1

T H E T H R E AT O F U R B A N C R I M E I N A F R I C A 

Violent crime in Africa’s cities is endemic and 

in many places worsening. Africa as a whole has a 

homicide rate of 20 per 100,000 (in Europe it is 5.4, 

in North America 6.5, and in South America 25.9).1

The problem is particularly severe in some urban areas. 

Kinshasa’s homicide rate is estimated to be as high as 

112 homicides per 100,000. The Nigerian police have 

recorded consistently rising rates of murder and attempted murder over the last 20 years.2

 Rates of armed 

robbery in Africa are also very high. In Nairobi, 37 

percent of residents reported being victims. The rate is 

27 percent in some Mozambican cities and 21 percent 

in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).3

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

Nonstate Policing: Expanding the Scope 

for Tackling Africa’s Urban Violence

By Bruce Baker

A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

◆ Worsening urban violence is placing increasing demands on Africa’s police departments.

◆ African police forces are typically woefully underresourced, inadequately trained, unaccountable, and 

distrusted by local communities, leaving them ineffective in addressing these security challenges.

◆ Nonstate or community-based policing groups often enjoy local support and knowledge, accessibility, 

and effectiveness. Accordingly, collaborative state-nonstate policing partnerships represent an 

underrecognized vehicle for substantially expanding security coverage in Africa’s urban areas in the 

short term at reasonable cost.

HIGHLIGHTS

NO. 7 / SEPTEMBER 2010

Research at a Cape Town hospital revealed 

that 94 percent of patients had at some point faced 

exposure to violence.4 South Africa Police Service 

figures also show an alarming rise in sexual crimes, 

with 27 percent of men indicating they had committed rape.5

Whatever the accuracy of crime statistics in Africa, the perception of growing danger has generated 

widespread anxiety. In Lagos, Nigeria, 70 percent of 

respondents in a city-wide survey were fearful of being victims of crime.6

 In Nairobi, more than half of 

the citizens worry about crime “all the time” or “very 

often.”7 A World Bank study in Zambia uncovered 

such a significant fear of crime that it affected the 

work decisions of teachers.8 Anecdotal accounts 
2

among city dwellers across Africa indicate that urban crime rates have increased rapidly in the last two 

decades, contributing to pervasive fears that impede 

commerce, fray social capital, and undermine normal urban activity. Violent crime is a daily threat for 

many city dwellers.

Such high crime rates have many contributing 

factors. To a large extent they are not surprising given 

Africa’s poverty coupled with its proximity to wealth 

in cities. The continent’s many protracted conflicts 

have also undoubtedly played a role. Many African 

cities have either directly faced war or suffered the social and economic consequences of conflict elsewhere 

in the country. These conflicts have produced violent 

political cultures and have traumatized, divided, and 

further impoverished societies. They have also fostered the availability of firearms. The percentage of 

city households claiming to own firearms in 2005 was 

18.3 in South Africa, 22.1 in Namibia, 31.1 in the 

DRC, and 56.3 in Burundi.9

Global processes also lie behind Africa’s rising 

urban crime. While the continent’s growing integration with international trade has introduced new 

commodities and market opportunities, it also has 

attracted illicit businesses, protection rackets, smuggling, and money laundering. New understandings 

of acceptable practices of livelihood formation have 

accompanied rising organized crime.10 Now, the path 

to success is often perceived as having less to do with 

education and hard work than with criminality, illicit 

deals, and trickery.

Africa’s weak security services and large numbers 

of unemployed or underemployed people desperate to 

earn a living make it an attractive base for international criminals. The United Nations (UN) Office 

on Drugs and Crime has identified West Africa, with 

its ineffective policing and bribable governments and 

security forces, as an emerging narcoregion that provides a convenient halfway stop for Latin American 

drug traders exporting to Europe. Such international 

crime offers insurgents, militias, extreme political 

groups, and terrorist organizations opportunities for 

financing their activities. For instance, Al Qaeda in 

the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is reported to allow, 

at a price, heavily armed convoys transporting drugs 

from West Africa across territory it controls.11 Other 

terrorist groups based in Africa support themselves 

by kidnapping.

The upsurge in urban crime is aggravating other 

sources of instability. It deters the building of sustainable political institutions, economic growth, and 

social reconciliation.12 High crime rates similarly 

undermine trust in and respect for government, constraining its ability to provide leadership and foster 

popular participation. These concerns, in turn, depress both domestic and international investment 

and further weaken economic prospects.

The growing threats to stability posed by these 

internally focused security challenges underscore the 

expanding importance of Africa’s police forces for 

national security. Indeed, there is a growing recognition that Africa’s security forces need to be realigned 

toward the police to better meet its contemporary 

internal security challenges. 

THE WEAKNESS OF AFRICA’S POLICE

The sobering reality, however, is that the police 

in Africa have not had great success in dealing with 

urban crime. A difficult environment, the police 

force’s traditional disinterest in the poor, and lack of 

resources both in terms of personnel and in skills and 

equipment hamper its ability to be effective.

Too often police presence in the high-density 

locations where most city dwellers live is only sporadic and the number of officers available is very 

small (see table 1). Those who are available are commonly undertrained and may even lack literacy skills. 

Moreover, African governments often severely lack 

resources, institutional capacity, and in some cases 

Bruce Baker is a Professor of African Security at 

Coventry University, United Kingdom.

“the growing threats to stability 

posed by these internally focused 

security challenges underscore the 

expanding importance of Africa’s 

police forces for 

national security”
3

control of territory. Available resources have commonly been tilted heavily toward the military over 

the police. This preference for the military has weakened the police, who lack management and technical skills, interagency coordination, communication 

equipment, transport, and even lighting, office space, 

filing cabinets, stationery, computers, uniforms, and 

forensic labs—all undermining effectiveness.

Compounding these challenges is a long history of police neglect, corruption, and impunity 

common in Africa, having its roots in part in coercive colonial policing practices. One continentwide analysis argues that the police in most African countries are “significantly brutal, corrupt, 

inefficient, unresponsive and unaccountable to 

the generality of the population.”13 Indeed, multiple reports from Amnesty International, the International Bar Association, the Commonwealth 

Human Rights Initiative, and other respected 

international research institutes have frequently 

documented and criticized police behavior across 

the continent.14 Afrobarometer data found that only 

a minority of citizens in countries such as Benin, 

Zambia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya trusted 

their police force “a lot” or “somewhat.”

When police agencies in Africa are working in 

postconflict situations, they face an even tougher environment. Commonly, in the immediate aftermath, 

it is found that police personnel have abandoned 

their posts, been killed, or are no longer suitable for 

further employment because they committed human 

rights abuses. For instance, during Sierra Leone’s civil 

war approximately 900 police officers were killed and 

a considerable number suffered amputation. As a result, the size of the police force was reduced from 

9,317 to 6,600.15 For years after the civil war, police 

commanders across Sierra Leone reported a serious 

lack of officers, vehicles, land phones, and accommodation for the officers.16

Thus, in a postconflict situation there is a 

double dilemma. On the one hand, mechanisms 

of social order have been undermined, poverty has 

been exacerbated, and there is a surfeit of weapons and unemployed excombatants. On the other 

hand, the available resources and security personnel have been reduced, and respect for the agencies 

may have been diminished still further because of 

conflict abuses.

Many African governments have introduced 

new police restructuring, training, and oversight 

bodies but with limited success. Accordingly, few 

citizens expect a rapid transformation of policing and 

police forces. Rather, many continue to doubt their 

governments’ ability and willingness to finance the 

necessary steps that promise police availability, accountability, integrity, effectiveness, and community 

partnership. Their skepticism is reinforced by continuing media accounts of police abuse and collaboration with criminals and citizens’ daily encounters 

paying bribes to police to allow them through traffic 

check points17 or to investigate crimes.

This experience has driven many citizens to look 

elsewhere for protection. As one Nairobi citizen said, 

“If you do not make an extra arrangement for security 

beyond what the state provides, then you are vulnerable to attacks.”18 In short, official police protection is insufficient to address the growing violence 

experienced in many African cities. Even local police 

“...[there] is a long history of 

police neglect, corruption and 

impunity in Africa...”

ESTIMATED RATIOS OF POLICE OFFICERS TO POPULATION IN AFRICA

Guinea Bissau 1: 2,403 Liberia 1: 857

Uganda 1: 1,839 Nigeria 1: 722

Rwanda 1: 1,454 Sierra Leone 1: 625

Cf. United States 1: 346–500; Jamaica 1: 400; England and Wales 1: 402; India 1: 625; Indonesia 1: 1,145

Source: Author’s Research
4

commanders recognize the need to supplement their 

weakly performing personnel.

P O L I C I N G B Y C O M M U N I T I E S : 

UNRECOGNIZED PROVIDERS

While police in Africa’s cities are almost invariably weak and underresourced, citizens are not without policing services. In fact, such services are widely 

available to the majority—but they are provided by 

nonstate actors. In Africa it is not always appreciated 

that nonstate actors are so numerous and diverse that 

they are the dominant police providers, often enjoying local ownership, cultural relevance, accessibility, 

sustainability, and effectiveness. It is estimated that 

more than 80 percent of justice services are delivered 

by nonstate providers in Africa.19

The nonstate sector is so diverse that generalizations, whether dismissive or laudatory, are not useful. 

Africa’s numerous policing providers include customary leaders, religious organizations, ethnic associations, youth groups, street associations, work-based 

associations, community police forums, neighborhood organizations, local and international security 

companies, and local entrepreneurs. Contrary to 

popular opinion, not all are militants or vigilantes 

prone to violence and abuse. Indeed, they are often 

the preferred police in Africa’s cities. A survey of four 

Nigerian states found 16 nonstate policing organizations dealing with crime, which were citizens’ preferred choice 38 percent to 89 percent of the time.20

Nonstate police are for the most part within 

walking distance, speak local languages, and do not 

use formal legal terminology or procedures. A response is more or less guaranteed, thus making them 

more familiar and accessible. Required payments are 

usually relatively small. With their local knowledge, 

they commonly resolve neighbor disputes, restrain 

antisocial behavior, protect homes at night, and 

return stolen goods more consistently and effectively than official police. And they are culturally 

relevant in that they are policing the local prevailing

norms about what is a crime and how it should be 

addressed so as to restore community harmony. They 

exist not just because the state police are ineffective 

in enforcing order, but because the police are often 

perceived as enforcing an alien, inappropriate, or 

erroneous order.

Undoubtedly, some of the criticisms of local 

nonstate actors are valid. Some are indeed prone 

to human rights abuses and may be unreliable, have 

poor skills, and lack both transparency and vertical 

accountability. Yet most are not violent autonomous 

groups but frequently civic-minded, concerned citizens who regularly collaborate with African police 

forces.21 Such links are often welcome on the part 

of the local police commanders because they are 

unable to fulfill all of their responsibilities without 

local assistance. For nonstate actors, despite their 

awareness of the failings of the police, links with the 

police offer legitimacy and access to resources. They 

may also help ensure the police are more efficient 

and accountable. Typically collaboration involves 

sharing intelligence, equipment, training, and operational responsibilities.

Collaboration between state and nonstate police is common in African cities. The Rwandan 

government has authorized volunteers at the lowest 

level of local government to undertake everyday policing. Thus, they are frequently the policing agents 

of first choice. These authorities keep records of 

strangers to neighborhoods, report deviant behavior 

to officials, undertake dispute resolution, conduct 

patrols, and investigate minor crimes. Operating in 

such a restricted area of perhaps no more than 50 

to 200 households might seem to be excessive state 

surveillance that can be hijacked for political ends. 

On the other hand, according to local surveys, it 

does reduce urban crime remarkably.

Faced with rising armed crime they could not 

contain, the Liberian police, in consultation with 

community leaders, have established security zones 

“in Africa it is not always 

appreciated that nonstate actors 

are so numerous and diverse that 

they are the dominant police 

providers, often enjoying local 

ownership, cultural relevance, 

accessibility, sustainability, 

and effectiveness”
5

in Monrovia each with their own local watch teams. 

The teams patrol the suburbs at night, sometimes 

with the police, frequenting areas few police are willing to patrol by themselves. Working with the police, 

watch team violence against criminals has been restrained and police presence extended.

A southern Sudan market association in Yei has 

arranged with the police that when any traders are arrested they are to be handed over to the association. 

The market association then resolves the issue and 

reports their resolution to the police. While such an 

arrangement may obscure due process, it is regarded 

as a success by both the police in reducing their work 

load and by the association in preventing the escalation of relatively small disputes into the slow and 

expensive criminal justice system.

Another work-based organization, the taxi-driver’s association in Uganda, has an agreement with the 

police that allows the association to police taxi and 

bus parks regarding traffic offenses, pickpockets, and 

disputes between drivers and passengers. For their 

part the police offer the associations’ members training in crime control. When last surveyed it was seen 

as working in the interests of all.

Turning from informal groups to the commercial 

sector, a state–private sector partnership arrangement 

has produced positive results in Cape Town, South 

Africa. City center policing is run by Cape Town 

Partnership, which is an organization established 

and controlled by the city council and the business 

community. Private security guards patrol the area 

and secure public spaces in the city center. They 

maintain contact with the city police control room 

by radio and also supervise the area’s closed circuit 

television (CCTV). There are concerns that this approach merely displaces crime and that “undesirables” 

such as street merchants, the homeless, and beggars 

are “criminalized.” Nevertheless, the program is seen 

as a great success in creating a more secure city center 

and an attractive investment and tourist destination.

These are not isolated illustrations. Across Africa’s cities a large variety of actors provide policing, 

many in informal (and sometimes formal) partnerships with local police. Commanders of local police 

who participate in such collaborations recognize that 

nonstate actors present opportunities to enhance police effectiveness and institutional reputation. Further, one can argue that in the case of commercial 

security, they guard the principal economic assets of 

many African cities—banks, hotels, factories, international organizations, embassies, and even government and UN buildings. The stability gained, in turn, 

encourages further economic development.

It is true that nonstate actors lack the resources 

and skills to address international crime. Their contributions toward everyday policing, however, afford 

the official police greater latitude to redirect some 

of their resources to the threats of international and 

organized crime. Nonstate actors also offer the police 

a vital intelligence network of such criminal activity. 

Moreover, inasmuch as nonstate policing extends acceptable security provision, it promotes social equity, 

the lack of which is often argued as a contributing 

factor in the rise of crime. In short, there are sufficient success stories of nonstate policing at the local 

level to suggest that innovative national frameworks 

for security partnerships between state and nonstate 

actors can be used widely and systematically for addressing rising urban crime in Africa.

A P R O G R A M F O R TA C K L I N G 

URBAN CRIME

Programs for addressing urban crime in Africa 

must take into account two facts: One, the state 

police are too weak to undertake the task of crime 

prevention and investigation by themselves. Two, 

there are in fact many nonstate actors who currently 

provide the majority of everyday policing in cities. 

To establish a state police service sufficiently large 

and equipped to serve all citizens would take years 

and would be beyond many African state budgets to 

achieve or to sustain. Conversely, supporting nonstate 

actors already on the ground and who meet certain 

standards is much less costly and likely to be more 

sustainable. What is needed, then, is a coordinated 

program of targeted assistance for community-based 

“...across Africa’s cities a large 

variety of actors provide policing, 

many in informal partnerships 

with local police”
6

and commercial nonstate policing in addition to the 

support given to state policing.22

Such a program would not need to start from 

scratch with unfamiliar actors but could draw on 

existing though often overlooked successful local 

partnerships that contribute tangible results and efficiencies. By facilitating such partnerships, international donors can also help address concerns of poor 

and marginalized communities that make up sizable 

portions of Africa’s growing urban areas. Partnerships 

also prevent nonstate actors and state police from 

being totally autonomous and acting with impunity. 

Through semiformal partnerships, nonstate actors 

more often integrate and conform to generally accepted policing standards.23

State-nonstate policing partnerships also boost 

efficiency and performance. Some might fear that 

support to nonstate actors will divert precious resources away from formal policing. However, most 

nonstate actors require fairly minimal support. 

They do not use expensive buildings, computers, 

and vehicles or pay high salaries. A small investment in nonstate actors produces benefits for the 

state police in terms of increased personnel on the 

ground and enhanced intelligence. Moreover, this 

can be done alongside state police capacity building initiatives. As such, it constitutes no significant threat to police productivity. On the contrary, 

partnership permits a division of labor where the 

police can concentrate on their most essential 

functions and make use of their special skills, authority, and expertise while nonstate actors can 

undertake their own low-level and everyday policing needs (with backup support from state police in 

cases where they cannot cope). To better capitalize 

on these advantages, several priority steps should 

be taken.

Know the actors and set benchmarks for partnership. It is vital first to map nonstate policing groups, 

for it is not always obvious who is working in the field, 

what they are doing, and how. From such a mapping 

exercise it is important to identify the policing groups 

who should be supported. Reliable and effective nonstate partners will be those groups most open to reform 

and, above all, those that enjoy widespread local support. Nonstate police actors will perform best when they 

are perceived as legitimate and effective by those they 

are policing. However, the bar of acceptability should 

not be set so high as to require a nonstate group to meet 

current international standards. After all, few police 

forces in Africa would qualify by that criterion. What is 

important is that a policing group has local credibility, is 

not criminal or abusive, and is open to reform.

Devise performance guidelines and supervisory 

mechanisms. An overarching framework of policing 

standards to guide performance, procedures, jurisdictions, interventions, and other regular activities of 

nonstate policing actors should be developed. An accreditation program that acknowledges demonstrable 

knowledge and skills of nonstate actors would also 

be beneficial. It could offer a degree of legitimacy 

to the nonstate actors and opportunities to monitor 

and improve their performance. Accredited nonstate 

policing groups that sign up to a framework of standards could also be held accountable by city-wide 

structures. Drawing on the Cape Town Partnership 

model, state police would play a city-wide supervisory 

and coordinating role. They would receive reports of 

threatening activity, request a response from nonstate 

policing groups, and determine when the situation 

demands for the state police to be called in.

It is important to acknowledge that it is not just 

the nonstate actors that should have their standards 

raised. The skills of both partners need to improve. 

Both sides are then likely to increasingly respect and 

trust one another and both will gain the support of 

the people when they demonstrate that they are re- they demonstrate that they are responsive to local needs and skilled in their respective 

areas of specialization. This would entail nonstate 

actors solving routine local problems of crime and 

disorder. The police, in turn, will focus on specialized 

or more complex criminal investigations and handling major problems.

“...inasmuch as nonstate policing 

extends acceptable security 

provision, it promotes social 

equity, the lack of which is often 

argued as a contributing factor in 

the rise of crime”
7

Police urban crime hotspots that are ripe for 

partnership. A valuable first step in cities would 

be to seek solutions in two principal urban crime 

hotspots—markets and taxi-bus parks. Nonstate 

groups with a vested interest in maintaining order are already active in these areas. The range of 

economic activity and density of people frequently 

cause higher crime rates, and police and groups 

such as traders’ and drivers’ associations need to be 

brought together to better police these hotspots. 

State-nonstate partners can organize an agreement 

on division of labor, training programs in the law 

and its enforcement, and cooperative forums so as 

to enhance security in these key urban areas.

CONCLUSION

Policing programs exclusively focused on reforming state providers—when a state has very 

limited capacity—are unlikely to meaningfully enhance security for Africa’s cities in the near term. 

Account has to be taken of the many nonstate actors that offer everyday policing in the field. Police collaboration with acceptable nonstate actors 

offers an affordable and sustainable way to extend 

urban policing. Put another way, partnerships with 

the right nonstate actors enable African governments to extend crime protection to a larger segment of the population. Beyond enhancing local 

crime protection, this will increase government 

legitimacy, enhance social equity, and reduce the 

appeal of sinister organizations that prey on poverty and resentment.

NOTES

1

 “Global Burden of Armed Violence Report,” Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, 2004.

2

 Official Crime Statistics, Centre for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria (CLEEN Foundation), available at <www.cleen.

org/officialcrimestatistic.html>.

3

 Robert Muggah and Anna Alvazzi del Frate, “More 

Slums Equals More Violence: Reviewing Armed Violence and 

Urbanisation in Africa,” UN Development Programme, October 2007.

4

 The Trauma Center, see <www.trauma.org.za>. 

5

 Rachel Jewkes, Yandisa Sikweyiya, Robert Morrell, and 

Kristin Dunkle, “Understanding Men’s Health and Use of Violence: Interface of Rape and HIV in South Africa,” (Pretoria: 

Medical Research Council, 2009). 

6

 Etannibi EO Alemika and Innocent C. Chukwuma, Criminal Victimization and Fear of Crime in Lagos Metropolis, CLEEN, 

Monograph 1, 2005.

7

 “Crime & Violence at a Glance,” Enhancing Urban Safety 

and Security: Global Reports on Human Settlements 2007 (London: 

UN–HABITAT, 2007).

8

 Caroline Moser and Jeremy Holland, “Household Responses to Poverty and Vulnerability, Volume 4: Confronting 

Crisis in Chawama, Lusaka, Zambia,” (Washington, DC: World 

Bank, 1997), 125.

9

 UN Development Programme, 4.

10 AbdouMaliq Simone, Principles and Realities of Urban Governance in Africa (South Africa: UN–HABITAT, 2002).

11 Stephen Ellis, “West Africa’s International Drug Trade,” 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 6, 2009. 

12 Charles T. Call, “Competing Donor Approaches to Postconflict Police Reform,” Conflict, Security & Development, 2, no. 

1, 110; “Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework Report,” 

Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association 

of the United States Army (AUSA), 2002.

13 Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA), “Conference Summary Report, Police Reform & Democratisation Conference,” IDASA, 2007, available at <www.idasa.org.za/index.

asp?page=topics_details.asp%3FRID%3D11>.

14 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, “Policing in 

East Africa,” 2006; International Bar Association Human Rights 

Institute, “Partisan Policing: An Obstacle to Human Rights and 

Democracy in Zimbabwe,” 2007; “Nigeria: Killing at Will: Extrajudicial Executions and Other Unlawful Killings by the Police in 

Nigeria,” Amnesty International, 2009; IDASA, 2007. 

15 Mark Malan, Angela McIntyre, and Phenyo Rakate, 

Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL Hits the Home Straight, 

Monograph 68 (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2002), 65. 

16 Bruce Baker, “Who Do People Turn to for Policing in Sierra Leone?” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 23, no. 3, September 2005.

17 Research in 2002 showed that on average each Kenyan 

had been forced to bribe the police 4.5 times a month, paying 

them on average US$16 per month. Over 95 percent of dealings 

with the police resulted in a bribe. Betty Wamalwa and Atsango 

Chesoni, “National Integrity Systems Country Study Report: Kenya 2003,” Transparency International.

18 Pamela Leach, “Citizen Policing as Civic Activism: An 

International Inquiry,” International Journal of the Sociology of Law

31, no. 3, 2003.
8

19 OECD DAC, Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice, Organization for Economic Cooperation and 

Development, 2007; Bruce Baker, Security in Post-conflict Africa: The Role of Non-State Policing (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009).

20 Etannibi Alemika and Innocent Chukwuma, “The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria,” CLEEN Foundation, 2004.

21 Baker, 2009.

22 OECD DAC.

23 Bruce Baker and Eric Scheye, “Access to Justice in a Post-conflict State: Donor-Supported Multidimensional Peacekeeping in 

Southern Sudan,” International Peacekeeping 16, no. 2, 2009.

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For more information on ACSS, visit the Web site at 

http://www.africacenter.org.

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perspectives to U.S. policymakers.

AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

CENTRE D’ETUDES STRATEGIQUES DE L’AFRIQUE

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AFRICA SECURITY BRIEFS

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