466 U.S. at 697, and the petitioner must demonstrate the underlying facts 

by a preponderance of the evidence, Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 

103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). 

First, appellant claimed that his counsel did not obtain all of 

the files regarding appellant's case prior to advising appellant to enter a 

guilty plea or prior to the sentencing hearing. Appellant failed to 

demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient or that he was 

prejudiced because he did not identify what information counsel did not 

possess or how that information would have affected his decision to plead 

guilty or altered the sentencing hearing. Bare claims are insufficient to 

demonstrate a petitioner is entitled to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 

498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). Therefore, the district court did not 

err in denying this claim. 

Second, appellant claimed that his counsel coerced his plea by 

telling him that he would upset the judge if he did not plead guilty. 

Appellant failed to demonstrate that his counsel's performance was 

deficient or that he was prejudiced. Appellant acknowledged in the guilty 

plea agreement and at the plea canvass that he entered his guilty plea 

voluntarily and did not act under duress or coercion. Therefore, the 

district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Third, appellant claimed that his counsel promised him he 

would receive probation if he pleaded guilty. Appellant failed to 

demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient or that he was 

prejudiced. Appellant acknowledged in the guilty plea agreement that he 

had not been promised a particular sentence. Moreover, the district court 

advised appellant at the plea canvass that the court would decide the 

appropriate sentence. Appellant failed to demonstrate he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial had counsel 

explained the court's role in imposing sentence in more detail. Therefore, 

the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Fourth, appellant claimed that his counsel did not inform him 

in a timely manner that counsel was closing his law office. Appellant 

failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced. Appellant failed to demonstrate 

a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty and would 

have insisted on going to trial had counsel informed him of the closing of 

the law office at an earlier time. Therefore the district court did not err in 

denying this claim. 

Fifth, appellant claimed that his counsel told him he would 

file a notice of appeal and work on the direct appeal, yet failed to do so. 2 

We conclude that the district court erred in denying the petition without 

conducting an evidentiary hearing on the appeal-deprivation claim 

because appellant's claim was not belied by the record and if true would 

have entitled him to relief. See Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502-03, 686 P.2d at 

225; see also Toston v. State, 127 Nev. „ 267 P.3d 795, 800 (2011). 

Therefore, we reverse the district court's denial of this claim and remand 

for an evidentiary hearing on the claim. 3 

2We note that appellant filed an untimely proper person notice of 

appeal. This court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Anderson 

v. State, 60723 (Order Dismissing Appeal, June 22, 2012). 

3 1f the district court determines that appellant was deprived of a 

direct appeal, the district court should provide the remedy set forth in 

NRAP 4(c). 

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Next, appellant claimed his plea was not knowing and 

voluntary because he was not aware he could be adjudicated as a habitual 

criminal. Appellant failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that his plea 

was invalid. See Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368 

(1986); Hubbard v. State, 110 Nev. 671, 675, 877 P.2d 519, 521 (1994). 

Appellant's claim was belied by the record because he was informed in the 

guilty plea agreement, which he signed and acknowledged having read at 

the plea canvass, that he faced the possibility of adjudication as a habitual 

criminal. See Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502-03, 686 P.2d at 225 (1984). 

Moreover, appellant was not adjudicated as a habitual criminal. 

Therefore, the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Next, appellant claimed that his sentence is cruel and unusual 

punishment, plea bargains that do not bind the district court are 

improper, the district court improperly considered out-of-court statements 

made by the victim at the sentencing hearing, appellant's son told others 

that his mother coerced him into raising the allegations against appellant 

and he did not commit the crimes, the district court was biased, the State 

did not prove his prior convictions were proper for use in the 

enhancement, his prior convictions were stale and non-violent, the 

witnesses against him were not credible, he was sentenced without the 

opportunity to testify or be found guilty by a jury, he should have been 

convicted of a gross misdemeanor rather than a felony, and the 

presentence investigation report contained misstatements from the courtappointed psychologist. These claims were not based on an allegation that 

appellant's plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that his plea 

was entered without effective assistance of counsel, and therefore, were 

not permissible in a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

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stemming from a guilty plea. See NRS 34.810(1)(a). Accordingly, the 

district court did not err in denying these claims. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN 

PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the 

district court for proceedings consistent with this order. 

J. 

Douglas 

cc: Hon. Kathleen E. Delaney, District Judge 

Anthony Anderson 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk