bases and 

gain a temporary but significant advantage that could lead to casualties on 

the Coalition side. In some regions of Afghanistan where the population 

was also distributed across difficult terrain and enemy forces were equally 

dispersed, insurgent leaders required time to mass forces for strikes against 

the Coalition. In the case of the Waygal Valley in Nuristan province, US 

and Afghan forces in 2006 and 2007 were able to man and sustain small 

bases near the town of Aranas, a recognized center of insurgent activity in 

Nuristan, and in the hamlet of Bella. However, in 2008, when the Coalition 

headquarters consolidated its Waygal Valley presence onto one COP in the 

village of Wanat, the insurgents launched a large scale attack within days 

of its establishment. Arguably, the enemy had taken two years to mass 

sufficient forces to threaten the local civilians in the Waygal Valley enough 

to co-opt the civil authorities and exert control over activities in the town. 

This achievement made the attack on COP Kahler feasible.
196

What enemy success there was at Wanat was primarily predicated on 

one factor, tactical surprise. Press reports have referred to the action at 

Wanat as an “ambush” and declared that the Coalition force was “overrun” 

during the battle. Neither characterization is accurate. The Army defines 

an ambush as a “form of attack by fire or other destructive means from 

concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy.”1 While the 

insurgents did achieve tactical surprise, their attack was against a stationary 

US and ANA force, which was fighting from defensive positions. Clearly, 

the term ambush is inappropriate for this battle. Overrun is not an official 

Army term but in general military usage it means “to defeat decisively 

and occupy the positions of.”2 Applying the term in relation to the Battle 

of Wanat is, therefore, clearly inappropriate as the insurgents neither 

achieved a decisive victory nor occupied any of the American positions, 

even those at OP Topside.3

Still, the insurgents managed to gain an advantage over Coalition 

forces with the momentary and unexpected shock of their attack. While 

some members of the 2d Platoon, Chosen Company, seem to have had a 

certain late tour dread about the prospects of establishing a COP at Wanat, 

the chain of command did not expect the enemy to attack in the manner in 

which they ultimately did. Instead, as discussed in the first two chapters of 

this study, commanders from platoon level up through the senior Coalition 

command in Afghanistan expected the insurgents to increase their pressure 

on COP Kahler incrementally over time before committing to a large 

attack. This assumption was based on past actions of the insurgents in 

other places in the region, particularly at COP Ranch House near Aranas 

and at the COP in Bella. In previous instances, the insurgents had proven to 

be very deliberate in their operations. Coalition assumptions about enemy 

intent and capabilities played a critical role in the engagement at Wanat 

and will be assessed further in later sections of this chapter.4

Despite the tactical surprise, the US Soldiers reacted quickly and 

fought back valiantly. It was the courage and professionalism of the 

Americans and their two dozen Afghan allies that repelled a determined 

and coordinated assault by approximately 150 heavily armed insurgents 

who had stealthily managed to approach within yards of the Coalition 

positions before initiating their attack. For the most part, the battle took 

the form of a firefight at close range in which time was on the American 

side. When AH-64 Apache attack helicopters arrived followed closely 

by ground reinforcements, Coalition forces gained the upper hand. This 

paradigm, the placement of platoon sized positions supported extensively 

by fire support assets and a complex scheme of reinforcement, allowed the 
197

US forces to maintain small outposts near local political and population 

centers per current US Army counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. This 

model worked well enough to allow the Coalition to retain control of the 

base at Wanat after the assault began on 13 July.

At OP (Observation Post) Topside, however, the terrain and positioning 

of forces created difficulties. While the large boulders eased the task of 

constructing the OP, they were not located on the military crest of the 

ridge. This unfortunate fact thus precluded observation of the ravine 

to the immediate north. Here, the ravine formed by Wayskawdi Creek 

approached very near to the American position, allowing the insurgents to 

get within hand grenade range of the position undetected. The insurgents’ 

opening volley knocked out one machine gun and stunned the garrison, 

wounding almost all of them. In the ensuing firefight, the defenders did 

not regain the upper hand until two waves of ad hoc quick reaction forces 

(QRFs) arrived. Nevertheless, even at Topside, where the effects of tactical 

surprise were their greatest, the insurgents were unable to effectively 

overrun the position. Without a doubt, the enemy penetrated the OP. At 

one point, only a badly wounded Sergeant Ryan Pitts remained alive and 

fighting in the position. While the insurgents created a volume of fire that 

forced the evacuation of the OP by its walking wounded, the defense 

of the position was such that despite several perimeter penetrations, the 

insurgents were unable to follow up on their success. Although enemy fire 

was intense, it was mostly inaccurate, making the insurgents incapable of 

successfully isolating the OP from reinforcements. This failure blunted the 

AAF’s efforts even as they inflicted a relatively high number of casualties 

on the US contingent fighting at the OP.

Despite initial disadvantages, the members of C Company and its 

supporting elements fought well at Wanat. The main COP position held 

its own against insurgent pressure from all sides. US and ANA firepower 

remained at levels that allowed the American leadership to dispatch 

several waves of reinforcements to the OP. This defensive stand bought 

enough time for the arrival of direct fire support assets such as the Apache 

helicopters. The Apaches were able to effectively engage insurgent fighters 

who had approached dangerously close to friendly positions. With the 

defense so enhanced, the arrival of the first ground reinforcements allowed 

the Americans to counterattack, clear enemy positions in the bazaar and 

hotel complexes close to the COP, and evacuate the wounded and dead.

While Coalition forces successfully repelled the insurgent attack at 

Wanat, Coalition military leaders had to reassess their plans in the Waygal 

Valley. Just days after the attack on COP Kahler, senior commanders 
198

decided to withdraw all their forces from the Waygal District. This 

decision was based on a number of factors, including the capacity of TF 

Duke, the unit moving into northeast Afghanistan to replace TF Bayonet, 

to man a base at Wanat. Still, the withdrawal had negative effects. The 

move effectively abandoned friends of the Afghan Central Government 

and the Coalition. Further it provided the insurgency with a sanctuary area 

relatively close to the population centers along the Pech, Konar, Alingar, 

and Kabul River valleys. However, insurgent success in this period may 

prove to be fleeting. Reports from the district in late 2009 indicate that the 

Waygal Valley’s isolation from Coalition support has estranged the local 

populace from the insurgents.5

Several factors were instrumental in the successful defense of COP 

Kahler. The first was the effort made by the members of the 2d Platoon 

in the days before the attack. A combination of concertina obstacles, 

sandbags, and HESCO barriers buttressed the main COP to the extent that 

the insurgents were unable to penetrate the main perimeter despite being 

very close to it at the start of the action. Although several of the HESCOs 

were not completely filled with dirt, most were and all provided cover and 

concealment for key positions such as the mortar pit. The defenders used 

the available hand tools to the maximum extent possible, and the positions 

were excavated to the greatest depth feasible with these tools. The COP 

would not have survived the determined attack made on the morning of 13 

July without basic fortifications which the 2d Platoon constructed, even 

under the severe constraints under which the paratroopers labored.

The enemy was able to destroy or suppress the mortars, the TOW 

(tube-launched, optically tracked, wire guided) missile launcher and one 

of the light machine guns at the OP at the start of the action. However, 

the Coalition forces freely employed the remaining crew-served weapons. 

The vehicle mounted systems; two M2 .50-caliber machine guns and two 

Mk-19 automatic grenade launchers, as well as the remaining ground 

mounted M240 machine gun at the OP, and the Marine ETT’s (embedded 

training team) M240 offered enough firepower to keep the enemy at bay 

and allow the repositioning of forces to reinforce the threatened Topside 

position. These weapons systems, particularly the ones mounted on 

vehicles, played a key role in retaining freedom of action for the entire 

force at the COP. Despite being under intense enemy fire, most of the 

force remained in action long enough to keep the insurgents away from the 

main COP perimeter. Prior to the battle, Lieutenant Brostrom and Sergeant 

Dzwik, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant, had ensured that the 

maximum amount of ammunition was available for these weapons. In the 
199

initial movement to Wanat, each HMMWV (high-mobility multipurpose 

wheeled vehicle) carried extra ammunition and more arrived by helicopter 

the next day. During the engagement, the actions of the platoon were never 

constrained by lack of ammunition. Also, the 1st Platoon QRF brought 

additional ammunition, which allowed the defenders to continue the high 

rates of fire that were necessary to maintain the successful defense.6

Additionally, the importance of stand-to cannot be overemphasized. 

The force at COP Kahler was fully awake and alert at least 45 minutes before 

dawn, so, although tactically surprised, the Coalition force was manning 

all weapons and in position when the insurgents initiated the firefight. A 

traditional US Army defensive technique, stand-to was significant because 

of the insurgents’ preference for night movements followed by dawn 

attacks. While the intensity and closeness of the insurgent fire surprised 

the US Soldiers, the predawn period was the expected time for such an 

attack. Despite losses in the first volley based on the enemy’s ability to fire 

unimpeded by return fire, the defenders of the COP were able to regain 

their composure quickly and fight back effectively.

The defenders also displayed great flexibility in responding to the 

attack. As soon as it became obvious that OP Topside was the most 

vulnerable point in the American defense, tactical level leaders at the 

COP focused on organizing, dispatching, and leading ad hoc QRFs to the 

assistance of that position. Dzwik noted that even while he “was reduced to 

a rifleman for most of the fight . . . even when their current leadership was 

wounded or doing something else, each individual paratrooper acted as if 

he was an NCO.”7

 Company RTO (radio-telephone operator) Aass agreed 

with this assessment, “Whenever one leader went down, there was always 

somebody to take over in his position. Then when somebody who was 

senior to that person showed up at whatever point, there was yet another 

seamless transition. There were never any arguments over who was in 

charge. Somebody was always in charge.”8

 Wanat showed the flexibility 

of the US Army at the tactical level and exemplified the high standards of 

NCO (noncommissioned officer) initiative and leadership.

Finally, the last ingredient essential to the successful defense of COP 

Kahler was the bravery of the individual warriors, a quality displayed by 

every paratrooper, engineer, Marine, and Afghan soldier present. Individual 

exploits of bravery are too numerous to document comprehensively in this 

discussion. Still, a few examples are illustrative: Private First Class Sergio 

Abad, although severely wounded, continued to hand rifle ammunition to 

Sergeant Hector Chavez in the mortar pit at the start of the action. Chavez, 

in turn, on the evacuation of the mortar position, continued to drag Abad to 
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safety at the COP command post area even after he himself was seriously 

wounded. Staff Sergeant Erich Phillips threw a smoldering TOW missile 

away from fellow Soldiers while under intense enemy fire. Brostrom 

and Specialist Jason Hovater sprinted past enemy machine gun fire and 

through an insurgent occupied bazaar complex to rush to the assistance 

of those at OP Topside. At the OP, Private First Class Jonathan Ayers and 

Specialist Christopher McKaig continued to expose themselves to return 

fire at the insurgents, even after Ayers was shot directly in his helmet. In 

the midst of heavy fire, Myer, the company commander, moved to the OP 

to assess the number and condition of his men who had been wounded 

in the fighting there. Additionally, the MEDEVAC (medical evacuation) 

crews landed their helicopters on a small terrace under accurate and 

intense enemy fire through heavy obscuring smoke to treat and evacuate 

wounded Soldiers. The Army recognized the valor of the defenders with 

13 Silver Star medals, 23 Bronze Stars, and one pending recommendation 

for the Distinguished Service Cross.9

The sections that follow address in more detail the factors that 

contributed to the setting and outcome of the battle at Wanat on 13 July 

2008. The previous chapters of this study have discussed these factors in 

the course of providing a historical narrative. This conclusion seeks to 

emphasize those points in the form of a discussion that begins with the 

broader context of the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign in northeast 

Afghanistan and then addresses the contributing factors specific to the 

situation in Konar, the Waygal Valley, and finally the situation at COP 

Kahler on the morning of 13 July 2008. This discussion is designed to 

generate insights of utility to military professionals of today and tomorrow. 

The authors of this study further hope that the historical narrative and 

conclusions do justice to the professionalism and valor of the American 

and Afghan Soldiers who fought on that day.

Counterinsurgency in Northeast Afghanistan, 2007-2008

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-101 had tasked TF Bayonet and by 

extension TF Rock, to conduct a COIN campaign in the northeast provinces 

of Afghanistan. Over the course of the 15 month deployment in 2007-

2008, both Colonel Charles Preysler, the TF Bayonet commander, and 

Lieutenant Colonel William Ostlund, the TF Rock commander, designed 

campaigns intended to win over the population of these provinces by 

providing security from the insurgents and opportunities for economic and 

political progress. In this effort, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) 

became as important as infantry companies, as commanders struggled to 

achieve the right balance of lethal and nonlethal operations. Preysler, for 
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example, focused on a comprehensive economic and political effort in 

Nangarhar Province. His “Nangarhar Inc.” project attempted to improve 

infrastructure as well as agricultural conditions to transform the province 

into a model of economic development. The TF Bayonet commander 

hoped that the increasing economic opportunities would win support from 

the population for the cause of the Coalition and Afghan Government. 

At the same time, Preysler realized that for “Nangarhar Inc.” to work, he 

had to have a stable security environment and that required aggressive 

operations against committed insurgent forces.10

The leaders of TF Rock also hoped to create the kind of stability that 

would lead to economic and political progress in their area of operation 

(AO). For Ostlund, the main site of progress was the Pech Valley which 

became the focus of a successful economic effort launched by TF Rock and 

the Konar PRT. Enemy attacks in the Pech Valley had decreased between 

2006 and early 2008, an accomplishment attributed to road construction 

and the resulting increase in jobs. However, to secure the valley and protect 

its progress, Ostlund believed that TF Rock had to assert its presence in the 

main capillary valleys to the north and south of the Pech. For this reason, 

Ostlund’s subordinate companies found themselves in the Korengal, 

Watapor, and Waygal Valleys where the paratroopers often engaged in 

combat with an implacable insurgent enemy. 

Enemy activity in the Waygal Valley was less constant than in the 

Korengal or Pech valleys. While there were major combat actions in the 

Waygal Valley in 2007 and 2008, these were the exception and not the 

rule. Both US and insurgent forces in the valley were small in comparison 

to other areas and for the most part, the Waygal Valley was marked by 

extended periods of relative inactivity. When this calm was interrupted 

by violence, it was the insurgents and not the Coalition, who initiated the 

action. For example, after almost 90 days of relative inaction for the TF 

Rock paratroopers at Aranas in the summer of 2007, the enemy suddenly 

attacked COP Ranch House in August. After the battle, the valley was 

inactive again until the insurgents attacked a Chosen Company patrol near 

Bella in November 2007. This patrol was returning from a shura in Aranas 

at which the Americans were trying to assess the town’s winter needs. After 

the ambush, there was very little activity until the following May 2008 

when the AAF (anti-Afghanistan Forces) attacked Bella with increasing 

volleys of mortars and rockets in obvious preparation for a ground assault.

The mission of the patrol that was ambushed near Bella reflected the 

most common activity for TF Rock Soldiers; nonlethal missions such as 

attending shuras, opening schools, buying goods from the local populace, 
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and supporting reconstruction projects. In fact, TF Rock conducted over 

9,500 patrols during its 15 month tour, with only 1,100 enemy contacts on 

the patrols, a rate of slightly more than one contact per every 10 patrols. 

Ostlund emphasized the role of these nonlethal operations as part of his 

overall COIN campaign. Much of the success TF Rock achieved in the 

Pech Valley and elsewhere came through a partnership with the Konar 

PRT that brought invaluable resources and expertise to the reconstruction 

effort. However, TF Rock itself committed $2.2 million in the battalion 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds for 

infrastructure and economic projects in its AO. Of this amount, $110,000 

went to support projects in the Waygal district, an expenditure that ranked 

fourth in the 11 districts for which TF Rock was responsible. This figure is 

significant because the Waygal district had the smallest population of all 

the districts in the TF Rock AO.11

Despite these efforts, the Chosen Company paratroopers operating at 

COPs in Bella and Aranas had relatively little success in winning support 

from the population of the Waygal Valley. As outlined in the first chapter, 

the people of the valley were generally suspicious of outsiders, whether 

Westerners or fellow Afghans. Moreover, within the valley communities, 

there had been hundreds of years of intertribal and intercommunity conflict, 

magnified by hundreds of years of geographic and cultural isolation. 

Understanding the cultural antagonisms and commonalities present in the 

Waygal Valley and Wanat between the Nuristanis and the Safi Pashtuns 

and among the Nuristanis themselves was difficult and complicated. On 

a more practical note, the Ranch House and Bella COPs were totally aircentric in terms of logistical support. When the risk involved in sustaining 

them proved greater than the benefits gained by their occupation, it was 

time to rethink their locations. Movement to the district center of Wanat 

was the result.

This natural antagonism meant that the general population met TF 

Rock initiatives with caution or sometimes overt hostility. The insurgent 

groups in the valley used violence to oppose Coalition efforts, lashing out 

at the paratroopers and their Afghan allies in aggressive attacks. Ostlund 

recognized that even after months of effort, TF Rock had not made progress 

in the Waygal Valley, asserting, “no matter what we did [in the Waygal 

Valley] we were just not effective.”12 At least part of that ineffectiveness 

could be attributed to the overall lack of Coalition forces in the Waygal 

Valley. TF Rock could only commit one American platoon, roughly 40 

Soldiers, to the valley at any one time. This small contingent could operate 

in only one or two communities within the valley, leaving the remainder 
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exposed to insurgent influence and control. Even if the population had 

been more open to Coalition projects and plans, the simple fact that the 

local insurgent groups outnumbered US forces made any collaboration 

with TF Rock potentially dangerous to the residents of the valley. Thus, 

intimidation by the enemy was a major obstacle for the members of TF 

Rock to overcome. Certainly, the local leaders of Wanat had either sided 

with insurgent forces before the battle or felt they had no choice but to 

allow the enemy to infiltrate their town. The discovery of bloody uniforms, 

recently fired weapons and other equipment in the police station, as noted 

in chapter 3, was clear evidence that even the local agencies of the Afghan 

central government had been co-opted and had not favorably responded to 

coalition efforts to establish security and governmental legitimacy.

Despite previous problems with the valley population, TF Rock and 

Chosen Company did not abandon their COIN approach. Between the 

Ranch House attack in late 2007 and the engagement at Wanat, Ostlund 

and Chosen Company continued to meet with local leaders in the valley 

and attempted to use reconstruction projects as an inducement for their 

participation in creating security. When this initiative met with little 

success, the TF Rock leadership decided to move forward with the transfer 

of the COP from Bella to Wanat. The new COP would be located near the 

district center where the main north-south river road met an important 

east-west trail and where a major market was located. For this reason, it 

would serve as the base from which the Coalition could renew efforts to 

bring reconstruction projects to the valley and further the legitimacy and 

reach of the Afghan central government. Thus, the new COP at Wanat 

served as a symbol in the belief that the Coalition forces and their Afghan 

allies would still win over the population in the valley.

Enemy Disposition and Intent: Situational Awareness in the Waygal 

Valley 

On the morning of 13 July 2008, the insurgent enemy in the Waygal 

Valley launched a violent assault on TF Rock’s new base in Wanat. The 

proximate cause of the casualties was the insurgents’ ability to arrive at 

Wanat essentially undetected and infiltrate into positions literally yards 

from the main COP and the OP. How was the enemy able to obtain this 

degree of tactical surprise? The general response to this question must 

invoke the role of uncertainty, a factor that is inseparable from any 

military operation. Even in the twenty first century, Army staff officers 

and commanders continue to work in a world where the term “fog of war” 

applies. The “fog” persists even in an age in which a military force fields 

a large number of electronic devices to provide an ever increasing amount 

of situational awareness to commanders.
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In the planning for Operation ROCK MOVE and in the first days after 

the establishment of COP Kahler, US military leaders made decisions in the 

absence of highly precise information about enemy dispositions and enemy 

intent. First, the insurgent situation had changed in the Waygal Valley. 

Whereas in 2006 and 2007 the Americans were able to place two halfplatoon positions at Aranas and at Bella, the enemy in 2008 was far better 

mobilized to resist Coalition efforts in the area. The much more defensible 

and far less remote Wanat position actually had become less defensible 

than the smaller, more eccentrically designed Ranch House position had 

been in 2006. The Coalition presence in their midst no longer surprised 

the insurgent leaders. Apparently they had resolved to do whatever was 

necessary to remove that presence which had disrupted their operations 

and recruitment. For this purpose, by June 2008, Mullah Osman and other 

insurgent leaders had massed forces to attack Bella. The infrastructure 

was now in place to conduct a systematic and extended campaign to 

intimidate and exert control over the local civilian population. The 

number of Coalition forces on the ground facilitated these enemy actions. 

The American presence was thin. In fact, US forces had withdrawn from 

Aranas in late 2007 and by early July 2008 were preparing to evacuate 

COP Bella. Thus, it was evident to the valley population that the Coalition 

security commitment to specific communities was less than constant.

Coalition leaders also had difficulty understanding the political situation 

in Wanat. Certainly, tactical level commanders in TF Rock acknowledged 

that many within the Wanat population harbored anti Coalition sentiments. 

Several shuras between the Americans and Wanat leaders in the spring and 

summer of 2008 had gone poorly and one was followed by an insurgent 

ambush on Coalition vehicles returning to Camp Blessing. However, no 

one in the US leadership appears to have understood the willingness of 

village leaders to cooperate, willingly or unwillingly, with the AAF in a 

large attack against Coalition forces.

In place of precise information about the enemy, the Coalition chain 

of command from the platoon level to senior officers in the CJTF, made 

assumptions about insurgent dispositions and intent. At the tactical level, 

15 months of experience in the region had led to an expectation that any 

enemy attack on a new base would develop gradually with harassing fires 

preceding any deliberate attack. Myer used the August 2007 Ranch House 

attack as an example of how the “typical” attack evolved:

There are things that customarily happen and then it kind 

of builds up to a large event. What we eventually saw was 
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a pattern of about 90 to 120 days of build up until a large 

scale event happened. . . . What we anticipated was that they 

were going to first attack us with rockets because that was 

something they could do that didn’t take a lot of personnel to 

do it. If we had a new area occupied, they could try to affect 

us and try to dial in those rockets like they had done at Bella. 

They had shot rockets at Bella over time and then eventually 

they could get them inside the wire pretty consistently.13

Myer then stated succinctly, “So, we thought if they were going to do 

a large scale attack [at Wanat], they’re going to first refine all the assets 

they wanted to utilize to do that and then after something like 90 days, then 

they’re going to try to do a large scale attack like they did at the Ranch 

House.”14

In his expectation that the enemy would respond in a systematic 

gradual manner to the American presence at Wanat, Myer was not alone. 

Reflecting the views of the TF Rock S2, the ROCK MOVE operations order 

briefing indicated that the enemy would try to “disrupt the construction of 

[a Coalition Forces] base in the village of Wanat.”15 Before any general 

attack, the insurgents were expected to gradually establish a series of 

positions and weapons caches near Wanat. ROCK MOVE considered that 

the most dangerous enemy action would be an ambush of US forces as they 

moved into Wanat. However, this was not the insurgents’ most probable 

action. Before the attack, Lieutenant Colley, the TF Rock Assistant S2, felt 

that “the most likely enemy course of action would be to conduct probing 

attacks of the new US position in order to discover any weaknesses.”16 

Reflecting on the enemy reaction after the battle, Lieutenant Colonel 

Ostlund, echoed the beliefs of his staff and subordinates, “I think that the 

perception across the task force is that probes would come long before 

a deliberate effort [by the enemy].”17 He then stated that in his opinion 

“there was enough force protection and combat power [at COP Kahler] 

to dissuade any anticipated attack.”18 In terms of expectations of enemy 

actions, Ostlund and Myer were supported by Colonel Preysler, their 

brigade commander, and Generals Milley and Schloesser at CJTF-101. 

These officers all felt that a large attack at Wanat was unlikely, at least in 

the near future.19

The enemy response to Operation ROCK MOVE reinforced US 

assumptions. To the TF Rock planners, the most dangerous part of the 

operation was the withdrawal from Bella and the initial occupation of 

Wanat. An insurgent attack at Bella while helicopters were evacuating 

the position could have proven devastating. A complex ambush against 
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the newly arriving troops at Wanat could have been equally disastrous. 

However, neither event occurred. The timing of the evacuation of Bella 

with the occupation of Wanat seemingly confused the enemy. The 

Americans had achieved tactical surprise against the insurgents in both 

phases of the operation. No helicopters were shot down at Bella and the 

Coalition force arrived in Wanat without any opposition.20

Given the history of operations in the Waygal Valley during the TF Rock

deployment, there was good reason to expect no large enemy operations 

after the successful execution of ROCK MOVE. Chosen Company had 

seen only two major attacks during its operations in the Waygal Valley, 

the assault on Ranch House in August 2007 and the ambush near Bella in 

November of that year. The overall level of enemy activity in the valley 

was much less than in other parts of the battalion sector. As measured 

by troops in contact (TICs) incidents, the Korengal Valley, B Company’s 

sector, was three times as active as the Waygal Valley. In that valley, B 

Company had three bases including the Korengal Outpost and COP 

Restrepo. Able Company’s sector along the Pech River and in the Watapor 

and Shigal Valleys was more than twice as active. A large enemy attack 

shortly after the unopposed occupation of the Wanat position would have 

been an unprecedented action on the part of the insurgents. This belief was 

reinforced when, after the successful movement to Wanat and closure of 

Bella, Wanat was quiet in the four days leading up to the attack. In that 

same four day period, the battalion’s 12 additional bases registered daily 

enemy contacts and attacks.21

The insurgents in the Waygal Valley, of course, did not act according to 

precedent. Two factors played key roles in the enemy’s almost immediate 

strike on COP Kahler. The first was the availability of a massed force of 

insurgents near Bella. The second was the Coalition’s lack of operational 

security and operational surprise in the move to Wanat. In addition, the 

massing of insurgent forces was a combination of two additional factors. 

July was the middle of the insurgent campaigning season and each year the 

insurgents focused their efforts on one Coalition site. In the later days of the 

previous season, the insurgents had directed their efforts at Ranch House. 

In 2008 the enemy planned to strike at Bella. Intelligence indicators for 

several months before ROCK MOVE had indicated this enemy intention. 

The objective was either to disrupt a Coalition withdrawal or to take credit 

for the Coalition withdrawal after it occurred. The insurgent leaders did 

not want to let a campaigning season go by without at least one major 

attack against a fixed American location. When this did not happen at 

Bella and Coalition forces began arriving at Wanat, it appears the new 

outpost became the fresh target.22
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Before this shift, the enemy concentration against Bella did not 

go unobserved. The TF Rock S2 section noticed the increased enemy 

activities around the isolated post. Specifically during the period 1-4 July, 

there were indicators that the insurgent leadership intended to attack Bella 

at the first opportunity with at least 300 fighters. The Apache strike on 

the insurgent mortar teams on 4 July possibly disrupted the attack against 

Bella and probably wounded Osman, the insurgent leader. In addition, 

Captain Pry, the TF Rock S2 officer, felt that the land use discussions in 

Wanat had forced Osman, or his successor, to divide his forces between 

Bella and Wanat. The resulting pressure on the civilian population at Wanat 

was evident at the shuras held there on 26 May and 8 June. However, the 

need to target two places meant that the enemy was unable to assemble 

sufficient forces to attack either.23

Although Pry thought that the force massed to attack Bella could 

be used to attack Wanat instead, he was uncertain that this would be the 

immediate insurgent response. Pry was certain that the enemy had to react 

to the Coalition move into Wanat because such a development would 

threaten the insurgents’ freedom of action. If the AAF knew in advance 

when an occupation would take place, they would try to disrupt it or 

prevent it. Moreover, a position at Wanat would be most vulnerable during 

its initial occupation. Pry had some indications that Osman had already 

begun to take measures to prepare for operations at Wanat, such as the 

caching of supplies and weapons.24

Once ROCK MOVE had succeeded, the enemy reaction was less 

certain. Before Chosen’s 2d Platoon went to Wanat, Myer and Pry 

discussed the situation. The result of these discussions was inconclusive. 

While Pry felt the enemy had the capability to conduct a large attack, 

there was no direct evidence that they would do so. Myer agreed that a 

large scale assault was unlikely, although he felt the Coalition force at 

Wanat was adequate to repulse any attack if one did take place. After Bella 

was closed on 9 July, the enemy had a significant amount of fighters and 

resources in the Bella/Wanat area and only one Coalition post left to target; 

the newly established position at Wanat.25

Because of the nature of COIN operations in Afghanistan, with their 

inherent interaction with local populations of mixed loyalties, operational 

security and operational surprise were difficult if not impossible to 

attain. This was the case at Wanat where the Coalition forces desired 

to accommodate local sensibilities before placing a new camp near the 

village. As early as their 2007 predeployment site visit, TF Rock leaders 

had looked at the Wanat area as the site of a potential COP. Since existing 
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US Army procedures required the negotiation of land use with local 

ownership, the US forces could not simply occupy the site. Seizure of 

land for military purposes in wartime has been a longstanding military 

tradition. Nevertheless, in Afghanistan in 2008, despite the presence of 

a determined enemy in the countryside, there was an established set of 

procedures for taking local land for military use. While generally designed 

to accommodate local sensitivities, the Wanat negotiations had the opposite 

effect of antagonizing community leaders who were under pressure from 

the insurgents to avoid overt cooperation with the Coalition. Ironically, in 

this instance, the Wanat elders would have preferred that the US forces 

simply seize the land and reimburse them later.26

The land negotiations telegraphed the Coalition intention to move 

into the Wanat area. However, after the enemy began to intimidate the 

local citizenry, the negotiations became extended. On both sides, the 

Coalition occupation of Wanat became more of an event on the horizon 

rather than a reality. While the Wanat elders and the insurgent leaders 

knew that the Coalition intended to establish itself in the town, TF Rock 

leaders did not explain when or how this move would be made. Even so, 

the land negotiations did include the discussion of the location of the new 

base with the local civilian leadership. The geography of the village and 

valley restricted the options available to TF Rock and in a land ownership 

document negotiated between Ostlund and the district governor on 20 

April 2008, the TF Rock commander provided the governor with the 

intended site for the proposed COP. In retrospect, the TF Rock commander 

considered the district governor to be “an informant for the AAF.”27 Still, 

given the situation where Coalition officials negotiated for the use of 

specific plots of land, it was unavoidable that local nationals with unknown 

loyalty would become aware of which plots were to be used. This was 

a risk inherent to COIN operations in which the counterinsurgent forces 

strive to avoid unnecessarily alienating local populations.28

By withholding the specific timing of ROCK MOVE, TF Rock 

surprised the insurgents. This coup prevented the enemy from disrupting 

the initial establishment of COP Kahler when Coalition forces were most 

vulnerable. However, the combination of an available force in the region 

and some foreknowledge of the Coalition intent in Wanat greatly facilitated 

the insurgents’ capacity to transform a planned attack on Bella into an 

attack on Wanat without the usual and methodical escalation of contact. 

Although tactically surprised by the American occupation of Wanat on 8 

July, the enemy was able in turn to tactically surprise Coalition forces at 

COP Kahler on 13 July.
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Although the Americans did not expect any attack larger than a limited 

probe or harassing indirect fire, the Coalition chain of command believed 

that the force placed at Wanat and the fire support it had arranged could 

repel any unexpected assault. The force at COP Kahler, equivalent to two 

platoons of infantry with on site indirect fire and engineer support, was 

twice the size of the element that had successfully defended the Ranch 

House position 10 months earlier. Additionally, TF Rock had given to the 

Wanat garrison the priority of field artillery fires from the two 155-mm 

artillery pieces stationed at Camp Blessing and an additional two howitzers 

at Asadabad. The battalion QRF, Chosen Company’s 1st Platoon, was 

available for immediate reinforcement of Wanat. How the Coalition chain 

of command, from platoon to CJTF levels, understood the enemy situation 

in the Wanat area is salient to this discussion. That state of affairs evolved 

quickly between the arrival of US forces on the evening of 8 July through 

the morning of 13 July when the insurgents launched their attack. How 

did the Coalition forces gather information about their surroundings in the 

days between their arrival and the attack?

The ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) assets assigned 

by CJTF-101 to support Operation ROCK MOVE were important to the 

understanding of the situation in and around Wanat. Systems such as the 

Predator UAV that provided full motion video (FMV) and the Red Ridge 

aircraft that offered signals intelligence (SIGINT) were few in number and 

in high demand across Afghanistan in 2008. These assets were controlled 

by CJTF-101 which carefully managed their apportionment. For Coalition 

forces in Regional Command–East (RC-East), an area amounting to close 

to 50,000 square miles, only a single Predator UAV and a single WarriorAlpha UAV were available. In the Waygal Valley, the Predator UAV and 

other ISR assets controlled by the CJTF were critical because the UAVs 

belonging to the brigade and battalion could not operate there. TF Rock’s 

assigned Raven UAVs, for example, were small and fragile systems that 

were highly susceptible to the wind conditions in the valleys of Nuristan. 

TF Rock S2 Pry described the Raven as a “liability” in the Waygal Valley. 

Similarly, the high elevation and steep slopes of the Waygal Valley also 

prevented the employment of the brigade level Hunter UAV system over 

Wanat.29

Operation ROCK MOVE had a high priority at the CJTF-level. That 

status led the CJTF ISR managers to apportion a great deal of FMV and 

SIGINT coverage to Wanat in the first 72 hours of the operation. In the 

period from 9 July through the morning of 11 July, the Predator and Red 

Ridge systems collected information on the Waygal Valley. On each of 
210

these days, the FMV support amounted to 15 hours of coverage and the 

SIGINT to eight hours. These amounts are impressive but it is important 

to note that on each day, at least some of the FMV coverage of Wanat was 

reduced because the UAV system had to be shifted to combat operations 

in which Coalition forces were in contact with insurgents. During the 

three day period beginning on the morning of 9 July, neither the FMV nor 

the SIGINT systems detected any indicators of an enemy force that was 

massing around Wanat with intent to attack COP Kahler. 

CJTF-101 ISR managers made apportionment schedules 72 hours 

in advance. Before ROCK MOVE had begun, they had ensured that ISR 

coverage over Wanat would be substantial in the first three days of COP 

Kahler’s operations. Once the disestablishment of COP Bella, considered 

the most risky part of ROCK MOVE, was complete and the situation around 

Wanat appeared stable, the priorities at CJTF-101 changed. In the second 

week of July, CJTF Commander Schloesser and his staff were managing 

a number of large scale operations and crises including a major offensive 

operation in the Tangi Valley of Wardak Province where Coalition forces 

were actively seeking insurgent groups that had tortured, killed, and 

mutilated three American Army National Guardsmen. In the two weeks 

before the Wanat attack and the two weeks following that assault, there 

were over 60 insurgent attacks in southern Paktika and Khowst provinces 

and an additional 20 attacks along the Konar and Nangarhar provincial 

border areas. Compounding the challenges posed by the constant demands 

of these combat actions were poor weather conditions which after 11 July 

significantly reduced the amount of ISR available across Afghanistan. On 

11 July, the force at Wanat was supposed to have received some FMV 

coverage but incidents near the city of Khowst and in the Tangi Valley in 

which Coalition forces were in contact with the enemy took precedence 

and no UAV missions were flown over Wanat. Poor weather on 12 July 

grounded most of the FMV systems but four hours of SIGINT coverage 

was given to COP Kahler. This support ended at 1630 on 12 July.30

On 10 July, Pry had learned that the ISR coverage over COP Kahler 

was no longer guaranteed after 11 July and would likely diminish as other 

priorities became more important. While Pry and key staff in TF Rock and 

TF Bayonet vociferously protested the change in ISR apportionment and 

demanded that the CJTF continue to give significant FMV and SIGINT 

support to COP Kahler, the very real priorities noted above trumped their 

concerns. Without these external ISR resources, Chosen Company had 

to depend on its own sensors. The ITAS (Improved Target Acquisition 

System) component of the TOW missile system and the LRAS3 (Long 
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Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System) Ostlund had given to the 

unit were available for detection of visual threats. The Low Level Voice 

Intercept (LLVI) team and the ICOM scanners at battalion level continued 

to search for enemy communications that might indicate impending action 

against the new combat outpost.

Whether or not the Predator would have detected the movement of the 

insurgent force into Wanat after dark on 12/13 July is questionable. Using 

their LRAS3 and ITAS, the 2d Platoon identified a potential threat on that 

night just before the enemy attack began. This lack of detection suggests 

that the insurgents had moved onto the high ground surrounding Wanat as 

well as into the town itself in small groups that were not easily detected by 

the CJTF-level ISR assets. Having the UAV and other ISR assets overhead 

on the morning of 13 July may have enhanced the situational awareness of 

the force at COP Kahler but it is far from clear that those assets would have 

played a decisive role in disrupting the insurgent attack.

The members of the 2d Platoon also used simple observation to collect 

information of the developing situation. The most important observation 

they made during this period was that the number of military aged Afghan 

men was growing in Wanat while the women and children seemed to 

disappear. Moreover, a number of the paratroopers at COP Kahler asserted 

that many of these men appeared to be closely watching the activities 

at the COP. However, based on prior experience, Myer had expected 

such scrutiny. Perhaps more alarming was the lack of support from the 

governmental and local leaders at Wanat during the first few days of the 

operation. The Afghans had rebuffed all attempts by Brostrom to arrange a 

meeting with them. On 12 July, Brostrom discovered that the local Afghan 

leaders were holding a shura at the district center without an American 

presence. His concern then increased after he interrupted the meeting and 

was met with hostility. Finally, on the evening of 12 July, Myer received 

what could be interpreted as a veiled, if not relatively typical, warning 

of an imminent attack from a Wanat family that was supportive of the 

Coalition.

The TF Rock staff acknowledged receiving a report about the 

suspicious shura on 12 July but Myer did not report the Wanat elder’s 

warning he received on the eve of the insurgent attack. Myer discounted 

its significance. The local elder who gave it “was a guy that always said 

that in general terms we were going to get attacked. So I didn’t report 

anything because that is not what I thought.”31 Accordingly, the collected 

data did not decisively indicate to either Myer or his superiors that enemy 

forces were massing in and around Wanat for an attack. More precisely, 
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it is probable that the observations made by the force at COP Kahler did 

not override the lack of indications from the CJTF-level ISR assets or the 

widely held assumptions about how the enemy would begin any attack on 

Wanat.

The expectation of limited enemy action at Wanat shaped all Coalition 

actions in the days before the attack. When examining the thoughts and 

actions of key leaders and staff at the platoon, company, and battalion 

levels, it would be useful to assess further why assumptions about enemy 

intent were not reevaluated, given developing intelligence on the ground. 

There was no single certain indicator that the enemy had massed for an 

imminent attack. Certainly, neither the SIGINT nor IMINT detected such 

activity.There were signs, however, of growing insurgent activity in Wanat 

and its environs that might have generated new assessments in the days 

before the attack.

The Delays in Construction of COP Kahler

Once the Coalition force arrived on 8 and 9 July, the defenses of the 

base grew steadily but slowly. The most glaring problem was the delay 

in the arrival of the Afghan companies contracted to deliver the majority 

of the manpower, supplies, and equipment with which the COP would be 

constructed. There was nothing out of the ordinary in the use of Afghan 

contractors in this situation. Military engineer assets were in high demand 

across Afghanistan and Coalition units sought to hire contractors from 

the general area to offer employment that might help garner support from 

the population. However, no Afghan contractors in the Waygal Valley 

could provide the required construction services. Thus, TF Rock chose a 

contractor that had done similar work for the Army elsewhere in Konar 

province and, within the norms of the Afghan work environment, could be 

expected to perform to standard. 

While security concerns and communications problems delayed the 

arrival of the construction companies, Ostlund and Myer knew this before 

the commencement of ROCK MOVE and chose to risk going forward 

with the operation anyway. This was a calculated decision based on the 

lunar illumination cycle which would provide safer flying conditions for 

the aerial extraction of the Bella garrison and an attempt to have the new 

position established with the maximum number of days before the follow 

on unit took over AO Rock. Given the enemy’s prior deliberate actions, 

this seemed to be a reasonable chance to take at the time.32

Lacking the heavy equipment and construction materials that would 

have been provided by the Afghan companies, the 2d Platoon and the squad 
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from the 62d Engineer Battalion labored in the first four days to construct 

an initial defensive perimeter that was smaller in scale and protective 

capacity than was originally planned. To construct their positions, the 

paratroopers of the 2d Platoon relied on hand excavating tools (which they 

had to share), sandbags, concertina wire, and the HESCOs. Of course, the 

engineer squad did much of the heavier work, even while the Bobcat was 

inoperable. The Bobcat, even if it had remained operational throughout the 

whole preparatory period, could not have ascended the terraces that led to 

the OP to improve the position there.

In this labor, the hot weather and the developing shortage of bottled 

water slowed the ability of the men at COP Kahler to complete the work. 

They had brought as much bottled water as they could load in their 

vehicles along with all their other supplies. While Dzwik, the 2d Platoon 

sergeant, admitted he had miscalculated the amount of water required for 

the weather conditions, the five days of supply dictated in the operations 

order required aerial or ground resupply to accumulate from stockpiles 

at Camp Blessing. In the first days of COP Kahler, however, expected 

resupply was limited by a shortage of available aircraft and security on 

the ground route between Blessing and Wanat. The heat and water status 

was never so dire that the paratroopers completely ceased working. In fact, 

they had filters and iodine tablets that would have enabled them to draw 

water from a nearby well or the Waygal River if the water situation had 

become an emergency. However, with the resupply situation being unclear 

and more limited than expected, the platoon leadership reprioritized and 

asked for a resupply of bottled water from TF Rock while limiting labor to 

the cooler parts of the day rather than collect water from local sources. The 

requested bottled water soon arrived when several civilian trucks arrived 

from Camp Blessing with the cargo. This resupply was followed by an 

additional water shipment which came by Chinook helicopter with Myer 

on the day before the battle.33

Certainly, an earlier arrival of the Afghan construction companies 

with additional barrier material (sandbags, concertina wire, etc.) and more 

excavation tools would have enabled the US and Afghan troops to build more 

complete positions and allowed for the construction of overhead cover for 

the fighting positions. This supplementary protection may have afforded 

greater cover from the small arms fire and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) 

fragments that rained down on the Americans from insurgent positions 

on the roofs of buildings or on ridgelines. Nevertheless, the 2d Platoon 

and the ANA, while not able to build an impregnable defense in the days 

before the attack, surely did construct adequate defenses which managed 

to repulse the ensuing enemy assault.
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The most important effect of the platoon’s focus on constructing the 

COP, and the self imposed restrictions on labor in the hot weather, is that 

the platoon leader did not believe he could spare any element to mount 

regular patrols in the town and its immediate vicinity. Brostrom did lead 

a patrol to the Wanat district headquarters on 12 July where he found 

the local Afghan leaders holding a meeting. Other than this instance, the 

platoon leader apparently felt that he could not spare any of his men to 

conduct security patrols. Benton, the 2d Squad leader, stated, “We just did 

not have the assets to support ourselves moving much farther away [from 

the town center]. Moving a kilometer away from what we had, you were 

just signing your own death warrant at that point.”34

These concerns were real. The lack of regular patrols, however, meant 

Coalition forces at Wanat were not interacting with the population of the 

town to foster relationships and collect intelligence, both of which are 

critical to successful counterinsurgency operations. Moreover, the lack 

of patrols meant that for much of the four days they were in Wanat, the 

Coalition forces had little understanding of what was occurring in much 

of the town and on key terrain such as the deep ravine to the north of OP 

Topside.

Only on the morning of 13 July did Brostrom, at Myer’s urging, 

prepare to lead a second patrol. The purpose of this patrol, which included 

both US and Afghan troops, was to locate a potential site for a new OP. As 

the patrol prepared to leave the COP before dawn on 13 July, the insurgent 

attack began. The opportunity to detect the insurgents maneuvering on the 

high ground around Wanat or their infiltration into the town in the days 

before the assault had thus been lost.

The Timing of Operation ROCK MOVE: The Relief by TF Duke

Some of the paratroopers in TF Rock, including members of the 

2d Platoon, Chosen Company, contended that the relief in place (RIP) 

operation in early July 2008 ultimately affected the planning and execution 

of ROCK MOVE. The relief of TF Bayonet and TF Rock by TF Duke (3d 

Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division) and TF Blue Spaders (1st 

Battalion, 26th Infantry) was a complex operation that was to take place 

over a number of weeks between 7 July and early August. The execution 

of the RIP complicated operations at the battalion level during the period 

immediately prior to the Wanat attack. The staff had to plan for both current 

tactical operations and the imminent redeployment. Moreover, some key 

personnel such as the brigade engineer, had redeployed early to facilitate 

the return to home station.35
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Certainly, some leaders in the 2d Platoon believed the RIP distracted 

TF Rock. Dzwik described the timing of ROCK MOVE as problematic, if 

only because the RIP involved moving thousands of unit members around 

Afghanistan with helicopters, assets that were in short supply even without 

an ongoing relief. Other observers have noted that the traditional winter lull 

in combat operations presented a better time to establish a new COP in the 

Waygal Valley. TF Rock might have considered doing exactly this during 

the winter months of late 2007 and early 2008. However, at that time the 

unit was still committed to operating at COP Bella and Chosen Company 

had only one platoon available for manning outposts in the Waygal Valley. 

Thus, that winter would have been a difficult time to establish a second 

COP in the valley.36

The Coalition command could have tasked the incoming unit, 

TF Duke, with the mission of establishing the COP at Wanat, either 

immediately after the RIP or in the latter months of 2008 when the fighting 

season waned. The higher echelons of command at division, brigade, and 

battalion levels however, believed that TF Rock was a better choice for the 

job and that the end of that unit’s deployment was a better time. They did 

not want to pass this mission to a new unit which lacked the experience 

of TF Rock and organizationally had fewer troops and other resources 

than Ostlund’s command. Brigadier General Milley recalled that both the 

brigade commander and battalion commander believed that their units 

were the right force to establish the COP at Wanat. Milley remembered 

that Preysler “absolutely did not want, and strongly recommended against, 

handing that task off to the incoming brigade.”37 Milley considered the 

potential problems presented by executing ROCK MOVE while the RIP 

was ongoing. Ultimately, Schloesser and Milley decided that because 

Preysler and Ostlund had over 15 months of experience in the region and 

had been developing the operation for months, TF Rock was the right team 

to establish the COP at Wanat.38

Defensive Positioning

While contextual factors like the RIP contributed to the conditions 

extant prior to the attack at Wanat, far more important to the course of the 

engagement was the tactical situation at COP Kahler itself. Specifically, 

the positioning of the defenders and the placement of weapons had a direct 

effect on the unfolding of events. The size of the Wanat garrison is the best 

starting point for this discussion. C Company had placed two platoons, 

one US and one ANA (with three US Marine advisors), amounting to 56 

infantrymen plus a medic and a forward observer, at Wanat. This force 

was supported by a small composite mortar section consisting of a single 
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120-mm mortar, one 60-mm mortar, and six men. The battalion also 

augmented the garrison with a three man TOW missile squad attached 

from D Company to provide highly accurate direct fire support. TF 

Rock also attached an engineer squad (six men) from the supporting 62d 

Engineer Battalion to Chosen Company in order to build fighting positions 

at COP Kahler. Counting Meyer and Aass, this total force of 73 Soldiers 

was significantly stronger and more capable than the half-platoons from 

Chosen Company that had earlier garrisoned the more isolated Ranch 

House and Bella outposts. Further, the contingent at COP Kahler was 

larger than all those that manned TF Rock’s other separate bases, with the 

exception of Camp Blessing, in July 2008.39

The leaders of the Wanat garrison found a position with great potential 

and significant vulnerabilities. Most of the populated areas in Nuristan 

were in valleys surrounded by steep sided mountains. Thus, any position 

in or near these communities was by definition dominated by high ground. 

Wanat was no exception. However, the village, located as it was only five 

miles north of Camp Blessing near Nangalam, was far less remote than 

the previous outposts at Bella and Aranas. Further, a reasonably good 

road that reinforcements used on the day of the battle connected Wanat 

to Nangalam. When helicopter support was necessary, the aircraft found 

fewer terrain hazards around Wanat than at Bella and Ranch House. The 

position of COP Kahler itself, on the edge of the town, offered good fields 

of fire in several directions and was compact enough that units could easily 

be shifted around it.

The positioning of squad and weapon positions within the larger COP 

is yet another issue. The establishment of fighting positions is part of the 

art of infantry leadership. Because of the myriad of factors involved, there 

is no single correct manner of establishing a COP. At Wanat the ultimate 

repulse of the enemy attack vindicates the defensive arrangements to 

a degree. Still, salient facts about the tactical placement of squads and 

weapon positions contributed to the way in which the battle unfolded. The 

merits of the precise position of the COP as well as the location of vehicles 

and crew-served weapons, for example, require further discussion. The 

comments of the platoon sergeant of the reinforcing platoon from B 

Company, fresh from the Korengal Valley, focused on the weaknesses of 

the positions at COP Kahler, including the vulnerabilities of the OP. He 

noted:

My initial perception of the battlefield was why are we in 

the low ground, where are the fortifications, and why don’t 

we own any high ground? All of the gun trucks appeared 
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to be set within a distance of 50-75 meters of one another. 

. . The [enemy] had made use of all available dead space 

and buildings surrounding the area where COP Kahler was 

established and the high grounds on all sides. The OP was 

open to fires from the high ground on its north and west sides. 

. . The bazaar separated the OP from the main element where 

additional [enemy] personnel were located, further separating 

the US forces.40

The general location of the COP, the dead space surrounding it, the 

positioning of the vehicles and the OP, and the insurgent use of nearby 

buildings, form the core of the discussion that follows. 

COIN principles and Coalition land use policies created several 

paradoxes for the Soldiers at COP Kahler. While the best terrain for defense 

was on the high ground surrounding the town, any outpost placed on the 

ridges would be separated in time and distance from that community. 

This separation would have violated COIN imperatives that directed 

counterinsurgent forces to live with and be near the local people. That 

proximity would allow the Coalition to have a greater understanding of the 

situation in the settlement and would foster positive relationships between 

the Coalition and town residents. Therefore, COP Kahler needed to be as 

close to Wanat as possible. Contributing to this decision about location 

of the COP was an assumption that the proximity of a large number of 

civilians to some extent would deter the insurgents from launching major 

assaults on the outpost. This belief, while perhaps true in the abstract, was 

negated in practice by the insurgents’ success in intimidating the Wanat 

residents and infiltrating into the town immediately prior to the attack.

The restricted space on the main COP made the positioning of the 

120-mm and 60-mm mortars problematic, particularly once the insurgents 

occupied positions in the nearby buildings. Given the surrounding high 

ground, the nearby buildings, and the size of the COP, there were no real 

sites for the mortars that would not be subjected to direct small arms 

and RPG fire. However, in the cases of both systems, there were better 

alternatives. While the mortar section placed its 120-mm mortar in a large 

protected firing position, which also served as the platoon ammunition 

point, the site was located on the perimeter of the COP protected from 

enemy fire and ground assault solely by the concertina wire and the 

incompletely filled HESCO barrier encircling the position.

While US Army mortar crews are expected to be able to defend 

themselves, their primary mission is to fire the mortars. Accordingly, 
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placing the tubes behind the protection of infantry squad fighting positions 

would have facilitated the execution of this primary mission. Once the 

battle started, the mortar section found itself consumed with self defense. 

The proximity of the ammunition point and firing pit to the COP perimeter 

meant that the Soldiers designated to man the mortar were too close to the 

enemy to employ their main weapon system without risking their survival.

The 60-mm mortar was also poorly emplaced and employed. Left in 

an unmanned position in the center of the COP, the location provided no 

cover or concealment. Effective enemy small arms fire isolated the tube’s 

position. The 60-mm was designed for quick emplacement and portability 

but it remained on a site exposed to concentrated enemy fire. Accordingly, 

this small, portable, and very valuable weapon system remained unused 

throughout the battle.

The positioning and use of the ANA platoon also merits discussion. 

Typically, the ANA played a key role in Coalition operations through its 

ability to communicate with the local population and provide security 

while US forces accomplish other tasks. During the Coalition’s operations 

in 2006 in Wanat, the ANA played an important role in the defense, 

occupying key OP positions on high ground around the main position and 

conducting security patrols and interaction with the local civilians. In July 

2008, the activities of the ANA platoon were restricted to constructing and 

manning three fighting positions on the north side of the COP and a traffic 

control point (TCP) on the main road just south of the COP. This TCP was 

redundant as it was backed up by an American TCP a short distance down 

the same road. On his arrival at Wanat, Myer noted that his interaction 

with the ANA was restricted to looking at “the ANA sector of fire to ensure 

that they would have good fire control measures to keep them from firing 

at US forces.”41 However, as noted above, Myer and Brostrom eventually 

planned to use the ANA for the patrol tasked with reconnoitering sites for 

a new OP on high ground overlooking the COP. The insurgents attacked 

before this patrol began.

After their arrival on 9 July, the 24 Afghan soldiers and their three 

USMC advisors were certainly available to perform a variety of patrols as 

well as man OPs. The Marines believed that the Afghan soldiers possessed 

adequate training and skills to perform effective dismounted patrolling. 

With the structures so close to the COP perimeter, an ANA presence in the 

town could possibly have prevented the enemy occupation of the bazaar 

and other nearby structures. The ANA might have detected many of the 

signs of enemy infiltration in the town or picked up other indications of the 

impending attack. Unfortunately, the C Company paratroopers generally 
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distrusted the ANA, holding them in the same low regard as the Afghan 

Security Guards (ASG) who had failed the company at Ranch House and 

had killed 2d Platoon’s Sergeant First Class Kahler at Bella.42

The disposition and use of weapons systems at the COP also shaped 

the course of the battle. The 2d Platoon had a relatively large number 

of crew-served direct fire weapons as well as smaller squad automatic 

weapons (SAWs) at the outpost. The vehicle mounted weapons and the 

machine guns were key to the defense of any outpost such as COP Kahler. 

In the case of the 13 July battle at Wanat, these weapons and their crews 

unleashed a great amount of suppressive fire throughout the engagement. 

It is important to note that none of the vehicle mounted weapons could 

directly support the men at OP Topside. This is probably why the platoon 

leadership chose to place both of the unit’s M240 machine guns at the OP.

During the engagement, some of the platoon’s weapons failed. A 

superficial examination of these failures may lead to the conclusion that 

the root causes were either inherent to the weapons’ design or lay in poor 

maintenance by the operators. However, a more systematic analysis of 

weapons usage shows that almost all of the weapons that failed did so 

after firing a high volume of rounds in a short period. While about a fifth 

of the weapons failed sometime during the action, all but one of these 

cases occurred after the weapons were fired at a high rate for a number 

of minutes. The one exception was a SAW from the engineer squad that 

initially failed to fire but after a routine barrel change was back in action. 

Several other SAWs also jammed but their operators were able to put 

them back into working order. There is no conclusive evidence that the 

weapons’ failures led to any of the casualties at COP Kahler.

The concept of employment of weapons in an infantry platoon 

directed crew-served weapons to provide high rates of fire capable of 

suppressing enemy positions. These weapons, M240 machine guns and 

SAWs especially, were designed for such use and were equipped with beltfed ammunition and extra barrels. No M240s failed in the action and the 

SAWs that jammed, did so after firing a great number of rounds. As noted 

above, these jams were fixed when the operators changed barrels. In fact, 

most of the weapons that jammed at Wanat were M4 carbines. The M4 

was the basic individual weapon carried by US Soldiers in Afghanistan 

and was not designed to fire at the maximum or cyclic rate for extended 

periods. Enemy action and weapons dispositions forced the defenders of 

COP Kahler and OP Topside to use their M4s in uncharacteristic roles. 

This, not weapons maintenance deficiencies or inherent weaknesses in 

weapons design, was the reason a number of weapons jammed during the 
220

battle. The maintenance of a high rate of fire was critical to retaining fire 

superiority and to prevent positions (particularly OP Topside) from being 

overrun by determined and continuous insurgent assaults.

During the insurgent attack, the amount of suppressive fire from 

the crew-served weapons might have been greater but enemy fire, not 

mechanical failures, hindered their effectiveness. The two mortars were 

positioned in such a manner that the enemy was able to place direct small 

arms fire onto their locations. RPG fire at the beginning of the action 

destroyed the vehicle mounted TOW. The crew of one of the M240 

machine guns at the OP was severely wounded by RPG fire at the first 

enemy volley and the operator of the sniper rifle was killed early. The 

two M240s at the OP were left unmanned for long periods because one 

crew was out of action and the other had run out of ammunition, not 

realizing there was additional ammunition available in the OP from the 

unmanned weapon. When reinforcements arrived and attempted to use the 

M240 manned by the wounded or killed Soldiers, they were killed before 

they could fire the weapon. The other M240 remained unmanned until the 

second QRF arrived. The Marine advisors also had an M240, which was 

used throughout the action and was later moved to the OP position.

The main position had two Mk-19 grenade launchers mounted on 

HMMWVs and a .50-caliber machine gun mounted on the platoon leader’s 

HMMWV. Of these, one Mk-19 jammed but was repaired and fired for the 

remainder of the action. The other was fired until enemy fire destroyed it. 

The platoon leader’s .50-caliber machine gun fired continuously throughout 

the action. An additional M2 machine gun mounted on a HMMWV was 

stationed at the traffic control point and fired until knocked out by enemy 

fire.

Fire support external to C Company, along with the ability of the 

Americans to freely shift forces around and between defensive positions, 

proved to be decisive at Wanat. The arrival of the AH-64 Apache attack 

helicopters specifically, appears to have been a key moment in the 

engagement. The fire directed by the Apaches at the insurgent locations 

near the OP gave enough of a breathing space for the force at COP Kahler 

to consolidate and redistribute its strength. From that moment forward, the 

insurgents were essentially on the defensive.

This success is not to argue that the fire support plan was executed 

smoothly. The enemy’s ability to move very close to the Coalition positions 

prior to the start of the fight negated most of the preplanned fires making 

fire support an improvised process. Moreover, the absence of the company 
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fire support officer (FSO) and the isolation of the platoon forward observer 

at the OP hindered the coordination of support, especially the AH-64 

Apaches, forcing Myer to devote most of his attention to such issues. On 

12 July, Myer had left the FSO at Camp Blessing because he believed 

Pitts, the platoon forward observer, was extremely competent. He had 

no idea that Pitts would be fighting for his life at Topside during most 

of the engagement. Accordingly, Myer was forced to focus on managing 

air support (CAS), indirect fire assets, and MEDEVAC assets during 

the major part of the action. This limited his direct influence on tactical 

decisions. However, what impact the absence of the company FSO had on 

fire support is speculative, at best. Myer managed to obtain both fire and 

MEDEVAC assets for Wanat as soon as possible and, with only a single 

platoon from his company on the ground, this was undoubtedly his most 

important role in the battle.

The first Apaches arrived about an hour after the start of the action. 

Since the critical part of ROCK MOVE had already passed, the limited 

number of Apaches was providing a general support role for all of TF 

Bayonet based out of the centrally located airbase at Jalalabad. The 

direct flight time to Wanat was about 30 minutes. However, the Apaches 

were delayed by the requirement to escort the MEDEVAC Blackhawk 

helicopters, also located at Jalalabad, which were alerted after the Apaches 

were. The AH-64s then had to loiter around Camp Blessing until the field 

artillery barrage was halted so they could safely approach Wanat. Attack 

aviation arrived at Wanat as quickly as it could.

The placement of the OP is perhaps the most important factor 

contributing to the course of the engagement at Wanat. As documented in 

the second chapter, the leadership of the 2d Platoon was concerned that 

troops at the main COP had only limited fields of vision to the east because 

the bazaar blocked that view. Also of concern was the inability to see to the 

north, especially toward the bridges over the river from the COP. The view 

in this direction was blocked by the town’s buildings. Any OP location 

had to offer relatively clear views in both these directions. Accordingly, 

beginning in April, C Company commander Myer, 2d Platoon leader 

Brostrom and platoon sergeant Dzwik began looking at the ridgeline that 

OP Topside ultimately was placed on as the general location for an OP 

position.43 

Some consideration was given to establishing an OP on top of or 

inside the hotel. However, that decision would have entailed moving the 

residents out of the building and thus risked alienating the population. 

Finally, while Brostrom and Dzwik believed the OP needed to be on 
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higher ground, Brostrom also thought it could not be so far up the rise 

of the slope that travel between the location and the main COP would 

become too dangerous or time consuming. Put simply, Brostrom and 

Dzwik believed that if attacked, the OP had to be close enough for quick 

and easy reinforcement. An additional factor was a rocky outcropping 

partway up the ridge to the east of the bazaar. This outcropping consisted 

of three large rocks arranged in a roughly triangular configuration and a 

large shady tree. The paratroopers felt that the rocks would enhance the OP 

position by providing a certain amount of natural protection. The position 

of the rocks, however, was not on the military crest of the ridge, a fact that 

ultimately affected fields of observation. Brostrom eventually went along 

with this point, even defending the decision later with Myer, his company 

commander.44

All these factors led Brostrom to choose a spot on the side of the 

ridgeline approximately 60 yards east-northeast of the main COP. While 

that location offered good fields of vision eastward and distantly to the 

north, it was separated from the COP by the bazaar. This not only made 

OP Topside difficult to see from the main COP but also forced any travel 

between the OP and the main COP to go around the bazaar buildings 

which might complicate the movement of any reinforcing unit. More 

importantly, OP Topside was potentially fatally vulnerable because of the 

proximity of the deep ravine directly to its north and the dead space that 

this terrain feature created to within ten yards of the northern position 

of the OP. Enemy elements approaching westward down the Wayskawdi 

Creek toward Wanat could use the concealment offered by the dead space 

to get within grenade range of the OP when they initiated their attack. 

The 2d Platoon did not adequately cover this dead space either through 

the use of mines, early warning devices, or by patrolling. The platoon 

leader’s decision against mounting patrols has been discussed earlier in 

this chapter. The mine available to cover dead space was the Claymore 

antipersonnel mine. The Claymores used at OP Topside were not employed 

in this capacity but rather emplaced closer to the OP to repulse ground 

assaults during periods of limited visibility. In this role, the Claymores 

had a mixed record. More passive measures, such as tripwire flares or 

other movement detection devices do not seem to have been available to 

the platoon. Nor did the unit place expedient early warning devices in 

the dead space. However, the platoon leadership was quite aware of the 

problem and planned to use indirect fire to engage any enemy element 

detected in that low ground. The mortars were the most responsive indirect 

fire weapons for this mission but enemy action precluded the early use of 
223

the best indirect fire systems available to cover the space. The 155-mm 

howitzers at Camp Blessing were also available but during the battle the 

proximity of the enemy to the OP made their use dangerous.

After the battle, both Myer and Dzwik expressed reservations about 

the location of the OP primarily because of the dead space but also because 

higher ground overlooked it. On his arrival at COP Kahler on 12 July, 

Captain Myer determined that the site of the OP was not optimal and 

planned to shift it to a better location at the earliest opportunity. Because 

Myer did not believe an attack was imminent, this shift was to take place 

the morning of the attack. Such a site would have likely been farther 

to the east along the same ridge in a position better able to observe the 

ravine of the Wayskawdi Creek. That position would have been harder to 

reinforce than OP Topside proved to be. However, if Brostrom and Dzwik 

had redefined the mission of the OP to be a small post that would provide 

early warning of enemy movements rather than a relatively larger post 

that had a robust ability (two M240 machine guns) to not just detect but 

fight the enemy, the need for reinforcement may have been precluded. 

The reinforcing platoon from B Company did, in fact, move the OP to this 

position on higher ground at its first opportunity.45

Summary

All operations in war require a certain amount of risk because there 

are variables in play that could impact operations. These variables include 

the weather, the effects of terrain and, most importantly, the actions of the 

enemy. In COIN, the actions of the civilian population must be added to 

this list. At Wanat, a very experienced American infantry unit executed a 

complicated operation to establish a new post several days before the end 

of their deployment. The insurgent enemy, already prepared to attack the 

now abandoned Bella outpost, shifted gears against almost all American 

expectations, and attacked the new Wanat position within days of its 

establishment. The American and ANA forces defeated this attack but 

suffered nine combat deaths and over two dozen wounded in that defense. 

The Coalition then withdrew from the area. This final section summarizes 

the reasons for and the results of the actions on 13 July 2008 in Wanat, 

Afghanistan.

Counterinsurgency Operations

Across its large AO, TF Rock clearly pursued a COIN campaign. The 

unit’s operations were a combination of lethal and nonlethal missions, all 

focused on winning support from the local population. The TF had great 

success in the Pech Valley by using road construction and other building 
224

projects. In the Korengal and Waygal Valleys, there was less success in 

winning support. The xenophobia of the Waygal population was one reason 

for this lack of success. Nuristanis have historically shown suspicion of 

and sometimes hostility toward outsiders. This hostility could be defined 

as tightly as distrust of a neighboring village and as loosely as hatred of 

any foreigners. 

Compounding this cultural factor was the relatively minimal force 

projected by the Coalition into the valley. Because TF Rock’s units were 

stretched across a huge and mountainous region, Chosen Company, the 

element responsible for the Waygal Valley, could only afford to commit 

one US platoon to the valley at any given time. In a COIN campaign, 

such decentralization automatically incurred risk. In order to minimize 

the inherent risk, TF Rock’s leadership attempted to reallocate forces and 

other assets to meet changing demands and enemy actions. In fact, one 

can argue that leaders in CJTF-101, TF Bayonet, and TF Rock decided to 

conduct ROCK MOVE because they were felt strongly that COP Bella 

was too risky too maintain. Lieutenant Colonel Ostlund and his staff 

further attempted to mitigate risk generally by establishing quick reaction 

forces as well as positioning supporting units such as field artillery and 

combat aviation in places where they could best assist the small outposts. 

This was a difficult balancing act and one that had to be done on almost a 

daily basis. 

Decentralized operations also meant that the Coalition could offer 

only promises of comprehensive security to the population in many 

communities. The reality was that local insurgents in the Korengal, 

Waygal, and other valleys often held a great amount of influence over 

loyalties and actions of local populations.The enemy presence in Wanat 

was so great that it turned the town’s leaders against the government that 

had appointed them and into accomplices in the attack on COP Kahler. 

TF Rock never fully gained a strong foothold in the Waygal Valley. The 

small elements that manned the COPs at Bella and Aranas were never 

large enough to provide security and win the support of the populations of 

those small settlements. The establishment of COP Kahler was TF Rock’s 

attempt to remedy the situation by building a new outpost in the district 

center. The leadership in TF Rock recognized that the insurgents held 

power in Wanat but believed that Operation ROCK MOVE was a way 

to mitigate this influence in Wanat and, over time, reverse this condition. 

Further, the base at Wanat would not only be more secure because of its 

proximity to Camp Blessing but it would serve as the platform from which 

TF Rock and TF Duke, the incoming US brigade in the region, could begin 

efforts to win support from the population of the Waygal Valley.
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Combat Outpost Stationing in TF Rock

This work has attempted to place the battle at Wanat into the historical 

context of operations in the Waygal Valley. Over the course of 2007 and 

early 2008, the Coalition outposts were gradually moved nearer the main 

regional base at Camp Blessing. Wanat was the least remote post in the 

Waygal Valley. It was located less than five miles from Camp Blessing, far 

closer to the battalion headquarters than many other platoon sized positions 

in the TF Rock AO. Platoon COPs were the most common type of position 

in the TF Rock AO. Several such positions, including COP Kahler, also 

contained a company headquarters element as well as a combat platoon. 

With 74 Soldiers including the Afghan unit and other US attachments, 

the force at COP Kahler on 13 July was actually larger than that which 

manned typical outposts in the eastern part of Afghanistan.

Operations in AO Rock were decentralized to the company and 

platoon levels. The position at Wanat was a US and ANA platoon 

position. The platoon leader, assisted by his platoon sergeant, was the 

appropriate level of command. However, both the ANA and 2-503d 

Infantry deployed company headquarters to the position after a couple 

of days. This was appropriate considering that the platoons had been 

augmented with company and battalion level assets (mortars, TOW, and 

engineers). Command and control was simplified by collocating company 

commanders to the location. Whether higher level commanders (battalion, 

brigade, division) should have come to Wanat in the short period before 

the battle is problematic. To the chain of command, the most dangerous 

part of ROCK MOVE was the initial occupation of the position. Once this 

happened successfully, Wanat became a lesser priority than places under 

continual enemy contact such as the Korengal and Pech Valley regions. 

While TF Rock had intelligence indicators of massed insurgents, these 

were thought to have been brought together to attack the long established 

COP Bella. After air attacks blunted such an attack on 4 July and the move 

to Wanat was successfully executed several days later, most US observers 

felt that the enemy would have to have a preparatory period before 

attacking Wanat by ground assault. This was the enemy pattern in the past.

The decision to conduct ROCK MOVE during the beginning of 

the relief in place, transfer of authority (RIPTOA) process was clearly 

a calculated risk. However, the American chain of command strongly 

believed that such a maneuver was less risky if conducted by the departing 

experienced unit, rather than the new inexperienced unit, TF Blue Spaders. 

Therefore, having Chosen Company conduct ROCK MOVE was actually 

considered the less risky action. 
226

Although the battalion and brigade commanders did not visit Wanat 

before the battle and Myer only arrived the day before, this was hardly 

an example of command neglect. These commanders had busy schedules 

and multiple operations going on during the period 8-12 July. On 11 July, 

Ostlund escorted Admiral Michael Mullen, the senior American military 

officer, in a tour of the Korengal Valley and otherwise had a full slate of 

meetings with local officials and leaders throughout the AO Rock region. 

Myer personally directed the evacuation of Bella on 8 and 9 July and 

was diverted to Camp Blessing for the investigation of the 4 July Apache 

incident in which he played a major role. 12 July was the earliest he could 

get to Wanat given the investigation and the availability of transportation. 

Given that the Waygal Valley was quiet during the Bella evacuation and 

the first days of the Wanat occupation, it seems reasonable that these 

officers’ attentions were devoted to more pressing matters. 

Insurgent Performance 

 The preparations made by the insurgents at Wanat appear to have been 

thorough. Troops apparently assembled, received arms and ammunition, 

and marched to preparatory positions without any problems. In this, they 

were aided both by the illumination cycle and, critically, the American 

expectation that any overt action by the enemy would begin with probing 

attacks. However, once the battle started, usual insurgent deficiencies 

became apparent. Enemy fire control was almost nonexistent with volume 

substituting for accuracy and although the AAF massed forces at Wanat, 

they were not all committed initially to provide the maximum effect. 

Nevertheless, initial enemy fire was accurate enough to target effectively 

COP Kahler’s most powerful weapon systems. The TOW vehicle was 

destroyed by several RPG hits fired at short range. None actually hit the 

TOW system itself, which theoretically could have been removed from 

the vehicle and mounted on the ground until the ammunition caught fire. 

While insurgent fire neutralized the mortars, it also damaged the enemy 

position in the bazaar. Although the enemy fire’s intensity was high, its 

relative inaccuracy allowed the Americans to shift troops around the 

position and reinforce the OP several times. If the insurgents had not been 

firing from positions so close to the Americans, this advantage in volume 

would likely have been lost as well.

While the insurgents massed a relatively large force to attack Wanat, 

not all their forces appear to have been committed at the same time. Had 

they done so, the effect may have been decisive. Instead, the enemy was 

able to stay in the firefight for an extended period of time despite the 

likelihood of incurring significant casualties. This left some of their fresh 
227

troops exposed to American firepower when air support and reinforcements 

arrived. The insurgents would have been better served to have used their 

entire force in one massive strike at the beginning of the action. As it was, 

the survivors were exposed to concentrated fires from Coalition CAS as 

they withdrew from the battle area.

The Outcome at Wanat 

At the tactical level, American and ANA troops successfully defended 

COP Kahler. The key factor in the defense was that the forces employed, 

particularly when supported with additional firepower assets and a stream 

of reinforcements, were adequate to defend the positions. The defenders 

were able to maintain sufficient fires throughout the action, allowing 

leaders at the base to shift forces to protect the most threatened areas, 

particularly the OP. This achievement came in spite of the neutralization 

of the unit’s mortars and TOW, the limited value of field artillery in the 

region, and the hour required by the AH-64 Apaches to travel to Wanat. 

The Coalition’s defense of Wanat vindicated an approach that featured 

reserves of air power and ground troops made readily available to areas 

under attack.

Following the battle at Wanat, Major General Schloesser, the CJTF101 commander, decided to remove Coalition forces from the Waygal 

valley. His reasoning behind this decision rested on his understanding that 

the population in Wanat did not support the Coalition generally and would 

not support a COP within the limits of the town. Further, he believed that 

CJTF-101 did not have the troops and other resources necessary to place 

a new COP on the high ground above Wanat, from which a successful 

campaign to win over the town population might be possible. This 

evacuation was more of a relocation of the available forces than a retreat. 

Both TF Rock and its successor unit TF Blue Spaders, had responsibility 

for a large AO that included the most densely population areas of the 

Konar and Pech River valleys as well as the dangerous Korengal Valley. 

The RIP between TF Rock and TF Blue Spaders was not a one for one 

relief. The new unit was a modular combined arms battalion reconfigured 

to light infantry status for duty in Afghanistan. As such, it was slightly 

smaller than the airborne infantry battalion it was replacing. Without an 

influx of additional troops into the region, the US presence in this AO, 

already limited, would necessarily become smaller.

Events subsequent to the battle make the decision to evacuate the 

Waygal valley more difficult to assess. After the attack on COP Kahler, 

the US command adopted an indirect approach to deal with the Waygal 
228

Valley. Rather than creating small outposts with the limited number of 

troops available in the valley, the command decided to isolate the area and 

use the troops in more populated areas. On assuming his duties in June 

2009, General Stanley McChrystal, the American theater commander in 

Afghanistan, adopted a similar policy on a broader basis which resulted 

in the withdrawal of US forces from many capillary valleys in Northeast 

Afghanistan. 

At the strategic level, Wanat will only prove to have negative effects 

if ultimately the United States departs Afghanistan because the nation 

becomes convinced that the overall effort is not worth the cost, with Wanat 

being used as one piece of evidence in such an argument. As such, the 

battle’s importance could rise to a level far greater than its actual military 

significance.

Casualties at Wanat

The relatively high American casualty rate on 13 July 2008 has been 

attributed to a number of causes. These include weapons failures, command 

neglect, intelligence failures, logistics deficiencies, slow air support, and a 

failure to conduct COIN operations. A detailed analysis of these assertions 

shows that weapons did not fail and that problems with logistical support, 

while possibly hindering the creation of an impregnable defense, did not 

hinder the creation of an adequate defense. Air support was dispatched as 

quickly as possible with any delays based on a combination of limited air 

assets and the geography of northeastern Afghanistan.

The major cause of American casualties sits squarely in the realm 

of situational awareness, more specifically the Coalition leadership’s 

understanding of the insurgent enemy capability and intent. This situational 

awareness is better described not as a failure but as one of the persistent 

risks in warfare that so far has not been eliminated by advanced military 

technology. The enemy reacted in a way the Americans did not expect. 

While an adequate force and quick reaction system was in place to prevent 

a more complete disaster, this miscalculation did contribute to the high 

number of casualties.

Intelligence is not simply a matter of information collection. It is also 

a matter of information interpretation. By July 2008, all the officers in the 

TF Rock and TF Bayonet chain of command were experienced veterans 

of the war with these insurgents. They expected the enemy forces to react 

in the same way they had in the past. The insurgents had never attacked 

a position so soon after its establishment. They had never induced the 

population of a town to depart and allow that community to be turned into 
229

a base for immediate operations. While Coalition intelligence indicated 

that the enemy intended to attack in the Waygal Valley, the insurgents 

showed an uncharacteristic flexibility in shifting their focus immediately 

from Bella to Wanat and then in executing the attack.

The hot and cold nature of operations in the Waygal Valley played 

into the insurgents’ hands and was a major reason for the American 

interpretation. While the district saw three of the biggest battles in TF 

Rock’s tour in northeast Afghanistan, the area was virtually inactive 

between these events, particularly when compared to other valleys. When 

the dangerous portion of ROCK MOVE, the withdrawal from COP Bella, 

was successfully completed, the Waygal Valley seemed to have reverted to 

a cold status. Limited intelligence assets were moved elsewhere and signs 

that the enemy had assembled large forces were interpreted to mean an 

eventual attack, not an immediate one.

A secondary cause for the large number of casualties was the 

positioning of OP Topside, the site where eight of the nine deaths 

occurred. Observers will understandably argue about whether or not the 

platoon leadership made an accurate risk assessment which included key 

factors such as terrain, weapons emplacement and employment, dead 

space, and fields of fire. However, the overriding consideration is whether 

the benefits that the location of the OP gave to the force at COP Kahler 

outweighed its weaknesses. To be sure, the OP allowed for observation of 

the bridges to the north and up the slopes to the east and northeast. The 

platoon leader had magnified the capabilities of the OP by placing the 

platoon forward observer (FO) and LRAS3 there. Additionally, for an OP, 

Topside was manned by a sizable force that had two M240 machine guns 

along with other small arms. Finally, the OP was positioned near enough 

to the main COP to allow reinforcements to reach it relatively quickly.

On the other hand, the force at the OP was too small and too isolated 

to maintain the firepower necessary to repulse, without casualties, any 

sizable enemy contingent that attacked from close proximity. This type of 

attack was possible because of the ravine directly to the north of the OP 

which the Soldiers could not observe. This inability to see into the ravine 

was a critical weakness and ultimately, that terrain served as a covered and 

concealed route for the insurgents during the battle. The initial insurgent 

volley of fire from small arms and RPGs, while effective elsewhere, was 

particularly devastating to the nine man position on the side of the ridge. 

After the opening fusillade and the insurgents’ successful approach to the 

very edge of the OP, the initial fight at Topside became one of attrition 

in which the larger enemy force would probably win. This outcome 
230

became all the more likely when a large reinforcing element did not move 

immediately to the isolated OP once the fight began. All of the Soldiers at 

the main COP were busy reacting to enemy fire at that time. Instead, over 

the course of the first hour of the engagement, two smaller ad hoc QRFs 

arrived at the OP separately. Each of these forces took casualties, some 

incurred even before they arrived at Topside but these valorous actions and 

the arrival of the AH-64 Apache attack helicopters prevented the OP from 

being overrun by the enemy.

Closing Thoughts

Any military engagement if examined closely enough, will yield 

insights of potentially great value to serving Soldiers as they go forward 

to meet the challenges of their era. The engagement at Wanat, Afghanistan 

on 13 July 2008 is no exception. Different reviewers may use the same 

facts to reach different lists of insights or “lessons learned.” Thus, such 

a list compiled by one individual is by its very nature incomplete when 

seen by a wider community. This truism notwithstanding, the creation of 

such a list may be a useful exercise at this stage of our understanding of 

the Wanat fight. What follows is an admittedly partial list of observations 

and potential insights from CSI’s investigation of the engagement on 13 

July 2008:46

1. In a country like Afghanistan, with its extremes of terrain, altitude, 

and weather, the positive effect of a relatively small infantry force can be 

multiplied several fold by committing what would normally be considered 

an excessive number of enablers such as aviation and engineer assets. In 

a war of small heavily fortified posts nestled amongst the population in 

nearly vertical terrain, aviation and engineer units can extend the reach, 

sustainability, and survivability of the maneuver formations committed to 

the fight.

2. In a COIN environment, where the emphasis is on interaction with 

the populace, units may find themselves distributed throughout a large 

area in small platoon or squad-sized outposts. When these smaller units 

are operating in a decentralized manner across a distributed battlefield, 

commanders at all levels must provide necessary capabilities or further 

assess risk when required capabilities are not available. Within risk 

assessments, it is critical to determine where risk is mitigated and where it 

is not, therefore identifying acceptable and unacceptable risk.

3. Soldiers at any level can be lulled into an unwarranted sense of 

security in regard to what they believe the enemy will do and give short 

shrift to what the enemy can do based upon previous experience. Virtually 
231

everyone involved with Operation ROCK MOVE, from squad to CJTF, 

expected the enemy to respond in a particular way and that way was 

quite different from what actually happened. Military history is replete 

with examples of Soldiers turning threat analysis based on templates 

into ironclad paradigms, to their ultimate detriment. While the outcome 

at Wanat was not quite so catastrophic as some earlier examples of this 

phenomenon from American military history, the cost to 2d Platoon, 

Chosen Company was high in July 2008.

4. The normal progression of observations by low level units up 

the intelligence chain can lead to the loss of nuance and significance in 

the successive INTSUMs (intelligence summaries) ultimately reaching 

decision-makers. What the TF Bayonet G2 called “atmospherics” tended 

to drop out of the reporting of events as the multiple echelons recast and 

broadened their submissions. At least one general officer in the Wanat 

story has considered this phenomenon important enough to warrant 

possible structural changes in the reporting methodology.

5. When units rotate in and out of theater on a more or less fixed 

but staggered schedule, strong consideration should be given to the 

human effects such policies engender. Tasks given to both incoming and 

outgoing units should be balanced against both their capabilities and their 

expectations. At the higher echelons, these considerations seem to have 

been well balanced in regard to executing Operation ROCK MOVE during 

a complex RIP-TOA. Some of that understanding and balance, however, 

may not have penetrated to the company and platoon level where the 

policy had to be implemented at the end of a long, tiring, and dangerous 

tour in Afghanistan.

6. In a complex COIN environment, host nation forces will most 

likely be present and will also most likely not initially reach the level of 

professionalism thought to be necessary by their American counterparts. 

This disparity in capabilities can easily lead American personnel to 

underutilize the host nation units when attached to an American led 

operation, resulting in a potential loss of fighting power. The ANA platoon 

at Wanat, was still judged to be relatively immature as a unit, and thus was 

assigned solely to the construction of its own defensive positions. 

7. Given the perceived need to co-locate with the population in a 

COIN-centric operation, Coalition forces must retain situational awareness 

beyond their perimeter. If true standoff distance cannot be obtained or is 

deemed counterproductive, some means to see beyond the next building 

periodically must be gained. At Wanat, regular patrolling was foregone in 
232

the interest of advancing the state of the defensive fortifications, a difficult 

but understandable choice. Given the particular physical layout of the 

Wanat position, however, more aggressive patrolling may have been the 

only means to gain the necessary situational awareness to deny the enemy 

an unimpeded and concealed approach to the COP.

8. In small unit actions involving defensive positions, choices made 

early in micro-environments may have large consequences. Observation 

Post Topside, while sited to see the distant bridges, the higher mountains, 

and the southeast ridge upon whose lower slopes it sat, had absolutely 

no capability to see into the ravine of the Wayskawdi Creek or indeed 

into the dead ground little more than 10 yards in front of it. Thus the 

LRAS3 emplaced at Topside could see far but not near thereby permitting 

a concealed approach to both Topside and the village buildings between 

Topside and the main COP. While there seldom are perfect choices in 

defensive placement and the reasons for placing Topside where it was 

are understandable, the fact remains that an unobserved approach to 

within grenade range of the Coalition positions was left uncovered. Seen 

in that light, the formidable earth moving done by SGT Pitts’s Topside 

garrison may have inadvertently provided a false sense of security for all, 

however well it sheltered the occupants of the OP. Throughout the history 

of infantry fighting, placement decisions of only a few yards difference 

occasionally make a vast difference in the outcome of the fight and Wanat 

was no exception.

9. Finally, in a point that hardly bears repeating, technological 

superiority does not always guarantee battlefield success at minimal cost. 

Full motion video and robust SIGINT are helpful but are not infallible 

panaceas even if available 24/7. Technological marvels like ITAS and 

LRAS3 marvelously extend our range of vision but cannot yet extend into 

dead ground 10 yards in our front. Eventually, technology often gives way 

to human factors: courage, fear, and fatigue to name but a few and we must 

rely upon what some have called “aggressive self rescue” by individual 

Soldiers to prevail. The engagement at Wanat is yet another example of 

that phenomenon.

War can be studied. Tremendous tools of technology can be applied 

to complex analyses. What is unpredictable and cannot be completely 

measured is the human factor. The opposing sides are composed of human 

beings whose actions and reactions can be projected but not completely 

predicted. At Wanat, the enemy did not act as expected. Nevertheless, the 

defenders, although relatively small in number and dispersed over two 

separate positions and without their most important crew-served weapons, 

fought harder than the enemy expected and defeated them.
233

American casualties in the Battle of Wanat, although still relatively 

small in comparison to similar actions in American military history, were 

higher than public expectations in the modern age. Accordingly, the media 

and the public have sought an explanation for the losses. However, such 

explanations are not necessarily clear cut. War is not a science but an art. 

It is a series of actions and reactions by opposing sides both of which are 

operating in an environment of uncertainty. Historically, a professional 

military force has served the United States well and the US Soldiers and 

Marines who fought at Wanat on 13 July 2008 maintained, and indeed, 

strengthened this tradition.
234

Notes

 1. Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-02, Operational Terms and 

Graphics (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 1-10.

2. Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed., s.v.“1Overrun.”

3. An example of even a semi-official government media outlet referring to 

an overrun at Wanat is “US, Afghan Troops Abandon Base Overrun by Militants,” 

Voice of America News, 16 July 2008, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/

library/news/2008/07/mil-080716-voa01.htm (accessed on 31 August 2010). As 

late as June 2010, media outlets were still referring to Wanat incorrectly as an 

ambush. See Greg Jaffe, “Army Overrules Inquiry Faulting Officers in Wanat 

Ambush,” Washington Post, 24 June 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/06/23/AR2010062305289.html (accessed on 31 August 

2010).

4. Exhibit 16a (CPT, Company Commander, C/2-503d IN, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 60-3, 68-9; Exhibit 11a (COL, Brigade Commander, 173d ABCT, 

interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 17-19; Exhibit 7a (LTC, Battalion Commander, 

2-503d IN, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation 

into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, 

Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 23, 50-1, 54-5; Exhibit 9a (MG, CJTF101 Commander, 101st Airborne Division, interview) to US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal 

District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 26, 29-30; 

Milley interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 22-3.

5. Greg Jaffe, “‘They Feel Like Outsiders and They Don’t Want to Be:’ The 

U.S. Hopes that Afghans in Areas Along the Pech River Will Embrace Progress, 

But Much Unrest Remains,” Washington Post, 6 October 2009, http://www.

washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/05/AR2009100503799_

pf.html (accessed 14 December 2009).

6. The crew of one of the M240 machine guns at the OP perceived they had 

run out of ammunition, although the basic load of the other M240 positioned at 

the OP was available nearby for their use.

7. Sergeant First Class David Dzwik, interview by Matt Matthews, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 October 2008, 7.

8. Sergeant Erik Aass, interview by Matt Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 January 2009, 11.

9. The DSC recommendation was for SGT Ryan Pitts. The Silver Star 

awardees included, in alphabetical order: SPC Ayers (posthumous), 1LT Brostrom 

(posthumous), SPC Davis, SPC Denton, SGT Garcia (posthumous), SGT Gilmore, 
235

SSG Grimm, SPC Hayes, CPL (USMC) Jones, CPT Myer, SSG E. Phillips, SGT 

Pitts (interim award), SSG Samaroo, and SPC Scantlin.

10. Carter Malkasian and Gerald Meyerle, Provincial Reconstruction Teams: 

How Do We Know They Work? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

2009), 19; TF Rock, “AO Rock Overview, 26 July 2008” Briefing, slide 92.

11. Colonel William Ostlund, e-mail to Donald P. Wright, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 September 2009; TF Rock, “AO 

ROCK Overview, 26 July 2008” Briefing, slide 31. Population figures are 

from 2000 and were found at http://geobase.org.af/maps/national/population/

afgPopulationEstimates.xls (accessed 18 December 2009).

12. Colonel William Ostlund, interview by Contemporary Operations Study 

Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19–20 March 2009, 10.

13. Captain Matthew Myer, interview by Matt Matthews, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 December 2008, 3, 8.

14. Myer, interview.

15. TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE, 2/3 ANA, C/2-503 IN (ABN) and 

2-17 CAV, Level 1 CONOP, 8–9 July 08” Briefing, slide 6.

16. First Lieutenant Matthew Colley, statement to Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, undated 2009, 6; TF Rock, 

“CONOP ROCK MOVE” Briefing, slide 7.

17. Lieutenant Colonel William Ostlund, e-mail to Donald P. Wright, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 November 2009.

18. Ostlund e-mail. 

19. Exhibit 9a (MG, CJTF-101 Commander, 101st Airborne Division, 

interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 26, 29-30; Milley interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 

22-3; Exhibit 11a (COL, Brigade Commander, 173d ABCT, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 17-19

20. TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE” Briefing, slides 5 and 7. Lieutenant 

Colonel William Ostlund, e-mail to Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 8 May 2009. After the 4 July incident, while 

no aircraft were fired upon at Bella, the AAF did periodically shoot RPGs at the 

outpost. Despite the lack of antiaircraft fire, TF Rock personnel were very anxious 

about this threat as intercepted enemy ICOM radio traffic indicated that the AAF 

was preparing to engage helicopters in the area. See TF Bayonet, “07 July 2008 

Bayonet CUB Brief to CJTF-101,” 7 July 2008.
236

21. TF Rock, “TIC Asset Tracker” Spreadsheet, 22 July 2008; General 

Charles Campbell, “Memorandum, Subject: Army Action on the Re-Investigation 

into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, 

Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008, 13 May 2010, 8-9, 11; TF Rock, “Rock Daily 

Snapshot-Thursday, July 10, 2008.” 

22. TF Rock, “CONOP ROCK MOVE” Briefing, slide 6; Lieutenant Colonel 

William Ostlund, “Battle of Wanat Storyboard and Brief” Briefing, 16 July 2008, 

slide 4; Myer, interview, 1 December 2008, 4. 

23. Captain Benjamin Pry, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 May 2009, 6; TF Rock, “CONOP 

ROCK MOVE” Briefing, slides 6 and 7.

24. Pry, interview, 6 May 2009, 8; 

25. Pry; Myer, interview, 1 December 2008, 3.

26. Pry, interview, 6 May 2009, 7; Ostlund, “Battle of Wanat Storyboard and 

Brief” Briefing, slide 3.

27. Lieutenant Colonel William Ostlund Statement, CJTF-101, “Army 

Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified 

Version)” (Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, 21 October 2008).

28. Pry, interview, 6 May 2009, 7.

29. Pry, interview, 6 May 2009, 12–13.

30. Brigadier General Mark Milley, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison and 

Dr. William G. Robertson, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 

and 20 August 2009, 23; Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, America’s 

War in Afghanistan (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 2009), 311–312; 

US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 44-45.

31. Exhibit 16a (CPT, Company Commander, C/2-503d IN, interview) to US 

Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-investigation into the Combat Action at 

Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 64.

32. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Major Brian T. Beckno, 

interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 2 July 2009, 3–7 and Exhibit 12a (COL, Commander, 101st Aviation Brigade, 

interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 8-9.

33. Captain Devin George, “Logistics at Wanat,” e-mail to Douglas R. 

Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 April 2009.
237

34. Staff Sergeant Jonathan G. Benton, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 August 2009, 8.

35. Captain William Cromie, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 August 2009. The transfer of authority 

between TF Rock and TF Blue Spaders ultimately took place on 24 July 2008.

36. Sergeant First Class David Dzwik, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2 April 2009, 4.

37. Milley, interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 18.

38. Mille interview, 23.

39. Even in the volatile Korengal Valley, the reinforced B Company occupied 

three platoon-size outposts rather than one large company position.

40. Exhibit 10 (SFC, B/2-503d IN, statement)CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” 

(Korengal Outpost, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 1.

41. Captain Matthew Myer, Sworn Statement (Co C, 2d Battalion, 503d 

Infantry), CJTF-101, “AR 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat, 21 July 2008.”

42. Exhibit 42b (Staff Sergeant, USMC ETT 5-3, statement) to US Central 

Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat 

Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 

(Redacted), 39, 42.

43. Sergeant First Class David Dzwik, interview by Douglas R. Cubbison, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 9 July 2009, 2.

44. Exhibit 25 (SFC C/2-503d IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 

15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp 

Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 1; Exhibit 55 (CPT C/2-503d IN, statement), 

CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat (Redacted, 

Unclassified Version)” (Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 2008), 1; Dzwik, 

interview, 9 July 2009, 4–5; Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Anderson, interview by 

Douglas Cubbison, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 April 

2009, 4.

45. Dzwik, interview, 9 July 2009, 4–5; Exhibit 55, CJTF-101, “Army 

Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of Wanat”, 1; Exhibit 52 (1LT B/2-503d 

IN, statement), CJTF-101, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into Battle of 

Wanat (Redacted, Unclassified Version)” (Camp Blessing, Afghanistan, 16 July 

2008), 1-2.

46. Exhibit 10a (BG, CJTF-101 Deputy Commander, 101st Airborne Division, 

interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-Investigation into the 

Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, 

on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 43; Exhibit 10c (BG, CJTF-101 Deputy Commander, 

101st Airborne Division, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “Re-
238

Investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan 

Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 31-34; Exhibit 19a (LTC, 

Brigade S2, 173d ABCT, interview) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), “ReInvestigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan 

Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 43

26, 29-30; Milley interview, 18 and 20 August 2009, 19-21; Exhibit 19c (LTC, 

Brigade S2, 173d ABCT, statement) to US Central Command (CENTCOM), 

“Re-Investigation into the Combat Action at Wanat Village, Wygal District, 

Nuristan Province, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008 (Redacted), 4-5. The problem 

of templates unthinkingly becoming paradigms is well explored in Timothy 

Karcher, Understanding the “Victory Disease,” from the Little Bighorn to 

Mogadishu and Beyond, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper No. 3, Fort 

Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004.
239

Glossary

1LT first lieutenant

AAF Anti-Afghan Force (Afghanistan Insurgents)

AAR after action review

ABCT Airborne Brigade Combat Team

ACM anti-Coalition militia (Afghanistan 

Insurgents)

ANA Afghan National Army

ANP Afghan National Police

AO area of operation

AR Army Regulation

ASF Afghan Security Forces

ASG Afghan Security Guard

ASP ammunition supply point

BCT brigade combat team

BDU battle dress uniform

BMNT begin morning nautical twilight

BN battalion

CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned

CAS close air support

CCP casualty collection point

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program

CG commanding general

CJTF combined joint task force

CLP cleaner, lubricant, and preservative

CO commanding officer

COIN counterinsurgency

COL colonel

COP combat outpost

CP command post

Cpl corporal (USMC)

CPR cardiopulmonary resuscitation

CPT captain

CREST Contingency Real Estate Support Team

DOD Department of Defense

DSC Distinguished Service Cross

EENT end evening nautical twilight

ETT embedded training team 

FA Field Artillery
240

FMV full motion video

FO forward observer

FOB forward operating base

FRAGO fragmentary order

FSO fire support officer

GIROA Government of the Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan

GWOT Global War on Terrorism

HE high explosive

HHC Headquarters and Headquarters Company

HiG Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin

HMMWV high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle

HTT human terrain team

HUMINT human intelligence

HVT high value target

IBA individual body armor

ICOM integrated communications

ID Infantry Division; identification

IED improvised explosive device

IN Infantry

IO information operations

IR infrared

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISI Inter Services Intelligence

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance

ITAS Improved Target Acquisition System

J2 Intelligence Section at Joint Staff

J3 Operations Section at Joint Staff

JAF Jalalabad Airfield

JMRC Joint Multi-National Readiness Center 

(Hohenfels, Germany)

Kandak ANA Battalion (Afghanistan name)

KIA killed in action

LAW light antitank weapon

LLVI low level voice intercept

LN local national

LOC line of communication

LOO line of operation

LRAS3 Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance 

System
241

LTC lieutenant colonel

LZ landing zone

MBITR multiband inter/intra team-radio

MEDEVAC medical evacuation 

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit

MILDEC military deception

MRE meal, ready to eat; mission-rehearsal 

exercise

MWR morale, welfare, and recreation

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCO noncommissioned officer

NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge

NGO nongovernment organization

NOD night observation device

NVA North Vietnamese Army

OEF Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

OIC officer in charge

OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

OP observation post

OPD officer professional development

PDSS predeployment site survey

PER probable error of range

PFC private first class

PID positive identification

PRT Provisional Reconstruction Team

PV2 private (Pay Grade 2)

QRF quick reaction force

RC-East Regional Command–East

RC-South Regional Command–South

RIP relief in place

RIPTOA relief in place, transfer of authority

ROC rehearsal of concept drill

ROTC Reserve Officers’ Training Corps

RPG rocket propelled grenade 

RSTA reconnaissance surveillance and target 

acquisition

RTO radio-telephone operator

S2 Intelligence Section at Brigade and 

Battalion Staff

S3 Operations Section at Brigade and 

Battalion Staff
242

SAF small arms fire

SAW squad automatic weapon

SEAL Sea, Air, Land

SF Special Forces

SFC sergeant first class

SGT sergeant

SIGINT signal intelligence

SOF Special Operations Forces

SPC specialist

SSG staff sergeant

SSgt Staff Sergeant (USMC)

TAC tactical command post 

TACSAT tactical satellite

TCP traffic control point

“Terp” Afghan Interpreter (nickname)

TF task force

TIC troops in contact

TOC tactical operations center 

TOW tube launched, optically tracked, wire 

guided

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UEX unit of execution

US United States

USAID US Agency for International Development

USMC United States Marine Corps

WIA wounded in action

XO executive officer
243

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