STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY REPORT 

Regarding Use of National Security Authorities 

~ Calendar Year 2017 ~ 

Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency

April 2018
STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY REPORT 

Regarding Use of National Security Authorities 

~ Calendar Year 2017 ~ 

Table of Contents

Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 3

A. Background. ......................................................................................................................... 3

B. Areas Covered in this Report. .............................................................................................. 4

C. Context and Clarity. ............................................................................................................. 5

D. Key Terms............................................................................................................................. 5

FISA Probable Cause Authorities .................................................................................................... 7

A. FISA Titles I and III ................................................................................................................ 7

B. FISA Title VII, Sections 703 and 704..................................................................................... 7

C. Statistics............................................................................................................................... 8

FISA Section 702............................................................................................................................ 10

A. Section 702......................................................................................................................... 10

B. Statistics—Orders and Targets .......................................................................................... 12

C. Statistics—U.S. Person Queries ......................................................................................... 14

D. Section 702 and FBI Investigations. ................................................................................... 19

NSA Dissemination of U.S. Person Information under FISA Section 702 ..................................... 20

A. Section 702......................................................................................................................... 20

B. Statistics............................................................................................................................. 22

FISA Criminal Use and Notice Provisions...................................................................................... 25

A. FISA Sections 106 and 305 ................................................................................................. 25

B. Statistics............................................................................................................................. 25

FISA Title IV – Use of Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Devices ..................................... 27

A. FISA Pen Register/Trap and Trace Authority. .................................................................... 27

B. Statistics............................................................................................................................. 27

FISA Title V – BUSINESS RECORDS ................................................................................................ 30

A. Business Records FISA........................................................................................................ 30

B. Statistics –  “Traditional” Business Records Statistics Orders, Targets & Identifiers........ 31

C. Statistics – Call Detail Record (CDR) Orders, Targets & Identifiers ................................... 32

D. Statistics – Call Detail Records Queries ............................................................................. 35

NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS (NSLs)............................................................................................ 36

A. National Security Letters.................................................................................................... 36

B. Statistics – National Security Letters and Requests of Information.................................. 36

APPENDIX A................................................................................................................................... 39
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Introduction

Today, consistent with the USA FREEDOM Act and the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 

2017 (the reauthorized FAA) requirements to release certain statistics (codified in 50 U.S.C. 

§ 1873(b)) and the Intelligence Community’s (IC) Principles of Intelligence Transparency, we are 

releasing our fifth annual Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security 

Authorities presenting statistics on how often the government uses certain national security 

authorities. Providing these statistics allows for an additional way to track the use of Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) authorities and gives further context to the IC’s rigorous and 

multi-layered oversight framework that safeguards the privacy of United States person 

information acquired pursuant to FISA. The report goes beyond its statutory duty of providing 

statistics and further provides the public with detailed explanation as to how the IC uses these 

national security authorities. 

Additional public information on national security authorities is available at the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) website, www.dni.gov, and ODNI’s public tumblr site, 

IC on the Record. Furthermore, since the release of the previous report, ODNI has created the 

new website, www.intelligence.gov, that contains additional public information on the IC’s 

activities.

A. Background.

In June 2014,the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) began releasing statistics relating to the 

use of critical national security authorities, including the FISA, in an annual report called the 

Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities (hereafter the

Annual Statistical Transparency Report). Subsequent Annual Statistical Transparency Reports 

were released in 2015, 2016, and 2017. 

On June 2, 2015, the USA FREEDOM Act was enacted, codifying a requirement to publicly report 

many of the statistics already reported in the Annual Statistical Transparency Report. The Act 

also expanded the scope of the information included in the reports by requiring the DNI to 

report information concerning United States person (U.S. person or USP) search terms and 

queries of certain FISA-acquired information, as well as specific statistics concerning call detail 

records. See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b). On January 19, 2018, the reauthorized FAA was signed. See 50 

U.S.C. § 1881a. The reauthorized FAA (also referred to as the Section 702 Reauthorization Act of 

2017) codified additional statistics that must be publicly released, including many statistics that 

the government previously reported pursuant to its commitment to transparency. 
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B. Areas Covered in this Report.

This report provides statistics in the following areas (the terms used below are defined and 

explained later in this report):

 FISA Probable Cause Authorities. The number of orders—and the number of targets 

under those orders—for the use of FISA authorities that require probable cause 

determinations by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), under Titles I and 

III, and Section 703 and 704, of FISA.

 FISA Section 702. 

o The number of orders—and the number of targets under those orders—issued 

pursuant to Section 702 of FISA.

o The number of U.S. person queries of Section 702-acquired content and metadata.

o The number of instances in which the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

personnel received and reviewed Section 702-acquired information that the FBI 

identified as concerning a U.S. person in response to a query that was designed to 

return evidence of a crime unrelated to foreign intelligence.

o The number of instances in which the FBI opened, under the Criminal Investigative 

Division, an investigation of a U.S. person (who is not considered a threat to national 

security) based wholly or in part on Section 702-acquired information.

o The number of National Security Agency (NSA)-disseminated Section 702 reports 

containing U.S. person identities (various statistics relating to reports where the U.S. 

person identity was openly named or originally masked and subsequently 

unmasked).

 Use in Criminal Proceedings. The number of criminal proceedings in which the United 

States or a State or political subdivision provided notice under FISA of the government’s 

intent to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose any information derived from 

electronic surveillance, physical search, or Section 702 acquisition. 

 Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices. The number of orders—and the number of 

targets under those orders—for the use of FISA’s pen register/trap and trace devices, 

and the number of unique identifiers used to communicate information collected 

pursuant to those orders. 

 Business Records. The number of orders—and the number of targets under those 

orders—issued pursuant to FISA’s business records authority, and the number of unique 

identifiers used to communicate information collected pursuant to those orders. In 
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addition, the number of orders—and the number of targets under those orders—issued 

pursuant to FISA’s business record authority for the production of call detail records, 

and the number of call detail records received from providers and stored in NSA 

repositories.

 National Security Letters. The number of national security letters issued, and the 

number of requests for information within those national security letters.

C. Context and Clarity.

Consistent with the IC’s Principles of Intelligence Transparency, this report seeks to enhance 

public understanding by including explanations and charts for context and clarity. For example, 

the report provides charts that place the statistics in this report in context with the statistics in 

prior reports. While these statistics provide an important point of reference for understanding 

the use of these authorities, it is important to keep in mind the statistics’ limitations. The 

statistics fluctuate from year to year for a variety of reasons (e.g., operational priorities, world 

events, technical capabilities), some of which cannot be explored in an unclassified setting. 

Moreover, there may be no relationship between a decrease in the use of one authority and an 

increase in another. Nonetheless, we believe this report provides helpful information about 

how the IC uses these vital national security authorities. 

D. Key Terms.

Certain terms used throughout this report are described below. Other terms are described in 

the sections in which they are most directly relevant.

 U.S. Person. As defined by Title I of FISA, a U.S. person is “a citizen of the United 

States , an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 

101(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), an unincorporated association a 

substantial number of members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens 

lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated 

in the United States, but does not include a corporation or an association which is a 

foreign power, as defined in [50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1), (2), or (3)].” 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i). 

Section 602 of the USA FREEDOM Act, however, uses a narrower definition. Since

the broader Title I definition governs how U.S. person queries are conducted 

pursuant to the relevant minimization procedures, it will be used throughout this 

report.
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 Target. Within the IC, the term “target” has multiple meanings. With respect to the 

statistics provided in this report, the term “target” is defined as the individual 

person, group, entity composed of multiple individuals, or foreign power that uses 

the selector such as a telephone number or email address. 

 Orders. There are different types of orders that the FISC may issue in connection 

with FISA cases, for example: orders granting or modifying the government’s 

authority to conduct foreign intelligence collection; orders directing electronic 

communication service providers to provide any technical assistance necessary to 

implement the authorized foreign intelligence collection; and supplemental orders 

and briefing orders requiring the government to take a particular action or provide 

the court with specific information. The FISC may amend an order one or more times 

after it has been issued. For example, an order may be amended to add a newly 

discovered account used by the target. This report does not count such amendments

separately. The FISC may renew some orders multiple times during the calendar 

year. Each authority permitted under FISA has specific time limits for the FISA 

authority to continue (e.g., a Section 704 order against a U.S. person target outside 

of the United States may last no longer than 90 days but FISA permits the order to 

be renewed, see 50 U.S.C. § 1881c(c)(4)). Each renewal requires a separate 

application submitted by the government to the FISC and a finding by the FISC that 

the application meets the requirements of FISA. Thus, unlike amendments, this 

report does count each such renewal as a separate order. These terms will be used 

consistently throughout this report.

 “Estimated Number.” Throughout this report, when numbers are estimated, the 

estimate comports with the statutory requirements to provide a “good faith 

estimate” of a particular number. 

 Dissemination. In the most basic sense, dissemination refers to the sharing of 

minimized information. As it pertains to FISA (including Section 702), if an agency (in 

this instance NSA) lawfully collects information pursuant to FISA and wants to 

disseminate that information, the agency must first apply its minimization 

procedures to that information. 
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FISA Probable Cause Authorities

A. FISA Titles I and III

To conduct electronic surveillance or 

physical search under FISA Title I or FISA 

Title III, a probable cause court order is 

required regardless of U.S. person status.

Under FISA, Title I permits electronic 

surveillance and Title III permits physical 

search in the United States of foreign 

powers or agents of a foreign power for 

the purpose of collecting foreign 

intelligence information. See 50 U.S.C. 

§§ 1804 and 1823. Title I (electronic 

surveillance) and Title III (physical search) 

are commonly referred to as “Traditional FISA.” Both require that the FISC make a probable 

cause finding, based upon a factual statement in the government’s application, that (i) the 

target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, as defined by FISA and (ii) the facility 

being targeted for electronic surveillance is used by or about to be used, or the premises or 

property to be searched is or is about to be owned, used, possessed by, or is in transit to or 

from a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. In addition to meeting the probable cause 

standard, the government’s application must meet the other requirements of FISA. See 50 

U.S.C. §§ 1804(a) and 1823(a). 

B. FISA Title VII, Sections 703 and 704

FISA Title VII Sections 703 and 704 similarly require a court order based on a finding of 

probable cause for the government to undertake FISA activities targeting U.S. persons located 

outside the United States. Section 703 applies when the government seeks to conduct 

electronic surveillance or to acquire stored electronic communications or stored electronic 

data, in a manner that otherwise requires an order pursuant to FISA, of a U.S. person who is 

reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. Section 704 applies when the 

government seeks to conduct collection overseas targeting a U.S. person reasonably believed to

be located outside the United States under circumstances in which the U.S. person has a 

reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required if the acquisition were 

conducted in the United States. Both Sections 703 and 704 require that the FISC make a 

FISA Title I, Title III, and 

Title VII Section 703 and 704

 All of these authorities require individual court orders 

based on probable cause. 

 Titles I and III apply to FISA activities directed against 

persons within the United States.

 Sections 703 and 704 apply to FISA activities directed 

against U.S. persons outside the United States.
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probable cause finding, based upon a factual statement in the government’s application, that 

the target is a U.S. person reasonably believed to be (i) located outside the United States and 

(ii) a foreign power, agent of a foreign power, or officer or employee of a foreign power. 

Additionally, the government’s application must meet the other requirements of FISA. See 50 

U.S.C. §§ 1881b(b) and 1881c(b). 

C. Statistics

How targets are counted. If the IC received authorization to conduct electronic surveillance 

and/or physical search against the same target in four separate applications, the IC would count 

one target, not four. Alternatively, if the IC received authorization to conduct electronic 

surveillance and/or physical search against four targets in the same application, the IC would 

count four targets. Duplicate targets across authorities are not counted. 

Figure 1a: Table of FISA “Probable Cause” Court Orders and Targets

Titles I and III and Sections 703 and 704 

of FISA 

CY2013 CY2014 CY2015 CY2016 CY2017

Total number of orders 

1,767 1,519 1,585 1,559 1,437

Estimated number of targets of such 

orders*

1,144 1,562 1,695 1,687 1,337

See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1873(b)(1) and 1873(b)(1)(A). 

* Although providing this statistic was first required by the USA FREEDOM Act, the reauthorized 

FAA of 2017 enumerated this requirement at 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(1)(A).
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Figure 1b: Chart of FISA “Probable Cause” Court Orders and Targets

Figure 2: Table of FISA “Probable Cause” Targets – U.S. Persons

Titles I and III and Sections 703 and 704 -- Targets 

CY2016 CY2017

Estimated number of targets who are non-U.S. persons*

1,351 1,038

Estimated number of targets who are U.S. persons*

336 299

Estimated percentage of targets who are U.S. persons

19.9% 22.4%

See 50 U.S.C. §§1873(b)(1)(B) and 1873(b)(1)(C) for rows one and two, respectively.

* Previously the IC was not statutorily required to publicly provide these statistics but provided 

them consistent with transparency principles. The reauthorized FAA of 2017 codified this 

requirement at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1873(b)(1)(B) and 1873(b)(1)(C).

1,767

1,519 1,585 1,559

1,437

1,144

1,562

1,695 1,687

1,337

CY2013 CY2014 CY2015 CY2016 CY2017

FISA “Probable Cause” 

Court Orders and Total Targets

Titles I & III and Sections 703 & 704

Total Orders Est. Total Targets
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FISA Section 702

A. Section 702

Title VII of FISA includes Section 702, 

which permits the Attorney General and 

the DNI to jointly authorize the targeting 

of (i) non-U.S. persons (ii) reasonably 

believed to be located outside the United 

States (iii) to acquire foreign intelligence 

information. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a. All 

three elements must be met. 

Additionally, Section 702 requires that 

the Attorney General, in consultation 

with the DNI, adopt targeting procedures,

minimization procedures, and querying 

procedures that they attest satisfy the statutory requirements and are consistent with the 

Fourth Amendment. Additional information on how the government uses Section 702 is posted 

on IC on the Record.

Section 702 Targets and “Tasking.” Under Section 702, the government “targets” a particular 

non-U.S. person, group, or entity reasonably believed to be located outside the United States 

and who possesses, or who is likely to communicate or receive, foreign intelligence 

information, by directing an acquisition at – i.e., “tasking” – selectors (e.g., telephone numbers 

and email addresses) that are assessed to be used by such non-U.S. person, group, or entity, 

pursuant to targeting procedures approved by the FISC. Before “tasking” a selector for 

collection under Section 702, the government must apply its targeting procedures to ensure 

that the IC appropriately tasks a selector used by a non-U.S. person who is reasonably believed 

to be located outside the United States and who will likely possess, communicate, or receive 

foreign intelligence information. 

NSA and FBI task selectors pursuant to their respective Section 702 targeting procedures, which 

are discussed below. All agencies that receive unminimized (i.e., “raw”) Section 702 data – NSA, 

FBI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) – handle 

the Section 702-acquired data in accordance with minimization procedures, which are 

explained below. 

Title VII - FISA Amendments Act (FAA) Section 702

 Commonly referred to as “Section 702.”

 Requires individual targeting determinations that the 

target (1) is a non-U.S. person (2) who is reasonably 

believed to be located outside the United States and (3) 

who has or is expected to communicate or receive foreign 

intelligence information. 
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The FISC’s role. Under Section 702, the FISC determines whether certifications provided jointly 

by the Attorney General and the DNI meet all the requirements of Section 702. If the FISC 

determines that the government’s certifications its targeting, minimization, and, as described 

below, querying procedures meet the statutory requirements of Section 702 and are consistent 

with the Fourth Amendment, then the FISC issues an order and supporting statement approving 

the certifications. The 2016 FISC order and statement approving certifications was publicly

released in May 2017 and posted on IC on the Record. 

Certifications. The certifications are jointly executed by the Attorney General and DNI and 

authorize the government to acquire foreign intelligence information under Section 702. Each 

annual certification application package must be submitted to the FISC for approval. The 

package includes the Attorney General and DNI’s certifications, affidavits by certain heads of 

intelligence agencies, targeting procedures, minimization procedures, and, as described below, 

querying procedures. Samples of certification application packages have been publicly released 

on IC on the Record, most recently in May 2017. The certifications identify categories of 

information to be collected, which must meet the statutory definition of foreign intelligence 

information, through the targeting of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located 

outside the United States. The certifications have included information concerning international 

terrorism and other topics, such as the acquisition of information concerning weapons of mass 

destruction.

Targeting procedures. The targeting procedures detail the steps that the government must 

take before tasking a selector, as well as verification steps after tasking, to ensure that the user 

of the tasked selector is being targeted appropriately – specifically, that the user is a non-U.S. 

person, located outside the United States, who is being tasked to acquire foreign intelligence 

information. The IC must make individual determinations that each tasked selector meets the 

requirements of the targeting procedures. Each agency’s Section 702 targeting procedures are 

approved by the Attorney General and then reviewed, as part of the certification package, by 

the FISC, which reviews the sufficiency of each agency’s targeting procedures including 

assessing the IC’s compliance with the procedures. NSA’s targeting procedures (signed in 2017) 

for the 2016 certification package have been publicly released IC on the Record.

Minimization procedures. The minimization procedures detail requirements the government 

must meet to use, retain, and disseminate Section 702 data, which include specific restrictions 

on how the IC handles non-publicly available U.S. person information acquired from Section 

702 collection of non-U.S. person targets, consistent with the needs of the government to 

obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information. Each agency’s Section 702 

minimization procedures are approved by the Attorney General and then reviewed, as part of 

the certification package, by the FISC, which reviews the sufficiency of each agency’s 
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minimization procedures, including assessing the IC’s compliance with past procedures. The 

2016 certification minimization procedures have been released on IC on the Record.

Querying procedures. With the reauthorized FAA of 2017, Congress amended Section 702 to 

require that querying procedures be adopted by the Attorney General, in consultation with the 

DNI. Section 702(f) requires that a record of each U.S. person query term be kept. Similar to the 

other procedures, the querying procedures are required to be reviewed by the FISC as part of 

the certification package for consistency with the statute and the Fourth Amendment. Congress 

added other requirements in 702(f), which pertain to the access of certain results of queries 

conducted by FBI; those requirements will be discussed later in this report. 

To date, each agency’s court-approved minimization procedures have provided the rules under 

which the agency may query their databases containing previously acquired Section 702 data 

(content and metadata) using a U.S. person query term. As described above, with the 

reauthorized FAA of 2017, Congress amended Section 702 to require that, going forward,

querying procedures must be adopted by the Attorney General. Query terms may be datebound, and may include alphanumeric strings, such as telephone numbers, email addresses, or 

terms, such as a name, that can be used individually or in combination with one another. 

Pursuant to court-approved procedures, an agency can only query Section 702 information if 

the query is reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information or, in the case of the 

FBI, evidence of a crime. Additional information about U.S. person queries is posted on IC on 

the Record. 

Compliance. The IC’s adherence to the targeting and minimization procedures, including query 

requirements, is subject to robust internal agency oversight and to rigorous external oversight 

by the Department of Justice (DOJ), ODNI, Congress, and the FISC. Every identified incidence of

non-compliance is reported to the FISC (through individual notices or in reports) and to 

Congress in semiannual reports. DOJ and ODNI also submit semiannual reports to Congress that 

assess the IC’s overall compliance efforts. Past assessments have been publicly released. 

B. Statistics—Orders and Targets

Counting Section 702 orders. As explained above, the FISC may issue a single order to approve 

more than one Section 702 certification to acquire foreign intelligence information. Note that, 

in its own transparency report, which is required pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1873(a), the Director 

of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC) counted each of the Section 

702 certifications associated with the FISC’s order. Because the number of the government’s 

Section 702 certifications remains a classified fact, the government requested that the AOUSC 

redact the number of certifications from its transparency report prior to publicly releasing it.
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In 2016, the government submitted a certification application package to the FISC. Pursuant to 

50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2), the FISC extended its review of the 2016 certification package. The FISC 

may extend its review of the certifications “as necessary for good cause in a manner consistent 

with national security.” See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2) (note that with the reauthorized FAA of 

2017, this section has been updated to § 1881a(k)(2)). Thus, because the FISC did not complete 

its review of the 2016 certifications during calendar year 2016, the FISC did not issue an order 

concerning those certifications in calendar year 2016. The 2015 order remained in effect during 

the extension period. On April 26, 2017, the FISC issued an order authorizing the 2016 

certifications.

Figure 3: Table of Section 702 Orders

Section 702 of FISA CY2013 CY2014 CY2015 CY2016 CY2017

Total number of orders issued 1 1 1 0 1

See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(2).

Estimating Section 702 targets. The number of 702 “targets,” provided below, reflects an 

estimate of the number of non-U.S. persons who are the users of tasked selectors. This 

estimate is based on information readily available to the IC. Unless and until the IC has 

information that links multiple selectors to a single foreign intelligence target, each individual 

selector is counted as a separate target for purposes of this report. On the other hand, where 

the IC is aware that multiple selectors are used by the same target, the IC counts the user of 

those selectors as a single target. This counting methodology reduces the risk that the IC might

inadvertently understate the number of discrete persons targeted pursuant to Section 702.
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Figure 4: Table of Section 702 Targets (recall that only non-USPs are targeted)

Section 702 of FISA CY2013 CY2014 CY2015 CY2016 CY2017

Estimated number of targets of 

such orders* 

89,138 92,707 94,368 106,469 129,080

See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(2)(A). 

* Previously the IC was not statutorily required to publicly provide this statistic, but provided it 

consistent with transparency principles. The reauthorized FAA of 2017 codified this 

requirement at 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(2)(A).

C. Statistics—U.S. Person Queries

In July 2014, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB or Board) issued a report on 

Section 702 entitled, “Report on the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of 

the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act” (PCLOB’s Section 702 Report), which reported U.S. 

person query statistics for calendar year 2013. See PCLOB’s Section 702 Report, at 57-58. The 

USA FREEDOM Act, enacted in 2015, required the public reporting of statistics regarding the 

number of U.S. person queries of Section 702. Specifically, the Act required the “number of 

search terms concerning a known United States person used to retrieve the unminimized 

contents [...]” – referred as query terms of content – and “the number of queries concerning a 

known United States person of unminimized noncontents information [...]” – referred as 

queries of metadata. See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(2)(B) and (b)(2)(C), respectively. Thus, ODNI began 

reporting on these statistics in the Annual Statistical Transparency Report covering calendar 

year 2015. 

Below are statistics for U.S. person queries of raw, unminimized Section 702-acquired data.1

The U.S. person statistics are based on (a) approved U.S. person query terms used to query 

 

1 With the reauthorization of FAA in 2017, Congress codified new requirements regarding the access of results of 

certain queries conducted by the FBI. Specifically under Section 702(f)(2)(A), an order from the FISC is now 

required before the FBI can review the contents of a query using a U.S. person query term when the query was not 

designed to find and extract foreign intelligence information and was performed in connection with a predicated 

criminal investigation that does not relate to national security. Before the FISC may issue such an order based on a 

finding of probable cause, an FBI officer must apply in writing, to include the officer’s justification that the query 

results would provide evidence of criminal activity, and the application must be approved by the Attorney General. 
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Section 702 content and (b) U.S. person queries conducted of Section 702 noncontents (i.e., 

metadata). It is important to understand that these two very different numbers cannot be 

combined because they use different counting methodologies (approved query terms versus 

queries conducted) and different data types (content versus noncontents).

Counting approved U.S. person query terms used to query Section 702 content. The NSA 

counts the number of U.S. person identifiers it approved to query the content of unminimized 

Section 702-acquired information. For example, if the NSA used U.S. person identifier 

“johndoe@XYZprovider” to query the content of Section 702-acquired information, the NSA 

would count it as one regardless of how many times the NSA used “johndoe@XYZprovider” to 

query its 702-acquired information. The CIA started using this model in 2016 for counting query 

terms and those statistics were included in the Annual Statistical Transparency Report covering 

CY2016. When the NCTC began receiving raw Section 702 information, NCTC followed a similar 

approach of counting U.S. person query terms that were used to query Section 702 content. 

Figure 5: Illustration of how the IC counts approved U.S. person query terms used to query 

Section 702 content

 

50 U.S.C. Section 1873(b)(2)(A) requires annual reporting of the number of times the FBI received an order 

pursuant to 702(f)(2)(A); this statistic will be provided in future transparency reports. 

johndoe@XYZprovider

johndoe@XYZprovider

johndoe@XYZprovider

marydoe@XYZprovider

johndoe@123company

marydoe@XYZprovider

Query Events 

Raw Section 702

CONTENT

Query Terms Used

1. johndoe@XYZprovider

2. johndoe@123company

3. marydoe@XYZprovider

Count = 3 USP Query Terms

(Not counted were the 6 instances 

the query terms queried 

the content.) 
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Figure 6a: Table of U.S. Person Query Terms Used to Query Section 702 Content

See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(2)(B). 

* Consistent with 50 U.S.C. § 1873(d)(2)(A), this statistic does not include queries that are

conducted by the FBI. However, the reauthorized FAA of 2017 codified a new reporting 

requirement for the FBI under 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(2)(D), which is addressed later in this report.

Figure 6b: Chart of U.S. Person Query Terms Used to Query Section 702 Content

4,672

5,288

7,512

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

CY2015 CY2016 CY2017

Number of USP Query Terms

used to query the content of Section 702 information*

Section 702 of FISA CY2015 CY2016 CY2017 

Estimated number of search terms concerning a 

known U.S. person used to retrieve the 

unminimized contents of communications obtained 

under Section 702 (excluding search terms used to 

prevent the return of U.S. person information)*

4,672 5,288 7,512
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Counting queries using U.S. person identifiers of noncontents collected under Section 702.

This estimate represents the number of times a U.S. person identifier is used to query the 

noncontents (i.e., metadata) of unminimized Section 702-acquired information. For example, if 

the U.S. person identifier telephone number “111-111-2222” was used 15 times to query the 

noncontents of Section 702-acquired information, the number of queries counted would be 15.

Figure 7: Illustration of how the IC counts U.S. person queries of Section 702 noncontents

As with last year’s transparency report, one IC element, the CIA, remains currently unable to 

provide the number of queries using U.S. person identifiers of unminimized Section 702 

noncontents information for CY2017. Under 50 U.S.C. § 1873(d)(3)(A), if the DNI concludes that 

this good-faith estimate cannot be determined accurately because not all of the relevant 

elements of the IC are able to provide this good faith estimate, then the DNI is required to (i) 

certify that conclusion in writing to the relevant Congressional committees; (ii) report the good 

faith estimate for those relevant elements able to provide such good faith estimate; (iii) explain 

when it is reasonably anticipated that such an estimate will be able to be determined fully and 

accurately; and (iv) make such certification publicly available on an Internet web site. Because 

the CIA remained unable to provide such information for calendar year 2017, the DNI made a 

certification, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1873(d)(3)(A) to the relevant Congressional committees. 

As required by statute, this certification is being made publicly available as an attached 

appendix to this current report (see Appendix A). As described in Appendix A, CIA will be able to 

provide a good faith estimate of these queries for calendar year 2018; such information will be 

included in the 2019 annual transparency report.

111-111-2222

111-111-2222

111-111-2222

555-555-6666

333-444-4444

555-555-6666

Queries Events

Raw Section 702

NON-CONTENTS

(i.e., Metadata)

Query Terms Approved

1. 111-111-2222

2. 333-444-4444

3. 555-555-6666

Count = 6 USP Queries

(Each individual query event 

is counted.)
18 | P a g e

Figure 8: Table of U.S. Person Queries of Noncontents of Section 702

Section 702 of FISA CY2013 CY2014 CY2015 CY2016 CY2017

Estimated number of queries 

concerning a known U.S. person of 

unminimized noncontents 

information obtained under 

Section 702 (excluding queries 

containing information used to 

prevent the return of U.S. person 

information)*

9,500 17,500 23,800 30,355 16,924

See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(2)(C). 

* Consistent with 50 U.S.C. § 1873(d)(2)(A), this statistic does not include queries that are 

conducted by the FBI. However, the reauthorized FAA of 2017 codified a new reporting 

requirement for the FBI under 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(2)(D), which was addressed earlier in this 

report.

FISC Order Requiring Certain Section 702 Query Reporting by FBI. On November 6, 2015, the 

FISC granted the government’s application for renewal of the 2015 certifications and, among 

other things, concluded that the FBI’s U.S. person querying provisions in its minimization 

procedures, “strike a reasonable balance between the privacy interests of the United States 

persons and persons in the United States, on the one hand, and the government’s national 

security interests, on the other.” Memorandum Opinion and Order dated November 6, 2015, at 

44 (released on IC on the Record on April 19, 2016). The FISC further stated that the FBI 

conducting queries, “designed to return evidence of crimes unrelated to foreign intelligence 

does not preclude the Court from concluding that taken together, the targeting and 

minimization procedures submitted with the 2015 Certifications are consistent with the 

requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. 

Nevertheless, the FISC ordered the government to report in writing, “each instance after 

December 4, 2015, in which FBI personnel receive and review Section 702-acquired information 

that the FBI identifies as concerning a United States person in response to a query that is not 

designed to find and extract foreign intelligence information.” (Emphasis added). Id. at 44 and 

78. The FISC directed that the report contain details of the query terms, the basis for 

conducting the query, the manner in which the query will be or has been used, and other 

details. Id. at 78. In keeping with the IC’s Principles of Transparency, the DNI declassified the 

number of each such query reported to the FISC in calendar year 2016. This year, the DNI has 

again declassified the number reported for calendar year 2017, as noted in Figure 10.
19 | P a g e

Figure 9: Table Regarding Required Section 702 Query Reporting to the FISC

Section 702 of FISA CY2016 CY2017 

Per the FISC Memorandum Opinion and Order dated 

November 6, 2015: Each reported instance in which FBI 

personnel received and reviewed Section 702-acquired 

information that the FBI identified as concerning a U.S.

person in response to a query that was designed to return 

evidence of a crime unrelated to foreign intelligence.

1 0

D. Section 702 and FBI Investigations.

The reauthorized FAA of 2017 now requires that the FBI report on the number of instances in 

which the FBI opened a criminal investigation of a U.S. person, who is not considered a threat 

to national security, based wholly or in part on Section 702-acquired information. See 50 U.S.C.

§ 1873(b)(2)(D). This statistic will provide transparency with regard to how often Section 702 

collection is used for non-national security investigations conducted by the FBI. Figure 10

provides the required statistic.

Figure 10: Table Regarding Number of FBI Investigations Opened on USPs Based on Section 

702 Acquisition

Section 702 of FISA CY2017 

The number of instances in which the FBI opened, under the Criminal 

Investigative Division or any successor division, an investigation of a 

U.S. person (who is not considered a threat to national security) based 

wholly or in part on an acquisition authorized under Section 702.

0

See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(2)(D).
20 | P a g e

NSA Dissemination of U.S. Person Information under FISA Section 702

A. Section 702

In July 2014, the PCLOB’s Section 702 Report contained 10 recommendations. Recommendation 

9 focused on “accountability and transparency,” noting that the government should implement 

measures, “to provide insight about the extent to which the NSA acquires and utilizes the 

communications involving U.S. persons and people located in the United States under the 

Section 702 program.” PCLOB’s Section 702 Report at 145-146. Specifically, the PCLOB 

recommended that “the NSA should implement processes to annually count [...] (5) the number 

of instances in which the NSA disseminates non-public information about U.S. persons, 

specifically distinguishing disseminations that includes names, titles, or other identifiers, such 

as telephone numbers or e-mail addresses, potentially associated with individuals.” Id. at 146. 

This recommendation is commonly referred to as Recommendation 9(5). In response to the 

PCLOB’s July 2014 Recommendation 9(5), NSA previously publicly provided (in the Annual

Statistical Transparency Report for calendar year 2015) and continues to provide the following 

additional information regarding the dissemination of Section 702 intelligence reports that 

contain U.S. person information. Because the PCLOB issued its recommendation in 2014, these 

statistics were not included in Annual Statistical Transparency Report for calendar years 2013 or 

2014.

NSA has been providing similar information to Congress since 2009, in classified form, per FISA 

reporting requirements. For example, FISA Section 702(m)(3) requires that NSA annually submit 

a report to applicable Congressional committees regarding certain numbers pertaining to the 

acquisition of Section 702-acquired information, including the number of “disseminated 

intelligence reports containing a reference to a United States person identity.” See 50 U.S.C. 

§ 1881a(m)(A)(3)(i) (prior to the reauthorized FAA of 2017under § 1881a(l)(3)(A)(i)). Section 

702a(m)(A)(3) also requires that the number of “United States-person identities subsequently 

disseminated by [NSA] in response to request for identities that were not referred to by name 

or title in the original reporting.” See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(m)(3)(A)(ii). This second requirement 

refers to NSA providing the number of approved unmasking requests, which is explained below. 

Additionally, NSA provides the number of NSA’s disseminated intelligence reports containing a 

U.S. person reference to Congress as part of the Attorney General and the DNI’s joint 

assessment of compliance. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(m)(1) (prior to the reauthorized FAA of 

2017under § 1881a(l)(1)).

Prior to the PCLOB issuing its Section 702 Report, NSA’s Director of the Civil Liberties, Privacy, 

and Transparency Office published “NSA’s Implementation of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Act Section 702,” on April 16, 2014, (hereinafter “NSA DCLPO Report”), in which it explained 
21 | P a g e

NSA’s dissemination processes. NSA DCLPO Report at 7-8. NSA “only generates classified 

intelligence reports when the information meets a specific intelligence requirement, regardless 

of whether the proposed report contains U.S. person information.” NSA DCLPO Report at 7.

Section 702 only permits the targeting of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located 

outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information. Such targets, however, 

may communicate information to, from, or about U.S. persons. NSA minimization procedures

(publicly released on May 11, 2017) permit the NSA to disseminate U.S person information if 

the NSA masks the information that could identify the U.S. person. The minimization 

procedures also permit NSA to disseminate the U.S. person identity only if doing so meets one 

of the specified reasons listed in NSA’s minimization procedures, including that the U.S. person 

consented to the dissemination, the U.S. person information was already publicly available, the 

U.S. person identity was necessary to understand foreign intelligence information, or the 

communication contained evidence of a crime and is being disseminated to law enforcement 

authorities. Even if one these conditions applies, as a matter of policy, NSA may still mask the 

U.S. person information and will include no more than the minimum amount of U.S. person 

information necessary to understand the foreign intelligence or to describe the crime or threat.

Id. In certain instances, however, NSA makes a determination prior to releasing its original 

classified report that the U.S. person’s identity is appropriate to disseminate in the first 

instance using the same standards discussed above. 

Masked U.S. Person Information. Agency minimization procedures generally provide for the 

substitution of a U.S. person identity with a generic phrase or term if the identity otherwise 

does not meet the dissemination criteria; this is informally referred to as “masking” the identity 

of the U.S. person. Information about a U.S. person is masked when the identifying information 

about the person is not included in a report. For example, instead of reporting that Section 702-

acquired information revealed that non-U.S. person “Bad Guy” communicated with U.S. person 

“John Doe” (i.e., the actual name of the U.S. person), the report would mask “John Doe’s” 

identity, and would state that “Bad Guy” communicated with “an identified U.S. person,” “a 

named U.S. person,” or “a U.S. person.” 

Unmasking U.S. Person Information. Recipients of NSA‘s classified reports, such as other 

federal agencies, may request that NSA provide the U.S. person identity that was masked in an 

intelligence report. The requested identity information is released only if the requesting 

recipient has a “need to know” the identity of the U.S. person and if the dissemination of the 

U.S. person’s identity would be consistent with NSA’s minimization procedures (e.g., the 

identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance), 

and additional approval has been provided by a designated NSA official. 
22 | P a g e

As part of their regular oversight reviews, DOJ and ODNI review disseminations of information 

about U.S. persons that NSA obtained pursuant to Section 702 to ensure that the 

disseminations were performed in compliance with the minimization procedures.

Additional information describing how the IC protects U.S. person information obtained 

pursuant to FISA provisions is provided in recent reports by the civil liberties and privacy officers 

for the ODNI (including NCTC), NSA, FBI, and CIA. The reports collectively documented the 

rigorous and multi-layered framework that safeguards the privacy of U.S. person information in 

FISA disseminations. See ODNI Report on Protecting U.S. Person Identities in Disseminations 

under FISA and annexes containing agency specific reports.

B. Statistics

Below are statistics and charts to further explain how NSA disseminates U.S. person 

information incidentally acquired from Section 702 in classified intelligence reports. NSA may:

i. openly name (i.e., originally reveal) the U.S. person in the report, 

ii. initially mask (i.e., not reveal) the U.S. person identity in the report, or

iii. in the instances where the U.S. person identity was initially masked, upon a specific 

request, later reveal and unmask the U.S. person identity but only to the requestor.

This year’s report presents the dissemination numbers in a different format from the previous 

report to facilitate understanding and to provide consistency with NSA’s classified FISA Section 

702(m)(3) reports to Congress. This report separates the number of reports (in Figure 11) from 

the statistics relating to the U.S. person identities later disseminated (in Figure 12). 

NSA applies its minimization procedures in preparing its classified intelligence reports, and then 

disseminates the reports to authorized recipients with a need to know the information in order 

to perform their official duties. Very few of NSA’s intelligence reports from Section 702 

collection contain references to U.S. person identities (whether masked or openly named). 

The first row of Figure 11 provides “an accounting of the number of disseminated intelligence 

reports containing a reference to a United States-person identity.” See 50 U.S.C. 

§ 1881a(m)(3)(A)(i). Note that a single report could contain multiple U.S. person identities, 

masked and/or openly named. NSA’s counting methodology is to include any disseminated 

intelligence report that contains a reference to one or more U.S. person identities, whether 

masked or openly named, even if the report includes information from other sources. NSA does 

not maintain records that allow it to readily determine, in the case of an intelligence report that 

includes information from several sources, from which source a reference to a U.S. person 

identity was derived. Accordingly, the references to U.S. person identities may have resulted 
23 | P a g e

from Section 702 authorized collection or from other authorized signals intelligence activity 

conducted by NSA. This counting methodology was used in the previous report and is used in 

NSA’s FISA Section 702(m)(3) report. As noted above, a U.S. person is “a citizen of the United 

States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 101(a)(20) of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act), an unincorporated association a substantial number of 

members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent 

residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the United States, but does not include a 

corporation or an association which is a foreign power, as defined in [50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1), (2), 

or (3)].” See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i).

The second row of Figure 11 provides the number of reports containing U.S. person identities 

where the U.S. person identity was masked in the report. The third row provides the number of 

reports containing U.S. person identities where the U.S. person was openly named in the report. 

Figure 11: Table of Section 702 Reports Containing USP information unmasked by NSA

Section 702 Reports Containing U.S. person (USP)

information disseminated by NSA 

CY2016 CY2017

Reports – Total number of NSA disseminated §702 reports

containing USP identities regardless of whether the identity 

was openly named or masked.

3,914 4,065

Reports – Total number of NSA disseminated §702 reports

containing USP identities where the USP identity was masked.

2,964 3,034

Reports – Total number of NSA disseminated §702 reports

containing USP identities where the USP was openly named.

1,200 1,341

As explained above, rows 2 and 3 will not total row 1 because one report may contain both 

masked and openly namely identities.

Figure 12 provides statistics relating to the numbers of U.S. person identities that were 

originally masked in those reports counted in Figure 11 but which NSA later provided to 

authorized requestors (i.e., unmasked) during CY2017. This statistic is the number required to 

be reported to Congress in NSA’s FISA Section 702(m)(3) report. In other words, Figure 12 

provides “an accounting of the number of United States-person identities subsequently 

disseminated by [NSA] in response to requests for identities that were not referred to by name 

or title in the original reporting.” See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(m)(3)(A)(ii). This number is different 

than numbers provided in either CY2015 or the CY2016 Annual Statistical Transparency Report. 

NSA has decided to declassify the total number of U.S. person identities unmasked in response 

to a request. The U.S. person identities include individuals as well as non-individual entities 
24 | P a g e

whose identities NSA masks pursuant to law or policy. These non-individual entities, include, for 

example, U.S. IP addresses and artificial “persons” such as corporations. 

Previously, the Annual Statistical Transparency Report focused on responding to the PCLOB’s 

report recommendation 9(5) by counting only those U.S. person identities where the proper 

name or title of an individual was unmasked; it did not count any other unmasking such as 

email addresses or telephone numbers or U.S. IP addresses or U.S. corporations. Rather than 

distinguishing between the different ways a U.S. person might be named in an intelligence 

report, NSA will provide the total number of U.S. person identities unmasked in response to a 

specific request from another agency whether it is a title of an individual, an identifier such as 

an email address, an IP address or a corporation. Thus, this current Annual Statistical 

Transparency Report, in Figure 12, reports that same metric that is reported in NSA’s FISA 

Section 702(m)(3). However, because NSA’s FISA Section 702(m)(3) reports have a time period 

of September through August, comparing the two reporting years is not an exact comparison. 

Figure 12: Table of Section 702 USP Identities disseminated by NSA

Section 702 – U.S. person (USP) identities 

unmasked by NSA 

12 month period 

Sep 2015-Aug 2016

CY2017

The number of U.S. person identities that NSA

unmasked in response to a specific request from 

another agency.

9,217 9,529

Beginning with next year’s transparency report (due April 2019), ODNI will report statistics 

pertaining to how the IC disseminates U.S. person information regardless of the legal authority 

under which the information was collected (not only FISA Section 702). See ICPG 107.1.

Specifically, ODNI will report (1) the total number of requests to identify U.S. persons, whose 

identity was originally omitted, in disseminated intelligence reports, (2) the total number of 

those requests approved, and (3) the total number of those requests denied. 
25 | P a g e

FISA Criminal Use and Notice Provisions

A. FISA Sections 106 and 305

FISA Section 106 requires advance

authorization from the Attorney 

General before any information 

acquired through Title I electronic 

surveillance may be used in a criminal 

proceeding. This authorization from the 

Attorney General is defined to include 

authorization by the Acting Attorney 

General, Deputy Attorney General, or, 

upon designation by the Attorney 

General, the Assistant Attorney General 

for National Security. Section 106 also 

requires that if a government entity 

intends to introduce into evidence in 

any trial, hearing, or other proceeding, 

against an aggrieved person, 

information obtained or derived from 

electronic surveillance, it must notify 

the aggrieved person and the court. 

The aggrieved person is then entitled to 

seek suppression of the information. FISA Section 706 requires that any information acquired 

pursuant to Section 702 be treated as electronic surveillance under Title I, including for 

purposes of the use, notice, and suppression requirements under Section 106.

FISA Section 305 provides the same requirements for information acquired through Title III 

physical search (i.e., advance authorization, notice, and opportunity to suppress). 

B. Statistics

The reauthorized FAA of 2017codified that certain statistics concerning criminal proceedings 

must be provided to the public pertaining to Sections 106 and 305, including Section 702-

acquired information. Specifically, figure 13 provides that, in 2017, the Government filed notice 

of intent to use FISA-acquired information, pursuant to Section 106 or 305, in seven (7) 

separate criminal proceedings.

FISA Sections 106 and 305 

– Criminal Use and Notice Provisions –

 Commonly referred to as the “criminal use provision.”

 Section 106 applies to information acquired from Title I 

electronic surveillance; Section 305 applies to information 

acquired from Title III physical search.

 Attorney General advance authorization is required 

before such information may be used in a criminal 

proceeding; if such information is used or intended to be 

used against an aggrieved person, that person must be 

given notice of the information and have a chance to 

suppress the information. 

 The reauthorized FAA of 2017 codified that statistics 

must be provided to the public as it pertained to Section 

106, Section 305, as well as Section 702 acquired 

information.
26 | P a g e

Figure 13: Table Regarding Number of Criminal Proceedings in which the Government

Provided Notice of Its Intent to Use Cert FISA Information 

FISA Sections 106 and 305 CY2017

The number of criminal proceedings in which the United States or a State or 

political subdivision thereof provided notice pursuant to Section 106 

(including with respect to Section 702-acquired information) or Section 305 

of the government’s intent to enter into evidence or otherwise use or 

disclose any information obtained or derived from electronic surveillance, 

physical search, or Section 702 acquisition. 

7
27 | P a g e

FISA Title IV – Use of Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Devices

A. FISA PR/TT Authority

Title IV of FISA authorizes the use of pen 

register and trap and trace (PR/TT) 

devices for foreign intelligence purposes. 

Title IV authorizes the government to use 

a PR/TT device to seek and capture 

dialing, routing, addressing or signaling 

(DRAS) information. The government 

may submit an application to the FISC for 

an order approving the use of a PR/TT 

device (i.e., PR/TT order) for (i) “any 

investigation to obtain foreign 

intelligence information not concerning a 

United States person or” (ii) “to protect 

against international terrorism or 

clandestine intelligence activities, 

provided that such investigation of a

United States person is not conducted 

solely upon the basis of activities 

protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.” 50 U.S.C. § 1842(a). If the FISC finds 

that the government’s application sufficiently meets the requirements of FISA, the FISC must 

issue an order for the installation and use of a PR/TT device. 

B. Statistics

Counting orders. Similar to how orders were counted for Titles I and III and Sections 703 and 

704, this report only counts the orders granting authority to conduct intelligence collection --

the order for the installation and use of a PR/TT device. Thus, renewal orders are counted as a 

separate order; modification orders and amendments are not counted. 

Estimating the number of targets. The government’s methodology for counting PR/TT targets is 

similar to the methodology described above for counting targets of electronic surveillance 

and/or physical search. If the IC received authorization for the installation and use of a PR/TT 

device against the same target in four separate applications, the IC would count one target, not 

FISA Title IV 

 Commonly referred to as the “PR/TT” provision.

 Bulk collection is prohibited.

 Requires individual FISC order to use PR/TT device to 

capture dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling (DRAS) 

information.

 Government request to use a PR/TT device on U.S. 

person target must be based on an investigation to 

protect against terrorism or clandestine intelligence 

activities and that investigation must not be based solely 

on the basis of activities protected by the First 

Amendment to the Constitution. 
28 | P a g e

four. Alternatively, if the IC received authorization for the installation and use of a PR/TT device 

against four targets in the same application, the IC would count four targets. 

Estimating the number of unique identifiers. This statistic counts (1) the targeted identifiers 

and (2) the non-targeted identifiers (e.g., telephone numbers and e-mail addresses) that were 

in contact with the targeted identifiers. Specifically, the House Report on the USA FREEDOM Act 

states that "[t]he phrase 'unique identifiers used to communicate information collected 

pursuant to such orders' means the total number of, for example, email addresses or phone 

numbers that have been collected as a result of these particular types of FISA orders--not just 

the number of target email addresses or phone numbers." [H.R. Rept. 114-109 Part I, p. 26], 

with certain exceptions noted.

Figure 14: Table of PR/TT Orders, Targets, and Unique Identifiers Collected

Title IV of FISA

PR/TT FISA CY2013 CY2014 CY2015 CY2016 CY2017

Total number of orders 131 135 90 60 33

Estimated number of targets of 

such orders

319 516 456 41 27

Estimated number of unique 

identifiers used to communicate 

information collected pursuant 

to such orders*

- -

134,987# 81,035#† 56,064#

See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1873(b)(3), 1873(b)(3)(A), and 1873(b)(3)(B).

* Pursuant to §1873(d)(2)(B), this statistic does not apply to orders resulting in the acquisition 

of information by the FBI that does not include electronic mail addresses or telephone 

numbers. 

# This number represents information the government received from provider(s) electronically 

for the entire calendar year. The government does not have a process for capturing unique 

identifiers received by other means (such as hard-copy or portable media).

† Last year, the FBI mistakenly interchanged the number of unique identifiers for business 

records and PR/TT orders, reporting the number of business records unique identifiers as PR/TT 

unique identifiers and vice versa. This report corrects the error and accurately identifies the 

legal authority under which the FBI obtained the unique identifiers.
29 | P a g e

Figure 15: Table of FISA PR/TT Targets – U.S. Persons and Non-U.S. Persons*

PR/TT Targets CY2016 CY2017

Estimated number of targets who are non-U.S. persons 23 16

Estimated number of targets who are U.S. persons 18 11

Estimated percentage of targets who are U.S. persons 43.9% 40.7%

See 50 U.S.C. §§1873(b)(3)(A)(i) and 1873(b)(3)(A)(ii) for rows one and two, respectively.

* Previously the IC was not statutorily required to publicly provide these statistics, but provided 

them consistent with transparency principles. The reauthorized FAA of 2017 codified this 

requirement at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1873(b)(3)(A)(i) and 1873(b)(3)(A)(ii).
30 | P a g e

FISA Title V – Business Records

A. Business Records FISA

Under FISA, Title V authorizes the 

government to submit an application for 

an order requiring the production of any 

tangible things for (i) “an investigation to 

obtain foreign intelligence information not

concerning a United States person or” (ii) 

“to protect against international terrorism 

or clandestine intelligence activities, 

provided that such investigation of a 

United States person is not conducted 

solely upon the basis of activities 

protected by the First Amendment to the 

Constitution.” 50 U.S.C. § 1861. Title V is 

commonly referred to as the “Business 

Records” provision of FISA. 

In June 2015, the USA FREEDOM Act was 

signed into law and, among other things, it 

amended Title V, including by prohibiting 

bulk collection. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861(b), 1861(k)(4). The DNI is required to report various 

statistics about two Title V provisions – traditional business records and call detail records 

(discussed further below). On November 28, 2015, in compliance with amendments enacted by 

the USA FREEDOM Act, the IC terminated collection of bulk telephony metadata under Title V 

of the FISA (the “Section 215 Program”). Solely due to legal obligations to preserve records in 

certain pending civil litigation, including First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles, et al. v. National 

Security Agency, et al., No. C 13-03287-JSW (N.D. Cal.) and Jewel, et al. v. National Security 

Agency, et al., No. C 08-04373-JSW (N.D. Cal.), the IC continues to preserve previously collected 

bulk telephony metadata. Under the terms of a FISC order dated November 24, 2015, the bulk 

telephony metadata cannot be used or accessed for any purpose other than compliance with 

preservation obligations. Once the government’s preservation obligations are lifted, the 

government is required to promptly destroy all bulk metadata produced by 

telecommunications providers under the Section 215 Program.

FISA Title V

 Commonly referred to as “Business Records” 

provision. 

 Bulk collection is prohibited. 

 Call Detail Records (CDRs) may be obtained from a 

telephone company if the FISC issues an individual court 

order for target’s records.

 Request for records in an investigation of a U.S. 

person must be based on an investigation to protect 

against terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities 

and provided that the investigation is not conducted 

solely upon activities protected by the First Amendment 

to the Constitution. 
31 | P a g e

As noted in last year’s Annual Statistical Transparency Report, on November 30, 2015, the IC 

implemented certain provisions of the USA FREEDOM Act, including the call detail records 

provision and the requirement to use a specific selection term. Accordingly, only one month’s 

worth of data for calendar year 2015 was available with respect to those provisions. Any 

statistical information relating to a particular FISA authority for a particular month remains 

classified. Therefore, the Title V data specifically associated with December 2015 was only 

released in a classified annex provided to Congress as part of the report for CY2015. For the CY 

2016 report, statistical information was collected for an entire year under the USA FREEDOM 

Act Title V provisions. As a result, those statistics were included in that report. For the CY 2017 

report, statistical information was collected for an entire year under the USA FREEDOM Act 

Title V provisions. As a result, those statistics are included in this report.

Statistics related to traditional business records under Title V Section 501(b)(2)(B) are provided 

first pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(5). Statistics related to call detail records under Title V 

Section 501(b)(2)(C) are provided second pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(6). 

B. Statistics – “Traditional” Business Records Statistics Orders, Targets & 

Identifiers 

Business Record (BR) requests for tangible things include books, records, papers, documents, 

and other items pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §1861(b)(2)(B), also referred to as Section 501(b)(2)(B) . 

These are commonly referred to as “Traditional” Business Records.

Estimating the number of unique identifiers. This is an estimate of the number of (1) targeted 

identifiers (e.g., telephone numbers and email addresses) and (2) non-targeted identifiers that 

were in contact with the targeted identifiers. This metric represents unique identifiers received 

electronically from the provider(s). The government does not have a process for capturing 

unique identifiers received by other means (i.e., hard-copy or portable media).

Explaining how we count BR statistics. As an example of the government’s methodology, 

assume that in 2017, the government submitted a BR request targeting “John Doe” with email 

addresses john.doe@serviceproviderX, john.doe@serviceproviderY, and 

john.doe@serviceproviderZ. The FISC found that the application met the requirements of Title 

V and issued orders granting the application and directing service providers X, Y, and Z to 

produce business records pursuant to Section 501(b)(2)(B). Provider X returned 10 nontargeted email addresses that were in contact with the target; provider Y returned 10 nontargeted email addresses that were in contact with the target; and provider Z returned 10 nontargeted email addresses that were in contact with the target. Based on this scenario, we would 

report the following statistics: A) one order by the FISC for the production of tangible things, B) 
32 | P a g e

one target of said orders, and C) 33 unique identifiers, representing three targeted email 

addresses plus 30 non-targeted email addresses.

Figure 16: Table of “Traditional” Business Records Orders, Targets, and Unique Identifiers 

Collected

Business Records “BR” – Section 501(b)(2)(B) CY2016 CY2017

Total number of orders issued pursuant to applications under 

Section 501(b)(2)(B) 

84 77

Estimated number of targets of such orders 88 74

Estimated number of unique identifiers used to communicate 

information collected pursuant to such orders

125,354† 87,834

See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1873(b)(5), 1873(b)(5)(A), and 1873(b)(5)(B). 

† Last year, the FBI mistakenly interchanged the number of unique identifiers for business 

records and PR/TT orders, reporting the number of business records unique identifiers as PR/TT 

unique identifiers and vice versa. This report corrects the error and accurately identifies the 

legal authority under which the FBI obtained the unique identifiers.

C. Statistics – Call Detail Record (CDR) Orders, Targets & Identifiers

Call Detail Records (CDRs) – commonly referred to as “call event metadata” – may be obtained

from traditional telecommunications providers pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §1861(b)(2)(C). A CDR is 

defined as session identifying information (such as originating or terminating telephone 

number, an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, or an International Mobile 

Station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number), a telephone calling card number, or the time or 

duration of a call. See 50 U.S.C. §1861(k)(3)(A). CDRs provided to the government do not

include the content of any communication, the name, address, or financial information of a 

subscriber or customer, or cell site location or global positioning system information. See 50 

U.S.C. §1861(k)(3)(B). CDRs are stored and queried by the service providers. See 50 U.S.C. 

§1861(c)(2). 

Estimating the number of targets of CDR orders. A “target” is the person using the selector. For

example, if a target uses four selectors that have been approved, the number counted for 

purposes of this report would be one target, not four. Alternatively, if two targets are using one 

selector that has been approved, the number counted would be two targets.
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Figure 17: Table of CDR Orders and Targets

Call Detail Records “CDRs” – Section 501(b)(2)(C) CY2016 CY2017 

Total number of orders issued pursuant to applications under 

Section 501(b)(2)(C)

40 40

Estimated number of targets of such orders 42 40

See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1873(b)(6) and 1873(b)(6)(A).

The estimated number of Call Detail Records received from providers. This metric represents 

the number of records received from the provider(s) and stored in NSA repositories (records 

that fail at any of a variety of validation steps are not included in this number). CDRs covered by 

§ 501(b)(2)(C) include call detail records created before, on, or after the date of the application 

relating to an authorized investigation. While the USA FREEDOM Act directs the government to 

provide a good faith estimate of “the number of unique identifiers used to communicate 

information collected pursuant to” orders issued in response to CDR applications (see 

50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(5)(B)), the statistic below does not reflect the number of unique identifiers 

contained within the call detail records received from the providers. As of the date of this 

report, the government does not have the technical ability to isolate the number of unique 

identifiers within records received from the providers. As explained in the 2016 NSA public 

report on the USA FREEDOM Act, the metric provided is over-inclusive because the government 

counts each record separately even if the government receives the same record multiple times

(whether from one provider or multiple providers). Additionally, this metric includes duplicates 

of unique identifiers – i.e., because the government lacks the technical ability to isolate unique 

identifiers, the statistic counts the number of records even if unique identifiers are repeated. 

For example, if one unique identifier is associated with multiple calls to a second unique 

identifier, it will be counted multiple times. Similarly, if two different providers submit records 

showing the same two unique identifiers in contact, then those would also be counted. This 

statistic includes records that were received from the providers in CY2017 for all orders active 

for any portion of the year, which includes orders that the FISC approved in 2016. 

Furthermore, while the records are received from domestic communications service providers, 

the records received are for domestic and foreign numbers. More information on how NSA 

implements this authority can be found in the DCLPO report, in particular see page 5 for a 

description and illustration of the USA FREEDOM Implementation Architecture.
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Figure 18: Illustration of a hop scenario and counting

Target uses Phone A which is the FISC-approved selector in the FISC order. This would count 

as 1 order, 1 target, 7 unique identifiers (phones A, B, C, D, E, F, G) and, assuming 500 calls 

between parties, 6000 CDRs (*produced for both sides of a call event).

Assume an NSA intelligence analyst learns that phone number (Phone A) is being used by a 

suspected international terrorist (target). Phone A is the “specific selection term” or “selector” 

that will be submitted to the FISC (or the Attorney General in an emergency) for approval using 

the “reasonable articulable suspicion” (RAS) standard. Assume that one provider (provider X) 

submits a record showing Phone A called unique identifier Phone B – what is referred to as a 

“call event.” This is the “first hop.” In turn, assume that NSA submits the “first-hop” Phone B to 

the provider X, and finds that unique identifier was used to call another unique identifier Phone 

D. This is the “second-hop.” If the unique identifiers call one another multiple times, then 

multiple CDRs are produced and duplication occurs. Additionally, the government may receive 

multiple CDRs for a single call event. NSA may also submit the specific selection Phone A 

number to another provider (provider Y) who may have CDRs of the same call events.

Not all CDRs provided to the government will be domestic numbers. The targeted “specific 

selection term” could be a foreign number, could have called a foreign number or the “firstPHONE A

PHONE B

PHONE D

PHONE C

PHONE E

PHONE F

PHONE G

1

st Hops 2nd Hops
35 | P a g e

hop” number could have called a foreign number; thus, these CDRs statistics contain both 

domestic and foreign number results.

Figure 19: Table of CDRs Received Arising from Such Targets

Call Detail Records “CDRs” – Section 501(b)(2)(C) CY2016 CY2017 

Estimated number of call detail records arising from 

such targets that NSA received from providers pursuant 

to Section 501(b)(2)(C) and stored in its repositories*

151,230,968 534,396,285

* While the statute directs the government to count the unique identifiers, the government is 

not technically able to isolate the number of unique identifiers; thus, this number includes 

duplicate records. Additionally, the number of records contains both domestic and foreign 

numbers. 

D. Statistics – Call Detail Record Queries

The number of search terms associated with a U.S. person used to query the CDR data. Each 

unique query is counted only once. The same term queried 10 times counts as one query term. 

A single query with 20 terms counts as 20 query terms.

Figure 20: Table of CDRs -- U.S. person query terms

Call Detail Records “CDRs” – Section 501(b)(2)(C) CY2016 CY2017 

Estimated number of search terms that included 

information concerning a U.S. person that were used to 

query any database of call detail records obtained 

through the use of such orders*

22,360 31,196

See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(6)(C). 

* Consistent with § 1873(d)(2)(A), this statistic does not include queries that are conducted by 

the FBI.
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National Security Letters (NSLs)

A. National Security Letters 

In addition to statistics relating to FISA 

authorities, we are reporting information 

on the government’s use of National 

Security Letters (NSLs). The FBI is 

statutorily authorized to issue NSLs for 

specific records (as specified below) only 

if the information being sought is 

relevant to a national security

investigation. NSLs may be issued for 

four commonly used types of records: 

1) telephone subscriber information, toll records, and other electronic communication 

transactional records, see 18 U.S.C. § 2709; 

2) consumer-identifying information possessed by consumer reporting agencies (names, 

addresses, places of employment, institutions at which a consumer has maintained an 

account), see 15 U.S.C. § 1681u; 

3) full credit reports, see 15 U.S.C. § 1681v (only for counterterrorism, not for 

counterintelligence investigations); and 

4) financial records, see 12 U.S.C. § 3414. 

B. Statistics – National Security Letters and Requests of Information

Counting NSLs. Today we are reporting (1) the total number of NSLs issued for all persons, and 

(2) the total number of requests for information (ROI) contained within those NSLs. When a 

single NSL contains multiple ROIs, each is considered a “request” and each request must be 

relevant to the same pending investigation. For example, if the government issued one NSL 

seeking subscriber information from one provider and that NSL identified three e-mail 

addresses for the provider to return records, this would count as one NSL issued and three

ROIs. 

National Security Letters

 Not authorized by FISA but by other statutes.

 Bulk collection is prohibited, however, by the USA 

FREEDOM Act.

 FBI may only use NSLs if the information sought is 

relevant to international counterterrorism or 

counterintelligence investigation.
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 The Department of Justice’s Report on NSLs. In May 2018, the Department of Justice 

released its Annual Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Report to Congress. That report, 

which is available online, provides the number of requests made for certain information 

concerning different U.S. persons pursuant to NSL authorities during calendar year 

2017. The Department of Justice’s report provides the number of individuals subject to 

an NSL whereas the ODNI’s report provides the number of NSLs issued. Because one 

person may be subject to more than one NSL in an annual period, the number of NSLs 

issued and the number of persons subject to an NSL differs.

Why we report the number of NSL requests instead of the number of NSL targets. We are 

reporting the annual number of requests for multiple reasons. First, the FBI’s systems are 

configured to comply with Congressional reporting requirements, which do not require the FBI 

to track the number of individuals or organizations that are the subject of an NSL. Even if the 

FBI systems were configured differently, it would still be difficult to identify the number of 

specific individuals or organizations that are the subjects of NSLs. One reason for this is that the 

subscriber information returned to the FBI in response to an NSL may identify, for example, one 

subscriber for three accounts or it may identify different subscribers for each account. In some 

cases this occurs because the identification information provided by the subscriber to the 

provider may not be true. For example, a subscriber may use a fictitious name or alias when 

creating the account. Thus, in many instances, the FBI never identifies the actual subscriber of a 

facility. In other cases, this occurs because individual subscribers may identify themselves 

differently for each account (e.g., inclusion of middle name, middle initial, etc.) when creating 

an account. 

We also note that the actual number of individuals or organizations that are the subject of an 

NSL is different than the number of NSL requests. The FBI often issues NSLs under different 

legal authorities, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u(a) and (b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681v, 

and 18 U.S.C. § 2709, for the same individual or organization. The FBI may also serve multiple 

NSLs for an individual for multiple facilities (e.g., multiple e-mail accounts, landline telephone 

numbers and cellular phone numbers). The number of requests, consequently, is significantly 

larger than the number of individuals or organizations that are the subjects of the NSLs. 
38 | P a g e

Figure 21a: Table of NSLs Issued and Requests for Information

National Security Letters 

(NSLs)

 

CY2013 CY2014 CY2015 CY2016 CY2017

Total number of NSLs issued 19,212 16,348 12,870 12,150 12,762

Number of Requests for 

Information (ROI)

38,832 33,024 48,642 24,801 41,579

See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(6).

Figure 21b: Chart of NSLs Issued and Requests for Information

19,212 16,348 12,870 12,150 12,762

38,832

33,024

48,642

24,801

41,579

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

CY2013 CY2014 CY2015 CY2016 CY2017

Total NSLs Issued and 

Total ROIs within those NSLs

NSLs Issued ROIs in NSLs
APPENDIX