DEPA

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TMENT F THE ARMY •

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NITED S TAT S O

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F AME RI C

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THI S W E' L L D E F E N D

Joint Publication 3-15

Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine 

Warfare for Joint Operations

06 September 2016

i 

PREFACE 

1. Scope 

This publication provides guidance to plan and execute barrier, obstacle, and mine 

warfare for joint operations. 

2. Purpose 

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance 

of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations 

for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational 

forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise 

of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and 

prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use 

by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent 

of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and 

executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort 

in the accomplishment of objectives. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders 

of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate 

components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances 

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the 

contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, 

normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided 

more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a 

multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational 

doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not 

ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s 

doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and 

doctrine. 

 For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

 

 KEVIN D. SCOTT 

 Vice Admiral, USN 

 Director, Joint Force Development 
Preface 

ii JP 3-15 

Intentionally Blank 
iii 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-15 

DATED 17 JUNE 2011

• Provides clarity on US landmine policy, to include employment and training 

of anti-personnel landmines on and off the Korean Peninsula. 

• Redefines the term “render safe” to align and comply with US policy and 

treaty requirements. 

• Provides clarity and differentiation between joint intelligence preparation of 

the operational environment and intelligence preparation of the battlespace. 

• Provides legal accuracy and clarity to discussion on “military gain” and 

“legality of incidental destruction of civilian property” with regard to the law 

of war. 

• Provides clarity of the term “military deception” to align with Joint 

Publication 3-13.4, Military Deception, and deletes discussion on the two basic 

approaches to deception. 

• Modifies the definition and description of obstacle intelligence to provide 

clarity and align with existing doctrine. 

• Updates chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance and 

surveillance capability. 

• Provides clarity of civil affair activities and considerations in support of civilmilitary operations to align with doctrine. 

• Provides legal accuracy and clarity of authority for humanitarian mine action. 

 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-15 

Intentionally Blank 
v 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION 

 Introduction ................................................................................................................. I-1 

 Operational Framework .............................................................................................. I-1 

 The Threat ................................................................................................................... I-6 

 Legal Considerations .................................................................................................. I-7 

CHAPTER II

JOINT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 

 Authorities and Responsibilities ................................................................................II-1 

 General Considerations ..............................................................................................II-2 

 Planning Sequence .....................................................................................................II-8 

 Planning Support ......................................................................................................II-11 

CHAPTER III

LAND OPERATIONS 

 General Discussion .................................................................................................. III-1 

 Mobility Considerations ........................................................................................... III-2 

 Countermobility Considerations .............................................................................. III-6 

 Command and Control ........................................................................................... III-15 

CHAPTER IV

MARITIME OPERATIONS 

 General Discussion .................................................................................................. IV-1 

 Naval Mine Warfare Command and Control ........................................................... IV-2 

 Environmental Considerations ................................................................................. IV-2 

 Elements of Naval Mine Warfare ............................................................................ IV-2 

 Mining ...................................................................................................................... IV-2 

 Mine Countermeasures ............................................................................................ IV-5 

 Service Considerations ........................................................................................... IV-12 

 Navy Salvage Support............................................................................................ IV-14 

APPENDIX 

A Land Forces Reports .................................................................................. A-1 

B Service Specific Considerations .................................................................B-1 

C Humanitarian Mine Action .........................................................................C-1 

D References ................................................................................................. D-1 

E Administrative Instructions ........................................................................ E-1 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-15 

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms .............................................. GL-1 

Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-4 

FIGURE 

I-1 Types of Obstacles ...................................................................................... I-5 

I-2 The Hague Convention (VIII) Provisions ................................................... I-9 

II-1 Barrier, Obstacle, and Minefield Objectives ..............................................II-5 

II-2 Joint Planning Process ................................................................................II-8 

II-3 Intelligence Support Tasks .......................................................................II-12 

III-1 Breaching Considerations ........................................................................ III-4 

III-2 Example of Networked Munitions ......................................................... III-10 

IV-1 Environmental Considerations in Naval Mine Warfare ........................... IV-3 

IV-2 Elements of Naval Mine Warfare ............................................................. IV-4 

IV-3 Maritime Mine Countermeasures ............................................................. IV-5 

IV-4 Maritime Mine Countermeasure Mission Objectives .............................. IV-8 
vii 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

• Provides a framework to employ and counter obstacles 

• Outlines the role of obstacles in joint operations 

• Discusses US law and policy concerning landmines and humanitarian 

demining 

• Discusses the framework to plan and conduct land operations to minimize the 

impact from barriers, obstacles, and landmines, and to synchronize their 

employment 

• Outlines the strategic, operational, and tactical employment of sea mines and 

mine countermeasures 

Introduction 

Operational Framework In major operations and campaigns, and some crisis 

response and limited contingency operations, joint forces 

use obstacles offensively and defensively to attack the 

mobility of adversaries, enhance the effectiveness of 

friendly fires, deny adversaries the use of terrain, disrupt 

sustainment operations, and inflict damage to enemy 

forces. 

Joint forces must assure their mobility, conserve their 

fighting potential, and protect their ability to provide 

personnel, logistics, and other support. They predict and 

prevent enemy use of obstacles, detect their existence, 

avoid them, neutralize them, and protect against their 

effects. 

Assured Mobility Assured mobility is the framework of processes, actions, 

and capabilities that enable the joint force to deploy and 

maneuver where and when desired, without interruption 

or delay, to accomplish the mission. Assured mobility is 

the commander’s responsibility and is achieved through 

proactive mobility, countermobility, and survivability. 

While focused primarily on the joint function of 

movement and maneuver, assured mobility has links to 
Executive Summary 

viii JP 3-15 

each of the joint functions and enables and is enabled by 

those functions. 

The fundamentals of assured mobility are to: 

 Predict. Engineers and planners should predict 

potential enemy impediments to joint force 

mobility by analyzing the enemy’s tactics, 

techniques, and procedures; capability; and 

evolution. 

 Detect. Engineers and planners use intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to 

identify the location of natural and man-made 

obstacles, prepare to create/emplace obstacles, 

and identify potential means for obstacle 

creation. 

 Prevent. Engineers and other planners apply this 

fundamental by limiting the enemy’s ability to 

influence mobility through proactive measures 

before the obstacles are emplaced or activated. 

 Avoid. If prevention fails, the commander will 

maneuver forces to avoid impediments to 

mobility within the scheme of maneuver. 

 Neutralize. Engineers and other staff elements 

plan to neutralize, reduce, or overcome obstacles 

and impediments to increase freedom of 

movement. 

 Protect. Engineers and other elements plan and 

implement survivability and other protection 

measures that will deny the enemy the ability to 

inflict damage as joint forces maneuver. 

 Respond. Response must be scalable, flexible, 

and adaptable to operational capabilities, 

including a well-developed public information 

and information operations component. 

Legal Considerations The use of some obstacles, specifically mines, is 

governed by international laws, treaties, and agreements, 

as well as by US law and policy. The US regards mines 

as lawful weapons when they are employed in 
 Executive Summary 

ix 

accordance with US law and policy. The US is not an 

official party to the Ottawa Convention, but on 23 

September 2014 announced it was aligning its 

antipersonnel land mine (APL) policy outside the 

Korean Peninsula with the key requirements of the 

Ottawa Convention. US policy also governs some 

demining operations. In conducting mining operations, 

joint forces use the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

standing rules of engagement (ROE) in the development 

of ROE to ensure their actions are consistent with such 

laws and policies. 

Joint Planning Considerations 

Mine Release Authority The authority to employ mines originates with the 

President. Since the employment of mines in 

international waters or in foreign territories (including 

territorial seas) is generally a hostile act, the President 

must authorize them. Employing mines in allied 

territory or waters is permissible with host nation 

permission and presidential authorization. US joint 

forces will only employ nonpersistent mines that are 

authorized for employment in their operational area in 

accordance with US law and policy. 

Barrier, Obstacle, and 

Minefield Levels of 

Employment 

Strategic Employment. Before hostilities, barriers, 

obstacles, and minefields can be used as flexible 

deterrent options without posing an offensive threat. 

Defensive employment along a hostile land border can 

demonstrate friendly resolve. Pre-hostility employment 

will be as directed by the President. Presidential 

determination will be based, in part, on diplomatic 

conditions and on concurrence by affected friendly 

nations. 

Operational Employment. At the operational level, the 

primary use of obstacles is to restrict enemy maneuver 

options or to create friendly maneuver options. 

Offensive employment can protect friendly maneuver 

while disrupting the enemy’s ability to concentrate or 

maneuver forces. 

Tactical Employment. The employment of barriers, 

obstacles, and minefields at the tactical level is normally 

done to achieve offensive or defensive objectives to 

include enhancement of friendly direct/indirect fires, 
Executive Summary 

x JP 3-15 

delay/destroy enemy formations, or as an economy of 

force technique. 

Planning Sequence The joint planning process (JPP) underpins planning at 

all levels and missions. The primary steps of JPP are: 

 Planning Initiation. JPP begins when an 

appropriate authority recognizes a potential for 

military capability to be employed in response to 

a potential or actual crisis. 

 Mission Analysis. The initial planning guidance 

includes the identification of areas or zones that 

require operational-level barriers, obstacles, or 

minefields; critical targets or enemy functions for 

attack; sequencing of barrier, obstacle, and 

minefield employment and desired effects; 

logistics priorities; ROE; and the employment of 

obstacles and minefields to support denial 

operations. 

 Course of Action (COA) Determination. 

During COA determination, the joint force 

commander’s (JFC’s) staff initially assesses the 

terrain, weather, and climate to identify existing 

operational-level barriers, obstacles, and limits 

imposed by expected weather. 

 Plan or Order Development. During concept 

of operations development, the JFC’s staff 

initiates the development of the formal barrier 

and obstacle plan. This may include the 

employment of reinforcing barriers, obstacles, 

and minefields. 

Planning Support Planning for operations involving barrier, obstacle, and 

mine warfare (MIW) requires timely, continuous, and 

reliable all-source intelligence support. To support the 

planning process, commanders and staffs often require a 

variety of intelligence and engineer products that are 

available from a number of different intelligence and 

other organizations. 

Planning for the use of barriers, obstacles, and mines 

involves the acquisition, storage, maintenance, 

distribution, and security of the materiel. Logistics 

planners must be included early in the planning process 
 Executive Summary 

xi 

to ensure proper coordination and timely acquisition of 

the resources that will be needed to execute the plan. 

Planning for and employing barriers, obstacles, and 

mines requires communication to facilitate joint and 

multinational coordination and information flow to 

inform friendly forces (and, when necessary, other 

United States Government departments and agencies, 

international organizations, and nongovernmental 

organizations, as well as civilians) of locations. For 

operations outside the Korean Peninsula, provide 

guidance and direction on command and control with 

respect to APL employment by partner nations who are 

not party to the Ottawa Convention so as to not violate 

US policy contained in Presidential Policy Directive-37, 

US Landmine Policy. 

 Land Operations 

Support to Movement and 

Maneuver 

Support to movement and maneuver consists of the 

subtasks, capabilities, and systems within the joint 

functions that enable both mobility and countermobility 

operations. The focus is on supporting the maneuver 

commander’s ability to gain a position of advantage in 

relation to the enemy—conducting mobility operations 

to negate the impact of enemy obstacles, conducting 

countermobility to impact and shape enemy maneuver, 

or a combination of both. 

Engineer Functions The three engineer functions are combat, general, and 

geospatial engineering. Countering barriers, obstacles, 

and mines is included within mobility operations. The 

employment of barriers, obstacles, and scatterable 

mines/networked munitions is included within 

countermobility operations. At the tactical level, 

mobility and countermobility operations are typically 

supported by combat engineers as combat engineering 

tasks. 

Command and Control (C2) Planning. At the tactical level, commanders focus on 

identifying the scheme of maneuver that must be 

supported by mobility and/or countermobility efforts. At 

the operational level, countermobility planning focuses 

on granting obstacle emplacement authority or providing 

obstacle control. At each level, commanders include 

obstacle planning in the decision-making process. 
Executive Summary 

xii JP 3-15 

Reconnaissance is performed before, during, and after 

mobility operations to provide information used in the 

planning process, as well as by the commander and staff 

to formulate, confirm, or modify the COA.

Control Means. The purpose of obstacle control is to 

synchronize subordinate obstacle efforts with the 

commander’s intent and scheme of maneuver. 

Commanders exercise obstacle control by granting or 

withholding obstacle emplacement authority or 

restricting obstacles through orders or other specific 

guidance. 

 Maritime Operations 

Naval MIW consists of the strategic, operational, and 

tactical employment of sea mines and mine 

countermeasures (MCM). MIW is divided into two 

categories: the emplacement of mines to degrade the 

enemy’s capabilities to wage land, air, and maritime 

warfare, and the countering of enemy mining capability 

or emplaced mines in order to permit friendly maneuver. 

Naval MIW employs a broad approach, incorporating 

offensive and defensive aspects of MIW. National and 

military objectives can sometimes be achieved without 

clearing or even breaching adversary minefields. If US 

forces can prevent mines from being employed, bypass 

adversary minefields, or restrict the enemy to deploying 

only tactically insignificant minefields, then US 

objectives are more easily achieved. 

Naval Mine Warfare C2 Mine warfare commander (MIWC) is a supporting 

warfare commander to the Navy component commander 

or the officer in tactical command and is the 

commander’s primary advisor on all aspects of MIW—

both mining and MCM. 

Mine countermeasures commander (MCMC) is the 

supporting commander to the MIWC or designated 

commander for MCM within an assigned area. 

Depending on the extent of operations and geography, it 

is conceivable to have multiple MCMCs under the 

coordination of a single MIWC. 

Mining Objectives US mining can be employed to reduce the adversary’s 

threat to friendly forces and preserve freedom of action. 
 Executive Summary 

xiii 

Mining is essential to other warfare areas, particularly 

strike, antisubmarine, and antisurface warfare. Sea 

mines, or the threat of their presence, may restrict enemy 

use of sea areas vital to their operations. Conversely, 

mines may be used to protect friendly harbors, channels, 

and shores. Delays and interruptions in the shipping of 

war materiel may deprive the enemy of critical offensive 

and defensive capabilities. 

US Mining Policy In war, US policy is to conduct offensive, defensive, and 

protective mining as necessary. The decision to employ 

mines is typically made by the combatant commander or 

higher authority, depending on ROE. 

Mine Countermeasures MCM includes all actions to prevent enemy mines from 

altering friendly forces’ maritime plans, operations, or 

maneuver. MCM reduces the threat of mines and the 

effects of enemy-emplaced sea mines on friendly naval 

force and seaborne logistics force access to and transit of 

selected waterways. 

CONCLUSION 

This publication provides guidance to plan and execute 

barrier, obstacle, and mine warfare for joint operations.

 
Executive Summary 

xiv JP 3-15 

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I-1 

CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

1. Introduction 

a. Joint forces should be prepared to encounter barriers and obstacles (including 

improvised explosive devices [IEDs], mines, and other unexploded explosive ordnance 

[UXO]) and to conduct mine warfare (MIW), employing mines on land and sea during 

military operations. In many types of operations, joint forces can employ obstacles as a 

significant force multiplier. Per Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of 

the United States, the US military recognizes two forms of warfare: traditional and 

irregular. Other joint doctrine still uses the term warfare in a broader sense to describe 

activities or operations (e.g., unconventional warfare, anti-submarine warfare, MIW, and 

electronic warfare). However, these terms are not categorized as alternatives within the 

traditional and irregular warfare construct, but rather are retained due to their common 

usage and familiarity. 

b. The procedures for employing and countering obstacles on land differ from those 

at sea. For example, while obstacles on land are primarily employed and countered by 

combat engineers, this is not the case at sea, where ships, aircraft, and underwater elements 

deploy and/or counter obstacles, naval mines, and IEDs. This chapter provides a 

framework to employ and counter obstacles. Considerations that are unique to the land 

and maritime domains are covered in Chapter III, “Land Operations,” and Chapter IV, 

“Maritime Operations.” 

2. Operational Framework 

a. The Role of Obstacles in Joint Operations 

(1) During military operations, joint forces may encounter, or be required to 

employ, obstacles of any type. In any type of offensive or defensive operation, obstacles 

can help protect personnel, equipment, and facilities and maintain lines of communications 

“Everything that is shot or thrown at you or dropped on you in war is most 

unpleasant, but of all horrible devices, the most terrifying...is the land mine.” 

Sir William Slim, Unofficial History, 1959

Per Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,

the US military recognizes two basic forms of warfare: traditional and 

irregular. Other joint doctrine still uses the term “warfare” in a broader 

sense to describe activities or operations (e.g., unconventional warfare, 

anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, and electronic warfare). However, 

these terms are not categorized as alternatives within the traditional and 

irregular warfare construct, but rather are retained due to their common 

usage and familiarity. 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-15 

(LOCs). Joint forces conducting military engagement, security cooperation, and 

deterrence activities sometimes use obstacles to enhance deterrence and demonstrate 

resolve. In some cases, though, the use of obstacles constitutes an act of war. In operations 

such as humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), the very purpose of the operation might 

be focused on the reduction or elimination of obstacles. Such obstacles may have been 

emplaced years prior to the operation or by someone other than a current adversary. In 

major operations and campaigns, and some crisis response and limited contingency 

operations, joint forces use obstacles offensively and defensively to attack the mobility of 

adversaries, enhance the effectiveness of friendly fires, deny adversaries the use of terrain, 

disrupt sustainment operations, and inflict damage to enemy forces. 

(2) Employing and countering obstacles impacts (or is impacted by) all six of the 

joint functions. Command and control (C2) is critical to ensure that obstacles are 

integrated into the overall plan and support the concept of operations (CONOPS), comply 

with law and policy, and avoid unintended consequences. Intelligence should provide 

joint forces with as much information as possible about obstacles—and about adversaries’ 

capabilities to employ them. Political, social, cultural, and economic factors may affect 

how obstacles will be used. Joint forces can use obstacles to enhance the effectiveness of 

fires by increasing target acquisition time, creating target-rich environments, and creating 

vulnerabilities to exploit. Obstacles can also degrade the ability of friendly forces to 

employ fires by limiting or denying access to areas needed to launch and recover aircraft 

or areas from which other weapon systems can employ fires. Obstacles can significantly 

inhibit the movement and maneuver of joint forces and threaten their fighting potential 

and sustainment. Joint forces must assure their mobility; conserve their fighting potential; 

and protect their ability to provide personnel, logistics, and other support. They predict 

and prevent enemy use of obstacles, detect their existence, avoid them, neutralize them, 

and protect against their effects. Joint forces can use obstacles to delay, channel, or stop 

the movement and maneuver of adversaries or for protection against an enemy’s assault 

or against unauthorized access to facilities and bases. 

(3) Obstacles can create significant advantages for the joint forces within the 

operational area. Likewise, obstacles can also create challenges that require analysis prior 

to their emplacement: 

(a) The creation and removal of obstacles is often manpower-intensive; 

hazardous; and can consume a significant amount of time, materiel, equipment, and 

transportation resources. 

(b) Obstacles must be protected to prevent adversaries from bypassing, 

breaching, or clearing them. 

(c) To enhance and sustain certain effects (i.e., disrupt, fix, turn, and block), 

obstacles must be observed and covered by fires. 

(d) Obstacles can be just as hazardous to friendly forces and civilians as they 

are to adversaries. Without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, all minefields, 
 Introduction 

I-3 

mined areas, mines, booby traps, and other devices shall be cleared, removed, destroyed, 

or maintained in accordance with US policy and international law. 

(e) Obstacles inhibit the mobility of enemy, neutral, and friendly forces. 

(f) Employment can have an adverse effect on the perception of legitimacy 

and undermine popular support. 

(g) Employment can have an adverse effect on local commerce, which can 

be detrimental to the restoration of a nation’s political and economic system, especially 

during stability and counterinsurgency operations. 

b. Assured Mobility. Assured mobility is the framework of processes, actions, and 

capabilities that enable the joint force to deploy and maneuver where and when desired, 

without interruption or delay, to accomplish the mission. This construct is one means to 

enable a joint force to achieve the commander’s intent. Assured mobility is the 

commander’s responsibility and is achieved through proactive mobility, countermobility, 

and survivability. Assured mobility integrates all of the engineer functions and should not 

be confused with the limited application of the mobility function. While focused primarily 

on the joint function of movement and maneuver, assured mobility has links to each of the 

joint functions, and enables and is enabled by those functions. While the joint engineer 

has the primary staff role in assured mobility, other staff members play critical roles. The 

fundamentals of assured mobility are: 

(1) Predict. Engineers and planners should predict potential enemy impediments 

to joint force mobility by analyzing the enemy’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); 

capability; and evolution. Prediction requires a constantly updated understanding of the 

operational environment through the use of joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

environment (JIPOE). JIPOE is designed to be used at the strategic and operational levels, 

while intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a process used by individual 

commanders within a joint task force to analyze their individual areas of responsibility at 

the tactical level. 

(2) Detect. Engineers and planners use intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance assets to identify the location of natural and man-made obstacles, prepare 

to create/emplace obstacles, and identify potential means for obstacle creation. Their 

evaluation of existing obstacles or areas suitable for obstacle emplacement allows them to 

develop solutions and alternative courses of action (COAs), which may minimize or 

eliminate the adverse impact on joint force movement and maneuver. 

(3) Prevent. Engineers and other planners apply this fundamental by limiting 

the enemy’s ability to influence mobility through proactive measures before the obstacles 

are emplaced or activated. This may include destruction of enemy assets and capabilities 

before they can be used to create obstacles. 

(4) Avoid. If prevention fails, the commander will maneuver forces to avoid 

impediments to mobility within the scheme of maneuver. 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-15 

(5) Neutralize. Engineers and other staff elements plan to neutralize, reduce, or 

overcome obstacles and impediments to increase freedom of movement. The breaching 

tenets and fundamentals apply to the fundamental of “neutralize.” 

(6) Protect. Engineers and other elements plan and implement survivability and 

other protection measures that will deny the enemy the ability to inflict damage as joint 

forces maneuver. Protection may include countermobility missions to deny the enemy 

maneuver and to provide protection to friendly maneuvering forces. 

(7) Respond. The overarching objective of response actions is to save lives and 

maintain mission capability. Response must be scalable, flexible, and adaptable to 

operational capabilities, including a well-developed public information and information 

operations component. Effective response hinges upon well-trained leaders and personnel 

who have invested in response preparedness and training. Response will depend on the 

amount and kind of damage caused by the incident and resources that can be applied. 

c. Obstacle Framework. Obstacles can be either natural or man-made (or a 

combination of both), as shown in Figure I-1. 

(1) Natural obstacles are terrain features, such as rivers, forests, or mountains. 

(2) Man-made obstacles can be explosive or nonexplosive. 

(a) Nonexplosive obstacles do not contain explosives (although explosives 

may be detonated to create the obstacle). They include: 

1. Cultural obstacles are man-made terrain features that were not 

created for the purpose of obstructing military forces. Examples include archaeological 

sites, industrial/commercial infrastructure, major roads and electrical grid components, 

towns, canals, and railroad embankments. 

2. Constructed obstacles are created without the use of explosives. 

Examples include wire obstacles, earth-filled bastions, prefabricated concrete sections, 

anti-vehicle ditches, and vehicle-stopping devices. 

3. Demolition obstacles are created by the detonation of explosives. 

Examples include bridge demolition, road craters, and abatis. 

(b) Explosive Obstacles 

1. Mines 

a. Land Mines. A munition placed under, on, or near the ground or 

other surface area and designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a 

person or vehicle. Land mines can be hand emplaced or scatterable via air, artillery, or 

ground delivery system. 
 Introduction 

I-5 

(1) Persistent. Mines that remain active indefinitely waiting 

for activation by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle. 

(2) Nonpersistent. Mines that remain active for a 

predetermined period of time until one of the following functions renders the mine inactive. 

For US munitions, all scatterable mines are nonpersistent with variable activation times. 

Figure I-1. Types of Obstacles 

IED improvised explosive device existing obstacles reinforcing obstacles

UXO unexploded explosive ordnance

NOTES:

1. Explosive hazards are defined in the glossary and a description of all explosive hazards is beyond the 

scope of this publication.

2. A description of all UXO types is beyond the scope of this publication.

3. Scattered munitions that have self-arming, self-destructing, and self-deactivating features are examples 

of nonpersistent land mines.

Legend

Nonexplosive

Obstacles

Natural Man-Made

Cultural Constructed Demolition

Explosive

IED UXO

All Other

Explosive

Hazards

Networked 

Munition

(see Note 1)

(see Note 3)

Mines

(see Note 2)

Land

Mines

Persistent

Sea

Mines

Nonpersistent

Scattered

Munitions

Types of Obstacles
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-15 

(a) Self-destruction. An incorporated or externally 

attached, automatically functioning mechanism that secures the destruction of the munition 

into which it is incorporated or to which it is attached. 

(b) Self-neutralization. An incorporated, automatically 

functioning mechanism that renders inoperable the munition into which it is incorporated. 

(c) Self-deactivation Automatically rendering a mine 

inoperable by means of the irreversible exhaustion of a component (e.g., a battery) that is 

essential to the operation. 

b. Sea Mines. In naval mine warfare, an explosive device laid in 

the water with the intention of damaging or sinking ships or of deterring shipping from 

entering an area. 

2. IED. A weapon that is fabricated or emplaced in an unconventional 

manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals 

designed to kill, destroy, incapacitate, harass, deny mobility, or distract. 

For additional information about IEDs, see JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive 

Device Operations. 

3. UXO. Explosive ordnance that has been primed, fuzed, armed, or 

otherwise prepared for action, and which has been fired, dropped, launched, projected, or 

placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or 

material and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause. 

4. Networked Munitions. A class of remotely controlled, interconnected 

weapons systems that can be rapidly emplaced, consisting of nonpersistent anti-vehicle 

land mine (AVL)/antipersonnel land mine (APL) munitions that provide ground-based 

countermobility and protection capabilities through persistent surveillance and the scalable 

application of lethal and nonlethal means. 

(3) Existing Obstacles. Natural and cultural obstacles present as inherent 

aspects of the terrain comprise this category. 

(4) Reinforcing Obstacles. Obstacles that are specifically created to impede 

joint force movement and maneuver. 

3. The Threat 

Joint forces typically encounter obstacles in two physical domains: land and maritime. 

However, obstacle warfare can impact, and be impacted by, operations in other portions of 

the operational area. 

a. Land. Joint forces may encounter obstacles across the operational environment. 

Obstacles are more effective, however, when they are integrated with highly restrictive 

terrain such as mountains, jungles, or urban areas to deny or canalize movement. Joint 
 Introduction 

I-7 

forces may face adversaries with highly mobile conventional forces supported by lethal air 

and ground fires. Enemy surveillance capabilities may determine the effectiveness of 

employing friendly obstacles. The timing and methods of emplacement may be determined 

by the air situation. Adversaries may make extensive use of obstacles, including mines 

and IEDs, and a variety of countermeasures to defeat friendly forces. Joint forces may 

encounter both modern and technologically obsolete mines. The relatively low cost of 

mines and IEDs and their worldwide availability makes them ideal weapons for all nations 

and for anyone with access to them. In addition, enemy use of nuclear munitions and 

chemical mines should not be ruled out. The threat of terrorist employment of explosive 

hazards (EHs) may necessitate defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of US 

personnel, equipment, and facilities. 

b. Maritime. Enemy mine emplacement operations may be conducted against 

friendly ports, harbors, and sea lines of communications (SLOCs). Mines may also be used 

in other areas vital to US and multinational maritime forces such as amphibious objective 

areas (AOAs), fire support, and carrier strike group operating areas. The application of 

technology by industrially advanced countries has produced a sophisticated, effective form 

of naval MIW. Nevertheless, older mine technologies remain effective. The ease of 

emplacing mines by ship, aircraft, or submarine presents a valid threat to a commander 

who must rely on naval support or on seaborne reinforcement and resupply. Maritime 

power projection and resupply forces originate from friendly ports. During amphibious 

operations, assault and assault follow-on shipping must transit narrows and operate in 

shallow waters. The enemy can place these forces at risk, with little cost to its own forces, 

by emplacing only a few mines. Vessels in port are vulnerable to mines attached to their 

hulls or other forms of underwater attack by swimmers/divers. Another means of attack 

while in port or during transits of SLOCs or narrows is using suicide and non-suicide 

waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs). The use of such devices has been 

demonstrated by al Qaeda in attacks on USS COLE and the Motor Vessel LIMBURG. 

c. Air. Enemy use of obstacles could pose a major threat to the ability to conduct 

effective air operations. Control of airspace is essential to effective surface operations. 

The enemy could emplace nonexplosive obstacles to hamper or impede friendly air 

maneuver. Cables, balloons, high-power transmission line towers (painted to make them 

difficult to see by friendly air crews) are a few examples. Further examples include sea 

mines in an area where aircraft carriers would need to operate to be within effective range 

of the enemy. The enemy might also employ scatterable mines, along with munitions that 

have immediate effects, in attacks against friendly air bases ashore. Scatterable mines 

could seriously disrupt and delay air base launch and recovery operations, disrupt logistics 

sustainment operations to the air base, and thereby limit friendly air operations. 

4. Legal Considerations 

The use of some obstacles, specifically mines, is governed by international laws, 

treaties, and agreements, as well as by US law and policy. The US regards mines as lawful 

weapons when they are employed in accordance with US law and policy. US policy also 

governs some demining operations. In conducting mining operations, joint forces use the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) standing rules of engagement (ROE) in the 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-15 

development of the ROE to ensure their actions are consistent with such laws and policies. 

These laws and policies are complex and occasionally change, so it is critical that joint 

forces carefully consider them when developing their local ROE and ensure staff judge 

advocates review them for legal sufficiency. All commanders and staff involved with MIW 

should be familiar with the specific ROE concerning mines. This section identifies the 

laws, agreements, and policies that are most significant to the employment and 

counteremployment of obstacles. 

a. International Law. International law and practice regulate the initiation and 

conduct of armed conflict, limiting the use of certain types of weapons. 

(1) The law of war is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of 

armed hostilities. It includes four principles: military necessity, avoidance of 

unnecessary suffering, proportionality, and discrimination or distinction. 

(2) The Hague Conventions. Commencing in 1899, signatories to the various 

Hague Conventions sought agreements providing, among others things, regulations for the 

commencement of hostilities, the conduct of belligerents and neutral powers toward each 

other and other nations, and limitation of use of certain types of weapons in warfare. The 

Hague Convention VIII of 1907 addressed contact sea mines and sought to restrict and 

regulate their use. The relevant provisions of Hague VIII are summarized in Figure I-2. 

(3) International Agreements. There are two international agreements that bear 

indirectly on naval MIW. 

(a) The Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971 prohibits placing nuclear 

weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed or subsoil thereof beyond a 

12-mile coastal zone. Weapons of mass destruction other than nuclear weapons are not 

defined in this arms control treaty. 

(b) The navigation and overflight provisions of the 1982 United Nations 

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) reflect customary international law and 

codify the rights and duties of nations with respect to the use of the ocean. Though the US 

has not ratified UNCLOS, US policy is to consider all navigation and overflight provisions 

of UNCLOS as reflective of customary international law and, thus, binding on US forces. 

Mine emplacement operations must consider the applicable international law and the rights 

and freedoms enjoyed by all nations. 

(4) The United Nations (UN) Charter requires member states to refrain from 

the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 

state, except in two situations: individual or collective self-defense and as authorized by 

the UN Security Council. 

(5) The 1980 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on 

the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively 

Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, commonly referred to as the 1980 United 

Nations Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), is a law of war treaty governing 

the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious 
 Introduction 

I-9 

or to have indiscriminate effects. The US has fully integrated the CCW into land mine 

doctrine and practices. Protocol II (as amended on 3 May 1996) of the CCW refers to 

prohibitions or restrictions on the use of land mines, booby traps, and other devices. The 

protocol does not apply to the use of antiship mines at sea or in inland waterways. 

Requirements and restrictions on land mines include: requirements to mark and record nonremotely delivered mines when feasible and publicize minefield locations at the conclusion 

of hostilities; after cessation of active hostilities clear, remove, destroy, or maintain 

minefields, mines, and booby traps; requirements on the use of mines or booby traps in 

areas containing concentrations of civilians; and prohibition on types of booby traps. The 

protocol applies to internal conflicts as well as conflicts between states. 

(6) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, 

and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention) 

of 1997, to which the US is not a party, bans the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling 

of APLs (to include self-destruct/self-deactivating nonpersistent systems) and came into 

force on 1 March 1999. The treaty does not restrict the use of antitank mines or AVLs, to 

Figure I-2. The Hague Convention (VIII) Provisions 

The Hague Convention (VIII) Provisions

Some of the provision are:

It is forbidden—

1. To lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are so 

constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after the person 

who laid them ceases to control them;

2. To lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless 

as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings;

It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coast and ports of the 

enemy, with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping.

When anchored automatic contact mines are employed, every possible 

precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping. The 

belligerents undertake to do their utmost to render these mines harmless 

within a limited time, and, should they cease to be under surveillance, to 

notify the danger zones as soon as military exigencies permit, by a notice 

addressed to ship owners, which must also be communicated to the 

governments through the diplomatic channel.

At the close of the war, the contracting powers undertake to do their utmost 

to remove the mines which they have laid, each power removing its own 

mines. As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by one of the 

belligerents off the coast of the other, their position must be notified to the 

other party by the power which laid them, and each power must proceed 

with the least possible delay to remove the mines in its own waters.

Article 1

Article 2

Article 3

Article 5
Chapter I 

I-10 JP 3-15 

include those fitted with antihandling devices (AHDs). (Throughout this publication the 

term AVL is used to represent any antitank or anti-vehicle mine.) Nations that signed and 

implemented the Ottawa Convention, including many US allies, have legal restrictions that 

necessitate careful planning with other non-signatory partner nations (PNs) when 

contemplating any activities related to APLs. The US is not an official party to the Ottawa 

Convention, but on 23 September 2014 announced it was aligning its APL policy outside 

the Korean Peninsula with the key requirements of the Ottawa Convention. The policy 

was formalized by the President on 27 January 2016 in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-

37, US Landmine Policy. The US’s commitment and treaty obligations to the Republic of 

Korea preclude it from changing its APL policy there. 

b. US Law and Policy 

(1) Land mines 

(a) The primary treaty that restricts US use of mines is Amended Protocol II, 

which amends Protocol II to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 

Certain Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol II: 

1. Expands the scope of the original Protocol to include internal armed 

conflicts. 

2. Requires that all remotely delivered APLs be equipped with selfdestruct devices and backup self-deactivation features (informally called “smart” mines). 

3. Requires that all non-remotely delivered APLs not equipped with 

such devices (sometimes called “dumb” mines) be used within controlled, marked, and 

monitored minefields. US land mine policy prohibits the use of persistent land mines with 

the exception of their use for training personnel engaged in demining or countermining 

operations. 

4. Requires that all APLs be detectable using available technology. 

5. Requires that the party emplacing mines assume responsibility to 

ensure against their irresponsible or indiscriminate use. 

6. Provides for means to enforce compliance. 

7. Clarifies the use of non-self-destructing/self-deactivating weapons 

that propel fragments in a horizontal arc of less than 90 degrees and that are placed on or 

above the ground (e.g., the M18 Claymore “mine” when used in the tripwire mode. 

Claymores used in command-detonated mode are not subject to Amended Protocol II 

restrictions) for a maximum period of 72 hours, if: 

a. They are located in immediate proximity of the military unit that 

emplaced them, and 
 Introduction 

I-11 

b. The area is monitored by military personnel to ensure the 

effective exclusion of civilians. 

8. Upon ratification of the amended Protocol II, the US filed an 

understanding stating that the provisions of the amended Protocol II do not restrict or affect, 

in any way, nonlethal weapon technology that is designed to temporarily disable, stun, 

signal the presence of a person, or operate in any other fashion, but not to cause permanent 

incapacity. 

(b) Additionally, PPD-37, US Landmine Policy, contains specific guidelines 

for use of APLs only on the Korean Peninsula and prohibits their use outside the Korean 

Peninsula. 

(c) The US land mine policy addresses humanitarian land mine concerns 

while balancing legitimate warfigther requirements. Under this policy: 

1. Continued use of self-destructing/self-deactivating APLs and AVLs 

on the Korean peninsula and AVLs only outside of Korea is supported. Self-destructing 

land mines are not the cause of humanitarian land mine concerns. 

2. The US ended the use of persistent land mines of all types at the end 

of 2010, with the exception of use for training personnel engaged in demining or 

countermining operations and research purposes. 

3. The US no longer uses non-detectable land mines of any type. 

(d) CCW Protocol V (Explosive Remnants of War). On 28 November 2003, 

CCW states parties adopted Protocol V concerning explosive remnants of war (ERW). It 

was ratified by the US on 21 January 2009. Protocol V contains no restrictions or 

prohibitions on weapons or munitions. It addresses what must be done by parties to a 

conflict with respect to ERW that place civilians at risk and post-conflict remediation. Its 

focus is on pre-conflict preventive measures and post-conflict corrective measures. Its 

Technical Annex suggests best practices that parties are encouraged to follow on a 

voluntary basis to achieve greater munitions reliability. Obligations concerning clearance, 

removal, destruction, recording, precautions, and cooperation and assistance related to 

ERW apply only to ERW created after entry into force of Protocol V for the state party on 

whose territory the ERW are located; that is, the obligations are not retroactive. 

For additional information on the employment of mines by US forces or TTP for 

UXO/ERW, refer to Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 4-32.2/Marine 

Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-17.2B/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

(NTTP) 3-02.4.1/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.12, MultiService Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Unexploded Ordnance; Marine Corps 

Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-31.2/Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-15, Naval 

Mine Warfare; MCWP 5-12.1/NWP 1-14M/Commandant of the Coast Guard Publication 

P5800.7A, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (section 7.7 and 

9.2); Field Manual (FM) 4-30.51/MCRP 3-17.2A, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) 

Procedures; and Army Techniques Publication 4-32.16/MCRP 3-17.2C/NTTP 3-
Chapter I 

I-12 JP 3-15 

02.5/AFTTP 3-2.32, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive 

Ordnance Disposal. 

(2) US Policy on Humanitarian Demining. The US Humanitarian Mine Action 

Program has supported and funded humanitarian demining (HDM) efforts since 1988. 

Because of the threat to peace and safety, HDM operations have become a significant 

disarmament and peace operations activity. Demining is ultimately a host nation (HN) 

responsibility. However, the US promotes its foreign policy interests by assisting other 

nations in protecting their populations from land mines through mine awareness education 

and training of HN personnel in the surveying, marking, and clearing of mines. While 

providing such assistance, US military forces are prohibited from engaging in the physical 

detection, lifting, or destroying of land mines, except when necessary for the purpose of 

supporting a concurrent US military operation. See Appendix C, “Humanitarian Mine 

Action;” JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations; and JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian 

Assistance, for additional information. 
II-1 

CHAPTER II 

JOINT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 

1. Authorities and Responsibilities 

a. The President of the US and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) 

(1) Mine Release Authority. The authority to employ mines originates with 

the President. Since the employment of mines in international waters or in foreign 

territories (including territorial seas) is generally a hostile act, the President must authorize 

them. Employing mines in allied territory or waters is permissible with HN permission 

and presidential authorization. US joint forces will only employ nonpersistent mines that 

are authorized for employment in their operational area in accordance with US law and 

policy. 

(2) The President and SecDef 

(a) Approve ROE established by the geographic combatant commander 

(GCC) for the theater. 

(b) Promulgate policy and guidance concerning the employment of mines 

and humanitarian mine actions (HMAs). 

b. The Secretary of State and ambassadors obtain permission from HNs to employ 

mines within their territories or waters. 

c. CJCS transmits policy and guidance concerning the employment of mines and 

HMAs from the President and SecDef to the combatant commanders (CCDRs). 

d. Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) 

(1) CCDRs 

(a) Augment ROE (with approval by the President and SecDef as required). 

(b) Distribute ROE to subordinate commands for compliance. 

(c) Provide guidance and direction with respect to employment of barriers, 

obstacles, and mines. 

“Battles are won through the ability of men to express concrete ideas in clear and 

unmistakable language.” 

Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall 

US Army (1900-1977)
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-15 

(d) For operations outside the Korean Peninsula, provide guidance and 

direction on C2 with respect to APL employment by PNs who are not party to the Ottawa 

Convention so as to not violate US policy contained in PPD-37, US Landmine Policy. 

(2) Joint Task Force Commanders 

(a) Request supplemental ROE for MIW as required. 

(b) Provide guidance and direction with respect to employment of barriers, 

obstacles, and mines. 

(c) For operations outside the Korean Peninsula, provide guidance and 

direction on C2 with respect to APL employment by PNs who are not party to the Ottawa 

Convention so as to not violate US policy contained in PPD-37, US Landmine Policy.

2. General Considerations 

a. Barrier, Obstacle, and Minefield Levels of Employment 

(1) Strategic Employment. Before hostilities, barriers, obstacles, and 

minefields can be used as flexible deterrent options without posing an offensive threat. 

Defensive employment along a hostile land border can demonstrate friendly resolve. Naval 

defensive and protective mining can help protect friendly ports and waters. Pre-hostility 

employment will be as directed by the President. Presidential determination will be based, 

in part, on diplomatic conditions and on concurrence by affected friendly nations. Should 

deterrence fail, offensive naval mining of enemy ports and waters can constrict enemy 

seaborne sustainment efforts and reduce enemy ability to safely deploy maritime forces. 

Similarly, offensive employment of scatterable mines can deny or restrict enemy strategic 

mobility and sustainability efforts. 

(2) Operational Employment. Defensive barrier, obstacle, and minefield 

employment can help protect friendly ports, LOCs, and key facilities and free combat 

forces for offensive employment and denial operations. Barriers and obstacles of 

operational significance usually differ in scale from those of tactical significance. 

However, size alone does not make an obstacle operationally significant. At the 

operational level, the primary use of obstacles is to restrict enemy maneuver options or to 

create friendly maneuver options. Offensive employment can protect friendly maneuver 

while disrupting the enemy’s ability to concentrate or maneuver forces. Mines can also 

contribute to gaining air superiority. Mines can delay efforts to repair damage to air bases 

caused by munitions that have immediate effects, thus degrading or denying the base’s 

capability to launch or recover aircraft. Mines can also restrict the deployment of mobile, 

surface-based air defenses, as well as surface-to-surface systems, because rapid movement 

in a mined area increases the risk of a mine encounter. Mines can also disrupt logistics 

sustainment operations being performed in the enemy’s rear area. 

(3) Tactical Employment. The employment of barriers, obstacles, and 

minefields at the tactical level is normally done to achieve offensive or defensive objectives 
 Joint Planning Considerations 

II-3 

to include enhancement of friendly direct/indirect fires, delay/destroy enemy formations, 

or as an economy of force technique. 

b. Placement Considerations. To maximize the effectiveness from an operational 

barrier, obstacle, or minefield, certain factors must be considered. 

(1) On land, barriers, obstacles, and minefields are usually formed around or tied 

into an existing terrain feature (e.g., mountain chain or strait) or formed around a manmade structure (e.g., air base, canal, highway, or bridge). At sea, the placement of 

minefields is usually determined by environmental considerations such as depth, bottom 

characteristics, and littoral geography. Although there is little flexibility in positioning 

these large-scale obstructions, flexibility exists in selecting and designating features that 

will be enhanced or reinforced. Operational barriers, obstacles, and minefields are placed 

to manipulate the enemy in such a way that supports the commander’s intent and scheme 

of maneuver and should be observed or covered by fire. 

(2) The effects that these operational barriers, obstacles, and minefields will have 

on both the friendly and enemy forces’ ability to maneuver on land and sea or to conduct 

effective air operations must be analyzed. Intended effects of obstacles include disrupting, 

fixing, turning, or blocking enemy forces. Operational barriers, obstacles, and minefields 

do more than just degrade the maneuver of enemy forces. Because of their size and the 

pattern of placement, they virtually dictate the maneuver options of both friendly and 

enemy forces. Moreover, they serve to fix opposing maneuver elements facilitating 

engagement, thus increasing lethality of supporting arms. 

(3) The element of surprise can also be achieved through the employment of 

barriers, obstacles, and minefields. Because of their operational significance, both friendly 

and enemy forces usually know of their existence and location. Surprise can result when 

a barrier, obstacle, or minefield perceived by one force as significant fails to effectively 

obstruct the opponent. This implies that the operational significance of a barrier, obstacle, 

or minefield depends both on its physical obstruction capability and the way in which the 

opposing forces perceive it. Joint forces can achieve surprise through the use of air- or 

artillery-delivery systems that permit rapid mining in the operational area. These can 

confront the attacker with a completely new situation almost instantly. The use of hard-todetect employment means such as submarines is another way to achieve surprise. Surprise 

can be further gained through the use of lanes and gaps, phony minefields and obstacles, 

and self-destructing or self-deactivating mines. Friendly forces should avoid readily 

discernible or repetitive employment methods and utilize military deception (MILDEC) 

measures. When the type, location, and design are varied, the enemy’s understanding and 

breaching of friendly barriers, obstacles, and minefields is made more difficult. 

(4) Tactical barriers, obstacles, and minefields can be used offensively and 

defensively to help secure the population and provide protection for forward operating 

bases. 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-15 

(5) Barriers may be used in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and defense 

support of civil authorities operations for populace and resources control. Civil affairs 

(CA) personnel should be consulted regarding the potential impact on local attitudes. 

(6) Reinforcement is achieved by integrating systems of barriers, obstacles, 

minefields, and fires. The objective is to degrade enemy movement, assist counterattacks, 

and facilitate future friendly offensive operations. 

(7) Reinforcing obstacles and minefields are identified as early as possible, 

because the development of a barrier, obstacle, or minefield system in depth requires time, 

the commitment of engineer or specialized resources, extensive logistics support, or other 

forces such as overwatching maneuver elements. 

(8) Plans include the identification of assets to restore the integrity of a barrier, 

obstacle, or minefield if breached by the enemy. This is especially important if the 

obstruction is critical to operational success. 

(9) In operations involving land forces, the creation of massive obstacles should 

be considered in situations where friendly forces control a major river dam or bridge. 

Control of the dam provides the option of limited, controlled flooding or destruction of the 

dam to create both a destructive flood surge and flooded areas. The same might be applied 

to the destruction of large bridges that cross substantial watercourses or other large gaps. 

However, such actions should only be considered after carefully considering the treatment 

of any such actions under the law of war and the ROE for the operational area. Any 

commander considering destruction of dams, bridges, or other civilian infrastructure must 

carefully conduct a proportionality analysis with the staff judge advocate to ensure that the 

likely impact to civilian personnel and property is not excessive in relation to military 

advantage expected to be gained. Commanders should also coordinate with the public 

affairs office to enable a coordinated response to any public or media interest in such 

destruction. 

c. Offensive. The purpose of offensive barrier, obstacle, and minefield employment 

(to include air-delivered scatterable mines) is to impede or prohibit enemy movements 

while enhancing or protecting friendly force’s maneuverability through or around. This is 

achieved by influencing or controlling the movement of enemy ground and naval forces 

and degrading the enemy’s ability to conduct land-based aviation operations. The enemy’s 

ability to counterattack or reinforce is restricted, and the operational area is isolated. 

Barriers, obstacles, and mines have five main objectives in offensive operations (see Figure 

II-1). 

(1) Prevent Enemy Reinforcement or Counterattack. To prevent the enemy 

from reinforcing or counterattacking, critical routes are interdicted to hinder movement of 

reserves and logistics. Speed and depth are vital. 

(2) Facilitate Economy of Force. Barriers, obstacles, and minefields permit 

fewer forces to defend selected sectors, thereby allowing relieved maneuver units and other 

combat resources to be concentrated in other zones for attack. Similarly, they become a 
 Joint Planning Considerations 

II-5 

combat multiplier, amplifying the firepower effectiveness of the friendly forces defending 

them by creating optimum fields of fire. Easily defended choke points can be effectively 

reinforced with obstacles, supported by on-call fire support, and held by relatively small 

forces. 

(3) Provide Security. Barriers, obstacles, and minefields can be used in critical 

areas along the flanks of advancing forces to restrict enemy attacks. At the operational 

level, river systems, mountain ranges, deserts, and snow- or ice-covered areas are natural 

barriers and obstacles that can enhance flank security. Shallows, reefs, and other maritime 

hazards can be used at sea. Existing barriers and obstacles can be strengthened with 

reinforcing obstacles and minefields to counter an enemy threat. 

(4) Degrade Enemy Air Capability. Mines can pose a significant obstacle to 

the enemy’s ability to recover and resume operations after an air base attack. Any delays 

in the enemy generating sorties can provide friendly forces with an important opportunity 

to further suppress the enemy’s ability to defend against follow-on attacks, leading to the 

enemy’s loss of control of the air. 

(5) Fix the Enemy. Air- and artillery-delivered scatterable mines and emplaced 

mines can disrupt and delay the enemy’s retreat during pursuit and exploitation. They can 

also be used to disrupt the commitment of the enemy’s reserve and follow-on forces. 

d. Defensive. The purpose of defensive barrier, obstacle, and minefield emplacement 

is to degrade the enemy’s ability to maneuver, defeat the enemy attack, regain initiative, 

gain time, concentrate forces, control terrain, and exhaust the enemy prior to assuming the 

Figure II-1. Barriers, Obstacles, and Minefields Objectives 

Barriers, Obstacles, and Minefields Objectives

Offensive

Enhances and protects the friendly force’s ability to maneuver

Defensive

Directed toward degrading the enemy’s ability to maneuver or 

protect the force.











Prevent enemy reinforcement or counterattack.

Facilitate economy of force.

Provide security.

Degrade enemy air capability.

Fix the enemy.









Destroy or attrit the enemy force.

Support economy of force measures.

Retention of key terrain or areas of significant strategic, operational, or 

tactical value

Force protection
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-15 

offensive. Naval MIW distinguishes between defensive minefields, which are minefields 

laid in international waters or international straits with the declared intention of controlling 

shipping in defense of sea communications, and protective minefields, which are 

minefields laid in friendly territorial waters to protect ports, harbors, anchorages, coasts, 

and coastal routes. Barriers, obstacles, and mines have four main objectives in defensive 

operations (see Figure II-1). 

(1) Destroy or Attrit the Enemy Force. Barriers, obstacles, and mines can 

enhance the effectiveness of friendly fires or delay the enemy’s advance, upset timing, 

disrupt, channelize formations, and delay or destroy follow-on forces. 

(2) Support of Economy of Force Measures. Barriers, obstacles, and mines 

can be used in the economy of force role to strengthen a naturally strong existing obstacle 

area so that it need only be lightly defended, thus freeing forces to be concentrated 

elsewhere. Similarly, obstacles can be used in conjunction with mobile forces to protect 

flanks and other lightly defended areas. 

(3) Retention or Denial of Key Terrain. Barriers, obstacles, and mines can be 

used to deny the enemy access to key terrain or areas of significant strategic, operational, 

or tactical value. 

(4) Force Protection. Create barriers and obstacles for force protection. 

A main priority in defense is the degradation of enemy ability to maneuver. 
 Joint Planning Considerations 

II-7 

e. Denial Considerations. A denial measure is an action to hinder or deny the enemy 

the use of territory, personnel, or facilities. It may include destruction, removal, 

contamination, or erection of obstructions. 

(1) The GCC establishes the theater policies governing denial operations in 

coordination with allied or friendly governments. The GCC subsequently delegates 

detailed planning and execution to subordinate commanders. In developing denial policies, 

these subordinate commanders must consider those facilities and areas required to support 

life in the post-hostility period regardless of the outcome of the conflict. Additionally, the 

subordinate commanders must weigh the long-range social, economic, political, and 

psychological effects of the incidental destruction of civilian properties against the military 

advantages gained. The law of war requires that all military operations, including denial 

operations, be conducted consistent with the principles of proportionality and 

discrimination. 

(2) Denial operations usually do not focus upon immediate enemy destruction, 

but rather on contributing to future friendly operations. Denial operations may have a 

major impact on the civilian population. Denial targets frequently involve civilian facilities 

and structures that have been rendered military objectives because their nature, location, 

purpose, or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 

destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a 

definite military advantage. Examples include electrical power generation facilities and 

ports that are used by both the civilian population and the enemy’s military force. A 

proportionality analysis is required when considering denial operations against such 

targets. 

f. MILDEC. MILDEC consists of actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary 

military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing 

the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the 

accomplishment of the friendly mission. Specific guidance from the JFC or higher 

authority during planning will determine the MILDEC role in a joint operation. Barriers, 

obstacles, and minefields can support MILDEC. Time and enemy surveillance techniques 

will determine the best method of employing barriers, obstacles, and minefields in support 

of MILDEC. Allowing the enemy to observe units or vessels engaged or preparing to 

engage in seemingly realistic employment or breaching operations transmits a specific 

message to the enemy. Operations must be planned so that their execution will not 

inadvertently reveal friendly plans. The employment of phony obstacles and minefields is 

a MILDEC technique. 

See JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, for more information.

g. Political and Psychological. The primary objective of employing barriers, 

obstacles, and minefields may be deterrence rather than physical destruction. Accordingly, 

political and psychological considerations are key aspects that have far-reaching 

implications. From a political perspective, such measures will signal friendly resolve to 

take actions required to protect national interests. Psychological deterrence is also 

achieved. Although the degree of psychological deterrence cannot be quantified, the mere 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-15 

suspicion that mines have been emplaced can adversely affect enemy planning and 

operations in excess of the actual threat. The psychological impact of mines can be 

increased by exposure of their existence and the adversary’s lack of a ready capability to 

implement countermeasures. These considerations should be included in the development 

of the information operations portion of the plan. Any information-related capabilities 

employed in the operational area should also highlight elements to prevent humanitarian 

impacts and offer a potential alternative method to influence the psychology of hostile and 

neutral elements. 

3. Planning Sequence 

The joint planning process (JPP) underpins planning at all levels and missions. It 

applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to joint force component commands 

when the components participate in joint planning. The primary steps of JPP are shown in 

Figure II-2 and are discussed in the remainder of this section. 

a. Planning Initiation. JPP begins when an appropriate authority recognizes a 

potential for military capability to be employed in response to a potential or actual crisis. 

At the strategic level, that authority—the President, SecDef, or the CJCS—initiates COA 

development by deciding to develop military options. In an actual crisis, the CJCS will 

issue a warning order. CCDRs and other commanders also may initiate COA development 

on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by higher 

authority. 

b. Mission Analysis. The joint force’s mission is the task or set of tasks, together 

with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. 

The primary products of mission analysis are a revised mission statement, the JFC’s initial 

Figure II-2. Joint Planning Process 

Joint Planning Process

Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Step 4

Step 5

Step 6

Step 7

Initiation

Mission Analysis

Course of Action Development

Course of Action Analysis and Wargaming

Course of Action Comparison

Course of Action Approval

Plan or Order Development
 Joint Planning Considerations 

II-9 

intent statement, initial planning guidance, and the commander’s critical information 

requirements. The initial planning guidance includes the identification of areas or zones 

that require operational-level barriers, obstacles, or minefields; critical targets or enemy 

functions for attack; sequencing of barrier, obstacle, and minefield employment and desired 

effects; logistics priorities; ROE; and the employment of obstacles and minefields to 

support denial operations. For operations outside the Korean Peninsula, planning must 

include identifying PNs who are not party to the Ottawa Convention and create command 

and control safeguards so as to not violate US policy contained in PPD-37, US Landmine 

Policy.

c. COA Determination. COA determination consists of four primary activities: 

COA development, analysis and wargaming, comparison, and approval. A good COA 

accomplishes the mission within the commander’s guidance and positions the joint force 

for future operations and provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution. 

During COA determination, the JFC’s staff initially assesses the terrain, weather, and 

climate to identify existing operational-level barriers, obstacles, and limits imposed by 

expected weather. The need for additional barriers, obstacles, and minefields is identified. 

For operations outside the Korean Peninsula, COA determination must consider any PNs 

who are not party to the Ottawa Convention and their potential to use APLs. Areas suitable 

for enhancement and reinforcement are identified. Special attention is given to identifying 

areas that could be reinforced to form massive area obstacles. The terrain is evaluated from 

both friendly and enemy perspectives. The evaluation considers the enemy’s ability and 

willingness to cross difficult terrain. Friendly capabilities should not be assumed to be the 

same as enemy capabilities. Both friendly and enemy perspectives and capabilities are 

evaluated to estimate options available to each side. The terrain and climate assessments 

during the initial stage of the plan development phase will enhance the integration of 

barriers, obstacles, and minefields into the overall plan. Once the COA is approved, the 

staff converts the COA into a CONOPS. 

d. Plan or Order Development. Contingency planning will result in plan 

development, while crisis action planning will lead directly to operation order (OPORD) 

development. During plan or order development, the commander and staff, in 

collaboration with subordinate and supporting components and organizations, expand the 

approved COA into a detailed joint operation plan (OPLAN) or OPORD by first 

developing an executable CONOPS. The CONOPS describes how the actions of the joint 

force components and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and 

phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels. During 

CONOPS development, the JFC’s staff initiates the development of the formal barrier and 

obstacle plan. This may include the employment of reinforcing barriers, obstacles, and 

minefields. Emphasis is placed on maximizing the effectiveness of existing barriers and 

obstacles. Each barrier and obstacle plan requires an estimate of possible or probable 

enemy actions to identify opportunities for offensive and defensive action. When 

completed, the plan should clearly delineate operational barriers, obstacles, and minefields 

and their intended effects and potential unintended effects on the campaign or operation. 

(1) The JFC and staff must consider the various component weapons systems and 

delivery assets available to deliver or emplace the selected reinforcing barriers, obstacles, 
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-15 

and minefields. The delivery or emplacement assets must be identified and allocated 

accordingly. The JFC integrates this support into the overall campaign or operation. 

(2) The barrier and obstacle plan formulation should also identify areas that must 

remain free of obstacles or minefields to facilitate friendly maneuver. Such areas are 

necessary to exploit the advantages gained from enemy reactions and vulnerabilities. At 

the tactical level in ground operations, this is achieved through the designation of obstacle 

zones and belts. 

(3) Although sustainment is a Service component responsibility, the JFC must 

consider the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and limitations of logistics systems in the 

planning and execution of the operation. To achieve flexibility, the JFC must anticipate 

current and future requirements, the potential for degradation by enemy action, and the 

ability to sustain operations throughout an entire operation or campaign. 

(4) The barrier, obstacle, and minefield guidance contained in the OPLAN should 

provide for the necessary control of obstacle or minefield areas and obstacle or minefield 

restricted areas. It may designate critical obstacles and reserve the execution of selected 

obstacles. However, restrictions placed on subordinate commanders should be limited to 

those deemed necessary by the JFC. At a minimum, guidance should delineate any special 

reporting, recording, and marking responsibilities. For operations outside Korea, guidance 

must be given to include potential APL obstacle handovers from PNs that are not party to 

the Ottawa Convention. 

(5) The development of the joint campaign or OPLAN necessarily includes 

estimates from the component commanders as to how their assets and capabilities can best 

support the JFC’s objectives. 

e. The JFC reviews and approves the concept of employment for operational barriers, 

obstacles, and minefields, as well as the denial plan which is designed to prevent potential 

aggressors from the use of certain resources, and/or to deny them access to certain areas. 

As part of this approval process, the JFC verifies that the CONOPS meets intent and 

guidance and facilitates synchronization to produce the most effective employment of 

operational barriers, obstacles, and mines. 

f. Once formal approval of the OPLAN is obtained, subordinate and supporting 

commanders develop their own plans. In doing so, they can determine how existing and 

reinforcing barriers, obstacles, and minefields will affect maneuver; what conditions are 

imposed on plans; and how to employ supporting obstacles. Although this is addressed as 

a separate step, subordinate and supporting commanders develop plans concurrently with 

those of the JFC. For operations outside the Korean Peninsula, the OPLAN must include 

guidance to US subordinate commanders on PNs that are not party to the Ottawa 

Convention. 

g. The barrier, obstacle, and MIW plan is published, if required, as an appendix of an 

annex to the theater campaign plan, OPLAN, or OPORD. In addition, the reporting of 
 Joint Planning Considerations 

II-11 

execution or employment of barriers, obstacles, and minefields should be addressed in OPLAN 

or OPORD annexes and appendices (e.g., ROE and unit standard operating procedure). 

h. Although employment is addressed separately in this publication, planning and 

employment is a continuous process. As one operation is executed, the next one is planned, 

coordinated, and executed. In addition, planners must closely monitor execution and be 

prepared to adapt the plan, and future plans, in response to changing circumstances. This 

may involve reapportioning and reallocating assets and reprioritizing support for barrier, 

obstacle, and minefield emplacement. 

i. Plans for the removal or deactivation of barriers, mines, and obstacles may need to 

be formulated and employed during or after hostilities or other operations. 

For more information, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning. 

4. Planning Support 

a. Intelligence. Planning for operations involving barrier, obstacle, and MIW 

requires timely, continuous, and reliable all-source intelligence support. To support the 

planning process, commanders and staffs often require a variety of intelligence and 

engineer products that are available from a number of different intelligence and other 

organizations. This includes the command’s geospatial intelligence cell. The combination 

of the focused intelligence analysis from the joint force intelligence organizations and 

support through reachback combine to meet the commander’s intelligence requirements. 

Figure II-3 identifies some typical intelligence support tasks. 

(1) Collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence information must start 

during peacetime. Tasks include identifying and evaluating worldwide mine production 

facilities and storage capabilities (to include on-hand quantities). For each potential 

operation, analysts must evaluate types, quantities, and capabilities of mines, barriers, and 

obstacles available to the adversary. The evaluation includes technical information on each 

type of mine (characteristics, descriptions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities). 

(2) JIPOE is an analytical process used to produce intelligence assessments, 

estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the commander’s decision-making 

process. Included in this analysis are the tasks of identifying adversary mine, barrier, and 

obstacle storage locations; topographic, hydrographic, and oceanographic information; 

actual and potential locations of adversary mine, barrier, and obstacle employment; the 

adversary’s doctrine and TTP for countering and employing it; fire support to support mine, 

barriers, and obstacles (doctrine, capabilities, unit locations); breaching capabilities (assets, 

doctrine, and TTP); and current and future operational capabilities. 

See JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, for more 

information. 

(3) The joint force staff identifies significant information gaps about the 

adversary along with relevant aspects of the operational environment. With this 

information, intelligence requirements are developed for the collection of information or 
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 3-15 

the production of intelligence. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection 

operations must locate enemy barrier, mine, and obstacle locations; identify and locate 

enemy fire support and remaining enemy employment capabilities; and locate enemy 

breaching assets. This information, particularly updates, must be pushed down to tactical 

echelons. Given known enemy doctrine and TTP, intelligence must advise the JFC as to 

how the enemy will react in the face of friendly operations. 

(4) Obstacle Intelligence. Obstacle intelligence describes the product resulting 

from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of 

available information concerning any natural or man-made obstruction designed or 

employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the movement of friendly forces, and to impose 

additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment on friendly forces. The collection of 

information on obstacles and subsequent creation of obstacle intelligence are critical to 

breach planning and determining the necessary reduction techniques that offer the best 

chance for success while minimizing the risk to the breach force. This information is 

especially important when conducting breaching operations in complex or restrictive 

terrain to ensure that reduction assets are arranged in the right order in the movement 

formation, since the ability to reposition reduction assets within the formation may be 

limited due to the constricting nature of the terrain. Obstacle intelligence also validates the 

templated obstacles, helps verify an enemy intent and defense strength, and leads to refined 

maneuver and breach planning. Engineers, intelligence, and operations staff work together 

to determine specific obstacle information requirements for collection and subsequent 

Figure II-3. Intelligence Support Tasks 

Intelligence Support Tasks

Tasks identify and evaluate:

























Worldwide mine production capabilities and facilities.

Types, quantities, and capabilities of mines, barriers, and obstacles 

available.

Technical information on each type of mine (characteristics, description, 

capability, and vulnerabilities).

Enemy mine, barrier, and obstacle storage locations.

Topographic, hydrographic, and oceanographic information.

Actual and potential locations for enemy mine, barrier, and obstacle 

employment.

The enemy’s doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for employin g 

mines, barriers, and obstacles.

Enemy fire support for mines, barriers, and obstacles (doctrine, capabilities, 

unit locations).

Enemy breaching capabilities (assets, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, 

and procedures).

The enemy’s current and future operational capabilities.

Increased activity near suspected storage sites indicative of enemy intent 

to mine.

Technical exploitation of recovered improvised explosive devices and 

weapons caches.
 Joint Planning Considerations 

II-13 

production of obstacle intelligence. Examples of obstacle-related information 

requirements include the following: 

(a) Location, composition, orientation, frontage, and depth of obstacles. 

(b) Types of mines, fuzes, and method of employment (such as anti-vehicle 

or antipersonnel [AP] mines, buried or surface-laid, AHDs, and depth of buried mines). 

(c) Lane and bypass information. 

(d) Interval between successive obstacle belts. 

For more information on intelligence support to joint operations, see JP 2-0, Joint 

Intelligence. See FM 3-34.170/MCWP 3-17.4, Engineer Reconnaissance, for more 

information on obstacle reconnaissance. 

b. Logistics. Planning for the use of barriers, obstacles, and mines involves the 

acquisition, storage, maintenance, distribution, and security of the materiel. Logistics 

planners must be included early in the planning process to ensure proper coordination and 

timely acquisition of the resources that will be needed to execute the plan. 

(1) Acquisition and Storage. Anticipation is key to a sound acquisition and 

storage plan. Planners must ensure that the proper mix of mines and minefield, obstacle, 

and barrier emplacing materials and counter obstacle equipment and materiel are made 

available in time to meet the demands of the OPLAN. For operations outside the Korean 

Peninsula, planners need to address what to do with PNs who are not party to the Ottawa 

Convention and their APL stockpiles, especially if there is a consolidated storage area. 

Requirements at the operational level must be anticipated to prevent delays in delivery of 

the material to a theater. Unless they are special munitions, the storage of mines will 

normally be handled like any other munitions. 

(2) Distribution. The execution of this logistics function is crucial to the success 

of the OPLAN. It helps transform the OPLAN into tactical operations. Logistics planners 

must ensure the availability of sufficient resources to transport barrier or obstacle material 

and mines to the place of employment or deployment. 

(3) Legal Concerns. The international movement and storage of mines must be 

carefully coordinated to avoid legal and political repercussions because the use, possession, 

transfer, and stockpiling of mines is closely regulated under various international 

agreements and countries have differing legal obligations related to the possession, use, 

storage, and transport of mines. For operations outside the Korean Peninsula, planners 

must address the implication of working with PNs who are not party to the Ottawa 

Convention and their APL stockpiles. 

c. Communications. Planning for and employing barriers, obstacles, and mines 

requires communication to facilitate joint and multinational coordination and information 

flow to inform friendly forces (and, when necessary, other United States Government 

[USG] departments and agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental 
Chapter II 

II-14 JP 3-15 

organizations, as well as civilians) of locations. These activities require that secure, 

interoperable communications systems are available to support the mission. 

d. EHs Database. The joint force should establish a single EHs database for the entire 

operational area to facilitate a common understanding within the joint force and with 

multinational forces, other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and 

nongovernmental organizations. This database should include all known and suspected 

mines, IEDs, UXO, and other EHs, and be compatible with common operational picture 

(COP) tools to enhance situational awareness and support situational understanding. The 

rapid and timely declassification of military data on locations of mines and other EHs is 

essential for information sharing and development of a COP, which allows friendly forces 

the ability to safely navigate around or through these known obstacles. 

For more information, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning. 
III-1 

CHAPTER III 

LAND OPERATIONS 

1. General Discussion 

Barriers, obstacles, and land mines impact military operations in a range of 

situations—from defense support of civil authorities in an area littered with hurricane 

debris, through stability operations in which insurgents employ EHs, to offensive or 

defensive operations employing complex man-made and natural obstacle systems. This 

chapter discusses the framework to plan and conduct land operations to minimize the 

impact from barriers, obstacles, and land mines, and to synchronize their 

employment.

a. Support to Movement and Maneuver. Support to movement and maneuver is 

the integrated application of assured mobility throughout the operational area to preserve 

combat power. It is the framework within which consideration of barriers, obstacles, and 

MIW occurs. Support to movement and maneuver consists of the subtasks, capabilities, 

and systems within the joint functions that enable both mobility and countermobility 

operations. The focus is on supporting the maneuver commander’s ability to gain a 

position of advantage in relation to the enemy—conducting mobility operations to negate 

the impact of enemy obstacles, conducting countermobility to impact and shape enemy 

maneuver, or a combination of both. Support to movement and maneuver includes more 

than the capability to employ or counter obstacles. For operations outside the Korean 

Peninsula, JFCs need to address command and control arrangements with PNs who are not 

party to the Ottawa Convention so as to not violate US policy contained in PPD-37, US 

Landmine Policy. For example, it includes the regulation of traffic in the maneuver space, 

the handling of dislocated civilians, and other capabilities to support the maneuver plan. 

While support to movement and maneuver provides the broader framework of enabling 

capabilities, the discussion of barriers, obstacles, and MIW focuses specifically on mobility 

and countermobility (and the supporting survivability) tasks. Countermobility and 

supporting survivability operations are also linked to the joint function of protection since 

survivability is one of the subordinate tasks of that function. 

b. Engineer Functions. The three engineer functions are combat, general, and 

geospatial engineering. Countering barriers, obstacles, and mines is included within 

mobility operations. The employment of barriers, obstacles, and scatterable 

mines/networked munitions is included within countermobility operations. At the 

tactical level, mobility and countermobility operations are typically supported by combat 

engineers as combat engineering tasks, although selected combat engineering tasks may 

also be performed by general engineers. Combat engineers are specifically organized, 

“Gentlemen, I don’t know whether we will make history tomorrow, but we will 

certainly change geography.” 

General Herbert Plumer (to press conference the day before the blowing up of 

Messines Ridge, 6 June 1917)
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-15 

trained, and equipped to perform these tasks in close combat in support of a combined arms 

force. The remainder of this chapter discusses those combat engineering mobility, 

countermobility, and supporting survivability tasks that shape or deny land operations by 

employing or countering the employment of barriers, obstacles, and land mines. General 

engineering may also support mobility, countermobility, and survivability operations at all 

levels of warfare. Geospatial engineering is present to support all engineer operations. 

For further information about the engineer functions and the differences between combat 

and general engineers, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. 

2. Mobility Considerations 

a. General. Mobility operations include five functional areas, three of which are 

designed to directly meet challenges from barriers, obstacles, land mines, and other EHs. 

Breaching operations, clearing operations, and gap crossing operations are discussed 

further in paragraphs b through d below. The five functional areas of mobility operations 

for Army units and Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) are covered in detail in ATTP 

3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8, Combined Arms Mobility Operations. 

(1) Conduct Combined Arms Breaching Operations. Detect, breach or 

bypass, mark, and proof mined areas and obstacles. Combined arms breaching operations 

are typically performed in a close combat environment. 

(2) Conduct Clearing Operations. Employ tactics and equipment to detect and 

eliminate obstacles, mines, and other EHs. While this is not always part of a combined 

arms breaching operation and is typically not performed in a close combat environment, it 

will still generally include the task of breach. 

(3) Conduct Gap Crossing Operations. Fill/cross gaps in the terrain/man-made 

structures to allow personnel and equipment to pass. 

(4) Construct/Maintain Combat Roads and Trails. Expediently prepare or 

repair routes of travel for personnel and equipment. This includes temporary bypasses of 

damaged roads and bridges. 

(5) Perform Forward Aviation Combat Engineering. Construct/maintain 

forward airfields and landing zones (LZs), forward arming and refueling points, landing 

strips, or other aviation support sites in the forward combat area. This task also includes 

those actions performed in support of airfield seizure. 

b. Combined Arms Breaching Operations 

(1) Successful breaching operations are characterized by applying the breaching 

tenets. These tenets should be applied when obstacles are encountered in the operational 

area that require breaching operations. These tenets are: 

(a) Intelligence (includes obstacle intelligence). 
 Land Operations 

III-3 

(b) Breaching fundamentals of suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and 

assault. 

(c) Breaching organization with clear C2 channels.

(d) Mass of breaching capabilities.

(e) Synchronization of breaching activities with operations.

(2) Combined arms breaching operations are complex, but they are not an end in 

themselves. They are a part of the maneuver forces’ operation that helps achieve the 

objective. Breaching operations keep ground forces moving to the objective. When 

developing COAs for combined arms breaching operations, utilize the breaching 

considerations shown in Figure III-1. 

(3) As the combined arms team plans future operations, it may develop COAs 

that require breaching operations. Enemy obstacles that disrupt, fix, turn, or block the 

maneuver force can impair the timing and flow of the operation. Most obstacles will be 

observed by the enemy and protected with fires; obstacles should be bypassed if possible. 

For those obstacles that must be breached, constant coordination and integration of all 

elements of the combined arms team are vital for success. Combat engineers are focused 

on tactical engineer reconnaissance to include obstacle intelligence, and develop 

techniques to clear obstacles in the path of the force. Geospatial engineering may provide 

data to help plan a deliberate breach. At the brigade combat team (BCT) and the regimental 

combat team (RCT) level, organic combat engineer companies may require augmentation 

for more complex or sustained breaching operations. Appendix B, “Service Specific 

Considerations,” provides information on those capabilities likely needed to augment joint 

forces conducting mobility operations. 

(4) Breaching operations are adapted to exploit the situation. Deliberate, hasty, 

or covert breaching operations are used depending on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, 

troops and support available-time available (METT-T). 

(a) Deliberate Breach. A deliberate breach is used against a strong defense 

or complex obstacle system. It is similar to a deliberate attack, requiring detailed 

knowledge of both the defense and the obstacle systems. It is characterized by prior 

planning, preparation, and buildup of combat power on the near side of obstacles. 

Subordinate units are task-organized to accomplish the breach. The breach often requires 

securing the far side of the obstacle with an assault force before or during reduction. 

(b) Hasty Breach. A hasty breach is an adaptation of the deliberate breach, 

but is conducted when less time is available. It may be conducted in support of pre-planned 

or responsive operations. Hasty breaches may be necessary due to lack of clarity on enemy 

obstacles or changing enemy situations to include the emplacement of scatterable mines or 

networked munitions. 

(c) Covert Breach. Covert breaching is the creation of lanes through 

minefields or other obstacles that is planned to be executed without detection by an 
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 3-15 

adversary. Its primary purpose is to reduce obstacles in an undetected fashion to facilitate 

the passage of maneuver forces. A covert breach is conducted when surprise is necessary 

or desirable. Covert breaching is characterized by using stealth when reducing the 

obstacles, with support and assault forces executing their mission only if reduction is 

detected. Covert breaches are best conducted during periods of reduced visibility. The 

covert breach can use elements of the deliberate and hasty breach. 

(d) Breaching Variants 

Figure III-1. Breaching Considerations 

Breaching Considerations

NOTE:

Reducing a major barrier, obstacle, or minefield is a difficult and risky task. Forces must execute breaching 

aggressively. Forces and supporting fires are synchronized to minimize losses and enhance rapid passage 

through the obstruction.

Obtain any special 

equipment or material 

required.

Preparation

Detect minefields and 

other major obstacles.

Detection

Bypass may not meet

operational constraints.

Bypass

Breaching

Training and 

Rehearsals 

Throughout

Determine the 

characteristics and limitation 

of enemy barriers, obstacles, 

and minefields.

Reconnaissance
 Land Operations 

III-5 

1. Amphibious Breach. An amphibious breach is an adaptation of the 

deliberate breach specifically designed to overcome anti-landing defenses to conduct an 

amphibious assault. 

2. In-Stride Breach. An in-stride breach is a variant of a hasty breach 

that consists of a rapid breaching adaptation conducted by forces organic to (or taskorganized with) the attacking force. It is enabled by preplanned, well-trained, and wellrehearsed breaching battle drills and execution of the unit’s standard operating procedures. 

The in-stride breach takes advantage of surprise and momentum to breach obstacles. Instride breaches are effective against either weak defenders or very simple obstacles, when 

joint forces can execute battle drill on the move. Attacking forces are generally configured 

to execute an in-stride breach except when a deliberate breach is planned. 

(5) Combined arms breaching operations require the constant consideration of 

METT-T factors and the concentrated use of supporting arms. Fundamentals of combined 

arms breaching operations have evolved in concert with the fundamentals of ground 

combat and provide a logical and time-proven set of rules. 

(6) The most effective means to counter mines or other EHs is to prevent their 

employment. Proactive countermine operations destroy enemy mine or other EH 

manufacturing and storage facilities or emplacement capabilities before the mines or EHs 

are emplaced. Planners should consider enemy storage and mine production facilities and 

assets for inclusion on the target lists. In addition to destroying mine or EH manufacturing 

and storage facilities, units should target enemy engineers and equipment. 

c. Clearing Operations. Clearing operations are conducted to eliminate obstacles, 

whether along a route or in a specified area. Obstacles may be explosive or nonexplosive. 

Clearing operations involving explosive obstacles are especially difficult because the 

detection systems employed are imperfect and available neutralization systems are only 

partially effective. Clearing operations will not generally be conducted under enemy 

observation and fire. As with all mobility operations, an intensive reconnaissance effort is 

imperative to clearing operations. Clearing operations may be conducted in conjunction 

with or in support of any of the other mobility operations. For example, the establishment 

of a forward LZ may require an area or route clearance operation to support access to the 

site. Obstacle tracking and reporting should be properly documented and archived for 

situational awareness. This information is distributed up through the chain of command 

and eventually consolidated at the JFC level. At each level of command, the information 

can be used to develop a COP for the unit. 

For additional information about defeating IEDs, see JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised 

Explosive Device Operations. 

For a general discussion of clearing (route and area) operations, see ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 

3-17.8, Combined Arms Mobility Operations. For a discussion of clearing TTP, see FM 

3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D, Explosive Hazards Operations; FM 3-34.214/MCRP 3-17.7L, 

Explosives and Demolitions; and FM 3-90.119, Combined Arms Improvised Explosive 

Device Defeat Operations. 
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-15 

d. Gap Crossing Operations. Gap crossing operations are conducted to project 

combat power over linear obstacles or gaps. There are three general types of gap crossing 

operations (deliberate, hasty, and covert). The commander, with recommendations from 

the engineer and other staff members, task-organizes capabilities to support gap crossing 

operations. At the BCT/RCT level, organic combat engineer companies will typically 

require augmentation by additional engineer capabilities for most gap crossing operations. 

Appendix B, “Service Specific Considerations,” provides information on those capabilities 

that may be required to augment the BCT/RCT for mobility operations. Combat engineers 

conduct gap crossings in support of combat maneuver using tactical (assault) bridging 

equipment to span smaller gaps, heavy equipment (or the employment of fascines and other 

solutions) to modify the gap, or through the use of expedient bridging (rope bridges, small 

nonstandard bridging using local materials). Engineers may be tasked to provide additional 

crossing capabilities such as bridging equipment. River crossing is a unique gap crossing 

mission that requires specific and dedicated assets from all of the warfighting functions. 

For a discussion of river crossing and other types of gap crossings, refer to ATTP 3-

90.4/MCWP 3-17.8, Combined Arms Mobility Operations. 

e. Special Considerations 

(1) The amphibious breach is a type of deliberate breach specifically designed to 

overcome antilanding defenses in order to conduct an amphibious assault. Units conduct 

an amphibious breach when no other landing areas are suitable for the landing force (LF). 

Bypassing an integrated antilanding defense is preferred over conducting an amphibious 

breach whenever possible. However, the commander must always consider whether a 

bypass would produce additional risks. Synchronization and teamwork are essential for a 

successful amphibious breach, which is characterized by thorough reconnaissance, detailed 

planning, extensive preparation and rehearsal, and a buildup of combat power. 

See ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8, Combined Arms Mobility Operations; NWP 3-15/MCWP 

3-31.2, Naval Mine Warfare; MCRP 3-31.2A/NTTP 3-15.24, Mine Countermeasures in 

Support of Amphibious Operations; and JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations, for detailed 

discussions of amphibious breaching operations. 

(2) Urban terrain is complex terrain that affects the tactical options available to 

the commander and requires a thorough knowledge of unique terrain characteristics, 

detailed planning down to the smallest unit level, and sound leadership at all levels. The 

complexities of the urban environment, such as line of sight restrictions, inherent 

fortifications, limited intelligence, densely constructed areas, and the presence of civilians 

restricts current military technology. 

See ATTP 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, and JP 3-06, Joint Urban 

Operations, for a broader discussion of urban operations. 

3. Countermobility Considerations 

a. General. The objective of barrier, obstacle, and MIW employment is to disrupt, 

fix, turn, or block enemy forces and protect friendly forces. Employment is not an end in 
 Land Operations 

III-7 

itself, but supports the maneuver plan. This section discusses the employment of barriers, 

obstacles, and scatterable mines/networked munitions employed to counter the enemy’s 

freedom of maneuver. Survivability operations are often integrated with countermobility 

operations (especially during defensive operations) to support the protection of personnel 

and equipment overwatching the barriers, obstacles, and minefields as a part of an 

engagement area. 

See Army Techniques Publication 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5, Combined Arms Countermobility 

Operations, for a more detailed discussion of the tactical employment of barriers, 

obstacles, and land mines. Also see Appendix B, “Service Specific Considerations.” 

b. Terrain Considerations. Engineers are essential in the engagement area 

development for countermobility operations. 

(1) Engineers anticipate and provide terrain analysis products of likely 

contingency areas in support of JIPOE. Geospatial products assist in describing the 

environmental effects on enemy and friendly capabilities and broad COAs. Planners use 

modern, automated tools and equipment to create a very detailed analysis of the terrain and 

weather. 

(2) Many data management, analysis, and visualization tools are available to 

assist in the geospatial planning effort. Geospatial engineering provides commanders with 

terrain analysis and visualization, which improve situational awareness and enhance 

decision making. Examples of geospatial information useful for planning purposes are as 

follows: 

(a) Three-dimensional terrain fly-through capability. 

(b) Avenues and routes for joint forces, as well as likely enemy avenues of 

approach. 

(c) Obstacle zone locations. 

(d) Potential engagement areas. 

(e) Potential unit positions or sites. 

(f) Airfield and port information and capabilities. 

(g) Support to urban operations and other complex terrain. 

(h) High-payoff target information. 

(i) Deep-target information. 

(j) Communications or visual line of sight. 
Chapter III 

III-8 JP 3-15 

(k) Locations of LOCs and main supply routes and potential locations of 

base camps. 

(l) Identification of flood plains and potential LZs. 

(m) Fuzed data from multiple databases. 

(3) Terrain analysis is a key product of geospatial support. It is the study of the 

terrain’s properties and how they change over time, with use, and under varying weather 

conditions. Terrain analysis starts with the collection, verification, processing, revision, 

and construction of source data. It requires the analysis of climatology (current and 

forecasted weather conditions), soil conditions, and enemy or friendly vehicle performance 

metrics. Terrain analysis and geospatial information and services are necessary to support 

mission planning and operational requirements. Geospatial information and services 

require the management of an enterprise geospatial database at every echelon from 

combatant command to deployed maneuver forces. Terrain analysis is a technical process 

and requires the expertise of geospatial information technicians and a geospatial engineer. 

(4) Geospatial functional analysis sample products graphically describe the 

following: 

(a) Industries and energy. 

(b) Telecommunications infrastructure. 

(c) Underground facilities and caves. 

(d) Political boundaries. 

c. Employment Principles 

(1) Barriers, obstacles, and minefields should be evaluated from both an 

offensive and a defensive posture. 

(2) Barriers, obstacles, and minefields should directly support the maneuver plan. 

(3) Reinforcing obstacles should be integrated with existing barriers and 

obstacles to support the commander’s intent and operational concept. 

(4) Barriers, obstacles, and minefields are more effective when employed in 

depth. 

(5) By varying the type, design, and location of reinforcing obstacles, the 

enemy’s breaching operation is made more difficult. 

(6) The effectiveness of barrier, obstacle, and mine employment can be affected 

by the air situation. 
 Land Operations 

III-9 

(7) Coverage by observation and by direct or indirect fire is essential to restrict 

enemy breaching efforts, maneuver, and massing of forces and to increase the destruction 

of enemy forces. Planned on-call fires (indirect and/or direct) are ideal for this purpose. 

d. Countermobility Resources. The employment of mines, networked munitions, 

and other obstacles to support the friendly scheme of maneuver is resource-intensive. 

Combat engineers and others must have the barrier materials, mines, demolitions, and wire 

as well as the equipment needed to emplace/build the obstacles. There will often be 

competing priorities for the use of engineers and the materials and equipment needed to 

perform the work to support the obstacle effort. The following four categories provide a 

useful framework for identifying the resources required for effective countermobility 

operations: 

(1) Mines. Land mines are categorized as either persistent or nonpersistent. 

Both categories provide anti-vehicle and AP capabilities. Persistent mines are no longer 

authorized for use by US forces (except as noted in Chapter 1, “Introduction,” 

paragraph 4.b, “US Law and Policy”). Many persistent mines are activated by pressure 

or contact. These mines are emplaced by hand or mechanical means, buried or surface 

emplaced, and normally emplaced in a pattern that aids recording. Mechanical 

emplacement may be restricted by terrain conditions. The emplacement of persistent 

minefields is normally time, manpower, and logistics intensive. 

(a) Scatterable mines are most commonly used by technically advanced 

nations and are emplaced without regard to classical patterns. Although locations of each 

individual mine cannot be precisely recorded, scatterable minefields can be accurately 

recorded to within 10 meters when emplaced. They are emplaced by ground mine 

dispensing systems, artillery, aircraft, or by hand. They are designed to self-destruct after 

a set period of time, ranging from four hours to 15 days. Scatterable mines significantly 

reduce manpower requirements associated with MIW. Smaller and lighter, these mines 

reduce logistics requirements because of their reduced bulk and weight. Scatterable mines 

also make it possible to emplace minefields quickly and, importantly, to do so deep in the 

enemy’s rear area such as at an air base, LOCs, air defense site, or an assembly area. The 

deep-delivered capability is only available for employment on the Korean Peninsula. The 

current deep-delivered system (Gator) is a mixed system (APL/AVL) and is not available 

for employment outside the Korean Peninsula in accordance with PPD-37, US Landmine 

Policy. Aircraft and artillery are the most flexible and responsive means of scatterable 

mine delivery; however, they often have other competing roles. Other disadvantages 

include time and high number of artillery rounds or aircraft sorties required to emplace a 

minefield. These factors increase the exposure of emplacing artillery to counter battery 

fires and emplacing aircraft or helicopters to enemy air defenses. Networked munitions 

are a class of remotely controlled, interconnected weapons systems that can be rapidly 

emplaced, consisting of nonpersistent (self-destructing/self-deactivating) AVL/APL 

munitions that provide ground-based countermobility and protection capabilities through 

persistent surveillance and the scalable application of lethal and nonlethal means (see 

Figure III-2). 
Chapter III 

III-10 JP 3-15 

(b) The employment of scatterable mines requires close coordination 

between components during both the planning and employment phases of the operation. 

The coordination for the employment of scatterable mines is a combined effort of the joint 

targeting coordination board, the joint force engineer, and the joint force air component 

commander, if established. The joint force air component commander plans the use and 

delivery of air-delivered scatterable mines. The joint force engineer plans and integrates 

minefields into the barrier plan. The joint targeting coordination board is a forum to 

facilitate joint forces targeting operations to support and synchronize JFC targeting 

objectives. To ensure a coordinated effort, a general CONOPS is developed that includes 

such issues as identification of objectives, timing, minefield placement, and ingress or 

egress routes. Coordination is essential if scatterable mines are deployed where friendly 

forces may be operating or in locations that lie within the operational area. Once emplaced, 

scatterable mines remain active until detonated or until the mines self-destruct or selfdeactivate after a preset period of time. Required self-destruct or self-deactivate times 

depend upon the operational or tactical situation and are not necessarily related to the 

proximity of friendly forces. Although scatterable mines have self-destruct/selfdeactivation features, scatterable mine fields should be expected to contain UXO despite 

passage of the pre-selected self-destruct/self-deactivate times. As a result, friendly forces 

Figure III-2. Example of Networked Munitions 

Example of Networked Munitions

Spider

Enables man-in-the-loop command 

and control of all munitions in the field

RCU with transceiver 

makes up the remote 

control station 

Provides for 

extended range, 

often to overcome 

difficult terrain

Remote Control Unit (RCU)

Transceiver

Repeater

Munition Control Unit

500 meters

1,000 meters

(3,500 meters with 

variable height 

antenna mast)

Hand emplaced, remotely controlled 

munitions; detects intrusions, controls 

lethal and nonlethal munitions
 Land Operations 

III-11 

moving through scatterable mine fields should employ breaching or clearing tactics. US 

scatterable mines are designed to self-destruct and/or self-deactivate. Scatterable mines 

are selected when they are the optimum means available to support the JFC’s CONOPS. 

1. Employing scatterable mines requires prior coordination with and 

approval from the commander within whose boundaries the mines are employed. Specific 

coordination procedures should provide an optimum balance between requirements for 

control and flexibility in execution. In areas close to friendly forces or where friendly 

forces may operate before the mines self-destruct, detailed coordination is essential. Upon 

approval, the location of employment will be reported by the employing force to the 

appropriate ground force commander. 

2. Scatterable mines are most effective when combined with other 

weapons to delay, disrupt, destroy, or turn enemy forces. They can complement organic 

capabilities. For example, scatterable mines can be used to secure flanks of ground units, 

close breaches in minefields and obstacles, or protect an AOA. 

3. In early stages of contingency operations or at extended ranges, airdeliverable scatterable mines may be the only available mining capability. For operations 

outside the Korean Peninsula, the only air-delivered scatterable mines available for 

employment are the helicopter-delivered AVL Volcano. 

4. Minefields employed in direct support of ground forces have limited 

effectiveness if unobserved and not covered by some means of fire or fire support. 

5. If scatterable mines are the only type of ordnance that will satisfy the 

ground force commander’s requirements, their use should be specified in the ground force 

commander’s request. Similarly, if employment of scatterable mines in a specified area is 

not acceptable (i.e., likely to create an undesired effect), this should also be specified in the 

ground force plan. 

(2) Networked Munitions. As with the employment of scatterable mines, 

networked munitions requires close coordination between components during both the 

planning and employment phases of the operation. The same control measures as 

scatterable mines must be implemented. An example of networked munitions is the Spider 

system. This system is interoperable with the Army Battle Command by utilizing data feed 

sets to populate a common operating picture. This system provides man-in-the-loop 

operations and on-off-on capability, permitting the passage of friendly forces on demand 

and reducing incidents of friendly fire incidents and unintended engagements on civilians. 

(3) Demolition obstacles are created by the detonation of explosives. 

Demolition is generally used to create tactical level obstacles. However, it can also be used 

to create operational obstacles such as the destruction of major dams, bridges, and railways, 

as well as highways through built-up areas or terrain choke points. Demolition obstacles 

are typically classified as preliminary or reserved obstacles. Preliminary obstacles are 

those planned by subordinate commanders, are not considered critical to the JFC’s plan, 

and can be detonated as soon as they are prepared or as the situation dictates. Reserved 
Chapter III 

III-12 JP 3-15 

obstacles are those deemed critical to the JFC’s or subordinate commander’s plan 

and are detonated only when directed by the commander who designated them. 

Demolition obstacles may require lengthy completion time and large quantities of 

demolition materials because of the size and characteristics of the target. 

(4) Constructed obstacles are man-made, created without the use of 

explosives. Typical tactical examples are barbed wire obstacles and anti-vehicle ditches. 

Operational and strategic barriers and obstacles may also be constructed. Examples are 

fortified areas and lines. These large-scale obstructions generally require extensive time, 

manpower, equipment, and material. In general, engineers will play a major role in 

obstacles of this magnitude. Constructed barriers and obstacles should be emplaced before 

hostilities or in areas not subject to observed fires, because construction personnel can be 

exposed to all types of enemy fire. 

(5) Field Expedient Obstacles. When mines, barrier materials, or engineer 

resources are not available or are in short supply, the JFC may have to rely on field 

expedients such as abatis, flame field expedient, or the improvised use of military 

demolitions for employment in place of obstacles and minefields. Field expedients can be 

hastily constructed from materials found on the battlefield, such as containers, fuel, and 

explosive devices. They can provide a quick, effective means for providing a limited 

offensive and defensive obstacle capability when conventional resources are not available. 

Employment of field expedient obstacles that possess the same characteristics as APLs 

(designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person and that will 

incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons) will on be employed in accordance with 

US law and policy. 

e. Offensive Employment. During offensive planning, the JFC, through the joint 

force staff, identifies priority locations and plans and coordinates the joint emplacement of 

barriers, obstacles, and minefields. Under some circumstances, the JFC may designate the 

systems that subordinate commanders utilize for emplacement. These barriers, obstacles, 

and minefields generally focus on isolating the battlefield, facilitating economy of force, 

enhancing overall force security, and blocking or disrupting an enemy’s withdrawal. 

During planning and deployment, care must be taken to ensure that the mobility of the 

attacking force is not hindered. Key factors for consideration in offensive employment are: 

(1) The scheme of maneuver for the operation. 

(2) Current enemy situation capabilities, intent, and probable COAs. 

(3) Accurate terrain analysis to determine where friendly forces are vulnerable to 

counterattack. 

(4) Preplanning, deconfliction, and coordination with other components. 

(5) C2 of obstacle and mine emplacement. 

(6) Obstacle tracking and information flow to inform friendly forces of friendly 

and enemy barrier, obstacle, and minefield locations using the standard report formats. 
 Land Operations 

III-13 

f. Defensive Employment. During defensive planning, the JFC, through the joint 

force staff, identifies priority locations and plans and coordinates the joint emplacement of 

barriers, obstacles, and minefields. The JFC must proactively define the methodology that 

subordinate commanders use to both track obstacle emplacement and to report the status 

of their defensive systems. Under some circumstances, the JFC may designate the systems 

that subordinate commanders use for emplacement. For operations outside the Korean 

Peninsula, this is especially important when subordinate commanders of PNs are not party 

to the Ottawa Convention and may employ APLs. The primary intent of defensive barrier, 

obstacle, and MIW employment is to degrade enemy capabilities by disrupting combat 

formations and their movement, interfering with C2, and confusing enemy commanders. 

The secondary intent is to destroy or attrit enemy forces. Key factors for consideration in 

defensive employment are as follows: 

(1) Current enemy situation, capabilities, intent, and probable COAs. 

(2) Confirmation of where the maneuver commander has designated engagement 

areas and intends to engage the enemy. 

(3) Confirmation of the scheme of maneuver for the defense. 

(4) Accurate terrain analysis to determine where friendly forces are vulnerable to 

enemy attack. 

(5) Preplanning, deconfliction, and coordination with other components. 

Logistics planning must provide for replacement of special equipment and materials to 

support breaching operations. 
Chapter III 

III-14 JP 3-15 

(6) C2 of obstacle and mine emplacement. 

(7) Information flow to inform friendly forces of friendly and enemy barrier, 

obstacle, and minefield locations using the standard report formats. 

(8) Integration of barrier, obstacle, and minefield emplacement complements the 

plan for defense. 

(9) Emplacement of nonpersistent minefields and other time- or labor-intensive 

obstacles before the beginning of hostilities in order to reduce the exposure to enemy fire. 

(10) Preplanned employment of scatterable minefields throughout the 

operational environment. The choice of scatterable systems is mission-dependent. Ground 

emplaced mine scattering systems are best for rapidly emplacing large minefields in 

friendly controlled areas. Artillery or aircraft-delivered systems are employed throughout 

the battlefield. The appropriateness of artillery or aircraft delivery systems varies 

depending on the threat conditions and other mission priorities. For operations outside the 

Korean Peninsula, the only air-delivered scatterable mines available for employment are 

the helicopter-delivered AVL Volcano. However, organic systems should be employed 

whenever possible. 

(11) The timetable for friendly operations may be upset or cause incidents of 

friendly fire if the wrong self-destruct settings are used. Emplacement of nonpersistent 

scatterable minefields is not nearly as labor-intensive as the old conventional munitions, 

but the planning has to be precise for their placement and the time duration set on the 

munitions for the self-destruct time of four hours, 48 hours, or 15 days. 

(12) Obscurants, used as a limited obstacle to canalize or slow advancing enemy 

forces. When combined with barriers, obstacles, and/or minefields, obscurants can 

enhance the vulnerability of enemy forces by limiting their visual, target-acquisition, and 

intelligence-gathering capabilities. 

g. Other Considerations. The overriding consideration in planning obstacles is 

accomplishment of the mission. However, there are three considerations that are key to 

the military mission. 

(1) Legal Restrictions. The creation and employment of countermobility 

barriers, obstacles, and mines must comply with the law of war, international law, and US 

law and policy. The JFC will ensure that the staff judge advocate is integrated throughout 

the planning process and that countermobility plans—especially those involving the 

emplacement of mines—receive a final legal review prior to execution. 

(2) Obstacle-Clearing Operations at the Cessation of Hostilities. Obstacleclearing operations continued for years in Kuwait following the end of the 1990-1991 

Persian Gulf War, largely due to a lack of accurate minefield records by the defending Iraqi 

forces. Iraqi mines and minefields continued to threaten civilians long after hostilities were 

concluded and caused numerous casualties to military and civilian personnel. Accurate 
 Land Operations 

III-15 

reporting, recording, and tracking will not only minimize friendly fire incidents but also 

expedite clearing operations when peace is restored. 

For a general discussion of clearing (route and area) operations, see ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 

3-17.8, Combined Arms Mobility Operations. For a discussion of clearing TTP, see FM 

3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D, Explosive Hazards Operations; FM 3-34.214/MCRP 3-17.7L, 

Explosives and Demolitions; and FM 3-90.119, Combined Arms Improvised Explosive 

Device Defeat Operations. See also Appendix C, “Humanitarian Mine Action,” for more 

discussion. 

(3) Impacts of Obstacles on Civilians and Their Environment. Obstacles 

frequently modify terrain through demolition, excavation, and other means. Some obstacle 

actions, such as destroying levees, setting fires, felling trees in forested areas, or 

demolishing bridges, may have immediate adverse impacts on civilians and often will have 

long-term effects on them and the environment and are governed by the law of war. 

Commanders must minimize the impact of obstacles on civilians and the environment if 

militarily possible. For example, if the enemy can be prevented from using a bridge by 

means other than demolishing it, commanders may choose the less damaging COA. Efforts 

should be undertaken to mark minefields to prevent harm to civilians. Commanders must 

avoid unnecessary destruction of farmland or forests or pollution of water sources when 

creating obstacles. Care exercised by commanders will alleviate long-term negative effects 

on civilians, friendly forces, and the environment. Moreover, application of the principles 

of proportionality and military necessity are legal requirements under the law of war. 

4. Command and Control 

a. Planning. Commanders and staffs consider both friendly and enemy use of 

obstacles when planning operations. At the tactical level, assured mobility planning brings 

focus to mobility, countermobility, and survivability task planning in support of breaching, 

clearing, and gap crossing operations. At the tactical level, commanders focus on 

identifying the scheme of maneuver that must be supported by mobility and/or 

countermobility efforts. At the operational level, countermobility planning focuses on 

granting obstacle emplacement authority or providing obstacle control. At each level, 

commanders include obstacle planning in the decision-making process. This ensures that 

a combined arms approach to mobility operations, as well as countermobility obstacle 

integration, is effective in support of the maneuver plan. Obstacle tracking must be an 

integral part of initial and subsequent planning. 

b. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance is performed before, during, and after mobility 

operations to provide information used in the planning process, as well as by the 

commander and staff to formulate, confirm, or modify the COA. The information gathered 

through reconnaissance, other geospatial products, and terrain analysis supports the 

mobility operation. Tactical reconnaissance supporting mobility operations should focus 

on obstacle information. This information collection effort includes all tasks to detect the 

presence of enemy (and natural) obstacles, determine their types and dimensions, and 

provide the necessary information to plan appropriate combined arms breaching, clearance, 

or bypass operations to negate the impact on the friendly scheme of maneuver. Tactical 
Chapter III 

III-16 JP 3-15 

reconnaissance also allows friendly forces to anticipate when and where the enemy may 

employ obstacles that could impede operations, as well as verify the condition of natural 

or other man-made obstacles. 

c. Control Means. The purpose of obstacle control is to synchronize subordinate 

obstacle efforts with the commander’s intent and scheme of maneuver. Commanders 

exercise obstacle control by granting or withholding obstacle emplacement authority or 

restricting obstacles through orders or other specific guidance. However, commanders 

must be cognizant that lack of obstacle control measures may result in obstacles that 

interfere with the higher commander’s scheme of maneuver, while excessive obstacle 

control may result in a lack of obstacles that support the refined fire plans of subordinate 

commanders. Commanders and staffs consider width, depth, and time when they conduct 

obstacle-control planning. The following considerations guide this planning: 

(1) Support current operations. 

(2) Maximize subordinate flexibility. 

(3) Facilitate future operations. 

d. Reporting, Recording, and Marking

(1) Intelligence concerning enemy minefields is reported by the fastest means 

available. Spot reports (SPOTREPs) are the tactical commander’s most common source 

of minefield intelligence. They originate from patrols that have been sent on specific 

minefield reconnaissance missions or from units that have discovered mine information in 

the course of their normal operations. The information is transmitted to higher 

headquarters and tracked in joint minefield and obstacle databases. 

(2) Lane or bypass marking is a critical component of obstacle reduction. 

Effective lane marking allows commanders to project forces through an obstacle quickly, 

with combat power and C2 intact. It gives an assault force and follow-on forces confidence 

in the safety of the lane and helps prevent unnecessary casualties. 

ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8, Combined Arms Mobility Operations, provides detailed 

discussions of marking operations. 
IV-1 

CHAPTER IV 

MARITIME OPERATIONS 

1. General Discussion 

a. General. Naval MIW consists of the strategic, operational, and tactical 

employment of sea mines and mine countermeasures (MCM). MIW is divided into two 

categories: the emplacement of mines to degrade the enemy’s capabilities to wage land, 

air, and maritime warfare, and the countering of enemy mining capability or emplaced 

mines in order to permit friendly maneuver. Naval MIW has played a significant role in 

every major armed conflict involving the US since the Revolutionary War. Mines can be 

inexpensive, easy to procure, reliable, effective, and difficult for intelligence agencies to 

track. More than 50 of the world’s navies have mine emplacing capability, while a 

considerable number of countries, many of which are known mine exporters, actively 

engage in development and manufacture of new models. Although many of these 

stockpiled mines are relatively old, they remain lethal and can often be upgraded. 

b. As adversaries have pursued irregular means, they have introduced the IED threat 

to the maritime domain. Boats laden with explosives or WBIEDs can be used against ships 

and areas connected to water. An early example of this type was the Japanese Shinyo 

suicide boats during World War II. These explosive-laden boats were successful in 

damaging or sinking several American ships. More recently, suicide bombers used a 

WBIED to attack the USS COLE in the port of Aden. In Iraq, US and United Kingdom 

troops have been killed by WBIEDs. The proliferation of WBIED knowledge continues 

to spread in extremist networks. A further use of minefields by adversaries is to accentuate 

the effectiveness of other weapons and thereby provide a suitable environment for their use 

rather than a primary weapon. This may be achieved by using minefields to channel 

shipping into selected killing areas or restrict their maneuverability. 

c. Naval MIW employs a broad approach, incorporating offensive and defensive 

aspects of MIW. National and military objectives can sometimes be achieved without 

clearing or even breaching adversary minefields. If US forces can prevent mines from 

being employed, bypass adversary minefields, or restrict the enemy to deploying only 

tactically insignificant minefields, then US objectives are more easily achieved. 

d. Legal Considerations in the Employment of Mines. The use of naval mines is 

governed by Hague Convention VIII of 1907, which limits the type, method of use, and 

tactics used by nations employing mines. Other international agreements, as well as US 

and allied peacetime ROE and ROE during armed conflict, constrain their use. All joint 

commanders involved in MIW, whether mining, MCM, or both, should be familiar with 

these legal considerations. A more detailed discussion of international law relative to naval 

mines is contained in NWP 3-15, Naval Mine Warfare. 

“The clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the 

enemy’s will to be imposed on him.” 

Sun Tzu, The Art of War
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-15 

2. Naval Mine Warfare Command and Control 

a. JFC. Naval MIW is an enabler of joint force operations. The JFC is supported in 

MIW by the Navy component commander (NCC), or, if assigned, a combined or joint force 

maritime component commander (JFMCC). 

b. NCC or JFMCC. The NCC or JFMCC staff supports the JFC with all operationallevel military operations at sea, including MIW. As such, the NCC staff should integrate 

MIW into their planning. The Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center 

(SMWDC) maintains a deployable staff to provide phased, scalable MIW expertise and 

support to NCCs. 

c. Mine Warfare Commander (MIWC). The MIWC is a supporting warfare 

commander to the NCC or the officer in tactical command and is the commander’s primary 

advisor on all aspects of MIW—both mining and MCM. SMWDC can serve as the MIWC 

and perform the MIW functions in support of the NCC. 

d. Mine Countermeasures Commander (MCMC). The MCMC is the supporting 

commander to the MIWC or designated commander for MCM within an assigned area. 

Depending on the extent of operations and geography, it is conceivable to have multiple 

MCMCs under the coordination of a single MIWC. United States Navy (USN) mine 

countermeasures squadrons (MCMRONs) fulfill the MCMC role, and are the preferred 

choice for MCM planning and force C2. The MCMC controls the operations of MCM 

assets (surface mine countermeasures [SMCM] vessels, airborne mine countermeasures 

[AMCM] squadrons and detachments, and underwater mine countermeasures [UMCM] 

elements) in the operational area. 

3. Environmental Considerations 

a. Mine cases, mine sensors, target signals, and MCM systems are all impacted by 

environmental factors and impact the selection of equipment and procedures. 

b. Influence of the Environment. Mines are effective in proportion to the suitability 

of the environment for both weapons delivery and deployment after mine placement. 

Environmental factors that should be considered when deciding to conduct exploratory and 

reconnaissance operations, as well as employment techniques, are provided in Figure IV-1. 

4. Elements of Naval Mine Warfare 

MIW can be divided into the subdisciplines of mining and MCM. These are further 

divided into various areas, depicted in Figure IV-2, and discussed in paragraph 5, 

“Mining,” and paragraph 6, “Mine Countermeasures.” 

5. Mining 

Mining supports establishing and maintaining control of essential sea areas. Mining 

includes all methods that use naval mines to deny sea area or inflict damage on adversary 

shipping to hinder, disrupt, and deny adversary operations. 
 Maritime Operations 

IV-3 

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS IN NAVAL MINE WARFARE

Category Factors Major Operation Impact

Coastal 

topography 

and landmarks 

Marginal topography, natural and 

man-made landmarks, aircraft 

flight path hazards, shoals, and 

other underwater hazards to 

surface craft 

Navigational control, accuracy flight restrictions, 

and pattern controls 

Atmospheric 

characteristics 

Climatic conditions, duration of 

darkness and light, visibility, air 

temperature, winds, precipitation, 

storm frequency, and icing 

conditions 

All operational limitations and restrictions common 

to adverse atmospheric conditions, platform and 

equipment selection, force level requirements, and 

logistic concerns 

Water depth Bathymetry, seasonal storms, 

river run-off 

Extent of operational area in relation to mine type 

to be countered, choice of countermeasures, 

platforms, gear and tactics; limits to diver 

employment 

Sea and surf Sea and swell condition, surf 

characteristics 

Operational limits for surface craft, explosive 

ordnance disposal personnel, and mine 

countermeasures equipment; actuation probability 

for pressure mines; rate and direction of sweep or 

hunt; mine detection capability 

Currents Surface and subsurface current 

patterns, including tidal, surf, and 

riverine-originated currents 

Navigation and maneuver of displacement craft 

and towed equipment; navigational error; diver 

operation limitations; effect on mine burial 

Ice conditions Thickness and extent of sea ice Modify, restrict, or preclude operations depending 

on extent and thickness of ice 

Water column 

properties 

Water temperature, salinity, and 

clarity 

Temperature effects on diver operations; ability to 

visually, acoustically, or optically locate moored or 

bottom mines; temperature/salinity compilation of 

conductivity for magnetic sweep; sonar depth and 

effectiveness 

Seabed 

characteristics 

Bottom roughness, material, 

strength, stability, and “clutter” 

Decision to employ minehunting techniques; 

limitations on mechanical sweep gear; extent to 

which a mine will bury 

Acoustic 

environment 

Sound velocity profile, acoustic 

propagation/attenuation, acoustic 

scattering, and reverberation 

Sonar settings, ranges, and effectiveness, acoustic 

sweep path and sweep safety, number of minelike 

contacts, and sonar hunting efficiency 

Magnetic 

environment 

Electrical conductivity, number of 

magnetic minelike contacts, 

ambient magnetic background 

Ability to employ open electrode sweeps; extent 

and strength of magnetic field established by 

magnetic sweep gear; number of minelike targets 

limiting magnetic hunt efficiency; effectiveness of 

magnetometer detectors 

Pressure 

environment 

Natural pressure fluctuations due 

to wave action 

Actuation probability for pressure mines and, 

hence, the selection of conventional or guinea pig 

sweep techniques 

Biologic 

environment 

Bio-fouling conditions, hazardous 

marine life 

Ability to detect and classify mines visually or with 

sonar; marine life presenting potential hazard to 

divers 

Figure IV-1. Environmental Considerations in Naval Mine Warfare 

a. Mining Objectives. In MIW, mining has application in all phases of joint 

operations. US mining can be employed to reduce the adversary’s threat to friendly forces 

and preserve freedom of action. Mining is essential to other warfare areas, particularly 

strike, antisubmarine, and antisurface warfare. Sea mines, or the threat of their presence, 

may restrict enemy use of sea areas vital to their operations. Conversely, mines may be 

used to protect friendly harbors, channels, and shores. Delays and interruptions in the 

shipping of war materiel may deprive the enemy of critical offensive and defensive 
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-15 

capabilities. Enemy ships confined to their bases or deterred in transit by mining operations 

contribute less to the war effort, and delays in shipping may be as costly as actual losses. 

b. US Mining Policy. In war, US policy is to conduct offensive, defensive, and 

protective mining as necessary. The decision to employ mines is typically made by the 

CCDR or higher authority, depending on ROE. Mines can reduce the enemy threat by 

destroying and disrupting their operations, interdicting enemy SLOCs and ports to 

neutralize or destroy combatant and merchant ships, and by defending US and allied 

shipping. More specifically, naval mines aid in sea control in conjunction with other forces 

to: 

(1) Deter enemy use of naval mines. 

(2) Deny enemy use of designated ocean areas, ports, or waterways for 

diplomatic, economic, or military purposes. 

(3) Influence enemy maneuver and direction or otherwise restricting the enemy’s 

movements to buttress the operational effectiveness of friendly forces. 

(4) Protect ports; coastal lines of passage; open preplanned shipping lanes, 

referred to as Q-routes; and designated operating areas. 

(5) Destroy enemy ships and submarines directly. 

(6) Establish blockades to provide political leverage in a limited war situation. 

Figure IV-2. Elements of Naval Mine Warfare 

Elements of Naval Mine Warfare

Mine Warfare

Mining

Active Passive

Offensive

Minehunting Locate 

Threat

Defensive Offensive

Minesweeping Localize 

Threat

Defensive

Mine 

Countermeasures

Protective

Neutralization Reduce 

Platform Risk
 Maritime Operations 

IV-5 

(7) Deny the enemy the ability to carry out amphibious operations, or in support 

of friendly amphibious operations. 

c. Mining Assets. Mining is generally conducted by United States Air Force (USAF) 

or USN strike aircraft. Submarines and surface ships can also be configured to emplace 

mines. Given the joint warfare aspects of mining, the NCC’s MIW staff will work in 

coordination with the operations and intelligence directorates of a joint staff. 

For additional information on naval mining capabilities, refer to Appendix B, “Service 

Specific Considerations,” and NTTP 3-15.1, Maritime Mining. 

6. Mine Countermeasures 

MCM is the second area of MIW. MCM includes all actions to prevent enemy mines 

from altering friendly forces’ maritime plans, operations, or maneuver. MCM reduces the 

threat of mines and the effects of enemy-emplaced sea mines on friendly naval force and 

seaborne logistics force access to and transit of selected waterways. 

a. MCM operations are divided into offensive and defensive MCM (see Figure IV-3). 

(1) Offensive MCM. The most effective means of countering a mine threat is to 

prevent the emplacement of mines in the first place. Offensive MCM deters or destroys 

enemy mining capability before the mines are emplaced. Although essential to offensive 

MCM, these operations are not normally conducted by naval MIW forces. Given the 

significant impact that enemy mines can have on the JFC’s CONOPS, the JFC and MIW 

Figure IV-3. Maritime Mine Countermeasures 

Maritime Mine Countermeasures

Offensive

Prevent the emplacement of mines through destroying enemy mine:

Defensive

Counter mines once they have been emplaced through:

Passive mine countermeasures

Active mine countermeasures







Manufacturing facilities

Storage facilities

Emplacing platforms







Localization of threat utilizing Q-routes

Detection and avoidance of minefields

Risk reduction





Minehunting

Minesweeping
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-15 

planners should consider inclusion of enemy mine layer, mine storage, and, ultimately, 

mine production facilities and assets on joint target lists. 

(2) Defensive MCM. Defensive countermeasures counter mines after they are 

emplaced. MCM can be conducted following the termination of conflict to eliminate or 

reduce the threat to shipping posed by residual sea mines. However, most defensive MCM 

operations are conducted in support of other maritime operations, such as sea control or 

power projection. Defensive MCM includes passive and active MCM. 

(a) Passive MCM reduces the threat from emplaced mines without 

physically attacking the mines through reduction of ship susceptibility to mine actuation. 

Three primary passive measures are localization of the threat, detection and avoidance of 

the minefield, and risk reduction. 

1. Localization of the threat is aided by the establishment of a system of 

transit routes for friendly forces. These routes may be designated as Q-routes, to be used 

by friendly shipping to minimize exposure in potentially mined waters. Establishment of 

transit routes should be one of the first steps taken by MCM planners, if routes have not 

been designated previously. 

2. Detection and avoidance of minefields is enabled by exploiting 

intelligence information and MCM efforts. When mine location has been established, 

shipping may be routed around the area. 

3. Risk reduction consists primarily of ship self-protection measures 

rather than external MCM activity. Risk may be reduced by limiting interaction with a 

mine sensor. Against contact mines, a reduction in draft and posting additional lookouts 

can reduce the number of mines the ship’s hull strikes. Reducing the ship’s emissions also 

reduces activation signals for many influence mines. Use of on-board magnetic field 

reduction equipment or external degaussing, silencing a ship to minimize radiated noise, 

or using minimum speeds to reduce pressure signature are examples of operational risk 

reduction. Enhancement of ship survivability in the event of mine detonation is another 

form of risk reduction. 

(b) Active MCM is employed when passive countermeasures alone cannot 

protect shipping traffic. This entails physical interference with the explosive function of 

the mine or actually destroying it. Minehunting and minesweeping are the primary 

techniques employed in active MCM. Both are enabled by detailed intelligence and 

planning by the MCMC. Due to the nature of the MCM mission and forces involved, local 

air and maritime superiority is normally required for successful MCM operations. 

1. Minehunting. Minehunting is the employment of sensor and 

neutralization systems, whether air, surface, or subsurface, to locate and dispose of 

individual mines. Minehunting is conducted to eliminate mines in a known field when 

sweeping is not feasible or desirable, or to verify the presence or absence of mines in a 

given area. When mines are located, mine neutralization is performed through the use of 

systems such as remote-controlled vehicles, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) divers, or 
 Maritime Operations 

IV-7 

marine mammal systems. Minehunting poses less risk to MCM forces, covers an area more 

thoroughly, and provides a higher probability of mine detection than minesweeping. 

2. Minesweeping. Minesweeping is conducted by either surface craft 

or helicopters and involves the towing of mechanical or influence sweep systems. 

Mechanical sweeping employs specially equipped cables to sever moored mine cables so 

that the mines float to the surface, where they can be destroyed by EOD divers. Influence 

sweeping involves the use of towed or streamed devices that emit signals emulating target 

ships to trigger influence mines. 

b. Intelligence Support 

(1) Intelligence Gathering. Prior to MIW operations, intelligence may indicate 

the types, quantities, or locations of mine storage sites. This information can cue the 

surveillance of mine storage sites to detect the movement of mines. Intelligence of mine 

movement to mine emplacing platforms and the subsequent movement of the mine 

emplacing platforms can provide advance information to ascertain the type, size, and 

location of minefields. Where mining is a possible threat, tracking and intelligence 

collection should begin early and be sufficiently systematic to provide confident estimates 

of mine activity. 

(2) Mine Exploitation. MCMs are enabled by detailed knowledge of the mine 

sensor and targeting circuitry. Intelligence on enemy mine emplacement operations can 

help identify the type of sensor and style of target processing used. Accurate data can be 

acquired by actually exploiting a mine recovered during MCM operations. Exploitation 

may provide information on mine settings and mine modification intelligence. 

c. Planning Considerations. The MCM planning process starts with an estimate of 

the situation and a mission statement that is used to develop an MCM tasking order. Some 

aspects of the mission must be defined by the supporting commander. 

(1) Objectives. The mission statement includes an objective for active MCM, an 

acceptable risk factor, and a specific operational area. The MCMC shall choose a specific 

objective (see Figure IV-4). 

(a) Exploratory. Exploration determines whether mines are present. It is 

usually conducted immediately when an enemy minefield is suspected. 

(b) Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance operations rapidly assess the limits of 

a mined area and estimate the number and types of mines. 

(c) Breakthrough. The breakthrough objective is directed when open 

channels and staging areas for an amphibious operation or port break-in and/or break-out 

is rapidly required. The goal is to reduce the threat to friendly shipping passing through 

the mine threat area in the specified time available for MCM. 
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-15 

(d) Attrition. Attrition objectives call for continuous or frequent MCM 

efforts to keep the threat of mines to ship traffic as low as possible when traffic must 

continue to transit the mined waters for a comparatively long period of time. 

 (e) Clearing. Clearing removes as many mines as possible from the 

assigned area to reduce risk to friendly shipping to an acceptable risk. 

(2) Risk Directives. MCM techniques are more hazardous when used against 

certain mine types. To determine the proper MCM technique, the MCMC must be given 

direction regarding the maximum acceptable degree of risk to MCM forces, in addition to 

an operational objective. More restrictive time constraints increase the degree of risk. 

(3) MCM Asset Availability. MCM tactics are determined by the threat, 

environment, time, and available assets. The time required for MCM forces to arrive at the 

mined area and the time available for completion of MCM operations are key factors. 

AMCM forces can provide short-notice, rapid response to any mining threat. AMCM 

forces usually emphasize quick response capability over fully equipped response capability 

and stamina to maximize response capability. SMCM forces are often better equipped and 

have greater stamina, but have relatively slow transit speeds and longer response times. 

For long distances, heavy-lift ships can transport SMCM units to the area more quickly 

with reduced SMCM wear and tear. 

(4) Amphibious Operations. The preferred tactic for amphibious forces 

operating against countries or organizations employing coastal defenses is to avoid, bypass, 

Figure IV-4. Maritime Mine Countermeasure Mission Objectives 

Maritime Mine Countermeasure Mission Objectives

Exploratory

Reconnaissance

Breakthrough

Attrition

Clearing

Determine whether mines are present.

Make a rapid assessment of mined area limits, types of mines, and 

numbers.

Open channels and staging areas for amphibious operation or 

break-in and/or break-out of a port.

Make continuous or frequent efforts to minimize the threat of mines 

to ship traffic.

Attempt to remove all mines from assigned areas.
 Maritime Operations 

IV-9 

or exploit gaps in these defenses whenever possible. However, operational limitations may 

preclude this tactic and a breach of these defenses may be required. The capability to 

counter mines and obstacles is, therefore, essential to the conduct of amphibious 

operations. Coastal mining may interfere with littoral maneuver at sea, in the surf zone 

(SZ), and on the beach. Specifically, it may affect amphibious advance force operations 

and ship-to-shore movement, and could possibly hinder or preclude the maneuver of the 

LF ashore. To shape the operational environment in order to conduct the amphibious 

operation, MCM and amphibious breaching may be required. MCM forces will most likely 

be operating, at least initially, as part of an amphibious advance force during supporting 

operations. MCM and amphibious breaching must be synchronized within the overall 

amphibious force timeline. Planning a successful MCM or amphibious breach requires the 

combined efforts of the commander, amphibious task force (CATF), supported by the 

MCMC, and the commander, landing force (CLF). JFC, JFMCC, and CATF involvement 

may also be necessary to help ensure that sufficient MCM and breaching assets and their 

necessary support (includes protection and logistics while conducting MCM and breaching 

operations) are available. Early dialogue between these commanders will aid planners in 

identifying detailed mission requirements. These considerations include: 

(a) Intelligence Efforts. A collection plan to support amphibious operations 

is a joint effort of the amphibious task force intelligence organizations. Intelligence efforts 

should identify the type and location of mine threats in the AOA, AOA characteristics, 

enemy locations, and obstacles in the SZ and beyond. 

(b) Synchronization. MCM and amphibious breaching operations require 

precise synchronization to maximize supporting arms and to minimize risks to friendly 

forces. The LF scheme of maneuver and CONOPS ashore drive the ship-to-shore 

movement requirements, which in turn determine the general location and number of lanes. 

Lane requirements and obstacle construction will influence the size and composition of the 

breach force. Reverse planning should be used to synchronize actions at the obstacles with 

actions on the objective. 

(c) Breaching Fundamentals. Suppression, obscuration, security, 

reduction, and assault are applied to amphibious breaching operations against obstacles 

under direct enemy observation and fire. 

(d) Organization. The amphibious forces are organized to quickly and 

effectively reduce obstacles and expedite LF movement to the objective. Forces are 

generally task-organized into support, breach, and assault organizations. 

(e) C2. Unity of command is critical to MCM and amphibious breaching 

operations. The CATF and the CLF share responsibility for MCM. The line of 

demarcation for their respective areas of responsibility for MCM depends on topographic, 

hydrographic, meteorological, and tactical conditions of the AOA. As in other areas of 

amphibious warfare where the CATF and the CLF share planning responsibility, this line 

of demarcation should be identified during joint planning. The CATF is responsible for 

MIW in the sea areas of the operational area. This includes the planning and execution of 

all facets of MIW (working through the MIWC or MCMC as assigned) and providing the 
Chapter IV 

IV-10 JP 3-15 

logistics support and force protection for MCM assets. The CATF conducts assault 

breaching operations from shallow water (SW) through the SZ and onto the beach, up to 

point or line of demarcation on the beach. The CLF conducts mine and obstacle breaching 

and clearing operations landward from the CATF and the CLF mutually agreed upon line 

of demarcation on the beach, and for follow-on clearance operations on the beach. 

Refer to MCWP 3-31.2/NWP 3-15, Naval Mine Warfare; MCRP 3-31.2A/NTTP 3-15.24, 

Mine Countermeasures in Support of Amphibious Operations; ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-

17.8, Combined Arms Mobility Operations; NTTP 3-02.1M/MCWP 3-31.5, Ship-to-Shore 

Movement; and JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations, for more information on MCM and 

breaching support to amphibious operations. 

(5) Support Requirements. Deployed MCM ships, helicopters, and EOD units 

are not self-sustaining. Communications; ordnance; recompression chambers; supply; 

personnel support; and petroleum, oils, and lubricants must be provided for these units. In 

addition, ships will require magnetic and acoustic calibration range services and 

intermediate maintenance support. Helicopter units will require hangar space, 

maintenance, and support equipment, either afloat or ashore depending upon the specific 

operation. Support may be provided to ships and EOD units by an assigned MCM support 

ship or an adjacent shore facility. Helicopter support may be provided by an adjacent 

airfield or by an air-capable MCM support ship. When operating near hostile enemy areas, 

force protection requirements exist for all MCM platforms. 

Minesweeping is a method of active maritime countermeasure and is conducted by either 

surface craft or helicopter. 
 Maritime Operations 

IV-11 

(6) Control Measures and Reporting. The MCM operations report is used to 

exchange MCM tactical information between all components and joint headquarters. It 

provides the location and status of Service component MCM operations, including 

breaching and clearing. It is also used to request, task, plan, report, modify, and approve 

MCM operations, as appropriate. The report format is specified in Military Standard-6040, 

US Message Text Formatting Program, and listed in Appendix A, “Land Forces Reports.” 

(a) Structured Operation Tasking MIW Support. The operation task 

(OPTASK) series of structured messages provides functional warfare area (e.g., MIW, 

strike, communications) specific policy and guidance. SMWDC prepares and submits the 

USN-wide OPTASK MIW message and subsequent updates or changes to Third Fleet for 

review and promulgation by Commander, United States Fleet Forces Command 

(USFF)/Commander, United States Pacific Fleet (COMUSPACFLT) (SMWDC and 

Commander, Mobile Mine Assembly Group, provide input to the standing USN-wide 

OPTASK message for mining operations). The standing USN-wide OPTASK MIW 

should be supplemented by numbered fleet commanders regarding mission and area of 

operations specifics, including issuance of fleet-level OPTASK MIW and/or MCM 

addressing unique theater characteristics, command relationships, and operational-tactical 

direction. Prior to the commencement of an operation or exercise, an OPTASK MCM will 

normally be issued to the MCMC by the appropriate operational control authority. When 

required, the MCMC will prepare an additional OPTASK MCM to provide specific 

information to assigned MCM forces and any supported or supporting forces. 

(b) Mine Report. The mine countermeasure report (MCMREP) is used by 

individual MCM organizations or a commander, task unit, to report results of MCM 

operations. The MCMC will specify the frequency for MCM assets or commander, task 

unit, to submit MCMREPs. 

Additional reports and reporting requirements for naval mining and countermeasures can 

be found in NWP 3-15, Naval Mine Warfare. 

d. Organizational Support 

(1) Coast Guard Defense Forces. Coast Guard Defense Forces East and West 

are commands established under the respective JFMCC to conduct maritime homeland 

defense missions for Commander, US Northern Command, and Commander, US Pacific 

Command, including support for domestic MIW operations. 

(2) SMWDC provides oversight of USN MIW programs and training and 

readiness of MIW forces that include AMCM, SMCM, UMCM, and MCMRONs, that can 

deploy on short notice to support CCDRs, as required. SMWDC supports these 

commanders in planning MCM exercises and operations. 

e. Operational Considerations. When an enemy minefield is encountered, a number 

of decisions must be made. If the minefield is not on a primary SLOC or operational route, 

the best action may be to warn and divert shipping around the area. If the minefield is in 

an essential area, the decision must be made as to what type of MCM to employ. The 
Chapter IV 

IV-12 JP 3-15 

number and types of mines, availability of MCM forces, and time will determine the type 

of MCM to employ. It may also be possible to counter a minefield in a critical area by 

sending forces over it (e.g., vertical envelopment or vertical resupply) rather than through 

or around it. 

(1) Integrated MCM Operations. Integrated MCM operations optimize 

available MCM assets and tactics to meet the needs of the mission. Consideration must be 

given to both mutual support and mutual interference. For example, support from MCM 

helicopters may significantly reduce the risk to SMCM vessels if shallow moored mines 

and sensitive influence mines are swept before the SMCM employment. However, if 

influence sweeping is performed concurrent with EOD operations, this presents risk to 

EOD divers in proximity as a result of sweep-generated mine detonations. The MCMC 

must plan operations to exploit the strong capabilities of each MCM element and schedule 

events to accomplish the mission in the most efficient manner consistent with the risk 

directive. 

(2) Multinational Force Coordination. Operations against enemy mining are 

often carried out by a multinational MCM effort. MCM operations may be conducted by 

several national forces in close proximity. To conduct such operations safely and 

efficiently, agreements to coordinate operational areas and communications, as a 

minimum, must be established to prevent mutual interference. 

(3) Q-Routes and Route Survey. The Q-route system is a preplanned set of 

shipping routes that can be activated partially or totally by the area commander after 

determining that mining is imminent or has occurred. Activating Q-routes minimizes the 

area an MCMC has to clear to provide safe passage for shipping and reduces the force 

required to conduct MCM. Survey operations are conducted along Q-routes during 

peacetime to determine if the route is favorable for minehunting. If it is not, a change of 

route may be required. Once established, the route is surveyed to collect environmental 

and contact data to support wartime operations. The route is periodically surveyed to 

locate, evaluate, and catalog contacts and environmental changes. This database can be 

used in conflict to determine if mining has occurred and, if it has, to reduce the time 

required to clear the route. 

For additional information on naval MCM capabilities, refer to Appendix B, “Service 

Specific Capabilities.” 

7. Service Considerations 

a. Army-Navy. Naval MIW includes mining and MCM in all sea areas, the littoral 

operating area in an amphibious operation to include the SZ and the beach (as determined 

in the planning process), and in certain cases may extend inland where waters are navigable 

from the sea. In short, if maritime assets are capable of conducting MCM in any waterway 

where Army craft need to navigate, it is likely that the NCC or JFMCC will be directed to 

clear those mines. A mining threat in the US, at choke points along SLOCs, or at ports of 

debarkation, can delay or completely halt the movement of material required to support 

overseas operations or campaigns. Commanders, confronted by a mining threat, will 
 Maritime Operations 

IV-13 

request MCM assets through the CCDR. In some cases, combined MCM forces or forces 

from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or other allied nations may, after appropriate 

national coordination, provide MCM. 

b. Air Force-Navy. The USAF plays two important roles in supporting MIW forces 

(in addition to supporting offensive MCM). First, USAF bomber aircraft can deliver large 

quantities of mines per sortie at long distances from their bases, playing a critical part in 

accomplishing mining plans directed by joint commands. USAF aircraft are also a key 

component of the joint direct attack munition assault breaching system in support of 

amphibious operations. The second USAF role is the Air Mobility Command’s (AMC’s) 

deployment of AMCM and UMCM forces, and MIW C2 elements and the continuing 

delivery of critical repair parts via AMC aircraft. Under US Transportation Command 

direction, AMC integrates its effort in support of MCM with heavy sealift of SMCM 

platforms or personnel and materiel. 

c. Marine Corps-Navy. During amphibious operations, MCM at sea—whether in 

the deep or SW where amphibious warfare ships and their escorts operate, or in the very 

shallow water (VSW) and SZ where assault craft bring troops and weapons to the beach—

is conducted by a Navy MCMC. Normally, the MCMC is a subordinate and supporting 

commander to the CATF. MCM in the sea areas will be performed by a combination of 

the “MCM triad” of SMCM, AMCM, and UMCM assets; MCM in the VSW will be 

performed by UMCM. When insertion of US Marine Corps forces (other than those 

already embarked on amphibious shipping) is accomplished by airlift of personnel to a 

permissive location where they can be united with equipment stored on maritime prepositioning ships squadron (MPSRON) ships, USN MCM assets may be required to assure 

access to seaports of debarkation for the use of those MPSRON vessels. In some situations 

the MPSRON ships will join the amphibious ships and be supported by MCM forces to 

establish logistics over-the-shore operations. 

d. United States Coast Guard (USCG). The Commanders, Atlantic and Pacific 

Coast Guard areas, are USCG flag officers who are also designated Commanders, Coast 

Guard Defense Forces East and West, respectively, for the joint force maritime component 

commands US Northern Command and US Pacific Command. USCG area commanders 

assign appropriate USCG forces to the JFMCC to support MIW operations. USCG assets 

are frequently included in exercises where mining and MCM are involved. Prior to 

initiating mining and MCM exercises in areas that are not regular USN operational areas, 

the Commander, Mine Warfare Command, must establish liaison with Commander, Coast 

Guard Defense Forces East or West, as appropriate. Commander, Coast Guard Defense 

Forces East or West, will notify subordinate USCG commands and coordinate USCG 

participation/support as required. USCG Juniper class buoy tenders may be used to 

conduct survey operations in a number of scenarios using portable side-scan sonar 

equipment. USCG assets will likely support route survey and MCM forces conducting 

MIW operations in US territorial waters in times of conflict. 

For additional information on naval mining capabilities, refer to Appendix B, “Service 

Specific Capabilities.” 
Chapter IV 

IV-14 JP 3-15 

8. Navy Salvage Support 

Navy salvage operations support the establishment and maintenance of ports and 

LOCs during military operations. This support may include, but is not limited to, 

port/harbor clearance, towing/heavy lift operations, the emergency repair of combatant 

vessels aground to towing damaged vessels to an established safe zone for repair or 

reconstitution. It may also include the removal of material from a sunken aircraft or vessel 

in order to limit the exposure of classified material to enemy forces and to clear a navigation 

channel or pier access. 

For more information on Navy salvage capabilities, see NWP 4-12, Navy Salvage 

Operations.
A-1 

APPENDIX A 

LAND FORCES REPORTS 

Minefield reports will be submitted by the emplacing unit commanders through 

operations channels to the appropriate operations officer or operations directorate of a joint 

staff of the authorizing headquarters. That headquarters will integrate the reports with 

terrain analysis and disseminate them as tactical information. The reports should be sent 

by secure means. Once emplaced and activated, minefields are lethal and unable to 

distinguish between friendly forces and enemy. For this reason, positive control and 

continuous flow of information is necessary. Reporting, recording, and marking of 

minefields must be performed using methods that are consistent and well understood. 

1. Enemy/Friendly Unit/Minefield/Obstacle Report. Any detection, encounter, or 

knowledge of enemy minefields or mining activities must be reported by the fastest reliable 

means. The report is made to the next higher commander, and must include all known 

information about the minefield. 

General Instructions: Use to report all obstacles on the battlefield after developing a report.

Disseminate information and report to all command posts and units in the area of operation as soon

as possible. From FM 6-99, US Army Report and Message Formats: 

ENEMY/FRIENDLY/UNIT MINEFIELD/OBSTACLE REPORT 

LINE 1—DATE AND TIME_______________________________ (DTG) 

LINE 2—UNIT_________________________________________(unit making report) 

LINE 3—EMPLACING UNIT_____________________________ (emplacing unit, if known) 

LINE 4—APPROVING AUTHORITY_______________________ (approving authority, if required 

or known) 

LINE 5—TARGET/OBSTACLE NO._______________________ (target or obstacle number, if 

required or known) 

LINE 6—TYPE OF EMPLACING SYSTEM__________________ (type of emplacing system, if 

required or known) 

LINE 7—TYPE MINES/OBSTACLES______________________ (type of mine or obstacle, if 

known, include width and 

depth) 

LINE 8—TYPE MARKING SYSTEM_______________________ (type minefield or obstacle 

marking system, if emplaced) 

LINE 9—LIFE CYCLE DTG______________________________ (DTG of life cycle or selfdestruct time, if known) 

LINE 10—CORNER LOCATIONS_________________________ (UTM or six-digit grid 

coordinate with MGRS grid 

zone designator of corners) 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-15 

LINE 11—REDUCE____________________________________ (obstacle or minefield reduced:

YES or NO) 

LINE 12—NO. OF LANES_______________________________(number of lanes) 

LINE 13—REDUCTION ASSET USED_____________________ (MICLIC, mine plow, mine 

roller, demolitions, and so on) 

LINE 14—WIDTH______________________________________ (width of lane) 

LINE 15—DEPTH______________________________________(depth of lane) 

LINE 16—GRID TO START OF LANE______________________(UTM or six-digit grid 

coordinate with MGRS grid 

zone designator of start of lane 

[entrance]) 

LINE 17—GRID TO END OF LANE________________________ (UTM or six-digit grid 

coordinate with MGRS grid 

zone designator of end of lane 

[exit]) 

LINE 18—LANE MARKING______________________________ (type of marking system, if 

emplaced) 

LINE 19—BYPASS_____________________________________(YES or NO) 

LINE 20—BYPASS GRID________________________________(UTM or six-digit grid 

coordinate with MGRS grid 

zone designator to bypass) 

LINE 21—BARRIERS___________________________________(concertina wire, pickets, 

and/or trenches, and any other 

obstacle information 

necessary) 

LINE 22—NARRATIVE__________________________________(free text for additional 

information required for report 

clarification) 

LINE 23—AUTHENTICATION____________________________ (report authentication) 

DTG date-time group 

MGRS military grid reference system 

MICLIC mine clearing line charge 

NO. number 

UTM universal transverse mercator 

2. Scatterable Nonpersistent Minefield Reporting. Accurate, timely, and uniform 

reporting and dissemination of scatterable nonpersistent minefield emplacement 

information is a must. Fluid and fast-moving tactical situations require that complete 

information on scatterable nonpersistent mine employment be known and passed on in a 

simple, rapid manner to all units that could be affected. The variety of emplacing systems 
 Land Forces Reports 

A-3 

and emplacing units preclude the use of locally devised reporting and dissemination 

methods. Scatterable nonpersistent minefields must also be recorded to facilitate clearing 

of possible UXO/duds. Shown below is a relatively simple reporting procedure that will 

be used for scatterable nonpersistent mines. It is applicable for all delivery systems and 

can be sent in a voice, digital, or hard copy mode. As in FM 6-99, US Army Report and 

Message Formats: 

(a) Scatterable Minefield Warning 

General Instructions: Use to request authority to execute a planned scatterable minefield 

(SCATMINE) obstacle. Use the SCATMINREQ to request authority to plan a SCATMINE 

obstacle and the scatterable minefield report (SCATMINREC) to record an executed 

SCATMINE obstacle. 

SCATTERABLE MINEFIELD WARNING 

LINE 1—DATE AND TIME_______________________________ (DTG) 

LINE 2—UNIT_________________________________________(unit making report) 

LINE 3—TGT OR OBSTCL NO.___________________________(target or obstacle number) 

LINE 4—EMPLACING SYSTEM__________________________ (Emplacing System) 

LINE 5—ANTIVEHICULAR 

MINES______________________________ 

(YES or NO) 

LINE 6—ANTIPERSONNEL MINES_______________________ (YES or NO) Only authorized 

for employment on Korean 

Peninsula 

LINE 7—AIM POINTS__________________________________ (grid coordinates of aim points 

or corner points, if required, 

due to refinement when 

authorized) 

LINE 8—SAFETY ZONE________________________________ (size of safety zone) 

LINE 9—MINEFIELD MARKING__________________________ (type of marking) 

LINE 10—LIFE CYCLE__________________________________(DTG of life cycle planned) 

LINE 11—ACTIONS____________________________________ (actions taken by personnel 

involved) 

LINE 12—NARRATIVE__________________________________(free text for additional 

information required for report 

clarification) 

LINE 13—AUTHENTICATION____________________________ (report authentication) 

DTG date-time group 

NO. number 

OBSTCL obstacle 

TGT target 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-15 

(b) Scatterable Minefield Request 

General Instructions: Use to request authority to plan emplacement of SCATMINE. IAW unit SOPs

or the SCATMINE planning and execution policy, units will prepare and submit SCATMINREQ in

enough time to allow the request to be staffed at the appropriate level and approval or disapproval

returned to the requesting unit. Once a unit receives permission to plan a SCATMINE obstacle, it 

must still receive release authority before proceeding. This process is normally given when a

scatterable minefield warning (SCATMINWARN) is sent 30 minutes prior to execution and the

higher commander acknowledges and approves the release. Once the minefield is in place, a 

minefield/obstacle report (SCATMINREC) is sent to register the minefield. This is key, as the

minefield may be on a unit boundary or beyond the FLOT. As in FM 6-99, US Army Report and

Message Formats: 

SCATTERABLE MINEFIELD REQUEST [SCATMINREQ] 

LINE 1—DATE AND TIME_______________________________ (DTG) 

LINE 2—UNIT_________________________________________(unit making report) 

LINE 3—TGT OR OBSTCL NO.___________________________(target or obstacle number) 

LINE 4—EMPLACING SYSTEM__________________________ (emplacing system) 

LINE 5—ANTIVEHICULAR 

MINES______________________________ 

(YES or NO) 

LINE 6—ANTIPERSONNEL MINES_______________________ (YES or NO) Only authorized 

for employment on Korean 

Peninsula 

LINE 7—ATTITUDE____________________________________ (attitude of minefield) 

LINE 8—DIMENSIONS_________________________________ (DTG of life cycle planned) 

LINE 9—AIM POINTS__________________________________ (aim points or center point of 

the minefield) 

LINE 10—SAFETY ZONE_______________________________ (size of safety zone) 

LINE 11—MINEFIELD MARKING_________________________ (type of marking) 

LINE 12—UNIT OBSERVING____________________________ (unit observing) 

LINE 13—MISSION____________________________________ (task, purpose, and intent) 

LINE 14—LIFE CYCLE_________________________________ (DTG of life cycle planned) 

LINE 15—ACTIONS____________________________________(actions taken by personnel 

involved) 

LINE 16—NARRATIVE_________________________________ (free text for additional 

information required for report 

clarification) 
 Land Forces Reports 

A-5 

LINE 17—AUTHENTICATION____________________________ (report authentication) 

DTG date-time group 

NO. number 

OBSTCL obstacle 

SCATMINE scatterable mines 

TGT target 

(c) Scatterable Minefield Record 

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: Use to report emplacement of SCATMINE. IAW unit SOPs or

SCATMINE planning and execution policy, units will prepare and submit SCATMINREC in enough

time to allow the request to be disseminated to all affected units. Once executed, it is critical to 

report each obstacle as a separate SCATMINREC to ensure it gains immediate visibility. (Placing

SCATMINREC in the obstacle database, which is how most of the normal obstacles will be

reported, slows dissemination.) This is especially important if the obstacle is on a unit boundary or

beyond the FLOT. As in FM 6-99, US Army Report and Message Formats: 

SCATTERABLE MINEFIELD RECORD 

LINE 1—DATE AND TIME_______________________________ (DTG) 

LINE 2—UNIT_________________________________________ (unit making report) 

LINE 3—TGT OR OBSTCL NO.___________________________ (target or obstacle number) 

LINE 4—EMPLACING SYSTEM___________________________(emplacing system) 

LINE 5—ANTIVEHICULAR 

MINES______________________________ 

(YES or NO) 

LINE 6—ANTIPERSONNEL MINES________________________(YES or NO) Only authorized 

for employment on Korean 

Peninsula 

LINE 7—LIFE CYCLE___________________________________ (DTG of life cycle planned) 

LINE 8—AIM POINTS___________________________________(aim points or center point of 

the minefield) 

A.___________________________________________________(UTM or six-digit grid of one 

corner) 

B.___________________________________________________(UTM or six-digit grid of one 

corner) 

C.___________________________________________________(UTM or six-digit grid of one 

corner) 

D.___________________________________________________(UTM or six-digit grid of one 

corner) 
Appendix A 

A-6 JP 3-15 

LINE 9—EMPLACING___________________________________(unit emplacing mines and 

report number) 

LINE 10—SAFETY ZONE________________________________(size of safety zone) 

LINE 11—MINEFIELD MARKING__________________________(type of marking) 

LINE 12—APPROVING AUTHORITY_______________________(approving authority 

commander) 

LINE 13— REPORT POC _______________________________ (person completing this report)

LINE 14—ACTIONS____________________________________ (actions taken by personnel 

involved) 

**Repeat lines 3 through 14 to report multiple minefields. Assign sequential lines to succeeding 

iterations. For example, first iteration is 3 through 14; second iteration is 3a through 14a; third 

iteration is 3b through 14b; and so on. 

LINE 15—NARRATIVE__________________________________ (free text for additional 

information required for report 

clarification) 

LINE 16—AUTHENTICATION____________________________ (report authentication) 

DTG date-time group 

NO. number 

OBSTCL obstacle 

POC point of contact 

SCATMINE scatterable mines 

TGT target 

UTM universal transverse mercator 

3. UXO/ERW Reporting. The UXO SPOTREP is a detailed, swift, two-way 

reporting system that makes clear where the UXO hazard areas are, what their priorities 

are, and which units are affected by them. The report is used to request help in handling a 

UXO hazard that is beyond a unit’s ability to handle and that affects the unit’s mission. 

This report helps commanders set priorities based on the situation. The UXO SPOTREP 

is the first-echelon report that is sent when a UXO is encountered. The report consists of 

nine lines and is sent by the fastest means available. As in FM 4-30.51/MCRP 3-17.2A, 

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Procedures: 

LINE 1—DATE TIME GROUP______________________________ DTG item was discovered. 

LINE 2—REPORTING ACTIVITY___________________________ (Unit identification code) and 

location (grid of UXO). 

LINE 3—CONTACT METHOD_____________________________ Radio frequency, call sign, 

point of contact and 

telephone number. 

LINE 4—TYPE OF ORDNANCE____________________________ Dropped, projected, placed 

or thrown. If available, 

supply the subgroup. Give 

the size of the hazard area. 
 Land Forces Reports 

A-7 

LINE 5—CBRN CONTAMINATION__________________________Be as specific as possible. 

LINE 6—RESOURCES THREATENED______________________ Report any equipment, 

facilities, or other assets that 

are threatened. 

LINE 7—IMPACT ON MISSION____________________________ Provide a short description of 

current tactical situation and 

how the presence of UXO 

affects mission. 

LINE 8—PROTECTIVE MEASURES________________________ Describe any measures you 

have taken to protect 

personnel and equipment. 

LINE 9—RECOMMENDED PRIORITY_______________________ Recommend a priority for 

response by EOD or 

engineers. 

 
Appendix A 

A-8 JP 3-15 

Intentionally Blank 
B-1 

APPENDIX B 

SERVICE SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS 

1. Land Mobility Capabilities 

a. Operational Environment. The operational environment includes significant 

challenges to both mobility and maneuver. Potential challenges to maneuver range from 

conventional obstacles and mines employed in depth to booby traps, and other EHs 

employed in improvised and adaptive attacks. Adversaries may seek refuge in terrain that 

by its nature and remoteness challenges maneuver. They will use complex terrain and 

urban areas to disperse US and multinational forces and limit many of our capabilities. 

Support to movement and maneuver tends to be focused at the tactical and lower 

operational levels in support of combat maneuver. It is primarily related to forces operating 

on land. Mobility support is applicable at all echelons and for all military forces. The 

focus of this appendix is to provide a concise discussion of enemy countermobility 

capabilities and their employment of land mines and other EHs. It includes a discussion 

of the US units and potential capabilities to provide mobility and support to movement and 

maneuver against these countermobility capabilities. 

(1) Land Mines. Whether buried conventionally in patterns, emplaced on the 

surface in seemingly random fashion, or intentionally scattered, land mines will likely be 

present in prolific numbers on the battlefield. Potential adversaries with conventional 

military capabilities will employ large numbers of land mines to offset maneuver 

advantages. Highly developed adversaries may employ large numbers of scatterable 

mines. Less developed adversaries are likely to employ more persistent mines and other 

explosive obstacles in lieu of scatterable mines. Terrorists will obtain and employ land 

mines in any manner possible to inflict losses on our friendly forces as well as civilians. 

Their most likely choice will be EHs to include IEDs rather than mines, but their use of 

mines remains a very real possibility. The numbers and types of land mines available to 

potential adversaries are extensive and include APLs and AVLs with numerous types of 

firing mechanisms (see FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D, Explosive Hazards Operations;

Training Circular [TC] 20-32-3, Foreign Mine Handbook [Balkan States]; TC 20-32-4, 

Foreign Mine Handbook [Asia]; TC 20-32-5, Commander’s Reference Guide: Land Mine 

and Explosive Hazards [Iraq]). Conventional employment of mines will typically be 

integrated with other obstacles such as wire and tank ditches to create complex obstacles. 

(2) EHs. An EH is any hazard containing an explosive component. FM 3-

90.119, Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Operations, describes 

EHs currently encountered in five categories: UXO (including land mines), booby traps 

(some booby traps are nonexplosive), IEDs, captured enemy ammunition, and bulk 

explosives. Information in this manual focuses on the enemy’s employment of EHs as a 

direct challenge to friendly freedom of maneuver. IEDs and UXO are the two types of 

EHs that are of greatest concern for movement and maneuver. 

See FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D, Explosive Hazards Operations, for additional 

supporting information. 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-15 

(a) The IED System. IEDs are not a new phenomenon, but recent use of 

IEDs has greatly expanded the methods in which they are used and the types of materials 

used to create them, which poses an increasing challenge to US and friendly forces’ 

freedom of maneuver. The improvised version can be almost anything containing 

explosive material and initiator. It is an improvised device that is designed to cause death 

or injury by using explosives alone or in combination with other materials—to include 

projectiles, toxic chemicals, biological toxins, or radiological material. IEDs can be 

produced in varying sizes, functioning methods, containers, and delivery methods. 

Commercial or military explosives, homemade explosives, or military ordnance and 

ordnance components can be used to make them. IEDs are primarily conventional highexplosive charges, also known as homemade bombs. A chemical and biological agent, or 

even radiological material, may be included to create initial effects and the psychological 

effect of the device. They are unique because the IED builder has had to improvise with 

the materials at hand. Designed to defeat a specific target or type of target, they generally 

become more difficult to detect and protect against as they become more sophisticated. 

The sophistication of IEDs varies greatly from a crude design fabricated from common 

materials to premanufactured kits, and ranging in size from a cigarette pack to a large 

vehicle. IEDs can be detonated in numerous ways including radio control, 

heat/sound/motion sensor, command wire, and victim initiated. The degree of 

sophistication depends on the ingenuity of the designer and the tools and materials 

available. Cached, stockpiled munitions within the theater of operations may provide the 

explosive materials to would-be enemy bombers. In an IED environment, the information 

derived from the technical exploitation of IEDs is critical to development of force 

protection measures and to the conduct of attacking enemy networks. If time permits, EOD 

personnel should have the opportunity to render safe and process IEDs for technical 

exploitation. 

For more information on IEDs and countering IEDs, see JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised 

Explosive Device Operations.

(b) UXO. UXO includes ordnance items that have been fired, projected, 

dropped, or placed in such a way that they propose a hazard to personnel or property. 

Whether in an area by design or accident, these items have not yet fully functioned or 

detonated and are hazards. UXO poses the risk of injury or death to personnel but also can 

pose a challenge to maneuver along a key route or within a significant area. 

See ATTP 4-32.2/MCRP 3-17.2B/NTTP 3-02.4.1/AFTTP 3-2.12, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Unexploded Ordnance, and ATTP 4-32.16/MCRP 3-

17.2C/NTTP 3-02.5/AFTTP 3-2.32, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 

b. Staff Integration for Support to Movement and Maneuver. Each maneuver 

force echelon down to the BCT and the RCT level has organic staff capability (engineers; 

military police [MP]; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear [CBRN]; and others, 

such as EOD when augmented) to integrate their collective combat support (CS) mobility 

capabilities into the combined arms fight. These CS planners are the primary members of 

the battle staff responsible for understanding and integrating mobility capabilities to 
Service Specific Considerations 

B-3 

support movement and maneuver. Those capabilities may be organic to or augment the 

maneuver force. These staff members synchronize their collective capabilities to support 

the needs of the maneuver commander and enable movement and maneuver for the force. 

c. Mobility Units and Capabilities 

(1) Army 

(a) Organic Mobility Units and Capabilities. The Army is a brigade-based 

force. The major combat and support capabilities a brigade needs for most operations are 

organic to its structure. Each BCT has an organic combat engineer battalion with combat 

and general engineering capabilities, as well as engineers on staff to provide geospatial 

engineer expertise and engineer planning capability. See JP 3-34, Joint Engineer 

Operations, for more information about these units and their capabilities. Other mobility 

support assets within the BCT include reconnaissance elements and, in some cases, MP 

platoons (PLTs). Additional information on the structure of each of the BCTs and their 

subordinate units can be found in FM 3-90.6, Brigade Combat Team. Additional 

information on the capabilities and structure of the organic combat engineers can be found 

in FM 3-34, Engineer Operations, and Army Techniques Publication, 3-34.22, Engineer 

Operations-Brigade Combat Team and Below. 

(b) Augmenting Mobility Units and Capabilities. The organic structure 

of the BCT does not provide all the combat engineer mobility support needed to conduct 

mobility operations. The BCT may need additional breaching, clearing, gap crossing, or 

other selected capabilities based on mission requirements capabilities that reside in 

echelons above brigade engineer battalions (BEBs). The BCT commander and staff must 

identify and address required capability shortfalls through mission analysis and 

augmentation coordination with non-BCT engineer commanders. 

1. Engineer Augmentation. The BEB is the organic engineer 

capability within the BCTs and it may require augmentation to support countermobility 

operations exceeding their close CS capability. Engineer units and capabilities likely to 

augment the BCT in mobility operations include the combat engineer company, mobility 

augmentation company, clearance company, area clearance PLT, engineer support 

company, explosive hazards coordination cell (EHCC), and engineer mine dog detection 

unit. For combined arms breaching operations, the BCT will generally require 

augmentation by one or two mobility augmentation companies or sapper companies and 

additional route clearance PLTs. The type and number of augmentation units required will 

vary with METT-T. For a gap crossing operation, the BCT would require the augmentation 

listed above plus at least one multi-role bridge company. In clearance operations, the BCT 

may be augmented by numerous clearance companies, area clearance PLTs or other combat 

engineer elements (and perhaps an engineer mine dog detection team). The EHCC’s 

mission is to predict, track, distribute information on, and mitigate EHs within the theater 

that affect force application focused logistics, survivability, and awareness of the 

operational environment. The EHCC maintains an EH database, conducts pattern analysis, 

investigates mine and IED strikes, and tracks UXO hazard areas. The cell provides 

technical advice on the mitigation of EH, including the development of TTP, and provides 
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 3-15 

training updates to field units. For more information about these units, see JP 3-34, Joint 

Engineer Operations. Army, Marine Corps, and Navy units may form engineer 

reconnaissance teams (ERTs). An ERT is not an engineer unit but rather an engineer 

capability. The current engineer force structure does not provide for engineer personnel or 

equipment dedicated to reconnaissance efforts. However, experience has shown that 

employment of engineers in a reconnaissance role enhances the effectiveness of 

reconnaissance in support of mobility operations. Because an engineer unit has limited 

assets to draw from, the formation of ERTs can subsequently degrade the capabilities of 

the organization from which they are drawn. The commander must understand the tradeoffs between using engineer assets in a reconnaissance role versus using them in other 

roles. 

2. Other Mobility Support Augmentation 

a. EOD units provide the capability to neutralize hazards from 

conventional UXO, IED, CBRN and high-yield explosives, and associated materials that 

present a threat to operations, installations, personnel, and/or material. EOD forces also 

may dispose of hazardous foreign or US ammunition, UXO, individual mines, boobytrapped mines, and chemical mines. EOD forces serve as a combat multiplier by 

neutralizing UXO that is restricting freedom of movement and denying access to supplies, 

facilities, and other critical assets. EOD forces equip, train, and organize to support tactical 

land forces. 

b. Rotary-wing and fixed-wing joint aviation assets will provide 

critical augmentation to the BCT to support mobility operations. Aviation support will 

augment the BCT reconnaissance and fire support capability, provide airborne mine 

dispensing capability, and support the BCT’s ability to maneuver and bypass obstacles. 

c. CBRN. CBRN assets that can support the BCT and its engineers 

include: 

(1) CBRN Reconnaissance PLT (infantry brigade combat team 

[IBCT]). This PLT conducts dismounted CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance, CBRN 

consequence management support, site exploitation support, and hazardous materials 

mitigation support. 

(2) CBRN Reconnaissance PLT (armored brigade combat 

team [ABCT]). This PLT conducts mounted CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance, site 

exploitation support, and biological surveillance if properly equipped. 

(3) CBRN Reconnaissance PLT (Stryker brigade combat team 

[SBCT]). This PLT conducts mounted CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance, site 

exploitation support, and biological surveillance if properly equipped. 

(4) CBRN Decontamination PLT (Heavy). This PLT conducts 

thorough equipment and troop decontamination, mass casualty decontamination, patient 

and contaminated remains decontamination support, and hazardous materials mitigation. 
Service Specific Considerations 

B-5 

(5) CBRN Decontamination PLT (Light). This PLT conducts 

operational level decontamination, provides support for mass casualty and human remains 

decontamination, and provides hazardous materials mitigation. 

(6) CBRN PLT (Obscuration) (Mechanized). This PLT 

conducts sustainment and temporary obscuration. 

d. CA forces play an important role in supporting mobility through 

the development, coordination, and execution of CA operations that positively influence 

target populations to support the commander’s objectives. CA are designed to provide the 

maneuver commander direct interaction with the civilian populace through the conduct of 

civil reconnaissance and assessments of the civil component of the operational area. 

Through their interaction with the indigenous populations and institutions, CA forces can 

minimize the negative impact of military operations on civilian populations and the level 

of interference of civilians on military operations. This can be critical during populace and 

resources control operations which could include planning and coordinating with other 

stakeholders for options such as: 

(1) Keeping the populace in place. 

(2) Identifying potential dislocated civilian routes. 

(3) Coordinating the movement of dislocated civilians. 

(4) Assisting in relocation operations. 

For additional information on the functions and capabilities of CA forces, see JP 3-57, 

Civil-Military Operations, and FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations.

e. Tactical-level military information support operations can 

degrade the enemy’s combat power, reduce civilian interference, minimize collateral 

damage, and increase the population’s support for operations. Military information support 

personnel assist the commander by encouraging civilians to avoid military operations, 

installations, and convoys. 

(2) Marine Corps. The Marine Corps deploys units based on the MAGTF 

construct. Each MAGTF consists of four elements: the command element, ground combat 

element (GCE), aviation combat element, and logistics combat element (LCE). 

(a) The GCE of all MAGTFs includes task-organized combat engineer 

detachments that provide mobility and countermobility support. They range in size from 

a PLT reinforced, a company reinforced, to an entire combat engineer battalion (CEB). 

(b) Combat engineer PLTs and companies can be reinforced by elements of 

the CEB’s mobility assault company and engineer support company. The mobility assault 

company consists of one assault breaching PLT, one assault bridging PLT, and two route 

reconnaissance and clearance PLTs with three route clearance teams each. Engineer 

support company consists of heavy equipment and motor transport assets to transport it. 
Appendix B 

B-6 JP 3-15 

(c) The LCE of all MAGTFs includes task-organized engineer support 

battalion (ESB) detachments that provide general support, general engineering, and combat 

engineering (mobility/countermobility) and EOD. Engineer PLTs and companies can be 

reinforced by elements of engineer support company, bridge company, and EOD company. 

In addition to the ESB within the LCE, there is a combat logistics battalion with an engineer 

services company that provides direct general support, general engineer support, and 

limited combat engineer support. 

For additional information about Marine Corps engineer units and capabilities, see JP 3-

34, Joint Engineer Operations; MCWP 3-17, Engineering Operations; and MCWP 3-17.2,

MAGTF Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 

2. Land Countermobility Capabilities 

a. Employment of Barriers, Obstacles, and Mines. As with support of mobility, 

countermobility operations will be affected by the operational environment. 

Countermobility execution is primarily the responsibility of combat engineers, although 

many other capabilities are integrated with their efforts. The engineer and the tactical 

commander must decide early in the planning process how to best position obstacles 

(including mines and other obstructions) to increase the effectiveness of friendly fire and 

maneuver and deny or channel the maneuver of the enemy. Combined arms obstacle 

integration is a necessary function of countermobility operations. Countermobility 

operations are also a part of support to movement and maneuver and have the likelihood 

of requiring and competing for many of the same combat engineer assets that are also 

required for mobility or survivability operations. Properly integrated obstacles, obscurants, 

and fires help to wrest the initiative from the enemy and deny him his objectives. 

(1) Barriers. A barrier is a coordinated series of obstacles designed or employed 

to channel, direct, restrict, delay, or stop the movement of an opposing force and to impose 

additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment on the opposing force. Barriers can 

exist naturally, be man-made, or be a combination of both. The construction of barriers 

may require extensive engineer support, time, and materials and is more likely to employ 

general engineers in their construction than obstacles or minefields. 

(2) Obstacles. An obstacle is any obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, 

fix, turn, or block the movement of an opposing force. They are also employed to impose 

additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment on the opposing force. Obstacles can 

exist naturally, be man-made, or be a combination of the two. The effectiveness of 

obstacles is enhanced considerably when covered by observation and fire. Obstacles 

include abatis, anti-vehicle ditches, blown bridges, built-up areas, earth-filled bastions, 

prefabricated concrete sections, minefields, rivers, road craters, terrain, and wire. As 

mentioned above, mines are employed in combination with other obstacles to create 

complex obstacles. 

(3) Land Mines. Mines are explosive devices that are emplaced to kill, destroy, 

or incapacitate enemy personnel and/or equipment. They can be employed in quantity 

within a specified area to form a minefield, or they can be used individually to reinforce 
Service Specific Considerations 

B-7 

nonexplosive obstacles. They can also be emplaced individually or in groups to demoralize 

an enemy force. Mines may be emplaced by hand or delivered by other means. A 

minefield is an area of ground that contains mines or an area of ground that is perceived to 

contain mines (a phony minefield). Minefields may contain scatterable mines and/or 

networked munitions. By presidential directive, US forces may no longer use non-selfdestructing land mines, except to train personnel engaged in demining and countermine 

operations. Landmines will only be employed in accordance with US law and policy. The 

use of the M18A1 Claymore used in the command-detonation mode is not restricted under 

international law or US law or policy. Tactical minefield effects include disrupt, turn, fix, 

and block. Minefields are used to: 

(a) Produce a vulnerability to enemy maneuver that can be exploited by 

friendly forces. 

(b) Cause the enemy to deploy forces early. 

(c) Interfere with enemy C2. 

(d) Inflict damage to enemy personnel and equipment. 

(e) Exploit the capabilities of other weapon systems by delaying enemy 

forces in an engagement area. 

(f) Protect friendly forces from enemy maneuver and infiltration. 

(4) Types of Minefields. There are four general types of minefields: protective, 

tactical, nuisance, and phony. Each type is determined by its distinct operational 

environment purpose. Therefore, minefields are employed differently and they target the 

enemy in unique ways that support the overall concept of the operations. 

(a) Protective minefields are employed to protect the force, equipment, 

supplies, and facilities from enemy attacks or other threats. Protective minefields are 

usually employed and emplaced at the small-unit level (PLT or company/team). The 

authority to emplace protective minefields is normally delegated to the company/team 

commander. In some cases, such as a hasty defense, protective minefields are emplaced 

on short notice by units that use mines from their basic load or local stock. More 

commonly, protective minefields are used as part of a unit’s deliberate defense. The mines 

are emplaced so that they are easy to detect and recover by the emplacing unit. Much like 

final protective fires, protective minefields provide the defender with close-in protection 

during the enemy’s final assault. Protective minefields serve two purposes. First, they 

impose a delay on an attacker that allows the defender time to break contact as the unit 

displaces to another battle position. Secondly, they break up the enemy’s assault to 

complete its destruction. The composition of a protective minefield is driven by the 

vulnerability of the defender. 

(b) Tactical minefields directly affect the enemy’s maneuver in a way that 

gives the defending force a positional advantage. Tactical minefields may be employed by 

themselves or in conjunction with other types of tactical obstacles. They attack the 
Appendix B 

B-8 JP 3-15 

enemy’s maneuver by disrupting its combat formations, interfering with its C2, reducing 

its ability to mass fires, causing it to prematurely commit limited breaching resources, and 

reducing its ability to reinforce. The defender masses fires and maneuver to exploit the 

positional advantage created in part by tactical obstacles. Tactical minefields add an 

offensive dimension to the defense. They are a commander’s tool for recapturing and 

maintaining the initiative that is normally afforded to an attacker. Combined with fires, 

tactical obstacles force the attacker to conform to the defender’s plan. Tactical minefields 

may be emplaced during offensive operations to protect exposed flanks, isolate the 

objective area, deny enemy counterattack routes, and disrupt enemy retrograde. 

(c) Nuisance minefields impose caution on enemy forces and disrupt, delay, 

and sometimes weaken or destroy follow-on echelons. Nuisance minefields are a form of 

tactical minefields. Once nuisance minefields are emplaced, they do not require cover by 

observation or direct fire. Nuisance minefields are usually irregular in size and shape; they 

can be a single group of mines or a series of mined areas. They can be used to reinforce 

existing obstacles and can also be rapidly emplaced on main avenues of approach. Selfdestruct/self-deactivating mines, scatterable mines, and/or networked munitions may be 

used in nuisance minefields. 

(d) Phony minefields deceive the enemy about the exact location of real 

minefields. They cause the attacker to question his decision to breach and may cause him 

to expend his reduction assets wastefully. Phony minefields may be employed in 

conjunction with other minefields, but should be used only after the enemy has become 

mine-sensitive. The success of phony minefields depends on the enemy’s state of mind. 

The bluff succeeds best when the enemy is mine-conscious and has already suffered the 

consequences of a mine encounter. A fear of mines can quickly evolve into paranoia and 

break the momentum of the enemy’s attack. Therefore, phony minefields are normally 

employed in conjunction with real minefields and are seldom employed alone. Once the 

enemy has become mine-conscious, phony minefields may produce considerable tactical 

effects with very little investment in time, labor, and material. Phony minefields may also 

be used to extend the front and depth of live minefields when mines or labor are in short 

supply or when time is restricted. They may be used to conceal minefield gaps through 

live minefields. 

(5) It is important to distinguish the difference between the types of minefield 

and the means of emplacement. Volcano, Modular Pack Mine System, standard-pattern, 

and row mining are not types of minefields; they are just some of the means used to 

emplace tactical, nuisance, and protective minefields. They may also be the method of 

emplacement that is replicated by a phony minefield. 

(6) Types of Mines 

(a) AVLs. AVLs are designed to immobilize or destroy vehicles and their 

occupants. 

1. Types of Kills. An AVL produces a mobility kill (M-Kill) or a 

catastrophic kill (K-Kill). An M-Kill destroys one or more of the vehicle’s vital drive 
Service Specific Considerations 

B-9 

components (for example, breaks a track on a tank) and immobilizes the target. An M-Kill 

does not always destroy the weapon system and the crew; they may continue to function. 

In a K-Kill, the weapon system or the crew is destroyed. 

2. Types of Fuzes. Anti-vehicle fuzes fall into three design categories: 

a. Track-width. Usually pressure-actuated, requiring contact with 

the wheels or tracks of a vehicle. 

b. Full-width. Activated by several methods—acoustics, magnetic 

influence, tilt-rod, radio frequency, infrared sensor, command, or vibration. Tilt-rod or 

magnetic-influence fuzes are the most common. Full-width fuzes are designed to be 

effective over the entire target width and can cause a K-Kill from penetration and spalling 

metal or from secondary explosions. When a full-width fuze is activated solely by contact 

with the wheels or tracks of the target vehicle, it usually causes an M-Kill because most of 

the energy is absorbed by the wheels or tracks. 

c. Off-route. Designed to be placed along the side of a route likely 

to be taken by armored vehicles. It has numerous fusing possibilities, including infrared, 

seismic, break wire, and magnetic. It produces an M-Kill or a K-Kill, depending on the 

location of the target at the time of mine detonation. 

3. Types of Warheads. AVLs can be identified by their warheads: 

a. Blast AVLs derive their effectiveness from the force generated 

by high-explosive detonation. They usually produce an M-Kill when the blast damages 

the track or the vehicle, but a K-Kill is also possible. 

b. Shaped-charge mines use a directed-energy warhead. A shaped 

charge is formed by detonating an explosive charge behind a cone of dense metal or other 

material. Upon detonation, the cone collapses and forms a metal slug and a gaseous metal 

jet that penetrate the target. A K-Kill is probable if the crew or ammunition compartment 

is hit. 

c. Explosive-formed penetrating mines have an explosive charge 

with a metal plate in front. Upon detonation, the plate forms into an inverted disk, a slug, 

or a long rod. A K-Kill is probable if the crew or ammunition compartment is hit. 

(b) APLs. APLs are designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or 

contact of a person and will incapacitate, injure, or kill one or more persons. APLs will 

only be employed in accordance with US law and policy. 

1. Types of Kills. APLs can kill or incapacitate their victims. The 

injuries and deaths they cause commit medical resources, degrade unit morale, and damage 

nonarmored vehicles. Some types of APLs may break or damage the track on armored 

vehicles. 
Appendix B 

B-10 JP 3-15 

2. Types of Fuzes. APLs can be fuzed in many ways, to include 

pressure, seismic, wire, or command detonation: 

a. Pressure fuzes usually activate an APL when a load is placed on 

the fuze. 

b. Seismic fuzes activate an APL when the sensor detects 

vibrations. 

c. Trip wires or break wires activate an APL when something 

disturbs barely visible wires. 

d. Command-detonated mines are activated by an individual when 

he detects the enemy in the mine’s blast area. 

3. Types of Effects. APLs contain five types of effects: 

a. Blast. Cripples the foot or leg of an individual who steps on it, 

can also burst the tires of a wheeled vehicle that passes over it. 

b. Bounding fragmentation. Throws a canister into the air; the 

canister bursts and scatters shrapnel throughout the immediate area. 

c. Direct-fragmentation. Propels fragments in the general 

direction of enemy soldiers. 

d. Stake-fragmentation. Bursts and scatters shrapnel in all general 

directions. 

e. Chemical. Disperses chemical threats and hazards to whoever 

activates it; contaminates the surrounding area. The US does not use chemical mines. 

(c) AHDs. AHDs perform the function of a mine fuze if someone attempts 

to tamper with the mine. They are intended to prevent moving or removing the mine, not 

to prevent reduction of the minefield by enemy dismounts. An AHD usually consists of 

an explosive charge that is connected to, placed next to, or manufactured in the mine. The 

device can be attached to the mine body and activated by a wire that is attached to a firing 

mechanism. However, a small percentage of US artillery-delivered AVLs have AHDs built 

into them. Although the Volcano, Modular Pack Mine System, and Gator mines do not 

have AHDs, they have an inherent anti-handling capability since they may detonate when 

moved because the mine may sense a significant change from its original orientation. Other 

countries continue to employ AHDs on AVLs and APLs. Some mines have extra fuze 

wells that make it easier to install AHDs. An AHD does not have to be attached to the 

mine; it can be placed underneath the mine. Mines with AHDs are sometimes incorrectly 

called booby-trapped mines. In accordance with the CCW and Ottawa Convention, AVLs 

with AHD are not considered APLs. AVLs and AHD will only be employed in accordance 

with US law and policy. 
Service Specific Considerations 

B-11 

b. Staff Integration of Countermobility and Support to Movement and 

Maneuver. Each maneuver force echelon down to the BCT and the RCT level has organic 

staff capability (engineers, MP, CBRN, and others such as EOD when augmented) to 

integrate their collective CS countermobility capabilities into the combined arms fight. 

These CS planners are the primary members of the battle staff responsible for 

understanding and integrating countermobility capabilities to support movement and 

maneuver. Those capabilities may be organic to or augment the maneuver force. These 

staff members synchronize their collective capabilities to support the needs of the 

maneuver commander and assure movement and maneuver for the force. Countermobility 

focuses on denying the enemy movement and maneuver as well as enabling freedom of 

movement and maneuver of the friendly force. 

c. Countermobility Units and Capabilities 

(1) Army 

(a) Organic Countermobility Units and Capabilities. BCTs are 

strategically flexible. The major combat and support capabilities a brigade needs for most 

operations are organic to its structure. Each BCT has one organic BEB with two combat 

engineer companies with capabilities focused on supporting combined arms 

countermobility. Other engineer elements in the BCT include a terrain team and engineer 

planners. See JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, for more information about these units 

and their capabilities. Other countermobility support assets within the BCT include 

reconnaissance elements and, in some cases, MP PLTs. Additional information on the 

structure of BCTs and their subordinate units can be found in FM 3-90.6, Brigade Combat 

Team. Additional information on the capabilities and structure of the organic combat 

engineers and those engineer organizations and capabilities likely to augment each of the 

BCTs can be found in FM 3-34, Engineer Operations, and Army Techniques Publication 

3-34.22, Engineer Operations—Brigade Combat Team and Below. 

(b) Augmenting Countermobility Units and Capabilities. The organic 

structure of the BCT does not provide all the combat engineer and other elements needed 

to conduct countermobility operations. BCTs have organic engineer elements as shown 

previously in this appendix, but may need additional capabilities based on mission 

requirements. The BCT commander and staff must identify and address required capability 

shortfalls through mission analysis and augmentation coordination with non-BCT engineer 

commanders. 

1. Engineer Augmentation. The BEB may require augmentation to 

support countermobility operations exceeding their capability. BEBs organic to the ABCT 

and SBCT are equipped with Volcano mine dispensers. The BEB organic to the IBCT has 

no organic Volcano mine dispensing equipment. The engineer force pool for 

countermobility capability is the same for mobility capability. For a deliberate defense, a 

BCT has organic countermobility capability in its BEB engineer companies to emplace 

obstacles using its combat engineer PLTs, as well using its earthmoving capability to 

emplace berms and tank ditches. Depending on the enemy, the required obstacle size, the 

terrain, and the time available, the BCT BEB may require augmentation from an echelons 
Appendix B 

B-12 JP 3-15 

above brigade engineer battalion. Engineer units and capabilities likely to augment the 

BCT in countermobility operations include the sapper company, mobility augmentation 

company, combat engineer company, and engineer support company. The type and 

number of augmentation units required will vary with METT-T. 

For more information about these units, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. 

2. Other Countermobility Support Augmentation 

a. Rotary-wing and fixed-wing joint aviation assets will provide 

critical augmentation to the BCT to support countermobility operations. Aviation support 

will augment the BCT reconnaissance capability, add fire support capability including the 

possible employment of scatterable mines, and support the BCT’s ability to maneuver in 

relation to the natural or emplaced obstacles. For operations outside the Korean Peninsula, 

the only air-delivered scatterable mines available for employment are the helicopter 

delivered AVL Volcano. 

b. Indirect fires are integrated with the countermobility effort to 

magnify the effects of the barriers, obstacles, and mines. The organic artillery battalion in 

each of the BCTs will be augmented or reinforced to provide the requisite fire support for 

the BCT. 

c. CBRN assets that can support the BCT and its engineers include: 

(1) CBRN Reconnaissance PLT (IBCT). This PLT conducts 

dismounted CBRN reconnaissance and consequence management support. 

(2) CBRN Reconnaissance PLT (ABCT). This PLT conducts 

mounted CBRN reconnaissance and can conduct biological surveillance if properly 

equipped. 

(3) CBRN Reconnaissance PLT (SBCT). This PLT conducts 

mounted CBRN reconnaissance and can conduct biological surveillance if properly 

equipped. 

(4) CBRN Decontamination PLT (Heavy). This PLT conducts 

thorough equipment and troop decontamination. 

(5) CBRN Decontamination PLT (Light). This PLT conducts 

operational level decontamination. 

(6) CBRN PLT (Obscuration) (Mechanized). This PLT 

conducts sustainment and temporary obscuration. 

(7) CBRN PLT (Obscuration) (Wheeled). This PLT conducts 

sustainment and temporary obscuration and MILDEC operations. 
Service Specific Considerations 

B-13 

(2) US Marine Corps. The GCE of all MAGTFs includes task-organized 

combat engineer detachments that provide mobility and countermobility support. These 

detachments are sourced from the Marine division’s CEB. The ESB combat logistics 

battalions of the Marine logistics group provide general engineering support in support of 

MAGTF countermobility requirements. The Marine wing support squadron of the aviation 

combat element provides limited countermobility support, especially at MAGTF air 

facilities. 

For additional information about Marine Corps engineer units and capabilities, see JP 3-

34, Joint Engineer Operations. 

3. Maritime Mining Capabilities 

a. The Minefield 

(1) The Minefield Compared with Other Weapons 

(a) In naval warfare, a minefield is an area of water containing mines 

emplaced with or without a defined pattern. If the field is not declared or the mine 

emplacement operation goes unobserved, it may not create its desired effect until sometime 

after the mining agents have departed. Although able to discriminate between target types, 

mines are unable to determine the nationality of a target. Unless sterilizers or self-destruct 

features are incorporated, the mine continues to be effective until swept or otherwise 

neutralized. Note: A mine sterilizer is a countermeasure device designed to make a mine 

harmless after a preset number of days. 

(b) When used, mines have inflicted disproportionate casualties compared 

with the mine emplacement effort. The collateral effects of mining operations, such as the 

diversion of shipping, the exposure of ships to other weapon systems, and the cost of MCM 

efforts, can have a major impact on objectives. 

(c) The design of a naval minefield, and the type and number of mines to be 

used, depends on the field’s purpose, expected adversary traffic, geographical location, 

amount of countermeasures to which it will be subjected, and the mining platforms to be 

used. Optimum minefield design enables mining forces to achieve their objectives without 

excessive mining effort. Although neutralizing a single mine can prove easy, an entire 

minefield is challenging. 

(2) Types of Minefields. Naval minefields can be characterized by their purpose 

and where they are laid, as follows: 

(a) Offensive minefield: a minefield laid in enemy territorial water or waters 

under enemy control. 

(b) Defensive minefield: a minefield laid in international waters or 

international straits with the declared intention of controlling shipping in defense of sea 

communications. 
Appendix B 

B-14 JP 3-15 

(c) Protective minefield: a minefield laid in friendly territorial waters to 

protect ports, harbors, anchorages, coasts, and coastal routes. 

(3) Mine Classification. Naval mines are typically classified in one of three 

ways: 

(a) Final position in the water. Discussed in follow-on paragraphs. 

(b) Method of actuation. This includes contact, magnetic, acoustic, seismic, 

and pressure. 

(c) Method of delivery. This includes air, surface, and submarine. 

(4) Final Position in the Water. When classified according to the position they 

assume in the water after placement, mines fall into three primary categories: 

(a) Bottom mines. 

(b) Moored mines. 

(c) Moving mines. 

(5) Bottom Mines 

(a) Bottom mines are non-buoyant weapons. When planted, the mine case 

is in contact with the seabed and is held in place by its own weight. In areas with a soft 

bottom they may be completely or partially embedded. Such mines are referred to as buried 

mines. A mine that is resting on the bottom (unburied or partially buried) may also be 

referred to as a proud mine. 

(b) There are two special categories of bottom mines that react differently 

from other bottom mines when they are initially emplaced, but they become similar once 

they have reached their final plant position: 

1. A moving bottom mine is a collective description for those designed 

to move along the bottom after being planted, but before becoming armed. 

2. A self-propelled mine is fitted with propulsion equipment, such as a 

torpedo, that is used to propel it to an intended final position. For example, a submarine 

could fire a self-propelled mine from a standoff point that is outside of the intended 

minefield location, and the mine would then propel itself to the desired location. 

(6) Moored Mines 

In US usage, the term “bottom mine” is always used, and the term “ground 

mine” should be avoided. In allied usage, while “bottom mine” is the 

preferred usage, the term “ground mine” is still used in some contexts. 
Service Specific Considerations 

B-15 

(a) Moored mines have a buoyant case set at a certain depth beneath the 

surface. The mine is held in place above the seabed by means of a cable or chain that is 

attached to an anchor. The mines are frequently fitted with a self-destruct device that will 

cause them to flood and sink if separated from the anchor. Mines that separate from their 

anchors and rise to the surface are known as floaters. These may continue to float until 

they are struck and detonated, or they may deteriorate from their exposure to the seawater. 

Using moored mines can avoid problems that bottom mines may encounter in deep water. 

The length and weight of the mooring cable and the mine case crush-depth will limit the 

maximum water depth in which they may be emplaced. 

(b) A major disadvantage of moored mines is that the mooring cable can be 

cut with mechanical sweep apparatus. When this occurs, the case floats to the surface and 

must be avoided or destroyed. Another disadvantage is that they can be affected by current 

and tidal variations that cause the case to dip below its intended depth and change the angle 

for intended operation, thereby reducing its effectiveness against a surface target. 

(c) There are two special types of moored mines that contain propulsion 

systems that enable them to quickly reach the intended target: 

1. Homing or guided mines are self-propelled moored mines that use 

guidance equipment to home onto a target once the target has been detected. 

2. A rising mine is a self-propelled or buoyant moored mine that releases 

from its mooring and rises to detonate on contact with (or proximity to) a target. It does 

not incorporate a homing device to guide it to the target, but contains logic circuitry that 

enables it to calculate an estimated target location. 

(7) Moving Mines. Moving mines are classified as either drifting or oscillating 

mines. 

(a) Drifting Mines 

1. This is a mine that is buoyant or neutrally buoyant, but does not have 

an anchor or any other device to maintain it in a fixed position. It is free to move under 

the influence of wind, tide, or current. It may float at the water’s surface or may be kept at 

a set depth beneath the surface by a depth-controlling hydrostatic device. It may be 

attached to a small piece of flotsam or other innocent-looking object, or even to another 

drifting mine. Two or more may be tethered together to increase the probability of striking 

a ship. 

2. Drifting sea mines which do not self-destruct or self-deactivate within 

one hour are banned from international waters by the Hague Convention VIII of 1907 

relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines. A drifting mine is classified 

differently from a moored mine that has become a floater, as a floater was designed to be 

anchored, while a drifter was designed to float freely with the tides and currents. It is also 

forbidden to lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon 

as they have broken loose from their moorings. 
Appendix B 

B-16 JP 3-15 

3. The principal advantage of drifting mines is that their use is 

independent of bottom depth. The major drawback is that they scatter and may imperil 

friendly shipping. Consequently, drifters are usually fitted with devices designed to sink 

them after a short life span. As such, the most useful application has been in tactical 

situations in which they are placed in the path of an adversary to cause a delay or diversion. 

(b) Oscillating Mines

1. This is a drifting mine that regulates its depth by means of a 

hydrostatic control mechanism. 

2. The hydrostatic control mechanism causes it to oscillate at or near a 

preset water depth, which permits the mining of waters that are too deep for bottom or 

moored mines. 

b. US and Allied Mine Emplacement Assets 

(1) Mines reach their maximum effectiveness only when they are accurately 

positioned in time to be armed and ready for the transit of the first target ship. This 

requirement places the burden on operational forces to employ delivery vehicles with 

acceptable capabilities. As previously stated, mines may be delivered by aircraft, 

submarine, or surface craft. Selection depends on the various environmental and 

operational factors associated with each situation. The factors to be considered include: 

(a) Type of minefield (defensive, offensive, or protective). 

(b) Number and type of mines to be delivered. 

(c) Number of sorties required. 

(d) Defensive capabilities in area, attrition rate expected for delivery 

vehicles, and the need for standoff delivery systems. 

(e) Environmental characteristics, such as water depth and bottom 

composition. 

(f) Required accuracy in delivery. 

(g) Logistics for coordinating stockpiled mines and delivery systems. 

(2) US Mine Inventory. The US mine inventory consists of a variety of air- and 

submarine-delivered, influence-actuated mines. Sizes vary and include 500 to 2,000 

pounds. The US mining program is designed to support offensive, defensive, and 

protective mining operations. Detailed discussion of these systems can be found in NTTP 

3-15.1, Maritime Mining. 

(3) Air Delivery. Aircraft are the most suitable delivery vehicles for most 

offensive mining operations. In general, any aircraft capable of carrying bombs can carry 
Service Specific Considerations 

B-17 

a similar load of sea mines of the same weight class. There are some constraints and 

limitations imposed by matching suspension lugs on some mines to certain bomb racks, 

the shape and dimensional changes of some mines brought about by the addition of flight 

gear or fins, and the high drag and buffeting characteristics of mines carried on external 

stations. Several incompatibilities can be corrected with existing adapters and modification 

kits, but the performance limitations imposed on high-speed aircraft are also factors. 

Range, weather conditions, auxiliary equipment, and armament must be considered, as 

each can affect the maximum permissible load aboard the aircraft. The tactical manual of 

the individual aircraft is the final authority on mine carriage. 

(a) Advantages of Air Delivery. There are a number of advantages 

associated with aerial delivery: 

1. Aircraft can penetrate areas inaccessible to ships and submarines and 

can replenish existing fields without danger from previously emplaced sea mines. 

2. Aircraft have a faster reaction time than surface ships or submarines. 

3. Aircraft are generally more readily available and can typically 

complete their mining mission quickly. 

4. Aircraft can carry a wide variety of naval mines. 

(b) Disadvantages of Air Delivery. There are a number of disadvantages 

associated with air delivery, but for offensive scenarios, many of these can be overcome 

through proper planning. 

1. The payload-per-sortie is relatively small except for large, bomber 

aircraft. However, this disadvantage can be overcome by the ability to rapidly execute 

multiple sorties. 

2. Mine emplacement accuracy of aircraft is lower than for a surface 

ship but is adequate for offensive mining. 

3. Many aircraft types can be restricted by weather conditions. 

4. The range of aircraft without aerial refueling support is more 

restricted than that of surface ships or submarines. 

5. In general, aircraft deploy mines in a less clandestine manner than 

submarines (but more so than surface ships). 

6. Aircraft are vulnerable to enemy defenses, especially if the area to be 

mined is within the envelope of an enemy integrated air defense system. 

(c) Helicopter Delivery. It is possible to deliver sea mines by helicopter, 

but such use is inefficient due to limited range and carrying capacity. 
Appendix B 

B-18 JP 3-15 

(4) Submarine Delivery. Submarines are most effective in areas that are too 

well protected for surface or aircraft delivery. Normally, they will be used in offensive 

fields, but may be used to emplace defensive fields as well. This can take place day or 

night, surfaced or submerged. The availability of the Submarine-Launched Mobile Mine 

enhances the submarine capability. 

(a) Advantages of Submarine Delivery. The advantages of submarinedelivered mines are: 

1. The clandestine nature of submarine delivery. 

2. Mission radius. 

3. Unrestricted by weather conditions. 

(b) Disadvantages of Submarine Delivery. The disadvantages of 

submarine-delivered mines are: 

1. Limited payloads and weapons mix. 

2. Slow reaction time (i.e., if not loaded with mines for a contingency, 

submarine must return to a port for loading of naval mines). 

3. Slow transit speed when compared with aircraft delivery. 

4. Submarine availability with respect to competing mission 

requirements. 

5. Delay incurred in reconfiguring mines to fit a torpedo tube. 

6. Cannot replenish existing fields without danger from previously laid 

sea mines. 

(5) Surface Delivery. This is the preferred method for protective and defensive 

minefields where transit distances are limited and the area to be mined is benign. Any 

surface ship can be configured to emplace sea mines by hoisting or rolling them over the 

side or by using temporarily installed mine rails or tracks. There are no active US mine 

emplacing surface ships in service today. However, should an operational requirement 

develop, it is possible to configure ships to emplace mines. Suitable conversion of cargo 

ships is also an option. Some allies do have a surface mine emplacement capability. 

(a) Advantages of Surface Delivery 

1. Able to carry a larger payload than aircraft or submarine mine 

emplacers. 

2. Surface assets have the ability to position mines more accurately than 

the other delivery assets. 
Service Specific Considerations 

B-19 

(b) Disadvantages of Surface Delivery 

1. Surface ships have a slow reaction time and are not suitable when 

time is critical. 

2. Surface mine emplacement is not clandestine. 

3. They are vulnerable to attack, so they are not effective offensively. 

4. Surface ships are unable to replenish existing minefields. 

Additional information on naval MIW capabilities can be found in the NWP 3-15, Naval 

Mine Warfare, series of publications or by contacting Commander, SMWDC. 

4. Naval Mine Warfare and Mine Countermeasures Organization and Capabilities 

a. Naval MIW Force Organization. The Commander, USFF, and COMUSPACFLT 

are the administrative and operational commanders for the naval MIW forces. When other 

fleet commanders require naval MIW support, forces are provided through the numbered 

fleet commanders, with SMWDC coordination. Commander, USFF, and 

COMUSPACFLT normally exercise operational control over Navy Munitions Command 

(NMC) units—deployable mine assembly teams which are administratively consolidated 

with larger NMC detachments. These NMC units are directed by Commander, Mobile 

Mine Assembly Group, in response to mine-build orders generated by the SMWDC MIW 

staff or the designated MIWC. The respective type commanders are responsible for naval 

MIW force readiness, and SMWDC, as the USN principal naval MIW command, is 

responsible for the integrated training, tactics, and interoperability of the naval MIW 

forces. These forces are required to be prepared to deploy on short notice to meet the 

CCDR’s operational requirements. SMWDC maintains a deployable, scalable naval MIW 

staff to support fleet or combatant command staffs and provides technical advice to the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization and allied countries. Additionally, the USN maintains 

deployable tactical MCMRONs that report to SMWDC or other designated commander. 

These MCMRONs are operational staffs that exist to exercise tactical C2 of specified 

MCM forces (air, surface, and underwater). 

b. Command Relationships and Mission-Related Terminology. The following 

command relationships are defined by joint doctrine, but are presented here for clarification 

as they relate to naval MIW-MCM (mining forces are considered strike warfare assets and 

are not discussed here). Assigned MCM units are placed within a command organization 

on a relatively permanent basis. An Avenger Class ship that deploys as part of an MCM 

task unit (TU) is an example of assigned MCM units. 

(1) Attached. MCM units are temporarily placed within a command 

organization for short duration and specific operation. An Avenger Class ship operating 

within a strike group to protect maneuver space is an example of an attached MCM unit. 
Appendix B 

B-20 JP 3-15 

(2) Supporting. MCM units that operate in general, mutual, direct, or close 

augmentation of a supported force, but remain assigned or attached to the supporting force 

commander. 

c. MCM Force Response Categories. MCM forces fall into three categories based 

on response capability: 

(1) Immediate Response Force. Immediate response forces are MCM forces in 

theater and in close proximity available for countering imminent threats and protecting 

maneuver space. Immediate response forces are structured to provide MCM coverage rates 

that permit freedom of maneuver with minimal delay. 

(2) Rapid Response Force. Rapid response forces are MCM contingency forces 

that can quickly arrive in theater. They consist of continental United States (CONUS)-

based, rapidly deployable forces and in-theater, forward-deployed naval forces, available 

to commence operations within 96 hours. The rapid response forces can augment 

immediate response forces for direct support to a strike group operation or provide theater 

mission support in advance of approaching forces. 

(3) Follow-On Force. Follow-on forces are MCM forces that are time-phased 

to arrive in theater after combat operations commence. Follow-on forces execute largescale MCM operations to expand the operational area initially cleared by rapid response 

forces and conduct post-hostility mine clearance. These forces include CONUS-based 

AMCM and EOD forces not employed in the rapid response force and CONUS-based 

SMCM ships, which can self-deploy or be heavy-lifted into theater. 

d. US MCM Assets. This section describes resources of the current USN MCM triad 

of forces, consisting of AMCM, SMCM, and UMCM systems and platforms. In most 

MCM operations, the US approach is to employ the triad working in concert. Each 

functional component of the triad offers complementary capabilities in MCM. The 

following paragraphs briefly describe US systems and platforms in service. 

(1) AMCM. This section describes the general capabilities of AMCM 

helicopters and their systems. Additional information on AMCM functions and 

capabilities are contained in NTTP 3-15.22, Airborne Mine Countermeasures Operations. 

The AMCM force consists of two squadrons of MH-53E helicopters, HM-14 and HM-15, 

and the AMCM Weapon Systems Training School. The operational squadrons are 

organized and trained for rapid deployment and can be largely self-sustaining when 

operating in detachments from a large deck amphibious warfare ship or a shore site. 

Principal capabilities of the aircraft include sonar minehunting/bottom mapping, with laser 

bottom mine identification; mechanical minesweeping; influence minesweeping; precision 

navigation; and environmental reconnaissance. Typically, AMCM helicopters can carry 

and employ one MCM system at a time. The decision on which system to employ must be 

made well before the mission in order to configure the aircraft before flight. 

(a) MH-53E Helicopter. The AMCM helicopter is the MH-53E Sea 

Dragon, a three-engine heavy-lift helicopter. Discussion of maximum and operational lift 
Service Specific Considerations 

B-21 

limitations can be found in Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization 

Flight Manual A1-H53ME-NFM-000, Navy Model MH-53E Helicopters. The aircraft can 

fly for approximately four hours, assuming that environmental conditions do not restrict 

full-capacity fueling. More specific discussion of endurance and other limitations can also 

be found in Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization flight manuals. 

(b) AMCM Systems. The major equipment used by the current AMCM 

systems includes mechanical and influence (acoustic, magnetic, and combination) 

minesweeping equipment and minehunting sonar. The systems are modular to permit 

installation and removal. 

(2) SMCM. The surface element of the MCM triad is the Avenger Class, which 

has the capability to hunt and sweep moored and bottom mines. Avenger Class vessels 

have minehunting and neutralization capabilities, and can conduct mechanical, influence, 

and combination minesweeping. Their hulls are constructed of wood with a laminated 

glass reinforced plastic outer shell to reduce magnetic signature. Propulsion is primarily 

diesel engines driving twin shafts, with backup electric light load propulsion motors 

powered by a marine minesweeping gas turbine generator for reduced acoustic signature. 

The gas turbine generator can also power a bow thruster, for station-keeping and low-speed 

maneuvering, or the magnetic influence sweeping equipment. These vessels participate in 

coordinated operations with amphibious and other supported forces, conduct independent 

operations, and participate in integrated MCM operations. While these vessels can operate 

for extended periods of time, their transit speed is slow, and therefore they are unable to 

deploy rapidly in support of contingency operations. They are often deployed by heavylift shipping, and availability of such assets must be considered. Some Avenger Class ships 

are permanently forward deployed to alleviate this circumstance. MCM equipment used 

aboard the Avenger Class includes mechanical and influence (acoustic, magnetic, and 

combination) minesweeping gear, a hull-mounted variable depth high-frequency sonar, 

and a tethered pilotable minehunting unmanned underwater vessel (UUV) capable of 

identifying and neutralizing naval mines. Additional information on SMCM functions and 

capabilities is contained in NTTP 3-15.21, Surface Mine Countermeasures (SMCM) 

Operations. Principal SMCM operational capabilities are: 

(a) Minehunting sonar. 

(b) Remotely operated vehicle mine neutralization. 

(c) Mechanical moored minesweeping. 

(d) Influence minesweeping. 

(e) Combination sweeping (mechanical-acoustic and magnetic-acoustic). 

(f) Support of EOD operations to neutralize, destroy, and exploit mines. 

(g) Magnetic silencing. 

(h) Precision navigation. 
Appendix B 

B-22 JP 3-15 

(i) Environmental measuring. 

(j) Buoying equipment. 

(k) Nonferrous design throughout to reduce magnetic signature. 

(l) Propulsion designed to reduce acoustic signature. 

(3) UMCM. This section describes the general capabilities of UMCM assets and 

their systems. Additional information on UMCM functions and capabilities is contained 

in NTTP 3-15.23, Underwater Mine Countermeasures (UMCM). 

(a) EOD MCM PLTs. EOD MCM PLTs operate in conjunction with 

SMCM and AMCM units to reacquire, identify, neutralize, recover, and dispose of sea 

mines in the SW and VSW regions. They may deploy as part of an amphibious force and 

are vital in supporting amphibious operations. EOD MCM PLTs are designed to be 

deployable on short notice and can sustain operations without major resupply for 

approximately 30 days. They have diving and hand-held sonar equipment employable to 

a working depth of 200 feet and a maximum depth of 300 feet, but generally do not operate 

in the VSW region up to the SZ; that mission is assigned to the VSW TU as discussed in 

paragraph 4d(3)(c), “VSW TU.” The primary mission of these detachments is to provide 

the MCMC with the capability to relocate, neutralize, counter, and exploit mines. 

Additionally, they can neutralize and countermine drifting and floating mines and are 

capable of prosecuting minelike contacts (MILCOs). They use specialized underwater 

breathing apparatus, recompression equipment, and technology to extend their working 

times, but are limited to operating in currents of one knot or less in sea state 3 or less, and 

their operating times may be further reduced by temperature extremes. EOD MCM PLTs 

are compatible with and complement the other members of the MCM triad, SMCM and 

AMCM. Specifically: 

1. AMCM and EOD. EOD assets can be used in conjunction with 

AMCM to reacquire and prosecute contacts that have been located by helicopter using the 

Global Positioning System and selected segments of sonar imagery that are analyzed 

relative to the MILCO, or to dispose of mines released from their moorings by mechanical 

sweeping. 

2. SMCM and EOD. EOD forces should be embarked aboard SMCM 

ships whenever minehunting is ongoing. This enables the prosecution of contacts using 

divers only or divers and unmanned neutralization vehicles. They can also deploy from a 

platform of opportunity, such as an amphibious warfare ship, to allow the SMCM units to 

continue operations while EOD assets prosecute MILCOs. 

3. Marine Mammal System (MMS) and EOD. When used in concert 

with a MMS, EOD forces can identify marked contacts, neutralize previously marked 

contacts, conduct verification dives, or exploit a previously neutralized contact. 
Service Specific Considerations 

B-23 

4. UUVs and EOD. EOD assets can be used to reacquire, identify, and 

neutralize UUV contacts using the Global Positioning System and selected segments of 

sonar imagery. 

(b) EOD Mobile PLTs. EOD mobile PLTs are trained and equipped to 

perform the same missions as an MCM PLT, with the exception of mine recovery and field 

exploitation. Though possessing a smaller capacity for MCM operations, and operationally 

focused on other EOD missions, these units are referred to as possessing a “limited” MCM 

capability, and are a valuable force multiplier for operational commanders. For example, 

EOD mobile PLTs embarked in carrier strike groups provide the battle group’s primary 

drifting mine neutralization capability. 

(c) VSW TU. The VSW TU mission is to execute MCM in the VSW/SW 

region to the seaward edge of the SZ (normally the 10-foot depth contour). VSW TU assets 

conduct low-visible exploratory and reconnaissance operations to locate and prepare sea 

mines and obstacles for neutralization in support of amphibious operations and are also 

capable of providing the MCMC with an accurate and timely hydrographic reconnaissance 

report. Such missions are carried out in support of the amphibious task force commander 

to help prepare the operational area, but the unit’s capabilities are also vital to the 

amphibious task force and LF commanders in executing the landing plan. The unit is 

capable of detecting, classifying, identifying, and neutralizing mines while assisting in 

opening assault lanes for landing craft and amphibious vehicles. Stages of VSW TU 

operations in support of amphibious operations include reconnaissance of possible landing 

sites, establishing a navigational grid, and swimming predetermined search patterns to 

detect, locate, classify, and map obstacles and mines. The team may also conduct clearance 

operations. Specific VSW TU capabilities include: 

1. Locating, marking, and mapping mines in the VSW and SW region. 

2. Assisting in lane selection. 

3. Clearing mines within VSW and SW seaward approaches to 

amphibious landing beaches. 

4. Precise navigation, obstacle location, doctrinal bottom type 

classification, and bottom mapping. 

(d) The VSW TU is comprised of EOD divers, Marine Corps reconnaissance 

specialists, fleet technicians and divers organized into four operational PLTs: unmanned 

systems PLT, dive PLT, MMS PLT, and combatant craft PLT. 

1. Unmanned Systems PLT. The UUV team uses the Mk 18 Mod 1 

UUV to search for and map underwater objects in the VSW and SW regions with its 

onboard side-scan sonar. The Mk 18 Mod 1 can perform reconnaissance via hydrographic 

and side-scan sonar surveys from the seaward edge of the SZ to the deep water region. The 

vehicle is small, capable of deployment by two people, simple to program, and can be 

launched and recovered from a small vessel or boat without a crane or special handling 

equipment. Mk 18 Mod 1 can operate for over 20 hours on battery power before recharging 
Appendix B 

B-24 JP 3-15 

and is capable of speeds over 2.5m per second. It is programmed using a laptop computer, 

and can employ sound-emitting transponders as navigational reference beacons, or its 

onboard computer can autonomously select another more appropriate navigation method 

to use. Mk 18 Mod 1 missions are preprogrammed and the vehicle runs a predetermined 

track. Acoustic signaling equipment can be used to recall UUVs. UUV operators perform 

classification of sonar images during post mission analysis. Mk 18 Mod 1 was used 

successfully during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM as it was sent out to perform wide area 

surveys. MMS were then used to inspect potential targets located by Mk 18 Mod 1, and 

EOD PLTs followed up with demolition tasks. The unmanned aerial vehicle team uses the 

radio-controlled, man-portable Silver Fox and Manta unmanned aerial vehicles to provide 

real-time, low-observable intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance as well as adversary 

and friendly laydown situational awareness via electro-optical and infrared video during 

all phases of the VSW/SW missions. They can be launched from a forward operating base 

or various small insertion craft, and recovered via in-water landing. The aircraft are 

capable of fully autonomous flight and are able to carry various payloads to enhance 

mission effectiveness and adaptability. 

2. VSW Dive PLTs. The dive PLT is comprised of three elements, each 

with 14 combat divers and an officer in charge. Divers operate in pairs with a Viper

underwater breathing apparatus and an integrated navigation sonar system. Diver missions 

may last as long as three hours, and divers are capable of conducting exploratory, 

reconnaissance, and clearance operations. Although divers are a slow asset for clandestine 

reconnaissance and exploration, they provide the best mine identification and verification 

available and are well-suited for reacquisition, identification, and clearance. As with all 

divers, environmental limitations associated with extreme cold or hot water should be taken 

into account during planning. 

3. MMS PLTs. Dolphins possess natural sonar ability, and, with proper 

training and care, can readily discriminate between MILCOs and non-MILCOs and can be 

reliably used to detect, mark, or neutralize mines or MILCOs. All three MMSs can carry 

out day or night operations and can be airlifted to a forward operating base or deployed on 

a naval vessel with a well-deck capability. In support of amphibious operations the 

dolphins can hunt mines from over the horizon into the operational area to clear boat lanes, 

and locate and mark mines for neutralization. The three MMSs assigned for use by the 

VSW TU are dolphins that are identified by system numbers. 

a. Mk 4. Dolphins trained to detect, mark, and/or neutralize moored 

mines. An animal handler on the surface controls the dolphin from a small boat. 

b. Mk 7. Dolphins trained to detect, mark, and/or neutralize bottom 

mines. The Mk 7 Mod 0 version MMS detects bottom mines proud of the bottom, and the 

Mk 7 Mod 1 version MMS detects bottom mines both proud of the bottom and buried. An 

animal handler on the surface controls the dolphin from a small boat. 

c. Mk 8. Dolphins trained to detect and mark bottom mines. The 

animal handler on the surface operates out of a low-visible craft that offers a greater degree 

of concealment than other small boats. 
Service Specific Considerations 

B-25 

4. Combatant Craft PLT. The combatant craft PLT employs the 11-

meter Zodiac to insert and extract VSW TU PLTs. A typical deployment will include four 

11-meter rigid hull inflatable boats, trailers, and two maintenance integrated services units. 
Appendix B 

B-26 JP 3-15 

Intentionally Blank 
C-1 

APPENDIX C 

HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION 

1. HDM assistance is the detection and clearance of land mines and other ERW, 

including activities related to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance 

with respect to the detection and clearance of land mines and other ERW. The Department 

of Defense (DOD) HDM assistance is authorized by Title 10, United States Code (USC), 

Section 407. The USG HMA program assists countries in relieving the suffering from the 

adverse effects of uncleared land mines and other ERW while promoting US interests. The 

DOD HMA program assists nations plagued by land mines and ERW by executing trainthe-trainer programs of instruction designed to develop indigenous capabilities for a wide 

range of HMA activities. 

2. The USG Policy Coordination Committee for Democracy, Human Rights, and 

International Operations Subgroup on HMA approves support for PNs. The DOD 

representative to this interagency Policy Coordination Committee for Democracy, Human 

Rights, and International Operations Subgroup on HMA is the Chief, HMA (Assistant 

Secretary of Defense [Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict]). DOD HDM 

assistance is a critical component of the overall USG mine action program. 

3. HMA activities are a legitimate training opportunity for US military units that have 

demining tasks on their mission-essential task list. The operational requirements for 

deployment of US military personnel in support of HMA activities are identical to the 

deployment process for other similar training operations. The training requirements on a 

unit’s mission-essential task list for wartime training and deployments may be met during 

HMA training. HMA training activities are also a key security cooperation tool available 

to a CCDR to gain training and other engagement opportunities in a specific country. 

Specifically, HMA activities can improve DOD visibility in the context of providing 

assistance to address a humanitarian need, build the capacity of the PN government, reduce 

or eliminate ERW, and build relationships with the PN government and its populace that 

can improve DOD access within a PN and/or region. DOD HMA activities typically 

include training PNs in the procedures of land mine clearance, mine risk education, and 

victims’ assistance. 

4. US forces carry out HDM assistance when the assistance promotes either the 

security interests of both the US and HN or the specific operational readiness skills of the 

members of the armed forces who participate in the activities. HDM assistance must be 

approved by the Department of State (DOS) and shall complement, and may not duplicate, 

‘‘I think we do agree on one central goal, and that is the need to end the threat 

that land mines pose to civilians. The best way to do that is to proceed full speed 

ahead with the job of pulling mines from the soil like the noxious weeds that they 

are. I am proud that the United States is far and away the world leader in mine 

removal programs.’’ 

Madeleine K. Albright 

Secretary of State, 8 April 1999
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-15 

any other form of social or economic assistance that may be provided to the country 

concerned by other USG departments or agencies. 

5. By law, DOD personnel are restricted in the extent to which they may actively 

participate in ERW clearance and physical security and stockpile management operations 

during HCA. Under Title 10, USC, Section 401(a)(1), Military Departments may carry out 

certain HCA activities in conjunction with authorized military operations of the armed 

forces in a foreign nation. Title 10, USC, Section 407(e)(1), defines the term HDM 

assistance (as part of HCA activities) as detection and clearance of land mines and other 

ERW, and includes the activities related to the furnishing of education, training, and 

technical assistance with respect to explosive safety, the detection and clearance of land 

mines and other ERW, and the disposal, demilitarization, physical security, and stockpile 

management of potentially dangerous stockpiles of explosive ordnance. However, under 

Title 10, USC, Section 407(a)(3), members of the US Armed Forces while providing HDM 

assistance shall not engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of land mines or 

other ERW, or stockpiled conventional munitions (unless the member does so for the 

concurrent purpose of supporting a US military operation). Additionally, members of the 

US Armed Forces shall not provide such HDM and civic assistance as part of a military 

operation that does not involve the armed forces. Under DOD policy, the restrictions in 

Title 10, USC, Section 407, also apply to DOD civilian personnel. 

6. A country experiencing the adverse effects of uncleared ERW may request US 

assistance. The country must formally request help from DOS through the US embassy. 

The country team provides a copy of the request to the pertinent GCC. Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency (DSCA) assists the CJCS, US Special Operations Command, GCCs, 

host countries, and other organizations in planning for, establishing, and executing mine 

action programs. 

7. All requests for DOD HMA training and activities, including testing of new 

demining technology in foreign countries, will be vetted through Chief, HMA (Assistant 

Secretary of Defense [Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict]). This office will 

conduct all interagency coordination as required. 

8. DOD HMA activities are funded from the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and 

Civic Aid (DSCA) appropriation. The combatant commands may purchase limited 

demining equipment and supplies necessary for the conduct of the trainer program and 

transfer the equipment to the PN or designated agent upon completion of the DOD training 

program. 

Further information may be obtained from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Instruction (CJCSI) 3207.01, Military Support to Humanitarian Mine Actions; DOD 

Humanitarian Demining Research and Development homepage: 

http://www.humanitariandemining.org; and the United Nations Electronic Mine 

Information Network: http://www.mineaction.org. 
D-1 

APPENDIX D 

REFERENCES 

The development of JP 3-15 is based upon the following primary references. 

1. Public Laws 

a. Title 10, USC. 

b. Title 14, USC. 

2. Strategic Guidance and Policy 

a. National Military Strategy of the United States of America. 

b. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the 

Department of Homeland Security on the Use of the US Coast Guard Capabilities and 

Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy. 

c. PPD-37, US Landmine Policy.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications 

a. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of 

Force for US Forces. 

b. CJCSI 3150.25E, Joint Lessons Learned Program. 

c. CJCSI 3207.01C, Department of Defense Support to Humanitarian Mine Action. 

d. CJCS Manual 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning 

Formats and Guidance. 

e. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

f. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

g. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

h. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations. 

i. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

j. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations. 

k. JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations. 

l. JP 3-13, Information Operations. 
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 3-15 

m. JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations.

n. JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations. 

o. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. 

p. JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations. 

4. Multi-Service Publications 

a. ATTP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8, Combined Arms Mobility Operations.

b. ATTP 4-32.2/MCRP 3-17.2B/NTTP 3-02.4.1/AFTTP 3-2.12, Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Unexploded Ordnance. 

c. ATTP 4-32.16/MCRP 3-17.2C/NTTP 3-02.5/AFTTP 3-2.32, Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 

d. FM 3-34.170/MCWP 3-17.4, Engineer Reconnaissance. 

e. FM 3-34.210/MCRP 3-17.2D, Explosive Hazards Operations. 

f. FM 3-34-214/MCRP 3-17.7L, Explosives and Demolitions. 

g. FM 4-30.51/MCRP 3-17.2A, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Procedures. 

h. MCRP 3-31.2A/NTTP 3-15.24, Mine Countermeasures in Support of Amphibious 

Operations. 

i. MCWP 3-31.2/NWP 3-15, Naval Mine Warfare, Volume I. 

j. MCWP 5-12.1/NWP 1-14M, Commandant of the Coast Guard Publication 

P5800.7A, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. 

k. NTTP 3-02.1/MCWP 3-31.5, Ship-to-Shore Movement. 

l. Army Techniques Publication 3-37.34/MCWP 3-17.6, Survivability Operations. 

m. Army Techniques Publication 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5, Combined Arms 

Countermobility Operations. 

5. United States Army Publications 

a. ATTP 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. 

b. FM 3-34, Engineer Operations.

c. FM 3-90.6, Brigade Combat Team.
References 

D-3 

d. FM 3-90.61, Brigade Special Troops Battalion.

e. FM 3-90.119, Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations. 

f. FM 6-99, US Army Report and Message Formats.

g. Army Techniques Publication 3-34.22, Engineer Operations—Brigade Combat 

Team and Below. 

6. United States Navy Publications 

a. NTTP 3-15.1, Maritime Mining. 

b. NTTP 3-15.21, Surface Mine Countermeasures (SMCM) Operations.

c. NTTP 3-15.22, Airborne Mine Countermeasures Operations.

d. NTTP 3-15.23, Underwater Mine Countermeasures (UMCM).

e. NWP 3-02.4, Explosive Ordnance Disposal.

f. NWP 3-05, Naval Special Warfare.

g. NWP 3-15, Naval Mine Warfare.

h. NWP 4-12, Navy Salvage Operations.

i. Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization Flight Manual A1-

H53ME-NFM-000, Navy Model MH-53E Helicopters. 

7. United States Marine Corps Publications 

a. MCWP 3-17, Engineering Operations.

b. MCWP 3-17.2, MAGTF Explosive Ordnance Disposal.

8. Other Publications 

a. Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-1 (C), Vol. I, Allied Maritime Tactical 

Instructions. 

b. ATP-1 (C), Vol. II, Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures. 

c. ATP-6C (Navy) (Air), Volume I, Allied Doctrine of Mine Warfare, Policies, and 

Principles. 

d. ATP-24 (C) (Navy), Tactical Instructions and Procedures for the Conduct of Mine 

Warfare Operations. 
Appendix D 

D-4 JP 3-15 

e. Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 2036, Land Minefield Laying, Marking, 

Recording, and Reporting Procedures. 

f. STANAG 2430, Land Force Combat Engineer Messages, Reports, and Returns 

(AEngrP-2). 

g. STANAG 2485, Countermine Operations in Land Warfare.

h. TC 20-32-3, Foreign Mine Handbook (Balkan States).

i. TC 20-32-4, Foreign Mine Handbook (Asia).

j. TC 20-32-5, Commander’s Reference Guide: Land Mine and Explosive Hazards 

(Iraq). 

k. Allied Procedural Publication-4, Allied Formatted and Standard Messages.

l. Maritime Tactical Publication-6(c) Volume I, Naval Mine Warfare Principles. 

m. Maritime Tactical Publication-6(c) Volume II, Naval Mine Countermeasures 

Operations Planning and Evaluation. 

n. Maritime Tactical Publication-24(c) Volume I, Naval Mine-Countermeasures 

Tactics and Execution. 

o. 1980 United Nations Convention on Conventional Weapons, especially Protocol II 

and IV. 

p. 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 

Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction. 

q. Variable Message Format Message Number K05.16, Land Minefield Laying 

Report, TIDP-TE, Vol. III, Annex A. 
E-1 

APPENDIX E 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

1. User Comments 

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine 

Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments 

should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and 

appearance. 

2. Authorship 

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor 

for this publication is the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (J-4). 

3. Supersession 

This publication supersedes JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint 

Operations, 17 June 2011. 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine (DD JED), Attn: Joint 

Doctrine Division, 7000 Joint Staff (J-7), Washington, DC, 20318-7000 or 

email:js.pentagon.j7.list.dd-je-d-jdd-all@mail.mil. 

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint 

Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View 

Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697, and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force 

Development, J-7/JED. 

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change 

source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a 

proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other 

organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents 

reflected in this publication are initiated. 

5. Lessons Learned 

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force 

readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, 

training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint 

Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons 

learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative 

resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness 
Appendix E 

E-2 JP 3-15 

of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine 

development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations, 

events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become 

institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are 

routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the 

development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil or 

http://www.jllis.smil.mil. 

6. Distribution of Publications 

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is 

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be 

IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview, 

Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD 

Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information. 

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at 

https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (NIPRNET) and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp 

(SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and 

Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base AnacostiaBolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100. 

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, 

the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CDROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally 

reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and CS agencies. 
GL-1 

GLOSSARY 

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS

ABCT armored brigade combat team 

AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures 

AHD antihandling device 

AMC Air Mobility Command 

AMCM airborne mine countermeasures 

AOA amphibious objective area 

AP antipersonnel 

APL antipersonnel land mine 

ATP allied tactical publication 

ATTP Army tactics, techniques, and procedures 

AVL anti-vehicle land mine 

BCT brigade combat team 

BEB brigade engineer battalion 

C2 command and control 

CA civil affairs 

CATF commander, amphibious task force 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CCDR combatant commander 

CCW 1980 United Nations Convention on Conventional 

Weapons 

CEB combat engineer battalion 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CLF commander, landing force 

COA course of action 

COMUSPACFLT Commander, United States Pacific Fleet 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CONUS continental United States 

COP common operational picture 

CS combat support 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOS Department of State 

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency 

EH explosive hazard 

EHCC explosive hazards coordination cell 

EOD explosive ordnance disposal 

ERT engineer reconnaissance team 

ERW explosive remnants of war 

ESB engineer support battalion 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-15 

FM field manual (Army) 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GCE ground combat element (MAGTF) 

HCA humanitarian and civic assistance 

HDM humanitarian demining 

HMA humanitarian mine action 

HN host nation 

IBCT infantry brigade combat team 

IED improvised explosive device 

JFC joint force commander 

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

environment 

JP joint publication 

JPP joint planning process 

K-Kill catastrophic kill 

LCE logistics combat element (MAGTF) 

LF landing force 

LOC line of communications 

LZ landing zone 

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force 

MCM mine countermeasures 

MCMC mine countermeasures commander 

MCMREP mine countermeasure report 

MCMRON mine countermeasures squadron 

MCRP Marine Corps reference publication 

MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication 

METT-T mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support 

available-time available 

MILCO minelike contact 

MILDEC military deception 

MIW mine warfare 

MIWC mine warfare commander 

M-Kill mobility kill 

MMS marine mammal system 

MP military police (Army and Marine) 

MPSRON maritime pre-positioning ships squadron 
Glossary 

GL-3 

NCC Navy component commander 

NMC Navy Munitions Command 

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures 

NWP Navy warfare publication 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operation order 

OPTASK operation task 

PLT platoon 

PN partner nation 

PPD Presidential policy directive 

RCT regimental combat team 

ROE rules of engagement 

SBCT Stryker brigade combat team 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SLOC sea line of communications 

SMCM surface mine countermeasures 

SMWDC Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center 

SPOTREP spot report 

STANAG standardization agreement (NATO) 

SW shallow water 

SZ surf zone 

TC training circular 

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 

TU task unit 

UMCM underwater mine countermeasures 

UN United Nations 

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

USAF United States Air Force 

USC United States Code 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USFF United States Fleet Forces Command 

USG United States Government 

USN United States Navy 

UUV unmanned underwater vessel 

UXO unexploded explosive ordnance 

VSW very shallow water 

WBIED waterborne improvised explosive device 
GL-4 JP 3-15 

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

anti-vehicle land mine. A mine designed to immobilize or destroy a vehicle. Also called 

AVL. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

arming. As applied to explosives, weapons, and ammunition, the changing from a safe 

condition to a state of readiness for initiation. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

barrier. A coordinated series of natural or man-made obstacles designed or employed to 

channel, direct, restrict, delay, or stop the movement of an opposing force and to 

impose additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment on the opposing force. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

barrier, obstacle, and mine warfare plan. A comprehensive, coordinated plan that 

includes responsibilities; general location of unspecified and specific barriers, 

obstacles, and minefields; special instructions; limitations; coordination; and 

completion times; and may designate locations of obstacle zones or belts. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

bottom mine. A mine with negative buoyancy that remains on the seabed. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

canalize. To restrict operations to a narrow zone by use of existing or reinforcing obstacles 

or by fire or bombing. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

clearing operation. An operation designed to clear or neutralize all mines and obstacles 

from a route or area. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

contact mine. A mine detonated by physical contact. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

conventional mines. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

defensive minefield. 1. In naval mine warfare, a minefield laid in international waters or 

international straits with the declared intention of controlling shipping in defense of 

sea communications. 2. In land mine warfare, a minefield laid in accordance with an 

established plan to prevent a penetration between positions and to strengthen the 

defense of the positions themselves. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

degaussing. The process whereby a ship’s magnetic field is reduced by the use of 

electromagnetic coils, permanent magnets, or other means. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-15) 

denial measure. An action to hinder or deny the enemy the use of territory, personnel, or 

facilities to include destruction, removal, contamination, or erection of obstructions. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 
Glossary 

GL-5 

exclusive economic zone. A maritime zone adjacent to the territorial sea that may not 

extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 

territorial sea is measured. Also called EEZ. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

explosive hazard. Any material posing a potential threat that contains an explosive 

component such as unexploded explosive ordnance, booby traps, improvised 

explosive devices, captured enemy ammunition, and bulk explosives. Also called EH. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

flame field expedient. Simple, handmade device used to produce flame or illumination. 

Also called FFE. (Approved for replacement of “flame field expedients” and its 

definition in JP 1-02.) 

hasty breach. The creation of lanes through enemy minefields by expedient methods such 

as blasting with demolitions, pushing rollers or disabled vehicles through the 

minefields when the time factor does not permit detailed reconnaissance, deliberate 

breaching, or bypassing the obstacle. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

humanitarian mine action. Activities that strive to reduce the social, economic, and 

environmental impact of land mines, unexploded ordnance, and small arms 

ammunition. Also called HMA. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

influence mine. A mine actuated by the effect of a target on some physical condition in 

the vicinity of the mine or on radiations emanating from the mine. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

influence sweep. A sweep designed to produce an influence similar to that produced by a 

ship and thus actuate mines. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

magnetic mine. A mine that responds to the magnetic field of a target. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

mechanical sweep. In naval mine warfare, any sweep used with the object of physically 

contacting the mine or its appendages. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

mine. 1. In land mine warfare, a munition placed under, on or near the ground or other 

surface area and designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a 

person or vehicle. 2. In naval mine warfare, an explosive device laid in the water with 

the intention of damaging or sinking ships or of deterring shipping from entering an 

area. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

mine countermeasures. All methods for preventing or reducing damage or danger from 

mines. Also called MCM. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

minefield. 1. In land warfare, an area of ground containing mines emplaced with or 

without a pattern. 2. In naval warfare, an area of water containing mines emplaced 

with or without a pattern. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 3-15 

minefield record. A complete written record of all pertinent information concerning a 

minefield, submitted on a standard form by the officer in charge of the emplacement 

operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

minefield report. An oral, electronic, or written communication concerning mining 

activities (friendly or enemy) submitted in a standard format by the fastest secure 

means available. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

minehunting. Employment of air, surface, or subsurface sensor and neutralization systems 

to locate and dispose of individual mines in a known field, or to verify the presence or 

absence of mines in a given area. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

minesweeping. The technique of clearing mines using either mechanical sweeping to 

remove, disturb, or otherwise neutralize the mine; explosive sweeping to cause 

sympathetic detonations, damage, or displace the mine; or influence sweeping to 

produce either the acoustic or magnetic influence required to detonate the mine. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

mine warfare. The strategic, operational, and tactical use of mines and mine 

countermeasures either by emplacing mines to degrade the enemy’s capabilities to 

wage land, air, and maritime warfare or by countering of enemy-emplaced mines to 

permit friendly maneuver or use of selected land or sea areas. Also called MIW. 

(Approved for incorporation into1-02.) 

moored mine. A contact or influence-operated mine of positive buoyancy held below the 

surface by a mooring attached to a sinker or anchor on the bottom. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

networked munitions. Remotely controlled, interconnected, weapons systems designed 

to provide rapidly emplaced ground-based countermobility and protection capability 

through scalable application of lethal and nonlethal means. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

nonpersistent mine. Mine that remains active for a predetermined period of time until 

self-destruction, self-neutralization, or self-deactivation renders the mine inactive. 

(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

nuisance minefield. A minefield laid to delay and disorganize the enemy and to hinder 

the use of an area or route. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

obstacle. Any natural or man-made obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, 

or block the movement of an opposing force, and to impose additional losses in 

personnel, time, and equipment on the opposing force. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

obstacle belt. A brigade-level command and control measure, normally depicted 

graphically, to show where within an obstacle zone the ground tactical commander 

plans to limit friendly obstacle employment and focus the defense. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-7 

obstacle clearing. The total elimination or neutralization of obstacles. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

obstacle intelligence. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

obstacle restricted areas. A command and control measure used to limit the type or 

number of obstacles within an area. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

obstacle zone. A division-level command and control measure to designate specific land 

areas where lower echelons are allowed to employ tactical obstacles. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

operational control authority. The naval commander responsible within a specified 

geographical area for the naval control of all merchant shipping under Allied naval 

control. Also called OCA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

ordnance. Explosives, chemicals, pyrotechnics, and similar stores, e.g., bombs, guns and 

ammunition, flares, smoke, or napalm. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

oscillating mine. A hydrostatically controlled mine that maintains a pre-set depth below 

the surface of the water independent of the rise and fall of the tide. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

passive mine. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

persistent mine. A land mine, other than nuclear or chemical, that is not designed to selfdestruct; is designed to be emplaced by hand or mechanical means; and can be buried 

or surface emplaced. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

phony minefield. An area free of live mines used to simulate a minefield, or section of a 

minefield, with the object of deceiving the enemy. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 3-15) 

pressure mine. 1. In land mine warfare, a mine having a fuze that responds to the direct 

pressure of a target. 2. In naval mine warfare, a mine having a circuit that responds to 

the hydrodynamic pressure field of a target. (Approved for incorporation into 

JP 1-02.) 

proof. In mine warfare, to verify that a breached lane is free of live mines by passing a 

mine roller or other mine-resistant vehicle through as the lead vehicle. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

protective minefield. 1. In land mine warfare, a minefield employed to assist a unit in its 

local, close-in protection. 2. In naval mine warfare, a minefield emplaced in friendly 

territorial waters to protect ports, harbors, anchorages, coasts, and coastal routes. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

Q-route. A system of preplanned shipping lanes in mined or potentially mined waters 

used to minimize the area the mine countermeasures commander has to keep clear of 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-15 

mines in order to provide safe passage for friendly shipping. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-15) 

recovery. 1. In air (aviation) operations, that phase of a mission that involves the return 

of an aircraft to a land base or platform afloat. (JP 3-52) 2. The retrieval of a mine 

from the location where emplaced. (JP 3-15) 3. In personnel recovery, actions taken 

to physically gain custody of isolated personnel and return them to friendly control. 

(JP 3-50) 4. Actions taken to extricate damaged or disabled equipment for return to 

friendly control or repair at another location. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-34) 

reduction. The creation of lanes through a minefield or obstacle to allow passage of the 

attacking ground force. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

reinforcing obstacles. Those obstacles specifically constructed, emplaced, or detonated 

through military effort and designed to strengthen existing terrain to disrupt, fix, turn, 

or block enemy movement. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

reserved obstacles. Those demolition obstacles that are deemed critical to the plan for 

which the authority to detonate is reserved by the designating commander. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

rising mine. In naval mine warfare, a mine having positive buoyancy, which is released 

from a sinker by a ship influence or by a timing device. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02.) 

sterilizer. In mine warfare, a device included in mines to render the mine permanently 

inoperative on expiration of a pre-determined time after laying. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-15) 

tactical minefield. A minefield that is employed to directly attack enemy maneuver as 

part of a formation obstacle plan and is laid to delay, channel, or break up an enemy 

advance, giving the defending element a positional advantage over the attacker. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-15) 

tactical obstacle. An obstacle employed to disrupt enemy formations, to turn them into a 

desired area, to fix them in position under direct and indirect fires, or to block enemy 

penetrations. (Approved for replacement of “tactical obstacles” and its definition in 

JP 1-02.) 

terrain intelligence. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

 
Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

 JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

 JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

 JSDS prepares JS staffing package

 JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for 

signature 

 LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first 

draft (FD)

 PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC

 FD comment matrix adjudication

 JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to 

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system

 Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment 

matrix

 FC joint working group 

STEP #4 - Maintenance

 JP published and continuously 

assessed by users 

 Formal assessment begins 

24-27 months following 

publication

 Revision begins 3.5 years 

after publication

 Each JP revision is completed 

no later than 5 years after 

signature

STEP #1 - Initiation

 Joint doctrine development 

community (JDDC) submission to fill 

extant operational void

 Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts frontend analysis

 Joint Doctrine Planning Conference 

validation

 Program directive (PD) development 

and staffing/joint working group

 PD includes scope, references, 

outline, milestones, and draft 

authorship

 JS J-7 approves and releases PD to 

lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant 

command, JS directorate) 

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT

DOCTRINE

JP 1

LOGISTICS COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE PLANS SYSTEM

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

OPERATIONS

JP 3-0

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint 

Publication (JP) 3-15 Operations is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below 

illustrates an overview of the development process: