Partnership for Peace: Charting a

Course for a New Era

by Jeffrey Simon

Strategic Forum

By the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) will have enlarged to 26 countries, with 10 of the original 24 Partnership

for Peace (PFP) partners having achieved full

Alliance membership. This transition marks

the end of an era and raises questions about

PFP direction and long-term viability.

The original strategic rationale for the

partnership, enhancing stability among and

practical cooperation with the countries

along the NATO periphery, has become even

more compelling in the context of further

Alliance enlargement, the war on terrorism,

growing Western interests in Southwest and

Central Asia, and the rise of authoritarian and

neoimperialist sentiments in Russia. That

said, the key incentive that once animated

engagement in the partnership has been

diminished since the remaining partners are

either not interested in membership or unlikely to join for many years.

To retain its relevance and effectiveness, the Partnership for Peace must be

transformed, adequately resourced, and

better integrated with bilateral and regional

efforts to address new security challenges.

The Istanbul Summit could launch an initiative to promote new, tailored PFP programs in

the Balkans, greater Black Sea region, and

countries of Central Asia.

NATO should also link Balkan partner

membership accession to the completion of

specific NATO acquis with a time horizon of

roughly 5 to 8 years and offer intensified

dialogue with Ukraine as a prerequisite to

initiating membership discussions.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and

Warsaw Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faced a strategic challenge: how

to shape the post-Communist reform process in

Central and Eastern Europe in ways that would

foster stability and allow for cooperation on

common security problems. NATO created the

North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in

December 1991 to promote dialogue on common security concerns with these countries and

the former Soviet Union. The NACC dialogue

bridged the former East-West divide and illuminated opportunities for practical cooperation.

The council also helped Central and East

European politicians understand that defense

requirements are best rooted in democratic

politics and that national security encompassed

civil emergency planning and a broader range

of concerns, not just the military.

PFP Evolution

The Partnership for Peace (PFP), which

built on the NACC, has undergone enormous

change since it was launched in January 1994.

The PFP was designed to allow for practical

cooperation between NATO and nonmembers

on a bilateral and multilateral basis and to

prepare aspirants for entry into the Alliance,

which was not yet ready to accept new members. Though many aspirants initially saw the

partnership as a “policy for postponement,” 

it did address some of their security concerns

and established the norm that partners should

make contributions to common security.1

Continued partner pressure for membership

and political shifts in the West led NATO to

initiate a Study on NATO Enlargement that

made clear to all that the partnership was the

best path to NATO membership.2

Within 6 months of launching PFP, there

were roughly two dozen partners, including

most of the newly independent states of the

former Soviet Union. PFP architects wrestled to

identify the most useful forms of cooperation

and found military exercises and training

generated great interest. Initially, about a

dozen partners participated in the Partnership

Coordination Cell (PCC) at Mons, Belgium, to

coordinate and plan military exercises for

search and rescue, humanitarian assistance,

and peacekeeping operations. The PCC terms of

reference expanded to include “peace enforcement operations” after the December 1995

Dayton Accords and the NATO decision to allow

partners to deploy peacekeepers in the Bosnia

Implementation Force (IFOR)3 and follow-on

Stabilization Force (SFOR).4 Another focal

point was internal defense reform—the socalled Planning and Review Process (PARP).5

The July 1997 Madrid Summit invited the

Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to join

the Alliance and “enhanced” the partnership to

be more relevant and operational.6 The summit

also debuted the Euro-Atlantic Partnership

Council (EAPC), which replaced the NACC, and

the creation of the NATO–Russia Permanent

Joint Council and NATO–Ukraine Commission

to enhance consultation and cooperation with

Russia and Ukraine.

By the April 1999 Washington Summit,

the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland had

just become the first PFP partners to join the

Alliance, which was then heavily engaged in a

bombing campaign of Serbia. In the follow-on

Kosovo Force (KFOR), 16 PFP partners contributed to the operation,7 in addition to the 

3 new Allies. The summit approved the new

Alliance Strategic Concept, which underscored

the importance of partnerships and launched a

No. 206

March 2004

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points

No. 206, March 2004 Strategic Forum 1
Defense Capabilities Initiative to improve

operability among Alliance forces and, where

applicable, between Alliance and partner forces

in operations not falling under Article 5 (the

collective defense provision of the Alliance). It

approved a third PARP cycle that further enhanced partner force planning procedures to

make them more closely resemble the NATO

Defense Planning Questionnaire.8 The 1999

summit also introduced the Membership Action

Plan (MAP) as a visible manifestation of the

NATO “Open Door” (Article 10) policy with a

clear set of Allied expectations from prospective

members.9 The MAP Annual National Plans

generated by the nine10 aspirant partners would

allow each to set its own objectives and targets

on preparations for possible future membership. This framework and experience prepared

the partnership well for the challenges of the

war on terrorism.

Post-9/11 Challenges

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11,

NATO and many partner governments have

struggled, with varying degrees of success, to

reshape their defense capabilities to deal with

the new risks posed by global terrorism. In

response to the attacks on the World Trade

Center and the Pentagon, the United States

increased defense expenditures by $48 billion

(a sum equal to the entire defense budget of

the United Kingdom). In contrast, the defense

budgets of most other longtime Allies have

remained unchanged and the overall capabilities gap between America and other Allies has

widened further since the accession of the

Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Yet in

the aftermath of 9/11, NATO committed itself to

a broader functional and wider geographic

area of engagement. After invoking Article 5 on

collective defense on September 12, NATO

airborne warning and control systems flew over

the United States while its naval forces operated

in the eastern Mediterranean.

Still, as NATO began to “plan” operations

in and around Afghanistan, PFP demonstrated

its utility in bolstering and facilitating NATO

operations in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Moreover, at their first meeting after the 9/11

attacks, EAPC defense ministers affirmed their

determination to utilize the partnership to

increase cooperation and capabilities against

terrorism. Consistent with the NATO realization

that it must place greater emphasis on meeting

the challenges of asymmetric warfare, the

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council approved

new PARP ministerial guidance11 and adopted

an Action Plan 2002–2004 and the Civil Emergency Action Plan regarding possible chemical,

biological, or radiological (CBR) attacks.

Although the International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in

Afghanistan commenced in January 2002 with

the participation of several Allies and PFP

partners, NATO did not assume command

until April 16, 2003.12 In addition, many Allies

(to include two new ones—Poland and the

Czech Republic) and six PFP partners13 rendered substantial assistance in Operation

Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Finally,

after Saddam Hussein was toppled in Iraq,

NATO provided intelligence and logistical

support to the Polish-led multinational division,14 comprised of many Allies and 11 partners, which is engaged in stabilization efforts

as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

15 It would

not be beyond imagination that NATO might

assume command of the Polish division sector

at some point. Allies and partners are likely to

be engaged in these areas for years to come.

To better address these challenges, the

November 2002 Prague Summit approved the

Prague Capabilities Commitment, NATO

Response Force, and new NATO command

structure. Its centerpiece is the creation of the

small NATO Response Force with high-tech

capabilities for expeditionary missions that

would allow European Allies and partners to

contribute small niche units (for example,

police, engineering, de-mining, chemical

decontamination, alpine, and special forces)

with secure communications, ample readiness, and the capability to deploy, sustain, and

operate with U.S. forces through the entire

conflict spectrum. If implemented, these

initiatives would provide a more constructive

burdensharing arrangement for NATO in the

post-9/11 risk environment. 

The Prague Summit also endorsed the

military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism

that calls for “improved intelligence sharing

and crisis response arrangements [and commitment with partners] to fully implement the

Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Action

Plan . . .against possible attacks by. . . chemical, biological or radiological agents.”16 So,

too, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

adopted the Partnership Action Plan Against

Terrorism on November 22, 2002, which commits partners to take steps to combat terrorism

at home and share information and experience.17 Although this plan has not yet achieved

very much, it does establish a framework upon

which to build necessary functions.

A Vision for PFP Revival

To keep the Partnership for Peace relevant

and effective over the next decade, partners

need to focus on developing capabilities to

combat terrorism and other transnational

threats. New programs could focus on making

interior ministries, police, and border guards

more effective. A revived partnership needs to

improve its intelligence cooperation to include

sharing of interior (police and border control)

and finance information. Finally, the PFP

budget and functions need to be reexamined

and updated to support future counterterrorist

operations to include the counterproliferation

efforts and missile defense systems outlined in

the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism.

Added to these broader functional and

wider geographic challenges facing the

Alliance, the relationship between NATO members and PFP partners is changing dramatically. With 7 MAP partners acceding to membership in 2004, there will soon be more Allies

(26) than partners (20)—including Russia

and Ukraine, who, while PFP members, have

special bilateral relationships with NATO. Allies

will be struggling with the transformation of

their own armed forces and security sector

institutions and with completing the integration of the 10 newest members. The 20 remaining partners have diverse security interests, and

the majority of them have much weaker defense establishments and governmental institutions than those joining the Alliance. 

Given this context, the Istanbul Summit

should articulate a new strategic vision for the

partnership to ensure its ability to support

NATO commitments to a wider geographic area

and broader functional engagement. The

summit will mark 10 years since the inception

of the Partnership for Peace, and 10 partners

will have joined the Alliance. During this

period, many subregional partnerships and

regional groupings have emerged and contributed substantially to confidence, stability,

2 Strategic Forum No. 206, March 2004

Jeffrey Simon is senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National

Defense University. Please address questions or comments to his attention at simonj@ndu.edu.
and security. A revived partnership needs to

build on and help extend the benefits of this

subregional cooperation. 

But for NATO to succeed in reenergizing

the PFP at the Istanbul Summit, the partnership will need to be tailored to the security

concerns and interests of the remaining 20

NATO partners and 2 PFP aspirants (BosniaHerzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro) who fall

into the following 8 distinct groups with very

diverse needs, interests, and capacities:

■ 5 “advanced” partners—Austria, Finland,

Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland—with no interest

yet in joining the Alliance

■ 3 MAP partners—Albania, Croatia, and

Macedonia—who do aspire to membership and for

whom NATO must keep its Open Door “credible”

■ 2 Balkan PFP aspirants—BosniaHerzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro

■ 3 Caucasus partners—Armenia, Azerbaijan,

and Georgia

■ 5 Central Asia partners—Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and

Uzbekistan

■ 2 relatively inactive partners—Belarus and

Moldova

■ Ukraine, which claims to be an aspirant

with an “Action Plan” and hopes to join the

Membership Action Plan

■ Russia, which does not aspire to membership but maintains a special relationship in the

NATO–Russia Council established in May 2002.

The incentives for PFP participation vary

widely. Russia, which is not interested in formal membership, and Ukraine, which aspires

to join NATO, are special cases. While Moldova

and Belarus remain relatively inactive in the

partnership, their role could change as they

adjust to their altered geostrategic environment

after enlargement. The partnership also provides incentive for Bosnia-Herzegovina and

Serbia-Montenegro because it remains their

one near-term pathway to Euro-Atlantic structures and legitimacy. So, too, the remaining 16

PFP partners, who fall into 4 categories, are

likely to embrace a reenergized PFP.

Advanced Partners. All of the five advanced partners18 (except Switzerland) are

already in the European Union (EU) and

remain outside formal NATO membership by

choice. Their increased participation in the

PFP in recent years has focused primarily on

the Balkans and serves as an example of partnership participation as being important in its

own right and not necessarily being a route to

membership. These partners (along with NATO

members) should be encouraged to establish a

“buddy” system with Caucasian and Central

Asian partners (as Sweden and Finland have

already done with the Baltic states and similar

to what Lithuania has been doing with

Georgia). This may not be easy, as the advanced partners have been more active in local

Baltic cooperation and Balkan peace support

operations that have been inexorably shifting

to the European Union.19 Hence, it will be a

challenge to keep these partners engaged in

wider NATO geographic interests. One way to

engage them might be to make preparation of

NATO exercises in the Caucasus and Central

Asia more flexible, allow the nonaligned partners to take a greater part in their planning,

and encourage their security sector expertise in

a revived partnership.

Balkan Stability and Security. NATO

enlargement, the MAP process, and Partnership

for Peace have played a very important but

underappreciated role in enhancing Balkan

stability and security. Slovenian, Bulgarian,

and Romanian membership in NATO forms a

stable security foundation. The MAP (as long

as the Open Door policy remains credible)

keeps Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia positively engaged in activities consistent with

NATO principles, and the incentive of PFP

membership keeps Bosnia-Herzegovina and

Serbia-Montenegro productively focused. Their

continued successful engagement has become

increasingly important in light of the transfer

of the NATO Operation Allied Harmony in

Macedonia to the European Union

(Concordia) and will become even more

important after the likely transfer of the Dayton

implementation missions conducted by NATO

SFOR to the European Union later in 2004.

If PFP were to become moribund or lose

credibility, Balkan security would be severely

undermined because some nations might be

tempted to move in unconstructive directions.

With this in mind, the Istanbul Summit

could establish more precise goals that need to

be achieved in order to keep the NATO Open

Door credible for the three remaining MAP

members, particularly Albania and Macedonia,

which have been in the partnership for almost

a decade.20 If NATO is unprepared to offer

membership soon to these countries, it needs to

establish the prospect of it. NATO might consider some version of a “regatta concept”

linking Balkan MAP partner accession to the

completion of specific, well-defined NATO

acquis built into the MAP Annual National

Plans and with a notional time horizon of

roughly 5 to 8 years.21 While the regatta concept was rejected for the 2002 Prague Summit

invitees because member governments wanted

to keep membership a political decision rather

than linking it to completion of fixed criteria,

it may be the only way to maintain interest in

the partnership among these three countries

still recovering from recent conflicts. PFP

programs should be coordinated with EU

assistance to security sector reforms to tackle

the new security threats outlined in the EAPC

Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism.

PFP programs need to be better integrated

with the successful subregional Southeast

European Defense Ministerials (SEDM) process

(which should also be broadened to include

interior and intelligence functions), the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) to

combat transborder crime, and the Southeast

European Brigade (SEEBRIG) in the Balkans.

If this proves difficult in the Balkans (as it

likely will beyond), then the PFP mandate,

consistent with the Prague Summit Action Plan

Against Terrorism, ought to be broadened to

include Partnership Goals with police activities

as it already has been with border guards. The

objective is the improvement of interagency

coordination and cooperation within and

among Balkan states.

This integration could be accomplished

within the annual SEDM meetings that began

in 199622 and have succeeded in enhancing

transparency and building cooperation and

security in Southeastern Europe. In 1999, the

Southeast European Defense Ministerials

approved the creation of the Southeast European Brigade that comprises a 25,000-troop

force that can be assembled as needed by

brigade commanders. There is speculation that

the SEEBRIG might be deployed to Bosnia

sometime in the future.

It is now time to build further upon SEDM

successes to deal with the new risk environment

consistent with NATO guidance. The Southeast

European Defense Ministerials should be

broadened to include civil emergency planning

and interior and intelligence ministers to

become an annual Southeast European Defense, Interior, and Intelligence Ministerial

(SEDIIM). The new SEDIIM should be encouraged to coordinate further its work with the

SECI,23 which broadened its activities in October 2000 to combat transborder crime involving trafficking of drugs and weapons, prostitution, and money laundering. Since Moldova,

No. 206, March 2004 Strategic Forum 3
Serbia-Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina

are SECI members and the latter two are also

PFP aspirants, they should all become SEDM

observers, with the goal of ultimate membership in the broadened SEDIIM process.

Balkan stability can be maintained and

security further enhanced by fine-tuning the

Partnership for Peace and MAP process to keep

the program credible and members and aspirants engaged, coupling PFP goals to a broadened functional SEDIIM and SECI with a more

inclusive participation by initially extending

observer status to Moldova, Serbia-Montenegro,

and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Greater Black Sea Defense Ministerial

and Caucasian Partners. The greater Black

Sea region has acquired increased strategic

importance to NATO in recent years, particularly since the Alliance assumed ISAF command in Afghanistan and support of the 

Polish-led division in Iraq. However, regional

security dialogue and cooperation have been

complicated by lingering disputes, weak governance, and other problems. While there has

been dialogue on economic cooperation in the

region, Black Sea defense ministers have never

met. It is time to apply the successful lessons of

security cooperation in Central and Southeast

Europe to the greater Black Sea region. The

first step to regional stabilization is to build

understanding through discussion of security

risks and then to build greater cooperation

through implementation of military activities

in support of a transparent agenda. What

options should the participants consider?

The successful Balkan cooperation initiatives—SEDM (and potential SEDIIM), SECI,

and SEEBRIG—could serve as models for the

Caucasus and also extend their benefits

throughout the greater Black Sea littoral.

The Central and East European experience since the late 1980s provides several

successful examples of using military cooperation to build confidence and regional security

among wary neighbors that could be applied to

improve interstate relations in the greater Black

Sea region. These include Romania-Hungary

military contacts to improve otherwise cool

political relations in the early 1990s; the continued deployment of the Czech-Slovak battalion in the United Nations (UN) Protection

Force and UN Command Humanitarian Relief

Operation during and after the January 1993

“velvet divorce”; the Polish-Ukraine Battalion

in Kosovo (and now Iraq); and the formation

of the Baltic Battalion and SEEBRIG to foster

regional cooperation in the Baltics and

Balkans. Adapting some of these experiences as

models for application within the Caucasus

and with the three new Black Sea Allies (after

2004) and partners and other willing Allies

(coupled with a U.S. Black Sea presence),

under a revived PFP, could go a long way in

advancing greater Black Sea cooperation and

stability and NATO security interests.

There are some foundations upon which

to build security cooperation in this region. Six

Black Sea littoral states established the Black

Sea Force in April 2001 for search and rescue

operations, mine clearance, environmental

protection, and promotion of goodwill visits by

naval forces.24 One can envision the creation of

a Black Sea Task Force to deal not only with

civil emergency contingencies, such as the

earthquakes that perennially strike the region

or potential CBR incidents, but also to interdict

the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and humans,

particularly if Ukraine and Russia participated.

Since the continued engagement of

Ukraine in the partnership is important, the

Istanbul Summit might consider commencing

intensified dialogues with Ukraine as a prerequisite to joining the MAP, assuming Ukraine’s

presidential elections are held as scheduled in

October 2004 in accordance with standards set

by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and adhere to Ukrainian constitutional procedures.

In addition to interstate cooperation, U.S.

policy can help improve Black Sea cooperation

and stability. The likely new U.S. presence in

Bulgaria and Romania can be leveraged to

improve interoperability through development

of joint training and logistics facilities and to

build a joint expeditionary Black Sea Task

Force. Coupled with Bulgaria, Romania, and

Turkey—now the three Black Sea Allies with a

rich experience in SEDM and SEEBRIG—the

U.S. presence could be beneficial in fostering

wider Black Sea cooperation under a revived

PFP program.

Although all three Caucasus partners were

PFP signatories in 1994, their participation has

varied considerably and only recently has

become more prominent. This has been particularly evident with the PARP, which remains

the core of transparent defense planning,

accountability, and democratic oversight of the

military, and provides the foundation to enhance subregional cooperation. After 9/11, all

three Caucasus partners joined the PARP.

Though Armenia participates in the

Partnership for Peace, cooperation with NATO

remains controversial because of unresolved

problems with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenia

has good relations with Bulgaria, Greece, and

Romania and remains very close to Russia. 

An original signatory of the May 15, 1992,

Tashkent Commonwealth of Independent

States (CIS) Collective Security Treaty with

Russia, Armenia was the only Caucasus state

which renewed its commitment for another 5

years on April 2, 1999.

While Azerbaijan and Georgia signed the

CIS treaty in 1993, they withdrew from it in

April 1999. Azerbaijan’s principal security

concerns are its conflict with Armenia over

Nagorno-Karabakh and problems with terrorism, drugs, crime, and human trafficking.

Azerbaijan cooperates with the United States in

counterterrorism and participates in postconflict efforts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Georgia participates in KFOR and Black Sea

regional cooperation and wants NATO to play a

role in solving the Abkhazian and South 

Ossetian conflicts on Georgian soil, and in

September 2002, its parliament adopted a

resolution endorsing the goal of NATO membership. The United States has assisted the 

Georgian armed forces through the Train and

Equip Program and in establishing control over

the Pankisi Gorge near the border with Russia.

The United States has greater influence

among Caucasian (and Central Asian) partners

than NATO (and EU) structures per se because

the Alliance has been more hampered by what

it can offer in terms of assistance.25 But this

could change if the NATO Security Investment

Program (NSIP) was more directly focused on

the region and the PFP Trust Fund was made

more robust.

Central Asian Partners. While it was

hoped that NACC and partnership participation by the Central Asian states would maintain their ties to the West and encourage

democratic developments, the results have

been mixed. PFP cooperation did facilitate

NATO moves into Central Asia to support

operations in Afghanistan in 2001; however,

4 Strategic Forum No. 206, March 2004

the successful Balkan 

cooperation initiatives

could serve as models 

for the Caucasus
the politics of the region remain largely authoritarian. Security cooperation was also

complicated by the fact that four of the five

Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) were among the

original signatories of the CIS Collective

Security Treaty with Russia and Armenia.

When the protocol extending the treaty was

signed on April 2, 1999, Uzbekistan dropped

out of the treaty. Four of the Central Asian

states were among the PFP signatories of

1994, but only after 9/11 did Tajikistan finally

join. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan also joined

PARP in December 2001.

Though none of the Central Asian partners

participated in any of the Balkan operations

(IFOR, SFOR, or KFOR), they have supported

U.S.- and NATO-led operations in Afghanistan

and Iraq. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have

provided basing rights and overflights for U.S.

and coalition forces in Operation Enduring

Freedom, and Kazakhstan supported Poland

with de-mining troops in Iraq and permitted

the overflight and transport of supplies and U.S.

troops in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Increasingly, these activities have irritated the Russians.

Hence, encouraging the active participation of

Russia in a revived PFP, as well as consultations

in the Russia–NATO Council, will be increasingly important to reduce the inevitable frictions and explore options for cooperative 

Russian engagement.

Istanbul Initiatives

The foregoing analysis illustrates the

increasing importance of effective cooperation

with PFP partners to NATO ability to meet its

wider geographic and functional needs. A

revival of the partnership would also provide an

opportunity to promote democratic governance,

defense and security sector reforms, and subregional cooperation in the Greater Black Sea

region and Central Asia, steps that will enhance

long-term security of the entire Euro-Atlantic

region. While PFP must continue to adapt to

the requirements of the post-9/11 era and a

changing NATO membership, its original

charter to promote good neighborly relations,

democracy, free enterprise, equitable treatment

of ethnic minorities, and democratic oversight

and effective management of the armed forces

has enduring value.

To give new momentum to the Partnership for Peace on departure from Istanbul, a

number of actions should be considered to

ensure PFP vitality.

First, the United States and its Allies should

devise a PFP strategy to link Balkan MAP partner accession to the completion of specific

NATO acquis with a time horizon of roughly 5

to 8 years and offer intensified dialogues with

Ukraine as a prerequisite to joining MAP.

Also, consistent with existing PFP guidance, the Southeast European Defense Ministerials should be broadened to include civil

emergency planning and the participation of

interior and intelligence ministers to become

an annual Southeast European Defense, Interior, and Intelligence Ministerial; its cooperation with SECI should be encouraged; and the

provision of observer status to Moldova, BosniaHerzegovina, and Serbia-Montenegro in the

SEDIIM should be promoted.

Further, programs of subregional cooperation in Southeastern Europe could be adapted

to or extended across the Black Sea. The United

States and others could work with SEDM participants to sponsor the creation of a Greater

Black Sea Defense Ministerial and Black Sea

Task Force to deal with civil emergency contingencies and interdiction of illegal trafficking.

An action that the United States should

take is to announce its willingness to support a

new Istanbul Initiative with roughly $80 million to $100 million to promote basic PFP

objectives in the Balkans, greater Black Sea

region, and Central Asia. The funds would

support military education and training programs and broader security sector reforms, and

provide the catalyst for promoting necessary

subregional cooperation and institutional development. The United States should challenge

other Allies to offer proportional funding, including support for Central and Eastern European members to transfer the lessons of their

security sector transition to these other partners.

After the launch of PFP in 1994, when it

became obvious that resources were lacking,

the United States started its Warsaw Initiative

with $100 million in annual funding. By the

2004 Istanbul Summit, most of the Warsaw

Initiative’s key recipients will be members of

the Alliance, with the program achieving

enormous success. But the remaining 20

partners, particularly around the greater Black

Sea, in the Caucasus, and Central Asia, have

significantly weaker political, economic,

social, and security and defense institutions

than the 10 partners who have become full

NATO members. In addition, the challenges

that these partners face, consistent with the

post-9/11 broader civil emergency planning

and counterterrorism direction taken by NATO

since the Prague Summit, require greater

assistance to bring their personnel and institutions closer to NATO standards.

The United States should support the new

Istanbul Initiative with funding at roughly the

same amount as the current Warsaw Initiative

(Department of Defense share of $40 million

and Department of State Foreign Military

Financing [FMF] share of $40 million), to

focus on a more sophisticated program stressing the basics. The Department of Defense

share would be used to train and educate

civilian and military partner personnel; assist

in developing a rational partner military force

that would be capable of cooperating with its

border troops, police, and intelligence institutions; refine and develop civil emergency planning procedures that will be interoperable with

immediate neighbors; and promote the development of a Greater Black Sea Defense, Interior, and Intelligence Ministerial to work with

NATO and the United States. The Department of

State FMF share should be used to upgrade air,

ground, and sea facilities and build required

infrastructure to support efforts such as the

Greater Black Sea Defense Ministerial and

Greater Black Sea Task Force.

Several multilateral funding actions

should also be taken. NATO must ensure that

the PFP Trust Fund becomes more than a

rhetorical commitment. The fund—which has 

allocated $4.2 million to destroy antipersonnel

mines in Albania, Ukraine, and Moldova, and

dispose of missile stockpiles in Georgia—will

be expanded.

The Alliance also needs to look at redirecting NATO infrastructure funds to improve the

infrastructure and bases needed to support

Alliance operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and

other potential remote deployments.

The NATO Security Investment Program

has an annual budget of over $600 million

($681 million in 2004)26 to cover installations

and facilities dealing with communications

and information systems, radar, military headquarters, airfields, fuel pipelines and storage,

No. 206, March 2004 Strategic Forum 5

a revival of the partnership

will enhance long-term

security of the entire 

Euro-Atlantic region
harbors, and navigational aids. NSIP funds

have also been used to cover eligible requirements for the NATO–led SFOR, KFOR, and ISAF

peace support operations to include repair of

airfields, rail, and roads.27

Since NATO has assumed the lead in the

Afghanistan International Security Assistance

Force, NSIP funds now ought to be eligible for

the ISAF operation and be applied to the

broader Black Sea region to augment NATO air,

road, and rail support. The Istanbul Summit

should make NSIP funds eligible to improve

facilities in PFP countries in direct support of

ISAF and other remote operations. 

The summit should also authorize the

Secretary General to restructure the NATO

International Staff yet again to consolidate the

partnership in one directorate,28 perhaps

headed by its own assistant secretary general.

This would symbolize Alliance commitment to

a renewed partnership and highlight the enduring importance of the program.

Finally, NATO needs to engage the European Union and other institutions in coordinating assistance to these regions more effectively to help partners advance security sector

reform, rule of law, and other capabilities that

will enhance security and stability.

If the Istanbul Summit fails to give new

momentum to the Partnership for Peace, there

likely will be destabilizing consequences with

implications throughout the Euro-Atlantic

region, and NATO will find it increasingly

difficult to fulfill its missions in the Balkans,

Afghanistan, and Iraq. A reenergized PFP can

help NATO achieve its broader functional and

geographic objectives.

Notes1

These occurred in the form of Individual Partnership

Programs and self-differentiation. It marked the establishment of

a wide environment of cooperation to include participation in

the Planning and Review Process, peace support operations in

the Partnership Coordination Cell, transparency, and democratic

oversight of the military. 2

The study, briefed to partners in 1995, incorporated the

principles of political democracy, economic free enterprise,

equitable treatment of ethnic minorities, good neighbor relations, and democratic oversight of the military as essential

elements of being a producer of security into NATO acquis. 3

The following 14 (of 26) PFP partners participated in

the Implementation Force: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech

Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,

Romania, Russia, Sweden, and Ukraine. 4

Later Ireland, Slovakia, and Slovenia also joined the

Stabilization Force.

5

The first PARP cycle launched in 1995 had 14 participants: Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia,

Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,

Sweden, and Ukraine. See Anthony Cragg, “The Partnership For

Peace and Review Process,” NATO Review 43, no. 6 (November

1995), 23–25. 6

The second PARP cycle launched in October 1996, which

introduced interoperability objectives to permit partner forces to

operate with Allies, had 18 partners sign up. 7

The 16 partners participating in KFOR included Austria,

Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,

Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland; Russia and

Ukraine; and Azerbaijan and Georgia from the Caucasus. 8

In essence, Partnership Goals for Interoperability and for

Forces and Capabilities would replace the old interoperability

objectives in 2000. The new Partnership Goals aimed to develop

specific armed forces and capabilities that partners could offer in

support of NATO operations and permit partners in the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council greater participation in deliberations involving exercise planning. 9

MAP identified five partner areas (political/economic,

defense/military, resources, security, and legal) that were

necessary to develop the capabilities needed for membership. 10 Croatia only joined the partnership after the Washington

Summit on May 25, 2000; later, in May 2002, it joined the MAP. 11 The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council met December

19, 2001. Now 19 partners participated in the PARP. Uzbekistan

and Kazakhstan followed Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. 12 PFP partners Austria, Finland, and Sweden; MAP

member Albania; and NATO invitees Bulgaria and Romania

participated in the International Security Assistance Force. 13 Central Asian partners Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan; Black

Sea partners Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine; and MAP invitee

Slovakia, with new members Poland and the Czech Republic,

participated in Operation Enduring Freedom. 14 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe, assisted

Warsaw’s orientation and force generation conferences; the NATO

School at Oberammergau helped train the multinational staff;

Allied Forces, Southern Europe, supported the Warsaw planning

staff on logistics planning; NATO assisted the Poles to establish a

secure satellite communications link and provided intelligence

sharing and information management. NATO Press Release

(2003) 093, September 3, 2003; accessed at <http://www.nato.

int/docu/pr/2003/p03-093e.htm>. 15 MAP member Macedonia; MAP invitees Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania, and Slovakia; Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine on the

Black Sea; Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Caucasus; and Kazakhstan in Central Asia participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom. 16 Prague Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State

and Government of the Atlantic Council in Prague on November

21, 2002. NATO Press Release (2002) 127, November 21, 2002;

accessed at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>. 17 See paragraphs 16.1 through 16.5. Partnership Action

Plan Against Terrorism, November 22, 2002. This initiative called

on partners to intensify political consultations and information

sharing on armaments and civil emergency planning; enhance

preparedness for combating terrorism by security sector reforms

and force planning, air defense and air traffic management, and

armaments and logistics cooperation; impede support for

terrorist groups by enhancing exchange of banking information

and improving border controls of arms ranging from weapons of

mass destruction (WMD) to small arms and light weapons;

enhance capabilities to contribute to consequence management

of WMD-related terrorism and civil emergency planning; and

provide assistance to partner efforts against terrorism through the

Political Military Steering Committee Clearing House mechanism

and creation of a PFP Trust Fund. 18 In terms of criteria for NATO membership as outlined in

the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement. 19 For example, Austria, Finland, and Sweden participated

in Bosnia–IFOR, to be joined later by Ireland in SFOR. All five

participate in KFOR. Only Finland, Sweden, and Austria have

engaged in ISAF, and none is in Operation Iraqi Freedom. 20 Both joined in February 1994 and November 1995

respectively; Croatia only joined the Partnership for Peace in May

2000 and the MAP in February 2002. 21 The regatta concept entails extending an invitation

contingent upon completion of specific predetermined acquis. If

multiple invitations are extended, actual accession dates could

likely vary. 22 SEDM members include Albania, Bulgaria, Greece,

Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, and Turkey (with the United

States, Italy, and more recently Ukraine as observers). Croatia

joined SEDM in October 2000. 23 Launched in December 1996, the United States initiated

and supported the SECI to encourage cooperation among the

states of Southeastern Europe on economic, transportation, and

environmental matters as a way to facilitate their access to

European integration. The SECI Center in Bucharest supports

common transborder crime fighting efforts of participating

countries. SECI presently includes all 10 Balkan countries from

Slovenia to Turkey plus Hungary and Moldova. 24 Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and

Ukraine. 25 For over a decade, the United States has been working

closely with Georgia (and Uzbekistan in Central Asia) on

training forces to deal with their internal requirements. 26 Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO

Defence, M-DPC-2 (2000) 107, May 11, 2000. 27 Under the heading of Crisis Response Operations in the

NATO military budget and NATO Security Investment Program,

NATO is already spending NSIP funds in Afghanistan and is

about to spend even more in the operation of Kabul Airport. 28 PFP “drift” has resulted in part from the restructuring of

the international staff. The partnership is now subordinate to two

Assistant Secretary Generals—to the Political Affairs Security

Policy Division and the Defense Policy and Planning Division.

6 Strategic Forum No. 206, March 2004

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by

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the views of the Department of Defense or any other

agency of the Federal Government.

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