No. 187, December 2001 Strategic Forum 1

Strategic Forum

Understanding has evolved in the last

decade about how an adversary might

use nuclear, radiological, biological, or

chemical weapons against the United States.

Increasingly, America is concluding that

potential adversaries view these not as

“weapons of last resort” but rather as tactically and strategically useful. The United

States can expect their use early in a conflict

as well as throughout the extended battlefield, including on U.S. territory itself.

States and state-supported terrorists are

of primary concern, for these actors can most

readily harness the full range of technical

and operational capabilities needed to use

nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)

weapons in sophisticated, effective ways.

The U.S. military is becoming more

aware of the requirements for operating in an

NBC environment, but more needs to be done

to ensure success.

Deterring NBC use may be more difficult

than it was during the Cold War. New concepts and capabilities, including more

sophisticated active and passive defenses,

will be required. Missile defense will play 

an essential role.

A fully capable national response 

will require not only a better prepared

military but also a better prepared public

health infrastructure.

Despite years of research, the community’s

knowledge of how an adversary might use

nuclear (and radiological), biological, and

chemical (NBC) weapons remains restricted in

important ways. The historical data that inform

this area are rather limited and largely dated.

We do not have much in the way of adversary

planning documents or doctrine to study, and

nations acquiring NBC weapons do not usually

address employment concepts. Despite these

gaps, we do know that NBC weapons afford

potential adversaries cost-effective force multipliers and that a number of states of concern

are actively pursuing their development.

We know that in the 20th century NBC

weapons were used in warfare. We also know

that the successful use of chemical weapons by

Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, and the absence of an

international outcry, led to a renewed emphasis

on such programs—the Chemical Weapons

Convention notwithstanding. Similarly, wouldbe proliferators likely have observed the relative

absence of substantial punitive measures relating to flagrant Iraqi violation of international

nuclear and biological weapons conventions.

Moreover, it is worth remembering that we have

been repeatedly surprised over the last decade by

the scope of the Soviet biological weapons program, the scope and depth of Iraqi NBC efforts,

North Korean missile development activities,

and other high-profile cases. The unclassified

judgment of the Director of Central Intelligence

on this subject is clear and alarming: we face

the real and growing prospect of proliferation

surprise as we move into the 21st century.

Most informed observers agree that some

nations are acquiring NBC capabilities with

the intent of using them—whether to threaten

or coerce neighbors, to deter nations from

interfering in their regions, to seek advantage

in time of conflict or war, or even to punish

the United States or its allies. Terrorist groups,

some with state sponsorship, also have sought

to achieve such capabilities. The emerging

consensus of the analytic community is that

we must increasingly contend with a wide

range of potential adversary NBC uses. There is

no guarantee, and only a low probability, that

the future will resemble the past in this

strategic arena.

As a consequence, it is important to think

more carefully about how states and nonstate

actors may actually use NBC weapons. The

approach here is to examine how our thinking about adversary use has evolved in the last

decade and the implications this evolution

has had. 

Concepts of the Cold War

It is instructive to look back a decade and

consider what U.S. experts thought about how

adversaries viewed the biological and chemical

weapons that they were developing and how

they might employ them.

Generally speaking, many in the United

States believed that the proliferation of chemical

and biological weapons could be explained as a

way for less developed nations to acquire what

some termed the “the poor man’s atomic

bomb.” That is, such weapons were believed to

be a seemingly inexpensive counter to the nuclear arsenals of the great powers. In a similar

vein, perhaps in keeping with evolving concepts

about our own nuclear weapons as the Cold War

wound down, they were seen as weapons of last

resort. The United States itself began using this

term to describe nuclear weapons in statements

surrounding, for instance, the evolving new

Adversary Use of NBC Weapons:

A Neglected Challenge

by John F. Reichart

No. 187

December 2001

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points
strategic concept for the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO). Moreover, they were seen

as weapons that most likely would be reserved to

ensure regime survival.

Even the language used to describe chemical and biological weapons reinforced these

ideas. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

was the term of choice. While there were some

good reasons for using this phrase (and it

remains popular especially in political and

arms control contexts), referring to NBC

weapons as WMD may have had the unintended consequence of locking many analysts

and policy officials into thinking that adversaries, too, would view these weapons as useful

only for mass destruction. The term WMD was

also unhelpful in that it blurred the distinctive

attributes of, and differences among, nuclear,

biological, and chemical weapons. But the

focus on mass destruction was convenient as it

did fit in with the deterrence concepts of the

time. If adversary WMD really were weapons of

mass destruction and of last resort (and in

these ways they were analogous to nuclear

weapons), they could fit comfortably within

our prevailing concept of deterrence. That is, if

they were going to be used to achieve mass

destruction, then clearly our threat to retaliate

with nuclear weapons would be credible. Consequently, it was seen as unlikely that these

weapons would be used and, if they were, that

the United States would emphasize offensive,

retaliatory responses rather than defensive

countermeasures.

Within a few years, the undifferentiated

term WMD evolved toward the more differentiated term NBC, precisely because it was obvious that these are different weapon types with

a wide range of possible effects, some of which

were not at all massive. Unfortunately, even

the well-intentioned effort to differentiate

among weapons by labeling them nuclear,

biological, and chemical had little effect on

changing our thinking about how adversaries

might employ them.

The continuing mindset that linked NBC

solely with mass destruction also contributed

to a seldom articulated but always implied

idea that defending against and operating in

the face of actual use of these weapons was

“too hard to do.” While thinking through the

possible use of biological weapons during the

Gulf War, for instance, planners were unable to

contemplate collectively and constructively

either the potential magnitude of the problem

or the necessary defensive responses. If biological weapons were the showstoppers that analysts suggested they could be, one might have

reasonably asked whether the United States

should not just seek to make its declaratory

policy clearer and less ambiguous, to rely on

nuclear weapons to deter, and to spend money

on deploying “things that count” in warfighting. Indeed, many held this position.

Not only was operating in NBC environments and defending against NBC attacks

considered “too hard to do,” but also, paradoxically, few perceived a clear requirement for

such capabilities. That is, with particular

respect to weapon effects, the evident majority

view held that the effective application of

chemical and biological weapons was simply

too difficult for an adversary to achieve. A

number of reasons probably accounted for this:

prior U.S. discontinuation of offensive chemical and biological weapons programs; an

unlearning of Cold War-era lessons too quickly

in a nascent post-Soviet environment; wishful

thinking that both deemphasized the threat

and sought to secure a widely heralded peace

dividend; and an incorrect focus on tactical

forces rather than potential strategic applications of such weapons, which may also include

use against rear areas, logistics and staging

areas, and perhaps even noncombatants or

assets outside the theater of operations.

A widespread perception also existed that a

large quantity of chemical munitions was

necessary to affect forces directly in the field,

and these large stockpiles evidently existed only

in North Korea. Moreover, the argument continued, most biological weapons were too slowacting to have significant tactical impact.

Combining these thoughts, chemical and

biological weapons (CBW) were not widely

considered particularly effective against forces

in the field. There was a general sense that we

could muddle through or, if we proved incapable of doing so in particular, limited instances (for example, at a contaminated airfield), we could always operate from a different

location. In addition, despite evident and

significant differences, biological warfare was

often popularly equated with chemical warfare.

Broadly, we operated under a legacy structure

in which we organized, equipped for, and

trained to operate in a chemical

environment—and added the biological dimension largely as an additional duty. This

approach proved inadequate. In viewing biological weapons (BW) through a chemical

weapons (CW) prism, we shortchanged and

deemphasized a proper understanding of the

biological threat and necessary defense countermeasures.

To the extent that we thought about the

implications of adversary use of NBC at the end

of the Cold War, the focus was on U.S. forces.

Understanding the effect on coalitions was not

a priority, even in Korea, where forces ill

equipped to fight in a chemical environment

would be responsible for protecting the flanks

of American units. When we did think of possible adversary NBC employment concepts, it was

usually limited to regions far from American

shores. Given the limited range of many missile delivery systems at that time, this thinking

was understandable.

Our conception of adversary use of NBC

weapons from the late 1980s through the early

1990s can be summarized as follows:

■ While adversaries might acquire NBC

weapons for various reasons, including coercion,

they were less likely to use them against us. The key

was to maintain a credible U.S. deterrent posture.

■ If deterrence failed and an adversary used

NBC weapons, that use would probably be reserved

to defend the adversary’s homeland or to ensure

regime/state survival and likely would come late in

a conflict. Even if use came earlier, we might have

adequate warning as—our focus being primarily

on chemicals—large stocks would be required to

have decisive results, and we might well detect and

counter such a buildup.

■ Our Cold War focus on detection, avoidance,

and decontamination seemed to be a sound basis

for coping with chemical use. Airfields especially

2 Strategic Forum No. 187, December 2001

John F. Reichart is director of the Center for Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense

University. Please direct any questions or comments to Dr. Reichart at (202) 685–4200, or forward them 

via e-mail to reichartj@ndu.edu.

in viewing biological

weapons through a

chemical weapons prism,

we shortchanged and

deemphasized a proper

understanding of the

biological threat 
might be at risk, but alternative sites were usually

available. Naval forces were seen as largely immune, and mobile army forces were perceived as

capable of maneuvering around detected hot zones.

Gulf War Watershed

The Gulf War had a catalytic effect on

these perceptions, but it took most of a decade

for a newer paradigm to emerge fully. The Gulf

War began to change our thinking on potential

adversary NBC uses for three principal reasons.

First, we had to consider the relationship

between nuclear deterrence and adversary use of

NBC weapons, and we had to think about the

possibility of our own nuclear use as a potential

response to NBC use by regional adversaries

against us. If U.S. experts could not think of

credible ways to use nuclear weapons—and the

two “quick look” studies that were undertaken

immediately prior to the Gulf War allegedly

seemed to raise this question—why should we

assume an adversary would find our nuclear

deterrent threat fully credible? Nonetheless, in

the months before the Gulf War, we clearly

wanted Iraq to understand an implied threat to

use nuclear weapons if it used chemical

weapons against us. Evidence suggests that we

were successful in that effort.

Second, the Gulf War made it clear to

more people that CW might be used against

cities, ports, or airfields—all far from the front

line. The strategic value of adversary CW became apparent, even when coupled to minimal

warfighting capabilities only. Taking this into

account, we began to understand that CW use

could affect tactical forces in a significant

manner, even when not employed directly

against them on the battlefield. Just the fear

that CW-armed Scud missiles might be used

against Israeli cities caused a major shift in

defensive forces—through the deployment of

limited theater missile defenses—as well as in

the coalition’s offensive game plan as it diverted

aircraft for the elusive Scud-hunting mission.

Third, we began to see in the aftermath of

the war the vastly underestimated extent of the

Iraqi BW program and the degree to which Iraq

had successfully developed and weaponized

biological agents. Our lack of knowledge of

Iraqi BW programs and our evident inability to

deal with them was the warning shot across the

bow that we needed to come to grips with

biological threats.

Contemporary Views 

These and other factors contributed to a

slow but steady reassessment of adversary NBC

use concepts. The analytic community began

to explore more fully the range of emergent

issues. While primary research was not possible—we could not interview key Iraqis or other

proliferators and ask how they actually intended to use these weapons—defector testimony was explored, and the United Nations

Special Commission uncovered additional

useful information. One promising methodology was the use of “red teams” in tabletop

exercises. The Center for Counterproliferation

Research at the National Defense University

developed an interactive game in which participants assume the role of an adversary planning

cell and are asked to make recommendations

on the use (or threatened use) of CBW in

support of specified political and military

objectives articulated by a hypothetical regime

in possession of such assets. Since 1994, nearly

4,000 military operators and planners, logisticians, medical professionals, and civilian

defense specialists have attempted to discern

whether, when, and how potential adversaries

might use CBW in this setting. While it would

be inaccurate to suggest that potential adversaries necessarily think along these lines, the

consistent themes emerging from these exercises are revealing—and are quite different

from what had been traditional conceptions of

NBC use. From these and related activities, a

growing consensus on several points is evident:

■ Potential adversaries may pursue chemical

and biological weapons not necessarily to counter

U.S. or allied nuclear weapons but to counter our

conventional military superiority.

■ NBC weapons are not just weapons of last

resort. Indeed, early use, especially of BW, is not

only possible but also likely. Furthermore, we are

just beginning to think through how an adversary’s

inclination to use CBW might be bolstered by

possession of nuclear weapons. Some research

suggests that the acquisition of even a small

number of nuclear weapons (especially if coupled

with long-range delivery systems) by these states

may make early use more likely because they may

believe that their nuclear weapons can be held in

reserve to deter any contemplated use of nuclear

weapons by the West or to ensure regime survival

and, thus, possibly avoid total defeat.

■ Weapons, especially biological ones, with

lower lethality effects can be attractive. Inflicting

widespread illness (mass casualty) rather than

death (mass fatality) may afford options or reduce

potential consequences to an adversary, both from

an operational and a political perspective. This is

yet another way that we have come to understand

that nuclear is not chemical is not biological.

■ Nonetheless, all too often, BW still tends to be

put in the “too hard to do” category. BW exercise play

today sometimes resembles that of nuclear weapons

in Cold War exercises: it can put an end to them. To

avoid this, we demonstrate a repeated tendency to

adhere to artificial restrictions when testing our

capabilities, either by specifying less effective offensive

employment conditions or delivery modes (by selecting agents that would not be show-stoppers or whose

effects would not truly be felt until well after the brief

exercise) or by choosing agents for which we assume

(correctly or not) adequate prophylaxis—thus

asserting that they will have little operational impact.

■ The civilian sector has thought about and

exercised its ability to respond to NBC events. But

these have been exercises confined to a single city or

community. Our adversaries—state and nonstate

alike—may be capable of far more sophisticated,

multiple, and simultaneous attacks.

■ The community has also come to understand that a thinking adversary will fully use the

extended battlefield, where airbases, ports, command, logistics, and other key nodes are on the

front line. Indeed, the U.S. homeland is the front

line. Again, we have come to appreciate this likelihood, but much of the work to date on how operations might be affected remains focused on chemical weapons. This is important work, but the

biological threat may in the end be the greater one.

While inadequacies remain in the way we treat

biological weapons, an increasing number of

analysts and policymakers have concluded that BW

is radically different. To break out of the “too hard

to do” BW defense box, we need to train and exercise in a more realistic manner, devise new operational concepts, and seek to field sufficient quantities of appropriate prophylactic capabilities.

■ Aside from prompting us to think more about

early use, research has also clearly pointed to the

potentially negative effects that CBW use might have

on coalition cohesion. This is a concern because

host-nation civilians and coalition forces may be at

risk of, yet largely unprepared for, chemical and

biological weapons use and because political will

may shatter in the face of a CBW threat.

No. 187, December 2001 Strategic Forum 3

NBC weapons are not

just weapons of last

resort. Indeed, early 

use, especially of BW, is

not only possible but

also likely
4 Strategic Forum No. 187, December 2001

Toward a Bottom Line

In the past decade, our understanding of

the NBC threat has matured. Instead of seeing

CBW mainly as a threat far from our shores, we

recognize it also as a threat to American and

allied homelands. Instead of seeing the NBC

threat emanating solely from states, we understand the threat from nonstate actors as well.

Surely, though, we can deter such use, one

might object. In the end, of course, we hope we

can. But we see the increased possibility that

deterrence could fail in a regional context,

especially if it is based primarily on the threat

of retaliation. This has led to an increasing

emphasis on deterrence predicated on denial

capabilities, including improved counterforce

and active and passive defense capabilities.

Here, missile defenses have a critical role to

play, as do public health resources. Among

others, one important message from gaming

and related activities has a good news/bad news

bottom line: while adversary planning teams

seriously take into account our nuclear deterrent in developing a course of action for NBC

use, they almost always devise a threshold

below which they believe nuclear weapons

would not be used in response—and therefore

are not deterred from an aggressive course of

action. The logic of achieving deterrence

through a combination of offense and defense

becomes obvious. A key component of our

defense will be a stronger, more integrated,

more prepared public health establishment.

A decade ago, the NBC analytic community concluded that, with regard to deterrent

forces, legacy weapons and concepts were

largely sufficient. Certainly, the community was

beginning to question this, but, at most, relatively minor adjustments were seen as necessary. With regard to military operations, the

community assessed that while some threats

(especially chemicals in select regions) were

evident, these would be unlikely to materialize

and, if they did, we would still be able to

cope—in other words, use would not present a

show-stopper. Doctrine was still based on Cold

War thinking, which both called for forwardbasing and contamination avoidance and

downplayed potential threats to rear areas.

While research, development, and acquisition

activities were probably too complex to theorize

adequately, the CW-oriented passive defense

model held center stage, and we were not too

concerned about the possibility of early use.

Today, we recognize the need to develop

new deterrent concepts and tools appropriate to

the task. The security community is increasingly concerned about operations and is

searching both for data to understand NBC

effects on future battlefields better and for

improved doctrine and operational concepts for

NBC environments. We have a long way to go.

While the case for BW obviously can be made,

it is perhaps equally true for emerging chemical nerve agent threats. While the defense

transformation currently underway will affect

counterproliferation—perhaps in ways that we

cannot currently envision—U.S. strategy

clearly will need to take into account both the

operational and strategic effects of NBC use on

coalitions and the genuine global dimension of

the growing threat. Research and acquisition

have a difficult task, since fielding full-spectrum capabilities is easy to request but difficult

to fulfill.

BW Terrorism Strikes

As this paper went to press, we began to

see the systematic use of anthrax against citizens in the United States. It is unclear at this

time whether this use is directly related to the

war on terrorism. Whatever becomes known

over time about the individual or group that is

directing these attacks, we clearly have passed

an important threshold. Indeed, whether the

current attack is the action of a lone terrorist or

a group connected to Osama bin Laden or is

state-sponsored, this use is consistent with

many of the conclusions developed over the

years in trying to understand how state adversaries might use NBC weapons against us.

These include:

■ Use that happens early in a conflict, without

warning, as opposed to being used as weapons of

last resort

■ Use of BW as a weapon of choice, not necessarily to kill many people (although anthrax is

capable of doing that) but always as a weapon of

disruption (whether the agent selected is of higher

or lower lethality)

■ Use that is ambiguous in terms of the

character of the attack, including its objectives, its

magnitude, and its origin 

■ Use in the United States, not just something

our forces might encounter “over there”

■ Use that attempts to change public perception of the risks involved in a conflict or even to

disrupt coalition formation and cohesion.

It is also important to note that while we

are currently fixated on the biological challenge, nations and groups that are interested in

NBC weapons tend to be interested in the full

range. We exclude considering the nuclear,

radiological, and chemical threats at our peril.

Whether used as a weapon of terror or a

weapon of warfare (and the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but they may be of

significantly different character), nuclear,

radiological, biological, and chemical weapons

pose unique challenges. We need to understand

better how they might be used if we are to

fashion effective responses.

a key component of our

defense will be a stronger,

more integrated, more

prepared public health

establishment

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