Fu ture War

An Assessment of Aerospace

Campaigns in 2010

JEFFERY R. BARNETT

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

January 1996
Li brary of Con gress Cataloging

 in Publication Data

Bar nett, Jeffery R., 1950–

Fu ture war : an as sess ment of aero space cam paigns in 2010 / Jeffery R. Bar nett.

 p. cm.

In cludes bib lio graphi cal ref er ences and in dex.

1. Air war fare—Fore cast ing. 2. Twenty- first cen tury—Fore casts. I. Ti tle.

UG632.B37 1996

358.4′009′0501—dc20 95- 5402

 CIP 

Dis claimer

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest o

academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The view

expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or positio

of the Department of Defense or the United States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy authorities and is cleared for publ

release.

ii
This project

would have been impossible

without the support and advice of my wife,

former Captain Katherine Hoyland Barnett, USAF.
iv
Contents

Chapter Pag

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

 1 OVERARCHING CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Information War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Parallel War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Revolution in Military Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

 2 PEER COMPETITOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

 3 NICHE COMPETITOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

 4 NEAR-TERM ACTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Appendix

A Illustrative Scenario (Peer) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

B Illustrative Scenario (Niche) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

C List of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

v
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Illustrations

Figure

 1 Target Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

 2 Orders of Magnitude Improvement in Precision

Munitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

 3 Radical Change in 15 Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

 4 Automated Versus Man-in-the-Loop Decision

Making. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

 5 Massive Stealthy Cruise Missile Attack . . . . . . . . . . 32

 6 Cruise Missiles, Due to Their Ability to

Change Course, Make Point Defense Difficult . . . . . 95

 7 The Iraqi Army in Retreat from Kuwait City . . . . . . . 10

 8 Map of Sino-Russian Area of Operations . . . . . . . . 116

 9 Map of East Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

 10 Map of Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

 11 Operational Distances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Table Pag

 1 Major Differences Between Peer and Niche

Competitors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

 2 Comparisons Between Aerospace War and

Information War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

 3 Niche Competitor Compared to Peer

 Competitor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

 4 Trends in Air Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

 5 Vladivostok Weather (Ceilings in Percent) . . . . . . . . 119

 6 Kinshasa Weather (Ceilings in Percent). . . . . . . . . . 137

vi

Pag
Photographs

US Military Vehicles at Ad Damman, Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . 5

US Army Troopship, General W. H. Gordon,

Departing Korea, 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Overhead View of Tent City at Sheikh Isa, Bahrain, 

During Operation Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Armored Battalion in Tactical Road March . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

UK 1st Armored Division Entering Iraq During

Desert Storm Ground Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Iraqi MiG-25 Destroyed in its Hardened Shelter by

a Precision Bomb During Operation Desert Storm. . . . . . . . . 92

Aircraft Parking Ramp at Sheikh Isa, Bahrain,

During Operation Desert Shield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

vii

Pag

Foreword

Jeff Barnett, one of a growing number of military

professionals who recognize that the United States has

entered a new revolution in military affairs, thinks carefully

about what this revolution means for the US military, where it

will lead us, and what must be done with it to give the nation

a new level of military power in the twenty-first century. He

has some well-articulated insights.

Colonel Barnett’s prognostication: It will take hard work to

ride the revolution to its promise, and hard thinking, now, to

plot the proper course. While the revolution may already be

underway, the United States, in his view, will not be its sole

beneficiary. Nor will the United States monopolize the

technical and doctrinal engines that drive this revolution

forward; others will also seize its driving technologies. As a

result, the United States must be prepared to face both peer

and niche competitors in the future—the former with military

capabilities roughly equal to those of the United States, the

latter with capabilities perhaps sufficient to deter US

intervention even when important US interests are at stake.

The author therefore focuses on one of the central issues in

the emerging US debate on national security; namely, to what

extent can the United States use its lead in the new revolution 

in military affairs to deter the growth of peer and niche

competitors, or defeat them if they decide to compete directly

with military force. His answers are straightforward: We must

develop superior capabilities in information war , join

operations, and parallel war. He lays out what this means in

specific technological and doctrinal terms.

It is here, I think, that the author makes his greatest

contribution. His assessment is free from the kind of hyperbol 

that sometimes creeps into discussions of the changes under

way in the US military, and he lays out in direct and balanced

form the promises of information war theory and the leverage

it gives to the concept of parallel war . But he also indicates th

ix
kinds of changes that will be necessary if we are to achieve

this in the face of determined opposition by peer and niche

competitors sometime early in the next century. The changes

are pretty drastic, as suggested by the following sample:

• radical alterations to current air defense operations

• CONUS-positioned command

• low signature becomes key to successful military operations

• the potential of stealthy cruise missiles to dominate

warfare

• the probable end of large invasion forces.

This is a book about the future and about aerospace war in

the future. It is a book all warriors should read.

WILLIAM A. OWENS

Admiral, USN

Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs

 of Staff

x
About

the Author

Colonel Jeffery R. Barnett, USAF, is the Military Assista nt t

the Director, Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Colonel Barnett is a senior navigator with 2,000 flying hour

in the C-130 and the C-9. He flew 40 combat and combatsupport missions in Southeast Asia. He also flew as a member

of the personal aircrew for the Supreme Allied Commander

Europe. His staff assignments include Headquarters United

States Air Force and Headquarters Pacific Air Forces. During

the 1991 Gulf War, he was attached to the CHECKMATE

planning cell.

Colonel Barnett earned a bachelor of arts degree in history

from the College of the Holy Cross and holds a master of science

degree in international relations. He is a graduate of the Air War

College, the Air Command and Staff College, Squadron Officer

School (Distinguished Graduate), and the Army-Air Force

Air/Ground Operations School (Distinguished Graduate).

Colonel Barnett has published widely. His recent publications

include: “The Shadows on Veterans’ Souls” (Houston Post

November 11, 1994); “War’s Worst Risk Is to the Soul” (Lo

Angeles Times, June 6, 1994); “Nonstate War” (Marine Corp

Gazette, May 1994); “Exclusion as National Security Policy

(Parameters, Spring 1994); and “We Have More to Offer

(Proceedings, April 1993).

xi

Colonel Jeffery R. Barnett

Preface

The purpose of this book is to outline the aerospace aspects

of future war. Because future war is an exceptionally broad

subject, three caveats are in order.

1. This book outlines only future state versus state warfare

Its theories are applicable only to future wars between

sovereign states and alliances of sovereign states. States have

organized militaries, infrastructures, production bases

capitals, and populations. These components enable unique

capabilities and vulnerabilities—which dictate the scope and

character of war. Because states alone have these attributes

theories of state versus state war are unique.

The book is not intended to provide a template for wars with

nonstates such as future versions of Somali clans, Bosnian

Serbs, or Vietcong. Nonstate warfare is certainly important; its

future deserves serious treatment. However, because

nonstates differ fundamentally from states, an examination o

future nonstate warfare requires a wholly separate treatment

Nonstates, by definition, exist without infrastructures

production bases, and capitals. Nonstates usually have

neither organized militaries nor any responsibility fo

populations. In essence, nonstates have completely differen

makeups relative to states. Because of these gross differences

nonstates require their own theories of war.

l

 It is impossible to

reconcile both state and nonstate conflict into one theory

Future aerospace operations in wars with nonstates mus

remain for others to address. This particular book views

future aerospace operations through only one prism, that o

state versus state conflict.

2. This book reviews only the aerospace aspects of futur

war. This limited focus is not meant to slight land and nava

campaigns—they will remain crucial to future war, forming

fundamental components of joint campaigns. However, land

and naval campaigns are extensive in their own rights. Their

projections must remain for others to outline. This book wil

xiii
project land and naval warfare only to the extent that (1) they

are affected by aerospace operations and (2) armies and navies 

are supported by, or operated in support of, aerospace

campaigns.

3. This book begins and ends in the future. It is not a linea

extrapolation of current trends; it is not meant to summate

the cumulative effects of current policies and programs

Rather, this book outlines how future warfare could be

conducted, given the expected advances in technology

Whether or not national decision makers choose to equip

organize, and train aerospace forces in accordance with this

vision of the future is a separate question—one that is beyond

this book’s scope.

2

Notes

1. Col Jeffery R. Barnett, “Nonstate War,” Marine Corps Gazette, May 1994

84–89.

2. This book also does not recommend specific treaty changes (e.g.

intermediate-range nuclear force treaty, antiballistic missile treaty).

xiv
Acknowledgments

Credit for many of the ideas in this book rests with others.

Far and away the most creative and insightful thinkers on

future warfare are Andrew W. Marshall, Director, Ne

Assessment (Office of the Secretary of Defense) and Col John

A. Warden III, USAF, Retired, former Commandant, Ai

Command and Staff College. They inspired key concepts in

this book. Other significant contributors include Col Tom

Smith, USA; Capt Jim FitzSimonds, USN; Col Chuck Miller

USAF; Cmdr Jan van Tol, USN; Dr Tom Welch; and Col Dick

Szafranski, USAF. The insights and encouragement of D

Andrew Krepinevich; Capt John Hanley, USNR; Dr Michae

Vickers; David Ochmanek; Fred Frostic; Dr Chris Bowie; Cap

Dick O’Neill, USN; Maj Scott Dorff, USAF; Mark Herman; Co

Don Selvage, USMC; Col John Roe, USAF; Dr Fred Giessler

Dr Bruce Bennett; Dr Lou Marquet; Maj Terry Fox, USAF; Lt

Gen Dale Vesser, USA, Retired; Col Dave Deptula, USAF; Dr

Mike Brown; Dr Chuck Bartlett; Dr Barry Watts; Maj Joe

Squatrito, USAF; Capt Jim Hollenbach, USN; and Col Jamie

Gough, USAF, were invaluable. My editor at Air University

Press, Mr Preston Bryant, was professional in every respect.

xv

Introduction

As we look to the future of war we must face one absolute

certainty: any projection will prove faulty. Despite our bes

intellectual efforts, the future will remain unknowable

Between now and the focus of this study, the year 2010

humankind’s innumerable decisions will interact to form a

future far beyond our powers to predict. It would reveal the

greatest hubris to claim absolute insights on such a dynamic,

multidependent future.

This limitation is especially true concerning war. Any

projection of future war must contain implicit assumptions of

time, enemy, location and purpose. We must know when th

war occurs in order to project what kinds of technologies

might be available. We must know the purpose of the war in

order to forecast what level of effort the Nation will dedicate

We must know the enemy in order to build the mos

appropriate strategic campaign, addressing both offensive and 

defensive centers of gravity. Finally, we must know the

location of the war in order to define the types and numbers of

operational targets. All four factors will interact to define the

nature and conduct of any future war. However, because non

of the factors are knowable in advance, any vision of future

war will be severely limited.

Accepting these limitations, this book will center on two

themes. First, it will highlight where fundamental changes in

military operations have already occurred. Militaries, by their

nature, are hesitant to embrace unproven theories. As a

result, they are usually slow to recognize new possibilities in

operational art. Nonetheless, fundamental change in the

conduct of war is a constant throughout history. To stay

ahead of this change military planners must constantly

reevaluate their concepts of war. This book is designed to help

military professionals recognize new opportunities mandated

by changes that have already occurred in the technologica

and political environments.

xvii
The second theme in this book is the impact of foreseeable

technological advances on military operations. Technology is no

standing still; if anything, technological advances are

accelerating. Significant advances in technology are a valid

planning assumption over the next 15 years. Advances in

microprocessing and all its supporting technologies will drive

new possibilities on future battlefields. While the exac

specifications of these technologies are beyond our capacity to

define in advance, we can assume technological change of at

least the pace experienced over the past 10 to 20 years

Technological change of this magnitude will mandate

commensurate changes in military operations. This book wil

explore some of the more significant impacts of probable

technologies on the future battlefield.

Each argument exploring these twin themes is explained in

detail in the succeeding chapters. Understanding the need fo

some readers to have an overview of key points in advance, the

following paragraphs will introduce the key arguments. They

are not intended to convince skeptical professionals of the

validity of each proposal. That is the purpose of the detail in

the succeeding chapters.

Despite current optimism, a peer competitor to the United

States will eventually arise. Only the timing is unknown. Due

to the time needed for tensions to increase and rearmament to 

begin, and based on historic intervals of fundamental change

in security and technology, the earliest edge of this window is

approximately 15 years (2010).

A peer competitor is defined as a state (or alliance) capable

of fielding multiple types and large numbers of both emerging

and present weapons, then developing an innovative concep

of operations (CONOPS) to realize the full potential of this mix

In most ways, a peer’s military capabilities will roughly equa

those of the United States. The peer’s goal will be to control a

vital interest of the United States, on either a global or

regional basis, then defeat the US military response. Historic

examples of peer competitors include the USSR, Naz

Germany, and Imperial Japan.

A niche competitor is defined as a state (or alliance) tha

combines limited numbers of emerging weapons with a robust

xviii
inventory of current weapons, then develops an innovative

concept of operations to best employ this mix. The niche’s

overall military forces will be inferior to those of the United

States. Its goal will be to effectively challenge US interests in

its region by making the US military response sufficiently

costly to either deter initial involvement or dissuade furthe

involvement on the part of the US.

A niche competitor could arise at any time over the next 10–20

years. It could access (1) civilian space networks for surveillance

and communications, (2) international arms markets for low

observable missiles with precision guidance, and (3) computer 

and communications professionals for information war 

Although these technologies are only emerging today, they’l

likely become widely available over the next 10–20 years. By

2005–2015, many countries could obtain these technologies

and integrate them with the rest of their military. Examples of

possible niche competitors include Iraq and North Korea.

In general, the military capabilities of future peer and niche

competitors will differ significantly in both quality and

quantity. While both will incorporate emerging advances in the

key technologies of information, command and control (C

2

)

penetration, and precision, they will do so in markedly

different ways.

For example, a peer competitor will field surveillance systems

that are dedicated to military applications. They will respond

directly to the peer’s tasking. Taskings will cycle in near real time

(NRT). A niche competitor, on the other hand, will likely de pend

more on commercial information systems (e.g., commercia

communications satellites). These systems will be less respon

sive, especially when controlled by a third party. A niche wil

experience greater time delays between data collection and

dissemination to weapon systems. Peers will pose multiple

types of challenges to defense systems, while niches wil

confront defenses with only a few types of penetrating systems

The niche will also depend more on off-board guidance (such as

the Global Positioning System) while a peer will use autonomous 

guidance systems (such as inertial guidance).

A peer will have the wherewithal to avoid being defeated by

a single, crushing blow by the United States. It will have

xix
sufficient depth and wealth to preclude being overwhelmed by

massive numbers over a small area. It will also deter strategic

attacks with a robust nuclear retaliatory capability

Conversely, a niche competitor must contemplate war withou

these advantages. Table 1 summarizes the major differences

between peer and niche competitors.

Table1

Major Differences Between Peer and Niche Competitors

Peer Competitor Niche Competitor

Information Indigenous, Dedicated Third Country, Commercial

C

2

NRT, Redundant, Automated Delayed, Nodal, Hierarchical

Penetration Multisystem Single System

Precision Autonomous Guidance External Guidance (e.g., GPS)

 (e.g., terminal)

Weapons of Mass Hundreds. Can Reach USA. <10, Theater Reach

Destruction

Size Large, Strategic Depth Small, Little Depth

Any forecast of future aerospace war must reflect the

current revolution in military affairs (RMA). Historically, RMA

occur only when militaries fundamentally change both their

concepts of operations (CONOPS) and their organizationa

structures to best employ radically new technologies. In other

words, revolutions in military affairs are underwritten by new

technologies but realized through new operational and

organizational concepts.

Technological advances in four general areas are underwriting

a new aerospace approach to future war:

1. Information

2. Command and control

3. Penetration

4. Precision

By 2010, well into the information age, aerospace planners

will have an incredible amount of information about the target

state. They’ll never know everything, but they will detec

orders of magnitude more about the enemy than in past wars

With this information, commanders will orchestrate operation

xx
with unprecedented fidelity and speed. Commanders will take

advantage of revolutionary advances in information transfer

storage, recognition, and filtering to direct highly efficient

near-real-time attacks. Responding in this direction, aero

space attackers will take advantage of advances in stealth 

hypersonic, and/or electronic warfare technologies to greatly

increase the chances of penetration. While defenses wil

certainly defeat some attackers, others will get through a

rates higher than previously experienced. Finally, once over

the target area, aerospace platforms will deliver brillian

munitions. Deliveries will be highly accurate. Target locations

will be measured within feet. Working together, advances in

these four areas of aerospace technology will underwrite a

revolution in military affairs.

The new operational concept to realize the potential of these

underwriting technologies is parallel war. In parallel war

aerospace forces simultaneously attack enemy centers o

gravity across all levels of war (strategic, operational, and

tactical)—at rates faster than the enemy can repair and adapt

The overall goal of parallel war is paralysis of the enemy

through shock (as opposed to gradual attrition). For this

reason, leadership is the highest priority target. Once

paralyzed, the enemy will be unable to orchestrate either a

damaging offense or an effective defense.

Parallel war requires large numbers of highly precise

weapons directed against vital targets. While this concept has

long been envisioned by strategists in theory, advances in

technology are currently enabling its prosecution in reality

Aerospace forces will soon be able to engage hundreds o

targets within the first hour of a conflict. They will deliver

thousands of precision munitions within each 24-hour period

Enabled by advance information systems, these weapons wil

strike vital enemy targets. The sum of these capabilities drives 

more than an increase in military efficiency. As explained in

chapter 1, these capabilities drive a new concept—parallel war .

New organizational concepts are needed to support these

new technologies and concepts of war. The greatest need is for

new approaches to command and control. This is the numbe

one issue facing today’s aerospace planners. The information

xxi
age is rapidly increasing the amount, speed, and fidelity o

data gathered and distributed to war fighters. Exponentia

advances are on the horizon. However, the basic command

hierarchy for US forces has remained roughly the same. While

commands move through the system much faster than before

the basic aerospace C2

 system is unchanged. From a historica

perspective, this overlapping of new technologies on top of old

hierarchies is a signpost for “old think.” A more automated

and flat structure, notwithstanding its own vulnerabilities

offers the greatest potential for near-real-time, deconflicted

multiservice, multitheater operations.

One major change in aerospace C

2

 is needed immediately

The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) for theate

war should remain in CONUS. Basing the JFACC in CONUS

would avoid creating a fixed, in-range, high-value target fo

the enemy. It also would allow immediate planning/tasking o

the aerospace campaign. A CONUS-based JFACC would hav

well-exercised connectivity with combat units (e.g., through

fiber-optic cable connections with CONUS-based stealth

bomber wings). Target planners would have immediate access

to all-source intelligence. All data relayed by satellite

(including data from national systems) would down-link to this

JFACC which would fuse the data, filter extraneous elements

and distribute distilled information. A CONUS-based JFACC

could also take advantage of CONUS databases and expertise

JFACC computers could be hardwired to a secure information

net. After running computer simulations to determine the bes

tactical options, JFACC would issue the air tasking orde

(ATO). This centralized ATO could direct all air assets, whethe

based in-theater, in CONUS, or in adjacent theaters. Finally, a

single, CONUS-based JFACC would husband the limited

number of aerospace strategists and standardize CONOPS

regardless of theater.

Future US theater commanders will call upon a Joint Forc

Information Component Commander (JFICC) to (1) collec

information on enemy capabilities, deployments, and intentions

(2) fuse data collected from all sources and distribute timely

information to users; (3) flow friendly information efficiently

even in the face of enemy attacks and competing friendly

xxii
requirements; (4) degrade enemy information networks; and

(5) defend friendly information networks against enemy

intrusion. Aerospace forces should expect heavy taskings in

support of the JFICC.

Future aerospace operations will require increasingly

centralized execution. The increasing range of defense weapons

and the decreasing range at which stealthy targets will be

identified will stress aerospace defenses. Given decentralized

C

2

, several aircraft—or several batteries—might fire simul

taneously at the same target. Or one might shoot while another

makes a counterproductive maneuver. Or no one might shoot

everyone thinking someone else has the lead. A centralized

execution system can deconflict these factors.

A second factor requiring centralized execution is the

multitheater nature of future offensive operations. Routine

strike packages may require intelligence and communications

from space, bombers from CONUS, escorts from carriers

tankers from a neighboring theater, and unmanned aeria

vehicles (UAV) from frontline ground forces. All will operate

long-range; all will be interdependent; all will probably receive

last-minute changes to their orders. Decentralized execution

effective in past wars, won’t answer this challenge.

Because technology will allow near-real-time information

and C2

, commanders at all levels will try to move towards snap

decisions in near real time. This tendency will open interesting

opportunities for operational art. Commanders will exploit this

tendency. They will make concerted efforts to drive their

opponent’s snap decisions toward the poor end of the

spectrum, usually by presenting false indications of intent or

reality. The ultimate goal will be to either slow down the

opponent’s decision loop or force the opponent to continue

making bad decisions in near real time.

Any enemy will have access to these same technologies, o

course, and will exploit them to varying degrees. Aerospace

planners must prepare for innovative enemies possessing

advanced information and C

2

 systems, stealthy aircraft and

missiles, and precision munitions. Future enemies will also

employ the full gamut of existing weapon technologies

including nuclear weapons.

xxiii
One potentially dominant technology is the stealthy cruis

missile. Its low signature, independence from fixed launch

facilities, and ability to rapidly change routing make its

long-range detection very uncertain. Cruise missiles also hav

the capability to launch from any medium (sea, air, land) and

to navigate/target with single-meter accuracy in all weather

They can attack from any direction at any time of day. In

addition, prospects for “cheap” stealthy cruise missiles ar

high. Future militaries will buy/produce thousands o

low-observable cruise missiles. Thus, aerospace defenders wil

have to deal with massive numbers of precise attackers and

very little warning.

Such an attack would challenge the number one mission o

aerospace forces: to establish aerospace superiority

Thou-sands of stealthy cruise missiles would likely rende

current aerospace defense CONOPS obsolete. Curren

aerospace defense CONOPS assume exactly opposite

conditions: limited numbers of expensive, high-signature

attackers (e.g., Su-24s and Scuds), visible from launch to

engagement, with an exposed support infrastructure. Stealthy

cruise missiles invalidate those assumptions.

Defensive counters to stealth terminology may be analogous

to antitank or antiaircraft developments before World War II

Although huge advances in defense against tanks and aircraf

were made before World War II, both tanks and aircraft had

decisive effects on that war. Although neither was invulnerable

both dictated a new environment for warfare.

In a similar way, stealth technology will dictate a new

warfare environment. It may be possible to degrade the cruise

missile’s effectiveness by targeting its navigation and termina

area guidance. Air defense units should exploit this potentia

in addition to improving physical interception capabilities.

One key to successful operations in the emerging

environ-ment will be signature reduction. All fixed forces with

large signatures will eventually be detected and hit. Stealthy

cruise missiles and bombers, properly supported by

information and precision technologies, will make

high-signature, immobile forces extraordinarily vulnerable.

xxiv
Since air bases have high signatures, aerospace forces

should base outside the range of enemy stealth systems. Such 

basing will be possible only if the aerospace inventory

emphasizes long-range operations. Under this condition

aircraft would need long legs for flights from rear area bases to

enemy targets. Aircrew ratios would have to support long

sortie durations. Aircraft and munitions inventories would

have to be sufficient to deliver effective, sustained firepower

from distant bases. With minimal support, deployment kits

must support extended operations from distant bases. Given

these attributes, aerospace forces could effectively operate

outside the range of enemy stealth systems.

In the future wartime environment, large invasion forces wil

be highly vulnerable. Their vulnerability will be greatest during

the initial stages of an invasion when forces must mass to

overcome indigenous defenses. Such wartime standbys as truck

convoys, tank columns, ammunition ships that require days t

unload, airlift aircraft needing hours to off-load and r efuel, larg

air bases with “tent cities,” and air refueling aircraft parked

nose-to-tail may not be possible in the emerging environment.

If the United States chooses to oppose an invasion of an ally

it must do so during the initial stages of the attack. Failure to

immediately engage the enemy could prove disastrous. I

enemy forces gain control of their objective, the US would have

to mass forces to expel them.

As US forces mass to capture the lost territory, their

logistics, convoys, and buildup areas would come under heavy

attack. While the United States will probably be on the strat egi

defensive in a future war, it must take the operational offensive

Despite any advantages that may accrue to the defense by new

technologies, the US can maintain the initiative only through

the offensive. In this future environment, US airlift operations

must assume significant enemy surveillance.

Space will undoubtedly be a strategic center of gravity in any

future war. Both sides will want space control. Whichever sid

can exploit space for communications, collection, and

positioning—while denying similar capabilities to its enemy—

will gain a decisive advantage. For this reason, both sides wil

attack satellites. Attacks on homeland infrastructure for spac

xxv
operations (e.g., launch pads; command, control, communica

tions, computers, and intelligence [C

4

I]) may be restricted due

to the threat of nuclear retaliation. However, if satellite contro

depends on a small number of ground stations, those stations

will likely come under attack. The United States may operate

under certain disadvantages in any future space war. Fo

example, the enemy may

1. shoot first (the National Command Authorities will probabl

deny first strikes by US forces against enemy satellites);

2. have a power advantage due to a greater willingness to use

nuclear power plants in space;

3. have more state-of-the-art satellites due to a faster acquisi

tion cycle;

4. aggressively weaponize space despite US and world

opinion; and

5. prosecute an attrition strategy by emphasizing quantity

over quality.

To mitigate these disadvantages, planners should integrate

satellites and UAVs for communication and surveillance. They

should plan for redundancy between types of platforms

overlapping coverage among types of sensors, and connectivity

between all platforms with a common C

4

I architecture. When

combined with innovative C

2

, this integration will provid

dominant battlefield awareness in a highly competitive

environment.

High-signature surveillance platforms will not thrive in the

emerging environment. Satellites, especially those in low earth 

orbit, will be very vulnerable during a future war. As a backup

and to heighten crisis stability, the US should prepare a high

altitude long endurance (HALE) UAV architecture fo

com-munication, navigation, and surveillance.

Manned atmospheric platforms, such as AWACS and J-STARS

will have heavy taskings in a war with a niche competitor. In a

war with a peer competitor, however, these platforms wil

prove too vulnerable for operations near enemy forces.

The side that can retrain its entire force to execute the most

modern CONOPS will have a decisive advantage in future war

Computer simulations may enable this decisive advantage.

xxvi
Chap ter 1

Overarching Concepts

(T)he microchip is transforming how we use air power on

the battlefield. We now have the ability to acquire and

communicate huge volumes of information in real time, and

we have the computing power to rapidly analyze those

data. And we have the control systems that allow that

analysis to be passed simultaneously to the users. This is

transforming our battlefield situational awareness and our

battle planning.

—Secretary of Defense William Perry*

As we look to the future, the growth of information tech

nologies seems limitless. Hardly a day goes by without a break

through of some kind in information-related technologies. Fo

this reason, it is likely both the US and an enemy will have

information-based systems far more advanced than those

currently available. Both the US and its enemy could have

• global satellite networks with voice, data, and imagin

capabilities 50 times greater than today (based on advances in

data compression, processing, frequency management, minia

turization, and sensors). Although the military will control 

limited number, commercial interests will own most platforms.

• autonomous weapons, enabled by artificial intelligence

automatic target recognition algorithms, and multispectra

miniature sensors.

• sophisticated computer viruses—and equally sophisticated

encryption protocols.

• data fusion at rates 104 times faster and more accurate

than today, based on advances in processing and software.

1

• data storage capabilities at 103 times greater than today

(due to miniaturization).

1

*Remarks to the conference of the American Institute of Aeronautics and

Astronautics, the Aerospace Industries Association, and the Aviation Week Group

Arlington, Va., 4 May 1995.
Information War

Because of these and other advances, an information

campaign will be integral to any future conflict. Simply stated

information will dominate future war. Wars will be won by the

side that enjoys and can exploit: cheap information while

making information expensive for its opponent; accurate

information within its own organization while providing or

inserting inaccurate data in its opponent’s system; 2 near

real-time information while delaying its opponent’s

information loop; massive amounts of data while restricting

data available to its opponent; and pertinent information while 

filtering out unnecessary data.

The US does not have a monopoly on this insight. The

impact of information technologies on war is well understood

abroad. According to one Chinese defense intellectual: “(I)n

hi-tech warfare, tactical effectiveness no longer depends on the

size of forces or the extent of firepower and motorized forces

But more on the control systems over the war theater and

efficiency in utilizing information from the theater. Superiority 

in numbers and strength no longer plays a decisive role.”

3

Military theorists in Russia hold a similar view. Maj Gen

Vladimir I. Slipchenko, (Retired) the leading Russian military

theoretician: “The impending sixth generation of warfare, with

its centerpiece of superior data-processing to suppor

precision smart weaponry, will radically change military

capabilities and, once again, radically change the character o

warfare.”4

Military professionals should feel comfortable envisioning

campaigns focused on information. Although an information

focus brings new targets and weapons to war, it nevertheless

mirrors traditional military concepts in at least six general ways.

1. As with all forms of warfare, information war (IW) will hav

offensive and defensive aspects. Militaries will both prosecut

information war and defend against its use by the enemy.

2. Information war will be conducted at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Decision makers at each leve

will orchestrate information campaigns. They’ll attack infor

mation infrastructures at the national, theater, and unit levels.

2
3. Information war will both support other military

campaigns and operate independently. For example, just as

naval air forces have both independent (e.g., antisubmarine

warfare) and supporting (e.g., close air support) missions

information components will sometimes support othe

operations and sometimes require the support of other forces.

4. Information war will be an imperative for victory. Even a

past victories were possible only through supremacy of the air

land, or sea, future victories will be doubtful withou

information supremacy.

5. Military forces must be capable of operations despite

successful enemy IW. Because perfect defenses against IW are 

an unreasonable expectation, units must continue functioning

despite corrupted information.

6. Information war will have distinct mission types. As with

conventional military forces, no one type of IW will suffice to

describe all its ramifications. For example, just as aerospace

power has distinct mission types (e.g., airlift, interdiction

counterair), IW will have subsets. Table 2 illustrates this point

in more detail.

Table 2

Comparisons Between Aerospace War and Information War

TYPICAL AEROSPACE MISSIONS ANALOGS IN INFORMATION WAR

Counterair, Counter Space Counter Information

Strategic Attack Destroy/Distort National Information

Network

Interdiction Target C

4

I Nodes

Close Air Support Jam

Airlift Transmit Information to Theater

Air Refueling Update Databases in Flight

Electronic Combat Insert Viruses, Corrupt Data

Surveillance & Reconnaissance Understand Enemy’s Information

Architecture

Given the critical importance of information to future war

the theater commander should have a component commander

3
dedicated solely to winning the information campaign. Othe

components will have tactical information forces and interests

to be sure, but to orchestrate information war at the strategi

and operational levels, both offensively and defensively, the

CINC should designate one commander and organization

responsible for fighting and winning the information

campaign.

5 This will be a critical campaign. Army Secretary

Michael P. W. Stone reported after the 1991 Gulf War :

The first priority of coalition forces during the offensive phase

was the systematic destruction of Iraqi Command, Control,

and Communications (C3). The same offensive strategy is

likely to be employed against U.S. forces by any future

adversary. (Emphasis Added)

6

The joint force information component commander (JFICC

should have five goals:

1. Collect information on enemy capabilities, deployments

and intentions.

2. Fuse data collected from all sources and distribute timely

filtered information to users.

3. Flow friendly information efficiently in the face of enemy

attacks and competing friendly requirements.

4. Degrade enemy information networks.

7

5. Defend friendly information networks against enemy

intrusion.

To accomplish these goals, the JFICC should have opera

tional control (OPCON) over certain forces on a routine basis

and should exercise temporary operational control over forces

normally under the OPCON of other component commanders.

Forces normally under the JFICC‘s operational control should

include systems (e.g., satellite communications [SATCOM]

collection satellites, antisatellite [ASAT], specialized munitions

and personnel (e.g., satellite controllers, hackers, cryptog

raphers, psychological operations [psyops] specialists, frequency 

managers). The JFICC should use assigned forces to conduc

and support operations within the theater commander in

chief’s (CINC) overall guidance.

Caution: Whenever a new type of warfare emerges, there’s a

tendency to overstate its case. For example, during the 1920s

and 1930s, airpower zealots overstated the capabilities o

4
airpower. Airpower visionaries, such as Douhet and Mitchell

made promises about the future effect of airpower that (to put

it charitably) experience was slow to validate. The potential o

strategic airpower was easier to foresee than to execute.

Information zealots will likely make similar mistakes

Because societies and militaries are increasingly dependent on

information, the potential for information campaigns to

fundamentally impact future war is obvious. However, its

practice will take time to mature. This delay will be due to

uneven progress in military reliance on information

technologies, the ability to militarily affect information, and

the military’s acceptance of the attendant cultural changes.

For example, at the strategic level of war, information wil

have a decisive effect only if the target state is informationbased. If it’s a third wave state, its wealth will depend on

information.8 By targeting this information network, a military

could impoverish its enemy and facilitate its defeat. However

if the enemy state’s wealth is not based on information, a

strategic information campaign will not have a decisive effect.

If the national leadership depends on an information

network to retain power, this network should be a prime

target. By severing the information network, the US could

undermine the regime. But the network’s value as a target se

will decrease if the national leadership can maintain politica

power regardless of attacks on its information apparatus

Nevertheless, it will be important to attack the enemy’s

national information network due to its secondary effects on

the nation’s war-making (operational) capabilities even though

these attacks won’t be strategically decisive in their own right.

At the operational and tactical levels of war, however, planners

should expect decisive effects from an information campaign. In

1994, the US Army Chief of Staff outlined this point.

Information Age armies will develop a shared situational

awareness based on common, up-to-date, near-complete friendly

and enemy information distributed among all elements of a

task force. First, operational and tactical commanders will

know where their enemies are and are not. . . . Of course, this

“knowledge” will never be absolute, and it is folly to assume it

ever will become “perfect.” It will be, however, of an order of

magnitude better than that achieved even during the Gulf

War. Second, information age armies will know where their own

5
forces are, much more accurately than before—and deny this

critical information to the enemy. Last, this enemy and

friendly information will be distributed among the forces of all

dimensions—land, sea, air, and space—to create a common

perception of the battlefield among the commanders and

staffs of information age armies.

9

If the US attains the Army Chief of Staff’s vision—while

degrading comparable enemy capabilities—it is difficul

(though still possible) to envision our defeat. The speed

fidelity, and breadth of modern information systems offer

orders of magnitude increases in military efficiency. This

efficiency will only increase in the future. As a result

information efficiency will be a key factor in future war and

will become an area of conflict. Commanders always seek to

observe-orient-decide-act (the “OODA” loop)* faster than thei

opponents. Opposing fighter pilots, JFACCs, and nationa

command authorities (NCA) always try to get inside their

opponents’ OODA loop. This was true in the past and wil

remain true in the future. The difference between the past and

the future will be in terms of speed and breadth of decisions

As the technical ability to complete the OODA loop in near rea

time (NRT) emerges, commanders at all levels will move

towards ever faster decisions. Whether it will be wise to do so

is another question, but the ability to observe and command

in NRT will exist—and whoever can get closest to it will gain an

advantage.

This drive towards near-real-time C2 will open interesting

opportunities for operational art. Commanders will exploi

their opponents’ drives toward near-real-time decisions

Because near-real-time decisions will require heavy degrees o

automation and decision protocols, commanders at all levels

will strive to drive their opponent’s snap decisions towards

poor decisions, usually by presenting false indications o

intent or reality.

For example, it is likely that US forces will be hypersensitive

to any indications of missile TELs (mobile missile launchers) in

the next war.** In fact, US C2 may focus extensive attention on

6

 *Term was coined by Col John Boyd .

**Besides TELs, other enemy systems which might attract considerable attention

could include WMD and enemy leadership.
each and every indication of a possible TEL. If this is the case

and if the enemy identifies in advance which key indicators

will immediately gain US attention, the enemy could quickly

overload the US C2 structure by providing “thousands” o

single-factor indications of missile TELs. Single radio trans

missions, heat bursts, shapes, or radar emissions might deceive

US C2 into rapidly refocusing its attention and surveillance

assets on “thousands” of false targets. Even if each report

demands only a few minutes of attention, this refocusing

might affect all parts of US C2 (not just the antimissile forces

as senior commanders get directly involved in sorting out the

maze of false reports. To decrease the time required to dea

with false reports, the US would probably either add more

cross-checks into its TEL detection architecture (thus slowing

the process) or restructure its decision algorithms regarding

TELs (thus voiding some aspects of peacetime training). Either

counterstep would drive major changes in US C 2 during th

critical early stages of the war.

This contest over indications offers new possibilities in

operational art. By understanding indication priorities and

the tendency towards near-real-time (“snap”) decisions, a com

mander could overwhelm the opponent’s C2 structure during

the critical early phases of the fight.

The ultimate goal in this counter C2 effort will be to compe

the opposing force to either slow down its OODA loops o

continue making bad decisions in near real time. Either option

degrades information efficiency, thus gaining a decisive

advantage in war.

Advances in hardware, software, and bandwidth—driven by

the private sector—are certain. Their impact on future conflic

will be profound. Simply stated, the ability to rapidly exploit

observations of friendly and enemy positions and capabilities

at levels superior to that of the enemy, will be decisive at the

operational and tactical levels of wars. For this reason, there

will doubtless be a fight over information in any future war

Winning this information war—with integrated, redundant

secure, and exercised networks—will be imperative to victory.

Caution: The English language uses the word “know” to cove

a broad range of sins. We can use “know” when referring t

obvious facts (Do you know what time it is?). We can also use

7
know when referring to in-depth assimilation of a subjec

(She really knows her business!). In English, the word “know

covers a broad range of cognition—from observation through

understanding.

Unfortunately, this broad usage allows us to gloss over

important distinctions. While it is certain that emerging infor

mation technologies will provide an incredible amount of detai

about the enemy on day one of a war, it is less certain we will

fully understand that enemy on day one. Satellites, UAVs

information “sweepers,” manned aircraft, and civilian media

will ensure we see the enemy with historic detail. However

simple observation of enemy deployments will not suffice; we’l

also need an in-depth grasp of enemy forces at all levels of war

What is their logistics structure? Who are their key decision

makers? How does their command and control function? Wha

is their intelligence flow? Which units are reliable and highly

trained/equipped? Which network nodes do they hold dear?

What are their operational and strategic goals?

 These questions, and thousands more like them, are critica

to any attack plan. This plan demands extensive under

standing of the enemy, not just observation. When we blithely

claim extensive knowledge about future enemies, we mus

admit this distinction. Which level of knowledge are we talking

about? Without a concerted effort to study the enemy in

advance of hostilities, our level of knowledge will probably

bend more towards the observation side of the scale than the

understanding side.

Parallel War

Although each section of this book treats mission areas

separately, future aerospace operations against the enemy a

all levels of war and across all target categories must occur

almost simultaneously. Near-simultaneous attacks across the

enemy target set will be the hallmark of future aerospace

operations. Failure to conduct aggressive and overwhelming

attacks across all facets of enemy power would waste a

decisive capability.

8
The theory of near-simultaneous attack across multiple targe

sets is nothing new. Airmen have recognized it for decades. A

large number of attacks in a day has far more effect than the

same number of attacks spread over weeks or months. In his

report to President Truman at the end of WWII , Gen Hap

Arnold asserted that strategic air assault is wasted in sporadic

attacks that allow the enemy to readjust or recuperate.

Historically, however, airmen lacked the military capabilities

to implement near-simultaneous attack. During all o

1942–1943, for example, the Eighth Air Force attacked a tota

of only 124 distinct targets.

10 At this low attack rate (averaging

six days between attacks), the Germans had ample time to

repair and adapt between raids.

Contrast this WWII rate of attack with the 1991 Gulf War. In

the first 24 hours of Operation Desert Storm, coalition ai

forces attacked 148 discrete targets. Fifty of these targets were

attacked within the first 90 minutes. 11 Targets ranged from

national command and control nodes (strategic) to key bridges

(operational) to individual naval units (tactical). The goal was

to cripple the entire system to the point it could no longer

efficiently operate, and to do so at rates high enough that the

Iraqis could not repair or adapt. Coalition forces, knowing an

incredible amount about Iraq , efficiently orchestrated

thousands of sorties, reached key vulnerabilities with high

certainty, and, once in the target area, hit specific targets. The

end result was near-simultaneous attack across hundreds o

key Iraqi targets. Under this intense attack, Iraq was unable to

either regain the initiative or orchestrate a cohesive defense.

Such targeting, conducted against the spectrum of targets in 

a compressed time period, is called parallel war.* The goal o

parallel war is to simultaneously attack enemy centers o

gravity across all levels of war (strategic, operational, and

tactical)—at rates faster than the enemy can repair and adapt

This is a new method of war. Previous generations of military

strategists could not prosecute parallel war. They had only th

sketchiest knowledge of the enemy’s key strategic and

operational targets. The enemy was opaque prior to contact

9

*The term parallel war was coined by Col John A. Warden III, USAF. It came into

general use after the Gulf War.
Even when military commanders knew what to target, they

had to first “roll back” an enemy’s defenses before attacking

key centers of gravity. But modern technology is changing

these long-held axioms of war. Extensive data on the enemy is

now available on day one of any war. Although it will never be

absolutely complete, the Information Age is providing eve

increasing details on the strategic and operational centers o

gravity of potential enemies. As demonstrated in the Gulf War 

modern penetration and precision can place these centers o

gravity under massive attack on day one of a war—and do so

faster than an enemy can react. Most importantly, modern com

mand and control systems can plan and direct this offensive in

10

Figure 1. Target Categories
near real time. These attributes of parallel war distinguish i

from anything seen in military history. Ambassador Paul Nitze

observed the effect of parallel war in the 1991 Gulf War:

After the first few minutes, there was literally nothing Saddam

could do to restore his military situation. His means of communicating with his subordinate commanders were being

progressively reduced. The Iraqi commanders had difficulty

carrying out orders for a coordinated movement of their forces.

Their command posts, air shelters, and even tanks buried in

the sand were vulnerable to elimination by precision

penetrating bomb attack.*

11

Figure 2. Orders of Magnitude Improvement in Precision Munitions

*Paul Nitze, Wall Street Journal Editorial, 24 December 1991, 6.
Parallel war is enabled by emerging advances in four key

technologies:

1. Information. By 2010, well into the Information Age, aerospace planners will detect an incredible amount of information

about the target state. They will never know everything, but

they will detect orders of magnitude more about the enemy

than in past wars. At the strategic level of war, they should

observe the connectivity among the national leadership, the

architecture of the national communications grid, and the

position of elite troops who are key to regime protection

among other things. At the operational level of war, they

should see the location and connectivity of key corps and air

defense headquarters, the naval order of battle, the location

and LOCs of theater-level supplies, and the coordinates o

critical nodes in airfields and ports. At the tactical level of war

they should know where most of the enemy’s uni

headquarters are, their communications centers and means

and the individual locations and readiness levels of squadrons

divisions, and ships.

2. Command & Control (C2). Future commanders will use

the Information Age’s revolutionary advances in information

transfer, storage, recognition, and filtering to orchestrate

attacks and defenses. Theater-wide taskings will flow with

unprecedented fidelity and speed. Commanders will conver

“the understanding of the battlespace into missions and assignments designed to alter, control, and dominate that space .”

12

3. Penetration. Units will launch penetrating platforms

against these targets. Enabled by stealth, hypersonic, and/o

electronic warfare technologies, these platforms will penetrate

in significant numbers. While defenses will certainly defea

some attackers, others will get through at rates higher than

previously experienced.

4. Precision. Once over the target area, penetrating platform 

will deliver brilliant munitions. Deliveries will be highly

accurate. Target locations will be measured within feet. Circula

error of probability (CEP) will be less than a meter. Brilliant

sensors will have the ability to distinguish between tanks and

trucks, between parked bombers and decoys. Because of thi

12
precision, fixed and mobile targets will be struck by the

thousands.

Attacks facilitated by advances in information, C2, penetration

and precision will occur within the first 24 hours of conflict—

and continually thereafter. This compressed, broad, and

precise attack should leave the opponent paralyzed, unable to

either coordinate an effective defense or mount an

orchestrated offense. The potential for parallel war will onl

increase in the future. Information, C2, penetration, and

precision will allow targeting of each target type at the outset

of hostilities. Advances in the underlying technologies wil

multiply the number of targets struck.

In 1995, the Air Force Chief of Staff described parallel war a

a revolutionary development: “Not too far in the next century

we may be able to engage 1,500 targets within the first hour, if

not the first minutes, of a conflict. . . . We will be able to

envelop our adversary with the simultaneous applica- tion o

air and space forces.”

13 Unfortunately for the US, enemies wil

also have this capability. Employing—and defending

against—parallel attack by aerospace forces will be a crucia

aspect of future joint campaigns.

Revolution in Military Affairs

Modern warfare is in the midst of a revolution in military

affairs (RMA). How US aerospace forces can thrive in this

revolution is the guts of this book. RMAs are more than jus

changes in technology. Rather, RMAs occur only when

militaries fundamentally change their concepts of operations

(CONOPS) and their organizational structures to best employ

radically new technologies. RMAs are underwritten b

technology but realized through doctrinal change.

14 As the US

Secretary of Defense noted in 1995:

Historically, an RMA occurs when the incorporation of new

technologies into military systems combines with innovative

operational concepts and organizational adaptations to

fundamentally alter the character and conduct of military

operations.15

13
Throughout history, militaries have reacted differently to

new technologies. Some opted to overlay new technologies on

top of their current ways of doing business. They used new technologies to improve the efficiency of what they were already

doing. Other militaries recognized the same new technologies

as drivers of fundamental change. To realize the full benefit o

the new technologies, they remade themselves; they remade

their doctrine and their organization. In so doing, they gained

substantial battlefield advantages over those who only overlaid

new technologies on top of existing doctrine. A historica

example illustrates this point.

During the interwar period, both Germany and Franc

developed tanks. In terms of numbers and capabilities, their

tank inventories were roughly the same. If anything, the

French had a slight advantage in quantity and quality. In

terms of doctrine and organization, however, the two armies

were quite different. This difference proved decisive.

To realize the potential of the tank, the Germans remade

their army. They recognized that mechanized armor rendered

the old ways of war obsolete and, based on this recognition

the Germans did far more than add tanks to their inventory

Rather, they devised a new doctrine (blitzkrieg) and built new

organizations to support that doctrine (panzer divisions)

These were radical changes, and they fundamentally changed

the way the German army made war. These changes affected

promotions, strategy, maneuver, and training. The Germans

also “bet their country” that it would work when they attacked

France. It is interesting to note the Germans accomplished

this revolution despite the severe restrictions imposed by the

Versailles Treaty and the Great Depression.

The French army took a more conservative approach to

tanks. They simply overlaid tank technology on top of existing

CONOPS and organizations. They saw tanks only in terms o

supporting infantry units. To an extent, they were correct—

tank support made infantry units better. However, by using a

radically new technology solely to improve and support

existing units, the French missed the armored RMA of WWII

The result was Sedan 1940. The French had no idea of how to

deal with the speed of German panzer thrusts, and they had

no counter of their own. Although both armies had tanks

14
(in fact, the French had more tanks than the Germans)

their methods of employment differed greatly. How they

employed this new technology was decisive. The fall of France

provides a clear-cut lesson: CONOPS and supporting

organizational structures are crucial when exploiting radically

new technologies.

Today’s aerospace planners face decisions of simila

magnitude. Fundamentally new technologies are emerging

They will underwrite the next RMA. However, we won’t realize

the next RMA unless we devise new ways to employ the mix o

emerging and present technologies, plus build organizationa

structures best suited to support this mix.

What are today’s emerging technologies? There are four: infor

mation, C2, penetration and precision. Future commanders

will amass an incredible amount of data about the conflict arena

and they will have the technical means to cycle high-fidelity

taskings in near real time. Weapons will reach targets through

out the depth and breadth of the theater and, after penetrating

these weapons will hit exactly where they’re aimed. Previous

generations of military leaders had bits and pieces of these

capabilities, but they never had them all. The synergistic use

of these technologies offers the potential for an RMA .

If history is any guide, aerospace forces must devise

radically different CONOPS and supporting organizations to

realize the full potential of the coming radically new

technologies. It will be a singular stroke of luck if current US

aerospace CONOPS and organizations bridge the gap between

current and future technologies. Devising fundamentally new

CONOPS and organizational structures will prove tremen

dously difficult, however. It will challenge career paths

hard-won modernization programs, professional military

education, and a host of other facets crucial to success in war

Nevertheless, confronting this challenge is a prerequisite for

realizing this revolution in military affairs.

Complicating our search is the fact that these technologies

aren’t secret. Both sides in a future war will have access to the

same underwriting technologies. Both will have greatly

improved information, C2, penetration, and precision. Both

may have innovative employment concepts and organizations

Therefore, planners must not only devise ways to use these

15
new technologies; they must also make their operationa

concepts capable of succeeding while under attack from

similar enemy capabilities. This is an immense challenge. It is

the challenge this book is intended to evoke.

Caution: There is a natural tendency within today’s military

to focus on defeating these new technologies. We speak o

information denial, viruses, antistealth radars, and spoofing

technologies as having the potential to negate these emerging

technologies. By orienting our defenses on these new types o

threats, some argue, we can continue to rely on existing

concepts of operations—concepts that have proven successfu

in past wars. Such thinking is a serious mistake.

When new military technologies arrive, we must learn to

live with them. Hoping they’ll go away is futile. Can you

imagine army generals in the 1930s arguing that all they

needed was an antitank weapon to make tanks obsolete? O

navy admirals arguing that all they needed was an

antiaircraft gun to make airplanes obsolete? Unfortunately

historians tell us, some generals and admirals made exactly

those arguments. They reacted to new—and unproved—

technologies by focusing on defenses. To a degree they were

right: Improved defenses made the tank and the aircraf

vulnerable. Their error lay in equating vulnerability with

obsolescence. The two aren’t the same. The successfu

generals and admirals of WWII were those who exploited th

capabilities and flaws in these new technologies while learnin

to live in the environment they created.

The successful generals and admirals of our next wars wil

be the ones who understand that advanced capabilities in

information, C2, penetration, and precision are here to stay

We can—and will—increase the vulnerabilities of these

technologies, but we’ll never make them obsolete. We must

resist the temptation to believe that better defenses will allow us

to return to the old and proven ways of doing business

Advanced information, C2, penetration, and precision ar

integral to future war; we must adapt to thrive in their environ

ment. This adaptation will realize the current revolution in

military affairs.

16
Simulation

Today’s state of the art is tomorrow’s antique. Because of the

rapid pace of information technologies, “cutting edge” today is

“out-of-date” tomorrow. The half-life of today’s hi-tech is

measured in months, not years. If you doubt these axioms o

modern life, ask anyone who has bought a personal comput er

Any computer bought today is invariably bettered in price

capacity, and speed within months. Whether we like it or not

rapid obsolescence in technology is the norm today. Staying on

the leading edge of modern technology is a never-ending effort.

Nor is rapid obsolescence confined to the civil sector

military programs see the same effects. Computers in the first

production J-STARS E-8C have 200 times the capability o

those in the prototype E-8A deployed to the 1991 Gulf War 

Subcomponents of the B-2 are already old technology. Thes

examples are not criticisms of particular weapon systems

rather, they are examples of normal lag times between

technology introduction and weapon system production.

It is important to stress, however, that procurement of a

weapon system does not end this lag time. Putting an airplane 

on the ramp does not mean that it’s ready for war. New

weapons require trained personnel; operators and maintainers

must learn how to use and fix their new equipment. New

weapons also require integration into the rest of the force

Those charged with devising operational plans mus

thoroughly understand the capabilities and shortfalls of new

systems. Supported and supporting organizations must also

understand each new system’s contributions. Realizing the ful

potential of a new technology requires retraining across the

entire institution, and this takes time.

This time lag raises a critical issue for aerospace planners

Given a new technology, how much time can we spend in

procuring the weapon and training the force—and still have a

state-of-the-art weapon system? If procurement takes 10–15

years and training takes another 5–10 years, it is unlikely tha

state of the art will wait—unless no one else arms for war

That’s a poor assumption for strategic planning!

In essence, today’s rapid technological change means

aerospace planners must compress both their procuremen

17
systems and their training systems. It does little good to

compress one and not the other. It is important to field new

technologies faster and to accelerate the training system. I

operators must have a new system in their hands before they

can put it in their brains, the cycle will always be long; it coul d

induce a critical delay in the next war. The side that can best

identify superior technologies and train its entire force to

optimize them will have a decisive advantage. German Army

doctrine emphasized this necessity over 60 years ago:

New arms give ever new forms to combat. To foresee this

technical evolution before it occurs, to judge well the influence

of these new arms on battle, to employ them before others, is

an essential condition for success.

16

Achieving this advantage in an era of rapid change will require

considerable innovation. One avenue having considerable

promise for compressing the procurement training timeline is

computer simulation. Computer simulation can contribute in

five general areas:

1. Reduce the time, resources, and risks of the acquisition

process. Simulation can also increase the quality of the system

being acquired. Virtual prototypes can support the many phases

of the acquisition process and the testing of new systems.

2. Allow aerospace planners to develop doctrine and tactics

while a weapon is still in development. Planners will be able to

explore a new technology’s incorporation into the complete

spectrum of military operations prior to its fielding. Feedback

can be available in near real time, with scenario recon

struction systems providing robust analysis capabilities

Information architectures, especially those dealing with

automated C2, can be tested across several mission areas.

3. Allow joint training with programmed weapons, active

and reserve forces, multiple echelons, and large-scale forces

Computer-generated forces (friendly, neutral, and hostile

can replace human participants, allowing the representation

of realistic large-scale forces in synthetic environments

controlled by small numbers of human commanders. Synthetic

environments can bridge large geographic regions worldwide

and involve the entire joint force, from senior commanders

down to individual airmen. Trainees can interact with synthe ti

18
environments through projected and alternative 

go-to-war com

mand, control, communications, computers, and intelligence

(C4I) equipment and weapons.

4. Allow leaders to explore alternative plans, doctrines, and

tactics. Computer simulation can support planners by providing

insights into the effectiveness of theater-level campaign plans

operational-level battle plans, and tactical-level mission plans

Decision makers can simulate and evaluate consequences o

alternative courses of action. Automated scenario generation

and database construction tools, along with easily accessible

database repositories, can enable short-notice models and

simulations, allowing computer simulation to support crisi

action planning.

5. Allow war fighters and military planners to rehearse

missions. Simulators can immerse war fighters in a synthetic

environment that accurately models the anticipated terrain

environmental conditions, and threat. This capability can

increase the probability of mission success by fostering

familiarity and proficiency with the mission plan while

providing feedback to improve the plan.

Simulation is only one part of the overall acquisition and

training process. It has definite limitations, not the least o

which is its poor capabilities at the strategic level of war

However, computer simulation has the potential to aid both

analysis (making better decisions) and training (inducing

better behavior). It can be conducted with varying levels o

human interaction. Its greatest attribute may reside in

identifying interfaces and analyzing interoperability. Varying

aspects of warfare (joint, ground, air, naval, NBC, R&D

training, C2, communications, logistics, intelligence, space

special operations, etc.) are all amenable to some measure o

computer simulation.

Staying on the cutting edge of rapidly advancing technologies

is tough to do. It requires continual learning and reequip- ping

To compete in this environment demands an ability to quickly

procure and incorporate new hardware and software. Failure

to do so will result in CONOPS and equipment that fall short

of state of the art. Computer simulation has consider

able potential for helping us to thrive in this era of rapid

change.

19
Notes

 1. Adm William A. Owens, “Vision Force 2005: The Pendin

Revolution,” briefing, vice chairman joint chiefs of staff, March 1995.

 2. Inserting false data into an enemy’s information system is probably

the most effective tactic in information war . It encourages the enemy to

(1) mistrust all its data; and (2) construct internal barriers (or gateways) for

data entry.

 3. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-CHI-93-126, 2 July

1993, 22.

 4. Vladimir I. Slipchenko, “A Russian Analysis of Warfare Leading t

the Sixth Generation,” Field Artillery, October 1993, 38.

 5. In a similar vein, all components employ aircraft, but only one (the

Air Force) has the primary missions of strategic attack and defeat of the

enemy’s air force.

 6. Secretary of the Army Michael P. W. Stone, Preliminary Repor

Lessons from Operations Desert Shield and Storm, 22 April 1991, 7. Entir

report is classified (Secret). Information extracted is unclassified.

 7. Richard O. Hundley and Eugene C. Gritton, Future Technology

Driven Revolutions in Military Affairs (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994), 68.

 8. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn o

the 21st Century (Boston: Little Brown, and Co., 1993). First Wave states ar

agrarian-based. Second Wave states are industrial-based. Third Wave state

are information-based.

 9. Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, “War in the Information Age,

Military Review, April 1994, 56.

10. Roger A. Freeman, Mighty Eighth War Diary (London: Jane’

Publishing Co., 1981), 9–161.

11. CENTAF Master Attack Plan, 16 January 1991. Although the plan i

classified, these figures are unclassified.

12. Adm William A. Owens , “The Emerging System of Systems,

Proceedings, May 1995, 38.

13. Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, “Getting the Air Force into the 21s

Century,” speech to the Air Force Association’s Air Warfare Symposium

Ireland, Fla., 24 February 1995. Italics and underlining in the original.

14. For a more complete overview see James R. FitzSimonds and Jan M

van Tol, “Revolutions in Military Affairs,” Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1994

24–31.

15. William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress

(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1995), 107.

16. Excerpt from Die Truppenfuhrung, 1933, quoted by Matthew Cooper

The German Army 1933–1945: Its Political and Military Failure (New York

Stein and Day, 1978), 137.

20
Chap ter 2

Peer Competitor

Along with today’s military focus on major regiona

contingencies (MRC),* moderate-sized conflicts, airmen mus

also prepare for war with a future peer. While major regiona

contingencies are more likely and deserve immediate

attention, planning for them won’t suffice for war with a peer

War with a peer would involve higher degrees of scope

casualty tolerance, national mobilization, and—mos

importantly—enemy military capabilities. In a war with

twenty-first century equivalents of Nazi Germany or the Sovie

Union, the risks and downsides of a US defeat would be

great—far greater than in an MRC-level war. To twist a cold

war phrase, war with a peer would not be a “greater included

case” of an MRC.

A peer competitor is capable of fielding multiple types and

robust numbers of both emerging and present weapons, then

developing a new concept of operations (CONOPS) to realize

the full potential of this mix. Its goal is to capture a vital interest

of the United States, then defeat the US military response.

Fortunately, the chance of war with a peer is remote. The

US has unquestioned military superiority over all possible

adversaries. No potential peer nation is arming for war with

the United States. The US currently exceeds every defense

budget in the world by at least a factor of four, spending as

much on defense as the next eight largest defense budgets in

the world combined.1 The US is at peace with the few

nations capable of reaching peer status; war with a peer is

not on the horizon.

Unfortunately, this favorable environment won’t last. I

history teaches us anything, it teaches us times change

Despite current optimism, humankind has not seen the end

of major war. Major war may happen in 10 years (unlikely)

21

*The term Major Regional Contingency (MRC) was defined by US Secretary of Defens

Les Aspin in Report of the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993.
or 15 years (possible), or sometime after that (virtually

certain). Defense planners should regard conflict with a peer

as inevitable; only the timing is unknown. For discussion

purposes, this book assumes the early edge of the window—it

discusses war with a peer beginning in 2010.

This 2010 time frame is arguable. Some may view 2010 as

too far away; they believe it a waste of time to fine-tune future

decisions because we’ll revisit today’s decisions many times

between now and 2010. On the other hand, others consider

2010 too close; because it’s only 15 years away, they say, most

of our present inventory will still exist. In fact, they point out,

some systems in the current program objectives memorandum

(POM) will still be in production in 2010. They recommend

that we really stretch our thinking and consider a war in 2020 

or 2030. To clarify the reason for a 2010 focus, it might be

helpful to draw an analogy with the interwar period.

In the mid-1920s, the “war to end all wars” had just ended

Democracies were triumphant. International tensions wer

few. Military spending was tight. Few people thought another

war between the great powers was probable. In fact, most

people considered such a war inconceivable. Unfortunately

however, World War II was only 15 years away. Great powe

conflicts sparked by unforeseeable events initiated rearma

ment in the mid-1930s—and global war five years later. In this

short period of 15 years, international politics radically

changed. Linear projections of the future became worthless

Conflict with a peer went from being inconceivable in 1925 to

the national purpose 15 years later.

It is important to understand that the rapid change of the

interwar period was not unique. Swift, discontinuous change

is the norm throughout modern history. The normal course o

events is to experience fundamental change in short periods o

time. However uncomfortable this history is for planners, we

must recognize rapid change in international politics and

technology is a given. The change witnessed between the

Treaty of Locarno (1925) and the Battle of Sedan (1940

reflected many other 15-year periods in history. For example

consider the 15 years starting in 1945. Imagine giving a

speech in 1945 in which you predicted that, by 1960, the US

would

22
• begin 40+ years of 

cold war  with the USSR,

• see the Soviets test an A-bomb before the end of the decade,

• see the USSR launch the first space satellite,

• see China “fall,”

• fight a communist China in Korea,

• strongly back the new Jewish state in Palestine,

• build atomic-powered ships, and

• face a communist Cuba.

You would have been laughed off the stage. Your audience

would have rejected the possibility of these changes

Nonetheless, each event occurred, with profound impacts on

the US military. Policymakers had to face a radically different

strategic situation. Another example would be the next 15-year

period (1960–1975). The US lost a war, witnessed a president

assassinated, saw a president and a vice president resign in

disgrace, watched as France withdrew from NATO’s military

structure, began the “Great Society” program, went off the gold

standard, and saw one-dollar-a-gallon gasoline. If you’re stil

not convinced, take the next 15-year period, 1975–1990. Who

in 1975 predicted seeing, within 15 years:

• Computers on every desk

• The US as the world’s number one debtor

• Quarter-trillion-dollar federal budget deficits

• Honda as the number one car in America

• Capitalism in China

• Disintegration of the USSR

• A US-Iraq War (with Russian approval and Syria as an ally)

• Peace between Egypt and Israel

• The Iranian Revolution

• A Polish Pope

As we look towards the future, we should keep these lessons o

modern history in mind. The world can change radically in a

little as 15 years—and usually does. If we are lucky, change

over the next 15 years will be positive and peaceful. We may

experience an extended period of “deep peace.” Statesmen may

successfully avoid war. Nations may concentrate on interna

and economic matters. Whatever change we experience may be

peaceful and stable. In fact, we can make a good case “deep

peace” is the most likely future scenario. It’s tough to sculpt a

23
credible scenario where great powers have no better option

than war. None of the great powers should fight over farmland

(food is plentiful and cheap). Nor should they fight over

resources. Oil, the only obvious resource that might force a

war, should remain abundant for the next several decades.

When building war games, our planners have great difficulty

devising a credible cause for major war. Major war is difficult

to posit as a likely scenario.

Nevertheless, prudent planners cannot dismiss war’s possibility

The summer of 1914, which saw an assassination turn into a

World War, provides sufficient precedent for political stupidity

Whether we like it or not, great powers will eventually “stupid”

themselves into war. This war could start after some sort o

crisis. Its nature could be environmental, viral, economic, or

ideological. Regardless of cause, we must assume a major war

will someday happen. Miscalculations by one or more of the

parties will eventually escalate a crisis into a major war.

2

With this possibility in mind we must add another variable

Just as the international environment can change quickly, so

can military operations. Again, the interwar period is

instructive. In the short period between 1925 and 1940, the

science of war changed radically. Armies, navies, amphibious

forces, and air forces underwent revolutions. The German

army developed armored warfare. The US and Japanese navies

developed carrier warfare. The US Marines developed

amphibious warfare. The Royal Air Force and the US Army

developed aerial warfare. Advances in technology and doctrine 

revolutionized warfare. As a result, the character of war fough

in 1940 was entirely different from that possible in 1925.

Changes in air force inventories illustrate this point. In

1925, biplane bombers such as the Curtiss B-2 were state o

the art—and extremely expensive. Within 15 years they were

obsolete. Aviation technology sped past the biplane. The heavy

bombers and monoplane fighters of World War II , with thei

training, logistics, and basing infrastructures, bore little

resemblance to the inventory of the Army Air Service in 1925.

24

*Some people include “fresh water” as a future scarce resource. However, given

enough oil, a state can convert sea water to fresh water. Other critical resources have

either substitutes or multiple sources.
Although the equipment of 1925 quickly became obsolete

the thinking of this era directly affected initial WWI

operations. During the interwar years, prophets like William

(“Billy”) Mitchell and groups like the Air Corps Tactical Schoo

built the doctrine of strategic bombing. Their thinking

combined with the civilian aircraft industry’s emphasis on

large aircraft, drove the Air Corps focus on heavy bombers. As

a direct consequence of this focus, most of the funding during

the tight budget years of the Great Depression went to heavy

bombers. This procurement made B-17s available at WWII’

outset; B-17s embodied the Air Corps doctrine of strategic

bombardment.

At the same time, this doctrine dampened development o

long-range fighters. For this reason, large numbers of P-51s

and P-38s did not arrive in Europe until two years after the

war began. Even when these long-range escort fighters did

arrive, it took several months of trial and error to devise their

optimum CONOPS.

3 This shortfall in long-range fighte

inventories and CONOPS was a direct result of interwar

thinking.

25

Figure 3. Radical Change in 15 Years
During this short period, both the inventories and the

doctrine of airpower underwent fundamental change. Of these

two changes, developments in doctrine were far more

enduring. While the inventories of 1920–1935 were irrelevan

to WWII, the doctrines developed during that era dictated the

initial employment of airpower in WWII.

Although major conflict is currently improbable, given

current international conditions, history tells us that those

conditions will quickly—and radically—change. For reasons

unknowable today, major conflict will erupt at some time in

the future. For planning purposes, we must assume (1) some

sort of major crisis will eventually heighten internationa

tensions; (2) these tensions will spark a military buildup, and

(3) war will follow.

Could all this happen within the next decade? Very unlikely

The stream of events required to produce a major conflict

between great powers will take time. Only when we project

beyond 15 years do we enter the realm of the possible

Unlikely to be sure, but still possible at the early edge of this

window. Given the downsides inherent in being unprepared

we believe it necessary to explore this possibility.

To envision this future war, planners should start with

possible future weapon systems as their baseline—not what i

currently on the ramp and in procurement. As the WWI

experience shows, most of today’s weapons will be obsolete for

a 2010 war. For example, it is very unlikely that today’s

models of cruise missiles and satellites will reflect the state o

the art in 2010. Nor will bombers. Just as advances in engine

technologies made the 1925 Curtiss B-2 bomber obsolete in

WWII, advances in information technologies will bypass the

avionics/computers/munitions in today’s Northrop B-2 bomber

Although today’s weapons will become obsolete, today’s

thinking will not. The doctrines developed today will be

critical. If the World War II analogy holds, doctrines developed

today will guide rearmament and initial operations in the nex

war. Today’s planners will develop the operational concepts for

a 2010 war; how US aerospace forces fight tomorrow will b

guided by how US aerospace planners think today. For thi

reason, we need to explore the concept of war with a peer

competitor in the 2010 time frame.

26
Environment

When projecting a major conflict with a peer, planners must

expect both sides to employ significant numbers of advanced

technology aerospace systems. These systems will include

1. Atmospheric and space-based reconnaissance and com

munications systems. These systems will vary in quality and

quantity between opponents. They will, at a minimum, be able 

to detect massive force movements and relay this information

in near real time despite significant enemy countermeasures.

2. Information Age command and control systems. Future

C2 will devise and direct integrated taskings with high fidelity

in near real time. They’ll be heavily automated and dispersed

Attacks on any single node of this structure will not have

catastrophic effects.

3. Stealth aircraft and stealth cruise missiles. Both side

will deploy tens of thousands of aerospace weapons with low

signatures. These very low-observable weapons will use

state-of-the-art electronic warfare systems to further increase

their chances of penetration. Stealthy cruise missiles will b

inexpensive, allowing their employment in massive numbers.

4. Precision weapons. Reflecting current trends in senso

technologies, precision weapons will have less than one meter

accuracy with brilliant munitions.

4 They will guid

independently of external positioning systems (e.g., globa

positioning system [GPS]), and they will have automatic targe

recognition capabilities.

5 Some of these weapons will retain

their accuracy regardless of weather or darkness.

In addition to these emerging technologies, both sides wil

possess large numbers of nuclear weapons plus delivery

systems capable of worldwide reach.* This strategic nuclear

threat will significantly constrain military operations. Due to

the possibility of nuclear retaliation, each side may place

restrictions on attacks against the other’s homeland. Politica

leaderships may prohibit attacks on certain strategic targets

(e.g., leadership, satellite ground stations, enemy stealth

27

*This book does not assume international nuclear disarmament.
facilities) within the enemy

s borders, regardless of means

Both sides will have substantial resources and strategic depth

Neither will be overwhelmed by sheer numbers. Both wil

have an economy capable of producing large numbers o

state-of-the-art weapons. Both will have enough territory to

permit maneuver.*

War with a future peer will present challenges of a different

nature from those posed by an MRC scenario today. Both

sides will use multiple sensors to detect large force movements

and relay this information in near real time to stealthy aerospace weapon systems. Possibly operating from a sanctuary

these stealthy aerospace weapons will likely penetrate

aerospace defenses in significant numbers. Once in the targe

area, they will strike with great accuracy. Most importantly

these weapons will be employed and controlled in an innovative fashion. Both sides will employ emerging technologies in

ways that maximize their unique capabilities. Defense forces

will face a combination of advanced surveillance and

communications, innovative command and control, stealthy

attack systems, precision munitions, nuclear weapons, and

robust resources in the hands of an innovative attacker.

The fact that this war-fighting environment will be challenging

and destructive does not mean US aerospace forces can’

surmount it. Quite the contrary. If the US plays its cards right, i

could thrive in this environment. The US already possesses

early generations of the key emerging technologies. Fo

example, the US is experimenting with fourth generation

stealth aircraft while other nations are still trying to

understand stealth‘s basic physics. Stealth ownership allow

the US to devise counters and improvements to stealth in

practice while others must rely on theory. In addition to

stealth, the US leads most potential enemies in precision

weapons, space platforms, all-weather enabling technologies

information war, and simulation. As a result of this head start

28

*A precise definition of a peer in terms of size and depth isn’t possible. If size is a valid

criterion, it seems safe to say that small countries, along the lines of Singapore and

Israel, could never attain peer status. Countries with the size and wealth of Korea 

Brazil, and South Africa could.
the US can refine and integrate a series of key emerging

technologies while other militaries are still trying to build them.

In any war with a peer, US force structure would be far

greater than currently programmed. We can anticipate

substantial US rearmament as a peer competitor arms itsel

and relations sour. As that happens, the US will draw upon its

resources to rapidly field large numbers of the lates

generation of weapons. The US will not “sit pat” while a

potential peer enemy arms for war.

But technology alone doesn’t win wars; operational art i

decisive. Given rough parity in weaponry, whoever bes

employs its weapons wins the battle. History is replete with

examples where both sides employed roughly equal forces bu

with quite different employment schemes—and completely

different results. Sedan (1940), Midway (1942), and the Bekaa

Valley (1982) are but three examples of campaigns in which

the victor used a superior concept of operations to over

whelming advantage. As in past wars, future battles will be

won by the side that has the best concept of operations.

Today’s aerospace planners must devise superior employ

ment concepts for future weapons. Given the US lead in

technology and resources, the US should have superior

weaponry in a war with a peer. Whether the US will have a

superior CONOPS is less certain. In building a future

CONOPS, planners should start by forecasting future weapons

capabilities for the US and its peers. They should then ask

themselves whether current US offensive and defensive

CONOPS will thrive in that environment. If the answer is yes

our problem is greatly simplified; planners need only

incorporate these new weapons into current plans. If the

answer is no, however, planners must build new US offensive

and defensive aerospace CONOPS.

As a first step, we should ask ourselves: Will the current US

air defensive CONOPS suffice against a peer in 2010?

Unfortunately, the answer is probably “no.”

The current air defense CONOPS for all American military

forces assumes beyond visual range (BVR) detection of enemy

aircraft and missiles. We assume that long-range sensors

primarily radar and infrared, will detect and track enemy

aircraft and missiles far from the target area. Given this long

29
warning time, air defense C2 will have time to sculpt a

response. We further assume that commanders will have

sufficient time to pick the most efficient weapon, task that

weapon in a positive manner, and perform cross-checks to

decrease the chance of fratricide. For example, current US

weapon systems are built on the assumption that long-range

sensors will acquire the target. Patriot , AIM-7, AIM-120, and

AWACS assume that the target has a high radar signature

DSP and AIM-9 assume that the target has a high infrared

signature. Thus, a key assumption throughout the curren

30

Figure 4. Automated Versus Man-in-the Loop Decision Making
aerospace control CONOPS is that enemy aerospace platforms

will reflect or emit high signatures.

Unfortunately, that assumption will not prevail; future

warfare will involve thousands of stealthy cruise missiles and

aircraft with low signatures. The heat signatures of aircraf

and cruise missiles will be below the tolerances o

spaced-based infrared surveillance systems, making them

difficult to detect upon launch. Stealth technologies wil

decrease their chance of detection by radar. In addition

aircraft and cruise missiles will avoid intense defenses by

varying their routes. Even if detected in flight, their target wil

be uncertain. For all of these reasons, alerting specific

terminal defenders will be difficult.

Our present CONOPS also assumes limited numbers o

attacking missiles and aircraft. Due to the multimillion dollar

unit costs of aircraft and accurate ballistic missiles , we can

assume that any attack by these systems will be limited. For

example, the entire US Air Force (active duty, guard, and

reserve) inventory totals only 6,814 aircraft.6 While large in a

relative sense, this number is small in an absolute sense. A

limited inventory means limited attacks. Attacks can involve

only a few hundred at a time; at most a thousand. Reflecting

this limitation, coalition air forces launched only 931 attack

sorties during the first 24 hours of Operation Desert Storm .

Given these relatively limited numbers, the current aerospace

defense CONOPS is appropriate. A few hundred costly

attackers justifies multiple defensive shots by less expensive

(but still costly) SAMs and AIMs. Stealthy cruise missiles 

however, change this exchange ratio.

Stealthy cruise missiles are cheap. One US defens

contractor reported his company could build a –30db (fron

and rear aspect) cruise missile with 300 NM range fo

$100,000. He then added that one should not buy this missile

from his company; a company with less overhead could build

the same missile much cheaper. 8 Expected advances in

production technologies combined with economies of scale

(driven by large procurement runs) should cut the costs of very

low-observable cruise missiles even further.

Such low unit costs will allow a peer attacker to employ

stealthy cruise missiles in waves. At $100,000 per copy, a flee

31
of 100,000 stealthy cruise missiles would cost only $10 billion

Such a sum is well within the range of any peer anticipating

war with the US. A fleet this size could launch waves o

attackers. Each cruise missile would be cheaper than the US

defensive weapon sent against it (SAMs, AIMs). The current US

aerospace defense CONOPS, which shoots expensive missiles

at even more expensive aircraft and ballistic missiles , is ill

suited to a massive, continuous attack by cheap cruise missiles .

Another factor that must be considered is command and

control. Current C2 concepts for US aerospace defense are ill

suited to the emerging environment. With few exceptions (e.g.

Patriot batteries in automatic mode against incoming

missiles), lethal attacks on aerospace targets require human

decisions. Human fingers control every trigger. Usually, voice

commands are required prior to missile launch. In an era o

multiple penetrating targets, each with low signatures, such

positive control may prove insufficiently responsive. Only an

automated C2 structure will have the speed to react in

sufficient time to defeat a mass attack by low-signature

missiles. Unfortunately, the culture of current aerospace

organizations will slow the understanding of this shortfall.

32

Figure 5. Massive Stealthy Cruise Missile Attack
Another C2 shortfall is in the area of doctrine. US adherenc

to the doctrine of decentralized execution9 will degrad

defensive operations. Because of the increasing range o

defense weapons, multiple defenders may fire on the same

target at the same time. They may all have the motivation and

opportunity to engage the same target simultaneously

Different batteries of SAMs and flights of interceptors may also

overlap coverage of specific targets. We need to deconflict firing

decisions across our broad array of defensive weapons in this

environment.

Given a fast, lethal, and low-signature target, severa

defenders may feel the need to quickly take any shot that

presents itself. Given decentralized C2, several aircraft/

batteries might fire on the same target simultaneously. Or one

platform might shoot while another makes a counter

productive maneuver. Or no one might shoot, each thinkin

that another defender has the lead. The most appropriate

defender may even withhold its fire due to fears of threats yet

to appear. Low-signature targets pose a considerable problem

for future defenders.

Stringent rules of engagement (ROE) may solve the

deconfliction problem if all possible circumstances are worked

out in advance of the war. But such prescience is unrealistic

It would require an accurate projection of enemy capabilities

and friendly vulnerabilities in advance of the war. There’s no

historical precedent for such an accurate projection

Therefore, an alternative is necessary. Only a centralized C 

system has the potential to deconflict these factors in the

chaos of war. Directing long-range defensive missiles agains

short-range targets presents an immense C 2 challenge

Decentralized execution, effective in past wars, won’t answer

this challenge.

For all of these reasons, sophisticated stealth in the hands o

a peer enemy would render our current aerospace defense

CONOPS obsolete. If the US attempts to use its current air

defense CONOPS against a future peer aerospace threat, i

would not be able to enforce air supremacy.

10 Stealthy

attackers would likely penetrate in high numbers. Taking

advantage of modern surveillance and precision, they would

hit crucial targets with substantial effect. In essence, high

33
leverage enemy air attacks against US deployments would be

probable. Therefore, the US needs a new aerospace defense

CONOPS to survive in this future environment.

In this same context, we must also review future offensiv

operations. Will the current US offensive CONOPS suffice in

the future? Unfortunately, the answer again seems to be “no.”

The current US aerospace CONOPS anticipates extensive

use of in-theater systems. The overwhelming majority of these

in-theater systems (e.g., AWACS, KC-10, F/A-18E, F-15E

Army Tactical Missile System [ATACMS]) emit or reflect high

signatures. If employed against a future peer, they would be

highly vulnerable to detection by multiple layers of enemy

sensors. With this information, the peer enemy will inflic

substantial attrition. Stealthy interceptors (whether manned

or unmanned) will attack the airborne platforms. Stealthy

cruise missiles and bombers will attack their bases

Short-legged US stealthy systems, such as TLAM, F-22, and

F-117, would also be vulnerable. While survivable in flight

they depend on high-signature support systems (e.g., surface

ships, AWACS, air refuelers, fixed air bases). By attacking

these high-signature support systems, a peer enemy could

significantly degrade short-legged US stealth . Thes

vulnerabilities point to a recurrent theme in future warfare

theory: high-signature systems won’t survive. This theme

applies to aerospace forces as well as their ground and nava

cousins.

The stealthy cruise missile symbolizes this threat. Future

stealthy cruise missiles will (1) fly against critical targets, (2

penetrate into target areas in large numbers, and (3) hit within

feet of their targets. Stealthy cruise missiles, properly

supported by information and precision technologies, will make

high-signature, immobile forces extraordinarily vulnerable. Ai

supremacy, which is required to protect ammunition ships

needing days to unload, airlift aircraft needing hours to

off-load and refuel, large air bases with “tent cities,” and air

refueling aircraft parked nose-to-tail in the open, may not be

possible. In this emerging environment, the United States may

not be able to protect high-signature, theater-based aerospace 

forces. Absent a reasonable certainty of protection, any

CONOPS dependent on their survival is suspect.

34
Simply stated, we

in which the current US aerospace

CONOPS will prove inadequate for dealing with an

enemy employing advanced information, C2, penetration, and

precision in a sophisticated manner.

In addition to its impact on war fighting, this vulnerability

also raises a stability issue. Lacking an ability to absorb an

enemy attack in this new environment of advanced

information, C2, penetration, and precision, we will be tempted

by an overwhelming incentive to preemptively attack. This

defines a dangerous situation: Absent adequate defenses

whoever strikes first wins. When either side in a crisis

perceives an overwhelming advantage by striking first, tha

crisis will be inherently unstable.

Nuclear deterrence doctrine during the cold war addressed

crisis stability in great depth. To induce crisis stability, both

sides built large inventories, redundant systems (e.g., the

TRIAD), extensive surveillance, hardening, and innovative

CONOPS (e.g., airborne alert). The intent of these measures

was to heighten crisis stability. The nuclear deterrence

theorists did more than envision how to fight a nuclear war

they also described how to avoid “use or lose” situations

Today’s aerospace planners must sculpt similarly effective

crisis stability regimes for the emerging stealth environment.

In summary, today’s aerospace planners must devise a future

aerospace CONOPS with three projections in mind. First

aerospace defenses must anticipate a massive, low-signature

target set. CONOPS that assume long-range detection o

limited attackers will not thrive. Second, offensive aerospace

forces must de-emphasize high-signature, theater-based

forces. Their attrition in the emerging environment will be

sufficiently high to preclude high-tempo operations. Third

planners must take steps to induce greater crisis stabilit y

into the US force structure and CONOPS. Absent greater

redundancy and more effective defenses, the US could find

itself in a “use or lose” predicament during a crisis.

With these three themes in mind, the following 11 operationa

concepts will be critical to aerospace operations in a future

war with a peer.

• Conduct a defensive counterstealth campaign.

• Degrade enemy cruise missile guidance.

35
• Establish ballistic missile defense.

• Control and exploit space.

• Integrate ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance

systems.

• Support the Information Campaign.

• Conduct offensive strikes within enemy homeland.

• Attack enemy invasion/occupation forces.

• Avoid deployment of critical targets within range of enemy

stealth.

• Position JFACC in CONUS.

• Airlift critical supplies and spare parts into the combat area.

Conduct a Defensive Counterstealth Campaign

“Stealth” is synonymous with low observability—no

invisibility. Stealth systems will reflect or emit signals

intermittently during flight. Their “stealthiness” will vary

depending on aspect. While their frontal aspect may present a

very low-observable signature (–25 to –30 db), their side, rear

or overhead aspects may reflect to a much higher degree

Different radar bands will also offer different levels o

detection. By thoroughly fusing different types of sensors

throughout the battlespace, defenses might increase thei

detection of stealth systems—thus enhancing the cues

available for friendly fighters and air defense batteries. Once

cued, those defense systems could focus their sensors on a

specific area to track and target. The mix of defense sensors

should include these six characteristics:

1. Long-wavelength radars

 a. Land-based (due to power requirements)

 b. Airborne (to expand line-of-sight range)

2. High-altitude, possibly space-based, radars (to give a

vertical aspect)

3. UAVs with radar, infrared, and imaging sensors

4. SIGINT (to cue airfield attack, detect sortie generation)

5. High-power, short-range radars/lidars* arranged along

likely attack corridors (mobile to degrade preemption efforts)

6. High-fidelity and near-real-time kill assessment

36

*Lidar = light detection and ranging (a laser radar).
Sensor deployment must keep three principles in mind

First, all sensors must feed an integrated database. Stealth

systems will not allow many “hits.” The few detections received

might give a targeting solution if thoroughly fused. A fused

system of sensors might also decrease the chance of enemy

spoofing. Second, these sensors should be arranged in a

circular, vice linear, fashion. Stealth platforms have varied

signatures based upon aspect. It will be far easier to detect a

stealth missile/aircraft from the side or rear than from

head-on. In addition, because stealth platforms attempt to

reflect radar energy away from the transmitter, it would be a

great advantage if radar reflections from pulses emitted from

one location could be received in a second location. Third, as

the enemy tries to spoof sensors or as expected signatures fai

to mirror reality, field units must have the capacity to rapidly

adjust sensor algorithms.11 It will do little good to identify

every inbound stealthy target if multiple false targets are

concurrently displayed. The sensors must be designed to allow

rapid adjustment by trained operators.

Once wide-area defense sensors detect stealth missiles/

aircraft, they will cue air defense interceptors and missiles

The interceptors will need the following nine characteristics:*

1. Data link with the sensor fusion center. Onboard sensors

will not suffice to acquire and target enemy stealth. Inter

ceptors will need real-time updates from offboard sensors.

2. Long range. Interceptor bases should be beyond the range

of enemy cruise missiles (as should aerial refueling bases)

Interceptors must sortie from rear bases and loiter in the

expected engagement area.

3. Air-to-air missiles with multispectral seekers. At different

aspects of the engagement, different sensors may have a lock

on the target. Some combination of radar, acoustic, imaging

and IR sensors on the missile will be preferable to singlesensor missiles.

4. Missiles with long-range autonomous guidance

5. Missile warheads with increased blast radius

37

*These characteristics will apply to all interceptors, whether manned or unmanned

Teleoperated interceptors may be practical by 2010. If so, they would need capabilitie

along these lines.
6. Superior maneuverability. The best way to defeat stealth

fighters may be through visual acquisition and guns (as in

WWII).

7. Large numbers on combat air patrol at any one time

Since most detections of stealth aircraft and missiles will occu

at short range, interceptors must be nearby to effect the

intercept.

8. Light logistics. Air bases should be mobile. Squadrons

must regularly redeploy to complicate enemy attack planning.

9. Stealth. Interceptors will need low signatures. High

signature interceptors won’t survive in this environment. Both 

surface- and air-launched missiles (SAMs, AIMs) will increas

ingly be capable of autonomous tracking.

Air defense batteries will need these four characteristics:

1. Multispectral trackers and warhead seekers. At differen

aspects of the engagement, different sensors may have a lock

on the target. Some combination of radar, acoustic, imaging

and IR sensors, both on the ground-based tracker and on the

missile, will be preferable to single-sensor reliance.

2. Multiple shot and rapid reload. Assuming a low

signature target, individual SAMs may have low Pk. Advantage

will accrue to systems capable of firing with only a margina

solution vice a system needing a high Pk shot (which might

not happen). This will require inexpensive missiles and a rapid

firing capability. Laser and/or directed energy weapons may

prove to be weapons of choice.*

Note: This is a major issue. If cruise missiles are cheap

current missile defense concepts may find themselves on the

adverse side of the expense ratio. For example, using an

$800,000 Patriot missile to intercept a $100,000 cruise missile

is grossly inefficient. This inefficiency will increase if more

than one air defense missile is needed for each attacking

cruise missile (due to a less than 1.0 Pk) and large numbers o

air defense missiles are needed for every possible target area in

case of saturation attack.

38

*Due to attenuation caused by the atmosphere (e.g., severe weather), a mix of weapon

types may be preferable.
3. Mobility. Units must move daily to complicate enemy

attack planning. Movements should result in minima

downtime with continuous positive C4I.

4. Integrated effort with air defense fighters. Just as fighter

interceptors shoot targets with friendlies in the engagemen

zone, air defense batteries must be able to fight in airspace

occupied by friendly air defense fighters (joint engagemen

zone).

The overall approach should be to (1) fuse sensors to cue

and track very low-observables, (2) integrate defense weapons

so the most appropriate can be tasked whenever sufficien

target information is available, and (3) wrap the entire

aerospace defense system in an “OODA” loop of only a few

minutes.

Degrade Enemy Cruise Missile Guidance

Classic counterair operations seek to destroy enemy aircraf

either in the air or on the ground. Neither approach works wel

versus stealthy cruise missiles. Their inherent stealthiness

makes radar and visual interceptions very difficult. Nor are

attacks on cruise missile bases practical. Future peers will rely

on mobile launchers; no readily identifiable bases will exist

For all intents and purposes, cruise missiles are les

vulnerable to the two pillars of current defensive counterair

doctrine: air interception and airfield attack. Cruise missile

defense requires an additional approach.

The most exploitable weakness of cruise missiles may b

their guidance systems. It may be possible to degrade enemy

cruise missile effectiveness by targeting their navigation and

terminal area guidance. For example, if attacking cruise

missiles use GPS, defenders could manipulate the GPS

unencrypted civil code within 1,000 NM of enemy launch

areas. Because the GPS signal is very weak (.000001 watt), i

is highly vulnerable to low-power jammers. Scattered 10- o

25-watt jammers could degrade GPS accuracy in specific

areas. These jammers could either be on the ground or aboard

HALE UAVs; this would complicate possible jamming

countermeasures by varying the jamming direction. The GPS

signal could also be manipulated by spoofing or by turning off

39
the unencrypted civil code on those satellites within the field

of view of route/target area (the US would retain military mode

for US operations).*

Because of rapidly decreasing costs in inertial guidance (e.g.

quartz or fiber-optic INS), these counters may have li mited

usefulness. The peer may not depend solely on GPS fo

guidance. The peer may also jam GPS theater-wide. However

if the peer uses external systems to either update or navigate

cruise missiles, they’ll present a possible weakness.

Terminal seekers “look” for specific patterns in the targe

area. These patterns may involve an infrared, radar, image, or

acoustic signature (or some combination). Depending on the

sophistication of the seeker’s algorithm, it may be possible to

spoof the terminal seeker. By understanding the pattern the

seeker is programmed to find, decoy teams could devise

returns which would attract the terminal seeker to benign

areas. For this reason, understanding the seeker’s algorithm

should be a prime target of US intelligence. The job of spoofing

terminal seekers should be a primary mission of air defense

units (in addition to their physical interception mission).

Establish Ballistic Missile Defense

The principal advantages of ballistic missiles (speed, range

and mobility), make them integral to any weapons inventory

Assuming sensor-to-warhead target data transmission, a

near-real-time (NRT) decision cycle, and warheads capable o

identifying/tracking mobile targets (e.g., ships, TELs), ballistic

systems offer unique and important military capabilities. Mos

importantly, they can kill targets with limited windows o

vulnerability.

However, ballistic missiles have a major vulnerability. They

offer a high signature. Ballistic missiles have a large infrared

signature at launch and are radar reflective. They have minima

maneuverability. They can be tracked from launch through

impact. Given these attributes, we can conceive of several ways

to defeat ballistic missiles. Improved aerospace technologies

40

*As civil dependence on GPS increases, it will be politically impossible to “turn-off

GPS except in dire circumstances. War with a peer over a vital US interest, however

would meet this restriction.
(e.g., lasers, kinetic kill), integrated with improved computing

technologies, offer considerable promise.

Key to ballistic missile defense (BMD) will be an integrated

architecture which targets all aspects of a ballistic missile’s lif

cycle. This life cycle includes: production; transportation

support personnel; C4I; defenses; and the missile’s thre

phases of flight (boost, post-boost, and terminal). This air

defense architecture should have unitary command (except for

point defenses) and be thoroughly exercised in peacetime

Finally, fixed, high-signature BMD will prove too vulnerable to

the stealth cruise missile threat. Therefore, interceptors and

sensors must also be mobile.

Unfortunately, a leak-proof BMD is probably impossible. As

the Air Force Chief of Staff opined in 1995: “I’m not sure we’re

ever going to have 100 percent capacity to catch inbound

missiles.”

12 Because some leakage is probable, operations

dependent on large force concentrations are untenable; we

must devise military forces capable of dispersed operations.

Control and Exploit Space

Space will undoubtedly be a center of gravity in any future

war with a peer. Space offers a medium for near instantaneous

cheap, worldwide communications. It offers the possibility o

continuous surveillance of terrestrial events plus highly

accurate positioning. These are war-deciding capabilities. I

one side can exploit space for communications, collection, and

positioning—while denying similar capabilities to its enemy—i

will gain a decisive advantage. In 1986, the Chief of Nava

Operations recognized this point directly:

Today we know that in wartime, even in a conventional war of 

limited duration, the two superpowers would fight a battle of

attrition in space until one side or other had wrested control.

And the winner would then use the surviving space systems to

decide the contests on land and sea.

13

In general terms, war in space will mirror any other kind o

war. It will have offensive and defensive aspects. Militaries wil

attack enemy satellites while trying to defend their own

satellites. Space war will be fought over distances great and

small. Targets will range from the surface of the earth (ground

41
stations) to GEO (geosynchronous earth orbit), plus every

where in between. Weapons will be manned and unmanned

kinetic-kill, and energy-kill. Environmental damage wil

temper operations. Targets will include all facets of each space

weapon (e.g., C2, infrastructure, production base, personnel

and defenses). While the physics of space will dictate uniqu

weapons technologies, future war in space will involve goals

similar to those applicable in terrestrial warfare.

If left unchallenged, space architectures will provide

war-winning information. Prior to war, space sensors wil

unobtrusively observe enemy force deployments, national and

military infrastructures, and physical characteristics o

potential areas of operation. These capabilities parallel much

of what the US Army stresses in METT-T (mission, enemy

tactics, terrain, time). Two of the five (enemy, terrain) are

observable from space; mission and tactics can be inferred

from satellite reconnaissance. Having this information prior to 

a war has immense military value.

During the conflict, space will act as the “grid” on which

critical information architectures “hang.” Satellites will survei

enemy maneuvers, assess friendly forces, aid positioning, and

facilitate communications. These capabilities will support both

the offense and the defense. They will help guide targeting

decisions while alerting terrestrial units of possible enemy

attacks. These are critical warfighting capabilities. They’l

enable every facet of combat, combat support, and comba

service support.

Space will also serve as a transit medium. Ballistic missiles

and some sensors will transit space on suborbital trajectories

Either side in a war may wish to attack those platforms while

still in space. For these reasons, neither side in a major war

can allow its opponent unchallenged use of space .

Challenges to satellites will fall into four areas: ground- and

space-based lasers; exoatmospheric EMP/MHD/HPM*; jam

ming; and kinetic kill. These systems will vary in effectiveness

The first two (lasers and frequency weapons) pose the lesse

challenge. Lasers can be negated through shielding. Proven

42

*EMP: electromagnetic pulse (<1MHZ); MHD: magneto-hydrodynamic (1-100MHZ

HPM: high-powered microwave (100-200MHZ).
technologies can dissipate laser energy throughout the target

Frequency hardening (especially against EMP) is a well

understood, though expensive, process. Although a single type

of shield cannot defeat all types of frequency weapons

shielding can protect satellites. To negate lasers and frequency

weapons, military satellites should incorporate these features

For weight and cost reasons, however, COMSATs will not.

The latter two space interdiction threats (jamming and

kinetic kill) are more problematic. Engineers can passively

degrade the jamming threat to communications via frequency

hopping and narrowly-focused signals (e.g., EHF, laser )

However, many forces will continue to rely on unfocused UHF

signals. Such signals could remain susceptible to

high-powered jamming. Their best defense may reside in using

suppression forces against the jammers. Because jammers

emit, they give away their precise location to antiradiation

missiles. The inherently high signature of jammers is a

substantial vulnerability.

Suppression of low-power jammers, however, will prove

difficult. If the satellite is broadcasting or receiving low

powered signals, a low-powered jammer may suffice to

interfere with its signal. This interference may render norma

transmissions unreliable. Such low-powered jammers could be

deployed in large numbers. They could also be mobile (space 

air, land). Either technique would make suppression through

interdiction difficult.* Also, jammer inventories will be

important. Jammers produced and deployed by the thousands

throughout the theater could overwhelm directional antijam

filters installed on receivers.

The interdiction threat will vary depending upon target orbit

Because satellites in low earth orbit (LEO) can be reached by

air-launched ASATs and space-based interceptors (e.g.

Brilliant Pebbles), they will be vulnerable to frequent

short-warning, and relatively inexpensive attack. Their bes

chance for individual survival probably rests in increased

43

*A jammer aboard a satellite in close proximity to a GPS satellite would b

exceptionally difficult to defeat. By co-orbiting the jamming satellite slightly ahead o

the GPS satellite, an enemy would make some US interdiction efforts difficult. Fo

example, a kinetic kill of the jamming satellite might scatter debris in the GP

satellite’s orbit.
maneuverability and threat detection. By changing orbit when

an ASAT/interceptor is en route, the target satellite may

degrade the ASAT/interceptor’s targeting solution (and its Pk)

Unfortunately, this solution requires significant payload

penalties. Extra fuel for maneuvering (and reacquiring the

orbit) means less mission payload. Another possibility is

co-orbital escort satellites. Just as fighters regularly escor

reconnaissance aircraft and bombers within the atmosphere

escort satellites could escort/protect high-value collection

satellites in space. The escort satellites would target ASAT /

interceptors attempting to intercept the protected satellite 

These concepts of escort and maneuverability have significan

downsides, however, principally in terms of magazine capacity 

and launch costs.

The best chance for architecture survivability will require a

combination of maneuverability, escort, and—most impor

tantly—rapid replenishment.* In a sense, satellites in the nex

war should take a page from heavy bomber survival tactics in

WWII. Although WWII bombers were readily detected and flew

predictable routes (similar to satellites ), their limited

maneuverability and escorts provided enough protection for

operations to continue. This protection sufficed because

bombers were readily replaceable.** As soon as one bomber

was lost, another took its place. For example, the Eighth Air

Force lost, on average, 12 percent of its fleet each month in

1943 and 1944.

14 Despite these losses, Eighth AF heavy

bomber inventories rose during that time. Although protection 

of the bombers was never very good, defensive measures and

robust production sufficed to keep gains ahead of losses. LEO

satellites in the next war should be as replaceable as bombers

were in WWII.

15 Assuming that satellites in LEO will fac

similar attrition because they will operate in a simila

situation (a high-value target, operating over enemy territory

44

 *Before dismissing this analogy out of hand, readers should put themselves in th

places of military planners in 1925. From a 1925 perspective, the costs and attrition

of WWII were horrendous. Nevertheless, they happened. The costs and attrition of 

2010 war with a peer will also be horrendous. Nevertheless, we must prepare with the 

scale of previous peer wars in mind.

**Bomber aircrew attrition, a most important factor in evaluating bomber operations

is omitted here because aircrew attrition has no direct comparison in satellit

operations.
on a predictable route), a replacement regime on a par with

that for WWII bombers is mandatory.

Satellite maneuverability would severely complicate ASAT

targeting—if the enemy’s space tracking capabilities were

degraded prior to any maneuvering. Satellite locations are, a

best, estimates based on studies of previous flight paths

change the flight path and you change the expected location. If

the enemy is unable to construct a new flight path after a

satellite‘s maneuver, it would be unable to predict an intercept

location. For this reason, satellite tracking facilities will be

prime targets in any war with a peer.

Satellites in GEO should experience higher survivability

They’ll also be vulnerable to ASATs, but three constraints wil

mitigate these vulnerabilities. First, sophisticated ASATs (with 

extensive maneuverability and multiple sensors) will probably

need a heavy booster to reach GEO. Heavy boosters require a

considerable launch infrastructure. The limited number o

such space-launch facilities could be targeted by nonletha

(e.g., conventional EMP) means.* Second, because easterly

tracks along the equator are the most efficient for air launches

into GEO, combat air patrols along likely launch tracks migh

degrade launch efforts. Third, an ASAT would nee

considerable time to climb to GEO for the intercept. During

this time, countermeasures (e.g., maneuvering, a defense

antisatellite weapon [D-ASAT], electronic intrusion) could

occur. While satellites in GEO will be vulnerable to

interception, these factors will make GEO satellites mor

survivable than satellites in LEO.

Offensive operations against enemy space systems wil

parallel these defensive measures. Enemy systems without the

proper shielding, frequency management, maneuverability

and encryption will be vulnerable to interdiction. One caution

It is doubtful that the NCA will authorize a first strike on

enemy space systems and infrastructure. We should assume

that the enemy will strike first. Given this assumption, the US

must have replacement satellites (and their launchers) ready

at war’s outset.

45

*Should nonlethal weapons fail, the NCA might approve a conventional attack on th

ASAT launch facility.
Protecting the information flow will become as important as

protecting the information collectors. Loss of either has the

same effect. If US forces depend solely on satellites in GEO fo

data relay (e.g., SATCOMs, such as the military strategic and

tactical relay satellite [MILSTAR]), it would present the enemy

with a “single point failure” target set. By destroying the

limited number of US military communications satellites, th

enemy would make many US reconnaissance satellites les

effective. To lessen this vulnerability, alternate information

flows are needed. The most obvious is the civilian communication constellations projected for the near future. Iridium

Globalstar, and Teledesic, for example, promise to provide

considerable bandwidth. However, these satellites will hav

two major weaknesses. They will orbit in LEO and won’t b

maneuverable. Enemy ASATs will take advantage of these

weaknesses. They will likely “attrit” COMSATs in LEO (unles

the enemy is also using the same LEO satellites fo

communications).

As with collection satellites, UAVs may offer an alternative.

A HALE UAV at 80,000 feet has a horizon of approximately

400 NM. Thus, it has line-of-sight connectivity with a similar

UAV at the same altitude 800 NM away. A string of HALE

UAVs, each 500–800 NM apart, could relay communications

over several thousand miles. The last downlink could be to a

ground station, connected via fiber optic cable with the

national communications grid.** This downlink receiver could

be either civilian or military, overt or covert.***

This UAV relay system would not replace a SATCOM system

but rather provide an alternative channel to satellites. It migh

also provide two additional benefits. First, a UAV architectur

allows modifications of existing hardware on a daily basis

Unlike SATCOMs, which are “frozen” in R&D long before launch 

and, once launched, do not allow further hardware

modifications, a UAV fleet could receive continuous hardware

updates. Given the rapid pace of telecommunication

46

 *HALE UAVs could also back up positioning (e.g., GPS) satellites.

 **Any third wave country could supply the downlink station. All are connected with

the information grid through fiber-optic cable.

***An ability to rapidly lay fiber-optic cable would further enhance this alternative.
technology, this is no small benefit. Second, an additiona

communications channel would induce a measure of stability

in a crisis. As both sides postured for possible war, each would

be tempted to preemptively attack the other’s satellites. Given

the vulnerability of satellites and their critical role in a future

war, this “first strike” temptation may prove overwhelming

However, an alternative communications system would lessen

the military advantage gained by a first strike on communications satellites. As a result, it could heighten crisis stability.

The concept of first strikes in space raises an importan

point. It is likely the US will operate with five disadvantages in

any space war. First, the NCA will probably deny first strikes

by US forces against enemy satellites, thus sacrificing the

initiative in any war with a peer. Second, it is doubtful that the

US will equip its satellites with nuclear power plants. If the

enemy uses nuclear powered satellites, they will have decided

power advantages over US satellites. Third, the enemy may

have a faster acquisition cycle for satellites (dependent on

solar and battery power). If it takes the US 10 years to design

build, and launch a satellite, and if the peer enemy can do the

same job in five years, the US may be operating with inferior

equipment. Fourth, a peer may aggressively weaponize space

despite US and world opinion. This weaponization could

include an extensive ASAT capability. Fifth, a peer may pursue

an attrition campaign in space. A peer may build an architec

ture that is quite unlike the current US emphasis on expensive

multimission satellites. The peer might emphasize large

numbers of single-mission, readily-replaceable satellites. Uni

inefficiencies would be offset by their greater survivability in

an attrition war. Should these five potential disadvantages prove

true, the US disadvantage in any space war would be severe.

Integrate Intelligence, Surveillance,

and Reconnaissance Systems

Aerospace collection and communications platforms come

in three varieties: space-based; unmanned atmospheric; and

manned atmospheric. In other words, satellites, UAVs, an

aircraft. Sensors aboard these platforms also come in severa

varieties. Passive sensors include imagery intelligence (IMINT

47
[photography, infrared]), SIGINT (exploiting an enemy

s commu

nications), and electronic intelligence (ELINT [pinpointing

electronic emissions]). Active sensors include lidar and radar

platforms (e.g., space-based wide-area surveillance [SBWAS]

joint surveillance target attack radar system [J-STARS ]

AWACS, tactical reconnaissance aircraft [U-2, TR-1]). Each plat

form and sensor has unique capabilities and vulnerabilities. It

makes considerable sense to integrate these systems into a whole.

Commanders need the capability to tap whatever intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensor they

deem necessary. If the peer should successfully target one

aspect of the ISR system, other platforms must transparently

assume that particular task. For example, both satellites and

HALE UAVs are capable of wide-area surveillance and cueing

“National” systems such as DSP, “theater” systems such as

J-STARS, and “tactical” systems such as an airborne early

warning/ground environment integration segment (AEGIS

radar, also have overlapping capabilities. Should the enemy

successfully interfere with one of these systems, commanders

need the flexibility to task another system with replacemen

capabilities. The successor system would assume all or part of 

the mission. Such a transfer would require both a centralized

tasking structure for ISR assets and a universal connection o

all ISR assets to an overall C4I system.

Another reason commanders need more than one ISR system

is that they can use different types of sensors concurrently to

decrease the effect of enemy spoofing. Enemy “targets” identified

by electronic sensors might, when concurrently identified by

imaging sensors, prove to be decoys. No sensor is ever perfect

but because independent probabilities are additive, two or more

different sensors looking at the same target will give a

higher-confidence product than a single sensor (or single type o

sensor).*

AWACS, J-STARS, and TR-1 will have little utility in a wa

with a peer.16 They emit continuous signatures, have little

48

*For example, suppose an ELINT satellite detects a target with 70 percent confidence

Concurrently, a SIGINT UAV identifies the same target with 50 percent confidence

Intelligence would assign an 85 percent confidence factor to that target (70% + [30% x

50%]) = 85%. This is the same method we use with missiles. One AIM-7 has a .7 Pk

two AIM-7s have a .91 Pk (.7 + [.3 x .7]) = .91.
maneuverability, and are highly reflective. They will be prime

targets for stealthy interceptors. A peer’s stealthy interceptors

will likely penetrate into autonomous missile range of these

aircraft.

In addition, a peer might field stealthy cruise missiles havin

an antiaircraft capability. These missiles would take cueing

from land-based passive sensors (via triangulation), use

antiradiation sensors for long-range tracking, then switch to a

radar or IR sensor in the terminal phase.

This combination of attacking stealth aircraft and stealth

cruise missiles would put high-value, emitting aircraf

continuously on the defensive. They would contribute only

intermittently to the overall campaign. High-signature aircraf

such as AWACS, J-STARS, and TR-1 may still prove useful in

rear-area defense roles, such as protecting an air base, port

stream of airlifters, or a convoy of ships.

Aerospace force structure should emphasize space-based

systems and stealthy UAVs for 24-hour conflict surveillance

while de-emphasizing high-signature, high-value aircraft.

They should have redundancy between types of platforms

overlapping coverage among types of sensors, and connectivity

with a common C4I architecture. This integration will allow

dominant battlefield awareness in a highly competitive

environment.

Support the Information Campaign

Aerospace forces should expect heavy taskings in support o

the Joint Force Information Component Commander’s (JFICC

campaign. Satellites, UAVs, and manned aircraft will collec

data on the enemy’s information and C 2 architectures

Satellites and UAVs will relay this data to the JFICC’s fusion

and analysis centers. These centers will identify priorities and

critical nodes within these architectures, which the JFICC wil

use to orchestrate offensive and defensive campaigns. In

support of these campaigns, aerospace platforms (ASATs

49

*To achieve continuous collection with a variety of sensors, the US should hav

hundreds of UAVs available for a war with a peer. In comparative terms, a few

hundred UAVs would cost far less than the project J-STARS inventory. UAVs woul

also have significantly lower life-cycle costs.
missiles, bombers) will deliver munitions (both lethal and

nonlethal) against JFICC-directed targets. Other military

forces will also support the JFICC’s campaign, but aerospace

forces should expect sizable taskings.

This support will be a part of the theater CINC’s norma

apportionment process. The CINC will apportion a certain

percentage of sorties to JFICC support (e.g., a certain

percentage of UAV sorties on a certain day will fly in

accordance with JFICC taskings). Just as aerospace forces are

sometimes apportioned to support naval or ground campaigns

future information campaigns will see the joint force

information component commander tasking aerospace forces

in accordance with the theater CINC’s overall guidance. The

CINC will integrate this information campaign with ground

naval, and aerospace campaigns to effect a strategic victory.

At the same time, the peer enemy will be conducting its own

IW campaign against the US. A prime target will be US military

forces. Therefore, US aerospace forces must operate efficiently

while under information attack.

The peer will undoubtedly attempt to corrupt information

vital to US aerospace operations. The enemy’s IW effort wil

probably center on four general areas: (1) deployment (e.g., the

Federal Aviation Administration [FAA] network); (2) employmen

(e.g., the air tasking order [ATO], battle management); (3) sur

veillance (e.g., downlinks from ELINT satellites); and (4) logistics

(e.g., supply requests). To mitigate the effects of such

intrusion, aerospace forces must incorporate a series o

defensive measures. These measures should include regula

exercises in a corrupted information environment, software

protocols which flag nonstandard inputs, redundan

information links which check message fidelity while providing

back up information routing, and extensive encryption that is

changed regularly. Despite these efforts, we should expect a

least modest success by enemy IW. We must learn to live with

it—successful IW will be a given in future war. Just as army

units have long operated under the threat of air attack

aerospace units must have the ability to operate while under

information attack.

Key to successful operations in any war will be decision cycles

Both sides in a peer conflict will attempt to detect and task in

50
near real time. Each will attempt to make snap decisions—faster

and better than its opponent. Whoever builds the tighte

decision loop will gain a significant advantage. This struggle for

tighter decision loops will occur at all levels of war. Opposing

fighter pilots (tactical), JFACCs (operational), and NCA

(strategic)—all will try to observe-orient-decide-act faster than

their opponents. Each side will strive towards near-real-time

decision cycles because they confer war-fighting advantages.

The advantage of near-real-time decisions carries with it a

risk. Near-real-time decision cycles will require extensive use

of automation and threat/opportunity triggers. By under

standing either the algorithms inherent in the enemy’s

automated decision architecture or the key factors which

trigger certain reactions, the commander can manipulate

enemy responses. Therefore, a concerted effort to understand

and exploit the enemy’s decision process is mandatory. I

effective, such an operation would initially drive the enemy

toward bad decisions. After a series of bad decisions, the

enemy would be forced to insert added cross-checks into its

decision process, thus slowing down its decision cycle. As a

result, snap decisions may be poor decisions if your opponent

properly understands your decision process.

Conduct Offensive Strikes

within the Enemy Homeland

In a future war with a peer, strikes on the enemy homeland

are mandatory. The peer will have key facilities within its

homeland integral to its war effort. These targets could include

political and military leadership, weapons of mass destruction

command posts for operational forces, sources of nationa

wealth, military sustainment depots, satellite ground stations

satellite tracking facilities, power projection forces (e.g.

missile/bomber bases), and a national information network

among others. Successful strikes on these targets will have a

critical effect at the strategic and operational levels of war.

Despite the critical nature of these targets, aerospace

planners should expect significant political restrictions on

these attacks. These restrictions will derive from a fear o

nuclear retaliation. By definition, any peer will have

51
nuclear-armed ICBMs. A peer will probably threaten to answer

any strike on its homeland, nuclear or conventional, with a

nuclear-armed ICBM strike on CONUS. This threat may

inhibit the NCA from authorizing a strategic air campaign on

the peer’s territory. At the very least, the NCA will wan

military options that don’t include massive attacks on a

nuclear-armed enemy’s homeland.

Planners must reconcile the need to disable strategic targets

within the enemy’s homeland with probable NCA restriction

on doing so. A permissible option may involve precision strikes

with nonlethal weapons. Although usually discussed in terms

of low-intensity conflict, nonlethal weapons may hav

considerable utility in a war with a peer. Their employmen

against soft targets (e.g., electric grid, political organs, nuclear 

facilities, air defense C4I nodes, fuel storage) could cripple the

enemy’s war-making capacity without presenting an excuse

for a nuclear response.* For example, MHD bursts over stealth

aircraft bases might cripple that fleet (at best) or its sortie

generation (at worst). Spraying anti-fuel microbes on enemy

air bases would also degrade sortie generation. Such strikes, i

successful, would impair the peer’s ability to orchestrate either

strategic defenses or operational attacks.

Similarly, conventional EMP bursts near key electrical and

information facilities might impair national C2. EMP burst

near space launch facilities might deny the enemy access to

space. In addition, some enemy targets, such as cruise missil

facilities or military leadership, may prove impractical. They may b

hardened or so dispersed as to be unreachable. In such cases

attacks will center on supporting infrastructures. Targets wil

include communications links and critical support (e.g.

electricity). These nonlethal warheads could be delivered by

stealthy cruise missiles launched from sea and air platforms

during the day, or by long-range stealth bombers launched

from CONUS at night.

17

Bomber penetration of the enemy’s homeland will require

defense suppression and escort. After all, enemy defenses

52

*However, there should be no attacks with any type of warhead on any aspect o

enemy ICBM forces (to include early warning satellites). Planners must avoid puttin

enemy strategic nuclear weapons in a “use-or-lose” situation.
against bomber attacks will have three factors in their favor

First, the enemy will know likely target areas (e.g., air defense

headquarters within the capital city). This knowledge wil

narrow the focus of defense efforts. Second, peers may obtain

limited cueing of bomber locations from long-wavelength

radars or SIGINT intercepts. Partial information might suffice

to enable visual interceptions. Third, high unit costs will keep

stealthy bomber inventories low; loss of even one stealthy

bomber will be significant. For these three reasons, bomber

attacks on an enemy homeland warrant a pair of precautions

First, stealthy cruise missiles should precede bombers into

defended target areas. Similar to the old Tacit Rainbow

program, these missiles would autonomously suppress

active defenses. They could also act as decoys, emitting

signatures similar to those of bombers. Second, stealthy

fighters should escort stealth bombers. The bomber needs

some protection in case an enemy fighter acquires it

Because interceptions of stealthy bombers are a possibility

bombers need suppression and escort. Both the escor

fighter and the defense suppression UAV must be stealthy to

avoid compromising the bomber. Bombers should no

penetrate alone.

Attack Enemy Invasion/Occupation Forces

War with a peer will probably involve contested territory

outside the peer’s borders. Unless someone figures out a way

to occupy territory without putting soldiers on the ground, the

peer’s invasion/occupation forces will require large land

forces. Such forces need equipment to take territory. They

need tanks, artillery, and helicopters. These weapons need

supporting trucks, ships, and logistics bases. All in all

invasion and occupation is a large-signature operation.

This weight is needed for a simple reason. To overcome

modern defenses, massive numbers of mobile forces are a

prerequisite. For example, Warsaw Pact plans for invading

Western Europe envisioned massive numbers:

It was estimated that in order to overcome the main line of

defense, it was necessary to have at least a sixfold superiority

53
over the opponent. The breach of subsequent defense lines

required only a threefold superiority.

18

Unfortunately for the invading soldiers, massive numbers

equate to a high signature—which results in a high chance o

detection and targeting. This situation gives the defense an

advantage.

Whether the invasion force moves by land or sea, the result

should be the same. US space -based and atmospheri

unmanned platforms will detect large-signature forces

Satellites and UAVs will provide awareness and cueing o

operational-level enemy maneuvers. The primary sensor wil

be a phased-array radar with moving target indicator (MTI

capability aboard satellites in LEO.

19 MTI radars will search

large areas and detect massed surface forces on the move

Electro-optical (EO) sensors aboard satellites in GEO will hav

sufficient resolution to keep a watch on main operating bases

and probable avenues of attack. To complement satellite

surveillance, UAVs would carry MTI/SAR (synthetic aperture

radars) and EO sensors. UAVs would provide high revisit rate

of specific areas of concern. UAVs would also replace satellite

broad-area surveillance if the enemy degrades satellite

operations. On land, possible attack avenues could be

monitored by unattended ground sensors (UGS). These could

be camouflaged and stealthily seeded by either aircraft or

UAVs. Miniaturized ground sensors, incorporating robus

microelectronics and communications, will sniff, watch, listen

and analyze. They could be densely distributed in

high-interest areas and/or broadly seeded over areas of lesser

interest.* After cueing by any or all of these sensors, UAVs

would recce probable enemy formations and identify specific

targets/locations for attack.

This data will be cross- or up-linked via satellite to a secur

JFACC. JFACC will fuse this data (using wide-area automatic

target recognition software) to rapidly identify enemy forces

Accompanying software would automatically assign priorities

54

*At sea, sound surveillance system (USN) (SOSUS)-type sensors would perform th

broad area detection function. Probable detections would be interrogated by mor

precise sensors (UAV, satellite, J-STARS for surface targets; sonar buoys delivered b

aircraft/UAVs for subsurface contacts).
to these targets based on threat and commander

s intent.*

After coordinating with the other component commanders

(e.g., the land and naval component commanders), JFACC

would then distribute taskings to worldwide units, which

would conduct precise interdiction on enemy forces. After the

attack, collection platforms would surveil the damage and, i

necessary, reinitiate the process.**

Given these future capabilities, the theater CINC would pro

bably levy the following operational goals on US aerospace forces:

• Degrade enemy invasion/occupation forces (e.g., stealth

bomber strikes with brilliant munitions, cruise missile attack

with an antiship warhead or mines).

• Hollow-out the enemy invasion/occupation force through

attacks on logistics areas and LOCs (e.g., with cruise missile 

delivered cluster bomb units [CBU], bomber-delivered mines).

Nonlethal weapons should prove especially effective agains

massed ground maneuver forces. Weapons such as high

power acoustic generators, high-power microwaves, EMP, anti

POL agents, and antirubber chemicals—applied against units

in road march—should cause bunch-ups and disorganized

advances. Conventional attack (e.g., a stealth bomber carryin

800 submunitions) could then inflict more permanent damage.

Satellites and UAVs will also identify large logistics bases

Once identified, JFACC will task the most appropriate

munitions and delivery platforms to strike them. Logistics

bases may prove an aggressor’s greatest vulnerability. In the

face of informed and precise attack, the enemy should be

unable to develop the logistics infrastructure necessary fo

multidivision invasion/occupation.

US Army operations in Operation Desert Storm illustrat

both these points. During the ground offensive, the US VII and

55

 *This capability does not presently exist. A substantial development effort will b

required to build this capability. This effort will take advantage of expected advance

in parallel processing software and hardware, artificial intelligence, rule-based

programming, novel database architectures, and networking.

**Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) after long-range strikes will pose a sever

challenge. The abilities to identify and strike targets at long range are only two-third

of a war-fighting capability. The attacker must also know quickly and surely whethe

or not the attack succeeded. BDA ranges must equal strike ranges. One technique may

be to lace explosives with signature chemicals visible to UAV and satellite sensors.
XVIII corps required 1,600 truckloads of fuel and ammunition

per day.

20 These supplies came from two logistics base

(“Charlie” and “Echo”) which, themselves, took a month-long

effort of continuous traffic to fill. When operating at full speed

an average of 18 trucks per minute arrived at these logistic

bases.

21 Assuming an aggressor will have roughly similar

logistics requirements, the signature and vulnerability of thei

logistics bases and convoys will make them highly vulnerable

Such massive logistics will be readily targeted in the new war- fightin

environment. By hollowing out their logistics, US aero- space force

could immobilize enemy invasion/occupation forces.

An ability to retask strike missions en route would prove a

great benefit in this environment. Because of the long flight

times involved (e.g., some stealth bomber sorties will originate

in CONUS), the tactical situation may change significantly

between final aircrew briefing and time over target. When

attacking maneuver forces, an ability to retask attackers en

56

US Military Vehicles at Ad Damman, Saudi Arabia
route is mandatory. The type of information processing systems

required to make retasking work will be the main difference

between today’s stealthy bombers (i.e., B-2) and those of 2010.

Targeting invasion/occupation forces is crucial to an overal

approach to a future peer competitor. It is important fo

planners to recognize the advantages inherent in the defense

in this 2010 war. Advances in information, C 2, penetration

and precision will make large surface forces highly vulnerable

This vulnerability will be highest during the initial stages of an

invasion when the invader must mass to overcome indigenous

defenses. It is at this stage that the US must engage the pee

enemy. Failure to engage the enemy at this stage would prove

disastrous. Once the enemy gains control of its objective, the

US would find itself at a severe disadvantage. As the US tried

to mass forces to capture the lost territory, its logistics , convoys

build-up areas, etc., would come under heavy attack. In essence

57

US Army Troopship, General W. H. Gordon, Departing Korea, 1951
the process outlined in this paragraph would be turned

against the US.*

Avoid Deployment of Critical Targets

within Range of Enemy Stealth

It has always been a sound tenet of military doctrine to keep

friendly forces—to the maximum extent possible—outside the

range of lethal enemy systems. Units close with the enemy only

when necessary to accomplish specific objectives. This tene

will not change in a future war with a peer. If anything, the concept will become even more important as information, C 2

penetration, and precision capabilities increase. Complicating

this situation will be concurrent increases in weapon range.

58

*For this reason, naval platforms (arsenal ships, aircraft carriers, SSNs with cruis

missiles) will have secondary roles to long-range, land-based bombers. The tim

needed to sail ships with their escorts to the AOR may exceed the vulnerability

window of the peer’s power projection force.

Overhead View of Tent City at Sheikh Isa, Bahrain, During Operatio

Desert Storm
In a future war with a peer, prudence dictates that aerospac 

forces base few assets within range of enemy stealth . To th

maximum extent possible, US aerospace forces must base

outside the range of enemy stealth systems. For example, if th

peer enemy’s cruise missiles have a 1,000-NM range, US

aerospace forces should base >1,000 NM from the likely

operating area(s) of these missiles. High-value airborne

platforms (e.g., AWACS, J-STARS, Rivet Joint) would launch

and recover from bases >1,000 NM from the enemy. The US

goal should be to concentrate fire, not forces.

Such basing will be possible only if the US aerospace

inventory emphasizes long-range operations. Aircraft will need 

long legs for flights from rear area bases to enemy targets, and

aircrew ratios must support long sortie durations.* Inventories o

aircraft and munitions must be sufficient to deliver effective

sustained firepower on the target set from bases >1,000 NM

away. Deployment kits must support extended operations with

minimal support. This will enable split unit operations and

frequent changes of bases. Finally, because of enemy aero

space defenses, these long-range strike systems must be stealthy.

Having said that, however, we must understand tha

significant forces will still have to operate routinely within

range of enemy deep-strike systems. For example, the CINC

may deploy surface-to-surface missiles into the theater to

threaten time-critical targets (TCTs). In addition, UAV, C2, and

BMD units will deploy close to the fight.

Several measures will increase their survivability. Their

arrivals in theater should be covered by ground and airborne

air defenders.** They would deploy/disperse/camouflage

during darkness. Most importantly, forces deploying within

range of enemy stealth must be mobile. They must constantly

shift their location, if only by a few miles. If they simply deploy to

one location and sit pat, enemy surveillance systems wil

eventually pinpoint their location; enemy deep-strike stealth wil

likely penetrate with precision. Immobile facilities necessary for

59

 *Although aircraft may fly multiple sorties in one day, aircrews will not.

**Air defense fighters over airheads would attempt to visually acquire attacking enem

stealth fighters. We should assume stealthy cruise missiles will not be observable i

flight. Individual missiles may be visually acquired and shot down, but this will be an

exception, not the rule.
operations should adopt ship and tank antimissile defenses

(1) kinetic-kill (e.g., Phalanx) or directed-energy weapons (DEW

for point defense; (2) reactive armor to decrease warhead

explosive effect; and (3) decoys.

Position JFACC in CONUS

Our current C2 CONOPS deploys the JFACC* to the theate

of operations. Forward deployment has the advantage o

allowing face-to-face contact between the theater commander

(the CINC) and the JFACC. It also fosters personal relationships

with coalition partners. However, this deployment has two

significant downsides.

First, deploying JFACC to the theater puts a high-value/

high-signature target within range of enemy stealth systems

As the key aerospace battle manager, the JFACC will top th

enemy’s target list.** With its large infrastructure (e.g.

antennas, tents, vans) and robust communications, sooner o

later the enemy will pinpoint the JFACC ‘s location.

22 If thi

location is within range of enemy stealth systems, thos

systems will eventually penetrate US defenses and precisely

attack the JFACC‘s headquarters.

Second, JFACC is unable to direct the campaign while

physically deploying to the theater. While en route, and until the 

key staff with its equipment and defenses are in place, JFACC

will have neither the knowledge nor the connectivity to

orchestrate an aerospace war. This delay is a critica

shortcoming. The peer enemy is most vulnerable during its

invasion phase. Logistics are massed; routes of march exposed

Giving the enemy a “breathing space” during its most vulnerable

time is a questionable CONOPS.23

A solution to both problems is to base the JFACC in

CONUS.*** This basing would keep the JFACC outside the rang

60

 *As stated previously, this book uses the term “JFACC ” to encompass all aerospac

C

2

 above wing level (e.g., AOC, TACC, ROCC, LRR, ASOC).

 **Just as the Iraqi Air Defense HQ was a high priority during the opening phase o

Operation Desert Storm—which the US attacked with stealth systems (i.e., F-117).

***The logic for putting the JFACC in CONUS may also apply to other componen

commanders. For example, the naval component commander in the 1991 Gulf Wa

owned forces operating in the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea. His

presence aboard one ship operating in one of these locations did little to improve hi

decision making over other NAVCENT forces.
of enemy stealth systems and avoid creating a fixed, in-range

high-value target for the enemy. It would also allow immediate

planning/tasking of the air campaign. There would be no

delay imposed by waiting until JFACC (with its defenses) has

deployed and set up operations. Instead, the JFACC could

begin directing the air campaign immediately. Planners would

have immediate access to all-source intelligence. A CONUS

JFACC would allow well-exercised connectivity with comba

units (e.g., fiber-optic cable connections with CONUS-based

stealth bomber wings).24 They could take advantage of CONUS

databases and expertise; JFACC computers could be

hardwired to a secure information net. All data relayed by

satellite (including data from national systems) would

downlink to a fixed JFACC facility. It would fuse the data, filte

out extraneous material, and distribute distilled information

In essence, JFACC would immediately have the exercised

expertise to turn information about the situation into

knowledge about the war. After running computer simulations

to determine the best tactical options, JFACC would issue th

ATO. This centralized ATO would direct all air assets, whethe

based in-theater, in CONUS, or in adjacent theaters.

This approach is compatible with the current communica

tions concept of “smart push, warrior pull.” If JFACC wer

colocated with the worldwide intelligence manager, uni

taskings and the applicable intelligence information could be

distributed concurrently (“smart push”). Intelligence officers

sitting alongside the operational tasking officers would

“attach” the requisite intelligence information.* Issuing both

the tasking and the accompanying intelligence would decrease

ATO cycle times, as units could immediately begin mission

planning based on the most current information (as opposed

to drafting an information request and waiting for the

response). It would also provide the most appropriate

information to the units whether or not the units were aware

of its existence. Finally, it would provide an alternative to the

tendency to make “everything” available to the tactical level

61

*Computers would handle most of this function. Certain types of targets would

automatically generate certain types of intelligence. They might also automaticall

generate certain intelligence taskings.
The tendency to make everything available to the warrior has

the potential for overloading users and transmission means

Of course, units would retain the authority to query the

database for additional specific information (“warrior pull”) as

they saw fit.

Complexity is another factor arguing for a CONUS JFACC 

Orchestrating an aerospace war is anything but simple; it is

extremely complex. Weapons are air-, space-, land-, and sea

launched. Targets are fixed and mobile, hard and soft, terrestria

and space, strategic and operational. Some platforms move a

tens of thousands of miles an hour (in space ); others move at a

few knots (at sea). Squadrons are scattered around the globe

their strike packages coming from equally scattered units

Support comes from an alphabet soup of agencies: CIA, DIA 

CIO, NRO, DISA, DMA, NSA. Data requirements are measured

in terabits. If JFACC must deploy to the theater, this orches

tration must be accomplished by a mobile C 4I structure—

adding another factor of complexity to an already incredibly

difficult process.* Establishing a permanent CONUS JFACC

would delete at least this additional level of complexity.**

Airlift Critical Supplies and Spare Parts

into the Combat Area

The CINC will probably direct a substantial airlift flow into

the combat theater to support its accompanying C 4I

component forces, and indigenous forces. Airlift operation

must reconcile their CONOPS with the peer’s information, C 2

penetration, and precision capabilities. As an entering

assumption, airlift planners must allow for the probability tha

all large airlift operations will operate under some measure o

enemy observation. As a result, airlifters operating within

62

 *Even if JFACC is already positioned in theater (e.g., the HTACC at Osan Air Base

Republic of Korea), a back-up facility must be capable of assuming this complex

orchestration. However, any HTACC back-up will not be as effective; it’s unreasonabl

to expect equal capabilities from back-up facilities/personnel. Thus, putting JFACC

at Osan provides the DPRK a high-value target.

**Another argument could be standardization. Given rapid advances in information

technologies, it is likely that theater commands (EUCOM, PACOM, CENTCOM) wi

build different C

4

I structures. This will hamper training. Units will have to prepare t

interact with several different command structures.
range of enemy weapon systems must also operate within the

enemy’s OODA loop. They must be able to arrive and depar

before enemy C4I can detect the airlifters, direct an attack, and

deliver warheads onto the target. By operating within the

enemy’s OODA loop, airlift sorties can flow into the theater.

This will require minimal ground times by all sorties into

bases within range of enemy systems.* Rapid off-loads are

mandatory in this environment. Arriving forces would disperse

immediately after landing.

Civilian airlifters (CRAF) will have little use in this

environment. They are neither configured for rapid off-loads

(“roll-off”) nor hardened against EMP. Their need for lon

ground times to off-load cargo will place them outside the

enemy’s OODA loop. The enemy will have time to detect

launch, and strike civilian cargo transports on the ground. I

these strikes carry conventional EMP warheads, precision wil

not be necessary. An EMP blast within a mile of a civilian

airplane, with its unshielded fly-by-wire controls, could

disable that airplane. Despite the heavy costs incurred by

relying exclusively on military airlifters, they’re required fo

airlift operations during a war with a peer. In addition

because any military airlift fleet will have a finite size, airlif

requirements for aerospace forces must fit within a much

smaller ton-miles/day capacity than is presently assumed.

Summary

This chapter has discussed operational concepts for US

aerospace forces in a future war with a peer around the year

2010. In such a war, both sides will undoubtedly possess

thousands of state-of-the-art aerospace weapons. These

weapons will include stealth systems (cruise missiles and

manned fighter-bombers), information systems (surveillance

and communications), nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles 

with intercontinental range. A peer enemy will also possess

63

*If the threat is enemy cruise missiles, ground times could be as much as an hou

(due to time of flight). If the threat is from electromagnetic launchers (railguns)

ground times should be less than 10 minutes.
sustainable and redundant military capabilities. Because o

the geopolitical environment, it is safe to assume the majority

of conflict will occur on the enemy’s borders and that these

borders will be several thousand miles from the CONUS.

This future war will be fundamentally different from those

possible today. The biggest difference will lie in the inability o

aerospace defenses to protect high-signature forces from

attack. In a future war with a peer, we must assume stealthy

cruise missiles and aircraft of both sides will penetrate

aerospace defenses in significant numbers. These systems wil

target critical vulnerabilities (due to modern surveillance

systems) and will hit what they target (due to modern

precision). Each side will also have near-real-time C 2

redundant capabilities, and long-term sustainability. Unlike

Operation Desert Storm, critical nodes in these systems wil

operate from sanctuary; the threat of nuclear retaliation wil

place restrictions on homeland strikes. Taken in aggregate

this environment differs markedly from current conditions. It

will require fundamental changes in our concepts of operation

In a sense, our situation is similar to the one faced by military

strategists during the interwar period.

Between WWI and WWII, developments in aircraft and

armored vehicles fundamentally changed the conduct of war

Those who succeeded in opening stages of that war were the

ones who adjusted their CONOPS to fit the new technologica

environment. If we posit a major war 15 years from now (in

2010), we should expect similar magnitudes of change. Driven 

by stealth and information technologies, the magnitude o

difference between a war today versus one in 2010 could be

comparable to the difference experienced in the interwar

period (1925–1940). The time interval is the same. If the WWI

analogy holds, critical weapons and CONOPS, proven in the

past and relied on today, will become obsolete over the next 15

years.

As we project a war in this environment, two themes keep

repeating. The first theme is that we must engage peer

aggressors when they are in the invasion mode. This is when

they are most vulnerable. The new generations of weapons can

detect and destroy massed surface forces on the move. If we fai

to engage the aggressor immediately, we’ll find ourselves

64
on the adverse side of this exchange ratio; we

ll be in the

invasion mode, trying to move large forces in the face o

advanced enemy information, C2, penetration, and precision

systems.

The second theme involves the question of a CONUS-based

versus theater-based JFACC. This question requires extensive 

examination. Our preliminary judgment leans towards the

former because forward deployed headquarters are vulnerable

require time to set up, and have inherently poor connectivity

(compared to a centralized approach). Spending valuable

hours and sorties to move a headquarters—especially one tha

will have inferior communications—within range of the

enemy’s missiles is a questionable way to operate. Further

more, the theater will extend over millions of square miles

Critical assets, such as satellite control and long-rang

bombers, will base outside the theater. There is little to be

gained by placing JFACC within several hundred miles o

some subordinate units; practically all communication

between them will “bounce” off satellites. Theater-to-CONUS

communications will take the same time and routing as

theater-to-theater. The important question is, where can the

JFACC get the best information? A centralized, CONUS-based

JFACC structure seems the best alternative.

The following aspects of future peer warfare deserve specia

emphasis:

• Aerospace defenses must anticipate massive numbers o

low-signature attackers. If unit costs of cruise missiles decreas

to the $100,000 range, both sides will likely employ large numbers

of very low-observable attackers.

• Offensive aerospace forces must de-emphasize high- signature

theater-based assets. Their attrition in the emerging

environment will be sufficiently high to preclude high-tempo

operations.

• Planners must take steps to induce greater crisis stability

into the US force structure and CONOPS, especially with

regard to space. Absent greater redundancy and more effective

defenses, the US could find itself in a first strike predicament

during a crisis.

65
• Planners must avoid deployments of critical fixed targets

within range of enemy stealth. Fixed facilities will face an

unacceptable risk of destruction by precision stealth systems.

• Planners should integrate satellites and UAVs fo

communications, navigation, and surveillance. UAVs promis

sufficient loiter times—and survivability—to accomplish these

missions. Integration will allow rapid substitution and reduce

the effects of deception (through cross-checking).

• Space will be a center of gravity in any future war with a

peer. Both sides will rely on satellites for communication

positioning, and collection. Satellites in LEO will b

particularly vulnerable. They will require both active and

passive defenses, including shielding, maneuverability, rapid

replacement, frequency management, and redundancy

Satellites in GEO will be secure if enemy launch facilities

capable of GEO reach are destroyed.

• Future peer aerospace forces will include stealthy inter

ceptors. As a result, high-signature atmospheric platforms (e.g.

AWACS, J-STARS) will not thrive in a future war with a peer.

• JFACC should base in CONUS. Fixed, permanent basing

will allow immediate tasking of worldwide assets while

excluding a high-value, high-signature target (JFACC HQ

from the range of enemy stealth systems.

• JFACC will provide NRT information on allied and enemy

maneuvers to allied forces. This transfer will require specialize d

equipment and liaison teams.

• Satellites are lucrative targets absent (active and passive

defensive measures.

• Defensive counterair must emphasize sensor fusion

Because a significant portion of the enemy aerospace force wi

be stealthy—and stealth systems in flight will intermittently

reflect and emit—a thoroughly fused sensor network is

important. It holds the possibility of successful detection and

targeting. This system must be mobile to preclude targeting by

ballistic missiles.

• Degrading enemy cruise missile guidance will be a top

priority. By manipulating external guidance systems (such as

GPS), and by positioning decoys in the target area, defenders

66
will attempt to exploit any algorithm weaknesses in the enemy

system.

• Planners must devise a concentrated offensive against key

targets within the enemy homeland. C4I is the highest priority

The NCA will probably restrict these strikes due to the threat

of nuclear retaliation. For this reason, nonlethal weapons 

delivered by stealthy bombers and cruise missiles, will assum

a leading role.

• The aerospace campaign will attempt to deny enemy

invasion/occupation, primarily through long-range bombers

with precision munitions and cruise missiles. Logistics will b

the most lucrative target set.

• When airlifting critical supplies and spare parts into the

combat area, operators must minimize ground times

Depending upon distance from enemy missile launchers

ground times will usually be measured in terms of minutes

not hours. Airlift must be capable of efficient operations

despite an information-corrupted environment (to include

nonavailability of GPS).

• Future aerospace forces will attack critical enemy targets

in a parallel fashion, denying their ability to adapt or repair in

advance of subsequent strikes. Their goal will not be attrition

they will attempt to paralyze enemy C2.

• Defenses will take advantage of ballistic missil

vulnerabilities (large infrared signature at launch, rada

reflective in flight, minimal maneuverability). Having said that

a 100 percent shield is probably impossible.

• Aerospace forces should expect heavy taskings in suppor

of the joint force information component commander’s (JFICC

campaign. Operations will center on (1) destroying nodes (such

as collection platforms, relay networks, and fusion centers

and (2) distorting information by viral insertion and spoofing

Because the enemy will also conduct IW, aerospace forces mus

prepare to fight in an information-corrupted environment.

These themes should guide aerospace planning for a future

war with a peer. Because evolving technologies will allow

thousands of precision strikes per day, planners must devise a

new CONOPS to take full advantage of this new capability.

67
Notes

 1. The Military Balance, 1994–1995 (London: The International Institut

of Strategic Studies, Brassey’s, 1994). The US budgeted $261.7B for defense

for FY 1994. The next eight largest defense budgets (in order): Russia

($79B); Japan ($42B); France ($35B); United Kingdom ($34B); German

($28B); Italy ($16B); South Korea ($14B); and Saudi Arabia ($14). Tota

$262B. China‘s military budget is difficult to state with precision. Th

Military Balance estimates somewhere between $7B to $27B (see page 170)

Note: Dollars for defense are not an absolute gauge of military capability

They are only a rough indicator. However, ratios of four, eight, or 20 to one

suffice to preclude military equivalence.

 2. Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Dimension (New York: Doubleday, 1990)

313–48.

 3. Richard G. Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe

(Washington, D. C.: Center for Air Force History, 1993), 358–60. In January

1944, Eighth AF’s escort fighters changed their CONOPS from “close escort

with bombers to “ultimate pursuit.”

 4. Brilliant sensors can discriminate between targets (e.g., identify a

tank versus a truck).

 5. Full ATR under all weather conditions is foreseen within 10 years

See Aviation Week & Space Technology, 6 February 1995, 20.

 6. “USAF Almanac 1995,” Air Force Magazine, May 1995, 50. Figure i

TAI (Total Aircraft Inventory).

 7. Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Gulf War Air Power Survey

vol. 5, 1993. (Secret) Information extracted (Table 75) is unclassified.

 8. Proprietary conversation between OSD/NA and a corporate vic

president of a major US defense contractor, May 1995.

 9. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United

States Air Force, vol. 1, fig. 2-2. “Centralized Control/Decentralized

Execution” is a “Tenet of Aerospace Power.” “Execution of aerospace

missions should be decentralized to achieve effective spans of control

responsiveness, and tactical flexibility.”

10. AFM 1-1, vol. 2, defines air supremacy as “That degree of ai

superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective

interference.” Air superiority is “That degree of dominance in the airbattle o

one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the

former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place

without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.”

11. During the 1991 Gulf War, the USAF deployed prototypes of the E-8

J-STARS to the Gulf with six software specialists. These specialists wrote 17

upgrades to the J-STARS software in order to adjust expected conditions to

the realities of the Gulf. Many viewed this deployment of code writers with a

weapons system as a unique event, necessitated by the rush to employ

J-STARS ahead of schedule. However, future deployments of software expert

with weapon systems may become the norm. Alternatively, the code writers

could remain in CONUS if they are well connected with the deployed systems.

12. USAF Chief of Staff Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, quoted in Inside the Ai

Force, 3 February 1995, 9.

68
13. Colin S. Gray, quoting Adm Carlisle A. H. Trost, USN Retired, 

Spac

Power Survivability,” Airpower Journal 7, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 27–42.

14. Davis, appendixes 7 and 8.

15. Message, 122007ZJUN95, Chief of Naval Operations Weekly Update

05-25. A rapid replacement CONOPS would have to overcome two curren

cultural impediments: (1) our reliance on only two launch centers and (2

the considerable time we take to check out vehicles prior to launch and

satellites after reaching orbit. For example, the fifth UHF Follow-on

Advanced Communications Satellite, launched 31 May 95, needed tw

months of on-orbit testing before being turned over to Naval Space

Command for operational service.

16. On 25 April 1995, USAF Chief of Staff Gen Ronald Fogleman stated

“I see a future without AWACS. Instead, space-based assets will be providin

the air picture and (have the benefit of) not tying up tankers.” Quoted by

Tanya Bielski, “Air Force Chief Embraces Information Warfare,” Defens

Daily, 26 April 1995, 125.

17. For a broad discussion of nonlethal weapons in strategic attack, se

Jonathan W. Klaaren and Ronald S. Mitchell, “Nonlethal Technology and

Airpower: A Winning Combination for Strategic Paralysis,” Airpower Journa

9 (Special Edition, 1995): 42–51.

18. Interview with Gen P. S. Grachev, Russian Minister of Defense

Izvestia, 2 June 1992, 2. Quoted by Michael M. Boll, “By Blood, Not Ballots

German Unification, Communist Style,” Parameters, Spring 1994, 66.

19. William P. Delaney, “Winning Future Conflicts” (Unpublished

manuscript, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, 15 October 1992). Essentially a

space-based version of J-STARS. Three-meter resolution would suffice t

identify military convoys. An eight-satellite constellation would give 30

minute revisit times for areas at 50

o

 latitudes. Each satellite‘s returns woul

be fused to enable constant dwell time.

20. William G. Pagonis and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, Moving Mountain

(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), 147. Also, even if curren

efforts to reduce logistics requirements succeed, logistics signatures wi

remain high. For example, if these two corps reduced fuel and ammunition

requirements by 25 percent, they would still expose a target set of 1,200

trucks.

21. Ibid., 146.

22. During Operation Desert Storm, the JFACC headquarters in Riyadh

consisted of 2,000 personnel. See Gulf War Airpower Survey, chap. 5.

23. If the war’s in an immature theater, this “breathing space ” could b

quite long. “The several months needed to create the ad ho

communications, tasking, processing, and information reporting system

used in Desert Storm represents an unacceptable readiness posture.

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Global Surveillance

December 1993, 3–8. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

24. According to Lt Gen Carl O’Berry, Headquarters AF/SC, a high

bandwidth fiber-optic network connecting all 111 AF bases in the CONUS

would cost $1.3B. See “Bandwidth or B-2 Bombers?” in Governmen

Computer News, 5 June 95, 68.

69
Chap ter 3

Niche Competitor

Paul Bracken describes the United States as experiencing an

“Indian summer in national security.”

1 For the first time in

half a century, America faces few threats to its vital interests

Its enemies are weak while its friends are strong. America’s

borders are secure, its economy is growing, and its military is

far and away the finest in the world. All in all, America is in a

relatively comfortable situation.

This is not to say threats don’t exist. Given certain

circumstances, small states such as North Korea or Iraq could

threaten US interests. But in relative terms, such threats are

manageable. During this Indian summer in national security

all threats to vital American interests can be managed by

current US security mechanisms.

But as Bracken’s metaphor implies, this condition won’

last. Just as winter inevitably follows Indian summer, more

substantial threats to America’s vital interests will eventually

arise. As the previous chapter outlined, these threats could

take the form of a peer competitor. Fortunately, for the reasons

stated, a peer competitor is unlikely over the next 15 years. A

more likely threat within the next 10–20 years is a niche

competitor.

A Niche competitor is a state (or alliance) that combines

limited numbers of emerging weapons with a robust inventory

of current weapons, then develops an innovative CONOPS to

best employ this mix. Examples of possible niche competitors

include Iraq and North Korea.

There are five key points to remember when envisioning a

niche competitor.

First, a niche would always be militarily inferior to the US. It

would have a weaker military and it would have a weake

strategic position. By the former, we mean the niche would never

have the breadth and depth of weapons available to the US. A

niche could never hope to slug it out toe-to-toe with the US. It

would inevitably lose an all-out war. Its goal would be to raise

71
the cost of US involvement beyond an acceptable level. A niche

would seek to effectively challenge US interests in its region by

making the US military response sufficiently costly to either

deter initial involvement or dissuade further involvement.

By the latter point, we mean a niche would find it difficult to

close out US options; that is, to decisively knock the US out of

a war. Because of its strategic depth and wealth, the US wil

always have the option of “revisiting the decision.” The US

could lose the initial campaign and withdraw, then return to

the fight after rearming and restructuring. A niche, on the

other hand, wouldn’t have these options. Once it loses to the

US, the niche would find it impossible to mount another

campaign of equal or greater intensity.

Instead of counting on an absolute defeat of the US, a niche

competitor’s best course would be to encourage the US to

avoid the fight. The US will probably do so when it perceives

its possible costs exceeding its gains. The prospect of high

casualties or a drawn-out conflict may affect this perception

Such an election is different from being forced out. Conversely

the niche will present multiple strategic centers of gravity to

US attack. Its leadership, industrial base, nationa

infrastructure, population, and key military forces will be

reachable by US aerospace forces from the first day of the war

onward. It will be far easier for the US to close out a niche

state than for the niche to decisively defeat the US.

Second, the niche will present operational centers of gravity

to attack. We can assume the niche is doing something outsid

its borders that is contrary to substantial US interests. That is

the casus belli for US military involvement. The invasion/

occupation involved in this aggression must be of sufficient

size to gain and hold territory.* The invading forces would

require personnel and equipment numbering in the tens o

thousands. These operational forces would present numerous

critical targets for attack. Their detection and targeting would

be a prime mission for US aerospace forces.

Third, many nations have the capacity to attain niche

status. Unlike a peer competitor, a niche seeks to develop a

72

*Examples could include second invasions of Kuwait by Iraq or of South Korea by Nort

Korea. We’re not talking about civil wars against an insurgent or nonstate enemy.
proficiency in only a few mission areas, as opposed to many

For example, a niche may invest only in stealthy cruise

missiles, space interdiction systems, and data fusion centers

while eschewing competition in sea control, air superiority

R&D, airlift, and amphibious operations.

Because its military capabilities are considerably less, a

niche can get by on a smaller resource base. Smaller resource

requirements mean there are literally dozens of nations

capable of fielding a niche-competitor military. Examples o

possible niche competitors include the two countries used in

current MRC planning (Iraq and North Korea), plus Australia

Brazil, Chile, India, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, and

the Ukraine, among others.* In essence, any nation with the

wealth to buy limited numbers of emerging weapon systems is

a potential niche competitor. While a niche would not have the

size or sophistication of the US military, it might be able to

frustrate limited US objectives in its region.

Fourth, a niche would have to be capable of doing more than

fielding state-of-the-art weapon systems. Modern weapons

underwrite the ability to compete in the new warfare

environment, but are not enough in themselves. To take ful

advantage of the capabilities inherent in emerging weapons, a

niche military must be able to adjust its CONOPS as well as its

inventory. For example, a niche must do more than simply buy

information weapons. Rather, it must integrate information

war systems with the rest of its inventory in a synergistic way

We must expect the niche to employ and control new

technologies in innovative ways. These ways might differ

markedly from their past doctrine.

Finally, unlike war with a peer, war with a niche will be a

“come as you are” war. The absence of risk to US vita

interests would preclude domestic American support for a

rapid buildup. The prospect of war with a niche would

probably have little effect on the future years defense plan

(FYDP). In addition, warning time would be shorter than for

war with a peer. The niche would need little time to field its

limited number of emerging weapons. These two factors mean

73

*These nations are listed solely for illustrative purposes. There is no intent to imply

conflict between one of these nations and the United States.
the US would likely have only its existing units at its disposal

Some acceleration of procurement immediately before

hostilities is possible, but a rapid US rearmament is unlikely

US employments would largely mirror those planned and

exercised in peacetime.

Niche competitors will face a similar situation. They’ll have

military requirements unrelated to a war with the US. For

domestic and regional reasons, niche competitors will be

unable to focus their military efforts solely on defeating the

US. In fact, only a small proportion of their military will be

optimized for defeating US forces. Niche states will have more

important military missions than just war with the US.

Take present-day Iraq as an example. Iraq uses its military

for two missions which have nothing to do with the US. Its

military’s highest-priority mission is internal security, which is

Saddam’s number one security problem. Iraq‘s military

manpower, resources, and CONOPS must support this

mission. Officers are promoted based on loyalty and their

ability to effect internal security. The second-priority mission

for Iraq’s military is security against regional foes. Turkey

Syria, and Iran all pose credible threats to Iraq . Iraq‘s military

must maintain the capability to deter those countries. For

both these military missions (internal security and regiona

defense), manpower-intensive, attrition militaries are effective

Tanks, Scuds, infantry divisions, helicopters, and nonstealthy

fighters are suited to these missions.

Fighting the US is a third-priority mission for the Iraqis

Unfortunately for them, however, the military forces and

CONOPS required to defeat the US are ill-suited to the first two

missions. But the fact that Saddam Hussein’s forces ar

ill-suited to fight the US doesn’t mean he can afford to

dispense with them. Quite the contrary. Saddam, like other

potential niche competitors, must maintain internal security

defend his borders against larger neighbors, and remain ready 

for war with the US. That’s a difficult charge—and a very

expensive one. Iraq‘s best solution is to lay a limited number o

emerging systems on top of an existing force structure that

was built with two higher priority missions in mind. Iraq

cannot build a military focused solely on defeating the US

Other niche competitors would face a similar situation.

74
In summary, a niche could compete with the US by

employing bits and pieces of advanced technology along with a

robust inventory of traditional weapons. It would integrate

these weapons using innovative strategies to offset the greater

military breadth and depth of the US. Its goal would be to

persuade the US to leave the conflict (as opposed to seeking a

decisive military victory). The niche would exploit asymmetries

in strategic culture, geography, and political/military

objectives. Warning time for this war would be much shorter

than that envisioned for a peer conflict.

Environment

When projecting a future conflict with a niche competitor

the United States must expect the enemy to field a mix o

emerging and previous systems, as well as to use an

asymmetric method of employment. The types of information

C2, penetration, and precision systems, as well as the number

and size of their weapons of mass destruction help to

distinguish niche competitors. Table 3 compares the

capabilities of a peer competitor to those of a niche competitor.

Table 3

Niche Competitor Compared to Peer Competitor

PEER COMPETITOR NICHE COMPETITOR

Information Indigenous, Dedicated Third Country, Commercial

C

2 NRT, Redundant, Automated Delayed, Nodal, Hierarchical

Penetration Multisystem Single System

Precision Autonomous Guide

(e.g., Terminal)

External Guidance

(e.g., GPS)

WMD Hundreds. Can Reach USA. <10, Theater Reach

Size Large, Strategic Depth Small, Little Depth

75
Emerging Systems

In general terms, a niche might have emerging systems with

access to commercial satellite (COMSAT) networks (communi

cations and surveillance), modern C2 systems, stealthy cruise

missiles (equipped with either warheads or sensors), advanced 

missile guidance, and advanced conventional munitions. In

more specific terms, a niche’s emerging systems would

emphasize information, C2, penetration, and precision.

A niche enemy will use a mix of civilian and military

information systems for military purposes. It will use civilian

surveillance satellites to detect large US force movements

Data obtained from civilian sensors will not be near real time

(NRT); it may be several days old. Despite its age, such data

will prove useful in identifying large, fixed, build-up areas (e.g.

airfield parking ramps, logistics points, lines o

communication, ports).* Civilian communication satellites wil

relay military data and instructions. Cruise missiles will hav

surveillance and communications packages to augmen

satellite coverage.

Owing to expected advances in the civil sector, niche C 2 wil

exceed the current state of the art. Advances will be mos

significant in the areas of processing, fusion, and encryption

Due to its reliance on civil systems, niche C 2 will be delayed

relative to our own. It might also present single-point failure

nodes and a hierarchical planning and tasking process.

It’s a near-certainty future niche competitors will field

stealthy cruise missiles. They are currently under developmen

by a wide variety of sources. Any nation with a moderate

defense budget should be able to buy several thousand

stealthy cruise missiles capable of strike, communication

relay, and surveillance. Therefore, we must assume at least a

portion of the enemy’s aerospace weapons will present low

signatures.

A niche enemy will have a large inventory of precision

weapons. Reflecting at least mid-1990s state of the art, these

weapons will have less than 10-meter accuracy. They may

depend on US-controlled navigation systems (e.g., globa

76

*By 2002, experts estimate civilian imagery satellites will have one-meter resolution.
positioning systems). Some of these weapons will retain their

accuracy regardless of weather or darkness.

Previous Systems

A niche’s previous systems might consist of a handful o

nuclear weapons, large stocks of chemical weapons, a limited

number of ballistic missiles, and substantial numbers o

late-generation traditional systems (e.g., tanks, aircraft

artillery, surface warships, mines).

A niche competitor would likely have a robust inventory o

currently (mid-1990s) available weapons. These could include

infantry, armor, artillery, submarines, mines, nonstealthy

fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, ASATs, chemica

munitions, and short-range ballistic missiles (e.g., Scuds). Th

niche would use these previous systems to conquer territory

while using its emerging systems to combat US intervention. A

niche would also have weapons of mass destruction, including

nuclear weapons.

A niche competitor would probably have a limited number o

nuclear weapons (less than 10). Without an intercontinenta

ballistic missile (ICBM), however, these weapons would no

directly threaten US territory. Nevertheless, they’ll threaten US

allies and bases in the region. A niche could use these

weapons to threaten a country which gives the US basing or

overflight rights during a contingency. For example, a

nuclear-armed North Korea should be expected to threaten

Tokyo with a nuclear strike should Japan allow US forces to

operate from Japanese bases during a war in Korea . Similarly

the North Koreans might inhibit a large US logistics flow by

threatening Pusan with nuclear attack. In these examples, a

niche would need only a handful of nuclear weapons t

complicate US operations.

Putting all of these factors together, a niche competitor o

10–20 years from now will present challenges of a different

nature from those posed by an MRC-scale competitor today. A

future niche will be able to detect large US force deployments

and relay this information to stealthy weapon systems. These

systems will likely penetrate US aerospace defenses in

significant numbers. Once in the target area, they’ll strike with

77
great accuracy. This combination of previous weapons (tanks

a few nuclear weapons, submarines, ASATs, surface-to-ai

missiles, etc.) plus emerging weapons (stealthy cruise missiles 

civil satellites for reconnaissance and communications, etc.)

orchestrated by a new CONOPS, would confront US aerospace

forces with a demanding situation.

Asymmetric Employment Schemes

Further complicating this environment would be the

likelihood of asymmetric employment schemes.* A niche

competitor would likely avoid a direct confrontation with the

US. Rather, the niche would attempt to offset US strengths by

employing an indirect strategy. For example, a niche

competitor would not seek information dominance. It is highly

unlikely a niche will surpass the US military in information

technologies over the next 10–20 years. US companies and

universities lead the world in information technologies; the US

military totally dominates the military applications of these

technologies. Therefore, the niche might pursue an

“information neutral” environment. It would attempt to “leve

the playing field” by degrading US information flows.

Information leveling could be accomplished several ways

One way would be through hackers. The niche could hire any

number of computer hackers to attack US information

networks. These hackers could be hired at the last minute

assuring state-of-the-art competence. They could be hired in

large numbers from around the world; India and Russia, fo

example, have a wealth of software talent willing to work for

relatively low pay. It would be very difficult for the US to

assess the scope and direction of this campaign in advance o

hostile intrusion.

78

*Conflict is almost always fought in an asymmetric manner. Even among pee

competitors, symmetric conflict is rare. For example, Great Britain and Napoleoni

France were peer competitors, even though the former relied mainly on its navy whil

the latter emphasized its army. The World War II Battle of the Atlantic between

US/UK and Germany matched merchantmen/aircraft/destroyers versus U-boats. I

the sports world, two football teams may be evenly matched although one emphasizes 

a running game and defense while the other relies on a passing attack. In conflict

asymmetries are the norm. When we use the term “asymmetric,” we’re trying t

identify fundamentally different ends and means.
Fortunately, such an offensive has significant weaknesses

For example, the US could take steps to protect its vita

information systems. Just as banks and businesses protec

their information systems through encryption and protocols

the US military would use similar methods to protect its

information systems. Another weakness is that disorganized

hackers would probably bring little orchestration to thei

attacks. Lacking proper training and positive control, they

would likely “service” targets with little regard to operationa

art. Finally, hackers would get little feedback on success or

failure. They would not know whether they were successful

nor could they be sure they were entering a real system

Despite these weaknesses, however, hackers in the employ o

a niche could pose a credible threat to US information

systems. Serious defenses are mandatory.

A second approach to information leveling would be by

physical attacks on US collection and communications

satellites. The niche could launch primitive ASATs agains

these platforms, particularly those in low earth orbit. The

niche could also detonate a nuclear weapon in space or in the

upper atmosphere. The resulting electromagnetic pulse (EMP

would disable unshielded satellites. Replacement satellites, i

also unshielded, would quickly degrade due to the enhanced

radiation retained by the Van Allen Belts.

2 While nich

systems in space would also be affected, EMP blasts would

probably adversely affect US information forces—and thus, US

operations—to a greater extent than those of the niche

aggressor. An orchestrated campaign with ASATs and EMP

blasts could degrade US space systems and cripple US

military operations worldwide.

A third asymmetric employment strategy available to a niche

is projection denial. Niche competitors will not have the mean

to conduct a long-range campaign against US forces with a

high confidence of success. They would lack the NRT

intelligence and manned penetrators necessary for such a

campaign. However, niches could offset these shortcomings by

combining a mix of relatively low-tech systems and weapons to

make US power projection operations difficult, or even

unfeasible. For example, a niche could mix a handful o

modern diesel submarines and mine barriers to slow and

79
canalize US sea lift. It could observe the resulting choke points

with commercial overhead imagery then target specific ships

with stealthy cruise missiles.

In this example, the niche would avoid challenging American

naval forces directly. Its objective would not be command o

the seas, but rather sea denial. The niche would use

information obtained through third-party COMSATs to plo

the movement of US forces at sea. It would then launch

missiles towards anticipated LOCs. These missiles would use

seekers with broad-area terminal guidance.

Should the US decide to absorb these attacks and remain

in the war, it would face a decision. The US could either

operate under this type of observation or attempt to interdic

the niche’s information. The latter would prove difficult in the

Information Age where multiple sensors outside governmen

control are available.* Data—and its means of transmission—

is becoming ubiquitous. It seems most likely the US will be

forced to operate under a limited amount of enemy

observation. Prudent aerospace planners should allow for this

probability.

By employing innovative operational concepts and a limited

number of emerging weapons, a niche competitor could pose

significant challenges to US operations in certain circum

stances. Asymmetric employment concepts, particularly in the 

areas of information and power projection denial, might “leve

the playing field” to the point the US is dissuaded from involvement. To deal with this challenge, US aerospace forces should

prepare to employ the following 10 operational concepts:

• Paralyze enemy command and control.

• Dominate battlefield awareness.

• Integrate space-based systems and unmanned aeria

vehicles for conflict surveillance.

• Support the information campaign.

• Attack enemy wealth.

• Attack enemy invasion/occupation forces.

80

*Third-country satellites could be vulnerable to (1) government-to-governmen

pressure, requesting the third-party state cease providing satellite information to th

niche competitor, (2) to electronic warfare against the satellite or ground station, an

(3) direct ASAT strikes.
• Establish aerospace superiority.

• Avoid deployment of critical fixed targets within range of

enemy stealth.

• Airlift forces and logistics into the combat area.

• Support the ground counteroffensive.

Paralyze Enemy C

2

Every military professional knows the absolute necessity o

continuous control of military operations. Murphy’s Law is

alive and well in the military profession; military operations as

simple as change-of-command ceremonies require constan

massaging. Wars are infinitely more complex than ceremonies

Unexpected obstacles and opportunities are the norm; no

operation ever goes according to plan. As a result, each and

every military operation requires an incredible amount o

hands-on control. Continuous adjustments are alway

required. These adjustments depend upon positive command

and control. Decision makers and the means to transmit their

decisions make up this system. Thus, nodes crucial to this

system are high-value targets. Their disruption would cascade

chaos among subordinate units.

For a niche competitor, command and control nodes are a

major vulnerability. Modern US surveillance systems (especially

electromagnetic intelligence) are expert at identifying command

links. Open-source literature can also provide wiring diagrams

of communication flows. Once identified, these nodes are

vulnerable to US attack.

There is little a niche competitor can do to forestall this

vulnerability. If the niche constructs a command and contro

network comprised solely of hardened, indigenous systems, i

will be, at best, rudimentary. The US could easily operate

within the niche enemy’s decision loop. If, at the other

extreme, the niche uses world-class communications systems

and protocols, it will expose itself to massive information

interdiction. This interdiction could be remarkably precise

The US would pressure companies based within the US or

allied nations to provide source code and architecture

information. This knowledge would facilitate an information

interdiction campaign. Unfortunately for the niche competitor

81
there is little recourse. Any information system, indigenous or

imported, will have substantial drawbacks.

If the niche has indigenous satellites capable of NRT

operations, they should top the US target list. NRT information

architectures put all aspects of US military operations at risk

On the other hand, architectures using another country’s

civilian imagery satellites will be a less immediate threat

necessitating a less immediate response. Third country civilian

systems are inherently less responsive than indigenous

military systems. It will take time to get the right picture from

the civilian satellite through the downlink station to the

niche’s operational headquarters for analysis and tasking. I

may take days to produce an executable product. During the

processing time, the US could redeploy forces or defenses.

The US will strike enemy C2 nodes at each level of war. A

the strategic level of war, national political and military

leadership will be attacked. The goal will be to isolate the

enemy’s national decision makers from their instruments o

power. These instruments may range from weapons of mass

destruction, to air defense, to intelligence, to political contro

over their population. The niche’s nuclear weapons should no

sway this strategy. As long as the US effect is to isolate the

enemy leadership from its means of command—as opposed to

decapitation—the US can avoid placing enemy leadership in a

suicidal corner.

At the operational level of war, field commanders will be

severed from their subordinate units. At the tactical level, units

will be cut off from their battle managers. Threat warnings and

targeting information will arrive too late to do any good.

Dominate Battlefield Awareness

It is well within the realm of technical possibility to observe

practically everything of operational significance about a

battlefield. Admiral William Owens, Vice Chairman of the Join

Chiefs of Staff, called this concept dominant battlefield

awareness. This concept has three components. First

platforms continuously surveil the area of interest. A mixture

of aircraft, satellites, and UAVs, equipped with multispectra

sensors, establishes 24-hour, all-weather coverage of the

82
battle area. Unattended ground sensors sniff/watch/listen/

report along areas of possible maneuver. SOSUS-type sensors

listen for underwater threats. Second, data generated by these

sensors are fused and filtered through wide-area automatic

target recognition software. This software cues more refined

systems to specifically identify emitters and high-signature

targets (e.g., armored formations or logistics points). Lastly

this information is disseminated to weapon systems. This

dissemination takes advantage of large bandwidth and digita

compression technologies. It transmits via direct broadcas

satellites. The result of these three steps is dominant battle

field awareness.

A note of caution: Dominant battlefield awareness does no

mean perfect knowledge of all enemy locations and intentions

Knowledge of everything, distributed to everybody, i

impossible to attain. Plans based upon such an impossible

standard are doomed to failure. Rather, dominant battlefield

awareness is an attempt to exploit order-of-magnitude increases

in what’s identifiable about a battlefield.

Throughout military history, what commanders have no

known about an adversary has dominated our image of war

The armies of generals Lee and Meade bumped into each othe

at Gettysburg. In 1914, the German army didn’t even know

the British Expeditionary Force was on the continent unti

they ran into the BEF at Mons .

3 Hitler kept panzer divisions in

reserve near Calais, waiting for the “real” cross-channe

invasion. Saddam’s army had little knowledge of Gen H

Norman Schwarzkopf’s deployment to the west for the “lef

hook.” In each of these cases, commanders had little

information on whole armies maneuvering in front of them. In

today’s Information Age, such military ignorance is impossibl

if one fields an integrated mix of sensors, filters, and

disseminators—and protects this architecture from effective

enemy interference.

Integrate Space-based Systems and UAVs

for Conflict Surveillance

Niche competitors will probably have the ability to targe

satellites in LEO and to effect an EMP burst in space (via a

83
nuclear explosion). The US must have ready counters for these

probabilities. Of the two, the EMP threat may be the lesse

challenge. Satellites must already be hardened due to solar

activity. This shielding could be intensified to negate EMP

effects. However, this shielding would be required on al

satellites for which military operations are dependent—

including civilian-owned communications satellites.*

The ASAT threat depends on target orbit. Satellites in

geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) should remain relatively

secure. During our planning period (2005-2015), it is

improbable that any niche will have air-launched access to

GEO. Putting an ASAT into GEO will require a powerfu

booster. For any niche, such boosters will require a fixed

launch complex. Such a complex should not survive conflic

initiation; the US would attack fixed space launch facilities on

day one of the war.

On the other hand, LEO satellites would be reachable by

air-launched (e.g., the F-15/ASAT) or mobile ground-launched

systems. US options for decreasing this vulnerability will be

few. Targeting air-launched ASATs prior to launch is not likely

they’ll be difficult to identify among the hundreds or

thousands of similar type weapons. The most effective

measure will probably involve two steps: (1) maneuver the

satellites and (2) destroy the niche’s space-tracking capability

Without solid data on satellite tracks, the niche would find

targeting extremely difficult. Other defensive measures could

include in-flight interception of the ASAT, stealthy satellites

and a rapid replacement capability.

What this means is that satellites would probably b

targeted to varying degrees. Because communications

satellites are primarily in GEO, they should survive (unless the

niche develops a mobile ASAT with GEO range). Reconnais

sance satellites, however, operate primarily in LEO. Thei

survival in war with a niche is less certain.

84

*The US could promote such shielding by reimbursing COMSAT owners for carryin

the extra weight needed for shielding. The mechanism could parallel that presentl

used for the civil reserve air fleet (CRAF). The US government pays airlines for th

extra weight some aircraft carry in order to be suitable for military operations.
As a result, the US must augment space -based systems with 

atmospheric systems. Fortunately, UAVs, along the lines o

Tier II+ and Tier III-, are well along in development. High

altitude-long endurance UAVs, with loiter times of 48–72

hours, are probable in our planning time frame. They promise

sufficient loiter times and survivability to accomplish the

surveillance mission. While UAVs have capabilities tha

recommend them in their own right, they are also necessary to

provide redundancy for space-based systems. Satellites in LEO

with predictable trajectories are simply too vulnerable to

interdiction.

This technological solution brings with it an organizationa

challenge. The theater commander must integrate two

fundamentally different architectures. The commander in chie

(CINC) must integrate both space -based and atmospheri

sensors and relays; total reliance on one or the other for

critical tasks is not wise. One or the other may be unavailable

to perform a specific job at a crucial time. It will be far more

effective to integrate their tasks so that one type of system is

not the sole source for any vital node. It will also be far more

efficient to integrate the data acquired by each system

Because space-based and atmospheric systems are presently

controlled by separate commanders (USCINCSPACE and the

theater CINCs, respectively), this integration will require

adjustments to current command relations.

Support the Information Campaign

Dominant battlefield awareness also requires denying the

enemy a similar amount of information. As with a peer enemy

the theater CINC will task the Joint Force Information

Component Commander to orchestrate a denial/distortion

campaign. In a sense, the JFICC will deprive the information

age to the niche. Once that’s accomplished, the other

components will end the industrial age.

Against a niche competitor, we should expect the JFICC t

conduct a short, high-tempo information campaign. This is

due to two factors. First, the niche’s information target set

would be smaller than that of a peer. By definition, a niche

would be less robust in information infrastructure. Second

85
because the niche would not pose a likely nuclear threat to the

US, fewer political restrictions on homeland attacks will come

into play. This would permit attacks with all types o

conventional munitions across all target categories. The resul

should be a short, intensive campaign on a limited number o

targets in the most efficient way possible.

Aerospace forces would directly support this campaign. In

most cases, targets should be highly precise. They would

include connectivity (e.g., fiber-optic lines and radio/cellula

antennas), nodes (e.g., switching stations), repair assets

downlink stations (e.g., satellite ground stations), fusion

centers, and C2 personnel. Munitions used against these targets

will cover the gamut of the inventory—earth penetrators

MHD, EMP, CBU, HE, etc. Bombers and cruise missiles would 

serve as delivery platforms.

Attack Enemy Wealth

To undercut the niche’s ability to continue the war and to

punish it for starting the war in the first place, the CINC would

probably direct aerospace forces to attack the niche’s wealth. I

the niche depends on trade, aerospace forces would identify

and interdict that trade. Shipborne trade would be easiest to

interdict; overland the most difficult. The goal would be to stop

all substantial trade. Minor amounts of imports and exports

would always occur (if nothing else, these would take the form

of smuggling). But nation-supporting trade, dependent on

large and regular flows of goods, is easily identified and stopped.

If the niche depends on imported resources (such as oil)

trade in that resource could be struck as outlined above

targets could include trucks, bridges, shipping, ports, and

trains. Also, aerospace forces could attack the supporting

industry and its infrastructure. Those targets could include

pumps, pipelines, refineries, storage tanks , and ports

Electrical production and transmission facilities crucial to this

industry could also be attacked, as could banking and

communications links with the rest of the world. Any of these

approaches could cripple trade.

A service-based economy would provide an extremely

vulnerable target set. Because services are readily substituted

86
an attacker need only disrupt transactions to cause customers

to look elsewhere. For example, large customers can readily

choose banks and insurance companies anywhere in the

world. They pick specific firms based on convenience

reliability, and returns. Attacks on either the buildings

housing such businesses—or their supporting electricity and

communications—would quickly interrupt transactions to the

point that customers would take their trade elsewhere. Because

service economies are severely affected by disruptions, aero

space attacks against their infrastructure offer high leverage.

In those cases where crucial supporters of the niche

government have commercial interests, attacks would focus on

those interests. It does little good to impoverish common

citizens when they have no voice in government policy. It

makes great sense, however, to target the wealth of key

government supporters. Intelligence agencies should provide

precise insights into the commercial concerns of key regime supporters. Aerospace forces would then attack these enterprises.

Attack Enemy Invasion/Occupation Forces

Wars of the twentieth century have proven infantry’s

inability to overcome modern defenses by itself. Massed

infantry charges didn’t work at the Marne and haven’t worked

since. The Iran-Iraq War proved this lesson again. To overcome

modern defenses, armies need armored mobility. They need

tanks, armored personnel carriers, mobile artillery, and

trucks—by the thousands. This means, by definition, tha

attacking armies bent on invasion and occupation are

high-signature enterprises.

The combat forces themselves would also present a lucrative

target set. US Defense Department planning guidance in 1993

described notional niche invaders as having at least 5,000

armored vehicles and several hundred thousand troops.

4 Such

massed formations of tanks, troop carriers, and mobile

artillery—necessary for all but a dispersed, footborne invasion—

are readily detected. Once detected, they are vulnerable to

aerospace attack. Bombers and cruise missiles, carrying a

wide assortment of precision munitions, have a proven ability

to destroy massed, slow-moving surface forces. Practically the

87
88

Armored Battalion in Tactical Road March

UK 1st Armored Division Entering Iraq During Desert Storm Groun

Offensive
entire family of aerospace munitions under current development (sensor fused weapons, wide-area munitions, brillian

antitank munitions) is optimized for this target set. Equipped

with advanced munitions either in service or about to become

operational and directed by modern C3I systems, airpower has

the potential to destroy enemy ground forces either on the

move or in defensive positions at a high rate while concurrently destroying vital elements of the enemy’s war-fighting

infrastructure.5

Niche competitors would be unable to rapidly replace los

armored forces. Their inventories are limited and, because

niche regimes use armored forces for internal security and

border defense, they can ill afford to lose several thousand in a

war with the US. Also, once these inventories are cut

replacements are difficult to obtain. Although used main battle

tanks and armored personnel carriers are available on the

world market, their quality is suspect. In addition, used

armored vehicles aren’t cheap, spare parts availability is

uncertain, and hard currency is required for purchase.

New procurement is a poor alternative. Prices of new

armored vehicles are high and worldwide production is low. A

niche can’t rely on the international arms market to produce

large numbers of armored vehicles. The capacity simply

doesn’t exist in the post-cold-war world.

For these reasons, once the niche loses its armored forces, it

will have great difficulty replacing them. This difficulty wil

cause internal and regional security problems for the niche.

In addition to their combat elements, invading/occupying

armies require immense amounts of support. Logistical “tails

are vital to land force invasion/occupation. For example, a US

armored division consumes 600,000 gallons of fuel per day

when on the offensive.

6 In addition to the personnel and

transportation units assigned directly to each division, an

attacking force of six US divisions requires a support force o

roughly 200,000 personnel and 40,000 trucks.

7 These suppor

forces are mandatory elements of military operations. Simply

stated, armies don’t move without logistics.*

89

*Even if an army could cut its logistics requirements by 50 percent, a substantia

number of critical targets would remain.
These logistics lines and stores are ripe for interdiction. They

have high signatures. By definition they are less defended

than combat forces. They move slowly and have few defense

systems. As Eliot Cohen writes, “The weakest part of any

military organization is its logistical train—the array o

ill-protected trucks, storage depots, maintenance areas, and

supply points that are needed to sustain forces in combat.”

Precision munitions delivered with an element of surprise

against enemy logistics should have a devastating effect. A

major goal of US aerospace forces will be to “hollow out” an

attacking army by gutting its logistics .

While a niche competitor’s armored forces will not mirror US 

armored divisions, we can assume they will depend upon large

amounts of support personnel and infrastructure. Even

dividing the US numbers by a factor of two or three still leaves

a substantial support force. That is the nature of maneuver

units; large supporting elements are crucial.

US aerospace forces would concentrate on countering

military invasions by striking an invader’s maneuver forces

logistics, and C4I from the outset of hostilities. This would no

be an attrition campaign, however. The overall idea would be

to deny an invader mass and maneuver, thereby forcing the

enemy into a frontal attack scheme. US aerospace attacks on

enemy armor, logistics, massed formations, C4I, and ai

support would limit the enemy’s offensive options to poorly

coordinated infantry and artillery attacks. As noted above, this

style of frontal assault is readily defeated by modern defenses

Should the enemy insist on massing its surface forces despite

the threat of precision attack from aerospace weapons

wide-area munitions delivered by aerospace forces would have

a decisive effect.

Establish Aerospace Superiority

We should expect niche competitors to field a limited numbe 

of ballistic missiles; many already do (e.g., Scuds). The speed

range, and survivability of mobile ballistic missiles make them

attractive. Planners must incorporate the ballistic missile

threat within their calculus when devising future aerospace

superiority regimes. Fortunately, ballistic missiles in th

90
hands of a niche competitor should have several major

weaknesses.*

One weakness is that ballistic missiles offer a high

signature. They emit a large infrared signature at launch and

are radar reflective in all phases of flight. These high

signatures mean that space-based systems can detect ballisti

missile launches with high confidence and can then cue radar

trackers. Once tracked, the minimal maneuverability o

ballistic missiles makes them vulnerable to interception.**

Another weakness is that ballistic missiles are expensive. A

niche would probably have fewer than a hundred. Fo

example, Iraq launched 88 Scuds during the Gulf War .

Unclassified sources estimate North Korea‘s inventory of Scud

launchers at 30; the Saudis have a total of 40 ballistic

missiles.

10 It is unlikely a niche could afford the massive

salvoes of ballistic missiles needed to overwhelm robus

theater defenses.

A third weakness is that mobile targets are almos

invulnerable to ballistic missiles. Unless the missile is

equipped with brilliant sensors, the combination of missile

inaccuracy and target movement makes for a very low Pk.

Lastly, while ballistic missiles are optimized for attacking

targets with limited windows of vulnerability, this capability

demands an extensive support network. This support network 

must include surveillance sensors, sensor-to-warhead targe

data transmission, and an NRT decision cycle. Such a network

adds to unit costs and presents a lucrative target set for US

attack.

Despite these vulnerabilities, the threat posed by ballistic

missiles demands a layered and robust defense. US defenses

should target enemy ballistic missiles throughout thei

deployment and employment. This means (1) disrupting

ballistic missile C4I, (2) targeting ballistic missile launcher

91

 *One weakness of current ballistic missiles that should not persist is inaccuracy

Currently, the CEP of ballistic missiles available to niche competitors is measured i

hundreds of meters. These ballistic missiles are most suited for attacking wide-area

soft targets (such as cities). Their inaccuracy makes hardened point target

invulnerable to ballistic missile attack. Given expected improvements in precision an

navigation technologies, this shortfall should end long before 2010.

**Improved aerospace technologies (e.g., lasers, kinetic kill) integrated with improve

computing technologies offer considerable promise for high-confidence interceptions.
prior to launch, (3) detecting launches, (4) intercepting the

missile/warhead in flight,* and (5) degrading the en route

accuracy of the missile or terminal accuracy of the warhead

Total success in any one of these tasks, or substantial success

in them all, will effectively defeat a niche ballistic missile attack.

Manned aircraft in the hands of a niche competitor is

probably the easiest aerospace defense task. During the time

period of this projection, the US will face only nonstealthy

fighters. It’s unlikely that a niche would have stealthy aircraft

The F-22 air superiority fighter won’t even arrive in US

inventories until the turn of the century. No other stealth

air-to-air fighter is under serious development. This lack o

stealth availability means niche air forces must rely on

nonstealthy fighters. These fighters can’t compete with the

F-22. Thus, any niche confronting the US will find itself with a

significant quality disadvantage in terms of air-to-air fighters.

92

*Boost phase, post-boost phase, or terminal.

Iraqi MiG-25 Destroyed in its Hardened Shelter by a Precision Bomb

During Operation Desert Storm
Any niche air force opposing the US would also find itself at

a serious quality disadvantage (see table 4). Even relatively

large niche air forces, such as the Israeli, Indian, and Saud

air forces, possess less than 200 frontline fighters .* That’s les

than 5 percent of the US inventory of frontline fighters . Even

assuming a 1:1 exchange ratio, any niche fighting the US

would quickly lose its frontline fleet and pilots without any

hope of quick replacement.

 Table 4

93

*Frontline fighters: F-14/15/16/18/117/, AV-8, MiG-29/31, Mirage 2000

Su-24/27, Tornado.
As we look to future war, the number of frontline fighters i

a critical measure. Older fighters will be increasingly difficul

to maintain. Old aircraft will become obsolete. How many

modern aircraft a niche has today is the best indicator o

future capabilities.

Finally, a niche’s nonstealthy forces would be inadequately

supported by EW, air-to-air missiles, tankers, training hours

intelligence, maintenance, etc. These shortfalls would make

the niche’s manned aircraft capabilities quite vulnerable.

The type of aerospace infrastructure necessary to compete

with US aerospace forces is simply unaffordable for niche

competitors. They would come to fight with an inferior position

in each element of the air-to-air equation. An offensive

counterair campaign against enemy air bases should be

expected to destroy the niche’s ability to launch coordinated

strike packages. The few numbers of inevitable leakers should

prove manageable by defensive counterair assets. Again, an

effort will be required, but the components for an effective

defense against a niche’s nonstealthy manned aircraft during

the next one or two decades are already programmed.

This optimism does not extend to unmanned atmospheric

systems. The US will face a substantial challenge agains

stealthy enemy cruise missiles. Because cruise missiles

require little in the way of infrastructure support, an offensive

counterair campaign against cruise missiles would pay few

dividends. For example, there would be few cruise missile

“bases” to attack. The niche could launch cruise missiles from 

mobile TELs garrisoned in warehouses. It’s not likely ou

intelligence agencies would find many cruise missiles prior to

launch.

Further complicating cruise missile defense is the ability o

cruise missiles to change direction. The inherent agility o

cruise missiles makes “point defense” meaningless. At no time

prior to impact can the defender be certain of the cruise

missile’s target. Although the cruise missile may seem headed

for an unimportant area during one phase of flight, it migh

change direction towards a vital target during its next flight

segment. This uncertainty stresses defenders. It puts

defenders in the far more difficult “area defense” mode. Rather

94
than narrowing their efforts to point targets, they must defend

large areas against precision attack.

An additional complication to area defense is the possibility

that any one cruise missile might be carrying a nuclea

warhead. Because even one nuclear impact could have

strategic consequences, “zero leakage” becomes the standard

Not even one cruise missile can be allowed to penetrate, even

when its suspected target is benign. This combination of zero

leakage for an area defense makes cruise missile defense an

extraordinarily demanding task.

In the cruise missile defense equation, C4I may prove th

most lucrative target, especially at the strategic level. C 4I fo

cruise missiles is a complicated task. The enemy must garner

information on US vulnerabilities, decide on a course of action

95

Figure 6. Cruise Missiles, Due to Their Ability to Change

Course, Make Point Defense Difficult
distribute taskings, then assess results. Disrupt any one leg in

this structure and you degrade it all. Because C 4I support

each leg of this structure, it forms the key target set

Continuous attacks on the niche’s C4I should drive it towards

uncoordinated and poorly considered use of the niche’s cruise

missiles.

The majority of the countercruise effort would be in defen

sive counterair. A mix of long-wavelength radars to detec

stealthy cruise missiles,* high-powered targeting radars to

refine the cued information, and large numbers of interception

missiles** (both ground- and air-launched) offers some promise

of partial air defense. The JFACC would need to tightly

integrate these components to achieve an effective system. I

the stealthy cruise missiles depend on off-board navigation

aids like GPS, the US should interfere with the weak GPS

signals. These defensive measures would significantly

decrease the effects of niche cruise missile attacks.

Having said that, numerous stealthy cruise missiles wil

almost certainly penetrate even the most robust defenses

Therefore, it’s doubtful the US will be able to establish air

supremacy if the niche has a substantial inventory of stealthy

cruise missiles employed from mobile launchers.

Avoid Deployment of Critical Fixed

Targets within Range of Enemy Stealth

As with the case of the peer competitor, the niche must be

expected to possess stealthy cruise missiles. Unlike a pee

competitor, however, a niche’s stealthy cruise missiles would

have several significant limitations.

First, a niche’s cruise missiles would be limited in number

Lacking a state-of-the-art defense industrial base, a niche

would have to buy its missiles (or at least critical components

abroad. Normal constraints on sending currency abroad would

likely limit procurement. Second, dependence on foreign

96

*Long-wavelength radars would be placed aboard aircraft, as opposed to bein

ground-based or carried on aerostats. Ground basing restricts detection to th

horizon. Aerostat basing is difficult when conflict has already begun (set-up time i

extensive for aerostats). Aerostats also present the enemy with an immobile

high-signature, high-value target.

**When fully developed, directed energy weapons may prove especially effective.
suppliers may also limit inventory replacements after the war

begins. The US may be able to either interdict resupplies or

dissuade suppliers. Third, a niche’s cruise missiles would lack

sophistication. Without a production base, the niche wouldn’

have the full expertise available to a producer. This lack o

indigenous expertise would diminish a niche’s ability to

rapidly reprogram or modify its missiles after a conflict began

Similarly, a lack of expertise would inhibit the niche’s ability to

maintain the state-of-the-art status of its missiles if there were

a significant time period between purchase and use. Fourth, a 

niche’s cruise missiles may not have real-time connectivity. A

first-rate cruise missile offensive capability requires more than

just the missiles themselves. It also requires advanced

information and C

2

 systems, all of which are expensive and

require extensive operational expertise. A niche probably

wouldn’t have the capability to continuously monitor the

entire battle area, identify key vulnerabilities, transmit this

information to decision makers, then disseminate tasking

orders to missile batteries—all in near real time. These four

limitations would limit a niche’s ability to effectively employ

stealthy cruise missiles against US forces.

Despite these limitations, high-signature, immobile forces

would be extraordinarily vulnerable to a niche competitor’s

cruise missiles. A niche would eventually detect large, fixed

facilities via modern surveillance systems, and would attempt

to overwhelm defenses with large numbers of low-signature

cruise missiles. Those missiles that penetrate would probably

hit vital targets with precision. The sum of these capabilities is

militarily significant. Air supremacy over ammunition ships

needing days to unload, airlift aircraft needing hours to

off-load and refuel, large air bases with “tent cities,” air

refueling aircraft parked nose-to-tail in the open, and so forth

might not be possible.

12 If we make the mistake of giving a

niche enough time to orchestrate cruise missile attacks on

high-signature, immobile US forces, we’ll likely see the niche

exact a considerable toll.

This prospect forces a basic decision on future US employ

ment CONOPS. The question is, will the US attempt to operate

inside or outside the range of emerging enemy weapons (such

as stealthy cruise missiles)? In other words, will the US

97
attempt to (1) build sufficient defenses to negate the threat

posed by a niche’s inventory of emerging weapons or (2) stay

outside the range of these weapons while conducting

operations? The latter case drives force structure requirements

towards long-range and standoff systems. The former heightens 

the value of radically new defense systems and low-signature

dispersed operations.

As with most things, the answer lies somewhere in the

middle. To the greatest extent possible, the US must keep its

forces outside the range of enemy stealth. Understanding tha

out-of-range basing won’t be possible for all forces, the US

must adjust its equipment and CONOPS to operate under the

threat of a stealthy cruise missile attack by a niche enemy.

The US can take several steps to minimize its force structure

within range of niche cruise missiles. It can take advantage o

modern communications and keep key command and contro

functions (e.g., component commanders) within CONUS

Because most communications “bounce” off SATCOMs

anyway, and significant aerospace forces (e.g., bombers

98

Aircraft Parking Ramp at Sheikh Isa, Bahrain, During Operation Deser

Shield
tankers) base outside the theater, the rationale for keeping key

aerospace C2 nodes (e.g., JFACC) in-theater is probably based

more on culture than operational efficiency. The US could also

emphasize long-range, highly survivable systems (e.g., stealth

bombers) at the expense of short-range ones (e.g., F-16 ) tha

require additional support aircraft. Finally, the US could

minimize its in-theater logistical departments to the greates

extent possible.* These steps would lessen the number o

critical targets placed within range of niche stealth.

Airlift Critical Supplies and Spare

Parts into the Combat Area

A major difference between a peer competitor and a niche

competitor is the niche’s absence of near-real-time

sensor-to-shooter systems. When fighting a niche, we can

assume there will be a delay in the cycle time necessary for the

niche to detect a US vulnerability, make an attack decision

disseminate the tasking, and put a weapon on target (time o

flight). As long as airlift ground times are shorter than this

time loop, airlift operations can proceed.

However, if the niche invests heavily in sensor-to-shooter

technology, airlift operations could be readily targeted. Fo

example, if the niche has direct downlinks from multiple

third-country surveillance satellites, plus a rapid decision

system, it could launch against our aerial ports during their

most vulnerable windows. Several airlifters with their arriving

forces on a small parking ramp would make a perfect target for

stealthy cruise missiles with cluster munitions. In addition, i

arriving units were to delay before dispersing, they would give

the niche a similar opportunity to target massed forces.

A niche could also launch cruise missiles against routin

airway traffic. Cruise missiles with active seekers could fly

along standard arrival routes and airways. Highly reflective

civilian airliners (i.e., the CRAF) on predictable routes, devoid

of threat warning receivers or active countermeasures, could

incur heavy losses.

99

*The policy of two-level maintenance supports this logic.
GPS jamming would further complicate airlift operations. To

degrade enemy cruise missile targeting, the US would almos

certainly jam or spoof the civilian GPS signal (“CA” code) in the

vicinity of potential US target areas. While US military forces

would retain access to the encrypted military GPS signal (“Y

code), US civilian airlifters without access to the GPS Y code

would find their GPS navigation equipment unusable within

the theater of operations. Combined with the absence o

terminal navigation aids (e.g., TACAN/VOR/ILS), only airlifters

with access to the GPS Y code would be capable of instrumen

navigation (to include instrument approaches).

To deal with this possible environment, airlifters should plan fo

rapid onloads and off-loads within theater, access by civilian

airlifters to the GPS Y code, and staggered, nonperiodic routings.

Support the Ground Counteroffensive

Regardless of the effect of aerospace attacks on enemy

ground forces, it’s likely the niche leadership would leave its

forward invasion elements in place. Even if its troops are

halted, cut off, and under continuous attack from the air, a

wholesale retreat is unlikely. Granted, such a strategy is illogical

Once its ground forces are stopped in their tracks with no

chance of sufficient resupply, a logical enemy leadership would

acknowledge the hopelessness of its situation and sue for peace

Unfortunately, such intelligence is rare. Just as Hitler left von

Paulus’ Sixth Army at Stalingrad and Saddam left his conscript

divisions to be run over in the Kuwaiti theater of operations, we

must anticipate that niche enemies would leave their invasion

forces in place regardless of the effectiveness of air strikes

against them. If these forces occupy territory of interest to the US

or its allies, friendly ground forces would eventually have to

launch a counteroffensive to drive them out.

Although the inevitability of a ground counteroffensive is o

little doubt, its character would be the focus of much debate

Some might recommend a heavy, multidivision ground

offensive (similar to the Desert Storm ground war). The upside 

of this approach is the likelihood of few friendly battle

casualties. By using overwhelming firepower, the US should

be able to shred what’s left of the niche’s ground invasion/

100
occupation force. However, this approach also has a downside. I

requires a massive buildup prior to G day. This concentration

would become a lucrative target for the niche’s cruise missiles 

This approach is also time intensive, requiring many months

to move hundreds of thousands of troops (with their hundreds 

of thousands of tons of equipment and supplies) to the area o

operations. During this time, the enemy might adapt to the air

offensive and devise an alternative strategy.

101

Source: Department of Defense

Figure 7. The Iraqi Army in Retreat from Kuwait City
A better approach would emphasize light ground forces for

the counteroffensive. The source could be the local threatened

ally, other US allies, and/or US Army and Marines. All would

depend on airpower as the source of heavy fire support for

maneuver units. This dependence would mean extensive

taskings for aerospace forces.

Summary

This chapter discussed operational concepts for US aerospace forces in a future war with a niche competitor in 2010

In such a war, the United States would undoubtedly possess

more and better aerospace weapons. The US aerospace

arsenal would include stealth systems (cruise missiles and

manned fighter-bombers), dedicated atmospheric and

space-based information systems, automated C2, precision

munitions with submeter accuracy, nuclear weapons, and

ballistic missiles with intercontinental range. A niche enemy

would possess some of these systems in limited quantity

Because of the geopolitical environment, it’s safe to assume

the conflict would occur within and adjacent to the niche

enemy’s borders. These borders would be several thousand

miles from the CONUS.

This war would be fundamentally different from that which

is possible today. The biggest difference would lie in the

inability of aerospace defenses to protect high-signature forces

from attack. In a future war with a niche, we must assume the

stealthy cruise missiles and aircraft of both sides would

penetrate aerospace defenses in significant numbers. Afte

penetrating, these systems would target key vulnerabilities

(due to modern surveillance systems) and would hit what they

target (due to modern precision). Unlike Operation Deser

Storm, large, fixed, high-signature US facilities would probably

absorb attacks. This environment differs markedly from

current conditions. It would dictate fundamental changes in

our concepts of operation.

The following aspects of niche warfare deserve specia

emphasis:

102
• We must avoid deployments of critical fixed targets within

range of enemy stealth. Their risk of destruction by stealth

systems would be unacceptable.

• JFACC should base in CONUS. This fixed, permanen

basing will allow immediate tasking of worldwide assets whil

excluding a high-value, high-signature target (JFACC HQ) from

range of enemy stealth systems.

• LEO satellites would be lucrative targets absent extensive

defensive measures. Satellites in GEO will be easier to defend

we can minimize a niche’s limited GEO ASAT capability by

attacking its space launch infrastructure.

• To undercut the niche’s ability to continue the war and to

punish it for starting the war in the first place, the CINC would

probably direct aerospace forces to attack the niche’s wealth

Targets could include trade, resources, and/or services. Assets o

the ruling elites would have top priority.

• During the time period of this projection, the US would

face only nonstealthy fighters. It’s unlikely a niche would have

stealthy aircraft. In addition, any niche would face a serious

shortfall in numbers. Even assuming a 1:1 exchange ratio, any

niche would lose its frontline fleet and pilots without any hope

of quick replacement.

• The US must augment communications and reconnais

sance satellites with unmanned atmospheric systems. UAVs

promise sufficient loiter times and survivability to accomplish

these missions. JFACC would forward NRT information on

friendly and enemy maneuvers to allied forces. This transfer

would require providing technical support and liaison officers.

• Degrading enemy cruise missile guidance would be a top

priority. By manipulating external guidance systems such as

GPS and by positioning decoys in the target area, defenders

would attempt to exploit any algorithm weaknesses in the enemy

system.

• Defenses would take advantage of ballistic missile

vulnerabilities (large infrared signature at launch, rada

reflective in flight, minimal maneuverability). Having said that, a

100 percent shield is probably impossible.

• We must mount a concentrated offensive against enemy C

4

Cruise missiles and stealth bombers would assume this mission.

103
• Our defensive counterair campaign would emphasize

sensor fusion. Enemy stealth systems would intermittently

reflect and emit in flight, especially from the side and rear

aspects. A thoroughly fused sensor network holds the

possibility of successful detection and tracking.

• Aerospace forces would support the JFICC‘s campaign. Al

niche vulnerabilities would be targeted from the onset of the

war. Aerospace taskings would likely be heavy.

• The aerospace campaign would attempt to deny enemy

invasion/occupation, primarily through long-range bombers

and cruise missiles delivering precision munitions.

• When airlifting critical supplies and spare parts into the

combat area, we must minimize ground times. Depending upon 

distance from enemy missile launchers, ground times should

be measured in terms of minutes, not hours.

• Aerospace forces would support counteroffensive forces. A

counteroffensive would probably be necessary to reclaim

territory from the aggressor.

• JFACC would attack the niche in parallel. All target types at

all levels of war would come under attack near simultaneously

The goal of these attacks would not be attrition. Rather, the goa

would be paralysis, especially of the enemy’s C2.

While not an exhaustive list, many of these aspects of a

future CONOPS differ significantly from that currently

envisioned for MRC planning. Accepting stealth as a given fo

both sides, we must figure out how to best operate in this

environment. Signature reduction would be key to successfu

operations. Systems with small signatures have a high

probability of survival. Those with large signatures would

eventually be detected and hit. The implications of this

environment deserve extensive examination and debate.

Notes

 1. Paul Bracken, “The Military After Next,” The Washington Quarterly

Autumn 1993, 158.

2. R. C. Webb et al., “The Commercial and Military Satellit

Survivability Crisis,” Defense Electronics 27, no. 8 (August 1995): 21–25. A

low-yield nuclear detonation would likely “pump” the Van Allen Belts. The

104
enhanced belts would maintain a high radiation state for over a year, thus

degrading unshielded replacement satellites.

 3. Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Bantam, 1962)

280–81.

 4. Les Aspin, Report of the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, 13.

 5. Christopher Bowie et al., The New Calculus (Santa Monica, Calif

RAND, 1993), 83–84.

 6. Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, 1986, 60.

 7. Bowie, 70.

 8. “Two Types of Airpower,” Orbis, Spring 1995, 190.

 9. Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Gulf War Airpower Survey, vol. 5

1993, 562. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

10. The Military Balance 1994–1995 (London: International Institute o

Strategic Studies, 1994), 137, 178.

11. Christopher J. Bowie et al., “Trends in the Global Balance of Airpower

(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995). Data is current as of 1991.

12. It takes approximately nine days to off-load a break-bulk ammuni

tion ship. Point paper N513, Headquarters USN, 25 November 1992.

105
Chap ter 4

Near-Term Actions

This work is only a first attempt at building a vision of futur

aerospace warfare. A more accurate and comprehensive vision

is needed. An institutional effort will be required for the US

Department of Defense to build and implement this vision

Three initiatives would considerably promote this institutiona

effort:

1. Designate a focal point for future warfare. A vision o

future war is important to today’s decision makers; the fact

one doesn’t exist reveals a serious shortcoming. To

permanently fix this shortfall, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs o

Staff (CJCS), should elevate this responsibility to the director

level on the Joint Staff. A Joint Staff Director would have

sufficient clout to garner the necessary resources and

attention to aggressively pursue a vision of future warfare over

the long term.

One option would have J5 assume this responsibility—as it

sole job. Released from any focus on day-to-day events, J5

would develop the future war-fighting vision for the US

military and drive its implementation. Planning future warfare

(mid- and long-term) would be J5’s only job (regional affairs

and arms control would move to J3).

2. Build a concepts development center (CDC). This center

would have the sole, permanent mission of developing operational concepts for future warfare. Their initial focus should be

2010. Similar to the war-gaming efforts of the Naval War

College in 1920–1930s, the CDC would conduct an ongoing

series of war games. These games should generate new

concepts of operation and supporting organizations for future

warfare. It would develop concepts for all elements of the joint

campaign, to include aerospace operations. Insights gained

could build from one game to the next. CDC would also main- tain 

a clearing house for the insights learned from other Service wa

games centering on the future. J5 would drive this effort.

107
3. Build an information warfare center. This should be a

new organization dedicated to developing war-fighting concepts

for the Information Age. It should deal with all forms of i nfor

mation war (strategic/operational/tactical; offensive/ defensive

all missions). This center should have a mix of civilian, active

duty, and reserve manning. J5 would also drive this effort.*

Although these groups will overlap in some areas, each

should develop future CONOPS independently. Both should

regularly brief joint and service leadership with stakes in

future warfare.

Immediate Action

In addition to these broad efforts to clarify our vision of futur 

war, five narrower actions are appropriate for immediate

implementation.**

Task Defense Intelligence Agency for comprehensiv

future projections. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA

does a good job of estimating worldwide arms inventories

and force structure trends. That effort should continue

However, future capabilities of possible adversaries involve

more than weapons inventories. How a military intends to

operate is also important. Therefore, DIA should also focus on

trends in doctrine (as revealed by writings, HUMINT

exercises). This focus is necessary to discover the innovative

operational concepts and organizational structures of possible

enemies—which may differ radically from: (1) ours; (2) anyone

else’s; and (3) what we expect. Reviews of foreign initiatives

can serve as a critique on US concept development. J5 wil

monitor this effort.

Study out-of-theater C2. Our present CONOPS deploys

C2 to the theater of operations. The CINC and componen

commanders deploy close to the fight. This concept made

sense when proximity to the battle was necessary to obtain

accurate information. However, high-value C2 nodes within

range of enemy stealth systems is an ever-increasing risk

108

 *Assuming that CJCS made J5 the focal point for future warfare.

**These action items need central management to ensure institutional follow-through

Each paragraph indicates J5 as that focal point (assuming CJCS designates J5 as th

planner for future war).
Also, C2 deployments delay development and implementation

of campaign plans during transit and setup. Since today’s

joint C4I architecture makes accurate information available at 

great distances, it is now possible to command forces from

greater distances. While great distances will make persona

leadership more difficult, this is nothing new. It’s already

impossible for component commanders to see/visit al

subordinate forces. For example, aerospace forces in the 1991

Gulf War were spread from Spain to Diego Garcia , from th

Red Sea to the Persian Gulf. Some were even based in the

CONUS. Finally, considerable manpower and facility suppor

are needed to support each theater. For these reasons, we

need to review component C 2 with an eye toward

consolidation within CONUS. J5 (not J3 or J6) should review

our C2 architectures.

Study centralized control of national and theate

collection platforms. National and theater surveillance

systems are poorly integrated. They are tasked separately

Much of their output feeds separate databases. Because future

enemies will target our information systems, these systems

must function together. Should one go down, another mus

immediately take up the slack. This can best be done by a

centralized command authority. CJCS should direct J5 (no

J6) to report with specific recommendations within the year.

Organize for information war. IW has offensive and

defensive aspects. It is conducted at the strategic, operational

and tactical levels. It has many subsets (e.g., jamming

viruses, psyops). Unfortunately, no one is responsible for

bringing the art of war to IW in its entirety. NSA has a piece

So do SPACECOM, the services, each CINC, and so forth

Because information supremacy will be as important as air

supremacy to future war, it’s time to designate a CINC for IW

This CINC will work IW at the strategic and operational levels

of war (components will retain tactical-level IW—just as they

retain tactical aircraft while the AF works strategic and

operational airpower). CJCS should designate CINCSPACE as

the IW “king.” J5 will monitor progress. If rapid progress is no

forthcoming, CJCS could create another CINC or give the

mission to one of the services as the executive agent.

109
Organize for parallel war. General Fogelman spoke of the

possibility of attacking 1,500 targets the first day of a war. I

his vision is correct, we’re looking at far more than just an

increase in efficiency—we’re looking at the possibility of a new

style of warfare. Future war may be conducted by attacking an

enemy across all target sets and all levels of war near

simultaneously. This type of war could strip an opponent o

the ability to repair and adapt. Initial operations may prove

decisive. CJCS should task the CINCs and services to brief the

JCS on their appraisal of parallel war and its applicability to

their mission (to include their vulnerabilities to this type o

warfare). J5 will coordinate this review.

Required Flexibilities

Future warfare will also require specific flexibilities within

weapon systems. Decisions made today will affect tha

flexibility. Therefore, today’s acquisition considerations fo

aerospace forces should include these factors:

Information. Platforms must have the ability to incorporate/

upgrade the latest information hardware and software, employ

information obtained by off-board sensors, and transmi

information garnered by onboard sensors to other weapon

systems. Systems must also be able to operate despite a

corrupted information environment.

Long range. Aerospace platforms should be based as fa

from enemy stealth systems as possible. Distance either puts

a base out of enemy stealth range or gives layered defenses

more opportunities to detect and target enemy attacks

Short-range systems will contribute only in very low-threa

environments.

Stealth. High-signature aerospace weapons won’t survive in

future war. Weapon systems must emphasize passive sensing

minimal reflectivity, and discrete emissions. If platforms have

these characteristics but their support structures (e.g.

tankers, AWACS, fixed air bases) do not, the platform as a

weapon system will not survive.

Precision. Manned aerospace platforms will become

increasingly expensive. Driven by their need to incorporate

long range, stealth, data processing, and mobility, there’s no

way they will also be cheap. This expense will drive down

110
inventories. At the same time, target sets are expanding (better

C2 will allow dispersion; the possibility of strategic attack adds

to the number of targets). There’s also the desirability o

conducting near-simultaneous attack across all levels of war

Precision is required to reconcile these trends. Each sortie

must kill multiple targets.

UAVs. We need to think in terms of tens of thousands o

UAVs. Their inherent stealthiness and minimal basing

requirements allow low-signature operations. Their lack of an

aircrew allows casualty-indifferent operations (although no

collateral damage-indifferent). They are increasingly capable

of long-endurance flights. They can perform strike

communications, and surveillance missions. While manned

platforms will remain mandatory for certain types of missions

(e.g., killing hard targets or targets with uncertain locations)

UAVs will make decisive contributions to future aerospace

operations if employed skillfully in large numbers. At the same

time, future US defenses must have the capability to deal with

large numbers of stealthy UAVs (i.e., cruise missiles) attackin

simultaneously. Attacks by several hundred missiles at one

time are plausible.

Mobility. One result of the Information Age will be the

enemy’s near-certain detection of fixed facilities. To offset this

information, future commanders will need the flexibility to

move land-based aerospace forces between bases. Such

mobility requires a lean support structure. This concep

affects how we envision munitions, C2, maintenance, POL, and

support equipment.

Alternatives to space. Satellites in fixed orbits will be

exceedingly vulnerable in the future. Military operations

dependent on satellite support rest on a dubious assumption

of satellite survivability. We need alternatives to space -born

architectures. These alternatives should emphasize HALE

UAVs and fiber-optic cable.

Power projection. Finally, the Information Age wil

fundamentally affect power projection. Ubiquitous sensors and

transmission devices will give our future military commanders

extensive information on the enemy’s scheme of maneuver

Unfortunately, the enemy will also have substantia

information about our forces. This information will make

111
either side

s invasion forces exceptionally vulnerable when

they mass to attack. Mobile defenses accompanying massed

forces will be inadequate to stop interdiction forces

emphasizing state-of-the-art information, C2, penetration, and

precision. It is at this point, very early in the battle, that wars

will be won or lost. Once territory is seized, it may prove

excessively costly to reclaim. Therefore, future US weapons

must be capable of “day one” operations. US weapons must

have the capacity to strike with overwhelming force from the

first day of the war.

112
Appendix A
Illustrative Scenario (Peer)

To illustrate future war with a peer competitor, imagine

the following hypothetical scenario. China invades the

Maritime Provinces of Russia. China‘s announced goal is to

foster an independent state; it promises to withdraw al

troops after independence is established. China ‘s Peoples

Liberation Army (PLA) immediately captures Khabarovsk 

cutting the Trans-Siberian and BAM (Baikal-Amur Mainline

railroads. The remaining Russian units in Khabarovsk

retreat to Komsomolsk. The PLA does not pursue, instead

relying on air attacks and lack of supplies to neutralize the

remaining Russian forces. The only other substantia

Russian ground force in the area is holding Vladivostok , bu

is under heavy pressure. Russian and Chinese air forces

battle overhead. Due to low sortie rates and effective SAMs

neither can establish air superiority. The UN Security

Council meets, but China vetoes all measures. China issues

a demarche on strategic attacks on Chinese soil: any attack

conventional or nuclear, on its soil will trigger a nuclear

response on the soil of the attacking state. The Russians

unwilling to risk nuclear war, refrain from nuclear first-use

However, the Russians do attack Chinese military targets up

to 200 NM deep into China .

The US decides to unilaterally enter the conflict on Russia ‘

side.* The president orders the theater commander to achieve

these five objectives:

• Reduce the impact of air attacks on Russian forces.

• Enhance Russian combat capabilities in the Maritime

Provinces.

• Resupply Russian forces in Vladivostok and Komsomolsk

• “Attrit” PLA forces on Russian territory (especially those

attacking Vladivostok).

• Support the Russian counterattack from Komsomolsk

towards Khabarovsk.

115

*This is only an il lus tra tive sce nario. The spe cific rea son for in ter ven ing is not im por 

tant for sce nario pur poses. What is im por tant is to out line a con tin gency in which th

en emy is a peer and the fight is thou sands of miles from US ter ri tory.
In accordance with this strategic guidance, the theater

commander tasks his Joint Force Air Component Commander

(JFACC) to accomplish five specific objectives:

• With the Russian air force, establish air superiority over

the Maritime Provinces.

• Airlift US combat support and combat service suppor

units to Komsomolsk and Vladivostok.

• Airlift Russian supplies into Komsomolsk and Vladivostok.

• Attack key Chinese military forces and LOCs on Russian

territory.

116

Figure 8. Map of Sino-Russian Area of Operations
• Provide near-real-time information on Chinese military

movements to Russian commanders.

The JFACC faces several significant problems. First among

them is China’s considerable stealth inventory. The PLAAF has

100,000 stealthy cruise missiles and 1,000 mobile launchers.

Range: 1,000 NM. RCS: <.001 frontal and rear aspects; <.01

side aspect. Guidance: integrated GPS /INS en route

millimeter wave seeker in the target area. CEP is <1 meter. Warhead: 1,000-lb conventional, CBU, infrared cameras with data

burst transmitters, multichannel jammers, decoys, or 100-KT

nuclear. From launch areas around Harbin, Beijing, and Hon

Kong, Chinese stealthy cruise missiles can strike all major

East Asian cities (e.g., Tokyo, Seoul, Hanoi, Vladivostok).

The PLAAF also has 72 stealthy fighter-bombers divided

among three bases. Their combat radius is 500 NM

(unrefueled High-High-High Profile). Seoul, the Maritim

Provinces, and the Sea of Japan lie within their range. Chinese

stealthy fighter-bombers have an RCS between .1 and .001

depending on aspect. Each aircraft can carry either four

long-range launch-and-leave air-to-air missiles or eigh

precision bombs (or canisters). Aircraft guidance: integrated

GPS/INS en route. Warhead guidance is either visual (e.g.

laser guided) or through pattern recognition sensors.

The JFACC’s second problem is that he may not plan on

using Japanese or Korean bases for offensive operations

When the Japanese government appeared ready to announce

its active support for the combined Russo-US operation

(including basing and cooperative air defense), Chinese

bombers sank five oil supertankers approaching Japan

After the US Seventh Fleet seized Chinese merchant ship 

in international waters, Chinese stealthy cruise missiles

struck two USN ships at Yokosuka Naval Station, Japan 

Damage was heavy, casualties light. The Chinese also

publicized their ability to hit nuclear power plants in Japan

with cruise missiles.** As a result of these events, the

117

 *China pro duces all mis sile com po nents in di ge nously.

**Ja pan has 47 op er at ing re ac tors. See “The Asian Syn drome: Many More Re ac tors,

New York Times, 23 April 1995.
Japanese government restricted US Forces Japan (USFJ) to

defensive operations only. The (unified) Korean governmen

followed suit.

The JFACC‘s third problem is that China‘s space-based

surveillance and communications systems can detect and

relay information on large US buildups. China‘s on-orbi

collection systems include NRT imaging, ELINT, and SBWAS

118

Figure 9. Map of East Asia
(radar). On-orbit communications systems include a

Chinese-owned civilian constellation (serving Asia and

Oceania) in LEO plus three military communications satellites

in GEO. China also has replacement satellites and available

launchers ready to go.

A fourth problem is that per NCA guidance, JFACC canno

conduct a strategic air campaign—even with conventiona

weapons—against critical targets on Chinese territory.* The

NCA places leadership, C4I, and weapons (including cruise

missile and stealthy fighter-bomber bases) on Chinese

territory off-limits to attack. However, the NCA does allow

attacks with nonlethal weapons against these targets.

The JFACC‘s fifth problem is that the Chinese have

SOSUS-type arrays in both the Sea of Japan and the Eas

China Sea. The Chinese used commercial ships during

peacetime to deploy this system. It is connected via fiber-optic

cable with a control center in China (undetermined location). I

is a relatively crude system; quiet submarines can operate

with little chance of detection. However, large-screw surface

ships and submarines firing missiles are readily detected. As a 

result, US Navy ships capable of offensive operations wil

assume a high level of risk if they operate in either the Sea of

Japan or the East China Sea.

Table 5

Vladivostok Weather (Ceilings in Percent)

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Ceilings

<3,000

9 11 23 33 38 71 68 52 33 28 19 11

Ceilings

<1,000

4 5 12 19 24 57 53 33 13 10 7 4

Inches

Precipitation

.3 .4 .7 1.2 2.1 2.9 3.3 4.7 4.3 1.9 1.2 .6

Source: USAFETAC/DOO (Now AFCCC)

119

*Simi lar to China‘s status as a sanc tu ary dur ing the Ko rean War.
Weather works both for and against air operations. If the

war starts in summer, low ceilings will hamper air strikes

Summer is the rainy season in the Maritime Provinces

ceilings are low, precipitation high. On the plus side

Chinese movements are restricted. Wet, marshy terrain

would channel any invading Chinese forces along bridges

and prepared roads. This channeling would make them

easier to detect and attack. Conversely, if we were to assume

a winter offensive, the opposite conditions would exist

Ceilings would rise and precipitation would decrease

facilitating air strikes on surface forces. However, frozen

rivers and marshes would afford the Chinese more avenues

of advance. For purposes of this scenario, the war starts in

the summer.

In this scenario, China uses massive numbers of troops to

invade Russian territory while stealthy aircraft and cruise

missiles attack key Russian targets. These stealthy systems

(cruise missiles and stealthy fighter-bombers) pose a

significant threat to any deployment of US forces within

1,000 NM of China. Stealthy cruise missiles place sof

targets (e.g., embarkation ports, air bases, aircraft carriers

nonhardened C2 facilities) at significant risk during daylight

followed by either cruise missile or stealthy fighter-bombe

attack at night. Chinese stealthy fighter-bombers could also

attack high-signature airborne targets (e.g., AWACS, E-2C

J-STARS, C-17, B-1) operating within 500 NM of China . Thi

threat slows down US deployments and limits the types o

forces capable of effective participation.

US Aerospace Concepts of Operations

In this hypothetical scenario, China‘s stealthy cruis

missiles have the ability to target US forces within 1,000

NM; Chinese stealthy fighter-bombers can target US forces

within 500 NM. Both operate from a sanctuary enforced by

the threat of nuclear weapons . US basing options are

degraded by Japanese and Korean neutrality. US forces have

access to bases in Russia, Alaska, the CONUS, Guam, and

Taiwan.

120
In accordance with guidance from the theater commander

the US aerospace CONOPS contains the following major

themes:

• Limit the number of US targets vulnerable to attack.

• Command US aerospace operations from Cheyenne

Mountain.

• Protect US space systems.

• Attack China‘s satellites.

• Provide NRT information on the enemy to Russian

defenders.

• Degrade Chinese stealth cruise missile accuracy.

• Attack China‘s stealth aircraft force.

• Defend against Chinese stealth attack.

• Defend against Chinese theater ballistic missile attack.

• Attack Chinese strategic and operational information.

• Deny Chinese invasion forces mass, maneuver, and

effective C4I.

• Airlift critical supplies to Russian forces.

• Prosecute a parallel war.

Limit the Number of Targets Vulnerable

to Attack

Most US combat units remain more than 1,000 NM from

China, outside the range of Chinese cruise missiles . Th

weight of the US combat effort falls on aerospace forces

primarily long-range strike aircraft and missiles. Short-legged

nonstealthy aircraft (e.g., F-16, F-18) have little use. Because

of the presence of Russian ground forces in the Maritime

Provinces, the US does not deploy ground combat units. The

CINC limits deployments within range of Chinese stealth t

“enhancing” capabilities: C4I, air defense units (including

spoofing and jamming teams), surface-to-surface missile

batteries (e.g., cruise missiles , UAV launchers), and lif

infrastructure. Those forces disperse after landing to preclude

rapid identification and targeting (their approximate locations

will have already been revealed by the high-signature airlifter)

Units remain mobile and camouflaged.

121
Command US Aerospace Operations from

Cheyenne Mountain

The theater CINC deploys forward; the JFACC and staf

remain at Cheyenne Mountain.* The CINC gives genera

guidance (e.g., apportionment, overall objectives) through a

liaison office to the JFACC. The JFACC deploys staff element

forward (to Vladivostok and Komsomolsk) to liaise with

Russian forces (especially army units and ADA).

Fixed basing of the JFACC allows immediate planning/

tasking of the air campaign. There’s no delay in aerospace

operations as the JFACC headquarters deploys to the Russian

far east. There’s also the crucial benefit of not positioning an

important target within range of enemy stealth systems.

The JFACC at Cheyenne Mountain is colocated with the

Joint Force Information Component Commander (JFICC). Thi

dual headquarters receives all data collected by satellites

UAVs, aircraft, and surface sensors. This data is relayed

through SATCOMs, backed up by COMSATs and three strings

of HALE UAVs across the Sea of Japan. Each string consists o

two UAVs separated by 500 NM. They relay data to separate

ground stations in Japan which are connected by fiber-opti

cable to the US grid. Data moves through the US grid to

Cheyenne Mountain. As an additional safety measure, the

JFICC orbits spare SATCOMs while readying more fo

immediate launch.

JFACC tasks strike aircraft regardless of location (e.g.

stealth bombers based in CONUS, FB-22s at Petropavlovsk)

JFACC directs employment of air defense units in theater

cruise missiles aboard ships at sea, surveillance aircraft in

theater, and air refuelers in Alaska, Guam, and centra

122

*Chey enne Moun tain has the ad van tage of prox im ity to USSPACE COM, put ting two 

ma jor aero space com po nent com mand ers to gether. It is also im mune to all but a

nu clear at tack (bar ring de vel op ment of ki netic rods from space ). Other pos si ble lo 

ca tions in clude Fal con AFB (also has ex cel lent con nec tivity with USSPACE COM)

Lang ley AFB (wealth of per son nel with op era tional ex per tise), and the Pen ta gon

(ready ac cess to sat el lite down links, in tel li gence, po liti cal lead er ship). In all cases

sig nifi cant parts of the JFACC‘s staff could be lo cated else where. For ex am ple, th

JFACC could be at Fal con AFB with lo gis tics co or di nated from Lang ley AFB while

stra te gic tar get ing is drafted by CHECK MATE in the Pen ta gon.
Russia.* It works closely with the colocated JFICC to manag

and position surveillance platforms, and to deconflic

communications requirements.

Unit taskings in the ATO are accompanied by the requisite

intelligence information (“smart push”). Units can reques

specific additions (“warrior pull”), but the majority of their

information is managed centrally. Smart push/warrior pul

requires considerable expertise on the JFACC staff. Officer

must anticipate the intelligence needs of operating units

However, it has the advantage of decreasing ATO cycle times

while facilitating bandwidth management.

Protect US Space Systems

Having equipped its satellites with shielding against lasers

and EMP, US satellite defenses are primarily concerned with

Chinese jamming and direct ascent ASAT. To offset th

jamming threat, the US relies on frequency-hopping EHF

transmissions. Their focused footprint makes jamming

ineffective. Nonlethal strikes on high-power jammers within

China (readily pinpointed by their high signature), plus

suppression of Chinese jammers within Russia , decreas

interference on UHF channels. That leaves Chinese ASATs

(and space mines) as the greatest threat.

At the outset of hostilities, China‘s two space mines in GEO

drift toward US satellites. Due to their lack of either escorts o

maneuverability, two US SATCOMs are destroyed. The US

responds with ASAT strikes on all Chinese satellites 

regardless of orbit. China follows suit. Both sides, however

refrain from attacking the other’s ballistic missile warnin

satellites (e.g., DSP).

Despite the risk of nuclear retaliation, both sides attack

missile launch facilities. With NCA approval, the CINC orders

cruise missile attacks against the limited number of Chinese

fixed space launch facilities. The Chinese retaliate with cruise

123

*Since this sce nario in volves Rus sia as an ally, and Rus sia has world- class SAMs

there’s no need in this par ticu lar sce nario to de ploy US SAMs (e.g., Pa triot ) to th

AOR.
missile attacks against Vandenberg AFB and Kennedy Space

Center (launched from “commercial” ships), plus simila

Russian facilities. As a result of these attacks, all three

nations lose their heavy space-launch capabilities. They can

neither launch large satellites nor put sophisticated ASATs

into GEO.

The US also attacks China‘s single space tracking facility

This attack significantly increases the survivability of US

satellites. By maneuvering satellites and denying the Chinese

the ability to identify the new tracks, the US impairs China ‘

ability to precisely target US satellites.

Remaining US satellites in GEO survive. Space-based

infrared systems detect air-launched ASATs upon launch

giving satellite controllers ample warning. Controllers use

satellite maneuver and escort satellites to defeat the Chinese

air-launched ASATs sent against GEO targets. In addition

the US attrits host aircraft for air-launched ASATs . Becaus

these aircraft are nonstealthy and use tracks within five

degrees of the equator for launch, they are readily detected

and intercepted by AEGIS-type ships in the Indian Ocean.

US satellites in LEO also use maneuver to complicate

Chinese air-launched ASAT targeting. However, maneuver

ability is limited due to fuel restrictions. As a result, the

Chinese heavily attrit satellites in LEO. Constant maneu

vering also degrades collection by these LEO satellites.

The loss of heavy launch complexes makes replacement o

large platforms impossible. Replacement alternatives follow

two paths. First, a fleet of 1,000 stealthy HALE UAVs carrying

a variety of sensors assumes lost capabilities. This fleet

launches from the area around Lake Baikal (Irkutsk

Ulan-Ude), the Kamchatka peninsula, and the Kurile

Islands. Launch sites rely upon dispersion for defense

Second, air-launched boosters (similar to today’s Pegasus

put attrition fillers into LEO .* Some of these satellites

continuously maneuver until their fuel is exhausted, then

remain in orbit until destroyed by Chinese ASATs . Other

continuously maneuver until their fuel is exhausted, then

124

*Host air craft op er ate from Flor ida. Launch tracks are along the equa tor (3,000 NM

round- trip).
deorbit for recovery and relaunch. All satellites are single

mission and stealthy.

Attack China‘s Satellites

US attacks on Chinese satellites parallel China’s space

supremacy effort. US antisatellite jammers and lasers are

based in space, in Russia, and in the US. Jammers in Russia

deployed by the hundreds, regularly move to complicate

Chinese suppression attempts. Lasers attempt “soft kills

against Chinese satellites.

Russian special operations forces, along with US and

Russian cruise missiles, attack Chinese satellite ground

stations. US forces attack all Chinese satellite ground stations

outside of China (e.g., ships in international waters).

Due to the loss of heavy space launch facilities, the US relies

on air-launched ASATs. The US uses air bases in its southeas

to launch host aircraft. These bases support both launches into 

GEO (from along the equator) and LEO insertions along pola

tracks. The US also launches ASATs along HEOs to attemp

intercepts with Chinese satellites in GEO.

ASATs are capable of carrying a variety of warheads. To

reduce the chance of space debris, initial ASATs carry

nonlethal warheads. They use EMP, MHD, and HPM for sof

kills on Chinese satellites. For those satellites immune to sof

kills, kinetic kill warheads on ASATs would follow. Given a

robust inventory of ASATs with various warheads, the US

could heavily attrit Chinese satellites, regardless of orbit.

Provide Near-Real-Time Information on Enemy

Military Maneuvers to the Russian Defenders

High-value airborne platforms (AWACS, J-STARS, TR-1

Rivet Joint) launch and recover from bases >1,000 NM from

China. Bases include Shemya, Petropavlovsk, Elmendorf, and

Irkutsk.* Orbits within range of Chinese stealth fighters

(500-NM radius) and cruise missiles (1,000-NM radius

125

*As long as China main tains space-based sur veil lance sys tems and ICBMs , high

 value as sets would avoid us ing the same air base on con secu tive nights. This mo bil ity

dras ti cally in creases sup port and C

2 re quire ments, plus crew ra tios.
carrying antiradiation sensors) are possible, but risky. Stealth

fighters escort surveillance platforms. However, given the

importance of these platforms, their limited numbers, and

their large signatures, attrition is high; they are priority

targets for Chinese counterair weapons. For this reason

JFACC restricts their orbits to overhead rear area bases and

convoys.

The JFACC integrates space-based systems (primarily

electro-optical satellites in GEO and phased array rada

satellites in LEO) and hundreds of HALE UAVs (primarily SAR

equipped) to effect 24-hour surveillance of Chinese forces

These systems relay their data through communications

satellites and HALE UAVs (with communications packages).

SATCOMs relay the data directly to established ground

stations, then on to Cheyenne Mountain. The HALE UAV

relay their data to ground stations in Japan for relay via

fiber-optic cable through the US communications grid to

Cheyenne Mountain. State-of-the-art computers fuse this

data.** Russian liaison officers review the resulting

information and distill what’s necessary for transmittal to

Russian units. The US provides liaison officers and the

requisite hardware and software (e.g., computers, satellite

links, receivers, crypto keys, display boards) to the

Russians.***

Degrade Chinese Stealth Cruise

Missile Accuracy

Because Chinese cruise missiles use GPS for updating en

route guidance, JFACC directs jamming of the unencrypted

civil signal (CA code) from GPS satellites within view of th

area of operations.**** Chinese cruise missiles can stil

navigate to the target area using cheap INS technology, bu

126

 *This is a fea ture of cur rent UAV de sign ef forts. For ex am ple, “the Tier 2 UAV wi

carry a 30- inch an tenna for sat el lite com mu ni ca tions.” Avia tion Week, 16 May 1994

20. Whether the re ceiv ing ground sta tion is in thea ter or in the CONUS is ir rele vant to

data trans mis sion re quire ments.

 **Al go rithms are con tinu ally ad justed by con tract pro gram mers.

 ***We’re as sum ing US and Rus sian units ex er cised this con nec tivity pre hos tili ties.

****Liegh Ann Klaus, “GPS Ad vance ments Over shadow Grow ing Pains,” De fense Ele

tron ics, Feb ru ary 1995, 13–15. Re tain Y code for US mili tary op era tions.
without GPS updates they aren

t as accurate as planned. As a

result, Chinese cruise missiles become more susceptible to

local jamming and spoofing in the target area. Units dedicated 

to this task are deployed with US force elements and attached

to Russian air defense units.

Attack China‘s Stealth Aircraft Force

China bases its entire stealth aircraft inventory within

Chinese borders. Due to political restrictions on homeland

attack, US platforms deliver only nonlethal weapons agains

the Chinese stealth bases. Aerospace forces (cruise missiles

bombers) deliver conventional EMP and MHD bursts ove

Chinese stealth aircraft bases. These bursts cripple the

manned stealth fleet. Those aircraft not effectively disabled

have their sortie generation degraded (due to disabling o

support equipment). These bursts also disable some C 4

nodes. To further degrade operations, cruise missiles spray

anti-POL microbes on these bases. Despite these attacks

China remains capable of generating 24 stealth fighter-bombe

sorties per night (.33 sortie rate).

Long-range bombers and cruise missile carriers launch from

Alaska, the CONUS, Guam, Thailand, Vietnam, and Russia

They complicate Chinese defenses by attacking from all clock

positions.

Defend Against Chinese Stealth Attack

Understanding that Chinese stealth systems will reflect o

emit signals intermittently during flight, the US deploys a mix

of sensors to the AO. The US deploys long-wavelength radars

to northern Japan.* SIGINT collectors operate from Irkutsk

and Elmendorf. Within the Maritime Provinces, the US deploys

high-power, short-range radars and lidars across likely attack

corridors. Sensors point both forward and backward to take

advantage of frequency shortfalls in nonfrontal aspects. Radar 

reflections from pulses emitted from one location can be

127

*De spite Japa nese neu tral ity in this war, To kyo would likely author ize use of its ter ri 

tory for air de fense ra dars, es pe cially if the data col lected by these sys tems wen

di rectly to the US, not Rus sia .
received in a second location, allowing wide separation

between sensor and shooter. UAVs launched from auster

airfields (e.g., highway strips) patrol likely launch and

penetration areas. They carry different types of sensors

(e.g., electro-optical, inverse synthetic aperture radar, o

jet-engine modulation). All UAVs transmit data directly to

communications satellites for relay to the JFACC at Cheyenn

Mountain.

JFACC assesses this data for accuracy. Because sensors ar

“looking” for small returns, false targets proliferate. JFACC‘

computers distill and filter the returns to provide an accurate

picture. Based on this accurate picture, JFACC transmit

taskings and information to air defense units. Stealthy

interceptors respond from Petropavlovsk and bases on

Sakhalin and the Northern territories. They’re equipped with

multispectral seekers on their air-to-air missiles. Rada

solutions remain possible; during air-to-air engagements

enemy fighters lose sufficient “stealthiness” to enable tracking

solutions. Imaging sensors prove decisive against cruise

missiles. In addition to air defense fighters, a limited number

of air defense batteries protect key US forces. They also receive

direct tasking from JFACC. Finally, Russian liaison officers

relay the threat picture to Russian forces, along with

information on US responses.

Defend Against Chinese Theater

Ballistic Missile Attack

Russian forces deploy their own BMD to defend their own

bases. JFACC deploys US BMD to defend only US forces

Because the Chinese use mobile launchers for their ballistic

missiles, air strikes on Chinese missile launch facilities are

not productive. JFACC includes ballistic missile C4I within th

homeland target list for bombers and missiles carrying

nonlethal weapons. Missile production and test facilities are

also in this list. The JFACC positions an airborne laser aircraf

over the Maritime Provinces, but it is shot down by a Chinese

stealthy fighter. Thereafter, BMD relies on space -based IR

sensors to detect launches (satellites dedicated to this mission 

are augmented by covert sensors on other satellites and by

128
HALE UAVs orbiting over likely launch areas). After launch

detection, JFACC cues theater and terminal defenses. These

defenses use kinetic kill interceptors, ground-based, high

powered lasers, and directed energy weapons for the

intercepts. Emitting ground-based sensors in the termina

areas are made mobile in order to degrade preemption attacks.

Attack Chinese Strategic and

Operational Information

In support of the Joint Force Information Componen

Commander’s campaign, aerospace operations center on two

missions: (1) destroy key nodes (such as collection platforms

relay networks, and fusion centers) in the Chinese information

network; and (2) distort data in the Chinese information

network by viral insertion and spoofing. These twin operations 

delay vital information to the enemy while making the enemy

mistrust the remainder.

Missiles and bombers deliver nonlethal weapons against C4

nodes within China. Targets include the defense ministry

component headquarters (down to corps/fleet/regimen

levels), C2 of collection platforms, the communications system

between the national leadership and its internal security

apparatus, logistic depots and systems, power grids, banking

TV/radio, and the transportation network (especially the air

traffic control system). JFACC also orbits high-altitude UAVs

overhead Chinese satellite downlink facilities. Equipped with

jammers, these UAVs disrupt the tasking and data flow

between ground stations and satellites.

Within Russia, the JFACC directs more conventiona

destructive means against Chinese information systems

Targets include theater C2 facilities, collection platforms

transmitters, transmission lines, logistics, and information

repair facilities/units. Methods include precision bombs

jamming, and spoofing. Because the goal is to dominate

information at the strategic and operational levels of war, the

JFICC orchestrates these attacks. The JFACC only executes it

aerospace aspects.

129
Deny Chinese Invasion Forces Mass,

Maneuver, and Effective C

4

I

Cruise missiles launch from ground, sea, and air platforms

Sea-launched cruise missiles launch from beyond 1,000 NM

due to the “counterbattery” threat of Chinese cruise missiles .

Air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) launch >500 NM from

China due to the stealth fighter threat.** Ground-launched

cruise missiles launch from Russian bases in the Kurile

Islands. Prevailing winds in the area aid the US attack. Winds

are generally out of the east at 15 knots.***

Long-range stealthy bombers launch from CONUS.***

They’re escorted over the target area by long-range stealth

fighters and UAVs (for jamming and suppression). Afte

strike, the bombers recover at Guam, Elmendorf, and/o

Irkutsk. Bombers return the next night and restrike Chinese

targets en route back to CONUS. Air refuelers launch/recover

in Russia, Alaska, and Taiwan. Fighters launch/recover from

Petropavlovsk and Irkutsk.

The immediate task of this campaign is to drop all major

bridges across the Ussuri and Amur Rivers on the

Sino-Russian border east of 130E. The intent is to cut supply

lines in Russia and China. One stealth bomber sortie effect

these cuts the first night of the war. Resulting choke points

are identified by satellites and UAVs (with wide-area automati

target recognition [ATR]), then attacked by cruise missiles

during the day and long-range stealth bombers at night.

Stealthy cruise missiles and bombers deliver a wide variety

of munitions on Chinese forces. Scatterable mines, anti-POL

gels, and conventional EMP blasts break unit cohesion and

canalize the enemy advance. Brilliant munitions destroy

high-value equipment. Each sortie results in multiple kills

130

 *Submarine- launched cruise mis siles have lit tle util ity in this sce nario.

 **Op ti mum cruise mis sile car rier is an “ALCM truck.” It would have long- range and

large weap ons ca pac ity.

 ***850- millibar and 700- millibar vec tor mean winds are 080/10 and 090/10, re spec 

tively. Data fur nished by US AFE TAC/DOO.

****0.5 sor tie rate due to CONUS bas ing. Quick turns made pos si ble by high (4.0

crew ra tios. As sum ing ad vances in ex plo sives and pre ci sion over the next 15 years

each B-2 car ries 40 weap ons.
When Chinese forces disperse to offset these attacks, their

assaults on Russian positions break down.

Against targets with limited windows of vulnerability

(sometimes called “short dwell” targets), JFACC launche

ballistic missiles. Strikes are highly successful due to

sensor-to-warhead target data transmission, the NRT decision

cycle, and maneuvering warheads capable of identifying/

tracking mobile targets (e.g., mobile C2, Chinese cruise missil

TELs on Russian territory). Chinese ballistic missile defense

are ineffective in the forward area.*

Airlift Critical Supplies to Russian Forces

The US limits airlift deliveries to high-value replacemen

parts/weapons. SAM reloads top the priority lists, followed by

UAVs and air-to-air missiles. Due to the Chinese cruise missile

threat, off-loads are rapid. Airlift sorties landing in the

Maritime Provinces spend less than one hour on the ground

Their goal is to arrive and leave before Chinese C 4I can detec

the airlifters’ presence, direct an attack, and deliver warheads

into the target area.**

Prosecute a Parallel War

The US attacks key nodes of Chinese military power across

all levels of war with near-simultaneity. As stated before, the

NCA restricts attacks on the Chinese political structure (due to

the threat of nuclear retaliation). All other targets, however

are fair game for attack. At the tactical level, the idea is to

defeat the attacking invasion force—not just by attacking any

single system (such as armor), but by concurrent attacks on

all facets of the invasion force. This includes the armor

logistics (e.g., POL, ammunition), personnel, command and

control, and LOCs (especially roads, tunnels, and bridges).

At the operational level, the idea is to defeat the attacking

armies—not just by attacking individual units, but by

131

 *Just as to day’s mo bile SAMs in for ward ar eas are less ef fec tive than fixed SAMs

around capi tal cit ies.

**Time- of- flight as sump tion based on a sub sonic cruise mis sile launched 500 NM

away.
concurrent attacks on units, their theater supplies, their

supporting personnel, the command and control links between

field commanders and units, and their invasion LOCs

especially the bridges across the Amur and Ussuri Rivers.

At the strategic level, the idea is to defeat China ‘s ability to

wage war—not just by severing communications between the

national leadership and its elements of power, but by

concurrent attacks on the national leadership’s communica

tion infrastructure, China‘s national communications and

transportation grids (with nonlethal weapons), and its ai

defenses.

All these attacks (strategic, operational, and tactical) occur

near simultaneously. Such simultaneity is a daunting

challenge. Given current technology, parallel war against a

peer enemy is not possible today. However, given current

trends in technology, this capability could exist in 2010

Improvements in information will allow greater efficiency in

delivery, thus lessening wastage. Decreasing target location

error and munition delivery error will substantially decrease

the size and number of bombs needed for a high Pk. The end

result will be thousands of munitions delivered precisely

against critical targets in a highly compressed time period. For

example, it is reasonable to project a future force of 100

bombers, each carrying 800 precision munitions. That’s a tota

of 80,000 bombs delivered precisely against specific targets

Several thousand cruise missiles with a wide variety o

munitions (e.g., EMP, HPM, MHD, antiradiation) would

precede the bombers, hitting air defense radars (particularly

low frequency, antistealth radars), antenna arrays, jammers

electrical grids, and soft C4I. This assault, repeated daily fo

weeks, would shock the Chinese offensive, enabling Russian

forces to hold their ground.

132

Appendix B
Illustrative Scenario (Niche)

To illustrate a future war with a niche competitor, imagine

the following hypothetical scenario. Nigeria attacks Zaire with

10 armored divisions (including 5,000 armored vehicles)

Nigeria’s operational goal is to capture Kinshasa, thereby

cutting Zaire’s access to the Atlantic.

Drawing on its oil wealth, Nigeria has built a substantia

military. In addition to the ground attacking force, Nigeria ’

military consists of:*

• 200 fighter aircraft (half are front line: MiG-29 , Rafael

Su-35), equipped with advanced medium-range air-to-ai

missiles (AMRAAM) and precision ground-attack munitions,

• Five nuclear weapons (100 kilotons), and

• 100 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) with a

range of 1,000 NM and CEP of more than 500 meters.

Also, Nigeria has integrated three emerging weapons into its

military. First, it uses COMSATs (commercial satellites) fo

photo reconnaissance and communications. These satellites

are majority-owned by the European Community, the Arab

League, and an Asian business consortium. Nigeria is a

minority owner of each system. All refused US requests to shut

down Nigerian access. These satellites allow encrypted

communications throughout Africa. They also provide imagery

directly to mobile ground stations in Nigeria and with th

attacking columns. This imagery has one-meter resolution. In

addition, the Nigerians have two backup ground stations in

sympathetic third countries. These facilities are connected to

Nigeria by fiber-optic cable.

Second, Nigeria has stealthy cruise missiles (purchased

from Israel, Brazil, and France) with these capabilities:

• Inventory: 5,000, with 100 mobile launchers.

• Guidance: Integrated GPS/INS en route; terminal guidance

uses millimeter wave seeker, infrared, or antiradiation. CEP is <5

meters.

135

*Such a force is no tional; it bears no re la tion to cur rent Ni ge rian in ven to ries. In to ta

num bers it’s simi lar to the force struc ture used by RAND in The New Cal cu lus, 16.
• Range: 1,000 NM.

• Warhead: 1,000-pound conventional warhead, cluste

bomb unit (CBU), zirconium disk, napalm, infrared cameras

with data burst transmitters, multichannel jammers, decoys

HPM, MHD, or EMP.

• RCS <.001 (frontal aspect only).

Third, Nigeria bought five ASATs from Russia. The ASAT

launch from Su-35s. They are kinetic kill with IR sensors

These ASATs can only reach satellites in low earth orbit.

136

Figure 10. Map of Africa
Zairian forces are moving to reinforce Kinshasa but ar

considered far inferior to the Nigerian military. Countries

between Nigeria and Zaire (Cameroon, Gabon, and Congo

either ally with Nigeria or give Nigerian forces free passage

The US decides to unilaterally enter the conflict on Zaire ‘

side.* The president orders the US military to assist Zaire ‘

army in halting the Nigerian advance north of the Congo River.

The theater CINC levies the following specific aerospace

taskings:

• Establish air supremacy over US forces.

• Establish air superiority over Zaire and the Nigerian LOCs.

• Airlift US units to the theater.

• Attack Nigerian military forces south of the Nigerian border.

• Provide near-real-time information on Nigerian military

movements to Zaire.

Assuming this war starts in summer, weather is not much

of a factor. Throughout the year, ceilings are above 3,000 feet

more than half the time. The rainy season around Kinshasa is

early winter, especially November and December. Precipitation

in July and August is practically zero. Temperatures are

always above freezing.

Table 6

Kinshasa Weather (Ceilings in Percent)

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Now Dec

Ceilings

<3,000′

22 19 19 19 25 49 40 45 33 30 16 16

Ceilings

<1,000′

1 1 1 1 1 1 - - - - - -

Inches

Precipitatio

n

5.0 5.6 6.7 8.4 5.4 .2 .1 .1 1.3 5.5 9.3 6.7

Source: USAFETC/DOO (Now AFCCC)

137

*This is only an il lus tra tive sce nario. The spe cific rea son for in ter ven ing is not im por 

tant for sce nario pur poses. What is im por tant is to out line a con tin gency where th

niche en emy is su pe rior to its re gional op po nent. Also, the fight is thou sands of miles

from US ter ri tory and there’s lit tle in- place US mili tary in fra struc ture.
The US begins deploying two armored divisions and 10

fighter squadrons, with their associated C4I, into Zaire and

southwestern Congo. One ARG and two carrier battle groups

position themselves off the coast of Gabon. Defensive systems

against cruise and ballistic missiles deploy with these forces

Batteries position around the land bases. Improved

AEGIS-type ships escort the battle groups. Both rely on

airborne aircraft equipped with long-wavelength radars fo

missile detection and cueing. Surface radars guide the actua

intercepts.

One week after deployment begins, Nigeria launches 200

stealthy cruise missiles with CBU (plus four with electronic

decoy packages and four with jammers) against the Brazzaville

and Kinshasa airports. They overwhelm the limited number o

fully operational air defense batteries.* In addition, some of the

intercepts are hampered by software shortfalls; the Nigerian

cruise missiles present slightly different signatures from those 

expected. The simultaneous arrival of three tactical ballistic

missiles further confuses the defenses. As a result, half the

cruise missiles penetrate. Multiple AWACS, J-STARS, KC-10s

and B-747s are destroyed on the ramp. A large tent city is

heavily damaged. US casualties are high. Television crews

transmit pictures of Zairian soldiers looting the bodies of dead

Americans. Stealthy cruise missiles also cripple three USN

ships off the West African coast and one RO/RO supply ship

at Kinshasa harbor.

In the wake of this disaster, public support for intervention

polarizes in the US. The president reaffirms the US commitment, but replaces the theater CINC and requests a new

strategy. Planning is constrained by basing restrictions. Al

countries within 1,000 NM of the AOR refuse US overflight and

basing requests. The US must rely on Ascension Island

(United Kingdom), Azores (Portugal), Canary Islands (Spain)

South Africa, Kenya, and Zaire for land bases. Bases in the

CONUS, Europe, South America, and at Diego Garcia are also

available.

138

*For ex am ple, a sin gle Pa triot bat tal ion is nor mally equipped with six bat ter ies, each

of which can fire up to eight mis siles bef ore re load ing (to tal: 48 mis siles).
US Aerospace CONOPS

In this scenario, a hypothetical enemy (Nigeria) launches 

land invasion of a nation 700 NM to its south (Zaire ). Thi

operation is a land force-intensive attack, with 10 divisions o

armor and infantry.* Its size and capability far outmatch the

defending (Zairian) army. To protect US interests in the region 

the president orders the US military to assist Zaire . The military

task is to stop the Nigerian advance short of the Congo River.

Anticipating American intervention, Nigeria bought high

technology weapons. It has stealthy cruise missiles with 1,000

NM range, access to civilian satellite information and communi

cations, and a robust air defense system (radars, fusion centers

surface-to-air missiles, and manned interceptors).

In accordance with guidance from the theater commander, the

US aerospace CONOPS contains a baker’s dozen of majo

themes.

· Limit the number of targets vulnerable to attack.

• Command US aerospace operations from Cheyenne

Mountain.

• Protect US space systems.

• Collect NRT information on enemy maneuvers.

• Degrade Nigerian stealth cruise missile accuracy.

• Attack strategic and operational targets within Nigeria.

• Defend against Nigerian stealth attack.

• Defend against Nigerian ballistic missile attack.

• Attack Nigerian information at all levels of war.

• Attack Nigerian ground forces.

• Airlift critical supplies to Zairian forces.

• Support the ground counteroffensive.

• Prosecute a parallel war .

Limit the Number of Targets Vulnerable to Attack

Absent a direct threat to US vital interests, it is doubtful th

American public will support a casualty-intensive war (e.g

Vietnam, Korea). Therefore, casualties are a US strategic cente

139

*Cur rent demo graphic pro jec tions es ti mate Ni ge ria ’s 2010 popu la tion at 240 mil lion.
of gravity. US forces must accomplish their mission while

(1) minimizing the number of US forces deployed within range

of Nigerian stealthy cruise missiles, and (2) protecting those

forces deployed to the area.

Accordingly, most US aerospace forces base more than

1,000 NM from Nigeria, outside the range of Nigeria‘s cruis

missiles. They launch from bases in the CONUS, Europe

islands in the Atlantic (Azores, Canaries, Ascension), Brazil

South Africa, southern Zaire, Kenya, and Diego Garcia. This

basing structure puts a premium on long-range bombers and

missiles. Short-legged, nonstealthy aircraft (e.g., F-16, F-18

have little use.

To support Zairian forces and to coordinate actions, a

limited number of US forces deploy near Kinshasa . Thes

forces provide “enhancing” capabilities: C4I, air defens

(including spoofing and jamming teams), surface-to-surface

missile batteries (e.g., cruise missiles), UAV launchers, and

airlift infrastructure. One squadron of close-air-suppor

helicopters also deploys for emergency assistance.

These forces disperse after landing. They remain mobile

shifting location every day or two. They have robust aerospace

defenses. Where possible they use Phalanx for point defense

and reactive armor to decrease warhead explosive effect. For

sustenance they require only a few airlift sorties a day.

Command US Aerospace Operations

from Cheyenne Mountain

Given (1) the dispersed nature of US forces, (2) the need to

minimize US exposure to casualties, and (3) the lack of a need

to coordinate aerospace actions with other air forces, the

JFACC remains in the CONUS.* From a secure, well-exercised 

base the JFACC commands the worldwide attack on Nigeria

and its invasion/occupation forces.

140

*Chey enne Moun tain has the ad van tage of prox im ity to USSPACE COM. Other can di 

date lo ca tions could in clude Fal con AFB (also has ex cel lent con nec tivity with

USSPACE COM); Lang ley AFB (wealth of per son nel with op era tional ex per tise); and the 

Pen ta gon (ready ac cess to sat el lite down links, in tel li gence, po liti cal lead er ship). In al

cases, sig nifi cant parts of the JFACC ’s staff could be lo cated else where. For ex am ple

lo gis tics could be co or di nated from Lang ley AFB while CHECK MATE in the Pen ta gon

drafts stra te gic tar get ing.
JFACC HQ receives all sensor data from satellites and UAV

via SATCOM relay. JFACC tasks strike aircraft in the CONUS

(e.g., stealth bombers at Whiteman AFB), strike aircraft in

theater (e.g., FB-22s at Nairobi), air defense and battle

management units in theater (based in southern Zaire ), cruis

missile-equipped ships at sea, and air refuelers at Ascension

Island, Tenerife (Canary Islands), and Lajes Field (Azores )

JFACC HQ works closely with USSPACECOM to manage and

position reconnaissance satellites, plus deconflict communica

tions satellite requirements.

As a backup to SATCOM links, the Joint Force Information

Component Commander (JFICC) deploys HALE UAVs with

communications relay packages to the AOR. A bridge of three

HALE UAVs connects theater assets with a downlink station

on Ascension Island. Fiber-optic cable moves this data from

Ascension Island to the US information grid (through Europe)

However, due to successful attacks on Nigeria‘s space-tracking

facilities, this alternate routing is unnecessary.

ATOs contain taskings, support data, and intelligence

information. A central intelligence management staff attaches

relevant information to ATO taskings. Units retain the

authority to query the database for more information, but the

normal procedure—facilitated by computer software—includes 

applicable intelligence with each tasking.

The theater CINC deploys forward. The CINC gives genera

guidance (e.g., apportionment, overall objectives) through a

liaison office to the JFACC. The JFACC puts staff elements

forward in Kinshasa to liaise with Zairian forces (especially

army units and ADA).

Protect US Space Systems

Nigeria‘s nuclear weapons (i.e., EMP) and ASATs threaten

US space systems, particularly those in LEO. To preclude an

EMP burst in space, US cruise missiles attack Nigerian spac

launch facilities on day one of hostilities. Space launch

facilities are fragile. They do not stand up to multiple explosions.

To deal with the air-launched ASAT threat, the US takes

three approaches. First, JFACC gives a high priority to attacks

against those airfields where ASAT-capable aircraft (i.e.

141
SU-35) are based. Both lethal and nonlethal weapons g

against aircraft shelters, storage facilities, C4I, barracks, and

power sources. Despite this effort, some ASATs survive. As a

second approach, the US readies replacement platforms

(satellites and UAVs). Because the niche enemy has a small

finite ASAT capability, the US does not need a robust space

protection regime (shielding, maneuverability, stealth, escor

satellites, etc.), as would be required for war with a peer

142

Figure 11. Operational Distances
competitor. In this case, relying on replacement satellites i

cheaper than incorporating robust defenses on each satellite 

Third, the US destroys Nigeria‘s space tracking facility

Without the means to observe normal orbit variances, Nigeria‘

ASATs become too inaccurate to be militarily effective.

Collect NRT Information on Enemy Maneuvers

High-value airborne platforms (AWACS, J-STARS, TR-1

Rivet Joint) launch and recover from airfields in southern

Zaire (Katanga Province). Bases include Kolwesi, Likasi, and

Labumbashi. SIGINT platforms operate from Ascension Island

Co-based fighters escort surveillance platforms, although

orbits remain outside the combat radius of Nigerian fighters

(unrefueled).

J-STARS proves exceptionally worthwhile in this scenario

From orbits 150 NM either side of the Nigerian advance

(outside of SAM range), J-STARS maps advancing columns. I

identifies tracked versus wheeled vehicles. It provides

adequate targeting information to long-range strikers, and

identifies logistics sites through history traces of supply

vehicles. No substantial forces move without detection by

J-STARS.

Although their orbits are within range of Nigeria ‘s cruis

missiles, and these cruise missiles have antiradiation sensors

Nigeria‘s cruise missiles do not pose a threat to emitting

surveillance aircraft. The AWACS has a limited ability to detec

stealthy cruise missiles within a few miles of its antenna. Once

the AWACS detects a cruise missile inbound against it, th

AWACS causes the antiradiation sensor on the Nigerian cruise

missiles to break lock by “blinking” its radar and changing its

flight path. Unlike the missiles of a peer competitor, Nigeria ‘

missiles have only a single air-to-air sensor (antiradiation)

Manipulation of the AWACS signal causes the cruise missile to

break lock. Other emitting surveillance aircraft (such as

J-STARS) orbit close enough to the AWACS to receive simila

warning information. They also use blink and maneuver to

defeat antiradiation sensors. Finally, both the AWACS and

J-STARS have active defenses against missiles (e.g., chaff

flares, EW).

143
HALE UAVs launch from Kinshasa to patrol Nigerian

maneuver forces, especially those beyond J-STARS range. Fo

the most part, UAVs patrol 100 NM to the east and west o

Nigerian ground forces. These UAVs fly parallel to the Nigerian

advance but outside the range of Nigerian SAMs. Data

collected from all UAVs are uplinked to communication

satellites for relay to the CONUS JFACC.

 Sensor suites include beam radar, EO, phased-array radar

(with MTI), and IR. The beam radar is the lightest and cheapest

It sweeps likely areas with its radar beam. It filters returns

through a wide-area ATR package on the UAV looking fo

certain patterns. When it identifies these patterns, it transmits

suspected target locations and types to the JFACC. The JFACC

then tasks UAVs carrying more defined sensors (EO, SAR, and 

IR). These sensors can discriminate between tanks and truck

with high confidence. They have sufficient resolution to

identify vehicles by type (e.g., T-72 versus T-60). This dua

UAV approach allows wide-area coverage with only a few highcost EO, phased-array radars, and infrared-capable UAVs.

The JFACC orchestrates atmospheric systems and satellites

to effect 24-hour conflict surveillance. Revisit times are 30

minutes or less. State-of-the-art computers fuse this data

Zairian liaison officers review the resulting information and

distill what’s necessary for transmittal to Zairian units. The

US furnishes the transmission means (e.g., computers

satellite links, receivers) plus liaison officers to Zairian forces.

Degrade Nigerian Stealthy Cruise Missile Accuracy

Nigeria‘s cruise missiles use GPS to update their en route

navigation system. The US degrades Nigeria‘s cruise missile

by manipulating GPS civil mode within 1,000 NM of Nigeria 

For political reasons, turning off the civil code (course

acquisition [CA] code) on those satellites within the field o

view of the route/target area is not an option. Civil authoritie

throughout Africa require GPS for everyday functions. Signa

manipulation is through a combination of local jamming and

spoofing. Ten- to 25-watt jammers deploy around and among

US forces and key target areas. Jamming is accomplished

144
without affecting the military GPS signal (Y code) that is

needed for US operations.

Degrading cruise missile accuracy is not an “additiona

duty” for aerospace defense units. It is performed by units

specifically structured, trained, and dedicated to this job. They

direct intelligence services to identify weaknesses in Nigerian

cruise missile hardware and software. Nigerian cruise missiles

target recognition software is a prime essential element o

information (EEI). By disturbing the expected pattern

electronically and by positioning decoys, air defense units

degrade the accuracy of Nigeria‘s cruise missiles.

Attack Strategic and Operational

Targets within Nigeria

The JFACC orchestrates an aerospace campaign agains

weapons stores, airfields, infrastructure (including civi

electrical and communications grids) and strategic C4I target

in Nigeria. Primary means are long-range stealthy bombers

and long-range cruise missiles.

Cruise missiles launch from surface ships and submarines

The US Navy deploys with 1,000 stealthy cruise missiles , each 

with a range of 1,000 NM. Their warheads include 1,000-lb

conventional warheads, CBU, and EMP. They have brillian

sensors (with ATR) and inertial guidance. They operate 24

hours a day.

Stealth bombers launch and recover in Recife, Brazil .

Aircraft fly a 0.5 sortie rate carrying 16 PGMs per sortie.**

Their air refueling support comes from Ascension Island 

Bombers are the primary platform for attacking hard targets

They operate over the target area only at night, escorted by

stealth fighters and UAVs (for jamming and suppression).

145

 *This pro file as sumes an un pro grammed de ploy ment ca pa bil ity on the part of the

B-2. If no such ca pa bil ity ex ists, the B-2s would have to sor tie from the CONUS

which would cut their sor tie gen era tion in half. Op er at ing from the CONUS might also 

de grade op era tional re spon sive ness be cause the longer flight times would re quire ear 

lier air crew mis sion plan ning, which would re quire an ear lier post ing of the ATO. This

pro file also re quires a high (4.0) crew ra tio.

**A force of 20 B-2s would re sult in 160 pre ci sion bombs per day (20 x .5 x 16 = 160)

A force of 40 B-2s would equate to 320 pre ci sion bomb de liv er ies per day.
Defend Against Nigerian Stealth Attack

Air defenses use multiple types and layers of area sensors to

detect enemy stealth, then fuse this information to allow rapid

cueing and focused targeting. Understanding that stealth

systems reflect or emit signals intermittently during flight, the

US deploys a mix of sensors to the AOR. Long-wavelength

radars deploy to Kinshasa. Within Zaire and the Congo, th

US deploys high-power, short-range radars and lidars across

likely attack corridors. They’re arranged in a circular

overlapping fashion to detect stealthy cruise missiles from th

side and rear aspects. Radar reflections from pulses emitted

from one location can be received in a second location

allowing wide dispersion between sensors and shooters

Finally, UAVs launched from austere airfields (e.g., highway

strips) patrol likely launch and penetration areas with a mix o

sensors. All transmit data to SATCOMs for relay to the JFACC

in the CONUS.

JFACC fuses this data and retransmits taskings and

information to air defense units. Stealth interceptors, flying in

a CAP role, respond. The interceptors are equipped with

multispectral seekers on their air-to-air missiles. Rada

solutions remain possible at short range. Imaging sensors

prove decisive against cruise missiles. In addition to ai

defense fighters, a limited number of air-defense batteries

protect key US forces. They also receive direct tasking from

JFACC. Finally, Zairian liaison officers relay the threat picture

to Zaire‘s forces, along with information on US responses.

Defend Against Nigerian Ballistic Missile Attack

Nigeria has 100 IRBMs with 1,000-NM range. Because

they’re launched from mobile TELs, attacks on launch sites

are impractical. Instead, the JFACC directs a five-stage

defense:

(1) Bombers and cruise missiles attack Nigeria‘s ballistic

missile C4I. These attacks degrade Nigeria‘s ability to employ

its missiles to maximum effect. (2) Space -based systems (e.g.

DSP, SBIR) detect ballistic missile launches, then cue rada

trackers. (3) Airborne and ground radars use this cueing to

146
detect and track the missile. (4) Intercepts are accomplished

by airborne lasers and ground-based missiles. (5) Because

Nigeria‘s ballistic missiles are equipped with maneuvering

warheads, manipulating the GPS and the use of spoofing

signatures in target areas lessens warhead accuracy. Despite

these efforts, one in 10 missiles penetrates. Of the successfu

penetrators, half hit valuable targets.

Attack Nigerian Information at all Levels of War

Because the goal of these attacks is to dominate information

at the strategic and operational levels of war, the JFICC

orchestrates these attacks; the JFACC executes only its

aerospace aspects.

Aerospace operations center on two areas. One is destroying

nodes (such as collection platforms, relay networks, and

fusion centers) in the Nigerian information network. The other

is distorting information in the Nigerian information network

by viral insertion and spoofing.

Missiles and bombers attack all aspects of Nigeria ‘

information system. This includes political, economic, and

military information systems. Targets include the information

aspects of leadership, production, power, transportation

public information, and the military. Aerospace forces also

target all UAVs and satellites the niche owns.

In most cases, targets require precision. Targets include

connectivity (e.g., fiber-optic lines and radio/cellula

antennas), nodes (e.g., switching stations), repair assets

downlink stations (e.g., satellite dishes), fusion centers

platforms (aircraft, UAVs, and satellites), and C2 personnel

Munitions cover the gamut of the inventory: earth penetrators

MHD, EMP, HPM, CBU, HE, and so forth. Bombers and cruise 

missiles deliver the munitions.

Attack Nigerian Ground Forces

The goal is to “hollow-out” the Nigerian advance to a point

where indigenous defenses can hold. This point can be

accomplished by denying the Nigerians mass, maneuver, and

effective C4I.

147
The Nigerians must move 10 divisions over 700 miles

carrying all their logistics with them. Due to the distance from

Nigeria, these forces move without air cover. The terrain is

difficult. The area between Nigeria and Zaire is mountainous

and laced by major rivers. Choke points abound.

US bombers deliver high-explosive, penetrating bombs (e.g.

I-2000) against bridges and tunnels in advance, behind, and

between the Nigerian divisions. They scatter mines and

unattended ground sensors (UGS) along likely routes o

advance. Bombers then hit the resulting tie-ups with a mix o

munitions: sensor fused weapons, WAM, BAT, and CBU

Trucks (especially tank transporters, fuel carriers, and food

wagons) are the highest priority.

US bombers launch from Nairobi and Mombasa, Kenya , hi

their targets (armored columns, LOCs, logistics), and return.

They fly a 2.0 sortie rate.** Aerial refuelings are not required.

Fighter-bombers based in southern Zaire escort thes

strikes over the target area. Escorts carry a mix of defense

suppression missiles, air-to-air missiles, and precision bombs

These fighter-bombers need long legs. Due to minimal airpor

infrastructure in southern Zaire, the JFACC would prefer no

to base large numbers of tankers at these bases. Tankers take

up ramp space and drain limited jet-fuel supplies.

Note: Nigerian forces routinely carry low-power jammers

tuned to the GPS frequency. The jammers degrade US systems

that are dependent on GPS in the target area (e.g., munitions

such as JDAM).

Airlift Critical Supplies to Zairian Forces

Once Nigerian C2 is stressed and its NRT surveillance

destroyed, airlift operations into Kinshasa and Brazzavill

resume. Because Nigeria retains its stealthy cruise missiles

and access to civilian overhead, airlifters must vary arrivals

and limit ground times to only a few hours.

148

 *Re quires over flight ap proval by one of the fol low ing: Su dan, Uganda, or Tanzania.

**Quick turns made pos si ble by high (4.0) crew ra tios. Due to mini mal in fra struc ture

in Kenya, spare air craft and at tri tion re serve would base at Di ego Garcia.
Airlifters fly either directly from the CONUS or stage from

Lajes (Azores). Their air refueling support comes from Lajes

Tenerife, and Las Palmas (Canary Islands). Because these

airports have limited fuel supplies, the US offers to pay “spo

plus 50 percent” to private firms to keep each base flush with

jet fuel.

Support the Ground Counteroffensive

Aerospace forces support the ground component commander’s

(GCC) campaign. The CINC’s guidance is to drive advanced

elements of Nigeria‘s army away from Zaire to at least th

Cameroon-Congo border. In accordance with the GCC’s plan

of maneuver, aerospace forces provide heavy firepower suppor

while continuing to interdict Nigerian army elements.

Although an amphibious landing in Cameroon has th

potential for cutting off the Nigerian army from its home base

Nigeria‘s remaining cruise missile inventory and access to

civilian overhead imagery dissuades the CINC from this option.

Prosecute a Parallel War

The US attacks key nodes of Nigerian power across all levels

of war nearly simultaneously. Operational and strategic

attacks offer the most leverage.

At the operational level, the idea is to defeat the attacking 10

divisions—not just by attacking individual units—but by

concurrent attacks on their invasion LOCs (especially the

tunnels and bridges in Cameroon, Gabon, and Congo), thei

C2 (the mechanism for directing repairs), and logistics stock

of fuel and food. When these target sets are attacked at the

same time, the attacking divisions have too much to fix, too few

resources to fix it, and no way to efficiently direct what’s left.

At the strategic level, the idea is to defeat Nigeria ‘s ability to

wage war. Due to its possession of nuclear weapons , the NCA

does not permit decapitation attacks on Nigerian leadership

However, the NCA permits attacks intended to isolate th

Nigerian leadership from its elements of power. These attacks

sever normal communications between the national leadership

and its elements of power. Simultaneous attacks also degrade

149
the leadership

s access to near-real-time information, strip

homeland air defenses, effectively stop all centralized electrica

production, cut the national transportation grid, and place the

populace at risk—all in a short period of time. As a result of

these simultaneous attacks across all strategic centers o

gravity, the Nigerian leadership finds itself unable to

orchestrate an effective war with Zaire.

At the tactical level of war (where individual attacks actuall y

occur), aerospace forces attack all elements of a unit’s

strength nearly simultaneously. In addition to attacking

individual weapons (e.g., a tank, airplane, or ship), aerospace

forces attack the C2 for that weapon, its communications

intelligence support, defenses, morale, and supplies. Attacks

on the weapon system, as opposed to just the weapon, within

a short time period reduces that weapon’s ability to adapt.

This aerospace campaign, across levels of war and all target

sets, would destroy the Nigerian offensive.

150

Appendix C
List of Acronyms

AADC Area Air Defense Commander

ABCCC Airborne Battlefield Command and Control

Center

ABL airborne laser

ABM antiballistic missile

ACA airspace control authority

ADA air defense artillery

AEGIS airborne early warning/ground environment

 integration segment

AFCCC Air Force Combat Climatology Center

AIFV armored infantry fighting vehicle

AIM air intercept missile

ALCM air-launched cruise missile

AMRAAM advanced medium-range air-to-air missile

AOC air operations center

AOR area of responsibility

APC armored personnel carrier

ARG Amphibious Ready Group

ASAT antisatellite weapon

ASOC Air Support Operations Center

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System

ATO air tasking order

ATR automatic target recognition

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

BAM Baikal-Amur Mainline Railroad

BAT brilliant antitank munition

BEF British Expeditionary Force

BDA battle damage assessment

BMD ballistic missile defense

BUR bottom-up review

BVR beyond visual range

C2 command and control

C3I command, control, communications, and

intelligence

153
C4I command, control, communications,

computers, and intelligence

CA course acquisition

CAP combat air patrol

CBU cluster bomb unit

CCD camouflage, concealment, and deception

CDC concepts development center

CENTCOM US Central Command

CEP circular error of probability

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CIC Combat Information Center

CINC commander in chief

CINCSPACE Commander in Chief, Space Command

CIO Central Imagery Office

CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

COMSAT commercial satellite (civilian-owned)

CONOPS concept of operations

CONUS continental United States

CRAF civil reserve air fleet (MAC)

CVBG Carrier Battle Group

CVN aircraft carrier (nuclear powered)

D-ASAT defensive antisatellite weapon

DEW directed-energy weapons

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DISA Defense Information Services Agency

DMA Defense Mapping Agency

DPRK Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea

DSP Defense Support Program

EEI essential elements of information

EHF extremely high frequency

ELINT electronic intelligence

EMP electromagnetic pulse (<MHZ)

EO electro-optical

EUCOM European Command

EW electronic warfare

154
FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FYDP Future Years Defense Plan

GCC Ground Component Commander

GEO geosynchronous earth orbit (22,300 miles)

GPS global positioning system

HALE high altitude, long endurance

HE high explosive

HEO highly elliptical orbit

HPM high-powered microwave (100-200MHZ)

HTACC Hardened Tactical Air Control Center

HUMINT human intelligence

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

IMINT imagery intelligence

INF intermediate-range nuclear force

INS inertial navigation system

IR infrared

IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile

ISR intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance

IW information war

J-3 Operations Directorate (Joint)

J-5 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (Joint)

J-6 Command, Control, and Communications

Systems Directorate (Joint)

JAOC Joint Air Operations Center

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition

JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander

JFICC Joint Force Information Component

Commander

JTCB Joint Targeting Coordination Board

J-STARS joint surveillance target attack radar system

KT kiloton

KTO Kuwaiti theater of operations

155
LEO low earth orbit (60-250 miles)

LF low frequency

LGB laser-guided bomb

LIDAR light detection and ranging ( a laser radar)

LO low observable (~ -10 to -15 db)

LOC line of communications

LOS line of sight

LRC lesser regional contingency

LRR long-range radar

MASINT measure and signature intelligence

MBT main battle tank

METT-T mission, enemy, terrain, troops-time

MHD magneto-hydrodynamic (1-100MHZ)

MILSTAR military strategic and tactical relay satellite

MRC major regional contingency

MTI moving target indicator

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC nuclear, biological and chemical

NCA National Command Authorities

NLOS non-line-of-sight

NM nautical miles

NRO National Reconnaissance Office

NRT near real time

NSA National Security Agency

OODA observe-orient-decide-act

OPCON operational control

OPS operations

PACOM Pacific Command

PGM precision guided munitions

Pk probability of kill

PLA Peoples Liberation Army (China)

PLAAF Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (China)

POL petroleum, oil, and lubricants

POM program objectives memorandum

PSYOPS psychological operations

156
RCS radar cross section

R&D research and development

RMA revolution in military affairs

RO/RO roll-on/roll-off (USN)

ROCC Regional Operations Control Centers (NORAD)

ROE rules of engagement

SAM surface-to-air missile

SAR synthetic aperture radar

SATCOM communications satellite (military)

SBIR space-based infrared system

SBWAS space-based wide-area surveillance

SFW sensor fused weapon

SIGINT signals intelligence

SIOP Single Integrated Operations Plan

SOF Special Operations Forces

SOSUS sound underwater surveillance system

SSN attack submarine (nuclear powered)

TACC Tactical Air Control Center

TBM tactical ballistic missile

TCT time-critical target

TEL transporter-erector-launcher

TLAM Tomahawk land-attack missile

TR-1 tactical reconnaissance aircraft

(U-2 derivative)

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UGS unattended ground sensors

UHF ultra high frequency

USA United States Army

USAF United States Air Force

USAFETAC United States Air Force Environmental

Technical Application Center

USCINCPAC United States Commander in Chief, Pacific

 Command

USFJ United States Forces, Japan

USN United States Navy

USSPACECOM United States Space Command

157
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VLO very low observable (~ –25 to –30 db)

WAM wide area munition

WMD weapons of mass destruction

158

Bibliography

Aftergood, Steven. “A Revolution in Military Affairs?” F.A.S

Public Interest Report Journal of the Federation o

American Scientists 48, no. 1 (January/February 1995).

Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of th

United States Air Force. 2 vols. Washington, D.C.

Department of the Air Force, March 1992.

Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt. “Cyberwar is Coming!

Comparative Strategy 12 (1993): 141–165.

Bacevich, A. J. “Preserving the Well-Bred Horse.” The Nationa

Interest. Fall 1994.

Barnett, Jeffery R. “Nonstate War.” Marine Corps Gazette, May

1994, 84–89.

Bodnar, John W. “The Military Technical Revolution: From

Hardware to Information.” Naval War College Review

Summer 1993.

Bowie, Christopher J., et al. The New Calculus. Santa Monica

Calif.: RAND, 1993.

____. Trends in the Global Balance of Airpower . Santa Monica

Calif.: RAND, 1995.

Bracken, Paul, and Raoul Henri Alcala. Whither the RMA: Two

Perspectives on Tomorrow’s Army. US Army War College

Strategic Studies Institute, 22 July 1994.

Bracken, Paul. “The Military After Next.” The Washington

Quarterly, Autumn 1993, 157.

Breemer, Jan S. “The End of Naval Strategy: Revolutionary

Change and the Future of American Naval Power.

Strategic Review, Spring 1994.

Caton, Jeffrey L. Rapid Space Force Reconstitution. Maxwel

AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1994.

Clodfelter, Mark, and John M. Fawcett, Jr. “The RMA and Air

Force Roles, Missions, and Doctrine.” Parameters, Summe

1995.

Creveld, Martin van. Technology and War. New York: Free

Press, 1991.

159
Dick, Charles. 

Russian Views on Future War—Part 2.Jane

Intelligence Review, October 1993, 451.

Dunn, Richard J., III. From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond

Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land

Warfare. McNair Papers no. 13. Washington, D.C.: The

Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense

University, 1992.

Echevarria, Antulio J., and John M. Shaw. “The New Military

Revolution: Post-Industrial Change.” Parameters, Winte

1992–93.

FitzGerald, Mary C. The Impact of the Military-Technica

Revolution on Russian Military Affairs. Washington, D.C.

Hudson Institute, 1993.

_____. “Russia’s Vision of Air-Space War.” Air Force Magazine

December 1993.

_____. “The Russian Image of Future War.” Comparative Strategy

13, no. 2 (1994).

FitzSimonds, James R., and Jan M. van Tol. “Revolutions in

Military Affairs.” Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1994.

FitzSimonds, James R. The Revolution in Military Affairs

Challenges for Defense Intelligence. Washington, D.C.

Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1995.

_____. “The Coming Military Revolution: Opportunities and Risks.

Parameters, Summer 1995.

Garrity, Patrick J. Why the Gulf War Still Matters: Foreign

Perspectives on the War and the Future of Internationa

Security. Los Alamos, N. Mex.: Center for Nationa

Security Studies, July 1993.

Gray, Colin S. “Space Power Survivability.” Airpower Journal 7

no. 4 (Winter 1993): 27.

Herman, Paul F. “The Military-Technical Revolution.” Defens

Analysis 10, no. 1 (April 1994): 91–95.

_____. “Future Military Powers.” Defense Analysis 11, no. 1 (1995).

Hitchens, Theresa, and Robert Holzer. “DoD Eyes 21st Century

Now.” Defense News, March 28–3 April 1994, 1.

160
Holzer, Robert, and Stephen C. LeSueur. 

DoD Plans Revolution

in Technology, Tactics.” Defense News, 23–29 May 1994, 1.

_____. “Pentagon Plans for Revolution.” Army Times, 6 June 1994, 1

_____. “A Revolution in War Tactics.” Navy Times, 13 June 1994, 1.

Hundley, Richard O., and Eugene C. Gritton. Future Technology

Driven Revolutions in Military Affairs. Santa Monica, Calif.

RAND, 1994.

Jablonsky, David. “US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in

Military Affairs.” Parameters, Autumn 1994.

Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Ai

Operations. 14 November 1994.

Kendall, Frank. “Exploiting the Military Technical Revolution: A

Concept for Joint Warfare.” Strategic Review, Spring 1992.

Klaaren, Jonathan W., and Ronald S. Mitchell. “Nonletha

Technology and Airpower: A Winning Combination fo

Strategic Paralysis.” Airpower Journal 9 (Special Edition

1995): 42–51.

Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. “Keeping Pace with the Military

Technological Revolution.” Issues in Science and Technology

Summer 1994.

_____. “Cavalry to Computer: The Patterns of Military Revolutions.

The National Interest, Fall 1994.

MacGregor, Douglas A. “Future Battle: The Merging Levels o

War.” Parameters, Winter 1992–1993.

Mazarr, Michael J. The Military Technical Revolution

Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Internationa

Studies, 1993.

_____. The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense

Planning. US Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute

10 June 1994.

McKenzie, Kenneth F., Jr. “Beyond Luddites and Magicians

Examining the MTR.” Parameters, Summer 1995.

Metz, Steven, and James Kievit. The Revolution in Military

Affairs and Conflict Short of War . US Army War College

Strategic Studies Institute, 25 July 1994.

Morocco, John D. “US Military Eyes Revolutionary Change.

Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1 May 1995.

161
Morton, Oliver. 

Defence Technology.The Economist, 10 June

1995, 5–20.

Ochmanek, David. “Military Technology: Revolution o

Evolution?” Letter to the editor, Issues in Science and

Technology, Winter 1994–1995, 7.

Owens, William A. “JROC: Harnessing the Revolution in Military

Affairs.” Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1995, 55–57.

_____. “The Emerging System of Systems.” US Naval Institute

Proceedings, May 1995, 35–39.

Pagonis, William G., with Jeffrey L. Cruikshank. Movin

Mountains. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992.

Perry, William J. “Desert Storm and Deterrence.” Foreign Affair

70 (Fall 1991): 66–82.

_____. Annual Report to the President and Congress, February

1995.

Pine, Art. “Pentagon Looks to Start High-Tech Revolution in

Ways of War.” Los Angeles Times (Washington edition), 27

July 1994.

Ricks, Thomas E. “Warning Shot: How Wars Are Fought Wil

Change Radically, Pentagon Planner Says.” Wall Stree

Journal, 15 July 1994.

Senge, Peter M. The Fifth Dimension. New York: Doubleday, 1990.

Slipchenko, Vladimir I., Maj Gen, Retired. “A Russian Analysis o

Warfare Leading to the Sixth Generation.” Field Artillery

October 1993, 38.

Starr, Barbara. “Plotting Revolution at the Pentagon.” Jane’

Defence Weekly, 10 June 1995.

Stech, Frank J. “Sociopolitical Stresses and the RMA.

Parameters, Summer 1995.

Sullivan, Gordon R., and James M. Dubik. Land Warfare in the

21st Century. US Army War College, February 1993.

_____. “War in the Information Age.” Military Review, April 1994

46–61.

Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn

of the 21st Century. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1993.

162
Warden, John A., III. The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat

Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988.

_____. “The Enemy as a System.” Airpower Journal 9, no. 1 (Spring

1995): 40–55.

Welch, Thomas. “Technology, Change and Security.” Washington 

Quarterly, Spring 1990.

163

Index

aerospace superiority: 81, 90

AIM-120: 30

AIM-7: 30, 48

AIM-9: 30

air tasking order: xxii, 50

airlift: 3, 34, 62–63, 67, 73, 81, 97, 99, 116, 121, 131

Alaska: 120, 122, 127, 130

Arnold, Hap: 9

ASAT: 4, 43–47, 49, 77–80, 84, 103, 123–125, 136, 141–143

Ascension Island: 138, 141, 143, 145

Aspin: Les: 21, 105

ATACMS: 34

ATO: xxii, 50, 61, 123

AWACS: xxvi, 30, 34, 48–49, 59, 66, 69, 110, 120, 125, 138, 143

Azores: 138, 140–141, 149

B-1: 120

B-17s: 25

B-2: 17, 24, 26, 58, 69, 130, 145

ballistic missile: 31–32, 36, 40–42, 63, 66, 77, 90–92, 102

121, 123, 128, 131, 138–139, 146–147

Battle of Sedan (1940): 22

Beijing: 117

Bekaa Valley: 29

blitzkrieg: 14

Bottom-Up Review: 21, 105

Boyd, John: 6

Bracken, Paul: 71, 104

Brazil: 28, 73, 135, 140, 145

Brazzaville: 138, 148

C-17: 120

Cameroon: 137, 149

Cheyenne Mountain: 121–122, 126, 128, 139–140

China: 23, 68, 115, 117–121, 123–125, 127, 129–130, 132

cold war: 21, 23, 35

COMSAT: 43, 46, 76, 80, 84, 122, 135

165
Congo: 137–139, 146, 149

cruise missile: xxiv, 26–27, 31–32, 34–35, 37–41, 49, 52–53, 55

58–59, 63–66, 73, 76, 78, 80, 86–87, 94–99, 101–104, 111

117–123, 125–128, 130–132, 135, 138–141, 143–146, 148

D-ASAT: 45

Defense Intelligence Agency: 108

DIA: 62, 108

Eighth Air Force: 9, 44

electromagnetic pulse: 42, 79

EMP: 42–43, 45, 52, 55, 63, 79, 83–84, 86, 123, 125, 127

130, 132, 136, 141, 145, 147

F-117: 34, 60

F-14: 93

F-15: 84

F-15E: 34

F-16: 99, 121, 140

F-18: 121, 140

F-22: 34, 92, 122, 141

Fogleman, Ronald R.: 20, 68

France: 14–15, 23, 67, 78, 135

frontline fighters: 93–94

GEO: 42, 45–46, 54, 66, 84, 103, 119, 123–126

Garcia, Diego: 109, 138, 140, 148

geosynchronous earth orbit: 42, 84

Germany: xviii, 14, 21, 67, 78

global positioning systems: xix, 27, 77

GPS: 27, 39–40, 43, 46, 66–67, 96, 99–100, 103, 117

126–127, 135, 144–145, 147–148

Guam: 120, 122, 127, 130

Gulf War: xi, 4, 6, 9, 17, 60, 68–69, 91, 105, 109

Hanoi: 117

high-powered microwave: 42

HPM: 42, 125, 132, 136, 147

Hussein, Saddam: 74

166
ICBM: 52, 77, 125

information war: ix, xix–xx, 2–4, 8–9, 28, 73, 108–109

Iran: 73–74, 87

Iraq: xix, 9, 23, 71–74, 87, 91

IRBM: 135, 146

J-STARS: xxvi, 17, 48–49, 54, 59, 66, 68–69, 120, 125, 138

143–144

J3: 107, 109

J5: 107–110

J6: 109

Japan: xviii, 67, 77, 117–119, 122, 127

JFACC: xxii, 6, 36, 51, 54–55, 60–62, 65–66, 69, 96, 99

103–104, 116–119, 122–123, 126, 128–129, 131, 140–141

144–148

JFACC HQ: 141

JFICC: xxii–xxiii, 4, 49–50, 67, 85, 104, 122–123, 129, 141, 147

Joint Force Air Component Commander: xxii, 4, 49, 67, 85

116, 122, 129, 141

Kenya: 138, 140, 148

Khabarovsk: 115

Kinshasa: 135, 137–138, 140–141, 144, 146, 148

Komsomolsk: 115–116, 122

Korea: xix, 23, 28, 62, 68, 71–73, 77, 91, 139

Kuwait: 72

laser: 36, 38, 41–43, 91, 123, 125, 128, 129, 147

LEO: 43–46, 54, 66, 83–85, 103, 119, 124–126

logistic: 8, 19, 24–25, 38, 50, 53, 55, 57–58, 60, 67, 69

76–77, 81, 89–90, 129, 131, 140, 143, 148–149

low earth orbit, xxvi, 43, 136

magneto-hydrodynamic: 42

METT-T: 42

MHD: 42, 52, 86, 125, 127, 132, 136, 147

MiG-29: 93–135

Mitchell, William (“Billy”): 25

Mons: 83

167
National Command Authorities: xxvi

NCA: 45, 47, 52, 67, 119, 123, 131, 149

Nigeria: 73, 135–141, 143–149

Nitze, Paul: 11

nonlethal weapons: 45, 52, 55, 67, 69, 119, 127–129, 132, 142

Nonstate warfare: xiii

NSA: 62, 109

nuclear weapons: xxiii, 27–28, 52, 63, 77–78, 82, 102, 120, 149

OODA loop: 6–7, 39, 62–63

Operation Desert Storm: 9, 31, 57, 60, 64, 69, 102

Owens, Willam A.: 20

P-38s: 25

P-51s: 25

parallel war: xxi, 8–13, 110, 121, 131–132, 139, 149

Patriot: 30, 32, 38, 123, 138

Perry, William: 1

Petropavlovsk: 122, 125, 128, 130

revolution in military affairs: xx–xxi, 13, 15–16

RMA: xx, 13–15

Royal Air Force: 24

Russia: 2, 67, 78, 115, 120, 123, 127, 129–130, 136

SATCOM: 4, 46, 98, 122–123, 126, 141, 146

satellite: xxii–xxiii, xxvi–xxvii, 1, 4, 8, 40–52, 54–55, 61, 65–66

69, 76, 78–80, 82–86, 99, 103–105, 111, 119, 121–126

128–130, 135–136, 139–144, 147

Saudi Arabia: 68

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman: 83

Seoul: 117

Simulation: xxii, xxvi, 17–19, 28, 61

Slipchenko, Valdimir I.: 2, 20

Soviet Union: 21

space: xxiii, xxv–xxvi, 6, 12–13, 19, 27–28, 36, 41–43, 45, 47

52, 54, 60, 62, 65–66, 68–69, 73, 80, 83–85, 91, 102, 111

118, 121–126, 128, 139, 141–143, 146

168
stealth: xxi–xxii, xxiv–xxv, 12, 27–28, 31, 33–38, 41, 49

52–53, 55, 57–61, 63–66, 81, 92, 96, 98–99, 102–104, 108

110, 117, 121–122, 125–127, 130, 139, 141–142, 145–146

Su-24s: xxiv

Su-35: 135–136, 142

Sullivan, Gordon R.: 20

T-72: 144

Taiwan: 120, 130

tank: xxv, 11–12, 14, 16, 53, 59, 74, 77–78, 86–87, 89, 144

148, 150

TLAM: 34

TR-1: 48–49, 125, 143

Treaty of Locarno (1925): 22

Trost, Carlisle A. H.: 68

U-2: 48

UAV: xxiii, xxvi, 8, 36, 39, 46–50, 53–55, 59, 66, 82–83, 85

103, 111, 121–122, 124, 128–131, 140–142, 144–147

unmanned aerial vehicles: xxiii, 80

USSR: 23

Valdivostok: 115–117, 122

von Paulus: 100

Warden, John A.: xv

Whiteman AFB: 141

World War II: xxiv, 9, 14, 16, 22, 25–26, 38, 44–45, 64, 78

WWI: 64

Zaire: 135, 137–141, 143, 146, 148–150

169