The United States seeks to engage Japan 

and China in building a peaceful international 

order at the regional and global levels. The 

Bush administration has articulated two 

conceptual approaches to this challenge, one 

centered on Japan and the other on China.

The first approach, associated with 

former Deputy Secretary of State Richard 

Armitage, emphasizes Japan’s potential role 

as a global partner. Armitage begins with the 

U.S.-Japan partnership and works outward to 

the regional and global levels, emphasizing 

shared values and democracy as the foundation of the alliance. This vision highlights 

Japan’s potential regional and global contributions, while viewing China as a possible 

challenge to regional order.

The second approach, associated with 

Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, 

emphasizes China’s potential as a responsible 

stakeholder in the international system. 

Zoellick starts with China’s global significance and works inward to consider that 

nation’s impact on regional security and its 

future domestic political evolution. This vision 

highlights shared U.S. and Chinese interests 

and managing disputes within a larger cooperative framework. The chief concern 

is about China acting as a free-rider that 

gradually undermines the existing international and regional order. 

The 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy 

combines elements of both approaches to 

international and regional order in articulating 

a “hedge strategy” toward China. This essay 

highlights some conceptual and policy questions that arise from efforts to integrate the 

Armitage and Zoellick approaches to Asia.

The search for order has long challenged 

diplomats and statesmen. Today’s liberal 

international economic and political order 

has evolved out of a century of conflict, 

revolution, and war into a pattern of interestbased cooperation among the world’s great 

powers. The international system, however, 

is not a self-regulating mechanism; maintenance of order, once established, requires the 

active and full participation of major powers 

with high stakes in the effective functioning 

of the system.

In East Asia today, Japan and China are 

two such powers. The former is a long-standing 

democratic ally of the United States; the latter 

is a rising power destined to shape the contours of the 21st-century international order. 

Since coming to office in 2001, the Bush 

administration has attempted to engage 

both countries toward support of global and 

regional order. Yet the strategies adopted—

and exemplified by former Deputy Secretary 

of State Richard Armitage and current Deputy 

Secretary of State Robert Zoellick—represent 

strikingly different approaches to order in 

East Asia and beyond.

The case for a Japan-centric strategy 

was articulated in a report prepared by a bipartisan study group chaired by Armitage 

and Professor Joseph Nye of Harvard, which 

was published by the National Defense 

University in October 2000.1 Armitage drew 

heavily on the report as a road map for policy 

after joining the Bush administration a few 

months later. The China-centric approach, 

by contrast, gained visibility in a speech 

Zoellick delivered to the National Committee 

on U.S.-China Relations in September 2005.2

It would be misleading to suggest that these 

two documents represent the totality of the 

Bush administration’s thinking on either 

Japan or China, but they do provide insights 

in the core elements and underlying logic of 

each approach. Particularly in East Asia, both 

documents are regarded as highly influential 

statements of American strategy. 

Ultimately, the two strategies may prove 

compatible. The 2006 U.S. National Security 

Strategy combines elements of the Armitage 

and Zoellick approaches to international and 

regional order in articulating a “hedge strategy” toward China.3 However, implementing 

the strategy will call for properly balancing 

its engagement and military legs. It will 

also require defining U.S. priorities in the 

interplay of global and regional interests and 

finding the right policy balance between 

China and Japan. 

The Armitage Exegesis

Richard Armitage’s emphasis on Japan 

reflects above all an alliance-centric approach 

for managing change. Anticipating the 

challenges of the new century, the Armitage 

report found the U.S.-Japan relationship to 

be “more important than ever.” Japan not only 

had “the world’s second-largest economy and 

a well-equipped and competent military” but 

also stood as “our democratic ally.” In addition 

to many common interests, shared democratic 

values provide a firm and enduring foundation, 

allowing the two allies to cooperate readily 

in shaping the international order of the 

21st century.

Looking back on the 1990s, the study group 

expressed concern that “China had become 

the principal focus of American policymakers,” 

despite the fact that since the suppression of 

pro-democracy forces in Tiananmen, relations 

Strategic Forum

No. 220

June 2006

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

No. 220, June 2006 Strategic Forum 

Visions of Order: Japan and 

China in U.S. Strategy

James J. Przystup and Phillip C. Saunders
No. 220, June 2006 Strategic Forum 

with China had been “characterized by a series 

of crises.” Implicit in this concern was the criticism that the attention paid to China had come 

at the expense of the U.S.-Japan relationship 

and the alliance.

The Armitage report took the Clinton 

administration—and Japan—to task for 

failing to implement the security agenda set 

out in the 1996 U.S.-Japan Tokyo Declaration 

“in large measure because of concerns over 

Beijing’s hostile reaction to the reinvigoration 

of the security partnership.” The declaration 

provided a post–Cold War vision for alliance 

security cooperation, and Japan’s subsequent 

1997 Defense Guidelines committed Japan 

to provide rear area support to the United 

States in contingencies “in areas surrounding 

Japan.” Although Japan defined those areas 

in functional rather than geographic terms, 

China regarded this potential security cooperation as including a Taiwan contingency. 

In contrast to the Clinton administration’s 

perceived tilt toward China, the report called 

for a “recognition that the time has arrived for 

renewed attention to improving, reinvigorating, 

and refocusing the U.S.-Japan alliance.” The 

U.S.–UK “special relationship” was posited as “a 

model for the alliance.” The reference pointed 

to the shared values and common interests at 

the heart of the Anglo-American relationship 

that historically have been the foundation for 

cooperation in dealing with threats to the international order. It stood as an implicit invitation 

to Japan to assume international responsibilities 

for world order similar, but not identical, to 

those performed by the United States and the 

United Kingdom. Support for Japan’s efforts to 

become a permanent member of the United 

Nations (UN) Security Council spoke to the 

contributions the envisaged U.S.-Japan partnership could make to global order.

The report identified the prohibition on 

the exercise of collective self-defense as “a constraint on alliance cooperation” and made clear 

that the United States would welcome a Japan 

“willing to make a greater contribution and to 

become a more equal alliance partner.” In this 

context, it called for enhanced intelligence and 

defense industry cooperation, particularly in the 

development of missile defense, as well as for a 

wide-ranging diplomatic dialogue on key longterm strategic issues—among them the rise of 

China and its implications for regional order.

The study group put the United States 

squarely on the side of Japan in its dispute 

with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. 

More broadly, the report urged that the United 

States and Japan should encourage China “to 

become a positive force in regional political 

and economic affairs” and called for the two 

countries to “engage in an ongoing strategic 

dialogue on this subject.” While arguing 

against containment, the unstated direction 

of the report is toward a hedging strategy with 

respect to China. The United States and Japan 

would work to encourage China’s evolution 

as a responsible regional actor, but should 

China fail to move in that direction, it would 

be confronted by a reinvigorated alliance. 

In other words, a strong partnership was the 

best guarantee that China would emerge as 

a supporter of the existing political and 

economic order.

During the Cold War, the alliance with 

Japan served as the East Asian anchor of the 

U.S. global strategy of containment aimed at 

the Soviet Union. Today, it stands as a central 

element in the efforts of Washington and Tokyo 

to deal with the post-9/11 security challenges 

to international order posed by terrorism, the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 

and the future direction of states at the crossroads, notably China, India, and Russia. Within 

the alliance, Japan has moved to assume a 

larger role in support of international order, 

as evidenced by the assistance rendered by the 

Maritime Self Defense Force during Operation 

Enduring Freedom and the deployment to 

Iraq of the Ground Self Defense Force to aid in 

postwar reconstruction. Japan was among the 

first countries to support the U.S. Proliferation 

Security Initiative. 

The Armitage vision for the alliance found 

expression in the joint statements issued at the 

conclusion of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee meetings in February 2005 

and May 2006.4 The “2 + 2” statements set 

the foundation for a future strategy for the 

alliance, marking a convergence of bilateral, 

regional, and global interests and the understanding that the alliance enhances the security of both countries, the Asia-Pacific region, 

as well as “global peace and stability.” In effect, 

the joint statements transcended the military 

alliance, potentially transforming Japan from 

an Asian ally into a global strategic partner in 

maintaining international order. 

Clearly, there are limits to what Japan 

can do at present. It lacks the stature of being 

a permanent member of the UN Security 

Council. Japanese governments have interpreted Article IX as constraining their country 

from the exercise of collective self-defense, an 

obligation assumed by all Security Council 

members. Japan, by democratic choice, has 

denied its Self Defense Forces global power 

projection capabilities. Despite its global interests, Tokyo can have only limited strategic 

impact absent cooperation with Washington.

The Zoellick Zeitgeist

In contrast to Armitage’s vision of an 

expanding U.S.-Japan partnership, the Zoellick 

view of China has a more contingent quality. 

Zoellick’s September 2005 speech contains the 

oft-cited invitation to China to become a “responsible stakeholder” supporting the existing 

international system.5 China’s growing global 

importance and integration into the international system are clearly emphasized; the 

paramount issue for Zoellick is the character 

and content of China’s global influence.

The speech begins by highlighting the 

profound impact of China’s 1978 decision to 

embrace globalization and integrate itself into 

the international system. “China is big, it is 

growing, and it will influence the world in the 

years ahead . . . the essential question is how 

Dr. James J. Przystup and Dr. Phillip C. Saunders are senior research fellows in the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Comments may be directed to 

przystupj@ndu.edu and saundersp@ndu.edu.

the emphasis on Japan 

reflects an alliance-centric 

approach for managing 

change that invites a larger 

Japanese role in support of 

international order
No. 220, June 2006 Strategic Forum 

will China use its influence.” Zoellick argues 

that “China has a responsibility to strengthen 

the international system that has enabled its 

success” and proposes a U.S. policy goal of 

urging Beijing to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the current international system.

In exchange for assuming more responsibility in sustaining current international rules, 

norms, and organizations, China would gain a 

greater voice within these institutions and an 

enhanced ability to work with the United States 

“to shape the future international system.” 

Playing the role of a responsible stakeholder 

would not only advance China’s national interests, but also allow Beijing to pursue a larger 

regional and global role without sparking a 

destabilizing competition with Washington.

Zoellick emphasizes important U.S. and 

Chinese common interests that can be pursued 

through cooperation and proclaims a 

“shared interest in sustaining political, 

economic, and security systems that provide 

common benefits.” The speech devotes considerable attention to China’s economic role, 

noting that the nation has benefited from an 

open, rules-based international economic 

order and from access to the U.S. market in 

particular. But the increasing size of the 

Chinese economy means that it now affects 

the smooth functioning of the global economy: 

“The United States will not be able to sustain 

an open international economic system . . . 

without greater cooperation from China, as 

a stakeholder that shares responsibility on 

international economic issues.” The theft of 

intellectual property, currency policy, and a 

mercantilist energy policy are identified as 

areas where China currently falls short of 

responsible behavior. 

In the realm of foreign policy, China is 

considered to have ample opportunities to 

demonstrate responsibility in dealing with 

issues such as North Korea, nonproliferation, 

and counterterrorism. Zoellick praises specific 

Chinese contributions to stability, while noting 

that in other cases, such as export controls and 

dealing with the Iranian nuclear program, the 

seriousness of China’s commitment is not clear. 

He also raises concerns about the underlying 

purposes and lack of transparency in China’s 

rapid military modernization and highlights 

the need for a “peaceful political transition” 

to a more accountable government.

Although his emphasis is on China’s 

global impact, Zoellick also grapples with 

the reality that its power and influence are 

increasing more rapidly at the regional level 

than at the global level. He notes that Beijing 

is already playing a larger role within Asia 

and states that “the United States respects 

China’s interests in the region.” Zoellick 

praises China’s participation in multilateral 

diplomacy in Asia, while expressing concerns 

about potential efforts to “maneuver toward 

a preponderance of power” in the region. 

Zoellick also highlights the importance of 

China resolving its differences with Taiwan 

peacefully. The speech recognizes the reality 

of increasing Chinese regional influence, but 

avoids taking a position on Chinese longterm intentions in Asia or specifying which 

of these interests are legitimate and must be 

respected by the United States.

The speech does not fully explicate the 

relationships between China’s behavior at 

the global, regional, and domestic levels. 

However, it implicitly invokes two concepts: 

liberal international relations theory and 

modernization theory. 

Liberal institutionalism highlights 

ways in which participation in international 

institutions alters state calculations of costs 

and benefits.6 The theory asserts that increased integration into global and regional 

institutions will raise the costs of aggressive 

actions, thereby producing more moderate 

and responsible Chinese behavior at both the 

regional and global levels. Zoellick also invokes modernization theory7 in arguing that 

the closed politics that have accompanied 

economic growth over the last 25 years are 

not sustainable: “As economic growth continues, better-off Chinese will want a greater say 

in their future, and pressure builds for political reform.” Zoellick suggests these forces will 

eventually produce positive political changes 

and lead to greater convergence of U.S. and 

Chinese values.

The emphasis on China’s potential to 

be a constructive global actor is an enduring 

thread in U.S. Asia policy. President Franklin 

Roosevelt envisioned China as one of the five 

great powers that could stabilize the postwar 

world; the Chinese seat on the UN Security 

Council has its origins in this vision. Zoellick 

revived the idea of great power cooperation 

when he accompanied China’s foreign minister 

to Roosevelt’s Hyde Park estate. 

In the 1970s, Richard Nixon and Henry 

Kissinger viewed their opening to China as a 

means of extracting the United States from 

Vietnam and as a strategic balance against 

Soviet global power. In the late 1970s and 

1980s, a number of senior Carter and Reagan 

administration officials supported intelligence 

cooperation and arms sales to China as a 

means of increasing pressure on the Soviet 

Union.8 Although China was not a true global 

power at the time, these officials viewed it as 

a strategic actor that could affect the global 

competition between the United States and the 

Soviet Union. Even after Tiananmen Square, 

President George H.W. Bush saw China as 

having continuing strategic value, as both 

a hedge against a possible resurgent Soviet 

Union and a potential supporter of a new 

world order. President William Clinton emphasized the potential for Sino-U.S. cooperation 

on transnational issues as a justification for 

working to establish a “constructive strategic 

partnership” with China in 1997–1998.

Some advocates of cooperation cautioned 

that China could become highly disruptive 

if alienated. Richard Nixon famously argued 

in 1967 that China should not be left in 

“angry isolation.”9 Beijing’s emphasis on the 

importance of stability to support economic 

development and assurances that it will not 

challenge the existing order have eased 

concerns about it playing a disruptive role. 

Nevertheless, China’s large size and population 

mean that a breakdown in domestic order 

or weakened government control of borders 

could be highly destabilizing at both the 

regional and global levels.10

Two Visions, One Policy?

The two approaches to regional and 

global order differ significantly. Armitage 

begins with the U.S.-Japan partnership and

the emphasis on China’s 

potential to be a constructive 

global actor is an enduring 

thread in U.S. Asia policy
works outward to the regional and global 

level, while Zoellick starts with China’s global 

significance and works inward to consider that 

nation’s impact on regional security and its 

future domestic political evolution. Armitage 

emphasizes the importance of shared values 

and democracy in the U.S.-Japan alliance, 

while Zoellick focuses on shared U.S. and 

Chinese interests and managing disputes 

within a larger cooperative framework. For 

Armitage, the chief challenge to regional 

security lies in the potentially disruptive 

actions of a powerful China. For Zoellick, 

the concern is about China acting as a freerider that gradually undermines the existing 

international and regional order.

Although Armitage and Zoellick address 

the issue of order in East Asia from different starting points, it should be possible, in 

theory, to integrate both approaches into a 

coherent policy. Indeed, the Bush administration’s 2006 National Security Strategy 

attempts such a synthesis. The document 

encourages China to become a responsible 

stakeholder in support of the international 

order, notes the global significance of 

the U.S.-Japan relationship, and explicitly 

endorses a hedging strategy toward China.11

It assumes that the two approaches are 

complementary, without examining the 

different assumptions at the core of each 

and the operational issues involved in 

making them work together. 

The choice of a hedge strategy reflects 

uncertainty about China’s future political 

and military evolution. Rather than defining 

China clearly as an ally or an adversary, this 

strategy seeks to balance engagement/diplomacy and dissuasion/deterrence. The former 

emphasizes U.S. efforts to induce China’s 

cooperation and encourage integration into 

global institutions and the global economy 

as a way to shape China’s future evolution. 

The latter emphasizes U.S. military capabilities 

to guard against the possibility of a China 

that becomes aggressive or threatening. The 

challenge in implementing such a strategy 

is maintaining a balance between the 

two elements as they interact at global and 

regional levels.

In effect, Armitage and Zoellick represent 

the different components of the hedge strategy. 

Zoellick’s call for China to play the role of 

a responsible stakeholder emphasizes the 

engagement side and envisions common 

interests between the United States and China 

producing cooperation that will contribute 

to order at the global and regional levels. 

Armitage’s focus on the U.S.-Japan partnership 

(and other U.S. alliances in Asia) stresses 

the military side of the hedge strategy. This 

approach highlights the role of U.S. power 

and alliances in limiting China’s ability 

to challenge the order in Asia. Zoellick 

focuses on China’s potential contributions 

to global order, while Armitage sees Japan 

as a global partner. 

Ultimately, the two strategies may prove 

compatible. Beijing may embrace Zoellick’s

stakeholder concept for cooperation in support 

of international order. Such an evolution 

would comport with the aspiration of the 

Armitage report that China become a 

“positive force” in regional affairs. Zoellick 

suggests that Chinese acceptance of an international role as a “responsible stakeholder” 

would ease international tensions over rising 

Chinese power and improve prospects for 

Chinese political reform and eventual democratization. This vision would also conform 

with Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso’s 

aspirations for China: its peaceful rise and 

democratic future.

Democratic peace may ultimately prevail, 

with U.S., Chinese, and Japanese interests being 

effectively managed within such a framework. 

In practice, however, the vision is decidedly 

future-oriented. Attaining that vision will 

depend in large part on whether U.S. strategies 

can manage both the challenge of maintaining 

order at the regional and global levels and an 

intensifying Sino-Japanese rivalry. 

Success will require defining clear 

priorities in the interplay of U.S. global and 

regional interests and finding the right policy 

balance between China and Japan. Efforts 

to advance the international stakeholder 

concept at the global level with China should 

not compromise historic U.S. interests in East 

Asia. At the same time, the military hedge 

with Japan in East Asia should not work 

against U.S. efforts to advance international 

order with China. Success will also require 

addressing challenges related to internal 

policy coordination and domestic politics.

Balancing Relations

Dealing with China and Japan in an 

Armitage-Zoellick context requires a careful 

calibration of U.S. regional and global 

priorities. Current Sino-Japanese tensions 

will greatly complicate U.S. efforts to enlist 

support from both countries for regional and 

global order. Fundamental tensions include 

competition for regional leadership, the outstanding territorial disputes over the Senkaku 

islands and the East China Sea, concerns about 

each other’s military modernization, and a 

potential competition for energy resources. 

These issues have been exacerbated by the 

unresolved role of history in the domestic 

politics of both countries.

Tensions in the Japan-China relationship 

may also have a broader impact within Asia. 

The Sino-Japanese rivalry greatly affects 

prospects for regional cooperation and integration. It is difficult to see substantive progress 

toward the creation of an East Asian community if China, Japan, and South Korea are 

at odds over sensitive political issues, ranging 

from history to democracy.12 Issues of Japan’s 

historical conduct within Asia and visits to 

the Yasukuni shrine have not only aggravated 

Sino-Japanese relations, but have also given 

China an effective tool to attack Japanese 

influence throughout Asia. This both limits 

Japanese contributions to Asian stability and 

poses challenges for U.S. regional diplomacy.

Striking a balance between China and 

Japan is complicated by the fact that their 

regional rivalry coexists with the potential for 

both countries to make positive contributions 

to global order. However, securing substantive 

cooperation may require U.S. actions that 

take sides in the regional competition. This 

raises difficult questions: Will Tokyo see

No. 220, June 2006 Strategic Forum 

although Armitage and 

Zoellick address the issue 

of order in East Asia from 

different starting points, 

it should be possible to 

integrate both approaches 

into a coherent policy
Washington’s efforts to develop a “stakeholder” accommodation with Beijing at the 

global level as giving priority to China? 

Will efforts to develop the U.S.-Japan alliance 

and implement a hedging strategy work at 

cross-purposes with efforts to reach an accommodation with Beijing? Is a U.S.-China 

accommodation possible while China 

remains an authoritarian state and Taiwan 

an unresolved issue?

The Armitage report places the United 

States firmly on Japan’s side, while Zoellick 

is more circumspect about how Washington 

should balance its relations with Beijing and 

Tokyo. As Deputy Secretary of State, Armitage 

declared that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty 

covered territories administered by Japan, 

extending to the disputed Senkaku islands.13

This commitment was underscored by 

joint exercises conducted in January 2006 

by the U.S. Marines and elements of the 

Japanese Ground Self Defense Force that 

focused on the defense of unspecified remote 

islands. While making clear its commitment 

to defend Japan, the United States must 

also be cautious about getting drawn into 

Japanese territorial disputes with China (over 

the East China Sea and the Diaoyu/Senkaku 

islands) and South Korea (over the Tokdo/

Takeshima islands) that do not involve core 

U.S. interests.

Although Zoellick expresses U.S. respect 

for China’s interests in Asia, this statement 

does not address key questions such as 

which Chinese regional interests are to be 

respected and the degree of respect they deserve. Another glaring omission in Zoellick’s 

speech is the failure to address the degree 

of compatibility between U.S. and Chinese 

interests in Asia. For example, going back 

over a century to the Open Door, successive 

U.S. administrations have resisted efforts of 

Asian governments to exclude U.S. influence 

from the region. This raises the question as 

to how Zoellick would regard Chinese efforts 

to exclude the United States from regional 

institutions such as the East Asian Summit 

or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 

Is this the “preponderance of power” he 

cautions China from seeking?

With respect to Taiwan, Beijing 

asserts important and legitimate interests in 

pursuing unification. China’s interests are 

not necessarily permanently incompatible 

with U.S. interests in “peaceful resolution” 

and a solution acceptable to the people of 

Taiwan. But in addition to the regional 

strategic issues involved, the reality of 

Taiwan’s democracy and China’s autocracy 

will ensure that the issue remains a delicate 

matter in bilateral relations.

The U.S. relationship with China lacks 

the shock-absorbing protection of shared 

democratic values, which are at the heart 

of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Given the 

administration’s emphasis on democracy 

and congressional concerns about a wide 

range of human rights issues in China, it 

is not idle to speculate over the extent to 

which an interests-based accommodation 

can be sustained in the absence of movement 

by Beijing toward political liberalization.

Conversely, Japanese values and most of 

Japan’s global interests are closely aligned 

with those of the United States. However, 

legitimate questions exist about whether 

Tokyo is prepared to play a global role if it 

requires disruptive changes at home. Domestic 

factors such as the strength of the agriculture 

lobby and visits by Japanese prime ministers 

to the Yasukuni shrine, in which convicted 

war criminals are enshrined, are already 

limiting Japan’s ability to play a regional 

leadership role, much less a global role. 

Although the Armitage report is correct to 

encourage greater contributions at both levels, 

the jury is still out on Japan’s willingness to 

step up to the challenge. Even if Tokyo does 

remove self-imposed political and constitutional constraints and significantly increases 

its contributions to global order, its efforts 

might be insufficient to compensate for 

foregone Chinese global cooperation. A more 

assertive Japan might also result in Chinese 

efforts to disrupt regional and global order.

Armitage’s emphasis on Japan and U.S. 

alliances ultimately represents a skeptical 

view about China’s future role in Asia. 

Thus, the focus of the Armitage report is 

on strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance 

implicitly as a hedge against China, not on 

defining and recognizing legitimate Chinese 

interests or building a framework for cooperation. This implies a much less cooperative 

relationship than Zoellick envisions.

The increasing willingness of Japanese 

officials to describe China as a threat and 

support Taiwan is likely to increase China’s 

tendency to regard the U.S.-Japan alliance 

as a destabilizing regional factor. Beijing has 

expressed concerns about the objectives of the 

alliance, its role in a potential Taiwan contingency, and whether Washington seeks to 

empower Tokyo militarily as a counterweight 

to China. Aggravating Chinese concerns about 

regional security and Taiwan will not induce 

Beijing to play the role of a “responsible 

stakeholder” at the global level, an issue that 

highlights a final difference between the 

Armitage and Zoellick approaches. The 

Armitage report is skeptical about whether 

positive incentives can induce cooperative 

Chinese behavior. It emphasizes the role Japan 

and other U.S. alliances in Asia can play in 

raising the cost and reducing the benefits of

aggressive Chinese behavior. Armitage devotes 

relatively little attention to the potential 

negative impact on Chinese willingness to 

cooperate or on China’s future political 

evolution. Conversely, Zoellick hopes that U.S. 

willingness to accept China as a responsible 

stakeholder and respect its regional and global 

interests can induce positive contributions to 

global order and result in stable bilateral 

relations that increase the chances for eventual 

Chinese democratization. However, this implies 

accepting a strong China whose interests may 

not match those of the United States.

No. 220, June 2006 Strategic Forum 

the U.S. relationship with 

China lacks the shockabsorbing protection of 

shared democratic values, 

which are at the heart of 

the U.S.-Japan alliance

the Armitage report places 

the United States firmly on 

Japan’s side, while Zoellick 

is more circumspect about 

how Washington should 

balance its relations with 

Beijing and Tokyo
9 Richard M. Nixon, “Asia After Viet Nam,” Foreign Affairs

46, no. 1 (October 1967), 113–125.

10 Kenneth Lieberthal has made this argument, available at <rand.org/nsrd/capp/happen/02/lieberthal.html>. Also 

see David M. Lampton, “Paradigm Lost: The demise of ‘weak 

China,’” The National Interest (Fall 2005), 73–80.

11 National Security Strategy of the United States of

 America.

12 A larger question is whether the United States should 

encourage regional integration or support the status quo.

13 Richard L. Armitage, “Remarks and Q & A at the Japan 

National Press Club,” Tokyo, Japan, February 2, 2004, available 

at <state.gov/s/d/former/armitage/remarks/28699.htm>.

The Armitage and Zoellick views of 

sustaining international and regional order 

differ significantly in their assumptions, logic, 

and priorities. Reconciling both views into 

a coherent strategy theoretically should be 

possible, and recent U.S. strategic documents, 

such as the 2006 National Security Strategy, 

attempt to do so by using the concept of 

a hedge strategy to deal with uncertainty 

about China’s future. This aims to influence 

China’s policy choices and future evolution 

in positive directions, while guarding against 

the possibility of failure without becoming a 

self-fulfilling prophecy. The Zoellick approach 

is broadly compatible with the engagement 

track of a hedge strategy, while the Armitage 

approach emphasizes the importance of the 

U.S.-Japan alliance in guarding against a 

possible aggressive China.

In practice, however, combining the 

approaches is likely to pose difficult choices. 

A hedge strategy requires careful coordination to keep the military and engagement 

elements in balance. The degree of difficulty 

is heightened by the fact that the Pentagon 

and the State Department each manage 

different tracks of the strategy. Without clear 

leadership on China policy, it will be difficult 

to modulate the balance between the military 

and engagement legs in response to changing 

developments. This can exacerbate difficulties 

caused by uncoordinated or mixed messages 

sent by different parts of the U.S. Government.

Sustaining order in East Asia will also 

require deft coordination and management 

of U.S. policies toward Japan and China, 

whose bilateral relations are likely to experience increasing strains and tensions. The 

choices the United States makes in regional 

security are also likely to affect the degree 

of global cooperation from China and Japan. 

Washington policymakers must gauge the 

compatibility of U.S. interests with those 

of China and Japan and consider how efforts 

to accommodate each country’s regional 

interests will affect their willingness to 

cooperate at the global level.

Zoellick’s speech does not offer details 

about which Chinese regional interests 

should be respected and the consequences for 

the U.S.-Japan partnership, while Armitage’s 

emphasis on Japan does not fully address the 

challenge of making China a stabilizing 

No. 220, June 2006 Strategic Forum 

actor at the regional and global levels—or 

the potential costs of China as a disruptive 

force. These issues are not necessarily 

irreconcilable, but they deserve more attention 

than they have received to date.

Notes

1 The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a 

Mature Partnership, INSS Special Report (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, October 2000), available at 

<www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SR_01/SFJAPAN.pdf>.

2 Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to 

Responsibility?” Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China 

Relations, New York, NY, September 21, 2005, available at <state.

gov/s/d/rem/53682.htm>.

3 National Security Strategy of the United States of 

America, March 2006, 40–42, available at <whitehouse.gov/nsc/

nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>.

4 Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative 

Committee, February 19, 2005, available at <state.gov/r/pa/prs/

ps/2005/42490.htm>. Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security 

Consultative Committee, May 1, 2006, available at <www.state.

gov/secretary/rm/2006/65523.htm>.

5 All quotations in this section are from Zoellick, “Whither 

China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Also see Robert B. 

Zoellick, Testimony before the House International Relations 

Committee, May 10, 2006. Slides are available at <www.state.

gov/documents/organization/66187.pdf>.

6 See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and 

Interdependence, 2d ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1989); Robert 

O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in 

the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University 

Press, 1984).

7 The classic statement is Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some 

Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and 

Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 

1 (March 1959), 69–105.

8 See James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s 

Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New 

York: Knopf, 1999), 85–154.

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Director of Research Director, NDU Press