No. 178, February 2001 Strategic Forum 1

Strategic Forum

Decisions on the next phase of strategic

force reductions and how to achieve

them will have to await the resolution

of larger issues related to the future of the

U.S. strategic force posture and national

missile defense. Once the Bush administration completes its Nuclear Posture Review,

however, it will need to decide whether to

continue the Cold War-style strategic arms

reduction process or explore alternatives for

reducing nuclear threats to national security

and transforming the U.S.-Russian strategic

relationship.

The traditional arms control process of

negotiating legally binding treaties that both

codify numerical parity and contain extensive

verification measures has reached an impasse and outlived its utility. Moreover, new

U.S. strategic priorities will require changes

in the ends and means of arms control policy.

The United States and Russia should

embrace a radically new framework to

achieve deeper reductions in strategic nuclear forces. The centerpiece of such a reform agenda should be arms control through

unilateral and parallel unilateral measures. To

jump-start this process, the administration

should give top priority to repealing legislation that prohibits the Nation from unilaterally

reducing strategic forces until START II enters

into force.

Unless the United States embraces a

more flexible and innovative approach to

strategic arms control, progress will be

stymied in developing a nuclear weapons

posture for the new security environment.

There has been a tectonic shift in the

strategic landscape since the Strategic Arms

Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations concluded in the early 1990s. The Soviet Union

and the Warsaw Pact are defunct. America and

Russia are no longer enemies and the nuclear

arms race between the two countries is, for all

intents and purposes, over. The threat of a

surprise nuclear attack has all but vanished

along with any plausible scenario between the

two countries that could escalate to a nuclear

war. The strategic warning time for reconstitution of a credible conventional military threat

to Europe can now be measured in years. The

likelihood that Russia could marshal the

economic resources for clandestine production

of new nuclear weapon systems on a militarily

significant scale is extremely remote. The most

serious security threats emanating from Russia

today—poorly safeguarded nuclear warheads

and materials and the potential proliferation

of such material and expertise to states of

concern—reflect profound weakness. Simply

put, the proliferation risks attendant to a

Russia in the throes of a long-term structural

crisis are a far more serious security threat

than SS–18 heavy missiles destroying U.S.

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in a

preemptive first strike. 

Consideration of future nuclear arms

control options must also take into account

long-term trends in Russian strategic force

levels. With or without arms control agreements with the United States, Russia will not

command the necessary resources over the next

10-15 years to sustain the number of deployed

warheads (1,500) it proposed for START III.

Moreover, economic constraints, combined with

growing obsolescence, will also lead to a steep

decline in its nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

Russian production of strategic weapon systems

has fallen dramatically over the last decade.

Moscow currently produces a negligible number of ICBMs per year and will not be able to

produce these systems fast enough to offset the

growing obsolescence of its ICBM forces. Further, infrastructure and resources are lacking to

sustain these decaying missile systems indefinitely or to support significant increases in

force structure. The other two legs of the Russian strategic triad are in even worse shape.

Since 1990, the last year that Russia produced

any new ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs),

the number of SSBNs has dropped precipitously

and will decline even further as older submarines are retired. The heavy bomber force

consists largely of older Bear bombers; Russia

has produced only a few strategic bombers

since the early 1990s and is unlikely to produce

any new heavy bombers in the near future. In

sum, Moscow faces the prospect of deep disinvestment in strategic nuclear forces for the next

decade and probably beyond. 

The Scorecard

The record over the last decade of both

traditional and nontraditional arms control

measures is largely one of initial successes

followed by unfulfilled promises and missed

opportunities to reduce the role of nuclear

weapons in U.S. national security policy and

bilateral security relations.

START I led to the elimination of nuclear

weapons on the territory of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus and to the accession of these

countries to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)

Renovating U.S. Strategic Arms

Control Policy

by Richard D. Sokolsky

No. 178

February 2001

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points
as nonnuclear weapons states (NNWS). If

START I reductions are fully implemented on

schedule (by December 2001), the treaty will

have brought about the irreversible elimination

of hundreds of Russian strategic delivery systems and about a 40 percent reduction in the

number of strategic warheads deployed by both

countries. START II, which was signed in 1993,

would further reduce the number of strategic

warheads deployed by the United States and

Russia to 3,000–3,500 each—about a twothirds cut from 1990 levels. 

Nonetheless, completion of START I has

been a slow process and since 1993 the strategic arms reduction process has been stymied. 

It took almost a decade to negotiate START I,

31

/2 years to gain its entry into force, and 

7 years to implement the required reductions.

Although START II was negotiated in less than 

12 months, it has yet to enter into force and is

likely to remain in limbo for some time, since

the Duma has attached conditions to ratification related to the Antiballistic Missile (ABM)

Treaty that the Senate is likely to reject. Although the two sides agreed in principle in

1997 to levels of 2,000–2,500 warheads in

START III, discussions have yielded little

progress. Meanwhile, the United States has

been bound for several years by domestic law to

maintain 6,000 deployed strategic warheads

until START II enters into force. Perversely,

therefore, the United States is retaining 3,500–

4,000 more warheads than the Pentagon says it

would need under START III. 

By contrast, nontraditional arms control

measures—unilateral and reciprocal initiatives, cooperative threat reduction programs,

policy declarations—have produced substantial

and quick benefits over the last decade. These

include reductions in U.S. and Russian tactical

nuclear weapons; the cancellation of several

major U.S. and Russian strategic weapon systems; improved safety and security for Russian

nuclear warheads and fissile material; the

downsizing of Russian nuclear weapons infrastructure; and, in connection with START I, the

deactivation or elimination in the former Soviet

Union of almost 5,000 strategic nuclear warheads, nearly 600 ballistic missile launchers

and silos, and nearly 500 ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

Traditional Arms Control

Both the traditional and nontraditional

approaches to arms control have a mix of

advantages and disadvantages. In the past, the

traditional arms control approach of carefully

negotiated, legally binding treaties has been

well suited to influencing how Russia reduced

its nuclear forces and to ensuring that those

reductions became permanent, were verified

with a high degree of confidence, and were

implemented according to an agreed schedule.

Although these benefits are not insignificant,

they must be viewed within a broader context

that takes into consideration a number of

factors critical to the successful negotiation of

arms treaties.

Stability. Formal treaties have provided

incentives for Moscow to put less emphasis on

systems such as the SS–18 that were considered destabilizing during the Cold War. It is

questionable, however, whether the Cold War

concept of strategic stability based on the

principle of mutual assured destruction is still

relevant now that Russia is no longer a strategic threat and there is virtually no risk of

surprise nuclear attack or a crisis that would

threaten rapid nuclear escalation. At one time,

“forcing the Russians to sea” was a worthy

goal. That said, Russia’s heavy ICBMs are a

wasting asset, given the overwhelming proportion of the U.S. strategic force posture that is

deployed on SSBNs that are not vulnerable to

ICBM attack. Of far greater importance in

today’s strategic environment than the ratio of

SS-18 warheads to U.S. ICBM silos is that both

the United States and Russia have the flexibility to size, structure, and operate their strategic

postures in accordance with their threat perceptions, military requirements, and financial

and operational constraints.

Irreversibility. Formal treaties help lock

in the benefits of arms control and would be

useful if a hostile leadership reemerged in the

Kremlin. Physically destroying strategic systems

renders them incapable of being used again

and legally binding obligations are more

difficult to reverse than political commitments.

Historically, Washington was most concerned

that Moscow not exploit arms control treaties to

achieve a significant military advantage;

hence, we sought to negotiate practices that

would mitigate the risks of treaty circumvention and breakout. The value of such measures,

however, has declined significantly, particularly

in light of Russian economic constraints and

declining strategic capabilities and the improved U.S.-Russian relationship. Further, for

the United States, the importance of preserving

maximum operational flexibility and programmatic freedom of action should be weighed

against the importance of achieving

irreversibility in nuclear weapons reductions.

Verification/transparency/predictability.

Formal treaties establish a host of practices that

help to reduce uncertainties regarding compliance and implementation. These procedures

were valued in the past because they reduced

the risk of miscalculating military intentions

and capabilities and helped to shape a more

structured and predictable strategic relationship. Whether this Cold War paradigm makes

sense in the current strategic environment is

increasingly open to question, particularly with

respect to the requirement for “stringent verification,” since the American desire to preserve

operational flexibility and reduce verification/

implementation costs and burdens outweighs

concerns over large-scale Russian cheating.

Indeed, in the current context, robust transparency measures may be a suitable alternative

to intrusive verification.

A problem with the traditional nuclear

arms control process is that it is slow. Indeed,

over the last decade the reduced threat perceptions in U.S.-Russian relations have outpaced

progress in strategic arms control. Consequently, both countries are now maintaining

far more strategic weapons than they need or

want. In addition, the process of negotiating

formal arms control treaties can create an

adversarial environment and, by perpetuating

the notion that mutual vulnerability to massive

retaliation is central to a stable relationship, is

incompatible with efforts to forge a more

positive strategic relationship. Moreover, the

U.S.-Russian relationship is more multifaceted

2 Strategic Forum No. 178, February 2001

Richard D. Sokolsky is a visiting fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National

Defense University. Mr. Sokolsky may be reached by phone at (202) 685–2249. The author wishes to

acknowledge the contribution of Dunbar Lockwood in the preparation of this Strategic Forum.

over the last decade the

reduced threat perceptions

in U.S.-Russian relations

have outpaced progress in

strategic arms control
now than it was during the Cold War, when

arms control was the main instrument for

building cooperation. Today, the possibilities

for cooperation are more numerous, and there

are downsides to allowing arms control to

dominate the relationship, among them the

risk of feeding Russia’s superpower pretensions.

Finally, by assuming such a high domestic

political profile in both countries, formal arms

treaties are often expected to shoulder more

weight than they can bear.

Nontraditional Measures

Unilateral or parallel unilateral measures

are well suited to making fast progress and

providing flexibility for both sides in implementation. In addition, such measures can be

preferable to formal arms control if intrusive

verification and other detailed measures are

not critical, desirable, or feasible. For example,

under current START II rules, the U.S. force of

95 B-52H heavy bombers would count as 1,900

warheads against an overall ceiling of 2,000–

2,500 accountable warheads. Clearly, if the

United States wishes to retain most or all of

these B-52Hs for conventional missions, it must

get some relief from START II counting rules.

It would be much easier, faster, and cheaper to

attain relief through transparency and confidence-building measures than negotiations

with Russia on START III. 

At the same time, informal arms control is

not without risks and uncertainties. One disadvantage is the absence of verification provisions, which sometimes creates concerns about

compliance. Also, it is easier to walk away from

informal understandings than from legally

binding treaty commitments. In addition, as

the United States and Russia move to lower

warhead levels, the number of warheads the

United States would consider of military significance if not constrained by a formal arms

control regime would decrease. Furthermore,

the United States could face international

opposition to unilateral initiatives. Russia

values the status and prestige afforded by

formal arms control negotiations, although a

recent statement by President Vladimir Putin

held open the possibility of parallel unilateral

reductions. Likewise, U.S. allies and most other

countries probably prefer formal arms control

treaties, and may see a U.S. decision to pursue

unilateral arms control as another indication

that America has abandoned cooperative approaches to international security. Finally,

congressional opposition and legal constraints

could make unilateral reductions in strategic

nuclear weapons difficult to achieve.

These problems and disadvantages need to

be weighed against the benefits of informal

arms control. Some of the obstacles to new

arms control practices can be overcome with

energetic U.S. leadership and adroit diplomacy.

In addition, concerns about informal arms

control should be placed in a broader context

that reflects current strategic realities.

First, the benefits of formal arms control

treaties are less important today than in the

past, in light of the changed strategic environment and Russia’s economic constraints and

plummeting number of delivery platforms for

nuclear weapons.

Second, the United States no longer needs

highly intrusive verification to be confident

that it can monitor deployed strategic force

levels. The United States will continue to possess for the indefinite future the intelligence

capabilities, with national technical means

(NTM) alone, to detect in a timely manner any

covert Russian actions that could alter the

strategic balance in a militarily significant

manner. Likewise, because of the length of time

it would take Russia to pose such a threat, the

United States would have ample time to take

effective countermeasures.

Third, unilateral reductions in strategic

weapons could be accompanied by

transparency measures (for example, data

exchanges and reciprocal visits to military

facilities) that would help alleviate concerns

absent a formal START III agreement.

Fourth, many items on the future U.S.-

Russian nuclear agenda—such as tactical

nuclear and nondeployed warheads—simply

do not lend themselves to formal arms control

treaties, at least in the near term, because of

technical, verification, and operational problems. In addition, there are steps each side

could take to reassure the other of its intentions

and to reduce the risk of an inadvertent nuclear war that are better suited to unilateral or

reciprocal initiatives. 

Fifth, if the administration decides to

deploy a national missile defense (NMD),

unilateral reductions in U.S. strategic forces

could allay Russian concerns.

Finally, there is little common ground

today in U.S. and Russian arms control goals.

The United States does not believe that the

negotiation of a new arms control treaty is a

sine qua non to reducing the threat of nuclear

war or to enhancing stability. By contrast,

Russia seeks further strategic arms reduction

agreements to constrain U.S. military capabilities and to maintain its own perceived superpower status. Russia wants to limit U.S. operational flexibility, and perceives U.S. efforts to

maintain this flexibility as threatening. These

differences, along with growing disparities in

strategic nuclear capabilities, will complicate

efforts to craft arms control treaty provisions

that can reconcile conflicting goals.

A New Paradigm

None of the features of the Cold War

landscape remains the same, yet little has

changed in American thinking about strategic

arms control with Russia. Future strategic arms

control policy toward Russia should be driven

by two considerations. First, how does it contribute to broader national security objectives,

in particular reducing the threat of nuclear

weapons and meeting the most serious threats

we are likely to face in the strategic environment of the 21st century? Second, how does it

contribute to the kind of long-term relationship

we would like to have with Russia and to reducing the prominence of nuclear weapons in

this relationship?

From this perspective, the logic of traditional arms control appears to be out of step

with the times, and U.S. nuclear arms control

policy needs to be renovated. Indeed, many of

the assumptions and principles underpinning

classical arms control are now incompatible

with broader U.S. national security and foreign

policy goals. Russia is no longer our enemy, yet

the traditional arms control approach generally presupposes and fosters an adversarial

environment. We want a relationship with

Russia based on trust, understanding, and

cooperation, where nuclear weapons play a

No. 178, February 2001 Strategic Forum 3

the United States no 

longer needs highly

intrusive verification to 

be confident that it can

monitor deployed strategic

force levels
4 Strategic Forum No. 178, February 2001

greatly diminished role—if they play any role

at all. However, the traditional approach to

arms control, with its emphasis on numerical

parity, has the perverse effect of raising the

salience of nuclear weapons in our relationship, to the detriment of more important issues

on our bilateral agenda. Curbing the spread of

weapons of mass destruction requires U.S.

leadership and credibility, especially in meeting

its nuclear disarmament obligations under the

NPT. But the formal arms control process is

deadlocked and is likely to remain so for the

foreseeable future, causing many countries

around the world to question the U.S. commitment to nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament and undermining the U.S. ability to

advance its nonproliferation agenda. Finally,

traditional arms control theology remains

fixated on reducing the negligible threat of

deliberate nuclear attack and ignores more

serious threats to stability, such as mismanagement of nuclear operations and practices, that

are not susceptible to instruments in the traditional arms control toolbox.

What are the implications of the foregoing

assessment for the general direction of U.S.

nuclear arms control policy toward Russia? The

United States puts too much emphasis on first

strike stability, numerical parity, number of

deployed warheads, and stringent verification

as metrics for judging the benefits, costs, and

risks of nuclear arms control options. In a new

strategic environment, the United States should

have new objectives and priorities. These include improving U.S.-Russian political relations; reallocating resources from maintaining

unnecessary nuclear force structures to developing capabilities to meet new threats; bolstering U.S. nonproliferation efforts; downsizing

Russia’s nuclear weapons production infrastructure; improving the security and safety of

nuclear warheads and fissile material; and

reducing the risk of nuclear crises or conflict

through miscalculation.

Accordingly, the United States should put

more weight on nontraditional arms control

and cooperative threat reduction and less emphasis on formally negotiated treaties. Unilateral or coordinated unilateral reductions in

strategic nuclear weapons should be at the core

of this transformation agenda. Other items on

this agenda should include early deactivation of

strategic systems that would be eliminated

under START II, expanded sharing of early

warning information and data on the status of

nuclear postures, increased assistance to Russia

under the cooperative threat reduction (CTR)

program for the elimination of strategic systems, and intensified U.S.-Russian dialogue on

strategic policies, programs, and force postures.

The goal of this strategy should be to help put

both sides on the path of de-linking their strategic forces from one another and transforming a

nuclear relationship that no longer serves broad

U.S. national security interests.

The administration does not need to

complete the Nuclear Posture Review before it

begins to restructure U.S. strategic arms control policy. Currently, the prospects for breaking the logjam in the START process remain

dim at best. Entry into force of START II 

is likely to remain hostage to the vagaries of

U.S. domestic politics, while progress on a

START III agreement is likely to founder over

conflicting U.S. and Russian priorities and the

complex and contentious issues that are on the

negotiating table.

Rather than continue pursuing a process

that is bound to move at a glacial pace or,

more likely, remain deadlocked, the new administration should give top priority to repealing current legislation that prohibits the United

States from making unilateral reductions in its

strategic forces until START II enters into force.

Once this legislation has been repealed, the

United States should begin promptly to reduce

strategic nuclear forces unilaterally to levels

commensurate with national security requirements, beginning with the deactivation of the

50 Peacekeeper ICBMs.

Thus, a more effective U.S. arms control

strategy for the future would first make immediate unilateral changes in our strategic force

posture, which would almost certainly elicit a

comparable Russian response. 

In the medium term, the United States

would agree on transparency measures related

to these reductions and other changes in U.S.

nuclear plans and operations. Such actions

would reassure Moscow that Washington is not

seeking to exploit Russian weakness to gain

unilateral military advantages.

In the longer run, some of these unilateral

steps could be converted into legally binding

commitments if we determined at that time that

formal treaties were both necessary and feasible,

given the overall strategic environment.

The United States has not reached a new

consensus on the strategy and purposes of

nuclear arms control with Russia since the end

of the Cold War. Not surprisingly, therefore, the

old bipolar nuclear arms control logic and

assumptions continue to govern the U.S. approach. Traditionally, strategic arms control has

focused primarily on trying to negotiate legally

binding treaties that enshrined strategic stability, numerical parity, and stringent verification.

It is far from clear, however, that these criteria

should continue to guide decisions about what

type of arms control measures the United States

should pursue in the future. Most importantly,

the philosophy and practice of traditional arms

control are no longer contributing effectively to

the goal of reducing threats to U.S. national

security. New strategic priorities will require

changes in the ends and means of classic arms

control policy. Unless the U.S. approach to

nuclear arms control is guided by a more

innovative and forward-looking vision, it may

well be doomed to increasing irrelevance or,

even worse, could undermine rather than

strengthen national security.

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from this country and abroad. The opinions expressed or

implied in this publication are solely those of the authors

and do not necessarily represent the views of the

National Defense University, the Department of Defense,

or any other governmental agency.

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the United States 

should begin promptly 

to reduce strategic

nuclear forces unilaterally

to levels commensurate

with national security

requirements