Flashman’s Revenge: 

Central Asia after September 11

by Eugene B. Rumer

Strategic Forum

T

he September 11 terrorist attacks have

altered the geopolitical dynamics in

Central Asia. The United States has

emerged as the preeminent power in the

region, causing other countries with interests in Central Asia to adjust to radically

changed circumstances.

The war on terrorism and increasing

instability in South and Southwest Asia call

for a long-term U.S. military presence in

Central Asia. Such a presence could also

complement ongoing U.S. diplomatic relationships in the region.

In the long run, U.S. influence in the

region will have to contend with the residual

advantages that Russia, China, and Iran have

by virtue of their geographic proximity, cultural ties, and trading patterns. The American

ability to promote the security and stability of

Central Asia will depend on the cooperation

of and perhaps partnership with one or more

of these states.

Central Asia will have to contend with

poor governance, widespread corruption, and

authoritarian regimes, with all the ensuing

consequences for U.S. efforts to promote

economic and political modernization. 

Balancing short-term stability against considerations of long-term political and economic reform will further complicate these

efforts. The roles of partner, security manager, and advocate of reform are not easily

reconciled in Central Asia. Still, the events of

September 11 have left the United States with

no alternative but to address these issues.

The terrorist attacks of September 11

swept away much of the uncertainty about

Central Asia’s importance to the international

system and its relationship with the major

powers, especially the United States. Indeed, the

five states of the region—Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan—have become among the most important

frontline states in America’s war on terrorism.

But the war did not alter many basic long-term

trends in the region that will complicate U.S.

activities as well as color Central Asian perceptions of the United States. Beyond the immediate demands of the war on terrorism, many

fundamental questions remain unanswered:

How important is Central Asia to the United

States? What is the nature of U.S. interest in the

region? What role should the United States play

in Central Asia: security manager, hegemon,

limited partner?

Defining the right role for the United

States in Central Asia is no easy task. The

region is geographically remote, unknown to

much of the American public, and not easily

accessible. It has few evident connections to the

United States. U.S. interests in Central Asia—

beyond the most basic ones such as peace,

stability, and alleviation of human suffering, as

well as those associated with terrorism—are

not easy to identify in ways that the American

people and their leaders would readily embrace. Moreover, the early record of U.S. engagement in Central Asia immediately after the

breakup of the Soviet Union and through the

1990s was not a positive one, resulting in

mutual disappointments in Washington and

the Central Asian capitals. That record offers

important lessons that will be considered below.

A History of Ambivalence

The events of September 11 and the onset

of the U.S. campaign against terrorism have

produced new winners and losers in and

around Central Asia. The region itself has been

the big winner; the world has focused attention

on it to a degree unimaginable in the 1990s.

The reason the world cares is different now

than in the early 1990s, when Central Asia had

nuclear weapons left over from the Soviet

Union, or in the mid-1990s, when oil and gas

were of great interest, or in the late 1990s,

when nongovernmental organizations were

campaigning for human rights. The world

cares about Central Asia now for two reasons:

its proximity to the South Asian tinderbox and

the belated realization by Western political

establishments that state failure anywhere in

post-Soviet Central Asia carries significant risks

for the West in its efforts to root out al Qaedastyle terrorist networks.

The new focus on Central Asia is a marked

departure from the 1990s when U.S. and Western attitudes toward Central Asia were full of

ambivalence about the nature of their interests

there. Then, the United States could best be

described as a bystander who was interested in

the region but unwilling to get involved.

U.S. policy toward the former Soviet

Union was the subject of keen personal interest 

on the part of two U.S. Presidents, several

Secretaries of State, and scores of senior State

and Defense Department officials. The

record of the 1990s is rich in speeches

by U.S. officials outlining policy

toward and views on the challenges of post-Communist

transition throughout the

former Soviet Union.1

No. 195

December 2002

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points

Post-9/11 Critical 

Issues Series

No. 195, December 2002
Yet it was not until 1997 that a senior U.S.

official made a major programmatic statement

on U.S. policy toward Central Asia.

In 1997, the Deputy Secretary of State,

Strobe Talbott, the Clinton administration’s

chief architect of policy toward the former

Soviet Union, gave a major address outlining

the U.S. approach to Central Asia.2 Ironically,

the most authoritative Government statement

about strategy for the region made quite clear

that the United States had no compelling

interest in the region, that Central Asia was not

a region of critical strategic importance, and

that, as a result, Washington effectively would

have no strategy for dealing with Central Asia.

The title of the speech was “Farewell to Flashman”—telling for its repudiation of the

fictional Victorian-era character and the

atavistic “Great Game” in which the swashbuckling adventurer had ostensibly played

such an active role.

The United States, Talbott made clear, was

not interested in planting its flag in Central

Asia as a player in another Great Game. Hidden

beneath the allegorical use of the fictional

character was an important message to all

those suspecting the United States of engaging

in yet another land grab in the heart of Eurasia. The message was clear: the United States

did not have a compelling interest in the region. It aimed not to become dominant in

Central Asia, but to keep others from dominating it or competing for influence there. Unlike

Europe or Asia, where a clearly defined U.S.

footprint, maintained through a web of alliance relationships, is essential for U.S. interests, Central Asia was of secondary importance.

No immediate U.S. presence was therefore

required. U.S. interests would be just as well

served if the region continued, in effect, as a

no-man’s land outside any other power’s sphere

of influence.

The worst imaginable turn of events from

the standpoint of U.S. interests would be a

geopolitical wrestling match between Russia,

China, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Turkey for

control of Central Asia. It would upset too

many other interests that the United States

might have elsewhere. The best approach for

all parties involved, the Talbott speech suggested, would be to allow Central Asia to

become a great-power-free zone, to let it

develop its natural resources and achieve

stability through economic development.

Hence, the unspoken but obvious conclusion:

the United States would be willing to help

with economic development and democratization, but most of all it would like to keep the

region from becoming an American problem.

That attitude prevailed for the rest of the

1990s. By the end of the second Clinton administration, U.S. relations with Central Asia

reached a difficult stage. The region’s image in

Western media had become tarnished by widespread reports of corruption, growing authoritarianism, and lack of progress on economic

reform. Increasingly, the expert community

came to view the “stans” not as the next generation of Asian tigers but as the next wave of

failed states. The region’s energy wealth—once

thought to be the engine of its economic recovery—had come to be viewed as the source of

rampant, debilitating corruption that one day

would ensure it a permanent place among

those resource-rich nations, such as Nigeria or

Congo, that had failed to take advantage of

their natural wealth. As a result, by the end of

the 1990s, the U.S. strategic debate (to the

extent that there was one) about Central Asia

was left pondering whether it was “strategic

quicksand” or a “mission too far.”3

The change of administrations in Washington in 2001 initially seemed to trigger few

changes in this attitude of general indifference.

Prior to September 11, the Bush administration

evidently had little time to revisit U.S. policy

toward Central Asia. It did not figure prominently in reports of the Bush administration

review of foreign policy priorities, which focused heavily on major powers—China, Russia, and India. Perhaps the sole exception was

the region’s energy potential, which the authors of the May 2001 report of the National

Energy Policy Development Group4 identified as

a promising source of hydrocarbons that could

help diversify the world’s energy supply and

lessen global dependence on the Persian Gulf.

The New Landscape

Since September 11, the United States has

emerged as the principal power in Central

Asian affairs. With the troop presence in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, the defeat

of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, and

all signs pointing to a long-term U.S. military

presence in the region, the United States has

become Central Asia’s security manager. After

10 years of working to maintain its distance

from Central Asia, to keep the region from

becoming a U.S. responsibility and headache,

the United States has landed squarely in the

middle of it.

The U.S. arrival has been a definite gain

for the Central Asian regimes. The Russian

withdrawal from Central Asia in the early 1990s

paradoxically made life difficult for area leaders, who were left without a regional security

manager. Mutual suspicions and intraregional

rivalries have effectively thwarted all hopes for

region-wide cooperation and consolidation.

Too weak to provide for their own security, the

Central Asian states have had to contend with

domestic insurgencies, cross-border incursions,

and fears of militant Islam, as well as serious

transnational threats, including drug- and

gun-running. U.S. reluctance to fill the void for

nearly 10 years had pushed the states of Central

Asia toward uneasy relationships with Russia

and China, both of which lacked the requisite

muscle and will to become effective regional

hegemons but were more than willing to throw

their weight around and assert themselves at

the expense of indigenous rulers. The U.S.

arrival in Central Asia has changed that, displacing both Russia and China as the region’s

preeminent powers and giving its leaders room

to maneuver vis-à-vis Moscow and Beijing.

China’s Setback. In the near term, the

most prominent victim of the new post-September 11 security order in Central Asia has been

the Shanghai Forum and, by extension, China.

Established in the mid-1990s by Russia, China,

and the Central Asian states, the forum was

intended to serve many purposes. For Russia

and China, it was a chance to manage Central

Asian security affairs and cross-border issues

free of U.S. influence. The Shanghai Forum

offered the Central Asian states the opportunity

2 Strategic Forum No. 195, December 2002

Eugene B. Rumer is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies. He is a specialist on

Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union. Please address questions or comments to his

attention at ndu-inss-research@ndu.edu.

after 10 years of working

to maintain its distance

from Central Asia, the

United States has landed

squarely in the middle of it
to sit at the same table with the two biggest

players in the region, to harness their resources

to help make Central Asia more secure against

Afghanistan-based and domestic insurgents

and militant Islamic movements, and to do all

this while getting both Moscow and Beijing to

guarantee their existing borders.

But since September 11 the United States

has established itself as the main power broker

in China’s strategic backyard. Moreover, the

United States has displaced China as Russia’s

principal interlocutor in Central Asian regional

affairs and has pursued a new strategic relationship with India—China’s long-term competitor. Finally, the United States has resumed a

patron-client relationship with Pakistan—long

a Chinese partner. None of this is to be taken

lightly by the national security establishment

in Beijing, especially given the tensions in

relations with Washington in recent years.

In the near term, China’s reversal of

fortune in the heart of Eurasia has been

breathtaking. A regional power broker prior to

September 11, China now finds itself marginalized, displaced, and virtually alone,5 pondering the unenviable (for Beijing) option of

playing second fiddle to the United States and

a host of its newfound best friends. No matter

how much China gains from the U.S. military

campaign—and there can be little doubt that

it has been a beneficiary of the campaign

against the Taliban and the ensuing blow to

operations of its own Uighur militants—U.S.

preponderance in Central Asia must be a

serious setback to the government that aspires

to the role of the Asian superpower.

Russia’s Gain. Russia’s post-September 11

position in the Central Asian region is more

bittersweet. Undoubtedly, few among Moscow’s

foreign policy and military elite cherish the sight

of U.S. troops in their strategic backyard. U.S.

military presence has been an awkward reality

for Russia’s national security establishment;

after all, the Russian government granted the

United States access to facilities that the Russian

military still controlled in areas that were Soviet

only a decade ago. At least, some must have

thought resentfully, the United States had the

decency to consult with Russia before moving

into the region.

Still, the uncompromising public stance

by President Vladimir Putin in support of U.S.

actions has brought a number of important

advantages to Moscow. The United States has

tacitly acknowledged a certain Russian droit de

regard in Central Asia. Russia’s own military

campaign in Chechnya ceased being a barrier

to Moscow’s relations with the West and instead

became something of a bridge on the strength

of the argument that both Russia and the

United States are fighting the same militant

Islamic enemy. Russian claims of Osama bin

Laden’s complicity in Chechnya’s separatist

(Moscow prefers to call it terrorist) movement

have also been perceived in a different light

since September 11. The issue of violations of

human rights in Chechnya has been effectively

relegated to the back burner in favor of the

more immediate concerns about terrorism and

other issues in relations with Washington.

Furthermore, Russia got a major postSeptember 11 boost in its standing in relation

to China, whose growing economic, military,

and strategic might had become a source of

increasingly vocal concern among Russian

politicians and foreign policy specialists.6 New

regard for Russia in Washington, as well as

prospects for continuing improvements in U.S.-

Russian relations, must send an important

signal to Beijing, further contributing to its

sudden sense of isolation.

In Central Asia proper, the new spirit of

accord and cooperation in U.S.-Russian relations has had important implications as well.

Central Asian potentates have learned well how

to play Washington and Moscow against each

other. The fact that there is now less light

between respective Russian and U.S. positions

on a number of important issues leaves Central

Asian governments less room to maneuver and

exploit their differences, whether in regard to

pipeline routes, Caspian boundaries, or security

ties to rogue regimes.

In practical terms, Russia can do little

other than offer the United States unimpeded

access to Central Asia. It has no military

muscle that would have allowed it to play a

significant role in the Afghanistan military

campaign in the air or on the ground. In the

short and medium terms, the best that

Moscow can do in support of counterterrorism

is to provide unfettered access to and from the

Central Asian region, share intelligence, and

do all it can (including accepting international aid) to put its own house in order—to

secure its nuclear weapons, material, and

expertise, as well as its chemical weapons and

biological warfare capabilities.

The nature of Russia’s contribution to the

war in Afghanistan indicates its likely role in

the region beyond the near term. Geography

will ensure its continuing importance to the

region for years to come, if only as an outlet for

oil and gas. Alternatives to existing shipping

routes will take years to build, and even then

they will complement, rather than substitute

for, the routes currently crossing Russia.

In addition to its geographic proximity,

Russia is bound to stay involved in Central Asia

for a long time because of its residual ethnic

population there. Despite considerable emigration from Central Asia, the region is still home

to some 8 million ethnic Russians (the largest

populations residing in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—5.1 million and 1.4 million, respectively).7 Although the fate of ethnic Russians

abroad is unlikely to be as important a theme

in domestic politics as some politicians have

claimed, no government in Moscow will be in a

position to ignore this issue, especially in the

event of regional destabilization.

But Russia’s military weakness, lack of

power projection capabilities, and limited

resources (already under multiple domestic

demands) will mean that it is not a realistic

candidate to become the region’s security

manager or hegemon for years to come, regardless of the future of U.S.-Russian relations.

Even so, given the congruence of U.S. and

Russian interests in combating radical Islamic

terrorism, Moscow’s military weakness means

that U.S. military presence in Central Asia will

benefit Russian security interests, no matter

how difficult it will be for the Russian elite to

come to terms with this turn of events.

Iran’s Loss. By contrast, Iran—Russia’s

long-time partner in Central Asia and ally in

the anti-Taliban cause—has found itself

among the losers in the region’s post-September 11 realignment. Long the pivotal member

of the anti-Taliban coalition and loyal backer

of the Northern Alliance, Iran has been

squeezed out of its key foothold in Central

Asia—Tajikistan—with which it shares strong

common cultural, linguistic, and ethnic ties.

No. 195, December 2002 Strategic Forum 3

U.S. military presence in

Central Asia will benefit

Russian security interests,

no matter how difficult 

it will be for the Russian

elite to come to terms

with this turn of events
4 Strategic Forum No. 195, December 2002

The speed and eagerness with which the

Tajik government accepted U.S. military presence on its soil must have seemed the ultimate

betrayal to Tehran. The opening of Turkmen

airspace to American overflights (even if officially only for humanitarian purposes) and the

deployment of allied troops to Central Asia

must have underscored to Iran’s political

establishment that in a confrontation with the

United States, it would now need to worry

about U.S. presence not only in the Persian

Gulf but also in the north—Central Asia and

the Caucasus—to say nothing of the east and

south—Afghanistan and Pakistan.

There can be little doubt that Iran, like

China, has been an immediate beneficiary of

the military defeat of the Taliban, with which

Tehran had had a very tense relationship. But

the aftermath of the military campaign and the

de facto establishment of a U.S. protectorate in

Afghanistan must have been a blow to Iranian

interests, adding to a growing sense of encirclement by the United States.

In the immediate post-September 11

period and the active phase of the military

campaign in Afghanistan, U.S.-Iranian relations showed glimmers of hope. Both the United

States and Iran had long been opposed to the

Taliban regime. Iran’s expression of sympathy

for the United States after the tragedy of September 11, pledge of cooperation in delivering

essential humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and

offer of assistance to U.S. airmen in cases of

emergency had further fueled those hopes. In

the absence of a common enemy, however, the

United States and Iran found themselves on

opposite sides of the Afghan divide. Iranian

attempts to play factional politics in

Afghanistan threatened the stability of the

fragile U.S.-backed Hamid Karzai government.

In addition, Iranian rejection of the

invitation by Washington to join the war on

terrorism manifested itself in continuing Iranian support for terrorist attacks against Israel,

most notably, as suggested in the so-called

Karine-A incident of January 2002, in which

Israel Defense Forces intercepted a major

clandestine shipment of Iranian-supplied

weapons and munitions to the Palestinian

Authority.8 The episode sent a powerful signal

that expectations of an imminent U.S.-Iranian

thaw in the aftermath of September 11 had

been premature indeed. This in turn was a

blow to Iranian influence in Central Asia,

where a new sheriff—the United States—was

in charge.

An Unavoidable

Responsibility

The emergence of the United States in a

new critical role in Central Asian security

affairs and the rapid displacement by the

United States of all other major players from

the Central Asian landscape prompt the following questions: Is this an opportunity to be

feared? Is Central Asia a “mission too far” for

the United States? And, again, what is the

nature of U.S. interest there?

There can be little doubt that, in the short

and medium term, the United States is committed to maintaining its military, political,

and economic presence in Central Asia. The

United States may adjust the level of its military presence in the region consistent with the

operational requirements of the mission of

securing Afghanistan, as well as other requirements associated with combating terrorism, but

support for Afghanistan and prosecution of

counterterrorism missions are the interests that

will determine U.S. presence in the region.9

Moreover, the pledge made by President

George Bush and Secretary of State Colin

Powell—“the United States will not abandon

the people of Afghanistan”10—leaves no doubt

that the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is a longterm proposition, one that General Tommy

Franks has recently compared to the American

presence in Korea. Given Afghanistan’s landlocked position and U.S. dependence on such

volatile neighbors as Pakistan or Iran for

access, Central Asia is bound to play a critical

role in counterterrorism strategy. Pakistan’s

volatility and the current state and uncertain

future of U.S.-Iranian relations underscore the

importance of Central Asia as an alternative

staging area for operations by the Armed Forces

in Afghanistan.

In the aftermath of September 11, though,

it would be shortsighted to define U.S. interests

in Central Asia merely in terms of operational

counterterrorism requirements and ongoing

military operations in Afghanistan. The tragedy

of the terrorist attacks has given a new and very

different meaning to the notion first articulated

by U.S. policymakers in the 1990s and enunciated by Strobe Talbott in 1997—the notion

that U.S. interests in Central Asia will be adequately served by the absence of geopolitical

competition in the region, by keeping the

region free of the Great Game. In the benign

post-Cold War atmosphere of the 1990s, it was

natural to interpret this simply as a formula of

U.S. disinterest and desire to avoid a new entanglement. As long as Central Asia was free of

big power competition, the United States had

little interest in it.

It is clear in retrospect that other powers

took a different view. Russia, China, Iran, and

Pakistan did not stay out of Central Asia or

Afghanistan. The latter, in fact, became the

hotbed of factional and big power rivalries with

(it seemed at the time) only the United States

not getting involved directly but admonishing

everyone else from the sidelines to stay out.

Factional warfare, driven by Afghanistan’s

internal divisions and fueled by big power meddling in its internal affairs, consumed the country in the 1990s, eventually raising the specter of

region-wide instability. Yet not one single power

involved in regional competition and

Afghanistan’s internecine warfare proved up to

the task of displacing all others and assuming

the role of Central Asia’s security manager.

In retrospect, the 1990s notion of making

Central Asia free of the Great Game and keeping it stable by limiting U.S. presence was

unrealistic. Since September 11, the opposite

appears to be unavoidably true: that the way to

keep Central Asia stable and free of great power

competition is by filling the security vacuum

that allowed the competition to develop in the

first place.

An Enduring Challenge

Whether the United States is prepared to

take on the challenge of maintaining security

and stability in Central Asia is virtually moot,

since in the eyes of most powers interested in

the region, it already has done so. U.S. actions

and statements in this regard have left little

room for doubt. Aside from the military deployment to the region, one of the most telling signs

of U.S. commitment to Central Asia appeared in

the bilateral U.S.-Uzbek declaration in March

the way to keep Central

Asia stable and free of

great power competition

is by filling the security

vacuum that allowed the

competition to develop 

in the first place
2002, in which the United States affirmed that

“it would regard with grave concern any external threat to the security and territorial integrity

of the Republic of Uzbekistan.”11

Such an undertaking will involve a substantial commitment of political and financial

resources from the United States, well in excess

of the billions of dollars spent to date in Central Asia.12 There is no guarantee that the

United States will eventually prove up to the

task, which it appears to have taken on in the

aftermath of September 11. The biggest challenge appears to be the long-term, almost

open-ended nature of the commitment required—along the lines of the commitment

the United States has made to countries such as

Turkey or Pakistan. Far more than money for

acquisition of military capabilities and bailouts

of insolvent local regimes, the United States

would have to take on the challenge of the

region’s modernization and integration in the

international community and economy.

Central Asia is vast, poor, corrupt, and

polluted.13 It suffers from backwardness and

long-term neglect as well as from equally

long-term isolation from the outside world.14

The majority of the region’s inhabitants have

seen their fortunes decline in the first decade

since independence.15 Overcoming these obstacles will be difficult and expensive, will require

a long-term commitment, and is not guaranteed success.

Yet despite long-running decline and

numerous obstacles to improvement in the

region, several aspects of the Central Asian

situation suggest that conditions in the region

are not as precarious as they appear to be in

neighboring Afghanistan. Although the region’s

population is predominantly Muslim, Central

Asia has no tradition of militant Islam. Its

governments have been able to maintain a

considerable degree of internal stability, albeit

by nondemocratic, often oppressive means.

Regional security has been greatly enhanced by

the presence of U.S. troops and—more importantly—the defeat of the Taliban regime in

Afghanistan and eradication of militant Islamic movements that had made forays across

the border from their Taliban-sponsored

Afghan sanctuaries.

The relative stability of Central Asia,

combined with its multitude of needs, makes

identifying some of the more deserving targets

for U.S. assistance a rather straightforward

task. From helping local and national governments improve water resource management

and basic infrastructure projects to building

and training national military institutions, the

list is long and—ironically—familiar. It is

virtually the same list that foreign governments

and international organizations from the

World Bank to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization offered the newly independent Central

Asian nations or contemplated offering a

decade ago. Ten years into independence, the

types of things Central Asia needs are largely

the same as they were when the Soviet Union

was collapsing, except the needs have become

ever more dire.

In spite of this lamentable continuity in

Central Asia, the situation in the region is far

from being a mere replica of the early postindependence phase. The five Central Asian

states have firmly established their independence, which was far from being taken for

granted a decade ago. The worst of postindependence strife has passed, most notably

Tajikistan’s civil war. Local elites have consolidated their hold on political power and economic resources. The five Central Asian countries have established and tested relationships

with other nations. And last, but certainly not

least, whereas the nature of U.S. interest in the

states had seemed uncertain only a decade

ago, the events of September 11 erased any

doubts that the United States is committed to

staying in the region for the long run.

But Central Asia’s status quo is at least as

much of a problem as it is an opening to a

potential solution to the region’s problems. Its

regimes are entrenched and have determinedly

suppressed all political opposition despite

countless appeals from the United States and

other nations to respect the most basic human

rights. Political succession is one of the greatest

challenges facing all regimes in Central Asia,

where democracy has steadily retrenched since

the days of perestroika and glasnost.

There is no dividing line between power

and property anywhere in the region. In fact, as

evidenced by numerous corruption scandals

and Western investigations involving prominent Central Asian personalities, access to

political power is the most reliable pathway to

wealth and property.16 The result of this has

been accumulation of wealth by local political

elites and widespread impoverishment of the

general population. Thus, the very sources of

Central Asian stability in the near term are the

obstacles to political and economic modernization and stability in the long term.

This situation, not unique to Central Asia,

poses a difficult challenge for the United States,

the challenge of harnessing the near-term

forces of stability in the name of long-term

change. It is in effect the same challenge U.S.

policymakers have faced in Central Asia since

1991, although the stakes clearly have been

altered in the wake of the terrorist attacks.

Toward a New Strategy

Given those stakes and the enduring

nature of Central Asian resistance to political

and economic modernization, the only sensible option for U.S. policy is to work with the

region’s ruling regimes but simultaneously to

seek gradual change in their domestic political and economic environments. The watchwords in this context should be continuity

and gradualism.

In the area of economic assistance, the

emphasis should be on alleviating widespread

poverty and eliminating potential sources of

political destabilization, such as high unemployment in rural and urban areas. Given the

region’s need for major improvements in basic

infrastructure, the water supply system, and

other labor-intensive projects, U.S. and other

international assistance could go a long way

toward providing much-needed jobs and income, defusing political tensions, and improving intraregional cooperation.

Domestic politics represents a far more

challenging target for U.S. assistance. The

entire experience of the 1990s in Central Asia

suggests that the region’s political elites have

not embraced the basic concepts of democracy

and have only paid lip service—at best—to

admonitions from Western leaders and international organization. Thus, the real

challenge—given the inevitability of political

succession throughout Central Asia—is to

make sure that succession does not lead to

No. 195, December 2002 Strategic Forum 5

the very sources of

Central Asian stability 

in the near term are the

obstacles to political 

and economic modernization and stability in

the long term
destabilization, as befell Tajikistan in the early

1990s. In the absence of stable domestic institutions and in the presence of personality-based

regimes, whose chief aim has been to avoid

political succession, political succession is the

biggest long-term threat to regional stability.

Here too, U.S. policy options are quite

limited and could involve tradeoffs between

stability and commitment to democratic principles. In some countries with troubled democratic traditions, such as Turkey, Pakistan, and

South Korea, the military has on occasion

taken an active role in domestic politics, claiming to be the last pillar of stability and savior of

the nation. Regardless of the merits of those

claims, the five Central Asian states do not yet

have even that option, however objectionable it

may appear. Their militaries are new, small,

and have uncertain traditions, given their short

histories of independence and statehood, as

well as the long-standing Soviet practice of

restricting the number of Muslim minorities in

the officer corps. U.S. security assistance and

military-to-military contacts could promote the

development of professional military institutions in Central Asia. However, it is conceivable

that in a future crisis in a Central Asian country, the military could indeed become the last

pillar of stability, triggering its intervention in

domestic politics. 

Need for a Diplomatic Strategy. The

new—deeper and wider—U.S. footprint in

Central Asia also calls for a new diplomatic

strategy for the region. The burden of Central

Asia is certain to be such that participation by

and cooperation from other powers with interests in the region will be required.

Given the regional players involved, forging a diplomatic consensus around Central Asia

will clearly be no easy task. The short list includes China, Iran, and Russia. Of these, Russia

has been by far the most cooperative partner in

U.S. post-September 11 efforts in Central Asia.

Each nation has a huge stake in regional stability, despite deepseated resentment and fears of

supposed U.S. hegemony in what each considers

its backyard. Thus, these states share an important interest with the United States. However,

their interest in Central Asian stability does not

outweigh fears of U.S. preponderance. Resolving

these tensions and forging a cooperative regime

will require a deliberate and determined effort,

along with compromise on the part of the

United States to communicate the nature of its

interests and presence in Central Asia and to

convince the Central Asian states of the nonthreatening nature of American intentions.

The Tyranny of Geography. Central Asia’s

most important neighbors—China, Iran, and

Russia—albeit squeezed by the arrival of the

United States in the short run, are bound to

play an important role in the region if only

because of geography.

Russia remains an important outlet for the

region’s commerce and a source of important

subsidies through favorable trade terms.17

6 Strategic Forum No. 195, December 2002

Esfahan

Shiraz

Basra

Qaraghandy

Chelyabinsk Kazan

Krasnodar

Kuybyshev

Novosibirsk

Omsk

Saratov

Ufa

Volgograd

Adana

Izmir

Donets'k

Oral

Nizhnily

Novgorod

Hotan

Karamay

Kashi

Korla

Qiemo

Bakhtaran

Aqtöbe

Aralsk

Saryshaghan

g

Atyrau

Aqtau

Tabriz

Shymkent

Taraz

Semey

Qostanay Pavlodar

Yekaterinburg

-

-

Xankändi

Mosul Aleppo

Kabul

Minsk

Tehran

Baghdad

Kuwait

Islamabad

Chisinau

Moscow

Ankara

Ashgabat

Kiev

Tashkent

Dushanbe

Damascus

Amman

T’bilisi

Yerevan

Beirut

Jerusalem

Cairo

Bishkek

Astana

Baku

RUSSIA

TURKEY

BELARUS

UKRAINE

MOLDOVA

EGYPT

JORDAN

ISRAEL

LEBANON

ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN

GEORGIA

KYRGYZSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

KUWAIT

SYRIA IRAQ

IRAN

SAUDI 

ARABIA 

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN INDIA

CHINA

KAZAKHSTAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN
China, too, will continue to play a growing role

in Central Asia. Its setback after September 11 is

a short- to medium-term phenomenon. It

shares a long border with Kazakhstan. Quite

apart even from the much-discussed oil pipeline

project from Kazakhstan to China—which

after years in limbo is facing daunting odds—

China has long been Central Asia’s key trading

partner.18 Aside from political and security

considerations, Central Asia is of particular

importance to Beijing because of its proximity

to Xinjiang and its ability to serve as a key

source of raw materials, steel, cement, fertilizers, and heavy machinery for that critical region.19 Quite clearly, economic development has

been key to Beijing’s hopes of maintaining

political stability there. That in turn underscores the importance of Central Asia for China.

Conversely, China is immensely important

for its two major Central Asian neighbors, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. But China’s gravitational pull will be a matter of trade and economic relationships spread out over decades. In

the short term, trade and even geographic

proximity are no match for U.S. military muscle

and Russia’s residual military presence in the

region. In the long run, Russia’s and China’s

staying power should not be underestimated.

Seeking a partnership for Eurasian stability with both Russia and China would require a

major adjustment in current U.S. thinking

about both countries. Neither may be ready at

the current stage for such a partnership, as they

are still adjusting to the fallout from September

11 and the U.S. response to it. Whether one or

both of these countries will ultimately join the

United States in this effort to bring long-term

stability to Eurasia is likely to be determined by

the overall quality and direction of U.S. relationships with each of them. But the prospect of

partnership in securing and consolidating the

gains of the early phase of the counterterrorism

campaign in Central Asia should be an important consideration in the U.S. debate about

relations with Russia and China.

Iran poses an equally difficult challenge

in the context of U.S. presence in Central Asia.

Its geographic proximity, ethnic and cultural

ties to the region, geopolitical ambitions, and

potential role as an export route and market

for oil and gas virtually ensure it an important

role in Central Asia’s long-term scenarios.

Although its military capabilities are unlikely

to pose a challenge to U.S. interests, it is

uniquely well positioned to meddle in regional

affairs and undermine U.S. influence there.

Thus, seeking a modus vivendi with Iran in

Central Asia is another key element of U.S.

diplomatic strategy for the region.

At the same time, there is no question that

the United States enjoys considerable leverage

vis-à-vis Iran in Central Asia. Militarily, economically, and politically, its position is far

superior to that of Iran—a circumstance

unlikely to be lost on Iranian political leaders.

Upon rational consideration, a modus vivendi

with the United States in Central Asia could

become an important objective for the Iranian

government. It would be counterproductive

therefore to relegate Iran a priori to the category of a U.S. adversary in Central Asia.

The biggest challenge that the United

States is likely to confront in Central Asia will

be the nature of Central Asian regimes and

their resistance to modernization. Stated

bluntly, the United States, through its political

involvement and military presence, runs the

risk of becoming the security guarantor of

Central Asia’s regimes—regimes that are

retrograde, oppressive, and resistant to political

and economic reforms urged upon them by

the United States and much of the rest of the

international community since their independence from the Soviet Union. Based on

experience, the odds that the United States will

be able to use its military presence and political influence as leverage to advance economic

and political reforms in Central Asia are not

encouraging. Hence, the danger that regional

regimes will use their role in fighting terrorism as an excuse to resist change is very real.

However, the United States simply has not been

given an alternative to maintaining a longterm presence in Central Asia and taking on

the role of security manager.

In the future, a lack of progress in U.S.

efforts to modernize Central Asia should not be

seen necessarily as a failure of U.S. policy. It is

important to recognize the limits of U.S. resources and influence. It is also important to

consider the alternatives and the fact that U.S.

presence has already contributed greatly to

regional stability and security and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

Notes1

For the online archive of Clinton administration

statements, see <http://clinton.archives.gov/welcome/

welcome.html> and <http://www.state.gov/index.html>. 2

Address by Strobe Talbott on July 21, 1997. See <http://

www.state.gov/www/regions/nis/970721talbott.html>. 3

See, for example, Kenneth Weisbrode, “Central Eurasia:

Prize or Quicksand? Contending Views of Instability in Karabagh,

Ferghana and Afghanistan,” International Institute for Strategic

Studies, Adelphi Paper 338; and Richard D. Sokolsky and Tanya

Charlick-Paley, “NATO and Caspian Security: A Mission Too Far?”

(Washington, DC: RAND, MR–1074–AF, 1999). 4

See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/Chapter8.pdf>.

5

China’s post-September 11 isolation in Central Asia is

underscored by the unprecedented new positive relations between

Russia and the United States, which were unaffected even by U.S.

withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty—a move that is

more likely to affect the U.S.-Chinese strategic balance than U.S.-

Russian strategic balance. 6

See, for example, materials from discussion on China

and the future of Russian-Chinese relations held by the leading

Russian foreign and defense policy organization Council for

Foreign and Defense Policy, accessed at <http://www.svop.ru/

yuka/856.shtml>. 7

Calculated on the basis of the Central Intelligence

Agency, The World Factbook 2001, accessed at <http://www.

cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>. 8

See Robert Satloff, “The Peace Process at Sea: The KarineA Affair and the War On Terrorism,” National Interest (Spring

2002), accessed at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/

satloff/satloff-peace.htm>; James Bennet, “Seized Arms Would

Have Vastly Extended Arafat Arsenal,” The New York Times,

January 12, 2002; and “President Bush, Prime Minister Sharon

Central Asia’s most

important neighbors—

China, Iran, and Russia—

are bound to play an

important role in the

region if only because 

of geography

No. 195, December 2002 Strategic Forum 7

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by

members of the National Defense University as well as

other scholars and specialists in national security affairs

from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions,

and recommendations expressed or implied within are

those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect

the views of the Department of Defense or any other

agency of the Federal Government.

PUBLICATION DIRECTORATE

Robert A. Silano William R. Bode

Director of Publications General Editor

The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes

books, monographs, and reports on national security

strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy.

For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at:

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/ndup2.html. INSS also

produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at:

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear

Director Director of Research
Discuss Middle East,” February 7, 2002, accessed at <http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-15.html>. 9

See remarks by Tommy Franks in August 2002 that U.S.

troops will remain in Afghanistan “indefinitely,” accessed at

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatonline/20020826/4391202s.htm>. 10 Colin L. Powell, remarks at International Conference for

Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, Tokyo, Japan, January

21, 2002, accessed at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/

2002/7366.htm>. 11 United States-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic

Partnership and Cooperation Framework, March 12, 2002,

accessed at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8736.htm>. 12In fiscal year 2002, assistance funding to the five Central

Asian states was estimated at $442 million. Since 1992, U.S.

Government assistance to Kazakhstan has amounted to roughly

$1 billion; Uzbekistan, $600 million; Turkmenistan, $250

million; Tajikistan, $475 million; and Kyrgyzstan, $725 million.

Compiled from Department of State data, it can be accessed at

<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/11032pf.htm>, <http://www.

state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/11038pf.htm >, <http://www.state.gov/p/

eur/rls/fs/11037pf.htm>, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/

11035pf.htm >, and <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/

11033pf.htm >.

13 Information on the internal situation in Central Asia is

widely available to the general public. For example, the International Crisis Group has published a series of reports describing

conditions in Central Asian countries and highlighting their

implications for their stability: “Central Asia: Water and Conflict,

May 2002,” accessed at <http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/

projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=668>; “Central Asia: Border

Disputes and Conflict Potential, April 2002,” accessed at

<http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?

reportid=606>. See also “Nations in Transit,” published

annually by Freedom House, accessed at <http://www.

freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm>. 14 In December 2001 testimony before the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for

European and Eurasian Affairs, A. Elizabeth Jones, summarized

the past 2 centuries of Central Asian history as a transition from

“squabbling and despotic warlords” to Russian colonization to

Soviet-imposed isolation. Testimony accessed at <http://www.

state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2001/11299pf.htm>. 15 All five Central Asian states have seen major increases in

infant mortality, a basic indicator of a country’s health, since

their independence and are comparable to some of the least

developed countries in Africa. See the Central Intelligence Agency,

The World Factbook 2001, accessed at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/

publications/factbook/index.html>; and Demograficheskiy

Yezhegodnik SSSR 1990 (USSR Demographic Yearbook 1990)

(Moscow: Goskomstat, 1990). 16 Seymour M. Hersh, “The Price Of Oil,” The New Yorker,

July 9, 2001. 17 For example, in 1999—the latest year available—

Russia was Kazakhstan’s biggest trading partner, with 20 percent

of Kazakhstan’s exports and 37 percent of its imports (International Monetary Fund, Republic of Kazakhstan: Selected Issues

and Statistical Appendix, January 2001). In 1999, Russia

accounted for 57 percent of Uzbekistan’s imports and 41 percent

of its exports (International Monetary Fund, Republic of

Uzbekistan: Recent Economic Developments, March 2000). 18 Ibid.

19 Such trade data is sporadic at best, but in 1996, for

example, Kazakhstan is reported to have accounted for 

43 percent of Xinjiang imports, Kyrgyzstan, only 14 percent. See

Central Asia and the New Global Economy (New York: M.E.

Sharpe, 2000), 220.

8 Strategic Forum No. 195, December 2002

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