IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs January 13, 2016

JORDAN MANSFIELD LOOPER v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2011-D-3737 J. Randall Wyatt, Jr., Judge

No. M2015-01018-CCA-R3-PC – Filed March 3, 2016

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Petitioner, Jordan Mansfield Looper, pleaded guilty to attempted second degree murder, 

and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in confinement. State v. Jordan 

Mansfield Looper, No. M2012-02523-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 4647629, at *1 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2013). Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his twelve-year sentence. 

Id. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and he now appeals 

the post-conviction court‟s denial of relief. Petitioner argues that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel when his trial counsel “abandoned” his case and when trial counsel 

told him that he would receive probation during sentencing. Petitioner further argues that 

these errors, in addition to his grief after viewing pictures of the victim‟s injuries for the 

first time, resulted in his guilty plea not being knowingly and voluntarily entered. 

Following our thorough review of the record, the parties‟ briefs, and the applicable law, 

we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROGER A. PAGE, SP. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS T.

WOODALL, P.J., and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., joined.

Sunny M. Eaton, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Jordan Mansfield Looper.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; David H. Findley, Senior Counsel;

Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Christopher Ricardo Buford, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.
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OPINION

I. Facts from Guilty Plea Submission Hearing

This court‟s opinion from petitioner‟s direct appeal explains that the State 

presented the following factual basis for petitioner‟s guilty plea:

[O]n September 13, 2011[,] at approximately 12:59 . . . in the afternoon, 

Officer Boone with the Nashville Metropolitan Police Department 

responded to 1 Dell Parkway in reference to a hit and run involving injury.

Upon the officer‟s arriving[,] Ms. Whitney Wiser was being prepared for 

transport and advised medical personnel there that [petitioner] was the 

person who ran over her with his black SUV. There was also a witness at 

the scene, Mr. Edward Wilson[,] who also saw the black SUV speed out of 

the parking [a]isle and intentionally run the victim over. Mr. Wilson gave a 

description [that] was later aired out over the airways for [petitioner] and 

the vehicle.

Ms. Wiser was transported to Vanderbilt Hospital. She had some serious 

injuries and was listed in critical condition with numerous scrapes and 

abrasions from the car and the asphalt[,] and she had . . . broken bones in 

her spine and some broken ribs.

[Petitioner] was later stopped in Wilson county by a Tennessee Highway 

Patrolman, Trooper Tracy Wright[,] and . . . [petitioner] later admitted that 

he was driving the vehicle that ran over Ms. Wiser in a statement to 

Detective Laura Thomas and Detective Mike Bennett of the Nashville 

Police Department . . . .

Id. 

II. Facts from Post-Conviction Hearing

Petitioner testified that he was originally charged with attempted first degree 

murder but that he pleaded guilty to attempted second degree murder on September 12, 

2012. Petitioner claimed that although his actions resulted in harm to the victim, he was 

innocent of attempted second degree murder because he never intended to harm the 

victim. Petitioner explained that his trial was set to begin on September 12, 2012, but 

that he did not believe that his case was ready to be tried because there were favorable 

witnesses that his trial counsel had not subpoenaed. Petitioner wanted the following 
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witnesses to testify at his trial: his employer, the arresting officer, a psychiatrist, an expert 

in the field of side effects from drugs and alcohol, and an expert in accident 

reconstruction. However, as far as he knew, his trial counsel had failed to subpoena any 

of these witnesses. The only witness that trial counsel planned to call on petitioner‟s 

behalf was petitioner‟s mother. Petitioner also wanted trial counsel to present cellular 

telephone records and text messages between him and the victim at trial; however, to his 

knowledge, trial counsel was not planning to do so. Therefore, on September 12, 

petitioner felt he was going to trial without the necessary witnesses or evidence to mount 

a defense. Petitioner stated that the day before trial, he and trial counsel only discussed 

jury selection and the victim‟s receiving a driving under the influence charge a month 

after the incident. 

Petitioner asserted that when discussing a plea bargain, his attorney told him that 

he would receive an eight-year sentence to be served at thirty percent with one year in 

confinement and the rest to be served on probation. Petitioner said that he planned to 

proceed to trial if he did not receive a plea offer of either probation or split confinement. 

Petitioner explained that on the morning of September 12, prior to his trial, he saw 

pictures of the injured victim for the first time. The pictures made him “feel sick” 

because he knew that his “actions caused it.” Petitioner described his emotional state as 

“in shock,” “hurt,” and “like a knife was in [his] stomach.” Petitioner said that he did not 

feel that he was capable of making decisions in that state; however, it was ten to fifteen 

minutes after viewing the pictures that he had to decide whether to accept the plea 

agreement or proceed to trial. In fact, a couple of days after petitioner pleaded guilty, 

petitioner contacted trial counsel about retracting the plea. Petitioner said that he did not 

remember what the judge said to him during the plea colloquy because he felt “lost.” 

Petitioner said that trial counsel explained the plea petition to him but that he did not read 

the petition before signing it. Petitioner asserted that trial counsel told him that he would 

be receiving probation. 

During cross-examination, petitioner denied reviewing the plea petition with trial 

counsel and was unable to recall telling the trial court that he had reviewed the form with 

trial counsel. Petitioner explained that he did not remember what evidence was presented 

at his preliminary hearing because he was “detoxing” from using Xanax. Petitioner also 

explained that while in jail prior to entering his guilty plea, he began taking Zoloft due to 

depression but that he still felt depressed even after taking the medication. However, 

petitioner conceded that although he was suffering from depression, he was still aware of 

what was occurring in his case. Petitioner asserted that during the plea colloquy, his 

mind was on the victim and the pictures that he had seen rather than the proceedings. 

Cindy Looper, petitioner‟s mother, testified that she was the first person that 

petitioner spoke to after harming the victim and that she had been planning to testify 
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about the conversation at petitioner‟s September 12 trial. Ms. Looper asserted that even 

though she was planning to testify, trial counsel failed to prepare her for her testimony in 

any way. Ms. Looper explained that when petitioner accepted his plea agreement, her 

understanding from speaking with trial counsel was that he was receiving ten to twelve 

years on probation. During cross-examination, Ms. Looper agreed that she knew her son 

was pleading guilty to a lesser charge than that for which he had been charged. 

Joe Looper, petitioner‟s father, testified that he recommended to petitioner 

approximately fifteen different witnesses but that to his knowledge, none of those 

witnesses had been subpoenaed for petitioner‟s trial. Mr. Looper explained that when he 

arrived at the courthouse on September 12 and realized that none of the suggested 

witnesses were present, he did not believe that the case was ready for trial. Mr. Looper 

asserted that trial counsel had told petitioner‟s family that because petitioner had never 

been in trouble before, he would be sentenced to ten years on probation. During crossexamination, Mr. Looper stated that although he remembered petitioner having a 

conversation with the court during the plea colloquy, he “didn‟t really pay that much 

attention to it.” Mr. Looper agreed that he knew a sentencing hearing would occur but 

asserted that he believed petitioner would receive ten years on probation. 

Trial counsel testified that he had been an attorney for fifteen years at the time 

petitioner entered his plea agreement and that he had handled “many” trials, fifteen to 

twenty of which were homicide cases. Trial counsel explained that in preparing for 

petitioner‟s trial, he met with petitioner “easily more than ten times” to discuss the case. 

Trial counsel stated that petitioner was “an intelligent young man” and that he was able to

understand and participate in all of their discussions regarding the case. Regarding the 

use of expert witnesses, trial counsel said that he and petitioner had discussed the 

necessity of an expert in accident reconstruction and that after he evaluated the evidence, 

he decided that an expert witness was unnecessary because he could glean the same 

information himself or from the other witnesses. Trial counsel explained that the witness 

list that petitioner and his family created contained witnesses that were appropriate for a 

bond or sentencing hearing but that they could not testify about the facts of the case at 

trial. Trial counsel testified that on the day of trial, he discussed the plea offer with 

petitioner and that petitioner “definitely” understood what was occurring. Trial counsel 

denied ever promising that petitioner would be sentenced to ten years on probation. Trial 

counsel explained that he told petitioner and his family that ten years on probation “was 

what [they] were aiming for, that the best case scenario was a probation sentence.” Trial 

counsel stated that petitioner “appeared” to understand the plea colloquy with the trial 

court, especially given the conversation he had with petitioner immediately before the 

colloquy. Trial counsel and petitioner also discussed which witnesses the defense should 

present at the sentencing hearing and the possible witnesses that the State would call. 

Regarding the photographs of the victim that petitioner saw on the morning he entered his 
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guilty plea, trial counsel said that he thought petitioner had viewed the photographs 

before but that he was not sure. He specifically recalled reviewing photographs with 

petitioner, and petitioner‟s turning his head to the side due to the photographs‟ contents. 

Trial counsel specifically stated, “I told him what was in the photographs[] if he didn‟t 

see them.” Trial counsel asserted that petitioner was not threatened or promised anything 

in exchange for his guilty plea and that nothing hindered petitioner‟s ability to understand 

what occurred during the guilty plea colloquy and sentencing hearing. 

During cross-examination, trial counsel conceded that he was not a crime scene 

reconstruction expert, that he never consulted an independent crime scene reconstruction 

expert in this case, and that it was likely, given the nature of petitioner‟s case, that the 

trial court would have approved funds to hire an expert. Trial counsel also conceded that 

he was unable to predict what experts in crime scene reconstruction, pharmacology, or 

trauma would have been able to offer or add to petitioner‟s defense. Trial counsel agreed 

that although he had talked to the state trooper who had pulled petitioner over on the day 

of the crime, he did not subpoena the state trooper to testify at petitioner‟s trial, even 

though the state trooper was the first person to interact with petitioner after the incident 

occurred. Trial counsel stated that he knew there was “a decent chance” that petitioner 

would receive a sentence to be served in confinement but that he hoped that trial court 

would offer “split confinement or probation.” 

Following this testimony, the post-conviction court specifically credited trial 

counsel‟s testimony that he had advised petitioner regarding the possible sentences that 

the trial court could impose. Regarding trial counsel‟s preparation and communication 

with petitioner, the post-conviction court again credited trial counsel‟s testimony and 

found that trial counsel had met with petitioner multiple times and reviewed the State‟s 

evidence and discovery with petitioner, including the photographs of the victim. The 

court also found that trial counsel had adequately prepared for trial. The court stated, 

“The court finds that [trial counsel] evaluated the State‟s evidence and possible defense 

theories and strategies, including the need for expert witnesses, and advised the Petitioner 

as best he could throughout the process.” The court found that petitioner had not 

received the ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Regarding whether petitioner‟s plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered, the 

court found that it had “thoroughly advised” petitioner that as part of his guilty plea, the 

trial court would conduct a sentencing hearing and would sentence him to between eight 

and twelve years and that the sentence could be served in confinement. Petitioner 

indicated to the court that he understood the trial court‟s explanation and that he did not 

have any questions about the process. The post-conviction court also discredited 

petitioner‟s assertion that he was overwrought with emotion during the plea colloquy 

from viewing pictures of the victim for the first time. The court found that petitioner had 
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failed to prove that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Petitioner now 

appeals the post-conviction court‟s determination.

III. Analysis

On appeal, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 

when his trial counsel “abandoned” his case and when trial counsel told him that he 

would receive probation during sentencing. Petitioner further argues that these errors, in 

addition to his grief after viewing pictures of the victim‟s injuries for the first time,

resulted in his guilty plea not being knowingly and voluntarily entered. The State 

responds that the post-conviction court properly denied the petition for post-conviction 

relief. We agree with the State.

To obtain relief in a post-conviction proceeding, a petitioner must demonstrate that 

his or her “conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgement of any 

right guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United 

States.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. A post-conviction petitioner bears the burden of 

proving his or her factual allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 40-30-110(f). “„Evidence is clear and convincing when there is no serious or 

substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.‟” 

Lane v. State, 316 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting Grindstaff v. State, 297 

S.W.3d 208, 216 (Tenn. 2009)). 

Appellate courts do not reassess the post-conviction court‟s determination of the 

credibility of witnesses. Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 292 (Tenn. 2009) (citing 

R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356, 362 (Tenn. 2008)). Assessing the credibility of 

witnesses is a matter entrusted to the post-conviction judge as the trier of fact. R.D.S., 

245 S.W.3d at 362 (quoting State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)). The postconviction court‟s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal unless the preponderance of 

the evidence is otherwise. Berry v. State, 366 S.W.3d 160, 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011) 

(citing Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578-79 (Tenn. 1997); Bates v. State, 973 S.W.2d 

615, 631 (Tenn. Crim. App.1997)). However, conclusions of law receive no presumption 

of correctness on appeal. Id. (citing Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tenn. 2001)). 

As a mixed question of law and fact, this court‟s review of petitioner=s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims is de novo with no presumption of correctness. Felts v. 

State, 354 S.W.3d 266, 276 (Tenn. 2011) (citations omitted). 

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the 

states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee 

Constitution require that a criminal defendant receive effective assistance of counsel. 

Cauthern v. State, 145 S.W.3d 571, 598 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Baxter v. Rose, 
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523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975)). When a petitioner claims that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel, he must demonstrate both that his lawyer‟s performance was 

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Finch v. State, 226 S.W.3d 307, 315 (Tenn. 2007) (citation 

omitted). It follows that if this court holds that either prong is not met, we are not 

compelled to consider the other prong. Carpenter v. State, 126 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tenn. 

2004).

To prove that counsel‟s performance was deficient, petitioner must establish that 

his attorney‟s conduct fell below an objective standard of “„reasonableness under 

prevailing professional norms.‟” Finch, 226 S.W.3d at 315 (quoting Vaughn v. State, 202 

S.W.3d 106, 116 (Tenn. 2006)). As our supreme court held: 

“[T]he assistance of counsel required under the Sixth Amendment is 

counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective 

assistance. It is a violation of this standard for defense counsel to deprive a 

criminal defendant of a substantial defense by his own ineffectiveness or 

incompetence . . . . Defense counsel must perform at least as well as a 

lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law and must 

conscientiously protect his client‟s interest, undeflected by conflicting 

considerations.”

Id. at 315-16 (quoting Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 934-35). On appellate review of trial 

counsel‟s performance, this court “must make every effort to eliminate the distorting 

effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel‟s conduct, and to 

evaluate the conduct from the perspective of counsel at that time.” Howell v. State, 185 

S.W.3d 319, 326 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

To prove that petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel‟s deficient 

performance, he “must establish a reasonable probability that but for counsel‟s errors the 

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Vaughn, 202 S.W.3d at 116 (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “A „reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.‟” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). As 

such, petitioner must establish that his attorney‟s deficient performance was of such 

magnitude that he was deprived of a fair trial and that the reliability of the outcome was 

called into question. Finch, 226 S.W.3d at 316 (citing State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 463 

(Tenn. 1999)).

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was deficient in his performance, thereby 

resulting in his involuntary and unknowing guilty plea. First, petitioner argues that trial 

counsel had “abandoned” his case and was unprepared for trial. However, trial counsel 
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testified that in preparing for petitioner‟s trial, he met with petitioner “easily more than 

ten times” to discuss the case. Trial counsel said that he and petitioner had discussed the 

necessity of an expert in accident reconstruction and that after he evaluated the evidence, 

he decided that an expert witness was unnecessary. Trial counsel explained that the 

witness list that petitioner and his family created contained witnesses that were 

appropriate for a bond or sentencing hearing but that they could not testify about the facts 

of the case at trial. The trial court concluded that trial counsel had adequately prepared 

for trial. The trial court specifically credited trial counsel‟s testimony and found that trial 

counsel had met with petitioner multiple times and reviewed the State‟s evidence and 

discovery with petitioner. The court stated, “The court finds that [trial counsel] evaluated 

the State‟s evidence and possible defense theories and strategies, including the need for 

expert witnesses, and advised the Petitioner as best he could throughout the process.” As 

stated above, appellate courts do not reassess a post-conviction court‟s determination 

regarding the credibility of witnesses. Dellinger, 279 S.W.3d at 292 (citing R.D.S., 245 

S.W.3d at 362). We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying relief on this 

issue. 

Petitioner also argues that trial counsel was ineffective when he told petitioner that 

he would receive probation during sentencing. However, trial counsel denied promising 

petitioner a probationary sentence. Trial counsel testified that while he hoped that 

petitioner would receive probation or a split confinement sentence, he informed petitioner 

that a sentence to be served in confinement was possible. The trial court specifically 

credited trial counsel‟s testimony that he had advised petitioner regarding the possible 

sentences that the trial court could impose, and we will not re-evaluate this credibility 

determination on appeal. Dellinger, 279 S.W.3d at 292 (citing R.D.S., 245 S.W.3d at 

362). The trial court did not err in denying relief on this issue.

Petitioner also argues that his guilty pleas were not entered knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently due to his trial counsel‟s ineffective assistance and due to 

his distraught emotional state after viewing pictures of the injured victim for the first 

time. A guilty plea must be entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Lane, 316 

S.W.3d at 562; see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 

395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969). If a plea is not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 

entered, the guilty plea is void because petitioner has been denied due process. Lane, 316 

S.W.3d at 562 (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 n.5). To make such a determination, the

court must examine “whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice 

among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” Id. Courts should 

consider the following factors when ascertaining the validity of a guilty plea: 

(1) the defendant‟s relative intelligence; (2) the defendant‟s familiarity with 

criminal proceedings; (3) the competency of counsel and the defendant‟s 
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opportunity to confer with counsel about alternatives; (4) the advice of 

counsel and the court about the charges and the penalty to be imposed; and 

(5) the defendant‟s reasons for pleading guilty, including the desire to avoid 

a greater penalty in a jury trial. 

Id. (quoting Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 330-31 (Tenn. 2006)). “[A] plea is not 

voluntary if it results from „[i]gnorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, 

[or] subtle or blatant threats.‟” Id. at 563 (quoting Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 

904 (Tenn. 1993)). Thus, the transcript of the plea colloquy must affirmatively show that 

a defendant‟s decision to plead guilty was both voluntary and knowledgeable. Id. The 

trial court must ensure that the defendant entered a knowing and intelligent plea by 

thoroughly “„canvass[ing] the matter with the accused to make sure that he has a full 

understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences.‟” Id. (quoting 

Blankenship, 858 S.W.2d at 904). 

Petitioner does not contest that the trial court properly conducted his guilty plea 

submission hearing but, rather, states that his pleas were involuntary because he was 

suffering from emotional turmoil and because his trial counsel was ineffective. As stated 

above, petitioner has failed to prove that trial counsel was ineffective, and the postconviction court specifically discredited petitioner‟s assertion that he was overwrought 

with emotion during the plea colloquy from viewing pictures of the victim for the first 

time. Furthermore, trial counsel testified that while he could not testify that petitioner 

had seen those specific pictures of the victim, he specifically recalled reviewing 

photographs with petitioner, and petitioner‟s turning his head to the side due to the 

photographs‟ contents. Trial counsel specifically stated, “I told him what was in the 

photographs[] if he didn‟t see them.” Based on the record and the credibility 

determinations of the post-conviction court, petitioner has failed to prove that his guilty 

pleas were not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.

 

CONCLUSION

Based on the parties‟ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the 

judgment of the post-conviction court. 

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ROGER A. PAGE, SPECIAL JUDGE