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Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap. FY2013-2038

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UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROAD MAP 

FY2013-2038 

IS 

APPROVED BY.· 

FRANK KENDALL 

: 

Under Secretary of Defense (AT &L) 

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Executive Summary

Unmanned systems continue to deliver new and enhanced battlefield capabilities to the 

warfighter. While the demand for unmanned systems continues unabated today, a number of 

factors will influence unmanned program development in the future. Three primary forces are 

driving the Department of Defense’s (DoD) approach in planning for and developing unmanned 

systems. 

1. Combat operations in Southwest Asia have demonstrated the military utility of unmanned 

systems on today’s battlefields and have resulted in the expeditious integration of 

unmanned technologies into the joint force structure. However, the systems and 

technologies currently fielded to fulfill today’s urgent operational needs must be further 

expanded (as described in this Roadmap) and appropriately integrated into Military 

Department programs of record (POR) to achieve the levels of effectiveness, efficiency, 

affordability, commonality, interoperability, integration, and other key parameters needed 

to meet future operational requirements. 

2. Downward economic forces will continue to constrain Military Department budgets for 

the foreseeable future. Achieving affordable and cost-effective technical solutions is 

imperative in this fiscally constrained environment. 

3. The changing national security environment poses unique challenges. A strategic shift in 

national security to the Asia-Pacific Theater presents different operational considerations 

based on environment and potential adversary capabilities that may require unmanned 

systems to operate in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) areas where freedom to operate is 

contested. Similarly, any reallocation of unmanned assets to support other combatant 

commanders (CCDRs) entails its own set of unique challenges, which will likely require 

unmanned systems to operate in more complex environments involving weather, terrain, 

distance, and airspace while necessitating extensive coordination with allies and host 

nations. 

The combination of these primary forces requires further innovative technical solutions 

that are effective yet affordable for program development. 

The purpose of this Roadmap is to articulate a vision and strategy for the continued 

development, production, test, training, operation, and sustainment of unmanned systems 

technology across DoD. This “Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap” establishes a 

technological vision for the next 25 years and outlines actions and technologies for DoD and 

industry to pursue to intelligently and affordably align with this vision. The Roadmap articulates 

this vision and strategy in eight chapters:

Chapter 1: Introduction — This chapter explains the Roadmap’s purpose and scope. It 

examines the current unmanned environment from an inventory and budget perspective while 

also surveying the potential future environment. The chapter includes an operational vignette to 

show potential future capabilities using some of the technologies described later in this 

Roadmap. Also, the chapter explains the reduction in budget over the next five years beginning 

with the President’s Budget request for $5.6 billion in unmanned systems in Fiscal Year 2013. In 

fact, the unmanned air domain as described in the 2014 President’s Budget released to the U.S. 
vi

Congress shows a 33.4% reduction in research, development, test, and evaluation and 

procurement funding from the previous year.

Chapter 2: Strategic Planning and Policy — This chapter expounds on the structure, 

direction, and established guidance from DoD leadership toward planning and developing 

unmanned systems. It briefly discusses some of the prevailing unmanned issues of the day and 

expresses departmental direction in their resolution.

Chapter 3: CCDR Mission and Capability Needs — A joint perspective emerges in this 

chapter through a discussion of mission capabilities unique to unmanned systems and an 

explanation of the requirements process used to deliberately develop those capabilities to achieve 

improved efficiency, effectiveness, and survivability and to reduce the burden on manpower at 

lower costs while still meeting future operational requirements. The perspective establishes that 

future unmanned systems must

• Provide capabilities more efficiently through such attributes as modularity, 

interoperability, integration with manned systems, and use of advanced technologies.

• Be more effective through features such as greater automation, improved 

performance, and flexible use of capabilities.

• Be more survivable in contested environments through improved and resilient 

communications, increased security from tampering, and system design.

• Reduce manpower requirements to operate and support unmanned systems.

Chapter 4: Technologies for Unmanned Systems — Certain key areas of interest for 

improving technology reflect DoD’s shift in strategic priorities and address the requirement to 

continue to reduce lifecycle costs across all systems, including unmanned systems. The six areas 

of interest highlighted in this chapter are interoperability and modularity; communication 

systems, spectrum, and resilience; security (research and intelligence/technology protection 

(RITP)); persistent resilience; autonomy and cognitive behavior; and weaponry. This chapter 

also describes how limited science and technology funding will potentially impact such emerging 

technology solutions.

Chapter 5: Operating Environment — This chapter describes the operating 

environments of unmanned systems, which are critical in determining system performance 

flexibilities (e.g., appropriate levels of automation, maneuverability, communication options) 

needed to accomplish the mission. The chapter emphasizes that every aspect of the operating 

environment, including the physical and regulatory, should be incorporated in all acquisition 

lifecycle stages. Guidance is currently available from each Military Department although 

requirements and standards must still be developed to support new capabilities.

Chapter 6: Logistics and Sustainment — The rapid development and fielding of large 

numbers and types of unmanned systems present DoD with a significant sustainment challenge. 

This chapter discusses the necessary transition from supporting immediate warfighter capability 

requirements to creating an affordable, long-term sustainment environment utilizing a flexible 

blend of original equipment manufacturers (OEM), other contractors, and organic support to 

meet logistics support objectives.
vii

Chapter 7: Training — The current state and forces shaping the training environment are 

similar to those that have shaped the logistics environment. As DoD transitions to a peacetime 

environment, the proper mix among the live, virtual, and constructive domains must be put into 

place to ensure that the asymmetric advantages offered by unmanned systems can be employed 

in future operations and at a reduced cost. This chapter describes the current state of training for 

unmanned systems, related challenges, and the way ahead. 

Chapter 8: International Cooperation — This chapter reflects DoD’s efforts to include 

cooperative research, development, test and evaluation, and regulatory/standard agreements of 

defense technologies and systems with foreign partners as well as the procurement of defense 

articles, systems, and services from foreign partners. DoD objectives and methods are explained.

While DoD unmanned systems development funding will likely be constrained over the 

early part of this decade, unmanned systems (air, maritime, and ground) continue to hold much 

promise for the warfighting tasks ahead. If the technical, logistics and sustainment, training, and 

cooperation challenges are addressed by accomplishing the projects and tasks described in this 

Roadmap, advances in capability and affordability can readily address the needs dictated by the 

plans, policies, and operating environments. These advances will achieve well beyond what is 

attainable today.
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Table of Contents

1 Introduction............................................................................................................................ 1

1.1 DoD Vision ......................................................................................................................... 1

1.2 Scope................................................................................................................................... 1

1.3 Current Environment .......................................................................................................... 2

1.3.1 Unmanned Aircraft Systems..................................................................................... 4

1.3.2 Unmanned Ground Systems ..................................................................................... 6

1.3.3 Unmanned Maritime Systems................................................................................... 8

1.4 Future Environment ............................................................................................................ 8

1.4.1 Objectives ................................................................................................................. 9

1.4.2 Trends and Characteristics...................................................................................... 10

1.4.3 Operational Vignette............................................................................................... 10

2 Strategic Planning and Policy .............................................................................................. 14

2.1 Strategic Guidance ............................................................................................................ 14

2.2 Congressional Direction.................................................................................................... 14

2.3 Acquisition Initiatives....................................................................................................... 14

2.4 Departmental Policy Consideration .................................................................................. 15

2.4.1 Autonomy ............................................................................................................... 15

2.4.2 Data Protection – Near, Middle, and Long Terms.................................................. 16

2.4.3 Data Exploitation .................................................................................................... 17

2.4.4 Selective Innovation................................................................................................ 18

2.4.5 Manned-Unmanned System Teaming (MUM-T)................................................... 19

3 Combatant Commander Mission and Capability Needs...................................................... 20

3.1 Why Unmanned? .............................................................................................................. 20

3.2 Requirements Processes.................................................................................................... 20

3.3 Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) .......................................................................................... 23

3.3.1 Battlespace Awareness JCA – JS/J-28, BA FCB.................................................... 23

3.3.2 Force Application JCA – JS/J-8, FA FCB.............................................................. 24

3.3.3 Protection JCA – JS/J-8, Protection FCB ............................................................... 24

3.3.4 Logistics JCA – JS/J-4, Logistics FCB................................................................... 24

3.4 A Look to the Future......................................................................................................... 25

4 Technologies for Unmanned Systems ................................................................................. 26

4.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 26
ix

4.1.1 Interoperability and Modularity.............................................................................. 28

4.1.2 Communication Systems, Spectrum, and Resilience.............................................. 28

4.1.3 Security: Research and Intelligence/Technology Protection (RITP)...................... 29

4.1.4 Persistent Resilience ............................................................................................... 29

4.1.5 Autonomy and Cognitive Behavior ........................................................................ 29

4.1.6 Weaponry................................................................................................................ 29

4.1.7 Sensor Air Drop ...................................................................................................... 29

4.1.8 Weather Sensing ..................................................................................................... 30

4.1.9 High-Performance Computing (HPC) .................................................................... 30

4.2 Interoperability and Modularity........................................................................................ 31

4.2.1 Background............................................................................................................. 31

4.2.2 Interoperability Functional Description.................................................................. 32

4.2.3 Modularity Functional Description......................................................................... 33

4.2.4 DoD Initiatives to Increase Interoperability and Modularity.................................. 33

4.2.5 Interoperability and Modularity Key Technologies................................................ 37

4.2.6 Summary................................................................................................................. 38

4.3 Communication Systems, Spectrum, and Resilience........................................................ 39

4.3.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 39

4.3.2 Issues with Current Unmanned Systems Communication Infrastructure ............... 40

4.3.3 Communication Gateways and Relay Sites............................................................ 42

4.3.4 Enterprise Data Centers and Distribution Nodes.................................................... 43

4.3.5 Satellite Communications....................................................................................... 45

4.3.6 Networking Infrastructure and Systems.................................................................. 45

4.3.7 Antennas ................................................................................................................. 46

4.3.8 Transmitter/Receiver Systems................................................................................ 47

4.3.9 UMS Communications............................................................................................ 48

4.3.10 Spectrum Considerations........................................................................................ 49

4.3.11 Waveforms.............................................................................................................. 50

4.3.12 Multiple-Input, Multiple-Output (MIMO) Systems ............................................... 52

4.3.13 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3)......................................................... 52

4.3.14 Optical Communications ........................................................................................ 53

4.3.15 Advanced Navigation Developments ..................................................................... 53

4.3.16 Improved GPS Operations...................................................................................... 54

4.3.17 Cost Effectiveness Considerations.......................................................................... 54
x

4.3.18 Future Trends.......................................................................................................... 55

4.3.19 Mobile Technologies .............................................................................................. 55

4.3.20 Summary................................................................................................................. 55

4.4 Security: Research and Intelligence/Technology Protection (RITP)................................ 57

4.4.1 Data at Rest (DAR) Encryption .............................................................................. 58

4.4.2 Cost Effectiveness................................................................................................... 58

4.4.3 Near-Term Goals .................................................................................................... 58

4.4.4 Middle- and Long-Term Goals............................................................................... 59

4.4.5 Unified Security Classification Guidance............................................................... 59

4.4.6 Cloud Computing and Multilayer Security............................................................. 60

4.5 Persistent Resilience ......................................................................................................... 61

4.5.1 Size, Weight, Power, and Cooling (SWaP-C) ........................................................ 61

4.5.2 Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) ............................................ 62

4.5.3 Survivability............................................................................................................ 63

4.5.4 Structures and Material Degradation ...................................................................... 64

4.5.5 Propulsion ............................................................................................................... 65

4.5.6 Summary................................................................................................................. 66

4.6 Autonomy and Cognitive Behavior .................................................................................. 66

4.6.1 Today’s State (2013–2017)..................................................................................... 68

4.6.2 Middle-Term Future State (2017–2022)................................................................. 71

4.6.3 Long-Term Future State (Beyond 2020)................................................................. 72

4.6.4 Key Enablers and Concerns.................................................................................... 72

4.7 Weaponry.......................................................................................................................... 73

4.7.1 Interoperability........................................................................................................ 75

4.7.2 Unmanned System–Specific Weapons................................................................... 76

4.7.3 Advanced Weapons Technology Areas.................................................................. 77

5 Operating Environment........................................................................................................ 80

5.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................... 80

5.2 Problem Statement............................................................................................................ 81

5.3 Physical Environment ....................................................................................................... 81

5.4 Policy and Regulatory Environment................................................................................. 82

5.4.1 Testing and Certification......................................................................................... 83

5.4.2 Sense and Avoid (SAA) Capability ........................................................................ 84

5.4.3 UAS Executive Committee (ExCom)..................................................................... 84
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5.5 Technology Application.................................................................................................... 84

5.5.1 Unmanned Aircraft Systems................................................................................... 85

5.5.2 Unmanned Ground Systems ................................................................................... 87

5.5.3 Unmanned Maritime Systems................................................................................. 88

5.6 Way Ahead........................................................................................................................ 90

5.7 Case Study: Air: Airworthiness and GBSAA................................................................... 90

5.8 Summary........................................................................................................................... 91

6 Logistics and Sustainment ................................................................................................... 93

6.1 Current Sustainment Environment.................................................................................... 93

6.2 Problem Statement............................................................................................................ 93

6.3 Challenges to Logistics and Sustainment ......................................................................... 94

6.3.1 Sustaining Non-PORs............................................................................................. 94

6.3.2 Limited RAM Data ................................................................................................. 95

6.3.3 Delayed Core Logistics Capability Requirements.................................................. 95

6.3.4 Transition from CLS for Life to Organic Capabilities............................................ 95

6.3.5 Immature or Lack of Lifecycle Sustainment Planning ........................................... 96

6.4 The Way Ahead ................................................................................................................ 96

6.5 Planning for Organic Depot Maintenance ........................................................................ 98

6.6 Sustainment Metrics and Performance-Based Logistics................................................... 99

6.7 Joint Logistics Integration................................................................................................. 99

6.7.1 Unmanned Aircraft Systems................................................................................... 99

6.7.2 Unmanned Maritime Systems............................................................................... 101

6.7.3 Unmanned Ground Systems ................................................................................. 101

7 Training ........................................................................................................................... 102

7.1 The Need to Train ........................................................................................................... 102

7.2 Problem Statement.......................................................................................................... 102

7.3 Challenges to Training.................................................................................................... 102

7.4 Current Training Environment........................................................................................ 103

7.4.1 Unmanned Aircraft Systems................................................................................. 103

7.4.2 Unmanned Ground Systems ................................................................................. 108

7.4.3 Unmanned Maritime Systems............................................................................... 109

7.4.4 The Acquisition Process ....................................................................................... 109

7.4.5 The Regulatory Environment................................................................................ 110

7.4.6 Technology ........................................................................................................... 110
xii

7.4.7 Manpower ............................................................................................................. 110

7.4.8 Asset Availability.................................................................................................. 110

7.4.9 Policy and Documentation.................................................................................... 111

7.5 The Way Ahead .............................................................................................................. 111

8 International Cooperation .................................................................................................. 113

8.1 Introduction..................................................................................................................... 113

8.2 Methods of International Cooperation............................................................................ 113

8.2.1 MOAs and MOUs................................................................................................. 113

8.2.2 Foreign Military Sales (FMS)............................................................................... 114

8.2.3 Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)........................................................................... 114

8.2.4 NATO ................................................................................................................... 114

8.3 International Cooperation Authority, Jurisdiction, Approval, and Disclosure ............... 114

8.3.1 Authority and Jurisdiction..................................................................................... 115

8.3.2 Approval and Disclosure....................................................................................... 116

8.4 Special UAS-Related Considerations............................................................................. 117

8.4.1 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)..................................................... 117

8.4.2 Armed UAS .......................................................................................................... 117

8.5 Reform Efforts................................................................................................................ 117

8.5.1 Security Cooperation Reform ............................................................................... 117

8.5.2 Defense Exportability Features (DEF).................................................................. 118

8.5.3 Export Control Reform (ECR) Initiative .............................................................. 118

8.5.4 Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure (TS&FD) ...................................... 119

9 Summary ........................................................................................................................... 120

Appendix A FOUNDATIONAL DOCUMENTS AND REFERENCES.............................. 121

Appendix B PRIORITY INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS......................................... 123

Appendix C DOD INITIATIVES TO INCREASE INTEROPERABILITY AND 

MODULARITY ................................................................................................ 126

Appendix D UNMANNED SYSTEMS T&E CAPABILITIES CURRENT STATUS........ 137

Appendix E MANNED UNMANNED TEAMING (MUM-T) AND MUSIC..................... 139

Appendix F CASE STUDY MQ-9 REAPER ....................................................................... 142

Appendix G POINTS OF CONTACT LIST.......................................................................... 145

Appendix H ABBREVIATIONS........................................................................................... 148
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List of Figures

Figure 1. Unmanned Warfare Information Repository................................................................... 2

Figure 2. UAS Inventory vs. Funding............................................................................................. 4

Figure 3. Inventory of DoD UAS ................................................................................................... 5

Figure 4. UAS (PB13 and Beyond) ................................................................................................ 6

Figure 5. UGS by Mission/Capability Area.................................................................................... 7

Figure 6. UMS by Mission Area..................................................................................................... 8

Figure 7. Operational Battlespace................................................................................................. 11

Figure 8. Array of Future Unmanned Systems (Notional) ........................................................... 12

Figure 9. Linked JCIDS Process................................................................................................... 21

Figure 10. DoD S&T Funding: FY1962–2016............................................................................. 26

Figure 11. Near-, Middle-, and Long-Term Goals........................................................................ 28

Figure 12. Interoperability and Modularity Goals for Unmanned Systems.................................. 39

Figure 13. High-Level C4 Infrastructure Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1) ......................... 40

Figure 14. DISA Proposed UVDS Functional Architecture......................................................... 44

Figure 15. Current UVDS Operational Architecture (February 2012)......................................... 44

Figure 16. Possibilities of Obtaining Spectrum Support in Various Host Nations for 

Wider Frequency Range ............................................................................................................... 51

Figure 17. Unmanned Systems Target Architecture..................................................................... 56

Figure 18. Communication Systems, Spectrum, and Resilience Goals for Unmanned Systems 57

Figure 19. SWaP-C Goals for Unmanned Systems...................................................................... 62

Figure 20. RAM Goals for Unmanned Systems........................................................................... 63

Figure 21. Survivability Goals for Unmanned Systems ............................................................... 64

Figure 22. Structures and Material Degradation Goals for Unmanned Systems.......................... 65

Figure 23. Propulsion Goals for Unmanned Systems................................................................... 66

Figure 24. Army’s Vision for Five Problem Domains (Think – Look – Move – Talk – Work). 70

Figure 25. RCTA’s Capstone Experiment in FY2014.................................................................. 71

Figure 26. Laser Homing Attack or Anti-Tank Missile (LAHAT) .............................................. 73

Figure 27. Laser-Guided SPIKE................................................................................................... 74

Figure 28. Switchblade Munition ................................................................................................. 75

Figure 29. Nanoparticles and Explosions..................................................................................... 77

Figure 30. Weaponry Goals for Unmanned Systems.................................................................... 79

Figure 31. SAA Self-Separation Functions .................................................................................. 84
xiv

Figure 32. UAS Pilot Simulator Training..................................................................................... 86

Figure 33. Operating Environment Technology Development Timeline ..................................... 92

Figure 34. Lifecycle Sustainment Planning Analysis Way Ahead ............................................... 97

Figure 35. Organic Depot Maintenance Sources of Repair Approved Consolidations.............. 100

Figure 36. Army Group 3 and Above UAS Operator Training Flow......................................... 104

Figure 37. Current Marine Corps Group 3 UAS Operator Training Flow ................................. 105

Figure 38. Air Force MQ-1/9 Pilot & Sensor Operator Training Flow...................................... 106

Figure 39. UAS Training Objectives.......................................................................................... 112

Figure 40. Overarching Innovation Goals Timeline ................................................................... 120

Figure 41. MUSIC I Operational View (OV-1).......................................................................... 140

Figure 42. MQ-9 Reaper Sustainment Plan ................................................................................ 144

List of Tables

Table 1. DoD Unmanned Systems Funding ($ mil/PB14) ............................................................. 3

Table 2. MUSIC I Capabilities and Use Cases........................................................................... 141
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

1

1 Introduction

The purpose of this Roadmap is to articulate a vision and strategy for the continued 

development, production, test, training, operation, and sustainment of unmanned systems 

technology across the Department of Defense (DoD). Recent combat operations in Southwest 

Asia have demonstrated the military utility of unmanned systems in today’s combat environment 

and have resulted in the rapid integration of unmanned technologies into the joint force structure.

This Roadmap establishes a vision for the next 25 years and outlines actions and technologies for 

DoD, industry, universities, and others to pursue to achieve the sustained, affordable, rapid 

integration and application of unmanned systems.

This Roadmap is required by goals within the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Task 

Force charter. Specifically, Goal 5 of the charter refers to the roadmap task:

1

Goal 5. Serve as the Department’s lead activity for the 

development and promulgation of the Unmanned Systems 

Roadmap.

1.1 DoD Vision

DoD will develop and field affordable, flexible, interoperable, integrated, and 

technologically advanced unmanned capabilities that will

• Prevail in the full range of contingencies and in all operating domains, including 

cyberspace (Defense Strategic Guidance 2012);

2

• Enable decisive force effectiveness in Joint and coalition operations;

• Be critical to future success;

• Emphasize missions according to strategic guidance from intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR); counterterrorism; counter-weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD); and operations required to operate across all environments, including antiaccess and area denial (A2/AD);

• Protect the homeland; and

• Be able to surge and regenerate forces and capabilities.

1.2 Scope

This Roadmap continues the path outlined in the 2011 edition of the Roadmap and 

addresses three unmanned operating domains: air, ground, and maritime. It leverages the existing 

roadmaps produced by the individual military departments and agencies and focuses on the 

common technical, training, and policy challenges that each Armed Service faces in achieving 

the full potential of unmanned systems technology. A list of the applicable Service documents 

that form the foundation of these conclusions can be found in Appendix A.

 1 The full charter is available on the Unmanned Warfare Information Repository (Figure 1). 2 “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Leadership,” Defense Strategic Guidance, January 

2012.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

2

This document serves a diverse stakeholder community with one of the primary target 

audiences being DoD. By providing a common vision toward overcoming unmanned challenges, 

this Roadmap can shape military department investments in unmanned innovations. The plans 

outlined in this document also shape the efforts of Service requirements developers, budget 

planners, program managers, laboratories, warfighters, and 

other key DoD stakeholders. In addition, this document 

serves the defense industry by providing insight into DoD 

priorities and helping to shape industry investments, 

particularly for independent research and development 

investment strategies. Finally, this Roadmap informs key 

stakeholders outside DoD, including Congressional staffs, 

the Government Accountability Office, advocacy groups, 

and academic institutions.

The traditional unmanned catalog, historically contained in 

this document, now resides in a separate, online tool. This 

tool has been in place since 2010 and provides greater 

functionality than a hard-copy document. The online 

approach also facilitates more frequent updates to the 

catalog than the biennial publication of this Roadmap. 

Readers can find the common access card–protected 

catalog on the Unmanned Warfare Information Repository

(Figure 1) at https://extranet.acq.osd.mil/uwir/.

3

1.3 Current Environment

Urgency resulting from the swiftly changing international environment is deeply felt 

within DoD’s acquisition programs. Specifically, three forces are driving this sense of urgency:

department budgetary challenges, evolving security requirements, and a changing military 

environment. Budgets for unmanned systems are discussed in this section while the other two 

forces are addressed in the future environment section (see Section 1.4). 

As we turn the page on more than a decade of grinding conflict, we must 

broaden our attention to future threats and challenges. That means 

continuing to increase our focus on the Asia-Pacific region, reinvigorating 

historic alliances like NATO, and making new investments in critical 

capabilities like cyber.

In order to accomplish our mission, we also must make wise budget 

decisions prioritizing our interests and requirements.

— Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense4

 3 Common access card protection is required on the OUSD(AT&L) network infrastructure. Inquiries can be made to 

OUSD(AT&L)S&TS-UW&ISR. See page 149 of Appendix G for contact information. 4 Source: http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1754.

Figure 1. Unmanned Warfare 

Information Repository
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

3

The 2013 Presidential Budget (PB13) reduced the overall DoD budget by $259 billion 

over the next Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), with a total reduction of $487 billion over the 

next 10 years. The 2014 Presidential Budget, with the potential effects of sequestration, further 

reduces the budget by about $55 billion across the FYDP.

5 Some defense programs were 

bolstered with additional funds while others required adjustments downward. The budget 

focuses on developing A2/AD technologies to ensure dominance in A2/AD scenarios and will 

fund the next-generation bomber and other modernizations. Table 1 explains the unmanned 

systems portion of PB14.

Table 1. DoD Unmanned Systems Funding ($ mil/PB14)

FYDP 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total

Air

RDTE 1189.4 1674.0 1521.4 1189.4 1087.9 6662.2

Proc 1505.5 2010.2 1843.5 1870.7 2152.8 9382.7

OM 1080.9 1135.2 1102.7 1156.9 1178.5 5654.1

Domain Total 3775.9 4819.4 4467.6 4217.0 4419.3 21699.1

FYDP 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total

Ground

RDTE 6.5 19.1 13.6 11.1 10.6 60.9

Proc 6.5 27.9 30.7 42.6 55.4 163.1

OM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Domain Total 13.0 47.0 44.3 53.7 66.0 223.9

FYDP 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total

Maritime

RDTE 62.8 54.8 66.1 81.0 87.2 351.9

Proc 104.0 184.8 160.1 158.1 101.1 708.2

OM 163.4 170.3 182.4 190.5 193.6 900.2

Domain Total 330.2 409.8 408.6 429.7 381.8 1960.2

FYDP 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total

All

Unmanned 

Systems

RDTE 1,258.7 1,747.9 1,601.1 1,281.5 1,185.7 7,075.0 

Proc 1,616.0 2,222.9 2,034.3 2,071.4 2,309.3 10,253.9 

OM 1,244.3 1,305.4 1,285.1 1,347.4 1,372.1 6,554.3 

Domain Total 4,119.1 5,276.2 4,920.5 4,700.4 4,867.1 23,883.2 

Note: Ground operations and maintenance (OM) is funded with overseas contingency operations 

funding.

Over the past decade, the quantities and types of unmanned systems acquired by the 

Military Departments have grown, and their capabilities have become integral to warfighter 

operations. The size, sophistication, and cost of the unmanned systems portfolio have grown to 

rival traditional manned systems. Unmanned systems now include both major acquisition 

programs to provide long-term capability and short-duration projects to meet urgent needs. 

For this Roadmap, unmanned systems operating in the air domain are referred to as

unmanned aircraft systems (UAS); in the ground domain, unmanned ground systems (UGS); and 

in the maritime domain, unmanned maritime systems (UMS). Each operating domain brings a 

unique set of environmental attributes affecting the warfighter. In complex mission 

 5 Source: http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1643.
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environments, multiple systems across several domains must cooperate and interoperate to 

effectively perform mission tasks.

1.3.1 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

An unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is a “system whose components include the 

necessary equipment, network, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft.”6 In some cases, 

the UAS includes a launching element. DoD inventories and funding of UAS are expected to 

continue a gradual upward trend through 2015 (see Figure 2) and then trend downward in 2016 

and beyond, although UAS experienced a full $1.3 billion (33.4%) reduction from fiscal year 

(FY) 2013 to PB2014 in combined research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and 

procurement funding. Outside DoD, UAS sector growth is predicted to continue to rise and was 

described as “the most dynamic growth sector of the world aerospace industry this decade.”7

Within DoD, RDT&E

funding is planned to taper off over 

the next five years; and depot 

maintenance consolidation efforts 

underway are expected to reduce 

operation and maintenance costs

(O&M).

However, considering 

current inventory levels, overall 

funding demonstrates a continued 

commitment to invest in UAS 

performing predominately ISR 

missions. Thus, while one industry 

analysis and forecasting group 

estimates worldwide UAS spending 

will almost double over the next 10 

years to a total of $89 billion,8 a 

comparison of DoD funding plans versus industry predictions indicates DoD will not be the bulk 

user within that market. However, DoD does intend to be the most innovative user. From a 

strategic planning perspective, UAS have grown to a sizable fleet providing a variety of 

capabilities that DoD will need to maintain over the near term. See Figure 3.

 6 Joint Publication (JP) 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, 20 May 2010. 7 “Teal Group Predicts Worldwide UAV Market Will Total $89 Billion in Its 2012 UAV Market Profile and 

Forecast,” Press Release Newswire, United Business Media, 11 April 2012. 8 Ibid.

Figure 2. UAS Inventory vs. Funding
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Figure 3. Inventory of DoD UAS

Looking toward the future, modernization of current capabilities will dominate, and

limited development of new capabilities will likely focus on smaller numbers of higher end 

platforms capable of operating in more contested air environments. With fewer new systems in 

development and many future projects being deferred, the planning outlook toward future 

systems is much more conservative. See Figure 4.

Additionally, DoD seeks to improve overall interoperability over time. The latest Joint 

Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for UAS (approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council (JROC) builds on all applicable joint guidance for manned aircraft operations while 

describing the capabilities and complexities of employing UAS.9 Similarly, the latest Unmanned 

Aircraft Systems Interoperability Initiative (UI2) Capability Based Assessment (CBA) provides 

an operational assessment of UAS interoperability tasks needs.10 The CBA identifies and 

prioritizes DoD’s ability to satisfy those needs and suggests doctrine, organization, training, 

materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) solutions to 

close each gap.

 9 Joint CONOPS for UAS, Third Edition, November 2011: 

https://extranet.acq.osd.mil/uwir/docs/Joint_Concept_of_Operations_for_Unmanned_Aircraft_Systems_Third_Editi

on_Final_November_2011.pdf. 10 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Interoperability Initiative (UI2) Capability Based Assessment, 14 May 2012: 

https://extranet.acq.osd.mil/uwir/docs/UI2%20CBA%20Report%20Final%20Signed.pdf.
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Figure 4. UAS (PB13 and Beyond)

1.3.2 Unmanned Ground Systems 

UGS are a powered physical system with (optionally) no human operator aboard the 

principal platform, which can act remotely to accomplish assigned tasks. UGS may be mobile or 

stationary, can be smart learning and self-adaptive, and include all associated supporting 

components such as operator control units (OCU). Integration of UGS enabled by add-on 

mission module payloads to the other military domains is an essential part of future DoD 

operations, not only from a system perspective, but also from a joint-service and coalition 

perspective. This vision continues to be strengthened as ground-based robots have proven their 

worth in Iraq and Afghanistan across a spectrum of mission areas as shown in Figure 5.

As the Nation’s 10 years of war wind down, DoD inventories and funding of UGS are 

expected to decrease in 2014, followed by a gradual upward trend in 2016 and beyond with the 

fielding of new programs of record (PORs) to meet expanding mission requirements. The first 

wave of UGS fielding resulted from rapid acquisition programs driven by urgent warfighter 

needs in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Recognizing the need to maintain the UGS 

capability beyond today’s fight, but lacking fielded PORs, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army 

approved a directed requirement for continued support and sustainment of selected contingency 

systems. This directive authorizes the sustainment of specific capabilities beyond today’s 
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worldwide engagements to bridge the capability gap until enduring capabilities are developed 

and acquired using traditional Armed Service programming.

Figure 5. UGS by Mission/Capability Area

DoD has maintained an enterprise approach to UGS capability since the early 1990s. The 

Joint Ground Robotics Enterprise (JGRE) construct has enhanced joint-service capabilities and 

coordination and provided a means for focusing DoD efforts in UGS. The JGRE focus has 

evolved over time in response to technology advancements and warfighter needs. Today’s 

enterprise focus is on synchronizing UGS programs across the Services to eliminate redundancy 

and maximize investments to ensure that future systems are affordable, mission flexible, and 

supportable while eliminating duplication across DoD.

In response to Congressional concerns, the U.S. Army has developed a 30-year UGS 

campaign plan. This campaign plan was developed as a broad avenue of approach to coordinate 

and synchronize UGS RDT&E efforts with Army force modernization requirements. The 

purpose of the resulting UGS execution order is to provide a modernized force of mannedunmanned teams with improved persistence, protection, and endurance. Realization of this goal 

will decrease physical and cognitive workloads on our warfighters, while increasing their combat 

capabilities. The end state is an affordable, modernized force as a manned-unmanned team with 

improved movement and maneuver, protection, intelligence, and sustainment. 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

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1.3.3 Unmanned Maritime Systems 

UMS comprise unmanned maritime vehicles (UMVs), which include both unmanned 

surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs), all necessary support 

components, and the fully integrated sensors and payloads necessary to accomplish the required 

missions. While funding for UMS is falling 45% across the FYDP, future UMS inventories 

continue to rise. Indeed, as new littoral combat ships arrive in service, support UMS will rise in 

number. Refer to Figure 6 for an overview of UMS.

Figure 6. UMS by Mission Area

1.4 Future Environment

As stated in 1.3, the swiftly changing strategic environment is causing a sense of urgency 

primarily driven by three forces: department budgetary challenges, evolving security 

requirements, and a changed military environment. Sections 1.3.1, 1.3.2, and 1.3.3 addressed 

budget challenges, and 1.4.1, 1.4.2, and 1.4.3 address the security requirements and military 

environment and describe the future operating environments as foreseen in U.S. strategic 

documents.
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1.4.1 Objectives

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review identified two clear objectives11 for DoD:

• Rebalance the capabilities of America’s Armed Forces to prevail in today’s wars 

while building the capabilities needed to deal with future threats.

• Continue strong support for DoD processes to better support the urgent needs of the 

warfighter; buy weapons that are usable, affordable, and truly needed; and ensure that 

taxpayer dollars are spent wisely and responsibly.

In today’s conservative fiscal environment, austere military budgets must be focused on 

purchasing improved capabilities that responsibly support the nation’s strategies while 

maintaining a leading edge in appropriate technology innovations. These strategies are based on 

potential conflicts around the world. Two strategy and budget documents that guide joint 

priorities, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Leadership” and 

“Defense Budget Priorities,” both released in January 2012, state that U.S. military strategy will 

place renewed emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region.12,13

Indeed, as we end today’s wars, we will focus on a broader range of 

challenges and opportunities, including the security and prosperity of the 

Asia Pacific.

— Barack Obama, President of the United States14

Consequently, air, land, and naval forces in the DoD planning cycle will be focused on 

improving operational capabilities to address current and future threats plus A2/AD security 

challenges analogous to the strategic state of the Asia-Pacific region as described in the “Joint 

Operational Access Concept.”15

Today’s problems and their solutions may not solve the problems arising 20 years from 

now. What possible strategic world situations should the United States prepare for to prevail 

militarily in conflicts 25 years in the future? What will the operational environment be like? Who 

are potential rivals? How should the United States invest in cutting-edge, critical unmanned 

capabilities to ensure success of the joint strategy while using networked cross-domain 

solutions?

 11 “Quadrennial Defense Review,” February 2010. 12 “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Leadership,” Defense Strategic Guidance, January 

2012.

13 “Defense Budget Priorities,” January 2012. 14 “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” February 2010. 15 “Joint Operational Access Concept,” 17 January 2012.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

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1.4.2 Trends and Characteristics

Consider these environmental 

trends and characteristics and how they 

will affect DoD’s operational unmanned 

systems:

• Pressure for reductions in 

federal budgets (and thus 

reduced military department budgets) will continue to increase; therefore, DoD 

cannot afford to acquire capabilities exceeding military needs. This increased 

pressure will further drive the need to be interoperable and better share information 

across the joint force.16

• Operational issues will be more complex as the pace of technological change 

accelerates.17 Designing systems to easily accept technological improvement 

capabilities and support multiple mission needs will be increasingly important.

• U.S. military forces will be rebalanced.

– Tension and change will contribute to uncertainty in the Middle East.

– Unable to compete force-on-force or globally, determined adversaries will adapt 

their strategies toward attempting to prevent access to certain regions or airspace 

and will target critical, less protected nodes (e.g., South Asia, Africa, and the 

Middle East). Such strategies will likely include attempts at the proliferation of 

nuclear weapons.

• Violent extremism will continue to threaten U.S. interests at home and around the 

globe.

• Unmanned technologies will continue to improve in many different capability areas.

– Competitors are catching up in unmanned technology.

– Increasingly data-intensive multisensor/multi-mission capabilities are evolving.

– Unmanned technology innovations are rapidly increasing.

• Cyber domain will be a conflict environment as readily as land, sea, or air and 

space.

18

• Enemy unmanned systems will complicate air, ground, and maritime operations by 

adding new low-altitude, ground, and amphibious threats to the force that must be 

countered. This concern will require the development of friendly countermeasures, 

including tactics, techniques, procedures, and training that enable the force to operate 

in the emerging environment.

1.4.3 Operational Vignette

The following futuristic storyline gives insight into the capabilities that could come about 

with today’s emerging technologies applied on future unmanned systems.

 16 “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Leadership,” Defense Strategic Guidance, January 

2012.

17 Ibid. 18 “Joint Operational Access Concept,” 17 January 2012.
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1.4.3.1 The Setting

In the year 2020, a nuclear inspection team from the United Nations (U.N.) International 

Atomic Energy Agency is expelled from the (notional) country of Norachi while on its second 

visit in three weeks. The agency team was denied access to nuclear sites and, therefore, could not 

verify any “military dimension” within the country’s nuclear program. A government 

spokesperson for Norachi insists its nuclear program does not have military applications. 

Meanwhile, Norachi’s leader declares on state-owned TV that the country has weapons grade 

nuclear enrichment capability and announces new military exercises “to prevent aggressions” by 

Western powers. Western concern centers on a new uranium enrichment plant, which is buried 

deep underground and, therefore, much harder to monitor or, if necessary, attack. Additionally, 

the potential transport and/or selling of WMDs materiel or technology increases the threat to the 

Western powers.

Western officials are divided over whether Norachi is shifting toward a defensive posture 

or is just playing for time to pursue its nuclear program, which it says is for strictly peaceful 

purposes. The U.N. has responded by enacting a ban on the sale of goods to Norachi, including 

an embargo on oil sales. Neighboring nations that are friendly to Norachi do not share this view. 

The U.N. is requesting the support of the United States and allied powers in surveillance 

and enforcement of the export bans to Norachi. Norachi is situated on the coast with 

mountainous areas inland. See Figure 7. Many ports have active commercial shipping enterprises 

in addition to their military facilities and berths. Additionally, Norachi has a modern road 

network and mature air transportation network for transport of goods to and from the country.

1.4.3.2 U.S. Forces

• Traditional manned air, sea, and land forces

• Land-based unmanned aircraft

• Sea-based unmanned aircraft operated 

from aircraft carriers and support ships

• Unmanned ground systems

• Vertical lift unmanned systems

• UUVs

• Small tactical UAS and UGS

1.4.3.3 Norachi Forces

• Homeland Defense ground forces

• Surface ships (patrol boats and frigates)

• Kilo-class submersibles

• Integrated air defenses with anti-aircraft 

artillery and surface-to-air missile systems

• Late-model fourth-generation fighters

• Sophisticated jammers

• Sensor intelligence

Figure 7. Operational Battlespace
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1.4.3.4 Air, Maritime, and Ground Intelligence

The National Command Authority (NCA) tasks the Combatant Commander (CCDR) to 

support the U.N. resolution and assist in enforcing the ban on Norachi. NCA also requests

increased surveillance and reconnaissance efforts on Norachi for indications and warnings of 

potential escalation of threats.

To enforce the ban, the CCDR employs a variety of land-based and sea-based systems to 

conduct ISR and interdiction. Unmanned systems provide a critical enabler to this mission. To 

survey the land and sea approaches to the country, the Air Force’s and Navy’s unmanned 

systems, including the high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) UAS with its multiday ISR and 

communication relays, provide extended persistence with a wide variety of sensors. Also, the 

aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and its supporting carrier strike group ships are tasked to 

help enforce the maritime portion of the ban on exports to Norachi. Using the Unmanned Carrier 

Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System (UCLASS), persistent ISR and strike 

capabilities are available to the CCDR. Using ship-based and land-based UAS and UMS with 

sophisticated sensor suites, maritime movement to and from Norachi is effectively tracked and 

identified. UUVs provide an effective network that detect underwater traffic and track identified 

submersibles in detail. Some of these underwater systems have extreme endurance and can patrol 

enemy coastlines. 

After a few days, unmanned reconnaissance flights and UMS intelligence establish

pattern of life in the region and at the WMD facilities, including maritime traffic in the region. 

Activity-based algorithms exploit the incoming intelligence data and conclude anomalies exist in 

the Norachi nuclear facility network. Additional unmanned assets are employed to further 

investigate these anomalies. Special Operations Forces deploy inexpensive, small, low-power 

unmanned sensor systems. One bird-like vehicle is deployed to conduct an overwatch of one 

noted facility. It perches on an electrical power line where it derives its power to gather and 

transmit images. Rugged UGS are deployed; they navigate over difficult terrain autonomously 

and provide closer video surveillance. These electrically powered vehicles accept power from 

solar/moon panel converters and a low-power laser light received from overhead assets in the 

Figure 8. Array of Future Unmanned Systems (Notional)
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vicinity, such as the perched bird-like vehicle. See Figure 8. When these unmanned assets are

applied and the resulting intelligence data are analyzed, U.S. leadership concludes Norachi has 

reached a critical stage in development at the nuclear site. Human intelligence correlates and 

confirms this conclusion.

1.4.3.5 Escalation of Tension

Norachi determines the international community is aware of the maturity of its nuclear 

program. To garner support, Norachi reaches out to another like-minded nation and negotiates a 

sale of WMD material. Through human intelligence, the international community becomes

aware of the sale, yet does not know how or when the WMD will be moved. The threat of WMD 

proliferation, plus the potential of interception and stealing by non-state actors, escalates the 

tension with Norachi.

The United States maintains a heightened level of surveillance to detect any shipments 

from the WMD facilities. The integrated network of air and ground sensors, with automated 

processing and exploitation algorithms, monitors activity and cues sensors based on activities. 

The sensors detect abnormal movements of vehicles from a key WMD storage site. The U.N. 

authorizes interception of the WMD because proliferation and potential terrorist use of the WMD 

are greater risks than a likely response from Norachi. Penetrating, high-altitude airborne systems 

track the vehicle and provide cueing information to incoming strike aircraft. Launched from the 

off-shore aircraft carrier, the strike package comprises of manned tactical aircraft with numerous 

combat support UAS providing tactical intelligence communication relay, jamming support, and 

strike support. The joint strike fighter operates as a command ship and works in concert with its 

supporting unmanned systems as a seamless network of strike and jamming aircraft. The strike 

package penetrates Norachi airspace and intercepts, strikes, and stops the convoy. An extraction 

team follows shortly behind, secures the area, and locates the WMD. The extraction team loads

the cargo on unmanned vertical-lift transports and departs the area. The operation stands down 

while maintaining a continuing presence of air, sea, and land systems to maintain situational 

awareness as the Norachi situation evolves.

As illustrated by this vignette, many new capabilities might be possible utilizing today’s 

emerging technologies and applying those technologies on unmanned systems.
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2 Strategic Planning and Policy

2.1 Strategic Guidance

DoD uses a vast array of unmanned systems to complete its mission, from ground and 

undersea to aircraft flying in the upper regions of the atmosphere. In the past, those systems were 

such an enhancement to ongoing operations that some systems were fielded before they were 

completely ready for production and without adequate training plans while others were being 

rapidly developed in limited numbers to satisfy an immediate warfighter need.

Unmanned systems continue to prove their value in combat operations in Afghanistan, 

where military operations are planned and executed in extremely challenging environments.

Indeed, adversaries are fighting using increasingly unconventional means, taking cover in the 

surrounding populations, and employing asymmetric tactics to achieve their objectives. In future 

conflicts, we must be prepared for these tactics as well as for a range of other novel methods of 

opposition, including so-called “hybrid” and A2/AD approaches to blunting U.S. power 

projection. Unmanned systems will be critical to U.S. operations in all domains across a range of 

conflicts, both because of their capability and performance advantages and because of their

ability to take greater risk than manned systems.

As unmanned systems have proven their worth on the battlefield, DoD has allocated an 

increasing percentage of its budget to developing and acquiring these systems. With the 

transition from a handful of innovative experimental systems to normalized program 

developments, unmanned systems have received their share of inclusion in Congressional 

direction and are influenced by many acquisition initiatives and departmental policies.

2.2 Congressional Direction

Legislation requiring

• Creation of an executive committee (ExCom) for UAS airspace 

integration

• Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) plan integration of UAS into 

the National Airspace System (NAS) by 2015

2.3 Acquisition Initiatives

• Should Cost/Would Cost19

• Affordability20

• Better Buying Power21

• Roadmap Guidance — Mandate Affordability 

as a Requirement22

 19 Carter, Ashton B., Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, “Should-cost and 

Affordability Memorandum”: http://www.acq.osd.mil/docs/Should-cost%20and%20Affordability.pdf. 20 Ibid. 21 Better Buying Power (Public Site): https://acc.dau.mil/bbp. 22 Carter, Ashton B., Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, “Implementation 

Directive for Better Buying Power — Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending”: 

http://www.acq.osd.mil/docs/USD(AT&L)_Implementation_Directive_Better_Buying_Power_110310.pdf.
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2.4 Departmental Policy Consideration

Of the many issues arising over the use of unmanned systems in today’s world 

environment, several have become questions of departmental policy and required active direction 

from leadership. Five of the many unmanned issues that required departmental consideration 

over the past two years include autonomy, data protection, data exploitation, selective 

innovation, and Manned-Unmanned System Teaming (MUM-T).

2.4.1 Autonomy

DoD defines unmanned aircraft as “an aircraft or balloon that does not carry a human 

operator and is capable of flight under remote control or autonomous programming.”23

Therefore, when the aircraft is under remote control, it is not autonomous. And when it is 

autonomous, it is not under remote control. While these two conditions could exist (controlled

and uncontrolled), current DoD UAS are remotely operated and capitalize on automation in 

extreme circumstances, such as a lost link condition, to automatically perform a preprogrammed 

set of instructions. This distinction is important because our community vernacular often uses the

term “autonomy” to incorrectly describe 

automated operations. Chapter 4 contains a 

detailed discussion on autonomy and cognitive 

behavior and notes that research and 

development in automation are advancing from 

a state of automatic systems requiring human 

control toward a state of autonomous systems 

able to make decisions and react without 

human interaction. DoD will continue to 

carefully consider the implications of these 

advancements.

The potential for improving capability and reducing cost through the use of technology to 

decrease or eliminate specific human activities, otherwise known as automation, presents great 

promise for a variety of DoD improvements. However, it also raises challenging questions when 

applying automation to specific actions or functions. The question, “When will systems be 

fielded with capabilities that will enable them to operate without the man in the loop?” is often 

followed by questions that extend quickly beyond mere engineering challenges into legal, policy, 

or ethical issues. How will systems that autonomously perform tasks without direct human 

involvement be designed to ensure that they function within their intended parameters? More 

broadly, autonomous capabilities give rise to questions about what overarching guiding 

principles should be used to help discern where more oversight and direct human control should 

be retained. 

The relevant question is, “Which activities or functions are appropriate for what level of 

automation?” DoD carefully considers how systems that automatically perform tasks with 

limited direct human involvement are designed to ensure they function within their intended 

parameters. Most of the current inventory of DoD unmanned aircraft land themselves with very 

 23 JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 November 2010 (as amended 

through15 April 2013): http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
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limited human interaction while still operating under the control of a human and perform this 

function with greater accuracy, fewer accidents, and less training than a human-intensive 

process; as a result, both a capability improvement and reduced costs are realized. This specific 

automatic process still retains human oversight to cancel the action or initial a go-around, but 

substantially reduces the direct human input to one of supervision. Human-systems engineering 

is being rigorously applied to decompose, identify, and implement effective interfaces to support 

responsive command and control (C2) for safe and effective operations.

Systems are designed and tested so that they perform their tasks in a safe and reliable 

manner, and their automated operation must be seamless to human operators controlling the 

system. This automation does not mean operators are not monitoring the control of the system. 

Currently, automated functions in unmanned systems include critical flight operations, 

navigation, takeoff and landing of unmanned aircraft, and recognition of lost communications 

requiring implementation of return-to-base procedures. As technology matures and additional 

automated features are thoughtfully introduced, DoD will continue to carefully consider the 

implications of autonomy. For armed platforms, DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.09 establishes 

policy for the development and use of autonomous capabilities.24

2.4.2 Data Protection – Near, Middle, and Long Terms

Near Term (0–4 years). Encryption of UAS C2 and data links is critical for protecting 

UAS operations, ISR, and other communicated information. Presently, DoD specifies encryption 

and key management for UAS C2 communications and both still and motion imagery. Type 1 

validated encryption is required for processing 

classified communications, and FIPS 140-2 validated 

encryption at a minimum must be used for processing 

unclassified communications.25 DoD Instruction 

(DoDI) S-4660.04 also specifies further encryption 

and key management methods, such as the use of 

encryption keys provided by the National Security 

Agency (NSA), to enable interoperability.

Middle Term (4–8 years). Future encryption 

solutions will contain products that have a quicker 

time to market, greater coalition interoperability, and 

improved key management. The use of software Suite B26 cryptography, which enables the 

protection of classified information,27 is the primary driver behind faster product certification, 

which allows faster approval for coalition partner use. The development of UAS noncontrolled 

cryptographic products in the near term is expected to aid in coalition interoperability and lower 

lifecycle and logistics costs. Key management improvements will provide greater scalability, 

efficiency, and standardization for dynamic group keying techniques in UAS airborne 

networking with dynamic joining and leaving.

 24 DoDD 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapons Systems, November 2012. 25 Details of these requirements, which apply to groups 2 through 5 UAS, can be found in DoDI S-4660.04, 

Encryption of Imagery Transmitted by Airborne Systems and Unmanned Aircraft Control Communications (U), 

27 July 2011. 26 Suite B cryptography is defined by NSA: http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/index.shtml. 27 For additional information, see Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Policy (CNSSP) 15.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

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Long Term (more than 8 years). In the longer term, advancements in component 

consolidation, higher data rate cryptography, and open standards will enhance UAS encryption. 

Hardware consolidation yielding single chip and coprocessor encryption modules will make 

routine cryptography both faster and feasible for smaller, group 1 UAS.28 Improvements in 

hardware will also lead to higher data rate cryptography. Further standardization in common 

radio and cryptographic interfaces will enable improved remote UAS management and lower 

lifecycle costs.

2.4.3 Data Exploitation

Data are increasing in volume and availability as is the number of sensors with increased 

resolution and time-dominant requirements that present significant challenges and opportunities 

for DoD. As more and more sensors arrive on the battlefield and those sensors’ capabilities

increase, more data are delivered to warfighters, but the warfighters’ ability to process and 

exploit such a large volume of data in a timely fashion is increasingly challenged. The problem is 

also exacerbated on both ends of the transmission link. Either huge volumes of data must be 

downsized before their transmission, or the data highway on which they travel must be increased 

in size and speed. Many gaps identified and prioritized in the UI2 CBA describe this in detail.

Further, after reception, the data must be used by analysts to draw conclusions for the 

decision makers. If the data are already formatted and arrive prioritized, fewer analysts are 

required to take advantage of the intelligence. Similarly, if the various databases are archived in 

a standard way, the various warfighter intelligence cells will use far fewer analysts to exploit 

databases and draw conclusions. Data must be immediately accessible by both anticipated 

analysts/consumers and unanticipated analysts/consumers.

Automated exploitation techniques are improving in ground-based intelligence 

production systems in the distributed common ground station (DCGS) families, the attack and

Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems (JAUS) programs, and other elements of the 

unmanned systems family. Current sensor resource management commands must be extended to 

include preset data resolution and reporting criteria. These current capabilities must be addressed 

for use as a requirements base and prototyping for UAS onboard applications. Onboard 

exploitation is further discussed in Section 4.6.4.

Strategic Studies Quarterly29 recognized that DoD improvements to the warfighters’

situational awareness are necessary and a metamorphosis is needed to develop into a tightly 

organized and dynamic ISR force. The Air Force report makes the following recommendations:

1. Overhead capabilities must be planned and executed in coordination with the National 

Reconnaissance Office because surveillance is increasingly becoming a standoff 

capability.

 28 In commercial industry, Intel implemented instructions, named Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) New 

Instructions (AES-NI), for Core processors in 2010 that can conduct several steps of AES encryption and decryption 

into a single instruction.

29 “Air Force Strategic Vision for 2020–2030,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2011.
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2. Planning for a postwar (Afghanistan and Iraq) 

transition surveillance and reconnaissance structure must 

address the DCGS (a prime user of raw, unmanned-systemderived intelligence) and shift focus to processing and 

disseminating national and allied intelligence products.

3. Automated technologies must be exploited to improve 

data analysis so that human analysts are employed in the 

highest order tasks. Accelerated development of translation 

software, artificial intelligence, and electronic means to 

process raw data — signals and electronic intelligence — is 

the most practical approach to managing this glut of data and 

should become an Air Force funding priority. Additionally, 

collaborative tools could transform traditional data 

exploitation, including addressing high-value target 

intelligence mission exploitation. This activity traditionally 

consumes large amounts of human resources; therefore, a tool for this priority would 

reduce analyst requirements. 

2.4.4 Selective Innovation

Both national military strategy and joint concept documents describe a vision of utilizing 

technical innovation for future capability improvements. Given the aforementioned budgets 

constraints, future mission needs will have to be met by funding capability improvements that 

exploit existing systems with innovative improvements to their indigenous technologies. This 

approach might be as simple as modifying a sensor to improve data flow or applying standard 

message set architectures to improve interoperability.

...even at a time of increasing budget constraints, the Army has been good 

about finding money for UAS improvements.... Advances in technology 

have taken sensors, cameras and other gear from the analog to the digital 

age, making them ever smaller, lighter, more energy-efficient and useful.

— COL. Tim Baxter, Army UAS Project Manager

in the Program Executive Office for Aviation30

Innovation must continue, especially under the current fiscal environment, and must 

include not only improvements to existing CONOPS but also the development of entirely new 

CONOPS. More emphasis on innovative approaches must be given to all future unmanned 

systems development. Unmanned systems open up new avenues for pursuing systems that are 

smaller, lighter, faster, and more maneuverable and that take more risk than equivalent manned 

platforms. In particular, the ability of unmanned assets to take risks that would not be taken with 

manned assets opens up new CONOPS, such as low-cost, expendable systems that trade armor 

and stealth for quantity. In other words, a fleet of low-cost, disposable platforms could survive 

through attrition rather than through expensive, exquisite capabilities.

 30 Source: http://blog.al.com/huntsville-times-business/2012/04/armysunmanned_aircraft_systems.html.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

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2.4.5 Manned-Unmanned System Teaming (MUM-T)

Technological advances and military adaptation will result in merging unmanned systems

from air, ground, and sea domains into teams of unmanned and manned systems. MUM-T will 

be essential as DoD makes a shift in geographical priorities toward the Asia-Pacific region while 

retaining emphasis on the Middle East. A force of the smaller, more agile manned-unmanned 

systems of the near future will enable DoD to mobilize quickly to deter and defeat aggression by 

projecting power despite A2/AD challenges. MUM-T will provide the following key capabilities:

• Defeating explosive ground surface, sub-surface (tunnel), and sea hazards from 

greater standoff distances.

• Assuring mobility to support multiple points of entry. 

• Enabling movement and maneuver for projecting offensive operations. 

• Establishing and sustaining the shore lines of communications required to follow 

forces and logistics. 

• Protecting austere combat outposts.

• Providing persistent surveillance to detect and neutralize threats and hazards within 

single- to triple-canopy and urban terrain.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

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3 Combatant Commander Mission and Capability Needs

3.1 Why Unmanned?

The prevalence and uses of unmanned systems continue to grow at a dramatic pace. The 

past decade of conflict has seen the greatest increase in unmanned aircraft systems, primarily 

performing ISR missions. Use of unmanned systems in the other domains is growing as well. 

The growth of unmanned systems use is expected to continue across most domains. Unmanned 

systems have proven they can enhance situational awareness, reduce human workload, improve 

mission performance, and minimize overall risk to both civilian and military personnel, and all at 

a reduce cost.

The capabilities of unmanned systems are not unique over manned systems. Weapon 

systems produce effects in nearly all domains, independent of being manned or unmanned. It is 

important to highlight that there are no requirements for unmanned systems within the Joint 

force, but some capabilities are better fulfilled by unmanned systems. Unmanned systems 

provide persistence, versatility, survivability, and reduced risk to human life, and in many cases 

are the preferred alternatives especially for missions that are characterized as dull, dirty, or 

dangerous. With that mindset, unmanned systems are being optimized for these dull, dirty, or 

dangerous missions:

• Dull missions are ideal for unmanned systems because they involve long-duration 

undertakings with mundane tasks that are ill suited for manned systems. Good 

examples are surveillance missions that involve prolonged observation. Unmanned 

systems currently fulfill a wide variety of “dull” mission sets, and the number will 

increase in all domains as unmanned systems capabilities improve.

• Dirty missions have the potential to unnecessarily expose personnel to hazardous 

conditions. A primary example is chemical, biological, and nuclear detection 

missions. Unmanned systems can perform these dirty missions with less risk exposure 

to the operators.

• Dangerous missions involve high risk. With advances in capabilities in performance 

and automation, unmanned systems will reduce the risk exposure to personnel by 

increasingly fulfilling capabilities that are inherently dangerous.

3.2 Requirements Processes

Growth in unmanned platforms of all sizes and shapes has been substantial, with a 

corresponding increase in payload numbers and capability. Several of these systems were 

developed using the deliberative requirements and acquisitions processes. Policies have reflected 

a shift to support the integration of unmanned systems into the joint force and use across the 

battlefield when the capability is required by the CCDR. Many systems were rapidly acquired 

and immediately fielded using the Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) process. JUONs

have successfully added significant capability to joint warfighting. While those unmanned 

systems were rapidly developed to meet the immediate needs of the warfighter in the near term, 

they have not undergone rigorous requirements review and joint coordination through the normal 

Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process, including, for example, 

review for systems interdependencies and interoperability. Further, their long-term enterprisewide capability portfolios have not been fully considered. Consequently, they have not received 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

21

due consideration in the context of broader joint capability areas (JCAs), which provide structure 

and organization to requirements development. In the future, consideration of such factors as the 

recently required JCIDS Training Key Performance Parameter (KPP) will more fully allow

operators, maintainers, and leaders to realize full design capability sooner in the requirements 

process.

A formal review and approval process has been implemented for delineating which 

programs should transition to enduring programs (and eventually PORs) and/or which program 

sensors or other components need to be maintained via other programs. During this process, the 

JUONs and CCDR’s integrated priority list (IPL) requirements were considered as well as the 

capabilities adjudicated against the Joint Direct Support Aerial ISR JROC-approved initial 

capabilities document that outlines the tactical commander’s needs.

DoD recently revised the JCIDS requirements process to streamline urgent and deliberate 

capability development and enable requisite timeliness in meeting warfighter needs while giving 

important consideration to long-term 

affordability and sustainability. JCIDS is a 

key supporting process for DoD acquisition 

and Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 

Execution (PPBE) processes. It ensures the 

capabilities required by the warfighter are 

identified with their associated operational 

performance criteria to successfully execute 

the assigned missions. This coordination 

ensures a better understanding of the 

warfighting needs early in capability 

development and provides a more 

comprehensive set of valid, prioritized 

requirements. DoD’s acquisition arm can then 

focus on choosing options to meet welldefined requirement capabilities. Figure 9

shows the linked and streamlined process.

The key decision body in the JCIDS process is the JROC, chaired by the Vice Chairman, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. JROC has the responsibilities under Title 10 of the United States Code to 

consider input from CCDRs on joint requirements as well as to consider cost, schedule, and 

performance tradeoffs in establishing requirements. Currently, JROC is shaping the force with a 

more robust requirements review process. The Council is addressing the complex issues earlier 

and iteratively, using better upfront fidelity on cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs and 

more analytic rigor in risk analysis. JROC constantly assesses joint capabilities by comparing 

risk and affordability against current defense strategies. Unmanned systems must provide 

capabilities with superior cost, schedule, and performance metrics to compete against other 

systems within JROC or other DoD forums.

Given today’s highly constrained fiscal environment, it is imperative that DoD look at 

areas where efficiencies can be gained to create unmanned systems that are both effective and 

affordable. DoD will look at capitalizing on commonality, standardization, and joint acquisition 

strategies, among other strategies. Unmanned systems must become more efficient in addressing 

Figure 9. Linked JCIDS Process
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

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capability gaps, including increases in interoperability, autonomy, modularity, effectiveness, and 

teaming with manned systems. In addition, DoD demands these unmanned systems be affordable 

at the outset, experience little or no cost growth in their development and production evolution, 

and control lifecycle costs. To achieve these objectives, the full range of DOTMLPF-P options 

must be considered in the earliest development activities.

Capability requirements, validated by the JCIDS process, inform prioritization activities 

in the competition for funding during the PPBE process. The objective of the PPBE process is to 

provide the best mix of forces, equipment, training and support attainable within fiscal 

constraints according to DoDD 7045.14.31 To meet this objective, the PPBE process aims to 

meet goals established by the President and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) in the Strategic 

Planning and Joint Planning Guidance. In the PPBE process, the Military Departments match 

available resources (e.g., fiscal, manpower, material) against validated requirements to achieve 

the strategic plan. A key task is to develop a balanced, affordable capabilities-based Service 

Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The POM position for the capability to meet a given 

requirement is assessed and revised when necessary to fit with Joint and coalition capabilities,

and the final position becomes part of the President’s budget. 

An important input to the POM position is each CCDR’s IPLs. These lists are 

communicated annually by the CCDRs to SECDEF, the U.S. Congress, and the Joint Staff. IPLs 

can be specific or cross-cut capability gaps. The Joint Staff develops recommended solutions to 

the gaps. These gaps can span from programmatic changes of current programs, initiation of a 

new capability documents via JCIDS, and investment in science and technology (S&T) solutions 

to the initiation of new studies and experiments. JROC decides which gaps are most important to 

mitigate based on risk assessments and the adequacy of DoD’s ongoing efforts. This 

prioritization of gaps is part of the capability gap analysis (CGA) process and results in a key 

input to the PPBE process. While specific capability gaps are classified, they typically include a 

range of needed capabilities. Within the CGA process, the Joint Staff determines whether any 

system could best satisfy the capability gap. Unmanned systems do not get special consideration. 

Systems must demonstrate a superior ability to satisfy the capability to garner support. 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 6212.01F provides another 

JCIDS consideration.

32 It further defines responsibilities and establishes policy and procedures to 

develop the Net Ready Key Performance Parameter (NR KPP) and its certification requirement 

for all information technology (IT) and national security systems (NSS) that contain joint 

interfaces or joint information exchanges. The DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) is also in 

the final stages of issuing DoDI 8330 to address IT and NSS.

33 This issuance will supersede 

DoDD 4630 issuances and the DoD CIO’s Interim Guidance Memorandum. DoDI 8330 employs 

a new concept of “tiered accountability” to meet interoperability requirements internal to DoD 

and external mission partners.

 31 DoDD 7045.14, Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS). 32 CJCSI 6212.01F, Net Ready Key Performance Parameter (NR KPP), March 2012. 33 DoDI 8330 (DRAFT), Interoperability of Information Technology (IT), including National Security Systems 

(NSS).
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

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3.3 Joint Capability Areas (JCAs)

The JCAs34 are currently the preferred 

method DoD uses for reviewing and 

managing capabilities. The JCA framework 

provides the structure around which 

capabilities and capability gaps can be 

aligned across DoD and across the various 

portfolios to correlate similar needs, leverage 

effective solutions, and synchronize related 

activities. Also, various frameworks, such as 

the Universal Joint Task List, are readily available to aid in identifying and organizing the tasks, 

conditions, and required capabilities.

Mapping current and projected unmanned systems against the JCAs provides a sense of 

what the product line portfolio is for unmanned systems and how it currently contributes, and 

could contribute in the future, to the missions of DoD. Each JCA represents a collection of 

related missions and tasks that are typically conducted to bring about the desired effects 

associated with that capability. Nine Tier One JCAs are defined, and unmanned systems are key 

contributors in the Battlespace Awareness, Force Application, Protection, and Logistics JCAs. 

Each area is assigned to a Functional Capability Board (FCB) on the Joint Staff (JS). FCB 

contact information is available on Intellipedia through the Secure Internet Protocol Router 

Network (SIPRNet).

35

Current technology and future advancements can and will enable single platforms to 

perform a variety of missions across multiple capability areas. This versatility represents an 

opportunity for DoD to achieve a greater return on investment. Furthermore, the projections show 

that there will be opportunities for joint systems to conduct missions for each Service, just as there 

will be situations in which domain conditions or Service missions will dictate unique solutions. 

3.3.1 Battlespace Awareness JCA – JS/J-28, BA FCB

Battlespace Awareness is a capability area where unmanned systems in all domains have 

the ability to contribute significantly into the future to conduct ISR and environment collectionrelated tasks. Applications in this JCA include aerial, ground, surface sea, and undersea 

surveillance and reconnaissance. Today, these functions are performed by several systems across 

all domains and mission sets. In the future, technology will enable mission endurance to extend 

from hours to days and allow for long-endurance persistent reconnaissance and surveillance in all 

domains. Unmanned systems are expected to integrate a greater range of C2 options from soldierto-platform direct control to increased CONOPS options for operations that can be independent of 

C2. Therefore, onboard sensors that provide the systems with their own organic perception will 

contribute to Battlespace Awareness regardless of their intended primary mission. To achieve this

goal, unmanned systems development and fielding must include the tasking, collection, processing, 

exploitation, and dissemination (TCPED) processes required to translate vast quantities of sensor 

data into a shared understanding of the environment. Many ongoing efforts are streamlining these 

 34 Source: http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare. 35 Source: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/jroc.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

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processes. This capability area lends itself to tasks and missions being conducted collaboratively 

across domains as well as teaming within a single domain.

3.3.2 Force Application JCA – JS/J-8, FA FCB

Force Application is another JCA that includes a proliferation of unmanned systems 

contributing to maneuver and engagement. Today, Predator, Reaper, and Gray Eagle UAS are 

weaponized to conduct offensive operations, irregular warfare, and high-value target and highvalue individual prosecution; this trend will likely continue in all domains. In the air domain, 

projected mission areas for UAS include air-to-air combat, electronic warfare (EW), and

suppression and defeat of enemy air defense. On the ground, UGS are projected to conduct 

missions such as remotely conducted, nonlethal crowd control; dismounted offensive operations;

and armed reconnaissance and assault operations. In the maritime domain, both UUVs and USVs 

are projected to be particularly suited for mine laying and mine neutralization missions.

DoD personnel must comply with the law of war, including when using autonomous or 

unmanned weapon systems. For example, paragraph 4.1 of DoDD 2311.01E requires that

“[m]embers of the DoD Components comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, 

however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations.”36

Current armed unmanned systems deploy lethal force only in a fully human-operated 

context for engagement decisions. For these systems, the decisions both to employ force and to 

choose which specific target to engage are made by a human. The United States operates defensive 

systems for manned ships and installations that have human-supervised autonomous modes and 

has operated these systems for decades. As technology advances and more automatic features are 

introduced, DoD will continue to carefully consider the implications of autonomy in weapon 

systems to ensure safe and reliable operations and minimize the probability and consequences of 

failures that could lead to unintended engagements. For this reason, DoDD 3000.09, Autonomy in 

Weapon Systems, mandates a policy review before entering formal development for proposed 

weapon systems that would use autonomous capabilities in a novel manner.

3.3.3 Protection JCA – JS/J-8, Protection FCB

Protection has particular applicability for unmanned systems to assist in attack prevention 

or effects mitigation. Unmanned systems are ideally suited for many protection tasks that are 

deemed dull, dirty, or dangerous. As the future enables greater automation with respect to both 

navigation and manipulation, unmanned systems will be able to perform tasks such as 

firefighting, decontamination, contingency base and base camp security, installation security, 

obstacle construction and breaching, vehicle and personnel search and inspection, mine clearance 

and neutralization, sophisticated explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), casualty extraction and 

evacuation, and maritime interdiction. In the Protection JCA, teaming within domains and

collaboration across domains will likely prevail.

3.3.4 Logistics JCA – JS/J-4, Logistics FCB

Logistics is ideally suited for employing unmanned systems in all domains to deploy, 

distribute, and supply joint forces. Unmanned systems will perform logistics tasks at home and 

 36 DoDD 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program, 9 May 2006.
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25

with the forward deployed. The purpose of the capability is to enable unmanned cargo systems in 

full-spectrum operations to perform the dull, dirty, and dangerous missions by capitalizing on the 

persistence of unmanned systems to free up manned assets for more difficult missions within an 

area of operation. The following tasks are particularly well suited for unmanned systems:

• Transportation of routine supplies (e.g., food, water, ammunition, and medical 

supplies) to the forward units in all types of ground terrain. 

• The resupply from sea-based assets located offshore.

• Support for special operations forces. 

• An alternative delivery option to widely dispersed operating forces for routine 

(around the clock) and immediate (time-sensitive) logistics support. 

• Routine maintenance-related tasks such as inspections, decontamination, and 

refueling. 

• Material handling and combat engineering. 

Although currently prohibited by policy, future capabilities by unmanned systems could 

include casualty evacuation and care, human remains evacuation, and urban rescue. The unmanned 

vehicles are intended to mitigate risk to the maximum extent by reducing the requirement to 

operate manned vehicles when the weather, terrain, availability, and enemy pose an unsuitable 

level of risk.

3.4 A Look to the Future

This Roadmap provides a DoD vision for the continuing development, fielding, and

employment of unmanned systems. Chapter 4 discusses the investments in technology to 

enhance capability and reduce cost. Warfighters value the inherent benefits of unmanned 

systems, especially their persistence, versatility, and reduced risk to human life. The Joint Staff 

will continue to support unmanned systems when they fulfill joint requirements and are effective 

and affordable. Unmanned systems must 

• Provide capabilities more efficiently through modularity and interoperability. 

• Be more effective through greater automation and greater performance. 

• Be more survivable with improved and resilient communications, development for 

antipermissive environments, and more security from tampering. 

• Take the “man” out of unmanned. Currently personnel costs are the greatest single 

cost in DoD, and unmanned systems must strive to reduce the number of personnel 

required to operate and maintain the systems. Great strides in autonomy, teaming, 

multi-platform control, tipping, and cueing have reduced the number of personnel 

required, but much more work needs to occur. 

JROC supports a Joint Doctrine and Planning Conference review of the approved 

November 2011 Joint CONOPS for UAS to determine whether it has matured enough to 

transition to joint doctrine and become integrated into existing Joint Publications.
26

4 Technologies for Unmanned Systems

4.1 Introduction

The pace of technological advances across the broad spectrum of unmanned systems

applications has allowed what were once rather cumbersome vehicles and systems outside the 

“circle of warfare trust” (systems trusted by the warfighter) to shoulder burdens in warfare 

mission areas unforeseen only a few years ago. With dramatic increases in battery life and 

computer processing; reduction in size and complexity of sensors; and improvements in 

reliability, maintainability, automation, and operator interfaces, unmanned systems are now vital 

components of an operational commander’s tool kit.

While commanders have become more accustomed to the capabilities (and limitations) of 

unmanned systems from operations during the first decade of the 21st century, the next decades 

are already presenting a two-sided challenge that represents stark differences from recent 

operations. First, a strategic shift in national security to the Asia-Pacific Theater presents 

different operational considerations based on environment and potential adversary capabilities. 

Second, a shrinking fiscal environment (without overseas contingency operations (OCO)

funding) and base budget levels that are likely to be flat at best will challenge both unmanned 

systems operators and suppliers to seek efficiencies in total cost of unmanned systems 

ownership, from cost of manufacture, avionics, and deployment to manpower savings and 

logistics. This challenge is two-sided because one side cannot be considered without the other:

meeting operational demands must be accomplished in the context of budgetary constraints — in

the near, middle, and long term. See Figure 10 for an example of the President’s 2012 S&T 

budget request for DoD.37

Figure 10. DoD S&T Funding: FY1962–2016

 37 Slide #15 extract from Mr. Bob Baker, Deputy Director, Plans & Programs, Assistant Secretary of Defense & 

Engineering, FY2012 President’s Budget Request (PBR) for the DoD S&T Program Briefing, 21 June 2011.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

27

When I announced the new guidance, I highlighted five key elements of the 

strategy and five key elements of the vision that we have for a military force 

of the future. And let me just summarize each of those...First, the military 

will be smaller and leaner, but it will be agile, flexible, rapidly deployable 

and technologically advanced. It will be a cutting-edge force...[F]ifth, we 

will protect and prioritize some very important and key investments in 

technology and new capabilities as well as our capacity to grow, adapt, to 

mobilize, to surge as needed.

— Leon E. Panetta, Former Secretary of Defense38

As a result of DoD’s new warfighting strategy and in recognition of new budgetary 

constraints, the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

(USD(AT&L)) is sponsoring a Defense Science Board study with the following charter:

“The Defense Science Board (DSB) is requested to conduct a study of emerging 

technologies that will enable the next generation of dominant military capabilities to be in 

development or fielded by 2030. Some of the products of the study will be:

1. A set of recommendations intended to guide the DoD research and development 

investments in applied technology and technology demonstrations over the period of 

2014 to 2020;

2. Mapping of the identified technologies to applications and capabilities that may be 

enabled; and

3. For a select set of promising technologies, recommended experiments or concept 

demonstrations that foster innovation and provide entry ramps to enhance operational 

capabilities via block upgrades to existing systems or as entry ramps to new systems 

and operational concepts.”

The study is guided in part by the January 2012 military strategy guidance, “Sustaining 

U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.”39

The study will include surveying and assessing the potential for significant advances in 

technology outside DoD that could contribute to future military capabilities. These advances 

could augment DoD investments in areas such as quantum computing, microelectronics, 

robotics, nanomaterials, genetics, “big data,” alternative energy sources, advanced materials, and 

modeling and simulation. Technologies that have the potential to significantly enhance or 

transform the nature of warfare in the sea, land, air and space, and cyber regimes will be the 

focus of this study.

 38 Source: http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4962. 39 USD(AT&L) Memorandum, “Terms of Reference-Defense Science Board Study on Technology and Innovation 

Enablers for Superiority in 2030,” 15 March 2012.
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This chapter highlights six areas of interest for the technological advancement of 

unmanned systems. The areas are reflective of DoD’s shift in strategic priorities and also address 

the requirement to continue to reduce lifecycle costs across all systems, including unmanned 

systems. In each section, near-, middle-, and long-term goals, as defined in Figure 11, are 

discussed.

Figure 11. Near-, Middle-, and Long-Term Goals

The six areas of technology key for DoD to enhance capability and reduce cost are

interoperability and modularity; communication systems, spectrum, and resilience; security 

(research and intelligence/technology protection (RITP)); persistent resilience; autonomy and 

cognitive behavior; and weaponry. Other important areas include sensor air drop, weather 

sensing, and high-performance computing (HPC).

4.1.1 Interoperability and Modularity 

Sensor and weapon technology is rapidly maturing, as is processing and algorithm 

development, often outpacing DoD’s ability to transition upgraded capability and material 

improvements to fielded platforms. The current myriad of sensors, communications, and

weapons systems is continually evolving due to leveraged commercial processes and electronic 

standards technology. Coupled with DoD’s major systems inventory designed to last several 

years, technology refresh presents both an intra-platform challenge (modularity) and an interplatform challenge (interoperability). Interoperable interfaces for enhanced modularity and crossdomain data sharing present an opportunity to minimize future lifecycle costs, reduced force 

structure requirements, and adapt rapidly to changing threats or new available technologies. See 

4.2 for more details.

4.1.2 Communication Systems, Spectrum, and Resilience

The challenges that all unmanned systems face include the availability of communication 

links, the amount of data that the communication links support, certification of the 

communication spectrum, and the resilience of all radio frequency (RF) subsystems against 

interference (e.g., electromagnetic). See 4.3 for more details.

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2030+

 

Desired Capabilty

Near Term: Capabilities and 

advancements which should be 

operational within the next five years. 

These items principally require 

industry investment to mature and/or 

operationally demonstrate to ensure 

rapid fielding and/or budgetary 

prioritization with discrete and 

operationally representative data. 

Investment in advanced technology 

initiatives via S&T 6.3 funding, also 

apply here to an extent.

Mid-Term: Capabilities and 

advancements which could be 

(or are currently) in discrete 

project stages at laboratories 

and S&T directorates such as 

DARPA, IARPA, ONR/NRL, AFRL, 

ARL, JHU-APL, MIT-LL amongst 

others. These items principally 

require investment via both 

S&T 6.3 initiatives and Applied 

Research initiatives via S&T 6.2 

funding. The timeframe for Mid 

Term objective is five to ten 

years.

Long Term: Capabilities 

and advancements 

which are in the basic 

research stage, such as 

(but not limited to) 

materials development 

or new & novel 

processes or 

approaches. These 

items principally 

require investment in 

Basic Research 

initiatives via S&T 6.1 

funding. Time frame for 

long term objectives is 

ten years and out.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

29

4.1.3 Security: Research and Intelligence/Technology Protection (RITP)

Unmanned systems are often employed with critical program information and sensitive, 

classified data to complete the assigned mission and, therefore, require RITP. Unmanned 

systems must include appropriate security measures not only to prevent unauthorized 

access/control, unauthorized or unintentional disclosure of data, and preservation of 

technological superiority, but also to enable more rapid adaptation of new sensors, weapons, and 

processing software. See 4.4 for more details.

4.1.4 Persistent Resilience

While unmanned systems are inherently more persistent based on significantly better 

fuel/weight ratios, unmanned systems’ design schema can be better optimized to provide overall,

more effective on-station time. Additionally, further miniaturization of avionics, power and 

propulsion, and stores management enables smaller systems, which, when combined with more 

persistence, can minimize investment. Increased persistence calls for improvements in reliability, 

maintainability, and survivability. Therefore, while further size, weight, power, and cooling 

(SWaP-C) improvements are hallmarks of all systems, including unmanned, they must be 

accomplished while enhancing reliability, maintainability, and survivability to ensure broadspectrum warfighting effectiveness. See 4.5 for more details.

4.1.5 Autonomy and Cognitive Behavior

Nearly all unmanned systems require active control of basic vehicle operations and 

behavior that affects communications, manpower, and system effectiveness. One of the largest 

cost drivers in the budget of DoD is manpower. A significant amount of that manpower, when it 

comes to operations, is spent directing unmanned systems during mission performance, data 

collection and analysis, and planning and replanning. Therefore, of utmost importance for DoD 

is increased system, sensor, and analytical automation that can not only capture significant 

information and events, but can also develop, record, playback, project, and parse out those data

and then actually deliver “actionable” intelligence instead of just raw information. As with other 

facets of unmanned systems, the need for greater autonomy is subject to fiscal pressures, i.e.,

operating within budget constraints while reducing manpower needs and U.S. exposure to 

dangerous risks and increasing operational effectiveness. See 4.6 for more details.

4.1.6 Weaponry

Expanding options for weapons delivery from unmanned systems includes new munition 

options where some capability is now integrated and adding additional weaponized platforms to 

the unmanned force structure. To fully integrate the use of weapons and unmanned systems, it 

will be critical to leverage the key technology areas in the preceding paragraphs (4.1.1 to 4.1.5) 

as well as in specific, weapons-related areas. See 4.7 for more details. 

4.1.7 Sensor Air Drop

Unattended sensors were used extensively during the Vietnam War and were influential 

in reducing the rate of arrival of personnel and equipment into the south. Emplacement of 

multiple types of unattended ground sensors can provide indications and warning, 

communications relay, weather reports, activity identification, high-value individual/target
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

30

detections, kinetic weapon cueing, and near-real-time alarms and can support predictive 

movements via array lay-downs. Using UMS for placing sensors provides a method for 

increasing persistence and determining/identifying activity and targets without dedicating 

personnel or multiple high-demand sorties to provide both area and/or point coverage.

Many unmanned platforms are already equipped to externally carry equipment, and all 

have mission plans that provide their controlled, overwatch and/or autonomous covert 

movement. Unattended ground sensor technologies are increasing and are able to collect and 

report unique information and to use coordinates-seeking location capabilities for accurate covert 

emplacements. The unmanned family of vehicles typically has complementary sensors that can 

provide exact emplacement location along with imagery information and that can support 

mission planning and route following. However, the need to improve persistence and situational 

awareness continues to increase beyond the expected numbers and capabilities of unmanned 

assets. In the future, UAS platforms and profiles may be ideal for penetrating denied battlespace 

to accurately dispense sensors and nonkinetic capabilities, etc. Future capabilities may also 

include deploying “attach bots” that would allow tracking/identification of personnel who pass 

through an area.

4.1.8 Weather Sensing

UAS platforms fly throughout areas of operations on a near-all-weather 24/7 basis at 

multiple altitudes. These missions require accurate and timely weather forecasts to improve 

sensors planning and data collection in support of the CCDR and to avoid potential weatherrelated accidents. Accurate weather reporting also supports complementary ground and flight 

planning synchronization. Future weather reporting will be ingested in near real time in the 

DCGS weather application and CONUS weather central and will be correlated with other 

weather information to improve accurate predictions for the tactical commander. Weather 

sensing information will be automatically formatted and reported via multiplexing on the 

platform’s data link with automated routing to the DCGS and other appropriate weather 

prediction and reporting positions. As UAS endurance dramatically increases, weather 

predictions will be more imperative to ensure launch, recovery, and ranging limitations are 

accurate so that potential weather-related incidents can be avoided and coordinated flight and 

ground operations can be improved.

4.1.9 High-Performance Computing (HPC)

Very high capacity and high-definition sensors are causing bandwidth issues. Each sensor 

and communications have independent components to process disparate information. This 

individualism creates a wide breadth of nonstandard airframe kits, component interfaces, and 

SWaP-C configurations. Future technologies will provide the capability for a standard HPC 

(family) for most unmanned systems. HPC allows a common hardware-defined architecture to 

correspond with a common software-defined architecture to form a consolidated plug-and-play 

standard performance and applications architecture that would host the processing in one 

miniaturized chassis. The common architecture would be available to UAS vendors for 

compliance to make integration less costly. Using a member of the HPC family and/or use of a 

common hardware would also support technology insertions as one of several possible 

component interchanges within processor boards, memory, or other electronics. It would also 

further enable improved software downloads. HPC can be applied in multiple subsystems within 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

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unmanned systems to address challenges in cloud computing and multilayer security, 

communications, open standards, data storage, cost, ease of technology insertion, SWaP-C, etc.

4.2 Interoperability and Modularity 

4.2.1 Background

Warfare has become increasingly complex, and U.S. military operations often require 

cost-effective integration of disparate assets from across the Services and other joint, 

interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) partners. Furthermore, unmanned 

systems are playing an increasingly vital role in these operations. For this reason, it is imperative 

for DoD, in cooperation with JIIM partners, to not just develop standard information exchange 

requirements (IERs), but also to stabilize them. Stable IERs that address joint and Service needs, 

interoperability profiles (IOPs), middleware (which can translate multiple system inputs and 

outputs), and other areas are needed to reach the necessary level of interoperability across 

manned and unmanned systems.

It is DoD policy40 (based on federal laws) that IT and NSS employed by DoD 

components shall, where required, be interoperable with existing and planned systems and 

equipment of joint, combined, and coalition forces, other U.S. Government departments and 

agencies, and nongovernmental organizations, as appropriate. DoDD 5000.01 requires that 

“Systems, units, and forces shall be able to provide and accept data, information, materiel, and 

services to and from other systems, units, and forces and shall effectively interoperate with other 

U.S. Forces and coalition partners.”41 CJCSI 6212.01F requires DoD components to develop, 

acquire, test, deploy, and maintain ITs that are interoperable and supportable with existing, 

developing, and proposed (pre-Milestone A) ITs through architecture, standards, defined 

interfaces, modular design, and reuse of existing IT solutions and are interoperable with host 

nation, multinational coalition, and federal, state, local, and tribal agency partners.

DoD unmanned systems have historically been developed for Service-specific needs

driven by the rapid fielding timelines in support of immediate operational requirements. While 

fielding these systems rapidly has been valuable, fully stable IERs have often been, of necessity, 

sacrificed to battlefield urgency, and fielded systems can generally demonstrate only limited 

interoperability with other manned and unmanned platforms across Services. As more and more 

unmanned systems are fielded, open architectures (OAs), nonproprietary interfaces, governmentowned data rights, and standard IOPs will be required to further enable a broader net-centric 

environment that is truly interoperable, open, and scalable.

As a result, DoD is adopting and exploiting open system design principles and 

architectures to increase competition, foster reuse across systems, and increase interoperability.

This new acquisition model requires access to multivendor solutions to enable rapid insertion of 

new technologies to counter emerging threats, avoid technology obsolescence, and decrease time 

to field new capabilities. For example, DoD is adopting an open business model to support the 

implementation of an OA for UAS ground control stations (GCSs) to drive greater acquisition 

 40 CJCSI 6212.01F, Net Ready Key Performance Parameter (NR KPP), 21 March 2012. 41 DoDD 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System, 12 May 2003.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

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efficiencies and reduce the total ownership costs. This effort will also include application of a 

common UAS Control Segment (UCS) architecture as described in 4.2.4.3.

4.2.2 Interoperability Functional Description 

The USD’s vision for interoperability spans the JIIM domains. Successful definition and 

implementation of proper interoperability will enable the warfighter to add capability, encourage 

innovation, and support program cost control.

The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept 

services from other systems, units, or forces and to make use of the services, 

units, or forces; and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to 

operate effectively together. An example for the use of this policy would be 

the condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items 

of communications electronics equipment when information or services can 

be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users.42

Interoperability is integral to the continued success of missions using unmanned systems 

and represents a long-term objective of the Services and their stakeholders. The urgent needs in 

theater and corresponding rapid acquisition approach during recent years have resulted in the

current fleet of unmanned systems that generally do not interoperate with each other or with 

external systems. The combat development community is calling for interoperability as a critical 

element to the future unmanned systems fleet. The ability for manned and unmanned systems to 

share information will increase combat capability, enhance situational awareness, and improve 

flexibility of resources. Interoperability will improve the ability for unmanned systems to operate 

in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks.43 Properly stabilized, implemented, and 

maintained, interoperability can serve as a force multiplier, improve warfighter capabilities, 

decrease integration timelines, simplify logistics, and reduce total ownership costs. 

New rules in acquisition establish the requirement to acquire systems and families of 

systems (FoSs) that are interoperable.44 Once mature and stable IERs and other key 

interoperability areas are defined in support of this overall objective, DoD’s unmanned systems 

must demonstrate interoperability in a number of realms that will challenge current systems:

• Among different systems of the same domain, i.e., using a common GCS or OCU for 

multiple, heterogeneous unmanned vehicles.

• Among systems of different domains, i.e., allowing ground, aircraft, and maritime 

vehicles to work cooperatively.

• Among systems operated by different military departments under various CONOPS 

and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), i.e., allowing joint Service systems to 

work in concert to execute a common task or mission.

 42 Unmanned Interoperability Initiative (UI2) Capability Based Assessment, 1 March 2012. 43 JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 

17 March 2009).

44 DoDD 5000.1, Enclosure 1, paragraph E1.10.
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• Among systems operated and employed by coalition and allied militaries under the 

governance of various Concepts of Employment (CONEMPs) and TTPs in 

multinational combined operations or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

standardization agreements, i.e., allowing coalition and allied systems to work in 

concert to execute a common task or mission based on predefined roles and 

responsibilities.

• Among military systems and systems operated by other entities in a common 

environment, i.e., allowing military UAS to share the NAS and international airspace 

with commercial airliners and general aviation or allowing military UGS to operate 

safely in the civilian roadway environment.

4.2.3 Modularity Functional Description

Concurrently, subsystem modularity and interoperability of components are essential to 

affordable improvements, maintenance and sustainment, and increased capability. As payloads, 

sensors, software, and computing algorithms and devices are anticipated to evolve much faster 

than the vehicle platforms, creating interoperable component/subsystem interfaces for enhanced 

modularity represents an opportunity to minimize future lifecycle costs and adapt rapidly to 

changing threats or new available technologies. Upgrading existing proprietary components may 

be both expensive and logistically unfeasible because whole platforms may need to be taken out 

of service and/or replaced. Such a closed development approach has resulted in a number of 

unfavorable characteristics that impede applications of technical progress and the adoption of 

new capabilities. In addition to the interoperability characteristics mentioned in 4.2.2, unmanned 

systems must be modular so the same or at least similar components can be used in the same or 

different types of systems, e.g., plug-and-play use of different sensors on unmanned systems (the 

vehicle and its supporting systems).

4.2.4 DoD Initiatives to Increase Interoperability and Modularity 

The following subsections summarize the DoD initiatives that will require technological 

advances and cooperation among DoD, governmental agencies, and industry. Each initiative is 

also described in more detail in Appendix C.

4.2.4.1 Unmanned Interoperability Initiative (UI2) Capability Based Assessment (CBA)

This CBA is the culmination of a joint working group (WG) effort to conduct an 

operational assessment of unmanned systems interoperability task needs, identify and prioritize 

gaps in the ability to satisfy these needs, and identify potential DOTMLPF-P priorities to 

mitigate the identified capability gaps. Appendix G of the CBA provides the prioritized listing 

and description for each of the 29 joint interoperability gaps. Each military department and 

agency will find aspects of the CBA relevant to its mission responsibilities. The Interoperability 

Integrated Product Team (I-IPT) under the UAS Task Force will continue to work with the 

military departments and agencies to close gaps identified within the CBA to ultimately improve 

capability to the warfighter.
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4.2.4.2 Standards and Governance Efforts

DoD is working to accomplish unmanned systems interoperability by standardizing 

critical interfaces within the overall UAS architecture by implementing standard IOPs. Since 

“standards are ever evolving,” key enablers in this effort will be to clearly and consistently 

define the communication protocols, message formats, and implementation methods across these 

interfaces for new start efforts and system upgrades. In addition, development of middleware that 

can translate the multiple system inputs and outputs will be a key enabler. This effort will 

facilitate the mandated acquisition, technology, and logistics lifecycle management efficiencies 

across current and future unmanned programs.

4.2.4.3 UAS Control Segment (UCS) Architecture 

The UCS Architecture is a framework representing the software-intensive capabilities of 

current and emerging UAS programs in the Army, Navy, and Air Force inventories. The goal is 

to develop an architecture based on Service-oriented architecture (SOA) principles, which will 

be adopted by each Service as a common business model for acquiring, integrating, and 

extending the capabilities of the control systems for UAS.45

4.2.4.4 Unmanned Systems Interoperability Profiles (USIPs)

USIPs are the implementation of the mandate by the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s 

“Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Memorandum 14667-07” (13 September 2007) to develop 

standard IOPs linked to JCIDS documents. They help drive the implementation of approved DoD 

and/or joint interoperability priorities at the Service level and may even require a new Service 

IOP or revision to an existing IOP.

USIPs also support the CJCSI interoperability requirement by creating specific points of 

“capability-based interoperability.” The purpose of a USIP is to define profiles of standards 

sufficient to guarantee interoperability in support of a specific mission capability. A USIP may 

reference DoD standards, Intelligence Community standards, Service-specific IOPs, and

commercial standards to achieve capability-based interoperability. All approved USIP standards 

can be found on the DoD IT Standards and Profile Registry (DISR). 

4.2.4.5 Service Interface Control Working Groups (ICWGs) 

The intent of a Service-level ICWG is to ensure UAS program/product managers, 

developers, Services, and end users actively participate in the development and implementation 

of Service-specific interoperability solutions. This collaborative organization (Governmentindustry partnerships) serves as the standards recommendation body chartered within each 

Service to promote interoperability across various product lines. 

4.2.4.6 Service IOPs

Historically, unmanned systems have used very deterministic point-to-point interfaces; 

however, provisions of network-centric warfare require UAS programs to implement common 

standards in support of a FoS type of architecture. Widely accepted or approved standards are 

 45 Source: https://ucsarchitecture.org/.
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often too broadly defined with varying options and inadvertently allow compliance but not 

necessarily interoperability (e.g., common data link (CDL) standards and Motion Imagery 

Standards Board (MISB) standards). Interface “standards” vary and allow for diverse 

implementation strategies and interpretations. To be truly interoperable, a FoS requires the 

Service-level development of IOPs, and eventually those IOPs must be interoperable with IOPs 

of the other Services.

4.2.4.7 DoD CIO Interoperability Steering Group

Due to the SECDEF’s efficiency initiatives, the DoD CIO and Director for Force 

Structure, Resources, and Assessment of the Joint Staff (J-8) formally agreed to transfer all 

Interoperability Certification Panel (ICP) responsibilities to the DoD CIO in a memorandum of 

understanding (MOU) dated 26 August 2011. The DoD CIO subsequently renamed the ICP to 

the Interoperability Steering Group. The DoD CIO will designate the chairperson of the 

Interoperability WG and direct its associated activities to review interoperability policy, 

program, testing, and certification matters in coordination with the Defense Information Systems 

Agency (DISA) and Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC).

4.2.4.8 Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC)

JITC is an organizational element of the DISA Test & Evaluation Directorate and has 

responsibility (per DoDI 4630) for certifying joint and combined interoperability of all DoD IT 

and NSS. It works closely with the Services, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense

(OSD), and DoD CIO to provide recommendations to the Interoperability Steering Group for 

waivers, extensions, and ultimately full interoperability certification and compliance status 

reporting to defense acquisition executives (DAEs) and service acquisition executives (SAEs).

4.2.4.9 Joint Technology Center/Systems Integration Laboratory (JSIL)

JSIL supports the assessment of system integration readiness during the product 

development process, prior to actual flight testing. JSIL provides for distributed hardware-in-theloop testing of payloads, air vehicles, ground system components, and joint interfaces using the 

Multiple Unified Simulation Environment (MUSE) in globally distributed command exercises

and experiments. The purpose of JSIL is to provide simulation, integration, and a full range of 

test support to the joint unmanned systems family.

4.2.4.10 DoD IT Standards and Profile Registry (DISR)

DISR is an online repository of DoD IT and NSS standards and related information, 

formerly captured in the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA), version 6.0. DISR replaces JTA. All 

approved USIPs are submitted to DISR. The Navy intends to use the DISR to formalize its

approved Service IOPs.46

4.2.4.11 Future Airborne Capability Environment (FACE)

The Army common operating environment (COE) is an approved set of computing 

technologies and standards that enable secure and interoperable applications to be rapidly 

 46 Source: https://gtg.csd.disa.mil/uam/homepage.html?timestamp= .
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developed and executed across a variety of computing environments. Within the COE initiative, 

FACE is Army Aviation’s implementation. The objective of FACE is to establish a standard 

COE to support portable, capability-based applications across DoD avionics systems. 

4.2.4.12 Sensor/Platform Interface & Engineering Standardization (SPIES) Initiative 

The goal of the SPIES initiative is to develop electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensorplatform interface standards that reduce acquisition, integration, and lifecycle costs; improve 

agility; promote OA and interoperability objectives via Navy/DoD standardization; and maintain 

system performance, reliability, maintenance, and availability. 

4.2.4.13 IOPs Defined for UGS

As payloads, sensors, software, and computing devices are anticipated to evolve much 

faster than base platforms, creating interoperable interfaces for enhanced modularity represents 

an opportunity to minimize future lifecycle costs and adapt rapidly to changing threats or new 

available technologies. The Robotic Systems Joint Project Office (RS-JPO) I-IPT, formed in 

2009, is working to establish, adopt, and apply interoperability standards for UGS by working 

with the combat developers, the S&T community, and private industry. The effort is focused 

around utilization of the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) AS-4 standard for Joint 

Architecture for Unmanned Systems (JAUS) with implementation guidance defined by the UGS

IOPs. 

4.2.4.14 Advanced Explosive Ordnance Disposal Robotic Systems (AEODRS) Common 

Architecture

Currently, fielded EOD robotic systems are modified commercial products with different 

OCUs, limited autonomy, different architectures and designs, and company proprietary software. 

AEODRS is being executed by the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division via 

the Navy Program Office for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (PMS 408) to provide joint forces 

with an improved and modular EOD capability to respond to unexploded ordnance, counterimprovised explosive devices, and WMD missions. AEODRS comprises three system variants, 

utilizing Government-owned common system architecture and interfaces, which will be fielded 

in an incremental approach. The common architecture is present at the physical, electrical, and 

logical interface levels for the UGS FoS to enable modular plug-and-play components and 

interoperability.

4.2.4.15 Test & Evaluation – Architecture and Bench Testing

The AEODRS program utilizes an architecture test bed and simulation environment to 

verify logical interfaces that are defined by architecture definition documents and interface 

control documents. Capability module evaluation is accomplished by utilizing a test bed to verify 

compliance with AEODRS common architecture. Each capability module is plugged into the test 

bed separately to ensure individual capability modules adhere to architecture and performance 

requirements. 
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4.2.4.16 GEOINT Functional Manager Seal of Approval (GFMSA)

The Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), serving in the dual 

roles of the DoD Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) Manager and the Intelligence Community 

GEOINT Functional Manager, has established a GEOINT Functional Manager Seal of Approval 

(GFMSA) endorsement process. The GFMSA is recognition that an IT component has been 

tested and/or evaluated by a credible independent party and has been found to meet the standards 

conformance and interoperability qualification criteria set by the National System for GeospatialIntelligence (NSG) community. GFMSA addresses NGA’s responsibility to develop 

interoperability test and evaluation (T&E) criteria, measures, and requirements related to 

GEOINT per CJCSI 6212.01F. GFMSA increases visibility of GEOINT test criteria, measures,

and requirements by offering recognition for entities that follow existing statutory and regulatory 

T&E processes while giving due diligence to GEOINT. 

The GFMSA objective is to promote a standards-based interoperable working 

environment throughout the NSG enterprise. The GFMSA process enables program and project 

managers to confirm that the required GEOINT capability is delivered. One of the greatest 

challenges for a program/project manager is to extend high-level capability requirements 

sufficiently into manageable functional, operational, and technical components to accommodate 

acquisition development. The key questions are 1) “What do I want to have happen as a result of 

my program activities?” and 2) “How will I know it when it happens?” For the GEOINT 

functional aspect of a program/project, the GFMSA recognition program adds significant fidelity 

to answer these questions and minimizes the research needed to understand the application of 

GEOINT standards and the interoperability objectives and operational capabilities that must be 

realized across the NSG enterprise.

A group within NGA, the NSG Interoperability Action Team (NIAT), is an assistance 

and outreach body composed of subject matter experts in the field of GEOINT (and associated 

metadata) standardization and architecture deployment. The GFMSA is tightly connected with 

the NIAT functions to promote GEOINT interoperability across the NSG enterprise. The NIAT 

aids program offices with expertise in the area of GEOINT implementations for a given 

sensor/platform pairing in support of the system’s capability. The NIAT supports acquisition 

category (ACAT) programs throughout the requirements and acquisition processes, joint 

capability technology demonstrations, and quick reaction capabilities. GFMSA ensures the 

adequacy of those implementations within the system in support of its data and metadata 

interoperability across the enterprise. This effort also encompasses the appropriate provisions of 

the standards needed to meet regulatory, architectural, operational, and functional requirements 

for integration of GEOINT functions and capabilities across the NSG enterprise.

4.2.5 Interoperability and Modularity Key Technologies

IER performance today is driven by a number of factors, including proprietary interfaces, 

data, bandwidths, communication waveforms, frequencies and settings, the type of data being 

shared (e.g., imagery, detections, voice), and the metadata tagging required (which varies widely 

depending primarily on end users, their processing needs/capabilities, and types of data). The 

ability of platforms to share data among a variety of users depends primarily on the 

characteristics described above, and in most instances, system engineering tradeoffs must be 
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made in each of those characteristics so that a system’s development, production, maintenance,

and performance are optimized.

Two primary challenges related to improving and maintaining IER performance go hand 

in hand: 1) the ability to modify platforms for different IERs rapidly while avoiding broken IERs 

and safety degradation (particularly airborne platforms) and 2) the ability to rapidly modify 

platforms for different sensor capabilities while concurrently ensuring new sensing capabilities 

are distributed via the appropriate IERs.

Attempting to keep pace with these evolving needs with “core” platform systems is likely 

unattainable; however, maturation of a few key technologies could address these evolving needs 

while minimizing platform impact:

• Middleware. The ability to easily adjust data tagging and formatting to keep pace 

with evolving analytical and processing needs. If “raw” sensor data can be retagged 

or formatted without affecting core platform sensors or computers, IER performance 

could be more easily maintained while realizing the benefits of technology advances 

and minimizing platform impacts.

• Multiformat discovery and processing. The ability to ingest and process different 

data types simultaneously. This key enabler for continued performance can minimize

platform impact. If data formats, tags, and content are known for fielded systems and 

if processing and analytical algorithms and computing can interact with different data 

formats and types at the same time, then analyst workload can be reduced in 

discovery and reallocated to analysis while platforms can more synergistically update 

their products via middleware and in concert with other improvements possibly 

driven by obsolescence issues or related emerging performance needs.

• Federated mission computing. The ability to plug and play payloads while 

needing only to address SWaP-C constraints. Adding new payloads to older 

platforms, which do not rely on centralized mission computers, is typically much 

easier to do than adding new payloads to newer platforms with their centralized 

computing. The move about 20 years ago to centralized mission computing meant 

that while payloads could physically be added, the cost and time to recertify the 

mission computing made those modifications more lengthy and difficult. Either 

changing mission computing philosophy or federating mission computing down to the 

payload (or possibly GCS) level could greatly improve rapid integration of new 

technologies.

• Universal payload adapters. The ability to install and uninstall different payloads 

given a platform’s allocated SWaP-C. When combined with federated mission 

computing and defined platform SWaP-C, a standard hardware and interface 

installation point is critical to rapidly reconfiguring platforms for emerging needs.

Today, platform weapons stations are typically used for this function because their 

SWaP-C and data interfaces are defined and controlled by the weapons that must be 

carried. A similar approach for sensing payloads would be a key enabler.

4.2.6 Summary

While the initiatives summarized in 4.2.4.1 to 4.2.4.16 are by no means all inclusive, they

serve to illustrate the vast amount and diversity of effort and attention being given to 
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interoperability and modularity concerns and the pursuit of mature and stable IERs. The battle 

lines in the maneuver space of the battlefield are blurring, and the need to share information, 

sensors, payloads, and platforms is real. The fiscal battlespace is also blurring, and vendors must 

shift strategies to adhere to open standards to the maximum extent practical by utilizing tools 

such as universal payload adapters, different mission computing philosophy, and key open 

subsystems (KOSS); developing middleware solutions to manage the input and output from 

legacy systems and manned systems; migrating toward OAs; reusing software; and developing

robust repositories. As unmanned systems are relied on more and more heavily, their ability to 

communicate data with Service and joint systems along with their ability to adapt internally and 

externally will be critical to maintaining warfighting effectiveness against emerging threats while 

taking advantage of more capable technology. Figure 12 summarizes the goals for 

interoperability and modularity for unmanned systems.

Figure 12. Interoperability and Modularity Goals for Unmanned Systems

4.3 Communication Systems, Spectrum, and Resilience

4.3.1 Introduction

Key challenges all unmanned systems (other than pure autonomous systems) face are the 

availability of communication links, the amount of data that the communication links support, 

the assignment of spectrum allocations, and the resilience of all RF subsystems against 

interference (e.g., electromagnetic). There is a continued need for the Services and agencies to 

match and improve interoperability requirements to meet mission needs for CCDRs. DoD 

unmanned systems need a process for operational control and mission data distribution, 

especially for nonautonomous systems. For some UGS and UMS, these types of information 

exchanges can use a cable for the transmission path, but for highly mobile unmanned operations, 

the exchange is more likely to use signals sent across the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) or by 

other means (e.g., acoustical or optical). 

Figure 13 illustrates the communication network operational architecture (OV-1) required 

to support unmanned systems. Manned systems are included in this architecture to illustrate the 

need for a common communication support infrastructure between manned and unmanned 

sensor and other C2 systems — the supporting command, control, communications, and 

computers (C4) infrastructure should be platform agnostic (manned or unmanned). The 

operational architecture employs various EMS frequency bands, communication gateways and 

relay sites, data centers and data dissemination nodes, and terrestrial radio and network services.

The communication links within this architecture support the C2 of unmanned platforms and

their respective payloads and support the backhaul of information from those payloads to 

tactical, operational, and strategic consumers. Wherever possible, payload mission data should

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2030+

p y y y

Desired Capabilty

Near Term: Implementation of 

middleware or translators into existing 

systems to maximize standards 

compliance; Universal payload 

adapters; KOSS analysis to identify and 

implement candidates for migration to 

open interfaces.

Mid-Term: Software 

reprogrammable interfaces, 

universal payload adapters; 

federated mission computing.

Long Term: Multiple 

Input/Multiple Output 

systems and 

subsystems.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

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instantly reside on globally accessible data centers that enable users worldwide to find, obtain,

and consume real-time and non-real-time ISR and other mission data quickly and easily.

Sections 4.3.2 through 4.3.17 address needed and planned developments within the unmanned 

communication systems architecture and identify applicable standards and system guidance for 

each area.

Figure 13. High-Level C4 Infrastructure Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1)

4.3.2 Issues with Current Unmanned Systems Communication Infrastructure

Operational lessons learned, detailed analytical studies, after action reviews, JUONs, and 

combat mission need statements over the past 10 years of global combat operations have 

repeatedly shown C4 infrastructure shortfalls in our ability to support unmanned platforms.

Specific issues include

• Poor Global Connectivity. Insufficient ability and capacity to globally distribute 

high-bandwidth data from unmanned platforms (e.g., full-motion video (FMV)) to 

strategic, operational, and tactical users. A majority of the current unmanned 

infrastructure is focused on the Middle East and unable to support operations in other 

parts of the globe.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

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• Costly Satellite/Network Contracts. Much of our satellite communication 

bandwidth for each system is procured separately through commercial leases, often at 

a premium over the traditional DISA commercial satellite communications 

(SATCOM) portfolio. Many systems also rely on separate platform-centric terrestrial 

network infrastructures to provide connectivity with tactical, operational, and 

strategic consumers. Because this connectivity is often provided by leased 

commercial networks, the overhead cost of each system is further increased.

• Stovepipe Infrastructures. Many unmanned systems programs established vendor 

proprietary communication solutions, including gateways for beyond-line-of-site 

(BLOS) communication and access to terrestrial network infrastructures. This 

approach prevents the sharing of resources across platforms, significantly increases 

infrastructure overhead costs (e.g., facilities, program management), and inhibits 

system interoperability.

• Poor Information Sharing. Many systems employ dedicated processing, 

exploitation, and dissemination (PED) and mission data infrastructures that prevent 

effective data sharing among systems, services, and organizations.

In short, the current unmanned systems communication infrastructure is prone to wasteful 

redundancy of efforts, lacks interoperability, and inhibits the distribution of system data to 

potential consumers.

To better understand the best ways of addressing the challenges facing future unmanned 

systems operations, it is helpful to make several key assumptions:

• Programmed Resources Will Be Limited. OCO funding has been sustaining most 

unmanned systems operations in recent years. This funding will disappear in the 

coming years as troops draw down. Without program resources, the limited leased C4 

infrastructure in place today will atrophy.

• C4 Infrastructure Demand Is Growing. Unmanned systems capacity requirements 

will grow with improvements in sensor technology and greater global distribution and 

will require a robust and flexible communication infrastructure, which in turn will 

require growth in the transport of multiplexed and multilevel classified disparate 

information. UAS data link capacities are expected to be capable of consolidating 

several high-bandwidth ingests and be network capable. Advanced airborne routers 

should be able to sort single-data-link disparate data and route to the appropriate 

consumer with assured classification transport. Onboard processing should also 

provide applications to provide appropriate bandwidth, compression, imagery frames

per second, and resolutions in accordance with user capabilities.

• Operating Environment Will Be Challenged. Future unmanned missions are 

expected to occur in both benign and contested C4 operating environments. The C4 

infrastructure must be resilient and able to perform the mission even in hostile 

electromagnetic and cyber environments.

• Open Standards Improve Interoperability. Future development of unmanned 

system platforms and their associated communication infrastructure must be guided 

by open standards and interfaces to enable interoperability and efficiently utilize 

limited resources.
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• Enterprise Capabilities Improve Efficiency. Establishing a sensor-agnostic 

communication infrastructure that is shared by multiple unmanned programs will 

provide cost reductions and improve information sharing and interoperability.

4.3.3 Communication Gateways and Relay Sites

DoD and commercial gateways provide access to military and nonmilitary satellites and

to the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) transport and Internet Protocol (IP) netcentric services, which in turn provide global distribution of mission data and enable long-range 

C2 of unmanned systems. Likewise, relay sites connect line-of-sight (LOS) communications 

with BLOS radio systems for mission data and C2 connection to DISN.

Numerous platform-centric and proprietary gateways are provided today to support 

operations in the Middle East. To reduce long-term expenditures on gateways and to more 

efficiently and effectively process information from unmanned systems, DoD will transition to 

platform-agnostic gateways utilizing existing global enterprise SATCOM gateway facilities (e.g., 

teleport standard tactical entry point (STEP) sites). Existing enterprise gateways can provide 

common, secure facilities; operators and maintainers; and rack space. They can also provide

centralized management of floor space; power; and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 

(HVAC). As a result, they can reduce the duplication of efforts among the various unmanned 

system program offices. Leveraging these Government assets greatly improves the affordability 

over a communication infrastructure based on dedicated, proprietary gateways currently used for 

some unmanned systems. Near-term efforts are already underway to establish manned and 

unmanned ISR connectivity at the Lago Patria Gateway, Italy, and Pope Air Force Base (AFB), 

North Carolina, STEP sites. These facilities will be configured to support a wide variety of 

airborne platforms utilizing commercial Ku band SATCOM.

Each gateway site will host multiple IP SATCOM systems including frequency division 

multiple access (FDMA) (e.g., enhanced bandwidth efficient modem) and multiple frequency 

time division multiple access (MF-TDMA) (e.g., Joint IP Modem, iDirect, Linkway, Linkstar, 

and Advantech) modems. The gateways provide intermediate frequency (IF) routing of signals 

between modems and earth terminals. All IP-enabled modems are connected to the converged IP 

transport and routing network to provide dynamic routing of IP packets and access to DISN 

services. Each gateway site will provide cooperative technologies to enable and/or support 

automated bandwidth leveling, di-plexing and further IP dissemination (routing) of multilevel 

security information, alternate routing, and recovery and data backup.

SATCOM gateways alone will not satisfy all deployed warfighter requirements for 

satellite coverage. Certain operating environments will fall outside the coverage area of these 

gateways and their associated SATCOM assets or may require service from satellites with which

the SATCOM gateways are currently unable to communicate. In such scenarios, a dedicated 

BLOS gateway will still be required to support unmanned systems. DISA is developing 

cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs) with industry to look at expanding 

the SATCOM gateway enterprise to include commercial satellite gateways. DISA’s SATCOM

gateway vision includes leveraging commercial satellite gateways as black (encrypted) packet 

entry points into DISN. This capability could provide a lower cost alternative to coverage

shortfalls and preclude the need to hire dedicated vendors to establish all new entry facilities, 

baseband and encryption equipment, and associated terrestrial connectivity to DoD networks. To 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

43

support this CRADA effort, DISA is also exploring improvements in gateway transport 

technology, in particular, the development of digital IF technology for interfacility transport of a 

modem IF output. This capability would facilitate connectivity from any modem to any antenna 

in the world, through the DISN fiber core. Digital IF will enable collapse of modem assets into 

centralized enterprise sites and transform SATCOM gateways into simplified radio access 

facilities. Additionally, digital IF would also allow the option of using commercial gateways as 

radio access facilities to provide black packet transport in areas where DoD SATCOM gateways 

do not provide sufficient coverage.

Unmanned systems require standard relay system architectures to facilitate connection of 

LOS systems to potential global consumers. To support operations in Afghanistan, a JUON 

drove the development of relay systems to support delivery of high-volume sensor traffic. The 

corresponding C4 infrastructure took more than a year to build and deploy. To provide support 

for operations outside the Afghanistan area of operation and to ensure this capability is available 

at the start of a contingency operation, DoD might consider a designated lead agent to manage 

and develop future relay systems. The lead agent could leverage existing radio systems wherever 

possible. For example, linking state-of-the-art transceivers used for LOS transmission of FMV 

and C2 data with two-way Global Broadcast Service (GBS) systems can provide a standard relay 

component for the unmanned systems architecture.

4.3.4 Enterprise Data Centers and Distribution Nodes

The Intelligence Community and Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I))

are responsible for ensuring that data are accessible, and they have made great strides in 

increasing accessibility to the warfighter. Ultimately, NGA and NSA are the functional combat 

support agencies for imagery and signals intelligence and maintain the authority and 

responsibility for data storage and dissemination. The stovepipe nature inherent in current 

unmanned systems extends to the data storage, handling, and dissemination functions of these 

systems. To reduce overhead costs, optimize manpower requirements, and improve data sharing 

among various services, organizations, and allied partners, unmanned systems data should be 

consolidated into cloud-enabled enterprise data centers with a standard infrastructure established 

to distribute the data to all authorized consumers. This approach falls in line with overall federal 

and DoD mandates to consolidate and reduce data centers and establish a select number of 

facilities to support all platforms and joint consumers. Recent efforts to accomplish this goal 

include the Intelligence Community’s “big data” cloud computing efforts and DISA’s Unified 

Video Dissemination Service (UVDS) established to support real-time distribution of FMV data 

to consumers around the globe. See Figure 14.

DISA’s UVDS provides DoD-wide FMV consolidation, enterprise-wide FMV situational 

awareness, metadata transformation and dissemination services, and a robust routing capability 

for worldwide dissemination of FMV. Installed in DISA’s Defense Enterprise Computing 

Centers, UVDS supports various FMV sources and user communities by providing for the 

dissemination of black (encrypted) and red (unencrypted) FMV streams via multicast streaming 

and near-real-time web-based streaming. UVDS implements DoD and industry standards, 

protocols, and profiles (e.g., SD, HD, H.264, MPEG-2, FLASH) to ensure the greatest level of 

interoperability among existing systems while taking advantage of existing computing 

infrastructures associated with DoD’s Global Information Grid (GIG) terrestrial connectivity.

The robust routing architecture connects CONUS and OCONUS locations and takes advantage 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

44

of DoD gateways for efficient and real-time dissemination of FMV across SATCOM networks 

(e.g., GBS, Joint IP Modem, and USCENTCOM Digital Video Broadcast with Return Channel 

via Satellite). UVDS replaces the need for dedicated point-to-point communication circuits

supporting Predator and Reaper operations. See Figure 15. 

Figure 14. DISA Proposed UVDS Functional Architecture

Figure 15. Current UVDS Operational Architecture (February 2012)
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

45

4.3.5 Satellite Communications

A significant cost of current unmanned systems architectures is the procurement of 

satellite bandwidth through commercial leases. Most bandwidth used in support of deployed 

unmanned systems missions was procured individually, under unfavorable terms. By aggregating 

commercial SATCOM leases across multiple unmanned systems, DoD could significantly 

reduce costs in the future. To do so, future lease arrangements should be investigated through the 

DISA commercial SATCOM portfolio, utilizing the Future COMSATCOM Services Acquisition 

(FCSA) contract structure. Additionally, DoD should pursue innovative, alternative contractual 

opportunities and arrangements with industry that minimize the necessity for annual or multiyear leasing. These approaches allow more competitive pricing and increased buying power for 

Government customers. Using a common infrastructure, including compatible waveforms, will 

make possible the sharing of satellite bandwidth and potentially reduce the aggregate demand 

below the sum of the individual requirements of each system. Furthermore, the FCSA contract 

structure will provide the flexibility for “surges” in capabilities in response to changing mission 

environments.

In addition to more efficient commercial leases, the overall cost of satellite bandwidth 

can be further reduced by leveraging more DoD SATCOM assets. Wideband global satellite 

(WGS) can be used in conjunction with DoD enterprise gateways to offload unmanned systems

data traffic from commercial transponders. However, this strategy is not feasible today due to a 

lack of installed Ka band terminals on unmanned platforms. All unmanned systems programs 

requiring BLOS connectivity must develop plans to establish Ka band capability to leverage 

military SATCOM resources and avoid costly annual commercial leases. Wherever possible, 

unmanned systems BLOS transceivers should consider support of both commercial and military 

satellite bands to provide operational flexibility and use available DoD resources.

These benefits should be carefully weighed against the potential operational risks if 

military units use commercial SATCOM services. UAS programs must consider a strategy 

and/or provisions to manage the potential risks of using the non-U.S. military SATCOM 

services. The major components of an implementation strategy should include need, potential 

operational risks identified in all related operational scenarios, and the optimal balance between 

cost effectiveness (benefits) and operational risks.

4.3.6 Networking Infrastructure and Systems

Wherever possible, unmanned systems programs should leverage the DISN core as their 

baseline terrestrial networking infrastructure for global connectivity. Connection points to the 

DISN core are already available at DoD gateway sites. Additionally, DISA is further developing 

its DISN core and enterprise wide area network IP service offering to complement the unmanned 

systems relay solution set.

The IP networking component of enterprise gateways provides routing and encryption/ 

decryption to multiple security enclaves for access to DISN. Encrypted unmanned systems traffic 

would be routed through the DoD gateway net-centric convergence router, which provides 

connectivity between IP modem hubs and DISN. The convergence router is currently connected 

to both the Layer 3 unclassified provider edge and Layer 2 multiservice provisioning platform 

and supports multiple traffic types, virtual private network tunnels, and circuit connections.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

46

Unmanned system design configurations and DISN must ensure that proper IP address and ports 

and services assignments are planned into the design before the systems are fielded and that the 

systems’ network configurations are modifiable in the field to quickly respond to network 

intrusion events. 

However, unmanned systems design configurations and DISN will need to provide 

technology that rectifies jitter and latency inherent within an all-IP-based system for the most

sensitive type sensors or other critically high reliability mission functions. Buffering issues 

discovered on legacy unmanned systems can cause loss of sensitive data due to dropped packets 

if transferring on an all-IP-based environment. In the past, deterministic technologies, such as 

asynchronous transfer mode, would provide the precise timing and buffer resilient capability to 

ensure complete data transfers with effectively no jitter or latency. Unmanned systems and DISN 

will need to develop and provide a similar network that ensures no packets are lost end to end 

between the most sensitive sensors from the unmanned vehicle, through the respective unmanned 

controlling segment, to various networking, to end user mission partners.

DISN core connectivity will not be readily available in all potential operating 

environments. Networking of multiple deployed unmanned systems may be necessary to better 

ensure connectivity of the systems in non-line-of-sight (NLOS), urban, hostile, and/or noisy 

EMS environments to relay or transfer the collected information onto GIG. Currently, envisioned 

network concepts include employing topology control algorithms for sparsely connected 

directional networks in response to jamming detection; developing cognitive algorithms for 

jammer detection; utilizing resilient topology control for directional networks, using IP-based,

autonomous, self-organizing, nonhomogeneous networks; and providing LOS control to UAS 

from within an isolated network (i.e., no reach back). In 2012, the Air Force demonstrated a 

network with UAS and several ground nodes under the Net-T demonstration. Another concept is 

within the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA’s) LANdroids program,47

which calls for the deployment of small, inexpensive, smart robotic radio network relay nodes 

that can leverage their mobility to coordinate and move autonomously. The program seeks to 

demonstrate the capabilities of self-configuration, self-optimization, self-healing, tethering, and 

power management. There is interest in the application of SOA approaches to future network 

configurations and the use of multicast communication technologies to allow semiautonomous 

and autonomous collaborations.

4.3.7 Antennas

Communication with highly mobile systems requires high-gain, rugged, and lower cost 

multidirectional antennas. The larger UAS may also use highly focused beams to achieve 

connectivity with more distant systems.48 Developments in phased array antennas and “smart” 

antennas (including combining signals from multiple antennas) could offer an alternative to 

traditional dish antennas; however, they require tradeoffs among SWaP-C. DoD and industry 

must also continue developing such techniques as multifocused and supercooled antenna 

systems. 

 47 Source: http://www.darpa.mil/ipto/programs/ld/ld.asp. 48 Global positioning system (GPS) could be used to aid in this connectivity.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

47

Future antenna systems must be able to receive signals over a broad range of frequencies,

but they also must be frequency selective (see 4.3.13). Therefore, phased arrays are a viable 

approach. Dynamically controlled (e.g., null jammers) element (~ 9 elements) arrays are 

available now, but significantly larger numbers of elements that are conformal (e.g., using 

metamaterial) and that are molded within the vehicle surfaces are in development (2020). 

SWaP-C and low-profile aspects are major developmental areas. The utilization of common 

apertures has called for the development of new interference mitigation methodologies that 

minimize co-site interference effects and improve the potential for achieving simultaneous 

transmit/receive operations within adjacent frequency bands.

4.3.8 Transmitter/Receiver Systems

Future transmitter/receiver systems require improved interoperability, resiliency, 

efficiency, and operational flexibility. Wherever possible, future BLOS transceivers should 

support both commercial Ku band and military Ka band connectivity. Programs such as the 

Navy’s Triton and Army’s Gray Eagle efforts are already moving in this direction. Such 

hardware will allow maximum flexibility across operating environments and improve resiliency 

of the systems in contested environments. The challenge of using multiband terminals on 

unmanned sensor platforms is often not caused by technological limitations, but rather by 

budgetary constraints. Significant upfront cost is involved with upgrading or installing new 

multiband terminals on unmanned platforms. However, the lifecycle costs of such systems are

lower than the lifecycle costs of a Ku band–only platform, which continues to rely on leased,

costly commercial SATCOM bandwidth to support operations. Further, all platforms should

consider employing multiband LOS transceivers. This strategy will provide an alternate means of 

connectivity to potentially contested satellite resources, improve link diversity/resiliency, and

link to future ground and airborne (e.g., Joint Aerial Layer Network (JALN)) relay nodes. In 

addition to this broad guidance on transmitter/receiver systems, the following technical 

recommendations are provided:

• Transmitters. Current transmitter solid-state power amplifiers (SSPAs) are typically 

made with gallium arsenide (GaAs) substrate. Gallium nitride (GaN) SSPAs, 

currently in development, provide significant advantages over GaAs SSPAs. GaN 

SSPAs offer more than double the efficiency of GaAs amplifiers; they increase the 

amplifier operational bandwidth; and they may provide for a wider range of 

frequency of operation. The high transmit efficiency of GaN systems will also reduce 

the cooling requirements. To achieve some of these benefits, the amplifier designs are 

being enhanced with adaptive operating point controls that adjust to the instantaneous 

power being demanded from the amplifier. This enhancement significantly reduces 

the average prime power required by the transmitter’s high-power amplifier (HPA) by 

allowing it to effectively turn itself off when not in use, yet adjusting to maintain 

proper conditions to ensure minimal distortion at higher instantaneous powers. The 

GaN technologies are currently available for selected frequency bands and will soon 

be available for fielding (2014). The HPAs may also utilize signal-processing-based 

signal predistortion techniques to compensate for the basic nonlinearity of the 

amplifier’s transfer characteristics. To help in anti-jam and RF interference risks, 

developments in frequency-hopping characteristics should continue.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

48

• Receivers. Instantaneous bandwidth performance and analog-to-digital converter 

sampling speeds have continued to improve year after year.49 In addition, 

improvements in integrated chip fabrication methods have allowed for significant 

miniaturization and reductions in part counts and for various transmit/receive and 

antenna functions and components to be integrated on a single chip (2013). These 

receivers must incorporate higher system selectivity, high spur-free dynamic range 

(greater than 80 dB to 90 dB from adverse adjacent and off-channel electromagnetic 

environmental effects (E3)), and resistance to adverse E3. Fiber optics has been used 

to speed up the data and signal transfers from and to the antenna and the signal 

processing hardware (2012).50 Microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) 

developments should provide smaller size, more flexibility, and greater performance 

(by a factor of 100 or better) in receiver designs (2015). However, these receivers 

must be able to operate in the presence of adjacent high-power transmitters that can 

drastically desensitize their RF front end, and tunable analog preselector filtering 

(using innovative low-SWAP-C technology) may reduce such desensitization. Future 

developments are expected to provide improved reliability and fabrication yields, 

reduced thermal characteristics, reduced integration complexity, and lower production 

costs. 

• Transmit/Receive Systems. Such systems will emphasize new technologies like 

spatial, combining, high-power, solid-state amplifiers using monolithic microwave 

integrated circuits (MMICs). A MMIC (sometimes pronounced “mimic”) is a type of 

integrated circuit device that operates at microwave frequencies (300 MHz to 300 

GHz) and typically performs functions such as microwave mixing, power 

amplification, low-noise amplification, and high-frequency switching. MMICs are 

smaller and cheaper than conventional integrated circuits.

Recent developments, including software-defined radios, have produced a diversity of 

technologies, but no formal standards have been developed yet for this technology. Recently, the 

VITA 49 Radio Transport (VRT) standard51 has been proposed as a solution to the 

interoperability dilemma. This standard provides an interoperability framework that can be used 

for analysis of RF spectrum and localization of RF emissions. The framework is based on a 

transport protocol to convey time-stamped signal data in IF data packets and metadata in context 

packets. The protocol abstracts the receiver data from specific hardware implementations and 

thus enables a common software suite to be developed independent of the receiver architectures, 

manufacturers, and physical links.

4.3.9 UMS Communications 

Ocean dynamics challenge underwater and surface communications and are unique to 

UUVs and USVs. However, there is a significant difference between UUV and USV 

communication requirements. An UUV is very autonomous and requires less bandwidth than an 

USV acting on the surface. Due to collision regulations and safety, the USV must send to a 

 49 Lundberg, Kent H., High-Speed Analog-to-Digital Converter Survey, MIT Press, 2002. 50 See the DARPA Optical RF Communications Adjunct and the Office of Naval Research’s Enabling Capability 

programs. This application is more for ground-based systems than for airborne systems. This use also significantly 

minimizes the signal loss and allows more advantageous placement of selected components. 51 Reference work by Robert Normoyle, DRS-Signal Solutions.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

49

watchstander live feedback that requires significant bandwidth. Once autonomy becomes more 

reliable, perhaps the bandwidth could decrease, but a USV is expected to always have a 

requirement for higher bandwidth due to its mission types. For example, the USV will be used 

generally for engagement of surface targets requiring active oversight by an operator/weapons 

person.

UUVs will gain efficiency and effectiveness with the development of improved real-time, 

two-way communications that do not undermine mission accomplishment. The Navy’s Undersea 

Dominance Roadmap (published in 2012) identified current and future architectures to link 

UUVs, distributed netted systems, and tactical platforms. The Navy has begun initial production 

of a planned 150 littoral battlespace sensing UUVs, which are capable of completing up to sixmonth-long autonomous sensing missions. Advanced UUV sensors and clandestine and lowlatency communication and networking capabilities are viewed52 as key game changers. Future 

developments will come through the Office of Naval Research S&T research and development 

efforts.

4.3.10 Spectrum Considerations

The EMS is highly regulated at the national53 and international54 levels. Federal 

Acquisition Regulations and Office of Management and Budget policies require U.S. national 

spectrum approval before funds are expended on spectrum-dependent systems (SDS). DoD 

policy and military department regulations require submission of technical parameters to the 

national spectrum approval process as well as to host nation’s approval processes for prior

approval before spectrum operations can commence within the United States or other nations.

While numerous over-the-air communication systems and active sensors, such as radar, have 

been designed, built, and fielded so they comply with national and host nation spectrum 

regulations and technical standards and have performed reasonably well, others have been 

fielded in a noncompliant status and have often not met final operational constraints. 

U.S. military operations are now occurring in many parts of the world where adequate 

spectrum is not available for C2, sensor, and data link systems. There is a significant increase in 

the number of SDS the United States, our partners, and our coalition forces deploy to address 

current, and may want to deploy to address expected future, mission areas. In addition, these 

SDS collect more information, and missions often require greater bandwidths to send their 

information directly to warfighters. Also, mission areas are becoming more spectrally “noisy” 

because of increasingly cluttered and hostile spectrum environments. As such, a continual 

demand for improved spectrum efficiency and effectiveness is being placed on all DoD SDS.55

All unmanned systems must complete, during their development process, a spectrum 

supportability and risk assessment (SSRA) in accordance with DoDI 4650.01. The SSRA is to 

identify and mitigate regulatory, technical, and operational spectrum supportability. Because 

 52 Navy’s updated UUV Roadmap. 53 For the U.S. Government, see the National Telecommunications and Information Administration’s Manual of

Regulations and Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency Management. Washington, DC, January 2008 edition, 

September 2009 revision (incorporated by reference under 47 CFR 300.1).

54 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Radio Regulations, Geneva, Switzerland. 2007 Edition. 55 All new and modified SDS programs now must conduct an SSRA prior to Milestone B (source: DoDI 4650.01). 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

50

national and international spectrum rules and policies can rapidly change,56 developers should 

maintain a close liaison with appropriate DoD spectrum offices before finalizing communication 

system designs. 

There is particular interest in expanding DoD UAS operations in nonsegregated portions 

of the NAS; this expansion may require the use of specific types of spectrum allocations to 

perform C2 and sense and avoid (SAA) functions due to safety and regularity of flight 

requirements. The preferred allocations are those set aside for, and carefully controlled by, civil 

aviation authorities. Where necessary, alternative allocations may be used by Government users 

provided an equivalent level of protection can be demonstrated. That equivalent level may 

include higher performance specifications, e.g., those for reliability and data latency.

The teleoperation of UGS from a remote location requires negotiation between LOS and 

NLOS conditions to provide situational awareness and reconnaissance to the warfighter. Wide 

frequency bandwidths are needed to support the near-real-time imaging required to negotiate

confined areas, doors, etc. The availability of the right spectrum is critical for the operation of 

UGS to support various missions. This availability is determined by a number of factors, 

including a host nation’s allocation and assignments of spectrum within its borders, congestion, 

and operational requirements of the SDS. Based on the results of appropriate SSRAs, the SDS 

may need to be planned and designed for multiband operation and/or provide significant tuning 

flexibility to maximize global use.

The DARPA’s Next Generation project and its follow-on Wireless Network after Next 

(WNaN) program demonstrated the feasibility of dynamic spectrum access (DSA). DSA offers 

the ability to change frequency band use based on the actual use or nonuse of certain bands by 

other adjacent SDS. The Army is also considering having WNaN become part of an Army POR.

However, a recent Air Force Scientific Advisory Board study said that DSA is far from being 

proven technology. Developmental challenges include susceptibility to countermeasures, costs of 

integrating with existing systems, developing standards (including regulatory aspects), and cosite interference (2015).

4.3.11 Waveforms

In accordance with DoD policy, CDL is the DoD standard waveform for all airborne 

manned and unmanned platforms with ISR sensors. All ISR wideband terminal variants, 

including tactical CDL equipment, must comply with Specification 7681990 and the overarching 

Specification 60038365.

57 Furthermore, wideband terminal variants must comply with the latest 

revision of Specification 60038368.58 Legacy ISR programs upgrading communication 

 56 Relatively near-term spectrum usage changes came from ITU and its 2012 Worldwide Radiocommunication 

Conference (WRC); UAS spectrum use was a conference agenda item. Changes in frequency band usage for UAS 

may also come from the FAA and the International Civil Aeronautics Organization (ICAO) as part of the UAS 

operations in the NAS airspace and in other nation-states’ airspace during preparations for the WRC to be held in 

2015.

57 Specification Number 7681990, Performance Specification for the Standard Common Data Link (Std-CDL) 

Waveform, November 2009, and Specification Number 60038365, Capstone Specification for the Network-Centric 

Common Data Link (CAPSTONE), November 2007. 58 Specification Number 60038368, Performance Specification for the Bandwidth Efficient-Common Data Link 

(BE-CDL) Waveform, May 2011.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

51

capabilities must comply with the latest revision of the appropriate CDL specification, and any 

systems not implementing a current interoperable version of CDL must develop a migration plan 

for review by the DoD CIO and USD(I). Any waivers from these requirements must be approved 

by the USD(AT&L).

The CDL family (currently five variations) of waveform specifications permits terminals 

to operate in S, C, X, Ku, and Ka bands. Other bands are under consideration (see Figure 16),

and they are employed in multiple aerial and ground ISR platforms. Current plans call for CDL 

to evolve from a point-to-point capability. Near-term added capability plans include modernized 

cryptographic solutions (including agile and dynamic key distribution methods to support 

mission retasking at the strategic and tactical level), dynamically adaptive waveform parameters 

and A2/AD requirements [anti-jam, and low probability of intercept/low probability of detection 

(LPI/LPD)]. Middle-term (2019) plans include new networking capabilities (e.g., self-healing 

and self-forming, ad-hoc networking, disruption-tolerant networking, and dynamic and multipleaccess network management). Long-term (2020+) plans include autonomous policy-based 

network management and cognitive CDL. CDL waveform changes must comply with DoDI 

4630.09.

59

Figure 16. Possibilities of Obtaining Spectrum Support in Various Host Nations for 

Wider Frequency Range

Due to size, weight, and power considerations, small unmanned aircraft systems (SUAS), 

which require data link terminals smaller than available miniature CDL technology, may be 

exempted from this policy after waiver review by the OUSD(AT&L). Moreover, to ensure 

SUAS transition to achieve DoD net-centric policies and to support efficient spectrum use, 

incorporation of encryption, and interoperability requirements, the DoD CIO and USD(I) will 

review and approve any SUAS data link solutions prior to acquisition. The miniature CDL 

terminal has low enough size, weight, and power that it could be used on vehicles down to 

 59 DoDI 4630.09, Wireless Communications Waveform Development and Management, 3 November 2008.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

52

roughly 30 lb. All CDL terminals require an approved encryption capability (DoDI S-4660.04).

Any CDL terminals not compliant with encryption policy require a review by the DoD CIO and 

USD(I) with support of NSA.

The CDL program will promote interoperability, standardize interface implementations, 

promote compliance with industry-accepted standards (including USIP and other commercial 

development/maintenance standards), and maximize use of open standards. Future CDL 

technologies will promote reuse of waveforms, software, and hardware so that the amount of 

new development (i.e., items created from scratch) is reduced. The Services are encouraged to 

use competitive acquisition for procurement of CDL systems, and any new CDL developments

shall include unlimited rights for technical data and software.

4.3.12 Multiple-Input, Multiple-Output (MIMO) Systems

MIMO is a proven technology and is currently being used in commercial fourth 

generation (4G) wireless systems moving at less than 30 knots. It has been tested at data rates up 

to 300 Mbps.60 MIMO combines information theory, forward error correction coding, signal 

processing, and propagation theory; therefore, the mathematics behind MIMO and space-time 

coding is complicated. MIMO would use multiple paths (although they are not necessarily 

independent) with lower data rates on each path; apply space-time coding and capacity 

optimization to achieve a total high data rate mission; apply power saving to jammer margin; and 

evaluate performance in benign and stress conditions.

With further improvements in electronic discovery, interface design, and adaptive 

protocols, self-forming and self-healing mesh networks may enable unmanned systems to 

operate in multiplatform, multisensor networks.

4.3.13 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3)

Electronic systems may be susceptible to damaging E3 that can arise from a variety of 

natural or manmade (including enemy EW and friendly counter-EW) environmental sources.

61

E3 applications include full vehicle susceptibility analysis; enclosure shielding effectiveness 

calculation; test rig design, assessment, and normalization to free space environments (e.g.,

lightning return conductor systems); cable design and shield transfer impedance extraction;

prediction of induced currents and voltages in complex cable systems; and performance of 

electromagnetic interference (EMI) filters, ferrites, or nonlinear transient protection circuits. The 

DoD E3 handbook62 describes the tasks that should be accomplished to ensure E3 control and 

EMC measures are incorporated into the development and operational procedures of an item to 

achieve the desired level of EMC during its life cycle. The joint E3 control strategy recognizes 

that electromagnetically interfering and susceptible equipment designs should be eliminated or 

avoided (via proper budgeting support) during development and in acquisition and proposes use 

 60 The conditions in UAS applications are much different than those for commercial cell phones. 61 These sources may include electromagnetic pulse (EMP), radio frequency interference, high-intensity radiated 

fields (HIRF), electromagnetic interference (EMI), electrostatic discharge (ESD), lightning strikes, and precipitation 

static (P-STATIC). Other concerns include the hazards of electromagnetic radiation to personnel, ordnance, and 

volatile materials (RADHAZ).

62 MIL-STD-464, MIL-STD 461F, and MIL-HDBK-237B, Guidance for Controlling Electromagnetic 

Environmental Effects on Platforms, Systems, and Equipment. 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

53

of a positive control methodology called “gating” in conjunction with established “exit criteria”

to monitor the planning and application of E3 control measures.

A critical challenge is that while communication needs continue to increase, degradation 

from interference also tends to increase at a comparable, if not more accelerated, rate. While it is 

not an easy task to design a highly sensitive radio receiver that also has a wide dynamic range,

communication systems transmission advances without comparable E3 resilience advances will 

not ensure continuous operations of unmanned systems. 

4.3.14 Optical Communications

The application of lasers in unmanned systems communications could provide increased 

target detection capabilities, improved anti-jam performance, robust LPI/LPD, and decreased 

EMI within the communication subsystem. Optical routers will be more practical when we 

employ unmanned high-flying vehicles like the Global Hawk, Boeing’s Phantom Eye, and the 

X-37B. Optical communication systems are hampered by atmospheric absorption challenges, yet 

they offer far greater bandwidth (measured in gigabits per second) capabilities. LOS optical links

have successfully been demonstrated at link ranges in excess of 50 km. Applications could apply 

to fixed locations and in air-to-air and ship-to-ship scenarios. Theoretical estimates indicate that 

air-to-ground links are feasible at rates up to 100 Mbit/s for link slant ranges up to 100 km, 

depending on atmospheric conditions. Due to the extreme narrow beamwidth of such systems, 

maintaining pointing accuracy to and from a moving unmanned system will be a major 

challenge (>2020). A recently completed DARPA program, Free Space Optical Experimental 

Network Experiment, employed a hybrid optical/RF communication technology and 

demonstrated air-to-air (>200 km range; data rates of 3 Gb/sec to 6 Gb/sec) and air-to-ground 

(>130 km slant range; 3 Gb/sec to 9 Gb/sec) point-to-point communications. 

4.3.15 Advanced Navigation Developments

DARPA63 is working on two advanced navigation strategies that are kinematic (i.e., there 

is no force rebalance) and should offer significant improvements in effectiveness.

The Precision Inertial Navigation Systems (PINS) program seeks to use ultra-cold atom 

interferometers as an alternative to GPS updates. Advancements in atomic physics in the past 

two decades have given scientists much better control over the external quantum states of atoms, 

including deliberate production of matter waves from ultra-cold atoms. This advancement has 

allowed development of matter wave interferometry techniques to measure forces acting on 

matter, including high-precision atomic accelerometers and gyroscopes. Using this technology, 

this program seeks to develop an inertial navigation system, which should have low 

unprecedented drift rates yet address many scientific and technical challenges. The program is on 

schedule to demonstrate a high-precision atom interferometer inertial navigation system on an 

aircraft during 2013, with a total system volume less than 20 liters. Since this innovation is an 

entirely inertial system, it will require no transmissions to or from the platform, thus enabling a 

jam-proof, nonemanating inertial navigation system with near-GPS accuracies for future military 

submarines, aircraft, and missiles.

 63 The point of contact is Dr. Stefanie Tompkins.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

54

The program has developed improved gravity gradiometers, accelerometers, and 

gyroscopes where the atoms are in a nearly perfect inertial frame of reference (no sensor case) 

and the laser/atomic physics interactions determine the relative motion between the inertial frame 

and the sensor case. The sensor accuracy derives from the use of optical wave fronts to 

determine relative motion.

The High Dynamic Range Atom (sensors) (HiDRA) program seeks to develop the 

compact sensor operation used on dynamic platforms where the inertial measurement unit (IMU)

would offer accuracies of a 20 m/h, 10 g, 100 o/s, <4 L sensor, <20 L system. Relative to 

conventional sensors, it would offer a common technology for accelerometers and gyroscopes, a 

high sensitivity and linearity for high-g environments, and cost-effective fabrication and

maintenance. Relative to PINS II sensors, it would offer use in multiple axes, high-g operation, 

compact sensor heads, integrated laser system/sensor heads, field-programmable gate array 

timing system for high repetition rate operations, atom recapture, scattered light suppression for 

short modulation period, and multipulse beamsplitters (optional).

4.3.16 Improved GPS Operations

The NGA has developed the Estimation and Prediction of Orbits and Clocks to High 

Accuracy (EPOCHA) real-time software for GPS orbit/clock estimates, which enables the 

capability for potentially higher accuracy GPS positioning for many platforms. Using the NGA 

EPOCHA products could provide more current, higher rate information to improve position 

estimates. The concept has been demonstrated in post-processing, and the results confirm the 

improved accuracy; decisions regarding incorporating it within existing or future systems have 

yet to be made. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for EPOCHA real-time support to military 

platforms is FY2014 (October 2013), with a 5-minute message update rate. Full Operational 

Capability (FOC) is scheduled by FY2016 (October 2015), with a 30-second message update 

rate.

Many UAS conduct Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) using GPS. Currently, 

DoD requires Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) GPS64 as SAASM 

decreases GPS vulnerabilities by offering encrypted GPS data and satellite authentication. In the 

near future, a military GPS upgrade known as M-code GPS will be made available. M-code GPS 

is required for all new acquisitions starting in FY2017.65 The M-code signal provides better 

jamming resistance and has enhanced features for authentication, confidentiality, and key 

distribution. Unlike prior systems that may rely on GPS for positioning, M-code GPS can 

calculate PNT independently using only the M-code signal.

4.3.17 Cost Effectiveness Considerations

DoD’s desire is to operate unmanned systems in theaters or within the United States and 

its possessions so that constraints on communications and active sensor systems do not adversely 

affect successful mission execution. Specifically, DoD must significantly improve 

communication transmission efficiencies; attain better bandwidth efficiencies; increase 

transmitter/receiver efficiencies; acquire communication systems that are of less size and weight, 

 64 Relevant SAASM GPS policies include DoD GPS Security Policy, 4 April 2006, and Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Master Positioning, Navigation and Timing Plan, 13 April 2007. 65 The M-code GPS mandate is stated in Public Law 111-383, Sec 913.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

55

require less power, and need less cooling to operate satisfactorily; and acquire higher gain 

antennas that are able to receive signals over a broader range of frequencies while retaining 

frequency selectivity. Unmanned systems programs must also leverage existing DoD enterprise 

facilities wherever possible and avoid building separate platform-centric communication 

infrastructures. Current and future operational employment of unmanned systems will also 

require access to a range of SATCOM capabilities. Planning and budgeting for such unmanned 

systems operations must take into account realistic assessments of projected SATCOM 

bandwidth (both military and commercial) in a range of operational scenarios. Investments in 

unmanned systems must be matched with appropriate investments in the military and 

commercial SATCOM capabilities that are required to support unmanned systems operations.

4.3.18 Future Trends 

Based on the force multiplier that unmanned systems have provided to our combat troops, 

it is expected that there will be a continued and increasing demand for capabilities to be 

supported by their communication systems. Those demands will include such capabilities as 

having a single operator conduct more real-time analysis of multiple situations, while the 

unmanned system performs many of its assigned functions autonomously. Future communication 

equipment must be simple plug-and-play payloads that are easily, quickly, and cost-effectively 

modified, updated and/or upgraded, and linked to globally available enterprise capabilities (e.g., 

gateways, data centers) to ensure rapid discovery and exploitation of mission information from 

any authorized DoD consumer. 

4.3.19 Mobile Technologies 

The mobile technologies initiative is pursuing rapid Government off-the-shelf application 

development; transition to tablets and smartphones for computing platforms; and a 4G cellular 

infrastructure to disseminate intelligence, data, and voice transmissions. By leveraging the 

devices developed and supported by commercial industry, significant cost advantages and 

infrastructure can be used to accomplish missions without requiring taxpayer investment in a 

large and bureaucratic network or capability.

4.3.20 Summary

Several steps can be taken to solve the challenges faced by the future unmanned systems 

communication infrastructure. Affordability may be improved by centralizing unmanned systems

enterprise management. Centralized management of C4 transport and network infrastructures can 

greatly improve system availability and efficiently use scarce system resources. Common 

management of multiple system assets will result in network redundancy, resilience, and path 

diversity for sensor platforms. It will also allow flexible frequency usage for launch and 

recovery. Interoperability should be the key factor in considering affordability of future 

architecture solutions. The architecture should transition away from redundant stovepipe 

solutions to leveraging existing enterprise SATCOM, gateway, and terrestrial network assets.

Common IP modems (e.g., JIPM) should become the standard for providing net-centric system 

capabilities. Future commercial services should be procured through more innovative strategies 

(e.g., FSCA leases, point-of-presence access to commercial gateways). Additionally, the pool of 

communication resources can be deepened by expanding operating spectrum usage to military 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

56

Ka band and leveraging aerial networking capabilities such as JALN, including its GIG injection 

points.

Open standards and interface definitions are key to mitigating the challenge of 

interoperability of unmanned systems communication infrastructures. Enforced open standards 

and Government-owned data rights will promote the leveraging of common components and 

facilitate reuse among heterogeneous unmanned system platforms. Using Government-owned 

enterprise assets (e.g., WGS, DoD enterprise gateways, DISN core) will help unify the 

communication infrastructure.

Figure 17 summarizes the target unmanned systems communication architecture with the 

proposed solutions in place, and the new infrastructure exhibits greater interoperability among 

various unmanned system platforms through the use of common control and data dissemination 

systems. Resiliency is improved through use of multiband terminals and common interfaces, and 

this improved resiliency allows access to DoD and commercial SATCOM resources as well as to 

enterprise gateways and small points of presence at commercial radio facilities. The increased 

utilization of DoD assets in this architecture offsets commercial resource requirements, improves

efficiency, and reduces the operating costs.

Figure 17. Unmanned Systems Target Architecture
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

57

Figure 18 summarizes the goals for communications systems, spectrum, and resilience 

for unmanned systems.

Figure 18. Communication Systems, Spectrum, and Resilience

Goals for Unmanned Systems

4.4 Security: Research and Intelligence/Technology Protection (RITP)

While the challenge of incorporating security measures on unmanned systems mirrors 

that of manned systems, additional C2 requirements are unique to unmanned systems and expand 

the overall requirement for system security. This section addresses those overall requirements.

The evolution of integrated sensors across multiple systems drives the need for a 

modified approach to program protection. The emphasis has shifted from protecting systemorganic technologies and information to a more comprehensive methodology: a platformagnostic, sensor-specific approach to address program protection across multiple systems and 

platforms. This methodology seeks to ensure protection of not only the technology on which the 

sensors are based, but also the intelligence information collected by these sensors.

RITP includes the layered application of protective principles, techniques, and solutions 

to prevent compromise of critical information and/or technology to an adversary or otherwise 

unintended entity. This concept was developed to address the range of security elements required 

to carry out policies described in DoDI 5200.39.66 RITP incorporates DoD and Navy directives, 

instructions, policies, and guidance concerning program protection and/or countermeasures, 

including anti-tamper. RITP is accomplished through the rigorous evaluation of subsystems to 

identify critical program information (CPI) and assessment of resulting CPI to determine which 

elements require additional protective measures. RITP bridges systems security engineering and 

other overarching security operations to ensure protection of intelligence sensors and products.

System vulnerabilities and threats are examined, as well as risk of exposure and 

consequence of system compromise, to proactively establish the foundation of security 

disciplines as early as reasonable in the developmental life cycle. Impact to the program in terms 

of cost, schedule, and performance is also factored into the determination of appropriate 

protective measures. When applicable, protective measures selected for implementation are 

 66 DoDI 5200.39, Critical Program Information (CPI) within the Department of Defense.

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2030+

, , g y

Desired Capabilty

Near Term: Unmanned System 

connectivity to Teleport sites 

supporting Africa and Pacific, Global 

UVDS capabilities, Secure Micro Digital 

Datalink, DSA,WNaN, Chip Count 

reduction, Ka-band terminals, Single 

Chip T/R, GaN technology, Eff. FEC, "Diala-rate" CDL, Adv. MIMO, consolidated 

gateway sites under common 

communications architecture, 

aggregate COMSATCOM leasing under 

FCSA.

Mid-Term: Multi-focused, Supercooled Antennas, Conformal 

phased array antennas, 

standard multi-band 

transceivers, cloud-enabled 

enterprise data centers, 

transition BLOS gateway 

capabilities to enterprise 

gateway sites supplemented 

with dedicated gateways 

outside coverage areas, tech 

refresh terminal upgrades to 

Ka-Band or multi-band 

hardware.

Long Term: Adv. Error 

Control, Further Adv. 

MIMO configurations, 

Network Path Diversity, 

Optical 

Communications, 

commercial gateway 

points-of-presence with 

Digital IF inter-facility 

transport.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

58

validated and verified as part of program systems engineering, T&E, and systems security 

engineering processes. With the integration of emerging technologies with critical information, it 

is more important than ever to evaluate appropriate layered protective measures through an 

integrated approach that includes complementary disciplines such as information assurance, 

operational security, anti-tamper, and counterintelligence and intelligence analysis. Anti-tamper 

is more cost effective when implemented at program onset.

4.4.1 Data at Rest (DAR) Encryption

To date, no NSA-approved, type 1–certified DAR encryption devices are suitable for 

U.S. military operational and/or tactical airborne platforms storing data labeled top secret and 

secret compartmented information (TS/SCI) and below. The manned systems community often 

relies on an emergency destruct plan to ensure physical destruction of classified media, including 

DAR stored on hard drives, should an operator believe the classified media are at risk of 

compromise.

As spinning hard drives are replaced by solid state drives and other media storage 

devices, the need for other methods of destruction becomes more critical. Other manned 

platforms face similar data destruction challenges. While NSA-approved data sanitization 

techniques are available, these techniques are either too time consuming for emergency scenarios 

or not approved for the sanitization of TS/SCI data. These limitations drive programs to seek 

other protective measures, including encryption.

For UAS, destruction of data becomes an even more challenging endeavor because

aircrews are not available to carry out procedures such as an emergency destruct plan.

Unmanned programs must rely on autonomous protective measures. Unmanned platforms are 

required to have an emergency location transmitter that transmits its GPS location to support 

rapid recovery and/or for coordinates-seeking NLOS weapon targeting for data/vehicle 

destruction.

4.4.2 Cost Effectiveness

Since the DAR encryption capability for data labeled TS/SCI and below is extremely 

limited, several programs have collaborated to devise a solution that can be implemented across 

systems in the very near term, such as within 24 months. Although some development work is 

still required, the cost involved with the acquisition, development, and production is relatively 

minimal when the overall payoff is considered. The end product would cost less than most 

Type 1–certified network encryptors and would help to ensure that, with a push of a button (or 

even with an autonomous command), DAR would be rendered unobtainable by the adversary.

The overall cost savings in terms of prevention of technology or information/intelligence loss 

would far exceed the initial development cost.

4.4.3 Near-Term Goals

Representatives from the Navy and Air Force have identified the need to integrate more 

robust methods for protecting classified DAR. The proposed solution includes the identification 

of resources for concept development of an NSA-approved Type 1–certified DAR encryptor that 

will be integrated on airborne (manned and unmanned) platforms and their associated ground 

support and processing stations. Unmanned systems must have the ability to remotely and 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

59

autonomously render DAR unrecoverable by the adversary through a reliable and immediate

encryptor key zeroization process. The proposed solution also allows the DAR to be recovered 

when appropriate key recovery protocols are executed. 

The proposed next-generation DAR encryptor must be installed in a manner that is as 

transparent to platform subsystem functionality as possible to minimize subsystem redesign 

requirements. Performance must not be degraded due to encryptor latency. The use of inline 

media encryptors (versus software-based and/or embedded encryption methods designed into 

each platform subsystem) may minimize the integration impact on legacy platform subsystems 

requiring DAR encryption. Inline media encryptors will also allow for flexibility to upgrade to 

media with greater storage capacity. Mission and ground support and processing CONOPS have 

proven to be a primary driver for DAR encryptor functional specifications. Key management 

processes must be conducive to interoperability across systems and GCSs. Multiple encryptor 

keys may be loaded through a single key fill port. The single encryptor may support multiple 

inputs and multiple target storage media locations, at multiple classification levels. Technical 

concepts for a next-generation DAR encryptor have been identified and evaluated for 

compatibility with the intended CONOPS. Several platforms have provided input for encryptor 

functionality with a focus on platform-agnostic, sensor-specific integration.

4.4.4 Middle- and Long-Term Goals

Evolving technologies for storage media will drive the need for faster, more specified 

encryption devices that support data in various states and blur the line between DAR and data in 

transit. Similarly, storage media requirements will increase, along with the need to move those

media at a more efficient speed. As more data are processed and stored off the system, the need 

for adaptive technologies for data encryption becomes more critical. As these adaptive 

technologies emerge to support encryption, program protection requirements will also evolve.

The complementary approach of integrating layered protective measures will likely yield the 

most cost-effective and robust means to prevent compromise of the data and/or technologies.

4.4.5 Unified Security Classification Guidance

As sensors are integrated across multiple platforms with similar mission requirements, 

the need for unified security classification guidance becomes more evident. Systems will 

integrate sensors from multiple classification levels and comply with guidance from various 

classification authorities. As conveyed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 

Associate Director of National Intelligence, and the DoD CIO in the “Intelligence Community 

Classification Guidance Findings and Recommendations Report”:

A critical component of effective intelligence collaboration and information 

sharing is a common understanding of information classification standards 

and policies. Inconsistent interpretation and application of the classification 

levels defined by Executive Order 12958, as amended, often results in 

uneven guidance, misunderstanding, and a lack of trust between 

Intelligence Community agencies and mission partners concerning the 

proper handling and protection of information. Agency-unique or 

contradictory classification guidance can slow or prevent information 

sharing across agency, Government, and partner lines. Therefore, we must 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

60

create classification guidelines that transcend organizational cultures. True 

information sharing and intelligence collaboration cannot occur until all 

participants trust that when they provide information it will be appropriately 

protected. A capstone Intelligence Community classification guide 

governing intelligence information is necessary to enable that trust.

4.4.6 Cloud Computing and Multilayer Security

With the progression of unmanned ISR platforms and the resulting surge of data, the need 

to disseminate this information to a broad area of users in a timely manner becomes painfully 

evident. On a similar note, as DoD continues to feel budgetary pressure, programs are urged to 

find ways to more effectively conduct their operations — the Intelligence Community is no 

exception. There is a tremendous push to consolidate IT systems, eliminate redundancy, and 

focus on a cloud solution instead of traditional desktop or network architectures. It is not 

surprising that the Intelligence Community embarks on this endeavor with a great deal of 

caution.

There is going to be a cultural shift in addition to a technology shift in the 

way we do business, and in the agencies recognizing that some of their 

individualities and their equalities are not going to be given up, but they’re 

going to interface with them in a different way.

Cloud computing initiatives are being developed as the Intelligence 

Community works to transform its use of IT to a model that incorporates 

shared services and requires less duplicative resources.

Grant Schneider, 

Deputy Director, Information Management and 

CIO, Defense Intelligence Agency

Some of the driving concerns about cloud computing within the Intelligence Community 

involve confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Stringent requirements are set to prevent 

unauthorized disclosure of classified data. It is critical to ensure that the implementation of a 

cloud computing architecture in the Intelligence Community enables the user to distribute and 

receive information, while maintaining the required level of security controls to protect that 

information. Integrity of that information must be preserved to ensure that the data are not 

unintentionally (or maliciously) modified or degraded. Availability to users is a primary concern.

The expansive operational (and often mobile) user environment dictates the need for a robust 

cloud computing capability. The increasing requirement for larger volumes of data presents 

bandwidth, latency, and storage challenges. As the user base becomes broader and multiple 

classification domains are introduced, these challenges become even more difficult to manage.

Incorporating a multiple-security-level network (and the associated requirement for data 

tagging) presents its own inherent challenges: combining these networks into a well-defined, 

interoperable architecture requires extensive consideration. As agencies move to a centralized 

architecture, security processes, policies, and standards must be integrated into a unified, 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

61

enforceable structure. This transition is not simple because agencies are already operating under 

well-established processes and governances. Initiatives are in place to incorporate cloud 

computing in the Intelligence Community. The residual challenges reside in how the operational 

platforms will be able to incorporate their mission CONOPS and platform architectures into the 

cloud to enable more effective information dissemination.

4.5 Persistent Resilience

By working with Service sponsors and their respective laboratories in aligning the S&T 

portfolios to the warfighters’ needs, the Services must take a synergistic approach to provide 

linkages and insight to upcoming technology initiatives across the unmanned systems portfolio.

To that end, persistent resilience is a key component to all unmanned systems, regardless 

of whether the system is being used in air, ground, or maritime domains. The Navy is currently 

developing a Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS under the Persistent Maritime 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems program office (PMA-262). BAMS UAS, now called Triton, is 

being developed to provide persistent ISR, which to successfully execute will not be possible 

without the resilient subsystems that make up the overall UAS. In simplistic terms of a system or 

subsystem, without resilience, persistence is not possible. Resilience is the ability for an 

application, system, or subsystem to react to problems in one of its components and still provide 

the best possible service. Persistence is the continuance of an effect. 

The areas where emerging technology enablers should focus for persistent resilience are

• Size, weight, power, and cooling (SWaP-C) (see 4.5.1)

• Reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) (see 4.5.2)

• Survivability (see 4.5.3)

• Structures and material degradation (see 4.5.4)

• Propulsion (see 4.5.5)

4.5.1 Size, Weight, Power, and Cooling (SWaP-C) 

DoD wants to reduce the size, weight, and power consumption of military platforms, as 

does the consumer electronics business, because large SWaP-C impedes mobility and raises 

maneuvering costs. Day-to-day operations may require tradeoffs in available time on task when a 

payload must be added at the expense of less fuel. If the payload is too large to add into existing 

internal space, it may have to be added externally. External placement can add drag to a UAS 

and reduce time on task. Additionally, some program offices are currently being constrained by 

the power consumption of payloads. These programs must look at upgrading to larger, more 

powerful generators, which add more weight, take up space, increase heat, and cause cooling 

concerns.

Miniaturization generally enables smaller systems and, when combined with more 

persistence, often minimizes investment. Miniaturization also generally reduces weight and 

power consumption. Therefore, SWaP-C issues can be addressed by focusing on compact sensor 

operation on dynamic platforms. In development under DARPA’s PINS/HiDRA programs is a 

six-degrees-of-freedom cold atom IMU, which is an example of a miniaturized three-axis gyroaccelerometer currently being developed to address package size, weight, and power 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

62

consumption while still providing precision navigation. Additionally, focus is turning toward 

modularity of payloads, which allows plug-and-play capabilities in joint and combined 

architectures. Plug-and-play attachments are capable of rapid integration into existing systems, 

including joint systems that integrate into an OA in which the interfaces comprise open standards.

As DoD envisions cost savings by reducing stovepipe development and shifting toward 

standardized architectures to further enable interoperability, modularity will also play a key role 

to ensure interoperability, ease of upgrades to systems, and synergized DOTMLPF-P.

Miniaturized systems that allow multirole, multi-mission capabilities will further reduce costs by 

allowing Services and program offices to leverage modular systems that have already been 

developed. Ultimately, less continual investment is required when a smaller volume can 

continually accomplish the same missions. Figure 19 summarizes the goals for SWaP-C for 

unmanned systems. 

Figure 19. SWaP-C Goals for Unmanned Systems

4.5.2 Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM)

Reliability and maintainability are critical performance attributes for unmanned systems 

to accomplish their missions and to achieve required operational availability. With many 

unmanned systems being required to provide persistent support, such as ISR for periods of 24 to 

30 hours (and potentially more in the future) by one vehicle, it is inherent that the systems are 

reliable with low failure rates. Use of failure rate will be consistent with any reliability parameter

such as mean time between failure (MTBF). Systems must meet or exceed mission reliability 

goals to ensure that unmanned systems can reliably accomplish their missions once they have 

been deployed. Furthermore, when a system becomes degraded, it must be simple enough to 

maintain and replace, especially in the austere expeditionary environments with little 

infrastructure support in which these systems are being operated. These systems must remain 

simple and supportable by the operators and maintainers in the field. Built-in tests may be 

sufficient at a weapons-replaceable-assembly (WRA) level, but at a system or subsystem level, 

the lack of integration causes RAM issues.

The more reliable the systems, the more cost effective they become over the life cycle.

As well, the simpler a system is to maintain and repair, the more cost savings it provides.

However, one of the largest challenges to maximizing system RAM is the potential impact to 

development and production cost. Another hurdle to achieving RAM in systems is the continued 

pursuit of new capabilities, which often consumes program resources at the expense of RAM. To 

overcome this hurdle, it is important for strong RAM requirements to be developed concurrently 

with the system CONOPS and capability requirements. Satellite systems are designed to last 

without repair for years and sometimes decades by necessity, but that also comes at a significant 

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2030+

 p 

Desired Capabilty

Near Term: Miniaturized Position, 

Navigation, Time (PNT) solutions; 

Miniaturized Warning and SelfProtection Systems; Adaptive Power 

Generators; Improved / Smaller 

Batteries and Lithium-Chemistry 

Batteries; Overall Power 

Improvements without Additional 

Volume, Weight and Heat.

Mid-Term: Improvements in 

Micro and Nano Technology; 

Improved Power and Energy 

Density.

Long Term: 

Improvements in Energy 

Storage and Energy 

Harvesting; Extreme 

Environmental 

Conditions Battery 

Technology.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

63

development and production cost. To achieve total ownership cost effectiveness in RAM, higher 

reliability materials and parts must be used to reduce sparing levels, improve maintainability 

(including enhanced integrated diagnostics), and reduce levels of corrective/direct maintenance, 

etc. Figure 20 summarizes the goals for RAM for unmanned systems. 

Figure 20. RAM Goals for Unmanned Systems

4.5.3 Survivability 

Survivability is a function of five key elements:

• Detectability is the probability of being discovered by an enemy force.

• Susceptibility is the probability of being hit or jammed in a particular environment.

• Vulnerability is the probability of surviving if hit or jammed in a particular 

environment.

• Stability is the probability the vehicle will reliably operate in the manner that was 

intended after it has been hit or jammed in a particular environment.

• Crashworthiness is the probability the vehicle and its load will survive an impact 

without serious damage. 

An important characteristic of unmanned systems is that to some extent their loss is 

acceptable if it prevents the loss of warfighters or innocent civilians. Areas of survivability that 

are always a challenge, particularly for UAS, are susceptibility and vulnerability. Many of the 

warning and self-protection systems that are found on manned platforms may seem applicable to 

unmanned platforms because they face the same threats. However, the vehicles typically have 

not been designed with the SWaP-C or, in some cases, the maneuverability of the manned 

platforms, which would more easily support the warning and self-protection systems currently 

used on manned platforms. The warning and self-protection systems found on manned platforms 

require high electrical power, which causes high temperatures, or heat, in the avionics 

compartments; because UAS (and unmanned systems in general) have smaller compartments,

heat dissipation is a constant issue. Adding to the heat issues, due to bandwidth limitations in 

uplinks and downlinks, more and more processing is being done aboard the platforms to reduce 

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2030+

y, y y p 

Desired Capabilty

Near Term: Low cost/high reliability 

materials and components; 

Prognostics Health Monitoring (PHM) 

Algorithms for Existing Systems; 

Composite Repair Improvements; 

Corrosion Control; Software Maturity 

Prediction and Growth Methodologies 

(including a better understanding of 

the integration of software and the 

computational environment and the 

required testing); Composite 

Manufacturing Technologies for Repair 

Parts Fabrication (out of autoclave); 

Wireless Data Transmission 

(elimination of signal wires).

Mid-Term: Low cost/high 

reliability materials and 

components; Integration of 

Health Monitoring 

Design/Coding with 

Prognostics Design/Coding; 

Composites Flaw 

Detection/Resolution 

Technology; Methods for 

Predicting Hardware Reliability 

Based on HALT Tests; Sensor 

Fusion for Diagnostics and 

Prognostics; Composite 

Manufacturing Technologies 

for Repair Parts Fabrication 

(additive manufacturing for 

structural components): Direct 

Writing Technology 

(elimination of signal wires).

Long Term: Low 

cost/high reliability 

materials and 

components; Material 

Behavior Prediction and 

Integration with 

Structural Prognosis; 

Advanced 

Troubleshooting to 

Component Level; 

Reduce Scheduled and 

Unscheduled 

Maintenance; Robust 

Life-prediction in 

Automated Logistics 

Environments. 

Collection and Longterm Storage of all PHM 

Data.

Standardized RAM-Cost (RAM-C) 

modeling and analysis (including Life 

Cycle Cost and CONOPS optimization)
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

64

the high amounts of raw data being transmitted via the C2 links. With the need for more 

processing power aboard the platforms come increases in temperature on the small computer 

chips and boards of the survivability systems. Another challenge area in susceptibility and 

vulnerability is jamming or spoofing. Miniaturized solutions for anti-jam antennas or SAASMs

to counter threats such as GPS-denied environments are needed. Again, unmanned systems are 

typically smaller than manned systems; however, some unmanned systems still have large radar 

cross sections, IR, and acoustic signatures that make them detectable and, therefore, susceptible.

Cost effectiveness in the area of survivability is going to be achieved much the same way 

that it will be achieved in SWaP-C. Survivability systems require a lot of power and put out a lot 

of heat, which, in the smaller compartments of unmanned systems, can cause RAM issues. By 

miniaturizing the survivability systems and improving power consumption and heat dissipation

with more reliable and durable components, cost savings can be realized. This approach will also 

translate into systems that can be used by both manned and unmanned platforms and thereby

provide a way to leverage common systems across similar and dissimilar platforms.

Additionally, improvements or new technologies, e.g., IR signature reduction or low IR paints, 

must be cost neutral to standard paints and equipage currently being used. These products must

also remain as maintenance and cost recurring friendly as possible. Figure 21 summarizes the 

goals for survivability for unmanned systems. 

Figure 21. Survivability Goals for Unmanned Systems

4.5.4 Structures and Material Degradation

Today’s unmanned systems operate in extreme environments ranging from sandy and hot 

climates to humid or freezing climates and from high altitudes to fathoms beneath the oceans.

Unmanned systems need optimized material properties that can endure these conditions in 

addition to withstanding stress, corrosion, and other structural effects of the operating 

environments. Today’s unmanned systems are relying more and more on composite materials 

that provide lightweight, flexible, strong structures. While these new composites are currently 

difficult and expensive to repair, industry and DoD are making great strides in the design and 

production of advanced composite materials. 

The tradeoff for a lighter yet strong material is its high cost. Cost effectiveness for 

structural and material durability must now be achieved by focusing on the strength and 

durability of materials and structures to reduce or avoid repair costs. DARPA’s Defense Sciences 

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2030+

 

Desired Capabilty

Near Term: Miniaturizing Warnings and 

Self-Protection Systems ( Anti-Jam, 

SAASM, etc); Antenna Improvements; 

SWaP-C Improvements / Power 

Efficiencies; Increased Onboard 

Processing Capability for Warning and 

Self-Protection Systems; RF/IR 

Countermeasures / Use for Slow 

Movers; Cooling/Heat Dissipation for 

Warning/Self-Protection Systems; MultiSpectral DIRCM (LASER); Signature/RCS 

Reduction / Low Infra-Red (IR) Paint; 

Crashworthiness; Stellar Navigators 

(GPS Independent Navigation 

l ti )

Mid-Term: Light Weight Towed 

Decoys; Smaller/Lighter Radar 

Warning /Missile Warning 

Receiver Sets for 

Countermeasures; ElectroMagnetic Pulse Protection.

Long Term: Improved 

Electronics; NitrideTransistor Technology; 

Alternatives to SiliconBased Electronics; 3-D 

Integrated Circuits.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

65

Office has multiple programs with objectives to improve materials in the areas of novel materials 

and material processes, multifunctional materials and material systems, and biologically inspired 

materials. However, more industry focus must be on the near term for structures and material 

degradation. Figure 22 summarizes the goals for structures and material degradation for 

unmanned systems.

Figure 22. Structures and Material Degradation Goals for Unmanned Systems

4.5.5 Propulsion 

As mentioned in 4.5.4, today’s unmanned systems operate in many different and extreme 

environments. With these external factors, fuel-efficient propulsion and power output is needed 

for the many systems aboard unmanned systems. Persistence in conducting missions such as ISR 

is not possible without adequate propulsion and power. Unmanned systems must maintain their

health, currency, and technical superiority with innovative approaches for increasing power and 

thermal management and improving power output and thermal loads. Many of today’s persistent 

systems rely on efficient forms of propulsion that are sustainable for long-endurance missions.

Other systems require propulsion that can be optimized for long range and endurance or 

optimized for high speed. Additionally, systems such as UUVs face challenges to extend 

endurance into months with energy technologies that are air independent. Regardless of 

providing propulsion for an air system or a surface system, a propulsion system must be not only 

efficient, but also adaptive to faults by continuing to operate in a degraded state or by stabilizing 

itself and returning to a normal state.

As technology for propulsion systems continues to evolve and improve, the areas of 

maintenance, sustainment, and lifecycle cost reduction will always remain key to achieving cost 

effectiveness. Smarter systems (via software and computers) should allow for diagnostics or 

logic-based tools to perform “virtual inspections” and thereby reduce the time to troubleshoot the 

system or its components. Likewise, validated propulsion health monitoring systems will allow 

for just-in-time maintenance. Also, biofuels that are renewable and that meet or exceed military 

or jet fuel performances metrics will help reduce the dependence on fossil fuels. Additionally, as 

mentioned above in RAM, the more resilient propulsion systems become, the more cost effective 

they will be, and the more cost savings they will provide. Figure 23 summarizes the goals for 

propulsion for unmanned systems. 

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2030+

 

Desired Capabilty

Near Term: Corrosion Protection, 

Detection, and Mitigation; Structural 

Mode Characterization; High-Loading; 

Lightweight Structural Materials; 

Advanced Structural Concepts; 

Materials Degradation/Corrosion; 

Structural Protection /Maintenance; 

Advanced Joining Methods for CMC 

subcomponents; Durable 

Thermal/Environmental Barrier 

Coatings; Manufacturing/Fabrication 

Processes for Affordable CMCs in Hot 

Section Applications. Use of nano tube 

technology for EMI hardening, anti-icing 

and maintenance prediction

Mid-Term: High-Fidelity 

Residual Strength and Life 

Prediction Tool for Adhesively 

Bonded Composite Structures; 

Innovative Approaches for 

Enhancing Interlaminar Shear 

Strength of Two-Dimensional 

Composite Reinforced Flex 

Beams and Yokes; Composites 

Flaw Detection/Resolution 

Technology.

Long Term: Advance 

material science. This 

area is currently one of 

the focus areas for 

DARPA and its Defense 

Sciences Office (DSO). 

For more background on 

the DARPA DSO 

programs in these 

material areas, visit the 

following link: 

http://www.darpa.mil/

Our_Work/DSO/Focus_A

reas/Materials.aspx.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

66

Figure 23. Propulsion Goals for Unmanned Systems

4.5.6 Summary 

As stated in 4.5, the areas of focus for emerging technology enablers in persistent 

resilience are

• Size, weight, power, and cooling (SWaP-C)

• Reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM)

• Survivability

• Structures and material degradation

• Propulsion

For unmanned systems in future middle- to high-intensity combat against more capable 

adversaries, persistent resilience must not be limited to traditional analysis of just the unmanned 

vehicle(s), but must also investigate the ground, communication, tactics, and manning aspects 

that collectively provide the unmanned systems capability. The ultimate benefit from this activity 

is the avoidance of significant loss of unmanned systems capability and resulting adverse combat 

outcomes for the total force. The objective of early analysis of persistent surveillance is to 

achieve early identification of system weaknesses in the context of known and projected threats;

subsequent identification, analysis, and exploration of alternatives to mitigate significant 

weaknesses; and the development of material solutions and/or training and tactics solutions to 

institute before encountering such conflicts in the future.

4.6 Autonomy and Cognitive Behavior

Unmanned systems that have the option to operate autonomously today are typically fully 

preprogrammed to perform defined actions repeatedly and independently of external influence or 

control; that is not to say these systems are unmonitored. These systems can be described as selfsteering or self-regulating and can follow an externally given path while compensating for small 

deviations caused by external disturbances. However, the automatic system is not able to initially 

define the path according to some given goal or to choose the goal that is dictating its path.

The future of autonomous systems is characterized as a movement beyond autonomous 

mission execution to autonomous mission performance. The difference between execution and 

performance is that the former simply executes a preprogrammed plan whereas performance is 

associated with mission outcomes that can vary even during a mission and require deviation from 

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2030+

p p 

Desired Capabilty

Near Term: More Efficient Electrical 

Power Generation, Thermal 

Management; Air Independent Energy 

Systems (UUV); Quick 

Recharge/Refueling (UUV); Jet Noise 

Reduction; Component Technologies 

Accommodating Increasing 

Power/Thermal Loads; Hot-Section 

Materials and Coatings, Maintenance, 

Sustainment, Life-Cycle Cost 

Reduction; High Capacity & Power 

Battery Technology.

Mid-Term: Introducing Geared 

Turbofan Developments into 

Smaller Systems; Future 

Vertical Lift; Turbo-machinery 

and Drive Systems; Variable 

Cycle Engine Technologies; 

Hybrid turbine-electric power.

Long Term: Fuel 

Cell/Non Hydrocarbon 

Fuels (same propulsive 

qualities and similar or 

lower cost); Bio-Fuels, 

Alternative Fuels, New 

Energy Sources.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

67

preprogrammed tasks. Autonomous mission performance may demand the ability to integrate 

sensing, perceiving, analyzing, communicating, planning, decision making, and executing to 

achieve mission goals versus system functions. Preprogramming is still a key part and enabler of 

this kind of operation, but the preprogramming goes beyond system operation and into laws and 

strategies that allow the system to self-decide how to operate itself. Initially, these control 

algorithms are created and tested by teams of human operators and software developers. 

However, if machine learning is employed, autonomous systems can develop modified strategies 

for themselves by which they select their behavior. An autonomous system is self-directed by 

choosing the behavior it follows to reach a human-directed goal. Various levels of autonomy, in 

any system, guide how much and how often humans must interact or intervene with the 

autonomous systems. In addition, autonomous systems may even optimize behavior in a goaldirected manner in unforeseen situations (i.e., in a given situation, the autonomous system finds 

the optimal solution). 

It is important to note here that automation is only as good as the software writer and 

developer because the control algorithms are created and tested by teams of humans. In these 

algorithms, the “patterns of life” are critical to automation and must be observed and captured 

properly to ensure accuracy and correctness of a decision-making process within the software.

Ensuring accuracy and correctness requires a continual process in which the observe – orient –

decide – act (OODA) loops in the software are continually updated via manual analysis, training,

and operator understanding of algorithm inputs and outputs. The human brain can function in 

dynamic environments and adapt to changes as well as predict what will happen next. In 

simplistic terms, the algorithms must act as the human brain does.

To take on increased autonomy in unmanned systems, the systems will require additional 

sensors that can provide a more accurate perspective of their surroundings as well as the capacity 

to interpret those inputs so that they can respond appropriately to the situation. Additionally, they 

will require the ability to be untethered from human interaction. A key enabler in unmanned 

systems autonomy will be navigation. Given the dependence UAS have on PNT, the platform 

will execute only as well as the accuracy of the PNT in the system. Inaccurate PNT introduces 

error to air vehicle navigation and sensor cueing. Mission computers are continuously updated 

with position, air speed, ground speed, and drifts so the UAS can intelligently pick the best route 

to take while maneuvering away from restricted areas or boundaries. Navigation alternatives 

must be researched and evaluated to overcome dependency on systems such as GPS.

Autonomy in unmanned systems will be critical to future conflicts that will be fought and 

won with technology. The near-term area for Air Force and Navy capability development is 

implementing land and carrier-based UAS to provide ISR and strike from the land and sea. 

Middle- and long-term naval capability will focus on A2/AD. The Air Force and Navy are

investing research and development efforts and procurement programs to overcome these access 

threats and assure the ability of the joint force to project power in support of our allies and 

partners and to protect U.S. interests.

An important element of overcoming access threats and maximizing the fleet’s capacity 

is unmanned systems. As a result, autonomy in unmanned systems has been identified by Navy

and DoD leadership as a high priority. However, specific pathways for the introduction of 

technologies that enable greater levels of autonomy have not been identified. The special feature 

of an autonomous system is its ability to be goal-directed in unpredictable situations. This ability 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

68

is a significant improvement in capability compared to the capabilities of automatic systems. An 

autonomous system is able to make a decision based on a set of rules and/or limitations.

To aid in the ongoing solutions for autonomy on unmanned systems, the Naval Research 

Advisory Committee is conducting a study to clarify the potential of autonomy to transform 

naval operations and eventually the operations of other Services. The study will explore the 

current and anticipated potential of technology to achieve various levels of autonomous 

operations. The study will also consider potential naval uses of autonomy, with emphasis on 

maritime systems, and the challenges associated with realization of these applications. The study 

will consider autonomy as a capability that is enabled by a set of technologies, such as sensing, 

intelligence, reliability, and endurance. Advances in these technologies are key to permitting an 

autonomous system to make decisions in the framework of an operational mission. The study 

will assess state-of-the-art autonomy and identify technical shortfalls or opportunities to 

significantly advance the capability. The goal is to identify where autonomy has high potential to 

enable naval missions; however, implementation of autonomous systems also introduces 

operational challenges, such as affordability, policy, and doctrine.

Additionally, S&T development programs are underway in the Air Force, Army, and 

Navy as well as at DARPA. While applications of autonomy among the Services tend to be 

applied to a specific domain of interest, in many cases the underlying technology is applicable 

across domains. For example, the Air Force is developing teaming technologies for air platforms, 

while the Navy and Marine Corps are applying similar technologies to ground vehicles and the 

Army is applying similar technology to robots. The following subsections detail efforts by the 

Department and show similarities where appropriate.

As the level of autonomy increases, manpower savings can be achieved and/or human 

resources can be redirected to other tasks. As examples, Army tactical robots could ultimately 

augment manning in small units, Marine Corps intelligent UGS may also conduct logistics 

missions, and Air Force/Army systems are envisioned to be designed so a single operator can

control multiple UAS. All these systems offer the opportunity for significant manpower savings 

or the opportunity to use the saved manpower in other critical tasks.

As DoD advances the state of the art in autonomy, industry and academic partnerships 

will be critical. Investment to produce affordable systems will allow unmanned systems to 

become ubiquitous on the battlefield.

4.6.1 Today’s State (2013–2017)

In general, research and development in automation is advancing from a state of 

automatic systems requiring human control toward a state of autonomous systems able to make 

decisions and react without human interaction.

Related to UAS, the Navy is partnering with the Air Force in advancing airborne sense 

and avoid (ABSAA) technologies. The Army is leading the ground-based sense and avoid 

(GBSAA) common requirements development coordination for the Airspace Integration IPT. In 

addition to technologies for airborne operation, the Navy is investing in development of 

autonomous deck operations. In the near term, autonomous deck operations research and 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

69

development includes technologies to support high operating tempo (OPTEMPO) launch and 

recovery of small UAS and precision on-deck UAS locating and tracking. 

A major goal of naval developments for Marine Corps applications is to make systems 

smarter and cheaper. The Navy is developing low-cost, ubiquitous, intelligent, tactical UGS that 

will operate as a force multiplier integrated with manned, unmanned, and optionally manned 

systems. The current state of autonomy for most tactical UGS requires human decision makers 

and LOS communications. Systems that are autonomous require highly structured and 

predictable environments. In the near term, Navy research focuses on transitioning from 

teleoperated UGS to autonomous logistics connector UGS with independent path planning 

functionality and doctrinally appropriate maneuvers and behaviors. Further, the Navy is 

developing technologies to navigate trafficable on- and off-road terrain at tactically appropriate 

speed. Affordability is a key requirement for all these developments, and effective operation in 

day, night, and GPS-denied environments is critical. In the near term, the Office of Naval 

Research is developing technologies that will enable a 2016 limited military utility assessment of 

the logistics connector Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV), which includes multimode 

perception, day and night operation, and complex terrain traversibility.

We can’t support small teams of Marines using robotic platforms whose 

sensors cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, and whose software cost 

millions or in some cases billions of dollars to develop.

— George Solhan, Director, 

Office of Naval Research Code 30

The Army S&T vision is one where manned and unmanned systems work together with

greatly enhanced capabilities in the following five problem domains: adaptive tactical reasoning; 

focused situational awareness; safe, secure, and adaptive movement; efficient proactive 

interaction with humans; and interaction with the physical world. The Robotic Collaborative 

Technology Alliance (RCTA) uses the following anthropomorphic shorthand to describe these 

five problem domains: think – look – move – talk – work.67 Figure 24 summarizes the Army’s 

vision for these five problem domains, barriers to achieving its vision, and work to be done to 

advance toward the vision.

In the near term, the RCTA plans a Capstone Experiment in FY2014. See Figure 25. The 

Capstone Experiment is centered around a notional cordon-and-search operation: during urban 

transit by a small unit (i.e., four to five soldiers), a fugitive is reported to have entered a building 

the unit is approaching. A man-transportable robot is instructed to “cover the back door” of the 

building by the unit commander because he cannot safely split up his limited resources. The 

robot must understand and acknowledge the order, associate the order with its perceived 

environment, move safely and securely to an appropriate vantage point, observe activity behind 

the building, and report any salient events to the unit commander. As needed, it enters the 

building and negotiates stairs or other mobility obstacles. It then returns to its unit, maintaining 

situational awareness, and is ready for another assignment. While this narrative occurs in the 

context of a cordon-and-search operation, its underlying capabilities support a broad range of 

 67 Robotic Collaborative Technology Alliance (RCTA) FY2012 Annual Program Plan.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

70

potential operational missions. Similar to the other Services, middle- and long-term work by the 

RCTA will continue to evolve and improve capabilities to increase the level of autonomy in 

systems from the current, remotely operated systems to autonomous systems and system-ofsystems (SoS) approaches.

Figure 24. Army’s Vision for Five Problem Domains 

(Think – Look – Move – Talk – Work)

Barriers to Achieving our Vision ----- >

Simplistic and 

Shallow World 

Model

Mobility-Focused 

Perception

Tele-operated or 

(at best) 

Scripted Planning

No Shared 

Understanding of 

Missions and Roles

Missing or Shallow 

Learning Capabilities

World Model is 

either at only a 

metric level 

precluding 

reasoning, or at 

only a cognitive 

level without 

physical grounding

Objects in the world 

are perceived 

primarily only as 

mobility regions not 

as discrete objects of 

semantic and 

cognitive importance

Bots are almost 

always tele-operated 

or at best only 

perform sample 

scripted behaviors - 

and scripting all 

needed behaviors is 

not tractable

Bots are opaque and 

distributed, and cannot 

explain what they are 

doing - primarily 

because they don't 

know

Bots must be explicitly 

programmed to do tasks, 

so it is intractable to 

product the needed scope 

of behavior. Any learning 

capability is shallow and 

lacks generalization

"Think" Adaptive Tactical Reasoning

Understand tasks, missions (METT-TC)

Follow semantic instructions

Generate behaviors to achieve mission, 

adapting to changing situation

Understand teammates and what they need to 

know

"Look" Focused Situational Awareness

Maintain SA relevant to current task/mission

Contribute to general SA of unit

Look for salient unforeseen events

Observe and report on salient activity

"Move" Safe, Secure and Adaptive Movement

Move cognitively in reaction to safest route in 

the world (as people do) with GPS or other 

metric crutches

Move in tactically and continually relevant 

manner

Adjust to mobility challenges such as terrain, 

weather, barriers

"Talk" Efficient Interactive Communication

Receive and acknowledge semantics 

instructions

Explain own behavior

Report information relevant to mission

Seek guidance as needed

"Work" Interaction With Physical Wold

Inspect and manipulate objects

Transport objects as needed

Open doors, windows, hoods, trunks, etc.

Use tools as needed

World model needs 

to represent wide 

variety of objects to 

be manipulated.

Robot needs to 

perceive well enough 

to interact effectively 

with objects in a 3D 

world.

Robot needs to figure 

out how and when to 

manipulate or 

transport objects as 

needed.

Robot needs to learn from 

interaction with the 

physical world, e.g. when 

door is locked.

World model needs 

to store and 

operate upon all 

entities needed to 

relate movement to 

tactical 

constraints.

Robot must perceive 

all entities in its 

environment relevant 

to safe, secure, and 

adaptive movement.

Robots must move in 

a tactically correct 

manner and react to 

changes in mission or 

circumstances.

Robot needs to learn from 

its movement experience 

whether from mobility 

challenges or tactical 

behavior.

World model needs 

to have shared 

mental models as a 

basis for humanrobot interaction.

Robot needs to send 

and information 

relevant based on a 

shared perception 

(common ground).

Robot needs to receive 

and acknowledge4 

cognitive-level 

instructions and 

similarly explain its own 

behavior.

Robot needs to be able to 

learn through cognitivelevel interaction with 

human teammates.

World model needs 

to represent 

concepts such as 

missions, tasks, 

and generally METTTC.

Robots need to 

generate behaviors 

pertinent to 

achieving the 

mission, adapt to 

changing situation.

Robots need to be able 

to follow instructions 

given at a semantic or 

cognitive level, not just 

"goto (x,y)."

World model needs 

to represent, 

maintain, monitor, 

and correct all info 

needed for SA.

Robot needs to 

contribute to the 

general SA of the unit, 

noting salient 

observations.

Robot needs to report 

on salient observations 

as needed to other 

elements of its unit.

Robot should learn by 

comparing its 

observations and actions 

to those of ts human 

counterparts.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

71

Figure 25. RCTA’s Capstone Experiment in FY2014

4.6.2 Middle-Term Future State (2017–2022)

The middle-term future state in the 2017–2022 time frame will consist largely of a further 

maturation of near-term capabilities. Middle- and long-term goals primarily increase capability, 

scale technologies, move from ground-based to platform-based technologies, and move the 

capability further along the scale from automatic to autonomous behavior. As an example, the 

Air Force’s multiple-aircraft manager could be matured to include management of transit 

operations involving multiple UAS, which could reduce crew requirements and optimize the 

allocation and use of crews.

The Navy’s middle-term technology developments will evolve near-term technologies to 

greater levels of autonomy and team-oriented behaviors. In the middle term, naval autonomous 

deck operations research includes technologies for autonomous flight deck awareness and 

movement, decision aids for interactive manned/unmanned operations, and robust intelligent 

autonomous flight deck operations. Middle-term plans for Marine Corps UGS include transition 

from autonomous logistic connector to integrated operations with dismounts with followme/come-to/go-to capability; autonomous “wingman” capable of human-like tactical behaviors; 

in-stride support of Marine Corps rifle squads, including tactical decision making while in enemy 

contact; advanced perception of individual humans, urban environments, and effective operations 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

72

in challenging weather conditions; and enhanced human-robot interaction that enables teaming 

and trust. 

4.6.3 Long-Term Future State (Beyond 2020)

The long-term state for unmanned systems will bring further maturation of the middleterm capabilities. It will also bring higher levels of automation. It will allow concepts like smart 

teams of unmanned systems operating autonomously to conduct operations in contested 

environments. It will also allow concepts like “loyal wingmen,” i.e., unmanned systems that 

operate in conjunction with manned platforms to conduct operations.

Similarly, naval research and development for both shipboard systems and marine UGS 

in the long term are focused on greater automation and SoS. The desired long-term capabilities 

for UGS include fully autonomous, multirole platforms with independent and cooperative 

decision making. Additionally, the Marine Corps desires self-sustaining, integrated warfightermachine SoS approaches in the long term.

4.6.4 Key Enablers and Concerns

To fully realize the operational benefits of autonomy, certain key enablers must be 

available. Included among these are mission planning that is dynamically modifiable; precise 

navigation and timing; cross-cueing sensors; handoff capabilities and information transport to 

other onboard systems; and data dissemination to GCS operators, controllers, and edge 

warfighters. Autonomous controls are required to develop and disseminate requisite information 

tailored to bandwidth and user profiles. Precise PNT is critical for autonomous systems 

operation. PNT allows for freedom of movement, understanding of the operational area, collision 

avoidance, and sensor and weapons cueing. Precise PNT must be maintained even in harsh and 

GPS-denied environments. Ultra-high precision inertial navigation systems and other non-GPS 

navigation systems will be key enablers for autonomous system operations.

Additionally, cross-cueing and/or dynamically retasking of multi-intelligence

sensors/modes and/or weapons capabilities are required to support onboard processing that 

provides aided target recognition, identification, and tracking. Filtered target information must be 

passed to onboard weapons systems as the onboard cueing and/or tasking of onboard sensor 

target information is confirmed. Change and status notification must be given to UAS operators 

and operations intelligence staffs so they can monitor, and override if necessary, the autonomous 

payload and/or weapons systems information and controls. The system must be able to operate in 

a continuous OODA loop. This ability will depend on well-written and tested software, coupled 

with sensors that allow the system to autonomously observe and react to patterns of behavior. To 

achieve autonomy, this OODA loop interaction must occur continuously and must not be based 

on a single point in time.

As autonomous systems become ubiquitous, efficient utilization of bandwidth will be a 

key enabler. As more autonomous systems occupy the battlefield, MIMO communication 

networks could be one of the crucial technologies. Further, bandwidth must be used efficiently 

and effectively to prevent denial of service.

Finally, several concerns are associated with full-scale operation of autonomous systems, 

many of which are related to the key enablers. As examples, maintaining accuracy and 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

73

availability of PNT is a key concern. Proper training and timeline to develop the operational 

experience that enables the continuous OODA loop are additional concerns. Development of the 

ability for operators to turn processing on and off and conserving bandwidth via metadata 

standards are additional concerns. Lastly, development of appropriate rules of engagement for 

utilizing processed information and for lost links is a developmental concern. As autonomy 

development continues to proceed from automatic to autonomous systems, developers must 

address these concerns.

4.7 Weaponry

The increased use of unmanned systems as weapons delivery platforms has been a 

significant step in the integration of unmanned systems in the battlespace. Unmanned systems

can be used in significantly different operating and threat conditions than manned platforms, 

come in a much wider range of classes and sizes than manned systems, can exhibit greater 

persistence and endurance than manned systems, and have the potential to support a large range 

of mission sets.

The introduction of remote video links, enabling operators to monitor the unmanned 

systems payload view in real time, enables users to employ weaponized unmanned systems with 

more flexibility and with improved confidence. Network-enabled systems employing distributed 

C2 elements with ISR and armed airborne assets (either separate platforms or integrated into a 

single unit) benefit from progress made with unmanned systems and precision-guided weapons. 

Typical weapons that could be adapted for UAS use include the Laser Homing Attack or 

Anti-Tank Missile (LAHAT) (Figure 26). As early as 2004, this weapon was proposed for testing 

with U.S. Hunter UAS. LAHAT utilizes the semi-active laser homing guidance method to 

accurately home in on targets from a distance beyond 10 km. Fitted with a shaped charge 

multipurpose warhead, LAHAT can engage targets marked by a laser designator mounted on the 

launching platform or by an indirect designation from another unit located closer to the target.

Each missile weighs about 13 kg, and a complete launcher with the four missiles weighs only 

75 kg, significantly less than any alternative weapon.

Figure 26. Laser Homing Attack or Anti-Tank Missile (LAHAT)

The laser-guided SPIKE (Figure 27) was developed by the Weapons Division of the 

Naval Air Warfare Center with assistance of DRS Technologies. Originally designed as a manportable weapon for the Marines and the Navy’s special operations force, SPIKE fills a critical 

niche for a low-cost, lightweight guided weapon for U.S. ground forces. It is also considered for 

tactical UAS and a force-protection weapon to defend surface ships from small-boat swarms or 

light aircraft. The missile uses a semi-active laser seeker to engage laser-designated targets from 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

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a distance of two miles. Each SPIKE missile weighs 5.3 lb (2.5 kg) and is 25 inches (63.5 cm) 

long. The missile performed its first controlled flights in 2005. The Spike missile is designed to 

be used on medium-weight and lightweight UAS. The missile has already been tested with the 

DRS Sentry HP drone at Eglin AFB, Florida, as part of Air Force UAS Battlelab evaluation.

Figure 27. Laser-Guided SPIKE

Another type of lightweight weapon considered for UAS is the 2.75-inch Hydra-70 

rocket. In 2005, four 2.75-inch rockets were fired from Vigilante UAS test bed and demonstrated

the weaponization potential of rotary-wing UAS. The tests evaluated the stability and flight 

control adjustments necessary to compensate for excessive loads during the weapon’s firing. On 

these tests, the Vigilante was controlled from a nearby UH-1 manned helicopter. Such tests will 

provide important data for the integration of Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System 

(APKWS II) with future rotary-wing UAS. 

APKWS II is intended to fill an aviation systems weapons gap between the Hellfire 

missile and unguided Hydra-70 2.75-inch rocket and introduce an affordable, lightweight, 

precision aerial guided rocket. APKWS II weighs about 13 kg and integrates a strap-down laser 

seeker (fixed in the wing roots) and guidance section onto the Hydra-70 rocket. It will be 

effective against soft and lightly armored targets as well as urban operations. A new design uses 

existing or new production rockets, fitted with a middle-body guidance approach that employs a 

distributed aperture semi-active laser seeker; the same element is also used in the Army’s 

Precision-Guided Mortar Munitions program.

APKWS II will use the Hydra Universal Rail Launcher (HURL), a lightweight four-rail 

launcher originally developed for the Comanche attack helicopter but modified for use with 

UAS. Designed as a “smart rocket launcher,” HURL can be linked to onboard avionics through 

MIL-STD-1760 and MIL-STD-1553 interfaces.

A version of a 2.75-inch laser-guided rocket called Direct Attack Guided Rocket 

(DAGR) is designed to be fully compatible with the Hellfire II system and 229 smart launcher 

system and, therefore, to increase the launcher load out by up to four times.

Switchblade (Figure 28) is a weapon designed for hand, tube, or aerial launch that could 

provide the warfighter with a rapid delivery to gather ISR information on BLOS targets. 

Designed as an expendable system, Switchblade will also have an option to carry a small 

explosive charge to enable rapid prosecution of selected targets with minimal collateral damage.
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

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The miniature, remotely piloted or automated platform can either glide or propel itself via quiet, 

electric propulsion and provide real-time video for information gathering, targeting, or feature or 

object recognition. 

Figure 28. Switchblade Munition

Adapting proven weapons technology with new concepts to take advantage of unmanned 

systems persistence and emerging net-centric capability, manned and unmanned teaming will be 

critical to improving the sensor-to-shooter equation and further decreasing in the kill chain 

timeline. However, certain technological issues must be addressed to further enhance unmanned 

systems as weapons delivery platforms in the near, middle, and long term.

4.7.1 Interoperability

No current weapons system employed from unmanned systems was designed specifically 

for unmanned vehicles. As discussed in other sections of this chapter, the capability need to 

rapidly deploy weapons on unmanned systems drove design compromises in interoperability.

The same rigor now being applied to systems interoperability must be used to address current 

concerns and design of future weapons systems for unmanned systems:

• Cross-Service, cross-platform interoperability and capability. Manned platform have 

settled on common armament interface units, bomb racks, and logistics. Unmanned 

systems should follow this lead, especially with shipboard storage and employment 

concerns, logistics, training, and flight certification.

• Interchangeability within classes of unmanned systems where practicable as well as 

with manned systems where practicable.

• CONEMPs and TTPs standardized across the services.

The OSD USIP WG initiated a Weapons USIP (USIP 5.0) based on a recommendation 

from the I-IPT and Services. This effort was a truly joint approach to enable efficient UAS 

weapon integration to significantly reduce risk with mature, standardized interfaces. USIP 5.0 

helps to define the mandatory implementation of standards and specifications to achieve an 

interoperable mode of operation for internal and external exchanges for all weaponized UAS and 

applicable manned platforms. The USIP also includes an IOP to address cooperative engagement 

and the Joint Digitally Aided CAS (DACAS) project. Once approved by OSD(AT&L), USIP 5.0 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

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will be maintained on the DISR as a mandated standard and shared with the appropriate NATO 

Standardization Agreement (STANAG) bodies for incorporation into international standards.

4.7.2 Unmanned System–Specific Weapons 

To take advantage of all classes of unmanned systems, especially UAS, technological 

advances in specific areas must be addressed in weaponry to arm multiple classes of unmanned 

systems:

• Weapons designed for multiple missions. The ability to select the yield of the 

weapon in advance of employment is often referred to as a “scalable effects” 

warhead. The ability to vary the explosive power of a warhead has clear implications 

for reducing risk to friendly forces and civilians and also for reducing unnecessary 

damage to infrastructure other than the intended target. Historically, the notion of 

varying the explosive power of a warhead has been primarily linked with nuclear 

weapons, where the term “dial-a-yield” is generally used. In this case, the amount of 

material that can “boost” the yield (for example, tritium) can be varied, as can the 

performance of “initiators,” which allow a chain reaction to propagate. Achieving this 

scalability with conventional (i.e., chemical) explosives presents different challenges.

A plausible explanation of how this may be achieved would be varying the manner in 

which the explosive material contained in the warhead is detonated.

• Weapons designed with multiple modes. Current multimode requirements are 

derived from current and future mission environments, such as frequent bad weather. 

In current operations for both manned and unmanned aircraft, a mix of weapons is 

carried to ensure the proper weapon is available for the weather and threat at the 

target area. Depending on the environment, often only half of the bomb load is

employed. For certain classes of unmanned systems, this approach is simply not an 

option. A true multimode weapon will be an essential aspect of arming unmanned 

systems. However, multimode weapons are only part of the solution. The ability to 

integrate unmanned systems within the manned weapons construct, while taking 

advantage of the unmanned systems’ inherent traits of endurance, survivability, etc., 

will be key. They must be able to target and track moving threats reliably and 

precisely and identify the target and acceptable collateral damage in bad weather and 

with many targets in a cluttered environment. This goal will require a common 

network between human observers, the unmanned system, and other delivery 

platforms and weapons.

• Weapons design for use within the unmanned systems environment. The 

potential weapons operating environment for unmanned systems will be significantly 

different from comparable manned platform performance envelopes and weapons 

engagement envelopes.

• Standardized weapons designs including modular designs, interchangeable within 

similar unmanned systems from different services and designed for shipboard storage 

and employment.
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4.7.3 Advanced Weapons Technology Areas

4.7.3.1 Nanoenergetics

Energetic materials contain chemical energy that, when released, can burn rapidly, such 

as in fireworks or rocket fuel, or explode, such as in a grenade or bomb. Energetic materials at 

the nanoscale show promise for military applications. Nanoparticles have more surface area and,

therefore, have increased contact with the other chemicals that make up a propellant or 

explosive. After a reaction is initiated (that is, the explosion is set off), this greater surface area 

causes a faster reaction rate, which makes for a more powerful explosion. This work could be 

useful in weapons systems that would utilize greater amounts of energy, making them more 

lethal. By working at the nanoscale, weapons designers can also control the rate at which energy 

is released by changing the size of the nanoparticles; in other words, the designers could

customize the explosive for each application. For example, a weapon designed to penetrate into 

the ground to destroy a bunker may need an explosive with a different reaction rate than a 

weapon designed to explode and project shrapnel above ground troops. See Figure 29.

Figure 29. Nanoparticles and Explosions

An example of this technology is the use of aluminum nanoparticles in explosives that the 

Air Force is developing. When nano-aluminum powder is added to explosives, weapons can be 

made smaller and more powerful. These weapons are useful in aircraft with limited space, such 

as remote control drones. Researchers are developing techniques that allow weapons 

manufacturers to add a greater amount of nano-aluminum powder to an explosive using a 

solvent.

4.7.3.2 Advanced Weapons Materials

Significant research is ongoing at Service and national laboratories in areas such as 

polymers, metals, ceramics, composites, and bio-inspired materials. Unmanned systems are 

looking for opportunities to transition to these advancements to reduce SWAP-C and enhance 

safety and survivability, where applicable.
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4.7.3.3 Unmanned Systems as a Weapon

The theory of aerial dominating weapons is not new, but to date its implementation has 

remained limited by current technology to few, specific contingencies, such as the suppression of 

enemy air defense (SEAD), where targets could be clearly identified and pursued with radar 

homing weapons.

Israel pioneered this field with the Harpy loitering SEAD weapon, developed by Israel 

Aerospace Industries. The system has been acquired by several countries including China, 

Turkey, South Korea, and India. Israeli Military Industries is demonstrating a similar 

multipurpose warhead for its Delilah air-launched missile, yet this weapon is quite large for 

conventional UAS. A follow-on to Harpy, known as Cutlass, was developed under U.S.-Israeli 

cooperation. While the program has not been officially concluded, Israel is known to have 

offered advanced Harpy systems to several customers, including the United Kingdom, where it 

was proposed as “White Hawk,” for the British Loitering Munition Capability Demonstration 

under cooperation with Missiles, Bombs, and Deadly Ammunitions (MBDA). Another Israeli 

company, RAFAEL, competed for the same program, offering the BLADE (Battlefield Loitering 

Artillery Direct Effect), based on a modified Sparrow M UAS

designed and produced by EMIT.

A different concept developed for the Army, pursued 

area domination by a combination of several types of loitering 

NLOS missiles. The original concept included “smart” loitering 

weapons, which would provide area surveillance, target 

acquisition, and pursuit of time-critical attack, while other 

targets would be engaged by precision attack missiles (PAMs), 

fitted with imaging IR seekers. However, this concept proved 

too costly and complex. The Army eliminated the loitering 

missile-sensor element and deployed the NLOS launch system 

with the PAM, as a weapon repository ready to support combat 

units, targeted by assets available to the unit over the network. 

Various types of air domination systems are being 

considered by the Air Force to enable a military force to 

dominate an area from the air for extended periods and deny enemy movements and 

maneuvering. Current systems under consideration are standard weaponized UAS or small 

expendable loitering weapons, fitted with imaging sensors, such as the Low-Cost Autonomous 

Attack System (LOCAAS). Operating in swarms of “intelligent munitions” weapons, the 

LOCAAS can autonomously search for and destroy critical mobile targets while aiming over a 

wide combat area. Recent enhancements of the LOCAAS concept introduced man-in-the-loop 

functionality to enable retargeting and the ability to abort attack by a human controller when 

required. Further enhancements could integrate the LOCAAS into a “Surveilling Miniature 

Attack Cruise Missile” (SMACM) “mothership” carrying four LOCAAS units. The mothership 

will be able to support the units with targeting, surveillance, and communication support and

extend the range and persistence of the basic version beyond 250 nautical miles. LOCAAS and 

SMACM are designed to operate in open area and pursue stationary and mobile targets of 

opportunities as soon as they are exposed in the open.
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A tremendous amount of work has yet to be done in the area of autonomous systems as a 

weapon. Current systems have less than optimal loiter times and are not readily adaptable to the 

shipboard environment and the strike fighter mission. As well, advances in interoperability, 

materials technology, and fusing have not been incorporated across the unmanned systems 

spectrum.

Figure 30 summarizes the goals for weaponry for unmanned systems.

Figure 30. Weaponry Goals for Unmanned Systems

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2030+

Desired Capabilty

Near Term: Integration and 

interoperability of current weapons 

employed for unmanned system.

Mid-Term: Unmanned specific 

weapons development.

Long Term: Long Term 

Nano energetics.
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5 Operating Environment

5.1 Introduction

The world’s markets, technologies, and regulatory environments for unmanned systems 

are evolving rapidly and creating opportunities in platforms, payloads, leasing, operations, and 

maintenance. DoD is looking beyond Iraq and Afghanistan towards a world of rapid 

deployments to trouble spots where airfields may not be available. After U.S. forces begin 

withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 in accordance with presidential planning, commanders

expect to focus on contingency missions where the United States may have no established 

presence. UAS must then operate from ships or beaches rather than from fixed bases. Airborne 

launch of unmanned platforms is another approach.

Unmanned systems are better suited than manned platforms in some circumstances. In 

anticipation of such use, every segment of unmanned systems — the deployed platform, control 

station(s), and control link(s) — must all be considered from the earliest stages of program 

development. The environment must encompass all influences on this extended system, not just

focus on the platform itself. System technology program requirements must be outlined in a 

CONOPS that details how the system is to be used in the intended physical operating 

environment and provides a baseline for all system requirements. 

In addition to operating unmanned systems in strenuous physical environments, programs 

must also account for the ability to operate within existing regulations and within socially 

acceptable means. There will always be regulatory uncertainty when a revolutionary technology 

is introduced, as is the case with unmanned systems. A prime example is the consideration of

UAS flights in the NAS, where UAS must operate within the FAA Federal Aviation Regulations 

(FARs). Even in cases where UAS do meet all applicable FARs, users of the UAS must consider 

the safety of the general public and abide by applicable privacy laws. Similarly, UGS intending 

to operate on U.S. public roads must at a minimum comply with Department of Transportation 

(DoT) regulations and federal, state, and local motor vehicle laws, but should additionally show 

safety and traffic efficiency enhancements to gain acceptance from the general public.

The unmanned systems safety guide for DoD acquisition references DoDI 5000.1, which

instructs program managers to prevent environment, safety, and occupational health (ESOH) 

hazards, where possible, and manage ESOH hazards where they cannot be avoided. The 

unmanned systems must also comply to the Army equipment spectrum certification (ESC), 

which allows program management offices and others to apply for new equipment frequency 

allocations (i.e., spectrum certifications), request changes to existing spectrum certifications, 

request host nation coordination, and submit questions. The system tracks these “requests” and 

provides real-time status updates and mechanisms to collaborate with the Spectrum Management 

Office, which processes the request. Currently, the ESC process manager supports only Army 

requests while Navy and Air Force versions of this system are under development. Also, 

unmanned systems must meet information assurance requirements for their complex software 

systems as these systems must interact with other systems and humans through networked C2

systems to share information and control these systems. The Navy and Air Force have differing 

versions of this same process.
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5.2 Problem Statement

The operating environment of the unmanned system is a critical factor in determining the 

appropriate level of autonomy and the capability to maneuver as needed to accomplish the 

mission.

The intended physical operating environment provided in a CONOPS and other program 

requirement documents will help determine the level of technology that must be applied to the 

unmanned system. More stressing physical environments will most notably affect the level of 

autonomy required, along with the capability to act on the situation at hand.

Similarly, in the regulatory environment, program plans must account for the regulatory 

hurdles that are typical with revolutionary technologies. Individual technologies must be 

carefully examined at every level in the system until the appropriate levels of technological 

advances are defined to be capable of overcoming such hurdles.

These concerns are especially important and apply to A2/AD scenario planning factors.

These factors include technologies supporting survivability, anti-jam, all weather, and 

persistence capabilities as described in Chapter 4.

5.3 Physical Environment

The physical operating environment provides the basis for the unmanned systems

capabilities. Ideally, unmanned systems should be able to adapt to any environment but, to 

constrain the problem, many state-of-the-art unmanned systems are currently designed from the 

ground up to operate within an assumed environment.

The UAS physical operating environment may vary greatly. Generally, UAS will operate 

in similar conditions as manned aircraft, i.e., in all weather, from low to high altitude, and in 

airspace that is congested and possibly contested. Some UAS, such as Triton, are intended to fly 

in maritime environments at both very high and low altitudes. Flights at lower altitudes must 

consider saltwater and humidity in both design and operation, while high-altitude operations 

must consider extreme temperatures and the lack of air pressure. Also, the altitude transitions 

through weather and additional stresses will require additional capability considerations. 

The physical operating environment determines the basis for UGS capabilities.

Operations for future UGS will vary from occurring in structured and semi-structured 

environments to occurring outside a defined perimeter on semi-structured to unstructured terrain 

in support of force protection or physical security missions in more hostile environments. UGS 

maneuvering must account for environmental conditions (e.g., obstacles, threats, road 

conditions) in addition to the system performance. Further environmental classifications, such as 

urban/rural, forest/open, road/non-road, indoor/outdoor, must be addressed with regard to UGS.

DARPA and the auto industry continue to pursue automated technologies that could 

allow UGS to operate in a variety of conditions. Current efforts allow vehicles to operate within 

pavement lines, operate in sequence, stop when objects are ahead, and take caution when foreign 

objects are near (such as deer). Many of these efforts are intended to enhance vehicular safety, 

but also assist unmanned systems technology through increasing automation. 
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The intended physical operating environments for UMS are in and around harbors, 

strategically placed within major shipping routes such as the Strait of Hormuz, or possibly out in 

the open ocean. Although maneuvering with no roads and no “water traffic controller,” USVs 

must be capable of avoiding ships, docks, floating debris, and navigation aids and must stay 

within proper navigable waters (i.e., not run aground). In addition, USVs must operate in 

accordance with collision regulations (COLREGS).68 Because not all maritime traffic (including 

military and commercial) always follows the COLREGS, however, autonomous behavior is 

more difficult to develop for USVs.

On the other hand, although UUVs have the risk of running into underwater obstructions, 

they do not typically have to worry about other vehicles. Furthermore, there are also no 

navigation rules for underwater operation. For UUVs operating in a stressing environment such 

as open ocean, the technology must be capable of providing enough power to last long durations 

of time while autonomously performing their missions even when communication links are 

limited.

5.4 Policy and Regulatory Environment

Unmanned systems programs must consider all the policies and regulations of the 

appropriate authorities as program planning begins. UGS may need to operate on public roads 

where DoT is the regulatory authority within the United States, while UGS on foreign lands must 

remain within the policies of the host nations. Projects conducted by the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration will provide valuable data to develop safety standards and 

performance requirements, which will help ensure the safe testing and subsequent operation of 

autonomous vehicles on public roads. New technologies for UGS must be tested for safety and 

verified by the appropriate regulatory authority.

The primary regulations controlling the safe navigation of U.S. vessels are the navigation 

rules published by the U.S. Coast Guard.69 These rules are applicable to international and inland 

waters. The international waters rules are based on the 1972 International Regulations for 

Prevention of Collision at Sea (72 COLREGS), as amended, a treaty that the United States

adopted in 1977.

The Navigation Safety Advisory Council (NAVSAC) was established by the U.S.

Congress to advise the Secretary of Transportation, via the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, on 

matters relating to the prevention of collisions, rammings, and groundings. In May 2011,

NAVSAC recommended to the Coast Guard that UMS be required to comply with the navigation 

rules, including some amendments deemed necessary for UMS compliance.

In addition to safe navigation rules, UMS must comply with other rules and regulations,

such as for RF communication equipment operation and for environmental restrictions covering 

the operation of sonars and underwater acoustic instruments.

Safe operation of aircraft within domestic national airspace is governed by the FARs

maintained and published by the FAA. Compliance with the FARs requires a pilot in the cockpit 

of the aircraft to “see and avoid” other aviation traffic. Therefore, UAS by nature cannot comply 

 68 International Regulations for Prevention of Collision at Sea (COLREGS), 1972. 69 COMDTINST M16672.2D, Navigation Rules, International – Inland, 23 November 2011.
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with the FARs. DoD UAS operations outside of restricted or warning areas within the NAS are 

currently required to obtain a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) from the FAA in 

accordance with FAA Order 7610.4, Chapter 12, Section 9.70 The order identifies information 

that should be included in the COA request, including a description of the intended flight 

operations, UAS characteristics, and lost link procedures.

Outside U.S. sovereign national airspace, foreign nations have designated civil aviation 

authorities (similar to the FAA) that regulate and exercise governance over their sovereign 

national airspace. Furthermore, when operating in international airspace (i.e., over the high seas) 

DoD UAS observe International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) flight procedures when 

practical and compatible with their mission. However, in accordance with DoD policy (and 

consistent with international law) when operational situations do not lend themselves to ICAO 

flight procedures, such operations may be conducted under due regard.71 In designated combat 

airspace, DoD UAS operate in accordance with instructions provided by the designated airspace 

control authority.72

5.4.1 Testing and Certification

Testing of UMS is required for the Military Departments to be able to certify compliance 

with regulations and demonstrate safe operations. 

USVs must meet the same requirements of a manned craft or boat that is intended to be 

put into service. Testing unmanned systems in general is a significant challenge and can be very 

costly. For example, if it is impossible to put a man aboard a USV, the amount of time and 

expense increases significantly to verify that the propulsion system is working correctly. The 

Navy has developed a guide for testing USVs and drafted an approach to certifying USVs. The 

guide and draft certification method are available from the Naval Surface Warfare Center 

Carderock, Detachment Norfolk.73

To be able to fly in any airspace, DoD UAS are required to be certified as airworthy. 

Airworthiness certification is a core acquisition and engineering process conducted for system 

safety and takes into account material, service life, and mission requirements within the intended 

airspace.

Level of certification depends on the mission requirements of the system. A certification 

allowing unlimited NAS access may be cost prohibitive and unnecessary. For systems that do not 

require full airspace access or are constrained by cost or other technical hurdles, military 

departments may impose operational restrictions when issuing airworthiness statements for UAS. 

Examples include flights within a shipboard environment, only in uncongested airspace, or under 

other certain conditions with specific safety precautions. UAS may be allowed very limited 

access to the NAS, such as flights limited only within restricted or warning areas or only over 

unpopulated areas with other restrictions if little is known about the system or the operational 

risks are deemed too high to permit operations within the NAS. 

 70 FAA Order 7610.4P, Chapter 12, Section 9. 71 DoDI 4540.01, Use of International Airspace by U.S. Military Aircraft and for Missile/Projectile Firings, 

28 March 2007. 72 JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, 20 May 2010. 73 Scott Sampson, Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock, Detachment Norfolk.
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5.4.2 Sense and Avoid (SAA) Capability

SAA is a technical approach that has been 

proposed to bridge the gap between the FAR 

requirement for a pilot in the cockpit to “see and 

avoid” and the “unmanned” nature of UAS. In 

general, an SAA system should include the ability to 

perform the eight functions listed in Figure 31. It 

should be noted that for DoD UAS, expanded access 

to the NAS based on SAA technology will require 

continued use of COAs until current FAA policy, 

guidance, or regulations can be changed.

5.4.3 UAS Executive Committee (ExCom) 

The UAS ExCom was developed from a recommendation on conflict and dispute 

resolution from the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act. It is a focal point for senior 

leaders from DoD, FAA, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the 

Department of Homeland Security to resolve any policy and procedural disputes and to identify 

solutions to enable the integration of DoD and other federal agency UAS into the NAS.

The UAS ExCom approved the UAS NAS Access Plan in October 2010, which addresses

the milestones, policy recommendations, flight standards, and operating procedures necessary to 

provide a path for UAS integration into the NAS. The ExCom continues to work on many of the 

issues and recommendations identified in the plan, including continued improvements to the 

COA process as well as policy and procedural updates to enable significant improvement in UAS 

NAS access. In addition, the ExCom extended the COA expiration interval from 12 to 24 months 

and formalized an agreement on allowing transition from Class D airspace to adjacent Restricted 

or Warning areas. The ExCom is actively working to improve several other policy-related UAS 

issues, including 

• Developing processes and procedures to allow multiple unmanned and manned 

operations in Class D airspace 

• Simplifying the process for UAS to operate in Class D airspace from military airfields

• Simplifying the process for, and expanding the access of, SUAS to operate in Class G 

airspace

• Allowing UAS flights in remote operating areas with limited restrictions

5.5 Technology Application

An unmanned system may include a SoS. For example, a USV may host a UAS and 

UUS, or a UAS can provide inflight refueling to another UAS, or a UAS may be deployed as a 

communication relay station for UGS. Unmanned systems may be part of a greater system 

including manned elements as well. Technology developments must assess the impact each has 

across the rest of the system components or other systems. 

Figure 31. SAA Self-Separation Functions
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5.5.1 Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

One of the key capabilities UAS currently provide to the warfighter is persistence, for 

example, persistent ISR. Technology improvements can expand persistence much further, but 

programs must consider the operating environment while incorporating the technology. As an 

example, one technology application is onboard data processing. This automation technology can 

help minimize critical bandwidth necessary to transmit ISR data to the warfighter and may also

be suitable for reducing the intelligence officer workload and decreasing the time in the kill 

chain.

Key technology enablers that UAS will encounter in operational environments include 

C2 links, SAA systems, sensors and displays, separation algorithms, and interoperability. 

5.5.1.1 C2 Links

As an essential component of UAS by definition, solutions to problems associated with 

link spectrum availability, latency, and reliability must be developed in all operating 

environments. Spectrum considerations should be fully understood for UAS to operate at any 

given location for C2 and also for SAA (where radar is employed). For C2 within LOS, the 

United States and other countries have an approved spectrum allocation to globally use the 

Aeronautical Mobile (Route) Service 5030–5091 MHz band. For BLOS, the World 

Radiocommunications Conference (WRC) was unable to reach agreement at the WRC-12, but 

will continue studies for decision at WRC-15. The WRC-12 decided that no additional spectrum 

allocation was required for SAA purposes. 

5.5.1.2 SAA Systems

An SAA system, whether ground, air, other, or integrated, will result from the effective 

use of many technologies. The SAA system will be a SoS, including sensors to detect and track, 

C2 subsystems to transmit information to a display providing situational awareness to a qualified 

pilot/operator, and algorithms to recommend or implement maneuvers depending on varying 

degrees of autonomy. Complex SAA systems may allow for formation flights or multiple 

shipboard operations in both SUAS and large UAS environments, all while preserving or 

enhancing flight safety. 

5.5.1.2.1 Ground-Based SAA (GBSAA) Systems

A GBSAA system is designed to provide safe separation for UAS operations within a 

prescribed volume of airspace using a ground-based system of sensors, displays, 

communications, and software. The sensors perform detect and track functions while algorithms 

and/or displays assist the pilot/operator with the requirement to evaluate, prioritize, declare, and 

determine the best course of action to avoid a hazard. The mission-critical information is 

provided to the pilot/operator in a GCS or at the operating station to enable the pilot/operator to

Technology will improve the performance of our systems and allow them to 

last longer, to use fewer people, to cost less, and to provide more relevant 

information, where it’s needed and when it’s needed.
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make decisions to safely navigate the airspace. Future developments may automate maneuvers

and allow more efficient use of the airspace and the easing of air traffic management tasks. 

5.5.1.2.2 Airborne Sense and Avoid (ABSAA) Systems

ABSAA development efforts are focusing on an onboard capability to perform both selfseparation and collision avoidance to ensure an appropriate level of safety. The capability is 

intended to give pilot/operators the ability to avoid conflict and collision avoidance with other 

aircraft in a safe and efficient manner in all classes of airspace. Early versions of this technology 

may function similarly to early phases of GBSAA by requiring the pilot/operator to initiate 

maneuvers, but work is being done to enable autonomous 

action by the aircraft, or pilot-on-the-loop operations, where 

the system can identify and react to conflicts. Current 

programs have phased validation schedules for flights within 

airspace in which DoD is authorized to operate with due 

regard, en-route/Class A, and divert/Class E/Class G 

operations as technology innovation and integration allow. 

5.5.1.3 Sensors and Displays

Although developing common and interoperable

sensors across multiple types of control systems and extensible to multiple platforms is best for 

the current fiscal environment, UAS sensors must

be customized to the mission environment. 

Miniaturization of sensors will allow additional 

capabilities on smaller UAS and/or will enable 

the capability to collect more information aboard 

a single platform. Displays built for SAA 

functions should be common and compatible 

across the Services, regardless of GBSAA or 

ABSAA applications, as well as across air traffic 

services (see Figure 32). This compatibility will 

reduce training costs and allow the development 

of common terminology and understanding. 

5.5.1.4 Separation Algorithms

For the foreseeable future, a pilot/operator will have direct decision authority for all UAS 

actions; this approach is known as “pilot in the loop.” Predicated on the failure of self-separation 

and approaching collision avoidance scenarios, the addition of separation algorithms will aid the 

pilot/operator in completing the mission. Such algorithms will also be needed for autonomous 

systems. This capability applies in the NAS, foreign airspace, and combat zones, but may be 

most applicable in open ocean and other areas where flights would be conducted under “due 

regard” regulations where air traffic services are not available.

5.5.1.5 Interoperability

UAS will be operating in an increasingly crowded airspace with the potential need to 

interact with manned assets. The UI2 CBA identified and prioritized IOP gaps in airspace 

Figure 32. UAS Pilot Simulator Training
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integration and interoperability capabilities. Decision makers on the ground must be able to 

access sensor systems for both manned and unmanned aircraft to enhance situational awareness. 

Video data must be capable of transferring between aircraft to maintain ISR continuity. 

Therefore, interoperability standards must be in place so the right information gets to the right 

people. Initial stages of this type of interoperability were demonstrated during the Army’s 

Manned Unmanned Systems Integration Capability (MUSIC) exercise in September 2011. This 

technology needs continued maturation across the military departments to meet DoD 

interoperability goals. 

5.5.1.6 Other Technologies

Technology can be used to improve survivability under hostile environments and also 

improve overall reliability of unmanned systems. Improved reliability will make them more 

acceptable to a cautious public. Power systems can allow the endurance of a UAS to expand 

further beyond today’s limited envelope. Also, as sensor payloads continue to improve and 

collect more data (such as FMV), data processing techniques must be able to smartly filter 

relevant data to pass to the ground within the limited bandwidth available. 

5.5.2 Unmanned Ground Systems 

The ability to maneuver effectively in a wide range of environments is a requirement that 

a UGS must meet. Those environments could include being thrown or launched, climbing hills or 

stairs, and hopping and landing upright. The technologies for advancing this capability are 

primarily autonomy, sensors, and avoidance algorithms.

5.5.2.1 Autonomy

The ability of the UGS to navigate autonomously is largely dependent on the accuracy 

and robustness of its perception system, which seeks to create an accurate model of its

environment. Designing a perception system capable of dealing with all types of environments is 

very challenging with the current technology. To constrain the problem, current state-of-the-art 

UGS are designed from the ground up to operate within an assumed environment(s). If these 

assumptions are valid, the UGS often operate effectively. The UGS will fail to operate as 

intended, however, when circumstances are different from assumed. To alleviate this problem, it 

is desirable to have a perception system that can adapt to various environments. To be able to 

adapt, the UGS must understand the context of its environment and recognize when that context 

changes. One possible method of 

understanding context is through the 

classification of video imagery. Once an 

environment is classified, UGS require 

perception adjudication that specifically 

addresses the perceptual needs of the UGS at 

run-time. A number of factors dictate the 

perceptual needs of UGS, including mission 

awareness, environmental complexity, 

mobility requirements, and the sensor 

capabilities necessary to build contextual 

information from the environment. The 
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enabling technology supporting these factors includes hardware and software related to 

autonomy, communications, power, vision, architecture, warfighter machine interfaces, 

manipulators, terrain mobility, and payloads.

5.5.2.2 Sensors and Avoidance Algorithms

Although collision avoidance systems on unmanned systems have been tailored for UAS, 

there is also a great need to apply them to ground systems. Examples of this technology include 

collision avoidance algorithms, traffic pattern recognition, and navigation. While avoidance 

systems for UGS may come about from UAS technologies, a good opportunity to leverage 

developments comes from the auto industry. The auto industry has a much greater ability to 

apply research and development technology funding with the initial focus on improving safety, 

and many of these technological developments will apply to making UGS safer as well. 

5.5.2.3 Other UGS Technologies to Consider

Other technologies may also give UGS greater flexibility within its intended 

environment. Interoperability may be a very important consideration to reduce costs and add 

efficiency, especially as the sensors become more complex. Issues such as dual-use sensors, 

high/low data, data storage, and secure communication links may all be very important to 

evaluate. Vehicle-to-vehicle communications have the potential to greatly increase safety by 

sending and receiving data messages across equipped vehicles and translating the data into 

warnings to the driver of potential collisions. Several top auto manufacturers are quickly 

developing prototypes with varying technologies for civil auto applications. These technologies 

will benefit the civil community through fuel and time savings and improved safety and will 

certainly have benefits to DoD as well.

5.5.3 Unmanned Maritime Systems 

UMS may be used for a variety of purposes. 

They can ensure security within harbors, scan for 

problems on a ship hull, sweep an area for mines, 

secure critical waterways, provide ocean tracking, and 

more. Because of the operating environment, the 

technology that allows these capabilities is unique.

Like UAS, persistence is a key capability that UMS 

can provide; however, unlike UAS, UMS allow more 

than just persistence. For example, the largest issue 

with UAS is their inability to operate in bad weather or 

low visibility. UUVs, on the other hand, can operate in poor weather conditions. Therefore, DoD 

can continuously scan for mine drops or follow an enemy threat such as a submarine. In any 

case, persistence requires improved power and propulsion systems, autonomy and data 

processing, improved communication systems, and advanced sensors.

5.5.3.1 Power Systems

Certainly powering for long-term persistence is a large challenge. Having the ability to 

sprint at high speeds to intercept a target is not the only power requirement. Towing also requires 

power; for example, the mine warfare mission typically requires a significant tow load — much 
Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038

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more than a normal craft’s capability. Certain supporting payloads are also very power intensive.

A USV carrying other UUVs or USVs would have to recharge or refuel the other payloads, and 

this requirement would require more power.

5.5.3.2 Autonomy and Data Processing

Like UAS or UGS, UMS can be preprogrammed for certain missions. For example, 

UUVs can autonomously scan the hull of a ship for threats or other foreign objects within harbor 

or scan a geospatial area for mines. However, the technology gets more complex as the level of 

autonomy increases. The appropriate autonomy level plays a key role in persistence during 

clandestine missions, e.g., the ability to sense and avoid hostile forces and to detect and avoid 

obstacles such as approaching vessels, fishing nets, or more conventional obstacles like rock 

formations or coral heads. Autonomy may also play a key role in the capability to diagnose and 

react in a proportional manner to UMS internal failures (fault management) during long 

missions, especially in clandestine missions. For these types of missions, the UMS needs the 

capability to send important, relevant information as needed, such as relaying the track of a 

detected threat. 

Data processing enables the transmission of a reduced amount of data like beam-formed 

sonar images instead of raw, stave data, without compromising quality. Not only is there a need 

to use preprocessing to reduce the amount of data transmitted, but also automated target 

recognition enables target discrimination, i.e., reporting contacts of interest instead of sending 

entire images for human interpretation.

5.5.3.3 Communication Systems

Communication systems on UMS drive the need for advanced 

data processing techniques. Undersea C2 limitations preclude 

teleoperated solutions, and such limitations drive UUV autonomy 

needs. Bandwidth is much lower with acoustic signals compared to RF 

signals; therefore, wireless data rates are reduced. In clandestine 

operations, C2 links must extend over long distances into the undersea 

environment to provided operators with situational awareness and 

supervisory control over a UUV. 

5.5.3.4 Advanced Sensors

New technologies enable real-time adaptation and optimization 

of sensor settings and unattended tactical planning for sensor 

employment according to the environmental conditions. Because a human is not around to 

recognize that the sensor is not operating optimally, sensors need the capability to adapt to 

optimize their abilities. In addition, they must improve in other areas:

• Marinization. Typically most commercial sensors are built for UAS. Their 

environment is simpler compared to USVs and UUVs. Not only is salt water a 

problem, but the accelerations and shock from bumps are well above anything 

experienced by a UA.
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• Built-in test. Sensors must have the ability to know and report when they are not 

working correctly so the control system can take appropriate action.

• Data fusion. To be truly useful in the future, sensor data output must be standardized 

for incorporation into a fusion engine providing for a better world view (i.e.,

understanding of the environment around the unmanned system).

• Additional capability. Sensors must allow for faster operation (i.e., as speed of a 

USV increases, cameras and radars must be able to see further and clearer to 

determine the proper course of action so the vehicle has time to react).

Sensors must continue to be developed and improved to gain even more capability and 

robustness in a maritime environment.

5.6 Way Ahead

To operate within the existing regulatory environment, programs must comply with 

existing policy framework or get policy waivers because policies tailored to unmanned systems 

are still in development. Regulatory and cultural hurdles must be carefully considered early in 

system development. In this paradigm, technology development and tests will help shape the 

appropriate requirements, standards, and regulations. Industry will help frame what is possible as 

the “state of the art,” and programs will define what is fiscally responsible. Once the standards 

and regulations are complete, PORs can then create requirements for their systems with a 

complete set of expectations. 

5.7 Case Study: Air: Airworthiness and GBSAA

Services programs and 

CCDRs that require UAS must

define the types of airspace they 

require for their missions. The 

CONOPS should define the 

operating environment, 

considering the NAS for 

training before deploying 

overseas in a foreign airspace.

Two important factors, although 

not the only factors, for UAS 

flights in the NAS are the 

airworthiness of the vehicle and 

the SAA solution to comply 

with FAR or COA requirements. Below, we quickly examine these factors in a case study of the 

Army Gray Eagle at Fort Hood, Texas. The Gray Eagle currently requires a COA to transit from 

Joint use Class D airspace to restricted airspace a short distance away. 

Like manned systems, the Gray Eagle vehicle must be certified as airworthy and properly 

equipped to fly in the intended airspace. The aircraft structure, propulsion system, control 

redundancies, software, and control links must all be certified to a certain standard defined by the 

Service’s technical airworthiness authority (TAA). However, the Army has determined that 

certification costs are prohibitively expensive to certify the Gray Eagle to manned aircraft 
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standards. Therefore, the Army TAA takes into account the potential risk of a failure and the 

population density below the intended flight path, which would cross over a road. To minimize 

risk to people and property on the ground, the Gray Eagle will fly perpendicular to the road and 

take other similar precautions.

The Army has a clear understanding of the airspace the UAS must transit, equipage 

requirements for that airspace, normal aircraft traffic patterns, surrounding terrain, and other 

potential hazards to accomplish its training mission. The Army decides that GBSAA is the 

chosen SAA solution based on mission requirements and costs. The GBSAA radars monitor the 

airspace for potential conflicting traffic, and algorithms assess the potential for conflicts and 

suggest heading changes to the operator to maintain separation. 

The combination of these efforts allows the Army to confidently navigate the airspace 

safely with regard to other airspace users as well as people and property on the ground. This 

solution provides the capability to accomplish the training mission without incurring high costs 

such as transiting the entire unit to another location. 

5.8 Summary

Technology is evolving rapidly, and this fast evolution is challenging regulatory 

authorities to keep pace with needed rules and regulations as well as challenging military 

departments to keep costs down when abiding by DoD acquisition and management processes. 

Every aspect of the operating environment, including the physical and regulatory, should be kept 

in mind at every stage of the acquisition life cycle. Guidance is currently available from each 

Military Department although the requirements and standards must still be developed. 

Unmanned systems are ideally suited to increase the envelope for the physical 

environment. They are often built with the intent of putting them in harm’s way and avoiding

risk to a pilot, operator, or controller. The timeline in Figure 33 shows the technical path toward 

successful increases in capability across the domains for the next 25 years. 
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Figure 33. Operating Environment Technology Development Timeline

Goals 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2030+

UAS

UGS

UMS

UAS

UGS

UMS

Adaptable Systems

Mid Term Far Term

Integrated SAA. 

Evolution with 

NextGen

Autonomous 

Architecture

Increased safety 

and efficiency for 

flights in NAS and 

worldwide. Effective 

forensics Desired 

Capabilty

Technology 

Projects

Increased missions in 

expanded geographical 

areas

Autonomous 

missions worldwide

Effective Autonomy Systems and Avoidance 

Algorithms. Security Architectures

Robust physical capabilities

Autonomy for specialized 

missions in localized areas. 

Increasingly networked systems

Secure C2 Links. Certified GBSAA. 

Certified Displays. Improved 

Sensors. Interoperable payload 

Expand physical architectures. 

Increase Autonomation for 

Specific Tasks. V2V Comms

Improved Power, Comm, and 

Sensor Systems

Incremental access to the NAS. 

Effective information fusion

Near Term

Certified ABSAA and 

Separation Algorithms. 

Integrated equipment

Expanded Autonomy 

Systems and Avoidance 

Algorithms

Routine Access to the NAS. 

Due Regard capability. 

Effective exploitation

Effective mannedunmanned teaming
93

6 Logistics and Sustainment

6.1 Current Sustainment Environment

The rapid development and fielding of large numbers and types of unmanned systems 

present DoD with a significant sustainment challenge. Reliance on joint operations and 

multinational coalitions further complicates that sustainment challenge. Joint mission 

requirements need matching logistics capabilities that meet the specific mission requirements of 

the CCDR. 

Evolving requirements often force premature system redesign efforts to meet emerging 

warfighter needs. Rapidly evolving technology and economic conditions affect the requirement 

and the ability of unmanned systems to meet stated reliability, maintainability, and affordability 

requirements. Original equipment manufacturer 

(OEM) assertions of proprietary interests 

complicate organic support. As budget 

pressures increase, programs must develop 

more cost-effective sustainment solutions. The 

transition from supporting the warfighters’ 

immediate capability requirements to creating 

an affordable, long-term sustainment 

environment will require a flexible blend of 

OEM and organic support to meet logistics 

support objectives.

6.2 Problem Statement

The first generation of fielded unmanned systems was focused on the rapid delivery of 

immediate capability to the warfighter. Because of the need to rapidly develop and field these 

initial capabilities, long-term sustainability planning has often occurred late in the development 

cycle. Many programs have been procured as vertically integrated, vendor-propriety solutions 

relying on a single prime contractor who was often held accountable to meet many criteria,

including a compressed delivery schedule. These rapidly fielded programs are often immature in 

terms of reliability and supportability and are heavily reliant on contractor logistics support 

(CLS). In most cases, unmanned systems are no different from manned platforms and require 

investments in reliability and maintainability to 

provide availability at an affordable cost. 

However, reliability, maintainability, and 

lifecycle costs have been secondary 

considerations, and early application of reliability 

and maintainability engineering activities to the 

design has been neglected. As programs plan for 

long-term sustainment, they must establish 

lifecycle sustainment strategies that can costeffectively meet documented warfighter 

requirements and comply with statutory 

requirements and DoD policies. 
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6.3 Challenges to Logistics and Sustainment

The need to quickly field unmanned capability led to shortcomings in the area of logistics 

and sustainment planning and implementation. Challenges include

• Sustaining non-PORs

• Limited RAM data 

• Delayed core logistics capability requirements 

• Transition from CLS for Life to Organic capabilities

• Immature or lack of lifecycle sustainment planning

6.3.1 Sustaining Non-PORs

Programs initially fielded as user operational evaluation systems or as rapid acquisitions 

in response to JUONs have since transitioned to PORs that provide enduring warfighting 

capabilities. Many involve procurement quantities of hundreds of units that will be sustained for 

the foreseeable future. The Services have focused on “getting product out the door,” rather than 

maturing and improving sustainability within systems because of the urgent goal to meet 

immediate warfighter needs with unmanned systems capabilities. The programs often have not 

developed the data strategies to support the system for the long term, including procuring failure 

and product support usage data. The Services have met the needs of the warfighter by fielding

developmental versions of the PORs as quick reaction capabilities, fielding non-POR sensor and 

weapons capabilities on POR platforms, and fielding multiple POR low-rate production units 

prior to completion of the initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) and formal declaration 

of IOC.

The Services have also developed 

innovative, and sometimes ad hoc, logistics 

concepts to support near-term in-theater 

warfighter readiness. For instance, in 2006, the 

Army Materiel Command chartered the RS-JPO 

to provide in-theater support via the Joint 

Robotics Repair Facility (JRRF) and the Joint 

Robotic Repair Detachments (JRRDs). JRRF 

provides a one-stop shop for fielding, 

sustainment, training assessment, and asset 

accountability. It also provides support, e.g., 

operational instruction, preventative maintenance 

checks, services, and troubleshooting. The 

JRRDs, established in Kuwait and Afghanistan, fill an Army maintenance capability gap created 

by the acquisition and deployment of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) robotic systems in 

theater. These organizations operate outside the standard Army logistics system and force 

structure to provide training and to issue and repair robotic equipment. The facilities are staffed 

with a mix of Government personnel and contractors. 
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6.3.2 Limited RAM Data

Much of the unmanned systems capabilities were delivered with large numbers of 

developmental and low-rate production assets that were not fully matured or proven to meet the 

system’s RAM requirements. The lack of proven reliability creates a challenge to long-term 

system availability and affordability because reliability is typically the single largest designcontrollable driver of operations and sustainment costs. While providing a tremendous capability 

to the warfighter, when IOT&E does occur, systems often do not meet their operational 

sustainment thresholds and are deemed not suitable. 

6.3.3 Delayed Core Logistics Capability Requirements

The rush to deliver these critical capabilities to the field led to a reliance on the OEM to 

satisfy sustainment requirements. Prime contractors have been responsible to provide CLS to 

ensure the operational readiness of their systems in the field. In many cases, little organic 

maintenance capability at the military organizational and intermediate (field) level has been 

established. Program offices have relied on the capacity of the prime contractors’ production 

lines to satisfy depot maintenance requirements. The delay in the establishment of organic depot 

capabilities sometimes put programs at odds with statutory requirements. Several programs have 

begun the transition from contractor support to an organic capability. However, contractor 

assertions of proprietary technical data rights,

74 investment costs for support equipment and 

facilities, parts obsolescence, and frequent software upgrades create challenges to establishing 

depot capability in the near term. In an effort to create organic maintenance efficiencies and 

commonalities between the programs, the Services have begun to work together to identify 

potential synergies in establishing common sustainment concepts and capabilities. An FY2011 

UAS Organic Depot Study recommended the establishment of repair capabilities at a limited 

number of depots based on major subsystems to take advantage of existing depot capabilities and 

capacity (see Figure 35 in 6.7.1). The Joint Logistics Board endorsed the workload assignment 

consolidations and directed that Air Force avionics, ground electronic, software, and sensor 

workloads be further evaluated for potential consolidation.

6.3.4 Transition from CLS for Life to Organic Capabilities

For UAS, the same FoS was often selected to meet the requirements for ISR and weapons 

platforms of different Services; therefore, a large degree of commonality exists among the 

various platforms and sensors. However, because of the initial strategy of using the prime 

contractor for CLS for life to sustain rapidly deployed and evolving capabilities, the various 

program offices are just beginning to recognize and take advantage of commonalities by 

establishing common logistics infrastructures to reduce investment costs as they develop plans to 

transition to organic support late in the development cycles.

Contracts for CLS, in many cases, have not been performance based, i.e., requiring 

specified levels of readiness, but rather cost-plus-award-fee arrangements providing flexibility to 

respond to changes in requirements and OPTEMPO. While these arrangements provide an 

 74 10 USC 2320 provides that in the case of an item developed by a contractor or subcontractor exclusively at private 

expense, the contractor or subcontractor may restrict the right of the United States to release or disclose technical 

data to persons outside the Government. The statute further states that these restrictions do not apply to technical 

data that are necessary for operation, maintenance, installation, or training.
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immediate advantage to quickly field warfighter operational capability, more affordable 

sustainment solutions are required as fleet sizes have grown.

6.3.5 Immature or Lack of Lifecycle Sustainment Planning

Fielded unmanned systems are frequently not managed or maintained as other platforms 

are within the inventory. For instance, with Army UGS, the operational urgency and uniqueness 

of these platforms required a nonstandard approach in integrating these technologies into the 

force. This understandable and needed deviation created, as a byproduct, a parallel management 

system that bypassed many established processes and procedures. The RS-JPO sustainment 

strategy for the family of robots includes improvements and upgrades to current platforms with 

the latest technologies. Due to the drawdown from theater, RS-JPO is developing a responsible 

drawdown strategy that includes long-term storage and future disposition of robotic systems.

The Army lacks adequate maintenance doctrine to address the technologies incorporated 

into robotic systems. Robotic maintenance doctrine has not been delineated in Army doctrine.

Only a small group of operators and personnel within the Army working in the development, 

testing, and acquisition of robotic technologies is well acquainted and/or understand the impact

of these technologies. RS-JPO initiated efforts to improve the maintenance strategy by 

improving databases and how data are analyzed, decreasing top sustainment parts cost drivers, 

and outsourcing repairable parts. By improving the way data are collected and analyzed in the 

Cataloging Ordering Logistics Tracking System, JRRF hopes to identify and increase MTBF and 

identify systemic parts problems to reduce the number of parts consumed. Also RS-JPO is 

currently working with the OEMs to analyze the repair-versus-replace cost of their top 

sustainment parts cost drivers to determine whether the return maintenance actions are being 

accomplished efficiently. Future plans also include the possible outsourcing of parts repairs to a 

non-OEM contractor. JRRF continues to develop and refine repair processes and serve as the 

center for technician support for all the detachments and training sites.

Multiple challenges exist for sustainment due to the many different configurations of 

nonstandard equipment (NSE). The optimum goal is to have modularity across platforms for 

plug-and-play adaptability. This approach will reduce the number of required repair parts and

allow plug-and-play payload options to fulfill multiple capability requirements. This effort will 

also maximize the life of the current fleet and save a substantial amount of money in repairs and 

spare part purchases. 

6.4 The Way Ahead

For unmanned systems to move from an environment of rapid development and fielding 

to an environment of long-term sustainment, programs must take a lifecycle management 

approach. Affordable lifecycle sustainment solutions that meet the warfighter’s threshold 

requirements must be generated to maintain the capabilities of the first generation of unmanned 

systems over the foreseeable future. As new unmanned systems and capabilities are developed, 

new programs must apply lessons learned to ensure long-term sustainability is addressed early in 

the development process.

In September of 2011, USD(AT&L) directed that sustainment plans be developed for all 

unmanned acquisition programs and be reviewed for improved affordability and effectiveness.
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Lifecycle logistics planning and analysis execution is important from the acquisition phase 

through operations to the retirement phases of the weapon system life cycle. Cross-functional 

planning and integration are essential to ensure that supportability requirements are addressed 

comprehensively and consistently with cost, performance, and schedule during the life cycle.

The objective is operational effectiveness through an affordable, effective support strategy that 

meets goals for optimum readiness and facilitates iterative technology enhancements during the 

weapon system life cycle. See Figure 34.

Figure 34. Lifecycle Sustainment Planning Analysis Way Ahead

Increased O- and I-Level 

Support 

Organic Depot Field 

Teams 

Fully Fielded O/I level 

Maintenance Capability

Mix of 

Organic/Contractor 

Supply based on longterm best value

Title 10 Compliant Core 

organic Depot 

Capability

Sufficient End Item 

Assets to Achieve 

Operational and 

Materiel Availability 

Goals

Future State

Organic Capability 

Increased 

Government Rights to 

Data 

• Supportability 

Analyses

• Level of Repair 

Analysis

• Supportability 

Analyses 

• Level of Repair 

Analysis

• O/I level Technical 

orders Development

• Supportability 

Analyses

• Business Case 

Analysis

• Provisioning Data 

Development

• Supportability 

Analyses

• Core Analysis

• Level of Repair 

Analysis

• Business Case 

Analysis

• Requirements 

Analysis to establish 

Am Metric and 

required Inventory. 

Revised Acquisition 

Strategy

Life Cycle

Sustainment

Planning and 

Analysis

• Acquisition/Data 

Rights Strategy

• Business Case 

Analysis

• Development of 

Depot Level Repair 

Procedures

Field Service 

Reps/Depot level 

Support At 

Organizational level

Contractor O/I-level 

Maintenance

Contractor Inventory 

Control Point (ICP)

Contract Logistics 

Support

High Equipment 

Utilization with limited 

pipeline resulting in 

increased downtime

Current State

Limited Data Rights 

Owned by 

Government/ 

Proprietary Data

Increased Reliability 

MTBCF Achieved 

Growth Curve Met 

Reduced 

O&S Costs

• Reliability and 

Maintainability

• Program Reliability 

Growth Plan

Reliability 

Requirements not 

understood/not being 

met
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6.5 Planning for Organic Depot Maintenance

Central to sustainment planning and execution is the concept of core depot-level 

maintenance capabilities. First codified in 1984, the current statute75 states, “It is essential for the 

national defense that the Department of Defense maintain a core logistics capability that is 

Government-owned and Government-operated (including Government personnel and 

Government-owned and Government-operated equipment and facilities) to ensure a ready and 

controlled source of technical competence and resources necessary to ensure effective and timely 

response to a mobilization, national defense contingency situations, and other emergency 

requirements.”

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2012, as further amended in the 

FY2013 NDAA, introduced several new provisions of law relating to the identification and 

implementation of core logistics capabilities that affect the sustainment of UAS. The law now 

specifically requires a determination of the applicability of core logistics requirements by 

Milestone A and an estimate of core logistics capabilities and sustaining workloads by Milestone 

B. The identification of core capability requirements and sustaining workloads is now a threestage process linked to the acquisition cycle. The Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) must 

now certify pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2366a(a)(4), “that a determination of applicability of core 

depot-level maintenance and repair capabilities requirements has been made,” prior to Milestone 

A approval.76 Milestone B approval may not be granted until the MDA certifies, “An estimate 

has been made of the requirements for core depot-level maintenance and repair capabilities...and 

the associated sustaining workloads to support such requirements.”77 Additionally, “Prior to 

entering into a contract for low-rate initial production of a major defense acquisition program, 

the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the detailed requirements for core logistics 

capabilities...and associated workloads required to support such requirements have been 

defined.” This three-stage process is designed to identify organic depot-level maintenance 

requirements early in the acquisition cycle to reduce the necessity for interim CLS and to allow 

for the timely establishment of organic capabilities. The determination that a function is core 

requires that government-owned and government-operated depot-level maintenance and repair 

capabilities and capacity, including the facilities, equipment, associated logistics capabilities, 

technical data, and trained personnel, shall be established not later than four years after a weapon 

system or item of military equipment achieved IOC or is fielded in support of operations.78

The early identification of core requirements and sustaining workloads will drive 

programs to identify and acquire data required to establish repair capabilities early in the 

acquisition process. DoD must also be ready to challenge assertions that unmanned systems were 

developed exclusively at private expense, or at a minimum be prepared to aggressively assert its 

“Government purpose rights” (under the provisions of 10 USC 2320) to the technical data 

required to maintain these systems.79

 75 10 USC 2464, Core depot-level maintenance and repair capabilities. 76 10 USC 2366a, Major defense acquisition programs: certification required before Milestone A approval. 77 10 USC 2366b, Major defense acquisition programs: certification required before Milestone B or key decision 

point B approval, section (a)(3)(F).

78 Ibid. 79 10 USC 2320, Rights in technical data.
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6.6 Sustainment Metrics and Performance-Based Logistics

Recent JCIDS guidance requires the establishment of a Sustainment KPP for all ACAT 1 

programs in the capability development document and Capabilities Production Documents 

(CPDs) for the system.

80 ACAT II and below programs with materiel solutions are required to 

include the Sustainment KPP or sponsor-defined sustainment metrics. The Sustainment KPP is 

stated as a Materiel Availability threshold and objective and is supported by key system 

attributes for reliability and for Operations and Support (O&S) costs. Establishing these metrics 

early and tracking them throughout the life cycle of the program will help ensure that the 

programs can meet the warfighter’s requirements at an affordable price. The flowdown of these 

metrics into performance-based logistics strategies to achieve operational effectiveness and 

system affordability is the preferred approach to systems support.81

Establishment of rigorous reliability growth programs to ensure that programs are 

meeting reliability thresholds has great potential to enhance the long-term affordability and 

availability of unmanned systems. Incorporating design features to enhance maintainability and 

supportability into future UAS has the potential to greatly increase readiness and lower O&S 

costs. Incorporating modularity and common interfaces that can accommodate integration of new 

sensor, weapons, and communication capabilities without requiring major platform redesigns and 

retrofits can potentially improve maintainability by simplifying the fault isolation, removal, and 

replacement of subsystems. In-flight diagnostic and prognostic technologies have the potential to 

improve repair turnaround and improve readiness. As the unmanned systems portfolios mature, 

responsible program executive offices (PEOs) and program offices can create opportunities for 

efficiencies by adopting policies and processes that encourage the use of common components 

and configuration elements, such as batteries, fasteners, electrical distribution panels, and 

support equipment. Commonality creates opportunities for common supply chains, sources of 

repair, and other product support elements. 

6.7 Joint Logistics Integration

6.7.1 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

As the sustainment of UAS becomes more institutionalized within the organic support 

infrastructures for maintenance, supply, and transportation, the accomplishment of much of the 

field- and depot-level maintenance will transition from CLS to the Government and military.

Because of similar platform characteristics, subsystems, and manufacturing and repair processes, 

there is great potential for UAS programs to team together to reduce investments and operations 

and maintenance costs. The use of tools such as public/private partnerships (PPPs) and 

performance-based logistics contracts should be explored as methods to reduce sustainment and 

infrastructure costs. Agreements across different programs and Services can also reduce the costs 

of establishing organic repair capabilities and incentivize increases in systems reliability. As a 

result of these efforts, overall O&S costs can be reduced.

To facilitate the identification of opportunities to reduce overall investment and O&S 

costs, the UAS Task Force has established a Logistics and Sustainment IPT with the Services. In 

 80 CJCSI 3170.01, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, 19 January 2012. 81 DoDI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 8 December 2008, pg 29, enclosure 2.
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FY2011, a depot WG was established to recommend depot sources of repair for UAS major 

subsystems. The group recommended the establishment of depot repair capabilities at a limited 

number of depots based on major subsystems to take advantage of existing depot capabilities and 

capacity (see Figure 35). The Joint Logistics Board endorsed the workload assignment 

consolidations and directed that Air Force avionics, ground electronic, software, and sensor 

workloads be further evaluated for potential consolidation. The recommendations resulted in

rational depot source of repair assignments for UAS core workloads and generated large cost 

avoidances and savings.

Figure 35. Organic Depot Maintenance Sources of Repair Approved Consolidations

In FY2012, the Logistics and Sustainment IPT met to create a forum to discuss lessons

learned and to foster sustainment synergies. The IPT has identified potentially high payoff 

strategies of creating partnerships with industry to support families of components, such as 

sensors and communication links common across the Services. The UAS programs are 

researching opportunities to use existing manned aircraft capabilities to sustain similar UAS 

components. The Air Force’s Reaper program and the Army’s Gray Eagle program will use the 

Navy’s Fleet Repair Center Southeast, Jacksonville, Florida, repair capability for H60 helicopter 

MTS-A sensors to repair their MTS-B sensors.
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6.7.2 Unmanned Maritime Systems

The Navy is currently supporting UMS through a combination of OEM and organic 

support. In the next few years, the sustainment strategy and infrastructure for UMS must be 

formalized and standardized to gain better control of the supportability resources and become 

more responsive and effective. The quantities of USVs and UUVs being developed and fielded 

in the next decade demand that attention be given to effective system sustainment. An organic 

support infrastructure for configuration control, supply support, maintenance, storage, and 

transportation is essential to bring efficiencies and cost effectiveness to these critically important 

systems. A planning yard should be established for UMS.

6.7.3 Unmanned Ground Systems

For UGS, due to the tremendous amount of dollars invested into NSE to meet the 

warfighter capability gap for the current conflict, the Army’s Capabilities Development for 

Rapid Transition process categorized NSE robots into three categories: 1) recommend POR, 2) 

retain to support in theater, and 3) terminate. The majority of the NSE robots fall into category 2.

A significant quantity of NSE robotic systems has been purchased and is being maintained using 

other contingency operations dollars. These NSE robots have proven to provide a needed 

capability to the warfighter and have saved lives. Also, these NSE robotic systems provide some

of the capabilities outlined in the documents of developing PORs that meet current and future 

operational commander’s capability requirements, but these PORs are not scheduled to be 

fielded until FY2015 and beyond. The strategy is to utilize some of the NSE robots as a bridging 

capability to the PORs until the PORs are fielded, store them for future contingencies, or utilize

them as training aids. Nevertheless, these NSE robots still require a sustainment package that can 

be provided by JRRF or the OEM. 
102

7 Training

7.1 The Need to Train

Training is a critical link in delivering warfighter capability. DoD can acquire and deliver 

the most technologically advanced equipment, but if the operators, maintainers, leaders, 

planners, users, and support personnel are not properly trained on the equipment or do not have a 

thorough understanding of its CONEMP, the advantages offered by this warfighting capability 

will be lost through its misapplication. A study by the Defense Science Board found that “U.S. 

armed forces have a training superiority that complements their technological superiority.”82 The 

report points out, however, that this superiority can be eroded if the acquisition process does not 

properly integrate training into equipment development, testing, and fielding. The criticality of 

acquisition and training integration is emphasized by the requirement for acquisition program 

managers to “work with the training community to develop options for individual, collective, and 

Joint training” as part of the acquisition process.83 The report also emphasizes that failure to 

deliver adequate training venues, where needed, will negate technical superiorities of hardware. 

Operators, maintainers, users, support personnel, and leaders must, therefore, be properly trained 

at the appropriate levels and intervals throughout their careers using the optimum mix of live, 

virtual, and constructive or blended reality training domains so they can use equipment 

effectively and to its full design capability. This chapter describes the current state of training for 

unmanned systems, some of the challenges involved, and the way ahead. 

7.2 Problem Statement

Unmanned systems have been a warfighting success story, but work must still be 

accomplished in the institutionalized training environment. As operations in Afghanistan draw 

down and decisions are made about which systems transfer to a peacetime footing, the Services 

will have to make serious decisions about training. These decisions will not be limited to simply 

stating recurring training requirements. Rather, the details of how the training will be 

implemented must be planned and weighed so that every training opportunity is maximized to 

offset its incurred costs. At play will be cultural and political realities; interacting dynamics of 

technology, policy, and regulation; and fiscal constraints. Failure to meet the training challenges 

will result in a loss of combat-gained experience and an inability to effectively employ these 

systems in the future. 

7.3 Challenges to Training

Even with the success unmanned systems demonstrated on the battlefield, DoD faces 

challenges in training. These challenges, as discussed in 7.4, relate not only to the types of 

unmanned systems (e.g., UAS, UGS, UMS), but also to acquisition, regulations, technology, 

manpower and other assets, and policy and documentation. This discussion is by no means 

exhaustive or in any particular order of precedence. Furthermore, DoD fully expects that as new 

generations of unmanned systems develop, the variety of missions they perform expands, and 

 82 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Training Superiority & Training Surprise, OUSD(AT&L), 

Washington, DC, January 2001. 

83 DoDI 5000.02 Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 8 December 2008, p.61.
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priorities change based on circumstances such as wartime, OPTEMPO, NAS restrictions, new 

challenges will arise. 

7.4 Current Training Environment

Today’s training environment for unmanned systems is similar to that characterized for 

logistics and sustainment, i.e., one of playing catch-up, in this case, to provide training support 

for the rapid fielding of unmanned systems. The term “disruptive technology” was coined by 

Clayton Christenson in 1995 to describe a situation where a technology introduces new priorities 

and value structures requiring significant structural adjustments to processes, organizations, and 

operational paradigms. The rapid development and fielding of large numbers and types of 

unmanned systems to meet expanding contingency needs is an example of a disruptive 

technology, which has resulted in significant challenges for the training community. The 

challenges presented by sheer unmanned systems numbers, diversity, and rapid fielding are 

complicated by the imminent drawdown of forces in theater and their return to a peacetime 

footing with a more stringent regulatory environment. 

Improvements in joint operations integration, both at the individual and unit levels, are 

necessary to be able to employ combat capability synergistically:

• Operators must receive tailored training specific enough to support unique Service 

mission sets, yet broad enough to allow operators to integrate and contribute in a 

coalition environment.

• Training programs must adequately encompass initial qualification and 

proficiency/refresher training while also providing room to accommodate growth as 

technology and TTPs improve and evolve.

• Training programs must be integrated into the institutional base.

These challenges include such things as availability of resources, policy, and regulation. 

DoD is cognizant of these challenges and is making progress toward meeting them. In the future, 

the use of common equipment may also significantly reduce overall program costs and time to 

train.

7.4.1 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

UAS are fielded by all four Services. UAS training has undoubtedly received more 

attention than UGS and UMS training. Service training programs are at different stages of 

maturity; however, as unmanned systems have matured, so too have the Service training 

programs. In an effort to establish minimum levels of training across the Services, the Joint Staff 

developed CJCSI 3255.01, which serves as the foundational crewmember training enabler with 

the FAA toward UAS integration into the NAS.

84 To achieve initial manning levels and arrive at 

a steady-state throughput, the Services have used varying mixes of organic and nonorganic UAS 

training, a variety of approaches for the different groups of UAS, and various personnel 

strategies. 

 84 CJCSI 3255.01, Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Minimum Training Standards.
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7.4.1.1 Army

The Army architecture for its Group 3 and above UAS operations includes an aircraft 

operator and a payload operator. The Army operates and maintains its RQ-7 Shadows, MQ-5 

Hunters, and MQ-1C Gray Eagles. The 2nd Battalion, 13th Aviation Regiment (2–13th 

Aviation), formerly Army UAS Training Battalion (UASTB), located at Fort Huachuca, Arizona,

conducts initial entry and military occupational specialty (MOS) training for all operators, 

maintainers, and leaders on Group 3 and above UAS. Operators attend a two-phase training 

program (see Figure 36) and receive a 15W MOS plus an additional skill identifier (ASI) for the 

aircraft they are qualified to operate. Maintainers attend a 17-week common UAS repairer course 

graduating with a 15E MOS, which qualifies them to maintain the Shadow. Additional courses 

and skill identifiers are required for qualification in Hunter and Gray Eagle maintenance. 

Additionally, 2-13th Aviation supports the Joint community by training Marine Corps and Navy 

UAS personnel. In FY2012, they trained more than 2,100 UAS personnel.85

The Raven is the Army’s primary SUAS. Ravens are lightweight, man-portable, and 

operated and maintained by a single soldier. The Army’s Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort 

Benning, Georgia, currently conducts all Army Raven UAS training. As of 1 October 2012, the 

Army has transitioned to a SUAS Master Trainer program to train experienced operators at Fort 

Benning. These Master Trainers then return to their respective units to train SUAS operators at 

home station; this approach reduces the impact to the unit and enhances training flexibility. 

Uniformed instructor mobile training teams that deploy to units to deliver the syllabus are used 

to supplement training needs. Training is provided primarily to enlisted soldiers, but officers are 

also trained. Upon completion of the course, personnel are qualified to program, launch, fly, 

retrieve, and maintain Ravens. Qualification does not result, however, in the award of an MOS or 

Specialty Identifier. 

Figure 36. Army Group 3 and Above UAS Operator Training Flow

 85 Eyes of the Army, U.S. Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2010-2035.
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7.4.1.2 Marine Corps

The Marine Corps uses a three-person crew for its RQ-7B Shadow training. The crew 

consists of an unmanned aircraft commander (UAC), an air vehicle operator (AVO), and a 

mission payload operator (MPO). RQ-21A Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft Systems (STUAS) 

are crewed by a UAC and an AVO, who performs the MPO function as well. UACs are officers, 

while both AVOs and MPOs are enlisted positions. Currently, Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

Squadron (VMU) officers are sourced from the existing pool of qualified aviation officers; 

however, with the establishment of the VMU Officer Primary Military Occupational Specialty

(PMOS), new second lieutenants will begin to be qualified as UACs. This dual sourcing strategy 

will continue until grade shaping of the MOS is achieved. AVOs and MPOs are sourced as entrylevel positions, and each is also assigned a unique UAS MOS identifier. 

The Marine Corps utilizes Army, Navy, and Air Force schools to train its VMU 

personnel, including maintenance personnel. The flow for Marine Corps Group 3 training is 

depicted in Figure 37. The Marine Corps is currently exploring the feasibility of standing up a 

UAS schoolhouse to standardize training for its RQ-7B and RQ-21A UACs, operators, and 

maintainers. This schoolhouse will build on joint training primary schools and maximize the use 

of simulation. 

Figure 37. Current Marine Corps Group 3 UAS Operator Training Flow

In July 2012, the Marine Corps stood up a Group 1 SUAS training activity at Camp 

Lejeune, North Carolina, to provide standardized non-MOS training for enlisted Marine Corps 

operators of SUAS. One of the goals of this schoolhouse is to relieve the line units from the 

burdens of providing initial SUAS training for their operators. By providing a centralized 

schoolhouse co-located with 2nd Marine Division, efficiencies in training and logistics have been 

achieved. A similar SUAS training activity is planned for Camp Pendleton, California, in support 

of 1st Marine Division.

7.4.1.3 Air Force

The Air Force classifies its Groups 4 and 5 UAS (MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and 

RQ-4 Global Hawk) as Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA). RPA pilot and sensor operator aircrews 

are formally trained to operate the aircraft. Officer RPA pilots are sourced from the current rated 

pilot community or through the newly established Undergraduate RPA Training (URT) program, 

similar to Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT) program for manned aircraft. URT 

is another dual accession strategy to reach initial USAF RPA manning requirements. Sensor 

operators are enlisted airmen sourced similarly to pilots, some from current intelligence career 
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fields and others through the newly created RPA sensor operator career field. The Air Force 

created new career fields and associated specialty codes for both its new rated RPA pilots and 

sensor operators. The training flow for these positions is depicted in Figure 38 (NOTE: The 

formal training unit for the Global Hawk is at Beale AFB, California.)

Figure 38. Air Force MQ-1/9 Pilot & Sensor Operator Training Flow

The Air Force has also created a Mission Intelligence Coordinator position to manage 

real-time/near-real-time intelligence information available to MQ-1/9 RPA pilots and/or sensor 

operators. Mission intelligence coordinators are sourced primarily from existing squadron 

intelligence positions and intelligence officer positions. Candidates undergo an initial 

qualification training course at either Creech AFB, Nevada, or March Air Reserve Base, 

California, and further mission qualification training at a squadron to attain mission-ready status. 

Air Force RPA maintenance training is accomplished at three Air Force skill levels. RPA 

maintenance fundamentals are taught at the maintenance school at Sheppard AFB, Texas. 

Following RPA training at Sheppard AFB, initial and advanced skills maintenance training 

occurs at the operational RPA squadron.

The Air Force classifies its Groups 1 to 3 UAS, such as the Raven, Scan Eagle, and 

Shadow, as SUAS. They are operated by qualified SUAS operators, primarily enlisted airmen. 

These SUAS operators attend a formal, 10-day training course approved by Air Force Special 

Operations Command and conducted by Det 1, 371 SOCTS at the Eglin Range Complex in 

Florida. Curriculum has been developed and approved for the RQ-11B and is in development for 

the RQ-20A. SUAS operators are interchangeably qualified as vehicle operators and mission 

operators, the two crew positions required to operate the system. Qualification as an SUAS

operator does not result, however, in the award of an Air Force Specialty Code or Special 

Experience Identifier. 
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7.4.1.4 Navy

While the formal deliberative process for developing training to support emerging largescale Navy PORs is in the infancy stage, the Navy has the advantage of drawing on lessons 

learned from the other Services. Current training during system development for PORs and rapid 

deployment capability efforts is being supported and provided by the associated program offices 

through contractor arrangements. 

The Navy recently opened up a MQ-8 Fire Scout operator and maintainer training center 

at Naval Air Station Jacksonville. The aircraft and personnel are dual qualified in SH-60 

Seahawks and assigned to mixed aviation squadrons containing both Seahawks and Fire Scouts. 

A similar organizational and basing construct is being examined for the MQ-4 Triton, the UAS

complement for the Navy’s fleet of P-3/8 aircraft to conduct ISR missions. Triton is currently 

operated at a demonstration level with training of initial operational evaluation crews slotted for 

late FY2014 followed a year later by initial cadre training. In June 2010, the Navy and Air Force 

signed a Triton and Global Hawk synergy memoranda of agreement (MOA) that specifies Navy 

and Air Force WGs to “Identify and incorporate every appropriate synergy in basing, 

maintenance, aircraft C2, training, logistics, and data requirements for processing, exploitation, 

and dissemination (PED) functions.”86

Viable long-term training solutions for Navy systems are currently being developed 

within the framework of the basic UAS qualification standards outlined in the CJCSI 3255.01 

and the Naval Education and Training Command Course Development and Revision Process. 

7.4.1.5 Continuation and Joint Training

The focus of Service training efforts and strategy thus far has centered on developing 

initial skill sets and qualifying personnel to man a rapidly increasing UAS fleet. How to maintain 

and advance these skill sets through continuation training and education at the individual, crew, 

and collective levels has been largely overshadowed by the contingency environment. While 

Services have established currency requirements for their operators, currency is typically 

maintained through real-world operations rather than in a training environment. Furthermore,

additional challenges impact domestic training. These challenges are being mitigated largely by 

the use of simulators and surrogates, but the full mix and balance of the live, virtual, and 

constructive domains and blended reality must be identified for the future. 

Given that individual, crew, and collective continuation training constitutes the majority 

of training requirements and activity, the Services will need to continue efforts in these areas. 

These training programs are necessary to prepare operators for joint training and pre-deployment 

exercises.

While surrogates and virtual substitutes do address some challenges, the lack of home

station UAS training opportunities and codified TTPs can limit the training experience of units 

preparing for deployment into theater. For example, combat training centers have observed units 

that were not adequately trained in UAS operations at home station prior to capstone training 

 86 Memorandum of Agreement between Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) and the RQ-4 Global Hawk 

system, signed 12 June 2010
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exercises. Such units routinely receive UAS hands-on immersion training following deployment 

into theater during mission execution.

Attempts are being made to incorporate unmanned systems into joint and multinational 

exercises at every level. As a high-demand/low-density asset, live unmanned systems are often 

unavailable for exercises and pre-deployment training. The use of manned surrogate platforms to 

replicate aspects of unmanned platform behavior, such as FMV feeds, is common and useful in 

ensuring the exercise participants are trained and familiar with unmanned systems capabilities 

when deployed. Additionally, exercise and pre-deployment training scenarios use computergenerated, simulated video feeds to support joint exercises and to ensure warfighters are able to 

incorporate unmanned systems into their training even when actual systems are not available.

7.4.2 Unmanned Ground Systems

The Army provides UGS training through the RS JPO. Headquartered in Warren, 

Michigan, the RS JPO’s training mission is twofold: 1) to develop, integrate, and manage UGS

training operations, requirements, plans, and products through partnerships with organizations 

and entities internal and external to the RS JPO and 2) to execute joint functional operator and 

technical training for COTS and POR systems to support force capability generation and unit 

resetting through mobile training teams and resident courses. Since its inception, RS JPO has 

been tasked as the equipment support activity manager for supporting the “in theater” and 

“training center” sustainment operations for UGS for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 

Corps. Currently, training is from neither a systems approach nor a MOS organizational 

construct identified or designated to perform the training function. 

In 2004, the RS JPO established the JRRF in response to urgent operational needs and in 

support of the joint forces engaged in the theatre of operations for all Joint Service NSE robotic 

systems. The JRRF’s support areas include in-theater sustainment support and individual and 

unit operations training of robotic systems. RS JPO conducts operator certification courses on all 

robotic systems currently fielded and intended for users in the theater of operations. Training is 

currently conducted at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; Selfridge Air National Guard Base 

(SANGB), Michigan; and unit home stations through mobile training teams.

The small robot certification course is a two-day course that provides the operator system 

uses, characteristics, capabilities, limitations, component identification, pre-mission mechanical 

and functions checks, and hands-on practical application. Personnel are required to successfully 

complete a practical exercise performance evaluation to obtain certification. The M160 operator 

course is six days long and currently conducted at Fort Leonard Wood.

All robot technicians are trained on tasks that are required for the repair and maintenance 

of robotic systems supported by RS JPO. This training is achieved via a 10-week robot 

maintenance and repair course currently taught at SANGB. The course totals 400 hours of 

training in which the technicians are certified to work on RS JPO-supported robotic systems. 

Technicians receive operator training and hands-on training in troubleshooting; removing and 

replacing line replaceable units on currently deployed robotic systems; and using maintainer 

tools, special tools, and test equipment to maintain robotic platforms.
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Due to increasing robotic sustainment and training demands, RS JPO opened the Robotic 

University at Fort Leonard Wood on 4 April 2012. This detachment consists of technician bays 

and classrooms, warehouse space, and office space. Robotic University is truly a one-stop-shop 

with the ability to repair, supply, and train robotic systems. The Robotics University and 

SANGB training sites, with their equipment, materials, technicians, and instructors, give service 

members the required skills and confidence in the robotics. 

7.4.3 Unmanned Maritime Systems 

The Navy currently has a number of UMS consisting of USVs and UUVs that perform a 

variety of missions including mine warfare, mine neutralization, reconnaissance, surveillance, 

hydrographic surveying, environmental analysis, special operations, and oceanographic research. 

These systems vary in size and displacement and run from man-portable systems to systems 

40 feet in length and several thousand pounds in displacement. These systems are predominately 

launched from submarines or surface ships and recovered and maintained aboard those vessels. 

The new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) employs the largest inventory of unmanned systems for a

variety of missions including surface warfare (SUW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and mine 

countermeasures (MCM).

UMS training consists of an assortment of methodologies that provide an optimal 

learning environment and include classroom as well as hands-on training. Classroom instruction 

consists of the fundamentals of operation and maintenance while the hands-on training covers 

the practical application of that knowledge. Follow-on and refresher training is provided by 

computer-based training (CBT) that includes online simulations of actual operations. Training is 

conducted at the appropriate training center, such as the Mine Warfare Training Center in San 

Diego, California, or at the Warfare Center that is the core support center for the specific system.

LCS Detachments consisting of up to 15 officers and technicians are assigned to LCS for 

each of the respective Mission Modules (i.e., SUW, ASW, MCM) and undergo classroom and 

hands-on training before boarding LCS for a deployment. As the personnel rotate on and off one 

LCS to other assignments and then back again, refresher training is provided at the Shore Based 

Trainer in San Diego. It includes individual CBT consoles and team training consoles to help 

sharpen previously learned skills. There are also CBT modules that can be downloaded for 

continuous training while aboard the LCS. Additional training centers will be established in Fort 

Lauderdale, Florida, and at various overseas locations as warranted to maintain detachment 

proficiency.

7.4.4 The Acquisition Process

Much has already been said in this document about the challenges created by the rapid 

acquisition of unmanned systems in response to urgent operational needs. As the immediacy of 

urgent operational needs begins to slow, the unmanned systems acquisition process will begin to 

normalize. As requirements for new generations of unmanned systems are generated, training 

must be developed concurrently with the new systems. Associated costs should be appropriately 

addressed across the program life cycle. The training KPP is required to eliminate ad hoc training 

systems at delivery. 
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7.4.5 The Regulatory Environment

The regulatory environment is a unique challenge to unmanned systems operations, 

particularly in peacetime. While all systems are governed by regulatory requirements of one sort 

or another, unmanned systems bring with them an additional set of procedural and safety 

concerns because they are unmanned. These concerns are further increased with discussions of 

system autonomy. Much attention is being given to UAS autonomy, but it is not unique to UAS. 

How to train with an unmanned truck, for example, designed to move along roadways in a 

combat environment presents challenges when trying to traverse the U.S. interstate system and 

local county roads. Regulatory oversight may have the most significant impact on basing 

decisions and training operations, especially for UAS. 

7.4.6 Technology

Technology challenges for training can be grouped into two categories: 1) the need to 

train to new missions and affiliated technologies and 2) technology impacts on training. New 

missions, hardware developments, and software integration appear to be endless. Each has to be 

accompanied by associated training. For example, access to airspace may be enhanced by SAA

technologies that open up more opportunities for live training. Conversely, high-fidelity 

simulators and the availability of surrogate platforms could lessen the dependence on live 

training. Some technology impacts may not be so direct, but may be important none the less. For 

instance, a common control system not only has a training component, but could also lessen 

manpower requirements by leveraging the ability of a single operator to control multiple systems 

simultaneously. As a result, training throughput requirements and manpower resources could be 

decreased.

7.4.7 Manpower

Training faces several manpower challenges. First is the need for a sufficient instructor 

cadre. With ongoing contingency operations, qualified and potential instructors are often 

unavailable. Second, the Services have to address personnel qualifications and requirements, to 

adjust force structure, and to revise personnel processes to accommodate the new technologies. 

These actions affect the training audience. The coordination and integration of operators, force 

structure, and data analysts impact how training is accomplished and how training affects human 

resources. Manpower considerations for training must be fully explored to attain mission 

efficiencies and readiness. 

7.4.8 Asset Availability

Adequate training resources are another challenge. First, similar to unavailability of 

instructors because of real-world operations, actual unmanned system platforms are often not 

available for training. This lack of platforms can be mitigated by leveraging the use of simulation 

and surrogates. Second, programs need training capability assets, such as realistic target sets in 

representative terrain, runways, scoring and feedback systems for crewmember after action 

reviews, access to airspace and frequency spectrum, simulators and surrogates, communications 

infrastructure, and C2 organizations and processes at ranges. Low-cost training munitions that 

replicate the service munitions of weaponized platforms will also need to be developed to 

facilitate realistic training within budgetary constraints and installation range limitations. These 
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assets can be integrated into training requirements and plans. Moreover, the assets can influence 

basing decisions, operations, and funding strategies.

7.4.9 Policy and Documentation

Processes for capturing lessons learned and developing Service and joint doctrine and 

TTPs must be established and institutionalized through policy and documentation. Policy and 

documentation serve as the basis from which the Services develop training CONOPS, 

requirements, and plans. DoD, Service, and Joint plans identify and describe how the populations 

will be exposed to unmanned systems through professional military education and training. 

Training strategies for weaponized unmanned systems must identify the types and quantities of 

munitions required to maintain operator, crew, or unit proficiency in a training environment.

Additionally, policy, documentation, and plans codify career paths and expectations for 

unmanned systems leaders, operators, planners, maintainers, and users. 

7.5 The Way Ahead

Despite the challenges introduced by the rapid acquisition and fielding of unmanned 

systems, these systems are providing valuable capabilities to CCDRs today. Introduction of new 

systems and processes are traditionally fraught with growing pains, including in training. It is 

through their perseverance, ingenuity, and professionalism that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 

marines can adjust to ever-changing circumstances to maintain mission readiness and combat 

effectiveness. As DoD moves toward an environment where unmanned systems needs are more 

mature and the acquisition process normalizes, training processes and systems will also mature. 

While the real-world environment flexes with real-world contingencies and the realities of 

domestic unmanned systems training become more imminent, DoD is addressing training 

challenges as follows:

• The requirement and acquisition processes will continue to be reviewed for inclusion 

of training plans throughout a program’s development to help improve the rapid 

acquisition process. Current policy requires a draft training plan at each acquisition 

milestone. Additionally, new policy is being developed to strengthen those 

requirements and provide guidance for developing training for rapid acquisition 

programs. The policy will also offer a training plan template for the Services to 

support an appropriate training strategy.

• Organizations within DoD are working with regulators, other government 

organizations, and industry on how to safely incorporate these new technologies into 

today’s world on an ongoing basis. For example, the Airspace Integration IPT and

UAS ExCom, discussed in Chapter 5, will continue to implement products and 

activities to incrementally gain access to the NAS with the goal of attaining the level 

of UAS access to the NAS necessary to complete training and readiness requirements. 

• Training plans will be developed and updated to reflect modifications to legacy 

systems and introduction of new systems. DoD will continue to develop SAA

technologies to gain access to the NAS, increase commonality across control systems, 

increase autonomy of systems, and align fidelity of simulators for appropriate phases 

of training. Additionally, long-term success can be economically achieved with 

increased commonality of hardware to reduce unnecessary unique systems training.
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• As forces redeploy, the availability of instructors to fill training positions at all levels 

is expected to increase. As initial manning quotas are met, cross-flow accessions will 

be curtailed, and schoolhouses will transition to steady-state throughputs. As newly 

established career fields grow, season, and develop, experience levels will increase 

and normalize, similar to other career fields across the forces. Personnel systems will 

continue to align to the new technologies and mature.

• As forces return to home station from the current operational contingencies, decisions 

will be made about which systems become enduring PORs and transition back with 

the forces. It is envisioned that the redeployment will increase the availability of 

assets for training. Service and Joint training plans will need to mature and add the 

specificity needed to make prudent basing and resourcing decisions that enable 

effective training. 

• Service roadmaps will continue to evolve and mature along with the doctrine, training 

plans, and documentation needed to support robust training systems. Emphasis will 

be put on fostering jointness and incorporating cross-service participation during 

exercises. A comprehensive training strategy will be developed to guide the myriad of 

efforts across DoD and help ensure effective and efficient training. The strategy will 

leverage work already completed or underway within the Services and Joint Staff. Its 

scope will be broad to address the totality of UAS training, from the smallest to the 

largest systems, at all echelons, for all appropriate personnel, and across the training 

continuum.

A notional timeline for UAS training objectives is presented in Figure 39 and will be 

further refined upon completion of the UAS training strategy in FY2013. By overcoming these 

training challenges and developing a DoD-wide training strategy, future unmanned systems will 

deliver more effective warfighting capabilities to the battlefields of tomorrow.

Figure 39. UAS Training Objectives

Goals 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2030+

Technology 

Projects

Capabilty 

Needs

Near-Term: Improved 

simulator fidelity & 

integration of payloads onto 

surrogate platforms

Mid-Term: Integration of 

commonality efforts with 

simulator development

Far Term: Integration of 

simulators and surrogates 

into the live, virtual, and 

constructive and a blended 

reality training environments

Near-Term: Develop and implement DoD UAS 

Training Strategy; develop doctrine to 

support use of UAS operations; inform 

acquisition of surrogates and simulators; 

identify airspace requirements 

Mid- & Long-Term: Continue implementation 

and refine DoD UAS Training Strategy; refine 

UAS training programs to adjust for changes 

in doctrine; monitor acquision for 

incorporation into training programs
113

8 International Cooperation

8.1 Introduction

DoD international cooperation efforts include the cooperative research, development, 

test, and evaluation of defense technologies and systems with foreign partners as well as the

procurement of defense articles, systems, and services from foreign partners. It also includes 

participation in NATO capability groups. The objectives of international cooperation are 

• Operational. To increase military effectiveness through interoperability and 

partnership with allies and coalition partners. 

• Economic. To reduce weapons acquisition cost and achieve better buying power by 

sharing costs and economies of scale, avoiding duplication of development efforts,

and cooperatively producing or selling more weapons systems to our allies and 

friends.

• Technical. To access the best defense technology worldwide and minimize the 

capabilities gap with allies and coalition partners.

• Political. To strengthen alliances and relationships with other friendly countries.

• Industrial. To bolster domestic and allied defense industrial bases.

8.2 Methods of International Cooperation

Three primary methods are used for international cooperation:

• International agreements such as memoranda of agreement/understanding 

(MOAs/MOUs) aimed at joint research, development, and/or procurement of, or 

investment in, new defense technologies and systems

• Foreign military sales (FMS)

• Direct commercial sales (DCS)

8.2.1 MOAs and MOUs

DoD has entered into bilateral and multilateral agreements with a variety of international 

partners for the joint development of defense technologies and systems. Under such agreements, 

DoD works with its foreign counterparts and shares existing technology, expertise, and resources 

to develop new technical information; develop new technology, defense systems, or platforms; or 

improve existing products. DoD has entered into several such international cooperative 

agreements with foreign partners to advance UAS. For example, The Technical Cooperation 

Program (TTCP), a collaborative defense S&T program involving the United States, Great 

Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, was established to familiarize all partners with 

each other’s national defense S&T programs and to cooperate in a broad range of defense S&T 

activities and projects. The results of TTCP activities assist each participant in meeting defense 

requirements, while avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort. The participants of TTCP have

an active UAS program to share and conduct joint experiments in areas such as autonomous C2, 

novel aircraft configurations and systems, UAS self-protection, and counter-UAS. This activity 

has spawned an International Operators’ Group, which includes both operators and researchers to 

identify and address pervasive issues, as well as a number of bilateral agreements with individual 

nations.
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8.2.2 Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

The FMS program is the U.S. Government’s program for transferring defense articles, 

services, and training to other sovereign nations and international organizations. Under FMS, 

DoD procures defense articles and services on behalf of the foreign customer using the same 

acquisition process DoD uses for its own military needs. Countries approved to participate in this 

program may obtain defense articles, services, or training by paying with their own national 

funds or with funds provided through U.S. Government-sponsored assistance programs. In 

certain cases, defense articles, services, and training may be obtained on a grant basis. The 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency administers the FMS program for DoD. FMS cases must 

be reviewed/approved through the Department of State (DoS), and, in some cases, the U.S. 

Congress must be notified through the Congressional Notification process. In general, these 

government-to-government purchase agreements tend to ensure standardization with U.S. forces,

provide contract administration services that may not be available through the private sector, and 

help lower unit costs by consolidating purchases for FMS customers with purchases for DoD. 

8.2.3 Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)

Under DCS, U.S. companies obtain commercial export licenses from either DoS (for

munition items) or the Department of Commerce (DoC) (for dual-use items). These licenses

allow the companies to negotiate sales directly with foreign customers. All DCS are subject to 

the approval of DoS or DoC and, in some cases, the U.S. Congress and must comply with 

applicable U.S. exports laws and regulations. DCS allows the foreign customer more direct 

involvement during contract negotiation, may allow firm-fixed pricing, and may be better suited 

to fulfilling nonstandard requirements.

8.2.4 NATO

The military alliance promotes cooperation and interoperability through information 

exchange and the development of standards (see http://nsa.nato.int/nsa). For example, 

airworthiness standards have been developed and adopted by member nations and are being 

incorporated in MIL-HDBK-516B.

87 Additionally, the alliance is acquiring (under DCS) the 

NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) System, a derivative of the U.S. Global Hawk 

system. Five Europe-based AGS aircraft will serve alliance missions and, in turn, reduce demand 

for U.S. ISR systems to meet NATO requirements. See Appendices B and C of this roadmap for 

additional information on alliance standards, and see the publication AAP-0388 for established

procedures for the production, maintenance, and management of NATO standardization 

documents in accordance with NATO regulations.

8.3 International Cooperation Authority, Jurisdiction, Approval, and 

Disclosure

The U.S. Government has split export licensing authority for FMS and DCS among 

multiple organizations. The two primary Government regulations are the International Traffic in 

 87 MIL-HDBK-516B, Airworthiness Certification Criteria. 88 AAP-03, Production, Maintenance and Management of NATO Standardization Documents, Edition J, Version 2, 

November 2011 (http://nsa.nato.int/nsa).
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Arms Regulation (ITAR), which controls defense articles and services under the jurisdiction of 

DoS, and the Export Administration Regulation (EAR), which controls dual-use items under the 

jurisdiction of DoC.

8.3.1 Authority and Jurisdiction

8.3.1.1 International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR)

The Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) authorizes the President to control the 

export and import of defense articles and services. Pursuant to Executive Order 11958, this 

statutory authority was delegated to the DoS. ITAR implements that authority and is the 

governing regulation controlling the export of defense articles and services. ITAR includes the 

U.S. Munitions List, a list of defense articles controlled by ITAR. It further defines the export 

licensing requirements and procedures needed to export a defense article or perform a defense 

service as well as the process to determine the jurisdiction of a commodity (i.e., whether an item 

is controlled under ITAR or EAR). 

ITAR provides a number of exemptions to the licensing requirements for defense articles 

and services. Many of these exemptions are country specific (e.g., through implementation of 

UK and Australian defense trade treaties, the Canadian exemption) while others are transaction 

specific (e.g., shipments by or for U.S. Government agencies). Most ITAR exemptions have 

rigorous procedures, documentation, and record-keeping requirements associated with their 

implementation. Each of the U.S. military services, as well as other select DoD organizations, 

has been delegated limited export authority by the DoS. 

8.3.1.2 Export Administration Regulation (EAR)

EAR implements the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979. DoC has statutory 

authority for implementing EAA, which governs the export of the dual-use items identified in 

EAR’s Commodity Control List (CCL). “Dual use” refers to EAR-controlled items that can be 

used both in military and other strategic uses and in civil applications and are distinguished from 

items with weapon and military-related use or design that are subject to DoS control or the 

Department of Energy’s nuclear-related controls. EAR delineates license requirements for dualuse controls and, similar to the ITAR, provides for licensing exemptions. Note that not all items 

on the CCL require a license for release to all countries, and some commodities not specifically 

listed on the CCL could require an export license for select end uses and end users.

8.3.1.3 Foreign Disclosure

Decisions to disclose classified military information are often tied to security assistance 

and arms cooperation programs or to the transfer of defense articles; therefore, the National 

Disclosure Policy (NDP-1) must be in compliance with the provisions of the Arms Export 

Control Act and the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy. The release of classified military 

information for all U.S. Government disclosure activities must support U.S. foreign policy and 

military objectives. The basis for the release or denial of classified military information is 

twofold: a judgment by designated disclosure authorities that 1) the foreign recipient has the 

capacity and intent to provide adequate security protection to the information and 2) the national 

interest (foreign policy or military) will benefit.
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The policy provides for operation by exception. Exceptions to the policy may be decided 

by the Secretaries of State and Defense, their principal deputies, or the National Disclosure 

Policy Committee (NDPC). In most instances, the NDPC grants exceptions to policy. After 

deliberation by the NDPC, disclosure authority is delegated to the heads of departments and 

agencies responsible for the information within certain security classification limits (e.g., top 

secret, secret, or confidential) for specified categories of classified military information.

Considered in establishing these limits for each country or international organization are the 

following factors:

• Evaluation of the capability to protect the information based on a favorable NDPC 

security survey and/or a Central Intelligence Agency assessment of the risk to the 

information

• Existence of a formal government-to-government security agreement providing for 

the protection of the information

• Existence of a mutual defense or similar arrangement

• Frequency of disclosure

8.3.2 Approval and Disclosure

8.3.2.1 Technology Security

DoD has created 12 technology security review processes. Each process has 

responsibility for select technologies. For example, these processes include low-observable and 

counter-low-observable technology, GEOINT, communications security (COMSEC) devices, 

intelligence data, GPS, data links and waveforms, and night vision devices. Prior to the export 

(or implied export) of any item or technology controlled by the various technology security 

processes, the responsible process must be engaged and provide its concurrence with the 

proposed transfer.

8.3.2.2 Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy

The CAT policy is the standing Presidential policy guidance on arms transfers.

89 It is 

intended to promote restraint in the transfer of U.S. weapons systems, while supporting U.S. 

national security and foreign policy objectives and meeting the legitimate defense requirements 

of allied and friendly nations. DoS is responsible for articulating this policy and plays a major 

role in any proposed changes to it. DoS action officers use the CAT policy in case-by-case 

reviews of proposed transfers to determine whether a particular transfer of military equipment 

and/or services meets the 12 criteria established by the policy. This list of criteria can be found at 

http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rsat/c14023.htm.

8.3.2.3 Congressional Notifications

Pursuant to Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, the Executive Branch is 

required to formally notify the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign 

Affairs Committee when a potential FMS meets or exceeds specified dollar thresholds. Bureau of 

Political-Military Affairs Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfer (PM/RSAT) officers 

 89 Presidential Decision Directive 34 (PDD-34), Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, 17 February 1995.
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work with Bureau leadership and DoD to make the required notifications, including briefing 

Congressional staff on the potential arms sale and how it will serve U.S. interests.

8.4 Special UAS-Related Considerations

In addition to the above general constraints, certain considerations are unique to UAS,

i.e., they normally do not apply to other unmanned systems.

8.4.1 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

MTCR is an informal and voluntary association of countries that share the goals of 

nonproliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering WMDs and that seek to 

coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing WMD proliferation. MTCR rests 

on adherence to common export policy guidelines that are applied to an integral common list of 

controlled items. The greatest restraint (i.e., “a strong presumption of denial”) is applied to what 

are known as “Category I items.” These items include UAS with capabilities exceeding a 

300 km/500 kg range/payload threshold, the production facilities for such systems, and any 

major subsystems.

8.4.2 Armed UAS

DoD and DoS both place a high level of scrutiny on the export of armed UAS. In 

addition, the U.S. Congress has previously expressed reservations over the release of armed UAS 

to any but our closest allies. 

8.5 Reform Efforts

The U.S. Government and DoD have initiated a wide variety of reform efforts that will 

affect the DoD processes and procedures involved in international cooperation. Although not an 

exhaustive list, 8.5.1 through 8.5.4 highlight some of the current major reform efforts that will 

likely affect international cooperation related to unmanned systems.

8.5.1 Security Cooperation Reform

The FY12–16 Defense Planning and Programming Guidance90 called for establishing a 

task force to conduct a comprehensive review of DoD’s security cooperation processes. Specific 

requirements included the development of options for adjusting the operational direction, 

control, and authority of agencies implementing security assistance; options for aligning and 

streamlining security assistance and technology transfer processes, organizations, and 

regulations; a plan to implement a certification curriculum for security cooperation professionals 

similar to that for the defense acquisition workforce; and a plan to consider authorities, 

alignment of planning and resources, organizational change, and key processes. After analysis 

and outreach, the Security Cooperation Reform Task Force (SCRTF) revealed a series of 

findings and took a two-pronged approach to build an “anticipatory” system with a “fast-track”

capability for urgent partner needs. 

 90 FY12–16 Defense Planning and Programming Guidance, para. 6.3, Reform Security Cooperation (U), pg. 30, 

20 May 2010.
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SCRTF identified a set of 58 recommendations across five focus areas: planning, FMS 

process (i.e., contracting, procurement, transportation, and distribution) improvement, 

accelerated delivery, workforce development (training and education), and technology security 

and foreign disclosure.

In July 2011, SECDEF directed that the SCRTF recommendations be implemented and 

that SCRTF — under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

USD(Policy) — oversee implementation of the recommendations in the report.

8.5.2 Defense Exportability Features (DEF)

The DEF program is intended to ensure that the design and engineering of export variants 

of U.S. systems are initiated early in the acquisition process to increase the security of sensitive 

U.S. technology, avoid the high cost of developing an export variant from a fully engineered and 

implemented U.S. system, and achieve better buying power through the economies of scales 

realized through increased international procurement. The DEF pilot program was authorized in 

the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act. In FY2012, four programs, including a Navy

UAS, conducted DEF feasibility studies. These assessments identify the potential benefits and 

costs of providing protection to critical program information for the export variants in the design.

8.5.3 Export Control Reform (ECR) Initiative

In August 2009, the President directed a broad-based interagency review of the U.S. 

export control system, with the goal of strengthening national security and the competitiveness of 

key U.S. manufacturing and technology sectors by focusing on current threats and adapting to 

the changing economic and technological landscape. This review determined that the current 

export control system is overly complicated, contains too many redundancies, and, in trying to 

protect too much, diminishes our ability to focus our efforts on the most critical national security 

priorities. The Administration has determined that fundamental reform of the current system is 

necessary to overcome the inefficiencies and redundancies of a set of systems within a system.

As a result, the Administration launched the ECR Initiative, which is a common sense 

approach to overhauling the nation’s export control system. The ECR Initiative, which is not 

related to the President’s National Export Initiative, is designed to enhance U.S. national security 

and strengthen the ability of the United States to counter threats such as the proliferation of 

WMDs. The purpose of export controls is to ensure that items do not end up in the hands of 

someone who intends to harm the United States or its allies. It is a risk-based system, where 

items are generally authorized for export to low-risk destinations, while other items may be 

allowed to other destinations after closer scrutiny and some items may be denied.

The Administration is implementing the reform in three phases. Phases I and II reconcile 

various definitions, regulations, and policies for export controls, while building toward Phase III, 

which will create a single control list, single licensing agency, unified IT system, and 

enforcement coordination center. This implementation plan is designed to resolve core problems 

first, before focusing on Government reorganization. The consolidation plan in the final phase 

would eliminate the need to keep the systems within a system fully synchronized, by eliminating 

these separate systems. This common sense approach is good government, especially in this era 

of tightening budgets.
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8.5.4 Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure (TS&FD)

The Export Control Reform Task Force Report (issued 29 January 2010) recommended 

the initiation of an effort “to streamline and harmonize” U.S. Government TS&FD processes. As 

a result, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked USD(AT&L) and USD(Policy) to conduct a 

review of DoD-led TS&FD processes and provide alternative TS&FD system concepts to 

enhance transparency, predictability, and timeliness while maintaining the overall high quality of 

U.S. Government decision making in this key area. 

The U.S. Government currently has 13 separate, internal TS&FD processes in which 

DoD either leads or is a key participant. These processes are generally reactive in nature and do 

not anticipate building partner nation capacity requirements. Since these processes are neither 

integrated nor harmonized with each other, the lack of transparency and predictability in the U.S. 

Government TS&FD decision-making processes makes it difficult to synchronize U.S. 

Government activities to build partner nation capacity, which includes Washington arena, 

country team, CCDR, partner nation, and U.S. and foreign industry involvement.

DoD’s current TS&FD activities are focused on three areas:

• Establishing a TS&FD office to serve as the central processing organization of DoD 

decisions that affect DoD aspects of TS&FD release requests.

• Developing and issuing revised DoD and U.S. Government policy guidance to 

consolidate and restructure current U.S. Government TS&FD decision-making 

processes to enhance the quality, timeliness, and efficiency of DoD’s overall TS&FD 

decision making.

• Implementing overarching improvements in DoD for building partner nation capacity, 

defense exportability features, industry and partner outreach, and DoD workforce 

initiatives oriented toward proactive — rather that purely reactive — TS&FD 

decision making.
120

9 Summary

While DoD unmanned systems development funding may taper off over the early part of 

this decade, unmanned capabilities hold much promise for domestic commercial applications and 

personal consumer use. This trend could indeed reduce the price point of these systems for the 

military, which is good news for the U.S. taxpayer. However, if the technical challenges to 

unmanned systems development and operations are addressed by accomplishing the technical 

projects and tasks described in this roadmap, advances in capability can be readily achieved by 

the Services well beyond what is achievable today. See Figure 40. 

Figure 40. Overarching Innovation Goals Timeline

As the unmanned industry moves toward more deliberate and traditional program 

developments, it is imperative these future capabilities be addressed by the Service requirements 

managers as new programs are initiated. Working together with industry, academia, and other 

agencies, DoD will continue to map an affordable path using emerging technologies as a basis 

for future warfighter capabilities.

Goals 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2030+

Far Term

Improved Storage & 

Energy Harvest

Nano Energetics

GBSAA, ABSAA and 

Integrated NextGen

Sensor Data Cross 

Domain Sharing

Integration of simulators 

and surrogates into the 

live, virtual, and 

Efficient and afforable 

developments

Imporved Training 

Improved power, engine, & 

guidance technologies

Integration of weapons 

technologies

Increased Interoperability

Improved Power and 

Density

Unmanned Specific 

Weapons Design

Communication Gateway 

Points-of-Presence

Increased survivability and 

communication resilience 

Improved persistence 

Overarching Innovation Goals

Summary Timeline

Multi-Sensor/Milti-Mission 

Sensor Miniaturization & 

Interoperability

Improved simulator fidelity & 

integration of payloads onto 

surrogate platforms

GBSAA Solutions GBSAA Plus ABSAA 

Solutions

Sensor Modularity

Integration of 

commonality efforts with 

simulator development

Link connectivity & common 

communication architectures Enterprise Gateways

Desired 

Capabilty

Technology 

Projects

Near Term Mid Term

Increased lethality 

Incremental increases in 

airspace integration 

Increased autonomy and 

maintainability
121

Appendix A FOUNDATIONAL DOCUMENTS AND REFERENCES

Air Force Science & Technology Plan, Department of the United States Air Force, 2011.

Carter, Ashton B., Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

“Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power — Obtaining Greater Efficiency and 

Productivity in Defense Spending.”

Carter, Ashton B., Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

“Should-cost and Affordability Memorandum.”

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Master Positioning, Navigation and Timing Plan, 13 April 

2007.

Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Policy (CNSSP) 15.

Defense Budget Priorities and Choices, Department of Defense, January 2012.

DoD GPS Security Policy, 4 April 2006.

Eyes of the Army, U.S. Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2010-2035.

“Fiscal Year 2012 President’s Budget Request (PBR) for the DoD S&T Program,” briefing, Mr. 

Bob Baker, Deputy Director, Plans & Programs, Assistant Secretary of Defense & Engineering, 

21 June 2011.

“FY12–16 Defense Planning and Programming Guidance,” 20 May 2010.

International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Radio Regulations, Geneva, Switzerland. 2007 

Edition.

Joint CONOPS for UAS, Third Edition, November 2011.

Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), Department of Defense, 17 January 2012.

Lundberg, Kent H., High-Speed Analog-to-Digital Converter Survey, MIT Press, 2002.

Naval Science and Technology Strategic Plan, Office of Naval Research, September 2011.

National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), Manual of Regulations 

and Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency Management, Washington, DC, January 2008 

edition, September 2009 revision.

Presidential Decision Directive 34 (PDD-34), Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, 17 February 

1995.

“Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” Department of Defense, February 2010.

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Training Superiority & Training Surprise, 

OUSD(AT&L), Washington, DC, January 2001.

Robotic Collaborative Technology Alliance (RCTA) FY2012 Annual Program Plan.
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Shaud and Lowther, “An Air Force Strategic Vision for 2020–2030,” Strategic Studies 

Quarterly, Spring, 2011.

“Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” Defense Strategic 

Guidance, January 2012.

“Teal Group Predicts Worldwide UAV Market Will Total $89 Billion in Its 2012 UAV Market 

Profile and Forecast,” Press Release Newswire, United Business Media, 11 April 2012.

“Terms of Reference-Defense Science Board Study on Technology and Innovation Enablers for 

Superiority in 2030,” USD(AT&L) Memorandum, 15 March 2012.

Unmanned ground systems roadmap, Robotic Systems Joint Program Office, July 2011.

Unmanned Interoperability Initiative (UI2) Capability Based Assessment, 1 March 2012 and 

14 May 2012.

Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036.
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Appendix B PRIORITY INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS

The list of standards below is not all-inclusive; rather the list focuses on priority 

standards for joint interoperability and UI2 CBA gaps. To be effective, policy and standards 

require DAE and SAE commitment, oversight, and enforcement prior to approving applicable 

JCIDS milestones (and DoD architecture framework products), Interoperability Certification and 

Information Support Plans (ISP). These priorities will be updated during biannual reviews of this

Roadmap (or sooner by exception).

• USIP 1.1 Line of Sight Transmission of Motion Imagery for Battlespace Awareness 

Using Standard Common Data Link. Mandated standard available on DISR, 

30 November 2010. Interoperability Profiles (IOPs):

IP 1.1: Motion Imagery for Situational Awareness Governing Standards. These standards 

are the basis for the implementation and take precedence.

 MISP 5.1, Motion Imagery Standards Profile, December 2008

 Motion Imagery Standards Board (MISB) Standard 0601.2 UAS Datalink Local 

Metadata Set, October 2008

 MISB EG 0902, MISB Minimum Metadata Set, May 2009

 IETF RFC 0768, User Datagram Protocol, August 1980

 IETF RFC 0791, Internet Protocol (IPv4), September 1981

Other Applicable Standards. These references are cited by the governing standards and 

provide further specification detail to completely define the implementation.

 MISB Standard 0807, DoD/I/NSG Motion Imagery Metadata Registry

 MISB Standard 0604, Time Stamping Compressed Motion Imagery

 MISB Standard 0102.5, Security Metadata Universal and Local Data Sets for 

Digital Motion Imagery

 MISB RP 0603, Common Time Reference for Digital Motion Imagery Using 

Coordinated Universal Time

 MISP RP 0903, Video Moving Target Indicator Local Data Set

 ISO/IEC 13818-1:2007, Information Technology — Generic Coding of Moving 

Pictures and Associated Audio Information: Systems

 SMPTE 335M-2001, Metadata Dictionary Structure

 SMPTE 336M-2007, Data Encoding Protocol Using Key-Length Value

 SMPTE RP210.10-2007, Metadata Dictionary Registry of Metadata Element 

Descriptions

 NGA.STND.0024-2_1.0, Sensor Independent Complex Data (SICD) for complex 

SAR imagery

 NATO STANAG 4676, NATO Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance 

Tracking Standard (NITS)—Key enabler for UAS information fusion, currently 

used to “make sense” of GMTI “dots”

 NATO STANAG 4607, Ground Moving Target Indication Format (GMTIF)

 NATO STANAG 4559, NATO Standard Image Library Interface (NSILI)—

currently edition 3, the next edition will be XML capable—used to share and 

expose data between systems
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 NATO STANAG 3277, Joint ISR Task and Request Data Format—cross-cue and 

sensor task request implementation

 Theater Net-centric Geo-location (TNG) Joint Interface Control Document 

(JICD)—SIGINT interoperability

 JPEG 2000, Interactive Protocol (JPIP)—useful in large format sensor 

applications like wide area surveillance sensors

 SMPTE 296M-2001, 1280 x 720 Progressive Image Sample Structure —

Analogue and Digital Representation and Analogue Interface

 SMPTE 274M-2008, 1920 x 1080 Image Sample Structure, Digital 

Representation and Digital Timing Reference Sequences for Multiple Picture 

Rates

 SMPTE 295M-1997, 1920 x 1080 50-Hz — Scanning and Interface

 NATO STANAG 4609, AIR (Edition 2) — NATO Digital Motion Imagery 

Standard

 AEDP-8 (Edition 2), NATO Motion Imagery (MI) STANAG 4609 (Edition 2) 

Implementation Guide

 MIL-STD-2500C, National Imagery Transmission Format (NITF) Version 2.1 for 

the National Imagery Transmission Format Standard

IP 2.1: Managed Configuration of STD-CDL Terminals Governing Standards:

 Specification Number 7681990, Rev H, Performance Specification for the 

Standard Common Data Link Waveform

 Specification Number 60038365, Capstone Specification for the Network -Centric 

Common Data Links

 NATO STANAG 7085, Interoperable Data Links for Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance (ISR) Systems, Edition 3, pending promulgation

https://gtg.csd.disa.mil/uam/marketing.jsp

• UAS Control Segment (UCS) Architecture Release 3.1

https://ucsarchitecture.org

• National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) GEOINT Metadata Standards

(OUSD-I Memo 31 AUG 2011) for MIL STD 2500C, MISP and STANAG 4607.

 DoD IT Standards and Profile Registry (DISR) Online

https://gtg.csd.disa.mil/uam/marketing.jsp

• DoD Common Data Link (CDL) Policy 7 August 2009.

• Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Committee (JFS ESC) Digitally Aided Close 

Air Support (DACAS) Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs). ECP # 8 Unmanned 

Aircraft System (UAS) Integration as a Strike Platform.

https://community.apan.org/joint_close_air_support_jcas/dacas_ci_usc/default.aspx

• CJCSI 6212.01F NET READY KEY PERFORMANCE PARAMETER (NR KPP), 

21 March 2012.
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• NATO STANAG 4586, Standard Interface of the Unmanned Control System (UCS) 

for NATO UAS Interoperability

• DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF), Version 2.0

http://dodcio.defense.gov/dodaf20.aspx
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Appendix C DOD INITIATIVES TO INCREASE INTEROPERABILITY 

AND MODULARITY 

UI2 CBA

This CBA is the culmination of a joint WG effort to conduct an operational assessment of 

unmanned systems interoperability task needs, identify and prioritize gaps in the ability to satisfy 

these needs, and identify potential DOTMLPF-P priorities to mitigate the identified capability 

gaps. Each military department and agency will find aspects of the CBA relevant to its mission 

responsibilities. The I-IPT under the UAS Task Force will continue to work with the military 

departments and agencies to close gaps identified within the CBA to ultimately improve 

capability to the warfighter.

The CBA effort derived the 29 prioritized joint UAS interoperability gaps, which are

listed below. The complete approved CBA is available on the USD(AT&L) restricted Unmanned 

Warfare Information Repository website.

• Detect or sense and avoid other airspace users in accordance with NAS standards and 

tactical requirements for deconfliction and collision avoidance.

• Provide selectable ISR data in joint approved network formats and waveforms.

• Provide ISR, tracking data, and location information in common, discoverable, 

retrievable, selectable formats to authorized subscribers across domains, including C2 

interfaces such as Blue Force Tracker.

• Provide accurate position reporting sufficient for joint common operational picture 

and joint common air picture applications.

• Provide location information from all sensors for ISR contacts of interest from UAS 

to authorized subscribers, including the transfer of targets in different domains, e.g.,

for the transfer of a subsurface maritime contact by a UA. (Authorized subscribers 

include direct machine-to-machine data exchange.)

• Provide accurate UA position reporting sufficient for safe and effective operation in 

NAS airspace and theater airspace.

• Enable vehicle/payload control by all authorized joint users with approved control 

mechanisms.

• Provide UAS sensor point and area of interest location information to authorized 

subscribers in the specified format.

• Enable multiple authorized controllers (subscribers/requests) to control and transfer 

control of the vehicle (and/or payloads) and to accept transfer of control between 

approved control nodes (including when payloads are able to support multiple users 

simultaneously) (will require the capability to assess and prioritize requests).

• Provide communication gateway and aerial network or network node services 

compatible with appropriate joint networks.

• For appropriately equipped UAS, provide target designation in accordance with

requirements of precision joint munitions (such as JAGM, Hellfire, and small 

diameter bomb).

• Provide and/or exchange payload and mission information to authorized subscribers 

in the specified format.
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• Transmit, relay, or retransmit required voice transmissions or sensor data in 

accordance with joint standards to authorized DoD and non-DoD subscribers.

• Provide fire support functions that are compatible with joint targeting control systems 

and procedures.

• For both manned and unmanned platforms, provide airborne handoff of missions or 

services between platforms.

• Enable authorized users to access data archive and retrieval systems.

• Integrate with the unmanned systems environment to C2 sensor fields using other 

unmanned sensors and platforms.

• Provide and enable joint information operations and information warfare effects 

including electronic attack, electronic protection, and EW support that is compatible 

with joint EW attack systems and appropriate requirements for “hardening” against 

EW threats.

• Deliver lethal or nonlethal effects in accordance with joint TTPs.

• Provide battle damage assessment input data in joint approved formats to authorized 

subscribers and assessment teams.

• Provide meteorological and oceanographic data in common, discoverable, retrievable 

format to authorized subscribers.

• Provide chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive data in 

prescribed format to authorized subscribers.

• Simultaneously control multiple air vehicles of either similar or dissimilar types from 

a single control station.

• Provide multiple authorized users (GCS or manned aircraft) with the capability to 

control target designation and weapon launch in accordance with joint TTP.

• Provide nonmilitary data compatible with federal and state agencies in support of a 

range of disaster, wildfire, and rescue operations.

• Provide platform-operating status by UAS class sufficient to facilitate transfer of 

control (handover) of the air vehicle or systems within the joint force to facilitate safe 

operation.

• Provide platform health indicator information to authorized controllers in the 

specified format.

• Perform launch and recovery under the control of multiple authorized and capable 

joint users and facilities (terminal phase of operations).

• In situations involving a loss of control link or loss of communications, comply with 

DoD contingency procedures.

Standards and Governance Efforts

DoD can accomplish unmanned systems interoperability by standardizing critical 

interfaces within the overall UAS architecture and implementing standard IOPs. DoD must 

clearly and consistently define the communication protocols, message formats, and 

implementation methods across these interfaces. The I-IPT will work with DoD partners, the 

Services, and the Joint Staff to define and enforce the standard IOPs through the USIP WG and 

the UCS WG for incorporation into the JCIDS processes. This effort will facilitate the mandated 

acquisition, technology, and logistics lifecycle management efficiencies across current and future 

UAS programs.
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The OSD defines OA as follows:91

A multifaceted strategy providing a framework for developing joint interoperable 

systems that adapt and exploit open-system design principles and architectures. This 

framework includes a set of principles, processes, and best practices that:

 Provide more opportunities for competition and innovation

 Rapidly field affordable, interoperable systems

 Minimize total ownership cost

 Optimize total system performance

 Yield systems that are easily developed and upgradeable

 Achieve component software reuse

UCS OA is the business model foundation on which all USIPs and Service IOPs should 

be based. In some instances, USIPs and/or Service IOPs may be incorporated into the UCS 

framework; however, the overarching intent is to ensure synchronization and compatibility 

among UCS, USIP, and Service IOP directives.

UCS Architecture 

The UCS Architecture is a framework representing the software-intensive capabilities of 

current and emerging UAS programs in the Army, Navy, and Air Force inventories. The goal is 

to develop an architecture based on SOA principles, which will be adopted by each Service as a 

common business model for acquiring, integrating, and extending the capabilities of the control 

systems for UAS. Under direction from the USD(AT&L) Acquisition Decision Memorandum 

(11 February 2009), the UAS Task Force chartered the UCS WG to develop and demonstrate a 

common, open, and scalable architecture supporting UAS Groups 2–5. The UCS WG comprises

Government and industry representatives and operates collaboratively using a technical society 

model where all participants are encouraged to contribute in any area of interest. In this context, 

the UCS Architecture supports the following OSD-stated high-level business objectives:

• Acquisition flexibility for control segment subsystems and components

• Cost control

• Innovation at all levels of industry

• Reduced integration time for new capabilities

• Reuse across Service and joint UAS programs where appropriate

Upon completion of UCS Architecture version 2.1, the UCS WG is planning to transition 

to the Army’s Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center (AMRDEC)

Joint Technology Center/Systems Integration Lab (JSIL) at Redstone Arsenal for enduring 

governance, oversight, management, and custodianship of the UCS business model, interfaces, 

web repository, and future revisions to the UCS Architecture and/or interfaces. JSIL will 

establish the UCS Steering Committee (SC) and continue to support OSD and the service 

acquisition portfolio managers. JSIL will stay synced with USIPs, ICWGs, and IOPs and will be 

the Government lead for both the UCS SC and USIP SC. In this capacity, JSIL will act as an 

 91 Terms and Definitions, Defense Acquisition University: https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=22108.
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unbiased third party to routinely advise OSD, the Joint Staff, and Service acquisition executives

on all UCS issues.

The restricted website is https://fusion.dynetics.com/project/UCSWG. To request access, 

visit the I-IPT public website (http://ucsarchitecture.org), and follow the instructions for 

requesting access to the restricted website.

Unmanned Systems Interoperability Profiles (USIPs)

USIPs are the implementation of the mandate by the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s 

“Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Memorandum 14667-07” (13 September 2007) to develop 

standard IOPs linked to JCIDS documents. They help drive the implementation of approved DoD 

and/or joint interoperability priorities at the Service level and may even require a new Service 

IOP or revision to an existing IOP.

USIPs also support the CJCSI interoperability requirement by creating specific points of 

“capability-based interoperability.” The purpose of a USIP is to define profiles of standards 

sufficient to guarantee interoperability in support of a specific mission capability. A USIP may 

reference DoD standards, Intelligence Community standards, Service-specific IOPs, and

commercial standards to achieve capability-based interoperability. All approved USIP standards 

can be found on DISR.

The USIP WG is currently run by the JSIL and comprises Government and industry 

representatives in the same enduring governance, oversight, and management role as the UCS 

SC. This new USIP SC will form an advisory group that is responsible to the UAS Task Force

and serves in an unbiased, coordinating role for all UAS Task Force IPTs involved in USIP 

development, implementation, and initiation. The USIP SC shall coordinate staffing and 

approval of proposed USIPs with the UAS Task Force, JROC, and JCA functional capabilities 

boards as required. The USIP SC will remain engaged with the Service ICWG/IOP processes to 

ensure synchronization and foster the vertical and horizontal cooperation essential to joint 

interoperability. 

The intent of the USIP development and management process is to leverage existing 

processes within both the DoD acquisition management system and the JCIDS process to 

develop more capable and interoperable unmanned systems.

• USIP 1 (LOS FMV), approved, in DISR release 11-1.

• USIP 2 (BLOS FMV), to be submitted for DISR release 12-1.

• USIP 3 (Bandwidth Efficient LOS), on hold pending BE-CDL Rev B outcome.

• USIP 4 (Video Control Interface for Region of Interest Delivery), in progress. This 

effort relates to wide area sensors.

• USIP 5 (Weaponization), in progress.

The restricted website is https://software.forge.mil/sf/go/proj1887. To request access, 

visit the I-IPT public website

(https://software.forge.mil/sf/projects/usip_universal_systems_interoper), and follow the 

instructions for requesting access to the restricted website.
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Service Interface Control Working Groups (ICWGs) 

The intent of a Service-level ICWG is to ensure that UAS program and product 

managers, developers, Services, and end users actively participate in the development and 

implementation of Service-specific interoperability solutions. This collaborative organization 

(Government-industry partnerships) serves as the standards recommendation body chartered 

within each Service to promote interoperability across various product lines. 

The ICWG is a technical “engineering-level” body focused on identifying interoperability 

solutions for the respective Service’s UAS FoS. These select requirements and implementation 

strategies are published within a set of IOPs and are for use by developers and implementers of 

new (and potential) UAS and related capabilities. IOP implementation across UAS products 

facilitates diverse levels of interoperability and is intended to provide the end user with an 

increased payload utility, a reduced tactical footprint, and an expanded unmanned aircraft

platform availability. 

The Services as a whole have made significant progress in establishing these ICWGs for 

unmanned systems for the end-to-end management of interface control. Each Service’s ICWG 

has an independent process for IOP development and configuration control. To ensure horizontal 

and vertical integration, each Service’s ICWG staff is represented within the other’s ICWG 

consortia unmanned systems, including the I-IPT, UCS WG, and USIP WG. Members from both 

the UCS SC and USIP SC are also represented. The Army established the ICWG process within 

PEO Aviation’s UAS project office. The Navy recently followed suit and is actively working to 

establish its program under PEO Unmanned Warfare. The Air Force is in the process of vetting 

approval for the same for unmanned systems and organizations.

In coordination with the USIP SC and UCS SC, ICWGs are ideal bodies to nominate 

and/or implement USIPs either as a bottom-up nomination or a top-down implementation 

directive from OSD/Joint Staff. It is envisioned that applicable Service IOPs may be candidates 

for DoD/joint implementation through the USIP nomination process. Conversely, USIPs and/or 

UCS Architecture requirements may drive the development of new Service IOPs or modification 

of existing IOPs. In either case, the overarching intent is to avoid duplicative or conflicting 

Service IOPs.

Service IOPs 

Historically, unmanned systems have used very deterministic point-to-point interfaces; 

however, provisions of network-centric warfare require UAS programs to implement common 

standards in support of an FoS type of architecture. Widely accepted or approved standards are 

often too broadly defined and inadvertently allow compliance but not necessarily interoperability 

(e.g., CDL standards and MISB standards). Interface “standards” vary and allow for diverse 

implementation strategies and interpretations. To be truly interoperable, an FoS requires the 

Service-level development of IOPs. 

IOPs provide implementation guidance, best common practices, and profiles of standards 

to help ensure interoperable systems within a Service. IOPs are tightly coupled to program 

offices and industry partners because each sponsoring entity (e.g., program, industry partner) 

typically signs off on the IOP. Service system integration laboratories test against their IOPs to 
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ensure program compliance. IOPs perform a similar function to USIPs but typically have a 

broader scope. A single IOP may touch on several interrelated capabilities and their associated 

standards, profiles, practices, etc. IOPs that have support across multiple Services are good 

candidates for nomination as new bottom-up USIPs.

IOPs are managed by their respective Services and are developed through a collaborative 

process of various product offices and private industry partnerships. Within IOPs and related 

publications, each Service attempts to set and enforce only the standards critical to respective 

UAS interoperability. This approach provides the level of commonality required for 

interoperation while minimizing the impact on the native capabilities and design for each 

platform. IOPs contain interface requirements specific to interoperation capability within the 

various UAS. Additionally, IOP-related products (such as associated performance specifications, 

implementation guides, and interface control documents) support IOP implementation strategies, 

provide clarity of intent, and promote the use of emerging technologies expected for future 

standardization. In Service-specific cases, IOPs may be posted on DISR depending on the nature 

and approved enforcement or testing mechanisms.

Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC)

JITC is an organizational element of the DISA Test & Evaluation Directorate and has 

DoDI 4630 responsibility for certifying joint and combined interoperability of all DoD IT and 

NSS. JITC follows the processes outlined in DoDI 4630, the DoD CIO Interim Guidance 

Memorandum, and the JITC Interoperability Process Guide (10 September 2012) to perform 

joint interoperability testing and certification. It works closely with the Services, Joint Staff, 

OSD, and DoD CIO to provide recommendations to the Interoperability Steering Group for 

waivers, extensions, and ultimately full interoperability certification and compliance status 

reporting to DAEs and SAEs. OSD and JITC are committed to testing reciprocity agreements 

with the various joint and Service testing facilities to encourage compliance testing earlier in the 

acquisition and product development process and to support the USIP SC, UCS SC, and ICWGs.

The restricted website (DKO) is available on the public website:

(http://jitc.fhu.disa.mil/index.html).

Joint Technology Center/Systems Integration Laboratory (JSIL)

JSIL supports the assessment of system integration readiness during the product 

development process, prior to actual flight testing. JSIL provides for distributed hardware-in-theloop testing of payloads, air vehicles, ground system components, and joint interfaces using 

MUSE in globally distributed command exercises and experiments. The purpose of JSIL is to 

provide simulation, integration, and a full range of test support to the joint UAS family.

More recently, JSIL was resourced in a program decision memorandum to support OSD, 

the UAS Task Force, and I-IPT plan of action and milestones. As the UCS WG and USIP WG

transition to an enduring role, JSIL will continue to lead the UCS SC and USIP SC in direct 

support to OSD’s acquisition oversight roles for establishing, maintaining, and reporting 

USIP/UCS implementation and compliance.
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The restricted website is provides more information. To request access, visit the I-IPT 

public website (https://software.forge.mil/sf/projects/usip_universal_systems_interoper), and 

follow the instructions for requesting access to the restricted website.

DoD IT Standards and Profile Registry (DISR)

DISR is an online repository of DoD IT and NSS standards and related information,

formerly captured in JTA, version 6.0. DISR replaces JTA. All approved USIPs are submitted to 

DISR.

In addition to the definition of common capability descriptions, standards, data models, 

and architectures, DoD, through OSD, continues to promote the development of OA tools and 

implementations to aid system acquisition and development in embracing the OA concepts.

These efforts extend across the technology and unmanned vehicle spectrum, from software 

development kits, to complete architectures, addressing UGS, UMS, and UAS, across the 

Services. Examples of such tools include the following ongoing efforts on the ground, in 

maritime spaces, and in airspaces: 

1. The JAUS Tool Set (JTS) is a tool to help developers build JAUS-compliant software 

components without having to be intimately familiar with the details of JAUS. JTS 

allows an unmanned systems designer to focus on behavior, rather than on messaging, 

protocol, and other considerations, by providing a graphical user interface service editor, 

validator, internal repository, C++ code generation, and Hypertext Markup Language 

(HTML) document generation.

The Navy and OSD have supported and promoted the use of JTS and have had 

success incorporating it into development and acquisition efforts. Use of JTS on 

programs accrues benefits to a number of stakeholders in the acquisition chain and 

research and development and T&E communities. These benefits include enabling a fair 

basis for competition among vendors so that true capabilities are evaluated, reducing 

vendor lock-in on unmanned systems, and enabling the development of a “service 

repository” for JAUS capabilities that have been developed and are available for reuse.

JTS reduces the threshold for entry into developing JAUS-compliant systems, opens the 

market to small businesses, and drives competition and innovation focused on core 

technology. In addition, JTS provides an accepted, common validation capability, which 

is critical to ensure systems maintain compliance with JAUS.

2. The NATO STANAG 458692 Compliance Toolkit (4586CT) is an integrated set of 

software tools that provides passive, interactive, and automated test capability. Its core 

function is to verify the structure and content of data link interface (DLI) messages 

against both NATO STANAG 4586 and “private” messages as defined to support 

service-, mission-, or platform-specific requirements. This nonintrusive capability is 

provided either in real time or during post-run analysis. Additionally, 4586CT can be 

interoperable with other DLI-compatible systems in either manual mode (where an 

engineer monitors and injects DLI messages into the network) or automated mode (in 

 92 NATO STANAG 4586, Standard Interface of the Unmanned Control System (UCS) for NATO UAS 

Interoperability.
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which 4586CT interacts directly with other DLI systems according to user-defined scripts 

and procedures).

These capabilities enable 4586CT to perform compliance testing of unmanned 

systems relative to NATO STANAG 4586 and other, more specific IOPs, at both the 

message level and the higher level protocol session levels. Complex DLI message dialogs 

can be monitored and system interaction sequencing verified as 4586CT follows userdefined test programs. As 4586CT can function as a proxy for other unmanned system 

components, it is also used during system development and task-specific integration 

testing and can provide insight into unmanned systems interaction and performance.

Multiple instances of 4586CT can also be employed to perform rapid prototyping of 

interoperation protocols during profile design; as a result, 4586CT can be a useful tool 

during the development of interoperability standards themselves.

Future Airborne Capability Environment (FACE)

Near Term. The Army COE is an approved set of computing technologies and standards 

that enable secure and interoperable applications to be rapidly developed and executed across a 

variety of computing environments. Within the COE initiative, FACE is Army Aviation’s 

implementation. The objective of FACE is to establish a standard COE to support portable,

capability-based applications across DoD avionics systems.

FACE will reduce lifecycle costs and time to field, obtain industry and DoD program 

management endorsement, and facilitate conformance with standards to maximize 

interoperability between applications within the avionics system. The environment builds on 

OAs, integrated modular avionics, and a modular open systems approach (MOSA) and is 

designed to be portable, modular, partitioned, scalable, extended, and secure. By expanding on 

the MOSA and OA principles, FACE uses abstraction layers at key interfaces to diminish the 

need for new standards. The FACE technical strategy is to create a software environment on the 

installed computing hardware of DoD aircraft that enables FACE applications to be deployed on 

different platforms with minimal to no impact to the FACE application. 

SPIES Initiative

Near Term. The goal of the SPIES initiative is to develop EO/IR sensor-platform 

interface standards that enable reduced acquisition, integration, and lifecycle costs; improve 

agility; promote OA and interoperability objectives via Navy/DoD standardization; and maintain 

system performance, reliability, maintenance, and availability.

SPIES will also work to enable a methodology and process for maintaining and revising 

the standards and adding new standards, as required. By following the computer peripheral 

model, the intent is for all devices and components to operate over standard buses and use 

standard connectors and basic database protocols. With SPIES, the expected total ownership cost 

savings is expected to be around 25%, with additional benefits, including reduced integration 

risk.

IOPs Defined for UGS

As payloads, sensors, software, and computing devices are anticipated to evolve much 

faster than base platforms, creating interoperable interfaces for enhanced modularity represents 
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an opportunity to minimize future lifecycle costs and adapt rapidly to changing threats or new

available technologies. The RS-JPO I-IPT, formed in 2009, is working to establish, adopt, and 

apply interoperability standards for UGS by working with the combat developers, the S&T 

community, and private industry. The effort is focused around utilization of the SAE AS-4 

standard for JAUS with the implementation guidance being defined by the UGS IOP. 

Near Term: IOP V0. In December 2011, the IOP v0 development process and content 

were presented to a joint executive board, consisting of Government leaders from the material 

developer, combat developer, and S&T communities. The joint executive board voted 

unanimously to approve and publish IOP V0. The IOP enables tailoring based on the use of 

interoperability attributes. Not every interoperability requirement will apply to every future 

system; therefore, the IOP provides a mechanism to independently specify these requirements in 

a composable manner. Interoperability attributes applicable to the specification and design of a 

system can be identified and used to filter applicable requirements from the IOP to support 

system design, development, conformance, and validation testing, IOT&E, and fielding. This 

approach shrinks the “design space” of future UGS interfaces from infinite to a small number of 

options. RS-JPO will require the use of IOPs in future requests for proposals for PORs. For 

industry, this interoperability approach means that companies with business models that favor

closed-architecture products will ultimately either lose market share or need to adapt their 

business strategies. In the near term, the core interoperability team within RS-JPO and the Tank 

and Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center will be defining program- and 

system-specific instantiations of IOPs. Program-specific IOP instantiations will become part of 

future IOPs, and system-specific instantiations of IOPs will be used to determine whether there is 

any supporting business case to upgrade existing fielded systems to be fully or partially IOP 

compliant. 

Middle Term: IOP V1. In addition to the capabilities already resident in widely fielded 

systems, IOP V1 will include interfaces for unmanned applique kits, explosive detection and 

marking payloads, modular controller interfaces, and a basic interface with SUAS assets. In IOP 

V1, the focus will be on increasing the interoperability with other domains, such as overarching 

networks, UAS, and manned systems. 

Long Term. Future UGS are anticipated to interface with tactical and enterprise 

networks, such as GIG. The Army has defined a strategy for realizing a COE network into which 

UGS are anticipated to eventually interface. While achieving this interface would entail 

significant acquisition challenges in terms of information assurance planning, this interface 

would provide great opportunities for increasing the capabilities of UGS for warfighters. For 

example, a warfighter equipped with a COE-connected mobile device could search for software 

applications that are needed to conduct the mission, including UGS video feed and sensorcontrol applications. In addition, geospatial models and other data structures available in the 

COE could significantly enable UGVs to navigate autonomously. Autonomous operations could 

reduce the amount of computing power necessary on platforms and controllers and may reduce 

the wireless communication bandwidth required in UGS radios. 

DoD will also increase coordination between ground and air domains. Although UAS and 

UGS are based on different standards (NATO STANAG 4586 for large UAS and SAE AS-4

(JAUS) for UGS), it is feasible for future systems to use an inward (ground) facing SAE AS-4 

protocol and an outward (air) facing NATO STANAG protocol to interoperate. In addition, as 
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UGS become more accepted and embedded in the force structure, interoperability with manned 

ground systems will be necessary. It is anticipated that the vehicular integration for C4, ISR, and 

EW interoperability (VICTORY) standard will provide the interoperable interfaces for 

communicating with manned ground systems. As a result, RS-JPO’s interoperability profiles 

must eventually define the protocols for interfacing with VICTORY-based systems.

AEODRS Common Architecture

Currently, fielded EOD robotic systems are modified commercial products with different 

OCUs, limited autonomy, different architectures and designs, and company proprietary software.

AEODRS is being executed by the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division via 

the Navy Program Office for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (PMS 408) to provide joint forces 

with an improved and modular EOD capability to respond to unexploded ordnance, counterimprovised explosive devices, and WMD missions. AEODRS comprises three system variants, 

utilizing Government-owned common system architecture and interfaces, which will be fielded 

in an incremental approach. The common architecture is present at the physical, electrical, and 

logical interface levels for the UGS FoS to enable modular plug-and-play components and 

interoperability.

Near Term: Intraplatform Modularity. AEODRS Increment 1 is partitioned into nine 

separate capability modules (CMs) designed to function as standalone components across the 

variant platforms in the family of vehicles. Each CM is task and function specific and is designed 

to perform specific functions within the overarching system. Because major interfaces are 

defined and available to CM and subsystem competitors, the OA model aims to promote future 

technology infusion in a truly competitive environment. Increment 1 is broken down into three 

major subsystems including the OCU, the UGV, and the communication link. CMs within the 

UGV include CM-MOB (mobility), CM-PWR (power), CM-MAS (master), CM-MAN 

(manipulator), CM-VIS (vision), CM-EEF (end effector), and CM-AB (autonomous behaviors). 

Middle Term: Interplatform Modularity/Interoperability. The AEODRS program 

consists of an FoS including three system variants that will be fielded in an incremental 

approach. Increment 1 (dismounted operations) will be fielded first, followed by Increment 2 

(tactical operations) and Increment 3 (base/infrastructure operations). Use of common 

architectures and task- and function-specific capability modules will enable use of modules, 

software, and OCUs across platforms for all three system variants. The OA throughout the FoS 

allows interoperability between platforms through Government-defined and -controlled 

electrical, physical, and logical interfaces, in addition to the commonality of the OCU. In 

addition, the FoS is characterized by interchangeable modules that can be integrated in plug-andplay fashion without proprietary issues for each subsystem. 

Interface Standards and IOPs 

DoD has long recognized the value in fostering collaboration among Government, 

industry, and academia in open unmanned systems to address interoperability and common 

standards. To that end, a number of IPTs, WGs, and other communities have formed to address 

the interoperability challenge. These forums for unmanned systems have enabled the 

Government to engage with industry at all levels to aid in the systems and architecture design 

process, rather than just be customers. These collaborating communities exist within a variety of 
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national and international standards bodies, span the domains of unmanned systems 

(air/ground/maritime), and address key cross-domain areas as well as domain-unique 

capabilities. DoD intends to continue to support this type of collaboration as it fosters the 

development of interoperability and standards WGs. Examples include the following: 

• NATO Joint Capability Group Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (JCGUAV) is engaged in 

interoperability efforts in unmanned aviation. JCGUAV subsumed NATO’s three 

military department UAS-related groups (i.e., PG-35, Air Group 7, and Task Group 

2) in 2006. Its major accomplishments to date include NATO STANAG 4586 for 

UAS message formats and data protocols, NATO STANAG 4660 for interoperable 

C2 links, NATO STANAG 4670 for designated UAS operators training, and NATO 

STANAG 4671 for UAS airworthiness, and NATO STANAG 7085 for the CDL 

communication system, which has been mandated by OSD since 1991.93

• Current USIPs produced by the I-IPT define the standard interface for payload 

products and the data link between a control station and air vehicle for LOS and 

BLOS scenarios. Future USIPs will address other aspects of interoperability, 

including data encryption, different data link technologies such as BE-CDL, and 

enhanced capabilities provided by future sensors.

• JAUS began in 1995 as an effort by the Army’s program office for UGS in the 

Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center (AMRDEC) at 

Redstone Arsenal to establish a common set of message formats and data protocols 

for UGS made by various manufacturers. Deciding to convert JAUS to an 

international industry standard, the program office approached the SAE, a standards 

development organization (SDO) with robotics experience, which established the 

AS-4 Unmanned Systems Committee in August 2004. The AS-4 committee has three 

subcommittees focused on requirements, capabilities, and interfaces and an 

experimental task group to test its recommended formats and protocols before 

formally implementing them. The migration to the SAE has been completed, and the 

first set of SAE JAUS standards, focusing on the JAUS Service Interface Definition 

Language, core services, mobility services, manipulation services, and environmental 

sensing services, has been balloted and released. Although AS-4 committee members

may create standards on other aspects of unmanned systems beyond message formats 

and data protocols for UGS, much of this broader work is now being undertaken by 

other UAS-related SDOs. NATO STANAG 4586 is unmanned aviation’s counterpart 

to JAUS.

 93 NATO STANAG 4660, Standard for UAV Interoperable Command and Control Data Link (IC2DL); NATO 

STANAG 4670, Recommended Guidance for the Training of Designated Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operators; 

NATO STANAG 4671, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems Airworthiness Requirements; and NATO 

STANAG 7085, Interoperable Data Links for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Systems, 

Edition 3, pending promulgation.
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Appendix D UNMANNED SYSTEMS T&E CAPABILITIES CURRENT 

STATUS

Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

UAS T&E activities are heavily leveraging existing manned air systems T&E capabilities 

to test unmanned systems. Capabilities are being added to address differences for T&E of 

unmanned systems for primarily Level 1 autonomy systems (e.g., JUAS–Mission Environment). 

The C2 of today’s UAS is located both on the surface (land and water) and in manned aircraft. 

For example, the Army recently demonstrated control of a UAS from an Apache helicopter. 

Today, the air vehicle decision solutions are made with deterministic algorithms. As autonomy 

levels increase, for example, Autonomous Aerial Cargo Utility System (AACUS) Innovative 

Naval Prototype (Ref 3), the systems will incorporate an ever-increasing number of 

nondeterministic algorithms in the UAS. T&E of how and why decisions are reached by these

algorithms is a challenge that requires new improved processes and resources. As UAS embody 

more Level 2 to Level 4 autonomy capabilities in the future, improved tools will be needed for 

efficiently and effectively testing these higher levels of autonomy.94

Unmanned Ground Systems

UGS T&E capabilities across the Services are primarily derived from manned vehicle test 

capabilities. These capabilities are environment and terrain specific and were successfully used 

in the past to verify the safety, performance, and effectiveness of early UGS, which were 

controlled remotely, teleoperated, or possessed very low levels of supervised autonomy. The 

sensing and perception capabilities of autonomous systems are increasing rapidly, and obstacles 

on the terrain are equal, if not more important, to safety, performance, and effectiveness as actual 

terrain types and geometries. 

The challenges facing the operational test community will involve the safe use of UGS 

integrated with warfighters and manned systems during events as well as the ability to assess 

mission effectiveness based on a finite number of possible physical scenarios that can be 

efficiently construed. Warfighters are on the ground or mounted in formation with these vehicles. 

Before placing these systems in the presence of the warfighter, safety and performance must be 

proven under controlled conditions. 

To date, traditional evaluations have yet to be performed with UGS. Evaluations of 

currently fielded systems have been based on documenting, verifying, and assessing system 

safety and performance capabilities, unlike traditional evaluations, which correlate a capability to 

a system or mission requirement. Existing evaluation techniques based on manned systems fail to 

adequately assess sensing, perception, and intelligent control. 

It is imperative to test UGS to verify they are safe to operate among dismounted 

personnel and other moving vehicles. Each Service, as well as several public and private entities, 

offers some degree of T&E capability required to prove the safety, suitability, and effectiveness 

 94 For a description of autonomy levels, see table 3 on page 46 of the Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 

FY2011-2036: http://www.acq.osd.mil/sts/docs/Unmanned%20Systems%20Integrated%20Roadmap%20FY2011-

2036.pdf.
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of future UGS. Existing ranges and test facilities have been adequate to test systems with very 

limited autonomous capabilities and systems operated through teleoperation. 

Unmanned Marine Systems 

Existing ranges are limited to support the testing of UMS in a fully autonomous mode. 

Long-endurance mission profiles and limited tracking coverage restrict the test envelope for 

comprehensive autonomous testing behavior. 

UUV test capabilities remain largely centered on underwater T&E ranges familiar with 

weapon systems that have attributes in common with a number of UUVs. Many UUV T&E 

requirements can be accomplished on these traditional underwater tracking ranges, which 

provide accurate track, simulation/stimulation, and acoustic acquisition and some of the required 

bathymetry. Many of the ranges offer additional operational areas with challenging bathymetry 

and environmental conditions, which help meet the T&E needs for UUV missions. 

Advances in power systems and autonomy and the need for extended missions of up to a 

month at a time are stretching the ability of current underwater tracking ranges. Extended power 

capabilities and a high degree of autonomy allow newer UUVs to operate over extended areas

and increase the risk of loss of these very high value, one-of-a-kind, assets. The ability to 

maintain track or provide areas with low risk of surface and underwater target (SUT) loss is 

important in these future T&E events. 

The ability to safely launch and recover UUVs as SUTs presents challenges for T&E. 

The Navy does not have submarine platforms dedicated to T&E, and the introduction of 

developmental systems into the operational platform is a daunting process. This situation,

coupled with limited at-sea time, challenges the comprehensive testing evolutions to demonstrate 

the suitability of the integrated host/UUV platform to the mission.

1
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Appendix E MANNED UNMANNED TEAMING (MUM-T) AND MUSIC 

Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T)

The concept of MUM-T is to combine the inherent strengths of manned platforms with the 

strengths of UAS, with product synergy not seen in single platforms. MUM-T combines robotics, 

sensors, manned/unmanned vehicles, and dismounted soldiers to achieve enhanced situational 

awareness, greater lethality, improved survivability, and sustainment. Properly designed, 

MUM-T extends sensor coverage in time and space and provides additional capability to acquire 

and engage targets.

The pilot can use the sensor on the UAS, just as a sensor would be used aboard an aircraft, 

except that the position of the UAS sensor can be up to 80 km ahead from the aircraft. The 

MUM-T capability provides an unprecedented standoff range from threat weapons and 

acquisition systems. MUM systems largely depend on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and 

civil considerations. The transfer of sensor data between the UAS and the manned system 

reduces risk to both platforms and increases the mission effectiveness and survivability rates of 

friendly forces. Environmental conditions affect the efficiency of MUM-T employment.

Manned Unmanned Systems Integration Capability (MUSIC) Exercise

Interoperability has been a top objective of the Army and the UAS project office for 

years. Interoperability greatly increases efficiency in Army systems through common interfaces 

and shared assets. Development, integration, and testing of interoperability standards into UAS 

universal products, such as the universal GCS and the universal ground data terminal, are top 

objectives of the UAS project office in the near term. In an effort to streamline and coordinate 

interoperability initiatives across products, the UAS project office, under oversight of PEO 

Aviation, hosted its first MUSIC exercise in September 2011 with plans to continue conducting 

exercises every two years or as needed.

The MUSIC exercises showcase to the soldier and Army community the progress being 

made in unmanned interoperability and emerging technologies through common interfaces. 

Exercises also act as a strategic planning tool by driving integration and test of the various 

platforms to a common hardware and software baseline. 

MUSIC I Exercise 

Overview. The objective for the MUSIC I Exercise was to showcase interoperability 

progress and emerging technologies in accordance with the 2.x series of the Army UAS IOPs. 

The exercise took place in Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah, at the UAS Rapid Integration & 

Acceptance Center on 16 September 2011. Weeks of pre-ground and -flight checks culminated 

into a live two-hour demonstration to a group of media, contractors, and Army officials. The 

audience witnessed real-time video feeds from the unmanned and manned payloads, screen 

captures from the GCSs, video feeds from within the shelter, and visual aids through an 

operational scenario to help demonstrate the capabilities and achieve a better understanding of 

how they benefit the soldier. Successful execution of the MUSIC exercise provided the product 

office with a wide range of lessons learned across multiple areas, including system usability, 

reliability, integration, and configuration control.
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Capabilities. MUSIC I showcased four main capabilities as outlined in Figure 41 and

Table 2.

Figure 41. MUSIC I Operational View (OV-1)
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Table 2. MUSIC I Capabilities and Use Cases
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Appendix F CASE STUDY MQ-9 REAPER

Need to Transition from CLS to Long-Term Organic Capability

The MQ-9 Reaper program began as a quick reaction capability program in October 

2001. Due to the urgency to deliver the system to the field, much of the sustainment planning 

was skipped. The program manager determined a CLS sustainment strategy for the life of the 

program. After a review, based on the statutory requirements of 10 USC 2464, the Commander,

Air Force Materiel Command, determined that core capability requirements were applicable to 

the MQ-9 and issued a core depot decision memorandum (6 August 2008). The MQ-9 program 

was directed to transition into the organic depot-maintenance support.

The Reaper program also relied on CLS for field-level support because of the speed with 

which it was fielded. As the projected number of deployed capabilities increased, this 

sustainment strategy proved unaffordable. The Air Force needed to transition to military 

maintainers. Since the program was erroneously designated CLS for life, the program manager

had not developed a data strategy or established the Government’s requirements and rights for 

technical data. The MQ-9 was dependent on OEMs for sustaining engineering support and

supply support. Initial funding estimates for data and equipment to accomplish the 

transformation to organic depot were also not affordable in the Air Force budget. 

Initial Reliability Requirements Not Met

Typical of many programs that have been rapidly developed and deployed, the reliability

requirements of the Reaper system were initially not well understood or developed. The primary 

reliability metric being measured and tracked was mean time between critical failure (MTBCF)

as documented in the CPD of August 2006. This metric received a deferment from the Air Force 

Requirements Oversight Council after the 2008 IOT&E report noted the original MTBCF values 

were not achievable based on system performance. Additionally, because of the lack of 

redundant systems, all failures were interpreted as “critical failures.” In 2011 it was recognized 

that deferring the achievement of the reliability goal until a future block upgrade would not be 

sufficient. The Air Force needed to reevaluate the requirement against test and operational data 

to determine a realistic reliability goal and then establish a reliability growth program to ensure 

that the system could continue to meet the goal.

Sustainment Transformation

Since 2009, the program office has been executing a strategy to transform the 

sustainment of the Reaper program to focus on long-term affordability. The transformation 

planning by the program office culminated in the development of a lifecycle sustainment plan 

that details the results of the program’s planning efforts and documents the overall framework 

for optimal sustainment of the MQ-9 system throughout its life cycle at minimum lifecycle cost. 

The plan emphasizes the following major elements: requirements stability and reliability growth, 

depot transition, data strategy, and business case analysis (BCA).

Requirements Stability/Reliability Growth

The program established a Joint Reliability Maintainability Evaluation Team in 2012. 

The team reviewed field failure data and made recommendations to the warfighter community 
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for new Threshold and Objective MTBCF values. The MQ-9 reliability and maintainability 

growth program has been established to manage the growth of reliability with an emphasis on 

identifying reliability readiness and cost drivers that have a substantial return on investment to 

the warfighter.

Depot Transition 

10 USC 2464 (a)(3)(B) states the requirement, “Core depot-level maintenance and repair 

capabilities and capacity, including the facilities, equipment, associated logistics capabilities, 

technical data, and trained personnel, shall be established not later than four years after a weapon 

system or item of military equipment achieves initial operational capability or is fielded in 

support of operations.”95 In December 2009, the program established the Depot Maintenance 

Actions Working Group (DMAWG) to stand up organic repair. A three-phased approach was 

established to target the major repair and cost drivers:

• The first phase, Early Induction, identified items with low activation risk and includes 

the MQ-9 EO/IR sensors and a selection of items from the aircraft, engine, and 

communication equipment. The initial induction program will stand up in FY2013. 

• The second phase will expand the initial partnership to cover items that generate 80% 

of the repair costs and will be put in place between 2014 and 2015, seven years after 

core was first determined to be applicable. 

• The final phase will include more than 500 components with low repair rates. 

Throughout the DMAWG process, the program is working with the Army Gray Eagle 

program to identify opportunities for leveraging similar efforts. The programs are working 

together to establish sensor capability with the Navy’s Fleet Repair Center South East in 

Jacksonville, Florida.

Data Strategy

PPPs between OEMs and depots is one method to assure that the Government will have 

access to repair data without requiring a procurement or re-procurement data package. In 

addition to pursuing these partnerships, the Reaper program office continues to pursue 

Government ownership of data and is leveraging the Army Gray Eagle program’s research of the 

Government’s rights.

The program continues to provide contractor field service representatives (FSRs) while 

developing interactive electronic technical manuals, which will greatly enhance the military 

organization-level maintainer’s ability to troubleshoot and repair the system while reducing the 

need for contractor FSRs and depot-level field assistance.

Business Case Analysis (BCA)

In December 2009, the program began a BCA to recommend a long-term sustainment 

strategy for the MQ-9 weapon system. The scope of the analysis included a full evaluation of the 

MQ-9 sustainment alternatives, including the implementation of performance-based logistics, 

 95 As amended by P.L. 112-81 in 2011. Previously there was a requirement to identify core capability within four 

years of IOC.
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initiation of PPPs, and the evaluation of organic sustainment support. A baseline report was 

presented in July 2010. After a strategic pause to incorporate critical repair data and lessons 

learned from other BCA efforts, the MQ-9 BCA effort resumed in May 2011 and was completed 

in June 2012. The final BCA recommended separate performance-based agreements for the 

sensors, aircraft, and engine between the OEMs and depots and recommended that supply chain 

management be transitioned to the Government. See Figure 42.

BCA

MTS-B Stand-Up

Early Induction Phase 1 (9 items)*

Depot Activation (570 items) **

Dev

Program Milestones

DMAWG Kickoff

CA BCA

Software Activation (DRAFT)

* Includes MQ-1/9 items

** 570 items (MQ-1/9) being reviewed and may decrease

Program Office Procurement 

FY14 POM

CY 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1

Task

ASC/WII ACC AFCS OSD Congress / Budget Enacted

ASC/WII ACC AFCS OSD Congress / Budget Enacted

FY15 POM

FY16 POM

ASC/WII ACC AFCS OSD Congress / Budget Enacted

FY17 POM

BCA Comp Activation

Phase B

Phase A

RFP CA 

Early Induction Phase 2 (9 items)* CA 

CA (Est) 

CA 

Data Insertion

Baseline

Alt 

GR&A 

Final 

Recommendation

Approval

Competition 

Assessment & 

Implementation 

Agreement 

Development

Title 10 DMI FRP Compliance

DSOR/

SE, Spares, Training, Technical Manuals/Data

ASC/WII ACC AFCS OSD Congress / Budget Enacted

Time Now

As of Jul 12

Complete 

ILA

Complete 

Figure 42. MQ-9 Reaper Sustainment Plan

Conclusion

The MQ-9 Reaper case study illustrates the strategy and actions required, when proper 

initial lifecycle sustainment planning was not done, to transform the sustainment of unmanned 

systems from a short-term, rapid-fielding environment to a long-term sustainment environment. 

The transformation of unmanned systems will require dedicated effort over the next decade to 

develop and execute lifecycle sustainment strategies that ensure the long-term affordability of the 

systems. In the case of the Reaper program, the lifecycle sustainment strategy end state of 

organic support is expected to be fully achieved by 2018 — almost 10 years after the Air Force 

established the requirement and many years after statutory mandates. As new programs are 

developed, it is critical for programs, in conjunction with their Services and warfighters, to begin 

to formulate a lifecycle sustainment strategy at program inception so that requirements for 

availability, reliability, and affordability are considered in the design, sustainment resources are 

identified early, product support packages are tested with the system, and long periods of interim 

contractor support are avoided once the programs are fielded.
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Appendix G POINTS OF CONTACT LIST

AF/A3/5

Air Force Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements

1480 Air Force Pentagon, Room 4E1024

Washington, DC 20330-1480

ASC/PEO ISR & SOF

AFLCMC/WI

Aeronautical Systems Center, Project Executive Office for Intelligence, Surveillance, 

Reconnaissance and Special Operations Forces

Air Force Life Cycle Management Center

2530 Loop Road West, Room 144

Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-7101

DARPA

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

675 North Randolph Street

Arlington, VA 22203-2114

(703) 526-6630

HAF/A2

Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

1700 Air Force Pentagon, Suite 4E1070

Washington, DC 20330-1700

Joint Staff J-8 DDRA

8000 Joint Staff Pentagon

Washington, DC 20318-8000

NAVAIR

Commander, Naval Air Systems Command

47123 Buse Road

Building 2272, Suite 540

Patuxent River, MD 20670

(301) 757-1487

Navy N2/N6

2000 Navy Pentagon, Room 5C289

Washington, DC 20350-2000

NGA

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

7500 GEOINT Drive

Springfield, VA 22150
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NORAD & USNORTHCOM/J5

Strategy, Policy and Plans Directorate

250 Vandenberg Street, Suite B016

Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3820

OASD/R&E

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering

4800 Mark Center

Alexandria, VA 22350-3600

(571) 372-6512

ODASD(MR)

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Materiel Readiness

3500 Defense Pentagon, Room 3C168

Washington, DC 20301-3500

(703) 614-6922

OUSA/ASA/ALT

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology

103 Army Pentagon, Suite 5C151 

Washington, DC 20310-0103

(703) 697-2012

OUSD(AT&L)/S&TS-UW&ISR

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Strategic 

and Tactical Systems – Unmanned Warfare & Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

3090 Defense Pentagon, Suite 3B938

Washington, DC 20301-3090

(703) 695-6188

OUSD(P&R)

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

4000 Defense Pentagon

Washington, DC 20301-4000

RS JPDO

The Joint Planning and Development Office

1500 K Street, NW, Suite 500 

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 220-3487

SAF/AQIJ

Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition

1060 Air Force Pentagon 

Washington, DC 20330-1060
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USA HQ/G3

U.S. Army Deputy Chiefs of Staff G-3/5/7 (DAMO-SSF) 

400 Army Pentagon

Washington, DC 20310-0400

USA/PEO AVN

U.S. Army Project Executive Office for Aviation

Attn: SFAE-AV

Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898

(256) 313-4004

USA/TRADOC

Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

950 Jefferson Avenue

Fort Eustis, VA 23604-5700

(757) 501-5876

USAF/ARL

U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory

88th Air Base Wing Public Affairs

5215 Thurlow Street, Bldg 70

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH 45433-5543 

DSN 672-3252 or (937) 522-3252

USN/N2/6

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance

2000 Navy Pentagon

Room 5C289

Washington, DC 20350-2000

USN/ONR

Office of Naval Research

One Liberty Center

875 N. Randolph Street, Suite 1425

Arlington, VA 22203-1995 

(703) 696-5031 

USN/PEO U&W

U.S. Navy Project Executive Office for Unmanned Aviation & Strike Weapons 

Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)

Public Affairs Officer

47123 Buse Rd, Bldg. 2272, Suite 246

Patuxent River, MD 20670-1547

(301) 757-9703
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Appendix H ABBREVIATIONS

..........A

A2/AD Anti-Access and Area Denial

ABSAA Airborne Based Sense and Avoide

ACAT Acquisition Category

AEODRS Advanced Explosive Ordnance Disposal Robotic Systems

AFB Air Force Base

..........B

BAMS Broad Area Maritime Surveillance

BCA Business Case Analysis

BLOS Beyond Line-of-Sight

..........C

C2 Command and Control

C4 Command, Control, Communications, and Computers

CAT Conventional Arms Tracker

CBA Capability-Based Assessment

CCDR Combatant Commander

CCL Commodity Control List

CDL Common Data Link

CIO Chief Information Officer

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

CLS Contractor Logistics Support

COA Certificate or Waiver of Authorization

COE Common Operating Environment

COLREGS Collision Regulations

COMSATCOM Commercial Satellite Communications 

CONEMP Concept of Employment

CONOPS Concept of Operations

CONUS Continental United States

COTS Commercial Off The Shelf

CPD Capabilities Production Document

CPI Critical Program Information

CRADA Cooperative Research and Development Agreements
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..........D

DAE Defense Acquisition Executive

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DAR Data at Rest

DCGS Distributed Common Ground Station

DCS Direct Commercial Sales

DEF Defense Exportability Features

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency

DISN Defense Information Systems Network

DISR DoD IT Standards and Profile Registry

DMAWG Depot Maintenance Actions Working Group

DoC Department of Commerce

DoD Department of Defense

DoDD Department of Defense Directive

DoDI Department of Defense Instruction

DoS Department of State

DoT Department of Transportation

DOTMLPF-P Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, 

Facilities, and Policy

DSA Dynamic Spectrum Access

DSB Defense Science Board

..........E

E3 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects

EAR Export Administration Regulations

ECR Export Control Reform

EMI Electromagnetic Interface

EMS Electromagnetic Spectrum

EO/IR Electro-Optic/Infrared

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EPOCHA Estimation and Prediction of Orbits and Clocks to High Accuracy

EW Electronic Warfare

ExCom Executive Committee

..........F

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FACE Future Airborne Capability Environment

FAR Federal Aviation Regulation

FCB Functional Capability Board

FMS Foreign Military Sales

FMV Full-Motion Vehicle

FoS Families of Systems

FY Fiscal Year
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FYDP Future Years Defense Plan

..........G

GBS Global Broadcast Service

GBSAA Ground-Based Sense and Avoid

GCS Ground Control Station

GEOINT Geospatial Intelligence

GFMSA GEOINT Functional Manager Seal of Approval

GIG Global Information Grid

GMTIF Ground Moving Target Indication Format

..........H

HALE High-Altitude Long-Endurance

HiDRA High Dynamic Range Atom

HURL Hydra Universal Rail Launcher

..........I

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

ICWG Interface Control Working Group

IER Information Exchange Requirements

IF Intermediate Frequency

I-IPT Interoperability Integrated Product Team

IMU Inertial Measurement Unit

IOC Initial Operational Capability

IOP Interoperability Profile

IOT&E Initial Operational Test and Evaluation

IP Internet Protocol

IPL Integrated Priority List

IPT Integrated Product Team

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

IT Information Technology

ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations

..........J

J-8 Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate of the Joint Staff

JALN Joint Aerial Layer Network

JAUS Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems

JCA Joint Capability Area

JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System

JIIM Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational

JITC Joint Interoperability Test Command

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council

JRRF Joint Robotics Repair Facility
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JS Joint Staff

JSIL Joint Technology Center/Systems Integration Lab

JTA Joint Technical Architecture

JUON Joint Urgent Operational Need

..........K

KPP Key Performance Parameter

..........L

LOS Line-of-Sight

LPI/LPD Low Probability of Intercept/Low Probability of Detection

..........M

MDA Milestone Decision Authority

MIMO Multiple-Input, Multiple-Output

MISB Motion Imagery Standards Board

MOA Memorandum of Agreement

MOS Military Occupational Specialty

MPSF Mission Package Support Facility

MTBCF Mean Time Between Critical Failure

MTBF Meantime Between Failure

MUM-T Manned and Unmanned Teaming

MUSE Multiple Unified Simulation Environment

MUSIC Manned and Unmanned Systems Integration Capability

..........N

NAS National Airspace System

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NIAT NSG Interoperability Action Team

NLOS Non-Line-of Sight

NR KPP Net Ready Key Performance Parameter

NRL Naval Research Laboratory

NSA National Security Agency

NSE Nonstandard Equipment

NSG National System for Geospatial-Intelligence

NSS National Security Systems

..........O

O&S Operations and Support

OA Open Architecture

OCO Overseas Contingency Operations

OCONUS Outside the Continental United States

OCU Operator Control Unit

OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
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OODA Observe, Orient, Decide, Act

OPTEMPO Operating Tempo

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

..........P

PED Processing, Exploitation & Dissemination

PEO Project Executive Office

PINS Precision Inertial Navigation Systems

PNT Position, Navigation, and Timing

POM Program Objective Memorandum

POR Program of Record

PPBE Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution

PPP Public-Private Partnership

..........R

RAM Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability

RCTA Robotic Collaborative Technology Alliance

RDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

RPA Remotely Piloted Aircraft

RF Radio Frequency

RITP Research and Intelligence/Technology Protection

RS-JPO Robotic Systems Joint Project Office

..........S

S&T Science and Technology

SAA Sense and Avoid

SAASM Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module

SAE Service Acquisition Executive

SANGB Selfridge Air National Guard Base

SATCOM Satellite Communications

SC Steering Committee

SCRTF Security Cooperation Reform Task Force

SDS Spectrum-Dependent Systems

SECDEF Secretary of Defense

SOA Service-Oriented Architecture

SoS System of Systems

SPIES Sensor/Platform Interface and Engineering Standardization

SSRA Spectrum Supportability and Risk Assessment

STANAG Standardization Agreement

STUAS Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System

SUAS Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems

SWaP-C Size, Weight, Power and Cooling
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..........T

T&E Test and Evaluation

TAA Technical Airworthiness Authority

TS&FD Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure

TS/SCI Top Secret/Secret Compartmented Info

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

..........U

UA Unmanned Aircraft

UAS Unmanned Aircraft Systems

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UCLASS Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System

UCS UAS Control Segment

UGS Unmanned Ground Systems

UGV Unmanned Ground Vehicle

UI2 Unmanned Interoperability Initiative

UMS Unmanned Maritime Systems

UMV Unmanned Maritime Vehicle

U.N. United Nations

USC United States Code

USD Under Secretary of Defense

USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

USD(I) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

USIP Unmanned Systems Interoperability Profile

USV Unmanned Surface Vehicle

UUV Unmanned Undersea Vehicle

UVDS Unified Video Dissemination Service

..........W

WG Working Group

WGS Wideband Global Satellite

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
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