02 October 2006

Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives

Consequence Management

Joint Publication 3-41
PREFACE

i

1. Scope

This publication provides overarching guidelines and principles to assist commanders and

their staffs in planning and conducting joint chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and

high-yield explosives consequence management operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces

of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination

and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for

the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs)

and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use

by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication

to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a

manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the

overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatant

commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands,

and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed

except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.

If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications,

this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally

in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current

and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or

coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by
ii

Preface

JP 3-41

the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders

should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where

applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WALTER L. SHARP

Lieutenant General, USA

Director, Joint Staff
TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................................................................. v

CHAPTER I

THE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND

HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVES CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENT

• General ...................................................................................................................... I-1

• Crisis Management, Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,

and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management and Foreign

Consequence Management ...................................................................................... I-2

• The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield

Explosives Consequence Management Overview..................................................... I-3

• The Joint Force in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Environment............................ I-13

CHAPTER II

DOMESTIC CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR,

AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVES CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

• Domestic Response Framework ............................................................................... II-1

• Roles and Responsibilities in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,

and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management .......................................... II-7

• Plans for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield

Explosives Consequence Management .................................................................. II-13

• Joint Force Considerations ...................................................................................... II-22

CHAPTER III

FOREIGN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

• General ................................................................................................................... III-1

• Responsibilities....................................................................................................... III-3

• Operations .............................................................................................................. III-4

• Foreign Consequence Management Planning Considerations ................................ III-12

• Foreign Consequence Management Phases ........................................................... III-15

CHAPTER IV

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

• Planning Considerations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,

and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management ......................................... IV-1

• International Law, Agreements, and Planning Considerations for North America ... IV-14
iv

Table of Contents

JP 3-41

APPENDIX

A Key Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives

Consequence Management Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents................... A-1

B Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support

Functions ......................................................................................................... B-1

C Base Support Installation Considerations............................................................ C-1

D References ......................................................................................................... D-1

E Administrative Instructions ................................................................................. E-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................... GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions............................................................................... GL-6

FIGURE

I-1 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield

Explosives Consequence Management Methodology (A Different

Mindset) ....................................................................................................... I-6

II-1 National Incident Management System Framework...................................... II-15

II-2 Notional Joint Field Office Organization ...................................................... II-18

II-3 Emergency Support Functions...................................................................... II-20

II-4 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield

Explosives Consequence Management Tiered Response Options................ II-23

II-5 Joint Task Force Staff Boards, Centers, and Cells ......................................... II-26

II-6 Geospatial Information Systems Data Layers ............................................... II-28

II-7 Anticipated Tasks and Requirements ............................................................ II-29

III-1 Notional Joint Task Force Consequence Management Structure ................... III-5

IV-1 Joint Task Force Mortuary Affairs Response Assistance Plan........................ IV-9

B-1 Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency

Support Functions ....................................................................................... B-2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

•

•

•

•

v

Discusses the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield

Explosives Consequence Management Environment

Covers Domestic Consequence Management

Covers Foreign Consequence Management

Discusses Planning Considerations and Training

Introduction

Joint forces conduct

chemical, biological,

radiological, nuclear, and

high-yield explosives

(CBRNE) consequence

management (CM) under

several different

circumstances.

Crisis management.

Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives

(CBRNE) consequence management (CM) can be conducted within

three situations (or environments): Department of Defense (DOD) leads

the operational response in reaction to an incident involving US forces

and allies, across the range of military operations; defense support to

civil authorities in a domestic response. This response includes assisting

Federal agencies within the US, territories, and possessions in

accordance with the National Response Plan (NRP); or, defense

support to a foreign request. Tasks will originate from the host nation

(HN) through the Department of State. The joint force commander

(JFC) responsible for CBRNE CM focuses on mitigating the

consequences of the CBRNE incident. Understanding the effects of

CBRNE on the populace and the infrastructure is essential for the

JFC to apply the right resources at the right time. Even prior to being

formally tasked to assist, the JFC should strive to develop full situational

awareness with respect to the incident’s cause to better understand

the event’s impact and to prevent further injury or harm to the civilian

populace or the responding joint force. Situational awareness is

especially important in suspected or known adversary attacks for force

protection considerations.

Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement response and

involves measures to identify, acquire, plan, and employ the use of

resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act

of terrorism.

Crisis Management, Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

and Foreign Consequence Management
vi

Executive Summary

JP 3-41

Domestic CBRNE CM.

Foreign consequence

management.

Addressing the impact of

an accidental, intentional,

or natural release of

CBRNE material is the

basis for the CBRNE CM

activities performed by the

Department of Defense.

During a CBRNE

incident, CM efforts must

make the preservation of

life a priority.

Domestic CBRNE CM are those actions taken to maintain or restore

essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from

disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist

incidents.

Foreign consequence management (FCM) is defined as assistance

provided by the United States Government (USG) to a HN to

mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent CBRNE attack

or event and restore essential government services.

CBRNE CM encompasses CM actions taken to address the

consequences from all deliberate and inadvertent releases of

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear agents or substances,

and high-yield explosives with potential to cause mass casualties

and large levels of destruction. An exception is response to

accidents or incidents involving US nuclear weapons in DOD or

Department of Energy custody.

CBRNE CM, is normally managed at the national level (US or

HN governments), with DOD providing support as directed.

During combat operations, DOD leads the operational response

in reaction to an incident involving US forces and allies.

CBRNE consequences are the result of an accident or intentional

incident involving chemical agents, biological agents, radiological

sources, nuclear devices, or high-yield explosives, and/or

industrial materials that are hazardous by themselves or when

mixed with other material, including hazards from industrial

pollutants and waste, and will produce a toxic effect in exposed

personnel.

CBRNE CM includes those measures and methods of responding

to CBRNE events to alleviate damage, loss of life, hardship or

suffering caused by the incident, protect public health and safety,

emergency restoration of essential government services and

infrastructure, and provide emergency relief to governments,

businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a

CBRNE situation. The method of response will include use of

standing contingency plans and procedures to determine what

forces and capabilities are required and committed in support of

requests for assistance.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield

Explosives Consequence Management Overview
vii

Executive Summary

Domestic CBRNE CM

command and control.

Homeland Security

Presidential Directive

(HSPD)-5, Management

of Domestic Incidents.

The joint force conducting CBRNE CM will usually be in support

of a Federal agency. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) always

retains control of Federal (Title 10) military forces providing

CBRNE CM. The state governors, through the adjutants general,

control National Guard forces when those forces are performing

active duty in their state role and when performing active duty

under Title 32, United States Code. The JFC remains within the

normal chain of command for military forces from the President,

as Commander in Chief, to the SecDef, to the combatant

commander (CCDR). If the JFC is a National Guardsman, the

individual can maintain dual Title 10/Title 32 authority over forces,

if agreed to by the President and the state governor.

The President, through his constitutional authority as Commander

in Chief, authorizes military actions to include CBRNE CM

response. To guide this response, the executive, legislative, and

judicial branches of government issue and review key guidance,

primarily through the President and Congress.

The NRP was developed as a result of Homeland Security

Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5 to integrate the Federal

Government current family of Federal domestic prevention,

preparedness, response and recovery plans into a single, alldiscipline, all-hazards plan to unify the domestic incident

management process. When the NRP is used, national interagency

plans such as the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution

Contingency Plan, Mass Migration Emergency Plan, National

Search and Rescue Plan, National Infrastructure Protection Plan,

and National Maritime Transportation Security Plan are

incorporated as supporting and/or operational plans. In addition

to consolidating Federal plans, other modifications within the

NRP that impact DOD are the establishment of a National

Operations Center (NOC), the establishment of an Interagency

Advisory Council (IAC), and the creation of a principal Federal

official, who may be appointed to represent the Secretary of

Homeland Security at the incident site. A national incident

management system (NIMS) to provide a consistent nationwide

approach for Federal, state, and local governments to work

effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and

recover from domestic incidents was also a result of HSPD-5.

Domestic Response Framework

Key Executive Guidance
viii

Executive Summary

JP 3-41

HSPD-8, National

Preparedness.

Intelligence oversight

collection and

information sharing.

Psychological operations.

Use of weapons and rules

for the use of force.

Immediate response.

This directive is a companion to HSPD-5, which identifies steps for

improved coordination in response to incidents. This directive describes

the way Federal departments and agencies will prepare for such a

response, including prevention activities during the early stages of a

terrorism incident.

The judge advocate’s role is especially important during domestic

operations as the parameters under which DOD operates are

different in the US than they are overseas. Military commanders’

need for information and intelligence within the homeland is on

the rise — they expect force protection information and

counterintelligence to be integrated into domestic operations due

to a heightened awareness of potential terrorist threats. These

needs and expectations pose unique issues in the information and

intelligence gathering arena. DOD intelligence components are

subject to one set of rules referred to as intelligence oversight.

US law and DOD policy prohibits DOD from using psychological

operations (PSYOP) units to conduct operations against US

citizens. However, these assets can be used to help disseminate

critical information to the civilian population. DOD may use

PSYOP personnel and equipment to support activities such as

information dissemination, printing, reproduction, distribution,

and broadcasting.

A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction establishes a

presumption that units deployed to sites of a CBRNE situation

will not carry arms. Units may deploy to sites of CBRNE

situations with their weapons in storage in the event that the unit

is subsequently authorized to carry arms by the SecDef or is

deployed from the CBRNE site to an assignment where weapons

are authorized.

The DOD policy on immediate response addresses the authority

delegated to DOD component or military commanders to provide

immediate assistance to civil authorities to save lives, prevent

human suffering, or mitigate great property damage in the event

of imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil

emergency or attack. The potentially catastrophic nature of

CBRNE incidents would most likely lead to DOD forces

conducting CBRNE CM under immediate response authority,

but there are no policy exceptions or special authorities for

CBRNE CM.

Domestic Consequence Management Special Considerations
ix

Executive Summary

Plans for Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

Memorandums of understanding/memorandums of agreements

for mutual assistance are often established between military installations

and local communities. If an installation commander receives a request

for assistance directly from local civil authorities prior to a presidential

declaration of a major disaster or emergency, the requesting agency

should be referred to the local/state emergency management channels,

unless an immediate response condition exists or a mutual assistance

agreement is in effect.

The NRP uses the foundation provided by the Homeland Security

Act, HSPD-5, and the Stafford Act to provide a comprehensive,

all-hazards approach to domestic incident management across a

spectrum of activities including prevention, preparedness,

response, and recovery. Most joint force domestic CBRNE CM

operations will be authorized as a result of the President declaring

a disaster or emergency.

Joint forces performing CBRNE CM supporting civil authorities

are part of domestic incident management and operate in

accordance with the NRP. The NIMS forms the foundation for

conducting domestic response operations. This framework

provides a consistent approach for Federal, state, local, and tribal

governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare

for, prevent, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents,

regardless of cause, size, or complexity. Joint forces conduct

CBRNE CM in accordance with NIMS but maintain a distinct,

independent chain of command. However, military personnel

can and frequently will receive tactical direction from the onscene commander and subordinates, especially in circumstances

where small numbers of military personnel augment civilian

response functions. Installation forces operating under immediate

response authority stay under the control of the Service branch

of the chain of command unless committed to the Federal response

effort by the Secretary of Defense. The NIMS is based on three

levels: the field level, the regional level, and the national level. A

joint force will interact within the framework of NIMS either

directly with the defense coordinating officer or indirectly at all

three levels.

At the national level, the IAC is comprised of senior Federal

representatives from the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS), DOD, other Federal departments and agencies, and

Memorandums of

understanding/

memorandums of

agreements.

The National Response

Plan guides the Federal

response to any given

emergency or disaster.

National Incident

Management System

framework.
x

Executive Summary

JP 3-41

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as required. The IAC plans

and coordinates Federal strategic incident management efforts, to

include assessing national impacts and those associated with the actual

or proposed Federal response and anticipating future Federal resource

and operational requirements for the incident. The NOC is the primary

national hub for domestic incident management operational coordination

and situational awareness.

At the regional level, the regional response coordination center

coordinates regional response efforts, establishes Federal

priorities, and implements local Federal program support until a

joint field office is established at the field level.

At the field level, the incident command structure (as detailed in

the NRP) is used. The incident command is analogous to a tacticallevel unit and directs on-scene emergency management.

Phase I — Alert/Preparation/Situation Assessment. Situational

awareness is vital to understanding the CBRNE CM operation

parameters.

Phase II — Deployment. Echeloning the needed joint force

assets at the appropriate time is the key to success during this

phase of the operation.

Phase III — Support to Civil Authorities. Planning and

execution efforts will be synchronized with the efforts of the

supported civil authorities.

Phase IV — Transition. Transition of functions to civil

authorities begins when the civil authorities and the joint task

force (JTF), as well as the supported combatant commander, agree

to implement the transition plan.

Phase V — Redeployment. Redeployment begins when forces

are directed to prepare for redeployment. Success is defined when

all forces, less follow-on or remaining forces, have redeployed to

their designated home station.

Domestic Response Operations

Domestic response

operations consist of the

five phases.
xi

Executive Summary

Foreign Consequence Management

Primary responsibility for FCM rests with the HN, unless otherwise

stipulated under relevant international agreements or arrangements.

Unless otherwise directed by the President, the Department of State

(DOS) is the lead federal agency (LFA) for USG FCM operations

and is responsible for coordinating the overall USG FCM response.

When requested by the LFA and directed by the SecDef, DOD will

support USG FCM operations to the extent allowed by law and subject

to the availability of forces. The response may include a number of

agencies with specialized capabilities, in addition to forces provided

by DOD. The ability of the USG to assist a HN government and its

affected population is determined by the nature of the CBRNE event,

the forces available to provide assistance, and the time required to

deploy to the vicinity of the incident. The more rapidly FCM assistance

is coordinated and applied, the better the chances of success in mitigating

the effects of the CBRNE incident.

DOD support to USG FCM operations is a series of coordinated

efforts in response to requests from the LFA to support a HN.

FCM may require specialized capabilities to include but not

limited to hazardous materials handling, decontamination, urban

search and rescue, public health and medical care, and public

notification efforts beyond the scope or scale of traditional disaster

relief efforts. Additionally, DOD will provide representation to

the DOS-led foreign emergency support team/consequence

management support team to support USG FCM operations, as

requested by the DOS and directed by the SecDef. DOD will

retain command and control of all DOD assets (personnel,

infrastructure, and equipment) supporting the LFA in USG FCM

operations.

USG and national agencies, allied nations’ military and civilian

agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs perform

roles in FCM operations, if requested by the HN. While each

entity might maintain a unique capability, coordination of

responders is the responsibility of the HN. The DOS retains

responsibility for coordination among USG entities.

FCM operations will generally not be conducted during hostile action;

however, situations may arise where FCM may be required under

less than permissive conditions at the request and support of the HN.

For example, insurgents commit CBRNE incidents against a new

Foreign Consequence Management Operations

Foreign consequence

management (FCM) is

assistance provided by the

United States Government

to a host nation to

mitigate the effects of a

deliberate or inadvertent

CBRNE attack or event

and to restore essential

government services.

FCM operations may

require a complex and

massive coordination

effort.
xii

Executive Summary

JP 3-41

Foreign Consequence Management Phases

government. The new government may request response assistance

from US and coalition forces. The USG may direct the US military to

secure the area around the incident in order to establish the most

permissive environment possible to facilitate coordinated response

efforts.

FCM plans should include support related to essential services

and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting

from disasters and catastrophes. Such services may include

transportation, communications, CBRNE reconnaissance, public

works, fire-fighting, information planning, care of mass casualties,

resources support, essential and/or routine health and medical

services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials mitigation,

food preparation and distribution, and energy generation and

distribution. Additionally, FCM response may require specialized

hazard material handling, and decontamination planning efforts

to enhance foreign disaster relief efforts.

Phase I (Situation Assessment and Preparation). Phase I

includes those actions required to conduct situation assessment

and preparation, including the timely and accurate assessment of

the CBRNE situation, preparation for deployment and the

deployment of selected advance elements.

Phase II (Deployment). Phase II begins with the SecDef

approved Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff deployment and/

or execute order designating the intermediate and/or forward

staging bases and establishing formal command relationships (i.e.,

supported and supporting commanders). The order serves as the

formal authority for the deployment of forces. Phase II ends

when all forces have completed movement to the designated

incident location and supporting locations.

Phase III (Assistance to HN Authorities). Phase III begins

with the arrival of required military assistance at the incident

location and supporting locations and ends with the determination

that DOD support is no longer required.

Phase IV (Transition to HN and/or Other Agencies). Although

planning for transition of CBRNE CM begins as soon as practical

following the initial response, Phase IV begins with the formal

Ongoing military

operations take

precedence over military

support of FCM unless

otherwise directed.

FCM will be composed of

five phases that will be

scoped by tasks to be

accomplished.

Foreign Consequence Management Planning Considerations
xiii

Executive Summary

Planning Considerations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

implementation of the transition plan for those tasks and responsibilities

being accomplished by DOD.

Phase V (Redeployment). Phase V begins with the redeployment

of US military forces involved in the foreign CM operations and

is complete when all forces have returned to their previous military

posture.

After a CBRNE incident, parallel assessment processes occur at

the field level by local responders; at the regional level by the

emergency response team-A; and at the national level by the NOC

and IAC. These assessments determine the scope and magnitude

of the incident, and will ultimately determine the need for DOD

and joint force participation.

The CCDR will, in coordination with Federal and state authorities

(usually the chief of mission (COM) or state adjutant general),

send an assessment element to gain early situational awareness

and conduct assessments in response to a CBRNE situation.

Liaise and coordinate with other agencies and civil authorities.

Interagency coordination is a continuous process that should be

established and emphasized prior to an event occurring, as well

as during and after an event happens. Coordination takes place

at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Whether

coordination is conducted through the CCDR’s joint interagency

coordination group or other means such as an interagency planning

cell or group at the combatant command or JTF levels, the

importance of interagency coordination in the planning process

cannot be overstated. In particular, ensure public affairs support,

information management, and dissemination is in concert with

that of DHS or the COM and HN.

Providing logistic support for CBRNE CM produces challenges

not encountered with other types of joint operations. There may

be a high sense of urgency, especially if the US has been attacked.

The force is task-organized depending on the mission and requires

transportation, billeting, messing, and other life support services.

The force may deploy with significant assets and specialized

equipment that will be determined by the mission, situation, and

the designated response force. The size of the force may range from

a detachment to a brigade sized unit.

Assess.

Coordinate operations.

Conduct logistics.
xiv

Executive Summary

JP 3-41

Frequently, the most immediate needs for support to civil authorities

will be in the medical area. Providing initial essential stabilizing medical

care and forward resuscitative/surgical care are the two essential

capabilities that will be required in the first hours following the CBRNE

event. DOD may also be required to support medical augmentation to

local hospitals, community health (vaccinations, disease investigation,

prophylaxis dispensing, preventive medicine and veterinary support),

patient movement and distribution/redistribution of patients, medical

logistics distribution, and mental health, as well as potentially providing

direct medical treatment and patient decontamination.

Tasks may include decontamination of civilian and military

personnel as well as civilian and military equipment. Additionally,

decontamination of contaminated remains is a viable mission.

Local hospital decontamination tasks will also be required.

Contaminated waste disposal will be a key requirement, and

important in the context of interagency coordination. The

Environmental Protection Agency will play a significant role as

the emergency support function coordinator and primary agency

responsible for hazardous waste.

This publication provides overarching guidelines and principles

to assist commanders and their staffs in planning and conducting

joint chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield

explosives consequence management operations.

CONCLUSION

Health services support.

Contain and

decontaminate.
CHAPTER I

THE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND HIGHYIELD EXPLOSIVES CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENT

I-1

“You can’t improvise consequence management.”

Honorable Paul McHale

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

Visit to Joint Task Force Civil Support

29 October 2004

1. General

a. The focus of this publication is the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and highyield explosives (CBRNE) consequence management (CM) activities for all deliberate and

inadvertent releases of CBRNE with potential to cause high casualties and large levels of

destruction. Joint forces conduct CBRNE CM under several different circumstances. CBRNE

CM can be conducted within three situations (or environments):

(1) Department of Defense (DOD) leads the operational response in reaction to an

incident involving US forces and allies, across the range of military operations. This may also

include response on a DOD installation.

(2) Defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) in a domestic response. This response

includes assisting Federal agencies within the US, territories, and possessions in accordance

with the National Response Plan (NRP).

(3) Defense support to a foreign request. Tasks will originate from the host nation

(HN) through the Department of State (DOS). However, on-scene DOD commanders may take

appropriate action in life-threatening situations while awaiting DOD/DOS tasking.

b. The joint force commander (JFC) responsible for CBRNE CM focuses on mitigating

the consequences of the CBRNE incident. Understanding the effects of CBRNE on the populace

and the infrastructure is essential for the JFC to apply the right resources at the right time.

Health effects on the populace may include asphyxiation, burns, radiation, shock, and blast

injuries, as well as other complications from toxic industrial materials (TIMs), chemicals,

biological agents, toxins and pathogens, and radiation. Infrastructure destruction may include

damage to critical sectors that may disrupt the production and delivery of essential goods and

services (e.g., water, public health and emergency services, energy, transportation, postal services),

disrupt information and telecommunications technologies and operability, or degrade public

safety and security. The infrastructure may be affected not only by a blast caused by high-yield

explosives or a nuclear detonation, but also by contamination caused by chemicals, biological

toxins and pathogens, radiation, or by toxic substances.

c. Due to the potentially catastrophic nature of a CBRNE incident, a joint force may be

required to assist in the response after civilian resources have been overwhelmed or depleted.
I-2

Chapter I

JP 3-41

Even prior to being formally tasked to assist, the JFC should strive to develop full situational

awareness with respect to the incident’s cause to better understand the event’s impact and to

prevent further injury or harm to the civilian populace or the responding joint force. Situational

awareness is especially important in suspected or known adversary attacks for force protection

considerations. Analyzing the potential impact of a CBRNE incident on the population and

associated infrastructure allows planners to adequately translate DOD capabilities into a

coordinated response.

2. Crisis Management, Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management and Foreign Consequence

Management

a. Crisis management (CrM) is predominantly a law enforcement response and involves

measures to identify, acquire, plan, and employ the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent,

and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.

b. Domestic CBRNE CM are those actions taken to maintain or restore essential services

and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural,

manmade, or terrorist incidents. CBRNE CM may include measures to restore essential

government services, protect public health and safety, and provide emergency relief to affected

governments, businesses, and individuals. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-

5 establishes policy to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major

disasters, and other emergencies. As such, the United States Government (USG) has a single,

comprehensive approach to domestic incident management so that, with regard to domestic

incidents, CrM and CBRNE CM are treated as a single, integrated function, rather than as two

separate functions.

c. Foreign consequence management (FCM) is defined as assistance provided by the USG

to a HN to mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent CBRNE attack or event and restore

essential government services.

d. In both the domestic and foreign environments action is normally implemented at the

national-level (US or HN governments), with DOD providing support, as directed. Domestically,

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the lead in managing a national level emergency

response, with the NRP providing guidance for conducting and managing response to incidents

of national significance. Chapter II, “Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear

and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management,” provides guidance regarding the

applicable process and regulations that govern the DOD response to a domestic CBRNE event.

In foreign environments, DOS leads the response efforts of the USG. Chapter III, “Foreign

Consequence Management,” addresses the roles and responsibilities of DOD forces providing

FCM support after a CBRNE event overseas. The CBRNE CM activities for all deliberate and

inadvertent releases of CBRNE with potential to cause high casualties and large levels of

destruction are the focus of this publication.
I-3

The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield

Explosives Consequence Management Environment

The terms “incident management,” “crisis management,” and “consequence management;” and

the relationships between them, are discussed in Joint Publication (JP) 3-26, Homeland Security.

3. The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives

Consequence Management Overview

a. Addressing the impact of an accidental, intentional, or natural release of CBRNE material

is the basis for the CBRNE CM activities performed by DOD. CBRNE CM encompasses CM

actions taken to address the consequences from all deliberate and inadvertent releases of chemical,

biological, radiological, nuclear agents or substances, and high-yield explosives with potential

to cause mass casualties and large levels of destruction. In response to nuclear accidents or

incidents involving US nuclear weapons in DOD or Department of Energy (DOE) custody, refer

to Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3150.8-M, Nuclear Accident Response Procedures

(NARP), which provides a concept of operations as well as the functional information necessary

to execute a comprehensive and unified response to a nuclear weapon accident.

b. CBRNE CM is normally managed at the national level (US or HN governments), with

DOD providing support as directed. During combat operations, DOD leads the operational

response in reaction to an incident involving US forces and allies.

(1) DSCA policy and procedures guide DOD forces in a domestic response. DSCA,

a subset of civil support (CS), refers to support provided by Federal military forces, DOD civilian,

and military contract personnel and DOD agencies and components during immediate response

and in response to approved requests for assistance during domestic incidents to include terrorist

threats or attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. This response includes support to

Federal agencies providing assistance to local, state, and tribal authorities within the US, territories,

and possessions for CBRNE CM operations. Secretary of Defense (SecDef) policy provides

guidance for the operational framework upon which the CBRNE CM joint force’s relations with

local, state, tribal, and Federal officials are built.

(a) The mission of the US military is to fight and win the nation’s wars, to

defend the homeland, and to conduct other operations in accomplishment of national

objectives. The military’s primary mission does not include domestic law enforcement or civil

administration, nor does it encompass domestic long-term recovery or restoration operations.

CBRNE CM support shall emphasize DOD roles, skills, and structures, such as the ability to

mass, mobilize and provide logistic support.

(b) The joint force chain of command and civilian oversight within DOD

will be clear. The joint task force (JTF)-CBRNE CM commander reports directly to the supported

combatant commander (CCDR), who in turn reports to the SecDef and the President. Within

DOD, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) (ASD[HD]) is the principal

civilian advisor to the SecDef on domestic CM activities for CBRNE incidents.

(c) The military forces responding to a CBRNE CM event will generally

operate in a support role to the lead or primary agency, unless the President has directed
I-4

Chapter I

JP 3-41

that DOD is the lead. In most CBRNE CM situations that have been declared to be an incident

of national significance, DHS will be the lead agency. In any case, DOD may provide assistance

that has been approved by the appropriate authorities.

(d) DOD civil support promotes and leverages the unique skills of the Reserve

Component (RC) within the homeland.

(2) When approved by the President, the USG may provide FCM support to a HN

either at the request of the HN or upon HN acceptance of a USG offer of assistance. DOS is the

lead federal agency (LFA) for USG FCM operations, unless otherwise directed by the President.

HN requests for assistance and/or USG offers of assistance will be made through the LFA. This

is normally the chief of mission (COM). When requested by the LFA and directed by SecDef,

DOD will support USG FCM operations through a designated supported geographic combatant

commander (GCC). DOD actions in support of USG FCM operations will be coordinated

through the LFA. The USG response may use the NRP International Coordination Support

Annex construct to guide the USG response if the situation dictates and the LFA so wishes.

GCC actions will be guided by status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), other international

agreements, DOD policy, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), memorandums of agreement

(MOAs) established with the HN, and contingency plans.

(3) DOD support to CBRNE CM will formally exist when requested by civil authorities

until civil authorities have reestablished normal operations or otherwise directed by SecDef.

The final phase, leading to full recovery, will almost always be addressed and coordinated by

civil authorities in both the domestic and foreign environments.

c. In CBRNE CM, interagency and intergovernmental coordination are of paramount

importance. Interagency coordination is the coordination that occurs between agencies of the

USG for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. Similarly, in the context of DOD involvement,

intergovernmental organization (IGO) and nongovernmental organization (NGO) coordination

refer to coordination between elements of DOD and IGOs or NGOs to achieve an objective.

Interagency coordination is conducted at strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and while

individual tasks and organizations may differ on each level, the essence of interagency coordination

is the effective integration of multiple agencies with their diverse perspectives and capabilities.

In conducting CBRNE CM as a supporting agency, DOD must coordinate closely with other

USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs to ensure unity of effort and success of the mission.

For more information on interagency coordination see JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental

Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I.

d. CBRNE Incidents. During a CBRNE incident, CBRNE CM efforts must make the

preservation of life a priority. This is a significant shift in mindset for JFCs, staff personnel, and

CBRNE CM planners. The planning process begins with determining and assessing potential

CBRNE consequence and the endstate the supported CCDR plans to achieve. CBRNE

consequences are the result of an accident or intentional incident involving chemical agents,

biological agents, radiological sources, nuclear devices, or high-yield explosives, and/or industrial
I-5

The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield

Explosives Consequence Management Environment

materials that are hazardous by themselves or when mixed with other material, including hazards

from industrial pollutants and waste, and will produce a toxic effect in exposed personnel. For

the purposes of this JP; a TIM will be used as a generic term for toxic, infectious, or radioactive

compounds in solid, liquid, aerosolized, or gaseous form. TIMs may be used or stored for use

for industrial, commercial, medical, military or domestic purposes. TIM may be chemical,

biological, or radioactive and described as a toxic industrial chemical (TIC), a toxic industrial

biological (TIB), or toxic industrial radiological (TIR) materials. The effects of an incident/

event involving a particular material may result in infirmity, injuries, sickness (physiological or

psychological), structural damage, death, and/or contamination. CBRNE CM includes those

measures and methods of responding to CBRNE events to alleviate damage, loss of life, hardship

or suffering caused by the incident; protect public health and safety; emergency restoration of

essential government services and infrastructure; and provide emergency relief to governments,

businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a CBRNE situation. The method of

response will include use of standing contingency plans and procedures to determine what forces

and capabilities are required and committed in support of requests for assistance. Figure I-1

illustrates the relationship between CBRNE events, their effects, response methodology, and the

response force level and type used to mitigate the effects of CBRNE events. CBRNE CM

includes preparing for and responding to the consequences of CBRNE incidents, no matter what

their causes. Accidents may occur at chemical plants, nuclear power plants, or other facilities

that have the potential for release of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)

material, or during the transportation of such toxic industrial CBRN material. Intentional acts

include use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by adversaries, (whether global, regional,

or nonstate), sabotage, and other acts of terrorism. CBRN materials present hazards that can be

both immediate and delayed. In some instances the delayed effects can cause more problems for

joint forces and may alter the CBRNE CM response activities.

e. Chemical Agents and their Effects

(1) Chemical agents include any chemical substance which, is intended for use in

military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate through its physiological effects. In

contrast, TICs include any chemical substances in solid, liquid, aerosolized, or gaseous form

that may be used, or stored for use, for industrial, commercial, medical, military, or domestic

purposes that produce toxic impact to personnel, materials, and infrastructure.

(2) When distinguished by their effects on human physiology, chemical agents fall

into five categories: blood (cyanide compounds), blister (vesicants), choking (pulmonary agents),

incapacitating, and nerve. Chemical agents may also be categorized by their persistency. Agents

are described as persistent when, after release, they may remain in the environment for hours to

days and nonpersistent when they remain for 10 to 15 minutes. Persistent agents are primarily

contact hazards while nonpersistent agents are primarily inhalation hazards.

(3) The greatest risk with TICs lies in exposure to inhaled chemicals, but emergency

responders may receive lethal or incapacitating dosage through ingestion or absorption through

the eyes or skin. A variety of industries use and produce chemicals that pose hazards to individuals

if exposed to sufficient quantities or concentrations. In many instances, chemical warfare
I-6

Chapter I

JP 3-41

individual protective equipment does not provide protection from TICs (e.g., chlorine gas, sulfuric

acid).

(4) For information on TIC hazards, see the current edition of the National Institute

for Occupational Safety and Health Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards (http://www.cdc.gov/

niosh/npg/pdfs/2005-149.pdf). The sources of these environmental and industrial hazards may

be quite extensive in an industrialized area. Any site that stores or uses toxic chemicals may pose

a threat to personnel even if the site is operating under normal conditions. Industrial accidents or

sabotage, such as destruction of a large industrial complex, may release these potentially toxic

substances.

(5) Regardless of the nature of the toxic chemical, CBRNE CM operations will focus

on life saving and prevention of further injury tasks to include: responding immediately to treat

identified casualties; securing and decontaminating the area to prevent spreading of the chemical;

decontaminating people possibly exposed; and providing support to a displaced populace. In

Figure I-1. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives

Consequence Management Methodology (A Different Mindset)

In CM Mitigating CBRNE is the Focus Effects

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR,

AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVES CONSEQUENCE

MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY

(A DIFFERENT MINDSET)

Effects to People

Effects to Infrastructure

Effects on Operations

Effects on Economy

Effects on Alliances &

Coalitions

Response Drives

Forces Required

How to Mitigate

Harm Dictates

Method of Response

Effects Cause Harm

Ability to Anticipate Requests for Assistance

Affects Speed of Response

CBRNE: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives

CM: consequence management
I-7

The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield

Explosives Consequence Management Environment

many instances, chemical warfare individual protective equipment does not provide protection

from toxic materials nor is it certified for use in support of civilian authorities outside of a

battlefield environment.

See US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM) Tech Guide

244 for further information. See also Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)/

Department of Justice (DOJ) publication, Emergency Response to Terrorism Job Aid.

f. Biological Agents and their Effects

(1) Biological agents are microorganisms that cause disease in personnel, plants, or

animals or cause the deterioration of material. Biological agents are divided into two broad

categories; pathogens and toxins.

(a) Pathogens are infectious organisms that cause disease or illness in their host

and include bacteria, viruses, rickettsias, protists, fungi, or prions.

(b) Toxins are biologically derived poisonous substances produced as by-products

of microorganisms, plants, or animals. They can be naturally or synthetically produced.

(2) Examples of biological agents and their associated diseases are Bacillus anthracis

(anthrax), AIV H5N1 (avian influenza), Clostridium botulinum (botulism), Shigella species

(food borne illness), Hantavirus (pulmonary syndrome), Legionella pneumophila (Legionnaire’s

disease), Histoplasma capsulatum (histoplasmosis), Yersinia pestis (bubonic and pneumonic

plague), Variola virus (smallpox), Francisella tularensis (tularemia), and Ebola virus (viral

hemorrhagic fever).

(3) Infectious biological organisms represent one of the greatest potential threats due

to their reproductive ability and the time delay from infection to symptom. An infectious biological

attack may remain undetected for several days to weeks after release due to the incubation

periods that biological agents may have. Diagnosis may be slow as many infectious agents have

a slow onset and present with nonspecific symptoms that rapidly escalate in severity. Another

compounding problem is that patients may simultaneously present in geographically separated

areas. Depending on the pathogen, preventive measures and treatment will be difficult to

implement due to factors such as large number of casualties, restriction of movement, and

quarantine. Finally, first responders may be among the first casualties, rapidly overwhelming

local and state support systems.

(4) Terrorists and other enemy elements may attempt to use biological agents to infect

people, agriculture, industry, and the environment.

(a) When people are infected, hospitals may be the first source to notice an increase

in specific symptoms. Alternatively, the first signs of an attack may be unusually high and

widespread purchase of over-the-counter medicines by civilians within a region. Hospitals
I-8

Chapter I

JP 3-41

report to their departments of health and to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The

CDC and National Institutes of Health can then recommend steps for containment and treatment.

(b) Agriculture can be attacked through animals or crops. This type of attack can

affect a nation’s food supply, economics, and international trade.

(c) Bacteria can be bio-engineered for specific functions. An example is an oileating bacteria. This technology could be used to deteriorate or contaminate industrial supplies

or materials.

(5) TIB. This category encompasses any biological material manufactured, used,

transported, or stored by industrial, medical, or commercial processes which could cause a potential

infectious or toxic threat. It includes those biohazards which are infectious agents or hazardous

biological materials that present a risk or potential risk to the health of humans, animals or the

environment. The risk can be direct through infection or indirect through damage to the

environment. Biohazardous materials include certain types of recombinant DNA

[deoxyribonucleic acid]; organisms and viruses infectious to humans, animals, or plants (parasites,

viruses, bacteria, fungi, prions, rickettsia); and biologically active agents (toxins, allergens,

venoms) that may cause disease in other living organisms or cause significant impact to the

environment or community. TIBs are often generated as infectious waste (sharps and body fluid

contaminated material) and as biological samples (biopsies, diseases for research, etc.).

g. Sources of Radiation and Effects

(1) Radiological Sources. Radioactive materials cause damage by the ionizing effects

of neutron, gamma, beta, and/or alpha radiation. These sources can be found in a number of

military and civilian environments, including nuclear power plants, hospitals, construction sites,

and others.

(2) Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) are devices, other than a nuclear explosives

device, designed to disseminate radioactive material in order to cause destruction, damage, area

denial, or injury.

(a) RDDs are designed to disperse radiation and/or contamination. One design,

called “dirty bombs,” uses explosives to disperse radioactive contamination. A dirty bomb

typically generates its immediate casualties from the direct effects of the conventional explosion

(i.e., blast injuries and trauma). The main purpose of a dirty bomb is to frighten people by

contaminating their environment with radioactive materials and threatening large numbers of

people with exposure. Their use may also result in area denial and costly cleanup or

decontamination.

(b) By scattering the radiological material, the RDD may create a large area of

radiological contamination. The actual dose-rate will be dependent upon the type and quantity

of radioactive material spread over the area. This may not be uniformly distributed. As an area

denial weapon, an RDD can generate significant public fear and economic impact since the area
I-9

The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield

Explosives Consequence Management Environment

affected may involve loss of use during a lengthy and costly decontamination process. The

contaminated area poses a danger to individuals by external or internal radiological contamination.

External contamination on individuals can usually be removed by surface cleaning, and by

removing contaminated clothing. Internal contamination is much more dangerous and occurs

when contaminants are ingested and/or inhaled and concentrate in tissue. This may result in

prolonged, high intensity local radiation exposure.

(3) TIRs. TIRs are any hazardous radioactive material manufactured, used, transported,

or stored by industrial, medical, or commercial processes. Radioactive waste, such as spent fuel

rods and medical radiological material, is a major source of these materials. By far the largest

quantities of radioactive waste — in terms of both radioactivity and volume — are generated by

the commercial nuclear power and military nuclear weapons production industries, and by nuclear

fuel cycle activities to support these industries such as uranium mining and processing.

Radioactive waste is classified by origin not on the physical and chemical properties of the

waste that could determine its safe management. Radioactive materials can produce toxic or

long term health effects to personnel, and can cause contamination. Damaging effects from

radiological materials are caused by neutron, gamma, beta, and alpha ionizing radiation.

h. Nuclear Material. Nuclear detonations cause three types of injuries: blast, thermal and

radiation, as well as electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects described further in a later section.

(1) Blast injuries are caused by the overpressure wave traveling outwards from the

center of the nuclear detonation. The types of injuries are the same as occur with conventional

explosives and are further described in the next section.

(2) Thermal injuries present as flash burns (burns from direct exposure to the thermal

radiation pulse, typically ultraviolet, visible, and infrared waves) or flame burns (burns from

materials set afire by the infrared energy wave igniting flammable materials).

(3) Radiation injuries from a nuclear blast occur from two sources: prompt and residual.

Prompt radiation effects occur due to the neutrons and high-energy gamma rays emitted

immediately by the weapon. Severity depends on the weapon’s yield, emission spectrum, and

distance to the target. Residual radiation effects are due to emissions (typically alphas, betas,

and low energy gammas) from fission fragments (the heavy atom products produced during

fission) and activated environmental materials (when materials absorb radiation and become

radioactive themselves). Collectively, these sources are called fallout. The amount of fallout

depends on the weapon’s yield, type, and height of burst, while the area affected depends heavily

on the wind. The hazard to personnel depends on the level of radiation present and the duration

of exposure.

(a) Ionizing Radiation. The extent of tissue damage resulting from exposure to

ionizing radiation depends on the type of radiation and the dose of exposure experienced.

1. Localized or focal tissue damage. One type of localized injury “beta

burns” results when skin is exposed to beta emissions, either an intense source or for a long
I-10

Chapter I

JP 3-41

period. Another type of localized or focal tissue damage may be a result of an internal dose as a

result of inhalation or ingestion of a radioactive particle. For example, if the common fission

product iodine-131 is inhaled or ingested, it will likely concentrate in the thyroid gland and may

cause tissue damage.

2. Acute radiation syndrome (ARS) occurs from whole-body exposure to

radiation, not just specific areas of the body . . . the higher the radiation dose and dose rate, the

earlier the symptoms will appear and more danger to exposed personnel. Individuals with a

combination of injuries, blast and/or thermal combined with radiation exposure, will be more

vulnerable to ARS.

For additional information, see Military Medical Operations Armed Forces Radiobiology

Research Institute, http://www.afrri.usuhs.mil.

(b) The long-term effect for people exposed to radiation depends upon the damage

done to the person’s tissue by the ionizing radiation. Typically, there may be an increased risk of

cancer. Anyone with a significant radiation exposure should be included in a monitoring program

for any long-term health effects.

(c) Communications capability is essential for accurate situational awareness. The

possible disruption of the information and communications infrastructure during a CBRNE incident is a

key consideration in consequence management planning. Commercial communications may be disabled

or saturated making day-to-day communications (radio, cell phone, phone, 911, etc.) unusable. Nuclear

detonations may not only create physical damage to this infrastructure, but also temporarily disrupt

communications transmission. EMP damage from a nuclear detonation may cause national disruptions

in the information and communications infrastructures. EMP will be widespread, possibly across entire

continental areas if nuclear detonation occurs at high altitudes, generally several tens to hundreds of miles

above the ground. Nuclear detonations at any height will generate EMP, but the intensity and duration

of the pulse and the affected area will vary with the height of detonation. It is expected that at a minimum,

local disruptions in information and communications infrastructures will result from EMP. Nuclear

detonations may also affect radio transmissions for some hours after the burst. It is important to

understand that commercial electromagnetic interference standards are not designed to protect

against EMP attacks. During such an event, there could be widespread disruption of electronics.

All electronics may not be affected; however, because in order to do so, they would need to be

connected to some larger “antenna.” For example, a turned-off computer without any cables or wires

attached to it would likely avoid damage from an EMP, since the physical size of the computer may be

small enough that it may not collect enough energy to be affected. But when it is plugged in, and/or when

other cables are attached, it becomes part of a much larger network of wires, which form an antenna.

Additionally, national concern triggered by the incident will demand immediate, accurate information

flow both to the public and for emergency managers and leaders at all levels of government to manage

the response effectively and efficiently. Joint forces develop and maintain a common operational picture

that allows the joint force to gain situational awareness. Joint forces providing CBRNE CM may need

to augment or replace the communications infrastructure in the affected areas using organic equipment

such as the mobile subscriber equipment that has the capability of tying into the commercial telephone

network and which normally operates using portable line-of-sight microwave links when wired links are
I-11

The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield

Explosives Consequence Management Environment

not viable or not available. Consistent, accurate information flow to the public is essential to ensure the

response matches the needs in the affected area. Nuclear effects may not only create physical damage

to this infrastructure, but also temporarily disrupt telecommunications transmission.

i. Classification of Explosives

(1) Explosives is categorized as high-explosives (HE) or low-order explosives (LE).

HE produces a defining supersonic overpressurization shock wave. Examples of HE include

Trinitrotoluene, nitroglycerin, dynamite, and ammonium nitrate fuel oil. LE create a subsonic

explosion and lack HE’s overpressurization wave. Examples of LE include TICs, pipe bombs,

gunpowder, and most pure petroleum-based bombs such as Molotov cocktails or aircraft

improvised as guided missiles. HE and LE cause different injury patterns.

(2) Explosive and incendiary (fire) bombs are further characterized based on their

source. “Manufactured” implies standard military-issued, mass produced, and quality-tested

weapons. “Improvised” describes weapons produced in small quantities, or use of a device

outside its intended purpose, such as converting a commercial aircraft into a guided missile.

Manufactured (military) explosive weapons are exclusively HE-based. Terrorists will use

whatever is available – illegally obtained manufactured weapons or improvised explosive devices

(also known as “IEDs”) that may be composed of HE, LE, or both. Manufactured and improvised

bombs cause markedly different injuries.

(3) Conventional explosives can generate casualties in several ways depending on the

type of explosion, secondary effects of the explosion (e.g., building collapse, fire), and the

surrounding environment of the explosion (e.g., confined spaces, availability of debris or materials

to generate an expanding area of potential injuries). TICs may also be used as a source of highyield explosives (e.g., ammonium nitrate when mixed with diesel fuel).

j. Consequences of Incidents Involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,

and High-Yield Explosives on Infrastructure

(1) A CBRNE incident can disrupt production and delivery of essential goods and services.

Water supplies may be contaminated or unable to flow to incident area populace. Public health and

emergency services will likely be affected by the CBRNE incident either directly by their proximity to the

incident or indirectly by the overwhelming need for the emergency response. EMPs destroy or cause

transitory disruption of the power grid and damage or destroy portable/mobile electronic devices or

equipment. The transportation and communication infrastructure may be stressed through evacuations,

providing relief supplies, or as a direct result of the CBRNE incident. The response required by a joint

force could potentially span the range of these effects. Joint forces are designated as the secondary

support agency for all the ESFs as stated in the NRP and could conduct relief missions, dislocated

civilian support missions, communication, rescue and recovery missions, security missions, or provide

technical assistance for these support functions. Chapter II, “Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management,” provides guidance on the applicable

law, regulations, and policy that govern DOD assistance to domestic civil authorities, and Chapter III,

“Foreign Consequence Management,” addresses DOD FCM activities and assistance.
I-12

Chapter I

JP 3-41

(2) Support to civil authorities may also include specific public health support to state and

local health departments, hospitals, health clinics, mortuaries, and pharmacies, to include distribution of

pharmaceutical stockpiles. Other disrupted services may include postal, banking and finance. Joint

forces supporting civil authorities may assist in responding to the needs of affected communities. A

primary concern to all response efforts is restoration of government functions to the affected area.

Effects to public safety and security may result directly from CBRNE attacks on government institutions

or indirectly from cascading disruption of the institutions. Indirect effects include cascading disruption

and financial consequences to government, society, and the economy through public and private sector

reactions to an incident. Joint forces have the capability to assist in this area by supporting civil authorities

in restoration of essential goods and services.

(3) Another consequence of CBRNE incidents is infrastructure and terrain

contamination. Contamination from a CBRNE event can be concentrated or be spread over a

significant area depending on the means of delivery and the agent used. These areas are of

operational concern during the recovery phase of the incident. For larger areas of contamination,

forces may be requested to assist civil authorities logistically by providing transportation for the

affected population, assisting with decontamination efforts, assisting with infrastructure

restoration, and monitoring operations.

(4) Degradation or stoppage of a DOD installation mission may occur. Efforts of

installation personnel and potentially local or HN personnel may be used to reconstitute essential

missions; however, the effectiveness and timeliness is incident specific. The seam between the

installation and the community during a CBRNE incident may be nonexistent due to the local

responders responding to their community; however, response to a DOD installation incident is

a Service responsibility.

(a) Service plans must address transfer of mission procedures, if necessary, due

to a CBRNE event occurring either on or close to the installation. Installation protection requires

the ability to detect, assess, warn, defend against, and recover from a CBRNE attack.

(b) SOFAs, DOD policy, MOUs, and MOAs may provide guidance regarding

CBRNE CM support to or from the local authorities (although it must be noted that local MOUs

and MOAs may not be legally enforceable). Consult the supporting legal office for guidance.

For more information on CBRNE CM on installations, see DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism

(AT) Program, Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2000.18, Department of Defense

Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive Emergency

Response Guidelines, JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

(NBC) Environments, as well as other Service publications.
I-13

The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield

Explosives Consequence Management Environment

4. The Joint Force in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield

Explosives Consequence Management Environment

Overarching requirements for a joint force in a CBRNE CM environment are two-fold: the joint

force must shape the composition of the response through proactive planning and interagency,

intergovernmental, and nongovernmental coordination; and the joint force must protect each

member of DOD in support of civil authorities. The CBRNE CM environment causes joint forces to

plan in a unique way. Plans will be unique in that they must recognize the primary reason for employment

of the joint force is to mitigate the consequences of a CBRNE event/incident. Planning considerations,

discussed in Chapter II, “Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives

Consequence Management,” and Chapter III, “Foreign Consequence Management,” are significantly

different for the joint force conducting CBRNE CM as the primary mission, than for joint forces conducting

other missions. Requirements for protecting joint forces remain a constant priority for the JFC, especially

when operating in a contaminated environment. Supporting civil authorities also may entail unique legal

implications, and these must be considered through all phases of planning and operations.
I-14

Chapter I

JP 3-41

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER II

DOMESTIC CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND

HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVES CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

II-1

“During emergencies the Armed Forces may provide military support to civil

authorities in mitigating the consequences of an attack or other catastrophic event

when the civilian responders are overwhelmed. Military responses under these

conditions require a streamlined chain-of-command that integrates the unique

capabilities of active and reserve military components and civilian responders.”

National Military Strategy of the USA

March 2004

1. Domestic Response Framework

a. Domestic CBRNE CM Command and Control. The joint force conducting CBRNE

CM will usually be in support of a Federal agency. The SecDef always retains control of Federal

(Title 10) military forces providing CBRNE CM. The state governors, through the adjutants

general, control National Guard forces when those forces are performing active duty in their

state role and when performing active duty under Title 32, United States Code (USC). The JFC

remains within the normal chain of command for military forces from the President, as

Commander in Chief, to the SecDef, to the CCDR. If the JFC is a National Guardsman, the

individual can maintain dual Title 10/Title 32 authority over forces, if agreed to by the President

and the state governor. National Guard soldiers and airmen may serve either in a Federal status

like other reserve soldiers, or in a state status (state active duty or Title 32 status) under the

command of the governor. When serving in their home state for disaster relief, they typically

will serve in state status. National Guard soldiers and airmen serving in state status are not

subject to the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), (18 USC Section 1385), which generally prohibits

Service members in Title 10/Federal status from engaging in civilian law enforcement activities

(unless constitutional or statutory exceptions apply). Some state laws, however, also restrict the

law enforcement activities that can be performed by National Guard members even when in

state status. Statutory exceptions to the PCA include the Insurrection Act and Federal laws that

allow the Attorney General to ask the SecDef to authorize the use of active duty forces to assist

in law enforcement activities after a CBRN incident. The JFC normally provides support when

civil authorities request DOD support, evaluated by DOD authorities and approved by SecDef

or designated representative. The evaluation criteria used by DOD authorities includes legality

(compliance with laws), lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces), risk

(safety of DOD forces), cost (who pays, impact on DOD budget), appropriateness (whether the

requested mission is in the interest of DOD to conduct), and readiness (impact on DOD’s ability

to perform its primary mission). Planning an effective, proactive response to mitigate a CBRNE

event includes considerations that contribute to saving lives, preventing injuries, reducing human

suffering, providing temporary critical life support, and providing shelter to the affected populace.

For more information on the request for assistance process and dual authority under Title 10/

Title 32, USC, see JP 3-26, Homeland Security.
II-2

Chapter II

JP 3-41

For more information, refer to the following: JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, and JP 3-28, Civil

Support.

b. Key Executive and Legislative Guidance. Presidential decision directives (PDDs),

national security Presidential directives (NSPDs), HSPDs and executive orders (EOs) are the

primary means by which the President issues national security policy guidance. These Presidential

documents, national level strategy documents, and laws provide the basis for the development

of subordinate and implementing guidance by DOD agencies. A list of documents that provide

guidance for CBRNE CM are contained in Appendix A, “Key Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Legal, Strategy, and Policy

Documents.” The following documents deserve special note due to their direct applicability to

CBRNE CM:

(1) HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents. The NRP was developed as a

result of HSPD-5 to integrate the Federal Government current family of Federal domestic

prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into a single, all-discipline, all-hazards

plan to unify the domestic incident management process. When the NRP is used, national

interagency plans such as the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency

Plan, Mass Migration Emergency Plan, National Search and Rescue Plan, National Infrastructure

Protection Plan, and National Maritime Transportation Security Plan are incorporated as

supporting and/or operational plans. In addition to consolidating Federal plans, other modifications

within the NRP that impact DOD are the establishment of a National Operations Center (NOC),

the establishment of an Interagency Advisory Council (IAC), and the creation of a principal

Federal official (PFO), who may be appointed to represent the Secretary of Homeland Security

at the incident site. A national incident management system (NIMS) to provide a consistent

nationwide approach for Federal, state, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently

together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents was also a result of

HSPD-5.

(2) HSPD-8. This directive is a companion to HSPD-5, which identifies steps for

improved coordination in response to incidents. This directive describes how Federal departments

and agencies will prepare for such a response, including prevention activities during the early

stages of a terrorism incident. It establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the US to

prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other

emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness (including CBRNE)

goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to state

and local governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal,

state, and local entities.

(3) The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. The

Stafford Act is the primary legal authority for Federal participation in domestic disaster relief.

When incidents of national significance that are declared disasters or emergencies by the President

occur, Federal support to states is delivered in accordance with relevant provisions of the Stafford

Act. A governor may request the President to declare a major disaster or emergency if the

governor finds that effective response to the event is beyond the combined response capabilities
II-3

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

of the state and affected local governments. Based on the findings of a joint Federal-state-local

preliminary damage assessment indicating the damages are of sufficient severity and magnitude

to warrant assistance under the act, the President may issue a major disaster or emergency

declaration. Federal assistance takes many forms — including the direct provision of goods and

services, financial assistance (through insurance, grants, loans, and direct payments), and technical

assistance — and can come from various sources. Under the NRP construct, DOD is designated

a support agency for all emergency support functions (ESFs) and a cooperating agency for a

number of NRP support and incident annexes. The ESFs serve as the primary operational-level

mechanism to provide assistance to state, local, and tribal governments or to Federal departments

and agencies conducting missions of primary Federal responsibility.

(4) The Economy Act (Title 31 USC, Section 1535). In accordance with the Economy

Act or other applicable authorities, Federal agencies participating in the NRP request may provide

federal-to-federal support by executing interagency or intraagency reimbursable agreements.

Federal agencies providing mutual aid support may request reimbursement from the requesting

agency for eligible expenditures.

(5) Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18 USC, Section 1385). Under the PCA, active-duty

Federal military personnel may not participate in law enforcement activities except as otherwise

authorized by the Constitution or statute. However, Congress specifically authorized military

forces to engage in law enforcement activities when dealing with emergency situations involving

nuclear materials. See 18 USC 831 and DODD 5525.5.

(6) The National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) and the National

Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. The NSHS complements the National

Security Strategy (NSS) of the US by providing a road-map for mobilizing and organizing the

Nation to secure the US homeland from terrorist attacks. This includes objectives around which

society can mobilize, align and focus on homeland security functions, align budgetary resources

to the task of securing the homeland, and account for performance on homeland security efforts.

The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction also complements the National

Security Strategy by expanding on the actions necessary to address the need for proactive

counterproliferation, strengthened nonproliferation efforts, and effective CBRNE CM to combat

WMD.

c. Key Department of Defense Guidance

(1) Implications. DOD guidelines are promulgated in a variety of documents that

include strategy documents, planning guidance, DODDs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff (CJCS) policy documents. These documents are consistent with and complementary to

the Federal statutes and national security policy discussed earlier. DODDs specifically address

missions for homeland defense (HD) and CS operations to include CBRNE CM. A list of key

DOD guidance documents is provided in Appendix A, “Key Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Legal, Strategy, and Policy

Documents.” The following documents, further discussed in Appendix A, are of special note:
II-4

Chapter II

JP 3-41

(a) The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support that builds on the

concept of an active, layered defense outlined in the National Defense Strategy.

(b) The DODD 3025 series of directives that provide policy on and responsibilities

for CS activities.

(c) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3125.01A, Military

Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation, that provides operational and

policy guidance for US military forces supporting domestic CBRNE CM operations to prepare for and

respond to the effects of a threatened or actual CBRNE situation.

(2) Special Considerations. The following discussion provides general guidelines

for functional areas that are associated with CBRNE CM. They also have specific legal

implications of which commanders should be aware.

(a) Intelligence Oversight Collection and Information Sharing Handling

1. The judge advocate’s (JA’s) role is especially important during domestic

operations as the parameters under which DOD operates are different in the US than they are

overseas. Military commanders’ need for information and intelligence within the homeland is

on the rise — they expect force protection information and counterintelligence to be integrated

into domestic operations due to a heightened awareness of potential terrorist threats. These

needs and expectations pose unique issues in the information and intelligence gathering arena.

DOD intelligence components are subject to one set of rules referred to as intelligence oversight.

Everyone else in DOD, except the military criminal investigative organizations are subject to a

different set of rules governed by DODD 5200.27. Therefore, the commander must direct his

need for information or intelligence to the right component — the component with the capability

and authority to achieve the commander’s intent. Figuring out the nature of the data and the

right unit to gather it are areas that often require JA input.

2. In light of today’s changing environment, commanders and their staffs

should carefully consider the different rules when planning domestic operations. This section

examines the proper role of DOD intelligence components during these operations; the rules

regarding the collection, retention, and dissemination of information about US persons; and the

JA’s responsibilities in this area.

(b) Psychological Operations (PSYOP). US law and DOD policy prohibits

DOD from using PSYOP units to conduct operations against US citizens. However, these assets

can be used to help disseminate critical information to the civilian population. DOD may use

PSYOP personnel and equipment to support activities such as information dissemination, printing,

reproduction, distribution, and broadcasting.

(c) Use of Weapons and Rules for the Use of Force (RUF). CJCSI 3125.01A,

Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical,
II-5

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation, Enclosure E, establishes a

presumption that units deployed to sites of a CBRNE situation will not carry arms. Units may deploy to

sites of CBRNE situations with their weapons in storage in the event that the unit is subsequently

authorized to carry arms by the SecDef or is deployed from the CBRNE site to an assignment where

weapons are authorized. Military commanders are responsible to ensure that weapons and ammunition

are properly stored and physically secured. Military members providing security for stored weapons

and ammunition at military facilities during CBRNE CM operations may carry their weapons while

performing their normal security duties. In accordance with CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of

Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (S), mission-specific RUF for

CBRNE CM operations are set forth in CJCS Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 0500-98 (U), Annex

C. National and local decisions about force protection conditions (FPCON) may have an impact on

the arming policy. The decision to implement a particular FPCON is a command decision and the JTF

commander may set a higher FPCON if warranted by threat level assessments for the joint operations

area (JOA). FPCON is based on an assessment of the vulnerability of JTF personnel or facilities,

criticality of personnel or facilities, availability of security resources, impact on operations and morale,

damage control considerations, and other international or US actions. Because the CBRNE CM

mission is most likely in response to a terrorist attack, it is highly likely that deterrent measures may

include requesting SecDef authorization to arm the response forces along with taking other additional

security measures based on local FPCON.

(d) Immediate Response. The DOD policy on immediate response addresses

the authority delegated to DOD component or military commanders to provide immediate

assistance to civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property

damage in the event of imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or

attack. Immediate response is situation-specific and may or may not be associated with a declared

or undeclared disaster. The potentially catastrophic nature of CBRNE incidents would most

likely lead to DOD forces conducting CBRNE CM under immediate response authority, but

there are no policy exceptions or special authorities for CBRNE CM. A JFC, responding to a

SecDef approved DSCA mission and/or execute order (EXORD), is like any other DOD military

commander and may find the need to exercise his/her immediate response authority with available

forces. This is particularly relevant in the event of a second terrorist attack or TIM release

within the JOA, since trained medical and specialized CBRNE assessment/response teams are

on the scene and able to rapidly respond to time-sensitive requests from the civil sector. It is

important for commanders to understand that the policy is limited, restrictive, and conditional.

The situation is a bona fide emergency which overwhelms the ability of civilians to respond and

meets the restrictions criteria within DOD and Service directives. As soon as practical, the

military commander, or responsible official of a DOD component or agency rendering such

assistance, shall report the request, the nature of the response, and any other pertinent information

through the chain of command to the National Military Command Center, so that the information

is received within a few hours of the local commander’s decision to provide immediate response

support. Immediate response requests in the event of a CBRNE incident may include, but are

not limited to:
II-6

Chapter II

JP 3-41

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE DURING THE 1906

SAN FRANCISCO EARTHQUAKE

Immediate response authority reflects the historical role of the military,

particularly the Army, to provide an immediate or emergency response to

the civilian community in case of disaster. This authority is firmly entrenched

in current Army Regulations, forerunners of which may be traced to the

early twentieth century. One of the most celebrated examples of the use of

this authority in this century was the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and

fire. There, General Frederick Funston, commander of the Department of

California and, at the time of the earthquake, the Pacific Division, deployed

all troops at his disposal to assist civil authorities in both a civil disturbance

and a disaster relief role. Destroying large parts of the city, the earthquake

and resulting fire left 250,000 San Franciscans homeless. Troops were

immediately employed to stop looting and to protect Federal buildings such

as the mint and the post office. In addition, they assisted firefighters in

battling the conflagration. While General Funston telegraphed the War

Department to inform it of his actions, he took those actions he deemed

necessary in what was clearly an emergency situation.

Lurid flames sweep San Francisco in William Alexander Coulter’s panorama

of the largest maritime rescue in United States history, where more than

thirty thousand people were taken from the shoreline between Fort Mason

and the foot of Lombard Street. Mr. Coulter’s painting depicts the flotilla of

rescue vessels ferrying survivors from the burning city to Sausalito.

SOURCE: The Virtual Museum of the City of San Francisco

1. Rescue, evacuation, and emergency medical treatment of casualties,

maintenance or restoration of emergency medical capabilities, and safeguarding the public health.
II-7

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

2. Emergency clearance of debris, rubble, and explosives ordnance from public

facilities and other areas to permit rescue or movement of people and restoration of essential services.

3. Detection, assessment, and containment (initial steps taken to facilitate

emergency evacuation and public awareness warnings).

4. Roadway movement control and planning.

5. Emergency restoration of essential public services (including fire-fighting,

water, communications, transportation, power, and fuel).

For more information on hazard immediate response authority see JP 3-26, Homeland Security,

and JP 3-28, Civil Support.

(e) MOUs/MOAs for mutual assistance are often established between military

installations and local communities. If an installation commander receives a request for assistance

directly from local civil authorities prior to a presidential declaration of a major disaster or

emergency, the requesting agency should be referred to the local/state emergency management

channels, unless an immediate response condition exists or a mutual assistance agreement is in

effect. Installations may have entered into earlier mutual assistance agreements with the local

community in the areas of fire-fighting, hazardous materials, medical evacuation and/or other

areas, as appropriate. Dependent upon circumstances, this type of support may not be considered

immediate response. Accordingly, requests for assistance under mutual assistance MOUs/MOAs

must be considered in accordance with applicable DOD and Service directives.

2. Roles and Responsibilities in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

a. DOD and the National Response Plan. When conducting CBRNE CM operations in

accordance with the NRP, DOD will be in support of a lead or other primary agency. The

domestic operating environment for DSCA presents many challenges to the JFC. It is imperative

that commanders and staffs at all levels understand the statutory and operational relationships

among all Federal agencies involved in the operation. Therefore, commanders and staffs at all

levels must be knowledgeable about the NRP and the NIMS and know how their commands fit

in to the overall NIMS framework. DOD provides assistance to the lead or other primary

agency upon request by the appropriate authority and approval by SecDef. The NRP

contains a number of incident annexes that apply to CBRNE situations. Each annex lists the

coordinating agency or agencies and cooperating agencies involved in the response, provides

information on applicable policies, authorities, planning assumptions, concept of operations,

and responsibilities of cooperating agencies for the particular incident described. DOD is a

cooperating agency for the following CBRNE CM related incident annexes:

(1) Biological incident.

(2) Catastrophic incident.
II-8

Chapter II

JP 3-41

(3) Nuclear/radiological incident.

(4) Oil and hazardous material (HAZMAT) incident.

(5) Terrorism.

For more information on Federal department and agency roles and responsibilities for CBRNE

CM see the National Response Plan and the NRP Catastrophic Incident Supplement.

b. DOD Roles and Responsibilities. A brief synopsis of specific DOD roles and

responsibilities applicable to CBRNE CM is provided below:

(1) Secretary of Defense. SecDef retains approval authority for the use of forces,

personnel, units, and equipment for CS, to include CBRNE CM. SecDef has the primary

responsibility to provide the overall policy and oversight for CS in the event of a domestic

incident. There may be circumstances or national objectives when DOD is required to temporarily

assume the lead for the Federal response based on Presidential decision. Should facts and

circumstances of an actual catastrophic incident warrant a significant DOD role, scope and

duration should be defined. A non-DOD civil authority will assume lead responsibility at the

earliest opportunity, consistent with operational requirements.

(2) ASD(HD). The Office of ASD(HD) is within the office of the Under Secretary of

Defense for Policy (USD[P]). ASD(HD) serves as the DOD Domestic Crisis Manager and

provides policy oversight for all domestic CBRNE CM support.

(3) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity

Conflict (ASD[SO/LIC]). ASD(SO/LIC) supports planning by the DOD Domestic Crisis

Manager for the contingent use of US counterterrorism forces in response to domestic terrorist

incidents.

(4) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD[HA]). ASD(HA) is a

critical component in the Services’ activation of the Federal coordinating centers (FCCs). FCCs

are DOD and Veterans Affairs medical facilities responsible for locating all civilian beds in their

geographic location, arranging the transport of patients from arriving aircraft, and all logistics in

support of receiving mass casualties from a disaster area.

(5) Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy ASD(ISP).

ASD(ISP) is the principal advisor to the SecDef and the USD(P) on issues relating to combating

WMD including nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management.
II-9

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

(6) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD[RA]). ASD(RA) is

responsible for monitoring RC readiness. ASD(RA) provides policy regarding the appropriate integration

of RC forces into response efforts.

(7) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CJCS serves as the principal military

advisor to the SecDef and the President in preparing for and responding to CBRNE CM incidents,

ensures that military planning is accomplished to support the lead or other primary agency for

CBRNE CM, and provides strategic guidance to the combatant commanders for the conduct of

operations.

(8) Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) and the Request for Assistance

Process. JDOMS, located within the Joint Staff Operations Directorate (J-3), produces military

orders as they pertain to domestic emergencies, forwards them to the SecDef for approval, and

then to the appropriate military commander for execution. A six-step process is initiated when

a request for assistance (RFA) is received from a lead or other primary agency:

(a) Lead or other primary agency initiates the RFA.

(b) RFA is sent to the DOD Executive Secretary for assessment/processing.

(c) RFA is processed and sent to ASD(HD) and JDOMS.

(d) JDOMS processes the order.

(e) SecDef approves the order.

(f) JDOMS issues the order to appropriate combatant commanders, Services,

and agencies.

(9) Combatant Commands

(a) Commander, US Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM),

Commander, US Southern Command (CDRUSSOUTHCOM), and Commander, US

Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM). These CCDRs have specific responsibilities for assisting

domestic civil authorities in their areas of responsibility (AORs) and are the supported commanders

during CBRNE CM operations. In addition to the HD mission, these commanders, when directed

by the President or SecDef, provide CS, to include CBRNE CM operations. Other geographic

and functional commands support CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSSOUTHCOM, and

CDRUSPACOM in their CBRNE CM efforts.

(b) Commander, US Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM).

When directed by the President or SecDef, CDRUSSOCOM conducts special operations in

support of CrM and CBRNE CM activities. CDRUSSOCOM may also provide liaison officers

and other assistance to the supported CCDR, as required.
II-10

Chapter II

JP 3-41

(c) Commander, US Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM). When

directed by the President or SecDef, CDRUSTRANSCOM is a joint force provider and provides

deployment, employment, and redeployment of common-user air, land, and sea transportation for

forces engaged in domestic CBRNE CM operations and provides aeromedical evacuation as required.

(d) Commander, US Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM).

CDRUSJFCOM supports CBRNE CM operations through the assigned roles of joint force

provider, joint force integrator, and joint force trainer, and through joint concept development

and experimentation.

(e) Commander, US Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM).

CDRUSSTRATCOM conducts space operations, consisting of force enhancement, space control,

space support, and force application, as the single point of contact for military space operations.

CDRUSSTRATCOM is the lead CCDR for integrating and synchronizing DOD in combating

WMD which includes CBRNE CM. In this role, CDRUSSTRATCOM will integrate and

synchronize applicable DOD efforts across doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership,

personnel, and facilities related to CBRNE CM efforts. CDRUSSTRATCOM has established a

Joint Functional Component Command to serve as the Center for Combating Weapons of Mass

Destruction.

(10) Subordinate Commands

(a) Commander, US Army North (CDRARNORTH). When approved by

SecDef and directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRARNORTH deploys military resources

and forces and conducts military support operations to help Federal, state, local, and tribal

authorities respond to a CBRNE incident within the homeland.

(b) Commander, Joint Task Force — Civil Support (CJTF-CS). When

approved by SecDef, and directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, CJTF-CS deploys military resources

and forces, and conducts military support operations to assist Federal, state, local, and tribal

authorities in responding to a CBRNE incident within the homeland. When domestic incidents

occur in the CDRUSPACOM or CDRUSSOUTHCOM AORs, they will be the supported

commander and CJTF-CS deploys in their support.

(c) Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-AK). JTF-AK is comprised of Alaskan

Command personnel, a subunified command of the US Pacific Command (USPACOM). Placed

under the operational control (OPCON) of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)

for HD (and CS) operations, JTF-AK is responsible for preventing, deterring, defending, and

defeating national security threats within the Alaska JOA.

(d) Commander, Joint Task Force — National Capital Region (CJTF-NCR).

When approved by SecDef and directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, CJTF-NCR provides

command and control (C2) of military support operations to help Federal, state and local authorities

respond to a CBRNE incident within the National Capital Region.
II-11

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

(11) Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). SecDef appoints the DCO to serve as DOD’s

single point of contact at a joint field office (JFO). The JFO is the multiagency coordination center

established locally for Federal incident-related prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery actions.

Requests for DSCA originating at the JFO are coordinated and processed through the DCO.

(12) Military Services. When approved by SecDef, the Military Services provide

forces, facilities, and assets to the supported CCDR as part of the DOD response to a CBRNE

incident. Specifically the Service Chief responsibilities are as follows:

(a) Provide the Joint Staff, J-3, with information on assigned CBRNE CM

capabilities, assets, units, and research or support facilities that are capable of providing reachback or on-scene support to CBRNE CM operations.

(b) Identify units available to the supported CCDR consistent with Title 10 USC.

(c) Provide designated forces, to include RC forces, in order to prepare for and

respond to a CBRNE situation, and support to the supported combatant commander through the

appropriate Service component commanders.

(13) Reserve Component Forces. National Guard and reserve forces are known

collectively as RC forces. They are integral to the accomplishment of peacetime operations and

prevention of conflict. Air sovereignty alert is a full-time mission of RC forces. RC forces

consist of the Army National Guard (ARNG), Air National Guard (ANG), US Air Force Reserve

(USAFR), US Army Reserve (USAR), US Naval Reserve (USNR), US Marine Corps Reserve

(USMCR), and US Coast Guard Reserve (USCGR). Guidelines for utilization of RC forces can

be found in Title 10 and Title 32 USC.

(a) Chief, National Guard Bureau. The National Guard Bureau facilitates and

resources ANG and ARNG forces and assets through the states adjutants general to conduct

CBRNE CM operations to assist state, local and tribal authorities in responding to a domestic

CBRNE CM incident.

(b) National Guard (NG). The NG primarily operates under three different

command relationships: Federal funding and Federal control (Title 10 USC – “federalized”

status); Federal funding and state control (Title 32 USC); and state active duty (state

funding and state control). NG forces, unless federalized, operate under the C2 of the governor

and adjutant general in state active duty and/or Title 32 status. The NG, when in state status,

responds under the governor’s control for CS missions in accordance with state laws. However,

when NG personnel or units are federalized by order of the President under Title 10 USC, they

respond under the same legal restrictions and C2 structures as active component military forces.

The NG, when in state status, is also normally the first military responder to CS incidents that

require resources beyond the capabilities of local and other state-level emergency response

organizations. Working under the control of the governor, their actions are closely coordinated

with those of other agencies, to include any DOD assets committed to the same or related incidents.

Additionally, in many states, the adjutant general is also the state’s director for emergency
II-12

Chapter II

JP 3-41

management, and as such, not only controls the response of the state’s NG forces, but also manages

and coordinates the state’s response to CBRNE CM in support of local governments.

(c) Reserve Forces. Each of the seven RCs is structured and operated in a manner

similar to its respective Active Component (AC) counterpart. Unlike the ARNG and ANG, the

remaining five RC organizations (USAR, USNR, USAFR, USMCR, USCGR operate under the

same C2 relationships in both peacetime and wartime and do not have state-specific relationships.

When called to active duty, RC forces conduct civil support missions under Title 10 USC

guidelines exactly as AC forces. While on active duty, members of the ARNG, ANG, USAR,

USNR, USAFR, and USMCR are subject to the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military

Justice. RC forces are called to active duty through the mobilization/demobilization process.

For more information on the RC mobilization/demobilization process, see JP 4-05.1, Manpower

Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Call-up.

(14) US Coast Guard (USCG). USCG is a Military Service and a branch of the

Armed Forces of the United States assigned to the DHS (Title 14, USC 1). When directed by the

President, or by a Congressional declaration of war, the USCG transfers to the Department of

the Navy for operations. However, at any time, USCG may also assist the Navy without

transferring forces by attaching USCG units to a Navy command. The gaining Navy commander

would exercise tactical control (TACON) of these attached USCG units.

(a) USCG’s homeland security (HS) mission is to protect the US maritime domain

and the US marine transportation system and deny their use and exploitation as a means for

attacks on US territory, population, and critical infrastructure. Additionally, USCG will prepare

for and, in the event of attack, conduct emergency response operations.

(b) USCG (under DHS) is the lead or other primary agency responsible for the

conduct and coordination of maritime security operations carried out under civil authorities for

HS in the US maritime domain. When USCG is serving in this role, DOD assets will serve in a

supporting role. However, C2 relationships will be tailored to the particular situation. There are

situations where USCG is a supporting agency operating in support of other Federal, state, and

local civil agencies and coordinates its domestic and foreign operations through these agencies.

In all cases, operations are governed by unity of effort and agreed protocols. In its maritime law

enforcement role, USCG has jurisdiction in both US waters and on the high seas and is the only

Military Service not constrained by the Posse Comitatus Act (i.e., it is unique among the Services

in that it has statutory law enforcement authority).

(15) Combat Support Agencies (CSAs). CSAs provide direct support to the CCDRs

performing CBRNE CM during emergency situations and are subject to evaluation by CJCS.

The seven CSAs are the Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency,

Defense Logistics Agency, National Security Agency, Defense Contract Management Agency,

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

Each plays a critical role in supporting CBRNE CM operations by ensuring the supported
II-13

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

commander has the information, situational awareness, logistics, and contracting support necessary to

carry out the mission.

For more information on DOD and CSA roles and responsibilities, see JP 3-26, Homeland

Security.

3. Plans for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield

Explosives Consequence Management

a. National Response Plan

(1) The NRP guides the Federal response to any given emergency or disaster. It uses

the foundation provided by the Homeland Security Act, HSPD-5, and the Stafford Act to provide

a comprehensive, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management across a spectrum of

activities including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. Most joint force domestic

CBRNE CM operations will be authorized as a result of the President declaring a disaster or

emergency. The Stafford Act establishes the programs and processes for the Federal Government

to provide disaster and emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations,

individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations. The provisions of the Stafford Act

cover all hazards including natural disasters and terrorist events. Relevant provisions of the

Stafford Act include a process for governors to request Federal disaster and emergency assistance

from the President. As defined by the Stafford Act, an emergency is “any occasion or instance

for which, in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement state

and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and

safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.” The NRP

framework provides the following to guide a response to incidents of national significance:

(a) Best practices and procedures from various incident management disciplines

— homeland security, emergency management, law enforcement, fire-fighting, hazardous

materials response, public works, public health, emergency medical services, and responder and

recovery worker health and safety — and integrates them into a unified coordinating structure.

(b) The framework for Federal interaction with State, local, and tribal governments;

the private sector; and NGOs in the context of domestic incident prevention, preparedness,

response, and recovery activities.

(c) The foundation for the development of detailed supplemental plans and

procedures to effectively and efficiently implement Federal incident management activities and

assistance in the context of specific types of incidents.

(d) Integration of the capabilities and resources of governmental jurisdictions,

incident management and emergency response disciplines, NGOs, and the private sector into a

cohesive, coordinated, and seamless national framework for domestic incident management.
II-14

Chapter II

JP 3-41

(e) Separate incident annexes for biological events, catastrophic events, oil and

HAZMAT, terrorism, and nuclear/radiological events. The joint force has a CBRNE CM role

with specified and implied tasks in each of the CBRNE areas as well as in many of the ESF

annexes (see the NRP for details).

(f) The NRP Catastrophic Incident Supplement provides the operational

framework for implementing the strategy contained in the NRP Catastrophic Incident Annex.

(2) National Incident Management System Framework

(a) Joint forces performing CBRNE CM supporting civil authorities are part of

domestic incident management and operate in accordance with the NRP. The NIMS forms the

foundation for conducting domestic response operations. This framework provides a consistent

approach for Federal, state, local, and tribal governments to work effectively and efficiently

together to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of

cause, size, or complexity. Joint forces conduct CBRNE CM in accordance with NIMS but

maintain a distinct, independent chain of command. However, military personnel can and

frequently will receive tactical direction from the on-scene commander and subordinates,

especially in circumstances where small numbers of military personnel augment civilian response

functions. Installation forces operating under immediate response authority stay under the control

of the Service branch of the chain of command unless committed to the Federal response effort

by the Secretary of Defense. Under NIMS, installation and joint forces may find themselves

getting task direction from a civilian firefighter, law enforcement officer, or emergency medical

technician, but this functional working relationship does not replace or circumvent the military

chain of command. Key to success for joint forces conducting CBRNE CM is to establish and

maintain unity of effort within the framework of NIMS while maintaining unity of command

within DOD. The joint force’s understanding of the NIMS is fundamental to providing effective

and efficient support to civil authorities. Figure II-1 describes the NIMS based on three levels:

the field level, the regional level, and the national level. A joint force will interact within the

framework of NIMS either directly with the DCO or indirectly at all three levels.

(b) To provide for interoperability and compatibility among Federal, state, and

local capabilities, NIMS includes a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies

covering the incident command system (ICS); multiagency coordination systems; incident

management training; identification and management of resources (including systems for

classifying types of resources); personnel qualifications and certification; and the collection,

tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources. NIMS builds upon the

ICS which establishes a management concept that can be used to manage joint force response to

almost any event, whether an emergency incident, a public service activity, or another project of

any kind. It can be used equally well for both small and large situations, and it can grow or

shrink in size as the needs of the situation require. ICS consists of a philosophy, a set of rules,

and a way of organizing an incident that provides uniformity and consistency in coordinating

and controlling activities.
II-15

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Figure II-1. National Incident Management System Framework

NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FRAMEWORK

Multiagency Coordination Entity

Strategic coordinationPrioritization between incidents and

a resource allocation

Focal point for issue resolution

ssociated

Coordination Structures EOCs/Multiagency Coordination Centers Support and coordination Identifying resource shortages and issues Gathering and providing information Implementing multiagency coordination entity decisions

Command Structures

Incident Command

Direct on-scene emergency management

National Level Regional Level Field Level

DCO: Defense Coordination OfficerEOC: Emergency Operations CenterJFO: Joint Field OfficeJTF: Joint Task Force

CommandCoordinationOperational Control (DCO to JTF)

Regional

Response

Coordination

Center

State

Emergency

Operations

Center

Incident

Advisory

Council

National

Operations

Center

Combatant

Command

Incident

Command

Post

Incident

Command

Post

Area

Commander

Task

Forces

Incident

Command

Post

Joint

Field

Office

JFO

Coordination

Group

DCO

JTF

Local

Emergency

Operations

Center
II-16

Chapter II

JP 3-41

ARLINGTON COUNTY AFTER-ACTION REPORT ON THE RESPONSE TO

THE SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACK ON THE PENTAGON

Incident Command System and Unified Command: The primary response

participants understood the Incident Command System (ICS), implemented

it effectively, and complied with its provisions. The Arlington County Fire

Department, an experienced ICS practitioner, established its command

presence literally within minutes of the attack. Other supporting jurisdictions

and agencies, with few exceptions, operated seamlessly within the ICS

framework. For those organizations and individuals unfamiliar with the

ICS and Unified Command, particularly the military, which has its own clearly

defined command and control mechanisms, the Incident Commander

provided explicit information and guidance early during the response and

elicited their full cooperation.

SOURCE: Arlington County After Action Report, 23 July 2002

(c) At the national level, the IAC is comprised of senior Federal representatives

from the DHS, DOD, other Federal departments and agencies, and NGOs as required. The IAC

plans and coordinates Federal strategic incident management efforts, to include assessing national

impacts and those associated with the actual or proposed Federal response and anticipating

future Federal resource and operational requirements for the incident. The NOC is the primary

national hub for domestic incident management operational coordination and situational

awareness. The NOC consists of a multiagency watch and operational coordination center that

fuses law enforcement, national intelligence, emergency response, and private-sector reporting.
II-17

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

The NOC facilitates homeland security information sharing and operational coordination with other

Federal, state, local, tribal, and nongovernmental emergency operations centers (EOCs).

(d) At the regional level, the regional response coordination center (RRCC)

coordinates regional response efforts, establishes Federal priorities, and implements local Federal

program support until a JFO is established at the field level. The RRCC establishes

communications with the affected state emergency management agency and coordinates

deployment of the emergency response team – advance element (ERT-A) to field locations,

assesses damage information, develops situation reports, and issues initial mission assignments.

A DOD regional emergency preparedness liaison officer who assists in coordinating requests

for defense support may also operate within the RRCC.

(e) At the field level, the incident command structure (as detailed in the NRP) is

used. The incident command is analogous to a tactical-level unit and directs on-scene emergency

management. The incident command will most likely be formed with incident management

officials and responders from Federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, as well as private and

nongovernmental organizations. An area command is established when the complexity of an

incident and incident management span-of-control considerations dictate. CBRNE incidents

that require the involvement of joint forces will likely be of such scope and magnitude. A

unified area command is typically established by the administrator(s) of the agency or

governmental body having jurisdictional responsibility for the incident when multiple incidents

occur, or when the incidents under the authority of the area command span multiple jurisdictions.

This allows agencies with different legal, geographic, and functional authorities and

responsibilities to work together effectively. The area command sets overall incident-related

priorities for supporting agencies; allocates critical resources according to the established priorities;

ensures that response to incidents is properly managed; ensures effective communications; ensures

that incident management objectives are met and do not conflict with each other or with agency

policies; identifies critical resource needs and reports them to the interagency coordination system,

usually EOCs; ensures that short-term emergency recovery is coordinated to assist in the transition

to full recovery operations; and provides for personnel accountability and a safe operating

environment. EOCs at the state, county, and local levels represent the location where information

and resource coordination occur to support incident management activities.

(f) The JFO is a multiagency coordination center established at the field level.

The JFO is the primary hub for coordination of Federal, state, local, tribal, private, and

nongovernmental organizations to manage the CBRNE incident. The JFO is a temporary Federal

facility established locally to coordinate operational Federal assistance activities to the affected

jurisdiction(s) during incidents of national significance. Other Federal operations centers or

operational entities, to include the JTF headquarters, also collocate at the JFO whenever possible.

In the event collocation is not practical, the JTF headquarters will be connected virtually to the

JFO and will assign liaisons to the JFO to facilitate the coordination of Federal incident

management and assistance efforts. There are three organization components within the JFO —

the coordination group, coordination staff, and sections. The structure of the JFO is shown in

Figure II-2.
II-18

Chapter II

JP 3-41

Figure II-2. Notional Joint Field Office Organization

NOTIONAL JOINT FIELD OFFICE ORGANIZATION

JFO

Coordination

Group

JFO

Coordination

Staff

JFO

Sections

Principal Federal Official

Chief of Staff

Safety Coordinator

Liaison Officer(s)

Infrastructure Liaison

Others as needed

External Affairs

Operations

Section

Response and

Recovery

Operations

Branch

Law Enforcement

Investigative

Operations Branch

(Joint Operations

Center)

Domestic

Emergency

Support Team

Human Services

Group

Emergency Services

Group

Infrastructure

Support Group

Mitigation Group

Planning

Section

Logistics

Section

Finance/

Administration

Section

(Comptroller)

Office of the Inspector General

Defense Coordinating Officer

FBI

Special Agentin-Charge

Federal

Coordinating

Officer

State

Coordinating

Officer

The JTF C2

Element

C2: Command and Control

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation

JFO: Joint Field Office

JTF: Joint Task Force
II-19

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

1. The JFO Coordination Group. Consists of the PFO, the Federal coordinating

officer (FCO), the state coordinating officer (SCO), other senior Federal officials such as the senior

Federal law enforcement officer, and possibly other nongovernmental and private-sector representatives.

If a JTF is established by the CCDR, consistent with operational requirements, its C2 element will be

collocated with the PFO at the JFO to ensure coordination and unity of effort. The PFO has no direct

authority over other officials, but represents the Secretary of Homeland Security as the lead Federal

official. The PFO ensures overall coordination of Federal domestic incident management and resource

allocation activities; ensures seamless integration of Federal activities in support of and in coordination

with state, local, and tribal requirements; provides strategic guidance to Federal entities; facilitates

interagency conflict resolution as necessary; serves as a primary point of contact for Federal interface

with state, local, and tribal senior elected/appointed officials, the media, and the private sector; provides

real-time incident information to the Secretary of Homeland Security through the NOC and the IAC as

required; coordinates response resource needs between multiple incidents as necessary or as directed

by the Secretary of Homeland Security; coordinates the overall Federal public communications strategy

locally to ensure consistency of Federal interagency communications to the public; and ensures that

adequate connectivity is maintained between the JFO and the NOC; local, county, state, and regional

EOCs; nongovernmental EOCs and relevant elements of the private sector. The FCO conducts an

initial appraisal of the types of assistance most urgently needed; coordinates the timely delivery of

Federal assistance to affected state, local, and tribal governments and disaster victims; supports the

PFO; administers the financial aspects of assistance authorized under the Stafford Act; works in partnership

with the SCO; and takes other action consistent with the authority delegated to him or her as deemed

necessary to assist local citizens and public officials in promptly obtaining assistance to which they are

entitled. The SCO is the state’s counterpart to the FCO, managing the state’s incident management

programs and activities.

2. JFO Coordination Staff. The JFO coordination staff provides specialized

assistance to the JFO. The DCO is the single point of contact from DOD in the JFO for civil

support. The defense coordinating element (DCE) is the DCO’s staff. The DCO with the DCE

processes requirements for military support; forwards mission assignments to the appropriate

military organizations through DOD channels; and assigns military liaisons to activated ESFs,

as appropriate. The collocation of the JTF C2 element does not replace the requirement for a

DCO/DCE as part of the JFO coordination staff and it will not coordinate requests for assistance

for DOD. ESFs reflect a grouping of government and certain private-sector capabilities into an

NRP organizational structure to provide the support, resources, program implementation, and

services that are most likely to be needed to save lives, protect property and the environment,

restore essential services and critical infrastructure, and help victims and communities return to

normal following domestic incidents. The ESFs serve as the primary operational-level mechanism

to provide assistance to state, local, and tribal governments or to Federal departments and agencies

conducting missions of primary Federal responsibility.

See Appendix B, “Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support

Functions,” for more information on ESFs.

3. JFO Sections. JFO sections are established, as necessary, to meet the essential

management functions of operations, planning, logistics and finance/administration.
II-20

Chapter II

JP 3-41

a. The operations section coordinates operational support to on-scene

incident management efforts. Branches may be added or deleted as required, depending on the

nature of the incident. The operations section also is responsible for coordination with other

Federal command posts that may be established to support incident management activities. The

15 ESFs provide staff and resources to the sections of the JFO, principally the operations section,

consistent with the purpose and scope defined in the NRP annexes. A joint force conducting

CBRNE CM should be aware of their activities through the DCO. The joint force conducting

CBRNE CM will not typically be involved with law enforcement activities. Figure II-3 contains

a list of ESFs with their short title.

b. The planning section collects, evaluates, disseminates, and uses

information regarding the threat or incident and the status of Federal resources. It is also

responsible for preparing and documenting Federal support actions, and developing strategic,

contingency, long-term, and other plans related to the threat or incident, as needed. The planning

section provides current information to the JFO coordination group to ensure situational awareness,

determine cascading effects, identify national implications, and determine specific areas of interest

requiring long-term attention. The planning section also provides technical and scientific expertise.

c. The logistics section coordinates the logistic response of the Federal

Government to the entire disaster area and coordinates closely with the state and local officials for

Figure II-3. Emergency Support Functions

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

Emergency Support

Function

Title

1 n Transportatio

2 s Communication

3 g Public Works and Engineerin

4 g Firefightin

5 t Emergency Managemen

6 s Mass Care, Housing, and Human Service

7 t Resource Suppor

8 s Public Health and Medical Service

9 e Urban Search and Rescu

1 e 0 Oil and Hazardous Materials Respons

1 s 1 Agricultural and Natural Resource

1 y 2 Energ

1 y 3 Public Safety and Securit

1 n 4 Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigatio

1 s 5 External Affair
II-21

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

distribution management. This section coordinates logistic support to include control and accountability

for Federal supplies and equipment; resource ordering; delivery of equipment, supplies, and services to

the JFO and other field locations; and transportation coordination and fleet management services.

d. The finance/administration section is responsible for the financial

management, monitoring, and tracking of all Federal costs relating to the incident and the

functioning of the JFO while adhering to all Federal laws, acts, and regulations.

b. Contingency Planning. CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSPACOM, and

CDRUSSOUTHCOM are DOD’s principal designated agents and supported commanders for

domestic CBRNE CM. As such, they are responsible for the development and execution of

CBRNE CM plans in their respective AORs. As supporting functional combatant commands,

CDRUSSTRATCOM, CDRUSTRANSCOM, AND CDRUSJFCOM have support plan

responsibilities and these efforts need to be coordinated with the supported combatant command.

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is used to conduct joint planning

and execute and monitor the actions necessary to accomplish the mission.

(1) CONPLAN 0500, Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management

Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield

Explosive Situation. CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible for the development and maintenance

of CONPLAN 0500. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 0500-05 provides policy, authorities, and

capabilities to address CBRNE CM requirements.

(2) CONPLAN 2501-05, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).

(3) US Pacific Command CONPLAN 5002-05, Concept Plan for Homeland

Defense and Domestic Civil Support. CONPLAN 5002 articulates the responsibility for domestic

consequence management to include: the State of Hawaii; the US territories of Guam, American

Samoa, and Jarvis Island; the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Freely

Associated States Under the Compacts of Free Association, which include the Federated States

of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau; and the US

possessions of Wake Island, Midway Atoll, Johnston Atoll, Baker Island, Howland Island, Palmyra

Atoll, and Kingman Reef. USPACOM 5070, identifies military support to humanitarian

assistance, disaster relief, peace operations, refugee operations, and consequence management.

c. Crisis Action Planning (CAP). Upon receipt of a warning order regarding a domestic

CBRNE incident, the responsible CCDR initiates CAP. This time-sensitive planning for the

deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources involves

the CCDR and his or her staff, the operational forces, and the tactical units identified to respond

to the incident. Planning considerations for responding to a CBRNE incident are contained in

Chapter IV, “Planning Considerations.”
II-22

Chapter II

JP 3-41

4. Joint Force Considerations

a. Flexible Tiered Response. Military support will be tailored to the scope and magnitude of

the situation and will be focused on capabilities to meet the response requirements beyond the resources

of civil authorities. The appropriate CBRNE CM C2 headquarters is determined based on size and

complexity of the DOD required response, in accordance with a flexible tiered response concept.

Figure II-4 describes a tiered response strategy for CBRNE CM.

(1) Tier One is normally implemented for small scale, localized CBRNE incidents

having met SecDef criteria to implement CJCS CONPLAN 0500, Military Assistance to Domestic

Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation. The criteria have an impact on national level decision

making, but are transparent to tactical operations. In a Tier One situation, the DCO can effectively

exercise command over the small number of DOD forces required and still execute his functional

responsibilities with respect to processing mission assignments. The DCO is supported by a

DCE and emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLOs), and maintains various reachback

capabilities for technical advice and assistance. USNORTHCOM’s standing CBRNE CM joint

task force, Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) may be directed to provide a joint planning

augmentation cell (JPAC) or other assistance to the DCO to assist with CBRNE response planning

and execution. Specialized personnel, services, supplies, and equipment will be required from

DOD to support the Tier One response. Technical and advisory reachback may be required and

can be found at USNORTHCOM, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), DTRA,

and 20th Support Command.

(2) Tier Two is the normal response posture for CBRNE incidents having met the SecDef

criteria to implement CJCS CONPLAN 0500 and the need to establish a JTF to respond to the

incident. Specialized units, detachments, teams, supplies, and equipment will be required from DOD in

the Tier Two response along with enabling and sustainment forces. Extensive technical expertise and

advisory reachback are also often required. The DCO, DCE, and EPLOs perform their traditional role

in validating and coordinating mission assignments. The commander of a JTF normally is delegated

OPCON of all DOD forces designated in the EXORD, to include the DCO and DCE, executing

CBRNE CM support operations in the designated operational area. JTF-CS is trained and organized

specifically for this mission. Other JTFs may be established (if required) and referred to as a JTF for

consequence management (JTF-CM). These JTFs may require joint augmentation, particularly when

formed from a Service headquarters. Their staffs often receive direct support from USNORTHCOM’s

JTF-CS JPAC and technical expertise from DTRA’s Operation Center as well as other DOD units and

agencies to enhance its capabilities. A Tier Two headquarters (HQ) is typically considered first as the

C2 element. The President or Secretary of Homeland Security will declare an incident to be catastrophic

for CBRNE events that occur on the homeland soil. Initial response efforts will be in accordance with

the NRP-Catastrophic Incident Annex. Additionally, the CBRNE situation has met SecDef criteria, and

CJCS CONPLANs regarding CBRNE CM have been executed. CBRNE incidents are difficult for

state and local authorities to quickly assess in terms of clearly articulating Federal assistance requests

and requirements may not be fully appreciated for lack of experience with CBRNE effects. Rather than

a stable and clearly bounded problem, it will be one of cascading effects and expanding consequences.
II-23

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

Figure II-4. Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield

Explosives Consequence Management Tiered Response Options

TIER I

TIER II

COMMAND AND CONTROL

TIER III

I

N

C

I

D

E

N

T

M

A

G

N

I

T

U

D

E

C2 Command and Control

DCO Defense Coordinating Officer

DOD Department of Defense

EPLO Emergency Preparedness Liaison

Officer

JPAC Joint Planning Augmentation Cell

DCE Defense Coordinating Element

JTF Joint Task Force

JTF-CM Joint Task Force Consequence

Management

JTF-CS Joint Task Force Civil Support

MACDIS Military Assistance for Civil

Disturbances

O-6 Military Rate/Grade (Colonel or Navy

Captain)

O-9 Military Rate/Grade (Lieutentant

General or Vice Admiral)

SJFHQ Standing Joint Force Headquarters

Combatant Command

Established O-9 Level JTF

Headquarters

Complex Regional Problem

with Multiple Subordinate

C2 Elements

JTF-CS

JTF-CM

JTF for MACDIS or

Other Civil Support

Problem

Formed from:

Combatant Command

SJFHQ

Service Component

(with Joint

Augmentation)









Defense Coordinating  Officer or Other O-6

Commander

DCO with DCE and

EPLOs in National

Response Plan role

JPAC from JTF-CS











JTF-CS

with technical

augmentation

JTF-CM (C2 Formed by

Combatant Command

for the Incident)

Command and

Control Headquarters

from assigned or

attached forces

Joint Planning

Augmentation Cell

(JTF-CS)

Joint Manning

Document

augmentation

required







DCO, DCE, and EPLOs

Continue National

Response Plan Role

DCO, DCE, and EPLOs

Continue National

Response Plan Role

LEGEND

SCOPE OF DOD RESPONSE

DOMESTIC CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL,

NUCLEAR, AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVE CONSEQUENCE

MANAGEMENT TIERED RESPONSE OPTIONS
II-24

Chapter II

JP 3-41

Technical and advisory reachback may be required and can be found at USNORTHCOM,

USSTRATCOM, DTRA, and 20th Support Command.

(3) Tier Three involves extremely complex CBRNE scenarios impacting a wide

geographic area or a large population, or threatening national security. Multiple incidents in

different operational areas are supported by multiple JTFs. Since multiple JTF commanders

(including Commander, JTF-CS) have command of DOD forces conducting the CBRNE CM

response within their respective operational areas, the situation may require the designation of a

Tier Three JTF to assume command of all DOD forces responding to the situation in order to

achieve unity of command. The DCO, DCE, and EPLOs continue to perform their role in

validating and coordinating DOD support to Federal agencies. Technical and advisory reachback

is required.

b. Organizing Considerations

(1) A JTF for CBRNE CM is organized in a manner similar to a conventional JTF. A

senior JFC, typically the CCDR, normally establishes a CBRNE CM JTF to plan and conduct

CBRNE CM operations. JTF-CS was established in 1999 and is now a subordinate command to

USNORTHCOM. The JTF may be established subordinate to a geographic combatant command

or subunified command. For example, a GCC may elect to form a JTF to conduct CBRNE CM

operations in a specific region of the theater. The initial establishment of a CBRNE CM JTF

presents significant organizational, operational, and training challenges. These challenges affect

the CBRNE CM JTF commander’s ability to fuse a diverse group of key personnel, with varying

degrees of understanding and experience in joint operations, CBRNE CM operations, and

interagency cooperation, into a functioning CBRNE CM JTF. Therefore, key personnel assigned

to a standing or potential CBRNE CM staff, as well as those key personnel who coordinate with

a CBRNE CM JTF HQ, must understand both interagency and CBRNE CM techniques and

procedures in order to alleviate this problem and allow for an efficient operation of a CBRNE

CM JTF. Guidelines for establishing a JTF and standing JTF HQ can be found in JP 3-33, Joint

Task Force Headquarters.

(2) Augmentation. As the JTF staff conducts CAP and anticipates that mission

requirements will exceed the JTF staff’s capabilities (e.g., qualified personnel, facilities, or

equipment), the commander, joint task force (CJTF) should request assistance from the supported

CCDR. The supported CCDR should be prepared in advance to identify or request possible

resources from both the AC and RC forces to meet critical needs. Additionally, these augmentees

should train regularly with the CBRNE CM JTF if it is organized on a standing basis.

(3) Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ). GCCs have the capability to

provide the core of a JTF through their SJFHQ. The SJFHQ is a permanently manned, crossfunctionally organized, tailorable nucleus for an operational JTF headquarters. The SJFHQ

may augment a current JTF or employ as a core of a JTF. The SJFHQ is equipped to work in a

collaborative information environment for the CJTF.
II-25

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

(4) Joint Planning Augmentation Cell. The JPAC is a tailored group of functional CBRNE

CM joint planners that assist JTF staffs or the DCE. There are several organizations that train and staff

JPACs (JTF-CS has the capability to provide two on short notice) to augment other JTFs or DCEs

upon receipt of mission. JPAC members maintain currency in CBRNE CM areas through professional

education, participation in joint and multiagency exercises, and through planning for national special

security event contingencies. The JPAC is able to focus an ad hoc JTF staff on how to employ joint

forces in conducting CBRNE CM. The JPAC will also assist the JTF with obtaining technical augmentation

from (or at least dedicated reachback capabilities) DTRA, US Army Medical Research Institute for

Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), US Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense, US

Army Forces Command’s (FORSCOM’s) 20th Support Command (CBRNE), and the CDC. These

experts maintain liaison and reachback capability for the JTF and JPAC to national-level expertise,

while providing on-staff subject matter expertise. The JTF medical officer, in particular, should consult

with these technical experts, as they are also able to provide information critical to medical planning

considerations.

(5) Technical Augmentation and Liaison. CBRNE incidents entail operational and

force health protection risks. The affected community and Federal partners in the response may

also need technical advice in effects mitigation.

(a) DTRA. The DTRA representative should have expertise in CBRNE/TIM

event modeling and potential consequences of CBRNE events. If there is no DTRA representative,

refer to DTRA’s National Atmospheric Release Capabilities Listing and Center for Special

Weapons Effects, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Threats, Technology Transfers and

Resources unclassified website or classified website for further information. Access on the

unclassified network can be requested through the DTRA Operations Center, opscntr1@dtra.mil.

If no DTRA representative is available, North American Aerospace Defense Command J-33N

can provide the same modeling capabilities, has classified networks, and can provide CBRNE

briefs.

(b) USAMRIID. The USAMRIID representative should be an expert in

epidemiology and biological warfare defense.

(c) CDC. The CDC expert serves as the on-staff augmentation for the national

level emergency preparedness and response, the Laboratory Response Network, and Public

Health emergency response, to include expertise on the Strategic National Stockpile.

(d) 20th Support Command (CBRNE). The 20th Support Command (CBRNE)

is subordinate to US Army FORSCOM. Its representatives can serve as liaison to the CJTF and

are knowledgeable of the command’s capabilities and units.

(6) Boards, Centers, and Cells. The CJTF may elect to organize boards, centers, and

cells to facilitate a number of functions required of the CBRNE CM JTF. To assist in this

decision, the staff should determine what organizational structures have been formed within the

JTF, and what organizational structures have been delegated to the CJTF by the supported CCDR.

The CJTF must then decide what boards, centers, and cells would be best suited to support the
II-26

Chapter II

JP 3-41

JTF mission and functions. A notional representation is presented in Figure II-5. The DCO is typically

attached to the JTF and resides within the JFO as the DOD single point of contact under the NRP. JTFs

typically will require planning, logistics, medical fusion, current operations, future operations,

Figure II-5. Joint Task Force Staff Boards, Centers, and Cells

Bd Board

CBRN Chemical,

Biological,

Radiological,

Nuclear

Civ-Mil Civil-Military

Chem-Bio ChemicalBiological

CJTF Commander, Joint Task

Force

COS Chief of Staff

Ctr Center

Ctrl Control

DCJTF Deputy Commander, Joint

Task Force

Intel Intelligence

JTF Joint Task Force

Log Logistics

Mgmnt Management

Ops Operations

RUF Rules on the Use of Force

Spt Support

Synch Synchronization

Med Medical

LEGEND

J-6

OPCON

J-1

DCJTF

J-5 COS

J-4 J-3

Public Affairs

Joint

Information

Bureau

Joint Blood

Program Office

Joint Patient

Movement

Requirements Ctr

Chem-Bio Rapid

Response Team

Med Fusion Cell

Joint Military

Police Agency

Joint Personnel

Reception Ctr

Joint Intel Support

Element

Joint Visitors

Bureau

Joint Info

Management Bd

Joint

Deployment Bd

Joint Search and Rescue

Ctr

RUF Planning Cell

Joint Operations Ctr

Information Manage Cell

Joint Movement Center/

Joint Deployment and

Distribution Ops Center

Civ-Mil Operations Ctr

Sub Area

Petroleum Office

Joint Coordination Bd

Joint Planning Group

Contracting Office

Plans and Orders Cell

Joint Assessment Bd

Joint Facility Utilization

Bd

Joint Mortuary Affairs

Office

Evacuation

Control Ctr

Joint Security

Coordination Ctr

Future Ops

Synch Bd

Message Center

Defense

Coordinating

Officer

Provost

Marshal

Surgeon

Comptroller

Staff Judge

Advocate

Inspector

General

Joint Civ-Mil Eng Bd

Joint Material Mgmnt

Office

Log Procurement Spt Bd

----------------------------

Joint Transportation Bd

Logistics

Readiness Center

Joint Log

Readiness Cell

National Intel Support

Team J-2

Interagency Cell

CBRN Officer

Chaplain CJTF

JOINT TASK FORCE STAFF BOARDS,

CENTERS, AND CELLS

Joint Field Office

Joint Network

Operations Ctrl Ctr

Network Monitoring

Cell

OPCON Operational

Control

Centers, Boards, and Cells

Formed by CJTF
II-27

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

communication, and intelligence coordination centers and boards. Larger incidents may add requirements

for joint mortuary affairs, movement control, contracting, public affairs, visitors, and a standing personnel

reception center.

(7) Joint Intelligence Support Element. The joint intelligence support element performs

two critical functions for CBRNE CM: analysis and intelligence support to planning. Analysis includes

analyzing the potential for follow-on threats/incidents and the analysis of the incident’s consequences on

people and infrastructure. Intelligence support to planning integrates this analysis into current and future

planning efforts. The geospatial information systems (GIS) databases integrated with CBRNE modeling

provide a powerful tool with which to conduct analysis, depicting real-time incident effects and potential

effects for the current and/or follow-on incidents. Figure II-6 depicts various GIS data sets used in the

modeling process.

c. Response Operations. Response operations consist of the following five phases:

(1) Phase I — Alert/Preparation/Situation Assessment. Situational awareness is

vital to understanding the CBRNE CM operation parameters. The situation may warrant, due to

indicators and warnings or credible threats, the CAP process to begin before a CBRNE event

occurs. Determination of joint force command structure, the DOD anticipated response, and

early and thorough collaboration with Federal departments and agencies is paramount. Alerting

and preparing the joint force may be directed through a normal CJCS warning order; however,

CBRNE incidents may also occur without warning resulting in accelerated procedures and

possibly even verbal guidance.

(2) Phase II — Deployment. Echeloning the needed joint force assets at the appropriate

time is the key to success during this phase of the operation. Establishing a base support installation

(BSI), which may occur during the first phase, or during a transition between these phases, is a key

consideration, and is explained in further detail in Appendix C, “Base Support Installation Considerations.”

Conducting joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) is essential for mission

accomplishment and protection of the joint force. Forces that are directly involved in life saving and

preventing further injury will have the highest movement priority for CBRNE CM force deployment.

Following in movement priority will be forces that assess/establish operations or provide temporary

critical life support, and following that, will be those forces necessary to establish and sustain operations.

Biological incidents may or may not provide a clear point of origin. In this case, task force (TF) medical

may be the primary effort and have priority in movement. In some biological cases, such as anthrax,

there will also be a clean up requirement. Elements of TF response will normally have priority for

movement in the force flow because it contains those capabilities needed to relieve and/or augment the

efforts of first responders (i.e., monitoring, marking, decontamination, hot-zone extraction, security).

This TF will normally be employed closest to the actual incident site. CBRNE CM response units

should be immunized to prevent unnecessary delays in response posture. Inoculation may occur at

home base, an intermediate staging base, or the BSI based on availability of vaccine(s), time required for

vaccine to be effective, and time-distance criteria. Units must meet force health protection standards

established for the operation prior to deployment into an operational area. For units stationed in an

operational area, health protection standards will be met prior to employment. Health protection standards

will be established in the operation order or deployment order. The CJTF will have to consider all these
II-28

Chapter II

JP 3-41

factors and recommend a viable course of action (COA) to the supported CCDR at the earliest available

opportunity. Forces will be transferred to the JTF and command relationship will be established as

designated in the EXORD. The JTF then directs completion of JRSOI. Exceptions will be noted in

CCDR’s orders. After coordinating with the BSI, the JTF will commence JRSOI operations. Phase II

ends when the JTF and applicable DOD forces are closed/secured in the operational area and the

CJTF determines that forces are ready to execute the mission. Success is achieved when BSIs are

established, forces are deployed, and the JTF has established C2 of DOD forces and prepared to

respond to Federal agency-generated mission assignments.

(3) Phase III — Support to Civil Authorities. Planning and execution efforts will be

synchronized with the efforts of the supported civil authorities. Phase III begins when DOD forces

Figure II-6. Geospatial Information Systems Data Layers

UNCLASSIFIED

Baseline Map

Classified Imagery

Hospital Data

Threat Reporting

Emergency Services Data

Sensitive NSSE Deployments

Transportation Network

Sources Units

Commercial Imagery

JPO-STC MAAD List

Hazard Plume Models

DOD CIP List

Utilities/Energy Infrastructure

Terrain Elevation Data

Weather

CLASSIFIED

Depicted as Electronic Overlays

CIP: Communications interface processor

DOD: Department of Defense

JPO-STC: Joint Program Office for Special Technology Countermeasures

MAAD: Mission Assurance Asset Database

NSSE: National special security event

GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS DATA LAYERS
II-29

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

begin executing mission assignments within the operational area. The coordinating agency typically

assigns mission assignments to supporting or cooperating agencies for action. DOD accepts mission

assignments as RFAs, which become mission assignments only after they have been approved by the

SecDef. During this phase, the primary focus will be on mission assignments that involve lifesaving,

injury prevention, and providing temporary critical life support efforts. The CJTF will exercise OPCON

or TACON over all designated DOD forces as directed by the CCDR’s EXORD. The JTF may task

organize functionally, by Service components, or a combination of both, depending on the situation. An

example of tasks associated with requests for assistance is provided in Figure II-7. TF medical will have

medical augmentation, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and life support capabilities. TF support will

have the preponderance of the heavier logistic support capabilities (i.e., supply, transportation) and will

focus on mission assignments in such areas as displaced population support and mortuary affairs. The

JTF is responsible for executing mission assignments using the allocated DOD forces within the designated

operational area. The JTF is also responsible for requesting additional forces from the supported

CCDR if those within the designated operational area are not adequate. During Tier II operations, the

Figure II-7. Anticipated Tasks and Requirements

Joint Task Force Headquarters provides command and

control, and coordination for the following types of tasks and

requirements through functional task forces

Incident Site

Support

Medical Support Logistic Support Headquarters

Support













Coordination with

Local Emergency

Management

Director

Facility

Decontamination

Surveying,

Monitoring, and

Marking of Incident

Site

Site Management

Command and

Control of Area

Support

Critical Skills

Augmentation























Triage/Treatment

Definitive Care

Medical Logistics

Hospital

Augmentation

Epidemiological

Support

Agent Technical

Support

Stress

Management

Preventative

Medicine

Veterinary Support

Prophylaxis/

Immunization

Patient

Decontamination













General Support

Logistics

Joint Reception,

Staging, Onward

Movement, and

Integration

Displaced

Population

Mortuary Affairs

Transportation

Rotary-Wing

Aviation







Communications

Technical

Augmentation

Intelligence

Mapping

Modeling

Weather







ANTICIPATED TASKS AND REQUIREMENTS

Public Affairs
II-30

Chapter II

JP 3-41

JTF will receive mission assignments from the DCO/DCE after they have been validated. The JTF will

maintain force readiness of assigned forces in the designated operational area and manage supplies and

equipment brought in to support anticipated mission assignments.

(4) Phase IV — Transition. Transition of functions to civil authorities begins when

the civil authorities and the JTF, as well as the supported combatant commander, agree to

implement the transition plan. Transition plans will be executed on order. The plans should

possess measures of effectiveness based on the nature of the incident, local environment, personnel

affected, and support requirements. An effective and efficient transition phase will conclude

with a clear and expedient transfer of CBRNE CM responsibilities as soon as the end state

conditions are met. This phase ends when all activities are transferred to the designated authorities.

Success can be described as the complete transfer of responsibilities to another military HQ;

Federal, state, local agencies; or NGOs and forces begin preparation for redeployment. Beginning

early in the planning process, the JTF and TF commanders have the responsibility to develop

transition and redeployment plans that include transferring support responsibilities to other HQs,

Federal, state, local agencies or NGOs. TF commanders will coordinate these efforts by submitting

transition criteria to the supported JTF. Mission assignments given to the JTF in support of civil

authorities have been successfully executed, either, to the point of completion, or ready to be

transitioned to another command or agency.

(5) Phase V — Redeployment. Redeployment begins when forces are directed to

prepare for redeployment. This is an on order mission given by the combatant commander to

the CJTF. Determining when forces are no longer needed is important and should be determined/

defined as soon as the situation permits. This decision may be made in conjunction with the lead

or other primary agency or unilaterally by the Secretary of Defense. Uncommitted forces will

normally redeploy initially. Forces no longer required to support anticipated mission assignments

are recommended to the supported CCDR for redeployment. Particular attention should be

given to high-demand, low-density units possessing specialized, unique skills that may be needed

elsewhere. Selective redeployment may occur concurrently with the reception of additional

forces. Additional forces will redeploy after their functions are completed or transferred back to

other entities. Redeploying forces may require decontamination, medical observation/evaluation

based on the pathogen/hazard involved. Success is defined when all forces, less follow-on or

remaining forces, have redeployed to their designated home station.
CHAPTER III

FOREIGN CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

III-1

“Defending the American homeland is the most basic responsibility of our

government. As part of our defense, the United States must be fully prepared to

respond to the consequences of WMD use on our soil, whether by hostile states

or by terrorists. We must also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use

against our forces deployed abroad, and to assist friends and allies.”

President George W. Bush

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,

December 2002

1. General

a. FCM is assistance provided by the USG to a HN to mitigate the effects of a deliberate or

inadvertent CBRNE attack or event and to restore essential government services. Primary

responsibility for FCM rests with the HN, unless otherwise stipulated under relevant international

agreements or arrangements. Unless otherwise directed by the President, the DOS is the LFA

for USG FCM operations and is responsible for coordinating the overall USG FCM response.

When requested by the LFA and directed by the SecDef, DOD will support USG FCM operations

to the extent allowed by law and subject to the availability of forces. The response may include

a number of agencies with specialized capabilities, in addition to forces provided by DOD. The

ability of the USG to assist a HN government and its affected population is determined by the

nature of the CBRNE event, the forces available to provide assistance, and the time required to

deploy to the vicinity of the incident. The more rapidly FCM assistance is coordinated and

applied, the better the chances of success in mitigating the effects of the CBRNE incident.

b. DOD support to USG FCM operations is a series of coordinated efforts in response to

requests from the LFA to support a HN. FCM may require specialized capabilities to include but

not limited to hazardous materials handling, decontamination, urban search and rescue, public

health and medical care, and public notification efforts beyond the scope or scale of traditional

disaster relief efforts. Additionally, DOD will provide representation to the DOS-led foreign

emergency support team (FEST)/consequence management support team (CMST) to support

USG FCM operations, as requested by the DOS and directed by the SecDef. DOD will retain

C2 of all DOD assets (personnel, infrastructure, and equipment) supporting the LFA in USG

FCM operations. In the event that the DOS is unable to effectively coordinate a FCM response

(i.e., uncertain or hostile environment, no official DOS presence in-country), or in the absence

of a foreign government request due to a collapse of the government or the government ceasing

to function, the President may direct DOD to serve as the LFA.

For further guidance on foreign assistance, refer to JP 3-07.6, Joint Doctrine for Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance.

c. When conditions resulting from any emergency or attack require immediate action, local

military commanders may take such actions as may be necessary to save lives, prevent human
III-2

Chapter III

JP 3-41

suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. When such

compelling conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters,

commanders or officials acting under the “immediate response authority” may take necessary

actions to respond to requests from authorities. They must advice higher headquarters by the

most expeditious means available, and seek approval and additional authorizations as needed.

The GCC will notify the US COM at the time of the higher headquarters notification.

d. The USG provides assistance to the foreign government, upon the direction of the

President of the United States. Although the HN’s response capabilities may be overwhelmed,

the HN government always retains primary responsibility for the CBRNE CM response on its

soil.

e. There are other instances wherein DOD may respond to a CBRNE incident on foreign

soil; however, these situations are not considered to be FCM and this publication does not apply:

(1) DOD acts to protect and/or mitigate CBRNE effects on US/coalition forces during

major combat operations in order to continue the mission (CBRN passive defense).

(2) When directed, DOD provides assistance, mission permitting, to foreign civilian

populations affected by CBRNE material during the conduct of major combat operations in a

foreign country where the Department of State does not have an established presence.

(3) DOD response to CBRNE incidents that occur and are contained on DOD

installations and facilities overseas for which DOD retains primary CBRNE CM responsibility

under relevant international agreements or arrangements. DOD Instruction 2000.18 applies to

these instances.

f. In the last instance, DOD responds to CBRNE incidents that occur and are contained on

DOD installations and facilities overseas for which DOD retains primary CBRNE CM

responsibility under relevant international agreements or arrangements (including binational

and SOFAs). In this instance, the installation commander should inform/coordinate with DOS

and HN authorities, as appropriate. However, if the CBRN contaminant, plume, or its effects

are believed to reach areas off the installation, or the CBRNE event occurs adjacent to the

installation, DOD may initially respond to requests for assistance from local authorities in order

to save lives per immediate response authority, while coordinating with HN authorities, and, as

necessary, informing higher HQ and the US embassy, until such time as DOS assumes lead

agency for FCM, or further guidance is received.

g. FCM does not apply to DOD CBRNE response operations that are conducted within the

continental United States (CONUS), Alaska, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the

US Virgin Islands, US territories of Guam, American Samoa, Jarvis Island, the Commonwealth

of the Northern Marianas Islands, the Freely Associated States of Micronesia, the Republic of

Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the US possessions of Wake Island, Midway

Island, Johnson Island, Baker Island, Howland Island, Palmyra Atoll, and Kingman Reef (domestic

CBRNE CM).
III-3

Foreign Consequence Management

For further guidance on CBRNE CM operations as a result of US military actions, refer to JP

3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments,

and Service doctrine publications.

2. Responsibilities

a. Host Nation. Primary responsibility for responding to, managing, and mitigating the

consequences of a foreign CBRNE incident resides with the HN government. In reference to

maritime vessels, the flag state is responsible for CBRNE CM activities on the vessel and its

crew. A foreign government where a foreign flagged vessel berths, or the flag nation, may

request US or international support in responding to or mitigating the consequences of a CBRNE

incident.

b. Department of State. Typically, DOS coordinates USG support to a HN. When requested

by DOS, and approved by SecDef, DOD supports DOS in FCM operations, as appropriate, and

as part of the overall USG response.

c. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. ASD(ISP) serves

as the principal advisor for FCM policy, and represent the SecDef on all FCM policy matters

outside the DOD, to include interaction with the DOS and other Federal agencies. ASD(ISP)

provides oversight and review of all DOD support to FCM operations, and provide policy oversight

for the planning and pre-positioning of DOD FCM assets for foreign events, as directed by the

SecDef, including but not limited to, international athletic events, summits, and conferences.

Additionally, ASD(ISP) serves as the principal coordinator of DOD FCM exercises with the

interagency community.

d. Chief of Mission. The US COM (normally the ambassador) is the President’s top

representative in the HN. Normally, all USG support to the HN will be coordinated by the

responsible COM and country team. All matters requiring DOS review or approval should be

submitted to the COM.

e. Geographic Combatant Commander. Each GCC has the inherent responsibility to

provide support to DOS as the LFA for USG FCM operations, unless otherwise directed by the

President. HN requests for assistance and/or USG offers of assistance will be made through the

LFA. Each GCC will develop plans for foreign CBRNE situations within their assigned AOR.

If required, the GCC may designate and/or establish a JTF-CM to provide C2 over DOD assets

deployed in support of a FCM operation. The JTF-CM will be tailored to meet the specific

requirements of a CBRNE situation. When in a supporting role, CCDRs provide requested

forces and assets to the supported GCCs. Each GCC will develop interface procedures for

exchanging CBRNE CM operational support requests between COM, Joint Staff, their subordinate

commanders, and higher headquarters. The interface procedures should include HN to DOS to

DOD to supported CCDRs to supporting CCDRs’ protocols, and reside in theater plans or standard

operating procedures.
III-4

Chapter III

JP 3-41

f. Installation Commanders. As with US-based installation commanders, if a CBRNE

event occurs on foreign territory, US commanders may exercise their immediate response

authority; however, it is more restrictive (limited to saving lives) than within the homeland (see

CJCSI 3214.01B, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations). The

Department of Defense has independent statutory authority (10 USC 404) to respond to overseas

manmade or natural disasters when necessary to prevent loss of life. Under EO 12966, the

SecDef provides such assistance at the direction of the President, or in consultation with the

Secretary of State. In emergency situations to save human lives, when there is not sufficient

time to seek prior concurrence from the Secretary of State, DOD may provide assistance, and

advise and seek the concurrence of the Secretary of State as soon as practicable thereafter (see

also DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief).

3. Operations

a. FCM operations may require a complex and massive coordination effort. USG and

national agencies, allied nations’ military and civilian agencies, IGOs, and NGOs perform roles

in FCM operations, if requested by the HN. While each entity might maintain a unique capability,

coordination of responders is the responsibility of the HN. The DOS retains responsibility for

coordination among USG entities.

b. FCM operations will generally not be conducted during hostile action; however, situations

may arise where FCM may be required under less than permissive conditions at the request and

support of the HN. For example, insurgents commit CBRNE incidents against a new government.

The new government may request response assistance from US and coalition forces. The USG

may direct the US military to secure the area around the incident in order to establish the most

permissive environment possible to facilitate coordinated response efforts.

c. Notional JTF-CM Design. The organization and makeup of the JTF-CM will depend on

the situation and mission. Figure III-1 offers a notional JTF-CM organization structure. The

size of component elements depends upon incident severity and mission requirements. Mission

requirements will dictate the functional categories required in the responding organization.

Guidelines for establishing a JTF and standing JTF headquarters can be found in JP 3-33, Joint

Task Force Headquarters.

(1) Consequence management response and assessment (CM R&A) component.

(a) CM R&A component tasks may include:

1. Incident site reconnaissance and assessments.

2. Incident site entry/exit management.

3. Assistance with decontamination of personnel, equipment, facilities, and/

or terrain.
III-5

Foreign Consequence Management Figure III-1. Notional Joint Task Force-Consequence Management Structure

Civil

Affairs Chemical

Services

Restoration

Maintenance

Rotary

Wing

RECON SEC

Sanitation Road Repair Earth Moving

EQUIP

MED

Heating

Water

Demo Debris Disposal

Bldg

Repair

DECON

PERS

MEDEVAC

Logistics

SPT

Power

Comm

Airfield

Repair

DC Camp

Builders

Triage

MP

HN

Liaison

PSYOP IRF

Special

Engineers

Supplies

Fixed

Wing

Heavy Equip

Engineers

Services

Ground

Special

Advisors

INF

ELE

NGO

Liaison

DC

Specialists RADCON

Mortuary

Affairs

HN

Contracting

Water

Transport

Field

Hospitals

APOD/

SPOD

Security

USNS Hospital

Ships

Air Medical

Assets

Maritime

Support

DC Camp

Admin

JTF

CM R&A

Operational Restoration

Transportation

and Logistics

CMO Medical

Security

NOTIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

Seaport

Repair
III-6

Chapter III

JP 3-41

4. Analysis and recommendations to COM, USG agencies, and HN for nearterm management of the incident.

5. Medical assessments and screening.

6. Initial interface with local responders.

(b) The exact composition of the CBRNE response element will be based on

incident type and severity. Additional response elements may be required based upon the incident’s

scope and severity.

(c) The radiological control team provides health physicists and/or other technical

expertise (radiation control and safety) assistance to the component commander.

Figure III-1. Notional Joint Task Force-Consequence Management Structure (cont’d)

APOD airport of debarkation

CMO civil-military operations

CM R&A consequence management response and

assessment

DC displaced civilian

DECON decontamination

EQUIP equipment

HN host nation

INF ELE infantry element

IRF immediate reaction force

JTF joint task force

MED medical

MEDEVAC medical evacuation

MP military police

NGO nongovernmental organization

PERS personnel

PSYOP psychological operations

RADCON radiological control

RECON reconnaissance

SEC security

SPOD seaport of debarkation

SPT special project team

USNS United States Naval Ship

NOTIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE CONSEQUENCE

MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE (cont’d)
III-7

Foreign Consequence Management

(d) The immediate response force consists of a security element, a medical element,

and support element.

(2) Civil-Military Operations (CMO) Component. CMO component tasks may

include:

(a) Assistance in supporting the interface between HN government and outside

assets.

(b) Assistance in dealing with displaced civilians.

(c) DOD coordination between other USG organizations, HN organizations,

multinational organizations, and NGOs.

(3) Medical Component

(a) Medical component tasks may include the following:

1. Providing preventive medicine support to prevent disease and nonbattle

injury, to include providing medical surveillance activities for the JTF.

2. Triage of casualties.

3. Treatment for casualties and responders.

4. Augmentation to existing medical treatment facilities in accordance with

SOFAs.

5. Assistance in medical administration and management during an incident.

6. Collection of medical specimens as required for laboratory analysis and

identification.

7. Patient tracking.

8. Distribution of medical supplies.

9. Administration of immunizations and prophylaxes, as required.

10. Patient transports.

11. Stress management.

12. Patient decontamination.
III-8

Chapter III

JP 3-41

13. Detection.

14. Security.

(b) The medical component surgeon coordinates the activities of the subelements

for the JTF commander through the component surgeons. Elements of the medical component

will be sized based upon the severity of the incident and casualty projections from the commander’s

assessment.

(c) The radiological advisory medical team is specifically trained in radiological

health matters, and provides on-site assistance and guidance to the component commander and

local medical authorities. This team is normally found within the joint technical augmentation

cell (JTAC).

(d) Biological incident-specific augmentation.

1. The US Army chemical and biological advisory team provides on-site

advice for chemical-biological (CB) casualty care.

2. The aeromedical isolation team consists of physicians, nurses, medical

assistants, and laboratory technicians specially trained to provide care to and transport patients

with diseases caused by infectious agents. CDRUSTRANSCOM has waiver authority on

movement of contaminated/contagious patients. CDRUSTRANSCOM policy is to move a

limited number of patients (up to 50) only under extreme circumstances.

3. The Army’s special medical augmentation response – aeromedical isolation

team (SMART-AIT) consists of physicians, nurses, medical assistants and laboratory technicians

specially trained to provide care to and transport a limited number of patients (up to two

simultaneously) with diseases caused by highly contagious, infectious agents. With appropriate

coordination, SMART-AIT may be deployed in an FCM environment, but does not possess

organic air or ground transportation assets.

(4) Clean-Up Component

(a) The JTF-CM clean-up component may provide initial assistance to the HN in

decontamination and initial clean-up services to protect public health and safety, and restore

essential services. Protracted off-base site clean-up and long-term remediation is the responsibility

of the affected country. The clean-up component tasks may include the following:

1. Providing support for decontamination efforts.

2. Providing assistance in critical infrastructure restoration.

3. Assistance in initial off-base site clean-up and debris removal.
III-9

Foreign Consequence Management

4. Providing support to decontamination of fatalities.

(b) Engineer capabilities within this component fall into three categories.

1. Combat engineers with extensive explosives demolition capability, and

limited earth moving and debris disposal capability.

2. Construction engineer units possess an organic capability to accomplish

necessary road, facility (including damage control centers), and air infrastructure repairs to support

JTF operations.

3. DOD and Contract Assets. DOD engineer assets maintain tremendous

design and construction management capability and deployable “Prime Power” elements. DOD

contracting capability spans the spectrum of construction services, as well as other contracted

support services in order to augment or fill operational voids.

(c) Nonengineer assets within this component, such as water production and

transport, communications equipment/facilities, and maintenance and repair of other infrastructure

components, are not typically an engineer functional responsibility, but often will require engineer

support. As the technical nature of this support increases, the ability of engineer units to adequately

support diminishes, and contract expertise is required.

(d) The composition of each of these modules will be based upon required levels

of restoration, service capabilities, and availability of assets.

(5) Transportation and Logistics Component

(a) The tasks conducted by this component may include the following.

1. Providing transport support, to include aviation, ground, and, if necessary,

waterborne assets.

2. Providing assistance to the HN in the procurement of required logistics.

3. Providing contract support to the JTF.

4. Assisting the HN in the coordination or transportation.

5. Coordinating logistic support for the other components of the JTF.

6. Providing medical evacuation transportation support.

(b) The rotary-wing assets provide the means to move JTF personnel and

equipment, and casualties within the vicinity of the incident site. Both fixed-wing and high

speed waterborne assets can be used to quickly move personnel, casualties, and equipment
III-10

Chapter III

JP 3-41

inter- and intra-theater depending upon the locations of the affected areas and the condition of

surviving transportation infrastructure (airfields, ports, railroads, etc.).

(c) Depending upon the condition of the remaining transportation infrastructure

including roads and railroads, ground transportation units may be able to move personnel, supplies,

debris, and equipment in and around the incident area. The CCDR and JTF commander should

anticipate the need for substantial ground transportation packages.

(d) The use of a maritime support detachment will be dependent upon waterway

and helicopter/aerial access of incident site and JTF transportation requirements.

(6) Security Component

(a) Security component tasks may include the following:

1. Providing force protection and security for JTF, as required.

2. Protecting US citizens and victims.

3. Implementing appropriate antiterrorism measures.

4. Establishing early warning systems within the JTF operational area.

5. Providing convoy and patient transport security.

(b) Separate security elements may be required to provide airport, military aircraft,

sea port, and ship security, as appropriate to the mission being performed.

(c) Coordination with NGOs and IGOs.

(d) Coordination with USG and combatant command crime scene investigators.

d. USG assets available for FCM support include:

(1) DOS Foreign Emergency Support Team. The FEST provides a wide range of

specialized skills not normally available on-scene. The DOS, through the Office of the Coordinator

for Counterterrorism, is the lead agency coordinating the FEST. When deployed, USG CBRNE

CM activities are coordinated by the CMST which can be deployed either as a component of the

FEST or as a separate entity. This interagency team is led by the DOS Bureau of International

Security and Nonproliferation, Foreign Consequence Management Program. The CMST provides

the following: technical assistance to the HN and USG agencies; liaison with the FEST, lead or

other primary agency, appropriate GCC, USG agencies, and others; assessments of HN emergency

needs; advice regarding the development of USG options for a coordinated FCM response;

recommendations for appropriate USG response; and the establishment of relationships among

NGOs. Upon approval by SecDef, DOD will provide support to the CMST, as required.
III-11

Foreign Consequence Management

(2) Department of Energy. The DOE possesses several teams which provide expertise

and advice during a CBRNE CM operation involving mainly radiological or nuclear events.

(a) Consequence Management Planning Team (CMPT). The CMPT provides

technical advice and supports the development of a FCM plan addressing radiological hazards,

medical impacts, mitigation of consequences, and the deployment and use of other DOE assets.

Additionally, they coordinate and direct the in-field deployment and use of other deployed DOE

teams. The team consists of a team leader, two effects prediction personnel, two health physics

and data assessment personnel, two communications and logistic specialists, and one medical

advisor.

(b) Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT). The CMHT is activated

immediately following the deployment of any DOE asset. They are the exclusive source for

coordinating effects predictions, modeling, and data assessment for field operations until the

CMPT is operational.

(c) Radiological Assistance Program (RAP). The RAP provides the initial DOE

radiological emergency response capability. Under the RAP, there are several radiological

assistance teams to assist in identifying the presence of radioactive contamination on personnel,

equipment, and property at the accident or incident scene. These teams also provide advice on

personnel monitoring, decontamination, and material recovery.

(d) Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST). The NEST provides technical

response to help resolve incidents involving improvised nuclear and radiological dispersal devices.

The team is able to search for, locate, and identify devices or material.

(e) DOE Aerial Measuring System (AMS). AMS provides helicopters and

fixed-wing aircraft to respond to radiological emergencies. Its capabilities include aerial radiation

surveys and search (gamma spectroscopy), real-time radiological aerial sampling, aerial

photography survey, and aerial multispectra scanning surveys.

(f) National Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (NARAC). NARAC

provides real-time computer predictions of the atmospheric transport of radioactivity from a

nuclear accident or incident.

(g) Joint Technical Operations Team. This team is a combined DOD and DOE

team providing technical advice and assistance to DOD nuclear accident regional response forces.

e. DOD assets dedicated for FCM support include:

(1) Joint Technical Augmentation Cell. The JTAC is a tailored team that, when

directed, deploys to a supported combatant commander’s AOR to provide CBRN technical

advice and planning assistance for executing FCM operations. The JTAC leverages existing

DOD capabilities into an on-call cadre of technical experts drawn from key combatant

commander-assigned, Service, and DOD agencies. The JTAC personnel provide a wealth of
III-12

Chapter III

JP 3-41

technical expertise, experience, and a reachback capability to an established network of contacts

within DOD, Federal agencies, and various scientific research and academic communities. The

JTAC can be employed by the CCDR to support the combatant command, component command,

or JTF-CM. The JTAC also maintains linkage with technical experts in the CMST to ensure the

coordination of technical information and analysis between both DOS and DOD.

(2) Joint Technical Operations Team. This team is a combined DOD and DOE

team providing technical advice and assistance to DOD nuclear accident regional response forces.

(3) DTRA Consequence Management Advisory Teams (CMATs). CMATs provide

direct operational support to GCCs which provide modeling, simulation, and CBRNE CM

technical expertise with significant 24-hour reachback. They can assess CBRNE capabilities of

installations and critical facilities, and actual/potential CBRNE locations/facilities, and assist in

CBRNE CM planning and training. CMATs can be augmented with legal and public affairs

capabilities. Additionally the CMAT may be augmented with health physicists from the Armed

Forces Radiobiology Research Institute that can provide on-site training to health professionals

on the management of nuclear or radiological casualties. The CMAT may be embedded within

the JTAC, or as a stand-alone entity.

4. Foreign Consequence Management Planning Considerations

FCM plans should include support related to essential services and activities required to

manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. Such services may

include transportation, communications, CBRNE reconnaissance, public works, fire-fighting,

information planning, care of mass casualties, resources support, essential and/or routine health

and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials mitigation, food preparation

and distribution, and energy generation and distribution. Additionally, FCM response may require

specialized hazard material handling, and decontamination planning efforts to enhance foreign

disaster relief efforts. The JFC and staff and subordinate and/or supporting commanders and

staffs consider the following when planning FCM.

a. The HN has primary responsibility for CBRNE CM, unless otherwise stipulated under

relevant international agreements or arrangements.

b. Normally, DOS is the LFA for USG FCM operations, unless otherwise directed by the

President. DOD will support the LFA in FCM operations.

c. Joint Force Mission. Ongoing military operations take precedence over military support

of FCM, unless otherwise directed.

d. Current agreements established, or required, within AOR.

e. Geography of the operational area.
III-13

Foreign Consequence Management

f. Reachback capabilities availability and release ability from CONUS (e.g., modeling and

simulation, mitigation assets such as chemical, biological incident response force/weapons of

mass destruction-civil support team [WMD-CST] like response assets). Availability of CBRNE

CM response capabilities within theater, both military and civilian.

g. Personnel and equipment augmentation requirements.

h. Security. Once the operational environment is confirmed, the US force commander

determines the types and numbers of forces required to meet the mission. The operational

environment also determines the rules of engagement to be used within the operational area.

The more permissive the environment, the more predictable the outcome of the mission.

Operational environments are categorized as permissive, uncertain, or hostile. The distinction

between responding to a CBRN incident conducted in a permissive environment versus a hostile

environment must be clear. Failure to make this distinction results in inadequate planning and

unrealistic expectations. First, the cause of the crisis must be determined. If the crisis is manmade,

or if men are manipulating a natural crisis or industrial accident for political purposes, then this

becomes an intervention operation, conflict is to be expected, and the environment should initially

be considered hostile. Operations in a permissive environment are characterized by commonality

of purpose for all parties, a quantifiable understanding of the problem, clear objectives, provision

of support until normalcy returns, and level of HN cooperation. Coordinate FCM security

efforts with HN security/law enforcement and within HN agreements. When allowed, security

at the incident site includes visibly marking the perimeter of the incident site, establishing an

entry control point, controlling entry into the site, securing the area around the site, and providing

antiterrorism and force protection measures.

i. CBRNE and Other Infrastructure Reconnaissance. Determination of the levels and

limits of contamination in the area affected by the event. Determination of the effects of all of

CBRNE on all of the aspects of the infrastructure.

j. Decontamination. Contaminated personnel, equipment, facility, and area

decontamination requirements. This includes coordination with medical personnel on patient

decontamination requirements.

k. Mortuary Affairs (MA). MA includes the search, recovery, tentative identification,

decontamination, evacuation, internment, and, when required, temporary internment,

disinternment, and reinternment of human remains. MA also involves the operation of processing

points that may include MA collection points, theater mortuary evacuation points, and MA

decontamination collection points and operation of the personal effects depot(s) and the Dover

Point-of-Entry Mortuary (in FCM operations). MA also includes identification and removal of

remains, and any decontamination requirements needed for transport. Planning considerations

should also include measures to inter biologically contaminated remains. Public health will take

precedence over the repatriation of contaminated or contagious remains.

See JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations, and CJCS Memorandum 0026-02 for

further guidance on contaminated remains.
III-14

Chapter III

JP 3-41

l. Medical. This includes care and treatment of casualties, preventive care, and mental

health requirements for HN population, and DOD and non-DOD civilians and personnel. Casualty

prediction is an important factor to determine appropriate and timely response capabilities. Patients

may require decontamination or quarantine of personnel prior to evacuation from the affected

area.

m. Populace. Quarantine, evacuation or shelter, protection and sustainment, information

dissemination, and next of kin notification issues are planning considerations that must be made

by the JFC when determining the needs of the displaced populace.

n. Legal. DOS, HN requirements. FCM operations can be subject to a variety of

international treaties, HN laws, and US statutes and regulations that apply overseas (e.g., removal

of contaminated items, transportation of contaminated materials across borders, HN HAZMAT

laws, and US environmental requirements extending outside the continental United States).

Usually, DOS will coordinate support to the HN, IGOs, and NGOs that may be involved; providing

support for these entities can create fiscal law and other issues.

o. Public Affairs. Public affairs support to other Federal agencies, and the HN may include news

media operations, and public and command information. The HN public affairs mission is to expedite

the flow of accurate and timely information about HN activities to the public, as well as internal military

audiences. HN public affairs efforts are focused at the operational level to enable the commander to

gain local public acceptance and approval of HN activities, thereby enhancing its freedom of movement

within the joint operations area. Public affairs become a key consideration in FCM to restore public

confidence, provide guidance to affected areas and personnel, and to report factual details of the CBRNE

event. Public affairs must be coordinated both with DOS and the COM for each affected country.

p. Health Service Support (HSS)

(1) Ensure adequate joint medical communications architecture is established to provide

compatible and responsive communications for the military HSS system.

(2) Ensure adequate standardization and interoperability policies are in place to ensure

all deployable medical systems supporting joint operations are interoperable between Service

components. In FCM, this is particularly important relative to deciding on acceptable levels of

decontamination, remediation, and exposure guidance.

(3) Review entitlements, applicable laws, and regulations for the provision of US

military HSS to military and nonmilitary personnel of another nation.

(4) Coordinate support with outside relief agencies (Red Cross, NGOs, and IGOs) in

theater to ensure complete visibility for overall medical situation and requirements.

q. Medical Logistic Support Requirements. Includes planning for and identifying the operation’s

potential requirements for medical support. Early planning and identification of requirements will facilitate

the efficient execution of medical supply logistic activities.
III-15

Foreign Consequence Management

r. Liaison requirements with other DOD elements; USG agencies, including the country team;

HN government officials; other foreign government officials; other civilian organizations; and international

public and private groups.

s. Training and readiness requirements of JTF-CM/CBRNE response capability. The CCDR

can enhance readiness by pre-identifying the headquarters which will serve as his/her JTF-CM and

monitoring availability and readiness of CBRN response capable forces within the AOR.

5. Foreign Consequence Management Phases

FCM will be composed of five phases that will be scoped by tasks to be accomplished. The

phases, while sequential, may overlap in execution.

a. Phase I (Alert, Situation Assessment, and Preparation). Phase I includes those actions

required to conduct situation assessment and preparation, including the timely and accurate

assessment of the CBRNE situation, preparation for deployment, and the deployment of selected

advance elements. The GCC, in coordination with the COM, may deploy in-theater CBRNE

assessment, detection, and identification survey teams as required. Phase I ends when the nature

and scope of the CBRNE situation and initial response force requirements are defined.

b. Phase II (Deployment). Phase II begins with the SecDef-approved Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff deployment and/or execute order designating the intermediate and/or forward

staging bases, and establishing formal command relationships (i.e., supported and supporting

commanders). The order serves as the formal authority for the deployment of forces. Phase II

ends when all forces have completed movement to the designated incident location and supporting

locations.

c. Phase III (Assistance to HN Authorities). Phase III begins with the arrival of required

military assistance at the incident location and supporting locations, and ends with the

determination that DOD support is no longer required. Commanders begin planning immediately

for transition to HN and civilian agencies, and should identify the necessary or minimum

conditions to initiate transition to other agencies.

d. Phase IV (Transition to HN and/or Other Agencies). Although planning for transition

of CBRNE CM begins as soon as practical following the initial response, Phase IV begins with

the formal implementation of the transition plan for those tasks and responsibilities being

accomplished by DOD.

e. Phase V (Redeployment). Phase V begins with the redeployment of US military forces

involved in the FCM operations, and is complete when all forces have returned to their previous military

posture.
III-16

Chapter III

JP 3-41

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER IV

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

IV-1

“A Good Plan violently executed today is better than a perfect plan executed

tomorrow.”

George S. Patton

“In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is

indispensable.”

Dwight D. Eisenhower

1. Planning Considerations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and

High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management

An assessment of the chemical warfare agent will indicate key information that will impact

force protection measures and decisions. The assessment information will provide feedback

such as protection requirements, hazard levels, areas of contamination, expected duration of

hazards, etc. This information will contribute to the commander’s situational awareness, and

the commander will continue to use the technical assessment capability that will be part of any

response capability involving CBRNE CM. The primary goals of CBRNE CM are to save

lives; prevent injury; provide temporary critical life support; protect critical infrastructure, property,

and the environment; contain the event; and preserve national security. In addition, it is

advantageous to respond in such a manner that the minimal impact of the event serves as a

deterrent for future domestic and international terrorist attacks. Every incident will be different,

but the underlying concepts will remain constant. A robust CBRNE CM program serves as a

deterrent against future CBRNE use. The focus of CBRNE CM operations is the consequences

produced by the incident. While this chapter focuses primarily on domestic CBRNE CM, the

planning considerations may be applicable for the varied environments associated with FCM.

For further specific planning guidance for FCM refer to Chapter III, “Foreign Consequence

Management.” The following items should be considered during the CBRNE CM planning

process.

a. Assess

(1) After a CBRNE incident, parallel assessment processes occur at the field level by

local responders; at the regional level by the ERT-A; and at the national level by the NOC and

IAC. These assessments determine the scope and magnitude of the incident, and will ultimately

determine the need for DOD and joint force participation. Planners and assessors must remember

that any assessments must be done as quickly as possible since time delays in responding will

result in additional lives lost.

(2) The CCDR will, in coordination with Federal and state authorities (usually the

COM or state adjutant general), send an assessment element to gain early situational awareness

and conduct assessments in response to a CBRNE situation. The senior individual of the
IV-2

Chapter IV

JP 3-41

assessment element serves as the CCDR’s liaison officer to gain on-scene situational awareness

and provide recommendations on the appropriate level of C2 and initial resources required for

the CBRNE incident response. The assessment element may include a staff judge advocate,

chemical, medical, public affairs, operations, plans, logistics, law enforcement, and

communications officers and selected subject matter experts to assist in developing the assessment

and recommending an appropriate response. USNORTHCOM’s standing CBRNE CM joint

task force, JTF-CS, trains and prepares for this mission by maintaining an on-call command

assessment element (CAE) capability. Other CCDRs have standing site assessment teams or

survey and assessment teams prepared for this mission.

(3) Because the vast majority of DSCA falls under USNORTHCOM, the JTF-CS

CAE procedures are included here as an example of assessment processes and actions. Following

coordination with state civil and military officials (typically the state adjutant general) and Federal

officials (to include the FCO, the ERT-A, the DCO and other on-scene technical advisors), the

CAE makes an evaluation of potential shortfalls in Federal and state capabilities, which may

become requests for DOD assistance. The CAE prepares its assessment shaped by its knowledge

of CBRNE effects, the harm or damage they may cause, and how to mitigate and manage the

resulting consequences. The assessment identifies proposed methods of response, anticipated

actions, and potentially required forces. Information gathered by the CAE is developed, either

independently or through the support of an appropriate joint planning group for CAP, into a

commander’s assessment using the JOPES format for a commander’s estimate and forwarded

to the CCDR. This document provides specific recommendations to the CCDR relative to the

CBRNE response effort, to include tailoring and supplementing the CBRNE CM response force

structure required. The assessment helps the CCDR conduct the mission analysis and prepare

the commander’s estimate with a recommended DOD COA to be taken in support of the event

and recommended DOD resources and capabilities for anticipated mission assignments. The

commander’s estimate identifies force to task capabilities required to accomplish anticipated

catastrophic event DOD mission assignments. With SecDef approval, and through CJCS direction,

these capabilities are resourced by United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) (in its

role as the global primary joint force provider), the Military Services, other CCDRs, and the

DOD agencies (as supporting organizations to CJCS CONPLAN 0500.) The CJCS EXORD

identifies the designated forces provided to the CCDR and specifies the type of command authority

(normally OPCON). Additionally, it provides approval of purpose, desired effect, and COA to

be taken in support of Federal agencies for this CBRNE situation.

(4) Specific assessment items are provided below:

(a) Damage and Injury Reports. Examine damage and injury reports for

information on specific CBRNE effects. Specific events/incidents should include the control of

contamination, and should include contaminated casualties. CBRNE devices or vectors each

present unique characteristics that must be analyzed to plan and provide appropriate response

measures.
IV-3

Planning Considerations

(b) Nature of the Incident. Examine the effect on the population and

infrastructure to identify response capabilities required to address the incident. This includes

assessing risk to responders in order to determine force protection requirements.

(c) Force Protection (FP). Ensure FP is planned for and implemented. A top

priority during CBRNE CM operations, FP considerations include providing proper protective

equipment to personnel, planning for site safety, security, individual awareness of hazards and

dangers, protection from contamination through proper marking and avoidance of contaminated

areas, and proper preventive medicine and mental health care.

(d) Duration and Geographical Extent of the Incident. Assess the number of

jurisdictions affected by the incident and the likelihood of the scope expanding significantly.

(e) Weather and Terrain. Examine the effect weather and terrain may have on

the CBRNE material to include dispersion of chemical, biological, radiological agents or toxic

material by wind.

(f) Public Reaction. Gauge public reaction to the incident as it can affect response

requirements, particularly if the level of fear is high or likely to grow, or if massive population

movement is underway or expected.

(g) Mission Duration. Assess mission duration, as it will drive sustainment

requirements. Extenuating circumstances may prolong CBRNE CM operations in the event

civilian capability is lacking or inadequate. However, transition back to local responders should

occur as soon as is practical.

(h) CBRNE Reconnaissance Measures. Plan for the conduct of sampling,

surveying, and surveillance. Military forces generally have only basic sampling and detection

capabilities, so specialized military units may be required.

(i) Identification of Supporting DOD Forces. Local authorities may have some

DOD forces assisting within their area under immediate response authority. Work through the

Services to identify Title 10 units that are providing support either under immediate response or

under local authority prior to the EXORD and JTF establishment. Once the JTF is established,

understanding capabilities of forces currently operating within the JOA will support the JTF

commander with C2 and will also eliminate duplication of capabilities required for DOD support.

b. Coordinate Operations

(1) Interagency Coordination. Liaise and coordinate with other agencies and civil

authorities. Interagency coordination is a continuous process that should be established and

emphasized prior to an event occurring, as well as during and after an event happens. Coordination

takes place at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Whether coordination is conducted

through the CCDR’s joint interagency coordination group or other means such as an interagency

planning cell or group at the combatant command or JTF levels, the importance of interagency
IV-4

Chapter IV

JP 3-41

coordination in the planning process cannot be overstated. In particular, ensure public affairs

support, information management, and dissemination is in concert with that of DHS or the

COM and HN. Ensure compliance with Appendix R of the NRP, “Compendium of National/

International Interagency Plans.” Reference JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental

Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, for

a detailed discussion/reference on interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination during joint

operations.

(2) State and Local Capabilities. Determine if specialized state or local assets are

available to address the incident. The state civil-support team and state HAZMAT coordinator

has coordination with state assets and may advise on specialized response assets, and even

private resources (such as industrial resources) available for response. Attempt to determine

response capability gaps and seams that will require filling by DOD resources or capabilities,

i.e., equipment, material, or personnel.

(3) Federal Coordination. The CCDR and staff will coordinate through the DHS for

national incidents and DOS for incidents involving foreign nations. These contacts should be

verified with every training event.

(4) Communications. Determine if communication infrastructure is intact. If not, or

if it is overwhelmed, specialized communications equipment may be needed for connectivity

and interoperability with other agencies. This is particularly important in a nuclear incident with

resulting EMP. It should be anticipated that normal civilian communications means (i.e., landline, cell phone, internet) will be greatly affected and should not be considered as primary means

of communications during a catastrophic event.

(5) Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Technical Support. Consider the potential

for secondary devices designed to explode or release toxic material after emergency response

personnel have arrived. Ensure reachback is possible for weapon disposition or other technical

expertise.

(6) Occupational and Public Health. Identify a lead medical/health DOD agency /

liaison to provide support and recommendations regarding personnel and public health and

safety including cleanup levels and risk assessments. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),

CDC, and Occupational Safety and Health Administration may provide recommendations to the

DOD regarding health, safety, and cleanup levels.

(7) Evidentiary Requirements. Where exclusive Federal jurisdiction applies,

coordinate with the appropriate military legal advisor to determine evidence collection procedures

in case the incident is a criminal or terrorist act.

(8) Transition and Disengagement. Plan for the termination of military support.

This is a politically sensitive phase requiring detailed planning. DOD will typically disengage

from operations when the local authorities are capable of assuming the responsibilities for the

response operations. This is generally when the immediate danger from the CBRNE event is
IV-5

Planning Considerations

eliminated, the capabilities to save lives are in place, and critical services are restored. DOD will

generally not remain to conduct site recovery operations.

(9) Legal Requirements. In both national and foreign CBRNE CM, unique legal

requirements may exist. Legal review by the assigned judge advocate should occur as the event

unfolds to ensure compliance with any such requirements.

c. Conduct Logistics. Providing logistic support for CBRNE CM produces challenges

not encountered with other types of joint operations. There may be a high sense of urgency,

especially if the US has been attacked. The force is task-organized depending on the mission

and requires transportation, billeting, messing, and other life support services. The force may

deploy with significant assets and specialized equipment that will be determined by the mission,

situation, and the designated response force. The size of the force may range from a detachment

to a brigade sized unit. This is the most complicated DOD civil support response option. MultiService forces originate from diverse locations and converge at an aerial port of debarkation

(APOD)/BSI to be integrated under a common commander. The nature of this deployment

requires detailed planning and significant JRSOI support to receive, organize, and stage the

forces for follow-on operations. Plans should allow forces to rapidly deploy, conduct JRSOI

and successfully execute their mission immediately after a CBRNE incident has occurred. The

responsiveness of support forces will not only impact the success of the mission but also impact

the trust of the population affected by the CBRNE incident.

(1) Response Time. Time sensitivity for DOD response may vary depending upon

the severity and type of event and may determine the need for a particular mode of transportation.

Procedures for the development of time-phased force and deployment data and for the deployment,

sustainment, and redeployment of forces within the context of JOPES are found in the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122 series of manuals.

(2) Logistic support in domestic CBRNE CM is similar to logistic support for foreign

humanitarian assistance, with some unique considerations in medical support, mortuary affairs,

and populace displacement under CBRNE conditions.

For more information see JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance.

(3) Although logistic elements may precede other joint forces, it is very likely that

local and state government agencies, to include the NG, will have already responded to the

CBRNE incident as mandated by the NRP and local and state contingency plans. Therefore, as

part of their mission analysis, logistic planners should assess the capability and availability of

the local and state assets and local military installations.

For more information on general logistic planning and support, refer to JP 4-0, Doctrine for

Logistic Support of Joint Operations.
IV-6

Chapter IV

JP 3-41

(4) Deployment and Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and

Integration. CRBNE response units, with direction from the parent unit and Service, are

responsible for coordinating and executing predeployment activities, movement to and activities

at ports of embarkation, and arrival at ports of debarkation (PODs). The designated JTF, in

coordination with the designated BSI commander and JFO, will coordinate activities for JRSOI

activities. Depending on the situation, JRSOI of incoming Title 10 forces may not be tied to the

BSI or a designated installation. It may have to be conducted through an abbreviated method of

capturing personnel and equipment status without requiring the traditional deliberate JRSOI

model.

For other deployment and redeployment operations, see JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and

Redeployment Operations.

(5) Base Support Installation. A BSI is a military installation within the US, its

territories, or possessions controlled by any Service or agency, in or near an actual or projected

domestic emergency operational area, designated by the DOD to provide military support for

DOD and Federal agency disaster response operation efforts. See Appendix C, “Base Support

Installation Considerations,” for more information on BSI planning considerations.

(a) Resources provided by a designated BSI may include, but are not limited to:

marshalling and lay down areas, security forces, personnel and equipment reception/staging

areas and facilities, personnel support, billeting, transportation, material handling equipment,

maintenance, general supply and subsistence support, contracting support, communications

support, and medical services.

(b) Logistic planners should consider appropriate Service and RC installations as

potential BSIs that will facilitate JRSOI and sustainment of CBRNE CM capable units. Although

the Services, when directed by SecDef, will designate the appropriate BSI, locations for potential

BSI should be based on previous site surveys, assessments, and mission analysis. In a foreign

country, logistic planners can seek information from the combatant command country books,

the country team, and special operations forces, or other military units operating in the operational

area to determine BSI options and HN support.

(6) Transportation. Plan for critical transportation routes and infrastructure to be

disrupted by the incident itself or by secondary effects such as populace movement and emergency

response efforts. Identify primary and alternate transportation routes and staging areas. The

joint force headquarters staff coordinates through the DCO at the JFO with Department of

Transportation as the primary agency for ESF 1 regarding movement restriction and transportation

safety to determine accessibility and status of the road network, APOD, and sea ports of

debarkation (SPODs) within the operational area. The deployment of US forces supporting

CBRNE CM will be directed by EXORD.

(a) All transportation modes are considered to support the domestic CBRNE CM

response, including organic assets. The deployment of CBRNE CM unit personnel, supplies,

and equipment should be phased so as to not overwhelm throughput of PODs, road networks,
IV-7

Planning Considerations

and on-site reception and support capabilities. For those units that cannot deploy with organic

assets, US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) can provide deployment, employment,

and redeployment common-user air, land and sea transportation for forces engaged in domestic

CBRNE CM response operations. Due to the deleterious effect of aircraft contamination on

intertheater operations, operational commanders should consider all measures possible consistent

with mission priorities and operational risks to debark uncontaminated or decontaminated cargo,

equipment, and personnel at uncontaminated airfields.

For more information on air mobility operations in a CBRNE-contaminated environment, refer

to MCM 0026-02, Chemical Warfare (CW) Agent Exposure Planning Guidance.

(b) USTRANSCOM also provides aeromedical evacuation, air refueling, and

aerial port services to support CBRNE CM operations. However, in a contaminated environment,

USTRANSCOM may limit the transportation of contagious and contaminated casualties to no

more than 50 and treat patients in place. Logistic planners must be cognizant of the potential

issues pertaining to requirements for the staging, reuse, transportation of and/or disposition of

decontaminated or residually contaminated equipment used during the CBRNE CM response

effort. These issues could significantly slow the normal redeployment process. Planners must

also consider the impact of cleanliness policy initiatives involving the transport of contaminated

patients/cargo.

For more information on current cleanliness policy, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support, Air

Force Instruction (AFI) 41-307 (Attachment 12), Aeromedical Evacuation Patient Considerations,

and Standards of Care, and USTRANSCOM policy documents titled, Policy on Contaminated Human

Remains, and Chemical Warfare Agent Exposure Planning Guidance.

(7) Contracting Services. Critical contracting administration support is essential to

expedite the procurement of services and material in support of CBRNE CM operations.

Logisticians should be familiar with the services provided by the Defense Contract Management

Agency that support the CCDR. When contracting for supply, transportation, and services,

logisticians should consider existing contracts already supporting military installations and other

Federal agencies in the operational area and contracts available through the state’s United States

Property and Fiscal Office when applicable.

(8) Engineer Services. The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is the designated

ESF #3 coordinator and a primary agency as directed by the NRP. USACE can provide water,

ice, construction materials, and engineer services when activated under ESF#3 and ESF#6. If

ESF#3 or ESF#6 have not been activated, the JTF or DCO will request engineering capabilities

through the CCDR to the components.

(9) Mortuary Affairs. The joint forces may assist Federal agencies by providing

assistance in managing human remains, including victim identification and MA. The primary

responsibility for responding to MA issues rests with state and local authorities. A local or state

medical examiner official will normally have the responsibility for leading the MA response effort.

Other important state/local government stakeholders who may have significant operational
IV-8

Chapter IV

JP 3-41

involvement include; office of emergency management, department of public health, NG, state

law enforcement department of the environment, and the fire department/hazardous materials

units. There are several conditions that will shape the ability of the local and state officials to

respond to mass fatality operations. Some of these factors include; number of fatalities, quality/

state of remains, the agent or agents (contaminated vs. uncontaminated), location and size of

search and recovery area, conditions (weather, daylight, terrain), city/state/Federal resources

available, DOD resources available, and most importantly public expectations. Within the

construct of the civilian operation there are a number of different missions where joint forces

may be asked to provide civil support assistance in the area of MA. Expected missions are

advisory support, search and recovery, reception, remains storage, remains decontamination,

personal effects, photography, fingerprinting, forensic dentistry, forensic pathology, family

assistance, administration and logistic support, and remains disposition. For remains that cannot

be decontaminated, protecting the health of Service members and the public must take precedence

over rapid repatriation. Temporary interment of those contaminated remains that still pose a

threat to public health is the recommended method for disposition. A phased plan may be

required to assist civil authorities in augmenting medical examiners or coroners. See Figure IV1 for an example.

For more information on joint mortuary affairs operations, refer to JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in

Joint Operations.

(10) Resupply. Ensure that critical resupply items are identified and addressed (e.g.,

self-contained breathing apparatus refills and other CBRNE related consumables).

d. Health Services Support. Frequently, the most immediate needs for support to civil

authorities will be in the medical area. Providing initial essential stabilizing medical care and

forward resuscitative/surgical care are the two essential capabilities that will be required in the

first hours following the CBRNE event. DOD may also be required to support medical

augmentation to local hospitals, community health (vaccinations, disease investigation,

prophylaxis dispensing, preventive medicine and veterinary support), patient movement and

distribution/redistribution of patients, medical logistics distribution, and mental health, as well

as potentially providing direct medical treatment and patient decontamination. DOD must

coordinate health services support with the state health officer through the state’s office of

emergency preparedness.

(1) Health Facilities. Identify the capabilities of the local health facilities to treat and

house patients. Identify what special medical support DOD is expected to provide. If this

cannot be identified locally, information concerning the ability of local health facilities to treat

and house patients should be available from the state’s emergency preparedness office.

(2) At-Risk Population. Identify the demographics of the population at-risk (elderly,

young, pregnant, etc.).

(3) Medical. Augment the analysis of available information on epidemiological and

diagnostic patterns resulting from the incident to address preventive medicine requirements,
IV-9

Planning Considerations

Figure IV-1. Joint Task Force Mortuary Affairs Response Assistance Plan

HOT ZONE

MADCP

COLD ZONE

XXX

XXX

X X

WARM

ZONE

Joint task force mortuary affairs integrates into local, state, and

federal operations to assist and augment the Medical

Examiner/Coroner in the following: Search and recovery,

staging, storage and decontamination, transportation,

in-processing, DNA identification, and disposition.

1. –

Mortuary Affairs Teams in personal protective

equipment go into the contaminated zone

recovering remains/personal effects and

transport to temporary storage. There may

be areas still too contaminated to justify risk.

Search & Recovery

1. Search &

Recovery 2. Staging,

Storage, and

Decontamination

3. Transportation

and Clean Storage

4. In-Processing 5. DNA Lab

6.

Disposition

2. –

Remains are stored and brought to the

mortuary affairs decontamination control

point (MADCP) for decontamination,

evaluation and readied for transport to clean

storage.

Staging, Storage & Decontamination 5. –

The Armed Forces Medical Examiners Office

could assist in a limited number DNA

identification activities.

DNA Identification

3. –

Decontaminated remains could be moved to

long-term storage sites designated by the

Medical Examiner.

Transportation & Clean Storage 6. –

Department of Defense may be asked to

assist with disposition of remains.

Disposition

4. –

Personnel could be integrated into morgue

operations assisting with initial file creation,

fingerprinting, personal effects storage, DNA

sampling, general assistance, and

administrative support.

In-Processing

JOINT TASK FORCE MORTUARY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANCE PLAN
IV-10

Chapter IV

JP 3-41

laboratory services, and casualty evacuation and treatment conducted by local, state, and Federal

public health authorities. If foreign medical support is provided, ensure that operating procedures

are provided. Recognize that there are unique issues relating to military medical support to

include personnel and supplies.

(4) Populace Care. During a CBRNE catastrophic incident, large numbers of people

may be left temporarily or permanently homeless and may require prolonged temporary housing.

The JFC may be requested to support short term mass care in meeting basic human needs of

food, water, shelter, hygiene, and medical care. DOD may also be requested to provide cots and

tents or assist with construction of temporary shelters. Key to planning populace care is

determining the transition of responsibilities from DOD to civil authorities in the event that

temporary shelters and camps become more permanent.

e. Contain and Decontaminate. Tasks may include decontamination of civilian and

military personnel as well as civilian and military equipment. Additionally, decontamination of

contaminated remains is a viable mission. Local hospital decontamination tasks will also be

required. Contaminated waste disposal will be a key requirement, and important in the context

of interagency coordination. The EPA will play a significant role as the ESF coordinator and

primary agency responsible for hazardous waste. The USCG may also play a significant role as

a primary agency for hazardous materials as defined by the NRP and the National Contingency

Plan. A DOD medical/health representative with appropriate technical expertise serve as

coordinating element for health-based recommendations for health and safety and clean up

aspects related to military unique hazards (such as chemical warfare agents).

(1) Site Management

(a) Containment. Joint force CBRNE CM response elements provide the

capability to reduce or isolate an incident in order to mitigate or prevent further risk or damage

to persons, materiel, facilities, and the environment. Contamination-control measures include

leaving equipment in a potentially contaminated area until it is tested for contamination by

qualified personnel. Other measures could include encapsulating contaminated items by covering

the equipment with plastic bags or tarps.

(b) Detection/Identification. The CBRNE incident may require forces to detect

and identify the specific hazard(s). Forces may also be tasked to survey the contaminated area

to determine extent and level/degree of contamination. Survey elements will help ensure that

the incident site is treated as a crime scene by setting boundaries and cordoning the site. Hazard

areas may need to be marked and isolated to warn and protect the response personnel working in

the area. Setting boundaries facilitates strict control into and out of the incident site.

(c) Security. The joint force CBRNE CM commander normally will not be

authorized to provide or augment local or Federal law enforcement in conducting access control,

traffic control, or site security except on Federal installations and facilities. These public safety

responsibilities are law enforcement tasks that restrict freedom of movement of civilian population

and Posse Comitatus Act legal restrictions must be observed for Title 10 forces unless there has
IV-11

Planning Considerations

been a Presidential authorization. NG forces in state active duty or Title 32 status do not have

these limitations because they conduct operations under the control of the state governor.

See JP 3-26 Homeland Security, for further discussion on this topic.

(d) Zone Control. In a CBRNE CM role, joint forces may assist with verification

and management of containment boundaries set by civil authorities. Control zones are operational

areas established by civil authorities at an incident site within which only specific types of

operations are conducted. Personnel working in these areas must adhere to strict procedures to

ensure the safety of those working in the zones. Control zones are established to ensure the

safety of all responders and control access into and out of a contaminated area. The three zones

established at a CBRNE incident site are the hot zone, the warm zone, and the cold zone. See

Service publications for a complete discussion of zone control.

1. Hot Zone. The hot zone is an area immediately surrounding an incident,

which extends far enough to prevent adverse effects from the device/agent to personnel outside

the zone. The hot zone can also be referred to as the exclusion zone, red zone, or restricted zone

and is the primary area of contamination. The hot zone is the area that the incident commander

judges to be the most affected by the incident. This includes any area to which the contaminant

has spread or is likely to spread. Access is only permitted to personnel who are properly trained

and protected. The incident commander sets the perimeters of this zone after giving consideration

to the type of agent, the volume released, the means of dissemination, the prevailing meteorological

conditions, and the potential of local topographic characteristics to channel agent dispersal.

Priorities within the hot zone may include conducting search and rescue, performing mitigation,

and identifying CBRNE or other physical obstacles to the entry point. The hot zone is also the

location where contamination reduction begins. In the event of a biological attack, continued

surveillance of the population, animals, vectors, and the environment should be conducted to

mitigate the amplification or spread of the biological agent.

2. Warm Zone. The warm zone can also be referred to as the decontamination

zone, contamination-reduction zone, contamination-reduction corridor, yellow zone, or limited

access zone. It is the area immediately surrounding the hot zone, which could become

contaminated due to ongoing operations. The warm zone is the area between the hot and cold

zones where personnel and equipment decontamination and hot-zone support take place. It

includes control points for the access corridor and thus assists in reducing the spread of

contamination. It is an operational area safe from downwind exposure and includes the bulk of

the decontamination assets where survey-teams are positioned and equipment decontamination

is accomplished. Access control points connecting the warm zone to the hot and cold zones are

established. In the event of a biological attack, continued surveillance of the population, animals,

vectors and the environment should be conducted to ensure the yellow zone is free of

contamination.

3. Cold Zone. The cold zone can also be referred to as the support zone,

clear zone, or green zone. It is the area outside the warm zone where there is no contamination

present. The cold zone is the area where the incident command post and support functions that
IV-12

Chapter IV

JP 3-41

are necessary to control the incident are located. The same basic considerations that are used for

the hot and warm zones influence the extent of the cold zone. The cold zone must be readily

accessible and provide the means for safety and rest. It must also be large enough to accommodate

local, state, and Federal CBRNE response forces (if required) and to serve as the staging area for

personnel and equipment. The operational priorities of the cold zone include providing C2 for

operations being conducted in the warm and hot zones and ensuring that there is an area of

security for emergency personnel and response forces conducting operations.

(e) National defense area (NDA) or national security area (NSA) planning

considerations. The DOD response and activity within the boundaries of a NDA or NSA

established in the event of a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident is not considered

DSCA. However CBRNE CM planners must understand this relationship to response activities

that would occur in accordance with DODD 3150.8, DOD Response to Radiological Accidents,

and DOD 3150.8-M, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP), in order to plan

for DSCA if the effects were not contained within the NDA or NSA.

1. National Defense Area. An area established on non-Federal or non-DOD

Federal lands located within the US, its possessions, or territories for the purpose of safeguarding

classified defense information or protecting DOD equipment and/or material. Establishment of

an NDA temporarily places such lands under the effective control of DOD and results only from

an emergency event. The senior DOD representative at the scene will define the boundary, have

the boundary marked with a physical barrier, and have warning signs posted. The landowner’s

consent and cooperation will be obtained whenever possible; however, military necessity will

dictate the final decision regarding location, shape, and size of the NDA.

2. National Security Area. An area established on non-Federal or Federal

lands located within the US, its possessions, or territories, for safeguarding classified information,

and/or restricted data or equipment and material belonging to DOE or National Aeronautics and

Space Administration (NASA). Establishment of a NSA temporarily places such lands under

the effective control of DOE or NASA and results only from an emergency event. The senior

DOE or NASA representative having custody of the material at the scene shall define the boundary,

mark it with a physical barrier, and post warning signs. The landowner’s consent and cooperation

shall be obtained whenever possible.

3. Off-Site. That area beyond the boundaries of a DOD installation or DOE

facility, including the area beyond the boundary of an NDA or NSA, that has been, or may

become affected by a nuclear weapon accident or significant incident.

4. Off-site authority and responsibility at a nuclear weapon accident rests

with state and local officials. It is important to recognize that land placed temporarily under

Federal control by the establishment of NDA or NSA to protect USG material or classified

property and materials will revert to state control upon disestablishment of the NDA or NSA.

The state governor is responsible for the health, safety, and welfare of individuals within the

territorial limits of the state during periods of emergency or crisis. The on-scene commander
IV-13

Planning Considerations

will assist the state in ensuring that the public is protected. For foreign incidents, the HN retains

sovereignty over its soil and the responsibility for the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.

5. C2 on-site at the scene of a nuclear weapon accident rests with the agency

in charge of the facility or geographic area where the accident occurs. If the accident occurs

outside these boundaries, the Service or agency having custody of the weapon at the time of the

accident has C2. If the accident occurs outside the 48 contiguous states, but within US territories,

responsibility for directing the US response shall rest with the CCDR in whose AOR the accident

occurred. If the accident occurs outside the US or its territories, the CCDR will coordinate with

DOS, as appropriate. “On-site” is that area around a nuclear weapon accident under the OPCON

of the installation commander, facility manager, DOD, on-scene commander, DOE team leader

(at a DOE accident), or host government official. For accidents/incidents in the US, its territories

or possessions, on-site includes any area established as a NDA or NSA. When overseas, this

onsite secure area should be defined in the HN agreement and will be referred in this document

as a security area. This area, although not equivalent to the NDA or NSA, uses local authorities

to restrict people from the immediate area of the accident for their protection and the safeguarding

of weapon systems.

6. Civil authorities/officials have primary responsibility for C2 off-site and

will request Federal assistance and assets through DHS Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA). The state coordination officer (SCO) together with the senior FEMA official and the

DCO coordinate requests for Federal assistance to ensure that assistance is provided. If an

accident/incident involving nuclear weapons results in a Presidential declaration of a major

disaster or emergency, Public Law 93-288 (Stafford Act), states the President will appoint a

FCO to coordinate the overall Federal response. Policy and doctrine for DSCA would then

apply in providing the additional military support (off-site) to the FCO as required, subject to the

military missions and priorities of DOD.

(2) Movement. Consider requirements to decontaminate personnel, vehicles, and

equipment in support of evacuation, redeployment or any movement from a contaminated site.

The intent to retrograde residually contaminated equipment must be communicated through the

CJCS due to potential risks and political/environmental sensitivities.

(3) Disposal. Consider requirements to dispose of unsalvageable equipment and

vehicles.

(4) Monitoring. Consider requirements to monitor personnel, vehicles, and equipment

entering or exiting a contaminated zone.

f. Safety and Risk Assessment

(1) Safety. Safety must be emphasized during deployment for CBRNE CM operations

because they will be directed with little warning and lack of preparation time. Forces may move

immediately into employment with little rest and under extremely stressful conditions. Military

issue protective equipment may not protect against all CBRN hazards. JTF’s have historically
IV-14

Chapter IV

JP 3-41

relied on their components to run their individual Service safety programs because safety expertise

resides in the Services. Exposure guidelines, standards and instructions should be set by the

JFC. Tracking of exposure and force health protection compliance should be captured, analyzed,

and acted upon as a joint safety issue.

(2) Risk Assessment. The JFC should employ risk assessment and risk management

during CBRNE CM operations as a decision-making process used to mitigate risks associated

with all hazards that have the potential to injure or kill personnel, damage or destroy equipment,

or otherwise impact mission effectiveness. Risk assessment will help identify hazards and then

assess those hazards to determine risk. The effect, not the source, of the hazard is what’s important.

Assessment is usually a mechanical process of assessing the probability of the event or occurrence,

estimating the expected result or severity of an event or occurrence, and then determining specified

level of risk for a given probability and severity. Matrixes and tables are often used to assist in

this process.

(3) Risk Management. Risk management entails developing controls and making

risk decisions, implementing those controls, and then supervising and evaluating. Maintaining

safety discipline is extremely important during CBRNE CM operations. When personnel operate

in an area that is not considered a high threat area (such as within the US), there is the risk of

losing situational awareness and failing to remain vigilant. The heightened sense of urgency in

working to help parents, children and the elderly who have been attacked by a terrorist may

impact on decisions and cause Service members to want to take more personal risk. Other

examples of long-term hazards include climatic extremes, CBRN and hazardous waste

contamination, or disease threats within the particular operational area or indigenous population.

2. International Law, Agreements, and Planning Considerations for North

America

a. Security Cooperation. Security cooperation consists of a focused program of bilateral

and multilateral defense activities conducted with foreign countries to serve US security interests

and build defense partnerships. The SecDef identifies security cooperation goals, assesses the

effectiveness of security cooperation activities, and revises goals when required to enhance

effectiveness. Each GCC develops and implements a theater security cooperation (TSC) program

and a strategy outlining a concept and approach for planning, executing, and assessing a TSC

program. The strategy derives from the National Defense Strategy and the SecDef security

cooperation guidance, as well as command mission statements and command objectives. As

part of his or her command strategy, CDRUSNORTHCOM establishes partnerships with neighbor

nations to integrate capabilities to respond to and mitigate the consequences of disasters and

emergencies.

b. Canada – United States (CANUS) Agreements

(1) Implications. A number of CANUS agreements and plans exist that provide for

the military of one nation to provide support to the military of the other nation with respect to

assistance to civil authorities. These agreements cover binational planning efforts, the movement
IV-15

Planning Considerations

of forces, and other mutual support requirements. Key documents addressing this guidance are

contained in Appendix A, “Key Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield

Explosives Consequence Management Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents.”

(2) Special Considerations. As in the US domestic environment, the binational

environment has special considerations that must be addressed when planning for and executing

CBRNE CM operations.

(a) Sovereignty. Both governments exercise control of their sovereign territory

and command their national forces in accordance with national laws, policies, and directives

during CBRNE CM operations.

(b) Federal Coordination of Emergency Response. Depending upon the nature,

severity and location of the emergency, Canada’s Department of Public Safety and Emergency

Preparedness Canada and the US DHS may communicate to coordinate a binational emergency

response plan. Complementing these efforts, Foreign Affairs Canada, acting on behalf of the

Government of Canada, and the office of the US Secretary of State, acting on behalf of the USG,

will in conjunction with existing consular emergency contingency plans, coordinate a binational

response.

(c) Cross Border Movement of Land Forces. Approval by the respective

governments is required for a Canadian forces (CF) military element to cross into the US or vice

versa. Authority for land forces to cross the CANUS border comes from an agreement between

Canada and the US on principles and procedures for temporary cross-border movement of land

forces.

(d) Intelligence Collection. The employment of Canadian and US military

intelligence collection assets will be coordinated and conducted in accordance with the national

laws and military directives of both countries.

(e) Military in a Law Enforcement Role. National defence is a federal

competence in accordance with section 91 (7) of the Canadian Constitution. The power to take

action must be given by legislation, such as the provisions found in the National Defence Act

(Revised Statutes of Canada 1985, Chapter N-5).

(f) Immediate Response Authority. Per Standing Deputy Chief of the Defence

Staff guidance for the Conduct of Domestic Operations, CF commanders may take whatever

action they consider necessary and reasonable to respond immediately to requests for humanitarian

assistance within Canada to save lives and prevent human suffering.

(g) Guidance for the Use of Force. Rules of engagement for CF personnel

deployed in a civil assistance mission will be requested by the JTF commander and authorized

in accordance with B-GG-005-004/AF-005 dated 2001-06-01, Use of Force in CF Operations

(Revision 1). Every mission will require unique guidance to deployed forces. Forces providing
IV-16

Chapter IV

JP 3-41

binational military support who are deployed cross-border will comply with RUF, use of force, or rules

of engagement designated in respective national operation/execute orders.

c. Canada – United States Planning Efforts

(1) CANUS Joint Radiological Emergency Response Plan (JRERP). After the nuclear

accidents at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania in 1979 and at Chernobyl, Ukraine in 1986, Canada and

the US recognized the need for cooperation in development of a response plan for radiological events.

Consequently, the two countries developed a joint plan to deal effectively with a potential or actual

peacetime radiological event that could affect both countries or be of a magnitude that would require

assistance from the neighboring country. The CANUS JRERP is currently being rewritten to incorporate

the Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. The

CANUS JRERP, is designed to do the following:

(a) Alert the appropriate federal authorities within each country of the existence

of a threat from a potential or actual radiological event.

(b) Establish a framework of cooperative measures to reduce, to the extent possible,

the threat posed to public health, safety, property, and the environment.

(c) Facilitate coordination between the federal government in each country in

providing support to provinces and states affected by a potential or actual radiological event.

(2) CANUS Civil Assistance Plan. Under the auspices of the CANUS Agreement

for Enhanced Military Cooperation, a number of planning efforts to address combined defense

and civil assistance are underway. These include the Basic Security Document (formerly the

Basic Security Plan) and the Combined Defense Plan.

d. Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America. The SPP is a US

Presidential initiative with DOD equities. The SPP agreement, designed to reduce barriers on

trade and facilitate economic growth while improving the security of the continent, was signed

on 23 March 2005 by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Canada, and the

President of Mexico. DHS and the Homeland Security Council are the lead agencies for the

agreement’s security components, with DOD as a supporting agency. The SPP Action Plan

addresses goals and objectives associated with homeland security to include “Protection,

Prevention, and Response.” One of the goals of the agreement is to “develop and implement a

common approach to critical infrastructure protection, response to cross-border terrorist incidents,

and as applicable, natural disasters.” This includes a dual-binational (US/Canada and US/Mexico)

objective on emergency management cooperation to develop and implement joint plans for

cooperation in incident response, as well as conduct joint training and exercises in emergency

response. This includes the development of a plan to build and strengthen mechanisms, protocols,

and agreements for communicating and coordinating emergency response for mutual assistance

and cooperation in the event of natural and technological/industrial disasters or malicious acts

involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives devices and hazards.
APPENDIX A

KEY CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND

HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVES CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

LEGAL, STRATEGY, AND POLICY DOCUMENTS

A-1

1. Legal, National Strategy, and National Policy Guidance

a. The Constitution. The Preamble states that two purposes of the Constitution are to

insure domestic tranquility and provide for the common defense. Furthermore, Congress has

the power to declare war, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a Navy, and provide for

calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union to suppress insurrections and repel

invasions. The President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The Constitution

provides the fundamental justification for HD and CS through the guarantee of domestic tranquility

and provision for the common defense of the nation.

b. Key Executive and Legislative Guidance. The following documents are key references

when addressing the CS mission area, to include CBRNE CM:

(1) HSPD-1, Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council,

established the Homeland Security Council to ensure coordination of all HS-related activities

among the executive departments and agencies and promote the effective development and

implementation of all HS policies.

(2) HSPD-3, The Homeland Security Advisory System, provides the guidelines for a

comprehensive and effective means to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist

acts to Federal, state and local authorities and the American people. This document establishes

the five threat conditions and their respective protective measures.

(3) HSPD-4/NSPD-17, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,

describes three pillars for our national strategy to combat WMD: counterproliferation to combat

WMD use, strengthen nonproliferation activities to combat WMD proliferation, and consequence

management to respond to WMD use. Each pillar iterates specific actions to be pursued within

the pillar.

(4) HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, assigns the Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security as the principal Federal official for domestic incident

management to coordinate the Federal Government’s resources utilized in response to, or recovery

from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies. Additionally, HSPD-5 established

the NIMS to provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, state, and local governments

to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic

incidents.

(5) HSPD-8,National Preparedness, establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness

of the US to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters,

and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, establishing
A-2

Appendix A

JP 3-41

mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to state and local

governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, state, and

local entities. This directive is a companion to HSPD-5 which identifies steps for improved

coordination in response to incidents.

(6) HSPD-9, Defense of United States Agriculture and Food, establishes a national

policy to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and

other emergencies.

(7) HSPD-10, Biodefense for the 21st Century, outlines the essential pillars of our

biodefense program and provides specific directives to further strengthen the significant gains

put in place during the past three years. These pillars include threat awareness, prevention and

protection, surveillance and detection, and response and recovery, which include response

planning, mass casualty care, risk communication, medical countermeasures, and

decontamination.

(8) PDD-39, US Policy on Counterterrorism, validates and reaffirms existing Federal

lead agency responsibilities for counterterrorism, which are assigned to Department of Justice

(DOJ), as delegated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for threats or acts of terrorism

within the US. The FBI, as the lead or other primary agency for CrM will involve only those

Federal agencies required and designated. The Directive further states that DHS/FEMA, with

the support of all agencies in the NRP, will support the FBI until the Attorney General transfers

lead agency to DHS/FEMA. DHS/FEMA retains responsibility for CBRNE CM throughout the

response. HSPD-5 modified the lead agency relationship identified in PDD-39 by stating that

“the United States Government treats crisis management and consequence management as a

single, integrated function, rather than as two separate functions.” PDD-39 validates and reaffirms

existing federal lead agency responsibilities for counterterrorism, which are assigned to DOJ, as delegated

to the FBI, for threats or acts of terrorism within the United States. The FBI as the federal agency with

lead responsibility for CrM will involve only those federal agencies required and designated. The

directive further states that DHS/FEMA with the support of all agencies in the NRP, will support the FBI

until the Attorney General transfers lead agency to DHS/FEMA. DHS/FEMA retains responsibility for

CM throughout the response.

(9) PDD-62, Combating Terrorism, created a systematic approach to addressing the

terrorist threat by reinforcing the mission of those agencies charged with fighting terrorism. The

Directive codified agency activities for apprehension and prosecution of terrorists, increased

transportation security, enhanced response capabilities, and increased protection of computerbased systems that lie at the heart of the economy.

(10) The National Strategy for Homeland Security. Prepared for the President by

the Office of Homeland Security, this document lays out the strategic objectives, organization

and critical areas for HS. The strategy identifies critical areas that focus on preventing terrorist

attacks, reducing the nation’s vulnerabilities, minimizing the damage and recovering from attacks

that do occur.
A-3

Key Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives

Consequence Management Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents

(11) Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. Establishes strategic guidance

for securing the US from direct attack with an active, layered defense. Expands on the National

Defense Strategy by establishing a lead, support and enable construct in organizing DOD objectives.

Provides specific objective to support CBRNE CM for CBRNE mass casualty attacks.

(12) National Defense Strategy (NDS). NDS establishes and directs how to accomplish

broad strategic objectives. Provides homeland defense implementation guidelines.

(13) The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland

Security to coordinate all Federal HS activities to protect the Nation against threats to the homeland.

To better facilitate the overarching HS mission area, Congress established DHS by merging

numerous agencies into a single department.

(14) Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools

Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act. This act enhances

domestic security against terrorism. It eases some of the restrictions on foreign intelligence

gathering within the US and affords the US intelligence community greater access to information

discovered during a criminal investigation.

(15) The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, (42

USC 5121 et seq) provides for assistance by the Federal Government to the states in the event of

natural and other disasters and emergencies. It is the primary legal authority for Federal

participation in domestic disaster relief. Under the Stafford Act, the President may direct Federal

agencies, including DOD, to support disaster relief. DOD may be directed to provide assistance

in one of three different scenarios: a Presidential declaration of a major disaster, a Presidential

order to perform emergency work for the preservation of life and property, or a Presidential

declaration of emergency.

(16) The Economy Act (Title 31 USC 1535). The Economy Act authorizes Federal

agencies to provide goods or services on a reimbursable basis to other Federal agencies when

more specific statutory authority to do so does not exist.

(17) National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction states that NBC

weapons in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security

challenges facing the US and that we must pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this

threat in all of its dimensions. Three principal pillars are: counterproliferation to combat its use,

nonproliferation to combat proliferation, and consequence management to respond to its use.

(18) The National Military Strategy (NMS) to Combat Weapons of Mass

Destruction provides comprehensive, coherent guidance needed to execute US military WMDrelated nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence-management missions. It also

provides strategic guidance for supporting other departments and agencies as directed, at home

and abroad.
A-4

Appendix A

JP 3-41

(19) National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Expands on the National Strategy for

Homeland Security and the National Security Strategy by expounding on the need to destroy terrorist

organizations, win the war of ideas, and strengthen America’s security at home and abroad. While the

national strategy focuses on preventing terrorist attacks within the US, this strategy is more proactive

and focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they reach our borders. The direct and continuous

action against terrorist groups will disrupt, and over time, degrade and ultimately destroy their capability

to attack the US.

(20) The National Military Strategy for Combating Terrorism. This strategy outlines

the effort our nation is making to win the war against global terror. This document elaborates on the

terrorism aspects of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America by expounding on

the need to destroy terrorist organizations, win the “war of ideas,” and strengthen security at home and

abroad. Unlike the National Strategy for Homeland Security that focuses on preventing terrorist attacks

within the Unites States, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism focuses on identifying and

defusing threats before they reach the borders of the United States. In that sense, although it has

defensive elements, this strategy is an offensive strategy to complement the defensive National Strategy

for Homeland Security.

(21) Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18 USC, Section 1385). This Federal statute places

strict limits on the use of military personnel for law enforcement. Enacted in 1878, the PCA

generally prohibits the use of the US Army (and later, the US Air Force) for civilian law

enforcement duties, except as authorized by the US Constitution, or statute. Although the PCA,

by its terms, refers only to the Army and Air Force, DOD policy extends the prohibitions of the

Act to US Navy and Marine Corps forces, as well. Specifically prohibited activities include:

interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or similar activity; search and/or seizure; arrest,

apprehension, “stop-and-frisk” detentions, and similar activities; and use of military personnel

for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or

interrogators. DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, sets

forth several forms of military assistance to civilian authorities, which are allowed under the

PCA. Further, in extreme situations, such as in some CBRNE CM operations or upon declaration

under the Insurrection Statutes, there is statutory authorization for Federal forces to be used in

certain law enforcement activities. CJCSI concerning CBRNE events presumes this will not be

the case. However, this could change under the direction of proper authority if the circumstances

dictate.

(22) Title 10 USC (Armed Forces). Title 10 provides guidance on the US Armed

Forces. Guidance is divided into 5 subtitles. One on general military law and one each for the

US Army, US Navy and US Marine Corps, the US Air Force and the Reserve Components.

Chapter 18 (sections 371-382) of Title 10 is entitled and governs Military Support for Civilian

Law Enforcement Agencies. Title 10 USC 375 directs SecDef to promulgate regulations that

prohibit “direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a

search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such

member is otherwise authorized by law.”
A-5

Key Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives

Consequence Management Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents

(23) Title 14, USC, sections 2, 19, 89, 141, and 143 define the statutory authority of the

USCG during HS missions.

(24) Title 32 USC, National Guard. Specifically, statutes in Title 32 USC authorize the

use of Federal funds to train NG members while they remain under the C2 of their respective state

governors. In certain limited instances, specific statutory or Presidential authority allows for those forces

to perform operational missions funded by the Federal Government, while they remain under the control

of the governor. Examples of those exceptions include the employment of WMD-CSTs, civil defense

missions, and the President of the United States-directed airport security mission.

(25) The National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy

(NMS). The NSS establishes broad strategic guidance for advancing US interests in the global

environment through the instruments of national power. The NMS, derived from the NSS,

focuses on how the Armed Forces of the United States will be employed to accomplish national

strategic objective. The NSS and the NMS continue to reflect the first and fundamental

commitment to defend the Nation against its adversaries.

(26) 4 Mar 2003, Memorandum of Understanding Between the Intelligence

Community, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland

Security Concerning Information Sharing. This agreement provides a framework and guidance

to govern information sharing, use, and handling among the following individuals and their

agencies: Secretary of Homeland Security, Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General,

and any other organization having Federal law enforcement responsibilities (other than those

that are part of the DHS). The agreement mandates minimum requirements for information

sharing, use, and handling and for coordination and deconfliction of analytic judgments.

c. Key DOD Guidance. The following discussion identifies a number of key documents

to make commanders and planners more aware of material that may assist in the planning and

execution of the CS mission areas.

(1) Unified Command Plan (UCP). The UCP provides basic guidance to all unified

combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates

the general geographical AORs for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional

responsibilities for functional combatant commanders.

(2) Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG). The SPG provides direction for DOD

components to develop the Future Years Defense Program and the President’s budget submission.

The four defense policy goals are to assure, dissuade, deter, and decisively defeat. The goals are

articulated in a planning construct of deterring forward and winning decisively while defending

at home. The SPG additionally lists the priorities of SecDef: winning the Global War on Terrorism,

strengthening combined/joint warfighting capabilities, transforming the joint force, optimizing

intelligence capabilities, counterproliferation, improving force manning, developing and

implementing new concepts for global engagement, strengthening our ability to fulfill our

responsibilities in HS, streamlining DOD processes, and reorganizing DOD and the USG to

deal with prewar opportunities and postwar responsibilities.
A-6

Appendix A

JP 3-41

(3) Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). The CPG reflects SecDef’s written policy

guidance to the CJCS for contingency planning. It is issued with the approval of the President after

consultation with the CJCS, provides the focus for the guidance in the NSS and SPG, and is the

principal source document for CJCSI 3110.01, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

(4) The National Military Strategy of the United States of America. The strategy

states “consequence management capabilities are essential in the aftermath of an attack, especially an

attack with WMD.”

(5) The National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The strategy qualifies WMD CM as “those actions taken to reduce the effects of a WMD attack

or event, including TIC and TIM, and assist in the restoration of essential operations and services at

home and abroad.”

(6) DODI 2000.21, Foreign Consequence Management. This document establishes

policy and assigns responsibility for DOD support to USG FCM operations in response to a

foreign chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive incident.

(7) DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism Program. This directive updates policies

and assigns responsibilities for implementing the procedures for the DOD antiterrorism (AT)

program. It establishes CJCS as the principal advisor and focal point responsible to SecDef for

DOD AT issues. It also defines the AT responsibilities of the Military Departments, commanders

of combatant commands, defense agencies, and DOD field activities. Its guidelines are applicable

for the physical security of all DOD activities both overseas and in the homeland.

(8) DOD O-2000.12-P, Department of Defense Antiterrorism Strategic Plan. This

plan guides the DOD’s AT program efforts by articulating strategic goals, objectives, and a

proposed strategy for achievement. This plan serves as strategic guidance for all DOD component

AT programs.

(9) DODD 2000.15, Support to Special Events. DODD 2000.15 provides definitions

for a special event and support and outlines policy guidelines and responsibilities for DOD

support of special events. It allows for the DOD component to designate a special events

coordinator who is charged with providing timely information and technical support to the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

(10) DODD 2060.2, Department of Defense (DOD) Combating WMD Policy. This

directive identifies WMD Consequence Management as one of eight mission area that guide

DOD efforts to combat WMD.

(11) The DODD 3025 series of directives, instructions and manuals provide policy

on and responsibilities for CS activities. As a result of the terrorist attack on September 11,

2001, the Federal government changed how it supports state, local and tribal authorities in

responding to incidents and events. In conjunction with the changes to the Federal response

DOD modified how it supports the Federal response. The new DOD policies and procedures are
A-7

Key Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives

Consequence Management Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents

found in the DODD 3025, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, which establishes DOD policy and

assigns responsibilities for providing DSCA, DODI 3025, Processing Requests for Defense Support

of Civil Authorities, which establishes DOD procedures for the internal DOD processing of requests

for DSCA and DOD Manual 3025, Manual for Defense Support of Civil Authorities, which establishes

a single comprehensive system and terminology for DOD to plan for, and respond to, approved requests

from civil authorities. The Manual prescribes procedures, and provides guidance by which the DOD

provides support in response to a valid request from civil authorities or other authorized requesting

agency to prepare, prevent, protect, respond and recover from domestic incidents including terrorist

attacks, major disasters, and domestic special events.

(12) DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities. DODD 3025.1 provides

guidance on CS activities for disaster-related civil emergencies. The lead or other primary

agency may request DOD assistance for CS missions. All requests for DOD assistance enter

through the Executive Secretary. When imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil

emergency or attack may require immediate action, local military commanders and responsible

officials of the DOD components may take such actions as may be necessary to save lives,

prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage.

(13) DODD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances. DODD 3025.12

provides guidance on CS activities for civil disturbances and civil disturbance operations, including

response to terrorist incidents, and covers the policy and procedures whereby the President is

authorized by the Constitution and laws of the US to employ the Armed Forces to suppress

insurrections, rebellions, and domestic violence under various conditions and circumstances.

Planning and preparedness by the Federal Government and the DOD for civil disturbances are

important due to the potential severity of the consequences of such events for the Nation and the

population.

(14) DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA). This directive

governs all DOD MACA, including support in connection with incidents involving an act or

threat of terrorism. The employment of US military forces in response to acts or threats of

domestic terrorism must be requested by the Attorney General and authorized by the President.

(15) DODD 3150.8, DOD Response to Radiological Accidents. This directive

promulgates DOD policy and planning guidance to implement the FEMA Federal Radiological

Emergency Response Plan, which has been superseded by the NRP.

(16) DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and

Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense. This directive establishes the

Defense Investigative Program general policy, limitations, procedures, and operational guidance pertaining

to the collecting, processing, storing, and disseminating of information concerning persons and organizations

not affiliated with the Department of Defense.

(17) DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.

This directive assigns responsibilities and provides policy and procedures to be followed with

respect to support provided to Federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts.
A-8

Appendix A

JP 3-41

(18) DODI 2000.18, Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines. This

instruction implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures to establish

and implement a program for a worldwide DOD installation emergency response to manage the

consequences of a CBRNE incident. It provides guidance for the establishment of a CBRNE

preparedness program for emergency responders at all DOD installations. DOD installation

emergency responders must be prepared to respond to the effects of a CBRNE incident to preserve

life, prevent human suffering, mitigate the incident and protect critical assets and infrastructure.

(19) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Concept Plan 0500, Military Assistance

to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosives Situation. This plan provides SecDef with

a wide range of military options to assist in the domestic CBRNE CM operations in response to

a CBRNE incident. It also informs GCCs of the full range of their CBRNE CM responsibilities

and it provides information and guidance for the conduct of domestic CBRNE CM operations.

(20) CJCSI 3110.16, Military Capabilities, Assets, and Units for Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Operations.

This instruction identifies and describes specific military capabilities, assets, and units potentially

available to support military CBRNE CM operations in response to CBRNE incidents. Although

an actual CBRNE incident would involve a large array of DOD assets, this instruction primarily

focuses on CBRNE CM technical support and capabilities that are not generally found throughout

the force. This instruction lists selected CBRNE-CM capabilities, assets, and units by Service.

(21) CJCSI 3121.01B Standing Rules of Engagement/Rules for the Use of Force

for US Forces. This instruction provides the standing rules for the use of force to be employed

by US forces performing DSCA missions.

(22) CJCSI 3125.01B, Defense Support of Civil Authorities to Domestic

Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosives Incidents. This instruction provides operational and policy

guidance and instructions for US military forces supporting domestic CBRNE CM operations

in preparation for responding to a CBRNE situation. This instruction only applies to domestic

CBRNE CM operations. This instruction is of specific importance to the geographic combatant

commands with domestic CBRNE responsibilities. It identifies that domestic CBRNE CM

support encompasses both deliberate and inadvertent CBRNE situations including terrorism,

acts of aggression, industrial accidents, and acts of nature. It recognizes that domestic CBRNE

CM may be conducted by US military forces under immediate response authority and in support

of the designated LFA. This CJCSI establishes the charter for CJCS CONPLAN 0500, describing

operational and policy guidance to facilitate a rapid DOD response for a potential or actual

domestic CBRNE CM situation and provides information to the Federal departments and agencies,

DOD, and CJCS operational and policy guidance to the combatant commanders and Services concerning

DOD support to the LFA during a domestic CBRNE CM situation.
A-9

Key Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives

Consequence Management Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents

(23) CJCSI 3214.01A, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management

Operations. This instruction provides guidance for US military forces supporting USG-led

FCM operations in response to a CBRNE situation.

(24) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Concept Plan 8099, Combating Weapons

of Mass Destruction. This plan provides the SecDef with a strategic planning framework for

global combating weapons of mass destruction campaign. Links strategy to tasks.

2. Key International Legal Documents

a. Canadian Legislation

(1) Emergencies Act (Revised Statutes of Canada: 1985 c.22 4th Supplement).

The Emergencies Act is contingency legislation that is invoked when specific emergency

conditions are met. Following a catastrophic event and a Province request for federal assistance,

the Canadian Federal Government may declare a public welfare emergency under the Emergencies

Act. For the purposes of the Act, a national emergency is an urgent and critical situation of a

temporary nature that seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such

proportions or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to deal with it, or

seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve the sovereignty, security

and territorial integrity of Canada and that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law

of Canada.

(2) Emergency Preparedness Act (Revised Statutes of Canada: 1985 c.6 4th

Supplement). The Emergency Preparedness Act is federal legislation that establishes emergency

preparedness as a required activity of the federal government; charges all Ministers of the Crown

with the identification of potential emergencies within their departments; and requires all Ministers

to develop and test appropriate emergency plans.

b. CANUS Agreements

(1) Canada-United States Integrated Lines of Communication (ILOC) Agreement.

The CANUS ILOC agreement facilitates cooperation in training and operations and provides for reciprocal

logistical support, supplies and/or services in nonroutine situations.

(2) Canada-US Agreement for Enhanced Military Cooperation. Under this agreement,

both countries work together on contingency plans for defending against, and responding to possible

threats in Canada and the US including natural disasters and potential terrorist attacks.

(3) Temporary Cross-Border Movement of Land Forces Between the United States

and Canada Agreement. This Agreement provides principles and procedures for temporary crossborder movement of land forces between the two nations.

(4) Canadian-United States Regional Emergency Management Agreements.

Emergency management officials in Canada and the US have regional, mutual assistance agreements to
A-10

Appendix A

JP 3-41

manage emergencies or disasters when the affected jurisdiction(s) requests assistance in response to

natural disasters, technological hazards, manmade disasters, and civil emergencies. These agreements

are compliant with the Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government

of Canada on Cooperation in Comprehensive Emergency Planning and Management.

These agreements promote unity of effort with civil authorities in planning and executing military support

to civil authorities. Three regional agreements implement regional emergency management mutual

assistance covering specific states and provinces:

(a) Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Agreement.

(b) Prairie Region Emergency Management Assistance Compact.

(c) International Emergency Management Assistance Memorandum of

Understanding.

(5) JRERP. The CANUS JRERP establishes the basis for cooperative measures to deal

effectively with a potential or actual peacetime radiological event involving Canada, the United States, or

both countries. The JRERP will apply whenever a potential or actual radiological event occurs that can

affect both countries or, although affecting one country, is of a magnitude that the affected country may

need to request assistance from the other. The JRERP is designed to:

(a) Alert the appropriate federal authorities within each country of the existence

of a threat from a potential or actual radiological event.

(b) Establish a framework of cooperative measures to reduce, to the extent possible,

the threat posed to public health and safety, property, and the environment.

(c) Facilitate coordination between organizations of the federal government of

each country in providing support to states and provinces affected by a potential or actual

radiological event.

(6) Inland Pollution Contingency Plan. June 1998. The US Environmental Protection

Agency and Environment Canada recognize that there is a high probability that there will be a

spill or other release of oil or hazardous materials along the common border between Canada

and the US. The CANUS Joint Inland Pollution Contingency Plan provides for cooperative

measures for dealing with accidental and unauthorized releases of pollutants that cause or may

cause damage to the environment along the shared inland boundary and that may constitute a

threat to the public health, property, or welfare. The Inland Plan is made up of five regional Annexes or

regional plans.

c. Military Agreements

(1) Combined Defense Plan (Draft). The Combined Defense Plan is an authoritative

document that facilitates the military defense of the CANUS Region across multiple domains by
A-11

Key Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives

Consequence Management Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents

Canada and the US to defeat threats and aggression. The goal of the Combined Defense Plan is to

speed the Decision-to-Action time.

(2) Quadripartite Standardization Agreements (QSTAG). The Armies of the United

Kingdom, Australia, and the Canadian Forces have agreed to adopt standard operational concepts

in various QSTAG agreements. The armies further agreed to consult and wherever possible,

reach mutual agreement, before introducing changes to these agreements.

(3) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Agreements

(STANAGs). STANAGs are promulgated by the Director NATO Standardization Agency. No

departure may be made from these agreements without informing the tasking authority in the

form of a reservation at the time of ratification. Ratifying nations have agreed that national

orders, manuals and instructions implementing these STANAGs will be developed. The aim of

these agreements is to provide guidelines to commanders about operational issues. Participating

nations agree that NATO armed forces will adopt the standards outlined in each agreement.

d. Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America. The SPP agreement, designed

to reduce barriers to trade and facilitate economic growth while improving the security of the

continent, was signed on 23 March 2005 by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister

of Canada, and the President of Mexico. DHS and the Homeland Security Council are the lead

agencies for the agreement’s security components, with DOD as a supporting agency. The SPP

Action Plan addresses goals and objectives associated with homeland security to include

“Protection, Prevention, and Response.” This includes a dual-binational (US/Canada and US/

Mexico) objective on emergency management cooperation to develop and implement joint plans

for cooperation in incident response, as well as conduct joint training and exercises in emergency

response. This includes the development of a plan to build and strengthen mechanisms, protocols,

and agreements for communicating and coordinating emergency response for mutual assistance

and cooperation in the event of natural and technological/industrial disasters or malicious acts

involving CBRNE devices and hazards.
A-12

Appendix A

JP 3-41

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX B

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

B-1

1. General

The role and responsibilities of DOD in a CBRNE CM incident are identified in the NRP ESF and

incident annexes. This appendix aligns those identified DOD responsibilities associated with tasks from

CJCSM 3500.04D, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and to the Department of Homeland Security’s

Universal Task List. While ESFs contained within the NRP are written for a domestic incident, these

responsibilities are applicable and adaptable to foreign responses. Refer to DTRA’s Nuclear Accident

Response Capability Listing and Center for Special Weapons Effects, NBC Threats, Technology

Transfers and Resources unclassified web site or classified web site for further information.

Access on the unclassified network can be requested through the DTRA Operations Center or

opscntr1@dtra.mil.
B-2

Appendix B

JP 3-41

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

Emergency Support Functions (ESF) #1 - Transportation (Department of Transportation)

Department of

Defense (DOD)

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

Provide staffing to

National Response

Coordination Center

(NRCC) and regional

response

coordination center

(RRCC)

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM/

USAF/

UST OCSNAR /M

DLA

SN 8.2 - Provide DOD/

Government-wide support

SN 8.3 Coordinate Military

Activities Within the Interagency

Process

SN 9.2.2 Coordinate

Consequence Management

SN 9.2.3 Provide

Nonproliferation Support

OP 7.4 Coordinate CM in JOA

NS 2.2 - Develop plans,

procedures, and protocols

describing how personnel,

equipment, and other

governmental and

nongovernemental resources will

support incident management

requirements

NS 4.2 - Activate Incident

Command System

NS 4.5 - Provide for Liaison

Support

NS 5.1 - Coordinate and provide

transportation support

NS 5.6 - Provide logistics

management (resource) support

Assist in restoring

transportation

infrastructure

U e SACE SN 8.2 - Provid

DOD/Government-wide support

SN 8.3 Coordinate Military

Activities Within the Interagency

Process

SN 9.2.2 Coordinate

Consequence Management

NS 2.1 Provide for protection of

national infrastructure

NS 2.2 - Develop plans,

procedures, and protocols

describing how personnel,

equipment, and other

governemental and

nongovernmental resources will

support incident management

requirements

NS 5.1 - Coordinate and provide

transportation support

NS 5.3 - Provide engineering

and other support for structures,

public works and infrastructure

systems

Provide military

transportation

capacity

U n STRANSCOM SN 1.1 - Determine Transportatio

Infrastructure and Resources

SN 1.2 - Conduct Deployment

and Redeployment

SN 6.6 - Mobilize CONUS

Sustaining Base

SN 8.2 - Provide DOD/

Government-wide support

SN 9.2 - Deter by Denial

OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence

Management in JOA

NS 5.1 - Coordinate and provide

transportation support

NS 5.6 - Provide logistics

management (resource) support
B-3

Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #1 - Transportation (Department of Transportation) (cont'd)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

Assist in contracting

civilian airlift

USTRANSCOM/

DCMA

SN 1.1 - Determine Transportation

Infrastructure and Resources

SN 1.2 - Conduct Deployment

and Redeployment

SN 6.6 - Mobilize CONUS

Sustaining Base

SN 8.2 - Provide DOD/

Government-wide support

SN 9.2 - Deter by Denial

OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence

Management in JOA

NS 5.1 - Coordinate and provide

transportation support

NS 5.6 - Provide logistics

management (resource) support

Provide support in

emergency operation

and restoration of

inland waterways,

ports, and harbors,

including dredging

operations

U / SACE SN 8.2 - Provide DOD

Government-wide support

SN 8.3 Coordinate Military

Activities Within the Interagency

Process

SN 9.2.2 Coordinate

Consequence Management

NS 2.1 Provide for protection of

national infrastructure

NS 2.2 - Develop plans,

procedures, and protocols

describing how personnel,

equipment, and other

governmental and

nongovernemental resources will

support incident management

requirements

NS 4.2 - Activate Incident

Command System

NS 5.1 - Coordinate and provide

transportation support

NS 5.3 - Provide engineering

and other support for structures,

public works and infrastructure

systems
B-4

Appendix B

JP 3-41

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #2 - Communications (Department of Homeland Security)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

No DOD specific

tasking in Aug 04

draft ESF annex

D d IA SN 2.5 - Disseminate an

integrate national strategic

intelligence

SN 3.5 - Provide space

capabilities

SN 5.1 - Operate and manage

global strategic communications

and information systems

SN 8.1 - Support other nations or

groups

SN 8.2 - Provide DOD/

government-wide support

SN 9.2 - Deter by denial

NS 1.5 - Disseminate timely and

accurate national strategic and

threat intelligence consistent with

security clearances as

appropriate

NS 2.1 - Provide for the

protection of national

infrastructure

NS 4.1 - Develop plans,

procedures and policies for

coordinating, managing and

disseminating public information

NS 4.4 Alert appropriate

national-level organizations of

incidents of national significance

NS 5.2 - Provide

telecommunication and

information technology support to

Federal, State, territorial, local,

and tribal officials and private

sector

NS 7 - Provide national

communications and information

management support

USNORTHCOM/

USACE/

USPACOM

SN 3.6 Conduct Survivable

Mobile Command Center

(SMCC) Operations and

Planning Functions (See: SN

3.6.4, SN 3.6.5, SN 3.6.6)

OP 4.7.2 Conduct Civil Military

Operations in the Operations

Joint Area

OP 7.4 Coordinate

Consequence Management in

JOA

PCS 4.2 Activate regional and

State incident command system

(See: PCS 4.2.1; PCS 4.2.2;

PCS 4.2.5; PCS 4.2.6; PCS

4.2.10)

PCS 4.3 Provide State and

regional direction, information,

and support as appropriate to

incident command (IC) or unified

command (UC) (See PCS 4.3.1;

PCS 4.3.2)
B-5

Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #3 - Public Works and Engineering (USACE)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

No DOD specific

tasking in Aug 04

draft ESF annex

U e SACE * OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequenc

Management in JOA

SN 5.7 Manage DOD Resource

SN 8.1.4 Support Military Civic

Action

IM 3 - Manage/direct Public

works and engineering

IPR 3 - Conduct building

department, public works and

engineering

NOTE: The USACE is the primary agency for providing technical assistance, engineering, construction

management resources and support during response activities.

*USACE is acting in its civil sector role(s) under public law and not under DOD funding. USACE authority is

derived from the Flood Control and Coastal Emergency Act (P.L. 84-99) and the Stafford Disaster and

Emergency Assistance Act (P.L.93-288).

ESF #4 - Firefighting (USDA/USFS)

Assume full

responsibility for

firefighting activities

on DOD installations

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

ST 8.2.3 Coordinate Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance

IM 4 - Coordinate Firefighting

Operations

IPR 4 - Conduct Firefighting

NS 5.4 Provide firefighting

support for incident of national

significance

PCS 5.5 Coordinate firefighting

support for response of national,

regional or State significance

Support firefighting

operations on nonmiliary lands

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence

Management in JOA

Provide contracting

services through

USACE to obtain

heavy equipment

and/or demolition

services for urban

and rural firefighting

forces.

DCMA/

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM/

USACE

SN 8.1.4 Support Military Civic

Action

NS 5.3 Provide engineering and

other support for structures,

public works and infrastructure

systems (See NS 5.3.4, NS

5.3.5, NS 5.3.12)

NS 6.5 Build Critical Infrastructure

Protection Requirements in

Contract Processes and

Procedures

PCS 5.4 Coordinate Building

Department, Public Works and

Engineering Support for Response

of National, Regional and State

Significance (See PCS 5.4.9,

PCS 5.4.13, PCS 5.4.14)

PCS 5.5 Coordinate Firefighter

Support for Response of

National, Regional and State

Significance

IM 4.4 Identify Fire Suppression

Resources (See IM 4.4.4)

IM 7.2 Provide Logistics

Management (See IM 7.2.4.4)
B-6

Appendix B

JP 3-41

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #5 - Emergency Management (DHS/FEMA)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

Identify staff liaisons,

POCs, SMEs

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

SN 8.2.4 Assist Civil Defense

SN 8.3 Coordinate Military

Activities within the Interagency

Process (See SN 8.3.3)

SN 9.2.2 Coordinate

Consequence Management

ST 4.2 Coordinate Support for

Forces in Theater (See ST

4.2.2.2, ST 4.2.5)

ST 5.4 Provide Strategic

Direction to Theater Forces

(See ST 5.4.3.1, ST 5.4.3.3)

ST 8.2 Provide Support to

Allies, Regional Governments,

International Organizations or

Groups (See ST 8.2.2, ST 8.2.3)

ST 8.5 Coordinate and Integrate

Regional Interagency Activities

(See ST 8.5.1, ST 8.5.3)

ST 9.5 Coordinate CM in

Theater

OP 4.7 Provide Politico-Military

Support to Other Nations,

Groups, and Government

Agencies (See OP 4.7.2, OP

4.7.5, OP 4.7.6)

NS 4.5 Provide for Liaison

Support

PCS 4.5 Provide for Regional

and State Liaison Support

OP 7.4 Coordinate CM in JOA

OP 5.5 Establish, Organize, and

Operate a JF HQ (See OP

5.5.2, OP 5.7.4)

ESF #6- Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services (DHS/FEMA)

Provide ice and

water

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

ST 4.2.1 Integrate Supply and

Services

ST 8.2.3 Coordinate Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance

IPR 6.4 Provide Emergency

Food, Water, Clothing
B-7

Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #6- Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services (DHS/FEMA) (cont'd)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

Provide assistance in

mass care shelter

site inspections

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

SN 8.2 Provide DOD/

Government-Wide Support (See

SN 8.2.2, SN 8.2.4)

ST 8.4 Provide Theater Support

to Other DOD and Government

Agencies

OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence

Management in JOA

IM 6 Coordinate Mass Care,

Housing, and Human Services

IPR 6 Provide Mass Care,

Housing, and Human Services

NS 5.5 Provide Mass Care,

Housing, Human Services

Support and security (See NS

5.5.3)

PCS 5.7 Coordinate Mass Care,

Housing, Shelter, and Human

Services Support for Response

of National, Regional and State

Significance (See 5.7.2)

Provide temporary

housing support

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

OP 1.5.5 Assist HN in Populace

and Resource Control

IM 6 Coordinate Mass Care,

Housing, and Human Services

IPR 6 Provide Mass Care,

Housing, and Human Services

NS 5.5 Provide Mass Care,

Housing, Human Services

Support and security (See NS

5.5.3)

PCS 5.7 Coordinate Mass Care,

Housing, Shelter, and Human

Services Support for Response

of National, Regional and State

Significance (See 5.7.2)

ESF #7 - Resource Support (GSA)

No DOD specific

tasking in Aug 04

draft ESF annex

DLA/

USPACOM/

USNORTHCOM

OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence

Management in JOA

SN 5.7 Manage DOD Resources

IM 7 Coordinate Resource

Support

IPR 7 Provide Resource Support

NS 6 Manage National

Resources
B-8

Appendix B

JP 3-41

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #8 - Public Health and Medical Services (HHS)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

Alerts DOD NDMS

Federal Coordinating

Centers (FCC) and

provides

reporting/regulating

instructions to

support incident relief

efforts.

J e CS SN 5.4.4 Prepare and Issu

Presidential and/or Secretary of

Defense/CJSC Orders

SN 9.2.2 Coordinate

Consequence Management

NS 4.4 Alert Appropriate

National-Level Organizations of

Incident of National Signficance

PCS 4.4 Alert Appropriate

National-Level Organizations of

Incident of National and regional

and State Significance

PCS 5.9 Provide public Health

and Medical Services Support

including mental health services

(See PCS 5.9.2)

IM 5.4 Coordinate Jurisdictional

Emergency Management

Operations

Alerts DOD NDMS

FCCs to activate

NDMS patient

reception plans

J e CS SN 5.4.4 Prepare and Issu

Presidential and/or Secretary of

Defense/CJSC Orders

SN 9.2.2 Coordinate

Consequence Management

Provide support for

the evacuation of

seriously ill or injured.

Evacuates and

manages

victims/patients from

incident sites to

NDMS patient

reception areas

USTRANSCOM/

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

SN 1.2.8 Provide Global Patient

Movement and Evacuation

SN 4.3.3 CoordinateDefensewide

Health Services

SN 9.2.1 Coordinate CBRNE

Protection for Strategic Forces

and Means

ST 4.2.2 Coordinate Health

Service Support

OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence

Management in JOA

NS 5.1 Coordinate and Provide

Transportation Support (See NS

5.1.5)

NS 5.7 Provide public Health,

mental health and Medical

Services Support (See NS

5.7.6)

PCS 5.2 Coordinate and

Provide Regional and State

Transportation Support (See

PCS 5.2.7, PCS 5.2.7.1, PCS

5.9.10)

IM 1.1 Develop Transportation

infrastructure incident Response

Plan (See IM 1.1.3)

IM 10.3 Coordinate and Direct

Response to Oil and Hazardous

Material Incidents (See IM

10.3.4)

IPR 1.1 Activate Approved

Traffic Control Plan (See IPR

1.1.1, IPR 1.1.5)

IPR 10.3 Respond to Oil and

Hazardous Material Incidents

(See IPR 10.3.4)
B-9

Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #8 - Public Health and Medical Services (HHS) (cont'd)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

Provide logistical

support

U h SNORTHCOM ST 4.2.2 Coordinate Healt

Service Support

OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence

Management in JOA

NS 5.6 Provide Logistics

Management (Resource)

Support

NS 5.10 Provide Food and

Agricultural Support (See NS

5.10.1.5)

IM 7.2 Provide Logistics

Management

IPR 7.1 Provide Logisitics

Support

Provide medical

personnel for casualty

clearing/staging

USTRANSCOM/

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

SN 1.2.8 Provide Global Patient

Movement and Evacuation

SN 4.3.3 Coordinate

Defensewide Health Services

SN 9.2.1 Coordinate CBRNE

Protection for Strategic Forces

and Means

ST 7.1.4 Determine and Validate

Forces and Cargo to be

Deployed or Redeployed

OP 4.4.3.2 Manage Flow of

Casualties in the Joint

Operations Area

IPR 8.1 Conduct situation

assessment and Implement

Casualty Management Plan (See

IPR 8.1.5)

Provide medical

personnel for other

missions including

aeromedical

evacuation and

medical treatment

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

ST 7.1.4 Determine and Validate

Forces and Cargo to be Deployed

or Redeployed

OP 7.4 Coordinate CM in JOA

IPR 8.1 Conduct situation

assessment and Implement

Casualty Management Plan (See

IPR 8.1.5)

Mobilize and deploy

Reserve and NG

medical units

J S CS SN 6.6 Mobilize CONU

Sustaining Base

NA
B-10

Appendix B

JP 3-41

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #8 - Public Health and Medical Services (HHS) (cont'd)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

Coordinates patient

reception, tracking,

and management to

nearby NDMS nonFederal, VA, and

DOD medical

treatment.

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM/

USTRANSCOM

SN 6.6.4 Expand Health Service

Support

ST 9.6 Integrate Theater ISR

with the CBRNE Weapons

Situation

ST 4.2.2 Coordinate Health

Service Support

ST 4.2.2.2 Coordinate Patient

Evacuation from Theater

OP 5.1.4 Maintain Operational

Information and Force Status

OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence

Management in JOA

OP 4.4.3 Provide for Health

Services in the Joint Operations

Area

NS 5.7 Provide public Health,

mental health and Medical

Services Support (See NS

5.7.6)

PCS 5.9 Coordinate public

Health and Medical Service

Support including mental health

services (See PCS 5.9.10)

IM 8.1 Conduct situation

assessment and establish

Hospital Emergency Incident

Command System (HEICS) as

the means to provide direction

(See IM 8.1.3.2, IM 8.1.4)

IPR 1.2 Provide Transportation/

Personnel Support and

Resources (See IPR 1.2.1)

IPR 8.1 Conduct situation

assessment and Implement

Casualty Management Plan

Provides medical

personnel to assist

HHS in public health

protection activities

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

ST 4.2.3 Coordinate Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance

ST 8.2.4 Coordinate

Humanitarian and Civic

Assistance Programs

OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence

Management in JOA

NS 5.7 Provide public Health,

mental health and Medical

Services Support (See NS 5.7.9

NS 5.7.14)

PCS 3.5 Coordinate Public

Health Surveillance and Testing

Processes, Immunizations, and

Isolation Or Quarantine for

Biological Threats

PCS 5.9 Provide public Health

and Medical Service Support,

including mental health (See

PCS 5.9.5, PCS 5.9.8)

IM 8.1 Conduct situation

assessment and establish

hospital emergency incident

command system (HEICS) as

the means to provide direction

IM 8.2 Develop Public Health

and recovery worker

Management Guidelines

IPR 8.8 Provide for Worker

Health and Safety
B-11

Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #8 - Public Health and Medical Services (HHS) (cont'd)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

Provides DODreimburseable

medical supplies for

distribution to mass

care and medical

care facilities

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM/

DLA

SN 9.2.2 Coordinate

Consequence Management

OP 4.8 Acquire, Manage, and

Distribute Funds

OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence

Management in JOA

NS 5.7 Provide public Health,

mental health and Medical

Services Support (See SN 5.7.5,

NS 5.7.17)

PCS 5.9 Coordinate public

Health and Medical Services

Support including mental health

services (See PCS 5.9.15)

Provides emergency

medical support in

disaster area and the

surrounding vicinity

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM/

Installation

Commanders

ST 4.2.3 Coordinate Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance

ST 8.2.4 Coordinate

Humanitarian and Civic

Assistance Programs

OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence

Management in JOA

IM 8.1 Conduct situation

assessment and establish

Hospital Emergency Incident

Command System (HEICS) as

the means to provide direction

(See IM 8.1.3)

Provides assistance

in managing human

remains, including

victim ID and

mortuary affairs.

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

ST 4.2.1 Integrate Supply and

Services

ST 4.3.2 Provide Supplies and

Services for Theater Forces

OP 4.4.1 Coordinate Field

Services Requirements

OP 4.4.1.2 Coordinate Mortuary

Affairs in the Joint Operations

Area

NS 5.7 Provide public Health,

mental health and Medical

Service Support (See NS

5.7.10)

PCS 5.9 Provide public Health

and Medical Services Support,

including mental health services

(See PCS 5.9.18)

IM 8.1.2.8 Develop Mortuary

Plan for Mass Caualties

IM 8.5 Conduct epidemiological

investigations as surveillance

reports warrant and Coordinate

Diaster Medical Assistance

team (DMAT) assets/Services

(See IM 8.5.3)

IPR 8.7 Release Remains to

Mortuary Services
B-12

Appendix B

JP 3-41

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #8 - Public Health and Medical Services (HHS) (cont'd)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

Provide evaluation

and risk management

support

Combatant

Commanders

ST 4.2.2 Coordinate Health

Service Support

ST 4.2.3 Coordinate Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance

NS 5.7 Provide public Health,

mental health and Medical

Services Support (See NS

5.7.2)

PCS 5.9 Provide public Health

and Medical Services Support,

including mental health services

(See PCS 5.9.4)

IM 5.1 Coordinate Jurisdictional

Prevention Programs (See IM

5.1.1.2)

IM 10.3 Coordinate and Direct

Response to Oil and Hazardous

Materials Incidents (See IM

10.3.1)

IPR 5.2 Assess Site Impact

Provide blood

products

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

ST 4.2.2 Coordinate Health

Service Support

ST 4.2.2.1 Manage Theater

Joint Blood Program

OP 4.4.3 Provide for Health

Services in the Joint Operations

Area

OP 4.4.3.1 Manage the Joint

Blood Program in the Joint

Operations Area

NS 5.7 Provide public Health,

mental health and Medical

Services Support (See NS

5.7.12)

PCS 5.9 Provide public Health

and Medical Services Support

including mental health services

(See PCS 5.9.20J)

IPR 8.14 Conduct Blood Drives

Provide confirmatory

laboratory testing

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

ST 4.2.2.3 Manage Medical,

Dental, and Veterinary Services

and Laboratories and Supply

NS 5.7 Provide public Health,

mental health and Medical

Services Support (See NS 5.7.19)

NS 5.12 Provide Public Safety

and Security Support (See NS

5.12.8)

PCS 5.9 Provide public Health

and Medical Services Support,

including mental health services

(See PCS 5.9.22)

PCS 5.12 Coordinate Food and

Agricultural Support for Response

to Incident of Regional and State

Significance (See SN 5.12.6.2)

PCS 5.14 Coordinate Public

Safety adn Security Support

(See PRS 5.14.7)

IPR 11.10 Provide Laboratory

and Diagnostic Support,

Subject-Matter Expertise, and

Technical Assistance
B-13

Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #9 - Urban Search and Rescue (DHS/FEMA)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

Provide US&R JMT

fixed and/or rotarywing transportation

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

SN 8.1.5 Conduct Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance and

Humanitarian and Civic

Assistance

SN 8.2 Provide DOD/

Government-Wide Support

SN 8.2.2 Support Other

Government Agencies

ST 8.2.3 Coordinate Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance

ST 6.2.7.2 Coordinate Civil

Search and Rescue

OP 6.2.9 Coordinate Personnel

Recovery in Theater

OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence

Management in the JOA

NS 5.8 Provide Urban Search

and Rescue Support (See NS

5.8.5)

IM 9 Coordinate Urban Serach

and Rescue

Provide US&R JMT

ground transportation

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

SN 8.1.5 Conduct Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance and

Humanitarian and Civic

Assistance

SN 8.2 Provide DOD/

Government-Wide Support

SN 8.2.2 Support Other

Government Agencies

ST 8.2.3 Coordinate Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance

ST 6.2.7.2 Coordinate Civil

Search and Rescue

OP 6.2.9 Coordinate Personnel

Recovery in Theater

OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence

Management in the JOA

NS 5.8 Provide Urban Search

and Rescue Support (See NS

5.8.5)

IM 9 Coordinate Urban Serach

and Rescue
B-14

Appendix B

JP 3-41

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #9 - Urban Search and Rescue (DHS/FEMA) (cont'd)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

Provide mobile

feeding units for

US&R task forces &

JMT

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

SN 8.1.5 Conduct Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance and

Humanitarian and Civic

Assistance

SN 8.2 Provide DOD/

Government-Wide Support

SN 8.2.2 Support Other

Government Agencies

ST 8.2.3 Coordinate Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance

ST 6.2.7.2 Coordinate Civil

Search and Rescue

OP 6.2.9 Coordinate Personnel

Recovery in Theater

OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence

Management in the JOA

IM 9.2.6.2 Provide Mobile

Feeding Units for Urban Search

and Rescue task force

Provide portable

shelters for US&R

JMTs

U n SPACOM SN 8.1.5 Conduct Foreig

Humanitarian Assistance and

Humanitarian and Civic

Assistance

SN 8.2 Provide DOD/

Government-Wide Support

SN 8.2.2 Support Other

Government Agencies

ST 8.2.3 Coordinate Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance

ST 6.2.7.2 Coordinate Civil

Search and Rescue

OP 6.2.9 Coordinate Personnel

Recovery in Theater

OP 7.4 Coordinate Consequence

Management in the JOA

IM 9.2.6.1 Provide Portable

Shelters for Use by Urban

Search and Rescue Task Force

Deploys StS and

TSSTs to supplement

US&R JMTs

USPACOM/

USACE

SN 8.2 Provide DOD/

G t overnment-Wide Suppor

NS 5 - Provide National Incident

Support

Assist JMT

Engineering Cells

U c SACE SN 8.1.4 Support Military Civi

Action

NS 5.8 Provide Urban Search

and Rescue Support (See NS

5.8.6)
B-15

Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #9 - Urban Search and Rescue (DHS/FEMA) (cont'd)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

Provides structural

evaluation and

building stabity

monitoring.

U c SACE SN 8.1.4 Support Military Civi

Action

NS 3.4 Provide Engineering and

Structural guidance (HVAC,

plumbing, mechanical, and

structural measures) to Reduce

Or Eliminate Hazards

PCS 3.4 Provide Regional and

State Engineering and Structural

Measure Guidelines to Reduce

Or Eliminate Hazards

ESF #10 - Oil and Hazardous Materials Response (EPA/USCG/DOD)

Provides On-Scene

Coordinator and

directs response

actions for DOD

hazardous materials

Installation

Commanders

SN 3.4.4 Safeguard National

Strategic Capabilites

SN 3.4.10 Protect the National

Sea Frontiers

ST 6.2.2 Coordinate the Removal

of Strategically Significant Hazards

OP 4.5.4 Coordinate Recovery

and Salvage

OP 6.2.2 Remove Operationally

Significant Hazards

OP 6.2.10 Develop and Execute

Actions to Control Pollution and

Hazardous Materials

OP 7.4 Coordinate CM in JOA

IM 10 Coordinate Oil and

Hazardous Materials Response

IPR 10 Conduct Oil and

Hazardous Materials Response

NS 5.9 Provide Oil and HAZMAT

Response Support for Incident of

National Significance

PCS 5.11 Coordinate Oil and

HAZMAT Response Support for

Response of National, Regional

and State Significance (See

PCS 5.11.1)

IPR 10.1 Implement Plans,

Programs, Agreements and

Requirements for Responding to

Hazardous Material Incidents As

Required

Provides response

and recovery

assistance to

Radiological

Dispersal Device and

Improvised Nuclear

Device incidents

USACE/

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM/

USTRANSCOM

SN 9.2.2 Coordinate

Consequence Management

OP 4.5.4 Coordinate Recovery

and Salvage

OP 7.4 Coordinate CM in JOA

IM 5.4.1.11 Implement

Radiological Assistance

Program Plan (RAP), Federal

Radiological Emergency

Response Plan (FRERP), and

National Response Plan (NRP)

NS 5.9.8 Track, Monitor, and

Secure All Production, Use, and

Transfer of Nuclear Material
B-16

Appendix B

JP 3-41

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #11 - Agricultural and Natural Resources (USDA/DOI)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

Assess food supply

and storage facility

availability

J , DOMS ST 4.2.2.3 Manage Medical

Dental, and Veterinary Services

and Laboratories and Supply

PCS 5.12 Coordinate Food and

Agricultural Support for

Response to Incident of

Regional and State Significance

(See PCS 5.12.1.2, PCS

5.12.6)

PCS 6.1 Establish Regional,

State, tribal, and Local Systems

for Describing, Inventorying,

Requesting, and Tracking

Resources (See PCS 6.1.1.3)

Assess

transportation,

material handling

equipment and

personnel availability.

NOTE: This

responsibility will be

confined to the posts,

camps, and stations

within or adjacent to

the disaster area

Installation

Commanders

OP 4.5.1 Provide for Movement

Services in the JOA

NS 5.1 Coordinate and Provide

Transportation Support (See NS

5.1.1)

NS 5.10.1.2 Catalog and Locate

Available Resources of Food,

Transportaion, Equipment,

Storage, and Distribution

Facilities

PCS 5.12.6 Identify

Requirements and Mobiize

Resources Such As

Transportation and Storage,

Federal, State, and Local Food

Stockpiles, and Staging Areas

for Distribution

IM 1 Coordinate Transportation

Operations
B-17

Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #11 - Agricultural and Natural Resources (USDA/DOI) (cont'd)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

Assess laboratory

and diagnostic

support

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

ST 4.2.2.3 Manage Medical,

Dental, and Veterinary Services

and Laboratores and Supply

NS 5.7 Provide public Health,

medical health and Medical

Services Support (See NS

5.7.19)

NS 5.12 Provide Public Safety

and Security Support (See NS

5.12.8)

PCS 5.9 Provide public Health

and Medical Services Support,

including mental health services

(See PCS 5.9.22)

PCS 5.12 Coordinate Food and

Agricultural Support for

Response to Incident of

Regional and State Significance

(See SN 5.12.6.2)

PCS 5.14 Coordinate Public

Safety and Security Support

(See PRS 5.14.7)

IPR 11.10 Provide Laboratory

and Diagnostic Support,

Subject-Matter Expertise, and

Technical Assistance

Assists animal

emergency response

organizations

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

ST 4.2.2.3 Manage Medical,

Dental, and Veterinary Services

and Laboratores and Supply

NS 5.10.2.4 Implement and

Activate Animal and Plant Health

Inspection Services (APHIS)

Emergency Operations Center

NS 5.10.2.7 Provide Resources

and Procedures for the

Response to an Outbreak of a

Highly Contagious Animal

Disease

PCS 5.12.2.7 Coordinate

regional and State Resources

and Procedures for the

Response to an Outbreak of

Highly Contagious Animal

Disease

IPR 11.6 Mobilize Veterinary

Services for Livestock and

Companion Animals
B-18

Appendix B

JP 3-41

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #11 - Agricultural and Natural Resources (USDA/DOI) (cont'd)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

Provides veterinary

support resources

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

ST 4.2.2.3 Manage Medical,

Dental, and Veterinary Services

and Laboratores and Supply

NS 5.7.11 Assist in planning and

Delivering Healthcare to Injured

Or Abandoned Animals and

performing Preventive Medicine

Activities (NRP)

NS 5.10.2.3 Supply Animal and

Plant Health Inspection Services

(APHIS) Assets to augment VS

assets in the State where the

disease exists, as needed by

the area veterinarian in charge

(AVIC) (NRP)

IM 11.6 Coordinate Veterinary

Services

IPR 11.6.1 Provide Veterinary

Services for Livestock and

Companion Animals

Provides laboratory

support to APHIS

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

ST 4.2.2.3 Manage Medical,

Dental, and Veterinary Services

and Laboratores and Supply

NS 5.7 Provide public Health,

mental health and Medical

Services Support (See NS

5.7.19)

NS 5.12 Provide Public Safety

and Security Support (See NS

5.12.8)

PCS 5.9 Provide public Health

and Medical Services Support,

including mental health (See

PCS 5.9.22)

PCS 5.12 Coordinate Food and

Agricultural Support for

Response to Incident of

Regional and State Significance

(See SN 5.12.6.2)

PCS 5.14 Coordinate Public

Safety and Security Support

(See PRS 5.14.7)

IPR 11.10 Provide Laboratory

and Diagnostic Support,

Subject-Matter Expertise, and

Technical Assistance
B-19

Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #11 - Agricultural and Natural Resources (USDA/DOI) (cont'd)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

Provides removal

and disposal

assistance for

contaminated and

uncontaminated

debris including

animal remains

USNORTHCOM/

USPACOM

ST 6.2.2 Coordinate the

Removal of Strategically

Significant Hazards

ST 6.2.10 Develop and Execute

Actions to Control Pollution and

Hazardous Materials

NS 5.3.2 Manage, monitor,

and/or provide technical advice

in debris management and

reestablishment of ground and

water routes into affected area

PCS 5.4.11 Execute regional

and State Contaminant Control

Measures for In-Place Debris

IPR 3.2.1 Conduct Clean-Up and

Debris Management

ESF #12 - Energy (DOE)

Coordinate

emergency power

team missions with

power-system

restoration

U / SACE SN 8.2 -Provide DOD

government-wide support

IPR 12.4 Provide and

Coordinate the Use of

Emergency Power Generation

Services At Critical Facilities

ESF #13 - Public Safety and Security (DHS/DOJ)

Provides physical

and electronic

security systems and

expertise

U d SACE SN 3.4.5 Coordinate an

Conduct Strategic Operations

Security

NS 2.1.7 Develop Standarized

Guidelines for Physical Security

Programs for government and

private sector office buildings,

laboratories, andother facilities

IM 3.2.1 Develop Building

Codes/Standards That Address

Safety, Structural Integrity, and

Physical Security

IM 13.4.4.1 Coordinate with

local emergency management

and law enforcement to ensure

security is provided for shelters,

mass care and medical facilities
B-20

Appendix B

JP 3-41

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #14 - Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation (DHS/USDA/DOC)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

Provides community

planning and civil

engineering technical

assistance and

natural hazard risk

assessment

expertise

U e SACE SN 8.2 -Provid

DoD/government-wide support

PCS 5.2.1 Gather and process

damage assessments of

regional and State transportation

infrastructure

IM 14 Coordinate community

recovery, mitgation and

economic stabilization

IPR 14 Support Community

Recovery, Mitigation and

Economic Stabilization

Supports

development of

housing, debris

mangagement, and

restoration national

strategies and

infrastructure

U e SACE SN 8.2 -Provid

DoD/government-wide support

NS 5.2.3 Implement plans and

measures necessary to identify

damaged critical infrastructure

assets, repair, reconstitute, and

secure telecommunications

networks and actions to protect

these assets from secondary

damage. Ensure that uniform

definitions and criteria are used

at and between each level of

government for damage

assessment

NS 5.5.3 Provide assistance for

mass care, short-term and longterm housing and supply needs

of disaster victims

IPR 6.7 Identify Long-Term

Housing Needs
B-21

Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for Emergency Support Functions

Figure B-1. Department of Defense Role and Responsibilities for

Emergency Support Functions (cont’d)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (cont'd)

ESF #15 - External Communication (DHS/FEMA)

DOD

Responsibility

DOD Lead(s) Related Universal Joint

Tasks (DOD)

Related Universal Task

List (DHS)

No DOD specific

tasking in Aug 04

draft

SN 5.1 Operate and Manage

Global Strategic Communications

and Information Systems

SN 3.3.6 Determine National

Residual Capabilites

SN 3.5.3.4 Provide

Communication Channels

SN 3.6.4 Maintain

Communications with Other

SMCC Assets and National

Military Command System

Command Center

IM 15 Coordinate Emergency

Public information and External

Communications

IPR 15 Provide Emergency

Public information and External

Communications

NS 4.1 Develop plans,

procedures and policies for

coordinating, managing and

disseminating public information

NS 5.14 Provide Emergency

health and medical Public

information and External

Communications support

PCS 4.1 Develop and provide

regional and State public

information

PCS 516 Provide Emergency

Public Information and External

Communications Support for

Incident of National, Regional

and State Significance
B-22

Appendix B

JP 3-41

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX C

BASE SUPPORT INSTALLATION CONSIDERATIONS

C-1

1. Purpose

The checklist below is provided to assist commanders and their staffs to conduct mission

analysis, prepare to meet logistic requirements and coordinate the potential use of a military

installation for base support of DOD forces during disaster response operations. These are

considerations and not requirements. Depending on the physical location of the APOD and

SPOD, the questions concerning airfield or port suitability may be analyzed separately or in

conjunction with base support planning. BSI planning considerations should take into account,

at a minimum, the following areas related to the key functions of logistics for CONUS and

outside the continental United States (OCONUS) operations:

a. General

(1) Is there a concise concept of the purpose of the BSI? Is there a description of the

functions that the BSI is to support?

(2) What forces have been identified to support the operation? Has the deployment

flow been analyzed to determine time phasing for induction of logistic elements?

(3) What are the key assumptions that the BSI must operate under?

(4) For domestic CBRNE CM, where is the established JFO in the affected area? For

FCM, where is the host nation emergency operation center, or where will the JTF-CM be located?

(5) For domestic CBRNE CM, where is the location(s) of the nearest FEMA

mobilization site(s)? For FCM, where are the nearest APOD, SPOD, and JRSOI points?

(6) What is the anticipated time frame that the BSI will be expected to provide support?

b. For OCONUS operations the following additional considerations apply:

(1) What CBRNE capabilities are resident in the host nation or state and local

jurisdictions?

(2) What mutual support agreements are in place for host nation or state/local support?

c. Airfield Suitability

(1) Is the APOD capable of handling the flow of forces and material moving in/out

and around the operational area ?
C-2

Appendix C

JP 3-41

(2) Are the personnel and cargo reception and staging capabilities of the airfield capable of

handling the deployment flow for onward movement? (Refer to JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and

Redeployment Operations).

(3) Is a contingency response element needed to manage air mobility activities?

(4) What is the current condition of the airfield? What are the runway lengths? What

is the current usage/throughput of the airfield? What is the working and parking maximum

(aircraft) on ground?

(5) Can the airfield support MEDEVAC and utility helicopter operations?

(6) Is the weight bearing capacity of the airfield sufficient to handle the type of aircraft

that will be used for movement?

(7) What impact does weather have on airfield operations? Night operations?

(8) Are adequate personnel and equipment assets available to assist in arrival/departure

airfield control group operations? What materials handling equipment (MHE) is available?

(9) Is there support for mobile aeromedical staging facilities?

(10) Is sufficient refueling capability/bulk fuel available?

(11) Is direct support aircraft maintenance available?

(12) What are the characteristics and capabilities of the main supply routes (MSRs)

that access the airfield?

(13) What other nearby military or civilian airfields are available?

(14) What is the threat level?

(15) What type of physical security is available at the airport?

(16) Are security personnel available?

(17) After review of threat, vulnerability, and criticality assessments, what force

protection measures are needed?

(18) Coordinate with the appropriate military legal advisor to ensure that the operative

rules for the use of force/rules of engagement are properly tailored for the situation.

(19) Is air traffic control and fire/crash/rescue available?
C-3

Base Support Installation Considerations

(20) Is the airfield free of CBRN contamination? If not, is decontamination necessary?

Are the contamination levels safe for current operations?

d. Supply

(1) Does the site have adequate supply support capabilities in place to sustain the

forces in the operational area ?

(2) What supply capabilities are available? Will military augmentation be required?

(3) What is the process to establish requisition flow? What type of automated or

nonautomated requisition system is used? How will the forces tie into that system?

(4) What supply support is available for common-user items in relation to the standard

categories of supply? What type of storage, handling, shipping, security, and safety measures

and procedures are in place? Is cold storage available?

(5) What distribution capability is available? What MHE is available? Can it be

moved to support multiple locations to include potential forward operating bases (FOBs)?

(6) Is fuel storage and distribution available to support the rolling stock and potential

FOBs?

e. Maintenance

(1) Does the site have adequate maintenance capabilities in place to sustain the units

in the operational area ?

(2) What maintenance capability is available to support primarily automotive,

communications, and medical equipment? Will military augmentation be required?

(3) What are the procedures for disposal of contaminated fuel, oils, antifreezes, and

other hazardous materials?

(4) Is local repair part support available?

f. Transportation

(1) Can the site accommodate deployment, sustainment, and redeployment flow and

facilitate movement of units in/out and around operational area?

(2) What transportation capability is available?

(3) What other transportation capabilities (rail lines or marine ports) are available to

support military operations?
C-4

Appendix C

JP 3-41

(4) What transportation tracking systems are in place?

(5) Are loading ramps available?

(6) What are the characteristics and capabilities of the MSRs that access the base?

What are the primary and secondary routes? What are the dimensions and classifications of

bridges along the routes? Are there any restrictions or chokepoints? What routes are identified

for evacuation?

(7) What is the availability of installation transportation motor pool assets (truck, bus,

passenger vehicles)? Are drivers available for these assets? Are rental vehicles available?

(8) Does the installation transportation officer (ITO) have contract capability with

local vendors (truck, bus, passenger vehicles) to support a surge?

(9) Are the personnel and cargo reception and staging capabilities of the installation

capable of handling the deployment flow for onward movement? (Refer to JP 3-35, Joint

Deployment and Redeployment Operations).

(10) Will the ITO be able to support redeployment operations of the DOD forces?

(11) What are the procedures and availability for ground refueling?

(12) Who will provide transportation management services to coordinate personnel

and material movements into, within, and out of the JOA?

(13) Who will provide daily operations briefings?

(14) Who will provide technical guidance to subordinate units and civilian agencies?

(15) Who will coordinate and deconflict transportation movement mission

assignments?

(16) Who will monitor freight and passenger movement by all modes in the JOA?

(17) Who will coordinate transit clearances for highway movement?

(18) Will there be a movement control center in the JOA information clearing house?

(19) What tracking systems will the movement control center (MCC) have access to?

(20) Who will monitor flow and velocity in the supply distribution system?

(21) Will a special assignment airlift mission validator be located in the MCC?
C-5

Base Support Installation Considerations

(22) Will unit movement officers back brief ITO on deployment plan?

(23) Has the unit created load plans for air movement?

g. Civil Engineering

(1) What engineering assets are in place and available to support forces in the operational

area?

(2) What are the water planning factors in use on the installation? Will sufficient

water support be available to support the DOD forces? What procedures are used to ensure the

water is potable?

(3) What are the procedures for trash collection and disposal?

(4) What are the procedures for hazardous waste collection and disposal?

(5) What environmental rules and procedures are in place?

(6) Will the installation be able to handle the additional energy usage requirements or

will supplemental generators be required?

(7) What force protection considerations will require engineer support to implement?

h. Health Services

(1) Does the site have adequate medical support capabilities in place to sustain the

forces in the operational area?

(2) What medical assets are available and what capabilities do they have?

(3) Is there a primary and secondary hospital available? What number of medical

field units, operating rooms, and hospital beds are available? What type and how many medical

specialists are available?

(4) Are there ground and air ambulances available?

(5) Is medical supply available?

(6) Is there a pharmacy available? What types of medicine are in short supply/not

generally available?

(7) What are the availability and power requirements of mobile drug/blood registration

storage units?
C-6

Appendix C

JP 3-41

(8) What medical capabilities exist in the local community?

(9) What type of mortuary affairs capability or plan is on site and available?

(10) Are patient decontamination capabilities available?

(11) What are the diseases endemic in the local population and vectors present in the

area.

i. Other Services

(1) Is there a contracting office on the installation? What local contracting procedures

are in place? What existing contracts are in place to support the major items previously listed?

(2) Is finance support available?

(3) Is there adequate infrastructure to support billeting and food service? If not, what

contract lodging and food service options are available?

(4) Is there an adequate location to locate a joint operations center?

(5) Are hardstand facilities available to support several large command operations

centers?

(6) What is the availability of laundry, shower, and latrine facilities? Will the installation

provide portable facilities as required?

(7) Are exchange facilities available?

(8) Is there adequate infrastructure in place to support C2 communications

requirements?

(9) Are there adequate force protection and security procedures in place? Will this

require military augmentation?

(10) What are the procedures for receiving mail?

(11) What type of public affairs assistance is available?

(12) What type of religious support is available?

(13) Is there adequate security forces and trained security augmentation forces support

to:

(a) Secure the site (mark areas around the site clearly).
C-7

Base Support Installation Considerations

(b) Provide convoy security on to the installation or from one area of the installation

to another for containment of the crisis.

(c) Implement force protection tasks as assigned.

(d) Provide weapons and ammunition storage facilities.

(14) Is there a CBRNE capability resident on the installation?

(15) Is there a fire-fighting capability resident on the installation?
C-8

Appendix C

JP 3-41

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX D

REFERENCES

D-1

The development of JP 3-41 is based upon the following references:

1. General

a. The Constitution of the United States.

b. Title 10 USC (Armed Forces).

c. Title 14 USC (USCG).

d. Title 32 USC (National Guard).

e. Homeland Security Act of 2002.

f. USA PATRIOT Act.

g. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.

h. Title 31 USC 1535 (Economy Act).

i. Title 18 USC 1385 (Posse Comitatus Act).

j. HSPD-1, Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council.

k. HSPD-3, The Homeland Security Advisory System.

l. NSPD-17/HSPD-4, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

m. HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents.

n. HSPD-8, National Preparedness.

o. HSPD-9, Defense of United States Agriculture and Food.

p. HSPD-10, Biodefense for the 21st Century.

q. NSPD-20, Counterproliferation Interdiction.

r. NSPD-46, National Policy for Combating Terrorism.

s. National Response Plan.
D-2

Appendix D

JP 3-41

t. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Risk Management Series: Reference Manual to

Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, FEMA 426.

u. The 9/11 Commission Report – Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorists

Attacks Upon the United States.

v. National Strategy for Homeland Security.

w. National Security Strategy.

x. National Military Strategy.

y. National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

z. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.

aa. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Intelligence Community, Federal Law

Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security Concerning Information

Sharing.

bb. National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Supplement.

cc. National Defense Strategy of the USA.

dd. National Counterintelligence Strategy of the US.

ee. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.

2. Department of Defense

a. Unified Command Plan.

b. Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG).

c. Contingency Planning Guidance.

d. DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism Program.

e. DOD O-2000.12-P, Department of Defense Antiterrorism Strategic Plan.

f. DODD 2000.15, Support to Special Events.

g. DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities.

h. DODD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances.
D-3

References

i. DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA).

j. DOD 3025.1-M, Manual for Civil Emergencies.

k. DODD 3150.8, DOD Response to Nuclear Weapon Accidents and Incidents.

l. DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not

Affiliated with the Department of Defense, 7 January 1980.

m. DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.

n. DODI 2000.18, Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological

Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines.

o. DODI 2000.21, Foreign Consequence Management (FCM).

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

a. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Concept Plan 0500, Military Assistance to Domestic

Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological,

Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosives Situation.

b. CJCSI 1800.01A, Officer Professional Military Education Policy.

c. CJCSI 2030.01A, Chemical Weapons Convention Compliance Policy Guide.

d. CJCSI 3110.16, Military Capabilities, Assets, and Units for Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Operations.

e. CJCSI 3125.01, Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations

in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosives Situation.

f. CJCSI 321401B, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations.

g. CJCSI 3431.01, Joint Nuclear Accident and Incident Response Team (JNAIRT).

h. CJCSI 3500.01B, Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States.

i. CJCSI 3500.02C, Joint Training Master Plan 2002 for the Armed Forces of the United

States.

j. CJCSI 5120.02, Joint Doctrine Development System.

k. CJCSM 3500.03A, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States.
D-4

Appendix D

JP 3-41

l. CJCSM 3500.04D, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL).

m. CJCS Guide 3501, The Joint Training System – A Primer for Senior Leaders.

4. Joint Publications

a. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

b. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

c. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

d. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

e. JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task

Force Operations.

f. JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

g. JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental

Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.

h. JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)

Environments.

i. JP 3-13, Information Operations.

j. JP 3-26, Homeland Security.

k. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

l. JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

m. JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction.

n. JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations (PSYOP).

o. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

p. JP 4-02, Health Service Support in Joint Operations.

q. JP 4-05.1, Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component

(RC) Call-up.

r. JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.
D-5

References

5. Multi-Service Publications

a. Field Manual (FM) 3-05.105/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-11.30/

Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP[I]) 3-2.35, Multiservice

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Forces in Nuclear, Biological, and

Chemical Environments, (FOUO).

b. FM 3-11.4/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-37.2, NTTP 3-11.27/

AFTTP(I) 3-2.46, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for NBC Protection.

c. FM 3-11.5/MCWP 3-37.3, NBC Decontamination.

d. FM 3-11.6/Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 105-7/Marine Corps Reference Publication

(MCRP) 3-37B, Field Behavior of NBC Agents (Including Smoke and Incendiaries).

e. FM 3-11.9/MCRP 3-37.1B, Navy Tactics References Publication 3-11.32/AFTTP(I) 3-

2.55, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds.

f. FM 3-11.14/NTTP 3-11.28/AFTTP(I) 3-2.54/MCWP 3-37.1A, Multiservice Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Vulnerability Assessment.

g. FM 3-11.19/NTTP 3-11.29/AFTTP(I) 3-4.44/MCWP 3-37.4, Multiservice Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for NBC Reconnaissance.

h. FM 3-11.21/MCRP 3-37.2C/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP(I) 3-2.37, Multiservice Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Consequence

Management.

i. FM 3-11.22, Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures.

j. FM 3-11.24/NTTP 3-11.23/AFTTP(I) 3-2.33/MCWP 3-37.5, Multiservice Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for NBC Defense of Theater Fixed Sites, Ports, and Airfields.

k. FM 3-11.86/NTTP 3-11.31/AFTTP(I) 3-2.52/MCWP 3-37.1C, Multiservice Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Biological Surveillance.

l. FM 4-02.33/Navy Medicine (NAVMED) P-5038, Control of Communicable Diseases

Manual.

m. FM 4-0284/NAVMED P-5042/AFMAN (I) 44-156/MCRP 4-11.1C, Treatment of

Biological Warfare Agent Casualties.
D-6

Appendix D

JP 3-41

n. FM 4-02.285/MCRP 4-11.1A/NAVMED P-5041/Air Force Joint Manual (AFJMAN) 44-

149, Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries.

o. FM 10-63/AFMAN 143-3, Handling of Deceased Personnel in Theater of Operations.

p. MCM-0026-02, Chemical Warfare (CW) Agent Exposure Planning Guidance.

6. Army

a. USACHPPM Tech Guide 244, The Medical NBC Battlebook.

b. AR 381-61, The Army Chemical Agent Safety Program.

c. FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook.

d. FM 4-02.7, Health Services Support in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment.

e. FM 4-25.11, First Aid for Soldiers.

f. US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Medical Management of

Biological Casualties.

7. Air Force

a. Air Force Handbook (AFH) 10-2502, USAF Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Threat Planning and Response Handbook.

b. AFH 32-4014, Vol IV, USAF Operations in a Chemical and Biological Warfare (CB)

Environment, CB Planning and Analysis: Volume 2.

c. AFH 32-4014, USAF Ability to Survive and Operate Procedures in a Nuclear, Biological,

and Chemical (NBC).

d. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 41-307, Aeromedical Evacuation Patient Considerations

and Standards of Care Environment: Volume 4.

e. AFMAN 32-4004, Emergency Response Operations.

f. AFPD 10-26, Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield

Explosives (C-CBRNE) Operations.

g. AFPD 32-40, Disaster Preparedness.

h. Air Mobility Command Chemical-Biological Concept of Operations.
D-7

References

8. Marine Corps

a. Marine Corps Order 1510.71, Individual Training Standards (ITS) System for NBC

Defense (NBCD) Occupational Field (OCCFLD57).

b. Marine Corps Skills Training Handbook: Individual Combat Basic Tasks.

9. Navy

a. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare.

b. Naval Doctrine Publication 2, Naval Intelligence.

c. Naval Doctrine Publication 4, Naval Logistics.

d. Naval Doctrine Command, Multinational Maritime Operations, Executive Summary.

e. Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-20.31, Surface Ship Survivability.

10. International Documents

a. Emergencies Act (Revised Statutes of Canada: 1985 c.22 4th Supplement).

b. Emergency Preparedness Act (Revised Statutes of Canada: 1985 c.6 4th Supplement).

c. Canada-United States Integrated Lines of Communication (ILOC) Agreement.

d. Canada-US Agreement for Enhanced Military Cooperation.

e. Temporary Cross-Border Movement of Land Forces Between the United States and

Canada Agreement.

f. Canadian-United States (CANUS) Regional Emergency Management Agreements.

g. Canada-United States (CANUS) Civil Assistance Plan (draft).

h. North America Emergency Response Guidebook.
D-8

Appendix D

JP 3-41

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX E

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

E-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint

Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should

address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Air Force. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for

this publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7).

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CDRUSNORTHCOM

JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD//

CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JT10//

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center,

Joint Doctrine Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans and Joint

Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate

will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military

Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7 when changes to

source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________________________
E-2

Appendix E

JP 3-41

4. Distribution of Printed Publications

a. This publication is not programmed for printing. However, if printed, additional copies

of this publication can be obtained through the Service publication centers listed below (initial

contact) or USJFCOM in the event that the joint publication is not available from the Service.

b. Individuals and agencies outside the combatant commands, Services, Joint Staff, and

combat support agencies are authorized to receive only approved joint publications and joint test

publications. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign

nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign

Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative

support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 15 November 1999, Support of the Headquarters

of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL

1655 Woodson Road

Attn: Joint Publications

St. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center

2800 Eastern Boulevard

Baltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point

5450 Carlisle Pike, Box 2020

Mechanicsburg, PA 17055-0788

Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications)

814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321

Albany, GA 31704-0321

Coast Guard: Commandant (G-RPD)

US Coast Guard

2100 2nd Street, SW

Washington, DC 20593-0001

Commander

USJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102

Doctrine and Education Group (Publication Distribution)

116 Lake View Parkway

Suffolk, VA 23435-2697
E-3

Administrative Instructions

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted.

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in

accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security Program.

5. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. The Joint Staff will not print copies of electronic joint publications for distribution.

Electronic versions are available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET), or http://

nmcc20a.nmcc.smil.mil/dj9j7ead/doctrine/ (SIPRNET).

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the

combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to

foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense

Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon,

Washington, DC 20301-7400.
E-4

Appendix E

JP 3-41

Intentionally Blank
GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AC Active Component

AFH Air Force handbook

AFMAN Air Force manual

AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction)

AMS aerial measuring system

ANG Air National Guard

AOR area of responsibility

APOD aerial port of debarkation

ARNG Army National Guard

ARS acute radiation syndrome

ASD(HA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)

ASD(HD) Assistance Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense)

ASD(ISP) Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy)

ASD(RA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)

ASD(SO/LIC) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and LowIntensity Conflict)

AT antiterrorism

BSI base support installation

C2 command and control

CAE command assessment element

CANUS Canada-United States

CAP crisis action planning

CB chemical-biological

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield

explosives

CCDR combatant commander

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CDRARNORTH Commander, US Army North

CDRUSJFCOM Commander, US Joint Forces Command

CDRUSNORTHCOM Commander, US Northern Command

CDRUSPACOM Commander, US Pacific Command

CDRUSSOCOM Commander, US Special Operations Command

CDRUSSOUTHCOM Commander, US Southern Command

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, US Strategic Command

CDRUSTRANSCOM Commander, US Transportation Command

CF Canadian forces

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
GL-2

Glossary

JP 3-41

CJTF commander, joint task force

CJTF-CS Commander, Joint Task Force – Civil Support

CJTF-NCR Commander, Joint Task Force – National Capital Region

CM consequence management

CMAT consequence management advisory team

CMHT consequence management home team

CMO civil-military operations

CMPT consequence management planning team

CM R&A consequence management response and assessment

CMST consequence management support team

COA course of action

COM chief of mission

CONPLAN concept plan

CONUS continental United States

CPG Contingency Planning Guidance

CrM crisis management

CS civil support

CSA combat support agency

DCE defense coordinating element

DCO defense coordinating officer (DOD)

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOD Department of Defense

DODD Department of Defense directive

DODI Department of Defense instruction

DOE Department of Energy

DOJ Department of Justice

DOS Department of State

DSCA defense support to civil authorities

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

EMP electromagnetic pulse

EO executive order

EOC emergency operations center

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

EPLO emergency preparedness liaison officer

ERT-A emergency response team – advance element

ESF emergency support function

EXORD execute order

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCC Federal coordinating center

FCM foreign consequence management

FCO federal coordinating officer

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
GL-3

Glossary

FEST foreign emergency support team

FM field manual

FOB forward operating base

FORSCOM US Army Forces Command

FP force protection

FPCON force protection condition

GCC geographic combatant commander

GIS geospatial information systems

HAZMAT hazardous materials

HD homeland defense

HE high-explosives

HN host nation

HQ headquarters

HS homeland security

HSPD homeland security Presidential directive

HSS health service support

IAC Interagency Advisory Council

ICS incident command system

IGO intergovernmental organization

ILOC integrated line of communications

ITO installation transportation officer

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff

JA judge advocate

JDOMS Joint Director of Military Support

JFC joint force commander

JFO joint field office

JOA joint operations area

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

JP joint publication

JPAC joint planning augmentation cell

JRERP Joint Radiological Emergency Response Plan

JRSOI joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

JTAC joint technical augmentation cell

JTF joint task force

JTF-AK Joint Task Force – Alaska

JTF-CM joint task force – consequence management

JTF-CS Joint Task Force – Civil Support

LE low-order explosives

LFA lead federal agency
GL-4

Glossary

JP 3-41

MA mortuary affairs

MACA military assistance to civil authorities

MCC movement control center

MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication

MEDEVAC medical evacuation

MHE materials handling equipment

MOA memorandum of agreement

MOU memorandum of understanding

MSR main supply route

NARAC national atmospheric release advisory capability

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVMED Navy Medical

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

NDA national defense area

NDS national defense strategy

NEST nuclear emergency support team

NG National Guard

NGO nongovernmental organization

NIMS National Incident Management System

NMS national military strategy

NOC National Operations Center

NRP National Response Plan

NSA national security area

NSHS National Strategy for Homeland Security

NSPD national security Presidential directive

NSS national security strategy

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures

OCONUS outside the continental United States

OPCON operational control

PCA Posse Comitatus Act

PDD Presidential decision directive

PFO principal federal official

POD port of debarkation

PSYOP psychological operations

QSTAG quadripartite standardization agreement

RAP Radiological Assistance Program

RC Reserve Component

RDD radiological dispersal device

RFA request for assistance
GL-5

Glossary

RRCC regional response coordination center

RUF rules for the use of force

SCO state coordinating officer

SecDef Secretary of Defense

SJFHQ standing joint force headquarters

SMART-AIT special medical augmentation response – aeromedical isolation

team

SOFA status-of-forces agreement

SPG strategic planning guidance

SPOD seaport of debarkation

SPP Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America

STANAG standardization agreement (NATO)

TACON tactical control

TF task force

TIB toxic industrial biological

TIC toxic industrial chemical

TIM toxic industrial material

TIR toxic industrial radiological

TSC theater security cooperation

UCP Unified Command Plan

USACE US Army Corps of Engineers

USAFR United States Air Force Reserve

USAMRIID United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious

Diseases

USAR United States Army Reserve

USC United States Code

USCG United States Coast Guard

USCGR United States Coast Guard Reserve

USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

USG United States Government

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command

USMCR United States Marine Corps Reserve

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command

USNR United States Navy Reserve

USPACOM United States Pacific Command

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

WMD weapons of mass destruction

WMD-CST weapons of mass destruction-civil support team
acute radiation syndrome. An acute illness caused by irradiation of the body by a high dose of

penetrating radiation in a very short period of time. Also called ARS. (Approved for

inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

area of responsibility. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within

which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called

AOR. (JP 1-02)

base support installation. A Department of Defense service or agency installation within the

United States, its territories, or possessions tasked to serve as a base for military forces

engaged in either homeland defense or defense support to civil authorities operations.

Provides general support logistic and administrative support to military forces. Also called

BSI. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

biological agent. A microorganism that causes disease in personnel, plants, or animals or causes

the deterioration of materiel. (JP 1-02)

biological weapon. An item of materiel which projects, disperses, or disseminates a biological

agent including arthropod vectors. (JP 1-02)

blister agent. A chemical agent which injures the eyes and lungs, and burns or blisters the skin.

Also called vesicant agent. (JP 1-02)

blood agent. A chemical compound, including the cyanide group, that affects bodily functions

by preventing the normal utilization of oxygen by body tissues. (JP 1-02)

chemical agent. Any toxic chemical intended for use in military operations. (JP 1-02)

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives consequence

management. The consequence management activities for all deliberate and inadvertent

releases of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives that are

undertaken when directed or authorized by the President. Also called CBRNE CM.

(Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

chemical warfare. All aspects of military operations involving the employment of lethal and

incapacitating munitions/agents and the warning and protective measures associated with

such offensive operations. Since riot control agents and herbicides are not considered to be

chemical warfare agents, those two items will be referred to separately or under the broader

term “chemical,” which will be used to include all types of chemical munitions/agents

collectively. Also called CW. (JP 1-02)

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-6 JP 3-41
chemical weapon. Together or separately, (a) a toxic chemical and its precursors, except when

intended for a purpose not prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention; (b) a

munition or device, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through toxic properties

of those chemicals specified in (a), above, which would be released as a result of the

employment of such munition or device; (c) any equipment specifically designed for use

directly in connection with the employment of munitions or devices specified in (b), above.

(JP 1-02)

command assessment element. The small team of personnel sent by the United States Northern

Command or United States Pacific Command to a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,

or high-yield explosives incident site to conduct a consequence management assessment

and make an evaluation of potential shortfalls in federal and state capabilities, which may

become requests for Department of Defense assistance. Also called CAE. (Approved for

inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

contamination. 1. The deposit, absorption, or adsorption of radioactive material, or of biological

or chemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects. 2. Food and/or water

made unfit for consumption by humans or animals because of the presence of environmental

chemicals, radioactive elements, bacteria or organisms, the byproduct of the growth of

bacteria or organisms, the decomposing material (to include the food substance itself), or

waste in the food or water. (JP 1-02)

contamination control. Procedures to avoid, reduce, remove, or render harmless (temporarily

or permanently) nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical contamination for the purpose

of maintaining or enhancing the efficient conduct of military operations. (This term and its

definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the

next edition of JP 1-02.)

crisis management. Measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to

anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or an act of terrorism. It is predominantly a law

enforcement response, normally executed under federal law. Also called CrM. (JP 1-02)

decontamination. The process of making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing,

destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing chemical or biological agents, or

by removing radioactive material clinging to or around it. (JP 1-02)

defense coordinating officer. The Department of Defense on-scene representative who

coordinates defense support of civil authorities requirements with the federal coordinating

officer, or his or her designated representative. Also called DCO. (This term and its definition

modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition

of JP 1-02.)

GL-7

Glossary
GL-8

Glossary

JP 3-41

domestic. The continental United States (including the District of Columbia), Alaska, Hawaii,

the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and

the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or any political subdivision thereof.

Two former trust territories, Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of

Micronesia, also are deemed eligible assistance under the Compact of Free Association.

(This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot

be referenced outside this publication.)

electromagnetic pulse. The electromagnetic radiation from a strong electronic pulse, most

commonly caused by a nuclear explosion that may couple with electrical or electronic

systems to produce damaging current and voltage surges. Also called EMP. (JP 1-02)

emergency operations center. The physical location at which the coordination of information

and resources to support domestic incident management activities normally takes place.

An emergency operations center may be a temporary facility or may be located in a more

central or permanently established facility, perhaps at a higher level of organization within

a jurisdiction. Emergency operations centers may be organized by major functional

disciplines (e.g., fire, law enforcement, and medical services), by jurisdiction (e.g., Federal,

state, regional, county, city, tribal), or by some combination thereof. Also called EOC.

(Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

emergency preparedness liaison officer. A senior reserve officer who is the representative of

the providing Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and a designated defense

coordinating officer. Also called EPLO. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP

1-02.)

emergency support functions. A grouping of government and certain private-sector capabilities

into an organizational structure to provide the support, resources, program implementation,

and services that are most likely to be needed to save lives, protect property and the

environment, restore essential services and critical infrastructure, and help victims and

communities return to normal, when feasible, following domestic incidents of domestic

emergency, disaster, or catastrophe. The emergency support functions serve as the primary

operational-level mechanism to provide assistance to state, local, and tribal governments or

to Federal departments and agencies conducting missions of primary Federal responsibility.

Also called ESFs. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

federal coordinating officer. The federal officer who is appointed to manage Federal resource

support activities related to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies. The federal coordinating

officer is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of federal disaster assistance

resources and programs to the affected state and local governments, individual victims, and

the private sector. Also called FCO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term

and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
GL-9

Glossary

foreign consequence management. Assistance provided by the United States Government to

a host nation to mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent chemical, biological,

radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives attack or event and restore essential government

services. Also called FCM. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

forward operating base. An airfield used to support tactical operations without establishing

full support facilities. The base may be used for an extended time period. Support by a

main operating base will be required to provide backup support for a forward operating

base. Also called FOB. (JP 1-02)

geospatial information and services. The collection, information extraction, storage,

dissemination, and exploitation of geodetic, geomagnetic, imagery (both commercial and

national source), gravimetric, aeronautical, topographic, hydrographic, littoral, cultural, and

toponymic data accurately referenced to a precise location on the earth’s surface. These

data are used for military planning, training, and operations including navigation, mission

planning, mission rehearsal, modeling, simulation, and precise targeting. Geospatial

information provides the basic framework for battlespace visualization. It is information

produced by multiple sources to common interoperable data standards. It may be presented

in the form of printed maps, charts, and publications; in digital simulation and modeling

databases; in photographic form; or in the form of digitized maps and charts or attributes

centerline data. Geospatial services include tools that enable users to access and manipulate

data, and also include instruction, training, laboratory support, and guidance for the use of

geospatial data. Also called GI&S. (This term and its definition are provided for information

and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 2-03.)

health service support. All services performed, provided, or arranged by the Services to promote,

improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These services

include, but are not limited to, the management of health services resources, such as

manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of

the wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically

unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat

stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, medical food, and

medical intelligence services. Also called HSS. (JP 1-02)

incapacitating agent. An agent that produces temporary physiological or mental effects, or

both, which will render individuals incapable of concerted effort in the performance of their

assigned duties. (JP 1-02)

incident command system. A standardized on-scene emergency management organization

that reflects the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents, without being

hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. The incident command system is the combination of

facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating with a common

organizational structure, designed to aid in the management of resources during incidents.
GL-10

Glossary

JP 3-41

The incident command system is used for all kinds of emergencies and is applicable to

small as well as large and complex incidents. The incident command system is used by

various jurisdictions and functional agencies, both public and private, or organized fieldlevel incident management operations. Also called ICS. (Approved for inclusion in the

next edition of JP 1-02.)

incident management. All actions taken to prepare for, prevent, respond to, or recover from

any event impacting lives or property. It includes pre-event, during, and post-event activities.

It can be associated with attack, natural, or manmade situations involving disasters or other

catastrophic occurrences. It includes military support to civil authorities, military assistance

to civil authorities, military assistance during civil disturbances, and military assistance to

law enforcement agencies programs under the umbrella of defense support to civil authorities.

It includes both domestic and foreign support operations. It includes humanitarian aid and

relief missions. Actions include measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential

governmental services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and

individuals affected by the incident. (This term and its definition modify the existing term

and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

incident of national significance. An actual or potential high-impact event that requires a

coordinated and effective response by and appropriate combination of Federal, state, local,

tribal, nongovernmental, and/or private-sector entities in order to save lives and minimize

damage, and provide the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation activities.

(Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

industrial chemicals. Chemicals developed or manufactured for use in industrial operations or

research by industry, government, or academia. These chemicals are not primarily

manufactured for the specific purpose of producing human casualties or rendering equipment,

facilities, or areas dangerous for human use. Hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride,

phosgene, and chloropicrin are industrial chemicals that also can be military chemical agents.

(JP 1-02)

joint field office. A temporary federal facility established locally to provide a central coordination

point for federal, state, local, and tribal executives who have been vested with responsibility

for incident oversight, direction, and/or assistance. Also called JFO. (Approved for inclusion

in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or

attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force

commander. See also joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified

commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command

(command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)
GL-11

Glossary

joint interagency coordination group. An interagency staff group that establishes regular,

timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational

planners. Composed of US Government civilian and military experts accredited to the

combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant

commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides the combatant commander

with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other US Government civilian

agencies and departments. Also called JIACG. (JP 1-02)

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. A system that provides the foundation for

conventional command and control by national- and combatant command-level commanders

and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint

planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System includes joint

operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by

communications and automated data processing systems. The system is used to monitor,

plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment

activities associated with joint operations. Also called JOPES. (JP 1-02)

joint operations center. A jointly manned facility of a joint force commander’s headquarters

established for planning, monitoring, and guiding the execution of the commander’s

decisions. Also called JOC. (JP 1-02)

joint planning augmentation cell. An exportable planning expertise for chemical, biological,

radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives consequence management operations. Also

called JPAC. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication

and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. A phase of joint force projection

occurring in the operational area. This phase comprises the essential processes required to

transition arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into forces capable of meeting

operational requirements. Also called JRSOI. (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense,

a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander.

Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

Joint Task Force – Civil Support. A standing joint task force established to plan and integrate

Department of Defense support to the designated lead federal agency for domestic chemical,

biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives consequence management

operations. Also called JTF-CS. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint technical augmentation cell. A tailored team that, when directed, deploys to a supported

combatant commander’s area of responsibility to provide chemical, biological, radiological,

and nuclear technical advice and planning assistance for executing foreign consequence

management. Also called JTAC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
GL-12

Glossary

JP 3-41

lead federal agency. The federal agency that leads and coordinates the overall federal response

to an emergency. Designation and responsibilities of a lead federal agency vary according

to the type of emergency and the agency’s statutory authority. Also called LFA. (JP 1-02)

Note: The term “lead federal agency” is not in the National Response Plan but it is included

in this document to be consistent with current Department of Defense doctrine and guidance.

mission assignment. The means by which the by Department of Homeland Security/Federal

Emergency Management Agency provides and assigns federal support upon declaration of

a major disaster or emergency as defined in the Stafford Act. It orders the mobilization of

immediate, short-term emergency response assistance when an applicable state or local

government is overwhelmed by the event and lacks the capability to perform, or contract

for, the necessary work. Also called MA. Note: Department of Defense accepts all Federal

Emergency Management Agency mission assignments as requests for assistance. These

requests for assistance only become Department of Defense mission assignments once they

have been vetted through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland

Defense) and the Joint Director of Military Support and have been approved by the Secretary

of Defense. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication

and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

mission-oriented protective posture. A flexible system of protection against nuclear, biological,

and chemical contamination. This posture requires personnel to wear only that protective

clothing and equipment (mission-oriented protective posture gear) appropriate to the threat

level, work rate imposed by the mission, temperature, and humidity. Also called MOPP.

(JP 1-02)

National Disaster Medical System. A coordinated partnership among the Departments of

Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Defense, and Veterans Affairs established

for the purpose of responding to the needs of victims of a public health emergency. Also

called NDMS. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

National Incident Management System. A national crisis response system that provides a

consistent, nationwide approach for Federal, state, local, and tribal governments; the private

sector; and nongovernmental organizations to work effectively and efficiently together to

prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or

complexity. Also called NIMS. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

national special security event. Events of national significance that require greater visibility.

Also called NSSE. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

nerve agent. A potentially lethal chemical agent which interferes with the transmission of nerve

impulses. (JP 1-02)

nonpersistent agent. A chemical agent that when released dissipates and/or loses its ability to

cause casualties after 10 to 15 minutes. (JP 1-02)
GL-13

Glossary

nuclear, biological, and chemical environment. Environments in which there is deliberate or

accidental employment, or threat of employment, of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons;

deliberate or accidental attacks or contamination with toxic industrial materials, including

toxic industrial chemicals; or deliberate or accidental attacks or contamination with

radiological (radioactive) materials. (JP 1-02)

pathogen. A disease-producing microorganism. (JP 1-02)

persistency. In biological or chemical warfare, the characteristic of an agent which pertains to

the duration of its effectiveness under determined conditions after its dispersal. (JP 1-02)

persistent agent. A chemical agent that, when released, remains able to cause casualties for

more than 24 hours to several days or weeks. (JP 1-02)

principal federal official. The federal official designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security

to act as his/her representative locally to oversee, coordinate, and execute the Secretary’s

incident management responsibilities under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5

for incidents of national significance. Also called PFO. (Approved for inclusion in the next

edition of JP 1-02.)

protection. 1. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military

and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed

or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. 2. Measures that are

taken to keep nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards from having an adverse effect on

personnel, equipment, or critical assets and facilities. Protection consists of five groups of

activities: hardening of positions; protecting personnel; assuming mission-oriented protective

posture; using physical defense measures; and reacting to attack. 3. In space usage, active

and passive defensive measures to ensure that United States and friendly space systems

perform as designed by seeking to overcome an adversary’s attempts to negate them and to

minimize damage if negation is attempted. (JP 1-02)

radiological accident. A loss of control over radiation or radioactive material that presents a

hazard to life, health, or property or that may result in any member of the general population

exceeding exposure limits for ionizing radiation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition

of JP 1-02.)

radiological defense. Defensive measures taken against the radiation hazards resulting from

the employment of nuclear and radiological weapons. (JP 1-02)

radiological dispersal device. A device, other than a nuclear explosive device, designed to

disseminate radioactive material in order to cause destruction, damage, or injury. Also

called RDD. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

radiological environment. Conditions found in an area resulting from the presence of a

radiological hazard. (JP 1-02)
GL-14

Glossary

JP 3-41

toxic industrial biological. Any biological material manufactured, used, transported, or stored

by industrial, medical, or commercial processes. For example: infectious waste and as

biological samples (e.g., biopsies, diseases for research). Also called TIB. (Approved for

inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

toxic industrial chemical. Any chemical manufactured, used, transported, or stored by industrial,

medical, or commercial processes. For example: pesticides, petrochemicals, fertilizers,

corrosives, poisons, etc. Also called TIC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP

1-02.)

toxic industrial material. Any toxic industrial material manufactured, stored, transported, or

used in industrial or commercial processes. It includes toxic industrial chemicals, toxic

industrial radiologicals, and toxic industrial biologicals. Also called TIM. (Approved for

inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

toxic industrial radiological. Any radiological material manufactured, used, transported, or

stored by industrial, medical, or commercial processes. For example: spent fuel rods, medical

sources, etc. Also called TIR. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

weapons of mass destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or

of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass

destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons,

but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a

separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02)
Assessments/

Revision

CJCS

Approval

Two

Drafts

Program

Directive

Project

Proposal

J-7 formally staffs with

Services and combatant

commands

Includes scope of project,

references, milestones, and

who will develop drafts

J-7 releases Program

Directive to Lead Agent.

Lead Agent can be Service,

combatant command or

Joint Staff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2

Program Directive

The combatant commands receive

the JP and begin to assess it during

use

18 to 24 months following

publication, the Director J-7, will

solicit a written report from the

combatant commands and

Services on the utility and quality of

each JP and the need for any

urgent changes or earlier-thanscheduled revisions

No later than 5 years after

development, each JP is revised

STEP #5

Assessments/Revision



ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, combatant commands, or

Joint Staff to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services and

combatant commands

J-7 initiates Program Directive

STEP #1

Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as

shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine

publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 3-41 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATIONS

PLANS SYSTEMS

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes

required changes and prepares pub for

coordination with Services and combatant

commands

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval

as a JP

STEP #4

CJCS Approval

Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority

(PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with combatant

commands, Services, and Joint Staff

STEP #3

Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINT

WARFARE

JP 0-2

UNAAF