WEAPONS PROLIFERATION AND 

ORGANIZED CRIME: THE RUSSIAN 

MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCE 

DIMENSION 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

INSS Occasional Paper 10 

Proliferation Series

June 1996 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

US Air Force Academy, Colorado 

 The views expressed in this report are those of 

the author and do not necessarily reflect the official 

policy or position of the Department of the Air Force, 

the Department of Defense, or the US Government. This 

report is approved for public release by SAF/PAS; 

distribution is unlimited. 

********

 This paper is the result of research conducted 

under the auspices of an INSS grant in the summer of 

1995. 

******** 

 Comments pertaining to this report are invited 

and should be forwarded to: 

 Director, Institute for National Security 

Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFE 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5D33 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840-6258 

 Voice: (719)-472-2717 

 Fax: (719) 472-2716 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Introduction 1 

The Russian Criminal Environment 4 

Military Crime 9 

Military Crime and the Conventional Arms Trade 11 

Military Crime and Weapons of Mass Destruction 28 

Nuclear Arms and Proliferation Issues 29 

Chemical Arms and Proliferation Issues 39 

Conclusions 45 

Endnotes 48 

FOREWORD 

 We are pleased to publish this tenth volume in 

the Occasional Paper series of the USAF Institute for 

National Security Studies (INSS). This monograph 

represents the results of research conducted during 

fiscal year 1995 under the auspices of a grant from 

INSS. 

 The proliferation of weapons of all types, 

especially weapons of mass destruction (WMD), has 

emerged as a primary international security challenge 

in the post-Cold War era. This paper examines the 

critical issue of weapons proliferation in a unique 

way by focusing on how criminality in the former 

Soviet Union (FSU) exacerbates this problem. 

Undoubtedly, this dimension of the weapons 

proliferation problem does not receive enough 

attention, is not well understood, and presents 

extremely difficult policy-making challenges. As the 

author points out, many very worrisome proliferation 

ingredients are already present in the FSU, including 

huge stockpiles of conventional arms and WMD; 

widespread corruption, turmoil, and uncertainty in 

military and security establishments; and the 

potential for huge profits from state and nonstate 

markets. Adding organized crime to this volatile mix 

creates an explosive recipe and marks the FSU as the 

primary source of weapons proliferation for years to 

come. 

About the Institute
 INSS is primarily sponsored by the National 

Security Negotiations Division, Plans and Operations 

Directorate, Headquarters US Air Force and the Dean of 

the Faculty, USAF Academy. Its other sponsors are the 

Assistant Chief of Staff for Air Force Intelligence, 

OSD Net Assessment, the Defense Special Weapons Agency 

(formerly the Defense Nuclear Agency), and the Army 

Environmental Policy Institute. INSS’ mission is to 

promote national security research for the Department 

of Defense within the military academic community and 

support the Air Force national security education 

program. Its primary purpose is to promote research 

in fields of interest to INSS’ sponsors: arms 

control, proliferation, national security, regional 

studies, the revolution in military affairs, 

information warfare, and environmental security. INSS 

coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across the military services to 

develop new ideas for defense policy making. The 

Institute develops topics, selects researchers from 

within the military academic community, and 

administers sponsored research. It also hosts 

conferences and workshops that facilitate the 

dissemination of information to a wide range of 

private and government organizations. INSS is in its 

fourth year of providing valuable, cost-effective 

research to meet the needs of its sponsors. 

 We appreciate your continued interest in INSS 

and its research products. 
PETER L. HAYS, Lt Col, USAF 

Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

 In the changed international security 

environment of the post-Cold War era, concerns related 

to weapons proliferation--especially weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD)--have taken center stage. One 

dimension of this problem that has not received enough 

attention is how organized crime facilitates weapons 

proliferation worldwide. In this context, the former 

Soviet Union (FSU) has emerged as the world’s greatest 

counterproliferation challenge. This region, after 

all, contains the best developed links among organized 

crime, military and security organizations, and 

weapons proliferation. 

 The dissolution of the Soviet Union provided a 

fertile seedbed for the development of serious and 

pernicious criminal activity of all types. Crime in 

the FSU has increased by orders of magnitude. More 

ominously, organized crime has emerged as one of the 

strongest actors in the FSU. According to some 

official Russian estimates, organized crime may now 

control some 40,000 state and private organizations 

and over half of all economic entities within the FSU. 

 The flourishing illegal trade in weapons, both within 

and outside of the FSU, is one of the most serious 

reflections of this overall criminal environment. 

Most importantly, analysts soon reach one inescapable 

conclusion concerning this trade in weapons: Russian 

military and security forces are the principle source 

of arms becoming available to organized crime groups, 

participants in regional conflict, and corrupt state 
officials engaged in the black, gray, and legal arms 

markets in their various dimensions. 

 The post-Cold War explosion of criminal activity 

within Russian military and security organizations 

resulted from the nearly complete breakdown of Soviet 

socioeconomic structures as well as the widespread 

corruption within these organizations during the 

Soviet era. Criminal elements have taken advantage of 

the unique resources and expertise of the military and 

security organizations and, in return, have provided 

nontraditional means of support for these 

organizations in the power vacuum that resulted from 

the Soviet Union’s demise. Analysts both within and 

outside of Russia have increasingly come to recognize 

an extensive and expanding overlap between Russian 

“power ministries” and the criminal world. 

 The flourishing illegal trade in conventional 

weapons is the clearest and most tangible 

manifestation of the close links between Russian power 

ministries and criminal organizations. The sheer 

magnitude and pervasive nature of this problem 

underscore its seriousness. Some 81 tons of 

munitions, for example, had allegedly disappeared by 

the time Russian forces completed their withdrawal 

from East Germany. Moreover, attempts to centralize 

and control sanctioned Russian weapons exports via 

Rosvooruzheniye, the new consolidated state armaments 

company, have proven less than successful. 

Specialized military and security organizations, such 

as the notorious Security Service of the President, 

seem to be increasingly operated as private militias 
to protect the illegal arms trade and various other 

criminal activities. A final clear indication of the 

magnitude of the conventional arms proliferation 

problem within the FSU is the seemingly endless supply 

of sophisticated weapons available to the Chechen 

rebels. 

 The magnitude of the WMD proliferation problem 

from the FSU is less clear and less tangible, but the 

potential is certainly very worrisome. There have 

been many open reports of small-scale fissile material 

smuggling out of the FSU, and Chechen rebels planted 

radioactive material in Moscow’s Ismailov Park. 

However, the existence of a much more dangerous, 

larger-scale, and better-organized Russian “nuclear 

mafia” remains a topic of debate. The 12th Main 

Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (12th GUMO) is 

charged with the security and transportation of 

fissile materials within Russia. With the aid of the 

United States’ Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 

program, the 12th GUMO is attempting to cope with this 

enormous challenge. It is unclear, however, whether 

it will be able to deal with the most serious threats, 

such as attacks by organized criminals or terrorists. 

 The situation with regard to the proliferation 

of chemical weapons (CW) usually receives less 

attention but may be more serious. With an 

acknowledged stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of 

chemical agents, the potential for CW proliferation 

out of the FSU, especially via organized crime 

channels, is enormous. This potential was ominously 

foreshadowed by the March 1995 Tokyo subway nerve gas 
attack, which revealed numerous personnel and hardware 

links between the Russian CW establishment and the Aum 

Shinrikyo cult. 

 Overall, this study reaches four main 

conclusions. First, Russian military and security 

organizations are the primary sources for the 

flourishing illegal weapons trade within and outside 

of the FSU. Second, military criminality is playing 

an integral role in facilitating the illegal weapons 

trade. Third, weapons proliferation is fostered by 

extensive ties between criminal Russian military 

organizations and criminal elements within the Russian 

civil sector. Finally, the aforementioned factors 

raise substantial doubts about the avowed security of 

the Russian nuclear and CW stockpiles. These 

conclusions have enormous implications for American 

and Western policy makers as they attempt to craft 

mechanisms like the CTR to deal effectively with the 

threat of weapons proliferation from the FSU. 

2

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY 

Lieutenant General Paul E. Stein 

Superintendent 

Brigadier General Ruben A. Cubero 

Dean of the Faculty 

HEADQUARTERS, US AIR FORCE 

PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE 

Major General Robert E. Linhard 

Director of Plans 

Colonel (S) Todd Bodenhammer 

Chief, National Security Negotiations Division 

USAF INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES 

Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hays 

Director 

Major Alan R. Van Tassel 

Editor 

Ms Marsha Taylor 

Cover Design 
3

INSS OCCASIONAL PAPERS

1. Explaining Weapons Proliferation: Going 

Beyond the Security Dilemma. Gregory J. 

Rattray, July 1994 

2. The Ukrainian Military: Instrument for 

Defense or Domestic Challenge? Oleg Strekal, 

November 1994 

3. North Korea’s Nuclear Program: The Clinton 

Administration’s Response. William E. Berry, 

Jr., March 1995 

4. Environmental Assistance as National 

Security Policy: Helping the Former Soviet Union 

Find Solutions to its Environmental Problems. 

Robert L. Dunaway, November 1995 

5. Economic Power in the Sino-U.S. 

Relationship. Kevin F. Donovan, December 1995 

6. Nuclear Proliferation: Diminishing Threat? 

William H. Kincade, December 1995

7. Nuclear Proliferation: The Diplomatic Role 

of Non-Weaponized Programs. Rosalind R. 

Reynolds, January 1996

8. Five Minutes Past Midnight: The Clear and 

Present Danger of Nuclear Weapons Grade Fissile 

Materials. Guy B. Roberts, February 1996 

9. The International Legal Implications of 

Information Warfare. Richard W. Aldrich, April 

1996
4

WEAPONS PROLIFERATION AND ORGANIZED CRIME:

THE RUSSIAN MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCE 

DIMENSION

by 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Introduction

 As the end of the 20th Century approaches, the widespread 

availability and distribution of all types of weapons is fueling armed conflicts, 

organized criminal activity, and random violence in many regions of world. 

Arms trafficking--whether black market, gray market, or the injudicious legal 

sale of weapons--has long been a prominent security concern for those areas 

of the world most affected. While weapons trafficking during most of the 

post-World War II era has been assessed in a Cold War context, the 

dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 marked a watershed for this 

already serious problem. Vast new weapons stockpiles and willing 

distributors unrestrained by Cold War political and ideological limitations 

entered local, regional, and international arms markets with considerable 

fervor. 

 The end of the Cold War also marked the start of a new era of 

concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 

the evolving role of state and nonstate actors in the acquisition, spread, and 
5

employment of WMD. The former Soviet Union (FSU)--especially Russia, 

which inherited the bulk of WMD stockpiles, manufacturing potential, and 

technologies--became a central focus of regional and world proliferation 

concerns. While Russian political and military spokesmen officially expressed 

confidence about the security of WMD systems, they also voiced private 

concerns about the ability of state institutions to fully protect WMD stockpiles 

and know-how. At the same time, a combination of wild rumors, frequent 

seizures of low-grade radioactive materials, and a handful of more serious 

proliferation cases indicated that the potential for serious WMD leakages from 

Russia and the FSU was beginning to be realized. 

 Across the spectrum of arms trafficking from small arms to WMDassociated systems, organized crime has come to play a substantial role. This 

criminal involvement takes various forms, including traditional civil-sector 

groups, shadowy commercial ventures, and corrupt government officials. In 

this regard as well, Russia and the FSU have emerged as central concerns, 

since crime and corruption in the wake of the Soviet bloc’s dissolution quickly 

began to shape and influence every dimension of public and private life. 

Military establishments in the region--shrinking, impoverished, and 

demoralized--were far from immune to these pressures and, in the case of the 

Russian armed forces in particular, have become major participants in the 

illegal diversion of weapons. 
6

 Overall, the confluence of volatile developments in Russia and its 

periphery--the presence of large conventional and WMD stockpiles and 

technologies, high levels of crime and corruption, turmoil in large military and 

security establishments, and the potential for huge profits from state and 

nonstate markets--identify the region as a focus of weapons proliferation for 

years to come. The role of organized crime in arms trafficking is manifested 

in the form of traditional criminal groups, criminalized government 

organizations and commercial structures, and corrupt individuals. 

 This study considers both conventional and WMD arms proliferation 

and addresses those criminal structures and corrupt state institutions associated 

with these issues. The focus is on Russia, however, since it is the most 

important potential source of weapons and technologies and the state most 

deeply affected by criminal endeavors. More specifically, the study examines 

the phenomenon of widespread Russian military criminality, the association of 

military organizations with criminal groups, and the extent to which the 

Russian military plays a role in black and gray conventional arms markets. 

After establishing a pattern of systemic Russian military criminality associated 

with conventional arms trafficking, the study addresses those military

organizations most closely involved with nuclear and chemical weapons 

development, storage, and employment and identifies potential vectors within 

the Russian armed forces for the diversion of WMD materials and 

technologies. 
7

The Russian Criminal Environment

 Newly established regimes in Russia, other FSU states, and Eastern 

Europe face serious problems that seem to defy easy solutions. They include 

daunting economic and resource constraints, complex political and social 

problems, weakened and demoralized military and security establishments, 

and a host of transnational security concerns, such as organized crime, 

narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and environmental issues. Conflicts sparked 

by national and ethnic tensions have been joined by unprecedented waves of 

legal and illegal immigration, including refugees from conflict areas. 

Immigrant populations are often seen as bases where foreign criminal or 

terrorist elements can hide and operate. 

 In short, Russia and a number of states in the FSU and Eastern 

Europe have become fertile seedbeds for the most pernicious forms of random 

and organized crime. Throughout these regions, the interests of local, regional, 

and international criminal groups have coincided with the appearance of 

disrupted economies, requirements for hard currency, and reduced law 

enforcement effectiveness. Corruption in particular has become a familiar 

disruption to reform programs ranging from the creation of sound financial 

institutions to the restructuring of military and police forces. 

 The Russian criminal environment is a specific example of the 

corrosive effect that widespread criminality can have on state security 
8

institutions throughout the region.1

 Overall crime rates have continued to 

climb despite dramatic increases beginning in the late 1980s. The Ministry of 

the Interior (MVD) recently indicated that overall crime in the first two 

months of 1995 had increased by some five percent in comparison with the 

same period in 1994, with murders up ten percent. Former Russian Interior 

Minister Viktor Yerin also indicated that the total number of crimes was 

nearly half again as great as published figures, if one considered those crimes 

that were unreported. Other figures from mid-March 1995 indicated that 

juvenile crime had increased by 76 percent over the last six years, a factor that 

is having a considerable effect on the quality of the military conscript pool 

among other more obvious issues.2

 

 It is organized crime, however, that poses the greatest threat to 

Russian national cohesiveness and stability. While estimates vary, a Russian 

specialist recently indicated that some 4,300 criminal gangs exist in Russia, 

the most powerful of which have defined spheres of criminal activity to 

include arms and drug trafficking, gambling, banking, petroleum exports, 

automobile theft and smuggling, precious metals trading, and a host of other 

ventures. For gangs in the Moscow area, some 15 percent were thought to 

have international ties, as do a substantial number outside of Moscow.3

 

 Official 1994 Russian estimates of organized criminal penetration of 

state institutions indicate that criminal groups controlled some 40,000 state 

and private organizations, including hundreds of state enterprises, joint-stock 
9

companies, cooperatives, banks, and markets.4

 The hundreds of Russian 

banks and financial groups are particularly central to criminal endeavors. 

According to a 1995 Ministry of Internal Affairs report, “criminal structures in 

the state now control over 50% of economic entities.”5

 The organizational 

disarray, lack of effective legislation and authority, shifting political 

affiliations, and pervasive criminal penetration present in Russia’s financial 

system have all combined to create rich criminal opportunities.6

 

 The influence of crime in political systems throughout the region is 

pervasive. In this regard, the possibility that increasing numbers of criminals 

may win election or appointment to executive, legislative, or judicial positions 

has been a continuing concern. In the case of the Russian Parliament and 

regional legislatures, this concern appears well-founded, given criminal 

resources and the coercive measures used so effectively in other spheres.7

 The 

potential for criminal penetration of Russian legislative bodies is illustrated by 

Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov’s identification of some 85 criminals 

running for Parliament in the fall of 1995. Kulikov also announced that some 

1,600 linkages between criminals and high government officials were being 

investigated and estimated that 30-50 percent of criminal profits were used to 

bribe state officials.8

 

 Nevertheless, determining who is influenced by organized crime is 

rarely easy, and political agendas run side-by-side with real and alleged 

criminal activities. In Russia, accusations that “reformist political circles” are 
10

heavily influenced by organized criminal agendas mask the actual intentions 

behind the reformers’ “concern for human rights, the constitution, [and] the 

criminal and procedural code.” Such accusations, therefore, require critical 

examination, as do charges directed at representatives of the military-industrial 

sector, former Communists, and other political targets.9

 

 Within this overall environment, and fully reflective of it, the trade in 

weapons is flourishing. While there are various estimates of the number of 

uncontrolled arms circulating in the region, all of them put the number in the 

tens of millions. Aside from the number and variety of circulating arms, 

however, it is the increasingly blurred distinction among black, gray, and legal 

arms trading that constitutes the greatest danger for the mid to long term. 

Arms disseminated through black, gray, and legal channels are provided to a 

variety of recipients and range from custom handguns delivered to mafia 

kingpins to helicopter and fixed-wing aviation resources delivered to drug 

cartels abroad to bulk deliveries of weapons and equipment to paramilitary 

groups and other nation-states. These weapons are provided along routes that 

often are used jointly by drug and other contraband smugglers. The main 

providers include government institutions, specially established business 

ventures and joint-stock companies, corrupt bureaucrats and military officers 

directly and indirectly involved in official arms sales, and organized criminal 

groups.10 With regard to Russia per se, there is a fundamental conclusion that 

analysts soon reach when examining the trade in weapons: Russian military 
11

and security forces remain the principal source of arms becoming available to 

organized crime groups, participants in regional conflicts, and corrupt state 

officials engaged in the black, gray, and legal arms markets in their various 

dimensions. 

 It is instructive, however, to address military criminality more 

generally before looking at specific linkages among Russian military and 

security forces, crime, and weapons proliferation. 

Military Crime

 In some states of the FSU and Eastern Europe, and most dramatically 

in Russia, the deepening association of military and security establishments 

with criminal enterprises has been especially alarming. While military crime 

possesses some special features, it reflects problems in the larger society. It 

clearly is an understatement, as one representative of the Russian Military 

Procuracy put it last year, that “the army organism reacts sensitively to the 

changes in the socioeconomic structure.”11 

 Amid societies and state institutions that are increasingly undermined 

by crime, military and security establishments in the FSU and Eastern Europe 

have been faced with a combination of powerful incentives, opportunities, and 

marketable resources that are facilitating the development of military-criminal 

organizations. At the same time, crime is on the rise in other public and 

private sectors of these fledgling democracies. This is particularly true among 
12

active duty military and security forces--as well as retired or discharged 

military and security personnel--who are faced with diminished prospects and 

low public regard. 

 Typically, military and security forces have ready access to valuable 

state property; the land, air, and sea transport to move that property; and 

specialized skills that criminal organizations need and can put to good use. 

Because of severe economic constraints, military units also began working 

more closely with civilian economic enterprises in many countries and 

concluding a range of contracts and business ventures on their own. On the 

one hand, civil economic elements required direct military support to continue 

functioning, while on the other, military units required new arrangements for 

food, clothing, and other basic support.12

 In this overall environment, military crime has come to incorporate 

activities ranging from individual crimes of opportunity to sophisticated 

organized crime, including close interaction with foreign groups and gangs. 

As one 1995 Russian assessment put it regarding the relationship between the 

“criminal world” and the “power ministries” (as the Defense, Interior, Federal 

Security Service, and other Russian security ministries are termed), “At one 

fine point, two lines--the power ministries and the criminal world--intersected. 

. . . The criminal world was admitted to secret facilities. The power 

ministries--to the criminal world.”13
13

 These still-evolving relationships have reduced the reliability of 

many military units (including those deployed in peacekeeping missions), 

undermined law enforcement efforts at every level, contributed to the 

“criminal resource base,” and generated variations of organized crime as it 

appears in the region and beyond. 

Military Crime and the Conventional Arms Trade

 Developments subsequent to the dissolution of the USSR could 

scarcely have been better designed to sustain and promote military criminality. 

 It should be emphasized, however, that when the Russian armed forces were 

created in May 1992, criminal enterprises had already been flourishing in its 

Soviet predecessor.14 This clearly involved “privatized” arms trade activities 

and a breakdown of centralized control over armaments. The theft of weapons 

in the Russian military, for example, increased by 50 percent in 1989 and 

continued to mount in 1990.15 On a larger scale, in January 1991 United 

Nations personnel enforcing the arms embargo against Iraq found substantial 

quantities of Russian arms and other military items hidden on a Soviet 

merchant ship in the Red Sea. Some arms were even concealed in the 

captain’s cabin. While the incident seemed a puzzling contradiction to the 

USSR’s avowed support of UN sanctions, in retrospect it stands as an early 

indicator of uncontrolled arms trafficking for profit.16 
14

 Clearly, the earliest and most visible indication that criminal trends in 

the Soviet military would continue in the Russian armed forces was the 

widespread theft, diversion, and unauthorized sale of weapons, ammunition, 

and equipment. Providing effective physical security for Russian military 

ordnance depots and other facilities became, and remains at the end of 1995, 

an unsolved problem. The quality of individuals assigned to guard these 

facilities has been severely criticized, and remedial programs to stem losses 

from theft or unauthorized sale have floundered in the face of resource 

shortages, compelling criminal profits, and the near indifference of military 

personnel who face a spectrum of organizational and personal problems.17 

 The consequent hemorrhage of military arms from depots, units, and 

Defense Ministry production facilities has had a number of variants. 

Weapons, munitions, and other equipment are stolen from storage sites by 

civilian criminals, often in collusion with military sentries and other service 

personnel. Facilities are also successfully attacked or breached by criminal 

groups that neutralize or kill sentries and seize arms. This is a problem that 

has been particularly serious in areas near Russia's periphery. In addition, 

weapons are sold outright, individually and in lots of varying sizes, by officers 

and other military personnel stationed in Russia and abroad.18 

 In the Western Group of Forces (WGF) in East Germany, other 

groups of forces in Eastern Europe, and units in the Baltic states, the sale of 

individual weapons by Soviet/Russian troops became notorious beginning in 
15

the late 1980s and continued throughout the troops’ phased withdrawal. On a 

larger scale, an underground trade in heavy equipment ranging from armored 

vehicles to Mig aircraft has also been widely reported.19 This included the 

alleged disappearance of some 81 tons of ammunition from WGF depots in 

early 1994. The charge was compatible with other WGF resource diversions 

but drew heated denials by the WGF commander-in-chief, Colonel General 

Matvey Burlakov. General Burlakov was later dismissed from the Army 

under a cloud of suspicion for a host of alleged criminal activities, including 

the diversion of huge quantities of arms from his command.20 Analogous 

military-criminal associations in arms and equipment trafficking by Russian 

military officers have been evident in the Baltic states, the Crimea-based 

Black Sea Fleet, Moldova, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.21

 A similar environment has existed inside Russia. In 1993, for 

example, four officers ranging in rank from major to colonel were arrested in 

Moscow for selling weapons. This rather unremarkable incident illustrated 

how smoothly profit had replaced ideology, since three of these officers were 

from the Humanitarian Academy of the Armed Forces (formerly the Lenin 

Military-Political Academy).22 The commander and deputy commander of the 

10th Air Defense Army were charged with weapons thefts and sales as well.23

 In 1994, the chief of the Smolensk Federal Counterintelligence Service 

(Federal'naya Sluzhba Kontrrazvedky--FSK) Directorate pointed to the dozens 

of guns, grenades, and rounds of ammunition confiscated by Chekists (the 
16

traditional Soviet name for security service personnel) from the “mafia in 

uniform.”24 

 A specific illustration of how such weapons are disposed of is 

provided by the Russian Military Procuracy, which cited the case of a 

lieutenant colonel in the Rocket and Artillery Armaments Service of a 

Siberian Military District (MD) formation who sold AK-74 automatic 

weapons, antitank grenade launchers, and pistols to the Russian Kontinent 

Company, Ltd.25 Similarly, a major general and fellow officers in the Ural 

MD acquired military pistols and sold them on the civilian market.26 These 

kinds of sales continue to flourish around many Russian garrisons and serve as 

a conduit for arms to criminal and extremist organizations within and outside 

of Russia. Overall, as 1995 progressed the MVD still considered the Russian 

military to be “the main and stable source” of weapons supplied to criminal 

groups and participants in ethnic conflict around Russia’s periphery.27 

 While the selling of weapons and munitions by officers and other 

military members remains endemic and well-documented, it is the diversion of 

profits from legal and gray market sales and the outright execution of largescale black market sales for personal gain that are among the biggest areas of 

Russian military thievery. It is instructive, therefore, to sketch briefly some of 

the dimensions, complexities, linkages, and ambiguities of these sales and the 

principal actors involved. 
17

 The sanctioned weapons trade in Russia has resided in statedesignated “companies,” weapons manufacturing enterprises, and elements of 

the armed forces, all of which are authorized to sell weapons abroad. The use 

of international joint-stock companies and other commercial firms to set up or 

facilitate transactions also has been a feature of Russian arms sales. In an 

ostensible effort to impose order on the free-wheeling, uncoordinated, and 

multiparticipant “legal” arms market that arose from the ruins of the USSR, 

Russian President Boris Yeltsin on 18 November 1993 signed an edict that 

created the state company Rosvooruzheniye (a contraction that means 

“Russian armaments”).28 The edict read in part as follows: 

 In order to provide for a state monopoly on exports and 

imports of arms and military equipment for the Russian Federation, 

Oboroneksport, Spetsvneshteknika, and the GUSK [Main Directorate 

of Special Contacts] shall be withdrawn from the Ministry of Foreign 

Economic Relations and merged into the Rosvooruzheniye company 

and placed under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation 

Government.29 

 On the surface, this move seemed a well-grounded attempt to regain 

control over an important source of state revenue. However, because of the 

huge hard-currency profits involved, key officials, politicians, bureaucrats, 

middlemen, lobbyists, and others made intense efforts to associate themselves 

with the arms import-export business. Military and security force personnel 

were often at the center of this activity. 

 Lieutenant General Viktor Samoylov, a supporter of former Defense 

Minister Pavel Grachev and a long-time member of the Defense Ministry’s 
18

Main Cadres Directorate who had no experience in arms sales, was named 

Rosvooruzheniye director.30 The Most financial group (its shadowy dealings, 

security service affiliations, and political rivalries are discussed further below) 

became one of several authorized banks, despite never having been involved 

in arms sales. Prominent figures who became associated with 

Rosvooruzheniye have included former Soviet Defense Minister Marshal of 

Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, who was named Yeltsin’s presidential 

representative to the new state company;31 First Deputy Prime Minister O. 

Soskovets, who became Chairman of the Interdepartmental Commission on 

Military and Technical Cooperation, the organization that supervises 

Rosvooruzheniye; and the notorious former chief of the Security Service of 

the President (Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Presidenta--SBP), Major General 

Aleksandr Korzhakov, who was granted responsibility for the company’s 

“observance of state interests.”32 

 As with earlier arrangements, a prominent question about Russia’s 

arms sales under the new system soon became, “where is all the money 

going?” While officials associated with Rosvooruzheniye flourished 

personally, the return of revenues to the Russian Federation remained limited. 

Widespread suspicions were raised by the shady business dealing of men like 

Korzhakov. That is, aside from his dark political and conspiratorial presence 

in the Kremlin, Korzhakov had interwoven business dealings with his official 

duties. Aside from his Rosvooruzheniye links, Korzhakov has been tied to the 
19

Logovaz financial concern. Logovaz grew out of VAZ, the Soviet state 

vehicle manufacturer, and among other ventures has attempted to profit from 

oil export revenues that were to be put back “into hunting lodges and other 

property.”33 An incident at the end of 1994 illustrates how agendas involving 

arms sales, financial deals, political rivalries, and personal animosities 

routinely combine. 

 On 2 December 1994, Korzhakov directed his SBP bodyguard forces 

to raid the headquarters of Most. Most, while an authorized bank for 

Rosvooruzheniye and central to many other business ventures involving senior 

political officials, also was affiliated with Korzhakov’s political rivals. The 

raid was carried out by some 30 armed and masked SBP personnel as well as 

elements of the Kremlin’s Main Protection Directorate (Glavnoye Upravleniye 

Okhrany--GUO), then headed by a Korzhakov ally, Lieutenant General 

Mikhail Barsukov. An effort to halt the search of Most offices by the thendesignated FSK chief in Moscow, Yevgeniy Savostyanov (an ally of Most

director Vladimir Gusinskiy), was rebuffed by SBP/GUO forces and led 

shortly thereafter to Savostyanov’s dismissal by Yeltsin.34 Multiple 

explanations for the raid have been advanced which, according to concerned 

members of the Association of Russian Banks, is not unprecedented.35 In any 

event, the Main Military Procuracy announced in May 1995 that criminal 

investigations of the incident had been dropped for lack of evidence that any 

violation of authority had taken place.36 Clearly, however, the pursuit of 
20

personal profit and power are imperatives as strong as any of the purely 

political motivations or machinations suggested. 

 Such goings-on by state security and law enforcement organizations 

render a term like “conflict of interest” wholly inadequate and suggest to 

Russian critics that state companies like Rosvooruzheniye are largely personal 

preserves; their profits are parceled out to selected members of the leadership 

and the leadership’s financial and business affiliates. Even prominent military 

figures like Marshal Shaposhnikov, an officer who embodied a tradition of 

ostensibly honorable military service, have been the targets of sarcastic 

speculation regarding their evident wealth amid the poverty of those officers 

and enlisted personnel whose well-being was their personal and institutional 

responsibility.37

 The very nature of foreign weapons sales; the poorly-documented 

revenues generated and their disposition; the controversial nature of political, 

financial, and other figures associated with the new state company; and links 

to commercial and financial ventures and deals (some through predecessor 

organizations) earned Rosvooruzheniye the nickname “Ros-vor,” a play on the 

Russian words meaning “Russian thief.” Charges and countercharges 

involving so-called “demo-thieves” (allegedly criminal democratic reformers) 

in and out of Yeltsin’s administration have made tracing the flow of weapons 

and profits both a major issue and challenge. Examples include 

Rosvooruzheniye; uniformed criminals in the military and security forces; 
21

predatory arms-manufacturing firms of the military-industrial sector who saw 

their profits threatened by the creation of Rosvooruzheniye; other 

unscrupulous state companies, commercial enterprises, and financial firms 

involved in the arms trade; and investigative reporters. It is evident, however, 

that irregular arms and equipment sales abroad are carried out with seeming 

“state authorization” and that much of the hard currency generated is not 

finding its way into Russian Federation coffers.38

 Russia’s severe “capital flight” problems appear to have involved the 

diversion of arms sales or military equipment revenues and associated 

ventures. Cyprus banks, for example, have been favored Russian choices for 

large cash deposits since 1992. Arms have been a frequent Russian 

commodity, generating large sums of money.39 In mid-summer 1994, a selfadmitted Russian arms trader who traveled locally in a chauffeured limousine 

stayed at a Limassol, Cyprus, hotel. At the same time, a Cypriot banker said 

he believed two Russians who deposited large quantities of cash in his bank 

were former Russian Army generals. In the view of one Cypriot banker: 

Russia is bankrupt and can’t generate this kind of cash. All money 

that’s coming from Moscow is illegal because of Russia’s exchange 

control regulations. But we’re talking of millions and that can only 

come from illegal arms sales, most probably to Iran and Iraq.40 

 Rosvooruzheniye did not remain the only official weapons trader for 

long, despite the rationale behind its creation. In May 1994, just six months 

after a presidential decree consolidated new arms sales in one state company, 
22

the Russian government granted permission for weapons manufacturers to 

export arms and conclude agreements with foreign partners. Under this 

apparent contradiction of state policy, Rosvooruzheniye would still set prices 

but not retain its position as sole deal-maker for new weapon system sales. 

According to Shaposhnikov, the new regulations would be implemented 

gradually. He also pointed to the pressing need for Russia to fill an 

extraordinary gap and “develop a law on arms trade!”41 The effect of this new 

arrangement on Russian arms sales and the increasingly tainted reputation of 

Rosvooruzheniye was far from clear, since the state company seemed to 

operate much as before. Nevertheless, though the current Rosvooruzheniye

General Director, Aleksandr Kotyolkin, announced that foreign arms sales of 

at least $2.5 billion were expected in 1995 (an $800 million increase over the 

previous years’ sales figures), his April 1995 announcement followed on the 

heels of documents showing Rosvooruzheniye criminality. 

 More specifically, the published materials dealt with a 

Rosvooruzheniye audit that “exposed a slump in the volume of arms exports, 

tax evasion, underpriced sales, the financing of commercial firms from the 

company's current capital, and fabulous benefits paid to employees.”42 The 

charges largely concerned actions under former director Lieutenant General 

Viktor Samoylov, whom Kotyolkin replaced in November 1994. Since 

Kotyolkin and a number of his colleagues were members of Rosvooruzheniye, 

their culpability remains to be determined. In addition, competition between 
23

Grachev's Defense Ministry (MoD) and Rosvooruzheniye over arms sales 

authority suggests to some Russian observers that leaked audit reports may 

have been directed at Kotyolkin's supervisor and Grachev's enduring rival, 

Aleksandr Korzhakov.43 Indeed, Grachev wasted little time after the scandal 

broke in proposing that the MoD be given “monopoly right to the arms 

trade.”44 While the MoD evidently lost this battle for Russia’s huge arms 

profits, efforts to impose “normal” state controls over arms sales continue. 

 Among the most recent rounds in this effort was the fall 1995 

decision to allow a number of weapon and equipment producers to sell their 

products abroad, a move that made earlier decisions in this regard more 

explicit. Seven military-industrial production enterprises were granted this 

privilege, including the Rostvertol joint-stock company (“Mi” series 

helicopters), the Izhmash joint-stock company (Kalashnikov assault rifles and 

other weapons), and the Antey enterprise (air defense systems). As one 

commentator concluded, “this means in effect that Rosvooruzheniye forfeits 

completely its monopoly on exporting Russian arms.”45 As with past arms 

sale issues in Russia, this remains to be seen, as do the effects of further 

decentralizing an already corrupt and poorly managed effort. 

 The Russian armed forces for some time have been directly involved 

with the sale of “used” arms and equipment, as well as the provision of 

security assistance. In this regard, the Voyentekh State Armament and 

Military Equipment Sales Company was established in the summer of 1992 at 
24

the behest of Defense Minister Grachev. The idea was for Voyentekh to 

“export equipment and armaments at the disposal of the Ministry of Defense” 

and use the money to build housing for servicemen.46 Rather than selling 

newly manufactured weaponry like Rosvooruzheniye, Voyentekh’s “more 

modest” role has been to sell surplus materiel from MoD organizations like the 

Main Rocket and Artillery Directorate (Glavnoye Raketno-Artilleriyskoye 

Upravleniye--GRAU) and the Main Armor-Tank Directorate (Glavnoye 

Bronetankovoye Upravleniye--GBTU). Other participants in this aspect of 

arms sales are the General Staff, which determines the kinds of equipment that 

are excess and available for sale, and various commercial companies and joint 

ventures which may be used to facilitate transactions. Some 97 percent of the 

proceeds from this continuing arms sale program were to go to the military 

housing fund.47 However, these programs have been the target of continuing 

allegations of corruption. Charges concern the personal enrichment of active 

and former officers involved in the sales. Questions about the underfunded 

and substandard military housing effort also abound.48 In addition, it has been 

equipment already in military inventories that has found its way into the hands 

of criminals, parties to ethno-national conflict, irregular armed groups, and 

virtually any other kind of customer with an ability to pay.49 

 The proposed sale of two ships from the Pacific Fleet--the Minsk and 

Novorossiysk aircraft carriers--is a case in point. While these vessels were to 

be sold to the Republic of Korea (ROK), supposedly for salvage, critics have 
25

noted that the ROK has no facilities for this purpose. Rather, it was thought 

these ships would ultimately make their way to the People’s Republic of China 

(PRC) for dismantling, thus improperly transferring various ship-building 

technologies that the PRC has wanted for some time. Whatever the accuracy 

of these suspicions, the role of the Kompass-1 joint venture in this transaction 

is notable. Kompass-1 was designated an intermediary for the sale. It was 

established by the parent Russian-Korean Kompass Company, whose 

members include former Chief of the Soviet General Staff Moiseyev, former 

Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy Admiral Vladimir Nikolayevich 

Chernavin, and former Soviet Navy (and Pacific Fleet) Chief of Rear Services 

Vice Admiral Makhonin.50 The familiar pattern of former senior officers and 

their active duty partners profiting from questionable equipment sales elicited 

the following understated observation from a Russian observer: “Such a 

distinguished constellation of stars makes it doubtful that the percentage 

promised by General Grachev for the sale of the ships will be fully used for 

the Pacific Fleet’s social needs.”51 

 The Russian MoD’s role in foreign arms aid has also involved the 

Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation (Glavnoye 

Upravleniye Mezhdunarodnogo Voyennogo Sotrudnichestva--GUMVS), 

which oversees military-technical cooperation (i.e., security assistance 

programs that include vetting arms sales and providing training and support to 

foreign military clients).52 In exercising these responsibilities, the directorate 
26

(whose responsibilities formerly resided in the General Staff’s 10th Main 

Directorate) has fallen into criminal activities of various types.53 Perhaps the 

most notable public example was the dismissal of Major General Vladimir 

Georgiyevich Ul’yanov, chief of the GUMVS’ Hard Currency Economic 

Service. In an agreement with Oboroneksport, one of Rosvooruzheniye’s

parent organizations, he illegally received some $80,000 worth of consumer 

goods.54 The criminal opportunities available to GUMVS personnel may have 

quite direct or only peripheral relationships to arms and other security 

assistance transactions, but GUMVS’ access, resources, and mandate clearly 

have been well-exploited. 

 Among the most recent controversies over the diversion of military 

resources is the question of how armed groups in Chechnya acquired such 

large stocks of arms. The sustained intensity of fighting in Chechnya 

highlights the fact that Chechen weapons stockpiles ware substantial. The 

existence of such large arms inventories became a sensitive political issue 

centered on the question of “who armed Chechen President Dzhokar 

Dudayev?” Some Russian military and government officials have asserted 

that Dudayev acquired weapons by looting and stealing from Russian military 

depots in Chechnya during the troubled 1991-1992 period.55 Others point to 

complex Soviet/Russian political machinations and conspiracies running from 

Moscow to the Caucasus. 
27

 According to this latter view, the goals of Russian government 

factions were somehow furthered by the voluntary transfer (at Shaposhnikov’s 

order) of large arms stocks to Dudayev and by the abandonment of all Russian 

inventories (with Grachev’s acquiescence) upon Russia’s humiliating 

withdrawal from Chechnya in June 1992. Proffered motives for these actions 

include Russian “democrats” attempting to undermine support for the 

“Emergency Committee’s” August 1991 coup attempt by winning over 

Dudayev and the Chechen leadership, Russian efforts to maintain clandestine 

arms routes to Abkhazia, the hope that Chechens would use the weapons 

against South Ossetians, and payment for the continued use of Groznyy airport 

as an international drug-smuggling stopover for Russian aircraft.56 

 More important in the view of some analysts is how the Chechens 

continued to receive substantial quantities of armaments. The most 

compelling explanation is that arms were sold to the Chechens by Russian 

military officials. More specifically, Russian presidential advisors Emil Pain 

and Arkady Popov assessed in a February 1995 report that Dudayev acquired 

arms by buying them from “smart traders in military uniforms,” and that other 

criminal actions by officials in Moscow may have taken place as well, to 

include acquiescence toward drug smuggling.57 

 In any event, the overt start of hostilities in December 1994 did not 

slow the sale of arms to Chechens by the Russian military. Individual 

Chechen fighters continued to buy weapons and ammunition directly from 
28

individual Russian soldiers deployed in Chechnya, while wealthy Chechens 

acquired bulk quantities from more organized Russian military traders.58 As 

regards other arms supply routes, the MVD reported in April 1995 that it was 

investigating the attempted delivery of 4,350 pistols to Groznyy from the arms 

manufacturing plant in Izhevsk, Russia, while in May 1995 104th Guards 

Airborne Division paratroopers, who had recently returned to their Tula 

garrison from Chechnya, were arrested when they attempted to sell plastic 

explosives, grenade launchers, and ammunition to Chechen fighters.59

 Overall, the Russian military’s criminal involvement in conventional 

weapons trafficking for personal enrichment ranges from the sale of individual 

arms for quick profit to sophisticated large-scale weapons transfers for huge 

revenues. At the end of 1995, weapons diversions at both ends of this 

spectrum continued unabated. 

Military Crime and Weapons of Mass Destruction

 Clearly, the unrestrained criminal trade in conventional arms raises 

justifiable concerns regarding the security of Russian weapons of mass 

destruction--nuclear, chemical and biological arms--and their associated 

components and technologies. Given the systemic criminality that exists in 

the Russian armed forces, there is substantial reason to question whether the 
29

personnel responsible for Russia’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 

are more reliable than the corrupt military officials assigned to responsible 

positions elsewhere. The large WMD stockpiles in Russia; the slow pace of 

their destruction or neutralization; questions surrounding the security, control, 

and oversight of WMD assets; and lagging military reforms are in themselves 

cause for concern. However, to more fully appreciate the risk of WMD 

diversion via Russian military vectors, it is instructive to first examine some 

current issues associated with nuclear materials trafficking generally and then 

look at the more prominent military organizations concerned with WMD--

specifically nuclear and chemical units. 

Nuclear Arms and Proliferation Issues

 Tentative concerns over the security of Soviet nuclear weapons and 

materials began to surface in the late 1980s and were fully developed by the 

mid-1990s. While an early concern, the loss of Soviet tactical nuclear 

weapons based in conflict areas around the USSR’s periphery, has receded 

with the apparently successful withdrawal of these weapons into Russia, the 

diversion of fissile material and technology has grown as a recognized 

danger.60 

 The current profusion of rumored, demonstrably false, and 

occasionally real and quite serious instances of fissile material diversion and 

smuggling from Russia continues to fuel proliferation concerns. US and other 
30

Western specialists have compiled lengthy lists of real and alleged nuclear 

smuggling attempts linked to Russia and the FSU.61 Most of the Russian cases 

are associated with alleged thefts or diversions from facilities of the Ministry 

of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) or other civil organizations, rather than 

military sites. 

 The existence of a Russian “nuclear mafia” that is largely dedicated 

to acquiring and trafficking in fissile material or WMD technologies continues 

to be debated. As the chief of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service’s 

Directorate for Arms Control and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction judged it: 

 If you want my opinion--in no way is it even 

possible to talk about a “nuclear mafia” in the same context 

as the drug trade, where tens of thousands of people are 

involved and the activity is manipulated by truly well 

organized professionals. But it is our task, nevertheless, to 

prevent malefactors from establishing a real mafia.62

Despite this well-reasoned view, it is clear that individual criminals and 

organized crime groups have sought to profit from selling various radioactive 

materials. 

 The 1993 case of beryllium diversion, smuggling, and attempted sale 

by Russian criminals (publicly reported in October 1995) is a notable case in 

point that suggests some efforts to profit from nuclear materials may be quite 

organized.63 Certainly, this episode involved the same kind of bizarre 

personalities, criminal organizations, corrupt commercial ventures, negligent 
31

officials, and shadowy foreigners associated with the Russian conventional 

arms trade and other smuggling activities. 

 Foreign states and terrorist groups have focused on Russia as a 

source of nuclear materials and technologies. Russian Foreign Intelligence 

Service spokesmen have judged that “some countries in the Middle East, 

Central Asia, south[ern] . . . Africa, and Brazil show interest in Russia’s 

nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile technologies” and warn about 

efforts to acquire Russian WMD secrets.64 Continuing economic stringencies 

affecting Russian nuclear and missile scientists and workers have resulted in 

their emigration to countries willing and able to pay them. The Democratic 

Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been an aggressive consumer of 

ballistic missile technology. Russian scientists working in North Korea 

reportedly have been instrumental in the DPRK’s program, while in 1992 

Russian security forces barely prevented the emigration of 32 nuclear 

specialists to the DPRK to work on nuclear weapons programs.65 Russia’s 

insistence on selling nuclear reactors to Iran in the face of US and other 

Western warnings constitutes another danger of technology and material 

leakage that is potentially multiplied by Russian corruption and negligence.66 

 The nuclear terrorist dimension, widely discussed in the Russian 

media for some years, gained new impetus with suggestions that the nownotorious Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect had sought Russian nuclear and 

chemical technology.67 However, it has been Chechen threats to attack 
32

nuclear facilities and, most recently, to contaminate Russian areas with nuclear 

materials that energized Russian security personnel as 1995 came to a close. 

Shamil Basayev, the Chechen military leader who led the successful raid on 

the Russian city of Budyonnovsk in June 1995, warned in mid-October of that 

year that he was dispatching five containers of radioactive materials to Russia. 

 In a videotaped warning that showed containers about 50-60 centimeters high 

and 20-30 centimeters wide, Basayev also said that two of the radioactive 

containers would be wired with explosives.68 Basayev’s threat was at least 

partially fulfilled the following month when a Chechen message led the media 

to a radioactive package buried near the entrance of Moscow’s popular 

Ismailov Park. 

 While the material was characterized by Russian authorities as lowgrade and relatively harmless, the incident underscored the capital’s 

vulnerability to nuclear terrorism; demonstrated the easy access to some fissile 

materials by insurgent, terrorist, or criminal groups; and left citizens and 

security forces alike wondering what might come next.69 While having 

military implications and associations, the issues discussed above do not 

involve the Russian military per se. The relationships among the Russian 

military, crime, and nuclear arms constitute a more specific problem that will 

now be addressed. 

 The main military organization in charge of nuclear munitions is the 

12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (Glavnoye Upravleniye 
33

Ministerstvo Oborony), more simply known as the 12th GUMO. Unlike most 

other main and central directorates of the Soviet (and later Russian) Defense 

Ministry--including GRAU, GBTU, and analogous technical directorates 

involved with arms and equipment--the secretive 12th GUMO was nearly 

invisible to public view during the Soviet period. As retrospective Russian 

assessments have revealed, the directorate had its origins at the very end of 

World War II, when the so-called First Main Directorate was established 

under the USSR Council of Ministers to “coordinate work on atomic 

projects.”70 Two years later a “special department” was set up in the Ministry 

of Defense to study material on the employment and effects of US nuclear 

weapons. Following the successful explosion of a Soviet nuclear weapon in 

1949, the First Main Directorate and the MoD’s special department were 

merged to form a main directorate “to provide centralized direction of testing, 

stockpiling, and operating nuclear weapons and . . . protection against nuclear 

weapons.” This organization was the direct progenitor of today’s 12th 

GUMO, which is described by its chief, Colonel General Yevgeniy P. Maslin, 

as follows: 

 Military research and scientific test organizations as well as 

military units engaged in the immediate operation of nuclear 

munitions are subordinate to today’s Russian Federation Ministry of 

Defense Main Directorate. In connection with the reduction of 

tactical nuclear weapons, the elimination of intermediate and shorter 

range missiles and the limitation of strategic nuclear arms, the task of 

eliminating nuclear munitions and increasing the safety of the 

remaining ones also has been assigned to the Main Directorate in 

recent years.71 
34

 Thus, the 12th GUMO currently maintains large central nuclear 

munitions depots which have been filled with tactical, operational-strategic, 

and strategic nuclear weapons withdrawn from non-Russian areas of the FSU 

or otherwise taken “off-line” and redeployed.72 In addition to transporting 

nuclear weapons when necessary, the 12th GUMO runs a variety of research, 

development, and support facilities. It vigorously asserts exclusive control 

over these sites, insisting that they are fully secure and should be the province 

only of MoD inspectors and oversight. But the 12th GUMO is part of the 

Russian military and Russian society and, as a consequence, is potentially 

susceptible to the same economic, political, and criminal pressures. 

 This makes statements like the following one by the 12th GUMO’s 

deputy chief, Lieutenant General Sergey Zelentsov, less than reassuring. He 

made similar statements as recently as fall 1995. 

 The system for the protection of nuclear munitions is 

echeloned and extremely reliable. Access to them is multilayered. It 

is virtually impossible for outsiders to get to the warheads. The 

transport of nuclear munitions is also properly organized. There are 

special formations in a high state of readiness to thwart any attempt 

to seize them. To date there has not been a single loss from the 

nuclear arsenals.73 

 General Maslin similarly characterized theft from 12th GUMO 

facilities as “impossible” but also identified vulnerabilities to criminal or 

terrorist groups. These vulnerabilities were found principally in the theft of 

nuclear weapons while in transport, which must be taken “into account in 
35

planning our actions on a day-to-day basis.” Further, exercises were run 

regarding the theft of nuclear weapons from 12th GUMO facilities. Maslin 

candidly summarized the results of these exercises: 

 And I must tell you frankly that as a result of those 

exercises, I became greatly concerned about a question that we had 

never even thought about before: What if such acts were to be 

undertaken by people who have worked with nuclear weapons in the 

past? For example, by people dismissed from our structures, social 

malcontents, embittered individuals? This question is so serious that 

I had to deliver a report on it to an interdepartmental commission of 

the Russian Security Council.74

 In a country filled with embittered and desperate active duty and 

former military personnel, many long since engaged in criminal activities and 

some veterans of Soviet/Russian nuclear weapons programs, Maslin’s remarks 

seem well-considered. They also stand in sharp contrast to the typical 

reassurances issued by him and his fellow officers. 

 Criminality and disaffection in nuclear-associated units is more 

directly evident at deployed military facilities and operational sites, where 

living conditions are extremely poor and oversight is lax, than at the 

centralized and less-visible 12th GUMO facilities.75 For example, in 

reviewing detected military criminal cases in the late summer of 1994, acting 

Chief Military Procurator G. N. Nosov identified Strategic Rocket Forces 

(SRF) criminality fostered either by the poverty in which many officers found 

themselves or as a consequence of opportunity and potential monetary gain. 

He noted that an SRF officer had set up a currency exchange and shop at his 
36

quarters on base where he sold food at inflated prices. He also noted a major 

general and former chief of the SRF’s Financial-Economic Directorate who 

had illegally transferred 2 billion rubles to several private firms.76

 The activities of Major General Vladimir Rodionov, commander of a 

long-range aviation division in the Russian Far East, and his deputy are good 

examples of strategic force corruption. Long-range aviation (LRA) is one of 

Russia’s nuclear strike forces, tasked to hit targets deep in enemy territory. 

The two officers, however, transformed their “top secret” LRA operating base 

into a transshipment point for moving commercial goods and businessmen 

between cities in the Commonwealth of Independent States and China. Profits 

from these illicit operations were shared with bomber pilots and crews who 

came to see the commercial enterprise as their principal job. A small portion 

of the profits was put into the division’s account.77 These kinds of incidents 

suggest that conspiring military personnel would be willing to sell nuclear 

components or even a nuclear weapon, if given the opportunity. 

 Perhaps the most notable example of this potential involved nuclear 

materials stolen from a Navy nuclear facility in northern Russia. The 

circumstances and implications of the theft have gradually become more 

visible over the last two years. The incident centered specifically on a 

Northern Fleet nuclear fuel storage facility near Murmansk. 

 For several years now, the Northern Fleet has stood out as a center of 

military-civil crime and generally sloppy administration. Even during the 
37

Soviet period, the sudden explosions at the huge Northern Fleet munitions 

depot in 1984 presaged similar military disasters during the subsequent 

decade. During the spectacular series of explosions, at least one Soviet 

submarine in port sealed its hatches while crew members watched through the 

periscope with alarm as the explosions came disturbingly close to the fleet’s 

nuclear storage facilities. 

 From the late 1980s to date, numerous other examples of declining 

readiness and rising levels of carelessness have become increasingly evident, 

while the looting and more systematic theft of fleet resources involved both 

military and civilian groups. Added to these continuing problems has been the 

danger posed by 100 or more decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines, 

some with nuclear fuel unloaded, that one specialist characterized as “floating 

atomic bombs.”78

 However, the late 1993 theft of three “live fuel assemblies” (known 

by the acronym STVS) for obsolete “Victor 1” nuclear submarines from a 

naval storage facility in the Murmansk area speaks most directly to nuclear 

security and the potential for criminal penetration. More specifically, the theft 

involved a total of 4.3 kilograms of nuclear material, of which .85 kilograms 

were uranium 235. While the theft itself was not as significant as some others, 

what it revealed about fleet nuclear storage security and criminal opportunity 

was more significant.79 
38

 After months of fruitless investigation, three Russian Navy officers (a 

captain 2nd rank, a captain 3rd rank, and a senior lieutenant) were finally 

identified as the thieves. The investigation, concluded in mid-1995, indicated 

that the three officers had planned to sell the material to an organized crime 

figure who expressed an interest but never followed through. Military 

prosecutors were more concerned about security conditions at the nuclear 

materials storage site than with the theft itself. There was minimal perimeter 

security, essentially no protective alarm system, poor locks, elderly untrained 

guards who were afraid to handle their weapons, and STVS containers secured 

only by plastic seals that had been unchecked for years. While a spectrum of 

recommendations was made to improve security at this and other sites and 

some initial measures were taken, inadequate funding prevented their full 

implementation. What this indicates more broadly about military sites 

containing radioactive fuels or warheads is not clear, but it suggests that some 

sites fall far short of the high security levels military specialists assert. In 

particular, systemic criminality within the Russian military throws even the 

best security at the most sensitive military nuclear sites into question. 

Moreover, Boris Yeltsin’s decision in the late summer of 1995 to bar the 

Russian State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety 

(GOSATOMADZOR) from inspecting MoD nuclear sites meant that 

determining the adequacy of the armed forces’ nuclear security became strictly 

a military responsibility.80
39

Chemical Arms and Proliferation Issues

 The protection of Russian military chemical agents and the potential 

vectors for their diversion constitute a problem at least as large as the nuclear 

proliferation issue. Until the late 1980s, when the Soviets decided to publicly 

reveal the nature and extent of their programs, knowledge about Soviet 

chemical weapons was based more on inference and speculation than actual 

data. While Western analysts carefully studied the activities and voluminous 

writings associated with the Soviet Chemical Troops (Khimicheskiye Voiska), 

they dealt exclusively with defenses against chemical, radiological, and 

biological weapons, not with Soviet offensive employment.81 However, the 

opening of parts of the military’s Shikany chemical research, testing, and 

storage complex to foreign specialists and the press in 1987, along with 

subsequent official revelations, highlighted the scope and scale of Soviet (and 

Russian) chemical weapons production and storage. In no respect has this 

additional knowledge been a cause for complacency regarding the security of 

chemical agents and technology.82

 By all accounts, Russia inherited the largest chemical weapons 

arsenal in the world--about 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents, which are 

resident in bombs, missile warheads, artillery shells, other munitions, and 

storage canisters.83 Of these, 32,300 metric tons were declared to be nerve 

gases such as sarin, soman, VX, and others, while the remainder were stated to 
40

comprise older agents such as lewisite and yperite in separate and combined 

forms. They are maintained under the purview of the descriptively named 

Russian Federation Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops. 

In the view of some, overall Russian stockpile estimates were low and needed 

to be revised upwards.84 Indeed, in late November 1995 the chief of the 

Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops, Colonel General 

Stanislav Petrov, had to forcefully deny Russian Security Council charges that 

the military secretly maintained 100,000 metric tons of chemical agents.85 

The military continues to stipulate that only 40,000 metric tons are dispersed 

at Shikany and some six other principal chemical weapon storage sites. Still, 

questions about the actual size of the inventory linger.86

 During the 1980s and perhaps earlier, the Soviet Union embarked on 

a Shikany-based research and development effort to create binary chemical 

agents. This effort was carried out by a research team that included 

Lieutenant General of Chemical Troops Anatoliy Kuntsevich who, along with 

his leading team members, was awarded the Lenin Prize in 1991.87 The new 

weapons were characterized as five to eight times more powerful than earlier 

nerve agents, and allegations about their testing continued into 1995. These 

agents, whose quantities and disposition remain unknown, are not included in 

the 40,000 metric ton total. 

 As with nuclear materials and facilities under Russian military 

control, the security of military chemical stocks and technologies continue to 
41

be the target of many critics. In fall 1995, former Russian military scientist 

Vil S. Mirzayanov echoed earlier charges and asserted that the theft and illegal 

production of Russian chemical agents was a greater risk than the dangers 

associated with the nuclear arsenal. He highlighted the lax security at 

chemical depots and alleged duplicitous statements by Russian military 

officials on the status of research and testing. He also underscored extreme 

environmental hazards and inadequate chemical destruction approaches and 

resources.88 In short, Mirzayanov and others described an infrastructure that 

was at least as trouble-plagued as the military nuclear system. 

 The potential criminal diversion of chemical agents and technologies, 

however, was most visibly highlighted by two events in 1995. The first of 

these was the fatal March 1995 sarin attack by Aum Shinrikyo members in a 

Tokyo subway. It almost immediately generated speculation about a Russian 

connection to the chemical agents and technologies used and again spotlighted 

the ambiguous security and status of chemical weapons stocks. Russian, 

Japanese, and other investigators quickly identified a substantial number of 

sect members in Russia, including members in the government and other 

walks of life. Media commentators took note of a “gas analyzer” of Russian 

origin seized at a sect facility; reports of Aum Shinrikyo sect members among 

Russian Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops; alleged sect ties 

to the Russian Academy of Sciences; the large volume of commercial Russian 

ship and aircraft traffic between Russia and Japan; and other issues that 
42

suggested questionable Russo-Japanese linkages to sarin production or 

transport. 

 Critics of Russian chemical weapon policies, such as Doctor of 

Chemistry Lev Fedorov, emphasized the possibility that Russian chemical 

weapon technology may have contributed to the creation of sarin by sect 

chemists. While he doubted that sarin could have been stolen and 

transshipped due to its toxicity and volatility, Fedorov emphasized that many 

workers with sarin production experience had left the factory after it 

suspended operations in 1987.89 For their part, official Russian military and 

security service spokesmen, while acknowledging Aum Shinrikyo’s presence 

in Russia, reiterated the absolute security of military chemical depots and 

munitions, underscored the difficulty of transporting sarin from Russia, and 

noted that Japanese chemists were quite capable of producing sarin without 

foreign help. 

 Former Chemical Troops General Kuntsevich, who by spring 1995 

was out of the armed forces and identified as Director of the Russian Academy 

of Sciences Ecotoxinometry Center, decried reports of a Russian linkage while 

criticizing the Japanese for not reacting to earlier indicators of the sect’s sarin 

production experiments.90 Nevertheless, like Fedorov he acknowledged that 

“military-related individuals may sell such technology to foreigners . . . and 

refrained from ruling out the possibility of technology drain.”91
43

 The questions generated by the Aum Shinrikyo attack were followed 

half a year later by a second development that involved Russian chemical 

weapons more directly. It also was centered on Lenin Prize winner and 

former General of Chemical Troops Kuntsevich. In late October 1995, 

Kuntsevich was charged by the Russian Federal Security Service with 

delivering about 800 kilograms of chemicals to unidentified Middle East 

buyers in 1993 and attempting to smuggle an additional five-and-a-half tons in 

1994.92 The chemicals, said to be taken from military facilities, reportedly 

could be used for civil applications or to create chemical weapons. 

Kuntsevich also was judged responsible for the poor conditions at the Shikany 

2 military chemical facilities that he once ran. It was revealed that Kuntsevich 

had been removed from his presidential advisory post on chemical and 

biological issues by Boris Yeltsin in April 1994 for “gross violation of his 

duties.” However, as with other “disgraced” officials who have found good 

post-dismissal employment, he was able to remain affiliated with the Russian 

Academy of Sciences.93 Kuntsevich’s identification as a candidate in the 

December 1995 parliamentary elections as part of ultra-nationalist Vladimir 

Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party (the party later dropped Kuntsevich 

from its ticket) added a familiar political complexity similar to those noted 

above.94

 In summary, Russian military chemical weapons organizations, 

infrastructure, and personalities are subject to the same allegations and 
44

demonstrated shortcomings associated with the conventional and nuclear 

weapons structures and programs. Distinguishing truth from mere assertion in 

this shadowy world is difficult, but the evident dissension and disarray 

suggests that the illegal diversion of chemical materials or technologies is a 

daily possibility. 

Conclusions

 Institutionalized crime is flourishing in the Russian military and 

security forces as these faltering organizations struggle to deal with the 

challenges of a far different world. Military crime and corruption is now 

directly associated with the Russian Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, 

logistic and technical organizations, combined arms units and commands, 

strategic strike and air defense formations, and military education components. 

 Individual criminals range from general officers to the newest conscripts. 

Analogous problems are present in those Russian law enforcement and 

security bodies that are supposed to support internal order and combat crime. 

As it has for security establishments around the world that are faced with 

corruption and internal turmoil, this raises profound questions about the 

stability, motivations, and reliability of the Russian armed forces. The effect 

on weapons trafficking and the proliferation of conventional armaments and 

WMD has been profound. 
45

 In this regard, there are four principal judgments suggested by this 

examination of linkages among Russian military and security forces, 

organized crime, and weapons proliferation. First, black and gray market 

conventional arms trafficking, with Russian military materiel constituting the 

most substantial source, is continuing apace in the Central Eurasian/East 

European region and elsewhere. Second, criminality in the Russian armed 

forces (as well as the militaries of other FSU states) is playing an integral role 

in black and gray market arms trafficking and is increasingly corrupting state 

arms sale processes. Third, ties between Russian military/security 

organizations and civil-sector criminal enterprises associated with weapons 

trafficking are flourishing, as are relationships between military/security 

structures and shadowy joint-stock companies and commercial enterprises 

within Russia and abroad. Finally, in light of systemic Russian military crime 

and particularly close military-criminal ties with regard to the arms trade, the 

avowed security of Russian nuclear and chemical weapons is subject to 

substantial doubt. Reported security shortfalls at military nuclear and 

chemical facilities and the criminal vulnerability of active and former military 

personnel involved in nuclear and chemical programs suggest, in particular, 

that military vectors for WMD proliferation are far more likely than 

previously thought. Overall, the Russian military’s role in weapons 

proliferation--and the roles of militaries in other Soviet successor states--will 

be a substantial consideration in the establishment of stability and peace in 
46

Central Eurasia and beyond. Of special importance, these developing 

military-criminal linkages may represent one of the greatest WMD 

proliferation dangers, a potential that increasing numbers of official Russian 

spokesmen are now acknowledging. 
47

ENDNOTES

1 For a substantial survey of crime and its association with various aspects of Russian life 

including the military, see "Prestupnost'--ugroza Rossii" (Criminality--a threat to Russia), in the 

special edition of Obozrevatel', no. 2, 1993, which is dedicated entirely to this topic. 

2. “Kak poborot’ prestupnost’” (How to overcome crime), Krasnaya zvezda, 10 March 1995; and 

Penny Morvant, “ Crime Roundup,” OMRI Daily Digest, Part I, 17 March 1995. 

3. Olga Kryshtanovskaya, “Russia’s Mafia Landscape,” Izvestiya, 21 September 1995, as 

translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. XLVII, no. 38, 1995, p. 3. 

4. See Dmitry Alyokhin, "Law and Order: Head of the Chief Administration for Combating 

Organized Crime Discusses Organized Crime--and the Rector of the Russian Ministry of Internal 

Affairs' Institute Talks About That New Educational Institution," Segodnya, 18 May 1994, as 

translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. XLVI, no. 20, 1994, p. 16. Ibid. 

For excellent treatments of organized crime in Moscow and the former Soviet Union as well as its 

implications, see Joseph Serio, "Organized Crime in the Soviet Union and Beyond," Low Intensity 

Conflict and Law Enforcement, vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 127-151; and Mark Galeotti, 

"Organized Crime in Moscow and Russian National Security," Low Intensity Conflict and Law 

Enforcement, vol. 1, no. 3 (Winter 1992), pp. 237-252. 

5. Kryshtanovskaya, “Russia’s Mafia Landscape,” p. 3. 

6. One senior US official who had played a central role in investigating the BCCI financial 

scandals identified the reform of Russia’s financial system as the test of Russia’s ability to achieve 

true democratic reforms. (Presentation delivered at an international conference on organized crime, 

September 1994, Vienna, Virginia, on a non-attribution basis). 

7. Penny Morvant, “Criminals to Enter Parliament?” OMRI Daily Digest, no. 68, Part I, 5 April 

1995. 

8. Anna Paretskaya “85 Suspected Criminals Run for Duma Elections,” OMRI Daily Digest, no. 

193, Part I, 4 October 1995. 

9. These remarks were made by government opponent Valery Kolmakov, chairman of an 

organized crime and corruption subcommittee of the State Duma. Lee Hockstader, “A System in 

Which Everything Favors the Bad Guys,” Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 20-26 

March 1995. At the same time, Oleg Fedorov, former Finance Minister under Boris Yeltsin and 

head of the reformist “Forward Russia!” movement, suggested that eight unnamed financial 

groups held real power in Russia, and that “someone” benefited from the high rate of crime in 

Russia. The eight groups he referred to may be those backing the newly established Duma faction 

“Stability,” which supports Yeltsin and wished to postpone the December 1995 parliamentary 

elections (See Laura Belin, “Fedorov: Financial Groups Hold Real Power in Russia,” OMRI Daily 

Digest, no. 55, Part I, 17 March 1995. The complex relationships of large financial groups such as 

Most (meaning “Bridge” in English) have been continuing targets of speculation and investigation. 

 See, for example, Vadim Viktorov, “Vladimir Shumeyko and Weapons: Is There a ‘Bridge’ 

Between Them,” Novaya yezhednevnaya gazeta, 8 June 1994, as translated in FBIS-SOV-94-111. 

 Finally, it needs to be stressed that accusations of criminality constitute a frequently used political 

weapon and that the media associated with political factions and their various shadings must be 

balanced with other sources, views, and evidence when considering reports of criminal activity. 

For instance, while characterizations are less than perfect and what constitutes “reform” and 

editorial policy changes vary, Novaya yezhednevnaya gazeta and Segodnya are pro-reform, 

though the latter is owned by the Most Group and thus reflects a particular set of views; Izvestiya
48

and presidential administration newspaper Rossiyskiye vesti, both take a generally reformist, prodemocratic tack with the former, in particular, having good investigative reports; Rossiyskaya 

gazeta is a government newspaper thought to be partisan and subject to manipulation; Krasnaya 

zvezda reflects an increasingly factionalized military (but still largely Defense Ministry) 

perspective; Pravda is a newspaper reflecting the views of former Communists; Komsomol’skaya 

pravda, Nezavisimaya gazeta, and Moskovskiy komsomolets are aggressively investigative toward 

state institutions, enterprises, and individuals; Rossiya reflects strong nationalist views; 

Kommersant-Daily reflects reform and business interests; and Moscow News reports frequently on 

crime and security issues and often takes a critical view of Russian state institutions and 

personalities. 

10. For an account of various dimensions of questionable arms trafficking involving Russia’s 

Izhevsk arms factory, see Sergey Smirnov, “Takoy vot biznes: strelba po svoim” (That’s what 

business is about: shooting at your own), Literaturnaya gazeta, no. 16, 19 April 1995. 

11. Interview with Major General of Justice Gennadiy Sutormin by Oleg Getmanenko, “Army 

Actively Counters Crime: This Is Borne Out by Military Procurator’s Office,” Krasnaya zvezda, 

16 August 1994, as translated in JPRS-UMA-94-033, p. 24. 

12. In Ukraine, some Military Transport Aviation was reported to be largely at the disposal of 

commercial enterprises. Aleksandr Zhilin, “Army: Businessmen Command Aviation,” 

Moskovskiye novosti, no. 45, 7 November 1993, as translated in JPRS-UMA-94-002, p. 21. 

13. Smirnov, “That’s Business for You,” p. 6. 

14. For an interesting and instructive discussion of some aspects of military corruption during the 

Soviet period, see Brenda J. Vallance, "Corruption and Reform in the Soviet Military," Journal of 

Slavic Military Studies, vol. 7, no. 4 (December 1994), pp. 703-724. As addressed in many 

sources, most types of military crime evident in the Russian armed forces today are represented in 

at least limited or embryonic ways in the former Soviet military establishment. To this extent, 

Russian military crime is far from “new.” The Soviet armed forces, Soviet state institutions, and 

most fundamentally the Communist Party of the Soviet Union all established an organizational 

culture and practices commensurate with criminality. In terms of scope, diversity, development, 

and external linkages, the endemic criminality in the Russian armed forces represents the 

unrestrained flourishing of criminal activity rooted in more than seven decades of Soviet power. 

See also Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., “Mafia in Uniform: The ‘Criminalization’ of the Russian 

Armed Forces,” Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 1995. 

15. Report on military crime by Vladimir Gondusov on TASS, 1718 GMT, 29 March 1990, as 

translated in FBIS-SOV-90-062, p. 68; and Interview with Major General Yu. Kudinov by I. 

Yesyutin, “Oruzhiye ‘v rozyske’: razdum’ya nad trevozhnoy statistikoy” (Weapon in the 

‘investigation’: reflections over an alarming statistic), Krasnaya zvezda, 11 April 1990. 

16. Suzanne Crow, “Gulf--Diversion of Soviet Ship Raises Questions,” Radio Liberty, 16 January 

1991. 

17. See Kudinov, “A Weapon in the ‘Investigation,’” for a discussion of the poor security at arms 

storage facilities. 

18. Areas of ethnic conflict have seen numerous incidents of irregular and illegal arms transfers 

from Russian forces. A number of notable incidents from the troubled Transcaucasus area in the 

late 1992 period are set out in Yekaterina Glebova and Akaky Mikadze, “Munitioneers,” Moscow 

News, no. 51, 20-27 December 1992. 
49

19. Kholodov, "And Service Their Will Seem to Be Honey...,” p. 8. 

20. WS, "Interim Stocktaking of Russian Withdrawal," Frankfurter Allgemeine, 26 January 1994, 

as translated in FBIS-WEU-94-017. (The article was signed only with the initials "WS".) Former 

WGF commander Burlakov, who was named a Deputy Minister of Defense upon the completion 

of WGF’s withdrawal, became the subject of investigations by the Russian Parliament in the late 

summer of 1994. A principal reason for this investigation was the charge that new equipment 

assigned to his former command had not returned with his forces. 

21. Turbiville, “Mafia in Uniform,” addresses these areas in more detail. 

22. John Lepingwell, "Military Corruption Increasing?" Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 

Report, no. 185, 27 September 1993. 

23. Alyokhin, "Law and Order." 

24. Yuriy Mikhailov, “Grachev’s Mercedes Was Invented by Warrant Officer Pronin,” Novaya 

yezhednaya gazeta, 16 September 1994, as translated in JPRS-UMA-94-041, p. 1. 

25. G. N. Nosov, "Army: Everything's For Sale," Moscow News, 26 August-1 September 1994. 

26. Ibid. 

27. Doug Clarke, “Military Main Source of Criminals’ Weapons,” OMRI Daily Digest, no. 68, 

Part I, 5 April 1995. 

28. See Interview with Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov by Andrey Uglanov, “Partnerstvo vo imya 

NATO?" (Partnership in the name of NATO?), Argumenty I fakty, no. 22, June 1994; and 

Viktotov, “Vladimir Shumeyko and Weapons.” 

29. “'Bor'ba' za eksport oruzhiya i bor'ba za vlast' 'v verkhakh'," (‘Struggle’ for the export of 

weapons and the struggle for power ‘at the top’), Zavtra, no. 16, April 1994. 

30. Samoylov was also a close associate of and foreign military advisor to Federation Council 

Chairman/First Vice-Premier Vladimir Shumeyko, whose signature appeared on the edict 

establishing Rosvooruzheniye, and who appears linked to the Most financial group. Other figures 

prominent in the promulgation of the edict include First Deputy Prime Minister O. Soskovets, who 

approved the edict for the government, and V. Chernomyrdin, who approved Rosvooruzheniye’s 

charter. Foreign firms also appear to have had a role in the creation of the new state company. 

See Vasiliy Kryukov, “Guns Backing Up to the Market: Who Benefits from the Reorganization of 

Arms Exports in Russia,” Rabochaya tribuna, 19 January 1994, as translated in JPRS-UMA-94-

009. 

31. In October 1995, Marshal Shaposhnikov left this post to become Director of Aeroflot. 

Interview with Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov by Aleksandr Zhilin: "Coming Back to Aviation," 

Moskovskiye novosti, no. 75, 29 October-5 November 1995, as translated in EVP Digest, Part I, 1 

November 1995. 

32. Pertinent sources, all of which need to be considered in light of their affiliations and editorial 

perspectives, include “The ‘Struggle’ for Arms Exports,” Zavtra; Viktorov, “Vladimir Shumeyko 

and Weapons;” INTERFAX, 1309 GMT, 7 April 1994, as translated in FBIS-SOV-94-068-A; 

Pavel Felgengauer, “Rosvooruzheniye Is the Best Friend of the Military-Industrial Sector: But One 

Should Not Expect to Earn $20 Billion,” Segodnya, 6 April 1994, as translated in FBIS-SOV-94-

066; Interview with Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov by Laure Mandeville, “Russia Has Made 

Too Many Concessions to NATO,” Le Figaro, 29 June 1994, as translated in FBIS-WEU-94-126; 
50

Aleksandr Sychev, “V noyabre Moskva vvela monopoliyu na torgovlyu oruzhiyem, v maye 

otkazalas’ ot neye” (In November, Moscow introduced a monopoly in the arms trade, and revoked 

it in May), Izvestiya, 21 May 1994; and Eduard Viktorovich Maksimov and Yuriy Georgiyevich 

Sizov, “The Military Industrial Complex and Arms Sales,” Vooruzheniye, politika, konversiya, no. 

2, 1993, as translated in JPRS-UMA-94-009. 

33. Fred Hiatt “A Nation Up for Grabs,” Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 3-9 April 

1995. 

34. The FSK was subsequently reorganized and renamed the Federal Security Service 

(Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopastnosti--FSB). It was taken over by the chief of Main Protection 

Directorate (GUO), Lieutenant General Mikhail Barsukov. 

35. For a spectrum of views on the Most raid see Ibid.; Boris Aleksandrov, “Action by Special 

Services Did Russia ‘Immense Economic Damage.’” The Association of Russian Banks Sees the 

Precedent as a Symptom,” Segodnya, 7 December 1994, as translated in FBIS-SOV-94-235; 

Natalya Zhelnorova and Andrey Uglanov, “Gruppa ‘Most’: snova zamorozki” (The Most Group: 

again in the cold), Argumenty I fakty, no. 49, December 1994; INTERFAX, 1944 GMT, 5 

December 1994, as translated in FBIS-SOV-94-234; Vadim Yegorov, “Presidential Special 

Services Show Who Is in Control of Moscow. Following Friday’s Incident Vladimir Gusinskiy 

Urgently Sent His Wife and Son Abroad,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 December 1994, as translated 

in FBIS-SOV-94-235; Interview with Vladimir Gusinskiy by Natalya Zhelnorova, “Is the Snow 

Melting?,” no. 48, November 1994, as translated in FBIS-USR-94-133. 

36. “No Corpus Delecti Was Found On Yeltsin’s Security Men,” Moskovskiy komsomolets, 13 

May 1995, as translated by EVP Press Digest, 13 May 1995; and Penny Morvant, “Charges 

Dropped in Most Group Case,” OMRI Daily Digest, no. 93, Part I, 15 May 1995. 

37. Mikhailov, “Grachev’s Mercedes Was Invented by Warrant Officer Pronin,” p. 2. In a sarcastic 

reference to Shaposhnikov intended to indicate how well he was doing in comparison to other 

servicemen, Mikhailov noted in regard to the Marshal’s residence: “In addition to the official one, 

he is building two more houses on his land. Each one has approximately 250 square meters. He 

will probably let pilots from Germany who do not have apartments live there. After all, he 

commanded the 16th Air Army there.” 

38. Numerous Western reports have addressed Russia’s arms trade efforts. See, for example, 

Jonathan Beaty, “Russia’s Yard Sale,” Time, 18 April 1994, pp. 52-55; and Charles J. Hanley, 

“Russia Wholesaler of Choice for World’s Arms Traffickers, Associated Press Report, 30 March 

1994. 

39. Some Russian arms sales in Cyprus are evidently quite legal, if controversial. For example, 

Bayrak Radio, 1030 GMT, 12 June 1995, as translated in FBIS-WEU-95-113, reported protests by 

Cypriot Prime Minister Hakki Atun to the United Nations Security Council over the alleged sale of 

Russian (and French) arms to Greek Cypriot forces. 

40. Robert Fisk, “Moscow’s Mafia Finds an Island in the Sun,” The Independent, 3 August 1994. 

41. Sychev, “Moscow Introduced Arms Trade Monopoly in November, and Revoked It in May.” 

42. Interview with Aleksandr Kotyolkin by Natalya Gevorkyan, "'Rosvooruzheniye:' The 

Scandal Has Its Internal and External Reasons ," Moskovskiye Novosti, no. 29, 23-30 April, 1995, 

as translated by EVP Press Digest (on-line), 28 April 1995. 

43. Ibid. 
51

44. Aleksandr Zhilin, “The Marshal Has Come Out of the Trenches,” Moskovskiye novosti, no. 

32, 7-14 May 1995, as translated by EVP Press Digest (on-line), 11 May 1995. Marshal 

Shaposhnikov has evidently cast his lot with Korzhakov in this struggle, asserting that the SBP 

chief “is one of the few people in the Kremlin who are trying to oppose the across the board sale 

of the country and the selling out of national interests.” 

45. Anna Andrianova, "Another Seven Military-Industrial Complex Enterprises Secure 

Independent Exporting Right. 'Rosvooruzheniye' Definitely Loses Arms Trade Monopoly," 

Segodnya, 27 October 1995, as translated in EVP Press Digest, Part I, 27 October 1995; and 

“Yeltsin Changes the Procedure for Selling Arms,” Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 10 October 1995, 

as translated in EVP Press Digest, 10 October 1995. 

46. Interview with Voyentekh General Director, Lieutenant General (Reserve) Anatoliy 

Grigoryevich Funtikov by Valentin Rudenko, “‘Voyentekhu’ est’ chto predlozhit’” (Voyentekh

has something to offer), Krasnaya zvezda, 28 May 1994. 

47. Ibid. For more on Khorzhakov and the Rosvooruzheniye scandal, see Aleksandr Minkin, “The 

Goats Want to Guard the Cabbage--It is a Business They Love,” Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 21 

April 1995, as translated in JPRS-UMA-95-020, pp. 74-80. 

48. See Mikhailov, “Grachev’s Mercedes Was Invented By Warrant Officer Pronin,” p. 3, for the 

GBTU’s illegal receipt of currency from a foreign economic concern. 

49. Many allegations have also concerned the military’s sale of first-line equipment. See Alexei 

Nezayev, “Grachev Thirsts for Trade in Military Hardware,” Moscow News, 12-18 May 1995. 

50. Russian television and Dubl Networks, 0700 GMT, 14 December 1994, as translated in FBISSOV-94-248. 

51. Ibid. 

52. Interview with Lieutenant General Nikolay Nikolayevich Zlenko by Valentin Rudenko, 

“Interesy natsional’noy bezopasnosti prevyshe vsego,” (The interests of national security are 

above everything), Krasnaya zvezda, 25 February 1995. 

53. See the articles, Sergey Maslov, “V Evrope schitayet, chto mesto russkikh--na 

Vostoke”(Europe believes that the place for Russians--is in the East), Komsomol’skaya pravda, 30 

August 1994; and Igor Chernyak, “Smotrya kakikh russkikh--I na kakom Vostoke” (Looking at 

what kind of Russians--and what kind of East), Komsomol’skaya pravda, 30 August 1994. 

54. Mikhailov, “Grachev’s Mercedes Was Invented By Warrant Officer Pronin,” p. 3. 

55. Dzhokar Dudayev became president of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic in September 

1991 and subsequently pushed for the withdrawal of Russian forces stationed there. For a 1992 

profile of Dudayev see Lyudmila Leontyeva, “Djokar Dudayev,” Moscow News, no. 14, 1992. 

(The rendering of the Chechen president’s name varies widely from source to source). 

56. Interview with Major General Igor Kochubey by Irina Chernova, “The Order Came From 

Moscow--Leave Your Weapons,” Komsomol’skaya pravda, 21 January 1995, as translated in 

JPRS-UMA-95-003, pp. 5-7; Yuriy Bespalov, “Kto vooruzhal Dzhokhara Dudayeva? Oruzhiye 

sdali po prikazu Moskovy" (Who armed Dzhokar Dudayev? Weapons were handed over at 

Moscow’s order), Izvestiya, 14 January 1995; and Valeriy Yakov, “Who Armed Dzhokar 

Dudayev? It Is Best to Remove a Witness,” Izvestiya, 14 January 1995, as translated in JPRSUMA-95-003, pp. 8-9. Among the intriguing material related by Russian General V. Ochirov was 

a statement made suddenly by Dudayev to him in late 1993. Dudayev reportedly said: “Do you 
52

know that a special air route runs through Groznyy to Turkey, the Arab Emirates, Jordan, and 

other countries? We do not have customs or border control; the airport officially is not listed as an 

international airport, but airplanes flying to and from Russia make a stopover here. Who boards 

them here, who deplanes, what they are carrying--nobody knows.” (Yakov, “Who Armed Dzhokar 

Dudayev?”) For more on arms, drug, and money conspiracies involving Chechnya, see also Sergey 

Andreyev, “Rasplata budet: patrioticheskiye spetssluzhby preduprezhdayut izmennikov ”(There 

will be a day of reckoning: patriotic special services warn traitors), Zavtra, no. 28, July 1995; and 

the monograph (with pseudonymous author) Ivan Ivankov, Mezhdunarodnaya kontrabanda 

narkotikov I byvshiy SSSR (International narcotics contraband and the former USSR), (Moscow: 

Research Group ‘Feliks,’ February 1995). 

57. Robert Orttung, "More Revelations About Beginning of Chechen War," OMRI Daily Digest, 

no. 28, Part I, 8 February 1995. 

58. James Rupert, “Cache and Carry in Chechnya: The Russians Trade Arms With the Enemy,” 

Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 27 February-5 March 1995. 

59. Clarke, “Military Main Source of Criminals’ Weapons;” and “Russia Bombs Chechnya, 

Blocks Roads,” Associated Press Report, 21 May 1995. 

60. For reporting on early Soviet concerns, see Alexander Rahr, “Soviet Fear of Nuclear 

Terrorism,” Report on the USSR vol. 2, no. 13, 30 March 1990, pp. 10-11; and Alexander Rahr 

and R. Alex Bryan, “Concern Over Security of Nuclear Arms, Report on the USSR, vol. 2, no. 41, 

12 October 1990, pp. 6-7. 

61. See, for example, the many useful products and data bases of the Program for 

Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies to include Nonproliferation 

Review produced quarterly, and Nuclear Successor States of the Former Soviet Union, published 

jointly by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Monterey Institute of 

International Studies, May, 1994. 

62. Interview with Gennadiy Yevstafyev by Vladimir Orlov, “Interview of the Month--Nine 

Questions on Nuclear Nonproliferation,” Yadernyy kontrol, January 1995, as translated in JPRSTAC-95-002. 

63. See Tim Zimmerman and Alan Cooperman, “The Russian Connection,” US News and World 

Report, 23 October 1995, pp. 56-67. In brief, the beryllium was acquired by organized crime and 

associated commercial firms in Yekaterinburg by using a false purchase order submitted to a 

Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) nuclear research institute in Obninsk. The material was 

moved by aircraft to Vilnius, Lithuania, and stored in a local bank until seized by Lithuanian 

police responding to a tip. Unsuccessful efforts to sell the beryllium involved shadowy foreign 

(possibly North Korean) buyers. 

64. INTERFAX, 1802 GMT, 28 July 1995, as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-146, p. 25. 

65. Greg J. Gerardi and James A. Plotts, “An Annotated Chronology of DPRK Missile Trade and 

Development,” Monterey Institute of International Studies, 11 August 1994, pp. 4-5. See also 

“Russia Detains Weapons Experts,” Lawrence Journal World, 20 December 1992. 

66. Jim Adams, “US Senate Acts Against Russia Nuclear Sale to Iran,” Reuter News Service, 16 

March 1995. Russia evidently intends to help Iran build up to four nuclear reactors, a project that 

the US believes will advance Iranian nuclear weapons programs. 

67. See Kyodo, 1403 GMT, 10 April 1995, as translated in JPRS-TOT-95-006-L, p. 28, among 

many other media reports. 
53

68. Interview with Russian Internal Affairs Minister Anatoliy Kulikov by Yevgeniy Kiselev, 

NTV, 1800 GMT, 15 October 1995, as translated in FBIS-SOV--95-199, p. 55. 

69. Michael Specter, “Chechen Insurgents Take Struggle to Moscow,” New York Times, 24 

November 1995; and Brian Killen’s Moscow report, Reuter, 24 November 1995, via America OnLine, 1437 GMT, 24 November 1995. 

70. See the instructive article by the Chief of the 12th GUMO, Colonel General Yevgeniy 

Petrovich Maslin, “Nuclear Weapons: Results and Prospects,” Vooruzheniye, politika, konversiya, 

no. 4 (7), 1995, as translated in JPRS-UMA-95-026. 

71. Ibid. 

72. Anton Surikov and Igor Sutyagin, “The Movement and Storage of Russian Nuclear 

Weapons,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 1994, pp. 202-203. 

73. Vadim Markushin, “Prestupnym rukam do nashey yadernoy bomby ne dotyanut’sya” 

(Criminal hands will not reach our nuclear bomb), Krasnaya zvezda, 1 July 1994. 

74. Interview with Colonel General Yevgeniy Maslin by Vladimir Orlov, “A Threat of Nuclear 

Terrorism Exists in Russia,” Moskovskiye novosti, no. 44, 25 June-2 July 1995, as translated in 

The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. XLVII, no. 25,1995, p. 26. (Emphasis added). 

75. These include launch sites, rocket technical bases, assembly and disassembly facilities, and 

other operational-level storage facilities for nuclear components. Surikov and Sutyagin, “The 

Movement and Storage of Russian Nuclear Weapons,” addresses some of these sites. 

76. Nosov, “Army: Everything’s for Sale.” Amount cited in 1993-94 rubles. 

77. Yelena Matveyeva, “Airforce-Style Charter Flights,” Moscow News, no. 4, 211 January 1993. 

78. “A total nightmare”, Izvestiya, 17 March 1995, as translated in JPRS-TAC-95-012-L. By fall 

1995, Russian specialists were just as concerned about the problem, which seemed to have no 

promise of early resolution. The paper by L. P. Malyshev, “Problemy obespecheniya 

ekologicheskoy i tekhnologicheskoy bezopastnosti v protsessakh radikal’nogo sokrashcheniya 

strategicheskikh vooruzheniy Rossii” (Problems of supporting ecological and technological 

security in the process of radically reducing Russian strategic weapons), presented at the 

conference “Evolving Post-Cold War Security Issues,” Moscow, 12-14 September 1995 reiterated 

the dangers associated with decommissioning submarines. 

79. Viktor Litovkin, “Raspad: Uglovnyy protsess nad tremya ofitserami Severnogo flota” 

(Breakdown: Criminal trial of three Northern fleet officers), Izvestiya, 12 May 1995; Charles 

Hanley, “Doomsday Bazaar,” Part II, Associated Press, 27 March 1995; and Mikhail Kulik, 

“Exclusive: Some Problems of Storing Nuclear Materials in the Northern Fleet,” Yadernyy 

kontrol: Obozreniye po problemam oruzhiya massovogo unichtozheniya v Rossii i novykh 

nezavisimykh gosudarstvakh (Nuclear control: Review of problems of weapons of mass 

destruction in Russian and the newly independent states), February 1995, as translated in FBISSOV-95-046-S. 

80. Lev Lin, “Too Many Cooks . . . Defense Ministry Will Once Again Be Its Own Nuclear 

Controller,” Kuranty, 15 August 1995, as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-158, pp. 26-27. 

81. For a typical, bland Soviet explanation of Chemical Troops’ missions, see N. V. Ogarkov, 

ed.,“Khimicheskiye voiska,” Voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar’ (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1983), 

p. 794. 
54

82. This is despite the Soviet 1987 decision to stop producing such agents, international 

agreements, and numerous reassurances about the “strict military security” maintained over 

existing stocks. 

83. I. P. Beletskaya, “Russian Chemical Weapons,” Vestnik Rossiyskoy akademii nauk, February 

1995, as translated in JPRS-UST-95-025. 

84. Ibid. The “underestimation” case is made particularly strongly in Lev Fedorov, “We Were 

Preparing for an All-Out Chemical War,” Obshchaya gazeta, 26 January 1995, as translated in 

FBIS-SOV-037-S. The 40,000 metric ton figure has continued to be used officially, however, as 

reiterated by Lieutenant General Yuriy Tarasevich, Deputy Chief of the Radiation, Chemical, and 

Biological Protection Troops in Yuriy Golotyuk, “Russia Embarks on Destruction of Combat 

Poison Gases. Gas Attack in Tokyo Subway Prompts Russian President to Sign Edict,” Segodnya, 

28 March 1995, as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-067. 

85. Scott Parrish, “General Denies Russia Has 100,000 Tons of Chemical Weapons,” OMRI Daily

Digest, no. 228, Part I, 22 November 1995. The charge was made by Aleksei Yablokov, chief of 

the Interagency Commission on Ecological Security of the Russian Security Council. 

86. According to Golotyuk, “Russian Embarks on Destruction,” the destruction of chemical 

munitions is scheduled to begin by 1997 at two of the seven sites (Shikany and a Urals area 

military base in the Udmurtiya Oblast). All 40,000 metric tons are to be destroyed by 2005. 

87. Fedorov, “We Were Preparing for an All-Out Chemical War.” 

88. “Russia’s Chemical Arsenal Not Safe From Thievery,” New York Times News Service, 1 

October 1995. See also Oleg Zharov, “Blister Action Disarmament: A ‘New Guy’ in the Class," 

Novaya Yezhednevnaya Gazeta, 7 February 1995, as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-031 

FBIS-SOV-95-031. 

89. Interview with Leo Fedorov, “Russian Expert Discusses Sarin Incident,” Nihon Keizai 

Shimbun, 18 April 1995, as translated in FBIS-EAS-95-079. 

90. See, for example, Kazutaka Iijima, “General Rules Out Possibility of Sarin Gas Proliferation,” 

Manichi Shimbun, 10 April 1995, as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-073; ITAR-TASS Report, 0855 

GMT, 29 March 1995, as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-063; ITAR-TASS Report, 1544 GMT, 23 

March 1995, as translated in JPRS-TAC-95-012-L; Interview with Leo Fedorov, “Russian Expert 

Discusses Sarin Incident”; Interview with Academician A. Kuntsevich by Valentina Nikiforova 

and Aleksandr Chernyak, Pravda, 4 April 1995, as translated in JPRS-TAC-95-012-L. 

91. Iijima, “General Rules Out Possibility of Sarin Gas Proliferation.” 

92. The charges were released by FSB Chief Mikhail Barsukov. Leonid Beres and Aleksandr 

Koreyskiy, “Well-Known Scientist’s Travails,” Kommersant-Daily, 24 October 1995, as translated 

in EVP Press Digest, 24 October 1995. 

93. Andrey Vaganov, “Chemist’s Case. Part Two. Academician Kuntsevich Thinks That Someone 

is Settling Political Scores With Him,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25 October 1995, as translated in 

EVP Press Digest, 25 October 1995; Beres and Koreyskiy, “Well-Known Scientist’s Travails”; 

Penny Morvant, “Senior Official Accused of Smuggling Chemical Weapons,” OMRI Daily 

Digest, no. 206, Part I, 23 October 1995; and “Probe Focuses on Ex-Soviet Weapons Chief,” 

Associated Press Report, 24 October 1995. 
55

94. There was also the suspicion that these charges were made to encourage greater financial aid 

from the US and the West, since it demonstrated the “proliferation” consequences of an 

impoverished weapons industry.