No. 181, July 2001 Strategic Forum 

base future force structure.

This environment will not permit the

luxury of a strategic pause. Allowing the new

world order to arrange itself could present

the Nation with an unforeseen threat that it

cannot handle. To prevent such an eventuality, the military must address several challenges: the number of nontraditional threats,

financing a military capable of meeting all

the potential challenges it may face, the need

to reform itself to handle rapid developments

in technology, and interagency reform in

coordination with military reform so that the

full weight of national power can be brought

to bear against adversaries.

A deliberate process of military transformation must account for the need for public

support, which is essential for such a

process to succeed. Transformation would

encompass several areas: developing a

realistic strategic direction; reviewing personnel recruitment and retention; understanding the implications of joint and combined warfare for organization, structure,

core competencies, and operational concepts; revamping national security advisory

and decisionmaking processes; and assessing the effects of technological and social

changes on the military.

The West always contended that communism

was a fundamentally flawed system that would

eventually fail. Despite that belief, we were

caught by surprise by the sudden and total end

of the Soviet empire and the system that governed half the world. At the time, our President

proudly drew what appeared to be the logical

conclusion from these events: that there was to

be a new world order. Others talked of reaping

a peace dividend, since defense spending surely

could be reduced.

Our Nation made a half-hearted attempt

to reprise the Marshall Plan by trying to help

the former Soviet Union, as it was then known,

through the looming political and economic

crisis that it faced. The effort was called Operation Provide Hope. It was conceived by the

Secretary of State to encourage international

contribution of resources and advisors to help

the former Soviet Union enter the world of

democracy and free market economy. Also

established was a military-to-military program

designed to build relations with the Russian

military and help it through the transition.

Those of us involved were disappointed as

interest in these efforts by nations, including

our own, seemed to fizzle. The lessons of two

era and mark the last days of the most powe

ful forces ever fielded, we were given one fin

chance to demonstrate the might of our Cold

War-era military machine against the forces 

Saddam Hussein. The superiority of our tech

nology, soldier skills, and military leadership

completely dominated the Soviet surrogate

force fielded by the Iraqis. I recall being in

Eastern Europe shortly afterward visiting mi

tary schools and commands where the office

seemed awed and amazed at the total dominance by the U.S. military in the Gulf War. I

seemed a fitting last act for our powerful Col

War military as it exited the world stage afte

decades of standing tall and preventing a

devastating global conflict.

The American military came down rapidly—too rapidly—after these events. Suddenly, careers were terminated, units were

disbanded, and bases were closed. I rememb

the personal trauma I witnessed while statio

in Europe as massive reductions in force wer

announced, good soldiers were eliminated fr

the ranks, and proud units furled their color

There did not seem to be any logic to the dra

downs. It appeared that we would just have a

smaller version of our Cold War force. Despi

bottom-up review and other bureaucratic qu

studies, no sense could be made of the residu
religious, and historic hatreds that had been

simmering under the superpower bipolar lid.

Some nation-states collapsed into anarchy and

chaos; others showed alarming signs of becoming incapable or failed states. Some of these

collapsed states provided sanctuaries to extremist groups, which used these bases to plan,

train, and organize for strikes against U.S.

forces and other targets. Natural and manmade

humanitarian catastrophes were on the rise,

along with civil strife that seemed out of control in some parts of the world. Regional hegemons and rogue states that had learned the

lessons of the Gulf War began to develop what

has become known as asymmetric capabilities,

or threats that were designed to go against our

evident military vulnerabilities or gaps. These

asymmetric threats ranged from weapons of

mass destruction and long-range missiles to

low-tech sea mines and terrorist tactics. All

were designed to challenge a perceived weak

lord groups, brought a new and confusing

dimension to a world previously dominated by

nation-state interaction.

Remote places such as Somalia, Bosnia,

Rwanda, and East Timor became flashpoints

that required our intervention at some level. 

At the same time, the need to contain regional

threats such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea

remained a major military requirement. These

states also were becoming more threatening as

they developed greater military capabilities that

were aimed at denying us access to regions and

our allies within those regions. More and more,

our security interests seemed to be drawn into

remote, unstable parts of the world.

Changing Missions

As a result of these sorts of events

throughout the last decade of the 20th century,

our shrinking and adjusting Armed Forces were

hit by an onslaught of strange, nontraditional

One senior officer was quoted as saying, “Re

men don’t do MOOTW,” or military operatio

other than war, a term that became the title 

all these messy little low-end commitments.

The stress of the changes, confusion ov

missions, poor readiness conditions, constan

deployments, lack of direction, and atrophy

benefits, compensation, and quality of life

impacted the critical areas of recruitment a

retention. With a booming economy, even th

most dedicated service members were findin

it difficult to remain in the services under

these conditions. It became evident as the

20th century closed that the military was in d

need of direction and reform. It was difficul

for our political leaders to commit the resources necessary for change, since there we

pressing domestic needs, and the American

military still looked like the most powerful

force in the world.

A New Century

We have now entered the 21st century, a

our military must address several serious qu

tions and challenges. The first deals with the

growing number of these nontraditional

threats. Will these continue to increase, with

new types added to the confusing mix, and w

2 Strategic Forum No. 181, July 2

General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.), is a distinguished senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and

International Studies. He retired in September 2000 as Commander in Chief, Central Command, after 39 years

of service. His earlier assignments included Chief of Staff and Deputy Commanding General of Combined

Task Force Provide Comfort during the Kurdish relief effort in Turkey and Iraq. He also served as Military

Coordinator for Operation Provide Hope, the relief effort for the former Soviet Union. General Zinni also was

Director for Operations for Unified Task Force Somalia during Operation Restore Hope.
challenge a positive new world order and the

realization of a peace dividend.

Our security interests will require that we

have a military prepared to respond to:

■ a global power with sophisticated military capabilities

■ regional hegemons with asymmetric

capabilities, such as weapons of mass destruction and missiles, designed to deny us access to

vital areas and regional allies

■ transnational threats that include terrorist groups, international criminal and drug

organizations, warlords, environmental security issues, health and disease problems, and

illegal migrations

■ problems of failed or incapable states

that require peacekeeping, humanitarian

assistance, disaster relief, or national reconstruction

■ overseas crises that threaten U.S. citizens

and property

■ domestic emergencies that exceed the

capacity of other Federal and local government

agencies to handle

■ threats to our key repositories of information and our systems for moving information

This is a demanding list of requirements

to place on the military, and it does not include

We also will require that our forces continue to meet the peacetime demands of engagement and shaping. Maintaining stability by

building viable, interoperable coalitions with

the forces of regional allies will remain a necessity to ensure a positive security environment in

key areas of the world. Military engagement

challenges of this new century; however, it w

not be given adequate resources if the Ameri

can people do not understand the need. This

will require a stronger and closer relationshi

between Americans and their military. The

relationship has cooled, and even been strain

No. 181, July 2001 Strategic Forum 

The Henry Clay Hofheimer Lecture Series

T

his Strategic Forum is based on a lecture presented in the Henry Clay Hofheimer series at the

Joint Forces Staff College on May 24, 2001. Since 1987 the Hofheimer Lectures have been

sponsored by the National Defense University (NDU) Foundation. The series is named 

in honor of Henry Clay Hofheimer II, a prominent industrialist, businessman, and philanthropist

from Hampton Roads, Virginia, who was dedicated to promoting cooperation between the civilian

and military communities in the Tidewater area. He is particularly recognized for more than 

50 years of support of the Joint Forces Staff College. Mr. Hofheimer and his late wife, Elise, ensured that each commandant of the college met local civic and business leaders; he also attended

the graduation of nearly every class of the joint and combined planning and operations course.

This series features addresses by military or political leaders of national stature. Past participants have included Admiral Harry D. Train II, USN (Ret.), General William E. DePuy, USA (Ret.),

General Crosbie E. Saint, USA (Ret.), Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr., USN (Ret.), General Michael

P.C. Carns, USAF (Ret.), and The Honorable Ike Skelton.

NDU Press has published two previous lectures in the Strategic Forum series: NATO’s IFOR in

Action by Leighton Smith (no. 154, January 1999), and Military Lessons from Desert One to the

Balkans by Ike Skelton (no. 174, October 2000).
4 Strategic Forum No. 181, July 2

ticated educational and service experience. It

may be time to age the force by retaining more

troops with longer service, more time in grade,

and greater experience. The policies that foster

careerism should be removed or overhauled.

Quality-of-life areas, compensation, benefits,

personal development, challenging experiences, and personnel stability have to be key

considerations in getting and keeping the best

and brightest our society has to offer. The

future military will be an even more complex

institution and will require truly competent

and dedicated members.

Joint Warfare We must seriously address joint and combined warfare and recognize it as synonymous with the operational

level of war; it requires a true capability to

integrate forces, not just deconflict and coordinate their efforts. True coherence will come in

these operations when we can think past service

component integration to think about integrating forces within the domains of maneuver,

fire, information, and sustainment. Services

must eliminate interservice bickering and

corrosive competition that result in dysfunctional force applications or the absence of

needed warfighting doctrine and procedures.

grips with the issue of an appropriate ethos for

our service members. Are they still warriors

requiring values much like those of their uniformed forefathers, or have technology and

changing social attitudes made that outdated?

It is hard to imagine that the coming age of

cyberwarriors and remote control battle has

removed the need for a warrior culture. The

kinds of conflicts that we still face require a

long look at what the forces of political correctness and social change have done to morale,

good order and discipline, and combat effectiveness. Related to this are the attitudes and atmosphere that generate a zero-defects mentality

and a casualty- and risk-aversion approach to

thinking, and other demands on resources w

limit our ability to realize the full benefits of 

true transformation.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research b

members of the National Defense University as well as

other scholars and specialists in national security affai

from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusion

and recommendations expressed or implied within are

those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect

the views of the Department of Defense or any other

agency of the Federal Government.

NDU PRESS

William R. Bode George C. Maerz

General Editor Supervisory Editor

The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes

books, monographs, and reports on national security

strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy.

For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at:

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/ndup2.html. INSS also

produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at:

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Stephen J. Flanagan Robert A. Silano

Director Director of Publications