US Air Force 

Counterproliferation Center

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Edited by: 

Lieutenant Colonel Tasha L. Pravecek, USAF, 

Jim A. Davis, and Thomas Berg, eds.

Agroterrorist Attack: 

DoD Roles and Responsibilities
AGROTERRORIST ATTACK: 

DOD ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

Edited by 

Tasha L. Pravecek 

Jim A. Davis 

Thomas C. Berg 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

325 Chennault Circle 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427 

January 2006 
ii 

Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. 

Government, Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation 

Center. 
iii 

Contents 

Chapter Page 

Disclaimer....................................................................................... ii 

Acknowledgments ...........................................................................v 

Acronyms.......................................................................................vii 

Executive Summary......................................................................xiii 

 1 Military’s Role in Combating Agroterrorism: Introduction ............1 

Thomas C. Berg, Jim A. Davis, Donald L. Noah, and 

Tasha L. Pravecek 

 2 Recent Disease Outbreaks and National Exercises .......................17 

Tasha L. Pravecek, Jim A. Davis, and 

Christopher R. Greenwood 

 3 Department of Defense Response Planning ..................................33 

Brian V. Noland 

4 Military Manpower Assessment....................................................57 

John R. Herbold 

 5 Plant and Crop Response...............................................................69 

Howard F. Schwartz 

 6 Carcass Disposal............................................................................85 

John A. Scanga, Wendie A. Phelps, and Barbara E. Powers 

 7 Summary, Shortfalls, and Recommendations................................97 

Jim A. Davis and Donald L. Noah 

Contributors .................................................................................103 

Workshop Attendees....................................................................111 

v 

Acknowledgments 

We, the editors, thank the authors for their quality effort in 

researching and developing their chapters. We also thank the sponsors of 

the USAF Counterproliferation Center (CPC) who provided the resources 

that allowed us to support this project, especially Dr. Charles Galloway, 

Director, Chemical and Biological Technologies Directorate, Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency. 

We also extend our appreciation to Mrs. Jo Ann Eddy and Mrs. 

Abbey Plant who do an outstanding job of tolerating the unending requests 

for editing, researching, writing, administration, and general publishing 

efforts. Without their dedicated service, this product would not have the 

quality, accuracy, and professional appearance it does. We also thank Mr. 

Alan Reid for his editorial contributions to this project. 

As part of this project, a workshop was held at Colorado State 

University, Ft. Collins, Colorado, on December 9, 2004. In addition to the 

authors, attending were invited guests from the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture, Colorado Department of Agriculture, and other agencies to 

hear the authors’ presentations and provide input. Many of their 

comments were included in the final product. The editors give their 

sincere appreciation to the workshop attendees for their interest and 

comments regarding this agroterrorism project. 

vii

Acronyms 

AFIP Armed Forces Institute of Pathology 

AI Avian Influenza 

AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 

ANSER Analytic Services 

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

ARS Animal Research Service 

ASD (HA) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs 

ASD (HD) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

 Defense 

ACVPM American College of Veterinary Preventive 

 Medicine 

AVMA American Veterinary Medical Association 

BSE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 

CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, 

 High-Yield Explosive 

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CONUS Continental United States 

CPC USAF Counterproliferation Center 

CREST Contingency Real Estate Support Team 

CSREES Cooperative State Research, Education and 

 Extension Service 

DACVPM Diplomate American College of Veterinary 

 Preventive Medicine 

DCE Defense Coordinating Element 

DCO Defense Coordinating Officer 
viii

DHHS Department of Health and Human Services 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DoD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense Directive 

DODVSA Department of Defense Veterinary Services 

 Activity 

DOI Department of the Interior 

DSCA Defense Support to Civil Authorities 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

DVM Doctor of Veterinary Medicine 

EMAC Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

END Exotic Newcastle Disease 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

EP&R Emergency Preparedness & Response 

ESF Emergency Support Function 

FAD Foreign Animal Disease 

FADD Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FCO Federal Coordinating Officer 

FDA Food and Drug Administration 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FMD Foot-and-Mouth Disease 

FORSCOM Forces Command 

FSIS Food Safety Inspection Service 

GDP Gross Domestic Product 

GPS Global Positioning System 

GSA General Services Administration 

HAZMAT Hazardous Material 

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
ix

IA/IP Information Analysis/Infrastructure Protection 

ICS Incident Command System 

INSS Institute for National Strategic Studies 

JDOMS Joint Director of Military Support 

JFCOM Joint Forces Command 

JTF Joint Task Force 

JTF-CS Joint Task Force – Civil Support 

KNG Kansas National Guard 

KSU Kansas State University 

LFA Lead Federal Agency 

MA Mission Assignment 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding 

MOS Military Occupational Specialty 

MPH Masters of Public Health 

NABC National Agricultural Biosecurity Center 

NAPIS National Agricultural Pest Information System 

NASS National Agricultural Statistics Service 

NBIS National Biosurveillance Integration System 

NCH Natural and Cultural Resources and Historic 

 Properties 

NGB National Guard Bureau 

NIMS National Incident Management System 

NORTHCOM Northern Command 

NPDN National Plant Diagnostic Network 

NSSE National Security Special Event 

NRP National Response Plan 

PACOM Pacific Command 

PDD Presidential Disaster Declaration 

PFO Principal Federal Official 
x

PPQ Plant Protection and Quarantine 

PSRC Presidential Selective Reserve Call-Up 

READEO Regional Emergency Animal Disease Eradication 

 Organization 

RFA Request for Assistance 

SART State Animal Response Team 

SCO State Coordinating Officer 

SECDEF Secretary of Defense 

S&T Science & Technology 

SME Subject Matter Expert 

TAHC Texas Animal Health Commission 

TAMU Texas A&M University 

TRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy 

TSG The Surgeon General (Army) 

UK United Kingdom 

UN United Nations 

U.S. United States 

USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers 

USACHPPM United States Army Center for Health Promotion 

 and Preventive Medicine 

USAMRIID United States Army Medical Research Institute of 

 Infectious Diseases 

USC United States Code 

USDA United States Department of Agriculture 

USDC United States Department of Commerce 

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

VEE Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis 

VETCOM Veterinary Command 

VFIU Veterinary Field Investigation Unit 
xi

WMD-CST Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team 

WO Warrant Officer 

WWI World War One 

WWII World War Two 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Background: Agroterrorist Threat and Consequences 

The United States agricultural industry is extremely vulnerable to 

attack. One source states that 280 documents dealing with agroterrorism 

were found in Afghanistan caves.1

 In fact, “hundreds of pages of U.S. 

agricultural documents had been translated into Arabic. Al Qaeda’s 

interest in American agriculture was more than academic, according to 

government officials. A significant part of the group’s training manual is 

reportedly devoted to agricultural terrorism – the destruction of crops, 

livestock and food processing operations.”2

The science and art of how to promulgate an agroterrorist attack is not 

an international secret. There is a long history of countries that have 

worked in this field. This may reflect the common assumption that attacks 

against agriculture might be more attractive to terrorists because of the 

economic disruption and the secondary effects on humans.3

Agriculture is a key component of the U.S. economy, comprising over 

15% of America’s jobs and 11% of the gross domestic product.4,5 Billions 

of dollars worth of agricultural products are exported monthly resulting in 

over $50 billion exported annually.6 If the U.S. loses its ability to 

maintain its agricultural exports through an act of agroterrorism, at least 

three primary consequences will ensue: cessation of food production, loss 

of vital export markets, and near-term food shortages. 

Many potential adversaries either have or can easily obtain an 

agroterrorism capability that could cause catastrophic economic effects in 

the U.S. The economic impact of the September 11, 2001, attacks on 

America has been estimated to be well over $100 billion,7

 but the effect of a 

successful multipoint agricultural attack could surpass this and lead to longterm, perhaps unrecoverable damage to the agricultural export industry. 

Project Overview 

The U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center (CPC) was directed by 

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to conduct a study to 
Executive Summary 

xiv 

determine the Department of Defense’s (DoD) potential involvement in 

responding to an agroterrorism event. This resulting report details several 

possible roles for the DoD in a continental U.S. agroterrorist event. 

To complete this report, the CPC identified subject matter experts in 

the following areas: (1) DoD response planning; (2) military manpower 

assessment; (3) plant and crop response; and (4) carcass disposal. These 

areas were chosen because each has a potential for DoD involvement. 

The findings will provide local, state, federal, and DoD policy makers 

detailed information about current capabilities and future potential roles 

for the DoD in helping the nation prepare for, respond to, and recover 

from a terrorist attack on U.S. agriculture. 

Key Findings and Recommendations 

Chapter 2: Recent Disease Outbreaks and National Exercises 

The military’s role in the response to previous exercises or natural 

outbreaks of agricultural disease in the U.S. and in the world has not been 

clearly understood or well defined, and was limited or engaged as an 

afterthought when civilian forces became overwhelmed. 

The following are key findings of Chapter 2: 

• In foreign countries, the military was used in a logistical role 

(transporting carcasses and constructing disposal pits), mass 

euthanasia, and quarantine enforcement during response to natural 

foot-and-mouth disease and Nipah virus outbreaks (United 

Kingdom, 2001; Uruguay, 2000; Malaysia, 1998-1999). 

• In the United States, military personnel, equipment, and facilities 

were used in response to natural disease outbreaks of Venezuelan 

equine encephalitis (TX, 1971), Newcastle disease (TX and CA, 

1971 and 1972), avian influenza (PA, 1983), Mediterranean fruit 

fly (FL, 1997), West Nile fever (NY, 1999), and bovine 

spongiform encephalopathy (WA, 2003). 

• Military participated in the Crimson Sky exercise (sponsored by the 

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)), Silent Prairie series 
Pravecek / Davis 

xv 

(sponsored by the National Defense University), and several statesponsored exercises (GA, NC, KS, and TX). 

• During a time of war, the military may have other national defense 

priorities and obligations that prevent fulfilling responsibilities 

detailed in a Memoranda of Understanding to the U.S. Department 

of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

(USDA/APHIS), as demonstrated by the military’s inability to 

respond to the exotic Newcastle disease epidemic (CA, NV, TX, 

and AZ; 2002-2003) due to Operation Iraqi Freedom and 

Operation Enduring Freedom deployments. 

The following are recommendations of Chapter 2: 

• Review worldwide natural outbreaks and exercises conducted in 

the U.S. to better understand and conceptualize how the military 

could be involved in an agroterrorism response; 

• Conduct exercises to enable government officials and agriculture 

industry leaders’ participation in simulated response measures and 

appraise the efficacy of the existing policies; and 

• Examine barriers to interagency communication and cooperation 

revealed through exercises and examine natural disease outbreak 

after-action reports. 

Chapter 3: Department of Defense Response Planning 

As part of its mission to defend the United States, the DoD, in 

conjunction with other state and federal agencies, must plan and prepare to 

deter, prevent, defeat, and mitigate threats against the agriculture and food 

system. There are many civilian agencies involved in the regulation and 

protection of agriculture and food production in the United States. The 

response planning chapter details the many federal agencies involved in 

protection of agriculture, progressive disaster response to an agricultural 

event, DoD planning considerations, and impacts of an agricultural event 

on the Department of Defense. 
Executive Summary 

xvi 

The following are key findings of Chapter 3: 

• An agricultural event will hinder the military mission through 

disruption of food supply and troop movements, stress DoD forces with 

additional support requirements, activate Guard and Reserve forces, 

and create psychological impacts on DoD members and dependents. 

• DoD Directive 6400.4 designates the Secretary of the Army as DoD 

Executive Agent for Military Veterinary Services. The Surgeon 

General of the Army has delegated authority to accomplish the 

following responsibilities (complete list in Chapter 3): 

o Controlling animal diseases communicable to man, and 

o Developing military standards for commercial food plants 

providing products to DoD components. 

• Local installation commanders are authorized to respond locally on 

a limited basis to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate 

great property damage (DoD Directive 3025.1). 

• The National Guard can be used in Title 32 status to enforce a 

quarantine or stop-movement, under the control of the governor of 

the state, in the event of an agroterrorist incident. 

• During an agricultural emergency short of a Presidential Disaster 

Declaration, USDA may request DoD assistance in the form of 

military specialists or laboratory support through the Joint Director 

of Military Support. 

• If a Presidential Disaster Declaration is made, and state and federal 

resources are overtasked, longer-term DoD assistance may be 

requested through the Request for Assistance process coordinated 

by NORTHCOM. 

The following are recommendations of Chapter 3: 

• DoD planning should include intelligence gathering; formation of 

an integrated plan; and integration with local, state, and federal 

response systems: 
Pravecek / Davis 

xvii 

o DoD must maintain active participation in the integration 

and development of surveillance systems; 

o NORTHCOM should work with primary federal agencies 

to determine possible requirements in an emergency; and 

o Local installation commanders should examine security 

provisions and plan for food inspection and safety for 

active military and dependents at a local level, and develop 

contingency plans in the event of an interruption of normal 

food distribution. 

• State Adjutants General must work with state department of 

agriculture personnel and other response organizations to 

determine probable National Guard missions and resources 

required in an agroterrorist incident. 

• Each state should establish a public health veterinarian to serve as 

a link between agricultural interests and public health, thus 

improving communication. 

• The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense should 

address the military response and role in agroterrorism since an 

agricultural emergency is a domestic crisis. 

• DoD must take preventive measures and provide adequate training 

for recognition and destruction of foreign animal diseases and 

plant pests when redeploying to the United States. 

• DoD should examine and address training and exercise types and 

shortfalls in response to agroterrorism, for example, expand the number 

of military veterinarians who attend the Foreign Animal Disease 

Diagnostician courses at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. 

Chapter 4: Military Manpower Assessment 

Much of the history, as well as current expectations regarding sharing of 

resources and availability of dedicated DoD assets for response to agricultural 

emergencies, are based on assumptions grounded in the early 1970s DoD 

force structure. This force structure included a large standing army, mostly in 

garrison, substantial Reserve and Guard Forces replenished by the military 
Executive Summary 

xviii 

draft obligation, and internal/organic DoD support services and equipment. 

The manpower chapter reviews the type and magnitude of DoD manpower 

support required if an agroterrorism event occurs and comments on the 

appropriate level of effort needed to organize, train, and equip DoD personnel 

for an agroterrorist event. 

The following are key findings of Chapter 4: 

• There were 409 licensed veterinarians and 64 Food Inspection 

Specialists on active duty in the Army in 2004. 

• Approximately 100 active duty Army Veterinary Corps officers 

also have USDA training and certification as Foreign Animal 

Disease Diagnosticians. 

• Other potential military medical personnel whose backgrounds 

would help prepare them for an agroterrorism response include 15 

medical entomologists, as well as Army Environmental Science 

Officers, Navy Environmental Health Officers, and Air Force 

Public Health Officers. 

The following are recommendations of Chapter 4: 

• The federal directives, memoranda of understanding, and DoD 

directives should be reviewed and updated in line with current 

intelligence on terrorist threats; 

• Manpower requirements should be redefined to support the U.S. 

agroterrorism response capability; 

• Multiple federal agencies should be involved in agroterrorism 

defense research and response to avoid “warehousing” 

agroterrorism assets in one institution or agency; 

• Agroterrorism defense research initiatives at the U.S. Army 

Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) 

and other DoD organizations should be expanded; 

• Federal and state training and exercise plans should be developed 

and maintained; and 
Pravecek / Davis 

xix 

• Concepts and standard operating procedures for surveillance, 

epidemiology, quarantine, and mitigation should be developed and 

coordinated by DoD, U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and 

Plant Health Inspection Service, as well as with state and local 

response entities. 

Chapter 5: Plant and Crop Response 

A terrorist attack against plants and crops is a national security threat. 

Plant and crop production possess several characteristics that make this an 

attractive terrorist target. The plant and crop chapter addresses these 

unique characteristics, potential agroterrorist targets, the responsibilities of 

federal agencies in safeguarding this industry, and the type and magnitude 

of military support required for effective plant and crop response. 

The following are key findings of Chapter 5: 

Characteristics that make agriculture vulnerable to attack include the 

geographic dispersion of crop lands in unsecured environments and the 

difficulty of detecting crop and plant disease outbreaks in a timely way. 

Potential agroterrorist targets include field crops, farm animals, food 

items in the processing or distribution chain, market-ready foods at the 

wholesale or retail level, and agricultural facilities (including processing 

plants, storage facilities, wholesale and retail food outlets, food 

transportation links, and research laboratories). 

The following are recommendations of Chapter 5: 

• Enhance intelligence and monitoring concerning agroterrorism: 

o Link a national strategy to protect food and agriculture to 

other national security and counterterrorism programs; 

o Develop well-coordinated federal interagency mechanisms 

for gathering, assessing, and sharing sensitive intelligence 

information concerning hostile threats to U.S. food supplies 

and the agricultural sector; 
Executive Summary 

xx 

o Enhance DoD intelligence monitoring of priority crop areas 

and food processing/distribution centers; 

o Identify, train, and equip DoD personnel to rapidly detect 

plant disease; and 

o Enable DoD meteorologists to assist in predicting when 

conditions are likely to be conducive to pest outbreaks or a 

greater spread of disease. 

• Enhance military response measures: 

o Complete coordination and training of U.S. Department of 

Agriculture and National Guard forces in the eradication 

and disposal of infested plant materials and food products; 

o Train National Guard forces to provide security for 

response resources (chemicals, equipment, and personnel) 

and implementation of the quarantine and containment 

actions; and 

o Create and maintain a network of regional responder 

centers near major agricultural production regions for more 

rapid response. 

• Enhance command, control, and communications though 

development of a federally-coordinated, nationwide, electronic 

communications and data management network linking private 

agribusiness with emergency responders. 

Chapter 6: Carcass Disposal 

An agroterrorist event involving livestock will, by design, result in 

potentially large numbers of carcasses either from death due to the disease 

introduced or by the mass euthanasia efforts implemented to control the 

spread of the disease. Regardless of the cause of death, carcasses must be 

disposed of quickly, safely, and in an environmentally sound manner. The 

carcass disposal chapter describes a number of methods currently in use to 

handle diseased or dying animals and their carcasses which can potentially 

be applied to an emergency agroterrorist event. Additionally, the chapter 
Pravecek / Davis 

xxi 

details the role DoD may play in carcass disposal, including heavy 

equipment, manpower, logistics, and contracting expertise. 

The following are key findings of Chapter 6: 

• Nationally approved methods of carcass disposal include: 

rendering, composting, burial, landfilling, incineration and tissue 

digestion. 

• The military may provide heavy equipment for pit construction, 

secure transportation, and contract expertise to support disposal 

efforts. 

The following are recommendations of Chapter 6: 

• Identify the first point of contact for DoD in the event requiring an 

emergency response to an attack on the U.S. animal population; 

• Identify personnel and security resources available for response; 

• Identify personnel with incident command expertise for response 

coordination and consultation; 

• Identify a point of contact for contracting expertise to facilitate 

acquisition of third-party services and equipment; and 

• Identify a point of contact in the Army Corps of Engineers to 

oversee and administer real property, geological analyses, and 

engineering and construction of landfill and compost sites. 

Conclusion 

This study has identified four categories of deficiencies within the 

DoD regarding readiness for an agroterrorism event: 

1. Planning. There is no clear plan for integrating specific military 

capabilities into an overall response effort. The Army maintains 

communication with U.S. Department of Agriculture regarding 

animal diseases. However, this has not resulted in an integrated 

response plan. 
Executive Summary 

xxii 

2. Personnel. U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has only a 

single planner focused on an agroterror contingency. Moreover, 

although there are significant numbers of trained and experienced 

veterinarians, laboratory technicians, epidemiologists, and 

specialized technicians in the military, there is no centralized 

mechanism for tracking their locations and availability during an 

agroterrorism event. 

3. Liaison. Although DoD has a memoranda of understanding with 

the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug 

Administration, these relationships should be further solidified by 

creating permanent liaison positions. 

4. Mission. The DoD has not specifically acknowledged it has the 

mission of providing forces and/or resources following an 

agroterrorism event. Although this may be included, by 

implication, under the rubric of “homeland defense,” these 

shortfalls could be more easily remedied by a senior-level 

commitment to this mission. 

This examination of the military’s role in an agroterrorist event 

identified issues regarding the DoD’s preparedness to contribute to a 

response. Senior leaders within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 

Joint Staff, NORTHCOM, and the Army should commission a more 

complete analysis of what should be the military’s involvement following 

a major national agroterrorist event. The following milestones are offered 

as a suggested template of action for determining the optimum military 

participation in response to the agroterrorism threat and for ensuring DoD 

readiness. 

1. Determine if this is a valid mission for the DoD, likely a 

NORTHCOM action, in coordination with the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. 

2. Identify categorical capabilities that the DoD might be called upon 

to provide through a series of interagency tabletop and field 

exercises, with participation from all levels (e.g., state, local, 

national) of government, and including relevant non-government 

experts as well. 
Pravecek / Davis 

xxiii 

3. Evaluate the current capability of the DoD to meet those identified 

requirements. 

4. Close the delta between requirements and current capability by 

fine-tuning the military force structure and/or military 

responsibilities as outlined in interagency agreements. 

This report provides a brief investigation into several potential 

support activities the DoD might provide if an agroterrorist attack 

occurred. Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the DoD and the military 

services have risen to a new set of dangerous challenges in the war on 

terrorism. The true test of military response capability would be its 

response to a national agroterrorist attack. 

Notes 

1. National Governors Association, “Agroterror,” 6 February 2003, On-line. Internet, 17 

June 2005, Available from http://www.nga.org/cda/files/BIOSUMMIT03_WILLIAMS.PPT# 

287,2,AGROTERROR. 

2. Katherin McIntire Peters, “Officials Fear Terrorist Attack on U.S. Food Supply,” 

GovExec.com, 10 June 2003, On-line, Internet, 20 June 2005, Available from 

http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0603/061003kp1.htm. 

3. J.R. Gillespie, “The underlying interrelated issues of biosecurity,” J Am Vet Med 

Assoc 2000; 216:662-664. 

4. R. Casagrande, 2000, “Biological terrorism targeted at agriculture: the threat to 

US national security,” Nonproliferation Review, 7 no. 3, 93. 

5. J. Monke, “Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness,” CRS Report for Congress, 

2004, Order Code RL32521. 

6. Casagrande, 2000, 92. For a good overview of the agroterrorist threat, see also, 

Robert P. Kadlec, “Biological Weapons for Waging Economic Warfare,” Chapter 10 in 

Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E. Grinter, eds., Battlefield of the Future: 21st 

Century Warfare Issues (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1998), 251-266. 

7. “How much did the September 11 terrorist attack cost America?” The Institute 

for Analysis for Global Security, On-line, Internet, 22 June 2005, Available from 

http://www.iags.org/costof911.html.

CHAPTER 1 

Military’s Role in Combating Agroterrorism: 

Introduction 

Thomas C. Berg, Jim A. Davis, Donald L. Noah, and Tasha L. Pravecek 

I am concerned about avian flu. I am concerned about what 

an avian flu outbreak could mean for the United States and 

the world...If we had an outbreak somewhere in the United 

States, do we not then quarantine that part of the country, 

and how do you then enforce a quarantine? ...And who best 

to be able to effect a quarantine? One option is the use of a 

military that’s able to plan and move. 

–President George W. Bush 

Rose Garden Press Briefing 

October 4, 20051

The World Health Organization (WHO) reported on October 24, 2005, 

that there have been 126 confirmed human cases of avian influenza (H5N1) 

and 64 deaths.2

 Quarantining farms and destroying infected flocks have 

been standard control measures to stem the spread of disease. More than 

140 million birds have been culled in Asia.3

 Despite these efforts to control 

avian influenza, the disease continues to spread across the globe. This 

disease spread and the leap from infecting only avian species to humans as 

well has alarmed the President of the United States and the world. The 

WHO stated that “experts agree that another influenza pandemic is 

inevitable and possibly imminent.”4 If avian or other highly contagious 

disease arrives in America, prompt and effective containment of disease will 

be dependent on the coordinated reaction of appropriate local, state, and 

federal response personnel and assets. 

How will the U.S. military be used in the event of a massive natural 

disease outbreak? Or, in the event of a terrorist attack?5

 This publication 
Military’s Role in Combating Agroterrorism: Introduction 

2 

strives to present examples and examine shortfalls concerning the DoD 

roles and responsibilities in the event of an agroterror event. In order to 

understand the potential “planning and moving” requirements of the 

military, the threat and consequences must be fully understood. 

Agroterrorist Threat 

The U.S. agricultural industry is extremely vulnerable to attack for 

many reasons including the geographic concentration of different sectors of 

agriculture, the almost ubiquitous and highly contagious nature of many 

diseases or pests, and the massive size of the U.S. agricultural industry. Do 

our adversaries have the capability to convert these vulnerabilities into a 

real national security threat? Former Secretary of Health Tommy Thompson 

stated in December 2004, “for the life of me, I cannot understand why the 

terrorists have not attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do. We 

are importing a lot of food from the Middle East, and it would be easy to 

tamper with that.”6 One source states that 280 documents dealing with 

agroterrorism were found in the Afghanistan caves.7

 In fact, “hundreds of 

pages of U.S. agricultural documents had been translated into Arabic. Al 

Qaeda’s interest in American agriculture was more than academic, 

according to government officials. A significant part of the group’s training 

manual is reportedly devoted to agricultural terrorism - the destruction of 

crops, livestock and food processing operations.”8

The use of disease against plants and animals is not new. Indeed, in 

World War I (WWI) the Germans had a spy network producing biologics 

to inoculate horses and mules before they went across the Atlantic to 

support the military in the war. The peak success of the German program 

occurred when it infected over 4,500 mules and horses in Mesopotamia. 

Since WWI, many countries including the United States, Britain, and 

Japan have had anti-plant and anti-animal programs, and have weaponized 

many disease agents. In the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency 

developed methods for carrying out covert attacks against crops to affect 

severe crop loss.9

 And, in the 1940s and 1950s, the Soviet Union 

developed anti-agricultural biological weapons under their “Ecology” 

program. By 1990, a shift in Soviet strategy led to the abandonment of 

anti-agricultural weapons due to the belief that these weapons were not 
Berg / Davis / Noah / Pravecek 

3 

suitable for strategic military use. The Soviets thought these weapons to be 

suitable only for terrorist use to disrupt a target country’s economy.10

The science and art of how to promulgate an agroterrorist attack is not 

an international secret. Note in Table 1.1 the long history of countries that 

have worked in this field. This may reflect the common assumption that 

attacks against agriculture might be more attractive to terrorists because of 

the economic disruption, the secondary effects on humans, and the potential 

for deniability that might make the response or retribution less vigorous.11

Table 1.1 Countries with Past and Present Agricultural BW 

Capabilities 

STATE STATUS DATES DISEASE COMMENTS 

Canada Former 1941-60s Anthrax, Rinderpest Exact date of project 

termination unclear 

Egypt Probable 1972-

present 

Anthrax, brucellosis, glanders, 

psittacosis, Eastern equine 

encephalitis 

France Former 1939-72 Potato beetle, Rinderpest Exact date of project 

termination unclear 

Germany Former 1915-17, 

1942-45 

Anthrax, foot-and-mouth disease, 

glanders, potato beetle, wheat fungus 

In World War II 

(WWII) experimented 

with turnip weevils, 

antler moths, potato 

stalk rot/tuber decay, 

and miscellaneous 

anti-crop weeds 

Iraq Known 1980s2003 

Aflatoxin, anthrax, camelpox, footand-mouth disease, wheat stem rust 

(camel pox may have been 

surrogate for smallpox) 

Believed to have had 

program elements 

despite UN 

disarmament efforts 

Japan Former 1937-45 Anthrax, glanders 

During WWII 

experimented with 

miscellaneous anticrop fungi, bacteria, 

nematodes 

North Korea Probable ?-present Anthrax 

Rhodesia 

(Zimbabwe) 

Uncertain/ 

Former 1978-80 Anthrax 

Suspicious epidemic of 

cattle anthrax resulted 

in 182 human deaths. 

Some scientists believe 

government forces 

infected livestock to 

impoverish rural 

blacks during last 

phase of civil war. 

South Africa Former 1980s-93 Anthrax 

Syria Probable ?-present Anthrax 

 Continued on page 4. 
Military’s Role in Combating Agroterrorism: Introduction 

4 

STATE STAT DATES DISEASE COMMENTS 

United Kingdom Former 1937-60s Anthrax Exact date of project 

termination unclear 

United States Former 1943-69 

Anthrax, brucellosis, Eastern & 

Western equine encephalitis, footand-mouth disease, fowl plague, 

glanders, late blight of potato, 

Newcastle disease, psittacosis 

Continued from the 

disease column: rice 

brown spot disease, 

Rinderpest, 

Venezuelan equine 

encephalitis, wheat 

blast fungus, wheat 

stem rust 

USSR 

(Russia, 

Khazakstan, 

Uzbekistan) 

Formerly 

active; 

current 

status 

unclear 

1935-92 

African swine fever, anthrax, avian 

influenza, brown grass mosaic, 

brucellosis, contagious bovine 

pleuropneumonia, contagious 

ecthyma (sheep), foot-and-mouth 

disease, glanders, maize rust, 

Newcastle disease virus, potato 

virus, psittacosis, rice blast, 

Rinderpest 

Additionally 

experimented with: rye 

blast, tobacco mosaic, 

Venezuelan equine 

encephalitis, vesicular 

stomatitis, wheat & 

barley mosaic streak, 

wheat stem rust, 

parasitic insects and 

insect attractants 

Source: Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Agroterrorism: Agriculture Biowarfare: State Programs to Develop Offensive Capabilities, created 

October 2000. On-line. Internet, 22 June 2005. Available from http://cns.miis.edu/research/ 

cbw/agprogs.htm. Chart edited for space considerations; see complete chart and extensive footnotes 

on web page. 

Many potential adversaries either have or can easily obtain an 

agroterrorism capability that could cause catastrophic economic effects in 

the United States. The economic impact of the September 11, 2001, 

attacks on America has been estimated to be well over a $100 billion,12 but 

the effect of a successful multipoint agricultural attack could surpass this 

and lead to long-term, perhaps unrecoverable damage to the agricultural 

export industry. 

U.S. Agriculture Industry

Agriculture is a key component of the U.S. economy, comprising over 

15% of America’s jobs and 11% of the gross domestic product.13,14

Livestock sales make up half of this amount, or $93 billion and the United 

States is the world’s largest exporter of livestock and livestock products.15

Billions of dollars worth of agricultural products are exported monthly 

resulting in over $50 billion exported annually.16 In fact, the agricultural 

industry is recognized as one of only two major industries in the United 

States that exports more than it imports; the other being the aerospace 
Berg / Davis / Noah / Pravecek 

5 

industry.17 U.S. agricultural exports are so significant that they generate 

larger revenue than the entire national GDP of 70% of the world’s 

countries.18

Figure 1.1 Monthly U.S. Agriculture Trade, fiscal years 2004-2005 

Nora Brooks. “U.S. Agricultural Trade Surplus of $325 Million in January 2005.” U.S. Agricultural 

Trade Update, United States Department of Agriculture, FAU-102, 13 June 2005. On-line. Internet, 

18 June 2005. Available at: http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/erssor/trade/fau-bb/text/2005/ 

fau99.pdf. 

How has the United States become such a global force in agriculture 

and how has agriculture become such an important factor in the prosperity 

of America? Process changes, industrial technology, bio-technology, and 

information technology have been applied while utilizing the indigenous 

land, water resources, and production practices to produce what would 

appear to be an unstoppable agricultural machine. Smaller farms have 

been combined into much larger operations cutting overhead and allowing 

for purchases of large production equipment. The five top agricultural 

commodities, beef cattle, dairy products, broilers, hogs, and layers 

(chickens raised to produce eggs), represent animals now living in highly 

concentrated conditions.19

The modern poultry industry is a perfect example of this trend. It is 

common for poultry producers (also known as “integrators”) to control the 

entire process from hatching through grow-out, to slaughter processing 

and market distribution.20 These large, vertically integrated businesses 

commonly own or control hatcheries, farms, feed mills, slaughter facilities 
Military’s Role in Combating Agroterrorism: Introduction 

6 

and truck fleets. The advantage of this practice is a stable supply of 

wholesome, low-priced food products that are readily available to the 

consumer. The disadvantage of these highly specialized industries is the 

vulnerability to the accidental or intentional introduction of a plant or 

animal pathogen. 

Certain geographic areas now specialize in growing just certain crops 

or livestock, thereby enhancing national infrastructure efficiencies. For 

instance, by 1997, Texas produced 16% of the U.S. cattle and calves and 

22.5% of the U.S. cotton. In fact, 70% of the nation’s beef cattle are raised 

on one area with a 200 mile radius.21 Similarly, California produced 

92.2% of the grapes, 47% of tomatoes, and 75% of the strawberries grown 

in the United States. Geographically concentrating agriculture industries 

may be efficient but it also increases their vulnerability to agroterrorist 

attack. 

Additional advances in plant and animal protection are seen through 

species selection and genetic engineering. Some plants and animals have 

been selected for their disease resistance. Brahman cattle, for example, are 

selected for breeding partially because they have greater resistance to Texas 

tick fever. Moreover, some plants and insects are now being genetically 

modified to resist diseases and mitigate agricultural pests. Through 

eradication programs, the United States has been able to rid itself of some of 

the more severe agricultural scourges such as classical swine fever 

(formerly hog cholera), foot-and-mouth disease, and the infestations by 

screw worm fly. 

The benefit from these continual improvements is a reduction in the 

amount the U.S. citizen pays for food from 14% on their income in 1970 

to 11% in 1996.22,23 The significance of these figures is underscored by the 

fact that Russians spend approximately 50% of their income on food, the 

Filipinos spend 44%, and the Argentineans spend 34%.24,25 The American 

public expects cheap, safe, and high quality foods and places great trust in 

the production continuum leading to its dinner tables. 

Consequences of Agroterrorist Attack 

The United States, as a direct result of its national resources and 

increasingly efficient production capacity, has a global impact in the 

agricultural industry. If the United States loses its ability to maintain its 
Berg / Davis / Noah / Pravecek 

7 

agricultural exports through an act of agroterrorism, at least three primary 

consequences will ensue: cessation of food production, loss of vital export 

markets, and near-term food shortages. 

Once the initial agroterror event occurs, certain geographical areas 

containing specific sections of the affected industry could be shut down 

until situational awareness is achieved and the magnitude of the act is 

determined. The production, movement, and processing of livestock or 

crops could be stopped for days or weeks. However, it is possible that the 

response would require an entire industry to be shut down for months until 

the situation is resolved. Farms, factories, and distribution channels could 

be closed, leading to layoffs, job losses, and economic downturns for the 

communities tied to these industries. 

Second, the United States will lose vital export markets as other 

producers in the world quickly move to fill the void with their exported 

goods. Although some of the market losses will be temporary, many will 

be permanently lost unless the United States is able to begin exporting 

again quickly. The cessation of all product exports may place pressure on 

the United States’ balance of trade. 

Third, the introduction of disease may have grave consequences for 

food availability. Some food security experts estimate that the average city 

in the U.S. has at most a five-day supply of fresh meat, fruit, and 

vegetables on hand. These food stores could last from three to five weeks 

if edibility, and not freshness, was the main concern. Supermarkets and 

restaurants have shifted to “just-in-time” deliveries to bring fresher food to 

their customers. However, these businesses are vulnerable to severe 

economic risks if their distribution supply is disrupted. Food commonly 

travels great distances from the farm to the dinner table. A disruption in a 

metropolitan area’s food supply by an agroterrorist attack could lead to a 

surge in demand for food as panic buying and food hoarding occurred.26

Additionally, as a result of the import/export disruption, some foreign 

recipients of U.S. agricultural commodities may experience near-term 

shortages resulting in adverse population health outcomes. 

Unique DoD Capabilities 

The DoD downsizing since the end of the Cold War combined with 

current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to fight the global war on 
Military’s Role in Combating Agroterrorism: Introduction 

8 

terrorism have placed enormous pressure on the active duty and reserve 

forces of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Since military 

forces are most commonly seen fighting this war by directly engaging the 

terrorists, it is somewhat difficult to imagine what role, if any, soldiers, 

sailors, airmen, and marines might have in an agroterrorism event. 

However, the military brings unique capabilities and resources that could 

be vital before, during, or after such an event occurred. 

The capabilities and resources the DoD brings to the federal 

government’s response to an agroterrorism event include biological and 

chemical detection/reconnaissance and risk assessment, medical and 

veterinary support, laboratory capabilities, decontamination assets, 

logistics, and general response expertise.27 The National Guard’s Weapons 

of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST), which are 

composed of 22 highly skilled, full-time National Guard personnel, are 

designed to assist local first responders in determining the nature of an 

attack, provide medical and technical advice, and assist with the 

identification and arrival of other state and federal response assets. WMDCST teams are a state asset and are activated by the Governor of that state. 

They can be federalized under recent amendments to the Presidential 

Selective Reserve Call-Up (PSRC) authority.28

Despite the DoD’s wide-ranging capabilities, there are some 

restrictions to the unique resources and capabilities brought to support 

the civil authorities. In his 1999 report to the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Combating 

Terrorism Policy and Support stated that the DoD’s support to civil 

authorities is governed by five principles: (1) the DoD must have 

absolute and public accountability of officials involved in the oversight 

of this process while respecting constitutional principles and civil 

liberties; (2) the DoD must maintain a supporting role to the lead civilian 

agencies; (3) DoD support should emphasize its natural role, skills, and 

structures such as mass mobilization and logistical support; (4) DoD 

equipment and capabilities are primarily to support its war-fighting 

mission; and (5) the DoD abides by the existing legislative authorities 

that govern its civilian agency support.29 Thus, the role of the DoD in an 

agroterror attack is not yet clear-cut and needs clarification if the military 

is to be prepared to handle the problems created by an agroterror event. 
Berg / Davis / Noah / Pravecek 

9 

Nevertheless, the federal government has provided directives which 

address the concern to protect our agriculture and food resources. Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-9 (Defense of United States 

Agriculture and Food) states that the “United States agriculture and food 

systems are vulnerable to disease, pest, or poisonous agents that occur 

naturally, are unintentionally introduced, or are intentionally delivered by 

acts of terrorism. America’s agriculture and food system is an extensive, 

open, interconnected, diverse, and complex structure providing potential 

targets for terrorist attacks. We should provide the best protection possible 

against a successful attack on the United States agriculture and food 

system, which could have catastrophic health and economic effects.”30

HSPD-9 mentions a number of federal agencies, such as the Departments of 

Interior, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, the Administrator of the 

Environmental Protection and others as having a role in defending 

American agriculture. Although HSPD-9 does not mention the DoD in this 

capacity, the DoD has in the past and will continue in the future to play a 

role in helping our nation prepare for, respond to, and recover from an 

intentional attack on our nation’s food supply. 

The DoD has previously helped the Department of Agriculture respond 

to and recover from natural biological outbreaks in American agriculture. 

For example, nearly 4,000 military personnel participated in the effort to 

stem the 1971 outbreak of Venezuelan equine encephalitis in Texas. Other 

such support occurred in 1971-1972 when nearly 400 military personnel 

participated in stopping an outbreak of Newcastle disease in California and 

Texas. In 1983, about 140 military personnel helped support a campaign 

against avian influenza in Pennsylvania.31 Additional examples of DoD 

involvement in disease outbreaks are detailed in Chapter 2. 

Project Overview 

The U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center (CPC) was directed 

by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to conduct a study to 

determine the DoD’s potential involvement in responding to an 

agroterrorism event. This resulting report details several possible roles for 

the DoD in a CONUS agroterrorist event. 

To complete this report, the CPC and project assistant32 identified 

subject matter experts (SMEs) in the following areas: (1) DoD response 
Military’s Role in Combating Agroterrorism: Introduction 

10 

planning; (2) military manpower assessment; (3) plant and crop response; 

and (4) carcass disposal. These areas were chosen because each has a 

potential need for DoD consideration. The SMEs (chapter authors) and 

other invited guests (listed in the “Workshop Attendees” section of this 

report) attended a one-day workshop at Colorado State University, Fort 

Collins, Colorado, to discuss the topic areas. The authors incorporated 

comments of the invited guests and their own research into chapters which 

are included in this publication. 

This report explores each of the four areas in greater detail. The 

findings will provide local, state, federal, and DoD policy makers detailed 

information about current capabilities and future potential roles for the 

DoD in helping the nation prepare for, respond to, and recover from a 

terrorist attack on U.S. agriculture. The following paragraphs provide a 

brief introduction to the content of each military agroterrorism response 

issue examined. 

Chapter 2: Recent Disease Outbreaks and National Exercises 

The military’s role in the response to attacks or natural outbreaks of 

agricultural disease in the United States is neither clearly understood nor 

well-defined. In previous incidents and exercises in the United States and 

throughout the world, the military role was limited or engaged as an 

afterthought when civilian forces became overwhelmed. The exercise 

chapter provides examples of the memoranda of understanding that 

establish DoD involvement, military support in international and national 

disease outbreaks, and some U.S. agroterrorism exercises. 

Chapter 3: Department of Defense Response Planning 

As part of its mission to defend the United States, the DoD in 

conjunction with other state and federal agencies must plan and prepare to 

deter, prevent, defeat, and mitigate threats against the agriculture and food 

system. There are many civilian agencies involved in the regulation and 

protection of agriculture and food production in the United States. 

Principals among the federal agencies responsible for the safety of our 

food supply are the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and 
Berg / Davis / Noah / Pravecek 

11 

the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) through the 

actions of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Other federal 

agencies with responsibilities for food supply protection include the 

Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, and Defense. This 

response planning chapter details the agencies involved in protection of 

agriculture, plans for a progressive disaster response to an agricultural 

event, DoD planning considerations, and the likely impacts of an 

agricultural event on the DoD. 

Chapter 4: Military Manpower Assessment 

Much of the history as well as current expectations regarding sharing 

of resources and availability of dedicated DoD assets for response to 

agricultural emergencies are based on assumptions grounded in a much 

larger early 1970s DoD force. This force included a large standing army, 

mostly in garrison, substantial Reserve and Guard Forces – both 

replenished by the military draft obligation, and was sustained by 

internal/organic DoD support services and equipment. The manpower 

chapter reviews the type and magnitude of DoD manpower support 

required if an agroterrorism event occurs and comments on the scope of 

training, organization, and equipping needed to field an appropriate force. 

Chapter 5: Plant and Crop Response 

A terrorist attack against plants and crops is a national security threat. 

Plant and crop production is geographically dispersed in unsecured 

environments such as open fields and pastures. Like its livestock 

counterpart, the modern crop industry has evolved into large scale 

operations, which has increased its vulnerability to the intentional 

introduction of a disease. Plant and crop production possess several 

characteristics that make this an attractive terrorist target. The plant and 

crop chapter addresses these unique characteristics, potential agroterrorist 

targets, the responsibilities of federal agencies in safeguarding this 

industry, and the type and magnitude of military support required for 

effective plan and crop response. 
Military’s Role in Combating Agroterrorism: Introduction 

12 

Chapter 6: Carcass Disposal 

An agroterrorist event involving livestock will, by design, result in 

potentially large numbers of carcasses either from death caused by the 

disease or by the mass euthanasia efforts implemented to control the spread 

of the disease. Regardless of the cause of death, carcasses must be disposed 

of quickly, safely, and in an environmentally sound manner. The method 

used will depend on a number of factors including the number carcasses, the 

cause of death, the stability of potential infectious agents, local or regional 

environmental conditions, the availability of equipment, the availability and 

type of fuel sources, the cost and the impact of public perceptions. The 

carcass disposal chapter describes a number of methods currently in use to 

handle diseased or dying animals and their carcasses which could also 

potentially be applied to an emergency agroterrorist event. Additionally, the 

chapter details the role DoD may play in carcass disposal, providing heavy 

equipment, detailing manpower, supplying logistics, and providing 

contracting expertise. 

This report provides a brief investigation into several potential 

support activities the DoD might provide if an agroterrorist attack 

occurred. Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the DoD and the military 

services have responded to a new set of dangerous challenges in the war 

on terrorism. An even sterner test of military planning and moving 

flexibility will be how military forces, in cooperation with other U.S. 

departments and agencies, respond to a national agroterrorist attack. 

Notes

1. Office of the Press Secretary, “President Holds Press Conference: The Rose 

Garden,” 4 October 2005, On-line, Internet, 26 October 2005, Available from 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/print/20051004-1.html. 

2. World Health Organization, “Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of 

Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO,” 24 October 2005, On-line, Internet, 26 

October 2005, Available from http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/ 

country/en/. 
Berg / Davis / Noah / Pravecek 

13 

3. Washington Post, “Military’s Role in a Flu Pandemic,” 5 October 2005, On-line, 

Internet, 20 October 2005, Available from http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/ 

search.html/?nav=left. 

4. World Health Organization, “Avian influenza (“bird flu”) and the Significance of 

its Transmission to Humans,” 15 January 2004, On-line, Internet, 20 October 2005, 

Available from http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/avian_influenza/en/print.html. 

5. Robert I. Miller, “The Impact of Quarantine on Military Operations,” 

Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series, No. 31, (Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF 

Counterproliferation Center, August 2005). 

6. “Bush Downplays Food Terror Fears,” Associated Press, Washington, 4 December 

2004, On-line, Internet, 17 June 2005, Available from http://www.cbsnews.com/ 

stories/2004/12/03/terror/main659007.shtml. 

7. National Governors Association, “Agroterror,” 6 February 2003, On-line, 

Internet, 17 June 2005, Available from http://www.nga.org/cda/files/BIOSUMMIT03_ 

WILLIAMS.PPT#287,2,AGROTERROR. 

8. Katherin McIntire Peters, “Officials Fear Terrorist Attack on U.S. Food Supply,” 

GovExec.com, 10 June 2003, On-line, Internet, 20 June 2005, Available from 

http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0603/061003kp1.htm. 

9. Frederick R. Sidell, Ernest T. Takafuju, and David R. Franz, eds., “Textbook of 

Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare,” Office of the 

Surgeon General at TMM Publications: Washington D.C., 1997, 51, 459-461. 

10. Kenneth Alibek, “The Soviet Union’s Anti-Agricultural Biological Weapons,” 

in Food and Agricultural Security, Thomas W. Frazier and Drew C. Richardson, eds., 

(New York: The New York Academy of Sciences, 1999), 18-19. 

11. J.R. Gillespie, “The underlying interrelated issues of biosecurity,” J. Amer. Vet 

Med. Assoc. 2000; 216:662-664. 

12. “How much did the September 11 terrorist attack cost America?” The Institute 

for Analysis for Global Security, no date. On-line, Internet, 22 June 2005, Available from 

http://www.iags.org/costof911.html.

13. Rocce Casagrande, 2000. “Biological terrorism targeted at agriculture: the threat 

to U.S. national security,” Nonproliferation Review, 7, no. 3, 93. 

14. J. Monke, “Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness,” CRS Report for 

Congress, 2004, Order Code RL32521. 
Military’s Role in Combating Agroterrorism: Introduction 

14 

15. Rocce Casagrande, “Biological Warfare Targeted at Livestock,” Bioscience, 

July 2002, Vol. 52, No. 7. 

16. Casagrande, 2000, page 92. 

17. CIA World Factbook 2005, “Rank Order GDP,” On-line. Internet, 18 June 2005, 

Available from: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html. 

18. Ibid. 

19. Anne Kohnen, “Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism: Specific 

Recommendations for the United States Department of Agriculture,” BCSIA Discussion 

Paper 2000-29, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP 2000-04, John F. Kennedy School of 

Government, Harvard University, October 2000. On-line, Internet, 18 June 2005, 

Available from http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/Responding_to_ 

the_Threat_of_Agroterrorism.pdf. 

20. Casagrande, 2002. 

21. Jason Pate and Gavin Cameron, “Covert Biological Weapons Attacks against 

Agricultural Targets: Assessing the Impact the Impact against U.S. Agriculture,” BCSIA 

Discussion Paper 2001-9, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP-2001-05, John F. Kennedy 

School of Government, Harvard University, August 2001. 

22. Agriculture Fact Book 1998, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of 

Communications, November 1998, 43. Value of commodity cash receipts, 1996. 

23. Corrie Brown, “Agro-Terrorism: A Cause for Alarm,” Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 1-2 

(Winter-Spring 1999), 6. 

24. Austrade (Australian Trade Commission), “Food and Beverages to Russia,” no date, 

On-line, Internet, 17 June 2005, Available from http://www.austrade.gov.au/australia/ 

layout/0,,0_S2-1_CLNTXID0019-2_-3_PWB1698879-4_trends-5_-6_-7_,00.html. 

25. Barbara Rippel, “Inexpensive food essential for large parts of the world 

population,” Consumer Alert, March 2000, On-line, Internet, 17 June 2005, Available 

from http://www.consumeralert.org/pubs/OnthePlate/OTPMAR00.htm. 

26. J.W. Foxell Jr., “Current Trends in Agroterrorism (Anti-livestock, Anti-crop, 

and Anti-soil Bio-agricultural Terrorism) and Their Potential Impact on Food Security in 

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,” 24:107-129, 2001. 

27. Statement by Robert Newberry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Combating Terrorism Policy and Support, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 

United States Senate, 106th Congress, 27 October 1999, 3. 
Berg / Davis / Noah / Pravecek 

15 

28. Ibid, 4. 

29. Ibid. 

30. HSPD-9 Defense of United States Agriculture and Food, 30 January 2004. 

31. Newberry, 5. 

32. Dr. Tom Berg, DVM, PhD, was contracted by the CPC and acted as project 

assistant. 

CHAPTER 2 

Recent Disease Outbreaks and National Exercises1

Tasha L. Pravecek, Jim A. Davis, and Christopher R. Greenwood 

The United Kingdom’s (UK) State Veterinary Service commissioned 

a study in 1999 to examine the contingency plans and logistical and 

staffing preparations for an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) 

and other exotic animal diseases. The resulting Drummond Report 

commented that the United Kingdom was not adequately prepared for a 

large response. A year later, the United Kingdom had realized little 

improvement in their responses to animal disease despite concerns 

expressed by the chief of the UK State Veterinary Service regarding 

contingency strategies.2

 The real test of the United Kingdom’s ability to 

respond began on February 19, 2001, when a routine veterinary inspection 

in Essex showed signs of foot-and-mouth disease in 27 pigs. By the end 

of the UK foot-and-mouth disease crisis, hundreds of thousands of pigs, 

cattle, and horses were sacrificed.3

 A European Union committee on 

FMD found that a more rapid deployment of the British army would have 

reduced the backlog of carcasses for disposal and relieved the stress of the 

local farmers and rural communities.4

 The United States Department of 

Defense (DoD) should heed this European Union finding and establish 

military consequence management plans for animal disease outbreaks and 

identify/procure assets to assist the U.S. Department of Agriculture 

(USDA) before a similar domestic crisis. 

The military role in the response to attacks or natural outbreaks of 

agricultural disease in the United States is not clearly understood nor well 

defined. In previous international and domestic incidents and exercises, 

the military’s role was limited or engaged as an afterthought when civilian 

forces became overwhelmed. Many post-event and post-exercise 

discussions addressed the benefits of a quicker, more involved military 

reaction. This chapter presents the military role in recent natural events 
Recent Disease Outbreaks and National Exercises 

18 

around the world and exercises held in the United States that involved use 

of military personnel. 

Memoranda of Understanding 

The military and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) have had a 

long standing relationship since 1964. In the 1964 Memorandum of 

Understanding (MOU), the DoD agreed to assist the USDA in the event of 

biological contamination to the U.S. agricultural base.5 The current 

military role in support of agricultural incidents is further defined by a 

2000 MOU between the DoD, General Services Administration (GSA), 

and the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). In 

this MOU, the Department of Defense also agreed to assist USDA/APHIS 

with developing contingency plans and exercises.6

 MOUs are further 

detailed in Chapter 4 of this publication. 

Military Support in International and National Disease 

Outbreaks 

According to testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee 

provided by Robert Newberry, the DoD participates in exercises, assists in 

the development of response plans, provides laboratory support to the 

Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and the Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service, provides military specialists trained in foreign animal 

disease diagnosis, laboratory diagnosis, epidemiology, microbiology, 

immunology, entomology, pathology, and public health.7

 These military 

experts and their roles are further detailed by John Herbold in Chapter 4, 

“Military Manpower Assessment.” Since the 1970s, there are numerous 

instances of the DoD participation and support in disease outbreaks and 

exercises. 

There are several examples of DoD support to the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture during natural outbreaks of disease. In 1971, the DoD 

provided 4,000 military personnel to assist in stemming the outbreak of 

Venezuelan equine encephalitis in Texas.8

 The U.S. Army Medical 

Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) developed the 

vaccine to quell this outbreak of encephalitis.9 Next, during 1971 and 
Pravecek / Davis / Greenwood 

19 

1972, more than four hundred DoD personnel took part in combating the 

Newcastle disease in Texas and California. In 1983, the Pentagon supplied 

manpower and equipment in response to an avian influenza outbreak in 

Pennsylvania.10 And in June 1997, the DoD provided the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture use of facilities and specialized equipment to 

conduct spraying operations to combat the Mediterranean fruit fly in 

Florida. In 1999, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious 

Diseases collaborated with the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to identify the 

causative agent for the West Nile fever outbreak in New York City.11 

Finally, on December 23, 2003, a case of “mad cow disease” or bovine 

spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)12 was discovered in Mabton, 

Washington. An Air Force aircraft transported a suspected BSE infected 

sample to the UK for confirmatory analysis.13 Use of the Air Force asset 

allowed for rapid and safe transport, and enabled a quick confirmation of 

the BSE disease. In addition to these successful uses of the U.S. military 

in a research and response function, other nations have used their 

militaries for consequence management activities. 

Foot-and-mouth disease is a highly communicable viral disease of 

cattle and swine, and other cloven-hooved ruminants. Although foot-andmouth disease is not recognized as a zoonotic disease, its economic 

consequences are devastating. The 2001 foot-and-mouth disease outbreak 

in the UK cost the country an estimated ₤ 3.1 billion and ₤ 2.7-3.2 billion 

in lost revenue from agricultural trade and tourism, respectively.14 During 

the foot-and-mouth disease crisis, approximately 2,900 British soldiers 

assisted with quarantine operations and logistical assistance.15 

To prevent the spread of disease, meticulous border checks were 

critical. One month into the FMD outbreak, soldiers were called to 

accomplish border checks in the Republic of Ireland in an attempt to stop 

the spread of disease.16 In addition to the use of military forces for border 

checks and quarantine, the UK military provided logistical support as well. 

In Uruguay, when a similar outbreak occurred in 2000, the military shut 

down all human and animal movement into and out of the restricted area. 

This quarantine action resulted in the need for military to also conduct 

humanitarian assistance through airdropped food supplies to the local 

population.17 This airdrop demonstrated an alternative use of military 

forces in an agricultural emergency. 
Recent Disease Outbreaks and National Exercises 

20 

During the 2001 UK outbreak, the military was directed by the UK 

Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food to manage the logistics of 

transporting and disposing of over 3.9 million animal carcasses. In 

addition to transportation, military assets were used to construct the burial 

pits for carcass disposal. On March 25, the UK Government directed the 

British Army to dig huge pits at a closed military airfield near Carlisle, in 

Cumbria.18 It is reported that some pits used during the outbreak 

measured over 8 soccer fields in length and held thousands of animals.19

In some areas, the actual slaughter was carried out by licensed slaughter 

teams.20 However, on March 28, the British army had to slaughter 

thousands of sheep near Cumbria.21

Despite the successful use of the UK military forces, the decision to 

deploy the army in a logistical support role took place at a late stage in the 

epidemic, thus resulting in a backlog of carcasses that stressed the local 

communities.22 Due to the extensive nature of the UK foot-and-mouth 

disease outbreak, civilian resources were not robust enough to respond to 

the event alone. The military played a crucial role in the containment and 

consequence management of the foot-and-mouth disease episode. 

In Malaysia, the military were used in similar roles to that of the UK 

foot-and-mouth disease crisis; however, there were some adverse 

consequences. In 1998-99, swine in Malaysia manifested an unknown 

neurological disease. Even before the causative agent—the Nipah virus—

was discovered, the disease had spread significantly, ultimately causing 

104 human deaths and countless infections.23 Interestingly, more than 

1,500 Malaysian military personnel participated in the national effort to 

quarantine, euthanize, and dispose of approximately one million pigs. 

Because of the need to quickly stem the epidemic, and the lack of other 

options, this involved herding the animals into freshly dug pits and 

shooting them from above. As a result of this type of close contact, two 

soldiers contracted the disease and many others sought psychological 

counseling. Although it is very unlikely that this method of eradication 

would be employed in the United States, a similar event on United States 

soil may see the military monitoring roads, borders, and farms, enforcing 

quarantine restrictions or providing communications, transportation (air 

and land), and earth-moving services. 
Pravecek / Davis / Greenwood 

21 

U.S. Agroterrorism National Exercises 

Agroterrorism exercises afford government authorities and industry 

leaders the opportunity to participate in simulated response measures, to 

appraise the efficacy of existing policy structure, and to identify barriers to 

interagency communication and cooperation that occur during crisis 

management. The federal government has sponsored two separate series of 

agroterrorism exercises: “Crimson” and “Silent Prairie.” In terms of state 

sponsored exercises, Georgia, North Carolina, Kansas, and Texas are at 

the forefront of preparing for agroterrorism and have held numerous 

exercises to support their effort. 

The “Crimson” series was developed by the Analytic Services 

(ANSER) Institute and sponsored by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 

The first three exercises were conducted between September 2002 and 

January 2003. Crimson Sky and Crimson Guard both dealt with foreign 

animal disease (FAD) outbreaks while Crimson Winter simulated an 

attack on the U.S. food supply. The Department of Defense was reportedly 

involved in only the Crimson Sky exercise. 

Crimson Sky, developed with considerable input from the North 

Carolina Department of Agriculture, was the first of six exercises 

commissioned involving the entire USDA as well as principles from other 

federal agencies. It was designed to test the existing capabilities of the 

federal government to respond to an unexpected and extremely pathogenic 

outbreak. Participants were divided into four groups: interagency, USDA, 

industry, and “various states,” and each of them were asked to coordinate 

a containment and eradication response to the outbreak. 24

The “Silent Prairie” series was sponsored by the National Defense 

University and grappled with the problem of an agroterrorist attack during 

a period of mass military deployment. Two separate exercises were held, 

one in June 2002, and the other in February 2003. The Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Army National Guard, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

and other military leaders participated in this agroterrorism exercise, 

though specific details of their roles are not disclosed in open literature. 

The exercises were “designed to give senior government officials insights 

into the nuances and complexities of policymaking in the current global 

security environment and to illuminate policy and organizational 

options.”25
Recent Disease Outbreaks and National Exercises 

22 

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) hosted two 

exercises titled Silent Prairie, held at National Defense University’s 

National Strategic Gaming Center.

26 The exercise sought to improve 

dialogue between the Legislative and Executive branches during a 

simulated national emergency of foot-and-mouth disease. On June 25, 

2002, members of Congress, executive agency officials, and military 

leaders convened to take part in the exercise. Participants examined the 

consequences of an agroterrorist attack during a large-scale U.S. armed 

forces deployment – which closely mirrors today’s circumstances with 

American military personnel and resources assigned to Iraq and 

Afghanistan. The exercise also explored the economic ramifications of 

such an attack and the response necessary once a perpetrator had been 

identified. 

Those involved in Silent Prairie were forced to grapple with the 

challenge of balancing sufficient military capability versus domestic 

emergency response, management, and enforcement. “Participants 

examined the gravity, complexity, and difficulty inherent in responding; 

issues [sic] that would arise in a national level agricultural bioterrorism 

incident coincident with a large-scale overseas deployment of U.S. Armed 

Forces.”27 

The second exercise in the Silent Prairie28 series simulated a 

hypothetical, 45-day attack of foot-and-mouth disease on the United 

States. Continuing with the theme of the previous exercise, this one was 

concerned with how the nation would be equipped to respond to an 

agroterrorism incident during a major military deployment overseas. 

Members of Congress, the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and Agriculture, 

the Surgeon General, and members of other state and federal agencies 

served as part of the forty individuals who participated in the exercise held 

on February 11, 2003. 

Despite MOUs, Senate testimony, and exercises detailing military 

support, the interactions between the military and civilian community are 

not without flaws especially during a mass deployment situation. For 

instance, the U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service requested military assistance from the Army Veterinary 

Corps during the October 2002 through May 2003 exotic Newcastle 

disease (END) epidemic that effected bird populations in California, 

Nevada, Texas, and Arizona. END is an avian disease with a mortality rate 
Pravecek / Davis / Greenwood 

23 

of up to 90% for exposed birds. The Army Veterinary Corps was unable 

to commit personnel to assist in the END crisis due to involvement in 

Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) that was initiated October 7, 

2001, and in Operation Iraqi Freedom, initiated March 20, 2003.29 The 

END epidemic resulted in over 19,000 premises being quarantined and 

almost four million birds depopulated.30 Although the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service was successful in 

quelling the disease, military assistance would have been beneficial and 

may have resulted in a quicker resolution. This crisis represents an 

important lesson to the civilian community: during a time of war, the 

military may have other national defense obligations that prevent fulfilling 

responsibilities detailed in MOUs to the U.S. Department of Agriculture 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. 

U.S. Agroterrorism State Exercises 

Though the federal government developed two important and 

seemingly effective series of agroterrorism exercises, state-sponsored 

exercises – often incorporating county, state, and regional participation – 

have become far more prevalent and proactive in addressing this potential 

threat. This effort to heighten awareness of and preparedness for 

agroterrorism attacks is supported by a handful of enthusiastic and 

concerned localities and states. With the majority of American livestock 

and poultry residing in the Midwest, Southeast, and Great Plains; states 

like Georgia, North Carolina, Kansas, and Texas are at the forefront of this 

issue. 

Georgia was the first state to hold an exercise that dealt with an attack 

on its agriculture. Its initial effort, the Georgia State Avian Influenza 

Exercise, was conducted in 1999. It later sponsored a regional exercise 

that simulated foot-and-mouth disease and included the participation of 

Florida, North Carolina, and South Carolina. The DoD participated in 

both of these exercises. 

In the aftermath of the 1994 floods in Georgia, the state’s Department 

of Agriculture was requested to develop an animal disaster plan that could 

“mitigate the effects of catastrophic disaster on Georgia’s animal 

industries.”31 A year later, Georgia became the first state to feature an 

Emergency Support Function (ESF) that applied solely to animal industry 
Recent Disease Outbreaks and National Exercises 

24 

and agriculture catastrophes.32 The Georgia State Avian Influenza 

Exercise was intended to test the state’s new ESF-14 through a simulated 

introduction of avian influenza (AI). Sixteen state and federal agencies 

were present at the exercise. 

A regional foot-and-mouth disease exercise was conducted August 9-

12, 2001, and was comprised of a multi-state delegation from Georgia, 

Florida, North Carolina, and South Carolina. The exercise simulated a 

foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in Florida that ultimately spread into 

Georgia. Its objective was to test the response of support agencies as well 

as evaluate the projected cost of operations.33 The Georgia National 

Guard was present and participated in the state’s operation center during 

this 2001 tabletop exercise.34

North Carolina is one of the top producers in the poultry and swine 

industry, boasting a sizable portion of the nation’s total population of 

broilers and hogs. Because of this vested interest in preserving the 

integrity of the agricultural system, North Carolina has been a leading 

proponent in the development of exercises and policy meant to diminish 

the effects of an agroterrorism attack. 

North Carolina conducted the Silent Farmland35 exercise in August 

2003 to simulate an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the state. Silent 

Farmland was designed to test state and federal response measures and to 

understand the ramifications of an agricultural bioterrorism attack on state 

and federal security. The exercise also evaluated the ability of key 

agencies to communicate and cooperate with each other. The exercise 

model was an adaptation of the one developed for Silent Prairie through 

the National Defense University’s National Strategic Gaming Center. 

Silent Farmland’s objective was to “highlight the protections needed to 

effectively deploy and utilize the North Carolina National Guard, as well 

as Department of Defense personnel, during an agricultural bioterrorism 

event.”36

With the support of its National Agricultural Biosecurity Center 

(NABC),37 Kansas has been the host of several agroterrorism exercises. 

Two of these simulations, Exercise Prairie Plague and the Jefferson 

County Emergency Response Exercise, made no reference to military 

involvement. Exercises High Stakes and High Plains Guardian featured a 

replicated outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease across Kansas and utilized 
Pravecek / Davis / Greenwood 

25 

the Kansas National Guard as a third echelon of response to state law 

enforcement and traffic authorities.38

According to its final report, “the purpose of the NABC-KSU [Kansas 

State University] High Stakes simulation was to exercise Kansas local, 

state, and federal departments and agencies in the preparedness for, 

response to, and consequence mitigation of an agroterrorism attack on that 

state’s livestock industry.”39 The simulation featured an outbreak of footand-mouth disease across Kansas. The National Agricultural Biosecurity 

Center and Kansas officials also sought to determine necessary support 

requirements from federal departments and agencies for response and to 

identify inefficiencies that arose during the coordinated emergency 

management efforts.40 The hypothetical foot-and-mouth disease outbreak 

was based upon the same model used by the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture in its Crimson Series developed by the North Carolina 

Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. 41

In terms of military involvement in disease control measures, the final 

report argues for the Kansas National Guard to act as “third echelon of 

responders” once state law enforcement and transportation authorities 

become unavailable.42 The Kansas National Guard could also be used to 

ensure emergency traffic patterns are followed, restricted zones are 

maintained, and any other response measures are fully enforced.43 The 

final report for High Stakes is very forthright in its observation that it is 

important to include military personnel in these emergency response 

activities. 

In August 2004, Kansas state agriculture and emergency disaster 

agencies conducted the High Plains Guardian exercise simulating another 

outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. During this exercise, the state 

evaluated the military support aspect of agricultural disaster response. 

Participants included the Kansas Highway Patrol, Kansas Bureau of 

Investigation and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Northern 

Command, Kansas National Guard, and military reserve units. The Kansas 

adjutant general and state director of homeland security, Major General 

Tod Bunting, reported that Kansas has approximately 8,000 soldiers and 

airmen who are available on short notice to respond to an agroterrorism 

attack. Of these, 2,000 guardsmen would likely be used for quarantine to 

prevent movement of livestock on the roadways.44 Although all Kansas 

counties have not completed an agroterrorism emergency plan, exercises 
Recent Disease Outbreaks and National Exercises 

26 

such as High Plains Guardian provide valuable information regarding the 

expected use of state and federal military assets. 

As the home to more head of cattle than any other state in the United 

States, Texas predictably harbors an acute concern over the prospect of 

agroterrorism attacks within its borders. The Texas Animal Health 

Commission (TAHC) has sponsored much of the effort to prepare for this 

threat. In the past four years, Texas has hosted three significant 

agroterrorism exercises. During November of 2000, Tripartite Foreign 

Animal Disease Test Exercise Program tackled the challenge of 

coordinating a multi-national response to an outbreak of foot-and-mouth 

disease that threatened the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Conducted 

a year later, the State of Texas Foreign Animal Disease Modified 

Functional Exercise tested the state’s capability of coping with a 

pathogenic outbreak. Another Texas event was the Panhandle Exercise

which was more localized in nature, both in the region in which it focused 

(the Texas Panhandle) and the industry on which it concentrated (cattle). 

The State of Texas Foreign Animal Disease Modified Functional 

Exercise45 was the result of a partnership between the Texas Division of 

Emergency Management and the Texas Animal Health Commission, with 

the assistance of Texas A&M University. Held on June 26-29, 2001, it 

simulated a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak originating at Texas A&M’s 

Swine Facility. Over the course of the exercise, the disease spread quickly, 

infecting various locations throughout Brazos, Burleson, and Robertson 

Counties. 

The Texas National Guard was a full participant in the state foreign 

animal disease exercise.46 The Texas National Guard offered intensive 

logistical support for aircraft (both fixed and rotary), construction, 

transportation, traffic control and communications support in association 

with the Texas Department of Public Safety Emergency Operations 

Center.47

Conclusion 

To better understand and conceptualize how the military and its 

personnel could be involved in agroterrorism response measures, it is 

important to review the numerous worldwide natural outbreaks and 

exercises conducted in the United States. This review is especially vital 
Pravecek / Davis / Greenwood 

27 

because many of the individuals who are charged with responding to 

potential natural or agroterror incidents are unaware of the situation’s 

gravity or even its existence. Exercises also afford government officials 

and industry leaders the opportunity to participate in simulated response 

measures as well as to appraise the efficacy of existing policy structure. 

Oftentimes, barriers to interagency communication and cooperation are 

revealed through the practice of these exercises or examination of afteraction reports following a natural outbreak. The examination of real-world 

events and exercises offers critical opportunities for consequence 

management improvement and reformation. 

Notes

1. Christopher R. Greenwood and Jim A. Davis, “Agroterrorism Exercise and 

Disease Outbreak Project: Phase 1 of the Study of the Military’s Role in Combating 

Agroterrorism,” USAF Counterproliferation Center, 6 August 2004. 

2. Temporary Committee on Foot and Mouth Disease, 28 November 2002 “Report 

on Measures to Control Foot and Mouth Disease in the European Union in 2001 and 

Future Measures to Prevent and Control Animal Diseases in the European Union,” point 

15, On-line, Internet, 17 February 2005, available from http://www2.europarl.eu.int/. 

3. CNN.com/World, “Foot-and-Mouth Crisis Timetable,” 30 May 2001, On-line, 

Internet, 17 February 2005, available from http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/ 

europe/UK/04/11/fandm.timeline/. 

4. “Report on Measures to Control Foot and Mouth Disease in the European Union 

in 2001 and Future Measures to Prevent and Control Animal Diseases in the European 

Union,” point 27. 

5. Michael E. Peterson, “Agroterrorism and Foot-and-Mouth Disease: Is the United 

States Prepared?” Counterpliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series No. 13, Air 

University, Maxwell AFB, AL, 2002. 

6. MOU among U.S. DoD, GSA, and USDA/APHIS, 2 June 2000 (DoD), 29 

August 2000 (GSA) 30 June 2000 (USDA). 1985 MOU discussed by Robert Newberry, 

1999, “Statement by Robert Newberry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Combating Terrorism Policy and Support Before the Senate Armed Services 
Recent Disease Outbreaks and National Exercises 

28 

Committee,” 27 October 1999. On-line, Internet, 23 February 2005, available from 

http://armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/1999/e991027.htm. 

7. Ibid. 

8. Ibid. 

9. USAMRIID, “USAMRIID Highlights,” On-line, Internet, 22 February 2005, 

available from http://www.usamriid.army.mil/highlightspage.htm. 

10. Ibid. 

11. Newberry, “Statement by Robert Newberry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Combating Terrorism Policy and Support Before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee.” 

12. Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), widely referred to as “mad cow 

disease,” is a chronic degenerative disease affecting the central nervous system of cattle. 

The disease was first diagnosed in 1986 in Great Britain. BSE is a member of a family of 

diseases which includes scrapie, which affects sheep and goats; various animal 

encephalopathies; chronic wasting disease of deer and elk; and in humans, both classic 

and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD). BSE infection holds special concern due to 

the potential effects on humans. On March 20, 1996, the UK’s Spongiform 

Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) announced the identification of 10 cases of 

vCJD. The epidemiological evidence was consistent with BSE and the causal agent and 

laboratory evidence provided strong support to the hypothesis of a causal link between 

BSE and vCJD. On-line, Internet, available from http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/ 

fsheet_faq_notice/fs_ahbse.html. 

13. CNN.com, “U.S. First Apparent U.S. Case of Mad Cow Disease Discovered,” 

24 December 2004. On-line, Internet, available from www.cnn.com/2003/US/12/23/ 

mad.cow/. 

14. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (UK government) and 

Department for Culture, Media and Sport, “Economic cost of Foot and Mouth Disease in 

the UK,” On-line, Internet, 28 February 2005, available from http://labouranimal 

welfaresociety.org/files/fmdeconcost.pdf#search=‘economic%20cost%20of%20fmd%20i

n%20the%20uk’. 

15. CNN.com/World, “Foot-and-Mouth Crisis Timetable.” 

16. Ibid. 

17. Linda Logan, “News Release: Foot-and-Mouth Disease,” 28 February 2001. Online, Internet, 9 February 2005, available from www.bansidhegraphics.com/FMD.htm. 
Pravecek / Davis / Greenwood 

29 

18. CNN.com/World, “Foot-and-Mouth Crisis Timetable.” 

19. “Disaster Relief: The Brave New World of Disaster Relief Operations,” Armada 

International, March 2004, 18-30. 

20. Harry Snelson, “Foot and Mouth Disease in the UK—My Experience,” from the 

Proceedings of the North Carolina Healthy Hogs Seminar, Greenville NC, 31 October 

2001. On-line, Internet, 9 February 2005, available from http://mark.asci.ncsu.edu/ 

HealthyHogs/book2001/snelson.htm. 

21. CNN.com/World, “Foot-and-Mouth Crisis Timetable.” 

22. “Report on Measures to Control Foot and Mouth Disease in the European Union 

in 2001 and Future Measures to Prevent and Control Animal Diseases in the European 

Union,” point 27. 

23. Roslinah Ali, Anthony Mounts, Umesh Parashar, et. al. “Nipah Virus Infection 

Among Military Personnel Involved in Pig Culling during an Outbreak of Encephalitis in 

Malaysia, 1998-1999.” Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 7, No. 4, July-August 2001, page 

759. On-line. Internet, 22 June 2005. Available from http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no4/ 

pdfs/ali.pdf. 

24. “Perspectives on Food Security,” Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), 29 

October 2003, n.p. On-line, Internet, 18 June 2004, available from 

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/speeches/2003/em_acp.htm. 

25. “Silent Prairie Summary Report – INSS Holds First Secretary of Defense 

Strategic Policy Forum.” National Defense University – Institute for National Strategic 

Studies, n.p. On-line, Internet, 22 June 2004, available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/ 

Repository/INSS_Proceedings/Strategic_Policy_Forum/SPF_June_02_Silent_Prairie/Sile

nt_Prarie_Summary.htm. 

26. Ibid. 

27. Ibid. 

28. For articles related to this exercises visit the following sites: Michael Doyle, 

“Nunes takes on ag terror exercise – He and other officials try solving simulated disease 

outbreak.” Bee Washington Bureau, 13 February 2003, n.p. On-line, Internet, 18 June 

2004, available from http://www.nunes.house.gov/press/2003/newsclips/feb/011303 

agbioterrorsimFB.htm; Michael Meredith, “Bioterrorism Threat – FMD Defense 

Simulation.” American Association of Swine Veterinarians, 17 February 2003, n.p. Online, Internet, 18 June 2004, available from http://www.aasv.org/news/story.php?id=466; 

and Katherine McIntire Peters, “Officials Fear Terrorist Attack on U.S. Food Supply.” 
Recent Disease Outbreaks and National Exercises 

30 

GovExec.Com, 10 June 2003, n.p. On-line, Internet, 18 June 2004, available from 

http://homelandsecurity.osu.edu/focusareas/agri-terrorism.html. 

29. Joseph Annelli, Director of Emergency Management, USDA/APHIS, Maryland. 

Personal correspondence with Christopher Greenwood, 20 February 2005. 

30. USDA/APHIS, “2003 Emergency Management Warnings” Online, Internet, 28 

February 2005, available from http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/enc/exoticnc.html. 

31. Paul Williams, “Animal Health Emergency Management and Agroterrorism,” 

Conference Session: Georgia’s Emergency Management Operations Plan for Agriculture 

and Terrorism, 23 May 2002, n.p. On-line, Internet, 24 June 2004, available from 

http://www.agrosecurity.uga.edu/conf/gema.html. 

32. Ibid. 

33. “Agroterror,” National Governors Association, 6 February 2003, 30-41. Online, Internet, 23 June 2004, available from http://www.nga.org/cda/files/ 

BIOSUMMIT03_WILLIAMS.PPT. 

34. Jeffrey Mahany, Veterinary Medical Officer, USDA/APHIS, Georgia, personal 

correspondence with Christopher Greenwood 24 February 2005. 

35. For additional information regarding exercise Silent Farmland, refer to the 

following reports: “Federal, state, officials to participate in agriculture bioterrorism 

preparedness exercise,” NC Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 4 August 

2003, n.p. On-line, Internet, 21 June 2004, available from http://www.ncagr.com/ 

paffairs/release/2003/8-03silent.htm; Chris McIlroy, “North Carolina to Host 

Agroterrorism Exercise,” Front & Center, 17 July 2003, n.p. On-line, Internet, 21 June 

2004, available from http://www.nga.org/center/frontAndCenter/1,1188,C_FRONT_ 

CENTER%5ED_5708.html; and Dan Wilkinson, “Silent Farmland Takes on Threat of 

Biological Diseases,” WRAL.COM Newswire, 5 August 2003, n.p. On-line, Internet, 21 

June 2004, available from http://www.wral.com/news/2383350/detail.html. 

36. “HIMSS Related Bioterrorism Projects,” HIMSS National Preparedness 

Response Task Force, 14 August 2003, 88. On-line, Internet, 24 June 2004, available 

from http://www.himss.org/content/files/nprgrid_all_intitiatives.pdf. 

37. Aside from being recognized as a leading research institute in the field of 

agriculture, Kansas State University (KSU) is also home to the National Agricultural 

Biosecurity Center (NABC). The NABC works in conjunction with APHIS “to help 

coordinate the development, implementation and enhancement of diverse capabilities for 

addressing threats to the nation’s agricultural economy and food supply.” Among these 

capabilities is the development of agricultural security exercises. The NABC also 

receives some funding from the Department of Defense to conduct agroterrorism 
Pravecek / Davis / Greenwood 

31 

exercises involving National Guard and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) 

military assets. On-line, Internet, available from http://www.ksu.edu/nabc/mission.html. 

38. Exercise High Stakes. Final Report. Topeka, KS: National Agricultural 

Biosecurity Center, 19 June 2003. For a comprehensive account of Exercise High Stakes, 

please refer to its final report. It includes an account of the proceedings, a statement of 

purpose and objectives, a discussion of key components of the exercise, and a concluding 

analysis of what can be learned from the simulation. 

39. Ibid. 

40. Ibid. 

41. Ibid. 

42. Ibid. 

43. Ibid. 

44. Roxana Hegeman, “Kansas Readies Defenses against Agroterrorism Attack,” 

Dodge City Daily Globe Online (DodgeGlobe.com), On-line, Internet, 8 February 2005, 

available from www.dodgeglobe.com/ stories/080704/ag_0807040072.shtml. 

45. The furnished report on the Texas Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) Modified 

Functional Exercise provides a detailed narrative of the three-day simulation, charting the 

chronology of the disease outbreak and response measures. “State of Texas Foreign 

Animal Disease (FAD) Modified Functional Exercise Post-Exercise Report,” Texas 

Department of Emergency Management, June 2001, 1-37. On-line, Internet, 24 June 

2004, available from http://www.tahc.state.tx.us/emergency/exercises/tamu_exercise_ 

2001.pdf. 

46. Confirmed by Christopher Greenwood through electronic correspondence with 

Dr. L. Garry Adams, Associate Director of the Texas Agricultural Experiment Station 

and Professor of Veterinary Pathology at Texas A&M University. 

47. Christopher R. Greenwood and Jim A. Davis, “Agroterrorism Exercise and 

Disease Outbreak Project: Phase 1 of the Study of the Military’s Role in Combating 

Agroterrorism,” USAF Counterproliferation Center, 6 August 2004, 30. 

CHAPTER 3 

Department of Defense Response Planning 

Brian V. Noland 

Agriculture and food production are a vital part of the national 

infrastructure. A naturally occurring or terrorist agricultural event could 

have far reaching effects on all aspects of society. The impact of such an 

event could significantly affect and require a response from the 

Department of Defense. As part of its mission to defend the United States, 

the DoD in conjunction with other state and federal agencies must have a 

plan of action should such an event occur. More importantly, the DoD 

must enact plans to deter, prevent, defeat, and mitigate threats against the 

agriculture and food system. 

Current Surveillance and Inspection Systems 

Several governmental agencies are involved in the regulation and 

protection of agriculture and food production in the United States. Safety 

of the food supply is monitored at multiple levels, from oversight of the 

neighborhood coffee shop by a local public health department to the 

federal government’s regulation of a large multi-state food corporation. 

Principals among the federal agencies responsible for the safety of our 

food supply are the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and 

the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) through the 

actions of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Other federal 

agencies that also have responsibilities related to the food supply include 

the Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, and Defense. 

State and Local Agencies 

Each state independently administers its agricultural programs. Most 

states have a state veterinarian or commissioner of agriculture who 
Department of Defense Response Planning 

34 

supervises the state’s agricultural and livestock health efforts. Some states 

have public health veterinarians responsible for animal health issues 

relating to safe public consumption of animal products. Communication 

between the state veterinarian, the state department of agriculture, and the 

state and local public health department are imperative if surveillance and 

response efforts are to be effective. 

Currently, communication, manpower, and funding issues hinder the 

effectiveness of many state food and agricultural agencies’ ability to respond 

to a natural or terrorist agricultural event. To improve communication, each 

state should consider establishing a public health veterinarian serving as the 

link between agricultural interests and public health. 

United States Department of Agriculture 

The USDA is one of the principle federal agencies responsible for the 

safety of our food supply. Within the United States Department of 

Agriculture, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and 

the Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) are the primary divisions 

responsible for animal health and food inspection and regulation. 

The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service is responsible for 

protecting and promoting U.S. agricultural health, administering the 

Animal Welfare Act, and implementing wildlife damage management 

activities. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service performs these 

responsibilities through extensive animal and plant health monitoring 

programs, disease and pest response and eradication programs, and 

establishment of standards for animal health. In the event of an animal or 

plant disease outbreak, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service is 

the agency which responds at the federal level.1

The Food Safety Inspection Service ensures the nation’s commercial 

supply of meat, poultry, and egg products is safe, wholesome, and 

properly labeled and packaged. The Food Safety Inspection Service 

employs hundreds of inspectors who monitor the food safety of production 

facilities throughout the country.2

Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ), an Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service program, is responsible for ensuring the health of 

plants and crops. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service PPQ 

“safeguards agriculture and natural resources from the risks associated 
Noland 

35 

with the entry, establishment, or spread of animal and plant pests and 

noxious weeds. Fulfillment of its safeguarding role ensures an abundant, 

high-quality, and varied food supply, strengthens the marketability of U.S. 

agriculture in domestic and international commerce, and contributes to the 

preservation of the global environment.”3

United States Department of Health and Human Services-FDA 

The Food and Drug Administration is a scientific regulatory agency 

within the DHHS which is responsible for the safety of the nation’s 

domestically produced and imported foods, cosmetics, drugs, biologicals, 

medical devices, and radiological products. FDA’s responsibility in the 

food area generally covers all domestic and imported food except for that 

which the Food Safety Inspection Service has authority including meat, 

poultry, and frozen, dried, and liquid eggs.4

United States Department of Commerce 

The U.S. Department of Commerce (USDC) is responsible for the 

safety of seafood and fish processing plants. The U.S. Department of 

Commerce mission is “to create the conditions for economic growth and 

opportunity by promoting innovation, entrepreneurship, competitiveness, 

and stewardship.”5

United States Department of Homeland Security 

In accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating the overall 

national effort to enhance protection of the critical infrastructure and key 

resources of the United States.6

 Agriculture is a vital infrastructure and 

resource. Consequently, coordination of the overall response to an 

agricultural event is the responsibility of the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS). 

There are also Sector-Specific Agencies responsible for each critical 

infrastructure. Sector-Specific Agencies are defined as federal departments 

or agencies responsible for infrastructure protection activities in a 

designated critical infrastructure sector or key resources category.7,8 The 

United States Department of Agriculture is the Sector-Specific Agency 
Department of Defense Response Planning 

36 

responsible for agriculture and food (meat, poultry, and egg products). The 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services is the agency responsible 

for public health, healthcare, and food (other than meat, poultry, and egg 

products); and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible 

for drinking water and water treatment systems.9

United States Department of Defense 

DoD Directive 6400.4 designates the Secretary of the Army as DoD 

Executive Agent for Military Veterinary Services.10 Authority is further 

delegated to the Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to act on behalf of the 

Secretary of the Army for assigned responsibilities, functions, and 

authorities. Responsibilities include: 

1. Controlling animal diseases communicable to man, 

2. Developing military standards for commercial food plants 

providing products to DoD components, 

3. Developing approved lists of suppliers, 

4. Providing laboratory examinations of food products, and 

5. Providing on-base inspection of food products at all joint 

procurement and storage facilities and facilities under control of 

the Departments of the Navy and Army (excluding food 

preparation facilities).11

In the continental United States, food production plants inspected by other 

government agencies such as the United States Department of Agriculture, 

Food and Drug Administration, or U.S. Department of Commerce are 

usually not inspected by DoD personnel.12

The Secretary of the Air Force retains authority over the food 

inspection program at Air Force installations. Public health or preventive 

medicine personnel of the respective service oversee on-base food 

preparation facilities. 
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37 

General Disaster Response 

Local and State 

In a disaster, the first line of defense is at the local and state levels. A 

local government responds, supplemented by neighboring communities 

and volunteer agencies, as needed. If overwhelmed, the local government 

turns to the state for assistance. The state responds with state resources, 

such as the National Guard and other state agencies. The state may also 

request assistance from nearby states under Emergency Management 

Assistance Compacts (EMAC). This requires that losses and recovery 

needs be determined through damage assessment by local, state, federal, 

and volunteer organizations. 

For incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or 

high yield explosive agents (CBRNE), the National Guard employs 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST). The 

mission of these teams is to support the governor and the local incident 

commander in response to a local WMD event. The WMD-CST may be 

employed in Title 10 or Title 32 status as a reserve or reinforcing element 

for other WMD-CSTs, or as unilateral military support in a state without a 

WMD-CST. 

The WMD-CST has the ability to identify agents, assess 

consequences, advise on response measures, and assist with requests for 

state support. If the incident is determined to be of national impact, these 

CSTs work as part of the overall national response with the Joint Task 

Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS) or another Joint Task Force commander, 

both U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) assets. 

National 

If it is determined that state resources are insufficient to mitigate the 

disaster, the governor may request a major disaster declaration through the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) based on the damage 

assessment, and an agreement to commit state funds and resources to the 

long-term recovery. FEMA evaluates the request and recommends action 

to the White House based on the disaster, the local community, and the 

state’s ability to recover. 
Department of Defense Response Planning 

38 

At this point, there are two actions that may occur. First, the President 

approves the request and FEMA responds. Alternatively, FEMA informs 

the governor that the request has been denied. This process can take a few 

hours or a few weeks depending on the nature of the disaster.13

Department of Defense 

The Department of Defense may become involved in the disaster at 

several levels. Local base commanders are authorized per DoD Directive 

3025.1 to respond locally for a limited period of time, usually on a 

reimbursable basis to “save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate 

great property damage.”14 The governor may also activate the National 

Guard under state control and state funding. In the event that a Presidential 

Disaster Declaration (PDD) is made, and state and federal resources are 

overwhelmed, longer-term DoD assistance may be requested. 

The procedure for requesting DoD assistance, detailed in Figures 3.1 

through 3.3, is as follows. The Principle Federal Official (PFO),15 usually 

FEMA, initiates a Mission Assignment (MA). If a joint field office (JFO) 

has been established, a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) will evaluate 

the Mission Assignment and determine whether the resources requested 

are available elsewhere. If the Defense Coordinating Officer determines 

the additional resource request is warranted, he sends the MA to the DoD 

Executive Secretary and later to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense (ASD (HD)) for validation. If validated, the Joint 

Director of Military Support (JDOMS) processes the order and a copy is 

sent to NORTHCOM for mission analysis. The Secretary of Defense and 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense approve the 

order and the Joint Director of Military Support issues the order. The 

Services may then be tasked directly for resources; or Joint Forces 

Command (JFCOM), Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), the 

National Guard Bureau (NGB), and other unified commands may be 

tasked to support the desired requirements. Once federal DoD assets arrive 

in the area of operations, NORTHCOM assumes operational control of 

these forces. 

The diagrams presented here illustrate the request for assistance 

(RFA) process in three different situations. Figure 3.1 depicts the RFA 

process if a Defense Coordinating Officer has not yet deployed. Figure 3.2 
Noland 

39 

shows the process after a Defense Coordinating Officer has deployed but 

before the deployment of a joint task force (JTF). Figure 3.3 is the process 

for requests for assistance after deployment of both the Defense 

Coordinating Officer and the joint task force. Many DoD agencies 

participate in the request for assistance process, however NORTHCOM 

serves as the point of coordination and control in a response. 

Figure 3.1 Pre- Defense Coordinating Officer Deployment 

Request for Assistance Process 
Department of Defense Response Planning 

40 

Figure 3.2 Post- Defense Coordinating Officer Deployment 

Request for Assistance Process. 

Acronyms not included in text: SCO-State Coordinating Officer, FCOField Coordinating Officer, ESF-Emergency Support Function, DCEDefense Control Element 
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41 

Figure 3.3 Post- Defense Coordinating Officer / Joint Task Force 

Deployment RFA Process 

NORTHCOM is the unified combatant command responsible for 

establishing liaison with other federal agencies to provide disaster 

response capabilities during emergencies. NORTHCOM was established 

as a result of the events of September 11, 2001. It began operations on 

October 1, 2002, and became fully operational September 11, 2003. 

The NORTHCOM mission focus is two-fold: 

1. It must conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and 

aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests 

within the assigned area of responsibility. 

2. As directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, it must 

provide military assistance to civil authorities including 

consequence management operations. 
Department of Defense Response Planning 

42 

Figure 3.4 NORTHCOM Area of Responsibility 

As the unified commander for North America, NORTHCOM is the 

supported command16 during a national crisis, including agricultural 

emergencies. NORTHCOM, like many unified commands possesses few 

organic resources. During an emergency, the military services, Joint 

Forces Command (JFCOM), Forces Command (FORSCOM) and others 

are supporting and provide resources to NORTHCOM as approved by the 

Secretary of Defense. 

NORTHCOM is the principal operational command responsible for 

planning and executing Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) 

within the continental United States. NORTHCOM fulfills this mission by 

establishing liaison and planning for support with many different 

government agencies and departments. NORTHCOM may be asked to 

support natural disasters, CBRNE events, National Security Special 

Events (NSSEs), and other contingencies within its area of operation. 

NORTHCOM has coordinated and provided military support to the 

California wildfires, the Shuttle disaster, the 2004 hurricanes in the 

Southeast, and national security events such as the political conventions, 

the G-8 summit, the Reagan funeral, and the presidential elections. 
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43 

NORTHCOM performs these Defense Support to Civil Authorities 

functions by establishing a Joint Force Commander at the tactical and/or 

operational levels. Depending on the scope, this commander could be a 

Defense Coordinating Officer, a Joint Task Force, or a functional 

component command such as a JTF Land Component Command. The JTF 

commander deploys to the disaster area and exercises operational control 

of DoD assets in the area. The JTF commander reports to the 

NORTHCOM commander and actively engages with the Principle Federal 

Official and the Defense Coordinating Officer to determine needs and 

deploy resources. Effective coordination between state, federal, and DoD 

organizations is imperative for an efficient and effective response. 

If an event occurs in Hawaii or Guam, U.S. Pacific Command 

(PACOM) has similar roles and responsibilities in this area of operation as 

NORTHCOM does in North America. PACOM may be directed to fulfill 

a Homeland Defense or Civil Support mission to states and territories 

within its area of responsibility. 

General Response to an Agricultural Event 

Agricultural emergencies of limited scope will be addressed by local 

and state authorities. If the emergency impacts international trade, the 

United States Department of Agriculture will quickly become involved 

through the United States Department of Agriculture Area Veterinarian in 

Charge for animal issues, or through the State Plant Health Director for 

plant issues. 

The National Response Plan designates the USDA as the coordinator 

for Emergency Support Function #11 (ESF 11), Agriculture and National 

Resources. The United States Department of Agriculture also serves as the 

primary agency for: 1) provision of nutrition assistance; 2) control and 

eradication of an outbreak of a highly contagious or economically 

devastating animal/zoonotic disease, highly infectious exotic plant disease, 

or economically devastating plant pest infestation; and 3) assurance of 

food safety and food security (under USDA jurisdictions and authorities). 

The Department of the Interior (DOI) is the primary agency for protection 

of natural and cultural resources and historic (NCH) resources prior to, 

during, and/or after an Incident of National Significance. Federal agencies 

such as the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Health and Human 
Department of Defense Response Planning 

44 

Services, Transportation, and others are designated support agencies to the 

United States Department of Agriculture.17

The Secretary of Agriculture has broad authority and discretion for 

response to and elimination of animal or plant disease. For example, in 

reaction to an emergency, the Secretary may transfer funds from the 

United States Department of Agriculture to reimburse certain federal, 

state, and local response expenses, including operational costs for 

quarantine enforcement, perimeter control, depopulation, carcass disposal, 

and decontamination. The Secretary may also declare an Extraordinary 

Emergency, which allows for the use of federal authorities to take action 

within a state if the state is unable to take appropriate action to control and 

eradicate the disease.18

During an agricultural emergency short of a Presidential Declaration, 

United States Department of Agriculture may request DoD assistance. The 

DoD may provide assistance, military specialists or laboratory support to 

the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service on a reimbursable basis in 

accordance with the Economy Act.19 The United States Department of 

Agriculture requests this support through the Joint Director of Military 

Support (JDOMS) as outlined previously. 

In the event that needs cannot be addressed with the United States 

Department of Agriculture or other federal authorities, the President may 

also declare a major emergency or disaster under the Robert T. Stafford 

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.20 Presidential declaration of 

a major emergency or disaster activates a multitude of federal programs to 

assist in response and recovery. 

DoD Planning 

Just as general disaster response ranges from the local to the federal 

level, DoD planning should also include responses at all levels from the 

local installation to the strategic theater. Planning should include 

intelligence gathering; formation of an integrated plan; and integration 

with local, state, and federal response systems. 
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Intelligence Gathering 

To maintain situational awareness, real-time, accurate intelligence is 

critically important to the military commander, his command surgeon, and 

the command veterinarian. This real-time agricultural and public health 

intelligence is difficult to obtain. While under development, systems to 

integrate animal and plant information systems and national laboratory 

data are not yet in place. For instance, NORTHCOM and other DoD 

medical personnel are actively participating in development of the 

National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS), a Department of 

Homeland Security program to integrate national biosurveillance systems 

of all pertinent agencies including the United States Department of 

Agriculture and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. This 

system is designed to bring together many disparate information systems 

to create a common information picture. As surveillance systems become 

more integrated and coordinated, DoD must maintain active participation 

to ensure appropriate participation for an agroterrrorist response. 

Integrated Plan Development 

Plan development should include extensive coordination between the 

DoD and appropriate agencies from the local to national level. Planners 

should take into consideration contingency operations, availability of 

manpower and equipment, and possible effects of competing local 

missions and responsibilities. Support planning for agricultural incidents 

also requires knowledge of anticipated needs by other support federal 

agencies. NORTHCOM should work with primary federal agencies to 

determine possible requirements in an emergency. These agencies include 

the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service, Veterinary Services Emergency Programs for animal 

issues; the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Food Safety Inspection 

Service, and the Food and Drug Administration for food issues; and the 

U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service, Plant Protection and Quarantine for plant events. In addition, 

NORTHCOM’s command veterinarian coordinates with DHS components 

including Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IA/IP), 

Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) and Science and 
Department of Defense Response Planning 

46 

Technology (S&T), as the Department of Homeland Security has overall 

coordinating authority for national emergencies. 

Once probable support needs are identified, NORTHCOM must 

examine the inventory of resources available from all services. Specialty 

resources include veterinary personnel, epidemiologists, pathologists, and 

laboratory support. Non-medical resources include transportation, 

engineering, and contracting resources. 

Local Installation Response DoD Planning Issues 

In an incident involving food, the commander at a local military 

installation is ultimately responsible for the health and safety of his 

personnel. Therefore, it is imperative that local installation commanders 

examine security provisions and plan for food inspection and safety 

responses at a local level. Commanders should also address the safety and 

well-being of dependents both on and off-base. Additionally, commanders 

should develop a contingency plan if normal sources of food are 

compromised. This contingency plan may include the stockpiling of food 

staples on the installation and emergency preparedness training for 

dependents on and off the installation. 

In addition to the provisions for food-related emergencies, the local 

commander should plan for incidents involving animals or plants. Many 

military installations in the United States encompass large geographical 

areas. These areas include numerous plant and wildlife species. Some 

installations also lease portions of land to local farmers. Other sources of 

concern are the recreational horse riding stables, government owned 

military horse stables, and security forces’ dog kennels. Commanders have 

a responsibility to ensure that the installation does not become a reservoir 

for diseases that may adversely impact off-base areas. In the event of an 

animal disease outbreak on or off-base, the installation may be included in a 

quarantine or stop-movement area. Commanders should establish 

relationships with local agricultural authorities and plan for possible 

disruptions in normal base operations due to animal or plant disease issues. 

Local commanders are assisted in their efforts by military food 

inspection personnel as outlined in preceding sections of this chapter. 

Installation public health officials should also establish and maintain 

liaison with local civilian public health agencies since an agricultural 
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47 

emergency would likely effect the surrounding community as well. In 

addition to this support by specialists stationed on installations, the U.S. 

Army Veterinary Command (VETCOM) assists local installations in the 

United States in their efforts to ensure food safety and control animal 

diseases. 

The U.S. Army Veterinary Command is responsible for food safety 

and quality assurance, care of government-owned animals, and animal 

disease prevention and control for most Army, Air Force, Navy and 

Marine military installations in the United States.21,22 The U.S. Army 

Veterinary Command should work together with local installation 

commanders and civilian agriculture officials to develop programs for 

monitoring the health of domestic animal and wildlife populations and 

responding to threats against animals and plants on military installations. 

State Response DoD Planning Issues 

The National Guard is an important state asset for emergency 

response. At present, there are no military veterinary assets in the Guard. 

Nevertheless, State Adjutants General must work closely with state 

department of agriculture personnel and other response organizations to 

determine probable National Guard missions and types of resources that 

would be needed or expected in an agroterrorist incident. Additionally, all 

state exercises involving agricultural events should include representatives 

from the National Guard. 

The National Guard is particularly important because guard personnel 

can be used for law enforcement when mobilized in a state status (Title 

32) in contrast to active duty (Title 10) forces. “Title 32” refers to Title 32 

of the United States Code (32 USC) and “Title 10” refers to Title 10 of the 

United States Code (10 USC). When National Guard assets are used in 

Title 32 status, they are under control of the governor of the state and can 

effectively function as the state militia. They may be used for disaster 

relief, riot control, military protocol, and any other purpose as permitted 

by state law. In all instances, state law governs.23 In an agroterrorist 

incident, the Guard could be used in Title 32 status to enforce a quarantine 

or stop-movement. If placed in Title 10 status, the National Guard is 

federalized and effectively becomes a reserve military asset of the United 
Department of Defense Response Planning 

48 

States, falling within the federal military commander structure and cannot 

be used in law enforcement activities, such as quarantine. 

National Response DoD Planning Issues 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) (ASD(HA)) is 

responsible for policy direction related to military Force Health Protection. 

As such, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) provides 

guidance to all Services on issues of Force Health Protection. The 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) oversees the DoD 

Executive Agent for Veterinary Services (Army), issues guidance on 

veterinary services, and monitors and evaluates implementation of policy. 

The DoD Executive Agent, in turn, delegates authority to the U.S. Army 

Surgeon General for assigned veterinary service responsibilities.24 The 

Army Surgeon General implements veterinary service policies and 

programs through the DoD Veterinary Service Activity (DODVSA) to 

ensure an effective Force Health Protection program. 

The DoD Veterinary Service Activity coordinates programs for food 

inspection and veterinary services with all DoD components. It is 

imperative that DODVSA maintain coordination and situational awareness 

with all civilian agencies involved in agriculture or food production to 

identify potential agricultural problems that may affect the DoD. To 

accomplish this awareness, the DoD Veterinary Service Activity 

establishes and maintains liaison with the United States Department of 

Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of 

Commerce, and other agencies. Food or non-prescription drug problems 

are typically communicated through the Hazardous Food and 

Nonprescription Drug Recall System. The DoD Veterinary Service 

Activity must ensure systems are in place for timely notification of food or 

animal/plant disease problems that might impact force health protection. 

In addition, the DoD Veterinary Service Activity and the DoD must 

ensure measures are in place to prevent the introduction of foreign animal 

and plant agents through movement of equipment and/or personnel. DoD 

must take preventive measures and provide adequate training for the 

recognition and destruction of foreign animal diseases and plant pests to 

avoid unintentional introduction into the United States. This is especially 
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important in light of recent deployments to areas where diseases such as 

foot-and-mouth are endemic. 

Overall responsibility for Defense Support to Civil Authorities in the 

DoD rests with the Secretary of Defense.25 The Secretary of Defense 

fulfills this responsibility through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense (ASD (HD)) who oversees homeland defense 

activities, develops policy, conducts analyses, provides advice, and makes 

recommendations on homeland defense, support to civil authorities, 

emergency preparedness, and domestic crisis management matters within 

the DoD. Specifically, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense will assist the Secretary in providing policy direction on HD 

matters through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to U.S. 

NORTHCOM, PACOM, and other Combatant Commanders.26 An 

agricultural emergency fits the description of a domestic crisis, and thus 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense should address 

the military response and role in an agroterrorist event. 

Theater Response DoD Planning Issues 

As the supported combatant commands responsible for Defense 

Support to Civil Authorities, NORTHCOM and PACOM must maintain 

situational awareness of any unusual activities or events occurring within 

their areas of responsibility. This requires a coordinated effort with 

civilian agencies to ensure that information is shared in a timely manner. 

For medical, food, and agricultural issues affecting the NORTHCOM 

area of responsibility, the office of the Command Surgeon employs a 

cadre of medical planners, preventive medicine, environmental health, and 

operational medicine officers as well as a veterinary officer to monitor 

current events and trends and plan for future support missions. In addition, 

the command veterinarian actively engages with the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture/the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture/Plant Protection and Quarantine, the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture/the Food Safety Inspection Service, the Food 

and Drug Administration, and the Department of Homeland Security 

regarding food and agriculture issues. 
Department of Defense Response Planning 

50 

Training and Exercises 

Training and exercises are important in preparing emergency 

responders for an agroterrorist incident and ensuring the response plans 

are reasonable and effective. Currently, the DoD does not train for 

agroterrorist events on a broad scale. To address these shortfalls, the DoD 

must assess the type and scope of training. 

An example of a training shortfall is the education of military 

veterinary personnel in foreign animal disease diagnosis. Every year, the 

U.S. Department of Agriculture conducts several Foreign Animal Disease 

Diagnostician (FADD) courses at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, 

Plum Island, NY. The Plum Island center is operated jointly by the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture and the Department of Homeland Security. 

Although limited numbers of military veterinarians have attended these 

courses along with the U.S. Department of Agriculture employees and 

other veterinarians, the number of military veterinarians attending these 

courses should be expanded to further enhance DoD’s capability to 

support a foreign animal disease event in the United States. Likewise, 

refresher Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician courses for veterinarians 

should be instituted. 

A second example of a training shortfall is the shortage of personnel 

in DoD response roles, especially those in the veterinary services, who do 

not understand the new Incident Command Structure (ICS) instituted 

under the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) directed the Secretary of 

Homeland Security to develop and administer the National Incident 

Management System.27 Subsequently, DHS published the National 

Incident Management System March 1, 2004. The NIMS “represents a 

core set of doctrine, concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational 

processes to enable effective, efficient, and collaborative incident 

management at all levels.” 28 HSPD-5 requires all federal departments and 

agencies to adopt the National Incident Management System and use the 

Incident Command Structure to manage domestic incidents.29

DoD organizations who may be tasked to conduct DSCA should 

understand the Incident Command Structure and should be prepared to 

integrate into the disaster response system. This is particularly true in an 

agricultural response because the requests for assistance may be for 
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51 

individual veterinary specialists. Planners should identify specialty 

positions likely to be required and integrate the Incident Command 

Structure training into routine position training. 

Once possible support needs and training requirements are identified 

and addressed, the detailed plans should be extensively exercised to 

identify gaps and facilitate communication between DoD and non-DoD 

personnel. 

Impact of an Agricultural Event on the Department of Defense 

A major natural or terrorist agricultural event could significantly impact 

the DoD. The scope of the impact should be considered when developing 

response plans—these impacts include the disruption of the food supply and 

troop movements which may hinder the military mission; stress on DoD 

forces due to added defense support to civil authorities requirements; 

activating Guard and Reserve forces; and general psychological impacts on 

DoD members and their families. Adequate consideration of these impacts 

will ensure a solid and dependable response plan. 

Mission Assurance 

An agricultural event could lead to a disruption of the food supply 

due either to shortages, transportation restrictions, or contamination, and 

impact the ability of the Department of Defense to carry out its mission of 

protecting the United States. DoD installations in the United States 

receive most of their food from prime vendors who supply commissaries 

and dining facilities on a “just in time” basis, similar to commercial 

grocery stores. Overseas forces may be supplied to some extent by local 

sources, but the majority of foodstuffs, both for commissaries and other 

facilities, come from the United States. 

Combat rations for deployed forces may also be impacted by an 

agroterrorist event. Combat rations are produced at a very limited number 

of plants. Additionally, these rations are not stockpiled in large quantities. 

Therefore, long-term combat requirements cannot be met without regular 

replenishment. Generally, combat ration plants increase production only as 

demand goes up. Hence, a disruption in the supply of raw products could 

greatly degrade DoD’s ability to complete overseas missions. 
Department of Defense Response Planning 

52 

In addition, an agroterrorist attack could result in military movement 

restrictions both within the country and overseas. During the foot-andmouth disease outbreak in the United Kingdom, a large scale coalition 

training exercise with the United States was disrupted when British 

soldiers and equipment were not allowed to deploy to North Carolina. 

During an outbreak of a highly contagious disease impacting either plant 

or animals, it is likely that interstate and/or international movement of 

equipment and people would be severely restricted to prevent spread of 

the disease. At a minimum, decontamination of equipment may result in 

delays and added expense to exercises or deployments. 

Defense Support to Civil Authorities 

DoD may be called on by the Principle Federal Official to support the 

U.S. Department of Agriculture during an agricultural crisis. Initial 

support requests would likely be for veterinary personnel but might 

expand to include a wide range of military assets, including transportation, 

equipment, and laboratory support. These support requests will add 

substantial stress to military forces especially in light of the high 

operations tempo due to the Global War on Terrorism. 

Guard and Reserve 

Effects on National Guard and Reserve assets could also be significant 

during an agricultural emergency. The National Guard is one of a 

governor’s key assets during a crisis. With current contingency operations, 

many states have a high percentage of National Guard personnel deployed 

for federal missions. This limits the availability of these personnel for state 

service. Conversely, a situation in which a governor activates National 

Guard assets for a state emergency would limit the President’s ability to 

deploy these assets for federal contingencies. 

Adding to this delicate balance in use of resources, there is a 

disproportionate number of first responders who are also members of the 

Guard or Reserve. In a crisis, these personnel would be either unavailable 

to the Guard because of their civilian jobs, or unavailable as first 

responders because of other Guard and Reserve obligations. Potentially, 

this puts leadership in the unenviable position of having to choose where 

to best deploy these limited resources between two vitally needed areas of 
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53 

support. Emergency response planners must use caution to avoid “double 

counting” personnel who are dual-hatted, serving in both the Guard or 

Reserve and as civilian first responders.

Psychological 

Perhaps another impact of a disruption of the food supply on DoD is 

the psychological effect food contamination or a food shortage would have 

on the public in general, and on DoD personnel and their families in 

particular. Within the continental United States, a large percentage of 

military members and dependents live outside military installations and 

would be affected just like the rest of the general public by agricultural 

emergencies. Additionally, it would be extremely difficult for military 

personnel both deployed, overseas, or stationed stateside to remain 

focused on their mission while contemplating the dangers to the safety and 

well-being of their families. 

Conclusion 

Disruptions to the agricultural and food supply systems of the United 

States, whether intentional or unintentional, could significantly affect the 

DoD. These effects could range from local food shortages and movement 

restrictions to widespread economic and social damage impacting many 

aspects of American life including the ability of DoD to perform its 

mission to defend the United States. It is vital that DoD work with other 

agencies to plan for threats to food and agriculture. 

Notes

1. United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service Website, On-line, Internet, 10 January 2005, available from www.aphis.usda.gov/ 

lpa/about/welcome.html. 

2. United States Department of Agriculture, Food Safety Inspection Service 

Website, On-line, Internet, 10 January 2005, available from www.fsis.usda.gov/ 

About_FSIS/index.asp. 
Department of Defense Response Planning 

54 

3. United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service, Plant Protection and Quarantine Website, On-line, Internet, 13 December 2004, 

available from www.aphis.usda.gov/ppq/ppqmission.html. 

4. United States Food and Drug Administration Website, On-line, Internet, 10 

January 2005, available from www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/mission.html. 

5. United States Department of Commerce Website, On-line, Internet, 7 November 

2005, available from http://www.osec.doc.gov/bmi/budget/DOCSTPLAN.htm. 

6. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure 

Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, Office of the Press Secretary, The White 

House, December 17, 2003, 3. 

7. Ibid., 2. 

8. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-9, Defense of United States 

Agriculture and Food, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, February 3, 2004, 1. 

9. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7, 4. 

10. Department of Defense Directive 6400.4 (DODD 6400.4), DoD Veterinary 

Services Program, Department of Defense, November 24, 2003, 1. 

11. Ibid., 3. 

12. Army Regulation 40-657/NAVSUPINST 4355.4F/MCO P101110.316, 

Veterinary/Medical Food Inspection and Laboratory Service, Headquarters, Departments 

of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, Washington, DC, November 6, 1997, 7. 

13. National Response Plan, Department of Homeland Security, December, 2004, 46. 

14. Department of Defense Directive 3025.1 (DODD 3025.1), Military Support to 

Civil Authorities (MSCA), Department of Defense, January 15, 1993, 8. 

15. PFO designates a staff or agency, not an individual person. 

16. “Supported Command” refers to the command that prepares operations plans or 

operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

“Supporting Command” refers to the command that provides augmentation forces or 

other support to a supported command or develops a supporting plan. Joint Publication 1-

02 (JP 1-02), DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Department of Defense, 

12 April 2001, as amended through 31 August 2005, 515-516. 

17. National Response Plan, ESF 11, Department of Homeland Security, December, 

2004, ESF #11-1. 
Noland 

55 

18. National Animal Health Emergency Response Plan for an Outbreak of FootAnd-Mouth Disease or Other Highly Contagious Animal Disease (NAHERP) (Draft), 

United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, 

September 19, 2002, 5. 

19. “The Economy Act of 1932, as amended (31 USC 1535), authorizes an agency 

to place orders for goods and services with another government agency when the head of 

the ordering agency determines that it is in the best interest of the government and 

decides ordered goods or services cannot be provided as conveniently or cheaply by 

contract with commercial enterprise.” Economy Act of 1932, On-line, Internet, 14 

November 2005, available from http://www.lanl.gov/orgs/dod/doingbusiness/ 

economyact.shtml. 

20. Further information about the Stafford Act can be found at the FEMA Library, 

Online, Internet, 14 November 2005, available from www.fema.gov/library/stafact.shtm. 

21. Army Regulation 40-657/NAVSUPINST 4355.4F/MCO P101110.316, 1. 

22. Army Regulation 40-905/SECNAVINST 6401.1A/ARI 48-131, Veterinary 

Health Services, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, 

Department of the Air Force, Washington, DC, August 16, 1994, 1. 

23. Briefing by Major General Mason Whitney, the Adjutant General of Colorado, 

presented at the U.S. Northern Command Surgeons Conference, U.S. Air Force 

Academy, Colorado Springs, CO, July 2004. 

24. Department of Defense Directive 6400.4, 2. 

25. Department of Defense Directive 3025.1, 2. 

26. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject: Implementation Guidance 

Regarding the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, 

Washington, DC, March 25, 2003, 1. 

27. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, Management of Domestic 

Incidents, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, February 28, 2003, 3. 

28. Ibid., 5. 

29. Ibid. 

CHAPTER 4 

Military Manpower Assessment 

John R. Herbold 

The Department of Defense (DoD) has a long history of providing 

technical, logistical, and manpower support to multiple federal agencies. 

One area of special military support has been its response to natural threats 

to our agricultural industry. For example, military aviation assets have 

been used for aerial insecticide dispersal flights to control insect-borne 

maladies since the inception of the Army Air Corps. 

Later, in the Cold War era, the United States Army developed 

Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE), Eastern equine encephalitis (EEE), 

and Western equine encephalitis (WEE) vaccines for biological warfare 

defense. The Army released the stockpiled vaccine for veterinary 

applications in the early 1970s when the southern U.S. borders and the 

national equine industry were threatened by the natural spread of VEE 

from Central America into North America through Mexico.1

During the avian velogenic viscerotrophic Newcastle disease outbreak 

in southern California in 1971-1973, DoD provided assets for an extended 

period of time to assist in surveillance and eradication of that threat to the 

poultry industry.2

 The historic record reflects opportunities during which 

the military provided vital support during agricultural emergencies. 

This vital agricultural support may be more difficult to achieve given 

today’s expectation that the U.S. military will defend the U.S. homeland 

against terrorism while maintaining forces capable of deterring global 

aggression; and combating aggression in two regions simultaneously. 

Current U.S. Government expectations for response to agricultural 

emergencies regarding resource sharing and availability of dedicated DoD 

assets are based on assumptions based on the much more robust DoD 

force structure of the early 1970s. This 1970’s force included a large 

standing army, mostly in garrison, and substantial Reserve and Guard 
Military Manpower Assessment 

58 

Forces. Both of these were replenished by the military draft and bolstered 

by internal, organic DoD support services and equipment. 

DoD’s forces have changed drastically over the past 30 years with 

changing threats to U.S. national security. Since we are no longer fighting 

a Cold War, we no longer have a large proportion of our forces in garrison 

waiting for the proverbial “balloon to go up!” The size of the armed forces 

has been reduced substantially, and many combat functions have been 

moved to reserve components. Additionally, many support functions have 

been civilianized and/or outsourced to contractors entirely. 

Yet, expectations for the DoD to provide significant support in 

national agricultural catastrophes have not waned. In fact, with the 

perception of an increased agroterrorism threat since September 11, 2001, 

state and federal expectations have greatly increased of DoD support in an 

agroterrorist event. Due to the smaller forces that DoD now commands, 

the Department of Defense may not be able to meet the current 

expectations of supported state and federal agencies. Most likely, the 

Active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard forces may only provide small 

numbers of personnel in specific specialties in response to an 

agroterrorism event. The availability of DoD resources and forces during 

a national agricultural emergency should be thoroughly reviewed to 

determine the actual DoD response capability. This chapter details the 

current DoD capabilities and manpower that could be utilized during such 

an agroterrrorist event. 

Agroterrorism Response: Training, Organizing, Equipping 

In order to assess the ability of the current DoD manpower to respond 

to an agroterrorism event, the federal directives, memorandum of 

understanding (MOU) between DoD and the United States Department of 

Agriculture, and other DoD directives should be reviewed and updated. 

This chapter focuses primarily on the military medical specialist support 

areas for an agroterrorism event. 

Federal emergency response directives identify the DoD as the lead 

purveyor of generic logistical support in the case of a national declaration 

of a natural disaster.3,4 The most recent MOU concerning DoD agricultural 

emergency support is dated June 2, 2000, and signed by DoD, the General 

Services Administration (GSA), and the United States Department of 
Herbold 

59 

Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), with 

APHIS acting as the lead agency. The MOU states that “receiving 

prescribed support in the event that the presence of animal/plant diseases 

and/or pests constitutes an actual or potential emergency situation as 

determined by the United States Department of Agriculture Animal and 

Plant Health Inspection Service. The pest or disease may be endemic or 

exotic in nature. For the purposes of this MOU, an emergency is defined 

as any sudden negative economic impact, either perceived or real, such as 

a Foreign Animal Disease event or a natural disaster that threatens the 

viability of American animal agriculture and thereby the food supply of 

the United States.”5

 Clearly, an agroterrorism event would be considered a 

natural disaster. However, the decision as to whether DoD assets will be 

used lies with the Secretary of Defense. 

The U.S. Department of Agriculture and the DoD have also 

historically shared memoranda of understanding outlining their 

responsibilities in support of naturally occurring agricultural threats to the 

nation. The current MOU between DoD and the United States Department 

of Agriculture regarding military veterinary services assets availability and 

support is limited to technical support and consultation. Specifically, the 

MOU pertains to the current organic assets of the U.S. Army Veterinary 

Services. DoD agrees to provide: 

• a senior Army Veterinary Corps Officer to function as a liaison to 

the Deputy Administrator, Veterinary Services, the United States 

Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service; 

• an Army Veterinary Corps Officer as liaison to the Regional 

Emergency Animal Disease Eradication Organization (READEO) 

and/or the Veterinary Field Investigation Unit (VFIU); 

• military specialists trained in foreign animal disease diagnosis, 

laboratory diagnosis, epidemiology, microbiology, immunology, 

entomology, pathology, and public health; 

• laboratory support augmentation including Armed Forces Institute 

of Pathology (AFIP), U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of 

Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), U.S. Army Center for Health 
Military Manpower Assessment 

60 

Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM), and the DoD 

Veterinary Laboratory; 

• assistance in the development of response plans; and 

• participation in exercises. 

While this MOU appears to thoroughly describe the role of DoD 

support, the training, organization, and equipping of DoD assets and 

personnel must be further defined through DoD directives. The DoD 

Veterinary Services Program is described in DoD Directive Number 

6400.4, August 22, 2003.6 Under this directive, the Secretary of the Army 

is designated as the DoD Executive Agent for the program. Further, the 

authority to train, organize, and equip Veterinary Services Program assets 

is delegated to the Surgeon General, U.S. Army. The Surgeon General’s 

responsibilities included under the Veterinary Services Program are to: 

• control animal diseases communicable to man; 

• provide military veterinarians for research, development, training 

and education; 

• provide laboratory examination of food products; and 

• provide other aspects of food safety regulation. 

Under today’s force structure, the Army Medical Department would 

provide the preponderance of military specialist support assets such as 

foreign animal disease diagnosis, animal disease and food borne pathogen 

laboratory diagnosis, veterinary epidemiology, veterinary microbiology, 

veterinary immunology, veterinary pathology, and veterinary public health. 

DoD Support: Type and Magnitude of Support

Military manpower strengths and force specialty mix are driven by 

the United States National Security Strategy and National Military 

Strategy. DoD medical specialist support in national agricultural scenarios 

will be dependent on the available Active Duty and Reserve Component 

manpower strengths and specialties, and further modified by DoD 
Herbold 

61 

doctrine, interagency agreements, and other competing military 

requirements in the world. 

Active duty military medical assets are generated to support the warfighter. Therefore, the active duty military medical personnel mix is tied to 

the size of the overall force structure. Simplistically, more ships at seas 

means more shipboard medics needed. Fewer military personnel and their 

families garrisoned overseas equates to less in-country food procurement 

and a decreased requirement for military veterinary services. Likewise, 

more deployments of small units to foreign locations require more 

imbedded military preventive medicine and public health assets, including 

veterinary services. 

Due to the requirements to support the war-fighters, the magnitude of 

military support in a national agricultural emergency will be limited, 

regardless of area of military specialty requested. Additionally, manpower 

intensive organic assets such as clerical support, food service, heavy 

equipment operators, and logisticians have largely either been transferred to 

Reserve Components and/or outsourced to contractors entirely. This further 

reduces military agroterrorist support. Many veterinary medical technical 

areas inherently specialized in nature (such as laboratory animal medicine 

and veterinary pathology) have been civilianized or contracted out. To 

demonstrate, a conceptual view of “then” (1970) and “now” (2005) relative 

to military veterinary medical assets is depicted in Table 4.1.7

Table 4.1 Conceptualization of Changes in Military Force Structure 

1970 / 2005 

Military Veterinary Corps Personnel 

Component Active Reserve Guard 

Army “400” / “400” “100s” / “50” “100s” / Zero

Air Force “300” / Zero “100s” / Zero “100s” / Zero

The data have been rounded to the nearest hundred. First numbers 

indicate force structure in 1970 while second numbers indicate structure in 

2005. Although the USAF Veterinary Corps was abolished in the late 

1970s, approximately 100 Doctors of Veterinary Medicine are on active 

duty in today’s Air Force serving in a variety of roles (i.e., Military Public 
Military Manpower Assessment 

62 

Health Officer, Staff Biomedical Scientist), but not specifically as military 

veterinarians. 

The limited manpower resources DoD has to respond to a national 

agricultural event can be seen with current staffing data.8

 There were 

approximately 409 licensed veterinarians on active duty in the Army in 

2004. The distribution and title of their professional area of concentration 

is shown in Table 4.2. Additionally, there were 64 Food Inspection 

Specialists in the Warrant Officer Ranks. 

Table 4.2 U.S. Army Veterinary Corps Manpower 2004

Military 

Occupational 

Specialty (MOS) 

Title Number 

64A General Veterinary Officer 166 

64B Veterinary Preventive Medicine 119 

64C Laboratory Animal Medicine 44 

64D Veterinary Pathology 41 

64E Veterinary Comparative Medicine 19 

64F Veterinary Clinical Medicine 20 

 Total 409 

U.S. Army Veterinary Corps Officers technical consultation and 

support is further specialized by Board Certification in the specialties 

recognized by the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA). 

The distribution of Board Certified specialists is shown in Table 4.3. 

Additionally, approximately 100 of the current active duty Army 

Veterinary Corps officers have also received United States Department of 

Agriculture training and certification as Foreign Animal Disease 

Diagnosticians (FADD). 
Herbold 

63 

Table 4.3 U.S. Army Veterinary Corps Board Certification 2004 

AVMA Specialty # Certified 

Veterinary Preventive Medicine 110 

Veterinary Pathology 29 

Laboratory Animal Medicine 31 

Veterinary Practitioner 5 

Veterinary Internal Medicine 4 

Veterinary Emergency Medicine & Critical Care 3 

Veterinary Surgery 3 

Veterinary Radiology 1 

Veterinary Microbiology 2 

Another potential military medical personnel resource for 

agroterrorism response is the small cadre of military medical 

entomologists assigned to the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Military 

medical entomologists provide technical guidance to prevent and control 

disease and damage caused by a variety of medically and economically 

important insect vectors and pests.9 By virtue of their everyday 

responsibilities, they are familiar with agricultural and stored product pest 

issues. Although small in number, they are a significant technical resource 

with special skills often transferable to dealing with agroterrorism. 

Unfortunately, the Air Force has only 15 individuals in the medical 

entomology career field. Army and Navy medical entomological 

capacities are more robust; however, actual numbers are declining since 

certain categories of medical specialist manpower have been targeted for 

reduction and/or elimination.10 To exacerbate their small numbers, 

medical entomologists also have competing duties. While much of their 

focus centers on stored product pest control and quality assurance of food 

products procured by DoD, because they are generalists in preventive 

medicine and public health, their duties may also be administrative and 

only tangentially related to entomology. 

Other military medical personnel categories may be applicable to an 

agroterrorism response. For example, Army Environmental Science 

Officers, Navy Environmental Health Officers, and Air Force Public 
Military Manpower Assessment 

64 

Health Officers have some shared skills similar to Army Veterinary Corps 

Officers. Each of these military occupational specialties, although 

valuable, constitutes a very small proportion (in the hundreds) of the U.S. 

military medical personnel. Regardless of which additional military 

medical assets are identified as relevant to agroterrorism response, focused 

training and joint exercises with USDA units would be required to make 

these personnel an effective part of the national response plan. 

Conclusions and Recommendations 

The DoD is not an endless resource. Our national leaders discovered 

in the early 1980s that we had a scarcity of retrovirologists to unravel the 

mysteries of the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) epidemic 

and then in 1999 a scarcity of medical entomologists when faced with 

West Nile virus. History may repeat itself, and the DoD will find itself illprepared. Preparation for agroterrorism prevention and response must 

become a priority to avoid a national agricultural emergency. 

Due to limits in military manpower, the DoD may be able to only 

provide small numbers of personnel in specific specialties to respond to an 

agroterrorism event. Despite these potential limitations, the DoD should 

consider the role of the military in response to challenges with regards to 

an agroterrorist event. The military must build an infrastructure capable of 

its obligation to support U.S. national security. Following are 

recommendations to enable the DoD to more effectively address the 

agroterrorism manpower concerns. 

Redefine Manpower Requirements to Support Agroterrorism Response

The Department of Defense organization structure and manpower 

assets reflect perceived current and future DoD policy and requirements. 

Military institutions and organizational structures with unclear relevance 

to shifting national defense doctrine will need to redefine themselves. In 

some cases, missions may be deleted or the mission shifted to other 

agencies in order to support homeland security initiatives. Senior DoD 

analysts must consider the role of the military in an agroterrorist event and 

plan manpower assets accordingly. Likely, this will mean increases in 
Herbold 

65 

multiple medical specialties and a significant increase in the DoD’s 

involvement in agroterrorism exercises. 

Ensure Support of Multiple Federal Agencies for Agroterrorism Defense 

Research and Response 

Agroterrorism issues are multidisciplinary and involve multiple 

agencies. Efforts must be made to avoid “warehousing” agroterrorism 

research and response assets in one institution or agency based on the 

current perception of risk. Additionally, individual skill sets required for 

agroterrorism research and response may encompass only a small subset of 

a governmental agency’s overall mission. No one expected that the “War on 

Cancer” and institutional resources of the National Cancer Institute would 

provide the technical retroviral expertise needed to unravel the complexity 

of the AIDS infectious disease epidemic. This is one example reflecting the 

need for the involvement of multiple agencies in complex research and 

responses. Agroterrorism defense research initiatives at U.S. Army Medical 

Research Institute of Infectious Diseases and other DoD organizations 

should be funded and expanded to ensure robust agroterrorism research and 

response capabilities. 

Generate Federal and State Training Plans 

Multiple federal, state, and private agencies employ individuals with 

the skill sets required to respond to an agroterrorism incident. Due to a 

changing force structure, the DoD manpower assets are less robust than 30 

years ago but remain critical to support a major agroterrorist event. A 

well-funded federal and state cooperative training plan to develop and 

maintain a resource pool from the DoD, federal, and state agencies for 

national emergencies would serve the needs of multiple federal agencies. 

Address Agroterrorism Coordination and Response Challenges 

Agroterrorism events present a potentially unfamiliar response scenario 

to most in the U.S. Government. For instance, agroterrorism incidents may 

be insidious and covert hindering detection and response, similar to a 

bioterrorist incident. In addition, response coordination through the National 

Incident Management System and Incident Command Structure may not be 
Military Manpower Assessment 

66 

familiar to the animal industry and agriculture response systems. Finally, 

concepts and standard operating procedures for surveillance, epidemiology, 

quarantine, and mitigation may not be shared widely between the DoD, the 

United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service, and state and local response entities to ensure early 

disease and contamination detection, and containment. Adequate training 

and exercises should be required to ensure all parties involved in an 

agroterrorist response are cooperative and coordinated. 

DoD veterinary medical and entomological manpower assets and 

institutions already in place are a valuable resource for a national response 

to agroterrorism. Increasing these assets will preserve a national resource 

that is needed for homeland security and national defense, as well as 

global response to any agroterrorist event. The DoD should conduct an 

examination of the total military assets to assess the military’s overall 

preparedness to support response to such events. 

Notes

1. D.L. Huxsoll, W.C. Patrick, and C.D. Parrott, “Veterinary Services in Biological 

Disasters,” J. Amer. Vet. Med. Assoc. 1987, 15 March 190(6): 714-22. 

2. E.C. Sharman and J.D. Lamont, “The Velogenic Viscerotropic Newcastle 

Disease Eradication Program in Southern California,” (Presented at the XV World 

Poultry, Congress, 11-16 August 1974, New Orleans, LA.) 

3. Department of Defense Directive Number 3025.1 dated 15 January 1993, USD 

(P), Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). 

4. Department of Defense Directive Number 3025.15, dated 18 February 1997, 

(ASD (SO/LIC)), Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. 

5. MOU among United States Department of Defense (DoD), General Services 

Administration (GSA), and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal 

and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), dated 2 June 2000 (DoD), 29 August 2000 

(GSA), 30 June 2000 (USDA). 

6. DoD Directive 6400.4, 22 August 2003, ASD (HA), Subject: DoD Veterinary 

Services Program. 

7. An Assessment of the Veterinary Function of the Armed Forces Final Report, 17 

January 1979, (OASD/HA Contract MDA903-79-C-0015, Maximus Inc, McLean VA). 
Herbold 

67 

8. Manpower statistics for the Army Veterinary Corps active duty component were 

provided by Colonel Gary Vroegindewey, Assistant Chief, U.S. Army Veterinary Corps. 

COL Vroegindewey is a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine and Diplomate American 

College of Veterinary Preventive Medicine. 

9. Military Medical Entomology Programs, On-line, Internet, available from 

http://www.afpmb.org/links.htm. 

10. Conversations Senior Leadership of Air Force and Army Medical Entomology 

Programs. 

CHAPTER 5 

Plant and Crop Response 

Howard F. Schwartz 

Abundant, affordable, and safe food supplies are largely taken for 

granted. It is hard for Americans to imagine a world in which radical 

shortages of food could not be quickly remedied by a trip to the local WalMart Super Center. A simple, elegant attack on a few U.S. crops could 

result in a ripple through our food sector and economy with devastating 

consequences. An agroterrorism event would cause economic losses to 

individuals, businesses, and the U.S. Government as a result of the costs to 

contain and eradicate the disease, and to dispose of contaminated products. 

Is the U.S. military organized, trained, and equipped to defend against 

such an agroterrorism event? 

The potential of terrorist attacks against agricultural targets such as 

plants and crops is a threat to U.S. national security due to its impact on 

the U.S. economy. Today, multiple federal agencies effectively fill critical 

roles in the response to natural and man-made crop disease epidemics. The 

role of the U.S. military, however, is unclear and therefore little has been 

accomplished to prepare for military support in the event of a terrorist act 

against crop and plant resources. Nevertheless, the threat of agroterrorism 

is real, and the adverse impacts on the U.S. security could be staggering 

without considerable Department of Defense (DoD) preparation. 

Plant and Crop Economics 

Agriculture and food industries are very important to the social, 

economic, and political stability of the United States. In 2002, the food 

and fiber sector contributed $1.2 trillion, or 11% to the gross domestic 

product. Gross farm sales exceeded $200 billion in a relatively 

concentrated area throughout the Midwest, parts of the East Coast, and 

California. Production is split nearly evenly between crops and livestock. 
Plant and Crop Response 

70 

Although farming employs less than 2% of the country’s workforce, 16% 

of the workforce is involved in the food and fiber sector.1,2,3

Despite the large numbers of people employed in the agriculture and 

food industry, the production assets are relatively localized and thus 

present a lucrative target for a terrorist. Although the number of farms in 

the 2002 Census of Agriculture totaled 2.1 million, 75% of the value of 

production occurs on just 6.7% or 143,500 of these farms reflecting the 

concentrated nature of this strategic resource. This subset of farms has 

average sales of $1 million annually, and averages 2,000 acres in size.4 As 

crop production and harvesting technology, and genetic engineering 

progresses, the number of farms will decrease since fewer people and 

farms are required to produce the necessary food. 

An agroterrorism attack on crops would have tremendous impact on 

U.S. exports. The U.S. produces and exports a large share of the world’s 

grain. In 2002, U.S. exported $53 billion in agricultural products. The U.S. 

share of world production was 39% for corn, 38% for soybean, and 8% for 

wheat. The United States accounted for 23% of global wheat exports, 

54% of corn exports, and 43% of soybean exports.5 Thus, protection of 

this U.S. resource is critical to maintaining our economic health in the 

world market. 

Unique Characteristics of Agriculture 

Agriculture has several characteristics that pose unique problems for 

managing an agroterrorism threat. First, agriculture production is 

geographically dispersed in unsecured environments, such as open fields and 

pastures throughout the countryside, making crops an easy target to 

sabotage. Second, the presence, or rumor of presence, of certain pests or 

diseases in a country can reduce demand or quickly stop all exports of a 

commodity which can take months or years to resume. An additional result 

of pests or diseases can be a decline in the demand for some foods based on 

the products targeted in the attack (e.g., grains, fruits, or vegetables), while 

demand for other types of food may increase due to the resulting food 

substitutions. Finally, crop and plant disease outbreaks are difficult to detect, 

which makes an agroterrorist event even more challenging to manage. 

A recent example of export related economic consequences caused by 

an agricultural pathogen and its disease is karnal bunt, caused by the 
Schwartz 

71 

fungus Tilletia indica. Although the disease does not have a significant 

effect on crop yield, nearly 80 countries banned wheat imports from 

regions with karnal bunt infection. When the disease was discovered in 

Arizona and surrounding areas in 1996 (presumably from an accidental 

introduction from Mexico), there was an immediate threat to the overall $6 

billion per year U.S. wheat crop, of which 50% is exported. From 1996 to 

1998, the U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service spent over $60 million on the eradication effort, and 

growers in this small affected area lost well over $100 million from 

decreased sales and increases in production costs.6

Plant and crop disease outbreaks are difficult to detect. Even if a 

farmer closely monitors his crops, a lack of direct experience with foreign 

plant diseases may delay recognition of symptoms in event of an outbreak. 

Recognition is made more difficult because the number of lethal and 

contagious biological agents is greater for plants than for humans. In 

addition, it may be hard to distinguish a biological attack from a natural 

disease outbreak. Signs of infection may be manifested slowly, delaying 

effective response by individuals and/or authorities.7,8 Next, most of these 

diseases are environmentally resilient, endemic in foreign countries, and 

not harmful to humans – making it easier for terrorists to acquire, handle, 

and deploy the pathogens. Finally, limited genetic diversity in most U.S. 

agriculture species may make those species particularly vulnerable to 

specific pathogens. Thus, the general susceptibility of the agriculture and 

food industry to agroterrorism is difficult to address in a systematic 

way.9,10,11,12,13,14

Potential Agroterrorism Targets 

The disquieting characteristics described above are manifested in five 

potential targets of agricultural bioterrorism. These potential targets include: 

1. field crops; 

2. farm animals; 

3. food items in the processing or distribution chain; 

4. market-ready foods at the wholesale or retail level; and 

5. agricultural facilities. 
Plant and Crop Response 

72 

The fifth potential target includes processing plants, storage facilities, 

wholesale and retail food outlets, elements of the transportation 

infrastructure, and research laboratories. The agricultural industry’s 

widespread vertical integration, in which a single company controls much 

of the commodity production, processing, and distribution system, also 

facilitates the geographical spread of pathogens and contributes to United 

States vulnerability.15,16 Examination of these targets reflects that America 

is exceedingly susceptible to agroterrorism. 

From the economic impact, characteristics, and targets described here, 

it is obvious that preparation for and response to an agroterrorist attack 

against crops is complex and critical to our national well-being. The 

preparation and response involves the cooperative efforts of multiple state 

and federal agencies, including the DoD. 

Agroterrorism Response: Roles & Responsibilities of 

Federal Agencies 

The goal of the U.S. animal and plant health safeguarding system is to 

prevent the introduction and establishment of exotic pests and disease, to 

mitigate their effects when present, and to eradicate them when possible. 

In an outbreak, damage is proportional to the time it takes to first detect 

the disease. If a foreign pest disease is introduced, responsibility for 

recognizing initial symptoms rests with farmers, producers, veterinarians, 

plant pathologists and entomologists. The last line of defense, and the 

costliest, is the isolation, control, and eradication of an epidemic.17 

The U.S. Government has published the Public Health Security and 

Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act and the Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 9 to direct the appropriate federal agency to act in 

protection of agriculture. These documents and several responsible federal 

agencies are detailed in this section. 

The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 

Response Act (Public Law 107-188, June 12, 2002) contains several 

provisions important to agriculture, including:18

• expand Food and Drug Administrations (FDA) authority over food 

manufacturing and imports; 
Schwartz 

73 

• tighten control of biological agents and toxins through rules issued 

by the U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service and the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC); and 

• authorize expanded agricultural security activities and security 

upgrades at USDA facilities.19

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9 (HSPD-9) established a 

national policy to protect against terrorist attacks on agriculture and food 

systems.20 This directive instructs agencies to develop awareness and 

warning systems to monitor plant and animal diseases, food quality, and 

public health through an integrated diagnostic system. Animal and 

commodity tracking systems are included, as is gathering and analyzing 

international intelligence. Vulnerability assessments throughout the sector 

help prioritize mitigation strategies at critical stages of production or 

processing, including inspection of imported agricultural products.21

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has established a 

permanent National Homeland Security Research Center based in 

Cincinnati, Ohio, with the following divisions: 

• threat and consequence assessment; 

• decontamination; and 

• consequence management and water infrastructure protection. 

In this center, the Environmental Protection Agency will ensure effective 

design, implementation, and oversight of the research. Additionally, the 

Environmental Protection Agency will provide clear lines of communication 

and facilitate interaction within the Environmental Protection Agency and 

other federal agencies, universities, and private sector and research partners.22

The National Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN) is a consortium of 

five regional networks and a national database (Figure 5.1). The National 

Plant Diagnostic Network was established in June 2002 by the United 

States Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) as a key component of a national plant biological security 

program.23 The National Plant Diagnostic Network is linked to the 

National Agricultural Pest Information System (NAPIS) to facilitate the 

rapid exchange of diagnostic information, trends, and alerts.24 A secure 
Plant and Crop Response 

74 

agricultural system requires rapid detection of outbreaks, accurate 

diagnoses of problems, and prompt response to minimize impact. The 

National Plant Diagnostic Network must be supported and enhanced to 

improve the diagnostic and detection system in the event of a deliberate or 

accidental disease outbreak.25,26,27

Western Plant

Diagnostic Network

University of California, Davis

Great Plains

Diagnostic Network

Kansas State University

South Eastern Plant

Diagnostic Network

University of Florida

North Central Plant

Diagnostic Network

Michigan State University

North Eastern Plant 

Diagnostic Network

Cornell University

National Agricultural

Pest Information System

Purdue University

Figure 5.1 National Plant Diagnostic Network Regional Centers 

The Animal and Plant Disease and Pest Surveillance & Detection Network was 

established in response to the charge from the Secretary of Agriculture to 

Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension Service (CSREES) to develop 

a network linking plant and animal disease diagnostic facilities across the country. 

The National Plant Diagnostic Network focuses on the plant disease and pest aspect 

of the program. The network is a collective of Land Grant University plant disease 

and pest diagnostic facilities from across the United States. Lead universities have 

been selected and designated as Regional Centers to represent five multi-state 

regions across the country. The National Agricultural Pest Information System has 

been designated as the central repository for archiving select data collected from the 

regions. Colorado State University is one of nine state members of the Great Plains 

Diagnostic Network Regional Center coordinated from Kansas State University.28
Schwartz 

75 

Despite the extensive protection offered by the agencies detailed here, 

the DoD may provide critical assets and capabilities to enable more 

thorough protection and response. 

Type and Magnitude of Military Support 

DoD has no clear responsibility for responding to terrorist attacks on 

U.S. civilian personnel and facilities. While DoD would assume primary 

leadership in the event of terrorist attacks on domestic military 

installations and personnel, the probable collateral effects on civilian 

populations (particularly if biological weapons are employed) would 

necessitate shared responsibilities and close coordination with civilian 

agencies. Many authors have proposed involving multiple federal 

strategies to respond to the agroterrorism threat. Components of these 

strategies proposed should include involvement of the Defense 

Department to develop a more effective defense. 

In 2002, Dr. Henry Parker defined a federal strategy to meet the 

agroterrorist threat.29 He proposed Preventive Measures which include: 

• intelligence measures (identify potential threats and perpetrators, 

motivations, predict behavior); 

• monitor programs (detect and track specific pathogens and 

diseases); 

• targeted counter-terrorism research; 

• international counterproliferation treaties, protocols, and agreements; 

• creation of agent-specific resistance in livestock, poultry, and 

crops; 

• vaccination against specific biological weapons agents; 

• modification (where possible) of vulnerable U.S. food and 

agricultural practices to minimize impacts of terrorist acts; and 

• education and training (federal, state, and local). 

Dr. Parker also proposed Response Measures that should focus on: 
Plant and Crop Response 

76 

• consequence management; 

• early detection of specific biological weapons agents, delivery 

mechanisms, origins, and targets; 

• early management to stop disease spread and minimize infection; 

• epidemiology and treatment; 

• various responses (diplomatic, military, legal, economic), 

compensation and indemnification; 

• education and training (federal, state, and local); and 

• public awareness and education programs. 

After reviewing these prevention and response measures, several can 

be seen to include a military component. For instance, the DoD could 

provide assets in support of the Prevention Measures of intelligence and 

monitoring programs. In addition, the military could assist in the military 

response aspects of Response Measures. Finally, in addition to these 

measures, the DoD could provide assets, manpower, and experience in the 

Command, Control and Communication arena. Each of these potential 

military roles will be address in detail here. 

Intelligence and Monitoring

A national strategy to protect food and agriculture must be strongly 

linked to other national security and counterterrorism programs. It should 

also involve strategic partnerships with other federal, state, and local 

agencies and non-governmental organizations. For example, the DoD 

should assist in the development of well-coordinated federal interagency 

mechanisms for gathering, assessing, and sharing sensitive intelligence 

information among the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States Department of Agriculture, 

and DoD concerning hostile threats to U.S. food and agriculture.30

The DoD utilizes multiple sources of space-based monitoring to 

collect intelligence data. To enable real-time detection of agroterrorism, 

the DoD should enhance intelligence monitoring to include a 24-hour 

network of remote sensing satellites and ground truth support in priority 

crop areas and food processing/distributing centers. These areas could 
Schwartz 

77 

include primary acreage for commodities such as corn, wheat, rice and 

soybean (Figure 5.2) in addition to more specific vegetable and fruit 

production areas that are typically located close to major metropolitan 

areas (e.g., Los Angeles, Seattle, Denver, Phoenix, Chicago, St. Louis, 

Dallas, New York, and Miami).31 Currently, the United States Department 

of Agriculture uses remote sensing to observe seasonal variations in plant 

vegetation (Figure 5.3).32 Enhanced satellite monitoring by the DoD 

would enable a more accurate sensing of initial plant pest outbreaks and 

agroterrorism. 

2004 Corn for Grain Harvested

Acres (000) and Change From Previous Forecast

2004 All Wheat Harvested

Acres (000) and Change From Previous Year

Rice Yields, November 1, 2004

Pounds and Change from Previous Forecast

Soybean Yields 2004

Bushels and Change From Previous Month

Figure 5.2 United States Crop Production Centers, 2004

These graphics illustrate crop production figures collected by the United States 

Department of Agriculture; colors denote a decrease (light gray), increase (dark 

gray), or no change (white) in production values from the previous season.33
Plant and Crop Response 

78 

Conterminous U.S. Vegetation Condition - 2004

Period 18 (4/22 - 5/5)

Conterminous U.S. Vegetation Condition - 2004

Period 30 (7/15 - 7/28)

Conterminous U.S. Vegetation Condition - 2004

Period 42 (10/7 - 10/20)

Figure 5.3 Remote Sensing of Plant Vegetation and Monitoring 

for Initial Plant Pest Outbreaks, 2004

These figures illustrate continental U.S. ground vegetation for selected 14-day 

periods during 2004. Higher resolution versions of these satellite images on a 24-hour 

monitoring basis could detect initial agro-terrorist events that impacted crop health, and 

contribute to more rapid and successful mitigation efforts.

34
Schwartz 

79 

One of the best defenses against the introduction of new plant 

diseases, by either accidental or deliberate means, is rapid detection. One 

mission of the plant pathology research program of the United States 

Department of Agriculture Animal Research Service (ARS) Foreign 

Disease-Weed Science Research Unit at Ft. Detrick, Maryland, is 

development of rapid molecular-based systems for detection of naturally 

introduced foreign pathogens for use by the Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service, DoD, federal and state agencies, and universities. 

There are more than 500 pathogens that can cause major disease losses. 

Thus, a reliable methodology for rating and prioritizing those pathogens of 

the highest risk is essential.35,36 Members of the DoD should be identified, 

trained, and equipped to serve in this anticipated monitoring capacity. 

Plant diseases can materialize or be spread due to the weather. The 

DoD utilizes military meteorologists in its daily operations. These 

meteorologists could monitor regional, national, and international weather 

patterns (especially wind and moisture) which could contribute to a pest 

outbreak. More importantly, the personnel could rapidly identify 

downwind movement and targets that could be threatened by the 

secondary spread of a pest(s). Only minimal training would be required to 

enable DoD meteorologists to assist in determining conditions conducive 

to pest outbreaks or conditions and a greater spread of disease. 

Military Response Measures 

The U.S. military, especially state National Guard forces, could be 

used as a manpower resource to assist in the depopulation (eradication) 

and disposal of infested plant materials and food products. In the event of 

an agroterrorist attack, it may be necessary to complete a large scale 

eradication of infested plant materials and food products, and 

decontamination (fumigation, sterilization) of infested equipment and 

infrastructure (e.g., grain elevators, train cars) affected by the agents. 

Detailed coordination between the United States Department of 

Agriculture and National Guard forces must be accomplished to ensure an 

accurate assessment of capabilities the state can expect from the DoD. 

In response to a real or perceived threat, Guard personnel may also be 

used to provide security for resources such as chemicals, equipment, 

personnel, and implementation of quarantine and containment actions. In 
Plant and Crop Response 

80 

addition, security forces can safeguard regional supplies for the protection 

of un-infested crops near major agricultural production and food product 

handling centers to mitigate the spread of the pest(s) from the initial 

outbreak foci. 

For all military responses, the DoD and USDA should create and 

maintain a network of regional centers near major agricultural production 

regions to support a rapid, 24 to 48 hour, response. 

Command, Control, and Communication 

Effectively coordinated and rapid responses require integrated 

electronic field diagnostic and communication systems and emergency 

control centers that can take advantage of the very latest information and 

data management technology. The DoD has extensive capabilities and 

experience in developing effective Command, Control, and 

Communication systems. The DoD could assist in the development of a 

coordinated, nationwide electronic communications and data management 

network to link the private agribusiness community with emergency 

management staff; field response personnel; and key DoD, federal, state, 

and local agencies. This network could facilitate pathogen monitoring, 

reporting and tracking diseases, and communicating response measures 

and their effectiveness. 

Conclusions

In order to affect a comprehensive agroterrorist capability to protect 

plant and crop resources, DoD needs to develop strategic plans and 

establish partnerships between the United States Department of 

Agriculture (the United States Department of Agriculture Animal 

Research Service, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, 

Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension Service), DoD, 

CIA, FBI, Department of Homeland Security, state and local government 

agencies, private sector commodity groups, universities, and professional 

societies like the American Phytopathological Society. Establishing and 

strengthening these partnerships with resources and trained personnel 

could expand the national infrastructure and enhance operations support 

and rapid response. 
Schwartz 

81 

In terms of crop and plant response, the military’s role must be 

pervasive and interwoven throughout the nation’s homeland security 

fabric and strategies. A safe and dependable supply of food for our 

citizens is one of the most critical operative mandates for the Department 

of Defense. The military’s defense strategies must encompass 

comprehensive and state-of-the art approaches to reduce opportunities for 

agroterrorist events. Military response strategies must also encompass 

aggressive and timely actions to mitigate and eradicate the impact of 

agroterrorism on our plant and crop resources. A strong and well-trained 

military will not only provide the backbone for U.S. homeland defense 

infrastructure but will also enhance the implementation of Department of 

Homeland Security strategies dealing with national and international 

intelligence, monitoring, security, mitigation, and communication 

networks. 

Notes

1. J. Monke, “Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness,” CRS Report for Congress, 

2004, Order Code RL32521. 

2. H. Parker, “Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat,” 

McNair Paper 65, Washington, D.C.: Institute For National Strategic Studies, National 

Defense University, 2002. 

3. M. Wheelis, R. Casagrande, and L.V. Madden, “Biological Attack on 

Agriculture: Low-Tech, High-Impact Bioterrorism,” BioScience, 2002, 569-576. 

4. Monke, “Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness.” 

5. Ibid. 

6. Wheelis, Casagrande, and Madden, “Biological Attack on Agriculture: LowTech, High-Impact Bioterrorism.” 

7. L.A. Meyerson and J.K. Reaser, “Biosecurity: Moving Toward a Comprehensive 

Approach,” BioScience, 2002, 593-600. 

8. Parker, “Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat.” 
Plant and Crop Response 

82 

9. P. Chalk, “Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly: The Potential Threat of Deliberate 

Biological Attacks against the U.S. Agricultural and Food Industry,” Rand Corporation, 

2004, National Defense Res. Inst. Report, ISBN 0-8330-3522-3. 

10. L.V. Madden and M. Wheelis, “The Threat of Plant Pathogens as Weapons 

against U.S. Crops,” Annual Review Phytopath, 2003, 155-176. 

11. Meyerson and Reaser, “Biosecurity: Moving Toward a Comprehensive 

Approach.” 

12. Monke, “Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness.” 

13. Parker, “Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat.” 

14. J.L. Sherwood, J. Fletcher, and J. Swyers, “Crop Biosecurity: Are We 

Prepared?” APS White Paper, 2003, On-line, Internet, available from 

http://www.apsnet.org/ members/ppb/PDFs/CropBiosecurityWhitePaper5-03.pdf. 

15. Madden and Wheelis, “The Threat of Plant Pathogens as Weapons against U.S. 

Crops.” 

16. Parker, “Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat.” 

17. Monke, “Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness.” 

18. H.R. 3448, “Bill Summary and Status for the 107th Congress,” On-line, 

Internet, 8 February 2005, available from http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/ 

z?d107:HR03448:TOM:/bss/d107query.html. 

19. Monke, “Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness.” 

20. “Defense of United States Agriculture and Food,” Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive/HSPD-9, 30 January 2004, On-line, Internet, 2 February 2005, 

available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040203-2.html. 

21. Monke, “Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness.” 

22. “Homeland Security Research,” 31 January 2005, Online, Internet, 2 February 

2005, available from www.epa.gov/nhsrc. 

23. “National Plant and Diagnostic Network,” 14 December 2004. Online, Internet, 

2 February 2005, available from www.npdn.org. 

24. Meyerson and Reaser, “Biosecurity: Moving Toward a Comprehensive 

Approach.” 
Schwartz 

83 

25. Madden and Wheelis, “The Threat of Plant Pathogens as Weapons against U.S. 

Crops.” 

26. Meyerson and Reaser, “Biosecurity: Moving Toward a Comprehensive 

Approach.” 

27. Monke, “Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness.” 

28. “National Plant Diagnostic Network Regional Centers,” On-line, Internet, 

available from www.gpdn.org/DesktopDefault.aspx. 

29. Parker, “Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat.” 

30. Ibid. 

31. USDA National Agriculture Statistics Service, On-line, Internet, 8 February 

2005, available from www.usda.gov/nass/aggraphs/graphics.htm. 

32. Ibid. 

33. “United States Crop Production Centers,” 2004, On-line, Internet, available 

from www.usda.gov/nass/aggraphs/graphics/htm. 

34. “Remote Sensing of Plant Vegetation and Monitoring for Initial Plant Pest 

Outbreaks,” 2004, On-line, Internet, available from www.usda.gov/nass/aggraphs/ 

graphics/htm. 

35. N.W. Schaad, R.D. Frederick, J. Shaw, W.L. Schneider, R. Hickson, M.D. 

Petrillo, D.G. Luster, “Advances in Molecular-Based Diagnostics in Meeting Crop 

Biosecurity and Phytosanitary Issues,” Annual Review Phytopathol, 2003, 305-324. 

36. Sherwood, Fletcher, and Swyers, “Crop Biosecurity: Are We Prepared?” 

CHAPTER 6 

Carcass Disposal 

John A. Scanga, Wendie A. Phelps, and Barbara E. Powers 

The most recent U.S. animal inventories reported December 2003 and 

January 2004, show that there are 94.9 million head of cattle, 60 million 

swine, 6.09 million sheep, and 449 million birds (poultry).1

 The estimated 

mortality of cattle averages near 2.9%, adult sheep 3.5%, feedlot lambs 

2.6%, and swine 3.3%.2 The potential annual mortality of all livestock 

(cattle, pigs, sheep, poultry, and horses) in the United States according to 

Sparks Companies 2002 was 105,345 head per day or over 3.3 million 

pounds.3 There are many factors that contribute to these mortalities, such as 

common illnesses, infections, and respiratory ailments frequently associated 

with young animals and confined stock. Producers, veterinarians, and 

animal shelters must find secure, expedient, and economical means for 

disposal of these animals, road kill, and infectious wastes. In addition, 

livestock processors, wholesalers, and retailers must dispose of processing 

offals (meat waste) in the same efficient and economical manner. 

An agroterrorist event involving livestock could result in enormous 

numbers of animal carcasses requiring disposal. These carcasses would 

likely be harboring an infectious agent regardless of whether the animals 

died from exposure to an agroterrorist agent or from euthanization to 

prevent suffering from or transmission of disease. The method of carcass 

disposal utilized will depend on a number of factors including: quantity of 

carcasses, cause of death, stability of potential infectious agents, local or 

regional environmental conditions, availability of equipment and fuel, 

cost, and public perception. There are a number of methods currently used 

to handle diseased or dying animals, their carcasses, and slaughter offals, 

which can potentially be applied to an emergency agroterrorist event. 

One means of disposal is a form of recycling waste into otherwise 

useable products. Prior to the 1997 ban on feeding mammalian-derived 

protein sources to ruminants, and the growing concerns related to 
Carcass Disposal 

86 

transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE), the practice of 

converting non-consumable animal “waste” (diseased, dead, dying and 

disabled animals, slaughter offal, supermarket waste, and restaurant 

grease) into functional meat and bone meal and tallow (i.e., rendering) 

consumed approximately 40 billion pounds of raw material annually.4

Proper and timely removal of these biological wastes in an effective 

manner is crucial for maintaining the health of other stock and sanitation 

of processing facilities.5

 Carcasses left in proximity to the herd or flock 

may transfer illnesses and result in further losses. They can also serve as 

water and environmental contaminants and expose humans to harmful 

bacteria such as anthrax and Salmonella, viruses, or protozoa such as 

Giradia and Cryptosporidia, or other infectious disease.6

 

Rapid and effective removal and destruction is especially important in 

an agroterrorist event since these carcasses can potentially propagate the 

spread of disease. Researchers have achieved significant progress in the 

search of new disposal methods such as chemical7,8 and anaerobic 

digestion,9

 total de-polymerization,10 composting,11 and uses of recycled 

by-products.12

Carcass Disposal Methods 

Past experiences with highly publicized disease outbreaks such as 

foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) of cloven hooved animals in the United 

Kingdom (UK), Chronic Wasting Disease of cervids (of the deer family) 

in Colorado, and exotic Newcastle disease of poultry in California, have 

demonstrated need for cost-effective, safe, fast, complete, and 

environmentally acceptable disposal methods. There are several 

alternative methods of biological waste disposal that can be employed. 

The rendering method selected should be based upon operational 

objectives and state and/or federal regulations. These regulations are 

generally based upon the method’s impact upon disease control and air 

and water quality. While state laws regarding livestock disposal vary 

widely, most require disposal to take place within 24 to 48 hours. 

Nationally, the approved methods include: rendering, composting, burial, 

landfilling, incineration, and tissue digestion. Each of these disposal 

methods has useful attributes, but also possesses undesirable qualities.13
Scanga / Phelps / Powers 

87 

Rendering 

Rendering is an economically viable and effective means of recycling 

biological waste into usable products for the feed and oleo chemical 

industries. “In 2002, 36 million head of cattle, 100 million pigs, and nearly 

nine billion chickens and turkeys were slaughtered in the United States, 

yielding 85.5 billion pounds (38.8 million metric tons) of meat, an 

increase of 3.3 percent over 2001, and 18.8 billion pounds (8.5 million 

tons) of rendered product, an increase of 3.4 percent.”14 Daily, the 

rendering industry processes biological waste, converting this unusable 

material into edible fats and oils; and inedible lard, tallows, greases, meat 

meal, meat and bone meal, and dry rendered tankage. These products and 

other derivatives of the rendering industry are vital in manufacturing 

plastics, tires, antifreeze, jet fuel, biodiesel, lotions, soaps, candles, and 

numerous other common household items.15

The current rendering industry is divided between two types of 

facilities—independent plants and integrated rendering plants which are 

associated with livestock and poultry packing/processing facilities. While 

the source of animal by-products from an integrated plant is “known” 

material generated from the processing plant, independent renderers gather 

“unknown” materials from numerous sources including very small 

processing plants, restaurants, animal shelters, feedlots, dairies, and 

ranches.16 Currently, 70% of all products are rendered at integrated 

rendering plants.17 Many independent companies have been acquired by 

larger independent renderers, or have gone out of business. A great deal of 

this change in business structure is due to the Food and Drug 

Administration’s (FDA) implementation of Title 21 Part 589.2000 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations, August 4, 1997, which prohibited the use of 

most mammalian protein in feeds for ruminant animals.18

Composting 

Composting is a natural process in which bacteria and fungi 

decompose organic material in an aerobic environment. As 

microorganisms break down the organic material, energy, in the form of 

heat, is produced. This heat, when sustained between 130°F and 150°F for 

one week, will kill weed seeds and bacterial pathogens found in raw 
Carcass Disposal 

88 

organic matter,19 and results in compost, which resembles humus.20

Compost can be used as a soil amendment on farms, parks, and lawns and 

can be especially beneficial to “organic” farmers as a soil nutrient source. 

However, the composition of the finished compost can vary greatly due to 

differences in management and input materials.21 Composting of carcasses 

has been an effective alternative to pit burial because it reduces waste 

volume and the recycled waste can be subsequently reused.22

Composting biological waste produces a usable end product, but the 

success of composting depends on proper site planning and monitoring of 

the operation.23 Management issues include raw material, moisture and 

temperature control, and proper proportions of nitrogen and carbon 

sources.24 Optimally, the internal temperature will remain at or above 

130°F for three consecutive days such that pathogenic bacteria are 

destroyed. If temperatures exceed 150°F, all bacteria can be destroyed, 

ceasing the composting process. Odor from compost is another concern 

which can be regulated by balancing the carbon and nitrogen content at or 

above a 25:1 C:N ratio.25

Facility design should also address odor control and appropriate 

compost site location.26 While regulations vary by individual states, in 

general, safely composted products must meet the following criteria before 

being sold or distributed:27

1. Minimum of two heat cycles with temperatures reaching 130°F 

during each cycle, 

2. No visible soft tissue in finished compost, and 

3. Handling and storage of the compost must adhere to state or local 

regulations. 

Burial 

Instances of livestock burial date back 6,000 years.28 This method is 

inexpensive and requires only the use of common farm implements. Burial 

can be used to avoid attracting predators and scavengers and as a means 

for preventing further spread of contagious diseases. Burial sites should be 

monitored for evidence of disturbances by coyotes, rodents, and flies. 

Burial sites should also be capped with a mound of dirt; and grass should 

be reintroduced to prevent erosion.29 While burial does not initially reduce 
Scanga / Phelps / Powers 

89 

the volume of biological waste, over time carcasses naturally decompose 

into humus through microbial and chemical processes. 

One effective type of carcass burial is trench burial. As described by 

the Utah State University Extension Service, trench burial can be 

accomplished by digging a trench seven feet wide and nine feet deep and 

as long as necessary for the desired number of mature cows. The cows are 

placed in the trench and covered with a layer of dirt. The Utah State 

University Extension Service contends that deeper burial controls odors, 

helps to prevent the spread of disease, and keeps the carcass out of sight.30

In recent years, much concern has arisen over environmental 

contamination due to burial. Potential contamination of water and soils 

with diseases, chemicals, and bacteria are major concerns. In addition to 

hazardous environmental risks, urbanization rates have created an issue of 

recovering and removing buried animal remains prior to selling property. 

Burial, while inexpensive and readily employed for years, may no longer 

be considered a responsible option for animal disposal in many locales. 

Landfilling 

Landfilling animal remains in solid municipal waste areas is widely 

used, however regulations are inconsistent from county to county and state 

to state. These landfill waste areas must have a permit for operation, and 

be licensed to accept these types of waste. Landfills have authority to limit 

the number of dead animals accepted and can assign a fee to accept 

biological waste. Many older landfills that have evolved from former town 

or county dumps, may not yet comply with newer Environmental 

Protection Agency standards for landfill design. Therefore, the potential 

exists for the introduction of landfill pollutants to land or surface water. 

Modern landfills, which are capped to prevent water entry and lined to 

prevent to migration of leachate to groundwater, have minimized the 

groundwater pollution concerns.31 A major concern with landfilling is the 

issue of space. According to the Environmental Protection Agency, 70% 

of U.S. landfills will reach capacity by 2025.32

Incineration 

Incineration is among the most biologically safe methods of animal 

disposal included in this discussion with respect to destruction of infectious 
Carcass Disposal 

90 

agents.33 Incineration effectively destroys all infectious agents, transforming 

organic material into inorganic material through the exposure to high 

(1652°F) temperatures.34 Incineration poses minimal threat to water quality 

and effectively prevents the transmission of infectious diseases, including 

transmissible spongiform encephalopathies-causing prions. Ash generated 

from these processes can be safely disposed in controlled landfills or 

utilized as aggregate or other construction materials.35

To facilitate greater capacity, larger incinerators are being put into 

use. These larger incinerators produce more particulate matter and 

therefore must incorporate equipment to minimize emissions of particulate 

matter, heavy metals, and acidic gases.36 Any burning done for disposal 

purposes must abide by clean-air standards regulated by the 

Environmental Protection Agency and is subject to regular inspections to 

ensure proper maintenance and function of equipment.37

Tissue Digestion (Alkaline Hydrolysis) 

Chemical tissue digestion is a newer method of animal disposal 

primarily used by diagnostic laboratories such as those located near 

veterinary research centers and teaching hospitals. These digesters use 

boiling sodium or potassium hydroxide solutions to degrade protein and 

fat into a neutral solution of amino acids, peptides, sugars, and soap that is 

suitable for release into a municipal sewage system; and sterile calcium 

phosphate residue from teeth and bones that can be disposed of in an 

approved landfill.38 The large volume of effluent that is released into the 

sewer can pose a difficult challenge due to high biological oxygen demand 

that may overwhelm city sewer systems. While this tissue digestion 

process does eliminate infectious agents, it is volume limited (up to 

7,000 lbs) and time consuming (greater than 4 hours), and requires large 

capital expenditures for equipment and facilities. New generation tissue 

digesters have the potential to increase volume capacity, reduce effluent 

handling difficulties, and lower initial capital costs of equipment.39

Type and Magnitude of Military Support 

Following an agroterrorism attack, there are several factors which 

will determine the type and magnitude of support required. Those factors 
Scanga / Phelps / Powers 

91 

include: the epicenter of the event, the surrounding livestock populations, 

the surrounding human populous, and what species were involved. 

Individual events will vary widely in terms of climate, geographical 

terrain, and livestock and people densities. 

In actual global disease outbreak situations (UK and Uruguay), the 

military was called upon to provide human, security, and logistical 

resources to the 2001 foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks. The involvement 

of the military in both instances has been viewed as successful and integral 

in the rapid control and eradication of the disease. The role of the military in 

responding to the 2001 foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in the UK was 

viewed as favorable, particularly, their expertise in emergency, logistical 

and operational management.40

In many infectious foreign animal disease events, the disease of 

concern is often not ultimately responsible for the death of livestock. 

Often, depopulation is utilized as a means of preventing additional spread 

of the agent. In these scenarios the contribution of trained individuals who 

can assist with large-scale livestock depopulation would be valuable. 

Because effective and accepted methods of carcass disposal require 

some type of infrastructure, the actual process of disposal may be outside 

the reaches of the military. However, the military may provide access to 

heavy equipment and transportation mechanisms needed to mobilize 

disposal equipment and supplies. Additionally, the military may ensure 

secure transportation of carcasses to a central disposal location. The 

Department of Defense (DoD) could potentially assist in contracting these 

resources from the private sector. 

Excavation equipment and operators for onsite development of the 

site and handling of carcasses would be needed if burial, pit incineration, 

or composting were employed in the disposal operation. These resources 

would likely be contracted from the private sector with the assistance of 

DoD contracting agents and specialists. Additionally, for any operation 

requiring real estate resources, there is a possibility of the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers employing their Contingency Real Estate Support 

Team for the purposes of rapidly securing land leases and finalizing real 

estate transactions.
Carcass Disposal 

92 

Conclusions and Follow-up Actions 

The first question that must be addressed is: “When should the 

Department of Defense become involved?” Based on the debriefings from 

Uruguay and the UK, it is clear that the DoD should be informed of the 

emergency at the onset. The DoD involvement would be determined based 

upon the scale (single state, multi-state, national, international), magnitude 

(number of people, livestock, or farms affected) and scope of each 

individual event. In some instances, DoD may not have, or be able to 

supply support, given the current status of the agricultural event and 

military resources. 

In the circumstance that DoD resources are needed and available, the 

likely areas of support would involve security, contracting (private sector 

support and real estate), organization, and emergency response expertise 

through incident command type structures. For instance, the following 

DoD communication channels and areas of involvement in an animal 

emergency response should be explored: 

1. Who or what office is the first point of contact for the DoD? 

This individual or office should be contacted at the onset of 

any emergency animal response, regardless of cause. The 

involvement of DoD would then be determined based upon the 

current situation and needs. 

2. What personnel and security resources are available? 

In both the UK and Uruguay events, early military involvement 

in area quarantine and restriction of animal movement were 

critical in minimizing the spread of the infectious agent. These 

resources would likely be short-term, immediate needs of the 

response effort. 

3. Who is the contact for contracting?

The most probable DoD resource that would be utilized in any 

emergency response would be contracting expertise. Service 

and equipment needs will likely be provided through USDA or 

DoD contracts with third party providers. 
Scanga / Phelps / Powers 

93 

4. Who is the contact person for the United States Army Corps of 

Engineers? 

For large-scale animal disposal, the United States Army Corps 

of Engineers has infrastructure in place to oversee and 

administer real property, geological analyses and engineering 

and potential construction (i.e., landfill or compost site). 

An attack on our U.S. agriculture has the potential to generate 

millions of carcasses requiring immediate disposal. Current civilian 

facilities may not be able to transport and process these great quantities of 

biological waste without federal assistance. The DoD possesses critical 

capabilities and manpower which can be utilized in the event of an 

agroterrorist event or major natural outbreak of disease in the United 

States. These capabilities and manpower must be identified and employed 

to prevent further propagation of agroterrorist or naturally occurring 

diseases. 

Notes

1. United States Department of Agriculture, “Cattle and Calves, Inventory Report,” 

National Agricultural Statistics Service Commodity Reports, 30 January 2004; United 

States Department of Agriculture, “Hogs and Pigs, Inventory Report,” National 

Agricultural Statistics Service Commodity Reports, 30 December 2003; United States 

Department of Agriculture, “Poultry Inventory Report,” National Agricultural Statistics 

Service Commodity Reports, 29 January 2004; United States Department of Agriculture, 

“Sheep and Goats Inventory Report,” National Agricultural Statistics Service Commodity 

Reports, 30 January 2004; United States Department of Agriculture, “Meat Animals 

Production, Disposition and Income Report,” National Agricultural Statistics Service, 

2003. 

2. “Meat Animals Production, Disposition and Income Report,” United States 

Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2003. 

3. Sparks Companies Inc., “Livestock Mortalities: Methods of Disposal and their 

Potential Costs,” Prepared for The National Renderers Association, March 2002. 

4. Food and Drug Administration, “Cost analysis of regulatory options to reduce the 

risk of an outbreak of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) in the United 

States,” Prepared by the Eastern Research Group, Inc., Lexington, MA, 1996. 
Carcass Disposal 

94 

5. Brendan O’Neill, “Liquid Assets,” Meat Marketing & Technology, December 

2003, 82. 

6. Franklin Garry, “Carcass Disposal Risks,” Bio-waste Disposal and Utilization 

Strategy Meeting, Colorado State University, College of Veterinary Medicine and 

Biomedical Sciences, 2002. 

7. WR2 Waste Reduction, “Natural Biological Waste Digestion Process Eliminates 

Incineration, Promises Solution to BSE Disposal Problem,” Waste Reduction Inc., March 

2001, On-line, Internet, available from www.wr2.net. 

8. For instance, alkaline hydrolysis through Biological Mass Energy Extraction and 

Recovery (BioMEER) system, November 2005, On-line, Internet available from 

http://biomeer.fedvendor.com. 

9. C. Festino and C. Aubart, “Optimization of anaerobic digestion of slaughterhouse 

wastes and mixtures of animal wastes with sewage sludge and slaughterhouse wastes,” 

Anaerobic Digestion: results of Research and Demonstration Projects, Elsevier Applied 

Science, London and New York, 1986, 82-87. 

10. Energy Future Coalition, “Challenge and Opportunity: Chartering A New 

Energy Future,” Appendex A, Working Group Report-2, Bioenergy and Agriculture, 18 

July 2003. 

11. Debra Elias Morse, “Composting Animal Mortalities,” Agriculture 

Development Division, Minnesota Department of Agriculture, July 2001, On-line, 

Internet, available from www.mda.state.mn.us. 

12. Gary Pearl, “The Future is Catching Up- Non-feed and Bioenergy Uses for 

Rendered Products,” Render, August 2003, 10-14. 

13. USDA/APHIS, “Risk Reduction Strategies for Potential BSE Pathways 

Involving Downer Cattle and Dead Stock of Cattle and Other Species,” Federal Register,

21 January 2003, Vol. 68, No. 13, 2703-2711. 

14. Jim Rudbeck, “Market Report 2002,” Render, April 2003, 10-15, 59. 

15. “Beef By-product Usage-Executive Summary,” 1996, On-line, Internet, 

available from http://www.beef.org/documents/Beef%20By%20Products%20Usage% 

201996.doc. 

16. Environmental Protection Agency, “Compilation of Air Pollutant Emission 

Factors,” Volume I, Chapter 9, Stationary Point and Area Sources, Food and Agricultural 

Industries, September 1995. 
Scanga / Phelps / Powers 

95 

17. National Renderer’s Association, Washington, D.C., Personal Telephone 

Interview with John A. Scanga, 25 November 2003. 

18. Food and Drug Administration, “Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal 

Food or Feed; Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed,” Federal Register, Vol. 62, 

No. 108, 5 June 1997, 30936. 

19. Morse, “Composting Animal Mortalities.” 

20. Duane Wilson, “Methods of Disposal of Paunch Contents with Emphasis on 

Composting,” Inedible Meat By-Products – Advances in Meat Research, Volume 8, 

Chapter 11, Elsevier Applied Science London and New York, 1992, 265-280. 

21. M.J. Wineland, T.A. Carter, and K.E. Anderson. “Incineration or Composting: 

Cost Comparison of Methods,” Poultry Digest, 56:6, June 1997, 22, 24-27. 

22. USDA/APHIS, “Risk Reduction Strategies for Potential BSE Pathways 

Involving Downer Cattle and Dead Stock of Cattle and Other Species.” 

23. Morse, “Composting Animal Mortalities.” 

24. USDA/APHIS, “Risk Reduction Strategies for Potential BSE Pathways 

Involving Downer Cattle and Dead Stock of Cattle and Other Species.” 

25. H.M. Keener, D.L. Elwell, and M.J. Monnin, “Procedures and Equations for 

Sizing of Structures and Windrows for Composting Animal Mortalities,” Applied 

Engineering in Agriculture, Volume 16, Number 6, June 2000, 681-692. 

26. Morse, “Composting Animal Mortalities.” 

27. Ibid. 

28. “Urban Landscape Dynamics. Growth and Connections of the Urban Landscape 

Dynamics and Resource Use,” Uppsala, August 2003, On-line, Internet, available from 

http://www.arkeologi.uu.se/afr/symposium/abstracts/dilernia_uppsala_resource%20use.p

df. 

29. Jean E. Sander, Martin C. Warbington, and Lee M. Myers. “Selected Methods 

of Animal Carcass Disposal,” 1 April 2002, 1003-1005. 

30. C.V. Bagley, J.H. Kirk, and K. Farrell-Poe. “Cow Mortality Disposal,” Utah 

State University Extension, October 1999. 

31. Forum, Environmental Health Perspectives, July 1998, Vol. 106, No. 7. 

32. Marvin Cetron and Owen Davies, “50 Trends Now Changing the World,” 2002. 
Carcass Disposal 

96 

33. USDA/APHIS, “Risk Reduction Strategies for Potential BSE Pathways 

Involving Downer Cattle and Dead Stock of Cattle and Other Species.” 

34. Don A. Franco, “Animal Disposal-The Environmental, Animal Disease, and 

Public Health Related Implications: An Assessment of Options” Presentation, California 

Department of Food and Agriculture Symposium, 8 April 2002. 

35. Environmental Agency, “Solid Residues from Municipal Waste Incinerators in 

England and Wales,” May 2002. 

36. European Commission Health & Consumer Protection Directorate-General, 

“The Use of Open Burning for Dealing with Carcasses and other materials that might 

contain BSE/TSE Report,” 16-17 January 2003, On-line, Internet, available from 

http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out310_en.pdf. 

37. Wilson, “Methods of Disposal of Paunch Contents with Emphasis on 

Composting.” 

38. Sander, Warbington, and Myers, “Selected Methods of Animal Carcass 

Disposal.” 

39. For instance, alkaline hydrolysis through Biological Mass Energy Extraction 

and Recovery (BioMEER) system, November 2005, On-line, Internet available from 

http://biomeer.fedvendor.com. 

40. I. Anderson, “Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to be Learned,” Inquiry 

Report, House of Commons, London, UK. 2002. 
CHAPTER 7 

Summary, Shortfalls, and Recommendations 

Jim A. Davis and Donald L. Noah 

The specter of agroterrorism is on the rise across the United States. 

Many organizations and governmental agencies are gaining a better 

understanding of the vulnerabilities of our nation, potential capabilities of 

our adversaries, and the catastrophic effects of a well executed agroterrorist 

attack. Because of this expanding awareness, many agencies are considering 

the role the Department of Defense would play in such an event. 

Many questions must be answered quickly so the United States is not 

caught unprepared and so the DoD can use its resources and capabilities 

most effectively. Should the Department of Defense step forward in a 

more aggressive fashion to prepare for an agroterrorist event? Are there 

other governmental agencies or resources that are better suited or fully 

capable of handling the mission without the assistance of the DoD? Would 

the Department of Defense’s involvement in pre-attack preparations 

hinder responsible agencies from building truly independent capabilities to 

deal with a national agroterrorist event? Or, is the threat so insignificant 

that it has little effect on the national security of the United States? If the 

Department of Defense is needed to respond to an agroterrorist event at 

the national level, how can it prepare now and what will be expected from 

the DoD when it does respond? 

Agroterrorism is a threat to U.S. national security, as clearly detailed 

in the introductory chapter, yet the DoD has not gotten more involved in 

agro-defense or the planning to manage the aftermath of an agroterrorist 

event. Multiple reasons likely have driven the DoD to place this threat low 

on its list of concerns. The Department’s increasingly global 

commitments, coupled with trends toward down-sizing and “homeland 

defense,” stretch available forces and resources. Traditionally, the 

Department of Defense viewed its area of responsibility primarily as 

abroad and only recently has this focus shifted toward the continental 
 Summary, Shortfalls, and Recommendations 

98 

United States. The historic rarity of foreign incursions on U.S. soil and the 

Posse Comitatus Act, enacted after the American Civil War, have helped 

to root this foreign focus philosophy deeply in the mores of all military 

services.1

 The DoD defers to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the 

Department of Homeland Security, and others as more appropriately 

suited to handle an agroterrorist event. Some in the DoD hold the opinion 

that supporting agroterrorism is simply “a kind of mission we have never 

done and is not our job.” Others in the Department of Defense, however, 

assume that we are already capable of contributing to the response to an 

agroterrorist event. In our experience, leaders in other federal agencies 

expect DoD to provide support, however unspecified, following such an 

event. This is the crux of this report: Will the Department of Defense be 

prepared and able to provide such support if and when it is needed? 

Is DoD’s Role Mandated in an Agroterrorist Event? 

The National Response Plan, released in 2004 by the Department of 

Homeland Security, provides an all-hazards approach to national 

catastrophes (man-made or natural). Using the National Incident 

Management System, it provides much-needed clarity to tactical, 

operational, and strategic leaders as they prepare their respective agencies. 

To a certain extent it also defines how the Department of Defense is to be 

involved in various responses. In the incident annexes dealing with 

biological, catastrophic, and terrorism incidents, the DoD is listed as a 

“cooperating [support] agency.” Although the annex on food and 

agriculture incident has not yet been released, a similar role for 

Department of Defense is expected.2

Additionally, the DoD has a memorandum of understanding regarding 

veterinary services with the United States Department of Agriculture and 

the General Services Administration (GSA) – further detailed in Chapters 

2 and 4 of this report. In this Memorandum of Understanding, the DoD 

has agreed to assist in developing contingency plans and exercises as well 

as participate in other missions such as pest control, laboratory support, 

vaccine development, and providing a wide range of medical specialists.3

In 2003, the Department of Defense established the U.S. Northern 

Command (NORTHCOM), headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, 

Colorado Springs, Colorado. It was established as a single unified 
Davis / Noah 

99 

command with an area of responsibility encompassing Canada, the United 

States (excluding Hawaii), Mexico, and the surrounding waters out to 

approximately 500 miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico and several 

islands in the Atlantic and Caribbean.4

 Although NORTHCOM would 

provide the key military support in the event of a major agroterrorist event 

in the continental United States (as detailed in Chapter 3) there is only one 

person assigned to NORTHCOM who is tasked to plan for such a 

response.5

 However motivated and qualified, a single individual faces a 

truly mammoth task. 

Although traditionally trained to seize, secure, or destroy by force, 

U.S. military forces have increasingly shifted to peacemaking and 

peacekeeping operations. If a major agroterrorist event occurred and the 

military was called upon to enforce an animal quarantine, they might be 

perceived as law enforcement agents in our homeland. Are U.S. forces 

sufficiently trained for such a mission—and in sufficient numbers? The 

military’s ability to integrate with state and local government agencies will 

be honed only through meticulous planning and realistic exercises. 

Another concern centers on the number of military personnel 

potentially available to respond to a domestic incident. With significant 

operations on-going in Iraq and Afghanistan, will the military be available 

to help domestically with an agroterrorist event? Clearly, iterative 

planning efforts should include an estimation of the forces required for 

various contingencies, the appropriateness of existing interagency 

agreements, and clear lines of communication between respective offices 

within DoD, the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Department 

of Agriculture, and the Department of Health and Human Services. 

Shortfalls within DoD to augment a National Level 

Agroterrorist Event 

This study has identified at least four categorical deficiencies within 

the DoD regarding readiness for an agroterrorism event. 

1. Planning. As yet, there is no clear plan for integrating specific 

military capabilities into the overall response effort. While the 

Army maintains communication with USDA regarding animal 

diseases, this has not resulted in an integrated response plan. 
 Summary, Shortfalls, and Recommendations 

100 

2. Personnel. NORTHCOM has only a single planner focused on this 

contingency. Moreover, although there are significant numbers of 

trained and experienced veterinarians, laboratory technicians, 

epidemiologists, and specialized technicians in the military, there 

is no centralized mechanism for tracking their locations and 

availability in an agroterrorist event. 

3. Liaison. Although the Department of Defense has a Memorandum 

of Understanding with the United States Department of Agriculture 

and the Food and Drug Administration, these relationships should 

be further solidified by creating permanent liaison positions. 

4. Mission. Perhaps most importantly, the DoD has not specifically 

acknowledged the mission of providing forces and/or resources 

following an agroterrorism event. Although this may be included 

by implication under the rubric of “homeland defense,” these 

shortfalls could be more easily remedied by senior-level 

commitment to this mission. 

Recommendations for Action

This focused effort identified issues regarding the DoD’s 

preparedness to contribute to the response to a major agroterrorist event. 

Senior leaders within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint 

Staff, NORTHCOM, and the Army should commission a more complete 

analysis of what should be the military’s involvement following a major 

national agroterrorist event. The following milestones are offered as a 

template of action in determining the optimum military participation in 

response to the agroterrorism threat and ensuring its readiness. 

1. Determine if this is a valid mission, at least in part, for the DoD. 

This likely is a NORTHCOM action, in coordination with the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, and could be 

initiated by an extensive literature review of previous military 

involvement in agricultural disease outbreaks. 

2. Identify categorical capabilities that the DoD might be called upon 

to provide. This could be facilitated by a series of interagency 
Davis / Noah 

101 

tabletop and field exercises with participation from all levels (e.g., 

state, local, national, academic). 

3. Evaluate the current capability of the Department of Defense to 

meet those identified requirements. 

4. Assuming there is a delta between requirements and current 

capability, close the gap by fine-tuning military force structure, if 

possible, and/or military responsibilities as outlined in interagency 

agreements. 

The recent questions raised concerning the use of the military for 

quarantine operations in the event of an avian influenza outbreak in the 

United States demonstrate that the roles of the military in an agricultural 

event are not clearly established. The capabilities of the military are broad, 

and can be easily adapted to enhance an effective response to an agroterror 

attack. This project provided local, state, federal, and DoD policy makers 

detailed information about current capabilities and future potential roles 

for the Department of Defense in helping the nation prepare for, respond 

to, and recover from a terrorist attack on U.S. agriculture. 

Notes

1. John R. Brinkerhoff, “The Posse Comitatus Act and Homeland Security,” 

Journal of Homeland Security, February 2002, On-line, Internet, 22 June 2005, Available 

from http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/displayArticle.asp?article=30. 

2. National Response Plan, Department of Homeland Security, On-line, Internet, 25 

October 2005, Available from http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=15&content= 

4269. 

3. Robert Newberry, 1999, Statement by Robert Newberry, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Combating Terrorism Policy and Support Before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, 27 October 1999, On-line, Internet, 23 June 2005, 

http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/1999/991027rn.pdf. 

4. U.S. Northern Command, On-line, Internet, no date, Available from 

http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.who_homefront. 
 Summary, Shortfalls, and Recommendations 

102 

5. “Army veterinarian is military’s man with the plan,” Journal of the American 

Veterinary Medical Association, 1 February 2004, Volume 224, Number 3, 349. 
Contributors 

Thomas C. Berg, DVM, MPH, DACVPM, is a Senior Scientist for 

Biosecurity and Public Health, Medical Readiness and Response at 

Battelle. Dr. Berg’s most recent work has been in biosecurity and public 

health programs in homeland security, force health protection and 

agriculture biosecurity to defend against chemical, biological, radiological, 

nuclear and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) hazards to the Department of 

Defense, the livestock industry and other federal, state, county, and city 

government agencies. Dr. Berg has nearly 31 years of military experience 

(enlisted and officer) in the Navy, Air National Guard, and Air Force. He 

served 14 years in the Navy and in Air National Guard units as an avionics 

technician and aircraft maintenance officer, and served 17 years in the Air 

Force as a public health officer in a variety of assignments. During his 

career, Dr. Berg managed health risk assessment programs and the public 

health/preventive medicine aspects of occupational and environmental 

health consultation for military bases worldwide. He served as the chief of 

biomedical lab transition (technology transition) and Deputy Site 

Commander for the Air Force Research Laboratory’s (AFRL) Human 

Effectiveness Directorate. Dr. Berg was also the principal investigator on a 

project designed to enhance the protection, identification, response, 

mitigation, and recovery capabilities of a major livestock industry by 

developing solutions to capability gaps. He is a practicing veterinarian 

specializing in small animal medicine and surgery. Dr. Berg earned his BS 
Contributors

104 

in Animal Science and Zoology at South Dakota State University; his 

DVM at Kansas State University; and MPH at the Uniformed Services 

University of the Health Sciences. Dr. Berg is also a Diplomate, American 

College of Veterinary Preventive Medicine (DACVPM). 

Jim A. Davis, DVM, DrPH, DACVPM, is a Senior Program Manager for 

Battelle. Dr. Davis served 22 years in the Army and Air Force. His last 

assignment was as the Deputy Director of the USAF Counterproliferation 

Center. Previously, Dr. Davis was the AF Surgeon General’s Chair to Air 

University. Before coming to Air University, he was the Commander, 48th 

Aerospace Medicine Squadron at RAF Lakenheath, UK. He also served as 

UK Medical Intelligence Officer and USAFE Consultant for Public 

Health. Dr. Davis served 4 years in the U.S. Army Veterinary Corps, 6 

years in private veterinary medicine, and was in the Air Force since 1987. 

His areas of special interest include Chemical and Biological Warfare, 

bioterrorism, and occupational epidemiology. Dr. Davis has several 

academic degrees including a Doctorate of Veterinary Medicine from 

Texas A&M and a Doctorate of Public Health from the University of 

Texas. He is board certified with the American College of Veterinary 

Medicine. 

Robert P. Ellis, PhD, is the Colorado State University Biosafety Officer, 

and Professor, Department of Microbiology, Immunology and Pathology, 

Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO. Dr. Ellis has organized and 

taught courses for the Eagleson Institute, American Biological Safety 

Association (ABSA) Summer Seminar Series, and the ABSA Annual 

Meeting (Arboviral Vector Containment in the BSL-3 Laboratory; and 

Design, Construction, and Management of a BSL-3 Laboratory Building). 

He initiated a 2 credit, graduate/undergraduate course at Colorado State 

University: Biosafety in the Research Laboratory. He earned his BS at the 

University of Wyoming, Laramie, (Microbiology), and his MS in 

Veterinary Microbiology and PhD in Immunology at Purdue University, 

West Lafayette, Indiana. Dr. Ellis is a Certified Biological Safety 

Professional, a Diplomate of the American College of Microbiology 

(Specialist Microbiologist, Biological Safety) and a Diplomate, American 

College of Veterinary Microbiologists (Honorary). He is the Executive 

Director of the Conference of Research Workers in Animal Diseases, and 
Contributors

105 

the Founding Editor-in-Chief of Animal Health Research Reviews. He is 

currently on the Biosafety Committees for the National Renewable Energy 

Laboratory, Golden, CO, and the National Wildlife Research Center, Fort 

Collins, CO. Dr. Ellis has been a consultant on issues of biosafety and 

biosecurity for several universities, industries, and national laboratories. 

John R. Herbold, DVM, PhD, MPH, DACVPM is Associate Director of 

the Center for Biosecurity and Public Health Preparedness, University of 

Texas Health Science Center at Houston, and Associate Professor of 

Epidemiology, University of Texas School of Public Health Regional 

Campus at San Antonio. He holds an active commission in the Texas State 

Guard as Officer in Charge, Veterinary Unit, Alamo Group, Texas 

Medical Rangers. John Herbold’s previous positions include: Defense 

Science Board ad-hoc Task Force on SARS Quarantine; Chair, 

Occupational & Environmental Sub-Committee Armed Forces 

Epidemiological Board; Senior Policy Analyst for Preventive Medicine 

and Health Promotion, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Health Affairs); Chief Scientist for the Air Force Armstrong Laboratory 

Directorate of Aerospace Medicine; Vice Commander, USAF 

Occupational and Environmental Health Laboratory; Chief of Disease 

Surveillance, USAF School of Aerospace Medicine; Medical Intelligence 

Officer, HQ U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE); Chief, Environmental 

Medicine Branch, HQ USAFE; Assistant to the Command Veterinarian, 

HQ USAFE; Chief of Veterinary Services, Zweibrucken Air Base, FRG; 

Chief of Veterinary Public Health, Hanscom Field, MA. John Herbold is a 

Fellow of the American College of Epidemiology and Diplomate of the 

American College of Veterinary Preventive Medicine. He was awarded 

Bachelor of Science and Doctor of Veterinary Medicine degrees from 

Texas A&M University, the Master of Public Health from the University 

of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and the Doctor of Philosophy 

(Epidemiology) from The Ohio State University. 

Colonel Donald L. Noah, USAF, DVM, MPH, DACVPM currently 

serves as the Department of Defense Liaison to the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia. Col Noah’s military 
Contributors

106 

assignments include a base-level assignment in Japan; instructor at the 

U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine in San Antonio; infectious 

disease outbreak investigation fellowship at the U.S. Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention; infectious disease analyst with the Defense 

Intelligence Agency at Fort Detrick, Maryland; liaison officer between the 

U.S. Air Force Surgeon General and the Central Intelligence Agency; 

medical epidemiologist at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of 

Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID); and special assistant for biological 

defense at the Pentagon’s Office of the Secretary of Defense. He is also a 

USDA-certified Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician. In addition to his 

academic and military experiences, Dr. Noah also practiced in a large 

animal (predominantly dairy and swine) private practice in Ohio with his 

father for three years. Dr. Noah received his bachelor’s and veterinary 

medical degrees from The Ohio State University and a Master of Public 

Health from the University of Minnesota. He is also a Diplomate of the 

American College of Veterinary Preventive Medicine.

Lieutenant Colonel Brian V. Noland, USA, DVM, MPH, DACVPM, is 

the Command Veterinarian, U.S. NORTHCOM, Peterson AFB, CO. LTC 

Noland is the subject matter expert for agricultural and food issues at U.S. 

Northern Command in Colorado Springs, CO. LTC Noland’s previous 

assignments include Chief, Current Operations and Facilities Division, 

U.S. Army Veterinary Command, Fort Sam Houston, TX; Assistant to the 

Chief, Veterinary Corps, Fort Sam Houston, TX; Chief, UK/Ireland 

Division, Northern Europe Veterinary Detachment, RAF Feltwell, United 

Kingdom; Deputy Commander, Northern Europe Veterinary Detachment, 

Darmstadt, Germany; Deputy Commander, 110th Medical Detachment 

(VS), Frankfurt, Germany; Chief, Animal Medicine, Presidio of San 

Francisco, CA; Officer-in-Charge, Team E, 106th Medical Detachment, 

Taegu, S. Korea; and Chief, Animal Medicine Branch, Ft. Bragg, NC. He 

graduated from Utah State University with BS degrees in Animal Science 

and Bioveterinary Science. He received a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine 

degree from Colorado State University and a Master of Public Health 

degree from the University of Texas. He achieved Diplomate status in the 

American College of Veterinary Preventive Medicine. He is a graduate of 

the U.S.D.A. Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic School. 
Contributors

107 

Wendie A. Phelps, BS, is a graduate research assistant and student at 

Colorado State University. As an undergraduate, Ms. Phelps worked parttime in the Animal Physiology and Meat Science laboratories. She also 

had the opportunity to work and travel internationally, partaking in a study 

abroad/internship program at the Scottish Agricultural College in 

Edinburgh, Scotland, and as an intern with the U.S. Meat Export 

Federation-Mexico located in Mexico City, Mexico. Ms. Phelps earned 

her bachelors degree in Animal Science at the University of Arkansas. 

Barbara E. Powers, DVM, PhD, MS, is the Professor and Director, 

Diagnostic Laboratory, Department of Pathology, College of Veterinary 

Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, Colorado State University (CSU). Dr. 

Powers’ previous positions include Associate Professor and Director, 

Diagnostic Laboratory, Department of Pathology, College of Veterinary 

Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, CSU; Associate Professor and 

Director, Diagnostic Laboratory, Department of Pathology, College of 

Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, CSU; Associate Professor, 

Department of Radiological Health Sciences, College of Veterinary 

Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, CSU; Assistant Professor, Department 

of Radiology and Radiation Biology, College of Veterinary Medicine and 

Biomedical Sciences, CSU; Joint Appointment, Diagnostic Laboratory, 

College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, CSU; postdoctoral fellow in Radiology and Radiation Biology, CSU. Dr. Powers 

holds a BS in Agriculture Science, MS in Veterinary Anatomy, and DVM 

from Purdue University; and a PhD in Veterinary Pathology from CSU. 

Dr. Powers is the Immediate Past-President, Colorado Veterinary Medical 

Association; and Vice-President, American Association Veterinary 

Laboratory Diagnosticians (AAVLD). 

Lieutenant Colonel (Select) Tasha L. Pravecek, USAF, BSC, PhD, is 

the Chief of CBRNE Education, Research and Analysis at the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center. Previously, Lt Col (Sel) Pravecek was a 

student at Air Command and Staff College. She also served as the 354th 

Medical Group, Bioenvironmental Engineering Commander at Eielson 

AFB, AK. Other previous positions include Chief, Chemistry and 

Toxicology Branch, Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, 
Contributors

108 

Brooks AFB, TX; Instructor of Chemistry, USAF Academy; and Chief 

Cell and Tissue Culture Section and Research Toxicologist, Toxicology 

Division, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. Lt Col (Sel) Pravecek has a 

Doctorate in Environmental Science and Engineering from the University 

of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and MS degrees in Biological Chemistry 

from Wright State University and Military Operational Art and Science 

from Air Command and Staff College. She received her BS degree from 

the U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO.

John A. Scanga, PhD, is an Assistant Professor and Extension Meat 

Specialist at Colorado State University, Ft. Collins, CO. He also oversees 

the day-to-day operations of the Meat Science Teaching Laboratory, 

where he conducts research pertinent pre-harvest, post-harvest and postprocessing red meat safety, red meat quality, international trade issues and 

carcass disposal technologies. His previous research includes the use of 

postmortem marination treatments to improve beef tenderness and 

implicated the usefulness of these techniques in beef total quality and 

palatability management systems. In addition, Dr. Scanga’s research from 

several commercial cattle feeding operations which included production 

records, feedlot performance data, and carcass performance allowed him 

to make recommendations to the beef industry to help feeders reduce 

economic losses due to dark cutting beef. Dr. Scanga was appointed to the 

Editorial Board for the Journal of Animal Science in 2002. He sits on the 

Colorado Beef Quality Assurance Council, the American Society of 

Testing and Measures F10 Committee on Livestock, Meat and Poultry 

Evaluation Systems, CSU’s Public Policy Institute and the advisory board 

for CSU’s Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory. Dr. Scanga earned his BS 

degree in Animal Science, MS degree in Meat Science, and PhD in 

Animal Science at Colorado State University. 

Howard F. Schwartz, PhD, is a Professor of Plant Pathology & Associate 

Department Head, Department of Bioagricultural Sciences and Pest 

Management at Colorado State University (CSU). His current work 

emphasizes disease management of vegetable crops. Dr. Schwartz’s 

previous positions include Associate Professor of Plant Pathology, CSU; 

Assistant Professor of Plant Pathology, CSU; and Senior Staff Scientist, 

Plant Pathologist, Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical 
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109 

(International Center for Tropical Agriculture, CIAT) Bean Program, Cali, 

Colombia. He has been awarded the Colorado County Agents Association, 

Friend of Colorado County Agents Award; Rocky Mountain Bean Dealers 

Association Foundation, Regis Daily Award for Outstanding Service; 

Colorado State University, Oliver P. Pennock Distinguished Service 

Award; Cooperative Extension, Epsilon Sigma Phi Visionary Leadership 

Award; and American Phytopathological Society, Excellence in Extension 

Award. Dr. Schwartz has a BS in Agronomy (Business Minor) from the 

University of Nebraska at Lincoln, an MS in Plant Pathology (Plant 

Breeding Minor) from the University of Minnesota, St. Paul, and a PhD in 

Life Sciences (Plant Pathology) from the University of Nebraska. 

Workshop Attendees 

As part of this project, a workshop was held at Colorado State 

University, Fort Collins, Colorado, on December 9, 2004. The purpose of 

the workshop was to provide a forum to critique the chapters published in 

this publication and help the authors expand the content and scope of their 

chapters. In addition to the authors, there were invited guests from the 

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Colorado Department of Agriculture, and 

other agencies present to hear the authors’ presentations and provide input. 

Many of their comments were included in the final product. Therefore, 

their names and affiliations are presented here to recognize their valued 

contributions. The authors and editors thank them for their interest and 

comments regarding this agroterrorism project. 

Don Coates, DVM, is a retired US Air Force Colonel. Dr. Coates received 

his DVM from the Colorado State University, College of Veterinary 

Medicine and Biomedical Sciences. 

Kevin Dennison, DVM, is the Director Colorado State Animal Response 

Team (SART), Colorado Veterinary Medical Foundation, Denver, 

Colorado. Dr. Dennison received his DVM from Colorado State 

University. 
Workshop Attendees

112 

Hank Gardner, PhD, is the Associate Vice President for Research, and 

Professor, Environmental and Radiological Health Sciences, Colorado 

State University. Dr. Gardner’s academic credentials include an MS in 

Public Health from Tulane University, and a Doctor of Public Health in 

environmental health from the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health. 

Dan Harpster, DVM, is the Area Emergency Coordinator for Ohio, 

Michigan, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Dr. Harpster received his 

DVM from The Ohio State University College of Veterinary Medicine. 

Marc Johnson, PhD, is the Vice Provost for Agriculture and Outreach, 

and the Dean of the College of Agricultural Sciences at Colorado State 

University. Dr. Johnson earned his MS degree and master’s of technology 

and international development in economics from North Carolina State 

University, and his doctorate in agricultural economics from Michigan 

State University. 

Roger Krogwold, DVM, MS, MPH, DACVPM, is the Ohio and West 

Virginia Area Epidemiologist for USDA, APHIS, Veterinary Services. Dr. 

Krogwold received his DVM from the University of Minnesota, his MS 

from The Ohio State University, and his MPH from the University of 

Oklahoma. He is the ACVPM representative to the AVMA's American 

Board of Veterinary Specialties. 

Michael Logan, DVM, MPH, DACVPM, is the Area Epidemiologist for 

the USDA, APHIS, Veterinary Services, in Flowood, MS. Dr. Logan 

received his DVM from the University of Missouri and his MPH from 

Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine. 

Krista Martin, DVM, MPH, is an Area Epidemiology Officer for the 

USDA, APHIS, Veterinary Services. Dr. Martin received her MPH from 

the University of Washington, and DVM from the University of 

Wisconsin. 
Workshop Attendees

113 

Michael Martin, DVM, MPH, is the USDA, APHIS, Veterinary Services 

Area Epidemiologist for South Carolina and a technical consultant to the 

National Animal Health Laboratory Network for HL7 messaging and 

terminology standardization. Dr. Martin received his DVM from Missouri 

and his MPH from Harvard. 

Lance Perryman, DVM, PhD, is the Dean of the College of Veterinary 

Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, Colorado State University, Fort 

Collins, CO. Dr. Perryman received his DVM and PhD from Washington 

State University and his MS from The Ohio State University. 

Venaye Reece, DVM, is the Area Emergency Coordinator for South 

Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi for the USDA, APHIS, 

Veterinary Services. Dr. Reece received her veterinary degree from 

University of Georgia, College of Veterinary Medicine. 

Ian Stewart, MS, DVM, is the Colorado Area Epidemiologist for the 

USDA, APHIS, Veterinary Services. Dr Stewart received his BS degree in 

Microbiology, his MS degree in Microbiology and Immunology, and his 

DVM degree from Colorado State University. 

Sherrilyn Wainwright, DVM, MPH, is the Senior Staff Epidemiologist 

and co-lead for the Emergency Management Response System (EMRS) at 

the Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health, USDA, APHIS, in Fort 

Collins, CO. She received her MPH at Johns Hopkins School of 

Hygiene and Public Health, Baltimore, MD, and her DVM from Texas 

A&M University. 

Jim Williams, DVM, is the Nebraska and Colorado Area Emergency 

Coordinator, USDA, APHIS, Veterinary Services. Dr. Williams received 

his DVM degree from Colorado State University.