inss.ndu.edu SF No. 295 1 

The strategic import of U.S.-Cuba relations was underscored by President Barack Obama’s historic visit to Cuba from March 20–22, 2016, and his comment that he had come to Cuba “to bury the last remnant 

of the Cold War in the Americas.” Geography also reinforces the strategic importance of both countries to one another. Cuba sits astride the intersection 

of the three large bodies of water dominating the approaches to the southern 

United States. The large island nation is in a position to block, complicate, or 

facilitate U.S. border control efforts in many ways. Partnering with Cuba also 

might allow the United States to benefit from Cuba’s notable record of using 

soft power effectively in the Western Hemisphere and beyond.

But the reasons that Cuba needs good relations with its powerful and technologically advanced neighbor are even more evident. Besides its attractiveness 

as a trade partner, the United States has financial, military, logistical, medical 

research, and development capabilities; permanent physical presence; and strategic reach well beyond those of any other nation or even group of nations. Good 

relations with the United States would free up Cuban resources for economic 

development that have long been devoted to security preparedness.

The natural and perhaps mandatory place to broaden U.S.-Cuba rapprochement is to build on small military-to-military cooperation arrangements already 

in place. The Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, 

or FAR) of Cuba are the central institution of the state and far more capable 

and prestigious than Cuba’s Communist Party. The FAR are loyal, proud of their 

performance in the survival of the revolution, and reform-minded, believing that 

their own flexibility and penchant for reform have played a pivotal role in that 

survival. Its senior ranks are men personally chosen by Raúl Castro over several 

decades who share their leader’s sense of urgency about the need for reform. They 

Reflections on U.S.-Cuba 

Military-to-Military Contacts

by Hal Klepak

STRATEGIC FORUM

National Defense University

About the Author

Dr. Hal Klepak is Professor Emeritus 

of History and Strategy at the Royal 

Military College of Canada. He is an 

Advisor on Inter-American Security 

Issues. He is the author of Cuba’s 

Military 1990–2005: Revolutionary 

Soldiers During Counter-Revolutionary 

Times (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 

Key Points

◆ President Barack Obama’s visit to 

Cuba in March 2016 opened up the 

possibility of strategic benefits for 

both nations. Well after over 50 

years of hostility, however, it will 

not be easy to keep this nascent 

relationship on track.

◆ Avoiding missteps requires a deep 

knowledge of Cuba and particularly 

its Revolutionary Armed Forces 

(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, 

or FAR). The FAR are a complex and 

powerful institution that enjoys 

great public respect—more so than 

Cuba’s Communist Party—and 

remain central to the functioning of the Cuban economy and 

state. Broadening rapprochement 

without the support of the FAR is 

inconceivable.

◆ To build on the historic opening 

in diplomatic relations, both sides 

need a better appreciation of the 

other’s institutional norms and 

some clear “rules of the road” to 

guide the relationship.

◆ This paper offers insights concerning the FAR. It argues that it will be 

important to expand cooperation 

in the right areas and that it will be 

important to start small, go slow, 

build trust, consult early and often, 

let Cuba take the lead, and avoid 

imposing or reflecting a U.S.-centric 

view of civil-military relations.

July 2016

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH
2 SF No. 295 inss.ndu.edu

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, available at <www.cia.gov>.
inss.ndu.edu SF No. 295 3 

are nationalists first and foremost, but their loyalty to the 

revolutionary process is not in doubt. Thus they are open 

to reform, including more cooperation with the United 

States, but not at the risk of compromising or abandoning 

their revolutionary ethos or what they view as the impressive achievements of the revolution.

Given that the FAR’s role in Cuba’s future will be 

pivotal, understanding and knowing how to interact with 

them to the mutual advantage of both countries is a critical strategic requirement for U.S. forces in the Western 

Hemisphere. However, more than half a century of hostility and mutual distrust will make it difficult to keep 

U.S.-Cuba military relations on track and moving forward. Military-to-military cooperation cannot greatly 

exceed general progress on bilateral relations, but it could 

pave the way for better relations if managed well. In the 

case of Cuba, that requires a deep appreciation for the 

FAR’s institutional ethos, which is rooted in the FAR’s 

historical experience.

Cuban Military Tradition

Cuban history is, in the main, a military history. 

Strategic considerations have dominated the island’s 

past as they do its present. Cuba’s strategic location 

astride trade routes and its magnificent harbor in Havana made it an ideal base for expansion into the Americas. For nearly four centuries Cuba served as the linchpin of Spain’s imperial defense system in the Western 

Hemisphere, governed by military officials often down 

to the level of mayors. Spain put down a massive insurrection during Cuba’s first war for independence, 

the Ten Years’ War (1868–1878). Another major rebellion broke out in 1895 with a second Ejército Libertador

(Liberation Army) fighting the Spanish with considerable success until 1898, when the United States intervened and brought about a quick victory against the 

decrepit Spanish empire.

Washington heavily influenced Cuban political, 

economic, and, especially, military life between 1898 

and 1902, when Cuba’s independence was formally proclaimed and U.S. forces left (except for those stationed 

at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base) until 1959, when two 

columns of Fidel Castro’s Ejército Rebelde (Rebel Army) 

took Havana and overthrew the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista. Within less than a decade Cuban military 

uniforms, rank structures, saluting, equipment, logistics, 

weapons, vehicles, and tactical and strategic doctrine 

based on the U.S. model were replaced with the Soviet 

one. Cuban military intelligence borrowed techniques 

used by East Germany, but otherwise the influence of 

the Soviet Union dominated.

During the 2-year war in the Sierra Maestra and 

other parts of the country, Fidel molded a revolutionary 

army. A central part of the organization’s ethos was the 

belief that the FAR were the direct inheritor of the tradition of the mambi, the soldiers of the two 19th-century 

uprisings against Spain, and that the goal of total independence had been thwarted by the U.S. intervention. 

From recruit to comandante, the entire institution was 

imbued with the idea that its mission was to complete 

and secure national independence.

Following his victory, Fidel initially planned on a 

force of about 16,000 men. However, it soon became 

apparent that this figure was unrealistic. The Agrarian 

Reform, already in place in the early spring of 1959, 

was rejected by the great landowners of the country, a 

group that included many U.S. citizens. Rental and utility reforms also struck at the interests of the wealthy 

as well as U.S. companies and investors. The reaction 

was swift. A tit-for-tat series of moves by the U.S. and 

Cuban governments added an international dimension 

to the new government’s revolutionary struggle. By the 

end of September 1959, the new armed services were 

given that the FAR’s role in Cuba’s 

future will be pivotal, understanding 

and knowing how to interact 

with them is a critical strategic 

requirement
4 SF No. 295 inss.ndu.edu

restructured, and Castro’s brother, Raúl, was appointed 

minister over them.

The Ejército Rebelde was given a large role in the economy—including management of the Agrarian Reform—

to compensate for the flight of most of the bourgeoisie and 

bureaucracy of the old regime. Now the renamed FAR 

were asked to do even more to anchor the revolution and 

its rapidly leftward reforms, while also defending it from 

external aggression and internal subversion. Even so, Fidel 

and Raúl did not then consider a large professional army; 

they could not afford such a military model, and it did not 

fit well with the Cuban military’s ethos. Instead, they organized a massive reserve army to counter growing dissatisfaction at home and the increasingly menacing posture 

of the United States. By early 1961, diplomatic relations 

between the two countries were severed.

Cuba reacted to these challenges with the largest 

program of reserve formation in the history of Latin 

America. The FAR quickly grew to over 100,000 men 

and the reserves to more than double that figure. Conscription was established, eventually for 3 years of compulsory service for male youth, and membership of reserve and militia organizations was highly encouraged, 

including for young women. The strategy, called Guerra 

del Todo del Pueblo (War of All the People), which persists to this day, was to make attacking Cuba so costly 

that any possible benefits from taking the island would 

pale by comparison. To implement the strategy, Castro 

needed material, financial, and technical assistance. The 

first Warsaw Pact and Chinese weapons began arriving 

to arm the new Cuban forces in late 1960. Soon after, 

Cuban officers and senior noncommissioned officers 

(NCOs) were sent to communist countries to learn how 

to use them. At the same time, a “vigilance system” was 

set up to report on domestic dissent, and it soon proved 

its utility.

The FAR’s Reputation Grows

In 1961, a U.S. plan to unseat the Castro government was to be spearheaded by an invasion force of 

anti-Castro Cubans who were paid, armed, trained, and 

organized by the U.S. Government. The hope was that 

the force would seize a town and airport, declare itself 

the new Cuban government, and demonstrate enough 

legitimacy to justify a U.S. intervention to overturn 

Castro’s revolution. The dramatic failure of the 1961 

Bay of Pigs invasion advanced the revolution and allowed the fledgling government to proclaim “Imperialism’s First Defeat in the Americas.” The FAR’s prestige 

soared, and particularly their militia, which had done 

well in the early hours of the fighting. The struggle 

against “banditry” (actually, resistance to the revolution) 

took longer. Opposition groups were not eliminated by 

militia operations until 1965, but once this success was 

secured it added to the FAR’s reputation.

Along with Soviet assistance came the professionalization of the FAR along entirely Soviet lines. By the 

mid-1970s the institution appeared to be modeled after the Soviet system. Yet strong Cuban cultural norms 

ensured that the FAR remained intrinsically Cuban in 

their ethos. In addition, Havana was not always following Moscow’s lead in foreign and defense policy. Cuba 

often deviated from Moscow’s preferences during its 

“export of the revolution” phase when it set out to unseat many Latin American governments friendly to the 

United States and cooperating in plans to end the revolution. This phase of Cuban foreign policy ended with 

the death of Ernesto “Che” Guevara in 1967, but Cuba 

continued to support revolutionary movements abroad. 

From the Middle East to Africa to southern South 

America, the Castro government offered FAR training 

and low-level support to fellow revolutionaries, including the dispatch of full-fledged Cuban expeditionary 

forces to Angola and the Horn of Africa. Alongside the 

FAR went Cuban doctors, nurses, teachers, and sports 

military-to-military cooperation 

cannot greatly exceed general 

progress on bilateral relations
inss.ndu.edu SF No. 295 5 

instructors, and they were popular with the rebel movements they aided and the governments the FAR sometimes formed.

The Cuban public did not attribute the costs or occasional failure of overseas endeavors to the FAR. Instead, the FAR’s prestige only seemed to grow along 

with the force itself, which increased to nearly 300,000 

regulars and more than 800,000 reservists in the 1970s. 

The economic costs of overseas expeditions were heavy, 

but Cuba earned kudos from and influence within 

many developing countries and international forums. 

The FAR were eventually credited with a central role 

in the defeat of Apartheid in South Africa by Nelson 

Mandela himself—and in a venue as striking as the 

steps of the White House.1

 Cuba, thanks in large part 

to the FAR, was “punching above its weight” in international contests.

Summer 1990: The Special Period

Cuba received a “body blow” in the summer of 

1990 following the collapse of the Soviet system. With 

Soviet support gone, Fidel announced the arrival of the 

“Special Period in Time of Peace,” which included the 

greatest austerity the country had known since independence. In fact, the belt-tightening was much more 

severe than the effects caused by the U.S. Great Depression of the 1930s. The Cuban economy went into 

a tailspin. The economic deprivation in Cuba was not 

accompanied by widespread violence, but there were 

public protests accompanied by rioting on at least three 

occasions in the early to mid-1990s, the last of these 

being the 1994 protests known as the Habanazo.

Unrest was not contained by armed force. The conviction that the army does not fire on the people (el ejército no tira contra el pueblo) is so anchored in the moral 

code and self-image of the FAR that using it then to 

suppress unrest was inconceivable. That left only economic options. Fidel’s slogan of valen tanto los frijoles 

como los cañones (beans are as valuable as cannons) was 

quickly replaced by Raúl’s reinforced message: valen más 

los frijoles que los cañones (beans are worth more than cannons). In other words, the FAR would have to further 

expand their role in the Cuban economy.

The FAR shouldered more than their share of the 

austerity measures. Their budget fell by almost 60 percent from nearly $1.15 billion in 1990 to $496.7 million 6 years later. This amounted to a virtual budgetary 

freefall given that the value of the peso went through the 

floor over the same period of time. FAR end-strength 

fell from nearly 300,000 to around 60,000 during the 

same period. Military hospitals took in 60 percent of 

their patients from the civilian sector, thousands of softskinned vehicles ranging from jeeps to tank transporters 

were transferred for civilian use, and the military’s major 

effort turned from training to feeding itself and helping 

to feed the population at large.

Training virtually stopped, especially unit training. Postings abroad with foreign armed forces dried 

up. Technical, tactical, intelligence, joint operations, 

and even senior command courses in Russia and other 

former Warsaw Pact nations ended. Defense attaché 

positions abroad, vital for Cuba to retain its impressive 

intelligence-gathering system, were reduced to nine. 

Widespread cannibalization of equipment and weapon 

systems was used to keep a small amount of the most 

important stocks functioning. Fuel for training and operations fell by at least 70 percent—even for immediate 

reaction divisions—and by 90 percent for some others.

Yet amid this wholesale decline in resources, the 

FAR were asked to do more, not less. They took on a 

central role in agricultural production through the use 

of their manpower and training areas to grow crops and 

provided trained managers for much of the rest of the 

island’s economy. The FAR’s role was especially pronounced in fields that earned vital foreign currency such 

amid this wholesale decline in 

resources, the FAR were asked to do 

more, not less
6 SF No. 295 inss.ndu.edu

as mining, tourism, biomedicine, and tobacco exports. 

The FAR were also asked to increase security activities 

such as anti–illegal immigration and anti-drugs operations, which would be appreciated by the United States, 

and to further improve their ability to respond to national disasters.

Tens of thousands of officers and other personnel 

were released from the services, and bottlenecks for promotion became the norm. The time for conscripted service fell from 3 years to 2, and even then many young men 

who previously would have seen considerable military 

training to prepare them for popular resistance received 

little or none. The revolutionary ethos lived on, but it 

steadily frayed under the reality the FAR were experiencing. At a time when other militaries were incorporating 

advanced information-age technologies to enable new 

capabilities and operations, the FAR and their personnel 

with combat experience were aging and being starved of 

resources. Cuban military readiness plummeted.

Surprisingly to most observers, the FAR responded to these challenges with good morale and a sense of 

pride. The institution believes that its devotion and flexibility allowed the revolution to survive. While the FAR 

are significantly less impressive than they were before 

1990, they have remained a force capable of substantial defensive operations. In 2006, for instance, the FAR 

demonstrated their capacity to mobilize a major part of 

national manpower for defense when Fidel fell ill.

The FAR Today2

In addition to Cuba’s three military services oriented 

toward land, sea, and air, the FAR have a large service 

dedicated to agricultural production: the Youth Labor 

Army (Ejército Juvenil de Trabajo, or EJT). It numbers 

up to 100,000 conscripts—with minimal military training—whose task is solely to produce food for the FAR 

and the general population. The FAR also maintain a 

rather bewildering number of reserve force organizations, 

ranging from the relatively well-organized pre-1980 militia services to the truly massive (at least on paper): the 

Territorial Troops Militia (Milicias de Tropas Territoriales) and the Defense and Production Brigades (Brigadas 

de Defensa y Producción). In an emergency, the Defense 

and Production Brigades, which are trade union or workplace-based bodies, play a role in local defense or internal 

order. In addition, since 1960 there has been a network of 

Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Comités 

de Defensa de la Revolución) working with state security 

and police to keep an eye out for counter-revolutionary 

activities. However, the FAR have distanced themselves 

from formal internal security duties even as the police and 

Ministry of the Interior forces have been reinforced.

The country is divided into three major zones, each 

of which has its own army, attached air elements, and 

naval forces. These are the Western, Central, and Eastern 

armies. Each army is responsible for defense preparation 

in several provinces. In keeping with the Soviet system, 

the forces are divided into A, B, and C divisions reflecting readiness levels. The majority of units are no longer 

frontline formations (A) but merely cadres around which 

mobilization can take place (C).

In some respects, the army has suffered least from 

austerity because it was less dependent on high-tech 

weapons and equipment and the training courses that 

supported them. Cannibalization of equipment allows it 

to keep more platforms running than the other services, 

but it is no longer a heavily armored strike force. Instead 

it concentrates on countering beach, parachute, and helicopter landing threats. The army, and especially the reserve elements, has a major role in counternarcotics. It 

often conducts major labor-intensive sweeps of coastlines 

and islands when a bombardeo (bombardment—dropping drugs from aircraft or boats fearful of interception) 

the armed forces are seen as the 

most effective institution in the 

country and the one to which the 

state always turns when it must 

prevail
inss.ndu.edu SF No. 295 7 

takes place near Cuban territory. Even though the army 

has most of the manpower, installations, popular roles 

such as natural disaster preparation, and management of 

much of the economy, the fierce interservice rivalry often 

seen elsewhere is almost nonexistent in Cuba.

The navy has returned to its traditional coastal service status. For the time being it concentrates on anti–illegal immigration and anti-drug operations to build comity with the United States. One or two larger ships are 

still in service for mine-laying and limited transport roles, 

but the navy is now essentially a patrol boat force closely 

connected with support of the Frontier Guard Troops 

(Tropas Guardafronteras) of the Ministry of the Interior 

that work closely with the U.S. Coast Guard, the Royal 

Bahamas Defence Force, and other Caribbean security 

services on countering drug and immigrant trafficking.

Like its sister services, the air force was greatly 

reduced from its status in the 1970s when it operated 

many first-line reconnaissance, light bombardment, and 

fighter ground-attack aircraft. Replacement purchases 

are unaffordable and even spare parts are a luxury. The 

air force still operates a small number of vintage 1980s 

fighters, mostly in support of the other services in the 

counter-trafficking roles already mentioned. It monitors 

the few drug-carrying aircraft foolish enough to enter 

Cuban airspace and advises either U.S. officials through 

the British (who have a large anti-drugs training program with Cuba) or other informal channels regarding 

the aircraft’s location and likely heading north.

Despite its much reduced operational status the 

FAR remain the central institution of the state and the 

nation. They outstrip the party in so many ways that it is 

difficult to imagine a future where the FAR’s role would 

not be pivotal. The FAR are widely distributed throughout the country, disciplined, accustomed to hierarchy, 

prestigious, tasked with the state’s most popular activities, and have access to hard currency through their own 

efforts and position in the economy. Unlike the party, 

which has a reputation for inefficiency as well as an ineffective political, economic, and social philosophy, the 

FAR does not carry the stigma of being outdated. On the 

contrary, the armed forces are seen as the most effective 

institution in the country and the one to which the state 

always turns when it must prevail. This does not mean 

that the FAR and the party have a contentious relationship; the party remains ubiquitous in Cuban national life. 

Even though membership does not carry the privileges it 

once did, almost all senior military officers remain party 

members. All military units still have a political officer 

to ensure that a local nexus exists between the party and 

the FAR. Constant declarations of loyalty to the party 

still form part of the FAR’s daily institutional discourse.

There is little doubt that the FAR have every intention of outlasting the party, if need be, especially if the 

national transition takes a more dramatic turn. They are 

rich in leadership and management skills, victorious in 

war and counterinsurgency at home, and the principal 

architect of national independence and dignity. More 

importantly, the FAR are recognized as the primary advocate of reform over the last 30 years. The military is, 

in general, forward-looking and flexible in its approach 

to the challenges of the day—exactly the opposite of 

the party. Also in stark contrast to the party, the FAR 

already have a low-profile relationship with the United States and could serve as a bridge between the two 

countries if asked to do so. A final key point, however 

obvious it may seem, is that the armed forces are both 

available and armed.

The most unusual attribute of the FAR is their 

nontraditional role in the government’s highly centralized economy. Yet it is important to understand that 

the institution itself considers its nontraditional roles 

consistent with its revolutionary status. From its earliest days fighting in the Sierras from 1956–1959, the 

army took on tasks as varied as producing weapons and 

the FAR now have a hand in the 

administration of perhaps 60 

percent of the active economy
8 SF No. 295 inss.ndu.edu

equipment, building and even teaching in rural schools, 

working in agriculture to feed the force, and providing 

medical care for both troops and the local population. 

After military victory was secured and nonmilitary crises 

arose, the armed forces were asked to take on nontraditional missions not because they were the most efficient 

instrument but because they were the most loyal. As the 

military professionalized during the 1970s and 1980s, 

the FAR’s nontraditional roles were less common even 

though their role in agricultural production grew after 

the creation of the Youth Labor Army in 1973.

When the Cuban economy stalled in the mid-1980s, 

Raúl, as defense minister, turned to the FAR again to revitalize industries suffering from worker sloppiness and 

absenteeism. A group of officers was sent abroad, especially to Spain and Latin American countries, to learn 

modern business management practices. These officers 

received jobs of great importance in the economy to improve the performance of key industries. Then, when the 

economy suffered severely from the dissolution of the 

Soviet Union in the 1990s, the FAR were asked to further expand their role in managing the economy because 

they were perceived as both loyal and competent. In the 

summer of 1990, the FAR’s roles were redefined and persist to this day as follows:

◆ continue with the defense of the country and the 

revolution, and deter any attack coming from abroad

◆ continue to support the Ministry of the Interior 

and National Revolutionary Police Force in defeating 

subversion at home

◆ engage further in security activities such as anti–illegal immigration and anti-drugs, which may be looked 

on favorably by the United States

◆ continue to provide the organization, manpower, 

and structures for effective natural disaster preparation 

and relief

◆ feed themselves and assist in feeding the population

◆ assist where appropriate in the management of key 

sectors of the economy.

FAR officers were asked to apply modern management methods in the economy’s more dynamic sectors 

such as tourism, and to some extent biomedical, mining, and cigar manufacturing. The FAR’s economic roles 

became so important that all majors who wished to be 

promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel were asked to 

learn business and agricultural management techniques. 

This universal requirement reflects not only the invaluable need for properly prepared business managers but 

also the desire to avoid splitting the officer corps into two 

classes: those with economic experience and those with 

more traditional military career paths. However, over 

time a group of officers with long periods away from traditional military duties has developed, and this is a worry 

to senior FAR leaders because of perceptions of unfair 

advantage to those with access to economic assets.

In summary, the FAR now have a hand in the administration of perhaps 60 percent of the active economy, especially the foreign currency–earning sectors. Given their prestige, large role in the economy, monopoly 

on the use of armed force, and administration of vast 

swaths of Cuban national life, it would be easy to argue 

that Cuba is a military dictatorship. But that would be 

a mistake. The unique Cuban military experience defies 

common terminology. Military industry, military control, and similar expressions do not adequately convey 

the level of military involvement in Cuba. For example, 

analysts have applied the same term military industry to 

everything from the fundamentally military enterprises 

of the Unión de Industrias Militares, which use military 

personnel to produce equipment and weapons, to businesses where there is only one serving or retired officer 

at the head of the enterprise or in a key position. Lumping all such businesses together is misleading and exaggerates the FAR’s already impressive presence throughout the economy.

There is another point regarding business profits. 

There is no audit system for the armed forces external 

to the institution itself. The amount and use of business profits remain entirely unknown outside the most 

senior ranks of the military. This lack of transparency 
inss.ndu.edu SF No. 295 9 

inevitably raises questions about misuse of funds. In 

general, given the prestige of the institution, there is 

little public distrust on this score. But no one knows 

how profits are used. The amount of resources currently 

spent on national infrastructural repair, investment in 

tourism, and general recovery suggests business profits 

are, in a general sense, being spent properly, but there is 

no way of knowing for sure.

Challenges

The Cuban armed forces face many challenges, 

many of which, such as recapitalization, depend on 

Cuba’s economic progress. There are several particularly 

noteworthy issues, however, confronting the FAR that 

they could address more directly with leadership and 

management initiatives. 

Officer Corps Division. Potentially the most divisive 

impact of Cuba’s heightened austerity is the division of 

the officer corps into those with traditional military leadership duties, such as unit command and control, training, and similar activities, and those involved in the direct 

management of business enterprises. The longstanding 

intention of FAR leaders was that no such divisions 

should be allowed to surface. Raúl directed that a large 

pool of potential business managers be developed in part 

so that those assigned such duties would not have to stay 

away from traditional military matters for excessive periods. The reality is that it has not proved easy to separate 

effective managers from their important jobs just so their 

military careers can progress in a fairly normal pattern. 

Instead, a significant number of officers have remained 

for several, or even many, years involved with industrial 

and agricultural pursuits far removed from traditional 

military activities. Officers in these attractive business 

posts enjoy privileges not available to their colleagues 

serving in the field. Resentment is muted because most 

officers in line positions still believe that the country is 

faced with a national crisis that demands the best officers serve in high priority areas that will assist economic 

recovery. However, the situation remains a concern, and 

FAR leaders have sought means to address it.

Corruption. Such a large role in the economy provides opportunities for corruption since officers are dealing with large amounts of money in a society suffering 

from long-term scarcity. To suggest that there is no corruption under these circumstances would be to ignore the 

findings of innumerable studies of similar circumstances 

elsewhere around the world. The FAR’s response to date 

has primarily relied on education—a range of courses, 

lectures, and moral admonishments calling for resistance 

to such temptations. However, the FAR have also used 

severe means of deterrence by jailing, publicly dismissing, and otherwise castigating those found guilty of corruption. Even so, there have been several major cases of 

senior officer corruption, and a special branch has been 

set up within the FAR counter-intelligence apparatus 

to search out corruption in the higher ranks, especially 

among those with international business connections. 

Lower rank corruption is also a concern. The FAR’s place 

in the economy places many junior and senior NCOs in 

positions where the temptations of corruption are many 

and constant. The “it fell off the back of a truck” phenomenon, well known in the logistics systems of many 

countries’ armies, is also prevalent in the FAR and their 

many business enterprises.

Race. The traditional sources for most of the FAR’s 

membership are blacks, racially mixed people, and lower-class whites. Until recently, blacks and racially mixed 

people often avoided migrating to the United States because its reputation for the treatment of those groups, 

perceived rightly or wrongly, was poor. Thus these social 

groups rarely receive the remittances from abroad and 

cannot afford the startup capital for small businesses that 

have benefited from recent economic reforms. Consequently, the lower-class groups that most heartily support 

the revolution and supply such a large percentage of its 

military and police personnel are least able to capitalize 

on recent economic liberalization. For serving personnel the situation is particularly bleak; existing regulations 

do not allow them to accept remittances even if they are 

available from family or friends abroad. The FAR are trying to compensate these personnel with new, albeit small, 
10 SF No. 295 inss.ndu.edu

perks including improved barracks, better NCO housing, 

repairs to recreational facilities, better leave conditions, 

slightly improved salaries, and other inventive ways of 

rewarding loyalty. But the situation bears watching.

Age. The FAR have long been concerned about the 

country’s demographics, worrying that Cuba’s aging population was not producing sufficient recruits for future 

forces. Yet the current small size of the regular FAR forces, 

estimated at around 50,000,3

 means that it does not need 

many new recruits each year except for the agricultural labor force. Retention is stated to be quite good as well, with 

three guaranteed meals a day, reasonable accommodation, 

uniforms, improved conditions of service, a prestigious 

job, and better pay. Demographic trends affect the reserves 

more directly. As the population ages, including current 

active-duty commanders with combat experience, the “nation in arms” concept is eroding.

Suggested Areas for Greater 

Cooperation

There is already a history of low-profile but effective bilateral military cooperation between Cuba and the 

United States. Overflight issues related to disaster relief 

in the Caribbean have obliged the two countries to work 

together many times. The operations of the Guantánamo 

Naval Base also require cooperation on a wide range of 

issues, including health cooperation, fire brigade exercises, and so forth. For many years the U.S. base commander has had immediate access to his Cuban counterpart in 

the Frontier Guard Troops. There are scheduled monthly 

meetings between them, and either commander can ask 

for a special meeting at any time. When the base needed 

more Cuban airspace for modern aircraft to land safely, 

the requisite permissions were quickly given by the Cuban authorities. More recently the two countries worked 

together smoothly to provide medical assistance to Haiti. 

Some limited cooperation in natural disasters forecasting also has apparently taken place. Better known is the 

wide-ranging anti–illegal immigration collaboration between Cuba’s Ministry of the Interior (and indirectly the 

Cuban navy) and the U.S. Coast Guard. There is a U.S. 

Coast Guard lieutenant commander posted to the U.S. 

Embassy in Havana to facilitate cooperation, which is 

direct, daily, and ongoing.

Expanding on the current low-level, low-key foundation of cooperation is easy to imagine, but it does require some careful choices about fruitful areas for contact 

and also some attention to how the relationship is developed. Admittedly, Washington and Havana would have 

to overcome past adversarial patterns with major political 

commitments by both governments, but the following 

areas of potential collaboration should be considered.

Military Medical Health. Cooperation on military 

medical and health interventions would allow both sides 

to partner, contribute, and establish trust during popular and noncontroversial activities. Military medical collaboration during disaster relief operations makes the 

most sense, but because such operations are time sensitive and require some existing understanding of interoperability requirements, it also makes sense to partner in 

non-emergency humanitarian health operations. Given 

the strong link between health issues and international 

security,4

 the gains from such engagement would also 

have a clear security dimension for both Cuba and the 

United States. Extending the impact of Cuban doctors 

and nurses willing to do good work abroad with the financial resources and logistical reach of U.S. forces could 

generate much goodwill and mutual respect.

Military History. Perhaps counterintuitively, exchanging guest speakers in military educational institutions could pay dividends as it would inform the U.S. 

military, whose little knowledge of Cuba and its military stems from confrontations during the Cold War. 

Similarly, Cuban military personnel have long seen the 

there is already a history of lowprofile but effective bilateral 

military cooperation between Cuba 

and the United States
inss.ndu.edu SF No. 295 11 

United States as the behemoth that thwarted true independence in 1898. Yet Cuba and the United States 

share many more years of cooperation than of rancor. 

Cuban military historians are often officers in FAR uniform, and as such are in a position to expand the public’s 

general understanding of U.S.-Cuba relations. Military 

history is an important topic in both U.S. and Cuban 

military establishments. Students could be introduced to 

the two countries’ longer history of collaboration. They 

would discover that troops from the Thirteen American 

Colonies accompanied the British forces that took Havana in 1762, an event considered a positive development 

by Cubans to this day. Troops and ships from Cuba assisted the American Colonies to break away from Great 

Britain two decades later when they cooperated with 

the Congressional Army and Navy during campaigns in 

Louisiana, Florida, and Georgia, as well as in the seizure 

of the Bahamas from the British. Although international 

law obliged the United States to intercept expeditions 

organized on U.S. soil aimed at bringing arms and men 

to liberate Cuba from Spain during the 19th-century uprisings, U.S. public opinion was strongly pro-Cuban and 

assisted greatly in bringing the United States into the 

war on the side of the insurgents. While an unequal relationship evolved from that intervention, the connection 

was nonetheless a close one and brought Cuba into both 

world wars on the side of the United States.5

Peacekeeping. Another area for engagement that 

might seem unlikely at first is international peacekeeping. Neither the United States nor Cuba makes this type 

of military operation a priority. In the past, Cuban offers 

to join peacekeeping operations with the United Nations (UN) were rare since Cuban involvement would 

mean the United States would not support the operation. The United States often participates in UN peacekeeping with logistics support but typically does not like 

its forces saddled with such commitments. However, if 

the two countries could agree on a peacekeeping mission 

where both have larger humanitarian than geopolitical 

concerns, their partnership would make a good deal of 

sense. U.S. financial and logistical support could enable 

Cuba, which is respected in many developing countries, 

to contribute much needed discipline and propriety to 

UN peacekeeping efforts, whose reputation has been tarnished in recent decades.6

Natural Disasters. Cuba’s reputation is impressive when it comes to natural disaster preparedness and 

relief. The FAR are central to this effort and have an 

accumulated experience second to none in this field.7

There has been some increased cooperation between the 

two countries’ systems of weather watching and surely 

more could be done given the priority Cuba assigns the 

matter because of its vulnerable position in the path 

of so much tempestuous weather. The combination of 

Cuban knowledge and experience with U.S. resources 

could provide for mutually beneficial collaboration. For 

example, natural disasters, particularly hurricanes, have 

been sharply felt in the United States in recent years, 

and there is much that could be learned at the state level 

in terms of how best to use the National Guard and 

other military resources during such emergencies.

Illegal Immigration. One of the few areas where 

formal contact currently is permitted and encouraged is 

interdiction of illegal immigration. The formal accords 

between Washington and Havana, arrived at in the context of the balseros (rafters) crisis in the mid-1990s,8

 are 

now two-decades old and have shown that the two sides 

work well together. The mutual cooperation has demonstrated the seriousness, professionalism, efficiency, and 

energy of both nations’ armed forces and generated trust 

and goodwill. It would not be difficult to find ways to 

make this already successful area of cooperation more efficient and more widespread.

Drugs. The international illegal narcotics trade is of 

great concern to both nations, especially the security forces 

Cuba’s reputation is impressive 

when it comes to natural disaster 

preparedness and relief
12 SF No. 295 inss.ndu.edu

of both countries. The United States and most of the hemisphere have been plagued by citizen drug abuse. In contrast, Cuba has been spared this problem to a great degree 

due to a combination of educational programs, good health 

treatment in the face of the scourge, a highly effective deterrence approach to drug-trafficking trade in such items, 

and a major deployment of security and defense resources 

to fight against drugs. The Ministry of the Interior and the 

FAR, and the Cuban government more generally, are anxious to have a formal counternarcotics cooperation agreement with the United States to mirror the positive results 

from cooperation on illegal immigration.9

Terrorism. Cuba and the United States differ substantially in their preferred approaches to terrorism. Cuba 

emphasizes addressing root causes while the United States 

argues for immediate military and diplomatic efforts directed against the perpetrators of these crimes. Despite 

differences over means, both Washington and Havana 

agree on the need to end terrorism and have little use for 

those who promote it. Fidel distanced himself early on 

from the use of terrorism for political aims, arguing that 

such indiscriminate acts hurt the very people the movement was aiming to assist and only brought opprobrium 

to the movements that used them. Counterterrorism is yet 

another area where combining Cuban legitimacy in the 

developing world with U.S. resources could produce some 

intriguing options for collaboration.

Mexico. The Mexican Armed Forces share with the 

FAR a revolutionary tradition that, if not so visible in 

some day-to-day matters, still reflects the institution’s 

self-image in major ways. Cubans and Mexicans do not 

have a problematic history to contend with and, in fact, 

often have worked together on many security matters 

with great ease. In addition, U.S.-Mexico military relations have quietly intensified in recent years. So for areas 

of particular sensitivity, these three countries, which together dominate the Gulf of Mexico, could explore cooperation together in ways that might be less politically 

charged than a bilateral context. The Cubans could note 

that the Mexicans thought trilateral cooperation worthwhile, and vice versa, and the United States could state 

both the Cubans and Mexicans wanted it, so it made 

sense. Politically, trilateral engagement might be easier 

to sell to all elements of public opinion than a series of 

bilateral agreements. This proved the case for Mexican 

participation in the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force–

South counterdrug operations. The participation of other 

Latin American countries made it easier for Mexican 

military leaders to argue that the cooperation was in 

Mexico’s best interests rather than a “command performance” for the United States.

Hemispheric Defense Institutions. It will be some 

time before Cuba is ready to take a full part in hemispheric defense institutions, and those bodies might have 

to change significantly before Havana finds membership in them of great interest. However, it is possible to 

imagine multilateral training in several areas of possible 

collaboration. Cuba and the United States could offer 

training to some regional forces in roles as diverse as controlling illegal migration, interdicting drug shipments, 

preparing for natural disasters and their relief, search and 

rescue, medical health, and other fields.

Search and Rescue. The bulk of the FAR’s activity 

in the field of search and rescue is undertaken under 

the special circumstances of illegal migration, for which 

there is already a good record of working together over 

many years. Even though formal bilateral relations outside the scope of illegal immigration have not moved 

forward, it easily could. Given the heavy commercial and 

private boat and aircraft traffic across the Gulf of Mexico 

and Caribbean, search and rescue operations is a natural 

area for greater engagement.

Some Suggested “Rules of the 

Game”

There are some well-established principles for military-to-military contact, especially between countries 

Washington and Havana agree on 

the need to end terrorism
inss.ndu.edu SF No. 295 13 

with a history of enmity. Start slow, demonstrate respect, 

and build trust all come to mind. In the case of U.S.-Cuba 

military relations, these general rules should be enshrined 

as foundational. Most militaries tend to teach what they 

know and have a difficult time adapting their approaches 

to foreign circumstances. U.S. security programs often go 

awry as a result, as proved true in Afghanistan and Iraq, for 

example.10 Given the history and ethos of the FAR, taking a similar egocentric nationalistic approach to budding 

U.S.-Cuba military-to-military contact would be disastrous. Thus the rules of the game for U.S. officials to keep 

in mind are not unusual, but rather unusually important.

The first rule is the “go slow” principle. Throughout 

the island one hears the remark these days of the vital 

need to “tener la guardia en alto” (keep one’s guard up) in 

the negotiations for the future relationship with the United States. Despite how much Cubans want a better relationship with the United States, they remain suspicious 

after so many decades of hostility. In a sense, the FAR 

are uncertain about improved relations with the United 

States, and thus skittish if not unpredictable.

On the one hand, the armed forces know they can 

work with U.S. counterparts better than party officials, 

whose beliefs are considered anathema by U.S. officials. 

This is another FAR advantage over the party, and 

they are pleased to already have longstanding relationships with the U.S. military that are unthinkable for 

the party. Since rapprochement with the United States 

is widely considered essential for Cuban national recovery, these relations further boost the FAR’s already 

strong position in the state. FAR leaders are realists 

who know the revolution’s achievements, especially 

in public health and education, national dignity and 

independence, and racial and gender equality, are not 

easily guaranteed if the state is bankrupt. They know 

Cuban financial woes preclude the FAR taking part in 

the global military changes stimulated by the information revolution. They realize that only deep economic 

reform and further insertion into the international 

economy could preserve past progress and open future 

opportunities for the Cuban military.

On the other hand, the officer corps is still imprinted 

with its role as guardian of the revolution and continues to 

take devotion to the revolution seriously. The FAR will be 

dubious about U.S. intentions in broadening rapprochement. They carefully consider Washington’s policy pronouncements on Cuba, especially those that state the U.S. 

objective of regime change has not changed during recent 

moves toward closer relations (even while noting the caveat that regime change does not necessarily mean regime 

replacement). The FAR are sensitive to their own reduced 

capabilities. They would not want to showcase these weaknesses to a nation whose official policy is still the overthrow of its political, economic, and social system, even 

though formal diplomatic relations are now in place and a 

more optimistic prognostication of future cross-straits relations is widely embraced. Thus the FAR will not open up 

to foreign (essentially U.S.) “inspection” before they have 

recovered further from the disaster of the “Special Period.” 

They will not want foreign officers lecturing their troops, 

visiting their installations for extended periods, or participating in any uncontrolled arrangements.

The best prediction, therefore, is that the FAR will 

be wary of a U.S. rush to move too far too fast and will 

prefer a slow evolution that permits both U.S. actions 

and words to be carefully assessed. Ironically, any U.S. 

attempt to hasten rapprochement will likely retard it. It 

would be safer and more efficacious to let the Cubans 

set the pace. Once it is clear to the FAR that enhanced 

contact is not a danger to the revolution, they will generally be keen on relations with the U.S. Armed Forces, 

which they admire as well armed and professional. They 

will see advantages from such cooperation for Cuba, for 

moving slowly, taking small but 

cumulative steps, and letting the 

FAR set the pace will be critically 

important
14 SF No. 295 inss.ndu.edu

their forces, and conceivably in the future, for themselves 

personally in such areas as assignments overseas, education and training opportunities, and a chance to work 

with more modern equipment.

Starting small is a corollary to going slow. After 

building confidence in a step-by-step process, it will be 

easier to move on to wider cooperation. The small initial 

steps will demonstrate that it is possible for a small and 

ill-equipped force and the world’s largest, best equipped, 

and most powerful force to cooperate to mutual benefit. 

Small projects should thus be the rule in the early days of 

building expanded military-to-military contact. Moving 

slowly, taking small but cumulative steps, and letting the 

FAR set the pace will be critically important.

A natural consequence of letting the Cubans set the 

pace is to avoid approaching military-to-military contact 

as a fait accompli. Part of what makes U.S. forces so professional is their disciplined approach to working problems, making plans, and moving forward with purposeful effort. However, it will be vital to have the Cubans 

involved from the start with any planning for expanded 

relations. Presenting fully formed proposals as “package 

deals” will simply increase Cuban suspicions.

U.S. officers also must appreciate the entirely different conception of civil-military relations that marks the 

Cuban experience. There will be no point in thinking, saying, or acting as if the Cuban military could make more 

progress if it was more transparent with financial matters and generally less involved in economic and political 

matters. U.S. military personnel will naturally be inclined 

to see the FAR’s performance in nontraditional missions 

as inappropriate and transgressing its own civil-military 

norms. The FAR see their performance in nontraditional 

missions as evidence that their revolutionary ethos, connection with the public, efficiency and effectiveness, flexibility, and reform are secure.

Finally, thinking in terms of what the Cubans must

do is simply the kiss of death when dealing with them. 

Spain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, each in 

its time, attempted to dictate what the Cubans must do. 

It tended not to work well for any of these parties, and 

it certainly will not work well for expanded U.S.-Cuba 

military contact given the FAR’s attributes and historical experiences. U.S. interlocutors should explore possible 

enhanced engagement in a much more circumspect and 

contingent manner.

Conclusion

Cuba and the United States will differ on a range of 

issues for some time. Havana still believes that only a major and profound restructuring of the international order 

can bring about lasting solutions to illegal immigration, 

drug-trafficking, terrorism, climate change, and international insecurity in general. Washington is of the view that 

a functioning free enterprise system, essentially in today’s 

form, will bring about a better world through innovation 

and better standards of living for the largest number of 

people. This deep philosophical difference will not just 

vanish. In addition, a half-century of enmity, vastly different institutional experiences, and leery publics are further 

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, reports, 

briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

research and analysis in the areas of strategic and regional studies and engages in independent and leading-edge 

research and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by 

members of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security affairs from the United States and 

abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 

expressed or implied within are those of the contributors 

and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Defense 

Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. Visit NDU Press online at ndupress.ndu.edu.

Laura J. Junor

Director

Center for Strategic Research

William T. Eliason

Director

NDU Press

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

R.D. Hooker, Jr.

Director for Research

and Strategic Support
inss.ndu.edu SF No. 295 15 

impediments to expanded cooperation. Yet the geographic 

and strategic logic for both Cuba and the United States 

will inevitably incline leaders in both countries to explore 

deeper contact. Moving forward, it will be critically important to start small, go slow, build trust, consult early 

and often, let Cuba take the lead, and avoid imposing or 

reflecting a U.S.-centric view of civil-military relations. If 

this happens, it is altogether possible to imagine the two 

countries building bilateral current security relations to 

their mutual benefit, and sooner rather than later.

Notes 1 Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Ends: Washington and Havana in 

Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 457.

2 More detail is available in Hal Klepak, Cuba’s Military 1990–

2005: Revolutionary Soldiers During Counter-Revolutionary Times (New 

York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 71–73.

3 The Military Balance 2016 (London: International Institute for 

Strategic Studies, 2016), 392; A Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin 

America and Caribbean (Buenos Aires: Red de Seguridad y Defensa de 

América Latina, 2014), 176.

4 “Foreign Policy and Health Security,” World Health Organization, available at <www.who.int/trade/glossary/story030/en/>; Ted 

Kim and Santiago Otero-Ortiz, “Behind the Scenes: Defense Attachés’ 

Contributions to Cuban Diplomatic Engagement in Haiti,” Small Wars 

Journal, May 16, 2016, available at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/

art/behind-the-scenes-defense-attachés’-contribute-to-cuban-diplomatic-engagement-in-haiti>.

5 The two navies cooperated in the sinking of a German U-boat 

at one stage of World War II, a struggle often known in Cuba as the 

Great War against Fascism.

6 Yves Engler, “MINUSTAH’s Filthy Record in Haiti, The 

Guardian, September 11, 2011, available at <www.theguardian.com/

commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/sep/11/haiti-unitednations-minustahcholera>.

7 Interestingly, Cuban weather watchers accurately predicted the 

course of the worst natural disaster ever to hit the United States—

the 1900 hurricane that inundated Galveston, Texas—and offered 

warnings that tragically were ignored. See Al Roker, The Storm of the 

Century: Tragedy, Heroism, Survival, and the Epic True Story of America’s 

Deadliest Natural Disaster: The Great Gulf Hurricane of 1900 (New York: 

William Morrow, 2015).

8 Klepak, 124–127.

9 A step in this direction was taken on April 21, 2016, when a 

delegation of Cuban government national security officials toured Joint 

Interagency Task Force–South in Key West, Florida, at the invitation 

of U.S. Southern Command. The task force plays an important role 

in the detection, monitoring, and interdiction of drug-trafficking in 

the Caribbean. While there, the Cubans met with representatives of 

18 countries assigned to the task force. See Carol Rosenberg, “Cuban 

Security Officials Toured Key West Drug-War Center,” Miami Herald, 

May 5, 2016, A6.

10 A major study of the Afghan and Iraq wars by National Defense University scholars concluded that the Department of Defense 

made the mistake of “trying to create forces that mirror-imaged those 

of the West” (335) in those conflicts. It “developed ministries and 

military forces modeled on U.S. institutions” (330), and failed to make 

the effort “‘transactional’ and ‘conditional,’ based on shared objectives 

and situational variables” (16). See Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph J. 

Collins, eds., Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2015).

This paper expands on an informal presentation the author made at the National Defense University in 

September 2015. The author is grateful to John A. Cope, Ambassador Luigi Einaudi, and Dr. Christopher 

J. Lamb for their criticial and helpful suggestions that improved this paper. Other works by the author 

include Raúl Castro and Cuba: A Military Story (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) and Churchill Comes of Age: 

Cuba 1895 (The Free Press, 2015). The author continues to travel, teach, and research in Cuba.
16 SF No. 295 inss.ndu.edu

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